MASTER NEGA TIVE NO. 92-80692 MICROFILMED 1992 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project" Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code ~ concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material... Columbia University Library reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. '\ AUTHOR: HAMILTON, THOMAS TITLE: ANNALS OF THE PENINSULAR ... PLACE: EDINBURGH DA TE : 1829 Master Negative # COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT -s- BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROiFORM TARGET Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record pa mm 5 Ldin. 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MPNUFflCTURED TO PIIM STRNDfiRDS BY RPPLIED IMAGE, INC. ■'i\ /«.* ^3SSl 7^^f^-n«iiiiwi .i«iiiipi!ilip ij|i||aif<->« "iJPit<*«y»^^*«^^^ "^^ «. fe ^IvKTr,^ /•//!/• (TiuTatTiinfiit of Kottra 17l^Ang!1303. enj^iiab Mile* ! i 1 I convKnA 1800. TS!Sr^!Z^* t I I I -..].. ! I .M / ■' • PMU^P » KS.Zinf, ^<«^< ANNALS OP THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS. CHAPTER I. HISTORICAL RETROSPECT. The Annals of neighbouring nations seldom pre- chap. i. sent a contrast more striking, than that exhibited by the History of France and Spain, for the twenty years preceding the commencement of the Peninsular War. During that period, France had become the theatre of a vast and terrible revolution ; the whole fabric of her goverment had been overthrown ; society had been re- duced to its original elements ; and, amid tor- rents of blood shed on field and scaffold, she VOL. I. A 2 FRENCH REVOLUTION. CHAP. I. had passed from despotism to anarchy, and from anarchy had again subsided into despotism. These mighty changes had not flowed slowly onward, borne as it were on the progressive current of events, into gradual and almost im- perceptible development. They had at once burst on the world, in all the suddenness and terror of the earthquake or the tornado. Their causes, it is true, had been long in operation, but they had wrought in secrecy and silence ; and mankind stood aghast at a catastrophe so un- looked-for and appalling, whose overwhelming force and magnitude seemed to set all human efforts to impede its progress at defiance. It was impossible that the consequences of so tremendous a convulsion should be confined to France : they were felt in every zone and region of the earth. Kings trembled on their thrones, and nobles in their palaces ; while nations, par- taking of the endemic delirium of the hour, were prepared to burst the chains which had hitherto enthralled them, and hail the advent of that political millennium, which they ima- gined had already dawned in hurricane and tem- pest. All the governments of Europe became par- I WAR OF THE REVOLUTION. 3 takers, in a large degree, of the general alarm ; chap. i. and endeavoured, with natural anxiety, to avoid being drawn into a vortex so wide and over- whelming. In community of interest they found a common bond of union ; and war was resorted to, as the only means of escape from those dangers, the near approach of which they had witnessed with dismay. A general confederacy of the European monarchies was formed against Franco, and the restoration of the Boui'bons to the throne, was the avowed end to which the hostilities of the alliance were directed. To such an interference in her domestic gov- ernment, it was not to be expected that France would tamely submit. Though torn by the strife of faction, and distracted by internal con- vulsion, she displayed, in her relations with foreign powei's, a vigour, a fearlessness, and a promptitude to repel or retaliate aggression, which the feebleness and insecurity of her go- vernment at home gave little reason to expect. In the war which followed, the star of France prevailed, and that of the Allies grew dim be- fore it. The energies of the Republic, under the guidance of the great military leaders whom the revolution had called from obscur- GREAT BRITAIN. PEACE OF AMIENS. CHAP. I. ity to stations of prominence and command, were directed against her enemies with decided vigour and success. The league was soon broken ; one by one the members of the Alliance were encountered and overthrown ; and, on the re- turn of peace, France, triumphant at all points, remained undisputed mistress of a large acces- sion of territory, and of an almost overwhelm- ing influence in the whole political relations of continental Europe. Great Britain alone remained among her ene- mies, unhumbled and unsubdued. Mistress of the sea, while the arms of France were every- where triumphant on land, it seemed as if earth and ocean were divided against each other, in vast and interminable conflict. While the boun- daries of their respective elements seemed to assign to either belligerent his peculiar sphere of triumph, and to prescribe the limits of his sway, there existed few points of contact on which the strength of these mighty combatants could be matched in final and decisive struggle. Each seemed armed against his enemy in mail of impenetrable proof; and France having suc- ceeded in compelling the continental powers to withdraw from their alliance with England, the 1 I war gradually degenerated on both sides, into a chap. i. war of petty enterprises, attended only by com- paratively unimportant results. In the meantime, the power of France, which, from the period of the Revolution, had been pro- gressively increasing, had become apparently con- solidated by time and conquest. Her government had at length assumed a form of sufficient perma- nence and consistency, to warrant an expectation, on the part of England, that the national faith, if solemnly pledged by treaty, would not, as here- tofore, be sacrificed to popular clamour, or be disregarded amid the strife of contending fac- tions. It was, at least, obvious to all reasonable observers, that whatever changes the internal government of France might yet be destined to undergo, these could proceed only from with- in, and could neither be accelerated nor retarded by hostile aggression from without. Both parties had, in truth, become tired of a contest which occasioned a continued outpouring of blood and treasure, but which held out to neither, any pros- pect of a brilliant or advantageous result. Pacific iSOs. overtures were made and accepted ; and, by the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, the sword was again returned to its scabbard, and the 6 SPAIN: POLICY OF HER GOVERNMENT. CHAP. I. world, for a brief interval, enjoyed tranquiUity and repose. Wliile France had thus become the theatre, not only of a political, but of a mighty moral revolu- tion, and was exercising an irresistible control mi the destinies of Europe, Spain had partaken in nothing of the intellectual vigour and advance- ment which had long exerted a silent but power- ful influence on the surrounding nations. The moral energy, the proud and chivalrous gal- lantry-, the spirit of heroic enterprise, by which, in the better and brighter ages of her history, her diaracter was so strongly marked, had, for cen- turies, been gradually on the decline ; and the Spanish people, long habituated to despotism both political and religious, were still surrounded by an atmosphere of bigotry and darkness, which the light, dawning in the intellectual horizon of other nations, had been unable to penetrate. In the case of Spain, ignorance and misgovernment had produced their natural eifect ; and, notwithstand- ing the formidable magnitude of her physical resources, she had graduidly fallen from the pro- minent station she once held in the foremost rank of European nations, to that of a secondary power. i During the greater part of the reign of Charles chap. I. the Third, the government of Spain had fol- '"" lowed the true policy, dictated at once by her geographical position, and her deficiency in of- fensive power, in withdrawing, as much as possible, from all participation in the contests in which the other nations of Europe were embroiled. Bounded by France on the north, and on the east and south by the sea, the acquisition of Portugal and Gibraltar were the only projects of European aggrandizement to which tlw ambition of her rulers could be ra- tionally extended ; and, in the execution of such schemes of conquest, she could not but be aware that the whole maritime and military force of England woidd be exerted in opposition to her views. England, therefore, she had been ac- customed to regard as the chief obstacle to the «ucce8s of her ambition; and, actuated by dislike, heightened perhaps by difference of religion, com- mercial jealousies, and the great naval superiority of Britain, the goveminont of Spain had been uni- formly more prompt to engage in hostilities with that power, than any other with whom, in the oc- casional jarring of interest or policy, she might be .brought into collision. France, on the other hand. £? 8 WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN. PEACE OF BASLE. 9 r M CHAP. I. was naturally indicated, by her power and proxi- ^ mity, either as the most powerful ally of Spain, or her most formidable enemy. Through France alone was the Spanish territory vulnerable to the rest of Europe; while no alliance with other powers could afford protection from her hostility. Under the ministry of Florida Blanca, Spain, instigated by France, had taken part in the war between Great Britain and her colonies, and made a vigorous attempt to regain the fortress of Gibraltar. In tliis she failed ; and, after a pro- tracted war, in which her best energies had been exhausted with inadequate eflfect, she at length retired from a contest, of which the only favour- 178S. able result was the restoration of Minorca and the Floridas. Immediately before the breaking out of the French Revolution, Charles the Fourth, by the death of his father, had succeeded to the throne 1788. of Spain. Alarmed, in common with other sov- ereigns, at the new and startling doctrines, both political and religious, of which the revolution- ary government proclaimed itself at once the partisan and the apostle, Charles acceded to the general confederacy then forming in Europe, and declared war against France. In the hos- chap. i. tilities which followed, Spain was eminently un- successful, and compelled to act only on the de- fensive. The army of the Republic crossed the Pyrenees, reduced the fortresses of San Fer- nando de Figueras and St. Sebastian, and, after defeating the Spanish force in several engage- ments, became masters of the Biscayan provinces and the kingdom of Navarre. Charles, who saw with dismay the whole northern portion of his kingdom already in possession of the enemy, has- tened to supplicate for peace. The prayer of the Spanish monarch was granted by the Republic ; and, by the treaty of Basle, Charles was again restored to the sovereignty of his conquered pro- vinces, on condition of his relinquishing to France the Spanish portion of St. Domingo. Once more at peace, and relieved from the fear of present invasion, the government of Spain lost no time in disbanding her armies, and resigning herself to the enjoyment of an insecure and de- fenceless repose. >Vliile the whole population of France were training to the use of arms, the Spanish monarch, by a sort of inexplicable fatui- ty, was depressing the military spirit of his peo- ple, and depriving himself of all means of prompt a2 1795. July 22. 10 PEACE OF AMIENS. CAPTURE OP THE TREASURE SHIPS. 11 CHAP. T. and efficacious resistance to future encroachmeiit or invasion. No measures were taken to strength- en his northern frontier, or to repair the fortresses which had become dilapidated by the operations of the late war ; and all the precautions neces- gary for the future security of his kingdom were neglected. The dreamy tranquillity of Charles, however, was not destined to be of long duration. Having placed himself at the mercy of France, he was speedily called on to take part in the war which that country was again waging against England. The consequence was that the naval power of Spain was encoun- tered and overthrown, that her commerce was ruined, her treasury drained of its resources, and the intercourse with her colonies rendered pre- carious and uncertain. The peace of Amiens, which had been regard- ed by either party as little more than a tempo- rary cessation of hostilities, was, as if by mutual consent, soon broken. France and England, the rival and gigantic powers into whose hands were committed the destinies of the world, had again unsheathed the sword ; and it depended on the issue of the approaching conflict, whether the chains, by which Europe was already encircled. 1804. should be riveted or snapped in twain. In such chap. i. circumstances, it was the natural policy of Spain to have remained neutral. In common with the other weaker countries of Europe, she -would gladly have kept aloof from a contest which in- volved the certainty of immediate sacrifice, while its eventual advantages were only distant and contingent. In a war, however, of such a char- acter, and with objects so vast as the liberation or subjection of the world, it was not to be expected that the rights of neutral powers should be held sacred and inviolate. To remain neutral was, in truth, to encounter all the hazards and sacrifices of war, without participation of its benefits ; and the minor states of Europe soon found them- selves absorbed in the eddies of a whirlpool, and carried involuntarily forwai'd by an impetus, at once rapid and resistless. It was not long before the eyes of Spain were opened to the bold and decisive policy of the bel- ligerents. While yet at peace with both parties, Oct. 5. four Spanish frigates, loaded with treasure from America, were captured by an English squadron, without any declaration of war. By this fla- grant act of national piracy, Spain was at once driven iuto the ai'ms of France, and war agiunst r i 12 WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN. DON MANUEL GODOY. 13 ! ?( 1804. 1805. CHAP. I. Great Britain immediately declared. She saw that, for a mean and unwarrantable purpose, she had been made the object not merely of robbery but of insult ; and the unprincipled aggression of England drew from the whole Spanish nation a burst of indignant hatred, which the policy of France led her, by every means, to cherish and prolong. The throne of France was now filled by Na- poleon ; and the ascendency of his master-mind contributed to rivet yet more strongly the fetters by which Spain was already shackled. The tone at first assumed by the new Emperor, was in- tended to lull the Spanish government into still deeper security ; and it succeeded. Assurances of friendship, and promises of support, were made with a profusion, and an apparent warmth which seemed to warrant their sincerity; and they were received by Charles, with a credulity quite in harmony with the general imbecility of his character. The minister to whose hands the reins of go- vernment had long been intrusted, was Don Manuel Godoy ; and surely never was there a servant less qualified by character and talents, to compensate for the deficiencies of his master. I 1805. Raised by the illicit attachment of the Queen chap. i. from the situation of a private gentleman to the highest rank and office of the state, he brought to the task of governing a great nation, a narrow and uncultivated mind, a grovelling and selfish spirit. He was a man alike devoid of principle and firmness ; and the only proof of talent ex- hibited in his unfortunate career, must be sought in the ascendency, which, under every change of circumstance, he appears to have maintained over the minds of Charles and his consort. By their favour he was first created Due d'Alcudia, and afterwards, in honour of the treaty of Basle, which he had been chiefly instrumental in con- cluding, Principe de la Paz. To his hands were committed the direction and patronage of all the departments of the state. Every honour in the power of the monarch to bestow was lavished on the favourite. By his marriage with Marie Therese de Bourbon, the niece of Charles, he was elevated to the rank of royalty; and the state and magnificence of his establish- ment were such as had never before been afi^ect- ed by a subject. Some men there are, who, when called on by events to figure in a new and higher sphere of i II i 14 DOX MANUEL GODOY. 1805. CHAP. I. action than that for which they were originally destined, experience a proportionate expansion of intellect and power — in whom new energies are elicited hy the dangers and the difficulties, which, perhaps by a wise dispensation, are fated to surround and darken the paths of glory and ambition. Such a man was not Godoy. In him power called only into development the baser and more grovelling passions of his na- ture, while all the higher impulses by which Immanity is graced and ennobled, slept on in undisturbed repose. Under the sway of such a person it was impossible that Spain should pros- per. The honour of the country was sacrificed, her vital interests were disregarded, and the whole functions of the government of a great nation were made to converge towards a single point^ — the gratification of an unprincipled favourite. It is scarcely impossible to conceive a court more thoroughly dissolute and degraded than that of Madrid under the administration of Godoy. Those only received his favours who pandered to liis vices ; and all in any degree distinguished by wisdom, virtue, or patriotism, were treated with <;onturaely and neglect. It has been said that he was corrupted by France ; yet, there are many BON MANUEL GODOY. 15 1805. portions of his public conduct and policy at va- chap. i. riance with such a supposition. Godoy 's was not a lofty ambition : the rank, the wealth, the power he already enjoyed, afforded ample means of sordid gratification, and engrossed the capa- cities of his nature. France had no bribe of magnitude sufficient to secure the services of a man whose highest aspirations were already sated, to whom future glory, when weighed against present enjoyment, was but as dust in the balance. For some benefits, however, and these of no trifling magnitude, it is but justice to confess that Spain has been indebted to the administra- tion of Godoy. He increased and accelerated the impulse of the national industry by patron- age and encouragement. He extended his pro- tection to artists and men of science ; and it was in a great measure through his influence and exer- tions that vaccination became general in Spain, and was subsequently communicated to her pos- sessions in America, Under his administration the Inquisition lost its terrors ; works of national utility were encouraged and promoted ; and vig- orous and judicious measures were adopted to prevent the dissemination of infectious disease. 16 CHARLES THE FOURTH. UNPOPULARITY OF GODOY. 17 1805. CHAP. I. Let the censures of the historian, therefore, on the character of Godoy be severe but discriminating^. While he displays the darker and more promi- nent features of his character in their true col- ours, let him also do justice to those better qual- ities, by which, in other circumstances, it might have been brightened and redeemed. Of Charles it would be yet greater injustice to speak in terms of unmitigated reproach. None of the elements of greatness were mingled in his composition, and his virtues and his vices were alike those of an imbecile intellect. Naturally timid and irresolute, yet of a character in which was mingled much of kindness and bene- volence, Charles, had his lot been cast in calmer and more peaceful times, might have reigned in tranquil insignificance, by no means unfavour- ably distinguished among the tenants of the Spanish throne. But his powers were prodigi- ously disproportioned to the task imposed on him by the irresistible progress of events. With favouring breezes, and on a summer sea, he might have guided the vessel of the state prosperously on her voyage; but when the elements were abroad in their discord, it required another and more powerful arm, to steer her safely into port. 1805. It was impossible for any minister to be more chap. i. generally unpopular than Godoy. The ancient nobility regarded him as an upstart ; and were alike indignant at his elevation and jealous of his power. By the people at large he was consider- ed the source of all the misfortunes and the degra- dation by which, since his accession to power, the Spanish name and arms had been stained and hum- bled. The party thus opposed to the favourite, though strong in numbers were yet stronger in the rank and influence of their leader. Ferdinand Prince of Asturias, the heir-apparent to the throne, had naturally regarded the elevation of Go- doy with indignation and disgust. His sentiments were no sooner known than the party opposed to the minister rallied round him as their leader. Under any other than a despotic government it would have been impossible for Godoy to have retained his situation in opposition to the public voice. He must at once have been driven into retirement with ignominy and disgrace. But it is not the least disadvantage of an absolute and unmitigated monarchy, that it is cut off from all sympathy and communion with the people ; that the governors and the governed are not " bound, each to each, by natural sympathy ;" that the lAi* 18 DISORDERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. 1805. CHAP. T. portents of approaching eclipse are unseen or dis- regarded, till the earth is shrouded in darkness, and monarchs are " perjdexed by fear of change," which it is no longer in their poM-er to avert. 1906. In 1806 the disorders of the goveninient had at length reached their height : the army, un- paid and without equipment, was clamorous and undisciplined ; the navy, which in the preced- ing reign was formidabU», both in p(»int of num- bers and efficiency, had been annihilated at Trafalgar ; the finances were deranged ; the treasury exhausted ; and commerce, by the war with England, almost utterly destroyed. Spain Iiad in truth become a mere dependent on France; and the French ruler, far from compassionating her difficulties, stiU continued to exact fresh sa- crifices, and compliances nu)re humble. Godoy was now fully aware of the perils of his situation ; and, could Spain, by any peaceful effort of diplomacy, have bc^en detached from her dangerous and inglorious dependence on France, he would gladly have again raised her from thraldom, and have unbound the igno- ble shackles from her limbs. But the difficulties of his situation had become far beyond his feeble powers to overcome. On the one hand, the neg- CONCERTED AGGRESSION ON FRANCE. 19 1806. lect of aU warlike preparation on the part of chap. i. Spain, the dilapidated state of her frontier for- tresses, the total want of the munitions necessa- ry for the defence of her temtory if subjected to invasion, withheld him from openly adopting any measure which might incur the hostility of France. On the other hand, from the advanced age of the king, Jind the aversion of the heir-ap- parent, he could not but contemplate the proba- bility of a speedy termination to his power. He natiunlly feared the hostility of an injured people, and dreaded the ari'ival of the moment when, no longer protected by the shield of regal authority, he should be left the defenceless oh- ject of popular indignation. Stimulated by such fears, Godoy felt it neces- sary to conciliate public opinion, by the adoption of some immediate measure in unison with the general feeling of the nation. He accord- ingly proceeded to concert with the Russian and Portuguese ambassadors at Madrid, a plan of combined aggression on the territory of France. The details of this project it is now ciu-ious to contemplate. It was proposed that hostile prepar- ations shoidd be made simulUmeously at numer- ous and distant points, and should be conducted ^ 20 PROJECT OP INTENDED ATTACK. PROCLAMATION OF (JODOY. 21 CHAP^i. With such secrecy as to elude the obsenatlon of 1806. Napoleon, then actively engaged in the war with Prussia. Spain and Portugal were to unite their forces against the common enemy. Arrange- ments were to be made for assembling a large army in the ports of Great Britain, which, on a given signal, was to be landed on the north of Spain. The operations on land were to be sup- ported by a naval armament of overwhelming magnitude ; and, by a simultaneous movement in the north of Europe, Russia was to advance to the relief of Germany, with her whole military power. In such circumstances, before the armies of Napoleon, engaged in distant operations, could be concentrated for the defence of the kingdom, the allies were unexpectedly to cross the Pyre- nees, and, marching direct for Paris, to gain possession of the capital. By these measures it was conceived, that a sudden and decisive blow would be struck in the vital part where France was at once most vulnerable and defenceless. Such were the projects of the Prince of Peace; and smaU as the chance might be of maturing, under any circumstances, a scheme so widely ra- mified, and depending on so many contingencies 1805. for its completion, without exciting the suspicions chap. i. of Napoleon, all hope of success was at once blighted by his own rashness and precipitation. Before any of the necessary arrangements had been made, nay even before the powers most interested had been apprized of the part allotted to them in the projected scheme of hostilities, a proclamation was issued by Godoy, exhorting all Oct 5. loyal Spaniards to take arms, and rally round the throne of their sovereign. Circular letters were written to the bishops and civil functionaries of the provinces, urging them to excite the ardour of the people in the cause of their country. The nation, thus called on to defend their sovereign, could perceive no new danger which threatened his throne. The manifesto indicated no enemy against whom they were to arm. They were told of no insult or aggression which it had be- come necessary to repress or to revenge. The dangers of which it spoke were too indefinite and shadowy to rouse the fears or passions of the people. Its motives and its ends were alike veiled in an obscurity they were unable to pene- trate. The nation wondered and were silent. The astonishment excited by this warlike demon- stration was not confined to Spain. Europe was VOL. I. A 3 :2'^ ASTONISHMENT OF EUROPE. 1806. CHAP. I. unprepared for the loud note of gratuitous defiance sosuddenlysounded from Madrid. No alliance had been formed, no treaty concluded, no preparation made for any combined attack on the power of France. Even the ministers of Spain at the for- eign courts, were left wholly in the dark as to the views and projects of Godoy. The Russian and Portuguese ambassadors on the appearance of this unseasonable proclamation, lost no time in attempting to vindicate themselves from the suspicion of a connivance, which could not fail to draw down upon their governments the in- dignation of Napoleon. They denied being privy to its contents, and carefully avoided com- mitting themselves, by any future negotiations, to the discretion of a man so manifestly deficient in all the qualities of a statesman. It was upon the field of Jena that Napoleon received this proclamation — with what feelings may readily be conceived. That which to Eu- rope appeared vague and mysterious, to him was abundantly intelligible. He at once appre- ciated the policy of Charles and his minister ; and then it was, as he afterwards declared, that he first resolved on the subjugation of the Peninsula. POLICY OF NAPOLEON. 23 1807. In the meanwhile, the French Ambassador at chap. i. Madrid presented an indignant remonstrance on the perfidious and vacillating policy of the Span- ish government ; and Godoy, anxious to escape if possible from the consequences of his rashness, replied by humble assurances that the warlike preparations called for by the proclamation, were intended as a mere defensive measure against the Emperor of Morocco, who, instigated by the intrigues, and emboldened by the protection of England, might possibly attempt a descent on Andalusia. Napoleon, still engaged in a contest which required a concentration of his resources, deemed it politic to receive this lame and impro- bable explanation as satisfactory. His vows of vengeance slept ; but they were soon destined to awake from slumber. The peace of Tilsit, which speedily followed August, these events, left the French Emperor at full liberty to pursue his ambitious projects with re- gard to the Peninsula. He assembled a large army on the Garonne, and weakened the de- fensive powers of Spain, by exacting still lar- ger drafts from her army than she had yet been called on to furnish. Sixteen thousand of her best-disciplined troops, under the command 24 PEACE OF TILSIT. NAPOLEON S AMBITION. 25 1807. CHAP. I. of the Marquis de Romana, were marched into the north of Germany, and another division were employed in the occupation of Etruria. While matters were thus silently but rapidly verging toward the catastrophe, Napoleon continued to express his approbation of the conduct of Charles, and to lavish testimonies of his favour on Godoy. Whether the Spanish monarch and his minion were really deceived by these hollow appearances of esteem, it would boot little to ascertain. They were already in the net of the spoiler, and so involved in its multiplied convolutions that es- cape was impossible. No submission, however abject, no resistance, however ^prompt and energetic, could possibly have rescued Spain. It is not improbable that the fall of the Bourbons had already been decreed. Accustomed as Napoleon had been to the en- joyments of gratified ambition, he felt perhaps a new excitement to his pride in the idea that the plebeian brows of a scion of his house, should be graced by one of the highest and most ancient crowns of Europe. It was yet something to a spirit like his, to raise to the level of the no- blest of the earth all those whose veins were filled with blood kindred to his own. It was 1807. yet more than this, by a striking act of violent chap. i. and decisive volition, to prove to Europe, that *" henceforward her law was to be found in the arbitrary fiat of her master. But it was most of all to beat down, and trample in the dust, the descendants of an hundred kings ; to display th« full mea^sure of his contempt for those hereditary prejudices, before which the world had hitherto bent in reverence and submission; to stand forth in the indefeasible dignity of his own majestic spirit, with all the moral and intrinsic attributes of sovereignty concentrated in his person, as the man, marked out by nature, whose brow could alone support the diadem, or whose arm could wield the sceptre of the world. Whether the course of Napoleon, with regard to Spain, was influenced by the instigations of an ambition so wild and reckless, is one of those problems probably never destined to be solved. It is at least certain, there were other motives, and those of cogency more powerful and immediate, to urge him forward on that course of policy which was to terminate in the deposition of the Bourbons. In deciding on the immediate annexation oi Spain, as an appanage of his empire, Napolesii^ VOL. I. B 26 THE MOTIVES BY WHICH 1807. ri • HAP. I. by matiy of the political reasoners of tlie day, ha$ been held guilty, not only of an unprincipled outrage on the law of nations, but of being influ- enced in his proceedings towards that power, by the mere blind and vague stimulus of conquest. " Spain," say such reasoners, " feeble and inof- fensive*, was already in his power. IJer troops had fought in the same ranks with his own ; her resources had been drained to enrich his trea- sury, and were still at his command. Wliat then had he to gain by outraging the feelings of a people so little capable of disturbing his security, or by deposing a dynasty which he could bend so easily to all the purposes of his and)ition ?" The answer is, much. Over such a monarch as Charles, and such a minister «is Godoy, Napoleon well knew he could exercise no a&cendency but that of fear. While his armies continued to ad- vance, as they had hitherto done, in the career of conquest, he had nothing to dread from Spain, and he had dreaded nothing. But he Jilso well knew, that, should the tide of battle change, should the flood of success, on which he had hi- therto floated on from attack to victory — from victory to conquest, ebb again from beneath him, Spain would be among the first of the NAPOLEON WAS INFLUENCED. 27 1807. surrounding nations to unsheath the sword, and chap. i. raise the battle-cry on his declining fortunes. The proclamation of Godoy had given sufficient indication of her future policy, should adverse conthigencies occur to shake the stability of his government, or weaken its power. Had the views of Napoleon, therefore, been di- rected merely to the present, he could have beheld, in the degraded state of the Peninsula, nothing to excite his alarm. But, regarding the future secur- rity of a widely extended empire, he could scarcely fail to consider the acquisition of Spain, as a mea- sure essential to its permanence. The vast increase of territory which France had acquired by con- quest, in Italy, and beyond the Rhine, rendered it necessary to her safety, that the circuit of her do- minion should be proportionably eidarged in those quarters from which, by a sudden and unexpected invasion, an army might advance into the very centre of the kingdom. On this subject the rea- soning of General Foy appears unanswerable : " Spain presses on France," says that able would we could likewise add impaitial and un- prejudiced—writer, "in a way which differs whol- ly from every other pressure. Surrounded by the sea, and in contact only with a feeble neigh- 2 28 DANGER TO FRANCE CHAP. I. bour, Spain has nothing to fear from any lateral ■iQf^rr ag-gression, and, should she become the enemy of France, can bear down with all her strength on the northern frontier. — Napoleon knew, that behind the Pyrenees a generous nation had preserved its energy, and had not smik into de- gradation, even under the long oppression of a government inglorious abroad and despotic at home. He knew all that might be expected froiOi the people, and especially from the peo- ple of the south, when governed in wiison with their passions, and within the sphere of their moral impressions. A man might arise who would regenerate Spain ; a prince might reign, who would suffer it to be regenerated ; a palace revolution, a popular tumult, might give the impulse. It was not written in the book of fate, that Spain should be always ruled by a weak king, a shameless queen, and a contemptible fav- ourite. While the eagles of France were flying to the banks of the Danube, and urging their course towards the Vistula, an enemy was at her gates on the south. Tlie empire, which is so deeply vulnerable on one point, is strong no where. The increase of territory ought to be effected by concentric additions, and simultane- FROM THE HOSTILITY OF SPAIN. 29 1807, ously on all sides. The French armies, when chap, i, fighting in Poland, Bohemia, and Austria, might be turned by an enemy's army which present- ed itself on the frontier of the Pyrenees, be- cause that army would be the neatest to Paris. The centre of a kingdom is, in fact, the arc and buttress of its military power. Was not, then, the absolute and firmly-guaranteed sub- mission of Spain, a natural and necessary con- sequence of the extension of France beyond her natural limits, the Alps and the Rhine ? Such were the thoughts suggested to Napoleon by the idle proclamation of Godoy.'* The first step taken by Napoleon towards the completion of his project, was to induce Charles, through the agency of his minister, to become a App. No. l. party to a secret treaty which was signed at Fon- tainebleau. By this instrument the partition of Portugal was agreed on. The province Entre Minho et Douro was to be erected into a sepa- rate sovereignty for the king of Etruria, whose Italian dominions were to be ceded to France. The Alentejo and Algarva were allotted as the reward of Godoy, to whom they were convey- ed as a separate and independent principality. It was likewise stipulated that the sovereignty 30 TREATY AND CONVENTION OF FONTAINEBLEAU. 31 ^"^''' ^ ' ""^^^ «t^^r provinces of Portugal should rest in^ 1807. ^M-ance, till the tennination of the war; then to be restored conditionally to the House of Bra- ganza, or othenvise disposed of, as the plea- sure of the contracting powers might dictate. It was further agreed, that the colonies of Por- tugal should be divided between the sovereigns, on the principle of an equal partition. Such were the more prominent features of the treaty of Fontainebleau ; and on the same day on App. No. 2. which it was concluded, a convention was likewise signed, for carrying it into effect. By this it was arranged, that a body of twenty-five thousand French infantr)-, and three thousand cavalry, should enter Spain, and marcliing diiectly on Lisbon, were there to be reinforced by the junc- tion of a Spanish army of twelve thousand men. The troops of Charles were at the same time to take possession of the province Entre Minho et Douro, and the city of Oporto ; while a third division was to reduce and hold in occu- pation the provinces south of the Tagus. It was likewise provided by the convention, that the French troops should, on their march, be furnished with all necessary supplies, at the ex- pense of the Spanish government. 4 1807. Though the contracting powers appear to have chap. i. contemplated little probable opposition, to this si'heme of iniquitous spoliation, yet, in order to repel any possible attempts of the English to obstruct its execution, it was agreed that an army of reserve of forty thousand men, should as- semble at Bayonne, ready to march to the defence of any point which might be menaced with attack. The secrecy with which they were concluded is not one of the least remarkable circumstances connected with the treaty and convention of Fontainebleau. The negotiations on the part of Spain were conducted by Don Eugenio Izquier- do, a person uninvested with any public charac- ter, but enjoying the full confidence of Godoy. Of the powers intrusted to Izquierdo by the King and his minister, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris was kept in profound ignorance. All the diplomatic arrangements connected with the treaty, were concluded without his knowledge ; nor was it till several of the stipulations had been carried into effect that he first became acquainted with its existence. The instructions which Izqui- erdo received personally from the King, prepara- tory to his departure, are sufficiently illustrative both of the feeble character of Charles and his S2 PORTUGAL. CHAP. I. nnhounded reliance on Godoy, to merit record. 1807. " ^^^^l €^ tu protector,** said the monarch, *< tras quando te diga ; por medio suyo dehes tervir me,"* Of Portugal it is now time to speak. Engaged in the peaceful prosecution of an extended commerce, and relying for security on the faith of a treaty of neutrality — ^the advantages of which were purchased hy a large annual tribute to France, — her government had abstained, as much as possible, from mingling in the dissensions of the more powerful nations of Europe. Towards Spain, she had been guilty of no offence ; and con- nected with that power by public alliance, and multiplied intermarriages with the reigning fa- mily, the Prince of Brazil imagined that if not entirely secure from insult or partial injustice, his territory was at least safe from glaring out- rage and spoliation. He certainly did not, and could not anticipate, that the inoffensive policy of his government, could be followed, on the part of his allies, by an act of power so flagrant and un- • " Manuel Godoy is thy protector. Do what be orders thee It is through him that thou must serve me." These are the Tery words of Charles, given in the correspondence of Izquierdo. FoT, V, ii. p. 833. liWuMil II .. '. '^ w~^^- rr' «>=; DEMAND OP FRANCE AND SPAIN. 33 justifiable as that contemplated by the stipula- chap. r. tions of the treaty of Fontainebleau. , ^„ The peace of Tilsit had scarcely been conclud- Aug. ed, when the French and Spanish ambassadors at Lisbon united in a formal demand, that the App. No. 3. ports of the kingdom should be instantly closed against England, that the ships then in harbour should be seized, and the property of all British subjects confiscated. It was likewise intimated to the government of Portugal, that, in case the requisition of the ambassadors was not followed by an immediate compliance, a speedy declara- tion of war by both powers would be the inevita- ble consequence. The Prince Regent, unwilling to become the instrument of injustice towards an old and faith- ful ally, endeavoured, by a temporizing policy, to avert the necessity of immediate acquiescence in this unprincipled demand. He signified to the Court of France his readiness to prevent all fu- ture intercourse with England, but objected to the more violent measures prescribed for his App. No. 4. adoption. Aware, perhaps, how little weight would be attached by those whom he address- ed, to any collateral appeal to justice or the law of nations, the Prince Regent urged, as b2 f I u THE ARMY OF THE OIRONDE. COMPLIANCES OF PORTUGAL. 35 CHAP. I. the chief motive for the line of policy he was jgQ^ anxious to puisue, the fact that a Portuguese squadron was then cruizing in the Mediterra- nean, and the prudence of maintaining terms with England till it had returned to port. The feehleness of Portugal, however, render- ed all the remonstrances of her government in- effectual. To the confederated power of France and Spain, it was evident she could offer no ef- fectual resistance ; and Napoleon, without wait- ing for the result of her decision, directed an immediate seizure of all Portuguese vessels in the ports of France and Holland. Under these circumstances, notice was given to the English residents in Portugal of the precarious situation in which they stood ; and they were warned, hy a timely retreat, to escape from the rigorous measures to which, in the urgency of the crisis, it might be found necessary to have recourse. In the meanwhile, preparations for the invasion of Portugal were proceeding without abatement or delay. An army of twenty-five thousand in- fantry, and three thousand cavalry, under the title of the Army of the Gironde, had assem- bled at Bayonne, and waited only for an order to advance. The government of Portugal was. 1807. at once intimidated and overawed ; and the chap. i. Prince Regent, anxious, by every possible con- cession, to dissipate the darkening cloud which appeared ready to burst in thunder over his de- voted kingdom, was at length compelled to sa- trifice principle to safety, and purchase, even the chance of impunity, by injustice. His acquies- cence in the measures prescribed for his adop- tion was intimated to the Courts of France and Spain ; the property and persons of all subjects of England were seized, and a proclamation was issued prohibiting all commercial intercourse be- tween the countries. . These extorted sacrifices of the Prince Regent, produced no favourable change in his own for- tunes or those of Portugal. The dismember- ment of the kingdom had already been deter- mined, and the humiliating compliances of the government, tended rather to accelerate than re- tard the natural progress of events. Such were the relations of France and the Pen- insula, when the family differences which had long existed between Charles and the Prince of Asturias at length approached to an open rup- ture. The latter was hostile to Godoy, and na- turally indignant at the disgraceful causes of his 96 8PAIX. 1807. Oct.]l. CHAP I. favour. The party opposed to the minister, em- holdened by the accession of so powerful an aux- iliary, had been active in establishing intrigues for the overthrow of the favourite, while Ferdi- nand endeavoured to strengthen the cause which he espoused, by securing in its favour the influ- ence of Beauhamois, the French ambassador at Madrid. Through the latter a secret communi- cation from the Prince was transmitted to Na- poleon, in which he solicited the honour of an alliance with the imperial family of France. He entreated also that Napoleon would interfere to regulate the internal disorders of the govern- ment, and conveyed assurances, that to him a- lone could Spain look for deliverance from the evils under which she had long been suffering. To the solicitations of the Prince no answer was returned ; and Godoy having shortly afterwards become acquainted with the particulars of the transaction, Ferdinand, on the 28th of October, -App. No. 5. was arrested at the Esourial, and confined in the monastery of St. Laurence. On the 30th, a pro- clamation appeared charging him with high trea- son, in having organized a conspiracy for the purpose of dethroning the King. In a letter addressed to Napdeon, written on the 29th, i ) AFFAIR OP THE BSCURIAL. 37 Charles made an additional charge against his ghap. L son, of contemplating the assassination of the "TTJ^T" Queen. The people, however, considered these accusa- tions as originating solely in the machinations of Godoy ; and this persuasion tended if possible gtill further to aggravate the hatred with which both his person and ministry were regarded by the nation. Godoy, alarmed at the tempestuous demonstrations of popular feeling, and aware of the evident perils which surrounded him, resolved, as usual, to retrace his steps, and become the in- ftrument of reconciliation between the father and ion. Ferdinand was accordingly induced to ad- App. No. 6. dress a letter to the King, expressive of his con- trition, and imputing the errors of his conduct to the influence and evil counsels of the Dukes del Infantado and San Carlos. This submission of the Prince produced the desired effect. Charles issued a second proclamation, extending pardon Nor. 5. to his son, but stating that he had denounced the names of those principally concerned in the con- spiracy, and directing a select commission of the council of Castile to assemble immediately for the trial of the offenders. By this tribunal the partisans of the Prince were acquitted of all IMIIillMMI 38 LETTER OP CHARLES TO NAPOLEON. 1807. Oct 29. GHAP. I. treasonable intention ; but being professedly hos* tile to the administration of Godoy, through his influence they were severally banished from the capital, by the arbitrary edict of the Sove- reign. The letter which was addressed to Napoleon by the King, on the imprisonment of the Prince of Asturias, was not more fortunate than that of his son, in eliciting a reply. It conveyed ex- pressions of surprise, on the part of Charles, that the Emperor had not thought proper to consult him, in a matter so deeply interesting as the projected marriage of the heir-apparent. The remonstrance of his ally appears to have been treated by Napoleon with contemptuous neglect; and the ominous silence of the French ruler, was regarded by Godoy as a symptom of alienation from his interests, the consequences of which he was not prepared to encounter. His apprehen- sions were still further excited by a communica- tion from Murat, with whom he was on terms of confidential intercourse, informing him, that though the wishes of the Emperor prompted him to support his authority, yet the popularity of Ferdinand, and the near relation to himself in which that prince would be placed by the intend- REPLY OF NAPOLEON. 39 ed alliance with his family, rendered it impossible chap i. that he should take any prominent or open part in oj)position to his interest or wishes. Godoy already felt that his power was in the wane. Without the support of Napoleon, he was too conscious of his own feebleness and un- popularity, not to be aware that he must soon fall before the covert intrigues and open assaults of his enemies. Anxious, therefore, to adopt whatever measures might tend to ingratiate him with his protector, he prevailed on Charles to address another letter to the Emperor, solicit- ing his consent to the alliance of the Prince of Asturias with a branch of his august family. Even this second communication produced no immediate reply ; and leaving the Spanish Mon- arch and his minister in a state of painful solici- tude. Napoleon set out for Italy. While at Milan, he at length condescended to Nov. 15. answer the King of Spain's letters. His com- munication contained assurances that he was en- tirely ignorant of the circumstances connected with the conspiracy of Ferdinand ; and stated that his first intelligence of the transaction had been derived from the letter of the King. He denied likewise having received any proposal f 40 BEPLY OP NAPOLEOy. ^^^^' ^' from the Prince for an alliance with his family, 1807. ^"^ expressed his sanction and approbation of the contemplated arrangement. Such is a rapid and imperfect sketch of some of the more important events which preceded the hostile invasion of the Peninsula. (9 INVASION OF PORTUGAL. 41 CHAPTER II. INVASION OF PORTUGAL. 1807. The humiliating compliances of the Portu- chap. ii. guese Government produced no beneficial con- sequences on the fortunes of the nation. Ear- ly in November, the army of the Gironde, com- manded by Marshal Junot, who had formerly been ambassador at Lisbon, received orders to cross the Pyrenees, and advance on Salamanca. While thus threatening the territory of Portugal, the French Commander, so far from accompanying his advance with any profession of hostility, pro- claimed his sole object to be the emancipation Cf£ her government from the yoke of England, and to enable it to assume the attitude of an in- dependent power. Disposed as the Prince Re- gent might be, to yield ready credence to such flattering assurances, the return of his anibas- 42 ARRIVAL OF THE RUSSIAN SQUADRON. CHAP. II. sadors, who had heen dismissed from Paris and ~Tirr~ Madrid, could not but appear an alarming indi- lo07. cation of the hostile purpose for which the ar- mament had been assembled. The arrival in the Tagus of a Russian squa- dron, consisting of nine sail of the line and two frigates, contributed still farther to heighten the embarrassment of the government. Tlie appear- ance of this formidable force, at a juncture so cri- tical, appears to have been a coincidence entirely accidental, and unconnected, in any manner, with the operations by which the integrity of Portu- gal was then so imminently threatened. But it carried with it at least the appearance of design, and was naturally regarded, both by England and Portugal, as forming part of the great scheme of events, by which Napoleon was en- deavouring to realize the gigantic projects of his ambition. The injuries which foreign coercion had com- pelled the Portuguese government to inflict on England, had not excited the hostility of that power. The British government saw too plain- ly the magnitude of the dangers by which Por- tugal was surrounded, to resent a policy which Imd been forced on her rulers by difficulties FORBEARANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN. 43 1807. with which it was impossible to contend. But chap. ii. there are certain limits to forbearance, which cannot be overpassed without sacrifice of ho- nour; and it was distinctly intimated, that, al- though the exclusion of British vessels from the ports, and the expulsion of British subjects from the territory of Portugal, had not, under all the circumstances, been regarded as a hostile proceeding, any further act of aggression would be treated as a declaration of war, and give rise to inunediate reprisals. In order to give greater authority to this re- presentation, a squadron, commanded by Sir Sydney Smith, was sent to cruize off the Ta- gus ; and, on the appearance of another pro- clamation, directing the seizure of the persons, ^d the confiscation of the property of all Eng- lish residents in Portugal, Lord Strangford, the British Envoy, immediately quitted Lisbon, and retired on board the ship of the Admiral. In such a state of things, the arrival of the Russian fleet could scarcely fail to add embar- rassment and complexity to the difficulties by which the government of Portugal was environ- ed. It was regarded by England as connected with the hostile proceedings of Napoleon ; and f 44 ADVANCE OF JUNOT S ARMY ! IT ENTERS PORTUGAL. 45 CHAP. II. Lisbon was immediately declared in a state of - rigorous blockade, and every effort was exerted to prevent all naval communication with the Tagus, The army of the Gironde had already reached Alcantara, where, according to the stipulations of the convention, it vras joined by the Spanish contingent. The sufferings of the troops, during the march from Salamanca, are described by the thiebault, French officers to have been dreadful. The ^* * weather was stormy and inclement, and the roads, from the melting of the snow, rendered almost impassable.* In proportion as the army advanced, its difficulties appeared to accumulate. The Spanish government was unprepared for the promptitude and rapidity of the march of the French army ; and no magazines had been form- ed for its supply. The want of provision intro- duced disorder into the ranks. The starving soldiers quitted their battalions, and roamed about the country in search of plunder ; and when the van of the army reached Alcantara, it was in a state of utter DVTetchedness and des- titution. From Alcantara, Marshal Junot issued a pro»- Nov. 17. clamation to the Portuguese nation, declaring, that his only object in entering their territory, was to emancipate the government from the yoke chap. h. of England. It called on the people to receive jg^^ their invaders as friends engaged in hostilities against one common enemy, and denounced the App. No. 7. severest punishments on all who should take arms on his approach. On the 19th of November, the army passed the frontier, and moved onward to Lisbon by the route of Castello Branco. On the 23d, the van- guard reached Abrantes, and the government had found itself utterly unable to organize any effective system of defence. The rapid advance of the enemy had taken the Prince Regent by surprise. None of the fortresses of his kingdom had been garrisoned or provisioned, and no pro- clamation of the government had given notice to the people in what light their invaders were to be regarded. Deceived, till too late, by the hope that hostilities might still be averted by a sub- missive compliance with the dictates of the Em- peror, all defensive precautions had been neglect- ed. It was only when the French army were within four days' march of the capital, that the Prince Regent received intelligence of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and became at length aware of the full extent and bearing of his danger. 46 EMIGRATION TO BRAZIL. THE FRENCH ENTER LISBON. 47 1807. CHAP. II. While yet undecided as to the course most advisable amid the instant perils which sur- rounded him, a flag" of truce entered the Tagus, and the Prince Regent received assurances from Lord Strangford, that, notwithstanding the de- monstrations of hostility to which his government had been compelled to resort, the British Ad- miral would readily co-operate in any measures that might contribute to the security of the Royal Family. These assurances were relied on ; and, influenced by the counsels of the ambassador, he determined at once to (juit the kingdom and embark for Brazil. No time was to be lost in carrying" this resolution into eff\?ct. The ene- my were already at the gates; and having nom- inated a council of regency, the Prince Regent, accompanied by the Queen and the other mem- Nov. 27. bers of his family, embarked amid the tears of the sufl^ering people whom necessity had com- pelled him to abandon. The French took possession of Lisbon with- out opposition. The suddenness of the events by which the independence of the country had been sacrificed, seems to have cast the nation into a stupor from which it required some time to emerge. Junot, a man neither harsh in dis- position nor repulsive in manner, appears at chap. ii. first to have studied the arts of popularity, not ~~~ , . . , 1807. without partial success. On his entry into the city he was met by a deputation from the au- thorities, who presented an address congratulat- ing him on his arrival, and soliciting his protec- tion for the capital. Nothing, we are assured, could be more wretched than the appearance of the triumphant army by which the subjection of a kingdom had bepn thus rapidly achieved. Pi- quets of the Portuguese Royal Guard acted as guides to the French troops, and conducted them v. ii. p. 401. to their quarters. The imaginations of the peo- ple had been excited by the achievements of the heroes of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, and they had expected to gaze on a race of beings superior in all noble and personal attributes to the rest of mankind. How then were they as- tonished to behold a long line of limping, emaci- ated, and ragged soldiers, enfeebled by incessant marching and privation, and devoid even of the ordinary appurtenances of military pomp, enter their city with lagging pace and in disorderly ranks ! How rapidly the vision of glory must have vanished from their eyes ! Junot at first endeavoured to conciliate the iSfc 48 THE CONDUCT OF JUNOT. PROCLAMATION OF THE EMPEROR. 49 1807. n I CHAP. II. inhabitants by professions of friendly intention, and of a deep anxiety for the welfare and pros- perity of the kingdom. The customary forms of government were observed in all his public decrees, and a politic respect was shewn to the prejudices and peculiar observances of the peo- ple. By such conduct, he succeeded in lulling for a time the more obtrusive demonstrations of innate hostility which pervaded the great mass of the population, and Lisbon remained for sev- eral weeks in a state of sullen though tranquil quiescence. When Junot, however, had succeeded m re- organizkig his army, broken down and enfeebled by the severity and privations of their hurried march ; when he beheld the fortresses of the kingdom tenanted by French garrisons, the na- tive population deprived of their arms, and many of those who by their talents and popu- larity were likely to incite resistance to his authority, despatched on a mission of compli- ment to Napoleon, he thought it no longer necessary to dissemble. He at once threw aside the mask under which he had hitherto disguised the tyrannical designs of his master, and publicly proclaimed that Portugal was no 1 1808 Dated Milan, Dec. 23, longer to be considered an independent power, chap. ii. but a mere appanage of France. It was declared, that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign. By abandoning the country, it had forfeited all App. No. 8. right to the allegiance of the people ; and in the style of emphatic command peculiar to Na- poleon, the nation were informed, that " the Emperor willed that Portugal should thereafter be governed in his name, by the General-in-chief of his army." By anotlier exercise of imperial despot- ism the estates of the crown were confiscated, and heavy contributions imposed on the country at large. The reins of supreme authority were then jmblicly assumed by Junot, and the ancient insig- nia of the kingdom displaced by those of France. Tlie cause of the invaders, contaminated as it was by acts of barbarous oppression, found many par- tisans among the aristocracy of the country, and even among the clergy. The Patriarch of Lis- . v o bon issued a pastoral letter to his flock, begging Dec. 8. them, in the name of patriotism and religion, to unite in establishing tlie authority of tlie intru- sive government, and in bringing those to punish- ment who should dare to disturb the tranquillity of the country by vain and contimiacious resist- VOL. I. c n' P t J 50 SULLEN ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PEOPLE. PORTUGUESE FORCES DISBANDED. 51 1808. CHAP. II. ance. But it is unquestionable that the burden of foreign thraldom carried with it, an outrage on all the better and prouder feeliugs of the people. Unaccustomed to any yoke, save that of a native and domestic despot, they burned with desire to burst the galling shackles by which they had been suddenly entlualled, and to wreak their vengeance on the authors of the national misfortunes and degradation. Yet the demonstrations of these feelings were not in proportion to their depth and ardour. Oc- casionally a tumult in the streets of Lisbon, and curses, not loud but deep, nmttered on the French soldiery, as they passed on in the pomp and pa- noply of war, gave evidence how little amalga- mation of feeling the government had been suc- cessful in inducing between the conquerors and the conquered— the oppressors and the oppressed. When insurrection stalked forth into open day, it was instantly pimished and suppressed by a vigilant police, and the strong arm of military power : but for that alienation of heart, that deep-rooted though silent hatred of their invad- ers, which rankled in the bosoms of the people, a cure was not to be found by those who violat- ed their prejudices, and outraged their religion. 1808. It was in vain, therefore, that Junot endeavoured chap. Ii. to captivate the nation, by dazzling pictures of the prosperity which was about to dawn on the op- pressed and suffering country. It was in vain that he promised roads, canals, commerce, an improved government, and the wide diffusion of intelligence. To the value of such blessings the people were insensible. The shadowy glories of this visionary perspective were gazed on with indifference or incredulity. All their wants and aspirations were concentred in one single word — Freedom, Not indeed fi-eodom in its wider and more Aaluable acceptation ; but freedom from the tyrannical yoke of foreign dominion ; freedom again to become the slaves of a government, a- dapted, by its own limited intelligence, to the prejudices of the nation over which it ruled. One of the first steps which the policy of Ju- not led him to adopt, in order to secure the peaceable occupation of the country, was that of disbanding a large portion of the native army, and employing the remainder in foreign service. Accordingly, the thirty-seven regiments which constituted the standing force of the kingdom, were reduced to seven regiments of infantry and three of cavalry, and of these a large proportion 2 1! 52 ARMY OF ALORNA. THE SPANISH CONTINGENT. 53 1808. CHAP. II. was immediately organized, and sent off to Francp, under tlie command of the Marquis de Aloma. The superior officers of tliis corps were selected from the number of those who possessed the highest character and influence among their coun- trymen. They were proud, we are assured, of serving under the banners of Napoleon, of en- joying an opportunity of sharing those laurels which had hitherto been so plentifully gathered by his victorious soldiers. But such feelings did not extend to the great body of the army. To them, the path of military distinction appeared less strewn with flowers than thorns. Ani- mated, perhaps, with feelings of deeper patriot- ism than those who led them to the field, they felt also more deeply the pang of soj^aration from their country, and saw, with a clearer view, the difficulties, the dangers, and the privations, to which, in their destined service, they could not fail to be exposed.* • Of the aversion of the Portuguese to embark iu the service of France, the following striking facts, narrated by General Foy, afford sufficient proof. When the army of Alorna b^an its march, it was between eight and nine thousand strong. In passing through Spain, more than four thousand deserted and returned home. Five or six hundred remained in the hospitals. Some 1808. In the invasion of Portugal the Spanish troops chap. ii. appear to have played altogether an insignificant part. Their leaders were allowed to assume no command over the provinces which had been allotted them by treaty, and the authority of Junot was that by which alone all public acts were promulgated or enforced. Even this cir- mmstance brought with it some alleviation to tlie fears of the nation. The terms of the treaty of Fontainebleau had filled the people with despair. The dismemberment of their country, was the misfortune of all others which they regarded with the deepest dismay. The assumption, therefore, of the supreme authority by Junot, abhorrent as in other respects it might be to their feelings, carried with it the belief that the stipulations which decreed the separa- tion and dismemberment of Portugal were no longer intended to be enforced. If the future presented but a choice of evils, it seemed at least the smaller and less formidable, to become the dependent of France, than to be cut up and were killed at the first siege of Saragossa ; and, out of the whole number, only three thousand two hundred and forty arrived at Bayonne. ^^ I 54 LETTER OF THE DEPUTIES: 1808. CHAP. II. parcelled out into sovereignties, too limited in extent, resources, and population, to afford the means of effective repulsion to foreign insidt or aggression. Another circumstance contributed to confirm and to augment the hopes of the people, that the integrity of the country at least, would be saved from violation. The deputation from Lisbon which had been sent to congratidate the Empe- ror, were received by that monarch with a de- gree of flattering condescension, which led them to augur too favourably of his intentions towards Portugal. In consequence of this interview the April 27. deputies addressed a letter to their countrymen, which was made public in Lisbon. ' It was sign- ed by the Bishop of Coimbra, by the Marquis of Abrantes, president of the council of regency, nominated by the Prince on his departure, and by Don Nuno Caetano de Mello, connected by blood with the reigning family, and by many others of powerful influence in the state. App. No. 10. In this document the nation were assured, that the mighty genius of Napoleon could be equalled only by the elevation of his soul, and the disinterested generosity of his princi- ples ; that the army of France had entered Por- ITS EFFECT ON THE PEOPLE. 55 1808. tugal not as conquerors but friends ; that in chap. ii. occupying the kingdom. Napoleon had not been influenced by enmity to their former Sovereign, but by the wisli to enable the nation to cast off the trammels of England, and unite itself with the great continental system established over Europe. The deputies further stated, tliat the Emperor knew and lamented the privations which Portugal, in common with other nations, had endured from the temporaiy suspension of her commerce, and conveyed the Imperial assur- ance, that these would speedily be succeeded by great and Listing prosperity. The nation, they affirmed, stood absolved from all allegiance to the house of Braganza, which had forsaken them in the time of danger and difficulty ; and they assured the people, that the only course by which the honour and integrity of the country could be secured, was that of unlimited submission to their g^eat and magnanimous deliverer. This address of the deputies was not with- out its influence on the people. The hope of the restoration of their ancient dynasty, for a time had died in their hearts. Their sovereign was already in another hemisphere; and the course of events seemed to hold out no prospect 56 OPPRESSION OF THE OOVEPVArFXT. CHAP. II. of his future restoration. In such circumstances, 28Qg^ ^t 's scarcely possihle to douht, that, liad the government of France been moderated in its ac- tion on tlie nation by the dictates of humanity and pnidence, the prejudices of the people would have g^radually yielded, and their attachment to the fugitive sovereign have progressively dimin- ished. To such a consummation, however, the abuses and oppression of the new government certaiidy did not tend. Contributions of unex- ampled magnitude were levied on the people; and the severity of the measures by which these inordinate exactions were enforced, brought home at once to the bosoms of the people, a deep consciousness of the rapacity of their rul- ers. They beheld the plate torn by sacrile- gious hands from their churches; the palaces of their nobles plundered ; while even the hum- ble dwellings of the poor were robbed of the little lioard that industry had enabled them to amass. Was it possible that a govenmient which sanctioned such detestable proceedings could ever acquire a footing in the affections of the nation? Or, was it possible by any mea- sures of insult and outrage, to rouse into more - * ITS EFFECT ON THE PEOPLE. 57 1808. vehement resistance, the whole passions of a chap. ii. people ? Human action is the offspring more frequently of impulse than of reason. A na- tion may be subdued, but it can seldom be trampled on with impunity. Notwithstandmg the hopelessness of resistance, the spirit of na- tional animosity was continually breaking forth in acts of isolated rebellion against the power of their oppressors. c2 5a INVASION OF SPAIN. CHAPTER III. INVASION OF SPAIN. 1807. CHAP. III. While Portugal had thus become the prey of the spoiler, a deeper and more hazardous game was playing by Napoleon in Spain. The sluices of war had now been opened ; and the French armies swept onward into the Peninsula, like a mighty torrent, covering and overwhelming the land. It was stipulated, by the Treaty of Fontaine- bleau, that, exclusive of the force destined more immediately for the reduction of Portugal, a corps de reservcj of forty thousand men, should be assembled at Bayonne, ready to repel any hostile demonstration of England for the relief of her ally. The army of the Gironde, therefore, SECOND ARMY OF THE GIRONDE. 59 had no sooner crossed the Pyrenees, than another chap. in. corps, of twenty-four thousand of the anticipated conscriptions of 1808, was assembled on the v"^^^!* ^ . ^November, trontier. The commander of this force was General Dupont, an officer who was destined, in Spain, to blight the laurels which, under a happier star, he had acquired in other fields. Ar- rangements were speedily made for the advance of this second army of the Gironde ; and, hav- ing crossed the frontier, its march was directed on Valladolid, in which city the head-quarters of General Dupont wore established. The situation December. was in all respects happily chosen. VaUadolid is a position which commands the roads both to Lisbon and Madrid, and thus, without any un- equivocal demonstration of his views, Dupont was prepared to advance on either capital as circumstances miglit require. But the warlike preparations of France had 1808. not yet attained their full development. A third army, consisting of twenty-five thousand Infan- try, three thousand cavalry, and forty-one pieces of artillery, was assembled on the Garonne. On the 9th of January, tlie vanguard of tliis force, commanded by Marshal Moncey, crossed the January. Bidassoa, and pushed onward into Spain, over- 60 ARMY OF CATALONIA. 1808. January. CHAP. III. running Biscay and Navarre in its advance. Even this was not all. Another force was col- lected at the eastern extremity of the Pyre- nean chain, consisting of twelve thousand men of different arms, intended for the occupation of Catalonia. Independently of all other circum- stances, the congregation of tliis force shoukl at once have opened the eyes of Charles and his min- ister to the hostile schemes of Napoleon. All re- sistance in Portugal to tlie usurpation of France was already at an end, yet the reinforcement of the Jirmament in that kingdom, formed the only pretence on which the introduction of hu-ge and successive armies into the western pro- vinces of Spain, was attempted to be justified. The views of the French ruler in thus assembling an army on the north-eastern frontier of the kingdom, admitted, however, of no such colour- ing or excuse. It carried with it an indication of hostile intention, too palpable to admit of falla- cious interpretation. But all measures of spirit and vigour seem to have been alien to the character of Charles and his minister. No energetic steps were taken to repress the in- vaders ; no call was made to rouse the loy- alty and patriotism of the people ; and the des- I FRENCH SOLDIERS POUR INTO SPAIN. 61 picable rulers of this unhappy country were chap. hi. cx>ntented to behold the progress of insult and aggression, in silence and submission. So blunt- February'. ed and obtuse were the perceptions of the gov- ernment of Spain, that it could neither appreciate nor understand the moral energy of the people whom it governed, when roused into powerftil and consentaneous resistance. Though the character of Napoleon's views on the Peninsula had, in a great measure, been de- nuded of disguise, it is probable that, even at this period, they were apprehended by none, in their full bearing and extent. The independence of Spain indeed, thanks to the fatuity of her rulers, was gone. The yoke was on her shoulders, and the iron bit of the oppressor in her mouth. But none could calculate the erratic course of an ambition, which was continually subject to the operation of a thousand unknown influences. The measures, however, by which the projects of the French Emperor were to be carried into effect, had be- Foy, ii. 123. come no longer secret. On the great roads from France nothing was to be seen but con- voys of ammunition and provisions, trains of ar- tillery, the marching of battalions, and oflicers riding post in the execution of military duty. 62 CHARACTER OF THE FRENCH ARMIES. CHAP. III. From the Bidassoa to the Douro the country was jgQg covered with soldiers. The convents were con- February, v^^rted into hospitals and barracks, forts and bat- teries were erected on the more commanding stations, and in all the principal towns even the functions of the civil magistrate were assumed by the intruders. The character of the troops thus profusely poured into the Peninsula, is represented, by competent authority, to have been of the worst description. The officers were either veterans, dis- qualified by age and infirmities for the arduous duties thus involuntarily imposed on them, or ig- norant boys, prematurely taken from school, to be intrusted with the discharge of functions to which from youth and inexperience they were inadequate. The soldiery was composed of men of all countries, returned deserters, and recruits from the hospitals. It was impossible that masses composed of elements so dissimilar, should be inspired with any corporate spirit, or senti- ment of collective honour. Disunited by diver- sity of language, prejudice, and education, the' sol- diers of an army, thus thro\ni fortuitously to- gether, could be animated by no common remem- brances of former achievements, nor participate ARMY OP MURAT. 63 ( in the feeling of confidence and brotherhood chap. hi. which emanates from the anticipated fellowship of future glory. Strangers to each other ; uncon- pebrua . nected by community of interest ; united by no bond but that of military command ; unknown to their officers, by whom their comfort was neglect- ed; irregulariy provisioned, and still more irregu- larly paid ; these were apparently not the men from whom any great or brilliant achievement could be rationally expected. On the return of Napoleon from Italy, or- ders were instantly issued for summoning into service a new conscription of eighty thousand men. These were speedily assembled, and Mu- rat having been appointed to the command, they puihed forward into Spain, and remained con- March centrated in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, rea- dy, on the earliest signal, to advance on Ma- drid. It would, perhaps, be little interesting— it would, at all events, be incompatible with the narrow limits of the present work— to enter on a detailed and minute account of the measures of disguised hostility and open fraud, by which, at this period, the projects of the French ruler made rapid advances to completion. It is suffi- VOL. I. c 3 64 SEIZURE OP THE FORTRESSES. 1808. March. CHAP. III. cient to state, that the important fortresses of St. Sebastian, Pamplona, Figueras, and Barce- lona, feU, without resistance, into the posses- sion of the invaders, whose force in the north- ern provinces continued almost hourly to in- crease. The time, however, had not yet come when Napoleon considered it prudent to throw off the mask under which his designs were veiled from the Spanish monarch. He flattered the vanity of Charles, by sending him magnificent tokens of regard, and in his letters continued to ex- press his ardent desire for the completion of the contemplated alliance of their families. Na- poleon further stated his intention of visiting the Spanish capital, where, without the inter- vention of diplomatic forms, all matters of dif- ference between them might be personally ar- ranged. The promised visit, however, did not take place ; but Izquierdo, the confidential agent of Oodoy at the court of Paris, was despatched on a mission to Madrid, bearing the proposals of the Emperor to the King of Spain. These were of a character undoubtedly somewhat startling and exorbitant. Assuming his own pretensions to the I MISSION OF IZQUIERDO. 65 sovereignty of Portugal, to be at once exclusive chap.iii. and undisputed. Napoleon demanded in exchange /. , , loOo. for that country the kingdoms of Gallicia, Biscay, MarcH. and Navarre, in order to prevent the necessity of maintaining a military communication through the territory of Spain. It was proposed, like- wise, that France should participate in the com- merce of the Spanish colonies on the same terms as the mother country ; and it was signified to Charles, that the time had at length arrived when it was necessary that the succession to the Spanish tlu-one should become the subject of a final and immediate settlement. Such were the terms on which it was intimated to the King of Spain, he could alone hope to avoid the dreaded hos- tility of Napoleon. Of the events in Portugal, Godoy had been no uninterested spectator. He saw that his star, which had long been declining, was at length fast approaching the aphelion. In weariness of heart, he would gladly have resigned that power, whose possession had been to him one long scene, not of enjoyment but of struggle. To the prin- cipality which had been assigned him by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, as affording the only chance of honourable retirement, he still looked 66 PROJECT OF EMIGRATION 1808. March. i CHAP. III. forward with fondly cherished anticipations. But « time passed on without bringing with it the ex- pected gratification ; and at length the public de- claration that the undivided sovereignty of Por- tugal had been assumed by Napoleon, put an end for ever to his hopes. Under the deepest cloud of his misfortunes, it is impossible to compassionate Godoy. The whole efforts of his public life had been directed towards the single object, of promoting his own personal enjoyment. Never was a more ignoble purpose more perseveringly pursued, and never was there a failure more signal and complete. Disappointed in all his endeavours to secure the permanent enjoyment of his wealth and honours, bis hopes were at length narrowed to passing the remainder of his life in some obscure and tran- quil retreat. He already meditated the resigna- tion of his public offices, and was restrained only by the consciousness, that by the loss of power he would be deprived of his only safeguard from the violence of an indignant people. Amid the wreck of his hopes in the Old World, the views of Godoy were naturally directed to the New ; and still anxious to escape the perils by which he saw himself environed, he proposed to •%s TO AMERICA. 67 1808. March. Charles to consult the tranquillity of his declin- chap.iii. ing years by transferring the seat of sovereignty to his transatlantic dominions. Charles, exhaust- ed by infirmity, and hopeless of relief from the assistance of Napoleon, acceded to the advice of his minister, and, with all possible secrecy, prepa- rations were set on foot for the departure of the Court. The army of Solano was recalled from Portugal, and directed to march for Seville. Troops were stationed along the road by which the royal travellers were to pass, and the body guards were ordered to march from Madrid to Aranjuez. These preparatory movements, however, did not pass unnoticed by the people, whose fears were strongly excited by the prospect of the departure of their sovereign. Their discontent became clamorous and obtrusive ; and a procla- mation of the King, in which he denied being influenced by any intention of quitting the king- dom, had not the effect of restoring public con- fidence and tranquillity. The indignation of the populace was still fur- ther excited, by the circulation of reports, that, notwithstanding the assurances contained in the royal proclamation, preparations were still in fl 68 TUMULT AT ARANJUEZ. ! I rHAP.iii. progress for the evasion of the Monarch. Among 1808. *^^^^ ^^'^^^ g^^'® currency to such intelligence was March, the Prince of Asturias. Relying on tlie protec- tion of Napoleon, whom he considered favourable to his views, Ferdinand had openly declared his aversion to the project of emigration, and this coincidence with the national feeling, had the ef- fect of still further increasing his popularity. Time brought newconfimiation to the suspicions of tlie people, and the demonstrations of public discontent became daily more violent and tumul- Mar. 17. tuous. On the 17th of March, Araiijuez was surrounded by a multitude of peasants from the neighbouring villages, in a state of violent ex- citation. In the palace they found every symp- tom of preparation for a journey ; and goaded almost to frenzy by this proof of royal duplicity, they seized arms and shouted for vengeance on Godoy. The Life- Guards were drawn out for the defence of the palace, and the people rushed in tumidtuous confusion to the house of the favour- ite. The servants of the Infant Don Antonio and the Count de Montijo were the first to raise the cry of " Death to Godoy / The King for ever /" In a moment it was simultaneously re- verberated by many thousand voices. A squa- it TUMULT AT MADRID. 69 1808. March. dron of the Prince's Guard advanced to protect chap.iif. their leader ; and in the execution of this duty were furiously assaulted by the mob. The bro- ther of the favourite, Don Diego de Godoy, then came up with his regiment of guards, and directed them to fire on the multitude. The troops refused to obey ; and uniting with the po- pulace, struck and insulted their colonel and joined in the onset. The doors of the house were burst open, the furniture broken to pieces, and the splendid contents of the mansion subjected to unsparing havoc. In the meanwhile, Godoy had escaped ; the Princess de la Paz, terrified and trembling, ran out into the street ; yet so lit- tle was that injured lady the object of popular aversion, that she was escorted to the palace with every demonstration of respect. This alarming exhibition of national feel- ing produced the desired eft'ect. Godoy was instantly removed from his offices of Generalis- Mar. 19. simo and High Admiral; and Charles declared his resolution of assuming personally the command of his forces, both naval and military. At Ma- drid events of a similar character took place. Intelligence of what was passing at Aranjuez, had no sooner reached the capital, than the cry of 70 DEPOSITION OF OODOY: FOUND CONCEALED AT OCANA. 71 1808. March. CHAP. III. " Death to Godoy' was echoed tlirough all the streets and squares of the city. Crowds assem- bled round the houses of the Prince of Peace, his mother, his brother, and his sister. They were attacked and plundered, the furniture was thrown into the streets and burned, and all their inmates subjected to insult and abuse. The greater part of the garrison had been withdrawn to Aranjuez ; and the few remaining troops were found al- together insufficient to preserve order. The riot continued for two days, during which no restraint was attempted to be imposed on the violence of the people. Tranquillity was at length only restored by the proclamation of the King declaring the deposition of Godoy. Notwithstanding the deposition of the favour- ite, the appetite of the people for vengeance was yet unsated. The simple privation of that power which he had so flagrantly abused, ap- peared, in their ideas of retributive justice, to be a punishment altogether inadequate to his de- serts. Nothing less than the gibbet or the block would satisfy the excited craving of the populace, who thirsted for his blood. The escape of Godoy was no sooner known, than pursui was made after him in every direction. On the 1808. March. morning of the 19th he was found concealed in chap. hi. a garret at Ocana, where he had remained with- out food for nearly two days. The populace drag- ged him from his hiding-place ; and he would in- evitably have fallen a victim to their fury, had not the Prince of Asturias, with a body of Life- Guards appeared to his rescue. The popularity of Ferdinand saved the life of Godoy ; and the multitude, on receiving the promise of the Prince, that the object of their hostility should be given up to justice, quietly dispersed. The support of Charles was at last broken. Godoy, in spite of the favour of the monarch, was in the power of his enemies ; and Charles, in his declining years, at length knew himself to be friendless and alone. Sufl^ering from the united inroads of age and infirmity, he felt That like a cohimn left alone, The tottering remnant of some splendid fane, 'Sca|)ed from the fury of the barbarous Gaul, And wasting time, which has the rest o'erthrown, Amidst his house's ruins, he remained Single, unpropped, and nodding to his fcJl. In the person of Godoy, the real, though vi- carious sovereign, had already been dethroned, H 72 ABDICATION OF CHARLES. tl • CHAP. III. and the crown at once fell from the brows of the , shadow which had hitherto worn the semblance March. ^^ ^ monarch. On the evening of the day fol- . lowing, Charles notified, in a public decree, his abdication of the throne. *' The habitnal infir- Mar. 20. inities," he said, " under wliidi he had long la- boured, rendered him incapuhie of supporting the heavy burden of government ; the enjoyment of private life, and a climate more temj»erate than that of Spain, had become necessary for the re- storation of his health ; and, in these circum- stances, he had resolved on abdicating the crown in favour of his beloved son. He, therefore, by this decree of free and spontaneous abdication, made kno^^Ti his royal will, tliat the Prince of Asturias should forthwith be acknowledged and obeyed as king and natural lord of all his king- doms and dominions." The joy of the nation on the abdication of their monarch was extreme. Charles had lonir ceased to be popular, and participated largely in the odium attached to his minister. Ferdinand was the idol of the nation ; and to him alone did the people look with passionate ardour of expectation for deliverance from all their perils and o]>pres- sions. Never, in times of danger and of trou- li COUNCIL OP CASTILE. 73 1808. March. ble, did a monarch mount the throne under chap. hi. loftier auspices. He carried with him the af- fections and devotion, of a proud and generous people. Tlie seeds of resistance to foreign ty- ranny had been planted in the bosom of the na- tion, and were ready, at a breath, to have risen into a glorious harvest of armed men, prepared to sanctify the soil that bore them, by the out- pouring of patriot blood. Never was the sacred cause of liberty and justice, more deeply injured and contaminated, by the folly and apostacy of its champion. The Council of Castile is the only body in Spain which bears even the semblance of a constitutional assembly. The princes and nobles of whom, in former ages, it was composed, held their seats by hereditary tenure, and acted in a capacity somewhat similar to that of privy council to the king. In later times, it was constituted a judicial body ; and, since the disuse of the Cortes, had succeeded to many of the functions of that na- tional assembly, while the prerogative of nom- inating or displacing the members at his pleasure, had been assumed by the monarch. Notwith- standing this dependance on royal favour, the Council of Castile, in character of conservator 74 GODOY DEPRIVED OF HIS HONOURS. 1808. March. CHAP. III. of the laws of the monarchy, resolved, with be- coming dignity, to withhold their sanction from the abdication of the King, until the highest legal authority should have pronounced it valid, and consonant to constitutional usage. The new sovereign, however, was little disposed to give time for any laborious investigation of his title ; and issued an ordinance, enjoining the Ck)uncil, without delay, to publisli the abdication of Char- les. The vicinity of the French anny to th« capital, and the danger and unpopularity of the duty they had assumed, induced them to com- ply with this peremptory mandate ; and the ab- dication of the late monarch was publi^'are of his danger, made proposals to Morla, May. ^^'hich were rejected. He wished to quit the harbour of Cadiz ; and demanded protection a- gainst the English fleet then in the offing. But Morla refused all terras, declining the assist- ance of Lord Collingwood, who had assumed the command of the British fleet, and proceeded to erect batteries on various parts of the Isla de Leon, from which they assailed the hostile squadron with a heavy fire. These measures, after an interval of several days, during which a strong fire was kept up on the enemy, were at length productive of the desired eftect. Ros- silly, on the morning of the 14th of June, sent a flag of truce to the shore, and intimated his. readiness to surrender at discretion. This success was followed by the arrival of General Spencer with a corps of five thousand, men, which had been despatched from Gibraltar to co-operate with the Spaniards. By the ap- pearance of this force on the coast, the progress, of a French corps under General Avril, which had been despatched by Junot to hold possession of Cadiz, was arrested ; and General Spencer Wing subsequently taken up a position at A- I ARRIVAL OF THE DEPUTIES IN LONDON. 133 180B Mav-K yamonte, the garrison of Faro surrendered to chap. iv. the patriots. On this event, the Authorities of Algarve sent deputies to Seville, and united that province by alliance with the Supreme Junta. The patriotic force in this quarter was still fur- ther augmented by the junction of sixteen Span- ish battalions, which withdrew from the occu- pation of Portugal and joined the standard of their countrymen. Previous to the appearance of General Spen- cer on the Spanish coast, the deputies from Seville and Gallicia had arrived in England. Never was there enthusiasm more deep and gen- eral, than that which then animated the British nation in the cause of Spanish independence. The deputies were welcomed in London by loud and general acclamation. There was no hesitation manifested as to the line of policy which it became Great Britain to adopt. The people cjdled on their rulers to assist, with heart and hand,, a nation struggling for liberty, to cast off^ the chain of the oppressor. Never was the unanimous voice of a people poured forth with greater majesty and effect. The government did not withstand — no government could have withstood a call thus energetically made. In 134 INTEREST FELT BY ENGLAND 1808. May. CHAP. IV. such an excited state of the public mind, if their rulers had dared to oppose themselves to the wishes of the nation, they must have been driv- en from their situations with scorn and ignominy. It mattered nothing in such a case what party was in power, or by what peculiar principles their general policy was regulated. The ordi- nary barriers and distinctions of party were in a moment broken down, and Whig or Tory must have acted alike in yielding instant obedience to a voice thus sublimely and irresistibly poured forth. Since the accession of Napoleon, England had fought not for conquest but for safety. In spite of all her efforts, she had beheld the power of France continually gaining new accessions to its gigantic bulk. Europe, after a fruitless resis- tance, was at the foot of the conqueror, and the subsidies of England, by provoking premature hostilities, had only contributed to accelerate the catastrophe. Since the days of Egypt, the mi- litary force of England had been employed only in the conquest of Sugar Islands, or of some distant and isolated colonies which France still retained in the East. A nobler field was now open for her exertions. She was at length IN THE CAUSE OF THE PATRIOTS. 135 1808. May. to meet the Great Conqueror of the Age on chap. iv. the very continent he had subdued, to plant her sons breast to breast with those victori- ous soldiers who had never yet experienced defeat. The moment of decisive struggle was at length come, when the standard of England was to be raised in a higher and a better cause than any of which she had hitherto stood for- ward as the champion. Justice was on her side : the character of the contest was become too palpable to be mistaken by any party in the state. The cause of freedom and of resistance to oppression, is one that comes home with pecu- liar force to the hejirt and the understanding of an Englishman ; and followed in all its measures by the unanimous wishes of the nation, the go- vernment at once knew itself to be armed with a strength, of which, during a long course of in- glorious policy, it had hitherto been deprived. Every practicable assistance was immediately afforded to the patriotic cause. Vessels, freight- ed with arms, clothing, and military stores, were speedily despatched for Gijon. Supplies of money were sent to Ferrol to assist the insur- rection in Gallicia. All the Spanish prisoners of war were liberated and restored to their 136 PROCEEDINGS AT VALENCIA. 1808. May. c HAP. IV. country. The British army in Sicily was or- dered to afford protection and assistance to the insurgent Catalans; and General Spencer was directed to engage in active co-operation with the patriots of Andalusia. While such measures were adopting in Eng- land, the Spanish people had lost nothing of their ardour in the cause of independence. Valencia became the theatre of a tragedy deeper than any which we have hitherto been called on to record. The inhabitants, like those of the other pro- vinces, had risen in arms agaitist the French. In the vehemence of the first commotion, Don Miguel de Saavedra became the object and the victim of popular fury. He was followed to Requena, whither he had fled for safety, and brutally murdered by the people. His head, raised on a pike, was carried with acclamations round the city of which he had recently been governor. A Junta was then elected for the ad- ministration of the province ; and it is probable tliat Valencia might have remained undisgraced by further violence, but for the appearance of a wretch, named Calvo, by whom the functions of leader of the government had been assumed. Calvo came from Madrid, and was a canon of I ASSASSINATION OF THE FRENCH RESIDENTS. 137 i8oa May. the Cathedral of St. Isidore. By the display of chap, i v. a sort of demoniac energy, he acquired influence with the people. He retained, under his com- mand, a band of assassins ; and, confident in this support, he insulted the Junta, who refused to admit him as a member, and succeeded in ac- quiring such power as awed the authorities into submission. In Valencia there were many French resid- ents ; and it was natural, in the circumstances of the country, that these should become the pe- culiar objects of jealousy and suspicion. Alarm- ed at the dangers which surrounded them, they sought refuge in the citadel, and Calvo publicly denounced them, as having engaged in a plot for the surrender of the city to Murat. Ac- counts di6fer as to the particular proceedings which ensued ; but all agree in the result, that these unfortunate persons, in number about two hundred, were massacred by Calvo and his as- sassins. The mad ambition of Calvo grew with his success. He caused himself to be proclaimed Sovereign of Valencia, summoned the Captain- General to his presence, compelled the Intend- ant to disburse the public money, and treated the 138 CALVO CONDEMNED AND EXECUTED. VIGOROUS PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE. 139 1808. Mtf. CHAP. IV. Archbishop with insolence and contempt. By his orders, likewise, a new Junta was directed to assemble and assume the functions of that which he had determined to abolish. Fortunately for the interests of humanity, the career of Calvo was a short one. The Junta, which at first had been panic-stricken, began at length to gather courage, and to concert measures for the overthrow of this frantic demagogue. His popularity with the mob, already satiated with slaughter, was in the wane. The schemes of the Junta soon ripened into action. At one of their meetings, Calvo was invited to join in the deliberations. He came, followed by a train of ruffians who occupied all the avenues to the place of meeting. Towards the .Tunta he de- meaned himself with his usual insolence, and at- tempted to awe them into submission by threats of punishment. At length a Franciscan friar, named Rico, the most intrepid of their number, rose and denounced him as a traitor, and de- manded his immediate arrest. This was done. Calvo was sent in irons to the Island of Majorca, and subsequently executed as a traitor. The re- tribution of the Junta did not rest here. About two hundred of his blood-thirsty followers were 1808. May. likewise subjected to trial, and executed in pur- chap, i v. suance of the sentence awarded by the tribu- nal. It rarely happens, observes an able writer, that popular convulsions, however horrible may be the circumstances by which they are attended, have any prejudicial effect on the vigour of na- tional defence ; for the passions of the people, thus excited by domestic atrocities, when direct- ed against foreign enemies, acquire new intensi- ty. It was so in Valencia. The people were no sooner freed from the tyranny of Calvo, than they commenced vigorous preparations for de- fence. There appeared no limits to the popular enthusiasm. Provision was made not only for the security of the city, but of the province. The defiles leading into Catalonia were fortified. Troops were detached to co-operate with the military in Murcia ; and active dispositions were made to secure the passes of the road from Cas- tile. Before intelligence was received at Madrid of the insane atrocities of Calvo and his followers, an expedition against Valencia had been in pre- paration. The command of the force destined for this service was intrusted to Marshal Mon- 140 MONCEY ADVANCES AGAINST VALENCIA. 141 CHAP. IV. cey, an officer of high military reputation and JQ08. '^^^^eniished personal character. On the thirtieth May. o^ May, Moncey received orders to advance with a column of ten thousand men upon Cuenca, where, in case the disturbances at Valencia should have ceased, he was directed to halt, and content himself with watching the country be- tween the lower Ebro and Carthagena. Should the disorders in Valencia, however, remain un- quelled, he was instructed to direct General Chabran, at Tortosa, to advance with his divi- sion, and effect a junction in the neighbourhood of Valencia. In pursuance of these orders, Marslial Mon- cey, with an army of about ten thousand men of the dift'erent arms, set forward from Madrid on the fourth of June, and reached Cuenca on the Jun. 11. eleventh. In that town he remained for a week, and received intelligence of the state of mat- ters in Valencia. During his march, Marshal Moncey found the whole population animated by feelings of strong aversion to the intrusive government. Even around Cuenca, while it remained the head-quarters of his army, symp- toms of disaffection were daily numifested. In these circumstances, the Spanish and Walloon guards were sent forward to Valencia, and Mon- chap. iv. cey ordered Cliabran to advance to Castellon de ioqq Plana, tliat a more active concert might be es- j^ne. tablished between the armies. To a General of Moncey's experience it could not but be appar- ent that the campaign was not long destined to be bloodless. Not satisfied, therefore, wdth the precautions already mentioned, he wrote to Mu- rat, requesting that a column might be sent for- ward from Madrid to Albacete, to protect his right from attack, during his anticipated opera- tions. Murat, on his part, little aware of the difficul- ties with which Moncey was surrounded, felt dis- satisfied at the slowness of his progress. With a view to stimulate the sluggish movements of the veteran, he despatched Brigadier-General Excelmans, with directions to excite him by every means to operations of greater vigour and more decisive character than he had yet thought it prudent to undertake. Excelmans departed on his mission ; but on his route was seized by the populace, and, with his suite, carried prison- ers into Valencia. The difficulties of ^Moncey were evidently increasing ; and on the sixteenth he quitted ""* ^^ 2 142 THE COUNTRY DESERTED ON HIS APPROACH : I 1808. June. CHAP.'iv. Cuenca. The country around his line of march was deserted ; and notwithstanding the strict discipline enforced in his army, the inhabitants everywhere continued to fly on his approach. No opposition, however, was ofl^ered to the ad- vance of Moncey till he reached the bridge of Pajaso. There he found two or three thousand armed peasants, supported by a corps of about eight hundred Swiss Guards, prepared to dispute his passage, A clumsy work ha we b^ to subjoin that of Colonel Napier. " As the inhabitants took no part in the con- test," says that officer, " and received the French without any signs of aversion, the town was protected from pillage ! and Dupont, fixing his quarters there, sent his patrols as fu* as Ecija, without meeting with an enemy." It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by Colonel Napier, without any quotation of auUiority ! DIFFICULTIES OF DUPONT. 157 1808. June. The difficulties of Dupont were in no degree chap. v. diminished by the conquest and massacre of Cordova. The intelligence he received from Cadiz informed him of the surrender of Rossilly. He learned, also, that Castanos, and the army under his command, had declared in favour of the Constitution, and were advancing to invest his position ; and that the passes of the Sierra were occupied by bodies of armed smugglers, which cut oflF his communication with Madrid.* Under these circumstances, Dupont judged it prudent again to retire on Andujar, where he took up his position on the nineteenth. On his arrival, a detachment was immediately ordered jun. 19. to attack a band of insurgent peasantry at Jaen, which, by pressing on his out-posts, and cutting o£P his detachments, had occasioned considerable • The following extract, from an intercepted letter of Dupont to General Beliard, gives a striking picture of the difficulties with which he felt himself to be surrounded at this period. " We have not a moment to lose in quitting a position where we cannot exist. The soldier, all day under arms, cannot, as hitherto, reap the corn and make bread ; and all the peasantry have forsaken their homes. For Heaven's sake send us prompt assistance, — ^send us a strong body of troops, — send us, without delay, medicines and linen for the wounded ; for the enemy, for s month past, have intercepted all our ammunition, our wag- gons, and our provisions, from Toledo." 158 TOWN OF JAEN PILLAGED* 1808. June. 1 Foy. CHAP. V. annoyance. This service was performed with success; the town of Jaen was pillaged, and many of its inhabitants massacred, but the de- tachment returned without having been able to procure a supply of provisions to relieve the necessities of the army. The war on both sides had become one of barbarous and wanton cruelty. The people sought vengeance for the massacre of Cordova ; and they found it. All prisoners that fell into their hands were mur- dered. At Manzanares, they assaulted the hospital and massacred the sick. General Rene was siezed at Carolina, and thrown alive into a caldron of boiling water. Other officers were sawn in twain. The war of the most savage tribes could not exceed in guilt and cruelty, the contest of these two civilized and Christian nations. While at Andujar, Dupont was at length joined by the expected reinforcements from Ma- drid ; and was enabled to muster in the field nearly twenty thousand men. But even with this force he still continued inactive. Had he advanced to Seville, or at once determin- ed on evacuating the province, there can be little doubt that, in either case, his operations I I DUPONT RETREATS TO ANDUJAR. 159 1808. June. would have been attended by comparative sue- chap. r. cess. Had Seville not been his object he ought " never to have advanced to Cordova. Nothing had occurred after his march from Andujar, which should have had any influence in chang- ing his resolution. To remain at Cordova was to court defeat, to suffer himself to be hemmed in by the insurgent armies, to submit volun- tarily to the evils of a blockade. Sev'dle was the chief focus of the insurrection ; it contained abundant supplies, possessed a wealthy popula- tion, and, by attacking it, Dupont would have aimed a blow at the very heart which had occa- sioned a strong insurrectionary pulsation through every member of the kingdom. On the other hand, there were no obstacles of any serious magnitude to interrupt his retreat. The passes of the Sierra were occupied only by bands of peasants and smugglers, unequal to sus- tain the assault of regular troops ; and, in the plains of La Mancha, he might have awaited the arrival of such reinforcements as would have en- abled him successfuUy to encounter the insur- gent forces. But such views, though they might have had some influence with any ordinary general, had 160 CHARACTER OP DUPONT*S POSITION. ATTACK ON THE GRENADAN INSURGENTS. 161 1808. June. CMARV. none with Dupont. With the main-body of th0 army he remained at Andujar ; and the division of General Vedel was advanced to Baylen, with the view of maintaining, uninterrupted, the com- munication with La Mancha. In the choice of his position, Dupont displayed little mUitary judgment. It commanded indeed the main road from Seville to Madrid, but was liable to be turned at many points, in the season when the Guadalquiver became fordable ; and at all sea- sons by the bridge of Marmolexo, about two leagues lower do^-n the river, and by the ferry of Mengibar, about twice that distance higher up. Works, however, were erected for the defence of the bridge at Andujar ; and Dupont, blind to the real perils of his position, evidently anticipated that this would become the chief object of the enemy's attack. The enemy were not idle. Their commander was Don Francisco Xavier de Castanos, a gener- al devoid neither of talent nor experience, and destined to play a conspicuous part in the pro- gress of that war of which we have ah-eady traced the commencement. Vigorous preparations were making in Andalusia and the neighbouring pro- vinces to attack Dupont ; and the circle from 1808. June. which the supplies of the French army could be chap, v/ drawn was becoming gradually more confined. A body of the insurgents from Grenada had ad- vanced to Jaen, and were preparing to move on Carolina. It was necessary these should be dis- persed ; and General Cassagne, with a brigade of Vedel's division, was ordered to advance for this purpose. General Cassagne was successful in his attack on the insurgents, whom he routed after a severe engagement ; yet he did not return to Baylen without considerable loss, and a fame blackened by the perpetration of the most horri- ble enormities. In the meanwhile, the organization of fresh troops was proceeding without intermission at Seville. Every hour of delay was bringing fresh accessions of strength to the Spanish army. The inaction of the French army — naturally attri- buted to timidity — gave new confidence both to the leaders and the people. The army of Cas- tanos, formed into four divisions, was gradually approaching the French army, and narrowing the sphere of its influence on the surrounding country. The first division, commanded by Gen- eral Reding, was, in number, about ten thou- sand, and fonned the right of the army. The 162 OPERATIONS OF CASTANOS. HE ADVANCES TO ARJONILLA. 163 1808. JuJy. CHAP. V. second, about six thousand strong, was led by the Marquis de Coupigny, a Frenchman by birthy who had served in the Walloon Guards. The third division, and the reserve, under Don Felix Jones, an Irish refugee, and Don Manuel de la Pena, amounted, together, to about ten thous- Jal. 9. and men. On the ninth of July, it occupied a position extending from Carpio to Porcunas. On the eleventh, the scheme of operations against Dupont was concerted in a council of war. At this meeting, it was arranged that Reding's division should cross the Guadalquiver at Mengibar, and advance on Baylen ; that Cou- pigny should proceed, by Villa Nueva and La Hiquereta, to support the operations of Reding ; and that the remainder of the army, under Cas- tanos, should attack the enemy's position in front simultaneously with the meditated advance on his rear by Reding and Coupigny. Tlie light troops were directed to cross by Mamiolexo, and gain possession of the passes of the Morena leading to Estremadura. On the thirteenth, Reding advanced to Men- gibar, and, by a gallant attack, drove the enemy from the tete-du-pont, and established himself in the village, which, on the appearance of Vedel's Jul. IS. 1808. July. Jul. 15. division, he judged it prudent to evacuate. On chap. v. the fourteenth, the force of Coupigny appear- ed in the neighbourhood of Villa Nueva, and a continued skirmish took place during the day. On the fifteenth, Castanos occupied in force the heights of Arjonilla, and opened an immediate fire with his artillery on the bridge of Andujar. Dupont was deceived by this. He imagined the attack would be made in that quarter, and disposed his army accordingly. The Spanish light infantry, under Colonel Cruz, crossed near Marmolexo, and made an attack on the rear of the French army. This was speedi- ly repelled. Cruz retired with his skirmishers ; and Castanos, who had made a simultaneous de- monstration in front of the enemy, returned to his position. The circumstances of his situation appeared, however, to Dupont to become hourly more alarming ; and, ignorant of the occurrences at Mengibar, he directed Vedel to despatch a bri- gade to his assistance. Vedel, who had been strengthened by the arrival of Gobert's bri- gade at Baylen, either did not understand the order of his leader, or did not choose to obey it. On the evening of the fifteenth. I 164 RCDING CARRIES MENOIBAtt, AND PURSUES THE ENEMY TO BAYLEN. 165 CHAP.v. he set out for Andujar with his whole division, IQQQ leaving only a small body, under General Leger July. Bellair, to defend the village and ferry of Men- gibar. Reding took advantage of this. On the morn- ing of the sixteenth he sent forward his skirmish- ers as if intending to gain possession of the boats, while the main-body of his army crossed the river, about half a league above, at the ford of JuL 16. Rincon. The French immediately retreated. Reding followed up his success, and drove them in confusion from point to point till the arrival of Gobert, who, on hearing of the attack, ad- vanced immediately from Baylen. The arrival of this reinforcement retarded, though it did not stop, the progress of the assailants. General Gobert was killed. The French were driven back into Baylen ; and Reding, carrying with him a piece of artillery, and all the baggage of the detachment, retired to Mengibar. On the following day he crossed the Guadalquiver, and effected a junction with Coupigny. No sooner had Dupont received intelligence of these events, than, instead of concentrating his force at Andujar, he ordered Vedel to return on the night following to Baylen, and, uniting his force with that of General Darfour, who chap. v. had succeeded Gobert in the command, again to drive the Spaniards across the Guadalquiver. j , Before his arrival, Darfour had retired to Caro- lina, in consequence of a report that a body of the Spanish army were advancing on that town by the Linhares road. Vedel was naturally astonished at the sudden and unexpected evacua- tion of this important post, but relying on the accuracy of Darfour's intelligence, he followed Jul* 18. the movement of that general, and likewise fell back to Carolina. Reding, thus left without an enemy in his front, advanced successively to Baylen and the neighbourhood of Andujar, where he took up a position in rear of the French army, ready to take part in the anticipated attack of Castanos. Dupont's illusion respecting the strength of his position was at length dispelled. Taking every precaution to conceal his intention from the enemy, he abandoned Andujar on the night of the eighteenth, carrying with him the pillage of the city. By day-dawn he had advanced about five jui. i% leagues on the road to Baylen, when his ad- vanced-guard came in contact with the Spanish out-posts. Reding, ignorant of the motions of 166 BATTLE OF BAYLEN. 1808. July. Hi CHAP. V. his adversary, was at that moment forming his columns of attack on Andujar. The appearance of the French army took him wholly hy surprise, yet all his arrangements were made with prompti- tude and skill. Reding had formed his army on the acclivity of a hill, rugged, intersected hy deep ravines, and covered with plantations of olive. Dupont resolved at once on attack. It was ab- solutely necessary that he should recover Baylen, and re-open the communication with the scattered divisions of his army. He saw at last that the chances of a battle were less formidable than the evils of continued inaction, and determined on the adoption of that policy which, at an earlier period, would probably have been productive of a happier issue. Dupont halted his advanced-guard, and waited for the coming up of his army, a large propor- tion of which, encumbered by plunder, were yet a great way in the rear. Reding lost no time in attacking that portion of the French army already opposed to his division, and opened on them a destructive fire from all his artillery. The French cavahy at length came up, and were ordered instantly to charge. They did so with distinguished gallantry, but without succesf. BATTLE OF BAYLEN. 167 1808. July. General Dupr6 was killed in an attack on the chap. v. Walloon Guards ; and though the Spaniards at first lost ground, the cavalry were eventually repulsed with considerable loss. On the right of the line the Swiss battalions of either army were brought into conflict. Here the battle was waged on both sides with great vigour and pertinacity. Victory at length declared for the Spaniards. The French were driven back through the whole extent of their line, and were compelled to abandon their ar- tillery. Fresh reinforcements, however, were contin- ually arriving to the French army from the rear. These, with singular want of judgment, Dupont pushed forward into action as they arrived, thus affording to the enemy an op- portunity they did not neglect, of beating h& whole army in detail. A marine battalion of the Imperial Guard, which belonged to the reserve of the army, at length came up and overthrew the enemy opposed to it with singular gallantry. A general charge was made by the cavalry, which broke for a moment the Spanish line. But it was found impossible to 168 DUPONT PROPOSES AN ARMISTICE. 1808. July. CHAP.v. drive the Spaniards from their ground ; and the efforts of the French array gradually slackened. Under these circumstances, two Swiss batta- lions in the French service, which had already distinguished themselves in the action, went over to the enemy. The troops, fatigued by a long night marcli, and exhausted by the burning rays of the sun, were unequal to further exertion ; and Dupont, having failed in battle, determined to try the chance of negotiation. This might have been more successful, had not the advance of the army of Castanos, under General La Pena, at that moment attacked the bridge on the Andujar road, which Barbou's brigade had been left to defend. On hearing the report of artil- lery in the rear, Reding, who had readily accept- ed Dupont's proposal of an armistice, with the view to the arrangement of a convention, became at once aware of the advantages of his situation, and of the extent of the difficulties by which the French army was surrounded. In the new view thus afforded him of the situation of the armies, he declined the responsibility of grant- ing any terms, and referred the bearer of Du- pont's proposals to General Castanos, at Andujar, OPERATIONS OF VEDEL. 169 1808. July. The latter was disposed to insist that Dupont chap. v. should surrender at discretion ; yet ultimately consented to a stipulation, that his army should be embarked in Spanish vessels, and conveyed to France. During the progress of these disastrous events, the question naturally arises, where was Vedel ? It is difficult, on any hypothesis, to account for his conduct. That officer had quitted Carolina at an early hour, and marched on Baylen. As he advanced, the report of artillery became more frequent and distinct, and afforded satisfactory evidence of an engagement having taken place between the armies. About nine o'clock he reached Guarroman, about two leagues dis- tant from Baylen ; and in that neighbourhood halted to refresh his soldiers. There he remain- ed for several hours, though aware that the ar- mies were engaged ; and when he at length continued his advance, so little did he seem to dread the result of the action, that the brigades of Darfour and La Grange were left on the halting ground. On approaching Baylen, a body of troops were perceived, which Vedel imagined to be part of the army of Dupont. He was deceived. VOL. I. H 170 SURRENDSR OF THE FRENCH ARMY. i8oa J«ly. CHAP.V. Th» troops in question were Spaniiirds; and Vedel, on perceiving his mistake, despatched or- ders for the immediate advance of the troops at Guarroman, and prepared to attack the enemy in his position. Reding made every disposition to repel thc^ advance of Vedel, and announced, under a flag of truce, the suspension of arms, which had already taken effect between the Spanish array and that of Dupont, In spite of this communication, some fighting took place, but without any fa- vourable result on the fortunes of the French army. At length an order arrived from Du- pont, directing a cessation of hostilities. Vedel obeyed ; and in the course of the night retreated to Carolina, bearing with him the prisoners, cannon, and standards, which he had captured hma the enemy. We now come to the extraordinary «itas- trophe of these most singular preliminaries. On Jul. 22. the twenty-seGOttd, the armies of Dupont and Vedel, amounting to about eighteen thousand, laid down their arms before an army, inferior in all military requisites, and not greatly superior in numbers. Never did the chivalry of Fra»ce receive a ITS ANIMATING EFFECT ON THE PEOPLE. 171 1808. July. deeper tarnish than in the surrender of Bay- chap. v. len. Occurring in such circumstances, and at such a period, it could not fail to exert a powerful influence on the character and events of the war. All hope of speedy conquest was at once overthrown. Baylen was one of those dis- asters which the sophistry of Napoleon could neither varnish nor disguise. Eighteen thousand of the French army had laid down their arms, before men whom they had uniformly derided as an undisciplined and cowardly rabble. A blot had fallen on the proud escutcheon of France, which eloquence could not deepen, and certainly could not erase. Intelligence of this proud achievement flew with the speed of lightning through every quar- ter of the kingdom, stirring the hearts of the people like the blast of a trumpet. Tliey had now practically learned the animating truth, that the French were not invincible ; that even by men undisciplined and inexperi- enced in war, the soldiers, before whose prow- ess the world bad bent in awe, might be en- countered and overthrown. The projects of the enemy had not only been foiled, but that enemy kad been humbled into submission. The Anda- 172 THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF THE VICTORY CHAP. V. lusians felt that they had not only conquered the soldiers of France, but stamped disgrace upon J , ' her arms ; and it would be too much to expect, from such a people, that they should reduce their vanity within due limits, and apportion, to the ignorance and vacillation of the leader whom they had subdued, their real share of the exploit. Could those who beheld an army of eighteen thousand French soldiers, submit to the ignominious ceremony of depositing their arms, and afterwards march tamely into captiv- ity, amid the jeers and insults of a triumphant and indignant people, retain from that hour any vehement and pervading terror of the arms of France ? The plumage of those eagles which, in other lands, had soared victoriously over fields of blood and battle, they beheld soiled in the dust. Against the spoilers of their beautiful country, against the men who had not hesitated to support the cause of usurpation by massacre and outrage, who had trampled, in the inso- lence of power, on all they held dearest and most sacred, the heart of every Spaniard wae naturally animated by sentiments of indignant hatred ; but fear, at such a moment, did not, and could not mingle in their feelings. The terrors THROUGHOUT SPAIN. 173 of the French arms, for a time at least, were chap. v. gone. France would require many victories, to efface the memory of that solitary and disgrace- , , fill defeat. It must be confessed, however, that, to the Spanish cause, the consequences of the victory of Baylen were not wholly beneficial. It contributed to inspire the people with a degree of self-confi- dence altogether unwarranted by the circum- stances of the nation, or the power and character of its invaders. It is well, in such a struggle, that the people should feel confident of victory ; but they should likewise be impressed by the necessity of powerful, consentaneous, and per- severing exertion. The self-esteem of the Span- ish nation, their vague and dreamlike reliance on their own prowess and resources, required no Baylen to rouse them into due influence and ac- tivity. Constitutionally addicted to form an ex- aggerated estimate of their own powers, it be- came doubly dangerous to undervalue those of their enemy. Of this fault they cannot be ac- quitted; and of its injurious influence on the subsequent fortunes of the war, the progress of this narrative will afford abundant illustration. The feelings of Napoleon, on receiving intelli- 174 THE EFFECT PRODUCED ON NAPOLEON. 1808. July. CHAP. V. g-ence of the defeat and surrender of Baylen, may readily be conceived. On their return to France, Dupont, and all the generals of his army, were seized and imprisoned. The former, it has been asserted, died by poison in a dungeon. But why should Napoleon have been guilty of a crime to rid the world of a man like Dupont ? To all the nobler purposes of existence he was already dead. He had become a thing for the finger of scorn to point at. The forfeit of his life wa« not necessary either for the purpose of example or retribution. To such a man death was a re- fuge, not a punishment. In dying, Dupont would have encountered but the common lot of hu- manity, the fate alike of the proudest as of the humblest of mankind ; but in continuing an in- glorious existence, amid the scorn and contempt of his fellow-creatures, he stood forth the mark- ed and solitary object of a terrific retribution. Every efibrt of the French Government wag exerted to veil, from public notice, the disastrous circumstances of Baylen. All discussion on the subject was prohibited in the public journals ; and it was only after a lapse of four years, that a military court was assembled for the purpose of inquiring into the circumstances of the capi- VIOLATION OP THE TERMS OF THE SURRENDER. 175 1808. July. tulation. What the result was, is unknown ; but chap. v. shortly afterwards an Imperial decree appeared, by which the punishment of death was denoun- ced on any general, who should hereafter become party to a capitulation by which the troops of France should, in the open field, be made to lay down their arms. By the Spanish authorities, the terms of the surrender of Baylen were shamefully infrin- ged. The troops, instead of being convey- ed to France, were imprisoned in the hulks at Cadiz ; and, on their march, little protection wag afforded from the fury of the people. Few indeed of these unfortunate soldiers sur- vived the horrors of their confinement. Some years afterwards, a few hundreds, rendered des- perate by suffering, cut the cables of their pri- son-ship ; and, allowing her to drift to sea, under a heavy fire, were fortunately rescued by their countrymen, then blockading Cadiz. Such was the result of the first invasion of Andalusia. 176 BVENTS IN THE NORTH. CHAPTER VI. OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES. 1808. JttDe. CHAP. VI. While the arms of France were thus encoun- tering reverses in the East and South, the most important scene of struggle was in the North. By defeat in the other quarters of Spain, the war was merely prolonged, and the ultimate issue of the contest rendered more doubtful and remote. By defeat in the Northern Provinces, especially in those of Leon and Old Castile, the safety of the French armies, in every quarter of the kingdom, was immediately endangered. The primary basis of operations of the whole armies was Bayonne, and the conmiunication between that city and Madrid could not be interrupted without oc- casioning, in the words of Napoleon, "an univer- sal paralysis.** MEASURES OF MARSHAL BESSIERES. 177 1808. June. On the first appearance of insurrection in the chap. vi. North, vigorous measures were adopted by Marshal Bessieres, to restore submission and tranquillity. General Lefebvre Desnouettes was directed to advance from Pampluna to Zaragoza. From Bur- gos, detachments were sent against Valladolid, St. Andero, Segovia, and Legrono. Of the progress and results of these operations, it is necessary that we should now speak somewhat in detail The force destined for the reduction of St. Andero, was placed under the command of Gen- eral Merle. Before the insurgent army were a- ware of his having entered the Asturias he had reached Reynosa. While there he received orders to halt, in consequence of an insurrection having broken out in Valladolid, a city whose military importance was incalculably greater than that of St. Andero. To reduce this place to obe- dience, General Lasalle was despatched by Bes- sieres with a force of about five thousand men, and six pieces of artillery. He arrived at Tor- quemada on the seventh of June. Five hundred Jun. 7. peasants had obstructed the passage of the bridge with chains and waggons, and taken post in the surrounding houses and in the H2 178 DEFEAT OF CUESTA AT CABE9ON. CHAP. VI. church of Torquemada. The bridge was at once carried by the infantry of Lasalle, the town W* ^^ ^^^^ ^""^ burned, and the flying peasants were pursued and mercilessly sabred by the enemy. Jun. 8. On the eighth, Lasalle entered Palencia. The prayer of the Bishop, that the to\ni should be spared, was granted ; and, having disarmed the inhabitants, he proceeded to Duenas on the twelfth. There he was joined by General Merle; and the army, thus strengthened, ad- vanced on the following day to attack Cuesta, Captain-General of the province, at Cabe^on. Jun. 9. The force of that General was drawn up on the right bank of the Pisuerga, with the intention of defending the bridge and the toHTi. The French made a vigorous attack in two columns, and were completely successful. The Spaniards were driven with great slaughter at all points, and many plunging into the river were drowned. The loss occasioned to the French, by this en- gagement, amounted only to twelve killed and thirty wounded ; that of Cuesta's army is report- ed to have been very great, and no quarter was granted by the victors. ' Having achieved this victory, the French SURRENDER OF VALLADOLID. 179 Generals continued their advance to Valladolid. chap.vi. The defeat of Cuesta had left that city at the mercy of the enemy. A deputation of the chief j^^^^ authorities, headed by the Bishop, came forth to solicit clemency, and oflfer submission. All the arms and warlike stores found in the arsenal, were sent to Burgos ; and fifty hostages, for the future obedience of the city, chosen ft*om the families of greatest rank and influence, were ex- acted by the French Generals. While aflairs had put on so pacific an aspect at Valladolid, the presence of the French armies was required in other quarters. On the six- jun. le. teenth, General Lasalle broke up from Valla- dolid, and returned to Palencia. The division of General Merle was ordered to resume its op- erations against St. Andero ; and a brigade, un- der General Ducos, was directed to advance by Frias and Soncillo, to efi^ect a junction with the force under that officer. During his march to Reynosa, where he ar- rived on the twentieth, Merle's army encoun- ju^. 20. tered no opposition. But in the mountainous country around the Venta del Escudo, he found an insurgent force prepared to oppose his pro- gress. They occupied a range of defiles, through \ r i 180 MERLE DEFEATS THE INSURGENTS CHAP. VI. which it was necessary the French should pass on their route to St. Andero ; and had the skill J and vigour of the defence been equal to the strength of the position, the French must have been unsuccessful in the attempt to dislodge a military body so formidably posted. Merle formed his army into three columns, two of which were directed to scale the moun- tains, and take the enemy in flank, while the third advanced by the road, and made a charge on the front of the position. The Spaniards were driven at all points ; several guns were captured ; and the pursuit of the flying enemy was continued for some distance along the St. Andero road. Before reaching the point of his destination, General Merle had another obstacle to encounter. The road between Las Fraquas and Somahoz, is scooped out of the rock for a considerable dis- tance, and is flanked on one side by an almost perpendicular mountain, and on the other by a steep and precipitous ravine. Here the Span- iards had barred the road by an abattis, sur- mounted by four pieces of cannon, and defended by a numerous detachment of their army. In order to overcome this formidable impedi- AND ADVANCES TO ST. ANDERO. 181 ment. Merle sent out columns on either flank, chap.vi. directinff them, bv a circuitous route, to take the 1808. enemy in rear. These lateral movements were » •' June. successful. The Spaniards no sooner descried the approach of the columns than they hastily retreated ; and the French, without further op- position, entered St. Andero on the following day. In that city a junction was effected with the corps of Ducos, who, on his march, had de- feated a considerable body of the insurgents, by whom his progress had been obstructed at the pass of Soncillo. These vigorous measures were for a time suc- cessful in subduing resistance in the surround- ing country ; and the chief towns of Leon, Bis- cay, Asturias, and Navarre, awed into tempo- rary submission, sent deputies to Bayonne, to make formal declaration of obedience to the in- trusive sovereign. The operations against Aragon, were con- ducted by Lefebvre Desnouettes. The leader of the insurrection in that kingdom was Don Joseph Revolledo de Palafox, whose name, if devoted patriotism afford claim of exemption from oblivion, will be pronounced with honour by posterity. Palafox was the youngest of three Cavallero. 182 OPERATIONS IN ARAOON. 1808. June. CHAP. VI. brothers, and belonged to one of the most an- cient and distinguished families in the kingdom. He had accompanied his sovereign to Bayonne ; and his loyalty^ amid the trying circumstances of the times, had been ardent and unswerving. As Captain- General, he had exerted his authority in suppressing popular commotions, and in organ- izing an effective system of resistance to the common enemy. In this honoiu^ble path his progress was beset with difficulties. Aragon was alike destitute of regular troops, and of arms and ammunition. No province in the kingdom was poorer in defensive resources. She was rich only in the spirit of her people, and in the talent and heroic devotion of her leader. By Palafox every thing was done to give effect to the popular resistance. With the deserters from the regular army in other provinces, he organ- ized new regiments. A body of artillery was equipped for the field ; and all who could procure arms, enrolled themselves as his followers. When Lefebvre was directed to advance against Aragon, the Baron de Vergage, an offi- cer of the Walloon Guards, was at Calatayud, which he occupied with a battalion of students, and was daily adding to his force by the volun- ADVANCE OF LEFEBVRE. 183 1808. June. Jun. 9. tary enlistment of the neighbouring population, chap. vi. Palafox was at Zaragoza, from which place he detached a body of his army to assist the people of Tudela in defending the passage of the Ebro. The roads from the neighbouring provinces were guarded by detachments of troops, armed and organized with as much efficiency as the urgency of the juncture would permit. On the seventh of June, 1 efebvre commenced Jun. 7. his march from Pampluna, with a force of five thousand infantry, eight hundred cavalry, and several pieces of artillery. On the ninth, he came in contact with the insurgent force at Tudela, and routed them without difficulty. With unwarrantable cruelty, the leaders of the insur- rection were put to death, and the French army continued its advance on Zaragoza. On learning this disaster, Palafox, with nine thousand of his raw levies, and a few pieces of badly organized artillery, advanced to Mallen, and took post on the rivulet of Huerba. Here he was attacked by Lefebvre, and driven with J»n. 13. slaughter and loss of cannon from his ground. Another attempt was made to dispute the pass- age of the Xalon, but without success. The French army took possession of Alagon on the 184 PALAFOX ENTERS ZARAGOZA. CHAP. VI. fifteenth, and on the day following appeared be- jgQg^ fore Zaragoza. June. Palafox and his army had already retreated to the city, where every preparation for defence was immediately set on foot. He took up a Jun. 16. position in the surrounding gardens and olive grounds, and along the banks of the canal ; and having planted his cannon to defend the gates of the city, awaited the approach of the enemy. The conflict which ensued was bloody. The in- surgents fought without order, yet with a re- solution worthy of their cause. A body of the French army forced its way into the city, but was driven back with heavy loss by the inhabi- tants, who assailed them from the roofs and windows of the houses. The carnage was great on both sides; andLefebvre, probably little pre- pared for a resistance so vehement and deter- mined, having dislodged Palafox from his posi- tion, withdrew his army, and awaited the arrival of reinforcements. Zaragoza was a walled, but not a fortified city. It stands in an extensive plain covered with vineyards and olive groves ; and, within reach of cannon, is commanded on the south-west by a hill caUed the Monte Torrero, which forms the DESCRIPTION OF ZARAGOZA. 185 .. site of a convent. On one side the walls are chap. vi. washed by the Ebro, across which the communi- jgQg cation with the suburbs is by a bridge of stone ; j^jc and at the base of the Monte Torrero, the canal of Aragon runs in a direction nearly parallel to the course of the river. On the east and west, the country is intersected by two tributaries of the Ebro, one of which, the Huerba, approaches very closely to the walls of the city. In summer the Huerba is generally dry ; but the winter tor- rents have worn deeply into the soil, and thus formed a ravine, which is crossed m the neigh- bourhood of the city by two bridges. The Gal- lego, a river of considerable magnitude, dis- charges its waters into the Ebro, nearly opposite to the point of confluence of the Huerba. The walls, though old, were massive, gener- ally about ten feet high, and built of brick and rough stones. They were, apparently, not meant for the purposes of defence, but merely to ena- ble the civic authorities to levy taxes on every Vaughan. article brought into the to^vn for sale. The gates, which are nine in number, are of the most dmple construction, and the alignment between them is, in some places, preserved by the mud- wall of a garden — in others, by convents and 186 PREPARATIONS OF PALAFOX TO DEFEND THE CITY. 187 1808. Ju&e. CHAP. VI , dwelling-houses, or by the remains of an old Moorish wall, which has a slight parapet, but without any platform, even for musquetry. The city is built of brick ; the houses are three sto- ries in height, and the streets narrow and crook- ed, with the exception of one or two market- places, and the street called the Cozo, situated nearly in the centre of the town. Such was the situation, and such the defensive appliances, of Zaragoza. To an eye merely military, it would probably have appeared incap- able of resisting a siege. To one of keener pe- netration, which saw that all the energies of it« numerous population were powerfully roused to the determination of resolute resistance, the cause, though perilous and doubtful, might not have seemed hopeless. But of a defence so gal- lant and heroic, as that by which the siege of Zaragoza has been rendered for ever historically memorable— of an endurance so unshrinking of sufferings, ^\ hich it is even painful to contem- plate, no anticipation could have been formed by the most prescient observer. Palafox, driven into the city, did not relax in his efforts for its defence. He exhorted the in- habitants to continue steadfast to the cause in \ which they had gloriously embarked. He be-(HAP.vi. sought them to prove, by their actions, that ^^^g they were worthy of the precious blood which j^^^ had been already shed in their behalf. He animated them by assurance of victory, but did not conceal the price at which it was neces- sary it should be bought. Their soil was alrea- dy moist with the martyr blood of their breth- ren. Tlie Moloch of tyranny required new vic- tims — " Let us," he said, " be prepared for the sacrifice." But the views of Palafox were not confined to the internal defence of Zaragoza. As Cap- tain-General of Aragon, his duties had a wider scope. He had to organize and embody the re- sistance of the whole province ; and, unwilling to hazard every thing on a single contingency, he determined to distract the attention of the enemy from the siege, by another effort from without. He accordingly quitted Zaragoza ; and, crossing the Ebro at Pina, with such force as he had been enabled to collect, proceeded to Belchite, where he effected a junction with the corps of Versage. With the army thus collect- ed, amounting to about six thousand men, Pala- fox immediately advanced to Epila, in order to 188 PALAFOX DEFEATED AT EPILA. CHAP. VI. cut oflP the supplies of the French army. Some IgQg of his troops betrayed reluctance again to en- June, counter in the field an enemy with whom it was already apparent they were unequal to cope ; and several of the higher officers proposed re- treating to Valencia. Such timid counsels were rejected. Palafox oflTered passports to all who chose, at such a moment, to forsake his standard. " Let those who love me follow me," was his brief but emphatic address to the soldiers : — the whole army followed him. Lefebvre no sooner learned that Palafox was in the field, than he advanced to attack him. On Jun. 23. the night of the twenty-third the engagement took place. The Spanish army were unequal to cope with the superior skill and discipline of their opponents. Two thousand of their num- ber were killed or wounded; the whole artillery was captured ; and Palafox, defeated but unsub- dued, retreated to Calatayud. There he re- mained for a few days, endeavouring, with un- daunted spirit, to re-organize the wreck of his gallant band. On the first of July he again en- tered Zaragoza. In the meanwhile, the army of Lefebvre had been joined by that of General Verdier, who Jul. 1. HE RE-ENTERS ZARAGOZA. 189 1808. June. had been successfully employed in the reduction chap. vi. of Lograno, and by some battalions of Portu- guese. A heavy battering train was likewise brought up from Pamplunft ; and the combined force, thus collected for the siege of the city, amounted to about twelve thousand men. On the twenty-seventh, an attempt was made to Jun. 27. carry the Torrero by assault, in which the ene- my were repulsed with severe loss, leaving six guns, and five waggons of ammunition in the hands of the besieged. On the following day, their efforts were more successful ; and, owing to the cowardice of an artillery-officer, who af- terwards suffered death for his misconduct, the Torrero, and a neighbouring battery, fell into their hands. This misfortune prevented all com- munication with the city from the south. The French battering train was now brought into full action on the city. But the increasing danger which surrounded them, only roused the enthusiasm of the inhabitants to a higher pitch. They planted cannon at every commanding point ; broke loopholes for musquetry in the walls and houses, and converted the awnings of their windows into sacks, which they filled with 190 DEVOTION OP THE PEOPLE. 1808. June. CHAP. VI. sand, and placed in the form of batteries at the ■ gates. Every honse in the environs of the city, which could afford shelter to the enemy, was destroyed. The gardens and olive grounds were even rooted up by the proprietors, wherever they were supposed to impede the general defence. Thus was it, that in this noble struggle for free- dom, all private interests were disregarded. The share taken by the women in the me- morable defence of Zanigoza, it belongs to his- tory to record. By their voices and their smiles, the men were rewarded for past exertions, and animated to new. Regiu-dless of fatigue and danger, they formed parties for relieving the wounded, and for carrying refreshment to those who 8er\^ed in the batteries. Of these undaunted females, the young, delicate, and beautiful Count- ess Burita was the leader. Engaged in her bless- ed work of merciful ministration, with death surrounding her on all sides, she went, with un- shrinking spirit, wherever anguish was to be re- lieved, or sinking courage to be animated. Never, during the whole course of a protracted siege, did she once swerve from her generous and holy purpose. With all a woman's softness 1 .■^'"™.,_. „ HEROISM OF THE WOMEN. 191 1808. June. of heart, yet without a woman's fears, she par- chap. vi. took in every danger and every privation — a creature at once blessed, and bringing blessings. It was impossible, in such circumstances, that the defence of Zaragoza could be otherwise than heroic. Where women suffer, men will die. All ranks and classes of society laboured alike in the defence. Mothers, tearless and un- trembling, sent forth their children to partake in the common peril, and to perform such la- bours as their strength would permit. The priests took arms and mingled in the ranks. The ammunition was made into cartridges by the nuns. In Zaragoza all hearts were animated by a sacred zeal in the cause of liberty and their country. On the night of the twenty-eighth, a powder J""* 28. magazine blew up in the centre of the city, by which fourteen houses were destroyed, and two hundred men killed. This has been attributed to treachery, but without evidence. The enemy, however, took advantage of the confusion which such an occurrence could not fail to create, and opened a heavy fire on the city, which continued with little intermptioQ during the whole of the succeeding day. 192 THE FRENCH ATTACK THE CITY. CHAP. VI 1808. Junf. In the morning the Portillo gate, and the castle in its vicinity, became the chief object of attack; and the fire of the French artil- lery, concentrated on that point, destroyed the sand-bag battery erected for its defence. This, however, was continually re-constnicted by the indefatigable labours of the people. Here the carnage was excessive. The battery was repeatedly cleared of its defenders ; and so vehement and overwhelming was the fire of the enemy, that the citizens at length stood aghast at the slaughter, and recoiled from en- tering a scene already glutted with victims. At this moment it was, that a young female, named Augustina, of the lower class of the people, arrived at the battery with refreshments. She read the prevailing con- sternation in the countenances of those around her ; and snatching a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, she sprung forward among the bodies of the dead and dying, and fired ofi* a twenty-six pounder ; then mounting the gun, made a solemn vow, never, during the siege, to quit the battery alive. This animating specta- cle revived the drooping courage of the people. The guns were instantly re-manned, and point- 2 * *^ TS ■■*. ',m Z^ AND ARE REPULSED WITH SLAUGHTER. 193 1808. July. ed with such efi'ect, that the French were re- chap. vi. pulsed with great slaughter ; and having sufiered severely at other points, Verdier at length gave orders for retreat. On the second of July another attempt was Jul. 2. made to effect an entrance by the Portillo. A strong column advanced toward the gate with fixed bayonets, and without firing a shot. They were received with so destructive a fire, both of grape shot and small arms, that their ranks fell into disorder ; and, dispersing on all hands, no further attempt was made on that quarter of the city. Another column advanced against the gate Del Carmen ; and there also the enemy ex- perienced a spirited repulse. Hitherto the French had remained on the right bank of the Ebro. On the eleventh they Jul. ii. effected the passage of the river at a ford above the city ; and Verdier crossed a body of his ar- my, in order to protect a floating bridge which he was engaged in constructing. This was fin- ished on the fourteenth, notwithstanding every Jul. 14. effort of the garrison to impede the work. The cavalry immediately passed the river ; and scour- ing the country in all directions, destroyed the corn-mills, levied contributions on the villages, VOL. I. I 194 THE SUPPLIES OF THE CITY ARE CUT OFF. 1808. July. Vaughan. THAP. VI. and deprived the city of its supplies. The pow- der-mills of Villa Feliche, from which the city received its supplies, after a severe contest with the corps of Versage, were likewise gained pos- session of by the enemy. But the energy of Palafox, and the fertility of resource by which he was distinguished, did not desert him in these trying circumstances. In the city he erected com -mills, which were work- ed by horses, and the monks were employed in the somewhat unclerical and anomalous operation of manufacturing gimpowder. For this purpose all the sulphur in the city was collected ; nitre was extracted from the soil of the streets ; and charbon was supplied by the hemp stalks, which in that part of Spain are of unwonted magni- tude. By the end of July the city was entirely in- vested, and its defenders had already suffered severely from want of provisions. But the spirit of the people did not flag. Frequent sor- ties were made with the view of re-opening the communication with the country ; and, embold- ened by the arrival of the regmient of Estrema- dura, which had found its way into the city, an attempt was made to regain the Torrero by as- THE HOSPITAL TAKES FIRE. 195 1808. August. sault. This failed ; and the inhabitants, despair- chap. vi. ing of success in any external effort of hostility, determined to remain within the walls of their city, and perish, if necessary, in its ruins. On the night of the second of August and on the following day, the French bombarded the city. An hospital, containinL*^ the sick and Aug. 3. wounded, caught fire, and was speedily reduced to ashes. Every effort was made to rescue the sufferers. Men and women distinguished them- selves alike in this work of noble humanity, and, rushing amid the flames, braved all danger in the high excitement of the moment. It is pleasant that the annals of war and bloodshed, may be occasionally redeemed by the record of events like these. The efforts of the besiegers did not slack, though their progress was retarded by the daily sorties of the garrison. On the fourth of An- Aug. 4. gust, at daybreak, they began battering in breach, and by nine o'clock the troops in two columns advanced to the assault. One of these made good its entrance near the Con- vent St. Engracia, the other by the Puerta del Carmen, which was carried by assault. The 196 THE CITY IS AGAIN ASSAULTED. ll CHAP. VI. first obstacle overcome, the French took the batteries in reverse, and turaed the guns on the citv. A scene of wild havoc and confusion en- August. J sued. The assailants rushed through the streets, and endeavoured to gain possession of the houses. The Convent of St. Francisco and the general hospital took fire, and the flames spread on all CavaUero. hands. Many cast themselves from the win- dows on the bayonets of the soldiers ; and the madmen escaping from the hospital, added to the horrors of the scene, by mingling with the combatants— shouting, shrieking, or laughing, amid the carnage. Wherever the French penetrated they were assailed by a dreadful fire from the houses, all of which had been barricadoed. Dismayed by a resistance so obstinate and destructive, towards evening they lost courage, and re- treated in confiision to that quarter of the city which remained in their possession. The terrible events of the day had thinned the ranks of the assailants. Of their number above fifteen hundred had fallen, including several gen- erals. In such circumstances it was, that the French PALAFOX SUMMONED TO SURRENDER. 197 General summoned Palafox to surrender, in the chap. vi. following laconic note : — Quartel General — Santa Bngracia. La Capitulacion. The answer immediately returned was — Quartel General — Zaragoza, GUERRA AL CUCHILLO. The morning dawned and brought with it a re- »ewal of the dreadful conflict. The French had pe- netrated to the Cozo, and occupied one side of the street while the Spaniards were in possession of the other. In the centre, General Verdier was seen giving orders from the Franciscan convent. Here a contest almost unexampled took place. War was waged from every house ; the street was piled with dead, and an incessant fire was kept up by both parties. The batteries of the Zaragozans, and those of the French were frequently within a few yards of each other. At length the ammunition of the city was nearly expended, yet even this circum- stance induced no thought of surrender. As Palafox rode through the streets, the people crowded round him, and declared that if am- 1808. AugusL Aug. 5. 198 THE MT'RDEROUS CONFLICT IN THE STREETS I CHAP. VI. munition failed they were ready to resist the enemy with their knives. Towards sunset, how- even their hopes were cheered by the unexpec- August. ^ » ^ /.111 ted arrival of Don Francisco Palafox, the brother of their heroic leader, with a reinforcement of three thousand men. Eleven days passed, during which this mur- derous contest was continued, and new horrors were gradually added to the scene. The bodies of the slain which were left unburied in the streets, had become putrid, and tainted the at- mosphere with pestilential odours. Tliis was partially remedied by securing the French prison- ers by ropes, and pushing them forward into the streets, in order to remove the bodies for inter- ment. Aug. 8. On the eighth a council of war was held in the garrison, and in that assembly no voice was heard for surrender. It was determined to maintain those quarters of the city still in their possession with unshaken resolution ; and should the fortune of war be eventually unfavourable to their cause, to retire across the Ebro, and, des- troying the bridge, to perish in defence of the suburbs. There is a moral sublimity in the courage of the unfortunate, in that patient and CONTINUES FOR ELEVEN DAYS. 199 unshrinking fortitude of the spirit, which ena- chap. vi. bles the sufferer to stand fearless and unsubdued amid the fiercest storms of fortune. The devo- August. tion and patriotism of the Zaragozans had been tried by fire, and they came forth pure and unsullied from the ordeal. The resolution of their leaders was communi- cated to the people, and received with loud acclamations. The conflict was continued from Vaugban. street to street, from house to house, from room to room, and with renewed spirit on the part of the defenders. They gradually beat back their opponents, and regained the greater portion of the city. In the mean?rhile, Verdier being wounded had retired from the command, and Le- febvre received orders from Madrid to raise the siege, and take up a position at Milagro. On the night of the thirteenth, a destructive fire Aug. 13. was opened by the enemy from all their batter- ies, and many parts of the city were set on fire. The Church of St. Engracia was blown up, and that venerable fane of ancient religion was levelled with the dust. But the night of terror was followed by a dsLwn of joy. In the morning Aug. 14. the inhabitants beheld the distant columns of their enemy retreating discomfited, from one of 200 THE FRENCH RAISE THE SIEGE AND RETREAT. 1808. August. \ I CHAP. VI. the most murderous and pertinacious struggles of which history bears record. Thus concluded the ever memorable siege of Zaragoza, and thus was achieved the brightest and most honourable triumph of a people strug- gling for freedom. " There is not," says Mr. Southey, in a strain of eloquence worthy of the occasion, " in the annals of ancient or of modern times, a single event recorded, more worthy to be held in admiration, now and for evermore, than the siege of Zaragoza. Will it be said that this devoted people obtained for themselves, by all this heroism and all these sacrifices, nothing more than a short respite from their fate ? Wo be to the slavish heart that conceives the thought, and shame to the base tongue that gives it utter- ance 1 They purchased for themselves an ever- lasting remembrance upon earth — a place in the memory and love of all good men, in all ages that are yet to come. They performed their duty ; they redeemed their souls from the yoke ; they left an example to their country never to be for- gotten, never to be out of mind, and sure to contribute to, and hasten its deliverance." " Let it not be said," observes General Foy, speaking of the defenders of Zaragoza, CHARACTER OF THE DEFENCE. 201 « that it would have been better to preserve chap. vi. themselves, because at a subsequent period ,g^g they were forced to yield. Leonidas also August. died at Thermopylaj, and his death was certain before he went into battle. The glory of Zaragoza is of a similar kind. There too burst forth that religious fervour which embraces the present and the future, the cradle and the tomb, and which becomes still more holy when it is exerted against foreigners and the oppres- sors of our country. There also was exhibited that sublime indifference to life and death, which thinks of nothing but obedience to a noble im- pulse; and there the triumph c^ moral over physical nature was signally achieved."* The retreat of the besieging army left the • After these writers it is almost painful to quote Colonel Napier. ** It is manifest," he asserts, " that Zaragoza owed her safety to (uxulmt, and that the desperate resistance of the inhabitants, toot more the result of chance than qfany peculiar virtue.^'' Chance ! Such is the melancholy extremity to which a writer so talented as Colonel Napier is driven, in denying the heroic devotion of the Zaragozans; and the hypothesis has at least the advantage of being one not likely to encounter refutation. VOL. I. I 2 202 THE STATE OF THE CITY. 1808. August. CHAP. VI. Zaragozans in a state of extreme suffering and exhaustion. Yet the privations of their situa- tion were borne without a murmur. JMany there were who had been reduced from opulence to abject poverty. Parents had to lament their children, wives their husbands, orphans were cast shelterless upon the world. Yet the voice Vaughan. of wailing was not heard in Zaragoza. Private sorrows were not suffered to disturb the glory of the public triumph. The time of trial and excitement had passed away, yet the fortitude of the brave and devoted Zaragozans remained unshaken. Measures were immediately adopted to pre- serve the city from infection. The streets and ruins were cleared from their dead. Ferdinand was publicly proclaimed, and rewards were be- stowed on those who had distinguished them- selves in the struggle. The undaunted Au- g^stina was distinguished by peculiar hon- ours ; and Palafox, in the name of his sovereign, granted to the inhabitants of Zaragoza, the ex- clusive privilege of being perpetually exempted from disgraceful punishment for any cause, save treason or blasphemy. PROCEEDINGS OF DUHESME. 203 1808. CHAPTER Vir. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA. Of the movements in Catalonia we have not chap. vii. yet spoken. It is now necessary we should do so. While the reliance of Spain on the faith of her invaders was yet unbroken, Duhesme, who commanded the army of the eastern Pyrenees, had succeeded by fraud and intimidation in gaining possession of the city of Barcelona, and the fortresses of Figueras and Mont Jouy. On its occupation by the French, the garrison of Barcelona amounted to about four thousand men, but so precarious was the tenure by which that city was held by the intrusive army, that Duhesme connived ^t their escape, and they 204. INSURRECTION AT MANRESA. 1808. May. CHAP. VII. were suffered silently to depart and unite their strength with that of the neighbouring insur- gents. It was in Manresa that the earliest and most formidable ebullition of popular feeling took place. The inhabitants of that town, regard- less of danger, were unanimous in declaring their adherence to Ferdinand ; and the de- crees from Bayonne, and the edicts of the servile Junta of IVIadrid, were burned publicly in the market-place. In Tortosa the Governor was murdered by the inhabitants, in the first exacerbation of their loyalty, and Duhesme thought it prudent still further to strengthen his position by the occupation of Lerida. The Spanish regiment of Estremadura, which had joined the French standard, was detached on this service ; but the Leridans, with natural dis- trust, refused admission to their countrymen ; and this body, unwilling again to unite them- selves with the invaders, were subsequently received into Zaragoza, and bore part in the defence of that city. There were at this period many difficulties by which the French army in Catalonia were sur- rounded. The Junta of Gerona was indefati- 1 THE RESOURCES OF THE CATALANS. 205 1808. May. gable in stimulating the spirit of the people into chap. vii. overt acts of insurrection. The whole extent of its coast was open to the Mediterranean, and the province was liable at any moment to become the theatre of action for a British army. By the Navy of Britain the insurgents could easily be supplied with arms and warlike stores ; and th e patriotic cause in Catalonia numbered among its aisertors a very considerable body of disciplined and efficient troops. The general population, too, by the constitu- tion of the province were inured to arms. At the signal of the alarm-bell or Somaten, every person capable of bearing arms was compelled to appear at certain indicated points of each dis- trict, ready to perform such service as the au- thorities of the province might require at their hands. From this circumstance it was, that the insurgent Catalans were distinguished by the name of Somatenes, a body, in point of military requisites, more than ordinarily formidable to the invaders. Towards the end of May, Duhesme received orders to despatch two bodies of his army to co- operate with those in Valencia and Aragon. G^ieral Chabran, with a force somewhat ex- / 206 GENERALS CHABRAX AND SCHWARTZ 1808. June. ! CHAP. VII. ceeding four thousand men, was accordingly ordered to gain possession of Tarragona, and, se- curing its occupation by a sufficient garrison, to proceed by way of Tortosa, and, having incor- porated the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen with his division, to unite with Moncey in his operations against Valencia. General Schwartz, with a force nearly equal in amount to that of Chabran, was despatched against Manresa, with orders to in- flict punishment on the promoters of sedition in that city, and to levy on it a heavy contribution. He was then to proceed to Lerida, and, having gained possession of the city, to garrison the castle with five hundred men ; and subsequently to join Lefebvre's army in the siege of Zara- goza. On the third and fourth of June, these two divisions set forward from Barcelona. The object of Schwartz's movement did not remain secret. It was communicated to the people of Manresa, by intelligence from Barcelona, and they were prepared for his approach. The Somaten rung forth the alarm, and the peasantry of the country assembled in arms at the sound. The strong position of Bruch was selected as the scene of resistance, and Jun. 3. ] SET OUT FROM BARCELONA. 207 1808. June. Jun. the force congregated on that point, were sup- chap. vii. plied with ammunition from the powder-mills at San Feliche. It was a circumstance favourable to the Somatenes, that the French General was induced by the inclemency of the weather to halt for a day at Martorel, where he ar- rived on the fifth. When Schwartz, on the day following, advanced to attack the posi- tion, he found, to his cost, that the interval thus afforded had not been misapplied. On his Jun. 6. approach to Bruch, a heavy fire was opened on his column from the rocks and brushwood which surrounded the road, and his men fell back in confusion. But order was soon restored ; and the Catalans, driven from their station, made a hasty retreat to Manresa and Ignalada. In such circumstances it was that Schwartz, unfortunately for his military fame, alarmed at the unexpected resistance he had encountered, instead of pushing forward to Manresa, halted his division. Encouraged by this circumstance the discomfited Somatenes rallied in their turn, and became the assailants. Schwartz, still more alarmed at this fresh instance of courage, gave orders for retreat. During this operation, the gallant Somatenes hung upon the flanks and f 208 SCHWARTZ DEFEATED AT BRUCH. CHABRAN RECALLED TO BARCELONA. 209 1808. June. CHAP. VII. rear of the French army, and the difficulties of the latter becoming hourly more pressing, the ranks fell into disorder ; and when they reach- ed Martorel, it was in such confusion, and after sustaining such loss, that the continuance of oflFensive operations was impossible. On the following day the troops re-entered Barcelona. Throughout the whole province the tidings of this victory produced the most powerful ef- fect. Insurrection broke out on all hands. It was no longer with fearful hearts that the inhab- itants took arms : they flew to the standard of their country in the full hope and confidence of victory. Duhesme was soon aware of the peril which surrounded him, and despatched orders to Chabran instantly to return with his division. On the eighth that general reached Tarragona, without having encountered opposition ; but his retreat was impeded by the Somatenes, who already occupied the towns of Vendrell, Ar- bos, and Villa Franca. On arriving at Ven- drell, a small body of the insurgents, which still occupied the place, were immediately at- tacked and driven back without difficulty. At Arbos the chief stand was made; and Cha- bran, on his approach to that town, found Jun. 8. ♦I 1808. June. the Somatenes drawn up in position. The coun- chap. rir. try was open and adapted for the operations of cavalry ; and the superiority of the French in tliat arm, gave them an overwhelming advan- tage. In these circumstances the Catalan army was defeated, and the town of Arbos was pil- laged and set on fire. Duliesme, in the meanwhile, had judged it prudent to despatch a reinforcement to Chabran, which succeeded, on the eleventh, in effecting a Jun. 11. junction with the corps of that officer at San Feliche. "With this addition to his force, Chabran marched against JVIanresa, in order to revenge the disgrace which the gallant Somatenes, in that neighbourhood, had already inflicted on the French arms. Unluckily for the success of this project, the pass of Bruch again intervened. Since the former engagement every effort had been made by the Catalan authorities to add, by artificial means, to the natural strength of the position. Chabran attacked it, and was driven back with some loss ; and, dispirited by this circumstance, he retreated to Barcelona, amid the scoffis of the triumphant peasants, who con- tinued to harass his march to the very gates of the city. In every part of the province there was now i 210 INSURRECTION SPREADS THROUGH THE PROVINCE. 1808. June. CHAP. VII. open and avowed hostility to the French autho- rity. Almost every town possessed its Junta of government ; and the flame of resistance, which had hitherto smouldered in the bosoms of the people, now bui*st forth in full volume and inten- sity. The danger of Duhesme became hourly more imminent. The frontier fortress of Fi- gueras had already been attacked by the insur- gents, and the garrison were driven from the town into the citadel, and subjected to a rigor- ous blockade. Thus was Duhesme' s communi- cation with France interrupted ; and he deter- mined, without delay, to proceed to the relief of that important fortress. With this view it was necessary that he should gain possession of Gerona; and he accordingly set out from Bar- celona with the brigades of Generals Lecchi and Schwartz, in order to reduce that city. With the view of avoiding Hostalrich, a small fort held by the insurgents, Duhesme advanced by the road leading along the coast, and employed a French privateer, then at anchor in Barcelona, to attend his march. For this movement the Somatenes were not unprepared. A considerable body had taken post on the heights near Mongat, a small fort, which had been erected on the coast to afford t 1 MONO AT CAPTURED BY DUHESME. 211 1808. June. Jun. 16. protection from the inroads of the Barbary Cor- chap.vii. sairs. In attempting to defend the position thus taken, the Catalans w^ere unsuccessful. The French drove them from the castle, and cap- tured their guns; and another body, w^hich occupied the neighbouring heights of Moncada, were likewise put to flight. The town of Mataro fell next. 1 he resistance of the people was neither strong nor pertina- cious, yet the place was given up to plunder, Cabanes. and the foulest atrocities were committed by the French troops. On the morning of the twentieth, Duhesme Jun. 20. appeared before Gerona. The suburban villages of Salt and St. Eugenia were occupied and given up to plunder, and preparations were immediately made for the assault of the city. Gerona stands at the confluence of the Ter and the Ona ; by the latter of which rivers the city is divided. On the east is a ridge of rocky hills ; on the lower acclivity of which, the town is chiefly built, while a smaller portion, called the M ercadal, extends into the plain. On a mountain to the north-east stands the castle of Mont Jouy,* a place regu- • There are in Catalonia two fortresses of that name. il 212 SIEGE OF GERONA. CHAP. VII. larly fortified, and though smaD, of considerable strength. By three other forts connected by & ditch and rampart, the ridge to the eastward is completely commanded. All of these forts are within cannon shot of the city, and are separated from Mont Jouy by a rivulet and narrow valley. The more immediate defences of Gerona consist of an old wall with towers, but without ditch or platform, and two bastions, situated at the points where the Ona enters, and where it departs from the city. The Mercadal is fortified by a turreted wall with five regular bastions, but without half moons or covered way. In the city every preparation was made for a vigorous defence. The garrison consisted of three hundred men of the regiment of Ultonia, and a small party of artillery, which had escaped from Barcelona on its occupation by Duliesme. But the whole population of the city were in arms, and ready to bear part in the approaching contest. During the day, two batteries, which had been established by the French, opened fire on the city, but with little efi'ect ; and, as night closed, Laffaille. the assaulting column advanced, in a state of great disorder, against the bastion of Santa Clara. DUHESME RAISES THE SIEGE. 21S The attack was feebly supported. Some of the chap. vii. assailants succeeded in surmounting the wall, but these were charged instantly by the regiment j^^^^ of Ultonia, and hurled back into the ditch. Another attempt was made on the gate del Carmen. This too was repulsed with great slaughter ; and Duhesme, discouraged by these reverses, made no further attempt to gain pos- session of the city. The day following was J«n. 21. spent in fruitless negotiation ; and, foiled alike in artifice and arms, Duhesme judged it pru- dent to return to Barcelona. The leading Junta of Catalonia was that of Lerida. The authority of that body was gene- rally acknowledged throughout the province; and its endeavours were directed to give efi'ect and organization to the desultory resistance of the people. In pursuance of this object, a com- munication was kept up with Seville, Gibraltar, and the Balearic Islands, with Aragon and Valencia ; and measures were adopted to collect and discipline a body of regular troops, or, in the language of the country, Miquelets, which might meet the enemy in the field with some prospect of success. Eighty tercios, or regiments of one thousand men each, were directed to be raised, 214 GENERAL REILLE SUCCEEDS IN RELIEVING FIGUERAS. 215 k* 1808. June. l! CHAP. VII. forty of which were to act as regulars, the re- mainder as a reserve. In measures of such vigour and decision, there was of course much to excite the alarm of the French Government for the stahility of their footing in Catalonia. General Reille was accord- ingly sent forward from Perpignan to the relief of Figueras. His force amounted to about nine thousand men; and having accomplished the primary object of the expedition, he was direct- ed to continue his operations against Rosas and Jul. 5. Z Gerona. On the fifth of July, Reille appeared in the neighbourhood of Figueras, and with dif- ficultv effected the relief of the fortress. On the eleventh, he proceeded against Rosas, a small but fortified town on the coast, and on his route en- countered no enemy. The gates of Rosas, how- ever, were closed against his entrance ; and on summoning the place to surrender, the messen- ger was made prisoner, and a shower of bullets from the walls conveyed the answer of the gar- rison. Reille had no time for a siege. Don Juan Claros had raised the country in his rear, and an immediate retreat became necessary to the safety of his army. This was not efi*ected without loss. The insuigents harassed his march ; 1808. July. aud his loss, before reaching Figueras, exceeded chap, vii, two hundred men. In the meanwhile, the insurgents had again occupied the strong country on the right of the Llobregat, from San Boy to Martorel. In order to dislodge them, a force, under General Lecchi, was despatched from Barcelona, which, on the thirtieth, appeared before Molinos del Rey. jun. so. While the attention of the Somatenes was thus directed to the movements of Lecchi, the bri- gades of Bessieres and Goulas crossed the river at San Boy ; and, taking them by surprise, turn- ed the line of their position. The French thus successful, continued the pursuit to Martorel, plundering and burning the villages through which they passed. Nearly at the same time, Chabran, having re- cruited his division by a halt at Mataro, set out from that town to collect provisions in the neigh- bouring country. Near Granollers he encoun- tered a body of Somatenes, commanded by Don Francisco de Milans, and after an engagement, at most of doubtful success, Chabran fell back to Mataro, harassed on his retreat by the insur- gent force. Duhesme, still bent on the reduction of Gero- 1 Jul. 5. 216 THE SECOND 8IE0E OF GERONA. INVESTMENT OF THE CITY. 217 1808. July. JuL 21. I CHAP. VII. na, proceeded to that city by the road along the coast, and encountered new difficulties every mile of his progress. The Catalans had obstruct- ed the road by every possible impediment ; and while his left fiank was exposed to annoyance from the insurgents in that quarter, his right was cannonaded by Lord Coclirane in the Irape- rieuse frigate, and by several Spanish feluccas. After passing Mataro, General Goulas, with three battalions, was detached to attack the fort of Hostalrich, with the view of protecting the flank of the army from the continued hostilities of the Somatenes. The attack on Hostalrich failed. Goulas twice attempted an escalade, and was repulsed with loss ; and desisting from fur- ther efforts, again joined the army of Duhesme before the walls of Gerona. The city was invested on the twenty-second ; and, on the day following, the army was rein- forced by the division of General Reille. By Duhesme, the capture of Gerona was regarded as certain. A battering train had been brought from Barcelona ; and he is said to have de- clared, that, on the third day of the siege, the city should be taken — on the fourth, it should be destroyed. There is a homely proverb, by the 2 Jul. 22. 1808. July. recollection of which, Duhesme would have done chap. vii. well to temper his vaticinations. All measures, compatible with the strength of the besieging army, were immediately adopted to cut off external communication with the city. The corps of General Reille was posted at Puenta Mayor ; and the line of investment extended along the heights of San Miguel to the fords of the Ter, and from thence onward to the Monte Livio. The labours of the siege were prosecuted with little vigour. Several batteries were opened, and shells were thrown into the town, but the resolution of the inhabitants remained unshaken. The garrison was reinforced by the arrival of a light-infantry battalion, thirteen hundred strong, Jul. 25. which, with two pieces of field-ordnance, enter- ed the city on the twenty-fifth. This raised the spirit of the people to a pitch of exultation sel- dom to be found in a besieged city. Nor were their countrymen without less ac- tive and energetic in the cause than the gar- rison within. The Miquelets of Milans, and the Somatenes, commanded by Don Juan Claros, hovered round the camp of the enemy, attacking all stragglers, and driving back the foraging-par- VOL. I. K ■II 218 PALACIO LANDS AT TARRAGONA. CASTLE OF MONOAT RETAKEN. 219 1808. July. CHAP. VII. ties sent out to collect provisions in the neigh- bouring country. Tlie resources of the be- sieging army were becoming daily more pre- carious. Sickness broke out in the camp ; and while the city, whose communication with the neighbouring country still continued unbroken, received abundant supplies, the French were, in truth, suffering all the evils of a blockade. While matters were in this situation before Gerona, the Marques del Palacio, governor of the Balearic Islands, having concluded a treaty with Lord Collingwood, who commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean, landed at Tarragona, with about five thousand men, and thirty-seven pieces of artillery. This produced a great change in the aspect of affairs through- out the province. The Spanish fleet became disposable for the general purposes of defence ; and the Catalans, filled with joy at this accession of strength, became inspired with new confi- dence in the extent of their resources. Many officers, who had hitherto remained passive, and several of the civil authorities, quitted Barcelona, and joined the standard of Palacio. The Su- preme Junta immediately repaired to Tarragona ; and constituting that city the seat of govem- 1808. July. ment, appointed Palacio to the chief command chap. vii. of the provincial forces. The primary object of the new leader was to gtrengthen the line of the Llobregat, which had again been occupied by the Somatenes. With this view, the Count de Caldagues, with a force about two thousand strong, was detached to Martorel, where he was joined by the Miquelets, commanded by Colonel Bajet, a patriotic scriv- ener of Lerida. A part of this force had scarce- ly taken post at San Boy, when the position was attacked by a body of the enemy, which encountered a vigorous repulse. An assault on the castle of Mongat was con- certed with Lord Cochrane, and executed with complete success. The crew of the Imperieuse bore part in the action; and, relying on the faith of a British officer, the commander of the castle surrendered on capitulation. By Jul. SI. this event, about an hundred prisoners, seven guns, and a considerable quantity of ammil- nition and stores, fell into possession of the victors. Secure in their position on the Llobregat, the Spanish army became disposable for the relief of Gerona. But Palacio, deficient in the arm of fi 220 CALDAOUES APPROACHES OERONA, CHAP. VII. cavalry, was probably averse to risk tbe conse- quences of a general engagement, with troops so . * palpably inferior in discipline and equipment, to those with whom the palm of victory must, in such circumstances, have been contested. But willing to impede the progress of the siege, he despatched the Count de Caldagues, with four companies of regular troops, three field-pieces, and two thousand Miquelets and Somatenes, to harass the French army in their position, and intercept their supplies. From the fort of Hostalrich, where he halted for some days, the force of Caldagues was increased by the addi- tion of about two thousand of the new levies, Aug. 14. and two pieces of artillery. On the fourteenth, he took post at Castella, about two league* in rear of the French encampment. Here Cal- dagues was joined by Claros and Milans, and a scheme of joint operations was concerted with the garrison. The army, thus united, was about six thousand strong ; and it was determined, on the following morning, to attack the works of the enemy, who had removed the greater part of his force to the plain on the left bank of the Ona. The batteries in front of Mont Jouy were but slenderly tenant- AND ATTACKS THE BESIEGING ARMY. 221 ed with troops; and against these, the efforts chap, vii, of the Catalan army were to be principally di- rected. 1808. August. At nine o'clock on the morning of the six- Aug. 16. teenth, the garrisons of Mont Jouy and Gerona, made a simultaneous sally on the besiegers ; and overpowering the French troops opposed to their progress, carried and set fire to the batter- ies. One of these was for a moment recovered by a fresh column of the enemy; but rein- forcements coming up, the battery was again stormed, and remained in possession of the Spaniards. In the meanwhile, the force of Caldagues ad- vanced in several columns, and driving the French from the heights of San Miguel, attack- ed their encampment at Camp Duras, and finally pursued them across the Ten The advantages of this most brilliant achieve- ment were, fortunately, not lost to the gallant Catalans, by any imprudent prosecution of their victory. Instead of following an enemy, supe- rior in all military requisites, to the open plain, Caldagues, with the prudence of a wise general, remained on the heights, and made preparations 222 DUHESME RAISES THE SIEGE, AND RETREATS TO BARCELONA. 223 1808. August. CHAP. VII. to repel the attack which he anticipated on the following morning. But Duliesme, dispirited hy the defeat he had sustained, thought only of retreat. Under cover of night he put his army in motion ; and separating his force from that of Reille, fled to Barcelona, while the latter fell hack to Figueras. All his heavy artillery, large stores of ammuni- tion, and even many of the woundea were aban- doned. Duhesme did not venture to take the road by the coast ; but on learning that an English frigate was prepared to rake his columns on the march, he betook himself to the mountains, de- stroying his stores, and throwing his artillery over the rocks. Reille was more fortunate, and succeeded in reaching Figueras without hostile impediment. Of the brilliant victory thus achieved over an army superior in numbers, discipline, and equip- ment, and commanded by an officer of high mi- litary pretensions, the Catalans were justly proud. Duhesme endeavoured to conceal his St Cyr. disgrace by encouraging the belief, that he had retreated, in consequence of positive orders to relinquish the prosecution of the siege. But 1808. August. this report was too improbable to gain credit ; chap. vir. and St. Cyr informs us, that even in the French army under his command, " ce bruit ne trouva que des incredules*' As a general, Duhesme must stand convicted of gross ineptitude. In his management of the campaign, we can discover no skilful adaptation of means to ends ; and his conduct, before Gero- na in particular, exhibits a strange mixture of bullying and timidity.* His attacks on the city were foolish, and conducted in a manner ut- terly disgraceful to a disciplined army. He evi- dently expected to conquer without resistance ; and, deceived in this, he sought immediate re- fuge in flight. To subdue a brave people he seems to have relied solely on measures of fero- • Colonel Laffaille, in his work, " Memoires sur les Cam- pagnes de Cntahtgne,^* gives some amusing details, illustrative of the vacillation of his leader, during the first attempt on Gerona. The kame author informs us, that after the second siege, it even became a question, between Reille and Duhesme, whether the latter should not abandon Barcelona, and fall back on Figueras. But Duhesme knew that the loss of Barcelona could not fail to draw down on him the indignation of Napoleon ; and this cir- cumstance overbalanced his fears. Laifaille's information, on this matter, is stated to have been derived from the General himself. It certainly affords satisfactory evidence of the terror the gallant Somatenes had excited in their opponents. 224 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. OALLICIA. 225 I I CHAP. VII. cious intimidation. But there is no axiom more "TTTT" true, than that cruelty is not only a moral crime, August. ^"* ^ military error ; and we have authority for the fact, that the savage inflictions of Duhesme Cabanes. were beheld, not with terror, but hatred ; and that many of those who, in other circumstances, would have remained neutral in the contest, took arms from despair. At once to conciliate and subdue, is the achievement of a higher intelli- gence. Fire and slaughter are ever the instru- ments of a bungler. Let it be the lasting dis- g^race of Duhesme, that he employed such wea- pons, and employed them in vain. Such was the issue of the first noble and suc- cessful struggle made by the Catalans for the liberation of their province. At the end of Au- gust, 1808, the French, defeated at all points, remained only in possession of the city of Barce- lona, and the fortresses of Figueras and Mont Jouy. CHAPTER VIII. OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH- 1808. Gallicia possessed many advantages as aciiAP.viii theatre of resistance to the usurping govern- ment. Its surface was rugged and mountainous, diflicult of access, and easy of defence ; and, removed from the immediate sphere and in- fluence of the arms of France, it was yet sufii- ciently near to interrupt, by a single successful operation, the most important line of her com- munication. From its numerous seaports, the intercourse with England was easy and ra- pid ; and Gallicia may be said to have been the heart by which the vital succours of Britain were circulated through the great body of the Spanish people. The population of Gallicia is hardy and vigorous beyond that of any other province ; and, driven by the poverty of their k2 226 PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE. 1808. June. CHAP. VIII own country to seek employment abroad, these gallant and athletic mountaineers had become, as it were, the Parias of their wealthier neigh- bours, and might be found throughout Spain, engaged in every labour requiring powerful ex- ertion, and continued bodily endurance. In Gallicia, the spirit of resistance to French authority was no less resolute and pervading than in the other provinces. The assembling and training of new levies went vigorously on ; and the strong mountainous position of Manzan- al, in the neighbourhood of Astorga, was forti- fied by intrenchments, to serve as a station of defence. The leader of the Gallician army was Don Antonio Filangieri, Captain-General of the province, whose prudence and circumspection, in the first burst of national enthusiasm, had ex- cited popular indignation. By his energy and military knowledge, he had subsequently render- ed good service to the patriotic cause ; but the suspicions of the people were never wholly era- dicated, — and Filangieri died by assassination. Don Joachim Blake, an officer of Irish ex- traction, succeeded him in command. Dur- ing the month of June, the forces of the pro- vince were assembled at Lugo ; and their num- JUNCTION OF BLAKE AND CUESTA. 227 1808. July. bers were materially increased by the return of chap.viii Taranco's army from Portugal, and by five thousand Spanish prisoners whom England had debarked in Gallicia, in a state of complete equipment for service. Cuesta, after his defeat at Cabezon, had ral- lied the army of Castile, and taken post at Be- nevente. There he was joined by Blake, who, leaving only one division of his army to secure the position of Manzanal, reached Benevente on the sixth. It was the intention of Bessieres, if Ju^* 6. possible, to prevent this junction by a sudden attack on Cuesta ; but, disappointed in this ob- ject, he made immediate preparations to en- counter the combined armies in the field. On the ninth he quitted Burgos with the reserve. On the tenth he reached Palencia, where he collected the scattered columns of his army, and was joined by the division of General Mouton, which had advanced from Bayonne to replace the portion of the army engaged in the siege of Zaragoza. The force thus assembled, amounted to about fifteen thousand men, with thirty-two pieces of artillery. No sooner had Cuesta been reinforced by the 228 THEY ADVANCE TO RIO SECO. fj 1808. July. CHAP. VII I junction of the Gallician army, than he publicly announced his intention of advancing to Valla- dolid. On the prudence of this project, differ- ences are understood to have occurred between the generals. Blake, aware of the superior dis- cipline of the French troops, and of the great advantages they possessed in point of cavalry, was unwilling to advance into the plains, and try the hazard of a battle. He urged the policy of retiring to a strong position in the moun- tainous country of Leon or Gallicia, which, with- out a large reinforcement of his army, it would have been impossible for Bessieres to attack. But the more prudent counsels of Blake were overruled by Cuesta, on whom, as senior officer, the chief command had devolved. The Spanish army were put in motion ; and leaving a divi- sion at Benevente, proceeded in a direction which threatened Burgos and Valladolid. On the night of the twelfth, the army of Bes- sieres set out from Palencia. On the thirteenth it halted in a position extending from the Torre de Marmojas to Ampudia. In the evening, Marshal Bessieres received intelligence that the enemy were at Medina del Rio Seco. Before Jul. 12. DISPOSITION OF THE SPANISH ARMY. 229 1808. July. day-dawn on the fourteenth, his army, formed chap, vni in two columns, was on the march to attack them. The strength of the Spanish army has been variously represented. Amid conflicting state- ments, it may reasonably be assumed to have amounted to about twenty-five thousand in- fantry, with a few hundred cavalry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artillery. The body, thus formidable in point of numbers, was drawn up in two lines ; the first of which, supported by a strong artillery, ranged along the summit of a plateau, with a considerable declivity towards the French army, formed by the overflowing of the rivulet Sequillo during the rains of spring and winter. The country around was flat and cultivated, and divided into enclosures by stone walls. The second line was placed about a mile in rear of the first, and extend- ed greatly beyond it on the left. In this were stationed the best troops ; and the remain- der of the artillery was ranged in the centre. The position of the cavalry was somewhat in rear of the first line, and within a short distance of the road. The disposition of the Spanish army gave ad- 230 BATTLE OP RIO SECO. 1808. July. CHAP. VIII vantages to Bessieres, which he did not neglect. The great distance intervening between the lines afFardod an opportunity of dividing them ; and, with this view, while the brigades of Sabathier and Ducos advanced in column of battalions to attack the front of the position, the divisions of Merle and Mouton took the enemy in flank, and the front line of the Spaniards was instantly broken, and driven from its position with great slaughter. Nearly at the same time, the cavalry was charged by General Lasalle, and instantly put to flight. Under these unfavourable circumstances, a gallant attempt was made by Cuesta to retrieve the fortunes of the day. Two columns of attack were directed to advance from the second line, in order to regain the plateau. That on the right made a vigorous and successful charge on the enemy, and drove him back in disorder. Part of Mouton's division was likewise assailed by the Spanish cavalry, and compelled to re- treat ; but a body of the imperial guard advan- cing to its assistance, the Spaniards in turn were forced to give ground. The attack of the second line, however, was BATTLE OF RIO SECO. 231 1808. July. vigorous ; the French were losing ground, chap, viii and several of their guns were already taken. But the right column of the Spaniards had not been supported in its advance by the left, and from this circumstance its flank was un- protected. Of the opportunity thus afibrded Bessieres took immediate advantage. The exposed flank of the column was charged by the division of Merle ; and the Spaniards were driven back in irretrievable confusion. An at- tempt was made to rally in the town of Rio Seco, but without success. It was carried by Mouton's division at the point of the bayonet ; and the cavalry continued charging the fugitives with great slaughter, along the road to Bene- vente. The division of Blake was the only por- tion of the army which retreated in tolerable order. In this unfortunate action, the loss of the Spanish army was about five thousand. Fifteen pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of ammunition were taken on the field. On the part of the French, the victory was earned with little expense of life. Their loss, in killed and wounded, is said to have amounted only to one hundred and twenty-five of the former, and four Fov. 232 CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE. ITS IMPOLICY. 23S 1808. JhJj. I CHAP. VIII hundred of the latter. By another account it is estimated at eight hundred.* The battle of Rio Seco, though unfortun- ate, was far from dishonourable to Spanish prowess. The proximate cause of defeat was, unquestionably, the unskilful disposition of the army, which exposed it to be beaten in detail. Under circumstances the most un- favourable and dispiriting, the second line of the Spaniards fought with a courage and pertinacity worthy of a better general, and a more fortun- ate result. The advantage of the French, in point of cavalry, was counterbalanced by nothing in the position of the Spanish army. The latter fought in front of a defile, and were simultane- ously attacked both in front and flanks. That, after the defeat of the first line, the issue of the battle should even for a time have become doubt- ful, is a circumstance honourable to the courage of the Spanish troops. No general of sound dis- cretion would have given battle in the circum- • It is itated by Mr. Southey, on what he calls *'' the best au- thority'* — that of the neighbouring priests — that the number of •lain, alone, in the battle, amounted to twenty>seven thousand. Were it worth while, the extravagance of this calculation might be easily demonstrated by a rtductio ad abmrdum. Stances, and in the situation selected by Cue8ta.CHAP.viii His true policy, unquestionably, was, to have • We learn from the valuable appendix to the history of Colo- nel Napier, that the anxiety of Napoleon, with regard to the is- •ue of tiie operations of Bessieres, was intense. In his commu- nications to Savary, he uniformly expresses his conviction, that Leon and Gallicia were the only points from which a vital stab might be inflicted on the power of France in the Peninsula. In one letter he says, " Le but de tons les efforts de I'armee doit ctre de conserver Madrid. C'est la qu'est tout Madrid ne peut etre menace que par I'arm^e de Galice."— ^" Un echec que recevrait le General Dupont serait peu de chose ; un ecbec que recevrait le Marechal Bessieres serait plus considerable et se ferait sentir a I'extremite de la ligne." In another document we find the same opinions even more strongly expressed : — " Q'importe que Valence soit soumis? Q'importe que Saragosse soit soumis ? Mais general le moindre succes de Tennemi du cote de la Galice aurait des inconveniens immenses." The following extract, from a note dictated by the Emperor, will shew his opinion of the difficulties which must have attend- ed the invasion of Gallicia : — " S'il (Bessieres,) obtenaita JBe- nevente et a Leon un grand succes contre Varmee de Galicey peut- etre serait-il convenable pour proftter de la victoirey et dela ter- reur de premiers moments ^ de se jetter dans la Galice." So hazardous a measure, as entering Gallicia with so limited a force as that of Bessieres, is here considered by Napoleon as only advisable in case Bessieres should previously have achieved » great victory, and the movement could be effected before the •* terreur de premiers moments" should have subsided. It is therefore evident, that had Blake and Cuesta retired, without fighting, to the Gallician mountains, the French army would xu>t hare ventured to attack them. 1808, remained in the mountains of Leon or Gallicia,* j . 234 SUBSEQUENT MOVEiMENT OF THE ARMIES. SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENT OF THE ARMIES. 235 CHAP. VIII where, in an intrenched position, he might have IgQg *>itl defiance to any force with which Bessieres j„,y, could have assailed him. If we assume him— as we must do — to have been aware of the events then passing in the south, his conduct becomes still more censurable. Though, possibly, he might not have foreseen a success so brilliant and decisive as that of Baylen, yet he might, and ought to have known, that the situation of Dupont was one of almost irretrievable difficulty and danger, and to have calculated on the pro- bability of the army of Castanos being speedily disposable for more distant and extended oper^ tions. But relying on the numerical superiority of his troops, Cuesta forgot that more than half of these were nothing better than raw and un- disciplined levies, and advanced into the open country to encounter an enemy, with whom, when unassisted by strong advantages of posi- tion, it was abundantly evident he was unequal to cope. After the battle of Rio Seco, the differences which had existed between Blake and Cues- ta, occasioned the immediate separation of their forces. The former fell back on his posi- tion at Manzanal, while Cuesta marched for 1808. July. Leon. Neither were pursued. The energy of chap.viii Bessieres seemed to have evaporated in the bat- tle ; and General Lasalle, who, with the cavalry, was engaged in full pursuit, received orders to return. During the fourteenth and fifteenth, the army halted at Rio Seco, and subsequently, by easy marches, advanced to Benevente, which it did not reach till the twentieth. In that city he remained till the twenty-second, when he pro- juL 28. ceeded to Mayorga, where his army was rein- forced by the addition of ten thousand men. Cuesta had left Leon for Toro and Salamanca ; and Bessieres received orders to follow Blake into Gallicia. With this view, he had advanced to Pui»nta Orvigo, when intelligence reached him of the defeat of Baylen. By this event, an entire change of operations was rendered ne- cessary. 236 PROCEEDINGS AT BAYONNE. ASSEMBLY OF THE NOTABLES. 237 CHAP. IX. 1808. June. Jun. 7. CHAPTER IX. ADVANCE OF JOSEPH TO MADRID. The assembly of Notables lent themselves, as might be expected, to all the purposes of the Emperor. The organization of this body was re- gulated by the Supreme Junta of Government ; and the Church, the army, and the nobility of the higher and lower orders, sent their quota of re- presentatives to bear part in the solemn farce about to be enacted at Bayonne. On the seventh of June, the intrusive monarch of Spain arrived on the scene, and received the homage of all the Spanish deputies already in the city. These formed themselves into classes, according to their respective ranks, and waited on the new sovereign with addresses of congra- tulation. 1808. June. The fifteenth was the day fixed for the con- chap.ix. vocation of the Notables. The meeting consist- ed of eighty-six members. Don Miguel de Az- anza, ex-minister of finance, was appointed Pres- ident, and Don Mariano Louis d'Urquijo, Vice- president and Secretary. Both were men of tal- NeUerto. ent, both were of the party of Ferdinand ; but considering the Bourbon dynasty at an end, and hoping to extract benefit to their country even from her misfortunes, they were willing, in the necessity of the times, to transfer their allegiance to the new monarch. The character of Joseph seemed eminently calculated to allay the popular antipathy to the new government. Mild and generous in dis- position, pleasing in manners, with a mind en- larged by study, and a knowledge of the world rarely within the reach of hereditary monarchs to acquire, he apparently possessed every quality by which the happiness of his subjects could be promoted or ensured. Under a new dynasty, the evils of former misgovernment might be cor- rected. The institutions of antiquated tyranny, which had hitherto retarded the advance of Spain in knowledge and civilization, might be re- placed by others better fitted to draw forth her \' 238 THE NOTABLES ACKNOWLEDGE JOSEPH AS KING OF SPAIN. 239 II I 1808. June. CHAP. IX. resources, and enable her to reassume that rank among nations which her natural advantages en- titled her to hold. Napoleon had promised Spain a constitution, which should separate the treasure of the state from the property of the king ; which should draw a salutary line of de- marcation between the legislative aud executive powers, and establish the independence of the judicial order: a form of government, in short, which should encourage the diffusion of know- ledge among the people ; science, commerce, ag- riculture, and the arts ; all that can increase the wealth of a nation, or lend grace to its enjoy- ment. It was natural that those who anticipated such benefits from the accession of Joseph to the throne should support his cause. Yet it is now evident they reasoned falsely, and regu- lated their conduct on principles inapplicable to the circumstances of their country. They either knew little of the temper and spirit of the Spanish nation, or knowing, underrated its energy. They might and should have known that the hearts and voices of the people were in favour of their ancient dynasty ; that a constitu- tion, however excellent, is not to be thrust on an 2 1808. JUDC. unwilling nation by the bayonet, or disseminat- chap. ix. ed from the cannon's mouth. A nation cannot be bullied into freedom. They must know and feel their rights, before they can enjoy them ; and, least of all, can this sense of their privileges be successfully imparted to a people by a series of proceedings, in themselves a violation of them all. In supporting the cause of the intrusive monarch, these men betrayed, without benefiting their country. They contributed, what in them lay, to spread war and havoc through her pro- vinces. The course they followed was devious, yet not smooth ; it was not the path of loyalty, nor of freedom — scarcely that of honour. Never were the calculations of the wise more effectually put to shame, by the honest, unswerving firm- ness of the ignorant. Yet surely not in this igno- rant, that they acted on a deep sense of inalienable right, and rather than their native soil should be defiled by the tread of the op- pressor, bedewed it with their blood. Let us not, however, be unjust. That many of those who supported the new dynasty by their in- fluence and counsels, did so from pure and consci- entious motives, we know from their private cor- Nellerto. respondence ; and we know also that many, in ;J sssss. 1808. June. 240 HE RECEIVES THE HOMAGE OF THE GRANDEES. CHAP.ix. the long and fearful struggle which ensued, no- bly redeemed their error by joining the standard of their country, and hazarding life and fortune in her cause. * One of the first acU of the council of Notahles was to recognise Joseph as king of Spain and the Indies, and present an address of congratu- lation. The reply of the intrusive sovereign gave expression to sentimenU of moderation and benevolence which might confer honour on the most legitimate of despots. He wished only to reign, he said, for the good of Spain. To that object should all his eiforts he directed. He would not cross the Pyrenees as the parti- «m of a party. All his subjects had a right to equal justice, and they should all enjoy it. He knew the honour and generosity of the Castilian character. It was his ambition to be regarded as the father, not as the tyrant of his people. WhUe Bayonne thus presented the extraor- - A„,ong other,, the Duke del lofanUdo and the Marqim de U Romaoa. 'Nellerto give. «ver J letter, of the latter, » whjrf. he declare, the new dyn«,ty to be a W««.-S to h.. country. Uat ^ehtr.t .hi. period. *e real opinion of ""• "-""f "^f^ ZLt there can bT little doubt That he «K.n changed .t there CCxT Vet the tenor of hi. letter, prove, that even Rom«» could play the sycophant. AND IS CONGRATTLATED BY FERDINAND. 241 dinary spectacle of the proudest nobility of Eu- chap. ix. rope, bending in humility before the throne of a plebeian monarch, a circumstance yet more ex- ^^^^' traordinary gave completion to his triumph.— Neulrto. Ferdinand broke the silence of his retreat at Valencey, in order to congratulate Joseph on his assumption of regal authority. In liis own name, and in that of his brother and uncle, he again publicly renounced all pretension to the crown, and felicitated the Spanish nation on the acces' 8ion of a monarch, adapted, by his talents and his virtues, to promote their prosperity. It is in vain for the advocates of legitimacy, to at- tempt to paUiate the imperishable tarnish of such a document, by attributing it to necessity or vio- lence. Disgrace is never necessary to a brave man ; and no one of a spirit prouder than that of a Spanish Bourbon, but would have preferred death to the ignominy of a humUiation so de- grading. The proceedings of such a meeting as that assembled at Bayonne, can possess little in- terest. At aU events, their acts were few, and may be soon enumerated. They acknowledged Joseph as their king ; enjoined obedience to his authority ; accepted, with trifling modifications, VOL. I. If 1' 242 JOSEPH APPOINTS A MINISTRY, AND SETS OUT FOR MADRID. 243 1808. July. CHAP. IX. the constitution tendered by Napoleon, and re- gulated the law of future succession to the mon- archy. This done, their part in the performance was at an end. Before crossing the Pyrenees, Joseph pro- ceeded to appoint his officers of state. To a- void exciting national jealousies, he determined to enter Spain with but a small retinue of Frenchmen. All the important offices connected with the administration were filled by Spaniards. The Prince of Castel Franco, the Dukes Del Infantado, Parque, and Hijar, the Marquesses de Santa Cruz and Hariza, and the Counts de Fernan Nunez, Orgaz, and Castelflorido, and other great names of the monarchy, were in- vested with the dignities of the new court. The choice of ministers was judicious. Among the number were Azanza, Urquijo, Jovellanos, Ma- zaredo, and Cevallos. Men more distinguished in talent, or who possessed a higher place in the esteem of their countrymen, Spain did not af- ford. Blind to the dangers which awaited them, all were ambitious of taking office under the new government, and of giving public demon- stration of their zeal in its behalf. Surrounded by the grandees, and followed by 1808. July. a numerous suite of noble and distinguished chap. ix. Spaniards, Joseph at length set forth on his journey to Madrid. On entering Spain, he was greeted in every city with congratulations by the civic and provincial authorities ; but the people were gloomy and silent. It was the moment when Blake and Cuesta were marching to en- gage Bessieres, and all hopes were engaged in the event of the approaching contest. Should the Spanish army be victorious, no doubt could be entertained that the usurper would be com- pelled to re-enter France ; and, under such cir- cumstances, all were glad to shun the necessity of compromising their principles or safety, by any shew of allegiance to his authority. On the day of the victory of Rio Seco, Joseph entered Burgos, and by that event all obstacles to his further advance were at once removed. On the twentieth he arrived at Madrid. The municipal authorities came forth in their robes to greet his approach; the houses by which he passed were hung with rich tapestry ; laurels over-arched the streets; and it was amid the deafening and joyous clamour of bells, can- non, and military music, that the new monarch entered his capital. All was loud, save the Jul. 20. 2U HIS RECEPTION BY THE PEOPLE. 1808. July. CHAP. IX. voices of the people. As the cavalcade passed onward to the palace, the streets were silent and tenantless. The citizens hid themselves in their houses, as if unwilling to behold the living image of their country's degradation. They well remembered — could they forget? — that the throne of this plebeian successor of the Bour- bons was based on fraud, perfidy, and massacre. The streets through which he rode in triumph had been reddened with the blood of their coun- trymen. Was it in the nature of the haughty and revengeful Spaniards to forget this ? Had a few short weeks obliterated from their mem- ories all records of the second of May ? No ! The people of Madrid did not disgrace the cause of honour, loyalty, and justice, by bending at the chariot wheels of their oppressor. They were, indeed, told that the new monarch came to regenerate the country, to reform the abuses of a government with which the nation were con- tented, proffering immunities which they wanted not, and a freedom from oppression which they had seldom practically felt. But were they to believe that pure waters could flow from so cor- rupt a fountain ? Was it possible that the u- surper, whose very presence in their capital was THEIR FEELINGS TOWARDS HIM. 245 1808. July. in itself an insult and an outrage ; in whom they chap. ix. saw only the tool and minion of an ambition which trampled on all human rights ; to which no impediment was sacred, and which recklessly pursued its course, desolating and to desolate, could be greeted by the Spanish nation as the apostle of concord, the chosen minister of bless- ings, the saviour of their bleeding and lacerated country ? This was scarcely to be expected. The Span- ish government, though despotic, was not op- pressive to the great body of the nation. The nobles, almost uniformly attached to the Court, were seldom resident on their estates, which were occupied on easy terras by a flourishing tenantry. The administration of church pro- perty was also highly favourable to the peas- antry, who suffered little from the impo- sitions of the state, and constituted a body, hardy, warlike, and independent, and attached to a government under which, for a long succes- sion of ages, they had lived tranquil and con- tented. By them the evils of despotism were but little felt ; the trammels on mental freedom narrowed none of their enjoyments; and the victims of the inquisition were generally taken 246 HE ATTEMPTS CONCILIATION. CHAP. IX. from a class with which they had little commu- nion either of interest or feeling. 1808 J , * To a people thus situated, the prospect of po- litical regeneration possessed but little charm. Without knowledge, but that taught by their priests, who inculcated the most slavish doc- trines, both political and religious, to them a free constitution was, in truth, nothing but a name. No adage is more true than that a peo- ple to be free nmst be enlightened. The sun of liberty does not rise in the zenith, nor pour down the full flood of his unclouded radiance on re- gions dark and benighted. The twilight of doubtful struggle must precede his appearance. It is by slow degrees that the clouds which obscure his rays are illuminated and dispelled, till at length, mounting in the horizon, he dis- plays the full measure of his glory and efiiil- gence. The first acts of Joseph on his arrival at Mad- rid, were directed to attain that popularity of which he evidently stood in need. Ahns were profusely distributed to the indigent. Bull-fights were exhibited,' the theatres thrown open, and every art was employed to secure the " sweet voices" of the uncourteous populace. IS PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED. 247 The Council of Castile, in common with all chap.ix. the authorities of the kingdom, were directed to take the oath of fidelity to the new monarch, j^] This, with some inconsistency,* yet with hon- ourable spirit, the Council declined, and the members of it were, in consequence, excluded from the grand fete, at which the monarch had decided on receiving the congratulations of his more distinguished subjects. On the twenty-fourth, Joseph was proclaimed Jul. 24. King of Spain and the Indies, with every cir- cumstance of pomp and magnificence. On that occasion, however, the Count d'Altamira, the head of one of the most ancient families of Eu- rope, declined performing the functions of his office, as grand standard-bearer, and that duty was, in consequence, discharged by the Marquis del Campo d'Allange, a grandee of principles more pliant and accommodating. With these petty exceptions, all went smooth- ly at Madrid. The oath of allegiance was taken by the grandees and dignitaries of the kingdom ; mnd the prelates testified their zeal, by oflPering • The Council of Castile, in several of its acts, had already re- eo^ised the new dynasty. 248 HE PREPARES TO QUIT MADRID. 1808. July. CHAP. IX. personal congratulations to the new tenant of the throne on his assumption of the sceptre. But a storm was gathering in another quarter, which suddenly overcast the French horizon at Madrid, and changed the whole aspect of affairs in that city. Intelligence arrived of the surren- der of Dupont. The moral influence of this event was not less strongly felt in the capital than in other parts of the kingdom. Many, who in the prosperity of the invaders had joined their cause, now deserted it on the first symptom of misfortune. The Dukes del Parque and Infan- tado escaped from the city in disguise, and join- ed the insurgents. Cevallos, who, in the course of little more than two months, had sworn alle- giance to three monarchs, again deserted his colours and enrolled himself as a patriot. These were evil omens. The capital was now open to the armies of Andalusia and X'alencia; and it was reported that the former was within a few marches of the city. The Court were terror- stricken. A council of war was immediately assembled; and Savary, by whom Murat had been succeeded in command, proposed to garri- son the Retire, and attack the Spanish armies in succession, as they advanced to Madrid. But THE FRENCH RETIRE BEHIND THE EBRO. 249 '1 1808. July. more timid councils prevailed. It was deter- chap. ix. mined to abandon the capital and retreat behind the Ebro. Thus, after a short but fierce struggle, had the Spaniards, by their own unaided valour, suc- ceeded in freeing nearly their whole territory from the presence of the invaders. This suc- cess had been achieved against the first army of Europe, commanded by the greatest generals of the age. At the commencement of hostilities, we know that the French forces in Spain a- mounted in number to one hundred and fifty thousand men. These, by the energetic courage of the people, had been driven back and discom- fited. Not a foreign bayonet had been drawn in their cause. Whatever honour may attach to so splendid an achievement, must exclusively be given to the Spanish people. It is theirs and theirs only. Let this be the answer to those who accuse the patriots of lukewarmness, in the cause which they so gallantly and perseveringly maintained. In truth, considering the disadvan- tages under which they laboured, the wonder is, not that they did so little, but that they achieved so much. It was manifestly impossible, that a body of undisciplined levies, miserably armed and l2 250 GENERAL REFLECTIONS. 1808. July. CHAP. IX. equipped, without exeprienced leaders, and defi- cient in the arms of cavalry and artillery, could successfully contend with the French armies in the field. No sophistry, therefore, can he more gross, than that of those reasoners, who argue that the Spanish people were indiiferent to the cause of freedom, hecause their armies were frequently defeated in the field. The memory of Baylen, Valencia, Zaragoza, Bruch, and Gerona, will bear imperishable record of the national ardour and perseverance, and give the lie to those who would basely injure the cause of freedom, by vilifying the character of its defenders. Yet, he would judge erroneously of the cha- racter of this memorable struggle, who should form an estimate of the amount and vigour of the hostility of the Spanish people, by an exclu- sive reference to the operations of their armies. These, in truth, formed but a small part of that widely extended system of destructive warfare, by which the French were encountered in the Peninsula. Wherever any detachment of their armies could be overpowered by the peasantry, they were attacked and massacred. All strag- glers perished. The motion of large masses was continually required, to keep open the commu- GENERAL REFLECTIONS. 251 1808. July. nication of the difierent corps, and protect their chap. ix. convoys. The expense of life, by which the in- vaders were enabled, at any period, to hold mili- tary possession of the country, was enormous. Throughout the whole contest, there was a spirit of fierce and unmitigated hostility abroad, in every quarter of the kingdom ; an enmity which never slumbered nor slept, which was in con- tinual and almost universal action, and which M'asted, like a pestilence, the strength of the invaders. Though the Spaniards owed much of the suc- cess which crowned their efibrts, to their own zeal and courage, it must be confessed, that some portion of it is attributable to the blunders of their opponents. The French were evidently unprepared for the degree and character of the resistance which they encountered in the Penin- sula. They regarded the people with contempt, and were consequently led to attempt important objects, w4th inadequate means. Defeat wa» the penalty of these ignorant miscalculations. — Something of gratuitous tarnish, something even of dark and memorable disgrace, may have been cast on the national arms, by the misconduct and timidity of those intrusted with command ; 252 GENERAL REFLECTIONS. POLICY OF JUNOT. 253 1808. Jaly. CHAP. IX. but it is unquestionable, that the disasters, in which their operations so often terminated, are greatly attributable to those who directed the conduct of the war. Objects of vast impor- tance, which, by an eiFort of competent magni- tude and vigour, might have been secured to the invaders, were lost ; and all the moral con- sequences of failure were hazarded with an im- prudent rashness, of which the subsequent details of this narrative will abundantly display the results. CHAPTER X. OPERATIONS IN PORTUGAL. In Portugal, the measures of the usurping chap, x government were not of a character to conciliate the affections of the people. The invaders had ^^^^' June. at once thrown off the mask. The ancient dy- nasty was proclaimed to have forfeited the throne. The pictures of the Braganzan monarchs Ob$ervador were torn from the walls of the palace, with cir- ^^ "^" cumstances of public indignity. Contributions of inordinate magnitude were exacted from the people. The artifices which had been adopted in Spain, to blind the nation to the real views of the usurper, were considered unnecessary in Portugal. That country was too limited in ter- ritory, and too feeble in resources, to excite the fears of Napoleon ; and there no attempt was 254 THE RAPACITY OF THE FRENCH. EXCITEMENT OF THE PEOPLE. 255 CHAP. X. made to exhibit usurpation in the semblance of 1^ justice. June. ^" ^^^ ^y^^ ^^ ^^^ French government, a peo- ple so little formidable, had no claim to mercy or forbearance. " Of what use is it," asked the Foy. minister f Napoleon, in a letter to Marshal Junot, " to make promises which you cannot perform. Nothing, undoubtedly, can be more laudable, than to conciliate the confidence and affection of the people ; but do not forget that the safety of the army is a paramount object. Disarm the Portuguese ; maintain a strict watch over the soldiers, lest they become the nucleus of insurrection. Watch too the Spanish troops. Guard the important fortresses of Almeida and Elvas. Lisbon is too large and too populous a city, and the population is necessarily hostile. Withdraw your troops from it. Hut them on the sea coast. Keep them exercised, disciplined, and collected in masses, that they may be always ready to encounter the English army, which, sooner or later, will be landed on the shores of Portugal." Though the arrogance and the rapacity of their invaders, did not, and could not, fail to ex- cite the indignation and the hatred of the people, yet several months elapsed, before these feelings chap.x. gave rise to any general or formidable demon- ,q^q strations of resistance. Intelligence of the in- ju^g, surrection in Spain, at length set the match to the train, and fired the spirit of the people with a kindred ardour and devotion to the cause of freedom. In vain did Junot endeavour to de- Thiebault. ceive the people by false information. In vain did he suppress or mutilate the letters by the public post, which gave intelligence of the events passing in the sister country. The news were disseminated through the country by a thousand channels. Secret messengers were employed by the Supreme Junta, to convey to the Spanish army in Portugal, injunctions to join their coun- trymen in defending the throne and the altar from usurpation and insults. Private letters to the military of all ranks, besought them to re- turn to Spain, and afford protection to their fami- lies amid the dangers which surrounded them. Such appeals were not made in vain. Thence- forward no confidence could be placed in the fidelity of the Spanish army. Junot endeavour- ed to concilate them by every means in his power. He treated the higher officers with flat- tering distinction, and raised the pay and allow- i 256 INSURRECTION BREAKS OUT. THE SPANISH ARMY REVOLTS. 257 CHAP. X. ances of the troops, to an equality with those of ,^..Q the French army. Every measure was taken to Jane, guard against defection. TTie Spanish army was divided into small bodies, and dispersed over as wide a surface as possible ; directions were given to the officers commanding in the neigh- bourhood, to redouble their vigilance ; and pre- parations were made to repel, by strong measures, the first overt demonstrations of disaffection in the troops. It was under such circumstances of impending peril, that Junot was compelled, by the order of Napoleon, to weaken his army, by detaching four thousand men under Loison, to co-operate with Bessieres on the Spanish frontier ; and an equal number, under General Avril, to assist Dupont in his operations in Andalusia. The army of Junot was thus imprudently weakened, at the very moment when a powerful and general resist- ance was about to break forth ; and the force which remained was barely equal to supply the necessary garrisons, for the more important points of occupation. But circumstances favoured the French. Avril, having advanced to Tavira, was induced to retrace his steps, by inteUigence that an Eng- lish army was stationed at Ayamonte; and chap, x- Loison, having failed in his object of occupying Rodrigo, was subsequently recalled to Oporto. j^^^^ It was in that city that the chief body of the Spanish army was stationed. On the death of General Taranco, the command had been assum- ed by General Quesnel, a French officer of pru- dence and moderation, yet by no means acceptable to the troops. The symptoms of disaffection daily increased. Quesnel, fearing a revolt, pre- pared the fort of San Joao de Foz, which com- mands the harbour of Oporto, as a place of refuge for himself, and the weak escort on whose fidelity alone he could rely. His fears were soon real- ized. General Belesta, the officer next in com- mand, received orders from the Junta of Gallicia to return to Spain, and to bear with him as cap- tives all the French remaining at Oporto. These orders were obeyed: Quesnel and his staff were arrested ; and Belesta having convoked the na- jm,, g. tive authorities of the province, declared them at liberty to act as they thought proper, and departed for Gallicia, with the Spanish army and the prisoners they had secured. On the ninth of June intelligence of these Jun.9. events reached Lisbon. They were naturally 258 A DIVISION OP SPANIARDS DISARMED. CHAP.x. pregnant with alarm. Vigorous and decisive measures were immediately adopted by Junot. Jwie. Caraffa's division of Spaniards — the only one remaining in the country— composed of six bat- talions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and several troops of artillery, was stationed in dif- ferent villages in the vicinity of Lisbon. These troops, by a skilful and daring stratagem, were disarmed, and, with the exception of a few hun- dreds who succeeded in effecting their escape, were placed as prisoners on board of vessels in the Tagus. The boldness and facility of execution with which this success was achieved, struck the hearts of the insurgents with alarm. They again declared their allegiance to the existing gov- ernment. Junot was little inclined to increase the difficulties of his situation, by adding to the irritation of the people. He accepted their sub- mission ; and endeavoured, by a conciliatory pro- clamation, and by increasing the allowances of the Portuguese army, to secure their adhesion to his cause. Observador Yet Strong measures were taken for disarm- OT uguez. j^^ ^j^^ population. Heavy punishment was de- nounced on the possession of warlike implements, INSURRECTION AT OPORTO. 259 by any inhabitant, whether foreigner or native ; chap. x. and heads of families were declared responsible loUo. for the conduct of all belonging to their establish- j^^^^^ ments. In the numerous quarters where resist- ance had already appeared, detachments of French troops were stationed, in order at once to punish and overawe the disaffected. But the flame of hatred and indignation, which had long burned in the bosom of the people, could no longer be suppressed. Insurrection again broke forth in the province of Oporto. On the day of Corpo de Deos, the soldiers re- fused to carry the French eagles in the proces- sion. The appearance of a few Spaniards, who had remained in concealment since the departure of Belesta's division, gave rise to the report that a Spanish army was approaching to liberate the province. An English frigate, cruising off the entrance of the Douro, contributed to spread the belief that a squadron was about to enter the river. The governor, Don Luiz de Olive- ira, who had endeavoured to allay the tumult, was deposed from his command and thrown into prison. The gates of the Arsenal were forced, and arms and ammunition distributed a- mong the people. The insurrection continued :^60 INSURRECTION IN ALGARVE. GENERAL RESISTANCE OP THE PEOPLE. 261 1808. June. CHAP. X. hourly to assume a more formidable character. On the morning- of the nineteenth, the popnlace hurried in crowds to the Episcopal Palace. The Bishop came forth into the balcony, and gave them his pastoral benediction. He then descend- ed to the street, and, kissing the banners of the country, said to those who bore them, " Let us go and return thanks to God." The flock fol- lowed their pastor to the Cathedral Church, where, having implored a blessing on the cause in which they had embarked, a junta of eight members was appointed for the provisional gov- ernment of the country, of which the Bishop was declared president. While the standard of liberty was thus raised in the north, another insurrection, nearly si- multaneous, took place in Algarve. General Maurin, who commanded in that province, was succeeded, in consequence of illness, by Colonel Jun. 16. Maransin, who, with a force of about sixteen hundred men, found himself incapable of re- straining the tumultuous hostility of the people. The arrival of a British force at Ayamonte, gave encouragement to the insurgents ; while the ap- prehensions of Maransin were| increased, by the report that a Spanish force was about to cross 1808. June. the Gaudiana and enter Alentejo. It was im- chap. x. possible, under such circumstances, to retrieve the aflairs of the province with so limited a force, and Maransin instantly retreated to Mer- tola, leaving his baggage, papers, military chest, and above one hundred prisoners, in the hinds of the insurgents. The insurrection had now become general throughout the provinces on the right of the Mondego. At Braga, at Leiria, at Coimbra, and at many other places, the national standard had been reared amid the acclamations of the people. Partial engagements were continually taking place between the natives, and detach- ments of the intrusive army ; and though these, as might be expected, generally terminated in the defeat of the insurgents, yet the spirit of re- sistance was not quelled. While awed by the presence of an overwhelming force, tranquillity was for a time restored ; but no sooner had their enemy retired than the people were again in arms. Thus it was, that though nominally mas- ters of the country, the French, in truth, held only such portions of it, as were immediately oc- cupied by their troops. The measures of the Junta, for the liberation 262 PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUNTA. CHAP.x. of the kingdom, were vigorous and judicious. All the arms in the public depots were distribut- June ^^ ^^ ^^® people ; a train of field artillery was equipped ; the pay of the army was increased, and the disbanded oflBcers and soldiers were en- rolled in new regiments. Generals Bernardin de Freire and Miguel de Forjas, officers of re- puted talent, and of known hostility to the u- surping government, were assumed into the councils of the Junta, and appointed military leaders. Proclamations, exhorting the people to burst the shackles of their bondage, and to take arms in the cause of liberty and their coun- try, were circulated through the provinces. The Viscount de Balsemao was sent ambassador to England, to entreat the assistance of that power ; and a correspondence was opened with the Junta of Gallicia. While the country was thus torn by violent convulsion, Lisbon, the very seat and centre of the invader's power, was not tranquil. The fete of the Corpus Christi, is one which had uniform- ly been celebrated in the capital with extraordi- nary pomp. On that day the whole population of the city, increased by large accessions from the surrounding country, were annually collected '^ PROCESSION AT LISBON. 263 to witness the procession. Nothing could ex- chap, x, ceed its magnificence. The streets were strewn 1808 with flowers, the walls decorated with tapestry, j and the balconies displayed all of beauty and gplendour which the country could aff'ord. On that solemn occasion, not only the wealth of in- dividuals, but the vast treasures of the church were displayed, to add pomp to the festival. — The most prominent figure in the pageant was an image of St. George, glittering with jewels, mounted on a horse gorgeously caparisoned, and foll(»wed by a cavalcade of the royal household. Throngs of penitents and monks, duly marshal- led in the procession, formed a train so numer- ous as to occupy several hours in passing. The corporations of arts and trades, the senate, the tribunals, the councils, the regular troops, the generals, and the militia, followed in succes- sion. Then came the consecrated Host, pre- ceded by knights in their mantles, and covered by a splendid canopy, borne by the chief dig- nitaries of the church, in all the pomp and cir- cumstance of canonical splendour. Last of all came the Sovereign, the Princes of his family, and the grandees, on foot, without guards, and 2 264 PROCESSION AT LISBON. June. CHAP. X. mixed, as it were, with the great body of the people. This festival, Marshal Junot deemed it im- politic to abolish. He considered that any pro- hibition would probably be attributed to fear, and tend to increase the instability of the new government. On the day appointed, therefore, the procession took place, though shorn of its chief honours by the absence of the Sovereign, in whose place Junot did not think it pru- dent to appear, and of the figure of St. George, whose dress had been carried off to Brazil. — In all other circumstances the splendour of the pageant was undiminished. Cannon were fired from the castle in demonstration of respect, the streets were lined by the French troops, and the procession, in all wonted formality, had be- gun its progress, when, at the moment when the sacred Host was seen issuing from the Church of St. Domingo, the crowds in the squares of the Commercio and the Rocio, became ve- hemently agitated, and the commotion spread like wildfire through every street in the city. For this sudden perturbation there was no ap- parent cause. No symptom of hostility had been 1808. June. TERROR AND CONFUSION OF THE PEOPLE. 265 previously manifested, on the part either of the chap. x. military or the people. But in a moment, from some unknown and even now inexplicable cause, the whole aspect of affairs was changed. Cries of terror arose among the multitude, and were instantly reverberated by many thousand voices. Some exclaimed, « There is an earthquake, the city is about to be destroyed ;" others, " The English are landed ;" but the greater number were influenced by the apprehension of a general massacre, and invoked their countrymen to re- sist bravely to the last. Among the vast multitudes which thronged the city, aU was panic and confusion. Priests, nobles, penitents, and monks, in a moment de-' serted the procession, and mingling amid the crowd, carried with them the remains of broken crucifixes and tapers, strewing the streets with the fragments of their torn vestments. The insignia of the festival were overthrown and trampled under foot. Multitudes, actuated by blind terror, encountered each other like op- posing torrents, and obstructed all avenues of escape. The disorder pervaded aU ranks. The prelate who bore the Host deserted the sacred incarnation, and, returning into the church, was VOL. I. ^ ' .t ' -SLJAIM— ! ■ 266 COXDUCT OP JUNOT. i8oa June. cHAP.x. found concealed behind a screen. All participated alike in tlie indefinite and pervading terror, and fled with tumultuous disnaay. During the progress of this extraordinary convulsion, Marshal Junot was in the Palace of the Inquisition. He immediately went to the church of St. Domingo, and endeavoured to rally the fugitive prelates and nobles, who had fled to that sanctuary for protection. He per- ceived that it was most important that the pro- cession should at all events take place, as the best means of allaying the apprehensions of the people. Without waiting to inquire into the causes of the disorder, he gave the strongest as- surance that the French troops should aflFord protection from violence, and declared his inten- tion of joining the cortege. The procession ac- cordingly again set forth, and symptoms of dis- order were again manifested. The ceremonies of the day, however, were at length concluded with decency and order. On the return of Junot to head-quarters, amid tlirongs of people, a few voices saluted him with cheers, — the last he wa* ever destined to receive in Portugal* • The causes of this singular tumult, have never yet been dis- cwered. Thiebault attribute* it to an organized system of con- HE CALLS A COUNCIL OP WAR. 267 Surrounded by increasing difficulties, Junot call- chap. x. ed a council of war, and the result of their deliber- ations, was, a resolution to concentrate the army j„^ * in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, and abandon all Thiebault. the fortresses in the kingdom, with the excep- tion of Elvaa, Almeida, Peniche, and Setubal. But even this resolution presented considerable dif- ficulties in the execution. The communication, between the different branches of the army, was intercepted by the hostUe population of the in- tervening provinces. Loison was at Guarda, when he at length re- ceived one out of many despatches directing his return to Lisbon. In his attempt to reach Opor- to he had been unfortunate. On the sixteenth of Jun. 16. June, he had received orders to assume the com- mand at Oporto ; and, leaving a garrison in AI- meida, under General Chariot, on the day fol- lowing he commenced his march, with two bat- talions of light infantry, fifty dragoons, and six pieces of artillery. •piracy; but this hypothesis is irreconcilable with many of the circumsunces. The people were naturally suspicious of the designs and the good faith of their invader. They saw themsdves surrounded by an armed force, and at the mercy of its leader. In a multitude terror is contagious, and when the mine is laid, a spark 18 sufficient to explode it. 268 LOISON SETS OUT FOR OPORTO, CHAP.X. 1808. June. During the first four days of his march, Loi- son encountered no impediment. On the twen- ty-first he crossed the Douro at Regora, and halted at Rezamfrio. There he learned that the mountaineers, in considerable force, were prepared to dispute the strong country in his front ; and, under the influence of alarm, he de- termined on retreating. But even this measure was not unaccompanied with danger. His baggage had been already attacked ; and mass- es of armed peasants flocked from the sur- rounding mountains to obstruct and harass Jun.23. his retreat. At Castro d'Airo an engage- ment took place, in which the peasants, from want of discipline, encountered considerable loss ; and the march of the French army to Ce- lorico was no longer molested. At Celorico, Loison divided his army, and despatched one half to Trancoso, while with the other he pro- ceeded to Guarda, where his stay was cut short by the receipt of Junot's order, for the concen- tration of the army round the capital. On the thirtieth of June, Loison halted at Pinhel, and on the day following at Almeida. In that city he left his sick, and a garrison of twelve hundred and fifty men ; and, having dilapi- Jun. 30. BUT IS DRIVEN BACK. 269 dated the fort Concei^am, he commenced his chap. x. retreat on Lisbon. "— 180R At Guarda, Loison had reckoned on a friend- , . JuJy. ly reception. In this he was deceived. On ap- proaching the city, he found a body of peasants drawn up, and prepared, with an old piece of rusty artillery, found in the rubbish of the cas- tle, to dispute his entrance. An immediate at- Jul. 3. tack was ordered. The approach of the French spread confusion through, the ranks of the in- surgents ; and they were speedily driven from their position with great loss. The slaughter was unsparing,— above a thousand men were Thiebault. left dead on the field. The flying peasants were pursued along the streets of Guarda, which the French entered without further opposition ; and their success was followed by the usual scenes of massacre and pillage. On the fourth of July, Loison continued his jxn, 4. retrogressive movement on Lisbon. On the day following, an engagement took place at Alpe- drinham. The insurgents occupied a position of considerable strength, and had thrown up re- doubts on the face of the hill leading to the vil- lage. But their flanks were unsupported ; and 270 THE ALENTEJO RISES IN ARMS. 1808. July. Jul. 11. CHAP. X. a battalion having turned their right, the posi- tion became untenable ; and, after a strenuous but fruitless resistance, the insurgents were put to flight. Their loss, on this occasion, was con- siderable, and included their leader, the Capi- tao Mor, whose body was discovered among the slain. From Alpedrinham, Loison encoun- tered no further obstacle in his retreat, except that arising from the extreme difficulty of pro- curing supplies, in a country decidedly hostile. On the eleventh he reached Abrautes. The Alentejo had now risen in arms. At Villa Vi90sa the people attacked a detachment Jun. 23. of French troops, quartered in the town, and forced them to retire into the castle. General Leite, who had lately governed the province, wag now selected as military leader ; but that officer, aware of the narrow extent of the re- sources which the natives could oppose to the power of the intruders, declined the responsi- bility of command. The choice of the multitude then fell on Antonio de Lacerda, an old officer, who took such measures as seemed best suited to the danger of the time. Messengers were despatched to solicit aid from Badajos ; and 1808. June. MASSACRE OF VILLA VI9OSA. 271 marksmen were stationed on the top of the Con- chap. x. cei^am church, and other points which com- manded the castle. General Kellcrman, who commanded in the province, no sooner received intelligence of tliese events, than he despatched a force to re- lieve the troops driven into the castle. A dread- ful massacre took pljice. The insurgents were «lun. 25 routed ; and the French, entering the city at the charge, put the inhabitants to the bayonet with- out discrimination. Upwards of two hundred were killed in the streets ; the place was given up to pillage, and twelve of the prisoners were put to death as ringleaders, in what, by a singu- lar abuse of language, was designated rebel- lion. Lacerda fled to Oliven^a with a few followers, where he found a Spanish force, under command of General Moretti. By the latter, an attack was immediately determined upon the fort of Juramenha, which commands the passage of the Guadiana. This was successful. Moretti re- ceived assistance from Badajos ; and Kellerman, not aware of the weakness of the garrison, did not venture on any serious attempts to regain possession of the fort. 272 CAPTURE AND MASSACRE OF BEJA. CHAP. X. 1808. June. The fortunate result of this operation, and the hurried eracuation of Algarve by the enemy, gave spirit to the people. Proclamations, excit- ing the population to take arms, were circulated on all hands; and it became evident, from the increasing resistance in every qi:arter to French authority, that the cruelties perpetrated at Villa Vi90sa had signally failed of their anticipated eflFect. No change of policy, however, took place. The people of Beja rose against the enemy, and massacred two French soldiers, belonging to a detachment which the day before had entered their city. This criminal excess was followed Thiebault. by a dreadful retribution. Maransin defeated the insurgents and entered the town. It was pil- laged and burned, and a great proportion of the inhabitants put to the sword. Upwards of twelve hundred slain were found in the streets. The loss of the French on this occasion amount- ed only to thirty killed and fifty wounded.* Jun. 26. * There is something, we think, approaching to the &cetious, in the gravity with which General Thiebault obtrudes the fol- lowing anecdote upon the credulity of his readers. " II y eut me- me a Beja une circonstance qui peut etre rapportee. Un brave re- ligieux de cette ville ayant profite du triste tableau qu'elle offiroit apres le combat, pour fi■ 302 DELABORDE RETREATS. 1808. August. CHAP. XI. the right flank of the enemy's position. Dela- borde's situation had now become one of extreme peril; and he was too skilful a general not at once to perceive the necessity of immediate retreat. Precipitately abandoning his position, he retired to the village of Zambugeira, where he again made demonstration of resistance. From this, by a most gallant charge, he was di-iven by General Spencer. The loss of the French, in this engagement, was six hundred killed and wounded ; among the latter of which was their brave and skilful leader. That of the English was somewhat less. It is stated by the oflicial returns to have amounted altogether to four hundred and eighty-two. The force of Delaborde, in the action, is kno>vn to have amounted to five thousand men.* Such are the details of the first action fought • The force of the enemy was estimated by Sir Arthur Wel- lesley at six thousand men, which tallied exactly with the state- ment of a French officer, wounded in the action. Reasons, in our judgment, satisfastory, have induced us to make a lower esti- mate. The number actually in the field, is stated, by Thiebault, to have been only nineteen hundred men. Foy makes it two thousand two hundred men. Neither are entitled to credit. It is truly said, by Colonel Napier, that such puerile misstatements can only tend to throw ridicule on a deed of arms, in itself hon- ourable to the talent of the general, and the discipline and cour- age of his army. POLICY OF THE ATTACK. 303 1808. August. by British troops in the great cause of the Pen- chap.xi, insula. It is memorable, as affording the earliest opportunity of displaying, on a new scene, the spirit, gallantry, and discipline of English sol- diers ; and perhaps not less so, as constituting one of those rare occasions, in which the judg- ment and prudence of the greatest general of the age may fairly be called in question. It is now admitted, we believe, by all military men, that the attack on the front of the second po- sition at Roli9a, was injudicious. The columns of General Ferguson and Colonel Trant were alone sufficient to have dislodged the enemy, who must instantly have retired on their appearance. It is indeed difficult to conceive how Sir Arthur Wellesley, the reinforcement of whose army de- pended on contingencies beyond his control, with a force barely equal to make head against the combined army of his opponents, should, in such circumstances, have been so rashly lavish of the lives of his soldiers. They were brought into action with every possible disadvantage, and fought for an object which a skilful general could unquestionably have obtained without bloodshed. It is probable that Sir Arthur Wellesley was 304 RESULT OF THE ENGAGEMENT. THE ARMY MOVE TO VIMIERO. 305 CHAP. XI. unprepared for the obstinate and vigorous resis- tance which the enemy opposed to the colamns August. ^^ ^^^^ ^"^ Nightingale ; and that his object was to press Delaborde in his retreat more closely than could otherwise have been done. If so, he paid the penalty of his miscalculations. It cannot be doubted that the sight of seventy English prisoners, sent in triumph to Lisbon, must have produced an injurious moral influence on the minds of the people, and have led them to give credit to the exaggerated rumours which it was the policy of the enemy to set afloat. The numbers of the troops on both sides, ac- tually engaged, were nearly equal. Before the appearance of the columns of Trant and Fergus- on, the enemy had already been dislodged from his position ; and the brigades of Hill and Night- ingale were in a condition, unaided, to have driven him from the village of Zambugeira. Consider- ing the disadvantages under which they fought, and the magnitude of the obstacles overcome, the achievement was one unquestionably highly hon- ourable to the troops. The talent shewn by Delaborde, throughout his operations, must be admitted, by all par- ties, to have been very great. His chief object was to retard the advance of the English army, chap. xr. in order to gain time for a junction with Loison ; and the union of boldness and skill, by which ^^ ^^^ his manoBuvres for this purpose were conceived and executed, is, unquestionably, indicative of a highly-gifted commander. Driven from the village of Zambugeira, Dela- borde retired with his army, by the road to Torres Vedras. It was the intention of Sir Ar- thur Wellesley to have lost no time in following the enemy ; but having learned that the expect- ed reinforcement under General Acland was in the offing, he changed his resolution, and moved onward by the coast road, in order to cover the landing of the troops, and receive supplies from the shipping. On the eighteenth, the army halted at Lourin- Aug. is. Iia. On the nineteenth, it moved onward to Vimiero ; and on the twentieth, was joined by Aug. 20. the brigade of General Anstruther ; and the landing of the remainder of the corps was eff^ect- ed, with some difficulty, in the course of the night. Delaborde could not oppose the de- barkation, but sent on his cavalry, in hopes of attacking the troops on their march. This was foreseen. A detachment, under General } 1 306 PROJECT OF SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY. ITS CHANCES OF SUCCESS. 307 1808. August. CHAP. XI. Spencer, was stationed at Lourinha for their protection, and no annoyance was attempted by the enemy. It was known at bead-quarters, that a junc- tion bad taken place between the corps of Dela- borde and that of Loison, on the eighteenth, and that their united force was concentrated in posi- tion at Torres Vedras. The enemy daily sent for- ward patrols of cavalry into the neighbourhood of the British army ; and their superiority in that arm was too decided to admit of opposition. Of the position occupied by the French army, Sir Arthur Wellesley could learn nothing, ex- cept that it was very strong, and accessible only by a long and difficult defile. Under these circumstances, he had formed the resolution of advancing rapidly along the coast- road to Mafra, and thus turning the position of Torres Vedras. By this movement, he calculat- ed on forcing the hostile army to an immediate retreat, and on enjoying an opportunity of at- tacking Loison and Delaborde in a new position, before they should gain time to occupy it with advantage. To this plan of operations many objections have been stated. It has been said that the flank and rear of the army, when in march, would have been exposed to the chance chap. xi. of attack from an enemy greatly superior in cavalry, and one not likely to be deceived by ^ug^gt] any boldness of manoeuvre. The road to Mafra, for about six leagues, runs nearly parallel to a steep and rocky coast, and passes through a series of defiles, which affbrd no spot on which an army could form in order of battle. Had an attack been made, therefore, in such circumstances, on the army, lengthened out in a long column on the march, it cannot be doubted, that it must have contended with the enemy, under a mass of al- most insurmountable disadvantages. On the otlier hand, it may be urged that before the French general could have received intelli- gence of the contemplated movement, the British army would have been considerably advanced on their march. That the country intervening be- tween the direct road to Mafra, and that by which Junot, on the morning of the twenty-first, was marching on Vimiero, was of a character ex- tremely difficult and almost impervious, and that failing in the object of attacking the British army on the march, the only alternatives which remain- ed, were those of carrying the formidable position of Mafra, under every disadvantage, or of falling S08 ARRIVAL OF SIR HARRY BURRARD, CHAP. XI. rapidly back, by the Cabe<;a de Montichique, with the view of covering the capital. In either August. ^^^' *^® difficulties of the enenay would have been prodigiously increased. Considering the cliaracter and circumstances of the armies, it is more than improbable that an attack on the po- sition of Mafra, which did not admit of being turned, would have been attended with success. And in the attempt to cover Lisbon, the proxi- mity of a hostile capital, the population of which would probably be roused into acts of aggres- sion by the near hope of deliverance, must have added exceedingly to the perils and embarrass- ment of Marshal Junot. When we consider, too, that the plan in ques- tion was the deliberate adoption of a general, who has never since been known to commit his army, by any flagrant error of calculation, we shall probably be disposed to admit the conclu- sion, that the operation in question was found- ed on sound data, and that had it been carried into execution, the acquisition of Lisbon might have been effected with smaller loss, and with circumstances more honourable to our arms, than by the more timid policy which led to the con- vention of Cintra. AND CONSEQUENT CHANGE OF PLANS. 309 On the evening of the twentieth, however, a chap.xi, frigate, on board of which was Sir Harry Bur- rard, arrived in Marceira Bay. Sir Arthur August. Wellesley, thus suddenly superseded in com- mand, lost no time in reporting to that officer the situation and circumstances of the army, and the plan of operations which it had been his in- tention to pursue. Of the latter. Sir Harry Burrard expressed his disapprobation. He di- rected the cessation of any active movements, until the army should have been still further in- creased by the arrival of Sir John Moore, which might be expected in a few days. Against this unfortunate decision of his supe- rior. Sir Arthur, in vain, remonstrated. He as- sured him that the army was already fully equal to cope with that of the enemy ; that, situated as it then was, an engagement was inevitable, and that the only consequence of present inaction, would be that of yielding to the enemy the pri- vilege of choosing the moment of attack, while the greatest disadvantage would accrue from the sudden assumption of a line of operations mere- ly defensive. Sir Arthur likewise stated his decided conviction, that the corps of Sir John Moore would more beneficially contribute to the 310 MEASURES OF SIR HARRY BURRARD. HIS CHARACTER. 311 1808. August. ■1:1 CHAP. XI. common cause, by marching on Santarem, and thus narrowing and obstructing the communica- tion and retreat of the French army, than by unit- ing itself to a force already fully adequate to all the purposes it was intended to effect. Of the consequences to be dreaded from any demon- stration of vacilhition or timidity, Sir Arthur also spoke strongly, but in vain. Sir Harry Burrard remained fixed in his decision ; and the order, which had already been issued to the army for resuming their march, was counter- manded. Instructions were likewise despatched to Sir John Moore, directing him to move down in his transports to Marceira Bay, which had been determined as the point of debarkation for his troops. Such were the measures adopted by Sir Harry Burrard on the assumption of his brief command. That they were timid and injudicious cannot be denied. Yet, while we condemn the decision by which the projects of a greater military genius were at once overthrown, let us not be unjust, and blend our dispassionate regrets with the se- verity of personal censure. Thrown accidentally and unawares into what could only be considered as a situation of transient command, it was per- haps scarcely to be expected that his measures chap.xi. should be marked by the confidence and bold- 1808 ness of purpose, which might have contributed ^^ ^^ so greatly to the success of the campaign. It was certainly not unnatural, that a person so sit- uated should be unwilling to incur the responsi- bility of directing operations, of the propriety of which, and the chances of success which they afforded, he could form but a partial and imper- fect judgment. Called summarily to decide in difficult and unexpected circumstances. Sir Harry Burrard will probably be considered to have de- cided wrong ; yet he unquestionably decided to the best of his judgment. Fault, therefore, can be attributed only to those who sacrificed the in- terest of their country, by placing a man of nar- row capacity, yet of honest intentions, in a situ- ation for which he was manifestly unfit. That officers of such acknowledged talent and preten- sions as Sir John Moore and Sir Arthur Wel- lesley, should have been superseded in command by Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard, is a tolerably convincing proof that the selection of military leaders, was, in those days, regulated by principles very different from that of detur digniori. 312 POSITION OF VIMIERO. 1808. August. Aug. 21. CHAP. XI. Early on the morning of the twenty-first, Sir Arthur Wellesley visited the advanced posts, hut could discern no sign of an approaching enemy. About seven o'clock, however, a cloud of dust was observed in the extremity of the horizon, slowly moving towards the position of the British ; and at eight o'clock a strong body of the enemy's cavalry was observed on the heights to the southward. In a short time a strong column of infantry appeared on the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinha; and it became evident that a general engagement was on the eve of taking place between the armies. The village of Vimiero stands in a valley, watered by the little rivulet Maccira, at the eas- tern extremity of a high mountainous range, which extends westward to the sea. In front of the village is a hill of inferior altitude, terminat- ing in a plateau of considerable extent, and com- manded from several points. On the left is an- other strong ridge of heights, stretching to the eastward, and terminating on the right in a deep ravine. Over these heights passes the road to Lourinha, through the villages of Fontanel and Ventoso. Such were the more prominent features of the i ALLOCATION OP THE BRITISH ARMY. 313 1808. August. ground. It was thus occupied by Sir Arthur chap. xi. Wellesley : Six brigades were stationed on the mountain to the westward of the village. The advanced-guard, under General Fane, and the brigade of General Anstruther, with six pieces of artillery, occupied the plateau. The cavalry and reserve of artillery were posted in the val- ley, between the heights, ready to support the troops on the plateau, should that part of the position be attacked. The Lourinha road was guarded by the Portuguese troops and a small body of riflemen. The ground having been taken up on the previous evening, rather with a view to temporary convenience than military de- fence, a piquet only had been stationed on the ridge to the westward. As it was obvious, how- ever, from the enemy's demonstrations, that the left and centre were about to become the chief theatres of conflict, the brigades of Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, Acland, and Bowes, were successively moved from the mountain on the west to the heights on the Lourinha road, in order to strengthen what was evidently the most vulnerable part of the position. At nine o'clock the action commenced. Mar- shal Junot had formed his army in two divisions. VOL. I. 314 THE FRENCH ADVANCE TO THE ATTACK. 1808. August. CHAP. XI. The first of these, consisting of about six thou- sand men, was commanded by General Delaborde. The second, under Loison, was nearly equal in amount. The reserve, composed of four bat- talions of grenadiers, was commanded by Gen- eral Kellerman, and acted as a connecting link between the two principal divisions. The cav- alry, under General Margaron, was stationed partly in rear of the reserve, and partly on the right of Delaborde's division. The two divisions continued their advance, a- cross the rough and wooded country in front of the position, towards the plateau in the centre. On approaching the scene of action, however, each division separated into several minor col- umns, which commenced nearly simultaneous at- tacks on different portions of the British line. The most vehement was that headed by Delaborde in person, who first came in contact with the brigade of General Anstruther, which occupied the left of the plateau, and the village of Vi- miero. During its advance, this body was ex- posed to a destructive fire of artillery, which it bore with great steadiness and gallantry, and rapidly forced back the skirmishers who had been stationed in the woods on either fiank. A BATTLE OP VIMIERO. 315 1808. August. check, however, was soon given to the progress chap, xi- of the assailants, who, having reached the sum- mit of the plateau, were met by a destructive volley from the fiftieth regiment, which after- wards rushed on to the charge, and drove them in confusion, and with great slaughter, down the face of the hill. The attack on General Fane's brigade was no less decisively repulsed ; and a re- giment, which was advancing on the village, by the church, was opportunely attacked in flank by the brigade of General Acland, then moving to its position on the heights. A most gallant charge, by the small body of cavalry led by Col- onel Taylor, completed the discomfiture of the enemy in this quarter. They fled in utter con- fusion, and were vigorously pursued, by Colonel Taylor and his squadron, for nearly two miles ; when General Margaron, who commanded the French cavalry, observing the small number of the assailants, advanced to the charge ; and the remnant of this brave band were compelled to retreat, with the loss of their leader. General Kellerman, having rallied the fugitives, made a last effort with the reserve to retrieve the for- tunes of the day. A column, strongly support- ed by artillery, was again sent forward to gain :H6 BATTLE OP VIMIERO. CHAP. XI. possession of the village of Vimiero. In ad- vancing by the road, it was encountered by the Au ust. ^<>rty-third regiment ; and, after a short, but desperate struggle, was driven back. No far- ther attempt was made on this part of the posi- tion ; and the enemy retired, leaving seven pieces of artillery, and a great number of prison- ers, in possession of the victors. While these events were passing in the cen- tre, an attack, no less resolutely supported, was made on the left of the British, which occupied the heights, on the Lourinha road. In that quarter, General Ferguson, whose brigade had been moved from the right to the left of the line, had scarcely taken up his ground, when he found himself assailed by a strong body of in- fantry, supported by cavalry. The engagement was fierce, and resolutely maintained on both sides. The troops of Ferguson remained im- movable under every eflFort to dislodge them ; and, on the coming up of the eighty-second and twenty-ninth regiments, the enemy were charged with the bayonet, and driven back in confusion. The French cavalry endeavoured to retrieve the misfortune of the infantry by several charge, but in vain. They were uniformly repulsed with BATTLE OF VIMIERO. 317 1808. August. unshaken steadiness, by the brigades of Fergu- chap. xi. son and Nightingale, and at length ceased from farther attack. The fruit of this achievement was the capture of six gims ; and General Ferguson, leaving the seventy-fii-st and eighty-second regiments to guard these honourable trophies, was in full purguit of the discomfited enemy, when the bri- gwie of Brenier, suddenly emerging from the ravine, attacked the two battalions, and for a moment succeeded in retaking the captured ar- tillery. But the regiments instantly rallied ; and by a desperate charge with the bayonet, at once drove back the brigade of Brenier into the ravine, and remained masters of the guns. In this charge. General Brenier was made prisoner. Afiairs were in this situation on the left, when General Ferguson received an unexpected order to desist from the pursuit. His corps was ac- cordingly halted ; and the enemy taking advan- tage of this unlooked-for supineness of their op- ponents, were rallied by General Thiebault, and withdrawn, under protection of the cavalry, to a position in rear of Toledo. In the subsequent retreat of the army to Torres Vedras, it was re- 318 RESULT OF THE BATTLE. CHAP. XI. enforced by the junction of two battalions, which "7177"" had not come up in time to be of service in the August. action. The results of this brilliant victory were, the capture of a general oflScer and several hundred men, thirteen pieces of cannon, and twenty- three waggons loaded with ammunition. The total loss of the enemy, in the battle, has been estimated at three thousand. Generals Foy and Thiebault do not admit it to have exceeded eighteen hundred. But, considering all the circumstances of the action, the latter calculation will probably be held to be as much below the truth as the former is above it. With regard to the relative numbers of the armies, there exists also .much difference of statement. There can be no doubt that the British army was numerically superior to its opponent ; but Foy and Thiebault, in estimat- ing the amount of the French force at only nine thousand two hundred men, are, unques- Napier. tionably, not entitled to credit. A French order of battle, found on the field, gave a total of four- teen thousand men present under arms ; and this amount accords too accurately with other estimates, and also with observations made at SIR HARRY BURRARD ASSUMES THE COMMAND. 319 the time, to leave any doubt of its authenticity chap.xi and correctness. iQaci While the battle was yet in progress. Sir ^^ugust. Harry Burrard arrived on the field ; but, from motives of delicacy, declined assuming the com- mand till the enemy were repulsed. Towards the close of the action, when the ultimate suc- cess of the British arms could no longer be con- sidered doubtful. Sir Arthur Wellesley was na- turally anxious to reap the full fruits of his vic- tory, and represented to his superior in com- mand the importance of following up with vi- gour the advantages Jilready gained. But to this measure, Sir Harry Burrard, actuated by an unfortunate dread of responsibility, refused Iiis consent. It was urged to him, in vain, that the enemy, severely beaten and dis- comfited, had already commenced a hurried and confused retreat ; that one half of the British army had borne no part in the action, and was, consequently, in a condition to follow up the pursuit with vigour and effect; that the road to Torres Vedras being already in possession of General Hill, it was now in our power to anti- cipate the enemy by the occupation of that im- portant pass, and even to reach Lisbon before 320 SIR HARRY BURRARD FORBIDS THE 1808. CHAP. XI. him. But these arguments produced no benefi- cial consequence on the resolution of Sir Harry Burrard. With the caution of an aged com- mander, and the diffidence of an inexperienced eoe, he declined encountering the risks attend- ant on the brilliant scheme of operations pro- posed for his adoption, and declared his deter- mination of awaiting, in the position of Vimiero, the arrival of Sir John Moore. General Ferguson, on receiving, in the full ca- reer of success, the mortifying order to desist from farther operations, immediately sent his aid- de-camp to represent the great advantage to be anticipated from continuing the pursuit, and to state, that he himself might have cut off a considerable body of the enemy. Sir Ar- thur carried the aid-de-camp to Sir Harry Bur- rard ; but this second representation likewise fail- ed of effect.* The accounts he had received of the state of the Portuguese troops, was such as, • There u someAing suflBciently characteristic in the follow- ing anecdote to merit record : — Sir Arthur Wellesley, having in ▼ain used every argument and persuasion to change the deter- mination of his leader, was heard to exclaim, on retiring firom the conference, ** Well then, we have now nothing to do but to go and ^oot red-legged partridges." PURSUIT OP THE FRENCH ARMY. 321 in his opinion, to preclude all hope of their being chap.xi. found serviceable. The artillery horses were, or were supposed to be, inefficient ; and the want of ^^ ^ J cavalry appeared an insuperable objection to un- dertaking such operations as those contemplated by Sir Arthur Wellesley. These difficulties, in the mind of Sir Harry Burrard, were decisive. The army remained in their position ; and the French were suffered to retreat unmolested, and to re-organize at leisure their broken and fugitive troops. It may perhaps be considered as not wholly uninteresting to indulge in a brief speculation on the probable consequences, that would have resulted from a vigorous prosecution of the ad- vantages which the victory of Vimiero had placed in our power. In the first place, it should be remembered, that the whole army of Junot had been defeated, when not above one half of the British had been engaged. With regard to the enemy, we are assured by General Foy, that every corps — every soldier— had fought ; and, such were the necessities of Junot, that even the volunteer horse-guard, composed of French merchants of Lisbon, was made to bear its part in the engage^ o2 32-2 PROJECT OF SEIZING TORRES VEDRAS. CHAP. XI. raent. The whole troops of the enemy, there- , Q fore, were tired and dispirited, while a very August. ^^S^ proportion of the British was fresh and untouched, and ready for any operation which its leader might judge seniceable to the cause. Before the conclusion of the action, the divi- sion of General Hill was in possession of the di- rect road to Torres Vedras — that by which the enemy had advanced being a circuitous one. It was, therefore, quite practicable to have occupied Torres Vedras before the French could have reached it; and this would have been effected with greater facility, had the enemy, by a vigorous pur- suit, been prevented from rallying their scattered forces, while General Hill was in full prosecution of his march. The ground around Torres Vedras is extremely strong ; and there is no reason to doubt that he could have maintained his position, under every effort to dislodge him, till he had been enabled to open a communication with the main body of the army. It is indeed true, that the troops on their march would have been liable to the attacks of the French cavalry, which had suffered compar- atively little in the previous battle. But when we consider the qualities of British infantry, ITS PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES. 323 1808. August. which have since been tested in a long course of chap. xi. service, and the confidence in their own prow- ess, which the recent victory must have inspired, it is impossible, we think, to lend to this objec- tion all the weight which was yielded to it in high quarters, at the moment of decision.* The consequences, therefore, of this move- ment, would probably have been to cut off the retreat of the French army on Lisbon ; to gain possession of their baggage and military stores ; and, what was more important than either or both of these, to have saved the British arms from the stigma which attached to them in the eyes of Europe, from the unfortunate Conven- tion of Cintra. On the morning after the battle. Sir Hew Aug. 22. Dalrymple landed in Marceira Bay, and assumed the command of the army, which still remained on the field of Vimiero. In the course of the day, a large body of French cavalry was ob- served approaching our out-posts ; and the • It is but fair to Sir Harry Burrard, to state, that his opi- nions were supported by those of Sir Henry Clinton and Sir George Murray. With the exception of Wellington, the service boasts no higher names. 324 AN ABMISTICE AND PRELIMINARY CONVENTION CHAP. XI. whole line was immediately ordered under arms. ~j^- The object of the enemy, however, was pacific ; Aujnut *"^ *^® cavalry was soon ascertained to consti- tute the escort of General Kellerman, who came with a flag of truce. General Kellerman was immediately ushered into the presence of the Commander-in-chief. He stated his object to be the proposal of a ces- sation of hostilities, with a view to the total eva- cuation of Portugal by the French army. Sir Arthur Wellesley was directed to arrange the terms of an armistice ; and, in the course of the day, the basis of a definitive agreement was ar- ranged between the parties, subject, however, to the chance of being rendered void by the veto of Sir Charles Cotton, whose approval was de- clared necessary to the validity of the treaty. In this preliminary compact, no reference was made to the provisional government of Portu- gal, which was neither informed of, nor consult- ed on, proceedings in which the interests of their country were so deeply implicated. App. No.14. The chief stipulations of the document were as follows ;-— I. That a suspension should immediately take place, with a view to negotiate a convention ARE CONCLUDED BY THE HOSTILE GENERALS. 325 for the evacuation of Portugal by the French chap. xi. II. That a day should be appointed by the j^^^^^^, Generals-in-chief of the two armies, and the commander of the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus, for the negotiation and conclusion of the proposed convention. III. That the river Sizandra should form the line of demarkation between the armies. IV. That the British Commander-in-chief should undertake to include the Portuguese ar- mies in this suspension ; and that for them the line of demarkation should extend from Leiria to Thomar. V. That the French should not, in any case, be considered prisoners of war ; and that all the individuals composing the army, " should be transported to FrancCy with their armsy baggage^ and the whole of their private property, from which nothing should be excepted'^ VI. That no individual should be called to account for his political conduct ; that property should be respected ; and that all who were desirous to quit the kingdom should be suf- fered to do so unmolested. VI L That the port of Lisbon should be re- 326 SIR CHARLES COTTON DECLINES TO RATIFY THE CONVENTION. 327 1808. August. CHAP. xr. cognised as neutral for the Russian fleet ; and that the principles of maritime law, in respect to the privileges of neutral ports, should be strictly observed by the British squadron. VIII. That the horses of the cavalry, and the artillery of French calibre, should be transport- ed to France with the army. IX. That the suspension of arms should not be broken on either side, without forty-eight hours previous notice. By an additional article it was likewise stipulated, that the French gar- risons and fortresses should be included in the convention, in case they should not have capi- tulated before the twenty-fifth of August. On communicating the agreement to Sir Charles Cotton, that officer declined yielding his assent to that part of the convention which related to the Russian fleet, but declared his readiness to enter on a separate treaty with the admiral in command. The conditions of the preliminary agreement being thus found incapable of execution. Sir Ar- thur Wellesley strenuously recommended to the Commander-in-chief, at once to put an end to the armistice, and advance on Lisbon, leaving it to Marshal Junot to renew the negotiation on a difl*erent basis, if he thought proper. This ad- chap, xl vice, however, was rejected. Sir Hew Dalrym- ^g^g pie considered that, under all the circumstances, ^^^y^t it was more prudent and honourable to pursue the negotiation; and Colonel Murray was de- spatched to Lisbon, with full powers to conclude a definitive convention. At every step, however, new difficulties arose. The French, emboldened by the concession of such favourable preliminaries, brought forward new demands, and endeavoured, through diplo- matic subtilty and evasion, to secure advantages by the pen, which they were unable to acquire by the sword. To give some idea of the char- acter of the claims pertinaciously put forward by the negotiators, it may be sufficient to state, that they insisted on being suff"ered to carry off" two Portuguese frigates, and required that French troops should be given in exchange for Spanish prisoners. It is, indeed, probable, that pretensions, so entirely inadmissible, were urged rather with the view of procrastination than any hope that they could be acceded to by the Bri- tish generals. All delay was in their favour. The ships, on which the army depended for its supplies, were at anchor on an iron-bound coast, /. 4 328 A DEFINITIVE CONVENTION IS CONCLUDED. CHAP. XI . without a harbour, and liable to all the contin- 1808 &®"c*6s of weather. Augrat. Sir Hew Dalrymple, therefore, felt called on to transmit a distinct notification to Mar- shal Junot, that unless the terms of the con- vention, already specified, were immediately ac- cepted, he should, in forty-eight hours, recom- Aug. 29. mence hostilities. On the same day the army moved forward to Ramalhal. The decided tone thus tardily assumed by the British general, produced an immediate efi'ect. It became evident to the French negotiators, that evasion was no longer possible ; and, on the Aug. SO. following morning, the convention, duly signed, was forwarded from Lisbon. The question concerning the Russian fleet was settled by a separate treaty between Admiral Siniavin and Sir Charles Cotton. It was agreed, that the ships should be held as a deposit by Great Britain, during the war, and that the crews should be conveyed to their own country in British ships, without any stipulation regard- ing their future services. While these events were in progress, the corps Aug. 25. of Sir John Moore had arrived in Marceira Bay; and having, with some difficulty, effected a land- COMPLAINTS OP THE PORTUGUESE GENERALS. 329 ing, it joined the array. By this large accession chap. xi. the British force amounted to about thirty-two thousand men ; but the increase of his numbers August. had not the effect of inducing the British gene- ral to exact more severe conditions from his op- ponents, and the treaty, forwarded from Lisbon, App. No. 15. was immediately ratified by Sir Hew Dalrymple. Of the terms of the convention, the Portu- guese generals were loud in their complaints ; and by the nation it was regarded with extreme disgust and indignation. De Freire, of whose conduct during the active operations of the cam- paign the reader has already been informed, now spoke out in a tone at once decided and uncom- promising. He disclaimed, for himself or his government, any share of the responsibility which the British general had not hesitated so rashly to incur. He complained loudly of the absence of that proper deference and respect to which his Sovereign, as an independent prince and an ally of Great Britain, was entitled, and of the disregard which had been shewn, in the re- cent proceedings, to the honour and interests of the Portuguese nation. He particularly object- ed to the article which stipulated the surrender of the fortified places, stores, and ships, to the 330 OBJECTIONS URGED TO THE CONVENTION. CHAP. XI. British forces, without a solemn declaration, on jgQQ the part of their commander, that this sm-render August, was only temporary, and that the earliest oppor- tunity would he seized of restoring them to the government of Portugal. He objected also to that article which secured pardon and impunity to all political offenders ; because this was an un- warranted interference between a prince and his subjects, and deprived the former of his un- doubted right to punish such breaches of allegi- ance as he might think proper. It likewise afforded matter of complaint, that, in the con- vention, no notice whatever was taken of the troops in the Alentejo, nor of the Spanish army which had crossed the frontier. Although it must be admitted that these ob- jections, among many others, were urged by a person whose previous conduct entitled him to no very flattering construction of his motives, they cannot be considered in the light of mere groundless invective. With a degree of neg- lect, almost amounting to insult, the Bishop of Oporto was not informed of the armistice un- til three days after it had been signed; and even then he was merely told, by Sir Arthur Wellesley, that it contained nothing remark- THEIR CHARACTER. 331 able, except a provision for securing the neu- chap. xi. trality of the port of Lisbon, and the Russian "77^^ fleet. Now, conceding that the Junta of Oporto August. was not entitled to be considered in the pending negotiation, as the existing government of Por- tugal, it had unquestionably a right to be treat- ed with the deference due to a body of decided patriotism, which had rendered great services to the cause, and whose authority was at least ac- knowledged by a considerable portion of the kingdom. The objection urged by de Freire to that arti- cle which provided that the fortified places held by the enemy, should be surrendered to the English^ was one rather applicable to the form than the substance of the stipulation. It does not admit of question, that these strongholds of the kingdom ought to have been delivered up, either to the troops of that sovereign to whom they rightfully belonged, or to the English act- ing in his name and behalf ; but in the circum- stances of a nation without any general and ac- knowledged government actually in force, torn by jealousies and contentions within, and threat- ened externally by an enemy, to whose invading force they could of themselves have offered no II ij I J vTtmmmummi 332 MANIFESTO OF THE BRITISH GENERAL. €HAP. XI. effectual resistance, it was undoubtedly more IgQQ^ prudent that the important fortresses, whidh September, constitute, as it were, the very keys of the king- dom, should be held by hands of greater vigour, and of firmer grasp. With a view to allay the jealousy betrayed on this subject by de Freire and the Junta, Sir Hew Dalrymple published a manifesto, declaring, that he considered himself as the commander of an army strictly auxiliary to the Sovereign of Portugal ; that he held him- self bound to promote the dignity and security of his government by every measure in his power; and disclaiming, on the part of Great Britain, all intention or desire of territorial ag- grandizement. In the same^ document he gave public assurance, that the fortresses in ques- tion should be considered only as a trust, to be sacredly guarded, and honourably restored, so soon as the restoration could be made with safe- ty to the interests of the country. Sep. 2. On the second of September, the head-quar- ters of the British were established at Oyeras, and the army were put in possession of the forts on the Tagus. On the tenth, the Castle of Be- lem was evacuated by the French ; and on the Sep. 12. twelfth, a division was stationed on the Campo EVASIONS OF THE FRENCH. 333 Sta. Anna, sending a detachment to garrison the chap. xi. citadel of Lisbon , and to maintain order in the citv. ~I 1 808 It had been proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sentember that an article should be introduced into the con- vention, with the view of " making the French generals disgorge the church plate which they had stolen," and for limiting, by a more particu- lar description, the property which the army were to be allowed to abstract from the country under the name of baggage. This proposal, however, was not carried into effect, because it was represented by General Kellerman, that the introduction of such a stipulation, would be re- proachful to the French army, and unpleasant to its commander. General Kellerman pledged himself, at the same time, that such an abuse of the terms of the convention should not take place. The consequences of this forbearance were soon apparent. It became known that the French, un- der cover of the second article of the preliminary agreement, and the fifth of the convention, which guaranteed the undisturbed removal of their pri- vate property, were carrying off the spoils of churches and palaces, of the royal library, the arsenal, and the museum ; and that every species of fraudulent abstraction and covert pillage, n 334 HATRED OF THE PEOPLE TOWARDS THE FRENCH. CHAP. XI. was employed by the departing army. Tlie jQ^Q knowledge of such facts could scarcely fail to September, ^onse the indignation of the people. Popular tumults were the consequence; deep and intense curses were cast on the degraded robbers, whose unprincipled and oppressive tyranny had, by the remissness of the English, been suffered to ter- minate in flagrant and successful pillage. The flame of hatred towards their invaders, which had long burned in the bosoms of the Portu- guese, now sent forth its full volume to the gaze • of the world. Songs of insulting triumph were sung in the streets of Lisbon. Many of the tradespeople refused to sell to a Frenchman even the necessaries of life. Hordes of deprav- ed wretches took advantage of the temporary anarchy, and came forth to rob, and to assassin- ate. Constant patrols were sent out into the streets to repress violence and tumult. Yet these were only partially successful. The bodies of French officers and soldiers were every day found dead in the streets, where they had been trampled and spit upon by the passengers. And so great was the insecurity of the French army, that piquets were regidarly posted, and all who ventured to approach their quarters in the night PART OF THE PILLAGE DISGORGED. 335 were fired on. In this manner several Portu-CHAP. xi. ffuese were shot. 1808 In order to prevent, as much as possible, the September. successful exercise of the unprincipled system of pillage, in which the French were engaged, a Commission, of which General Beresford was Sep. 3. the chief, was directed to superintend the strict execution of the terms of the Convention. The commissioners entered on their duties with be- coming firmness. Through their exertions, the spoils of the museum and the royal library were restored ; and the money abstracted from the pub- lic treasury was ordered to be refunded. Yet it was found altogether impossible to put a stop to many unwarranted and shameful acts of furtive spoliation which were hourly taking place, in de- fiance of an order with difficulty obtained from Marshal Junot, that all stolen property should be restored. By an unfortunate oversight, a divi- sion of the French army was suffered to sail before the extent of the depredations they had committed could be ascertained, and it became a matter of delicacy, as well as of difficulty, to deal more harshly with the remaining portion of the army, than with that which had been suffered to escape. 336 THE FRENCH ARMY IS EMBARKED. ARRANGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT. 337 CHAP. XI. On the fifteenth, the first division of the French army sailed. The Spanish prisoners in September, the hulks were disembarked, and the liberation of the conntry was announced by the elevation of the national standard. On this occasion, the joy and enthusiasm of the inhabitants were raised to the highest pitch. The city seemed to send forth one mighty shout of triumphant thanks- giving. Innumerable banners were displayed in every quarter of the city. Tlie ships in the riv- er were decorated with the proud symbols of national independence ; and repeated salvoes of artillery proclaimed that the iron rod of the op- pressor was at length broken. For nine succes- sive nights the city was universally illuminated ; and all was joy and festivity in Lisbon. These rejoicings having ended, the destina- tion of the Spanish troops naturally became an object of attention to the Britisli general. Des- titute alike of money and arms, it was quite evident they could not ^be brought to act as an efficient body, unless the means of organization and equipment were furnished from the funds of the British army. This was done. A sum of twenty thousand dollars was advanced from the military chest, and the troops were soon brought I w into a state of complete readiness for service, chap.xi. The first project entertained, was that of sending them to Badajos ; but, on the representations of g^ ^^^^. two Catalan deputies, it was thought more ad- vantageous to the general cause to land them in Catalonia, where their presence could not fail to produce an immediate influence. The Spanish corps, in number about four thousand, was ac- cordingly embarked, and set sail for that des- tination. In attempting to arrange the details of a civil government in Portugal, Sir Hew Dalrymple became involved in a task of singular delicacy and difficulty. The Junta of Oporto were known, for some time, to have been engaged in intrigues to secure the extension and continu- ance of their power. Making a pretext of the troubled state of the capital, they expressed their wishes to the British General, that Oporto might be made the temporary seat of government; and that deputies from the difi^erent provinces should be directed to repair thither, to arrange the interests of the kingdom. It was likewise stated by the Bishop of Oporto, that he had ac- cepted authority, only in the hope of promoting the restoration of his sovereign; but if his con- VOL. I. « 338 APPOINTMENT OF A REGENCY. CHAP. XI. tinuance in office should be thought conducive to the national interest, he intimated that his duty 1808 / would not suffer him to quit Oporto, unless in Sej)temb6r. * *■ compliance with a direct order from the Prince Regent. He strongly urged the advantages which would accrue to the kingdom, from the proposed arrangement ; and that the opposition to its execution would be greatly obviated, were the measure to be suggested by the British General. The finesse of the Bishop was somewhat too flimsy to prove successful. Though aware of his popularity, and the services which be had rendered to the cause of his country. Sir Hew Dalrymple declined lending his sanction or sup- port to the proposed arrangement. He replied, that his sovereign could not, in the pecidiar cir- cumstances of Portugal, consent to the unquali- fied restoration of the Council of Regency, some members of which had incurred suspicion of be- ing attached to the interest of France. On the other hand, it was unquestionable, that those members who had kept their fidelity unstained during the period of struggle, were fully entitled to be reinstated in authority. Without entering into any detail of the petty SIR HEW DALRYMPLE RECALLED. 339 intrigues, which had their origin in private in- chap. xi. terests and individual cupidity of power, it will be sufficient to state, that, after many difficulties, J^^^^^^ a Council of Regency was appointed, of which ^*'" the Bishop of Oporto was a member. The Junta of Oporto then formally declared its functions at an end, with a proviso, that should the Regen- cy be overthrown by any new invasion of the enemy, their body should be held, de facto, to have resumed its authority. The other provin- cial Juntas were, in like manner, dissolved ; and the authority of the Regency was universally ac- knowledged throughout the kingdom. In England, the intelligence of the Conven- tion of Cintra was received with a general burst of indignation and disgust. The sentiment per- vaded aU classes, that the British arms had sus- tained a deep and imperishable tarnish, and the voice of the nation called loudly for inquiry. By the government, the demand of miUions was not, and could not be, disregarded. Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard were recalled from Portugal, and a court of general officers* The members of the court were as follows: -Sir David r^nda., President; Generals Craig, Lord Moira, Lord Heath- SolT ^''"^"*"*-^°«^»^« Lord Pembroke, Nugent, and r- i» I .340 BOARD OF INQUIRY ASSEMBLED. REPORT OF THE BOARD. 341 CHAP. XI. was directed to assemble at Chelsea, in order to inquire into the causes which led to the armis- 1808 Sf teml>^r ^^^ *"^ subsequent convention ; and to report, on a full consideration of the whole proceedings, whether the conduct of Sir Hew Dalrymple, or that of his subordinate ofl&cers, was such as to render them justly amenable to military cen- Nov. 14. sure. On the fourteenth of November, the Board held its first sitting. A minute investigation of all the circumstances took place ; but the report contained little more than a summary of the operations of the army, as detailed in evidence, and a concluding expression of opinion, that no farther military proceeding was necessaiy on the subject; "because, however some of the members might differ in their sentiments re- specting the fitness of the convention, in the relative situation of the armies, it was their unanimous opinion, that unquestionable zeal and firmness had throughout been exhibited by Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley ; and that the ardour and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers had, on every occasion during the ex- pedition, done honour to the troops, and re- flected lustre on his Majesty's arms." This report was not considered satisfactory by chap.xf. the government. The Court was accordingly reassembled, and the members of it were re- September. quired to declare whether " the armistice was advisable in the relative situation of the two armies, on the twenty-second of August; and, if so, whether the terras were such as ought to have been agreed upon ; and whether, when all the British forces were landed, it was advisa- ble to form a convention ; and, if so, whether the terms were such as ought to have been a- greed upon." It then appeared that the mem- bers of the court were divided in opinion. Six generals approved, and one (Lord Moira) dis- approved of the armistice. With regard to the Convention, opinion was more nearly balanced ; four generals expressed their approbation of the policy of that measure; and three (Lords Pem- broke, Moira, and General Nichols) dissented from that conclusion. Thus were the opinions of the people left as much at large as ever, by the dubious con- clusion put forth by the Board of Inquiry. The public indignation was not quieted, though partially withdrawn by the interest of the new events which were about to take place on the 342 REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN. CHAP. XI. theatre of war. In the meanwhile, the King-, IgQQ abstaining from any observations on the military September, points of the question, publicly expressed his disapprobation of those articles of the Conven- tion, in which stipulations were made aftecting" the interests of his allies. « His Majesty deem- ing it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorized admission into mili- tary conventions, of articles of such a descrip- tion, which, especially when incautiously framed, may lead to the most injurious consequences." Thus closed all judicial proceedings on this memorable convention. In reviewing the operations of the short cam- paign, of which we have just detailed the more prominent events, it must be admitted, we think, on all hands, that the conduct of Sir Arthur Wellesley, while in command, was marked by a degree of skill, boldness, promptitude, and fer- tility of resource, which can only be found united in a mind of the first order. Like an early sketch of a great master, it is perhaps possible to detect in it some error of conception, or fault of execution ; yet he must be blind in- deed, who does not perceive, in the general vigour GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. 343 and boldness of the design, promise of lofty ex- chap. xi. cellence and splendid achievement. The measure ~~~ of landing his army, without waiting for rein- September forcements, has been condemned hymen of differ- ent mould, as rash and imprudent. Never was an objection more futile urged against the measures of a great commander ; and when stated by Sir Hew Dalrymple, in his defence before the Court of Inquiry, it drew forth a most triumphant re- futation from Sir Arthur Wellesley. The truth is, that the determination of Sir Arthur Wel- lesley to engage his army in immediate oper- ations against the enemy, was the result of the nicest and most accurate calculation, and of a deep and well-grounded conviction, that his force was fully adequate to the expulsion of the French army from the capital. Had the projects of Sir Arthur Wellesley been carried into effect, by those who succeeded him in com- mand, there can be little doubt that the cam- paign would have been conducted to a more glorious result. To say nothing of the advance on Mafra, on the morning of the twenty-first, it was the decided opinion of Sir Arthur Welles- ley, expressed in the Court of Inquiry, that by a vigorous prosecution of the victory of Vimiero, 344 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. CHAP. XI. and pushing forward the right wing on the road to Torres Vedras, we might have antici- 1808. tembe P**^^ *^^ enemy in reaching Lisbon, and have at once placed Junot in a situation in which another defeat must have terminated in uncon- ditional surrender. To say that an operation of this bold and splendid character, was attended by hazard, is, in fact, to say nothing. All warlike operations are so. But the point is, did the one in ques- tion hold out a fair and reasonable prospect of success, and was the object to be attained of mag- nitude and importance sufficient to justify the risk. These are questions which gave rise to much difference of opinion at the time, and on which it would ill become the most gifted writer to express his conviction with anything approach- ing to dogmatism. Yet we know not why we should conceal our own decided belief, that the conclusions of those military reasoners who would answer these questions in the negative, are founded on narrow and timid views, by which it was more than improbable, that a ge- nius like that of Sir Arthur Wellesley could be influenced. On Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Bur- GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. 345 rard we would cast no censure. Successively chap. xi. called on to assume the command of the army in the immediate neighbourhood of an enemy, of g^ ^ ^/ whose strength and situation they knew nothing; in a state of utter ignorance of the localities of the country, and the temper of the inhabitants, these officers were placed, by the bungling mis- management of government, in a situation of difficulty, which it conveys no imputation, to as- sert they were unequal to overcome. Up to the period of the armistice, the chief impediments felt in all the operations of the army arose from want of cavalry, and the miser- able condition of the artillery horses. Why, we may ask, were these things so ? Why was an expedition, thus crippled and incapacitated for vi- gorous operation in the field, sent forth to encoun- ter difficulties, which might so easily have been avoided ? It was solely owing to our deficiency in cavalry, that Delaborde was enabled to effect an orderly and unmolested retreat from the po- sition of Roli9a ; and had our strength in that arm been greater, not only would the advan- tages acquired by the victory of Vimiero have been prodigiously increased, but all obstacle to a vigorous pursuit would at once have been re- p2 346 POLICY OF THE ARMISTICE AND CONV^ENTION. 347 CHAP. XI. moved. Whatever degree of lustre, therefore, the operations which terminated in the field of I Hun. September. Vimiero, may cast on the skill of the general, or the valour of his troops, they can contribute nothing to the honour of a ministry, by whose negligence or incapacity so many important advantages were lost to the country. On the subject of the armistice and subse- quent convention, we have a few — and but a few — observations to make. In favour of the princi- ple of the convention, and of its sound policy in the circumstances of the armies, the weight of evidence so decidedly preponderates, as almost to preclude a doubt with regard to a subject, on which we know that the highest military authori- ties entertained none. All the Generals of the army in Portugal, whose general or local informa- tion could lend weight to their opinions, declared their decided conviction that the Convention was founded, in the main, on a sound view of the sit- uation and resources of the enemy, and of our own means of offensive operation. From the very commencement of hostilities, it is known to have been the decided opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that the general interests of the cause, would be best promoted by adopting the most speedy measures for the expulsion of the chap. xi. French from Portugal, and bringing a British 1808. force to co-operate with the Spaniards on the September. Ebro. That it was in the power of the British army — numerically superior as it was to the enemy — to have expelled him from Portugal by force of arms, has never been denied. But it as little admits of a negative, that when the event of another battle should have compelled Junot to evacuate Lisbon, the province of Alen- tejo was open for his retreat, and that maga- zines had been already formed for the supply of his army during its retreat to the frontier. The strong fortress of Elvas was in his possession ; and the difficulty of provisioning the British army, in advancing into the interior, must have materially retarded the vigour of pursuit. It was judged too — and we think rightly judged — that the cause of the Spanish patriots would be more efficaciously promoted by the presence of thirty thousand British soldiers, and of four thousand liberated prisoners, than it could suffer disadvantage from twenty thousand additional French troops being thrown, at no very remote period, into the country. So much for the principle of the Convention. 348 THE DETAILS OF THE CONVENTION CHAP. XI. That many of its details were objectionable can- not be denied : and here alone it is that censure loOo. September. ^^^ ^^ justly on Sir Hew D.Urymple. It was certainly incumbent on that officer to have insist- ed on a specific stipulation by which the French should have been forced to disgorge their dis- graceful plunder, and to have taken strict measures for securing its execution. It became Sir Hew Dalrymple, we think, and it was due to the character of the army he commanded, to have assumed a higher moral tone in demanding all possible reparation from the infamous maraud- ers, who had proved themselves alike destitute of principle and honour. That the armistice and preliminary convention were concluded without the knowledge or participation of the Portu- guese general, we hold to have been another error. It ought not to have been forgotten that we stood in a relation of singular deli- cacy to the Portuguese Sovereign and people ; and it should have been the object of the Bri- tish general, to regulate his conduct in such a manner as to avoid exciting either jealousy or distrust, in a nation whose cordial co-operation was so essential to the successful prosecution of the war. Sir Hew Dalrymple must have known. OBJECTIONABLE. 349 that the patriots of the whole peninsula were chap.xi. abundantly ready to misinterpret both the mo- tives and actions of their allies ; and he must ^ * u ' September. likewise have been aware, that an union of senti- ment between the authorities of the two nations, was, on such an occasion, above all things desirable. On the whole, it will probably be admitted that the stipulations of the treaty were more favour- able to the French than it was either prudent or politic to grant. To have gained the confidence of the Spanish nation in the purity of her motives and the prowess of her soldiers,, was, to England, worth more than a victory. This, however, the Convention of Cintra did not tend to acquire for her. With an army flushed with recent victory, and greatly superior in numbers, and with the whole nation on our side, we shewed too plainly that the vanquished enemy was still formidable to the victors. The moral impression throughout Europe, arising from the measures in question, was decidedly unfavourable to our arms. Our military reputation was lowered ; and the British l^enerals were regarded as having scandalously sacrificed the interest of their allies. This im- pression may now, in a great measure, be re- ii 350 SENTIMENTS OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE. CHAP. XI. garded as unfounded; yet we believe that no Englishman looks back with pride on the Con- September, mention of Cintra, or would not feel happy could all record of it be erased for ever from our annals. STATE OF AFFAIRS IN SPAIN. 351 CHAPTER XII. OPERATIONS ON THE EBRO. It is now necessary to revert to Spain.- 'it CHAP.XII. Though tlie attachment of the nation to the cause of liberty was still unabated, yet their ef- forts had not been attended by any of those bril- liant results which had been confidently antici- pated. No man of unquestioned patriotism and commanding talents had arisen to guide the ener- gies of the Spanish people, and direct them into a salutary channel. Each Junta had become an isolated and independent government, acting without concert, and on narrow views, and only influenced in its policy by petty considerations of personal or local interest. The govern- ment throughout Spain had devolved on the pro- vincial noblesse and higher orders of the clergy, 1808. September. 352 FEELINGS OF THE SPANISH NATION. CHAP. XII. —classes of men who, from their deficiency of information, their habits, and their prejudices, 1808 <, / were peculiarly unfitted for the task they had assumed. On the first appearance of success, jealousies sprang up between the rival authori- ties ; and so powerful was the feeling of hostility thus excited, that it was even proposed in the Junta of Seville, to enforce submission to its su- premacy by the sword. Fortunately for Spain, the firmness of Castanos saved it from the im- pending horrors of a civil war. On hearing the proposal, he at once declared, that the troops under his command should not be employed against any but the common enemy. When the French evacuated Madrid, the reins of authority were, for a time, assumed by the Council of Castile. This body, which, by the tardy yet firm resistance which it opposed to the intruder, had regained some portion of its former influence with the nation, put forth an elaborate manifesto, vindicating the line of po- licy it had pursued in the difficult circumstances of the country. It declared its readiness to co- operate with the Provincial Juntas, in any mea- sures conducive to the general defence, and limited its own pretensions, as a public body, to APPOINTMENT OF A SUPREME GOVERNMENT. 353 guiding and stimulating the national ardour into chap. xii. beneficial action. As the peculiar circumstances ot the country did not admit of the Cortes September. being immediately assembled, it was recom- mended, by the Council of Castile, that the Provincial Juntas should despatch deputies to the capital, in order to decide on the imme- diate wants of the nation, and the mode by which they could be most advantageously sup- plied. A temporary form of government, founded on these propositions, was adopted by the Junta of Seville, and followed by the approbation of the great body of the nation. The deputies were Sep. 25. consequently elected, and installed at Aranjuez, with much formality, in their delegated func- tions. Count Florida Blanca was elected pre- sident ; and a circular missive was despatched, requiring recognition and obedience from the different authorities of the kingdom. One of the first acts of the Provisional Gov- ernment, was to vindicate their authority, which had been publicly set at nought by Cuesta. That general was unfavourable to the sway of the Juntas, and desirous of preserving the authority of the Captains-general and Royal ill 354 VIOLENT MEASURES OF CUESTA. CHAP. XII. Audienzas, which had, in a great measure, been , nullified by the establishment of these petty gov- September. emments. Endowed with more than an ordinary share of the national obstinacy and pride, this haughty leader was prepared, if necessary, to support his opinions by the strong arm of milita- ry force. The Junta of Leon and Castile, which he had appointed as a subordinate council for the regulation of the district, had, subsequently to the battle of Rio Seco, erected themselves into an independent government ; and, protected by Blake, issued orders to Cuesta to transfer his cavalry to the army of that officer. The pro- ceedings of the Junta were accordingly declared void; and Cuesta issued orders for the imme- diate assembly of a new Junta. He ventured even to seize the Leonese deputies on their way to Aranjuez, and detain them as prisoners. One of them, named Valdes, made known the cir- cumstances of his arrest to Florida Blanca, who, willing to avoid the fatal consequences of civil dissension, wrote mildly to Cuesta, requesting the release of the deputies thus unlawfully ar- rested, and that their conduct should be left to the judgment of the Supreme Government. Cas- tanos also interfered to prevent the evil conse- CONDUCT OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA. 355 quences of intestine discord; and addressed acHAP.xii. letter to the General, containing a strong re- monstrance on the violence and impolicy of his ^ ^ / conduct. In his answers to Count Florida Blanca, and Castanos, Cuesta entered on a laboured vindica- tion of his conduct ; and concluded, by declaring his resolution of holding his prisoners in strict custody, till the Central Junta should have as- sembled. It was to that body alone, he said, that he owed, or would pay, submission. The Council of Castile was then called on to interfere, with the view of restoring harmony ; but their efforts, for this piu'pose, were unsuc- cessful. Cuesta persisted in declaring, that the soi-disant Junta of Castile and Leon was an un- lawful authority ; that he considered his own power, as Captain-general, could only be super- seded by the decree of a Sovereign Regency ; and that as Valdes held the rank of general in the Spanish army, it was his intention to deliver him over to be tried by a military tribunal. On the first meeting of the Central Junta, de- puties from the Junta of Valladolid were sent, by the influence of Cuesta, to demand admission into that body. This was refused. Cuesta was 356 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA : CHAP. XII. summoned to appear at the bar of the Junta, to answer for his conduct ; and peremptory orders September ^^^^ issued for the release of the prisoners. On this occasion, the influence of Mr. Stewart, the British agent, was exerted to reduce Cuesta to obedience. That general at length thought it prudent to comply with the demands of the Junta ; and, releasing his prisoners, he repaired to Aranjuez. The result was, that Valdes was admitted to the exercise of his privileges as a member of the Assembly ; and that Cuesta re- mained at the seat of government, in a state of temporary obscuration. The Central Junta, thus peaceably installed in their functions and authority, at first gave fair promise of a beneficial exercise of their power. But the prospect, so gratifying to the friends of liberty, soon vanished. Their president, a man in the last stage of decrepitude, was unfitted, by his decaying powers, for the task of guiding the deliberations of such a body, or of enforcing the necessary subordination in its members. Their time was wasted in useless formalities and frivolous debates ; and it soon became apparent that the Assembly inherited all the defects of the Provincial Juntas, without their THEIR CHARACTER. 357 local influence. Its authority, though not open- chap.xii. ly questioned, was viewed by these bodies with T^JjIT" jealousy and aversion ; and the measures which September. it adopted were too little marked by vigour and decision to suit the character of the crisis. Feebleness of purpose, and tardiness of execu- tion, were its besetting sins, and were partly perhaps inseparable from its constitution. The members, in general, were men of untarnish- ed character ; but, drawn from different pro- vinces of the kingdom, they were unacquainted with each other, and deficient in the knowledge necessary to the successful exercise of their new duties. For a national convocation, their num- bers were too few ; for an executive govern- ment, too many. The more enlightened members were by no means unaware of the almost inevitable deficien- cies of the new government. It was the opinion of Jovellanos that a Regency of five persons should immediately be appointed, and that the Junta should be reduced to one half of its original number. That the power of the latter should cease on the assembling of the Cortes, which was to be convoked as speedily as was found prac- 358 IXEFFICIENXY OF THE JUNTA. CHAP. XII. ticable in the circumstances of the country. jQQg It was scarcely to be expected that the Junta September, should decree the abrogation of its own powers ; and the propositions of this distinguished patriot were not carried into eflPect. But the measure admitted by all to be most indispensable in the circumstances of the country, was the appointment of a Commander-in-chief, who might consolidate the national troops, and direct their efforts with unity of purpose and effect, against the common enemy. To the accomplish- ment of this object, however, there were many impediments. Spain afforded no general whose claims to so distinguished a command were pre- eminent and acknowledged. The local govern- ments, swayed by petty interests, were discordant in their sentiments ; and it was found impossible to unite the voices of the people in favour of any individual on whom the appointment could be bestowed. Under these circumstances, the Junta endeavoured to supply the place of a General- in-chief by a Military Commission, of which Castanos was destined to be president. Yet this measure, too, was fi-ustrated by unfore- seen diflBculties ; and time passed on without the CONFIDENCE OF THE SPANISH NATION. 359 1808. Septemlier. final adoption of any efficacious steps for the im- chap.xii provement and consolidation of the national forces. In the meanwhile, the confidence of the peo- ple in their own prowess and resources, had been increased, by the victory of Baylen, to a pitch of exultation almost ludicrous. In their eyes, the contest was already at an end, and it only remained to reap the full harvest of their glorious resistance. It was impossible to impress on them that the safety of their country still depended on their adoption of a system of firm, unrelenting, connected, and continuous resistance. They were unable to appreciate the dangers which surrounded them, and remained equally intractable to advice or persuasion. The Central Government, instead of exerting itself to dispel the unfortunate illu- sions of the people, were smitten with the epi- demic delirium, and endeavoured, by exaggerated statements of its military force, to deceive both the nation and its allies. At the very moment when the troops already organized were in want of almost every necessary, they proclaimed, in the true spirit of bluster and bravado, their im- Oct. 26. mediate intention of augmenting the army to «•- f-V.j,%5 ^i --K -^ -f* ^^ «Ss i*Jt: BIS >*^T Js^iS*. ^ "* ' ,»-'*S » ii '.^J^-jr-C-^'*^ i >'^-^^,' r'^ Cl«s<^ V^,. \ Book WW Columbia College Library (s Madison Av. and 49th St. New York. Btside the main topic this book also treats of Subject No. On page Subject No, On pagt r ANNALS OF THK PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS: FROM MDCCCVIII TO MDCCCXIV. BY THE AUTHOR OF CYRIL THORNTON. IN THREE VOLUMES. VOL. 11. WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, EDINBURGH: AND T. CADELL, STRAND, LONDON. MDCCCXXIX. XDIKBU&GH ; P&IMTED BY JOHN JOUKiiTOXE. CONTENTS OF VOLUME 11. CHAPTER I. Appointment of Sir John Moore. — Route of his army He ar- rives at Salamanca : — Is in great peril : — Deceived in his expec- tations of assistance : — Resolves to retreat —Protest of Mr. Frere. —Interview of Sir John Moore with the Spanish Generals. Mor- la. — Resolutions of Moore. — Letter transmitted by Charmilly. Sir John Moore communicates with Romana. Retrospect of the operations of the Spanish armies. — Folly of the Supreme Junta. The French approach Madrid :— Surrender of that city Napo- leon^s proclamation— Sir John Moore advances Halt of the army at Toro — Romana retreats — Enj^ag-ement of Lord Paget. Re- treat of Moore. — Perilous situation of his army. He reaches As- torj^— Sufferings and insubordination of the troops Tlie retreat continued — Battle of Corruna.— Death of Sir John Moore. Em- barkation of the army. — Observations on the campai^ CHAPTER IL Capitulation of Corruna, and surrender of Ferrol.— The French cross the Taj,ais._The Duke del Infantado's army Operations in Catalonia— Vigorous measures of the Junta Palacio driven from the Llobregat— Siege of Rosas by St. Cyr :~Capitulation St. Cyr marches on Barcelona — Battle of Llinas.— Defeat of the Spaniards.— St. Cyr enters Barcelona.— Battle of Molino del Rey. .^St. Cyr advances to Tarragona. CHAPTER in. Second Siege of Zaragoza.— Preparations for defence Palafox to surrender.— Progress of the siege.— The command of 1 1 338? tmttmoMa^a^ ■■J.;- ^— ■■ ■ • iiilliliiiiijiiiii'iii'iilliiilliiiiililr u CONTENTS. the French army assumed by Junot—Dlstress of the Zara^zans. —Heroism of the woraen—Palafox seized with fever.—The city given up. CHAPTER IV. Remonstrance of the Court of Vienna.— Effects of the Peninsu- lar campalt,ni.-Services of Sir Robert Wilson—Reinforcement of the Portugese army.— Romana defeated at Monterrey.— Atroci- ties of the French on the capture of 0|>orto.-Conduct of the British government—Battle of Ciudad Real— Battle of Medellin : —Its consequences. CHAPTER V. Landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley at Lisbon— He is appointed to the supreme command in Portugal — New era in the war — Bridge of Amarante carried by the French. -Plan of Sir Arthur Wellesley. —He crosses the Douro— The French driven from Oporto.— Movements of Soult Soult escapes by the mountain-paths.— Ob- servations. CHAPTER VL Successes in Gallicia. — Capture of Vigo. — Romana enters Aus- turias. — Movements of the French armies. — Ney and Soult aban- don Gallicia. — Occurrences in Catalonia— Movements of Reding. Battle of Vails. — Death of Reding. — He is succeeded by Blake. — Early successes of Blake. — He is defeated at Belchite. — Advance ofSuchet — Origin of the Guerillas— Guerilla warfare and leaders. CHAPTER VIL Distribution of the hostile armies. — Description of the country be- tween the Douro and the Tagus.— The British advance to Placentia and Majadas. — Repulse of Cuesta by Victor. — Cuesta falls back on the British army : — Its danger. — The French determine to attack. —Relative positions of the armies. — Battle of Talavera. — The French under Soult retire to Placentia. — Sir Arthur Wellesley ad- vances to attack Soult. — Cuesta follows. — The British cross the 1 CONTENTS. Ill Tagus — Repulse of the Spaniards at the bridge of Arzobisbo.— ' Project of Soult — Defeat of Vanegas at Almonacid.— Sir Ar- thur Wellesley falls back on Badajos— Termination of the cam- paign. — Observations on its policy. CHAPTER Vin. Incapacity of Cuesta — He is superseded by Eguia Position and strength of the armies — Advance of Arisaigo Battle of Oca- na— Its consequences,— Battle of Tamames.— State of Catalonia- Siege of Gerona:— The siege converted into a blockade.— Sufferings of the inhabitants — Capitulation of Gerona.— Unpopularity of the Supreme Junta. CHAPTER IX. Recapitulation — Speech of Napoleon to the Senate.— Prepara- tions of France — Gloomy prospects of the allies Hopes of Lord Wellington— His policy— Moves his head-quarters to Vizeu Soult enters Andalusia— Forces the mountain passes and enters Seville— Cadiz saved by the Duke del Albuquerque— Deposition of the Supreme Junta, and appointment of a Council of Regency The French in Andalusia annoyed by Guerillas Description of the Isla de Leon and of Cadiz :— Their defences Matagorda a- bandoned— Dissensions in Cadiz — Albuquerque retires in disgust. —Preparations of Sir Thomas Graham for the defence of Cadiz Atrocious proclamation of Soult, and consequent decree of the Spanish government — Character of Joseph Buonaparte.— Opera- tions of Suchet.— State of Aragonand Navarre Suchet advances against Valencia :— Retreats — Blake appointed governor of Ca. diz.— Affairs in Catalonia.— Siege and fall of Hostalrich Fall of Lerida and Mequinenza — Siege and capture of Astorga.— Move- ments of Romana. CHAPTER X. State of public feeling in England — The French armies rein- fbrced — Movements of Lord Wellington— Massena prepares to invade Portugal — Strength and character of the hostile armies \ • IT CONTENTS. Position of Lord Wellington m Lower Beiria. — Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo : — Its gallant defence, and surrender. — Massena enters Portugal. — His proclamation. — Almeida invested by the French- Combat on the Coa. — Proclamation of Lord Wellington. — Move- ment of the Britiiih army. — Siege and surrender of Almeida. — Massena violates the terms of capitulation. — Boasting of the French bulletins. — Fears in England — Firmness of Lord Wel- lington. — Massena advances into Portugal. — Description of the country north of the Mondego. — The British halt at Busaco, and prepare for battle.— Distribution of the armies. — Battle of Busaco. — Consequences of the victory of the British. — Masnena turns the British position. — The British retire on Lisbon, and enter tlie lines of Torres Vedras. — Massena goes into position. — Description and observations. — Retrospect of the campaign. — Co- inibra taken. — Massena retires on Santarem. — Is followed by Lord Wellington. — State of Lisbon. — Observations. t ANNALS OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS. f 4. ■^■■' i If 1 ANNALS OF THE " nunc igitlr, nunc ccelo iterum victricia sicna (res eget uis armis et bellatoribus istis) xleva, xt accelxra fuoiles arm a re britannos.'' Baptista Mamtuavus. PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS, CHAPTER I. CAMPAIGN OF SIR JOHN MOORE. On the liberation of Portugal, by the Conven- chap. i. tion of Cintra, it was determined by the British "j^^ government to despatch an expedition to the ^^^^^ north of Spain. Preparations for this purpose were immediately set on foot by Sir Hew Dal- rymple, and continued by Sir Harry Burrard, without any considerable progress being made in the equipment of the army for active ser- vice. It was not till the sixth of October that Sir VOL. II. ^ 1808. October. » APPOINTMENT OP SIR JOHN MOORE : CHAP. I. John Moore received official information of his heing appointed to command the troops des- tined for this service. The despatch stated, that the officer commanding the forces of his Majesty in Portugal, was directed to detach a corps of twenty thousand infantry, with two re- giments of German light cavalry, and a suitahle hody of artillery, to be pk ed under his orders, and that this force would be joined by a corps of above ten thousand men, then assembling at Falmouth, under command of Sir David Baird. Sir John Moore was directed to proceed, with the troops under his more immediate com- mand, without any avoidable delay ; and was in- structed to fix on some place of rendezvous for the whole army, either in Gallicia or on the borders of Leon. The specific plan of opera- tions to be subsequently adopted, he was to con- cert with the commanders of the Spanish ar- mies. Sir John Moore had no sooner assumed the command, than he found he had considera- ble difficulties to overcome. Few efiFective preparations had been made for the equip- ment of the troops by his predecessors in com- mand. Magazines were to be formed, and HIS INSTRUCTIONS. 1808. October. means of transport to be provided, in an impov- chap. i. erished and exhausted country. The ajpproach of the rainy season rendered it, above all things, desirable that the army should, as soon as pos- sible, set forward on its march ; yet all the com- plicated preliminaries, necessary for this pur- pose, were still to be accomplished. These formidable difficulties were overcome by the energy of Sir John Moore ; and, in less than a fortnight from the period of his assuming the command, the greater part of the army was on its march to the frontier. It formed part of the instructions of Govern- ment, that the cavalry should proceed by land ; but a discretionary power was vested in the commander, to move the infantry by sea or land, as he might judge most advisable. Sir John Moore preferred the latter, because, at that season of the year, a coasting voyage was uncertain and precarious, and because he was informed that, at Corunna, there were scarcely means of equipment for the force under Sir David Baird, already destined for that port. Considerable difficulties occurred in ascertain- ing the state of the roads ; and, deceived by er- 4 ROUTE OF THE ARMY. CHAP. I. roneous information on that point, Sir John Moore determined on dividing his army, a }^^^' dangerous arrangement, and one by which the October. & ^ , , « •*. u period of concentration would of necessity be retarded. In consequence of this decision, the troops were ordered to march in three col- umns. A corps of six thousand men, composed of the cavalry, four brigades of artiUery, and four regiments of infantry, under command of Lieu- tenant- General Hope, were directed to pass through the Alentejo, and proceed by the route of Badajos, Merida, TruxiUo, Talavera de la Reyna, and the Escurial. Three brigades, under Lieutenant-General Fraser, marched by Abrantes and Almeida. Two brigades, commanded by Major-(jen- eral Beresford, were sent by Coimbra and Almeida. As it was deemed imprudent, by Sir John Moore, that the two latter columns should be without artillery, a brigade of light six-pounders was likewise directed on Almeida. The different corps of the army having com- menced their march. Sir John Moore quitted Lisbon on the twenty-seventh of October. On Nov. 8. the eighth of November he was at Almeida. SIR JOHN MOORE ARRIVES AT SALAMANCA. 5 On the thirteenth he arrived at Salamanca, chap. i. where he received intelligence of the defeat and ^^^^^ dispersion of Belvidere's army before Burgos, i^o^ember. This event seems to have inspired the British general with melancholy forebodings of the fate of the contest in which he was about to engage. On the second night after his arrival, he was awakened by an express from General Pigna- telli, conveying intelligence that the enemy had pushed on a body of cavalry to Valladolid, a city not above three marches from Salamanca. The situation of Sir John Moore had thus suddenly become one of extreme peril. The enemy were in his front ; and he had in Sala- manca only three brigades of infantry, and not a single gun. In these circumstances, he contem- plated again retiring on Portugal. He assem- bled the Junta of Salamanca ; and laying be- fore them the information he had received, stated, that, should the enemy continue their advance on his front — now wholly uncovered — the British army had no option but retreat. On the arrival of intelligence, however, that the French troops had been withdrawn to Palencia, he determined on continuing his head-quarters at Salamanca ; and directed Generals Baird m-miti^- - II 6 SITUATION OF THE BRITISH ARMY CHAP. I. and Hope to close on that city with their divi- "TTT"" sions. 1808 J. / Every day brought with it intelligence of fresh disasters. By the battle of Espinosa, Blake's army had been dispersed. The whole left wing of the Spanish army, which occupied a line reaching from Bilboa to Burgos, had thus been annihilated ; and the flank of the centre, imder Castanos, was laid open to the enemy. The situation of Sir John Moore at Sala- manca, with respect to the Spanish armies, was very extraordinary. He was at the vertex of a triangle, the base of which, at the distance of between two hundred and fifty, and three hun- dred miles, was the French position, — the points at the extremities of the base, that is the French flanks, were the positions of the Spanish armies. The army of Castanos was, at this period, post- ed in the neighbourhood of Tudela, but on the opposite or north side of the Ebro, and about three hundred miles to the north-east of Sala- manca. The French were thus completely in- terposed between the Spanish and British ar- mies ; and might, at any moment, advance on the latter in overwhelming force. For this state of things, Sir John Moore was unpre- AT SALAMANCA. * pared. All his arrangements had been framed chap. i. on the assurance that the assembling of his ^g^g forces would be protected by the Spanish ar- js'ovember. mies. To effect the union of his isolated divi- sions had now become an operation of danger and difficulty. The position of these bodies was such as to prevent the possibility of immediate action. He was placed as a central point be- tween the two wings of his army, and found it impracticable to approach the one, without haz- arding the safety of the other. Thus compelled to remain inactive at Sala- manca, Sir John Moore endeavoured to stimu- late the local authorities into the adoption of such measures of promptitude and vigour as were suited to the exigence of the crisis. In this effort he failed. The Spanish people, though still influenced by fierce and unmitigated hatred towards their invaders, were no longer animated by that uncalculating and convulsive energy which, in the commencement of the struggle, had goaded them like madness in- to furious resistance. The fierceness of the par- oxysm had passed ; and though, in the cause of their country, the hand of every Spaniard was prepared to gripe the sword, the blows it dealt 8 SIR JOHN MOORE IS DECEIVED CHAP. I. were directed with an erring aim, and by H ,Q^Q feebler arm. Their detestation of a foreign November. Y^ke was undiminished ; but it had become a fixed and inert sentiment, rather than a fierce, uncontrollable, and all-pervading impulse. Before entering Spain, every thing had con- tributed to conceal the real state of the Penin- sula from the penetrating vision of Sir John Moore. The British government, itself de- ceived, had become, in its turn, the involuntary propagator of deception. At the commencement of the struggle, it had despatched military agents to the head-quarters of the different Spanish generals, to act as organs of communication, and transmit authentic intelligence of the progress of events in the seat of war. The persons selected for this service were, generally, officers undistin- guished by talent or experience, and therefore little suited to discharge, with benefit, the du- ties of an office so delicate and important. They seem generally to have become the dupes of the unwarranted confidence and inflated boasting of those by whom they were surrounded ; and their reports were framed in a strain of blind and sanguine anticipation, not deducible from any enlarged or rational view of the prospects IN HIS EXPECTATIONS OP ASSISTANCE. or condition of the people. Instead of true re- chap. i. presentations of the numbers, character, and state of efficiency of the armies, they were deluded into j^ovgniber. adopting the extravagant hyperboles of rash and vain-glorious men, and contributed what in them lay to propagate false and exaggerated notions of the military power of the Spanish nation. They did not venture to obtrude on the British Ca- binet the unpalatable truth that the national army -was, in effect, nothing more than a con- gregation of separate and independent bands, miserably armed, possessing but a scanty and ill- served artillery, and almost destitute of cavalry. Had they done so ; and had they stated likewise, that this army was without magazines of any kind, without generals of talent or experience, without officers sufficiently versed in the details of war, to instruct and discipline the raw levies which constituted the greater part of its numer- ical strength ; and, further, that the different leaders were prevented, by frivolous jealousies, and discordance of opinion, from cordially uniting in the execution of any great operation, the ca- lamitous events on the Ebro would probably not have come like a thunderbolt to crush and stulti- fy the combinations of a government, which was a2 -- -■'■•-"- .-.-'-^-t '^' fi^'^^s'^e^r^-^s^^^f'^'^^'W^^ ^^^^^^^^ 3^^^ ^^": !^ 10 THE DIFFICULTIES BY WHICH SIR JOHN MOORE FOUND HIMSELF SURROUNDED. II 1808. November. II CHAP. I. at least sincerely anxious to co-operate in the cause of freedom. England had furnished Spain with supplies; she had poured arms and munitions into the country with a profuse hand ; hut she had taken no efficacious measures for their judicious appli- cation. She exercised little influence on the counsels of the Spanish government ; and even while providing the very thews and sinews of the war, her voice was seldom listened to with obedience or respect. Arms, placed at the dispo- sal of men swayed by petty views and local inter- ests, were wasted and misapplied, and the supplies of money, clothing, and ammunition, so liberally afforded, became a bone of contention and of petty jealousy to the rival authorities. In truth, the provincial governors were actuated by no liberal and enlarged views of the public benefit. Supine in danger, and vain-glorious in prosper- ity, at once untalented and unenlightened, no men could be more unfitted to direct the re- sources of a nation with vigour and efi^ect. In such men Sir John Moore could place no trust. His expectations had been deceived. He found supineness where he expected energy ; a people not filled with an active spirit-stirring 1808. November. enthusiasm, but reposing in a dull, immovable, chap. i. and lethargic confidence in their own prowess and resources, even in the immediate neighbour- hood of a triumphant enemy. His mind became not only perplexed but irritated by the disap- pointment of his hopes. At Salamanca he knew himself to be placed in a difficult and precarious position, unprotected in front, separated from the wings of his army, with nothing but a barren country to retire upon. To the con- centration of his forces, he was aware, indeed, that no present obstacle existed; but how long such a state of things might continue, he had no data on which to form a judgment. The enemy at any moment might interpose a body which would prevent the possibility of a junction, for there existed no Spanish force from which he could anticipate protection. To the other embarrassments of Sir John Moore must be added, the difficulty of receiving true and faithful intelligence of the events passing around him. On public and official reports no confidence could be placed, and of more authentic sources of intelligence he was in a great measure deprived. He had been sent forward without a plan of operations, or any data on which to \ 12 HE REQUESTS THE OPINION OF MR. FRERE, AS TO WHAT MEASURES HE SHOULD FOLLOW. 13 il CHAP. I. found one. Castanos was the person with whom he had heen directed to concert his measures ; loOo. November. ^"^ *^*^ officer had been superseded by Romans ; and of the situation of the latter, Sir John Moore only knew that he was engaged in rallying tho remains of Blake's army, at a distance of about two hundred miles. Naturally distrustful of the apocryphal intelligence transmitted by the Bri- tish military residents, he could rely only on the reports of Colonel Graham and Captain Whit- tingham ; and these, in conjunction with the information which his own officers were ena- bled to procure, contributed still further to deepen the gloom by which his mind was overcast. It was in such circumstances, and under the influence of such feelings, that Sir John Moore wrote to Mr. Frere, the new minister at Madrid, whose opinions he had been instructed to re- ceive with deference and attention, proposing as a question what course he should pursue, in case the army of Castanos, which yet shewed front to the enemy, should be defeated. Should that event occur, " I must," said Sir John Moore, in a letter Nov. 27. dated twenty-seventh November, " either march upon Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of Spain, and thus run all risks, and share the for- chap. i. tunes of the Spanish nation ; or I must fall back on Portugal. In the latter case, I fall back upon November. my resources, upon Lisbon ; cover a country where there is a British interest ; act as a di- version in favour of Spain, if the French detach a force against me ; and am ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should circum- stances again render it eligible.'* On the day following the date of this commu- nication, intelligence arrived for which Sir John Moore was certainly not unprepared. Castanos had been defeated at Tudela with great loss, and the road to Madrid was now open to the French armies. In tliis state of things, without waiting for the answer of Mr. Frere, Sir John Moore determined on immediate retreat. With this intention, he transmitted orders to Sir David Baird at Astorga, and Sir John Hope at the Escurial. The former of these officers was direc- ted to retire on Corunna, the latter to push for- ward, if possible, to Salamanca. Sir David Baird was likewise directed to write immediately to England, that a supply of transports might be sent to the Tagus. " They will be wanted," I .1 1 u SIR JOHN MOORE RESOLVES TO RETREAT. MR. FRERB PROTESTS AGAINST IT. 15 1808. November. CHAP. I. said Sir John Moore ; " for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defeiided,'* Having thus formed his decision, the Com- mander-in-Chief directed a Council of Gene- ral Officers to assemble at head-quarters. He laid before them a full statement of the inteUi- gence he had received, and made known the reso- lution which it had induced him to adopt. His tone was manly and decided. He informed the generals that he had not called them together to request their counsel, or to influence them to conmiit themselves by giving any opinion on the course he had determined to pursue. He took the responsibility entirely upon himself; and he only required that they would immedi- ately take measures for carrying the plan into eflFect. When the resolution of their General was made known to the army, it was received by all ranks with more than murmurs of dissatisfaction and disgust. The British ai*my had suffered no disaster ; it had never been brought into contact with the enemy ; and all felt that to retreat with untried prowess froni the scene of contest, would 0x a tarnish on our arms, and^ by diminishing li the confidence of the Spanish nation in our zeal chap. i. and devotion to their cause, would proportion- ,g^g ally contribute to strengthen and consolidate the November. power of the usurper. Even the personal StaflF of Sir John Moore did not attempt to conceal their dissatisfaction at the adoption of a system fo adverse to their hopes. All lamented the order for retreat, all felt that it must cast a blight on that cause which they were prepared to defend by the outpouring of their blood. In his reply to the letter of Sir John Moore, Mr. Frere protested strongly against the mea- sure of retiring on Portugal. He assured hira it was one most deeply deprecated by the Spanish government. He urged the expediency of advancing to co-operate in the defence of Madrid, by every argument in his power. " Of the zeal and energy of the people," said Mr. Frere, " I have no doubt. The government are new, and have been hitherto too numerous to be very active ; but I trust that this inconve- nience will soon be remedied. They are reso- lute ; and I believe every man of them deter- mined to perish with the country. They will not, at least, set the example which the ruling powers, and higher orders of other countries have #^" 16 SIR JOHN MOORE PERSISTS IN HIS RESOLUTION. INTERVIEW WITH THE SPANISH GENERALS. 17 • i CHAP. I. exhibited of weakness and timidity." In case, ,_ however, the arguments which he most empha- November, ^ically urged for an advance on Madrid, should not to Sir John Moore appear sufficiently conclu- sive to authorize the adoption of the measure, Mr. Frere suggested the alternative of taking up a position in the strong country around As- torga. " A retreat from Astorga to Corunna," said the minister, " would be less difficult than through Portugal to Lisbon; and we ought, in that position, to wait for the reinforcements of cavalry from England, which would enable the army to act in the flat country which opens immediately from that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Castile.'* The arguments of Mr. Frere did not succeed in changing the opinions of Sir .John Moore. He still adhered to the resolution he had pre- viously formed, and only awaited the arrival of Sir John Hope, to commence his retreat on Por- tugal. This general, when within sixty miles of Salamanca, had been compelled to make a considerable detour in order to avoid the ene- my. In the meantime, the Supreme Junta had de- spatched two Spanish generals to the head- I quarters of the British army, in order to concert chap.i. with its commander an united plan of operations. These missionaries corroborated the exaggerated j.. t^^. statements of Mr. Frere with regard to the strength of the Spanish armies. They asserted that they were undismayed and increasing every hour ; and that General San Juan was in posses- sion of the pass of Somosierra, which he had fortified so strongly, as to render abortive all the enemy's hopes of reaching Madrid. Unfor- tunately for the credit of the generals. Colonel Graham had just arrived with intelligence that the pass had been already gained by the French. Sir John Moore was filled with perhaps merit- ed contempt for their ignorance and weakness of character, and on that account felt less dis- posed to accede to their solicitations that he would form a junction with Romana, and there- by create a diversion favourable to the defence of the capital. At the head of the Junta, was Don Thomas Morla, who had formerly succeeded Solano as Grovemor of Cadiz, and now exercised the chief influence at Madrid. The conduct of this man has been attributed to treason; of which the subsequent surrender of Madrid is considered — + 1 18 MORLA : HIS CHARACTER. LETTER OP MORLA AND CASTELFRANCO. 19 $ 1 CHAP. I. not uncolourably — as the overt consummation. It has been supposed, therefore, that his object December. *^ ^^^^ period was, by false representations, to draw the British army nearer to the capital, and thus to throw them into the hands of the French. On a review of the whole circumstances, how- ever, we think the imputation unwarranted by proof. The truth we take to be, that Morla was a cold, unprincipled, and selfish man, not unwilling to resist, while resistance did not com- promise his own safety, but ready to join the victors, whenever adverse circumstances should threaten to involve his own in the wreck of his country's interests. But even though acquitted of previous treason, enough of infamy will be connected with his name. His acceptance of service under the intruder admits of no pallia- tion ; and he will stand recorded as a man whose conduct is irreconcilable with honour or patri- otism, and whose base desertion of a noble cause marks him as unworthy to have ever been num- bered among its assertors. From this person, and from the Prince of Castelfranco, Sir John Moore received, on the Dec. 5. fifth of December, a joint letter, informing him that about twenty-five thousand men of the army of Castanos were falling back on Madrid ; that chap. i. ten thousand from the Somosierra were like- wise concentrating ; and that nearly forty thou- December. sand other troops were prepared to join in the defence of the capital. With these forces Sir John Moore was strongly invited to unite his army, or else to take such a direction as would enable him to fall on the rear of the French. " The Junta," concluded the letter, " cannot doubt that the rapidity of your Excellency's movements will be such as the interests of both countries require." Before Sir John Moore had made any decision on the contents of this letter. Colonel Charmilly, a French emigrant in the British service, arriv- ed with despatches from Mr. Frere. On the first of December, Charmilly had been in Ma- drid. He had witnessed the strongest and most unequivocal demonstrations of ardour among all dines of the people. The whole mass of the population was rising in arms ; the streets were broken up, houses barricaded, and peasants from all quarters were flocking into the city, to bear part in the defence. The Duke del Infantado had commissioned him to make known this state of things to the British general, and to entreat ■.^^"^" 20 LETTER OP MR. FRERE, • f II CHAP. I. him to make some movement that might oper- "TTTT" ate as a diversion for the capital, which its de- December, fenders had determined to hold out to the last extremity. In passing Talavera, to which place the Junta and Mr. Frere had retired, the latter strongly en- forced the same considerations, and intrusted Charmilly with a letter to Sir John Moore, urging him to relinquish the resolution of re- treat. In case, however, this letter should prove ineffectual, he gave Charmilly another, to he delivered only in the event of the General still persisting in his determination. The first letter of Mr. Frere contained a reit- eration of his entreaties, that Sir John Moore would suspend his resolution of retiring on Por- tugal. The enthusiasm pervading Madrid, he said, so far transcended all his hopes, that he could not forbear urging, in the strongest manner, not only the propriety, but the necessity, of supporting the determination of the Spanish people by every possible assistance. « I have no hesitation," continued Mr. Frere, "in taking upon myself any degree of responsibility which may attach to this advice, as I consider the state of Spain to depend absolutely, for the present, on the reso- it fr SIR JOHN MOORE RELINQUISHES HIS RESOLUTION. 21 lution you may adopt. I say, for the present; chap. i. for such is the spirit and character of the coun- ,^^q try, that, even if abandoned by the British, I December, should by no means despair of ultimate suc- cess." The resolution of Sir John Moore was at length shaken by these official statements. It was impossible to suspect that the Junta would deceive him in a mere matter of fact. He could not suppose that a person of Mr. Frere's known perspicacity had become the dupe of a mere flim- sy delusion. Of the ardour and effervescence of the popular spirit. Colonel Charmilly declared himself to have been a personal witness. To discover the real state of affairs, under such re- presentations, when cut off from all sources of more authentic intelligence, was beyond the power of human penetration. Sir John Moore, therefore, decided on a change of plan. He sent immediate orders to Sir David Baird, directing him to stop his retro- gressive march, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga. In these orders, the cau- tion and prudence of the general were admira- bly displayed. " The city of Madrid have taken op arms, have refused to capitulate to the Dated Deed. I I 22 TRANSMITS ORDERS TO HOPE AND BAIRD TO EFFECT A JUNCTION. 23 ■'# CHAP. I. French, are barricading their streets, and say they are determined to suffer every thing rather jy^j^^^ than submit. This arrests the French; and people who are sanguine entertain great hopes from it. I own, myself, I fear this spirit has arisen too late, and the French are now too strong to be resisted in this manner. However, there is no saying; and I feel myself the more obliged to give it a trial, that Mr. Frere has made a formal representation, which I received this evening. I must beg, therefore, that you will suspend your march until you hear from me again, and make arrangements for your return to Astorga, should it be necessary." Dec 6. On the day following, he wrote as follows :— "Let all your preparations, as far as provi- sions, &c. go, continue to be made for a re- treat, in case that should again become neces- sary. Establish one magazine at Villa Franca, and one or two farther back ; to which let salt- meat, biscuit, rum or wines, forage, &c. be brought up from Corunna. Send me, to Za- mora, two regiments of cavalry, and one bri- gade of horse-artillery, keeping one regiment of cavalry, and one brigade of horse-artillery with yourself; and send your troops by brigades I to Benevente. The enemy have nothing at pre- chap. i. sent in that direction ; and we must take advan- ^g^g tage of it, and, by working double tides, make up December. for lost time. By means of the cavalry-patrols, you will discover any movements immediately near you ; and I take for granted, you have got other channels of information ; and both you and me, although we may look big, and determine to get every thing forward, yet we must never lose sight of this, that, at any moment, affairs may take that turn that will render it necessary to retreat." The preceding order reached Sir David Baird at Villa Franca, late on the seventh of Decem- Dec. 7. ber, when in full retreat on Corunna ; and the movement was immediately arrested. The po- sition of the army at Salamanca had now become materially improved. Sir John Hope, who, in order to avoid the enemy, had advanced by a circuitous route, was already at Alba de Tonnes, and, by a movement to the left, the junction of the whole army was secure. In the meanwhile, the change which had taken place in the mind of the general was unknown in Salamanca. Charmilly, supposing, from the tone of those around him, that the circumstances un- 24 CHAP. I. 1808. December. I LETTER TRANSMITTED BY CHARMILLY der which he was to deliver the second letter had occurred, presented it to Sir John Moore. It ran thus : — " Sir, — In the event, which I did not wish to presuppose, of your continuing the determina- tion already announced to me, with the army under your command, I have to request that Colonel Charmilly, who is the bearer of this, and whose intelligence has already been referred to, may be examined before a Council of war. — I have, &c. J. H. Frere." That Sir John Moore should feel indignant at the receipt of such a letter was natural. He considered Mr. Frere as unwarrantably intrud- ing on his office as Commander of the forces, and attempting to control him, by a Council of war, to act against the dictates of his judgment. He tore the letter in pieces, and dismissed the mes- senger from his presence. Nor did his resent- ment rest here. On the day following, Char- milly received an order to quit Salamanca, which, after a fruitless attempt to procure its revocation, he was compelled to obey. On a calm review of the circumstances con- nected with this unpleasant collision, we feel lit- tle disposed to attribute blame to either party. ITS EFFECT ON SIR JOHN MOORE. 25 — Both unquestionably decided on the purest chap. i. and most conscientious motives. Both were animated by a vehement desire to act as mi&rht ° December. most contribute to the honour of their coun- try, and the interest of the common cause. — The style of Mr. Frere, indeed, is somewhat less courteous than might have been expected from so accomplished a diplomatist ; and the opinions of Sir John Moore were certainly entitled to greater respect than the minister seemed inclin- ed to accord them; but the question on which they differed was one on which men, zealous for the same end, might arrive at dissimilar conclu- sions, without imputation on the motives of either. In truth, the minds of Mr. Frere and Sir John Moore were of different mould and consistency. The one, ardent and enthusiastic, was disposed to rely with too facile a credence on the energy and devotion of the assertors of a noble cause. The other, too strongly disgusted perhaps, with re- peated proofs of ignorance and imbecility in the Spanish leaders, regarded the scene around him with the eye of a general. He felt little disposed to anticipate a fortunate issue to the resistance VOL. n. B 26 CHAP. I. i I' [ SIR JOHN MOORE's REPLY TO MR. FRERE. which popular enthusiasm might oppose to mili- tary skill and highly disciplined troops. They 1808. heheld the same events through different media, December, jn the picture of the one, the sun was mounting in the horizon, and the landscape was hathed in a flood of prospective radiance. In that of the other, the last rays of departing light had faded from the sky, and the face of nature lay hid in darkness. The resentment of Sir John Moore however, strong as it might be at the moment of receiving the offence, did not lead him to forget the respect due to the minister of his Sovereign. His an- swer to Mr. Frere's communications was mild and dignified : " I shall abstain," said he, « from any remark on the two letters delivered to me last night and this morning, by Colonel Charmil- ly. I certainly did feel and express much indig- nation at a person like him being made the chan- nel of a communication of that sort from you to me. These feelings are at an end, and I dare- say they will never be excited towards you again. If Mr. Charmilly is your friend, it was perhaps natural for you to employ him ; but I have pre- judices against aU that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him." He informed HE COMMUNICATES HIS PLANS TO ROM ANA. 27 \ Mr. Frere, that the order for retreat had been chap, i, countermanded, and that he had put himself in 1808 communication with the Marques de la Romana, December at Leon. He declared his readiness to do every thing in his power for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause ; but stated the impossi- bility of a direct movement on the capital, from the circumstance of the passes of Guadarama and Somosierra being already in possession of the French, and from the weakness of his army, until it should have formed a junction with the corps of Sir David Baird. Having at length adopted the resolution to advance. Sir John Moore wrote to the Marques de la Romana, informing him of this change in his decision, and expressing a strong wish for the speedy junction of their armies, in order that combined efforts might be made for the support of Madrid. The account of his army, however, given by the Spanish General, was abundantly discouraging. He had twenty thou- sand men under arms ; but they were stated to be in the very worst condition with regard to e- quipment. The soldiers were without havresacks, cartridge-boxes, or shoes, and many even with- 28 ROMANA's reply to sir JOHN MOORE. CHAP. I. out clothing ; yet their spirit was undaunted, and, if sufficiently provisioned, they would dis- 1 ftOR December t^^^^rge their duty in the field. The Marques likewise stated, that he would gladly have formed an immediate junction, with the view of advancing to the relief of the capital, were he not prevented from abandoning his present position by a corps of eight or ten thou- sand men posted between Sahagun and Almanza, the apparent object of which was to check his movements. Any approach to the British army would leave, to this corps, free ingress into As- turias, from whence he drew large supplies, and would likewise endanger Gallicia. A combined movement with Sir David Baird, however, might oblige them to fall back on Reynosa, and, in that event, he should be ready to unite his army with the English. On the seventh. Sir John Moore was inform- ed, by a communication from the Junta of Tole- do, that they intended to reunite the dispersed armies in that quarter, and defend the city to the last extremity. In reply, he assured the Junta that, if the rest of Spain were animated by a similar enthusiasm, ultimate success was certain, Dec. 7. REPORT OF COLONEL GRAHAM. 29 by whatever disasters its advent might be imped- chap. i. ed or delayed. He assured them they might "^^^ rely on all practicable assistance from the army December. he commanded ; and sent a British officer to re- side at Toledo, and concert measures for its de- fence. The word of promise, however, though liberally given to the ear, was broken to the hope; for the Junta, on the first approach of a column of the enemy, retired from the city, and it was occupied, without opposition, by the corps of Victor. On the ninth, Colonel Graham, who had been Dec. 9. despatched to Madrid, returned, with intelligence of its being already in occupation of the enemy. His progress had been arrested at Talavera, where he encountered two members of the Su- preme Junta. These informed him that oVIorla had entered into some agreement with the French, who had already gained possession of the Retiro and Prado of Madrid ; that Morla was suspected of treason in this proceeding, having refused admission to the troops of San Juan and Hereida, whose presence would have enabled the inhabitants to defend the city ; that Castel- lar, the Captain -General, and all the military of- ficers of rank, had refused to ratify the capitula- 30 SIR JOHN MOORE RECEIVES INTELLIGENCE CHAP. I. tion, and had left the town, carrying with them "TT7~" sixteen guns ; that the inhabitants still retained December. ^^^^^ ^™^ » *^^* *^® French army, amounting to about twenty-five thousand, had sufficient occupa- tion in holding the people in subjection; that La Pena, with thirty thousand men, was at Guada- laxara ; that fourteen thousand of San Juan's and Hereida's forces were assembling at Almaraz ; and that Romana, in Leon, was in command of an army exceeding thirty thousand men. The fall of Madrid, however, did not deter Sir John Moore from pursuing his projected operations. The great bulk of the French army, which might have been employed a- gainst him, had been carried into Catalonia, or towards Madrid ; and Sir John Moore con- sidered that, by a forward movement, and ef- fecting a junction with Baird, he would be able to menace the communication of the enemy, thus creating a diversion in favour of those Span- iards who still remained in arms, and giving time for the raising and embodying of new levies in the south. He never ceased, however, to contemplate the necessity of retreat, whenever the British army should become the chief ob- ject of the enemy's attention. .. T^ f *--^*^..'" * '— tLMLm.M.^^».M • OF THE SURRENDER OF MADRID. 31 It is now necessary that we should take a re- chap. i. trospect of the events more immediately con- ^g^g^ nected with the advance of the French army to j^ovember. Madrid, and its consequent surrender. After the battle of Tudela, General Maurice Mathieu entered Borja in pursuit of Castanos, having secured a great many prisoners on his march. On the day following he was joined by Marshal Ney. Castanos reached Calatayud in safety, where his followers were exposed to ex- traordinary privations. No magazines existed for the supply of provisions, the country was exhausted, and the military chest, containing two millions of reals, had been conveyed to Zaragoza. The soldiers, desperate with hunger, were no longer amenable to discipline ; and the inhabitants fled from their dwellings, dismayed alike by the conduct of their countrymen and the vicinity of the enemy. The position of Castanos at Calatayud was sufficiently advantageous. It enabled him to cover the preparations for defence then making at Zaragoza, and, in some degree, to menace the left flank of the enemy on his advance towards the south. From this station, however, he was recalled, by an order from Morla, to assist in the 32 RETROSPECT OF THE OPERATIONS OF CHAP. I. defence of the capital. On the twenty-seventh, ,QQQ therefore, he continued his retreat on Signenza, November, ^^^^re he arrived on the day following. During his march the rear-guard, under Don Francisco Venegas, was attacked in the pass of Buvierca ; hut, after a severe contest, it succeeded in repel- ling the enemy, though not without considerable loss. At Siguenza, Castanos received a sum- mons from the Central Junta, and resigned the command of the army to Don Manuel de La Pena. This officer was subsequently superseded at Guadalaxara, by the Duke del Infantado. On its retreat towards Valencia, the army was pursued by a body of cavalry and infantry under Bessieres ; and, after many difficulties, succeed- ed in reaching Cuenca, where it was enabled to rally unmolested. The victory of Tudela at once determined Napoleon to march rapidly on Madrid, with the centre of his army, while the wings continued the pursuit of the defeated Spaniards on the right and left. The advance of the army was commanded by Marshal Victor, who, on the Nov. 30. thirtieth; arrived in front of the defile of Somo- sierra, where the road crosses a mountainous chain, about sixty miles distant from the capital. THE SPANISH ARMIES. 33 He found the Spanish army, amounting to about chap. i. eighteen thousand, strongly posted in the gorge of the mountain. Of these about six thousand ^o^gj^i^r. were intrenched on the heights of Sepulveda ; and General San Juan, with the remainder, oc- cupied the pass. Sixteen pieces of cannon were judiciously placed in battery, on the highest part of the ridge flanking the ascent ; and thus favour- ably posted, the Spanish forces awaited the ap- proach of the enemy. Marshal Victor at once advanced to the attack of the position of Sepulveda. In this he was repulsed ; but the defenders, struck with panic, afterwards forsook their intrenchments, and fled in disorder towards Segovia. On the day following an assault was made on Dec i. the position of San Juan. Three battalions ad- vanced on the right, three on the left, and three on the centre, under a heavy fire from the Spa- nish artillery. The heights on either flank were covered with Spanish light infantry, with whom the French maintained a warm, skirmishing fire, unattended by any decided result. At this mo- ment Napoleon arrived, and, halting at the foot of the mountain, carefully examined the posi- b2 34 THE FRENCH FORCE THE SOMOSIERRA. CONDUCT OF THE SUPREME JUNTA. 35 CHAP. I. tion, amid the fire of the enemy. Having cora- pleted his observations, he immediately or- December, ^^red the Polish lancers of his guard to ex- ecute a charge on a battery which enfiladed the causeway, by which alone the position was approachable. The first squadron of the column was driven back in confusion by the shower of grape-shot and musquetry which it encountered. Under cover of the succeeding squadrons, how- ever, it was again rallied, and the regiment, sword in hand, charged up the mountain at full speed, and in a moment were in possession of the battery. The Spaniards fled on all hands, dispersing among the hills, with the loss of arms, baggage, ammunition, and artillery. The an- nals of modem war scarcely aflFord record of a more daring and singular exploit. The loss of the Polish regiment amounted only to fifty-seven men killed and wounded. In Segovia, the defeated army united with the troops which had retired from Sepulveda, and, subsequently marching to Guadarama, ef- fected a junction with the corps of Estramadura, under Hereida. With these forces, San Juan, unable to remain in occupation of the pass, from 1808. December. want of provisions, proceeded to the Escuriai, chap, i where an order met him to march instantly on the capital. While executing this order, insubordination spread among his followers, and the great body of the army forsook their ranks and dispersed. When the generals, therefore, approached Mad- rid, they had with them but a small band of fol- lowers ; and, discovering that the city had sur- rendered, they retired on Talavera. To this place the greater number of the deserters had bent their march. By these San Juan was brutally murdered, and his army, being without a rallying point, dispersed. While the events which we have already de- tailed, were in progress, the conduct of the government was marked by an inexplicable fa- tuity Instead of vigorous measures to recruit and re-organize the scattered forces of their armies, the Supreme Junta busied themselves in establishing a special tribunal for the trial of persons suspected of treason; and directed an investigation into the conduct of those who had acknowledged the authority of the usurper. The principles, on which it was provided that the proceedings of this Commission should be ,4 36 THE FOLLY OF THEIR MEASUR£$%. CHAP. 1. regulated, were unquestionably humane and "~~~~" liberal. Especial provisions were made to pre- T^ . * vent secret arrest, or irresponsible imprison- November. ' ^ ^ ment. The laws of trial were fair. Anony- mous information was rejected ; and in all the contemplated proceedings of this novel tribunal, the dictates of impartial justice were laudably observed. In this measure, and in others equally unsuit- ed to the circumstances and character of the times, did the Junta waste the precious moments which should have been devoted to matters of deeper importance. But they did worse than this. They adopted the fatal system of deceiv- ing the people with regard to the magnitude and imminence of their danger. Even while the Nov. 21. French threatened the important pass of Somo- sierra, the Junta addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of Madrid, declaring that the body by which the capital was menaced amounted only to eight thousand men. They declared that the enthusiasm, with which the soldiers were preparing to defeat the enemies of their country, was great beyond description ; that the English were ready to advance from the Escu- rial, to defend the capital, and support the oper- THE JUNTA RETIRE FROBf ARANJUEZ. 37 ations of the gallant army already gloriously en- chap. i. gaged in achieving fresh triumphs. ^808~ As soon as the pass of Somosierra was forced, No^e^ber, the Supreme Junta retired from Aranjuez to Badajos, leaving a Military Commission, un- der the presidency of the Marques de Castel- lar, to conduct the defence of Madrid. Judging from external demonstrations, the enthusiasm of Madrid rivalled that of Zaragoza. The people broke up the pavement in the streets, and inter- sected them with ditches, barricaded the doors and windows of the houses, erected batteries on the most commanding situations, and planted can- non in the squares and crossings of the streets. There were in the place sixty thousand men under arms, including six thousand troops of the line, all animated with a desire to defend the city to the last extremity. Unfortunately, however, the people were without confidence in their leaders. A report spread that sand was mixed with the gunpowder in the cartridges. The Marques de Perales was the person upon whom the crime of treason was charged. The mob broke into his house ; and before the Duke del Infantado could arrive to his assistance, Perales had been pierced with 38 THE FRENCH APPROACH MADRID. SENTIMENTS OF THE INHABITANTS. 39 CHAP. I. wounds, and his dead body dragged through the streets, amid the exulting execrations of the November, rabble. The near approach of the enemy struck the authorities with alarm. They felt little anxious that the city should be subjected to the horrors of a protracted siege, and agreed, should their hopes from without fail, to content themselves with such measures as might prevent the enemy from instantly forcing the town, and induce him to grant favourable terms of capitulation. A diversion by the British might operate in their favour. At all events, it was thought advis- able to strengthen the garrison as much as possi- ble. They counted on assistance from the fugi- tive troops of San Juan, many of which were hourly arriving ; and despatched the Duke del Infantado to conduct La Pena's army, with all speed to the capital. On this mission he set out on the second of December. On the day preceding, the corps of Marshal Ney effected a junction with the army of the cen- tre, by Guadalaxara and Alcala, and head-quarters were advanced to St. Augustino. On the second, the cavalry under Bessieres came in sight of the city, and took possession of the heights. Ma- '* drid was in the greatest fermentation. The chap. i. bells of all the churches rung forth alarm, the priests called the population to arms in defence j^^^^^^].^ of their hearths and altars, and the shouting of multitudes, mingling with the loud trumpet peal, gave intelligible intimation to the enemy of the state of the capital. In truth, there were two parties in the city. One consisting of the mili- tary, of the armed peasants from the country, and of the poorer class of the people, had no property to lose, and were determined to defend the city to the last extremity. The other comprehended the merchants and principal tradesmen, and all the richer body of inhabit- ants. These were unwilling to hazard all on the fortune of a cast, and maintained the im- prudence of exposing the capital to pillage, by an obstinate and protracted resistance. Jealou- sies, too, had broken out between the civil and military authorities, and valuable time was wasted in useless altercations, which the urgen- cy of the crisis demanded should be otherwise employed. In this situation of affairs, Bessieres sent an aid-de-camp into the city with a summons to the ~T 40 THE GARRISON SUMMONED TO SURRENDER. CHAP. I. authorities to open the gates. The mission was jQQg one of danger. The officer was seized by the December, exasperated people, and had he not been oppor- tunely rescued by a party of soldiers, would un- questionably have fallen a victim to their fury. Victoires et A Spanish general, with an escort of thirty men, was despatched to the out-posts of the enemy, with the answer of the authorities to this demand. It stated that the whole popula- tion of Madrid were prepared to die in defence of the city. In the meanwhile, the French army was approaching the scene of action. Towards evening, the corps of Victor was sent forward to gain possession of the suburbs on the northern approaches to the city, which, after considerable resistance, was accomplished ; and, before night- fall, artillery was posted on the more prominent points of occupation. At midnight, Berthier despatched a Spanish colonel of artillery, who had been taken prisoner at Somosierra, with a letter to the Marquis de Castellar, exhorting him not to subject the city to the horrors of an assault. To this communi- cation, Castellar replied that before he could give an explicit answer, it was necessary to THEY REQUEST AN ARMISTICE. 41 x.^CC* %j» ascertain the sentiments of the authorities and chap. i. the people. For this purpose, he demanded a suspension of arms till the following day. December. The request was not granted. On the morn- ing of the third, an attack was made on the Retiro, the favourite palace of Philip the Fourth, which stood on an eminence command- ing the city. The place was soon breached by the fire of thirty guns, and carried by assault, with the loss of a thousand of the garrison. The French were not contented with this ad- vantage, but immediately pushing on, succeeded, with little difficulty, in gaining possession of the China Manufactory, the great Barrack, the Hotel de Medina Celi, and other buildings com- manding the entrances to several of the princi- pal streets. The arrival of numerous deserters, chiefly of the Walloon guards, gave intelligence to the enemy of the state of feeling in Madrid. The continued success of the French had spread con- fusion and disorder. The calmness of resolute resistance was wanting, the population was not bound together by the strong tie of •mutual confidence amid surrounding danger. In these circumstances, another message was sent into '( 42 THE GARRISON AGAIN SUMiMONED. CHAP. I. the city, stating that the Emperor, unwilling to jgQQ occasion unnecessary Woodshed, would suspend December, hostile operations till two o'clock. " To attempt the defence of jVfadrid," said Berthier, "is against the principles of war, and inhuman for the inhabitants. The Emperor authorizes me to send you a third summons. An immense artil- lery is already placed in battery ; mines are prepared to blow up your principal buildings ; columns of troops are at the entrances of your city, of which some companies of riflemen iwe already masters. But the Emperor, always generous in the course of his victories, suspends the attack till two o'clock. The city of Madrid may expect protection and safety for its peace- able inhabitants, for religion and its ministers. The past shall be forgotten. Raise a white flag before the expiration of two hours, and send commissioners to treat for the surrender of the city." At five o'clock, Morla and Don Bernardo Yriarte arrived at head-quarters. They stated themselves to be charged to demand a cessation of hostilities during the remainder of the day, with the view of giving time to the authorities to dispose the people to surrender. These com- DEPUTIES SENT TO FRENCH HEAD-QUARTERS. 43 missioners were ushered into the presence of chap. i. Napoleon. His reception of them was calcu- lated to inspire terror. On Morla he particu- Decej^ber. larly vented his indignation. He adverted in strong language to the violation of the capitula- tion of Baylen. His address concluded thus : — " To violate a military treaty is to renounce civilization ; it degrades generals to the rank of the Bedouins of the desert. How dare you then to solicit a capitulation, you who have vio- lated that of Baylen ? See how injustice and bad faith ever recoil on the guilty ! I had a fleet at Cadiz ; it was in alliance with Spain, and yet you directed against it the mortars of the city where you commanded. I had a Spanish army in my ranks, and rather than disarm it, I would have seen it embark on board the English ships, and be forced afterwards to precipitate it from the summit of the rocks of Espinosa. I would rather have seven thousand more enemies to fight, than be deficient in honour and good faith. Return to Madrid. I give you till six o'clock in the morning ; come back at that hour to announce the submission of the people, or you and your troops shall all be put to the sword." 44 SURRENDER OF MADRID. CHAP. I. It was the object of Napoleon, in his treat- jgQQ ment of the deputies, to stimulate their fears, December. ^^ Order that the impression they carried with them might be diffused among the populace of Madrid. He was, above all things, anxious that the surrender of the capital should appear the voluntary act of the people — not the traitor- ous betrayal of their leaders. He felt the im- portance of propagating the belief that he had entered Madrid, not as an enemy, but amid the acclamations of the inhabitants. Dee. 4. Early on the morning of the fourth, Morla, and Don Fernando de la Vera, returned to the French head-quarters, announcing that the peaceable inhabitants had consented to receive, with gratitude, the generous oifers of the Em- peror. At ten o'clock. General Belliard, at the head of a body of French troops, entered the city, and assumed the command. During the night, the armed peasants from the country had returned to their habitations : and Castellar, re- fusing to sanction the capitulation, with the main body of the troops and sixteen guns, marched out of the city, and effected his re- treat. Dec 7. On the seventh. Napoleon issued a proclama- PROCLAMATION OF NAPOLEON. 45 tion to the Spanish nation. He declared they chap, i. had been misled by perfidious men to engage in ^^^^ a hopeless struggle. What possible result, he December, asked, could attend even the success of a few campaigns? Nothing but an indefinite pro- traction of war on their own soil— an endless uncertainty of life and property. Was there one Spaniard amongst them so senseless as not • to feel that the nation had been the sport of the eternal enemies of the continent, who took de- light in witnessing the effusion of French and Spanish blood? It had cost him but some marches to defeat their armies ; he had entered their capital, and the laws of war would justify him by a signal example in washing away, in blood, the insult offered to himself and his coun- try. But he had listened to the voice, not of justice, but of clemency. His wish was to be the regenerator of Spain. All that obstructed their prosperity and greatness he had destroyed ; he had broken the fetters which bent the people to the earth. Their destiny now was in their own hands. An absolute monarchy had been displaced by a free constitution. " It depends on yourselves whether this constitution shall con- tinue in your land. But should all my efforts I f . ■ mi- '9 ^ CONDUCT OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT. ^^^^' ^ ' prove fruitlesg, and should you shew yourselves 1808. ^worthy of my confidence, nothing will remain December, for me but to treat your country as a conquered province, and to establish my brother on some other throne. I shall then place on my own head the crown of Spain, and cause it to be re- spected by the guilty. God has given me the will and power to surmount all difficulties." This proclamation was succeeded by a num- ber of decrees on various subjects. No grant was in future to be made from the public re- venue to any individual. The Tribunal of the Inquisition, feudal rights, and the jurisdiction of seigniorial courts of justice, were abolished. The number of convents was reduced to one- third. Most of the members of the Council of Castile were displaced, and declared unworthy of continuing the magistrates of a free nation ; and, with few exceptions, a general pardon was granted to all Spaniards, on professing allegiance to the intrusive monarch. After the fall of the capital, the French stUl continued to follow up their successes. Toledo Dec. II. was occupied by Marshal Victor on the eleventh, and La Mancha became subject to the pillage of his ferocious soldiery. In the meanwhile, the POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES. 47 southern Juntas were employed in fortifying chap.i. the passes of the Sierra Morena, which were ""j^^ daily expected to become the object of attack, i^ecember. But at that moment the movements of the Brit- ish army had the effect of diverting the attention of Napoleon ; and it was probably expected that the force detached towards Badajos, in pursuit of the retiring Junta, would, in that direction, find easier access to Seville and Cadiz, than over the difficult and giant ranges by which Andalusia is bounded on the north. Wlien Sir John Moore, therefore, commenced his march from Salamanca, the different corps of the French army were disposed nearly as fol- lows. Marshal Bessieres was pursuing the re- mains of the central army on the road to Valen- cia. Victor had entered Toledo. Lefebvre, with a strong division, was marching on Bada- jos. Mortier was preparing to besiege Zara- goza ; Soult to enter Leon ; while Napoleon, from Madrid, was ready to support all these movements, and complete the subjugation of Spain. The total of this force was estimated at one hundred and fifty thousand men. That of Sir John Moore amounted altogether to twenty- «ix thousand nine hundred infantry, and two 48 SIR JOHN MOORE ADVANCES FROM SALAMANCA. |i CHAP. T. thousand four hundred and fifty cavalry. The jgQQ artillery was numerous, but of too small a cali- December. ^^e. It consisted of about fifty guns, including a brigade of useless three-pounders. Dec. 12. On the twelfth, Sir John Moore moved on- ward from Salamanca. On the thirteenth, head-quarters were at Alaejos. The brigade of General Beresford, and the cavalry under Lord Paget, were at Toro. General Hope was at Torrecillo ; the brigade of cavalry, under Briga- dier-General Stewart, at Rueda. By the latter, a party of fifty infantry and thirty cavalry, had, on the preceding night, been surprised and cut oflF. The prisoners declared that it was believed, in the French army, that the English were re- treating on Portugal. Dec 14. On the fourteenth. Sir John Moore received a despatch from Romana, expressive of his ap- probation of the movements of the British army, and of his intention to take immediate steps to efi^ect a junction. On the same day a packet of intercepted let- ters from the head-quarters of the French army — the bearer of which had been killed by the peasantry— was brought to Sir John Moore. It contained a despatch from Berthier to Soult, INTERCEPTED DESPATCH FROM BERTHIER. 49 directing him to occupy Leon, Benevente, chap. i. and Zamora, to drive the Spaniards into Gal- 1808. licia, and maintain subjection in the flat coun- ' try. It stated that no annoyance need be apprehended from the English, who were fd- ready supposed to be in full retreat on Por- tugal. But should this not be the case, the movement of the fourth corps on Badajos would speedily realize the anticipation. It likewise appeared from the letter, that Soult was at Saldanha, with two divisions ; and that another, under Mortier, had received orders to march on Zaragoza. The eighth corps, commanded by Jnnot, was stated to have passed the Pyrenees, and would probably be concentrated in Burgos. It had been the intention of Sir John Moore to push onward to Valladolid; but the intelli- gence contained in the intercepted despatch, in- duced him to alter his intention. By this it appeared that the corps of Soult was stronger than he expected ; and removing his head- quarters to Toro, he directed Sir David Baird to concentrate his division at Benevente, from which point an union, either by a flank or forward movement, might at any time be ef- fected. VOL. II. c 50 THE ARMY HALTS AT TORO. ROMANA COMMENXES RETREAT. 51 CHAP. I. While Sir John Moare was at Toro, he re- ceived another communication from Mr. Frere, Decembei. written in a tone of ardent remonstrance. Ig- norant of the change which had taken place in the plans of the general, it reminded hira of the immense responsibility which he as- sumed, in adopting a measure which must be followed by the immediate, if not the final ruin of our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources he was intrust- ed. " I am unwilling," continued he, " to enlarge on a subject on which my feelings must be stifled or expressed at the risk of of- fence, which, with such an interest at stake, I should be unwilling to excite. But this much I must say, that if the British army had been sent for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the mea- sures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose." In this letter Mr. Frere enclosed another from the Supreme Junta to himself, deprecating th« resolution of retreat, and m-ging, in the strongest terms, the advantage of hi? immediately engag- ing in active operations against the enemy. The chap. i. Junta assured Mr. Frere that the enthusiasm of 1808. the Spanish people had not been diminished by j^^ ' the recent reverses of their armies, and promised that he should be promptly joined by fourteen thousand men from Romana's army. The communication of Mr. Frere arrived too late to have any influence on the movements of Sir John Moore. His plans had already been decided. Against his better judgment he had engaged in operations from which he anticipated little beneficial result ; and, still contemplating the probability of retreat, he declined assuming the thief command of the Spanish armies, which was at this time ofl'ered him. The difliculties of Sir John Moore were in- creased by intelligence received from Sir David Baird, that the Marques de la Romana had ac- tually commenced his retreat from Leon on Gallicia. Such information could not feil of producing considerable vexation. Sir John Moore felt how materially liis operations would be impeded by this unexpected circumstance ; and, on his arrival at Castro Nuevo, he desr patched a courier to Romana, soliciting him to retrace hu steps, or else, by entering the 9 52 SIR JOHN MOORE MARCHES AGAINST SOULT. CHAP. I. Asturias, afford protection to the left flank "Tr~~~ of the communication on Corunna. To this, December, ^^on^^"*'! replied that he had commenced his re- treat in consequence of intelligence received from Sir David Baird ; that he was anxious at the present to do every thing for the relief of A(adrid ; and prepared to unite in any opera- tion with the English army. Sir John Moore had now resolved, if possi- ble, to attack Marshal Soult in his position at Saldanha, about eighty miles to the northward of Toro. He considered that even an unpro- fitable victory could scarcely fail to lend encour- agement to the patriots ; and, at all events, the forward movement would necessarily draw on him the whole French force in Spain, and thereby create a diversion, which would give the Spanish armies in the south time to rally and recover from the effects of the recent disasters. Dec. 18. On the eighteenth Sir John Moore moved forward to Castro Nuevo. The head-quarters of Sir David Baird on that day were at Be- nevente, about forty miles distant. On the nineteenth the march of the army was con- tinued on Villalpando and Valderas. On the Dec. 20. twentieth the junction with Sir David Baird was ENGAGEMENT OF THE CAVALRY. 53 formed at Mayorga. The total effective amount chap. i. of the combined army, is stated to have been twenty-three thousand infantry, and two thou- joecember, sand five hundred cavalry. About one thousand seven hundred men were on detachment, and four thousand in hospital. While head- quarters were at Mayorga, several skirmishes took place between the British ca- valry and that of the enemy. In Sahagun a de- tachment of seven hundred French cavalry was reported to be lodged, and Lord Paget deemed it practicable to cut them off. The ground was covered with deep snow, and the weather in- tensely cold. liord Paget, however, set forward on his march, and detaching General Slade with the tenth hussars along the Cea to enter the town, he wheeled off with the fifteenth and horse artil- lery to approach it by a different route. By day-dawn, Lord Paget had reached the town, in front of which he fell in with a piquet of the enemy. It was instantly charged, and all but one man cut down or made prisoners. The es- cape of this individual, however, gave the alarm ; and before the fifteenth could advance, the enemy were discovered drawn up to receive them in an open plain. 54 PRENCH CAVALRY DEFEATED. THE AR^tJr ORDERED TO MARCH ON SALDANHA. 55 CHAP. I. Lord Paget immediately formed line and ad- TTTT"" vanced to the charge. But the success of this ma- Decflinbci. "^^^^'re was prevented by a broad ditch or ravine, hitherto unobserved^ which obstructed their pro- gress. Some mancenvring took place between the corps, each endeavouring to gain the flank of the other. By superior skiD) Lord Paget at length effected his object. The ravine was pass- ed, and, coming down at full speed on their op- ponents, the fifteenth overthrew them in a moment. Many of the French were killed, and one hundred and fifty-seven prisoners, including two lieutenant-colonels, were brought back to the British camp as trophies of success. The loss of the fifteenth in this engagement was trifling. Dec 21. On the twenty-first the army moved to Saha- gun, where Sir John Afoore halted for a day to afibrd refreshment to the troops. There he received a despatch from Romana, dated Leon, December nineteenth. The Mar- ques expressed his approbation of the measures of Sir John Moore, and his willingness to co- operate in the proposed attack on SouU ; but the most extraordinary feature in the letter is, that the writer of it appeared wholly ignorant f of the surrender of Madrid, nearly twenty days chap. I. before! Another letter, received on the day following, stated that the corps of Soult con- j^^cember. sisted of about ten thousand men, of which one thousand were cavalry, with eight or ten pieces of artillery ; but that Soult, apprehensive of attack, had applied for reinforcements ; and, in the meanwhile, had collected the nearest troops, which augmented his force to about eighteen thousand men. These he had posted behind the Carrion. In the proposed opera- tion, Romana offered to unite with nine or ten thousand of his best men, and intimated his readiness to advance immediately on receiving the answer of Sir John Moore. This letter arrived late on the night of the twenty-second. Early on the following mom- Dec 23. ing, Sir John Moore despatched a messenger to Romana, informing him that he would on the same niofht march to the town of Carrion, where he had reason to believe that a body of the enemy were collected. " To-morrow," said the General, " I shall march on Saldan- ha. If your Excellency would march from Mansilla, either direct on Saldanha, or pass the river a little above it, whilst I march on 56 ARRANGEMENTS WITH ROMANA. THE ARMY ORDERED TO RETREAT. 57 CHAP. I. from Carrion, I think it would distract the at- |QQQ tention of the enemy, and considerably aid my December, ^^tack. My march from Carrion will probably be in the night. Any information of your move- ments, I shall thank you to address to me at Carrion, where I shall be at daylight to-mor- Under these circumstances. Sir John Moore chap. i. determined on retreat, and the march to Car- row »» In consequence of this determination, orders for an immediate advance were issued to the army. The march was to commence at eight o'clock in the evening in two columns. One of these was destined to force the bridge at Car- rion, and so penetrate to Saldanha ; and this body was already on the road, when a letter arrived from Romana, stating that the French, on the side of Madrid, were in motion to the northward. This intelligence coincided with the information received by Sir John Moore from other quarters. The corps of the ene- my, which was directing its march on Badajos, had halted at Talavera. Large supplies of forage and provisions had been ordered in the villages around Palencia. It was said that Na- poleon himself, had set out from Madrid, with the avowed intention of proceeding to Bene- vente without a halt. rion was countermanded. He considered that the beneficial object of his movement had already been attained. The progress of the enemy's ar- mies had been arrested in the south, and they . were now advancing on all hands to surround him. Sir .John Moore, therefore, felt convinced that nothing but immediate retreat could extricate him from the difficulties of his situation. His intentions were communicated to the Marques de la Romana, in the following words : " I shall take immediate measures for retiring on Astorga. There I shall stand ; as my retreat thence, if ne- cessary, will be secure. I shall be in the way to receive the supplies and the reinforcements which I expect from England. At the worst, I can maintain myself, and, with your Excellency's aid, defend the Gallicias, and give time for the formation of the armies in the south, and that which you command, to be prepared, when a joint effort may be made, which can alone be ef* ficacious.*' As Sir John Moore had not yet resigned the intention of defending Gallicia, he determined c2 1808. December. 58 THE RETREAT COMMENCES. CHAP. I. on retiring in such a direction as would fecili- "^^^^ tftte tlie execution of this measure, should it be December, ^ound desirable. To effect this it was nec€«- sary, in the first instance, to cross the Kslar, which could be done by three routes. The first i« by Mansilla, where the river U crossed by a bridge. The second by A'alencia de San Juan, at which point there is a ferry. The third is by Castro Gonzalo, where there is likewise a bridge, and from whence a road passes to Bcnevente. As Mansilla was already occupied by tlie Span- ish troops, the two latter routes wiere preferred, hnd Astorga was indicated as the place of ren- dezvous, where it was understood the army would make a stand. In the meanwhile, Ro- mana was expected to keep possession of Afan- eilla, and defend the city of Leon to tiie la^t ex- tremity. The day following was employed iti prepara- tions for retreat. In the evening, General Hope, with his own division and that of Geneiml Fraser, fell back to Mayorga, and Sir David Baird retired to Valencia de San Juan. To conceal this move- ment, strong patrols of cavalry were pushed on to the advanced posts of the enemy. On the twenty-fifth, the Commander-in-chief followed Dec. 24. ?-«• PERILOUS SITUATION OF THE ARMY. 59 General Hope with the reserve and two light chap.i. brigades. Lord Paget was ordered to remain "TTTjT" with the cavalry until the evening, and then to December, follow the reserve. Much difficulty was anticipated by Sir John Moore in crossing the Eslar, from the nvelting of the mountain snows ; but, on the twenty- Dec 26. sixth, Sir David Baird reached that river, and crossed it with trifling impediment. The other divisions of the army proceeded, without moles- tation, to Castro Gonzalo. At this moment the British army had become almost girdled by the enemy. From the twenty- aecmd to the twenty-fourCh, Soult had received strong reinforcements, and his army alone was already superior in number to the British. JuBOt, with the army liberaited by the Con- yention of Cintra, had advanced from Burgos to Piileneia, and threatened their right flank. Napoleon, in person, had set out from Madrid witii ali ^ke dis{>osabIe force in that quarter; and on the same day that the Tan of the British quit- ted Sahagnn, the advanced-guard of this army passed through Tordesillas, a town about fifty males distaut fi*om Benevente. The corps of Lefebvre had cha»ged the di- 60 NAPOLEON ATTEMPTS TO SURROUND THE BRITISH. CHAP. I. rection of its inarch, and was now advancing jgQg on Salamanca. The retreat of the British army Decemb«r. ^^ Portugal was til us cut off. The whole disposable force of the enemy, forming an irregular crescent, were thus advan- cing in radii on the British army, as a common centre. To cut off its retreat was now the chief object of Napoleon. Dec. 26. On the twenty-sixth an engagement took place between the British cavalry and that of the ene- my. Detachments from the army of Napoleon had been pushed on to Villalpando and Mayor- ga ; and in the neighbourhood of the latter place a considerable force of the enemy was observed to be drawn up on the acclivity of a hill, with the view apparently of cutting off any stragglers who might wander from the line of march. Two squadrons of the tenth hussars were instantly ordered to dislodge them. These, under the command of Colonel Leigh, rode gallantly up the hill, and by a successful charge drove back the French cavalry in confusion. In this affair many of the enemy were killed and wounded, and above one hundred made prisoners. On the same day the cavalry, the horse artillery, and a brigade of light infantry, halt- TIIE ARMY REACHES BENEVENTE. 61 ed at Castro Gonzalo ; and the divisions un- chap. i. der Generals Hope and Fraser marched to 1808. Benevente. On the twenty-seventh the rear- jv^ / guard crossed the Eslar, and followed the same route, having blown up the bridge. The hard- ships to which the army were now exposed, tended greatly to increase the general feeling of dissatisfaction at the measures of their leader. The route lay over miserable roads, and through an exhausted country. The weather was more than usually severe; heavy showers of rain and sleet drenched the soldiers to the skin, and it was not always that even at night they could procure shelter from the elements. — Turbulence and insubordination broke forth in the ranks. The soldiers, indignant at the Span- iards, who generally locked their doors on their approach, and concealed their little stock of pro- visions, were guilty of violence and robbery. These criminal excesses increased the evil. Hatred and disgust sprang up on both sides; and frequent scenes of bloodshed were the con- sequence. On the twenty-seventh of December the Dec. 27. column reached Benevente; and Sir John Moore issued a general order to the army, 62 INSUBORDINATION OP THE SOLDIERS. CHAP. I. characterizing its excesses in strong language. 1808 ^® expressed his deep regret that the army December, should have forfeited its former praise for ex- emplary conduct and discipline. The atroci- ties committed in Valderas, he declared to hare exceeded any thing he could have be- lieved of British soldiers. The situation of the army was such as to call for the display of qualities the most rare and valuable in a military body. These were not bravery a- lone, but patience and constancy under fatigue and hardship, obedience to command, sobriety, firmness, and resolution, in every situiition in which they might be placed. It was only by the ^play of soch qualities that the army could deserve the name of soldiers, — that they could be aWe to withstand the forces opposed to them, OP fulfil the expectations of their country. From Benevente, Sir John Moore despatched a courier to Romana. In the communication of whidi he was the bearer, Sir John informed the Marqfies that the enemy were in fiill advance, and that, on the preceding day, their main-body fiad reached Valladolid, only three marches to 1^ rear. " I sliall continue," he said, "my neveraent f a corps of Swiss, almost all of whom were killed or taken prisoners in a large building considerably in advance of the suburb. For several days all was quiet. The enemy Cavallero. ' were now aware that it was necessary to make a regular investment of the place ; and the works, in all quarters, were pushed on with vigour. The besieged on their part endeavoured by inces- sant labour to complete the works of defence ; 148 PALAFOX REFUSES TO SURRENDER. CHAP. III. batteries, were constructed to enfilade the prin- ' cipal approaches, the magazines were rendered Y^ \^j. bomb-proof, every outlet was palisaded and tra- versed; and, thus prepared, they waited with calm fortitude for the approaching struggle. Dec. ao. On the thirtieth. Marshal Moncey addressed a letter to Palafox, summoning him to surren- der the city, now entirely invested, and to spare the effusion of blood which must necessarily fol- low any further attempt at hopeless resistance. Moncey likewise informed him that Madrid had fallen ; and that Napoleon, at the head of a great army, was then in the act of chasing the English to their ships. To this Palafox replied, that if Madrid had fallen, Madrid had been sold. The works of Zaragoza were yet entire ; but, were they level- led with the ground, the people and the garrison would rather be buried in the ruins of their city, than disgraced by surrender. In the meanwhile, General Gazan succeeded in effecting the blockade of the suburb. One of his brigades extended on the right of the Zuera road, the other on the left to the bridge over the Gallego, on the road to Barcelona. On the THE SIEGE PROCEEDS. 149 right bank, Suchet held the ground comprised chap. hi. between the high* Ebro and the valley of the ^^^^ Huerba. Morlot's division occupied the valley. December. That of Meusnier was encamped on the heights of Torrero ; and the arc was continued to the low Ebro, by the division of Grandjean, whose right, by means of a bridge of boats, was in communication with Gazan. On the twenty-ninth, the trenches were re- Dec. 29. gularly opened against three points, viz. the Cha- teau of the Inquisition on the left, the bridge of the Huerba in the centre, and the convent of St. Joseph on the right. The last of these was the principal object of the enemy, because the works in rear were destitute of a rampart, and it was intended to connect the attack with a simul- taneous attempt to gain possession of the sub- urb. The garrison, however, were not idle. The communication between the Convent and the city could not be interrupted; and the gar- rison of the former, being daily relieved, made frequent sallies, by which the progress of the • To unmilitary readers it may be necessary to explain, that the high Ebro means the portion of the river above the city ; the low Ebro, that below it. 150 THE COMMAND ASSUMED BY MARSHAL JUNOT. CHAP. III. besiegers was materially retarded. On the thirty-first, a general sortie, supported by the December. ^^^^^ ^"^ ^^ ^^® P^**^^' ^^^ ™*^® against the enemy's line. Though gallantly supported, it was unattended by any successful result. The repeated attacks of the garrison were repulsed ; and, baffled in their efforts, they again entered the city. The loss on both sides was nearly equal. ,onn On the second of January, Moncey was su- Jan. 2. perseded by Marshal Junot in the command ol the besieging army. The latter was the bear- er of an order to Mortier, to move on Calatayud with Suchet's division, in order to keep open the communication with Madrid. This arrange- ment occasioned a material diminution of the besieging force, but no cessation of hostile ope- ration. The works against the Convent of St. Joseph went on, and between the third and sixth of January the second parallel was completed. Jan. 10. Till the tenth no action took place ; but on that day no less than eight batteries had been con- structed, and a tremendous fire from thirty guns was opened on the Convent. It was soon ren- dered untenable. But, amid the ruins, the gun- ners, covered by bags of wool, still continued to ATTACK ON THE CONVENT OF ST. JOSEPH. 151 1809. January* Jan* 11* exercise their vocation, and fired on the enemy, c hap, m tiU the waUs were nearly levelled with the ground. Even then the post was not relinquish- ed without a gallant effort. At midnight a sortie was made against one of the batteries, in ignorance that two guns had been planted for its protection. The intention of the brave assail- ants was thus defeated; and, having suffered heavy loss from a murderous fire, both in front and flank, they again retreated to the city. Even in the dilapidated condition of the Con- vent, it was not till the evening of the next day that the enemy attempted to carry it by assault. At the same time a party, having turned the Convent, succeeded, by means of a wooden bridge which the besieged had omitted to destroy, in effecting an entrance ; and thus did the French at length become masters of a heap of ruins, and of about an hundred gaUant men by whom they were defended. No sooner were the enemy in possession of St. Joseph, than they employed themselves in repairing the works, and completing the com- munication between the second and third par- allels, the latter of which they estabUshed on the right and left of the Convent. The garrison on 152 FEVER BREAKS OUT IN THE CITY. COMPLETION OF THE THIRD PARALLEL. 153 CHAP. Ill, that side were now compelled to remain within 1809 *^®^'' ^alls ; for the besiegers were secured against January, their efforts by the double obstacle of a river and an escarpment eight feet high. Jan. 15. ^^ *^c fifteenth, a second parallel was opened against the town ; and batteries were commenced in it, to enfilade the defences of the Augustine and Capuchin Convents, and that of Sta. Engra- cia. Yet neither the loss of their outworks, nor a tremendous bombardment, which the French kept up for several days, had the effect of dimin- ishing the ardour of the inhabitants. The Zara- gozans were not only actuated by that active and living energy which stimulates to deeds of high enterprize, but they possessed, likewise, that calm and passive fortitude, that buoyant upbear- ing of the spirit, which suff'ering cannot depress, nor misfortune overthrow. But their cup was not yet full. The inhabit- ants of the part of the city most injured by the bombardment, were driven into the other quar- ters, where many of them took up their abode in cellars, which afforded comparative security from the shells. The consequence was, that these dark and miserable receptacles became the focus of infectious fever. The disease spread rapidly 4 1 among a crowded and redundant population, chap. hi. Thus did death, on all hands, present itself to the unshrinking Zaragozans ; and the greater j^^^J^^ part preferred exposing themselves on the ram- parts, to breathing the infected air which per- vaded the dark and noisome retreats in which they had sought refuge. From the seventeenth to the twenty-first, the jan. 21. besiegers were occupied in the construction of new batteries to overcome the defences of the garrison ; and the third parallel was extended to command two sides of the Convent of Sta. En- gracia. In these circumstances, a sortie was made, in the hope of spiking the enemy's artil- lery. The fire of a battery of four mortars was found peculiarly annoying ; and eighty men, commanded by Don Mariano Galindo, volun- teered to attack it. They boldly precipitated themselves on the guard of the third parallel, put them to the sword, and succeeded in enter- ing the battery. At the same moment the ene- my's reserve came up. There was no retreat ; all perished except the officers and a few wound- ed soldiers, who were made prisoners. The movements of the numerous bodies of armed peasantry, in the surrounding country, g2 154- OPERATIONS OF LAZAN AND FRANCISCO PALAFOX. ALL THE OUTWORKS OF THE CITY TAKEN. 155 1809. CHAP. III. occasioned great inconvenience to the besiegers. Bands were formed on all hands ; which, though unable to resist the attack of disciplined troops, yet were sufficiently formidable to require per- petual vigilance, and numerous enough to nar- row the supplies of the besieging army, in a very important degree. On the left of the Ebro, the Marques de Lazan and Don Francis- co Palafox were advancing to the relief of the city. They occupied the country between Villa Franca, Licinia, and Zuera; and pushed for- ward parties to Caparoso to intercept the con- voys, and surround the division of Gazan. About this time, Napoleon, dissatisfied with the slow progress of the siege, sent Marshal Lannes to assume the command. This officer directed Mortier, with his division, to leave Calatayud> and to act on the left of the Ebro. Mortier at- tacked the force of Francisco Palafox, and suc- ceeded in dispersing it with very considerable loss. Lannes, in order to depress the hopes of the garrison of external assistance, addressed a lettel* to Palafox, communicating this circom- stance, and all the other disasters which had be- fallen the Spanish armies. Bat the mortifying intelligence thus conveyed did not shake the firmness of the undaunted leader. He rejected chap. hi. all compromise, and continued, with undiminish- ed vigour, to oppose every possible obstacle to ^^^^ the progress of the enemy. All the outworks of the place had now fallen, except the castle of the Inquisition, which had been subjected to no serious attack. The newly raised works of the Enceinte had been battered by fifty-five guns ; and, on the twenty-seventh, Jan. 27. three breaches were declared practicable. One was near an oil-mill, which stood without the walls of the place, though but little removed from them. The second was to the left of this, between the Convent of St. Joseph and the town. The third was in the Convent of Sta. Engracia. All these were attacked. At mid-day, a columa issued from the oil-mill, which had been occu- pied over-night, and, rapidly clearing the short distance which divided it from the wsdlsj entered the breach, unbroken by the heavy fire to which they were exposed, and the explosion of two Fougasses. Having reached the summit, the assailants found an interior retrenchment armed with two guns, which the garrison had unexpect- edly erected to obstruct their progress. They attempted, without success, to surmount this ob- U 156 THE FRENCH ATTACK THE CITY AT THREE POINTS. 157 CHAP, iii.stacle, under a shower of grape, musquetry, and grenades. Forced to retire, the besiegers took Januar^. advantage of the cover aflForded by the exploded Fougasses to effect a lodgment on the breach. The breach in face of St. Joseph presented fewer obstacles to be overcome. The column of attack having reached the summit, succeeded in occupying the opposite house, which the artillery in firing on the wall had laid open. The houses adjoining were then gained ; and on the right of the breach they found a gate which afforded another entrance into the town. Here, how- ever, their progress was arrested by a battery of the enemy, commanding a court which it was necessary to pass. On the left a double Capon- nier, which the garrison had used to communi- cate with St. Joseph's, was repaired and length- ened to the breach. The attack on Sta. Engracia was yet more suc- cessful. After a severe struggle the assailants gained the breach of the Convent, but in attempt- ing to advance further, they met a spirited re- pulse. Another effort was made, which termi- nated in their gaining possession of the building. The curtain leading from Sta. Engracia to the bridge of the Huerba was then enfiladed, and. 1809. January. taking the tete-de-pont in reverse, the enemy atcHAP. iii, once became masters of that important post. Here they were joined by fresh troops, and, pushing on within the curtain to the Convent of Mount Carmel, made an effort to gain posses- sion of it, which met with a repulse. From thence they advanced rapidly to the Capuchin Convent, putting forty artillery men, who con- stituted the whole of its garrison, to the sword. The assailants then established themselves along the rampart in order to guard the posts they had been successful in acquiring. A dreadful fire was soon opened on the be- siegers from the houses commanding the ram- part. From this they in vain sought shelter among the ruins of the half-demolished walls. Retreat became necessary, and the column was directed to retire on the Puerta del Carmen. The garrison, by a bold attack, regained possession of the Capuchin Convent; but two battalions coming up to reinforce the assailants, it was again taken, and maintained, though at a dear price, by the enemy. During the night a strong but unsuccessful effort was made by the besieged to regain pos- session of the Convents of Sta. Engracia and the 158 EFFORTS OF THE BESIEGED. ATTEMPT TO REGAIN THE CAPUCHIN CONVENT. 159 1809. January. CHAP. III. Capuchins. The results of these operatioiw were the loss to the besieged of fifteen guns and two hundred prisoners, and that the enemy gained footing in the city at two diflFerent points. The loss in killed and wounded, by the French accounts, was nearly equal on both sides. It amounted to about six hundred. The misfortunes of the Zaragozans were hourly accumulating. The Fever demon stalked through the city like a destroying angel, con- quering and to conquer. The number of dead per day amounted to three hundred and fifty, without including those who fell the more im- mediate victims of war. The hospitals were to© small to contain the host of patients, and the ne- cessary medicines were exhausted. The bury- ing grounds were choked with corpses ; and large pits were dug in the streets, into which avaUero. the dead were tossed indiscriminately. Heapt of bloated and putrescent bodies were piled be*- fore the churches, which were often struck by the shells ; and the maimed and ghastly carcsHM lay dispersed along the streets, a frightful speo tade of horror. Even under such evils the courage of the Zaragozans did not quaiL The city was now open to the invaders, and H 1809. January. the war as formerly was carried on in the streets chap. hi. and houses. Not one inch of ground was yield- ed by the besieged without a struggle ; and when finally driven from a building, they fre- quently, by a desperate ofi*ensive effort, recover- ed it ; and an equal resistance had again to be encountered by the assailants. Traverses were cmt around the portions of the city occupied by the enemy ; and at the sound of the tocsin, the garrison were always ready to rush to any quar- ter where hostilities had conunenced. Palafox, however, did not limit his efforts to obstructing the progress of the enemy ; he made vigorous efforts to recover the ground already lost, and drive the assailants from their stations. Two attempts were made to regain the Con- vent of the Capuchins. Both failed. A third more powerful effort was made on the thirty-first. Jan. Si. A breach was effected during the day, and at night the assault took place. The besieged ad- vanced with signal resolution towards the breach, but owing to a ditch sunk by the enemy it was found impossible to mount it. They then threw themselves on the door of the church, and en- deavoured to force it. In spite of the fire from 160 HEROISM OF THE WOMEN. 1809. January. CHAP. III. the windows, and the grenades showered from the steeple, they maintained their ground, forced the door ; but an epaulment within obstructed their progress ; and fresh troops being brought up by the enemy, the project was at length re- nounced. Priests and women bore part in these opera- tions. The former carried munitions, and gave ghostly succour to the dying, animating the sol- diers at once by their words and their example. The latter bore refreshments to their sons, or husbands, or fathers ; and sometimes when one of those dear relatives fell by their side, they seized his arms, determined to revenge his death or perish in the same glorious cause. In truth the contest lay between skill and enthu- siasm ; enthusiasm mingled indeed with super- stition of the grossest character, yet active, firm, vigorous, and unshrinking ; skill exerted in a struggle as unjust and degrading, as any by which the pages of history are contaminated and defaced. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the Feb. 1. garrison, the French gained ground. The first of February was marked by the capture of the C^^ Ai««. • -.^ SANTA ENGRACIA TAKEN. 161 Qonvents of St. Augustin and St. Monica. Hav-CHAP. in. ing been repelled in assaulting the breaches, the ,g^Q assailants sprung a mine, and by that means ef- February. fected an entrance, and took in reverse the works erected for their defence. A deadly struggle took place in the church. Every chapel, every column, every altar, became a point of de- fence, — the pavement was strewed with blood, and the aisles and nave of the church were cov- ered with the dead. During this terrific con- flict, the roof, shattered by bombs, fell in. Those who escaped, renewed the contest on the bodies of the dead and dying. The French were at length successful, and advancing on the Rua Quemada, gained possession of several houses. From these, however, they were eventually compelled to retreat. At the same time, an attack was made on the houses near Sta. Engracia. Two mines, one on the left, the other on the right, of the Convent, were sprung by the besiegers ; after which, two columns of Polish infantry succeeded in gaining possession of the ruins caused by the explosion. The loss of the besiegers was very considerable, and General Lacoste, commandant of engineers, was killed. He was an ofl&cer of 1^ M ' I 162 SLOW PROGRESS OP THE BESIEGERS. 1809. February. CHAP. Ill , great professional emioence, and untarnished character. During four days the besiegers were employed in constructing three gaUeries to cross the Rua Quemada. Two of these failed. By means of the third they succeeded in establishing them- selves in the ruins of a house which formed an angle of the Cozo, and of the Rua del Medio. A building, caUed the Escuelas Pias, commanded several traverses, made for the defence of the Cozo. Aware of the importance of this post, the assailants made several unsuccessful efforts to gain possession of it. They then attempted the adjoining houses ; but in this also they fail- ed. The system of blowing up the houses, now adopted, was favourable to the besieged; for the enemy, who established themselves on the ruins, were thus exposed to the fire of the sur- rounding buildings. In the meanwhile, the con- tinual succession of formidable and unforeseen obstacles, which presented themselves to the French soldiers, had considerably damped their ardour ; while the spirits of the besieged, who had to contend against famine, fever, and the French army, were yet unbroken. The inner town is encircled by the Cozo, CONVENT OF ST. FRANCISCO TAKEN. 163 which reaches at both extremities to the river , chap, iii , and the French, in order to connect their opera- ^^^^ tions with those of Gazan, on the left of the Ebro, February. determined, at all risks, to gain possession of it. The Convent of St. Francisco, therefore, became their immediate object. A mine was exploded, which brought down part of the building ; and a severe contest ensued, which lasted for two days. The Spaniards were at length driven out by the bayonet— the superiority of physical, as well as of numerical strength, being on the side of the assailants. From the tower of this building, the French now commanded the street, for a musket-shot on either side. There, however, their progress was for a time arrested. The buildings in the Cozo were large and massive ; and from their construction with roofs of arched masonry, nearly incombustible. Experience had perfect- ed the Zaragozans in their defensive warfare ; and the contest was continued with, if possible, augmented pertinacity. Three days were the French sappers successfully opposed in their en- deavours to cross the Cozo. The University was partially breached by the explosion of two small mines. The besiegers then endeavoured to i! w I™ 164 ATTACK ON THE SUBURB. IH CHAP. III. carry the building by assault ; but they were • met bv a fire so destructive as to compel them 1809. ^ P , to retreat. Hitherto the suburb on the left of the Ebro had been exempted from attack, since Gazan's failure on the first night of the investment. That officer, availing himself of some ambiguity in his orders, had declined to re-engage in active opera- tions ; nor was it till Lannes arrived, with au- thority to enforce his orders, that Gazan was in- duced to resume the oft*ensive. Feb. 7. On the seventh, the Convent of Jesus, on the left of the road to Lerida, was attacked. Trench- es were opened against it ; and twenty battering pieces having effected a breach, it was caiTied with little loss, the building not being consid- ered by the besieged as of material importance. The enemy then succeeded in establishing a lodgment to the right and left. Feb. 18. On the eighteenth, the suburb, after two un- successful efforts, was carried by assault. A tremendous fire from fifty guns soon laid open the way to the assailing columns. By mid-day a breach was effected in the Convent of St. Laz- arus, commanding the bridge ; and the defend- ers, after a strenuous resistance, were driven THE SUBURB IS CARRIED. 165 from the building. All communication between chap. hi. the suburb and the city was now cut off; and ^^^^ the French, immediately advancing to the river, February. intercepted the retreat of about fifteen hundred men, who, enfeebled by disease and suffering, were made prisoners. The capture of St. Laz- arus necessarily involved that of the suburb, which was without ammunition or provisions, yet many of its defenders continued to wage a fierce but hopeless war in the streets. Many crossed the bridge under a shower of bullets, and effected their escape to the city. Others succeeded in passing the river in boats. Alto- gether, the loss of the besieged amounted to a- bout two thousand. The brave Baron de Ver- sage, who commanded on the left bank of the Ebro, was killed. The loss of the suburb laid open to the enemy the only part of the town which had hitherto been exempted from direct attack. The be- siegers, imagining that the courage of the gar- rison had been abated by this irreparable mis- fortune, continued their operations with vigour. By means of mining, two enormous breaches were made in the University— both of which were at- tacked and carried; and the traverses of the 1 1 !| 166 CHAP. III. 1809. February. Feb. 19. PALAFOX IS SMITTEN WITH FEVER. Cozo were at length abandoned by the Spaniards. In the meantime, Palafox had been smitten with the dreadful disease, whose ravages had been more widely spread than even those of famine and the sword. This admirable and heroic leader, who, for above a month, had been una- ble to quit the vault where he lay stretched on a bed of suffering, at length saw the necessity of resigning the command. On the nineteenth, he transferred his authority to a Junta, of which Don Pedro Ric was ap- pointed president. A councU was immediately assembled to deliberate on the condition of the city, and the measures most proper to be adopt- ed. At this meeting it was stated, by the Gen- eral of cavalry, that only sixty-two horses re- mained, the rest having died of hunger. Of the infantry it appeared there were little more than two thousand eight hundred men fit for service. Ammunition was nearly exhausted; and should a shell penetrate the Inquisition, their only manufactory of powder would be de- gtroyed. The fortifications were stated, by the chief engineer, to have been almost utterly de- molished. There were neither men nor materi- als neceagary for repairing them ; and bags of RIC APPOINTED HIS SUCCESSOR. 167 1809. February. earth could no longer be formed from want of chap. hi. cloth. In order to ascertain the chances of external succour, the Duke de Villahermosa was sent to Palafox, to receive such information on the sub- ject as he might be able to communicate. But fever was raging in his brain, and he could com- municate nothing. His papers were examined ; but these only tended to increase the conviction, that no relief could reasonably be expected from without. With regard to the measures to be adopted, the Junta were divided in opinion. Twenty-six voted for capitulation; eight against it. The latter were averse to surrender, while even a possibility of succour remained. With proud gallantry of spirit the opinion of the minority was adopted by the Junta. A flag of truce was vithout discrimination of age, sex, or 1809. ^^^y- Terrified by the sight of such horrors, March, the people fled in crowds to the bridge, but were encountered there by showers of grape-shot and musquetry. Others endeavoured to cross in boats ; these, too, were fired on ; and above three thousand of the inhabitants were either drowned or shot in this quarter of the city. Altogether, the slaughter was very great, and would undoubtedly have been still greater, had not Marshal Soult exerted himself with honour- able zeal to put a stop to the excesses of his troops. Oporto, which had thus easily been occupied by the enemy, might, under a better organized system of defence, have opposed a very formid- able obstacle to the French armies. The gar- rison consisted of about twenty thousand men, and the city had recently been covered by a line of detached works, extending from the Douro to the sea, on which were mounted about two hundred pieces of artillery. But want of dis- cipline and subordination again proved fatal. Several of the superior officers, who endeavoured to restore obedience, were murdered by the sol- diers, under charge of treason. No further I 1809. March. efforts were made to regulate the defence, chap. iv. During two days an useless fire was kept up on the enemy, while busied in preparations for the assault. The soldiers acted on the impulse of individual courage, but without concert or obe- dience. Thus was it that the second city of the kingdom fell, almost without a struggle, into the hands of the enemy. But Soult, notwith- standing his success, did not deem it prudent to advance immediately on Lisbon. The hos- tility of the natives rendered the communica- tion between the French corps destined for the reduction of Portugal, at once difficult and pre- carious; and before quitting Oporto, he wish- ed to receive intelligence of the movements of Victor and Lapisse, the latter of whom, with a corps of five thousand men, was directed to threaten the frontier between the Douro and Almeida; and subsequently to join Victor whenever Soult should have advanced on the capital. No intelligence, however, of either of these leaders reached Oporto ; and Soult, a- verse to commit his army by any uncombined movement, applied himself to secure and con- ,-^^ I' 182 CHAVES RETAKEN BY SILVEIRA. ll CHAP. IV. cUiate the portion of the kingdom already orer- jgQQ ^"° ^y ^^s armies. March. ^^ ^^^ meanwhile, the division of native troops, under General Silveira, were not idle. Mar. S5. That General had succeeded in regaining pos- session of Chaves, and capturing about thirteen hundred of the garrison. He then made every effort to cut off the communication of the French army with Spain, by securing the bridge of Am- arante, and strengthening the line of the Tam- ega. The activity of Silveira, who succeeded in repulsing the enemy in several attacks, tend- ed greatly to raise the hopes of the Portuguese. The peasantry again took arms, and came in crowds to the field. Colonel Trant, who com- manded at Coimbra, took the field at the head of a body of militia and volunteers ; and Roma- na, who had received a reinforcement of three thousand men, already threatened the enemy's communications in Asturias. We must now turn to England. The disas- ters attendant on the retreat of Sir John Moore, and the wretched condition to which his army had been reduced, materially deranged the pro- jects of the British government. The troops « CONDUCT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. 183 1809. March. embarked at Corunna, instead of sailing direct chap. iv. for Lisbon or the south of Spain, had been under the necessity of returning to England, and the hope of successful resistance to the French power in the Peninsula had become more feeble in the minds of all. The British ministry, however, were not dis- heartened by the reverses of the preceding cam- paign. They served only to stimulate them to renewed exertions, and, at the close of Febru- ary, Sir Arthur Wellesley, then Chief Secretary for Ireland, resigned his ofiice and seat in Par- liament, to assume the command of the British forces in the Peninsula. It was determined to reinforce the army in Portugal ; and in March the expedition with Sir Arthur Wellesley sail- ed for Lisbon. His instructions were, in case that city should have been evacuated by Sir John Cradock, to proceed to Cadiz, and land there, if the government would consent to the admission of British troops into the garrison. The contemplated alternative, however, did not occur. Sir John Cradock had been engaged in preparations for the defence of the city ; and that officer, on being superseded by Sir Arthur Wel- lesley, was appointed governor of Gibraltar. \ I u 184 BATTLE OP CIUDAD REAL. 1809. March. t' CHAP. IV. In Spain, the current of events had been un- favourable to the patriots. In La Mancha, the Duke del Albuquerque had distinguished him- self in some affairs, of which the results would have been greater, but for the ill-judged inter- ference of Cartoajal, in whom the chief command was vested. The utter incompetence of this per- son was fully evinced at the battle of Ciudad Mar. 27. Real, where his army was completely routed by Sebastiani. In this engagement no strenuous re- sistance appears to have been made. The Span- iards were at once driven from their position in utter confusion. Three thousand of their num- ber were killed in the pursuit, and four thou- sand prisoners and eighteen guns were captured by the enemy. On the day following, a disaster still more fatal befell theEstramaduran army, under Cuesta. On the eighteenth, Victor had succeeded in forc- ing the defences of the Puente del Arzobisbo, and drove back the troops, which had been posted there, to Miravete. He then succeeded in re- establishing the bridge at Almaraz, which, owing to the cowardice or treachery of Henestrosa, who commanded at that point, was effected without diflSculty. Victor was thus enabled to pass over BATTLE OF MEDELLIN. 185 1809. March. his artillery, and collect his whole army at Trux- chap. iv. illo, where he gained possession of the mag- azines of the Spanish army. Cuesta, having retired to Santa Cruz, was re- inforced by a detachment of about four thousand men, under the Duke del Albuquerque, and at length determined to give battle. With this view, he took up a position near Medellin, forming his whole force in a single line, about a league in extent, without any reserve. The ground thus occupied, was singularly ill-chosen. It consisted of a wide and open plain, without cover of any kind ; and the same unhappy qua- lities which had distinguished Cuesta at Rio Seco, were again conspicuously displayed at Medellin. The Spanish army consisted of about twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry. The left wing was commanded by Henestrosa, which occupied ground somewhat higher than the rest of the position. The centre was com- manded by Don Francisco Trias ; the right by Don Francisco de E^uia. The cavalry were on the left, where the enemy presented the great- est force. The army of Victor, though infinitely superior Hi 186 BATTLE OF MEDELLIN : 1809. March. Mar. 28. CHAP^v..„ the qaality of the troops, .as somewhat '""" ""merically inferior. It consisted of about eighteen thousand foot and t.o thousand five hundred horse, and was formed in an arc, ex- tending between the Gaudiana and a cultivated raruie, which reaches from Medellin to the vil- lage of Mengabril. Victor placed his cavalry on the right, and the front was covered by six batteries, each of four guns. The action commenced by an attack on the Spanish centre, supported by a brigade of caval- ry. This was gallantly repulsed, and the Span- ish hue advancing, succeeded in taking one of the enemy's batteries on the left. The French left wmg gave way, and was followed with ef- fect for two hours. The cavalry was ably m». BOBuvred by General Lasalle, who retired slowly and having gained a favourable position, turned on the Spanish horse, and put them to the rout 1 he attack on the centre was then renewed, and the infantry disheartened gave way. Panic spread through the ranks, and the soldiers, cast- "ig away their arms, sought safety in flight. Every efl^ort of Cuesta to restore order proved abortive. The French foUowed up their .nc cess, giving no quarter in the pursuit. i ITS CONSEQUENCES. 187 il In this disastrous battle the loss of the Span- chap. iy. iards was very great. It has been stated at ,„ ^ twelve thousand killed, and seven or eight thou- March. sand prisoners; but this is probably an exaggera- tion. Nineteen pieces of cannon were taken by the French, whose loss in the action amounted, by their own account, to four thousand. Calamitous as the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real unquestionably were, neither the Supreme Junta nor the people were dishearten- ed by the misfortunes of their armies. The proceedings of the former evinced no symptom of alarm or despondency ; a vote of thanks was passed to Cuesta and his army ; and so little had that General declined in the opinion of his countrymen, that he speedily received the ap- pointment of Captain-General of the province. In the meanwhile, he retired to Almandrelejo, where he succeeded in collecting a force nearly as imposing as that with which he had encounter- ed the enemy at Medellin. I 11/ 188 ARRIVAL OF SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY. f III CHAPTER V. ATTACK AND CAPTURE OF OPORTO BY THE BRITISH. CHAP^. On the twenty-second of April, Sir Arthur 1809. ^^Wesley reached Lisbon, and was invested ApriL ^>t^ the supreme command in Portugal. From the period of that event a new era commences in the war. His appointment gave unity of ac- tion and purpose to the British and Portuguese forces, and at once put a stop to those unfortun- ate jealousies and distractions, which had already occurred but too frequently between the leaders of the allied armies. The forces of the enemy, against whom he was to act, were on the other hand divided. Soult had concerted with Victor a combined at- tack on the unconquered provinces of Portugal. The former was preparing to advance through Coimbra upon Lisbon, while Victor was to co- ATTACK ON THE BRIDGE OF AMARANTE. 189 1809. April. operate by marching from Alcantara on Abran- chap. v. tes, and, having secured that fortress, to continue his progress to the capital. Many delays occurred, however, in the ex- ecution of this project, which, had it been promptly carried into effect, must, in all proba- bility, have caused the embarkation of the Eng- lish army, and given a new aspect to the war. But Soult remained long inactive at Oporto, in- fluenced at once by the dread of committing his army by an unsupported operation, and by the increasing embarrassments of his position. The bridge of Amarante was in possession of the Portuguese, and thus his only line of communi- cation with Spain to the east had been cut off. A body of six thousand men, under Delaborde and Loison, were accordingly despatched with orders to g^n possession of the bridge, at any sacrifice. General Silveira was at Penafiel, from which town he withdrew on the approach of the enemy, and fell back to the Campo de Manhufe. On the two following days some skirmishing took place, and Silveira deemed it prudent to fall back to Amarante, and limit his efforts to defending the passage of the bridge. The town, which stands on a declivity on the right bank of the ^ 190 THE BRIDGE IS CARRIED BY THE FRENCH. PLAN OF SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY. 191 CHAP. V. Tamega, was instantly attacked and carried by ' the enemy. Every effort was then made to . .| * gain possession of the bridge ; but so firm was the resistance of the Portuguese troops, and so strong were the works by which it was defended, that the enemy were uniformly repulsed, and at length driven from the town. In this affair Lieut.-Colonel Patrick, an English officer, who had recently accepted a commission in the Por- tuguese service, was killed. On the day following, the French regained the town, and a fortified convent in front of the bridge. The Portuguese, however, still kept possession of the suburb on the other side of the river, and their batteries commanded the ap- proach. Delaborde, despairing of success from the heavy loss he had already sustained, had is- sued orders for the construction of a wooden bridge at some distance from the town ; but an officer of engineers, having proposed the con- struction of a mine, the experiment was tried with success. A breach was effected in the works, which the French infantry successfully assaulted ; and the cavalry, having crossed the river, drove the Portuguese from the suburb on the opposite bank. In these engagements the native troops behaved with distinguished gal- chap. v. lantry and resolution. 1809 The reader must now be aware of the general . ., * state of affairs in the Peninsula, when Sir Ar- thur Wellesley landed in Portugal. He at once perceived that the numerical superiority of the enemy was neutralized by the separation of their corps ; and while the movements of Lapisse and Victor were cautious and hesitating, he deter- mined, by a prompt and rapid advance, to attack Soult, and drive him from Oporto. This reso- lution was communicated to Cuesta, who was requested to content himself with keeping Vic- tor in check, until the return of the British from Oporto, when the two armies might act in combination on the south of the Tagus. In pursuance of the project thus ably con- ceived, a division, commanded by General Mac- kenzie, and a brigade of heavy cavalry under General Fane, were left at Abrantes, to watch the movements of Victor ; and the rest of the army was put in motion on Coimbra. In that city, the whole British force was assembled on the fifth of May ; and on the ninth it continued May 9, its advance. The division of General HiU was directed to embark at Aveira for Ovar, in order 192 HE 1V1 ARCHES ON OPORTO. RESOLVES TO CROSS THE DOURO. 193 CHAP. V. to take the enemy in flank, and force them back jgQg from the Vouga ; and Beresford, with a strong May. detachment, chiefly composed of Portuguese, moved upon Vizeu, to cut ofi* the retreat of Soult by Amarante. The main body proceeded by the direct route ; and on the tenth encounter- ed the enemy's advanced posts, which were May 11. driven back. On the day following, two divi- sions, strongly posted on the heights above Grijon, were dislodged from their position, and pursued with success till nightfall, when the British army halted with their advance, on the heights beyond Cavalleros, about two leagues from the Douro. During the night the enemy continued their retreat. In the meanwhile, the object of Sir Arthur Wellesley in these movements, could not be sup- posed to escape the penetration of Soult. He saw the danger of being speedily enclosed in the north of Portugal; and determined to extricate himself from the increasing perils of his position, by eva- cuating the country. Measures were accordingly adopted for this purpose. Preparations were instantly set on foot for removing the sick and the baggage ; and having destroyed the pontoon- bridge across the Douro, and given orders that 2 all the boats should be brought to the right chap. v. bank of the river, he imagined himself secure from immediate attack. He imagined, too, j^^ that Sir Arthur Wellesley would avail himself of his maritime resources, and embarking his troops, endeavour to efi^ect a landing near the mouth of the Douro. This would have allow- ed time for the leisurely retreat of the army ; and orders were despatched to Loison, requir- ing him to maintain his ground at ^[ezamfrio and Peza da Ragoa, in order to prevent the passage of the river being efl^ected at either of these points. Had the calculations of Soult been realized, with regard to his enemy's intentions, no ob- struction would have existed to his retreat into Gallicia ; or by advancing on Beresford with his whole force, he might have crossed into Beira. But Sir Arthur Wellesley had bolder measures in contemplation. He determined at once to cross the river, and drive the enemy from Oporto. With this view. General Murray was detached to Avintas, a ford about five miles higher up, where he was directed to cross the river with his brigade, and send down any boats which he might be able to procure. The brigade of VOL. II. I 194 TWO BOATS ARE PROCURED. THE DOURO IS PASSED. 195 CHAP. V. Guards, under General Sherhrooke, received jgQQ orders to cross the ferry below the city at Villa May. Nova. The main body, under his own imme- diate command, were to attempt a passage at the Convent of St. Augustino da Serra, which occupies a height nearly opposite to the town. The Douro was at that spot nearly three hun- dred yards broad, extremely rapid, with consid- erable heights on the right bank, and a large unfinished building designed for the Bishop's pa- lace, which could be made serviceable as a post of defence by those who first landed, till suflScient numbers should have crossed the river to enable them to advance on the town. To protect the passage, several guns had been planted in the garden of the Convent. May 12. By aid of the inhabitants, two boats had been procured from the opposite side of the river, and in these, three companies of the Buffs im- mediately passed the river. Other boats were speedily despatched by the zeal of the people ; and the embarkation of the troops was rapidly continued. General Paget was among the first detachment ; he immediately took possession of the unfinished building already mention- ed, and defended it with great gallantry, till the arrival of the forty-eighth, sixty-sixth, and a chap. v. Portuguese battalion, when the contest was con- ~~~ , 1809. tinned on more equal terms. Early m the en- ^^ gagement General Paget lost an arm, and the command devolved on General Hill, who was still warmly contesting the ground, when the brigade of Guards and the twenty-ninth regi- ment appeared on the enemy's right ; and in the opposite direction the troops were seen ap- proaching from Avintas. Under these circumstances, the enemy*s co- lumns fell back in confusion. The British charged up the streets of Oporto, making many prisoners, amid the most animated demonstra- tions of joyful welcome from the inhabitants. Handkerchiefs were waved from the balconies and windows, — blessings were breathed on the brave deliverers of the city, mingled, on all hands, with shouts of joyful and triumphant greeting. Confusion and disorder had spread through the whole French army. The panic seemed even to increase when they gained the open country ; and Major Harvey, with a single squadron of the fourteenth dragoons, charged through three battalions of French infantry, 196 THE FRENCH ARE DRIVEN FROM OPORTO. 1809. May. CHAP. V. marching in a hollow road, and brought off many prisoners, without sustaining any consid- erable loss. Unfortunately, however, it was found impos- sible to take full advantage of the panic of the enemy, by continuing the pursuit. The army were without supplies of any kind ; the rapidity of the advance from Coimbra having outstripped the most active exertions of the commissariat. The fatigue the troops had un- dergone rendered repose necessary; and the pursuit was, therefore, relinquished at the ap- proach of evening. Had these obstacles not intervened, there can be little doubt that the whole army of Marshal Soult would have been destroyed. As it was, however, nothing could exceed the boldness and the brilliance of the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley. The Douro had been passed in open day, in the very face of a power- ful enemy. One of the ablest and most ex- perienced of the French Marshals had been taken by surprise, and his army driven from O- porto, with the loss of its sick and wounded, of a great part of its baggage, and of a consider- able number of guns. THE MOVEMENTS OF SOULT. 197 In truth, the very boldness and danger of the chap. v. attempt contributed to its success. British Gen- erals had acquired the reputation of being cau- j^j^ tious, and averse from that daring policy which seeks great achievement through great hazard. So little, indeed, did the enemy contemplate even the possibility of Sir Arthur Wellesley at- tempting the passage of the Douro, that when a chef de bataillon gave notice that the Eng- lish were passing, his assertion was disregard- ed. Nor did Marshal Soult receive intelligence of the event, till General Foy, who was severely wounded in the action, from the height opposite to the Convent, observed the troops actually crossing, and the Portuguese making signals to them from the walls. Never was so complete a victory obtained at a smaller expense of life on the part of the victors. The loss of the English army amounted only to twenty-three men killed, and ninety-eight wounded. Driven from Oporto, Soult's first object was to effect a junction with Loison, and retire through Amarante on Zamora. But at Pena- fiel he learned that Beresford, having effected a junction with Silveira, had dislodged Loison from his position on the Tamega, and thus sue- 198 SOULT SACRIFICES HIS ARTILLERY, AND CHAP. V. ceeded in cutting off his intended line of retreat. IQQQ The situation of Soult was now in the highest May. degree precarious ; and, marching hastily on Bra- ga, he directed Loison to retire in that direc- tion. At Guimaraens, Soult learned that the Eng- lish army were endeavouring, by forced march- es, to reach Braga before him, and thus cut off his retreat on Gallicia. Pressed on all sides, by hourly-increasing diflSculties, Soult promptly de- termined to sacrifice his artillery, his baggage, and even his military chest, and escape by paths across the mountains impassable for a regular army. In the meanwhile, Beresford had directed his May 16. march on Chaves, to intercept the enemy in that quarter, while the British pushed forward on the other roads. At Salamonde a skirmish took place with the rear-guard of the French, and some prisoners were made. Soult contin- ued his retreat with unrelenting rapidity along the main road, to a point where a footpath, branching off to the left, enabled him to avoid Chaves, where the Portuguese waited his ap- proach. Though it was impossible for Sir Arthur Wel- ESCAPES BY MOUNTAIN PATHS. 199 1809. May. lesley to come up with an enemy, who, for the chap. v. sake of rapid movement, had sacrificed every- thing which constitutes an army ; yet the French army, during the whole retreat, was subject- ed to very serious losses, by the armed pea- sants of the country. Masses of the people con- tinually hovered on their flanks, and fired on them from every favourable position. A body of peasants, on the seventeenth, were endeavouring May i^. to destroy the bridge of Saltador, which crosses the Cabado, when the advanced-guard of the French came up. They were driven back with facility ; and the army was proceeding on its march, when the sound of cannon was heard from the rear, and panic instantly spread through the whole column. The cry arose that the British were at hand. The cavalry pushed on through the ranks of the infantry, increasing the confusion. All were anxious to pass the bridge to escape from the approaching enemy. The army became a vast mob. The greater part threw away their arms, and everything which could encumber their movements. Many were pre- cipitated into the torrent and drowned, — and many also were slain by the peasants, who con- 200 TERMINATION OF THE PURSUIT. CHAP. V . tinued firing from the rocks. All the haggage, 1809. ^^^^^ ^^^ escaped destruction at Guimaraens, May. was here lost. In this lamentable and disgraceful state, the French army continued its march along foot- paths, frequently indented by the furrows of mountain torrents, and obstructed by masses of rock which the cavalry found great difficulty May 17. in surmounting, and at night reached Monte- legre, a town about a league distant from the Gallician frontier. Here Soult discovered that the rapidity of his movements had been barely 8uffi(;ient to secure his escape. The fires of the Portuguese were seen on the mountains, in the direction of Chaves ; and leaving the cavalry to protect the rear from attack, Soult, after a few hours' halt, pushed forward across the frontier in the direction of Orense. Here the pursuit terminated. Other and more important objects claimed the attention of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the south ; and the ar- my, by leisurely marches, retraced its steps. Thus terminated this brief but glorious cam- paign. It comprised but a period of ten days ; yet how much of honourable achievement is com- prised within that narrow space ! The liberation "saemtKOimmm OBSERVATIONS. 201 of Portugal had been effected. The enemy had chap. v. been chased from its frontier with the loss of 1809 their sick, baggage, and artillery; and Soult, ^j with his dispirited, disorganized, and fugitive band, was forced to seek refuge in the very pro- vince from which, but a few months before, he had witnessed the disastrous embarkation of a British army. Though the operationsof Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the first moment when he put his army in motion on Oporto, are worthy of all admiration, they can scarcely with safety be considered as a precedent for future generals. To pass, in open day, a river so broad, so deep, and so rapid as the Douro, by means of a few boats, and in presence of a powerful enemy, must be held one of those felicitous violations of military rule, which it occasionally belongs to genius to make^ but which men of more limited powers can scarcely hope to imitate with success. The power of detecting at a glance the moment when the ordinary rules of art may be happily disregarded, is the exclusive attribute of a bold, original, and powerful mind. Yet the triumph of Oporto is not more attributable to the skill • and promptitude of Wellesley, than to the ne- 202 OBSERVATIONS. CHAP. V. gligence of his opponent. That Marshal Soult 2gQ9 should have suffered himself to he taken by sur- May. prise, and that the requisite precautions were not adopted for the safety of his army, must remain a blot on his military reputation. From the commencement of his retreat, however, all his operations are marked by talent and deci- sion. A commander of lower qualities would probably have sunk under the difficulties by which he was environed ; Soult rose and over- topped them. He unhesitatingly adopted the only measure by which his army could be res- cued from their danger; and by the prompt sacrifice of his artillery and baggage he suc- ceeded in evading his pursuers. I H CAPTURE OF VIGO. 203 1809. March. CHAPTER VI. OPERATIONS IN GALLICIA AND CATALONIA. The expulsion of the enemy from Portugal chap. vi. was followed up by successes almost of equal magnitude in Gallicia. Soult had no sooner entered Portugal, than Romana, who had succeeded in recruiting a considerable force, put himself in motion against the corps of Ney. Towards the end of March Mar. 27. a force, under Murillo, with a body of Por- tuguese, invested Vigo ; and with the assist- ance of a British frigate, succeeded in for- cing the garrison to surrender. It amounted to thirteen hundred men. On the day following, Mar. 28. a French battalion, that approached the town in ignorance of its surrender, was attacked, and nearly the whole of its number perished. Roma- ii< im I ■MM* ii 1 204 ROM AN A ENTERS ASTURIAS. CHAP. VI. na likewise, by a successful movement, surprised jgQg a body of the enemy in Villa Franca ; and two bat- April, talions, which attempted to maintain the palace Apr. 17. of the Duke of Alva, were made prisoners. He then crossed into Asturias ; and, leaving hig army under the command of Don Nicholas Mahy, he proceeded in person to Oviedo, for the purpose of dissolving the Junta, whose imbecili- ty had become apparent, and appointing a coun- cil more competent to the administration of affairs. On learning this movement, a scheme of combined operations was concerted by Marshal Ney and the French commanders in Leon, for the purpose of surrounding him. The former had assembled about twelve thousand men at Lu- go, and entered Asturias by routes almost im- passable, in expectation of surprising the Spanish army. General Bonnet, at the same time, ad- vanced along the coast from the East ; and Kel- lerman, with about six thousand men, entered by Pajares. The scheme, however well concerted, did not succeed. Mahy, fortunately apprised in time of the enemy's approach, retired into Gallicia. The French then advanced on Oviedo, occupying all MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMIES. 205 I* 1809. May. the avenues to that city, with the view of securing chap. vi. the person of Romana. That leader, however, succeeded in effecting his escape, and reached Gijon, where he embarked for Gallicia. Some skirmishes took place between the As- turian troops, under Ballasteros, and the French, in the course of which the city of St. Andero was taken, and almost immediately retaken, with considerable loss on both sides. In the meanwhile, Mahy, with the Gallician army, had made a rapid march on Lugo. Some skirmishes took place between the garrison and the besiegers, which terminated in favour of the latter ; and the place would probably have fall- en, had not Soult unexpectedly appeared with May 22. his army, and compelled the Spaniards to retire. Alarmed by these indications of nascent vi- gour in his opponents, Ney resolved to attempt the re-capture of Vigo, and then forming a junc- tion with Soult's force at Orense, to endeavour by a combined attack to effect the destruction of Romana's army. With this intention, he mov- ed on Santiago, with eight thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse. On his approach, a corps of Romana's army, under General Noronha, fell back on Caldas and Ponte- ■r- 1- ..A. 206 NBY AND SOULT RETIRE FROM OALLICIA. 1809. June. June 8. CHAP. vr. vrada, where they passed the river Sotoraayor, and formed on the other side, having previously destroyed the bridge at St. Payo. Daring the whole of the seventh of June, the French made vigorous efforts to effect the passage of the river, but their attempts uniformly encounter- ed repulse. The attack on the bridge was re- newed on the day following, but with similar success ; and Ney, at length, found himself com- pelled to retreat, under circumstances which not only precluded his proposed junction with Soult, but rendered it necessary to take measures for the evacuation of Gallicia. Accordingly, on the twenty-first, Ney gave up Corunna and Ferrol, and retired from the province through Lugo, Villa Franca, and As- torga. Soult had not been more successful. Though almost daily within sight of Romana's army, the superior activity of his opponent, and his more accurate knowledge of the country, defeated all his efforts to bring him to battle. With an army harassed and exhausted by three weeks of incessant marching, Soult at length gave up his June 24. abortive pursuit, and retreated to Sanabria, where having recruited the worn strength of June 21. OCCURRENCES IN CATALONIA. 207 his soldiers, he proceeded to Zamora, in order chap. vi. to co-operate with the other armies. "l809~ We shall now give a brief sketch of the oc- pg^ruary. currences in Catalonia. General Reding, who commanded in that pro- vince, had wisely determined to confine his efforts to the maintenance of a desultory war- fare, without risking his army by a general en- gagement. Vigorous measures were adopted for the embodying of new levies, and every fifth man in the province was called on to bear arms. The French army having exhausted the re- sources of the country, was obliged to quit its position at Martorel and Villa Franca, and draw nearer to Tarragona. Had Reding adhered to the prudent line of policy which his judgment dictated, there is little reason to doubt its being eventually crowned with success. But the popular voice was against it. The people were anxious for more imme- diate and striking results than could be expected to follow the more sure and cautious policy of their leader. Against his better judgment, therefore, Red- ing consented to embark the army in a scheme for surprising Barcelona. A line of posts was 208 lOUALADA TAKEN BY THE FRENCH. Feb. 16. OHAP^i. taken up, extending from Martorel through the 1809. ^^^ ^® ^*- Christina to Tarragona ; the head- February, quarters of the whole, under Don Juan de Cas- tro, being established at Igualada. The project, however, was soon frustrated. The intention of the Spanish leader was antici- pated by St. Cyr, who, on the sixteenth of February, when a general movement was about to be commenced, attacked the left of their line, which had been too much extended, and drove it back on Igualada, where large magazines had been most imprudently collected. These were taken by the enemy. The Spanish army, hav- ing neglected to occupy the road Llaecuna in sufficient strength, were attacked in rear, and fell back, dispiiited and in confusion, in the di- rection of Cervera, Cardona, and Manresa. In consequence of this disaster, Castro was removed from the command, and subsequently disgraced his character by entering the service of the intruder. No sooner did Reding receive inteUigence of the defeat of Castro, than he determined to col- lect the scattered troops, and conduct them to Tarragona. Accordingly, with a Swiss bat- talion, three hundred horse, and six pieces of MOVEMENTS OF REDING. 209 light artillery, he set out, on the twentieth of chap, vi, February, to execute his important mission. ^^^^ He was speedily joined by the troops which February. were retreating from the Col de St. Christina, and by a body of twelve hundred men, who, after bravely defending themselves in the Mon- astery of Santa Cruz, had succeeded in cutting their way through the enemy. He then pro- ceeded to St. Colonna de Queralt, where he ef- fected a junction with Castro, by which his army was augmented to about ten thousand men. At this moment, however. Reding received intelligence tliat Vails was already occupied by the enemy, with a view of intercepting his re- treat. Had Redmg then moved on Igualada, and subsequently on Montbuy, as St. Cyr was apprehensive he might, the French detachment at the former place, would probably have been cut oflF. But measures of promptitude and vi- gour were alien to the character of Reding. A council of war was held, by which it was decided that the army should proceed to Montblanch, where they arrived on the twenty-third. During Feb. 23. the day, a reconnoitring party of the enemy had been observed in their rear ; and thus certain iri 210 BATTLE OP VALLS. CHAP. VI. that their motions were known to the enemy, a 1809 second council of war was held, at which it wag February. : # ■ m » mi» m U»*i ta.^— Aug. 3. SIR A. WELLESLEY ADVANCES TO ATTACK HIM. CHAP.vii .era]s, that the British army should immediately 1809. ™*^<^^ to »"ack Soult, and that Cuesta should re- July, main in the position of Talavera, to protect this movement from any operation of Victor. The ' wounded likewise were to be left in charge of Cuesta, who declared himself delighted with this mark of confidence, and promised, that, if by any chance a retrogressive movement should be- come necessary, his first care would be the safety of the British committed to his protection. On the morning of the third of August, the British accordingly commenced their march on Oropesa. On his arrival there. Sir Arthur Wellesley received intelligence that Soult was already at Naval Moral, thus cutting off the communication with Almaraz, at which place he was informed the Spaniards, in their retreat from Banos, had crossed the river, and destroy- ed the bridge. The information thus brought, did not, how- ever, change his intention of advancing against Soult, and bringing him to battle. But, shortly after, a courier arrived from Cuesta, announcing, that, as the enemy were stated to be advancing on his flank, and as it was ascertained that the corps of Ney and Mortier had been united un- CUESTA QUITS HIS POSITION AND FOLLOWS. 247 1809. Augutt. der Soult, he had determined on quitting his chap. vir. position, and joining the British army at Orope- sa. This movement was executed the same night; and nearly the whole of the British wounded were left unprotected in the town of Talavera. The conduct of Cuesta, in this precipitate re- treat, is altogether indefensible. He had sud- denly abandoned the position intrusted to him, without any urgent necessity ; for it subsequently appeared that Victor was then at some distance, and not engaged in any movement on the Spanish army. Nothing indeed but the presence of a superior force, and the impossibility of provid- ing for their safety, could justify his relinquish- ing the British wounded. The distance which separated the allied armies was only five leagues, and in the course of a few hours he could have exchanged communications with Sir Arthur Wel- lesley. But Cuesta, acting on bis first impulse, put his army at once in motion ; and, so regard- less was he of the sacred trust which had been confided to him, that he allotted but seven waggons for the transport of the wounded. By indefatigable exertion, and by the sacrifice of much baggage. Sir Arthur Wellesley succeeded 248 THE BRITISH ARMY CROSSES THE TAOUS, 1809. August. CHAP. VII. in procuring about forty more, by which the greater number of the sufferers were rescued. In quitting the position of Talavera, Cuesta had abandoned the only situation in which the advance of Victor on the British rear could be resisted with any prospect of success. By this unexpected movement, the whole circumstances of the armies had been changed. Whether, had Cuesta remained faithful to his engagement, the projected scheme of operations was likely to be crowned with success, is a speculative question, on the discussion of which we shall not enter. This at least is certain, that by the vacillation of the Spanish leader the whole calculations of Sir Arthur Wellesley were at once overthrown. With a powerful enemy, both in front and rear, who, by a combination of movements, might bring an overwhelming force against him, one course only remained. The bridge of Almaraz had been destroyed, and Sir Arthur determined to throw his army across the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobisbo, which the retreat of Cuesta had left open to the enemy. Before quitting Oropesa on the morning of the fourth, Sir Arthur Wellesley had an inter- view with Cuesta, and represented to him that, Aug. 4. AT THE BRIDGE OF ARZOBISBO. 249 1809. August. situated as the armies then were, the only pni- chap.vii. dent measure was to take up the line of the Ta- gus, and, in a strong defensive position, to await the collection of stores, and the occurrence of more favourable prospects. But the Spaniard, who, but the day before, had been driven by his fears to a precipitate retreat, now felt his cour- age restored by the presence of the British, and vehemently urged the propriety of giving battle to the enemy. He refused to accede to the proposal of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who tired with combating the reasons of so shallow and obstinate an opponent, at length thought it ne- cessary to state, that whatever course the Span- ish leader might pursue, he certainly would not expose the army under his orders to foolish and unprofitable hazard. On the conclusion of the conference, orders were accordingly given for the march of the British, who on the same day crossed the Tagus at Arzobisbo. On the fifth, the army pursued its march through a country of extreme difficulty, and halted in the neighbourhood of Valdela Casa. On the seventh it reached Deleytosa, where a halt was found necessary, in order to refresh the troops, whose sufferings had been very great, l2 Aug. 5. 250 SPANIARDS DEFEATED AT ARZOBISBO. 1809. August. CHAP. VII. from the extreme heat of the weather, insaffi- cient nourishment, and the miserable condition of the roads. On the same day, Victor entered Talavera, where he behaved with the utmost humanity and kindness to the wounded British. Joseph, when it was ascertained that Sir Arthur Wellesley had crossed the Tagus, went to Aranjuez. Mortier and Soult marched on Arzobisbo, and Ney on Almaraz, with the view of cutting off the retreat of the Allies. But this object was defeated by the precaution of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had posted the division of General Crawford to prevent the passage of the river. In the meanwhile, Cuesta had followed the Bri- tish in their retreat to the bridge of Arzobisbo, and leaving the Duke del Albuquerque with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to defend it, he withdrew the remainder of his army to Paraleda de Garben. The French, however, having taken post on the opposite side of the river, soon succeeded in discover- ing a ford by which they crossed, and surprising the Spaniards, drove them at once from the works, with the loss of thirty pieces of can- non. After this, Cuesta with his whole forcQ > PROJECT OF SOULT. 251 1809. August. fell back on Deleytosa, while the British moved chap.vii. to Xaraicejo. Frustrated in his hopes of passing the Tagus at Almaraz, which would have placed the allies in a situation of great danger, Soult was desir- ous of again uniting the corps of Ney and Mor- tier to his own ; and, by a rapid march, to in- terpose his army between those of Wellesley and Beresford, while two divisions of the corps of Victor should guard the passages of the Tagus from Talavera to Almaraz. Soult then pro- posed to push on to Abrantes ; and having gain- ed possession of that important stronghold, to advance on Lisbon, entertaining little doubt of the immediate submission of the capital. This plan, however, did not meet the appro- bation of Jourdan. The corps of Ney was order- ed to Salamanca, in the neighbourhood of which the Spaniards, under the Duke del Parque, were actively engaged in the prosecution of a desultory war. Soult himself, was directed to remain at Placentia, and to leave the corps of Mortier to guard the Tagus. Meanwhile, Sir Robert Wilson, who, at Escalona, found himself cut off by the enemy from Arzobisbo, moved rapidly to. his right, 252 VANEGAS DEFEATED AT AOIONACID. » CHAP. VII. crossed the Tietar, and scrambling over the jQ^Q mountains, gained with difficulty the pass of August. B^nos, at the very moment when the corps of Ney was discovered to be approaching on its march from Placentia to the North. Sir Robert Wilson, with his usual enterprize and gallantry, determined to make an effort to de- fend the pass ; but, after a spirited resistance of several hours, the superior numbers of the enemy prevailed, and the Lusitanian legion was dislodged with great slaughter, and its fugitive remnant with difficulty escaped to Cas- tello Branco. Vanegas, after relinquishing his attempt on Toledo, remained with his army in the neigh- Aug. 6. bourhood of Aranjnez. On the fifth of August, he succeeded in gaining a decided advantage over an advanced division of the enemy On learning the retreat of Cuesta, he subsequent- ly fell back to Madrilejos, and opened a com- munication with that General, who directed him on no account to risk an action, but to remain prepared to combine his movements with those of the allied armies. But be- tween Cuesta and the Supreme Junta there was no unity of purpose; and harassed by SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY FALLS BACK ON BADAJOS. 253 inconsistent orders, Vanegas was unfortunate- chap. vii. ly induced again to advance, and give battle ' to the corps of Sebastiani at Almonacid. This . ^ Augu St. engagement, though many of the Spanish troops Aug. ii. behaved with great gallantry, terminated in the complete defeat of the army of Vane- gas. It was driven to the Sierra Morena, with the loss of all its baggage and artil- lery. With this action terminated the campaign which had been undertaken for the relief of Madrid, and the expulsion of the enemy from the central provinces of Spain. The British army at Xaraicejo, still served as a shield to the south- ern provinces, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, (whom the gratitude of his country had now ennobled,) considered it of importance to maintain the po- sition hfi then occupied. But the total failure of supplies rendered this impossible, and about the twentieth of August he fell back through Aug. so. Merida on Badajos, in the neighbourhood of which he established his army. At this period all operations in concert ceased between the English and Spanish armies. The Supreme Junta complained bitterly of the re- treat of the former, which left the road to Se- I I' 254 TERMINATION OF THE CAMPAIGN. 1809. August. CHAP. VII. ville and Cadiz open to the enemy, while the Marquis Wellesley, then amhassador in Spain, made strong representations of the privations to which the British army had been exposed, by the inattention and neglect of the authorities. In the correspondence which ensued, it appeared that the measure of retreat had been forced on Lord Wellington, by the absolute impossibility of supporting his army in the ground he occupied ; and that so far from shewing a contemptuous dis- regard of the wishes of the Junta, it was in com- pliance with their earnest entreaty that he had retained his army in the neighbourhood of Ba- dajos, notwithstanding the well-known unhealth- iness of the situation. By these unpleasant discussions however, a spirit of temporary estrangement was generated between the nations, and jealousies were excited which could not fail to operate injuriously on the interests of the common cause. Thus ended the campaign. Of its policy we shall say little, because, in truth, little remains to be said. The calculations of the allied Generals ap- pear throughout to have been founded on prin- ciples radically vicious, and it seems impossible that any permanent and important benefit could, OBSERVATIONS ON ITS POLICY. 255 1809. under the most favourable circumstances, have chap.vil resulted from the execution of a project so rash and precarious. Fortunately there was no con- cert in the operations of the adverse Gene- rals. The battle of Talavera was fought by the enemy, in utter recklessness and ignorance of the advantages they possessed. Had Lord Wellington been induced to proceed another march towards Madrid, and had the advance of Soult been accelerated by a single day, the re- treat of the British army would have been cut off, and the most fatal consequences must have ensued. In all the details of the campaign, however, abstracted from the error of its general concep- tion, we find the same skill, promptitude, and unhesitating self-reliance, by which the character of Lord Wellington has been uniformly marked. The ground which he selected to receive the enemy's attack was admirably chosen. His ma- noeuvres during the battle were those of a great general, at once perceiving and preserving the full advantages of his situation. His subsequent determination of attacking Soult, while Cuesta should keep Victor in check, was one which could have originated only in a mind of the * 256 OBSERVATIONS. 1809. CHAP. VII. highest energy and vigour. All these things are admirable ; yet it may be safely asserted, that but a small part of Lord Wellington's mil- itary reputation, will be found eventually to rest on the campaign of Talavera. ' CHARACTER OF CUESTA. 257 1809. CHAPTER VIII. OPERATIONS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. The utter incapacity of Cuesta had been chap. viii strongly represented to the Spanish govern- ment, and that officer was at length removed from his command. He was a man of strong passions and of narrow mind, who too often mistook rashness for courage, obstinacy for firmness, and procrastination for prudence. Buoyed up under every reverse by the most overweening self-confidence, he was disquali- fied, by narrow bigotry of opinion, from pro- fiting even by the dear-bought lessons of expe- rience. His measures uniformly failed, because they were uniformly adopted on the dictates of temporary impulse, rather than of any patient calculation of probabilities. Yet with all his defects, Cuesta was a man of upright intentions 258 CUESTA SUPERSEDED BY EGUIA. POSITION OF THE ARMIES. 259 CHAP. VIII and untarnished honour. While too many of jQQQ his associates were disposed to truckle to the October, usurper, Cuesta trod steadily in the path of pa- triotism and honour. He adhered to the cause of his country through every misfortune ; and the sincerity of the zeal with which he laboured to promote its success, has never, we believe, been questioned by friend or enemy. On the retirement of Cuesta, the command of his army was assumed by General Eguia, who, in conjunction with Vane'gas, could bring into the field an army of about fifty thousand men. Blake, after his defeat at Belchite, had only been able to re-assemble a corps of about six thousand men, with which his main object was to relieve Gerona. There were in Gallicia a- bout fifteen thousand men, under Noronha, but without cavalry or artillery. The Duke del Parque had nine thousand, at Ciudad Rodrigo. Such was the disposition and strength of the Spanish armies. The disposable force of the French amounted to about one hundred and twenty-five thousand men, exclusive of garri- sons. Of these about thirty-five thousand were occupied in Arragon and Catalonia ; the remain- der were in the two Castilles and Estramadura. 1609. October. Ney's head-quarters were at Salamanca; and chap. viii part of his corps was stationed at Ledesma and Alba de Tormes. Soult's were at Placentia; and he occupied Coria, Galesteo, and the banks of the Tietar and the Tagus, to the bridge of Arzobisbo. The corps of Mortier was at Tala- vera, Oropesa, and Naval Moral. Victor's head- quarters were at Toledo, his advanced posts at Daymiel. The corps of Sebastiani extended from Aranjuez to Alcala. Marshal Jourdan had been recalled, and Soult appointed Major- General of the armies. This appointment gave offence to Ney, who, in consequence, solicited leave to quit the army; and the command of his corps was assumed by General Marchand. It was in this state of things, when the enemy had a force of above seventy thousand men im- mediately disposable for its defence, that the Jun- ta adopted the insane project of advancing on Madrid, with the armies of Vanegas and Eguia. The former leader had been superseded by Gene- ral Arisaigo, a very young man, without talent or experience ; and to this person the command of this perilous enterprize was entrusted. In Ari- saigo the Supreme Junta calculated on finding a submissive instrument of their schemes ; and by ■4) i a t"".jv wiMiaiw— I «fSamm»4 260 ARISAIGO ADVANCES ON MADRID. BATTLE OF OCANA. 261 Hi II CHAP. VIII theie wretched calculators it waa thought possi- "TTTT" ble, by a rapid advance, to gain possession of the November, cap^tal, and thus to strike a signal blow, by which the grasp of the invader would at once be loos- ened. Without any communication with Lord Wel- lington, therefore, and without concerting any combined movement with the other armies, Arisaigo put his force in motion against the cap- ital. The French were unprepared for the sud- denness of this advance ; and Latour Maubourg, who commanded a considerable body of horse at Madrilejos, on learning that the Spaniards were entering the town, with difficulty effected his escape. The Spanish army were successful in several skirmishes ; and on the sixteenth of Nov. 16. November Arisaigo reached Santa Cruz de la Zorza, where he encamped his army on the heights. On receiving intelligence of this movement, Joseph Buonaparte immediately advanced with the main body of his forces to bring the enemy to battle. In order to deceive the Spanish General, the French at first made demonstrations of acting only on the defen- sive ; but Arisaigo, learning that a large force had assembled at Toledo, on his flank, became chap.viii alarmed at the peril of his situation, and marched 1809. towards Ocana, in order to occupy the great j^ / road from Seville to Aranjuez. In the neigh- bourhood of that town he was attacked on the day following, by the army under Joseph. Arisaigo waited his approach in a position of which the town of Ocana formed the centre. The country being flat, his wings were without support, the right terminating in an olive-grove, the left extending across the road from Aran- juez. The town was covered by a ravine which ran along its front. The artillery, consisting of about sixty pieces, was chiefly disposed in bat- teries on the right and left ; and the cavalry were formed in a body, a little in advance of the right flank. The second line was posted so near to the first, that, in case of the latter being thrown into disorder, there was no room for it to rally. About ten o'clock the French commenced their attack. A column, under Greneral Leval, supported by artillery, advanced on the right flank of the Spaniards. They were received with so heavy a fire, that Leval's division, in attempting to deploy, fell I ' 262 BATTLE OF OCANA I ITS CONSEQUENCES. 263 CHAP. VIII into confusion, and two pieces of artillery were joQQ dismounted. At this critical moment, a division November. ^^ reserve was ordered to advance through the intervals of the discomfited columns, and form line in front of them. This was immediately done, and a change soon took place in the fortune of the day. The cavalry, under Sebastian! charg- ed, and the whole right wing of the Spaniards at once went down. The left wing, however, was untouched, and an able General might yet have secured a retreat. But Arisaigo, utterly confounded, quitted the field, desiring this portion of the army to follow him. Lord Macduff, M-ho was present in the action, entreated the second in command to assume the direction ; but the French cavalry broke through the centre, and the rout became complete. The surrounding county was flat and open to the action of cavalry, which vigorously pursued the fugitives, and cut them down on all sides. Vic- tor, whose corps came up at the conclusion of the action, continued the pursuit all night. In this unfortunate battle the Spaniards lost all their baggage and artillery, and about thirty thousand stand of arms. The number of killed and wounded was about four thousand. Eigh- teen thousand were made prisoners; and, bycHAP.viii many, the number has been estimated still higher. The loss of the victors amounted only to seven- November. teen hundred. Lamentable, in every point of view, as this de- feat unquestionably was, it carried with it dis^grace rather to the General than the troops which he commanded. The latter displayed courage ; and ' the right wing received the onset of the French with firmness and resolution. The artillery was excellently served ; and several regiments shew- ed an unshaken front to the enemy, when above half their number had fallen. Had the army, thus sacrificed, been reserved for defence of the Sierra Morena, Andalusia would probably have been rescued from the grasp of the enemy. But thus it was, by ignorance, obstinacy, and mismanagement, that the hopes of Spain were blighted, and the blood of her sons unprofitably wasted. This disastrous battle, which, at a blow, laid open the southern provinces, was speedily fol- lowed by another scarcely less ruinous. The Duke del Parque, with an army augmented by recent levies to about twenty thousand men, had, for some time back, kept his ground in the neigh- 1 ■1 264 BATTLE OF TAMAMES. CATALONIA. 265 1809. October. cHAP.vin bourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, where, being join- ed by Sir Robert Wilson, he had succeeded in causing great annoyance to the enemy. In the middle of October, General Marchand advanced against this army, with the view of bringing it to action, and found it strongly posted near Tam- ames. The force of Marchand consisted of ten thousand foot, twelve hundred cavalry, and four- teen pieces of cannon. Despising his opponents, who enjoyed aU advantages of ground, he attack- ed them with an imprudent impetuosity, which terminated in the defeat of his army. After this engagement, in which he lost about three thou- sand men, Marchand retreated on Salamanca. There he was followed by the Duke, and Mar- chand withdrew his force across the Douro. For some time after this eyent, the Spanish army remained inactive at Salamanca; and the defeated corps having received reinforcements, November, again advanced, under General Kellerman, to re- trieve its disaster. The Duke del Parque, elated by victory, determined on again standing the hazard of a battle. It took place near Alba de Tormes. The Spaniards were driven from the high ground which they occupied, but retreated on Tamames in tolerable order. On the following 2 Nov. 17. morning, when within two leagues of that town, chap.viii a small body of French horse came up, and ' 1809 made a charge on the rear. The whole army xr * then fell into confusion, and dispersed. For- tunately, the enemy were not near enough for immediate pursuit ; and, on reaching the Pena de Francia, in that secure position a considera- ble body of the fugitives were collected. By this victory, the French were enabled, without further obstacle, to direct their views against Ciudad Rodrigo, and threaten Portugal. Lord Wellington, in consequence, removed his army from their unhealthy station in the neighbourhood of Badajos; and crossing the Tagus, fixed his head-quarters at Vizeu. While the Supreme Junta were wasting the national resources in ill-concerted endeavours to regain possession of the capital, the defence of Catalonia was left to the unaided efforts of its inhabitants. A French fleet had succeeded in escaping the English squadron, and in re-victual- ing Barcelona. This done, preparations were set on foot for the siege of Gerona. General Reille who was to have commanded the besieg- ing army, was at this period superseded by Ge« neral Verdier. The force under St. Cyr, which VOL. II. M if 266 SIEGE OF GERONA. 1809. May. CHAP. VIII was destined to act as a corps of obs ervatioD, occupied the fertile country around Vich. On the sixth of May, the besiegers appeared before Gerona; and taking possession of the heights of Casa Roca, and Costarroja, began to form their lines without opposition. The garri- son of the city, which amounted only to three thousand four hundred men, was commanded by Don Mariano Alvarez ; and the inhabitants, ^ncouraged by having twice driven the enemy from their walls, were again prepared to signal- ize their patriotism by a strenuous and unshrink- ing defence. Since the period of the former siege, the for- tifications of the place had been considerably strengthened. The three advanced redoubts, of which the enemy, in eighteen hundred and eight, had gained easy possession, were now in a complete state of defence ; and much labour had been expended in increasing the security of the other works. When the lines were completed, a summons was sent into the city, exhorting Alvarez to avoid the evils which could not fail to result from resistance. All terms, however, were re- jected, and the siege went on. I GARRISON SUMMONED. 267 1809. June. On the night of the thirteenth of June, the chap.viii bombardment commenced. This event had not been unprovided for by the inhabitants. The alarm sounded ; and the women, the aged, and the children, sought refuge in cellars, and other places of comparative security, which had been prepared for their reception. On the seven- teenth, an ill-judged sally was made by the be- jun. 17. sieged, which, though successful, was yet attend- ed by a loss of life which more than counter- balanced the benefit it produced. The bombardment continued, and spread de- vastation through the buildings of the city. Several hospitals were destroyed ; and the diffi- culty of providing accommodation for the sick and wounded, became daily greater. Fever and disease broke out among the inhabitants, yet their spirit remained firm and unbroken. In the meanwhile, St. Cyr, who had hither- to remained in his position near Vich, moved his head-quarters to Caldas de Malavella, in order to prevent succours being thrown into Gerona; and his army occupied a line, extend- ing from the Ona to San Feliu de Guixols, from which place the Spaniards, after an ob- stinate resistance, were driven on the twen- jun.2i 268 THE REDOUBTS CARRIED BY ASSAULT. MONT JOUY ABANDONED. 269 CHAP.viii ty-first. While thus stationed, the General received official intelligence that Marshal Au- gerau was about to supersede him in the com- mand of the seventh corps ; and this circum- stance contributed to deprive him of the influ- ence which he would otherwise naturally have exerted on the operations of the siege. He ob- jected to the manner in which Verdier had con- ducted his advances against the town, and his neglect of many salutary precautions. But his opinions were disregarded, and Verdier con- tinued to prosecute the siege, in full expectation of speedily becoming master of the place. July. The redoubts in advance of Mont Jouy, were carried by assault, and with a facility which tended to increase the contempt with which the French army regarded their opponents. Em- boldened by this success, they determined to as- sault a breach which a battery of twenty guns had opened in one of the bastions of Mont Jouy. Jul. 4. The attack was made in the night of the fourth of July, and terminated in the complete repulse of the assailants. During the thi-ee following days an incessant fire was kept up on the breach ; and on the Jul 8. eiglith, it was again assaulted. The French I columns were received with a fire, so well di- chap.viii rected and destructive, that, after several inef- fectual efforts, the troops were withdrawn in August. confusion, with the loss of eleven huudred of their number. From this time forward the siege was con- ducted with greater prudence. Batteries were opened on three different sides of the fort, and every precaution was adopted to ensure success. An entire month passed in the dispute of a rave- lin, which, when at length carried by the ene- my, was found untenable from being exposed to the musquetry from the fort. With the contests for possession of the rave- lin personal conflict ceased between the garrison of Mont Jouy and the besiegers. Though the defences were daily suffering by the enemy's mines and artillery, yet the fort was not aban- doned till the walls had been nearly levelled with the ground, and the whole guns had been silenced. In this situation, the ruins were resigned to the enemy ; and on the night of the eleventh of August, the garrison effected its re- Aug. U. treat. In defence of the town an equal share of re- solution and gallantry was displayed. By the 270 BLAKE THROWS SUCCOURS INTO THE CITY. THE FRENCH REPULSED FROAI THE BREACHES. 271 CHAP. VIII surrender of Mont Jouy, the French were en- ,oQq abled to throw up works nearer to the enceintey August. ^^^ * tremendous fire was opened from their numerous batteries. Towards the end of August, several breaches had been made, and tho g-arrison was greatly reduced by the casualties of war and disease. The hospitals were already crowded, and unable to contain the patients whose situation demanded admission. The ravages of the fever were hourly increasing, and the want of provisions began to be severely felt. Yet no proposal of surrender was heard in the city. The determi- nation of all ranks to resist the enemy to the last extremity remained unshaken by calamity. At this critical period, Blake having, by a series of skilful manoeuvres, succeeded in de- ceiving St. Cyr as to his intentions, was enabled Sep. 1. to throw three thousand of his army, with a supply of provisions, into the city. By this timely reinforcement the spirits of the garrison were raised ; and the besiegers, from a want of ammunition, were compelled for a time to sus- pend their operations. The interval thus af- forded was employed in strengthening and re- pairing the dilapidations of the place. On rCcei ^ ing the expected supplies, the be- chap.viii siegers redoubled their quantity of fire, and on ^ the eighteenth of September three breaches September. were declared practicable. On the day follow- ing, the assault was made, and the struggle, which was long and severe, at length terminated Sep. 19. in favour of the garrison. The French were repulsed in all their efforts, and having suffered great loss, were at length withdrawn in disorder. The besiegers were dispirited by this signal defeat of their greatest effort. It was deter- mined to convert the siege into a blockade, and to reduce those by famine whom they could not conquer by the sword. This was done. The situation of the garrison and the inhabitants of the city, was one of accumulating suffering. Famine was in their dwellings. The supply of corn was small, and the mules and horses were slaughtered at the shambles. The fever, which the heats of summer had rendered more virulent and fatal, was raging in its fury, and other forms of disease, scarcely less destructiv^o, assailed those whom the pestilence had spared. It is not in the breach or on the battle-field, — it is not amid the inspiriting and glorious ac- companiments of hostile struggle, where death >> !■» >> o iiiiii t Jtimtmmmmttmttt 272 THE SIEGE CONVERTED INTO BLOCICiDE. |i cHAi*.vii J comes suddenly if he comes at all, and the heart jgQg which panted for victory, and the lips which September, shouted triumph, in a moment become mute and motionless, — it is not in such circumstances that the courage of the human soul is most severely tested. In Gerona, the period of active strug- gle had passed away. All that now remained to its inhabitants, was to exert that calm and passive fortitude, that firmness of endurance, which shrinks from no suffering which duty de- manded they should encounter. This highest, rarest, and noblest description of courage, was not wanting in the Geronans. Amid famine and pestilence they remained unshaken, hoping the best, yet prepared to brave the worst ; look- ing for succour, but determined on resistance. Relief— enough only to prolong their suffer- ings — came. General O'Donnel, with one hun- dred and sixty mules loaded with provisions, succeeded, on the side of Bispal, in breaking through the enemy and reaching the town. The same officer, by a bold and skilful manoeuvre, subsequently succeeded in passing the besieging aimy, and retreating with his troops. The joy of the inhabitants at this seasonable relief was at first great. It raised hopes of Oct. 13. THE GARRISON REFUSE TO CAPITULATE. 273 1809. October, support from without, which were not realized, chap.viii Marshal Augerau had assumed the command of the besieging army. Convoys of provisions ar- rived from France, accompanied by a large rein- forcement of troops ; and a detachment which had been sent against Hostalrich, drove the Spaniards from the town, and became masters of the large magazines which had been formed there. The hope of external relief no longer existed in the city. A fearful mortality was raging with- in its walls. The burial-places were choked with corpses, and the deaths sometimes amounted eveji to seventy a day. Augerau straitened the blockade, and persevered in bombarding the city. He likewise sent letters into the city, to commu- nicate his victory at Hostalrich, the defeat of Blake's army, and the peace with Austria. With a humanity highly honourable, he even offered to grant an armistice for a month, and suffer supplies immediately to enter the city, provided Alvarez would capitulate at the expiration of that period, should the city not be relieved. The Geronans, however, were prepared to bear all, and would not, for the sake of shortening their own sufferings, consent to aught that might M 2 tfl 274 SUFFERINGS OF THE INHABITANTS. STATE OF THE CITY. 275 CHAP.viii injure their country. They knew that, should they accept the proposal of Augerau, a large pro- looy. ' 111 l>Jovember. portion of the besieging army would become disposable for other operations. The offer, therefore, was declined. The records of history present few instances of more pure and memor- able heroism. Notwithstanding the sufferings of the be- sieged, few cases occurred of desertion. But in one instance ten officers — two of whom were of noble birth — went over to the enemy. At length, however, suffering reached such a pitch, that many of the inhabitants, determined to risk death in the field rather than await his slow approiich in the city, attempted to escape through the enemy's lines, and in some instances succeeded. Nov. 29. Towards the end of November, Samaniego, the chief surgeon to the garrison, delivered a report to Alvarez on the state of health in the city. Aware of the nature of its contents, Al- varez directed Samaniego to read it, observing, " This paper will inform posterity of our suffer- ings — should there be none left to recount them." • The report was a dreadful one. In the whole city there did not remain a single house unin- I 1809. November. jured by the bombardment. The people bur- chap.viii rowed in cellars, vaults, and crevices of the ruins. The water stagnated in the streets which were broken up. The sick were frequently killed in the hospitals. The dead bodies, which lay rot- ting in holes amid the ruins, poisoned the atmos- phere. Even vegetation was affected by it. Trees withered in the gardens, and esculents re- fused to grow. Within three weeks five hundred of the garrison had died in the hospitals. The sick lay upon the ground without beds, and al- most without food. Nearly the whole fuel and provisions had been exhausted. " If by these sacrifices," concluded Samaniego, " worthy to be the admiration of history, — and if by consummat- ing them with the lives of those of us who by the will of Providence have survived our com- rades, the liberty of our country can be secured, happy shall we be in the bosom of eternity, and in the memory of all good men, and happy will our children be among their fellow country- men. •> The breaches, which ten weeks before had been assaulted, were still open; and the be- siegers having learned that the ammunition of the place was exhausted, determined on bolder «i«iiii I 276 ALVAREZ SMITTEN TVITH FEVER. CHAP.viii operations. All the outworks were carried, and a gallant sally of the garrison, though successful December. ^^^ "^* materially amend their situation. The besiegers had how advanced close to the walls, the breaches were open, and the enemy were evidently preparing for another assault. Dec. 4. In this state of things, the brave Alvarez became smitten with the prevailing epidemic. He re- signed the command to Don Julian De Bolivar, who summoned a council to determine what measures should be adopted in the extremity to which the city had been reduced. The meeting was of opinion that further re- sistance was hopeless, and it was resolved to Dec 10. treat for a capitulation. Marshal Augerau granted honourable terms. The garrison were to march out with the honours of war, and be sent prisoners into France, to be exchanged as soon as possible for an equal number of French prisoners then detained at Majorca, and other places. None but those who ranked as soldiers were to be considered prisoners. The French army were not to be quartered on the inhabi- tants. The public reconls of the city were nei- ther to be removed nor destroyed. The inhabi- tants were to be at liberty to quit Gerona, taking fAPITULATION OF GERONA. 277 1809. December. with them their property. The heroic Alvarez chap.viii was to be allowed to choose any place of resi- dence on the French frontier. He afterwards retired to Figueras, where he died. When the garrison, reduced by famine and disease, marched out, in presence of the French army, their shrunken forms, their glazed and hollow eyes, their wan and meagre counten- ances, excited even the compassion of their ene- mies. On entering the city, it was found that most of the guns had been fired so often as to have become useless. Brass itself, observed Samaniego, had given way before the constancy of the Geronans. It may be added, that brass will be found less durable than the tribute which shall be paid, by all noble and generous spirits, to the heroism and devotion of these intrepid patriots. After the battle of Ocana, the Central Junta displayed little of that energy which, on former occasions, had contributed to bear them through increasing difficulties. They endeavoured to conceal from the nation the full extent of their misfortunes. The discovery of a conspiracy for a change of government contributed yet more to their alarm. They knew themselves to have 278 CONDUCT OF THE SUPREME JUNTA. CONDUCT OF THE SUPREME JUNTA. 279 m 1809. December. CHAP.viii become unpopular with the nation. Libels were poured forth on them in all quarters ; and the chief efforts of the Junta were directed rather to the maintenance of their own precarious an- thority, than to any measures of effective resist- ance to the enemy. Yet for such measures the time imperatively called. The enemy threatened Andalusia ; and it was evident that by nothing but a rapid and vi- gorous concentration of the national efforts could his projects be successfully opposed. Under these circumstances, the Junta issued procla- mations to the people, couched in the same high tone of chivalrous patriotism which had formerly produced so animating an effect. But it was al- ready apparent that the nation had lost confidence- in the government. The Provincial Juntas had in many places resumed their authority ; and Spain was probably on the verge of relapsing into the state of confusion from which the formation of the Central Junta had delivered it, when the progress of the enemy put a stop to these intes- tine dissensions. So unpopular indeed had the Junta become, that no officer of reputation would consent to serve under them. In Gallicia, the Conde de Noronha had already reared the standard of re- chap.viii bellion. Romana, to whom the chief com- „ mand of the armies had been offered, declined its December. acceptance. The Duke del Albuquerque, who commanded a corps of about twelve thousand in Estramadura, was an object of fear and jealousy to the Junta. Castanos was in disgrace at Al- gesiras; and the chief command in Andalusia, at a crisis so important, was, almost from neces- sity, intrusted to the imbecile Arisaigo. Worse placed it could not be. 280 CURSORY RETROSPECT. SPEECH OF NAPOLEON TO THE SENATE. 281 CHAPTER IX. OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA. 1810. CHAP. IX. The year had closed in Spain triumphantly for the French arms, as it had commenced. The Spanish armies had sustained a series of un- paralleled defeats. The British had retired into Portugal ; and the efforts of Lord Wellington were, for the present, limited to the defence of that kingdom. England had wasted her re- sources in a fruitless and ill-judged expedition to the Isle of Walcheren, where disease had done the work of the sword. A triumphant peace had heen concluded with Austria ; and the whole of the immense forces of the French em- pire w^ere thus disposable for the reduction of Spain. At Paris, Napoleon, in a speech to the senate^ 1810. recounted the triumphs of the year, and inti- chap. ix. mated his intention of returning to Spain, to complete the conquest already almost achieved. " When I shall shew myself beyond the Py- renees,*' said he, in metaphor somewhat staled by frequent repetition, " the frightened Leo- pard will fly to the ocean to avoid shame, de- feat, and death. The triumph of my arms will be the triumph of the genius of good over that of evil,-^^f moderation, order, and morality, over civil war, anarchy, and the evil passions !** The war minister reported, that, of the con- scriptions already decreed, there still remained eighty thousand men uncalled into service. Of these, thirty-six thousand were to be immedi- ately embodied. Thirty thousand men, collect- ed at Bayonne, were ready to repair the casual- ties which had diminished the French armies in Spain ; and an additional force of twenty-five thousand, raised from the conscription of the year following, would be at the disposal of the Emperor. Such was the threatening aspect of affairs at the commencement of eighteen hundred and ten. Yet Lord Wellington did not despair of the cause in which he had embarked. When .1 \ 282 PROSPECTS OF THE ALUES. POLICY OF LORD WELLINGTON. 283 1810. ff ciiAP.ix. he entered Spain, but a few months before, he had done so in co-operation with an ar- my of considerable strength, against a compara- tively small and extended body of the enemy. Since that period, the Spanish armies had been routed and dispersed ; and, whatever ideas he might have previously formed, it was now evi- dent, that neither the talents of their leaders, nor the character of the troops, gave any pros- pect of vigorous and effective resistance to the progress of the enemy. But Lord Wellington likewise knew, that the security of Spain did not depend on the conduct of her armies, — that an in- domitable spii'it of hostility was abroad among her people, — that a desultory but destructive war was carrying on in all her provinces, — and that the expense of life, at which the French maintained their hold on the country, was one which could not fail gradually to enfeeble the invaders, and call for a succession of efforts, of such magnitude, as France, in the precarious state of Europe, might soon be unable to sup- port. In the meantime, it was obvious that de- fensive war was the only one which could be waged with any prospect of success. It was the policy of England to protract the contest ; to ohap. ix. lead the enemy to divide his forces by distracting ^^^^ his attention, and thus to subject him to the full operation of that petty but pervading hostility which was ever wasting his numbers. For the present, tlierefore. Lord Wellington determined to confine his efforts to the defence of Portugal, yet to stand prepared oa the occurrence of more favourable circumstances, again to widen the sphere of his operations, and advance into Spain. On crossing the Tagus, he moved his head- quarters to Vizeu ; and the army went into crin- tonments, extending from Coirabra to Pinhel, while the corps of General Hill remained at A- brantes and its neighbourhood. In this posi- tion, the troops remained for some time inac- tive, in order to recover the effects of the pre- ceding campaign, and the sickness which liad been engendered by the unhealthy station to which they had subsequently removed. At this period. Marshal Soult, with an army of about fifty thousand men, was prepar- ing to advance into Andalusia. The Junta, blind to the approaching danger, felt secure that the giant range of the Sierra Morena •*»..-.' '»-g>*i..rr* 284 SOULT ENTERS ANDALUSIA : FORCES THE MORENA, AND ENTERS SEVILLE. 285 1810. January. Jan. 20. CHAP. IX. would oppose an impenetrable barrier to the progress of the enemy. The passes of these mountains had been fortified with care, and a force of about twenty thousand men, under Ar- isaigo, was posted for their defence. But on the twentieth of January, the pass of Despena Perros was forced, with but little resistance from the troops, whose spirit was depressed by the remembrance of Ocana. In order to dis- tract the attention of Arisago, Soult divided his army into three columns, which advanced sim- ultaneously on the three principal debouches of the Sierra. The right, under Victor, by Alma- den ; the centre, under Mortier, by the road from Madrid ; the left, under Sebastiani, by Villa Nueva. Several mines had been placed by the Spaniards at the narrow parts of the de- file, but the explosion of these produced little effect. On the twenty-first, Soult's head-quar- Jan. 29. t^^^ were at Baylen ; and, on the twenty-ninth, the corps of Victor effected its junction with the army before Seville. In Seville— where, till now, nothing had been heard but the sound of presumptuous boast- ing — all was confusion. The Junta fled to Cadiz ; no measures had been taken to put the city in a condition for effective resistance ; and, chap. ix. after a negotiation of two days, it surrendered. On the thirty-first, Seville opened her gates, ^^^ and the intrusive monarch made his triumphal entry on the same day. The French thus be- came masters of nearly two hundred pieces of serviceable cannon, of immense magazines, and of the great cannon foundry, which was left un- injured. In truth, the resistance offered in Andalusia to the progress of the French arms was so slight, as to lead Joseph to believe that the spirit of the people had at length been effectually humbled. Jaen, which boasted every prepara- tion for defence, submitted, without a struggle, to Sebastiani. Granada followed the disgraceful example, after an impotent attempt to check the progress of the enemy by Arisaigo. A feeble effort was subsequently made in defence of Malaga, but this too failed ; and on the fifth Feb. 5. of February, the French took possession of the city. At Seville the army remained for two days inactive, when a corps, under Mortier, was de- tached into Estramadura, for the reduction of Badajos, and Victor was directed to march on I ^iR6 CADIZ SAVED BY ALBUQUERQUK. DEPOSITION OF THE SUPREME JUNTA. 287 CHAP. IX. Cadiz. Had the latter been at once pushed for- ward, with that celerity of movement for which 1810 Febniar *^^ French army is generally remarkable, and to which it has been indebted for many of its most splendid successes, there can exist little doubt that Cadiz would have fallen. The city, in truth, was utterly unprepared for attack; the garrison was insufficient to man the works, and there were not a thousand men in the Isla de Leon. The governor, General Vanegas, was unpopular and distrusted ; he accordingly resign- ed his authority, and a Junta of eighteen house- holders was elected by ballot to govern the city. In such circumstances was it, that Cadiz was saved from her impending danger by the vig- our and promptitude of the Duke del Albuquer- que. That General, placing little faith in the talent and prudence of the Supreme Junta, no sooner received intelligence that the French had passed the Morena, than, disregarding the orders of the Junta, who directed him to repair to Cordova, he marched on Cadiz with the greatest rapidity, and threw himself into the Isla de Leon, with a body of about eight thous- and men, in time to barricade the bridge of Zuazo before the head of \^ictor*s column came Feb. 4. 1810. February. up. Thus was Cadiz saved, and Spain spared chap. ix. from a misfortune which could not but have been followed by the most disastrous consequences. The unpopularity of the Supreme Junta had now reached its height. On their arrival in Cadiz, they attempted to resume their authority ; but neither the Local Junta, nor the array, nor the populace would obey their decrees. The per- sonal safety of its members was even endangered by the violence of the mob ; and, making a merit of necessity, the Junta at length resigned the shadow of that power which in reality they had long ceased to possess. A Council* of Regency, consisting of five members, was ap- pointed to wield the reins of authority till the Cortes should be assembled ; and the Junta closed their career by issuing a farewell address to the people, claiming credit, amid all their misfortunes, for purity of intention, and unshaken devotion to their country. • The Council consisted of the following members :_Don Pedro de Quevedo y Quintana, Bishop of Orense; Don An- tonio de Ascano; General Castanos ; Don Francisco de Saave- dra, late President of the Junta of Seville; and Don Esteban Fernandez de Leon, who was afterwards changed for Don Miguel de LardizabeL H 288 APPOINTMENT OP A REGENCY. CHAP. IX. Let this much be granted them : — Let it not 1810 ^^ assumed, because deficient in intellect, that February, t^^y were likewise corrupt in heart. If the Junta partook largely of the defects of the national character, they partook also of its virtues. Their career was unmarked by any base truckling or subserviency to the enemies of their country. Amid the storm of misfortune they had stood unbending and erect, animating their countrymen by their voice, and urging them to renewed eflPbrts. The task of govern- ing the nation at so arduous a crisis was one for which they were little qualified by know- ledge, talent, or experience. But their inten- tions were honest ; and the integrity of but few of its members has ever been considered liable to suspicion. Even the resignation of their authority did not protect the members of the Junta from persecution. The voice of the whole nation was against them; they were treated as criminals. The Council of Castile, which had repeatedly temporized with the intruder, declared their power to have been a violent and unconstitu- tionul usurpation. The mob accused them of peculating the public money ; and to gratify the THE ISLA DB LEON. \ 289 1810. March. public appetite for vengeance, some of the more ohap. ix. obnoxious were imprisoned ; and the rest — in- cluding the respectable Jorellanos — were ban- kbed to the provinces, and placed in a state of surveillance by the local authorities. Disappointed by the activity of the Duke del Albuquerque, in the hope of gaining Cadiz, the French for some months remained in possession of the chief cities of Andalusia, yet subject to continual losses and annoyance from the bands of Guerilla smugglers which abounded in the mountains. In the meantime, efforts were made by Great Britain, to assist the patriots in defending the Isla de Leon and Cadiz. Sup- plies of all sorts were liberally sent from Gibral- tar, and about six or seven thousand British and Portuguese troops, under Lientenant-General Graham, were landed on the Island. The Island or Isla de Leon, is somewhat tri- angular in form, bounded on two sides by the sea, and on the third by the Santi Petri rivw, of considerable depth, and varying in breadth from eighty to one hundred and fifty yards. This side is strongly fortified, and is besides na- turally strong. The Santi Petri can be crossed only by the bridge of Zuazo, flanked by batteries, VOL. J I. N 292 CADIZ. MATAGORDA ABANDONED. 291 1810. CHAP. IX. and connected with the mainland by a causeway, leading across a broad and swarapy marsh, by which the channel of the river is almost every- where bounded. There are two towns on the Isla de Leon ; one which bears the same name, containing about forty thousand inhabitants ; and another called San Carlos, consisting almost en- tirely of barracks and other government build- ings. At the extremity of a long and narrow isth- mus projecting from this island towards the north of the bay, stands the city of Cadiz. The portion of the sea enclosed within this isth- mus, the Isla, and the mainland, constitutes the harbour of Cadiz, which, opposite to the city, is about three miles broad. Cadiz is on three sides washed by the sea, and is strongly fortified on all. By land it can be approached only from the Isla de Leon, and along the narrow isthmus already mentioned, for defence of which, fortg and batteries of great strength had been erect- ed. When an enemy should have surmounted these, he would still find himself opposed by a regular front of fortification, extending from sea to sea, on which no expense or labour had been spared. 1810. The first care of Marshal Soult was to occupy chap. ix. all the outlets from the Isla, and to reduce Fort Matagorda, a small insular work, which was oc- cupied by a detachment of British, and by means of which he would be enabled to annoy the shipping in harbour. The heavy fire of his artillery soon rendered the work untenable, and on the twenty-third of April the garrison was Apr. 23. withdrawn by the boats of the squadron under Admiral Purvis. In Cadiz, dissention had unfortunately broken out between the Duke del Albuquerque, who had been appointed Governor, the Regency, and the Local Junta. The first in his exertions to strengthen the fortifications of the place, was not seconded either by the people or the authori- ties. The inhabitants remained indolent and lethargic spectators of the labours in which the garrison were engaged. The Junta would do nothing to supply the necessities of the troops, and the time and energies which should have been devoted to their high and important duties, was wasted in frivolous contentions with Albuquerque and the Council of Regency. The former, utterly disgusted, at length resign- February. ed the command, and quitted a scene where his IS 292 RETIREMENT OF ALBUQUERQUE. 1810. April. CHAP. IX. endeavours could no longer be useful, to assume the functions of Ambassador to England. Notwithstanding the apathy by which on all hands he was surrounded, Sir Thomas Graham did everything which his vigorous mind could suggest to add still greater security to the de- fences of Cadiz. A canal was cut across the isthmus which connects it with the Isla. The works along the river Santi Petri were improv- ed, and new ones thrown up, and the river fron- tier of the island soon presented a front of al- most unassailable strength. The French on their side were not idle. They fortified the towns of Rota, Puerto Real, Puerto Sta. Maria, and Chiclana ; formed entrenched camps in the intervals between them ; and at the point of Trocadero established batteries, from whence by means of huge mortars, constructed for the pur- pose at the cannon foundry of Seville, they suc- ceeded in throwing shells into the city. In this immense line of batteries, extending from Rota to the mouth of the Santi Petri, the enemy had upwards of three hundred pieces of cannon. In the meantime, the country was scoured by moveable columns of the enemy, which, though they frequently suffered severely from the arm- ATROCIOUS PROCLAMATION OP SOULT. 293 1810. May. ed bands of smugglers which haunted the moun- chap. ix. tains, succeeded in quelling all attempt at insur- rection, and in establishing the ascendancy of French dominion throughout the southern pro- vinces. At this period, a new and unheard of principle of war was attempted to be established by the French leaders. It was declared by Marshal Soult, in a public edict, that none but regular armies had a right to defend their towns, their houses, and their families, from violence and plunder; and that as no legitimate Spanish army could exist but that of his Catholic Majes- ty, Joseph Napoleon, all bodies of armed Span- iards, of whatever number or description, which existed in the provinces, should be treated as banditti, whose object was robbery and murder. Every individual taken in arms was immediately to be condemned and shot, and his body expos- ed on the highway.* • The utter and disgraceful recklessness of national law dis- played by the French throughout the war in Spain, may here receive another corroboration. Prisoners of war were actuaUy tned by a m.htary tribunal, and put to death, on the simple charg^ of attempting to escape. Lest this most atrocious fact should not otherwise gain credit, the following extracts from 294 DECREE OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT I ITS CONSEQUENCES. 295 CHAP. IX. "VVhen it was discovered by the Regency that 1810 ^^^* tnost infamous decree was actually carried May. into effect, they reprinted it with a counter de- cree, in French and Spanish, declaring-, that in these times every Spaniard, capable of bearing arms, was a soldier; and ordaining, that for every person who should be murdered by the enemy, the first three Frenchmen taken in arms should be hanged ; three should also be exe- cuted for every house burned, and three for every one who should perish in the flames. Soult himself they declared unworthy of the orders on this subject are given. The originals are in the pos- session of Lord Wellington. " (General Beliard. Madrid, 27 Novembre.)— L'intention du Roi est qu'il soit forme a Madrid une commission militaire, compos^e de sept raembres, par-devant laquelle vous ferez tra- duire les pcisonniers de guerre. Les jugemens d« la commis- sion emporteront la peine de mort, et seront sans appel." " (General Solignac. 5 Decembre.) — II m'a ete rendu compte que quelques prisonniers s'etaient ^happe^ dans la marche. Faites les rechercher, et ordonnez a I'egard de ceux qui seront pris, qu'on met eu execution I'ordre du 27 Novembre." " (Ministrede la Guerre a Paris. 14 Decembre.) — Les Es- pagnols ont tant de facilite pour se deguiser, et ensuite pour se derober a la surveillance^ que malgre la sev^rite qu'on exerce envers eux, on n'est pas toujours assure de les garder, quoi- qu'ils soient prevenus que les tentatives pour s'evader, leur font encourir la peine capitale, et que des nombreux exemples aien^ ^te faits."— Camjuoi^ of 180^. .dRP %_ 1810. May. law of nations till this decree had been repeal- chap. ix. ed ; and orders were issued that, if taken, he should be treated like a common robber. In the bands of Guerillas, which now exist- ed in every mountainous district of the country, the Regency found willing agents in the execu- tion of their retributive enactments. Few acts of outrage on the part of the enemy escaped without reprisal. In one instance, a Guerilla leader hung several Frenchmen on the trees bordering the high road near Madrid, in retalia- tion for several of his own men, whom the inva- ders had put to death ; and made known his in- tention of treating in a similar manner all the superior officers who should fall into his power. Thus did blood beget blood, and cruelty on the one side generate exasperation on the other. Of this truth most of the French leaders, by degrees, became convinced ; and, alarmed at the prospect before them, the system of extermination was happily allowed to sink into desuetude. In the state of feeling which existed, however, between the hostile parties, it was impossible but that acts of cruelty and vengeance should take place on both sides. Indignant at the losses they sustained from the Guerillas, many indivi- "jMimniiii mm JOSEPH. CHAP. IX. duals were summarily put to death by the 1810 ^^^"*^^> ^^ mere suspicion of being connected with those who annoyed them by a warfare so destructive and pertinacious. Yet it is but jus- tice to record, that the measures we have just detailed, which cannot fail to cast a deep shadow of ignominy on those by whom they were pro- jected or enforced, are in no degree understood to have emanated from him, whose regal autho- rity they were intended to establish. Joseph, constitutionally mild, disapproved of all acts of gratuitous violence and bloodshed. But his per- sonal influence, even in the affairs of his owh kingdom, was small. The French commanders knew themselves to be amenable to a higher power, and were solely guided in their policy by its influence and control. The ministers of Joseph, aware that his amiable and placid cha- racter was appreciated by the people, were not without hopes, that he might eventually ac- quire a place in their afl'ections, when the storm of resistance should have passed. But this expectation was never realized. Joseph, though not hated, was the object of popular de- rision. His indolence, his addiction to the plea- sures of the table, his want of mUitary qualities, MARSHAL SUCHET. 297 • Though somewhat out of place, the following passage from a letter U> Napoleon, written iji March, 1812, and wluch was intercepted by the capture of a convoy in the defile of Salinas, will exhibit Uie character of Joseph in a better light than that m which it has generally been regarded : " SiRK,--Les evenemens ont trompe mes esperances ; je n'ai fait aucuB bien, et je n'ai pas Tespoir d'en faire. Je prie done V.^ M. de me permettre de deposer entre ses mains, les droits qu'elle daigna me transmettre, sur la couronne d'Espagne il y a quatre ans. Je n'ai jamais eu d'autre but en I'acceptant, que ce- lui de faire le bonheur de cette monarchie. Cela n'est point en mon pouvoir." Let it be remembered, that when Joseph signed this honour- able renunciation of the crown, Spain was occupied by a nume- rous and triumphant army ; and that the Russian campaign, by which the throne of Napoleon was shaken to its base, had'not yet commenced. — Memoire* du General Hujfo, n2 1810. and his low origin, were all unfavourable to his chap. ix. acquiring any personal favour among a people so proud, so acute, and so haughty as the Span- iards. The higher and better qualities by which his character was honourably distinguished were seldom called into public and apparent action ; and Joseph, to the end of his career as a mo- narch, remained to the Spanish nation an object of unmitigated contempt.* After the defeat of Blake at Belchite, Suchet established his head-quarters at Zaragoza, and busied himself in preparations for the vigorous prosecution of the war. He established maga- 298 STATE OF ARRAGON. NAVARRE. 299 CHAP, ix .zines of all sorts, and disposed his army so as al 1810. ^"^® *^ maintain his communication with France, and to keep in check the numerous bands which had lately been strongly reinforced by ^C^uTtel' ^^^ ^»g.'l»^^s from Belchite. « Thus it was," says a French writer, " that the Spaniards, always beaten but never subdued, animated by a courage which misfortune could not depress, because founded on the love of country, opposed to the French throughout the whole Peninsu- la, but especially in Arragon and Catalonia, the same resistance which their gallant ancestors had offered to the Romans, to the Goths, and to the Moors, — to Charlemagne, and Louis the Four- teenth." Thus it was, too, that even in defeat were sown the dragon's teeth, which afterwards sprung up into armed men. The difficulty of Suchet's situation was con- siderable. The Guerilla bands were in posses- sion of all the valleys in the mountainous dis- dl^S^ch^ tricts. Detachments of his army were continu- ally out off. His couriers and convoys of pro- visions were intercepted ; the country was intimidated, and those who would willingly hav© remained neutral in the struggle, were forced by threats to join their countrymen in arms. The French army were kept in a state of continual chap. ix. vigilance and alarm. Partial engagements took ~" place on all hands, nor was it till the month of November that even the semblance of tranquil- lity could be restored. All the towns and strong places were then occupied by the French, and Suchet levied heavy contributions on the whole province. Navarre too was far from tranquil, and Suchet next directed his efforts to the pacification of that kingdom. He accordingly repaired to Pampeluna, and rectified many of the abuses, Jan. 2a which had been suffered to grow up under the administration of the Duke de Mahon, who had been sent as civil governor from Madrid. He published a severe edict, denouncing punishment on all inhabitants in whose possession arms should be found ; and having dispersed the band of Mina, the flame of insurrection was for a time smothered. Such was the situation of Arragon and Navar- re, when Suchet received orders from Marshal Soult, in his capacity of Major- General, to march rapidly on Valencia in two columns, one pro- ceeding by Teruel and Segorba, the other by Morella San Mateo, and the road leading along "inrfririfiiMiiiiiiMi' aflwr--'iir^iii 300 SUCHET ADVANCES AGAINST VALENCIA. CHAP. IX. the coast. Though these orders were at van- 1810. *°^® ^^^ *"* instructions from Paris, which di- February. rected, as preliminary measures, the -siege of Lerida and Mequinenza, Suchet did not con- Feb. 25. ceive himself at liberty to disobey. Accordingly, he repaired to Teruel, leaving General Musnier, with eight battalions and two hundred and fifty horse, to maintain tranquillity in Arragon. A column under General Habert proceeded by the coast. That under his own immediate command ^countered the Valencian force at Alventosa. The Spaniards were strongly posted, with a ravine in front, along the bottom of which flowed the deep and sluggish river Minjares. The road leading along the left bank of the stream was broken i^ and obstructed, and on the other side the village of Alventosa extended round a pre- cipitate and rugged height crowned by a ruined castle, which commanded the surrounding coun- try. Suchet determined to attack the left flank of this formidable position, and succeeded by a con- siderable detour in passing the river nearer to its source. The Valencians did not long withstand the attack of the French columns. They retreat- ;ed with the loss of fire guns and a portion of COMBAT OF ALVENTOSA. 301 1810. March. Mar. 5. their baggage. At Marviedro a junction was chap. ix. efl*ected with Habert, and the army pushed on to Valencia. The garrison of Valencia consisted chiefly of the soldiers who had fled disgracefully from Belchite. Suchet addressed a letter to General Caro, the Governor, in hope of inducing that officer to surrender the city. He assured him that he had not come to make war on the fine capital of the most beautiful of the Spanish |»rovinces, but to ofl'er peace and protection, «iich as Jaen, Granada, Cordova, and Seville, were at that moment enjoying. It was in- human, he said, to prolong a contest, maintain- ed at a vast expense of human suff^ering, where the issue was inevitable ; and he called on Gen- eral Caro to prove himself a benefactor to his country by surrendering the city of Valencia to Ae French arms. A proclamation was likewise issued to the people, declaring the anxiety of the French General to avoid efl'usion of blood, and exhorting the people to assist in the attainment of this humane wish. To this an answer was returned, stating, that Valencia had repulsed Marshal Moncey, and was prepared to repulse General Suchet ; and that if 302 SUCHET RETREATS FROM VALENCIA. \ CATALONIA. CHAP. IX. the latter was sincere in the laudable desire he JQ2Q had expressed to avoid bloodshed, it was for him to consider, whether the best and surest method of attaining that object was not to abstain from attack. In truth, the force of Suchet, consisting only of twelve thousand men, and thirty field-pieces, was altogether inadequate to the enterprize in which he had engaged ; and, having remained for five days in front of Valencia, he found it necessary to retrace his steps to the Ebro. He then made preparations for a systematic reduc- tion of the strong places held by the Spaniards, with the view to facilitate his future efforts for the reduction of the eastern provinces. February. Blake having been appointed Governor of Cadiz, O'Donnel succeeded to the chief com- mand in Catalonia. The skilful and daring ope- rations in which he had successfully engaged, had acquired for him the confidence of the peo- ple. Augerau had supposed that little more remained, after the reduction of Gerona, than to complete and rivet the subjection of the province. In this he was mistaken. A combat took place, in the neighbourhood of Vich, be- tween a body of Spaniards, under O'Donnel, 303 and the division of General Souham. The former chap. ix. bore themselves with courage, and assailed the " enemy with a steadiness and resolution to which ,. . February. they were unaccustomed. Never, by the con- fession of their own officers, was the courage of the French army more severely tested than in this action. O'Donnel, however, at length judged it prudent to retire, leaving the enemy in possession of the field. Souham, imagining the Spaniards had fled from fear, prepared to pursue. O'Donnel then commenced a series of skilful manoeuvres, by which, having led his enemy forward, he suc- ceeded in achieving several brilliant and impor- tant successes. The French losses in these en- gagements were very heavy, and they were still further aggravated by desertions from the fo- reign troops, who went over to the enemy in considerable numbers. In the meanwhile, the French prosecuted the siege of Hostalrich. The town had already fallen ; but the fort, which is strongly situated on a craggy height, still held out, and the gar- rison were animated by the best spirit. An at- tempt was made by O'Donnel to afford relief 304 FALL OF HOSTALRICH. CHAP^. to the beseiged, but without succegs, aud that jgjQ leader fell back on Tarragona. . May. Disappointed in their hopes from without, the garrison still continued to defend the fort with the most honourable fortitude and zeal. The besiegers kept up a dreadful bombardment, and the walls were gradually demolished by the fire of the batteries. They still, however, continued successfully to contest the possession of the May 12. place tiU the twelfth of May, when, having un- dergone a siege of four months, and consumed the whole of their provisions, these brave men determined to cut their way through the enemy's lines. In this bold attempt, about three hun- dred fell, and among these the heroic Don Julian de Estrada, their commander. The remainder succeeded in eflfectiiig their escape. These results were far from satisfactory to Napoleon. Marshal Augerau had boasted, in iis despatches, that the Ampurdan was com- pletely subdued ; but the comment of succeed- lag facts on this assertion had not been favour- able to its credit with the Emj)eror, and Auge- rau was superseded by Marshal Macdonald. The loss of Hostalrich was succeeded by an- FALL OF LERTDA AND MEQUINENZA. 305 1810. May. other of some consequence. The islands and chap. ix. fortress of Las Medas, forming an important maritime post, were surrendered to the French without resistance, through treason or coward- ice. Lerida also yielded without adequate re- sistance. Suchet opened his batteries against it on the seventh of May. On the twelfth, a magazine exploded in the town, and formed a breach. By thb the French assaulted the town and carried it. On the day following the castle May. is. surrendered. Success followed the arms of Suchet, when- ever he was not induced to transgress the rules of his art. The fort of Mequinenza, notwith- standing its strength, became an easy prize. Af- ter five days resistance it capitulated, and the June 8. subjection of Arragon being now fuUy assured, Suchet found himself at liberty to extend the sphere of his operations. The peace with Austria having rendered dis- posable the greater part of the force employed in Germany, large bodies of troops were thrown into Spain, and every corps was augmented. That of Junot, composed of the troops liberated hy the Convention of Cintra, consisted of three divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, amount- 306 SIEGE OF ASTORGA. CAPTURE OF ASTORGA. 307 1810. March. CHAP. IX. ing altogether to about twelve thousand men. Hitherto this force had been employed in dis- persing the irregular bands which abounded in Biscay, Navarre, and Old Castile. But on re- ceiving reinforcements, Junot advanced into Leon, with the view of protecting that kingdom from the incursions of the Gallician army. As- torga was garrisoned by about three thousand Spanish troops ; and an attack made upon it, in the preceding September, had been gallantly repulsed by Santocildes, who still acted as Go- vernor. The city was not strong, yet consider- able efforts had been made to improve and re- pair the works. Th^ walls were ancient and massive, and the suburbs, to the north and south, were covered and connected with the body of the place by a line of retrenchment. Astorga con- tained large magazines of all sorts ; and its ac- quisition, at this period, was held of great im- portance to the intended operations in Portugal, as it commanded a debouche leading into the north of that kingdom. On the twenty-first of March, Junot invested Astorga. The defence of the city was resolute- ly maintained for upwards of a month, when, at length, having repulsed their assailants at the Mar, 21. A • Long after the capture of Astorga, a soog was popular among the middling and lower classes, recounting the achieve- ments of the besieged, each stanza of which terminated in a sort of choral chant, declaring that ^^ AUorga was the tomb of Frenchmen.''^ We merely allude to this, as an indication of that buoyancy of spirit, which enabled the Spanish people to bear np amid so many and severe reverses, and to discover matter of ex- ultation even in disaster. 1810. April. breach, the garrison surrendered, only when the chap. ix. near exhaustion of their ammunition rendered further defence hopeless. The French suffered heavily in this siege, though the amount of their loss has been variously represented. This is certain : The expense of life at which As- torga was acquired, and the gallantry of its de- fenders, had a greater effect in animating the people, than its reduction in depressing them.* On the fall of Astorga, a detachment of Ju- not's corps reduced the castle of Sanabria, while the remainder proceeded to invest Ciudad Rodrigo. The Asturias had been reduced to submission ; so that, at the end of April, of the whole western frontier of Spain, Gallicia and Badajos alone remained free. The latter had been secured by the promptitude of Romana, when the corps of Mortier was approaching 308 MOVEMENTS OP ROMANA. CHAP.ix. from Seville, in expectation of carrying it by a jglQ coup-de-main. Baffled in this attempt, the April. French retired to Merida, Zafra, and Santa Marta, followed by a division, under Don Car- los O'Donnel. STATE OF SPAIN. 309 CHAPTER X. INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY MASSENA. I 1810. Since the commencement of the year, the chap. x. campaign had hitherto been one of almost unin- terrupted disaster. The Spaniards, had no army of any magnitude in the field; their most important fortresses were reduced or blockaded; and three-fourths of the kingdom had been overrun. The southern provinces had fallen, with scarcely the semblance of resistance. The wealth and resources of Andalusia had passed, without a struggle, into the hands of the enemy ; and Spain beheld the chief nursery of her armies, the provinces from which fresh bands of patriots might still have gone forth to combat, if not to conquer, in her cause, at once torn from her grasp. The British army had been com- pelled to limit its exertions to the defence of ■HT 310 PUBLIC FEELING IN ENGLAND. 1810. CHAP. X. Portugal ; and it was already evident that a mighty effort would soon be made for the reduc- tion of that kingdom. Never at any period had the cloud which lowered on the cause of Spanish liberty shed a darker or more impenetrable gloom. Those whose confidence in the zeal, the devotion, the native and untamed energy of the Spanish peo- ple had led them to predict a successful termina- tion to the contest, now wavered in their hope. The British government, urged by the enthu- siasm of the people, had at first rushed blindfold into the contest. The vast resources of England had been ineffectually wasted ; her utmost efforts had been found unequal to arrest the progress of the French arms ; and the lamentable expedition to the Scheldt, had exposed the counsels of her rulers to the ridicule of Europe. Under such reverses, the enthusiasm of the British nation had begun to subside. The bright and glowing colours, which in their eyes had beautified the prospect, gradually faded into fainter and more sober hues. True, indeed, the voice of England was still for war ; there was no flinching or faintness of heart among her sons, — ^but it was not as heretofore, for sudden. PUBLIC FEELING IN ENGLAND. 311 1810. desultory, and ill-judged operations, — for hasty chap. x. advance and precipitate retreat — for profuse ex- penditure of blood and money in pursuit of " British objects^'' — objects indeed, generally so truly British that no other government on earth would have thought them worth the expense and hazard of pursuit. Thus the blunders and incapacity of the min- istry had in a great measure lost them the confi- dence of the country. Even their warmer par- tisans — those who exonerated the men, did not venture to vindicate their measures. The gov- ernment had to encounter a strong and vehe- ment opposition both in Parliament and in the country. The policy of withdrawing our army from the Peninsula, — of husbanding the resources of England, till time and circumstances should be more favourable for their efficacious exertion, found many advocates among the greatest and most enlightened statesmen of whom England could boast. But party spirit was abroad in its violence ; and the doctrine of opposition, though generally salu- tary, was scarcely applicable to the crisis at which England had arrived. At all events it was car- ried too far. Pertinacity on one side had gene- \ I 312 R REINFORCEMENTS CROSS THE PYRENEES. CHAP. X. rated exaggeration on the other. Prudence is not a popular virtue ; and the tame doctrine of temporary inaction, though supported by a con- •iderable body of the nation, was but little in harmony with the pugnacious appetite of the majority. The Whigs were distrusted and dis- liked ; and many who condemned the ministry, were still anxious to retain them in power. In Parliament a trial of strength took place on the debate on the .Walcheren Expedition, and the Tories triumphed. The government, aware of the necessity of retrieving the disgrace of former failures, determined to prosecute the war with increased vigour. At the expense of nearly a million sterling, the Portuguese subsidiary force was augmented to thirty thousand men, and all the troops immediately disposable were sent out to augment the army of Lord Wellington. In the meanwhile, strong reinforcements had crossed the Pyrenees, and the French at this period had a force in Spain, of not less than three hundred thousand men, distributed over the whole surface of the country; Gallicia, Va- lencia, and Murcia, being the only provinces which remained free. Had even half of this force been concentrated, there was nothing in 1810. May. STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMT. 313 the Peninsula wliich could oppose its progress ; chap. x. but the nature of the warfare waged by the Span- iards, required its subdivision into numerous smaU bodies, to maintain the subjection of the conquered provinces, and to scatter the irregular bands which occupied the mountain strong- holds, and rarely suflFered an opportunity of sue cessful action to escape. These objects were not to be accomplished without heavy and continual losses. The animosity of the people was work- ing in silence the destruction of the invaders ; and Napoleon, in a country which his leaders had represented as conquered, beheld his armies gradually melting, and his efforts rendered nu- gatory, by the silent operation of causes which he could neither mitigate nor control. But the most prominent and immediate ob- stacle to the success of his projects, was the presence of a British force in the Peninsula. TiU the « Leopard sho.dd have been driven into the sea," a large army in Spain was re- quired to watch its movements. The force thus employed could lend no aid towards the general object of extending and securing the submission of the people to French authority lU efforts were necessarily directed to one sin- VOL. II. 314 MOVEMENTS OF LORD WELLINGTON. 1810. Mar. DHAP. X. gle and paramount object ; and till that had been accomplished, it was for all other purposes en- tirely useless. Lord Wellington, therefore, at once perceived that the force at his disposal was not strong enough for offensive operations ; and he knew, besides, that the loss attendant even on a vic- tory, might be ruinous in its consequences. De- termined to abandon the Peninsula only in the last extremity, he waited therefore the approach of the enemy, prepared to take advantage of every circumstance which might contribute to his security, and enable him to baffle the power- ful efforts of a superior enemy. In the beginning of May, Lord Wellington was apprized of some movements in the French army, which indicated their intention of ad- vancing against Ciudad Rodrigo. He according- ly moved towards the frontier, establishing his head-quarters at Celorico, and his divisions at Pinhel, Alverca, Guarda, Trancoso, and along the valley of the Mondego, as far as Cea ; and on the opposite bank of that river, at Fomos, Mang^alde, and Vizeu. The corps of Sir Row- land Hill remained in the neighbourhood of Abrantes, to check any operation on the part ♦J^* ^ ^"^ * ***"^ took place in the organization of ^^"L'!.Tr^ '''' '"'' '"^^ "^^ fi^ -^ which bad "^--ied Andalusia, formed the army of the southland wa, ^mmanded by Soult, ha.ing under him Victor, Seb^tiani, and The army of the centre, under the immediate orders of which had b^n raised in hi3 service, andTlhe Fa,nch ^ *»!« wiUun the district allotted for its occupation. ^^ The army of Portugal consisted of the second, sixth, and tighth corps, under the command of Mamna. 1810. Hay. PREPARATIONS FOR INVADING PORTUGAL. 315 of Regnier. In this position Lord Wellington chap. x. determined to watch the movements, and await the approach of the enemy. During the long period of tranquillity which had elapsed, both parties had been engaged in great and important preparations.* Under com- mand of Massena, perhaps the most celebrated of the great captains of Napoleon, a powerful army was assembling for the invasion of Portugal. It consisted of the corps of Marshals Ney and Janot, and of General Regnier ; while the corps of Mortier threatened an advance on the frontier of Alentejo. Besides these, General Montiniere was at Valladolid, with nine thousand infantry and four regiments of cavalry ; and to give stiU gwater importance to this imposing demon- I 316 STRENGTH OP THE HOSTILE ARMIES. 1810. May. CHAP. X. stration, a strong body of the Imperial Guard crossed the Pyrenees, and the remainder was held in readiness to follow,— circumstances con- veying a strong intimation that Napoleon in- tended to assume the personal command. On his side, Lord Wellington directed the works of Almeida and Abrantes to be strengthened and repaired, and determined to obstruct the progress of the enemy by every means in his power. Though anxious as long as possible to prevent the tide of war from rolling onward from the frontier, he had determined, on the advance of the enemy, to fall back on his resources, and thus to add materially to the difficulties of his opponent, by compelling him to weaken his force in the occupation of distant provinces, and extend the line of his communications through a hostile country. The numerical force of the hostile armies may be thus calculated :^- British and Portuguese Army, The corps with Lord Wellington, 30,000 The corps with Lieutenant- General HiU, - - . 14.,000 Carried over. 44,000 STRENGTH OF THE HOSTILE ARMIES. Brought over, 44,000 The reserve under Major- General Leith, - - - 10,000 54,000 In co-operation with this force was A corps of Portuguese Militia, - 10,000 The Spanish troops under Romana, 10,000 Making a grand total of 76,000 Army under Massena, The infantry of the 2d, 6th, and 8th corps, - - - 62,000 The Cavalry, - * 6000 The ArtUlery, &c. - - 4000 Total, 72,000 To this were afterwards joined Two divisions of the 9th corps under Drouet, - - 10,000 The remaining division of this corps under General Claperede, - 8000 The corps of Mortier co-operating on the south of the Tagus, - 13,000 317 CHAP. X. 1810. May. Making a grand total of 103,000 i *!• COMPOSITION ar the ho6tilb armies. ^^^' ^ ^y *^^ose who wonld form a just estimate of 1810. *|^® relatire strength of these armies, the descrip- Mky. tion of troops of which they were composed rowt be taken into calculation. The Portu- guese were yet untried. By the exertions of Marshal Beresford, they had indeed been brought into a state of comparative discipline, bat it was impossible to place any sanguine reliance on their conduct in the field. To give them confidence in themselves, Lord Wel- lington had directed the troops of the two nations to be brigaded together, in the pro- portion of one Portuguese to two British re- giments. Of the regular troops, therefore, hopes might be entertained ; but the Portuguese mUitia were so entirely defective in organiza- tion, as to be utterly unfit for the active opera- tions of a campaign. The French army, on the other hand, was composed of troops accustomed to conquer, and in the highest state of discipline ; while that of Lord Wellington might be compared to a piece of tesselated Mosaic, pleasing to the eye, yet far inferior in strength to a surface composed of one uniform and unbroken material. Lord Wellington had eariy foreseen that the THE PROVINCE OF LOWER BEIRA. 319 1810. May. attack of the enemy would be on the eastern chap. x. frontier of Portugal, by the way of Lower Beira. There were only two other routes by which it was practicable to penetrate into the kingdom : the one by Elvas and the Alentejo, the other through Gallicia on the north. By the first of these it was impossible to reach Lisbon, from the intervention of the Tagus. The second was obstructed by impenetrable ranges of gigantic mountains, which crossed every possible line of march. That Massena would invade the king- dom by either of these lines was utterly improb- able. Certain therefore of the route that would be followed by the enemy. Lord Wellington made his dispositions accordingly. Looking on Ciu- dad Rodrigo, and Almeida, as the points of which Massena must become master, before he could march either upon Lisbon or Oporto, he took up a position on the frontier mountains of Beira, in form of the segment of a circle, of which the convex part was presented to the quar- ter from which the enemy must approach. The defensive line was about thirty miles in extent, but its circular form gave it this advantage, that its several points were not distant from each other 320 GALLANT DEFENCE OP THE GARRISON. 321 SIEGE OP CIUDAD RODRIGO. JllB. 11. ^^^^' ^ ^n proportion to the length of its circumference. 1810. '^^® several posts, moreover, were very strongly June. secured by the nature of the ground. The Coa, with its tributary streams, flowed along the front of the line through the greater part of its extent. In the beginning of June, Massena advanced from Salamanca, to commence the siege of Ciu- dad RodrJgo. He brought with him a consider- able train of artillery ; and the speedy surrender of the place was con6dently anticipated. Not- withstanding the importance which had always been attached to this fortress, it was not in the best state of defence. The works were old, and in many points defective ; there were no bomb- proofs ; and the town itself, though built part- ly on a rock and washed by the Agueda, was not strong, being commanded from many points, and particularly by a height called the Teson. Some new works, however, had been added on the side on which it is most easily acces- sible; a ditch had been dug flanked by two bastions, and exertions made to render the convents without the walls available for [the defence of the approaches. The garrison, under command of General Herrasti, consisted of four 1810. June* thousand nine hundred and fifty men, chiefly chap. x. of the new levies. The population of the town did not much exceed the garrison in number. The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was undertaken with two corps only, that of Regnier being de- tached to the left of the Tagus for the greater facility of procuring subsistence. Early in June the place was in a state of complete investment. The trenches were opened on the night of the eleventh, and the enemy continued to push on the parallels till the twenty-fourth. The con- Jun. 24* vents of Santa Cruz and St. Francisco, si- tuated without the walls, were carried by assault ; and, on the morning of the twenty^ fifth, the enemy opened a heavy fire on the body of the place from a battery of forty-six guns planted on the Teson. By this, and by riflemen stationed in pits, the fire of the garri- son was kept down, and the sap was pushed to the glacis. The besiegers' batteries were then within sixty toises of the place, and the effects of the fire became infinitely more decisive. No- thing, however, could exceed the steadiness and resolution of the garrison. Every inch of ground was manfully disputed, and frequent sorties were made which occasioned great loss. o 2 ^1 322 SURRENDER OF CIUDAD RODRIOO. PROCLAMATION OP MASSENA. 823 1810. Jttlj. CHAP. X. to the besiegers. The place held out till the tenth of July ; and capitulated only when several practicable breaches had been effected, the prin- cipal defences destroyed, and the enemy had assembled in the trenches for the assault The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was carried on almost in the very presence of the British army. The outposts were near enough to hear even the report of rausquetry ; but, with every temp- tation to relieve the brave garrison of the place, Lord Wellington declined assuming the offen- sive. With so large a proportion of his troops half-disciplined and untried, and with so mighty an interest at stake, he could not, without im- prudence, have encountered an enemy so great- ly superior in numbers. It was not his object to risk his army for the sake of petty or temporary triumph ; and having already laid down a plan by which Portugal would eventually be rescued, he could not be induced to swerve from it by any circumstances, however painful to his feel- ings, or apparently derogatory to his reputa- tion. On the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, Massena de- tached a portion of his army to the relief of Astorga, which had been placed by General 1810. July. Mahy in a state of blockade. This object was chap. x. easily effected; and General Echevarria, who was engaged at Alcanizas in organizing a body of raw levies, was surprised by a detachment under General La Croix, and his force was nearly annihilated. On crossing the frontier, Massena issued a proclamation to the Portuguese. The Em- peror, he declared, had placed one hundred and ten thousand men under his orders^ to take possession of the kingdom, and expel the English. It was the wish of Napoleon to conciliate and promote the true interests of the Portuguese people. The English — that insidious people, who for selfish purposes, had involved the country in war and disaster — were their only enemies. " Let the arms they have put into your hands be turned against themselves. Resistance is vain. Can the feeble army of the British General expect to oppose the victo- rious legions of the Emperor ? Already a force is collected sufficient to overwhelm your coun- try. Snatch the moment that mercy and gene- rosity offer! As friends you may respect us, and as friends become the object of our re- spect. As foes you must dread us, and in the 324 THE FRENCH INVEST ALMEIDA. 1810. July. CHAP. X. conflict must be subdued. The choice is now before you, to meet the horrors of a bloody war, to behold your country desolated, your villages in flames, your cities plundered; or to accept an honourable and happy peace, which will ob- tain for you every blessing, that by resistance will be lost for ever.'* On the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, the enemy ad- vanced against Almeida. Fort Conception was blown up on their approach ; and General Craw- ford, with the light division, took post with his left flank resting on the fortress, and his right on the high ground above Val de Mula. Lord Wellington had directed that officer to avoid any engagement with the enemy, and on their approach to fall back across the Coa. General Crawford, however, determined to await the arrival of the French columns, and not to retire till pressed by superior numbers. On the raorn- Jttl. 84. ing of the twenty-fourth the piquets were driven in by the French skirmishers, which covered the advance of their columns. A vigorous attack was then made on Crawford's position, in which the whole corps of Ney was engaged. The British were compelled by superior numbers to give ground, and retreated down the hill to the ,! COMBAT ON THE COA. 325 1810. July. Coa. From the rains the river was unfordable, chap. x. and some confusion took place in crossing the bridge. The rear-guard had to sustain a violent attack, and the French endeavoured to push a body of cavalry across the stream ; but the op- posite bank of the Coa being precipitate, and occupied both by infantry and artillery, the at- tempt, though repeatedly made, was unattend- ed by success. Nor were the enemy's endea- vours to gain possession of the bridge more for- tunate in result. The British, who were posted behind walls which formed a kind of natural retrenchment for its defence, kept up so warm a fire on the assailants, that they were uniform- ly repulsed, notwithstanding their great numeri- cal superiority ; and General Crawford having maintained his new position till evening, fell back under cover of the night. The loss of the light division in this honourable engage- ment amounted to thirty killed, and two hun- dred and seventy wounded. That of the enemy was much more considerable. The French had already commenced thai shameful system of cruelty and plunder, whicli disgraced the army of Massena throughout the- whole of its operations in Portugd. Fven la ( f •1l 326 PROCLAMATION OF LORD WELLINGTON. 1810. Augtut. 9i n CHAP. X. the villages which sahmitted without resistance, the most infamous excesses were committed. The confidence manifested by the unfortunate inhabitants in the promises of Massena was repaid by conflagration, murder, robbery, and violation. A proclamation, therefore, was is- Ang. 4. sued by Lord Wellington, commanding all in- dividuals to remove their effects out of reach of the enemy. ** The Portuguese," said this do- cument, " must now perceive that no other means remain to avoid the evils with which they are threatened, but a determined and vigorous resistance, and a firm resolution to obstruct, as much as possible, the advance of the enemy into the interior of the kingdom, by removing out of his reach every thing that may contribute to his subsistence, or facilitate his progress, flie army under my command will protect as large a portion of the country as is possible ; but it is obvious that the people alone can deliver them- selves by a vigorous resistance, and preserve their goods by removing them beyond the reach of the enemy. The duties, therefore, that bind me to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to the Portuguese nation, oblige me to make use of the power and authority M I MOVEMENT OF THE BRITISH ARMT. 327 1810. August. with which I am intrusted, to compel the care- chap. x. leii and indolent to make the necessary efforts to preserve themselves from the dangers which threaten them, and to save their country. I therefore make known and declare, that all ma- gistrates, and persons in authority, who shall re- main in the villages and towns, after having re- ceived orders from the military officers to re- move from them ; and all persons of whatever class they may be, who shaU maintain the least communication with, or aid and assist the enemy in any manner, shall be considered as traitors to the state, and tried and punished as an of- fence so heinous requires." Almeida being a place of greater strength than Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wellington was en- titled to expect that its defence would have been at least equally protracted, and that the advance of Massena would have been retarded till the commencement of the rainy season, when his difficulties would have been greatly increased. Lest he should determine, however, on push- ing forward without waiting for its surrender, Lord Wellington drew back his divisions from Pinhel and Trancoso, and posted them along the Valley of the Mondego, in rear of Celori- 328 SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF ALMEIDA. 1810. CHAP. X. CO. By this arrangement his army was placed several marches in start of the enemy, and time afforded for a leisurely retreat, whenever that measure should become necessary. Massena, however, had determined to besiege Almeida; but his operations were delayed by the difficulties of the ground, and fire was not o- pened on the place till the twenty-third of August. Aug. 2T. On the twenty-seventh, however, tho town un- expectedly surrendered. The cause of this un- fortunate event was the explosion of a magazine, containing nearly all the ammunition of the place, which destroyed a large portion of the town, and buried the inhabitants in its ruins. The greater number of the guns were dismounted ; Campagnes hufife masses of stone were thrown into the de PortugaL trenches, by which twenty French soldiers were killed ; all the troops employed in guarding the ramparts were swept away by the violence of the shock ; the citadel was overthrown ; and the walls were rent in many places. Under these circumstances, the governor, General Cox, en- deavoured to capitulate, on the condition of being suffered to retire with his garrison. This pro- posal was rejected, and the French again opened fire on the place. On the following day, how- ASSENA VIOLATES THE CAPITULATION. 329 ever, a capitulation was agreed upon, which chap. x. stipulated, that the regular troops should be con- ^ sidered prisoners of war, but that the militia August. should be suffered to return to their homes, on condition of not resuming arms during the con- test. These terms were perfidiously broken by the enemy. A body of twelve hundred militia was forced to serve as pioneers ; and every induce- ment was held out, through the agency of the Marques de Alorna and other Portuguese rene- gades, to prevail on the troops of the line to en- ter the French service, and assist in the subju- gation of their country. As the alternative, in case of refusal, was a French prison, it was not difficult to obtain their assent. Massena, how- ever, did not profit by his dishonesty. Nearly all the men found means to escape, and in a few days rejoined the standard of their country ; and Lord Wellington, indignant at a breach of faith so dishonourable, did not hesitate to re-incor- porate them with his army. The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, in the immediate vicinity of the English army, was made, as might be expected, the subject of unmeasured boasting in the French bul- ill 330 STATE OF FEELING IN ENGLAND. CHAP. X. letiiis. These first successes were hailed as IgjQ the certain forerunners of approaching triumph, September. *"<^ ^^^^ "P to the world as new and unan- swerable proof of the folly of attempting to ob- struct the French armies in their career of con- quest. The siege of the important fortresses in question, it was said, had been carried on under the very eyes of Lord Wellington and his army. Yet he had not dared to advance to their rescue* He had sacrificed his allies, to his fear of French Talour, and of that army which was speedily, by one decisive victory, to drive him from the Peninsula. In England the apprehensions of all classes had been strongly excited ; and the army, ignor- ant of the vast preparations which had been made for the defence of Lisbon, regarded re- treat but as the prelude of embarkation. Even the British Government was hesitating and fear- ful. No precise course was pointed out to Lord Wellington to pursue ; but his instructions were couched in terms which showed the Ministry to be averse from any measures of boldness and hazard. He was directed to avoid all operations by which the safety of the army might be com- promised, and was informed, that his Majesty I .1 FEARS OF THE GOVERNMENT. 331 would be better pleased that the troops should chap. x. be immediately withdrawn, than that their safe embarkation should be risked by unnecessary gepumber. delay. In such circumstances, Lord Wellington, with the firmness and confidence that became him, did not hesitate to assume the whole of that re- sponsibility, from which it was evident, in case of disaster, the Government would be solicitous to escape. In no word or action of this great leader was vacillation discernible. He stood firm and collected, resolute in purpose, when all around him were wavering in hope ; and, in the unfettered exercise of his energies at such a moment, exhibiting a degree of moral intrepidi- ty which it is impossible to contemplate with- out admiration. The Portuguese, aghast at the approach- ing peril, watched with fearful anxiety the ga- thering of the cloud which was about to burst in thunder on their devoted country. The Govern- ment, aware of their own utter helplessness if deserted by England, adopted the only policy by which their country could eventually be saved, and entered with manly earnestness into the views of Lord Wellington. The nobility t U 332 MASSENA ADVANCES INTO FORTUGAL, I CHAP. X. and higher classes, submissive to misfortunes - which they could not avert, were generally September. ^^^^^^^"^ ^^ their adherence to the cause of their country. The lower orders were animated by a detestation of their treacherous enemy, so powerful and unchangeable, that every confi- dence might be placed in their devotion and at- tachment, even in circumstances the most ad- verse. The fall of Almeida left no further obstacle Sep. 16. to the enemy's advance, and on the sixteenth of September, having been joined by the corps of General Regnier, Massena commenced his inarch into Portugal. His army was formed into three columns. Junot's corps advanced by Pinhel and Trancoso ; Ney's by Alverca ; and the third, under Regnier, by Guarda and Ce- lorico. At Vizeu, however, the whole army was concentrated ; and from that point, in one immense body, pursued their march along the road on the right bank of the Mondego. Each French soldier carried provisions for seventeen days ; a period which, at a moderate calculation^ was considered sufficient to enable the army to reach Lisbon. Of the country now to be traversed by the BY THE ROAD ON THE NORTH OF THE MONDEGO. 333 hostile armies it may here be expedient to chap. x. say something. The rojid selected by Massena "7~i ' ^ ^ 1810. for his advance was of the worst description ; ggpt^nj]^, full of natural impediments; and by all the officers, by whom it had been surveyed, consid- ered almost impracticable. The direct, and in every respect preferable, road to Coimbra and Lisbon runs along the left bank of the Monde- go. By this Lord Wellington retreated, in a line nearly parallel with that followed by his op- ponent. Had Massena determined on advancing by the road on the south of the Mondego, he must have previously encountered the Bri- tish army in the strong passes of the Es- trella, a high mountain chain, extending from the Tagus to the Mondego. This, however, did not comport with his project of the campaign ; and, notwithstanding its numerous disadvan- tages, he directed his march along the road to the northward of the river. After passing Vizeu, the road declines from the ridge into a lower and more level country, and is subsequently cross- ed by the Serra de Busaco, which terminates abruptly on the Mondego. On the southern bank of that river there is another range called the Serra de Marcella, which forms 1 11] 334 THE BRITISH HALT IN THE POSITION OF BUSACO, CHAP. X. an obstacle of equal magnitade to the ad- TITT" vance in tbat quarter. To penetrate by any September, tolerable road from Vi«eu into Estremadu- ra, it is necessary to cross one or other of these mountainous chains. Lord Wellington having ascertained the direction of the enemy's inarch, accordingly crossed the Mondego, and occupied the Busaco range with his whole force, and in that strong position awaited the approach of the French army. The corps of General Hill had hitherto been ttationed on the line of the Tagus, in order to protect that route, while the intentions of the ene- my remained dobious ; and General Leith, with the reserve, remained at Thomar, ready to sap- port either Hill or Wellington, as occasion might demand. Both of these divisions, by a rapid and well-regulated march, joined the army on the twentieth, and took post on the ridge of Bn- laco. The position thus occupied consisted of one lofty ridge, extending from the Mondego north- ward, for a distance of about eight miles. It attains an elevation of two hundred and fifty feet above the ground immediately in front, and is covered by gorges and defiles of extreme dif- AND PREPARE TO GIVE BATTLE. 336 If- ficulty. Its principal disadvantage as a posi- chap. x. tion lay in its extent, which was manifestly "" " too great to admit of its being occupied at ^^^^^ / all points by an army not above sixty thousand strong. Some skirmishing had occurred on the twenty- Stp. 25. third, between the light division and the advan- ced guard of the French. The former destroyed the bridge across the Criz, on the road to Coim- bra ; but, on the following day, the river was passed by the leading divisions of the enemy, and on the twenty-sixth, the whole French Sep. 2«. army was concentrated in front of the British position. Even at this period, Massena seems to have formed no just appreciation of the skill and activity of his opponent. He had calculated on deranging his schemes, by the rapidity of his march, and imagined it impossible that the army should have been joined by the corps of General Hill. On reconnoitring the position, therefore, he considered its extent too great to admit of successful defence, and is said to have observed to one of the unworthy Portuguese by whom he WIS surrounded, " I cannot persuade myself that Lord Wellington will risk the loss of his re- 3 I* 336 THE FRENCH ARRIVE IN FRONT OF THE POSITION. DISTRIBUTION OP THE ARMIES. 337 CHAP. X. putation by giving battle; but if he does, I have him ! To-morrow we shall effect the conquest September. 01 Portugal, — and in a few days I shall drown the Leopard !'* The head-quarters of Lord Wellington were fixed in the Convent of La Trappe, which crowns the Serra. From that elevated position, in- deed from the whole summit of the height, the French army were distinctly visible. No sight could be more beautiful and striking. The eye rested on a vast multitude of men, clad in the imposing panoply of war, — their arms glittering in the sun, — standards waving in the air, while the distant sound of the trumpet or bugle load- ed the breeze. Sep. 26. On the evening of the twenty-sixth, the line of battle was formed. The division of General Hill, with those of Leith and Picton on his left, occupied the right of the position. The first division, under Sir Brent Spencer, was in the centre. General Cole's on the left. The light division was advanced somewhat in front of the left and centre. The main body of the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, formed in tho plains in front of Mealhada, and across the Oporto road ; and the brigade of General Fane remain* ed on the left bank of the Mondego, to repel chap. x. any reconnoissance which the enemy might at- tempt in that direction. September. Such was the distribution of the allied army. Daydawn on the twenty-seventh, shewed the Sep. 27. enemy drawn up for immediate attack. The corps of Ney was formed in close column op- posite to the Convent of Busaco. That of Regnier appeared in front of Picton's division, prepared to advance by the road crossing the height St. Antonio de Cantara. Junot's corps was in reserve, with the greater part of the ca- valry, and was posted on some rising ground about a mile in rear of Marshal Ney. In this order, covered by his light troops, the enemy's columns moved on to the at- tack. The abruptness and inequalities of the ascent contributed to cover their advance, and they reached the summit of the ridge without more serious opposition, than the occasional fire of guns posted on the flanking points. It was with the corps of Regnier that the first hostile collision took place. The regiments, in the part of the line to which he penetrated, had not reached the position assigned to them, and for a moment the height was in possession VOL. II. p 1.^.. ir f i SS8 BATTLE OF BUSACO. I ■ CHAP. X. of the enemy. Their leading battalions were in the act of deploying into line, when General Pic- ton, at the head of a few companies hastily col- 1810. September. \^\\ lected, came up, and with these and the light troops, he kept the enemy in play, until joined bv the eighth Portuguese regiment commanded by Major Birmingham, when charging the ene- my's column in flank, he drove them in great confusion down the hill and across the ravine. About a mile on the right, the enemy made strenuous efforts to gain possession of the pass of St. Antonio. These, however, were defeated by the seventy-fourth regiment, and a brigade of Portuguese directed by Colonel Mackinnon, who, without assistance, was enabled to main- tain his post in spite of every eflFort to dislodge him. Notwithstanding the complete discom- fiture of his first attack by General Picton, on the left of the pass, the enemy's column still continued to press forward, and again reached the summit of the height. From this the eighty-eighth regiment, under Colonel Wallace, and four companies of the forty-fifth, dislodged them by a gallant charge; and a brigade of General Leith's division, coming up at the a*me moment, the enemy were borne down f! BATTLE OP BUSACO. 339 the hill with irresistible impetuosity, and desist- chap. x. ed from all further attempt on this part of the position. 1810. The attack of Ney was even less successful ; '''''"'"" with a division of his corps formed in column of mass, he advanced against the height occupied by the light division. During his advance he experienced little opposition, and M^ithout dif- ficulty gained possession of a village situated on the brow of the ascent ; but no sooner did he crown the height, than he found the whole divi- sion of General Crawford, and General Pack's brigade of Portuguese, drawn up to receive him, and his column became exposed to a most destructive fire, both of musquetry and artillery. This, however, was but of short duration,— yet, so long, that the leading regiments of the assail-' ants were almost totally annihilated. A charge of bayonets foUowed ; the whole column was routed, and driven down the hiU with prodigious slaugh- ter. The expression of a French soldier, who was engaged in this attack, and subsequently made prisoner, « Qu'il se laissa rouler du haul Early Cam- en has de la montagne sans savoir comment il'^^g^^^'^^^ echappa;' is sufficiently explanatory of the mode W^»'°'^o"- 340 REPULSE OP THE FRENCH ARMY. CONSEQUENCES OP THE VICTORY, 341 i 1 CHAP. X. in which the remnant of this division effected — — its escape. Se Jtember ^^^"* ®'&^* o*clock in the moming, a fog came on, which, for a time, partially obscured the po- sitions of the two armies ; when the day cleared, however, it was discovered that the French had placed large bodies of light troops in the woods, which skirted the bottom of the Serra. In consequence, a continued skirmishing took place during the day. It was probably the intention of Massena, by this manwuvre, to draw Lord Wellington into an engagement of some consequence, in a situation where the advantage of position should be less decided- ly in his favour. But Lord Wellington was im- moveable. He advanced the brigade of Colonel Pakenham to the support of the light troops, but directed them to retire when pressed, leav- ing his position again open to the enemy, should he think proper to attack it. Massena, however, was but little inclined to avail himself of the facility thus afforded. The day passed without further attack on the British position; and on the approach of night, the French retired from the ground they had occu- pied during the day, and the village, from which chap. x. the light troops had been driven in the mom- ing, was again taken possession of by General ^ September. Crawford. The loss of the French army in this engage- ment amounted to between five and six thousand men, including four General officers, one of whom (Graindorge) was killed; another (Simon) wounded and made prisoner. The British and Portuguese loss did not amount to twelve hun- dred men. About three hundred of the enemy were made prisoners. Though the victory of Busaco exerted little influence on the operations of the campaign, its moral consequences were in the highest degree important. The Portuguese troops, which had hitherto been the object of contempt to some, and of mistrust to all, on that occasion establish- ed their character both for courage and discip- line, and proved that, though exposed for cen- turies to the action of debasing influences, there existed in the unbroken spirit of the people, a germ of high qualities, which, by proper man- agement, might be made to fructify into a glo- rious harvest. The contemned and vilified Portuguese had now fought side by side with i I 342 CONDUCT OF THE PORTUGUESE. 1 ! (HAP. X. British soldiers, and had home themselve*^ "7177"" with honourahle courage. Lord Wellington de- SepteraW. <^lared he had never witnessed a more gallant charge than tliat made on the column of General Regnier, in which the eighth Portuguese regi- ment bore part; and the confidence which he was now enabled to repose in their steadiness and energy, was worth more than a victory, even greater and more splendid in its consequences than that which he had achieved. It was from the meritorious exertions of Marshal Beresford that this result had pro- ceeded. The task allotted him of organizing and habituating the raw levies of the country to a steady and rigid system of discipline, was one for which his powers peculiarly fitted him ; and he performed it well. No man could be more profoundly versed in the minute technicalities of his profession, or more laboriously attentive to the dry mechanical details of military dis- cipline. The extent and value of his services were made known by the battle of Busaco, and, in consequence, he was shortly afterwards re- warded by the knighthood of the Bath. Sep. 28. On the morning of the twenty-eighth, the ar- mies still maintained their respective positions. ttl MASSENA TURNS THE POSITION. 343 and the light infantry were again partially en- chap. x. gaged on the left of the line. Towards mid- day, \fassena having ascertained, from some <^ ^ mb r Portuguese peasants, the existence of a practica- ble road across the Serra de Caramula, leading by Boialvo to Sardao, and the great road from Coimbra to Oporto, he determined to put his army in motion by that route, and thus, by a flfink manoeuvre, to turn the position of the British. In order to conceal his intention, the second corps continued to make demonstrations on the position of the allies, till the baggage and artillery had defiled; but the position of Bu- saco commands an extensive prospect, and towards evening a large body of the French army was observed to be in motion from the left of the centre to the rear, and from thence their cavalry were seen in march along the road leading from Mortagoa across the Serra, in the direction of Oporto. Lord Wellington was at once aware of their purpose, but it was too late to counteract or impede its execution. In truth, the probability of the enemy's at- tempting to turn the position by this route was not unanticipated ; and Colonel Trant, with a body of Portuguese militia, had been fl liSI^ZjaSB^ If 344 THE BRITISH ARMY RETIRES ON LISBON, i m\ CHAP. X. directed to take possession of the strong moun- tain passes in the neighbourhood of Sardao September. ^^^ Avelina. Unfortunately, however, Trant was sent round by Oporto by General Sil- veira, in consequence of a small force of the enemy having occupied St. Pedro de Sul; and notwithstanding every eflfort, he found it im- possible to reach Sardao before the night of the twenty-eighth, when the enemy were already in possession of the ground. By this untoward failure, the French army were suffered to con- tinue their progress unopposed through a series of defiles, which they could not otherwise have passed without severe loss. On ascertaining the movement of the French army, Lord Wellington gave instant orders to quit the position of Busaco, and continue the retreat. With the main body of the army he moved on Coimbra, while the corps of General Hill retired on Santarem by Espinhel and Tho- mar. Colonel Trant was ordered to take post with his corps along the northern bank of the Vouga ; and a body of militia was directed to en- ter Vizeu, in order to cut off the enemy's com- munication with Spain. The banks of the Mondego are generally high AND REACHES LEIRIA. 345 and rugged, presenting many favourable posi- chap. x. tions in which the passage of the French army might have been successfully opposed. But ^^^^' 1 , ,. September. such was not the policy of the British Gene- ral. With a more advantageous position in prospect, he resisted every temptation to fight a second battle on the Mondego ; and, crossing the river on the thirtieth, he continued his re- treat to Leiria, where he arrived on the second of October. During the whole march, the October, cavah-y, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, covered the rear of the army, and were engaged in se- veral affairs with the enemy's advance. The army halted in Leiria till the morning of the fifth, when Lord Wellington, having ascer- Oct 5. tained that the enemy were coming on in force, gave orders that the retreat should be resumed. Massena had entered Coimbra on the first, where he hoped, by the rapidity of his marches, to have come up with the rear of the British army. Deceived in this, he immediately pushed forward to Condeixa. There the exhaustion of his troops, and the want of provisions, compelled him to halt till the third. With a degree of imprudence, utterly unaccountable, the large stores of Coimbra, instead of being reserved for p2 ||! ■i4 ■"••^r^r ^i^^l.." ^-;: ^,.W^ 1^ -Wm'r~''9m^'- ■■ T-r5a-«!S^ ;:a!^&iB!"'- 346 THE INHABITANTS ACCOMPANY 1810. October. Oct. 9. Ifli CHAP. X. the regular supply of the army, were suffered to become the subject of pillage to the soldiery. But the immediate wants of the troops having been thus satisfied, the pursuit was continued ; and the wounded, whose transport had hitherto been a serious impediment to the army in its rapid advance, were left in hospital at Coimbra. In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington and Gen- eral Hill continued their retreat by leisurely marches ; and on the ninth the former reached Sobral and Torres Vedras ; the latter Alhandra on the Tagus. The proclamations which had been issued requiring the inhabitants to fall back on the approach of the enemy, and the fearful memory they entertained of the former barbarous atrocities perpetrated by the French troops, induced the whole population of the country traversed by the armies to fly from their dwellings, bearing with them all the pro- perty for which conveyance could be procured. The British army, during its retreat, was ac- companied by crowds of miserable and despair- ing creatures, driven forth as outcasts; and, though escaping with life, yet destitute of all means by which life could be supported. They quitted their homes— the scenes of all their THE ARMY ON ITS RETREAT. 347 1810. October. hopes, their memories, and their affections, in chap. x. the conviction that they were never again to behold them. Mothers with infants at their breasts ; children happy in their ignorance, and smiling amid the scene of desolation which sur- rounded them ; palsied grandsires smiling too in the second infancy of dotage ; men robust and vigorous, with features wrenched by strong agony of the spirit ;— the blind, the maimed, the cripple, the diseased, all animated by the com- mon and overpowering motive of escaping from the savage cruelties of the invaders, were seen crowding the roads, and flying for protection to the capital. The multitude of sufferers increased as the army approached Lisbon. The wayside became strewed with articles of furniture which the wretched fugitives were unable to carry far- ther. Those who, in the weariness of exhaust- ed nature, had cast themselves on the ground, started up with unnatural and convulsive energy to renew their journey, on learning that the enemy's columns were approaching. — But it is useless to enlarge on a spectacle of suffering of which the pen can give no adequate description. By no one who bore part in that memorable re- f^ p: 348 THE BRITISH ARMY ENTERS THE LINES CHAP. X. treat, can it ever be forgotten. Other scenes may fade in the changes of succeeding years, or pe- October ^^^^ utterly from the memory,— the impression of this can be eiflFaced only by death. Oct. 10. On the tenth the British army moved into its position in the lines prepared for its reception, and on the day following was joined by the Marques de la Romana, with about six thousand Spaniards from the Alentejo. When Lord Wellington commenced his re- treat from the frontier, it had been the im- pression of all ranks, that his intention was to embark, and finally relinquish a contest too unequal to be maintained with any pros- pect of success ; but the measured, leisurely, and imposing manner in which the retreat was conducted ; the knowledge that not an article of baggage had been sacrificed ; that during th« whole movement the infantry had never seen the enemy, but to defeat him on the heights of Busaco ; and that, in the engagements of caval- ry, the balance of success had uniformly been in favour of the allies,— contributed in some de- gree to restore confidence, and gave rise to a vague yet powerful hope that a retreat, in all re- spects so admirable, was not destined to termin- OP TORRES VEDRAS. 349 18J0. October. ate in embarkation. It was not, however, till chap. x. the army reached the lines of Torres Vedras, that the full tribute of admiration was paid to the skill and prescience of its leader. There the troops at once found themselves placed in a strongly fortified position, in which they might securely bid defiance to the utmost efforts of the enemy. On the tenth, Massena advanced to Sobral, Oct. la and drove out the force by which it was occupied. Then it was that he first became aware of the formidable position in which the allied army awaited his approach. He instantly halted ; and as soon as it was dark a retrogressive movement WM made, and three days elapsed before he again ventured to advance. From this circum- stance it was easy to infer his dismay at the un- expected strength of Lord Wellington's position. For several days he was engaged in recon* noitring the ground ; and though the chief fea- tures of its strength remained concealed, what he saw was, to an eye so experienced, enough to convince him of the extent and character of the obstacles opposed to his progress. From the first, therefore, he appears to have given up all intention of attack, and placed two ^"^^^ a*'''"'*^- fc' ».«F*-»»-.i 350 MASSENA GOES INTO POSITION. 1810. October. i||j CHAP. X. corps of his army in bivouac, on a range of heights extending from Villa Franca on the Ta- gus, in an arc, almost concentric with that occu- pied by the allies. Part of Ney*s corps was sta- tioned at Otta and Villa Nova, and the re- mainder occupied the villages along the banks of the river. At this period, several partial af- fairs alone brought the armies into collision. On Oct. 14. the morning of the fourteenth, a sharp skirmish took place with the piquets near Zibreira, on the main road to Lisbon ; and on the same day an attack was made on a redoubt at the foot of the mountain behind Sobral, which formed part of the British position. The garrison consisted of the seventy-first regiment, under the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Cadogan. The enemy ad- vanced to the assault, and were bravely repulsed; but not satisfied with this success, the seventy- first advanced, in turn, and driving the French from a redoubt they had erected near that of the British, triumphantly maintained it. This gallant exploit was performed in sight of both armies. Massena desisted from further eft'orts, and no event of any consequence occurred for several weeks. Of this period of inaction we shall take advantage, to offer a brief and THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. 351 1810. general description of the celebrated position chap. x. occupied by the allies. Lisbon stands at the extremity of a peninsula, the neck of which is crossed by several rugged and mountainous chains, stretching from the Tagus in a semicircular direction towards the sea, — a distance of about thirty miles. Along these, considerably below the point where the river ceases to be fordable, two lines of defence had been selected, — one considerably in advance of the other, — both of the greatest natural strength. To add to their security the whole resources of military science had been lavished. Moun- tains were scarped perpendicularly ; insignificant streams were dammed into inundations ; forts of the most formidable description were erected on the heights ; all roads by which the enemy could advance were broken up and obstruct- ed, and at every part enfiladed with cannon ; new ones were formed to facilitate the com- munications of the defensive army; the weak- er points of the position were strengthened by the construction of works and retrenchments ; batteries were planted on posts inaccessible; and every measure had been adopted by which the position could be rendered favourable for M ?'? -f^E^ — 352 TBB LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. 1810. CHAP. X. offensive operations, whenever such should be assumed. The right of the first line rested on the village of Alhandra on the Tagus, and was flanked by a flotilla of gun-boats, which occasioned great annoyance to the enemy. The road leading to the town, which forms the principal approach to Lisbon, was completely broken up, and ren- dered impassable, by every obstruction which ingenuity could devise. This most important part of the position was occupied by the division of General Hill, with that of General Crawford on its left. General Spencer's division was in the centre; and General Picton's and General Cole's continued the line of defence from Torres Vedras to the sea. Considerably in rear of the former, was a se- cond line of defence, of features nearly similar, and possessing advantages of equal magnitude and importance. At different places a series of works had been erected, covering the commu- nication between them ; and thus, even had the first position been carried by the enemy, he would still have found his approach to the ca- pital obstructed by a barrier of immense strength. On the southern bank of the Tagus, the heights THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. 353 1810. commanding the city and anchorage of Lisbon, chap. x. were fortified ; and a corps, consisting chiefly of marines from the fleet, allotted to defend them. Strong retrenchments were likewise thrown up around Fort St. Julian at the en- trance of the Tagus, in order to secure the em- barkation of the army, should the enemy suc- ceed in forcing the lines of Torres Vedras. The whole extent of the position was strong in the most emphatic sense of that term. To call it impregnable would be idle, because no accessible position is so ; but it certainly pre- sented no avenue of approach, by which the ene- my could elude encountering the full strength of the defensive army, or avoid being met by obstacles, which an immense numerical superior- ity could alone afford the prospect of combating with success. Independently, however, of the circumstances to which we have alluded, another prominent advantage of the position yet remains to be no- ticed. To the westward of Sobral, a huge ridge called the Monte Junto takes its rise, and stretches in a long unbroken chain to the north- ward, for a distance of about fifteen miles. There were no roads by which this mountain could be I" 354 RETROSPECT OP THE CAMPAIGN. 1810. m HI CHAP. X. traversed ; and it unquestionably added great- ly to the strength of the position oecnpied by the allies. In case of attack, the forces on the diflferent sides of the Monte Junto could lend no support to each other, since, in order to communicate, it was necessary to make the detour of its northern extremity — a march of nearly two days. The communications of Lord Wellington, on the contrary, between every branch of his position, were secure and easy ; and, in the course of a few hours, the great mass of his forces could be brought to the defence of any point the safety of which might be endangered. Let us now cast a passing retrospect over the operations of the campaign. From the first, it was evidently the intention of Massena to break in, by the rapidity of his movements, on the de- fences of his opponent ; to afford him no rest or breathing-time, but to force him at once to battle, or drive him headlong to his ships. So long as Regnier's corps remained in Estrema- dura, it was considered possible by Lord Wel- lington that Massena might push forward the main body of his army by Castello Branco and Abrantes. But, by that route, it would RETROSPECT OF THE CAaiPAIGN. 355 1810. have been necessary to force the strong position chap. x. of Sarzedas, and the defences of the Zezere. Had he followed the road along the northern bank of the Mondego, he would have been met in the passes of the Estrella mountains, and at the Ser- ra de Marcella. But the main object of Massena being to reach Lisbon, and by one decisive battle to terminate the campaign, he took the only route by which it was possible to advance, in ra- pid and uninterrupted march on the capital. True, he fought at Busaco ; but his doing so, was a blunder of the first magnitude, and convinced of this error, he instantly resumed the prosecution of his project, by turning the left of the position, and continuing his advance. During his march he left no garrisons behind him ; he occupied no posts even to secure his communication with Spain ; but sacrificing every thing to the maintenance of his numerical superiority, in the anticipated battle, he pushed resolutely forward in pursuit of the allied army. As he advanced, his difficulties increased. His communications with Spain were speedily cut off"; the country through which he passed was deserted ; the villages were tenantless ; and m 356 RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN. COIMBRA TAKEN BY COLONEL TRANT. 357 1810. i CHAP. X. for provisioning his army, he relied only on the supplies which Coimbra might afford. The road by which Lord Wellington retired from Celorico to the Ponte de Marcella was greatly superior to that followed by the French. To prevent hurry and confusion in his move- ments, he had thrown his army across a difficult country, several stages in advance, and thus en- sured the advantiige of being able to intercept the enemy's advance. To afford still great- er leisure for his movements, the bridges over the Dao and the Criz were destroyed by the light division ; and the army, crossing the Mondego, halted in the position of Busaco. There his left flank was liable to be turned, and Lord Wellington knew it ; but he knew also, should this manoeuvre be adopted, that time would still be afforded for a leisurely retreat ; and he wished to give confidence to his Portu- guese troops, by braving the enemy's army, in a favourable position. Great moral advantages resulted from this victory. The retreat from Busaco to Torres Vedras was felt by all to be the march of a victorious army falling back on its resources. There was nothing fugitive in the 1810. October. heart or spirit of the troops. The movement, chap, x though retrogressive, was attended by all the exhilaration of an advance. To the enemy it was an advance, but accompanied by all the depres- sion of a previous defeat, — of increasing diffi- culties, and accumulating privations. With Lord Wellington's arrival at Torres Vedras, the hour of triumph came. It was a triumph of which the greatest General, of whom history bears record, might have been proud. It was the triumph of consummate skill, prudence, and foresight, and the more glorious, because to the victors it was bloodless. In all the other vic- tories which Wellington has given to our annals, the courage, steadiness, and discipline of British troops, claim — and rightly claim — a large share of the awarded honour. Here it was all his own. The wreath of Waterloo may be divided ; but the brows of Wellington alone can be encircled by that of Torres Vedras. Massena had scarcely gone into position when he received intelligence that Coimbra, contain- ing all his wounded, had been captured by a corps of Portuguese militia under Colonel Trant. Trant had marched to Mealhada with the view of joining the corps under General Miller, but not ■4 358 THE enemy's communications CUT OFF. I "i ckAP. X. meeting liim, and hoping to take the enemy by IgTQ surprise, he resolved to advance alone against October. Coimbra. Near Fornos, he fell in with a French detachment, which he succeeded in cutting off and overpowering. The cavalry were then sent forward to occupy the road to Lisbon, while the infantry advanced against the town. The re- sistance oC the garrison was trifling : and the place surrendered at discretion, on a promise that the French soldiers should be protected from the violence and insults of the peasantry. The number of prisoners amounted nearly to five thousand. Three thousand five hundred musquets were t.iken and distributed to the Ordenenza of the country. The greater part of the prisoners were conveyed by Trant to Oporto, and the corps of General Miller and Colonel Wilson remained at Coimbra. These continued to scour the country ; and, in a few days, nearly four hundred of the enemy — chief- ly stragglers from the foraging parties — were made prisoners. To this number, each succeed- ing day brought new additions, and the difficulty of Massena in provisioning his army daily in- creased. The several Portuguese corps at Ou- rem, Peniche, Obidos, Abrantes, and on the DIFFICULTY OF SUBSISTING HIS ARMY. 359 1810. November. frontiers of Beira, formed a complete and con- chap, x nected cord on every side, and intercepted the whole of his communications. In truth, the French army possessed nothing of the country but the ground on which it stood. Had the orders of the government for the de- struction of all stores which could not be re- moved, been duly executed, it would have been impossible for the enemy to have remained a- bove a week in his position. But in many cases, the grain, instead of being destroyed, had been concealed in pits, which were discovered either by the treachery of servants or the sagacity of French soldiers ; and frequently the work of destruction had been delayed till the approach of the enemy rendered it impossible. It was from such sources that the supplies of the in- vading army were principally drawn. Massena remained above a month in his po- sition in front of Torres Vedras. The piquets of the armies were close to each other, but by tacit agreement no acts of hostility took place. About the beginning of November, the sick of his army increased so rapidly from exposure to the weather, and deficiency of provisions, that Massena detached the division of Delaborde to 2 l0»1 I ll III 360 THE FRENCH RETIRE TO SANTAREM. CHAP. X. occupy Santarem, with the view of forming au hospital, as well as to assist the foraging parties N vember ^^ ^^^' quarter. He likewise threatened A- brantes, and occupied ViUa Velha, with the in- tention of crossing the Tagus. In order to pre- vent this, General Fane, with a brigade of ca- valry, was detached to the southward of the river, with directions to advance along the mar- gin of the river, and destroy all boats, built or in process of building, within the reach of his guns. Nov. 14. At length, on the night of the fourteenth No- vember, the French army broke up from its en- campment, and retired to a line of cantonments extending from Santarem to Thomar. The line which had now been assumed by the enemy was stnmg. The left flank was secure, being bound- ed by the Tagus ; and the cavalry was chiefly posted on the right, which was without natural support. An advanced corps was strongly en- trenched on the heights of Santarem, behind the Rio Mayor ; and a post was established at Pun- hete, in the rear, with a bridge across the Zezere. The head-quarters of Massena were established at Torres Novw. On the retreat of the enemy Lord Wellington 1 AND ARE FOLLOWED BY LORD WELLINGTON. 361 immediately put his troops in motion to follow chap. x. him. But as the intentions of Massena were " uncertain, the division of General Picton, 'as a November measure of precaution, remained in its position at Torres Vedras, and the remainder of the army was brought opposite to Santarem. A report from General Fane, that the baggage was retiring towards Thomar, at first induced Lord Vyellington to believe that Massena was re- treating to the frontier. Under this impression some movements of attack were made by the light division and the brigade of General Pack ; but the enemy remaining firm, and displaying a considerable force, the columns were withdrawn, and no further demonstration was attempted. The allied army then went into cantonments at Alcoentre, Rio Mayor, Azembuja, Alenquer, and Villa Franca, and head-quarters were estab- lished at Cartaxo. The corps of General Hill was thrown across the Tagus, and occupied the villages of Barcos, Chamusca, and Caregiro. Should the enemy, in consequence of reinforce- ments, think proper to advance. Lord Welling- ton was thus prepared to fall back on the lines, and equally so to seize, by a prompt movement, VOL. II. Q U n 362 STATE OF LISBON. 1810. November. CHAP. X on any advantage which circumstances might place within his grasp. The state of Lisbon during the period mark- ed by the events we have just narrated, merits record. When the army commenced its retro- gressive movement from the frontier, the inha- bitants of the capital were filled with apprehen- sion and dismay. The richer classes thought only of securing their wealth ; commerce was at a stand, and a gloomy foreboding of approaching misfortune, overcame that lightness and buoy- ancy of spirit, for which the inhabitants of more southern and genial climates are generally re- markable. The entrenchments which had been formed round Fort St. Julian gave rise to the belief that the object of the retreat was embar- kation ; but no sooner had Lord Wellington as- sumed his position at Torres Vedras, than con- fidence was immediately restored, and the busi- ness and the pleasures of life went on in their ordinary routine. The measures dictated by humanity for supplying the wants of the multi- tude which had been driven in on the capital from the surrounding country, were speedily adopted. Hospitals and public buildings were allotted for their accommodation, and a general 1 STATE OP LISBON. 363 feeling of security pervaded the city, nt a mo- chap. x. ment when the enemy were within a march of ^ its walls. This was a singular state of things, NovemW. and differing greatly from what Massena had expected. He calculated on the occurrence of tumult and insurrection, and that the people, goaded by famine, would welcome the approach of the French army, less as conquerors, than as liberators of the capital from a state of un- endurable privation. These hopes were belied by the event. In Lisbon provisions were dear, but there existed neither danger nor apprehension of famine. The provinces of Alentejo and Algarve, the great granaries of the kingdom, were free from the enemy, and yielded considerable supplies; ships from America and England were daily arriving, and maize was easily imported from the coast of Barbary. During the remainder of the year, both ar- mies remained quiet in their cantonments, and few occurrences of any importance took place. The country to the east of Santarem is fertile and abundant; and, being removed from the line of advance followed by the French army, the orders issued by the Regency had been 11 11 y 364 GARDANNE REPULSED BY THE MILITIA. CHAP. X. generally evaded. The inhabitants, deeming jgj^ themselves secure, took no measures for the December, destruction or removal of the stores, on which their own subsistence and that of their families depended, nor was it till enveloped by the French cavalry, that they were undeceived. The consequence was, that but a small pro- portion of the corn had been carried off, and the enemy for some time enjoyed abundant supplies. Soon after his arrival in front of Torres Ve- dras, Massena had despatched General Foy to Paris, to explain his situation to the Emperor,^ and urge the necessity of large reinforcements. • Massena, in his report to the Emperor, transmitted by General Foy, represented the battle of Busaco as a false attack made to facilitate his object of turning the position, and con- Tcrted only by the ardour of his troops into a serious engage- ment. The capture of Coimbra by the Portuguese, he stated to have been the result of a mistake, and that his intention was to have garrisoned the town, &c. « Ce rapport," says Colonel Guingret, in his Narrative of the Campaign, "montre que lea « generaux memes deguisent parfois la verite aux Princes, « dont ils ont toute la confiance." As we presume this gene- ralization of a particular delinquency is intended only to ap- ply to his own countrymen, we have no inclination either to narrow its latitude, or dispute its justice. But what would be said in England, of an officer in command of an army, who should attempt to deceive his Sovereign, by the assertion of a deliberate falsehood ! DROUET EFFECTS A JUNCTION WITH MASSENA. 365 As the arrival of these, however, could not be chap. x. speedily expected. General Gardanne, command- ing on the Agueda, was directed to forward a r.^^^?* , I3ecemb«r. supply of ammunition for the immediate neces- sities of the army. That officer, with a corps of three thousand men, accordingly attempted to perform the required service, and advancing by Castello Branco, had nearly reached the French posts on the Zezere, wlien, alarmed by a report that Massena was retreating, he precipitately retraced his steps, abandoning the convoy, and harassed in his retreat by the Portuguese militia. General Drouet, who had recently moved for- ward to the Coa, then determined, with a corps of ten thousand men, to open a communication with Massena. He advanced for that purpose, by the road on the left of the Mondego, and en- countered little opposition on his march. To- wards the end of December the junction was Dec 26. effected without difficulty, and the troops of General Drouet were placed in cantonments round Leiria to strengthen the right flank of the army. In order to disperse the militia, a corps of eight thousand men, under General Claparede, li 366 CLAPAREDE DEFEATS THE MILITIA. 1810. December. CHAP. X. was posted in the neiglibourhood of Guarda. The irregulars, under (General Silveira, impru- dently suffered themselves to be drawn into an engagement wliicli terminated in their defeat. They were pursued across the Douro with con- siderable loss, when Claparede, whose chief ob- ject was to ke*'p open the communication be- tween Almeida and Santarem, judged it prudent to retrace his steps. The consequences of this check, however, were only temporary. The militia, commanded by officers of skill and acti- vity, were gradually acquiring confidence, and occasioned on all sides the greatest annoyance to the enemy. END OF VOLUME II. XDINBURGH : PRINTED BT J. JOHKSTOKXy 18, ST. iAMES*8 SQUARE. NOTE. In page 15 of the present Volume it is sta- ted, that the officers of Sir Jolm JMoore's per- sonal staff did not attempt to conceal their dis- satisfaction at the resolution of retreat adopted by their leader. This assertion, though made on what certainly did appear satisfactory autho- rity, we now find to be erroneous. By a com- munication with which we have been favoured by Colonel George Napier, we learn tliat the officers on the personc^l staff of Sir John JVfoore, 80 far from expressing dissatisfaction with any measure lie thought proper to adopt, entertain- ed on every occasion the most perfect reliance on the wisdom of his judgment. On the authority of this distinguished officer, tlierefore, we have great pleasure in correcting an error, unplea- sant to the feelings of tliose immediately con- cerned, and which, by passing uncontradicted in contemporary narratives, must in some degree have contributed to corrupt the future sources of history. '■ti. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY "^11 -J »,»;►, - '..-^ Tti ''^(^^ ^:. -^ i IK*: »^ »L > ■Wl K •»^^ ^; tHff .?yi ^^Jj'y.-'^'^', "ft ^»-., -f ^-V: *ji'*_„jP-^ %^1 » -, ; 1 ' i y/V'.Vifvt^-*',, .:»^'tij^;v;S;. %ii5i';="^- J^feiu."Mr^ ISS^5^*WJ Columbia College Library MadiBon Av. and 49tli St. New TTork. 6 B.siJe th. ma,. upU tku b<«k aiu lr.«t, esa surrenders — Movements of the Guerillas.— Battle of Mur. viedro— The town surrenders,— Suchet approaches Valencia. CHAPTER VL Marmont and Dorsenne advance to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo.— Position of the allied army — Ciudad Rodrigo relieved Affair of El Bodon — The Allies retire on Guinaldo Lord Wellington ialls back on the Coa.— Marmont reUres to Ciudad Rodrigo.— Ope- rations of General HilL—Affkir of Arroyo de Molinos.— Hill ad- vances on Merida.— Success of Ballasteros in the South.— Siege of Tariffa.— Suchet advances.— Siege and surrender of Valencia- Conduct of Blake. CHAPTER VIL Measures of Lord Wellington for supporting his army.—Move- ments of Marmont.— Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo by Lord Welling. CONTENTS. Ill ton — It is carried by assault. — Loss of the allies. — Gratitude of the Spanish nation.— Defeat of Lacy Reduction of Peniscola.— Success of Ballasteros at Cartama. CHAPTER VIIL Plans of Lord Wellington— He besieges Badajos — Its fall.— Observations — Movements of Soult — The Spaniards threaten Se- ville.— Lord Wellington moves on Almaraz. — Attack on Almaraz : — Jt is carried by assault CHAPTER IX. Difference between the Emperor Alexander and Napoleon State and force of the French armies — Lord Wellington moves on Salamanca. — Si^e of the Forts— Their capture. — Marmont re- tires behind the Douro — Lord Wellington takes post on the Douro — Movements of Marmont — Affair of Canizal The ar- mies move into position. — Manoeuvres of Marmont Battle of Salamanca — Results of the Battle.— The French retreat in con- fusion. — Lord Wellington advances on Madrid — Is received with joy in the capital — Consequences of the Battle of Salamanca.— Movements of General Hill. CHAPTER X. Perilous situation of Lord Wellington at Madrid.— He deter- mines to retire to the north — Siege of Burgos The Siege is raised — Sir Rowland Hill retreats Movements of Soult and Jourdan — The allied array retreats.— Action at Cabe^on. — The British cross the Douro at Tudela.— The Allies retire on Sala- manca.— Manoeuvres of the hostile armies.— Lord Wellington re- treats to the frontiers of Portugal.— Clamours in England Ob- servations oa the conduct of Lord Wellington. CHAPTER XL Relative state of the belligerents.— Events in the north of Eu- rope. — Napoleon baffled in Russia. — Military occurrences in Spain. —Preparations for opening the campaign Position of the allied . CONTENTS. .rmi.,.-Adv.n« of the dlied .rmy.-Tl.. F«nch driven from ^Umanc-The alU«l army er»ses fteDouro.-J»epb .b«.do» M ~cd join, the Freoch .™y ou the Dour.guer--S^eg^ ^ Tarragona—The siege rais«lon the approach of SucheU-Obser- J^t ons on the conduct of Sir John Murray.-Tarragona mvested ;;L„ri William Bentinck._Movements of th. arm.es._Affa.r ofOrdal. CHAPTER XIII. State of the war in relation to France—SouU assumes command. _The French army reinforced. -The situation of Lord We hog- ton becomes precarious-Position of the allied army.-Soult as- sumes the offensive-Attack on Maya-Attack on Ronces.alles. ^Retreat of the allies-Their position.-Battle of Sauroren.- Soult driven from his position-His movements and retreat. CHAPTER XIV. Sieffe of St. Sebastian._Its capture— Observations on the siege. _MovementsofSoult-Attack on St Marcial-Soult is defeat- ed :— Recrosses the Bidassoa. CHAPTER XV. Lord Wellington crosses the Bidassoa— The French driven back on Nivelle—Proclamation of Lord Wellington—Discipline en- forced by him— Soulf s position on the Nivelle.-He is attacked by CONTENTS. y Lord WeUington— Battle of the Nivelle.— The allied army go into cantonments — Operations on the Nive — The French driven into Bayonne.— Soult again assumes the offensive Attack on the left wing and light division.—Soult, repulsed, changes his plans :— Attacks Sir Rowland Hill with his whole force :— Is repulsed :— Draws off his troops.— Observations._Affairs of Catalonia—Se- cret treaty of Napoleon with Ferdinand The Cortes refuse to ratify it— Total discomfiture of the French — Napoleon returns to Palis.— His speech to the Senate.— Moderation of the Confederates. CHAPTER XVL Position of the hostile armies — Arrival of the Duke of Angou- leme at the British head-quarters — Movements of the armies.— S.>ult takes post at Sauveterre — Operations in front of Bayonne. —Passage of the Adour — Soult driven back Battle of Orthez.— Retreat of the French array :_Pursued by the British.— Defeat of the French at Aire.— Plans of Soult— Marshal Beresford marches on Bordeaux, accompanied by the Duke of Angouleme.— Loyalty oftheBordelais.— Conduct of Napoleon.— Congress at Chatillon. —Affairs of Vic Bigorre and Tarbes.— Soult retreats to Toulouse : —His position — Wellington recrosses the Garonne— Battle of Toulouse — Soult abandons Toulouse.— Sortie from Bayonne Oc- currences in Spain — Restoration of Ferdinand :_His proclama- tion :— He enters Madrid— Results of the war. t ii ANNALS OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS, " NUNC IGITUR, NUNC CGELO ITEKUM VICTRICIA SISNA (res EGET his ARMIS FT BKLLATORIBUS ISTls) eliva, it accei.era pugilks armare britannos." Baptista Mantuanus. ANNALS OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS. CHAPTER I. 1810. ANDALUSIA— ARRAGON— CATALONIA. Those disposed to attribute to the imbecility chap. i. of the government, the successive disasters which had befallen the Spanish armies, na- turally looked forward with anxiety to the Convention of the Cortes. By decree of the Supreme Junta, before quitting Seville, that representative body was directed to assemble in the Isla de Leon, and a code of instruc- tions was promulgated, directing the mode and principles of election. All cities which had VOL. iir. j^ J&USXE3BSi- V 1810. 2 CONSTITUTION OF THE CORTES. CHAP. I. sent representatives to the last assembly were to retain their privilege. The provincial Juntas were each empowered to elect a member, and the population of the provinces was to be re- presented by delegates, in the proportion of one to every fifty thousand inhabitants. Besides these, sixty-eight supplementary deputies were to be chosen in the different provinces as a re- presentative corps de reserve y from which all vacancies by death or otherwise were to be filled up. Nobles, plebeians, and secular priests, were declared equally within the pale of election ; and the only qualifications demanded were, that the person chosen should have attained the age of twenty-five years, and should hold no pen- sion or office of emolument under government. A temporary arrangement was made with regard to the representation of the American Colonies. It was agreed that twenty-six mem- bers should be added for that portion of the monarchy, including the Columbian and Philip- pine islands ; and, in order to obviate delay, it was arranged that these should, in the first in- stance, be chosen from the natives of those de- pendencies then resident in Spain. It was the intention of the Supreme Junta to have balanced THE CORTES MEET AT CADIZ. 3 1810. the influence of this popular assembly, by another chap. i. composed of the grandees, and dignitaries of the church, but this part of the project was not car- ried into effect. Many difficulties occurred in the election of members ; nor was it till the twenty-fourth Sep- Sep. 24. tember that the meeting, so anxiously expect- ed, took place. At nine in the morning of that day the deputies assembled at the Constitutional Hall in Cadiz, and walked in solemn procession to the Cathedra], where high mass was perform- ed by the Cardinal Archbishop de Bourbon. The oath was then adminisitered; and, after a discourse from the Bishop of Orense, the as- sembly at once entered on its high functions. One of the first acts of the Cortes was a de- cree declaratory of their own character and pri- vileges, and of the indefeasible rights of Fer- dinand to the throne of Spain. They pronounced the invalidity of any cession of the crown in favour of the French Emperor, and ordained that no member of the Cortes should accept of pension, honour, or reward from the Executive. In the proceedings of this assembly, a disposi- tion was speedily evinced to engage in matters of abstract and speculative legislation, little ap- 1 ^m 1810. 4 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CORTES. CHAP. I. plicable to the circumstances of the crisis. On the motion of the eloquent and patriotic Arguel- les, the state of the press in Spain became the sub- ject of discussion, and a decree emanated from the assembly, removing many of the restrictions un- der which it had laboured. A committee was appointed to inquire into the best means of ac- celerating the despatch of causes before the tri- bunals. It was ordained, that all prisoners ac- cused of crimes should be brought to trial, with- out the intervention of any unnecessary delay. The judicial authorities were directed frequently to visit the prisons within their jurisdiction, and every two months to transmit, through the Re- gency to the Cortes, an accurate account of the causes pending in the courts of law, and of prisoners charged with criminal offences. Such matters of legislative enactment are un- questionably, in every civil community, of the first importance ; but the moment when the ar- mies of the enemy extended from Cadiz to the Pyrenees, was scarcely the most proper for their calm and deliberate consideration. At such a crisis, to animate the courage of the people, to organize the irregular levies of the provinces, to consolidate their strength and direct their efforts, THE DUKE OP ORLEANS. 5 should have been the paramount, if not the ex- chap. i. elusive objects of the Spanish Government. In the preceding year, the Duke of Orleans then resident at Palermo, made offer of his services to the Central Junta. This had been declined ; but the Regency soon after their in- stallation invited him to assume the command in the provinces on the northern frontier, im- agining that the presence of a Bourbon Prince, of acknowledged talent, courage, and activity, would contribute to animate the population, and occasion considerable embarrassment to the French government. The Duke of Orleans immediately prepared to take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded. He sailed for Malta, and from August thence to Tarragona, where he issued a proclamation, inviting all true Frenchmen as well as Spaniards, to rally round the sUindard raised by a Bourbon for the subversion of that tyrannical usurpation by which both nations were oppressed. The Duke then proceeded to Cadiz, October, and was received with all the honours due to his rank, but the Cortes refused to sanction the ap- pointmept of the Regency, and he shortly after-* wards returned to Palermo. CHANGE IN THE REGENCY. EXPEDITION UNDER LORD BLAYNEY. CHAP. I 1810. Towards the end of October a change took place in the council of Regency. The Cortes displaced them, alleging as a cause, the repeated solicitations they had made to be relieved from office. Their successors were Blake, at that time commanding in Murcia ; Don Pedro Agar, A naval officer ; and Don Gabriel Cisgar, gover- nor of Carthagena. Neither Blake nor Cisgar were then present ; and the jMarqiies del Palacio and Don Joseph Maria Puig were selected, ad interim, for the vicarious exercise of their Amo- tions. At the ceremony of installation, Palacio ventured to express some scruples with regard to the inaugural oath, which he deemed inconsis- tent with the perfect allegiance due to Ferdin- and the Seventh. The Cortes then declared him to have forfeited the confidence of the nation, and appointed the Marques de Castellar to fill his place in the Regency. Till the close of the year, few discussions of importance took place. A project for regu- lating the representation of the colonies was passed into a law. It was unanimously voted that a public monument should be erected to the British monarch, as a testimony of the national gratitude ; and it was proclaimed that the Span- ish people would never lay down their arms chap. i. while a Frenchman remained within the Py- loIU. renees, nor till they had secured the indepen- dence and absolute integrity of the monarchy in both hemispheres. While such occurrences were passing within the walls of Cadiz, the city was still leaguered by the French army. Early in October, Mar- shal Soult received intelligence that an expe- dition was preparing to alarm the coast near Malaga ; and orders were sent to Sebastian! di- recting him to be in readiness to repulse the * meditated attack. On the twelfth, a corps of Oct. i«. nearly four thousand British and Spanish troops, under Major-General Lord Blayney, sailed from Cadiz, and on the fourteenth landed to the west- ward of Frangirola, about four leagues from Ma- laga. The object of this expedition was to gain potsession of the fort, which was occupied only by a small detachment. Had Lord Blayney suc- ceeded in this object, he was then to have gar- risoned the fort, and have re-embarked the re- mainder of his troops, in order to induce Sebas- tiani to attempt its re-capture. The expedition was subsequently to have been joined by a re- 8 FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION. CHAP. I. inforcement from Gibraltar, with the view ef 2810 ^^'■''y*"? ^Malaga by a coup-de-mahi. This project, in many respects faulty, expe- rienced a complete failure. Had Lord Blay- ney succeeded in gaining possession of the fort, the distance from Malaga to Frangirola was too small to have enabled him to accomplish the main object of the expedition. As it was, the troops were disembarked about three leagues to the westward of Frangirola, and were delayed many hours on their march by the badness of the roads. The Governor of the fort perceiving that the assailants were unprovided with the means of taking it by storm, declined all parley, and Lord Blayney did not deem it advisable to attempt an escalade. During the night some guns from the ships were placed in battery, but there was no time for a siege. On the follow- Oct. 15. ing morning, Sebastiani, at the head of a supe- rior force, came up, and at the moment of his appearance the garrison made a sortie. The result was, that Lord Blayney, and a great part of his force, were made prisoners, and the re- mainder with difficulty effected a retreat to their ships. The wonder is, that Lord Blayney, hav- ing failed in his object of carrying the castle, STATE OF MURCIA AND GRANADA. 9 1810. should, instead of re-embarking his troops in the chap. i. night of the fourteenth, have thought it advis- able to await the arrival of Sebastiani. In Murcia, and on the frontiers of Granada, several partial encounters took place between the French army and that of Blake. While the Spaniards were content to engage the enemy in a warfare of partisans, their efforts were fre- quently successful ; but whenever they attempt- ed to assume a fixed position, defeat followed their imprudence. In the centre and north of Spain the system of Guerilla warfare was stead- ily pursued. The Empecinado in Castillo, and Mina in Arragon and Navarre, were indefatiga- ble in seizing every opening for successful at- tack, and occasioned continual annoyance to the enemy. The hostility thus waged, was, on both side*, marked by features of the most bar- barous atrocity. No quarter was given or ex-* pected by either party ; and the waste of human- life in the constant succession of desultory con- flicts, was perhaps greater than would have re- sulted from the systematic operations of regular armies. Porlier was busy in the Asturias and Gallicia. An expedition of five British frigates, and about^ A 2 10 THE ASTmiAS AND GALLICIA. CATALONIA. 11 1810. CHAP. I. five hundred Spaniards under that leader, sailed from Corunna, with the view of attacking the French defences on the coast, and was com- pletely successful. Nearly the whole of the Jul. 9. enemy's batteries, from St. Sebastian to St. An- dero, mounting upwards of an hundred pieces of heavy cannon, were taken and destroyed with- out loss on the part of the assailants ; and the port of Santona was completely dismantled. A subsequent expedition, however, was less October, fortunate in result. A squadron of three Brit- ish frigates, accompanied by one Spanish frigate, several brigs and gun-boats, and above thirty sail of transports, with a considerable body of Spanish troops, under the distinguished partisan Renovales, sailed from Corunna, to occupy and fortify the town of Santona. The squadron had reached its destination when a storm came on, which drove the vessels from their anchorage in the road-stead, and, increasing in fury, the Span- ish frigate, an English brig, and five Spanish gun-boats, were wrecked on the coast. Many of the transports were driven ashore ; others were compelled to seek refuge in ports occupied by the enemy ; and upwards of one thousand men were thus lost. The English frigates suc- ceeded with difficulty in weathering the tempest, chap. i. —The operations in Catalonia were generally ^^^^ unconnected with those in the other provinces of the Peninsula. In a mountainous country, containing fortresses of great strength, which it was necessary to garrison and maintain, amid a fierce and hostile population, the esta- blishment of large magazines was indispensable to the success of the invaders. The British flag was seen everywhere on the coast, and supplies could only be procured by means of land convoys, at best slow, precarious, and insufficient. Thus was the French army in Catalonia narrowed, cramped, and hampered in all its movements ; and its operations were ne- cessarily confined within a narrow circle, which the activity of the native troops was contributing still further to circumscribe. The first object of Macdonald was to provi- sion Barcelona, which, from the commencement of the war, had been in a state of blockade, more or less rigorous. No stronger illustration can be afforded of the fragile and precarious tenure by which the French army maintained its hold in Catalonia, than the fact, that it was found necessary to array their whole force for the es-^ 12 SYSTEM OF MACDONALD. BARCELONA RELIEVED. 13 1810. July. CHAP. I. cort of a convoy. While Macdonald was en- grossed by this service, O'Donnel was not inac- tive. He attacked the French force on its march near Granollers, and succeeded in gaining an advantage which would liave been more de- cisive had the Somatenes, who received orders to attack the enemy in rear during the heat of the engagement, obeyed their instructions. As it was, the convoy succeeded in reaching Bar- celona. The system at first pursued by Marshal Mac- donald was worthy of liis reputation. Sparing of the blood of his soldiers, he avoided engagements which, though almost certain to be crowned with immediate success, could exercise no influence on the ultimate result of the war. His first ob- ject was to strengthen and provision the forti- fied places occupied by his army, and he endeav- oured, like St. Cyr, to conciliate the good-will . of the inhabitants. In this respect, he formed an honourable contrast to his immediate prede- cessor. After the fall of Gerona, Augerau imagined that measures of the greatest severity were necessary to intimidate the people. Act- ing under this detestable delusion, all peasants, tafeen with arms in their hand^, were executed, 1810. and a system of ferocious intimidation was a- chap. i. dopted throughout the principality. Macdonald at first acted on a sounder and better policy. He endeavoured to allay, by conciliatory proclamations, the fierce passions of the people, and substituted a system of mercy and mildness for one of bloodthirsty vengeance. The formation of magazines did much to prevent the necessity of pillage, and all abuses of authority were severely repressed. Yet even a policy so wise and generous failed of success. It is not at the moment when the wind abates, that the waves become still. The memory of past cruelties cannot suddenly be obliterated ; and the ardent, haughty, and suff*er- ing Catalans, were rather disposed to attribute to fear, than to more generous motives, any in- crease of lenity discernible in the measures of the invaders. Having relieved Barcelona, Macdonald took September. up a position near Cervera, as a central point, which would enable him at once to cover the siege of Tortosa, and menace the line of the Llobregat. O'Donnel was no indifferent spec^ tator of this movement. On the sixth of Sep- tember he quitted Tarragona, at the head of a ^ 14 THE FRENCH SURPRISED BY 0*DONNEL. ARRAGON. 15 1810. I CHAP. I. Strong division, and marched on Mataro. The artillery went by sea, under convoy of the Cam- brian frigate, and a small Spanish squadron. On the tenth he reached Mataro, and on the four- Sep. 14. teenth, succeeded, by a skilful manoeuvre, in sur- prising the brigade of General Schwartz, which occupied Bisbal and the neighbouring villages. The French, thus taken at unawares, and sur- rounded by a force greatly superior in number, made a gallant though vain resistance. All who escaped the sword were made prisoners, and Schwartz himself was in the number of the latter. They were immediately embarked for Tarragona. This was the last achievement of O'Donnel in Catalonia. He received a wound in the en- gagement, which made it necessary he should resign the command, and the Marques de Cam- poverde was appointed his successor. The suc- cess of Bisbal diflPused energy and spirit through- out the whole population of the province. Those who had hitherto been restrained by fear, now gave foil vent to their sentiments of hatred and revenge. The war, on both sides, became one of bloodthirsty vengeance ; and the French leader, departing from the system of lenity and forbearance which he had hitherto followed, en- 1810. deavoured to allay the general excitement by chap. i. violent reprisals. In the meanwhile, the situation of Upper Catalonia rendered it necessary that Macdonald should quit his position at Cervera. A convoy had assembled at Gerona, which required the presence of the whole French army for its protection. After much difficulty, the convoy reached Barcelona in safety ; and Macdonald, Nov. 25. having received large reinforcements, returned to afford protection to the third corps in the siege of Tortosa. The cliief object, however, both of Suchet and Macdonald, was the reduction of Tortosa. Early in June, the former received orders to undertake the siege, and was informed that the Catalonian army would simultaneously com- mence operations against Tarragona. In pur- suance of these instructions, Suchet began his preparations for this important siege. The com- mand in Arragon was confided to General July. Musnier ; and the brigade of General Buget was posted at Huesca to maintain tranquillity on the left of the Ebro. The brigade of Gen- eral Verges occupied Doroca, Teruel, and Cala- tayud. A series of fortified posts was estab- IS OPERATIONS OP 8UCHET : HE ADVANCES AGAINST TORTOSA. 17 1810. I CHAP. I. lisbed on the different lines of communication ; and thus guarded, a division was pushed forward to blockade the tete-de-pont of Tortosa, on the right bank of the Ebro. The mild and judicious administration of Sttchet had brought the inhabitants of Arragon to a state of comparative tranquillity. Many had resumed their ordinary occupations, and the fields again bore marks of cultivation. Those whom terror alone had induced to take arms, returned with the hope of safety to their homes; and the resistance to French power, though kept alive by the bold spirit of the Guerillas, had become less ferocious and pervading. This state of things, which a system of terror, how- ever rigorously enforced, never could have pro- duced, contributed to give greater security to the more distant operations in which the army was about to engage. IVIany circumstances, however, combined to impede the progress of the besieging army. Near its confluence with the sea, the Ebro flows through a mountainous and barren country, af- fording no road practicable for artillery. By the droughts of summer the river had become too shallow for navigva8 directed to cross the Tagus, and, with the fourth, sixth, and part of the first divisions, under ^farshal Beresford, to advance on Tho- mar, still occupied by the corps of Regnier. The light division, supported by the main body of the army, pushed forward by Leyria and Pombal. On the approach of Beresford, the French retreated from Thomar, along the foot of the Serra de Estrella, to Espinhel ; but the remain- der of their army, having concentrated at Pombal, seemed determined to maintain its ground. Lord Wellington, accordingly, made preparations for a general attack on the following morning. After a short but smart skirmish, the enemy's advan- Mar. 11. ced posts were driven in, and about two hundred prisoners secured by the light division. During the night, however, the French, having pre- viously set fire to the town, fell back on Redin- ha, where a strong rear corps was found posted, on the following day, along a ridge of easy Mar. 12. heights at the extremity of a defile. It was imme- diately attacked by the leading divisions as they 36 MASSENA IS DRIVEN FROM CONDEIXA : 1811. March. CHAP. II. came up, and, after an obstinate resistance, com- pelled to retreat for support on the main body. The enemy's object, however, was gained, — the march of the British was delayed for several hours; and the baggage and artillery, which had been retarded by the difficulties of the road, were enabled to cross the Soure in safety. The French army halted at Condeixa, where Massena again made demonstration of maintain- ing his ground. The position, thus occupied, consisted of a range of wooded heights of great strength, by which the road was completely commanded. An attack in front would have involved a great sacrifice of life; and Lord Wellington determined to dislodge the enemy Mar. 13. by a flank movement. Picton's division was accordingly directed by a considerable circuit to the eastward, to approach the only road open for his retreat. This manoeuvre had the desired effect. Picton's movement was no sooner dis- covered, than the enemy broke up from his po- sition, and fell back to Cazal Nova. On the day previous, Massena had detached a force of cavalry, under General Montbrun, with ^ few light guns, to summon Coimbra. That AND RETREATS BY THE PONTE DE MARCELLA. 37 1811. March. place was occupied only by a small body of mili- chap. ii. tia ; but the bold reply of the Governor to the message of Montbrun, led Massena to believe that the force in the city was considerable. Fear- ful, therefore, of committing his army, by wait- ing the reduction of the place, and pressed by the movement of Lord Wellington on his left, he gave up his intention of crossing the Mon- dego, and continued his retreat on the frontier by the road leading to the Ponte de Marcella. By the skilful manoeuvres of Lord Wellington, therefore, the French were prevented from en- tering the strong and unexhausted country be- yond the Mondego, and the communication of the allies with the northern provinces was opened. The enemy now continued their retreat through a country presenting a succession of admirable positions, which continually afforded the means of retarding the pursuit. Of this circumstance they reaped the full advantage. At Cazal Nova, the rear corps, under Marshal Ney, halted in a strong position, and on the following morning, their outposts were driven in by Mar. li. the light division. In order to dislodge them, Lord Wellington directed movements on their L.€^Wr»^ / 38 MASSENA ABANDONS MIRANDA DE CORVO. 1811. March. CHAP. II. flanks; and Ney withdrew his force to a ridge nearly parallel, where he again stood firm, till compelled by a similar manoeuvre to retreat. The French retired in fine order, on Miranda de Corvo, maintaining a continued action through- out the day. At this point, the corps of Regnier, which had marched by Espinhel, connected its movements with those of the main body of the army. The manoeuvres of Lord Wellington again forced the enemy to retreat. The division of General Cole had, on the day preceding, been detached to Panella, in order to secure the passage of the Esa. Near that place, it was joined by Nightin- gale's division which had followed Regnier ; and Massena, on observing the approach of this co- lumn on his flank, abandoned his strong position at Miranda de Corvo, having previously de- stroyed a considerable quantity of ammunition and baggage, for which means of transport could no longer be found. On the following morning a thick fog retard- ed the march of the allies for several hours. About nine the day cleared up ; and the troops, renewing the pursuit, passed through the smok- ing ruins of Miranda de Corvo. The French Mar. 15. ENGAGEMENT ON THE CEIRA. 39 1811. March. army were found in a strong position on the chap. ii. Ceira, a tributary of the Mondego, with one corps at Foz de Arouse, on the left of the river. Lord Wellington immediately direct- ed movements on the flanks of this corps, and attacked it briskly in front. By these measures it was driven rapidly back on the bridge in great confusion. The loss of the ene- my was very considerable. Many of their number were trampled down, and many drown- ed; and the darkness which came on contri- buted to increase the disorder. It has even been asserted that the bridge was blown up by the enemy, while crowded by their own sol- diers ; and two divisions, misled by their fears, opened fire on each other. A considerable quantity of baggage, and some ammunition car- riages, were taken by the allies. During the night Massena continued his re- treat, leaving the rear-guard to watch the ford. On the seventeenth the allies crossed the Ceira, Mar. 17. having been compelled to halt a day to wait the coming up of supplies. The French army took post in a strong position behind the Alva, occu- pying the Ponte de Marcella, and the heights along the right bank of the river. Massena, 40 LORD \\ ELLINGTON RELAXES THE PURSUIT. MASSENA REACHES CELORICO. 41 1811. March. i CHAP. n. deeming himself secure for several days, in this formidable position, sent out detachments to collect provisions from the neighbouring coun- try. Lord Wellington, however, directed two divisions to ford the Alva near Pombeira, in order to take the enemy in flank, and threaten his communication with Celorico ; and having afforded sufficient time for their advance, made a front movement on the Ponte de Marcella. Mar. 18. These manoeuvres were successful. Massena fell rapidly back upon Mouta, without waiting to collect his foragers, many of whom were made prisoners ; and the greater part of the allied army crossed the river at Pombeira on the same evening. Lord Wellington was at length compelled, by the want of provisions, to relax in the active pursuit he had hitherto maintained. The Por- tuguese troops, whose commissariat depended altogether on the supplies which could be pur- chased in the country through which they passed, were in a state approaching to famine ; and to enable them to move on, it had been found ne- cessary to share with them the supplies intend- ed for the British. A halt, therefore, was found necessary to give time for the arrival of forage and provisions from the rear, while Lord Wei- chap. ii. lington followed the enemy with the cavalry „ and light troops, supported by two divisions, j^^^i,. Owing to this circumstance the enemy were en- abled to reach Celorico with little further moles- Mar. 21. tation. In the meanwhile. Lord Wellington had de- termined on detaching a strong corps for the relief of Badajos. The division of General Hill, with the exception of General Houghton's brig- ade, was already on the south of the Tagus; and the fourth division, and General de Grey's brigade of heavy cavalry, and General Hamil- ton's division of Portuguese, were directed to join it. General Hill having recently returned to England, the command, ad interim, of this considerable force was bestowed on Marshal Beresford. Of its operations we shall speedily have occasion to speak. Massena, on reaching Celorico, instead of fall- ing back on Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, de- termined to take up a position in the neighbour- hood of Guarda, with the view of connecting his Mar. 2& operations with those of Soult on the Alentejo frontier.* After a few days halt the British • Marshal Ney, at this period, 'quitted the army. In his 42 FRENCH POSITION AT GUARDA : 1811. March. if CHAP. II. army resumed the pursuit, and on the twenty- eighth reached Celorico. On the following day it moved forward in five columns, supported by a division in the valley of the Mondego ; the mi- litia, under Trant and Wilson, covering the movement at Alverca, against any attempt which might be made on that side. The position occupied by the enemy, was one of the most formidable strength. The town of Guarda is situated on the summit of a steep and isolated mountain, which forms part of the Es- trella range, and commands the whole country by which it is surrounded. Massena availed himself of these natural advantages, and by their means expected to maintain his army within the frontier of Portugal. His officers, little appre- hensive of attack in a position so secure, relaxed in their accustomed vigilance, and at length con- opinion it should have moved on Almeida, and with his charac- teristic impetuosity he urj^ the necessity of this measure in the strongest manne^ Massena was irresolute. Orders and counter-orders were issued during the whole of the twenty- second. At length he decided against the opinion of Ney, and that officer immediately resigned his command in dLsgust. Massena dreaded the res}K)nsibility of entering Spain without orders from the Emperor, and was anxious to maintain at least some portion of the Portuguese territory. i LORD WELLINGTON CARRIES IT. 43 1811. March. gratulated themselves on the termination of the chap. ii. pursuit. So accurate were the calculations by which the movements of the attacking colunms were regu- lated, that they almost simultaneously appeared on the different sides of the mountain, and suc- ceeded in nearly reaching the summit before Mar. 29. they were discovered by the enemy. The latter precipitately retreated without firing a shot, and the whole French army was driven across the Coa. A brigade of infantry, under General ^laucune, posted considerably in front of Guarda, with difficulty escaped being cut oflF. Driven from Guarda, Massena determined on a final effort to maintain himself within the frontier, by posting his army in a strong position along the banks of the Coa. The right flank extended to Ruivina, guarding the ford of Ra- ponla de Coa, with a detachment at the bridge of Ferrereas. The left was at Subugal, and the eighth corps at Alfayates. The right of the allied army was opposite Subugal, the left at the bridge of Ferrereas; and Trant and Wilson crossed the Coa below Almeida, to threaten the com- munication of that place with Ciudad Rodri- go and the French army. 1 , 44 MASSENA RETIRES TO SUBUGAL. Il '1 1811. April. 4 CHAP. II. The enemy was posted so strongly that his position was only approachable by the left flank ; and on the morning of the third of April, the light division was directed to cross the Coa, at a ford several miles above Subugal, in rear of the corps of Regnier, while the third and fifth divisions should attack him in front ; the latter crossing the river at the bridge of Subugal, the former at a ford a short distance above it. The sixth division remained opposite to Ruivina, and a battalion of the seventh observed their detach- ment at the bridge of Ferrereas. The day was dark and cloudy, and a deep mist occasionally overspread the horizon, accompanied by storms of rain, which narrowed the scope of vision to the distance of a yard or two. A part of the light division had already crossed the river, when one of these impervious fogs came on. The enemy's piquets were driven in, and the troops advancing in pursuit, came at una- wares on the left of the main body of Regnier's corps, which it was intended they should turn. The consequence was that the advance was driven back on the forty-third regiment ; and Regnier, by a partial dissipation of the mist, having ascertained the smallness of the force Apr. 3. ENGAGEMENT AT SUBUGAL. 45 1811. April. opposed to him, directed on it a strong column chap. ii. of infantry, supported by artillery and horse. This attack encountered a spirited repulse ; and Colonel Beckwith's brigade advanced in turn against the enemy's position, where they were attacked by a fresh column of infantry on the left, and by a regiment of cavalry on the right. Under these circumstances the lead- ing bnttalion would probably have been sacri- ficed, had not Colonel Beckwith, with g^eat promptitude, retreated behind some stone en- closures, which enabled him to maintain his ground. The combat was then waged with vigour and pertinacity on both sides. Colonel Beckwith's brigade made another charge, drove back the enemy, and had gained possession of a howitzer, when the French cavalry advancing on their flank, again forced them to retire to their post. There they were joined by the other brigade of the light division, and Colonel Beck- with again advanced with his own brigade and the first battalion of the fifty-second. They were once more charged in flank by a fresh column of infantry supported by cavalry, and Colonel Beckwith took post in an enclosure on ihe top of the height, which enabled him to pro- % f 1 46 REONIER HASTILY RETIRES. MASSENA CROSSES THE AGUEDA. 47 1811. April. ii 1 I CHAP. II. tect tlie howitzer, in the capture of which so much gallantry had heen displayed. In this state of things, when Regnier was dis- posing his troops for another attack, the head of Picton's division came up and immediately open- ed fire. At the same moment, the fifth division, under General Dunlop, having forced the bridge, was seen ascending the heights to the enemy's right, and the cavalry appeared on the high ground in rear of the left. Regnier then observ- ing himself to be nearly surrounded, retreated with great precipitation to Alfayates, leaving the howitzer and above three hundred men dead on the field. About an equal number were made prisoners. The loss of the allies in killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to one hundred and sixty one. Considering the great numerical disparity of the parties in this well- fought engagement, the conduct of the light division was admirable. Under circumstances of disadvantage impossible to be foreseen, they maintained a contest of the most unequal description, and executed their manoeuvres in presence of a superior enemy, with the most imposing steadiness and preci- sion. " Although the operations of this day," 1 1811. April. says Lord Wellington, " were by unavoidable chap. ii. accidents not performed in the manner I intended they should have been, I consider the action that was fought by the light division — by Colonel Beckwith's brigade principally — to be one of the most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in." Had the retreat of Regnier not been favoured by the fog, the results of the engagement would have been yet more brilliant and decisive. The cavalry continued the pursuit as far as Alfayates, at which place the whole French army crossed the frontier and entered Spain. Mas- sena hastened to concentrate behind the Agueda; and on the eighth, not a Frenchman remained in Apr. 8. Portugal, except the garrison of Almeida, for the blockade of which Lord Wellington made immediate preparations. On the seventh, Sir William Erskine, who had been despatched with six squadrons of cavalry and two troops of horse-artillery, to reconnoitre Almeida, and drive in the enemy's posts, fell, unexpectedly, on a brigade of French infantry at Jun9a. Nothing could exceed the coolness and courage with which this body received the attacks of the assailants. The French commander formed his troops into a square, on which the cavalry I 48 TERMINATION OF THE RETREAT. ITS CONSEQUENCES. 49 1811. April. I CHAP. II. could make no impression, though supported by the guns, which occasioned great liavoc in the ranks. In this manner did the brigade con- tinue its retreat, till it reached Duas Casas, car- rying off the commanding officer, who was se- verely wounded, and affording a fine example of discipline and courage. The cavalry, how- ever, succeeded in securing many prisoners, and, altogether, the loss of this gallant body was con- siderable. The allied army then took up a position on the Duas Casas, with its advanced posts on Gal- legos and the Agueda. Tiie militia under Trant and Wilson were at Cinca Villas and Malpar- tida ; and the communication of Almeida, both with Ciudad Rodrigo and with the French army, was cut off. Thus terminated the invasion of Portugal ; — that invasion by which it was boasting! y pre- dicted that the British would be driven into the sea, and the conquest of Portugal be decisively achieved. From the moment of its advance from Almeida, the French army of Portugal had encountered a long, unbroken series of disaster and defeat. JNIassena had been biiffled in all his plans by the skill of his opponent. In every 1 1811. engagement he had been worsted; and at length, chap. ii. with the loss of nearly half his numbers, had been driven headlong from the kingdom, with- out the achievement of a single exploit which could serve to mitigate his discomfiture. By the aid of a British army, one of the weakest and most insignificant kingdoms of Europe, had successfully bidden defiance to the arms of France, and vindicated her claims to liberty by the sword. To the people of Portugal, is the honour due of having first given to Europe the spectacle of a mighty armament, led by one of the great captains of Napoleon, retreating, baffled, dispirited, and defeated, from the terri- tory of the kingdom it had vainly attempted to subdue. It is true, that a success so signal was not, and could not have been effected by the single and unaided efforts of the Portuguese nation. The age of miracles has passed — never to re- turn. The Portuguese did all that a people so situated, so animated, and so suffering, could be expected to achieve. But it is to the zealous, ardent, and honest co-operation of England ; to the consummate military talent of a British VOL. in. 50 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. 1811. CHAP. II. general; and to the gallantry and discipline of British soldiers, that a large share of the honour must be awarded. The government of France had hitherto treat- ed the efforts of Britain for the liberation of the Peninsula, with scorn and derision. England, they said, invincible on her native element, is insignificant on shore. Her generals are with- out boldness — without skill — without experience. The career of Wellington, they declared, had been one unvaried series of pertinacious blunder and fortunate escape. He was " un homme home " — a dull and plodding follower of vicious precedent, incapable of conducting war on an extended scale, or of improving the advantages offered by the blunders of his opponents " en grand general," British soldiers, it was said, though tolerable dischargers of firearms in a sta- tionary position, were laggards in manoeuvre, and only formidable from the stupidity which kept them ignorant of their danger, or the intoxica- tion which emboldened them to brave it. Yet it was by these very men, and by the raw Por- tuguese levies which they disciplined and com- manded, — by that very general whose talents GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. 51 1811. they denied, that Massena, in spite of all his chap. ii. boasting, had been driven triumphantly from Torres Vedras into Spain. A spectacle was thus exhibited to the nations of the Peninsula which could not fail to exhilarate their hopes, and animate their exertions. Nay, more, Europe was at length taught that proud lesson which led eventually to the overthrow of the most gigantic system of usurpation of which modern history bears record. There was not a province of his mighty empire in which the mo- ral tenure of the tyrant was not weakened. The yoke was loosened from the shoulders of his vassal sovereigns, and they waited but for the occurrence of a favourable moment when thev might cast it from them, and assert their claim to independence. It would be unjust to deny that, as a military movement, the compulsory retreat of Massena was conducted with consummate skill. The French army retreated en masse, their rear co- vered by a strong body under command of Mar- shal Ney. It was impossible to exceed the skill and boldness with which that officer, taking ad- vantage of every favourable position, foiled and delayed the pursuit of a force ten times more 52 CHAP. 1811 SKILFUL CONDUCT OF THE RETREAT. II. numerous than that which he commanded. Re- - sistance was uniformly made till the very last ' moment, when it could he continued with safety. All his movements were marked hy a prompti- tude and precision highly admirable ; by a fear- less confidence, ever bold, yet never degenerat- ing into rashness. From the moment, however, when Ney quitted the army, a decrease of vigour and energy was discernible. Worn by privation and fatigue, and looking back on a campaign M'hich presented few features calculated to lighten and redeem the gloom by which it was overspread, the French soldiers no longer felt confidence in their leader. All that was gallant and daring in the retreat, was attributed to Ney ; while the timid policy of Massena was made responsible for the misfor- tunes of the campaign. The knowledge that a difference of opinion existed between these cele- brated tacticians, tended still further to excite dis- satisfaction. The departure of Ney was regarded as a misfortune by the whole army ; and the lingering hope that the campaign might yet ter- minate in some honourable and distinguished achievement, gave place to forebodings of mis- fortune. These anticipations were not belied by I ATROCITIES OF THE FRENCH. 53 1811. the event. Massena, by the want of due vigi- chap. ii. lance, was driven disgracefully from his position at Guarda ; and he at length entered Spain with an army whose moral confidence was gone. During the retreat, the loss of the French army may be calculated at about five thousand men ; while that of the allies amounted to little more than six hundred. From the moment they crossed the fron- tier of Portugal, the invaders commenced a course of barbarous devastation, which con- tinued unbroken till they were driven forth from its territory. The necessities of an army, forced to subsist on such produce as the sur- rounding country could afford, rendered pil- lage, to a certain degree, inevitable; and, in such circumstances, it was scarcely to be expect- ed that acts of violence should not occasionally occur. But the gratuitous and wanton cruelty with which those inhabitants were treated, who, trusting to the promises of Massena, remained peaceably in their dwellings, must cast enduring infamy on all, by whom such a course of inhu- man outrage was perpetrated or abetted. " The conduct of the French army," says Lord Wellington, " throughout this retreat, has 54 ATROCITIES OF THE FRENCH. 1811. t! CHAP. ir. been marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed. Even in the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Femes, in which the head-quarters of some of the corps had been for some months, and in which the inhabitants were induced by promises of good treatment to remain, they were plundered, and many ot their houses destroyed on the night the enemy withdrew from their position; and they have since burned every town and village through which they passed." The track of the French army to the frontier was marked by desolation. The town of Ley- ria, with the Bishop's palace, was burned. The Convent of Alcoba^a, one of the most ancient and magnificent structures in the king- dom, shared a similar fate. Batalha, a religi- ous edifice of equal beauty and antiquity, was likewise destroyed. In the hearts of these de- graded barbarians, all human sympathies seem to have been dried up. The claims of age or sex afforded no protection from their murder- ous outrage. The bodies of murdered Por- tuguese were seen lying unburied, by the road, many of them — especially those of priests ^mutilated in a manner disgusting to huma- ATROCITIES OF THE FRENCH. 5.5 1811. nity. " This is the mode," says Lord Wei- chap. ii. lington, in a tone of honourable indignation, " This is the mode in which the promises have been performed, which were held out in the proclamation of the French commander-in- chief, in which the inhabitants of Portugal were assured, that he was not come to make war on them, but, with a powerful army of one hundred and ten thousand men, to drive the English into the sea. It is to be hoped that the example of what has occurred in this country, will teach the people of this and other nations what reliance is to be placed on such promises and assurances ; and that there is no security for life, or for any thing that renders life valuable, except in decid- ed resistance to the enemy." But the extent of the demoralization of the French army can be conceived only by those who saw the state of the cantonments in which they had been stationary for several months. There was something revolting, and even de- grading, to human nature, in the spectacle of extreme uncleanness which they exhibited. In the houses inhabited by the soldiers, all the in- stinctive decencies, by which man, even in his mere animal nature, is raised above the brutes, 56 ATROCITIES OP THE FRENCH. STATE OP OPINION IN ENGLAND. 57 1811. ♦ i CHAP. II. had been habitually disregarded. — Bat on such a subject it is unpleasant to enlarge. Let it flnffice that history can produce no instance of civilized and Christian man, reduced to a state of debasement more abject and humiliating, than that of the French army, in this war of unprin- cipled spoliation. 1811. CHAPTER III. SIEGE OF BADAJOS— BATTLE OF BAROSSA. In England, the precipitate abandonment of chap. iir. Portugal by the enemy, contributed to revive the hopes of the people, and consolidate the power of the government. Convinced that there was now a fair, though distant, pros- pect of ultimate success, both Parliament and the country gave their cordial support to the policy of prosecuting the war with a vigour, firmness, and energy, worthy of England, and of the glorious cause of which she stood forth the chief champion. This was the general sense of the nation ; and, supported by its voice, the ministry of Mr. Perceval were enabled to over- come all the difficulties by which they were sur- rounded. These indeed were of no trifling magnitude. The illness of the King occasioned c2 58 A REGENCY APPOINTED. CONDUCT OF THE WHIGS. 59 18J1. ll CHAP. III. the appointment of a regency, whicli threatened an entire change in the members of the govern- ment. In both houses of Parliament the decided preponderance of talent was on the side of the Whigs, and the opposition which government had to encounter was powerful and systematic. With a blindness scarcely reconcilable with their acknowledged astuteness of intellect, or with an unfairness, which the ordinary preju- dices of party can but partially excuse, the great Whig leaders endeavoured, by fallacy and mis- representation, to raise the fears and depress the hopes of the people, at a crisis of difficulty and danger, when the destinies of England hung trembling in the balance. They knew that the honour of their country was, at length, irretriev- ably committed in the cause of the Peninsula. They knew it to be impossible to withdraw the British army, not only without danger to the national safety, (for the danger might have been braved,) but without disgrace. Yet, knowing this, they did not hesitate to advocate a policy which must have cast a deep tarnish on the hon- our of their country. They vehemently urg- ed ministers to retire from a contest at once hopeless and absurd. Portugal, they declared, 1811. €X)uld not be defended. The retreat to Torres chap. hi. Vedras was designated as a hopeless abandon- ment of the whole kingdom to the enemy. When Massena was triumphantly driven beyond the frontier, the country was gravely told that his movement was a mere change of position from the Zezere to the Agueda — a manoeuvre to lead the allies to a distance from their resources, while the enemy would enjoy the advantage of removing from a ravaged and desolate country, to one comparatively fertile and unexhausted. The honour of Napoleon, they said, was pledged to effect the subjugation of the Peninsula ; and, unfortunately, his power was commensurate with his ambition. Under these circumstances, it was worse than folly to expect that a British army could prevent the consummation of his projects. The resistance of England should be confined to that element on which her power was undisputed and irresistible. Such was the language of the Opposition ; for- tunately, it was not in unison either with the judgment or the feelings of the nation at large. It contributed to lessen the popularity of the Whigs, and to weaken the influence which the leaders of that party had maintained over the 60 PROCLAMATION OF LORD WELLINGTON. SIEGE OF BADAJOS. 61 1811. CHAP. III. public mind. The Prince Regent, from respect to his father, expressed his determination to make no immediate change in the servants of the crown. The prime minister, Mr. Perceval, dig- played a talent and aptitude for business of the highest order; and the precarious tenure by which the ministry held office, occasioned no diminution of the vigour of their measures. A grant of one hundred thousand pounds was voted by Parliament, for the relief of the suffer- ing Portuguese ; and large subscriptions for a similar purpose were made throughout the king- dom. By this generous aid, the lives of thou- sands, who must otherwise have perished, were preserved ; many of them to fight the battles of their country, and contribute to the downfal of that despotism from which they had suffered. One of the first measures of Lord Wellington, after the territory of Portugal had been freed from its invaders, was to issue a proclamation warning the people to prepare against future efforts of the enemy. He recommended that every man in the kingdom, capable of bearing arms, should become familiarized with their use. That, in each district, places of safety should be prepared, to which the inefficient part 1811. of the population might retire in case of need ; chap. hi. that every one should bury his more valuable effects, keeping the place of deposit secret from all not interested in the concealment ; and that such stores of provision, as were not capable of re- moval or secretion, should be destroyed. If such measures of precaution were adopted. Lord Wel- lington assured the Portuguese, that the subjec- tion of their kingdom could not be effected by any invading force, however numerous and for- midable. The issue of such attempts, he declar- ed, was certain. They would terminate in the independence of Portugal, in the happiness of its inhabitants, and in the eternal honour of those by whose unshrinking firmness and patriotism the freedom of their country had been achieved. Lord Wellington, having issued this procla- mation, and made arrangements for the blockade of Almeida, distributed the remainder of his army in cantonments, and set out for the Alen- tejo, where operations of immediate. moment ap- peared to demand his presence. On the defeat of jNIendizabel, Soult completed the investment of Badajos, and pushed forward the siege with increased vigour. Parallels were thrown out to the right and left of the Pardale- 62 THE CITY DISGRACEFULLY SURRENDERS. 1811. March. 1|< CHAP. III. ras, and enfilading batteries thrown up for their protection. Unfortunately, the Governor, Gen- eral Menacho, who had hitherto conducted the defence with great spirit, was killed by a can- non-shot, when standing on the ramparts to ob- serve the effect of a sortie. His successor. General Imaz, was a man of less energy ; and, from the moment he assumed the command, the vigour of the resistance was evidently de- creased. Soult, on the other hand, having re- ceived intelligence of the retreat of Massena, was unremitting in his efforts for the reduction of the place. They were successful. On the ninth of March, the breaching battery opened. Mar. 10. and, on the day following, the place was given up, though the Governor was made aware, by a telegraphic despatch, that a strong force was ad- vancing to his relief. On the eleventh, the gar- rison, nearly eight thousand strong, marched out by the g^te of the Trinity, deposited their arms on the glacis, and were made prisoners of war. It was conceded by Mortier that the grena- diers should enjoy the privilege of marching out by the breach ; but, to effect this purpose, seve- ral hours' labour was found necessary : a suffi- cient proof of the pusillanimous conduct of the CAMPO MAYOR TAKEN. 63 i Governor in surrendering the city. The indig- chap. hi. nant comment of Lord Wellington, on the un- "T3T7~ worthy dereliction of their duty by the Spanish March, leaders, is worthy of record. " Thus," he says, " were Oliven^a and Badajos given up without any sufficient cause : while Marshal Soult, with a corps which was never supposed to exceed twenty thousand men, besides capturing these two places, made prisoners and destroyed above twenty-two thousand Spanish troops." On the fall of Badajos, Mortier advanced against Campo Mayor. The town was of little strength, and the works in bad order, and partly dismantled. It was garrisoned by a small de- tachment of militia, and only five guns were mounted on the ramparts. Under all these dis- advantages, however, it held out for eleven days, and did not surrender till a practicable Mar. 23. breach had been effected. A detachment, under Latour IMaubourg, was also sent against Albuquerque. The place — which was formerly one of great strength, and still capable of resistance — surrendered with- out firing a shot. The French thus gained pos- session of seventeen brass guns, of large calibre, which were immediately sent off to Badajos. 64 EXPEDITION FROM CADIZ AGAINST VICTOR : CHAP. III. The satisfaction of Marshal Soult at the suc- cessful course of the campaign in Estramadura, Febraary. ^^^^ hsLve heen considerably diminished by a reverse experienced about the same time by the corps of Victor before Cadiz. In the month of January, the Spanish government, in concert with General Graham, had determined on mak- ing a combined attack on the rear of the French entrenchments. In order to remove all feeling of jealousy on the part of the Spaniards, Gener- al Graham consented that the chief command should be assumed by General La Pena. The enterprise seemed to promise success, since the corps remaining before Cadiz did not exceed twelve thousand men, — and the allies would be enabled to attack them with a force numerically superior. It was accordingly concerted that the expedi- tion should be conveyed by sea to Tariffa ; and on being joined by the Spanish force at St.Roque, the combined army should advance against Vic- tor ; and, driving him from his lines, destroy the extensive works which had been erected from the bay of Cadiz to the mouth of the Santi Petri. An attempt was likewise to be made by the troops remaining in the Isla de Leon, under IT REACHES BAROSSA. 65 General Zayas, to open a communication with chap. hi. the allied force, and bear part in the operations. On the twenty-first of February the expedition p^j,^^^^ sailed; but the wind becoming violent it was found impossible to land at Tariflfii, or any port in the neighbourhood. It was decided, there- fore, to proceed to Algesiras, though from that point there was no road practicable for artillery. By the indefatigable exertions of the sailors, however, the guns were conveyed in boats to TariflFa, in spite of the formidable impediments of wind and current. On the evening of the twenty-seventh, the FeU. 27. whole combined force was assembled at Tariffa ; and on the following day continued its advance on Casas Viejas, and Veger, in hope of surpris- ing the detachments by which they were oc- cupied. The enemy retreated with some loss from these places. In the meantime General Zayas had succeeded in throwing a bridge across the Santi Petri, and forming a tete de pont for its protection. On the nights of the third and fourth, the post was attacked by the enemy, but on both occasions they encountered a repulse. On the fifth, the allied army having been joined Mar. b, by the troops from St. Roque, after a long and m BATTLE OF BAROSSA. CHAP. I II. fatiguing march, arrived on the low ridge of 23J2 Barossa, when General Lardizabel, with his di- March. vision, was directed to advance against the French entrenchments near the mouth of the Santi Petri. In the execution of this mission, the Spaniards conducted themselves in a manner worthy of applause. They attacked the enemy with gal- lantr)' and success, and forced him, after some resistance, to withdraw. La Pena having thus opened a communication with the Isla de Leon, moved forward, with the main body of the Span- iards, to the heights of Bermeja, to secure the advantage thus acquired, and directed General Graham to advance with the British to his sup- port. This order, notwithstanding the fatigue of the troops, was promptly obeyed ; and General Graham had already commenced his advance, when two divisions of the enemy were suddenly discovered, one of which directed its march on the heights of Barossa, still occupied by the rear-guard, while the other bore directly down on his flank. The scene of approaching encounter was a nigged and extensive plain, nearly circled by a BATTLE OF BAROSSA. 67 pine-forest, which sweeps from the Santi Petri ohaf. iil round its northern extremity to the sea. The ^g^j plain is intersected by several ridges of rough March. and sandy eminences, which stretch directly in- land from the shore. The ridge of Barossa is about a league distant from the mouth of the Santi Petri ; and the Bermeja height, in a direct line, is nearly equidistant from both of these points. At its termination, near to the sea, staTids a ruinous tower. On discovering the approach of the enemy, General Graham immediately directed his force to counter-march, with the determination of as- suming the offensive, at once perceiving that to retreat under such circumstances could not but endanger the safety of the whole army. Gen- eral Graham, accordingly, formed his troops in- to two divisions. Of these, the right, command- ed by General Dilkes, advanced towards the Barossa heights. The left, under Colonel Wheatley, hastened to clear a wood which in- tervened on the left and attack the enemy's column in that direction. The latter came first into action. Unchecked by the fire of the British guns, which being judiciously posted, and admirably served, did great execution, the 68 BATTLE OF BAROSSA. 1811. March. CHAP. III. enemy's right wing under General Laval press- ed on gallantly to meet the attack which the British were preparing. A warm fire of mus- quetry was for some time maintained by both parties, the brigade of Colonel Wheatley con- tinuing its advance. At length a decisive charge, led by the eighty-seventh regiment, and three companies of the Coldstream Guards, drove the enemy back in confusion, with the loss of a how- itzer and an eagle, which remained in possession of Major Gough of the eighty-seventh. The pursuit was continued across a narrow valley ; and a reserve formed beyond it was routed with facility, all attempts to re-form being prevented by the destructive action of the British guns. The right wing was not less successful. The enemy had gained the heights of Barossa with little diflSculty ; the rear-guard and Spanish bat- talions, by which it was occupied, retiring after some shew of resistance. General Ruffin, by whom this division of the enemy was command- ed, confident in his numbers and in the advan- tage of position, advanced to meet the assailants on the brow of the ascent. A warm engage- ment ensued. The fire of musquetry and artil- lery from the heights, occasioned great loss to VICTOR RETREATS TO CHICLANA. 69 1811. MftTch. the British ; but after a severe and sanguinary chap. hi. contest, the enemy were driven from the heights in complete disorder. Thus defeated at all points, Marshal Victor thought only of retreat. The exhausted state of the troops rendered pursuit impossible, and General Graham halted for several hours on the eastern side of the heights which had been the theatre of struggle. The results of this victory were the capture of an eagle and six pieces of artillery, with nearly five hundred prisoners, including two generals, (Ruffin and Rousseau,) who both died of their wounds. The enemy lost nearly a third of his number, upwards of three thousand being killed, wound- ed, or made prisoners. The victors also suffered severely, considering the smallness of the force engaged. Their loss amounted to about twelve hundred. During the whole of this brilliant engagement, General Graham received no support from the Spaniards under La Pena. Two battalions, indeed, which were attached to his division, and had remained with the rear-guard on the height till ordered to retire, made every effort to rejoin him, but did not come up till the enemy were in f 70 CONDUCT OF LA PENA : 1811. AfH'iL : f CHAP. I II. full retreat. With a force greatly superior in number to that of Villatte, who, with four thou- sand men, was posted on the Santi Petri, for the protection of the lines, had La Pena thrown him- self between that body and the centre, and push- ed forward on Chiclana, the most important con- sequences must have resulted. The manoeuvre would of necessity have been decisive. Victor could only have saved himself by instant and precipitate retreat ; and Villatte must either have at once abandoned the whole of the posts on the Santi Petri, or his retreat would have been cut off. This golden opportunity of achieviyg the entire object of the expedition, either through ignorance or cowardice, was lost by La Pena. During the whole engagement he remained in- active at Bermeja, satisfied with maintaining a position which the enemy were in no condition seriously to attack. General Graham was naturally indignant at the disgraceful conduct of the Spanish general. After such a lesson, it was impossible that in any future operations he could place any reliance on the support of such a man. He, therefore, withdrew from his command ; and early on the next morning crossed the Santi Petri. La Pena 2 HIS SUBSEQUENT INACTION. 71 for several days remained at Bermeja, anxious, chap. hi. as he declared, to follow up the victory which ~j British blood and British courage had alone ■^, . achieved. Yet, with a force under his own immediate command, of fifteen thousand men, he refused to advance against the enemy, with- out the aid and presence of those troops, which in the moment of peril he had betrayed. During this period several landings were eftected by marines and sailors of the squadron, at different points of the harbour, who succeeded in dismantling all the sea defences of the enemy, from Rota to Sta. Maria, with the exception of Catalina. Victor, alarmed at his situation, hastened to Seville to demand reinforcements, concentrating nearly his whole force at Xeres, a small guard only being left for the protection of the principal works before Cadiz. Even un- der circumstances so favourable, however, La Pena remained pertinaciously inactive. At length the French, who at first were panic- stricken by the defeat they had encountered, emboldened by the timidity of their opponents, made an offensive movement. This operated as the signal of retreat. La Pena immediately withdrew his troops into the Isla de Leon, and 72 LA PENA RE-ENTERS THE ISLA. 94 1811. CHAP. III. destroyed the communication across the Santi Petri. Such was the lame and impotent conclusion of an expedition, which in all its operations had been crowned with greater success than could reasonably have been anticipated from the cir- cumstances under which it was undertaken. We say this, because from the very moment when preparations commenced, the enemy must have been aware of the object for which they were intended. They commanded a view of the whole harbour ; they saw in fact the whole progress of embarkation ; the fleet steering for the Straits was clearly discernible from the coast ; and op- portunity was thus given to Marshal Victor of calculating the movements and counteracting the object of the expedition. In truth, however, Victor had long been a- ware of the measure which the Spanish govern- ment was busied in arranging. He accordingly wrote to Sebastiani at Seville, entreating him to unite his army with that before Cadiz, or at least to embarrass the allied force by manceuvring on its flank and rear. Had Sebastiani acceded to the desire of Victor, the situation of Graham and La Pena would have been one of the greatest OBSERVATIONS. 73 1811. danger, since it would have been impossible for chap. hi. an army, so discordant in materials as that which they commanded, to oppose the combined forces of their opponents, with any prospect of success. That such a junction did not take place was owing solely to the jealousy of the French com- manders. Sebastiani, intrusted with a sphere of independent command, did not choose to place himself under the orders of Victor ; and the op- portunity afforded of overwhelming the allied army was thus suffered to escape. But such expectations could form no part of the calcula- tions on which the enterprise was undertaken. The allied leaders were not entitled to calculate on the occurrence of such a contingency, when they knew the enemy had full notice of the in- tended attack. In this view we conceive the project, acted on by the allies, to have been radically faulty. In other respects it seems to have been concerted with skill and prudence ; and had the element of secrecy been added to its other features, we should hold it to have been altogether unexcep- tionable. The indignation excited by the conduct of La Pena, was not confined to the British army and VOL. lU. D 74 BERESFORD APPROACHES BADAJOS. AFFAIR AT CAMPO MAYOR. 75 1811. March. CHAP. III. people. His own countrymen joined in censur- ing the apathy or ignorance, by which all the beneficial consequences that might have resulted from the expedition had been sacrificed. The Cortes addressed the Regency, and demanded a complete investigation of the circumstances to which a failure so disgraceful was to be attri- buted. A Court of Inquiry was accordingly ap- pointed, which exonerated La Pena from the charge of cowardice, but not from the stigma of incapacity and want of enterprise. In the Alentejo a considerable corps of the allies, commanded by Marshal Beresford, was advancing to check the French in their career of conquest. He was directed to invest Badajos, if possible, before the garrison should have time to repair the defences, and make the necessary preparations for standing a siege. The nature of the intelligence from Cadiz had induced Soult to return to Seville ; and IMortier, who succeed- ed to the command, fell back on the approach of Beresford, leaving a small force under La- tour Maubourg, at Campo Mayor, to watch the movements of the allies. Shortly afterwards he was recalled to France. Mar. 17. On the seventeenth of March, the troops from I the north of the Tagus crossed the river at Tan- chap. hi. cos ; and after a halt of a few days near Por- 1811 talegre, to recruit their strength, exhausted by », / a long succession of heavy marches, Beresford continued his advance on Campo Mayor. He reached that place on the twenty-fifth ; and Mar. 25. from a height about a mile distant^ the enemy were seen running from the town, and hastily forming in order of march, while a convoy of artillery, ammunition, and provisions, was ob- served to be in motion towards Badajos. The enemy's force consisted of three battalions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and some horse artillery. Brigadier-General Long was directed to attack them on the right flank, and a charge made by the thirteenth light dragoons, under Colonel Head, supported by some squadrons of the seventh Portuguese cavalry, drove back the enemy's horse in confusion on their infantry, which halted, formed square, and in turn forced the assailants to retire. The road from Campo Mayor to Badajos lies over a wide unbroken plain, which afl^orded to both parties ample scope for the display of mili- tary skill. The charges of the light cavalry were uniformly successful, yet productive of no 76 BERESFORD ADVANCES TO ELVAS. HE CROSSES THE OUADIANA. 77 n 1811. March. I II! CHAP. III. important result. At one period a considerable part of the convoy was in possession of the thir- teenth, but being unsupported, Colonel Head found it impossible to reap the benefit of his achievement. The convoy again moved on, and succeeded in effecting its retreat to Badajos, with no greater loss than that of a howitzer. On the part of the allies the chief loss was sus- tained by the thirteenth light dragoons, which pursued the enemy to the very walls of Badajos, and were fired on by the guns of the place. Had Beresford employed his heavy cavalry to sup- port the charges of the thirteenth, there can be little doubt that the whole convoy would have been taken ; but alarmed at the boldness of Colonel Head's attack, he refused to allow the heavy cavalry to charge, observing that " the loss of one regiment of cavalry was enough for the day." The amount of casualties on the part of the allies was ninety-four killed and wounded, and seventy-seven missing. That of the enemy was considerably greater. On the day following, Beresford moved for- ward to Elvas, where he halted for several days, while preparations were in progress for crossing the Guadiana. The task was one of diflficulty. Mar. 26. 1811. March. The current of the river was rapid ; and Beresford chap. hi. had brought with him no materials for the con- struction of a bridge. He depended, therefore, on such supplies as the country could afford ; and so inadequate were these, that on the very morning of its completion, a sudden increase of the river entirely demolished the structure which had been laboriously erected. Rafts were then constructed ; and on the sixth of April April 6. the passage of the troops was effected near Ju- ramenha. Head-quarters were then established at a small village on the left of the Guadiana, in the neigh- bourhood of which the army halted for several days. During this period of inaction, the enemy were on the alert. An out-piquet, consisting of a squadron of the thirteenth light dragoons, was surprised by a party of the enemy's cavalry in the night ; and, with the exception of twenty men, the whole were made prisoners. The French, after this success, pushed forward to the village, from which Marshal Beresford with difficulty effected his escape. The alarm was at length given, but the party succeeded in reach- ing Oliven^a, bearing with them the men and horses they had captured, as trophies of success. 78 SIEGE OP OLIVENVA. 1811. April. CHAP. III. During the progress of these events, the gai-- rison of Badajos was busied in collecting pro- visions and repairing the works of the place. Mortier, whose force was too small to oppose that of Beresford, fell back to Llerena, leaving a detachment of four hundred men to garrison Olivenya. As this body might occasion some annoyance during the progress of the operations against Badajos, Marshal Beresford determined on the immediate reduction of the place. In- trusting, therefore, the conduct of the siege to General Cole, he placed the remainder of his army in a line of cantonments, extending from Merida to Zafra, in order to cut off the communications of Badajos, and prevent further supplies being thrown into the town. At Los Santos an affair of cavalry took place, in which one hundred and sixty of the enemy were made prisoners. The siege of 01iven9a did not long occasion a separation of the army. On the eleventh, General Cole sat down before the place, and on Apr. 15. the fifteenth, when the breaching battery had been established, he sent a flag of truce into the town, offering terms to the Governor, in case of immediate surrender. To this communication no answer was returned, and the batteries open- If 1811. April. SURRENDER OP OLIVEN9A. 79 ed fire. A breach was soon effected, when the chap. hi. Grovernor, apprehensive of assault, made an un- conditional surrender of the town ; and the gar- rison, consisting of three hundred and seventy men, were marched out prisoners of war. A few days after this event, Lord Welling- Apr. 20. ton arrived. He immediately reconnoitred Badajos, and gave orders for the immediate commencement of active operations. The loss of this important stronghold had been the only blow of the campaign. His anxiety to protect it had induced him to weaken his army to a de- gree which rendered the successes achieved over Massena less decisive than they would otherwise have been. He now considered its recapture es- sential to his future operations, since its possession enabled the French to protect their positions in the southern provinces, and placed the most fer- tile portion of Portugal within their grasp. It was impossible, too, that he could enter Spain with safety, while the enemy held so formidable a post on his flank. While the preparatory arrangements were yet in progress. Lord Wellington was recall- ed to the north, by the movements of Mas- sena. The want of a bridge across the Gua- 80 INVESTMENT OF BADAJOS. THE SIEGE IS RAISED. 81 fll CHAP. Ill, diana, for the transmission of artillery and stores, TTrj had, hitherto, kept the army inactive. Two had May. heen constructed and swept away by the torrents caused by a succession of heavy rains ; by great exertions, however, a third was established, and Beresford at length found himself in condition to commence operations against Badajos. The place was completely invested on the Maya eighth of May, by Major-General Lumley, on the right of the river, and by Major-Gen- eral William Stewart, on the left. Ground was immediately broken against Fort St. Chris- toval, and a breaching battery established on the eleventh, notwithstanding a vigorous sortie of the garrison, which, though at first partially successful, was, eventually, repulsed with consi- derable slaughter. The breaching battery, how- ever, produced little effect. The guns sent from Lisbon being of brass, were soon injured by the frequent firing. The Portuguese gun- ners were raw and inexperienced, while the fire of the fort was vigorous and well-directed. The consequence was, that, in the course of a few hours, the whole guns in the battery were rendered unserviceable. Fresh guns were then ordered to be brought up ; and, on the night of the twelfth, ground was chap, hi, broken against the castle ; when Beresford, hear- , ing that Soult, at the head of a considerable jyj^y^ army, was advancing from Seville, relinquished the further prosecution of the siege, and advanc- ed to meet him. On the fourteenth, the army was put in mo- May 14. tion on Valverde ; and the stores and artillery were removed under escort of General Cole's division. As the rear-guard commenced its march, the enemy made a sortie from the town in force, and a battalion of Portuguese suffered very severely. On receiving intelligence of the successful op- erations in Portugal, the Regent Blake had left Cadiz in hope of profiting by a conjunc- ture so favourable. He effected a junction with Castanos, who had been appointed to the com- mand in Estramadura ; and on the fourteenth these leaders had an interview with Marshal Beresford at Valverde. It was then agreed to offer battle to the enemy, and on the day follow- May 15. ing the British army took post on the heights of Albuera. Before Beresford commenced operations a- gainst Badajos, it was deemed of importance to c2 82 BERESFORD ADVANCES TO ALBUERA : HIS POSITION AT ALBUERA. 83 1811. May. iM CHAP. III. push the enemy as far as possible from the scene of action ; and a combined movement of Colonel Colburne, Ballasteros, and the Conde de Ville- mur, commanding the Estramaduran cavalry, induced Latour Maubourg to fall back to Con- stantino. Soult, however, having by large drafts from the corps of Victor and Sebastian! col- lected a considerable force at Seville, joined Latour Maubourg, and, with this united army, was advancing to the relief of Badajos. To oppose the progress of this formidable May 15. force, Beresford, on the fifteenth, took post on the heights of Albuera. During the night he was joined by the Spaniards under Blake and Castanos, who, with a liberality and self-denial unusual in the Spanish character, insisted that the chief command in the approaching engage- ment should be vested in Marshal Beresford. The ground occupied by the allies was a chain of eminences, along the front of which flowed the river Albuera, a narrow stream, and fordable in many places above the position. Towards the left, the great road from Seville leads over it by a bridge, and subsequently divaricates to Bada- jos and 01iven9a. On the left of this road, and a short distance from the bridge, stands the vil- \ 1811. May. lage of Albuera, containing a church and about chap. hi. an hundred houses, which had been deserted by their inhabitants. Below the bridge the Albuera was unfordable. The western bank occupied by the allies was of considerable altitude, and com- pletely commanded all the ground to the eastward. A little above the bridge, a brook called the Fer- dia joins the Albuera, and the banks of those streams, and the ground between them, is thickly covered with wood. The right of the position had no point (Tappui, the range of heights being prolonged in that direction to an extent it was impossible to occupy. On the the fifteenth, the cavalry were driven back from Santa Martha; and in the even- ing the leading divisions of the French army took post on some wooded ground about a mile distant, which stretched in a simicircular sweep downward to the river. The remainder came up during the night ; and Soult, with a force of eighteen thousand infantry, four thousand caval- ry, and forty pieces of cannon, found himself in presence of his enemy. The allied army was somewhat superior in numbers. It consisted of a corps of twelve 84 BATTLE OF ALBUERA. BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 85 CHAP. III. thousand Spaniards, which joined during the Igjj night ; of thirteen thousand British and Portu- May. guese infantry, two thousand cavalry, and thirty- two guns. Beresford occupied his position in the fol- lowing manner:— The Spaniards were posted on the right in two lines, their left terminat- ing on the Valverde road, where it joined the right of General Stewart's division which oc- cupied the centre. General Hamilton's Por- tuguese division was on the left, supported by a brigade of German light infantry, which held the village of Albuera. General Cole's division — which only came up as the action commenced —and one brigade of General Hamilton's divi- sion, formed a second line in rear of the left and centre. A strong body of artillery was posted for the protection of the bridge, and the cavalry, under General Lumley, lent support to the Spaniards on the right. About eight o'clock on the morning of the May 16. sixteenth, the French army were observed to be in motion; and shortly afterwards a strong force of cavalry, supported by two columns of infan- try and several guns, issued from the wooded i ground between the Ferdia and the Albuera, chap. iii. and directed its march towards the bridge. The artillery immediately opened fire, and a ^ ,' heavy cannonade was kept up on both sides, with great effect on the part of the British, from their advantages of ground. In the mean- while, Soult, crossing the Albuera, under cover of the wood, above the position, advanced with the main body of his army, and without oppo- sition took possession of the heights on the right flank of the Spaniards. The combat then commenced. The Spanish troops, after a short resistance, were driven from their ground, and Soult then formed his army in a line, extending to the Valverde road, and raking that of the allies. It became instantly essential to the safety of the army, that the enemy should be driven from the commanding station he had thus assumed. Beresford directed a new alignment : General Cole's division was placed in an oblique line with its right flank thrown back, and an endeavour was made to bring up the Spanish troops to the charge. This failed. A heavy fire was kept up by the French artillery, and a charge J 86 BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 1811. May. CHAP. III. of cavalry again forced them to retire in con- fusion. General Stewart's division, therefore, was brought up, and passing, through the Spaniards, advanced to gain possession of the heights. At this period a storm of rain came on, which complete- ly darkened the atmosphere, and rendered it im- possible to discern the movements of the enemy at any distance. The right brigade, under Col- onel Colburne, consisting of the Buffs, the sixty- sixth, the second battalion forty-eighth, and the thirty-first, was in the act of deploying, — the two leading battalions alone, having completed the manoeuvre, — when a regiment of Polish lancers, which under shelter of the mist had circled their flank, made a furious charge from the rear. The result was, that the whole brigade, with the exception of the thirty- first, which still remained in column, were driven forward into the enemy's line, and made prison- ers. General Latour Maubourg, with the caval- ry, then took post beyond the right of the allies, waiting for the first indication of retreat, to execute a grand and decisive charge, and throw confusion into the movement. Their mo- BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 87 1811. May. tions were watched by the heavy brigade, under ch ap. hi. General Lumley, and the horse artillery did con siderable execution in their ranks. It was under such circumstances that the brigade of General Houghton was advanced to retrieve, if possible, the fortunes of tlie day. A contest of the most bloody and pertina- cious character ensued. The leading regiment, the twenty-ninth, no sooner reached the sum- mit of the heights, than it was assailed by a fire of rausquetry and artillery which spread havoc through the ranks, — and in leading this regiment to the charge, General Houghton fell pierced with wounds. Unfortunately, the intervention of a steep but narrow gulley, ren- dered it impossible to reach the enemy with the bayonet, and the twenty-ninth was directed to halt and open fire. The fifty-seventh and forty- eighth then came up, and assuming their position in line, the struggle was maintained on both sides with desperate courage. In this state of things. General Cole directed the Fusileer brigade to advance on the enemy's left, and ascend the disputed heights from the valley. In the execution of this movement, General Cole, and almost every individual at- VOL. III. d3 88 BATTLE OF ALBUERA. CHAP. III. tached to his Staff, were wounded. The Fusi- jQjj leer brigade, on crowning the ascent, was re- l^jjy ceived with a fire so tremendous, that it at first recoiled, but instantly recovering its ground, displayed, throughout the remainder of this des- perate conflict, a degree of steadiness and intre- pidity impossible to be surpassed. Colonel Sir William Myers, commanding the brigade, was killed early in the action, and his country was thus deprived of the services of a most gallant and accomplished officer. In the meanwhile, General Houghton's bri- gade had maintained its ground in spite of all the enemy's efforts to dislodge it. Above two- thirds of its number had fallen, yet the remain- der continued unbroken, and not one inch of ground had been yielded. At length, the entire exhaustion of ammunition made it necessary to retire, and the retrogressive movement was made by the small number of survivors with the most perfect regularity. A brigade of guns was then advanced to the front, and immediate- ly opened fire. They were charged in flank by the Polish lancers, and for a moment taken ; but the Fusileer brigade coming up, the cavalry were driven back, and the guns withdrawn. THE FRENCH ARE REPULSED. 89 1811. May. At length the French were forced from their chap. hi. position with immense slaughter, and retired across the Albuera. Marshal Beresford, from his great inferiority in cavalry, did not judge it prudent to continue the pursuit ; and Soult, alarmed at the extent of his loss, made no effort to regain the post, the pertinacious mainten- ance of which had involved a sacrifice so pro- digious. While these events were passing on the right, several attempts were made to gain possession of the bridge and village on the left. Though a great proportion of the troops had been with- drawn from this point, General Alten's light in- fantry brigade, and General Hamilton's Portu- guese division, succeeded in repelling every attack. About three o'clock, the firing had entirely ceased, and both armies took post on the ground they had occupied in the morning. Thus terminated, perhaps, the most fierce and murderous contest which took place during the war. Out of seven thousand five hundred British, four thousand one hundred and fifty- eight were killed, wounded, or missing. The total loss of the allies in the engagement, a- 90 RESULTS OP THE BATTLE. 1811. May. CHAP. III. mounted to nearly seven thousand men. Soult, in his official despatch, rated the French loss at only two thousand eight Imndred ; but it was ascertained, by an intercepted letter from General Gazan, that upwards of four thousand wounded, were under charge of that officer. Taking this fact in conjunction with the number of killed and wounded left on the field, the loss of the French army cannot be reasonably calcu- lated at less than nine thousand men, — an a- mount of slaughter on both sides, which, in pro- portion to the numbers engaged, is altogether enormous. During the following day, both armies re- mained in peaceful occupation of their respec- tive positions. On the morning of the eigh- teenth, it was ascertained that Marshal Soult had withdrawn from his position, and was retiring on Seville. The cavalry, under Gen- eral Luniley, were instantly detached to follow this movement ; and at Usagre, a very gallant affair took place, which, without loss to the British, cost the enemy about an hundred and fifty of their number. Honourable as the battle of Albuera unques- tionably was to the prowess of British troops, it f.4k »• * » ' OBSERVATIONS. 91 did by no means succeed in adding a reputation chap. in. for military talent, to the other accomplish- TT^Y" ments of Marshal Beresford. The manoeuvres of Soult, before and during the battle, were bold and masterly. He seized at once on the vulnerable point of the position, and refused to relax his grasp while it was possible to retain it. Had he been opposed by other than British troops, in all probability Albu- era would have witnessed a repetition of the scene of Ocana. Never, in truth, was an army in more imminent peril than that of the allies. Soult at one period had not only gained the key of the position, but had captured a whole brigade of artillery, above one thousand prisoners, and six stand of colours. So decided indeed was his success, that Beresford even talked of retreat, when retreat could have involved nothing short of the entire ruin of his army. From the exe- cution of this purpose he w^as fortunately dis- suaded by the earnest remonstrances of General Stewart ; and by the sacrifice of more than half of his British force, he was enabled to regain that ground which ought never to have been lost. In allotting the defence of the most important k 92 OBSERVATIONS. 1811. May. CHAP. III. part of the position to the Spaniards, Be- resford was guilty of an error of the first magni- tude. He evidently expected that the chief ef- forts of the enemy would be directed against the bridge, but the right was the truly vulner- able point — the point, indeed, so obviously vul- nerable, that its selection by Soult, as the chief object of attack, might have been anticipated by any General of ordinary accomplishment in his profession. Had such useful prescience been possessed by Marshal Beresford, he would scarce- ly have intrusted the key of his position to that portion of his force on which least dependence could be placed ; and, by a different disposition of his troops, he would, in all probability, have escaped the peril to which the army was subse- quently exposed. In one respect, at least. Marshal Beresford and the army he commanded were fortunate. General Cole and General Stewart were officers of the highest merit, and exerted themselves throughout the day with a talent, promptitude, and energy, impossible to be surpassed. General Stewart seemed everywhere in the field, animat- ing and directing wherever danger seemed to OBSERVATIONS. 93 1811. May. lower most darkly ; and we believe it was solely chap. hi. from the dictates of his own judgment that Gen- eral Cole made that decisive movement in ad- vance by which the victory was decided. On the whole, the victory of Albuera was ut- terly barren and unproductive. In raising the siege of Badajos> Beresford at once allowed Soult to gain the great object of his movement ; in fact, the only object, which, on the part of the allies, it was worth hazarding a battle to prevent. The armies fought ; and Soult returned to Seville, baffled indeed in the field, yet successful in a- chieving the important purpose for which he had advanced. Beresford, on the other hand, after a successful battle, gained nothing but the boast of victory, earned at a most ruinous price. 94 MOVEMENTS OP MA88ENA : CHAPTER IV. BATTLE OF FUENTES— CAPTURE OF ALMEIDA. isn. April. CHAP. IV. On the twenty-eighth of April, Lord Wel- lington returned from the Alentejo, and again established his head-quarters at Villa Formosa. Nothing of importance had occurred during his absence. Massena had been employed in re-or- ganizing his army, which the retreat from Por- tugal had reduced to a miserable condition ; and, having received a reinforcement of fifteen hun- dred cavalry of the Imperial Guard, he concen- trated his divisions in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. His chief object was to intro- duce supplies into Almeida ; and, on the second of May, the whole French army, consisting of the second, sixth, eighth, and ninth corps, with all the cavalry that could be collected in the pro- vinces of Castile and Leon, crossed the Agueda 1 May 2. HE ADVANCES TO RELIEVE ALMEIDA. 95 181L May. and the Azava. Lord Wellington's inferiority chap. iv. in cavalry did not permit him .to oppose their march in a country peculiarly favourable for the exercise of that arm, and the cavalry and light division fell back on their approach to Fuentes d'Honore. The numerical strength of the enemy was considerably greater than that of the allies ; it amounted to forty thousand infantry, and five thousand cavalry, while Lord Wellington could only muster an effective force of thirty-six thou- sand men, of which not more than two thousand were cavalry. Notwithstanding this disparity, he determined to oppose Massena in his attempt to relieve Almeida ; and accordingly concent- rated his army to give battle. Almeida stands on the right of the Coa, a river of considerable magnitude, which, from the steepness of its banks, affords few points at which it can be crossed by an army. The bridge immediately in rear of Almeida is within range of the guns of the fortress, and at the period in question was so dilapidated as to be nearly im- passable. There is another at Castello Bom, about two leagues above Almeida ; but this also was a most difficult communication. A little 96 POSITION OF THE ALLIES. BATTLE OF FUENTKS D HONORE. 97 1811. May. CHAP. IV. higher up there is a ford, but between that point and Sabugal the river cannot be crossed. At the latter place the road from Ciudad Rodrigo leads across a stone bridge, affording the only safe and convenient communication in case of retreat. Lord Wellington, therefore, was naturally anxious to adopt a position which should enable him at once to protect the approach to Almeida, and cover this important line of communication. He was fully aware, however, that the great ex- tension of front thus rendered necessary, was highly disadvantageous ; and, from the first, he contemplated the probability of being forced by circumstances to relinquish the communication by Sabugal, and concentrate his army in a more confined position, for the protection of Almeida alone. Between the Duas Casas and the Touron rivers, both of which run nearly parallel to the Coa, is a range of easy heights, along which Lord Wellington formed the centre of his army. In front of these is the village of Fuentes d'Honore, which, though not strictly speaking embraced in the position, was held as an advanced post, and contributed materially to its strength. General 1811. May. Houston, with the seventh division, was posted chap. iv. on the extreme right of the line ; and a body of Spanish cavalry, under Don Julian Sanchez, was placed in the village of Nava d'Aver, about two miles beyond it, to add to the security which that flank derived from the extreme difficulty of the ground in its rear. The first and third divi- sions were stationed on the height in rear of Fuentes d'Honore, their light infantry occupy- ing the village. The sixth and light divisions were posted in rear of Almada, where the Duas Casas is crossed by a bridge. The fifth division formed the extreme left of the line, and guarded the great road to Almeida, with its flank resting on Fort Conception. The Portuguese brigade of General Pack, supported by a British batta- lion, was employed in blockading Almeida. On the third of May the enemy appeared in May 3. front of the position, and took post on a ridge which overhangs the village of Fuentes d'Honore, nearly parallel to that occupied by the allies. A brisk skirmish took place between the light troops, followed by a heavy cannonade, and a des- perate attack on the village. Lieutenant-Col- onel Williams, with the light-infantry battalions of the first and third divisions, maintained this post VOL. III. E i 98 BATTLE OF FUENTES D*HONORE. BATTLE OF FUENTES D HONORE. 99 1811. May. May 4. CHAP. IV. with great gallantry and resolution ; bat fresh numbers of the enemy pouring on to the attack, it was found necessary to support him succes- sively with the seventy-first, the seventy-ninth, and the twenty-fourth regiments. The contest was continued on both sides with great obsti- nacy and perseverance, till the approach of night, when the assailants, repulsed in all their efforts, took advantage of the darkness to retire. On the fourth no engagement took place. Massena employed himself in reconnoitring the position of the allies ; and Lord Wellington, an- ticipating that he would endeavour to turn his right, by crossing the Duas Casas at P090 Vel- ho, moved the division of General Houston to- wards that point, with directions to defend the passage of the river. The expectations of Lord Wellington were realized. On the morning of the fifth, the French army were observed to have made a general movement ; and the corps of Junot, with all the cavalry, appeared in two columns on the oppo- site side of the raUey of the Duas Casas, in front of P090 Velho. Lord Wellington, in conse- quence, sent the light division and the cavalry to the support of General Houston, and the May 5. 1811. May. first and third divisions also made a movement chap. iv. to their right. About seven o'clock the enemy drove in the advanced guard of the British, and took possession of the village of P090 Velho. The cavalry, under General Montbrun, having driven Don Julian Sanchez from Nava d'Aver, now executed a general charge, supported by infant- ry and guns, and forced the British cavalry to retire in some confusion beyond the infantry, which, opening fire, succeeded in checking the assailants. Though this attack was repulsed, the numer- ous cavalry of the enemy were observed to be collecting on the right flank, while large masses of infantry were forming in front. Under these circumstances, Lord Wellington decided on withdrawing his army to a more concentrated position, and giving up the communication by Sabugal. The seventh and light divisions, therefore, supported by the cavalry, were di- rected to retire, and a new alignment was taken up, extending from the Duas Casas to the Turon, nearly at right angles with that in which the army had hitherto been formed. The se- venth division was posted on a height beyond 11 m r 100 BATTLE OF FUENTES D HONORE. BATTLE OF FUENTES D HONORE. 101 1811. May. I CHAP. IV. the Turon, which commanded the whole plain to Frenada ; and the cavalry and light division were directed to form in reserve in rear of the left of the first division. This retrogressive movement was executed with the most perfect regularity, though press- ed by the enemy's cavalry, which, strongly sup- ported by artillery, made repeated charges on the retiring divisions. Their superiority in this arm was too decided to admit of contest ; but, occasionally, a few squadrons charged through the intervals of the squares, and succeeded in checking for a moment the progress of the as- sailants. During this movement the chasseurs Britanniques, in particfular, distinguished them- selves. They repulsed a furious charge ; and, by a well-directed flanking fire, compelled the French cavalry to retire with considerable loss. The conduct of the horse-artillery, command- ed by Captain Bull, was also admirable. No- thing could exceed the skill and boldness with which it was manoeuvred ; and, thus support- ed, the infantry accomplished its retrogression in unbroken order, and with a loss far inferior to that of the enemy. When the divisions reached their ground, the 1811. May. cavalry, in passing through the intervals of the chap. iv. new alignment, occasioned some confusion ; and taking instant advantage of this circumstance. General Montbrun ordered his whole cavalry to charge. In order to protect the retiring divi- sions, the line of march had been flanked by two brigades of guns, which instantly opened fire on the approach of the enemy. The infantry likewise poured in several volleys ; and, thus severely handled, the French cavalry retreated in confusion, ana Montbrun desisted from further eflPort. In the meanwhile, the sixth corps, which, during these events remained opposite to Fuen- tes d'Honore, had made strenuous efibrts to gain possession of that important post. About nine in the morning, several brigades of artillery were brought opposite to the vil- lage, and pointed in readiness to fire. At length, on a given signal, the whole of their guns opened fire on the village, and several columns of infantry moved forward to the at- tack. A struggle of the fiercest and most ob- stinate character ensued. The seventy-first, se- venty-ninth, and twenty-fourth regiments de- fended the village with the greatest gallantry, 102 BATTLB OP FUENTES D HONORE. I) 1811. May, CHAP. IV. disputing every inch of ground. In this state of things, Colonel Cameron of the seventy- ninth, commanding the brigade, was killed, and the enemy continuing to pour in fresh co- lumns, at length succeeded in overpowering the defenders. No sooner, however, did the as- sailants attempt to form beyond the houses, than the eighty-eighth, seventy-fourth, and eigh- ty-third regiments, advancing to the charge, drove them back into the village with the bayo- net, where the contest recommenced, and conti- nued to be kept up on both sides with great vi- gour and obstinacy, till the streets may be said literally to have been covered with dead.* To- • NoUiing could exceed the gallantry and devotion of the French troops in this part of the enga^ment. The forty- fifth French regiment in particular, distinguishable by their long red feathers, attracted the admiration of all who witnessed the contest. They came on to the sound of music in all the r^iilarity of a field-day, and subsequently maintained their ground in spite of every effort made by the seventy-first and seventy-ninth to dislodge them. The eagle of the regiment was then planted on the outward wall of the village nearest to the British position, and maintained there while a sharp en- gagement was carried on with the eighty-third, which, animated by the hope of gaining so splendid a prize, fought with the greatest courage. The forty-fifth were at length forced to retire, and an incessant fire having been kept up on the eagle, nearly an hundred of their number were found dead withiu grasp of the pole* MASSENA BETIRES. 103 wards evening the fire on both sides gradually chap, i v. slackened, and the village, as if by mutual con- ^^^^ sent, was divided by the combatants, the upper ^^^^ part being occupied by the British, the lower by the enemy. The result of these repeated eflEorts convinced Massena that he had nothing to hope from con- tinuing the contest. During the whole of the gixth an unbroken tranquillity reigned in both armies, and on the morning of the seventh he May 7. withdrew his troops from the front of the allied position. In order to repair as much as pos- sible the reverse he had experienced, orders were secretly transmitted to the Governor of Almeida, directing him to blow up the works, and escape across the Agueda with his garrison, at Barba del Puerco or San Felices. On the se- venth, Marshal JMarmont arrived from Paris, with authority to assume the command of the army. With this event, the military career of Mas- sena may be said to have closed for ever. The short period of his service in the Penin- sula had considerably impaired his reputation, and the charm of his name, as a watch-word to victory, had been tried in vain. Though V 104 OBSERVATIONS. 105 OBSERVATIONS. i| CHAP. IV. his faculties were entire, it was evident that 1811 ^® ^^^ considerably impaired their activity. Maj. He was no longer what he had been, when celebrated as the hero of Zurich, the defender of Genoa, and the unconquered opponent of Souvaroff. At Busaco, at Guarda, at Sabugal, and at Fuentes, he had not only been out- fought but out-manoeuvred ; and he returned to France, shrunk from the gigantic dimen- sions with which men's opinion had invested him, to the stature of a common man. At Fuentes d'Honore, during the whole of the third, his efforts were confined to the single object of gaining possession of the village, — a sort of nibbling hostility, which was unsuccess- ful, and deserved to be so. His operations on the morning of the fifth gave hope of better things. By directing his efforts against the right of the allied position, he took advantage of the most vulnerable point ; and in driving a British army from ground which they attempt- ed seriously to defend, he achieved a temporary success, to which no parallel can be afforded in the whole war. His subsequent manoeuvres are not equally entitled to praise. The charges of his cavalry— chap. iv. in which arm his superiority was overpowering ^g^j —were not supported by his infantry, and were jyj^y, therefore productive of little benefit. By some unaccountable timidity he appeared unwilling to commit the fate of his army to the chances of a battle, and no sooner did he perceive that Lord Wellington again fronted him in position, than he drew off his forces. He thus remained inac- tive at the very moment when having achieved an advantage, his troops felt something of that exhilaration, which the spectacle of a retiring enemy is certain to inspire. The position of the allies presented no feature of imposing strength. It was in many places unavoidably exposed, and open to the attack both of cavalry and artillery. The thick woods in front offered secure cover for the formation of his attacking columns; and thus favoured, he might have poured the full mass and volume of his force on any point of the position. It is nothing to say that in such a powerful and concentrated effort he might have encoun- tered repulse. If Massena was not prepared to fight for the relief of Almeida, why did he ad- vance ? If he was so prepared, was it possible e2 106 OBSERVATIONS. ALMEIDA CLOSELY INVESTED. 107 1811. May. CHAP. IV. that be could have engaged his enemy under circumstances more favourable than those in which he gave up the contest ? But the gravamen of the charge against ]\Ias- sena, is not that he did not attack his enemy's position, but that Jie did nothing. By throwing his cavalry across the Coa, a movement which, having lost Sabugal, it was no longer in the power of Lord Wellington to prevent ; he might have penetrated to the rear of the allies, and compelled them to regain their communications, by crossing the Coa at points of great difficulty. Such a manoeuvre must have utterly deranged the plans of the allies, and it was probably in reference to its adoption that Lord W^lington was currently believed to have declared, " That had Massena not been blind, he must have beat- en him at Fuentes." Of the manoeuvres of Lord Wellington, little need be said. In the disposition and arrange- ment of his army, he displayed in an eminent degree that skill, sagacity, and confidence which marked him as a tactician of the highest order. His original position was too extended for his numbers, and Lord Wellington knew it to be so ; but the communication with Sabugal was of fi u too much consequence to be lightly given up, chap, iv . and he therefore determined to maintain it, so ^^^^^ long as he might find it compatible with the more May. important object of covering Almeida. When the enemy's movements, however, made it pru- dent that he should concentrate his army for the protection of Almeida, he at once boldly re- linquished the preferable line of communication, relying on his own skill and the valour of his troops to prevent the necessity of retreat. The loss of the allied army, in the actions of the third and fifth, amounted to about seventeen hundred men. That of the enemy, from their acting throughout as assailants, must have been considerably greater. In the village of Fuen- tes, the lanes, the church, the court-yards, and the gardens, were found literally piled with the dying and the dead. A considerable num- ber of prisoners were likewise made by the allies. The French had no sooner retired, than Lord Wellington, having received information that General Brennier intended to sally out with the garrison, made instant arrangements for a more vigorous blockade. General Campbell's division was accordingly ordered to invest the 1 108 BBENNIER SALLIES PROM ALMEIDA, \ CHAP. IV. place, a battalion was posted at Barba del Pu- IQji erco, and a brigade on the high road to Rodri- May. S^' These precautions, however, were insuffi- cient. About midnight, on the eleventh, a tre- mendous explosion took place in the fortress which blew down the revetement of two fronts,' and General Brennier marched out with his garrison, taking the road to Barba del Puerco- He surprised and bayoneted a piquet; and, passing through the posts of the brigade on the Rodrigo road, was enabled to continue his march without serious molestation, and follow- ed only by General Pack, who, with a few troops hastily collected, hung upon his rear, indicating, by the flashes of his musquetry, the direction taken by the enemy. The object of Brennier was to reach Barba del Puerco; but mistaking his way, he followed a circuitous route which led him to some distance from the point of his destination. In the mean- while the officer commanding the battalion at Barba del Puerco, imagining from the sound of the firing that the enemy were receding from his post, moved his corps to a ford higher up, in the hope of intercepting them. By this error, General Brennier, on reaching Barba del » mjB^ fl AND ESCAPES WITH THE GARRISON. 109 1811. Mav. Puerco found the town unoccupied ; but the chap. iv. detour he had made, having enabled several re- giments to close on his rear, a heavy fire was opened as his troops were in the act of crossing the bridge, and about two hundred, including ten officers, were made prisoners. A consider- able number also were killed or wounded. With the rest of his force, Brennier succeeded in joining the French army, having performed an exploit remarkable at once for its boldness and its success. The intelligence of this unfortunate event was accompanied by a general feeling of mortification and disappointment throughout the army. At his particular request the conduct of the siege had been committed to General Campbell ; and it is difficult to acquit that officer either of negli- gence, or unsound judgment in the discharge of his trust. Had proper precautions been adopted in the disposition of the blockading force, the fruits of the victory of Fuentes would not thus have been sacrificed, nor would the character of a British army have been lowered in the eyes of their opponents. Marmont, on assuming the command, placed his army in cantonments in the neighbourhood l» 110 MASSENA SUCCEEDED BY MARMONT. SIEGE OF BADAJOS. HI 1811. May. CHAP. IV. of Salamanca; and Lord Wellington directed the works of Almeida to be repaired. It af- forded a favourable point for the establishment of a general depot of stores, whether he might still intend to remain on the defensive, or whe- ther circumstances might enable him to pene- trate into Spain. The information communi- cated by Marshal Beresford, determined him to detach two divisions to reinforce the south- em army ; and setting out instantly in person, May 19. he reached Elvas on the nineteenth, where he received intelligence of the battle of Albuera. He also learned that the investment of Badajos had been renewed on the same day, and that Soult was in full retreat towards Seville, follow- ed by the allied cavalry. Lord Wellington immediately assum^ the personal direction of the operations on the Guadiaua. In a few days the divisions detached from the northern army came up ; and on the Mayl27. twenty-seventh the place was completely in- vested, on the right of the -river by General Houston's division, on the left by those of Pic- ton and Hamilton. Trenches were opened on* June 5. the night of the twenty-ninth ; and on the fifth of June, the breach made in Fort St. Christoval 1811 June. was considered practicable. On the night fol- chap. iv. lowing it was assaulted. Owing to a blunder of the engineers, the attack failed. It had not been judged necessary to secure the ditch ; and from the moment it became dark, the garrison had been employed in removing the earth and rub- bish from the bottom of the breach, so that seven feet of the wall remained clear. An ob- stacle was thus unexpectedly presented, which the assailants were in no condition to surmount. Their ladders were too short ; and though the gallantry of the men led them to attempt clmib- ing the wall, their efforts proved unsuccessful. The enemy, from the parapet, hurled down on the assailants a shower of shells, grenades, stones, and other missiles, which occasioned great havoc ; and the party were compelled at length to retire, with the loss of half their number. During the two following days the fire against the fort was continued, and on the ninth the breach was again judged practicable. At night a storming party of two hundred men, preceded by a forlorn-hope of twenty-five men, under Lieutenant Hunt of the engineers, advanced against the breach. The enemy, however, were better prepared for their reception than on the Jun. 9. 112 SI£GE OP BADAJOS. 1811. June. Jun. 10. CHAP. IV. former occasion. Reinforcements had been thrown into the fort, and unfortunately Lieuten- ant Hunt was killed on the glacis when leading on his party. The troops thus left without a leader, continued to press on with their accus- tomed gallantry. But the breach was again found impracticable, from the same cause which had occasioned the failure of the former assault. After many ineffectual efforts, the party was at length withdrawn, with the loss of one hun- dred and forty-five men in killed and wounded. On the tenth, by an intercepted letter from Soult to Marmont, Lord Wellington received intelligence that these leaders were about to unite their forces, and advance against him. He, therefore, promptly determined on convert- ing the siege of Badajos into a blockade ; and on the night of the twelfth, the last of the guns and stores were withdrawn to Elvas, without moles- tation from the garrison. By other channels Lord Wellington had learned that Drouet, with a corps of eight thou- sand men, had marched from Toledo to join Soult, and reached Cordova on the seventh. He was aware, also, that Marmont had put his army in motion towards the south, and that Soult was THE SIEGE IS RAISED. 113 advancing to Merida to meet him. Lord Wei- chap. iv. lington, therefore, advanced to Albuera, and ^g^j took post with his army in order to fight Soult, j^^^ should he venture to advance alone to the relief of Badajos, Soult, however, having drawn all the disposable troops from the various towns possessed by the French in Andalusia, and be- ing joined by Drouet, marched on the twelfth Jun. 12. from Llerena, and on the eighteenth establish- ed a communication with Marmont at Merida. From thence Soult and Marmont directed their march on Badajos, when Lord Wellington cross- ed the Guadiana, and took up a line on the river Caya, covered on the left by Campo Mayor, and on the right by Elvas. The combined force of the armies of Portu- gal and the south, amounted to about seventy thousand men, whereof ten thousand were ca- valry. That of Lord Wellington, including the corps of General Spencer, which had made a parallel movement with the enemy in its front, did not exceed fifty-six thousand, including four thousand cavalry. The smallness of this force may be accounted for by the unhealthiness of the army, upwards of twelve thousand British being in hospital. The Portuguese troops, ill Iffct^lf;;*. "r" 114 SOULT AND MARMONT ADVANCE. 1811. June. %t * CHAP- IV. paid and ill supplied, were by no means in the same state of discipline and efficiency which had marked them at an earlier period. The regularity with which the British soldiers were paid and supplied, could not but tend to excite com- parisons productive of discontent, and it was judged necessary that Marshal Beresford should resign his command, in order to restore discip- line, and silence complaint. Under these circumstances, without dreading a battle, Lord Wellington determined not to court one. He resolved to limit his object to the defence of Portugal; and, with this view, he formed an encampment in the woods along the Caya, a small tributary of the Guadiana. This, forming the right of the army, was com- manded by Sir Rowland Hill, who had recent- ly returned from England, The left, under General Picton, occupied the heights in rear of Campo Mayor, which flanked the front of the position. The reserve, under Sir Brent Spencer, remained at Portalegre, ready, in case of need, to support the other divisions, or to cross the Tagus, should the movements of the enemy threaten danger in that quarter. While the army was thus posted, Lord Wel- LORD WELLINGTON RETREATS TO THE CAYA. 115 lington induced General Blake, with a corpa of c hap, iv . about nine thousand Spaniards, to move into the "^^ Conde de Niebla, and thus at once to threaten j^^^ SeviUe and the rear of the French army. Ac cordingly that leader set out on the eighteenth from Juramenba, and on the twenty-second Jun. 22. reached Mertola. There he remained for two days to refresh his troops, then crossed the Gua- diana ; but, instead of pushing for SeviUe, he ad- vanced against Niebla, an old and ruinous town, with a castle of considerable strength. Blake attempted to carry the latter by escalade, and, as might be expected, failed; and having fruitlessly spent three days before it, on receiving intelU- gence of the approach of a detachment sent in pursuit of him by Soult, he made for Ayamonte, where he embarked with all his artillery for Cadiz. From that city he soon after sailed to join the Spanish army, under General Freyre, in Granada. In the meanwhile, Lord Wellington knew it to be impossible that the enemy could long sub- sist their forces when in a state of concentra- tion, and he patiently waited the moment when they should find it necessary to break up from the frontier of the Alentejo. This took place L^se 116 SOULT AND MARMONT SEPARATE. STATE OF SPAIN. 117 1811. Jane. CHAP. IV. about the middle of July, when Soult returned to Seville ; and Marmont^ re-crossing the Ta- gus at Almaraz, marched on Salamanca. Lord WeUington, accordingly, leaving Sir Rowland Hill, with the second British division, and the Portuguese division of General Hamilton, and two brigades of cavalry to guard the Alente- jo, crossed the Tagus with the remainder of his army, and fixed his head-quarters at Fuente Guinaldo. The troops went into cantonments in the villages of Aldea de Bispo, Albergaria, Alma- dilla, and El Bodon. In these quarters the army remained upwards of a month, without disturbance from the enemy. I CHAPTER V. OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES. During the summer of eighteen hundred and chap. v. eleven, the country was quiescent and submissive ^^n to the intrusive government, in a degree unprece- dented since the commencement of the struggle, and no advantage was taken of the powerful diversion by which the array of Massena was for so long a period withdrawn from the Spanish territory. Joseph remained at Madrid, endea- vouring to organize a system of equitable go- vernment, by which the aversion of the people to their new sovereign might be gradually over- come. In this he did not succeed. The neces- sity of raising monej, to meet the exigencies of the state, gave rise to numerous confiscations of property ; and the cruelties and oppressive ex- actions of the French commanders, over whom 118 STATE OF SPAIN. STATE OF SPAIN. 119 1811. ?, CHAP. V. he possessed little control, counteracted all his views. The Spaniards held Joseph responsible for every act of atrocity, or oppression, com- mitted by the supporters of his cause ; and the flame of insurrection, though less violent, was not extinguished. The Cortes, holding their sittings in a dis- tant comer of the kingdom, and cut oflf from all' inteiTOttrso nith 4he interior, possessed lit- tle influence with the nation at large. It was owing, perhaps, to a consciousness of this cir- cumstance, that their attention was chiefly devot- ed to matters of speculative legislation, while subjects of immediate and pressing importance were entirely overlooked. It may be well, how- ever, at the present moment, to cast a cursory glance over the different provinces of the king- dom. Biscay and the Asturias were occupied by the French ; but in the latter, Porlier with his Guer- illas was in activity. On one occasion, by a sudden movement having appeared before St. Andero, he succeeded in ^pturing the garri- son. In Navarre, Espoz y Mina, allowed no oppor- tunity to escape of harassing the French army, 3 1811. and cutting off its communications. The rich val- chap. v. leys of Roncal and Roncesvalles, were still held by the natives. Gallicia was free from the ene- my ; but its army, under General Abadia, was in a wretched state of equipment ; and General Dorsenne, who had succeeded Bessieres in the north, was preparing to enter it. In Arragon, Suchet had succeeded in allaying the storm of resistance which he had encounter- ed in that kingdom. But numerous Guerilla parties were a-foot in the mountainous districts, and there was a small force of about four thou- 'Sand regulars under Villa Campa. In the two Castiles and Leon, the principal places were all held by the enemy. But in the province of Guadalaxara, the Empecinado al- lowed no opportunity to escape of inflicting pu- nishment on the invaders. On one occasion, he succeeded in surrounding and cutting off a strong detachment of the enemy, employed in escorting eleven thousand Spanish prisoners. Tliere were likewise bands of Guerillas in La Mancha, and in the province of Salamanca. Mmxsia was in possession of the Spaniards. Their army, commanded by Blake, was nearly f f 120 STATE OF SPAIN. BATTLE OF VALS» 121 1811. CHAP. V. twenty thousand strong, but miserably wanting in equipment and munitions. Granada was occupied by the French, who had garrisons in the sea-ports of Almeria, Ma- laga, and Marbella. In Andalusia, the Guerillas were numerous and active ; but the chief towns were held by the enemy, with the exception of Cadiz, Aya- monte, and Algesiras. The army before Cadiz remained under the command of Victor. Estramadura, while the French held Badajos, might be considered in their power. Of Catalonia and Valencia we shall now speak. The courage and enterprise of the Catalans had not been tamed by misfortune. The Su- preme Junta were dissatisfied with the inactiri- ty of O'Donnel during the siege of Tortosa, and displaced him from the command. His suc- cessor was the Marquis de Campoverde, whose conduct on previous occasions had raised him to .Jan. 16. distinction. In the meanwhile, General Sars- field had taken post, with about six thousand men, at Vals, from which station Macdonald de- tached his Italian division, under General Eu- 2 \ gene, and a brigade of cavalry, to dislodge him. chap. v. Sarsfield then fell back, and took up another ^ lo 1 1. position on the heights of Pla and Fruencaldas, January. where he waited the approach of the ene- my. Eugene, with greater gallantry than pru- dence, determined on immediate attack. His troops were received by a fire so destructive as instantly to arrest their progress. The Span- iards then charged with the bayonet, and drove back the assailants with great slaughter. Eu- gene was liimself mortally wounded in the en- gagement ; and the whole of his division would probably have been cut ofi^, but for the timely support of a brigade of infantry and some caval- ry, detached by Macdonald to his assistance. On the arrival of this force, the action was re- newed with alternations of success on both sides, but without decisive advantage on either. For several days after this check, Macdonald remained inactive, though the Spaniards still kept their position. At length, on the night of the sixteenth, taking every precaution to conceal his Jan. 16. march from the enemy, he withdrew to Lerida, where he placed his troops in cantonments. Of the defeat sustained at Vals, no notice was taken by the French journals. It was part of VOL. III. w 122 ACTIVITY OF SARSFIELD : 1811. March. CHAP. V. Napoleons policy to praise the Italian troops, and to infuse a taste for military glory into the people. He feared that a reverse so signal as that of Vals might create disgust at the con- scription, and aversion to bear part in a war of extermination, such as that waged in Catalonia. A severe censure on the conduct of Macdonald, was transmitted by the secretary of war ; and, to mark the Emperor's displeasure, he directed that the army about to besiege Tarragona, should be commanded by Suchet. About the end of March, Macdonald quitted Lerida for Barcelona. His route lay through a dangerous and difficult country, and Sarsfield was again on the alert. When Macdonald ap- proached Manresa, an Italian brigade, which formed his advanced-guard, \i as assailed by a warm fire from a part of Sarsfield's corps, placed in ambush to receive it. It was immediately thrown into confusion, and driven back on the main body ; and the Italians, enraged at these re- peated disasters, during the night set fire to the town of Manresa, in which the Marshal had es- tablished his head-quarters. The town was con- sumed to ashes, and many officers who were quartered there, were able with difficulty to HE ENGAGES THE ENEMY AT COL d'aVIC. 123 rescue their baggage and horses from the flames, chap. v. — At Montserrat, where Sarsfield had taken post, the conflagration was distinctly visible. March The spectacle filled his soldiers with rage, and being joined by all the inhabitants of the sur- rounding country, Sarsfield, on the following day, encountered the French columns in the defiles of the Col d'Avic, with every advantage of posi- tion. The French, with great gallantry, dis- lodged the Spaniards from every rock and accliv- ity on which they took post ; but the latter, re- treating from height to height, kept up a most galling and destructive fire. No quarter was given by the enraged Catalans; and so much did the necessity of carrying oflp the wounded impede the march of the French, that they were six hours in reaching the summit of the mountain. In the meanwhile, Campoverde, having es- tablished his troops in a strong camp in front of Tarragona, made an unsuccessful eff^ort to gain Mar. 19. possession of Mont Jouy at Barcelona. He had endeavoured to prevail on some of the leading officers to betray the place ; but his project be- coming known to the governor, the garrison were prepared, and no sooner did his leading batta- Mar. 20. lion enter the ditch, than it was almost annihi^; 124 RECOVERY OF FIOUERAS BY THE SPANIARDS. 125 1811. April. CHAP. V. lated by a tremendous fire from the garrison. The remainder of his force instantly retreated ; but their march was intercepted by detachments of the enemy, which occasioned great loss. Another and more fortunate effort was made for the recovery of Figueras. A colonel of Mi- quelets, named Rovira, who to his military title joined that of doctor of theology, being a person of active and enterprising mind, had long amus- ed himself in devising projects for regaining some of the important fortresses held by the in- vaders. These had been proposed to the suc- cessive commanders in the province, but reject- ed by all as visionary and impracticable. Cam- poverde, however, was at length induced to lend a favourable ear to the scheme of Rovira, and appointed General Martinez as his colleague in command. Having collected about one thousand volun- teers, these leaders approached Figueras with great secrecy, halting in the woods by day, and Apr. 10. marching by night. On the tenth they arrived at Palau Surroco, a short distance from the fortress. Preparations were then made for the execution of the perilous enterprise in which they had embarked. The ofl&cers commanding \ 1811. ApriU each division were acquainted with the works of chap. v. the fort, and received the most minute instruc- tions in regard to their duty. Intelligence had previously been established with three soldiers of the garrison, in the interest of Rovira. By these men, on the following night, the Span- iards were admitted into the castle ; and the first sentinel they encountered was killed be- fore he could give the alarm. The party then separated into detached bodies ; and with such skill and accuracy had the duties of each been defined, that while the governor and garrison were yet sleeping in their quarters, the castle of Figueras was in the hands of the Spaniards. The whole of the garrison, amounting to about one thousand men, were made prisoners. The guns of the castle were then turned against the town, which also surrendered. The Baron d*Eroles, who was ordered to reinforce the vic- tors, succeeded, in his march from Martorel, in capturing the forts at Castellfullit and Olot^ by which upwards of five hundred of the enemy were made prisoners. So badly, however, was Figueras supplied with provisions, that towards the end of April it became necessary to throw an additional sup- 126 CAMPOVERDE ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE FIGUERAS, AND IS DEFEATED. 127 CHAP. V. ply into the place. With this view Campoverde ^ left his camp near Tarragona, to escort a convoy May. for its relief. In the meanwhile, General Bara- guay d'Hilliers, who commanded in Upper Cata- lonia, hlockaded the town with the whole force May 3. at his disposal. In attempting to approach the town, Campoverde was attacked in flank and rear, and forced to retreat in great confusion, leaving the convoy and fifteen hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy. His loss in killed and wounded amounted to about nine hundred. During the progress of these events, Suchet, who had long been making preparations for the siege of Tarragona, took advantage of the ab^ sence of Campoverde, and advanced against the May 4. city. On the fourth of May, he drove in the Spanish posts established in front of Fort Oliva, and his artillery and stores were put in motion from Tortosa and Lerida. The communication with the former place was protected by Fort Balaguer, and an entrenched post at Perillo ; and, to secure that with Lerida, he fortified the convent which commanded the town of Mont Blanch. Tarragona stands on the side and summit of a steep and isolated height, situated between the ! 1811. May. points where the rivers Gaya and Francoli dis- chap, v embogue into the sea. On the northern, west- ern, and southern sides, the rock is scarped and precipitate ; but, on the east and south-east, the ground slopes down by a gentle descent to the harbour and the Francoli river. The upper town is encircled by an old wall which crowns the sum- mit of the rock; and the western side, on which is the approach from Barcelona, is besides protected by five Lunettes, which form a line reaching to the sea. There are likewise two large Lunettes on the northern face. Both present to the besieg- ers a front of naked rock, which renders any ap- proach on these sides peculiarly difficult. The lower town stands at the bottom of the height near the harbour, and is protected to the landward by a small bastioned square, called the Fort Royal, about three hundred toises distant from the enceinte of the upper town, and two hundred from the sea. Both this fort and the lower town are covered by a second wall, ex- tending from the upper town to the sea, and protected by three regular bastions, and several other works. The Spaniards, having always contemplated the probability of a siege, had repaired the -Hfc, ^ A-. „ I \ "tfc^ 128 SIEGE OF TARRAGONA. 8IEGE OF TARRAGONA, 129 1811. May. CHAP. V. works, which were in condition for an obstinate defence. The garrison were in number nearly equal to the besieging army, and a squadron of British men-of-war were anchored in the bay, thus securing the admission of reinforcements and supplies. Strong as Tarragona unquestionably was, the chief feature of its strength was the Fort Oliva, situated on a plateau of equal elevation with the upper town, from which it was about four hun- dred toises distant. It was armed with sixty pieces of cannon, and surrounded by a ditch twenty feet deep, which had been cut in the solid rock. It was judged necessary by Sachet that this fort should be carried ; and approaches were ac- cordingly ntade against it, and pushed on with great vigour. In order to check the fire of the men-of-war, which was found exceedingly annoy- ing, and force them to draw off to a greater dis- tance, a large redoubt was erected on the shore, whicli being found insufficient, three other bat- teries were erected nearer to the Francoli. We shall not enter on the numerous and com- plicated details of this interesting siege. Suffice it, that in its progress the French engineers gave t 1 '4 I 4 \ proof of the highest accomplishment in their pro- chap. v. fession. The siege was pushed with a degree ^^^^ of vigour and skill, which the garrison, brave, ^^^. * but unpractised, were unequal to withstand. Fort Oliva was carried on the night of the twen- tv-ninth. It chanced that a column of twelve May 29. hundred men was in the act of entering the fort to relieve the garrison, when the signal of as- sault was given by the enemy. The rear of this body was attacked, and many of the assailants entered the gate, pels mele with the Spaniards. This distracted the defenders, the French co- lumns continued to press on, and the fort was at length carried. Fifteen hundred of the garrison ^^^^^^^ perished in this assault ; about a thousand were Suchet. made prisoners.* The loss of Fort Oliva could not but depress the hopes of the garrison of Tarragona. On the following morning a column of three thousand men attempted to regain it, but without success. The enemy then pushed forward his advances • Marshal Sachet, in his official report, makes the number of prisoners amount only to one hundred and sixty. In his me- moirs he rates them at one thousand. We are inclined to be- lieve the latter statement as most creditable to the French army and its commander. f2 130 SIEGE OF TARRAGONA. CHAP. V. against the works of the upper town ; and the ^ breaching batteries were nearly complete when June. Colonel Skerret, with two thousand men, ar- rived in the bay from Cadiz. Colonel Skerret was prevented from throwing his troops into the town, by the assurances of the Governor that Tarragona was already amply garrisoned ; and that the force he commanded would render far greater and more important service by uniting with Campoverde in an attack on the rear of the besieging army. The Governor likewise stated, that when the enemy should commence batter- ing in breach, it was his intention to abandon the place, considering the lives of his soldiers to be of higher value than the ruins of Tarra- gona. Colonel Skerret, therefore, sailed in a man-of- war to join Campoverde, who had taken post with his army at Vendrels, about twenty-five miles to the eastward. Time was thus lost, and before any combined operation could be car* ried into eiBfect, Tarragona had fallen. Unfortunately, Contreras, instead of keeping secret his intention of abandoning the town, made it publicly known. The inhabitants, thus aware they were about to be forsaken by their THE CITY IS CARRIED BY ASSAULT. 131 defenders, became stupified with fear ; and Su- chap. v. chet, having gained intelligence of the design, ^^^^ was enabled to defeat it. jun^. No time was aflPorded for the proposed retreat. The French batteries opened at daylight on the twenty-eight, and by ten o'clock a practicable Jun- 28. breach had been formed. In a few hours the assault was given. The defence was trifling ; for the views of the garrison had been directed to retreat, and panic reigned throughout the city. A scene of terrible slaughter ensued. All within the city were put indiscriminately to the bayonet ; and a continued fire from the batteries swept away crowds of trembling fugitives, who fled to the shore in hope of rescue by the boats of the squadron. To many this hope was not broken. The British sailors, animated by com- passion for the sufl'erers, persevered, amid the enemy's fire, in conveying the fugitives to the ships moored in the offing. We have the assurance of Marshal Suchet, that the officers of his army made strenuous exertions to put a stop to the carnage. But the soldiers, with hands already steeped in blood, would not be restrained. Within and without the town the slaughter continued with unabated ferocity. The 132 THE GARRISON OF TARRAGONA 1811. June. CHAP. V. claims of age and sex were disregarded. Those who sought refuge in the churches, were massa- cred even at the altar. Beauty, innocence, and helplessness, did not save life, though they en- sured violation. More than six thousand unre- sisting persons were butchered. " And thus,'* said Marshal Suchet, in his official report, after detailing the circumstances of the massacre, *^ has the terrible example which I predicted taken place, and it will long be remembered by the Spaniards.*'* • In allusion to this dreadful scene of slaughter, and atroci- ties even worse than slaughter, Colonel Jones, in his able and ex- cellent history of the war, makes tlie following observations: — " There is something so exceedingly revolting in the picture of these severities, that the mind cannot divestitself of feelings of abhorrence towards tlie individual who directed them ; or, other- wise, were the subject coolly and dispassionately considered, the censure would be equally divided between the aggressors, and the commander of the suffering party. It is the paramount duty of every general to use every means in his power to bring his operations to a successful termination, and to preserv« the lives of his own men ; and there seems no other such effectual mode of preventing similarly obstinate defences to those of Gerona and Zaragoza, as for the assailants to avail themselves of every power of retaliation which victory furnishes. It is no more than the custom of war justifies, and self.preservation demands. In a battle, if a division stand the charge, the successful party make no scruple to bayonet all those whom they overtake, and no rea- son can be assigned why troops, fighting behind a wall, should be differently treated, and have the privilege of destroying their opponents till the last moment, and when they can no longer du IS PUT TO THE SWORD. 133 No sooner was Suchet master of Tarragona chap, v. than he proceeded to Montserrat, where the Ba- so with impunity, be greeted with firiendship. Till a certain point of tlie attack, it is perfectly safe to continue the defence ; if the garrison persevere longer they do it at their ovrn rLsk, — it is optional with them. It was so at Tarragona ; and the principle of putting to tlie sword, after the assault of a breach, all those found with arms in their hands, seems so fully justi- fied by right and policy, that General Suchet, on the abstract consideration of the subject, cannot be censured for having dooe so. The peculiar nature of the contest, however, ought to iiave made him hesitate in its application to the Spaniards, a people merely defending their homes against unprincipled ag- gression. The idea of so severely punishing an act of pure aelf-defence should have revolted his own feelings and those of his officers. Such not having been the case, and the ferocious acts of which they were guilty towards the unarmed inhabitants, ecjually with the garrison, having been publicly avowed, give rise to many reflections on the abasement of the moral character under military despotism. In what country, enjoying a suffi- cient share of freedom for impartial discussion, would a man, after such deeds, be received in society ? or what government, having the voice of a free and enlightened people to control their acts, dare to confer rewards upon him ?** In these ingenious remarks of Colonel Jones there is much truth, and we think some little inconsistency. On the gen- eral principles of military ethics, he fasserts that a gen- eral is authorized in directing the massacre of the garrison of a town carried by assault. In this we cannot coincida It is unquestionably true, that, when two hostile parties are contending against each other, the laws of reason and ne- cessity authorize the exercise of every means in the power of either, to ensure its own safety by destroying its oppo- nent, or reducing him to a condition in which he can inflict no further injury. But the law of self-preservation, which aloae can saodion the destruction of an eoemy, places Uk»^ 1811. July. 134 SUCHET PROCEEDS TO MONTSERRAT : CHAP. V. ron d'Eroles had established large magazines, and from whence he made incursions into the 1811. July. wwe a limit to that ri^ht. Wherever 8ecuritj can be ob- tained by means less revolting than that of actual slaughter, tl»e infliction of death becomes an act of mere wanton barbarity, ir- Teconcilable with moral principle, and adverse to that eternal code imprinted in the heart of man. In no case, therefore, can deatli be justifiably inflicted on men who lay down their arms, and who, by the privation of their liberty, can be prevented from endangering the future safety of the conquerors. In the case of « town carried by assault, it must frequently hap{)en that rude, ignorant, and unprincipled men, who compose tlie mass of all ar- •mies, and whose passions have been excited to the highest pitch, will burst the shackles by which at other times they are bound, and give full sway to a sentiment of ferocious revenge. But such an event must be considered as an unavoidable misfortune, not as the voluntary and justifiable infliction of an authorized retribution. It is a great and terrible evil, which every exer- tion should be made to modify or avert, and which no general is warranted, not merely in openly sanctioning, but in passively permitting. But Colonel Jones, admitting that the massacre of Tarragona was fully sanctioned by the abstract principles of war, denies the application of these principles to the case of a people struggling in defence of their rights against unprincipled aggression. Thus, the Spaniards, in Colonel Jones\s opinion, fighting in the «anse of liberty, would have been justified in the slaughter of a French garrison under circumstances similar to those of Tarra- gona, and the reciprocity only of this privilege of massacre is denied. Now, the fallacy of Colonel Jones's reasoning con- sists in this : He confounds the motive or cause of war, which may be just or unjust, with the ktw$ of war, which exclusively jregard the conduct of its details. In a monarchical govern- ment, it is the king exclusively who declares war ; who decides when the national safety is so much endangered as to require .an appeal to arms. To him the justice or injustice of a war is DESCRIPTION OF MONTSERRAT. 135 neighbouring country. On the twenty-fourth chap. v. of July, Suchet was joined by a detachment from ,q, , the garrison of Barcelona, commanded by Gen- jujy, eral Maurice Mathieu. Montserrat is a mountain of very singular cha- a matter of conscience, — a question, the right solution of which involves a high degree of moral resjwnsibility ; but it is one on which the soldiers who fight his battles are not called on to decide. The war, whether just or unjust, when once undertaken, must be conducted on certain fixed principles ; and it is for the fair ap- plication of these tliat the commander of an army is alone re- sponsibler The question, therefore, of Marshal Suchet's culpability in the present case, may be reduced to this : If, for the sake of striking terror, by a terrible example, he voluntarily permitted the slaughter in Tarragona to exceed the limits necessary for the immediate security of his army, there is no degree of indignation too great for his oflFence ; if, on the other hand, the massacre prooeeded solely from the untameable excitement of the soldiery, which every practicable measure was adopted to check and al- lay, then the evil was inevitable, and Suchet stands absolved from that charge of moral turpitude which must otherwise affix a deep stigma on his name. On these principles, we fear it is impossible that Suchet can be altogether justified. We may admit that the exertions of the officers were ineffectual to prevent the perpetration of atro- cities in the town ; but what can be said of the slaughter of the helpless and unresisting crowds who were swept away by grape- shot, and sabred by the cavalry on the shore, and on the road to Barcelona ? It is but fair, however, to state, that the Gov- ernor Contreras, in his official report, not only declares that he himself, wounded and made prisoner, was treated with the greatest humanity, but that every effort was made by the French officers to check the excesses of their troops. 136 M0NT8ERRAT IS CARRIED BY ASSAULT. 1811, July. CHAP. V. racier. Situated at a short distance from Barce- lona, Igualada, and Manresa, it commands the principal roads, and the numerous heights hy which it is surrounded. It consists of a congre- gation of vast pyramidal heights, rising from in- sulated rocks, from which singular peculiarity it derived its name of Monte Serrado, or the Saw- ed Mountain. On the summit stands the cele- hrated convent, so difficult of access and so com- manding in situation as to form a post of very extraordinary strength. The Spaniards had in- creased the difficulties of attack, by obstructing the road leading to the convent, and by con- structing redoubts on very steep rocks, to the summits of which artillery had with great diffi- culty been conveyed. Suchet, aware that the force of d*Erole» was insufficient to defend the place, if attacked at numerous points, directed an attack on three redoubts at the foot of the mountain, whilst seve- ral columns of voltigeurs climbed the rocks wherever they were found accessible. The pea- sants, stationed on the summits of the heights, received the assailants with a brisk fire, and rolled down stones and masses of rocks on the advancing columns. This, however, did not SURRENDER OF FIGUERAS. 137 1811. July. check their progress — the whole position was chap. v. carried by the bayonet, and d'Eroles himself was only enabled to escape by the darkness of the night, and his intimate knowledge of the passes. After the capture of IVIontserrat, Maurice Mathieu returned to Barcelona, while Suchet repaired to Arragon to make preparations for invading the kingdom of Valencia. After the failure of Campoverde's attempt to throw provisions into Figueras, the blockade of the place was continued without interruption by General Baraguay d'Hilliers. During a period of four months, the garrison held out in spite of the miserable condition to which they were re- duced by the entire exhaustion of their provi- sions. At length General Martinez, encouraged liy the success of the garrison of Almeida, deter- mined to sally from the place, and force his way through the enemy's lines with the bayonet. By the treachery of a Spanish officer, Macdonald received intelligence of this project, and was pre- pared to frustrate its execution. Lines of con- travallatton had been formed, covered by a strong abattis. During the day the French posts were doubled, and at night the troops were placed in bivouac, in the direction towards which it was 138 CAMPOVERDE IS SUCCEEDED BY LACY. IGUALADA TAKEN BY THE SPANIARDS. 139 1811. August. K k CHAP. V. considered probable the garrison would direct their flight. On the night of the sixteenth Martinez, at the head of three thousand men, sallied from the town, and succeeded in forcing their way to the abattis. Here, however, his progress was ar- rested. After eight gallant attacks, he was forced to return to the town, with the loss of four hundred men. Martinez then felt that all hope was at an end. Every horse and domestic animal within the place had been consumed for food. He, there- fore, determined to capitulate ; but before doing so, he employed two days in destroying every thing within the place which could be useful to the enemy. Macdonald granted honourable Aug. 19. terms, and on the nineteenth the place was given up ; and the whole of the fortresses of Ca- talonia were in possession of the French. The spirit of the Catalonians, however, was not broken by the misfortunes of the campaign. A new general was appointed to command the army, which^ at that moment, existed rather in posse than in esse. Fortunately, General Lacy was a man of enterprise and spirit, suited to the times. He issued a proclamation, calling on the people to return to the standard of their country, chap. v. On the first of September, d'Eroles, whose ac- ^^^^ tivity was ever conspicuous, succeeded, with the September. assistance of a British frigate, in recovering the islands of Las Medas, which had been lost in the preceding campaign. These being consid- ered of importance were occupied by a consid- erable force, and measures were speedily adopt- ed for strengthening the works. Soon afterwards, when the French forces had concentrated at Tortosa, General Lacy deter- mined to attack a series of fortified posts, which the enemy had formed from Barcelona to Leri- da. He accordingly marched rapidly on Igua- Oct. 4. lada, where a convent had beeil strongly forti- fied by the French. The town was surprised, one hundred and fifty of the enemy were killed, and twenty-five made prisoners. The remain- der escaped into the convent ; and, at daylight. Lacy, learning that succours were approaching from Montserrat and Casa Masana, fell back on Manresa. The enemy, little apprehensive of further at- tack, moved forward with a convoy, destined for the supply of the garrison of Igualada. Lacy formed his force into two divisions. The first, 140 D*EROLES ATTACKS OERVERA, 1811. October. CHAP. V. under d'Eroles, intercepted the advance of the convoy ; while Lacy, with the second, cut off its retreat. A column, with artillery, from Igua- lada, sallied out to the assistance of their coun- trymen ; but the day went in favour of the Span- iards. The whole convoy was taken ; upwards of two hundred of the French were killed and wounded ; and the remainder with difficulty ef- fected their escape into the convent. After this achievement, Lacy, finding his pre- sence necessary in the Junta, to forward the formation and organization of the army, left the command to d'Eroles. The enemy, weakened by their recent losses, soon after abandoned Jgualada, Montserrat, and Casa Masana, and withdrew to Barcelona.* D'Eroles then marched against Cervera. TTie French, on his approach, retired from the town into the university, which had been fortified ; • It is a remarkable fact, that, about the middle of eighteen hundred and eleven, when his armies in the east of S\mn were in full career of success, Napoleon appears to have anticipated the necessity, to which he was afterwards reduced, of abandon- ing the Peninsula. Observing that the spirit of the gallant Catalans remained unbroken under every reverse, and aware that a war of extermination must eventually terminate in the defeat of his projects, he gave orders that preparations should be made to destroy the fortifications of Barcelona. AND CARRIES IT. 141 and a party of five hundred foot, and thirty horse, chap. v. which were approaching from Lerida, instant- ly retraced its steps. A detachment was sent October in pursuit of this body ; and d'Eroles, with one ten-pounder, proceeded to attack the build- Oct. 10. ings occupied by the enemy. The gun opened fire, and the French, not aware that it was the only one in possession of the assailants, agreed to capitulate. Upwards of six hundred men were thus made prisoners, at an expense to the Cata- lans of only ten in killed and wounded. This success was followed by another of a si- milar kind. At Bilpuig, a body of the enemy were posted in the castle which commanded the town. Here the solitary g^n, which had done good service at Cervera, was again brought into action. Though without engineers, three mines were formed, the explosion of which reduced the castle to ruins. Of the garrison, which consisted of four hundred men, one hundred and eighty were made prisoners, — the rest per- ished. By these several successes, the whole country between Lerida and Barcelona was freed from the enemy. An attempt made by the French to intercept d'Eroles failed. By a bold and skilful 142 BLAKE COLLECTS A FORCE FOR THE RELIEF OF VALENCIA. 143 CHAP.v. movement that leader entered France, where he levied heavy contributions on the inhabitants. October. I* ^^ highly honourable to d'Eroles, that, during the whole of this incursion, he succeeded in pre- venting any retaliation of those atrocities which had marked the progress of the French in Spain. Having collected a considerable quantity of corn and cattle, and a considerable sura in specie, this enterprising leader succeeded in regaining his native mountains. Blake, on reaching Cadiz after his unsuccess- ful attempt on Niebla, prepared again to take the field ; and, embarking with a corps of choice troops, landed at Almeria, and joined the Mur- cian army near Baeza. Soult immediately ad- vanced with his whole disposable force to at- Aug. 9. tack him ; and, on the ninth of August, an en- gagement took place near Lorea. The Span- iards were driven with great loss from their position ; and, being closely pursued, the retreat became a complete rout, and they fled to the mountains near Caravaca. The Spanish cavalry in this action behaved with great courage, and gave protection to the fugitives who had taken Aug. 10. the road to Murcia ; but, on the tenth, they were attacked by the whole of the French ca- valry, and about five hundred were killed, chap. v. wounded, or made prisoners. The remainder, loll* amounting to about fifteen hundred men, retired August precipitately to Murcia. In a few days, however, the army of Blake, the greater part of which had been dispersed, again collected in the neighbourhood of Lebrilla? and that leader being appointed to the chief command in Valencia, his force was increased by reinforcements to thirty thousand men, and in- cluded nearly all the veteran troops of Spain. Generals Zayas, Sardizabel, Carlos O'Donnel Mahy, and Juan Caro, most of whom had earned distinction in the service, held subordinate com- mands in the army ; and Soult having returned to Seville, Blake found himself at liberty to employ his whole force for the defence of Va- lencia. Shortly after the fall of Tarragona, Macdon- ald was removed from the command, and Gen- September. eral Decaen appointed his successor. To en- sure unity in the operations of both armies, this officer was made subordinate to Marshal Suchet, who, on the fifteenth September, advanced from gen. 15 Tortosa, with the whole disposable force from Arragon and Catalonia, to achieve the conquest 2 144 SUCBET ADVANCES AGAINST VALENCIA. CHAP. V. of tbe rich province of Valencia. On the nine- teenth he reached Oropesa, and found the castle, which commanded the direct road to Valencia, 1811. September. _ , , . o u ^ «« in possession of a Spanish garrison, buchet, con- sidering celerity of movement to he essential to the complete success of his operations, deter- mined to proceed hy a route impracticable for Sep. 27. artillery ; and, on the twenty-seventh of Sep- tember, the army reached INIurviedro, a town which stands on the site of the ancient Sagun- tum, about four leagues to the eastwaid of Va- lencia. Blake, with thirteen thousand of the flower of his army, fell back to Valencia on the approach of the French. Tlie town was immediately oc- Sep. 28. cupied ; and, on the following day, an attempt was made to carry the fort by escalade, which terminated in the repulse of the assailants with considerable loss. From this event till the com- ming up of his artillery, Suchet directed his at- tention to the Spanish troops in the field. He detached General Robert to attack a division of Blake's army, under General Obisbo, at Segorba. Obisbo was defeated with great loss ; and, being pursued vigorously by the cavalry, his force dis- persed and sought shelter among the mountains. 1 OROPESA SURRENDERS. 145 1811. Oct. 10. The next operation was to attack the corps of chap, v O'Donnel, which was formed in position near BenaquaziL The Spaniards, after a trifling re- sistance, retreated across the Guadalaviar in some disorder, but with little loss. After these successes, Suchet was enabled to continue his operations against IMurviedro with- out interruption. On the tenth, the castle of Oropesa surrendered, at the moment when the besiegers were about to assault the breach. The road to Murviedro was now open, and the heavy battering-train arrived before that place on the sixteenth. A breach was soon effect- ed ; and, on the eighteenth, the French attempt- ed to storm it, but encountered a severe repulse. On the nineteenth, the assault was again given, Oct. 19. but without more favourable result. The gar- rison, under General Andrioni, were animated by the best spirit ; and, confident in the hope that Blake would advance to the relief of the place, entertained no thought but of resistance. In the meanwhile, Blake, at first unwilling to hazard all on the chances of a battle, determined to confine himself to movements on the flank and rear of the French army, and detached a force under Mahy, to surprise a detachment in VOL. III. a 146 MOVEMENTS OP THE GUERILLAS. Battle of murviedro. 147 CHAP. V. Cuenca, and thus interrupt the communication of Suchet with Madrid. The attempt, however, Se\mLr proved ineffectual, and IMahy returned with his division to the main hody of the army. In Arragon, however, Duran and the Empe- cinado, with ahout four thousand men, attacked Sep. 26. the town of Calatayud, garrisoned by three batta- lions of the enemy. Nearly the whole of these were slain and made prisoners. Nor was IMina Oct 16. less active or fortunate. He captured a detach- ment of eight hundred men in Ayerba, hav- ing previously surprised and defeated a party advancing to their relief. By these movements, the situation of Suchet had been rendered one of difficulty and danger. With the army of Blake in his front, he was compelled to detach a corps of four thousand men to protect Teruel, and escort a convoy expected from Zaragoza. Had a junc- tion been effected by Mina, Duran, and the Em- pecinado, and had these leaders attacked the French posts, and cut off the communication with Zaragoza, it is in the highest degree improbable that Suchet, whose communication with Tortosa was already intercepted by the peasantry, would have ventured to maintain his ground in Valencia. But the Guerilla leaders, influenced by petty jea- 1 »i. n '/ lonsies, were little disposed to act in unison, and chap. v. allowed the opportunity to escape. ■*" — Unfortunately, too, Blake at lenfii;h resolv- _ , ^ , October. ed to fight a battle for the relief of Murvie- dro. On the twenty-fourth of October, he took post on the heights of Pache, with his right towards the sea, supported by the fire of some English vessels, and his left resting on the village of Betara. On his approach, Suchet, leaving six battalions to continue the investment of Murviedro, advanced with his army, and took up a line, extending from the sea, in rear of Puzol, to the mountains beyond the village of Val de Jesus. On the following morning, Blake put his ar- my in motion for attack. The right wing was commanded by Zayas, the centre by Carlos O'Donnel, and the left, in which were the Va- lencians, by Villa Campa. IMahy, with the Mur- cian division, formed a second line in rear of the left ; while Blake, with another body of reserve, remained on El Puig. At eight in the morning, the French light Oct 25. troops were driven in. General Zayas then advanced in fine order, and, seizing posses- 148 BATTLE OF MURVIEDRO. 1811. October. CHAP. V. sion of the village of Puzol, changed his front on the extremity of his left, while with hi» right he moved on to gain an isolated height which commanded ail the ground in its front. At the same time, the left wing of the Span- iards, by a wide movement, attempted to turn the enemy's right flank, by which the centre was inconsiderately weakened. Suchet imme- diately took advantage of this error, and di- rected a powerful attack on the Spanish cen- tre, in order to isolate the wings. In this quar- ter the Spaniard)* fought bravely, and though forced at first to retire, again rallied and drove back the enemy with signal courage. Don Juan Caro made a desperate charge with the cavalry under his command on the enemy's horse, which were supported by artillery, and posted behind a mud wall. The Spaniards, very gallantly, leaped the wall, charged the guns, and cut down the gunners at their posts. No advantage, however, was reaped from this exploit. A fresh column of the enemy came on, the Span- ish cavalry were driven back with considerable loss, and Caro himself was made prisoner. The centre at length gave way ; but Lardizabel, hav- BATTLE OP MURVIEDRO. 149 1811. October. ing collected some horse, continued to show front chap, v to the enemy, and covered the retreat of the infantry. On the right, the battle had been waged with the utmost gallantry, by the troops under Za- yas. A severe struggle took place for the pos- session of the height, in which the Spaniards were at first successful, but subequently com- pelled to retire. Though this wing was isolated by the retreat of the centre, it still continued the contest with pertinacity and vigour. The French cavalry, in all their charges, were driven back in confusion. Both parties made strenu- ous oflforts to maintain the village of Puzol, and in this quarter the slaughter was very great. The Spaniards kept up a warm fire from the roofs and windows of the houses ; but after repeated alternations of success on both sides, Puzol remained in possession of the French. Zayas then retreated to the heights, near Puig, where he was again attacked both in front and flank. When driven from this last position, he executed his retreat in good order, by the road leading to Valencia along the shore. The left wing having also been repulsed, the whole army retreated, and Blake was unfortu- 150 MURVIEDRO SURRENDERS. 1811. October. I CHAP. V. nately induced to make a second stand, in the strong ground behind the rivulet Betara. From this measure no benefit resulted. The retreat was continued with greater rapidity and less order than before; and it was with great diffi- culty that he succeeded in throwing himself with the remains of his army across the Guadalaviar. The loss of the French in this engagement was somewhat above seven hundred in killed and wounded ; of the Spaniards, nearly four thou- sand seven hundred were made prisoners, and about one thousand killed and wounded. Twelve cannon, four standards, and upwards of four thousand m usque ts — nearly all English — were captured by the victors. The garrison of Murviedro beheld from the summit of their walls, which commanded all the neighbouring country, the defeat of that army in the success of whose efforts were centred all their hopes of relief. The place surrendered on the following morning, and the garrison, two thousand five hundred in number, were made prisoners. Blake, after his defeat, took up a position on the right of the Guadalaviar, which he strengthened by entrenchments. His left flank rested on the villages of St. Onofie and J SUCHET APPROACHES VALENCIA. 151 Manises, which had been strongly fortified. His chap. v. right was covered by canals, and appuyed on ■ the city of Valencia. September* Before engaging in further operations, Suchet determined to await the arrival of the reinforce- ments he had solicited from the governments of Paris and Madrid. In the meantime, he halt- ed on the left of the river, with his left at the Grao or port, his right at Liria, and his centre in the suburb Serano. He strengthened the front of his position with strong redoubts, and for nearly two months no occurrence of im- portance took place. i 152 DORSENNE AND MARMONT ADVANCE CHAPTER Vf. OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES- IN ANDALUSIA, AND VALENCIA. CHAP. VI. On the separation of Marmont and Sonlt, it lyi^ was agreed that Dorsenne, with the army of the September. North, should enter Gallicia, hy a rapid move- ment, seize Corunna by a coup-de-mairiy fortify Lugo, and thus once more obtain military pos- session of the province. In pursuance of this project, Dorsenne, abandoning the Asturias, moved towards Astorga, where the Gallician army under General Abadia had taken post. An attack was ordered, the Spaniards retreated after a feeble resistance, and Dorsenne continued his advance into the province. In the mean- while. Lord Wellington, having collected his army on the Coa, blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont, alarmed for the safety of so important a fortress, recalled Dorsenne, with the view of TO RELIEVE CIUDAD RODRIOO. 1.53 raising the blockade, and throwing copious sup- chap. vi. plies into the place. — 1811 By compelling the enemy to concentrate their September forces, for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wellington gained two important objects. He relieved Gallicia, and drew the corps of Souham from Navarre, where it had been sent for the purpose of keeping down the strong Guerilla parties, from which great loss and annoyance were experienced. It was with a view to such benefits, rather than any immediate hope of re- ducing the fortress, for the siege of which he was not yet prepared, that Lord Wellington had formed the blockade. On learning the approach of Marmont, he therefore prepared to abandon it, and occupy a defensive position, which would enable him to ascertain the force of the enemy, and regulate his future movements as circum- stances might direct. As a point of support, therefore, by which he might be enabled to keep out a strong advanced corps to the latest moment, he caused the heights in front of Guinaldo to be strengthened by field- works, and posted his troops in readiness to con- centrate in the position, whenever such a measure should become necessary. The division of Gen- (J 2 154 POSITION OF THE ALLIED ARMY. CHAP. VI. eral Picton was placed in advance on the heights of El Bodon, between Guinaldo and Pastores. The 181 1. , ... 1 . September, ^'g^^ division was on the right of the Agueda, near Martiago, its right resting on the mountains which divide Castile and Estrainadura. The left of the army, under General Graham, who had succeeded Sir Brent Spencer as second in com- mand, was on the Lower Azava. Don Carlos d'Espana, and Don Julian Sanchez observed the lower Agueda ; and Sir Stapleton Cotton, with the cavalry, was on the upper Azava, in the centre. General Foy, having collected a body of troops in upper Estramadura, the fifth division was posted in rear of the right, to observe the road leading from Perales, and the fourth divi- sion remained at Guinaldo. On the twenty-second September, the armies of Marmont and Dorsenne eflfected a junction at Tamames, about three leagues distant from Ciu- dad Rodrigo. Their combined force amounted to sixty thousand men, of which six thousand were cavalry. That of the allies, including four thousand cavalry, did not exceed forty thousand Sept 23. men. On the twenty-third, the enemy appeared in the plain near the city, but again retired. On the day following, they came on in great force. CIUDAD RODRIOO RELIEVED. 155 and escorted a large convoy of waggons, cars, chap. vi. and loaded mules, into the town. |qii During these operations, the allied army re- September. mained passive in its positions ; and the enemy, of course, were left in considerable uncertainty as to the intentions of Lord Wellington. These, however, IMarmont took speedy measures to as- certain. On the morning of the twenty-fifth, a body of French cavalry, consisting of about thir- ty squadrons, supported by a division of infantry, and twelve pieces of artillery, was observed in motion, along the great road leading from Ciudad Rodrigo to Guinaldo, on the left of El Bodon. To delay the progress of this formidable column, and give time for the coming up of other troops, Lord Wellington moved the brigade of General Colville, consisting of the fifth, seventy-seventh, and ninety-fourth regiments, to a height at some distance on the left, commanding the road to Guinaldo. This brigade had scarcely taken its position, when the enemy's artillery came up, and a brisk cannonade was maintained on both sides. The cavalry made a furious attack on the Portuguese guns, and succeeded in driving the gunners from their posts. This, however, was but the success of a moment. The fifth regiment 156 AFFAIR OF EL BODON. CHAP. VI . was ordered forward, and maintaining a brisk 1811. ^^^ ^ they advanced, charged with the bayonet, September, when within a few yards of the enemy. By this singular manoeuvre, the guns were regained. The fifth, maintaining their advantage, pursued the cavalry down the declivity of the height, and across the ravine. Though repulsed in this attack, the French cavalry, led by General Montbrun, again execut- ed a charge of the boldest character, on the part of the position occupied by the fifth and seventy- seventh. These regiments suffered them to ap- proach within a few paces, when firing a volley with great eflfect, the French instantly retreated in great confusion. In another part of the field a few squadrons of British and German dra- goons, shewed gallant front to the enemy, and, notwithstanding the overwhelming superiority of numbers by which they were opposed, con- tinued to skirmish with great eft'ect. It was not, however, the plan of Lord Wel- lington to commit his army by any serious en- gagement. The divisions had previously re- ceived orders to dispute the ground, but to re- tire when pressed, on Guinaldo. But the ne- cessity of a retrogressive movement became in- THE ALLIES RETIRE ON GUINALDO. 157 stantly apparent, by the discovery that a column chap. vr. hitherto hid by the nature of the ground, was in the act of turning the right of the position. Septembe The heights, therefore, were abandoned, and the troops, formed in square, were put in motion on Guinaldo. Nothing to a military eye could be finer than the scene which ensued. The battalions were repeatedly charged on their march by the enemy's cavalry, whom they repulsed with a gallantry and steadiness impossible to be sur- passed. At one time, the fifth and seventy- seventh were charged on three faces of the square at the same moment. For upwards of two miles these regiments, and the twenty first Portuguese, under Colonel Bacellar, continued their retreat in all the regularity of a parade movement, though entirely enveloped by the French squadrons. The chief loss sustained was from the Horse-artillery, which came up, and, firing on solid masses of infantry, did consider- able execution. Lord Wellington, having gained the object for which the position of Guinaldo had been fortified, would have immediately retired, had not an unforeseen circumstance prevented it. 158 POSITION OF 6UINALD0. LORD WELLINGTON FALLS BACK TO THE COA. 159 i! (HAP. VI. By some mistake, the light division did not ~~j~~ receive orders to retreat till all support had been September, withdrawn ; and General Crawford, apprehensive that in crossing the Agueda at Robleda he might be intercepted, and ignorant that Perales was occupied by a strong corps of the enemy, determined to retreat along the right bank of the river. Orders, therefore, were instantly sent to General Crawford, to retrace his steps, and cross by the ford of Robleda, and the divi- sions of Picton and Cole remained in Guinaldo to cover his junction. In the meantime, dispositions were made to re- ceive the enemy, should he think proper to attack the position. Fuente Guinaldo stands on a high ridge, nearly three miles in length, stretching from the Agueda across an extensive plain, by which it is bounded on the left. To secure this flank, two divisions were stationed at Nava d'Aver. The heights were occupied by the third and fourth divisions, and the brigade of General Pack. A division was posted •xi the right of the Agueda to face Perales, and coun- teract any attempt of the enemy to pass the river in rear of the position. Sep. 26, The morning of the twenty-sixth, which wa« expected to bring battle, passed over quietly, chap. vr. Marmont contented himself with making an ex- ' hibition of his force,— causing it to execute a va- o^ / riety of manceuvres, the rapidity and precision of which attracted the admiration of all who wit- nessed them. During the time thus occupied, the light division joined the army ; and Lord Wellington, at nightfall, unwilling to court bat- tle in a position assumed for a mere temporary object, put his army in retreat towards Alfayates, and stationed his rear-guard at Aldea de Ponte. On the twenty-seventh this village was at- Sep. 2J. tacked by the enemy, who twice succeeded in gaining possession of it. Twice, also, they were driven back by the gallantry of the fourth divi- sion, who ultimately remained masters of the disputed post. At night, the army were again in motion, and fell back to a position on the heights behind Soito, where an inflexion of the Coa gave protection to both flanks. In this position Lord Wellington determined to off'er battle. The manoeuvres of the enemy had hitherto been marked by the greatest confi- dence and boldness. They betrayed throughout an evident feeling of superiority, and something even of contemptuous disregard for an opponent 160 MAR»IONT RETIRES. CHAP. VI. whose policy had hitherto been wholly defen- 1811 *^^®' ^* ^^ clearly the intention of Marmont to September, drive the allies across the Coa ; but the army had already reached the ground which Lord Wellington had selected to give a decisive check to his progress. The natural defences of this position were strong. The flanks being cov- ered by the Coa could not be turned; but it presented no avenue of retreat. The suc- cess of the enemy at any one point of attack must have proved fatal to the army ; and the se- lection of such ground at once proved to Mar- mont, notwithstanding his immense superiority, how little apprehension was entertained by Lord Wellington of the result of a battle. It did not, however, accord with the views of Marmont to accept the challenge thus offered. He retired to Ciudad Rodrigo, where his army separated; part, under Dorsenne, returning to the north ; and the remainder, still retaining its designation as the Army of Portugal, moved to- wards the pass of Banos and Placentia. The allied army then went into cantonments, and head-quarters were established at Frenada. But perhaps the most splendid achievement 9f the campaign was performed by General Hill. OPERATIONS OF GENERAL HILL. 161 Oct 1. I ' That officer remained in the neighbourhood of chap, vi, Portalegre, covering the province of Alentejo against any incursion by the garrison of Bada- October, jos, while Castanos was employed recruiting the Estramaduran army, which had been so miser- ably sacrificed by the imbecility of Mendizabel. On learning that Castanos had already embodied a considerable number of recruits, IMarshal Soult directed Girard, with about four thousand foot, and a thousand horse, to march to Caceres, and scour the neighbourhood, in order to disperse these newly collected levies. The presence of this force was productive of much inconvenience. It narrowed the limits and resources of Casta- nos, whose troops (in the miserable state of the Spanish government and commissariat) depend- ed solely for assistance on what the neighbour- ing country might afford. A movement, there- fore, was concerted, by which a signal blow might be struck against Girard, and the pro- vince relieved from the burden under which it laboured. The execution of this enterprise was intrusted to General Hill, who, on the twenty-second of Oct.22. October, with such force as was deemed suffi- cient for the service, set out from Portalegre to- \ ji I' I 162 GENERAL HILL ADVANCES AGAINST GIRARD. CHAP. VI. ward the Spanish frontier. On the day follow- ing he reached Albuquerque, where he learned October. ^^** *^® cavalry of Girard had fallen back from Aliseda to Arroyo del Puerco. On the twenty- Oct. 23. fifth, the Spaniards, under the Conde de Penne Villemur, drove the enemy from Arroyo del Puerco. The French cavalry then fell back to Malpartida, which Girard occupied as an advanced post, his main body still remaining at Caccres. Oct. 26. ^^ reaching Malpartida, at daybreak on the twenty-sixth. General Hill learned that the ene- my had retired during the night, followed by a party of Spanish cavalry. It was soon after ascertained that Girard had quitted Caceres ; but as the direction he had taken was uncertain, General Hill remained at Malpartida to watch his movements. Having ascertained that the enemy had march- ed on Torre Mocha, the allies were put in mo- Oct 27. tion on the morning of the twenty-seventh, by Aldea de Cano, and Casa de St. Antonio. As this was a shorter route than the one followed by Girard, General Hill was not without hopes of being enabled to intercept and bring him to ac- tion. On the march, however, he learned that the enemy had quitted Torre Mocha in the ill" It PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK. 163 morning, and moved to Arroyo de Molinos, leav- cHAP. vl ing a rear-guard at Albala. Satisfied, from this TTTI information, that Girard was ignorant of his October. movements. General Hill, on the same evening, made a forced march to Alcuesca, where he halted in bivouac, taking every precaution to avoid discovery by the enemy's patroles. About two in the morning the troops moved ^t. 28. on from Alcuesca in one column towards Arroyo de Molinos, a village situated at the foot of a mountain crescent, generally inaccessible, which sweeps round it, and embraces a diameter of about two miles. There were three roads which it was necessary to occupy in order to cut off the enemy's retreat. That leading to Truxillo, which winds round the eastern horn of the crescent ; that to Merida, which diverges at right angles from the route by which the allies were advan- cing, and that leading to Medellin. Though the distance from Alcuecsa was little more than a league, it was nearly seven o'clock before the troops had defiled from the mountains, and formed under cover of a low ridge about half a mile from Arroyo de Molinos. General Hill then divided his force into three columns. The left column, consisting of the seventy-first 164 AFFAIR OP ARROYO DE M0LIN08. ^1 1811. October. CHAP. VI. and ninety-second regiments, supported by the ~ fiftieth, and three pieces of Portuguese artillery, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, was directed to carry the village at the point of the bayonet. The right column, consisting of Colonel Wil- son's brigade, and the Portuguese brigade of Colonel Ashworth, under Major- General How- ard, was instructed to move to the right, to cut off the retreat of the enemy towards Medellin, and finally to attack their left and rear. The cavalry, under Sir William Erskine, was placed between the two columns of infantry, ready to act in front, or move round either of them, as occasion might require. Unfortunate- ly, the British cavalry, mistaking the road in the darkness, were delayed in their advance; and the Spanish horse, under Penne Villemur, enjoyed the honour of first encountering the enemy ;-— the Spanish infantry remained in re- serve, and bore no part in the engagement. The route of these columns lay through a plain thinly covered with cork wood and evergreen oak; and, as day dawned, a vio- lent storm of rain and mist came on, under eover of which the troops continued their ad- lis: ^1 AFFAIR OF ARROYO DE M0L1N09. 165 1811. October. vance. On the left. Colonel Stewart mov^d chap. vi. rapidly on the village, which they succeeded in gaining unperceived, though the enemy were in motion, and a brigade had marched an hour be- fore for Medellin. The seventy-first and ninety- second then charged through the street, driving every thing before them at the point of the bay- onet, and leaving the fiftieth regiment, by which they were closely followed, to secure the prison- ers. The enemy's infantry, on escaping from the town, immediately formed into two squares, with the cavalry on the left, and opened fire on the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments. The former took post behind a wall and im- mediately opened fire ; while the ninety-second formed line on the right flank of the French, supported by two Portuguese guns, which short- ly after came up and did great execution. The ninety-second, which had hitherto been directed to reserve their fire, then received orders to charge; but the French, without waiting their approach, retreated rapidly, and in great con- fusion towards the mountain in their rear. At this moment the column of General How- ard approached, and the cavalry crossing the head of the retreating column, succeeded in separating 166 AFFAIR OP ARROYO DE MOLtNOS. GENERAL HILL ADVANCES ON MERIDA. 167 t CHAP. VI. the French horse from the infantry, and, by re-' "TTTj peated charges, threw it into confusion. General October. Howard, finding it impossible to get between the enemy and the mountain, made a rapid movement round its base, and, ascending at a point opposite to that chosen by the enemy, encountered them on the shoulder of the hill. No resource then remained to the enemy, but to disperse or surrender. All order was at an end ; the soldiers, throwing away their arms, fled, panic-stricken, towards the steepest parts of the ridge. Of the fugitives many were made prisoners ; and General Morillo, with the Span- ish infantry, one British, and one Portuguese battalion, continued the pursuit for eight leagues. General Girard, with a few hundred men, most- ly without arms, escaped in the direction of Se- rena. In this brilliant affair fifteen hundred of the enemy, including General Brun and the Duke d*Aremberg, were made prisoners, and the whole of their artillery, baggage, stores, and ammuni- tion were taken, at an expense^ on the part of the British, of sixty-four killed and wounded, and of only seven on that of the Portuguese. The loss of the Spaniards was likewise very trifling. General Hill returned to his cantonments at chap. vi. Portalegre, where he remained till the end of ^ " December. He then made a rapid movement on Decembe Merida, in hope of surprising a detachment of the enemy, under General Dombrousky, which occupied that town. About three leagues from Merida, however, he fell in with a foraging Dec 89. party, which, though briskly pursued, succeed- ed in effecting its retreat, and gave the alarm. The enemy, thus informed of his approach, im- mediately abandoned the town, leaving a consi- derable magazine of flour; and General Hill immediately directed his march against Drouet, who had taken post with part of his corps at Almandrelejo. On reaching that town, however, he found that Drouet had retired towards the south ; and, having cleared this portion of the province from the enemy. General Hill placed his troops in cantonments in Merida, and its vicinity. In Cadiz, and its vicinity, nothing of importance took place till the close of the year. The Cortes, occupied with matters of speculative policy, had done nothing to promote the interests, or acquire the confidence of the country. What Spain wanted, was a leader of skill, enterprise, and 168 AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTH. CHAP. VI. genius, to give unity to her exertions, and conso- lidate those resources which had hitherto been o . . wasted and misapplied. But this truth, obvious September. • *■ to all reasonable men, was not appreciated by the Cortes or the government. After the abandon- ment of Portugal by Massena, it was proposed that the frontier provinces should be placed un- der command of Lord Wellington. On a mo- tion to this effect, a debate took place in the Cortes; and the proposition, being somewhat wounding to Spanish pride, was negatived by a large majority. Ballasteros, who had been appointed to the command in Andalusia, remained in the neigh- bourhood of Gibraltar ; and, adopting a desultory system of warfare, occasioned great annoyance to the enemy. Soult, who had already made se- veral ineffectual efforts to crush so annoying an Sep. 28. opponent, at length despatched General Godinot with a force of about eight thousand men to exe- cute this service. Ballasteros, by a variety of skilful manoeuvres, avoided engaging a force su- perior to his own, and when pressed by the Oct. 10. enemy sought shelter beneath the guns of Gib- raltar. In the meanwhile, a detachment from Cadiz, 2 SUCCESSES OP BALLASTEROS. 169 1811. October. 3 under Colonel Skerret, and a Spanish force un- chap. vi. der Copons, were sent to occupy Tariffa, as a diversion in favour of Ballasteros. Tariffa was important in other respects. It afforded a secure point from which the allies might annoy the rear of the corps before Cadiz, and cut off their sup- plies. Godinot, therefore, on receiving intelli- gence of its occupation, immediately advanced against it. On the eighteenth, his artillery, with Oct. 10. a considerable escort, moved towards Tariffa by the pass of La Pena ; but as the road lay along the shore, tlie British ships of war assailed the column with so heavy a fire as to force it to return. Ballasteros now assumed the offensive ; and, attacking the rear-guard of the enemy, drove it back in confusion, and succeeded in making many prisoners. A more important advantage soon followed. General Semele had taken post at Bomos, on the right bank of the Guadalete, with two thousand foot, some horse, and three pieces of artiUery. Ballasteros, by a night-march, came unexpectedly on this force, and, putting them to the route, succeeded in capturing about one hun- dred prisoners, with the whole of the artillery and luggage. The unfortunate result of his opera- VOL. ui. „ Nov. 5. 170 SIEGE OF TARIFFA. SIEGE OF TARIFFA. 171 CHAP. VI. tions so affected the mind of General Godinot, that on reaching Seville, whither he had been j3 . ' recalled by Soult, he put a period to his exist- ence. The views of Soult were then directed to- wards Tariffa ; and General Leval, with about ten thousand men and eighteen guns, was di- Dec. 19. rected to reduce it. On the nineteenth of De- cember that officer appeared before the place, and on the following night it was completely invested, though not without considerable op- position on the part of the garrison. Tariffa was a place of little strength ; its only defence being an uncovered wall, flanked imper- fectly by small projections. It communicated, however, with an island, on which were two half-moon batteries and a martello tower; and a secure point of embarkation was thus afforded, should it be found necessary to abandon the town. The garrison consisted of twelve hun- dred British under Colonel Skerret, and about nine hundred Spaniards, commanded by Don Francisco Copons. Dec 24. On the night of the twenty-fourth, the be- siegers broke ground within four hundred yards of the place, and continued to push on their ap- proaches, though annoyed by the fire from the chap. vi. town, which did considerable execution. On the twenty-ninth, two batteries were completed ; j. / one of which opened fire on the gun-boats at an- chor in the bay, the other on the town. On the thirtieth. General Leval sent a summons to the I^« 80. governor, which drew from Copons a bombastic reply. On the thirty-first, a practicable breach had been effected, and preparations on both sides 1312 were made for the assault. On the following Jan* 1. morning a strong body of the enemy were seen advancing towards the breach. Colonel Gough, of the eighty-seventh, then drew his sword, and directed the band of his regiment to play the Irish air Garry Owen. The soldiers imme- diately cheered, and opened a very destructive fire on the advancing column. The forty-se- venth, in particular, who lined a wall descend- ing from the south-east tower, did great ex- ecution. The French halted for a moment, as if stunned, — then, rushing forwai'd, gained the bottom of the breach. Unable to effect an en- trance they hurried off under the wall to the right, and made an effort to gain the portcullis. De- feated in this, and finding themselves cut up by a flanking fire of artillery, and overwhelmed by 172 THE BESIEGERS ARE REPULSED. SUCHET CROSSES THE GUADALAVIAR. 173 CHAP. VI. showers of mnsquetry and hand-grenades, they hastily retreated, with the loss of five hundred Januar^. of their number. After this failure, no further attempt was made against the town ; and Leval having bu- ried his artillery, which the state of the roads rendered it impossible to remove, on the night of the fourth of January withdrew from the town by order of Marshal Soult, who, alarmed by the movements of General Hill, was concen- trating his army at Seville. The loss of the enemy was estimated to amount to two thousand five hundred men, — a number exceeding that of the garrison. This calculation, perhaps, exceeded the truth ; but their loss was unquestionably very great ; and the French, for the first time, learned what was to be expected from British soldiers when defending stone- walls. The siege lasted seventeen days ; dur- ing seven of which the breach was open. In Valencia, Suchet, having been joined by considerable reinforcements from the army in Catalonia, made preparations for the pas- sage of the Guadalaviar. General Blake had strongly entrenched himself on the right bank of that river, with a force of twenty thousand \' troops of the line, six thousand militia, and one chap. vi. hundred pieces of cannon. His infantry occu- pied a line extending from the sea to Manisses ; ^^ ^* ° ' December. his cavalry were placed on the left towards Ri- baroja. During the night of the twenty-fifth of De- Dec 25. cember, two bridges were thrown across the Guadalaviar, in front of Ribaroja, where the country was no longer intersected by that laby- rinth of canals which gave great strength to the other parts of the position. At Mislata, a third bridge was constructed for the cavalry and ar- tillery. Early on the twenty-sixth, three divisions of Dec 26. French infantry crossed the bridges in face of the Spanish cavalry, which was driven back in confusion on Torrente. The Murcian division at Manisses, observing the French columns on their left, became apprehensive of being sur- rounded, and, abandoning their posts, fled in great disorder towards Coterroja, on the road to Murcia. They were pursued by General Harispe, who made some prisoners, though un- able to come up with the main-body. At other points, the assailants were less suc- cessful. The division of Palombini, which pass- 174 BLAKE DRIVEN INTO VALENCIA- CHAP. VI. ed at Mislata, were unable to penetrate the ca- nals by which they were surrounded, and were n^^!l driven back in confusion on the Guadalaviar. The troops, however, rallied ; and General Ha- bert coming up to their support, they were en- abled to maintain their ground, till Blake, who beheld one division of his army already cut off, gave up the contest, and retired within the de- fences of the city. Valencia stands on the southern bank of the Guadalaviar, and is surrounded by a wall flanked by towers, to which some works had been added requiring regular attack. It was, moreover, covered by a strong line of retrench- ments, in which the suburbs were included ; and no expense had been spared in accumulating an ample supply of arms, guns, and ammunition, for the defence of works so extensive. Sachet immediately prepared for the regular siege of Valencia. On the night of the first of January, trenches were opened against the east- em extremity of the line, near IMont Olivete ; but the chief attack was directed against the sa- lient part of the line, which covered the suburb of St. Vincente. The works of the besiegers were pushed on 1812. Jan. 1. SURRENDER OP VALENCIA. 175 with great vigour ; and, on the morning of the chap. vi. fifth, the garrison, dispirited by their recent mis- fortunes, abandoned the defence of their lines, January, and retired into Valencia. The French then bombarded the city ; and on the eighth, Blake Jan. 8. consented to capitulate. The garrison, amount- ing to upwards of eighteen thousand troops of the line, including twenty-three general officers, were made prisoners ; three hundred and nine- ty-three pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of stores and ammunition, fell into possession of the victors. Thus did Suchet conclude a campaign, il- lustrated by a series of successes more brilli- ant than any which were destined to grace the French arms in the Peninsula. In every point of view, the conquest of Valencia was of vast importance : it gave the richest province of Spain into the grasp of the French ; it enabled the armies of Arragon and Catalonia to con- nect their operations with those of Soult; it gave strength and consolidation to the French power in the interior provinces ; it gave a great though temporary downfal to the hopes of the Spanish nation, which beheld the anni- hilation of its last effective army. Napoleon, to 17$ CONDUCT OF BLAKE. 1812. CHAP. VT. mark his sense of the distinguished services of Suchet, bestowed on him the title of Dake d'Albufera, and the rank of Marshal of France. This elevation was accompanied by a grant of the royal domain of Albufera^ in the neighbour- hood of Valencia, to be held as an unalienable fief of the empire. The conduct of Blake, in the operations which led to the surrender of Valencia, has subjected his integrity to vehement though unreasonable suspicion. He cannot be held as having betray- ed that cause which he had supported through- out the war with zeal and steadiness, if not with judgment. That he committed several flagrant errors, is unquestionable. He intrusted the de- fence of the river, from Manisses to Ribaroja, solely to his cavalry ; he shut up his army in Valencia, instead of retiring into Murcia ; and thus sacrificed the hopes of his country in a futile attempt to hold a town which was in no respect calculated for a protracted defence. Valencia might have furnished a national g^ard, which, with the addition of a few thousand re- gular troops, would have been sufficient to gar- rison the city. Had Blake then manoeuvred in the rear of the besieging army, or boldly J i ! CONDUCT OP BLAKB^ 177 1812. thrown himself into Catalonia, it is probable chap. vr. he would have arrested the tide of Marshal Suchet's success, even in the fulness of its flood. But Blake, with all his faults, must be admitted to have been a man of high courage and unshaken patriotism. His chief failing was one he held in common with the great mass of his country- men — a presumptuous self-confidence; and to this the long train of disaster, which unfortun- ately marked his career, may be attributed. h2 178 MEASURES OF LORD WELLINGTON CHAPTER VII. SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CIUDAD RODRIG(X CHAP. VII. While the array remained in cantonments^ 1812. the ever active mind of Lord Wellington was o engaged in devising measures by which the sup- ply of his army might be improved. It had been found by experience, that the transport of the country, even in conjunction with the nu- merous commissariat mules attached to each di- vision, was inadequate to the requisite convey- ance of stores and provisions. The waggons of the natives were of the rudest mechanism, and in many instances of little use. Lord Welling- ton, therefore, gave orders for the construction of a certain number, on a more improved model, to be attached to the army, under the denomi- nation of the Commissariat Waggon Train. Upwards of six hundred of these vehicles, each ! FOR THE SUPPLY OF HIS ARMY. 179 1812. capable of conveying a load of eight hundred chap.vii, weight, were constructed during the winter at Lisbon, Oporto, and Almeida, and were formed into divisions and sub-divisions, with conductors, artificers, and other subordinate persons attach- ed to each. By this judicious arrangement, the army became possessed of a wheel transport of its own, and the necessary requisitions on the inhabitants were rendered less burdensome and vexatious. But this was not all. By the exertions of the engineer officers, the Douro was rendered navigable to the confluence of the Agueda, a point about forty miles higher than boats had ever previously been able to proceed. A great distance of land carriage was thus saved, at a moment when the whole means of transport, at command, were required for the conveyance of the battering-train to be employed in the ap- proaching siege. In the meanwhile, IMarmont, satisfied from the facility with which he had succeeded in re- victualling Ciudad Rodrigo, that it was in no immediate danger of attack from Lord Welling- ton, remained tranquil in his cantonments on the Tagus. The activity of General Hill, in the i 180 MOVEMENTS OP MARMONT. SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIOO. 181 CHAP.vii. south of Estramadura, tended perhaps still fur- Q- ther to increase his security, by inducing the JaauarT. ^^^^^ ^^** Lord Wellington had detached a large portion of his army to the Alentejo. Under this impression, he not only quartered his army in very extensive cantonments, but even ventured to detach General Montbrun, with three divisions, to assist Suchet in his operations in Valencia. The division of General Bonnet had likewise been detached, by Dor- senne, to occupy the Asturias; and another, under General Dubreton, was scouring the pro- vince of Las Montanas. Lord Wellington, accurately informed of these details, determined instantly to commence the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Accordingly, Jan. 6. on the sixth of January, head-quarters were transferred from Frenada to Gallegos ; but the ground being covered with snow, and the wea- ther inclement, the army did not move till the eighth. The light division alone crossed the Agueda, and formed the investment ; but the other divisions took part in all the duties of the siege, and were prepared, if necessary, to move to the support of the investing force. Jan. 8. Shortly after dark, on the same evening, par- 1812. January. ties from the third, fourth, and light divisions chap.vii. broke ground before the fortress, under a heavy fire ; and a redoubt, situated on the great Te- son, was gallantly stormed by a party of the light division, under Lieutenant-Colonel Colbume. — The immediate direction of the siege was en- trusted to . Sir Thomas Graham, who had suc- ceeded Sir Brent Spencer as second in command. By the capture of the redoubt, a powerful pre- liminary obstacle to the operations of the besieg- ers was removed. On the night following, the first parallel was established, and the batteries traced out. On the night of the thirteenth, a Jan. 1& fortified Convent, situated on the right of the captured redoubt, was attacked and carried by a detachment of light infantry companies, sup- ported by Lord Blantyre's brigade. The as- sailants succeeded in approaching the Convent unobserved; and, efiPecting an entrance, took the garrison by surprise. As this post was of considerable importance, a lodgment was form- ed in it, and the sap was carried on to the line of the second parallel. On the fourteenth, the g^arrison took advan- tage of a moment when the trenches were un- guardedj to make a sortie. By a culpable neg- IJ Jan. 14. I 182 SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIOO. SIEOE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. 183 CHAP. VII. ligence, the guard, quitting the trenches, were accustomed to depart on observing the approach January. ^^ ^^® relief. For a moment, therefore, the enemy were successful ; the workmen, armed only with spade and mattock, hastily retired : but the alarm was instantly given, and the as- sailants were driven back, without effecting more injury than that of upsetting a few ga- bions into the sap. In the meanwhile, intelligence was received that Marmont, ignorant of the operations of the allies, was approaching, with the view of throw- ing supplies into the place. But as this ignor- ance could be but of short duration. Lord Wel- lington determined to push forward his ad- vances with the utmost rapidity, in the hope of carrying the town, before IVIarmont and Dor- senne should be enabled to collect their forces for its relief. In case, however, he should be defeated in this object, preparations were made for encountering the combined army in the field. The divisions, in the more distant cantonments, were moved up to the neighbourhood of Ciodad Rodrigo ; and General Hill was directed to throw two brigades across the Tagus, to move ^ occa&ion might require. It was considered of importance to gain pos- chap.vii. session of the convent of St. Francisco, by which the approaches were enfiladed on the left. Bat- j^^,,^^ teries were accordingly erected against it, which speedily destroyed the defences ; and, on the night of the fourteenth, it was carried by as- Jan. U. sault. The second parallel was then completed, and progress made by sap towards the crest of the glacis. Advances were likewise made from the left of the first parallel down the slope of the hill, and fresh batteries established, from which an incessant fire was kept up on the fausse braie^ and body of the place. On the nineteenth, two practicable breaches Jan. 11>. were completed, one in the fausse braie, the other in the main wall, and preparations imme- diately made for storming them, though the sap had not been brought to the crest of the glacis, and the counterscarp of the ditch was still en- tire. The attack of the main breach was committed to the division of Greneral Picton, consisting of the brigades of Major-General Mackinnon, and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell. The column was to be preceded by a storming-party, consisting of the light companies of the division under Ma- lt / 184 8IEOE OF CIUDAD BODRIOO. STEGE OP CIUDAD RODRIOO. 185 fl CHAP.vii. jor Manners of the seyenty-fourth ; and, to di- -„ vert the attention of the garrison, a demonstra- January. ^^^^ ^** *^ ^® made on the right by Lieutenant- Colonel O' Toole, with five companies of the ninety-fifth rifle corps, and the light companies of the eighty-third and ninety-fourth. The light division, consisting of the brigades of Major-General Vandeleur and Colonel Bar- nard, was directed to assault the smaller breach, headed by a storming party of three hundred men, led by Major Napier of the fifty-second regiment. General Pack was instructed to make a false attack with his brigade on the outwork of St. lago, and the convent of La Caridada, with in- structions to convert it into a real one^ should circumstances prove favourable. Jan. 19. Soon after dark, on the nineteenth, the troops were under arms, and at seven o'clock advanced to the assault. In order to facilitate the advance of the main storming party, under General Mac- kinnon, and remove such impediments as the enemy might oppose to their ascent of the main breach, Colonel Campbell, with the ninety- fourth regiment, and second battalion of the fifth, which had been placed as near as possible to the town, descended the counterscarp, by means of chap.vii. ropes, and moved silently to the breach, which they succeeded in reaching without discovery. January. Not meeting with any serious obstacle to retard their progress, and aware of the danger of delay at such a crisis. Colonel Campbell, on his own responsibility, formed the daring resolution of storming the town, though such an attempt was not warranted by his orders. At this moment he could only avail himself of the battalion of the fifth, and the right wing of the ninety-fourth, but placing himself at their head, he instantly commenced ascending the breach. The enemy were now on the alert ; and Col- onel Campbell had nearly reached the summit of the breach, when he distinctly heard the enemy's artillery men receive orders to fire. With great promptitude he instantly ordered the men to throw themselves flat on their faces. No soon- er had this been done than a shower of shot and shells swept over them ; and the troops, springing to their feet, again poured onward, and in a few moments the breach was cleared. In endeavouring to reach the ramparts on the right, an unexpected obstacle occurred. The enemy had cut a wide ditch between the breach I I 186 SIEGE OP CIUDAD RODRIGO. cHAP.vii.and the ramparts; but here one of those fortu- nate incidents occurred, on which the most im- January. P^^tant events frequently depend. Across the ditch two planks had been placed by the enemy, and in the confusion of their retreat, they had removed one of them, but neglected the other. Along this temporary bridge the troops passed to the ramparts on the right, driving the artillery men from the g^ns, and carrying every thing before them. New difficulties, however, soon presented themselves. The storming party, under General Mackinnon, had not yet appeared ; and the gar- rison, recovering from their panic, made a power- ful attack on their assailants. Under these cir- cumstances Colonel Campbell ordered a volley, and then charging at the head of his detachment, the French immediately fled, throwing down their arms. Such had been the celerity of Colonel Campbell's movements, that when on the ramparts, his men were fired at by the light troops from without the town, who were ignor- ant of its having been already stormed.* • That the fifth and ninety-fourth regiments had entered by the breach before General Mackinnon^s brigade came up, is not gen- SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO. 187 It was at this period that the column of Gen- chap. vii. eral Mackinnon commenced its attack. It was ^^^2, received by a shower of grape and musquetry, January. which did great execution ; but the troops pressing onwards, succeeded in clearing the breach. Unfortunately an expense magazine, on the rampart, accidentally caught fire, and General Mackinnon and many of his followers were killed by the explosion. Notwithstanding this misfortune, and a destructive fire kept up by the garrison from behind an interior retrench- ment, the assailants maintained their ground, till the troops which had already entered came to their assistance, when the enemy gave way. In the meanwhile. General Vandeleur's brig- ade of the light division, which had formed be- hind the convent in the suburb, nearly opposite to the lesser breach, advanced at the appointed moment to the assault. General Crawford — than whom the service boasted no more zealous and accomplished officer — received his death wound on the glacis while leading on his divi- sion ; and General Vandeleur, Colonel Col- erally known. The fact u in perfect accordance with the ac- count given in the despatch of Lord Wellington, though not with the minuter details of Lord Londonderry or Cotonel Jone*. 188 CIUDAD RO0RIGO CARRIED BY ASSAULT. LOSS OP THE ALLIES. 189 III; CHAP. VII. burne, and Major George Napier, who led 1812. *^® storming party, were likewise wounded. January. The courage of the soldiers, however, was not daunted. Notwithstanding the tremendous fire by which they were assailed, the column continu- ed its advance. The breach was carried in spite of every obstacle ; and the troops having hastily formed, swept round the ramparts to the larger breach. The column of General Pack had likewise been successful in their escalade, and the town was carried at all points. The garrison fled in confu- sion, throwing away their arms, and the whole of the survivors were made prisoners. This successful achievement was followed by the usual scenes of riot and excess. The men, no longer amenable to discipline, ransacked the houses in search of plunder. The cellars were broken open and emptied of their contents ; many houses were wantonly set on fire ; and the yells of brutal triumph uttered by the intoxicat- ed soldiers, were heard in wild dissonance with the screams of the wounded. Thus passed the night. In the morning, by the exertions of the oflBcers, discipline was partially restored. The soldiers by degrees returned to their duty, and 1812. January. the blind appetites of their brutal nature became chap.vii. again subjected to moral restraint. The loss of the allies in the siege and storm- ing of Ciudad Rodrigo, was considerable, though not more than might have been anticipated in such an operation. It amounted to one thou- sand three hundred and ten men in killed and wounded. Of the garrison one thousand seven hundred were made prisoners, and their loss in killed and wounded 'was estimated at a thousand. In the town were found a battering train of forty-four pieces, an immense quantity of ammu- nition, several thousand stand of arms, and con- siderable stores of provisions. The reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, was un- questionably an operation of great brilliance. It was effected in the depth of winter, with a rapidity for which Marmont was altogether un- prepared. The following are extracts from his reports to Berthier : — " I had collected five di- visions for the purpose of throwing supplies in- to Ciudad Rodrigo ; but this force is now in- adequate to the object. I am, therefore, under the necessity of recalling two divisions from the army of the north. I shall then have above sixty thousand men, with whom I shall march f 190 GRATITUDE OF THE SPANISH NATION. i 1812. January. tft '^ CHAP. vii. against the enemy. You may expect events as fortunate as glorious for the French army." Thus did Marshal Marmont write on the sixteenth of January. On the twentieth, he is forced to record the failure of his hopes. " On the sixteenth, the English batteries opened their fire at a great distance. On the nineteenth, the place was taken by storm, and fell into the power of the enemy. There is something so incom- prehensible in this, that I allow myself no ob- servation. I am not yet provided with the requisite information." The warmest admirer of Lord Wellington, need desire no more hon- ourable testimony to his skill, activity, and bold- ness, than is afforded by these extracts. The Spanish government and nation were not glow in expressing their gratitude for the signal service which had been rendered to their cause. Te Deum was sung in the churches of Cadiz ; a YOte of thanks to Lord Wellington passed by ac- clamation in the Cortes; and, as a permanent memor^l of Spanish gratitude, they conferred on him the dignity of a grandee of the first class, with the title of Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo. Nor were his own government and country more backward in manifesting their deep sense 1 HONOURS BESTOWED ON LORD WELLINGTON. 191 1812. of so splendid an achievement. It raised the chap. vii. confidence of the people in their army and its leader. Lord Wellington, with the approbation of all classes, was raised to the dignity of an Earl of the United Kingdom ; and the Parlia- ment, besides a vote of thanks to the army, an- nexed to the title an annuity of two thousand pounds a year, as a testimony of the national gratitude. It might have been expected that the reduc- tion of Ciudad Rodrigo would have animated the Spanish people into measures of vigour and activity. It had not this efi^ect. Throughout the whole provinces, with the exception of Ca- talonia, there was an utter absence of energy ; no advantage was taken of the opportunities af- forded of combined and efficacious exertion. In the north, Dorsenne had been compelled to eva- cuate the Asturias and part of Leon, to collect forces for the succour of Ciudad Rodrigo. The retreat was precipitate, yet the Spaniards took no advantage of it. Gallicia had long been freed from the presence of an enemy, yet what had the inhabitants of that province done for the libera- tion of their country ? Had a strong Gallician army been in the field, it would have become im- ii f. .!• 192 TORPOR OF THE SPANIARDS. 1812. CHAP. VII. possible for Dorsenne to have joined Marmont, and the whole scheme of the enemy's operations might at once have been overthrown. But Gal- licia did nothing. Her liberation had not been the signal of energetic preparation, but of inaction ; and the sole fruit of her patriotism had been the collection of a force of ten thousand men, perhaps worse disciplined and provided than any other force in the Peninsula. In Catalonia, a better spirit prevailed under cir- cumstances of disadvantage immeasurably great- er. A long succession of misfortune had raised instead of depressing the energies of the people. If, by the atrocities of Tarragona, Suchet hoped to quell the gallant Catalans into submission, he was deceived. If the spirit of patriotism and revenge, which glowed within them, could have been quenched by the most profuse out- pouring of blood, it would long have ceased to bum. But this was not so. The Catalans, in un- diminished numbers, continued to flock to the standard of their country, ready to peril all for the vindication of their freedom ; and in spite of the vindictive and disgraceful cruelty with which they had been persecuted, Catalonia was still in arms. I MOVEMENTS IN CATALONIA. 193 During the siege of Valencia, General Lacy, chap.vii. who had succeeded Campoverde in the command 1R12 of the Catalan army, took advantas^e of the mo- , '' ° Jaoaaiy. ment to make an attempt on Tarragona, assisted by a British squadron then cruising in that quarter. Having drawn together a force of ten thous- and Miquelets and regulars. Lacy accordingly advanced to blockade Tarragona. On receiving intelligence of this movement. General Decaen despatched a division under Maurice Mathieu, to raise the blockade, and bring Lacy to battle. Having been joined on his march by a detach- ment of three thousand men from Barcelona, the force of the two armies was nearly equal. On the twenty-second of January, the French ar- rived at Villa Franca, and in order to deceive Lacy with regard to the amount of his force, the troops were brought up, not in a body, but in successive detachments. This stratagem was successful. Lacy, ima- gining he had only to deal with a brigade, rais- ed the blockade to give battle. He was attack- ed on the twenty-fourth, on the heights of Alta- jan. 24. fulla, and after a severe contest, in which vic- tory long wavered between the armies, was VOL. III. I 194 DEFEAT OF LACY AT ALTAFULLA. 1812. January. CHAP. VII. compelled to retreat through the mountains to- wards Cervera, with the loss of his artillery. While Maurice Mathieu was thus employed in raising the siege of Tarragona, Decaen ma- noeuvred against the forces under Sarsfield and Rovira, in the direction of Vich and Manresa. A desultory and irregular warfare ensued, in which the native troops, from their activity and knowledge of the country, had generally the advantage. Marshal Suchet was not slow in taking ad- vantage of that hrilliant train of success which had hitherto marked his progress, to push his conquests still further. He gained possession of Guardia, Denia, Alzira, and St. Felippe ; and from the Pyrenees to the gates of Alicante Pe- niscola was the only fortified place in possession of the Spaniards. Shortly after the fall of Valencia, General Monthrun, with three divisions of the army of Portugal, arrived at Almanza, and anxious to signalize his zeal, he marched to Alicante, in hope of intimidating the governor into a sur- render of the city. This enterprise, which was undertaken in opposition to the opinion of Mar- shal Suchet, failed. The governor at once re- I REDUCTION OP PENISCOLA. 195 jected the proposals of Montbrun ; and that chap. vii. officer, having thrown a few shells into the 1812 town, found it necessary to retreat, and shortly January. afterwards rejoined the army of Marmont. Suchet then detached a division of his army under General Severoli, to commence opera- tions against the fort of Peniscola. Peniscola is a place of great strength, built on an isolated rock, jutting out into the sea, and connected with the mainland by a narrow isthmus. The garrison was commanded by General Navarro, and consisted of a thousand men. On the twen- ty-eighth of January, the French batteries open- ed fire, and on the fourth of February, the gover- nor disgracefully capitulated. So lost to shame wa« this man, that he even made a merit with Severoli of his cowardice. At the moment of surrender, he boasted of having means of resis- tance for two months, and of having refused to admit the Fnglish, who wished to lend aid to the garrison. In Peniscola, the enemy gained possession of sixty-six guns, and large stores of provision and ammunition. In the south, some partial successes were achieved. On the sixteenth of February, Bal- lasteros attacked the French General Maransin, Feb. 4. Feb. 16. 196 MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTH. CHAP. VII. near Cartaraa, with a force of about three thous- and men. The numbers on both sides were P . ' nearly equal, but the Spaniards had the advan- tage of ground ; and Ballasteros, concentrating his choicest troops, made a furious attack on the left of Maransin, and drove back that part of the line. The conflict was extremely obsti- nate, and lasted for three hours. At length, the French fled in confusion, and were pursued as far as Malaga. FLANS OF LOKD WELLINGTON. 197 CHAPTER VIII. SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF BADAJOS— ATTACK ON ALMARAZ. 1812. Februarj. On the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, Lord Wei- chap.viii lington took immediate measures to repair the works, and put the fortress in a defensible state. Having efi'ected this, and supplied the place with the requisite stores of provisions, he placed it under command of a Spanish governor, and returned to Frenada. He then determined on the bold project of throwing his army with suddenness and secrecy across the Tagus, and reducing Badajos before Soult and Marmont should be able to take effec- tive measures for its relief. At this period there were none of the enemy's troops in Estramadura, except a part of the fifth corps at Villa Franca, and a division under General Darican at La Sere- na. But Marshal Soult could readily concentrate 198 LORD WELLINGTON PREPARES CHAP.viii. a force of forty thousand men, while that of Marmont was yet more considerable. Should lol2. , , , February. *^®^® armies unite, it would be impossible to effect any thing, in face of numbers so utterly overwhelming. The success of the enterprise, therefore, de- pended on secrecy and rapidity of movement, and every means were adopted by Lord Wel- lington to conceal his intentions from the enemy till the last moment. With this view, the artillery for the siege was embarked in large vessels at Lis- bon, for a fictitious destination, and subsequently transhipped at sea into small craft, by which it was conveyed up the river Sadao to Alcacer- do Sal. From thence it was conveyed in car- riages across the Alentejo to Badajos, by a route towards which it was not probable that the sus- picions of the enemy would be directed. In all the details of preparation the same pru- dent caution was observed ; and at length the arrangements being completed, the army on the Mar. 6. sixth of March broke up from its quarters, and moving rapidly to the south, reached Elvas on the eleventh. One division only, covered by a few cavalry posts, remained on the Agueda. Mau:. 16. On the sixteenth of March, the army crossed TO BESIEGE BADAJOS. 199 the Guadiana, and Badajos was immediately chap.viii invested by the third, fourth, and light divisions, igi2. under command of Marshal Beresford and Gen- March, eral Picton. Sir Thomas Graham, with the first, sixth, and seventh divisions of infantry, and General Slade's and General Le Marchant's brigades of cavalry, advanced to Los Santos, Za- fra, and Llerena ; and Sir Rowland Hill, with the second division, and the Portuguese division of General Hamilton, and one brigade of caval- ry, moved from his cantonments near Albuquer- que to Almandrelejo and Merida. General Dronet, part of whose corps was sta- tioned at Villa Franca, finding himself thus threatened in front and flank, immediately fell back to Homachos. In the meantime the siege went on. On the seventeenth, the weather, which had hitherto Mar. 17- been remarkably fine, became cold and tempes- tuous. During the afternoon, and throughout the night, the rain fell in torrents ; and taking advantage of the obscurity, ground was broken within one hundred and sixty yards of Fort Pi- curina, undiscovered by the enemy. During the eighteenth, in spite of the ele- Mar. 18. ments, the troops persevered in their labours in 200 COMMENCEMENT OP THE SIEGE. 1812. Mardb ciTAP.viii the trenches. A heavy cannonade was kept up from the town, but with little effect. On the nineteenth, the rain continued with increased violence. The troops were without shelter of any kind, and the duties of the 8ieg During this movement he was closely li 1812. July. 232 MARMONT RETBEATS BEHIND THE DOURO. CHAP. IX. followed by the aUies ; and on the second of July, the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, sue ceeded in coming up with the rear-guard of the enemy, which they instantly attacked and drove in confusion across the Douro. On the night following, both armies halted in position on op- posite sides of the river. That of Marmont occupied a range of high ground, stretching from Polios to Simancas on the Pisuerga, with the centre posted at Tordesillas, to defend the passage of the Douro. The British took up a line, extending from La Seca to Polio?, and head-quarters were established at Rueda. Both Toro and Zamora had been strongly fortified by the French ; and the few other points at which the river could be crossed had likewise been put in a state of defence. Lord Wellington, therefore, considered the ene- my's position on the Douro too strong for at- tack, and both armies remained inactive for about a fortnight, during which period Marmont was joined by General Bonnet, from the Asturias, with a division of eight thousand men. The march of that General had not been unop- posed. The Spanish Generals, Mahy, Barcena, and Porlier, had drawn together a force of from LORD WELLINGTON TAKES POST ON THE DOURO. 233 1812. July. fifteen to twenty thousand men, with which it chap. ix. was determined to attack him on the march. To avoid this, Bonnet threw himself into the mountains, and by roads of great difficulty, suc- ceeded in reaching Reynosa without encounter, and, afterwards, in joining Marmont on the Douro. We shall here take leave to off'er a few cur- sory observations on the manoeuvres of the hos- tile armies. The object of Marmont in his advance to the neighbourhood of the position of St. Christoval, was to relieve the forts, which he was well aware could not hold out much longer without assistance, and to take the chances of Lord Wellington's retiring, in case he should think it prudent to decline a general engage- ment. There can be little doubt that this move- ment was made under a false notion of the strength of his opponent, for at the period in question, it was in no respect the policy of Mar- mont to fight a battle. He was in daily expec- tation of being joined by the division of General Bonnet, and the possession of the northern bank of the Douro, and of all the bridges on that river, gave him a decided advantage over his op- ponent. t i-pimmtm I) 234 CHAP. IX. 1812. July. Ml 1 M OB8E11VATION8. Bat in proportion as a battle was against tbe interest of Marmont, was it desirable to tbe Britisb General. By tacticians of no mean or- der, tberefore, Lord Wellington bas been beld guilty of an error, in not attacking bis opponent on the twenty-tbird or twenty-fourtb of June, wben it was certainly in bis power to bJive done so. Tbat tbe forts of Salamanca bad not yet been reduced, cannot be gravely urged as an objection to tbe measure. A garrison of eigbt bundred men could be beld in cbeck by a batta- lion ; and tbe wbole army were tbus disposable for battle. Tbat Lord Wellington could expect a more favourable opportunity of striking a de- cisive blow, can scarcely be established by any general reasoning on tbe subject ; yet in a few days we find him marching to tbe Douro, in iearcb of tbat very adversary who had already been within bis grasp on the Tormes. Once, on the Douro, the advantages of Mar- mont were very great. He had everywhere formidable positions at command, and the wbole bridges and fords were in bis possession, and guarded by strong defences. The river, bend- ing in its course, encircled tbe flanks of the allied army, and it was impossible for Lord Wellington OBSERVATIONS. 235 1812. July. to anticipate tbe quarter from which tbe enemy chap, ix . might direct bis attack. He might be deluded by a false demonstration at one point, while tbe real danger was approaching from another. By a single injudicious movement, he was continuaUy liable to be cut off from Salamanca, by the French army being suddenly thrown across the Douro, at gome of the numerous salient points formed by the windings of tbe river on either flank. On tbe other hand, Marmont, when pressed by the allies, bad always a secure retreat open to him by crossing the Douro. Had Marmont remained in his strong line on tbe Douro, in all probability the campaign would have terminated without any important result. But Lord Wellington knew it to be impossible that so large an army could long procure sub- sistence in any one position ; and aware that in bis rear tbe Guerilla parties were in constant activity, he waited the moment when the in- creasing necessities of his army should compel him to a decisive movement. Marmont, however, having received the ex- pected reinforcements, was little disposed to remain inactive. The army he commanded was II T AND CROSSES HIS ARMY AT TORDESILLAS. 237 I \ 236 MARMONT MAKES A FEINT AT TORO, 1812. July. 'li CHAP. IX. composed of veterans, inured to the warfare of the country, and full of confidence in their own discipline and prowess. In manoeuvre the French had uniformly proved themselves superior to the troops of every other nation ; while the English were proverbially deficient in that alacrity of movement, on which the success of a contest of tactic must generally depend. Marmont, therefore, calculated with confidence on the nu- merous advantages he enjoyed; and relied on his own skill, and the activity of his troops, to compel Lord Wellington to retreat on Ciudad Rodrigo, or fight a battle under circumstances of disadvantage. Both armies remained quiet in their positions Jul. 15. till the sixteenth of July, when Marmont moved his army to St. Roman, and passed two divi- sions across the Douro at Toro. Lord Welling- ton was not deceived by this manceuvre. Mak- ing a feint of moving on Toro with part of his army, he took up a strong position on the Gua- rena, occupying Villaescusa, Fuente la Pena, and Castrejon. On the night of the sixteenth, the French re- crossed the river at Toro, and having blown up the bridge, marched about ten leagues higher chap. ix. up to Tordesillas. Here, in the course of the ^g^^ day, Marmont passed the Douro with his whole j^y army, and made a forced march on Rueda, Nava del Rey, and Castrejon, of which places he took possession on the morning of the eighteenth, the allies falling back on his approach. During this movement, the right of the army, JuL 18. consisting of General Cole's, and the light divi- sion, were for some time in very imminent peril. The enemy attempted to cut off their communi- cation with the centre and left, and it was only by a resolute and successful charge of cavalry, that they were at length extricated from their difficulties. By a brilliant manoeuvre, therefore, Marmont succeeded in establishing his communication with the army of the centre, which was then ad- vancing from JNladrid to his support. The posi- tion of the allies now extended along the banks of the Guarena, a stream tributary to the Douro, which, near Canizal, separates into four branches, and again unites its waters about a league below it. By thus posting his army. Lord Wellington kept his communications un- 238 AFFAIR OF CANIZAL. MOVEMENT OF THE ARMIES. 239 IM' 1812. July. Jul. 18. r I CHAP. IX. broken ; and in case of attack, the advantages of ground were decidedly in his farour. Mar- mont likewise halted his army in position on the opposite bank of the Guarena. Shortly afterwards he pushed a considerable column across the river below the junction of the streams, which attempted to turn the left of the allies, and gain possession of the valley of Canizal, by which it would have been enabled to command the Salamanca road. This attempt was repulsed by the cavalry and General Cole's division. The twenty-seventh and fortieth re- giments, supported by a brigade of Portuguese, advanced to the charge with bayonets ; and the enemy retreated in confusion, leaving two hun- dred and forty prisoners in the hands of the vic- tors. In this affair about four hundred of the enemy were killed and wounded. The loss of the allies was more considerable, amounting in all to five hundred and fifty men. On the day following, Marmont withdrew his right, and moved his left forward, making de- monstrations against the right of his opponent. Lord Wellington made an instant counter move- ment. He crossed the upper Guarena at Val- lesa and El Olmo, with his whole army, and Jul.19. 1812. July. every preparation was made for the engagement chap. ix. on the following morning. On the twentieth, however, the enemy were observed still moving to their left along the heights of the Guarena, which they crossed with- out opposition, and halted for the night with their left at Babilafuente, and their right at Villamula. Lord Wellington, who, during the day, had closely followed the enemy in all his motions, encamped his army at Cabe^a Velosa, placing a corps of observation at Aldea Lengua on the Tormes. Nothing could be finer or more striking than the spectacle of the hostile armies during the greater part of the march on the twentieth. Jul. 20. They moved in parallel lines within half cannon- shot of each other, in the most imposing order and regularity. As the diversities of ground gave either party a temporary advantage, the artillery opened fire; but though both armies were prepared in a moment to form line of bat- tle, no collision took place. On the morning of the twenty-first, the two JuL 21. armies again moved forward in lines nearly parallel towards Huerta, between which place and Alba de Tormes the French army crossed -"«4^ 240 THB ARMIES MOVE INTO POSITION. 1812. Jnly* Jul. 22. CHAP. IX. the river, leaving only a small body m occupa- tion of the heights of Babilafuente. Marmont then directed his march to the left, threatening the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington immediately moved his army on the bridge of Salamanca, by which it crossed the Tormes m the evening, with the exception of the third division, and the Portuguese cavalry, under General D'Urban, which were left to observe the motions of the body of the enemy still re- maining at Babilafuente. Before daylight on the morning of the twenty- second, both armies moved into position. That of the allies extended from the Tormes to two steep and rugged heights, which, from their simi- larity, the natives geaeraUy distinguished by the name of the sister Arapiles. The position of the French was covered by a thick wood, and em- braced the heights of La Pena, and the hamlets of Calvarasso de Ariba, and Calvarasso de Abaxo. In the morning a good deal of skir- mishing took place. Detachments from both armies endeavoured to seize the Arapiles heights, and the French succeeded in gaining possession of the external and more distant one. The occupation of one of the ArapUes by the MAN(EUVR£S OF MARMONT. 241 1812. July. enemy, occasioned some changes in the posi-CHAP. ix, tion of the allied army. The right was extend- ed en potence to the heights behind the village of Arapiles, which was occupied by light infan- try ; and General Pakenham, with the third di- vision, and Portuguese cavalry, was directed to cross the Tormes, and take post at Aldea Te- jada, to lend still farther support to the right flank. The morning passed in a series of manceuvres on the part of Marmont, from which no conclu- sion could be drawn with regard to his ultimate intentions. Lord Wellington, therefore, content- ed himself with keeping an accurate observation on all the movements of his adversary, ready at any moment to assume the oflPensive, and equal- ly 80, should sound policy require it, to retreat. There can be no doubt that Lord Wellington considered the latter alternative as by far the more probable ; and every preparation had been made to carry it into effect. It was unques- tionably in Marmont's power, by turning the right of the allied army, to have rendered its position untenable. The baggage and com- missariat, therefore, had already quitted Sa- TOL. III. L ■'■UHfe ' 1 I 1812. July. 242 LORD WELLINGTON DETERMINES TO ATTACK. CHAP. IX. lamanca ; and even some of the divisions had commenced a retrogressive movement. About two oVlock, however, a sudden and decisive change took place in the character of the enemy's demonstrations. Under cover of a heavy cannonade, and a skirmish along the whole front of his line, Marmont advanced his centre, making at the same time a movement to his left, as if intending to encircle the position of the al- lied army, and cut them off from the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. His line, thus unduly extend- ed, was necessarily weakened, and the favour- able opportunity of attack, thus presented, was immediately seized by Lord Wellington. The following was the disposition of the army at the moment of attack. The first and light divisions were on the left of the Arapiles, and formed the extreme left of the line. The fourth and fifth divisions were posted in a double line, in rear of the viUage of Arapiles, with the sixth and seventh divisions, and the division of Don Carlos d'Espana in reserve. On the left of the fourth division was the Portuguese brigade of General Pack ; on the right of the fifth was that of General Bradford. The third division, with the main body of the cavalry, formed the DISPOSITION OF THE ALLIED ARMY. 243 1812. Jul J. extreme right. While these arrangements were chap. ix. in progress, the enemy made repeated attempts to gain possession of the village of Arapiles, oc- cupied by a detachment of the Guards ; but no important change took place in their general dispositions. The third division was then order- ed to advance obliquely to its right, to turn the left of the position, while General Cole's and General Leith's divisions should attack it in front. The arrangements being completed, the third division, led by General Pakenham, moved on to the attack. The division advanced in column of battalions, and was in the act of ascending the ridge occupied by the enemy, when the skir- mishers were driven in by a large body of cavalry, who in a moment came sweeping along the brow of the ascent, on the right flank of the division. Fortunately the retreat of the light troops had given intelligence of their approach ; and Colonel Campbell of the ninety-fourth, who commanded the brigade, had time to throw back the fifth regiment en potenccy which, by a well-directed volley, caused them to retreat in disorder. General Pakenham no sooner crowned the heights on the extreme left of the French, than 244 BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. t 1812. July. CHAP. IX. he formed line across their flank, and supported by General D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, and some squadrons of the fourteenth, advanced to- wards the centre, carrying every thing before him. On every favourable point where they at- tempted to make a stand, they were charged with the bayonet; and with such vigour did General Pakenham follow up his success, that even the colours of the British regiments were often seen waving over battalions of the ene- my. Sir Stapleton Cotton with the cavalry charged the enemy in front, and cut to pieces a brigade of French infantry, though not with- out sustaining a severe loss in General Le Mar- chant, who was killed at the head of his bri- gade. The whole left wing of the enemy was now retreating in confusion, and above three thousand prisoners had been made by the al- lies. While the events just narrated were passing on the right of the army, the tide of success had not flowed with equal rapidity in the centre. The repeated attempts of General Pack to gain possession of the Arapiles height occupied by the enemy, were unsuccessful. On the retreat of the Portuguese, a body advanced from the height, BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. 243 1812. July. and made a gallant and very vehement attack chap. ix. on the flank of the fourth division, while warm- ly engaged with the enemy in its front. Gen- eral Cole had been already wounded, and his divi- sion, disconcerted by this sudden attack, was com- pelled to retire in some confusion. The misfor- tune, however, was immediately repaired by the advance of a brigade of the fifth division, which, by a change of front, took the enemy in flank, and subjecting them to a cross fire, forced them instantly to retreat. The fourth and fifth divi- sions then continued to advance, uninterrupted by any further reverse, and gained complete possession of the crest of the position. In the meanwhile the Arapiles was carried by General Clinton ; and the third division had advanced from the left, along the centre of the French position, attacking and dispers- ing the enemy in every encounter. Marshal Marmont had been wounded, and the command of the army devolved on General Clausel, who, with great skill and promptitude, now endeavoured to rally his defeated troops in a new position, run- ning nearly at right angles with the original front. The ground was admirably chosen. Ei- ther flank of the position was supported by masses of cavalry; and the artillery was so 246 BATTLE OF SALAMANCA. 1812. July. CHAP. IX. posted as not only to sweep the whole face of the height, hut to command all the ground in the vicinity. The assumption of so strong a position caused a pause in the movements of the allies. Lord Wellington having examined it, at length di- rected the fourth division to dislodge the enemy hy a flank movement on the left, while Gen- eral Clinton s division, supported by the third and fifth, should attack it in front. It was in this part of the action that the loss on the part of the allies was most severe. General Clinton's division, during the whole of its advance, was exposed to a most destructive fire of artillery and musquetry, which it sustained with the greatest steadiness, till reaching the summit of the height, it at once charged with the bayonet, and the fourth division coming up, the enemy abandoned the position in great confusion, and fled towards Alba, where he crossed the Tormes. The allied troops continued the pursuit with great vigour till the approach of night, when the darkness and extreme fatigue of the troops, rendered it necessary to halt.* • But for an unforeseen circumstance, the Tictory of Sala- manca must have been attended with even ^eater results. U RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. 247 The immediate results of this most splendid chap. ix. victory, were the capture of eleven pieces of ar- jgi2. tillery, two eagles, and of seven thousand pri- juiy. soners. Three French Generals (Ferey, Tho- mieres, and Desgraviers) were killed ; Marshal Marmont, Generals Bonnet, Clausel, and Menne, were wounded. The total loss of the enemy cannot be calculated at less than fourteen thou- sand men. The number of killed and wounded on the part of the victors, was about five thousand two hun- dred, including six General ofiicers, one of whom (Le Marchant) was killed, the others (Beresford, Leith, Cotton, Cole, and Alton) were wounded. The enemy, taking advantage of the dark- ness, continued his flight during the night ; and, at day-dawn, the pursuit was renewed on the part Jul. 23. of the allies. The advanced-guard, consisting of Major-General Baron Bock's and General An- son's brigades of cavalry, which joined during the When the enemy took up his second position, the light division was directed to march to Huerta, and the first division to Alba de Tormes, to cut oflF their retreat. These orders, so far as concerned the first division, were not executed, and the Span- iards liaving abandoned the Castle of Alba on the approach of the French, the latter were enabled to effect their retreat across the Tormes without impediment. mrr^fltS .. 24a THE ENEMY RETREAT IN CONFUSION. 1812. July. CHAP. IX. night, succeeded in coming up with the enemy's rear division, strongly posted behind the village of La Serna. The two brigades instantly charged ; and the French cavalry, panic-stricken by their recent defeat, fled in great confusion, leaving the infantry to their fate. The whole of the latter, consisting of three battalions, were made prisoners. After this disaster, Ciausel continued his re- treat, by forced marches and in great disorder, towards Valladolid. Being joined, however, by a considerable body of cavalry and horse artil- lery from the north, he succeeded in crossing the Douro, with little further annoyance from the allies, whose march was delayed by the difficulty of bringing up the supplies. Lord Jul. 30. Wellington reached Valladolid on the thirtieth, but finding Ciausel continued his retreat on Burgos in a state of great disorganization, on the day following he recrossed the Douro, and halted at Ouellar. Lord Wellington then determined to march against the army of the centre, which, in order to favour the escape of the defeated force, had ap- proached the flank of the allies. Preparations August 7. for this purpose were immediately set on foot, LORD WELLINGTON ADVANCES ON MADRID. 249 and on the seventh of August the army com- chap. jx. menced its movement on Madrid, by the route of jgi2. Segovia, leaving a force under General Paget on August. the Douro to observe the motions of the enemy. Joseph Bonaparte could muster, for the defence of the capital, about twenty thousand men, — a force altogether inadequate to ofi*er any serious impediment to the march of the allies. In Madrid all was confusion. So decisive a move- ment on the part of Lord Wellington had been altogether unforeseen, and no arrangements had been made for the defence of the capital. Jo- seph had left Madrid on the twenty-first of July, and marched by the Escurial to join Marmont. In the neighbourhood of Arevalo he received in- telligence of IMarmont's defeat. He then march- ed by his right to Segovia, with the intention of drawing Lord Wellington's attention from the army of Ciausel. No sooner, however, did he learn that Lord Wellington was advancing against him, than he fell back rapidly on JNIadrid. In the meantime the allied army continued its progress. No attempt was made to defend the passage of the Guadarama mountains ; but, on the tenth, an engagement took place with a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had been sent for- l2 250 LORD WELLINGTON ENTERS MADRID. CHAP. IX. ward to watch the motions of the allies. Thig lg]2. ^^^^^ w»8 driven in in the morning by General Augun. D'Urban, who moved on to IMajalahonda, where he took post with his brigade of Portuguese ca- valry, Captain Macdonald's troop of horse artil- lery, and the cavalry and light infantry of the German legion. The enemy's cavalry having again approach- ed, General D' Urban ordered the Portuguese brigade to charge the leading squadrons of the enemy, which appeared too far in advance to be supported by the main body. The Portuguese cavalry advanced to the attack, but before they reached the enemy, turned about and fled. By this disgraceful conduct three guns were lost, which owing to the difficulties of the ground could not be removed. The Germans then charged, and succeeded in checking the progress of the enemy ; and Colonel Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry, and a brigade of the seventh division coming up shortly after, the French burned the carriages of the captured guns and retired. Auff. 12. On the twelfth the allies entered Madrid; Joseph having abandoned it on the preceding night, and retired to the left of the Tagus, where )ie took post with his right at Aranjuez, and his ^ 4» HIS RECEPTION BY THE PEOPLE. 251 181-2. Auj^nst. left in the direction of Toledo. A garrison of chap, ix seventeen hundred men were left in the Retire, in order to check the enthusiasm of the people, and preserve the convoys from plunder. The appearance of the allied army was hailed with joy and triumph by all ranks in the capital. All business was suspended ; and thousands of the inhabitants bearing branches of laurel, came forth to welcome their victorious liberators. O n the day following the Retiro surrendered. Don Carlos d'Espana was appointed governor, and the Constitution was proclaimed amid the enthu- siastic vivas of the populace. While these brilliant operations were in pro- gress, Marshal Soult had advanced against Sir Rowland Hill; but that officer retreating on his approach to the position of Albuera, which had been strengthened by entrenchments and redoubts, Soult did not venture to attack him. At Ulna, on the eleventh of June, an unfortu- Jum li. nate affair took place between the heavy bri- gade of cavalry, under General Slade, and a party of the enemy, commanded by General Lallemande. General Slade charged with great spirit, and in a few minutes put the French to flight; but the pursuit being continued 252 CONSEQUENCES OP SALAMANCA. [(■ CHAP. IX. too far, the enemy were reinforced, and be- 1812. ^™® *^® assailants in turn. After a sanguin- Augu«t. ^^y conflict, General Slade's brigade were driven back in great confusion, with the loss of nearly two hundred of their number in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Many other cavalry affairs took place, in one of which Lieutenant Streuwitz succeeded in surprising a party of the enemy, which he attacked and defeated, with the loss of twenty men and horses, besides a great number killed. But the aspect of affairs in the whole Penin- sula was at once changed by the victory of Sa- lamanca. Soult relaxed his grasp of Andalusia, and determined to concentrate his army in Gra- Aug. 2o. nada. On the twenty-fifth of August the siege of Cadiz was raised, and the Spaniards took imme- diate possession of Puerto Real and Chiclana. The enemy's rear-guard was attacked by a de- tachment sent from Cadiz, under Colonel Sker- ret and General Cruz Morgeon, which drove it Aug, 27. from St. Lucar ; and on the twenty-seventh Se- ville was carried by assault. The French, on the approach of the allied force^ evacuated the sub- urb Triana, and retreated to the town. An at- tempt was then made to defend the bridge ; but ' I * MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL HILL. 253 the grenadiers of the Guards attacked them chap. ix. with the bayonet, when all resistance ceased, „. • lol-c. and the enemy fled, leaving the streets strewed August. with their dead. In this afl^air they lost above two hundred prisoners, besides a considerable quantity of baggage, horses, and money. The enemy having withdrawn from Estrama- dnra, the presence of General Hill on the Gua- diana was no longer required, and that leader was directed to move to the Tagus, and connect hit operations with the main body of the army. On the approach of General HilFs corps, Joseph abandoned Toledo, and fell back to Almanza, on the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia, from which point he could communicate both with Soult and Suchet. With the exception of one battalion, the whole British troops were withdrawn from Ca- diz ; and every effort was made by Lord Wel- lington to excite the Spaniards to new and in- creased efforts at a crisis so important. 254 CHAP. X. 1812. Au^st. SITUATION OF LORD WELLINGTON CHAPTER X. SIEGE OF BURGOS— RETREAT OF THE ALLIED ARMY. The situation of Lord Wellington at Madrid, though hrilliant, was full of peril. The defeated army of Marmont was still numerous, and had been largely reinforced ; and a corps of observa- tion, of ten thousand men, had been sent into Alava. The armies of the south and centre, by forming a junction with that of Suchet, might speedily advance against the capital, with a force at least treble in amount to that of the allies. Little benefit had resulted from the tardy arrival of the Sicilian force under General Mait- land. A few days before its appearance on the coast, General O'Donnel had been defeated at Castalla, and driven into Murcia, with the loss of three thousand of his army. The only Spanish array with which he could co-operate having AT MADRID. 253 thus been beaten from the field, General Mait- chap. x. land remained cooped up in Alicante, and none of those benefits which had been anticipated \^^g^g^ from the arrival of this force were realized. In the north, indeed, Santocildes, with the Gal- lician army, besides other minor advantages gain- ed over the enemy, succeeded in reducing Astor- ga ; and the garrison, amounting to twelve hun- dred men, surrendered prisoners of war. A de- tachment of seven hundred men was captured by the Empecinado in Guadalaxara; and the Guerillas were every where active in their voca- tion. But in the neighbourhood of Madrid, no active exertions were made against the com- mon enemy. There was no attempt to organ- ize any military system, and it soon became evident to Lord >yellington that he could only calculate with security on his own army, to de- feat the projects of the enemy. To remain in Madrid, therefore, was impossi- ble, and only three other courses presented them- selves. He might advance into the south against Soult ; but, in that case, the other armies would immediately combine and act in his rear, and no advantage of any kind could be secured- 256 THE DIFFICULTIES OF HIS SITUATION. CHAP. X. He might unite his whole force, enter Valen- ,QI2 ^**> march directly on Alicante, estahlith his August communications with General Maitland, threat- en the armies of Arragon and the centre, and present their junction with Soult, leaving a corps of sufficient magnitude to guard the pass- age of the Douro. He might, in the third place, advance against the army of the north, which had again assumed a hostile attitude, and compelled General Paget to cross the Douro. This scheme was attended with the evident disadvantage, that it was in the power of Soult, Suchet, and Joseph, to combine their forces, and thus compel him to retreat. Under more favourable circumstances, the second of these projects, was probably that which Lord Wellington would have followed. Had Ballasteros done his duty in the south, and thrown himself between Soult and the army of the centre — had O'Donnel's anny been in con- dition to join him — and had the force of General Maitland, been of the magnitude which Lord Wellington had been taught to expect, the al- lied army, by entering the eastern provinces, might probably have secured a more brilliant termination to the campaign. But in all these HE DETERMINES TO RETURN TO THE NORTH. 257 1812. August. things Lord Wellington had been deceived. Bal- chap. x. lasteros refused to combine his movements with those of the allies. General Maitland's corps barely amounted to six thousand men. The army of O'Donnel had been beaten from the field; and in the whole south and east of Spain there exist- ed not a single force on the assistance of which he could rely. There were also other reasons to induce Lord Wellington to transfer his operations to the north. The resources of Gallicia had never been called forth since the French were driven out, about three years before, and Lord Wel- lington was assured, that a force of twenty-five thousand men were ready to act with him from thence, and able to oppose Clausel, if put in possession of Burgos. Considerable reinforce- ments were expected from England, and in the north only could these efi^ect their junction, in time to influence the success of the campaign. By advancing against the army of Portugal, he would at all events create a strong diversion in favour of the southern provinces, the most wealthy, the most populous, and the most patri- otic in the kingdom. He would secure the liberation of Andalusia, which Soult had unwil- " LORD WELLINGTON QUITS MADRID, f|HAi\x. lingly been driven to abandon, and was again 1812. P''®P*red to occupy on the first return of success. September. Thus forced on a choice of difficulties, Lord Wellington, considering it possible to strike a blow against Clansel before the other armies could advance to his support, determined to march in person to the north, with four divisions of his army. Two divisions were left in garrison at Madrid. General Hill moved to Aranjuez, to observe the motions of the army of the south ; and Ballasteros was requested to unite his force with the corps of that leader, in case Soult should direct his march on Madrid. In the event of Soult moving into Valencia, he was to take post at Alcazar, and defend the approach to the cap- ital on that side. On the first of September, Lord Wellington quitted Madrid, and on the morning of the Sep. 7. seventh, the army passed the Douro, and took possession of Valladolid. Clausel fell back on the approach of the allies, destroying the bridges on the Pisuerga. At Palencia, the Gallician army efl'ected its junction, but, instead of an efficient force of twenty-five thousand men, it scarcely mustered above ten thousand undisciplined sol- diers, utterly deficient in every thing of equip- AND CROSSES THE DOURO. 259 ment and organization, and officered by men chap. x. Ignorant of the first rudiments of their profes- 1812. September. On the nineteenth, the allied army entered Sep. 19. Burgos ; and the French, under General Souham, who, with a reinforcement of nine thousand men, had arrived on the day previous, to assume the command, fell back to Briviesca, leaving in the castle a garrison of two thousand men, under General Dubreton. The castle of Burgos is situated on an emi- nence, and strongly defended by its outworks. The enemy had encircled the acclivity, by two lines of formidable field-works, armed at all points with cannon, and the base of the hill was surrounded by an uncovered scarpwall of very difficult access. Lord Wellington considered the reduction of this fortress to be essential to the success of his operations, for the French had collected in it large stores of ammunition and provisions, and the allied array required it as a point of support, in the insecure position which it was boldly intended to assume. Lord Wellington, therefore, immediately di- rected the investment of the place, though the whole of his artillery consisted of three eighteen 260 SIEOE OF BURGOS. 6IEOE OF BUROOS. 261 S^19. CHAP. X. pounders, and five twenty-four pounder iron IQ22 howitzers, and the supply of ammunition was September. ^^^V This was the last efibrt to gain possession of the fortress, the advance of the enemy render- ing it necessary to desist from further opera- tions. The failure is attributable to the deficien- cy of meanS) not to any deficiency of ardour or devotion in the troops. Never were the bold- ness and intrepidity of British soldiers more ad- mirably displayed than in those unfortunate at- tacks, the unsuccessful termination of which was attributable to causes beyond their control. The loss of the allied army during the siege was very severe. It exceeded two thousand men, a number nearly equal to that of the brave gar- rison, whose efibrts were at length crowned by merited success. *In the meantime, the army under Souham, 1 264 SIR ROWLAND HILL RETREATS- MOVEMENTS OP SOULT AND JOURDAN. 265 CHAP.x. having been joined by the whole disposable force in the north, advanced through Monas- 1812 Octob^ terio, with the apparent intention of fight- ing a general action for the relief of Burgos. Oct 20. On the evening of the twentieth, the enemy came on in force, and drove in the outposts of the allied army ; but Sir Edward Paget, who was directed to move the first and fifth divisions upon their right flank, promptly executed this manoeuvre, and the French immediately fell back. While these events were passing in the north Sep. 15. of Spain, Marshal Soult, on the fifteenth of Sep- tember, had commenced his march from Granada, and having effected a junction with the army of the centre, advanced along the line of the Xucar towards Madrid. Ballasteros, influenced by petty jealousy of Lord Wellington, on whom the Cortes had wisely conferred the chief command of the Spanish armies, offered no annoyance to the enemy during this movement. He was in con- sequence removed from all military command, and imprisoned in the fortress of Ceuta on the coast of Barbary. The small force of General Maitland, cooped up in Alicante, without support of any kind from the native armies, could effect 2 1812. October. nothing ; and a trifling detachment of about six chap. x. hundred men, with some artillery, which, under General Donkin, had landed near Denia, were defeated in their object of carrying that post, and forced to re-embark. The armies of Soult and Jourdan then ap- proached Madrid, and arrived at Aranjuez on the twenty-third of October. Sir Rowland Hill Oct. 23. immediately placed his forces in position, cov- ering the capital, and preparations were made for a general engagement. On the night of the twenty-seventh, however, an express from Lord Oct. 27. Wellington arrived, directing Sir Rowland to fall back on the Adejo, unless an opportunity should occur of bringing the enemy to battle under circumstances of great advantage. The position chosen by General Hill was highly favourable ; but Soult, whose movements were combined with those of Souham, avoided a general engagement ; and marching to Toledo, crossed the Tagus, and thus threatened the rear of the allies. Under these circumstances, inde- pendently of the orders of Lord Wellington, im- mediate retreat became necessary. Madrid was in consequence evacuated, — the magazines in the Retiro were blown up, the guns spiked, and, VOL. III. M \ 266 RETREAT OF THE ALLIED ARMY TO THE DOURO. 267 1812. ()ctol)er. Oct. 21. CHAP. X. agreeably to his instructions, Sir Rowland Hill put his corps in motion, and slowly retired to- wards Salamanca. Nothing can be more admirable than the whole arrangements of Lord Wellington at this period of difficulty, nor more nicely balanced than his manoeuvres. On the twenty -first of October, the siege of Bur- gos was raised. During the nighty Lord Welling- ton filed his whole army under the walls of the cas- tle, and across the bridge of the Arlanzon, close- ly enfiladed by the guns of the place. This bold measure was productive of little loss ; and Lord Wellington thus succeeded in gaining a march on his opponent, who did not overtake him till the Oct. 23. twenty-third. On that day, the enemy's cavalry made a sharp attack on the rear-guard, which was gallantly repulsed by a light infantry bat- talion of the German legion. On the twenty-fourth, the army was joined by a reinforcement from England, under Lord Dalhousie, consisting chiefiy of the Guards, which had disembarked at Corunna, and Lord Wellington took up a position behind the Car- rion, the left at Villa Muriel, the right at Du- enas. The retreat had been so sudden and rapid, chap. x. tliat the greatest difficulty was experienced in the conveyance of the sick and wounded, a great October. portion of whom had not yet crossed the Douro. Lord Wellington, therefore, found it necessary to halt during the whole of the twenty-fifth ; and in order to check the pursuit of the enemy, di- rected the bridges over the Carrion and Pisuer- ga to be destroyed on their approach. In consequence the bridges at Villa JMuriel and Duenas were blown up. At Palencia the enemy attacked the party posted to cover the operation, and gained possession of the bridges in a perfect state. At Tariejo, owing to the failure of a mine, the bridge was little injured ; and the enemy, having pushed on a considerable body of cavalry, the covering party, under Cap- tain Ferguson of the fifty-eighth, were made prisoners. The enemy then pushed a corps across the Pisuerga, in contact with the posts of the allied army. Lord Wellington determin- ed to force them back; and on the approach of the columns, they hastily recrossed the river. On the left, a strong body was thrown across the river by a ford near Villa Muriel, and took possession of a village at some distance 268 ACTION AT CABE9ON. CHAP. X. from the bank. The Spaniards were order- TTTT" ed to dislodge them, but failed in the at- October. *^™P^ J ^"^ ^^® French, pursuing their success, came in contact with the fifth division, and the engagement was for some time very serious. The Spanish General, Don Miguel Alava, ob- serving the discomfiture of his troops, immedi- ately gallopped into the plain, and rallying them by dint of great exertion, led them back to the charge. The enemy being also repulsed by the fifth division, were then beaten back across the river with considerable loss. Oct 26. On the twenty-sixth, the army continued its retreat along miserable roads, and exposed to an incessant deluge of rain. The troops, dispirited, began to manifest symptoms of disorder. Dur- ing the night, the soldiers quitted their bivouacs in search of wine, and were guilty of numerous excesses. A large proportion being intoxicated, were regardless of command ; and the utmost exertions of the officers to restore discipline and regularity, were unavailing. General Souham made some attempts to gain possession of the bridge at Cabe9on, which were repulsed. He then marched down the Pisuerga towards the Oct 28. Douro, and endeayoored to pass the river at Siman- LORD WELLINGTON CROSSES THE DOURO. 269 il I cas, which was found impracticable from the chap. x. complete destruction of the bridge. A battery was established on some heights near Valladolid, October, which commanded a part of the road on the left of the river, along which the allied army was retreating; and the hospital waggons and com- missariat became occasionally exposed to its fire. On the twenty-ninth, the army continued its Oct. 29. retreat along the left of the Pisuerga, having destroyed the bridges at Cabe9on and Vallado- lid. The Douro being too high to be fordable at any point, the whole of the divisions crossed at Tudela and the Puente del Douro. The bridges at these places were likewise blown up. In the night, the enemy crossed a party by swim- ming, who dislodged a German regiment, posted to guard the ruins of the bridge of Tordesillas, and immediately proceeded to re-establish the communication. Lord Wellington in conse- quence took up a position in which he might give battle, and stationed his army along the banks of the Douro, on nearly the same ground which it occupied in July, before the battle of Salamanca. On the sixth of November, the enemy having Nov. 6. repaired the bridges at Toro and Tordesillas, 270 THE ALLIES RETIRE ON SALAMANCA. MANffiUVRES OF THE HOSTILE ARMIES. 271 CHAP. X. Lord Wellington recommenced his retreat, and fell back to Torrecilla del Orden, the corps of November, ^ir Rowland Hill having effected a junction on the third. On the eighth the divisions from Bur- gos occupied the heights of St. Christoval, in front of Salamanca; and General Hamilton's Portu- guese division held the town of Alba de Tormes. On reaching the Douro, General Souham de- sisted from the pursuit, till being joined by the armies of the south and centre, under Soult, their whole united force, amounting to seventy-five thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry, concentrated in position on the Tormes, on the Nov. 10. tenth of November. The army of Lord Welling- ton did not exceed forty-eight thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry ; and with the disadvan- tage of so great a disparity of numbers, he felt it necessary to continue his retreat, unless a favourable opportunity should occur of bringing the enemy to action. On the ninth, the French drove in the cavalry piquets in front of Alba ; and in the course of the day approached the positions on the Tormes, and attempted to force the passage of the river. They attacked General Hamilton's division in Alba with twenty pieces of cannon ; but finding they made no impression, the greater part of the chap. x. troops were withdrawn during the night. ~1812~ On the fourteenth the French crossed the river y^^v ember. in force, at three fords near Lucinas, and took post in a formidable position at Mozarbes. Lord Wellington then moved his army to the Ara- piles, the scene of his former victory ; but find- ing the enemy too strongly posted to render it prudent to assume the offensive, and perceiving that detachments of their cavalry were already in motion to intercept his communication with Ciu- dad Rodrigo, he withdrew the troops from Alba, and put his army in retreat towards the Agueda. On the sixteenth the allied army encamped on Nov. 16. the Valmusa. Soult followed their steps with a strong advanced-guard, but made no attempt to achieve any great and signal success. On the seventeenth the enemy cannonaded the rear- guard on its passage of the Huerba, near Mu- noz ; and, on the same day. Sir Edward Paget was unfortunately made prisoner, almost in the centre of the allied army. A detachment of French light troops were concealed in a wood on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Sir Edward observing an interval between the fifth and se- venth divisions of infantry, rode alone to the 272 TO THE FRONTIER OF PORTUGAL. 273 LORD WELLINGTON CONTINUES HIS RETREAT THAP. X. rear to inquire into the cause by which the pro- crress of the latter had been delayed. On his re- 1812 . . . XT , ' turn he missed his way, and fell into the hands November. of the enemy. By this unlucky accident, his country, at a moment of peculiar need, was de- prived of the services of one of the bravest and most distinguished of her leaders. During the whole of this retreat, though little annoyance was experienced from the ene- my, the suflFerings of the troops were very great. The weather was cold and inclement ; the troops at night were without shelter of any sort, and the rain descended in torrents, which precluded the possibility of lighting fires. The wretched con- dition of the roads, in many places nearly im- passable, occasioned great irregularities in the supply of provisions ; and under the pressure of such sufferings, it was found impossible to main- tain discipline. Not. 18. On the eighteenth the head-quarters of Lord Wellington were at Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the two following days the army crossed the Ague- da. Shortly afterwards, on learning that the enemy had withdrawn from the Tormes, the di- visions were distributed in extensive canton- ments, the right being thrown forward to Banos 4 i and Bejar to hold the passes, and the left re- chap. x. tired on Lamego. The season of the year no longer admitted of military movements, and the j^t^j^^j^Jj^^ troops were suffered to enjoy the repose neces- sary to prepare them for the toils of the succeed- ing campaign.* • On the arrival of the army in quarters, Lord Wellington ad- dressed a letter to the commanding officers of battalions, cen- surbg, in the severest manner, the misconduct of the troops during the retreat from Burgos — " It must be obvious," he said, " to even,' officer, that, from the moment the troops com- menced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all com- mand over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all de- scriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. " Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made m which the troops made such short marches,— none in which they made such long and repeated halts,— and none in which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy. These evils," continues Lord Wellington, « I have no hesitation in attributing to the habitual inattention of officers of regiments to their duty as prescribed by the regula- tions of the service, and the orders of this army. « Unfortunately, the inexperience of officers of the army, has induced many to conceive, that the period during which an ar- my is on active service is one of relaxation from all rule, in- stead of being, as it w, the period during which, of all others, every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier ; for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field-equipments, and his horse and horse-appointments ; for the receipt, and issue, and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his M 2 274 CHAP. X. 1812. STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING IN ENGLAND. The intelligence of the retreat from Burgos was received in England with clamours of dis- content and disappointment. The hopes which the early successes of the campaign had over- weeningly excited, were unreasonably depressed by its termination. Within and without the walls of Parliament loud accusations were heard against the Ministry. Even Lord Wellington, who, by a course of splendid achievement, had won his way to a high place in the hearts and hopes of all Englishmen, now ceased to be " gracious in the people's eye." He was accused of compromising the safety of his army by a se- ries of rash miscalculations. The Government were charged, by one class of politicians, with wasting the resources of the country in a hope- food, and the forag« for his horse, should be most strictly at- tended to by tlie officer of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army — a British army in particular — shall be broug^ht into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the ene- my on the day of triaL" Lord Wellington then proceeds to point out the most effec- tual means of remedying these evils, by means of greater vigi- lance and attention on the part of officers commanding regi- ments and brigades, and notices the superior regularity, in some particulars, of the French army. The letter, altogether, is of the most severe and unsparing character, aud produced a powerful eflfect. CHARGES MADE ON LORD WELLINGTON. 27.> i less struggle, — with lavishing the best blood of chap. x. England in defence of a people whose zeal and ^^^^ patriotism, if such ever existed, were long proved to have subsided into sluggish and imperturbable inertion. The events of the campaign were de- clared to have spread dejection throughout Spain, and renewed the confidence of her invaders. All hopes had been disappointed,— the allied army had been forced again to abandon the Spanish territory, — and the very name of Englishmen had become hateful to the people. The clever sophistry, it was said, by which the nation had been so long deluded into the belief that we were contending for the independence of Bri- tain and Spain, amid the mountains of the Pe- ninsula, was at length powerless. Thenceforth it must be manifest to all, that the war was solely continued because a powerful faction were benefited by the expenditure it occasioned. By such base and contemptible clamour it was little probable that Lord Wellington would be moved. No man ever sacrificed less to the ac- quisition of mere temporary and vulgar popula- rity ; none has ever done more to secure the lasting gratitude of his country. He knew that the campaign, which had thus exposed him to 276 OBSERVATIONS. 1812. CHAP. X. contumely and abuse, had shed fresh and unfading lustre on the British arms. It had been mark- ed by three signal triumphs; the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, of Badajos, and by the victory of Salamanca. These had been achieved at a time when the military power of the Spanish was at the lowest ebb. With an army whose ef- fective force did not certainly exceed sixty thou- sand men, he had traversed the interior of Spain — defeated a powerful army — occupied the capi- tal — liberated the southern provinces, — and, by a series of nicely calculated manoeuvres, baffled the pursuit of an enemy overpowering! y superior. At the very period when all this had been effected, the enemy had a force of two hundred thousand men in the Peninsula, commanded by leaders of high name and pretension, and whose fame had become familiar to all Europe. That the consequences of the victory of Sala- manca were less brilliant than might have been anticipated from its decisive character, is attri- butable to causes over which Lord Wellington could exercise no control. He was entitled, nay instructed, to calculate on the co-operation of a strong force in the eastern provinces. He was entitled to calculate on good service froxa OBSERVATIONS. 277 1812. the armies of O'Donnel and Ballasteros. He chap. x. was entitled likewise to expect, that the patriot- ism of the Spaniards would have taken advan- tage of the liberation of the capital to burst the cearments of its sepulchre, and come forth in re- novated strength. In all these — not vain but reasonable calcula- tions, he was deceived. By the bungling of the Ministry, the force from Sicily was delayed till too late, and was most beggarly in amount. The army of O'Donnel was defeated a few days before its arrival. Ballasteros refused to co-operate with the allied army, and did nothing. In spite of the victory of Salamanca, and the expulsion of the intrusive monarch from the capital, the tree of Spanish patriotism put forth no blossom. What, then, was to be done ? The course pursued by Lord Wellington, in the circumstances of diffi- culty by which he was surrounded, has been ve- hemently censured ; yet there existed no other to which objections of equal magnitude did not ap- ply. One great object — the liberation of the southern provinces — was at least secured by it. The failure before Burgos was unfortunate ; but nothing could exceed the skill of the manoeuvres by which it was followed, and never was a re- I 278 OBSERVATIONS. RELATIVE STATE OF THE BELLIGERENTS. 279 1812. CHAP. X. treat more imposing than that of Lord Welling- ton in face of the combined French armies. It may be fearlessly asserted, that no man of com- petent judgment can read the details of this most splendid campaign, without perceiving, that in tactic and combination Lord Wellington proved himself throughout superior to his opponents. While he repeatedly belied their calculations, in no one instance was he taken at a disadvantage, or involved in diflBculties, which he was unpre- pared to encounter and surmount. A general of less nerve would probably have fought a battle to escape the clamour by which he must have known he would be assailed in consequence of the reverse at Burgos. But Lord Wellington was not thus to be moved. He knew that the cause of his country and her allies would more effectually be promoted by a dif- ferent policy ; and in spite of every personal motive, he avoided battle, and continued his re- treat to the frontier of Portugal. In truth, if there is any one quality in Lord Wellington which demands our paramount admiration, it is the self-command with which, under every temp- tation, he kept the natural boldness of his cha- racter in strict subordination to the dictates of the coolest prudence. 1813. CHAPTER XL ADVANCE OF LORD WELLINGTON— BATTLE OF VITTORIA. Judging from the past events of the war, it chap. xi. has been maintained by many, that had Napo- leon remained at peace with the other nations of Europe, the complete subjugation of the Penin- sula must at length have been effected. Such an inference we hold to be unfounded. The whole Peninsula had long been unable to support either the armies of its invaders or its defenders. Agriculture had almost wholly ceased, in provinces subjected to perpetual in- roads, in which marauders continually destroyed the labours of the peasant. The cattle were driven into defiles amid the mountains, and a great portion of the population was converted into bodies of armed herdsmen, the more active and enterprising of which kept up a war of ex- 280 CHARACTER OF THE WAR. EVENTS IN THE NORTH OF EUROPE. 281 1813. %Jf CHAP. XI. termination on the enemy. They harassed his march, intercepted his foragers, and plundered his convoys. It was necessary, therefore, from the first, for the French to employ numerous armies in Spain ; to maintain a strong yet extend- ed line through the whole country ; and, above all, to preserve unbroken the communication with Bayonne. While they were able to do so, the vic« tories achieved by Lord Wellington appeared, from their want of subsequent advantages, as so much waste of blood. The warmest partisans of the cause became, in some degree, disheartened, by that continued alternation of victory and re- treat which had marked the arms of the allies ; and, to a superficial observer, it might have seem- ed that little progress had been made by the lavish expenditure of British blood and treasure, towards the attainment of the first great object of the war — the liberation of the Peninsula. But the extreme difi^usion of force thus neces- sary to the invaders, was pregnant with all the elements of defeat. Every additional province overrun by their arms, was in itself a cause of weakness. While they occupied the south, the north was still in arms : while pursuing their vic- tories in the east, they were defeated in the west. Present everywhere, they were nowhere strong c hap, xi . enough to put down resistance, and the greatest jgj^^ achievements of their arms were in general only followed by the farther extension of a vulnerable front. But, independently of other causes, nothing could be more certain, than that the increasing deficiency of the means of sustenance, would ul- timately of itself have compelled the French to diminish their forces, and narrow their schemes of conquest. The British army, secure of its supplies, though at an enormous expense, by the ports of Lisbon and Oporto, were better able than their opponents to support a war of depri- vation. Lord Wellington, therefore, had only to maintain his footing in the Peninsula, to feel se- cure that the hour would at length come when the contest would be maintained on equal terms, and be might enter on a wider and more bril- liant course of achievement. The period thus warmly anticipated at length came. It was accelerated not created by the events in the north of Europe. These are well known. By the destruction of his army in the Russian campaign, the throne of Napoleon had been shaken to its base, and it became at length i fM \ ft ' I 282 DEFEAT OF NAPOLEON IN RUSSIA. MILITARY OCCURRENCES IN SPAIN. 283 1813. CHAP. XI. apparent that the hour of deliverance for the nations of the Peninsula was at hand. At all events an important change had been wrought in the relative position of the belligerents. Hither- to the losses of the French armies had been re- placed by a large and almost constant inHux of reinforcements. In this mighty power of re- storation consisted the great and prominent ad- vantage which the enemy till now had possessed over Lord Wellington. While the whole means of England were unequal to repair the loss whicli might have flowed from one disastrous battle, the French leaders acted throughout with the conviction that no misfortune was irreparable. In opposing the British, therefore, it was their policy to dare every thing, conscious that in every struggle where the loss of combatants was equal, the game was in their favour. But times were now changed. The necessities of Napo- leon had compelled him to withdraw nearly twenty thousand men from the force in the Pen- insula ; and the movements of the enemy gave indication of an intention to abandon the whole south and centre of the kingdom. During the long interval in which the allied army remained in Cantonments, no hostile movement of importance took place. In No- chap, xi. vember, Longa, the celebrated partisan, sue- ^gjg ceeded in surprising a body of tbe enemy under General Fremant, who were posted in the town and valley of Sedano, near Burgos. He defeat- ed them with the loss of seven hundred in killed and wounded, five hundred prisoners, two guns, and the whole of their baggage, plunder, and provisions. In the month of February, General Foy F.bruanr. advanced from Salamanca, with a considerable force, in hope of surprising the town of Bejar. The garrison, however, were prepared; and when General Foy attempted to effect an en- trance by the gates of the town, his troops en- countered a spirited repulse. In the meanwhile every effort was made to repair the losses which the army had suffered during the late active campaign, and to restore the troops to that vigour and discipline which the sufferings of the retreat from Burgos had materially impaired. During the winter, large reinforcements and supplies of every kind were received from England. Several regiments of cavalry arrived ; others were remounted ; and every corps and department in the army was 15 284 PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 1813. ^( CHAP^. brought into a state of complete efficiency for active service. In the late campaigns the health of the troops had been found to suffer so severely from want of cover, that it was deemed advisable to re- medy this evil by providing tents for the sol- diers. A pontoon train was likewise fitted out, an adjunct of the highest utility and importance in a country so intersected by rivers as that which was about to become the theatre of opera- tions. While the army remained in cantonments, Lord Wellington, who had at length been ap- pointed to the chief command of the Spanish forces, repaired to Cadiz and Lisbon, to concert measures with the authorities. In a conference with the Spanish Regency, it was arranged that a force of fifty thousand native troops should be placed at his disposal, and an order was issued, for a portion of the general staff to remain at head-quarters, to serve as a channel of commu- nication with the Spanish leaders. Having com- pleted these preliminaries on the eleventh of May, Lord Wellington returned to Frenada, and preparations were immediately made for the advance of the army. i POSITION OP THE ARMIES. 2^ 1813. It has been already stated, that the allied chap. xi. forces were distributed in a very extensive line. Sir Rowland Hill, with the second division, and a body of Spaniards under General Morillo, was in Estramadura, and the remainder of the British and Portuguese occupied cantonments, extend- ing along the northern frontier of Portugal to Lamego. The Duke del Parque, commanded an army in La Manclia, and the force of Gener- al Elio, was stationed on the frontiers of Murcia and Valencia. The recent levies in Andalusia were intended to act as an army of reserve, and placed under the command of O'Donnel. The army of Gallicia, was commanded by Castanos, and occupied the frontier of that province. The Spanish armies were generally in a state of the most miserable equipment and discipline ; but the chief obstacle to their efficiency, lay in the petty jealousies of the secondary leaders, wh0| considering the assumption of the chief command by a foreigner, as involving a national degradation, did much to paralyse the zeal and valour of their solders, and frustrate the skilful combinations of the campaign. Something, how- ever, had been achieved. The government had at length adopted a wiser and more reasonable < h 286 FRENCH FORCE IN SPAIN. THE ALLIED ARMY ADVANCES. 287 1813. CHAP. XI. policy, and Lord Wellington received assurances that a great and determined eflFort would be made throughout the whole Peninsula, in the approaching campaign. Notwithstanding, Soult, with a considerable body of troops, had been called to Germany, there were still about one hundred and sixty thousand French in Spain ; but of these, a large proportion was dispersed in garrisons ; and the force under Suchet in the eastern provinces, may be calculated at thirty-five thousand. The armies of Portugal, the centre, and the south, under com- mand of Joseph, amounting collectively to about seventy thousand men, were spread through Castile and Leon, with the general head-quarters at Madrid. The army of Portugal, under the im- mediate command of General Reille, had its head-quarters at Valladolid. That of the centre, under Drouet, was distributed around the capi- tal ; and the head-quarters of the southern army were in Toledo. Arragon and Biscay were also occupied by independent divisions, under command of Generals Clausel and Foy. The position of the allies thus formed an ex- tensive semicircle round that occupied by the enemy, and the latter perhaps conceived that by the rapid movement of their concentrated forces, chap. xi. they would be enabled for a time, at least, to ^^^^ baffle the manoeuvres of an enemy acting on a line so extended. It was evident, however, from the preparatory arrangements of the ene- my during the past winter, that his views were chiefly directed to the defence of the Douro. The ground on the northern bank of that river, naturally strong, had been fortified at every as- sailable point by works and retrenchments ; and with such advantages of position, with a deep and rapid river covering its front, little doubt was entertained that an insuperable barrier would be opposed to the progress of the allied army. Preparations being at length completed for the commencement of operations, the army was put in motion on the sixteenth of May, in three bodies. Five divisions, with a large force of ca- valry, under Sir Thomas Graham, who had re- sumed his station as second in command, crossed the Douro, by means of boats provided for that purpose at Lamego, at Torremoncorvo, and St. Joao de Pesqueira, with orders to move through the province of Tras Os Montes, on Braganza, 2 May. If i 288 THE ENEMY DRIVEN PROM SALAMANCA, THE ALLIED ARMY CROSSES THE DOURO. 289 1813. Maj. CHAP. XI. and Zamora, and effect a junction with the re- mainder of the array near Valladolid. Lord Wellington in person, with the light di- vision, a brigade of cavalry, and a corps of Span- iards, moved forward on Salamanca by the di- rect route ; and Sir Rowland Hill, on the right, with the troops from Estramadura, was directed to advance on the same point by Alba de Tormes. By this grand and comprehensive movement, the enemy's position on the Douro was turned, as well as that of their whole forces on the south of the river. The movements of the right and centre were executed with such rapidity, that the officer commanding at Salamanca had barely time to abandon the town when it was entered by the British cavalry under General Fane, who pur- sued his rear-guard with great effect, and cap- tured about two hundred prisoners, and some guns. Lord Wellington then placed the divi- sions of the right and centre in cantonments be- tween the Tormes and the Douro, and, passing May 31. the river on the thirty-first, he joined the corps of General Graham. This portion of the army had encountered se- 1813. May. rious difficulties from the impracticable character chap. xi. of the country through which its march lay. The roads were miserable, intersected at nume- rous points by rivers and ravines, and leading over steep mountains^ up which the horses were unable to drag the artillery. By great exertion, however, these obstacles were overcome ; the corps reached its point of destination on the ap- pointed day, and took up a position, with the left resting on Tabara, in communication with the Gallician army. The enemy were utterly unprepared for this movement of Lord Wellington. Their attention had hitherto been directed to the front of the po- sition, and the possibility of the allied army ef- fecting the passage of the Douro within the Por- tuguese frontier had never been contemplated. The corps of General Graham reached the Esla, therefore, without encountering an enemy, and a party posted to guard the fords of that river near Losilla, hastily retired on their approach. On the thirtieth the fords were reconnoitred. May 30. but being found too deep, a bridge of pon- toons was laid down for the passage of the troops ; and, on the first of June, General J«a. 1. Graham encamped in the neighbourhood of VOL. III. N ■Airiiillii 290 JOSEPH ABANDONS MADRID, AND JOINS THE ARMY ON THE DOURO. 291 1813. June. CHAP. XI. Zamora, the French falling back on his ap- proach. On the day following, the enemy continued their retreat, having previously destroyed the bridges at Toro and Zamora. A brilliant affair took place with the cavalry. The hussar bri- gade coming up with the enemy's rear-guard near Morales^ gallantly charged and overthrew it ; and, continuing the pursuit for several miles, made two hundred prisoners. On the same Jan. 2. evening, Don Julian Sanchez^ with his Gueril- las, surprised and captured a French cavalry pi- quet at Castronuno. On the third, the corps of General Hill having crossed at Toro, the whole army directed its march on Valladolid. In the meanwhile, the rapid advance of the allies had placed the army at Madrid in a situa- tion of immediate peril. By remaining there, it must have been cut off from the army in the north, and from its line of communication with France. Joseph, therefore, immediately abandon- ed the capital, and crossing at Puente de Douro, succeeded in effecting a junction with the army of Portugal. The French armies, thus united, continued their retreat. On the seventh, the allies crossed the Carrion at Palencia, and on Jan. 7« the following days occupied both banks of the chap. xr. Pisuerga, the French retiring on Burgos, with- ^gjg out any effort to defend the passage of the June, river. The whole forces of the enemy were now con- centrated at Burgos ; and as this fortress form- ed the key of the north of Spain, and the last before reaching the Ebro, it was anticipated that here the decisive stand would have been made. Lord Wellington, therefore, to give time for the coming up of his rear, and to recruit the troops exhausted by the rapidity of the marches, made short movements during the eleventh, and on Jin. 11. the twelfth remained stationary with his left. In order to ascertain the enemy's intentions, however, and force him to some decisive mea- sure, he made a strong reconnoissance with the right, under Sir Rowland Hill, and, by a flank movement, dislodged a considerable force, un- der General Reille, from an advantageous posi- tion above the village of Hormaza. Though vi- gorously pressed by the cavalry, the enemy re- tired in the finest order, and succeeded in cross- ing the Urbal and Arlanzon with little loss. During the night, the whole French army aban- doned Burgos, having destroyed, as far as pos- 1 f 292 THE ALLIES CROSS THE EBRO. 1813. June. CHAP. XT. sible, the defences of the castle, and retreated towards the Ebro by Briviesca. Thus far the campaign had been one of sig- nal, though bloodless triumph. The next great object of Lord Wellington was to effect the pas- sage of the Ebro, which the enemy had made every preparation to defend. They had gar- risoned the strong fortress of Pancorvo; and the attempt to cross a river so considerable, in face of the combined forces of the enemy, must have led to an engagement under circumstances of the greatest disadvantage. Instead of continu- ing the pursuit, therefore, along the main road. Lord Wellington had again recourse to the ma- noeuvre which had been so successful on the Douro. He moved the army to its left by the road to St. Andero, and then traversing a coun- try of such difficulty as to have been hitherto deemed impracticable for carriages, crossed the Ebro, near its source, at San Martino and Puente de Arenas. For such a measure the enemy was utter, ly unprepared, and no precaution had been taken to occupy the strong natural defences which that portion of the Ebro afforded. From Puente de Arenas, the road, for nearly three THE FRENCH RETREAT ON VITTORIA. 293 1813. June. miles, runs along the left bank of the river, and chap, xi, is flanked by a ridge of rugged and precipitous mountains^ in many places inaccessible. In some parts the road has been hewn through the solid rock; and at one point in particular, the rock not only projects over the road, but juts out up- on the Ebro. The whole country, on either bank of the Ebro, above Miranda is eminently defensible. Having passed the river, the march of the army often lay through passes and defiles, which a thousand men might have successfully maintained against twenty times their number. Through such a country did the allied army pursue its march on Vittoria, without obstruc- tion from the enemy. On the eighteenth the Jun. 18. light division came in contact with two brigades of French infantry, on the march from Frias to Vittoria, which they attacked and defeated with the loss of three hundred men. At Osma a strong corps of the enemy, which had been as- sembled in great haste at Espejo, made a spirit- ed attack on the first and fifth divisions under Sir Thomas Graham. Though superior in num- bers the French were repulsed and pursued to Espejo. From thence they continued their re- treat unmolested to Subijana on the Bayas. h » 294 AFFAIR ON THE BAYAS. FRENCH POSITION AT VITTORIA. 295 1813. June. ) CHAP. XI. On the nineteenth the enemy's rear-guard were found strongly posted on the left of the Bayas, their right covered by Subijana, their left by the heights in front of Pobes. Lord Welling- ton directed the light division to turn the left of the position, while Sir Lowry Cole attacked it in front ; and the rear-guard was thus driven back on the main body of the army, then in full march on Vittoria. The moment had at length come when the enemy, whose whole movements since the com- mencement of the campaign had been those of retreat, was compelled to make a final and deci- sive stand on the Spanish territory, or suifer himself ingloriously to be driven headlong on the Pyrenees. Joseph decided on the former ; Jun. 19. and on the night of the nineteenth concentrated his forces in position in front of Vittoria, which the French had made their central depot in the Jun. 20. frontier provinces. During the twentieth Lord Wellington collected his divisions, on the Bayas, which had been scattered in the hasty march a- cross a rugged and difficult country ; and hav- ing made a close reconnoissance of the position of the French army, determined on the follow- ing morning to attack it. I Vittoria, the chief town of Alava, one of the chap. XI. Biscayan provinces, stands behind the little river ^^IS, Zadorra, in a plain about two leagues in extent, j^^ bounded on one side by a part of the Pyrenean chain, and on the other by a range of bold heights of smaller altitude. The ground around Vit- toria is marked by considerable inequalities of surface, of which the enemy did not fail to take advantage. At the period in question it was for the most part covered with ripening com, which gave concealment to the light troops, and some- times even to the movements of whole battal- ions during the engagement. The French army was posted as follows. The right extended northward from Vittoria across the Zadorra, and rested on some heights a- bove the villages of Abechuco and Gamarra Major, covered by formidable field-works. Be- tween the centre and right was a thick wood, into which were thrown several battalions of infantry. The right of the centre occupied a strong height commanding the valley of the Za- dorra. It was covered with infantry, flanked and otherwise defended by one hundred pieces of cannon. The advanced posts of the centre lined the banks of the Zadorra, the bridges over \ 296 FRENCH POSITION AT VITTORIA. I I CHAP. XI. which were fortified. The left and left centre 2g23 crowned the high ridge above the village of June. Subijana de Alava, with a reserve posted at the village of Gomecha, and a corps thrown out to occupy the bold mountains above Puebla^ to j»rotect the centre, which might otherwise have been turned by the main road where it crosses the Zadorra. Thus posted, the French army covered each of the three great roads which concentrate at Vit- toria, in the great road to Bayonne. That of Logrono by its left, that of Madrid by its centre, and that of Bilboa by its right. It was commanded by Joseph in person, hav- ing Marshal Jourdan as Major-General. In point of numbers there existed little disparity on either side ; it having been found necessary, before passing the Ebro, to detach General Foy with twelve thousand men towards Bilboa, to procure subsistence for the army, and keep in check the powerful Guerilla bands which haunt- ed the neighbourhood; and General Clausel, with a corps of fifteen thousand, was at Logrono. Lord Wellington likewise had found it necessary to employ the sixth division, under General Pak- enham, in guarding the line of supply. The DISPOSITION OF THE ALLIED ARMY. 297 f amount of combatants on either side, therefore, chap. xi. may be fairly calculated at from seventy to "J^^ seventy-five thousand men. ju^p. At daylight on the morning of the twenty- first June, Lord WeUington put his army in mo- tion, in three great divisions. That on the right Jun. 21. under Sir Rowland Hill, consisting of the second British division, the Portuguese division of the Conde de Amarante, and Morillo's corps of Spaniards, was destined to commence the action, by attacking the enemy's left on the mountains behind Subijana. The left column, commanded by Sir Thomas Graham, composed of the first and fifth divisions, two brigades of cavalry, and the Spanish division of Longa, was directed by a wide movement to turn the enemy's right, and crossing the Zador- ra, to cut off his retreat by the road to Bayonne. The centre corps, consisting of the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions, in two columns, was ordered to wait till both or one of the flank co- lumns should have crossed the Zadorra, and then to make a powerful attack on the French centre. The Spanish troops under General IMorillo commenced the action by an attack on the ene- my's corps, posted above Puebla, supported by n2 298 BATTLE OP VITTORIA. BATTLE OP VITTORIA. 299 18J3. June. 1| CHAP^i. the light companies of the second division and the seventy-first regiment, under the Honourable- Colonel Cadogan. After a severe struggle, in which that most promising and gallant officer was mortally wounded, the enemy were driven from the heights at the point of the bayonet. Strong reinforcements were then brought up by the enemy, and the contest was renewed, and continued for some time with great obstinacy on both sides. Sir Rowland Hill, however, having detached an additional force to support the troops already engaged, the French at length gave way, and yielded undisputed possession of the heights. Thus far successful, Sir Rowland HiU cross- ed the Zadorra, and directed two brigades of the second division to attack the heights of Subijana de Alava. Here the contest was se- vere. The troops advanced under a heavy fire of artillery, and succeeded in dislodging the ene- my, and driving them back on their reserve. The heights thus gallantly carried, however, were too important to be resigned, while a chance of regaining them remained. Fresh columns of attack were formed, and repeated ef- forts were made by the enemy to recover their I I , 1813. June. ground, but without success. At length Joseph, chap, x l alarmed at these repeated failures, and the threat- ening attitude assumed by Sir Rowland Hill, withdrew his advanced posts from the Zadorra, and directed the left to fall back for the defence of Vittoria. In the meantime. General Cole, with the fourth and light divisions, had passed the Zadorra at the bridges of Nanclares and Tres Puentes; and the third and seventh divisions, crossing by the bridge on the Mendonza road, both columns advanced against the heights in the centre. At the same time, Sir Rowland Hill moved forward from Subijana de Alava, and vigorously followed up the left wing in its re- treating movement. Though the enemy bad been forced to with- draw his left, the centre still stood firm, and re- ceived the columns, advancing from the Zadorra, with a fire so destructive, as for a time to check their progress. Two brigades of horse-artillery were then moved forward to the front ; and, thus supported, the centre columns continued their advance in fine order. Notwithstanding the difficulties of the ground, the division of Sir Thomas Picton first came in contact with a 300 BATTLE OP VITTORIA. BATTLE OF VITTORIA. 301 1813. June. CHAP^. gtrong body of the enemy, whom, by a spirit- ed attack, he drove into immediate retreat, with the loss of twenty-eight pieces of artil- lery. On the approach of the fourth and light divisions, the whole heights were abandoned, and the French retired in admirable order on Vittoria, taking advantage of every favourable position to turn on their pursuers. In the meanwhile. Sir Thomas Graham, with the left column, which on the evening before had been moved to Margina, was advancing by the high road from Bilboa to Vittoria. About ten o'clock, he approached the enemy's right, posted on the heights commanding the village of Abe- chuco. From these he immediately dislodged them, by attacks both in front and flank. Having gained possession of the heights. Sir Thomas Graham directed General Oswald's di- vision to advance against the village of Gamarra Major, which the enemy occupied in great force, while, with the first division, he attacked the village of Abechuco. Gamarra Major was car- ried in the most gallant style by the brigade of General Robinson, which advanced in columns of battalion, under a heavy fire of artillery and musquetry, without firing a shot, and drove out 1813. Juae. the enemy at the point of the bayonet, with chap. xi. great slaughter, and the loss of three guns. The attack on Abechuco was no less success- ful. Under cover of the fire of two brigades of horse-artillery, Colonel Halket's brigade of the German legion advanced to the attack, and drove the enemy from the village, with the loss of three g^ns and a howitzer, captured by the light bat- talion in a very gallant charge. The village of Gamarra Menor was likewise carried by the Spaniards under Longa, after a trifling resistance. During the operations at Abechuco, the ene- my made the greatest efforts to re-establish themselves in Gamarra Major. A strong body advanced to regain the village, but were driven back in confusion by General Hay's brigade. In spite of this failure, another attempt was subse- quently made ; but Sir Thomas Graham having caused the houses in front of the bridge to be loopholed, and placed his artillery in position to flank the approach^ the enemy were again re- pulsed, and did not afterwards venture to renew the attack. Notwithstanding these successes, it was found impossible to cross the bridges, the heights on the left of the Zadorra being occupied by a A. ^-*^ 302 BATTLE OP VITTORIA. BATTLE OP VITTORIA. 303 1813. June. CHAP. XI. Strong refierve; and General Graham awaited the moment when the attacks on the enemy's left and centre should occasion the withdrawal of the corps in his front. This at length came. Towards evening, when the centre of the allies had penetrated beyond Vittoria, the right wing of the enemy, fearing to be cot o£F, retired hastily from its position. Sir Thomas Graham immediately pushed forward across the Zador- ra, and took possession of the road to Bay- onne, which, for some distance, runs along the margin of the river. Great confusion ensued. The baggage, heavy artillery, military chest, and court equipages of Joseph, had already been put in motion by that road, and were now intercepted. The enemy's columns, which were also retreating on Bayonne, were forced back into the Pampluna road ; and in a moment the French army became a vast mob, without or- ganization of any sort, and divested of every at- tribute of a military body. Never had any vic- tory achieved by the enemy over the rude and undisciplined Spanish levies been more com- plete ; never was any army reduced to a more absolute and total wreck than that which now fled from the field of Vittoria. 1813. June. The allies pressed forward, allowing not a chap. xi. moment of respite in which order might be re- stored, and adding to the amount of their cap- tures at almost every step. Unfortunately the country was too much intersected by ditches to admit of the action of cavalry ; and it was im- possible for infantry advancing in military order to come up with an enemy who trusted solely for safety to rapidity of flight. The amount of prisoners, therefore, was comparatively small, though the pursuit was kept up with unre- lenting activity, till the approach of night, when the extraordinary fatigue of the troops occa- sioned it to be discontinued. Joseph — whom from this period it would be a mere mockery to designate as King — fled to- wards Pampluna, and owed his safety to the swiftness of his horse. The tenth hussars enter- ed Vittoria at full gallop the moment after his car- riage had left it. Captain Wyndham, with one squadron, pursued, and fired into the carriage; and Joseph had barely time to throw himself on his horse, and escape under the protection of an escort of dragoons. The immediate results of the battle were the capture of one hundred and fifty-one guns, and 304 RESULTS OP THB BATTLE. 1813. June. CHAP. XI. four hundred and fifteen caissons, with upwards of fourteen thousand rounds of ammunition, near- ly two millions of musquet cartridges, forty thousand pounds of gunpowder, the military chest, and the whole baggage of the army, in- cluding the baton of Marshal Jourdan. Several carriages with ladies, among whom was the Countess de Gazan, likewise remained as trophies in the power of the victors. Many other fe- males of rank, whose husbands were attached to the Court at Madrid, sought safety by mingling in the confused melee of fugitives. Being utter- ly unprepared for such a disaster, their suffer- ings were extreme during the retreat to the Pyrenees ; and many are stated to have crossed the frontier barefooted, and in a state of the most pitiable privation. Though the defeat of the enemy was thus ac- companied by every conceivable concomitant of disgrace, the loss of combatants on both sides was unusually small. The amount of killed and wounded, on the part of the allies, was un- der five thousand. That of the enemy is rated, by their own writers, so low as six thousand^ but was unquestionably greater. The num- ber of prisoners made by the allies, from the RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. 305 causes already mentioned, did not exceed one chap. xi. thousand. Of the two guns which the enemy ^g^^. succeeded in carrying off, only one reached Pam- j„ne. pluna, the other being taken on the following day.* • It is a coincidence worthy of remark, that the battle of Vit- tom was fought nearly on the same spot with another, in which a victory obtained by the English restored a legitimate Sove- reign to the throne of Spain. Within sight of the enemy's posi- tions on the twenty-first of June, and only a few miles higher up the same stream, the Zadorra, stands the vUlage of Nava- rette, where, on the third of Apiil, 1367, Edward the Black Prince, totally defeated Henry the Bastard, and, in consequence, seated Don Pedro on the Throne of Castile. Froissart, who gives a lively description of this engagement, ob- serves of Sir John fhandos, the most eminent among the English knighte, that *' he never thought during the day of making any prisoners ; but was solely occupied in fighting and pushing for- ward." The most striking passage, however, in his account, is that in which he describes the approach of the two armies to- wards each other, when, a little before they met, the Prince of Wales, with eyes and hands uplifted towards Heaven, exclaimed — " God of Truth, the Father of Jesus Christ, who has made and fashioned me, grant through thy benign grace, that the success of this battle may be for me and my army ; for thou knowest, that in truth I have been solely emboldened to undertake it, in the support of justice and reason, to reinstate this King upon his throne, who has been disinherited and driven from it, as well as from his country." This zealous prayer was immediately follow- ed by the onset, the Prince crying aloud, " Advance, banners, in the name of God, and St. George." " At the commencement," ssys the old historian, "the French and Arragonese made a des- perate resistance, and gave the good knights of England much trouble ;" but at last, " when all the divisions of the Prince were formed into one krge body," the enemy « could no longer »^».0^Aitmmm 506 OBSERVATIONS. cH^r The whole of Lord Wellington's n,an in retiring from the Ebro, having left a garrison in the castle of Pancorvo, Lord Wellington directed the Conde de Bisbal, with the Spanish reserve, to reduce it On the twen- ty-eighth, the town and lower fort were carried by assault ; and, on the first of July, the castle 1813. JuW. surrendered by capitulation. The garrison, con- chap. xi. sisting of six hundred and fifty men, were made prisoners. Whilst these operations proceeded on the left, the remainder of the army was no less actively employed. On reaching Pampluna, Joseph with- drew his wings from the Spanish territory, leav- ing three divisions of the centre, under Gazan, in the valley of El Bustan. Lord Wellington, en- tertaining somc^ig&spicion that they intended to fortify a position in that fertile and defensible country, directed Sir Rowland Hill, with three brigades of the second division, and one brigade of Portuguese, to approach the enemy by the pass of Lanz ; and Lord Dalhousie, with the se- venth division, to menace their right by a move- ment on San Estevan. These manoeuvres were completely successful. By a series of brilliant attacks, the enemy were successively driven from every post, and forced to seek safety in a rapid retreat across the Pyrenees. In the meanwhile, the third, fourth, and light divisions, with two brigades of cavalry, marched in pursuit of General Clausel, who, ignorant of the battle, advanced to Vittoria on the day fol- lowing. Finding it occupied by General Paken- VOL. III. o Jul. 7. I ' '' / I : I V 314 MOVEMENTS AGAINST CLAU8EL. 1813. July. n\ ^1 Jul. 1. CHAP. XI. ham's division, he instantly retreated on Lo- grono, where he remained several days, and Lord Wellington conceiving it possible to inter- cept his retreat, moved a large force towards Tu- dela, while another advanced on Logrono. Clau- »el, however, receiving intelligence of the ap- proach of the allies, and discovering that the direct road to France was barred against him, fell back on Zaragoza by forced marches, pursued and harassed by a strong Guerilla body under Mina. Having reached that city, he continued his re- treat on the pass of Jaca, where he entered France, with the loss of his artillery, and about three hundred prisoners, captured by the inde- fatigable Mina. With the exception of the garrisons of Pamp- luna and St. Sebastian, the whole army of Jo- seph had now retreated into France ; and pre- parations were immediately made for the reduc- tion of these last strongholds of the enemy. As Pampluna was generally believed to be ill pro- vided with provisions, it was placed under block- ade by a corps of Spaniards, and encircled by a strong line of entrenchments to preveilt the es- cape ot the garrison. St. Sebastian was imme- diately invested ; and Sir Thomas Graham, with HONOURS CONFERRED ON LORD WELLINGTON. 315 the first and fifth divisions, directed to prose- chap. xi. cute the siege. Intelligence of these events was received in ^^^^* England with unequalled joy and exultation. The Marquis Wellington was raised from the rank of Lieutenant-General to that of Field Marshal, and received the thanks of both Houses o£ Parliament. Illuminations and rejoicings took place in all the principal cities, and the measure of the national gratitude was filled to the brim. Nor were the Government of Spain back- ward in testifying their deep sense of the emi- nent services of Lord Wellington. By a decree of the Cortes, he was created Duke of Vittoria ; and a grant, in perpetuity, of the Lordship of Soto de Romano, in the kingdom of Granada, was annexed to the title. 1^ t fl Sl(> MOVEMENTS IN VALENCIA- THE ALLIES ADVANCE TO CASTALLA. 317 1813. CHAPTER XIL OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES, CHAP.xii. While in the north-west of Spain the cause of liberty and justice had gone forward, pros- pering and to prosper, the eastern provinces had become the scene of events of a very different character. During the preceding winter, a con- siderable reinforcement, under Major-General Campbell, arrived at Alicante from Sicily, and a body of native troops had been organized in the Balearic islands, under British officers. No movement, however, took place till the begin- ning of April, when Sir John Murray having as- sumed the command, the Anglo-Sicilian army, amounting to about sixteen thousand men, ad- vanced to Biar and Castalla. General Elio, who, with a corps of twelve thousand men, oc- cupied the frontiers of Murcia, also advanced to chap.xil Yecla and Villena. 1813 On learning this combined movement, Suchet . . ' collected his whole disposable force ; and on the morning of the eleventh. General Harispe sue- Apr. 11. ceeded in surprising the Spanish division in Yecla, about fifteen hundred of which were kil- led or made prisoners. On the day following he Apr. 12. again attacked the Spaniards at Villena, from which the cavalry immediately retired, leaving in the castle a battalion, which, wanting means of subsistence and defence, capitulated next day. Suchet then advanced by the road to Castalla, leading through the pass of Biar, which was oc- cupied by the advance of Sir John Murray's ar- my, under Colonel Adam. The orders of that officer were to fall back on Castalla, but to dis- pute the passage with the enemy. After a con- test of several hours. Colonel Adam accordingly retired on the main body, with the loss of two mountain guns, which had been disabled in the action. On the following day, Suchet found the allied Apr. 12. army strongly posted, with its left on a range of heights in front of Castalla, and the right and ll "P IHU.J,. 318 AFFAIR OP CASTALLA. 1813. April. \i r j CHAP. XII. centre covered by a ravine. He immediately directed a strong column to attack the left of the position, at the same time threatening the right with his cavalry. The enemy's column, covered by their light infantry, ascended the heights with great gallantry, opposed only by the Span- ish brigade of General Whittingham, which, for nearly an hour, kept up a continued skirmish with the light troops. At length, when they had nearly reached the summit, the British troops opened fire with tremendous eflPect ; and charging with the bayonet, drove back the as- sailants with great precipitation on their main body in the plain. After this repulse, Suchet, unwilling to com- mit his army by a general engagement with the defile of Biar in rear, retreated on Fuente la Higuera ; and Sir John Murray, on the day fol- Apr. 13. lowing, moved by the direct route on San Fe- lippe, in hope of reaching that point before the defeated force. In this he was disappointed ; and retracing his steps, again established himself in the position at Castalla. The loss of the al- lies in these engagements, amounted to one hun- dred and forty-five killed, and somewhat more than five hundred in wounded and missing. 1813. Mav. SIR JOHN MURRAY EMBARKS FOR TARRAGONA. 319 That of the enemy is acknowledged by Marshal chap. xii. Suchet to have been very great. No consequences, however, flowed from the advantage gained at Castalla. The position of the enemy on the Xucar was too strong to ad- mit of a direct attack on its front; and the ar- mies remained inactive till the end of May. Sir John Murray then received instructions from Lord Wellington to embark his army for Cata- lonia, and, securing an establishment on the coast, to combine his operations with the Catalan leaders, and thus effect a diversion in favour of Valencia. Should Suchet, however, succeed in bringing up his troops in time to prevent the capture of a maritime fortress, his orders were instantly to re-embark and return to Valencia, to assist the Duke del Parque in driving the enemy from his line on the Xucar. On the thirty-first of May, therefore, the ar- my was embarked at Alicante on board of the English fleet on that station, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hallowell. Early on the third of June, the troops were landed near the point of Salon ; and in the course of the day Tarra- gona was reconnoitred and invested. A brigade under Colonel Prevost had pre- May 31. Jun. 3. 320 CAPTURE OP THE COL DE BALAGUER, SIEGE OF TARRAGONA. 321 1813. June. I cHAP.xii.viously been despatched to attack the Fort on the Col de Balaguer, which commands the only road practicable for artillery between Tor- tosa and Tarragona. This force was joined on the fifth by two Spanish battalions ; and on the seventh the Fort capitulated. The garrison, consisting of eighty men, were made prisoners of war. The strength of Tarragona had been materially diminished since the former siege. The French could not aiford a garrison sufficient for the de- fence of works so extensive, and the outer line had been dismantled. In order to delay the pro- gress of the besiegers, however. General Berto- letti, the governor, occupied the Fort Royal and the ruins of the Bastion San Carlos, which had been hastily repaired on the approach of the allied army. Though General Murray was yet in no state to enter seriously on the siege, two .batteries were opened on the morning of the sixth a- gainst the Fort Royal, and another on the se- venth. On the morning of the eighth, it was reported by Major Thackray, the commanding engineer, to be practicably breached. It was the request, howey^r* of that officer that the Jun. 8. 1813. June. fort should not be assaulted, as the immediate chap. xii. possession of it could be rendered available for no object, and to maintain it would necessarily be accompanied by considerable loss. General Murray, therefore, determined to delay the at- tack, and gave orders that the fire on the fort should continue only to prevent the restoration of its defences. The stores, and the artillery, and engineer horses, were at length landed ; and on the morning of the eleventh, fire was opened on Jun. 11. the body of the place from two heavy bat- teries, at a distance of four hundred and fifty yards. But time had been already given for the approach of Marshal Suchet, who, leaving the command of the troops, on the Xucar, to General Harispe, moved rapidly with the re- mainder of his army on Tortosa, where, learning the fall of the Col de Balaguer, he left his artil- lery, and continued his march, with a single di- vision, by paths through the mountains on his left towards Tarragona. In the meanwhile, orders had been sent to General Maurice Ma- thieu, to advance rapidly with his whole dis- posable force from Barcelona, to the relief of the place. o2 322 THE SIEOE IS RAISED ON THE APPROACH OP SUCHET. 323 1813. June. ■ t I I I? « CHAP. XII. On learning these movements, General Mur- ray decided on raising the siege ; and in the course of the twelfth of June, embarked his in- fantry, leaving nineteen pieces of artillery in the trenches, and a considerable quantity of stores. Against this sacrifice Admiral Hallowell vainly remonstrated, and urged his opinion that by de- laying the embarkation till night the guns might be brought off. But Sir John Murray, strongly impressed with the conviction that the force un- der his command, even when joined with the Spanish army of Copons, in the immediate neighbourhood, was unequal to contend with the enemy, adhered to his resolution. The ca- valry and field artillery were sent to the Coll de Balaguer, as affording a more favourable place for their embarkation. During the night of the twelfth. General Mur- ray received an express from the Col de Bala- guer, informing him that a large body of the enemy had passed towards Tarragona, and he proceeded to that fort on the following day. On Jun. 13. his arrival, he found that a skirmish had taken place between the out-piquets and the French cavalry, and that it was necessary to land inftin- try to protect the embarkation of the cavalry 1H13. June. lun. 17. and artillery. During the following day, hiscHAP.xir. whole force was disembarked, in the hope of being able to cut off a body of the enemy at Bandillos. This hope, however, proved vain ; and ou the seventeenth, Lord William Bentinck arrived to assume the command of the army, which he immediately re-embarked, and having destroyed the defences of the fort, returned to Alicante. Such was the miserable conclusion of these operations. In the course of the following year, the conduct of Sir John Murray became tlie subject of investigation before a military tribunal. By the decision of the court, he was acquitted of all intentional disobedience to his instructions ; but convicted of having '< unne- cessarily abandoned a considerable quantity of artillery and stores, which he might have em- barked in safety, such conduct being detri- mental to the service." As no evidence of un- worthy motive was adduced, the court attributed his conduct to an '^ error in judgment ;" and no- thing followed upon the decision, as the case did not appear to the Prince Regent to call for the admonition pointed out by the court. But the verdict of no tribunal could remove \, MiNiMtHMi rftfk 324 OBSERVATIONS. THE ARMY RETURNS TO ALICANTE. 325 CHAP. XII. from Sir John Murray the irapntation of grosf Igj2 incapacity. Entertaining the deliberate convic- tion that the force he commanded was utterly unequal to contend with that of Suchet, it might naturally be supposed that on learning the approach of that leader he would take in- stant measures for the security of his army. But Sir John Murray, influenced by some unknown and unintelligible motive, continued his opera- tions against the town, at a time when he must have known that its reduction was im- practicable. Instead of re-embarking the gung and stores already landed, we find him, during the whole of the tenth and eleventh, employed in landing more, and moving them to situations of greater danger and exposure. On the twelfth, however, a change came over the spirit of his dream. He then determined in- stantly to re-embark his troops ; the guns were left in the trenches without an effort to remove them, in spite of the arguments and entreaties of Admiral Hallowell, who stated his conviction, that, by the delay of a few hours, they might be brought off^. All this is very miserable ; yet we do not blame Sir John Murray. That he acted to the 1813. JuIt. Jul. o. best of his judgment, we are bound to believe : chap.xii. But what shall be said of those who, amid the multitude of accomplished officers presented to their choice, selected such a man for the com- mand of an army ? On reaching Alicante, Lord William Bentinck advanced to form a junction with the Duke del Parque, with the view of attacking the different French posts in Valencia. But intelligence of the battle of Vittoria no sooner reached Suchet than he determined on abandoning the province. On the fifth of July, he retired into Catalonia, leaving twelve thousand of his army to garrison the chief fortresses in his rear. Lord William Bentinck, leaving the blockade of the other strongholds to the Spaniards, en- tered Catalonia, and crossing the Ebro below juL 30. that city, immediately invested Tarragona by sea and land. On the third of August, the army was joined by the Duke del Parque ; and on the eleventh, by the Catalan force, under Aug. 11. General Sarsfield. It was then determined to land the ordnance and ammunition, and com- mence the works of the siege. Suchet, however, who had retired on Barcelo- na, aware that Tarragona, if left to itself, must i iwif tftoa 326 MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMIES. CHAP. XII. goon fall, determined to make a strong effort for ,Q,.^ its relief. Having formed a junction with De- Auffust. cften, and collected all the troops which could he spared from Barcelona and the neighbouring garrisons, he advanced with a force of twenty- five thousand men. A strong column attempted to proceed by the road along the coast, but driven from this route by the fire of the Bri- tish squadron, it struck into that leading by Brafin and the Col de St. Christina, while De- caen, crossing the Francoli, advanced from Vails. On the approach of Suchet, Lord William Ben- tinck took up a position in front of Tarrago- na, with the intention of giving battle; but subsequently judging from an affair of out- posts, that the enemy were too strong, fell back during the night to Cambrils, and gave up Tar- ragona. In the circumstances of the French army, however, Suchet did not think it prudent to retain possession of Tarragona, but destroying the works he withdrew the garrison, and fell back behind the Llobregat. In this position he maintained his communication with Lerida, and covered Barcelona and the road to France. In the beginning of September, Lord William AFFAIR OF ORDAL. 327 Bentinck being informed that a considerable por- chap. xii. tion of the French forces in Catalonia had been withdrawn, moved forward to Villa Franca. An 1813. September. advanced corps, under Colonel Adam, consisting of a British, a Calabrian, and three Spanish bat- talions, with four mountain guns, was posted con- siderably in Jidvance at Ordal, a position of great strength, which commanded the high road from Barcelona. Though Lord William Bentinck was aware that Suchet had already assembled a large force at Molino del Rey, he considered the advance at Ordal to be secure, and antici- pated that the enemy would attempt to dislodge him from his position by a movement in flank. In this calculation he was deceived. At mid- night of the twelfth, the piquets of the advanced Sep. 12. corps were suddenly driven in, and the French came on in great force. The allies, though taken by surprise, and attacked by overwhelming num- bers, made vigorous resistance, and twice re- pulsed their assailants. At length, however, the position was carried ; and tlie French cavalry executing a charge on the retreating column, it was thrown into confusion, and forced to seek safety by dispersing amid the mountains. The guns, and a considerable number of prisoners. 328 THE COMMAND ASSUMED BY GENERAL CLINTON. CHAP. XII. were taken by the enemy ; and the total loss of Igjo the allies amounted to nearly one thousand men. September. ^^ ^^^ following day Lord William Bentinck retreated from Villa Franca on the approach of Suchet and Decaen, the latter of whom was ad- vancing on his left flank from Martorell. Dur- ing the march an affair of cavalry took place, in which the Brunswick hussars behaved with great gallantry. Suchet then recrossed the Llobre- gat ; and the allies, unmolested, continued their retreat on Tarragona by Altafulla. Shortly af- terwards. Lord William Bentinck returned to Sicily, and was succeeded in command by Lieu- tenant-General Clinton. STATE OP THE WAR. 329 CHAPTER XIIL BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES. 1813. Napoleon, while occupied with the great con- chap.xiii test, which he was about to wage on the banks of the Elbe, had, in some degree, withdrawn his attention from the operations in the Peninsula. He had trusted that the army, in the strong line of the Douro or the Ebro, would be enabled to give a decisive check to the progress of the al- lies ; and the more immediate pressure of the war in Germany had induced him to recall many of his ablest generals, and among others Soult, who had long held the chief command. But in one short month his hopes had been overthrown. By a series of splendid manoeuvres, terminating in a victory no less splendid, his grand army had been swept out of Spain, and the tide of war had already rolled onward to the Pyrenees, where a 230 SOULT ASSUMES THE COMMAND. THE ARMY IS REINFORCED. 331 1813. CHAP.xiii mighty effort was demanded to arrest its pro- gress. Under these circumstances, Napoleon at once perceived that the contest on the southern fron- tier was one which could no longer be disregard- ed. He felt the urgency of the crisis ; he saw that the most immediate and energetic measures could alone rescue France from invasion ; and a portion of the vast levies then raising was di- rected to recruit the exhausted ranks of the army in the Pyrenees. Soult, whose talents alone seemed equal to so great an emergency, hasten- ed from Germany to assume the command, with the rank of Lieutenant of the Emperor. If any measure could have restored the con- fidence of the disheartened and fugitive legions of Joseph's army, this appointment would un- questionably have done so. The reputation of Soult stood almost pre-eminently high, and no other leader, during the whole war in the Pen- insula, had enjoyed the confidence of the troops in an equal degree. Soult having proclaimed his determination of repairing the errors of his predecessors, and of driving the allies across the Ebro, took in- stant measures for the re-organization of the army. Supplies of all sorts were sent to replace ch a p.xiii the losses sustained in the campaign, and rein- iqiq forcements of cavalry and artillery gave consid- erable augmentation to his strength in these arms. His infantry, which by recent losses and desertions, had been reduced to eighty thousand, he divided into three corps, under command of Generals Reille, Drouet, and Clausel, with a body of reserve under Villatte. These arrange- ments being completed, he established a large depot at St. Jean Pied de Port ; and prepared^, by a strong effort, to relieve the fortresses, and roll back the tide of war from the frontier. The situation of Lord Wellington, to whom the progress of the campaign had hitherto been little else than one continued march of triumph, was become one of considerable hazard. Hav- ing to cover the siege of two fortresses, with a wide interval between, he was under the ne- cessity of extending his line in a dangerous degree. The positions occupied by his divi- sions were indeed strong ; yet, by the impass- able nature of the country, they were cut off from all direct communication with each other, and the enemy enjoyed the advantage of being able to direct the whole volume of his force 't» 332 SITUATION OF LORD WELLINGTON. IPOSITION OP THE ALLIED ARMY. 333 CHAP. XIII against a single corps, while the other divisions, 2gj^ separated by almost impenetrable barriers, could lend no assistance. A defensive army, there- fore, was weak in the precise proportion of the number of the passes it was necessary to maintain; and by the success of the enemy at any one point, the safety of the whole was liable to be compromised. This circumstance gave Marshal Soult a great and prominent advantage over his opponent. By a strong and sudden attack, he might rea- sonably calculate on overpowering one of the corps covering the passes ; and then, by pushing forward on the flank and rear of the remainder, he might force the whole army to a hasty re- treat, and thus effect the relief of the blockaded fortresses. A change, therefore, was about to take place in the character of the contest. The allied army was to defend a series of mountain defiles, in a country where cavalry could not act, and in po- sitions to which artillery could not be conveyed. They were about to enter on a struggle for which they were unprepared by any former experience ; while the system of mountain warfare was one for which the lightness and 1813. Jwly. activity of the French troops peculiarly fitted chap.xiii them, and in which they had hitherto been con- sidered unrivalled. The high fame of the hostile commanders contributed also to invest this pe- riod of the war with an extrinsic interest. Un- less at OportOj Soult had never been brought into close and direct contact with Lord Welling- ton. The celebrated leaders by whom the lat- ter had been successively opposed, when weigh- ed in the balance had been found wanting ; and Soult had been selected by the Emperor, as the man on whose skill and energy he relied, to repair the disasters of the campaign, and free the soil of France trom the reproach of invasion. The principal passes of the Pyrenees were occupied by the allied army, which was distri- buted in the following manner : — The right wing covered the direct approaches to Pampluna from St. Jean Pied de Port. The brigade of Major-General Byng, and the Spanish corps of General Morillo, occupying the advanced passes of Roncesvalles and Arbaicete, formed the extreme right, supported by the fourth division at Biscaret, and the third division in reserve at Olacque. The right of the centre, under Sir Rowland 334 POSITION OF THE ALLIED ARMY. cHAP.xiii Hill, consisting of the second division, and the Portuffuese division of the Conde de Amarante, 1813. J , * guarded the passes near Maya, in the valley of Bustan, distant about twenty miles from the pass of Roncesvalles. On his left were the seventh and light divisions, the former posted in the pass of Eichelar, the latter on the mountain Sta. Bar- bara, and in the town of Pera. The sixth di- vision was placed in reserve at St. Estevan, to support the troops at Maya or Echelar, as occa- sion might require. The left wing, commanded by Sir Thomas Graham, consisting of the first and fifth divisions, was engaged in the siege of St. Sebastian, pro- tected in its operations by a force on the Bidas- soa, composed of Lord Aylmer's brigade and the Spanish corps of General Freyre. The army of the Conde de Bisbal, about ten thousand strong, was employed in the blockade of Pampluna ; and the corps of Longa extended the line of communication from the Urnmea to the Bidassoa, forming a chain between the left, and left of the centre. Soult's first object was to relieve Pampluna. With this view, he collected the main body of his army in the neighbourhood of St. Jean Pied SOULT ASSUMES THE OFFENSIVE. 335 de Port. Posting the reserve at Urogne tocHAP.xiii guard the line of the Bidassoa on his right, he formed his army into two powerful columns, , , with which he prepared to make a simultaneous attack on the passes of Roncesvalles aud Maya. By the one he hoped to secure his immediate object, while the other was chiefly intended to deceive his opponent ; and, by diverting his at- tention to a difierent point, to delay the trans- mission of reinforcements to the real scene of danger. The column destined for the attack on the position of Maya, was about thirteen thousand strong, and commanded by Drouet. At ten o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fifth, this Jul. 25. corps was perceived to be approaching the right of the position, by a mountain path, leading from Espallete, across the ridge to the village of Maya. At the same time demonstrations were made against the difi^erent passes, and under cover of these manoeuvres having concen- trated a strong force in front of Aretesque, about half-past eleven they filed in column from behind the mountain, and attacked the piquets of the second division on the heights of Maya. The piquets, with the support of the light in- 336 ATTACK ON MAYA. ATTACK ON MAYA. 337 1813. Jalj. !^ cHAP.xHi fantry companies of the second brigade, for a time sustained the onset of the enemy, with the greatest steadiness, but were at length over- powered. The thirty-fourth and fiftieth regi- ments then came up, and charging with the bay- onet, succeeded in driving back the assailants. The latter, however, again advanced in great force, and the two gallant battalions were on the point of being surrounded, when the right wing of the ninety-second came up to their support. The contest was then continued on both sides with the greatest obstinacy. While the thirty- fourth and fiftieth were re-forming, the wing of the ninety-second was opposed to a force of the enemy more than two thousand strong, and al- most annihilated in the contest. The troops which had liitherto waged so une- qual a contest were at length ordered to with- draw ; and fresh regiments were moved forward in their place. But the enemy, in spite of all opposition, continued to gain ground, and was already in possession of the pass. The second division, overmatched in numbers, retired slowly, defending every favourable point, till joined by a brigade of the seventh division, under General Barnes, when the lost ground was regained, and 1813. July. the enemy driven back beyond the pass of Maya, chap.xiii About nine at night, the contest ceased ; and the troops, having formed line, were allowed an interval of repose. Throughout this severe engagement the British laboured under a decided disadvantage. Though the attack was made only at one point, it was im- possible for General Stewart to denude the other passes of defence ; and while the enemy acted in one compact and powerful body, they were op- posed only by successive battalions, brought up as the pressure of circumstances demanded. It was owing to this, that the utmost gallantry of the troops was unequal to arrest the progress of the assailants ; but in no instance were the qua- lities of British soldiers more finely displayed. The loss of the allies was very severe ; it ex- ceeded sixteen hundred men, and four guns were taken by the enemy. During the night. Sir Rowland Hill retired from the heights which had been so gallantly defended, and took post on some very strong ground in rear of Elizonda. The enemy remain- ed inactive in his position in front of Maya, dur- ing the whole of the twenty-sixth. In the meanwhile, Soult, with a column of VOL. III. p Jul. 2fi. ^■«^ 338 ATTACK ON R0NCE8VALLES. RETREAT OF THE ALLIES. 339 1813. Jul}'. cHAP.xni thirty-five thousand men, had directed a more powerful attack on Roncesvalles. Making a de- monstration on the front of General Byng's posi- tion, in advance of the Pass, he pushed the main body of his army along the ridge of Arola, on its left, occupied by General Cole's division. Though the enemy were greatly superior in numbers, General Cole defended his ground with great obstinacy, but was at length forced to retire with considerable loss. He then took up a strong position in rear, which the enemy did not ven- ture to attack. Soult then directed his efforts against the front of General Byng's brigade, and forcing it back gained possession of the road to Arbaicete, which enabled him to attack the Spanish corps of JVIorillo, on the right. The Spaniards, after some resistance, were forced to retire for sup- port on the fourth division; and the position being thus turned, General Cole, as soon as it was dark, fell back to a strong ridge in front of Zubiri, where he halted for the night. On the day following, General Picton moved up with the third division, and assumed the command ; but the enemy coming on in great force, both divisions retired to some strong Jul. 26. 1813. JnW. ground in the rear, where they remained in order chap.xiu of battle till night On the twenty-seventh, the retreat was continued to a position in front of the villages Huarte and Villalba, which covered the blockade of Pampluna. At the commencement of these operations, Lord Wellington was with the left of the army, probably anticipating that Soult's first effort would be directed towards the relief of St. Se- bastian, as the fortress more immediately in dan- ger. On the night of the twenty-fifth, he re- ceived intelligence that the enemy were in mo- tion, and hastened to the scene of action, where he arrived at the moment when the divisions under Sir Thomas Picton were taking up their ground. Lord Wellington determined to concentrate the main body of his army for the defence of Pampluna, and the sixth, seventh, and light di- visions, were directed to pass the mountains of Lanz, and form on the left of the fourth division. Sir Rowland Hill was directed to retire behind the Lizasso, and keep in check the corps of Drouet, which might otherwise have advanced on Pampluna, by the lateral road from Irantsum and Berisplano ; a body of the blockading force, 340 POSITION OF THE ALLIES. BATTLE OF SAUROREN. 341 cHAP.xiii under the Conde de Bisbal, was ordered to move 181^ up and form 9^ corps de reserve. At the same juj.., time, Sir Stapleton Cotton was ordered to bring up the cavalry, and take post bn the right of the third division, the only ground which permitted the action of that arm. General Picton's division formed the right, and was posted on a ridge, in front of the vil- lage Huarte, with its right extending to the hills beyond Olaz. The left, consisting of Gene- ral Cole's division, General Byng's brigade, and General Campbell's brigade of Portuguese, oc- cupied the heights in front of Villalba, between the rivers Arga and Lanz, with the left at a chapel behind Sauroren, on the high road from Maya. The divisions had scarcely taken up their ground, when the enemy directed an attack on a hill, projecting from the line on the right of the fourth division, occupied by a Portuguese and a Spanish battalion. These troops maintained their ground, and drove back the enemy with the bayonet ; but the possession of this post be- ing considered of importance to the position, Lord Wellington directed the fortieth regiment to advance to their assistance. Thus reinforced the enemy were defeated in every effort to gain chap.xiii possession of the hill. On the morning of the twenty-eighth, the j„j French army were formed on a mountain ridge, fronting the position of the allies. Their left rested on some bold heights beyond the road of Roncesvalles, and their right extended to the village of Sauroren, which they occupied in force. Before any hostile movement had taken place, the sixth division, under Major-General Pack, came up, and were immediately formed, unob- served by the enemy, across the valley, in rear of the left of the fourth division, making face against the village of Sauroren. The troops were scarcely posted, when the enemy pushed forward a very large force from Sauroren, in order to penetrate by the valley, and turn the left of the position. But this body being unexpectedly met by a strong fire, both in front and flank, was speedily forced to retire with great loss. The next efibrt of Soult was directed against the centre. About one o'clock, a strong column advanced against the left of the fourth division, posted at a chapel on the road to Ortiz, and speedily dislodged a Portuguese battalion, by 342 BATTLE OP SAUROREN. BATTLE OF SAUROREN. 343 1813. July. CHAP.xiii which it was defended. The brigade of General Ross, however, coming up, the Portuguese were enabled to rally, and the enemy in their turn were forced to give way. A powerful attempt was made to gain posses- sion of the hill on the right, defended by the for- tieth regiment, and two Spanish battalions. The French succeeded in gaining the summit of the height ; but the fortieth, charging with the bay- onet, drove them back with distinguished gal- lantry, and every effort of the enemy at this point proved abortive. Soult then directed a general attack on the whole front of the heights occupied by the fourth division, and a contest of the most despe- rate character ensued. The French advanced, with cries of" Vive VEmpereur!" to penetrate the position with the bayonet. The fourth divi- sion waited their approach, reserving their fire till the enemy had approached within a few paces, then pouring in a volley, and charging almost at the same instant, drove them down the heights in the greatest confusion, and with prodigious loss. In one instance alone was the attack success- ful. A Portuguese battalion, on the right of k 1 1813. July. General Ross's brigade, having given way, the chap-xiii assailants gained possession of the chapel near ~ Sauroren ; and General Ross being thus obliged to retire, the enemy succeeded for a moment in establishing his columns on the line of the allies. On perceiving this circumstance. Lord Wel- lington directed the twenty-seventh and forty- eighth regiments to charge ; and nothing could exceed the gallantry or the success with which these orders were obeyed. The two regiments, and General Ross's brigade, made several most brilliant charges, and at the bayonet's point dis- lodged the enemy from the chapel. At the same time, General Pack's division having moved up the valley to support the left of General Cole, the attack on this part of the position ceased en- tirely ; and Soult, at length convinced of the hopelessness of the contest, drew off his troops. The brunt of this severe struggle was borne almost exclusively by the fourth division, which, though repeatedly attacked by the enemy in great superiority of numbers, maintained its ground throughout the day. " In the course of this contest," says Lord Wellington, " the gal- lant fourth division, which has been so frequent- ly distinguished in this army, surpassed their 1^ 344 SOULT IS REPULSED. MOVEMENTS OF SOULT. 345 ]813. July. Jul. 29. CHAP.xiii former good conduct. Every regiment charged with the bayonet, and the fortieth, the seventh, twentieth, and twenty-third, four different times. Their officers set them the example ; and Major- General Ross had two horses shot under him. The Portuguese troops likewise behaved admir- ably ; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the Spanish regiments del Principe and Pravia," During the whole of the twenty-ninth, both armies remained inactive. But the situation of the allies was materially improved by the arriv- al of the seventh division at iMarcalain, between Sir Rowland Hill's position and the right, which secured the communication between the corps, and gave unity of action to the whole force. Soult then gave up all idea of penetrating the line of the allies, at the points towards which his efforts had hitherto been directed, and de- termined, by a lateral march, to effect a junc- tion with the corps of Drouet. This would open to him the road from Pampluna to Tolosa, by which he might advance against the left of the allied army, and taking it in rear, effect the li- beration of St. Sebastian. In order to masque his intention, he still oc- 1813. .Tilly. cupied, in considerable force, the strong position chap.xiii on the heights of Sauroren, which then became the point d'appui of the extreme left, and put the remainder of his force in motion by its right. At the same time, the wounded, the artillery, and a great part of the baggage, were sent off to the rear, in order that the army might, as much as possible, be untrammelled in its move- ments. On the morning of the thirtieth, the enemy's Jul. 30. troops were observed to be in motion towards the mountains on the south of Lanz ; and Lord Wellington, instantly divining the object of the manoeuvre, determined on dislodging the corps in his front from its position. Sir Thomas Pic- ton, therefore, with his division, was directed to move by the valley of Arga, against the French left, while the seventh division, under Lord Dal- housie, should turn their right in the valley of Lanz. These manoeuvres were completely suc- cessful. The brigade of General Inglis, with great gallantry, carried a height which support- ed their right; and General Pakenham, who, after General Pack was wounded, had assumed command of the sixth division, drove the enemy from the villages of Sauroren and Ortiz. p2 346 SOULT IS DRIVEN FROM HIS POSITION. 1813. July. •K: : cHAi'.xiii General Cole, with the fourth division, then moved on to attack the front of the position, and the enemy, after trifling resistance, gave way on his approach. By these operations, the French were compelled to abandon a position which Lord Wellington declared to have been " one of the strongest and most difficult of access he had ever seen occupied by troops.** In the meanwhile, Sir Rowland Hill having occupied the post of La Zarza, which exceed- ingly cramped and impeded their movements, the right wing, under Drouet, was strongly re- inforced, in order to dislodge him. About ten o'clock, the enemy filed about twenty thousand men to their right, to turn the left flank of the position. In consequence, Sir Rowland Hill moved General Pringle's brigade to the summit of the hill on the left of the road leading to La Zarza, which, as the enemy extended his right, was directed to make a corresponding movement on the ridge. General Walker's brigade was likewise moved to the left ; and the heights on the right of the road were occupied by Portu- guese. While the left of the position was thus threat- ened, powerful and repeated attacks were made '••■'"•i* RETREAT OP SOULT. 347 1813. JuIt. on its front, which uniformly encountered re- chap.xiii pulse. The ninety-second and thirty-fourth re- giments, in particular, chai*ged with the bayonet, and drove back the enemy with great slaughter. At length. Sir Rowland Hill observing that the enemy had already encircled his left, withdrew his troops to a strong and rugged ridge, about a mile in rear, where he maintained his ground in spite of every effort to dislodge him. On the morning of the thirty-first, the French Jul. 31. were discovered to be in full retreat ; the column of Reille by the road to St. Jean Pied de Port, and that of Clausel by Echalar and Sarre, and that of Drouet by Maya. The allied army in- stantly moved forward in pursuit. About eleven o'clock, a strong rear corps was found posted in the pass of Donna Maria, from which Lord Wel- lington dislodged them, by moving the second and seventh divisions on their fianks. A smart engagement, however, took place, in which the brigade of General Barnes, of the seventh divi- sion, particularly distinguished itself. The pur- suit was vigorously continued, many prisoners were made, and a large convoy with baggage was taken in the town of Elizonda. Thus terminated these great conflicts. By a •i«»*— f '■^tr^tMrnm- AMi SOULT IS DRIVEN FROM HIS POSITION. h 1813. Jiilv. t tiAi'.xiii General Cole, with the fourth division, then moved on to attack the front of the position, and the enemy, after trifling resistance, gave way on his approach. By these operations, the French were compelled to abandon a position which Lord Wellington declared to have been " one of the strongest and most difficult of access he had ever seen occupied by troops/' In the meanwhile. Sir Rowland Hill having occupied the post of La Zarza, which exceed- ingly cramped and impeded tlieir movements, the right wing, under Drouet, was strongly re- inforced, in order to dislodge him. About ten o'clock, the enemy filed about twenty thousand men to their right, to turn the left ffank of the position. In consequence, Sir Rowland Hill moved General Pringle's brigade to the summit of the hill on the left of the road leading to La Zarza, which, as the enemy extended his right, was directed to make a corresponding movement on the ridge. General Walker's brigade was likewise moved to the left ; and the heights on the right of the road were occupied by Portu- guese. While the left of the position was thus threat- ened, powerful and repeated attacks were made ^■IL RETREAT OF SOULT. 347 1813. .lulv. on its front, which uniformly encountered re-CHAi\xiii pulse. The ninety-second and thirty-fourth re- giments, in particular, chai*ged with the bayonet, and drove back the enemy with great slaughter. At length, Sir Rowland Hill observing that the enemy had already encircled his left, withdrew his troops to a strong and rugged ridge, about a mile in rear, where he maintained his ground in spite of every effort to dislodge him. On the morning of the thirty-first, the French .ini. 'M. were discovered to be in full retreat ; the column of Reiile by the road to St. Jean Pied de Port, and that of Clausel by Echalar and Sarre, and that of Drouet by Maya. The allied army in- stantly moved forward in pursuit. About eleven o'clock, a strong rear corps was found posted in the pass of Donna INIaria, from which Lord Wel- lington dislodged them, by moving the second and seventh divisions on their flanks. A smart engagement, however, took place, in which the brigade of General Barnes, of the seventh divi- sion, particularly distinguished itself. The pur- suit was vigorously continued, many prisoners were made, and a large convoy with baggage was taken in the town of Elizonda. Thus terminated these great conflicts. By a 348 RESULT OF THE BATTLES. !f ni A p.xiii skilful concentration of his strength, Soult had jgjc^ actually succeeded in penetrating to within a league of Pampluna ; yet, after one of the most desperate struggles in which troops ever were engaged, he had been compelled to return, leav- ing this important fortress to its fate. On the twenty-eighth, the garrison made a spirited sor- tie, and succeeded in gaining several batteries ; but they were at length driven back by the Spanish division of Don Carlos d'Kspana. The loss of the French army in these operations ex- ceeded eight thousand men. That of the allies amounted to about six thousand. By the retreat of the enemy, the allied army again became masters of the passes through the Au^r. 1. mountains. On the first of August, the diflPar- ent divisions were established nearly in the same positions which they had occupied previous to the attack of the twenty-fifth ; and, in order to provide against future attack, these were strengthened by the construction of redoubts and entrenchments. SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN. :U9 CHAPTER XIV. CAPTURE OF ST. SEBASTIAN-SOULT DKFFATKD AT ST. MARCIAL. I 1813. The town of St. Sebastian stands on a pen- chap.xiv. insula, formed by an inlet of the sea on its southern, and by the river Urumea on its northern side. The only approach is by a low, sandy, isthmus, which is crossed by a regular line of works, having a large hornwork in front. The water faces consist of a single high wall, with no flank defences but a few small towers. About six or seven hundred yards distant is a range of sand-hills, on the left of the Urumea, which flank the land defences of the town ; and in front of these the Urumea is fordable on the efflux of the tide. Near the neck of the isth- mus is a range of heights, on which stands the Convent of St. Bartholemeo, about eight or nine 350 glEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN. 1813. JiiW. 1,1 CHAP.xiv. hundred yards distant from the body of the place, which the enemy had put into a state of defence. Behind the town, at the extremity of the peninsula, is the castle. It stands on the sum- mit of a high oval shaped hill, the sides of which are scarped and precipitous, and by a projection to the south, forming, by the aid of moles, a har- bour for small craft. The side selected for attack was that towards the Urumoa ; and as a preliminary operation, it was judged necessary to gain possession of the Convent St. Bartholemeo, against which two small batteries were constructed on the night of the thirteenth of July. At the sametime, work- ing parties were employed on the sand-hills on the north of the river, in erecting batteries to open on the body of the place, as soon as the Convent should have fallen. The batteries having opened fire on the four- teenth, a false attack was directed on the day following, in order to ascertain whether the enemy's intention was to defend the place to ex- tremity. This attack, however, by the ardour of the troops, was converted into a real one, and encountered a severe repulse. SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN. 351 Jul. 14. 1813. July. vx On the seventeenth, one end of the Convent chap.xiv being in ruins, the assault was again given, and it was carried without difficulty, by the ninth regiment, and a brigade of Portuguese. The way being thus cleared, operations were pushed forward against the town. Batteries were erected on the sand-hills, both for breaching the river face, and for enfilading the front de- fences. On the nineteenth, approaches were commenced on the isthmus, both on the right and left of the village of St. IVIartin, which the enemy had burned. On the twentieth, all the batteries on both sides of the river opened fire on the town. On the twenty-first, Sir Thomas Graham sent Jul. 21. a summons to the governor, who refused to ad- mit the bearer into the town. In cutting the parallel across the isthmus, a sort of tunnel or sewer was discovered about four feet in height, which on examination proved to lead into the ditch opposite to the face of the right demi-bas- tion of the homwork, where it was closed by a door. In this drain it was thought advisable to plant a mine, and a quantity of earth was depo- sited at its further extremity, in the hope that S.r2 SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN. lh!3. July. cHAi'.xiv. the explosion might fill up the ditch, and form a bridge for the assailants. On the twenty-third, the breach being report- ed practicable, the fire of the batteries was di- rected to form a second breach on the left. Towards evening, a second smaller breach was considered practicable, and preparations were made for storming them on the following morn- ing, when the tide should prove favourable. At daybreak the troops were under arms, but ow- ing to a furious conflagration among the houses behind the breach, which bore the appearance of design, it was judged advisable to counter- mand the order for assault. At daybreak on the morning of the twenty- fifth, the troops being in readiness, the explosion of the mine gave the signal of advance. The storming party, consisting of about two thousand men, with the advance, led by Lieutenant Camp- bell of the ninth, then pushed forward towards the larger breach ; and the confusion caused in the town by the unexpected explosion, enabled them to reach it with little loss. The garrison, however, soon recovered from their alarm, and the assailants, in ascending the breach, were re- Jiil. 25. SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN. 3,>3 1813. Julv. ceived with afire so destructive, both in front chai'.xiv and flank, that after a gallant efi*ort, they were driven back in confusion, with tremendous slaughter. A few hours after the repulse of this attack, the garrison, animated by their success, made a sortie, and entering the parallel by the left, suc- ceeded in making prisoners of all the troops in the trenches, who sought refuge in some ruined houses in rear of the right of the parallel. These were exclusively Portuguese. The enemy then retired, cjirrying with him about two hundred prisoners into the town. It was at this period that Soult advanced with the intention of driving back the allied army and relieving Pamplona. In consequence. Sir Tho- mas Graham embarked his guns at Passages, and till the issue of the operations in the Pyre- nees became known, contented himself with keep- ing St. Sebastian in a state of rigorous blockade. The retreat of Soult, however, was no sooner known than Sir Thomas Graham made pre- parations for the renewal of the siege. On the sixth of August the artillery was relanded, Au^. H. and on the eighteenth a fresh battering train, and a plentiful supply of stores, arrived from 354 SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN. 1813. August. cHAP.xiv. England. It was determined to renew the for- mer attacks, both from the north of the Urumea and from the isthmus, with increased power of artillery ; and new batteries were accordingly erected. At midnight on the twenty-sixth, the garrison made a sortie on the advanced trenches, and suc- ceeded in reaching the parallel. There, how- ever, their progress was arrested by the guard in the trenches, and they were forced to retire into the town, carrying with them a few pri- soners. The batteries opened fire on the morning of the Aag. 28. twenty-eighth, against the towers which flanked the curtain on the eastern face, against the demi- bastion on the south eastern angle, and the ter- mination of the curtain of the southern face. The fire continued throughout the whole day without intermission. During the night a party of two hundred men were landed from the fleet, Aug. 20. under Sir George Collier, on the rocky island of Sta. Clara, and the small detachment posted for its defence were made prisoners. On the night following the garrison made another sortie, which, profiting by their former dear-bought ex- SIEGE OF ST. SEBASTIAN. 355 perience, the besiegers succeeded in repulsing c hap.xiv without loss. \H\3. During the following days the fire from the ^ufrust. batteries was continued, and three mines were iprung on the morning of the thirty-first, which Au^.^n. destroyed a large portion of the curtain. The column of attack was then formed. It consisted of Major-General llobinson's brigade, preceded by a storming party consisting of seven hundred and fifty volunteers from the different divisions of the army.* As the column filed out of the trenches, it be- came exposed to a heavy fire of shells and grape- shot; and a mine was exploded in the left angle of the hornwork in the front line of works, which blew down the counterscarp, under which the troops were advancing, but did not check their progress towards the breach. " Nothing," says Sir Thomas Graham, V could be more fallacious than the external appearance of the breach. • The storming party consisted of one hundred and fifty men of the light division, coininande0 OBSERVATIONS. cHAP.xiv.cided superiority, have lost that superiority in every instance in which a fortified place was to be attacked, and either failed in their object, or purchased success at a great and disproportion- ate price. This cannot be attributed to any want of talent or zeal in the Engineer officers, who were in general men accomplished in their profession ; and the testimony borne by Lord Wellington to their conduct on every occasion, is more than sufficient to exonerate them from censure. But the subordinate branch of the de- partment was miserably defective. There was no corps of sappers and miners, nor any body of men peculiarly trained to carry on the intricate and complicated operations of a siege. The corps of Royal Artificers consisted of handicraftsmen of different sorts, unprepared by previous edu- cation for the novel duties they were called on to discharge. But the number even of these was small, and the chief labour of the trenches fell to be performed by the soldiers of the line, or in other words by a promiscuous mass of men, bred many of them to sedentary occupa- tions, most of whom were utterly unskilled even in the use of the implements committed to their hands. In conducting a siege with such OBSERVATIONS. 361 181.3. clumsy and unmanageable workmen it was ofcHAp.xiv. course found impossible to push the approaches to the body of the place, and rash and dangerous expedients were in consequence resorted to. It was attempted, often vainly, to purchase with life, that which in other circumstances might have been gained by labour ; and the reliance of the besiegers was placed not on the resources of art, but on the courage of the troops. To assault a breach in the body of a place before a lodgment has been formed on the counterscarp, is evidently one of the most dangerous enterprises in which it is possible to embark. All authority is against such a mode of proceeding; it is a great and con- fessed violation of the just rules of attack, and has long been abandoned by the continental ar- mies. Yet such was the system adopted by the British army in all its sieges in Spain. Both at Badajos and St. Sebastian it signally failed ; and the journals of these sieges afford— if such were wanted— satisfactory evidence that accident alone can ghre to an assault, under such circumstances, a reasonable chance of success. There is no fire from the trenches to keep down that from the VOL. III. 362 OBSERVATIONS. MOVEMENTS OF SOULT. 3()3 1813. CHAP.xiv. place. The assailants advance to the breach without cover of any sort, and are therefore ex- posed, daring their whole progress, to a most destructive fire from the garrison. Order is necessarily broken in descending the counter- scarp, and cannot be restored in the ditch, un- der the shower of missiles poured down from the parapet. Thus the attack is made under every possible disadvantage, while the diffi- culty of surmounting the obstacles to the as- cent of the breach contribute still further to augment the confusion. But if in addition the breach be well entrenched, and the governor has employed the precautions prescribed by every treatise on defence, by covering the approach to the breach, and preserving a powerful flank fire both direct and vertical, to play on the assail- ing columns, no conceivable superiority of cour- age over a skilful enemy can counterbalance 8uch enormous advantages. The attack must fail, or at all events can only succeed by the occurrence of some of those fortuitous and un- foreseen accidents, by which in war the issue of a contest must sometimes be decided.* * Those who wUh to Me this subject elucidated with g^eat clearness and sound jud^ent, we beg to refer to the " Journal 1813. August. On the thirty-first of August, the very daycuAP.xiv. on which the town of St. Sebastian was carried by assault, Soult made another effort for its re- lief. Three divisions of Spaniards, under Gen- eral Freyre, occupied the left bank of the Bidas- soa, covering the high road from Bayonne. They were drawn up on the strong heights of St. Marcial, with their right extended in front of tlie Ilaya mountain, to observe the different fords by which the enemy might approach the position. On the left, they were supported by the first division and Lord Aylmer's brigade in rear of Irun, and General Longa's Spanish di- Tision was posted in rear of their right. On the thirtieth, it was ascertained that the Aug. 30. enemy were assembling a large force in the neighbourhood of Bera, and the brigade of Gen- of the Sieges in Spain," by Colonel Jones. The work constitutes a record of great importance, and the author exposes the defi- ciencies of the particular branch of the service to which he be- longs with an unsparing hand. The evils complained of, how- ever, we are happy to state, are now in progress of amendment ; and in any future siege in which a British force may be engaged, there is no reason to apprehend a repetition of such unfortunate results as those which it is our present duty to record. In the establishment under Coloael Paisley at Chatham, young officers of engineers, and the corps of sappers and miners, are not only instructed but practically exercised in all the duties of their profession. 364 ATTACK ON ST. MARCIAL. » I /iHAP.xiT. eral Inglis was in conseqnence ordered to the lj|iQ bridge of LezM^a, and two brigades of the Au^fust. fourth division to take post on the left of the Haya monntain, to strengthen the right flank. A Portuguese brigade wa« likewise moved to the right of the mountain, to prevent the position being turned in that direction. Aug. 31. On the morning of the thirty-first, the enemy crossed the Bidassoa in great force, by the fords in front of the position, and made a desperate attack on the Spanish left, on the heights of St. Marcial. The Spaniards, advantageously post- ed, received the attack with great firmness and gallantry. They charged the enemy with the bayonet, and drove them down the face of the heights, in the greatest confusion, to the river, in which many were drowned. The course of the Bidassoa being immediately under the heights occupied by the enemy, on which he had thrown up several batteries, he was enabled to throw a bridge across the river. A general attack was Uien made on the heights of St. Marcial. While the French columns were ascending the heights, Lord Wellington appear- ed in front of the line. The Spanish troops ex- pressed their joy and confidence by loud and re- ATTACK ON ST. MARCIAL. 3()5 peated acclamations; and again charging thecHAP.xiv. enemy with the bayonet, put them to the route, — ; *nd pursued them across the river. Nothing ^ ^J could be more triumphantly decisive than the suocets of the Spaniards, achieved without the smallest support from the British divisions posted in reserve. The French fled, panic- stricken and without order, and plunged head- long into the river at the different fords. The bridge gave way under the extraordinary pres- sure of the fugitives, and most of those passing at the moment were drowned. Soult, observing the extreme facility with which his most vehe- ment attacks had been repulsed, then gave up all hope of success, and took advantage of the darkness of a violent storm to withdraw his troops. " The conduct of the Spanish troops," says Lord Wellington, in his official account of the action, " was equal to that of any troops I have ever seen engaged ; and the attack having been frequently repeated, was, upon every occasion, defeated with the same gallantry and determin- atioB." During this ineffectual attempt to penetrate by the high road to St. Sebastian, strong columns '■ - *^ - 366 90CLT IS DEFEATED, 1813. August. CHAP.xiv. of the enemy forded the Bidassoa in the neigh- bourhood of Bera and Salines, with the view of turning the right flank, and gaining possession of the road leading through Oyarzun. The Portuguese brigade, stationed on the right of the Haya mountains, was then attacked ; and, though the brigade of General Inglis was imme- diately brought up to its support, it was found necessary to abandon the heights between Leza- ca and the Bidassoa. General Inglis then with- drew to a strong ridge in front of the Convent of St. Antonio, where the remainder of the seventh division shortly after came up to his support. The aspect of this formidable position, and the entire failure of the attacks on the heights of St. Marcial, at length induced the enemy to re-cross the Bidassoa. The river had become to swollen with the heavy rain which had fallen during the day, that the fords were found im- passable before the rear of the column had been able to cross. In order, therefore, to gain the bridge of Bera, they attacked General Skerret's brigade of the light division, both from the pass of Bera and from the left of the river. By this measure, the remainder of their force succeeded AND RE-CROSSES THE BIDASSOA. 367 1813. August. in effecting its passage by the bridge, though chap.xiv. exposed to a heavy fire from the light division. The loss of the enemy, during these engage- ments, was very g^eat, and included two Gen- erab of division ; but the moral consequences of their defeat were far more important. In pre- sence of both armies, the French columns had been repeatedly routed by the Spanish troops, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to re- gard with supreme contempt. The effect of this was twofold. It gave the Spaniards that col- lective confidence in themselves, which a long series of disasters had contributed to impair : it tended to depress the hopes and ardour of the French soldiers, in whose minds the results of the day must have been accompanied by a mor- tifying sentiment of inferiority. f 366 riiAP. XV 1813. DISCONTENT OP THE ALLIED TROOPS. CHAPTER XV. OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE. EVENTS IN SPAIN. Apteb the fall of St. Sebastian, nearly a mouth elapsed unmarked by any hostile more- ment on the part of eitlier army. During thit interral, both were employed in strengthening their respective position!, by the construction of field-works, and in preparing for the farther prosecution of the campaign. The weather wis cold and inclement, and the sufferings of the part of the allied army employed in guarding the passes were very g^eat. Compelled to pass a season of extreme rigour on the stormy sum- mits of the Pyrenees, the troops gazed down with a feeling of envy and discontent on the fer- tile plains and rich valleys of France, outspread before them. Being liable at any moment to attack, it was necessary that the strictest vigi- PREPAEATIONS FOR CROSSING THE BIDASSOA. 361) lanoe should be maintained, and the duties were chap. xv. in consequence severe. Under these circum- .„,„ stances, a spirit of gloomy discontent became Ortober. diffused among the soldiers, and the prospect of future glory was outweighed by present suifer- ing. Desertions, in consequence, became nu- merous ; and it was found necessary to check the increasing prevalence of this disgracefiil crime by severe examples. Until the fall of Pamplona it was impossible to act on the offensive on a great scale ; but, in the meantime. Lord Wellington determined to push his left acroM the Bidassoa, and dislodge the enemy from a range of heights on the right of that river, extending from the high and steep mountain, La Rhune, to the sea. On the sixth of October, preparations were made for Oct. 6. the approaching encounter ; and at three o'clock, on the morning of the seventh, the troops were Oct. 7. under arms. The dispositions for attack were as follows : — On the left, the first and fifth divisions, and General Wilson's brigade of Portuguese, were directed to ford the river in fonr coiumxis, near its mouth, and attack the enemy's entrenchments in the neighbourhood of Andaye. q2 370 DISPOSITION OF THE ALLIED ARMT. 1813. October. Il CHAP. XV. The Spanish corps of General Freyre, in threfe colamns, was to cross at fords higher up the ri- ver, in front of Boraton, and attack the works on the Montagne Vert, and the height of Man- dalle. The light division, under General Alten, and the Spaniards, under Longa, were to dislodge the enemy from the mountain of Commissari, and the pass of Bera. The Andalusian troops, under General Giron, were to advance against the entrenched position on the mountain of La Rhune. Every precaution was adopted to prevent dis- covery by the enemy. The troops moved on to the attack in deep silence. The night had been one of cloud and storm, and the approach of morning was accompanied by vivid flashes of lightning, which occasionally shed a glare upon the columns, brighter by contrast with the deep darkness by which they were preceded and fol- lowed. The storm, however, had rolled on to the French side of the river, and thus favoured, notwithstanding the noise of the artillery and pontoon train, the troops succeeded in gaining the different fords of the Bidassoa undiscovered by the enemy. PASSAGE OP THE BIDASSOA. 371 1813. October. The fifth division enjoyed the honour of first chap. xv. planting their feet on the French soil. Under a brisk fire from the enemy's piquets, they contin- ued their advance against the French line, which was hurriedly forming on the nearest range of hills. The first division came up soon after, and the enemy were driven from their works in gallant style, with the loss of six pieces of artillery. The brigade of General Hay, in par- ticular, distinguished itself. It attacked the enemy in three successive positions, with the most perfect success. The attack of the light division on the posi- tion of Bera was peculiarly brilliant. The ap- proach was narrow, and completely commanded by several strong redoubts on the acclivities and summits of the steep mountains above the vil- lage of Bera. But these obstacles did not re- tard the advance of the division. General Sker- ret's brigade, led by Colonel Colburne, attacked the right of the position, and drove the enemy from his entrenchments by a most gallant charge. The brigade of General Kempt attacked the DMS of Bera, and carried it with little difficulty. The result of these operations was the capture 372 THE FRENCH DRIVEN BACK ON THE NIVELLE. 1813. October. li l» I CHAF. xv.of Upwards of four hundred prisoners, and of three pieces of cannon. General Giron likewise succeeded in carrying the lower slopes of La Rhune. But the sum- mit was still maintained hy the enemy, when the approach of darkness prevented the prosecution of further measures to dislodge them. In the morning, however, the post was surrendered after a feeble reaistance ; and General Giron pushing forward, the enemy were forced to aban- don the whole of their intrenchments. These important successes were achieved with a loss comparatively small on the part of the allies. It amounted, altogether, to little more than fifteen hundred men. The resistance of the enemy was certainly more trifling than was anticipated, owing partly, perhaps to the secrecy and suddenaeaa of the attack, and part- ly to the circumstance that the views of Sonh were chiefly directed to the concentration of his army behind a strongly-fortified line on the Ni- velie. The allied army now occupied a range of eom- maading situatioat, from which it might at any moment continue its advance into the French PROCLAMATION OP LORD WELLINGTON. 373 territory. The surrender of Pampluna at length chap. xv. removed the obstacle which had hitherto tram- melled its operations, and forced it to hnger q^^^i^. inactive on the frontier. On the thirty-first of October, the garrison, four thousand in num- ber, surrendered prisoners of war, and all the artillery and stores were given up. The only cause of delay being thus removed, Lord Wel- lington immediately determined to assume the offensive, and drive the French army from its position. Before transferring his operations to the French territory. Lord Wellington issued a pro- clamation to the army, prescribing the conduct to be observed on passing the frontier. Nothing can more honourably mark the wisdom and hu- manity of the British Commander, than the re- g^ulations which, at sach a moment, were impe- ratively promulgated to the troops. As an ex- ample to future ages, and a contrast to the fero- cious system of intimidation adopted by the ene- my in Spain, the following clauses are worthy of historical commemoration :— • << Officers and Soldiers must recoUect, that their nations are at war with France, solely be- cause the ruler of the French nation will not al- » 374 DISCIPLINE ENFORCED BY LORD WELLINGTON. i\ II CHAP. XV. low them to be at peace, and is desirous of for- cing them to submit to his yoke ; and they must Octobe "*** forget, that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy, in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal, have been occasioned by the irre- gularities of his soldiers, and their cruelties, au- thorized and encouraged by their chiefs, toward the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country. To avenge this conduct on the peace- able inhabitants of France, would be unman- ly and unworthy of the nations to which the Commander of the Forces now addresses him- lelf.'* To enforce this order, however, was no easy task. In the British army, indeed, the system of discipline was too rigid, and the conduct pre- scribed too much in unison with the individual feelings of the officers, for any glaring breach of it to remain undetected or unpunished ; but the Spaniards and Portuguese were filled with too powerful a remembrance of the atrocities perpe- trated in the Peninsula by the French armies, Dot to feel desirous of retaliating on the French people the evils under which their own countries had so severely suffered. Cases of outrage, therefore, did at first occur ; but the firmness of BOULT's POSITION ON THE NIVELLE. 375 Lord Wellington in bringing the offenders to chap, x v. punishment, speedily put a stop to such vindic- ~7^7«~ tive demonstrations, which the peaceful charac- October. ter of the inhabitants did nothing to provoke. During all the operations in the south of France the strictest discipline was maintained ; and the forage and provisions necessary for the sup- ply of the troops were paid for at the highest price. Thus secure from spoliation, and certain of a favourable market for their produce, the inha- bitants of the country in a short time returned to their dwellings, and established a peaceful and lucrative traffic with the invading army. On the failure of his efforts in the Pyrenees, Soult had directed the formation of a strong line of defence, about twelve miles in extent, covering the town of St. Jean de Luz, and extending from the sea across the Nivelle to the heights behind Ainhoe. The whole front of this position was strongly fortified ; and the right, in particular, was covered by several formidable redoubts, and by an interior line of very considerable strength. In the centre, the line extended along the left of the Nivelle, which, at that part, forms a consider- able inflexion in rear of the mountain Petite La 376 LORD WELLINGTON ATTACKS SOULT's POSITION. i CHAP. XV. Rhaoe^ along a range of heights, covered on the .Q. left by the Sarre. The line then crossed the NoTdnber. ^^^®^^®» ***" the Nivelle. The garrison of one re- doubt alone attempted to repulse the assailants. While the light division were escalading the work, the column of Marshal Beresford succeed- ed in intercepting the retreat of the garrison, and an entire French battalion, nearly six hun- dred strong, was in consequence made prisoners. In the meanwhile. Sir Rowland Hill made a powerful attack on the heights of Ainhoe. The troops moved om in echelons of divisions ; and the sixth division, supported by that of Sir John Hamilton, having first crossed the Nivelle, came in contact with the enemy's right, posted behind the village, and at once carried the whole of his defences on that flank. The second divison was equally successful in its attack on a redoubt on a parallel ridge in the rear ; and both divisions then advanced to Espellate, when the enemy, afraid of being intercepted, abandoned their ad- vanced line in front of Ainhoe, and retreated in some confusion towards Cambo. During these operations, a detachment of fif- teen hundred Spaniards of Mina's division moved along the heights of Maya, and attacked the ad- BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE. 381 vanced post of the enemy in that direction, chap. xv. Their onset was vigorous, and the French were TT' at first forced to retire ; but, being reinforced, .^ . they again returned to the assault, and beat the Spaniards back nearly to the village of Maya. The heights on both sides of the Nivelle being thug carried, the third and seventh di- visions were directed to move by the left, and the sixth division by the right of the ri* ver, against a ridge of fortified heights near St. Pe, where the enemy was observed to be collect- ing in considerable force. These divisions came up, and, after a smart engagement with the ene- my, drove them in confusion from the position. By this success the troops of the centre were established in rear of the enemy's right, which still remained in their works. But the extreme extent of the line of movement, and the great difficulty of part of the ground to be crossed, joined to the approach of night, prevented Lord Wellington from pushing farther the advantages he had acquired. Marshal Sonlt took advantage of the darkness to retire the force from his right, and resigned hie whole line to the vietopi- oas army. The result of these splendid operations was R 382 BE9ULTS OF THE BATTLE. CHAP. XV. the capture of fifty guns, fifteen hundred prison- ers, and a considerable quantity of stores and V ammunition. The loss of the victors little ex- riov ember. ceeded five hundred killed and two thousand wounded, — an amount of casualties almost incre- dibly small, when the strength of the position occupied by the enemy, and the amount of the forces engaged, are taken into calculation. The truth is, that the enemy, in defending his works on the Nivelle, did not display that cou- rage and resolution, by which, aided by the talent of their leaders, the French army had earned trophies ia every quarter of Europe. They were dispirited and disheartened by a con- tinued series of defeats, and no longer met their opponents in the field with that confident antici- pation of victory, which, like other prophetic as- pirations, frequently contribute to their own ful- filment. Had it been otherwise, the loss of the allied army must have been very severe. Though the whole of the allied army conduct- ed itself in a manner impossible to be surpassed, no small portion of the success must be attri- buted to the artillery under Colonel Dickson. By the indefatigable exertions of that oflBcer, artillery was brought to bear on the enemy's THE ALLIED ARMY GO INTO CANTONMENTS. 383 works from situations which appeared utterly chap. xv. inaccessible to that arm. Mountain g^ns, bar- ' nessed on mules trained for the service, ascend- vt J ed the most diflScult ridges, and showered down destruction on the entrenchments below. Even in the situations where the enemy considered themselves most secure, they found they had miscalculated, and suffered very severely from the action of the British guns. The achievements of the tenth of November were followed by an interval of repose. The allied army went into cantonments between the Nivelle and the sea, while Marshal Soult with- drew his army within an entrenched camp in front of Bayonne. The shortness of the space which divided the armies, induced Lord Wel- lington to adopt the precautionary measure of establishing a defensive line of outposts, to pro- tect the divisions from sudden attack. It ex- tended from the sea along the front of the allied position to Cambo on the right. Daring the whole of November the weather continued inclement ; and the heavy and almost incessant rains, induced Lord Wellington to continue his troops in their cantonments. The 384 OPERATIONS ON THE XIVE. THE FRENCH DRIVEN INTO BAYONNE. 385 \P CHAP. XV. enemy, in the meanwhile, guarded the right bank of the Nire, and communicated, by strong d1!1^, patroles of caralry, with a divisicm, nnder ^^^'^^'' General Paris, stationed at St. Jean Pied de Port. Thw the allies occupied only the con- fined space between the sea and the Nive, and were cot off from the whole country beyond t^t rrrer, which afforded large supplies to the enemy. Lord WeUington, therefore, determined to cross the Nive, and drive back the advanced posts of the enemy, from the strong ground they occupied between the Nive and the Adour. The ninth of December was the day fixed for the execution of these intentions. At ten o'clock on the evening of the eighth, the pontoon train passed through Aranntz as quiet- ly as possible, and the troops were ordered to be under arms three hours before daylight. The left wing, under Sir John Hope, was di- rected to advance by the great road leading from St. Jean de Lua?, and reconnoitre the ene- my's entrenched camp near Bayonne. 9n Row land Hill was to cross the Nive at Cambo, and the sixth division, under Sir Henry Clinton, at Ustarits. Deed. Accordingly, at day-dawn, Sir John Hope chap. xv. commenced his advance, and the enemy on his . approach retreated, covered by his light troops, Oeeembor. which skirmished with the advance of the allies. By one o'clock, the left wing had gained the heights on the right of the Bayonne road, and the enemy were driven into their intrenched camp. Sir Rowland Hill with his corps passed the river by a deep ford above Cambo, and flanking the enemy's left at Urcuray, without resist- ance gained possession of the great road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Bayonne. The sixth division having crossed at Ustaritz, attack- ed a position to which the enemy had retired at Ville Franque, and speedily dislodged them. Darkness then came on, of which the enemy took advantage to withdraw all his posts within the lines of Bayonne; and Sir John Hope, with the left wing, returned to his former cantonments. On the morning of the tenth, Dec 10. Sir Rowland Hill established his corps with its right resting on the Adour, its left on the heights above the village of Ville Franque, and the centre in front of Vieux Monguerre, covering VOL. III. R 3«li BAYONNE. SOULT ASSUMES THE OFFENSIVE. 387 CHAF. XV. the road to St. Jean Pied de Port. The sixth division re-crossed to the left of the Nive. l)orpm»)^r Bayonne is situated at the point of confluence of the Nive and the Adour. The former which, during the greater part of its course, is a rapid mounUin stream of little consequence, bi^coraes unfordable for several miles above the city. The latter is a riverof greater magnitude, and descend- ing from the centre of the Pyrenees, in a course of fifty leagues, waters and enriches the plains of Gascony, and at Bayonne faUs into the sea. The town is strongly fortified on three sides, and on the fourth is covered by the Adour, which di- vides it from the city or suburb of St. Esprit. The citadel or castle likewise stands on the right of the Adour, across which there is a bridge, and commands the whole city and the anchor- age. It is the work of the celebrated Vauban, and of very considerable strength. In addition to the defences of the town, the enemy had formed an intrenched camp on the left of the Adour, covered in front by an impenetrable mo- rass, and sufficiently spacious to contain an army. There were only two roads practicable for artillery, by which Bayonne could be approach- ed from the south — the one leading from St, chap. xv. Jean de Luz, the other from St. Jean Pied T" de Port. All the other approaches were of the r* u' "^^ December. most miserable description, and, in the depth of winter, wholly impassable for carriages of any sort. While the armies were thus posted, Soult could direct an attack at pleasure on any portion of his adversary's line, the communications a- long which were of the worst and most difficult description. He likewise enjoyed this advan- tage, that, even if defeated, he had a secure retreat opened to him within the lines of Ba- yonne. Accordingly, on the morning of the tenth, Soult assumed the ofi'ensive, and directed a powerful attack on the left of the allied army covering St. Jean de Luz, the great entrepot for the supply of the allied array. At daybreak, he moved out of Bayonne with Dec. 10. the main body of his army, and advanced by the wood of St. Jean de Luz, to attack the left wing, under Sir John Hope. The road was defended by the fifth division, under Major-General Hay, stationed on the strong plateau of Barouillet, hav- ing the Portuguese brigade of General Campbell in its front. The light division was posted at Ar- W 'A^\ ATTACK OX THE LEFT WING. ATTACK ON THE LIGHT DIVISION. :m9 < HAF. xv.canques, about two miles on the right, between which and Barouillet there was a broad valley, 1818 Dweiniier ^**^ch had DOt been occupied, in the belief that the enemy would not venture to advance in this direction, with posts of such strength on either Hank. A column of the enemy first came in contact with General Campbell's Portuguese brigade, which retired for support on the fifth division on the plateau of Barouillet. Another column attacked the light division, and drove their out- posts within the village of Arcanques, which had been strongly intrenched. A strong body, however, pushed forward some distance beyond the left flank of the light division, and directed a powerful attack on the right of the fifth divi- sion, with the evident object of penetrating be- tween the two allied corps, in the direction of Arbonne. The fifth division, attacked in great force in front and flank, maintained its ground with the utmost gallantry, but its loss was very severe, and Major-General Robinson was wounded. In front of Barouillet, there is a thick coppice wood, and on tlie right there is a large field and an orchard. Through these the enemy came on in great strength, and having driven chap, xv in General Campbell's Portuguese brigade, and "TTJTiT" the brigade of General Robinson, which had npoember. been sent forward to support it, at length suc- ceeded in penetrating beyond the front of the position. At this moment, a Portuguese batta- lion, on the left flank, moved forward by the road, and wheeling into the rear of the wood, charged back on the French columns. The ninth regiment, on the right, made a similar movement ; and the enemy, thus unexpectedly attacked in rear, was compelled to retreat, with a heavy loss in killed and prisoners. The enemy, however, notwithstanding this check, renewed their attacks, and again attempt- ed to dislodge the fifth division from their ground. But the brigade of Guards coming up to their support, the French columns were uni- formly repulsed, till the approach of night put a close to the combat. In the meantime, the attacks on the light di- yision at Arcanques had been scarcely less ani- mated and persevering than those on the left. Repeated eff^orts were made by the enemy to drive the light division from their defences, which were always repulsed with great loss ; HIP 390 REPULSE OF SOULT. CHAP. XV. but, at the close of the day, the French troops retained possession of the plateau of Bassussary, December. ^" ^^® immediate front of Arcanques. During the night, Soult retired the bulk of his force from its position in front of Sir John Hope, with the intention of attacking the light division in overwhelming numbers. At day- I)w. 11. break on the following morning, the enemy's piquets were driven in by the fifth division, and the sentries were again pushed forward to their former stations. Sir John Hope, suspecting the enemy's intention, moved part of his corps to their right to support the light division. This occasioned a change in the plans of Marshal Soult, who, conceiving that the force at iiarou- illet had thus been materially weakened, again directed several columns against that point. The morning had passed quietly, the troops on the left had received their rations, and parties had been sent out to cut wood, when the alarm was given that the enemy were approaching. The cry of " To arms !" was instantly echoed by a thousand voices, and the fatigue-parties ran hastily back to assume their stations in the ranks. On observing this, loud cheers were heard from the enemy, and with shouts of " en SOULT CHANGES HIS PLANS. 391 avant ! en avant /'* their columns advanced to chap. xv. the attack. 1813. In a few moments, however, the left wing was December. under arms, and formed to receive them. The efforts of the enemy were less vigorous than on the preceding day; and they were again repulsed with considerable loss. At the close of the day, both armies remained in the same positions which they had occupied on the preceding night. On the morning of the twelfth, the French Dec. 12. were still observed to be in great force in front of the left wing, and their movements gave indica- tion of an intention to renew the attack in that quarter. In the afternoon, the enemy push- ed forward a body of tirailleurs, and some se- vere skirmishing took place with the piquets, but no attempt was made to advance in force, and night again closed without any change having taken place in the positions of the hostile armies. IMarshal Soult had now resigned all hope of penetrating the left of the allied army, but con- ceiving that the pertinacity of his attacks on that part of the line must have induced Lord Wel- lington to withdraw a considerable portion of his troops from the right, he determined on an entire change in his plan of attack. During the night 392 SUOLT ATTACKS SIR ROWLAND HILL I CHAP. XV . of the twelfth, therefore, availing himself of the 1813. ^*<^»l*tie9 afforded by his position, he withdrew December. ^^^ whole force through Bayonne, with the inten- tion of attacking the right of the army under Sir Rowland Hill. But Soult was again deceived in his calcula- tions. The probability of such a manceuvre on the part of the enemy had occurred to Lord Wellington, and measures had been taken to prevent its success. Orders were given to the fourth and sixth divisions to move to the support of the right, and the third division was held in readiness to cross the Nive, and afford still fur- ther support if required. The force, under the immediate command of Sir Rowland Hill, consisted of about thirteen thousand men. It was distributed as follows : On the left of his position a range of heights extends from the village of Ville Franque along the Nive, towards Bayonne. It is bounded by the river on one side, and by a deep valley, in the bottom of which are several large mill-dams, on the other. On this ridge was stationed Gen- eral Pringle's brigade of the second division. On the right, in front of the village Vieux Monguerre, there U abo a long ridge of high WITH HIS WHOLE FORCE. .S9.3 ground, which is bounded on the right by the chap. xv. Adour, and on the left by several mill-dams. On this was stationed the brigade of General Byng. oecember. The centre extended along a ridge of heights opposite to the village of St. Pierre D'Irube, and in front of the heights of Petit IMonguerre. It consisted of General Barnes's brigade, and the Portuguese brigade of General Ashworth. Two Portuguese brigades were posted in rear of Ville Franque, and formed a reserve. At daylight on the morning of the thirteenth, J^pf. Ki Soult issued from his intrenched camp with a force of thirty thousand men, and directed the inarch of his columns against the centre of Sir Rowland Hill. This general was no sooner a- ware of the enemy's intention, than he moved the brigade of General Byng, with the excep- tion of one battalion^ to support the right of the centre ; and a Portuguese brigade was brought up from Ville Franque to strength- en it on the left. As the enemy's columns advanced up the long acclivities in front of the centre, they were subjected to a most de- structive fire of artillery, and the havoc in their ranks was very great. The French, how- ever, continued their advance, driving in the r2 394 80ULT IS REPULSED, P «' CHAP. XV. piquets and the light troops which had been sent , „ forward to their support. The engagement then December, ^^caro© very warm. The enemy, in spite of the most determined resistance, succeeded, by supe- riority of numbers, in gaining possession of a height close to the position, and was continuing to gain ground when the brigades ordered to the support of the centre came up. The bat- tle was then waged on more equal terms, and after a long and strenuous contest, the French were driven back. The whole of the regiments in General Barnes's brigade distinguished them- selves by repeated charges on the enemy, and the conduct of the Portuguese troops was also marked by the greatest gallantry and firmness. The attack on General Pringle on the left was apparently intended to be merely auxiliary to the chief effort in the centre. During its continuance the enemy kept up a warm fire from his tirail- leurs, but did not venture any earnest and de- cided attack on the position. The guns, however, being advantageously posted, did considerable execution. In the meanwhile the enemy pushed for- ward a column on the right, in order to turn the flank of the position, to the village of Vieux AND DRAWS OFF HIS TROOPS. 395 MongTierre. The Buffs, and some companies of chap, xv light troops, which remained on that flank when "T7TT" the remainder of General Byng's brigade had December. been withdrawn, were at first forced to retire t(» some heighU in rear of the village. Being or- dered, however, by Sir Rowland Hill to recover the post, they attacked the enemy in the village, and drove him from it, with the loss of some prisoners. Thus had the utmost efforts of ^larshal Soult been defeated by the corps of Sir Rowland Hill, without any assistance from the divisions which Lord Wellington had directed to move to his support. Nothing could exceed the skill and coolness which Sir Rowland Hill displayed in this unequal contest, or the precision with which every movement was executed by the troops. He was ably seconded by the Honourable Sir William Stewart, whose gallantry, promptitude, and judgment, were conspicuous throughout the day. Soult drew off his troops and retired to some strong ground in front of the intrenched camp, where he remained in great force In order to dislodge them. General Byng's brigade was di- rected to gain possession of a height on their 394 SOULT IS REPULSED, ! CHAP. XV. piquets and the light troops which had heen sent forward to their support. The engagement then December. I>ecaro6 very warm. The enemy, in spite of the most determined resistance, succeeded, hy supe- riority of numbers, in gaining possession of a height close to the position, and was continuing to gain ground when the brigades ordered to the support of the centre came up. The bat- tle was then waged on more equal terms, and after a long and strenuous contest, the French were driven back. The whole of the regiments in General Barnes's brigade distinguished them- selves by repeated charges on the enemy, and the conduct of the Portuguese troops was also marked by the greatest gallantry and firmness. The attack on General Pringle on the left was apparently intended to be merely auxiliary to the chief effort in the centre. During its continuance the enemy kept up a warm fire from his tirail- leurs, but did not venture any earnest and de- cided attack on the position. The guns, however, being advantageously posted, did considerable execution. In the meanwhile the enemy pushed for- ward a column on the right, in order to turn the flank of the position, to the village of Vieux AND DRAWS OFF HIS TROOPS. 395 Monguerre. The Buffs, and some companies of chap. xv. light troops, which remained on that flank when ^g^^ the remainder of General Byng's brigade had December, been withdrawn, were at first forced to retire to some heights in rear of the village. Being or- dered, however, by Sir Rowland Hill to recover the post, they attacked the enemy in the village, and drove him from it, with the loss of some prisoners. Thus had the utmost efforts of Marshal Soult been defeated by the corps of Sir Rowland Hill, without any assistance from the divisions which Lord Wellington had directed to move to his support. Nothing could exceed the skill and coolness which Sir Rowland Hill displayed in this unequal contest, or the precision with which every movement was executed by the troops. He was ably seconded by the Honourable Sir William Stewart, whose gallantry, promptitude, and judgment, were conspicuous throughout the day. Soult drew off his troops and retired to some strong ground in front of the intrenched camp, where he remained in great force In order to dislodge them. General Byng's brigade was di- rected to gain possession of a height on their '■< 396 RESULT OfF THESE ENGAGEMENTS. OBSERVATIONS. 397 CHAP. XV. left. This was done. General Bjrng led on the jg23 troops to the attack, and ascending the hill un- December. ^^^ a heavy fire of musquetry and artillery, the enemy were driven down in some confusion, with the loss of two guns. An effort made to regain this post encountered a severe repulse, and the Portuguese brigade of General Buchan coming up, the enemy did not venture to renew the attack. The result of the operations from the ninth to the thirteenth of December, during which the troops were exposed to the weather, at the most inclement season of the year, was honourable, in the highest degree, to the allied army. Though Soult, from his situation, possessed the advan- tage of being able to bear with his whole force on any point of an extended and vulnerable line, in none of his attacks, made in vast superiority of numbers, did he succeed in gaining any advan- tage. He could not, by all his efforts, recover a single yard of ground, from that adversary whom he had declared himself prepared to drive tri- umphantly beyond the Ebro. He had repeated- ly attacked with an army, and been repulsed by a division. The loss of the allied army, during these con- tests, was very severe. It amounted altogether cha p. xv. to nearly five thousand men. That of the enemy, 1813, as iriven by the returns of the different corps, December, was about six thousand. On the eleventh, two battalions of Nassau troops, having received in- telligence of the liberation of their country, de- serted from the enemy, in hope of being thus enabled to join their restored sovereign. The fierce and stormy contest which for five days had raged between the armies, was follow- ed by a calm of some duration. The extreme rigour of the season induced Lord Wellington to keep his troops in cantonments, and in this quarter no military events of any consequence took place before the close of the year. The truth is, the proud and palmy days of the French army were gone. They were now be- come as familiar with defeat as they had formerly been with victory. The confidence of the troops had been broken by a continued series of disas- ters. Many of the veterans of Spain had been withdrawn, and the ranks were filled np with raw conscripts, forced into the service at a mo- ment when the French standard was sullied by defeat in every quarter of Europe. The ap- prentice was taken from his master, the student if: n I > t 398 CATALONIA. i| I n', CHAP. XV. from his college ; and they came, not voluntarily 1813 ^^^ animated hy the high aspirings of yoothfal December, ardour, hut chained together like felons, the en- forced defenders of their invaded country, and the supporters of that tyranny under which they suffered. It was with such unhopeful materials that Soult had to oppose the march of a victorious army, superior in numbers, in discipline, in con- fidence, and in powers of physical endurance. The difficulties of his situation were great and manifold, and the bold and skilful manner in which he struggled with these, neglecting no effort, and allowing no advantage to escape, re- tarding the progress of his enemy where he could not prevent it, and yielding no tenable position without a struggle, unquestionably mark him as a general of the highest order. We must now turn for a moment to Catalon- ia. The necessities of the Emperor occasioned large drafts to be made from the French army in the east of Spain. All thought of conquest in that quarter had been resigned ; and Napo- leon, in the hope of being able to render the army of Suchet available for his necessities, Dec. 11. and to excite division among the allies, con- TREATY WITH FERDINAND. 399 Dec. 18. eluded a secret treaty with Ferdinand, at Valen- chap, xv M, the object of which was to detach Spain ^^^^ from the coalition. By this treaty it was stipu- o^ember. lated that the Spanish territory should be evacu- ated by the troops both of England and France, and that all who had taken office under Joseph, should be secured in all their titles, offices, and estates. The Duke de San Carlos was imme- diately despatched to Madrid with a copy of this document, bearing a letter from the King, in which the members of the existing govern- ment were directed instantly to ratify it in the customary forms. But the concessions of Napoleon were too evidently wrung from him by the pressure of circumstances, to have any influence on the go- vernment of Madrid. They were unwilling to desist from hostilities, on the mere faith of a treaty without guarantee of any kind ; and the situation of Ferdinand, as a prisoner, was such afl to deprive his assent of all valid power in binding the nation. The reply of the Regency, therefore, conveyed expressions of joy at the approaching liberation of the country, and the restoration of its royal line; but was accom- panied by a copy of the decree of the Cortes, m 1814. Jan. 8. 400 THE CORTES REFUSE TO RATIFY THE TREATY. FRANCE. 401 CHAP. XV. passed some years before, declaring that no pub- lie act of the King, while in a state of durance, December. ^^^^ ^® recognised by the existing govern- ment of Spain. The arrival of the Duke of San Carlos at Mad- rid was followed by that of the celebrated Palafox, bearing another letter from Ferdinand, urging, in stronger terms, the immediate ratification of the treaty. But the Regency were immovable, and the Cardinal de Bourbon, in reply, informed his Majesty that an ambassador had been sent, in his name, to a congress of the belligerent powers, to treat for peace on an enlarged and secure basis. In the meanwhile, Suchet was chiefly occupied in escorting convoys of provisions to Barcelona. And satisfied with retaining possession of the fortified places, he remained, prepared to shape his course as the current of events might direct. With such events in the south of France and in Spain did the year close. It had witnessed the total and final discomfiture of one of the most profligate invasions in which cold and pro- fligate ambition ever ventured to embark, and presented an example of vicissitude in human aflairs, more extraordinary in its circumstances. i / I and memorable in its results, than any of which c hap, xv . the pages of history bear record. Napoleon, for ^g^^^ the first time, had been made to feel the full ef- fects of his ambition, and of conquests extend- ed too far to be either successfully maintained or honourably resigned. On every side his armies, hitherto so formidable, had encountered defeat. The monarchs whom he had humbled in the zenith of his prosperity, now declared against him ; and after experiencing a succession of re- verses, scarcely less decisive than those of the preceding campaign, he was driven across the Rhine, with the scanty and miserable relics of a vast army. Under these circumstances it was that Napo- leon returned to Paris ; and, announcing to his Nov. 9. Council of State the desperate situation of the country, demanded new sacrifices. He address- ed them in a strain of turbid and disconnected eloquence, which spoke the distraction of his own feelings, and could not be heard unmoved by men elevated by the remembrance of past gran- deur, and influenced by the immediate terrors of hostile invasion. « Wellington," he said, " is in the south ; the Russians threaten the northern frontier ; Aus- i >•*■ 402 SPEECH OF NAPOLEON TO THE SENATE. MODERATION OF THE CONFEDERATES. 4f03 CHAP, xv.tria, the south-eastern; yet, shame to speak it ! 1813 ^^^ nation has not risen in mass to repel them. — Every ally has abandoned me — the Bavarians have betrayed me ! — Peace ? No peace, till Mu- nich is in flames ! — I demand of you three hun- dred thousand men. I will form a camp at Bourdeaux of a hundred thousand — another at Lyons— a third at Metz. With the rem- nants of my former levies, I shall have a million of men under arms. But it is men whom I de- mand of you — full-grown men, in the prime of life; not these miserable conscript striplings, who choke my hospitals with sick, and my high- ways with their carcasses— Give up Holland ? rather resign it to the sea!— The word peace is ever in my ear, when all around should re-echo with the cry of war f" It was in such language that Napoleon gave expression to the wild tumult by which his spi- rit was convulsed. Reckless alike of human blood or human misery in following the frantic schemes of his ambition, he demanded fresh vic- tims ; and his cry, like that of the sisters of the Horseleech, was " Give, give !" The Senate, awed and intimidated, acceded to his demands. They at once passed decrees, ordaining a levy of three hundred thousand men, and doubling the chap. xv. public contributions. But the execution of such ^^ ^ ^ edicts was becoming daily more difficult, in a country already drained of its male population, and of its wealth ; and they were probably pass- ed, rather with the view of supporting Napoleon in the negotiations then pending with the Allied Powers, than with any expectation that so vast an augmentation of men and revenue could be furnished by the nation. In the meanwhile, though little obstacle inter- vened to the immediate invasion of France, the allies paused for a time in their career of success, and issued a public declaration, that their views were limited to the establishment of peace on equal and honourable terms, to which the ambition of Napoleon opposed the only ob- stacle. By this measure the hold which he pos- sessed on public opinion was weakened ; and the French nation, exhausted by the exertions of the baneful struggle, relinquishing all hope of conquest, thought only on peace. Hitherto, however, Wellington alone had in- vaded the French territory, and he it was who first broke the charm of imaginary sanctity with which the long absence of foreign aggression had invested it in the minds of the people. .♦I li 404 POSITION OP THE ARMIES. CHAPTER XVI. BATTLES OF ORTHEZ AND TOULOUSE. CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. CHAP.XVI. At the commencement of 1814, the allied "Tr!~ army occupied a line extending from Bidart on January. ^^® '®^ *® Arcanques and Ville Fran que, with the right thrown back en potence to Urcuray, on the road to St. Jean Pied dePort. The head-quarters of Lord Wellington were at St. Jean de Lua. In order to guard against surprise, telegraphic sig- nal stations were established in the cantonments of the different divisions, to give notice of any movement of the enemy. The French army occupied a defensive posi- tion, with its right, under Reille, in the in- trenched 'camp; its centre, under Drouet, ex- tending along the right of the Adour to Port de * Lanne, guarding the islands De Broc and De Berens ; and its left, under Clausel, along the .....#^. POSITION OF THE ARMIES. 405 right of the Bidouse, from its confluence with chap.xvi. the Adour to St. Palais ; the flank being cover- "[^^ ed by the cavalry. General Harispe, a Basque januar>. by birth, who had been recalled from Catalonia in order to organize a system of Guerilla war- fare among the mountaineers, was at St. Jean • Pied de Port, with a corps of irregulars, and a weak division of troops of the line.* For the support of this line on the right of the Pau, Hastingues had been strongly re- trenched, and the bridges on the Bidouse at Guiche, Bidache, and Come, were protected by tetes-de-pont, A bridge, covered by strong works, had been thrown across the Ardour at Port de Lanne, and a series of redoubts had been erected along the line of the river. The works of St. Jean Pied de Port were strengthened and • The eflforts of General Harispe failed of success. By dint of great exertion, he succeeded in assembUng a few bands of his countrymen, for the purpose of desultory war on the flank and rear of the alUed army ; but these were easUy kept in check by the Spanish GuerUlas, under Mina. The inhabitants, in gene- ral, were peaceable spectators of the contest waging m their country, and few instances occurred of their attempting acts of hostility. No motives of patriotism prevented their supplying the alUed army with provisions of all sorts, which were paid for regularly ; while Soult, who had neitlier the means nor the in- clination to follow such a course, could only obtain by enforced requisitions the means of subsisting his army. 406 ARRIVAL OF THE DUKE d'aNGOULEME. MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMIES. 407 I] v 1814. January. CHAP.XVI. repaired ; and the town of Dax was retrencked, to serve as an entrepot for supplies and reinforce- ments drawn from the interior. The impossibility of advancing through a country full of strong posts, and intersected by rapid streams, at a season when, by the heavy rains, the rivers had overflowed their banks, and the cross roads were impassable, prevented the movement of the allied army for a considerable period. Early in January, the Due d'Angou- leme arrived at St. Jean de Lnz from England, accompanied by a small suite. Lord Welling- ton, while he received the Prince with all the respect due to his birth and his misfortunes, was unwilling to commit his country by a rash and premature adoption of the Bourbon cause ; and requested him to appear only in the charac- ter of a simple volunteer, since, by the instruc- tions of his government, he was not authorized to receive him in any higher character. Never- theless, an address to the French nation, calling on them to renounce their allegiance to the ex- isting dynasty, and restore their ancient line of Princes, was circulated, by many private chan- nels, through the country, and produced in se- veral of the provinces a powerful effect. Till the middle of February no collision chap.xvi. took place between the armies, except a few ca- .-. . J IT • 1814. valry skirmishes on the Joyeuse, and an affair February. between Mina and General Harispe, in which the former was compelled to retreat into the valley of Bustan. The weather having then become more favourable. Lord Wellington pre- pared to take the field. His first object was to drive the enemy from his line on the Bidouse, and force him to abandon the whole country on the left of the Adour. With this view, the corps of Sir Rowland Hill broke up from its canton- ments on the fourteenth, and moved on Hellete Feb. 14. to turn the enemy's left, and cut off his commu- nication with St. Jean Pied de Port. By this movement General Harispe was forced to retire on St. Palais, leaving a garrison of fifteen hun- dred men in St. Jean Pied de Port ; and, on the day following, he continued his retreat to Gar- Feb. 15. ris. The Spanish corps of Mina then returned, and blockaded St. Jean Pied de Port. General Harispe, being joined by another body of troops near Garris, took post on the heights of La Montague. The position was strong; but Lord Wellington conceiving it possible to cut him off from the bridge of St. Palais, deter- 406 AFFAIR NEAR GARRIS. cHAP.xvi. mined instantly to attack him, though the only troops at his immediate disposal were the second ^1^^' division, under Sir WUliam Stewart, and the reoruary. ' . j i. Spanish corps of Morillo. The Spaniards, there- fore, were directed to march on St. Palais as ra- pidly as possible, while the British advanced to attack the position in front. The second division, with great gallantry, as- cended the heights, and drove down the enemy with the bayonet. The French made repeated efforts to recover their ground, but without suc- cess ; and the march of Morillo on his rear, at length compelled General Harispe to put his force in retreat, after suifering considerable loss. The Spaniards having been unable to reach St. Palais in time to intercept his retreat. Gen- eral Harispe was enabled to cross the Bidouse without molestation. This contest was not more remarkable for the gallantry displayed by the troops on both sides, than for the circum- stance of its being chiefly waged in the dark, night having come on during the struggle. On the day foUowing, Sir Rowland Hill cross- ed the Bidouse, and continued the pursuit. On Feb. 17. tl»e seventeenth, the enemy were found posted behind the Gave de Mauleon, having destroyed 80ULT TAKES POST AT SAUVETERRE. 409 the bridge at Arivarette. Under protection chap.xvi. of the artillery, however, the ninety-second re- "TTTT" giment crossed the stream by a ford, and attack- pebruary. ed the French troops in Arivarette. The ene- my retired ; and in the night passed the Gave* d'Oleron, and took up a position at Sauveterre. By these successes, the enemy had been driv- en from a country of peculiar difficulty, which, from its frequent intersection by rivers, afford- ed great advantages for defence. The position occupied by the enemy at Sauveterre was very strong, and covered in front by a broad and rapid river. The greater part of Soult's force being concentrated] in that neighbourhood. Lord Wellington determined to distract the enemy's attention by a general movement of the whole army to its front, thus simultaneously threaten- ing him at different points, while Sir Rowland Hill should turn his left by crossing the Gave d'Oleron at Villenave. This manoeuvre was at- . tended by the most complete success. Marshal • The torrents or rapids of the different rivers are known hy the vernacular name of gaveSf by the inhabitants of the coun- try. These gaves are distinguished among each other by the addition of the name of the principal town near which they flow ; for example, the Gave de Mauleon, the Gave d'Oleron, &c. VOL. III. S li* 410 OPERATIONS IN FRONT OP BAYONNB. PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR. 411 » CHAP.xvi. Beresford drove the French posts within the tete-de-pont of Peyrehorade. Sir Rowland Hill Februai^y. effected the passage of the Gave on the twenty- fourth; and Soult hastened to concentrate his forces behind the Pan, leaving in Bayonne a garrison barely sufficient for the defence of the works. We must now torn to the operations of the left wing in the immediate front of Bayonne. Lord Wellington determined to pass the left wing across the Adour below the city, by a bridge of boats. Preparations had been in pro- gress for this purpose for some time, but, from the breadth of the river, and the strength of the tides, it was necessary to employ vessels of from twenty to thirty tons burthen. These, however, Feb. 22. had been provided, and, on the twenty-second, waited only for a fair wind to sail from St. Jean de Luz to the mouth of the Adour. Feb. 23.. On the morning of the twenty-third. Sir John Hope moved forward with the left wing ; and driving in the enemy's outposts, formed a cordon round the town, terminating both above and be- low on the Adour. The heavy guns were with great labour and difficulty conveyed across the soft sandy ground to the banks of the Adour, immediately below the intrenched camp where chap.jtvi they were placed in battery. At the same time the fifth division obliged the French piquets, be- petruary. tween the Nive and the Adour, to retire within the intrenched camp on that side. The squadron, with the bridge-vessels, under Rear Admiral Penrose, having been detained by contrary winds. Sir John Hope determined to make an immediate effort to cross the river by means of pontoon rafts, guided by ropes ; and having succeeded in stretching a hawser across the river, the project was put in immediate exe- cution. The enemy, trusting to the width and depth of the river, and the rapidity of the current, of- fered no opposition, their attention being appa- rently engrossed by the warm fire kept up by the British artillery on an armed corvette at anchor near the town. Owing to the strength of the tides, the rafts worked slowly, and in the evening only about six hundred of the Guards, and two companies of the sixtieth rifle corps, had been conveyed to the right bank. The French at length discovered their error in neglecting to defend the passage of the river below the city, and a little before dark two bat- I 11 i i 412 PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR. PASSAGE OP THE ADOUR. 413 cHAP.xvi.talions were moved forward to attack the de- tachments which had already crossed. General I ffl I 44 * Februa' Stopford made immediate preparations to receive the enemy. He posted his troops behind some low sandy ridges, with their right resting on the Adour, and their left on a morass, the ground in their front being flanked by the artillery on the opposite bank. A few rocketmen were hastily sent across the river and advantageously posted on the sand-hills. In this position did the Guards await the ap- proach of the French columns, but the fire of the guns and rockets was alone sufficient to check their progress ; and, without venturing on closer encounter, the enemy retreated into the town. During the night the allied troops continued to cross the river, and on the following evening the whole of the first division was established on the right bank. Feb. 25. On the twenty-fifth, Admiral Penrose and the gquadron appeared off the mouth of the river ; and though the difficulties of effecting an en- trance were very great from the swell on the bank, and the uncertainty of the channel, they were surmounted by the skill and energy of British seamen, who led the way in the ships' launches, followed by the bridge-vessels. OfcHAP.xvi. the latter several were wrecked, but the remain- ^^^^ der, protected by gun-boats, passed up the river, YehrMorj. and by dint of incessant labour, a bridge had been laid down in the course of the twenty-sixth. Feb. 26. The bridge thus constructed was sufficiently strong for the passage of artillery ; and, till the conclusion of the war, served as the regular com- munication with the army from St. Jean de Luz and Spain, thus avoiding the inconveniences at- tending the route through the difficult country of the Gaves, in which all the bridges had been destroyed by the enemy. The establishment of this communication a- cross the Adour, opened to Lord Wellington the direct road to Bourdeaux, where he had long known that a strong party had been formed in favour of the Bourbons. But the district of country to be traversed by this route, besides being barren and uncultivated, was of a character unfavourable for military operations. Lord Wel- lington, therefore, when freed in his movements by the enemy's abandonment of the strong country in his front, directed his march on Or- thez, where Soult had placed his army in a for- midable position. -jx.f 414 SOULT FORCED FROM THE COUNTRY OF THE CHAP.xvi. Leaving the left wing under Sir John Hope to TZTT' form the blockade of Bayonne, he moved the re- 1814. . "^ February, i^ainder of the army in three columns. The left, under Marshal Beresford, having driven the ene- my from their intrenchments at Hastingues and Oyergave, passed the gaves of Oleron and Pau, at their confluence above Peyrehorade, and ad- vanced by the high road to Orthez. The cavalry and third division crossed the Pau by fords higher up the river near Berenx, and the corps of Sir Rowland Hill advanced directly on the bridge of Orthez, but finding it too strongly fortified to be carried by a coup de main, and being without artillery, no attempt was made to force a passage at that point. On the twenty- Feb. 27. seventh, the sixth and light divisions crossed the river by a'pontoon bridge; and Sir Rowland Hill, with the second division, remained on the left bank opposite to Orthez, on the road from Sau- veterre. Sonlt had placed his army in a strong position in the neighbourhood of Orthez, where he ap- peared determined to await the issue of a battle. It consisted of a range of tabular heights about a mile in length, stretching in the direction of Dax, the right of which terminating in a hiU of pecu- ii li I mff I GAVES, TAKES POST AT ORTHEZ. 415 liar boldness, was covered in front by the village chap.xvi. ofSt. Boes, The left rested on the town of Orth- ez, and commanded the passage of the river at February, that point, while the centre, sweeping back in the form of an arc, was protected by the protrusion of the wings. The divisions of Villatte and Ha- rispe, and the brigade of General Paris, were formed in reserve. Lord Wellington having reconnoitred the pos- ition, determined on immediate attack. He di- rected Marshal Beresford with the left wing, con- sisting of the fourth and seventh divisions, and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry, to attack the enemy's right at St. Boes. The centre, con- sisting of the third and sixth divisions, and Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of cavalry, under Sir Thomas Picton, was directed to move by the road leading from Peyrehorade against the centre and left, while the light division moved up a ravine between the columns, ready to support either as occasion might require. Sir Rowland Hill was directed to cross the river at a ford about two miles above Orthez, in order to take the enemy in flank or rear, and cut ofi^ his retreat in the di- rection of Pau. The action commenced about nine in the mom- .11 1 fsj I'f 416 BATTLE OF ORTHEZ. BATTLE OF ORTHEZ. 417 CHAP.xvi. ing, when Sir Lowry Cole, with the fourth di- TTr~ vision, carried the village of St. Boes, after a February, strenuous resistance. ]\Iarshal Beresford then directed his efforts against two lines, posted on the heights ahove, the only approach to which lay along a narrow tongue of ground, flanked on either side by a deep ravine, and completely com- manded by the enemy's guns. In this confined space it was impossible to deploy his masses; and so destructive was the action of the French ar- tillery, that notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the fourth division, it was found impracticable to reach the heights. A Portuguese brigade at length fell into complete disorder, and its re- treat was with difficulty covered by the remain- der of the division and a brigade of the light division which moved to their support. Thus far the tide of success had flowed in fa- vour of the enemy. The crisis was urgent, and Lord Wellington with the greatest promptitude at once decided on changing the plan of attack. The column under Sir Thomas Picton received instant orders to advance ; and the seventh di- vision, under General Walker, which had hith- erto remained in reserve, and Colonel Barnard's brigade of the light division, were ordered to t ll 1 support it, and attack the height occupied by the CHAP.xvr. right of the enemy, at its point of junction with the centre. February. This powerful and desperate attack was suc- cessful. The fifty-second regiment, under Col- onel Colburne, led the way in the most gallant style, supported on either flank by the troops of the third, fourth, and seventh divisions ; and the artillery, having gained a promontory jutting out from the position, swept the whole line of the enemy's centre. The third division earned particular distinction in the attack. The whole eleven regiments composing it were desperately engaged, and drove the enemy from every height on which they ventured to make a stand. The conduct of General Inglis's brigade was also ad- mirable. It executed a brilliant charge on the enemy's left, which was completely successful, and, if possible, increased the very high charac- ter which this brigade had previously acquired, by its steadiness and gallant demeanour on all occasions. At length, having gained the crest of the main position, a severe struggle ensued, but the French were at length forced to give way, and fled ra- pidly over the level ground in the rear, covered 82 t . ll III II i: 418 THE FRENCH ARMY RETREATS, AND IS VIGOROUSLY PURSUED. 419 CHAP.xyi. by their cavalry, which endeavoured to check 2Q1 j^ the pursuit by a very gallant charge on the sixth February. In . ^is affair, thirty officers and about three hundred men were made prisoners. 444 SORTIE FROM BAYONNE. 1814. April. CHAP. XVI Toulouse unfortunately was not the only scene of unnecessary bloodshed. Early on the morning of the fourteenth, a sortie in force was made from the intrenched camp in front of the cit- adel of Bayonne, on the position of the allies at St. Etienne. Major-General Hay, the com- manding oflScer of the outposts for the day, fell early in the engagement, and the assailants suc- ceeded in dislodging the allies from the village. They also drove in the piquets of the centre, where IVIajor-General Stafford was wounded. Reinforcements, however, were brought up, the whole of the lost ground was recovered, and the Apr. 14. piquets were established in their former posts. The loss of the allies in this affair was very serious. It amounted to eight hundred in kill- ed, wounded, and prisoners. Among the last was Sir John Hope, who, in bringing up some troops from the right to support the piquets, came sud- denly in the dark on a party of the enemy, when his horse was shot under him, and before he could be extricated he received two wounds and was made prisoner. The loss of the enemy in this affair exceeded nine hundred men. With this tragic episode, terminated the great drama of the war, and it only remains to advert OCCURRENCES IN SPAIN. 445 1814. to the events more immediately connected withcHAP.xvi. the restoration of the Spanish monarch, before these Annals shall have reached their conclusion. From the commencement of the present year, the military occurrences in Spain were of trifling importance. The enemy retained a force only in one corner of the kingdom, and were compelled to assume a part merely defensive, while the ne- cessities of the war in other quarters occasioned a continual diminution of its numbers. In Jan- uary the Regency and the Cortes removed to Madrid, where they were received with all the solemnity due to the national representation and government. The attempt to detach Spain from her alliance with England, by a treaty con- cluded with Ferdinand while a prisoner in France, having signally failed. Napoleon at length determined on the unconditional restora- tion of the Spanish monarch. On the thirteenth March. of March, Ferdinand set out from Valen9ay, and proceeding by way of Perpignan, on the twenty-fourth he reached Gerona, from whence Mar. 24. he addressed a letter to the Regency written with his own hand. It contained a general as- surance of his wishes to conduce in every man- ner in his power to the welfare and prosperity VOL. III. u K I 446 RESTORATION OF FERDINAND. 1814. April. CHAP.xvi. of his subjects, and an expression of his happi- ness on finding himself again on Spanish ground, amid a people and an array which had given such generous and honourable testimony of fidelity to their sovereign. From Gerona, Ferdinand proceeded to Zara- goza^ where he was received with the most en- thusiastic demonstrations of devoted loyalty. At Valencia his reception was equally flattering and enthusiastic, and, emboldened by these testi- monies of public attachment, he received the President of the Regency with coldness, and de- clined acknowledging the restrictions which the Cortes had placed on the despotic exercise of regal authority. The enthusiasm of the nation, however, would not be restrained. The principal nobility and clergy, and many members of the Cortes, flock- ed round their restored sovereign, and were un- willing, in their generous loyalty, to shackle that authority which they trusted would be directed in its exercise to promote the welfare and pro- sperity of the Spanish nation. Their homage was too warm to be the offspring of calculation. The monarch for whom they had poured forth their blood as water, had at length been given } ! J!4 PROCLAMATION OF FERDINAND. 447 1814. May. to their prayers ; and such was not the moment chap.xvi. when it was probable that the cold dictates of prudence would be heard or obeyed. Ferdinand was received by his devoted subjects as a despo- tic monarch, and the advocates and supporters of the constitution became obnoxious to the great body of the people. Thus supported, Ferdinand issued a manifesto May 4. from Valencia, charging the Cortes with having violated the constitution of the kingdom, and introduced revolutionary innovations utterly subversive of the regal authority. Some abuses, it was confessed, might have crept into the Spanish government, but these were not to be corrected by the rash and unprincipled proceed, ings of an illegal body. In order to repair such evils, the king promised he would in due time convoke the Cortes in a legitimate form, and act in concert with them for this purpose. The proclamation concluded by declaring the Cortes to be dissolved, and ordaining that all opposing the execution of this decree should suffer death. Thus did this crowned slave display his grati- tude to those noble-minded men, who, by their steadfast loyalty and persevering exertions, had u2 448 FERDINAND ENTERS MADRID. 1814. May. la } cHAP.xvi. contributed largely to his restoration to the Spanish throne. If the Cortes were irregularly convoked, and elected on principles unknown to the ancient constitution of the realm, it was ow- ing to the circumstances of the times, and to the base and pitiful truckling of Ferdinand himself to the French ruler. That the Cortes were guilty of many errors is undoubted ; that their views were generally narrow and injudicious, no one who has perused the record of their proceed- ings can venture to deny. But when we con- sider the bold and unwavering front which these men displayed in times of the greatest difficulty and danger, their generous ardour in the cause of liberty and loyalty, under the pressure of every danger and every temptation, their errors, when weighed against devotion so pure and so heroic, become but as dust in the balance. In a few days after the promulgation of this decree, Ferdinand removed to Madrid. His vengeance was first directed against the members of the Regency. The venerable Cardinal de Bourbon was banished to Rome, Agar to Car- thagena, Cisgar to a fortress in Catalonia. The eloquent and noble-minded Arguelles was con- May 13. I RESULTS OF THE WAR. 449 1814. demned to serve as a common soldier ; and all chap.xvi who had most distinguished themselves by en- lightened and generous views in the proceedings of the Cortes, were proscribed and punished. The whole measures of the government were in barbarous consistency with those we have de- tailed. The liberty of the press was abolished ; the Inquisition, by royal statute, resumed its hateful dominion over the souls and bodies of the people ; and the functions of the monarchy were brought into full action, without a single correction of any of the enormous abuses which, in the lapse of centuries, had crept into every department of the government. In France, the restoration of the Bourbons, not only relieved the nation from the immediate evils of invasion, but brought with it the es- tablishment of order, of civil rights, and perhaps of as much liberty as the people were at that period prepared to enjoy. Napoleon, dwindled from the Emperor of France into the prisoner of a petty island, exhibited a memorable instance of that retributive justice which Providence is occasionally pleased to display as a lesson to mankind. The mighty spirit which had shaken i I 450 RESULTS OF THE WAR. 1814. cHAP.xvi.the world like a tempest, and exercised a larger influence on the destinies of nations tlian any other individual of modern times, was made to pause a while in his career of ambition ; and in his enforced retirement, he might have exclaimed in the words of Seneca, singularly applicable to his condition, Quid me potens Fortuna fallaci mihi Blandita vultu sorte contentum mea, Alte extulisti, gra^ius ut ruerem, edita Receptus arce, totque prospicerera metus ? Melius latebam, procul ab invidiae malis, Remotus inter Corsici rupes maris. FINIS. EDINBURGH : PRINTED BT JOHN JOMNSTONJC, 18, ST. James's square. Lately published, BY THE SAME AUTHOR, In 3 vols, foolscap 8vo, price £1 Is. THE YOUTH AND MANHOOD OF CYRIL THORNTON. IHE SECOND EDITION. Have I not heard gn»t ordnance in the field, And heaven's artillery thunder in the sides ? Have I not, in a pitched battle, heard Loud narums, neighing steeds, and trumpets clang ? Srakspeare. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY