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This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order If, in Its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR: HOPPIN, JAMES MASON TITLE: NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S PLACE: NEW YORK DA TE : 1882 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT BIBLIOGRAPHIC MTCROFORM TARHFT Master Negative # Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record 108 Z3 V.3 '"■ ' ' '•tm^^^fmrn I lloppin, Joraec Macon, 1820-1906. Wotes on Arintotlo'c Ethics.'Bk... I, n, ^^ .„ I X, by J. ,,. Uo,,in.., „e„ York, Gher^ooa, Lo2. ' 65 p* 22.' : cjn m 25 en. Voluno of panphletG Restrictions on Use: a?ii9 TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA FILM SIZE: 3S yuunX. IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA, JIA) IB IIB REDUCTION RATIO:____J^^. S^'^E FILMED: 2/_lC_/5-3_ INITIALS l6jU> FILMED BY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS INC WOODRRrDGE CT c Association for Information and Image Management 1100 Wayne Avenue. Suite 1100 Silver Spring. Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 mm lllllllllilllllllllilllllllllllMlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll^ fWW I ^ m mmm m I Inches TTT T 1 T T I I I I I 1.0 1^ 1 2.8 2.5 1^ |£ 199 I.I IS ^■ii u ■iuu 1.4 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.25 I I M I 5 MfiNUFfiCTURED TO PIIM STPNDRRDS BY fiPPLIED IMfiGE. INC. \^ k 1 1 ^ ^ iT. c£:it '( oJ^- 2jA^ _ t NOTES ''"^°'^*5 w. LUD.ow, ON No. 244, East J 3th. St., NEW YORK, 25 J IN 1882 ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: Bks. I, II, III, IV, X, BY J. M. HOPPIN, JR., B, A.y Christ Churchy Oxford. NEW YORK: A. G. Sherwood & Co., Printers, 76 E. Ninth Street. 1882. n > I ^> i i T ' I r. ^7 yCcA-aud-e C/^t ue'Tiue, Cj'e: i^u ^^€i'ue^yi, ^Z^tx^naiec ^■ccu^. / I /. NOTES ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: Bks. I, II, III, IV, X, BY J. M. HOPPIN, JR., B. A.y Christ Churchy Oxford, NEW YORK: A. CI. Sherwood & Co., Pkinteus, 76 E. Ninth Street 1882. K ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: ^ r. Bks. I, II, III, IV, X. "j^ Show how Aristotle Arrives at his Definition of Moral Virtue. i'Si5 TtpoatpBriHTf ev pteffotTjTi ovaa rti Ttpo^ W«5, dpiffpievr} Xcycpy xai 003 civ o (ppovijj.03 opiffatev. Bk. II. 6. e^i5 is explained in Ch. 5. Since all the attributes of the Soul are naSr}, dvvd^eii^ e^€i3, and as virtue cannot (for rea- sons assigned) be either TtaBo^ or 6vvapii3^ we obtain e^i3 as its proper genus. Not Ttddrj. (i.) We do not apply the terms right and wrongs praise and blame^ to nadrfy as we obviously do to virtue. (2.) There is no npoaipeais in Ttddyj^ but there is in virtue. (3.) We are said to be moved \Kiva'iada{\ by ndOr}, but to be in "some way disposed'* [diaxai^Sai 71003] by virtue, and this difference in language implies a difference in fact. Not dvva^i3, (i.) As in the case of TtaOtj, w6 do not apply the terms rig/it and wrongs praise and blame, to dvva/xei3. (2.) 6vydpi€i3 come by nature, and virtue does not. Ergo, if virtue is neither a nado3 nor a 6vvapLi3j it must be a . * . Virtue is a ^£13 = genus. npoaipETixfj is added on the strength of what was said in Ch. 4. I. aid (A3. , , , , ) Requisites 2. 7tpoaipovpLSvo3 Si avTC . ^^ V of a 3. fiaftaiG03 Hai a/d€raHivTjT(a3 axoov. ) moral action ^Ev ^A^aorrjri ouffa, rfj npo^ ffjjidi — in the relative mean. He shows that every art, or practical science seeks the relative mean, and avoids the extremes of excess and defect — a fortiori, this will be the case with the pre-eminent science of Moj-al Virtue. copKjjAevtj Xoycp is added, because the mean is relative and not mathematically exact ; so that it must be determined from time to time by reason. CDi av 6 (ppovijdo^ opiGBiEv is added, because it might be asked, Where is the reason to be found? Aristotle regards reason as embodied in the "man of practical common sense." Analysis. In Bk. I. ch. 8, Aristotle proves his definition of happiness by comparing it with the definitions of preceding philosophers. I. Pythagoreans divided goods into three heads : (I.) ra tpvxffi (2.) rd aoj^aros (3.) ra ixr6i but they made goods of the soul the most important. Aristotle's definition implies this, because — {a.) He makes Happiness an activity of the soul. {b.) Because "activity," or "moral action," is not external, but an internal good. //. The Happy Man is said ev B,rfv ual €v Trpdrteiv^ the defi- nition of Aristotle is almost the same. The Cynics said that happiness w^s dpsTif. Aristotle in his definition makes happiness an ivepysia uar aparrfv, and it is important that we should consider it an evepyaia, because it is only those who act rightly that can obtain the good and honor- able things in life. [€7tf}fio\oL t(2>v f.v rep fiiw «aAc3v.] I. viii. 10. IV. Socrates said it was cppovijan, practical wisdom j the discus- sion of this, Aristotle leaves to the Vlth Bk. Anaxagoras said it was ooq)ia^ speculative wisdom ; this again left to Bk. VI. (Baser element of world='^oi}5.) VI. The Cyrenaics said it was with pleasure. Aristotle agrees with this, because he thinks that his happiness will naturally involve pleasure of a higher kind : (i.) It is present in a higher manner : it is inherent in the acts themselves, [o /?/o5 naB' avrov //di^i.] (2.) It is of a higher sort, natural \(pvGEi\, not artificial. (3.) It is more comprehensive, including ro naXov + ro aya- dovy as well as ro 7)6 f, VII. Xetwcraies included external prosperity. Aristotle agrees with this, for he thinks it necessary that a man should have certain external advantages, i. e., he must not be deformed \nayai(5xr]i\ low-born [6vffy€vi^3], or childless [dreKvo^]. VIII. Delian epigram : "•KakXiarov ro dinaiorarov^ Xcparov 6 vyiaiveiv^ rjdiarov dt necpvx ov ri5 ipa ro rvx^iv-" This separates various kinds of excellent and advantageous things. Aristotle does not agree with it, because they are all in- volved in /lis idea of happiness, and although he thinks that pros- perity is necessary to happiness, he does not agree with the Cyrenaics, who identify evrvxioc with happiness. Solon's Dictum \_XP^f^^ raXo5 opav]. Bk. I. Ch. 10.] Solon Said, ''Call no Man Happ¥ till he IS Dead." A. Did he mean that death was positive happiness } We who have made happiness an activity of the soul, cannot, of course, place it in the extinction of that activity. B. But perhaps Solon did not mean that death was positive happiness, but that the dead might be called happy, as being be- yond the reach of evils and misfortunes ; but if there is some good and evil to the living man, who is not aware of it [^rf aiaOavo- M^y^l is there not some also to /Ae deadi e. g. honor and dis- honor, and the good and evil of descendants. Here there arises a question, whether he will not be affected by the good and evil of descendants (discussed in next ch.). C. In looking to the end, then, are we to say that a man has been happy, and not to say that he is happy ,iow, while he is enjoy- ing happmess? and that, because we have conceived happiness to be somethmg ^ovi^ov and unchangeable [w^^ayucSs f^ra- poKov\. This is to make happiness depend on the rvxai, whereas the virtuous energies [a/ xar ai,ET,)y evipyeiai] are its basis* VKvptail and the ftsfiaiorrf^ wanted is nowhere greater than in those energies. As regards Tvxai good or bad— if J//W/— they will not affect the balance of life [poTii^l if large— good ones will make life more happy ; bad will crush or spoil happiness: still, even these may be the occasion of virtuous energies, and so far of happiness. Bk. II. Ch. 4.] "We Become Just, by Doing Just Actions " When the Doing of Them Shows us to be Just. (Apparent paradox.) Just as a worh of art shows a man to be an artist. This last is not true ; a man may do a work of art, ino tvxv^ Ka\ aXXov vnoSe^ivov, and is no artist, unless h^ possesses skill tn himself. Again, the arts are not a parallel case ; />/ the arts we look only to the excellence of the production \r6 ei] ; and only knowledge is required,*but in the virtues we look to the manner of doing a thing It must be done — (i.) f/(^<»5— with knowledge. (2.) npoaifiov^Bvo^ di n'/Jro'-deliberate choice for the thing's own sake. (3.) fiepaioj3 Hal aMeraHivf^raJs ^o^i^-with fixity and sta- bility. • This incidentally confirms Aristotle's definition of happiness. These are the liiree conditions in the mind of the agent, to make a virtuous action. Bk. III. Ch. 5.] Freewill. "Virtue and Vice are Equal- \.\ Voluntary. If the end=h the object of wish [/iovXf/Tov], and the means= the object of deliberation [^ouXstna] and deliberate choice [7rf>o(yip€Td], then the acts respecting these must be voluntary. Now, with these acts, virtuous energies are concerned ; therefore virtue is voluntary ; so, too, is vice, for if we ( an do, we can for- bear, and vice versa (parity of reasoning). Freewill is further proved : I. Man is the d PXV of 1"»i^ actions, and if so, they are voluntary. II. In governments the voluntariness of wicked actions alone causes them to be punished by lawgivers, who also reward virtuous actions impractical proof),* III. As for want of knoivledge [ayvoia] being an excuse, men are punished for that also, when self-caused and voluntary. IV. If drunkenness is the excuse, men ought not to have got drunk : if they were ignorant of the laws, they ought to have informed themselves of them. — \;''Toh ^^^v- ox)(5i diirXa Tct FTriTi/Jia,'* law of Pittacus, of My- tilene.] V. But perhaps some men are not capable of applying them- selves to their duty. Who made them so.^ They themselves did, by the repetition of such actions, as went to form their characters. VI. To plead that that they did twt knou* that such actions would form a habit, is a mark of extreme stupidity. VII. It is absurd for men to plead that they did not wish to become morally evil ; men do not 7vish to become unhealthy. VIII. Bodily faults which are in our own power are blamed, and no others ; therefore, vice being blamed, may be considered as in our power. {Analogy.) IX. It may be said that a man aims at the €>atv6pi€yoy ayaSoVy and that this (or his (pay raffia) is beyond his control, being constitutional. But if a man is airwi 710J5 of his constitutional habits, he is like- wise of his cpavTaffia, which is assimilated to them. If not, the aiming at the end will be no matter of our choice, but fixed by nature, and then virtues will be involuntary, as well as vice : so that this proves too much. X. Suppose the end to be fixed by Nature, still the means are in our own power, and if vt'rtue is thus voluntary (as men allow), then vice must be voluntary too. Still, habits, when formed, are not so much in our own power as the single acts which formed them. N. B. We are said to be avvairioi ttods — **in some sense joint causes" of our habits— with circumstances: i. e. habits being formed by acting in a certain way, under certain circumstances. We can only choose Acnv we will act, not under what circumstances we will act. Aristotle thus admits that our habits are, to some ex- tent, the result of causes over which we have no control. Bk. II. Ch. 2.] What is the Character of Virtuous Acts? The standard is opBoi \6y03 (but this point is reserved for Bk. VI.). I. They are, then, acts which avoid excess and defect, both of which prevent the formation of good habits : they are therefore iv ^eaorr/ri, II. They are acts which produce virtue, and are in their turn produced by virtue J for by abstaining from pleasure we become temperate, and the more we abstain, the more we are able to do so. These two points are suggested by the analogy existing between the body and the soul. The (pavepd are bodily habits, the dcpavrf the habit of the soul. The point of similarity is, that these are parts of the same complex being, and the argument from analogy is, that they resemble one another — 1. In their formation and growth {yeveGeis nai avBTfa€ii\ II. In their operation [fvi^fjyaia] when formed. Argument from Analogy in Bk. II. Ch. 6. Science and art seek the rehitive mean, and avoid the extremes: a fortiori, this will be the case with moral virtue, which is rtxyyi anftifieGTepa. The argument here depends upon the analogy between virtue and the arts, i. e., between the wo.rk of man as a moral agent, and the work of man as an artistic agent ; and the inference is, that what constitutes excellence in the one sort of work (artistic), will also constitute excellence in the other sort of work (moral). Both luill seek the relative mean, and avoid excess and defect. Bk. II. Ch. 7.] For Catalogue of Virtues, to Show that Virtue is a Mean, See Moore, Pp. 112— 113. Aristotle gives the following as supplementary : Excess. Mean. Defect. KaTan\i'}B,ii aidw^ avaiaxvvTia, (pSovos vefjisaii STrixaipsKaxia. But vepieffii and aidcoi are not mean states [/deffotf^rs^] ; that is to say, they are not stationary, as means are, but pass away, being naSij merely ; and because not jusfforrjTS^, they are not virtues. Nif^sffis is said to be a mean between (pdovo3 and STrtxaipe- Haxia. These, however, are not opposed to each other, and may exist in the same man. He Who Feels Pleasure at Vice and Pain at Virtue, is A Novice at Both. — (Cf. Moore, p. 78.) (Cf. Butler s Analogy, Ch. V., six pages from beginning: " For from our very faculties of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker" to "view of it.") When a man first begins, he may act with a greater zeal and zest, but when the habit is formed, he will have a more quiet satisfaction. A young soldier may enter on his first battle with greater impetuosity, but the veteran is more calm, and each may have his respective pleasure. So, contra, as regards pain, we may feel it more acutely when we first begin to do what is against the grain, but in time we be- .come inured to it, and feel a less acute pain, and get more insen- sible to the disagreeable. Explain — IleTraidev/Aevov yap iariv inl roaovrov Taxpifih iTVi- Had* fuaffTov yevo3y iqjoaov 7) rov npay^aTOj, (pvffts £7ri6ex£Tat. Aristotle several times tells us in Bk. I. that accuracy is not to be sought in questions of moral philosophy. We find this in his account of the mean^ anger, etc., and in the division of the soul* He says that matters of moral action and expediency have no fixedness Ytiefiixiori}i\ and that they come under no set of rules TrapayyeXia], but that we must act according to circumstances. It is in the application of rules to particular details of practice, that our responsibility rests. No rules can be so framed that evasion shall be impossible. Since praise and Maine (the awards of virtue and vice^ are be- stowed on voluntary actions, while involuntary ones meet with Gvyyvoo^t] and sXeo^, we ought to show what actions are voluntary and what involuntary. The knowledge of this is im- portant to legislators, who have to reward and punish. Involuntary actions. fiiaiovy ov ?} apxff e^coSev, roiavTT} ovffa, iv Tf ^rfdtv ffvjxfidWerai 6 TtpatTGDV r) 6 TtocGx^'^ 01 ayvoiay . J axovffia done in ignorance of some circumstance of the fact (ig- norantia facti) : not blame- able if attended with re- pentance, e. g., an under- graduate shot his compan- ion, and was greatly dis- tressed at the inquest : this is axcov. OVK SKOVCfia (ignorantia facti) being not followed by re- pentance are blameable, e. g. a man does another an inju- ry accidentally, and says, '* 1 did not mean to do it ; but never mind, it is just as well as it is:" this is ovx- ixcov. Voluntary actions. I OV V ^PXV ^^ avTO), ayvoGJV. €idoTi ra xad exaffra, Ignorance of the principle ev 015 // npd^i^, (ignorantia juris), blame- able : e. g., a criminal was hanged for shooting a cler- gyman, and wounding the clergyman's wife — rejoiced in the murder, justified it, and hoped that the wife would die : — e. g., man- slaughter. Perhaps Some One Will Say, from our Explanation of fiiaiovy THAT Tfdia and xaXd are so, ayayxa8,eiv yap, €^00 OVTa. I. But in this way we shall do nothing but what is /Siaiov, for the xaXov and the rjSv enter into all our actions as their principle. 10 II. Moreover, fiiaia cause us to act \v7rT^p(^s, but the Ha\d and i^Sea; ju€d^ ?}dovT}3, III. It is absurd [aroTrov] for a man to blame external cir- cumstances, and not himself, who is so easily caught [evOr^fjaTos] by them, or again, to ascribe the naXd to himself, but the aiaxpd to pleasure. Five Reasons why Things done from Spirit [^p/^o^] and FROM Appetite [eniftiy^ia} are not Involuntary. I. If these actions are involuntary, no animals, besides men, not even children, will be voluntary agents, because these are the motives from which they act. II. Perhaps the xaXd are tnovaia, and the aiaxi^d are axovGia. It is absurd, however, to suppose that one cause [h^ it OvfiOi or eniOvfAia] should produce oppo- site effects. III. We^ cannot drop the euovam^ because ini nai 6ei_ opyiS^eadai, xai riycov 6ei enidv^eiy, 6ei is here the emphatic yord. The sense of duty excludes the notion of in voluntariness. If we ought to do anything, it is clearly a voluntary act to do it. We must drop the dnovaux, for such are XvTTijpd, but the actions we speak of are not so. V. We feel that toc Hard Xoyia^ov dixapTifdivTa and ra Hard 6vpi6v are equally (psvxrd. If one class were voluntary and the other involuntary, we should not have the same feeling about both, and as man's pas- sions and reason are equally his, it is absurd to attempt this distinction between the acts which result from them. IV T I MIXED ACTIONS. Partaking of the nature of both, being most like voluntary ac- tions, inasmuch as the principle of action is internal \rf apxv iv avTcp\ but abstractedly involuntary, inasmuch as all would absolutely avoid them [^)iad avrd jutr axovaia\. I Praised. When for some great good^ or to avoid some great evil, we do that which otherwise we would not. e. g. Zopyrus, SccEVola, Regulus. I Blamed. When for some little good, or to avoid some little evil, we do that which we would not. e. g. Esau. I Pardoned. When under tJie influence of some great bodily tor- ment, we do that which we ought not. e. g. Naaman. 2 Mace. vi. At the feast of Bac- chus the Jews were compelled to go in the procession car- rying ivy. I Not Pardoned. When for any rea- son, we do an over- whelmingly dis- g race ful act, ^'s,Alc- mceon, who slew his mother, Eri- phylc, because his father commanded him. How DOES Aristotle's System Imply a Fixed Standard OF Morality, and how Would the Absence of Such A Standard Affect his Doctrine of the Mean? It is said that because there is no napayyBkia^ set of rules (Bk. II. Ch, 2), no objective code in Aristotle's system (the stand- ard being the subjective one, of the good man), therefore there is no fixed standard. This at first sight seems plausible — that the standard is vari- able — inasmuch as notions of right and wrong frequently shift, and, as Paley says, " Every vice has in its turn been deemed a virtue ; even assassination, to promote, by a tyrant's death, the public good." But Aristotle's "good man" \a7tov6aioi'\ would not allow this. He would hold that right is always rights and wrong always wrongs and that expediency would never convert wrong into right. For instance, the principle of justice is eternal, though its ex- emplification and details may vary : the good man intuitively per- 12 ceives this [^avT8veTai\ by his own unassisted light; and what thus appears to him, appears to every good man, semper, ubique etc." This question is discussed in Bk. III. Ch. 4., in the Dilem- ma, respecting the dyaSor and the fiovXifTov^ where he shows that TO ayaSov fiov\7]T(W is identical with to (paivojaevov to the good man. (Cf. Bk. X. Ch. 6. Sec. 5.) As regards the ff7rov6ai03, thejefore, whether regarded morally in himself [ffGDcppcjv]^ or as regards others [^iHaio^]^ or intellectually [(pp6vi^03], the standard is always fixed and unchangeable as regards essential principles, any ifehrmi nation as to details hein^ left to his Hpiaii ; how far he may be angry, etc. Cf. fV aiaSt). " KTr/aii. 13 {h.) He shows in spite of theory, that exterml prosperity is nec- essary to complete the idea of happiness. (/.) He rejects the notions of the Stoics, who define the virtues as states of mere quietude. [aTtadeias, Tivdi xai ?jpepiia5.] Virtue consists in the due regulation of all the parts of our nature (Book X.). (/) In conclusion, he shows that in matters connected with ethics, theory must be carried on to practice. Hence we must look to some authority to enforce good habituation. {h.) It is inductive, starting from common facts [oTi] that are within the observation of all— fVJ Ta^ apx^i- (/.) Theory of habits in Bk. II. (w.) Rules for conduct in Blc. II. 9. Modification of the Mean. Aristotle's mean is not an absolute mean, but a relative one— rel- ative, i. e. to the circumstances of different individuals. It is im- possible to lay down rules which will meet every case, or to re- duce morals to a rigid or mathematical precision. This appears from the words oopicf^ev\} \6ycp in his definition of virtue. That is, the varying standard of the mean must be calculated from time to time by reason. He says it is difficult to define'//^zc/, and with whom, and on what occasions, we should be angry.*" Small devia- tions from the ideal mean are not important, and we must some- times incline iq the excess, and sometimes to the defect, for so we shall be most likely to hit the mean. Three practical rules are given : (i.) Avoid the extreme, most opposed to the mean, in the nature of things. (2.) Avoid the extreme, to which our statural inclination \ini60' (Tz^] tends. (3.) Btivare of pleasure. Ci^assification of Goods. First division : (i.) Goods pursued for their own sake. * Cf. St. Paul, " Be angry, and sin not.' 14 (2.) Goods pursued for their oivn sake, and for the sake of some- thing else. (3.) Goods pursued for the sake of something else. Second division : (i.) External goods. (2.) Goods of souL (3.) Goods of body. Third division : (i.) Potential, can be abused according to taste of possessor. Cf. riches and bodily strength = potential. (2.) Actual, cannot (I. 12.). • Legislators. (i.) Bk. I. 13. Legislators study ap^rr^^ e. g. those of the Cretans and LacedeBiuonians ; hence it is in conformity with Aristotle's plan to consider it. (2.) Bk. in. Legislators, who have to reu^ard and punish, should know what actions are voluntary, and what in- voluntary. ml- (3.) Bk. in. The practice of legislators \vo^oBtrr]5\ con- firms Aristotle's view, that vice is voluntary : they reward virtue and punish vice. (4. ) He shows that moral training must be enforced by the in- tervention of the state. 0i\ia, (i.) Bk. II. Enumerated as one of the naStj--'' liking,'" "af- fection." • (2.) Bk. II.-IV. As a virtue; "friendliness," or "courtesy " [q)i\ia aveiJ rov fftepyetv]. (3.) Bk. VIII. "Friendship." Avyajjii3» (i.) Bk. I. I. rixy^ as opposed to science. (2.) As 2i class of goods with inaiverd and rifxia — Bk. I. 12. dvva^Bii =»things which are potentially, but not neces- sarily good (cf. riches). (3.) Bk. II. Capacities of receiving impressions from the nadr} (potentially) in the same chapter with f^eis and nadrf. N. B. Svvafii^ (capacity) potentially is opposed to evipyeia 15 • (activity), because dvva^i^ may be dormant or abused: cf, evep- Instances of Extremes Meeting. (i.) The rash man is also a coward. (2.) '^\it prodigal '\^ also illiberal. (3.) T\\t falsely modest man is also boastful. Nameless States. (i.) There is a nameless mean on the subject oi small honor, the extremes are said to contend for it. Cf. the illustration of the favorite dish. [d/d(piff^r/reiv rd dxpa.] , (2.) opyiXoTtji — npcx6rr}3 — dopyrfCJia, are names employed for the states nepl opyrfv. 4>avTaaia=r6 (paivo/xevov dyadov. op€^i3 [=fiovXrj- crii], wish, desire, occurs in definition of Trpoaipeat^ = ^ovXev- TiHtj op€^i5 rcov €q/ f}picov, Aristotle draws his illustrations from three sources : — i. Medi- cine ; 2. Gymnastics ; 3. Lawgivers. TIoXiriHrj. (i.) Bk. I. 2. Moral Philosophy. ^ (2.) Bk. I. 2. ^edodo^ TtoXiriHtf rt5 = treatise on moral phi- losophy. (3.) 7toXiTiKrj = statesmanship. (4.) Bk. III. 7toXirLK7)= first and best of the spurions kinds of courage. (5.) noXiriKO^ (pvaei=^ social being. (6.) 710X1x1x65 (iio5=life of a citizen, with all its privileges of which slaves have no share. (7.) Bk. I. 13. 710X1x1x65 = moral philosopher, lawgiver, poli- tician. (8.) 7roXtxiHd = native militia. i6 17 ** Moral Virtues are 'States' of the Emotions." Explain, and discuss how far Aristotle agrees with this. Before answering this question, we settle the meaning of the word '' state " in English. If it means " present condition, which may be transitory, it is a xivrjaii, and the above accordingly is not true. But if by "state" we mean the "settlea character," it will be true enough in regard to moral virtue, but it does not touch intellectual virtue. Aristotle would make e^ei5 "settled ways of being affected by the nadr], eUher bv or xaKo55. "E^€i5 = Ha6' a5 npoi nadr} e'^o/ifv iv v xaKWf, ^ e. g., if our anger is too vehement or too slack, xa«c55 exo^sv ,• but if it is in the mean, ev i'xo^^ev. We are said Hiveiadai, by the Ttadt], which are transient merely, but diaHeiadai by the fgf«, which are lasting. Duty. Aristotle's notion of duty is expressed when he says : Aei 6k Hui opyi8,aadai ini Tiai, nai iTtidv^eiv rivwv 6e, So, too, in Bk. II. 9 : 'AnoKXivnv 6a 6ei, ore ^v iTtt rfjv vnepfiokrjvy ort 6h eni rrfv eWeiipiv, Education. (i.) Bk. I. Only an educated man [7re7tat6£v^€V05] fit stu- dent for moral philosophy. (2.) Bk. II. I. Makes no little difference whether we are trained in such or such a way from our youth. [VX^^^-] (3.) Plato said that true education consisted in learning to like and dislike the right thing. (4.) Bk. X. 9. Moral training as necessary for the attainment of virtue. A Man Signs an Agreement Under Compulsion— How WOULD Aristotle hold him Obliged to Keep it? The act of signing waS y^iazov— hence Aristotle would pardon \6vyYVOopLT}\ the man for breaking the agreement, if for any great good, or to avoid any great evil (involuntary). Objection Raised to the Statement that Moral Virtue Can Only be Obtained by Practice. As the virtues all come by habituation, does it follow that we must be habituated "to each and every one?" Ans. — We may be placed in such circumstances, that we can- not develop all the virtues : e. g., if in moderate circumstances, we may be iXsvOepioiy but it will be impossible for us to be magnificent ; but suppose prosperity to come to the poor man, his liberality would become ^EyaXoTtpeTtsia ^ so the ^xeyaXo- npinrfi if reduced in circumstances, would become eXevStpio^, as his (pp6vrf(Xi5 would keep him right. A man conceals his convictions to obtain preferment. He is blamed, because for small good, he does what he ought not to do. (Mixed actions.) A man is keenly disappointed in seeing a favorite dish emptied before it reaches him, but he suppresses his mortification, and does not betray it. The nameless mean of small honor — jxLrpiOi and aGoq)poov, (Ambition.) Are the Virtues Separate or Not? The virtues are separate inasmuch as they are on different sub- jects ; at the same time the anov6aioi will be in possession of them all "potentially," through (ppovijai^. Relation of Pleasure to Happiness. The Cyrenaics (Eudoxus) said that happiness was with pleasure. Aristotle agrees with this, because he thinks his happiness involves pleasure of a higher kind. ' ( I.) It is pleasant in a higher manner — i. e., it is inherent in the acts themselves. '0 (iio5 xaO^ avrov rj6v5. (2.) It is of a higher j/7r/— natural {(pvaei), not artificial. (3.) It is more comprehensive, as it includes the ro ayador and the ro xaXXoVy as well as ro rf6v. In Bk. X. Aristotle shows that happiness is an activity according to the highest virtue, viz., the virtue of the iniellecty which has a pleasure of its own, which helps to intensify the activity. Though such a life would be beyond man. he teaches that we should aspire to the satisfaction of our divine nature \a8avari^ Sety], and only cultivate earthly things in a lower way. i8 Show the Relation of Happiness to Virtue. The relation is explained in Aristotle's definition of happiness — evapyeia il-vxrfi uar^ apicfTtjv ocpSTijv iv picp reXsidp, apiarff aperrf is explained in Bk. VI. at full length, and in Bk. X., recapitulated, it is said to be — (i.) Kpariari], (2.) ffwexeaTan/. (3.) TfSicXTtJ, (4.) avTocpHJfS, (5) l^^yy] 6l^ avrrjy ayanccGdai. (6.) ev axoUu Afterwards the life of the intellect is shown to be KpeitToov T} Kar^ ayOpGOTTOv, so that [devTtpcos] moral virtue must be cultivated. The sum of the whole being that the good man [(XTTovSalos] alone can be intellectually and morally happy. Temptation. JV0 man is blamed for being caught \dr]parci\ but for being easily caught \Evdi]paT6f\. The iynparrfj) is tempted, but overcomes temptation. In Bk. II. 8. Aristotle says that we are evxaraq)epoL ^dXXov rrpo^ anoXaaiixv 7} Ttpos KOG^iorjjra (orderly conduct), and that we are led by our /)ias [^ETtLSoai^^^ to that extreme, which is more contrary to the mean. Bk. 2. 9. He says that in order *to disccrcer the mean^ we must consider those things to which we are evnaraqjepoi — pleasure and pain are the test. A. As T t^at state t rer;:itX:"""^""^' ^"-'^^^'^ '^ ^^'^ '° -' ^--'^ -^ -^n- How FAR DOES ArISTOTLE ReCOGNIZE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF Capacity in Men for the Attainment of Happi- NEss.> Quote Passages. Definition-^v^p;.e,a i-vxr^s nar' ^piarr,y iptr^y ey «,„ reach of lu f '^ ^^^^'''''' "' ^oXvHotyos, within the butt. "^ "■' "°' '"capacitated [^^^rfpc^^^iyo,] for virtue, ^o6co ^era6^6c.a^y, u ^^ ««i /S/ot.._Bk. X. Ch. 7. § 8] and cMdr.n, as incapable of iyipyata nat' apfr^y. ^ JLf'w^^ shows that /.r/../;J„^;„-„«, consists in intellectual activity [dswpial Practically, none but the best men can J proach, even imperfectly, to such ^v6at^,oyia. Most men never Th? .'■ '"°'' "*"" ^PP^''^'^*' 'he happine.ss of the gods in the contemplative life, the more happy will thev be nt alid ;h ' "^"^ °^ responding degreefbetween h'appi-' ness and the capacity for intellectual activity : in the lower animals both are totally absent ; ,« ^ods both are present 7n \\ 23 perfection; among men both exist imperfectly, but in exact proportion to each other. To What Extent May it be Said that Aristotle^s The- ory IS Intended to Assist the Moral Progress of Society? Ethics, according to Aristotle, formed a sub-division of noki- riHrf, moral philosophy, the science of human life ; the other two parts being economics and politics (statesmanship). Ethics, there- fore, or the science of individual good, must be the groundwork of the rest, for unless the parts be good, the whole cannot be perfect. The development of mans moral nature is the introduction to the principles of human society, hence he defines happiness as ivipyeia 4'VXViy etc. He discusses the different virtues at length, showing the degrees of relation they have to society. Cf. frequent mention of lawgivers [vo^oOirrfs] : (i.) They study dperr). {2.) ^Yh^y reward and punish. (3.) Their practice confirms his views, that vice is voluntary. Bk. X. Aristotle insists that moral training must be enforced bv the intervention of the State. In What Points, Chiefly, Does Moral Virtue Differ, AND IN What Does it Resemble the Arts? (i.) In virtues as well as in arts, the ivtpyeiai precede the (2.) Two opposite effects, virtue and vice, proceed from the same cause, so it is with the arts ; there would be no need to teach them, if they invariably produced the same effects. (3.) It is not necessarily true that he who does good deeds is a good man ; so neither is it necessarily true that he who succeeds in a work of art is a good artist, for his success may be owing to accident [aTto rvx^3] or the suggestion of another [vtt^ aWov vnoOefievov]. 24 (4.) In arts we look merely to the excellence of the production, and only knowledge is required \yyobaif[. But in the virtues, we look to the manner of doing a thing- it must be done — (a) €idco3, (d) 7rpoatpov/xevo5 6i^ avro. (c) fii^aioj5 Hal d^£TaKiyr/T0J5 ^xoov, (5.) Science and art seek the relative mean, and avoid the ex- tremes, a fortiori, this will be the case with moral vir^ tue, which is axpifiecfTipa naarj^ rixyrfs, (6.) Art and virtue are conversant with that which is more than ordinarily difficult [nepl to x^^^TtdrEpoy-], tfow Does Aristotle Describe the Nature of his Meth- od ? AND how far is HIS TREATISE CONSISTENT WITH THESE Statements ? Aristotle begins with ri nporieitxiOa, ndoi a^oSenriov (how he IS to admit of proof) n-fpl axpoarov. We must not ^xp,ct too much accuracy in subjects of moral investigation He says to judge aright in these matters, education is necessary • and a young man is not fitted for the study of Moral Philosophy as wantmg experience, and because he has not the command of his pass.ons-««r« nado, ^y ,• a thing which this practical treatise espeoally looks to, reXoi yap (i. e. of the treatise) otJ vv«^«^' apiffTtjv aperr)v iv fiicp reXeiop. Bk. IV. 9, iyxpareia axpaffta aHoXaffia- jiiHTTj ris, — a conquering of the evil passions after a struggle, just as the napaXeXv^eva rov ffco/iaro3 piopia are made to go the right way. : would make the palsied limbs go the wrong way. napd (against) Ttpoaipecftv, : would lead a man to act 6 id npoaipeaiv. Quotations from Homer. (i.) Tovrov piev xdnvov nal Hvpiaro^ ^xroi eepye vT)a. Circe, not Calypso, gave this advice : " Go further from the extreme, which is most opposed to the mean. (2.) Hector says : ^ ^ novXv6dpia5 /ioi npdbroi eXeyx^rjv avadrjoeu 29 Diomede : ^/ ExTcop yip nore q)i]aei evl Tpooeaa^ dyopevoov *' Tv6eidr/5 vn' ej^eio" [cpo/Sevpievo^ ixero yi]af\. Illustrating that spurious form of courage which arises from fear of public opinion. • (3.) Hector again : Ov 6t X* eyaov andvevSe fxaxv^ TtTGoffGovTa voijgqd OX) 01 dpxiov eaaeiTai v, &c. II. ^Ee 6>7rezp/a'5=Experience. This results from familiar- ity with the empty [xeva] grounds of terror in war, and from familiarity with weapons. The difference between this and real courage is seen by a comparison between the conduct of regular troops, rank and file {cfrpariwrai) [who become cowardly when the danger surpasses their experience, VTrepTSivtj] and that of native militia [TroXirtxa], Socrates thought courage Ttue courage implies (i.) did xaXov rt, {^.) Due appreciation of the danger. . (3.) Sometimes caution. Each of the spurious kinds will be found deficient in one or the other, or both of the first two qualifications. III. €x 6ujxov=Spint — < 33 ' aStvo^y etc. jJLtvoi, etc. Spijuvy etc. ^e8,eaey aipia.j Aristotle acknowledges that bravery has a large element of this, and illustrates his view from Homer. But it obeys the dictates of an irregular passion. > /, IV. oi £t;6ATi(y£5= Sanguine. Their courage is based on like motives with that of the experienced ; when they find the danger greater than they expected \^ur] ffv^prf]^ they fly. V. €^ dyyoia5=lgnoTa.nt. The courage of the ignorant is akin to that of the sanguine, but worse, for they have no opinion of themselves [ovScv d^iQO/ja], and when the danger exceeds their expectations, they fly. d ff7rovSai03, Bk.1.8. Virtuous actions are pleasant, if (TTtovSafos judges rightly about them. Bk. III. 4. The anovdaio^ sees truth in everything, since he is, as it were, the rule and ?neasure of it — xavoov xai ^trpov, Cf. Sophists. Bk.X.6. Those things are honorable [rijuta] and pleasant [i^dia], which are so to the anovSaioi, Bk. II. 6. In definition of moral virtue \^xai 005 dv 6 q)p6- ri/A03 Spiff eievy Aristotle regards reason as embodied in the man of practical common sense. Excess. SpaavTTjS) axoXaffia Catalogue of Virtues. i^ Mean. Defect. dvdpBia deiXoTTji (joixppoai^ytf ai'aiadrjffia Excess. aGGDXia j^avavola q)i\oTipiia opyiXorrjs, a\a8,oveia ftco^oXoxia apecjKOi -\- HoXa^ HaraTtXi]^ 34 Mean. eXevdepia pieyaX onptneux {otVGDrVfJLOi) Ttpaorr}^ aXr/Oeia evrpaneXia cpiXo^ 35 Defect aysXsudepia ^inponptneia /Aixpot/:vxio[ a(pi\oTtjuia aopyrjaia eipGjveia aypoiHia 6v(T£pi3 -f" ;t75 = the definition of happiness implies a knowledge of the nature of virtue, and consequently of the nature of the soul. III. 3. 7. q)VGi3 airtov r£ = under proper objects of deliber- ation. II. I. 2. ovdtv TGov g)vaei ovtcjv aXXoos £^/^/= /iiH/)07rp£7r£ia = meanness. Excess^ ^avavaia and dnEiponakia—h^^ tciste and vul- garity. / There is a sort of scientific ^^/// implied in ^ByaXonptuEia -, cf o ^eyaXoTtpETCiji eTiiarmiovi ioinev ; to decide under what circumstances great expenditure is befitting. There must be the desire of what is noble— rot) uaXoiJ evena. Munificent acts must be done cheerfully and ungn$dgtngly— t}deoJ5 xal TrpoeriKGD^ ,• there must be no close calculations of how much ? or how little ? will it cost. Fitting occasions for the display of munificence, e. g. : (i.) Service of religion— A£iroi;p>/zaz. (2.) Great public or patriotic services (equipping a trireme) \r pit] pa pxcp\ or defraying the expenses of a state embassy {oLpxtO^ODp^\ (3.) Wedding \paa dadna^ yivBrai\ entertaining strangers [vnodoxd^ SevGJvl making [Saoped^] and returning presents [dvriSoDped^]. ^ (4.) Toy.presents to children, e. g. fftpaipa and Xipwdo^^ but this is not such greatness as to constitute }^eya' XoTipeTteia in its proper sense. 40 ETHICS.— BOOK I. il! ;^i Ch. I. r£A;;=" ends or objects of action." All human ac- tion aims at some good as its raXo^. Such riXr} are either (i.) Acts — evepysiaiy or (2.) Certain results — epya. Thus riXri are manifold, and they may be arranged in an ascending scale, according to the importance of the actions to which they are relative. Ch. 2.* TO r6Ao5 = the "chief good." The supreme end of all action will be the "chief good," to know which is important as a guide to right conduct. Naturally, it will be the rkXoi of the highest and most com- prehensive of the sciences, i. e. of TtoXirixf) (the T€Xo5 of the state having fair claims to be ranked higher than that of each individual). Ch. 3. The " study of Ethics " (a digression), axpifteia is not to be expected in a science dealing with subject- matter so vague, as justice, virtue, &c. Hence its conclusions will be general. The proper judge on points of Ethics will be the ne- naidevjuevoSy and not young people, because (i.) Inexperienced [aTterpo^]. (2.) Impulsive [xara ndOos r^ rov tjOov^ dps- iXevdepta, ^^ jueff6Tr/5 Ttepi Soffiv xal Xrnpiv xPVf^drojv.^^ It is more connected with giving than receiving. = riJ5 yap dperifs to ev noielv rj to ev ndax^iy, xal Ta xaXd npaTTiiv^ ^alXov ;/ xd aiaxpd ///; npaTTEiv.— Active and positive, rather than/^j.»- ive and negative. The extremes — affojTia and dveXevSepia — but ''prodigal " is used in wider sense [av^7tXtxoyref\ applied to the intemperate generally. Liberality is that ** quality or vir- tue which enables us to make the best possible use of money." Liberality is one of the most popular of virtues [cpiXoiJTai GX^Sov judXicFTa]. 55 Three conditions — (i.) A noble motive [toij xaXoO evexal. (2.) Due consideration of the recipients, the amount, and oc- casion [TaXXa oGa euETai Trj opOrj Soaei]. (3.) With cheerfulness [j^diGj^ rj aXvTrao^]. o iXevOepioi must not be indifferent to the source from which money comes. He will want it, as a means of giving, and not to secure it for himself. Liberality is to be measured, not by the absolute, but by the relative amount given. Liberality is more often found in those who have inherited, rather than in those who have made their money. Princes cannot be called prodigal, for their wealth is all but boundless, o iXevOepio^ is an easy man to have dealings with [evxoiyGovrjTof\. He will regret more keenly having spent too little, than having spent too much, and he is no friend to * Simonides ' [ovx apeGx6^ayof\. 6 aGojTO^ is easily cured by age and want [eviaTO^ t€ ydp egti xai vno rffs ifXixias xal vno Trf^ aTtopia^] ; the prodigal rather weak than vicious, for the benefit of others ; but the dveXsvOepio^ benefits no one, not even himself. Illiberality is incurable \avia- fof^. It is a more natural vice than aaooTia \GV}xcpveOTepov\ ; it has many forms \noXEVBiSLf\. It does not come in "com- pleteness " \oX6xXr]poi^Os\. iv. 5. 7.] to everybody. " dveXev- Bepia^^ is more opposed to '' iXevOepia^^ than '' dGGOTia.^' Instances of Extremes Being Subdivided. Excess. Mean. Excess. 6pa(JV5 ) d^o/3o3 ) dvdp£i03 deiXo^, apeaxoi xoXaS (piXo^ dvaepi^ dvaxoXoS). i, (2.) Result produced. (3.) Something difficult. 7k' dyadoi ysvGo^eda, Are There any Practical Rules Given for this Purpose.^ Aristotle enlarges on the indefiniteness of the general principles of morals and application in particular cases ; they fall under no rexrrf or napayyeXia, i. e. no practical set of rules. (i.) To become good, do good actions [habituation]. (2.) Good education from youth [this to make others good]. (a.) Avoid worse extreme. (b.) Avoid extreme to which you are most liable. {c.) Be on your guard against pleasure. But the question of practical rules is really the question of politics and not of Ethics. « Under Head of Ilpoaipsffis. We are responsible for all voluntary actions, which we do with- out 7rpoaipeai5 ; i. e. without going through a process of delib- eration and choice : e. g. actions done on the "spur of the mo- ment " [ra e^aiq)vrff\ ; whether from anger, desire, or any other motive. Aristotle Divides the Processes of the Soul into These Three : (i.) ;ra^05 ^ process on which follows pleasure or pain : e. g. fear. (2.) 6vva^i3=\% the faculty of having these feelings. (3-) f^i5 =is the permanent relation in which we stand towards the ndOt], "Virtue is only Vice a Little Exaggerated or a Little Controlled." Prove from Aristotle that this is A Misrepresentation of his Theory of the Mean. This misrepresents Aristotle's theory, because virtue is the right regulation, not of a vice, but of some feeling (or action) which in itself is neither good nor bad. It is good when you have the feeling in right amount, on right occasions, etc., bad when you 64 have it in excess or defect. But no diminution or exaggeration of a vice will make it a virtue ; you diminish or exaggerate the feeling (e. g., confidence or fear, to make courage"). Four Kinds of apxoti, , e. g. statue. (i.) The material marble (2.) The efficient artist (3.) The formal design in artist's mind (4.) The final purpose or end for which he intended it. Wvxr}. Comprises (of man) — (i.) The principle of life. (2,) The emotional nature. (3). The rational nature. Three Ways of Arriving at Apx^^- (i.) eVa;/C89)/f/= induction — q. g. chemistry. (2.) az(y^/?0'£z = perception — e. g. axioms. (3.) ££^i(T/ic5 = habituation — e. g. moral principles. , One Does Not Feel Pleasure in Every Virtue. e. g. One does not feel pleasure in courage, except so far as the attainment of the end and ideal of his being is felt and real- ized {nXrfv eq/ oaov tov reKov^ €(pd7TTeTai\ because there is an element of pain in it ; so that we do not energize pleasantly \r6 rjdioos evepyeiv]. Nor need we deny that a more reckless, though less brave man, might perhaps make a better rank-and-file soldier. ^Tparicora^ S^ ovStv urcos xcoXvet pir} rov5 roiovTovs Hpari