9ZN\G UT in the ®ttu cf ^^nr ^ovh |[>* LIFE or THB EMPEROR NAPOLEON >OTK nv Tui: E.\GUAVj:r.. The likeness is taken from tin; original print r'ngraved in the yt-jr 1797, \>y J. (jouE- tKoy, •v*hich print was drawn by Cukvunr, from David's original ski-tch after life. Towards tlie cod of the year 1797. about the time of general Bonaparte's return being expected from his victorious campaign in Italy, a gcntlema/i in order to pay his court to Joscpiiine (madam IJoaapartcj, wished to present her with a fan illustrative of the general's victories in Italy, lie .ipp'icd to Cbaldet, the celebrated draughtsman and sculptor, and member of the institute, who made an allegorical and emblematical design, in the centre of which is a medallion portrait of general lionaparte. i'.uwuEi- drew the likeness from the sketch which IJavid had made fro:n nature, when ibc gene- ral had sal to him about the year 1796, before be left Paris for the Italian frontier. CiiAUDET completed his design with the assistance of Fostaimb an.l I'ercieb, arcliiti.'cts, who drew the other medallions and ornaments with their accustomed ability, and I was ccinmLssioned tt> engrave this drawing, which I did Ijy the end of 17^7. J. Goi>KFR«ir, Julv, i8j4. i y I J GE f^' K RAIL 'OSV I^OI^ AFARTE THE LIFB-^^^^^^^_^^^^^^^^^ S OF THE \ EMPEROR NAPOLEON. WITH AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING AN EXAMINATION OF SIR W. SCOTT'S " LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE ; " AND A NOTICE OF THE PRINCIPAL ERRORS OF OTHER WRITERS, RESPECTLNG HIS CHARACTER AND CONDUCT. BY H. LEE. VOL. I. NEW-YO RK : CHARLES DE BEHR, No. 102, Broadway. 1835. [Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1835, by Crahles db Behr, in the Cleric's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New- York.] PREFACE. The general impression, that an impartial and accurate biography of the Emperor Napoleon does not exist, and that Sir Wal- ter Scott, in his " Life of Napoleon Bona- parte, ' did injustice to his subject, autho- rises an endeavour to supply that defect and repair that injustice. In the body and ap- pendix of the work, the first volume of which is now submitted to the public, this double object is attempted. The fame and amiableness of the author of Waverley, since they give importance to his errors and effect to his detraction, are far from alleviating his faults as an bisto- rt VI PREFACE, rian. His name is less glorious than tliat of Napoleon ; his memory less sacred than truth. It may be that the causes of his failure in one walk of literature, were the sources of his success in another. But a bigoted and fantas- tic zeal for the hereditary privileges of rank and royalty, when displayed ostentatiously in the light of reason, and mischievously ob- truded on the business of nations, is not the less absurd and offensive, that, transmitted through the twilight of romance, it has con- duced to the creation or embellishment of unreal characters and fictitious scenes. Their music and innocence, although they qualify the choristers of Rome to fill with harmony the domes of temples, and to touch with ecstacy the forms of devotion, would not exempt them from pity and aversion, should they go forth into the world and meddle Avith the affairs of bearded men. The propriety of annexing lo a life of the PREFACE. VII Emperor Napoleon, an examination of the work of Sir Walter Scott, is enforced by several considerations. In the first place, that work controverts the assertions of Na- poleon respecting matters of his personal experience, in the sketches which he dic- tated of his own life ; and so far raises a question, the decision of which is essential to a just estimation of his moral character. In the next place ; for an unknow n writer to demand of the public the acceptance of his own narrative and the rejection of that of the most eloquent and popular author of his aoe, without demonstratino the fal- lacy of one and the faithfulness of the other, would be a proceeding as presump- tuous as the example of Norvins has proved it to be vain.* * Norvins announced (see his preface) his woik as expressly designed to refute and discredit that of Sir Walter Scott — an effect ^\hich, notwithstanding his zeal and opportunities, lie does not appear to have had the slightest agency in producing. VIM PREFACE. An engineer, rather than see his fortress overcrowed and commanded, will not hesi- tate to demolish a neighbouring edifice, however costly its materials or curious its workmanship; however pompously its foundations may be laid in the earth, or gracefully its spires may spring into the air. Again; if it shall be found that the scheme of the great novelist embraced such misre- presentations as he covild decently repeat or plausibly imagine, their correction will counteract, in its most imposing form, and by a single operation, a diversified mass of historical falsehood, and establish in the reader's mind, various and important truths. It is observed by Lord Bacon, that '•^ the enquiry of truth, which is the wooing of it^ the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it^ and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it; is the sovereign good of human nature.' Within tlic compass of the design here PREFACE. IX indicated the task of noticing kindred and, conflicting errors of lesser writers, naturally falls. The author, removed from the in- fluence of national or personal feelings in relation to his suhject, is sensible of as little disposition to respect the follies of French, as the unfairness of British, historians, while he records the actions of a man, whose cha- racter, in rising to a level with the noblest examples of any former age, provoked and encountered the vilest prejudices and pas- sions of his own. i COiSTENTS. <^sSS^&Q)^S^Samm CHAPTER I. From 1769 lo 178 V Corsica — Birth of Napoleon — His familv — Circumstances attending his birlh — Anecdotes of his infancy — His father, a deputy of the nobles to Versailles in 1^79 — Places him at the military school of Brienne — Anecdotes respecting him while at Brienne — Pichegru his comrade and tutor — His admiration for Turenne — His early trans- fer to the school of Paris — The Chevalier Keralio's opi- nion and report of him — Admiration of his instructors at Paris — His favourite authors — Anecdotes in regard to hiai while at the school of Paris — Noticed bv the abbe Raynal — Death of his father — His comrades at Paris — Examined by La Place — Receives his first commission as second lieutenant of artillery — Joins his regiment at Va- lence, in Dauphine — His character at the time. CHAPTER H. From 1785 to 1793. Napoleon in garrison at Valence in Dauphine — Madam Co- lombier's kindness and esteem for him — In love with her daughter — His success in society — His comrades in the regiment — His prize essay successful in the academy of Lyons — His history of Corsica — Commended bv the Abbe Raynal — In garrison at Auxonne — Near being drowned in the Saone — Prince of Conde — Bonaparte's public letter lo the Corsican deputy Buttafoco— Kindness to his brother Louis — Promoted to a first lieutenancy in the regiment of Grenoble — Pieturns to Valence — Anecdote — General Dutheil — Bonaparte's liberal political opinions — Rescues a brother officer — Visits Corsica — Death of his father's XII IM)tX. uncle — AiiPcdole — Proniolcd to a caplaiucy — Conimaucfs a Corsican ballalion, and siij)ressesa riot at Ajac(;io — Tlic first siand;'!' against hin) — Goes to l\iris — llcmarks on the liorrors of the uolli or,hMir,and lolli of August — Jleilcc- tion — Interest al)Oiil liissistcjs — lleturns to ( ioislca — Tlxr <'\j)edltion af;ainst Sai'dinla — Paoll — Anecdote — Refuses to join l^ioli — Paoli's cruelly to tin; Bonaparte finnily — Clixil^varin Corsica — J}on;onaj)art(; lakes n fuge on the conti- nent, and sellles at Marseilles — ]{ona])artc joins the army of Italv — Writes and publishes *' Le Souper de i»cau- caire." CHAPTER ill. From Aiujuai, 1795, to March, 1794. Siege of Toulon — That place betrayed to EordlTood — Sen- siilion produced bj it — Situation ofToidon — Strength of the allied garrison — j^hasurcsof the coniniittee of public safety — Their jilan for the siege — 13onaj)arle chief of bat- talion — Ap|)oinledto command the artillery of the siege — General Carlaux. — ignorance at heatl-cpiarters — Dilli- cidties to contend a\ iih — Boniij)arte's ])lan — Rejected by Carlaux — Foliy of that general — Vigour and activity of Roniiparte — Council of uar — Ronaparle's plan adopted — Jls execution commenced — Little. Gibraltar — J>all(;ry of the convention — Mischievous interference of the de- puties — Sally and capture of General O'llara — Repulse of the sallying party — General Doppet — His cowardice and incapacity — General Dugommier — His coura^rp and experience — Discoin-agement of the besiegers — Confi- tlence of IJonaparle — His batteries play on JiiliicGii)raltar — Advises the storming that place — Little Gibraltar car- ried by assault — Brav(M-v of the garrison — Swaggering of ihe deputies — Tin; allied squadrons weigh anchor — 'Ihe town, forts and harbour plundered and evacuated — The French fleet, arsenal, and magazines set on hre — Dreadful conflagration — Distress of the Toulonese — Anecdotes — .lunot — Humanity of Bonaparte — Duroc — Afi'ection and admiration of Dugommier lor Jjonaparte — Bonaparte bri- g;)di(>r general — Is ordered to join the army of Italy — Prcsciibes a system of fortifications for the coast — His horror of the cruelty of a mob — His respect for the me- mory of Gasparin, and of Dugommier. iM»i;x. \m CHAPTER IV. From March, 1794, to October, 1795. Uonapai te joins the army of Italy as general of artillery — llis first aides-de-camp — General Dunierbion — Position of the two armies — Strong camp of the Sardinians — Bo- naparte's plan for dislodging them — Adopted by a coun- cil of ^vn^ — Massena — Bonaparte's active operations — Their rapidity and success — Beats the Austrians — Takes Oneille,Ormea,and Garessio — The Sardinians dislodged and Saorgio taken by Massena, who drives them from the Col deTende — Positions occupied by the French army — Their sufferings — Bonaparte's plan for uniting the armies of Italy and the Alps — Prevented In the events of the Qth Tliermidor — Preparations of the allies — Plan proposed by Bonaparte for counteracting them — Carries it inlo executifjn — Its effects — End of the campaign — His chief occupations in autumn and Avinter — Madam 1 liurreau — Bonaparte's infatuation — Its proboblc effect on his fortune — Iiobespierre the younger — Anecdote — Bonaparte put under arrest — lleleased without trial — Zeal and fidelity of Junot — Bonaparte summoned to the bar of the conven- tion, on a charge which is withdrawji — Allaehed to the armament prepared for an attack upon Rome — By his ad- vice that project abandoned — Mob at Toulon — Saves two deptities of the assembly — Rescues the Chabrillants — Rejoins the army of Italy — Ordered to take a command in the infantrv — Is dissatisfied and proceeds to Paris — Visits his mother on his way and stops at Chatillon-sur-Seine — Anecdote — His interview with Au])ry, the minister of war — His retoit — Tenders his resignation — It is not ac- cepted — Appointed to command the artilleiT of the army of the West — Kellerman's disasters — Dangeiof the Italian frontier — The committee of public saf ty consult Bona- parte — He draws up instructions which are sent to Keller- mann — Is employed in the war oihee in directing the operations of the armies — His reputed idea of obtaining orders to seek a command in the army of the Grand Sig- liior — Independent in his circumstances, though not rich — His disposal of his time while at Paris — His impres- sion in society. MV lM)IiM, CHAPTER V. From October, 1795^ to March, 1796. The convention adopt the constitution of the year 5 — Its principal provisions — Likely to be acceptable to the na- tion — The additional acts engrafted on it excite dissatis- faction — Wisdom of those acts — Combined opposition of the royalists and jacobins — The people of Paris stirred up to opposition — They vote for accepting the constitu- tion and for rejecting the acts — A majority of the nation and the armies ^\\e their suffrages for both — Resistance and insurrection of the sections of Paris — Violence of the section Lepellelier — Measures of the convention — Ge- neral Menou commander in chief of the army of the inte- rior — He attempts to disperse an armed body of insur- gents — Hesitates and fails — Danger of the crisis — Bona- parte an accidental witness of Menou's miscarriage — Repairs to the gallery of the convention — Agitation of that assembly — His conference with the executive com- mitee — Protests against being fettered by commissaries of the convention — Is appointed by the committee to command the troops — Barras made nominal commander in chief — Bonaparte's prompt and judicious measures — Gets possession of the cannon and occupies the bridges — Danican, commander in chief of the insurgents, summons the convention to dismis their troops — Bonaparte fur- nishes the members with arms — Movement of the insur- gent leader Lafonde, upon Pont Neuf — Cartaux abandons that post, and falls back to the Louvre — The insurgents close in and fire upon the Tuileries — Bonaparte orders his troops to act — Spirit and success of his operations — Cou- rage and repulse of Lafonde — The insurgents defeated on all points — Humanity of Bonaparte — The insurrection quelled — Exultation of the convention — Meanness of Bar- rass — The appointment of Bonaparte, as commander of the army of the interior, confirmed by the convention — Their moderation — Trial and danger of Menou — Saved hy the influence of Bonaparte — Bonaparte disarms the national guard, and executes other unwelcome but salu- tary measures — Scarcity in Paris — Discontent of the po- pulace — Anecdote — llecomposes the legislative guard for the new government — Organises a legion of police, and a guard for the directory — Becomes acquainted with Ma- INDEX . \v tlam Beauharnais and her son — Interesting interview — The ItaHan frontier again in danger — Bonaparte consuU- ed by the directory — Furnishes apian of campaign — ■ Appointed commander in chief of the army of Italy — Marries Madam Beauharnais — State of his fortune and his probaljle reflections — Leaves Paris and takes com- mand of his army. CHAPTER VI. From March, 4790, to May, 1796. Italy — The valley of the Po — The states and forces hv which it was defended — The instructions of the di- rectory to Bonaparte — The folly of those instructions — Comparative numhers and condition of the hostile armies — Sufferings of the French — Their want of food, mo- ney, horses, and artillery — Bonaparte relieves general Scherer — His appointment acceptable to the troops — Not so altogether to Massena and Augereau — The force and ascendancy of his character — Anecdote — Orders the head quarters to be advanced to Albenga — Mutiny of the 29th regiment — Royalist emissary — The mutineers punished, and the emissary arrested — Efficacious at- tention of Bonaparte to the subsistence of his troops — His march to Albenga — Disdains to return the cannonade of Nelson — Address to his army — Its character and effect — His generals and aides-de-camp — The high spirit of the army — Bonaparte's plan of invasion — His object frus- trated by the advance of general Laharpe — Stations of the several divisions of his army — Beaulieu opens the campaign — His activity and plan of operations — He ad- vances upon Yoltri — Directs Argenteau upon Savon a — Bonaparte resolves to detain Beaulieu at Voltri, and to attack Argenteau — Combat of Voltri — Of Monteligino — Good conduct of Cervoni — Heroism of Rampon — Battle of Montenotte — Defeat of Argenteau — Advance of the French — Beaulieu and Nelson disconcerted — Battle of Milessimo — Gallantry of Joubert — Surrender of Pro- vera — Passage of the Bormida and storming of Dego — Defeat of Beaulieu and further advance of the French — Surprise of Dego — Retaken by the Austrians — Counter- march of Bonaparte — Battle of Dego — Heroic conduct and death of general Causse — Promptness and activity of Bonaparte — Gallantry of Lannusse and of Lannes — XVI INDEX. Sanguinary defeat of the Austrians — Recapture of Dego — Bonaparte prudent after his surprise^Sends to re- connoitre Voltri — The Austrians and Sardinians com- pletely separated — Laharpe's division posted on the Belbo — Serrurier's division advanced against the Sardinians — The action of the army reversed — March of the French upon Ccva — They reach the commanding heiglit of Montezemoto — The plains of Italy in view — Feelings of the troops — Emotion and remark of Bonaparte — Attack upon Ceva — The Sardinians driven with loss from their intrenched camp — Alarm of the court of Turin — The French pass the Tanaro — Their active pursuit — General Colli retreats behind the Corsaglio — Serrurier passes that river — Driven l)ack — Bonaparte's dispositions for ad- vancing — Directs Augereau to march down the right hank of the Tanaro — With Serrurier and Massena passes the Corsaglio — Battle of Mondovi — Defeat of the Sar- dinians — Pursued by general Stengel with the French cavalry — His death and character — Gallantry of Murat — Rapid advance of the French army towards Turin — — Serrurier enters Fossano, Massena Cherasco, and Au- gereau Alba — Bonaparte fortifies Cherasco — His prepa- rations for strengthening his army — The king of Sardinia sues for peace — His general proposes a suspension of arms — Answer and conditions of Bonaparte — His frank- ness and moderation — Armistice of Cherasco — Suffering of the French troops for food — Their plundering — Dis- content of the officers — General Laharpe tenders his re- signation — Firmness and equity of Bonaparte — His mea- sures to supplv food to his troops, to repair his losses, and to strengthen his position — He equips his cavalry and prepares a park of artillery — His victories celebrated by the French legislature — His conduct approved by the directory — He resolves to invade the Italian possessions of the house of Austria. THE LIFE OP THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. CHAPTER I. From I 769 to 1785. Corsica — Birth of Napoleon — His family- — Circum- stances attending his birth — Anecdotes of his infancy — His father, a deputy of the nobles to Ver- sailles in 1779 — Places him at the military school of Brienne — Anecdotes respecting him while at Brienne — Pichegru his comrade and tutor — His admiration for Turenne — His early transfer to the school of Paris- — The Chevalier Keralio's opi- nion and report of him — Admiration of his in- structors at Paris* — His favourite authors — Anec- dotes in regard to him while at the school of Paris — Noticed by the Abbe Raynal — Death of his father — His comrades at school — Examined by La Place — Pxeceives his first commission as second lieutenant of artillery — Joins his regiment at Va- lence, in Dauphine — His character at the time. The island of Corsica, though known from the earUest ages, of considerable extent, and I CHAP. I. 2 THE LIFE OF CHAP. I. adjacent to the coasts of Italy and France, does not appear to have been the scene of any memorable event , until it became the birth place of Napoleon Bonaparte. He was born at Ajaccio, on the i5th of August, 1 769. (i) His father w^as distinguished for eloquence and liberality; his mother re- spected for the pride of virtue, and the pru- dence of an independent spirit. As the exertion of power awakens our wonder_, its origin excites our curiosity. After contemplating the actions of great men, we are pleased to trace the course of their parentage ; as travellers leave the cur-, rents of rivers to explore their sources, in untrodden wilds, in the clefts of rocks, and in barren mountains. In compliance with this general inclination, the follow^ing parti- culars respecting the Bonaparte family have, with more or less detail, been before re- lated. During the wars of the Guelph and Ghi- belline factions in Italy, the Bonapartes were among the adherents of the latter, which was the liberal and defeated party. Expelled from Florence, the city from which Dante had been banished; a younger brother THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 6 of the family found a refuge and a home in J^rom 1769 Lorsica. rrom this adventurous exile was ^ descended Charles Bonaparte; who, though unprosperous and shortlived, was the sire of sovereigns, and among them of a mo- narch, to whom Emperors were supphants, and who prostrated, pardoned, and created kings. The great grandfather of Napoleon had three sons — Joseph, Napoleon, and Lucien. The first of these had an only son, Charles; the second an only daughter, EUsabeth ; the third who was a priest, long survived his brothers, and died in 1791 archdeacon of Ajaccio. The father of Napoleon was thus the eldest in descent, and the sole represen- tative of his name in Corsica. From these circumstances, as well as from the ancient distinction of the family, which had been eminent in the church, had figured in the politics and literature of Italy, and which, besides minghng its blood with the Orsini^ the Lomellini, and the Medici^ claimed de- scent from the imperial house of the Com- neni, (2) great care was bestowed on his edu- cation. He studied at Pisa and Rome, and took the degree of doctor of laws. THE LIFE OF ^ ^^ ^- ^ Returning home, handsome, intelligent, and accomplished, he won the affections of Letitia Ramolino, a young lady of the is- land, descended from a noble family of Na- ples, and remarkable for personal beauty and strength of character. They were mar- ried so young, that a connection which was deemed eligible in other respects, their friends disapproved as premature. The fruits of- iiris-jnarriage were, besides five children who died in infancy, Joseph, king of Spain j Napoleon ; Lucien, princeof Canino ; (3) Louis, king of Holland; Jerome, king of Westphalia • Eliza, grand duchess of Tuscany; Pauline, princess Borghese; and Caroline, queen of Naples. The war of 1 768, in which the Corsicans contended against the power of France in vain, found Charles Bonaparte at the head of his island clan (or piet^e)^ and a friend and follower of Paoli. His wife, prompted by congenial spirit and the fervour of youthful love, resolved to share, if not his dangers , at least his hardships. In the disastrous campaign of 1769, accordingly, she followed the head quarters of the Corsi- can arrnvj throughout that series of mountain THE EJVlPErxOR ^'APOLEON. marches, which terminated in the battle oF ^^^^ ^^^^ ' , to 1785. Ponte Novo, and the final defeat of Paoli. Charles Bonaparte at first resolved to ac- company Paoli in his voluntary exile, being like him indignant at the subjugation of his country. But the situation of his wife re- quiring his immediate care and her longer residence in the island, he deferred his de- parture until a safe conduct was obtained for her from the French commander in chief. Then, while the father of Napoleon repaired to Porto Vecchio with intention to seek an asylum in England, his mother re- gained her solitary residence in Ajaccio, there to bring into the world, the future Emperor of France, The period of her pregnancy was ap- proaching, when influenced by distress and apprehension, rather than by the spirit of youth or beauty, Madam Bonaparte at- tended the celebration of mass on the day of the feast of the assumption. (4) The solemn ceremony was not concluded^ when the first pangs of childbirth surprised her. Hastening home, she was met by a gentleman who, observing an uncommon glow in her countenance and lustre in her eyes^ witJi CHAP. I. O THE LIFE OF a gallantry more natural than seasonable^ made these effects of pain and agitationj sub- jects of compliment and praise. She was just able to reach her house and throw herself on a sofa in the parlour. When discovered by her domestics, the child was born and the mother had swooned. He came into the world as he rose to greatness, without assistance. (5) About this timCj Charles Bonaparte, over- come by tenderness for his family, and the expostulations of his uncle the archdeacon, declined his purposed emigration, and re- turned home. In conformity with a custom of the fa- mily, the second son was christened Napo- leon. Of his infancy little is known, as probably little was remarkable. He was healthy, sprightly, inquisitive and wilful; mastered his elder brother who was of a gentle disposition ; disobeyed his father who was indulgent; but was submissive to his mother, who being of a firm and discreet character, united discipline with affection. He said of her, that she never overlooked a good or a bad action of her children ; she said of him, that though wild and head- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 7 stronff, he Avas a kind brother and a cood From 1769 ^' , . , ^ to 178d. son. He was the favourite of his father, who by averting sometimes, and sometimes inviting the mother's authority, curbed or hcensed the frolics of his darhng boy (6). Thus hghtly swayed were the impulses of a mind, which Avas soon to dazzle and to awe the world. When he was between five and six years of age, he was placed at a day school w^ith some little girls who were older than him- self. Caressed bv them all, he was most attached to the little Giacominetta. Her companions, jealous of this preference, re- sented it as graver persons sometimes resent more serious slights, by ridicule and rhyme. When they walked out, he always held her hand, while his stockings often fell about his heels. His arch tormentors fol- lowed them singing. " Napoleone di mezza calzetta, fal'amore a Giacominetta." (Napo- leon with his stockings half off, is making love to Giacominetta. J This was the signal for instant battle. With sticks, stones, or whatever came in his way, he invaded the little throng; then, as afterwards, prompt in his attacks, and fearless of numbers. 8 THE LIFE or ^j^^j_^' ^ When he was somewhat older, his mo- ther forbad the children chmbing the fig trees in the vineyard. At length Napo- leon took it into his head to long for some of the figs. They were ripe and tempt- ing, the opportunity seemed good, and he embraced it. Having satisfied his appetite he was filling his pockets, Avhen the keeper of the vineyard came upon him. Petrified with terror he clung helpless to a branch of the tree. The keeper threatened to tie him and conduct him to his mother. He beg- ged for mercy, fear made him eloquent, and the keeper appeared to relent. The next day however his mother expressed an ominous wish to gather some of these figs. They were all gone ; and the keeper being summoned, the culprit was exposed and chastised. How difficult to conceive the twice-crowned conqueror, whose frown darkened the face of Europe, trembling in a fig tree at the threat of a peasant! It was observed by his mother, that when he first went to school, he was not remarkable for quickness of apprehension; but that having once surpassed his comrades, he was greatly delighted, and never after- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEO>'. 9 wards lost his superiority. (7) It would seem ^^^^Jll^^ ^ ^^ vy / ^ to 17o5. that^ while his mind refused the influence of ordinary incitements, it was highly stimu- lated by the consciousness of merit, exer- cising a degree of free will, and requiring a certain dignity of motive^ even in its infan- tile eflforts. It is said that his favourite plaything was a small cannon, and his chosen retreat, a grotto, formed by an arching rock, and over- looking the sea. The first circumstance is too common to be characteristic; fondness for handhng arms betrayed the sex, not the disposition of Achilles. The second, if true, probably expanded his mind with some of its earliest visions ; for grand must have been the impression of the sea, even on the infant energies, of a soul as boundless and subhme as itself. In manhood, the sight of the desert, which he called a solid Ocean^ affected him strongly, elevating his imagina- tion with a sense of immensity. It having been the object of the French government to incorporate Corsica with France, their policy was of consequence conciliating. They established a provincial parliament, thus placing the new conquest 10 THE LIFE OF ^j ^^ -^ on a footing with the old provinces ; and as an additional favour, continued the existing magistracy of the tAvelve nobles, in whom ihelocal executive authority resided. Charles Bonaparte Avas a member of this magis- tracy; and although he had resisted to the last, both in the army and in a convention which was held after the battle of Ponte Novo, the domination of France, (8) he was induced to acquiesce in the new order of things, by these and other favourable mea- sures. He was soon gratified by the ap- pointment of assessor to the Royal Court of Ajaccio; a situation which, besides increasing his influence, augmented his income^ scarce adequate, in consequence of sacrifices and losses in the war, to his liberal habits and growing family. In 1779, the parliament of Corsica sent a deputation to Versailles. Charles Bonaparte, who besides liis other qualifications for such a mission, was an eloquent and enlightened advocate, was chosen deputy for the nobles, as w^as the bishop of Nebbio for the clergy, and one of the Casa Biancas for the com- mons. It was time to provide for the educa- tion of his two sons, Joseph and Napoleon, THE E3IPER0R NAPOLEON. I I the first being eleven and the second near ^^om 1769 / , ... to 1785. ten years oi age ; and as a situation in France was now preferable to one in Italy, for that purpose, he determined to take them with him to Paris. He passed through Florence, where his name and the rank of his family, were remembered. The Grand Duke Leopold^ gave hirn a letter of recommendation to his sister, the queen of France. He was graciously received by that unfortunate princess, and was a guest at the banquets of Versailles. Having dis- charged his public duty, he proceeded to dispose of his sons. Their inclinations pro- bably determined their destination . Joseph was placed in a classical seminary at Autun ; and the policy of the government facilitat- ing it, admittance was obtained for Napo- leon, in the month of April, asa king's scholar, at the royal military school of Brienne. (9) At this period there were two French generals in authority in Corsica^ whose conflicting pretensions created two parties. M. de Narbonne Pellet, was haughty and violent ; M. de idarbeuf, was mild and affable. The former , being of high birth and superior interest, was likely to prevail CHAP. I. 12 THE LIFE OF over his rival. Fortunately for M. de Mar- beuf, the deputation, with Charles Bonaparte at its head, arrived at the moment when this competition was under consideration. He was consulted by the minister, and made representations which effectually sustained M.deMarbeuf. The nephew of Marbeuf, who was arch- bishop of Lyons, and minister of ecclesiasti- cal affairs, acknowledged this act of well- timed justice; and, learning that M. de Bonaparte was conducting his son to the school of Brienne, introduced him by letter to a noble family of that name, residing there. This was the commencement of that kind- ness which the families of de Brienne and de Marbeuf extended to young Bonaparte, and which, from sportive malice or disappointed emulation, was ascribed by his school-fel- lows to a different cause. The aspersion being nourished by the press, and the policy of England, outlived the usual date of such ephemer(3e. The manly beauty and graceful accomplishments of Charles Bonaparte, the advanced age of M. de Marbeuf, and the character of Madam Bonaparte, were cir* cumstances which rendered the story ri- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 3 diculous, wbile they proved it to be un- FromiT69 to 17o5. true. [10 J At the school of Brienne, the young Gor- sican was not long in showing a disposition and ability to excel. He seemed to abound in sensibility and genius. If the last obtained him triumphs, the first exposed him to mor- tifications. His preceptors praised, but his comrades persecuted him. They ridiculed his Italian accent, mocked his imperfect French, and derided his comparative po- verty ; they called him a foreigner, the brat of a Corsican attorney, the bastard of the Count Marbeuf. As love for his parents, and affec- tion for his home, were heightened by recent separation from both, he keenly resented these insults ; and his spirit in combating boys his superiors in age and in size, associa- ted in a cabal against him, soon secured him friends. It was observed, that even when worsted, he never succumbed nor com- plained ; and, though provoked and injured, could not be induced, when in the routine of duty he became superintendant of the class, to report the misconduct of the boys by whose annoyance he himself had suf- fered. Rather than swerve from this point CHAP. I. 1 4 THE LIFE OF of honour, he preferred enduring imprison- ment, which he submitted to on one occa- sion, for the space of three days, (i i) These injuries and mortifications, though manfully supported, as they were felt to be unjust and found to be unavoidable, sunk deep into his youthful heart, which was disposed to overflows of feeling and ardent attachments. Their influence on his tem- per soon discovered itself by a change in his habits. From being sprightly, confident, and joyous, he became quiet, sensitive, and solitary; fonder of his books than of his schoolfellows. ( 1 2 j He naturally associated, in the same resentment, the wrongs inflicted on his native island with the sneers aimed at himself, and unconsciously infused the merit of public grief into his own puerile vexations. Thus was kindled that intense patriotism which animated his whole life; which warmed his boyish indignation ; di- rected his youthful studies ; inspired his greatest actions; and sanctified the dignity of his last request. He was too capable of acquiring know- ledge to be long insensible of its value. His application accordingly seemed less a matter THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. l5 olduLy than of choice; and his attention to From 1769 ...,,. . to 1785. discipline to be directed more by a sentiment of order than by the force of rules. Studious and reserved^ he was rather respected than popular in the school ; but when he did engage in the sports or enterprises of the little republic, his strength and fertility of character made him at once its dictator. The following anecdotes, relating to this period of his life, are accounted authentic. Soon after his arrival at Brienne, with all his natural vivacity about him, he was shown into a hall in which was a portrait of the Duke of Choiseul. The sight of this minister, who had defrauded Corsica of independence, excited his indignation so strongly, that he indulged it in epithets of abuse, in defiance of the rank and power of its object, and in spite of the reprehension and menaces of the professors. The first time he dined at the table of the principal, that person, with a view of trying the spirit of his guest, spoke ill of Paoli. The young Corsican interrupted him in- stantly, stoutly exclaiming — " Paoli is a great man^ he loved his country, and I shall never forgive my father for consenting to 1 6 THE LIFE OF ciiAP^i. xhe union of Corsica with France. He ought to have followed the fortunes of PaoH." When some of the boys were reproaching him with his Corsican birth and accent, he expressed warmly to a friend this compre- hensive menace.— -"I will do these French of vours all the harm I can :*' a sense of powder thus early quickening within him. His threat expired with the flash of temper which prompted it ; for he befriended with unequalled liberality the companions of his early days : his only revenge consisted in excelling them. In the severe winter of 1780, he per- suaded his comrades to construct a fortress of snow ; and applying rules drawn from the science of their common study, pro- tected the Avork by regular fortifications. Passing from the duties of an engineer to the functions of a general, he divided the stripling band into two parties, and had the fortress attacked and defended with a degree of vigour and skill, which besides evincing his proficiency, was thought to exhibit a remarkable power of rousing and directing the energy of others. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 7 On the days of the fetes of Brienne, for From 1769 , V . - n r to 1785. the purpose ot preventing an iniiux oi stran- gers into the school, guards were mounted, with orders to admit no person without a pass. It happened once when Bonaparte was the officer on duty, the portress^ who was in the habit of selhng milk, fruit, eggs, cakes, etc., to the students, counting on her personal consideration among them, presen- ted herself without a pass; and, upon being stopped by the sentinel, loudly insisted on admittance. The sergeant of the guard re- ported the fact to Bonaparte, who, though only thirteen years of age, did not hesitate between the inclinations of the boy, and the duties of the officer ; but, with that firmness of character, and aversion to disorder, for which he was always remarkable, called out in a tone of command, — ''Remove instantly that woman, who is bringing here the license of a camp." This woman, who was named Haute, he afterwards established with her husband comfortably at Malmaison. A fair was to be held in the vicinity of Brienne, and the students were desirous of attending it ; but. as they had quarrelled with 2 8 THE LIFE OF CHAP^i. the country people on a previous occaoion^ the professors issued an order confining them on the day of the approaching fair, within the gates of the college. This painful re- striction excited the enterprise and invention of young Bonaparte. Under his direction the students undermined a segment of the wall, conducting the operation so secretly, and adjusting it so nicely, that the sapped space tumbled down on the morning of the fair ^ which, by this stratagem they were enabled to visit without violating the order. His superiority of genius and efficiency of character, while they secured his ascendancy in the school, and, generally, the respect of the faculty^ seem to have been considered as reprehensible forwardness by illiberal ob- servers. Accordingly one of the teachers, tak- ing advantage of some slight irregularity, condemned him to wear a penitential dress, and to dine on his knees at the door of the re- fectory. He uttered neither complaint nor suppHcation, yet felt the indignity so acutely, that, at the moment it was about to be in- flicted, he fell into convulsions ; distress over- coming the strength of his body, but not the THE EMPEROR NA.P@LEON. 1 9 fortitude of his mind. The principal of the From 1769 to 1T85. school happening to pass by, and father Patrault, professor of mathematics, warmly interposing in behalf of his favourite pupil, he was rescued from the undeserved punish- ment, and the brutal pedagogue. It is worthy of remark that Pichegru, who was a charity scholar at Brienne, was his tutor in the mathematical class^ and that France was rearing together in one of her schools, the conqueror of Holland, and the dictator of Europe — the patriot who was the terror of Bourbons and foreigners, and the traitor who was a tool in their hands. In matters of principle he manifested, even at Brienne, an inflexibility so striking that it made a lasting impression on Pichegru. In 1796, when this last was conspiring to be- tray his country^ being consulted by a royal- ist agent upon the expediency of attempting to gain over the commander of the army of Italy, he bore unwilling testimony to his for- mer comrade's integrity and firmness. ^'' It would be a waste of time; I knew him at school ; his character is inflexible ; he has taken his side and will never change it.'' 20 THE LIFE OF CHAP. I. Tliestudiesinwhichlieexcelledwerethose chiefly pursued in the school, and directly embraced in the profession of arms — mathe- matics, history, and geography. But as the instinct of power is the early consciousness of a vigorous mind, a desire of influence was probably one of his primary motives; and it is therefore reasonable to infer, with- out reference to his subsequent career, that he might have been at Brienne, as ardent and successful in the study of eloquence and politics, as he was in acquiring the rudi- ments of war. ( 1 3) A lady who was conversing with him on the subject of his studies, mentioned the name of Turenne, reproaching the memory of that great general with having laid Waste the Palatinate. '^ And why not, madam," eagerly demanded the future victor, "if it was necessary to the success of his de- signs?'* This anecdote, in the spirit of which inay be discovered the embryo of that gigan- tic decision which was exemplified in his raising the siege of Mantua, as well as his ardent admiration of Turenne, shows how soon his understanding was capable of com- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 21 bining the extended reasoning of military From 1769 policy, with the technical conclusions of the art of war. (i4) From observations which dropped from him at St. Helena, it appears his powers of reflection were so active and strong in the season of early youth, that the sentiments of religious faith which the affection of his mother, and the piety of his uncle, had in- stilled into his childhood, became disturbed in the course of his fourteenth year^ by those doubts of reason, from which ordinary minds are free, until they are infested by the pride of manhood. In 1784, the Chevalier Keralio, who, as inspector-general of the military schools, was charged with the selection of pupils for pro- motion to the school of Paris_, selected Bo- naparte, though he was rather under the proper age, as one of the number to be sent from Brienne. As he was better acquainted with the sciences than the languages, the masters of the school proposed detaining him a year longer, in order that he might improve his knowledge of the classics^ alleging that he was not yet fifteen. " No," replied M. de 21 THE LIFE OF ^^J^^^^J;^ Keralio ; "1 know what I am doing ; if I transgress the rule respecting age, it is not from favour to any particular family, for I am not acquainted with that of this lad; it is solely from regard to his merit. I dis- cover in him a spark of genius which cannot ])e too carefully cherished." (i5) The cheva- lier, Avho was an author on tactics, had con- ceived a great affection for the young Corsi- can. Soon after the examination^, this in- spector of the school Avas advanced to other employment ; but his successor adopted his decision, and Bonaparte, with four other students, w^as transfered in October, 1784^ from the Royal school of Brienne, to that of Paris. (16) Marshal Segur, was then minister of war. Among his official papers, there exists a minute under the head of t/ie school q/* Tirienne (a transcri|>t of the report of M. de Reralio to the king), which shews that scientific acquirements were much less esteemed in the French army, when Bo- naparte commenced, than when he ended his military life. For after noting his age, size, and assiduity, and remarking that he THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 23 was tractable^ honesty and grateful^ the ^^^'^^^J?^ writer of the minute adds — ''would make an excellent seaman." It is remarkable that when Washington was about the same age^ a midshipman's warrant in the British navy was obtained for him ; and he was prevented from becoming ''an excellent seaman/' solely by the timid objections of his mother. (lyj Had both or either of these suggestions been effectuated, how different from what it now is, might have been the state of the civilized world ! His faculties being developed by growth and strengthened by exercise, Bonaparte's su- periority was more marked and impressive at the school of Paris even than it was at that of Brienne. The celebrated Monge, who was his instructor in geometry, formed a high opinion of his capacity. M. de I'Eguille, the professor of history, declared he would be- come a great man, and to his name in the class- book affixed this note, " A Corsican by birth arid character; he will distinguish himself if favoured by circumstances,"— alluding pro- bably to his vivacity of genitis, ardent sensibi- lity, and passionate application, which gave an unsocial cast to his character, and an orien- 24 THE LIFE OF CHAP. I. ^ tal warmth and splendour to his elocution. The professor of belles-lettres was so forcibly struck by this property of his style, that he at once imitated and described it, by calling his original and vivid amplifications, "blocks of granite issuing hot from a volcano." As Bonaparte discovered no aptitude for the German language, the German teacher was no believer in his extraordinary intelligence^ affirming, when told that he was already undergoing his examination for the artillery, that he '^always thought mathematicians blockheads." Study, the labour of most young minds, was, to his, recreation, and seemed now to engross his faculties with the absorbing force of a passion. His preference for his- tory continuing to prevail, Polybius and Arrien, but more especially Tacitus andPlu- tarch, were his favourite authors; one pre- senting to his mind admirable portraits of heroes and legislators ; the other enriching his judgment with profound maxims of political wisdom — both inculcating lessons of patriotism and virtue, contempt for weak- ness, and abhorence of vice. His applica- tion was as fruitful as strenuous, for though THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 25 his succeeding years were too active to ad- From 1769 mit of much reading, he displayed through Hfe, a famihar and accurate acquaintance with ancient history. There are probably few exercises in which mental vigour is more readily discovered, than in imbibing and assimilating historical knowledge. Macpherson's Ossian, which was then sanctioned by the Scotch critics as a collec- tion of genuine translations, and had been re- cently rendered into Itahan, he read like most youths of his time with curiosity and admiration; and as it was really an inge- nious compound of the finest thoughts, ex- pressions, incidents, and characters to be found in Homer, Virgil, Milton, and Tasso, andwas recommended to his taste by the beautyofCesarolti's version, it was one of the poetical works in which he most delighted. The boast and glory of his native tongue also shared his youthful admiration. In the dreadful campaign of i8i4, he observed a tree near Brienne, under the shade of which, in the days of peace and boyhood, he had read the Jerusalem Delivered, and admired deeds and battles less heroic than his own. During his stay at the school of Paris, two 26 THE LIFE OF ^^ — ^' ^ occurrences have been mentioned which ap- pear characteristic, one of the reach of his mind, and one of its readiness. The arch- bishop of Paris held a confirmation at the military school. At the name Napoleon^ he expressed surprise, and said there was no saint of that name in the calendar, '^ That is no objection to him," promptly observed the youth, '*^since there are a host of saints, and but three hundred and sixty-five days lo dispose of among them." The expense of education and living main-« tained in the royal school he found very great; proportioned rather to the habits of the rich and the luxuries of the capital, than to the expectations of the students, or the value of the instruction imparted to them. He prepared a memoir on the subject, pointing out the disadvantages of sumptuousuess, as well to those who could, as to those who could not afford to continue it. In this remarkable paper, after insisting that this expensive living tended to render the students frivolous and self-sufficient, he recommended that they should be made to eat coarse bread, to brush their own clothes, and clean their own boots, adding that fru- THE EMPEROPx :NAP0LE0N. 27 gal allowances and simple fare would make ^J^^rr^^^ them "robust, able to support the inclemen- cies of weather and the toils of war, and fit them to inspire the soldiers with respect and attachment/' Remarks like these, while they must be allowed to show a surprising range of observation and maturity of judgment, in a youth of fifteen, discover also how soon the self-exalting spring of his genius was be- ginning to act, elevating him above his own situation, and enabling him to look down on that of others. About this period also he is said to have formed liberal political opinions, which he indulged so far as to express himself in a let- ter to his parents, disrespectfully of the kingly office. The letter being submitted, according to the regulations of the school, to the professor of belles leltres, this sentiment was of course reprobated, the letter was de- stroyed and the writer rebuked. Afterwards when he was first consul, having occasion to employ a preceptor for his brother Jerome, he sent for his old instructor in belles lettres, and reverting kindly to their former acquain- tance, reminded him of the fate to which he had doomed his unlucky epistle. 28 THE LIFE OF ^^^1^- ^ In the course of one of his lectures, the professor of history at Paris introduced the revolt of the Constable of Bourbon, and en- larged, with loyal emphasis^ on the enormity of his fighting against his king. This view of the subject did not satisfy the mind of Bonaparte, whose finer feeling and nicer judgment, discriminated at once between patriotism and loyalty. The Constable's crime he justly apprehended, consisted not in fighting against his Mng^ but in uniting with foreigners to make war on his own country, A mind like this, it was not in the power of temptation or adversity, to degrade to the part of Bernadotte or Mo- reau. His reputation soon reached beyond the limits of his school, and attracted the notice of the Abbe Raynal, who paid him flatter- ing attentions. While he was thus enlarging the circle of his knowledge, and unfolding the rich pro- mise of his character, his father died of a can- cer of the stomach, at Montpellier. (i8) In this son were centered his hopes and affec- tions — so strongly, that although Joseph was the attendant of his sick bed, his dying THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 2g thoughts were fixed on Napoleon. On his From 1769 name he was heard frequently to call^ and in >^ *^ moments of delirious agony, to invoke the succour of his mighty sword. As if the clouds which darkened the death-bed of the parent, Avere tinged with prospects of the greatness and glory that were to descend upon his son. As it does not appear that Na- poleon had visited Corsica from the time of his entering the school of Brienne, his last interview with his father most probably took place when the latter came to Paris for medi- cal advice, on the first access of his disorder. Of course he knew very little of this parent. Among his fellow students^ two indivi- duals arementionedj whose names are event- fully connected with his own. Philippeaux, who, at Acre, under hostile banners, con- tributed to arrest the course of his Syrian conquests ; and Lauriston, his favourite aide- de-camp, whose protracted and ineffectual negotiations with KutusofT, contributed not to shorten his delay at Moscow. In September, 1785^, his dihgence and aptitude having again accelerated his exami- nation, he received his first appointment in the army ; a second lieutenancy in the regi- vio THE LIFE OF CHAP. I. j^^gnt of y^a F^re, or the ist artillery. (19} His success on this occasion Avas the more creditable, as his examination in the impor- tant branch of mathematics, was conducted by the great La Place. He is said to have been transported with joy at finding him- self an oflicer ; an emotion proportioned less to the inconsiderable event itself, than to the vast career which it opened. He joined his regiment forthwith at Valence in Dauphine, and there first did duty as an officer. Pausing to contemplate him, when thus emerging from the restraints of adolescence, it will appear that he was a youth fit to be loved with devotion by a friend, and with pride by a parent; that he was sensitive yet ingenuous, grateful but not vindictive, and though obstinate against injury, tract- able to kindness ; capacious of kjiowledge, and ardent in pursuing it, not as a badge of boyish superiority, but as an instrument for intellectual purposes. The progress of his understanding though rapid was steady, pro- portioned, not only to the strength of genius in which its impulse originated, but to the extent of advancement which its maturity was to reach. It was natural that his pre- . THE EMPErvOR NAPOLEON. 3 1 ceptors should have entertained, with afTec- ^^^^JZ^^ . .... *^ 1785. tion for his person, anticipations of his great- ness ; and it is probable they were not more gratified at seeing their predictions fulfilled, than surprised at the degree to which they were surpassed by his exploits. ( 32 ) CHAPTER II. s. From 1785 to 1793. CHAP. ir. Napoleon in garrison at Valence in Daupliine — Ma- dam Colombier s kindness and esteem for him- — In love "willi lier daughter — His success in society — His comrades in the regiment — His prize essay successful in the academy of Lyons — His history of Corsica. — Commended by the Abbe Raynal — In garrison at Auxonne- — Near being drowed in the Saone ■ — Prince of Condt^ — Bonaparte's public letter to the Corsican deputy ButtafocO' — Kindness to his brother Louis — Promoted to a first lieutenancy in the regiment of Grenoble — Returns to Valence — Anecdote — General Dutheil — Bonaparte's liberal political opinions — Rescues a brother officer — Vi- sits Corsica- — Death of his father's uncle -^^ Anec- dote — Promoted to a captaincy — Commands a Corsican battalion, and suppresses a riot at Ajaccio — The first slander against him — -Goes to Paris — Re- marks on the horrors of the 20th of June, and loth of August — Reflection — Interest about his sisters — Pveturns to Corsica — The expedition against Sardi- nia — Paoli — Anecdote — P^efuses to join Paoli ■ — Paoli^s cruelty to the Bonaparte family — Civil war THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. ' 33 in Corsica — Bonaparte active on the side of France From 1785 ^ Paoli calls in the English —Corsica subdued by . ^^ ^'^^^• England — Madam Bonaparte takes refuge on the continent, and settles at Marseilles — Bonaparte joins the army of Italy — Writes and publishes ** Le Souper de Beaucaire/' Attheheadof the society of Valence, when Lieutenant Bonaparte joined his regiment, was Madam Colombier^ a lady of amiable character and penetrating mind. The offi- cers of the garrison were invited to her par- ties, where she soon noticed and liberally encouraged, the strong and brilliant facul- ties of young Bonaparte. She introduced him to her acquaintances and recommended him to her friends, especially to the Abbe de St. Rufe, by whose hospitality he was associ- ated with the most distinguished persons of the province. His mother supplied him with an allowance which, added to his pay, placed him above the inconveniences of a narrow income. He became a favourite Avith his commanding officer, was of an age to feel the allurements of society as well as the attrac- tions of knowledge^ and entered its circles with pleasure and success. His slight ele- gant form, classical expressive face, original 3 34 THE LIFE OF CHAP. II. conversation,inwhich flashes of genius inces- santly appeared, excited. general admiration; and being new to life and its fashions, he pleased without the rules of pleasing, and therefore pleased the more, (i) Mademoiselle Colombier was about his own age. It was natural that he should see the graces of his friend's daughter, that she should perceive the merits of her mother's favourite ; and a sentiment of tenderness arose between them. Having established the usual intelligence of lovers, they met one moi ning by day break in an orchard^ where their passionate indulgence consisted in eat- ing cherries together. This was his £rst love; pure as the dew on the cherries, it prov- ed to be as transient, and appears to have been as cool. It was not without incurring the envy of his comrades, that he led this life of privilege and pleasure in the kind and happy society of Valence. This feeling does not appear to have disturbed his enjoyment at the time, nor to have stood in the way of their fu- ture good fortune ; for, of his messmates at Valence, six lived to receive marks of his particular favour j viz., Lariboissiere, THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 35 Sorbier, Desmazzis. d'Hedouville. Pioland, FromiT85 to 1795 and Mabille. (2) Madam Colombier died soon after the commencement of the revolution, in the success of which she is said to have taken a warm interest. Her enthusiastic esteem for young Bonaparte continued to the last. Though he had left Valence, she mentioned him on her death bed, and told those around her, that if he was not prematurely cut off, his career in life would certainly be glorious. He always spoke of her as his benefactress, and when he had more than verified her pre- dictions, testified his respect for her memory by making a munificent provision for her daughter. If Madam Colombier deserved his gratitude, she demands the notice of his bio- grapher, as being the only person to whom his infant fortune was indebted. Society, its charms and flatteries, the envy of young men and the favour of young ladies, did not allay his thirst for knowledge or for fame. He chanced to be quartered at the house of a bookseller who allowed him the free use of his miscellaneous assortment of volumes. Most of those during his stay at Valence, he read over and over, pushing his 36 THE LIFE OF CHAP^n. studies beyond the limits of bis profession and tbe taste of his class, into ihe distant re- gions of ecclesiastical history and papal go- vernment. Even from this irregular read- ing be appears to have gleaned a fund of sound and appbcable knowledge. At the age of eighteen be became a competitor for literary honours. The academy of Lyons offered a prize for the best essay on the fol- lowing question, proposed by the AbbeRay- nal. — '' What are the principles and institu- tions, the application of which is most con- ducive to the happiness of society ?" A sub- ject so abstract and comprehensive, it required boldness to undertake, and ability to manage. Bonaparte it seems^ though but a stripling, was deficient in neither prerequisite, and his anonymous essay not only gained the acade- mical prize, but general applause. Cast in a liberal political mould, it coincided with the literary spirit and popular feeling of the time, and to that circumstance doubtless, owed in some degree its success. But there was a force of logic, and an energy of feehng and expression in the essay, which under any circumstances must have been admired . The upward progress of its author, soon left this THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 87 small title to credit beneath him. When FromiT85 however he had risen high in the firmament of powerand glory, it was retrieved by the of- ficious flattery of Talleyrand. The Emperor, with a fastidiousness 23roper to his elevation, and common to men of great genius, saw, in his juvenile essay, nothing but its imperfec- tions, and threw it into the fire. A copy, it seems^ had been taken by his brother Louis, and the essay is now in print. About this time too, actuated by a noble veneration for the place of his birth^ and the land of his fathers, he undertook to compose a history of Corsica. He made some pro- gress in the work, which, with a proper feeling of respect, he dedicated to the Abbe Raynal. But though thus early and strongly inclined to authorship, the disposition ap- pears to have proceeded more from the abun- dance of his resources, and the creative ar- dour of his mind, than from a predilection for pursuits so meditative. His essay toward a history of Corsica was read and commen- ded by the Abbe Raynal, who in vain ad- vised its pubUcation. The production itself is lost, but the familiarity which its prepara- tion had given its author with the subject, 38 THE LIFE OF CHAP. ir. no doubt furnished his retentive memory with the materials, out of which was con- structed the clear and succinct account of Corsica, which he dictated at St. Helena. In consequence of popular disturbances at Lyons, in the year 1788, his regiment was ordered to that city. From Lyons it was transferred to Auxonne^ and it was while there that he was near being drowned in the Saone. In swimming, he w^as seized with the cramp, and sunk so suddenly, that his com- panions thought he was diving. After strug- ghng some time he lost his recollection, and drifted to a distance by the current, was lodged on a sand bank. Here his comrades, after giving him up as lost, recovered him before it was too late. In 1790, while he was stationed at Aux- onne, thePrince of Conde announced his in- tention of inspecting the school of artillery at that place. The name, as well as the rank of this personage, rendered his visit an im- portant occasion for the garrison. The Com- mandant therefore, determined to place the most accomplished, instead of the oldest, officer, at the head of the battery, and Bona- parte was of course the officer selected. His THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 3g comrades, to revenge iheir being postponed From 1785 to him, secretly spiked his guns the night before the review. But the mihtary glance of the future conqueror, was already too quick and pervasive to be surprised. Be- fore the prince came upon the ground, he had detected and frustrated the scheme, and at the appointed hour, was in full readi- ness to receive him. Little could the prince have foreseen that in the youth before him stood the chief, who was to eclipse the renown of his name, and to shorten its succession. The young oflicers of the garrison, who were eleves of the royal seminaries, were associated in the exercises of the school at Auxonne. A mathematical problem of great difficulty having been proposed for their study, Bonaparte, in order to accomplish its solution, confined himself to his chamber seventy-two hours without intermission. His power of application, in truth, seems to have been as remarkable as his genius. It was during his residence at Auxonne^ that he wrote and pubhshed his letter to Buttafoco, the Corsican deputy of the nobles in the national assembly. Besides force of 40 THE LIFE OF CHAP^ii. ^ invective, and reasoning, this letter exhi- bits a patriotic spirit^, and a sense of popu- lar rights, vs^hich must have removed all doubt as to the political inclination of the author, with regard to the revolution. It concludes with an apostrophe to the great patriots and orators of the assembly, which would alone be sufficient to show that, like Caesar^ had Bonaparte cultivated rhetoric, he would have rivalled the greatest masters of eloquence. The effect of this letter was equal to its intrinsic excellence, and greater than any expectation which the age or sta- tion of its author could have excited. It was adopted and republished by the patriotic so- ciety of Ajaccio, who, under its influence, passed a resolution, attaching the epithet in- famous^ to the name of their noble deputy. About this period, he was in treaty with M. Joly, a bookseller of the neighbouring town of Dole, for the publication of his history of Corsica. But partly from diffidence, and partly from the indecision occasioned by his approaching transfer to another regiment, he seems to have dropped the project, with- out putting the last hand to his work, or completing the agreement. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 4^ The office of chaplain having been abo- From 1785 lished by the government, the clerical orna- ments and sacred implements of the regi- ment, were deposited in Bonaparte's care at Auxonne. He showed them to M. Joly, and expressing himself respectfully with regard to religious observances^ said : "If you have never heard Mass I can repeat it to you." The functions of his uncle and his mother's ex- ample had made him from his childhood, fa- miliar with the forms of the Catholic church. That course of protection, which he ex- tended so liberally and so constantly, to the members of his familv, he seems to have commenced when a simple lieutenant. At Auxonne, his brother Louis, then but ten years of age, was under his care and instruc- tion, shared his meals, and occupied a room in his quarters. (3) It was by his care that Louis received the religious information ne- cessary for a communicant, and by his ex- hortations, that he took the sacrament of the Lord's Supper — conduct on the part of Na- poleon, which was not only kind and consi- derate as a brother, but affectionate and re- spectful as a son. ' In consequence of his promotion to a first /p THE LIFE OF CHAP. n. lieutenancy in the regiment of Grenoble, or the 4tli artillery, he left Auxonnein 1790 and returned to his old station of Valence, where the regiment of Grenoble was quar* tered. Here he became acquainted with young d'Hedouville who was an officer in that regiment. They were in the same mess, and sat beside each other at table. Among the rules of the mess was one imposing a fine on any member, who at meals, should intro- duce a professional subject. Bonaparte's fondness for his profession made him, it was observed, the most frequent infractor, and a constant victim of this rule. (4) Attended by his friend and comrade Des- mazzis he made an excursion from Valence into Burgundy as far as Mont Cenis, a town, famous for its manufacture of chrystal. On his way he stopped at Nuits and was invited to sup with Gassendi, a captain of his regi- ment, who had married the daughter of a physician residing there. Gassendi was a royalist, his father-in-law a patriot. Their opposition Avas displayed by a warm discus- sion at supper, in which Bonaparte's superior intelligence and logic, were so efficient on the side of the doctor, that he visited his guest THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 4^ next mornine; in his chamber, and thanked From 1785 . . . . . to 1793. him in flattering terms for his interposition. The eloquence and patriotism of the young officer, became the subject of conversation in the town. It was Snndav, and when he walked out, the people in the streets pulled off their hats to him as the champion of their cause. But the triumph of the morning was overcast at night. He was invited to pass the evening at the house of Madam Mery, a lady of wealth and fashion, who en- tertained all the aristocracv of the district. Here having expressed some of his opinions^ they were assailed and reprobated with the utmost violence. He attempted a war of words, but overpowered by noise and num- bers, was able to extricate himself only by the assistance of his hostess, who gracefully parried the blows which he could not resist. This incident, though it mortified him for the moment, contributed still farther to con- nect his name and feelings with the cause of the people. Of this trip, in which his curio- sity andfriendshipw^ere both gratified, and which appears to have been the last as well as the first, he ever performed from mere motives of pleasure, his recollection was so agreeable, that he conceived for the moment 44 THE LIFE OF CHAP. II. an idea of writing a description of it after the manner of Sterne, and spoke of it in afterlife with pecuHar complacency, calling it his sen^ iimental journey. Though reflective in the general bent of his mindj it Avould seem that when under the influence of professional duties and pleasing recreations, the shade of early mortification having passed away from his temper, he was become companionable and cheerful. His success in society at Valence, has been mentioned already^ and at St. Helena he him- self recorded various little anecdotes, indica- tive of the sportive disposition of his youth. As a sample of these anecdotes^ this may be repeated. An octogenary general undertook to exercise the young officers in gunnery, and was very intent on tracing the balls with his spy-glass. Bonaparte persuaded the young men to fire blank cartridges. The veteran could not of course discover where the balls struck, and reproached the wags with taking very wide aim. Their amusement consisted more in fun than in wit; in witnessing the general's eagerness in looking out for balls which were not fired, and asking the by- standers where they struck. After five or six rounds^ he suspected the trick and ordered THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 4^ the balls to be counted. He laughed heartily F«>i» ^^85 to 1793. at the joke, but notwithstanding, had its pre- petrators put under a momentary arrest. This veteran was General Duthiel, for whose memory, evidence of respect and a title to honour, are found in Napoleon's will. The revolution was npw decisively in pro- gress, and the political disunions by which it eventually distracted the nation, were mak- ing their way into the army. The soldiers, having the soundest feelings, were first affect- ed by thepatriotic spirit. Gradually it spread from them to the officers, and after the famous and comprehensive oath of allegiance " to the nation, the law, and the king," was pre- scribed by the national assembly, officers of superior rank and aristocratic conuectionsj espoused the popular side of the question. Bonaparte who had given early and frequent evidence of this disposition, and who was confirmed in it by the promulgation of the oath, acquired in addition to the authority conferred by professional talent, the in- fluence arising from political sympathy with the men. In consequence, he and his adhe- rents were able to manage the corps, although a preponderance of officers in rank if not in 46 THE LIFE OF CHAP. II. number was against them. This control he exercised with generosity, and rescued from a military mob an officer who had ex- cited the fury of the soldiers, by singing, at the window of the mess-room, the famous royalist song, "Oh Richard, Oh my King,'' a song, which was one day to be proscribed on his account. Thus, though deeply imbued with the liberal principles by which the re- volutionary party was actuated, he was not tainted by their cruelty, nor even their into- lerance. Indeed in reference to the motives of the opposite parties, he made subsequently this sound and just remark; " Had I been a general officer I might have adhered to the king ; a young heutenant, I sided- with the revolution." (5) It appears that about this time he was in , correspondence with the celebrated Paoh, on the subject of his history of Corsica, and on the prospect of a more liberal state of things, which by the enlightened labours of the na- tional assembly, was dawning on the nation. Paoli, in consequence of the success of Mira- beau's motion for the recal of the Corsican exiles, left England in 1790, and after being received with signal honour at Paris, was THE E>IPEROR NAPOLEON. 47 hailed on his arrival in Corsica with lovful From 1785 demonstrations or general respect. 1 he L.or- sicaus placed in his hands whatever power they had to confer ; the confidence of the Government was not inferior to the attach- ment of the people ; and PaoH wasappomted Lieutenant General in the army, and Com- mander in chief of themilitary division which comprehended the island. This was the state of things in Corsica when in September, 1 79 1 , Bonaparte, after an absence of more than twelve years visited his native town on furlough. He had left it a wild, sprightly boy, he returned to it an accom- plished officer, with powers of conception and expression singularly strong, and with a name already known in politics and letters. He joined his family in time to witness the last days of its second father, the good arch- deacon, - who had bestowed on it a parent's care. This venerable relative was so firmly persuaded of Napoleon's worth and ge- nius, that on his death-bed he called the chil- dren around him, and accompanied his last blessing with this advice :" Joseph, you are the eldest of the sons, but remember what I say. Napoleon is the head of the house." 48 THE LIFE OF CHAP. II. As Joseph was by no means deficient in promise, the spirit of the injunction could not be misapprehended. It seems to have made a deep impression on the mind of Na- poleon, and to have influenced his conduct as well as the expectations of his family, through life. His power in the circle of his brethren, was the same which he exerted in the world at large, and the judgment of the secluded and expiring prelate, was confirmed by the devo- ted obedience of armies, and the deliberate confidence of a great nation. The feeling of the relative was directed by sagacity, the judgment of the. people was actuated by af- fection, so that the ascendancy of Napoleon, whether viewed in its domestic or public cha- racter, may be said to have arisen from those legitimatesources, which nature implants and reason consecrates — the light of man's un- derstanding, and the warmth of his heart. (6J Her protecting son being in the army. Madam Bonaparte was compelled to assume the personal superintendence of the family affairs. These were by no means prosper- ous; for although the archdeacon left some ready money his ecclesiastical income of THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 49 course ceased with his life, and the costly From 1785 and unsuccessful experiments of Charles Bo- naparte in reclaiming an extensive salt marshy had seriously impaired his estate. (7) In these circumstances^ however, the fortitude and good sense of his widow effected much. She managed her properly with care and econo- my, and her children with that prudence and affection, which have evinced through a long and eventful life, the excellence of her character. In February, 1792, a general promotion, which was accelerated by the emigration of many officers^ raised Bonaparte to the rank of captain. The divisions generated by the revolution had extended themselves to Cor- sica, where, modified by circumstances pe- cuhar to the history of that island, they ap- peared in the shape of a party in favour of maintaining the union with France, and a party opposed to it. For the purpose of pre- serving the public peace, and supporting the legal authorities, a corps of local troops was raised in Corsica, and the provisional com- mand of one of the battalions was intrusted to Bonaparte. The insurgents, or anti- union party, had at first the sympathy, and 4 5o THE LIFE OF CHAP^i.^ finally the countenance, of Paoll ; and Ajaccio was the focus of its proceedings. Hence it happened that Bonaparte's first act of war, was exerted in opposition to the sen- timents of his father's commander j and in the suppression of a tumult in his native town. Peraldi, a popular leader of a rival clan and the opposite party, who breathed hereditary enmity to the Bonaparte family, was at the head of the discomfited rioters ; a circum- stance which Avas not likely to soften the in- veteracy of a clannish feud. Accordingly^ he denounced Bonaparte to the government, as the secret instigator of the disorder which he had openly quelled. This accusation, prompted by vengeance, was unsupported by truth. But it rendered a journey to Paris advisable, where, though the sanguinary temper of power was beginning to encourage delation, Bonaparte found no difficulty in vindicating his conduct. This slander of Peraldi is memorable as being coeval with the earliest of Napoleon's public services, and as the first in that long succession of falsehoods, which under the warmth and lustre of his merit, Avere exhal- ed from the disorder, malicCj and corruption THE EMPEROR NAPOLEO'. 5 1 of his a£[e. Though frustrated in its aim, it From 1785 . ... .to 1793. was not without effect in his history, as it was the occasion of his witnessing the outra- ges of the populace on the 20th of June and the I oth of August. On the first occasion, it is said, that upon seeing from the river terrace of the garden of the Tuileries the King pre- sent himself at a balcony of the palace, wear- ing the red cap of liberty, which, intimida- ted by the rabble, he had clapped upon his head, Bonaparte expressed indignation at the monarch's weakness, and exclaimed:-— "How could they suffer the mob to enter the palace ? It was only necessary to sweep off a few hundreds of them with cannon, and the rest would have been running now.'^ His contempt for a rout of this kind, origin- ating in his love of order and pride of dis- cipline^ and his confidence in the application of military force , were both strengthened doubtless by his recent experience in Cor- sica. (8) He was still more shocked by the sangui- nary excesses of the loth of August. The brave and immolated Swiss guards, their bodies lying in heaps on the pavement of the court, and their heads paraded about on 52 THE LIFE OF CHAP. II. pikes by demons in human shape, struck him with horror, and presented a spectacle which he remembered as "hideous and re- volting." Instinct with heroic fire, his soul shuddered at scenes of cruelty and murder, and his just understanding regarded the vio- lence of'a mob as the ferocity of a monster. But he was not in a position to reflect, that the fault, instead of being in the infu- riated populace, was in the oppression which had maddened them. They were born with natures askind, with sensibilities as gener- ous as the rest of mankind, but a bigoted and dissolute priesthood, a privileged and rapa- cious aristocracy, and a line of cruel and vo- luptuous kings, had ch^iven them through all the extremities of persecution and shift- ings of servitude, to the rage of despair. The great body of the French people had been treated like brutes until they were become brutal. Their mental vision had been so long obscured in depths of degradation, that the light of liberty affected them with bhnd- ness, the air of relief with convulsions. Ex- hausted by ages of oppression, a nation, re- nowned for generous devotion to ungrate- ful monarrhs, was excited to paroxysms of THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 3a frenzy by the first sensations of freedom. But From 1785 . ... to 1795. is this an argument in favour of divine right and legitimate monarchy, or a motive for dis- trusting the capacity of the people for self- government.-^ The people of France were no more to blame than is the solitary maniac, ■J 7 who escaping from unrighteous chains^ kills a stranger under the belief that in that stran- ger he is destroying the oppressor, whose cruelty tortured his limbs and distracted his brain. The objects of their fury were not the victims of popular rage, but of the royal vices which engendered it 5 and the axe which beheaded Louis XVI was raised, not by his subjects, but his ancestors. Through all the violence of the revolu- tionary struggles, the people had but one ob- ject of desire, freedom, but one subject of dread, tyranny; and their great leaders, the patriots of the revolution, pursued the no- blest aims of human ambition, the liberty of their fellow citizens, and the independence of their country. That the good which was desired and proposed was not all effected, and that unforeseen misery and crime could not be avoided, was their mutual misfortune, not their common fault. He therefore, who CHAP. II. 54 THE LIFE OF stigmatizes the revolution because of its in- cidental atrocities or unexpected catastrophe, might consistently reproach a miner, whose enterprise and labour afford comfort to mil- lions, because the fire-damps of the earth explode^ when touched by the flame of his useful torch. And he who can lament over the downfall of a throne, and the suffering of the individuals connected with it, without execrating the tyranny of which it was the seat, might he expected to sympathise with the murderer^ against whom the blood of his victim rises in judgment, without feeling indignation for the crueUy with which that blood had been shed, or pity for the pangs, which sent forth life in its current. The truth of these observations is too plain to be con- tested. They shew that as the excesses of the French revolution were the natural conse- quences of hereditary rule, the votaries of that system have no right to complain, when the vices of one king, descend in vengeance on his successor. They also shew, that if long continued submission strengthens the hands of the oppressor, it makes his ultimate ac- countabiUty the more perilous, by perverting the nature and the energies of the oppressed. THE E>IPEROR NAPOLEON. 55 Of no great political event have all the consequences been beneficial. The struggle which emancipated the United States, was not unattended by the sorrows of innocence, and the sufferings of virtue. Unminglcd ad- vantages were not to be expected from the French revolution, of whichj however, while the horrors were confined to France, the advantages redounded to mankind. That these were important, may be conceived by reflecting on the probable condition of Eu- rope, had the first coalition against France been successful. Those who rail against the French revolution, and describe its excesses as effects of the natural propensity of the people and the press, would do well to compa re them with the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the acknowledged offspring of the altar and the throne, since it was perpetrated by the order of Charles IX, and eulogised by the thanks- giving of Gregory II. The virtuous Sully re- cords some of the horrors of ([\\s legitimate reign of terror ^'\n which seventy thousand French protestants were massacred in the course of eight days. While Bonaparte was on this occasion at Paris, he seems to have felt the weight of From 1 785 to 1795. 56 THE LIFE OF CHAP. II. the inheritance which his dying uncle had turned aside from Joseph, and devolved upon him. His mother, though not in affluence, was in possession of comfort and indepen- dence, and for his own wants, his pay as Captain of artillery, constituted adequate, though not ample provision. But his younger brothers and his sisters were to be educated, and the latter provided for. About these last he felt most anxiety, for in writing at this time to his uncle Paravicini he observed: ^'Allow yourself to feel no uneasiness con- cerning your nephews; they will be able to take care of themselves." Accompanied by Bourrienne, he went from Paris to St. Cyr, to visit his sister Eliza, who was then at school there; and it is said, in speculating upon the means of making money, formed the momentary project, of renting a number of houses in Paris, and subletting them at pro- fitable prices. (9) Beturning to Corsica; and resuming the command of a local battalion, he wais direct- ed in January, 1793, to join the expedition of Admiral Truguet, against the neighbour- ing island of Sardinia. A second battalion was added to his corps, which constituted a THE EMPEROPi NAPOLEON. 5"] part of the land force of the armament. The From 1785 ... . to 1795. expedition sailed, the main body under the admiral to attack Cagliari ; and the Corsi- can detachment to make a diversion on the opposite side of the island. Bonaparte with his militia force, executed his part of the enterprise so far as to get possession of several islets and forts, in the straits of Boni- facio. But the principal attempt under Tru- guet having failed, in consequence, as was al- leged of Paoli's machinations, Bonaparte's subordinate success was unavailing. Conse- quently, he abandoned the positions he had taken, and re-embarking his men, returned to Ajaccio; where the spirit and ability which he had displayed were applauded, in spite of the inefficacy of his exertions, and the failure of the expedition. PaolijWho had for some time given reason to suspect that his former enmity to France was reviving in his mind^ was completely alienated by the outrages of the loth of Au- gust and the 3d of September. He had been much caressed in England during his exile, and had conceived admiration for the lead- ing men and principal institutions of that country. His discontent with the state of 58 THE LIFE OF ^3^^^J1l- things in France, exaggerated by these inch- nations towards her enemy^ induced him to form a design, and finally to take measures for separating Corsica from France, and annexing it to the possessions of the crown of England. At length being denounced to the French Government by the populaff societies of Provence, he was summoned to the bar of the convention to justify himself, under the penalty of being punished as a trai^ tor. Whatever had been his motives^ his conduct he was conscious, had placed him in a position in which success could alone justify or protect him, even before a temperate tri- bunal. He declined compliance with the fearful summons, under the pretext of age and infirmity, and then throwing off the mask with which he had hitherto veiled his pro- ceedings, invited the assistance of England, and raised the standard of revolt. (lo) Before taking this final step he communi- cated his intention to Bonaparte, who was already a person of influence in the island, and commanded as we have seen a corps of Corsican miHtia. As he had engaged the personal regard of Paoli, his co-operation was desirable from the double motive of policy THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 5g and friendship. The Corsican chief was a From1T85 to 1795. man of venerable age, imposing appearance, and elegant conversation ; skilful in war, and sagacious in government. He discoursed much with his young friend on the distracted state of affairs in France, enlarged on the advanta- ges of Corsican independence, referred to the united efforts of himself and Charles Bona- parte in support of it ; and riding over the ground of their campaigns, pointed out its memorable spots, and explained its military positions. Bonaparte though pleased with his anecdotes, and probably instructed by his experience, was far from agreeing in his poli- tical conclusions. He admitted that the con- dition of public affairs in France was fright- ful, but with his characteristic judgment argued that whatever is violent in degree is short in duration, and urged that as Paoli was possessed of extensive authority and great influence in the island, it was his pro- vince to maintain the laws, and preserve tran- quillity, until the fury of the convulsions in France should subside. He added that Cor- sica belonged geographically to Italy or France ; that religion, language, and position, rendered its cordial union with England im- 6o THE LIFE OF CH AP. II, praclicablejaiidtliat as Italy was insignificant, by reason of its subdivisions, the most natu- ral and advantageous connection for Corsica was with France; a connection which in good policy no temporary inconvenience should be allowed to disturb, and in sound patriot- ism, not even great calamities should be permitted to sever. It was during one of these conversations, that Paoli, struck by the force of Bonaparte's logic, and the dignity of his sentiments, exclaimed " Oh, Napoleon, vou are not a man of modern times^, your opinions belong to the men of Plutarch. You will rise to greatness." These expres- sions it appears, Paoli often repeated, (i i) Their last and decisive conference took place in the neighbourhood of Corte, a town in the interior, and the ancient capital of the island, the date and tone of which rendered it evident that they must part either as con- federates or enemies. Paoli persisted in his shortsighted designs in favour of the English connection J Bonaparte adhered to the coun- try of his father's adoption, and his own birth and allegiance. Their separation shows a remarkable diversity of conductin twogreat men disposed to act from honourable mo- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 6l lives, and placed on the same staee of affairs. From 1785 . . . to 1795. BulPaoli had recollections of pride and power tolookback upon, which though definite, and converged to the microscopic scene of Corsi- can history, were magnificent and endearing to the memory of age. His original hostility to France, though soothed and tranquilised by the homage and confidence of the leading men in Paris, had not been converted into hearty attachment. Bonaparte on the con- trary, was born a Frenchman and educated in France, was young, passionate for glory, vivid with hope and talent, and naturally looked forward to the undefined future, and the ample theatre of France, for opportunity and distinction. His professional pride and instinctive feeling were affected as he says with antipathy for the treasonable project of Paoli, and as vigorous plants shoot upward to the sun, his genius, which would have been imprisoned in the contracted circuit of his native isle^ gravitated towards the im- portant events of France, and the powerful emotions which produced them. PaoH, persevering in his unjustifiable pro- ject of delivering up Corsica to England, tem- porised with Bonaparte not a moment after 62 THE LIFE OF CHAP^ii,^ this last interview; and accordingly, the latter in retracing his steps toward Ajaccio, found himself surrounded and made prisoner by the partisans of Paoli at a place called Bocog- nano situated in a pass of the mountains. Escaping by a singular stratagem^ he reach- ed Ajaccio, whence with the assistance of a friend, hesucceededin joining the force which the committee of public safety had by this time assembled at Calvi, under the direction of the representatives of the people, Salicetti and La Combe St. Michael. A civil war noAV broke out in the island. Paoli having failed in the attempt, first to mislead Bonaparte's judgment by pursuasion, and next to secure his person by force, now resorted to threats, and warned him by letter that, if he continued to support the French authorities, he would treat him andhis family as public enemies. This menace being disre- garded or defied, the exasperated veteran pro- ceeded to execute it with vengeful severity. The French party was driven from Ajaccio ; the house in Avhich Bonaparte was born was given up to pillage, and converted into a bar- rack for British troops ; the farm laid waste, and in the blind impotence of rage and THE EMPEROR ^APOLEON. 63 wron2[, a decree of banishment was issued From 1785 to 1793. against Napoleon and his brother Joseph, (i 2) Sahcetti and St. Michael made several ineffec- tual descents, in which Bonaparte either com- manded or engaged ; but the Enghsh forces having interposed, and the mountaineers of Paoli joining them in numbers, the French cause was lost in the island. On one occasion Bonaparte was sent from Calvi to surprise Ajaccio. He embarked in a frigate, and landing on the north side of the gulf with a party of fifty men, took posses- sion of a fort called the Torre di Capitello. He had no sooner carried this point, than the frigate was driven to sea by a gale. While thus insulated and unsupported, the insur- gents attacked him with great violence, by land and water. He defended himself with spirit, and with such pertinacity, that he and his heroic little garrison were reduced to ra- tions of horse flesh. During the siege, he called out from the walls to a party, and harangued his misguided countrymen in a strain of eloquence so impressive, that he made many converts. After five days of conflict and starvation, the frigate returned 64 THE Lir'E OF CHAP^r.^ to her station, and he re-embarked, having first partially blown up the fort.(i3) He himself mentions, that in one of his landings, he got a few guns ashore, and with a round or two of grapeshot^ dispersed a body of the insurgents who opposed him. They returned to the attack however^ and mixed reproaches with their warfare, expres- sing indignation that he, a Corsican, should be fighting for France. In order to make themselves both seen and heard, they ascend- ed the neighbouring hills, and even mount- ed up into trees. Bonaparte had a gun load- ed with ball, and aimed it so well, that he cut off a limb on which one of these exclusive patriots was perched. His fall, which creat- ed a general laugh, was followed by the in- stant flight of his party. These partial efforts, however sj)irited^ were of no avail against the united force of Paoli and the English. The French repre- sentatives, accordingly, determined to aban- don the contest, and withdraw to France. Bonaparte contrived to communicate with his mother. Under his protection, she with- drew from the storm which overwhelmed THE EMPi:KOR NAPOLEON. 65 Corsica, and souf^lii sbeUer oq the contiiieiil, From 1785 -. . .to 1795. Stopping first at JSice, and settling finally in Marseilles, with the dependence of a large family, and the remnant of a small fortune. This expulsion of his father's family from their home, and of himself with circum- stances of odious solemnity, from the place of his birth, was probably the first occasion on which he felt the iron pressure of calamity. The severity of the blow, was not lessened by the reflection, that it was dealt by the hand of his paternal friend. Yet it neither embittered his affections, nor discouraged his enterprise, nor damped his liberality. After providing for the temporary establish- ment of his mother, he made immediate pre- parations for joining his regiment, which was then at Nice. He preserved to the last a warmth of affection for his native isle, (14) and an affectionate respect for Paoli; while the Corsican Phcenix, languishing in the cold and compulsive caresses of England, ( 1 5 ) expressed paternal joy at the deeds and triumphs of his youthful friend. (16 J Before he joined his regiment, his ser- vices in several delicate operations, the pre- cise nature of which has not been explained, 5 6() THE LIFE OF ' CHAP. II. were required b) general Dugear. This general, who commanded the artillery of the army which, encamped around Nice, was called the army of Italy, although it had never crossed the Alps, nor tasted the waters of the Po, had obtained authority from the war department, to employ young Bonaparte, upon his return from Corsica. About this time the insurrection of Mar- seilles broke out, a movement, consequent upon the arrest of the leaders of the Girondist party, in the Convention, on the 3ist of May and 2d of June; and which extended wdth violence into departments of the south and west. The insurgents of Marseilles orga- nized a force of six thousand men, with which, in order to cooperate with the mal- contents of Lyons, they took possession of Avignon, and thereby intercepted the com- munications of the army of Italy, This greatly embarassed the commanding general, who found his convoys of provision and ammu- nition, seized upon by the insurgents. In the emergency, which threatened to uncover the frontier on the side of Piedmont, the intel- ligence and address of Bonaparte Avere relied upon. x\t the instance of general Dugear THE EMPEROR NA.POLEON. 67 he wasdesDatched on a mission to the insur- From 1785 gents, m order to prevail on tnem to allow the convoys of the army to pass. He repaired to Marseilles and Avignon, conferredat both places with the leaders of the insurrection, convinced them that it was against their in- terest, whatever might be their sentiments respecting the convention, to provoke the hostility of the army, and succeeded in per- suading them, to offer no further interrup- tion to its communications and convoys. From a statement made incidentally by him- self it may be gathered, that while he was employed in reasoning with the rebellious leaders at Avignon, general Cartaux appeared before that town, with a body of conven- tional troops; a display of force which pro- bably lent to, and borrowed from, his ar- guments, additional weight. His observations during this excursion, of theweakness, violence, and mismanagement of the insurgents, as well as of their lawless and unattainable objects, furnished the occa- sion and materials for his '^Supper of Beau- caire;" a political essay thrown into the shape of a dialogue^ and published during his stay at Marseilles, explaining the causes lo THT Lii-r: or ^|[^^j_|^- ^ oC the revoliilioiJ, justifying the motives of its leaders, and deprecating the proceedings of llie insurgents. After reminding them of the superiority of disciplined battalions to untrained multitudes; of light artillery in field operations, to their heavy cannon; and suggesting, that although poor mountain- eers or starving peasants, might well afford to run the liazard of rebellion, the citizens of an oj)uIent town, stored with the fruits of indusiry and commerce, had reason to sup- port the authority of government, he warn- ed them thai perseverance in their lawless project would resull in failure, disgrace, pti- nishmeiit, and misery. Of this piece, the ]>rinciples and object of Avhich were consist- ent with the htnguage he held to Paoli, and the conduct he pursued in Corsica, the doc- trine was patriotic J the topics persuasive, the reasoning sound, and the style vigorous. It contained no metaphysical cant nor Jacobi- nical violence. The author spoke in the cha- lacter which he really bore, that of a soldier ; and endeavoured to disstiade his country- men from proceedings, which had the double effect of plunging the nationinto civil war^ and exposing it to foreign invasion. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 6APOLEO>'. 99 proached the rain fell in such torrents, that From 1795 . to 1 T94. general Dugommier was inclined to defer the assault twenty-four hours longer. At this suggestion the deputies manifested both impatience and indignation, and pro- testing against it, offered, in a conference with Bonaparte, to suspend Dugommier^ and confer the chief command upon him. (lo.) He refused to supplant his gallant ge- neral, but undertook to convince him that the rain was not an obstacle to success, as the bayonet was the weapon to be chiefly employed; and apprising him of the ex- treme discontent of the deputies, prevailed on him not to delay the assault. Accord- ingly the infantry and reserves were moved forward to a position in attacking distance^ and every preparation for the onset made. But now the deputies either grown cautious from the approach of danger, or wishing lo shift the responsibility of failure from them- selves to the general, or deterred by the ar- guments of certain officers, who contended that the place could not be stormed, propo- sed calling a council of war, and delibe- rating afresh on the propriety of an attack. But Dugommier had become as determined as Bonaparte. He rejected their proposal, 100 THE LIFE OF CHAP^ni.^ ridiculed their doubts, and refused to he- sitate a moment longer. Dividing his force into two columns, he himself took command of the first, and placed the second under the conduct of Bonaparte. In this order^ sup- ported by light parties on their flanks, they advanced through rain and darkness to the assault. As it was known that the body of the garrison was sheltered behind the hill, the assailants hoped to reach the fort unper- ceived and unresisted, and to force an en- trance without much opposition. But in this conjecture they were deceived; for the English commander had stationed a dense line of light troops at the foot of the emi- nence, who receiving the leading column of the French with a volley of small arms, re- called the garrison to their guns. Their fire, which was rapid and constant, w^s chiefly of grape shot^ and did great execu- tion. After a dubious and bloody struggle, the brave Dugommier, who had at one time forced his way into the work, was driven back. In despair, and expecting to expiate on the scaffold, misfortune in the field, the aged warrior exclaimed. "I am a lost man." Rallying the fugitives, Bonaparte, whose THE EMPEROR NAPOLEOJi. XOI horse had been killed under him, and who was severely bruised by the fall, pushed forward undismayed by his leader's repulse, prompt to revenge, and skilful to retrieve it. Perceiv- ing that the enemy continued their fire di- rectly in frontjhc detached a battalion of light troops under captain Muiron, who was well acquainted with the ground; ordering him to ascend the hill circuitously and under co- ver of certain inequalities in its surface. Muiron conducted his party so adroitly that he reached the fort undiscovered, and rush- ing in through an embrasure with a small party, threw the garrison into confusion. Bonaparte who followed in supporting dis- tance, and had been joined by Dugommier in person, attacked Avith his column at this cri- tical moment, and overpowering all resist- ance, carried the fort. The garrison though vanquished was not disgraced ; the English and Spanish cannoneers vied with each other in valour and pertinacity, and resisting to the last, were cut down to a man at their guns. Bonaparte was slightly wounded; Muiron, Victor, and Laborde severely. The enemy being reinforced from the two for- tifications at the foot of the hill,^made three spirited attempts to retake the important From 1795 to 1794 102 THE LIFE, OF ^^ fjj}h post, but their own guns were turned against them, and they were repulsed with consi- derable slaughter. Their loss including pri- soners exceeded two thousand men ; that of the French in killed and wounded amounted to one thousand. About three hours after Dugommier and Bonaparte were in quiet possesion of Little Gibaltar, the deputies, who had first encouraged, and then dis- suaded the assault, came gallantly forward sword in hand, lavishing praise, with the warmth of witnesses and the confidence of fellow labourers, upon the victorious troops, (i I ,) This swaggering was contemptible; but the vanity, assentation, and injustice, which followed it, were infamous. The commander of the artillery, having thus gained the position, to the possession of which he attached such decisive consequence, lost no time in employing its advantages, and in bringing his plan of proceeding lo the test of experiment. At the dawn of day he directed an attack to be made upon TEguillette, and Balaguier, as the forts at the two extreme points of the promontory were called. These though they were com- manded by Little Gibraltar, more immedi- THE EMPEROR .NAPOLEO>. I o3 atelv commanded the two ro.'ids, and me- Froin 1 7^5 ^ .to 1794. naced the fleet, than even that fortress itself did. Their garrisons however evacuated these places without waiting to be driven out, as they must have been by the guns of Little Gibraltar. Bonaparte then ordered up the heavy artillery from his own batteries with a view of mounting them in I'Eguillette and Balaguier, of closing the communication between the two roads, and opening a fire upon the aUied squadrons, which were now in their turn blockaded. But upon examin- ing the works he discovered that they were constructed of masonry, and that close in front of each was a tower serving for a lodgment and redoubt. These towers were also of stone and so incommodiously si- tuated that rebounding shot and splintering stones would glance from them upon the gunners in the forts. He therefore de- termined, at the expense of a delay of some hours, to throw up batteries of earth on the surface of the hill. In the mean time he was so confident of success that he said to Dugommier, and repeated to the officers — "To-morrow night, or the night after, you shall sleep in Toulon." 104 THE LIFE OF CHAP^iiL But already began to be manifested the efficiency of his plan of operations, and the magnitude of its results. Lord Hood had no sooner discovered that the forts on the summit and at the base of the promontory were in possession of the French, than he made signal to the fleet to weigh anchor and get out to sea. A council of war assembled in Toulon, at which it is said he proposed an instant and powerful effort to recover pos- session of Little Gibraltar and the fortified points which it commanded (12). This proposition which did credit to his spirit, was rejected by a majority of the council, who decided that the place, being no longer tenable, should be immediately abandoned. In the course of the evening the evacua- tion was commenced, in the midst of in- creasing dismay and confusion. Although the allies had obtained possession of Toulon upon the assurance of protecting its inha- bitants, and of preserving and restoring its vast military and marine establishments, sensible of their danger and of their force, but forgetful of their faith and honour, they resolved to carry off as prizes whatever ships they could get to sea, to burn the rest, to THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. I o5 destroy the forts and arsenals, and then to FromiT93 . . ... to 1794. convey into banishment such of the citizens as had been tempted by the promise of lord Hood into a degree of guilt which exposed them to the utmost rigour of justice, and had been plunged by its violation into a depth of responsibility, which placed them beyond the reach of mercy. Orders for destroying the fleet and arsenals were given accordingly ; and their execution entrusted to the courage and activity of sir Sidney Smith. But the French army was ap- proaching on all sides. General La Poype had got possession of fort Pharon ; Bona- parte from the promontory which he had stormed, and from Malbosquet which the English had abandoned, was throwing hot shot and shells into the harbour and the town; and the rapacity of the allies, un- allayed by considerations of justice or huma- nity, was restrained by their fears. Many of the ships, most of the arsenals, and the principal fortifications were preserved. The French galley slaves broke their chains and extinguished the English fires. Four ships of the fine and several frigates were loaded with stores and carried off; nine ships and io6 THE LIFE OF P^ ^'^- ^ four frigates were burnt ; but thirteen ships which had been dismantled, Were left un- destroyed in the harbour. The allied fleet, eager for pillage and intent to escape, offered but a tardy refuge to the distracted inhabi- tants, who hurried in the midnight confla- gration to the wharfs, and rushed into the boats, as they were directed by chance, or driven by terror. Suddenly the floating magazines which had been fired, not sunk, exploded with a shock and a glare that illumed and suspended the surrounding horrors. But Bonaparte soon revived his cannonade and continued it with fury throughout the night. Some of the English ships were injured, and several boats loaded with emigrants were sunk. After a night of terror, violence, and confusion, the hostile squadrons were seen at day break just clearing the harbour, freighted with plunder, ignominy, and grief (i3j. Lord Hood^ who was the principal agent in this transaction, sacrificed to the passions of his government^ the honour of his flag. The rage and rapine of his last hold upon Toulon, threw a dark colouring on his cau- tious entrance, and his hasty retreat; ag- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. IO7 gravating the insidious aspect of the first, From 1793 and giving a corsair appearance to the second. In this spirit the war in which Bonaparte had now effectually entered, was commen- ced by the alHes, and in the same spirit it was concluded. The joy of the pubHc at the event of the siege, was the greater, because the success was unexpected. The people classed it with the greatest triumphs of the republic, and, a proceeding unprecedented in the history of France, it was celebrated in conformity with a decree of the convention, by a national festival of careful ostentation and elaborate pomp. But neither in the report of the de- puties^ nor in the solemnity of the conven- tion, was the name of the real captor of Tou- lon even mentioned. His merit, though slighted, could not be suppressed. General Dugommier, upon reading the minutes of lord Hood's council of war^ which that as- sembly had left behind, was lost in wonder at the precision with which the proceedings of the enemy had corresponded with the conclusions of Bonaparte. His admiration was increased by the reflection that, as he owed the capture of Toulon to the skill of I08 THE LIFE OF c^^j^iii^ that officer, so he was indebted to his disin- terestedness for the command of the siege. Therefore he not only included his name in a Hst of officers whom he recommended for promotion, but assured the committee of pubhc safety, that, his merit and talents fpere so great^ that^ if he was neglected by the government^ he would advance him- self. The officers confessed his excellence, the soldiers were loud in his praise, and the clubs of Marseilles extolled his services ; so that military candour and popular feeling, counteracted the silence of the deputies, and the indifference of the government. Even Madam Cartaux, who had witnessed the al- tercations between the general and Bona- parte, applauded those talents which made the folly of her lord more conspicuous. At a public entertainment she praised the young officer of artillerv, and observed that he had too much sense to be a sans cullotte, "Then," said the indignant husband, ''we must be blockheads, all of us." " Not at all," replied the lady, "I don t pretend to say that; but he is not one of your class^ that you may be sure of." Bonaparte appears to have been indiffer- THE EMPEROR NAPOLfiON. IO9 ent to the praise, and insensible to the neg- From 4795 \ ' ^ to 1794. lect of which he was the object. But he doubtless felt great satisfaction at vindica- ting the safety and reputation of his conn- try, and at embodying in an exploit so use- ful and glorious, a ray of that genius whose untried force and impatient consciousness, he had felt amid the clouds of fortune, and the fluctuations of hope. Anecdotes of his personal conduct have been related, which repetition can hardly render trite. On one occasion, when he was superintending the erection of a battery under the enemy's fire, being anxious to des- patch an order, he called for the attendance of a soldier who could write. A handsome young sergeant stepped forward, and resting the paper on the parapet, wrote as he dicta- ted . A ball struck the parapet, covering the amanuensis and his paper with earth, "Very good," coolly remarked the sergeant, '^we shall not want sand this time.'' The eye and favour of Bonaparte were attracted by a courage thus playful on the brink of death, and the unknown sergeant was transformed eventually into general Junot, governor of Paris, and duke of Abrantes. (14) CHAP. III. no THE LIFE OF Soon afterwards, while throwing up works against Little Gibraltar, the besiegers were exposed to a destructive fife, which was so fatal at a certain battery, that the gun- ners refused to stand by it. It was of im- portance to serve these guns, since, however exposed, they were in a position to do great execution. Bonaparte neither punished nor reproached his men^ but, resorting to that magic by which genius subjects to its autho- rity the impulses of mankind, directed his favourite sergeant to post up conspicuously above the deserted guns, a card with these words : — '^ The battery of men without fear !" The appeal flew electrically through the ranks, and the soldiers, instead of avoid- ing the dangerous post, contended for the honour of serving at it. To confirm their spirit, the commander of the artillery took his station upon this battery, and ordered 'Hhe men without fear,'' to open their fire. Thus out of discouragement he created heroism. So great was the slaughter at this post that one of the guns was left without its compli- ment of men. Bonaparte seized the rammer of an artilleryman who had just fallen, and THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. Ill assisted in loading and firing repeatedly; From 1793 11 1 T . to 1794. and tnus contracted a cutaneous complauit, with which the poor soldier had been af- fected. By unskilful treatment its tendency to the surface was repelled, with effects, from which his constitution was not per- fectly relieved, until after his Italian cam- paigns, when he was able to take the advice of Corvisart. The milder virtues of justice and huma- nity he also displayed at Toulon. When the besieging army entered that place it was attended by the deputies, two of whom, Freron and Barras, had been compelled to fly when it was delivered up to the public enemy, and consequently were disposed to exceed in their punishments the ordinary rigour of the convention. The popular societes and volunteer companies of the sur- rounding country and neighbouring towns, soon followed, with tempers averse to mercy or moderation. But when the destruction of public property came to be viewed in all its extent of vastation; when the remains of the magazine, the ruins of the forts, the half- burnt arsenals and half-saved ships, were seen yet smoking with hostile fire ; when 112 THE LIFE OF CHAP. III. it was considered that the traitors of Toulon had given up to the enemies of their coun- property which belonged to all France ; which fed her pride, nourished qer strength, and contributed to her safety ; and when the troops beheld or remembered the num- ber of their dead and wounded comrades ; then indeed were the army and the people excited to furious indignation and unquali- fied revenge. (i5) A revolutionary tribu- nal was estabHshed by the deputies for the punishment^ rather than the trial of offen- ders. But it was found that the principal agents in the treason had fled w^ith the alh'es. Of those who remained, few were cul- pable but in a venial degree. Nevertheless upwards of a hundred victims were selected and sentenced to be shot. General Du- gommier discountenanced this ill directed severity, and Bonaparte lost the favour, and braved the resentment of the government, by refusing to order the execution of the sentence, (i6) which was carried into effect by a detachment of the revolutionary militia. Thus the wretched Toulonese suffered not only for the crime of their fellow citizens THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. Il3 and their own guilt, but for the bad faith From 1793 of the allies. A melancholy but wholesome ^ ^ * example of that dreadful retribution which awaits those who in time of war, direct the dagger of the enemy against the bosom of their country. The indiscriminate sacrifice of these unhappy men was doubtless cruel, but every lover of his country must confess, that the popular resentment which over- whelmed them was natural, and that its effects were salutary, as they had a direct tendency to destroy the connection which had been formed, between the foreign ene- mies of France and her domestic factions. (17) It was at this siege that Bonaparte con- ceived a regard for Duroc, who rose so high in his confidence and favour. [18^ On the same occasion Victor, Suchet, St. Hilaire, and Marescot, first felt that ascendancy which they were destined so often to witness and so long to obey. In effecting the reduction of Toulon, the commander of the artillery not only per- formed a most important service at a most critical moment, but young and subordinate as he was, displayed the qualities of a con-- summate general ; personal intrej^idity,, pro- 8 114 "^^^ ^^^^ ^^ CHAP. iir. fessional skill, humanity which neither in- terest could tempt nor power overawe, effi- ciency in collecting the means of warfare, and genius in kindling the enthusiasm of the troops^ and in detecting in a complex and extended position the true point of attack. These qualities which rank him with great captains, entitle him to the praise of history ; but what is especially memorable in a record of his life, is that sublime judgment which enabled him to foreshow with perfect accu- racy of discernment^ the consequences of a proposed operation, in the fears and ne- cessities of the enemy. This crowns the glory of his success at Toulon, and associates it with all his subsequent victories, in which judgment bore so great and fortune so small a part. The account of his conduct at this siege might be deemed unfaithful, were the offer of personal civility to his prisoner, general O'Hara, omitted. '^ All I ask,'' replied the latter, " is to be left alone, and to owe no- thing to pity," with a dignity of mind, which though obscured by a surliness of temper, was perceived and respected by Bonaparte. General Dugommier after completing the THE EMPKROIi NAPOLEON. Il5 leduction of Toulon, was appointed to the From 1793 command oi ine army oi the eastern Py- renees. He was desirous that Bonaparte should accompany him, and with a view of ensuring so important an acquisition, issued an order, directing that officer to follow him to the neighbourhood of Perpignan. But the committee of public safety, though tardy in acknowledging, and penurious in rewarding Bonaparte's services, were prompt and free in employing his talents. This they did by sending him in the opposite direction, and by assigning to him a duty, which though it promised no accession of glory, was likely to be attended by unplea- sant responsibihty and vexatious difficulties. During its performance he received his pro- motion to the rank of brigadier-general, and instructions, after its completion, to rejoin the army of Italy, and lake command of its artillery. The recovery of Toulon, with the exile or punishment of its misguided inhabitants, although it had humbled the spirit of insur- rection in the southern departments, had not extinguished it. The English had been forced to relinquish their hold on this impor- I if) THE LIFE OF ciiAP^i.^tant Station, but they had not done so with- out augmenting their OAvn naval power, and impairing essentially that of France. Their flag in consequence ruled the Mediterra- nean, and the French territory on that sea, vulnerable from the factious temper of the population, was exposed more than ever to insult and aggression. It became therefore a matter of pressing importance to supply by fortifications on land that protection to the coast which the fleets and forts of Toulon had formerly afforded. This task was en- trusted toBonaparte. It was barren and de- terring ; yet he performed it in a manner which was in the highest degree useful, and gave striking evidence of the analytical power 'APOLEO>'. I IQ der, he exjiressed at St. Helena by exclaiming, From 1795 ^ J &? to 1794. " Truly I thought myself at the end of the world, " a forui of speech which he employed to denote the strongest detestation and hor- ror. It seemed that the nerves of his body as well as the feelings of his soul, shuddered to the quick at spectacles of cruelty. It appears, he always deemed the support he received at Toulon, first from Gasparin, and afterwards from Dugommier, instru- mental in opening his way to fortune and to fame. The value of his services not only to the country but to themselves, greatly overpaid the general and the deputy. Ne- vertheless, in his will, he left substantial me- morials of his respect and gratitude for their names; thus by a magnificent retrospect, looking from the melancholy end of his ca- reer, to its bright beginning. ( 12^ ) CHAPTER TY. From March, 1794? to October^ ^795. CHAP. IV. Bonaparte joins tlie army of Italy as general of artillery' — His first aides-de-camp — General Du- merbion- — Position of the two armies — Strong camp of the Sardinians — Bonaparte's plan for dis- lodging them^ — Adopted by a council of war — Massena — Bonaparte's active operations — Their ra- pidity and success — Beats the Austrians- — Takes Oneille, Ormea, and Garessio — The Sardinians dis- lodged and Saorgio taken by Massena, wbo drives them from the Col de Tende — Positions occupied by the French army — Their sufferings- — Bonaparte's plan for uniting the armies of Italy and the Alps — Prevented by the events of the 9th Thermi- dor — Preparations of the allies — Plan proposed bv Bonaparte for counteracting them — Carries it into execution — Its effects — End of the campaign — His chief occupations in autumn and winter • — Ma- dam Thurreau — Bonaparte's infatuation — Its probable effect on his fortune- — Robespierre the younger- — Anecdote — Bonaparte put under arrest — Released without trial — Zeal and fidelity of Junot — Bonaparte summoned to the bar of the convention, THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 121 on a charge which is withdrawn- — Attached to the From 1794 armament prepared for an attack upon Rome — By ^ t o 179 5. his advice that project abandoned — Mob at Toulon — Saves two deputies of the assembly — Rescues the Chabrillanls — Rejoins the army of Italy- — Ordered to take a command in the infantry— Is dissatisfied and proceeds to Paris — Visits his mother on his way and stops at Chatillon-sur-Seine — Anecdote — His inter- view with Aubry, the minister of war — His retort — Tenders his resignation* — It is not accepted — Ap- pointed to command the artillery of the army of the West— Kellerman's disasters — Danger of the Italian frontier — The committee of public safety consult Bonaparte — He draws up instructions which are sent to Kellerman — Is employed in the war office in directing the operations of the armies — His reputed idea of obtaining orders to seek a command in the army of the Grand Signior — Independent in his circumstances, though not rich- — His dis- posal of his time while at Paris — His impression in society. Having digested the order, arranged the po- sition, and prescribed thestructure of suitable fortifications along the coast of France, from the Rhone to the Var, general Bonaparte pro- ceeded in March, ^794? ^^ ^he head quarters of the array of Italy, which were estabhshed at Nice. He was preceded by the reputation he had acquire d at Toulon, and accompanied 1:2 2 THE LIFE OF CHAP .JLV. ^ byhisfirst aides-de-camp, Mairon and Junot. The commander in chief, general Dumer- bion, was a veteran, who by hard service had gained high rank. He was intrepid, upright, and well informed , and having served the two previous campaigns on this frontier, was acquainted with its positions. He was severely afflicted with the gout, but as he discovered the merit and relied on the coun- sels of the young general of artillery, his efficiency was by no means impaired by his infirmities, (i) Macquart, d'Allemagne, and Massena, were his generals of division. The French army was stationed in the county of Nice, which is situated on the Mediterranean side of the maritime Alps, and between the rivers the Var and the Eoya. On the declivities of the Alps over- hanging this territory, the Sardinian army of twenty thousand men, occupied the camp of Fourches ; a formidable position resting on the strong fort of Saorgio, which com- manded the principal route from Nice to Ttirin. Fixed on this height, unassailable on his flanks from the nature of the ground, inexpugnable in his front as experience had demonstrated, and fortified both by nature THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 123 and art in his rear, the Sardinian commander From 1T94 ' , .to 179d. menaced the French frontier, communicated by his left with that of Genoa, and with the line of Austrian posts which were extended across the mountains from the vallev of the Bormida to the harbour of Oneille; and with the Enghsh cruisers and privateers, which intercepting from that port, the commerce between Genoa and Marseilles, interrupted the alleviation and supply afforded by it, to the French army and to the famine of Pro- vence. The importance of dislodging the enemy from this effective position, had been felt so sensibly by general Brunet, that on the 8th and 12th of the previous June, he had assailed it with a superiority of force and with persevering vigour. His efforts were vain and his loss considerable. With the government, which he served, as suspicion and proof were equivalent, failure and guilt were identical. General Brunet, unfortu- nate in battle, was charged with treason and punished with death. General Dumerbion who was to contend with equal difficulties, was subject to similar misfortune, and ex- posed to the same fate, for neither the in- terest of the nation nor the temper of the 124 ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ CHAPPY. ^ convention, would tolerate an inactive cam- paign. Thus circumstanced he must have regarded his antagonist, with feehngs akin to those of the shepherd, who sees the eagle that preys upon his lambs, perched upon an inaccessible rock, where neither his shouts can alarm nor his missiles reach her. But a hunter approached, from whose daring footsteps, and unerring eye, the only secu- rity was in instant flight. The first care of the general of artillery after his arrival, was to make himself ac- quainted with the station and force of the several divisions of the army. The perform- ance of this duty gave him an opportunity of studying the ground, of observing the enemy's position, and of tracing on the spot the unfortunate operations of general Bru- net. He perceived that the camp of Four- ches was too strong to be carried by a direct attack, hoAvever skilfully or gallantly con- ducted, and felt convinced that if general Dumerbion repeated the attempt of his pre- decessor, he would meet with no better suc- cess. The same military penetration which had revealed to him the mode of expelling the English from Toulon, now suggested to THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. I ^5 him the method of dislodging the Sardinians From 1794 P r, • , \ to 1795. irom oaorgio. (2.) His plan was projected on a scale of saga- city and enterprise which was as yet new and unattempted in this army, whose head quarters during t^vo campaigns had been stationary at Nice. It proposed extending the right wing divided into two columns, along the precipitous and narrow slope, be- tween the sea and the Alps, as far as Oneille and Loano ; separating the Austrian and Sar- dinian armies from communication with the British squadron; passing with the further column across the crest of the mountains and seizing Ormea and Garessio, two Sardi- nian forts on the sources of theTanaro; as- cending with the nearer column to the heights of Tanardo and Tanarello^, and occu- pying the route from Nice to Turin at a point in the rear of Saorgio. This movement, if successfully executed, would expel the Eng- lish cruisers and privateers from Oneille and Loano, protect the French coasting trade, cut off the enemy's communication with the sea; by endangering his retreat, compel him to abandon the camp of Four- ches, from which, after sanguinary efforts it 126 THE LIFE OF ^ ^^^ARTV^ i^aj been found impracticable to force him ; and would place the French army on the summits of the Alps, where, while their posts could neither be turned nor commanded, they would disquiet one member of the coa- lition for the safety of his country, and the security of his capital. If the Sardinian general should attempt to counteract this operation by assuming the offensive and attacking the French in their positions on the Var, besides thai these po- sitions were in themselves strong and capa- ble of being maintained against a superior force^ his advance would place the French right more completely on his flank and rear and render the movement proposed by Bonaparte still more efficacious and suc- cessful. Or, should he, which was not probable, detach a corps from his left in time and strength sufficient to arrest the progress of the French column, he must thereby expose his main position at Fourches, to a direct and victorious assault. So that whether the enemy remained quiet or moved forward, his eventual retreat was equally certain; he would lose all the advan- tages of superiority of ground, which, in- THeN EMPEROR NAPOLEON. I 2y dependenlly of other favourable conse- ^''^"iiJ^^ ^ " to 17Qt. quences, would result in their full force to the French (3 ). In forming this plan, Bonaparte appears to have reasoned on principles deduced from the nature of mountain warfare; in which strength of ground becomes a considera- tion so preponderating, that even in the conduct of an offensive campaign, an able general endeavours to conquer his enemy by positions. By these he forces him to fight to disadvantage or to retreat without fighting, losing in the first case the moral impulse and physical momentum of attack; in the second relinquishing the command of territory which otherwise he might have held (4). To this mode of commencing the cam- paign there was no serious military objection, while it was easy to remove the pohtical one which was suggested. It involved the necessity of violating, or to use an equivalent for the softer French term, of borrowing the neutral territory of Genoa. But in the pre- vious campaign, a detachment of Sardinian troops two thousand strong, had been per- mitted to pass in martial array, with drums 1 28 THE LIFE OF ^^^1^^'^ beating and colours flying through the terri- tory of the repubh'c, and to embark atOneille asareenforcement to the allied armament in Toulon. About the same time, so domi- neering was the influence of England on that coast, while she held possession of Tou- lon, that a British squadron had been suffered to attack and lake, with circum- stances of outrage and cruelty, the French frigate La Modeste while at her moorings in the harbour of Genoa (5). The neutral rights of this once proud republic^ thus pro- stituted, were entitled on principle to no respect from France. It was true that the importance of the commerce, which, under the Genoese flag, was maintained with the south of France, had impressed on the policy of the convention a character of unusual for- bearance, from which it was not expected, that the commander would deviate. But the operation in question would free that com- merce from obstruction, would establish a French force on the Genoese frontier, and be more likely to overawe than to irritate, so small and so mercantile a state. General Dumerbion yielded full attentiou and a ready assent, to the plan proposed by THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 29 the general of artillery, and submitted it to ^^^^ ^"^^^ . ... to1T95. a council of war, composed of his princi- pal officers and the deputies of the conven- tion. It was no sooner explained than it was adopted; its intrinsic advantages con- curring with the fresh and rising reputation of its author, to obviate unreasonable doubt and pertinacious discussion. To carry this bold plan into execution, Massena, on the 6th of April, crossed the Roya at the head of fourteen thousand men, with the first division of which, after taking the small castle of Vingtimilia^ he turned to his left, penetrated into his native moun- tains, and took post on Mont Tanardo and Monte Grande, inferior elevations of the Alps ; thus beginning his career of glory in the rough cradle of his infant sports. (7) Bo- naparte, who conducted the second division, taking a wider range between the English fleet on his right, and the Austro-Sardinian posts on his left, passed rapidly the Nervia and the Taggia, routed a strong body of Austriansat St. Agata, and taking possession of Oneille, put that sea-port in a condition of repelling hostile cruisers, and sheltering French trading vessels. Ardently prosecut- 9 l3o THE LIFE OF CUAV^Y.^ ii]g his movement^ he ascended from Oneille to the pass of Ponte di Nave, where an Austrian force waited to oppose him. This he defeated on the 1 5th of April^ and driving it over the mountains before him, compelled the neighbouring garrison of Ormea, con- sisting of four hundred men, to surrender. Twenty pieces of artillery, several thou- sand muskets, and a quantity of mihtary clothing, of which the troops were in want, fell into his hands. (8) His next object was Garessio, which being instantly attacked, fell an easy conquest. From Garessio, the ultimate point of his invasion, while he » threatened the plains and capital of Pied- mont, he secured his communication with the sea at Loano, by occupying, on the i8th of April, Monts St. Bernard and Rocca Bar- bena. Thus, in the short space of twelve days, Bonaparte had advanced the positions of the French army a distance of about eighty miles, through a tract of the most difficult country in Europe, driving the British cruisers from the coast on one side, dis- lodging the Austrian army from the moun- tains on the other, and had gained a THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. l3l position which overlooked the plains of From 1794 . . . to 1795. Piedmont, and menaced that kingdom with invasion. Massena, meanwhile, had conducted his operations on a line nearer to the enemy's camp, and in a manner equally vigorous and successful. Pushing onward from Tanaro, he reached the higher position of Tanarello, and posted himself, after several conflicts, on the route from Nice to Turin, and, in conformity with the indications of Bona- parte, at a point in the rear of Saorgio. The effect of these daring movements, on this skilful plan, was as decisive and complete as that which attended the storming of Little Gibraltar at Toulon. The Sardinian army, its flank turned and its retreat endangered, evacuated, in haste, the camp of Fourches, and leaving behind numerous cannon and immense stores, retreated higher up into the Alps to a pass called the Col de Tende. So great were the alarm and precipitation that Saorgio, though strongly garrisoned and re- gularly fortified, surrendered to Masseua, after a show of resistance, on the 29th of April ; and the intrenched camp of Fourches, which had been so triumphantly defended 1 32 THE LIFE OF CHAP^V-^ the year before, was now resigned without resistance, and taken without an attack. On the 8th of May, Massena having re- freshed his troops by a few days of repose, passed the Col Ardente^ and moved upon the left and rear of the Sardinians in their new position in the Col de Tende; while Dumerbion, no longer apprehending a coun- teracting effort of the enemy, directed the division of Macquart againt their front. This combined attack succeeded, and general Dumerbion becoming, in consequence, mas- ter of the maritime Alps, extended his left into communication with the nearest post of the army of the Alps, which, in emulation of his success, had lately dislodged the Sar- dinians from Mont Cenis. Thus the army of Italy, which, after re- peated change of commanders, and frequent bloody actions, had been unable, in the space of two years, to advance a step beyond the valley of the Var, was empowered, by the bold and original combinations of Bona- parte's judgment, in a single month, to sur- mount and to hold the frowning barrier of the Alps, from the Col de Tende to the Appeninas, to rend asunder the tenacious THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 33 connection of the allied forces, to expel the From 1794 r 1 to 1795. Sardinians and Austrians from the moun- tains, and the English fleet from the coast, with inconsiderable loss, to take three thou- sand prisoners, an intrenched camp, three mountain fortresses, a numerous train of artillery, with large stores of provisions and ammunition; and, cutting off the enemy's communication with the sea, to transfer the danger of invasion from the frontiers of France to the Sardinian capital. (9) The court of Turin, no longer sup- ported by intercourse with the British fleet, was thrown into the greatest consternation upon finding that frontier of the kingdom, whose natural obstruction was its greatest strength, overpassed without difficulty or delay, by a powerful and active enemy. The king, in his alarm, ordered a levy, enmasse^ of his subjects. Nor could the cabinets of London and Vienna regard, without serious apprehension, a rapidity of conquest which was then unexampled in the French armies, and which, if not counteracted, seemed likely, by placing the Sardinian monarch at the mercy of the French Republic, to create an important alteration in the state of the war. 1 34 THE LIFE OF CH AP. IV, Such was the outhne, and so great were the effects oC this second stroke of Bona- parte's mihtary genius. Though his glory was again shaded by superior rank, though a secondary station still kept his name un- known to the annals of Europe, and his sub- sequent exploits soon outshone the lustre of his present deeds, this expedition in the Alps, in the boldness and rapidity of its movements, and in the exact correspondence between its result and its conception, must be admitted to bear impressions of the same originality and excellence which distinguish his greatest campaigns. It ought to be men- tioned, in justice to General Dumerbion, that so far from desiring to suppress the merit of his general of artillery, in his des- patch to the government describing his suc- cesses, he said, " It is to the talent of general Bonaparte that I am indebted for the skilful plans which have assured our victory." The positions of the army of Italy on the Alps, though safe and formidable, were at- tended by many disadvantages. The air and water of these snowy regions were both unwholesome^ and the routes so difficult that the posts were insulated and the sup- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON, 1 35 plies irregular. The men fell sick, the From 1794 . .to 1795. horses perished, the guns were left behind, and the cavalry dismounted; so that the strength of the army rapidly diminished, while its expense was greatly increased. On the other hand, the rich plains of Piedmont which reposed and refreshed the Sardinian army, tempted the French forward to plenty and conquest. The committee of public safety, emboldened by the success already gained, were impatient of delay, and directed that offensive operations should be inces- santly pursued. But as his adversary was now in connection with his fortresses and reenforcements, general Dumerbion, whose sickness probably damped his enterprise, did not think himself, reduced as he was in artillery and cavalry, in strength sufficient to invade Piedmont, and meet the enemy in the plain. He, therefore, endeavoured to procure the cooperation of the army of the -Alps, and for that purpose authorized the general of artillery to confer with general Dumas and his principal officers. Bona- parte, on this occasion, submitted a plan for invading Piedmont, by uniting the two 1 36 THE LIFE OF CHAP. IV. armies in the valley of the Stura, which was approved by the deputies Ricord and Ro- bespierre, and by the committee of pubhc safety, to whom it was transmitted. But a difference of opinion on the part of the deputies employed Avith the army of the Alps, which could not be reconciled, and an insufficiency of means, especially in regard to cavalry, which could not be provided for, retarded its execution until the events in the convention of the 9th Thermidor prevented it altogether. (10) In September, how- ever, the preparations of the Austrians and the English put an end to this state of irk- some inaction. An Austrian corps, under general CoUoredo, was assembled on the Bor- mida, which, by establishing magazines as high up as Dego, near the source of that river, indicated a movement towards the sea coast, and a design of reopening a com- munication between the Austro-Sardinian army and the British fleet. Corresponding with this demonstration, the English^ it appeared, were to effect a landing at Vado, a Genoese port, and uniting with the Aus- trians, take possession of Savona, and force THE EMPEROB NAPOLEON. 1 87 the republic of Genoa, straitened by sea and ^^^"jJql^'^ land, to abandon her gainful neutrahty, and declare war against France. In forming this project, the allied powers, who were now strengthened by the renewed accession of Prussia to the coalition, with an army of sixty-two thousand men, ( 1 1 ) pi'O- posed taking advantage of their own wrong. Having first violated, as we have seen, the neutrality of Genoa, they were making the lawful consequence of that outrage, a pretext for further encroachment and oppression upon the rights of that feeble state; thus unjustly continuing a course of injury which they themselves had wantonly commenced. To counteract this dangerous and lawless scheme, which, besides its military conse- quences, would have had the effect of cutting off all relief to thescarcitywhichstillprevailed in the South of France, Bonaparte advised general Dumerbion instantly to advance his right wing, take possession of the heights above Vado, and establish a communication across the mountains, between that point on the coast and the positions which the army already held on the sources of the Tanaro, by the way of St. Jacques and Montenotte. 1 38 THE LIFE OF CHAP. IV. He would thus be in a situation to counte- nance the friends of France in Genoa, to prevent any direct attempt of the alHes on that city, in case it should be meditated, would assure the neutrality of that republic, place the French in command of the entire coast from thefrontier of France to theneigh- bourhood of Genoa, protect tbe French com- merce, maintain the separation between the Austro-Sardlnian forces and the British fleet, and disconcert completely the projects of the alHes on this theatre of the war. ( 12 ) General Dumerbion and the deputies having considered and approved this sugges- tion, a column of eighteen thousand men, with twenty pieces of light artillery, was put in motion to execute it. This force, from the impregnable nature of the French posts on the great chain of the Alps, could be de- tached without danger. Bonaparte, who advised, directed the movement, although the commander in chief was present. He first penetrated through the pass or Col de Bardinetto^ into Montferrat^ along the road which borders the Bormida, and on the 5lh of October, having left the heights of Biestro, descended rapidly into the plain. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. iSq His intention was to get into the rear of Col- ^^^^^^^^ loredo's corps of Austrians, amounting to twelve thousand men. But by retreating upon Cairo, and thence upon the forti- fied town of Acqui, Colloredo prevented the full success of this attempt. Neverthe- less, the French vanguard, under general Cervoni, maintained so active a pursuit, that the Austrians, besides abandoning their magazines, sustained the loss of a thousand men. General Dumerbion was not in a condi- tion to prosecute his movement in this direc- tion, or in other words to invade Italy. Want of forage had compelled him to send his horses to the pastures on the Rhone; so that he had no cavalry, a force indispensable in the plain; and no heavy artillery, without which a country strong, populous and studded with fortresses, could with difficulty he deemed be conquered. Moreover the authority Avhich had been given by^the go- vernment for uniting the armies of the Alps and of Italy, at the suggestion of Bonaparte, in the valley of the Stura, had been revoked, not without expressions of suspicious displeasure. Declining to expose himself to the frowns l40 THE LIFE OF ^^i^' ^ of a ] ealous authority, and to the Austrian and Sardinian forces which had been united in the neighbourhood of Acqui, he withdrew to his positions on the head waters of the Tanaro, and completed the object of his expedition, by taking possession of Savona, and forti- fying the heights which command the town and harbour of Vado. Thus the French were placed in command of a still greater extent of the coast and of the impending mountains; and had their ad- vanced parties securely established within a forced march of Genoa. While the allies— their formidable projects both by sea and land completely frustrated, the English ex- pelled from the coast and their confederates driven beyond the mountains — appeased the mortification of their common defeat, by mutual suspicion and reciprocal censure. ( 1 3) This ill humour though not among the mili- tary effects, was a desirable consequence of the successes of the French, and might, it was hoped, loosen the ties of the coalition. So ended this active and victorious cam- paign of the army of Italy. The leisure of autumn and winter Bona- parte employed in completing the fortifi^ THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. l4l cations of Vado and Oneille, in inspecting From 179-4 the line of maritime forts from the Var to ' the Rhone, which were in the progress of construction under his superintendence, and in perfecting his acquaintance with that part of the grand chain of the maritime Alps, in which he had not been personally employed. So intent were his observations that in company with St. Hilaire, he passed a night in January on the top of a mountain near the Col de Tende ; whence at sunrise, in the gorgeous light of the eastern horizon, he descried the lovely plains of Italy, and the distant waters of the Po. So strong was his emotion that he was tempted to exclaim, ItaliamI Italiam! his ardent genius pro- phetic of future glories, and dazzled by the visions which itself inspired. But his time was not altogether engrossed by the toils of war or the rude grandeur of mountain prospects. Scenes less inclement and softer contests occasionally engaged him. Among the members of the convention in attendance on the army of Italy, was M. Thurreau— a gentleman whose personal insignificance in the deputation, was re- deemed by the wit and beauty of his wife. 1 42 THE LIFE OF CHAP. IV. This lady was not insensible to the merit, nor unkind to the devotion of the young ge- neral of artillery, who proud of his success, ventured to manifest his adoration, by order- ing for her amusement, as they walked out on the great theatre of the Alps, an attack of the advance posts stationed below them. The French party was victorious, but they lost some of their number, and as the affair could lead to no result, it was in every sense of the term a wanton sacrifice of brave men's lives. In his youth, his infatuation, and the compunction with which he re- membered and confessed this criminal folly, indulgent readers may find some excuse for it. The incident is worthy of being re- corded, because the faults of such a man are sacred to history, and because the intimacy out of which it sprung was the means pro- bably of saving his Hfe. (i4) Robespierre the younger, who with his colleague Ricord, had joined the army of Italy after the siege of Toulon, became a great admirer of Bonaparte's talents j and a steady advocate for the plans he recommended. The character of this deputy it appears, was very different from that of his infamous THE EMPEBOR NAPOLEON. 1 43 brother — he was capable of feehng and in- From 1794 . . . to 1795. spiring a virtuous friendship. (i5) Being recalled to Paris by the elder Robespierre a few days before the 9th Thermidor, he earnestly invited the general of artillery to accompany him, his instances proceeding probably, from a desire to promote Bona- parte's professional advancement. That the latter resisted, at this inactive period of the campaign, these imposing solicitations, and thereby escaped being sacrificed in the un- looked for catastrophe of Robespierre and his partisans, was OAving doubtless in no slight degree, to the force of his attachment for Madam Thurreau. Years had revolved ; the general of artillery filled the imperial throne, whilst the fair one whose attractions had pleased and preserved him, was become a poor and faded widow. After many petitions which failed to pass the barrier of indif- ference that environs power. Madam Thur- reau obtained by accident, an interview with the Emperor — ^'Why,'^ said the so- vereign kindly ^' have you not before made known your situation : many of our former acquaintances at Nice, are now personages 1 44 THE LIFE OF CHAP.^V. ^ Qf ii^Q court, and in constant intercourse with me. " The answer of the widow is yet another proof, that friendship is faithful only to prosperity.— "Alas, sire^ since my misfortunes, they have ceased to know me." He felt for her distress^ and if he remember- ed her former weakness, was certainly not the person to chastise it. Her wants were instantly relieved, and her future comfort liberally provided for. Before the downfal of Robespierre, while the army held its positions on the higher crest of the Alps, Bonaparte had been di- rected by secret instructions which bear the signature of Ricord, to visit Genoa, to notice the state of the fortifications of that city, to penetrate if possible the pohtical intentions of the republic with regard to the belhgerent powers, and more especially to observe the conduct of Tiily, the French charge d'af- faires, respecting whose fidelity or fitness, some doubts were entertained. Soon after the 9th Thermidor, Ricord being superseded, and Robespierre, the younger, guillotined, Albite, Salicetti, and Laporte, who had pre- viously been in attendance on the army of the Alps, succeeded them in superintending the THE EMPEROB NAPOLEON. 1 45 army of Italy. Heated by the passions of From 179^ the new government, and acting on its prin- ciples of distrust towards the agents of the defeated party, they interpreted this mission to Genoa into an act of secret correspondence with the enemy. The plan which Bona- parte had proposed, and which shortly be- fore his death the younger Robespierre had approved and transmitted to the govern- ment for their adoption, they affected to think a scheme for placing the army of France in the power of the enemy. About the same time they were informed by an anonymous letter from Genoa, that a mil- lion of francs had been sent from that city, to corrupt one of the French generals. As Bonaparte was the most conspicuous among these, and was known to have planned and conducted the successful operations of the campaign, they believed, or pretended to be- lieve, that he was a mercenary accomplice of Robespierre the younger and Ricord, in a scheme to betray the army into the power of the allies. Early in August accordingly, these deputies ordered the arrest of general Bona- parte, and the seizure and examination of his papers. Instead of finding evidence of his 10 l46 THE LIFE OF CHAP. IV. guilt, lliey found sueli strong proofs of his innocence, that in the course of a fortnight, he was released without trial. Junot his aide de camp who was faith- fully attached to him, had with other mihtary friends determined, rather than he should be transferred to the dreaded tribunals of Paris, to rescue him from con- finement by force and convey him beyond the French territory. (i6) In effecting this design they would have experienced little difficulty, inasmuch as general Dumerbion who knew and had confessed his merit, and the troops, who here, as they had done at Toulon, looked up to him as the real com- mander, were indignant at his arrest. Junot made known to him the project which had been formed in his favour; but he mildly rebuked his friendly zeal, interdicted every thing like forcible interference, observing calmly, that he would trust for safety to his innocence,andthatJunot'sinterferencemight commit him. (17J It appears nevertheless, that he wrote a letter of very bold remon- strance which, (Laporte having rejoined the army of the Alps,) he addressed to Albite and Salicetti. From the personal acquain- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. I 47 tance of the last two deputies, of Salicetti From 1794 more particularly, with his services at Tou- lon, he regarded Laporte as the real. author of his arrest. In the despatch of Albite and Salicetti to the government, mentioning the release of general Bonaparte from arrest, they not only admit that there existed no foundation for the charges which they had made against him, but they allege, that his talents were too great, and his services too important, to justify at so critical a period of the campaign, his longer suspension from duty. (18} The officer by whom he was re- leased, found him poring over a map of Italy. During the succeeding winter, in one of his visits of inspection to the fortifications along the coast, Maignier the representative of the people at Marseilles, expressed to him an apprehension that the popular societies of that city, which was then agitated by violent tumults, would attack and plunder the magazines of powder and arms, esta- blished in the dismantled forts of St. Nicholas and St. John. On the requisition of this representative, Bonaparte sketched a plan for protecting these magazines, by a wall with battlements, on the side next the town. 1^8 THE LIFE OF CH AP.jy.^ Xhis plan was sent to Paris, and denounced by the successors of Maignier, as a project for reconstructing those fortresses, in order to bridle and oppress the people: for it often happened in this season of political passion, that conduct which appeared laud- able to one deputy or at one moment, would be held culpable the next, by another deputy. The convention, counte- nancing the charge of their colleagues, di- rected by a special decree, the commander of the artillery at Marseilles to repair to Paris and justify himself at their bar. Bonaparte who was attached to the army of Italy, had re- turned to his post, and colonel Sugny, being actually the chief officer of artillery at Mar- seilles, was designated by the terms of the decree. Sugny accordingly repaired to Paris, and as the thirst for innocent blood was in some measure allayed since the overthrow of the reign of terror, satisfied the conven- tion, that he was not the author of the project in question. In the course of the investigation it was readily discovered that the plan had been furnished by Bonaparte ; and a decree was pronounced requiring his appearance before the convention, in place THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 49 of colonel Sugny. From the violence of the From 1794 reaction which the thermidoriens, in the ' tide of their ascendency, directed against all who were suspected in the remotest degree, of having been partisans of Robespierre, there was just ground to apprehend, that the convention would deal with severe in- justice toward a general, who after being recently arrested as an accomplice of the tyrant's brother, was again involved in an offensive charge. Fully comprehending the danger of his position^ Bonaparte was unwil- ling to encounter a prosecution, in which, it was probable, innocence would constitute but a feeble defence. He exerted himself there- fore to procure a repeal of the decree, and the enemy happening to make serious demon- strations at the time, he was successful. The deputies, upon whom rested great responsi- biUty, became alarmed, and wrote to the go- vernment, that the presence of general Bona- parte with the army was indispensable. By their exertion, the accusation which had been transmitted to the convention was withdrawn, and the decree revoked. (19) These were the principal dangers to which he was exposed from the fury of the revolu- ^5p THE 3LIFE OF CHAP. IV. tionary government. (20) In every situation through which he had passed, it appears, that whether the balanpe of l)is fortune in- dlned to depression or turned to advance- ment^ he was indebted to the force of merit alone, for safety or preferment. His proficiency as a studei^jt antedated his trans- fer from Brienne to Paris, His attainments there, accelerated his promptiou to a heute- nancy. The same causes produced his selec- tion for the command of the artillery at Toulon; where his services protected him from the rage of the terrorists at his fearless humanity ; as his commanding talent at Saorgio, shielded him from the blind reaction of the thermidoriens. And it may be ad- ded, that while the firmness of his principles exposed him to the umbrage of both parlies, neither was able to fix a stain qu his integrity. The English, under the guidance of the unfortunate Paoli, having succeeded in sub- duing Corsica, and establishing a govern- ment in that island, and the Holy See having perpetrated a variety of insults, besides per- mitting the murder of Basseville, the French minister at Rome, the committee of public safety, actuated by just indignation, pre- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. l5l pared, in the early part of the year i -ygS, for From 4T94 to ITQS* Spending an expedition to Corsica, and then for making an unexpected attack upon Rome. With the ships of Avar Avhich had been re- scued from the Enghsh at Toulon, they composed a squadron of sixteen sail of the line, to which were attached a hundred trans- ports, having on board ten thousand select troops. This fleet, commanded by Admiral Martin, was lying in Toulon, while a British squadron of equal force cruised off the har- bour. The French government, after some fluctuation between the two objects, finally determined to direct their first effort against Rome, and a member of the convention, Letourneur, was sent down to Toulon in- vested with extraordinary powers, and Avith authority to equip the expedition, and con- duct it, without delay, to the capital of the Catholic world. This deputy, upon his ar- rival, held a council of war, which he ac- quainted with the intentions of the govern- ment, and consulted upon the best mode of executing them. General Bonaparte, whose reputation for patriotism seemed to have been corroborated by repeated and abor- tive accusation, had been selected to com- mand the artillery of the armament, and 1 52 THE LIFE OF CHAP. IV. in this capacity had arrived at Toulon and was summoned to the council. His opinion was adverse to the expedition, and to the wishes of the deputy Letour- neur. He argued that the squadron would probably be worsted, and the trans- ports taken, if attacked by the unincumbered English fleet, and insisted that the expedi- tion could not be safely attempted, unless the French were masters of the Mediter- ranean. He, moreover, affirmed, that it would be sacrificing ten thousand troops to land them in the neighbourhood of Rome without cavalry and without artillery horses, to convey which an augmentation of the con- voy, of the delay, and the risk, wouldbe neces- sary. His arguments were the less palatable to the deputy, as they were perfectly con- vincing to the other members of the council. In pursuance of his advice. Admiral Martin leaving the transports in the harbour, sailed on the I St of March with the deputy on board, for the purpose of engaging the Enghsh fleet, and gaining the mastery of the Mediterranean. The hostile squadrons came in sight off Leghorn, when Letourneur thought it prudent to retreat, and the Eng- lish admiral to chace. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. I 53 Admiral Martin, after capturing a single From 1794 ship, the Berwick, on going to sea, and losing two, the Ca Ira and the Censeurin retreat- ing, took shelter under the lies d'Hjeres. (21) Any doubts which the deputy might have felt respecting the opinions of the general of artillery, seem to have been re- moved by the experimental terrors of his voyage. The ill judged expedition against Rome was abandoned, and the ten thousand troops marched back to the camp near Nice. The party which had triumphed in the convention on the 9th Thermidor had not yet obtained predominance in the cities of the south. In Marseilles and Toulon the im- pulse of that movement had been felt violent- ly, but the Jacobin leaders, animated and abetted by the existing resentment at the treasonable proceedings of the opposite party in 1793, had been able still to maintain a control over the passions of the populace. At Toulon, the thermidorean deputies, Mariette and Cambon, were extremely ob- noxious to Jacobin hatred, and were accused in their societies of being disposed to lead back the revolution to legitimacy. In this stateof things a French privateer had brought in a Spanish prize, on board of which were 1 54 TWE LIFE OF CHAP. jv. twenty French emigrants, consisting, for the greater part, of the family of Chabril- lant. They were conveyed to the jail pf the town, and there confined. In the cou^sje of the succeeding tumults, a crowd collected at the arsenal, and rushed to the jail for thj? purpose of murdering its unhappy tenants. The deputies interposed, harangued the po- pulace, exhorted their leaders to desist from violence, and promised to have these unfor- tunate emigrants brought to trial in twenty-: four hours. But being themselves already sus- pected, instead of allaying the tumult, their exertions only served to inflame it. It was late in the eveningj they were lighting the lamps, and a voice answered the harangue of thedeputies by shouting, /e^ ushangupto the lanterns these protectors of emigrants. At this dreaded signal the outcry became more furious, and ''deep calling unto deep," the disturbance more extended and stormy. The miUtary guard being summoned, ap- droached, and was instantly repulsed. Bo- naparte, who was present, recognized, among the leaders of the mob, several can- noniers who had served under him at the siege of Toulon, and calling out to them, at this awful moment, mounted a pile of THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 55 timber. The cannoniers caused their general From 1794 to 1795. to be respected, and his voice to be heard. He calmed the infuriated crowd in the arsenal, and the deputies were permitted to with- draw in safety. In the streets, however, the uproar continued with fearful violence, and the prison guard were upon the point of being overpowered by the mob. Thither Bonaparte hastened, and there his inter- ference was again successful. The populace soothed and controlled by his address and manner, retired, and in the night he had the unhappy emigrants con- cealed in ammunition waggons, conveyed out of the town and safely embarked in the road of Hjeres. Thus bold and ac- tive was he in the cause of humanity, at a time when mercy seemed banished from France. (22) About the end of March general Bonaparte rejoined the army of Italy in the maritime Alps. It was soon afterwards incorporated with the army of the Alps, and the command of the united force given to general Keller- man, This arrangement was accompanied by a new classification of general officers, which restored to active service, those among 1 56 THE LIFE OF ^HAP^iV. them, who^ in consequence of personal im- becility orpolitical disaffection, had estranged themselves from the cause of their country from the moment of the overthrow of the monarchy, in the year 1792. Its effect was to exclude from employment a number of generals of artillery, and, in its application to Bonaparte, who was the youngest on the list, to place him in the infantry. His com- mand of the artillery in Kellerman's army being thus annulled^ he set out for the seat of government, with a view of applying for other and suitable employment. On his route he visited his mother at Marseilles, to whose heart his safety from danger, and his rising fame, must have communicated the tenderest pleasure. He found too his bro- ther Joseph happily married, and the com- forts of the family, which had been seriously impaired by the cruelty of Paoli, in a great measure renovated by his mother's pru- dence. At Marseilles he met general Kel- lerman, on his way to Nice, and communi- cated to him much information respecting the theatre of war, on which the hero of Valmy Avas not destined to gain lau- rels. Then adopting his brother Louis, THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON, 1 57 whose education he had particularly super- From 1794 to 1795, intended, as an extra aide de camp, he pro- ceeded on his way to Paris. At Chatillon- sur- Seine he met inteUigence of the insurrec- tion of the ist of Prairial, in which the Jaco- bins were, after temporary and terrible suc- cess, again overcome. The father of his aide de camp, Marmont, resided at Chatillon ; and to gratify this officer at whose instance he had taken Chatillon in his route, as well as to wait the return of public order in the capital, having been sufficiently disgusted with popular tumults, he remained there se- veral days. The father of Marmont, a knight of St. Louis, was a rich proprietor of iron works in Burgundy. His son who felt a strong inclination for a military life, after faihng to obtain entrance into the royal artil- lery, had been contented to join a provin- cial regiment. He was recommended to the friendship and protection of Bonaparte by an uncle who was a schoolfellow of the latter atBrienne, and his comrade and friend in the regiment of La Fere. A royalist, this uncle forsook his country to follow the emi- grant princes, and bespoke of Bonaparte that care of his nephew, which he himself could no 1 58 THE LIFE OF CHAP. IV. longer bestow on him. It is needles to say that this confidence of the exile was not mis- placed. Marmont's father, though avari- cious, was profuse and extravagant in enter- taining the hero of Toulon and Saorgio, and the liberal patron of his son. Though the weather was warm, his hearths blazed with fires, so that his hospitality amused more than it comforted his guest. (28 ) Upon arriving in Paris, Bonaparte pre- sented himself at the war office. In the changes which had followed the revolution of parties of the 9th of Thermidor, and had suc- ceeded more recent convulsions, Aubry, an an- cient captain of artillery, who as an indifferent patriot, and a spiritless officer, had been, though not an emigrant, aloof from service throughout the war, was elected to the con- vention, chosen a member of the committee of public safety, and entrusted with the ma- nagement of military affairs. To this mi- nister, who was moreover a secret enemy of the revolution, (2 4) the character and services of Bonaparte could not fail to present an un- pleasant contrast with his own. According- ly when in applying for active employment, Bonaparte represented that he had com- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEOIN. iSq mandecl the artillery at the siege of Toulon; From 1794 had superintended the work of fortifying the coast and harbours of Provence ; had ever since commanded the artillery of the army of Italy ; and added that it would be extremely painful for him to leave a corps in which he had served from his very infancy, Aubry coldly observed, that there were a great many artillery generals, that Bonaparte w^as the youngest of the number, and could not be employed out of turn. As Aubry had not been on duty during the war, and nevertheless had the effrontery to promote himself from a retired captaincy to the rank of general of division, and inspector of artil- lery, this observation was received and re- torted as unjust and impertinent. " Officers soon grow old on the field of battle," was the mixture of irony and logic, with which Bo- naparte abashed and irritated the inexpe- rienced veteran, A few days afterwards^ more in punishment than reward, he was ordered to join the army of the west engaged m the Vendean war, and take command of a brigade of infantry. (25) The service was unpleasant to his feelings, the destination an outrage to his pride, and actuated by a l6o THE LIFE OF CHAP. IV. proper feeling of dignity, he sent in his re- signation. This was not accepted, nor was it at once refused. In the meantime Aubry's selfish and reacting system, by which a number of officers, who like himself had been out of danger and service from the beginning of the war, were put in the place of those who had been constantly in the field, excited violent dissatisfaction and provoked a num- ber of remonstrances. Of the persons thus displaced not a few were officers of science and merit, while many like those who attended general Cartaux at Toulon, were the mushrooms of popular clubs, noisy, imbecile, and ignorant. They all however, by referring to Bonaparte's case, as the most glaring example of their common oppression, furnished the best evidence of his undisputed superiority. Unwilling to lose such an offi- cer, the committee of public safety corrected very soon the procedure of Aubry, so far as to restore general Bonaparte to the corps of which he was the acknowledged ornament, though not to the army in which he wished again to serve. The order to command the brigade of infantry was revoked, and he was nominated to command the artillery of the THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. l6l armyof the west; a destination, which though From 1794 notagreable was not degrading. But from this crisis of displeasure and embarrassment, he was extricated by causes which had often reUevedhim before; the pubhc danger, and his professional excellence. General Rellerman, whose abilities were not so high as his reputation, had been driven on the 27 th June from the positions in which Bonaparte had placed the right of Burner- bion's army; and had written to the com- mittee of public safety that if he was not speedily reenforced, he should be compelled even to abandon Nice. This intelligence excited great alarm, as Rellerman's defeat opened that vulnerable frontier again to in- vasion. The committee of public safety convoked and consulted such of the members of the convention, as had been on mission to the army of Italy, who instead of presenting any opinions of their own, with a unani- mity like that of the dissatisfied officers, con- curred in referring the committee to general Bonaparte, as the individual most capable of affording them information and giving them advice, in this unwelcome emergency. He was immediately ordered to attend the n 1 62 THE LIFE OF CHAP. IV. committee of wbicli Sieyes^ Ponte-Coulanl, lean -de-Brie, and liis former acquaintance Letonrneur, Avere members; after several conferences with w^liom, he drew up instruc- tions for Kellerman which the committee adopted. They are preserved in his me- moirs, and shew, his perfect comprehension of the ground on which Kellerman had been beaten, of the means by which that disaster might have been avoided; the position which it was now advisable to take, and those to be taken in case of farther retreat, as well as the total incapacity of the hero ofValmy to act uppn the exact and extended combinations which had led to the successes of the previous campaign. (26J When received at the head quarters of Kellerman, the military skill which they displayed excited surprise; but the officers who had served with Bonaparte, soon recognized the hand of their author. Under these instruciioir, on the 'yth of July, Kellerman took up the line of Borghetto, his right touching the sea at an eminence which commanded the plain and port of Loano; his left on a steej) and insulated rock, upon which Massena had erected a strong for- tification. This line the Austrian general THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 63 attacked several times, but not with much ^l^^Jr!^^ ' to 1795. vigour, as he had no hopes of success. The committee of pubUc safety were so well sa- tisfied with the first fruits of Bonaparte's la- bours in the war office, that they revoked the order appointing him to command the artillery of the army of the west, (27) and by a special decree, attached him until fur- ther orders to the department of war, with his rank of general of artillery, and charged him with the special duty of directing the active operations of the forces. This station which he held until October, was important and pleasing, as it ascertained his proper rank, gave scope to the exercise of his talents, and enabled him though he could not com- mand the army of Italy in person, to guide its movements and light its way to success. In November, general Scherer, who super- seded Rellerman, attacked and worsted the Austrians, cut off their communication with the British fleet, reestablished his own with Genoa, and retrieved that command of the coast and of the Alps, which the skill and enterprise of Bonaparte had gained, and the incompetence of Kellerman had lost. It has been asserted, and with some pro- l64 THE LIFE OF CHAP. IV. bability, that in the interval of eight days, which elapsed between his conference with Aubry and his restoration to suitable employ- ment, Bonaparte conceived for a moment the design of obtaining authority from the go- vernment to offer his services as general of artillery, to the Grand Seignior, who was at that time disposed to enter into the Euro- ropean war as an ally of France (28). It was natural that his imagination, all passionate for glory, when forbid the heroic fields of Italy, should spread its classical wings, for the shores of the Hellespont. And the idea once implanted in a mind so rich and ar- dent, might well shoot forth into a luxuriance of brilliant details and illustrious fortune. The likehhood that he did conceive and en- tertain this spirited project, is strengthened by the fervid activity of his intellect and ha- bits. For, as the youthful reader will do well to observe, from his entrance at the school of Brienne, in 1779, to the moment which our narrative has now reached, comprehend- ing the entire season of boyish folly and ju- venile effervescence, his exertion of mind and body appears to have been strenuous, voluntary, and unintermitting. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 65 Against all probability, it has been pre- tended, that during his residence in Paris on this occasion, he languished in professional destitution and personal poverty ; a friend- less object of casual pity and uncertain as- sistance. As his resignation was not ac- cepted, he was never deprived of his com- mission; and his pay as a general ofScer, independently of other resources, renders it certain, that he could not have been exposed to greater inconveniences of this sort, than such as were common to men of his rank. To suppose that in a season of general scarcity, and under the pressure of a deprc ciated currency, he was exempt from ordi- nary discomforts, would be to form an hy- pothesis, at variance with his admitted supe- riority to all mercenary considerations. In the French revolution, as in the American, few that were honest were rich. But from Bonaparte's prudent habits and simple tastes, incessant application to duty, and long absence from the capital, it may be safely inferred that in this crisis of na- tional difficulty, he was subjected personally to but slight annoyance. (29) For, although it appears that he sold his carriage and a set From 179-4 to1T95. 1 66 THE LIFE OF CHAP. IV. of books soon after his arrival in the metro- polis, il is certain that, about the same time, he placed his brother, Louis, at a provincial military school, and at his own expense main- tained him there. His lime was chiefly devoted to official duty and professional studies ; his hours of recreation, to the society of his early friends, and the entertainments of the theatre. Pri- vate circles felt the energy of his language; public men^ the scrutiny of his look. His conversation was remarked as picturesque and original. His demeanour, which was generally sedate, sometimes indicated intense meditation. For he looked into himself, and lingered to contemplate the glorious in- spirations of his genius; as a beauty gazes with secret pride, on the reflection of those charms, which are to delight, she feels, and to subdue mankind. ( ^67 } CHAPTER V. FromOctoher 1795, to March 1796. The convention adopt tlie constitution of the year III — From 1 795 Its principal provisions — Likely to be acceptaffete to to 1796. the nation — The additional acts engrafted on it ex- cite dissatisfaction — Wisdom of those acts — G6m- bined opposition of the royalists and jacobins — The people of Paris stirred up to opposition — They vote for accepting the constitution and for rejecting the acts< — A majority of the nation and the armies give their suffrages for both — Resistance and insur- rection of' the section of Paris — Violence of the section Lepelletier — Measures of the convention- — General Menou commander in chief of the army of the interior — He attempts to disperse an armed body of insurgents — Hesitates and fails — Danger of the crisis — Bonaparte an accidental w^itness of Menou's miscarriage- — Repairs to the gallery of the convene tion. — Agitation of that assembly — -His conference with the executive committee- — Protests against being fettered by commissaries of the convention — Is ap- pointed by the committee to command the troops — Barras made nominal commander in chief — Bona- parte's prompt and judicious measures — Gets pos- 1 68 THE LIFE OF CHAP. V. session of llie cannon and occupies llie bridges — Danican, commander in cliief of llie insurgents, summons llie convention lo dismiss llieir troops- — Bonaparte furnishes tlie members with arms — Move- ment of ibe insurgent leader Lafonde, upon Pont Neuf — Cartaux abandons lliatpost, and falls back to the Louvre — The insurgents close in and fire upon ihe Tuileries — Bonaparte orders his troops to act — Spirit and success of his operations — Courage and repulse of Lafonde — The insurgents defeated on all points — Humanity of Bonaparte — The insurrection quelled- — Exultation of the convention — Meanness of Barras — The appointment of Bonaparte, as com- mander of the army of the interior, confirmed by the convention — Their moderation — Trial and danger of Menou^ — Saved by the influence of Bona- parte — Bonaparte disarms the national guard, and executes other unw^elcome but salutary measures — Scarcity in Paris — Discontent of the populace — • Anecdote — Becomposes the legislative guard for the new^ government — Organises a legion of police, and a guard for the directory — Becomes acquainted vv^ith Madam Beauharnais and her son — Interesting inter- vievs^ — The Italian frontier again in danger— Bona- parte consulted by the directory — Furnishes a plan of campaign— Appointed commander in chief of the army of Italy — Marries Madam Beauharnais — State of his fortune and his probable reflections — Leaves Paris and takes command of his army. ^ In the summer of 1795, while general Bonaparte was employed in the war depart- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 169 nient at Paris, the convenlion discussed and From 1795 1 • • PI TTT ^^ 1796. adopted the constitution of the year 111. By this plan of government, which was a manifest improvement on the one it was in- tended to supersede, the executive power of France, under certain hraitations, was lodged in a directory of five members ; the judicial power in a body of elective magis- trates, whose sentences, in criminal cases, were to be founded on the verdicts of juries ; and the legislative power, in two houses^ the upper, or council of ancients, consisting of two hundred and fifty members, and the lower^ consisting of twice that number and called the council of five hundred. The legislative bodies were to appoint the mem- bers of the directory, and to reappoint one out of the five every year, and were them- selves to be chosen by electors delegated for that purpose by the people in their primary assemblies. One-third of each council was to be elected annually, so that the entire legislature was to be triennially renewed by the popular will, and the entire directory quinquennially, by the will of the legisla- ture. There was not only a proper separation of the great branches of power in the state^ 170 THE LIFE OF CHAP. V. andan approved subdivision of the legislative branch, but an approximation to unity in the executive, and to independence irl the judicial departments. The advantage of a single executive magistrate, like the presi- dent of the United States, AV^as not over- looked in the dehberations of the cotiventibil^ but a long line of paternal princes had created such a natural horror of monarchical p(3Wier, that a nearer approach to unity than five, had it been proposed by the convention, would have been repelled by their constituents, ffj Although^ in this form of government, there was much to recommend it to the nation, it was modified by two supplement- ary decrees or additional acts, which, after animated debate, the convention thought fit to adopt, and which exposed their work and themselves to mischievous misrepresentation and violent resistance. By these decrees, the one engrafted as an unavoidable sanction (2) on the other, and both made inseparable parts of the consti- tution, the delegated choice of the people was to be so restricted, on the first occasion, as to compose two thirds of the new legisla- ture of members of the existing convention. to 1796. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. I^I (3) So that, by this constitution, five him- From 1T95 dred members of the assembly which framed it, were to enter, by privilege, into the com- position of the legislature which it ])roposed to create, while two hundred and fifty mem- bers only were to be drawn, by right of elec- tion^ from the nation at large. Whatever might be the motives of pru- dence, or prospects of advantage by which this arrangement was dictated, it could scarcely be expected to escape exceptions, even from a constituency united in political concord. The people, it was true, in their primary assemblies, might rejecl: both the constitution and the additional acts incor- porated with it. But the necessity of a bet- ter organized government than the rule of a popular assembly^ in which all the authority of the state^ in spite of theory and expe- rience, was accumulated, was generally felt and acknowledged. In this state of things, when the heaving of recent convulsions, and the pressure of foreign war, rendered hesita- tion in domestic councils critically dangerous, to submit to the nation a form of govern- ment, which, desirable in itself, was clogged with offensive conditions, was a proceeding l'J2 THE LIFE OF CHAP. V. tending to place the prejudices of the people directly in the way of their judgment. But a faithful physician offers to the lips of his patient the salutary draught, although it may disgust his taste and nauseate his stomach. This natural irritation of public feeling it was the business of the existing parties to increase. The jacobins were smarting un- der the severity of the thermidoriens^ while the royalists had profited by their indulgence. These were grown bold, those desperate. Both parties saw, in the tranquil vigour of public affairs, likely to follow the adoption of the new constitution, the defeat of their hopes and projects. Thus, while their opinions differed, their interests coincided and their passions combined, and they rea- dily cooperated in reprobating the additional acts, and opposing the adoption of the con- stitution, as well as in exciting resistance to it after it was accepted and proclaimed. The jacobins adhering to their theories, and the royalists speculating on the accidents of domestic confusion and foreign aid, insisted, with equal violence, on leaving with the people the unlimited choice of their repre- sentatives, and denounced the supplementary THE EMPEROK NAPOLEON. 1 73 decrees as acts of gross usurpation, of self- From 1795 . J • -1 1- • • T) to 1796. created privilege, and incipient tyranny. But the motives of these parlies were as foul as their professions were fair; while the con- duct of the convention, though to appear- ance selfish and absurd, was really founded on considerations of foresight and caution, which prudent and patriotic men could not well disregard. (4) In 1 791, the constituent assembly, acting upon a principle of disinterestedness, in which there was more of prudery than wis- dom, had decreed the exclusion of its own members from the legislative assembly. By this respectable but inconsiderate delicacy, the newrepublic was deprived of the services of her most enlightened and experienced statesmen, at a season when she most needed them ; when howling factions were to be chained down with one hand, and rapacious kings to be held off with the other. To this error of the constituent assembly, many of the military miscarriages, financial blunders, and pohtical crimes which ensued, were generally and justly attributed. Without, therefore, a downright defiance of expe- rience, and a violent sacrifice of the public 1^4 THE LIFE OF p CHAP. V. good to popular humour and personal re- putation, the members of the convention, it is plain, could not have repeated a measure, which, in the moment of transition from one form of government to another, was not likely to be less mischievous in its second trial than it had proved to be in its first. They deter- mined to serve their countrymen faithfully at the risk of offending them ; not only to avoid the indiscretion of their predecessors, but to profit by their example ; and, instead of debarring the men who were already in power from participation in the new government, to render their exclusion, for a limited time, impracticable. The wisdom of this determination, had it not been sanctioned by recent experience, and by regard to the newness of the French people in the duties of self-government, was demonstrated by its eifects on the two fac- tions, to the hostility of which the real friends of the republic were exposed. The royalist and jacobin leaders were sorely disappointed to find they would still have to contend against the resolute, experienced, and incorruptible men, who had abolished monarchy, overthrown Robespierre, could THE EMPEROB NAPOLEON. l']5 neither be bribed nor terrified, and in the From 1795 midst of civil discord had kept more than half the European world at bay. In the agitation of a general election, in the disaffection of untried men, or in the folly of inexperienced counsellors, both parties hoped for the de- struction of liberty ; one sighing for the despotism of clubs and demagogues, the other for the rule of concubines and kings. Although the operation of the additional acts was expressly limited, and with decreasing force, to the two first years of the proposed government, it was not the less objectionable to these parties. For it was precisely in this early stage of its existence that they hoped, the royalists with the help of foreign gold, the jacobins by the effect of declamation and turbulence, to introduce into the two coun- cils a majority of members opposed to the new government. The opposition, thus compounded, was felt, more or less, in various parts of France, but in Paris it became overwhelming; so that the timid^ the imitative, and the idle of the capital, followed in its train and swelled its numbers. The convention, how- ever, maintained a firm tonej submitted 1^6 THE LIFE OF CHAP. V. their work fairly to the judgment of their countrymen, and waited the decision with becoming confidence. In Paris, the focus of the factions, as well as the centre of the government, the result was^ of course, to be first known, both to the convention and its leading adversaries. Orations in the halls, essays in the journals^ the arts of intrigue, and the force of inti- midation, were all employed by designing or intemperate malcontents, to embolden and augment the opposition. At first, their ef- forts were more successful than they de- served to be. Of the forty-eight sections into which the population of the metropolis was divided, forty-seven voted for accepting the constitution, but rejecting the decrees. This decision was pronounced at the expense of the most scandalous injustice and violence. In some sections the friends of the conven- tion were turned away by force from the polls, and in others they were deterred by threats from approaching them. However, the ill got triumph was short lived. The returns from the departments exhibited a great majority for the constitution and the decrees ; the returns from the armies on the THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 77 frontiers an enthusiastic unanimity. Havin^j From 1795 to 1 796. been formed by the requisition of 1793, or by subsequent conscriptions, the armies were composed of the soundest part of the population. Their camps^ or their bat- tle plains, reechoed their acclamations in favour of the constitution and additional acts. The army of Jourdan, the victors of Fleurus, sent to the convention from beyond thcRhine^ sixty thousand suffrages in favour of the new^ government. In some of the departments strong mi- norities voted for rejecting the decrees, while here and there, individuals proposed a king instead of the directory. These ex- ceptions to the general and decided appro- bation of the country were fortunate for the convention, as they manifested the perfect freedom with which public opinion had been expressed. The votes having been all re- ceived, the result, importing that the consti- tution and the additional acts had been ratified by the people, was proclaimed by the government on the 23d of September, and the constitution with the acts was declared the fundamental law of the state. The convention, acting with a prudent des- 12 I "7 8 THE LIFE OF ^^HAP^^^ patch, next decreed that the people, in their primary assemblies, should nominate their electors by the 2nd of October, that these should complete the election of members of the two councils on or before the 21st, and * that the legislature, under the new con- stitution, should assemble on the 6th of No- vember. (5) The factious leaders of Paris questioned the accuracy of the returns, and demanded of the government a formal inspection of the registers. These were submitted to them, and, tp their chagrin^, were found faithful and exact. In this situation of af- fairs, their only expedient was seditious vio- lence, and their final resource a general in- surrection of the capital^ in hopes of destroy- ing the actual government before the pro- posed one could get into operation. The section Lepelletier was particularly active and violent. At their instance a num- ber of the electors appointed by the people of Paris, in conformity with the new consti- tution, instead of waiting until the time pre- scribed by the decree of the convention for exercising iheir functions, met at the theatre of the Odeon on the 2nd of October, under THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 79 the ])rotection of several battalions of the From 1795 »• 1 1 rri 1- 1 to 1796. national guard. ine police attempted to disperse them, but were themselves easily and shamefully driven away. An armed force, under general Menou, was then em- ployed, but it did not arrive until after night, when the crowd had separated, and the assembly retired. In the course of the night and the next morning, the government delivered arms to the few well-affected citizens of all parties who volunteered their services, and placing them under the command of general Ber- ruyer, attached them to general Menou's regular force, During the same time, the section Lepelletier,in conjunctionwith seven others, declared itself to be in a state of re- bellion, and took instant measures for rous- ing the whole city to arms. Its leaders des- patched emissaries, and sounded the tocsin throughout Paris ; and the people, inflamed and deluded, seized their arms^ and has- tened to the places of rendezvous. The convention, upon this, decreed their session to be permanent, and charged their appropriate committees with the main- tenance of public order. The executive l80 THE LIFE OF CHAP. V. committee, composed of the committees of public safety and general security, then proceeded to direct that the section Le- pelletier should be instantly disarmed by military force. About eight o'clock in the evening of the 3d, general Menou, who commanded the army of the interior, accom- panied by the three representatives of the peo- ple who were in attendance as commissaries of the convention, proceeded, at the head of a strong force, with a detachment of cavalry and two pieces of cannon, to carry this order into execution. The force of the section was drawn up in the court of the convent cles Filles St. Thomas j at the head of the street Vivienne, where the Exchange is now situated. Their parties occupied the win- dows of the street, and the interior of the convent. Menou entering this street from that of St. Honore, marched towards them, and got his troops wedged into this long and narrow space, where neither his horse nor his infantry could act to advantage. Afraid to advance^ and ashamed to retire, the ge- neral and the deputies resorted to words. They summoned the insurgents to obey the order of the government, to deliver up their THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. l8l arms, and retire to their homes. But they FromlT95 to 1796. gained as Httle by parley as by force; for '^^ Delalot, the leader of the rebels, not only refused obedience to the summons, but de- livered an inflammatory harangue to the troops, in which he boldly declared, that force alone should deprive the citizens of Paris of their arms. Instead of ordering a charge, Menou and his council of deputies, w^ere glad to enter into a compromise, by which the insurgents agreed to disperse themselves, if Menou would first withdraw his troops. This capitulation enabled the regular troops to retreat, and the insurgents to maintain their ground, continue their vio- lence, defy the government, and proclaim their triumph. Fortunately for the convention, the taste of Bonaparte for dramatic entertainments had led him that evening to the theatre Feydeau, which is close by the head of the street Vivienne. Informed of the threaten ed conflict, he left the theatre for the purpose of observing this more important scene. He witnessed the unfortunate check of the go- vernment force, and, by a natural movement of concern and curiosity, hastened to the 1 82 THE LIFE OF CHAP. t. gallery of llic convention to see Avhat would be done to repair it. He found that assem- bly in the greatest agitation; the commis- saries, who had accompanied Menou, in order to shift the blame from their own shoulders, were accusing the absent general of treason. On their representation, Me- nou's arrest was decreed; and, of conse- quence, a successor was to be appointed. The danger was great; and the intelligence of every moment proved that it was increas- ing. Various members proposed different commanders, some Barras, some Bonaparte; the leading thermidoriens the former, be- cause of his activity in the defeat of Robes- pierre ; the commissaries of the army of Italy, and the members of the committee who were in daily intercourse with him, the latter^ because of his military talents, and energetic, but moderate character. (6) At- tending in the gallery, he heard these sug- gestions, deliberated whether he should ac- cept a service, which, from Menou's fate, was not in viting,might prove more distasteful than the war of Vendee or the mobs of Tou- lon, might bathe him deep in civil blood, and blight for ever his hopes of serving his V THE EIMPEROTl NAPOLEON. 1 83 country. But, reflecting, that if the in- Froni iT95 IT- . 1 to 1796. snrgents succeeded in overturning the go- vernment, the proposed im[)rovenient in the constitution of the cjuntry would fail to be effected, and the royahst, or foi'eign party, woidd gain the ascendancy, and surrender France to the coalition, he resolved, if he could, to defend the convention. (7) Having come to this decision Bonaparte repaired to the executive committee^ told them he had been a w^itness of the affair in the street Vivienne, and that the deprtrties w^ere more to blame than Menou was ; assur- ing them it Avould be impossible for him, should he be appointed to command the troops, to execute their orders on this critical occasion, with his hands tied by a coinmission of deputies. The members of the committee, struck by his confidence, were convinced by his representation ; but it was not in their power, without exciting a debate, for the issue of which there was not lime, to procure a decree of the convention innovating their long established custom so completely, as to send forth a general in chief unattended by a deputation of their own body. In this exigency they devised an expedient, which, while it conformed to 1 84 THE LIFE OF CHAP, V. their rule, obviated its inconvenience. They resolved to nominate their colleague Barras as general in chief of the army of the interior, and to appoint Bonaparte second in com- mand; so that while Barras was to have the attendance of the deputies, Bonaparte was to take the direction of the troops. This being agreed upon, Merhn de Douai, an active member of the committee, at half- past four in the morning, reported the project of a decree appointing Barras, pro- visionally, commander in chief of the army of the interior, and the deputies Delmas, Goupilleau de Fontenay and Laporte com- missaries to aitend him. Bonaparte who was immediately appointed by the committee second in command^ had in consequence of this arrangement previously entered on his duties. It will be readily conceived as he had controlled the warlike veteran Dugom- mier, when he was only lieutenant colonel, and had, as fifth in command, actually conducted an important campaign, that Barras though nominally his superior offi- cer, was really nothing more than his aide de camp. (8) His actual independence in command, on this occasion, becomes still more evident, when we reflect, that THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 85 having lust refused lo subiect himself to the From 1795 ^/, . •' to 1T96. supervision of the deputies, he would natu- rally have rejected the authority of Barras as an additional incumbrance. Having undertaken this service with de- hberation, he proceeded to perform it with- out delay. From Menou^ who was detained in an adjoining apartment of the Tuileries, he procured information respecting the force upon which he was to rely. This consisted of five thousand troops. The artillery, com- posed of forty pieces, was at the camp of Sablons guarded only by twenty-five men. With promptness, quickened probably by his familiarity with this instrument of war, he despatched Murat, then a lieutenant col- nel of cavalry, with three hundred horse, to secure these guns and convey them in- stantly to Paris. The insurgents^ not inattentive to this object, had sent a bat- talion of national guards to seize the ar- tillery. But the distance being considerable, Murat arrived first, and the insurgent party not daring to face his horse, by five o'clock in the morning this active officer had the cannon safe at the Tuileries. The insurrection was now too deeply rooted and too widely spread, to be sup- 1 86 THE LIFE OF CHAP. V. ^ press^ed by effecting the measure which Me- noil had attempted. The section Lepelletier was in concert with nearly all the other sections, and the insurgents were capable of collecting a force of forty thousand national guards. A plan of operations was to be adopted suited to this new state of things ; and this Bonaparte determined to make a defensive one, of which the safety and inde- pendence of the convention, the paUadium of his party, was to be the main object. His measures accordingly were taken to repel any attacks that might be made on the Tuile- ries, to collect a supply of provisions and ani- munition ; to protect and encourage as far as possible the Avell-affected part of the po- pulation, and to keep open a line of retreat to the country, should that be necessary, in order to obtain support from the depart- ments and the armies. For this purpose, he seized the bridges over the Seine and de- fended them with cannon; and occupied in a similar way the issues leading to theTuile- ries and the river from the street St. Ho- nore, which is long and parallel to the Seine. Thus on one side he Avas defended by a long range of houses, on the other by the river. The place J eridome^Sind ihe place de la TUE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 87 Concorde, he also occupied with infantry ^^^^JZ^^ ' i "^ to 1796. and artillery, placing his reserves to which all his cavalry was attached, in the place du Carrousel and the garden of the Tuileries. He sent a detachment to hold the heights of Meudon, as a point to retreat npon, and another to guard the road from St. Ger- main, so as to intercept any cannon that might be sent from that place to the insur- gents. He ordered all the ammunition and provisions that could be collected, to be brought to the Tuileries, and sent a snpply of small arms to the section Quinze Vingts, the only one which had voted for accepting the decrees. It is only necessary to examine a map of Paris, in order to be satisfied of the advan- tage of occupying these positions. As long as they w^ere held, the convention^ inacces- sible on all sides, was safe even from insult, and a line of retreat through the Champs Elysees, and the plain of Crenelle, free for the o[)eration of cavalry and artillery, and out of reach of fire arms from barricades and windows, was open for them and their troops, to the friendly population of the country and the approaching support of the armies. Each position was in itself strong; 1 88 THE LIFE OF ^2JJ^^:,Jj^ the troops were concentrated nntlcr the eye of the commander, and within reach of immediate reenforcement and direction. Having made these dispositions, and placed in command of the several posts, officers, who from rank or character were entitled to confidence, Bonaparte, in conformity with the recommendation of the government, ordered his troops to wait the attack of the insurgents, and in no case to provoke it. Thiswaspohtic,asit cast the blame of agres- sion on his adversaries; and it was prudent, as it held his force collected, Avhich was too small to be risked in narrow streets, and ex- posed to be overpowered or seduced while in the pursuit of separate parties. For with the addition of the volunteers under general Berruyer, the gendarmes and police, his aggregate force did not exceed eight thou- sand: and as the passions when carried to extremes are apt to run into their opposites, the best m.ode of striking a panic into the multitude, was to allow at first a free indul- gence to their audacity. (9) Meanwhile, the insurgents, who had not been idle, had assembled, on the morning of the 4^h of October, an armed body of twentv-seven thousand men. Their com- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 1 89 mittee, which renewed its meeting in the ^^^^ ^"^^^ convent at the head oi the street Vivienne, had issued a decree of outlawry against the executive committee, and established a tri- bunal for passing sentence on all persons found in arms against the sovereign people of Paris. Several generals had offered them their services, among whom were Danican and Duhoux, who had commanded the re- publican troops against the royahsts in La Vendee. By a strange association, count Maulevrier, a Vendean chief, and an emi- grant royalist Lafond, young, enthusiastic, and daring, were also among their military leaders. Danican, who had been a friend of Hoche, was not without talent, and being restless and declamatory, took with the fac- tious leaders, and was appointed their com- mander in chief. They intercepted the arms destined for the section Quinze Vingts, as well as a quantity of provision which was being conveyed to the Tuileries. Their troops were well armed, and being com- posed of the national guard, had been in regular training since the gth Thermidor, the year before. In addition to the corps of twenty-seven thousand men, which was al- ready embodied, they had, in reserve, about I go THE LIFE OF CHAP. V. half that number. The women of the lower classes were all in their favour, and were busy in efforts to shake the fidelity of the troops of the convention. So that, if Bona- parte had adopted the most skilful plan of defence, the means of attack in possession of the insurgents, whether consisting of force or seduction, were truly formidable. (lo) The executive committee, as the danger thickened around them, debated various pro- positions, but came to no effective resolution. Some members proposed that they should dis- miss their forces, and receive the insurgents as the Roman senators did the Gauls, Some advised that they should retreat at once to thecamp of Caesar on the heights of St. Cloud, and wait for reenforcements from the army of the west. Others recommended the ap- pointment of commissioners to make propo- sitions of accommodation to the different sections, a suggestion which, though it was adopted, led to no important result. While these vain discussi ons were prolonged, Lafond, at the head of a column of the insur- gents who had intimidated Menou, marched about half-past two o'clock from the section Lepelletier to the bridge called Pont Neuf. 4t the same time, another column from the THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. IQI place Je/'Or/eo// approached in theopposite ^^ ^,79^ direction, and formed in the place Dau- phine^ at the south end of the bridge. Ge- neral Cartaux, Bonaparte's former com- mander at Toulon, had been stationed at thisbridge with four hundred men and four pieces of artillery, and with orders to defend both ends of it. But unwilhng to come to blows, he retired down the quai to the rail- ing of the Louvre^ and allowed Lafond, without obstruction, to join in triumph his friends, in the place Dauphine. The in- surgents, at the same time, took possession of the jardin des Infants^ and occupied, in force, the front and steps of the church of St. Roch, the theatre Francais, and the hotel de Noailles, so as to hold possession of the Palais Royal, and the great street of St.Honore^ and to close in upon the posts of Bonaparte as nearly as possible. Women were sent forward, at all points, to tempt the men from iheir colours, and even the po- pular leaders themselves advanced, with flourishing and fraternal gestures, in the hope of corrupting them. Thus the day was passing away, one side threatening to attack^ the other resolved on defence, when about half-past three in the 192 THE LIFE OF CHAP^ V. ^ afternoon, the rebel commanders, apprized of the state of feeling in the mass of the na- tion and the ranks of the army, saw the ne- cessity of precipitating matters. (11) To cover their violence with the respectability of peaceful forms, and probably in hopes of overawing the convention, they summoned the government by a flag of truce, to remove the troops whose presence menaced the good citizens of Paris, and to disarm the men of terror as they denominated the volunteers, who were arrayed against them. Their herald was conducted blindfold to Bona- parte^ by whom he was introduced to the executive committee, as to the council of a besieged garrison. His threatening lan- guage agitated them sensibly, but did not overcome their resolution. The shades of evening were now approaching, and parties of the insurgents had glided from house to house, so as to get into windows within gun shot of the Tuileries. Bonaparte, with a view of strengthening his reserve, had eight hundred muskets and a supply of car- tridgeSj conveyed to the hall of the conven- tion; a measure which although it alarmed some of the members, by shewing them the THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. IqS full extent of the danger, committed all irre- Fro^n ^795 to 1796. trievably in the contest, and enabled the re- solute .in case of need, to give the modern Gauls a warmer reception, than their ances- tors had experienced from the senate of Rome. About half past four, when an orderly dragoon had been already shot in the street St. Honore, and a woman wounded on the steps of the Tuileries ; and when the head of Lafond's column was seen approaching the Tuileries on the opposite side of the river, Bonaparte determined to put forth his strength. Sending orders to his posts on the Seine^ to open a fire of artillery on La- fond, he hastened to the street Dauphin, where one of his detachments was menaced by a large body of the national guard, drawn up in front and on the steps of the church of St. Roch, and preparing to force their way to the Tuileries. To run forward his pieces, and pour upon this party repeated dis- charges of grape shot ; to drive them with ge- neral Berruyer's volunteers from the front and steps of the church into its body; and then, pointing his cannon up and down the street, to clear that important avenue of the enemy, was the work of a few minutes. Leaving i3 ig\ THE EIFL OF CHAP^. ^ ^1^^^^ pQj^i" ^TiiJ ^q very guarded pursuit, in charge of an approved officer, iie galloped to the river. Danican and Maulevrier had united themselves by this time with Lafond, and they were all three, with about seven thousand men, advancing in close column and at the charging step, along the quay upon the Pont Royal^ which emboldened by Cartaux's indecision at the other bridge, they hoped by one determined effort to carry. With the battery at the Louvre, that at the Pont Eoyal, and with pieces planted at intermediate points along the quay of the Tuileries, Bonaparte directed a rapid discharge of grape shot on the front, flank, and rear, of this dense mass. The effect was of course murderous. The insurgents shewed no want of courage, and though they several times wavered and broke, were as often rallied. Lafond proved himself a hero. Remembering the weakness of Menou, and impelled by his own fierce valour, he -: collected his bravest followers, and while his main body fired from the quay, twice threw himself upon the bridge, attempting to seize the guns and force the pass by a headlong charge. But Bonaparte was there in person. THE EMPErvOR NAPOLEON. IQS and twice repelled him by volleys of grape From 1795 and musketry. The undaunted zealot, who had been a subaltern in the royal guard, rushed a third time to the charge, and desisted not till the fire of his adversary had by death or terror, destroyed his column. At this point and at the church of St. Roch, the loss on both sides was considerable. At six o'clock, the insurgents after an action of an hour and a half, were defeated in all their attacks, and their cannon sent from St. Ger- main being intercepted, had lost all hope. Bonaparte in taking in his turn the offensive, with a sentiment like that of Caesar at Pharsalia, ordered blank cartridges only to be fired, justly inferring, that when such crowds, after the indulgence of confidence and a desperate exertion of courage, were once put to flight, the sound of a gun would keep up their panic. (12) This forbearance saved many lives. During the night he cleared the streets of barricades, patroled the rue Royale and the Boulevards, dislodged a party from the church St. Roch, and sur- rounded with detachments of infantry and artillery another party in the Palais Royal. The next day it was easily dispersed, as was igG THE LIFE OF C HAP. V. ^ a body who had collected in the convent at the head of the rue Vivienne. By noon on the 5th of October, the insurrection was suppressed, and tranquillity perfectly re- stored. The killed and wounded, of which rather the smaller number belonged to the troops of the convention, amounted to be- tween four and five hundred. Bonaparte had a horse shot under him. The deputies Sieyes, Louvet, and Freron, behaved with remarkable firmness. This victory, which caused infinite satisfaction to the real friends of the republic, who saw in it the defeat of Bourbon hopes, foreign intrigues, and domestic treason renewed and augmented the authority of the convention, very seasonably for the establishment of the new constitution. The members of that assembly were sensible of its value, as well in regard to the imminence of danger from which it rescued themselves, as to the series of convulsions from which it saved their country. In a report from the committee of public safety, which was adopted by the convention in the sitting of the 5th, it is described as, "a victory gained over a coali- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. IQ-J tion of royalism and anarchy, the most glo- Fomi795 ^ to 1 796. rious of the revolution, and also the most fortunate, as it was likely to close that great struggle. " As in spite of Barras's efforts to appropriate the credit to himself it was known to be the work of Bonaparte, this report placed him by the hands of the go- vernment itself before the eyes of the nation, as a great public benefactor^ and in conse- quence of the nominal superiority but real insignificance of Barras, brought more clearly into view his previous services at Toulon and in the Alps. The invidious meanness of Barras, it appears, he disdained to notice. On the 9th, Barras having formally de- clared to the CO n vention t hat public order and tranquillity had been reestablished, Bona- parte, with the officers who had fought un- der his orders, were received at the bar of that assembly. As his extraordinary au- thority, conferred by the committee of pub- lic safety, might be considered liable to ter- minate with the suppression of the insur> rection, his appointment, as second in com- mand of the army of the interior, upon the reluctant motion of Barras, was confirmed bv the unanimous vote of the convention, igS THE LIFE OF ^!?^ ^l7' ^ with ilie knowledge that the chief command, nominally held by BarraSjWas, in a few days, to be resigned, and, in the midst of acclama- tions attending the avowal that the conven- tion was indebted to Bonaparte for its safety (i3). In conformity with this arrange- ment, Barras resigned his nominal com- mand on the 26th of October, having held it, in conjunction with his incompatible office of deputy, for the short space of three weeks. The government, loathing the extermin- ating punishment of the reign of terror, used their victory with the utmost moderation. The ringleaders of the insurgents Avere, of course, capitally condemned, but Lafond alone was executed. He avowed and ex- ulted in his offence, with such defiance and pertinacity, that, although a disposition to spare him was felt, it could not be prudently indulged. A different sentiment prevailed towards Menou, who had exhibited weak- ness, and was accused of treason. The tri- umph of his successor, contrasted with his failure, exposed his weakness^ and aggravated his disgrace. The government was disposed, and the witnesses were interested, to sacri- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. I QQ fice him. But the influence which Bona- From 1795 to 1796. parte had acquired, by repairing the conse- quences of Menou's indecision, was gener- ously exerted to save his life. He declared to the members of the court, whom he as- sembled for the purpose by an invitation lo breakfast, that if Menou deserved death, the three representatives who had directed the mihtary operations, and parleyed with the insurgents, deserved the same punishment. This opinion, coming from the vanquisher of the insurrection and the protector of the convention, awakened a sentiment favour- able to Menou. The members of the court, seeing no reason that in a parity of guilt, death should be the lot of the mihtary offi- cer, and impunity the privilege of the cisdl agent, acquitted Menou. As commander in chief of the army of the interior, Bonaparte had to keep down the slumbering factions, of which, one having root in the gold of England and the intrigues of emigrants^, and the other in the ambition of demagogues and traitors, neither mercy nor severity could effect the extinction. He had also, in the infancy of the new govern- ment, to execute the rigorous measures of 200 THE LIFE OF ^^j^Fl^^[i^ disarming the obnoxious sections^ and of disbanding and reorganising llie national guard. The task, which required energy and address, was increased in difficulty by an extreme scarcity of money and food, a grievance which could not but excite discon- tent, and embarrass authority. Nevertheless, he succeeded in executing the orders of the directory, and maintaining the tranquillity of the capital. He was sometimes obliged to intimidate the clubs, at others to harangue the populace. On one occasion he was sur- rounded by a mob, menacing in their ges- tures and language, and clamorous for bread. A large fat woman was particularly violent. ''These dandy officers" (epauletiersj, said she, " laugh at us ; so that they eat and get fat, they care not if we starve." " My dear," replied the general, " look at me, and say which of us is the fatter of the two." He was then so very slender, that the striking contrast and the seasonable jest, excited the mirth of the crowd at the woman's expense, and separating peaceably, they made way for Bonaparte. In these collisions with the inhabitants of Paris, it was his own remark, that the population of the faubourg St. An- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 201 toine, composed principally of the poorer From 1795 people, was the most susceptible of reason- able impressions and generous impulses ; a fact, which shows that he possessed that true eloquence which, while it might be lost upon artificial classes of society, such as nobles or priests, fell with irresistible force on the common people, whose feelings flow fresh from the fountains of nature, and whose interests are inseparably connected with the general good. Among the least unpleasant of his duties was that of securing the members of the new government from a repetition of those out- rages to which their predecessors had often and recently been exposed. For this pur- pose he recomposed and strengthened the constitutional guard of the legislature, and formed one for the directory. After organ- izing the national guard, which consisted of a hundred and four battalions, and of the volunteers who fought so bravely under general Berruyer having created a legion of police, he established a camp of discipline and exercise in the plain of Crenelle. In executing these various duties, he wasbrought into intimate relation with the people of 202 THE LIFE OF CHAP. V. Paris, who, together with the miUtary corps which he constituted, felt and retained the impression of his plastickhand. It was while he commanded the army of the interior, and some time after he had exe- cuted the decree for disarming the sections, that he formed the acquaintance of the lady who became his first^ his most amiable, and his devoted wife. She was the widow of ge- neral Beauharnais, one of the last victims of the guillotine. The incident which led to this acquaintance was marked by the most inter- esting emotions of our nature; and the ac- count which Bonaparte has left of it, shows how deeply sensible he was to their in- fluence. " The measure of disarming the sections had been carried into execution, when there presented himself one morning at the head quarters of the commander in chief, a boy, ten or twelve years of age, who intreated to have the sword of his father restored to him* This boy, was Eugene de Beauharnais, after- wards viceroy of Italy. Napoleon, touched by the nature of his application, and the graces of his youth, granted his request. On receiving the sword of his father, Eugene THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 203 burst into tears. The general, affected by From 1T95 to 1796. the emotion of the son, treated him with so much kindness, that Madam de Beauharnais felt herself under an obligation to wait on him the next day with the expression of her thanks. It is unnecessary to speak of the extreme grace, the soft and enchanting man- ners of the empress Josephine. Their ac- quaintance thus commenced, soon became intimate and tender, and resulted, without much delay, in marriage." It would be difficult to conceive circum- stances more natural, feelings more affect- ing, or language more artless, than are found in this domestic memorial ; the personages a graceful boy, a lovely woman, and a youth- ful hero ; the sentiments, of which it may be said with truth, " He best can paint them who shall feel them most ;" filial piety, manly benevolence, maternal gra- titude, and generous sensibihty. The altar of love never burned with a purer flame ; nor does ancient poetry furnish anything of higher interest than this scene of actual life, which^ it is surprising, the pencil of modern 204 THE LIFE OF CHAP^. art has not yet consigned to the canvass. (i4) In producing it, fortune seems to have de- cided that the history of Bonaparte's love should be as simple and as grand as the pro- gress of his glory. As this was the exclusive effect of his services and merit, so that was the independent result of his taste and affec- tion; interest and indirection, the usual in- struments of successful ambition, havingbeen utter strangers to his public advancement and his marriage-tie. (i5) The winter passed away^ the capital was quiet, the government through all its departments, in unobstructed operation, and the season for miUtary operations ap- proached. The plans of the directory were enterprising, and their project on the side of Italy particularly bold. But general Scherer, instead of profiting, as it was sup- posed he might have done, by the victory of Loano, had remained inactive, and de- manding urgently supplies and reenforce- ments, expressed apprehensions of retreating behind the Var before the formidable pre- parations of the alHes. The directory dis- pleased and disconcerted, did what they had done when they were members of the con- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 205 ventioD, and when Kellerman instead of From 1795 Scherer was the inefficient general : they consulted Bonaparte, whose claims to their attention , continued personal acquaint- ance, and recent events had strengthened. In January 1 796, he furnished in writing the plan of an offensive campaign on that fron- tier, which, added to their own conviction, and the well known confidence of the army of Italy, in regard to his talents, determined the directory to trust for safety and conquest on that oft-contested frontier to general Bonaparte. In the beginning of March he was appointed commander in chief of the army of Italy; and on the 9th of that month was married to Madam Beauhar- nais. This it may be supposed was one of the happiest periods of his life. The woman of his choice was the wife of his bosom, and the field of glory in which he longed to shine, was now expanded to his enterprise. Around him were the pleasures of love; before him the prospects of honour; and within him the impatience of a martial spirit fretted with the reluctance of an enraptured heart. In the pauses of hope and joy, if he 206 THE LIFE OF CHAP^v. ^ looked back on the growth of his fortune, from its infancy when he was the orphan scholar of Brienne, to the vigorous promise of its present state, his reflections must have been fraught with pure and soHd satisfaction. In a season of faction, strife, selfishness, sus- picion, and cruelty, he had passed from subordination to eminence, without swerv- ing for a moment from the path of indepen- dence, openness, and honour : had con- descended to no solicitation, stooped to no compliance, mixed with no intrigue, con- tracted no obligation, participated in no injustice. Persecuted by the deputies, he had not sunk into submission ; flattered by the army, he had not been inflated with self love : so that he escaped the guillotine with- out propitiating the government, and more difEcult still, excelled his own commanders, without disobliging them. His opportu- nities, which were common to officers of his rank, had in every instance been surpassed by his exploits, while his advancement always lagged behind his services. Conscious of being indebted to no man, he felt that to him generals owed their fame, armies their suc- cess, individuals their lives, and the govern- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. lO'J meut its existence. Such may well have From 1795 been his reflections at this dawning season of his fame; for nothing is more remarkable in his history, than the direct, unassisted, and undesigning steps, by which his eleva- tion was accomplished. (i6) Filled with such thoughts as these, and " snuffing the battle from afar,^ upon the difficulty of succeeding wherfe older generals had failed being suggested to him, he said, ''in one campaign I shall be old or dead ;" meaning that he would have gained immortality or lost his life. A few fleeting days were given to Josephine; when, in an evil hour for his country's foes, he left Paris, and paying a brief visit to his mother at Marseilles, proceeded by rapid journeys to Nice, where he arrived on the 20th of March; and on the 27th of that month took command of the army of Italy. (17) ( 208 ) '^M <, \. \ is > 1^ ' » k CHAPTER VI. ^From Marchy 1796, fo il/«j, 1796. CHAPEL ^ Italy— Thejvalley of the Po—The states and forces by wliich it was defended — The instructions of the di- rectory to Bonaparte — The folly of those instruc- tions — Comparative numbers and condition of the hostile armies — Sufferings of the French — Their want of food, money, horses, and artillery— Bona- parte relieves general Scherer — His appointment ac- ceptable to the troops- — Not so altogether to Mas- sena and Augereau- — The force and ascendancy of his character — Anecdote — Transfers the head quarters to Albenga — Mutiny of the 29th regiment — Royalist emissary — The mutineers punished, and the emissary arrested — Efficacious attention of Bonaparte to the subsistence of his troops —His march to Albenga — Disdains to return the cannonade of Nelson —Address to his army — Its character and effect — His generals and aides de camp — The high spirit of the army — Bonaparte's plan of invasion — His object frustrated by the advance of general Laharpe — Stations of the several divisions of his army — Beaulieu opens the campaign — His activity and plan of operations — He advances upon THE EMPEHOR NAPOLEON. '2O9 Voltri — Directs Argenteau upon Savona — Bonaparle From March. resolves to detain Beaulieu at Voltri, and to attack ' ^,5^> . to May, ArgenteaU' — Combat of Voltri — Of Montehgino — 1796. Good conduct of Cervoni — Heroism of Rampon — Battle of Montenotte — Defeat of Argenteau — iVd- vance of the Frencli — Beaulieu and Nelson discon- certed — Battle of Millesimo — Gallantry of Joubert — Surrender of Provera< — Passage of the Bormida and storming of Dego — Defeat of Beaulieu and further advance of the French — Surprise of DegO' — Retaken by the Austrians — Countermarch of Bona- parte — Battle of Dego — Heroic conduct and death of general Causse — Promptness and activity of Bo- naparte — Gallantry of Lanusse and of Lannes — Sanguinary defeat of the Austrians — Recapture of Dego — Bonaparte prudent after his surprise — Sends to reconnoitre Voltri — The Austrians and Sardi- nians completely separated — Laharpe's division posted on the Belho— Serrurier's division advanced against the Sardinians — The action of the army reversed — March of the French upon Ceva — Thev reach the commanding height of Montezemoto^ — The plains of Italy in view- — Feelings of the troops — Emotion and remark of Bonaparte — Attack upon Ceva — The Sardinians driven w^ith loss from their intrenched camp — Alarm of the court of Turin — The French pass the Tanaro — Their active pursuit — General Colli retreats behind the Corsaglio^Serru- rier passes that river — Driven back — Bonaparte's dispositions for advancing — Directs Augereau to march down the right bank of the Tanaro — With Serrurier and Massena passes the Corsaglio — Battle of Mondovi'— Defeat of the Sardinians — Pursued 14 2IO THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. by general Stengel with the French cavalry — His death and character — Gallantry of Murat — Rapid advance of the French army towards Turin — Ser- riirier enters Fossano, Massena Cherasco, and Augereau Alba — Bonaparte fortifies Cherasco — His preparations for strengthening his army — The king of Sardinia sues far peace — His general proposes a suspension of arms — Answer and conditions of Bo- naparte — His frankness and moderation — Armistice of Cherasco — Suffering of the French troops for food— Their plundering— Discontent of the officers — General Laharpe tenders his resignation— Firmness and equity of Bonaparte— His measures to supply food to his troops, to repair his losses, and to strengthen his position— He equips his cavalry and prepares a park of artillery— 'His victories celebrated by the French legislature — His conduct approved by the directory — He resolves to invade the Italian possessions of the house of Austria. The country which general Bonaparte was about to invade, naUu-e and time had ren- dered strong and magnificent. Its moun- tains, rivers, and lakes, constitute barriers of formidable opposition, and objects of the utmost beauty and grandeur. Its monu- ments of glory and taste are equally great and equally enduring. In the bosom of its love- liest plains a foreign despot ruled its people with a leaden sceptre. It was afield tempt- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 211 iii^f to the ambition of a youthful warrior, From March, who dreAV his lineage from princes of the to May, land; but whether for the purposes of sub- . ^'^^' jection or deliverance, it was not to be en- tered but by the boldest efforts of enterprise and skill, (i )* Bonaparte has left a description of Italy, which, as a specimen of geographical paint' ing^ and statistical fulness and precision, is unrivalled. This, it would be useless to transcribe, and is dangerous to abridge. That portion of Italy^ which^ as distinguished from its peninsular and insular divisions, he calls the continental part, the great valley of the Po, embraced between the Alps and the Appenines and stretching eastward to the Adriatic Sea, was to be the theatre of his first campaigns. Through the centre of this vast and fertile plain rolls the stately current of the Po, increased on each side by the tri- bute of numerous rivers. Those from the Appenines are short and rapid, and^ except when swollen by the rains of winter, are generally fordable. Those from the Alps are longer and more copious, spread into frequent lakes, and fed by melting snow^s, are at their full in summer. This charming 212 THE LIFE OF CHAP VI. country, comprehending Piedmont, Lom- bardy, the dutchies of Parma and Modena, the Roman Legations and Venetian States, thus fortified by mountains and intersected by streams, contained many proud cities, much wealth, and a dense population. Sup- posing it reduced within the outhnes of a regular figure, its extent might be adequately defined by stating its length from west to east at three hundred miles, and its breadth at eighty. It was defended against Bona- parte not only by its mountain ramparts, but by the forces and fortresses of the king of Sardinia, the well known and wily porter of the Alps ; by a powerful army under a distinguished general of the emperor of Aus- tria; by contingents from Naples, Modena, and Parma; these active adversaries, sup- ported by the less direct, but not less effec- tual cooperation of the other states of Italy, Tuscany excepted, and by the fleets and subsidies of England. (2) As the instructions of the directory to their general bear a date anterior to his departure from Paris, there is reason from that fact to suppose, they were prepared after a full con- sideration of his own suggestions. This in- ference, which is confirmed by his affirma- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 2l3 tioiij (3) arises from the character of the in- From March, structions themselves. They are contained to May in a letter dated the 6th of March, and^ _^^ consist of a series of military subtilties in- terspersed with inconsistent directions and counteracting exhortations and restraints, superinduced upon a bold and sagacious design. This design is divided into two stages ; the first comprising a detailed and limited plan of invasion; the second sketch- ing an extensive and undefined project of conquest. The object of the immediate and elaborated plan was, to compel the king of Sardinia to abandon the coalition against France, and to force Austria to enter into a treaty of peace with the republic. The drift of the vague and ulterior project was, to uproot the Austrian ascendancy, and to over- awe the native governments, in Italy. In prosecuting the first design, the general was instructed to give an alternate direction to his blows ; that is, he was first to beat the Sardinians that he might aim an unimpeded stroke at the Austrians ; he was next to beat the Austrians that he might detach the court of Turin from the coalition ; and was to de- tach thecourt of Turin from the coalition that 2l4 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. he might Ibllow up his assaults upon the Aus- trians with such active and undivided vigour, as should force the emperor, notwithstanding the mercenary and inveterate stimulants of Kngland, (4) t^ postpone his abhorrence of amity with a popular government, to the prudence of accepting terms of peace. In pursuing this vibratory course of oper- ations, the general was recomnaended, with scrupulous emphasis, to limit his advance in the direction of Turin, in the first instance, to the taking of Ceva and the observation of Coni ; then to operate exclusively by his right, and with such boldness, as to drive the Aus- trians beyond the Po and disquiet them by a serious demonstration against Milan. This movement, which is enjoined with earnest repetition, had it been executed, would have placed Bonaparte between the Austrian army under Beaulieu, at least equal to his own, and that of Colli reenforced by draughts from numerous and powerful garrisonSjand by detachments from the army of the duke of Aoste, who, at the head of a superior force, was opposed to the army of the Alps under Rellerman. The perilous tendency of this attenuated scheme, makes its conception wonderful, and its folly plain. (5J 1796. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEOxN. 2l5 The inaccuracv of data, both political and FromMarchj ' . . 1796 military, upon which the directors pro- to May, ceeded in developing their plan, is not less remarkable, and shows how difficult it is for a secretary in his closet, and more especially for a cabinet of coordinate ministers, to pre- scribe the movements of an army in the face of the enemy. For example, the directory argued on the assumption that Ceva was a first rate fortress, whereas it was a secondary one, and that Tortona, a place of great strength, would, if attacked, offer but slight resistance. They assumed that the court of Turin was held in the coalition^ not by in- clination and interest, but by the force of Austrian predominance and English trea- sure, was disposed to prefer an alliance with France, and would be likely to embrace that connection, provided an equivalent for the succours of England, and protection against the power of Austria, were furnished by France. (6J Upon this conclusion they pro- jected a negotiation with the king of Sar- dinia, in virtue of which, and in return for the promise of indemnity in the Milanese territory, they were not without hopes that he would unite his forces with the French 2l6 THE LIFE OF CHAP. Yi. army, and relinquish, by Ireary, all tide to the dutchy of Savoy and the county of Nice, which, in the previous campaigns had been wrested from him by conquest. Vnit nothing could be more fallacious than this speculation upon the policy of the king of Sardinia, who was prompted by feehngs grounded in family connection, by the in- stincts of royalty and self-preservation, to re- sist the progress of the French arms, and to cut shorttheexistenceof the French republic. With singular inconsistency, the general was directed to undertake sieges in the heart of Piedmont and Mont Ferrat, and in the presence of superior armies, without ex- posing to the chances incident to a revsrse, his battering cannon ; was to encourage the subjects of Sardinia to form a political fra- ternity with the French, and yet was to ex- act from them heavy contributions to sup- port his army; and was to separate the court of Turin from the coalition, but was not to consent to a suspension of arms, without re- ceiving special authority from the directory. These pragmatical instructions, while they ostensibly sent forth the general to gain vic- tories and conquer dominions, really with* THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 217 held from him the power of can ving on the From March, " 17Q6 war, or of bringing about a peace. ( 7 ) He ^^ ^^jay^ was bound^ therefore, to be guided by the ^ ^'^^' great principles of military prudence and duty, and to conform to the cun^ent pressure of circumstances and the evident interests of his country, rather than to the confused and impracticable commands of the direc- tory. He was, in short, to navigate the sea of danger, upon which, in defending the independence of his country, he boldly launched, not upon the track laid down in his chart, but upon a course adapted to the object of the voyage, and to the force and direction of the winds and tides. The state of his army was not more sa- tisfactory than the nature of his instruc- tions. His fighting force did not exceed thirtv-five thousand men, while that of the enemy, well fed, supplied and appointed, with a full proportion of cavalry and a train of tw^o hundred cannon, amounted to seventy thousand. (8J Rations of meat, had for some time ceased to be distributed in the French camp, and even the supply of bread was precarious. On the cold and snowy Alps, the republicans had Avintered, half- 2l8 THE LIFE OF CHAP^VL clad^ ill shod, and without tents. Hunger and frost, which thinned their ranks by di- sease and desertion, had forced the troops into habits of plunder and insubordination. They lived by a system of marauding, which leading them often into the enemy's country^ was besides its other inconveniences, not unattended with danger and loss. Upon mountains of rock and ice, the horses of the army had sunk down and perished ; so that the cavalry consisting of two thousand four hundred men, was for the greater part dis- mounted, and even many of the staff officers were afoot. The arsenals of Nice and An- tibes contained abundant stores of ordnance; but five hundred mules which constituted the sole means of transport remaining to the army, admitted the employment of but thirty light pieces. The military chest was empty, and the financial efforts of the government had been able to supply the new general with no more than tAVO thousand crowns in gold, and one million of francs in bills, half of which were protested. So low in short were his means, and so desperate the poverty of the army, that when soon after his arrival, he directed a payment, which distributed THE EMPEKOR NAPOLEON. 219 according to rank gave each general of di- From March, vision three Louis d'or, (9) it was received as to May, a gratification, while the proportionate frac- > tion, paid on account to the privates, pro- duced more surprise than satisfaction, and more satisfaction than comfort. This latter payment he was enabled to effect only by his personal influence with a zealous con- tractor. (10) His reception by general Scherer and his relief of that officer seem to have been marked by every circumstance of propriety on both sides. On the day after assuming the com- mand, Bonaparte thus expressed himself in a letter to the directory. ''I am particularly gratified with my reception by general Scherer; who by his honourable deportment and readiness to supply me with all useful information, has acquired a right to my gra- titude, ffis health appears to be really some- what impaired. To great facility in ex- pressing himself he unites an extent of ge- neral and military knowledge, which may probably induce you to deem his services useful in some important station.'' To most of the regiments their new ge- neral had been known either at the siege of 220 THE LIFE OF ctiAP^L ^ Toulon, or in the campaign of Saorgio; and even to the division which upon the con- clusion of the Spanish war, had been led by Augereau from the Pyrenees to the Alps, as they had fought under Dugommier in 1 794, his name was familiar. He was received therefore as commander in chief with satis- faction by the army; although it appears that Augereau, and with better pretensions Massena, at first regarded his appointment as in some sort derogating from their own rank and reputation. (11) But this partial discontent was of momentary existence, was suppressed immediately by the superiority of his character, and speedily removed by the events of the campaign; while its tem- porary prevalence, by inducing these ge- nerals to elevate the standard of their own merit, may have had the effect of inciting them to extraordinary hardihood and prowess. His personal appearance was at this period of his life, very different from what it sub- sequently became. His face was so fleshless, that the chiselled form and fine expression of his features, were overcast with a look sa- turnine and severe. According to the fashion THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 211 of the time, his hair which shaded his fore- from March, 1 706 head, was tied behind, and fell in what were to May, called dog*s ears down his temples and cheeks. His figure was light and slender; and his rounded limbs terminated in feet and hands of such feminine proportion and delicacy, that it was evident his physical power of exertion and endurance, was sup- plied by the energy of his mind. On the other hand, his mental faculties were in a great measure independent of the influence which variations in the health or tension of robust and muscular frames, frequently exer- cise upon the intellect. Having been accustomed to command even when he was legally subordinate, it was easy for him to control, when he became chief in authority. The force of that ascendency which even at this stage of his career he exerted over those who approached him, was exemplified as he passed through Tou- lon, in the person of Decres, his future mi- nister of marine. This naval officer, who had known him at Paris before his appoint- ment, believed himself on a footing of per- fect famiUarity with the general of the army of Italy. Under this impression, upon hear- 322 THE LIFE OF CHAP. vr. ing llial Bonaparte was to pass through Tou- lon, he proposed to introduce several of his brother officers, with a view of obliging them, and of showing off the intimacy which he enjoyed with a commander in chief. At- tended by his comrades, he hastened to pre- sent himself, and was advancing, with the utmost cordiality, to salute the general, when the attitude, the look, the voice of the latter, stopped him short. There was nothing re- pulsive, injurious, nor even stern; but there was a magical something that prescribed a limit, which Decres confessed to a friend, he never afterwards dared to overstep. Upon relieving general Scherer, Bona- parte's first care was to break the attachments of custom which held the head quarters of the army of Italy inveterately stationary at jNice. They were ordered to be transferred immediately to Albenga, a town on the coast, about seventy miles in the direction of Genoa, for which town the troops cantoned around Nice were directed to march. To such a degree was the discipline of the army on this frontier depraved by long suffering, fruitless combats, and frequent change of comman- ders, that certain companies of the twenty- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 223 ninth refused to obey the order. With this in- From Marhc, subordinate spirit, political malcontents and toMav royalist intriguers, who, under the corres*^ J^^^ ^ ponding direction of Pichegru and the prince Conde, were then in full activity on the fron- tiers, had managed to infuse into that corps a tendency to Bourbonism so successfully, that one of the companies called itself t//e company of the Dauphin^ and two of the officers had ventured to shout long Iwe the king! At the same time, and as if in con- cert with these dangerous manifestations, a French emigrant presented himself at the advanced posts, in the character of a Sar- dinian officer, with a flag of truce and a communication from general Colli. From the coincidence of these events, Bonaparte^ naturally and justly apprehended a corre- spondence between his mutineers and the agents of general Colli. He determined, therefore, to be prompt and stern, if not ri- gorous, in dealing with this threatening dis- order. In spite of Colli's remonstrances, and the ostensible character of the Sardinian emissary, he was detained, (12) while both the disobedient and the royahst officers were arrested, the companies disbanded, the r)24 THE LIFJE OF CHAP. VI. men sent into the rear, and distributed in another regiment. This energetic correction humbled the mutineers, and contributed to estabhsh habits of obedience and the force of discipline. These^ it was the great object of the general to restore, not by unjust se- verity, but by removing the causes of dis- order ; for, as he wrote to the directory, the sufferings of the men extenuated their mis- conduct; and, ''^without discipline, he could not hope for victory." Looking closely and severely into the er- rors and abuses of the commissariat, he commenced at once a system of productive economy, active control, and inexorable cor- rection in the departments of subsistence ; and, seconded by the zeal of one of the con- tractors, he succeeded, in less than a week, by employing his limited means to the best advantage, in furnishing the troops with salt and fresh meat alternately every day. This addition to their diet had as good an effect upon the health as upon the temper of the army. (i3) On the march from Nice, along the rugged and precipitous shore of the Mediterranean, the head quarters, with the rear and baggage of the army, were exposed to the cannonade THE EMPEROh NAPOLEON. 22 ■} of Nelson's squadron. Their fire, ihoueh From March. 1796, incessant and not harmless, Bonaparle re- to May, ceived with such bold contempt, that he would not allow the columns to halt, either for the purpose of avoiding or returning it.(i4) Arrived at Albenga, he reviewed his troops, and, for the first time, addressed them in those accents, which whether grave or animated, never failed to awaken transports of enthusiasm in the soldier's breast. On this occasion his words were few, and not flattering. " Soldiers ! you are naked and hungry ; the government owes you much, but can pay you nothing. Your patience and valour in the midst of these rocks are admirable, but they cannot win for you mar- tial fame. I propose to lead you into the most fertile plains on the globe. Rich pro- vinces, great cities, will be in your power; there you will find honour, glory, and wealth. Soldiers of Italy ! canyon be want- ing in courage and perseverance .^ " There was boldness of promise in this address ; but, at the same time, hard condi- tions, and plain truth. The soldiers were told that they were to serve their country i5 226 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. without food, clothes, or pay, and were to procure these, as well as wealth and glory, only at the expense of hardship and peril. If they were to gain honourable rewards, they were to submit to unexampled priva- tions, and to accomplish prodigious under- takings. Had these pro[)6sitions been balanced in the measured phrases, and veiled in the studied sophisms of a rhetorician^ they would have produced discouragement and irritation, rather than the impulse of mihtary ardour. Rut^ in Bonaparte's direct and sim- ple expressions, there was a tact more ex- quisite than art, which genius only eould inspire, and the firmest valour could the best feel. Accordingly, this short and stern address, roused and elevated the gallantry of the army, as the freshening wind swells and directs the billows of the sea. Impelled by its energy and truth, their courage rose above the sense of suffering and injustice. The instinct of the soldiers more perspica- cious than the judgment of statesmen^ felt the glorious spirit of their leader: they an- swered his address with eager acclamations, and gave liim at once their entire confidence. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 227 Generous men ! they complained no more of From March, neglect, penury, or want; and sighed only to May, for battle, victory, and fame. In the charac- ter and effect of this address, when they are attentively considered, may be discovered the germs of those wonders which the cam- paign unfolded. fi5) The divisions were commanded by Mas- sena, Augereau, Serrurier, and Laharpe; the cavalry, by generals Stengel and Rilmaine, and the artillery such as it was, by general Dujard. Among the generals of brigade some of whom had served at Toulon and in the campaign of Saorgio, were Victor, Jou- bert, and St. Hilaire, names soon to be famed in war. Berthier, an officer of peculiar qua- lifications for the post, was adjutant general of the army. Murat, Muiron, Junot, Mar- mont, Duroc, Le Marrais, and Louis Bona- parte, were aides-de-camp to the commander in chief. The regiments had been trained in the best school for military virtue, in pe- nury and hardship, and had been steeled to danger in battles on the Pyrenees and the Alps. The moral feeling or military tone of the army, was therefore greatly superior to its numerical force or material condition. (i6j 2^8 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. The plan of Bonaparte's invasion of Italy differed from those of former conquerors, who in ancient or modern times carried their victorious arms beyond the mountain ramparts of that beautiful country. He de- termined to enter Piedmont, not by either of the passes of the Alps, which, owing to their immense altitude are blocked up with snow eight months in the year, and are besides guarded at their outlets by numerous and strong fortresses ; but through the pass of Cadibone, where the chain of the Alps declines to its lowest point, and the Appennines rise from their least elevation. To use his own descriptive phrase, instead of forcing the Alps, he resolved to turn them. The wes- tern outlet of this pass, about thirty miles south of Albenga, terminated at the port of Savona, a place suitable for the depot of the army; while to the eastward, it issued from the mountains between Ceva and Acqui, two of the least formidable ef the enemy's fortified places, and at a point threatening equally the Austrian and Sardinian camps. (17) Adopting this line of invasion, it was ne- cessary to assemble the army on its right. This delicate operation, as the passes of the THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 22g Alps were yet obstructed by snow, he counted From March, on effecting without interruption from Colli; to May, and as the positions of the Austrians were more distant, without interference from Beaulien. To provide against the more pro- bable annoyance of the former, he strength- ened the connection between the left of Augereau and the right of Serrurier, by occupying with a detachment of Rusca's brigade, the position of La Sotta, which commanded one of the passes in that quar- ter, and the importance of which his pre- vious acquaintance with that region of the Alps, enabled him at once to comprehend. His hope was to appear suddenly in the plains of Italy, to attack the Austrians or Sardinians separately , and with the moun- tains in his rear to manceuvre against Turin or Milan as he should judge more feasible. The left division under Serrurier was posted at Ormea and Garessio, on the eastern slope of the Alps, and the head waters of the Tanaro, in observation of Colli; who with the Sardinian army which constituted the right wing of the allied force, was encamped and intrenched around Ceva. The centre divisions under Mass^na and Augereau, were !i3o THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. Stationed at Loano, Finale, and Savona, towns on the sea coast. I^aharpe with the right division^ was advanced toward Genoa, having his vanguard under general Cervoni, pushed forward as far as Voltri. (i8) This disposition of Laharpe's corps had been made before Eonaparte's arrival, in concert with the proceedings of the French agent at Genoa ; who in order to intimidate that feeble slate, and extort from its fears a loan to the French treasury, had demanded a passage for troops through the Genoese territory, and announced that the French were to penetrate into Lombardy by the pass of the Bochetta. This inopportune step, which, though founded on the outrage per- mitted on the French flag and the frigate La Modeste^ gave naturally offence and alarm to the Genoese^ government, being instantly communicated to the Austrian general, in- duced him to draw his troops from their winter quarters, and com mence the campaign. Beaulieu though old, does not appear to have been inactive or, on this occasion at leasts hesitating. (19) Conjecturing from his information, that the French commander was determined to take possession of Genoa, THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 23 1 and to convert the resources of that neutral From March, repubhc into means or carrying on the war, to May, a design which he was aware the alHes had previously entertained, he took his measures with promptness and vigour. Dividing his army into three corps, he directed ColH with the right to keep Serrurier in check, while himself with the left, and Argenteau with the centre were to push through the moun- tains, each by the pass in his front, and unite their forces on the left of the French, in the basin of Savona. Argenteau was to march by the road of lower and upper Monte- notte, (20) and then to force his way by Monteligino, directly to Savona. Beaulieu, whose headquarters were at Novi, was to take the route of the Bochetta, interpose between the French army and Genoa, com- municate with the British squadron on that coast, drive Cervoni back upon Laharpe, Laharpe upon Massena, and forming a junc- tion with x\rgen tea u in the basin or plain of Savona, was to fall with overwhelming force upon the front and left flank of the French army. Bonaparte on the 9th transferred his head quarters to Savona. Being apprised that 232 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. the Aiistrians were in motion, and per- ceiving that instead of issuing unexpectedly upon the plains of Piedmont, he should have to fight his way through the mountains, he observed vigilantly the bold and forward movements of his adversary. Aware that he could overcome his vast superiority of means and numbers, only by rapid marches, well directed attacks, and skilful choice of ground, he discovered with pleasure, that Beaulieu by advancing upon Voltri , while Argenteau was only at Montenotte, had in- terposed the broad ridge of the Appennines between his left and centre, and that conse- quently Argenteau was more within reach of attack than of support; while three of his own divisions being all on the same side of the mountains, and in connected positions, could be expeditiously collected for a single operation. Combining these perceptions promptly into a system of action, he resolved to detain Beaulieu by a detachment at Voltri, and to fall with his principal force upon Argen- teau. Here at once may be seen the difference between a good general and a great com* mander. Upon the approach of Beaulieu's Ibrmidable columns, a good general would THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 233 have called in his detachments, concentrated From March, 1796 his force in some strong position, and risked to May, his life and reputation in its defence. Defeat- . ed, he would have been compelled to retire ; victorious, he would have been unable to advance_, against the still overwhelming numbers of the allies. But a great com- mander, facing danger with promptness and sagacity, disables the giant as he lifts his ponderous arm to strike. Acting upon this bold and skilful determination, Bonaparte sent orders to Cervoni to maintain himself obstinately atVoltri; while to encourage his resistance, as well as to protect his retreat, when it should become necessary, he posted two battalions in his rear on the heights of Voraggio. In the gorge of the pass through which Argenteau proposed to descend upon Savona, and at a point where several routes entering the mountains from Piedmont, unite, stands Monteligino, a rocky eminence which the French had slightly fortified. This post was confided to Colonel Bampon^ with the thirty-second regiment, consisting of about one thousand men, which, for its defence of Monteligino, got the surname of the brasfCj and became as famous in the cam- 234 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. paigns of Italy as the tenth legion was in the army of Caesar. The occupation and de- fence of this position, while it afforded ad- ditional protection to the retreat of Cervoni, was intended to answer the more important purpose of holding Argenteau back, so that Bonaparte might execute his meditated at- tack on the centre of Beaulieu s army, while it was completely out of support from his left. These dispositions were not completed before Bonaparte foresaw their success. Confident of victory, while his generals were uneasy and apprehensive, he wrote to the directory on the 8th of April in the following sanguine terms — ^' I have just caused the im- portant position of La Sotta to be occupied. When you read this letter we shall be al- ready engaged in battle. The treasury has not kept its word. Instead of five hundred thousand francs, it has only sent us three hundred thousand, and we have as yet no tidings of the six hundred thousand? which sum was announced. But in spite of all this we shall advance.'' On the same day, Massena in a letter to the com- mander in chief, thus expressed himself : — " I do not know what are your intentions in THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 235 leaving the troops (of Cervoni) longer at From Marchj Voltri. I must not conceal from you that to May, our line is too much extended to be defended with so small a force." In a letter of the 9th which general Mesnard addressed to Mas- sena, informing him of the advance of the Austrian centre, he observes, " General Roc- cavina commands this force. His design is to cut off the retreat of our troops from Vol- tri, and to make them prisoners." On the 8th the advanced parties of Beau- lieu attacked the corps of Cervoni, amount- ing to four thousand five hundred men, and were repulsed. On the loth the Austrians renewed the attack with a force estimated at ten thousand; but Cervoni, although his right was cannonaded by the English squad- ron, and his left turned by a division of Aus- trians, held his ground manfally the whole day. On the nth he retired to a strong position on the mountain of Le Fourche, and according to the orders of Bonaparte, fell back at night secretly and rapidly upon Laharpe, at Madona, situated about four miles in front of Savona, on the route to Montenotte. While Beaulieu with the left wing of his 236 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. army was thus engaged at Voltri, Argenteau with the centre which besides a division in the rear connecting it with the army of CoHi, mustered fifteen thousand men, advanced from lower to upper Montenotte. (21) In the forenoon of the nth his light column, two thousand five hundred strong, under general Roccavina, attacked the post of Monteligino, but was vigourously met by Colonel Rampon and repelled with loss. In a few hours Argenteau came up with the division, when a heavier column of attack was formed and a fresh assault made upon Rampon. This also was repulsed. The Austrians prepared a still stronger force for a third assault, indignant at being worsted by a corps so inconsiderable. The intrepid Rampon at the same time, who was without water food or ammunition, proposed to his men a solemn oath, to die rather than yield their post — ^' Let us die first!" was their heroic answer. The Austrians ad- vanced a third time, and reached the breast work of the redoubt, when Rampon with his self-devoted regiment rushed upon them with the bayonet, and with such deter- mined courage, as to drive them with THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 287 slaughter down the mountain. Upon this From March, . . . 1796 reiterated defeat, Argenteau finding his to May, men fatigued and disheartened, drew offs^ and encamped on upper Montenotte, intend- ing to turn the position of Rampon in the morning, and to reach Savona in spite of him. But Bonaparte had prepared for the ill fated Austrian very different employ- ment. Laharpe, already at Madona de Savona, was pushed forward on the night of the I ith, to support and supply Rampon, with whom he was united by break of day. Au- gereau was ordered to cross the Alps from Loano. in the direction of Millesimo, so as to maintain his connection, be in readiness for ulterior operations, and intercept any aid from Colli to Argenteau ; and Bonaparte in person, marched at midnight from Savona with Massena's division, to which the bri- gade of Joubert was united, and placed him- self by the dawn of day near upper Monte- notte, upon the right and rear of the un- suspecting victim of his celerity and skill. On the morning of the 12th, while Beau- lieu was victoriously establishing himself at Voltri, and opening a communication with 238 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. commoJore Nelson ; while Colli was amused near Ceva, by false attacks which Serrurier was instructed to make ; and Argenteau himself was preparing to deal with Rampon alone, he was at once assailed in front by Laharpe and Rampon united, and by Mas- sena in flank and rear. Notwithstanding the suddeness and combination of the French onset, Argenteau 'seconded by Roccavina^ received it with firmness. On this trying occasion, he exhibited intelligence and de- cision. His plan was to act on the defensive against Laharpe, and to extricate himself by attacking Massena with his principal force. But iie was not allowed time nor opportu- nity ; for Bonaparte had posted himself in the centre of Massena's division, and from a commanding height gave impulse and direc- tion to his columns. (22) Laharpe was ordered to attack the Austrian front at Monteligino, Massena with the brigade Mesnard to dis- lodge their right from the heights of Monte- notte, while Joubert was to penetrate into their rear.. These movements nicely com- bined and vigorously executed^ quickly de- cided the battle : the Austrians, their front overpowered by Laharpe and Rampon, their THE EMPEROrx NAPOLEON. 289 right driven from Montenotle by Massena, From March, . . 1796 and their rear at the same time attacked^ were to May, thrown into confusion, and in spite of the > ^^^' exertions of Argenteau and Roccavina, fled precipitately, with the loss of fifteen hundred men, killed and wounded, two thousand prisoners, five field pieces, and several stand of colours. The loss of the French was in- considerable. Such, succinctly, was the bat- tle of Montenotte, famous for being the first of a long series of victories, of which though not the least brilliant, it was in consequence of the want of cavalry among the least decisive. Owing to the skill of Bonaparte's manoeuvres, and the rapidity of his onsets, the Austrians were so completely routed, that they must have suffered severely had there been a rapid pursuit. Of the fugitives, the greater part who were Austrians, retreated upon Dego in the direction of Acqui. The Sardinian detachments with difficulty made their way to Millesimo^ on the road to Ceva. The former position while it defended the route towards Milan, was in the line of Beaulieu's countermarch from Voltri^ and of the ad- vance of reenforcements from Lombardy. The latter connected the Sardinian detach- 24o THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. ments with Colli's left wing, and command- ed the road to Turin. (28) Although on the morning of the 12th, Beaulieu, who was anxiously concerting with the English commodore, a plan of ope- rations against Savona, heard the distant sound of battle upon his right, it was not until the morning of the i3th, that the overthrow of his centre was made known to him. This intelligence fell like a thunderbolt in his path, severed his connection with Nelson's squadron, and dashed to pieces their mutual hopes of vic- tory, invasion, and conquest. He returned in haste to Acqui where he arrived that night ; having directed Sebottendorf with the main body of his corps to retrace his march by Sestri and the Bochetta to Dego, and Wiikassowich Avho had been pushed forward with a division of grenadiers on the left of Cervoni, to take the more direct route for the same point, by the way of Sassello. But the route in one case was difficult and rough, and in the other so circuitous, that Sebottendorf s leading battalions only were in time to participate in the next battle. Bonaparte was not less keen in prosecu-? THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 2 1^1 ting his success, than he had been bold and From March, . . ... 1796 skilful in gaining it. On the day of the battle to May. of Montenotte he advanced his head quarters to Carcare, a point at which the springs of the mountains turn their waters to the Po. Laharpe with the right division was ordered to pursue the Austrians on the route towards Sassello, with a view of driving them further upon their left, and of menacing an Austrian detachment of four battalions stationed at that place. He was then suddenly to wheel to his left and march in the direction of Dego, in order to cooperate with Massena in an attack on that fortified position. At the same time Massena was directed to advance by the main road to Dego, while Augereau's division, which, as Serrurier was yet sta- tionary at Garessio, now formed the left of the line, moved upon Millesimo. At this point the Piedmontese had been joined by Colli, with as manybattahons as hecould ven- ture to draw from his camp at Ceva and his main position in front of Serrurier; and at Dego, Argenteau was reenforced by Beaulieu with all the troops which had been able to come up from Voltri. Thus the Austrian general profiting by his numbers, notwith- i6 24^ THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. Standing the defeat of his centre, was able to oppose to his adversary more than an equal force^ which though it occupied an extended line, rested on intrenchments on the heights of Dego, and was strongly posted on those of Cairo and Millesimo. Here, covering the two great roads leading into Piedmont and Lombardy, he hoped to maintain himself until the arrival of troops from Milan and the return of all his divisions from Voltri, should enable him to resume offensive ope- rations, and retrieve the loss and discredit sustained by his lieutenant. But the battle of Millesimo^ which again disconcerted his plans, gave Bonaparte his second victory. The enemy had strengthened his right at Millesimo, by occupying a mountain called Cossaria, situated between the two branches of the Bormida, and commanding the valleys of both. They had also availed themselves judiciously of the nature of the ground in front of Millesimo^ and had posted a strong detachment in a narrow defile, through which an approaching force must pass. At daybreak on the i3lh, Bonaparte with his left division attacked the enemy in the defile before Millesimo. Augereau, who had not THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 2 43 yet been en^aeed, and was burninsf with From March, . . 1796, emulation of the glories of Montenotte, led to May, this attack, forced ihe pass with the impe- tuosity of a torrent, and supported by the brigades Joubert and Mesnard, cut off the corps of general Provera from CoUi's main body, and swiftly surrounded it on the mount of Cossaria, The strength and value of his elevated position being felt by Provera, he intrenched himself with his two thousand men in the extensive ruins of an ancient chateau on its summit. Here^ though he had little ammunition, and neither water nor food, he resolved to hold out to the last, as from his lofty strong hold he could see the Sardinian army preparing to come to his rescue. On the other hand, Bonaparte whose per- sonal activity in these battles was incessant, had, in the night, before he joined the divi- sion of Augereau, sent orders to Massena and Laharpe to expedite their movement uponDego, so as to attack in the morning. Consequently he was under the impression that his brave lieutenants were engaged in a struggle for victory, with which the division of Augereau ought to cooperate. He first there- 2 44 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. fo''^ summoned Provera, and that proving ineffectual, resolved to assault him, in the hope of clearing away all obstruction to an immediate attack on the force under Colli. But while the columns were forming for this perilous attempt, a brisk firing was heard in the direction of Cencio, which drew the commander in chief towards the centre of his line, which was held by the brigade Mesnard. To i\ugereau's direction was consequently entrusted the assault upon Provera. (24) I This officer was so confident in the prospect of relief, and the strength of his post, that he would consent to relinquish it only upon condition of a safe retreat to his friends, with his troops, their arms, and baggage. As the mountain, which was steep and rocky, pre- sented three faces, Augereau formed three columns of attack. They were commanded by generals Banel, Joubert, and Quenin^ and were supported by a proper reserve. Each column ascended a side of the mountain, with a view of distracting the fire of the enemy, and of meeting, in an attack, on the chateau. The assailants advancing, with determined spirit, in the face of a con- THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 2 45 Slant discharge of musketry, the heads of the From March, columns were more than halfway up, when to May, Joubert coming to a depression in the sur- ' * face of the hill, which afforded a degree of shelter from Provera's fire, halted in order that his men might breathe, and make their attack with collected vigour. Banel and Quenin, it appears, being apprised of his halt, imitated his example, and likewise suspended their progress. This result of discretion or accident, the enemy conceiving to be the effect of fear, took fresh courage, and while they continued their fire, rolled down huge stones from the ruinous walls upon the French columns, into which bounding rocks and showering bullets carried over- throw and slaughter. Generals Banel and Quenin were among the first and bravest of the slain. The exertions and intrepidity of Joubert not only sustained the courage of his men, but led them to the foot of Pro- vera's intrenchment, into which, with seven brave followers, he was forcing an entrance, when he was prostrated by a stone from the walls. (20) He rolled senseless down the precipice, and, though but momentarily dis- abled, was believed by his men to be dead. 2 4 6 THE LIFE OF CHAP VI. Before so many obstacles, the columns de- prived of their leaders, recoiled, the men scattering, and sheltering themselves, as they could, behind the few trees, slender brushwood, and rocky projections of the mountain, until night, which was now ap- proaching, favoured their retreat. The loss of the French in killed and wounded has been estimated at httle short of a thou- sand, in which number they lamented two generals and other gallant officers slain. XThus severely foiled, Augereau became cir- cumspect, and estaUislied posts close around tliefoot of tlie mountain. These, by order of Bonaparte, who returned to this point in the evening, and was appreliensive that Pro- vera might attempt in the night to cut a passage to the Sardinian army, he fortified, as well as he could, witli artillery, and pre- pared to maintain, by directing his men to sleep on their arms. During the i3th, Massena finding his troops fatigued by a long march, and his numbers insufficient for an attack on Dego, had waited for the junction of the brigade Dommartin, and for the support of Laharpe, so that, on that day, the cooperation pro- THE EMPEKOB NAPOLEON. 247 lected between the two wings of his army From March, 1796 by Bonaparte could not have taken place, to xMay, even had the assault on Provera proved suc- cessful. But, in the course of the morning of the 14th, these accessions reached Mas sena, and the two armies were in presence along the whole line; from Millessimo, where Augereau and Colli were confronted, to Dego, for the possession of which Bonaparte and Beaulieu were to contend. On the left the allies, on the right the French, were the assailants. The former confided in their numbers and position, the latter relied on their enthusiastic courage and their general's skill. Leaving Augereau to deal with Colli, and to reduce Provera, Bonaparte repaired, on the morning of the i4th, to the right of his line, with a view of superintend- ing, in person, the storming of Dego. On his way, after witnessing the gallantry with which Mesnard defeated an attempt of the enemy by piercing the French centre, to turn their left and relieve Provera, he directed him to incline to his right, so as to support the attack of Massena and Laharpe. For this important operation the division of Laharpe 2 48 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. -vvas formed into three close columns, under the orders of generals Causse, Cervoni, and Boyer; that of Massena into two, under Lasalcette and Monnier, Avhich last column, destined to turn the enemv's left, was at- tended J3y Massena in person. The Austrians w ere posted in a grand redoubt on the com- manding height of Dego, and in intrench- ments on a chain of contiguous but less ele- vated hills, extending to their right. These Were to be carried by the division of La- harpe, who was then to unite with Massena in the attack on Dego. About one o'clock, the preparations were completed, and the general ordered the troops to advance. At this moment, Junot arrived with the capitu- lation of Provera, and with intelligence that Colh, after being repulsed by Augereau, in repeated efforts to rescue Provera, had been finally compelled to retreat. This informa- tion stimulated to a higher degree of fervour the courage of the troops. They crossed the rapid Bormida under a plunging fire of ar- tillery; the columns of Laharpe fording the torrent, Massena passing on a rude moun- tain bridge. Moving with impetuosity and concert, they soon came into close action. THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. ^49 The Austrians resisted bravely, but were From March, 1 796 overpowered by the vigour of the French, to May, So complete was their success, that on the right, Massena after taking the Austrian ar- tillery, intercepted their retreat. The corps stationed in the great redoubt of Dego, had a prospect not unlike that of Provera, but a different fate. When attacked in front by the columns of Causse, Cervoni, and Lasal- cette, they could see Argenteau hastening up in the rear of the village, with a reenforcc ment of four battalions to their relief. They therefore stood firm, when they might have retreated in comparative safety. But Mas- sena continuing his active progress on their left, opened a fire on the flank of Argenteau, who felt himself endangered and instantly retired. At the same moment, Causse, Cervoni, and Lasalcette, assailed them in front, broke into their works, and fell upon them with the bayonet. The Aus- trians fought with a courage worthy of a better fate, but overwhelmed by their ene- mies, and unsupported by their friends, they were cut to pieces. Argenteau was censured for having too readily sacrificed these brave men to his own safety. Thus, from right CHAP. VI. aSo THE LIFE OF to left, along tlie whole line from the heights of Cossaria to those of Dego, Beanlieu's de- feat was complete. The action closed with the close of day. The vanquished fled to the camps they had left ; the victors slept on the hills they had won. The loss of the allied army in prisoners, amounted to six thousand, among whom were one lieutenant general, one brigadier, I and twenty-four field officers. Thirty pieces of artillery, a quantity of ammunition, and fifteen colours fell into the hands of the con- queror. As the French had mounted four hundred cavalry, and pursued the imperial- ists hotly from Dego, where the resistance was obstinate^, and the fighting severe, their loss in killed and wounded, which was com- puted by Bonaparte at two thousand five hundred, was doubtless considerable. The conduct of Provera, in surrendering without a determined effort to disengage himself, presents an obvious and inglorious contrast with the heroism of Rampon. In the hope of entailing upon the enemy the services of a general so inefficient, Bonaparte, in releas- ing Provera on parole, bestowed on hirn THE EMPEROR NAPOLEOiN. 25 1 words of commendation, which, it appears FromMarcbj ^ ^ 1796, in the seguel, had the effect they were de- to May, 1796. signed to produce. ^ The victory of Millesimo, by driving Beau- lieu back upon x\cqui^ and forcing Colli to withdraw to Ceva, completely disjoined the Austrian and Sardinian armies, andeffectually divided the motives of the two command- ers. Beaulieu became solicitous to protect Lombardy.and Colli anxious to cover Turin. Not a moment was lost in following up these Avell-earned advantages, and in over- powering the enemy by incessant rapidity as well as daring enterprise. With a view of favouring the junction of Serrurier who had been directed to approach from his position at Garessio^ Augereau was ordered to incline to his left, and to take possession of Mon- tezemoto. Laharpe was to support Auge- reau, while Massena with his division, for- ming the right of the line, was to advance in a corresponding direction, and to coope- rate, by turning their left, in dislodging the Sardinians from their fortified campatCeva. Meanwhile, Wukassowich, after a painful and devious march across themountains from Voltri, by way of Sassello, arrived at three 2^2 THE LIFE OF CHAP^^. ^ o'clock in ihe morning of the iStli in the rear of thepostat Dego, where, it will be remem- bered he had been directed by Beaulieu to form his junction with Argenteau. To his astonishment he found French instead of Austrian troops before him. Taking counsel from courage, he attacked them at day break, fatigued with the toil of the late '^ battle, and oppressed with wine from the neighbouring village. In spite of the exer- tions of their ofScers, the French offered but a slight resistance, and Wukassowich with little difficulty took six hundred prisoners, and recovered the positions as well as the artillery which Argenteau had lost. Intel- ligence of his disaster created great alarm at the French head quarters; for the surprise Avas not only complete, but inexplicable, as the French generals it would seem could not conceive the possibility of an attack on Dego, while their parties on the roads to Acqui and Ceva, were undisturbed. Mas- sena being first apprised of this rude assault upon the extreme right of his division, hastened to the spot, and putting himself at the head of the disordered battalions and such troops as were at hand, attempted to THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 253 drive the successful Austrians from their From March, 1706 ground, before they could fairly establish to May, themselves. But his men, who had not re* . covered from their consternation, attacked feebly, and were quickly repulsed. At this moment^ Bonaparte galloped up, leadingLa- harpe's division, whose march upon Ceva he had promptly countermanded. Under his direction efficient preparations were in- stantly made for fighting over the battle of the day before, and regaining the heights and redoubts, which had been so gallantly won, and so suddenly lost. The grand redoubt ofDego AVas again to be carried by assault; a task which was confided to general Causse, with the 99th regiment. General Mesnard with his brigade was charged with dislodg- ing the enemy from the surrounding heights, a service which Massena, whose privilege of rank was the post of danger, in person su- perintended. Causse finding his column dreadfully galled in climbing the hill, placed himself at the head of the grenadiers, and sprang forward in hopes by accelerating the issue^ to diminish the expense of the conflict. A deadly discharge of musketry from the redoubt, deprived the assailants of their CHAP. VI. 254 THE LIFE OF daring commander, and driving this party back upon the column, thrcAV the regiment into disorder. At this critical moment the Austrians rushed down the hill ; attacked, routed, and pursued the French. Bo- naparte, however, displaying the Sgth, which had just reached the ground un- der general Victor, received and broke the shock of the imperiahsts; and directing the officers of his escort to rally the 99th, with the united corps, forced them to retreat to their post on the hill. The conflict on this point was severe and doubtful. The ad- jutant general Lanusse took command of two battalions of light troops and determined to repeat the effort of Causse. The Hungarian grenadiers of Wukassowich, no less resolved to renew their successful charge, met and engaged him. Three times the French were forced to recede, as often the Hungarians were compelled to retire. The last time Lanusse placed his hat on his SAVOrd, and calling on his men who bravely followed, rushed up the hill and decided the action. In the meantime, Ivlassena had cleared the inferior heights, and gained the front of the grand redoubt, while Cervoni was scaling THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 255 the precipice on its flank. Upon this Wukas- ^"^^^^g^"^' sowich, his grenadiers discomfited, and his *« J^^ay, . 1111 1T96. post in danger of being surrounded^ had no resource but flight. The pursuit, like the battle, was fierce and bloody. The Austrian division was nearly destroyed, and all the artillery retaken. The intrepid conduct of Lanusse, which passed under the eyes of the commander in chief, was hke that of Ram- pon at Monteligino, rewarded by promotion to the rank of general of brigade. Lannes, the famous Duke of Montebello, who com- menced the campaign as a chief of battalion, participated in this glorious struggle. On the same ground, the day before, his gal- lantry had so engaged the attention of Bona- parte^ that he promoted him on the field to a full colonelcy ; a promotion which was the measure of the first degree of that merit which afterwards became colossal. These were the first occasions on which Bonaparte as commander in chief, enjoyed the congeninl pleasure of rewarding courage displayed on the field of battle. Owing to the closeness and desperation of the fighting, the French lost many officers, among them generals Causse and BonneL The former w^ho fell 256 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. wiortally wounded, upon seeing the com- mander in chief advancing in the heat of the action, could only articulate, " Is Dego retaken ? " the love of glory being the last emotion of his noble heart. Thesurpriseof the FrenchatDego although it was jDromptly and gallantly retrieved, discovers a want of that prudence for which their commander was subsequently distin- guished. His plan of operations was founded on the advantage which the movement of Beaulieu upon Voltri, and the time necessary for that general's reunion of his divisions, would be likely to give him over the Austrian centre. From his report of the victory of Millesimo, it appears he was aware of an Austrian corps being stationed at Sassello, and that he overrated it at eight batta- lions. Yet, with these pressing reasons for vigilance in respect to the security of his rear and right, he allowed Wukassowich, who actually marched by the way of Sassello, and united the troops there with his own di- vision, to reach his bivouacs unobstructed, and fall upon his men in their sleep. The consequences of this imprudence might well have been fatal. For had Bo- THE EMPEKOR NAPOLEON. 2b'] parte's attack on Deoro, which formed the From March, . 1796 leading operation in the battle of Millesimo, to May, been postponed from the afternoon of the 14th to the morning of the iSth, the failure of the French would have been inevitable, and their expulsion from Piedmont not im- probable. If we censure the French general, be- cause in the hurry of incessant fighting and pursuit, his judgment declined for a moment from its comprehensive elevation, we eannot fail to admire the active vigour, and easy celerity, with which its equipoise was reco- vered. The second capture of Dego was more glorious to the French than the first ; and the personal prowess which Bonaparte combined with his militarv skill in conduct- ing the operation, shows that, while he felt its critical importance, he perceived and employed the best means of ensuring its success. But neither the genius of Bonaparte nor the spirit of his troops in the opening of this • campaign, can be adequately admired, with- out bearing in mind that the first six days, from the combat of Vohri to the victory of Dego, with pauses of but a few hours, were ^7 2^8 TUE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. filled up Jiy one widely extended and con- tinued battle, in which the French infantry were victorious, at all points and against fresh troops, over superiority of ground, numbers, and equipment. While the shattered remains of Wukas- sowich's division pursued by the light troops of Massena and the cavalry of Stengel, fled to Acqui, increasing the consternation of their comrades, and the confusion of their general, Bonaparte, prompt, victorious, and persevering^ renewed his interrupted move- ment against the Sardinians. Attentive to the great object rather than the special instructions of the directory, he determined to operate vigorously with his left and centre; and prudent from experience, to protect his rear from a repetition of surprise or annoyance. Accordingly while Victor with one brigade was posted at Cairo, La- harpe was thrown directly in front with instructions to take post on the river Belbo, at the late Austrian camp of St. Benidetto, to observe Beaulieu, to restrain his detach- ments, and hold him separated from Colli. General Cervoni also was despatched to Sa- Yona to ascertain whether the enemy had THE E31PER0L NAPOLEON. 2^)9 completed the evacuation of Voltri. To From March, oerrurier^ orders were sent to come mto ^ ^j connection with Augereau, who was advanc- '' '^^• ing toward Ceva^ and to cooperate in an at- tack on the Sardinian intrenchments at that place, which Massena, by a corresponding movement on the right was commanded to turn. These combined movements were speedily performed. Thus the action of the army was reversed. The right division which hitherto had been incessantly engaged in marches or combats, was now left sta- tionary on the Belbo, while the left, which as yet had been inactive on the Tanaro, was placed in advance, and in close pursuit of the enemy. Serrurier descending the left bank of the Tanaro with the main body of his di- vision, by means of detachments on the right bank, cooperated with general Rusca in dis- lodging a Sardinian corps from the heights of St. Murialto, and in estabhshing the de- sired connection. The divisions advanced upon Ceva; Serrurier, by the way of Batifolo, Bagnasco, and Nucetto ; Augereau on the route of Montezemolo and Montezemoto. Serrurier's light troops driving in the out- posts of Colli reached the town of Ceva, as o,6o THE LlfE OF CHAP. VI. Angereau's advance crowned the summit of Montezemoto. From this proud and airy height the re- pubhcan troops enjoyed the wide and sud- den prospect spread out before ihem — the plains of Italy, so long regarded as the land of promise, glittering with the domes of dis- tant cities, shining with the currents of wandering rivers^ and waving with harvests of abundance and glory. This scene so sub- lime and delightful, they contrasted with the sterile rocks and wintry precipices over which they had burst with impetuous con- quest; and looking round on the icy range of the Alps that had ceased as if by magic to forbid their invasion, their bosoms throbbed with a sense of irresistible valour and in- vigorated hope. The general himself was not unmoved. Gazing at the huge rampart of mountains he said to his officers, " Han- nibal forced the Alps, but we, we have turned them;" a phrase which happily de- picted the grandeur, skill, and success of his enterprise. But the tide of invasion rolled swiftly along ; the political sympathy of the inhabi- tants adding momentum to the progress of THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 26 1 the victors, as they penetrated into Pied- From March, mont, and entered hke a broad wedge to May, . 1796. between the shattered alHes. On Colli, in his camp at Ceva, Bonaparte now freed from the Austrians^ directed his strength. Augereau descending from the heights, and Serrurier passing down the banks of the Tanaro, attacked on the 17th, the latter the right and the former the front of the Sardinian intrenchments. Massena on his side pushed forward with a view of cross- ing the river below Ceva, and getting into the enemy's rear. In the front where the brigades Beyrand and Joubert made and repeated vigorous assaults upon his exterior works, Colli, with his heavy artillery and a disposable division of eight thousand men, opposed a very resolute resistance. But on his right Serrurier, whose turn to court danger and distinction was now come, had pushed a brigade as far as Montbarsilico on the road to the bridges over the Corsaglio. The Sardinian general finding from this movement and the progress of Massena, his position no longer tenable, and fearing a catastrophe like that from which he had been unable to extricate Provera, was forced *7 63 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. lo retire, allhougli he thereby increased his distance from Beauheu. Availing himself of the night to repass the Tanaro, he gained the hridges over the Corsaglio, and selected a ]>o.sition on tlie left bank o( that river, at its conlluence with the Tanaix). Upon re- treating from Ceva, he strengthened the garrison of that fortress, but w^as not able to bring off the artillery from his camp, his expulsion from which spread consternation iimong'the provincial authorities, and alarm- ed the court of Turin. In this affair of Ceva the Sardinians , besides their killed and wounded, lost four hundred prisoners. Serrurier, alreadv on the left bank of the Tanaro and reenforced by the impatient ca- valry of Stengel, pursued closely in the rear of Colli. Bonaparte placed himself with this division and established his head quar- ters at the castle of Lesogno, situated near the right bank of the Corsaglio and its point of junction with the Tanaro. Massena who had passed the Tanaro lower down, now formed the centre of the line, and leaving a rearguard at ihe bridge of Ceva in order to observe the garrison and to maintain a com- munication Avith Victor's brigade at Cairo, THE liMPEKOU NAPOLEON. 263 directed his march for the ccneraTs head From March, . 1796, quarters. Aiigereaa, on the right moved to May, down the east bank of the Tanaro in the di- ^ , 1 rection of Casteliino ; Bey rand's brigade form- ing his rear; Ruscas escorting the captured artillery ; and Joubert's thrown upon the left, in order, by finding a bridge or effecting a passage below the mouth of the Corsaglio, to keep open a communication with the other divisions and to assist in the attack on CoUi. In the angle formed by the two rivers there was sharp fighting betAveen the French light troops and the rear of the Sardinians. On the I gih, Serrurier forced the passage of the Corsaglio, at the bridge of St. Michel, and, after taking several pieces of artillery, established the brigade Fiorella in that village. But his troops, who, in conse- cjuence of continual movements for several days, had received no rations, dispersed themselves in quest of food, and in this si- tuation were suddenly attacked by Colli's rear guard, and driven, with loss and dis- order, out of the village and over the bridge. On the same day, Augereau, with Joubert's brigade, reached the bank of the Tanaro, a deep and rapid stream, which here aug- 264 ^HE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. mented by the Corsaglio, andcleaving its way through clustered hills, presented in alter- nate opposition steep and shelving banks, which admitted only a long and diagonal passage. Parties of the enemy, who were drawn up on the left bank, had destroyed the bridge. Nevertheless, in order to make a diversion in favour of Serrurier, an effort was made to gain the opposite shore. Joubert, although lately wounded, urged his horse into the river, and, taking an oblique direction, succeeded in landing with a small party. But the current was found too strong and deep for the grenadiers^ and Augereau was therefore compelled to recall Joubert, and withdraw his brigade out of reach of the enemy's fire. The 21st, the rear of Massena's division having come up to Lesogno, preparations were made for forcing a passage of the Corsaglio at several points. Serurrier forming the left, was directed to ascend the stream, and crossing at the bridge of Torre, to fall upon Colli's right flank, while Massena was to effect a passage at the bridge of St. Michel, in the face of the enemy's batteries. The general in chief;, with part of Massena's division, and THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. ^65 With Joubert's brigade, was to cross by a From March, . 1796 ford above, and a hastily constructed bridge to May, below, the confluence of the rivers. ColU, . though hoping for support from BeauHeu, was intimidated by these preparations, and withdrew from his positions on the bank of the river, to more elevated and contract- ed ground immediately under Mondovi, where, if disappointed in receiving re- enforcements, he might have time to for- tify himself, and to remove the ample ma- gazines of that important town. But, on the 2 2d, while he was thus employed, the French, whose passage of the river had been accelerated by being unopposed, came upon him. Serrurier who led the pursuit, first came into action, assailing the enemy's centre with the brigades Dommartin and Fiorella, while the brigade of Guyeux at- tacked his right. At the same time the columns of the commander in chief and Mas- sena were gaining his left flank. Strength- ened by several redoubts. Colli resisted man- fully. In the centre Dommartin was at first repulsed by the exertions and gallantry of general Dichat, but being supported by Serrurier with Fiorella's brigade^ the attack 266 THK JJIE OF ^^^_}^'-^ was renewed willi vigour. In this con- flict, in which general Dicliat was mortally wounded, the struggle was severe, and the slaughter dreadful. Serrurier, however, suc- ceeded in carrying ihe principal redoubt which covered the Sardinian centre. His success decided the action. General Colli finding his centre thus exposed, and that Guyeux who had driven in his right was on the point of entering Mondovi, ordered a retreat behind the EUero, a movemejit Avhich soon degenerated into flight. He lost three thousand men killed and wonnded, fifteen hundred prisoners, among whom were three generals, eight pieces of cannon, and eleven stand of colours. In addition, the fortified town of Mondovi, with its artil- lery and magazines, was surrendered to the victor. As the weight of this battle had been sustained by Serrurier, it resulted that all the divisions and each commander, had proved their courage and conduct in this short campaign, of ten days and incessant action ; Massena and Laharpe at Monte- notte and Dego; Augereau at Millesimo, and Serrurier at Mondovi. Notwithstand- THE EiVlPEUOB NAPOLEO.N. !6r irig the roughness of the ground, it appears From March, that the general's aide-de-camp Murat^ made ^^ ^' a successful charge with the 20th regiment of ^ _JZ^^_ > dragoons. General Stengel, a brave and accomplished officer, had omitted no opportunity of secur- ing horses and mounting his troops, so that as the army beween Montezemoto and the Corsaglio was reaching suitable ground^ 4ie had thrown his cavalry occasionally in front, and was eager to compete with the infantry in service and glory. On the retreat of the Sardinians from Mondovi he pursued them ardently beyond the Ellero, and attacked a superior body of CoUi's horse. In the charge, which was not successful, the French were repulsed by the queen's regiment of dra- goons, and Stengel surrounded and killed. The brave Murat, rallied the broken squa- drons, and putting himself foremost in a desperate charge, routed the Sardinians and renewed the pursuit. Bonaparte deeply regretted the loss of Stengel, in whose charac- ter he said were united, besides various ac- complishments, the fire of youth and the judgment of age. His death was owing pro- bably to his defect of vision, his breast being >.68 THE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. reached by a sword-thrust, which with a clearer sight he might have parried. He fell a captive and a corpse, into the enemy's hands. (26) The French general^ neither stopped by resistance, nor delayed by success, advanced rapidly upon the traces of Colli, and directly towards the heart of Piedmont. Serrurier on the left pursued in the line of the enemy's retreat, by the road of Brealongo upon Fos- sano, from which town situated on the left bank of the Stura, after a sharp cannonade with Sardinian guns, he compelled Colli to retire. Bonaparte in the centre with Mas- sena's division, marched down the left bank of the Tanaro, and took possession of Che- rasco, a fortified place between the Stura and the Tanaro, and immediatly at their confluence. Down the right bank of the latter river, Augereau led his division by the way of Dogliano and Novetta to Alba^ an important town on the Tanaro, about fifteen miles below Cherasco. By keeping Auge- reau on the right bank, while the faculty of supporting Laharpe in case of an attempt on the part of Beaulieu to overwhelm him by numbers, was maintained, a larger space THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 269 for collecting provisions for the army was From March, commanded, and the necessity avoided of toMaV, , .„ ' . 1796.' conveymg heavy artillery across a river without bridges. These movements were so expeditious and well regulated that Ser- rurier entered Fossano, Massena's division took possession of Cherasco, and Augereau made himself master of Alba, all on the 25th ofx\pril. Thus in a fortnight after the commence- ment of active operations, the republican general, having defeated numbers doubling his own, reduced the x\ustrians to inaction and the Sardinians to despair, and left the exterior fortresses of Coni and Ceva far be- hind him, had established his army in three strong positions, embracing eight leagues of an important water course, in the centre of Piedmont and within thirty miles of its ca- pital. (27) Meanwhile Beaulleu, who had received from Colli and the Sardinian court, urgent solicitations for assistance, marched from Acqui with a part of his force to Nizza de la Paglia, in a direction tending to support Colli, who had fallen back behind the Po to Carignano, ten miles in front of Turin. 2'TO Tlir. LIFE OF CHAP VI. Counleracling this movement, which was too late and indecisive to be useful, Laharpe left his position on the upper Belbo, and drew down to Niella with a view of keeping in front of Beauheu^ and in closer connection with the right of Augereau. At the same lime^ as intercouse between the rear of the army and Savona had ceased in consequence of the shorter hne of communication, from Garessio and Oneille to Nice, being now in possession of the French, general Victor was directed to break up from Cairo and join Laharpe. Orders were likewise sent to ge- nerals Dallemagne and Macquart, who had remained in their positions on the extreme left, with a few skeletons of battalions, des- tined to guard the Col de Tende and main- tain a connection with the army of the Alps, to advance into Piedmont and in con- junction with one of Serrurier's brigades, to invest Coni. To give further security to his position, as well as to increase his power of annihilating the resistance of Sardinia, and carrying on the campaign against Beaulieu, Bonaparte requested general Rellerman to send forAvard to his support the right wing THE niMPEKOR NAPOLEOrs. 2-^1 of llie army of the Alps, which was now ^'Tt"' likelv to be unemployed. *^?i^^* A ^ ^ 1^96. Cherasco, where his head quarters were established, though a fortified town, being remote from the frontiers, was indifferently armed and provided. But its magazines contained a great quantity of artillery, and no time was lost in putting it in a state of defence. After this was effected, the main body of Massena s division was advanced in the direction of Turin as far as the little town of Bra, five miles in front ofCherasco, and but fifteen from general CoUi's camp. Thus posted, the French general seemed to be prepared to strike the last blow at the Sardinian monarchy, and with the aid of the disaffected population around him, to over- whelm the king himself in its ruins. As early as the day after the battle of Mondovi, general Colli had proposed a ces- sation of hostilities, in the hope of suspend- ing the tempest^ which, powerless from de- feat and unsheltered by Beaulieu, he felt unable to withstand. The court of Turin, alarmed at the loss of their intrenched camp at Geva, had furnished the occasion, by send- 211 *rttE LIFE OF CHAP. VI. ing plenipotentiaries to Genoa, to open ne- gotiations with the French agents under the mediation of Spain ; which court, since the treaty of Bale in July, 179?, was the chosen intercessor for the worsted coalitionists. Colli proposed an armistice, to continue until the result of these negotiations should be known. Bonaparte, though inexperienced in diplomacy, was too sagacious not to dis- cover in the nakedness of this proposition, an indirect appeal to his mercy; in other words, an application prompted by the help- lessness and trepidation of the Sardinian monarch. These he determined to turn to account; not for the sake of wresting exorbi- tant concessions from Victor Amadeus, but for the purpose of weakening the power of Austria in Italy, which was the great object of the campaign. His answer to general Coin, considered as a piece of diplomacy is remarkable for being perfectly void of finesse or duplicity; and regarded in reference to his situation as a victorious commander, is commendable for delicacy and modera- tion. (28) He replied that the directory had reserved to itself the power of making peace ; that consequently the commissioners of the THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 2'] 3 kine; of S irdinia would be under the neces- From March, sity of proceeding to Paris, or of waiting at to May, Genoa for the arrival of French plenipot en* tiaries; that considering the relative situation of the two armies, a simple and uncondi- tional cessation of hostiUties was out of the question ; and that although as a private in- dividual, he had reason to beUeve the French government would consent to peace on terms honourable to the king of Sardinia, he could not on the mere presumption, sus- pend the progress of his army. But he ad- ded, that if the king would surrender to him two of the three fortresses, Alexandria, Coni, and Tortona, he Avould agree to the desired suspension of arms. By this fair and direct proceeding he consulted the main object of the campaign, and the safety of his army, without humiliating the court of Turin, or appearing to remember either its character- istic duplicity, or its concern in the occu- pation of Toulon. With these conditions Victor Amadeus, in spite of the intrigues and instances of the Austrian and English envoys and partizans, complied without he- sitation ; and on the 28th of April, the armis- tice of which they formed the basis, and 18 2^4 "^^^ ^^^^ ^^ CHAP. VI. which comprehended the armies of Keller- man and the duke of Aoste, was signed at Cherasco. (29) In conformity with the terms finally agreed upon, by virtue of which the king of Sardinia engaged to separate himself totally from the coalition, and to discontinue harbouring French emigrants of all ranks; Coni and Tortona, with the artillery and magazines appertaining to them, were surrendered to the French ; a line of demarcation between the two armies, coinciding with the limits of their actual possessions, was defined; f Geva, situated greatly within that of the French, was evacuated by the Piedmontese garrison ; miUtary routes affording a direct communication with France were estab- lished; the Sardinian militia disbanded ; and the Sardinian army disseminated among va- rious and remote stations, so as to relieve the French, of old acquainted with the faith- less character of the court of Turin, from apprehensions of annoyance in their rear. It was also stipulated, at the instance of Bo- naparte, that Valenza, a fortified town on the Po, above the mouth of the Tanaro, and in the direct route from Cherasco towards THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 2^5 Milan, should be evacuated by Beaulieu's From March. ^ . -^ 1796, Neapolitan troops, and surrendered to the to May. French general, to be held by him until he should have effected the passage of the former river. This article, though apparently of secondary importance, had great influence on the succeeding operations. Murat, colonel of cavalry and first aide de camp of the commander in chief, was des- patched to Paris to deliver to the directory, w^ith a copy of the armistice, twenty-one stand of colours, trophies of the victories which had led to it; a mode of announce- ment as novel as the exploits themselves were then unrivalled. The aide de camp Junot, had been sent from Mellisimo with a report of that important battle, but being obliged to pass by Savona, and along the route of the Comiche^ Murat, who crossed the Alps at Mont Cenis and travelled post from Turin, reached Paris before him, and pro- duced consequently greater sensation and rejoicing in the capital. The legislative bo- dies of the new government, which at its birth in the previous autumn, Bonaparte had protected from the fury of domestic fac- tions, were now occupied in solemnizing ^.'j6 THE LIFE OF CHAP. vr. his triumphs over foreign foes. Repeatedly during one week in April, they decreed that the army of Italji had deserved well of their country. It need scarcely be mentioned, that the victories thus celebrated bear the immortal names of Montenotle^ Millesimo, Dego, Ceva, and Mondovi. It is worthy of remark, that the despatch of Bonaparte, announcing the armistice of Cherasco, was dated precisely one month after his first report from the head quarters at Nice. (3o) The French general remained at Cherasco only three days after the signature of the armistice. During this time, besides attend- ing to the execution of its conditions, he was *'*<^ employed in providing subsistence for his troops, and in repressing the habits of plun- der into which they had relapsed. The ra- A pidity of their movements since the nth of April, the scarcity of money, the insufficient transport and mountainous country, had rendered it impracticable to furnish a regu- lar supply of rations. The consequence was, that the men, after fighting all day for their country, had at night to plunder for food. This, of course, was attended always with THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 277 waste, sometimes with license and cruelty. "<^^^^rc^) To the reproaches of their officers they an- to May, swered, that their behaviour was better than ^ - ^^-^^^ — their fare, and to threats they opposed indif- ference or defiance. This state of things was productive of numerous complaints from the field officers to the generals, and from these to the commander in chief. General Laharpe's correspondence teems with indig- nation at the conduct of the men, with rage at the failure of the contractors, and with an inconsistent anxiety to punish both. The letters of the generals exhibit a situation of affairs, which under any other commander of the age, would have led to mutiny sooner than to conquest. In a letter of the 7th of April, general Rusca says, " I have but few cartouches at Bardinetto. You must for- ward a supply of them, as well as rations of brandy^ the troops being in bivouac without t blankets or shoes, and the cold is severe.*' On the 14th Massena wrote, '^My troops have received no bread, and I know not whether any can be found in the rear at Vado." Serrurier the same day, ^^ There are no provisions in the magazines of Ormea and Garessio*^ we live from hand to mouth/' ay 8 THE LIFE OF ClUF. VI. And Laharpe also on the i4th, ''In spite of ' ~^ ^ your promises, general, the troops are still without bread. They sink from fatigue and inanition ; send us, at least, a Uttlc bread and brandy, for 1 fear proving a prophet of ill ; yet, if we are attacked to-morrow, the men will behave badly for the want of phy- sical strength." On the morrow they had to fight the battle of Dego. The 17th Atb- gereau wrote, " I learn, by an order of the day, that shoes are to be served out to the divisions of generals Massena and Laharpe. But no mention is made of my division, which is in great Avant. I beg you to send me as soon as possible, a supply of shoes, of which I stand in need. Provisions destined for my division are received with difficulty." On the 20th, Laharpe, after reiterating his complaints and declaring that the 69th liad i received but two rations and a half in a ' week, concludes, " bread, bread, and again bread." On the 2 2d, this brave officer, whose troops, left in the exhausted country on the Belbo, were exposed to the greatest suffering, thus expressed himself, "The sol- diers are culpable, but those Avho expose them to the necessity of dying of hunger, or , THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 279 of living by pillage, are much more so. In FromM|rch, the name of humanity, in the name of that to May, . 1796. liberty which they are assassinating, come to «s_^ — - our rehef. Send us wherewithal to support our wretched existence, without committing crimes. Who would have believed that the brave troops of the army of Italy, would be rewarded with the cruel alternative of dying with famine, or living as brigands." These disorders, so grievous in them- selves, and so dangerous in their conse- quences, Bonaparte saw might be alleviated by the laws of discipline^ but could be cor- rected effectually only by the removal of their cause. While, therefore, he denounced punishment against those who should trans- gress the rules of subordination, or seize without authority the property of the inhabitants, he refused to sanction, except in one or two cases of excessive aggravation, i the infliction of capital punishment ; using at the same lime, his utmost exertions to stimulate the activity of the contractors, and to expedite the conveyance and delivery of provisions. For this object, as well as for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Aus- trians had completed the evacuation of Vol- CHAP. VI. 280 THE LIFE OF tri and might not repeat the surprise Dego, general Cervoni was sent, after the battle of the i5th toSavona, with directions to see that the supplies for the army were forwarded, without unnecessary delay or consumption at that depot. This con- siderate tenderness of Bonaparte for his troops, whose irregularities were more than compensated by their sufferings and their services, was displeasing to some of his offi- cers. Two field officers tendered their re- signations, and the brave general Laharpe, in whose character there appears to have ex- isted that sort of restlessness and inconsist- ency, which a keen susceptibility and an im- patient temper are apt to beget, addressed to the general in chief the following letter: "The extravagant disorder to which the troops give themselves up, and to which no remedy can be applied, since the authority to shoot a rogue is refused us^ hurries us to our ruin^ covers us with disgrace, and pre- pares for us the most cruel reverses. The firmness of my character not permitting me to look on these outrages, much less to toler- ate them, the only part left for me is to re- tire; andj therefore, I begof you^ general; to THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 28 1 accept my resignation, and to send an officer Ffom March, to take the command with which I am en- to May, trusted, preferring rather to cultivate the earth for bread, than to remain at the head of a rabble who are worse than the ancient Vandals." It is needless to observe that this letter neither altered the conduct of Bonaparte, nor the position of Laharpe, although it exemplifies the degree of embarrassment to which^ from this source of suffering and disorder, the former was exposed. (3ij However, the halt made at Gherasco, the armistice concluded there, and the establish- ment of direct routes of transportation be- tween France and Piedmont, soon enabled the general to apply an effectual remedy to these distressing inconveniences ; that is, to remove their cause. The troops being furnished with abundant food, ceased to plunder, and returned under the influence of miUtary rules and subordination, which afterwards, were strictly enforced. (3^) Vohmteers from the depots, and convales- cents from the hospitals, attracted by news of victory and plenty, made their way to his camp and repaired the losses which hi a83 THE LIF5 OF CHAP. VI. victories had cost. Sixty pieces of artillery were put in order for service, and by adding to the horses taken from the enemy, those which Avitli the consent of ilie government; of Sardinia, were purchased in Piedmont, the greater part of the troopers were mounted; so that the condition of the army of Italy became worthy of its spirit and prowess. At Cherasco Bonaparte was visited by the minister and the son of the king of Sardinia, who expressed, and probably felt great ad- miration for the young conqueror. The deUcacy and good faith of his proceedings in relation to the execution of the terms of the armistice; and his forbearance to counte- nance the revolutionary projects of the in- habitants in the province within which his principal force was encamped, gave peculiar satisfaction to the court of Turin, and made their military misfortunes less painful. His moderation in this instance was the more remarkable, as it was in opposition to the counsels of some of his generals, and to the letter of his instructions. (33) It will not escape the reader's observation that this was not the only point in regard to THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. ^83 which Bonaparte had deviated from the ^''^J^^^^'^^^ instructions of the directory. Instead of to May, acting principally against the Anstrians, he had directed his force chiefly against the Sar- dinians. Instead of penetrating to the right towards Tortona; he had advanced to the left upon Turin. And in place of refusing an armistice, he had granted one. This line of conduct, although it argued a fearlessness of responsibility, and a generous disdain like that of Alexander, to steal a victory^ may at first view appear insubordinate and unwar- rantable. To this conclusion however are opposed, the contradictory nature of the instructions themselves, the effectual manner in which had been accomplished the success of the French arms, and more than all, the consideration, that in every position in which Bonaparte had been previously employed, his ability to serve his country, had been proved to transcend the limits of his authority. At Toulon, though only a chief of battahon, with the sanction of Gasparin and the ac- quiescence of Dugommier, he commanded the siege. In the campaign of 1794? with the approbation of the deputies^ though he was only a brigadier general^ he directed the 284 '^^^ ^^^^ ^^ CHAP. VI. operations of general Dumerblon and his whole army. At Paris in 1795, in the pre- sence and with the applause of the conven- tion, he treated their commander in chief and their commissaries as mere nullities^ while he defended themselves against the insur- gents. So that if he exceeded his instruc- tions in the campaign of Montenotte, he had usurped command in the insurrection of Vendemaire, in the campaign of Saorgio, and at the siege of Toulon. On each of these occasions he had overflowed the ordinary channels of duty with a flood of courage, pa- triotism, and talent; and on all of them, an exuberance of public good had sprung from his excess of authority. Hitherto this pro- digality of service, had been accepted by the government as the bounty of genius; nor were the directory in the present instance, so unjust as to adopt a new rule of construc- tion, and pronounce his conduct to be the encroachment of ambition. (34) At this time, as neither the settled ani- mosity of factions nor the organized enmity of governments, had breathed mahgnant slanders on Bonaparte's name, his character and exploits commanded the admiration of THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. 2S5 t all Europe. (35) And having as we have From March, seen, in the short space of fifteen days, shaken to May, and upheld one kingdom, humbled and spared one monarch, established the subsis- tence, renovated the discipline, equipped the cavalry, supplied the artillery, recruited the strength, and fortified the rear of his army, he resolved to carry the war into the heart of Lombardy^ and single handed, (36) to brave the utmost might of that imperial house, whose hatred was destined to be an instrument of his elevation, and whose love, to be a cause of his downfal. (37) APPENDIX. i T,IBTIARX ' APPENDIX. CHAPTER I. Page 2. (i) From the manner in which sir Walter Scott records this cardinal event in his story, one might infer that his hero was a foundling — for instead of establishing the date of his birth by positive affir- mation or undeniable proof, he settles it by a vague circumstantial conjecture (v. iii, p. 6). ^^ The sub- ject of our narrative was born, according to the best accounts and his own belief, in the town of Ajaccio, upon the i5th day of August, 1769." This he- sitating, circuitous language, whicli might be pro- per to remove doubts concerning a remote or un- certain event, is evidently calculated to inspire them, when applied to a fact of recent occurrence, signal notoriety, and infinite attestation. How can the birth of any man, public or private, in the second half of the i8th century, be better determined, than Napoleon's was, at the time the author of Waver- ley condescended to adjust it by a scale of loose probabilities ; in the face of Napoleon's own state- ment, and in reach of the testimony of his mother, 19 290 APPENDIX. his uncle, and of the evidence afforded by the do- mestic chronology of a numerous family? Polybius insists on the importance of fixing with clearness and precision the commencement of an historical narrative, a precept which common sense, and common practice confirms. As sir Walter Scott has left a name in literature, more illustrious than that of Polybius, the reader may be curious to learn his motive, for employing terms on this occasion, which have the singular property of suggesting doubts which the author himself did not entertain, and upon a subject, in regard to which, certainty was not only de- sirable, but in truth almost unavoidable. That he could entertain no doubt on the subject is evi- dent, not only from its universal notoriety, but from the fact that he had before him and referred to Benson's Sketches of Corsica, in which (p. 3) the record of Napoleon's baptism, stating that he was born on the i5th of August, 1769^ is given jTor the declared purpose of clearing up all doubt. In the Quarterly Review for October, i8i4^ is an article headed, ^^ Memoirs of Buonaparte' s depo- sition^" in which, among other points of invective and schemes of detraction, a violent, though not a vigorous, effort is made, to prove that Napoleon had falsified the date of his birth, his name, and the names of his family. This article was ascribed by the voice of literary rumour, to a distinguished and ob- sequious place-holder under the British govern- ment, a prolific if not a powerful contributor to the CHAPTER I. 291 review in question. Of its temper and language the following passage will give the reader a just idea. ^^ It is worth recording as characteristic of Buo- naparte and consistent with his whole course of life, that \\q falsified the date of his birth, his own Christian and family names, and the names of his wife and of all his family. *^He chose to call himself Napoleon Bonaparte^ and to fix his birth day on the i5th August^ 1769. ^^ His real names are Napolione Buonaparte^ and he was born on the ^th Fehruary^ 1768. ^^ The change of name was evidently for the pur- pose of making it somewhat French; and it was not till his appointment to the army of Italy, that he made this alteration. Barras, in his official account of the affair of the i3th Vendemiaire, 5th October, 1 796, calls him, He general Buonaporte,' probably a misprint for Buonaparte^ and in the contract of marriage between him and his first wife, still existing in the registry of the second arron- dissement of Paris, dated also in 1796, he is called by the notary, Napolione Bonaparte; but his own signature at the foot of the contract, is written Na- polione Buonaparte; and the preamble to this deed states that his baptismal register, then produced, attests that he was born on the 5th February, 1768. ^'' For the change of date three reasons may be assigned, ist, that he piqued himself on being the youngest of heroes, and was not sorry to strike a year and a half from his real age ; 2d, Corsica was not annexed to France till June, 1 769, and 9.92 APPENDIX. therefore to make himself a Frenchman^ he was obliged to choose a date subsequent to this period ^ 3d, the i5th August was, in the French calendar, the day on which a vow of Louis XIII, putting his kingdom under the protection of the Virgin, was celebrated, and it therefore appeared a fit birth day for the saviour of France, as Buonaparte called himself, and a convenient niche for the new patron saint Napoleon. ^^From the same contract of marriage it seems that Josephine's real names were Marie - Joseph- Rose. ^^The names of the rest of the family, as they appear in the act of guardianship made on their father's death, and now remaining in the archives of the chambre des comptes, are as follows, Joseph, Napolione, Lucciano, Luiggi, Girolamo, Mariana, Carletta, Annonciada j in the last three persons, our readers would have some difficulty in recognising their imperial bignesses the Princesses Elise and Pauline, and her majesty Queen Caroline of Naples; but even this change did not satisfy him, for lat- terly, his court calendar announced these ladies as Marie-Elise, Marie-Pauline, and Marie-Caroline; and even his old mother Letzia was new christened Marie Letitia. ^^The story of Napoleon's having been baptized Nicholas is therefore not true ; though at the col- lege of Brienne he may have substituted this fami- liar name for his foreign one of Napoleon." The follv and falsehood of this effusion, are too CHAPTER I. 293 obvious and contemptible for serious notice or ex- posure. The empress wrote her name Josephine^ when she was madame de Beauharnais, as may be seen, in her ^ Letters to her Daug^hter/ found in the coUectionpublished by F. Didot. In composition^ Josephine was curtailed of its last syllable, as Marie Joseph-Rose. In regard to NapoUone (Ita- lian) and Napoleon (French) their difference is im- putable clearly to the two languages, as Las Casas (Spanish) has become Las Cases (French), and Henry (English) is Henri (French). Every body but the Quarterly reviewer it seems, knew that Buonaparte and BuonaroUi, and similar Italian names, were written with or without the w, at pleasure. This learned person seems also to have been ignorant, that Lucciano, Luiggi, Girolamo, etc., in Italian, are equivalent to Lucien, Louis, Jerome, etc., in French. But the mother of Napo- leon, a woman, who independently of the wonder- ful man she gave to the world, or of the eventful story of her life, is respected for all the virtues of her sex, venerable and venerated for her age, hap- pened to have two names, Marie Letitia (as may be seen in the baptismal register of her son, pub- lished by Benson) a circumstance so offensive and outrageous to the Quarterly reviewer, that he as- serts, ^^ even his old mother Letzia was new christened Marie-Letitia." One might apprehend, that some caged hyena, hungry for human flesh, had been inspired with the art of writing ! The Quarterly Review was considered a vehicle 294 APPENDIX. of demi-ofFicial wishes and opinions^ and the au- thor of this execrable diatribe, was of course less the dispenser of literary fame, than the orp-an of ministerial and royal sentiments. This last consi- deration it is well known, Sir Walter Scott was not the rude and rebellious person to disregard. In these circumstances may be discovered the influence to which the great Scotch Novelist was Z»oom^, and the associations to which he winked, upon setting out to escort the mighty name of Napoleon to posterity. That this Caledonian courtesy was altogether different from mere French politeness, and exhi- bited a perfect consistency between the deportment and design of the author, is evident from a previous pass^e of his work. In his preliminary history of the Frencb revolution, where he is describing the irruption of the populace, into the palace of Ver- sailles on the night of the 5th and 6th October, and the narrow escape of the queen from their fury, he goes out of his way in order to sooth and gratify legitimate ears by imputing to the hero of his book a gross falsehood, before he has even announced his birth^ name, or parentage. In a note (v. i, p. 20 r) referring to a remark made by Napoleon near thirty years subsequently to the period of which he was writing. Sir Walter Scott observes ; — ^' One of the most accredited calumnies against the unfortunate Marie Antoinette pretends, that she was on this occasion surprised in the arms of a paramour. Buonaparte is said to have mentioned this as a fact, upon the authority of Madame Cam- CHAPTER I. 295 pan. We have now Madame Campan's own ac- count, describing the condtict of the queen on this dreadful occasion as that of a heroine, and totally ex- cluding the possibility of the pretended anecdote. But let it be farther considered, under what circum- stances the queen was placed, — at two in the morn- ing, retired to a privacy Uable to be interrupted (as it was) not only by the irruption of the furious banditti who surrounded the palace, demanding her life, but by the entrance of the king, or of others, in whom circumstances might have rendered the intrusion duty • and let it then be judged whether the danger of the moment and the risk of discovery, would not have prevented Messalina herself from choosing such a time for an assignation," The sex, the beauty, and the fate of Marie Antoinette, com- mand for her memory the respectful indulgence of generous minds. But could these considerations justify the Author of Waverley, in endeavouring to forestall the equity of his readers, by creating an impression that the man, to the study of whose character he was professing to conduct them, had made a false assertion in order to propagate a cruel slander ? Unfortunately for the memory or Marie Antoinette and for the Author of Waverley, he sus- tains this imputation by a course of reasoning, which leads to a conclusion precisely opposed to the consequence he aims at. He argues, first, that considering the firmness of mind displayed by the queen on this occasion, it is absurd to suppose she would have permitted the caresses of a paramour igG APPENDIX. that night. The inference, however, is obviously the other way, inasmuch as had she been (jreatly oppressed with fear^ an access of love would have been improbable. He next argues that from the circumstances of the moment^ the liability to inter- ruption from the populace, or from the king, or, in consequence of danger, from others, it is impos- sible to conceive that she would then have consented to an assignation. Now the circumstances of the moment, so far from hearing this terrific aspect, were according to Sir Walter's own account on the previous page, the most favourable that could be to the alleged interview, as they were of a character to exclude the apprehension of disturbance. La Fayette had arrived with the civic guard from Paris, and after addressing the mob, having an audience of the king, and ^^ pledging himself to the national assembly, for the safety of the royal family, and the tranquillity of the night," had retired to rest under the sincere conviction, that there was not the least danger of an attack on the palace. Was there then any thing in the appearance of these circumstances, to deter the queen from an assignation ? Her previ- ous display of fortitude is not inconsistent with the anecdote, for the mind, after contending with stern emotions, is not unwilling to repose on those of a different description . With respect to the autho- rity of Madame Campan, which is so vaguely and bravely referred to, she says (t. ii, p. 77) that the queen on going to bed, ^^ directed her attendants to go to bed likewise, thinking there would be no CHAPTEPt I. 297 danger, that night at least." So that Marie An- toinette was not apprehensive of interruption from the populace, nor inclined to admit it from her ladies in waiting. As to the king, Madame Campan has commemorated too faithfully his unnatural coldness (t. i; pp. 60^ 88) and his almost incurable torpor (p. 186), to render the anecdote repeated by Na- poleon^ improbable, or the circumstance it records, inexcusable. Besides^ according to his version, the Count de Fersen, well known before as the queen's favourite, had arrived at Versailles only that even- ing (O'Mear a, v. ii, p. 1 7 2), when, though she might not have been disposed to form a new connection, there was nothing to deter the renewal of an old one . It is to be observed farther, that Madame Campan might very well relate an anecdote of the kind ver- bally, which she would decline publishing in a book ; while it is difficult to imagine a motive which would induce Napoleon to invent such a story : and it may be added that as the period of the restoration, un- der which Madame Campan's Memoirs as well as Sir Walter's work appeared, was not favourable to the development of truth in regard to this question, so the air of Versailles, the genius loci, at the time the queen was driven from her l3ed^ was not propi- tious to royal chastity. The reader cannot fail to perceive that as Sir Walter is on this subject far from questioning the veracity of Madame Campan, or of O'Meara, his laboured imputation was in- tended to bear exclusively upon the memory of Na- poleon. Had there been the least occasion for it 2()8 APPENDIX. — had the digression into which it is shaped been pertinent in the remotest degree — had Sir Walter been writing the life of Marie Antoinette, this at- tempt to vindicate her memory, even at the risk of reviving the recollection of her frailties, might have been pardoned in spite of its injurious feilure. But when it is obvious, that there was no occasion for it, that it is a violent deviation from his narrative, an excrescence from his subject, it exposes the in- tention with which his book was written too plain- ly to admit of doubt or to require demonstratiou. All that remains is to see how it is executed. Page 5. (2) It is remarkable that Sir Walter Scott, who is so devoutly respectful to long pedigrees and high birth, should express derision for the undisputed nobility and ancient distinction of the Bonaparte family. Hazlitt, a fierce republican, traces it with careful prolixity, (v. i, pp. 2, 3, l\^ 5, 6) ; Norvins, (v. i, p. i) with serious succinctness j Lockhart, (v. i, p. 1) with studied diminution -, while Scott classes it among minute matters which might be justly regarded (v. i, p. 2) ^^ as trivial and un- worthy of notice." The electors of Hanover^ when transferred from a poor German principality to the throne of Great Britain, by accident not by merit, were proud of the former distinction of their family, though the honours of this kind which it could boast, were not higher than those of the sovereign princes of Treviso, or of the Christian emperors of CHAPTER I. 299 Constantinople. For the descent of the Bonaparte family see Memorial de St. Helene (t. i^ p. 142 et sequente) ; Memoires de la Duchess d'Abrantes (t. i^ ch. 3) 3 La famille Bonaparte^ par M. Foissy, Avocat ; and Zoph's summary of universal history. Page 4. (3) The early traces of that disparagement which pervades Scott's Life of jNapoleon^ after he fairly reaches his subject, are, as might be expected from so practised and skilful a painter, slight and inci- dental ; disposing the mind of the reader to receive false impressions, rather than attempting directly to convey them. Thus (v. iii, p. 4) it is gently intimated that Napoleon possessed, in common with his father,, a sprightly mind and fluency of speech — ^"^ possessed a talent for eloquence and a vivacity of intellect which he transmitted to his son," — an intimation which leaves room for assign- ing to extraordinary fortune, rather than to trans- cendant genius, the principal events of his career. In the same style of design, and on the same page, it is observed, that his brother Lucien, who never fought a battle, planned a campaign, prescribed a peace, dictated a law, nor administered a govern- ment, ^^was scarce inferior to Napoleon in talent." A traveller who should say that the gloomy and lumpish hills of Scotland ^^were scarce inferior" to the Andes, would convey a very inadequate idea of the altitude of Chimborazo. As this over-praise of 3oO APPENDIX. Lucien, can scarcely be attributed to Sir Walter's partiality for the Bonaparte family, it must be con- sidered as a sly attempt, to extol one brother, at the expense of the other. Page i>. (4) That a lady in an advanced state of preg- nancy, and surrounded by the calamities of war, to which her husband as a chief of the defeated party was peculiarly exposed, should need the support of prayer, or implore the protection of heaven, can hardly be supposed to proceed from ^^a good con- stitution and bold character of mind," as is coarse- ly affirmed by Sir Walter (v. iii, p. 6). It must have required '^ a forty -parson -power" of prejudice, or of something worse, to induce an author of his delicacy of feeling and unrivalled power of descrip- tion — the creator of Rebecca — thus to caricature and debase this noble and touching incident. ' ^ Interea ad templum non aequee Palladis ibant Crinibus Iliades passis, peplumque ferebant Suppliciter tristes.'^ The benevolent and enlightened Addison re- commends to a lady in affliction (Spectator, No. iG3.) practices of devotion, as the most ef- fectual and the most natural means of relief. Page 6. (5) This account of the birth of her son, was com- municated to me, by the mother of Napoleon her- self, at Rome, long before the preparation of this CHAPTER I. 3oi work was thought of. She expressly contradicted the story about the tapestry of the apartment being ornamented with designs from the Iliad. Page 9. (G) Madame Mere. In the interview with which I was honoured by this venerable lady in the autumn of i83o^ she conversed much about the birth and infancy of her great son ; whose full length portrait in his imperial robes^ was at the head of the bed on which she was reclining. The portrait of her hus- band representing a very handsome man was on the right of her bed. Among other particulars she mentioned the extreme fondness and indulgence of Napoleon's father j who often saved his favourite from her correction, and controlled him frequently by threatening to tell her of his disobedience, saying, ^^ Very well, sir, I shall tell your mother, and she will teach you to behave better." She added, as well as I can remember her remark: ^' This threat usually checked Napoleon j but sometimes I had to switch him well." Page 9. (7) This fact mentioned to me by Madame Mere^ is repeated on her authority in Montbel's notice of the Life of the Due de Reichstadt (p. 357 .) Page 10. (8) He delivered a speech in that convention, which contained the following noble passage : — V 302 APPENDIX. ^^Ifj in order to be free, it were only necessary to wish it, all the nations of the earth would be free. But we learn from history that few have enjoyed that blessing, because but few have had the energy, the courage, and the virtue necessary to gain it." This speech was addressed to a people who had the will, but not the power to be free. The celebrated re- mark of Lafayette — "To be free it is only neces- sary to will it," had reference to nations in different circumstances. Page H. (9) Sir Walter Scott's statement of the circum- stances under which Napoleon was entered at the school of Brienne, is not only inexact, but is unau- thorised, except in so far as it coincides with the slanders prepared, during the war, by English hire- lings at Paris, and repeated by historians of the same class in London. He says (v. iii, p. 9) '^^ the Count de Marbeuf interested himself so much in the young Napoleon, as to obtain him an appointment to the Royal military school of Brienne/' and ar- ranges his dates (v. iii, p. 5) so as to ante-date the Corsican deputation three years^andsendit to Louis XV, whose life he prolongs to 1776 ! The narra- tive in the text is the substance of Napoleon's decla- ration to Las Cases (Memorial, t. i, pp. i54-5), is confirmed by his conversations with Antomarchi, which are adopted byHazUtt, and is countenanced by the account of Norvins (v. i, p. 10), while Sir Walter Scott's statement is contradicted or rejected CHAPTER I. 3o3 by every author pretending to respectability, \vho has written on the subject, except Lockhart, who, defying this body of authority, adopts the distorted story of Sir Walter, even to the extravagance of as- serting (v. i, p. 4) that Bonaparte entered the school of Brienne when but seven years of age. Why the patronage of Marbeuf should have been gratuitously interposed by both these authors, is a question, which can hardly be answered, without reference to the first note. Page 15. (lo) The slander noticed in this paragraph, ori- ginated in the intercourse of kindness, which sub- sisted between the families of de Marbeuf and Bona- parte. Napoleon's own positive account of this intercourse, as it was not controverted by Sir Wal- ter Scott, should have been adopted by him ; for his neglect of it implies a persuasion, that the declarations of his hero deserved neither to be cre- dited nor contested. But with a looseness which could hardly be admissible in the structure of a fictitious narrative, he destroys all the tendencies of probability, and the relations of cause and effect, composing the substance and aspect of this circum- stance. He makes Charles Bonaparte owe his de- putation to Versailles to the influence of Marbeuf in Corsica, and represents his judicial appointment as a consequence of this mission ; deriving both steps of advancement from the favour of Marbeuf (v. iii, pp. 5 and 9); whereas, Charles Bonaparte received 3o4 APPENDIX. the judicial appointment before he was deputed to Versailles, and was indebted for both these situa- tions to facts attested by Sir Walter himself j his popularity as a patriot, his eloquence as an advo- cate, and his consequent consideration among the nobility of the island. This is his own account of Napoleon's father (v. iii, p. 3). ^^ Charles Bona- parte was the principal descendant of this exiled family. He was regularly educated at Pisa, in the study of the law, and is stated to have possessed a very handsome person, a talent for eloquence, and a vivacity of intellect, which he transmitted to his son. He was a patriot also, and a soldier, and as- sisted in the gallant stand made by Paoli against the French . " Had Paoli refrained from emigration, and become reconciled to the French government, it may be readily conceived, without assuming the instrumentality of Marbeuf s influence (admitting he possessed this influence) that Paoli would have been offered the place of deputy of the nobles. In his absence, Charles Bonaparte, his friend, his com- patriot, his follower, may be said to have stood in his place. The truth is, that Charles Bonaparte, instead of being indebted to the influence of Mar- beuf^ actually supported Marbeuf by his influence, as is mentioned in the text, in conformity with the undisputed account of Napoleon himself, with the position of the persons and with the order and character of the events in question. It is remarkable, that the slander which this confusion of misstatements would seem intended to colour, CHAPTER I. 3o5 Sir Walter could not venture to confirm^ nor Lockhart to repeat. Page 14. (ii) Bourrienne (t. i, p. 35), an author, whose spirit of detraction and ingratitude, makes his tes- timony unexceptionable, when favourable to his benefactor. Page 14. (i a) From a fear of multiplying notes unnecessa- rily, I beg to observe, that the account given in the text, of Napoleon's disposition, conduct, and stand- ing, while at the military schools, is taken from his own consistent statements to Las Cases, O'Meara, and Antomarchi, the authenticated notes and say- ings of the professors, and the admissions of Bour- rienne, and Sir Walter Scott himself. This last author, however, at the expense of his consistency, takes care to represent Napoleon's reserve, superin- duced by circumstances, as the effect of a charac- ter naturally cold and unsocial — omitting those causes of pain to his sensibility and offence to his pride, which, for a season, '^ chilled the genial current of his soul." Page 20. (i3) Sir Walter Scott takes a different view of Napoleon's intellectual character, and seems to think it was fitted for scientific studies and military employments only (v. iii, p. 12); asserting that he never acquired the art ^^of writing or spelling French with accuracy or correctness" — that ^^ though of Italian origin he had not a decided 20 3o6 APPENDIX. taste for the fine arts" — that his ^* taste leaned to the grotesque and bombastic/^ and ^^that his bulle- tins seldom if ever present those touches of subli- mity, which are founded on simplicity and dignity of expression." The speeches, writings, and laws of Napoleon, prove, that he was as capable of excelling in legis- lation as in war, and of acquiring elegant attain- ments, as he was of gaining abstruse knowledge. The temerity of the assertion, that he never ^^ac- quired the art of writing or spelling French with correctness," may be estimated by reflecting, that he was educated from the age of ten to that of six- teen, by French instructors, with French compa- nions, and in French society, alone; that he con- versed in French only^ andthat all his compositions, even his letters to his parents, were in French, and were submitted, as Sir Walter Scott himself affirms, to the inspection and correction of a French pro- fessor of belles lettres. That at the age of twenty, he was the author of a French essay, which gained a prize of the Academy of Lyons in preference to other French essays; that he wrote a French his- torical tract which obtained the approbation of the Abbe Raynal, a French author of taste and dis- tinction; that before he was twenty- four years of age, he had composed other popular and admired writings in French; that throughout this susceptive period of life^ his constant associates and intimate friends, were French gentlemen and ladies; that he married a French lady; commanded French ar- CHAPTER I. 3o7 raiesj negotiated French treaties^ governed the French nation^ patronised French literature j was a member of the French Institute ; and for a series of years^ corresponded with his generals and mi- nisters^ the agents of other governments or of his own^ and the crowned heads of Europe ; and read^ wrote^ and spoke, habitually, for about forty years, in the French language only. If with this educa- tion and life, he remained incapable ^^ of writing or spelling the French language with correctness," the fact woidd constitute a peculiarity, as remark- able, as any circumstance connected with his cha- racter^ and in that view, should have been carefully and conspicuously set forth by Sir Walter. Where- as, the unceremonious manner in which he in- troduces and dismisses the strange assertion, shews that he preferred its being believed, to its being examined. Briefly mentioned in the beginning of the third volume, its proof is not attempted until the close of the fifth (p. 4^6)^ and this attempt consists only in the production of the copy of an autograph note from Bonaparte to Talleyrand, written, when the former was first consul, and the latter (the 2)ublic having forgotten as Sir Wal- ter observes — (v. iv, p. -23']) his '' scandalous" attempt to extort a bribe from the American com- missioners), was minister for foreign affairs. The errors of this note, though formally enumerated and emphatically marked, the reader will be sur- prised to learn, consist precisely of such mechani- cal lapses in orthography^ as are committed every 3o8 APPE^nlx. clay in the penmanship of careless or expeditious -writers. In a confidential note to his minister, INapoleon it seems, did not take care to finish the words faites and dites — omitting the final and penultimate letters in each, so as to write, instead o^ faites and diteSyfait and dit. This error, grave as it is, might perhaps have shocked the nerves of a pedagogue ; but that it can support the great cha- racteristical consequence attached to it, it is diffi- cult to conceive. It was evidently more the fault of the quill, than of the mind, employed in writing the notcj and if the author of Waverley was re- solved to exalt it into matter of historical moment, heshould have argued ignoranceinthe goose, rather than in the consul. If any thing can be more con- temptible than his imputation, or ridiculous than his reasoning, it is the figure which he assigns to himself and his fellow labourers in this momentous affah^ (v. V, p. 425). ^' This very singular memo- randum contains the instructions given by Napo- leon to Talleyrand, concerning the manner in which he wished him to receive Lord Whitworth, then about to quit Paris under the immediate prospect of the war again breaking out. He did not trust, it seems, to that accomplished statesman the slightest circumstance of the conference; ^^ although," as Talleyrand himself observed, as he gave to the Duke of Wellington the interesting document, in Napoleon's own handwriting, " if I could be trust- ed with any thing, it must have been the mode of receiving and negotiating with an ambassador." CHAPTER I. 309 The prince of diplomatists, is so dexterous as to discover, that Napoleon failed on a certain occasion, to dot his i s and cross his t s, and amazes the hero of Waterloo by proof of the important fact . This, the confounded chieftain^ divulg^es to the author of Waverley, who employs that genius, which had led captive the taste of nations, in reporting it to the world ! These personages might have recollected that the letters of Napoleon's signature were often imperfect. Could it be thence inferred, that he had never ^'^ acquired the art of writing or spelling his name with accuracy or correctness ?" They might also have referred to what he told O'Meara. ^^ April 3o, 1817. He observed that formerly he had some- times been in the habit of writing only half or three quarters of each word_, and running them into each other ^ that no person except one well acquaint- ed with his manner of writing could read it . " Or ihey might have remembered his observation to Las Cases (Memorial, t. vi, p. 387): '^ A public man, engaged in great affairs, a minister for in- stance, cannot and should not write with ortho- graphical correctness. His thoughts outstrip bis hand j he has time only to throw out signs ; he must put a word in a letter and a phrase in a word. To decypher all this is the business of clerks." In the professed romances of Sir Walter Scott, errors of composition not unfrequently occur,- yet who would undertake to assert that, born on the wrong side of the Tweed, ^' he had never acquired the art of writing English with accuracy or correctness?" 3lO APPE^DIX. It is clear that in this business^ Talleyrand was not the dupe. His diplomatic coolness in propounding the natural question if he could be trusted with any thing, is as remarkable as the officious simplicity of Sir Waher in recording it. The next allegation on this subject imports^ that INapoleon '^ though of Italian origin, had not a de- cided taste for the fine arts" — as if all persons of Ita- lian extraction were expected to possess a decided taste for the fine arts -, even those who^happened to be born and bred, who lived and died out of Italy. Are all men of Scotch origin supposed to be gifted with second sight ? Or, on the other hand, is it fair to reproach a man wdth not having that which he could not be expected to possess. ^^ A taste for the fine arts" may mean either the faculty of producing or of appreciatingcA^j/^^cew- vres in architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry or music. In the first sense, the phrase is inapplica- ble, as Napoleon never professed nor practised the fine arts; in the second it is untrue, as no other prince of modern times patronized the fine arts with equal taste and munificence. Let him be compared in this respect with his contemporaries — with Francis of Austria, Alexander of Russia, the Louises of France, and the Georges of England; or let the treatment which Talma received be contrasted with that which Sheridan experienced. After denominating the rich and metaphorical style of Napoleon in his youth, ^^ exaggerated phrases," Sir Walter com plains, that ^^his bulletins CHAPTER I- 3ll seldom if ever present those touches of sublimity which depend on dignity and simphcity of expres- sion." This would appear to admit that his bulle- tins do present frequent examples of sublimity, though seldom if ever of a particular description. But is it common to find ' touches of sublimity" of any sort, in the orders, proclamations, or reports of commanding generals — in those for examples of the Dukes of Marlborough, York, or WeUington ? It is evident that this entire statement about gram- mar and taste, would have the merit of being true, if it were completely reversed, that is, if, instead of his actual stofy^ Sir Walter hid said — Altliough Napoleon Jiad no opportunity in his youth of cul" tivating a taste for the fine arts, and was engross- edj during the whole of his career, hj the toils of war or the cares of government, he was so happilj endowed bj nature y that he was an excellent judge of the beauties of architecture , paintings poetrj, sculpture andmusic yUndpatronized their professors with a noble liberality — He hady moreover , such a rich vein of eloquence y that even in his military reports J numerous examples of the sublime occur ; some indeedy of those exquisite touches, which de- pend on dignity and simplicity of expression. The pains taken to expose ihese awkward falsifica- tions, will not be thought misapplied, when it is considered that absence of taste in the constitution of a strong character, is almost equivalent to the presence of ferocity. Besides obstaprincipiisy is as sound a maxim in criticism as in medicine. 3 1 11 APPENDIX. Page 21. (i/p) Bourrienne (vol. i^ p. 4o) denies this anec- dote, and attempts to discredit it by saying it is dated in 178.3, and that Napoleon was then at Brienne, '^ where certainly he never was in company, espe- cially in the company of ladies." Yet at page 37, he states that in the year 1783 the duke of Orleans and Madame Montesson came to Brienne — that for more than a month the magnificent chateau of the count de Brienne was ^^a little Versailles/' that brilliant ye/e5 were given in honour of the visit of the prince and Madame Montesson, who, together presided at the examination of the pupils of the royal school — that Napoleon divided with Bourrienne himself the mathematical prizes, and that Madame de Montesson complimented Bourrienne's mother on the frequency of her son's academical triumphs. Now here was a company of ladies to which Na- poleon was admitted . The observation was doubt- less made on this occasion, and probably by the Countess de Brienne, of whom Napoleon was a fa- vourite^ not the less, for having been recommended to her, as the reader will recollect, by a dignitary of the church and minister of the crown. The Count de Las Cases also discredits this anec- dote (though not on the emperor's authority) and for the same reason which Bourrienne advances ; that is, that while at Brienne Napoleon could not have been in the company of ladies. Yet the Count repeats this conversation of Napoleon (t. vii, pp. 19.7-8). <^ He talked while in bed of his early years CHAPTER I. 3l3 at Brienne ; of the Duke of Orleans, of Madame de Montesson, whom he remembered to have seen there j of the family of Nogent, of that of de Brienne, who were connected with the details of his boyhood^ etc." The reasons for denying it being thus ascertained to be unfounded, the anec- dote which does not appear to have been the off- spring of a malicious purpose, becomes from its ex- istence highly probable, the more so as it is consis- tant with the energy of Napoleon's character, the vigour of his judgment, the vivacity of his expres- sions, and his well known admiration of Turenne, as a commander, a sentiment which at fifteen must have been warmly associated with his professional pride. In his letter to the deputy Buttofaco, one of his first productions, he goes out of his way to speak of Turenne as the greatest of captains, so strong and insuppressible was the admiration he felt for him, and among the last of his dictations at St. Helena is a careful analysis of Turenne's cam- paigns. Page 22. (i5) The cause of Napoleon's early designation for the school of Paris, as explained in the text, is taken from the account repeated by Las Cases (Me- morial, t. i, p. 173), in Napoleon's own words. This account, adopted by Norvins (t. i, p. i4), and by Lockhart (v. i, p. 6), is rejected by Sir Walter Scott, who represents the selection of Na- poleon as *^ a compliment paid to the precocity of 3l4 APPENDIX. his extraordinary mathematical talent, and the steadiness of his appHcation" (v. iii, p. i4). Ad- mitting^ that ^^ precocity of talent and steadiness of application" are likely to coexist, it is to be noted that g^enius and prococity are very different things, and that what is precocious is generally thought shortlived and vvorthless. Napoleon's talent for mathematical reasoning, and the profoundest logic, is kno^yn to have been as lasting as it was strong. Page 22. (i6) With respect to the date of this examina- tion, and consequently the age of Napoleon at the time he left Brienne, an error which seems to have prevailed, is corrected in the text . Las Cases, on his authority says (t. i, p. 174) the examination took place in 1788 — and that he was designated by the Chevalier de Keralio for the school of Paris, ^^ al- though perhaps he was not of the requisite age." Now the customary age was i5 — and it is certain that he could only have been i4 in 1783 . So that it is probable Napoleon made a mistake of one year in referring by memory in 18 [5, to this remote event. This inference is strengthened by two do- cuments quoted at length by Bourrienne ^ one, the report of M. de Keralio to the king on the result of Napoleon's examination^ which is dated in 1784 (v. i, p. 28) the other, the register of the princi- pal of the school of Brienne, stating that Napoleon was born the i5th of August, 1769 — ^^ entered the school of Brienne the •^3d of April, 1779, and left it the 1 4th of October, 1784.'' CHAPTER 1. 3r5 Again, as the examination was annual, and as the Chevalier deKer alio rejected the proposal of the pro- fessors to detain him another year at Brienne^ his examination could not have been a year earlier than his departure from the school . It would appear, therefore, that he was examined a little before he was fifteen, and that he entered the school of Paris shortly after the commencement of his sixteenth year, viz. in October, 1784. Since writing the above I have conversed with the Count d'Hedouville, who was himself an elei^e of the military school of Paris, as well as a comrade of Napoleon in the regiment of Grenoble. The CouVit confirms this correction of the date, by the assertion that he left the school of Paris in 1784, and that Napoleon entered it at the time he, the Count, quit- ted it. Page 25. (17) ^^ Stimulated by the enthusiam of military genius to take part in tht war in which Great Britain was then engaged^ he had pressed so earnestly to enter into the navy, that, at the age of fifteen, a midshipman's warrant was obtained for him. The interference of a timid and affectionate mother deferred the commencement and changed the direction of his military career." (Marshal's Life of Washington, 2nd ed. ; v. i, p. 2.) Page 24. (18). The 24th February, 1785. 3l6 APPENDIX. Page 50. (19) It appears that he was examined in August, and commissioned in September. It may be proper to mention that the story referred to, but not adopt- ed by Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. i5), imputing to Napoleon, while a military student, the quixotic absurdity of attacking a balloon of Blanchard, the aeronaut, with his sword, was false as to Napo- leon, but true as to one of his comrades, Dupont deChambon. — S^q J^ie Politique et Militaire de NapoleoTiy par A moult (p. 3). This statement alpout Dupont is confirmed to me by the recollec- tion of the count Las Cases. X ( 3i7 ') CHAPTER II. Page 54. (i) After mentioning (v. iii, p. l6) that Napo- leon was only in his seventeenth year when he entered into society at Valence^ Sir Walter Scott adds, that '^ his manners could scarcely be called elegant, but made up in vivacity and variety of expression, and often in great spirit and energy, for what they wanted in grace and polish." Who, but the author of W^averley, could have ventured to notice, as a deficiency, the absence of polish in the manners of a lad of sixteen, fresh from a school of artillery, or could expect him to observe the rules of Chesterfield, and to exhibit that ease which presupposes long acquaintance with fashion- able society? In the deportment of so gifted a youth, there was naturally a spirit and a charm which would have been lost in modish ease, and suppressed by formal propriety. The gravity and emphasis with which Lockhart (vol. i, p. 8) follows up this absurd abnegation are amusing. In the mingled tones of a witness and a judge, this writer disposes of the manners of his hero by declaring definitively that ^' courtly grace and refinementof manners he never attained." Let us suppose this assertion to be true, would it follow that Napoleon did not attain a manner of 3l8 APPENDIX. much higher elegance than courtly grace and re- finement? The grace called courtly^ means the grace of a courtier^ and this implies a carriage of proud submission towards superiors, and of con- descending arrogance towards inferiors, a smooth impertinence of exigence and concession. This mechanical and subordinate grace^ which excludes manly independence and refined simplicity, would have been sadly out of place in the deportment of a man who never saw his equal, and whose man- ners, as the unstudied expression of feeling, intel- lect, and power, excited in the beholder a degree of pleasure and admiration which would have been apt to make him turn with disgust from an exhibi- tion of ^^ courtly grace and refinement." Here is already an array of deficiencies, a list of formidable denials, aimed at the memory of Napo- leon by his celebrated biographer. ^^ Though of Italian origin, he had not a decided taste for the fine arts." His bulletins seldom contained touches of ^^ simple sublimity of expression." ^^In his fifteenth year his taste had not become correct," and, in his seventeenth, ^^his manners could scarcely be called elegant and polished." Would it not have been as instructive and equitable in Sir Walter Scott to proclaim, that though of Greek descent, Napoleon could not recite the odes of Pindar and Archilochus — that all his battles were not as great as those of Austerlitz and Wagram — that in his fifteenth year he had not a long beard — and, in his seventeenth, was not married? CHAPTER II. 3 19 Page 00. (2) The Count d'Hedouville takes pleasure in relating testimonies of the warm and effectual kindness which Napoleon, throughout his career^ extended to him. Their political sentiments dif- fered when young, one being in favour of a limited constitution, the other of the royal prerogative. D'Hedouville, following out his principles, emi- grated. When Napoleon became first consul, he enquired for his former comrade, and learning that he was vegitating in Spain, sent for him. On their first interview he offered to make him one of his aides-de-camp, but observed that, perhaps, as his comrades of Valence were now all generals, he might not like to commence the career of arms so far below his former equals, and offered him a situ- ation in the diplomatic corps. D'Hedouville pre- ferring this latter profession, was immediately attached to the embassy at Rome, and subsequently appointed minister plenipotentiary at Frankfort. Page 41, (3) The author of Waverley, to give a mean and sordid colouring to the early life of his hero, speaking of his residence at Auxonne, says, (v. iii, p. 368), ^^M. Joly found the fugitive em- peror in a naked barrack room." ^' His brother, Louis, whom he was teaching mathematics, lay on a wretched mattress in an adjoining closet." In answer to which, Louis Bonaparte observes (Re- ponse, p. 28) ; '' This passage contains almost as ioiO APPENDIX. many falsehoods as lines . I rocollect very well tbat^ on my account, a larger and more commo- dious apartment was assigned to my brother than to the other officers of his rank. The furniture could not be either better or worse than that of his com- rades, because they were all in barracks, and, of course lodged and furnished by the state; I remem- ber that I had a very good chamber and an excel- lent bed. My brother directed my studies, but I had proper masters, even in literature." With respect to the accident of Napoleon's being nearly drowned while bathing in the Saone at Auxonne, there is a difference, in regard to some slight particulars, between the relation of it in the text and the recital of the count de Las Cases (t. iii, p. 433 ). But inasmuch as the count's journal was seized by the governor of St. Helena, before he had written out his notes of various conversations, I have adopted the account of the same incident found in the journal of O'Meara (v. ii, p. 227) and con- firmed by the recollection of Louis Bonaparte (Re- ponse p. 127). It happens to be in more decided contradiction to the story on the same, subject in- troduced by Sir Walter Scott (v, iii, p. 18), who with dramatic dexterity, transposes the accident to the city of Lyons and the river Rhone. *' Modo me Thebis, modo poscit Alhenis." Page 42. (4) For this anecdote I am indebted to count d'Hedouville. In the Memoires of Napoleon (Mon- tholon t. ii, p. 207) it is said that he was made CHAPTER II. 321 captain in 1789. This is an error either of himself or his amanuensis^ as the army list of the period shows that in 1789 he was a lieutenant. Count d'Hedouville says he joined the regiment of Gre- noble as lieutenant. Las Cases (t.i^ p. 224) dates his promotion to a captaincy in February 1792, as does INorvins (t. i, p. 22). Page 46. (5) The decided inclination of Napoleon to the popular side in the revolution^ as mentioned in the text^ an inclination natural to his youth^ his inde- pendent and enterprising character, and his fa- vourite studies^ is attributed by Sir Walter Scott principally to the circumstance (v. iii^ ?• ^7) of his being ' ^ a friendless stranger and adventurer," or in Lockhart's imitation (v. i, p. 6) ^^this poor solitary alien." It is not easy to conceive that a young French officer, who had been educated in a national military school of France^ had there distinguished himself above all his comrades ; had since been the object of applause, caresses and promotion ; and who counted among his friends Paoli and Raynal, could have considered himself Avhile on the French soil, and in the French army, ^^a friendless stranger and adventurer. " If this was the case the French army must have been, for the most part, composed of strangers, adventurers, and '^ poor solitary aliens." But this is not the only absurdity, into which on this subject Sir Walter is drawn, by his eager spirit of misrepresentation and 21 39.2 APPENDIX. (lispara(jement ; for in order to colour the insi- nuation that it was a selfish necessity, not a li- beral choice, which made Napoleon a patriot in the revolution, a statement, which the latter made at St. Helena in reference to this period of his life, is thus distorted by Sir Walter both in its language and its date. ^^Were I a general officer," he is alleged to have said, ^^ I would have adhered to the king, being a subaltern I joined the patriots. " Now his real words, as they are recited in the text, and as they were uttered at St. Helena about thirty years subsequently to the time alluded to, are these, ^^ had I been a general officer I might have adhered to the king ; a young lieutenant, I sided with the revolution, " not so much describing the motives under which he did act, as exemplifying, by a hypothetical reference to his own case, those which probably operated on others j and so far, extenuating the error of individuals, who pursued a line of conduct opposite to his own. His biogra- pher, however, gives his language a direct and parti- cular meaning instead of a conditional and general one, altering its terms and transposing its date, so as to convey the impression, that Napoleon, in- stead of acting from that principle and enthusiasm which became his character and suited his age, was by his own confession, influenced by personal in- terest and selfish calculations. The interpretation here given to his expressions, is not only borne out by the terms themselves, but corresponds with the uniform tenor of his senti- ments and conduct, in regard to emigration. His CHAPTER II. 323 elevation to the head of the government, opened the arms of France to her wandering children. In conversation with Las Cases on the voyage to St. Helena, he said (Memorial, t. i, p. 294) : ^' And for myself, can I affirm, notwithstanding my natural opinions, that there might not have been a train of circumstances which would have induced me to emigrate — the vicinity of the frontier^ the ties of friendship, the influence of a commander, etc. In a revolution, one can only be positive as to what one has already done j but it would not be wise to affirm that one might not have pursued very different conduct. And on this subject," adds Las Cases, ^^ he cited a singular instance of the influence of chance on the destinies of men. Serrurier and the younger d'Hedouville set off together to emigrate into Spain. A patrol fell in with them. D'Hedouville, younger and more active than his companion, passed the frontier, thinking himself very fortunate, and pursued his way to vegetate in Spain. Serrurier, obliged to retrace his steps into France, and quite in despair, became a marshal." Page 48. (6) This interesting anecdote, which shows the unbounded confidence which the young iXapoleon inspired in his own family. Sir Walter Scott dis- regards, though he took the trouble to pervert the saying which is noticed above. Louis Bonaparte in his reply to Sir Walter (p. 9) in alluding to the ascendancy of Napoleon in his family, says, ^^ I feel 324 APPENDIX. myself obliged to declare here, as the brother of the emperor Napoleon, that it was in his own family that he began to exhibit that great supe- riority; not after glory and power had elevated him, but in his early youth." Page 49.. (7) This fact is stated in a memorial addressed by Charles Bonaparte to marshal Segur, minister of war, applying for a place for a younger son, in one of the royal military schools. The memorial is recited in Bourrienne(t. i, p. 20). Page 51. (8) This plain interpretation of Napoleon's senti- jnents, founded on his general disposition and his situation at the time, did not occur, it would seem, to Sir Walter Scott, who resolves the language he alleges him to have used, into a sort of innate con- tempt of the people — a feeling, perfectly at va- riance with the well known character of Napoleon, and with all the great events of his life. But this contempt, though eminently arislocratical, and therefore entitled to the respect of that order, and to the homage of its idolater himself, he proceeds to represent as not very earnest, exclaiming (v. iii, p. 19) ^^ how different would his feelings have been had a seer whispered to him, that on the ruins of the throne which the people were demolishing, his own imperial seat was to be erected. " This is certainly more like ^'^demonology and witchcraft" CHAPTER II. 325 than history. It is as least the first time a man's character has been arraigned^ for what he might have done in a case^ which^ without supernatural means, could not occur. But Sir Walter^ as anx- ious to avert praise as to apply censure, employs in his service, when facts cannot be found, mis- statement or hypothesis, foUowingthe ancient rule of malice — " Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta rao"vebo." Page o6. (9) This statement is derived from Bourrienne, who with a modesty truly heroic, intimates that by rights, he ought to have been the great man, in- stead of his friend (v. i, p. 36). He further re- presents (p. 49) Napoleon in such destitution, while he was at Paris in 1792, that he himself though not rich, had frequently to pay for his din- ners. Even if this were the case, the account was so soon balanced, that these items might have been forgotten. But there is every probability against the assertion of Bourrienne, exclusively of his notorious bad faith. Bonaparte was a captain of artillery, and was in the receipt of full pay. He "was the head of his mother's familv, and could have got money from home, had he needed it. He was by all accounts, destitute neither of prudence nor of pride. The subject is noticed, not on account of any peculiar importance attached to it, but for the sake of truth only. For the same reason, I advert to the interesting Memoirs of the Dutchess d'Abrantes, in which Napoleon is described, while 3^6 APPENDIX. at the military school of Paris, as suffering under a sense of dependence, and impatient of the civilities offered him by madame de Permon, the friend of his mother, because the family of that lady was more prosperous than his own. It is also inti- mated in the same entertaining work, that being himself an eleve of the royal military school of Paris, he looked with chagrin and envy at the superior advantages of young Permon, who lived in the society of his parents, and the comforts of home. It is universally admitted that Napoleon had a decided taste for the profession of arms ; it is known that he was transferred from Brienne to Paris under flattering circumstances ; and that he was so much distinguished for genius and attainments, as to have attracted the notice of the Abbe Raynal. His uncle, the archdeacon, was living at the time referred to by the dutchess, and the fortune of his family, though impaired, was independent. It is not likely that in this state of things, his self- love would have suggested a painful comparison, between the subordinate luxury of a family in the capital, with the modest circumstances of his mother in a distant province j or that the most distinguished military student of the chief school of the kingdom, would envy the lot of a young gentleman, who was himself unknown, and whose family was confessedly neither opulent nor powerful. The statements here noticed, are the substance CHAPTER II. 327 of a dialogue of full three pages (Memoires de la Duchesse d'Abrantes (t. i, pp. 78, 79, 80^ 81), between M. and Madame de Permon, and their son, a dialogue which would appear to be repeated verbatim. The dutchess says (p. 29) she was born the 6th of November, 1784? at Mentpellier,, and came to Paris, or to use her own words (p. 69), •^ J^F^e came to Paris in 1785," and that her mother made immediate enquiries about Napoleon Bonaparte who was (p. 76. ) ^^ then at the military school of Paris. " Now as Napoleon, left the mili- tary school of Paris to join his regiment^ in Sep- tember or October, 1785, the dutchess could not have been quite twelve months old, when these conversations are said to have been held. If they were intrinsically probable therefore, if they were not, from various particulars which they contain, incompatible with the well known regulations of the military school^ they could not be received as au- thentic, especially as they are not of a nature to authorize the supposition, that such remarks as they consist of, would have been recorded at the time by the interlocutors. Page ^8. (10) The sketch here given of Paoli's Anglo-in- surrectionary proceedings, is a summary of state- ments found in Benson's Sketches of Corsica (sec- tion 2), and in the Memoires de Napoleon (t. IV. ch. 16.) 328 APPENDIX. Page GO. (ii) This saying of Paoli is recorded variously, as addressed directly to Napoleon himself, and as addressed to others respecting him. It was no doubt used both ways. I have adopted that version of it which seems most emphatic, and from the circumstances under which it occurred, most me- morable. It is found in Antomarchi (t. i, p. 197) repeated from the dictation of Napoleon, precisely as I have given it. Las Cases, Montholon, Norvins, Hazlitt, and even Lockhart, concur in one thing respecting it^ in representing Paoli as impressed upon personal acquaintance, with the great and heroic qualities of Napoleon, the firmness of his principles, and the energy of his character. But the manner in which the great novelist contrives to nulllfj this dangerous praise of a personage, who, according to his account, was in his youth chiefly remarkable for ^^ precocity of mathematical talent and steadiness of application, " is worthy of especial notice (v. iii, p. i5). ^^ Plutarch was his favourite author, upon the study of whom he had so modelled his opinions and habits, of thought, that Paoli afterwards pronounced him a young man of an antique cast, and resembling one of the classical heroes." Thus, it appears^ that a young man of precocious mathematical talent and steady application^ ^^^^Y ^Y closely studying Plu- tarch, cause himself to be esteemed, by eminent and exporienrod prrsons, equal in excellence to a classi- CHAPTER II. 329 cal hero; and that the statesman and warrior Paoli was entrapped by this sort of imitation, into the admiration of a were bookworm. Yet thisabsm^dity is hazarded, for the purpose of emasculating the anecdote referred to, a device, the success of which, while it would deprive the character of Napoleon of all essential force, and intrinsic dignity, would take from that of Paoli, the faculty of common penetration . Page 65. (12) The conduct of Paoli in the French revo- lution cannot be justified. After resisting the forced incorporation of Corsica with Fran.ce, he had a perfect right to acquiesce in it as Charles Bonaparte did, or to abjure it, as he himself for a time did. But he had no right, after accepting the amnesty held out by the law of the national assembly, and accepting also at the hands of the French government, an appointment of high trust and honour, to renounce his allegiance to France, and to dismember the republic, by delivering up the province committed to his superintendence, to a rival and hostile nation. He had sanctioned the annexation of Corsica with France, in the most solemn and binding manner ; and if he was justi- fiable in transferring Corsica to England, the au- thorities of any other province of France, would have been blameless, had they committed the same act. Yet more flagrant treason than they would have committed, can hardly be conceived. From respect for Paoli's general character, bi« 330 APPENDIX. conduct has been treated with indulgence ^eti hf French authors, and in that spirit, is noticed in the text. Sir Walter Scott extols it as nobly contrasted with the conduct of that portion of the Corsicans, who continued faithful to their alle- giance, and really appears to esteem perjury and treason in favour of England, the first and highest duties of a French citizen. Alluding to this part of Paoli's history, he holds the following language (v. iii, p. 19). ^^He was desirous of establishing that freedom which is the protector not the des- troyer of property, and which confers practical happiness instead of theoretical perfection." ^^In a word he endeavoured to keep Corsica from the prevailing infection of jacobinism, and in reward he was denounced in the assembly." ^^ The in- fection of jacobinism^ " in Corsica consisted simply in the ascendancy of the revolutionary government, and this it was the object of Paoli to prevent. Now we learn from Sir Walter himself (v. i, p. 68), that one of the main grievances that occasioned the revolution, was the fact that the people had no security whatever for their persons or their pro- perty. ^^They had no national representation of any kind, and but for the slender barrier offered by the courts of justice or parliaments as they were called, were subject to unlimited exactions on the sole authority of the sovereign. The properly of the nalLon therefore was at the disposal of the crowriy which might increase the taxes to any amount, and cause them to be paid by force, if force was necessary. The personal freedotn of CHAPTER n. 33l the citizen was equally exposed to aggressions hj * lettres de cachet.^ The French people, in short, had neither in the strict sense, liberty nor property, '^ So that Paoli in order to ^' preserve the property and practical happiness" of his coun- trymen, endeavoured to prevent the success of measures, taken for the overthrow of a government, which deprived them of both liberty and property. And, by way of convincing the world of his sincere and tender regard for these blessings, seized on the person of a confiding friend, and confiscated the property of an amiable widow and eight children, the relict and offspring of his departed fellow soldier. This was his exemplification of the rights of property and security of person, as opposed to ^^ the infection of jacobinism, and theoretical perfection. " But ^^the infection of jacobinism, " may be li- mited, to mean the excesses of the French revolu- tion. Yet Paoli had deliberately and solemnly made himself a French citizen. Had he a right to dismember his country, and throw himself and the province under his charge, into the grasp of its most powerful and inveterate foe, on account of certain excesses or errors, not affecting himself or his friends, in the existing parties or actual mi- nistry ? If he had, it is plain that Pichegru and Arnold, instead of being foul and blotted traitors, were spotless and uncorrupted patriots ; and O^Connell would be justified on account of long misrule, and of a late and acknowledged act of oppression on the part of the British government, in 332 APPENDIX. separating Ireland fromGreat Britain, and in placing that island under the dominion of France, in case of war between the two nations. Further, upon Sir Waller Scott's principles, when Louis XIV was endeavouring to force the Pretender upon the people of England, the officers employed by the British government, ought not only to have be- trayed their country to France, but counted on re- ceiving reward and applause for so doing. The spirit disclosed by Sir Walter in the passage here considered, will be found to pervade his entire work. It should be kept in mind that the aim of Paoli was not to establish the independence of his country, but to transfer its dependence from France to England, from a catholic to a protestant go- vernment. In the Appendix to the third volume of Scott's Life of Napoleon ( p. 364 )> it is mentioned that Pozzo di Borgo, who joined the English, was in- strumental in procuring Paoli's mock decree of banishment against Napoleon, and that owing to the vindictive temper of the latter, Pozzo di Borgo was chased from country to country, as the arms and influence of France overspread the continent. The truth appears to be, that Pozzo di Borgo, in the cases comprehended in this statement, stood in the predicament of a French citizen, serving or abetting a foreign power at war with France, and feh himself, as such, liable to be punished for treason, if he fell into the power of France, whether she was governed by the convention, the directory, tliC consul, or the emperor ^ a liability from which, CHAPTER 11. 333 his only chance of escape, would have been found in the clemency of Napoleon. He very naturally kept out of the way of his own countrymen^ as Dumouriez and Pichegru did likewise. Can it be supposed that had Arnold been observed to retire modestly, at the approach of general Washington and his army, his retreat would have been referred to by an impartial historian as proof, not of his consciousness of guilt, but of the ^^ strong love of revenge, '' the unforgiving and vindictive temper of the American commander, supposing general Washington to have thought himself personally wronged by Arnold ? In a strain quite exulting and equally rational, Sir Walter proceeds — '^ But the fate of these two early acquaintances seemed strongly contrasted and interwoven. As Napoleon began to lose ground, the fortunes of his relative appeared to advance, and honours and emoluments dropped upon him, in proportion to Napoleon^s descent from eminence." The true ground of contrast between them and their honours, consists, it must be allowed, in the difference between the friend and the enemy of his country. In proportion as France was agonized and humbled under the blows of the holy alliance, the fortune of Napoleon de- clined, and that of Pozzo di Borgo advanced, his ^' honours and emoluments" being unhappily de- rived from the calamities of the land which gave him birth, and the people who gave him honours. For Pozzo di Borgo was a member of the French 334 APPENDIX* legislature. As to his alleged relationship to Napoleon, the following account of its foundation and character, is found in O'Meara's Voice from St.Helena. ^^January, 6th. 1817. Cipriani informed me that Pozzo di Borgo was the son of a shepherd in Corsica, who used to bring eggs, milk, and butter to the Bonaparte family. Being a smart boy, he was noticed by Madame Mere, who paid for his schooling. Afterwards, through the interest of the family, he was chosen deputy to the legislative body, as their sons were too young to be elected. He returned to Corsica as procuratore generalcy (or public prosecutor) where he united himself with Peraldi, an implacable enemy of the Bona- partes, and consequently became one himself." We have here the exemplification of AEop's fable, of the serpent warmed on the husbandman's hearth. Cipriani was a Corsican, and maitre d'hotel of the emperor, a situation of confidence and respecta- bility. He died at St. Helena, and he is described by O'Meara as a man of talent and merit. His account of the Russian ambassador has not been contradicted as far as I know. Louis Bonaparte confirms his denial of the relationship of Pozzo di Borgo with the Bonaparte family (Reponse, p. 26). He says also, that there was no decree of ba- nishment, and that Joseph, not Lucien was with his brother in Corsica, Lucien being at Marseilles with Semonville, who had been appointed ambas- sador to Constantinople. The decree of banish- ment, could have been nothing more than an CHAPTER II. 335 order or threat of Paoli. But such as it was^ it is mentioned, emphatically by Norvins (t. i, p. 26) ; and as Louis Bonaparte was very young at the time, I have thought his denial not equivalent to Norvin's assertion and the probability of the fact. Page 64. (i3) Benson's sketches of Corsica (p. 5). The account here given is adopted by Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. 2 1), though he omits the material incident of Bonaparte's eloquent and successful appeal to the Corsicans, probably, because it would not have squared with the bad taste, bombastic and exag- gerated phrases, which he before (p. i3) declares, characterized his effusions. Page 63. (i4) This statement is in direct contradiction with the following assertion of Sir Walter Scott (p. 22). ^^ INapoleon does not appear to have re- garded Corsica with any feeling of affection. " All readers of English poetry will remember and few be unwilling to repeat, the stanza in the ^^Lay of the Last Minstrel," beginning — " Breathes there the man with soul so dead, " Who never to himself hath said, *' This is my own my native land ?"—* And ending — " If such there breathe, go, mark him well, " For him no minstrel raptures swell, ** High though his titles, proud his name, *^ Boundless his wealth as wish can claim ; 336 APPENDIX. " Despite his titles, power and pelf, " The wretch concentred all in self ; *' Living, shall forfeit fair renown, " And, doubly dying, shall go down " To the vile earth from whence he sprung, <' Unwept, unhonoured, and unsung." This wretch thus devoted to abhorrence and obli- viori; Sir Waher Scott affirms his hero to have been, in a work professing to preserve^ for distant posterity, a record of his actions and a portrait of his character. And this he does not only against all probability, but in defiance of evidence of the strongest descrip- tion, and staring him in the face. He has himself stated that a few months before the birth of Napo- leon, Corsica was by conquest incorporated (v.iii, p. 23) with the kingdom of France. He has also stated (p. 367) that when Napoleon was in his twenty-third year and only a lieatenantof artillery, he composed a work ^^ which might form two vo- lumes^ on the civil^ political and military history of Corsica. " Putting these two facts together, let us enquire what motive other than affection for Corsica^ and respect for the heroic struggles of her sons for independence, can be supposed to have prompted Napoleon's undertaking, or to have di- rected the choice of his subject. In addition we learn from Sir Walter (v. iii, ch. 7) that Napoleon while engaged in the heat and pressure of his Italian compaign contributed (^diS Sir Walter has it) to wresting his native island from the possession of England, and reannexing it to France; that CHAPTER II. 337 notwithstanding the great events which engaged his attention^ the short continuance^ contested tenure, and sudden termination of his power* notwithstanding all this, we learn from Sir Wal- ter Scott, that he had a marble fountain con- structed at Ajaccio, more for the comfort of the in- habitants, than the embellishment of the town. Besides, as was known to Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. 224)? among the latest efforts of his mind when oppressed by disease, insult, exile, and restraint, is an admirable geographical and historical notice of Corsica j and his conversations with Antomarchi, also known to Sir Walter, are replete with expressions of affection for his birth place. How then, can it be said with the least possible regard for truth, that iXapoleon was desti- tute of affection for the place of his birth, a senti- ment by the way, common to men, strongest in those of the strongest character, and claimed by Sir Walter, truly no doubt, for himself? George the third was his contemporary. This ^^ gracious king" ^^was in fact very near being born an alien, " both his parents being native Ger- mans. He placed ^^his affection for his birth place" above all question, not by writing its history, nor by rescuing it from foreign domination, nor by designs nor monuments of utility or munificence ; but by declaring a fact which every body knew, and effecting a repetition which would have been as meritorious in a parrot as a prince. The mi- 22 338 APPENDIX. nisters of Eng^Iand advised him to say to his subjects tliat he was ''born a Briton, " and the whole Bri- tish nation was thrown into transports of loyal fjratitude and delight ! Yet Napoleon, had he con- descended to repeat the assertion of a mere physical fact; or to catch at vulgar applause by reflecting on his fathers before him, might have proclaimed to France — '' Born a Frenchman, I glory in the name. " But Sir Walter asserts not only that Napoleon was regardless of Corsica, but that Corsica was re- gardless of him 3 and this double edged imputation he attempts to reconcile with verisimilitude, by affirming it to be natural. His language on this occasion, exemplifies so clearly the ease, with w^hich^ under the sanction of his great name, absurd con- jectures and ridiculous contradictions, could be cir- culated in place of attested facts and consistent in- ferences, that it deserves attentive examination (v. iii, p. 22). '' Napoleon never again revisited Corsica, nor does he appear to have regarded it with any feelings of affection." This sentence is composed of two affirmations^ the first positive, the second conjectural, and both unfounded. As to the first, we learn from Bourrienne (t. iii, ch. 2) that on his return from Egypt Napoleon landed at Ajaccio, and was received by the inhabitants with the warmest attachment and admiration j that he remained there eight days in consequence of un- favourable winds, and manifested for his birth CHAPTER II. 339 place a remarkable degree of affection. Bour- rienne's words are^ ^^ He was overwhelmed with incessant visits^ compliments and solid tationsj the whole town was in motion , every body insisted on being his cousin^ and from the prodigious number of god-children who came to pay their respects to their god-father, one might have supposed that Bona- parte had held one-fourth of the children of Ajaccio at the baptismal font. He w^alked out with us very often in the environs of Ajaccio, and took as much pleasure in pointing out to us the small domains of his ancestors, as he ever afterwards felt while in the zenith of his power, in numbering his crowns. " Lavalette, another eye witness of this visit, says (Memoires du comte Lavalette, t. i, p. 336) : ^^We arrived at Ajaccio. This little town was the birth place of the general in chief. He had left it eight (six) years before when only a captain of artillery. At the sight of his native town his breast was fondly affected. As we were direct from Egypt where the plague prevailed, we had not clean bills of health; and of course could not be allowed to land. The inhabitants surprised at seeing the ad- miraPs flag at our main, hurried down in crowds to the shore. But when they learned the presence of their illustrious countryman, his relations and friends sprang into the boats, threw themselves aboard the ship, and soon broke the quarantine. In this, however, there was little actual inconvenience. 34o APPKNDIX. since after a passage of forty clays, we had not a sinn^le man on the sick list. In one of the boats which crowded under the poop of the vessel, an old woman dressed in black stood up and stretched out her hands towards the general, crying out ^my dear son ! ' for some time, without being able to catch his attention. At length he discovered her, and instantly called out in return, ^ Mother! It was his nurse. " So much for the assertion of mutual indifference l)etween Napoleon and the people of Corsica, as well as for the repeated declaration (v. iv, p. i33) of his never having visited that island subsquently to his expulsion from it by Paoli and the English in the spring of 1793. But perhaps as neither the Memoirs of Bourrienne nor those of Lavallette had been published, at the time Sir Walter Scott's Avork appeared, the references just made may be thought not to render these statements of his inexcusable but only to make them incredible and absurd. Yet Dr. Antomarchi's account of the last moments of Napoleon was not only known to Sir Walter but consulted by him, as appears from his own words, (v. g, pp. 295-7). '*'Dr. Antomarchi's account of his last moments, a work in two vo- lumeSj though less interesting and showing far less acuteness than that of Las Gases, or of O'Meara, is yet useful and entertaining" and ^^ we beg to refer to Dr. Antomarchi's work, etc." In this work Na- poleon himself says (t. i, pp. 221-2) : ^*We arrived CHAPTER II. 341 at Ajaccio and anchored in the harbour. The companies of the town^ the population, hastened immediately to the landing; all wished to see me. They invited me to land. It was nothing but acclamations. The troops were under arms, but poor fellows, they had neither clothes nor shoes. I asked what was become of their military chest; but they had received not a sous for seven months. The paymaster was in advance to the government, having had to borrow forty thousand francs, which he distributed among them proportionably, in order to procure them subsistence, and to satisfy the tavern keepers who had refused their tables to the officers. I was indignant at this neglect. Collecting all my disposable cash I had their accounts stated and paid ; I did not wish their uniform to excite com- passion. In the evening there was a ball and illu- mination. In these demonstrations the poor vied with the rich. Brave people of Ajaccio, never shall I forget their reception of me. " In addition to this we have the admission of Sir Walter him- self (v. ix, p. 295) : ^^ Dr. Antomarchi seems to haye been acceptable to Napoleon, and the rather that he was a native of Corsica. " Sir Walter Scott has left behind him the reputa- tion of an amiable man, a pleasing poet, and a great novelist, but does this reputation justify or even excuse this wanton misrepresentation of his hero's affections, or this barefaced attempt to palm upon his readers a story, which he must have known to be untrue? '54 a APPENDIX. Thus far his narrative. Let us now examine the conjectures and inferences by which he endea- vours less to substantiate than to colour it. *^One small fountain at Ajaccio is pointed out as the only ornament which his bounty bestowed on his birth place." Here we recognize that ^^ canny Scot/' Andrew Fairservice himself. Because Napoleon did evince his affection for his birth place in a na- tural and expressive manner, and the fact could not be denied, it is masked by the reproach that this was the only mark, not of his affection^ which is the matter in controversy, but of his bounty , But this is not all. The allusion to the ^^ small fountain/' is made by Sir Walter (v. iii^ pp. s>2»3) on the authority of Benson, to whose Sketches of Corsica a very defective reference has been already noticed. On this occasion the mutilation of Benson is still more hazardous. Instead of saying that ^^ one small fountain was the only orna-^ meiit bestowed by Napoleon's bountj on Ajaccio," Benson observes (pp. lo-ii) '^ As you quit the town, the first object that presents itself is a little fountain on the left, which except the pavement of the quajj is the only puhlic work of Bonaparte for the place of his birth." So that the fountain was not pointed put as an ornament but as what it was no doubt designed to be, a work of public utility, and never was mentioned as the onlj work of that description J except by Sir Walter Scott him- self, who held before his eyes proof that his asser- tion was false, and his reproach unfounded. CHAPTER II. 343 As Ajaccio is a small town;, it required, one would think, a small fountain, upon those prin- ciples of proportion and good taste in the percep- tion of which Napoleon is affirmed repeatedly, by Sir Walter, to have been deficient. Had he con- structed a large fountain, at great cost, for orua^ ment rather than utility, he might have been justly accused of indulging his own vanity at the public expense. But Sir Walter seems to argue ihat thelarger the fountain, the greater the affec- tion. Yet this mode of reasoning would j ustify the belief, that the larger the book, the greater the truth, an inference which Sir Walter Scott's readers will, no doubt, earnestly protest against. He pro- ceeds, ^' he might, perhaps, think it impolitic to do anything which might remind the country he ruled that he\vas not a child of her soil ; nay, was, in fact, very near having been born an alien, for Corsica was not united to, or made an integral part of France until June, 1769, a few weeks only before Napoleon's birth." If it be witliin the limited license of history to substitute conjectures and sup- positions for events and reasoning, common sense and common decency undoubtedly require, that these conjectures and suppositions should be na- tural and consistent. Yet here Napoleon is repre- sented as fearing to bring to recollection a fact w hich both he and Sir Walter knew never existed, and is supposed to have concealed a sentiment, which, it is just before asserted, he never enter- tained. With equal boldness of language, and 344 APPENDIX. confusion of thoug^ht, it is inferred, that, inasmuch as he was born after Corsica became an integral part of France, he felt and acted precisely as if he had been born before that event, and knowing himself to be a native of France, must have thought himself an alien ! Again, a reproach on this last point, however idle or ridiculous, he is represented (p. 23) to have felt as a ^^ stigma," to avoid which, as well as to make the people of France forget the notorious fact of his having been born in Corsica, we are to believe he fell on the expedient of affect- ing indifference to that island and its inhabitants. The mode in which this ^^ oblivious antidote" was to operate on the memory of the French nation is not stated. Nor is it easy to conceive in what manner such a thought suggested itself to the author of Waverley, who knew how tenaciously the people of Great Britain adhered to George I and. II, although they ^^ actually were not chil- dren of her soil," and also knew how many of his gibbeted countrymen fed the vultures and tainted the air, for having dared to contest the rights, and resist the rule of those ^^ aliens »^ The last material in this fabrication is an exact quota- tion from Benson^ the traveller, whose light work has been already referred to. This, it will be observed, as Sir Walter positively and repeatedly asserts that Napoleon never revisited Corsica after he was driven out in 1793, is proceeding upon the plan of finding out a man's feelings by frequenting a place which he studiously kept aloof from. The CHAPTER II. 345 quotation is as follows : — ^^ The Corsicans are still highly patriotic, and possess strong local attach- ments. In their opinion, contempt for the country of one's birth is never to be redeemed by any other qualities . Napoleon, therefore, certainly was not po- pular in Corsica, nor is his memory cherished there." This is a mixture of assertion and inference which the author of ^^theLayof the Last Min- strel" should have been careful to disentangle and examine, if he condescended to notice it at all. He might have told his readers that Benson's is a light, hasty, and unpretending work — that he so- journed in the island but six weeks — that his work was at first ^^ intended only as a private memorial of six weeks agreeably passed," — and that it was swelled into the shape of a book by the English after-thoughts of the author. Besides, in the pre- vious sentence, carefully omitted by Sir Walter, Benson says, that, on Napoleon's ^^ elevation, the Corsicans looked for marks of especial favour, but such hopes were disappointed ;" showing that the feelings he observed among them, or supposed he observed, were the effect of this disappointment, and not proofs that the Corsicans reproached Na- poleon with want of affection for the place of his birth . Moreover, Benson visited Corsica as a sort of administrator of Paoli's estate in that island, and in the dogstar rage of the Bourbon ascendancy in France. His intercourse was therefore principally maintained with the agents of government, or the partisans of the old English faction in the island^ 3/\G APPENDIX. with the disciples of Pozzo di Borgo or Talleyrand. But, it may be asked, was there no other way for Napoleon to manifest feelings of affection for his native island than that afforded by the erection of large and costly monuments? Were not his bene- factions and patronage to individuals demonstra- tions of attachment equally useful and expressive? One thing which could neither be denied nor misapprehended, one would think, might have saved Sir Walter from plunging into this confusion of folly and injustice about the Corsicans. It is this broad and substantial fact, that France, instead of being, as he calls it, (p. 24) '^the land of Na- poleon's adoption,*' was the country of his birth j education, settlement, and residence ; and that Corsica, as a fractional part of it, was benefitted by whatever favours he conferred upon France, while bounties distributed and ornaments erected in Cor- sica, instead of being marks of affection for the land of his birth, were memorials of regard for the place of his nativity. The compliment which Sir Walter vouchsafes to ^'the high-spirited islanders" for resenting Na- poleon's alleged indifference, by retaliating it, must appear even more ridiculous than the main body of the fabrication with which it is connected, when the reader recurs to the citations already, made from Bourrienne^ Lavalette, and Antomarchi, and adverts to the fact, that, at this very moment, the *' high-spirited islanders" are strenuously en- gaged in erecting a monument to his memory. CHAPTER II. 3/(7 Page Go. (i5) ^' The great and well-earned influence pos- sessed by Paoli over his countrymen became the ground of jealousies." ^^ Towards the end of the year 1 79^, Paoli was informed that it was his Ma- jesty's pleasure that he should immediately leave the island, and go to England. He did so, and arrived in London towards the end of December." — (Benson's Sketches, p. 1 18). So that Paoli was banished by the English government, after having banished his friends for their advantage ; a retri- bution at once atrocious and just. Page G'6. (16.) Paoli died in England, on the 5th of Fe- bruary, 1807, ^f course, after the campaigns of Italy, Egypt, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, the close of the consulate, and the commencement of the empire. His manifestations of melancholy delight at the prodigies of his filial friend were not ap- proved, it has been said, by the British govern- ment. — (Vide Antomarchi, t. i, p. 197). Page 69. (17) The description of this essay of Napoleon, and the notice taken of the previous productions of his pen in the text, are at variance with the ob- servations respecting them, of Sir Walter Scott, who, adding to the weight of his authority, the force of his contempt, gives but a sad account of the lite- rary efforts of his hero. Of one he intimates, 348 APPENDIX. (v. iii, p. 17) though he had never seen it, that its principles were probably felt as a reproach to its author's practices j thus projecting a shade of un- defined and unfounded censure over the tract of his succeeding narration ; of another, that it was fortunately not executed , thus pronouncing sen- tence on it though unborn, and affirming, by gra- tuitous implication, Napoleon's incompetency j and of a third, (the supper of Beaucaire) after an erroneous and unvouched summary of it, alleging that it excited its author's shame so painfully (v. iii, p. 3o) that he caused the copies to be col- lected and destroyed with the utmost rigour. Before these bold and empty assertions issued from the press, it appears that this production, thus ri- gorously destroyed, rose like a phoenix from its ashes, and satisfied Sir Walter Scott that his ac- count of it required correction j (appendix, v. iii, pp. 354-7) t^^t^ instead of being what he had declared it to be ^^ a jacobin pamphlet," it was an essay inculcating submission to the acts and officers of government; that Marat was not, as he had asserted, one of the interlocutors, and that the essay contained no sentiment which could affect an honest man or a good citizen with self-reproach. Disappointed, but not disheartened, the author of Waverley, on this admitted alteration of his facts, founds an equivalent, if not identical imputation; as if the confusion arising from a blunder was to be relieved by perpetrating an injustice. This iraputa- lion imports, that although not stung by self-re* CHAPTER II. 349 proach on looking over his pamphlet, Napoleon was so disgusted with ^^ the colour of his vizard," which he had assumed for the purpose of allaying the vio- lence of a civil war while a foreign war was raging, that he called in and destroyed every copy that could be found, one only escaping, from which, unfortu- nately for the congruity of the body and appendix of SirWalter Scott's work, though not for its bulk, the essay was reprinted. ^^The colour of his vizard,'' we learn, (v. iii, p. 367) '^ was the assumed charac- ter of a jacobin, with the friendly intention of convincing the girondists that they were choosing an unfit time for insurrection." This, be it ob- served, is imputing to Napoleon the scheme of recommending himself as a friend to the girondists,, by assuming the character of their terrible and and mortal foe ; a device in the art of persuasion which was not practised by Demosthenes, nor in- culcated by Quintilian. We also learn from Sir Walter, that the soldier in the dialogue is Bona- parte himself, that his essay was ^' free from all the exaggerated and cant language of the day, no men- tion of liberty, equality, or fraternity of the rights of man, no abstract discussion of political prin- ciples." He then goes on with a degree of hardi- hood that Rob Roy himself never equalled : ^^ Not- withstanding, therefore, what is said in the text, from erroneous information of the nature of this publication, there is nothing in it (that is, nothing in what is said about the work in the text) incon- sistent with Napoleon's own account of the origin 35o APPENDIX. of the work, that it was written under the assumed character of a jacobin, with the friendly intention of convincing the girondists that they were choos- ing an unfit time for insurrection^ and attempting it in a hopeless manner." Now, let us see what is said in the text about this work (v. iii^ p. 3o) : ' ^ Napoleon had shewn that his own opinions were formed on the model of the times by a small jacobin publication called ^^Le Souper de Beaucaire," a political dialogue between Marat and a federalist, in which the latter is overwhelmed and silenced by the arguments and eloquence of the friend of the people." ^^It is whimsical to observe, that, in the manuscripts of St. Helena, he mentions this publi- cation as one in which he assumed the mask of ja- cobin principles, merely to convince the girondists and royalists that they were chusing an unfit time for insurrection, and attempting it in a hopeless manner." Now, between these statements, he al- leges in the appendix, there is no inconsistency, the first asserting that the jacobin opinions of Marat were those which Napoleon really entertained, and the second that he had merely assumed the lan- guage of a jacobin, the better to convince the in- surgents that they were chusing an unfit time for their attempt. Would it not be as rational to say. Notwithstanding that I told jou yesterday that two and two make four , there is no inconsistency between what I then said, and what I now say, that two and two make five ! So far was Sir Walter from thinking there was no inconsistency between CHAPTER II. 35 1 these two statements^ when he placed them in his text, that he introduced the latter as contrasted with the former, and as justifying an insinuation that it was on that account false. *"* It is whim- sical to observe, etc.," that is, it is odd that JYa^ poleoriy after having written the ^ Souper de BeaucairCy in the genuine spirit of a jacobiji^ and with such sincere extj^avagancCy that he as- sumed the vizard of Marat's name ; should have pretended J in the manuscripts of St, Helena ^ that he never entertained the exaggerated political sentiments of the jacobins^ but merelj assumed the mask of them for a moment , xvith the in- tention of pacifying an insurrection. The pre- tence is so whimsically false, that it is quite amusing to observe it. But this is not the only inconsistency between the text and the appendix. In the first Napoleon is ashamed of his work, be- cause it was ^^a jacobin publication." In the se- cond it is not a jacobin publication^ ^^ nothing can be more inaccurate than to say so" (p. 366) : still he is ashamed of his work ! However, at last Sir Walter endeavours to re- concile this inconsistency, by saying that Napoleon himself admits in the St. Helena manuscripts, that he did assume the mask of a jacobin; that he was disgusted at the ^^ colour of his vizard" afterwards, and therefore as Sir Walter asserts, destroyed his work. For this alleged admission of Napoleon, it is to be regretted that he does not make a less vague reference to bis authority. In the third volume of 352 APPENDIX. these manuscripts^ (Montholon p. xii) this is the account which Napoleon dictated of the origin of his Souper de Beaucaire, ^^ During Napoleon's stay at Marseilles near the insurgents, having had an opportunity of observing the feebleness and in- coherence of their measures and means, he wrote a small pamphlet, which he published before he left that city. He endeavoured to open the eyes of these madmen, and predicted that their revolt would have no other result, than to give occasion for the men of blood, to sacrifice their leading ci- tizens on the scaffold." Now this so far from being an admission that he had assumed the mask of a jacobin or that he assumed any mask whatever, at any time, shows the reverse, for the jacobins were the men of blood, from whose power and cruelty he was endeavouring to screen the people of Marseilles. This ^^ vizard," therefore, whose colour was so disgusting, never existed, and of course could not have occasioned the rigorous de- struction of the pamphlet. It is easy to conceive that when he had become the ruler of France and the dictator of Europe, he might have desired, from motives founded in the prudence of a statesman and patriot, but not from shame or disgust, to suppress the circulation of this early essay. It contained the affirmation of a military maxim, the soundness of which he had afterwards reason to deny (see Memoires de Napo- leon — Montholon — t. v, ch. 9). In the ^* Supper of Beaucaire" the military speaker says : ^^ It is an CFiAPTiiR II. 35 0^3 axiom in the military art that an army ^Yhich re- mains in its intrenchments is beaten. Theory and experience agree on this point." This dictum^ of Fouquet, the emperor would have been unwilling to recommend to his generals^ a consideration which alone may be assumed as sufficient to pro- voke the destruction of the pamphlet. It might have had a tendency to obstruct the fusion of par- ties upon accomplishing which he was so intent^ to awaken painful recollections which had long since subsided^ or to cast censure on the me- mory of men^ with w^hom those around him were connected, and who although they had erred in judgment, were many of them bright examples of virtue and talents. That it contained nothing to be ashamed of, or disgusted with, the pamphlet itself inconteslably proves. It is also easy to conceive, without reference to military opinions or political considerations, that a man of Napoleon's fine taste and matchless genius, after he had performed unrivalled achievements in war, politics, and legislation, was actuated by a feeling very different from shame or self reproach, wben he destroyed one of his early fugitive pro- ductions, by a discretion or fastidiousness, of which the greatest minds are not alwajs destitute. Virgil directed by his will^ that the last six books of the Eneid should be burned, because he had not suf- ficiently revised and polished them. None of his commentators have attributed that sensitiveness to 23 2oll. APPENDIX. shame or self reproach^ on account of political sen- timents ill that immortal poem^ althou(jh it does contain some which deserve reprobation. Johnson says of Pope — '^ Most of his juvenile productions^ were by his maturer judgment afterwards de- stroyed." As to Sir Walter himself^ his admirers cannot fail to regret^ that he was inattentive to these great examples of delicacy and judgment. Had it been otherwise, although his gains might have been less^ his fame would have been disembar- rassed of some of his earlier as well as later produc- tions, and untarnished by the one which we are now considering. The letter to Buttafoco is given at length in the appendix to the 3d volume of SirWalter Scott's Life of Napoleon with this preface (v. iii^ p. 368) ^^ We have preserved the composition entire, because^ though the matter be uninteresting, the rough and vivid style of invective is singularly characteristic of the fiery youth^ whose bosom one of his teachers compared to a volcano surcharged with molten granite ; which it poured forth in torrents^ when- ever his passions were excited." The reader will recognize in this sentence a distortion of the fact stated in the first chapter of this work, that the professor of belles lettres at the military school of Paris compared Napoleon's original amplifications to -'^blocks of granite issuing hot from a volcano. " The anecdote is derived from the Count de Las Cases; who thus relates it (Memorial, t. i, pp. 175-6 et 7 ) '^ Being myself an e/ei>e of the military school CHAPTER II. 355 of Paris^ but a year earlier than Napoleon, I had opportunities of talking about him frequently after my return from emigration, with the masters who had been our common instructors. M. Domairon, our professor of belles lettres, told me that he had always been struck with the originality of Napo- leon s amplifications ; he had called them from the time Napoleon was at school, granite heated in a volcano/'' Is there the slightest reference here to the ^^ passions" or ^^ bosom" of Napoleon^ the least intimation that the former were so fiery as to con- vert the breast they inhabited into a moral volcano overboiling with ire and fury? Rhetorical ampli- fications in the theme of a student may indicate the turn of his imagination or the tendency of his taste, but never have yet been supposed to proceed from the rage of his passions. Setting aside the memory of Napoleon, and the obligation of an historian to his readers, it might he supposed that feelings of deli- cacy and honour would have deterred Sir Walter from putting a calumny, invented by himself, into the mouths of two gentlemen whose hearts he knew must have abhorred it; one being the admiring instructor, the other the faithful friend of Napo- leon. From the violence of this departure from truth, the suprincumbent weight and ever-acting pressure of those motives by which the author of Waverley was influenced, may with some degree of accuracy be inferred. To this letter he affixes the date of January in the year 2, which answers to January^ '79^; when Napoleon was in Corsica, and 356 APPENDIX. . joined Truguet's expedition against Sardinia. The letter itself proves it must have been written before that time, for this among other reasons, that it ap- peals toMirabeau as one of the great patriots sitting in the assembly with Buttafoco, and Mirabeau died the 2nd of April 1791. As Lockhart's assertion is the mere echo of Sir Walter Scott's, it may be dis- missed as an exploded falsehood. The contradic- tion between Norvins and Hazlitt, shows that one or the other must be wrong , while an examination of the work itself will prove that neither was right. They consider the pamphlet as a theory of govern- ment^ written by a politician, whereas it was an argument addressed by an officer of the army en- gaged in the execution of a special and important duty, to a body of disaffected citizens, for the pur- pose of dissuading them from impeding the opera- tions of the army to which he was attached, and from resisting the authority of a government, which directed that army against a foreign enemy. That it was no apology for the reign of terror, but an exhortation to a union of arms and councils, for the purpose of reconciling the army and the ci- tizens, and resisting the common foe, a perusal of the dialogue will convince the most sceptical reader. It is wonderful that any one could misapprehend its object, or perceiving it, fail to render the essay unqualified applause. That Napoleon had this pamphlet destroyed is repeated in the text on the authority of Sir Walter Scott and of Bourrienne, and therefore not posi- CHAPTLR II. 357 lively. Neither Hazlitt nor Norvins mentions this fact. Page 69. (18) The accounts given by other authors^ of the appearance and object of this little work^ are various. That dictated by Napoleon himself, as cited in the preceding note^ states expressly that he wrote the pamphlet while he was staying at Mar- seilles^ and published it before he left that town, Norvins, ( t. i^ p. 29) asserts that it was printed at Avignon by Sahin Tournal. Hazlitt (v. i^ p. 44) affirms that it was after leaving Marseilles^ and on his return to Avignon, that he wrote this pamphlet. The probability is, thatit was written and published at Marseilles, and that it was published at Avignon also. In respect to its political character, the opinions of historians are still more discordant. The absurdities and contradictions of Scott have been sufficiently exposed. Lockhart (v. i, p. i5) says it was a pamphlet ^^in which the poUtics of the jacobin party were spiritedly supported, and of which he was afterwards so ashamed that he took great pains to suppress it." Hazlitt (v. i, pp. 44-4^) represents it as an effort to prevent civil war and bloodshed, and as the beginning of a system of pru- dence on that subject, which he carried to an extreme that made him as a statesman ^^ hesitating, cautious, and almost pusillanimous." Norvins, on the contrary, regards it as ^^an apology for the system of terror which then governed France" (t. i, p. 29.) 358 APPENDIX. Page 70. (19) It has been alleged that Napoleon proposed after the wedding of his brother^ marrying ma- demoiselle Desiree Clary^ but that her father re- fused his consent saying that ^^one Bonaparte was enough in the same family. " This is doubtless an indention subsequent^ for al St. Helena^ Napoleon denied ever having thought of this marriage (Las Cases, t. i, pp. 181 2). Hazlitt reasserts this story, and imputes to this attachment, his favour to Ber- nadotte, which proceeded, no doubt, from the well known arts of Bernadotte as a courtier and intriguer, from his connection with Napoleon's family, and from the interest of Joseph, the link of that connec- tion. The vanity which could persuade a lady to imagine that she had once captivated the great conqueror, cannot provoke censure nor excite surprise. ( 359 ) CHAPTER in. Page 7o. (4) Thiers, in his history of the French revo- lution, observes, (t. v, p. ^Sg) that admiral TrogofFwho commanded at Toulon, and deli- vered the place to lord Hood, was a '* foreigner whom France had loaded with favours." Page 75. (2) Extract from "the preliminary Declara- tion" of lord Hood to the inhabitants of Toulon: " and whenever peace takes place, which I hope and trust will be soon, the port with all the ships in the harbour, and forts of Toulon, shall be restored to France, with the stores of every kind, agreeable to the schedule that may be de- livered." Extract from the proclamation of lord Hood to the inhabitants in the towns and provinces in the south of France — "Trust your hopes to the generosity of a lojal, and free nation. ^^ Extract from the declaration made to lord Hood by the general committee of the sections of Toulon — who "having read the procla- mation of admiral lord Hood, commander in chief of his B. M. squadron, together with his preliminary Declaration" — "would have recourse to the generosity of a loyal people, who 56a APPLNDIX have manifested a desire of protecting all true Frenchmen, against the anarchists who wish to ruin them, declare to Lord Hood " — Here follow various conditions upon which the people of Toulon consent to deliver up the place. Of these, the 5th states that " the people of Toulon (are) full of confidence in the generous offers of lord Hood" — and the 8th, ''that when peace shall have been reestablished in France, the ships and forts which will be put into the hands of the English, shall be restored to the French nation, in the same state they were in when the inventory was delivered." Extract from the proclamation of lord Hood on taking possession of Toulon. " I do hereby repeat, what 1 have already declared to the people of the south of France, that I take pos- session of Toulon and hold it, in trust only, for Louis XVH, until peace shall be reestablished in France, which I hope and trust will be soon. Given onboard H. B M. ship Victory, off Ton- Ion, the 28th of August 1 795. " ' fSlgned.J "Hood." " By command of the admiral. " (fSlgned.J "J. Mc Arthur." See Annual Register for 1795 — State Papers — pp. 171, 2, 5. See also the declaration sent " byH. B. Majesty^s command to the commanders of his fleets and armies," dated the 19th of Octo- ber, 1793, recognising and confirming the agreo- CHAPTER 111. 56 r ment which had Leen entered into with the in- habitants of Toulon. Annual Register for 1 795, State papers, p. 199. Page 74. (5) This is the general estimate of La Poype's force. Gourgaud in the Menioires de Napoleon (t. I , p. 9) states it, I presume by mistake, at four thousand. Page 76. (4) In the Annual Register for 1 795 (History of Europe, p. 284)> the allied force is estimated at 12,000 men " bearing firelocks." This ex- cludes the cannoneers who must have been em- ployed in great numbers. Thiers (t. 6, p. 49) ratesthe land troops of the allies at 14 or i5,ooo. These antagonist accounts appear to confirm the computation of the emperor : viz. — 5, 000 Spaniards, I^yOOo Neapolitans, 5, 000 English, and 2,000 Sardinians — in all, 14,000. See Me- moires de Napoleon, Montholon (t. 3, p. 8). Sir Walter Scott, as he knew his countrymen were worsted, does not state their numbers. Page 77. (5) Norvins says (t. i, p. 52), that these ships conveyed 5, 000 seamen of Britanny, and that their presence at Toulon was feared by lord Hood. The Annual Register for 1795 mentions that the ships were sent round to Brest, '* with the hope of effecting a similar revolt in that quar- ter." — History of Europe, p. 284. 363 APPENDIX- Page 70. (6) Various dates have been assigned for this promotion. Las Cases (t. i, p. 224) makes it (he 19th October, 1795. But in the same volume (p. i94)» ^^ says on the authority of Napoleon, that in September, 1795, he was akeady a chief ofbattalion. In Montholon (t. 5, p. 11) Napo- leon states that he was chief of battalion before he was appointed lor the siege of Toulon. The same statement he repeated to Gourgaud (t. i, p 11) which is adopted or confirmed by Nor- vins (t. I, p. 55). Scott, with his usual indiffe- rence to facts, and contempt of accuracy, asserts (v. 5, p. 5o) that on occasion of Napoleon's being ordered to Toulon, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier genei^al. Yet, at page 44> after calling him "the young general of artil- lery," he declares that in conformity with the recommendation of Dugommier, upon the con- clusion of the siege, " he was confirmed in his provisional situation of chief of battalion, and appointed to hold that rank in the army of Italy." This is rewarding by injury, and promoting by degradation. Hazlitt on this point is vague and defective. Page 91. (7) This is the object which most writers (and Napoleon himself in his dictation to Gourgaud t. I, p. 16. among them)^ assign for concealing the erection and retarding the fire of this bat- CHAPTER III. 565 tery. Iii the dictation to Moiitholon, however (t. 5, pp. 28, 29), it is said that the fire was not to be opened until the day after Little Gibraltar should be taken, in order by the surprize to en- crease the confusion of the allies, who according to Napoleon's hypothesis, would be in the act of deliberating on the measures to be taken in consequence of the loss of Little Gibraltar. Page 91. (8) Sir Walter Scott says, this party con- sisted but of three thousand men (v. 5, p 07). Norvins (t. i, p. 40) raises the number to seven thousand. Napoleon in the dictation to Mon- tholon and Gourgaud makes it from six to se- ven thousand (t. i, p. 16, and t. 5, p. 29), an estimate the lower number of which is adopted by Hazlitt (v. i, p. 369), and by Thiers (t. vi, p. 55), authorities which I have followed. The military career of General O'Hara would have been as obscure as his talents were mode- rate, but for the remarkable fact of his having surrendered to Washington and to Napoleon. The anecdote respecting his sullen dignity in misfortune, is related by Napoleon himself in a letter to Kleber, of the loth September, 1798. In a letter to the same commander, Napoleon incidentally refers to his first efforts against the allied squadron at Toulon, in terms which shew the remarkable accuracy ofthe account of the same affair dictated at St. Helena; from which account 364 APPENDIX. that ill the text is derived. Encouraging hisheiite- nant to defend the harbour of Alexandria against an apprehended attack from the victorious Nel- son, he says — " With six twenty-four pounders, two furnaces for heating balls, and forty canno- neers, I contended for four days against the Eng- lish and Spanish squadron, and after burning a frigate and several bomb-ketches, forced them to draw^ off." (Letter of the 21st August, 1798.) Page 90. (9) In this pictures que language Napoleon him- self describes the general under whom he gained his first laurels. Yet, Sir Walter Scott, after denouncing as we have seen, the bad taste and worse French of Napoleon, retails it without ceremony and without acknowledgment, as his own (v. iii, p. 54), although by so doing he deflowers the compliment to Dugommier's me- mory, of all its grace and spirit. Page 99. (10) This fact rests on the assertion of Napo- leon at St. -Helena (Las Cases, t. i, p. 206), evidence, which if it were not convincing, the invidious suppression of his name by these depu- ties in their despatches, would confirm. They were unjust to him because he would not be un- generous to Dugommier. Page 102. (11) It is in these terms that Napoleon repre- CHAi-TER III. 565 sents the conduct of the deputies in his dictation to Gourgaud (t. i, p. 25), and that he repeats it to Montholon (t. iii^ p. 55), emphatically and expressly contradicting the statements written at the time of the siege^ which described these gentlemen as marching to the assault, at the head of the columns. Sir Walter Scott gives the substance of these opposite accounts to his readers, without adopting either, not unwilling, under the appearance of impartiality, to fix the suspicion of falsehood on Napoleon, and leave the disgrace of poltroonery on the deputies. Hazlitt (v. i, p. 565) and even Lockhart (v. i, p. 2o) are more just. Norvins is silent on this point; but what renders its examination proper, is, that Thiers, without referring to authority, and with the air of a person who considered his narration incontestable, ventures to sanction in the most positive language, the statement which Napoleon positively contradicts. These are his words, after describing the assault (t. vi, p. 55) : *' In this action, general Dugommier, the repre- sentatives Salicetti and Robespierre the younger, and the commandant of the artillery, Bona- parte, had been present in the fire, and had inspired the troops with the greatest courage." This is asserting that Salicetti and Robespierre the younger bore an equal part in the assault with Bonaparte and generalDugommier; an assertion, which, if not intended to destroy the deliberate statement of Napoleon altogether, might imply, 566 APPENDIX. that he and Dugommier came swaggering up, sword in hand to the fort, three hours after it had heen heen wrested from the enemy. To avoid this absurdity it must be inferred that the historian, designed to convey to the world a dow nright contradiction of a statement, made by Napoleon respecting a matter of fact, of which the latter was an eye witness, and in regard to which, he could hardly have com- mitted the error thus imputed to him , without falsehood. The only sources of authority to which a writer rejecting the statement of Na- poleon would be likely to resort, are first, the despatch of the deputies, Pucord, Freron, and Robespierre the younger, dated the 28 Frimaire (18 December) 1795 j second, the speech ofBar- rere^ delivered in the sitting of the 24 Decem- ber (14 Nivose) on the occasion of reporting this despatch, in the name of the committee of pub- lic safety, to the convention; third, the offi- cial report of general Dugommier, dated the 29 Frimaire (19 December) ^ fourth, the relation of the capture of Toulon drawn up by general Ma- rescot, who commanded the engineers of the siege, dated the 9th January, 1 794, and published in his compilation by Musset-Pathayin 1806; and fifth, the history of the siege of Toulon found in the voluminous work entitled: '^Victoires et Conquetes des Francais." In the first of these documents these three deputies say — "Distri- buted among the columns, we rallied such of CHAPTER III. 567 the troops as were for a moment daunted." They speak of their colleague Barras, as being em- ployed on the other side of the harbour with La- poype, but make no mention whatever of Sali- cetti ; so that if their own vague and interested account were to be received without abatement, it would not exactly sustain the narrative of Thiers. Passing from the first to the second document, from the deputies to their colleague the orator; it appears, that in the fervour of rhetoric and exultation, he thus discoursed to the conven- tion. "The representatives of the people march- ed at the head of the republican columns. Sa- licetti and Robespierre the younger, with their drawn swords, marshalled the first troops of the republic the road to victory, and mounted to the assault. They set an example of intrepidity. Ricord was also at the head of a column." This besides being a second-hand assertion, is in a style of description too frothy and effervescing for the sobriety of historical truth. Moreover, these deputies were colleagues of the orator as well as of his auditory, and one of them the brother of Robespierre^ who then presided in the reign of terror. The esprit du corps ^ the nature of the occasion, and the interest of the orator, all tended to produce exaggeration and praise. Barrere includes the name of Ri- cord, which Thiers omits, while they both omit that of Freron, one of the signers of the des- ^68 APPENDIX. patch which declares — "distributed among the cohimns, we rallied such of the troops as were for a moment daunted." In the third document general Dugommier says — ''so that, in spite of the obstructions of the weather, our brothers in arms sprang for- ward in the path of glory, as soon as the order was given. The representatives of the people, Robespierre, Salicetti, Ricord and Fr^ron were ivith us ; they set an example to onr brethren of the most signal devotion." This account it will be observed places Ricord and Freron on the same ground which Thiers assigns expressly to Robespierre and Salicetti; and from which Barrere excludes Freron. It makes no mention of Bonaparte whatever; and does not describe the deputies as mounting to the assault; but rather as being with the columns, when the order for the attack was pronounced, and the troops rushed forward to execute it. Consider- ing that the deputies were not expected to lead columns, or share in the danger of storming forts^ that something was due from courtesy to their station, that much was conceded from in- terest to their power, and that there is obvious inconsistency between the affirmation of Thiers and the report of Dugommier, it must be con- fessed, that the narrative of the historian is not corroborated by the report of the general. Ma- rescotsays — "The representatives of the people, the citizens Salicetti, Ricord, Robespierre the tHAPTER In. 36) younger, and Freron were present." But he omits the names of Dugommier and Bonaparte, although he mentions those of Laborde and Victor. His account is therefore far from sup- porting that of Thiers. Nor does it remove the impression that the presence of the deputies was confined to the moment, when the troops were put in motion. The prohabihty of this having been the fact is increased, when we re- flect, that of the five military gentlemen who are mentioned as participating in this arduous conflict — viz, Dugommier, Bonaparte, Muiron, Victor, and Laborde, four were wounded, that is Bonaparte slightly, and Muiron, Victor, and La- borde, severely — whereas of the four citizen sol- diers, all escaped untouched Again, men who would invidiously refuse praise to another, would not scruple to take credit unduly to themselves. Thiers admits (v. 6, p. 5i) that the reduction of Toulon was due to *' a young officer who com- manded the artillery. " This young ofiicer is not even mentioned in the despatch of the depu- ties, and there can be little doubt that the puff of Barrere about the drawn sword of Salicetti and Robespierre^ was prompted by those depu- ties themselves. In addition to this we should remember the analogous fact that Freron and Rarras, disavowed their letter, advising the go~ vernment to raise the siege, (See the Moniteur of the 28th December, 1795.) Nor does the account of this siege in the P^ic- 34 5^0 APPENDIX. toires et Conquetes^ etc. of the French armies, (t. :2, p. 1 55) justify the narrative of the historian. It is there observed (p. i6i) that the commis- saires of the convention, Salicetti, Ricord, Robes- pierre the younger, and Freron passed through the ranks and animated the soldiers to the attack, making no mention of Bonaparte, no distinction in favour of Salicetti andRobespierre, andleaving untouched the impression that the deputies confined their warlike exertions to words and gestures, and to the moment when the troops were moving to the assault. Upon the whole, therefore, it appears that this account of Thiers, resting on such unsound and incoherent vouchers, would be liable to suspi- cion^ even if it w ere uncontested. When op- posed to the deliberate and emphatic declaration of Napoleon, as to a matter of fact of which he was an eye witness, it ceases to possess the small- est authority. It may be observed of this author, that his work^ admirable as it is, betrays a ge- neral disposition to extol or excuse the civil per- sonages of the Revolution. In justice to Gasparin, it ought to be men- tioned, that he had left the army of Toulon before the assault of Little Gibraltar, and was not a party to the injustice, or the boasting of his colleagues. Page 104. (12) Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. 59) as- CHAPTER lil, 571 cribes this bold counsel to lord Hood — and as ills statement is substantially confirmed by Napo-i Icon (t, iii. p. 57, Montliolon), I have adopted it. It is perfectly inconsistent, however, with the relation of the same affair, in the Annual ReGfis- ter for 1795 (p. 284, History of Europe), Page 106. (i5) There are few passages of Sir Walter's work which reveal the spirit in which it was written, more clearly than the following puerile flourish. After describing, much in the style of scenes to be found in Rokeby and Ivanhoe (as if the tawdry costume which suits the stage, might be worn with grace or propriety in private circles), the awful but incomplete conflagra- tion perpetrated at Toulon, and the retreat of the British armament from its calamitous in- tercourse with French traitors, he adds — *' It was upon this night of terror, conflagration, tears and blood, that the star of Napoleon first ascended the horizon j and though it gleamed over many a scene of horror ere it set, it may be doubted whether its light was ever blended with those of one more dreadful. " Now so far from this figurative representation being true, the *^ terror, conflagration and tears, '' were all on the side of the English and their motly allies , while the star of Napoleon blen- ded its light with success, joy, security, and triumph. Sir Walter Scott had before him the 503 APPENDIX. Memoirs of Napoleon, in which (t. iii, p. 46) it is stated that the French government celebrated the taking of Toulon by a national festival, the first ceremony of the kind which the republic had ordained. He refers also to the files of the Moni- teur in which the details of this celebration are preserved, and yet he describes this leading triumph of the republic, as a '^scene of horror over which the star of Napoleon gleamed. '*^ When Caesar had exterminated the Nervians in a great battle, pacified Gaul, and intimida- ted the barbarians beyond the Rhine, the Ro- man senate were so far from regarding his suc- cesses as '' scenes of horror," that they decreed a public thanksgiving to the gods, of fifteen days. And the great captain of antiquity, whose '* star was then ascending the horizon," so es- teemed this national compliment, thathenotonly recorded it in his memoirs, but carefully men- tioned it, as an honor which had never been paid to any other commander. " Ob casque res, ex litteris Caesaris, dies XV, supplicatio decreta est, quod ante id tempus accidit nulli." The battle of the Nile was the first of Nelson*Sr great victories. To his* enemy it was no doubt a night of " terror, conflagration, tears, and blood." To him it secured the gratitude of his country, and immortal fame. What would the people of England have said, if this fair conquest of their hero, had been distorted by metaphori- cal detraction into "a scene of horror," and de- CHAPTER III. 575 precated with sinister regret as a night of * 'tears and blood." Page 109. (14) Lockbart (v. i, p. 21) says: " Junot be- came marshal of France." Even he ought to have known better. Junot might have gained a baton in 181 2 at Valentino. Page H2. (i5) That this was the course of public feel- ing, no one who considers the enormity of the crime committed by the Toulonese, and the ad- vantage taken of it by the English admiral, can doubt, especially after examining the terms of his proclamations, cited in a former note; his attempt, confessed in the Annual Register, to seduce from their allegiance the people of Brest and Rochefort: and the declaration of the king of Great Britain of the 19th October 179^, en- couraging other towns of France to follow the example of Toulon. Yet in defiance of this mass of evidence, attesting the insincere and calami- tous conduct of the English government in this treason of Toulon, British writers exhaust all their terms of reproach upon the cruelty of the French convention ! Sir Walter Scott calls it (v. iii, p. 4^) "republican vengeance ;" but says nothing about its exciting cause; although he seems to admit, that adequate exertions were not made to retain possession of Toulon, and of course, the power of protecting its guitly inhab Sy^ APPENDIX . tants. Lockhart (v. i, pp. 19, 20) is more un- just and extravagant ; and the Bourbon ascen- dancy in France, operating as an equivalent to alien feeling, Norvins, who wrote his history under the dominion of the Restoration, talks with as much horror of the reprisals executed by the agents of the convention, as of the dange- rous treason which provoked it (t. i, p. 45). And even Hazlitt, after properly observing (v. i^ p. 562) that " the excesses of the French revo- lution, were to be considered^ in the circum- stances of the time, and from the character of the people, as the natural but deplorable result^ of the general and almost frantic spirit of resis- tance to the threat of subjugation and oppression from without," is so far misled by this clamour, as to denounce more strenuously the stratagem by which the revolutionary tribunals entrapped their victims, than he does either the manner in which the people of Toulon betrayed their country, or that in which they were themselves betrayed (v. i, ch. 7). Yet what bounds would have been set to the indignation of British histo- rians, had a French admiral in the time of Louis XIV, after persuading the people of Ports- mouth to deliver into his hands that important station with all its fleets, arsenals and forts, upon the promise of receiving them " in trust only for the Pretender," and restoring them to England at the conclusion of peace between her domestic factions, upon finding himself likely to be driven CHAPTER III. 575 out of the place^ blown up the forts, burnt down the arsenals, carried off as prizes all the ships be could get away with, and set on fire the rest ? Notwithstanding the reproaches of French writers, it is not to be denied that England and France being at w ar, the British admiral was jus- tified in availing himself of the offer of the Tou- lon ese to deliver up to him their town, their harbour, and its contents. But it is equally undeniable that he was bound upon every prin- ciple of good faith to adhere strictly to the con- ditions, without consenting to which, he would never have got possession of Toulon. These, as they were understood by the Toulonese, and solemnly repeated by lord Hood himself, im- ported, that he took possession of Toulon, and ** held it in trust only for Louis XVll^ and that the place and every thing in it were to be re- stored to the French nation when peace should be reestablished in France." The object of the trust which he accepted being the interest of Louis XVn, lord Hood should have made the promotion of that interest the main purpose of his conduct, while in the possession of Toulon, and should have acted as if he had been appoint- ed to act by the King of France, and confined his agency strictly within the limits of his trust. It cannot be supposed that Louis XVH, either as claimant or possessor of the French throne, was likely to be benefitted by the destruction of the naval power of France. His comparatively Zn6 APPENDIX . venial connection with the foreign enemies of France liad hurried Louis XVI to the scaffold. It V, as not probable that delivering up the fleets, iorts, and arsenals of France to English posses- sion or EngHsh flames, would place his son, who was in the power of the French people; upon the French throne ! Yet lord Hood, the trustee of Louis XVII, 30 disposed of them to lord Hood, the commander of a British squadron. Holding this double character, he assumed one aspect to get possession of the fleet, and acted un- der the other to destroy or make prize of it. Sup- posing it be to his intention, and in his power, England and France being still at w ar, to replace the ships and other public property, at the re- establishment of peace in France, the injury to Louis XVII, in the increased irritation and dis- like af the French people was irreparable. But it is alleged by Thiers, that lord Hood, so far from consulting the interest ol Louis XVII, or any other interest than that of the British government and his own, prevented the departure of a deputation which the Toulonese proposed sending to the count of Provence, inviting him to repair ta Toulon, and there to establish himself as regent of the kingdom ; a step which might have been of infinite service to the cause of Louis XVII. If the minutes of the council of war, w hich fell into the hands of Dugommier are authentic, it would appear that the interest of Louis XVII was not thought of when the destruction of the pub- CHAPTER III. 577 lie property of Toulon was determined on. The Spanish government did not conceive that the interest of Spain, any more than that of Louis XVll was likely to he promoted by the conduct of lord Hood. In October, 1795, the king of Spain issued a declaration of war against Great Britain, in which, among other grievances com- plained of, is a breach of faith at Toulon, on the part of the English commanders, "in destroying all they could not carry off," and thus leaving the naval power of Great Britain in the Mediterra- nean, unrivalled. In the manifesto of the Eng- lish government, this reproach is answered by evasion and sophistry, which prove it to be irre- futable. " It is perhaps the first time that it has been imputed as a crime to one of the com- manding officers of two powers, acting in alli- ance, and making a common cause in war, that he did more than his proportion of mischief to the common enemy." This, besides evading the allegation of Spain, is avowing the doctrine that the end jusifies the means, that a commander in time of war, is to pay no respect to the laws of humanity, justice, or honour, but is to look only to the utmost degree of mischief to be inflicted on the enemy j and that bad faith or cruelty in one belligerent in a combined armament, casts no disgrace nor responsibility on the other. Upon this principle, the savage tribes of North America^ when in alliance with the King of Great Britain, are exempted by him from the restraints 378 APPENDIX. of humanity in war, and the denunciations of thatconneclion, by the great lord Chatham, were misapplied. Lord Hood was a gallant officer, and had many titles to respect, hut his conduct at Toulon was far below the dignity of his cha- racter and station, greatly unbecoming the se- cond of Rodney, and the captor of De Grasse. He made a promise^ upon the faith of which great advantages were yielded to him^ and per- formed it in a sense in which the partj who con- fided in him^ could not have understood it at the time it was given^ nor have been supposed to un- derstand it. With respect to the punishment of those citi- zens of Toulon, who confessed they had assisted the English in defending the place, its severe and indiscriminate infliction cannot be justified. But let the treason of Toulon be compared with the mutiny of the Nore. In the first case, French citizens delivered up to the enemy the largest naval squadron, and the chief naval sta- tion of their country. In the second, the Eng- lish seamen rose in mutiny against their officers in time of war, but refused to join the public enemy. The British government could not shoot all their seamen — yet not a single ring- leader was spared. Thiers thus describes the conduct of the En- glish admiral (t. v, p. 240): " Admiral Hood, who had hesitated a long time, at last made his appearance, and under the pretext of taking CHAPTER in. 379 possession of the port of Toulon in trust for Louis X\ II, received it for the purpose of burning and destroying it." And (t. yi, p. 5o) " The Spaniards were offended at the superiority af- fected by the English, and began to distrust their intentions. Admiral Hood taking advan- tage of this disunion declared, that since they could not agree together, it was necessary that for the moment no supreme authority should be appointed. He even prevented the departure of a deputation, which the Toulonese wished to despatch to the count of Provence, to invite that prince to repair to Toulon in the character of regent. From this moment it was easy to fa- thom the intentions of the English, and to per- ceive how blind and guilty had those French citizens been^ who had delivered Toulon into the hands of the most inveterate enemies of the French navy. " Page 112. (16) This fact which is stated by Norvins^ (t. i, p. 45) is countenanced by the positive and indignant terms in which Napoleon denied to Las Cases (t. i, p. 210) all participation in the execution of these men, a denial which he re- peated to Montholon (t. iii, p. 45)- Sir Wal- ter Scott, after reproducing the slanders thus denounced, proceeds to assign most convincing proofs of their falsehood, (and consequently of the impropriety of admitting them into his work) but for fear they should make no impression on 380 APPENDIX. the mind of the reader, he adopts a device of which he is no doubt the inventer. This con- trivance consists in stating the charge hypothe- tically as true, and then assigning excuses for it which if admitted to be just, prove the imputa- tion in question to be actually true. (v. iii, p. 45) " If he actually commanded at this execution, he had the poor apology that he must do so or him- self perish." Now as he did not perish, the inference arises that he actually superintended the execution. Page llo. (17) Had the designs of the English govern- ment, as manifested by the professions and con- duct of Lord Hood, and the declaration of the king of Great Britain, succeeded, it is evident that the whole French navy might have been destroyed by the cooperation of French malcon- tents, and the commanders of the British blockading squadrons. What was done at Tou- lon, was attempted to be done at Brest and Ro- chefort. It was necessary to repress this dange- rous correspondence with the public enemy, and the severity of the example which was set at Toulon, was doubtless increased by the evidences of national disaster and disgrace which there presented themselves. The less faith the Eng- lish observed towards the Toulonese, the less mercy did the French extend to them. Yet the safety of these people seems to have been a se- CHAPTER III. 38t condary consideration with the '^protectors of all true Frenchmen," "the trustees of Louis XVII," *Uhe generous agents of a loyal and free nation." According to SirWalter Scott (v. iii, p. Sg). ''The safety of the unfortunate citzens who had in- voked their protection, was not neglected even amid the confusion of the retreat. The nume- rous merchant vessels and other craft, offered means of transportation to all who having to fear the resentment of the republicans, might be desirous of quitting Toulon/' He goes on (p. 40) '^li had been resolved \\\dit the arsenal and naval stores, with such of the French ships as were not ready for sea, should be destroyed, and they were set on fire accordingly : " shewing that the destruction of French property was the first object, and the "safety of the unfortunate citzens" the second. Moreover the minutes of the council of war held by the allied officers, at which the evacuation was resolved on, as ci- ted by Montholon (t. iii, p. Sg), confirms this conclusion. — "Third question. Is it not the in- terest of the allies to abandon the town at once, after setting fire to every thing which cannot be carried off? Answer : The council decides una- nimously for the evacuation • the garrison which might be left in Toulon, would be without re- treat, could receive no succour, and would soon be in want of indispensable supplies. Besides a fortnight sooner or later it would be obliged to surrender, and forced to deliver up the arsenal, 38jt APPENDIX. the fleet and the establishments entire." Here no provision is hinted at or concern expressed for *'the safety of the unfortunate citizens." This is the account which Thiers gives of the part the Enghsh tcok in their behalf, (t. vi, p. 56). " Twenty ships of the line or frigates appeared suddenly in flames in the middle of the road, exciting despair among the wretched inhabi- tants, and indignation in the republicans, who beheld their fleet burning to ashes without being able to save it. Immediately twenty thousand individuals, men and women, the aged and in- fants, carrying with them whatever they most valued, hurried to the shores, and extending their hands towards the allied squadrons, implored an asylum which might shelter them from the victorious army. They consisted of all the fami- lies of Provence, who at Aix, Marseilles, and Tou- lon had committed themselves in this insurrec- tionary movement. Not a single shallop put off to the assistance of these imprudent citizens, who had put their trust in foreigners, and had deli- vered up to them the principal naval station of their country. At length admiral Langara, the Spanish admiral, more humane, ordered his boats to put off and to convey aboard the Spa- nish squadron, as many of the refugees as his ships could accommodate. Admiral Hood dared not resist this example, or the imprecations which were showered on his name. He gave or- ders at a late period, to receive the Toulonese CHAPTER III. 383 on board. These unhappy fugitives rushed des- perately into the boats. In their confusion some fell into the sea, others were separated from their families. Mothers were seen in search of their infants , wives and daughters seeking their fathers or husbands, wandered about the quays in the glare of the conflagation." General Mares- cot mentions the flight of" the wretched French citizens who remembered too late how faithless are the promises of an enemy, and how horrible is the fate of those whom a blind rage arms against their country. Confusion, hurry, and alarm, prevailed to such a degree in this em- barkation, that numbers of the fugitives were drowned. Several of the boats were sunk by the republican artillery, which began to fire from the opposite shores." Page 113. (i8) This fact is reported upon Napoleon^s authority by Las Cases (t. i,p. 25). Bourrienne affects to contradict it (t.i, p. 67) by affirming that it was not at Toulon that Napoleon selected Duroc as his aide de camp ; but afterwards in Italy. This might be true without bringing into question the assertion that he knew Duroc at Toulon for the first time, there divined his merit and exlended to him his favour. On this point there is still farther controversy. The Dutchess d'Abrantes (t. i, ch. i5; says that Junot was the first officer who was attached to Napo- 384 APPENDIX. leon as aide de camp. Norvins on the contrary (t.i, p. 4^) mentions that Muiron and Duroc were his first aides de camp. The probability is that Muiron was his first aide de camp and Junot his second, in relation both to rank and time, for they were both attached to his person, Muiron as adjutant, and Junot as sergeant and secretary,, at Toulon. In the campaign of the next spring and at Paris in 1795, Junot was undoubtedly one of his aides de camp, while there is no evidence other than the assertion of Norvins that Duroc was. In 1796 when he took command of the army of Italy, his list of aides de camp was of course increased, and in point of rank, Murat who had been attached to him during his com- mand at Paris, was first. Lavallette relates (Memoires, t. i, p. 188) that when he joined Bonaparte as aide de camp in Italy shortly after the battle of Arcole, Murat having been pro- moted and Muiron killed, Junot was the first aide de camp, Marmont second, and Duroc third. ( 585 ) CHAPTER IV. Page 122. (i) "Happily he allowed himself to be di- rected entirely by the young Bonaparte'' (Thiers, t. vi, p. 288). Page 12o. (2) The words of Thiers in his concise sketch of this campaign are (p. 288): " He was struck with an idea as fortunate as that which restored Toulon to the republic." Page 127. (5) This analysis of the plan is derived chiefly from the narrative of Napoleon himself (Mon- tholon, t. iii, chap. H). A reference to the Annual Register for the year 17945 as well as the sketch of Thiers, has been found useful. Page 127. (4) The most remarkable and successful exhi- bition of talent, in this sort of warfare, of which military annals preserve the record, was fur- nished by Caesar, in his campaign against Afranius and Petreius, the lieutenants of Pom- pey, in the mountains of Catalonia. Without lighting, he compelled these resolute and expe- rienced generals, by skilful choice of ground alone, to surrender at discretion an army equal in numbers to his own, which besides a large bod . of auxiliaries, conlRinedJii^e Roman legions; this before the battle of Pharsalia, and while 25 386 APPENDIX. Pompey was in the pride of his strength. The great Cond^ deemed this exploit such a master- piece of miUtary skill, that he visited and studied the ground. Ccesar de Bello cwili^ lib. i, chap. Q^^ 71, 84. — (Bossuety Oraison funehre de Louis de Bourbon). Page 128. (5) For these two facts, besides the Annuals of the period see Thiers (t. vi, p. 289). Page i29. (6) Thiers observes (ibid.): ''They could not hesitate to adept the plan of Bonaparte ." Page 129. (7) Massena was a native of the county of Nice, and though already respected as a brave and promising officer, had not acquired y«/7ze. Page 150. (8) M^moires de Napoleon — Montholon, t. iii^ p. 6^ — confirmed by the Annual Register for 1794 — chap. 4) History of Europe . Page 135. (9) It would be difficult, were it required, to determine, whether from carelessness the French, or prejudice the English, biographers of Napo- leon, have given the more defective accounts of these active, daring, and successful operations of their hero, in this his novitiate as a general officer. These operations evince a higher degree of mi- litary talent, than can be discovered in the entire CHAPTER JV. 587 career of Bernadotte, Joubert, or even Moreau; or of any English general from the death of Marlborough to the appearance of Wellington . They are introductory, too, to a brilliant series of Napoleon's subsequent exploits, and their im- portance unquestionably contributed to save him from the axe of the revolution. Yet Norvins (t. i, p. 49) assures his readers that Massena took Onielle, traversed the territory of Genoa, beat the Austrians at Ponte-di-Nave, and made himself master of Ormea and Garesio. Whereas it appears Massena did not cross the Taggia, or go near the territory of Genoa, but wheeled to his left in the neighbourhood of Vingtimilia, and penetrated into the rear of the Sardinian camp at Saorgio. Norvins, Avho professes (see his preface) to have studied the actions and me- ditated the biography of Napoleon for many years, merely gives him credit for the plan of this campaign, and from the moment of its adop- tion, makes him a cypher. Respect for the superiority of Massena's rank could not justify this depression of Napoleon, for on that prin- ciple general Dumerbion should have been the officer commemorated 3 as he was in fact at the time the events took place (See Annual Re- gister 1794? History of Europe, chap. iv). When we reflect that the great captain himself, in his last days, recollected these early efforts of his martial genius, with interest enough to dictate a clear though brief account of them, in his Me- 388 APPE^DlX. moirs of the war of Italy (Montholon, t. iii, chap. 2) it woiild appear that his countryman and admirer could scarcely think them unworthy of recital, without regarding them as fabulous. Yet had this been his opinion, respect for his readers demanded its avowal. So that in refe- rence to this part of Napoleon's life, there is in the work of Norvins, an unjustifiable omission. It is true that Jomini in his account of these operations (t. v, chap. 55) mentions Napoleon only as the adviser of the measure, confining his details to the officers commanding regularly the division, its columns, brigades, etc. But he was writing a general history, not the life of Na- poleon, and prepared his work^ before the Memoirs of Napoleon appeared. Hazlitt, whose book is written with more impartiality than judgment, furnishes but a meagre account of these important successes of the column conducted by Napoleon, adopting the slight allusion to them, which concludes a chapter on a different subject, in the dictation to Gourgaud (t. i, — chapter on the siege of Toulon) in preference to the connected narra- tive found in Montholon. Yet both these au- thors describe the plan clearly as Napoleon's, and as being bold, ingenious, and original. But Sir Walter Scott (v. i, p. 46) completes his ac- count of this successful series of marches and actions (which threw the court of Turin into such alarm, that a levy en masse of the inhabi- CHAPTER IV. 389 lanls of Piedmont was ordex^ed) in two sentences and one short note. "Bonaparte had influence enough to recommend with succcess to the ge- neral, Dumerbion, and the representatives of the people, RicordandRobespierre, a plan for driving the enemy out of this position, forcing them to retreat beyond the Higher Alps, and taking Saorgio ; all which measures succeeded as he predicted. Saorgio surrendered, with much stores and baggage, and the French army ob- tained possession of the Higher Alps, which being tenable by defending few and dilQficult passes, placed a great part of the army of Italy^ at disposal for actual service." The important note is in these words — '* The Sardinians were dislodged from the Col de Tende, 7th May 1794-" Here the reader will observe Napoleon's in- fluence, not his talent nor enterprise, is men- tioned. Sir Walter in the advertisement of his work (v.i,p.5) " claims credit for having brought to the undertaking a mind disposed to do his subject justice," Now suppose the duke of Marlborough, in his twenty-fifth year, had planned and conducted such brilliant and de- cisive manoeuvres and combats ; would his bio- grapher be excusable for contracting them into the compass of a quarter of a small page ? Sir Walter devotes about twenty times the space to Sir John Stuart's descent upon Calabria, in which he defeated an indifierent French general, and returned to the point from which he set out, SgO APPENDIX. without altering the general state of the war (v. vi, p. 2), than he does to military events in the life and character ot* his hero, which the Annual Register of the time, considered likely to change the face of Europe (See Ann. Reg. for ^794 — History of Europe, chap. 4). As to Lock- hart, it is sufficient to oliserve that his account is more slight and imperfect than Scott's. Thiers in his general narration (t. \i, chap. 5), has done more justice to these events, than either of the professed biographers, and has noticed ihem as fully as, from the nature and style of his work, which is more a civil than a military history, he could be expected to do. It may be observed that he confirms generally the account left by Napoleon, a fact which has been thought to occasion a special reference to both, where they coincide, unnecessary. Page 15G. (10) This incident in the campaign, omitted altogether by the four biographers above men " tioned, is not unworthy of notice as it contributes to demonstrate Napoleon's ascendency in the army ; and as its misrepresentation by Albite, Salicetti, and Laporte, was made one of the pretexts for placing the general of artillery under arrest Page 157. (11) Thiers, (t. vi, p. 271). CHAPTER 6gi Page 158. (12) A slight allusion to this project and the successful movements which grew out of its adop- tion, may be found in Norvins (t. i, pp. 62, 5), a more imperfect one in Hazlitt (v. i, pp. 576, 77), none at all in Scott, and none in Lockhart. The particulars in the text are derived from Na- poleon^s own account, dictated to Montholon succinctly (t. ii, p. 211), repeated in detail to the same amanuensis (t. iii, ch. 2), from the Moni- teur and Annual Register of the period, that very useful work, Bourrienne et ses Erreurs (t. i, ch. 5) J and from the well designed sketch of Thiers (t. vii, p. 77), Page 140. (i3) Thiers (ibid.) says Colloredo ''retired shamefully, accusing the English, who accused him in turn." Page 142. (14) In the first volume of the Memorial de St. Helene, the reader will find this circum- stance of military folly, and amorous infatua- tion, related in the words of Napoleon himself (pp. 217, 18), with an ingenuousness and a self reproach, which alone would carry conviction of their truth. He says '' the idea came suddenly into his head," of entertaining his fair compa- nion with a spectacle of war, and that the re- membrance of his folly was ever after accompa- nied with regret; shewing that he acted from a 5g2 APPENDIX . momentary impulse, which had there been time for reflexion, his good sense and good feeling would have repressed. The existence of this lady, her name, connection with Napoleon^ and the effects of it on his conduct and fortune, are all unnoticed it would appear by Norvins, Hazlitt, Scott, and Lockhart. Page 145. (i 5) Napoleon himself (Las Cases, t. i,pp. 21 5, 45i); the dutchess d'Abrantes (Memoires, t. i, p. 257); and Thiers (t. vi, pp. 462, 54). The last describes his conduct towards his brother as af- fectionate and even noble. The language of the first does not imply that his acquaintance with this unfortunate man, ever ripened into friend- ship, but that Robespierre conceived as was na- tural, an enthusiastic admiration for Napoleon, Page 140. {16) Norvins (t. i, p. 57), Page 148. (17) The dutchess d'Abrantes (t. i, p. 241 ) publishes his note to Junot. Page 147. (18) The variety of misrepresentation to which this distinct and remarkable fact of Na- poleon'sbeing placed under arrest, has been sub- jected, is truly astonishing. Norvins (t. i, pp. 56, 7) makes it happen in the winter of 1794, 95 — and describes it as the consequence of the plan which Napoleon furnished during CHAPTER IV. 395 that winter to the deputy Maignier for fortifying the magazines of Marseilles. Hazlitt (v. i, pp. 576, 76) describes Napoleon as having been in great danger of being summoned to the bar of the convention, and placed under temporary arrest, in the month of September, in conse- quence of this same plan furnished to the deputy Maignier, which plan was not applied for until some months subsequent to September • thus con- founding two unconnected events, and approxi- mating as many remote dates. Scott's account is almost as defective and much more confused. He (v. iii, pp. 46, 47) avers that while Napoleon was employed in directing those operations, which forced the Sardinians from Saorgio, and in making himself acquainted with that region of the Alps, he was involved in the accusation before the convention which grew out the plan he furnished for fortifying the magazines of Mar- seilles. This is putting together events which were separated by several months, and making the last in succession the cause of the first. He then proceeds — -'^In the remainder of the year 1794, there was little service of consequence in the army of Italy," '*andthe9thand lOthThermi- dor of that year brought the downfal of Robes- pierre and threatened unfavorable consequences to Bonaparte," — thus not only annihilating a number of important military events, but while apparently carrying forward his narration from the end of 1794? returning without notice to ^94 APPENDIX, midsummer of lliat year. lie then affirms that Bonaparte was in consequence of his friendship for the younger Robespierre, and his suspected connection with the party of his brother, super- seded and put under arrest; and thai being libe- rated by the influence of Salicetti he repaired to Marseilles, '^in a condition to give or to re- ceive little consolation from his family," and that he remained with them until May, 1795, when he came to Paris. Here, not to notice the incoherency of the language, the arrest in Au- gust, 1794? and the reorganisation of the armies of Italy and the Alps which took place in the spring of 1795, and by which Napoleon's service as general of artillery in the army of Italy ceased, are arbitrarily brought together ; and his mili- tary life from the beginning of September until May, totally extinguished by the dash of a ro- mantic pen. As to his incapacity to console, or be consoled by his family, there appears to have been little room for consolation on either side.' Joseph had married a rich and most amiable lady, the daughter of a banker of great wealth and credit at Marseilles, and Napoleon himself, after acquiring increase of fame and considera- tion, was returned safe from the dangers of war and proscription. It may be supposed, therefore, that while he himself was far from being dejec- ted, his family was at this particular time one of the happiest in France. In reference to the acquaintance of Napoleon CHAPTER IV. 595 with the younger Robespierre, Sir Walter proceeds still farther in injustice and error. After wandering back from the end of 1794 to the downfal of Robespierre and his party in the middle of that year, he says without authority, Napoleon "had been the friend of the tyrant's brother, and was understood to have participated in the tone of exaggerated patriotism afifected by his party" — and then adds — (v. iii, p.p. 47? 8) : " He endeavoured to shelter himself under his ignorance of the real tendency of the proceed- ings of those who had fallen; an apology which resolves itself into the ordinary excuse, that he found his late friends had not been the persons he took them for. According to this line of defence, he made all haste to disclaim accession to the political schemes of which they were accused. ' I am somewhat affected, ' he wrote to a correspondent, ' at the fate of the younger Robespierre, but had he been my brother, I w ould have poniarded him with my own hand, had I been aware that he w as formin"' schemes of tyranny. " Now here is a charge of the blackest complexion, brought forward without examina- tion or proof, by an author professing special in- tentions to do justice. It amounts to this — that as long as the Robespicrres were prosperous and powerful^ Bonaparte was their friend and abet- tor — that the moment they were overthrown^ exe- cutedy and decried^ he^ with an eager and treache- rous pusillaniniitj y disowned all knowledge of 5q6 ArPENDTX. or participation in their schemes ; of which he pj'ofessed such abhorrence^ that he declared he could have willinglj assassinated that one oj' the b/othei's, of whom he had been the personal friend I For this diabolical charge, the only authority produced, is the extract of a pretended letter from Napoleon to a correspondent; which as no reference is made to its date, the person to whom it was written, or the hook or collection in which it was found, it may be safely affirmed, not only never was written by Napoleon, but was extracted from a source so polluted, that the author of Waverley was ashamed to own his clandestine reliance upon it. But, let us suppose, for a moment, that the letter in question, in spite of the incongruity of its sentiments with Napoleon's character, was genuine, would it authorize the inferences which Sir Walter affects to draw from it as a matter of fair and obvious deduction ? He has himself stated (p. 46), that Ricord and Robespierre the younger, were the representatives attached to the army of Italy, to whom Napoleon's plan for dislodging the enemy from Saorgio was sub- mitted, and by whom it was approved. He has also satisfied his readers that Napoleon had not been in Paris from about the ist September, 1 795 j that is, for more than ten months pre- vious to the downfal of Robespierre, and that during this period of ten months, his occupa- tions had been intensely important, and exclu- CHAPTER IV. 697 sively military. These two facts shew that he had occasion to cultivate the acquaintance of the younger Robespierre, and that he had no occa- sion nor opportunity to become a partizan of his brother, or to obtain any particular know- ledge of the atrocious schemes imputed to him. Napoleon might, therefore, very fairly have answered, if reproached with being an accom- plice of the tyrant, that he knew nothing of his designs, and if these had been attributed by a correspondent to the younger Robespierre, and had been described as particularly enormous and execrable, he might have replied, that if such horrible treason was really meditated by the younger Robespierre, he would have killed him. himself, sooner than see it successfully perpe- trated. It is evident, that the signification of this part of the pretended letter would depend altogether upon the nature of the alleged schemes. But not only is there every reason to believe that the letter was not genuine, and that Sir Walter did not deem it to be genuine, but that he did not believe himself in the inferences he deduced from it. At page 5o, he says, when colouring another misrepresentation, "Bona- parte forgot neither benefits nor injuries." Now, friendship, which he will have it, existed be- tween Napoleon and the younger Roberspierre is the offspring of reciprocal kindness and mu- tual benefits, which, in the case of Robespierre, the younger, Napoleon must have forgotten. 5gS APPENDIX. Again, in his conclusion (t. ix, p. Sig), he says, "Napoleon's personal character was decidedly amiable, excepting in one particular. His tem- per, when he received, or thought that he re- ceived, provocation, especially if of a personal character, was warm and vindictive." It is not pretended that he was actuated by revenge, when " he made all haste to disclaim adhesion to thepoHtical schemes of which the Robespierres were accused;" so that, unless denying an un- fortunate friend at the expense of truth, was considered by the great Scotch novelist, " de- cidedly amiable ;" he could not possibly have believed that the insinuations against the charac- ter of his hero, which are here examined, were less false than they are foul. Lockhart(v. i, p. 25) mentions the facts of the arrest andrelease in their proper places ; but adds, with admirable ignorance and effrontery, that, owing to the general ill-will of the deputies, Napoleon was never afterwards employed in the army of Italy. Whereas, from the letter of the deputies who arrested him, (Bourrienne et ses Erreurs, t.i, p. 27) it appears, that the necessity of employing him in the army of Italy was one of the causes assigned by them for restoring him to duty; audit is clear, from his own ac- count of his life, from the history of Thiers, and from other less important works, that he con- ducted the army of Italy after his arrest and liberation, in the operations against Vado, Sa- CHAPTER IV. 599 vona, Cairo, and Dego. The license of Lock- hart is carried to the extent of adding, that, from the time of his Hberation from arrest to his com- ing to Paris, he remained inactive with his mo- ther at Marseilles, and, in this period of idleness and depression, fell in love with Mademoiselle Clary; thus suspending for an interval of nine months a career which was incessantly active and progressive; and reasserting, without the slightest proof, a story which Napoleon himself had contradicted (Las Cases, t. i, p. 182). In the same strain of heedless error, he intimates that Napoleon was too poor to marry; forgetting, that as Madamoiselle Clary was rich, his poverty would have formed an incentive; and that his brother Joseph, who was not a general officer, and was at least as poor as IXapoleon him- self, had already married the sister of Mademoi- selle Clary. Bourrienne, though he mentions the fact and the date of the arrest with sufficient accuracy, is, although diametrically opposed to Sir Wal- ter Scott, wofully inexact as to its cause; affirm- ing, that this had no reference whatever to a supposed complicity of Napoleon with Robes- pierre the younger, and Ricord; and, alleging, that had it not been for the downfal of Robes- pierre, the consequences might have been fatal to Napoleon. In the letter of the deputies, Albite, Salicetti, and Laporte, dated the 6th August, 1794) informing the committee of pub- 400 APPENDIX. lie safety of their having ordered the arrest, this alleged connection with Robespierre and Ricord is expressly enumerated among the reasons of that measure (See Bo^rrienne et ses Erreurs, t. i, p. 20 ; also Jomini, Histoires des Guerres de la Revolution, t, vi. p. 1 13). Nor is Bourrienne less unfortunate in accounting for his release. He asserts, that it proceeded, in no degree what- ever, from the belief of the deputies that his ser- vices were indispensable to the success of the army. These deputies themselves, however, give quite a different account, in their letter of the 24th of August, to the committee of public safety, in which they declare, that '* the talents of this officer are, in the highest degree, useful j that his innocence is evident; and that, there- fore^ they have suspended the arrest until the orders of the committee shall be received, and restored him to liberty" (Bourrienne, et ses Er- reurs, t. i, p. 27, and Jomini, t. vi, p. 1 14). Page 149. (19) Norvins (t. i, p. 5); Montholon, t. iii, p. 76). Page 130. (20) He himself mentioned (Las Cases^ t. i, p. 2 1 5) that he was outlawed by the order of one of the deputies with the army, because he would not allow him to employ the artillery horses in posting; but neither the name of the deputy nor the date of the order is given; nor CHAPTER IV. 4ot does the fact appear to have led to any serious consequence. Page 1S5. (21) This circumstance in the life of Napoleon, which is so particularly mentioned by himself (Montholon, t. iii, p. 80) is not noticed by Nor- vins, Hazlitt, or Lockhart. The ludicrous distor- tion to which it is subjected by Scott (v. iii, p, 99), will be pointed out hereafter. Yet the selection of Napoleon for such critical service, so soon after the accusation to which he was ex- posed, and his influence in counteracting so in- judicious an enterprise, were facts honorable to his character as a patriot and an officer. His pre- sence at Toulon on the occasion too, led to an act of the most intrepid humanity. Thiers, who thought the event of importance enough to form a part of his great work, thus records it (t. vii, p. 458) : "The government bad projected a ri- diculous coup de main against Rome. Anxious to revenge the assassination of Basseville, they had embarked ten thousand men on board the squadron at Toulon, which had been entirely refitted by the care of the commitee of public safety. It was designed to send them to the mouth of the Tiber in order to lay a contribution on the papal city, and then to retire promptly to the ships. Fortunately a naval action with admiral Hotham, from which both squadrons retired equal suflferers, prevented the execution of this project." 26 4o2 APPENDIX. Page ISS. (22) There are few indisputable events in the life of Napoleon , which have suffered more di- versified and wanton mutilation, than this rescue of two representatives of the people and a family of unfortunate emigrants from a mob. It is re- lated by himself (Montholon, t. iii, p. 86) in a narrative as distinct and graphical as any part Caesar's Commentaries, and is mentioned to have taken place in March, 1796, when he had been called to Toulon by this projected expedi- tion against Rome. On another occasion he in- troduced it by way of ilkistration in a conversa- tion with the faithful Las Cases (t. i, p. 210), mentioning the gratitude of the persons whom he saved, and though not proposing to fix its date, referring it incidentally to a period con- siderably posterior to the siege of Toulon. Las Cases adds of his own accord (p. 211) that after Napoleon's death the Chabrillant family, who had preserved as a precious relic the order for their embarkation, bore grateful testimony in an interview he had with them, to this noble act of humanity 5 adding a number of touching details of Napoleon's generosity on the occa- sion, which he himself had forgotten, or neg- lected to relate. Yet in spite of the inter- esting nature of the fact itself, and of the in- contestable evidence of its date and reality, Sir Walter Scott thus transposes, transforms, and degrades it, in the close of his account of the CHAPTER ly. 4<^D siege of Toulon (v. iii, p. 44) • '^Bonaparte lias besides affirmed, that, far from desiring to sharpen the vengeance of the jacobins, or act as their agent, he hazarded the displeasure of those whose frown was death, by interposing his protection to save the unfortunate family of Chabrillant , emigrants and aristocrats , who being thrown by a storm on the coast of France, shortly after the siege of Toulon, be- came liable to punishment by the guillotine, but w hom he saved by procuring them the means of escape by sea." Now here the fact is deformed and diminished in all its ingredients. The Cha- brillants were not saved from the guillotine of the convention, but from the murderous fury of a bloodthirsty mob — iheir rescue did not take place soon after the siege of Toulon, but more than a } ear after. Nor was his interposition likely to irritate the government, "whose frown was death, " but the mob whose rage was destruction. So far from it, he was likely to gain credit with the convention, as he saved at the same time two of its members. Again, its authority does not rest on the affirmation of Na- poleon alone, but concurrently on the acknow- ledgment of the emigrants themselves, to count Las Cases. Norvins (t. i, p. 58) mixes this fact up with the charge which had been previously made, against Napoleon, for furnishing a plan of defence for the magazines of Marseilles, and fiiiakes it one of the causes which moved the con- 4o4 APPENDIX. yention to summon him to its bar. Whereas, putting the difference of time out of the question, his saving the deputies on the same occasion, shows that the events were in character per- fectly incongruous. The inaccuracy ofHazlitt is still more remark- able (v. i, p. 36g). In reference to the execu- tions which were committed immediately after the capture of Toulon, he says — " It was during his stay at Toulon at this period that Bonaparte saved the Chabrillant family, who were brought into the harbour on board a Spanish prize , from the fury of the mob. It was just after the fall of Robespierre." — Now Toulon was taken in De- cember 1795; and Robespierre's downfal hap- pened in July 1794? so that according to this ac- count, Napoleon who, from his entrance at the school of Brienne until his first abdication, ap- pears never to have passed an idle week, must have lingered at Toulon in perfect inactivity about seven months. But Hazlitt himself records (p. 527) that he joined the army of Italy in March 1794, and was immediately after engaged in the campaign of general Dumerbion. This confu- sion of dates is not the only defect of his account. By placing the rescue of the Chabrillants in con- nection with the siege of Toulon, he diminishes the danger which, in the cause of humanity. Na- poleon so successfully braved. Immediately after the siege of Toulon when the troops who had taken it were present, he could with very little CHAPTER IV. 4^5 difficulty have dispersed a mob, and would have incurred no other danger, than that of incensing the government, from which at the worst, he might have escaped by emigration. But when the rescue was actually effected, it was not the frown of a distant government, but the fury of an encompassing mob, which he had to defy, and at the risk of being torn limb from limb on the spot. Lockhart's account of the affair (v. i, p. 20) being a bold and careless compendium of most of the errors of his predecessors, may be silently despised. From the despatch of the deputies Mariette and Cambon, dated the 27th Ventose (17th March), it appears there had been a succession of tumults for several days, which reached their utmost vio- lence on the 22nd Ventose (i 2th March). It also appears that several emigrants had been mur- dered in the course of the first outrages; and that the twenty emigrants who were rescued by Na- poleon, had been lying in prison under an order of the deputy Jean Bon St.-Andr^, about a month. They do not mention the name of Nar- poleon, though they do mention that of general Bazanet, who commanded the garrison of Tou- lon. They state however that they proceeded to the arsenal and addressed the crowd "sur- rounded by a feeble escort composed of the ge- nerals of the expedition and some citizens" — and that when they withdrew from the arsenal, they walked arm in arm with general Bazanet, who 4o6 appendix:. ■was more than once struck by a stone while thus? escorting them ; a fact which shews they were far from being protected by his influence. They also mention that the emigrants in the prison were saved from immediate massacre by the cou- rageous resistance which a soldier, whose name ihey could not learn, offered to the mob. This soldier was, no doubt, one of Napoleon's can- noneers. They describe themselves to have been in the utmost danger, and their letter evinces that they felt it in its full force. Page io8. (^5) This is theprogress, and this the date, which Napoleon himself assigns to his journey to Paris y making his arrival at the capital very distinctly subsequent to the insurrection of the first of Prairial (Montholon, t. iii, p. 88) . Neither Scott nor Hazlitt mention whether he reached Paris before or after that event, both saying (v. iii, p, 49, and V. i, p. 379) that he arrived there in May 1795. Norvins, however, dates his arrival before the ist Prairial (t. i, p. 61); while Lock- hart with his usual confidence in error, asserts positively (v. i, p. 23) that '^ before the end of the year (1794) ^^ came to Paris to solicit em- ployment. " Bourrienne (t. i, p, 71) not only places him in Paris before the ist Prairial, but implicates him remotely in the defeated conspiracy of that day, for the sake of Avhich calumny, he probably ventured on the anachronism. That it is one* CHAPTER IV. 4^7 additional evidence is found in the despatch of the deputies Mariette and Cambon, of the 17th March, ^vhich has been already referred to. In a postscript they mention that they had just seen the English prize ship (the Berwick) come into the harbour, and that they forward to the con- vention the despatches of their colleague Le- tourneur. NowLetourneur accompanied admiral Martin in his cruise, and the Berwick was taken off Corsica by the squadron soon after it sailed from Toulon. The fleets came in sight several days subsequently; the chase, the action^, which took place the 14th of March, the return into port, and the abandonment of the expedition against Rome, all happening successively after the capture of the Berwick. So that Bonaparte could not have returned from Toulon to the army of Italy, sooner than the last of March. While there, Aubry's offensive and unjust mea- sures were adopted (Thiers, t. vii, p. 4^7)5 upon learning and feeling Vv^hich, he set off for Paris early in May, where he arrived purposely after the I St Prairial. Kellerman, whom Napoleon met at Marseilles, as the former was on his w ay to take command of the army of Italy, was not appointed until the last of April, and did not reach Nice until the 9th May (Jomini, t. vii, pp. 81, 82). All these facts taken together shew that as late as least, as the first week of May, Napoleon could not have been nearer to Paris than Marseilles, and he asserts positively that on 4o8 APPENDIX, the 20th of May and some days afterwards he was not nearer than Chatillon-sur-Seine. The Dutchess d'Abrantes (t. i, chap. i5, 14, i5, et 16) falls into yet greater errors in regard to this fact, which, considering her tender years at the epoch of which she treats, is not surprising. She dates the arrival of Napoleon at Paris, not only before the ist Prairial ( 20th May) 1795, but before the ist Germinal (21st March) of that year (t. i, pp. 246, 57). She says too that he had but one aide de camp (Junot) with him, whereas he himself mentions expressly Marmont, and Marmontonly, who would hardly have re- mained sonear the capital as Chatillon-sur-Seine. Madame Bourrienne mentions Louis Bonaparte (t.i,p.8o). This account Louis Bonaparte inciden- tally confirms in his reply to Sir Walter Scott, in which he says, his brother was accompanied on his arrival at Paris by three aides de camp — '' Ju- not, Marmont and myself" (Reponse de Louis Bonaparte a Sir Walter Scott — p. 16). Unless the reader should prefer on a subject of this kind, the recollection of a "Miss not in her teens" (the Dutchess was not then 1 1 years of age) to the grave assertion of Napoleon, in making which he could not have been actuated by vanity nor heated by controversy, fortified by the cir- cumstantial mention of his delay at Chatillon and the object of that delay; confirmed by the collateral statement of Louis Bonaparte in an effort to establish another point, and by the CHAPTER IV. 409 letter of the deputies Mariette and Cambon to the convention, the picturesque details furnished by the Dutchess, respecting Napoleon's constant visits to the house of Madame Permon, and fre- quent conversations ^vith that lady, her son, and her various guests, before the ist Prairial, as they are made to spring out of the current events of the day, must be received as the errors of a me- mory too severely tasked. The Dutchess appears to have misconceived other particulars respect- ing this memorable ist of Prairial. She makes Salicetti take refuge in her mother^s house, as an outlaw, on the evening of the 2d Prairial, and while Napoleon was there (t. i, pp. 3o2-5). Whereas Salicetti was not accused, or proceeded against by the convention until the 8th of Prai- rial (Thiers, t. 7, p. 4^5)5 and then in conse- quence of intelligence which was that day receiv- ed from Toulon. The historian, when speaking of this intelligence, says, "■ It could not fail to provoke new violence against the partizans of the mountain and the patriots. It was alleged, that the events at Paris and Toulon were con- certed ; they accused the members of the moun- tain of having secretly organized these proceed- ings, and attacked them with fresh exasperation. They instantly decreed the arrest of Charbon- nier, Escudier, Ricord, and Salicetti, charging all four with having agitated the south." This shews that Salicetti^ instead of being outlawed On the 2d Prairial; was not even accused until ^10 APPENDIX. the 8th of that month, and then on a charge not thought of before, and but remotely connected with the insurrection at Paris. In the Moniteur of the gth Prairial, the account given by Thiers is confirmed. It is there officially stated, that the letters of the representatives of the people at Marseilles had confirmed the rumour of the terrorists having got possession of the arsenal of Toulon in the course of a revolt, in w^hich their colleague, Brunei, lost his life; that the con- vention had decreed that the members who were arrested on the night of the ist Prairial should be brought back to Paris, and tried by a military commission (that is, Romme, Goujon, etc., who killed themselves), and that the convention had, on the same day, ordered the arrest of Ricord, Salicetti, etc. It is not easy to conceive, that a man would be first outlawed, and next accused. With regard to this journey of Napoleon, and the time of his arrival at Paris, there exists yet another error, which, from the high authority of the work that contains it, would be likely, if uncorrected, to deprive my own narrative of the reader's confidence, and to leave this particular subject involved in confusion. In the Memorial deSt. Helene(t.V\\, pp. 582,85), it is mentioned, on the authority of Napoleon, that in return- ing from Nice to Paris in 1794? ^^ stopped at the chateau of Marmont's father, and that it was in the month of July or August. This is a mistake, as to the year and the month, either of CHAPTER IV. 4l I ilie emperor's memory, or of the record of his friend, and probably of the latter. For, on all other occasions, Napoleon refers this visit to Paris and sojourn at the house of Marmont the elder, to the month of May, 1795 (Montholon, t. ii, p. 9.12, and t. iii, p. 88), a date which all authorities of weight, except the one in ques- tion^ and circumstances of application, confirm. Throughout the 3 ear 1794* as the reader must be aware, Napoleon was employed either in for- tifying the coast of Provence, or in conducting the campaign of Dumerbion in the maritime Alps, except apart of the month of August (sec note 18 of this appendix), when he was ar- rested upon returning from a mission to Genoa, which he had performed under instructions from Ricord, the deputy, dated the i3th July, 1794 (See the instructions copied in Bourrienne, t. i, p. 56). It is, therefore, as impossible to con- ceive that he could have been at Chatillon-sur- Seine in July or August, 1794? as it is difficult to doubt that he was there in May, 1795. This, and similar errors, in the work of count de las Cases, although they may mislead inattentive readers, and colour the misrepresentations of unfaithful writers, are invaluable as guarantees of the fidelity of his journal. Had it been com- posed^ prepared to bolster up a reputation, to support a party, or to sustain a cause, it is cer- tain that such mistakes would not have existed. Actual error in this case, is the highest evidence of intentional truth. 4l2 APPENDIX. Page 138. (24). Hazlitt (v. i, p. 879) affirms, that Aubry was a secret friend to the Bourbons. He was implicated as one of the chief conspirators in the counter-revohitionary attempt of the i8th Fructidor^ and banished with Pichegru and others to French Guiana; but, according to Thiers (t. ix, p.5i6), as a promoter of political reaction, not as a royalist. Page ISO. (25) This fact is asserted by himself (Montho- Ion, t. iii, p. 89) very emphatically, and is made the cause of his tendering his resignation. In that excellent work (Bourrienne et ses Erreurs) the author of a most conclusive refutation of Bourrienne's misstatements on this part of Napo- leon's life, after proving that he was never ca- shiered, says, he was not ordered to the army of the west as general of infant jy (t. i, p. 5o), but as "commander in chief of the artillery of the army of the west." This last assertion is proved to be accurate by an order of general Hoche mentioning the fact, but it does not dis- prove the positive assertion of Napoleon himself, that he previously received an order to join the army of the west, and take the command of a brigade of infantry. If this assertion could leave any doubt on the mind, it would be removed by referring to a speech of Freron in the conven- CHAPTER IV. 2J.l5 tion on the 1 8th Vend^miaire, when, remonstra- ting against the proceedings of Aubry, he said, that ''general Bonaparte had been withdrawn from his appropriate line of service, in order to be put into the infantry.'' Louis Bonaparte misapprehends, in some degree, this aflfair. (Reponse, p. i5). He represents his brother as having received his appointment to the army of the west, as general of artillery, while he was attached to the army of Italy, and as having visited Paris purposely to get that destination changed. But Napoleon himself expressly says (Montholon, t. iii, pp. 88, 9), that he was placed on the list of generals of infantry to be employed in the artillery when a vacancy should occur : and that after this interview with Aubry, he was positively ordered to join the army of the west as a general of infantry : assertions which the speech of Freron confirms. Page 162. (26) Thiers states (t. vii, p. 4^9), that Kellen- man, although the corps of ten thousand men which had been destined to embark at Toulon for Rome was restored to his army, was so weak- ened by detachments employed in suppressing the renewed insurrections of Toulon and Lyons, that he could not resist the attack of the Aus- trians and Sardinians. But, it is evident, from the instructions drawn up by Napoleon, and despatched to Kellerman by the committee of AjA APPENDIX. public safety, that he did not comprehend the nature and advantages of his position, ^vhich was taken for oflfensive, not defensive purposes^ for falhng upon the enemy the moment he placed his foot on the narrow tract of Geneose territory between the Alps and the sea ; and not with a view of waiting the maturity of his pre- parations, and receiving his attack. It is fair to observe, that Jomini's account is totally at va- riance with this view of the subject. He alleges that the defensive was not only judicious on the part of Kellerman, but sanctioned by the com- mittee of public safety (t.vii, pp. 81,82). The operations he relates are rather inconsistent with this allegation, which is in direct contradiction to the statement of Napoleon, and the extract which he produces of the despatch written by himself, and after being signed by the com- mittee, forwarded to Kellerman (Montholon, t.iii, p. 93). In this despatch the absurdity of acting on the defensive is thus forcibly demon- strated. " The committee observed to Keller- man, that the army was not extended in 1704 beyond the heights of the Tanaro, and had not prolonged its right byBardinetto, Melogno, and St. Jacques, except for the purpose of prevent- ing the Austrian army connecting itself with the English squadron, and of being in a situation to advance to the succour of Genoa, if the enemy should attack that city, either by sea or by the pass of the Bochetta. That the army did not CHAPTER lY. 4^5 occupy Vado as a defensive position, but an of- fensive one, and to be able to fall upon the enemy if he should shew himself on the narrow tract between the Alps and the sea (la riviere). That the moment the Austrians had set foot at Savona,he ought to have attacked them, in order to prevent their getting possession of that place, and thereby cutting off his communication with Genoa 3 but since he had failed to do these things, nothing was left but to evacuate Vado^ etc." It is true, that Kellerman was weakened, for a moment, by the necessity of suppressing the revolts at Lyons and Toulon ; but at the end of his campaign, after all his losses by war, desertion^ and disease^, his force in the field amounted to 06,950 men, exclusive of 4^000 at and near Nice, 6,000 at Toulon and the neigh- bouring towns, and 10,000 marching to join him under Augereau — (See the table in Jomini, t. vii, p. 298). So that his army was not weaker than Dumerbion's, with which, in 1794? Bonaparte, as we have seen, had dislodged the Sardinians, beaten the Austrians, driven away the English, seized the coast, and occupied the whole chain of the maritime Alps, in the course of a few days. Thiers, after representing, on this occasion, Kellerman's occupation of the line of the Bor- ghetto as a decision of his own judgment, in his succeeding volume (t. viii. i55), admits, that it had been traced out for him by Napoleon. He is right in saying it had been traced out in 1794) 4.16 APPENDIX. but he omits remarking, that it was retraced in the instructions of the committee in the last of June or first of July, 1 796. Napoleon's character of general Kellerman is^ no doubt, perfectly fair (Montholon, t. iii, p. 92) : " Kellerman was brave, extremely active, and endowed with many ex- cellent qualities j but he was perfectly destitute of those talents which qualify a man for the chief command of an army. In conducting this war in the Alps, he committed nothing but faults." Page 165. (27). This fact is substantiated by the follow- ing order of general Hoche, commander of the army of the west, dated the first complimentary day of 1 795 ( 1 8th September) . ' * The committee of public safety having called to its bureau (^"pres de lui^^^ the general of brigade, Bonaparte, I hereby cause him to be replaced by the chief of brigade Dutol, whom I have directed to take command of the artillery, which had been con- fided to that general'' (See Bourrienne et ses Erreurs, t.i, p. 5o). Page 164. (28) As the word of Bourrienne was much less faithful than the memory of Napoleon, the as- sertion of the former that Napoleon applied for leave to be employed in the Turkish service (t. i, p. 74) is less to be relied on than the denial repeated as coming from Napoleon by O'Meara (v. i, p.25o). CHAPTER IV. 4*7 PaG3 16o. (39) Of this annoyance the degree may be as- certained by reference to these well attested facts : I , that at this very time JNapoleon received three thousand francs for a coach he sold to Sa- licetti (Bourrienne, t. i, p. 71); 2, that he sold a valuable collection of books (Norvins, t.i, p. 60); 5, that he was in the receipt of his pay as a ge- neral officer (Montholon, t. ii, p. 211, et Bour- rienne et ses Erreurs, t. i, pp. 5i, 52); and 4, that at the period in question he fixed his brother Louis at the artillery school of Chalons at his own expense (Reponse par Louis Bonaparte, a Sir Walter Scott, p. 16). These facts are well attested, because the first is asserted by Bour- rienne in support of a calumny distinct from this alleged indigence — and he does resort to the truth in endeavouring to propagate falsehood , because the second is positively stated by Nor- vins a respectable writer, though a false infer- ence is drawn from it; because the third is vouched by the declaration of Napoleon, and de- monstrated by the essay referred to in Bour- rienjie et ses Ejreurs ; and because the fourth is proved by the undisputed acknowledgment of Louis Bonaparte himself, who for a reason to be found in Napoleon's will, cannot be suspec- ted of undue affection for his brother's memory. In misrepresenting this momentary halt in the forward march of Napoleon's career, the princi- 27 4l8 APPENDIX. pal English and French authors whose works 1 have consulted, seem to have written from mo- tives originating in different feelings, coinciding as to one object, and diverging with respect to others. Thus Sir Walter Scott, and his disciple, Lockhart, unobservant of that Roman dignity of mind which makes well supported poverty sub- lime, appear to be of opinion that by repre- senting Napoleon as poor, they detract from his greatness. In this liberal spirit the first abso- lutely affirms (v. iii, p. 49): "He found himself un- friended and indigent in the city of which he was at no distant period to be the ruler. Some individuals however assisted him, and among others the celebrated performer Talma, who had known him while at the military school, and even then entertained high expectations of the part in life which was to be played by " le petit Bonaparte^* (In a note to this French phrase he adds) ; *^0n the authority of the late John Philip Kemble. " Sir Walter Scott it is known visited Paris ostensibly in search of materials for his work, when Talma was a living actor, and he made this assertion when Kemble was a dead one (Talma died at Paris igth October, 1826). The former could have given him original and direct testimony on this point ; the latter could at best have furnished only second hand information in regard to it. Yet he preferred as a witness the dead Englishman to the living Frenchman, and a hearsay story to direct testimony, as authority for reaflirming an assertion which the hero of €HAPTFR IV. 4*9 his book had positively contradicted, in Talma's lifetime, and to all appearance, with Talma's acquiescence (O'Meara, v. ii, p- 296). This pro- ceeding it must be confessed shews as little ten- derness for truth, as consideration for the cha- racter of the man whose memory the great no- velist was prelending to embalm. Leaving "the late John Philip Kemble" in his grave, let us suppose Talma had really asserted that in the summer of 1 796, he found Napoleon in Paris '* unfriended" and so "indigent*' that he himself aflforded him pecuniary assistance ; could any general in the French or in the British service believe him, even if the story had not been contradicted by Napoleon himself, seeing that he was a general officer at the time and in receipt of his pay as such? Inregardto this appearance of Talma on the stage. Sir Walter thus proceeds in error and defamation (v. iii, p. 5o). "Bonaparte had something of his native country in his disposition, he forgot neither bene- fits nor injuries. He was always during the height of his grandeur particularly kind to Talma, and even honoured him with a degree of his inti- macy. As for Aubry being amongst those belong- ing to Pich^egru's party who were banished to Cayenne, he caused him to be excepted from the decree which permitted the return of those unfortunate exiles, and Aubry died atDemarara.'* In the first place, as Napoleon neither needed nor received the benefits in question from Talma, the 420 APP.NDIX. counterbalancing fabrication conslriicted on " tbe disposition of bis native country," falls to tbe Ground. If bis contradiction of tbe storv needed support it \\ ould be found in tbe fact tbat neitber Bourrienne, his wife, nor tbe dutcbess d'Abrant^s , wbo all undertake to furnisb such minute details about Napoleon's intimates at tbis time of bis life, mentions Talma among them. So tbat tbis fact only remains out of Sir Wal- ter's story, tbat Napoleon was particularly kind and munificent to tbe Frencb Roscius, not from gratitude, br.t from taste and generosity. Again, if an indir;ent man is unfriended, be will be apt to steal or starve. If a man in want meets witb an old acquaintance wbo relieves bim, it would be botb false and ungrateful in bim to say tbat be bad been unfriended, for, a "friend in need is a friend indeed." Yet Sir Walter says Napoleon came to Paris in 1795 in perfect indigence, met witb an old acquaintance wbo assisted bim, and was yet unfriended, and tbat altbougb he was tbus unfriended, be was ever after grateful to tbis acquaintance. Tbus it appears tbat witbout reference to otber accounts or circumstances, Sir Walter's romance of Talma is one of tbose in- genious inventions, of wbicb the parts will not bold togetber. As to tbe never to be forgotten ''injuries" of Aubry, tbey bappen to be scarcely more real and not more important tban tbe re- membered ''benefits" of Talma. Aubry bad in- cluded Napoleon in an arrangement of officers, favourable to ibe class of wbicb be himself was CHAPTER IV 42 i • an individual, and unfavourable to the class to which Napoleon belonged. In their conference on this subject, Aubry's injustice had been protes- ted against, and his impertinence severely retor- ted and rebuked. The indignant, but unac- cepted tender of Napoleon's resignation followed; of which, the correction of Aubry's procedure, the restoration of Napoleon to his appropriate line of service, and his elevation to a situation of higher trust and greater consequence than he had as yet held, were the speedy consequences. In all likelihood therefore, he regarded Aubry as the involuntary promoter of his fortune, and so far from remembering, after a lapse of great events and much time, the poor exile of Cayenne with vindictiveness, the probability is, he forgot him altogether. His correspondence at the time, and his Memoirs (Montholon, t. iv,p.256), shew, that he was far from approving the measure of punishment inflicted by the directory, and spoke of the banishment of citizens, who w ere not convicted of treason, in the strongest terms of reprobation. Besides the decree which per- mitted the return of certain exiles from Cayenne, was not a repeal of the decree of banishment, but an act of exception to it. So that Napoleon, instead of causing Aubry, as Sir Walter asserts, to be excepted from this act, at the utmost, only failed to except him from the operation of the former decree. In this there was no favour, but does it follow there was revenge or even injus- ^22 APPEIfDIX, tice. Was any plea of palliation or innocence urged in favour of Aubry, as there was in favour of others? According to Sir Walter Scott, it would appear, there was none. While the un- disputed fact remained against Aubry, that he conspired with Pichegni, to betray his country. Further, the restoration of banished persons — even of honorable and conscientious emigrants — was a gradual process, which was of necessity re- gulated very much by the state of public feeling. If Aubry died before liis guilt was forgotten, or could be excused, it was neither the eflfect nor proof of vindictiveness in the character of Napo- leon. After this, to quote the following passage^ is to expose its contradiction and refute its leading assertion (v. iii, p, 5i). '* Meantime his situation becoming daily more unpleasant, Bonaparte soli- cited Barras and Freron, who as thermidorien& had preserved their credit, for occupation in al- most any line of his profession " — '' He was of- fered a command in La Vendee which he declined to accept. '^ Lockhart's misrepresentations on this point, are principally the repetition of Sir Walter's, and require no notice. But he had access to a reser- voir of slander, which happily for the admirers of Sir Walter's invention, had not been prepared when he compounded his life of Napoleon, Bourrienne in his Memoires says (t. i, p. 71) that Napoleon when thus oppressed by poverty and neglect *' envied" his brother Joseph's good for- CHAPTER IV. 4^5 lune in marrying the rich Mademoiselle Clary, and would exclaim, "How fortunate is that iv^ue Joseph." Admitting that the exclamation was really made and was fairly repeated, the word coquin (rogue), was evidently used in a favour- able and even a fond sense, as a man says of his child '* you dear little rogue," or of his friend, "what a lucky dog." Yet Bourrienne, who was engaged in a very laborious and incongruous chapter of calumny , headed it, in reference to this anecdote awkwardly enough (ch. vi), ^'-Bona- parte is jealous of his bivther.^^ Out of these clumsy materials Lockhart, with less felicity than assurance, contrives an original slander of his own, which has the advantage of belying both brothers at once. Referring indefinitely to Bourrienne, this faithful translator says (v. i, p. 24) "How fortunate," Napoleon would exclaim "How fortunate is that^ooZ Joseph!" As this author's volumes were prepared for the volumi- nous English work entitled : "The Family Libra- ry j" from the references already made to them, the reader will perceive that their principal use consists in shewing, with what perilous care, he thought historical truth ought to be excluded, from the intellectual nourishment of Enijlish fa- milies. Hazlitt (v. i, p. 58 1-2) describes Napoleon as retired and studious, but says nothing of his poverty, farther than relating one version of /j.24 APPE.NDIX. the Talma story, and also Napoleon's contradic- tion of it. Coming to the French authors who profess to afford particular instruction on the subjects now under examination, it will be found that, while ihey agree with the author of Waverley in regard to the '* indigence," they disagree with him altogether as to the ''unfriended" state of his hero. Both classes sink him into abject po- verty; but while the first desire to have him rescued by the pitiful machinery of accidental assistance, the second insist on relieving him by their own or their friends' sagacious liberality. According to these authorities, few men ever had so many or such generous friends. Bourrienne, his wife, and brother, were especially kind to him, and entertained him at dinner and in the evening "very often." Bourrienne visited him every morning, and found in his apartment many distinguished persons (t. i, pp. 70, 71). Al- though the husband says he was in great want of money, the wife avers he accompanied them very often to the theatres (p. 80). The Dutchess d'Abrantes declares (t.i,p. 276), that "he came regularly every day to her mother's house," and often dined there ; that he was miserably poor, but had Junot for a banker, who not only gave him three-fourths of the money sent him by his parents, but more than half of what he won with the remaining fourth (p. 277). Taking into consideration that the account fur- CHAPTER IV. 4^5 nished by the dutchess embraces a period of time anterior to the 12th Germinal, when Napo- leon was at Toulon, or somewhere in the mari- time Alps, it is appropriate to the present sub- ject only, so far as it shews, that had he been in Paris y he would have found friends and a wel- come, if nowhere else, in the house of Madame Permon. Norvins, though free from the malice of Bourrienne, and less entertaining than the Dutchess d'Abrantes, is not less inexact than either. He represents Napoleon (t. i, p. 62) as deprived of his pay, and in the greatest distress, and likely to starve, but for the timely recol- lection of the deputy, Doulcet de Ponte-Cou- lant, that there was such an officer in Paris as general Bonaparte. He has it, that this bene- volent person having succeeded Aubry in the war department, called Napoleon to a situation near him before the defeat of Kellerman was heard of. This is contradicted not only by the re- peated declaration of Napoleon himself, but by the essay which has already been referred to in Bourrienne el ses Erreurs (t. i, pp. 5o, 5i), de- monstrating that he never was without his pay, and. that it was in consequence of the disaster of Kellerman that he was consulted and employed by ihe committee of public safety (Gourgaud t. i, p. 48 et Montholon t. ii p. 211, et t. iii, p. 90). In regard to the gratitude which this respectable author, and Hazlitt after him (v. i, pp. 379, 80) allege that Napoleon felt /^26 APPENDIX. for the kindness of Pont^-Coulant, both the sentiment and its cause appear to be imaginary. The proceeding of the committee of which Pont(5-Coulant was a member was this — Upon being alarmed by the disaster of Kellerman, they convened and consulted those members of the convention who had been on mission to the army of Italy, who, to a man, told them that the best thing they could do was to take the advice of Napoleon. He gave them advice j extricated their army from the peril in which it was placed ; and then Pont^ Coulant, in order to se- cure his future assistance, got a decree passed, attaching Napoleon to the bureau of which he himself was the chief. Now, in this affair, ac- cording to the ordinary course of human feel- ings, the gratitude, if such a sentiment was ex- cited, could not have been on the side of Napo- leon. But, supposing he could have felt grati- tude on the occasion, he would have been grate- ful to the deputies who pointed him out to the committee, rather than to the committee who obtained his aid, or to Pont^ Coulant, who, after making trial of it, profited by his sagacity. The reader will observe, that almost exclusive possession of him is claimed by the different parties, the Bourriennes and Permons j and that all these writers appear to have known where he was in the months of April and May, 179^, better than he did himself. It is surprising that Thiers, whose narrative CHAPTER IV. 427 is generally so clear and philosophical, should have countenanced these errors of fancy, me- mory, and malice. In his account of the insur- rection of the sections, 4th October, 1796, and of the agency of Napoleon in quelling it, it is observed retrospectively (t. viii, p. 41): " Bar- ras had near him an officer very capable of com- manding the troops. All the deputies who had been sent on mission to the army of Italy knew the young officer of artillery who had decided the capture of Toulon, caused the fallof Saorgio, and of the lines of the Roya. This young officer, become general of brigade, had been deprived of his commission fdestitue) by Aubry, and now found himself in Paris out of employment, and almost reduced to indigence. He had been in- troduced to Madame Tallien, who received him with her accustomed benignity, and who even solicited in his behalf " The most that can be said in favour of this passage, is, that it does not contain as many errors as words. It is now need- less to repeat either on the authority of Napoleon himself, his brother Louis, or the order of ge- neral Hoche attesting his appointment to the command of the artillery in the army of the west, that Napoleon never was deprived of his commission, nor in a state approaching to indi- gence. The assertion that he was in a connec- tion of particular intimacy or favour with Bar- ras f'^ B arras avait aupres de lu^J at the time here spoken of is altogether erroneous. They had 428 APPENDIX. met at the siege of Toulon in 1795, bat being employed on dift'erent sides of the harbour, had not formed an acquaintance. Napoleon's first particular connection with Barras, which was not at the instance of that deputy, took place on the evening of the 12th Vendemiaire, when the nominal command of the troops of the conven- tion was conferred on Barras, and the real com- mand entrusted to Napoleon (O'Meara v. ii, p. 225; Montholon t. ii, p. 21 1). As to the be- nignant reception and patronizing smiles of Madame Tallien, it is probable that, previously to the 1 5th Vendemiaire, they had not been be- stowed on Napoleon. That interesting lady and Madame Beauharnais were on the most intimate terms ^ and if Napoleon frequented the salons of Madame Tallien, before the 1 5th Vendemiaire, he must have formed the acquaintance of her bosom friend and constant visitor, Madame Beau- harnais, also before that event. But his own and other accounts agree in representing his first acquaintance with Madame Beauharnais as occurring subsequently to the 1 5th Vendemiaire, and while he commanded the army of the in- terior. The occasion of that acquaintance — the application of Eugene for the sword of his fa- ther — his emotion on receiving it — the impres- sion he made on the general, and the visit of his grateful and graceful mother to acknowledge the kindness which had been extended to her son, are facts too well ascertained to be denied or insisted CHAPTER IV. 4^9 Upon (Montholon, t. iii, p, 119. Las Cases^ t. i, p. 222 — O'Meara, v. i, p. 179 — Constant, t. i, p. 1 5). So that Madame Tallien cannot be added to the number of persons — Tahna, Junot, the Bourriennes, the Permons, etc., who be- friended this "unfriended" and indigent officer, before the i5th Vendemiaire. But the fanciful texture of the historian's language becomes ap- parent, when it is connected with his previous and subsequent expressions in relation to Napo- leon. He first mentions the name of Bonaparte at the siege of Toulon (t. vi, p. 5i), and thus introduces him. " In the council of war, there w as SLjoung officer, who commanded the artil- lery in the absence of the chief of that corps. His name was Bonaparte, and he was a native of Corsica." This was in the autumn of 1793. He next notices him in the spring of 1794? in the camp before Saorgio (t. vi, p. 288). " Hap- pily general Dumerbion allowed himself to be directed entirely by the joujig Bonaparte." The third time he accords this distinction to the hero of Toulon and Saorgio, is in the summer of 1794, when in accounting for the inactivity of the armies of Italy and the Alps, he observes (t. vii, p. 96): " Thejoz^^z^ Bonaparte was even accused of being an accomplice of Robespierre, by reason of the confidence with which his ta- lents and his plans had inspired the younger of these brothers." The fourth time, in the au- tumn of 1 795, when it appears he is again com- memorated as the "• young officer of arlillery 450 APPENDIX. who was known to all the deputies who had been on mission to the army of Italy, and who had decided the taking of Toulon, caused the fallof Saorgio, and the linesof the Roya." Af- terwards when the directorial government had got into operation, he is called (t. viii, p. 124) : *' The young Bonaparte who had figured on the i5th Vendemiaire." And in March, 1796, after his marriage and appointment to the command of the army of Italy, it is solemnly recorded that (t. viii, p. 224): '' Thirty thousand fa- mished soldiers were confided to a young man, unknown but daring." So that according to Thiers, Napoleon was not only in the enjoyment of perpetual youth, but as epithets acquire force by regular repetition, was actually younger in the spring of 1796, than he had been in the au- tumn of 1795. Again — on the 1 5th Vendemiaire, that is the 4th October 1796, he is the young general well known to the convention, as the captor of Toulon, of Saorgio, and of the lines of the Roya; in March 1796, after having added to these distinctions, the victory of Vendemiaire under the eyes of the government itself, and the successful command during a critical season of the army of the interior, he is reduced to "a young man unknown.'^ Now the fact is that Napoleon was not only two years and a half older as a man in March 1 796, than he w as at the siege of Toulon, but as an officer, as he intimated to Aubry, was growing old in the field of battle — was a general of distinction and experience, CHAPTER IV. ^Sl versed in the arts of love and warj and at the time of ^Yhich we are now treating, was more likely and more disposed to confer than to re- ceive benefactior.s; as may be gathered from his interference to save Menoufrom condemnation, and to liberate Bourrienne from arrest (^Bour- rienne, t, i, p. 84). It is true that Napoleon speaks of himself in the spring of 1796 (Montho- Ion, t. iii, p. 120) as " a young man." But it is in reference to the situation he held as a com- mander in the centre of the republic, when the government was safe and powerful, while the Italian frontier was menaced with invasion; and in contrast with general Hatry, a veteran from the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, who was ordered to Paris to succeed him. In the same relative manner he described himself in September 1795, as *' an ancient officer of artil- lery;" (Montholon, t. iii, p. 11); but this had allusion to his regular education and length of service in the artillery; and was in opposition to officers who without a military education, had entered that corps since the commencement of the revolution, such as those whom he found attached to Cartaux. In this language, there is the simplicity of truth; in that of Thiers, the romance of history. The desire of effect, of displaying vivid and theatrical contrasts, of raising Napoleon by the sudden magic of a fan- tastic phrase, from perfect obscurity to glittering distinction, probably betrayed this elegant his- torian inio ihese mawkish misrepresentations; 452 APPE^.DIX. which besides being in very bad taste, discover a forgetfubiess of the claims of common sense, the dignity of history, and the sacredness of truth. In short, Thiers seems not to perceive that an attempt to patronize the fame of Napo- leon, is an attempt to degrade it. It is ridiculous to pretend that Napoleon is re- markable among great generals for his youth. Alexander had overturned the Persian empire before he was twenty-six. At that age Hannibal had conquered Spain, traversed Gaul, passed the Alps, and invaded Italy. Scipio commanded in Spain, and took New Carthage, before he was twenty-four. At the age of twenty- three, Pompey had acquired the title oi imperator and that of the great at twenty-five. Yet we do not find Plutarch perpetually repeating the young Pompey y the young Alexander ^ nor Polybius and Livy, declaring that when Hannibal pre- pared to scale the Alps, he was a young man unknown hut daring. The great Conde was not twenty-two when he gained the battle of Rocroy^ and before he was twenty-four, had added to that exploit the capture of Thionville, the taking of Philipsburg, and the victory of Nordlingen. Turenne was a major-general at twenty-three years of age. Charles Xll fought the battle of Narva, and raised the siege of that place andof Riga in his nineteenth year. Hoche had distinguished himself, and commanded the united armies of the Pthine and the Moselle, CHAPTER IV. 433 when he was but twenty-five. Napoleon's ex- cellence above other great men, was not in the prematurity of his genius, but in its force. . Out of the contradictory tales of error^ va- nity, detraction, or malice, which have here been noticed the strong, and simple fact arises. that Napoleon was indebted, for fortune and for fame, up to this period of his life at least, to his own character and services alone. 28 ( 434 ) CHAPTER V. Page 170. (i) This is evident not only from the state of public sentiment disclosed by the votes on this oc- casion^ but from the fact^ that after the i8th Bru- maire, when the nation had become disgusted with the directory^ it was thought necessary to appoint three consuls. Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, pp. 5[, 6i) expends a profusion of loose and rambling so- phistry^ to prove, that there existed at this time in the body of tlie French nation, a ^^ general ten- dency " in favour of the restoration of the Bour- bons, and a strong though reluctant admiration of the British constitution ; with all the abuses by which it was then infected. Arguing, however, with that freedom from the restraints of reason and consistency, which is natural and becoming in a writer of romances, he demonstrates the very re- verse of what he undertakes to prove ; showing conclusively (pp. 60-61) that the nation generally abhorred both the persons and the power of the Bourbons, and that monarchy itself was so odious, that although princes who were not personally detested, such as the dukes of Orleans and York CHAPTER V. 435 were menllonetl^ their names received not tlie slig^htest support. It is scarcely worth while to observe, that Lockhart adopts with implicit defe- rence the absurdites of Scott^ infringing with con- stancy and courage the moral of the old saying — amicus Plato, sed magis amicus Veritas. For a just representation of the state of public feeling in France at this period, the reader who may have forgotten the fate of the expedition to Quiberon in the summer of 1795, is referred to the ist Chapter of the 8th volume of Thiers. This is the account he gives of the friends of the Bourbons (p. 3). ^^The royalists concealed themselves behind (his mass of malcontents. They consisted of a few emigrants, and returned priests, some creatures of the ancient court who had lost their places, and many indifferent and dastardly persons who dreaded a stormy freedom. " Page 170. (2)Norvins (t. i, p. 10) observes ^^a third de- cree submitted these two dispositions to the accep- tation of the people, as inseparable from the new constitution." Page 171. (3) In the exposition of this supplementary provision of the constitution of the year 3, there appears to have prevailed a remarkable indis- tinctness of expression. Thiers states (t. viii, p. i7)^nhat the new legislative body was to be 43G APPENDIX. composed oi Iwo-tbiicls of the convention." Scott expounds them in the same manner (v. iii, p. G7) ^^ the first (decree) ordaining; the electoral bodies of France to choose as representatives to the two councils under the new constitution at least two-thirds of the members presently sitting in con- vention ,*" language which is adopted by Lockhart (v. i, p. 27). Napoleon ( Montholon^ t. iii, p. io3) explains the provision more accurately — ^^ The con- vention attached to the constitution two additional laws^ by which they prescribed that two-thirds of the new legislature should he composed ofmemhers of iheconventionr ]Norvins(t. i, p. 70) gives a third interpretation : ^^ By one of these additional laws, the convention formed two-thirds of the legislature^ '' pliraseology which leaves it uncertain whether they were to be composed of the members of the con- vention, or of persons chosen by the conven- tion. Even if the numbers of the convention and of the new legislature were equal, the statement of Napoleon is the more clear, and is therefore fol- lowed in the text. Page 175. (4) On this subject Thiers expresses himself as follows (t. viii, pp. iG-i7): ^^Such was the con- stitution by which it was hoped to maintain a re- public in France. It presented one important question ; the constituent assembly, by an ostenta- tion of disinterestedness, had excluded itself from the legislative assembly by which it was to be re- placed ^ should the convention do the same? It CHAPTER V. 437 must be confessed that such a determination would have been a g^reat imprudence. Among an incon- stant people, who, after having lived fourteen cen- turies under a monarchy^ had in a moment of en- thusiasm overthrown it, the republic was not so fixed in their manners, that its establishment could be trusted to the course of things. The revolution could only be effectually defended by its founders. The convention was composed for the greater part, of members of the constituent and legislative assem- blies j it united in itself the men, who on the i4th of July and the 4th of August, 1789, had abolished the ancient feudalgovernment, had overturned the throne on the loth of August, had on the 21st of January immolated the chief of the Bourbon dynasty ; and who for the space of three years, had made unheard-of efforts to sustain their work against all Europe. These men alone were capable of defending the revolution which was consecrated in the directorial constitution. Therefore, not pluming themselves upon a vain disinterestedness, they decreed on the 2 2d of August that the new legislative body should be composed of two-thirds of the convention^ and that but one-third should be chosen by general election. Norvins says(t. i, p. G9), ^^The failure of the constitution of 1791, had been justly attributed to the decree of the con- stituent assembly which excluded all its members from the succeeding legislature. " — ^^ At a moment of equal danger, the convention reflected on the fault of its predecessors, and added two additional /|38 APPENDIX. , laws lo the social compact." Napoleon, too, ob- serves (Montholon, t. iii, p. io3): ^^It was the general opinion that the short duration of the constitution of 179I3 was to be attributed to tlie law of the constituent assembly excluding its members from the legislature." Even Jomini, aide- de-camp of the emperor of Russia, admits (t. vii, p. 2i3): ^^That in truth, these dispositions (the additional acts ) which caused so much alarm, were, although contrary to the principles of the new constitution, really founded in the interest of the republican party." And Hazlitt (v. i, p. 399) declares, in speaking of these decrees, that ^^this prompt and seasonable step had for its object to save the country from the return of anarchy, or a counter revolution." These authors of different nations and various opinions, wall be found to con- cur in regard to the prudence of the convention in passing the additional acts; and therefore to justify the expressions on this subject in the text. Sir Walter Scott's exposition of these enactments, however, is altogether opposed to that of the authors above cited, and is too characteristic of the poli- tical sentiments pervading the body of his work, and too much at variance with justice, to be passed without examination. It is in these words (v. iii, p. 66) : ^' But the constitution of the year 3, with all its defects, would have been wiHingly received by the nation in general, as affording some security from the revolutionary storm, had it not been for a selfish and usurping decree of the thermidoriens to mutilate and render it nugatory at the very CHAPTER V. 439 outset^ by engfrafung; on it the means of continuing the exercise of their own arbitrary authority. It must never be forgotten^ that these conquerors of Robespierre had shared all the excesses of his party, before they became his personal enemies ; and that when deprived of their official situations and in- fluence, which they were likely to be by a repre- sentative body freely and fairly elected, they were certain to be exposed to great individual dan- ger. Determined, therefore, to retain the power in their own hands, the thermidoriens suffered with an indifference amounting almost to con- tempt, the constitution to pass through, and to be approved of by, the convention. But under pre- tence that it would be highly impolitic to deprive the nation of the services of men accustomed to public business, they procured two decrees to be pass- ed^ the first ordaining the electoral bodies of France to choose as representatives to the tw^o councils under the new constitution, at least two-thirds of the members presently sitting in convention^ and the second decJaring, that in default of a return of two-thirds of the present deputies, as prescribed, the convention themselves should fill up the vacancies out of their ow^n body- in other words, should name a large proportion of themselves their own successors in legislative power. Tiiese decrees were sent down to the primary assemblies and every art was used to render them acceptable. ^ ^ But the nation, and particularly the city of Paris, generally revolted at this stretch of arbitrary autho- rity. They recollected that all the members who 44o APPENDIX. had sat in the first national assemhly, so remark- able for talent, had been declared ineligible, on that single account, for the second legislative body; and now, men so infinitely the inferiors of those -who were the colleagues of Mirabeau, Mounier, and other great names, presumed not only to declare themselves eligible by reelection, but dared to establish two-thirds of their number as indispensable ingredients of the legislative assem- blies, which, according to the words alike and the spirit of the constitution, ought to be chosen by the free voice of the people. The electors, and parti- cularly those of the sections of Paris, angrily de- manded to know, upon what services the deputies of the convention founded their title to a privilege so unjust and anomalous. Among the more active part of them, to whom the measure was chiefly to be ascribed, they saw but a few reformed terrorists, who wished to retain the power of tyranny, though disposed to exercise it with some degree of modera- tion, and the loss of whose places might be possibly followed by that of their heads; in the other they only beheld a flock of timid and discounte- nanced helots, willing to purchase personal security at the sacrifice of personal honour and duty to the public; while, in the convention, as a body, who pronounced so large a proportion of their number as indispensable to the service of the state, judging, from their conduct hitherto, they could but discover an image composed partly of iron, partly of clay, deluged with the blood of many thousand victims — a pageant without a will of its own;, and which had CHAPTER V. 44 1 been capable of giving its countenance to the worst of actions, at the instigation of the worst of men -, — a sort of Moloch, whose name had been used by its priests, to compel the most barbarous sacrifices. To sum up the whole, these experienced men of public business, without whose intermediation, it was pretended, the national affairs could not be carried on, could only shelter themselves from the charge of unbounded wickedness, by pleading their un- limited cowardice, and by poorly alleging that, for two years, they had sat, voted, and deliberated under a system of compulsion and terror. So much meanness rendered those who were degraded by it unfit, not merely to rule, but to live ; and yet two- thirds of their number were^, according to their own decrees, to be intruded on the nation as an indis- pensable portion of its representatives. Such was the language held in the assemblies of the sections of Paris, who were the more irritated against the domineering and engrossing spirit exhibited in these usurping enactments, because it was impos- sible to forget that it was their interference, and the protection afforded by the national guard, which had saved the convention from massacre on more occasions than one." Looking at the mere exterior of this disquisition of the great novelist, it will be observed, that with a view either of dividing the responsibility of its misrepresentation, or of adding some degree of sanction to its folly, after exhibiting it, in the first instance, as the effusion of his own opinions, he 442 APPENDIX. ascribes it at last to thcpcople of Paris. — ^^ Such was ihelan^jLiage held in the assemblies of the people of Paris." But this expedient, for whichsoever of these purposes it may have been used, is, indepen- dently of its insincerity and confusion, signally abortive. For, even if it were true^ that these hackneyed metaphors and obvious contradictions had ever been hazarded by any one but the author of Waverley himself, the fact which on that hypo- thesis would arise, viz. that he had adopted the heat- ed extravagance of sentiment and language proper to a paroxysm of party violence — would shew a temper of mind incompatible with the equity of an histo- rian. To admit therefore the assertion which he employs to enforce his reprobation of this measure and its authors, is an effectual way of exposing his injustice. Another remark obviously suggested by this passage, is, that, throughout, Sir Walter sup- presses the important fact, that the operation of these additional acts was expressly limited, at the utmost, to two years, after which the right of elec- tion, as defined by the constitution, was to revert fully to the people. When this fact is attended to, in connection with the delicacy and danger of effecting a transition from one set of fundamental institutions to another, in time of unextinguished civil faction, and of uncompromising foreign war, the unfairness of Sir Walter Scott (who knew that at Quiberon immediately before, and at the He Dieu during this period, his own government, at an immense expense of gold and honour, had CHAPTER V. 443 kindled civil war in France) in imputing to selfish- ness a proceeding which was clearly attributable to patriotic discretion^ will appear the more inex- cusable. He had already objected (p. 65) to this constitution that '^ it was new/' — ^^ a mere experi- ment in politics." Without stopping to inquire whether it would have been honest or wise in the convention to reestablish the old constitution of France, which Sir Walter confesses (v. i, p. 68) afforded security neither to property nor person^ and which was so utterly corrupt as to be deemed unsusceptible of improvement or regeneration, it may be affirmed that the fact of the newness of the constitution of the year 3, of its being ^^ an experi- ment," or to use the language of Thiers, a system not yet ^^ fixed in the manners of the people," rendered it the duty of the representatives to adopt such measures, as, without being inconsistent with morality^ should appear likely to engraft the new institutions firmly in the habits of the nation, and protect them from the assaults of foreign, and the sap of domestic foes. There is yet another observation suggested by a general view of the strictures of Sir Weaker Scott^ on these additional acts of the convention. The very ardent zeal with which he seems suddenly inspired in favour of a ^^representative body freely and fairly elected ;" — ^^a legislative assembly chosen by the free voice of the people," must attract the notice of every reader. Throughout his work, he holds up the British constitution, in its unreiormed 444 APPENDIX. State, as a model of perfection in government, as v.i, p. 73) ^^thcnoblesystem of masculine freedom which had been consolidated by the successive efforts of so many patriots in so many ages." Yet, so far was this ^^noblesystem of masculine freedom" from admitting of ^' a. representative body chosen by the free voice of the people," that seats in one of the branches of its legislature, were, and are held, Hke land and houses, by hereditary tenure, and a large proportion of places in the other, were fill- ed without regard to the voice of the people, upon the avowed principle of introducing and continu- ing in the legislature, men of political talent and of experience in public business. So that, while an inveterate violation of the freedom of popular election of England is, in the scales of this writer's historical balance, the essence of *^ masculine free- dom," a temporary encroachment on it in France, at a moment of the greatest danger, is a selfish ^^stretch of arbitrary authority," ^^ an unjust and anomalous privilege," ^^an act of domineering and engrossing usurpation," of ^^unbounded wickedness or unlimited cowardice," which rendered its au- thors ^^ unfit, not merely to rule^ but to live." Regarding, with closer attention, this tirade against the convention and their work, it is dis- coverable that Sir Walter attributes the additional acts to inconsistent motives ; that is, to the cow- ardice of the convention in the first instance, and to their ambition in the second — to an excessive love of life, and an inordinate love of power. Now, CHAPTER V. 445 if it be true that they passed the additional acts, because they feared that, upon losing their places, they would lose their heads, it cannot be true that they enacted these laws, because they ^^ wished to retain the power of tyranny," and ^^ dared to establish two-thirds of their number" in the new legislature from a ^^ domineering and engrossing spirit." These motives being antagonist, and each sufficient, the admission of either is the exclusion of the other. While, therefore, considered as causes, they cannot be connected with the conduct of the convention in passing the additional acts, and leave those salutary regulations to be drawn from the motives of patriotism and prudence, from which they have been justly deduced by the authors already referred to ^ considered as effects, they are to be traced distinctly to causes existing in the character and disposition of Sir Walter Scott, the consciousness of which should have de- terred him from undertaking a work touching the honour of France, or the glory of Napoleon. These causes, excluding some which have been alluded to, are, first, the most contracted prejudice against the nation and the hero ; second, the grossest infa- tuation in favour of that line of pretenders, whose claims and reputation were equally wounded by the freedom of the French people, and the renown of their emperor -, and third, the habit of turning history into romance, and romance into history. The absurdity of imputing want of courage and capacity to such men as Carnot, Sieyes, Louvet^ 44G APPENDIX. Legendre, Delacloi, Tallien, Freron, Boissy d'An- glas^ Thibeaudeau, Cambaceres, Rewbell, etc., — men who had overthrown the tyranny of Bour- bons and priests, of Robespierre and the jacobins, and had at the same time defended their devoted country against the force of more than half of Eu- rope, aided by the mercenary influence of England and the machinations of the exiled princes^ is, besides its injustice, as ridiculous as the pretext assigned for it ; which is, that they did not over- throw Robespierre sooner. In specificating this charge, Sir Walter's words are (v. iii, p. 52), ^^If they had shown proper firmness, the revolution of thegth Thermidor might as well have been achieved at the beginning of that frightful anarchy (that is, the reign of terror) as after that long period of un- heard-of suffering." So that Brutus and Cassius were cowards because they did not kill Caesar as soon as he crossed the Rubicon, instead .of waiting until he had fought the battles of Pharsalia, Thap- sus, and Munda ; had destroyed Pompey and his sons, Scipio and Cato ; and fixed his power so firm- ly, that it was perpetuated by his nephew. But, unfortunately, SirWalter, in the previous volume, in which he was not quite so intent upon depre- ciating the character of Napoleon, had been at the pains to show that the overthrow of Robespierre, when it was accomplished, was attended by the greatest difficulty and danger. In relating the commencement of the struggle which ended in that fortunate catastrophe, he avers (v. ii, p. 35i) that, CHAPTER V. 44; ^^had Robespierre possessed military talents, or even decided courage, there was nothing to have pre- vented him from placing himself that very night (the night previous to his downfal) at the head of a desperate insurrection of the jacobins and their followers. Payan actually proposed that the ja- cobins should instantly march against the two committees — surprise their handful of guards, and stifle the civil war that was menaced, even in the very cradle. This plan was deemed too hazardous to be adopted, though it was one of those sudden and masterstrokes of policy which Machiavel would have recommended." Now, a stroke of policy which was not likely to succeed, could not be called a ^^ masterstroke ;'^ and, as Robespierre proved destitute of courage, it would seem accord- ing to Sir Walter, that both parties in this despe- rate struggle were poltroons ! At a later moment of the contest he describes the scenes in the con- vention (p. 356) as ^^ dreadful," and asks (p. 35'j), ^' who was it that for two years had lived on other terms than under Robespierre's permission ?" This is the formidable power which he likens to the crushing coils and devouring throat of ^^ the huge Anaconda" (p. 34^) that might have been so easily overturned. At a stage still later, he says, ^^ The fate of France, perhaps, depended on the presence of mind and courage" of Henriot — who turned out to be '^ stupid and cowardly" — and continues (p. 36i)—^^ Fortune^ or the demon which he had served, afforded Robespierre another chance for 448 APPENDIX. safely, perhaps for empire." The extreme diffi- culty of mastering the tyrant and his creatures thus confessed by Sir Walter, is confirmed by other accounts, particularly by that of Thiers j wherein (t. vi, ch. 7) the reader may see the various fluc- tuations and breathless chances of the struggle vi- vidly pictured. These observations show that the allegation of cowardice and incapacity against the convention, is not only inconsistent with truth, but irreconcilable with the previous statements of Sir Walter himself. The digression into which they have run is no deviation from the subject, for the plain tendency and probable object of this vilifica- tion of the convention, its motives and labours, are, as their triumph on the i3th Vendemiaire was in- disputably owing to Napoleon, to reflect upon him the discredit of having protected a pack of unprin- cipled usurpers, and of having volunteered his ef- forts to rivet upon France, the chains of their selfish domination . Forbearing to notice other less flagrant falsifica- tions of actual fact or natural inference, these gross misstatements remain to be exposed (v. iii, p. 68). ^^ These decrees were sent down to the primary as- semblies of the people, and every art was used to render them acceptable. But the nation, and par- ticularly the city of Paris, generally revolted at this slretch of arbitrary power." One would think, that a writer, styling himself with pompous em- phasis (v. ii, p. 358), ^^ a British historian," would have produced some colour of authority for such CHAPTER V. 449 l)road and positive assertions. The author of Waverley, however^ seems to be independent of evidence as well as of fact. So far from truth is the assertion^ that every art was used by the govern- ment to render the decrees acceptable, or to in- fluence the votes of the people on the occasion, that according to the best authority, the very re- verse was the fact. Thiers in describing the man- ner in which the votes were taken in Paris, says, (t. viii;, pp. 23, a4) : ^^ The sections commenced taking the votes on the constitution and the de- crees, by driving off without the least ceremony, the patriots who came to vote at their polls. In some sections they turned them out of doors; in others, they signified to them by handbills that they would have to stay at home , for if they came to the polls they would be insulted and driven away. Many individuals were thus deprived of their rights -y they hastened to the convention to reclaim against the violence done to them. The conven- tion disapproved the proceeding of the sections^ hut refused to interfere y in order to ai^oid the ap~ pearance even^ of recruiting votes y and that the abuse itself might prove the freedom of the delibe- ration,^^ He relates other facts to prove the per- fect liberty which was allowed to the popular mind — that in some few departments there were strong minorities — and that individuals here and there proposed a king. The assertion that ^^ the nation generally" as well as the city of Paris, revolted against this measure 29 45o APPENDIX. of llie g;overnnient, is so bold a departure from fact, that it amazes as much as it disgusts the reader. Thiers affirms (t. viii, p. 27) '^ The constitution ^vas accepted ahnost unanimously, and the decrees hy an immense majority j" and (p. 28) says that llie malcontents doubting or disputing this fact, demanded an inspection of the registers, scrutinized them, and casting up the enumeration of votes which had been proclaimed by the convention, '^ found it exact." It is well known that Lemaitre, the royalist agent, and other factious leaders^ used every exer- tion to excite opposition in the departments, and succeeded, after days of labour, only in provoking some slight movements at Orleans, Chartres, Dreux, Verneuil, and Nonancourt (Thiers, t. viii, p. 3o). But if the nation at large as well as the capital was hostile to the constitution, why did not reenforce- ments pour into Paris to assist the sections? why did the armies, who were the e'Z/Ve of the nation, not recruits, accept the constitution and decrees by acclamation j and how could the cowardlj con- i^cTz/Zo/z have dared to resist ^^a general revolt of the nation and of Paris?" That the reader may be the better able to com- prehend the full extent of Sir Walter Scott's teme- rity and injustice, on the subject of the members of the French convention who formed the constitu- tion of the year 3, and passed the additional acts, and whom the author of Waverley describes as ^^ Molochs," and ^^ Helots," — ^^men unfit to ruleor CHAPTER V. 4^1 to live j" the following observations in regard to them from the Annual Register of 1795, is submit- ted to his attention : — ^^ The majority of the mem- bers were chosen on account of the moderation of their character and principles. Some were noted for their preference of a private to a public life^ and none were suspected of intending to avail them- selves of this opportunity of rising to power. It is more probable, therefore, that they sought to please the nation than to gratify their personal ends'' (History of Europe, p. 98). Page 178. (5) This last term was afterwards shortened to the 27th October. — Thiers — (t. viii, p. 73.) Page 182. (6) Napoleon says (Montholon, t. iii, p. 109) that Mariette, one of the deputies he had rescued from the mob at Toulon, and who was at this time a member of the executive committee, recom- mended his appointment on this occasion; and he told Las Cases (t. i, p. 216) that the husband of Madame Thurreau was also in favour of his ap- pointment, a fact which shows the imminence of the danger^ the vivacity witli which it was felt, and the confidence which the talents of Bonaparle already commanded. Page 185. (7) The course of his reflections is sketched in the most lively colours by himself — (Las Cases, t. ii, p. 246). 4^2 APPENDIX. Page 184. (8) This account of the manner in which Napo- leon came to be placed in command of the forces of the convention on the i3th Vendemiaire, is de- rived from his own relation of that event (Mon- tholon t. iii^ ch. 3), from the files of the Moniteiir of that period (folio for the last six months of the year 1795), and from the proces-verbal of the con- vention (t. Ixxi, p. 282, et t. Ixxii, p. 16). The narrative of Sir Walter Scott^ in reference to this subject, has evidently been constructed of very different materials. It is as follows (v. iii, p. 74): ^^ The general management of affairs, and the di- rection of the conventional forces" (says this in- ventive historian) '^ was then committed to Bar- ras ; but the utmost anxiety prevailed among the members of the committee by whom government was administered^ to find a general of nerve and decision enough to act under Barras in the actual command of the military force, in a season so de- licate, and times so menacing. It was then that a few words from Barras, addressed to his colleagues Garnot and Tallien, decided the fate of Europe for well nigh twenty years. ^ I have the man,' he said, ^ whom you want ; a little Corsican officer, who will not stand upon ceremony.' The ac- quaintance of Barras and Bonaparte had been, as we have already said, formed at the siege of Tou- lon." — ^^ On the recommendation of Barras, Bona- parte was sent for." It is needless to insist on the direct contradiction to which this fabrication is CHAPTER V. 45 J exposed by the declaration of Napoleon, that he had no acquaintance with Barras at Toulon, and that he went, of his own accord, to the com- mittee ; because there is one fact which ought to have satisfied Sir Walter that his story, whether formed by his own fancy, or furnislied by some un- mentionable slanderer, cotdd not be believed by any person of common sense. It is, that Carnot and Tal- lien, with the knowledge of Barras, were members of the committee, with which, for many weeks. Napo- leon had been in official and constant communica- tion. It is impossible, therefore, that to men thus situated, Barras could have ejaculated the sudden discovery here ascribed to him, respecting the birth, stature, or character of Napoleon, or that, had he done so, Carnot and Tallien would have committed the safety of themselves, their families, their friends, and government, when they were under ^^ the ut- most anxiety," to an obscure officer, thus suddenly and (jueerly remembered. What renders the re- mark more incredible, is, that Napoleon, instead of being an obscure ^^ little Corsican officer," |was personally known to a number of the leading mem- bers of the convention, as the most distinguished officer of his rank in the army. Norvins (t. i, p. 78) gives a fair, but not an exact representation of this matter. Hazlitt (v. i, p. 4o2, et s. viii) copies, without acknowledgment, the narrative of Napo- leon, while, as the reader may suppose, Lockhart (v. i, p. 29) republishes the ridiculous fabrication of Scott, to which, with surprise and sorrow be }*, 454 APPENDIX. said^ the account of Thiers^ to be examined here- after_, bears too close a resemblance. Page 188. (9) Thiers (t.viii^ p. 4?) expresses an opinion that the best plan for Bonaparte would have been to act on the offensive, and disperse the insurgettt^ by a brisk attack, without waiting for their aggres- sion. This idea does not seem warranted by the relative condition of the parties, either in a political or military point of view. First, it was an object with the convention to keep their adversaries in the wrongs second, the danger of commencing the attack, and pursuing different detachments of insurgents through long and separated streets, was exemplified then by Menou, and has since been more fully by Marmont, in the revolution of July. Instead of eight thousand men, five thousand re- gular troops, and three thousand volunteers and police^, Marmont had twelve thousand, all regular troops, including five thousand of the royal guard. But, instead of keeping these troops concentred, lie left but feeble detachments in the neighbour- hood of the Tuileries, sent one column from the rue Royal up the boulevards ,• another by the quays along the river to the place de Greve^ a third to the Marche des Innocens, and a fourth up the rue Riclilieu and the boulevards to the place de la Bastille, and thence down to the place de Greve, while the 1 5th regiment was stationed beyond the river in three delachments, at the palace of Justice, CHAPTER V. 4^5 the Pantheon^ and the Hotel des Invalids. The result of this dissemination of his force in order to act on the offensive^ to attack and disperse crowds, was, that some of his detachments were over- powered by the populace, and some seduced j that others could not reach the points to which they were directed, form the junctions which were pre- . scribed, or even return by the streets through which they had penetrated ; and that while one column attacked the people with determined spirit, another refused to fire on them. It has been observed, that after affairs became desperate, and all offensive plans had failed, Marmont^ when it was too late, collected his troops upon the same points which the eye of Napoleon had at once fixed on. As he was probably with Napoleon on the 1 3th Vendemiaire, and was a man of military ta- lents and experience, his error is remarkable. Per- haps a secret repugnance to follow the example of a chief whose standard he had deserted, turned his view from the path of judgment. Perhaps he wanders an outcast from his country, because he proved a traitor to his friend. Page 190. (ro) This comparative estimate of the force on either side, differs from that of Sir Walter Scott, who, although he admits that Napoleon* had but about eight thousand men, represents his force as formidable and imposing. To colour this misre- presentation, he describes the insurgents as feeble^ 456 APPENDIX. thou(jli numerous^ aud says (v. iii, p. ^5) that Na- poleon had " two hundred pieces of cannon ." Now, the fact is, that the sections had at their disposal forty thousand national guards, who had been in reij'ular training ever since Angust, 1794^ and Na- poleon, as he asserts (Montholon t. iii, p. no ; Las Cases t. ii_, p. 248 j see also Norvins t. i, p. 74) had but about forty pieces of cannon^ which were how- ever all-sufficient for his eight thousand men, if he meant to use musketry or bayonets at all. Lock- hart, not wilhng to sanction the statement of Na- poleon, nor daring to repeat the huge exaggeration of Sir Walter, asserts (v. i, p. 3o), that the artil- lery of the camp of Sablons, for which Murat was despatched, consisted of ^^ fifty great guns." This fabrication, though amid such a number of grosser and more artful ones, it might appear unworthy of notice, is deserving of attention, because it is ob- viously the design of both the Scotch biographers to discredit the word of Napoleon, by contradic- tions on immaterial points, so that when they come to examine important subjects, or to advance fa- vourite calumnies, the reader may be disposed to consider his assertion as entitled to even less weight than their own . Page 192. (11) Sir WaUer Scott, it is evident, was almost as well qualified to command an army, as to canon- ize the virtues of a French hero. He insists upon it, that the best policy for the insurgents was to CHAPTER V. 4^7 barricade the streets, block up Bonaparte and his troops within the circuit of his posts, and wait the effect of famine. As an army of two hundred thousand men, and a population of several mil- lions, might be daily expected in such a conjunc- ture, to pour their strength into Paris, this would belike advising a pack of sheep-stealers to surround the fold, and wait quietly until the shepherds with their dogs, should come upon them in the morning. It is singular that Thiers, who asserts so emphatically what Sir Walter attempts to conceal, the favourable disposition of the great majority of the nation, and the enthusiastic acquiescence of the army in the proposed constitution and the decrees, should have adopted the idea (t. vii, p. 49) that Bonaparte, after having provided for a retreat to Meudon, would suf- fer himself to be shut up in the Tuileries, while his cannon commanded the bridges, the Champs Ely- sees, and the plain of Grenelle; or that there would havebeen time to reduce him by famine in the cen- tre of a country, of which the army and a vast ma- jority of the people were on his side. Danican and Lafonde, knowing the state of public feeling, and the natural tendency of the turbulent passions to sub- side, saw that delay would to them be ruin. Page 19o. (12) It will be remembered that, on witnessing the violence of the populace on the 20th June, 1792, he said, if the king had, at the beginning, swept off a few hundreds of the rioters with can^ non, '^ the rest would be running now<'^ 458 APPENDIX. Page 198. ( 1 3 ) Different accounts exist of this appointment by the convention^ but that given by Napoleon (Las Cases, t. ii^ p. 255; Montholon t. iii, p. r i6) isadopt- C(l in the text. The narrations of the biographers and historians^ whose works I have consulted on this subject^ are as various almost as their names. Scott (v. iii^ p. 78) says, *'But a separate triumph was destined to Bonaparte as the hero of the day. Five days after the battle, Barras solicited the attention of the convention to the young officer^ by whose prompt and skilful dispositions, the Tuileries had been protected on the i3th Vendemiaire^ and pr6'- posed that they should approve of general Bona- parte's appointment as second in command of the army of the interior, Barras himself still remaining commander in chief. The proposal was adopted by acclamation." Lockhart (v. i, p. 3i) says, ^^ This eminent service secured the triumph of the conventionalists, who now assuming new names, continued, in effect, to discharge their old func- tions. Barras took his place at the head of the directory, having Sieyes, Carnot, and other less celebrated persons for his colleagues ; and the first director took care to reward the hand to which he owed his elevation. Within five days from the daj of the sections, Bonaparte was named second in command of the army of the interior; and, shortly afterwards, Barras finding his duties as di- rector sufficient to occupy his time, gave up the command in chief of the same army to his ^^ little CHAPTER V. 4^9 Corsican officer." Hazlitt (v. i, p. 409) copies, without acknowledgment or explanation, the ac- count of Napoleon, stating that he was chosen com- mander in chief j while Norvins (t.i, p. 76) asserts, that ^^ the convention confirmed his nomination as second in command of the army of the interior." It will be perceived, that these accounts disagree with each other, while all but the blind transla- tion of Hazlitt are at variance with the relation of Napoleon himself. As this juxtaposition demon- strates that but one of the four narratives can pos- sibly be right, a slight analysis will prove that each of them is wrong. Scott and Lockhart however agree in one favourite point, in representing Na- poleon as the protege of Barras. The first affirms that ^^ Barras solicited the attention of the conven- tion to the joung ojficer^'' and ^^ proposed that they should approve of general Bonaparte's ap- pointment as second in command of the army of the interior, Barras himself still remaining com- mander in chief." According to Scott, therefore, Bonaparte must have been indebted to Barras, not only for his first employment on the night of the 1 2th Vendemaire as second in command of the conventional forces (see note 8 of this appendix), but for being confirmed in this command after the struggle of the 1 3th was over. Lockhart makes Napoleon equally the creature of Barras, represent- ing the latter with remarkable ignorance of French history, as the colleague of Sieyes at this time, and as resigning his command after he became direc- 46o APPENDIX. tor to his ^Mittle Corsican officer," It might be difficult to determine whether Sieyes, having been elected a director on the first occasion (thoup-h he refused the place, which was actually filled by Car- not; see His Loire de France depuis 1789, par Toulongeoji, t. iii^ p. 2!23), or his having served as successor to Rewbell four years subsequently (see Thiers t.x^ p. 284), misled Lockhart into the ab- surdity of furnishing a directory of five members with six persons, either circumstance, however light, being cause sufficient for an effect so trivial. Bat, however this may be, if these writers are to be credited, the inference would arise, that inasmuch as Napoleon, in his repeated narratives of this part of his life, attributes no agency and confesses no obligation to Barras, he v>^antonIy misstated a fact, and meanly suppressed the acknowledgment of a favour. As this miscreated inference has an obvious tendency to discredit his Memoirs, and to disparage his character, it is to be regretted that the narrative of Thiers should be found to enforce it. Reference has already been made to the slight- ing and defamatory neglect and contradiction to which the biographers of Napoleon, whether ca- lumnious like Scott, impartial like Hazlitt, or lau- datory like Norvins, subject statements, however earnest and positive, in his account of his own life, and one or two instances of simi- lar unfairness have been noticed on the part of the best historian of the French revolution. Af- firmations which Napoleon made in relation to facts of ^hich he himself was the agent or ^itne??'^ CHAPTER V. 46 E these writers virtually deny, or captiously contra- dict, Avithout pretending to the slightest personal knowledge of the subject, or condescending to as- sign the smallest reason for this modest valuation, indulged in by each of his own authority. The injustice of this proceeding, both in regard to the memory of Napoleon, and the confidence of their readers, need not Le enlarged upon, inasmuch as every mind attentive to the matter, must at once discover the labyrinth of doubt and confusion, both as to character and events, into which these con- flicting statements and arbitrary insinuations lead. With a view of sustaining my own narrative, and of enabling the reader to determine to which side the balance of truth inclines, between the statements of Napoleon and the asseverations of these writers, I shall select the account of Thiers, as being the latest and the fullest among them, and, from the nature and spirit of his work, the most free from partiality or prejudice. And in order to render the examination more clear and complete, I shall place the adverse statements in relation to the com- mand of the army of the interior; in opposite co- lumns. Napoleon's was dictated al- mo't word for word at difl'e- rent times to Las Cases and to Monlholon. Tlie transcript of the latter, beginning- with tlie first appointment, is here quo- ted (t. iii, pp. 1 08, 109 et 10}. " Each member proposed, as successor to Menou, the gene- ral who enjoyed his particular confidence ; the Tncrmido - Thiers after mentioning the agitation of the coHvention, says (t. viii, p. ^o), " At this moment, wnich recalled all the dangers of Thermidor, they thought of the deputy Barras, who in his character of general of brigade, had been clothed with the command on that memorable day, and had acquitted himself with all the 462 APPENDIX. riens proposed Barras ; but he was liltle acceptable to the other parties. Those who had been at Toulon, with ihs army of Italy, and the members of the committee of public safety who had daily intercourse with Napoleon, proposed him as the person most capable of extricating the convention from their dangerous position, by the quickness of his coup ct'ceil, the energy and modera- tion of his character. Mari- elte, who belonged to the mo- derate party, and was one of the most influential members of the committee of forty, ap- jjroved this choice. Napoleon who heard all this from the midst of the crowd, deliberated nearly ahalf an hour with him- self on the step which it was proper for him to take. At length he decided, and re- paired to the committee, to whom he described in a lively manner the impossibility of his being able to direct so impor- tant an operation with three representatives who actually exercised the power and con- trolled the conduct of the com- manding general ; he added, that he had witnessed the event in the rue Yivienuej where the commissaries had been the most to blame, al- though they had presented themselves in the convention as triumphant accusers of Me- nou." "Struck by Napoleon's reasons, but not having the power to annul the authority of the commissaries of the con- vention without a long de- bate in that assembly ; the committee, in order to recon- cile all their objects, for there was no time to lose, deter- mined to propose Barras for general in chief, giving Napo- leon at the same time the place of second in command. By energy that was desirable, (p. 40 They appointed him ge- neral of the army of the in- terior, and gave him as ad- joints the three representatives who had been charged before his appointment with the di- rection of the armed force. One circumstance rendered this choice very fortunate. Bar- ras had near him an officer (Bonaparte) very capable of commanding^ and he would not have had the littleness of mind to exclude a man more able than himself." (p. l^i) " Barras thought of him the 1 2th Vendemiaire in the night ; and requested that he should be appointed his second in command, which request was granted. The two selections, submitted to the convention during the same night, were instantly approved. Barras confided the care of the mi- litary dispositions to the young general , who immediately charged himself with them all." (p. 55) " The conven- tion accorded a brilliant re- ception to Barras and Bona- parte. Barras, already cele- brated since the yth Thermi- dor, became still more so by the day of Vendemiaire. To him was attributed the safety of the convention. Neverthe- less he did not fear to assign a portion of his glory to his young lieutenant. ' It is general Bonaparte,' said he, ' whose prompt and skilful dispositions have saved this assembly {enceinte).^ These words were applauded. The command of the army of the interior was confirmed to Bar- ras, and the second in com- mand to Bonaparte." CHAPTER V. 463 th'S expedient, the three com- missaries were got rid of, •\yilhout having any cause of complaint. As soon as Napo- leon found himself charged with the command of the forces which were to protect the convention, he repaired to an apartment of the Tuileries in which was Menou, etc." (p. ii6). " When, after this great event, the oflicers of the army of the interior were presented in a body to the convention, that assembly declared Napo- leon by acclamation general in chief of the army of the inte- rior, Barras not being able longer to combine the title of representative with military functions." Previously to entering into a comparative analy- sis of these disagreeing recitals^ it may be well to observe, that Napoleon's was prior in point of time, was dictated originally, without the advantage of reference to other accounts, was prepared in a situa- tion not convenient for research nor conducive to meditation, and having once passed from his possession, was never afterwards in his power j while that of Thiers, subsequent in date, purports to be the product of extensive reference and indus- trious collation, and was composed in a position in the highest degree favourable to the detection of error and the discovery of truth. As far as regards the influence of predisposing circumstances, the record of the sedate historian would seem to prefer a stronger claim to belief than is presented by the statement of the personal narrator. But let us see. luthe first place, Thiers affirms that Barras 464 APPENDIX. was appointed (general in chief on this ur(jcnt oc- casion, in consequence of his special quaUfications, and creates the unavoidable inference, that he was thought capable of meeting the crisis. This, however, is altogether improbable, inasmuch, as if Barras had been thought competent for the emer- p-ency, why should the committee themselves have appointed a second in command? Was it the custom of the French government at the time, not only to furnish a commanding general with three deputies as commissaries or adjoints, but also with a designated second in command? Was it the case with respect to Pichegru, Jourdan, Moreau, or Hoche ? Again, if the committee had full con- fidence in Barras, they could have no more in Bo- naparte, and therefore his appointment as second in command would have been a useless, if not offensive innovation, at a moment of extreme and immediate danger. If it was not a superfluous formality involving unseasonable delay, and per- haps fatal embarrassment, it was the effect of a less degree of confidence being felt by the committee in the qualifications of Barras than in those of Bo- naparte, which establishes a conclusion subversive of the statement of Thiers j that is, it proves that Barras was not appointed in consequence of his supposed capacity for the command, but for some other reason. This other reason is found in the statement of Napoleon. Barras was nominated by some members of the convention, in consideration of his activity on the gth Thermidor^ Bonaparte CHAPTER V. 465 •was proposed by Mariette, and other members, on account of his military talents^ of -which they had witnessed the display, and of his firm and moderate character, with which Mariette was particularly acquainted. The compromise between these two opinions, and the necessity of employing decided military abilities, as well as of getting rid of the in- cumbrance of the commissaries, who were protested against by Bonaparte, induced the committee, in all probability with the concurrence of Barras, to give Barras the nominal command, in order that he might engross the attendance of the commis- saries ; and to confer on Bonaparte the real com- mand, in order that he might meet and repel the insurgents. With respect to the next assertion, that Barras requested the committee to appoint Bonaparte his second in command before he con- fided the direction of the military dispositions to Bonaparte, the absurdity of the idea renders the statement incredible^ for the moment Barras was appointed general in chief, he would have pos- sessed, not only from the nature of his office, but from the letter of his commission, had his command been real, ample authority to appoint Bonaparte his second in command without the agency of the committee. The decree conferring the appoint- ment on Barras was prepared by the executive com- mittee, and runs thus : — ^' The national con- vention decrees, that the general of brigade, Bar- ras, representative of the people, is appointed ge- neral in chief of the armed force of Paris, and of 3o 466 APPENDIX. the army of the interior, and that all aiUlwriUes, civil and military ^ are required to acknowledge and ohej him as suchJ" With this absolute autho- rity, it is impossible to conceive, that (had it been more than nominal) Barras^ in a moment of such critical peril, would have taken the trouble, time, or risk, of applying to a committee pf forty mem- bers, to make an appointment which he himself had singly the power to make. If he could have committed so dangerous a blunder, he certainly was totally unfit to hold more than the qualified and negative trust which was really confided to him, and which from its nature, renders the idea of his application for Bonaparte's appointment inconsistent and absurd. From these considerations, it must be concluded, that Bonaparte's employment on this occasion, instead of being in compliance with a re- quest of Barras, was the effect of his own reputation, the danger of the moment, and the impression he made on the committee. Thiers proceeds to declare, that these two appointments having been agreed on by the committee, were submitted to the con- vention the same night, and instantly sanctioned. It is impossible for me to judge of the weight of his authority for this naked assertion, as he refers to no document or writer in support of it, nor pro- fesses to have been a witness, as Napoleon says he was, of the events in question. This much, how- ever, I can venture to slate, that it is at variance with the account of the matter furnished by the contemporaneous report of the debates of the CHAPTER V. 4^7 convention in the Moniteur, and in the collection of documents entitled, Proces-vephal de la Con" ventioti rationale. From these official papers, it appears, that at half-past four in the night session of the 1 2th Vendemiaire, Merlin de Douai, on the part of the committee, proposed to the con- vention a decree appointing Barras general in chief, which proposition was proposed and adopted in the words already recited j and that immedi- ately afterwards three deputies were appointed as his adjoints, according to the invariable rule in such cases. It further appears that on this oc- casion^ not a word was said of Bonaparte, his name not being submitted to the convention. This fact, while it conflicts with the assertion of Thiers, confirms to the letter the statement of Na- poleon, who says, that his appointment was the work of the committee alone. Moreover, from the late hour at which Merlin de Douai proposed the decree, half-past four a.m., it is evident, that in this crisis of the public distemper, Barras was ex- hibited by tlie executive committee as an absorbent to take up the annoyance of the superintending de- puties. For Bonaparte had been on duty, and exer- cising the real command long before^ as at one o'clock he had sent off Murat to the camp of Sablons in time to complete the conveyance of forty pieces of artil- lery to the Tuileries, within less than an hour after the proposition of Merlin was made. So much for the first appointment. With regard to the circum- stances and character of the second, Thiers will be 4G8 APPENDIX. found to be still more egreg^iously mistaken. He asserts that Barras, already celebrated on account of the Qth of Thermidor, gained an accession of glory by the day of Vendemiaire, and adds posi- tively, in reference to tlie occasion of this second appointment, ^^ to him was attributed the safety of the convention." (0/^ lui attrihiia le salut de la coiwention). Here again I am forced to disclaim all acquaintance with his authority, and, of conse- quence, the ability of estimating its value. If however, the journals of the debates in the Moni- tcur, and the prochs-vevhal, one record corrobo- rating the other, are to be relied on, it would appear that the invention of the historian, had it been exerted in emulation of sir W. Scott, could hardly have contrived a statement more remote from the truth than this is. According to these official documents, on the 1 8th Vendemiaire, Freron, a distinguished member of the convention, in a speech urging the propriety of correcting the arrangement which Aubry, while at the head ot the war department, had adopted respecting the employment of general officers, said, ^^ Forget not (riouhliez, pas) that the general of artillery, Bonaparte, appointed in the night of the J 2th to replace general Menou, and who only had to the morning of the i3th to make the skilful dis- positions of which you have seen the happy effects, was taken from his own line of service to be put in the infantry." This pregnant sentence shews how far the convention was from attributing their safety CHAPTER V, 469 to Barras. Freron speaks of two facts connected by their relation to Napoleon. One he recalls to the memory of his hearers ; the other he mentions as dwelling in their minds and obvious to their judgment. The first was, that Bonaparte had been unfairly treated by Aubry ; the second, that as successor to Menou, or real commander in chief, he had saved the convention. The speech in ques- tion contains not the remotest allusion to Barras. It produced a motion of reference from Letourneur, a member of the committee which had concerted the two appointments, who by his silence con- firmed the agency assigned by Freron to Bonaparte, and the nullity implied against Barras. The reader will not fail to observe, that although the members of the convention generally were igno- rant of the appointment of Napoleon at the time it was made by the committee, they could not remain so many days afterwards ^ and had no doubt come to a full knowledge of his services at the time Fre- ron made his speech. But Thiers assigns to Barras as large a portion of magnanimity as of glory. He says ^^ He did not fear to transfer a portion of his glory to his young lieutenant. ^ It is general Bonaparte,' said he, ^ whose prompt and skilful dispositions have saved this assembly.' These words were applauded. Barras' appointment as commander in chief of the army of the interior was confirmed, and that of Bonaparte as second in command also." If we trust to the journals of the convention, 470 APPENDIX. every allegation of which this statement is com- posed, except the very last, is unfounded. At half past nine on the evening of the i3th, Barras en- tered the hall of the convention, and gave an ac- count of the operations and success of the day, all in the first person, without the slightest allusion to Napoleon, and in a strain so egoistical, that had Barras really achieved the defeat of the insurgents, it w^ould have been unbecoming. On the i4th, he spoke on the same subject, and in the same strain^ saying not a word of Napoleon, although he men- tioned his own colleague, Talot. On the 17th, he spoke three times in relation to the conflict with the sections, altogether omitting his nominal se- cond in command. Finally, when Bonaparte and the other officers were introduced, he declined an opportunity that was afforded by another member^ to draw the slightest distinction in his favour. For when Baraillon proposed that a set of arms should be presented to the officers who most dis- tinguished themselves, Barras said, '^ they all had distinguished themselves— it was impossible to dis- criminate j " slighting at once the associated rank which Bonaparte held, and the committee who had conferred it. Does this seem like not fearing to allow a fair share of gloij to his joung lieute" nant ? However, after Bonaparte and the other officers had retired^ and when Freron in debating another subject, mentioned incidentally and by way of illustration, the real command and emi- nent and admitted services of Napoleon, '' the CHAPTER V. 471 happy effects of whose skilful dispositions, as successor to general Menou, you have seen 3" then, when silence could no longer serve his purposes, Barras spoke out — although the sub- ject did not require it — and attempting a tran- sition from selfishness to liberality, from jealousy ta patronage, said, — '^ I will call the attention of the national convention to general Bonaparte ^ it is to him, it is to his skilful dispositions that we are indebted for the defence of this hall around which he had distributed the posts with great ability. I move that the convention confirm the nomination of Bonaparte to the place of second in command of of the array of the interior." This restricted praise might have been aptly added to the observation which Barras had made respecting the officers ge- nerally, on the occasion of Baraillon's motion, and though it would not have been an evidence of mag- nanimity, it would have been an act approaching to justice. But when it is considered that on all appropriate occasions Barras had not permitted the name of Bonaparte to escape his lips, and uttered it only after the positive and uncontradicted as- sertion of an eminent member had rent asunder the veil of his concealment, and by an implied and sarcastic rebuke, forced him either to confess his injustice or to seem to repair it, it is difficult lo form any other opinion respecting his conduct on the occasion, than that so far from its being that of a liberal patron to his '' little Corsican officer," it was an ungenerous and mean attempt to appro- 472 APPENDIX. priate to his own possession, credit which was due to a distinguished and successful general. Another of the incredible assertions in this statement of the historian is, that the appointments of Barras and Bonaparte, as first and second in command of the army of the interior, were on this occasion of singular magnanimity in the life of the former, confirmed by the convention. He has be- fore declared (p. 4^) that these same appointments were submitted to the convention on the night of the 1 2th, and then confirmed. Yet he will have his readers believe that they were again confirmed on the 1 8th. That man must entertain a singular conception of legislative power, who will assert or believe that a law, perfect in its character, and un- limited as to time, must be re-enacted every six days by the authority from which it emanated, in order to preserve its force. The decree of the con- vention, which had not been repealed, was com- plete and effectual in the first instance, and could not be made more so by repetition. Approxima- ting these two assertions of Thiers, it appears that one inevitably falsifies the other* But comparing them with the facts attested by the journals of the convention, it results that half of each is true, and half false— making the amount of error detected by either process the same, but the disposition of it different. Thus, it is true that the appointment of Barras was confirmed on the night of the 12th, and that of Bonaparte on the day of the i8th. It is not true that Bonaparte's appointment was con- CHAPTER V. 473 firmed on the night of the 12th, nor that Barras's was on the day of the i8th. The first member of this negative proposition has been demonstrated al- ready by reference to the proceedings of the con- vention on the night of the 1 2th, in the official record of which, neither the name nor the appoint- ment of Bonaparte occurs. The same record establishes the second, by showing that on the i8th, not a word was said respecting the appointment of Barras ; while upon his constrained and ungracious motion, that of Bonaparte was confirmed. " The national convention confirms the nomination made by the committee of public safety, of general Bona- parte to the place of second in command of the ar- my of the interior." — (Proces-verbal de la Conven- tion national, t. Ixxi, p. 26). This part of the great history of Thiers, can afford but little insight into the character of Barras, or the life of Napoleon ; yet, considering this edition was published in i832, the author announcing himself ^^ minister of state, and a deputy," it will be apt to inspire foreigners with strange ideas of the legislative wisdom of France. According to this accomplished author and practised statesman, an appointment made by the executive, and confirmed by the legislature in one week, is, in the regular course of proceedings, to be confirmed over again by the same legislature the next week, in order to keep it in force ; and that too, in cases where it is known to the legisla- ture that the nature of the office is temporary, and that it is the intention, as well as the interest of the 474 APPET?DIXi incumbent, to resign it witlitn a fe\v days. TKat this much was known to the legislature in respect to Barras, is evident from the fact, that in sixteen days after this alleged second corifirmatron, he did resign, and with symptoms of impatience, his appointment as provisional general of the Sii'riiy of the interior (Proces-verbal, t. Ixxii, p. ^oy)-, and also from the fact that he was then a cati- didate for a seat in the directory, into which, as we learn from Thiers himself (t. viii, p. 80) strongs objections were entertained against admitting mili- tary commanders. Now, although Barras did not rank among the distinguished generals, he was not popular enough to risk the objection, as, after getting rid of his military appointment, and mak- ing all the advantage lie could, both by concealing and confessing with equal fraud, the services and glory of '^ his young lieutenant," he obtained the smallest number of votes of the five persons who were elected directors. Out of the 218 votes that were given, Larevelliere-Lepaux got 216, while Barras received but 129 ; the other three numbers being respectively 189, 176, and ifj6. While these remarks satisfy the reader as to the fitness of Barras to the cliief command of the con- ventional forces, and his magnanimity in the dis- tribution of tlie glory of Vendemiaire, they will also sliow some of the errors into which Thiers en- tangled his narrative, by allowing his nimble inven- tion, or fastidious taste, to deviate from the plain, firm, and consistent account, left by the principal actor in the scene he was describing. CHAPTER V. 4^5 Returning to the simple narrative of Napoleon, it will be easy to prove that it is true in every respect. It has already been shown, by explain- ing the nature of the appointment itself, and the circumstances in which it was made, as well as by the uncontradicted assertion of Freron, that Na- poleon was placed by the committee in nominal subordination to Barras, in order to render him really independent of the commissaries or adjoints. It has also been shown that the convention, with the knowledge of this antecedent fact, and of the prospective one, that Barras was soon to resign even his nominal superiority, confirmed this appoint- ment made by the committee. When a govern- ment appoints a man second in command of an army, knowing that the first in command is never to exercise his nominal authority, and is in a few days to resign it, it is equivalent to conferring on this man the command in chief. In the particular case in (question, it was more emphatically so, inas- much as Barras was from the first the scape-goat to carry off the sins of the adjoints, and by that means to increase the power of Napoleon j facts, avowed by Freron, when he said that Bonaparte, notwithstanding Barras' appointment, was the successor of general Menou, who had just before been commander in chief. It is to be observed further, that while the appoihtment of Napoleon, formally as well as really, to the command in chief, would have been a harsh extrusion of Barras from his nominal rank, it would have subjected his sue- 476 APPENDIX. cesser to the control of the commissaries before the danger of the crisis was entirely over — conse- quences, of which the first would have been unne- cessary, and the second inconvenient. These ob- servations, it is hoped, will be received as conclu- sive that Napoleon confined his narration strictly within the limits of truth, when he described him- self as the actual commander in chief, from the time that, under his own conditions, he was ap- pointed by the executive committee; and as the acknowledged commander in chief, from the mo- ment the appointment of the committee, under the circumstances which are here explained, was con- firmed by the unanimous vote of the convention, the highest authority of the state. The only re- maining point of his narrative to be considered, is that in which he affirms, that, on being pre- sented with the other officers to the convention, he was ^^ named bj acclamation commander in chief of the army of the interior*" This would seem to have been rather a spontaneous move- ment of the members, upon seeing the man whom they had by this time learned was their real de- liverer, than a formal act of the legislative body, and can be more readily conceived to have hap- pened, from the fact, that on the evening of the 1 3th, and the next morning, when the great mass of the convention supposed Barras was the saviour of the state, they hailed his appearance uniformly with acclamations. Besides, Thiers himself says, that Barras' proposition that the appointment of CHAPTER V. 477 Bonaparte should be confirmed, ^^ was applauded." So that, while there are many circumstances of probability in favour of this statement, besides the weight of Napoleon's word, there is not one against it. An assertion, which is confined neither to sir Walter Scot I, nor to the English language, has been hazarded, imputing to Napoleon that gross and disordered self-love which could induce him deli- berately to misstate facts, and falsify events, in order to aggrandize his glory in the view of poste- rity. As a general charge, this general answer to it readily presents itself^ that a man, conscious of possessing such substantial titles to renown as he must have been, would not be apt to desire or risk a reliance on false pretensions. Were this the proper place in the present work to investigate the grounds of this charge, it might be alleged, that the comparison which has just been made between the easy narrative of Napoleon, and the elaborate history of Thiers, does not invalidate the authority which the name of the former is likely to confer on his words. It might too be pertinently added, that another and a similar statement of his, which has been relied on in the text, and which, if unsup- ported, would be obnoxious to this odious charge, is fortified by the short but pregnant speech of Freron, that has proved so fatal to the fictions of Thiers, and which attests so fully the veracity of Napoleon. In relating his difficulties with Aubry, the emperor says (Montholon, t.iii, p. 89), that the 4^8 APPENDIX. Other officers of artillery, who were discontented with Aubry's arrangements, referred to his case as the most glaring example of Aubry s injustice. If this assertion were disputed, which, with the generous confidence of truth he made on his own authority alone, although it is of a nature to be al- most unsusceptible of direct proof, the observation qf Freron in his speech would suffice to confirm it, since he referred with the silent but virtual acquiescence of his colleagues, to Bonaparte's case, in addressing the convention, as the most flagrant instance of Aubry's injustice. For the naked as- sertions of the authors of these invidious charges, it is not likely that such apt and corroborating au- thority will often be found. The failure of Thiers, as well as the four biogra- phers of Napoleon, to notice his striking boldness in insisting on being freed from the encumbrance of adjoints, that he might meet the danger and responsibility of the crisis singly; a proposition which no other man in France would have made, shows that Thiers comprehended very imperfectly, both the peril of the occasion, and the spirit of Na- poleon. From the hollow and blustering character of Barras, it is evident that at such a moment he would have deemed a crowd of commissaries the surest means of safety and of strength. It is remarkable that, althougli Norvins states correctly the act of the convention confirming Na- poleon's appointment as second in command, and Hazlitt copies literally the assertion of Napoleon, CHAPTER .V. 479 that the convention appointed him general in chief, they should both be wrong ; neither apprehending tJicfijcts correctly, nor enabling their readers to do so. Najjoleon's statement, essentially true when he made it, ceased to convey the truth after it had been contradicted in various ways by different au- thors, and especially after Norvins asserted that his nomination was confirmed by the convention, not as general in chief, but as '^ second in cammand." So that as Hazlitt did not explain and substantiate the laconic affirmation of INapoleon, by repeating it, he conveyed less than the truth, less than Napo- leon intended to impart. On the other hand, Norvins, by simply retailing the literal import of the decree of the convention, without explaining those circumstances which made the appointment of second in command equivalent, at the least, to tlie command in chief, exposes his own text to con tradiction with the declaration of Napoleon, leaves his readers destitute of a distinct knowledge of facts, and embarrassed with an unpleasant doubt as to the comparative value of the statementts of Norvins himself and of his hero. To recur to, enumerate, and demolish, the frontless, and contradictory misstatements of Scott and Lockhart j both representing Barras as the maker of Napoleon's fortune, and the latter declaring that he resigned his office in Napoleon's favour, after he, Barras, became director, cannot, the imposing assertions of Thiers having been dis- posed of, be worth half the time it would require. 48o APPENDIX. Page 204. (i4) The parting of Hector and Andromache notwithstanding its tender and picturesque cir- cumstances, is hardly more interesting than the meeting of Napoleon and Josephine. If the Trojan infant, terrified at the crested glitter of his father's helmet, touches every heart, the tears of the Gallic boy on receiving the sword of his murdered sire, swell with sympathy every generous breast. If the fete foreboded of the Trojan princess, con- demned to suffer the taunts or loves of a barbarian victor, fills the mind with indignant melancholy ; the doom of the French empress, forced to endure the cruelty of Austrian scorn and Muscovite pity, awakens the deepest sorrow. If the Dardan hero, overpowered by treachery and force — but the pa- rallel is too mournful to be pursued. Page 204. (i5) In the pile of defamatory ordure, which the British press and the Bourbon coteries, created respecting Napoleon's life and character, one of the foulest materials was that which derived this appointment from the prostitution of his wife when she was madam Beauharnais. Considering the va- lue which was attached to this literary filth during the war, in England, and after the restoration, in France^ neither its quantity nor fetidness can oc- casion surprise. Perishable as it was putrescent, the light shed on the personal history of Napoleon, CHAPTER V. 4^1 first by Las Cases, and next by O'Meara^ quickened the natural process of its destruction, and it would have long since disappeared entirely from the face of the earth, but for the delicate researches and vi- vifying genius of the author of Waverley. From this steaming mass, he occasionally condescended to extract materials in order to variegate, enlarge, and finish the biographical patchwork, with which, to fulfil a profitable contract, and to please the taste of lordly ministers and legitimate kings, he had undertaken to shroud the memory of Na- poleon . The calumny in question, as far as its outlines can now be traced, imports that madam Beauharnais was, at the time Napoleon married her, the mistress of Barras, and that Napoleon agreed to take her off the hands of the director and make her his wife, upon Barras engaging to procure for him the command in chief of the army of Italy — or, as sir Walter furtively intimates — make that appoint- ment ^^ the dowry of the bride." This aspersion, which makes Josephine more infamous than Barras, and Napoleon than Josephine, was too enormous and offensive for sir Walter to touch without he- sitation. Accordingly after approaching it in the first instance, with no little caution, he avoids the contaminating contact by saying (v. iii, p. 84) : ^^ Madame Tallien and her friend formed the soul of these assemblies," at the apartments of Barras, ^'' and it was supposed that Barras was not insen- sible to the charms of madame Beauharnais — a ru- 3i 482 APPENDIX. mour which VA-as likely to arise, whether with or without foundation." This allusion^ slight as it is, is discountenanced in the next paragraph, in which he says Josephine was in the bloom of beauty, and there was '^ no reason to doubt that Napoleon was induced by the effect solely of her personal charms to offer her his hand, his heart and his fortunes." This however was going loo far, as it would suppress the slander altogether, and therefore, on the next page, the allusion is re- vived in the shape of a strong implication. '^ The marrj'ing madame Beauharnais, was a mean of uniting his fortunes with those of Barras and Tal- lien, the first of whom -governed France as one of the directors," etc. On the next page, this impli- cation is reen4^orced by the assertion already quoted, that the command of the army of Italy, or, as sir Walter with euphonic boldness says, '^ of the Italian armies," was ''^ the dowry of the bride." Thus it is impossible for the reader to shake from his mind the impression that the rumour in ques- tion had, in the opinion of the author of Waverley, foundation in truth. For how else could the mar- rying madam Beauharnais unite the fortune of Na- poleon with that of the director Barras ? Did sir Walter unite his fortune by marriage, with every gentleman on terms of acquaintance with lady Scott? With Tallien, the friendship existing be- tween his wife and Josephine formed the bond of the alleged union ; but Barras was a bachelor and a libertine. And why else was the command of CHAPTER V. 483 the ^'Italian armies," at the disposal of the direc- tor, ^^who governed France," to be ^^the dowry of ihe bride ?" As this slander is effectually though slyly sanctioned by sir Walter^ and is connected with his previous efforts to make Napoleon, on the 1 3th Vendemiaire, an obscure ^^ little Corsican officer," indebted for notice and distinction to the patronage of this same Barras, it will not be im- proper to expose its undeniable falsehood. In the first place, madam Beauharnais is represented to have been ^^ in the full bloom of beauty" and ex- tremely agreeable in her manners. Can it be sup- posed that Barras, in possession of such a woman, would, not only transfer her to another man, but pay this other man for accepting her. Beauty and grace and social charms were never so disposed of before. Achilles did not bribe Agamemnon to force Briseis from his tent. But it may be said that as Bonaparte agreed to marry her, and Barras did not wish to form that sort of connection, Josephine preferred becoming the general's wife to remaining the director's mistress. Had that been the case, it cannot well be supposed that Barras would have rewarded Bonaparte for depriving him of his mis- tress, or would have endowed her liberally to in- duce her to desert him. If she preferred Bonaparte to Barras, the latter would not have recompensed her that she might gratify both the love and am- bition of his successful rival. If she did not prefer Bonaparte, but married him for convenience, and at the intance of Barras, admitting that so proud 484 APPENDIX. and promising a general as Bonaparte is said to have been would accept as his wife the mistress of another man^ it is impossible to conceive that, loving Josephine as sir Walter declares Bonaparte did, with excessive ardour and '^peculiar affec- tion," he would have left her a few days after their marriage, at Paris, in the society of her old pro- tector, and hastened away to a distant frontier. Thus, without reference to the damning origin of this slander, allowing it all the importance and plausibility which the tact and name of the author of Waverley impress it with, human nature her- self stamps it with the seal of refutation and con- tempt. It may be added that had Josephine been the mistress of Barras, the sword of Beauharnais Avould not have been found by Eugene in posses- sion of Bonaparte. As to the appointment, supposing that Barras, the least able and the least respectable of the di- rectors, ^^ governed France," it is difficult to con- ceive what other general he could have selected for this frontier, who could be spared from some other station, and possessed adequate qualifications. Pi- chegru had become justly suspected of treason, and was replaced by Moreau in Holland. Hoche was fully and honourably employed against the Anglo- royalists and brigands in the west ; and Jourdan had the more important command on the Rhine. Moreau had served all along in the north ; Hoche was successfully completing the suppression of the civil war in the west ; and the command on the CHAPTER V. 4^5 Rhine was the highest military appointment which the directory could bestow. Bonaparte was at least next in distinction to these generals^ and was especially acquainted with the troops and the ground on the Italian frontier. Here are abun- dant motives for the appointment. So that unless we suppose more than plain and sufficient motives were required to induce the directory to entrust him with this command ; and also suppose^ not only that Napoleon and Josephine were vicious — unfeeling in the grossest possible degree — but that the human passions in Barras and Bonaparte deviated from their uniform direction^ it is utterly impossible to regard otherwise than with incredu- lity and abhorrence the story by which sir Walter attempts to degrade the memory of his hero. The contrast between his readiness to calumniate Jo- sephine and to vindicate Marie Antoinette, with equal feebleness and absurdity in both cases, de- serves to be attended to. The timorous and clandestine manner in which the author of Waverley dips his pen into the name- less and noisome receptacle whence he derived this slander, has been already noticed. Lockhart, if not more honest, is at least more bold. Instead of circling and hesitating like sir Walter, he, ^^ with all the might of gravitation blessed" in stories like these, plunges in at once up to the knees (v. i, p. 33). ^^ It was commonly said, indeed itwas universallj beliei^ed^ that Josephine, whose character was in some respects indifferent^ pos- sessed more than legitimate influence over tJie first /jSG APPENDIX. director. Bonaparte, however, offered her his hand, she, after some hesitation, accepted it, and the young; (jeneral by this marriage cemented his connection with the society of the Luxembourg, and in particular with Barras andTallien, at that moment the most powerful men in France" (p. 34). ^ Bonaparte was appointed to the splendid com- mand. It is acknowledged in one of Josephine's Jetters, that Barras had promised to procure it for him before their marriage took place. ^ Advance this man,' said this personage to the other directors, or, he will advance himself without you.' " The words of this extract which I have underscored, convey the calumny in all its dimensions — the more than legitimate iirfluencej and the indifferent cha- racter of Josephine. Bonaparte's hand offered, however, and his connection with Barras the li- bertine, cemented by the marriage; and Jose- phine acknowledging, not mentioning, that the appointment had been promised, make up in a re- solute but insidious form, the allegations — that Barras kept Josephine at the time Bonaparte of- fered her his hand — that Bonaparte believed in the existence of this concubinage, but nevertheless of- fered to marry her — that by taking to wife Barras' cast-off mistress, he cemented his connection with that director ; and as Josephine herself confessed, obtained the promise of commanding the army of Italy. However these cruel and unfounded insinua- tions, put forward with pretensions to historical truth, must excite the reader's indignation, the last CHAPTER V. 487 part of the falsehood by its ludicrous absurdity, may ^vell compose his temper completely. Everj body believed, and most people said that Barras had bribed Bonaparte to marry his cast-off mistress^ by procuring him the command of the army of Italy, and of course the other directors, who were at the head of the society of the Luxembourg, must have believed and spoken of it. Yet, to these di- rectors — the virtuous Larevelliere, the stoical Car- not, and the tenacious Rewbell — (Thiers, t. viii, ch. 2. — Montholon^ t. iii, ch. 3), Barras very coolly said, ^^ I have got Bonaparte to marry my mistress, and therefore you must give him the com- mand of the army of Italy! !" And more won- derful, still, these directors obeyed the dictation, and became parties to the contract ; although ex- cept Carnot, they were all more popular than Bar- ras, and Carnot was infinitely more respected. Now, to believe this slander, we must not only believe all the inconsistencies required by sir Walter's story, but must conceive it possible that this scene and transaction between Barras and his colleagues, actually took place ! But Lockhart (at p. 32) says, that Bonaparte, holding the chief command of the army of the interior, ^^ had now passed into the order of marked and distinguished men." Could it be supposed that such a man would have united his destiny with the cast-off mistress of Barras, from a motive of ambition ,* the alleged fact that Josephine's connection with Bar- ras was believed by every one, would have des- troyed that motive; as it would have discredited 488 APPENDIX. him necessarily with the other directors. On the other hand^ if we impute it to the madness of love, that love v^ould never have allowed Bona- parte to leave his new wife a few days after his marriage, in company with her old protector^ while he was campaigning beyond the Alps. To make up his version of the slander, Lockhart puts into the mouth of Barras the remark of Dugom- mier, to the committee of public safety, after the siege of Toulon -, the least culpable falsification, by the way, in his blundering fiction. He calls it, too, '^ a splendid command" to make the alleged degra- dation of Napoleon the more probable. The fact is, it was an appointment which hitherto had yielded to the French generals more disgrace than glory ; for although Anselmn, Byron, Brunet, Du- gommier, Dumerbion, Kellerman^ and Scherer, had been appointed and removed in succession, the head quarters had never advanced beyond Nice, and the army was now^ after much starving and slaughter, likely to be driven within the French frontier. The plea of ignorance, to the benefit of which, as we have seen, Lockhart is occasionally entitled, cannot be urged in his behalf in this instance, for it is probable, from his own words, that while he was endeavouring to impress his readers with a belief in this story, he himself was convinced of its falsehood. Speaking of Josephine, and in allusion to her di- vorce, he says on the same page, — ^^Her subse- quent fate will always form one of the darkest pages In the history of her lord/' Now if she had been CHAPTER V. 4^9 the mistress of Barras^ and had been transferred as a mere instrument of pleasure, of which one was sated and the other desirous^ surely no one could reproach Napoleon with excessive cruelty^ in se- parating himself from such a wife ; considering that^ according to Lockhart's insinuation, he found her a deserted concubine^ and actually left her a crowned empress. It is needless to point out other claims to incredibility with which this part of Lockhart's work abounds. Jomini, who deserted Napoleon's colours, is more just to his memory than the Scotch novelist or critic. He treats the slander with contempt , says that Bonaparte owed the ap- pointment to his signal services under Dumerbion, and adds (t. viii, p. 49) ' ^^ History will vindicate this great captain from the calumnies retailed by envy, ignorance, and party hatred." In justice to Hazlitt and Norvins, it is proper to mention that neither of them countenances the silly and malig- nant tale. The latter, however, is grossly inexact in saying (t. i, p. 83) : ^^ Bonaparte received the command in chief of the army of the interior, left vacant by the election of Barras to the directory. A few days after ^ married to Madame de Beauhar- nais, he was appointed general in chief of the army of Italy." The two appointments were separated by near half a year. Page 207. (16) He said to O'Meara (v. i, p. 2^0)^ ^^ No- thing has been more simple than my elevation. It 49^ APPENDIX. was not the result of intrigue or crime. It was owing to the peculiar circumstances of the times, and because I fought successfully against the ene- mies of my country." Page 207. (17) Sir Walter Scott says (v. iii, p. 86) Napo- leon left Paris for the army the fourth day after his marriage. There is a diversity of dates as to this event. The marriage register proves that he was married at Paris on the 9th of March. Yet Norvins asserts (t. i, p. 8 >), that he left Paris on the 23rd of Feb- ruary ! In tfie Memoirs of Napoleon (Montholon, t. iii^ p. 120)^ his departure from Paris is dated the 4th of March, a typographical error probably, and only less extravagant than that of Norvins. Hazlitt, attempting, it would seem, a conjectural correction of this error, says (v. i, p. 44); he left Paris on the i4th of March. Lockhart's account is (v. i, pp. 33, 3j), that he was married on the 9th of March, and left Paris ten days afterwards. Bourrienne (t. i, pp. 10 r, io3) dates his marriage the 9th of March, and his departure the nist. I know not sir Walter's authority for asserting that he quitted Paris and his new bride the fourth day after his marriage ; but if design may be inferred of a misstatement, from the fact of its being em- ployed to promote a favourite, though not a lauda- ble object of its author, the reader will be apt to conclude that this apparent mistake is really one of the most artful and deliberate fictions ever con- CHAPTER V. 49 J^ Irived by the great novelist. These are his words: ^^ Bonaparte remained with his wife only three days after his marriage, hastened to see his family, who were still at Marseilles, and, having enjoyed the pleasure of exhibiting himself as a favourite of fortune in that city which he had lately left in the capacity of an indigent adventurer, proceeded rapidly to commence the career to which fate called him, by placing himself at the head of the Italian army." Now, without this early date for his departure from Paris^ the old figment about ^^ indigence y^ and ^^ adventurer^'' could not have been reproduced with any speciousness, nor could the new aspersion respecting the pleasure of exhibiting himself at Marseilles have been hazarded. For, as Nice is at least six hundred miles from Paris, there would have been no time for this contemptible display. But this is not the only shaft of defamation which sir Walter was enabled to aim by this simple con- trivance. By means of it he makes Napoleon prefer the idle exhibition of his uniform and retinue at Marseilles, to the society of his wife, or to the com- mand of his army. In this point of view, sir Walter's artifice is more to be admired than his hero ,* for it would be impossible to conceive a character more deserving of contempt than Napo- leon's would be if his biographer were, even in this single instance, deserving of credit. But if dates did not destroy this fabrication, and if the consis- tency of character did not expose to the reader's scorn the attempted imposition, sir Walter him- 492 APPENDIX. self would render it perfectly ineffectual ; for he says^ as we have seen, that Napoleon loved his wife with peculiar affection^ reproaches him, as we shall see, with the expression of excessive ardour, and at page 89, says he advanced with all imaginable de- light to this **• independent field of glory and con- quest j" and that his ^^ proud heart throbbed to meet danger on such terms." So that if he loved Josephine, and longed to reach the army he com- manded, he must have been more stupid and beastly than the ass between two bundles of hay, in stopping eight or ten days to display himself at Marseilles. Here the reader will not fail to notice the un- sparing nature, as well as the high degree, of sir Walter's injustice. As Napoleon, who was the testamentary and acknowledged head of his family, stopped a few hours at Marseilles to see his widowed mother, he is reproached with the childish vanity of loitering in that seaport to display himself and his good fortune j yet as sir Walter has already upbraided his memory with a want of affection for the place of his birth, if on this occasion Napoleon had passed through or near Marseilles without stopping to see his mother, he would unquestionably not have omitted to accuse him of want of natural feeling and proper respect for his parent. The fact is, according to his biographical scheme, the ac- tions of his hero are uniformly reprehensible, either in their motives or consequences — and generally in both. But there was yet a further object to be gained CHAPTER V. 49'3 by this well-calculated mistake. By insisting that he was but the other day an ^^ indigent adven- turer/' hanging loose upon the society of a secon- dary seaport, and representing him now as exult- ing in the astonishment of cits and brokers at the sudden change in his condition, such a degree of littleness and contempt is impressed upon the cha- racter of JNapoleon, tliat sir Walter is enabled to forestall the dignity of his approaching exploits, by assigning them before hand \.o fate — by calling his career of conquest, that ^' to which fate had called him/' a course of success which a perverse destiny had prepared for him. Thus the reader is predis- posed to receive without surprise or question, every future disparagement with which chance or in- dustry may supply sir Walter. It may be worth while to observe that admitting the date assumed by sir Walter, and supposing consequently that INapoleon left Paris on the 1 3th of March, it is very clear from his first letter to the directory from Nice, dated the 28th of March, that he could have had no time for idle display at Marseilles, had he been inclined to make so contemptible a figure. In this letter (Correspondance inedite, t. i, p. i) he says: ^^ I have been for several days within the canton- ments (enceinte) of this army, of which I took the command yesterday." He then gives a minute ac- count of the army, his means and plans, of a mu- tiny which he had suppressed, and other matters showing that he must have been some time in the neighbourhood of Nice. Now Nice is six hundred miles from PariS; so that even if he left Paris on the 494 APPENDIX. i3tli, which is not probable^ and reached the army several days before he took command of it, which is certain, he could have had no time for assisting in the disgusting display invented for him by the ^'British historian." It may here be added that in the Victoires et ConqueLes (t. v, p. 169) it is expressly and carefully asserted that Bonaparte ar- rived at Nice the 20th of March, the date which I have adopted. The felicity with which the word adventurer is here used by the author of Waverley, may be estimated by reference to a former note (appendix, ch. 4) note 29), and by comparing its signification with the long service, the professional rank, and military distinction of Napoleon, when on his way to the capital of his native country, and attended by his aides de camp, Junot and Marmont, he passed through Marseilles in May, 1795. Thus much for this defamation on the score of his vanity. On the same page, the author of Waverley furnishes a slander equally gross and easy of exposure, respecting his temper. Speaking of the character of Josephine, he says — ^' She had at all times the art of mitigating his temper, and turning aside the hasty determinations of his angry moments, not by directly opposing, but by gra- dually parrying and disarming them." If there was any doubt about the meaning of this — that it was intended to assure the reader that Napoleon's tem- per was sudden, fierce, and boisterous — the imita- tion of Lockhart would remove it. His version of it, which proves that a stream of falsehood; like . CHAPTER V. 49^ any other stream, gathers impetus when it flows in a declining channel, that is, descends from a great author to a little one, is in these words (v. i, p. 34) : ''She, and she alone, could overrule by gentle- ness, the excesses of passion to which he was liable ; and her subsequent fate will always form one of the darkest pages in the history of her lord." Now, in regard to tliis angry and impetuous temper, it is somewhat surprising that both these authors have pretended to conduct Napoleon from his birth to his twenty-seventli year, through the competitions of schools, the emulation of subalterns^ the rival- ship of generals; the contrarieties of stupid and the confidence of sensible commanders — the pre- dilection of one set of deputies, the proscription of another set, and the contention and blood of a ci- vil conflict — and yet not a single instance, not a solitary outburst of this quick and furious temper appears ! Cartaux's imbecility he dexterously ma- naged; Dugommier's confidence he faithfully an- swered ; Aubry's impertinence he coolly retorted ; Barras' illiberality he proudly overlooked ; his flying countrymen he mercifully spared; Menou's life he generously shielded; and Eugene's tears he in- stantly felt. Does this look like a fierce and angry disposition? Ferocity '-should be made of sterner stuff;" and had it inhabited Napoleon's breast, would hardly have waited to show itself until he married a lovely, tender, and compassionate wo- man . It would seem from these a uthors t li at if the indignation and resentment of a man, melt away 496 APPENDIX. before the softness and blandishments of the sex to which nature had assigned the offices of pity and intercession, his temper must necessarily be irrasci- ble and violent. There is no doubt that Josephine was a willing, active, and indiscriminate petitioner for mercy ; and that from the generous and forgiv- ing temper of Napoleon, she was almost always a successful one. This interesting truth, which re- flects so much honour on the memory of the em- press and ^^ her lord," the boasted equityof ^^British historians" (v. ii, p. 368), converts into a foul imputation against the latter. The prospective and criminating allusion of Lockhart to Josephine's divorce, and the use of the words ^^ her subsequent fate," and ^^ darkest pages in the history of her lord," forming, as they do, the grossest caricature of the open, respectful, and affectionate proceeding of Napoleon, and a just picture of tiie foul, sinister, and mysterious attempt of George IV against the crown, and the reputation, if not against the life of his queen, the mother of his child^ and of the heiress to the British throne, forces upon the memory by so strong a contrast, the Milan spy, the noji mi ricordo witness, the scuffle about the coronation, his subservient ministers, and her mysterious fate — that one might suppose this historical instructor of the families of England^ was slyly endeavouring to stigmatize the memory of his '^ gracious sovereign," without incurring the guilt of disloyalty. ( 497 ) CHAPTER VL Page 211. (i) Sir Walter Scott, infusing into his misre- presentations more and more boldness, as the events in his hero's life increase in number and importance, prefaces the immortal campaign of 1796, by representing the invasion of Italy as unjust (v. iii, p. 88). *' The French nation, in the times of which ^ve treat, spoke indeed of the Alps as a natural boundary, so far as to au- thorise them to claim all Avhich lay on the west- ern side of those mountains, as naturally per- taining to their dominions ; but they never deigned to respect them as such, when the question respecting their invading on their own part the territories of other states, which lay on or beyond the formidable frontier. They assumed the law of natural limits as an unchal- lengeable rule when it made in favour of France, but never allowed it to be quoted against her interest." But for the eager injustice of this passage it might be deemed the scribbling of a school boy, who was attempting a disquisition above the reach of his mind. Does a nation, by claiming a river or a range of mountains as a na- tural boundary, especially after having extended its conquests to this limit, renounce the right of 32 yj.Q8 APPENDIX. passing that boundary in time of war ? The St. Lawrence is claimed by the United States along many miles of its course as a natural boundary ; but no interdiction to the invasion of Canada, in case of war, would arise out of that claim. The Pyrenees are admitted to be one of the na- tural boundaries of Spain ; yet Lord Wellington with his Spanish and Portuguese allies, did not feel scrupulous in pushing his bold invasion into France on that side. In the particular case al- luded to by Sir Walter Scott, it happened that the coalition itself had been endeavouring to invade the French frontier from the time lord Hood got possession of Toulon. When a nation claims a chain of mountains or other natural limit, in time of war, as its boundary, it can only be understood as declaring its intention not to make peace without esta- blishing this claim ; as France had done in re- ference to the countries conquered on her side of the Alps and the Rhine. It neither denies to its enemy nor renounces for itself, the right, in time of war of passing this boundary in martial array. Danger and difficulty are then the only obstacles. In order to counteract completely the spirit of Sir Walter's observations, it may be proper to state that the war in prosecuting which Na- poleon was then engaged, was on the part of France, a defensive one. Now, that the cloud of political falsehood and imposture which the CHAPTER VI. 499 British press had spread over the civilized world, has been dispelled by the French revolution of July and the English parliamentary reform, no publicist of reputation or writer of common sense will venture to deny this position. In support of it, concurring authorities of both na- tions may be referred to. Thiers (t. ii, p. 82) says : "It must be confessed that this cruel war, which so long lacerated Europe, was not pro- voked by France, but by the foreign powers. France in declaring war, did no more than re- cognize by a decree the state in which they had placed her." Colonel Napier begins his manly and luminous work by asserting that (v. i, p. i) " up to the treaty of Tilsit the wars of France were essentially defensive." It is true on the other hand, that Washington's famous procla- mation of neutrality, by which he avoided the obligation of reciprocal guarantee in the treaty of 1778 between France and the United States, w as founded on the assumption that France was the offensive party in the war with England (See Marshall's Life of Washington^ v. ii, ch. 8, 2d edit.). But this decision of the American go- vernment, admitting that its justice was as evi- dent as its prudence, had no reference to any other branch of the conflict, than that between France and Great Britain 5 while the campaign of Italy was directed chiefly against Austria and Sardinia. 500 APPENDIX. As Napier's history is a work not to be men- tioned without a sentiment of respect for its author, less cannot justly be said in his com- mendation, than that in all the substantial qua- lities of an historian, clearness of narration, dignity of sentiment, respect for truth, and sympathy for human virtues, he is the very op- posite of Scott and Lockhart. Page 212. (2) Sir Walter Scott, in his catalogue of the forces opposed to Napoleon in the opening of this campaign, not only omits enumerating among the members of the coalition, the Dukes of Parma and Modena, an error which, as we shall see, is not accidental, but also excludes from the list the English fleet, although the cooperating squadron was commanded by Nel- son (Southey's Life of Nelson, ch. iv.). Ac- cording to his account (v. iii, pp. 88-9), Napo- leon was to contend only ** with an Austro-Sar- dinian army, and a strong Neapolitan force which was to be added, so that in general num- bers their opponents were much superior to the French, but a great part of this force was cooped up in garrisons which could not be aban- doned.'' If any thing like an estimate of the allied, force can be made out of this see-saw of assertions and qualifications, it is, that it would have been superior to that of the French but for the number of troops required for garrisons CHAPTER VI. OOI wliich were to have no direct concern in the warj but that in consequence of such garrisons, they were not superior. Under his representa- tion of the matter too the fortresses of Piedmont, were a positive disadvantage to the allies and consequently an advantage to the French ! In stating the numher of troops in the French army this restrained and hesitating style is exchanged for one absolute, ample, and swelling (v. iii, p. gS) : " The forces which Bonaparte had under his command, were between fifty and sixty thousand good troops, having been many of them brought from the Spanish campaign, in consequence of the peace with that country." "With these statements alone for his guidance, the reader would be led to conclude that taking quality and numbers together, the French fight- ing force was superior to that of the allies, which in reality doubled it. Page 215. (5) This affirmation is contained in one of the notes made in pencil by Napoleon while at St. Helena, at the foot of the letter of instruction of the 6th of March. It appears, that in dictating his campaigns of Italy, he made use of two vo- lumes containing this letter of instruction, one of which J fell into the possession of Montholon, and the other was preserved by Marchand. The notes attached to that of Montholon are published in his fourth volume (p. 596). Of those preserved 5o*Jl APPEND IX. by Marchand, a copy has been taken by gene- ral baron Pelet, the officer so w ell known for his merit in letters and in arms, and who is at the head of the depot s^eneral cle la guerre. The liberality of general Pelet, has enabled me to compare the two copies thus preserved, and 1 discover that they are almost identical, excepting that the first note of the copy of general Pelet is omitted in that of Montholon. It contains the affirmation in question, and is^ when translated, as follows \' — *' This instruction is an indifferent amplification^ full of contradiction and absurdity, of a luminous and original memoir, which Napo- leon had presented to the directory in January, 1796." The memoir here alluded to was dated January 19th, 1796, and was addressed to gene- ral Clarck, the secretary to the directory. Con- sidering the mind from which it sprung, military men will agree that I can do no less than avail myself of general Pelct's permission to lay it before the public. To the memoir of the 19th of January is attached a paper which appears to have been previously prepared, and to have par- ticular reference to the inaction of general Scherer after his success in November. The existence and date of this memoir add to the many evidences which prove the accuracy of Napoleon's statements of fact in regard to his own history. The reader will perceive that the importance which he attached to the posi- tion of La Sotta, in his letter to the directory of CHAPTER VI. 5o5 the 8th of April, was founded on his previous acquaintance with the military points of this region of the Alps. In the printed copy of his letter of the 8th April (Correspondance inedite, t. i, p. 12), a blank is left where La Sotta should have been inserted, as I discovered by reference to the original despatch in the archives of the d'pot general de la guerre. '* Head Quarters, Paris, igth January, 1796. Buonaparte^ general in chief of the army of the Interior^ to general Clarck, cc ''I transmit to you, my dear general, the note which you requested of me. I will avail myself of the earliest opportunity of calling at your office. {SignedJ " Buonaparte." *' Note, on the army of Italy. '^ 19th January, 1796. " If the army of Italy suffers the month of February to pass without doing anything, as it has allowed the month of January to pass, the campaign of Italy may be considered to have to- tally failed. It is necessary to be well convinced that great successes can be obtained in Italy only during the winter season. " Supposing that the army of Italy were put 5o4 APPENDIX. in motion immediately^ it might march upon Ceva, and force the intrenched camp at that place, before the Austrians, who are quartered at Acqui, would be able to join the Piedmontese. '' If, upon discovering the preparations made by the French, the Austrians by moving along behind the Tanaro should come into junction with the Piedmontese, it would be necessary for our army to make two marches upon Acqui; that is to say, that it march first to Cairo, and then to Spigno. It may be safely assumed that upon this the Austrians will hasten to return, in order to defend their communications with the Mi- lanesCc '' The operations to be undertaken are in fact simple. If the Piedmontese are alone, march upon them directly by the way of Ga- ressio, Bagnasco, La Sotta, Casteleroso, Monte- zumo, and having beaten them, and forced their intrenched camp, lay siege to Ceva — an operation preliminary to any other, whatever course may be then determined on. " Should the Austrians have the prudence to unite with the Piedmontese at Montezumo, it will be necessary to separate them ; and for that purpose, to march upon Alexandria, and ma- noeuvre so as to gain twenty four hours, in order the moment their separation is effected, to re- turn and force the intrenched camp of Ceva. " The intrenched camp of Ceva being in our possession, it will require a force double our CHAPTER VI. 5o5 own to compel iis to raise the siege of that fortress. The artillery of the siege will be landed at Vado ; a want of carriages need not be ap- prehended, the Pays des Langes abounding in means of transport, and the siege of Ceva not requiring more than 24 or 5o pieces. " Masters of Ceva, not a moment should be lost to advance the division which guards the Col de Tende, the Briga, and the heights of the county of Nice as far as Borgo. Its junction with the main army should be effected by the route of Mon- dovi • and then the whole force should march direct upon Turin. The king of Sardinia would then make propositions for peace. In that case, the general should reply that he has not the right to make peace, and that a courier must be sent to Paris j and, during this interval, in order to hasten a peace, the king of Sardinia will be obliged to make such proposals as cannot be refused, and as v^ill completely fulfil the views of the government. If not, Turin may be laid in ashes without caring about the citadel. " For the rest, as the war in Italy depends al- together on the season, each month requires a new plan 5 it will therefore be necessary that the government place entire confidence in Iheir general, leaving him a latitude of discretion, and pointing out only their great object j for it will require a month to get an answer to a des- patch coming from Savon a, during which time the face of affairs may have changed altogether. 5o6 APPENDIX. " When we shall have taken Turin, the siege of Alexandria and Tortona will be useless, and we may enter the Milanese without difficulty. " The government should direct that the bridge equipages and pontons for the Mincio and the Osflio, which I had caused to be prepared, be completed. Every thing necessary for bridges over the Po, the Adige, the Ticin, and the Ta° naro, will be found in Italy, where also will be obtained transportation, clothing, and subsist- ence for the heroic army which shall make themselves masters of the plains of Piedmont and of the Milanese. fSignedJ " Buonaparte." Attached to the above, and apparently of a date^ by some weeks earlier, is the following : — ^^ Note^ on the direction which should he given to the armj of Italj. " An essential fault was committed in not forcing the intrenched camp of Ceva, while the Austrian s after their defeat were retired to a point on the other side of Acqui, and the whole of our armv was left disposable for attacking Ceva. Our success could not have been doubt- ful, since we should have had a force of thirty thousand men to attack from sixteen to twenty thousand Piedmontese. " Why did not the division of general Serru- rier, which on the 5d was at Garessio and St. CliAPTER VI. 507 Jacomi, that is to sav, in less than four hours' march of Ceva, and the division of general Mas- sena, which advanced as far as Cairo, within about the same distance of Ceva, profit by their victory ? It was impossible not to comprehend, that the capture of Ceva, putting in our power a district of Piedmont, would procure for the army supplies of shoes, clothing, subsistence, and means of transport. The taking of Ceva, alone, would secure to the army healthy canton- ments, and would terminate that perpetual game of prisoners base, which, for several years our army has been playing on the peaks of the Alps and x\ppennines. " The capture of Ceva, and the concentration of our army around that fortress, are operations of such great importance, that they would deter- mine the court of Turin to make peace, and would diminish very perceptibly the enormous expense of the army of Italy. The Austrians, in falling back to Alexandria, have abandoned the Piedmontese ; an error of which they ought to think better, if they have not done so already. We should march without delay upon Ceva, by way of Miiessimo, Montezumo, and St. Jacomi, while a division should be pushed beyond Bati- folo. Masters of the intrenched camp of Ceva, the heavy artillery for a siege must be sent for- ward, and the carriages of transport, which are in abundance in the neighbourhood of Ceva, 5o8 APPENDIX. should be secured, and employed for the con- veyance of balls and shells. * • Ceva being once taken, and our army assem- bled there, we should find ourselves masters of a part of Piedmont, and threaten at the same time Coni, Turin, and Alexandria. " The division which now guards the Col de Tende, the Briga, and the intermediate passes, will then invest Coni, or at least establish itself at Borgo, so as to observe the movements of the garrison of Coni. " The united army, reenforced by the detach- ments expected from the Pyrenees, should march upon Turin in February . A division of the army of the Alps, four or five thousand strong, should pass by Mont Geneve, and reenforce the army of Italy, under the walls of Turin. The snows which block up the passes of the Alps, oppose but slight obstruction to the march of a column, when it is sure of finding friends and succour on the other side of the mountains. CSignrdJ " Buonaparte." Page 214. (4) In the debate in the house of commons on the address in answer to the king's speech in October, 1796, Mr. Fox said — ■'' It was ridiculous to insist upon danger from treating with France, because they had subverted their former, and adopted a new, constitution j the permanence of a treaty depending on its equitableness.. r;nd cor- CHAPTER VI. 5o9 respondence with the reciprocal interests of the contracting parties. It was become nugatory to talk of our allies j we had, indeed, mercenaries in our pay, w^hom we could only retain by ex- cessive bribes, and who were every moment, hesitating whether to accept of them, or of the terms proffered by our enemies, to detach them from this country." (See Annual Register for 1796. History of Europe, p. 11). These assertions of the parliamentary luminary of his country, which the course of events more than the lapse of time have inscribed on the tab- lets of history as the irreversible judgments of wisdom, were then scouted by a great majority in the house of Commons; while the sentiments and policy of his successful rival, Mr. Pitt, not- withstanding the splendour of his talents, the greatness of his character, and the authority of his name, if proposed to the house of Commons at this time, when the legitimate King of France is again expelled from his throne by a revolution, would be received as the ravings of a political bedlamite. So vast is the difference between the influence of the crown and the privileged classes in Great Britain at the present day, and their influence at the close of the last century. So perishable are the works of statesmen who build on temporary passions and factitious inte- rests, and so steadfast the creations of minds, which employ the solid materials of reason, truth, and justice. In relation to these subsidies, la- 5lO APPENDIX. vished by the British government on the conti- nental despots, it is certain that with half their amount lord Wellington or lord Grey might have purchased as large a quantity of war and slander against the French nation and govern- ment, since July, i85o, as Mr. Pitt and his dis- ciples had done before that epoch. Page 214. (5) Norvins appears to have misconceived the plan of the directory. He says (t. i, p. 85) "The directory prescribed to their general, as a pre- liminary operation, the conquest of Piedmont, the object of which was to be to force the Aus- trians to evacuate that country, and defend themselves in their own territory.'' This was the plan Napoleon adopted, not that which the directory prescribed; for they instructed the general not to pass the exterior garrisons of Pied- mont, to mask them, and pursue the Austrians into Lombardy, in order that the King of Sardi- nia, left to his natural inclinations, might enter into an alliance with France against Austria ; or if unnaturally inclined to adhere to the coali- tion, might be forced to abandon it. Jomini, in speaking of these instructions (t. viii, p. Sg) says, " They form one among the most remarkable documents in the history of this war." The am- biguity of this language is to be lamented, when the admitted ability of the writer is taken into consideration, especially as at a subsequent CHAPTER VI. 5l I page (p. 88) in speaking of Bonaparte's advance upon Ce\a he says : " The conquest of this flou- rishing country (Italy) depended then in the first place on success against the Sardinian army; and the general in chief, more wise than the direc- tory, who had enjoined him not to operate upon his left, resolved to direct the greater part of his army against Colli." Page 21o. (6) In reference to this clause of the instruc- tions Napoleon in one of his crayon notes, oh- served, " The first interest of the court of Tu- rin was to stifle revolutionary sentiments, and to oppose the success of the French republicans. — How stupid this is!" And the directory in their reasoning having asked the question," why, since it is the interest of the Piedmontese to join with the French in driving the Austrians out of Italy, does not the court of Turin hasten to unite its forces with those of the republic for that pur- pose." — Napoleon answers in a note, "In order not to be guillotined — The directors reasoned just as Louis XM might have done." Page 217. (7) Napoleon's concluding remark on the in- structions is — "It may be seen from these stu- pid instructions that if Napoleon was victorious, it was in spite and in defiance of the instructions of the government." These instructions are said to be the work of Carnot (Thiers, t. viii, p. 256). 5 12 APPENDIX. If SO, they demonstrate the truth of Napoleon's description of Carnot's vaunted capacity as mi- nister of war (iMontliolon, t. iii, p. i25). "In the committee of public safety, he directed the mi- litary operations, and was useful, without me- riting the praise bestowed on him. He had no military experience, and his opinions were false, upon every part of the art of war," etc. Page 217. (8) This estimate of the strength of the two armies it must be confessed, is only a conjectural one. The numbers given by various respectable authorities range through many degrees of enu- meration. Napoleon states his own fighting force fit for duty (Las Cases, t. ii, p. 2663 INIon- tholon, t. iii, p. 176) at about thirty thousand men and that of the allies at eighty thousand. This estimate Avhich is no doubt correct as to his own army, may have overrated that of the allies. It is however adopted by Norvins and Hazlitt (t. i, p. 87; V. i, p. 417). Thiers in stating the strength of the French army gives different numbers, as if they were matters of caprice, not of calculation. First he says (t. viii, p. 224) it amounted to thirty thousand men, next (p. 227) to " thirty-six thousand at most," and concludes by stating that the enemy opposed about sixty thousand men to the thirty thousand of Bona- parte. Jomini (t. viii, p. 69) rates the French iorce at forty-two thousand, four hundred. But CHAPTER Vl. 5l5 m liis enumeration he includes the detach- ments under generals Macquart and Garnier or d'Alniagne amounting to six thousand nine hun- dred, which were in garrison on the coast, or posted at the passes of the Alps on Bonaparte's left, and no part of which entered Italy until after the occupation of Cherasco. This would leave for the army of Italy thirty-five thousand, five hundred men. Deducting the sick, the ac- tive force would not exceed thirty thousand men. The strength of the allied army Jomini puts at fifty-two thousand, an estimate lower than is to be found in any other writer, and in- consistent with probability from the inference that, considering it was an allied force, its small superiority of numbers would not have made it an overmatch for the French estimated by him at forty-two thousand four hundred. Con- sequently the victories of Bonaparte, instead of being the effects of his great military genius and the incapacity of Beaulieu, as Jomini himself describes them to be (t. viii, ch. 56) would have been nothing more than the ordinary re- sults of a contest between combined forces on one side, and an army of one nation on the other. It is possible that Jomini gave the mmiber actually in the field excluding the nu- merous garrisons. But these garrisons fur- nished detachments to increase the field force, ^nd were recalled as the French advance me- Placed the fortresses. Thus Colli, upon aban- 55 5l4 APPENDIX. doning his intrenched camp at Ceva, threw a detachment into that fortress. Of these incon- sistent estimates I have adopted a medium as the nearest approximation to truth in my power. In the work entitled Victoires et Conquetes des Francais^ (t. v, pp. i65 et 164) the effective force of the French army is estimated at thirty- four thousand men, upon the authority of a spe- cific return signed by Berthier. With regard to this voluminous work the account it contains of this first campaign of Italy is so very defective, conjectural, and confused, that very little in- struction can be derived from it. It was pre- pared, it would seem, before the Memoirs of Napoleon, or the Memorial of St. -Helena were published. Page 219. (9) This fact, mentioned by Napoleon in his dictation to Las Cases (t. ii, p. 285) and to Mon- tholon (t. iii, p. 192) a fact so honourable to the Spartan patriotism and courage of the French army, is strangely caricatured by sir Walter Scott (v. iii, pp. 95, 96). "Berthier preserved, as a curiosity an order dated on the day of the victory of Albenga, which munificently con- ferred a gratuity of three louis dor upon every general of division. Among the generals to whom this donation was rendered acceptable by their wants, were, or might have been, many whose names became afterwards the praise and CHAPTER VI. 5l5 dread of war. Augereau, Massena, Serrurier, Joubert, Lannes, and Murat, all generals of the first consideration, served under Bonaparte in the Italian campaign," ^In a note he adds : "This piece of generosity reminds us of the liberality of the kings of Brentford to their Knightsbridge forces : '-*•'- First king. Here, take five guineas to these warlike men. '■'•'' Second king. And here, five more, which makes the sum just ten, ' '• '■ Herald. We liave not seen so much the Lord knows when I'" As to the assertions of fact contained in this passage, it may be observed that "the victory of Albenga" never was beard of before, being a later discovery than the sea coast of Bohemia. ISapoleon's peacefal phrase (Montholon, t. iii^ p. 192, and Las Cases, t. ii, p. 285): " Un ordre du jour d'x\lbenga, an order of the daj of Al- benga^' that is, dated at Albenga, this roman- tic historian has heroically translated, **an order dated on the day of the victory of Albenga" — making the harmless words, " day of Albenga," equivalent to day of Marengo^ day of Austerlitz^ phrases familiar in the annuals of French glory. His next assertion, that a 'donation" ol three loiiis d'or, which he mentions and ridicules as "apiece of generosity," is a misrepresentation of another phrase of Napoleon, whose words ^5;f 5l6 APPEISDIX. are, *' a gratification of three loiiis d'or," that is, pieces of gold, '' was granted to each general of division," No one in his senses can under- stand this to mean, that tie commander in chief, made presents, or that lieutenant generals re- ceived presents, of three pieces of gold ; the anec- dote was introduced to shew penury instead of '^munificence ;" the destitution of pecuniary resources existing in the army ; the emptiness of the military chest 5 and although sir Waller in- timates that this gold was given hy Napoleon to reward his generals for "the victory of Alhenga, the gratification really consisted in Napoleon advancing to the generals of division a small part of their pay or expenses in gold, in louis d'or, at a time when that coin was extremely scarce and valuable, and when their pay was generally received in a description of currency of little Talue out of France 5 at a time too, when Napo- leon said to the army — "the country owes you much, hut can pay you nothing." These pieces of gold were public money, spared out of a fund which, small as it was, was all that the go- vernment could furnish for the use of the com- mander in chief, for gaining intelligence, etc., in tlie enemy's country; and therefore the ad- vancing these few pieces of gold was deemed "according a gratification." That this is the meaning of the phrase is evident not only from the rank^ character, and relation of the parties, two of the generals at least having pretensions CHAPTER VI. 5l7 to the chief command — but from the fact of the advance being mentioned in an order of the day, shevv^ing that it was an official transaction. It is so understood by Thiers, who says (t. viii, p. 228) * 'He procured for his sokliers apart of the pay which was due to them. He distributed to each of hisgeneralsybwr Louis in gold." Showing by the word distj^ibuted that he deemed it an advance of so much pubUc money on account to these officers ; and by the substitution of the word Jour for tliree^ either that Thiers had seen the order of the day, and found that Napoleon's re- collection was so far inaccurate, which is not probable; or that he himself had wantonly dis- dained accuracy in so small a matter, which is probable. Jomini, in order to describe the state of pecuniary distress under which the comman- der in chief laboured even after his entrance into the plains of Piedmont, says(t. viii, p. 96), ''An idea of the penury of the army maybe collected from the correspondence of the commander in chief, who sent Massena twenty-four francs in gold to provide for his official expenses." In the fac simile of general Washington's accompts, which has been lately published^ there appears the following item — "19th of April, 1777, to specie" (or hard money, contrasted with de- preciated paper) "to major general Greene for secret services, 5/." being about the same amount which, in similar circumstances, Napoleon ad- vanced for similar objets to the generals next to jlS APPENDIX. him in command, and, like Washington, on pub- lic account. The third of sir Walter's asser- tions in the above cited passage is, that Lannes and Murat were among the generals of this time. He tells us himself, further on (p. 126), that the first was "colonel Lannes," and it is very certain that at the time of " the victory of Albenga," he was only a chief of battalion, and Murat but a colonel. So much for sir Walter's facts ; his ridicule, borowed from The Rehear- sal and aimed at the fortitude and patriotism of the French officers, is below all contempt, and of course beneath further notice. — The manner in which the next bold '* British historian" re- lates this matter of the louis d'or is worthy of attention on two accounts; one as verifying Aristotle's famous definition — ''Man is an imita- tive animal;" the other, as shewing that on this occasion Lockhart did not adopt all the errors and illiberality which he found in Scott. These famous louis d'or he thus commemorates, for the special instruction of English families (v. i, p. 55): "Berthier used to keep, as a curiosity, a ge- neral order, by which three louis d'or were grant- ed as a great supply to each general of divi.sion dated on the very day of the victory of Albenga. Here is nothing about, "donation" or '• genero- sity," nor is there the least sneering at the des- titution and hardships of the French army. But the reader cannot fail to notice the tone of inti- macy, of familiar and particular knowledge, af- 7 >? CHAPTER VI. 5l 9 fected by Lockhart respecting this order of the day, and "the victory of Albenga." "Berthier used to heep/^ that is wheji I knew him he used to keep this order of the day as a curiosity. And it was " dated the very dij of the victory of Al- benga," that is, what is more remarkable I have discovered that this order was dated "the very day of the victory of Albenga." Now what boy or girl, or what gentleman or lady in England, reading for the sake of easy instruction or agreeable study, would not suppress instantly any doubt that might suggest itself in regard to this unheard of victory, upon observing the spe- cial, emphatic, and circumstantial manner in which the editor of the Quarterly Review had taken care to mention it. Let us suppose that two American historians had successively men- tioned, the battle of Brighton ^ or the victory of IVindsor^ and to make their ignorance and im- posture plausible had affected to know the very day., on which it took place — wliat measure would there have been to the sneers, the scorn, the scoffs, and taunts, of this very Mr. Lockhart, and his kindred reviewers j not excepting the quaint and eloquent editor of Blackwood's Ma- gazine, who commends this work of Lockhart, for "generous candour," and "solid informa- tion :" tlie "generous candour" evinced in the stratagem by which Napoleon is made to call his brother " that fool Joseph;" and the "solid in- formation " displayed in the ever memorable SsO APPENDIX. *' victory of Albenga. " This commendatiodf^ however monstrous, can hardly be ironical, since it is prefixed as a puff to Lockhart's book. If the intrinsic faults of sir Walter's work, did not ren ler its non-existence desirable, its evident tendency to encourage the production of histori- cal nonsense and critical deception would justify the most earnest efforts to expunge it from the tablets of English literature. Hazlitt (v. i, p. 4il) represents this advance of three louis d'or, as "an extraordinary gratifi- cation," adding the word extraordinarj, to those of Napoleon, and so far obscuring the sense. But my reason for referring to his work, which is informed with an impartial spirit, and con- tains many striking reflections, is to mention, not without regret^ that Hazlitt's account of the campaigns of Italy is almost a literal transla- tion of Napoleon's own narrative, of which pa- ragraphs are here and there transposed; a fact which considering the character and position of the two men, may be said to constitute the most stupendous and most barefaced literary fraud, that was ever committed. Shall we live to see a translation of Caesar's CommentaireSy published in England as an original work ? 1»AGE 219. (lo) Thisfact which is stated by Thiers (t. viiiy p. 228) and Jomini (t. viii, p. 61) will recall to the mind of the American reader the patriotic CHAPTER VI. 521 conduct of general Jackson during the last war between the United States and England. Page 220. (ii) The existence of this natural feeling has been often mentioned by w ell informed French writers. Thiers (t. viii, p. 228) says: ^'Massena bore him ill willfor having exerted an ascendancy over the mindof Dumerbion in 1794." Traces of this sensibility may be discovered in the an- swers both of Massena and Augereau to Napo- leon's letter's from Nice, announcing to them his assuming the command. The first says, under date of the 29th March: "I have received, ge- neral, your letter of yesterday. I make you my very sincere compliments on the command in chief of the army of Italy, which has been con- ferred on you. You have known for a long time the justice I have done to your military talents." Shewing that his acquiescence was not uncondi- tional, was in consequence of his having long admitted Napoleon's military talents. Augereau's expressions reveal a similar state of mind. "I have received your letter of the 8th of this month, by which I learn that you have taken the command in chief of the army. I congratu- late myself on being under your orders, hnowiiig your patriotism aucl military talents. I will do my best to fulfil your instructions in whatever orders you may give me ; and you may count on my zeal, my activity, and devotion^ in the pub- 522 APPENDIX. lie cause.''' Sensibility so natural, and founded in military pride, is far above censure. But when we think of the future career of the men and of the long existing relations between the comman- der in chief, and these condescending lieute- nants, it is interesting to notice with some atten- tion the point at which their connection com- menced. Hazlitt (v. i, p. 4^^) seems to have misunderstood these letters of Massena and Au- gereau. Both their letters throw a ludicrous light on the assertion of Thiers that at this time. Napoleon was *'a young man unknown.^' Page 225. (12) General Colli in sending an emigrant Frenchman in the character of a Sardinian offi- cer, and under the protection of a flag of truce, abused the privilege attached to messengers of peace in time of war, inasmuch as France could not be at war with her own citizens. Napoleon was justified on general principles, and a for- tiori, by reference to the mutiny in his army, in detaining Moulin. His letter to the directory of the 8th of April announcing this fact, shows that he was not disposed to enforce the law against this imprudent Frenchman, whose punishment it appears consisted only in temporary confine- ment. For a full account of the object and in- trigues of the conspiracy carried on between Pi- chegru on one side, and the Prince of Conde, the Austrian general Klin gin, and the British CHAPTER VI. 523 envoy at Berne, Wickham, on the other, see the vohimes entitled ; " Correspondance trouvee d Offenboiirg " — and the corroborating docu- ments in the '•''Alliance des Jdcobins avec les ■i An^^lais'"' (J Page 224. (i5) See Napoleon's order of the 5oth of March (Correspondance inedite, t. i, p. 7). Page 22o. (r4) Thiers (t. viii, p. 329), Jomini, t. viii, p. 62). An English officer who was then a lieu- tenant in Nelson's squadron, mentioned the fact to me as it is here related. It is not alluded to hy Scott or Lockhart. Page 227. (i5) Sir Walter Scott furnishes a translation of this address, which under the appearance of carelessness, conceals much art. He intersperses touches of his magical pencil for the purpose of bringing Napoleon's sentiments into harmony with the dark colours in which he proposes to portray his character. For these plain expres- sions in the address, " rich provinces, great cities will be in your power — you will there find honour, glory, and wealth," sir Walter adroitly substitutes — "rich provinces, opulent towns, honor, glory, wealth, all shall be at your dispo- sal." The reader will here perceive the diffe- rence between '^ will be in your power,'' and 524 APPENDIX. ^*' shall be at ^owv disposal , "the absolute meaning of shall and the licentions force of disposal. Towns ^vith their inhabitants and property are in the power of a victorious army; but they are at the disposal of the general, who is bound to obey the laws of war, to consult the principles of justice, and to listen to the dictates of huma- nity. Again, when Napoleon asks with vigo- rous simplicity. " Can you be wanting in cou- rage and perseverance" — the author of Waver- ley makes him exclaim, "with such a prospect before you, can you fail in courage and con- stancy" — that is, w ith the sure prospect of hav- ing the wealth and beauty of these fertile plains and populous cities at your absolute disposal, can you fail in courage and constancy ? It may be observed that the desire of misrepresentation leads Sir Walter into the absurdity of placing honour and glorj under the action of the same verb^ with towns and provinces — " all shall be at your disposal, ' as if honour and glory were material substances, or commodities of purchase and transfer. Napoleon says, "provinces and cities will be in your power " — " You willy/zz^ (or gain) honour, glory and wealth;" by con- necting wealth with honour and glory evidently, excluding the ideas of plunder and licence, which sir Walter's version studiously holds forth as the leading sentiment of the general and the ruling motive of his army. By these swift and shadowy stratagems of version, the min 1 of the CHAPTER VI. 5^5 reader is prepared to receive unconditionally the animated illustration of the following remark — ^' This was shewing the deer to the hound when the leash is about to be slipped." This is one instance of the easy omnipotence of that pen which has so often enchanted mankind- of the art possessed by sir Walter of introducing false impressions into the reader's mind under the en- velope of a metaphor. By representing the al- lied force as a deer, a timid inojQPensive animal, their hostile intents, their desire to invade and subjugate France, their great superiority of numbers, of cavalry, artillery, supplies, and equipments; their numerous fortresses, the coo- perating English fleet, the rocky Appennines, the snowy Alps, all disappear like frost work before the rays of the sun, from the contempla- tion of the reader ; who, acquainted with the event of the campaign, looks upon Beaulieu, his army and allies, as innocent, defenceless beings, about to be cruelly overmatched and destroyed. On the other hand, by exhibiting the French general and an army under the figures of a huntsman and staghound, an impression of their strength and rapacity, of their power and will to overtake and devour, is created, which excludes from the mind, their war of self-de- fence, their inferiority of numbers, their suffer- ing and unfurnished condition, the exhaustless patriotism of the troops, and the matchless ge- nius and enterprise of their- leader, in meeting 526 APPENDIX. and overcoming with such odds against them, the forces of the coaUtion. This art of predis- posing the reader to accept ficti )n for truth, of employing his fancy to deceive, or if need he, to debauch his judgment, no writer in the English language ever possessed in a higher degree than sir Walter Scott. In its exercice in the former sense consists much of the charm of his delight" ful romances, and in the latter, much of the vice of this pretended history. The extent of his injustice in the present case may readily he con- ceived by an English reader, if he will reflect that an army may obtain wealth without dishonour; that the soldier is as fairly entitled to the spoils of honourable war as the sailor. We hear a great deal of the Deccan prize money, in which Eng- lish noblemen and generals participated. The amount of prize money distributed among the British seamen of all ranks during the last war, it might be difficult to calculate ; yet who would be so unjust as to impute to the brave tars who gained it, the ignoble desire of plunder ? Was that the motive of Nelson when at a sublime mo- ment he uttered the sublimer expression — ^'England expects e^^eiy man to do his dutj.^^ Page 227. } (i6) Hitherto the errors of sir Walter Scott, have consisted principally of matters of asser- tion^ insinuation, or inference. On the present occasion, he formally suspends his narrative for CHAPTER VI. 5^7 the sake of introducing a historical reflection on the art of war, which in point of military nonsense may well vie with his confident refe- rence to the ^'victory of Albenga." The so- lemn bustle, with which it is ushered into view, was intended no doubt to command the reader's attentive consideration (v. iii, p. go). "For victory, he relied chiefly upon a system of tactics hitherto unpractised in war, or at least upon any considerable or uniform scale. It may not be unnecessary to pause, to take a general view of the principles which he now called into action. Nations in the savage state being constantly en- gaged in war, always form for themselves some peculiar mode of fighting, suited to the country they inhabit and the mode in which they are armed. The North American Indian becomes formidable as a rifleman or sharpshooter, lays ambuscades in his pathless forests, and practices all the arts of irregular war. The Arab or Scy- thian manoeuvres his clouds of cavalry, so as to envelop and destroy his enemy in his deserts, by sudden onsets, rapid retreats, and unexpect- ed rallies, desolating the country around, cutting off" his antagonist's supplies, and practising in short the species of war proper to a people supe- rior in light cavalry." In this passage, notwith- standing the admirable freshness and animation of the style, the reader will at once discover that there is not a single fact truly affirmed, which is not erroneously proposed. The ge- 528 APPENDIX. neral assertion that "nations in a savage state are constantly engaged in war," admits or rather requires this obvious qualification, or the chase, which last occupation not only engrosses the greater part of the lives of savages, but creates interests which constitute the principal cause of their wars. For the rest, the facts alleged as pe- culiar to savage nations, are common to them Avith civilized nations, who make war according to the mode in which they are armed and the country they inhabit. — Hannibal was famous for laying ambuscades. In 1765, the French adapting their warfare to the country they were in, defeateid and killed general Braddock, by means of an ambuscade. In 1796, at the battle of Arcole, Napoleon placed the brave thirty- second in ambuscade, and by a sudden attack destroyed a column of three thousand Croats. The Virginia. Kentucky, andTennesseeriflemen, are better sharpshooters than the North Ame rican Indians, better horsemen, and more expert in the arts of irregular war. The Russian ge- nerals in 1812, manoeuvred their clouds of Cos- sacks, and desolated the country far and wide. The Enulish commanders when they make war on the banks of the Ganges, employ, like the natives, the huge elephant to transport the bag- gage of armies, and to break lines of hostile infantry. Napoleon himself formed a corps ol dromedaries for pursuing his wild foe, through the deserts of Egypt. So that admitting there CHAPTi R Yi. ' Sag could be the least possible relation between this reflection on savage warfare, and the principles on which Bonaparte conducted his invasion of Italy, its folly would make it abortive ; as sir Walter Scott seems himself to discover in the closing paragraph wherein he describes his sa- vages, whether Arab, or Scythian, as prac- tising, '* in short the species of war proper to a people superior in light cavalry." Now what more could a civilized commander, Turenne or Marlborough, Frederic or Wellington have done, " who was superior in light cavalry ^^ He proceeds. ' ' The first stage of civilization is less favourable to success in war. As nations advance in the peaceful arts and the character of the soldiers begins to be less familiarly united with that of the citizen, this system of natural tactics falls out of practice; and when foreign invasion or civil broils call the inhabitants to arms, they have no idea save that of finding out the enemy, rushing upon him and committing the event to superior strength, bravery, or numbers. An example may be seen in the great civil war of England, v.here men fought on both sides, in almost every county of the kingdom, without any combination or exact idea of uniting in mu- tual support, or manoeuvring so as to form their insulated bands into an army of preponderating force. At least what was attempted for that purpose must have been on the rudest plan pos- sible, where even in actual fight, that j^art of the 34 550 APPENDIX. army which obtained any advantage pursued it as far as they could, instead of using their success for the support of their companions; so that the main body was often defeated when a victorious wing was in pursuit of those whom their first onset had broken." Here the imputed accidents of a civil war in England, at a time when the population of that country was di\ided by political and religious feuds, and had been estranged from martial duties by a long peace, are taken for military characteristics of the age in which that war oc- curred. Gustavus Adolphus flourished a little before, and Turenne a little after the great civil war of England, and if the French were rriore advanced in civilization than the English in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Swedes were probably less so. Yet who will say that these great commanders had *' no idea save that of finding out the enemy, rushing upon him, and committing the event to superior strength, bravery, or numbers" — had "no exact idea of manoeuvring so as to form their insulated bands into an army of preponderating force" — or that they suflfered their "main body to be often de- feated" by having "a victorious wing in pursuit of those whom their first onset had broken." This bold and feeble attempt at philosophising on the military history of society, of inducing general principles from an analysis and arrange- ment of particular facts, is carried to the length CHAPTER VI. DDI of making the single instance and peculiar cha- racter of prince Rupert, >vhom in Rokeby sir Walter calls " hot Rupert," a fair sample of the Avarlike kaow ledge and skill likely to exist among nations in that state of civilization which the English had reached at the time of the great civil war. Prince Rupert made himself remark- able for pursuing the left wing of the parlia- mentary forces, in the battle of Naseby, so far, that before his return^ Cromwell and Fairfax had irretrievably defeated the king's right and centre. Yet, on this single act, which might have occurred in any age of the world, of a single officer, whose character was peculiarly prompt and impetuous, is founded a general principle in the history of tactics w^hich the reader is gravely requested to pause and reflect upon. With respect to the imputed Rccidenis of of the great civil war; of the parties being "with- out combination" and divided into ** insulated bands," the assertion shows that sir Walter was indifierent to facts whether of English or of French history. At the battle of Marston Moor, as Hume relates, " fifty thousand British troops were led to mutual slaughter." These were probably the largest armies which were en- gaged in a conflict purely civil at any time during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the battle of CuUoden, in 174^, the pretender had four thousand men, and the duke of Cum- berland a much larger force (see Smollet's His- 553 APPENDIX. tory of England, ch. g). In the war of the Ame- rican revohition, the forces engaged in hattle in no instance amounted to forty thousand men. Sir Walter continues — "But as war becomes a profession, and a subject of deep study, it is gradually discovered that the principles of tac- tics depend upon mathematical and arithmetical science; and that the commander will be vic- torious who can assemble the greatest number of forces upon the same point at the same moment, nothwithstanding an inferiority of numbers to the enemy when the general force is computed on both sides." Were Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, prince Eugene, or Marlborough, oris Welling- ton, famous for discoveries in mathematical and arithmetical science ; or w ere Newton and La- place esteemed able tacticians, or well qualified to command armies ? It is wonderful to see how boldly he connects propositions together which have no relation. Mathematical and arithme- tical science, is put forward as leading to the discovery, that "the commander will be victo- rious who can assemble the greatest number of forces upon a given point." Now this idea, as it might be properly stated, would occur and has occurred to great commanders whether they understood mathematics or not. But it is not accurately expressed by sir Walter, for the com- mander must not only be able to assemble the greatest number of forces upon the same point. CHAPTER YI. 555 and at the same moment; but he must be able to select a vital point and a proper time for the operation^ matters which have no more relation to mathematical or arithmetical science, than they have to dancing a minuet. It would he as rational to talk of new principles of poetry as of war. Napoleon, upon whose character and military conduct, sir Walter is here speculating, was of opinion that his principles of war were the same that were practised by the great com- manders before hini: — Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, prince Eugene, and Frederick the great, men whose eras fill a space of more than two thousand years, and comprehend all degrees of civilization (Mon- tholon, t. ii;. notes vii et xvi). Respecting Na- poleon's secret^ as sir Walter says it was called, he himself, in speaking of these great captains, thus eloquently reveals it — (Montholon t. ii, p. ig5) : "Make offensive war like Alexander, Han- nibal, Ceesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, prince Eugene, the great Frederick; read and reread the history of their eighty-eight cam- paigns, model yourself on them; it is the only means of becoming a great captain, and oi sur- prisin g the secrets of the art''' Here is nothing like mathematical or arithmetical science; but advice to study the conduct and exploits of great generals, to imitate, to imbibe their heroism, enterprise, activity, and prudence; to hold your force collected^ to choose strong ground or to 554 APPENDIX, make il so j to march rapidly on imporlant points^ to cherish the spirit of your troops, and the re- putation of your arms j to penetrate the charac- ter of your enemy; to inspire him with fear and act on that fear; to keep your troops well supplied j your communications free; and by political ad- dress and ascendancy to manage your allies. Thus you may become a great captain, but not by studying mathematics. It would convey a reflection on the reader's understanding to expose these absurdities far- ther. But as the course of sir Walter's disquisi- tion runs into less harmless misrepresentations, its examination in this direction must be pur- sued. After repeating a number of truisms about Napoleon's celerity, exact combinationsy choice of agents, etc. (in which few men by the way, seem to have been more unlucky), he adds, ''Great sacrifices were necessary to enable the French troops to move with that degree of cele- rity, which Bonaparte's combinations required. He made no allowance for impediments or unex- pected obstacles ; the time which he had calcu- lated for execution of manoeuvres prescribed, was on no account to be exceeded; every sacrifice was to be made of baggage, stragglers, even ar- tillery, rather than that the column should ar- rive too late at the point of its destination. Hence, ail that had hitherto been considered essential not only to the health but to the very existence of an army, was in a great measure dis- pensed with in the French service; and for the CHAPTER VI. 555 first time troops were seen to take the field without tents, without camp-equipage, without magazines of provisions, without military hospi- tals, the soldiers eating as they could, sleeping as the could, and dying as they could ; but still advancing, still combating, and still victorious." The declaration that (he "dying soldiers, still advanced still combated and were still victo- rious," is not the least unfounded assertion in thispassagej for of all the commanders of his age Napoleon was the most careful about his commu- nications, magazines, and hospitals. His attention to these subjects of military adminstration may almost be called excessive, as maybe seen by his orders and letters in all his campaigns. In this particular campaign of Italy, so far from causing the destitution and marauding of the troops, he put an end to those evils as every body who has attended to the subject, except the author of Waverley, and it appears Lockhart (v. i, p. 57) must have discovered. In his first letter to the directory from Nice, dated the day after he as- sumed the command he says, *' The administra- tive situation of this army is deplorable, but it is not desperate. Henceforward the troops will eat good bread and will have meat." Accordingly two days after appears this order (Correspon- dance inedite, t. i, p. 7). "Fresh meat is to be served out to the troops every other day. The battalions who receive salt meat to day will have fresh to-morrow j and those receiving fresh meat 556 APPENDIX. will have salt." The fact i?, that this regard for the comfort of his men, was one of the causes of their attachment to him. Can it be supposd that through good and through ill fortune, armies would have devoted themselves to a general who was regardless of their health and exis- tence, and left them to eat^ sleep, and die as they could ? As to his making no allowance for difficulties, and insisting that the time pres- cribed for movements, must on no account to be exceeded, nothing is more contrary to truth. It is well known that at Marengo, he waited anxiously but in confidence for the return of De- saix's division from Novi — that in this very cam- paign of Montenotte, JMassena delayed his attack on Dego, many hours after it had been ordered, in consequence of the troops not joining him in time; and in the military correspondence of the same campaign occur the following expressions in two letters from Augereau, the first dated the i6th of April, and the second the 25d. In the first, written on the heights above Ceva, Au- gereau says, *'I have this moment received your different orders, but I cannot put them in exe- cution"^ — ''Neverthless, if you persist in the changes you prescribe I pray you to let me know." In the second, written from Castellino, below the confluence of the Tanaro and the Corsagiio^ he says, '^l received this morning, at 7 o'clock precisely, your order to march the same hour; which it is imposj^le for me to do. I will exert CTTAPTCR VI. 537 myseif however, to put my columns in motion without delay" — The truth is sir Walter wrote at random, and Napoleon fought with wisdom, with a knowledge of the capacity of men and a powerful control over their impulses; and though he performed great exploits, did not exact miracles from his troops, nor move them by mathematics. It is scarcely necessary to in- form the reader that Lockhart epitomizes the folly and injustice of this part of sir Walter's book. Jomini, himself a soldier, holds the fol- lowing language (t. viii, p. 61), "The first mo- ments of the French general were consecrated to providing for the wants which might obstruct his operations, and to obtain a knowledge of the state of his troops. " — " Carrying a severe scru- tiny i III o the administrations, he very soon im- pressed them with his own activity, assured the different services, and seconded by the zeal and credit of a banker who was a contractor, he con- trived to pay a part of their back pay to the troops, which restored their confidence, and attached them irrevocably to a chief who knew how to meliorate their condition. "' Napoleon himself says V in his first letter to the directory (Correspondance inedite, t. i, p. 2 "The troops will henceforward eat good bread, and will have meat, arid already they have received a part of their back pay" Yet with this evidence of the fact before him, and with the order for furnish- ing fresh and salt meat alternately, Norvins(t.i, 538 APPENDIX. p. 88) ventures on the following statement: "Besides, the government not having paid into the military chest but two thousand louis, and one million in bills which were almost all protes- ted, it was impossible to nitdiorate the condition of the army,'" This was not slander, but sheer folly ; and as it w as written after sir Walter Scott's book was published, furnished no autho- rity for his misrepresentation* Page 228. (17) In describing the plan by which Napo- leon proposed (o enter Italy, sir Walter Scott says (v. iii, pp. loi, ?), "he resolved to pass through the Genoese territory by the narrow pass called the Bochetta leading round the ex- tremity of the mountains, and betwixt these and the sea. Thus he proposed to penetrate into Italy by the lowest level which the surface of the country presented, which must be, of course, where the range of the Alps unites v/ith that of the Appennines." Every reader knows that "thepassof the Bochetta," instead of lead- incr araund the extremity of the mountains, and betwixt these and the sea, is a pass across the Appennines leading directly from the sea at Ge- noa, to Voltaggio, jNovi, Alexandria, and Tu- rin. Why it should be a matter "of course'' that the lowest level v.hich the surface of the coun ry presented must be where the range of the Alps united with that of the Appennines, would seem to be a geological discovery made CHAPTER VI. , 5^9 Ly ''the great unknown." The pass of Cadi- bone whence the Alps and Appennines unite, and through which Napoleon proposed entering Piedmont, is at least thirty miles north-west of the Bochetta. There are numerous other errors equally flagrant in this part of sir Walter's work — thus he talks (p. g5) of " these Alpine cam- paigns being victoriously closed by the armis- tice of Cherasco. " Sixteen clays would seem a time sufficiently short for one campaign. Again, in afFectinQ' to recaDitulate the motives of the government for entertaining the project of in- vading Italy, he mentions the murder of the Frenchenvoy Bassevilleby the populace of Rome, whicii the republic naturally resented, because no attempt was made to prevent, punish, or atone for it, by the papal authorities. The au- thor of Waverley, who would have stigmatized the French as brutes, had they shown no resent- ment at this outrage on humanity and the rights of ambassadors, and had a similar murder occurred at Paris, would have held it up to de- testation as the consequence of republican li- berty, thus notices the indignation of the French government (v. iii, p. 99). ''The French government considered this very naturally as a gross insult, and were the more desirous of aven- ging it, that by doing so they should approach nearer to the dignified conduct of the Roman re- public, which, in good or evil, seems always to have been their model. The affair happened in 54o * APPENDIX . 1795, but was not forgotten in 1796." At first siglit it would seem to be a strange imitation of the conduct of the Pioman republic to take ven- gence on the citizens of Rome themselves, and capture their city, which were at one time the objects of the French republic in reference to the murder of Basseville. But it is difficult to con- ceive that a motive so slight as the imitation of this or that model, could have entered into the plans of a government desirous to avenge so cruel a wrong. It would be as fair and as rational to say that a husband and friend resenting the wrongs ol a modern Lucretia, are actuated.by a desire to "imitate the conduct" ofCollatinus and Brutus. This light and sneering tone, on such a subject, is as revolting to common sense as to com- mon feeling. The following is a short and unexaggerated account of the murder of Basse- ville, which sir Walter calls " an affair," and seems to think ought to have been speedily for- gotten. " The third of January, i 795, the mob attacked the carriage of Basseviile, as he was driving out, with stones. His coachman turned back and drove to his hotel. The doors were broken open, and Basseviile stabbed with a bayonet in the belly. In his shirt, holding his intestines in his hands, he was dragged into the street, and at last laid down in a guard house on a camp bed, where he expired the next day" (Montholon, t. iii^ p. 81). Sir Walter next proceeds to assign the pur- CHAPTER VI. , 'J^l pose of avciiging this outrage as one of the oh- jects proposed hy the French government in authorising Napoleon to invade Italy. In the elaborate instructions of the 6th of March the subject is not alluded to, nor is the name of Basseville or of Rome mentioned. At a later period and a different stage of the campaign, after the armistice of Cherasco, when the directory saw that one of their two princi- pal enemies in Italy was humbled and disarmed, they thought of Rome, as may be seen by their despatch of the 7th of May, (Correspondance inedite t. i, p. i4^)» ^^^^ then with sentiments of moderated hostility. Yet sir Walter a\ers (v.iii, p. 97) that the objeet of the directory at the opening of the campaign was 'to annihilate and dethrone the Pope." And, as if to accumulate misstatements upon the commencement of this campaign, he adverts to, as connected with it, the proposed coup de main against Rome in March, 1795, reference to which is made in the fourth chapter of this work, and in the twenty-first note of the appendix to that chapter. It was bad enough to omit all notice of this project and Napoleon's agency in counteracting it, in their proper place, but it is w orse to introduce them out of season, and encumbered with misrepre- sentation about as silly and positive as that piece of solid ifjoimatiojiy ''the victory of Albenga. " After mentioning this project, but assigning to it no date, he says (v. iii, p. 99): "Bonaparte 54^ APPExM)iX. Tvho was consulted, recommended that the north of Italy should he first conquered, in order tliat Rome might be with safety approached and chastised. " The absurdity of this proposition is a proof that it never could have entered the head of Napoleon. It is like advising that Great Britain should be first conquered in order that the isle of Anglesey might be got at and its inha- bitants chastised — the power of Rome hearing that proportion to the strength of the coalition in the north of Italy. Napoleon, as has been already stated, advised nothing about the north of Italy, but insisted that unless the French fleet first obtained a mastery in the Mediterranean, the expedition to the mouth of the Tiber would be attended with disappointment and disaster. What seems to have misled tfie author of Waver- ley, or rather to have given occasion to his ro- mance, is the following remark of Napoleon, when opposing the expedition in the council of war (IMonthalon t. iii, p. 8i): " Napoleon v.as of opinion that this expedition would expose the army of Italy," (that is by depriving it often thousand troops) "and would itself end in disaster • that if notwithstanding it was to be undertaken, it would be necessary, at the same time, to surprise Mount Argentare, Orbitello, and Civita Vecchia, and then to disembark the army. But ten thousand men appeared lo him too small a force for such a coup de mainy etc. These three places on the Roman and Tus:>:i CHAPTER vr. 543 icoast, sir Walter conceived T^eie in the Alps and the north of Italy, with the same geogra- phical knowledge which persuaded him to call the Bochetta, a pass betwixt the Alps and the sea. The next errors with which sir Walter's en- trance upon this campaign is carpeted, are the reproduction of an old, and the commission of a new fabrication. Speaking of the plan of in- vading Italy, he says (v. iii, p. loo) : it "suited in every respect the ambitious and self confident character of the general, to whom it was now intrusted. It gave him a separate and indepen- dent authority, and the power ef acting on his own judgment and responsibility; for his coun- tryman Salicetti, the deputy who accompanied him as commissioner of the government, was not probably much disposed to obtrude his opinions. He had been Bonaparte's patron, and was still his friend. " From this we are to believe that a desire to obtain a chief command and indepen- dent authority, was peculiar to Napoleon as a general, and we are to feel persuaded, that am- bition and self confidence are the principal qua- lities displayed by a commander who attacks and defeats an army double in number and strength to his own. But w as it for the Avant of ambition on the part of Scherer, or self confidence on that of Kellerman, that this command of the army of Italy was misplacedin their hands — Kellerman who thought himself "the firstv^ general in 544 APx^ENDlX. Europe. " Were ambilion and self confidence the leading qualiiies displayed by Miltiades at Marathon, Henry V at Agincourt, Henry IV of France at I>rv, Marlborough at Ramilies, Prince Eugene at Turin, Frederic the great at Lissa, Prince Ferdinand at Minden, and Jackson at New Orleans. Is there no such thing as heroic enterprise, contempt of death, collectedness in danger, or devotion to the cause of ones country? The jriendsliip and patronai^e of Salicetti the reader v^ill remember were proved by concur- ring with Albite and Laporte in arresting Napo- leon and denouncing jiim to the convention as a mercenary traitor and an accomplice of Robes- pierre ! Further, sir Walter Scott ought to have known that Salicetti was not the only commis- sioner in attendance upon the army ofllaly, that Gareau was his colleague, that the expression of his opinion would not have been an obtrusion of it; and that if it was not expressed it was in consecpence of the continued triumphs of the general, not from deference to his ambilion or self confidence. It is very true that Napoleon was on principle opposed to the interference of civil agents with the commanders of armies, and as will be remembered had protested against it on the 1 2th Vendemiaire. This was not the effect of ambition; but the decision of common sense, sanctioned by common practice. The British government did not send members of parliament to regulate the moveri:ents of lord CHAPTER VI. 545 Wellington. The Scotch writers and critics have never forgiven M. Frere to this day, for his interference with sir John Moore. But sir Walter adds, "the young general's mind was made up to the alternative of conquest or ruin, as may be judged from his words — "In three months I v» ill be either at Milan or Paris." Does this look like self confidence ? Its introduc- tion by sir Walter* only shews the inherent in- consistency of predetermined error. As there appears to be nothing like common sense in the exclusion of greater qualities than self-confi- dence and ambition from this part of Napoleon's career, so there seems no reason for supposing that the circumstances of disorder, disobedience, and destitution, in which he found the army of Italy, were likely to be peculiarly attractive to a person under the influence of a desire to gratify these last mentioned qualities. The command on the Rhine, or that on the Moselle, offered the prospect of more speedy, and less costly success. It V* ould disgust the reader were an enumera- tion of the pert fallacies of Lockhart to be added to this notice of sir Walter's important blunders. As a general observation it may be affirmed, that his epitome shows a total ignorance of this part of the subject, and as much injustice of imputa- tion and confidence in error, as are to be f mnd in the work of the author of Waverley himself. Speaking of the resentment of the French go- vernment at the shocking and unatoned murder 55 5.^6 APPENDIX. of Basseville, he also represents it was one of the motives for invading Italy, alleging (v. i, p. 58) that "the haughty repuhlic considered this as an insult which could only he washed out by seas of blood." How much Roman blood did the French army shed? Again, after describing the positions taken by Beaulieu for protecting Genoa and preventing the entrance of the French into Italy, stating that he placed one of his columns at Yoltri, another at Montenotte, and kept the third at Ceva, this modern Polybius proceeds (p. 59) " The French could not advance towards Genoa but by confronting some one of the three armies thus strangely posted." The main body of the French were in and around Savona and Loano ; how they were to advance towards Ge- noa, by confronting the allies at Montenotte and Ceva, it is not easy to discover. We may expect next to hear that an army stationed at St. Cloud cannot advance upon Paris without confronting a force posted at Versailles ! — or that a force landed at Dover could not march upon London without encountering an army encamped near Edinburgh. Page 230. (18) Scott and Lockhart (v. iii, ch. 5, and V. i, ch. 4) seem to have supposed thatCervoni's movement upon Voltri, was directed by Napo- leon ; whereas his correspondence shows, it was made before his taking the command, and in direct opposition to his plans and wishes. But CHAPTEfl VI. 547 Norvins ^Yanders farther from the fact, and (t. i, p. 92) expressly asserts that it was one of Napoleon's first operations. In his despatch of the 6th of April, Napoleon tells the directory: ''The movement which I found commenced against Genoa, has drawn the enemy from their w inter quarters. I have been very sorry and ex- tremely dissatisfied with this movement upon Genoa, so much the more inopportune, that is has obliged that republic to assume a hostile atti- tude, and has awakened the enemy whom I wished to take by surprise. It will cost us a sa- crifice of men." Page Si.'O. (ig) Among the innumerable arts and strata- gems of detraction employed by the author of Waverley to diminish the fame of his hero, some are so low and palpable as to be among those pratices of deception called tricks. Of these, one is attempted at the expense of general Beaulieu; an officer of experience, courage, and activity, who had been selected for the com- mand of the allied forces in consequence of his services in this very war, and against French troops and commanders- In describing the cha- racter of Beaulieu, Thiers says (t. viii, p. 227) ''He had distingnished himself in the Low Countries. He was a veteran with the ardour of a young man." Scott however describes him (v. iii, p. loi) "of great experience and some talent 548 APPENDIX . but no less than seventy- five years old, accus- tomed all bis life to tbe ancient rule of tactics, and unlikely to suspect, anticipate or frustrate those plans formed by a genius so fertile as that of Napoleon." The reader will detect in this a sly and awkward attempt to make Napoleon's success as much the consequence of the age and imbeci- lity of his antagonist as of his own wonderful genius. Yet the archduke Charles, when in the flower of youth and spring time of glory, after being instructed by the failures of Beaulieu, Wurmser, and Alvinzi, and after having worsted Jourdan and Moreau, when opposed to Napo- leon, made no better resistance than Beaulieu did Page 251. (20) We are told by sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. io4)» whose descriptions of battles iii poetry and prose have been universally admired, that " Argenteau descended w^ow Montenotte ;" the famous village of that name, being situated on a mountain of the Appeninne range. It might as well be said that a traveller in Switzerland descended on Mont -Blanc. The truth is, that Argenteau occupied Dego and Sassello, and as- cended by the route of Lower to Upper Monte- notte. Even this ludicrous oversight does not arrest the prone imitation of Lockhart, who (v. i, p. 3g) says — " On the loth of April d' Argenteau cajne down upon Montenotte.^' He must have dropped from the clouds. Jomini, in describing CHAPTER VI. 549 the descent oi Xr^entesiU (t. viii,p. 67) thus ex- presses himself. '' He moved in three cohimns with the main body of his troops, to force the in- trenched positions which a detachment of La- harpe's division occupied on the summits of Mon- tenotte and Montehgino.'^ And he adds : — ''In order to give a just idea of the event we are going to describe, it is indispensable, that the reader should be convinced of the importance of the position of Monlenotte. It is composed of a small chain of heights situated on the summit of the Appennines, etc." Page 238. (21) Las Cases (t. ii, p. 295) justly observes that differences will be found between the offi- cial reports of Napoleon and his account dic- tated at St. Helena. Among them he says is one resulting from the statement in the former, that xAirgenleau had but fifteen thousand men when he attacked Rampon ; while he had left a division of ten thousand in the rear to main- tain his communications with Colli at Ceva. And he adds that it was against this division of ten th^isand men that Massena fired the first shot on the morning of the battle. It is obvious that in many respects Napoleon's reports were necessarily founded on what he supposed to be, at the time, the situation and intentions of his adversary. Page 258. (22) Jomini says (t. viii, p. 72) : — " The ge- 55o APPEM)lX. neral in chief placed himself on a ridge in the centre of his divisions, the better of judge of the turn of affairs, and to prescribe the manoeuvres which might become necessary." Page 240. (25) Sir Walter Scott's account of the combats of Voltri and Monteligino, is fair enough. His battle of Montenotte however is a curiosity (v. iii, p. 104). "Cervoni, who retreated before Beau- lieu, had united himself with Laharpe, and both advancing northward during the night of the nth, established themselves in the rear of the redoubts of Monteligino, which Rampon had so gallantly defended. This was not all. The divisions of Augereau and Mass^na had marched by different routes on the flank and on the rear of Argenteau's column ; so that the next morning instead of renewing his attack on the redoubts, the Austrian general was obliged to extricate himself by a disastrous retreat, leaving behind him colours and cannon, a thousand slain and two thousand prisoners. Such was the battle of Montenotte, the first of Bonaparte's vic- tories ; eminently displaying that truth «nd ma- thematical certainty of combination," etc. From this it would seem that if two corps of an army unite, and advance northward during the night, while two other corps had marched by different routes on the flank and rear of the enemy, that enemy is of necessity defeated with the loss of colours, cannon, slain, and prisoners, by virtue CHAPTER VI. 55 i of the truth and certainty of mathematical com- binations; and without any thing like courage or generalship on the part of the victors. The commander who is attacked may not cut his way through the forces in his front, or turn successfully on those in his rear. The attacking troops may not behave badly, nor their general act timidly. Jomini, who really describes this battle, though partial to the allies (t. viii, pp. 7 1 , 7:2, 75), attributes the success of the French to the vigour and rapidity of their attacks, the skill with which they were directed, as well as to their superiority of force collected suddenly on a single and vital point. Lockhart's account ''v. i, p. SQ; is a meagre and close imitation of sir Walter's — both intimating that Augereau's division was in the action, though they both assert the contrary immediately after- wards (v. iii, p. 106, andv. i, p. 40). It is but fair to acknowledge that on this subject Thiers is not behind the British historians^ in solid in- formation or vapid romance (t. viii, p. 23 1 ). He says — "Bonaparte that very night withdrew his right formed by the division Laharpe, at this moment engaged with Beaulieu along the coast, and advanced it by the route of Montenotte, in front of Argenteau. He directed on the same point the division Augereau^ in order to support that of Laharpe. Finally he caused the division Massena to march by a circuitous route across the Appennines, so as to gain a position in the rear 552 APPENDIX. even of Argenteau's corps. The 12th of April in the morning, all his columns were in motion: placed on a lofty hill himself, he saw Laharpe and Augereau marching on Argenteau," Now so far was Augereau from being with Laharpe and in the battle of Montenotte, that a physical impossibility existed to prevent it. For on the afternoon of the nth, as all authorities agree in stating, his division was at Loano, from which place it would have required a march of thirty- six miles through the Alps and Appennines, be- tween evening and day break in the month of April, to place him in front of the Austrians with Laharpe, while this general had but about eight miles and Massena fourteen to reach their respective positions. This wanton error of Thiers is the more exceptionable, as it assigns to Napoleon an overwhelming superiority of force in the battle, and effaces from Augereau's conduct at Milessimo that colour of fierceness, which courage, exasperated by emulation, would be likely to take, in a character so ambitious, selfish, and vain. Page 244, (24) Sir Walter Scott's narrative of these Alpine ''campaigns" as he calls them, is so sketchy and imperfect, that it is difficult to mark individual errors. He asserts however (v. iii, p. 107) that Bonaparte "ordered three successive attacks," on Provera. Jomini, who CHAPTER VI. 553 describes all these operations very minutely, says (t. viii, p. qq) that Bonaparte after (Ordering an attack on Provera, ^vas called away while prepa- rations were making for it by a brisk firing at Cencio, and that then three columns were formed which advanced against Provera simul- taneously, on the three faces of the hill. These statements correspond with Napoleon's report to the directory (see Moniteur of the 27th April 1796), and with his concise narrative dictated at St. Helena, v*hich furnish no authority for the ** three successive attacks." In his report of the action he speaks of but one attack made by three columns with a fourth in reserve, and ex- j3ressly mentions that before it took place he was called away by a firing which was heard on his right. In his dictation to Las Cases (Me- morial, t. ii, p. 274)5 he says simply that the attack on Provera failed; and to Montholon (t. iii, p. 184) that " several attacks failed,'' and adds that during the battle of (he i^th, the general in chief was present at all the important points of the line. Taking the accounts to- gether, it appears that Napoleon was not present, that several attacks must have reference to the three distinct columns, that the three successive attacks of sir Walter did not take place, and that admitting their reality, ihey were ordered by Augereau and not by Napoleon in person. In a letter of the 14th of Aj ril, the day of the battle of Milessimo, Augereau, in reportingtoBo- 554 APPENDIX. naparte the surrender of Provera, says (Corres- pondance inc^dite, t i, p. 58): It \vere to be wished that this capitulation had taken place yesterday before the attack, we should not then have to regret the brave generals Banel and Qu^nin, " etc. The tactics of Lockhart are equally romantic and much more confused. He affirms (v. i, p. 40) that in consequence of the battle of Montenotte, while Beaulieu retreated from Voltri to Dego, in order to reestablish his communication with Colli, Colli, "with the same purpose in \ie\y Jell back also, and took post at Milessimo." Colli all this time, as Lock- hart's own and other narratives shew (p. Sg) was at Ceva, at least four leagues in the rear of Mi- lessimo. So that as Argenteau had " descended'^ upwards ui^ on Montenotte, Colli retreated /or- wards to Milessimo. This admirable historian goes on — '*Next morning (the 14th) Bonaparte himself arrived at that scene of the operations. He forced Colli to accept battle, utterly broke and scattered him; and Provera, thus aban- doned, was obliged to yield at discretion." This is as like the truth as black is like white. Bo- naparte left that scene of operations on the morning of the 14th, and during that day was employed with the divisions Massena and La- harpe in carrying the intrenched heights of Dego ; where he received Augereau's written report of the surrender of Provera (Jomini, t. viii, p. 80). And so far was Colli from being ''forced CHAPTER VI. 555 to accept battle," that he himself attacked Au- gereau repeatedly with a view of rescuing Pro- vera. Napoleon says (Las Cases, t. ii, p. 274) " all the attacks of Colli to disengage Provera were vain." Thiers (t. viii, p. 254), and Jomini (t, viii, p. 79) confirm this account. Page 24o. (25) This active and intrepid officer appears to have been but momentarily disabled on this oc- casion, for Napoleon in his report says : — " His soldiers believed him to be dead, but his wound is not dangerous," and the next day we find him engaged at the head of bis brigade. Although he was under Massena's command in the battle of Montenotte, he seems to have been generally attached to the division of Augereau. However from the prompt dispositions and rapid move- ments of the French commander and columns, the brigades belonging to the several divisions in these Alpine operations, were occasionally interchans^ed. Thus in the battle of Montenotte the bri^rade Dommartin was with Massena, at Mondovi, with Serrurier. Page 268. (26) It appearing useless to indicate minutely the imperfections of cir Walter Scott's narra- tive of these battles, which is altogether erro- neous and defective,! have determined to notice only such prominent and positive errors, as 556 APPENDIX. shov/ not only how indifferent he was about fur- nishing his reader with facts, but how ready he was to supply him Avilh ficJion. \n sketching the battle of Mondovi(v. iii, p. 5) he says: "The dispirited army of Colli was attacked atMon- dovi during his retreat, by two corps of Bona- parte's army, from two different points, com- manded by Massena and Serrurier. The last general the Sardinian repulsed with loss- but when he found Massena in the meantime was turning the left of his line, and that he was thus pressed on both flanks, his situation became almost desperate. The cavalry of the Pied- montese made an efi'ort to renew^ the combat. For a time they overpowered and drove back those of the French ; and general Stengel, who commanded the cavalry, was slain in attempting to get them into order. But the desperate valour of Murat, unrivalled perhaps in the heady charge of cavalry combat, renewed the fortune of the field." It would be difficult to convey a greater quantity of misrepresentation in the same number of words, The object of Colli wasnot to retreat beyond Mondovi, but at that place to make a stand where he had strong- ground, important works, and magazines, and was actually fortifying himself when he w as at- tacked. He did not repulse Serrurier v.ith loss, and yield to the movement of Massena. The victory was gained by Serrurier, with the bri- gade Guyeux on the left and those of Dommar- CHAPTER VI. 557 tin and Fiorella in the centre. Napoleon in his concise account says (Montholon, t. iii, p. 189) " SeiTurier carried the redoubt of Bicoque and decided the battle." Jomini, who having de- serted the French colours, and entered the service of the allies, as aide de camp to the em- peror Alexander, may hv deemed the organ of the Sardinians in this campaign, says (t. viii, p. 95) after mentioning that Serrurier attacked the centre with the brigades Dommartin aud Fiorella, '* forced thus in the centre, and sur- rounded on both flanks by Meynier and Guyeux, Colli determined to repass the Ellero. " — Norvins (t. i, p. 98) gives a similar account — ''Serrurier carried the redoubt of Bicoque, and decided the success of the battle." And Thiers (t. viii, p, 239) mentions — " Serrurier decided the victory by taking the principal redoubt." This injus- tice to Serrurier seems to have been occasioned by sir Walter's confounding the check that ge- neral received at the bridge of St. Michel on the 19th, with his victorious attack at Mondovi on the 22d. But even his conduct at St. Michel was highly praiseworthy; and his misfortune, which was not a simple repulse, but the loss of an advantage which he had gained, was owing to the insubordination of his troops. Napoleon says (Montholon, t. iii, p 188) "Serrurier would however have maintained himself at St. Michel, had not a regiment of light infantry given itself up to pillage." General Despinois, 558 APPE^D1X. in a letter of the igth, confirms Napoleon's statement (Correspondance inedite, t. i, p. 80) : "We Avere masters of St. Michel, of the castles and the heights — in short we were on the point of gaining a complete victory. A part of the di- vision of general Serrurier unfortunately gave themselves up to pillage, in spite of the efforts of that officer to prevent it. The enemy pro- fited of this folly to return to the charge, and the conquerors lost their advantage in an instant " Carnot in a despatch of the 28th of April to the general in chief says — " Congratulate on the part of the directory, the general of division Serrurier, on the conduct he displayed in the attack on St Michel and on the passage of the Corsaglio." The next assertion, that the Piedmontese cavalry made an effort to renew the combat and overpowered the French horse, is perfectly un- founded. The cavalry, with the exception of a charge by Murat with a single regiment, was not engaged in the battle of Mondovi, nor could be, in consequence of the rough and precipitous ground. This is clear from the uniform silence of other authors respecting the cavalry; from the topography of the place, and from the fol- lowing extract from a letter (probably the last he ever wrote) of the brave general Stengel dated the 21 st, the day before the battle, and written on the heights of Vico, in the immediate front of Colli's right wing TCorrespondance in^ CHAPTER VI. 559 dite, t. i, p. 69). " I regret that the ground does wot permit me to think of charging the enemy ^ nor even to draw out mj cavalry from the place in which they are posted^ in order to approach the mountain 5 the reverse of which the enemy might occupy." It follows that the List assertions declaring that Stengel was killed in the battle of Mondovi, which w as completely decided before he com- menced his pursuit; and that Murat renewed the fortune of the field 3 are attributable solely to the ready and abundant invention of sir Walter. Stengel was killed, as the reader knows, after the battle was over, and beyond the river EUero, in charging the rear guard of the flying Sardinians ; and for any thing which took place in the battle of IMondovi, might have been alive now. Lockhart's epitome becomes more and more defective. He omits all mention of the combat of Dego on ihe i5th, where Lanusse so greatly distinguished himself, and where the prudence of Napoleon, which was so conspicuous among his military virtues, received an early and instructive lesson ; as we see him immedi^ ately afterwards leaving theentire division of La- harpe and the brigade of Victor, to protect his rear, and sending back general Cenoni to re- connoitre Voltri. Page 269. (27) At page 112 of his third volume, sir 560 APPENDIX. Walter Scolt gives a summary of this campaign. Although he admits that the invasion of Pied- mont had been accomplished ''with so much military skill," he overshadows this attempt at justice by previously ascribing it altogether to fortune. " Thus fortune, in the course of a cam- paign of scarce a month, placed her favourite in full possesion of the desired road to Italy by command of the mountain passes, which had been invaded and conquered with so much mi- litary skill." The reader will have ascertained that the only stroke of fortvme which occurred in the campaign, was the wandering arrival of Wuckassowich before day break on the i5th, in the rear of Dego ; which gave the Austrians an unexpected advantage, that, for the time neutra- lized the hard-earned victory of the 14th; and which was retrieved, after Massena's effort had failed, by the promptness and energy of Napo- leon in person. Indeed sir Walter himself fairly acknowledges that fortune bore no part in these victories, for (at page 1 1 5 and 1 16) he thus expresses himself. " The talents as a general which he bad exhibited, were of the very first order. There was no disconnection in his ob- jects, they were all attained by the very means he proposed, and the success was improved to the utmost. A different conduct usually charac- terises those Avho stumble unexpectedly on vic- tory, either by good fortune or the valour of their troops. When the favourable opportunity CHAPTER VI. 56 r » occurs to such leaders, they are nearly as much embarrassed hy it as by a defeat. But Bona- parte who had foreseen the result of each ope- ration by his sagacity, stood also prepared to make the most of the advantasfes which mia^hfc he derived from it " Notwithstanding the discriminating and manly temper of these observations, it is difficult to sup- press a smile at finding them appended to sir Walter's confused, erroneous, and imperfect nar- rative, in which are found, " the victory of Al- benga," the "pass of the Bochetta betwixt the Alps and the sea," "the descent upon Monte- notte," and Serrurier's defeat in the battle of Mondovi, mistakes which independently of the more important and calumnious misrepresen- tations respecting the motives and character of the French general and his army, render sir Walter's history of these ''Alpine campaigns,*' to which he subjoins this formal retrospect, per- fectly unintelligible and ridiculous. Page 272. (28) This correspondence consists of the fol- lowing letters (Correspondance inedite , t, i, PP- 97-9^-99-^00)- ^^ To the general commanding in chief the French army in Italy. *'*" From the head quarters of the Piedmontese army. " 23d of April, 1796. ^* Having learned that his majesty the king of 56 562 APPENDIX. Sardinia has sent plenipotentiaries to Genoa, thereto treat for peace, under the mediation of the court of Spain, I beheve, general, that the interest of humanity would require that hostilities should be suspended on both sides during the pendency of these negotiations. I therefore propose to you an armistice, either unlimited or for a definite time as you may prefer, with a view of sparing the useless effusion of human blood, etc., etc.'' *' Colli." '^^ The general in chief of the army of Italy to general Colli^ commanding in chief the armj of the king of Sardinia. " Head quarters, Caru, 24th of April, 1796. ^' The executive directory has reserved to it- self, sir, the right to treat of peace. It is there- fore necessary that the plenipotentiaries of the king, your master, should proceed to Paris or wait at Genoa for the plenipotentiaries whom the French government may send there. "The military and moral situation of the two armies, renders a pure and simple suspension of arms impossible. Although I am individually persuaded that my government will grant peace on honourable conditions to your king, I cannot, on this vague presumption stop my march. There is however a mode of accomplishing your object, conformably with the true interests of CHL\PTER VI. 563 your court, and^vhich^vill spare an effusion of bloodj useless, and therefore contrary to reason and the laws of war. This is to put in my pos- session two of the three fortresses, Coni, Alexandria, and Tortona, as you may choose. Then we can wait without hostilities the issue of the negotiations which may be entered upon. This proposition is very moderate. The reci- procal interests which ought to exist betw een Piedmont and the French republic, inspire me with a lively desire to see averted from your country the various calamities which threaten it, etc., etc. ^' Bonaparte.*' ^'^ Tg the general in chief of the French array in Italy. ■" Head quarters of the Piednionfese army, 26tli of April, I -g6. "I have communicated, general, to the (ourt of Sardinia the letter you have written in reply to that I addressed to you, to notify you of a ple- nipotentiary of the king having been sent to Genoa, charged to make overtures of peace at that place, and to invite you, while waiting tlieir result, to spare the eft'usion of human blood by a suspension of arms. " I am authorised by his majesty to inform you in the mean time, that the French minister at G^noa, to whom the plenipotentiary of the APPENDIX. 664 king addressed himself on the subject of these overtures, has declared to him that neither he himself nor any other person at Genoa has autho- rity to enter upon such negotiations, but that it is necessary to address them to the executive di- rectory at Paris^ which alone has the right of entertaining them. Upon which the plenipo- tentiary stated his intention of directing his fur- ther proceedings on the subject to the proper quarter. While by these means (which cannot fail to involve some delay) we may accomplish the desired and salutary work of a peace between the two states, the king desirous of sparing to both nations the calamities of all sorts, which hostilities inflict, has not hesitated to give his consent that the proposed suspension of arms, which you seem disposed to accept upon certain conditions, may take place and be determined upon without delay. In consequence H. M. orders me to declare to you that he will consent to put into your power two of his fortresses ; that is Coni, and Tortona, as you have demanded, during the negotiations about to be entered upon, and in the manner which shall be agreed to. In virtue of which all hostilities shall cease from this time to the termination of the said negotiations. And in case of difficulties which may arise from the ac- tual situation of the allied army, it may notbe in his majesty's power to surrender as above stated, the place of Tortona, H. M. is determined to CHAPTER VI. 565 offer in lieu of it, the fortress of Demont, With exception of the surrender of these two places, every thing shall remain in statu quo with re- gard to the countries occupied by the two ar- mies, w ithout its being allowed to either to pass the line of their respective limits; and conform- ably to the manner in which the whole subject shall be settled specifically between us. "Colli." The reader will discover from this correspon- dence that the concessions demanded by Napo- leon were as moderate as the ascendancy of his arms, the rights of his government, and the safety of his army, could possibly admit of; that he proposed the surrender of two out of three fortresses, and accepted the offer of two out of four. It may be also perceived that in requiring this security against the proverbial faithlessness of the court of Turin, he avoided all allusion to it. It may be observed too, that as his demands were not exorbitant, so his declarations were true. It was true that the directory had reserved to itself the right of treating for peace. It was true that he was persuaded they would grant honourable terms to the king; since their in- structions expressed the greatest anxiety not only for a peace, but an alliance wdth the king of Sardinia, This last observation brings into view a state- ment of Thiers in relation to the conduct of Na 566 APPENDIX. poleon in the conference at Cherasco, wTiicI* r.opears to be bolli unfounded and injurious. This author says (t. viii, p. ^45 et 244) '' Bona- parte could not suppose the directory would consent to give any part of Lombardy to Pied- mont ; for it was not yet conquered, and its conquest was desired only for the purpose of making it an equivalent for the Low Countries, But a vague hope of aggrandizement might dis- pose Piedmont to ally herself to France, which would have been worth a reenforcement of twenty thousand excellent troops. He promised nothing, but he contrived by letting fall a few words to excite the cupidity and hopes of the cabinet of Turin." These statements are not only inconsistent with the character of Napoleon, which they degrade into a resemblance with Metternich or Talleyrand, but totally at variance with the truth. If he did, by a few words, intimate the probability that the French government would enter into an alliance wilh the king of Sardinia, by which they would agree, upon his furnishing a contingent of ten thousand troops, to conquer and cede to him districts of Lombardy, he was authorized by the letter and spirit of his instruc- tions to do so, and was expressing himself in strict conformity with the written intentions of the directory. That this is the fact will be ad- mitted by Thiers himself upon reading the in- structions of the 6th of March; and more par-- CHAPTER VI. 567 ticularly the following clause, explaining and confirming them, in the next letter of instruc- tion dated the 7th of May. In this letter Carnot says (Correspondance inedite, t. i,p. 147)" "In the first place, make the conquest of the Mi- lanese, whether it should be restored to the house of Austria as a cession necessary to assure peace with that power, or whether it may suit us to give it eventually to the Piedmontese, either as a recompense for the efforts we may engage them to make to aid in its conquest, or as in- demnity for the departments of Mont Blanc and the maritime Alps" (that is Savoy and the county of Nice), " constitutionally united to the re- public." It is impossible to read this passage without perceiving that Napoleon when con- ferring with the Sardinian agents upon the prospects of peace^ could not fairly deny his impression that the directory would grant them honourable terms, and be disposed in conside- ration of an alliance offensive and defensive, to cede to Sardinia out of conquests that might be made in Lombardy, an equivalent for the king's relinquishment of all claim to Savoy and Nice. It is evident, therefore, that this misrepresen- tation of Thiers is as dow nright as it is gratuitous, and that for the colour of subtile and faithle-js adroitness, which it reflects upon the character of Napoleon, inconsistent with the tenor of his life and repugnant to his disposition, the world is indebled to the fancy of the French historian. 568 APPENDIX. Page 274. (•j.g) On the subject of this annistice, sir Walter Scott is thrown into convulsions of legitimate in- dignation, which, howeverhxdicrous in a '^British historian," may probably appear perfectly consis- tent with the rank and dignity of a new Scotch baronet. The eflfusion of this noble sentiment takes the following sonorous and magnificent form(v.iii, p. 1 15) : '^ The sovereign of Sardinia, Savoy, and Piedmont, had no means of preserv- ing his capital^ i^^J? ^^^ existence, on the conti- nent, excepting by an almost total submission to the will of the victor. Let it be remembered, that Victor Amadeus III was the descendant of a race of heroes, who, from the peculiar situation of their territories, as constituting a neutral ground of great strength betwixt France and the Italian possessions of the house of Austria, had often been called to play a part in the general affciirs of Europe, of importance far superior to that which their condition as a second rate power, could otherwise have demanded. In ge- neral, they had compensated their inferiority of force by an ability and gallantry w^hich did them the highest credit, both as generals and politi- cians ; and now Piedmont was at the feet, in her turn, of an enemy weaker in numbers than her own'' (^her owny/\i3Ll7). *^ Besides the reflections on the past fame of his country, the present hu- miliating situation of the king was rendered more CHAPTER vj. S6g mortifying by the state of his family connections. Victor Amadeiis was father-in-law of Monsieur (by right Louis XVIIl), and of the comte d'Ar- tois (the reigning king of France). He had re- ceived his sons-in-law at his court at Turin, and afforded them an opportunity of assembling around them their forces, consisting of the emi- grant noblesse, and had strained all the power he possessed, and in many instances successfully, to withstand the artifices and the arms of the French republicans ; and now, so born, so con- nected, and with such principles, he was con- demned to sue for peace on any terms which might be dictated, from a general of France, aged twenty-six years, who a few months before, was desirous of an appointment in the artillery service of the Grand Signior." The probable inaccuracy of the closing assertion having been shewn in the 4th chapter of this volume, and in the 28th note of the appendix to that chapter, it is worthy of attention here solely in conse- quence of its being a voluntary aggravation on the part of sir Walter, of the royal misfortunes which he so ruefully deplores. But if the ser- vice of the Grand Signior, a monarch whose power was much more ancient and extensive than that of Victor Amadeus HI, o^- any other Victor Amadeus, was really derogatory to the character of a European officer, it might be demanded in what consisted the dignity of this house of Savoy, which it Avould appear to be 570 APPEISDIX. sacrilege to approach either hy conquest or pa- cification. We are told by sir Walter, that one source of his dignity was in the king's birth, in his being "descended from a race of heroes," and being father-in-law to Louis XVIII and the comte d'Artois , being ''so born and so con- nected" With respect to the circumstance of " being so born," the reader will remember (2d note of appendix to the ist chapter) that sir Walter himself pronounced it to be " trivial and unworthy of notice." As to this " race of heroes," ihe only one of the king of Sardinia's royal predecessors who was famous in the history of Eu- rope, was Victor Amadeus I ; and his fame is thus described by a countryman of sir Walter's, on the authority of a kincr whose word has been held to be law, not only by Louis XVIII and the comte d'Artois, but by all who, like sir Walter acknow- ledge the fashionable and flourishing doctrine of the divine right of kings. Smollett, in his history of England (b. i, ch. 8), mentioning the low state of fortune to which the prospects of the emperor were reduced in Italy by the united arms of France and Savoy, observes, — '^ The emperor's prospect, however, was soon mended by two in- cidents of very great consequence to his interest. The duke of Savoy" (then in strict alliance with France), " foreseeing how much he should be exposed to the mercy of the French king, should that monarch become master of the Milanese, engaged in a secret negotiation with the empe- CHAPTER Vr. 671 ror^' Vvitli whom, as the ally of France, he was then at war), " which, notwithstanding all his caution, was discoveredby the court of Versailles. Louis immediately ordered the duke of \ endome to disarm the troops of Savoy that were in his ar- my, to the number of two and twenty thousand men (Voltaire, Siecle de Louis XIV, reduces this number to five thousand) ; to insist upon the duke's putting him in possession of four consi- derable fortresses, and to demand that the num- ber of his troops should be reduced to the esta- blishment stipulated in the treaty of i6g6. The duke, exasperated at these insults, ordered the French ambassador, and several officers of the same nation, to be arrested. Louis endeavoured to intimidate him by a menacing letter, in which he gave him to understand, that since neither religion, honour, interest, nor allianceshad been able to influence his conduct, the duke of Yen- dome should make known the intentions of the French monarch, and allow him four and twenty hours to deliberate." This is one of the many acts of unblushing perfidy performed by that father of ''a race of heroes," Twho was a strane^er to the sentiments of hojiow and reli- gioJi), which in the opinion of our *' British his- torian," ''did him the highest credit both as a general and as a politician." It may be ob- served that Louis XIV, the revered ancestor of those rightful kings, " Mor.sieur and the comte d'Artois," would not be satisfied, with his over- 572 APPENDIX. whelming army under the duke of Yendome, Avithoutthe surrender *' of four considerable fort- resses," while Napoleon, "a general of France aged twenty-six years," with his small army, and with the Austrian forces before him, was satisfied with two. Yet Yictor Amadeus 1, had not en- couraged the treason of Louis' subjects, nor by means of it, taken possession of Toulon, and a large French fleet. Passing from this heroic progenitor of heroes to his immediate successor in the illustrious line, Smollet (b. ii, ch. 4 and 5), says that Yictor Amadeus 1 resigned his throne to his son Charles Emanuel; and that three years afterwards, *' Victor Amadeus^ the abdicated king of Sardinia, having, at the insti- gation of his wife, engaged in some intrigues in order to reascend the throne, his son the reign- ing king, ordered his person to be seized at Montcalier, and conveyed to Rivoli, under a strong guard. His wife, the marchioness of Spigno, was conducted to Serva. The old king's confessor, his physician, and eight and forty persons of distinction, were imprisoned." This will serve to convince the reader of the pious respect with which the ''descendants of this race of heroes" were in the habit of look- ing back upon the character of their ances- tors, and "on the past fame of their country." In respect to the warm affection for his sons-in- law by which it is alleged Yictor Amadeus the third was engaged in war against "the artifices CHAPTER VI. 573 and arms of the French republicans;" it may be observed that, inasmuch as, in the estimation of all loyal and true baronets, the affections, vir- tues, and rights, of legitimate monarchs, are exalted, sacred, and inviolable, in proportion to the extent of their dominions and the an- tiquity of their royal descent, it may be safely asserted that the king of Sardinia could not pretend to love his son-in-law more than the emperor of Austria loved his. Now in 181 5 his apostolic majesty, provoked not by the ill faith, but by the misfortunes of his son-in-law, joined his most inveterate enemies in a war against him, and prosecuted it with unaffected cruelty and sincere ingratitude, until he had taken from him his crown, and separated from him his wife and child; and made that wife accept as her partner in a dance of triumph at his ruin, the man who not only enjoyed the reputation of be- ing greatly instrumental in her husband's down- fal, but in having him murderously relegated to a rock in the African sea. Taking this conduct of the emperor of Austria as the standard of mo- narchical feeling, it cannot with a proper res- pect for his imperial rank, be admitted that the fortitude of the king of Sardinia, was severely tried by being placed under the necessity of dis- continuing inconvenient assistance to his sons-in- law. Yet sir Walter Scott seems to be of a dif- ferent opinion, avers that Victor Amadeus III (p. ii5) signed the treaty with France with the greatest reluctance, *'and did not long sur- 574 APPENDIX. vive it," language which the imitation of Lock- hart interprets (v. i, p. 42) " died of a hroken heart a few days after the treaty of Clierasco.'' But even if Napoleon could be held accountable for the tenderness of Victor Amadeus's heart, or for the treaty of Paris, with which he had as little concern, it would be difficult to prove that the death of the king was the effect of his con- duct, since that monarch survived the treaty of Paris instead of " a few days," five months, and then died, in his seventy-first year, not by " a fall from a cherry ti^ee," but of a fit of apo- plexy. All the cruelty with which Napoleon can be reproached, consisted, as we have seen, in requiring and obtaining the cautionary sur- render of Coni and Tortona, when as sir Wal- ter himself confesses, "\ictor Amadeus's capi- tal, nay his existence on the continent," were at the mercy of Napoleon. Coni and Tortona, both these authors deno- minate " keys of the Alps,"' Lockhart, with an abundance of solid information, describing them as the only kejs of the Alps (v. i, p. 40*" And lastly, wrested from his hands, Coni and Tor- tona, the two great fortresses called ^' the keys of the Alps." Every body, but these "British historians," who ever looked at a map of Italy, knows that Tortona is at least fifty miles from the Alps, at the opposite edge of the plain of Piedmont 5 and that an army invading Piedmont by the passes of the Alps, might take all the keys CHAPTER VI. 676 of those mountains, and Turin itself, ^vithout being within a day's march of Tortona. Yet such trash as this, mixed up with calumny and contra- dictions, is sold and circulated in England, for the instruction, in political sentiment and histo- rical knowledge, of families, whose parents stu- died the thoughtful and luminous pages of Hume, Robertson, and Gibbon! In regard to the rhapsody about the kings of Sardinia playing " an important part, superior to that demanded bv their condition as a second rate power, '' this circumstance instead of being a matter to boast of, was the effect of shameful imprudence on their part. Nations, like indivi- duals, when they are made to attempt enterprises above their strength, and to assume- characters out of the range of their position and qualities, are sure to be exposed sooner or later to calamity and disgrace. Page 276. (5o) In closing his reflections on the military operations, which eventuated in what Lockhart calls the "treaty of Cherasco," confounding in one pregnant blunder the armistice of Cherasco, signed 28th of April, and the treaty of Paris con- cluded the 1 5th May, observations escape the author of Waverley which , notwithstanding their folly, deserve consideration. He thus ediheshis readers (v. iii, p. 116). " Bonaparte's style in addressing the directory, was at this period more modest and simple, and therefore more 076 APPENDIX. impressive, than the figurative and bombastic style which he afterwards used in his bulletins. His self opinion, perhaps, was not risen so high as to permit him to use the sesquipedalian words and violent metaphors, to which he afterwards seems to have given a preference. We may remark also, that the young victor was honour- ably anxious to secure for such officers as distin- guished themselves, the preferment which their services entitled them to. He urges the promo- tion of his brethren in arms in almost every one of his despatches, a conduct not only just and generons but also highly politic. Were his recom- mendations successful, their general had the gratitude due for the benefit; were they over- looked, thanks equally belonged to him for his good wishes, and the resentment for ihe slight attached itself to the government, who did not ffive effect to them. " In the first note of the Appendix to the first chapter of this volume, the reader will have observed an index pointing out the biographical intention, the quo animo^ with which the author of Waverley undertook to descend from the re- gions of romance to the high road of history, and to furnish the public with a life of Napoleon. The passage of his work now under considera- tion, reveals most clearly the accordant spirit in which that intention w as executed. If Napoleon recommended for promotion such of his officers in tlds active and sanguinary campaign, as emi- CHAPTER YI. 577 Sienlly deserved it, such as Rampon, Lanusse, and Lannes, it is first admitted that he was ac- tuated by an honourable desire to reward pa- triotism and valour -, but, lest the merit of this just and liberal, though common, sentiment, should attach itself to the character of his hero, sir Walter hastens to balance it by the impu- tation of a mean and interested policy — the more mean as it implies a design upon the reputation of the government, whose confidence he enjoyed and whose army he commanded. Regardless of metaphysical as of moral propriety, sir Wal- ter thus crowds together upon a single and very natural act, the redundant and incongruous mo- tives of justice, generosity, policy, and fraud. This compound of compliment and calumny, this equipoise of admitted honour and imputed baseness, while they disclose the jusfe milieu condition of the author's moral sentim'^nt, de- monstrate the distinct separation which the scheme of his work required him to maintain between the course of his narrative and the principles of justice, in regard to that important branch of his subject, consisting of the impulses of his hero's heart, and the motives of his con- duct. With respect to the less essential qualities of Napoleon, we shall find in this passage evidence of the same industrious artifice and anxious de- famation. Although, in 1796, Napoleon's mili- tary reports and despatches are expressed in 37 578 APPENDIX. language modest and simple, the reader is as- sured, upon the word of a baronet, that at a later stage of his career, they will be found to assume a style bombastic, inflated, and pompous. When, however, we come to this later stage in his ca- reer; when we find him on the banks of the Moscowa, in the zenith of power, conquest, and glory, and admire the heroic simplicity of these words: — '' Soldiers! behold the battle which you have so long desired, " etc. j sir Walter protests on the honour of " the great unknown," that, if we turn back to an earlier stage of his career^ we shall find, notwithstanding the sim- ple and impressive style of this address, that his orders and reports were (v. vii, p. 272) expressed in that " tinsel of oratory which he generally used on such occasions." By this ingenious process it will be perceived, that the author of Waverley contrives to acknow- ledge the merit of Napoleon, and at the same time to defame him. If he performs an act of incontestable honour and generosity, the natu- ral motive is artfully withdrawn, to make room for the farfetched imputation of selfish and treach- erous policy. If he discovers a becoming mo- desty to-day, it is instantly asserted that he will become conceited and arrogant to-morrow, and therefore that there is no occasion for praising him; and if to-morrow he maintains a style of severe simplicity, it is boldly aveiTcd that his manner of expression yesterday was remark- CHAPTkr. VI. 5*70 ^hly tinselled and tawdry , and of course that this single exception can entitle him to no credit. As this literary legerdemain when exposed, must disgust all persons of sense and dignity; so the attempt to contaminate with corrupt mo- tives the ordinary solicitude of a commander for his deserving officers, cannot fail to offend mi- litary men, of whatsoever nation. They will •say : — If^sir Walter ScotVs rule of construction become general^ our utmost gallantry may fall to extort recommendations for promotion from our commander in chiefs who must either neglect usj or expose his own honour and delicacy. It is clear that by this forked and poisonous process of defamation— the invention and practice of the greatest writer of his age — the courage of Leo- nidas, the integrity of Fabricius, the patriot- ism of Wallace, and the virtue of Washington, might be plausibly calumniated. There can be no doubt that had Napoleon omitted to recommend the promotion of his me- ritorious officers, the author of Waverley would have imputed his neglect to a jealous policy, to a desire of engrossing the whole credit of the cam- paign to himself. So that in the plan of his work there was a positive certainty that the memory of his hero would incur censure on any given occasion ; no matter what might be the nature of his motives or the tenor of his conduct. In connection with the predetermined defa- mation, sir Walter on the next page misrepre- 58o APPEISBIX. sents and ridicules a passage of the speech of M. Daubermesnil, a member of the council of five hundred, in celebration of the exploits of Bonaparte and his army. It is possible that even a fair version of the passage in question, might expose the French orator to the charge of extra- vagance. But had the author of Waverley com- pared this French oration, with his own effu- sion on the death of George III, he might have found M. Daubermesnirs flourish about Orpheus, Tyrtaeus, and Ossian, tame even to frigidity. In a memoir which was published in the Edinburgh Journal of the 8th of February, 1820, sir Walter Scott poured forth the following strain of idol- atry, which besides shewing his incapacity to discriminate between rank and merit, and being repugnant to every sentiment of moral dignity and religious feeling, is beyond comparison the most successful example of the anticlimax, to be found in the whole compass of English literature. ti Were a voice from heaven to proclaim aloud to us, that there is another and a better world, in which virtue may expect its assured reward^, the testimony of a miracle could not impress the awful truth more deeply upon the mind, than the life and death of George the Third." *^ Next comes Dalhoussey the great god of war, '•'■ Lieutenaut-colonel to the earl of Mar," CHAPTER VI. 58 I Page 281. (5i) No kingdom was ever before conquered by troops in the state Bonaparte's were in, dur- ing this victorious campaign against the king of Sardinia and his aiUes, in the close of which, as sir Walter Scott observes (v. iii, p. ii5), that monarch "had no means of preserving his ca- pital, nay, his existence on the continent, ex- cepting by an almost total submission to the will of the victor." Their distress for subsistence and clothing is thus noticed by the Annual Regis- ter of the period. *'No class of men had sig- nalized their attachment to republican principles with such fervour and constancy as the French soldiery*"^**. Hunger and nakedness had fre- quently been their portion in the midst of their most splendid successes.**** The army of Italy, in particular, had exhibited astonishing exam- ples of fortitude in the most trying situations, that their enemies had concluded, from the re- ports of the difficulties to which they were re- duced, in procuring the means of existence, that nothing else would be needed to compel them to abandon their positions and withdraw to France. * * * * The coarse and digusting food on which they subsisted, was compared to theLacedemo- nian broth of old, and none it was said, but Frenchmen, Greenlanders, or Scotch highland- ers, could have fed on such messes." The legions ofCaisarin the civil war, were 58: APPENDIX, reduced to great extremity while investing the camp of Pompey in the neighbourhood of Dyr- rachium, and lived for the most part on bread made of the root of a plant called chara or wild cabbage. Loaves of this bread, the reader will remember, they were in the habit of throwing to the outposts of Pompey, in order to convince their adversaries that they were not likely to re- lax in their exertions, for want of food. But at this time Caesar made no conquests. On the contrary Pompey made a sally in which he gained a victory, destroyed a number of Caesar's best troops, and forced him to break up his camp, change the plan of the war, and march into Thessaly (Caesar, Bello Civili, 1. iii). In the Par- thian war, Anthony and his troops exhibited, under privations of this kind, great courage, forti- tude and patience; but it was in a retreat, in which their efforts were confined to self-preservation, in which they suffered great loss, and the Ro- man soldiers pillaged their commander's tent (Plutarch, Life of Anthony). In sir JohnMoore's retreat to Corunna, although his troops came to their colours whenever the enemy appeared, and constantly repulsed, and finally defeated marshal Soult, the British commander had re- nounced all hopes of conquest and fought only for safety (Napier's Peninsular War, v. i, ch. 5). Bonaparte's short campaign of Montenotte and Cherasco, in which with an army half as nume- rous as. the one opposed to him, he subdued a CHAPTER VI. 585 strong kingdom, in a fortnight, and, notwith- standing his exertions to procure regular sup- plies, comparatively speaking, without rations, cannon, or cavalry, stands alone in the annals of warfare. Page 281. (52; In a letter of the istofMay, general Ver- dier, the adjutant general of Augereau's division, reported that a corporal and a private of the sixth regiment of carabiniers, had been shot under the sentence of a court martial, for the commission of thefts with violence (Correspondence inedite, t. i, p. 119). This fact would alone disprove all sir Walter Scott's assertions about Napoleon's system of marauding — (See also on this subject V^ictoires et Conquetes, t. v, p. 2i/{). Page 282. (55) Montholon, t. iii, pp. 192, 195, — ^' The minds of the people in Piedmont were greatly agitated • the court did not enjoy public confi- dence; it placed itself at the discretion of Napo- leon, and solicited an armistice. Many persons would have wished that the army should march on Turin. Officers and even generals did not conceive it prudent to undertake the conquest of Italy, with so small a force of artillery, ca- valry so badly mounted, and an army so feeble, and likely to be reduced every day by sickness and remoteness from France." At page 197 of the same volume, Napoleon recites in substance the 584 APPENDIX. arguments of the officers ^vlio were opposed to invading Lombardy, and who suggested '* that it would be more advantageous to profit by the success already gained, and to revolutionize Piedmont and Genoa, before going farther." In the instructions of the directory of the 6th of March, the reader will find the following sentence, "The generalin chief will endeavour by all means in his power to excite the malcon- tents of Piedmont, and to make them breakout in a general or partial insurrection, against the court of Turin." Having gone beyond the hopes of the directory, in conquering Piedmont, Napo- leon could aflford to disregard this odious instruc- tion which was intended as a means of gaining advantages, which his campaign had without those means transcended. Page 284. (34) It appears from the despatch of Car- not of the 7th of May approving the armistice, that Napoleon had obtained the assent of Sali- cetti on the occasion, a form which although he makes no allusion to it in communicating to the government the terms of the truce, was no doubt pleasing to the directors, as it seemed to make the general's departure from the letter of their orders, less direct. Page 28S, (55) In a letter to Napoleon of the 25th of April Carnot says — "All France, all Europe CHAPTF.R Vf, 585 have their eyes fixed upon you. Your triumphs are those of Hberty." And Lockhart, the editor of the Quartex'ly Review, in 1829, speaking of this period of his Hfe observes (v. i, p. 43) : '^ The name of Bonaparte was spotless, and the eyes of all Europe were fixed in admiration on his ca- reer. — The contradictions between these ex- pressions and the narrative and insinuations of the same author, and more particularly of sir Walter Scott, now that their misrepresentations have been exposed, render^ this admission of no further value than as it affords for the progress of this work, a point of departure, up to which, according to the solemn decision of a " British historian," and the obiter dictum of an exalted literary judge, the spotless name, and unqualified merit of Napoleon, cannot be legally disputed or justly denied. Page 28o. (56). The armies of Moreau and Jourdan on the Rhine, although it was understood they were to operate in concert vvith tbe army of Italy, remained inactive in their cantonments until the month of June (Jomini, t. viii, p. i65). Page 28o. (57) Maria Louisa confessed to the emperor that when their marriage was first talked of, she experienced a certain insuppressible fright, in consequence of the bad terms in which she had 586 APPENDIX. been accustomed to hear the members of her family speak of Napoleon, and that when she reminded them of it, her uncles, the archdukes, who urged her very much to consent to the mar- riage, replied, ^' all that was true only while he was our enemy, but he is no longer our enemy now.^' '^ Indeed, to give an idea," said the em- peror, 'of the benevolent feelings toward me in which that family was educated, there was one of the young archdukes who often burned his puppets, saying that he was roasting Napo- leon (Las Cases, t. i, pp. 418-19)." i Iff t-i *\ 5 i ■.* THE END. ERRATA. Pabfacb, in the last page, line i, after and erase the comma. Page 12 line 23, for ephemeroe read ephemern. 32 line '],{ov drowed read drotvned. 86 — 7, for with t/ie read with /lis. 112 — 2, after coun add /rj. 129 — 8, after ro/)Ojerf an for bold read boldest. 52 1 — 10, for letter's read letters. 525 — 23, erase an. 526 — 7, for exercice raad exercise. 529 — 16, for soldiers read soldier. 539 — 2, for (f Acncc read (v/ierc. 546 — I i, for strangeljr read stronglj: 55o — 2, for 0/ judge, read /o judge. 559 — 27, for Cenoni read Cerconi. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY UBRABIES L 0315021572