Shall the President and Senators in Congress be 
 Elected by a Direct Vote of the People ? 
 
 ADDRESS 
 
 delivered before the alumni 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT 
 
 COMMENCEMENT, 
 
 JUNE 25. 1895. 
 
 BY 
 
 HON. H. HENRY POWERS. 
 
Shall the President and Senators in Congress be 
 Elected by a Direct Vote of the People ? 
 
 Mr. President and Gentlemen : 
 
 I have in the past heard much said on occasions like this 
 of the duties of educated men in politics. The theories ad¬ 
 vanced were clearly sound, but general in character, and 
 possibly difficult of specific application. 
 
 Let me, to-day, bring 1 your attention to a concrete case. 
 Two amendments to the Federal Constitution are proposed, 
 providing for a direct vote of the people in the election of 
 President and Senators in Congress. 
 
 The discussion of these proposed changes has already 
 commenced and in the near future you will be called upon 
 to render your verdict. 
 
 In the discussion thus far of these questions, the opposi¬ 
 tion to the proposed changes has developed two typical char¬ 
 acters in debate, first, the blindly conservative man and. 
 second, the dangerously indifferent man. Both represent 
 classes that can be found in every community. Both can be 
 found in the halls of legislation, on the press, and in every 
 forum of debate where questions of public concern are con¬ 
 sidered. The conservative man maintains that the constitu¬ 
 tion is the work of ‘-inspired men” and, moreover, is “a cen¬ 
 tury old.” Therefore esto perpetua. The indifferent man 
 while conscious that faulty provisions exist, nevertheless 
 quiets his convictions bythe weakest possible justification, it 
 “works well enough.” 
 
 All agree that the organic law of any form of government 
 should, when established, be preserved and conserved with 
 a jealous care. A constitution, written or unwritten, is a 
 law of guaranties. In monarchial states, where the scepter 
 of power may fall into bad hands, protection is needed 
 against the executive. In republican states protection is 
 most needed against the legislature. This is the reason why 
 in American constitutions, state and national, a veto has 
 been given to the executive. This explains why it is that at 
 the present time there is a marked tendency in the public 
 
3 
 
 mind to incorporate into the fundamental law inhibitions 
 which have hitherto been supposed to appertain to the do¬ 
 main of statutory law. Thus, in some states, prohibition of 
 the liquor traffic has been embodied in the constitution. The 
 new constitution of New York regulates the responsibility of 
 stockholders in joint stock companies. In some of the new 
 states in the West, codes of enactments, regulating- rights 
 which the legislature could, and in most states does control, 
 are incorporated, in mass, in the new constitutions. All this 
 demonstrates the fact that the people have become jealous of 
 their legislatures. 
 
 But the amendments proposed for the election of the Pres¬ 
 ident and Senators cannot be brought within the range of 
 any criticism that may be made of the tendency to confuse 
 statutory and constitutional law. It is not proposed to in¬ 
 troduce any new features, but merely to change the colorings 
 of an existing one. 
 
 The conservative man, therefore, is not called upon to 
 contemplate a radical remodeling of the structure of his 
 magna charta; he is only asked to permit a change in the 
 location of one of its doorways. 
 
 Obviously there is a marked difference between the grant 
 of a sovereign power and the choice of an agent to adminis¬ 
 ter such power. 
 
 So far as the constitution deals with the election of the 
 President and Senators, the conservative man can approach 
 the question of a change with a less halting step than in 
 case of proposed changes of its substantial organic force. 
 He may safely copy the conservatism of St. Paul, “Prove all 
 thing's, hold fast that which is good, ” and if he is to hold 
 fast that which being tested is good, he must let go that 
 which is bad. Nor can intelligent men object to a change of 
 the constitution in the minor matter of detail, on the ground 
 that existing forms “work well enough’’and therefore should 
 be undisturbed. No provision of our organic law that is jus¬ 
 tified only on the ground that it works well enough can find 
 any proper place in that law. All the provisions of the con¬ 
 stitution should not only work in a way that is well enough, 
 but in a way the best possible. If there be in the structure 
 any weak timbers that may at any time bring on disaster, 
 they should be replaced now without waiting to see how long 
 they may work well. 
 
 But I deny that existing methods do work well enough, 
 and I am supported in this denial by a large majority of the 
 people in this country. 
 
 The states of Illinois, Louisiana, New York. Kentucky, 
 
4 
 
 Kansas, Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa. Idaho, California and 
 Oregon have already in formal manner demanded that Sena¬ 
 tors be elected by a direct vote of the people. In their action 
 every section of the country, and both of the great political 
 parties, have spoken. A very large fraction of the public 
 press in all parts of the country, and representing all politi¬ 
 cal parties, has spoken in the same voice. 
 
 The national House of Representatives in the 52nd and 
 again in the 53rd Congress, by a large majority and upon a 
 proposed amendment in an objectionable form, passed a joint 
 resolution in favor of this change. The amendment as it 
 came before fhe House in both Congresses was coupled with 
 a proposition to take away all supervisory power in Congress 
 over the election of Senators, a power which manifestly 
 would probably never be called into exercise, but one that 
 should exist as a safeguard against a refusal to elect. 
 
 Without the presence of this feature, the joint resolution 
 would have received the support of four-fifths of both the 
 great political parties and five-fifths of the small one. 
 
 I am aware that here in Vermont we have little local in¬ 
 terest in this question. The existing system has always 
 worked well here. But Vermont is an exceptional state and 
 always has been since January 16. 1777. Our representa¬ 
 tion in the Senate has always been and now is the best pos¬ 
 sible, and its personnel would be the same however we made 
 our choice. Our unvarying rule always has been, in filling 
 a vacancy, and alwas will be to sieze our lanterns like Dio¬ 
 genes and go out and search for a man. 
 
 But Vermont is jnst as much interested in the Senatorial 
 representation of the other 43 states as she is in her own, 
 and it is because of faulty elections in some of these sister 
 states that this demand for a change has arisen. The func¬ 
 tion of a Senator is discharged not for the state electing him 
 alone, but he legislates for the nation at large. The action 
 of the Senators from Nevada, Delaware, or New York, has 
 the same direct bearing upon Vermont interests as that of 
 her own. Indeed, they are our own Senators to all practical 
 intents and purposes, and hence it is that we in Vermont 
 have the right to insist that the methods used in their elec¬ 
 tion should be pure, and that the rights of the people should 
 not be sacrificed to corporate wealth or political legerdemain. 
 If we on our part furnish the best material, we have the 
 right and we should be on the alert to provide a method by 
 which other states can act up to the same standard, 
 
 The usual and indeed the only argument used against an 
 amendment to the constitution that will enable the people to 
 
elect Senators by a direct vote is the one already alluded to 
 and which may be called the objection of the conservative. 
 He opposes all proposed change whether it be structural or 
 fundamental, whether it be functional or organic. He says 
 the framers of the constitution were “inspired men," who 
 crystalized all the wisdom of the ages in that sacred instru¬ 
 ment, and that it is “altogether perfect," or, if not, near 
 enough to perfection to work well. 
 
 He forgets, however, that these inspired men themselves 
 did not regard their work as perfect, and that because of 
 their own fallibility they carefully provided a scheme where¬ 
 by needed amendments might be made, and that during the 
 first century of its existence no less than fifteen distinct 
 amendments, going to the very essence of the Federal sys¬ 
 tem, have been made to this “altogether perfect" work of 
 these “inspired men." Washington, Hamilton, Madison, 
 Wilson, Gerry, Sherman and others, the leaders of thought 
 in the convention, confessed to errors in the instrument, and 
 never dreamed of the endorsement that the modern conserva¬ 
 tive gives to their labors. 
 
 Only two unchangeable provisions were incorporated into 
 the constitution against which amendments were forever shut 
 out. One was that the slave trade should not be forbidden 
 before 1808, and the other that the equal representation of 
 the states in the Senate should not be disturbed without the 
 consent of the state interested. 
 
 He forgets, too, that these same inspired men were at log¬ 
 gerheads over the method to be adopted in the choice of Sen¬ 
 ators. Mr. Dickinson of Delaware, who proposed the meth¬ 
 od of election by the legislatures of the states, gave this as 
 his reason for his proposal: “I wish the Senate to bear as 
 strong a likeness as possible to the British House of Lords, 
 and to consist of men distinguished for their rank in life and 
 their weight of property. Such characters are more likely 
 to be selected by the state legislatures than in any other 
 mode."—Elliott. Debates 1(>(>. Many people to-day are con¬ 
 vinced that the wish of Dickinson has been fulfilled in some 
 respects to the letter. 
 
 Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania, one of the most far-sighted 
 men in the convention, favored an election by the people. 
 
 In this connection it must be remembered that in 1787 the 
 framers of the constitution were starting out to put into con¬ 
 crete form a body of principles enunciated in the Declaration 
 of Independence, which were a wide departure from nearly 
 all existing models of government. A government qf the peo¬ 
 ple by the people under the restraints of a written constitu- 
 
6 
 
 tion was unlike any scheme hitherto tried. They were 
 equally averse to the evils of a pure democracy and a pure 
 monarchy. They sought to establish a republic in which 
 the political power should reside in the people, but that the 
 people should be constituted a body politic of citizens, hav¬ 
 ing common interests and invested by mutual compact with 
 certain political rights. In other words, they would frame 
 a government of the people regulated by a fundamental law. 
 This was the conception of a republic which they had drawn 
 from the works of Milton, Sidney, Harrington and Locke, the 
 great oracles of republican liberty in the 17th century. 
 
 Hence it was that there existed a hesitation in submitting 
 the choice of public officials to the people directly. Mr. Sher¬ 
 man of Connecticut, voiced this distrust when, in favoring 
 the election of members of the House by the state legislature, 
 he said, “The people immediately should have as little to do 
 as mav be about the government. ” Mr. Gerry of Massachu¬ 
 setts, expressed similar views. This sentiment was rife in 
 all the states at this time. Indeed, in Vermont it was not 
 until 1850, three-quarters of a century after our constitution 
 was adopted, that it was deemed safe to trust the people 
 with the election of a high bailiff or a justice of the peace, 
 and we did not in our theory of a popular government mount 
 to a level high enough to entrust the election of a Secretary 
 of State and Auditor of Accounts to the people till within the 
 past ten years. 
 
 But now all this distrust of the vox populi has departed 
 and the surprise is that it ever existed. 
 
 Now it is safe to assume that a constitution is best which 
 most nearly conforms in its structure to the theory of govern¬ 
 ment which it is supposed to embody. Our theory is a popu¬ 
 lar government, a government by the people. The people 
 are not. as Mr. Sherman declared, to be shut out of any im¬ 
 mediate agency in the government, but on the contrary are 
 to have both a mediate and controlling agency in its conduct. 
 At the time the constitution was framed there was no evils 
 of party politics to shun. There was then less danger in 
 trusting elective methods to an electorate distinct from the 
 people. Purity in elections was then expected to follow the 
 methods provided. But we are now confronted with changed 
 conditions which demand changed methods. 
 
 The great aim of any method should be purity in elections 
 and that method is best which best secures it. The primary 
 function of a state legislature is legislation for the people, 
 not the choice of their officials, which is a matter foreign to 
 the work delegated. 
 
The public welfare demands its attention to the primary 
 duty assigned to it, and when it acts as an intermediary for 
 the filtration of the popular wish it is exercising an abnor¬ 
 mal function. But the indifferent man declares that the 
 present method works well enough. Is this true? First, no 
 method works well enoug-h which in any case does not work 
 at all. During the last Congress three states were short in 
 their representation in the Senate, by reason of the inability 
 of their respective legislatures to make a choice. As already 
 said, the other 43 states had a direct interest at stake in the 
 election in each of these recusant states. The failure toelect 
 was the direct fault of the method. In each case the people 
 of those states would have made an election in sixty minutes. 
 The plan does not work well enough. In Delaware weeks 
 and months were lately wasted in a deadlock in the legisla¬ 
 ture over the attempted choice of a Senator, which the peo¬ 
 ple would have settled in an hour, thus entailing vast ex¬ 
 pense upon the people of that state, and compelling serious 
 neglect of proper matters of legislation, and intheend reach¬ 
 ing a result that leads to grave doubt whether any choice 
 has been made. The plan does not work well enough. In¬ 
 stances innumerable might be citt?d where practically the 
 whole session of a legislature has been exhausted in fierce 
 and unprofitable contests over the choice of a Senator, with 
 utter neglect of proper legislative duties, and the conversion 
 of a law-making body into a partisan mob. The plan does 
 not work well enough. 
 
 There is a widespread public belief — whether right or 
 wrong I do not affirm—that in repeated instances seats in 
 the Senate have been gained by the lavish use of money by 
 successful aspirants. It is important, nay it is absolutely 
 necessary under our form of government that elections should 
 be pure, and it is equally important that the people believe 
 them to be pure. The moral effect is precisely the same in 
 either case. Any plan that makes possible this distrust 
 does not work well enough. 
 
 Mr. Justice Field of the Supreme Court, is quoted as say¬ 
 ing that four-fifths of the wealth of the country is in the 
 hands of corporations. It is easy to see what a vast influ¬ 
 ence this accumulation gives to corporate managers. Now 
 it is a noticeable coincident that theheadsof great corporate 
 interests which are liable to be affected by Federal legisla¬ 
 tion are often successful candidates for Senatorial honors, 
 and some of them — it is generally thought — have little quali¬ 
 fication for such duties, save their accidental relationship to 
 these great interests, and some of whom at least would have 
 
8 
 
 never aspired to the place had the people a chance to make 
 a choice. It is not by any means insisted that connection 
 with corporate interests disqualifies a man for Senatorial 
 honors, but it is insisted that the people of each state have 
 the right to demand the election of men to this high office 
 who will act for the public welfare rather than as the agents 
 of any special local interest, and that any plan of election 
 that makes possible the election of such men does not work 
 well. 
 
 Again, no electorate should be provided that, by any 
 chance, gives to a minority the choice of a Senator. Under 
 the present legislative method just that faulty electorate is 
 created. Take the case of Vermont, and I refer to this not 
 by way of criticism but as a forcible example of the possibil¬ 
 ities for wrong results that inhere in the existing method. 
 
 Our joint Assembly on full representation consists of 277 
 members ; 139 votes constitute a majority ; 139 small towns 
 with 139 votes, and representing not over 33 per cent, of the 
 votes can elect a Senator. Thus the will of two-thirds of the 
 people may be overpowered by one-third. It is no answer to 
 say that such a result is improbable. The constitutional 
 possibility of such a result condemns the existing method. 
 We have no right to expose the choice of our people to any 
 chances of miscarriage. 
 
 Other states in their legislative system of representation 
 are equally exposed to minority rule. The great debate in 
 Illinois in 1858 between Lincoln and Douglass forcibly illus¬ 
 trates the danger of minority control, and equally demon¬ 
 strates the security of popular elections. There the two 
 candidates for the Senate made an active canvass of the 
 state, and every member of the legislature elected was chos¬ 
 en upon the distinct ground of his fealty to one or the other 
 of these candidates. This contest came the nearest to an 
 election by the people of any campaign in our history. On 
 the popular vote Lincoln had near 5,000 majority, but owing 
 to the fact that a few Senators, under the Illinois constitin- 
 tion. held over, under a prior election, Douglass had a ma¬ 
 jority on joint ballot, and the expressed will of the people 
 was denied for six years. 
 
 Surely, the plan does not work well. 
 
 Again, a somewhat popular species of grand larceny with 
 the politicians of all parties in these days, known as the 
 gerrymander, in many states has made the legislature the 
 representative of a minority of the people, and secured 
 thereby a Senator opposed by the majority. This, coupled 
 with the fact that a majority of a legislature is actually 
 
9 
 
 stolen in some instances leads forcibly to the conclusion that 
 legislative elections do not work well. 
 
 Once more, every public official should be directly respon¬ 
 sible to an existing constituency. The legislature electing 
 a Senator often times passes out of office before the Senator 
 begins his official term. To whom are Senators responsible ? 
 Not to the legislature electing them and at best to the 
 people only constructively. On the other hand, if the people 
 made the choice there is an ever existing constituency with 
 which the Senator is closely allied, and to whom he acknowl¬ 
 edges his continued responsibility. 
 
 But would an election by the people correct the evils men¬ 
 tioned? It certainly w r ould, in most cases, and in the others 
 would minimize them to the smallest degree. 
 
 Under a popular election, direct responsibility to the peo¬ 
 ple is secured as already observed. Underthismodeofelec¬ 
 tion no Gerrymander could be possible. The people would 
 vote on a general ticket unaffected by any juggling with the 
 legislature. 
 
 Under this system all danger of minority control,as notic¬ 
 ed in thelllinois and Vermont examples, would be effectually 
 excluded. 
 
 Under this plan no corporation attorneys, holding briefs 
 for their clients as their credentials, nor corporation man¬ 
 agers, whose fitness for the place is established by their 
 dexterity in watering stocks, could ever pass the eye of scru¬ 
 tiny that would be leveled upon them by the people. 
 
 Under this plan there will be no unrepresented states in 
 the Senate, and the weeks and months of fruitless balloting 
 well be avoided, and lastly this method brings our constitu¬ 
 tion more nearly in accord with the theory upon which our 
 institutions are built. The change does not disturb the theo¬ 
 retical representation of states in the Senate, does not vary 
 any delegated power given to a Senator. It merely alters a 
 method by which heischosen. and unless, like Mr. Dickinson, 
 we desire to see a House of Lords in the Senate Chamber, 
 the merits of the proposed amendments are easily demon¬ 
 strated. 
 
 The political boss, so called, is one of the modern inventions 
 brought forth in the evolution of political science. He is not 
 altogether indigenous to American soil, nevertheless, his re¬ 
 markable growth in the atmosphere of free institutions has 
 attracted both the wonder and the indignation of patriotic 
 men everywhere. He does not ply his arts in the ranks of 
 the people at large, but confines his work mainly to the 
 legislature of the states, and representative gatherings of the 
 
10 
 
 people and in many of them he holds a sway more absolute 
 than that of the Autocrat of Russia. In vain does the aroused 
 and indignant manhood of a great city strive for better local 
 government. The boss commands the legislature to defeat 
 all measures calculated to attain that end, and the order is 
 obeyed. What hope is there that any—the very best quali¬ 
 fied man in either party—in the state of New York could be 
 elected to the United States Senate, who did not wear the 
 yoke of the “boss”? What man in this audience doubts that 
 a single mind controls with an iron hand the legislature of 
 that state, to-day, and could demand his own or dictate an¬ 
 other’s election to the Senate at his own will and pleasure? 
 
 As patriotic men, as intelligent men, do you wish to per¬ 
 petuate a system which, in the choice of national law-mak¬ 
 ers, not onlv denies to the people all voice, but stifles that of 
 the legislature and determines the question of choice by the 
 arbitrary will of one man ? 
 
 But, you will say, could not the boss control 51 per cent, 
 of a state convention as easily as 51 percent, of a legislature? 
 Not so easily, but possibly it might be done. In the legisla¬ 
 ture the boss pools the issues of the various members — all 
 have their local and personal interests to serve and by yok¬ 
 ing these interests together, the members themselves are 
 yoked together. A state convention is differently constitut¬ 
 ed. There are no special local interests affecting its mem¬ 
 bers. The chance therefore for combinations are greatly 
 minimized. But suppose the convention is controlled by the 
 boss, the game is not yet finished, the hardest obstacle of all 
 is to be overcome, the people are the final arbitrators, their 
 verdict is usually right. 
 
 I do not dare to affirm the fact, but many of you doubtless 
 believe that the seats of certain Senators, to-day, are filled 
 by incumbents who have reached them through the ways 
 that are dark and the tricks that are vain of political boss- 
 dom, and who might never have seen the city of Washington 
 had they awaited an invitation from the people to go. 
 
 Much that has been said respecting the election of Sena¬ 
 tors by the people applies to the question of electing the 
 President in the same way. In this case, however, our con¬ 
 servative friend will have to revise his logic. 
 
 The electoral college as created by the framers of the con¬ 
 stitution was intended to be a body of select men, commis¬ 
 sioned to choose a President without consultation with, and 
 with no responsibility to the people at large. 
 
 The theory was that the office was of such importance 
 that the people should have no voice in filling it. but that del- 
 
11 
 
 icate duty could.be best discharged by appointing a select 
 committee to do it for the people. Washington was twice 
 chosen in accordance with the plan and the theory of the 
 plan. No one else since his day has been chosen upon the 
 original theory, but every one elected has been chosen in 
 spite of it. The office of President is the most important in 
 our political autonomy. His administration of public affairs 
 touches most sensibly every nerve of our political body. His 
 influence upon the public welfare, both in its domestic and 
 foreign relationships, is more potent than that of a monarch. 
 The question of his equipment for the office, his zeal, his tem¬ 
 perament, his caution, his discretion, his judgment, his pa¬ 
 triotism, and his honesty, is addressed to each individual 
 citizen in the nation. 
 
 Why should I be compelled to intrust my answer to that 
 question to the irresponsible keeping of some other man? 
 Why should I be compelled to cast my ballot by proxy ? Are 
 the chosen electors of our state any more trusty, or better 
 equipped, any more honest and patriotic than the average cit¬ 
 izen of the state? As originally designed the electors were 
 ander no responsibility to the people for their choice. They 
 are under none now except constructively ; no legal control 
 over their action exists, and they have become, in fact, a 
 board of mere figureheads to announce the choice ot the peo¬ 
 ple. They play the part of a bulletin board to announce the 
 result of the race. 
 
 Thus far the diagnosis shows them to be harmless, but if 
 this consideration is the only defense that can be urged for 
 a continuance of the system, its weakness as well as its dan¬ 
 gers are confessed, The election of President means some¬ 
 thing more than the choice of an official. It carries with it a 
 hundred thousand offices to be filled with a hundred thous¬ 
 and incumbents, more terrible in their power than an army 
 with banners, and more hungry in their yearnings for place 
 than the unfed lions of the jungle for food. 
 
 Civil service laws have done much to allay the yearnings 
 of political appetites, but alas, human nature is still the at¬ 
 tribute of the race and the millenium is strangely delayed. 
 
 Money, power, station and honor are involved in the 
 struggle for preferment, and the fate of the majority is in¬ 
 trusted to the keeping of an irresponsible judge. 
 
 Who shall say that the vote of a single elector in the 44 
 states that may decide an acrimonious and hotly contested 
 Presidential election, with all its possibilities and dangers, 
 is a safe depository of our hopes as a free people ? Who 
 shall guarantee the honor of that single elector when con- 
 
12 
 
 fronted with the millions of money that might be laid at his 
 f ee t? If state legislatures can be stolen or debauched, what 
 hinders the theft of an elector? 
 
 In 1876 both the great political parties acted upon the as¬ 
 sumption that this danger was apparent. Both sought by 
 every means to avert it. Both believed it possible of realiza¬ 
 tion, and any system that makes it possible is defective, is 
 radically wrong, is, in fact, the most alarming weakness that 
 exists in our constitution. A revolution was averted in 1876 
 by the patriotic action of both parties. But that experiment 
 can never be successfully repeated. Party spirit is growing 
 more exacting, year by year. New phases of public opinion 
 are being reflected. New theories of government are being 
 developed. New warfares between labor and capital are 
 being waged. Everything conspires to intensify party zeal 
 and stupefy party honor. You may answer that the good 
 sense of the American people can settle all conflicts. To this 
 I agree, but the trouble is that under the present system, the 
 good sense of the American people cannot be exerted. It is 
 locked up in the conscience and honor of one man in a close 
 contest, and he may, perchance, be the very man to surrender 
 the key. 
 
 But the system is exposed to the danger that a minority of 
 the people can elect a President. Indeed, in 1876 Mr. Tilden 
 recieved 250,000 more votes of the people than Mr. Hayes and 
 still was defeated in the electoral college. In 1888 President 
 Harrison received 95,000 less votes than Mr. Cleveland on the 
 popular vote, and was elected by a vote nearly two to one in 
 the electoral college. In nearly every election the ratioofthe 
 popular vote to that of the electors for the respective candidates 
 is strangly inconsistent with the theory of popular govern¬ 
 ment. 
 
 If there be one danger more than another that imperils 
 the success of our system of government, it is the indifference 
 of the voters, that keeps them away from the polls, and thus 
 exposes the control of public affairs to the vigilant but more 
 dangerous element of the people. 
 
 Every inducement should be held out that will bring all 
 good citizens into an active participation in political affairs. 
 Now the method of electing the President keeps at home a 
 large portion of the voters in all but the close states. New 
 Hampshire and Vermont have practically the same popula¬ 
 tion, practically the same voting strength ; yet New Hamp¬ 
 shire usually casts double the votes that Vermont does. The 
 political result in Vermont is assumed in advance of the vote, 
 hence thousands keep away from the polls, knowing that 
 
 fc 
 
13 
 
 some majority will be cast for the candidate for President 
 of the dominant party, and that it is not important that this 
 majority be large. If the majority in Vermont for A was 
 50,000, and this excess could be added to A’s vote in New 
 York in the tabulation of results, it might change the result 
 in New York. But under the present system, whatever the 
 majority in Vermont may be, it has no contributing force be¬ 
 yond state lines. 
 
 The present method makes the state instead of the nation 
 the unit of voting strength in the choice of an official who ex¬ 
 ercises national powers and is clothed with national pre¬ 
 rogatives, and is not in intent or function a representative 
 of the states. 
 
 Thus the accepted theory of our government, to-day, that 
 our constitution is the text of a compact rather than a con¬ 
 federation; that we are a unit, not an aggregate; that we 
 are a nation, not a combination, is refuted by this illogical 
 and long since condemned method of choosing our national 
 chief magistrate. 
 
 As educated men invested with the privileges and charg¬ 
 ed with the duties of a citizenship that embodies all the sov¬ 
 ereign power of a great nation, it is your mission to lead and 
 instruct, not to follow and fawn. 
 
 Constitutional law, like statutory law, is an evolution. 
 Mackintosh says, “Constitutions grow, they are not made.” 
 As the wants of society expand, as the need of reform is de¬ 
 veloped, as the conservation of popular rights is demanded, 
 changes must tqke place. This is especially true in a 
 government like ‘ours, founded upon the consent of the 
 governed. 
 
 Intelligent men, therefore, are confronted with fields of 
 inquiry which must be entered and tilled. They are com¬ 
 pelled to prove all things. That their investigations should 
 proceed along conservative lines is the sure law of their 
 progress. Conservatism has saved the world from count¬ 
 less blnnders that followed in the wake of progress, but it 
 is a discriminating conservatism, not a blind bigotry, that 
 conduces to the happiness and well-being of man. “A con¬ 
 servative, ” says Douglass Jerrold, “is a man who will not 
 ltx)k at the new moon out of respect for that ancient institu¬ 
 tion, the old one. ” 
 
 If you wish for a government of the people by a minority 
 of the people, and for the minority, keep to the existing 
 methods. If you desire a government of the people by boss- 
 dom, and for the boss, stand by existing methods. If you 
 
14 
 
 prefer a government of the people by bargain and sale, and 
 for the highest bidder, perpetuate existing methods. But 
 if you seek a government of the people, by the people, and 
 for the people, then give control to the people. 
 
 LilL 
 
 /