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AUTHOR: 
 
 GUTHRIE, MALCOLM 
 
 TITLE : 
 
 SPENCER'S 
 
 UNIFICATION OF 
 
 KNOWLEDGE 
 
 PLA CE : 
 
 LONDON 
 
 DA TE : 
 
 1882 
 
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 ox MR. SPENCER'S 
 
 UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
ON 
 
 MR. SPENCEE'S 
 
 \ 
 
 UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 BAO.ANTYNE. HANSON AND CO. 
 EDINBURGH AND LONt>ON 
 
 BY, 
 
 MALCOLM GUTHRIE, 
 
 AUTHOR OF 
 ON MR. spencer's FORMULA OF EVOLUTION." 
 
 »■ o 
 
 TRUBNER 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 & CO., LUDGATE 
 
 1882. 
 
 [AU rights reserved.] 
 
 HILL. 
 
 «*\ . 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 5054J 
 
 This work, taken in conjunction with a previous one "On 
 Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution," must be regarded 
 as a criticism of the general logical construction of Mr. 
 Spencer's philosophical system. The writer is not opposed 
 to the author he criticises as regards the scientific doctrine 
 of evolution or natural development, so far as it is known 
 to us ; but he sees great blanks in the deductive treatment, 
 and great failures of explanation, which cause him to re- 
 gard Mr. Spencer's presumed fulness of exposition as 
 merely illusory. 
 
 In so far as Mr. Spencer's work is viewed as an 
 attempt to show the ci priori reasonableness of evolution 
 by gradual development already established in various 
 departments of science by d posteriori methods, it may 
 be held to have accomplished its object ; but in so far as 
 it claims to have put together a framework of thought 
 commensurate with all the sequences of the cosmos, it 
 must be considered a disjointed structure, from which as 
 yet several connecting parts are missing. And it will 
 be found that the deductive system which Mr. Spencer 
 attempts is so mystical in its fundamental ideas, as well 
 as so incomplete in its logical connections, that, regarded 
 
 >- 
 
VI 
 
 PREFA CE. 
 
 PRE FA CE, 
 
 Vll 
 
 as a system of Philosophy, it is as vague as it is ill 
 constructed. 
 
 Thus, although the writer is fundamentally in sympathy 
 with the goal of Mr. Spencer's attempt, and although he 
 accepts the same d posteriori truths, he is nevertheless 
 compelled to criticise adversely the ambitious claims of 
 the system, with the faultiness of reasoning and general 
 bad workmanship entailed by the supposed accomplish- 
 ment of the endeavour. Although it is important that 
 established truths should be frankly accepted, however 
 inharmonious with previous beliefs, it is equally important 
 that imperfections of theory should be freely acknow- 
 ledged. The attempt to outrun the gradual growth of 
 knowledge by filling in every hiatus with theoretical ex- 
 planations is a positive obstruction to the progress of 
 science. 
 
 Although the first principles of a science are the first 
 in logical order, they are generally the last in order of 
 discovery. They are arrived at by generalisations of ex- 
 tended experience. They mark the attainment of true 
 scientific inductions, and manifest their correctness by the 
 explanations they are able to afford. They enable us to 
 discern the coherence of large classes of facts, and give 
 us the power to forecast a line of sequences whereby 
 we may direct them to the accomplishment of desired 
 ends, or shape our actions to those coming events which 
 are beyond our control. As an instrument of discovery, 
 first principles are of very little value, and, on account of 
 the many chances of error, and of the fascination which the 
 idea of a completed system exercises over the imagination 
 
 of great minds, the search after them has been fruitful of 
 
 error. 
 
 The present undertaking, therefore, is to be regarded 
 not as an attack upon the evolutionism of Lamarck, nor as 
 an attack upon the evolutionism of Lyell or Darwin, nor 
 yet upon the evolutionism of Spencer as regards the de- 
 velopment of intelligence, but as an attack upon the 
 theory which attempts to combine all these into one con- 
 tinuous process. Moreover, the criticism is not made 
 upon the ground that such a theory, in the nature of 
 things, cannot be established, but that as yet it is not 
 established, and that in the endeavour towards its ac- 
 complishment Mr. Spencer fails. It may even be asserted 
 that there is not anywhere discernible the probable or 
 possible grounds of such an universal connection of se- 
 quences. 
 
 The writer finds himself in accord with Mr. Spencer in 
 maintaining that any merely materialistic or mechanical 
 interpretation of the universe is beyond question insufficient 
 to account for what we find in it. He is not in accord 
 with him in supposing that the theory of the "double 
 aspect " is intelligible and capable of completing a logical 
 explanation. He is not in accord with him in supposing 
 that mysticism completes explanations partially effected 
 by intelligible methods. And he is not in accord with 
 him in his estimate of what can be accomplished by 
 means of the concrete factors he actually employs, more 
 particularly in the deductions of biology. 
 
 So curiously inconsistent is Mr. Spencer's position, as 
 at the same time that of the scientific man giving: con- 
 
VI 
 
 PREFA CE. 
 
 PREFA CE. 
 
 vu 
 
 i\ 
 
 as a system of Philosophy, it is as vague as it is ill 
 constructed. 
 
 Thus, although the writer is fundamentally in sympathy 
 with the goal of Mr. Spencer's attempt, and although he 
 accepts the same a posteriori truths, he is nevertheless 
 compelled to criticise adversely the ambitious claims of 
 the system, with the faultiness of reasoning and general 
 bad workmanship entailed by the supposed accomplish- 
 ment of the endeavour. Although it is important that 
 established truths should be frankly accepted, however 
 inharmonious with previous beliefs, it is equally important 
 that imperfections of theory should be freely acknow- 
 ledged. The attempt to outrun the gradual growth of 
 knowledge by filling in every hiatus with theoretical ex- 
 planations is a positive obstruction to the progress of 
 
 science. 
 
 Although the first principles of a science are the first 
 in logical order, they are generally the last in order of 
 discovery. They are arrived at by generalisations of ex- 
 tended experience. They mark the attainment of true 
 scientific inductions, and manifest their correctness by the 
 explanations they are able to afford. They enable us to 
 discern the coherence of large classes of facts, and give 
 us the power to forecast a line of sequences whereby 
 we may direct them to the accomplishment of desired 
 ends, or shape our actions to those coming events which 
 are beyond our control. As an instrument of discovery, 
 first principles are of very little value, and, on account of 
 the many chances of error, and of the fascination which the 
 idea of a completed system exercises over the imagination 
 
 of great minds, the search after them has been fruitful of 
 
 error. 
 
 The present undertaking, therefore, is to be regarded 
 not as an attack upon the evolutionism of Lamarck, nor as 
 an attack upon the evolutionism of Lyell or Darwin, nor 
 yet upon the evolutionism of Spencer as regards the de- 
 velopment of intelligence, but as an attack upon the 
 theory which attempts to combine all these into one con- 
 tinuous process. Moreover, the criticism is not made 
 upon the ground that such a theory, in the nature of 
 things, cannot be established, but that as yet it is not 
 established, and that in the endeavour towards its ac- 
 complishment Mr. Spencer fails. It may even be asserted 
 that there is not anywhere discernible the probable or 
 possible grounds of such an universal connection of se- 
 quences. 
 
 The writer finds himself in accord with Mr. Spencer in 
 maintaining that any merely materialistic or mechanical 
 interpretation of the universe is beyond question insufficient 
 to account for what we find in it. He is not in accord 
 with him in supposing that the theory of the "double 
 aspect " is intelligible and capable of completing a logical 
 explanation. He is not in accord with him in supposing 
 that mysticism completes explanations partially effected 
 by intelligible methods. And he is not in accord with 
 him in his estimate of what can be accomplished by 
 means of the concrete factors he actually employs, more 
 particularly in the deductions of biology. 
 
 So curiously inconsistent is Mr. Spencer's position, as 
 at the same time that of the scientific man sivins con- 
 
Vlll 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 Crete explanations of concrete sequences, and that of the 
 mystic basing his explanations on symboUsm, that the 
 whole course of the criticism may be taken as a vindi- 
 cation of Mr. Spencer's final conclusion that :— 
 
 " Matter, Motion, and Force are but the x, y, and z with 
 which we work our equations, and formulate the various 
 relations among phenomena in such way as to express 
 their order in terms of x, y, and 2— though I have shown 
 that the realities for which x, y, and z stand, cannot be 
 conceived by us as existing thus or thus without commit- 
 ting ourselves to alternative absurdities." * 
 
 In the predicament thus described we actually find 
 ourselves whenever we pursue to their logical results 
 any of Mr. Spencer's formulas of explanation, if we 
 attach to the terms employed any definite meaning; 
 and in this verdict of the author himself is to be found 
 the most potent vindication of the course of the present 
 
 criticism. 
 
 The present work may indeed be regarded as undertaken 
 in the interests of the purity of scientific thought, and for 
 the promotion of correct methods of scientific investiga- 
 tion, by showing the futility of those methods which 
 anticipate the results of study, and by exposing the conse- 
 quent abuses of logic and of words, more particularly in the 
 employment of the latter as more than merely representative 
 of certain concrete facts. This, and any actual clearance 
 of imperfect theory, constitute the only claim which the 
 present book may have upon the attention of the student. 
 To the higher claim of positive accomplishment it does not 
 
 * First Principles, p. 580. 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 IX 
 
 aspire. The uses of criticism are negative only. Never- 
 theless this subordinate task has its own place in the 
 elucidation of truth. 
 
 It is not to be expected that Mr. Spencer should reply 
 to these criticisms. The public will fally appreciate his 
 objections to the controversies attendant upon replies and 
 rejoinders, as well from their unsatisfactory results as 
 from the interruption of work which they entail. The 
 public will fully understand that silence does not imply 
 the lack of any answer to our positions, but that Mr. 
 Spencer is occupied with work having greater claims upon 
 his attentioji. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 ON MR. SPENCERS UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 § I. The Unification of Knowledge as the Main Object of Mr, 
 
 Spencer's Works 
 
 § 2. The Form of the Unification of Knowledge . 
 § 3. Mr. Spencer's Unificatory Predicates .... 
 § 4. The Mystical Methods of the Unification of Knowledge . 
 § 5. The I*sychological Methods of the Unification of Knowledge 
 § 6, The Metaphysical Methods of the Unification of Knowledge 
 § 7. The Physical Methods for the Unification of Knowledge 
 § 8. An Enumeration of Mr. Spencer's Physical Methods for the 
 Unification of Knowledge .... 
 
 (a) Hypothesis of the Seventy Factors 
 (6) Hypothesis of the One Factor 
 
 § 9. The Supraphysical Methods for the Unification of Knowledge 
 
 (a) Supraphysical Hypotheses Strictly Considered 
 {h) Hypotheses Including Feeling 
 
 (c) Other Supraphysical Hypotheses 
 
 (d) The Hypothesis of Three Factors 
 (f) The Hypothesis of One Factor 
 (/) The Hypothesis of Two Factors 
 
 § 10. The Supraphysical Methods and Mr. Spencer's use of them 
 §11. The Method of Cumulative Factors .... 
 § 12. The Symbolic Method for the Unification of Knowledge 
 
 § 13. Simulations of Unification 
 
 § 14. General Summary .... .... 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I 
 
 6 
 8 
 
 9 
 22 
 
 30 
 
 37 
 
 41 
 
 41 
 43 
 
 50 
 
 51 
 
 53 
 56 
 59 
 
 63 
 
 70 
 
 78 
 
 79 
 82 
 
 86 
 89 
 
xu 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 REPLY TO MR. SPENCER's CRITICISM. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 93 
 
 § I. Justification of Previous Criticism 
 
 § 2. Considerations Leading up to a Study of Mr. Spencer's Posi- 
 tion as restated by him in the Appendix to " First Prin- 
 ciples" 99 
 
 (o) On Theories of Knowledge 99 
 
 (b) Digression : being an Examination of the Second 
 
 Chapter of Mill's " Examination of Sir W. 
 Hamilton's Philosophy," entitled the "Rela- 
 tivity of Human Knowledge " . . . IIO 
 
 (c) On Conceptions 117 
 
 (d) Mr. Spencer's Scheme as restated in his Appendix 
 
 to " First Principles " 121 
 
 {«) On the Algebraical Illustration of the Theory that 
 Knowledge can be Unified by means of the 
 Formulation of the Relations of Factors, the 
 Factors themselves being Unknown . . 1 30 
 
 § 3. The Double- Aspect Theory 1 37 
 
 § 4. Criticism to which Mr. Spencer has not Replied . . .143 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 < 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS. 
 
 § I. The Continuity of Motion 145 
 
 § 2. The Ultimate Problem I S3 
 
 § 3. Mr. Spencer's Admissions of his Failure to Account for Con- 
 sciousness 155 
 
 § 4. Does Mr. Spencer Profess to Explain the Universe? . . 158 
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 xiu 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 AN EXAMINATION OF THE " PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY " WITH 
 REGARD TO ITS POSITION IN THE SYSTEM FOR THE UNIFICATION 
 OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 § I. The Psychological Method for the Unification of Knowledge . 163 
 
 (a) Study of Part VII. of the " Principles of Psycho- 
 
 logy " 163 
 
 (b) Digression 17' 
 
 (c) Resumption of the Study of the " Psychology " . 178 
 
 (d) The Final Question 181 
 
 (e) Summary of this Section 195 
 
 § 2. The Problem of the " Psychology," being a Consideration of 
 the Science of Psychology with Regard to its Place in Mr. 
 Spencer's Constructive Scheme ...... 196 
 
 (a) What is Psychology ? 196 
 
 (6) What is Evolution ? 204 
 
 (c) Digression on Verbal Modes of Identifying Pro- 
 
 cesses 205 
 
 (d) Psychology Considered as a Direct Deduction 
 
 from the Persistence of Force . . . .212 
 {e) Psychology Considered as an Indirect Deduction 
 
 through Physical Histories . . . .213 
 (/) General Considerations with Regard to the Unifi- 
 cation of Knowledge . . . . .218 
 
 § 3. The Double- Aspect Theory 221 
 
 Appendix to this Section — 
 
 (a) Professor Clifford on the Double- Aspect Theory . 231 
 (6) Dr. Bain on the Double- Aspect Theory . . 245 
 
XIV 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 AN EXAMINATION OF THE "PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY " WITH REGARD 
 
 TO ITS PLACE IN MR. SPENCER's SYSTEM. 
 
 § I. General Considerations 
 
 (o) The Mystical Method Excluded . 
 (6) The Metaphysical Method Excluded 
 
 (c) The Psychological Method Excluded 
 
 (d) Feeling and Consciousness Excluded 
 
 (e) Simulations of Unification . 
 (/) The Theory of " Additional Factors ' 
 (g) An Intelligible Explanation only to be Attempted 
 
 by the Physical or Concrete Method 
 
 § 2. The Data of Biology 
 
 § 3. The Actions of Forces on Organic Matter, and the Reactions 
 of Organic Matter on Forces 
 The Definition of "Life" 
 
 §4 
 §5 
 
 The Inductions of Biology 
 
 (a) Growth 
 
 (6) Development 
 
 (c) Function 
 
 (d) Waste and Repair 
 («) Adaptation . 
 
 § 6. General Causes of Physiological Development 
 § 7. How is Organic Evolution Caused ? 
 § 8. Equilibration — 
 
 (o) Introductory .... 
 (6) Equilibration of Motion 
 
 (c) Equilibration and the Conservation of 
 
 (d) Equilibration and Force 
 
 (e) Equilibration as a Universal Process 
 (/) Modes of Equilibration 
 
 Energy 
 
 PAGE 
 264 
 
 264 
 265 
 265 
 266 
 272 
 279 
 
 28s 
 289 
 
 295 
 297 
 300 
 
 301 
 302 
 
 305 
 306 
 
 3" 
 
 314 
 
 314 
 
 315 
 316 
 
 317 
 319 
 
 (jg) Unstable Equilibrium . . . • 
 
 {h) Moving Equilibria . . • • 
 
 (t) Equilibration and Structure . 
 
 (Jfc) The Motions of Moving Equilibria 
 
 {I) ^Moving Equilibria : Waste and Repair 
 
 (m) The Evolution of Moving Equilibria . 
 
 (n) Moving Equilibria and Simple Equilibration 
 
 § 9. Ut. Spencer's Account of Equilibration— 
 
 (a) The Equilibration of Motions . . . • 
 (6) The Equilibration of Forces 
 
 (c) Mr. Spencer's Interpretation of Moving Equilibria 
 
 (d) Suggested Identical Interpretation of Organic 
 
 Evolution 
 
 («) Statement of the Argument 
 
 (/) The Origin and Maintenance of Moving Equilibria 
 {g) General Survey of the Counterbalances 
 (h) Feeling and Consciousness as External Factors . 
 (t) Feeling and Consciousness as Counterbalance 
 
 § 10. Mr. Spencer's Scheme of Biological Reconstruction Considered 
 
 as the Outcome of the Laws of the Moving Equilibrium . 
 
 § II. General Review of Mr. Spencer's Scheme of Biological Recon- 
 
 btruction . . ...•••• 
 
 (a) General Principles of Morphological Development 
 
 (6) The Morphological Development of Animals 
 
 (c) Mr. Spencer's Exposition of Physiological De 
 
 velopment 
 
 (d) How Organic Development is Affiliated upon 
 
 Evolution in General 
 
 § 12. Indirect Equilibration 
 
 § 13. The Inner Formative Forces of Organism— Polarity 
 (a) General Considerations 
 (6) Polarity, Growth and Development 
 
 (c) Polarity and Function . . . • 
 
 (d) Polarity and Waste and Repair . 
 
 (e) Polarity in General .... 
 (/) Polarity and Physiological Units . 
 (g) Polarity and Genesis . . . • 
 
 XT 
 
 PAGE 
 320 
 321 
 
 323 
 327 
 
 329 
 330 
 332 
 
 333 
 335 
 336 
 
 344 
 355 
 356 
 
 358 
 361 
 
 362 
 
 368 
 
 376 
 
 377 
 
 379 
 
 381 
 
 394 
 
 396 
 401 
 401 
 408 
 409 
 410 
 413 
 
 415 
 416 
 
 ^J^l 
 
XVI 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (A) Polarity and Heredity 4^8 
 
 (t) Polarity and Variation 420 
 
 (k) Polarity as a Factor in Genesis, Heredity, and 
 
 Variation 4^2 
 
 {I) The Double Power of Physiological Units in Con- 
 struction and Modifiability .... 425 
 (m) A Concrete Case of Biological Reconstruction . 427 
 (n) The Affiliation of Polarity upon Evolution in 
 
 General, and its Relation to Physical Science . 435 
 
 § 14. General Review of the Argument 439 
 
 § 15. The dp-iori Explanation of Genesis and Reproduction . . 445 
 
 § 16. Natural Selection— Its a priori Interpretation . . . 462 
 
 § 17. The Theory of Accidental Origins 469 
 
 § 18. Summary 475 
 
 ON MR. SPENCER'S 
 
 UNIFICATION^ OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
ON 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF 
 
 KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 -♦♦- 
 
 CEAPTER I. 
 
 § I. Tlie Unification of Knowledge as tJie Main Ohjed of 
 
 Mr. Spencer's Works. 
 
 Mr. Herbert Spencer has published a number of volumes with 
 the evident intention of producing a considerable effect upon 
 the course of human thought. These volumes are fuU of sug- 
 gestive thinking, and display in many respects great insight. 
 The amount of care and research involved in their production is 
 manifest, and their influence on modern thought, though vague, 
 
 is undoubted. 
 
 At the same time, it may be questioned whether that portion 
 of the public which has endeavoured to judge of Mr. Spencer's 
 undertaking without theological prejudice, and has in part 
 acknowledged his theories, has ever set itself thoroughly to 
 understand" him, to judge of the consistency and coherency of 
 his works as a whole, to estimate properly his main endeavour, 
 and to range in their due places his subordinate tasks. That 
 Buch should be the case is not at all surprising, for the bias of 
 modern thought is all in Mr. Spencer's favour, and men naturally 
 prefer to have their thinking done for them, being pleased 
 when they find their own half-formed theories receive apparently 
 a full and cogent expression. Such, indeed, was the present 
 
2 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 writer's feeling ; but having set himself to explain Mr. Spencer's 
 works to a Philosophical Society, he found himself in tlie diffi- 
 culties already set forth in a previous work and about to be 
 stated in this. 
 
 Now, it must be clearly borne in mind that Mr. Spencer's 
 series of books is essentially one work. The volumes on " Bio- 
 logy," " Psychology," *' Sociology," " Ethics," &c., are not inde- 
 pendent treatises upon these different sciences, but unite in a 
 series as links in a continuous chain, forming one whole System 
 of Philosophy. The question therefore arises, what is the 
 main idea of Mr. Spencer's series of works 1 what is his principal 
 purpose ? what is the one great object he has in view, to which 
 all these separate volumes are subservient 1 
 
 That the unification of knowledge is the set purpose of Mr. 
 Spencer's works appears, wd think, open to no dispute. What- 
 ever assertion we may make respecting other views of our author 
 which he may consider misapprehensions, we believe that he 
 will not shrink from acknowledging this intention as holding 
 the first and foremost place in his Philosophy. It is the ruling 
 idea of the whole work. It is the principal purpose he holds in 
 view throughout the exposition of his doctrines. He not only 
 sets it out plainly before his readers in commencing his labours, 
 but he refers to it throughout the whole series of volumes as 
 being the end, indeed, to which they subserve. 
 
 To make this clear, let us study the first chapter of the book 
 on The Knowable (" First Principles "), entitled " Philosophy 
 Defined," in which Mr. Spencer tells us what is Philosophy 
 and what are its aims. On p. 131 we find it stated that Philo- 
 sophy is " knowledge of tlie highest degree of generality ; " and 
 again we are asked — " What must be the specific shape here 
 given to this conception? The range of intelligence we find 
 to be limited to the relative. Though persistently conscious 
 of a Power manifested to us, we have abandoned as futile 
 the attempt to learn anything respecting the nature of that 
 Power; and so have shut out Philosophy from much of 
 the domain supposed to belong to it. The domain left is 
 that occupied by Science. Science concerns itself with the 
 coexistences and sequences among phenomena ; grouping these 
 
 MAIN OBJECT OF MR. SPENCER. 3 
 
 at first into generalisations of a simple or low order, and 
 rising gradually to higher and more extended generalisations." 
 Science includes the family of the sciences— Mechanics, Physics, 
 Chemistry, Geology, Biology, Psychology, Sociology, Ethics, &c. 
 Philosophy is the knowledge constituted by the fusion of all 
 these contributions into a whole. Science consists of truths 
 more or less separated, and does not recognise these truths as 
 entirely integrated, — and whatever " integrated " may mean, we 
 presume it must imply unification. 
 
 We are next shown the historical growth and organisation 
 of knowledge, from crude experiences embodied in particular 
 propositions, to general propositions embracing a large number 
 of experiences of a similar character. Some of the highest 
 triumphs of Science have been achieved when classes of pro- 
 positions of diverse characters have been unified in a proposition 
 which has been able to embrace and express them all within 
 the meaning of its terms. Thus it is seen that the organisation 
 of knowledge is a building-u|rprocess ; we go from induction to 
 induction, ever reaching propositions of wider and more com- 
 prehensive sweep, the busy thinkers of humanity bringing the 
 results of their labours to an edifice which mounts up pyramid- 
 wise towards the apex which shall crown the entire structure. 
 
 As each wider general proposition is formed, it will be seen 
 that the less- wide included propositions " as well as isolated 
 particular propositions, become, as a mode of thought, corol- 
 laries from that wider proposition. It is true the wider pro- 
 position itself has been reached inductively, and is justified 
 by original observations and experience, and by the successive 
 generalisations which led up to it ; but when it is once formed, 
 these in their turn become but corollaries of the more general 
 proposition. Such general propositions form the key to know- 
 ledge, and enable us to foretell from givon circumstances whole 
 series of events. We find expressed in them the law of the rela- 
 tions of factors by which we are able to foresee a long course of 
 sequences. Thei^e are the truths and genemlisations of Science 
 which constitute the triumphs of intellectual achievement. 
 
 What shall we say then ? Shall wo arrive at a time when 
 these larger truths shall themselves be comprehended in some 
 
4 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 stiU wider generalisations, and may we eventually look forward 
 to the unification of all knowledge in a single proposition? "If 
 so, the process must apparently be analogous to past methods. 
 We must build up to it by wider generalisations of the widest 
 scientific truths, and then we shall have a proposition from 
 which aU others are seen to be corollaries, and from which all 
 future sequences can be deduced. 
 
 Thus we see that the unification of knowledge must have a 
 double justification, and be capable of a double statement and 
 exposition. It must be the legitimate outcome of an inductive 
 or building-up process, and as a mode of thought it must bo 
 embodied in a proposition from which, as corollaries, all the 
 included truths or propositions are deducible. This, then, is 
 the goal of Philosophy, and will be found to accord with Mr. 
 Spencer's teachings. After citing several instances in which 
 a single scientific formula expresses a large number of diverse 
 individual facts (which passages, for the fuller understanding 
 of the argument, should be carefully read), he continues (p. 
 
 133): — 
 
 " And now how is Philosophy constituted 1 It is constituted 
 
 by carrying a stage further the process indicated. So long as 
 these truths are known only apart and regarded as independent, 
 even the most general of them cannot without laxity of speech 
 be called philosophical. But when, having been severally 
 reduced to a simple mechanical axiom, a principle of molecular 
 physics, and a law of social action, they are contemplated 
 together as corollaries of some ultimate truth, then we rise to 
 the kind of knowledge that constitutes Philosophy proper. 
 
 '* The truths of Philosophy thus bear the same relation to 
 the highest scientific truths that each of these bears to lower 
 scientific truths. . , . It is the final product of that process 
 which begins with a mere colligation of cnide observations, 
 goes on establishing propositions that are broader and more 
 separated from particular cases, and ends in universal proposi- 
 tions. Or to bring the definition to its simplest and clearest 
 
 form : Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unified knowledge; 
 
 Science is paHially-uniJied knowledge ; Philosophy is coTnjpletelt/- 
 unijied knowledge." 
 
 MAIN OBJECT OF MR. SPENCER. $ 
 
 Mr. Spencer goes on to a passage which seems to mean, that 
 if we frame an universal proposition, either rigidly by an induc- 
 tive process not overstepping the bounds of actual knowledge, 
 or by consciously overstepping these bounds and forming a 
 hypothesis concerning the universal proposition, then we have 
 two forms of Philosophy — in the one case the universal proposi- 
 tion is the product of the induction, and in the other case it is 
 the means or instrument of exploration — in the latter event it 
 must be justified by its agreement with experiences and the 
 amount of interpretation it accomplishes in expressing the rela- 
 tions of sequences. Mr. Spencer would seem to imply that the 
 strictly inductive method, by never going beyond the bounds of 
 experience, is insufficient as a means of explanation, and we 
 must have recourse to hypothesis, so that, setting out with some 
 hypothetical universal truth, we judge of its merits by the results 
 — the test being that its corollaries shall be found coincident 
 with the sequences of Nature. 
 
 Mr. Spencer, it may be remarked, does not say this explicitly, 
 but it seems to be what he attempts to say, and it is certainly 
 what he ought to say to make it conformable to his previous 
 reasoning. This is what he does say in the second paragraph 
 
 of § 38 :— 
 
 " Two forms of Philosophy, as thus understood, may be dis- 
 tinguished and dealt with separately. On the one hand, the 
 things contemplated may be the universal truths : all particular 
 truths referred to being used simply for proof or elucidation of 
 these universal truths. On the other hand, setting out with the 
 universal truths as granted, the things contemplated may be the 
 particular truths as interpreted by them." (Query ^ deduced 
 from them ?) "In both cases we deal with the universal truths ; 
 but in the one case they are passive and in the other case active 
 — in the one case they form tJie products of exploration^ and in 
 the other case Vie instruments of exploration.^^ 
 
 However, our only object at present is to establish the fact 
 that Mr. Spencer's main purpose is the unification of know- 
 ledge. We see that he sets it down as the goal of Philosophy, 
 and we can only suppose, after this precise initial statement, that 
 not only the "First Principles" but all his other works are 
 
6 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 written with this end in view. We therefore propose entering 
 upon a broad examination of these works, with the purpose of 
 ascertaining how far they contribute to that end. But first we 
 will inquire as to the conditions of the proposed unification 
 itself. 
 
 %2. The Form of the Unification of Knowledfje. 
 
 What, then, must be the form of the unification of know- 
 ledge 1 We hold that all knowledge is expressed in proposi- 
 tions. All knowledge is of the relations of things or the rela- 
 tions of sequences, and all coherent knowledge is expressed m 
 propositions of one sort or another. Firstly we have singular 
 propositions, next wider propositions, again propositions of a 
 still more general character, and finally perhaps universal pro- 
 positions. But nothing is worthy of the name of knowledge 
 that cannot be set down in a proposition. Still more : nothing is 
 worthy of the name of a proposition, the terms of which do not 
 convey a distinct impression to the mind, the separate parts of 
 which have not distinct meanings and definite intelligibility. This 
 is indeed our experience in the actual progress of Science. Scien- 
 tific progress has been made by the formulation of science, that 
 is, by the framing of specifically knowable propositions, and it 
 is only when generalisations of thought have taken this definite 
 form that they have been entitled to a place in the organisation 
 of knowledge, and formed firm points for fresh departures If, 
 then, the formation of Philosophy must be by a method analo- 
 gous to that of Science, the outcome must have equally the 
 proper form of knowledge, and appear with clear intelligibility 
 in a proposition framed of definite terms. To say that it 
 should not so do is to say that we seek for the unification of 
 knowledge in non-knowledge and in other ways than the ways 
 
 of Science. 
 
 " The answer to every question which it is possible to frame," 
 says Mr. Mill, "is contained in a Proposition, or Assertion. 
 Whatever can be an object of belief, or even of disbelief, must, 
 when put into words, assume the form of a proposition. All 
 truth and all error lie in propositions. AMiat, by a convenient 
 
 I 
 
 FORM OF THE UNIFICATION. 7 
 
 misapplication of an abstract term, we call a Truth, is simply a 
 True Proposition ; and errors are false propositions." * 
 
 A proposition consists of three parts— a subject, a predicate, 
 and a copula. ^\Tiat, then, should be the terms of an unifica- 
 tory proposition ? It must be all-embracing ; it must comprise 
 the cosmos. In order to do this our subject must be thus ex- 
 pressed : All existences, all sequences, or all existences and their 
 interrelations, or the interrelations of aU existences ; the copula 
 will be the word " are ; " and the predicate will be the universal 
 truth which is to unify knowledge. 
 
 AVhat then is the right method of procedure for framing this 
 universal proposition 1 Can we reach it as the natural outcome, 
 bv induction, of the present state of the sciences? or does that 
 state justify us in framing some hypothetical proposition which 
 we can afterwards verify by the identification of its corollaries 
 with the course of nature, and thus cause it in its turn to assist 
 the inductive process, by enabling us to fill up the blanks in the 
 connections of the sciences 1 or must we start boldly with some 
 purely original hypothesis and try it on its own merits ? Evi- 
 dently the former course is that justified by experience. We 
 must consider how Science leads— see if we can frame a propo- 
 sition in harmony with it, and then test it as described. This 
 is indeed the manner of Mr. Spencer, save that he refrains from 
 the rigid test of one definite proposition. 
 
 Nevertheless we are under the necessity of framing one, and 
 one only, and the first question that arises is whether we must 
 include in our subject "all existences" or only their interrela- 
 tions'! But since existences for the most part are compound 
 and had preceding histories, they must, according to Mr. Spencer 
 ("First Principles," p. 541), be included in our proposition. 
 
 He says : — 
 
 " It was shown that a Philosophy stands self convicted of 
 inadequacy, if it does not formulate the whole series of changes 
 passed through by every existence in its passage from the 
 imperceptible to the perceptible, and again from the perceptible 
 to the imperceptible. If it begins its explanations with exist- 
 
 • J. S. MiU's Logic, vol. i. p. 21. 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 \ 
 
 V 
 
!n 
 
 8 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 ences that already have concrete " (Query, perceptible ?) " forms, 
 or leaves off while they still retain concrete forms ; then mani- 
 festly, they had preceding histories, or wiU have succeeding his- 
 tories, or both, of which no account is given. And as such 
 preceding and succeeding histories are subjects of possible know- 
 ledcre, a Philosophy which says nothing about them falls short 
 of the required unification. Whence we saw it to follow that 
 the formula sought, equally applicable to existences taken singly 
 and in their totality, must be applicable to the whole history 
 of each and to the whole history of all." 
 
 This passage must be accepted with some modifications. 
 Evidently the perceptible and the concrete are treated as iden- 
 tical. Evidently also the history of the passage of the imper- 
 ceptible into the concrete or perceptible is beyond the pale of 
 knowled-e and therefore of Philosophy, although Mr. Spencer 
 says here that it is the subject of possible knowledge. Also 
 the element of perceptibility, though a condition of an existence 
 being within knowledge, is not a condition of the independent 
 exist°ence and order of nature. Several of these matters will 
 hereafter have to be discussed. In the meantime it seems evi- 
 dent from the passage quoted that we shall have to include in 
 
 our subject 
 
 ** All existences and their interrelations ; " 
 the copula of course will be the word « are," and the predicate 
 will be the ultimate truth. 
 
 And since this ultimate truth, whether it be a rigid induction 
 or of a hypothetical nature, must be subjected in the end to the 
 deductive test, the predicate must commence with the words 
 ** corollaries of," which for convenience we shall hereafter incor- 
 porate with the copula, leaving the final or ultimate truth to be 
 expressed in the predicate as the problem for investigation. 
 
 § 3. Mr. Spencer's Unificatory Predicates. 
 
 In seeking the requisite proposition, we shall pursue a rather 
 mixed method ; for while our main object will be the ascertain- 
 ment of Mr. Spencer's opinions, we shall find it more convenient 
 to consider all the varieties of predicates which could be em- 
 
 THE UNIFICATORY PREDICATES. 9 
 
 ployed to make our proposition complete. As to Mr. Spencer, he 
 seems to forget that unificatory implies oneness. He has quite 
 a number of universal truths, and no doubt there are a number 
 of universal truths ; but when, as in § 38, he speaks of inter- 
 preting things by means of universal truths m the plural, 
 ^vhere is the unification? Surely there must be 07^6 ultimate 
 truth from which even the universal truths are derivable. And 
 from this initial confusion we never get clear. Throughout Mr. 
 Spencer's works we are continually finding that something or 
 other is a corollary from some of the ultimate truths; but this 
 does not constitute an unification of knowledge-it is only a 
 partial unification, which falls short of the goal of Philosophy. 
 These universal truths have to be unified. 
 
 Further, we find that Mr. Spencer nowhere sets down his 
 proposed unifications in the distinct form of a proposition 
 matever ideas he may have, or whatever opinions he may wish 
 to convey as to what precisely does constitute the unification 
 of knowledge, he does not put them down anywhere in the 
 form of a distinct proposition, but leaves us to gather his 
 opinions in an indistinct manner from incoherent statements 
 scattered here and there throughout his works. And if we 
 set ourselves the task of gathering these opinions for the pur- 
 pose of completing our unificatory proposition by furnishing it 
 with a predicate, what do we findl We find • that quite a 
 variety of different methods of the unification of knowledge are 
 taucrht by m. Spencer ! In studying these in detail, we see 
 that they arrange themselves into six classes, which we may 
 caU the Mystical, the Psychological, the Physical, the Meta- 
 physical, the Supraphysical, and the Symbolical. And if we 
 make good our criticism, what becomes of Mr. Spencer s unifi- 
 cation of knowledge 1 
 
 § 4. The Mystical Methods of the Vilification of Knowledge. 
 
 One of the first requisites in the treatment of a complicated 
 study is the collection of aU the material that properly appertains 
 to it, and the demarcation of all that is extrinsic. It is, there- 
 fore, with great satisfaction that the student observes l^Ir. 
 
 \ 
 
lO 
 
 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Spencer adopt this precautionary method in distinguishing 
 between the proper objects of study and those speculative and 
 shadowy subjects upon which so much human energy has been 
 absolutely wasted. Mr. Spencer very properly holds these in- 
 quiries in contempt, like others before him, and teaches that 
 modesty of thought which is the characteristic of the true man 
 of science, retaining his attention within the bounds of the 
 Knowable, and so restraining his thought that his energy is ex- 
 pended in useful organisation within the actual limits of know- 
 ledge, instead of wasting its force in useless flights into the 
 regions of the Unknowable. This satisfaction, however, is but 
 of short duration; for the student finds, after making this 
 mental effort to clear the ground of extraneous speculative 
 growth, and after preparing himself for the masterly task of the 
 co-ordination of all that is knowable under the guidance of his 
 new teacher — a task he contemplates with great zest and satis- 
 faction — that all the work is spoiled by the re-introduction of 
 that Unknowable which had just been repudiated. For in the 
 book on the Knowable the Unknowable is always presenting 
 itself. It meets one at every turn, and each important term 
 is a back-door into the Unknowable. Elaborate results of 
 careful structure are vitiated by continual references to the uu- 
 knowability of the factors employed. 
 
 This is a fundamental defect in Mr. Spencer's exposition of 
 his philosophy, and calls for serious attention, since he is ap- 
 parently conscious of the fact himself, and is prepared to justify 
 it. We ourselves, in our study, fully understood that when we 
 had reached the end of the book on the Unknowable we had 
 done with it for ever ; and that is why, in all our subsequent 
 studies of the book on the Knowable, we so persistently ignored 
 it, and held that we had to deal with terms and propositions of 
 a knowable character, and having definite values only. 
 
 It is not necessary for our present purpose, although wo 
 are engaged in pointing out this great fundamental defect 
 of exposition, that we should enter fully into the study of 
 the Knowable and the Unknowable, but it is necessary that 
 we should illustrate the nature of the distinction, so as to 
 lead up to and make clear our point of criticism. The 
 
 Tl 
 
 THE MYSTICAL METHODS. 
 
 II 
 
 general subject of the limits and conditions of human know- 
 ledge receives attention in some of the following sections 
 of this chapter, and also in sect i of chap. ii. For our im- 
 mediate design, let us consider our knowledge of oxygen and 
 hydrogen. What do we know of these two substances 1 We 
 turn to a book on chemistry, and find all their several pro- 
 perties or attributes fully set out. We find that oxygen has 
 certain definite properties, without which it would cease to 
 be oxygen as we know it; and when we speak of oxygen, 
 it is this indissoluble set of attributes that we refer to. We 
 mean no less than this. Do we mean anything more? Cer- 
 tainly not. All we mean by oxygen is a bundle of attributes 
 or properties. Curiosity asks, " What ties this bundle together ? 
 What is the nexus ? " (for these questions always sound more 
 impressive in Latin). " What is the substratum upon which 
 all these properties are built? What is the nature of the 
 substance or matter in which all these attributes inhere?" 
 Well, we do not know, and we do not see why such a ques- 
 tion should be asked at alL The question derives its point 
 from the further question, "In what respect does this ?iexus 
 or substratum differ from that of hydrogen, so that the latter 
 ties together another and different set of attributes?" No 
 doubt, if we could understand this and the further distinc- 
 tions between all the other elements, it would enormously 
 extend the boundaries of science; but this is held to be un- 
 knowable, and certainly is unknown. Actual knowledge is 
 limited to the ascertained properties of oxygen, hydrogen, and 
 the rest, and it does not pertain to the realms of science to say 
 anything at all about the nexuses and the substrata. Our 
 knowledge is precise, clear, definite, and without any confu- 
 sion ; we know in chemistry what we are talking about. Chemi- 
 cal science, indeed, is so far advanced that the laws of atomic 
 combination are set forth. Under Mendejeleef's law, the dis- 
 covery of a new element was predicted; and, as in the cele- 
 brated case of the planet Neptune, it was looked for and found 
 — taking its place in an orderly series. 
 
 Let us suppose now that since we cannot understand the 
 nexus or substratum of oxygen and hydrogen, they are there- 
 

 12 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 fore to be regarded as differentiated manifestations of an Un- 
 knowable Power, we would ask, Does this add to our know- 
 ledge of oxygen or hydrogen taken singly? We would also 
 ask. Does it add to our knowledge of them taken together, or 
 taken in their interrelations ? It cannot be said that it adds 
 any information or increases our knowledge of them one iota. 
 If any one chooses to assert this theory, we may be willing to 
 admit the truth of it — we are scarcely in a position to deny it 
 — but when we come to look at our question in the dry light of 
 reason, we "are bound to confess that the Unknowable Power 
 which manifests itself thus and thus does actually manifest 
 itself thus and thus, no more and no less, and is actually 
 known to us as thus conditioned. This is the material with 
 which Science deals, and to which Philosophy, taken as the 
 unification of the sciences, must be rigidly confined. The 
 unification must be accomplished witliin the bounds of know- 
 ledge : if the unknowable is mixed up in it over and beyond 
 the known conditions— as a factor, but a factor of unknown 
 value — then the whole organisation or co-ordination of the 
 sciences is vitiated and comes to nought. Hence it appears to 
 us that the question as to the nature of the nexus or substratum 
 of matter is quite as much beyond the purview of philosophy as 
 it is of science, and does not affect the consideration of our 
 studies in the least. 
 
 Mr. John Stuart Mill may here be cited as giving the weight of 
 his reasoning to the same effect. He acknowledges the unknown 
 cause, but disclaims it as holding a place in the truths of science 
 or philosophy. In his " Logic," chap, ii., § 7, there is a very 
 excellent discussion of the metaphysical questions concerning 
 the nature of "body." It would carry us beyond our present 
 object to discuss these questions here. It is only requisite to 
 note that Mr. Mill admits the unknowability of the substratum 
 of matter, or of the laws of the differentiation of the attributes 
 of matter, and also the unknowability of the substance of mind. 
 
 " Body having now been defined the external cause, and 
 (according to the more reasonable opinion) the hidden external 
 cause, to which we refer our sensations ; it remains to frame a 
 definition of Mind. Nor, after the preceding observations, will 
 
 THE MYSTICAL METHODS. 
 
 13 
 
 this be difficult. For as our conception of a body is that of an 
 unknown exciting cause of sensations, so our conception of a 
 mind is that of an unknown recipient, or percipient, of them ; 
 and not of them alone, but of all our other feelings. As body 
 is the mysterious something which excites the mind to feel, so 
 mind is the mysterious something, which feels, and thinks" 
 
 (p. 81). 
 
 " Thus, then, as body is the insentient cause to which we are 
 naturally prompted to refer a certain portion of our feelings, so 
 mind may be described as the sentient subject (in the German 
 sense of the term) of all feelings ; that which has or feels them. 
 But of the nature of either body or mind, further than the 
 feelings which the former excites and which the latter expe- 
 riences, we do not, according to the best existing doctrine, know 
 anything ; and if anything, logic has nothing to do with it, or 
 with the manner in which the knowledge is acquired" (p. 82). 
 
 This seems to correspond with the Unknowable Power of 
 Mr. Spencer, which manifests itself to us and in us in various 
 ways. We ask again, What is the value of such a power in a 
 eystem of knowledge 1 How does it affect the organisation of 
 knowledge ? If it is placed out of the sphere of the knowable, 
 how can it have any place in the endeavour to systematise 
 knowledge? If it has not, then let it for ever be banished 
 from our minds in the attempt : if it has, and yet we are unable 
 to fix it in our minds in its mode of operation, then we have 
 mere mysticism, and not science at alL 
 
 ^Ir. Mill proceeds to say, when discussing the import of pro- 
 positions, p. 134, that although they deal with phenomena 
 and their relations, yet indirectly they deal with the sub- 
 strata which are the hidden causes of phenomena. Never- 
 theless all they assert of these is their mere existence, and all 
 their value, influence, and efficacy are summed up in the know- 
 ledge of the phenomena in which they manifest themselves. 
 In actual practice the so-called substances may be completely 
 ignored : their only place is that of verbalisms in a logical clas- 
 sification. 
 
 ** In the first place, sequences and co-existences are not only 
 asserted respecting Phenomena : we make propositions also 
 
ilil 
 
 14 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 respecting those hidden causes of phenomena which are named 
 substances and attributes. A substance, however, being to us 
 nothing but either that which causes, or that which is conscious 
 of, phenomena ; and the same being true, mutatis mutandis, of 
 attributes ; no assertion can be made, at least with a meaning, 
 concerning these unknown and unknowable entities^ (beyond their 
 mere existence,) except in virtue of the Phenomena by which 
 alone they manifest themselves to our faculties." 
 
 Thus we see that Mr. Mill agrees with Mr. Spencer in his 
 acknowledgment of the Unknowable, but consistently rejects it 
 from the list of things respecting which any proposition can be 
 made. 
 
 To make our case more clear, let us take Mr. Spencer's own 
 illustrations of the office of Philosophy at p. 132 of "First 
 Principles." 
 
 " If we ascribe the flow of a river to the same force which 
 causes the fall of a stone, we make a statement, true as far as 
 it goes, that belongs to a certain division of Science. If, in 
 further explanation of a movement produced by gravitation in 
 a direction almost horizontal, we cite the law that fluids subject 
 to mechanical forces exert re-active forces which are equal in 
 all directions, we formulate a wider fact, containing the scientific 
 interpretation of many other phenomena; as those presented 
 by the fountain, the hydraulic press, the steam-engine, the air- 
 pump. And when this proposition, extending only to the 
 dynamics of fluids, is merged in a proposition of general dyna- 
 mics, comprehending the laws of movement of solids as well as 
 of fluids, tliere is reached a yet higher truth ; but still a truth 
 that comes wholly within the realm of Science." 
 
 This is followed by a second series of illustrations, ending in 
 the law of the relation between the amount of heat and the 
 amount of molecular change, and by a third series, drawn from 
 the phenomena of sociology, and ending in the law that each 
 man seeks satisfaction for his desires in ways costing the smallest 
 efi'orts. 
 
 Now it is quite clear that the several individual instances 
 upon which these generalisations are founded, as well as all tho 
 subsidiary generalisations leading up to the wider ones, are 
 
 THE MYSTICAL METHODS. 
 
 15 
 
 matters of clear knowledge. If we add that they are all difi'e- 
 rentiated manifestations of an Unknowable Power, we know no 
 more about them than we did before, and we do not more clearly 
 understand the nature of their interrelations as a whole. 
 
 Mr. Spencer says of them that " so long as these truths are 
 known only apart and regarded as independent, even the most 
 general of them cannot, without laxity of speech, be called 
 philosophical. But when, having been severally reduced to a 
 simple mechanical axiom, a principle of molecular physics, and 
 a law of social action, they are contemplated together as corol- 
 laries of some ultimate truth, then we rise to the kind of know- 
 ledge that constitutes Philosophy proper. The truths of Philo- 
 sophy thus bear the same relation to the highest scientific truths, 
 that each of these bears to lower scientific truths, &c." 
 
 It is thus seen that even when we reach Philosophy it is still 
 within the limits of the knowable — it is merely Science extended. 
 Extended it may and indeed must be to its furthest limit — 
 pushed out to its most extreme boundary — but it is still Science. 
 It is a pity, indeed, that it should be called anything else but 
 Unitative Science, for when we get to speaking of Philosophy 
 the mind begins to soar. Philosophy is the intoxication of 
 Science rather than Science itself ; it sees visions, dreams dreams, 
 grows poetic, prophetic, religious, and, by exciting the moral and 
 spiritual emotions of our nature, causes us to lose the calm, clear, 
 and cold apprehension of knowable things which is the character- 
 istic of Science. In this respect we do not say that Philosophy 
 is wrong, nor that its broadest views should not so aff'ect us. 
 The consideration of this subject, indeed, we hope to take up in 
 a future work ; but in the meantime, having firmly settled our- 
 selves to the task of unifying knowledge under Mr. Spencer's 
 guidance, we never intend to allow ourselves, while engaged in 
 tliis special undertaking, to get ofl" our feet or stray away from 
 the knowable. So that when Mr. Spencer says he looks for the 
 unification of knowledge in the derivation of the three scientific 
 truths already specified, as corollaries from some ultimate truth, 
 we can only understand him to mean that this ultimate truth is 
 arrived at first inductively, that it is intelligible (that is to say, 
 knowable), and then that it can be used deductively. If we go 
 
i6 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 on to say that this ultimate truth is a manifestation of the un- 
 knowable, we do not add to our knowledge by saying so. The 
 ultimate truth must express what we know in the first instance, 
 and if any one likes to say that it also expresses w^hat we do 
 not know, in that it, like all other truths, is a manifestation 
 of the unknowable, he does no harm and he does no good, 
 regarding the matter in its purely scientific aspect. Its value 
 depends upon its validity as an ultimate induction, and upon its 
 capacity for deductive interpretation. 
 
 We see, therefore, that the unification of knowledge must 
 be effected within the limits of the knowable, and we expect 
 this from Mr. Spencer when he so deliberately sets apart the 
 unknowable and the knowable for separate treatment. 
 
 Nevertheless, the book on the Knowable is pervaded by 
 references to the Unknowable Power. Kow either the Unknow- 
 able Power puts itself wholly into the bondage of conditions or 
 manifestations, or it does not, and the quantity remaining so 
 unconditioned is constant or variable. If the Unknowable 
 Power wholly manifests or conditions itself, then the Unknow- 
 able Power is wholly known in its manifestations, and these 
 known, it may be ignored. But this will be the case also if that 
 which remains unconditioned and unmanifested never interferes 
 w4th that which is conditioned and manifested. If, on the 
 other hand, it does so interfere, then it becomes matter of know- 
 ledge, in so far. as thus manifested ; but the unification of 
 knowledge in this case is not possible, for the elements of know- 
 ledge are of a variable character. So that in the one case all 
 references to the Unknowable Power are confusing and illegiti- 
 mate, and in the other case the task of unification is utterly 
 hopeless. Still more is this the case if it does interfere in ways 
 that are unknowable by us. 
 
 This is Mr. Spencer's actual treatment of his subject He 
 defines matter (chap, iv.), he explains motion (chap, v.), he says 
 what he means by the term " force" (chap, vi.), in their scientific 
 meanings, and he also treats of all of them in chap, iii Yet 
 the two former, viz., Matter and Motion, are but modes of the 
 latter — Force, and by the latter we mean the " persistence 
 of some power which transcends our knowledge and concep- 
 
 THE MYSTICAL METHODS. 
 
 17 
 
 lion. The manifestations, as occurring either in ourselves or 
 outside of us, do not persist ; but that which persists is the 
 unknown cause of these manifestations. In other words, assert- 
 ing the persistence of force is but another mode of asserting an 
 unconditioned reality, without beginning or end." And as at the 
 commencement, so at the end of his work, Mr. Spencer holds 
 the same opinions. On pp. 55 7, 558, he reiterates the doctrine of 
 an Unknowable Power which works in us certain effects. 
 
 "These effects have certain likenesses of kind, the most 
 general of which we class together under the names of Matter, 
 Motion, and Force ; and between these effects there are likenesses 
 of connection, the most constant of which we class as laws of 
 the highest certainty." 
 
 But we submit that those laws which come within the scope 
 of Science are just as valuable to us, and are not in the least 
 augmented or diminished in value by the acknowledgment of 
 an Unknowable Power behind them, of which they are but 
 manifestations. And the writer who introduces an Unknow- 
 able Power in the unification of the Knowable is responsible 
 for misleading students not sufficiently wary to understand 
 that this Unknowable Power, — whatever may be its value in 
 moral and emotional aspects, — is of no effect whatever in this 
 particular purpose. 
 
 If we say, then, that a stone thrown from an eminence will 
 fall to the ground, and we can formulate the law by which 
 its motion is effected, so as to be able to calculate the time it 
 will take to reach the ground, we are not much wiser if some 
 philosopher tells us that the fall is effected by some Inscrutable 
 Power. We find no reference to an Inscrutable Power in any 
 treatise on mechanics or chemistry. We make no allowance for 
 it in the actual construction of machinery, guns, ships, buildings, 
 &c., nor in any of the processes of manufactures. These only 
 recognise scrutable or knowable powers. And as in the smaller 
 80 in the greater matters of Science ; it is just as evident that 
 an inscrutable power which manifests itself thus or thus is 
 known by, and limited by, its known manifestations, and the 
 unification of knowledge is to be effected within the limits of 
 
 actual knowledge only. 
 
 B 
 
1 8 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 It is true that some of the language of Science, in the imper- 
 fection of our knowledge, consists of words acknowledging 
 powers; and the laws of their action being only partially known, 
 the greater stress of meaning belongs more to the former than to 
 the latter. But this is an evidence of our ignorance rather than 
 of our knowledge. As knowledge increases the defect will pass 
 away. Thus we now speak of the law of gi'avitation, and care 
 nothing about the powers or attractions of which it is the law. 
 We speak of the laws of motion and laws of chemistry simply 
 as the formulae of the action of unknown powers, but care 
 nothing about those powers when we are able to formulate their 
 laws. Thus in the growth of knowledge the remaining terms 
 expressive of powers will give place to propositions expressive 
 of laws of action. In the same way some of the scientific or 
 pseudo-scientific words which Mr. Spencer uses — viz., equilibra- 
 tion, polarity, &c. — now express meanings in which the acknow- 
 ledgment of unknown powers is expressed ; but when we are 
 able to formulate their laws, the laws will be evervthing and 
 the powers nothing. So to speak, as the knowable advances the 
 unknowable recedes, or becomes of less account. 
 
 In any case, the unknown and the unknowable can never 
 explain or unify the known. To attempt to do so is mysticism ; 
 and one of the many phases of Mr. Spencer's work is mysticism 
 of the character just explained. The unification of knowledge 
 effected is an unification within the lines of Science as far as 
 we can go, and then the final unification is an act of mental 
 despair in the unification by means of an Unknowable Power. 
 Before it, all is one ; in it, one is all. Out of it, all proceeds ; 
 into it, all go. It is the unity of processes ; all things and their 
 interrelations are but manifestations of it. The question is, Does 
 anybody understand this 1 and if so, to what object and in what 
 manner is the valuable information to be applied 1 The test is 
 in the application. Mr. Spencer has omitted inorganic evolution. 
 He has subjected himself to criticism in biological evolution, and 
 it will be seen, when we come to criticise it, that the interpreta- 
 tions, whatever value they may have, are not derived from the 
 Unknowable Power, but from certain known manifestations of it. 
 
 Unfortunately, in the study of Mr. Spencer's works, we meet 
 
 THE MYSTICAL METHODS. 
 
 19 
 
 I 
 
 with a certain number of words and phrases which are capable 
 of being understood in a variety of different meanings ; and it 
 will be found in the present criticism that under the various 
 sections thereof we shall have to treat of the same words. The 
 reason is that they bear different senses under each head. Thus 
 the word Force may be used in a mystical sense, in an abstract, 
 physical, or symbolic sense ; and our examination will be rather 
 one of different systems founded upon these different senses 
 of the same terms than one dealing wuth differently expressed 
 systems of Philosophy. 
 
 The sense we have now to deal with is that which takes them 
 all to be but expressions for manifestations of an Unknowable 
 Power, and invests them with a mysticism derived therefrom, 
 seeming to confer upon them a greater aptitude for explanation 
 and for the unifiv^ation of knowledge than they would possess 
 if the idea of an Inscrutable Power behind them were not pre- 
 sent to the mind. This is mysticism, and it means that what 
 we do not know is the explanation of what we do know. We 
 have found in various instances that the value of terms, pro- 
 positions, and scientific laws is derived from what is knowable 
 in them, and that their value is not in the least affected by the 
 addition of an Inscrutable Power. Mysticism is an attempt to 
 read into these terms, propositions, and laws a value derived 
 from this attribution to them of an Unknowable Power as their 
 cause or manifestation. We deny the validity of the attempt in 
 general, and we shall have to examine some instances in detail. 
 
 There are various forms of Mysticism, according to the 
 education or natural bias of individual minds. They are the 
 Religious, the Metaphysical, and the pseudo-Scientific forms. 
 What is common to them all is the recognition of an Inscrutable 
 Power at work in the cosmos. They differ in respect to what 
 is read into this Inscrutable Power, according to the convic- 
 tions, the reasoning, or the sentiment of individuals. The 
 Inscrutable Power derives its value in human interests from the 
 manner in which it is regarded, for this is the bond of relation 
 it has with humanity. What should be the attitude of the 
 human mind towards it — whether it should be regarded as an 
 Intelligent Divine Being, or as Self-Determining Being, or as 
 
20 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 an Unknowable Force— we reserve for discussion when we 
 come to consider Mr. Spencer's Ethics. All we are concerned 
 with at the present time is to see how Science and the process 
 of increasing generalisation of knowledge which ends in unifica- 
 tion is affected by this method of treatment. 
 
 The widest of all generalisations, according to Mr. Spencer, 
 is " the Persistence of Force ; " so that the unification of know- 
 ledge is effected when we are able to say—" All existences and 
 their interrelations are corollaries of the Persistence of Force." 
 The Persistence of Force may be taken as a scientific, that 
 is to say, a knowable phrase, and one that has a limited and 
 definite meaning, arrived at in the process of inductive science- 
 building, of which we have before spoken ; and, in this respect, 
 it does not properly come on for discussion under our present 
 heading of the Mystical, but will have to be considered under 
 the head of the Physical Methods of the Unification of Know- 
 ledge. But seeing that Mr. Spencer refuses to be tied down to 
 any definite meaning which may be attached to the term, and 
 repudiates as misrepresentations any conclusions deduced from 
 attaching any definite meaning to it, and since he states, in the 
 most emphatic manner, that all he means by the term Force 
 is, that it is a symbol like the algebraical *' z," we are bound 
 not to consider this method of the unification of knowledge 
 among the physical methods of the unification of knowledge, 
 because in these methods we are obliged to give definite mean- 
 ings to the terms we employ. We shall, of course, in order to 
 make this an exhaustive criticism, so consider the proposition ; 
 but, in the meantime, what is the value of the proposition if 
 the term "force" is regarded merely as a term deriving its value 
 not from processes of induction, but from these pltis an Unknow- 
 able Power? 
 
 It is to be presumed that the proposition can have no value 
 if the term " force " has no meaning. Therefore it must when 
 it is used have some indistinct meaning. It must be half under- 
 stood — or it must be changeable and mean something sometimes, 
 or sometimes have one meaning, sometimes another. This is 
 the only way to get anything out of it, to mean something when 
 we pronounce it, or to make it a i)rincipal term in an all- 
 
 THE MYSTICAL METHODS, 
 
 21 
 
 comprehensive proposition applicable to all the interrelations of 
 
 existences. i i i. • 
 
 From the foregoing two things are evident. Firstly, that m 
 the scientific progress from un-unified knowledge to partially 
 unified knowledge, and to still more unified knowledge, the 
 process is a truly scientific one from first to last ; that is to say, 
 the general propositions, though wide, are still definite— they 
 have true meanings— are intelligible, and of practical worth in 
 actual application. Knowledge never by any process of induc- 
 tion oversteps itself into the Unknowable ; it builds with solid 
 bricks, and never makes an archway into thin air. It is obvious 
 that the ultimate truth of Science which is to unify its compo- 
 nent parts— if indeed such an end can ever be attained— must be 
 within the scope of knowledge and not beyond it. The induc- 
 tive process does not end in mysticism. Mysticism is some- 
 thing added. If Science can proceed a certain distance and no 
 further, and if it then says, * Beyond this I cannot go,' it simply 
 owns its own incompetence. It may recognise mystery beyond, 
 but this recognition of an Inscrutable Power beyond it is not 
 an unification of knowledge but a confession of defeat. If in- 
 duction ends in the vague recognition of an Inscrutable Power, 
 all weU and good ; it may have a value, but that value certainly 
 is not in the unification of knowledge. 
 
 Secondly, it is clear that there can be no deductive process 
 from a proposition the terms of which are uncertain or even 
 positively stated to be inconceivable. What are the corollaries 
 of blank? what are the corollaries of Force or the Persistence 
 thereof if Force is an Unknowable Power? 
 
 The deductive problem is from the phrase " Persistence of 
 Force," regarding the latter word as untranslatable into any 
 definite conception, or regarding it as known forces plus the 
 attribution of unknowable power, to draw a series of 'corollaries 
 which correspond to and will be a picture of all the changes of 
 the universe from the commencement, le., from undifferentiated 
 Force. This is clearly impossible. It may be said that Mr. 
 Spencer nowhere advances such a proposition. We are unable 
 to decide exactly, yet his language sometimes looks very like 
 it. If he does, then our criticism applies. If he does not, then 
 
 r 
 
 \ 
 
22 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 what he really means will no doubt receive examination in one 
 of the other sections. 
 
 There are other unificatory propositions of Mr. Spencer's 
 relating to Matter, Motion, &c., which are apparently of definite 
 meaning, and which we shall so consider later on in our 
 work, but which also he transforms into mystical proposi- 
 tions when the exigencies of criticism force him to do so. They 
 are not only Matter and Motion as we know them, but since 
 they are manifestations of an Unknowable Power they are 
 supposed to possess a value in thought over and above this 
 knowable value, and in this case the same remarks apply. 
 Scientific induction may place them beyond knowledge, but 
 deduction can get nothing out of them. . 
 
 \yhat shall we say again to the proposition — " All existences 
 and their interrelations are corollaries of the Unknowable " ? 
 Only this, that the proposed deductive process would be a sheer 
 impossibility. Not that Mr. Spencer proposes this in clear 
 words, but it is what any universalistic proposition amounts 
 to o^ which the predicate admits in any form an Unknowable 
 Power as a factor in the process of reasoning. 
 
 We come to the conclusion, then, that in Mysticism, that is to 
 say, those methods of the unification of knowledge the terms of 
 which are held not merely to connote the included facts of induc- 
 tion, but something added of an unknowable character, although 
 it may be the final attainment of human research, we do not 
 reach the final goal of Philosophy — the unification of knowledge 
 — but rather an acknowledgment of the futility of the endeavour. 
 We conclude also that any proposition in which the predicate 
 contains some term which is merely a sign or symbol standing 
 for the Unknowable, of which we can form no adequate con- 
 ception, is a proposition of the mystical order transgressing the 
 limits of true scientific induction, and utterly valueless as the 
 starting-point of a deductive process. 
 
 § 5. TJie Psychological Methods of the Unljication of 
 
 Knowledge. 
 
 Mr. Spencer^s representation of the means by which the 
 unification of knowledge may be effected varies with the nature 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS. 23 
 
 of his subject. In the "Psychology" we get quite a special 
 account of it— indeed, several different accounts. 
 
 The continuity of our criticism will be best preserved by 
 noting here only the general conclusions of our study of the 
 ^ Psycholo^ry " so far as they relate to the special object of our 
 present inquiry, namely, the unification of knowledge leaving the 
 justification of our representations to a more detailed exposition 
 in chap. iv. Here we give merely a summary of that chapter, 
 in order to preserve a proportionate argument. 
 
 Therein it wiU be seen that Part VII. of the " Psychology 
 furnishes us with an interesting study of the endeavour to unify 
 knowledge by psychological methods, for there are several of 
 them Apparently Mr. Spencer defeats his own object by pro- 
 posing so many. Whether he does an injustice to himself or not 
 by fading to show that these various unifications can themselves 
 be unifie'd, we do not know ; but holding ourselves that they 
 cannot be fused into a larger inteUigible generalisation, we 
 believe them to be mutually destructive inasmuch as there can 
 only be one unification of knowledge. This is a fatal flaw, 
 independent of the failure of each separate unification, taken 
 on its own merits, to answer the requirements of the criterion 
 we hold continuaUy before us, namely, that it must- be both a 
 scientific induction including all other scientific inductions, and 
 a proposition from which as coroUaries aU existences and their 
 interrelations can be deduced. 
 
 The first conclusion we come to respecting Mr. Spencers 
 unification of knowledge as expounded in the " Psychology " 
 is drawn from the reasoning leading up to the foUowing passage, 
 
 extracted from § 386 : — 
 
 " And it was further argued (§ 40), that setting out with 
 these fundamental intuitions provisionally assumed to be true- 
 that is, provisionally assumed to be congruous with aU other dicta 
 of consciousness— the process of proving or disproving the con- 
 gruity becomes the business of Philosophy ; and the complete 
 establishment of the congruity becomes the same thing as the 
 complete unification of knowledge in which Philosophy reaches 
 
 its goal." 
 
 We find it, therefore, clearly stated, first, that the goal of 
 
 1 J 
 
^. 
 
 24 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Philosophy is the unification of knowledge ; secondly, that this 
 unification is accomplished when certain fundamental intuitions 
 are found to be congruous with all the other dicta of conscious- 
 ness ; thirdly, that the business of proving or disproving this con- 
 gruity becomes the business of Philosophy. 
 
 Taking the passage by itself, one would say that as internal 
 relations are the product of external relations, or the establish- 
 ment of correspondences between the internal in response to the 
 external ; — then the establishment of congruities between the 
 primordial correspondences, with all the other dicta of conscious- 
 ness, must be a very simple process ; for it is only the establish- 
 ment of congruities between the most general experiences and 
 the details of experiences. The result arrived at would be that 
 the details of which a whole is made up are parts of that 
 whole. 
 
 But letting this go by, what are the fundamental intuitions 
 with which all other dicta of consciousness have to be found 
 congruous, thus producing a harmony in which the unification 
 of knowledge is effected? Mr. S[ encer does not enumerate them, 
 but the result of his ensuing reasoning is the establishment of 
 another and entirely different goal and method of Philosophy. 
 
 " That which Philosophy takes as its datum must be an 
 assertion of some likeness and difi*erence to wliich all other 
 likenesses and differences are secondary. If knowledge is 
 classifying, or grouping the like and separating the unlike, and 
 if the unification of knowledge proceeds by arranging tlio 
 smaller classes of experience within the larger, then the pro- 
 position by which knowledge is unified must be one specifying 
 the antithesis between two ultimate classes of experiences in 
 which all others merge." 
 
 The theory of this second method is : Since knowledge is classi- 
 fication, the more complete the classification tlie more completely 
 unified is the knowledge, and the nearer we approach a philo- 
 sophy. When, therefore, we have succeeded in comprehending 
 knowledge in two large classes, we can proceed no further; know- 
 ledge is unified and philosophy has reached its goal. "What, 
 then, are these two widest of all groups of experiences 1 They are 
 the self and the non-self — the faint and the vivid aggregates of 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS, 
 
 25 
 
 (.1 
 
 .♦I 
 
 experience. When these are properly demarcated, knowledge 
 
 is unified. 
 
 But we do not rest here. Another stage of the reasoning 
 carries us up to the Unknowable. From these considerations 
 we reach the datum or " postulate that the manifestations of 
 the Unknowable fall into two separate aggregates, constituting 
 the world of consciousness and the world beyond consciousness." 
 Is this, then, the fundamental proposition which has to be 
 found congruous with every result of experience, direct and 
 indirect, and which shall thereby fulfil the objects of Philosophy? 
 AU knowledge can be divided into two classes— that relating to 
 the Ego, and that relating to the Non-ego. When we have 
 come to this conclusion knowledge is unified, and these two 
 classes of knowledge are manifestations of an Unknowable 
 Power. But we have already found that no unification of 
 knowledge is to be found beyond the bounds of knowledge. 
 To look to the Unknowable for it is to produce mysticism, and 
 to transcend knowledge altogether. 
 
 These three thoughts are thus summed up by Mr. Spencer, 
 
 "First Principles," p. 157 :— 
 
 "In brief, our postulates are :— an Unknowable Power; the 
 existence of knowable likenesses and differences among the 
 manifestations of that Power ; and a resulting * segregation of 
 the manifestations into those of subject and object." 
 
 This is the organised and consolidated conception, the primor- 
 dial datum with which all the other dicta of consciousness have 
 to be found congruous, by means of which Philosophy accom- 
 plishes its final unificatory process. 
 
 Our criticism upon this portion of Mr. Spencer's endeavour 
 to unify knowledge can only be that it is vague and meaning- 
 less. That it is of such a wide and general character as to be 
 applicable to all knowledge is true enough, but general descrip- 
 tions do not give an insight into the relations of sequences, nor 
 do they enable us to form propositions from which the inter- 
 relations of all existences can be deduced. Shall we say that 
 the general description of mankind is that it segregates into two 
 • classes, man and woman, and that this is an unification of the 
 
 ♦ llow and why resulting ? 
 
P9^ 
 
 26 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 knowledge of humanity? Or shall we add to our knowledge 
 by saying that they are different manifestations of the Un- 
 knowable] It is, indeed, the most general description of 
 the human race, surpassing all descriptions of form, feature, 
 colour, language, habits, civilisation ; yet, although the largest 
 of possible inductions respecting mankind, how barren of deduc- 
 tions! how little unificatory in its enunciation! how utterly 
 void of instructiveness as to the interrelations constituting the 
 history of the human race ! 
 
 But again reverting to the requirements of the unification of 
 knowledge, let us inquire how far they are complied with in the 
 scheme before us. We have seen that to effect this unification 
 we must build up inductively till we are able to formulate one 
 widest of all propositions, which shall thereupon become the 
 starting-point for a series of deductions, which deductions shall 
 correspond with the actual history of the interrelations of all 
 existences. How is this requirement satisfied by the scheme 
 now under consideration ? Let us first try to frame our proposi- 
 tion, as thus — 
 Subject. " -^ existences and their interrelations " 
 
 Copida. " are [corollaries of ] " * 
 
 Predicate {he- n ,-t 1 • i? xi r • j. j • • i 
 
 inq the vlti- ^"® segregation of the faint and vivid mani- 
 
 niate truth). festations of the Unknowable." 
 
 With respect to it we can only remark, that we are unal)lo 
 to see anything in it or to get anything out of it. And we 
 scarcely know, indeed, how to proceed with our dtiductive pro- 
 cess. It does not seem that we can go direct from it to concrete 
 instances, such as the rise of mercury in the barometer or ther- 
 mometer, or the union of oxygon and hydrogen into water, or 
 the hatching of an egg. We would therefore have to proceed 
 mediately. But how ? Would we first have to deduce matter 
 and motion as corollaries from the ultimate proposition ? But 
 these are themselves merely symbolic terms, representing mani- 
 festations of the Unknowable of which we can have no definite 
 conception, and presumably of the vivid order of manifestations. 
 Should we next have to deduce the indestructibility of the one 
 manifestation and the continuity of the other ? Should we have 
 
 * See § 2, p. 8. 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS. 
 
 27 • 
 
 to deduce the instability of the homogeneous in order to reach 
 dilJrentiations of matter and motion, and then could we hope 
 t deduce from the unificatory proposition, by a separa e and 
 ndependent process of reasoning, the antagonistic principle of 
 equTbration, which would put them all back -to^o-gen^^^ 
 a<iain1 Thus, it is suggested, we would arrive a the unifica- 
 tL of all concrete experiences. We feel compelled, however, 
 to deny the logical connection of these propositions as deduc- 
 tions from the unificatory proposition now under consideration, 
 and require a more distinct explanation. ^ 
 
 This criticism would seem to render any further examination 
 of Mr. Spencer's unification ot knowledge upon a psychological 
 basis unnecessary. However, we have pursued the inquiry m 
 great detail in Chapter IV., in order to do justice to our author 
 and to prevent the reader from straying from the one fixed 
 object of Philosophy when studying the "Psychology, so that 
 in the midst of multifarious changes he may keep steadfastly 
 in view the one real point and goal of all his studies. By this 
 method we shaU see that, however rich Mr. Spencer may be in 
 su--estion, or however satisfactory and profitable may be the 
 mi'nor studies in themselves, still he fails to satisfy the mind 
 in respect of the main object which he sets out to accomplish. 
 We must refer our readers to this chapter for an account of Mr. 
 Spencers treatment of the so-called Final Question AH we 
 need do here is to say that it falls mainly within the lines o 
 the foregoing criticism. The principal additional thought brought 
 out in \t is that the " impression we call resistance .... is 
 the primordial, the universal, the ever-present constituent of 
 consciousness;" and this consequently "becomes the mother 
 tongue of thought, in which all the first cognitions are regis- 
 tered, and into which aU symbols afterwards learned are inter- 
 
 ^"^^t is^difficult to know what to make of this in relation to the 
 foregoing proposition. Evidently Mr. Spencer would have us 
 believe that all manifestations of the Unknowable, both faint 
 and vivid, are ultimately resolvable into varieties of the impres- 
 sion we call resistance. These varieties can only be differences 
 of degree, we presume. To be different in kind would be to 
 take them out of the classification. Besides, we know what 
 
Mi 
 
 i! 
 
 28 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 is meant by differences of degree of resistances, but we could 
 have no conception of different kinds of resistances. Mr. 
 Spencer means to say then, that all our knowledge consists of 
 experiences of aggregates of differences of degrees of resistances, 
 and that all knowledge aggregates itself into two great masses, 
 one consisting of intense resistances (the vivid manifestations), 
 and the other consisting of slighter resistances (the faint mani- 
 festations) ; also that all the manifestations of the Unknow- 
 able take the form of the impression we call resistance, even 
 although there were no consciousness to be impressed, and that 
 between these two orders of impressions of resistance there is 
 no series of invisible gradations but a wide gulf fixed. 
 
 Are we then to form a new unificatory proposition according 
 to our new lights, and say that 
 
 "All existences and their interrelations" 
 
 *' are [corollaries of ] " 
 
 " the segregation of faint and vivid manifestations of the 
 
 Unknowable, manifested in different degrees of 
 
 the impression we call resistance?" 
 
 Or shall we amend the predicate, and say — 
 
 '* Are the segregation of aggregates of different degrees of 
 
 resistances or combinations of resistances 1 " 
 The former is or would be a subjective unification of know- 
 ledge, since it depends upon "the impression" which a con- 
 scious being has of resistance ; and therefore it does not seem 
 to be capable of forming a proposition from which the history 
 of the existence and interrelations of the objective world and 
 of times anterior to consciousness could be deduced. The 
 deduction would have to be from the impression of resistance 
 and this manifestly could not be applied to objective history. 
 This is a fatal objection to all subjective methods for the 
 Tinification of knowledge. And since knowledge is the estab- 
 lishment of correspondences corresponding to the correspon- 
 dences of the environment, it is difficult to see how any 
 subjective method is competent to deal with the universe as a 
 whole in respect of .the unification of the knowledge of it. 
 
 The second or altered form of the i)roposition would throw it 
 into the class of the pliysical methods of unification of know- 
 ledge, and will hereafter receive due consideration. In the mean- 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS. 
 
 29 
 
 time we must remark that mere resistance by itself would not 
 seem to be very fruitful of result. If each unit had merely the 
 power of self-protection-mere resistance without any power of 
 attraction— there would be no occasion for the resistance, for 
 there would be no encroachment, and we will see in due course 
 that we shall have to consider a system of mutual attractions 
 
 and resistances. . . 1 . , i. 
 
 It is ric-ht to say that later on in the discussion of his theme 
 Mr Spencer enters more minutely into the relations of conscious- 
 ness to resistance. At the same time we do not see that his 
 subsequent treatment of the question saves him from the 
 
 criticism. 
 
 Mr. Spencer finishes this process of reasoning by a recourse 
 to the Unknowable Power, and thus throws the unification of 
 knowledge by the psychological method upon the mystical 
 method, Subjecting it accordingly to the criticism applicable to 
 
 that form of argument. 
 
 We conclude this section by taking the three instances of 
 scientific unification given by Mr. Spencer at the outset to 
 see if they are capable of receiving the philosophical unification 
 there proposed by the method of this section, and by means 
 of the propositions we have found it necessitates. Kefernng to 
 "First Principles," p. 132 et seq., we find the various motions of 
 a river, the fall of a stone, the action of a fountain, the hydraulic 
 press, the air-pump, and the various laws of movement of solids, 
 are all capable of expression in common laws of dynamics. 
 This is followed by a second series of illustrations, ending in 
 the law of the relation between the amount of heat and the 
 amount of molecular change, and by a third series, drawn from 
 the phenomena of sociology, ending in the law that each man 
 seeks satisfaction for his desires in ways costing the smallest 
 efforts. The question is, can we unify all these wide scientific 
 truths by deducing them as corollaries from the proposition that 
 " All existences and their interrelations " 
 " are [corollaries of ] " 
 " the segregation of faint and vivid manifestations of the 
 Unknowable, manifested in the different degrees of 
 the impression we call resistance " 1 
 
30 SPENCER^S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 We submit that Mr. Spencer's psychological methods will 
 not bear this severe logical test, nor any other manner of definite 
 and formal statement. 
 
 - § 6. The Metaphysical Methods for the Unification of 
 
 Knowledge, 
 
 We have next in order to consider one of the most inveterate 
 of the idols of the intellect. There may possibly be a le^iti- 
 mate science of metaphysics, but all those sciences which admit 
 into their system objectivised abstractions are vitiated throu-h- 
 out by the influence of these figments. That student wiU °be 
 wise who, m commencing any philosophical study, provisionally 
 at least repudiates all objectivised abstract terms from his 
 vocabulary. Particular terms representing particular phenomena 
 we know and terms of totality representing groups or general 
 aspects of phenomena we know, but abstractions we do not 
 know, except as verbalisms for logical convenience. 
 
 Abstract terms have two separate origins. They may be 
 firstly, general terms changed into the singular, or thev may be 
 terms of relation or attribute generalised and put in the'singular 
 In every case it is essential to their due impressiveness that 
 they should have an initial capital letter, and sometimes they 
 are accorded the dignity of the definite article-as The Absolute 
 Ihe Homogeneous, &c.* ' 
 
 We have already seen that if we speak of oxygen or hydro'-en 
 we know what we mean; and if we speak of the sum of the 
 chemical elements, it is legitimate and indeed necessary to use 
 a general term or term of totality-Matter; and we prefer 
 designating this class of terms by the name " terms of totality " 
 rather than by the name "general terms," because it more 
 clearly indicates that they derive all their value from the par 
 ticulars sui.med up in them, and have no individual value of 
 themselves. We would have it clearly understood that the 
 general term m the singular number does not connote some 
 sing e existence of which it is the name, but a variety of par- 
 ticulars which arc thus represented for convenience. Thus, by 
 • See " On Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution," Part V. 
 
 THE METAPHYSICAL METHODS. 
 
 31 
 
 usin" the word flatter, we can speak of aU the various kinds 
 of m^atter included in the term in so far as a common predicate 
 is applicable. In this use, the term Matter is a well-understood 
 word having a definite meaning. But another use is made of 
 it We have already seen that we only know oxygen and 
 hydrogen as differentiated bundles of attributes or properties ; 
 that the law by which they are differentiated is inscrutable ; 
 that if there is any substance in which they inhere, we cannot 
 possibly know anything about it; and that, so far as we are 
 concerned, it might practically be non-existent, while as a part 
 of knowledge it is non-existent Nevertheless the term Matter 
 is applied to this figment of the imagination, and figures accord- 
 ingly as a factor in various systems of metaphysics. In the 
 same wav we know certain specific and particular attractions 
 and repulsions of bodies ; and we are not content with framing 
 a -eneral term or term of totality for use when we wish to 
 predicate something which shall be applicable to all of them 
 but when it is made, we speak of an individual entity which 
 seems to have objective existence-Polarity. In the same way 
 the relations of distance give rise to the abstraction bpace, 
 which is thereupon supposed to be an entity-Time following 
 suit ; whereas there is no general space, but only special dis- 
 tances, and no general time, but only particular relative intervals 
 of succession. Even the Positivist generalises human beings, 
 and then forms an abstraction called Humanity, which he erects 
 
 into an object of worship. , . 1 .i 
 
 In a very singular passage, Mr. Spencer asks us to study the 
 
 instance of a piano.* _ . . 
 
 " On thinking of a piano, there first rises in imagination its 
 visual appearance, to which are instantly added (though by 
 separate mental acts) the ideas of its remote side and of its 
 solid substance. A complete conception, however, involves the 
 strings, the hammers, the dampers, the pedals ; and while suo- 
 cessivply adding these to the conception, the attributes first 
 thought of lapse more or less completely out of consciousness 
 Nevertheless, the whole group constitutes a representation of 
 the piano. Now, as in this case we form a definite concept of 
 
 » First Principles, p. 95. 
 
32 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 a special existence, by imposing limits and conditions in suc- 
 cessive acts; so, in the converse case, by taking away the limits 
 and conditions in successive acts, we form an indefinite notion 
 of general existence. By fusing a series of states of conscious- 
 ness, m each of which, as it arises, the limitations and conditions 
 are abolished, there is produced a consciousness of something 
 unconditioned. To speak more rigorously :-This consciousness 
 IS not the abstract of any one group of thoughts, ideas, or con- 
 ceptions ; but it is the abstract of all thoughts, ideas, or con- 
 ceptions. That which is common to them all, and cannot be 
 got rid of, is what we predicate by the word existence, &c." 
 
 It seems to us that the process which Mr. Spencer here 
 proposes is not possible. We cannot put ourselves into that 
 very unscientific frame of mind which is necessary for the 
 purpose. We cannot dissociate the ideas of dampers, pedals, 
 &c., from our conception of a piano. We feel that there is such 
 a correspondence between things and conceptions, that the only 
 way to fuse the various ideas connected with a piano into the 
 required indefiniteness of general existence would be by fusing 
 the piano itself into general existence by grinding it into dust"] 
 and then we have no idea of a piano at all. 
 
 It is by thus quitting the actual limitations of things, and 
 undertaking impossible mental processes, that philosophek go 
 so far wrong, and lay themselves open to the sneers of men of 
 science. They make science get out of its actual conditions- 
 like a ghost out of a body— and then from the law of this pseudo- 
 science of the abstract they work down to the actual Dis- 
 sociating itself from all the inconvenient trammels of concrete 
 conditions, metaphysical philosophy completely ignores chemical 
 and physical science, and sets up in business on its own account. 
 But it thereby becomes merely a manipulation of words which 
 are not representative of any actual existence whatsoever 
 
 Mr. Mill, in his chapter " On the Import of Propositions '' 
 says : * — ' 
 
 " The distinction between an abstract term and its correspond- 
 ing concrete, is no difference in what they are appointed to 
 signify ; for the real signification of a concrete general name is, 
 
 * System of Logic, vol. i. p. 14a 
 
 THE METAPHYSICAL METHODS. 
 
 33 
 
 as we have so often said, its connotation ; and what the con- 
 crete term connotes, forms the entire meaning of the abstract 
 name. Since there is nothing in the import of an abstract 
 name which is not in the import of the corresponding concrete, 
 it is natural to suppose that neither can there be anything in 
 the import of a proposition of which the terms are abstract, but 
 what there is in some proposition which can be framed of con- 
 crete terms. ... It is impossible to imagine any proposition 
 expressed in abstract terms which cannot be transformed into a 
 precisely equivalent proposition in which the terms are concrete, 
 namely, either the concrete names which connote the attributes 
 themselves, or the names of the fandamenta of those attributes* 
 the facts or phenomena on which they are grounded." 
 
 All terms are originally concrete and refer to definite objective 
 or subjective existences. In the process of distinguishment and 
 classification which goes on from {he first, plurals are introduced, 
 and by and by terms which are inclusive of a great number of 
 individuals come to be used. By and by, also, names are given 
 to those qualities or properties of objects which they severally 
 possess in common. Abstract terms are arrived at by both 
 methods. In the first case, the general term is individualised 
 and spoken of in the singular (for example, Man), as if the sum 
 total of a number of individuals could have an existence as a 
 separate entity, itself capable of being treated as an unity, and 
 taking its part as such in the interrelations of things. In the 
 other case, the property or quality dealt with becomes a power 
 (for example. Humanity or Polarity), taking its place as a 
 factor amongst other similar powers and amongst the objective 
 realities of the universe. 
 
 From this we see that there will be a great number of words 
 which have double meanings according as they are used as 
 general terms referring to a great number of individuals con- 
 cerniiig which something is predicated, or as they are employed 
 to designate an imaginary entity which has no actual existence 
 in the cosmos. Further, if these terms are used in propositions, 
 pny proposition of which they form part must also have a 
 double meaning, and must be susceptible of a twofold inter- 
 pretation, resulting in a cliangeful and uncertain import. 
 
 c 
 
34 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 In this case, the only resource is to consider the proposition in 
 either sense successively— first as having a concrete general 
 reference, and next as requiring an abstract rendering. 
 
 This, then, is what we propose to do in the case of those 
 propositions of Mr. Spencer's which are framed in such terms 
 as may either be representative of general concrete facts or else 
 may be interpretable as pure abstractions. We shall seek clear- 
 ness of thought by a separate consideration of the ambiguous 
 propositions which Mr. Spencer formulates, and shall inquire 
 whether they are sufficient under either aspect singly to unify 
 knowledge. If so, then the other aspect is superfluous ; and if 
 not, then the intermingling of the two does not effect the desired 
 
 unification. 
 
 Let us first, then, consider some of the abstract terms employed 
 by Mr. Spencer in his unification of knowledge— Matter, Motion, 
 Space, Time, Force, Polarity, &c. The survey of Nature which 
 forms the basis of knowledge informs us of a great variety of 
 objects, differuig in some respects, and in some respects resem- 
 bling each other. Advancing Science, by a process of experiment 
 and°analysis, resolves these objects into seventy or eighty so- 
 called elements, the properties of each of which it is able to 
 enumerate. What general name is to be given to the sum 
 total of these, so that when it is used we may know that it is 
 applicable to these elements, and that it is these alone which 
 are spoken of as actually existent ? The general term so used 
 is *'* Matter." But since they diff'er amongst themselves, they 
 can only be designated by this general term in respect of those 
 properties which they possess in common : then, by a strange 
 perversity, those properties which they have in common are 
 abstracted and regarded as an unity or entity; and although this 
 abstract Matter, having extension with resistance, and nothing 
 else, is nowhere to be found, yet it is treated exactly as if it 
 were a real existence. 
 
 One of the most curious instances of the hold which an 
 abstraction has upon the human mind as an imagined existence 
 is the term Space. We have referred to it before. If there 
 is one thing of which people are certain, it is the existence of 
 Space as an objective entity, whereas Space is in reality only 
 
 I 
 
 THE METAPHYSICAL METHODS. 
 
 35 
 
 an abstract term derived from the experience of "distance 
 between." In just the same way the abstract term Time does 
 not represent any reality, but is derived from intervals of suc- 
 cessions of changes in the relations of bodies. Some change 
 of relations of objects being taken as a standard — say the rela- 
 tions of movement of the earth and the sun — then other 
 changes of relations are compared therewith, and the term 
 Time becomes a convenient word, but does not represent an 
 objective existence. 
 
 Motion is a general term relating to all motions, and ex- 
 j')ressive of the change of positions of objects or the parts 
 thereof. It is not, and cannot be made to be, representative of 
 any individual objective existence. It is a convenient term to 
 use when treating of all motions, when we predicate something 
 which is applicable to all motions. It is not an objective entity, 
 nor a factor having actual existence. 
 
 We may have some difficulty in realising the terms Attraction, 
 Resistance, Polarity, Force, Equilibration, &c., in our minds as 
 general concrete terms, yet it must be still more difficult to assign 
 them any value as abstract terms. As concrete realities, we 
 may be able to understand the relations of various attractions, 
 repulsions, &c., and to make calculations respecting them which 
 shall come out correct, these attractions and repulsions being 
 in operation amongst and being part of the properties of the 
 seventy or eighty so-called elements. When we speak of them 
 in general terms, we are unable to divest our thoughts of these 
 concrete references. The terms ought to be merely sums-total of 
 concrete experiences. As to their being abstract entities, we 
 can have no conception of attractions and repulsions apart from 
 the concrete objects. 
 
 Therefore if Mr. Spencer should say (as indeed it would not 
 
 be unfair for the purposes of study to assume him to say) that 
 
 " All existences and their interrelations 
 
 are [corollaries of] 
 
 the Persistence of Force," 
 
 and the term Force is held not to be a general concrete term 
 
 but an abstraction, then it could be maintained that as an 
 
 abstraction it has no existence, neither has it properly any 
 
56 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 meaning dissociated in this way from all the concrete facts from 
 which it has been extracted. 
 Again, if we say that 
 
 " All existences and tjieir interrelations 
 are [corollaries of] 
 the Formula of Evolution and Dissolution," 
 apart from the incongruities of thought involved in the state- 
 ment, there is also this point relevant to the present issue-- 
 namely, the principal terms used therein {i.e., Matter and 
 Motion, considered as abstract terms) represent no existence. 
 There is no abstract Matter and no abstract Motion. There 
 are it is true, the seventy or eighty so-called elements, which 
 have for their term of totality the word -matter;" and they 
 undergo changes of relative position which are called "motions; 
 the concrete hypotheses concerning both of which will be duly 
 considered in their proper place : but if we choose to undertake 
 a purely mental process having no correspondence with reality, 
 and to manufacture an ideal matter and an entity called Motion, 
 we cannot argue from them as to the actualities of things, nor 
 unify our knowledge of them by means of these invented terms. 
 It is useless, therefore, to traverse the whole of Mr. Spencer's 
 series of propositions, and examine them in respect of their 
 adequacy as abstract terms to unify knowled, e made up of 
 individual concrete experiences. If these tern. \ are to be of 
 any use in such an endeavour, it must be as gd-ieral terms or 
 terms of totality representing universal concrete facts— never 
 quittincr their reliance upon these facts, and never losing their 
 relation thereto. If deductions are to be made from this 
 generalised and abstractly stated knowledge, it must only be as 
 a convenient and mediate mode of deducing conclusions from 
 the vast number of original concrete facts. 
 
 We need have no scruple, therefore, in summarily quitting 
 this class of methods for the unification of knowledge, and of 
 proceeding forthwith to the direct method just indicated. 
 
 fi 
 
 THE PHYSICAL METHODS. 
 
 37 
 
 § 7. TJie Physical Methods for the Unification of Knowledge. 
 
 The subject we have now to consider is the endeavour to find 
 the goal of Philosophy within the limits of Science or the 
 actually known. As such a method is very narrow in its scope 
 and very rigid in its limits, we are not likely to be successful. 
 Nor do we apprehend that any philosopher could so limit him- 
 self, nor that Mr. Spencer anywhere proposes to confine his 
 speculations within such narrow bounds. Everywhere we have 
 to frame hypotheses which go beyond the known, and this 
 mental reaching out into the unknown but not unknowable 
 region of theoretical science brings before us the considerations 
 treated of in our next section, entitled, the " Supraphysical 
 Methods for the Unification of Knowledge." In actual fact, Mr. 
 Spencer's attempt, when it is not by the methods already dis- 
 cussed, is a mixture of these rigid scientific and theoretical- 
 scientific methods ; and it must be admitted that the actual and 
 the theoretic are so closely interwoven that it is difficult to 
 distinguish them ; so that in result the actually known gives the 
 weight of its authority to the theoretic, and the latter throws 
 its all-including mantle over the universe in the guise of 
 authentic science. Therefore, without imputing to Mr. Spencer 
 any attempt to unify knowledge within the region of the actually 
 known, it will be useful to see how far the known by itself will 
 carry us on our way ; and the inquiry will also prove an advan- 
 tageous preliminary to the study of the wider hypotheses treated 
 in the next section, which, indeed, derive all their authority, 
 whatever that may be, from the facts and generalisations of 
 actual science. 
 
 There are two general remarks to be made as to this class 
 of methods. The first is, that we expect to find strict intelli- 
 gibility of terms. The physical sciences being built up from 
 observation and experience, the terms employed should always 
 carry with them exactness of expression, so as to be commen- 
 surate with the experiences which are to be registered by their 
 means. Physical terms have definite and limited meanings, so 
 that when they are used, they are known to possess an exact 
 
I 
 
 38 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 value-no more and no less. Their title to become true factors 
 in processes of reasoning is in so far as they represent actual 
 factors in the objective processes. . 
 
 For example, there is no mistaking a treatise of mechanics, 
 nor the formulas therein contained. So also in the science of 
 chemistrv, certain words or signs are symbols representing certain 
 facts or'gronps of facts actually existent in nature, and the 
 interrelations of groups of properties of a definite and known 
 
 kind. , . 1 * 
 
 Indefiniteness and error creep in when the mental process of 
 generalisation begins, which has no corresponding process in 
 the facts of nature themselves. This process may be a legiti- 
 mate one to a certain extent and for certain purposes-to the 
 end that is to say, of ascertaining how far the same predicate 
 can'be applied to large classes of facts-but it requires constant 
 verification, and is good only so far as it is commensurate 
 with facts. It is, however, a dangerous process— for general 
 terms when once established in the mind by repetition, and by 
 constant use in arguments and reasonings, are apt to assume a 
 false reality, as representing, not a collection of concretes, but 
 an unit which is an entity itself, and a factor not only m 
 thou-ht but in nature. Thus we get the word " matter," which, 
 from°being originally nothing more than a collective term, sum- 
 miner up the seventy or eighty so-called elements (the elemenr.3 
 themselves being nothing more than groups of properties), came 
 first to represent them in respect of those properties whica 
 they all had in common, namely, extension and resistance, and 
 afterwards to represent a mysterious something which held 
 together these groups of properties— an unknowable entity, 
 active and powerful, but beyond the ken of human sense or 
 
 insight. , 
 
 There is, therefore, a twofold way in which Mr. Spencer s 
 physical class of methods for the unification of knowledge may 
 be regarded. We may either take his general physical terms 
 as terms having a definite meaning and a value commensurate 
 with the contained physical or concrete experiences, and reason 
 therefrom, or we may regard them as general symbols. In the 
 one case we have intelligible factors, the interrelations of which 
 
 THE PHYSICAL METHODS. 
 
 39 
 
 are calculable ; in the other case we have imaginary entities, 
 things having an unity and powers founded upon these known 
 factors, but including something more than the totality of its 
 contents. 
 
 Now it is obvious that according to the way in which wo 
 use these terms must be the result of our endeavours towards 
 the unification of knowledge. We venture to submit, with 
 due deference yet with boldness, that if we adopt the latter 
 course and seek our unification of knowledge in the formation 
 of a proposition which expresses the supposed relations of 
 general entities, which are themselves inconceivable and entirely 
 unrepresentable in thought, then we take our unification of 
 knowledge out of the bounds of the intelligible and throw it 
 into the class of the metaphysical methods which we dealt with 
 in the last section. 
 
 On the other hand, if we accept the physical terms as having 
 definite, limited, and intelligible meanings, then we have a course 
 of reasoning open before us which we can pursue clearly, and 
 which is open to criticism and intelligent treatment, whether we 
 can succeed in eff*ecting an unification by means of it or not. 
 
 If we are asked which course Mr. Spencer actually pursues 
 in his work, we should answer, Both, although perhaps un- 
 consciously. He does not clearly let his readers see firstly 
 what the one can effect and then what the other can effect, 
 but he proceeds in a conjoint fashion, so that when intel- 
 ligible concrete matters are being dealt with, the one rendering 
 of the terms is given, and when the exigencies of the case 
 surpass intelligibility or the powers of the human reason, then 
 the other aspect of the terms comes in, and is employed with 
 a certain air of conclusiveness, so as to satisfy the eager desires 
 of the hasty reader, if not the critical judgment of the student. 
 It will be our task, having distinguished the different methods, 
 and having pointed out when terms lose their significance, so 
 as to become mystical or metaphysical, and thus to throw the 
 unification into the illegitimate class of methods, to set out in 
 detail the various physical methods proposed by Mr. Spencer, 
 and, after attaching to them every possible intelligible mean- 
 ing, to work them out fully, in order to see whether they 
 
40 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 accomplish the object which he has set before our view. This 
 is the task we now propose. 
 
 The second general remark we have to make respecting the 
 physical class of unificatory propositions is, that they must 
 express a process. 
 
 There is nothing upon which ^fr. Spencer insists more 
 strongly than that all sequences are parts of one process, and 
 that in the discernment of this process — i.e., in the setting up 
 in the mind of a series of corollaries which shall be the counter- 
 part of the series of sequences which nature presents — is to be 
 found the unification of our knowledge of nature. We would 
 therefore direct attention to the question, what is meant by a 
 process, and what is meant by the recognition of a process ? 
 
 An artificial process is the treatment of substances by sub- 
 jecting them to various chemical and mechanical forces, so as 
 to change some of their arrangements of properties, either by 
 adding to or taking from, and thus changing the shape or alter- 
 ing the distribution in such a way as to produce the intended 
 result. A natural process is the change or redistribution of parts 
 effected by the natural relations of bundles of properties under 
 given circumstances, without any intention towards a given 
 end. A natural process works from the past, not to the future : 
 it is simply the flowing on of one sequence after another 
 as different forces come into relation. From this view of a 
 natural process it follows that if we could trace up the present 
 state of the cosmos to its immediately preceding state, and so 
 backwards, we would discern the history of all sequences. And 
 if, further, we could analyse nature, and be able to ascertain her 
 constitution at any given period, and by preference a period of 
 simplicity of composition and structure, then we would be able 
 to deduce therefrom all her subsequent history as a process con- 
 sequent upon that constitution at that time. We Avould no 
 doubt be able to say, There is so much oxygen, so much hydro- 
 gen, so much iron, and so forth, and the properties of oxjcren 
 are thus, the properties of hydrogen are thus, the properties of 
 iron are thus, and so on. If we could do this, then we would 
 have so many factors to our process, and our knowledge of the 
 history of the universe would be simplified according as we were 
 
 PHYSICAL METHODS— THE SEVENTY FACTORS. 41 
 
 able to reduce the ntimber of the original factors. At present 
 the number of the factors is the number of the so-called ele- 
 ments, say seventy or eighty, plus ether and the known physical 
 laws. For a complete knowledge it would be requisite to know 
 the quantity and the exact position of each atom at any given 
 time which might be selected as a starting-point. But failinf' 
 that exact knowledge, even the conception of such a calculation 
 might be supposed to give us a fair notion of its adequacy to 
 explain all the incidents of the process, presuming the requi- 
 site knowledge of quantity and position. But even then we 
 should still be very far from an unification of knowledge, m 
 that the number of the factors is so great It is true that the 
 reduction of all knowledge to the recognition of a process 
 calculable from the relations, positions, quantities, and proper- 
 ties of seventy or eighty factors would be a great simplifica- 
 tion ; yet it is only a first stage in the process. To show that 
 these factors themselves are but the results of a still smaller 
 number of factors would be a still further simplification ; but 
 the real unification of the processes of nature would not be 
 reached until the whole series was interpreted as the relation of 
 two factors. 
 
 It would seem from this statement that knowledge never will 
 be unified ; and, indeed, that is our belief. At the same time 
 it will be our duty to give our attention to such proposals as 
 are made, and not set up our despair or our scepticism as a test 
 of other men's achievements. And if all the histories of Nature 
 can be understood by means of the recognition of a process 
 dependent upon the interrelations of factors, be these factors 
 numerous or few, then knowled/^e is so far unified — our expla- 
 nations are effective, — our knowledge is organised, — Science has 
 become a practically complete Philosophy. 
 
 § 8. ^7i Enumeration of Mr. Spencer's Physical Methods for the 
 
 Unification of KnoicleAge. 
 
 (a.) Hypothesis of the Seventy Factors. 
 
 The first proposition we have to consider is that the history 
 of the solar system, ending in the state of things as we know 
 
,^ „x-rirr^4TfON OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 A2 SPENCER'S VMFICATIUSS ur 
 
 . , ,• t>,„ existing facts of a-mal and vegctablo 
 it now, ;ncludmg tho ex ^ ^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ,j 
 
 life, is the result of a pro<=ess a ^^^^ ^„g_ 
 
 a nebula existent in the cosmos some mil J ^^^_ 
 
 'This nebula consisted of he --^" J ^^f i, ,, described 
 „.ents or bundles of properties 1.-^^^^^ ^^^ ^ ^„,, 
 
 in books on chemistry. ihe'r inherent m 
 
 extent influenced and -^f ^^t^n iT-hen disengaged 
 the mass, such as separative Motion, ^h^^ .^^^ 
 
 ftom the nebula, ^^o-d these consUtuenfad^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ 
 relation, with the results indicated, Jhe q ^^^^^^^^ ^^ 
 
 arises, Is such l^^y^:^ZltT:llT^^^^y^^^^ and bio- 
 ;::LThr;atr JnivUe and calculable process due to 
 
 ^Z^rf^^ a bo. J^^^£, 
 Srrsu:i":atre stlntelppendix to .1. i. of the 
 'Sgy," criticised by us in our former volume ^^ ^^ 
 
 This Appendix also explains the o"S>n ana na = 
 
 Matter, '^reupon the ^^^^^ ^^tm^^ ^^'^^^^^^^ 
 "Biology," showing how a 1 the f^^^^^^^^ .^ ^^^^^.^^ ^„ 
 
 of some '=0'^^'^'''^7^2. Ivsical environment. This history 
 the circumstances of ^^^^"^ P^'''^'",, bailed examination in 
 affords matter for a more ^f^^f^^'J^:^, ,,,^ is to 
 Chapter V. of this work. Ihe resuio , -^^^ ti,e results 
 
 show that from the nebula constitut d -J "bed ^^^^^„^^^^ 
 
 are not '^^^f f ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^ it 
 
 from the -^"^l^/^^YntSlt as^the re'sult of the factors 
 to be a P-- V^^^^;^.^^^^^^^^^ already stated, we have not 
 given. In this «^amina -^ ^^ Chemistry, a 
 
 wandered beyond the ^°"7"'^l ",* . ^ .^ thus limited 
 
 V 1, «T, PVivsics and a book on ilechanics. J»s uiua 
 
 book on injsics, duii factors inadequate to 
 
 • See " On Mr. Spencer's Formula of Evolution," p. 33 et m^ 
 
 PHYSICAL METHODS'-ONE FACTOR. 
 
 43 
 
 Bcientific statement, and, as preliminary to the next section, it 
 will be well to ascertain their value in this respect. Founded 
 on actual science as these supraphysical methods must be, it will 
 be useful to examine first what truths of science afford them 
 countenance and authority. 
 
 (b.) Hypothesis of the One Factor, 
 
 The first scientific generalisation in order of pre-eminence and 
 of most extensive use throughout the work is the Persistence 
 of Force, and the method based upon it ascribes the unification 
 of knowledge to the proposition that 
 
 " AU existences and their interrelations 
 are [corollaries of] 
 the Persistence of Force." 
 
 This proposition has already been considered in its abstract 
 interpretation ; we have now to consider it in its value as 
 derived from, and being a general expression of, concrete expe- 
 rience. We have to regard the Persistence of Force as an 
 ultimate generalisation built up by ever-increasing generalisa- 
 tions of knowledge as specified in the beginning of this 
 chapter, and from which all changes of the universe can as 
 corollaries be deduced. 
 
 Let us take our science first-hand from the exposition of 
 Professor Balfour Stewart, to whose work " On the Conservation 
 of Energy " we now refer. This work strikes us as tentative 
 rather than as conclusive, as an attempt in the right direction 
 rather than as the final expression of scientific investigation. 
 The matters treated of by Professor Stewart do not seem in 
 his hands to acquire complete philosophic form, as will be seen. 
 
 In the first place. Professor Stewart gives us a catalogue of 
 the Forces of Nature, and, secondly, a list of the Energies of 
 Nature. What is the difference between Force and Energy is 
 not stated, and has to be gathered from a comparison of the 
 two lists. And even then, when we discover that the former 
 means principally the forces of attraction, the denotative terms 
 might easily be exchanged. Energy is that which *'doe3 
 work " against these attractive forces. 
 
 ?' 
 
%■ 
 
 4, SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 The Forces of Nature arc— 
 
 1 The Attraction of Gravitation (p. 48> 
 
 , The Attraction of Cohesion (p. 51)- 
 
 4 Electrical Attraction (p. ^4) Koara« _, f 
 
 tothat force .hich ye call Ch-^/^^^;^^ (p. 50), as in 
 We have purposely left out Ea^t' ^^^ ,^,3 of 
 
 all probability the cases so termca 
 
 ''T? Zr sl^:Srirnot propound any theoi^ of the 
 CoSSnlfTorce similar to «- ^^ot^ ^el^^^^ 
 
 Energy, whicl. ^^ ^^::^:^ZZrTs^^ as the 
 less it would seem to be jut as % e ^^^ ^^ 
 
 doctrine of the Conservation of Enery ^^^ 
 
 teach us the transmutation of ^"^^^ ^^^^^^^ ,^,^„,i the 
 various kinds of Force enumerated above couia 
 
 one into the other. 
 
 Let us now consider — 
 
 TJte List of Energies. 
 
 A. Energy of Visible Motion. 
 
 B. Visible Energy of Position. 
 
 C. Heat Motion. 
 
 D Molecular Separation. 
 
 E^ Atomic or Chemical Separation. 
 
 F. Electrical Separation. 
 
 G. Electricity in Motion. 
 H. Kadiant Energy. 
 
 We observe that Professor Stewart says nothing about Kerve 
 Eol: Muscular Energy. Pojrity^^. ^^t^-J~S 
 by Mr. Spencer; nor does he mention ±eeiin^, u f 
 
 to the— > ^^ ^^^^ ^^ Conservation:' 
 
 more aennu y universe as a whole, or, if this 
 
 PHYSICAL METHODS— ONE FACTOR. AS 
 
 be isolated from the rest, as far as force or energy is concerned, 
 forming a sort of microcosm, to which we may conveniently 
 
 direct attention. 
 
 " This portion, then, neither parts with any of its energy to 
 the universe beyond, nor receives any from it. Such an isola- 
 tion is, of course, unnatural and impossible, but it is conceiv- 
 able, and will, at least, tend to concentrate our thoughts. Now, 
 whether we regard the great universe or this small microcosm, 
 the principle of the conservation of energy asserts that the sura 
 of all the various energies is a constant quantity, that is to say, 
 
 adopting the language of Algebra — 
 
 .^v ,^v /i-r» f a constant 
 (A) + (B) + (C) + (D) -f (E) + (F) -f (G) + (H) = j ^^^^^^^^ 
 
 "116. This does not mean, of course, that (A) is constant in 
 itself, or any other of the left-hand members of this equation, 
 for, in truth, they are always changing about into each other — 
 now, some visible energy being changed into heat or electricity; 
 and, anon, some heat or electricity being changed back again 
 into visible energy — but it only means that the sum of all the 
 energies taken together is constant We have, in fact, in the 
 left hand, eight variable quantities, and we only assert that 
 their sum is constant, not by any means that they are constant 
 themselves." 
 
 We note here that we shall have to quote this exposition 
 of the conservation of energy against Mr. Spencer when we 
 come to controvert his doctrine of the Continuity of Motion ; 
 for Motion, according to Professor Stewart, is not a constant 
 quantity, but is interchangeable with energy of position, which 
 is a state of rest. 
 
 An element of obscurity remains in respect of the affinities 
 or polarities of the so-called elements. The question arises, 
 Are these constant quantities inherent in these elements ? If 
 not, what would they be without them ? and if they are, how 
 do they rank with the forces or energies on the list, since they 
 are not then convertible t 
 
 And again, if all the modes of energy specified are convertible, 
 is it legitimate to suppose that they could all be converted 
 into one kind? In this case, what would become of the chemical 
 
46 SPENCER^S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 attractions or polarities in question 1 Generally speaking, what 
 is the relation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy to 
 the permanency of the properties of the so-called elements 1 
 
 AVith these preliminary provisoes, we are able to under- 
 stand the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy as held 
 by men of science, namely, that there is a variety of different 
 kinds or modes of manifestations of energy in nature, that 
 these modes are capable of interchange; and that although 
 each mode may vary in quantity, it only does so by be- 
 coming another mode, the total quantity of energy remaining 
 
 constant. , 
 
 This is the doctrine upon which is founded Mr. Spencer s 
 «' Persistence of Force." It would appear in some places of Mr. 
 Spencer's work, though not in others, that he would include in 
 this term the Indestructibility of Matter also ; yet as the latter is 
 not a mode of force interchangeable with any other, it would seem 
 illegitimate to do so, and therefore we take it that Mr. Spencer's 
 scientific doctrine is the same as Professor Stewart's. At any 
 rate, it is convenient for the present section so to consider it, 
 reserving for the next section any extension of meaning. It 
 is the scientific statement as arrived at by scientific men 
 that we have under consideration at present, and having fully 
 acquainted ourselves therewith, we have to consider what are the 
 coroUaries of the constant quantity of energy. Can we deduce 
 all the interrelations of existences from the knowledge we 
 have that the sum total of all kinds of energy, however they may 
 interchange, remains a constant quantity? To our mind it is a 
 barren proposition. The only corollary from it seems to be that 
 if one kind diminishes another must increase. We may find 
 all the facts of nature in conformity, that is, uncontradictory of 
 this principle and of the Indestructibility of Matter and the 
 attractive Forces, but we shall never be able to deduce the 
 particular and special changes from these principles. We shaU 
 never be able to understand the differentiation of the un- 
 known energy into the various modes of its manifestation as 
 get forth by Professor Stewart; and failing in the first 
 corollaries, we fail in aU the others. Since we cannot know 
 the nature of the original Force or Energy, we can get no 
 
 PHYSICAL METHODS— ONE FACTOR. 
 
 47 
 
 corollaries from it. If we are asked to draw corollaries from 
 the Persistence of Force, and we know not Force, the stress 
 of netting the corollaries is thrown upon the Persistence, and 
 the only corollaries derivable therefrom are merely that if 
 one kind of force augments, another will diminish, and vice 
 versa. The only other corollary we could get from the teaching 
 would be that the facts of experience upon which the doctrine 
 is founded will never contradict themselves, but will always 
 be found conformable to the general principle of which they 
 are the warrant. In fact, nearly all Mr. Spencer's corollaries 
 from the Persistence of Force are found to be merely statements 
 that such and such a fact, general or particular, is in harmony 
 with the doctrine of the Persistence of Force. But it will at 
 once be seen that to find facts or circumstances uncontra- 
 dictory of a proposition is a very different thing from deriving 
 them from it as corollaries. The former is a merely negative 
 result, the latter is what we truly look for as conferring that 
 insight into the connection of sequences which is the unifica- 
 tion of knowledge. Bearing in mind that Mr. Spencer pro- 
 poses to found his most general proposition on actual science, 
 let us take several of the corollaries which he draws from the 
 Persistence of Force and examine them as corollaries from the 
 doctrine of the Conservation of Energy as expounded by Pro- 
 fessor Stewart. 
 
 Still keeping within the bounds of actual science, let us ask 
 whether the Instability of the Homogeneous is really a corollary 
 from the Conservation of the Attractive Forces or the Conserva- 
 tion of Energy ? The proposition is — 
 
 "The homogeneous, or any substance or existence that is 
 homogeneous, is unstable," 
 
 Viewed as a corollary from the theory of the constant quan- 
 tity of energy, this proposition does not seem to have any 
 relation to that general principle. If it has, the corollary would 
 seem to be that the homogeneous remains stable if it is in a state 
 of balance, which is, indeed, implied in the term homogeneous. 
 Supposing, however, Mr. Spencer means that if different parts of 
 a homogeneous mass are differently affected by various incident 
 forces, the mass no longer remains homogeneous — then wo 
 
48 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 acknowledge the corollary but quit the proposition under study, 
 and find another one altogether, namely, that incident forces 
 impinging upon another aggregate of forces produce changes. 
 This will be allowed as a corollary, but will be seen to be a very 
 barren one. The kind of change wrought, the nature of the 
 sequences, depends upon the particular incident forces, and upon 
 the particular receptive forces. 
 
 We have seen already that the Indestructibility of Matter is 
 not a corollary from the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. 
 Professor Stewart, though in an imperfect way, disclaims it, 
 nor can it be included in the list, because all that are included in 
 the list are not individually permanent but changeable. And 
 it is not a corollary from exclusion, because by exclusion it 
 cannot stand in the relation of a corollary at all. It is an 
 independent, not a dependent, doctrine. The scientific state- 
 ment of the Conservation of Energy is thus seen not to warrant 
 as its corollary the doctrine of the Indestructibility of Matter. 
 
 Is it, then, a corollary from the Conservation of Force as given 
 by Professor Stewart 1 If the proof of it is the indestructibility 
 of weight, then by Matter is meant the Attraction of Gravita- 
 tion, and the theory is a corollary from itself. 
 
 Again, the Continuity of Motion is not a corollary from the 
 Conservation of Energy, because motions, being included as 
 some of the energies which are mutually convertible with other 
 energies in a state of balance or rest, are seen not to be con- 
 tinuous. 
 
 ^"either is any power of the nature of mind, feeling, will 
 power, mental energy, &c., a corollary from the Conservation of 
 Energy, for being excluded from the list, they are not conver- 
 tible°iuto any of those which compose the constancy of the 
 quantity. On the other hand, it is a corollary from this doc- 
 trine that there are no such energies in operation as factors, 
 for they can only act in increasing or decreasing the quantity 
 of energy made up of the kinds mentioned in the list. Whereas 
 energy °is a constant quantity, never augmenting nor decreasing. 
 Aje we to say that Equilibration is a corollary from the Per- 
 sistence of Force, as thus made up of the two forms described by 
 Professor Stewart 1 We think not Equilibration is a tendency 
 
 THE PHYSICAL METHODS. 
 
 49 
 
 to a state of rest. All motion is the act of balancing ; when 
 balance is reached, rest ensues. But the constancy of the quan- 
 tity of energy only means that whether in the form of motion or 
 in the form of energy of position the total quantity is the same 
 ^the form is indifferent— and the constancy of the quantity 
 does not necessitate either motion or rest. As regards Mr. 
 Spencer's special phases of Equilibration promulgated in the 
 *♦ Principles of Biology," there is no relation apparent.* 
 
 We might, again, ask. Is the Formula of Evolution a corollary 
 from the Persistence of Force, as thus considered, or Integration 
 or Dissolution 1 We would find in each case either contradic- 
 tion or non-relation. The only corollary from the Persistence 
 of Force is that if there is change from one kind of energy, it 
 must be into another kind ; but the doctrine is absolutely fruit- 
 less of special corollaries. It does not even necessitate change 
 of any kind, only that if there is a change it must be into an- 
 other kind. The key to special changes must not be looked for 
 in this barren and general proposition, but in the actual kinds 
 and relations of the special forces enumerated, and in the 
 resistive or other forces which are left out of it altogether. 
 Wlien these are brought together and understood in all their 
 relations of quantity and position at any given time, then we 
 can read the sequences, not otherwise. 
 
 We find, then, that the scientific doctrine of the Conservation 
 of Energy is useless in itself for the philosophic purpose. 
 Viewed as a corollary from the scientific doctrine of the Con- 
 servation of Energy, the only logical conclusion arrived at would 
 be that some change would take place equivalent to the amount 
 of energy changed. 
 
 And if we add to this the doctrine of the Conservation of 
 the Attractive Forces, and again the Indestructibility of Matter, 
 whatever that is, we are unable by them to read off the history 
 of the physical cosmos, and much less can we attain to an 
 explanation of biological processes. 
 
 We therefore conclude that within the limits of actual science 
 philosophy is not attainable. A more detailed criticism to this 
 end is given in our former work, and in the examination of 
 
 * See Chapter V. of this work. 
 
 D 
 
 L H 
 
 i 
 
Il 
 
 50 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 the " Biology," included in the present volume. We now pass 
 on to the Supraphysical Hypotheses. 
 
 § 9. The Supraphijsicdl Methods for the Unificatlan of 
 
 Krundedge. 
 
 Since it is seen that the purely physical methods of study carry 
 us out a short distance in our endeavours towards the explana- 
 tion of the cosmos, while the study of them yet points in various 
 ways towards theories of a more general character, our thoughts 
 naturally take a wider range, and we set ourselves to the task 
 of framing hypotheses which, whether founded on actual know- 
 ledge or purely imaginary, aim at one and the same result, 
 namely, the explanation of all the modes of physical combina- 
 tions and histories and all their associated developments. These 
 theories, for convenience' sake, we call the Supraphysical, on two 
 grounds : in the first place, because they aim at getting behind 
 and explaining the relations of the present ultimately known 
 factors (i.e., the. chemical elements); and in the second place, 
 because since they are thus but an extension of the methods 
 and factors of science, we do not transgress beyond the reach 
 of the human intellect, but every idea and every proposition 
 founded upon them is at least conceivable. Thus we are 
 capable of estimating what each hypothesis is able to explain 
 and what it fails to include. Such demarcations of failure 
 are just as useful as the demarcations of success, because they 
 enable the intellect properly to direct its future exertions ; and 
 this is far better than the endeavour to slur over deficiencies 
 of explanation under the cover of indefinite thought and con- 
 fusing verbiage. 
 
 We shall have to treat of two classes of hypotheses of the 
 supraphysical order, the legitimate and the illegitimate, the 
 former dealing with definite conceptions and being more nearly 
 related to the actual truths of science, and perhaps con- 
 sequently of a more limited scope — the latter free from such 
 tiresome restrictions as to meaning and scope, and, from their 
 indefiniteness, apt to delude the mind with the appearance of 
 greater magnificence, and even of greater efficacy for cosmical 
 
 THE SUPRAPHYSICAL METHODS. 
 
 51 
 
 explanation. Both methods have this in common, that they 
 are founded on generalisations of actual knowledge ; but they 
 treat these generalisations in very different ways, the charac- 
 teristic of the former being that it deals with imagined concretes, 
 that of the latter being that it deals with objecti vised abstrac- 
 tions — that is to say, terms of totality conceived as general terms 
 connoting a something which is an unity itself — a special factor 
 — having definite relations with other objecti vised abstractions 
 established in the same way. 
 
 Let us first treat of those legitimate hypotheses which are 
 most nearly related to actual knowledge. And it is not to be 
 supposed that in this chapter, which is only a mere outline 
 of the study, we intend to traverse the whole field of supra- 
 physical speculation. It is our intention here merely to indicate 
 the chief features, so as to enable the student, in following Mr. 
 Spencer or any other author, properly to locate the particular 
 hypothesis or method he may have under examination, and thus 
 prevent aimless and indefinite wandering. 
 
 (a.) Supraphysical Hypotlieses Strictly Considered. 
 
 Physical science has done something already, if we endeavour 
 to approach the subject from the safe side of actual accom- 
 plishment, towards supraphysical theories. Men of science 
 are working towards such theories year by year. The methods, 
 experimental or logical, by which Science has reduced chemical 
 processes to the interrelations of the seventy or eighty so-called 
 elements, and physics to certain laws of motion, are continually 
 encroaching upon the mysteries of the unknown, and are endea- 
 vouring to penetrate still further. Year by year adds to our 
 knowledge of the motions of matter, and of the behaviour of 
 the elementary substances under various physical conditions. 
 
 In chemistry we find the hypothesis that the seventy or 
 eighty so-called elements are really not simple, but have com- 
 ])lex constitutions, formed of one or two simple original elements 
 differentially aggregated. The properties of these original ele- 
 ments are variously estimated. Some theories would invest them 
 merely with the attributes of attraction and resistance, perhaps 
 also with differentiated shapes and modes and rates of motion. 
 
*a 
 
 II 
 
 II 
 
 ^|i 
 
 I 
 
 52 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 The theory that the relations of the so-caUed elements are 
 those of modes and rates of motion, coupled with some theory 
 of shapes produced by the varied aggregation of units having 
 polarities of attraction and repulsion, is supported by implica- 
 tions from various branches of science. The doctrine of chemi- 
 cal combinations supports it ; more particularly does it derive 
 support from the very abstruse law formulated by Mendele- 
 jeef and Lothar Meyer, termed the "Periodic System." The 
 science of Molecular Physics, to which the late Professor Clerk 
 Maxwell so largely contributed, and which the late Professor 
 Clifford popularised, also tends in the same direction. The 
 science of Spectroscopy likewise indicates the complicated 
 structure of some of the so-called elements in the number and 
 variety of the lines produced in the spectrum, and in the theory 
 that these are caused by the varied motions of different units 
 in a state of incandescence. The behaviour, also, of different 
 substances in a state of tenuity in the radiometer under the 
 appUcation of electricity again tends in the same direction. 
 The physical explanation of heat as molecular motion, of light 
 as ethereal motion, of colour as differentiated rates of ethereal 
 motion, all point towards a theory founded on the relations of 
 differently constituted aggregations of units of attraction and 
 repulsion plus an ether having no property but simple resis- 
 tance and attraction. 
 
 Now it is possible to suppose a physical worid thus constituted 
 —it is a reasonable hypothesis— one that we are able to conceive 
 —one coming within what Professor Tyndall would call legiti- 
 mate scientific imagination. It may be regarded as a possible 
 explanation of the laws of the various sciences of Chemistry, 
 Physics (molar and molecular), Electricity, Light, Heat, Spec- 
 troscopy, &c. ; and if the special laws were eventually arrived 
 at, it would constitute an actual unification of all these sciences. 
 We are still, it is true, far from such an unification, but science 
 is tending in that direction. 
 
 How far Mr. Spencer places his reliance on this intelligible 
 hypothesis is not very clear. Undoubtedly he works with it to 
 a certain extent, and he even, as we shall presently see in the 
 critical study of his work on " Biology," in part uses it ; but 
 
 HYPOTHESES INCLUDING '^FEELING," 53 
 
 in his reply to our previous criticism he bo decidedly and 
 positively refuses to be tied down to any such, definite and 
 precise theories, that it is difficult to know how far and to what 
 extent he relies upon them, and how far he discards them m 
 favour of symbols that stand for things and processes of which 
 we can have no conception. | 
 
 \8 just stated, the critical study is that of Biology. ^ e can 
 see very weU that the theory just indicated might be supposed 
 to be sufficient for the explanation of the physical constitution 
 of the cosmos, but it would not seem to account for the origin 
 and history of organised living beings. Here, again, notwith- 
 standing very close study of Mr. Spencer's "Biology," we are 
 unable to assign the author's exact position. He very cleariy - 
 repudiates "feeling" as a factor in biological histories,* and 
 apparently relies wholly upon the properties of some of the 
 so-called elements, including their mutual polarities, and upon 
 their external relations, called equilibrations, with the physical 
 forces and energies included in Professor Stewart's list. In this 
 case Biology itself would have to be included in the ultimate 
 unification of knowledge we have just described ; and under 
 these conditions, supposing such to be Mr. Spencer's views, 
 we have examined his theory of Biology very thoroughly m 
 Chapter V. of this book. The result of that examination is 
 that the explanation fails ; and if we add to this failure to 
 explain Biology upon merely physical premises, the additional 
 failure to account for and define the mutual relations of physical 
 structure and processes with feeling and mentality, we have 
 the most important and interesting of all studies shut out from 
 the proposed unification of knowledge. 
 
 (h.) Hypotheses including Feeling. 
 It is of comparatively little moment to us that all physical 
 processes, exclusive of the biological, can be shown to be the 
 result of certain differentiated combinations of original simple 
 units. Such a proof is an intellectual achievement which gives 
 intellectual gratification and no more. What is of vital interest 
 is to know what we ourselves are, whence we came and how, 
 * See Principles of Biology, vol. I chap. 8. 
 
lii 
 
 il! 
 
 54 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Avhither we tend, and what the law of our conduct— what we 
 are to one another in the long course of our history? Are 
 we anything more than accidents appearing in the cooling of a 
 nebula, and vanishing in the ruins of a dead world t 
 
 On these questions the theory just considered throws no light. 
 A rational explanation of feeling and its relations, simple and 
 complex, with physical aggregations and organisations, seems to 
 demand a theory of origin which includes feeling amongst the 
 initial factors— a theory which shall specify a factor of feeling 
 in the most simple of all physical interrelations; which shall 
 assif'n feeling as an universal concomitant of physical combi- 
 nations and disintegrations. Several such theories have been 
 propounded, in which physical changes bear assigned relations 
 to feeling, and feeling bears assigned relation to and influence 
 upon physical changes. This introduces us to a very difficult 
 problem; for if feeling is not merely the concomitant of a 
 physical process, but is also a factor in physical processes, how 
 is the theory of the constant quantity of the physical forces to be 
 maintained 1 Of course it can be replied that the theory need not 
 be maintained ; it may be argued that feeling, " psychic force," 
 or whatever it may be termed, may increase or decrease or vary 
 the physical forces of Professor Balfour Stewart's list, and that 
 there may be no fixed relations between physical combinations 
 and feeling. But everything in the history and constitution of 
 living beings points to the existence of such definite relationship 
 of interdependences. Were it otherwise, the unification of 
 knowledge, and indeed science of any sort, would seem to be 
 impossible. But in fact, as justified by experience, we are 
 warranted in our endeavour to assign an explanation — a historic 
 explanation— by which we shall see that all biological structure 
 and function is the result of the interrelations of original fac- 
 tors, including feeling. As a matter of fact, all we can say 
 is, that no adequate explanation on these lines has yet been 
 effected, and we have no inkling of any. At the present time, 
 notwithstanding all our achievements of Science, the relations 
 of physical combinations and changes to feeling, and the influ- 
 ence of feeling upon physical changes, is an impenetrable 
 mystery. Mr. Spencer in some places recognises this mys- 
 
 HYPOTHESES INCLUDING ^'FEELING.'' 55 
 
 tery to the fuU. Nevertheless, he professes to have accom- 
 plished the task of explaining the origin and development of all 
 living creatures, or at least to have formulated the main lines of 
 such'a history of morphological and physiological development ; 
 and this theory is founded purely upon physical processes, the 
 factor of feeling being formally excluded. 
 
 We think it may fairly be urged that some such theory as 
 the one just indicated may, if not at present, yet at some future 
 time, come within the scope of legitimate hypotheses. We are 
 able to conceive of all the factors requisite for such a hypothesis, 
 although we are not able as yet to frame any notion of their mode 
 of connection or relation. This, however, remains for the future. 
 Mere possibilities we are unable to measure. But if such 
 a conception, however legitimate the hypothesis may be, is not 
 possible at the present time, and yet is necessary for the com- 
 plete unification of knowledge, then all the more certain is it 
 that at the present time such a unification cannot be efi'ected. 
 Let us now proceed to put into a proposition the views we 
 have just been discussing, so as to keep our theories within the 
 methods of procedure we deemed to be correct at the commence- 
 ment of our present study. 
 Let us first say — 
 
 " All existences and their interrelations 
 
 are [corollaries of] 
 
 conceptions of the relations of original units of attraction 
 
 and repulsion." 
 Our conclusion is, that although this might be a sufficient ex- 
 planation of all physical processes, it would not afl'ord us an 
 explanation of the origin and development of living beings, even 
 if we consider such development to be unaff'ected by the factor 
 of feeling; and that if we consider it to be so afi'ected, then, 
 since the factor of feeling is not included, either expressly or 
 implicitly, in the proposition, that proposition fails to recognise 
 one of the essential factors, and is to that extent incomplete. 
 This thesis will be more fully considered in Chapter V., where 
 we treat of the ** Biology.*' 
 
!!t 
 
 56 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 (c.) Oth^ Supraphydcal Hypotheses. 
 There are other forms into which the supraphysical hypo- 
 theses can be thrown, and which are implied in several parts of 
 Mr. Spencer's works. The importance he attaches to Equilibra- 
 tion and Polarity warrants us in giving them special treatment 
 For clearness of study, let us throw them into the form of a pro- 
 position, thus : — 
 
 " All existences and their interrelations 
 
 are [corollaries of] 
 Equilibration," 
 and 
 «* All existences and their interrelations 
 are [corollaries of] 
 Polarity." 
 We mention these because Mr. Spencer in his « Biology " so 
 lar-ely employs them in effecting his constructive arrangements. 
 Polarity is a legitimate scientific term ; it is representative of 
 a number of concrete facts, taking its origin in the action of the 
 loadstone and magnetic needle, enlarged by the knowledge of 
 the behaviour of electrified substances, but deriving its spe- 
 cial significance ' in biological construction from the science of 
 crystallography. The special relationships thus characterised 
 are those° mutual affections of atoms by which they range them- 
 selves into special forms of aggregation. These mutual affections 
 may or may not have to do with what are caUed chemical 
 affinities, but in any case they have to do with the method 
 of aggregation of similarly constituted molecules. 
 
 The form of crystallisation is now universally specified as 
 appertaining to the properties of those bodies which do crystal- 
 lise, although there are certain bodies called colloids which do 
 not assume that form of aggregation. The manner in which Mr. 
 Spencer employs the powers included in the term Polarity is 
 treated of at great length in Chapter Y. of the present work. 
 He assumes that the differences of perceptible crystalloid form are 
 due to differences of size and shape of the atom or molecule— and 
 very reasonably so, for assuming polarity of an atom or molecule 
 to be positive and negative at different points, the arrangement 
 
 POLARITY AND EQUILIBRATION. 
 
 57 
 
 effectuated must be due to the shapes and sizes of the con- 
 stituent particles. Colloids, he seems also to say, have similar 
 attractions and repulsions, but they either have no constant 
 shape or the shapes are not rectilinear but curvilinear. Mr. 
 Spencer's very clever and ingenious but delusive argument is 
 founded on the attempt to confer on the colloids which con- 
 stitute organic matter all the formative powers of the crystalloids, 
 so that on the one hand they are so pliant as to receive any 
 and every change of form, and yet, when so required for con- 
 structive purposes, they have the methods of aggregation of 
 crystals, with definite shapes and fixed modes of aggregation. 
 The theory is strained still further when, in lieu of the definite 
 homogeneous structure of a mass of crystal, we have it stated that 
 we owe to a similar process the heterogeneous structure of an 
 animal composed of an osseous part, a nervous part, a cuticle, a 
 liver, muscle, &c., made up, it may be, of similar modified units, 
 but not formmg a structure resultant from the forms and 
 polarities of special physiological units, in the same manner as a 
 mass of crystal is determined by the forms and polarities of 
 its constituent particles. It will be found, we think, from a 
 study of the criticism just referred to, that the proposition ex- 
 plaining the interrelations of all existences by Polarity will 
 not be found of the desired efficiency. 
 
 The proposition attributing all existences and the history of 
 their interrelations to Equilibration is a wider and more inde- 
 finite explanation, inclusive in all probability of the polarities 
 we have just been considering. It is a supraphysical hypo- 
 thesis, because it is founded upon experiences with which we 
 are fully acquainted and conveys a more or less definite concep- 
 tion. The hypothesis is in some respects confusing, in that it is 
 not clear what forces can be equilibrated with one another, and 
 what forces stand apart and have no place in a process of mutual 
 balancing. Of course, it can be clearly understood that the 
 forces and energies enumerated in Professor Balfour Stewart's 
 list mutually affect each other, and whether interchangeable or 
 not can be so related to each other as to mutually balance each 
 other in a state of rest or equilibrium. But it is not quite 
 clear what (if any) of the properties we ascribe to the seventy 
 
58 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 or eighty so-called elements are essential to them and cannot 
 be detached from them, and are therefore not includable in 
 a general equilibration — for instance, Polarity. The whole 
 subject requires a greater thoroughness of treatment than Mr. 
 Spencer has given it, and it is imperative that some one should 
 write that preliminary book on Inorganic Evolution which Mr. 
 Spencer was obliged to omit. Is Polarity a fixed property, for 
 instance, of Oxygen ? If so, and if not, how does it take part 
 in a process of Equilibration? Again, if Matter is a special 
 manifestation of Force of an indestructible character and not 
 interchangeable with other modes of Force, in what respect does 
 it so dififer from those other modes as to be uninterchangeable, 
 and how does it enter into the general process of Equilibra- 
 tion? Is Matter as a form of force specialised as Attrac- 
 tion or as Resistance ? If the latter, is it conditioned as to 
 shape or size, or how otherwise 1 Is it always associated witli 
 Motion or Attraction? Mr. Spencer would perhaps say that 
 all these alternative scientific notions are inconceivabla If 
 so, then all these supraphysical theories must be abandoned as 
 not aff'ording the sought-for universalistic explanation. All we 
 desire to make out now is, that if we are to consider such hypo- 
 theses, they must be commensurate with the whole of the facts, 
 and they must be framed in clear language founded on definite 
 notions of actual conditions. If, as we suppose. Equilibration 
 is one of those ill-conceived thoughts of which we have a clear 
 conception with regard to some special instances, and vaguely 
 formed analogies with regard to other processes, together with 
 still more indefinite ideas of application to the whole system 
 of things, it is quite beyond all intelligibility as an universa- 
 listic explanation and as a means for the unification of know- 
 ledge. 
 
 This hypothesis is treated at length in Chapter V. of the 
 present work, forming part of our study of " Biology," and is 
 given in this connection because that study is the most important 
 of Mr. Spencer's series of works, as well as on account of the 
 curious twists and turns which are therein given to the hypo- 
 thesis of Equilibration. We content ourselves here with showing 
 that until the factors with which Equilibration deals are more 
 
 THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE THREE FACTORS. 59 
 
 clearly set out, as well as the forces which are beyond its scope 
 (if any) and the modes in which they affect each other, the 
 mere term Equilibration as prime mover or as an instrument 
 in development, and more particularly in biological development, 
 especially, again, if feeling is a factor therein, is useless and 
 meaningless ; and until all this is done we cannot understand 
 the proposition which assigns Equilibration as the long-sought-for 
 predicate 
 
 (d. ) The Hypothesis of the Three Factors. 
 
 We have now to consider certain illegitimate supraphysical 
 methods. We characterised these at the outset of the section 
 as being founded on objectivised abstractions. We have already 
 found a condemnation of all such methods of reasoning in a 
 former section of this chapter. But we find it necessary to 
 speak of them here because they have a supposititious authority 
 in physical experiences, and because it is desirable to show in 
 what manner they are actually applied in trying to make use 
 of them as explanations of physical change. For this purpose 
 we shall have to direct attention to the process of reasoning in 
 the earlier chapters of the book on the Knowable in Mr. Spencer's 
 ** First Principles." 
 
 The course of thought pursued in these earlier chapters of 
 "First Principles" has all the formality of a clear and con- 
 sistent argument carefully stated. The reader is made to feel 
 that he advances firmly step by step, until he has it clearly 
 impressed upon his mind that all his future work is founded 
 upon the understood relations of three original factors, the 
 formulation of w^hich will constitute the desired unification 
 of knowledge. Now, a factor is that which has special properties 
 in relation to other factors, and when we have a given number of 
 related factors, and clearly understand these relations, we can 
 foresee the general character if not the details of their sub- 
 sequent histories. The factors which Mr. Spencer gives are 
 the Indestructibility of Matter, the Continuity of Motion, and 
 the Persistence of Force. It will be seen that neither Matter, 
 ^lotion, nor Force are defined. In the special chapters treating 
 of them the conceptions we should attach to these terms are 
 
6o SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 specified, but it is elsewhere stated that they are but symbols 
 standing for modes of the Unknowable. If we confine them 
 to the modes or manifestations as known to us, the consideration 
 of our subject is thrown into the physical section of our study, 
 or into the preceding part of this section. If we take them in 
 the sense implied in each particular sentence in which they 
 occur, we have variable terms, but generally meaning the approach 
 together or separation of bodies having resistance and exten- 
 sion, and implying powers of attraction and combination, and 
 powers of separation. But the real stress of meaning is often 
 put upon the adjective turned into an objectivised abstraction, 
 and we find our minds dwelling more upon the Indestructibility, 
 the Continuity, and the Persistence than upon the intelligent 
 understanding of the objects which are indestructible, con- 
 tinuous, and persistent How we can speak of these factors, 
 and yet not be able to specify those properties in respect of 
 •vvhich they are related factors in a process of physical develop- 
 ment, is incomprehensibla A treatise on chemistry we can 
 understand, or a treatise on mechanics, although we have no 
 knowledge at all as to what oxygen is in itself, nor what motion 
 is in itself; howbeit we do know what we mean in every 
 instance when these terms are used in scientific treatises. Mr. 
 Spencer works with the three factors mentioned above, and in 
 the formulation of their relationship he seeks to unify knowledge. 
 This is clearly set out in Chapter XL of the " First Principles,** 
 entitled " Recapitulation, Criticism, and Recommencement." 
 
 " § 90. But now, what parts do these truths play in forming 
 such a conception 1 Does any one of them singly convey an 
 idea of the cosmos : meaning by this word the totality of the 
 manifestations of the Unknowable? Do all of them taken 
 tof^ether yield us an adequate idea of this kind 1 Do they, even 
 when thought of in combination, compose anything like such an 
 idea 1 To each of these questions the answer must be — No. 
 
 " Neither these truths nor any other such truths, separately 
 or jointly, constitute that integrated knowledge in which only 
 Philosophy finds its goal. It has been supposed by one thinker 
 that when Science has succeeded in reducing all more complex 
 laws to some most simple law, as of molecular action, knowledge 
 
 THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE THREE FACTORS. 61 
 
 ^viU have reached its limit. Another authority has tacitly 
 asserted that all minor facts are so merged in the major fact 
 that the force everywhere in action is nowhere lost, that to 
 express this is to express 'the constitution of the universe. 
 But either conclusion implies a misapprehension of the problem. 
 ** For these are all analytical truths, and no analytical truth- 
 no number of analytical truths, will make up that synthesis of 
 thought which alone can be an interpretation of the synthesis 
 of thin<-s. The decomposition of phenomena into their elements, 
 is but a preparation for understanding phenomena in their state 
 of composition, as actually manifested. To have ascertamea 
 the laws of the factors is not at all to have ascertained the laws 
 of their co-operation. The question is, not how any factor, 
 Matter or Motion or Force, behaves by itself, or under some 
 ima-ined simple conditions ; nor is it even how one factor 
 behaves under the complicated conditions of actual existence. 
 The thing to he expressed is the joint product of the factors under 
 all its various aspects. Only when we can formulate the total 
 process, have we gained that knowledge of it which Philosophy 
 aspires to. A clear comprehension of this matter is important 
 enough to just- fy some further exposition." .... 
 
 "§92. To resume, then, we have now to seek a law of 
 composition of phenomena, co-extensive with those laws of their 
 components set forth in the foregoing chapters. Having seen 
 that matter is indestructible, motion continuous, and force per- 
 sistent—having seen that forces are everywhere undergoing 
 transformation, and that motion, always foUowing the line of 
 least resistance, is invariably rhythmic, it remains to discover 
 the similarly-invariable formula expressing the combined con- 
 sequences of the actions thus separately formulated." 
 
 The problem here proposed is the formulation of the com- 
 position of phenomena by the light thrown upon it in the 
 preceding chapters. *' The thing to be expressed is the joint 
 product of the factors," and the factors are Jilatter, Motion, and 
 Force, and the continuity of each. Now it is evident that 
 unless we know precisely what is connoted by these terms, we 
 are unable to understand the formula when expressed. This is 
 the old question which is always reappearing, and it is impossible 
 
THE HYPOTHESIS OF ONE FACTOR. 
 
 63 
 
 62 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 to tell whether Mr. Spencer thinks it necessary that we should 
 attach any meaning to them or not ; but if not, how are we to 
 distinguish between them, so as to know that we are talking 
 about different things ? It is not possible to speak about them 
 without attaching some ideas to them. And we can only suppose 
 Matter to refer to the sum-total of the seventy or eighty so-called 
 elements, Motion to their change of relative positions, and Force 
 we do not know to what. Nor does Mr. Spencer appear to 
 be in any more satisfactory position respecting it, for he omits it 
 altogether in the final unificatory formula in which he originally 
 proposed to include it. The difficulty is this : he has already 
 said that Matter is a manifestation of Force, and that Motion 
 is a manifestation of Force ; how then can they be three 
 separate factors? Force sometimes seems to be one original 
 factor precedent to the other two, and manifesting itself 
 in them — annihilating its separate existence, if it ever had 
 any, in the two modes of manifestation, so that it loses indi- 
 viduality in the two factors; and yet is put down as one 
 of three co-operating factors. How can it be a third 
 factor in a set of which its own manifestations are the other 
 two?* 
 
 Accordingly, when Mr. Spencer asks the question, t " What 
 must be the general character of such a formula ? " he replies, 
 " It must be one that specifies the course of the changes under- 
 f^one by both the Matter and the Motion," leaving the third 
 factor out of account altogether. "The law we seek, there- 
 fore," he says, " must be the law of the continuous redistribution 
 of Matter and Motion. . . . Philosophy, rightly so called, can 
 come into existence only by solving the problem." 
 
 One is surely entitled to ask why all the importance attributed 
 to Force in so many preceding chapters, if all knowledge is to 
 be summed up in terms of Matter and Motion ; and why in 
 all the succeeding chapters there is any reference beyond the 
 terms of the formula as so limited to the laws of the redis- 
 
 * This difficulty is treated at length in our former criticism "On Mr. 
 Spencer's Formula of Evolution," p. 208. 
 t "First Principles," p. 276. 
 
 tribution of Matter and Motion ; and what validity can be 
 attached to the cosmical unificatory explanations in detail when 
 all the work is done in other terms than those of the formula 
 itself 1 For throughout Mr. Spencer's works there is a constant 
 reference to the harmony of his various explanations with the 
 formulated unification of knowledge because coincident with 
 the laws of Force, which inferred or expressed laws of Force 
 are other than the one particular law expressed in the formula. 
 Thus Force is of great import up to the formulation of the 
 factors ; it is then tacitly omitted from the formula without any 
 explanation of the reasons why ; and again, when we come to 
 actual work, it is once more quietly resumed as if it were actually 
 included in the formula. 
 
 Our problem, therefore, resolves itself into two questions, 
 namely — Is the unification of knowledge to be effected by 
 means of the knowledge of one factor. Force, or by means of 
 the formulation of the relations of two factors. Matter and 
 Motion? And in the ensuing discussion we find ourselves 
 labouring under the great difficulty of having to use language 
 and employ terms of which we disapprove. To use terms 
 appertaining to a particular doctrine in the discussion and 
 criticism of that doctrine is almost an acceptance of it — so 
 much is conceded at the outset, so much is involved in the 
 accuracy or inaccuracy of nomenclature. And first let us 
 consider — 
 
 (e.) Tlie Hi/pothesis of One Factor. 
 
 The one factor is of course Force. Now Factor is a term of 
 relationship, and implies other factors. Therefore we cannot 
 call one individual existence (if these words have any meaning) 
 a factor at all. The thought we try to form in our minds is 
 that of an activity, simple, homogeneous, unconditioned, and 
 having no relations to any other existence. Any change is one 
 of self-determination. Wlien a man has succeeded in forminji 
 this conception, he is capable of writing whole volumes of Philo- 
 sophy, sprinkled throughout with entities dignified with names 
 having initial capitals; and the ignorant will look up to him with 
 awe. Nothing whatever can be said against him, only that ho 
 
64 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 lives outside the world of actual and practical thought, for none 
 of his thinking is ever applicable to scientific explanations, nor 
 to the conduct of life either in ethics or politics. 
 
 From one factor, whether it is called Force, the Absolute, 
 or the Unconditioned, no thinking is ever possible. Yet to 
 one point all thought of the ct priori kind is forced, and cannot 
 rest till it reaches Unconditioned Being. Mr. Spencer's penul- 
 timate is the Homogeneous. He is forced to this by the 
 nature of his argument. If Philosophy is bound to explain all 
 changes, it must go back to a time before clianges commenced. 
 If it has to account for all differentiations, it must commence 
 with the Homogeneous. If it has to tell us all about the 
 Conditioned, it must have a background of the Unconditioned. 
 Thus we arrive, as indeed is explained by Mr. Spencer himself, 
 at the Absolute or Unconditioned Being. 
 
 We find, indeed, that all philosophies whatever, starting from 
 any point, whether of a subjective nature or of a purely and 
 strictly physical nature, are bound to meet at this focus of 
 'thought. All study, whether subjective or objective, is the 
 study of changes and series of changes. The senses are conscious 
 of changes, the volition deals with changes, the intellect per- 
 ceives changes all around it; the mind w^onders at changes, 
 Science tries to understand their connections, AVe anticipate 
 the future ; we endeavour to explain the present by the past. 
 We seek the ultimate cause of all change. In going backwards, 
 as Mr. Spencer correctly points out, we go from the definite, 
 coherent, heterogeneous, to the indefinite, incoherent, homoge- 
 neous. We go from the complex to the simple, from greater 
 diversity to greater sameness. In the course of our thought we 
 arrive at a time of least differentiation, and finally to a state of 
 absolute uniformity, where there are no conditions to the ulti- 
 mate being. From the physical sciences we trace the progres- 
 sive simplicity and uniformity up to a sphere of units of attrac- 
 tion and repulsion having no differentiation and apparently no 
 cause of any differentiation. Science out of its own materials 
 can assign no beginning of change. Under the philosopher's 
 keenest analysis the specialities of material bodies disappear and 
 resolve themselves into a supposititious force, which as yet is 
 
 THE HYPOTHESIS OF ONE FACTOR. 
 
 6S 
 
 unmanifested in Matter or Motion, and which does not know 
 even Attraction and Kesistance. And here he finds himself 
 strangely enough in the company of Hegel and others, the most 
 advanced of the subjective philosophers, who have arrived by 
 another road at the same identical point. 
 
 This is the difficulty that presents itself, and is met by various 
 schools in various ways. The Comtists refuse to set out on the 
 speculative journey at all. Mr. Spencer goes nearly to the end, 
 but not quite, and boldly says he has been almost all the way — 
 all the rest is Unknowable ; and yet all knowledge is unified 
 by the fact that all its lines converge towards that unknow- 
 able centre into which he is unable to penetrate : a statement 
 which is manifestly no explanation. Hegel, again, plunges into 
 the depths of this Homogeneous, this Absolute Being, and from 
 the fact of it producing change out of an apparently unchange- 
 able homogeneity, deduces the principle of Self-Determination. 
 Having established this principle at the beginning, he holds that 
 it has an ever-living right as a factor in the universe, and thus 
 builds up a system which most commends itself to the religious 
 philosophers of the day. 
 
 However, the fact remains, that, whether from the religious, 
 the subjective, or the scientific standpoints, all views end in th6 
 realisation by the mind of Absolute Being, supreme, uncondi- 
 tioned, and unknowable — whatever afterwards may be made of 
 it by each party. 
 
 Mr. Spencer seemingly attacks this problem in his specious 
 argument entitled " The Instability of the Homogeneous." But 
 " the Homogeneous," when pursued to a final analysis, carries us 
 onward by the obliteration of differentiations to a state where 
 all differentiations have disappeared — to a state not merely of 
 uniformity or equal balance of Matter and Motion or of the 
 forces of attraction and resistance, but to a state before even 
 these forces have become differentiated. This impossibility of 
 attaining to a conception of the primordial state and of the 
 grand First Cause of all changes would seem to exclude the 
 possibility of the unification of knowledge. Mr. Spencer's 
 theory of the Instability of the Homogeneous is equivalent to 
 Hegel's Self-Determination. If the history of the cosmos is a 
 
 E 
 
66 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 single process and the initial cause is due to this or any similar 
 principle, then in the absence of a knowledge of the Uncon- 
 ditioned the nature of the process must for ever remain beyond 
 the grasp of human reason. 
 Let us, however, say that — 
 
 "All Existences and their interrelations 
 are [corollaries of] 
 the Instability of the Homogeneous," 
 and examine it as a supraphysical method. 
 
 Now "the Homogeneous" is merely an adjective turned 
 into a noun. We have to suppose something of which homo- 
 geneousness is predicated. We are obliged, in fact, to represent 
 in our minds units of some sort — either units of resistance and 
 attraction or units of some other sort. The figure of equilibrium 
 according to Mr. Spencer is the sphere. If forces are the main 
 element in the ultimate constitution of the universe, then homo- 
 geneous units of force must be co-existent in a state of equili- 
 brium — that is to say, in a sphere. Now the proposition is 
 that the homogeneous is unstable, and it is therefore equiva- 
 lent to the proposition that a state of equilibrium is unstable. 
 It means that the homogeneous of itself changes to something 
 dse, and that of two sides of a balance, by and by, one will 
 outweigh the other. This of course is contradictory to the 
 theory of the Persistence of Force, but agrees w^ith the theory 
 of Self-Determination held by some philosophers. But it is 
 evident that although it may be a principle in nature that every- 
 thing changes into something else, still this principle does not 
 show us the interdependence of sequences, and knowledge could 
 not be unified thereby. 
 
 The next proposition we have to consider under this heading 
 is that 
 
 *' All Existences and their interrelations 
 
 are [corollaries of] 
 
 the Persistence of Force." 
 
 It does not seem that if we are unable to get corollaries from 
 
 Force itself or from Absolute Being, that we shall be able to 
 
 get such corollaries from its attribute of Persistence as shall 
 
 explain its varied manifestations ; only that, given these as its 
 
 THE HYPOTHESIS OF ONE FACTOR. 67 
 
 modes, there will be corollaries as to some of the general condi- 
 tions of the relations of these modes. ^ 
 
 Thus if Matter, taken as Kesistance and Extension, is a mode 
 of Force and Force is Persistent, and Motion is also a mode of 
 Force it is not a corollary that each is indestructible and un- 
 transformable into the other, for such might be, and the sum 
 or persistence of Force would be unchanged. 
 
 But, indeed, there is no warrant in science for the supposi- 
 tion of Force at all, only for Forces. 
 
 Professor Stewart does not say that (A) + (B) + (0) + (JJ) 
 + (E) + (F) + (G) -f- (H) = Force, or Energy; he does not let 
 them escape from the left-hand side of the equation at all. All 
 he states is that (A), &c., + to (H) = a constant quantity. As 
 a name for this constant quantity, as a term expressive of the 
 sum-total of the individuals of a class, the word Energy may 
 be good ; but as representative of an entity it is merely an 
 objecti vised abstraction of the illegitimate order. 
 
 Apparently (A) never decreases without some one or more of 
 the others in the series increasing ; and if all but one were made 
 to disappear, then the constant quantity would be in that one 
 kind of energy ; it would not disappear into the other side of 
 the equation. We would have (A) = a constant quantity, say 
 Attraction. This, coupled with the ultimate result of the theory 
 of the indestructibility of matter, viz., Resistance or Repulsion, 
 would give us two ultimate factors. 
 
 It may be admitted at once that such a hypothesis, if we had 
 more knowledge, might explain all the physical relations of 
 things. We may grant that from these factors through 
 Polarity, Shape, and Size all the constituents and mutual 
 relations of the seventy or eighty so-called elements might be 
 explained, and a theory of the universe and of its distri- 
 bution might be made. But, as shown in our previous criti- 
 cism, it would be open to some grave objections, and would be 
 deficient in explanations of the greatest interest and import- 
 ance to us. The grave objections would be that we could never 
 picture to our minds any state from which to make a historical 
 start. If we supposed a heterogeneous beginning, our philosophy 
 would be imperfect ; if we supposed a state of homogeneity, we 
 
ill 
 
 68 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 could find no starting-point at all; and if we pictured to ourselves 
 a state of great simplicity under the rule of equilibration, we 
 could not imagine anything but a very speedy reversion to a 
 state of homogeneity or complete equilibration. We can only 
 reasonably deduce the complex organised universe from a com- 
 plex unorganised one. We can understand organisation out of 
 a chaos of complex material, but not the formation of complex 
 material out of the Homogeneous. 
 
 The great deficiencies of such an explanation would be, 
 that while possibly it might explain the physical interrela- 
 tions, it has not within it the possibility of any explanations 
 of feeling or consciousness, and, we make bold to say, of any of 
 the interrelations of matter constituting organised living beings, 
 or of their reproduction and continuance as races of creatures. 
 
 The question next arises how far Mr. Spencer's Persistence 
 of Force is equivalent to Professor Balfour Stewart's Conserva- 
 tion of Energy. No doubt Mr. Spencer means more by it than 
 is contained in Professor Stewart's list of Energies, and more 
 than the list of his Forces added, and he may think that we 
 are treating him unjustly in regarding his theory as identical 
 with Professor Stewart's. Let us consider this. We are bound, 
 we think, in the first place, to take Professor Stewart's doctrine 
 of the Conservation of Energy as complete in itself. All the 
 items of the equation are transformable one into the other, 
 and the increment of one implies the decrease of some other. 
 It is not asserted that any other mode of energy beyond the 
 limits of the list can be transformed into any one of them, 
 or vice versa ; but, on the contrary, the inference is that such a 
 transference is an impossibility, for it would vary the total 
 quantity of energy. The essential point of the theory is that this 
 quantity is invariable — that the circle of interchange of modes 
 is complete in itself, and is unassailable from any quarter. 
 
 If, therefore, Mr. Spencer means by the Persistence of Force 
 something more than Professor Stewart means by the Conserva- 
 tion of Energy, plus the Conservation of the Attractive Forces, 
 and plus the Indestructibility of Matter, which are also complete 
 in themselves and unassailable, he must mean that there is a 
 remainder of Force excluded from these classes, and not inter- 
 
 THE HYPOTHESIS OF ONE FACTOR. 
 
 69 
 
 1 
 
 chan^'eable with them, which also is of a constant character. 
 Kow we do not know the above modes of Force or Power 
 in themselves, but we have a scientific knowledge of them, which 
 is more to the purpose. What do we know of this implied extra 
 Force ? We grant at once we do not know it in itself: do we 
 know it scientifically, as we know the other modes of Force ? 
 do we know its manifestations, and the laws thereof 1 If we 
 do, let Mr. Spencer express them, and show their relations 
 amongst themselves and their relations to the other modes of 
 Force or Power. If it can be done, we are so much nearer the 
 unification of knowledge. If it has not been done, we so far 
 fail of it. If it is impossible, that unification is impossible too. 
 The uniformity or parallelism of the characteristics of all 
 changes in the physical world and in the regions of feeling and 
 social action are indeed very suggestive of an identical Power 
 behind them all This parallelism affords the poet and the 
 orator abundant stores of illustration in their poems and dis- 
 courses, and has also its philosophic significance. Mr. Spencer's 
 volumes are rich in instances of these apparently overruling 
 Laws of Force, and he very often appeals to them as forming 
 that bond of universal relationship which is to unify know- 
 ledge. We acknowledge the full force of the suggestion, but 
 cannot go beyond its bare recognition, and are unable to give it 
 that precise statement or formulation which alone can impress 
 upon it any scientific value. Grateful acknowledgment is due 
 to Mr. Spencer for bringing out so strongly these marked identi- 
 ties of process between the physical world and the facts of biology, 
 including the action of the emotions, of the intellect, and of 
 bodies of men in societies ; but granting all this, there is still 
 wanting a definite formulation, and there is still wanting the 
 knowledge of this extra factor and its laws of interrelation 
 with those other factors which we can formulate with scientific 
 
 precision. 
 
 It can, however, be maintained from Mr. Spencer's writings 
 that his Persistence of Force is not more than Professor Stewart's 
 Conservation of Energy plus the Conservation of the Attractive 
 Forces and the Indestructibility of ^Matter. Inorganic Evolu- 
 tion is clearly contained within the assigned limits, and it 
 
 {\^ 
 
I 
 
 70 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 will bo seen from a study of Organic Evolution as explained 
 by Mr. Spencer— so far as regards its first stages in the 
 Appendix to vol. i. of the " Biology," examined in our previous 
 criticism, and so far as regards its more advanced stages in the 
 passages treated of in Chapter V. of the present work— that 
 the supposed explanation never trespasses beyond these limits. 
 Morphological and physiological developments are all shown 
 to be the results of the physical properties of certain elementary 
 substances in equilibration with a physical environment, all 
 governed by purely physical laws. In addition to this we must 
 also bear in mind that Mr. Spencer expressly excludes Feeling 
 from amongst the factors of Biology.* 
 
 The conclusion is, that "One Factor" is a contradiction of 
 terms, since the term " Factor " implies other factors in inter- 
 relation ; that from the adjective Persistence no corollaries are 
 deducible ; that the constancy of quantity amongst modes does 
 not afford any knowledge of their special relations; that to 
 keep any meaning in our studies we have to confine ourselves 
 to concrete experiences or legitimate generalisations therefrom ; 
 that any supraphysical theory is only of value so far as it is 
 commensurate with the concrete ; and that outside of concrete 
 manifestations the terms Force and Energy have no meaning 
 
 whatsoever. 
 
 (/.) The Hi/2wthesis 0/ the Two Factors. 
 
 The two factors are the two manifestations of Force, namely, 
 Matter and Motion. These are the two factors that ultimately 
 find a place in the formula of evolution and dissolution. The 
 conclusion indicated in Chapter XL of "First Principles" 
 receives an elaborate treatment in the following six chapters, 
 until the goal of Philosophy is arrived at in the formula 
 referred to. The value of this formula received a varied 
 examination in our former criticism ; nevertheless, it will be 
 useful to summarise our views of it here. 
 
 In the first place, we desire to know what meaning is to be 
 attached to the terms. We have already seen that if the term 
 Matter is to be taken as indicative of the Tiextis or substratum 
 binding together the various bundles of properties constituting 
 
 * Principles of Biology, voL i. chap. 8. 
 
 THE HYPOTHESIS OF TWO FACTORS. 71 
 
 the chemical element, it is a term without any logi^l v^ue 
 whatever in any formula or process of reasoning. AYe have 
 isot^ that, L an objectivised abstraction it has no actua 
 existence, and that the only legitimate use of the term is its 
 employment in a proposition which makes a predication com- 
 mon to all the chemical elements. These propositions are 
 very limited in number, and comprise assertions respecting the 
 properties of resistance, extension, attraction, and their spatial 
 derivatives, or their derivatives of motion and time. In our 
 former work we entered into a detaQed examination of the 
 possible meanings of this hypothesis, but Mr. Spencer repu- 
 diates all of them as not being the expression of his views. 
 We found, of course, that these factors did not afford explana- 
 tions of the facts of feeling and mind, nor, indeed, of the 
 morphological and physiological histories of animal and vege- 
 table life even if considered apart from the factor of feehUg. 
 A further criticism of the methods by which Mr. Spencer 
 works out these processes will be given in Chapter V. of this 
 work and will exhibit still more clearly, we think, the failure 
 of Mr. Spencer's reasoning. In this critical portion of his 
 system of Philosophy the formula of evolution and dissolution 
 plays no part whatever in the logical synthesis. The factors 
 from which, as results or consequents, the morphological and 
 physiological histories have to be deduced are not objectivised 
 abstractions called Matter and Motion, but a certain small 
 number of chemical elements, together with certain laws of 
 polarity and equilibration, and certain laws of Force or IVIotion. 
 These facts are so imperfectly realised in the mind, and their 
 relations are so loosely referred to, that they never receive 
 proper scientific st^xtement. This, of course, renders all the 
 more easy the apparent accomplishment of the process ; but 
 immediately strict formulation and definiteness of meaning are 
 insisted upon, its deficiencies become apparent. However, what 
 we wish to point out here is that the formula of evolution and 
 dissolution does not represent the working power of the universe, 
 even according to Mr. Spencer's treatment, but that the actual 
 tools by which he endeavour to accomplish his great construc- 
 tive work are the known elements and their physical laws. 
 
ill! 
 
 72 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 The formula referred to is nothing more than a partial descrip- 
 tion of the most general characteristics of physical changes, 
 and even in this very limited and comparatively uninteresting 
 portion of the cosmos it does not claim to rank as an explana- 
 tion showing the sequences from original factors. 
 
 This formula is so well known that we need not repeat it. 
 The proposition founded on it would be — 
 
 ** All Existences and their interrelations 
 
 are [corollaries of] 
 
 the Formula of Evolution." 
 
 "We now have to free the term matter from the rigid limits we 
 assigned to it in the study of the Physical Methods as merely 
 a name for the sum-total of the whole of •the substances 
 known to us as the so-called elements. As a supraphysical 
 term, we have to consider it as relating to units having resist- 
 ance and therefore extension. We are free to vary our hypo- 
 thesis by supposing other attributes, such as attraction ; and 
 indeed it is difficult to see how we can proceed without some 
 such addition. We may even suppose mutual repulsion. We 
 must not, however, introduce special polarities, for that would 
 increase the number of our factors and spoil our proposition. 
 We are at liberty, however, to suppose varieties of size and 
 shape. 
 
 Our proposition includes the term Motion. It is founded 
 upon the joint doctrines of the Indestructibility of Matter 
 and the Continuity of Motion. The latter proposition w^e shall 
 have occasion to controvert, but for the present purpose pro- 
 visionally accept. The supposition is that motion never ceases, 
 but is ever continuous ; ceasing in one connection, it is only 
 transferred to some visible or invisible motion of other aggregates 
 of matter. What we have to do now is to consider- the pro- 
 position that Matter and Motion being both indestructible, 
 their interchanges are concomitant, and all the changes of the 
 universe are correctly described, if not explained, by the assertion 
 of a concomitance between the concentration of matter and the 
 transference of motion ; as well as between the reception of 
 motion and the separation of matter. 
 
 As before pointed out, the causes of these concentrations 
 
 THE HYPOTHESIS OF TWO FACTORS, 
 
 73 
 
 and separations of matter, which include all the chemical as well 
 as the mechanical combinations and decompositions in nature, 
 are not touched by the hypothesis. Taking the causes for 
 granted, then, the most general characteristic of the phenomena 
 
 so says our hypothesis — is the concomitance of the separation 
 
 of matter with the increase of motion and of the concentration 
 of matter with the decrease of motion. Surely this is not say- 
 ing very much, and falls conspicuously short of an explanation. 
 We have, therefore, to throw our proposition into the amended 
 form — 
 
 ** All Existences and their interrelations 
 
 are [corollaries of] 
 
 the Concomitance of tlie 
 
 integration ) ^f Matter with the I dissipation 1 ^^ jj^y^^ „ 
 dissipation j ( integration J 
 
 Let us see how it is applicable to the construction of the uni- 
 verse out of the raw material postulated. 
 
 The furthest point to which Mr. Spencer carries us back is 
 the existence of a nebula or of nebulae in a medium of ether. 
 These nebulae have or acquire a rotary movement; also, pre- 
 sumably, they are composed of the seventy or eighty so-called 
 elements in a gaseous condition ; but whether or not, whatever 
 the constituents of the nebulae may be, the cause of differentia- 
 tion is unassigned. This, as already alleged, constitutes Mr. 
 Spencer's first failure in explanation, and he is under the diffi- 
 culty either of accepting the elements as we know them and 
 conceive them (which leaves them unexplained), or of carry- 
 ing us backwards towards universal homogeneity and absolute 
 being, from which they are unexplainable. Now, even if we 
 accept the condition of things thus described, and ap{)ly to it 
 the Formula of Evolution, it is impossible to work out from these 
 data the actually existent universe. Evolution is an integra- 
 tion or concentration of matter and a concomitant dissipation of 
 motion. It is necessary that the attention should be fixed 
 upon this concomitance. We cannot have the concentration of 
 matter without the dissipation of motion, and conversely we 
 cannot have the reception of motion without the dissipation of 
 matter. The two things go together. There is always a double 
 
m 
 
 74 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 process. It is impossible in the nature of things that it can be 
 otherwise. Whenever there is evolution there is dissolution ; 
 whenever there is a process of dissolution there is a concdmitant 
 process of evolution. There is a measurably equal concentration 
 of matter for all dissolution or separation of matter, and this 
 means exactly the same thing as the concomitant increase and 
 decrease of motion. 
 
 We must also remember that the quantity of Matter is always 
 the same and the quantity of Motion is always the same. Yet, 
 notwithstanding the fact that in the cosmical system matter can 
 part with motion to other matter, it cannot part with it wholly 
 so as to remain matter by itself. Mr. Spencer nowhere tells us 
 why this process should not be carried to such an extremity. 
 We must also bear in mind that motion cannot exist by 
 itself, but is always the motion of matter. These con- 
 siderations all tend to strengthen the theory of concomitance, 
 namely, that matter and motion being constant quantities 
 and always combined, whenever there is a concentration of 
 one there must be a dissipation of the other. We must also 
 bear in mind that the state of concentration means one of greater 
 density of matter and less motion, and that the state of dissipation 
 means one of greater tenuity of matter and increase of motion. 
 
 Kesuming our study, then, of the original state of scattered 
 nebulae, we have certain aggregates of relatively concentrated 
 matter with comparatively little motion, surrounded by ether, 
 which is presumably matter in a state of great tenuity, and 
 according to the hypothesis now under consideration, in a state 
 of relatively greater motion. What happens ] According to Mr. 
 Spencer, the nebulae part with their motion and undergo the 
 process of evolution or concentration, while the surrounding 
 ether absorbs their motion and undergoes a process of dissipa- 
 tion. But, according to our view of the matter from the postu- 
 lates given, the ether, having an excess of motion over the nebulae, 
 would impart some of its motion to them, and gradually dissolve 
 them till the whole of the nebulae were amalgamated with ether 
 into one homogeneous mass. On what principle can Mr. Spencer 
 justify the supposition that the nebulae could part with their 
 motion to matter having already motion in much greater excess? 
 
 THE HYPOTHESIS OF TWO FACTORS. 75 
 
 Motion does not pass away into space and exist by itself apart 
 from matter— it is only transferred to other matter. According 
 to this theory, it is a constant quantity, and cannot go out of 
 existence. In the case given, what becomes of it? Do we not 
 here find an additional failure of Mr. Spencer's physical explana- 
 tion^ , , . , Tir CI 
 
 A difficulty here presents itself with which Mr. Spencer 
 does not deal Either we must conceive of the physical universe 
 as limited or as unlimited. If we conceive of it as unlimited, 
 then universalistic science is impossible. We are, therefore, 
 bound to think of it as limited ; and if we are bound to think of 
 it as limited, we are bound to think of motion as quantitatively 
 constant and as contained within definite confines. The effect of 
 motion is to separate units of matter, and the law of its transfer- 
 ence can only be that of the equalisation of motion, and conse- 
 quently equal distribution of matter, tending ever to a slate 
 of equilibrium or homogeneity ; that is to say, an equal dis- 
 tribution of matter and motion— a state, in fact, of perfect 
 equilibrium. From this it would appear that equilibration is 
 the ruling principle under the conduct of which the Formula of 
 
 Evolution works. 
 
 How, then, if all things arose out of a state of homogeneity, 
 could there ever have been any evolution or concentration of 
 the matter of some part of it, with a concomitant dissipation 
 of another part of it? It would be inconsistent with the ruling 
 principle of evolution, namely, equilibration. And even if 
 slightly disturbed by some external power, would it not im- 
 mediately revert in the most direct manner to its equilibrium ? 
 
 If the ruling tendency is equilibration considered as the equal 
 distribution of matter and motion, and if all changes have to be 
 accounted for as changes from homogeneity, then since homo- 
 geneity is an equal distribution of matter and motion, out of it 
 no changes could ever arise. 
 
 It would really appear that Mr. Spencer is so intent upon evolu- 
 tion that he forgets the concomitance of the other half of his 
 formula, and having a nebula in his hands, he unceremoniously 
 throws the superfluous motion overboard into the lealms of space, 
 without ever looking to see what becomes of it. 
 
76 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Equilibration is a tendency to the homogeneous, and since 
 equilibration rules evolution and dissolution, it tends to defeat 
 evolution, and it is not clear how any evolution can take 
 place. Therefore, simple mechanical equilibration is not the 
 ruling principle of the universe, nor the ultimate cause of 
 its changes, but there is something else which governs the 
 mutual processes of evolution and dissolution. What that 
 something else is nobody can tell, but evidently the something 
 which rules evolution and dissolution must be the law by which 
 all knowledge is unified, for all knowledge is knowledge of evo- 
 lutions and dissolutions, and until it is discovered there can be 
 no such unification. 
 
 The most simple instances of evolution and dissolution aro 
 those which occur under the withdrawal or application of that 
 kind of motion called heat. The application of heat to ice 
 causes a change into liquid water; the further application of 
 heat produces the state of water called steam. The withdrawal 
 of heat causes a series of reverse changes. And in Mr. 
 Spencer's imperfect demonstration this seems to be the prin- 
 cipal if not the only view taken of the changes recognised by 
 the Formula of Evolution. Molecular motion is withdrawn by 
 some unknown cause from the nebula, and it concentrates. As 
 before stated, it is not clear whether this nebula is homogeneous 
 matter or not If it is, it is not shown why concentration does 
 not take place uniformly instead of into diversified forms. The 
 withdrawal of heat, for instance, affects different substances 
 differently. At the same temperature we have different substances 
 in all the different states of solid, liquid, and aeriform. The 
 air, the solids, and the liquids in a room are all about the same 
 temperature. These different states are not examples of different 
 amounts of heat, but of the properties of bodies which defy the 
 uniformity of the concomitance of the concentration of matter 
 with the dissipation of motion — showing again that there must be 
 some law overriding that of the concomitance of the two which 
 is Mr. Spencer's Formula or law of Evolution. According to 
 the formula, the more dense an object the less motion, and the 
 greater tenuity the greater motion. According to the degree 
 cf density the degree of molecular motion. 
 
 THE HYPOTHESIS OF TWO FACTORS. 
 
 77 
 
 In Mr. Spencer's chapter on " Dissolution " occurs a curious 
 forgetfulness of the conditions of the formula of Evolution and 
 Dissolution and the course of the previous argument ; for he 
 
 says, § 183 :— 
 
 "Apparently the universally co-existent forces of attraction 
 and repulsion, which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm in 
 all minor changes throughout the Universe, also necessitate 
 rhythm in the totality of its changes — produce now an immea- 
 surable period during which the attractive forces predominating, 
 cause universal concentration, and then an immeasurable period 
 during which the repulsive forces predominating, cause universal 
 diffusion — alternate eras of Evolution and Dissolution." 
 
 Here we have the forces of attraction and repulsion set down 
 as causing alternation instead of concomitance. In the place 
 of a concomitance of evolution and dissolution, which is the 
 essence of the formula of Evolution and Dissolution, we have 
 alternate eras of each. Surely this is a plain contradiction of 
 
 theory. 
 
 Another curious inconsistency in the working out of the 
 theory is the doctrine of "locked-up" motion. Nitrogenous 
 compounds specially possess this property of being able to 
 «* lock up" motion— gunpowder, gun-cotton, nitro-glycerine, some 
 of the compounds of organic matter, all possess it. It is one of 
 the properties of organic matter which is essential to the higher 
 evolutionary stages; without it, biological development could 
 not take place. Yet it is contradictory to the Formula of Evolu- 
 tion, which is to the effect that the more motion the less inte- 
 gration, and to the theory of the Continuity of Motion, which 
 proclaims that motion is always going on and never stops. So 
 that the Formula and its sustaining doctrine fail us just in the 
 most interesting and important of our studies. 
 
 In the argument of this sub-section we have been obliged to 
 attach definite notions to the terms with which we have to deal, 
 namely. Matter and Motion ; and we have had to take them, if 
 not as realised abstractions, still as near to that form as possibla 
 Tiiis means that we have de-specialised our notions as far as 
 was in our power ; nevertheless, all the value or meaning in 
 the whole of the argument lies in whatever remains of con- 
 
78 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Crete connotatioa Since Mr. Spencer would repudiate thcPi» 
 concrete meanings as far as he could, we cannot suppose that it 
 is in this aspect that he would estimate their value. Yet if we 
 take away their concrete contents there is nothing left to give 
 them any meaning, and therefore, in every respect, we recognise 
 the inutility of this method. 
 
 § 10. The Siipraphij^cal Methods of (he Unification of Knoio- 
 ledge, and Mr. Spencer's Use of them. 
 
 Nevertheless it is to this class of method that Mr. Spencer 
 really looks for the unification of knowledge. 
 
 For instance, he regards matter as something more than a 
 mystical and incomprehensible entity, as more than a mere 
 abstract term, as more than a subjective phenomenon, as 
 different from the simple sum-total of the so-called elements. 
 And the same remarks may be made of other terms which he 
 uses, such as Force, Forces, Motion, Attraction, Resistance, 
 Special Polarity, Equilibration, Integration, Dissipation, &c. 
 
 The whole aim of the book on '* The Knowable" in the " First 
 Principles " is to establish a science of the sciences— a science 
 which is not a mere mysticism or subjective speculation, and 
 which yet goes beyond the limits of the narrow concrete sciences, 
 even though, being founded on them by a process of still higher 
 generalisation, its terms and propositions are not beyond the 
 intelligent comprehension of the human mind. It is true, 
 indeed, that Mr. Spencer denies all this, as wiU come under our 
 notice in the next section ; but we do maintain that such is 
 the intent and general purport of this part of his works, and 
 the impression produced by them upon the mind of the student. 
 We justify our statement by the argument that by such a 
 science of the sciences alone and by such methods alone can 
 physical science be unified, and we are taught to look forward 
 to it from the outset of Mr. Spencer's works. This view of Mr. 
 Spencer's attempt is borne out by a perusal of his chapters on 
 the Indestructibility of Matter, the Continuity of Motion, and 
 the Persistence of Force, in the book on " The Knowable." 
 These terms are thereafter generalised, including, yet being 
 
 THE CUMULATIVE METHOD. 
 
 79 
 
 something higher and wider than, the so-called elements and 
 their relations, and are so used in the enunciation of supra- 
 physical truths, such as " The Persistence of Relations among 
 Forces," " The Transformation and Equivalence of Forces," 
 "The Direction of Motion," "The Rhythm of Motion," 
 " The Formula of Evolution," " Segregation," " Equilibration," 
 
 &C. 
 
 It is the duty of the student to see whether the attempt so 
 made by Mr. Spencer is carried out carefully or not, to the 
 exclusion of metaphysical abstractions, which have no meaning 
 and represent no actualities of the processes of the cosmos ; 
 whether the result is or is not vitiated by the introduction of 
 the mystical ) whether the subjective is properly eliminated ; 
 whether the general theory is justified either as a rigid induc- 
 tion from facts or as a deduction corresponding with facts ; 
 whether the unification only to be accomplished by one or other 
 of these methods is merely simulated by the applicability of 
 identical descriptions to various classes of processes ; whether, 
 in fact, the science of the sciences so attempted is kept free 
 from mixture with all other methods . of thought and from 
 obscurities of reasoning, and moreover is made not only clear 
 and intelligible, as all scientific statements should be, but also 
 is shown to be sufficient to account for all the interrelations of 
 existences. 
 
 § 1 1. Tlie Method of Cumidative Factors. 
 
 We do not say that Mr. Spencer anywhere teaches the 
 theory of an unification of science by means of cumulative 
 factors, but in several places he speaks of " additional factors " 
 coming in which assist the progress of evolution, and we feel 
 justified in considering the subject specially, in case of any 
 student being misled by the suggestion of such a method. 
 
 It is obvious that if we undertake to explain any complicated 
 state of existence as the resultant of the relations of certain 
 original factors, the explanation, if effected, will be held to be 
 complete in itself. If it be a chemical explanation, the results 
 will all be shown as due to the relations of certain of tho 
 

 80 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 chemical elements. If it be an arithmetical calculation, tlie 
 result is involved in the statement of the problem under the 
 laws of the relations of arithmetical combinations. Again, aU the 
 intermediate stages, from the commencement to the result, are 
 equally due to the relations of the original factors. We should 
 not say of them, whatever phase they might present, that they 
 constituted "additional factors." Yet this is what Mr. Spencer 
 does in the exposition of his scheme. Each stage of complexity 
 becomes an additional factor in the progress of Evolution. Now 
 it can easily be understood that advancement in complexity, 
 when once established, helps forward the general progress of 
 the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, by establishing addi- 
 tional causes of heterogeneity in varied modes of relationship 
 with the new conditions of the environment. But it is mislead- 
 ing to say that any new combination being the direct result 
 of "original factors constitutes a new factor. It is an incident 
 in the general process, but nothing new is added so far as 
 the enumeration of the factors of the general process is con- 
 cerned. 
 
 Therefore we cannot suppose that Mr. Spencer seriously 
 
 advances the general theory of the evolution of the cosmos by 
 
 means of cumulative factors. At the same time, the exposition 
 
 of his theory here and there by means of this mode of expression 
 
 is apt to mislead the student, and should be duly noted in 
 
 advance. For if the reader of Mr. Spencer's works became 
 
 * impressed with the notion that new or additional factors came 
 
 into the cosmical process now and again, it is clear that he would 
 
 not properly understand Mr. Spencer's design of reading its 
 
 history as one process from first to last, the understanding of 
 
 which is the unification of knowledge. 
 
 It is easy to trace the steps by which he would be misled. 
 Eor instance, he would suppose that highly complex molecules 
 formed by the natural relationships of elementary atoms should 
 be regarded as additional factors in the relations of things. And 
 again, when these complex molecules by ordinary physical laws 
 or by chance contiguity formed themselves into small masses, he 
 might think that these masses, highly complex, changeable, modi- 
 
 THE CUMULATIVE METHOD, 
 
 81 
 
 fiable, sensitive, formed fresh factors in the cosmical series. 
 And he might then make the mistake of regarding "sensitiveness" 
 as the new factor, and not only so, but he might even suppose 
 that sensitiveness, being a noun, was the name of some entity 
 actually existent in the universe, and a factor in its processes, 
 instead of regarding it as a name for the mechanical instability 
 of certain highly complex compounds of the chemical elements. 
 And if he did so, it is obvious he could make no greater mis- 
 take in the pursuit of a strictly logical and deductive procedure. 
 But if he did make such an error, the step would be easy to the 
 supposition of feeling or consciousness, and by very easy grada- 
 tions he could arrive at organised consciousness. The new 
 factor expressed by the term " sensitiveness," although ex- 
 pressive of delicate mechanical relations, easily lends itself to 
 subjective applications, and through the verbal tie of association, 
 a new factor of Feeling might make its appearance in the cos- 
 mical sequences. And although Mr. Spencer may be careful to 
 explain that Feeling is not a factor in biological actions and 
 development, yet the student finds great difficulty in bearing 
 this in mind. 
 
 In one sense, each new combination is a new individual 
 factor in its environment, as each man or woman taking his or 
 her place in the world is a new factor in society ; and in any 
 account of a partial history, the advent of such a new individual 
 may be regarded as the addition of a new factor. But in a 
 cosmical explanation there can be no new factors ; all has to be 
 accounted for as from resultant original factors — as the product 
 of the original constituents ; and it is misleading to speak of 
 additional factors unless it is well understood that it is a mere 
 mode of convenience of • expression. At the same time, it con- 
 veys a dangerous suggestion in a system of which the essential 
 thought is the logical explanation of all things as a single 
 process due to the relations of a small number of original 
 factors. 
 
 Again, the danger is enhanced if the student, believing in 
 the possibility of new or additional factors appearing in the 
 progress of evolution, believes also in similar accretions to the 
 

 82 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 physical laws. For instance, after mastering the meaning of 
 the term " equilibration " in dynamic, he might admit a new 
 factor in that class of physical changes called biological in Mr. 
 Spencer's special law of biological equilibration, by which 
 animals and plants endeavour to preserve their existence by the 
 adaptation of inner forces to meet destructive forces in the 
 present or prospective environment. His mind having been 
 weakened and his logical faculty rendered less acute by pre- 
 vious familiarity with the admission of additional factors, he 
 might be ready to admit new and additional laws of dynamics, 
 and in this complexity of confusion he might lose the logical 
 connection with his original conception of a single and continu- 
 ous process of the cosmos resulting from certain understood 
 primordial agencies. 
 
 This section is inserted not on the supposition that Mr. 
 Spencer anywhere teaches the theory of cumulative factors 
 except as incidents in the consequents of original general 
 factors, but by way of guarding the student from mistakes 
 he might make in the interpretation of the author's language. 
 
 § 12. Tlie Symbolic Method for the Unification of 
 
 Knowledge, 
 
 We think that if charged with any of the foregoing methods 
 of the unification of knowledge, Mr. Spencer would deny the 
 imputation, and say that his critic misunderstood him. It 
 would appear to be the peculiarity of Mr. Spencer's system that 
 his unification of knowledge is effected by means of the discern- 
 ment of the relation of unknowable entities, which entities cannot 
 be represented in thought, and have to be symbolised by certain 
 signs. It seems that unknowable powers, although manifested 
 as such and such, cannot be regarded as known, even although 
 their relationship to one another can be known. It appears 
 that this knowledge of relationship between them is in one 
 sense sufficient for the unification of knowledge, yet in another 
 
 THE SYMBOLIC METHOD. 
 
 S3 
 
 sense it is insufficient, in that the entities of which we know 
 the relationship are unknowable. It appears that we are not 
 allowed to unify knowledge within the bounds of these know- 
 able relationships, but must introduce symbols standing for the 
 Unknowable Powers. We are not allowed to use symbols 
 standing for known factors, but are obliged to use symbols 
 standin<T for unknowable entities. These entities can only be 
 represented by symbols, and when we say that Matter, Motion, 
 and Force are the entities in question, and are unknowable 
 in themselves, but yet are fully known in their interrelation- 
 ships, insomuch that knowledge can be unified by means of a 
 proposition or formula expressive of their relationship, the 
 knowledge of what they are " in themselves " would seem not 
 to be necessary at all, and any reference to them by means of 
 symbols to be quite out of place. We are fully satisfied if we 
 can unify knowledge by means of the proposition specifying 
 the mutual relationship. But according to Mr. Spencer, Matter, 
 Motion, and Force are terms that are not allowed to stand for 
 known factors, but must stand for the unknowable, yet dif- 
 ferentiated factors, and mean no more than x, y, and 2. In 
 another place this subject is fully considered. Symbols as a 
 rule stand for something that is known, and are supposed to 
 have no value unless they stand for something. But according 
 to Mr. Spencer's peculiar and unique position, they stand for 
 something or somethings that we do not know, but which are 
 yet of such a nature that when the relationship between them 
 is expressed, the proposition in which they occur has a mean- 
 ing. Thus, for instance, if we say that the integration of 
 X is concomitant with the dissipation of ?/, the proposition 
 has a meaning, although we do not know what x and y 
 stand for. Evidently the meaning is to be gathered from the 
 relationship of x and y as expressed in the terms integration 
 and dissipation. Now the only meaning we can attach to 
 integration is "mutual approach," and the only meaning we 
 can attach to dissipation is the transference of the dispartive 
 power. These seem to imply units which have extension, for 
 how otherwise can we attach any meaning to "approach to- 
 gether"? and since dissipation of x means retrocession, wo 
 
 i 
 
i!ti 
 
 ■ '■ 
 
 84 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 also get our meaning only by supposing units having extension 
 being further separated from each other. Therefore we arc 
 forced by the necessities of the case to make x stand for t)ie 
 units of extension and y stand for the separative power which 
 is transferred. We cannot, in a general description of clianges, 
 use the terms integration and dissipation without supposing 
 an extended something which integrates or dissipates. To 
 say, then, that x and i/ have no definite meaning is not 
 correct. If they symbolise more than the mere extension and 
 dissipation, whatever more they symbolise is of no value or 
 account whatsoever. AMiat they do symbolise of the knowable 
 is all that we have to do with, and is all that is expressed 
 in a proposition in which they occur. 
 
 " The inmost nature or essence of a Thing is apt to be re- 
 garded as something unknown, which, if we knew it, would 
 explain and account for all the phenomena which the thing 
 exhibits to us. But this unknown something is a supposition 
 without evidence. We have no ground for supposing that 
 there is anything which, if known to us, would afford to our 
 intellect this satisfaction ; would sum up, as it were, the know- 
 able attributes of the object in a single sentence. Moreover, 
 if there were such a central property, it would not answer to the 
 idea of an * inmost nature ; ' for if knowable by any intelli- 
 gence, it must, like other properties, be relative to the intelli- 
 gence which knows it, that is, it must consist in impressing 
 that intelligence in some specific way ; for this is the only idea 
 we have of knowing; the only sense in which the verb * to 
 know ' means anything. 
 
 " It would, no doubt, be absurd to assume that our words 
 exhaust the possibilities of Being. There may be innumerable 
 modes of it which are inaccessible to our faculties, and which 
 consequently we are unable to name. But we ought not to 
 speak of these modes of Being by any of the names we possess. 
 These are all inexplicable, because they all stand for known 
 modes of Being. We might invent new names for the un- 
 known modes ; but the new names would have no more meaning 
 than the x, y, z of Algebra."* 
 
 * Mill on Hamilton, p. 14. 
 
 THE SYMBOLIC METHOD. 
 
 85 
 
 According to this, Mr. Spencer is unwise in using the terms 
 flatter, Motion, and Force to represent the unknowable yet 
 difi'erentiated Powers, because they stand for known modes of 
 Being, and if he wishes words to stand for the unknown modes 
 he ought to use the symbols a;, y^ and z, and then they have no 
 more meaning than when used in Algebra as blank forms of 
 equations, of no value until a meaning is put into them. But 
 Mr. Spencer could not afford to translate the term Matter 
 wherever he uses it into the sign x. Motion into ?/, and Force 
 into 2. Let the student try it, and he will find in every case 
 that he either means nothing at all, or that he has concrete 
 implications, as in the case considered above. Mr. Mill con- 
 siders the resort to Xy y, and 2 a resort to blankness, the ne plies 
 ultra of speculative absurdity. Mr. Spencer considers it the 
 highest attainment of philosophical research. 
 
 Mr. Spencer's repudiation of special and limited meanings for 
 liis principal terms when hard pressed by criticism is a mere 
 evasion. It is a means by which, when any definite meaning 
 attached to his terms is found to embarrass the unification of 
 knowledge in any given proposition, the proposition may be held 
 to be good on the understanding that the principal terms mean 
 something, but we do not know what. In this way they may take, 
 one after the other, all the definite meanings that can be assigned 
 to them, plus something else which shall make up for their deficien- 
 cies ; and the unification of knowledge is then effected by terms 
 which include every meaning that can be placed upon them. 
 
 The final unification of knowledge is effected through an 
 amalgamation of all the methods by means of symbols which 
 will receive any and all meanings. We beg to submit that this 
 is not the method of unification which Science has a right to 
 demand. Science requires that the ultimate truth of induction 
 should be clearly and intelligibly expressed. Logic requires 
 that the ultimate truth from which all others are deducible 
 should be an intelligible proposition having definite terms. What 
 ^Ir. Spencer has given us is changeful, incoherent, unintelligible 
 as a whole, and in any of its intelligible forms is insufficiently 
 founded on induction, and incapable deductively of reproducing 
 the universe and its history. 
 
 li 
 
Ill 
 
 H 
 
 1^^ 
 
 86 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 § 13. Simulations of Unification, 
 
 This review of Mr. Spencer's methods for the unification of 
 knowledf^e wBuld not be complete without a notice of several 
 simulations of unification which present themselves throughout 
 his works, sometimes inmost important conjunctures, and which 
 give the appearance of unity of process without the reality and 
 without the logical continuity required. These methods and 
 the effect upon the mind do not depend upon the formulation of 
 an all-embracing proposition at all, but upon the common appli- 
 cability of descriptive terms. A certain parallelism between 
 different processes is discerned, and without attempting to 
 identify these processes in their relations of historical depend- 
 ence, or to explain them as outcomes of some common original 
 factors, it is deemed sufficient to generalise their common char- 
 acteristics, so that by composing a description which is appli- 
 cable to them in common, a false and delusive unification of 
 knowledge is thereby effected. If we have to describe the 
 history of a complex physical world, we have to describe a 
 history of change in which the raw material, by a process (let 
 us say) of cooling, was enabled gradually to enter into relations 
 of mutual combination. Again, if we have to describe the 
 history of organisms, wo have to recount a history of gradual 
 differentiation and insensible development. We find that the 
 <^eneral characteristics of these two histories is an advance by 
 insensible gradations from a state of incoherent, indefinite, 
 simple homogeneity to a state of coherent, definite, complex 
 heterogeneity. A study of mental history exhibits the same 
 characteristics, and this identity of the characteristics of these 
 histories gives an outside semblance of unity that is made to 
 pass for the unity itself. But so long as the whole of the three 
 processes are not shown to be the results of the same compre- 
 hendable original factors, this unity is in reality not effected. 
 
 The persistent manner in which this similarity of character- 
 istic is presented to us throughout Mr. Spencer's works, and his 
 continual assertion of the harmony or conformability of various 
 processes to these characteristics of " evolution in general," pro- 
 duces in the mind the desired effect. Moreover, it produces 
 
 SIMULATIONS OF UNIFICATION. 
 
 S7 
 
 the effect of throwing the attention on the Formula of Evolu- 
 tion in which these general characteristics are formally expressed, 
 thus raisin <^ the conviction of the effectiveness of that formula 
 in the unification of knowledge. Yet, when examined, this 
 constant reference to the Formula of Evolution will be found 
 to be of a very superficial character. For it is not the appli- 
 cation of the formula in its entirety to any case under con- 
 sideration ; it is only the taking out of a part of the formula 
 and seeing that it applies. The formula was expressly stated 
 in advance to be the formulation of the relations of three origi- 
 nal factors, but one of them has been omitted altogether. The 
 two factors left were ^Matter and Motion, and the essence of 
 the formula was the concomitance of the integration of the one 
 with the dissipation of the other. But in the instances referred 
 to, this concomitant process is utterly ignored, as are also the 
 two factors themselves ; and the applicability of the formula is 
 held to be good, and the unification of knowledge is held to bo 
 valid, if it be found merely that the histories of all combina- 
 tions present an advance from a state of incoherent indefinite 
 homogeneity to a state of coherent definite heterogeneity. If 
 the unification of knowledge is effected by means of the Formula 
 of Evolution, it is because that Formula is taken to pieces, and 
 part of it applied here and part there. It is not universally 
 applied in its integrity. 
 
 The second simulation of unification is effected by the frequent 
 use of an important w^ord which occurs in the Formula of 
 Evolution, — a word which in like manner is dissociated from 
 the factors the law of the interrelation of which the formula is 
 supposed to express. This word is then set up in business 
 for itself and is very effective. It is " Integration." If the 
 history of all processes includes a progress from a state of inco- 
 herent, indefinite homogeneity to a state of coherent, definite 
 heterogeneity, it is a history of the mutual combinations of 
 various original factors, whether these factors be ultimate units 
 of attraction and resistance, or atoms of the so-called elements, or 
 of physiological units, or feelings, or sounds, or men, or what not 
 It is a history of combinations of units, of combinations of 
 compounds, of combinations of aggregates, of combinations of 
 
88 
 
 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 GENERAL SUMMARY, 
 
 89 
 
 111 
 
 I 
 
 II 
 
 Itl 
 
 i lii 
 
 I 
 
 complex aggregates. It is evident that whether these are 
 interdependent or not, whether they are all results of two 
 or of many original factors, or whether there be new factors 
 and accessions of forces in the course of their histories, the 
 history of the whole of them is still one of combinations 
 and continuous combinations ; or let us call the process one of 
 continuous "integration." Then integration is expressive of 
 the principal characteristic of this history, and any theory of 
 combination or series of combinations to which the term " inte- 
 gration" can be applied is found to conform to "evolution in 
 general ; " for is it not one of the principal terms in the Formula 
 of Evolution? Yet when we come to examine its place in the 
 formula, we find that its application is confined to the integra- 
 tion of matter, and is made strictly concomitant, as the very 
 essence of the formula, with the dissipation of motion. 
 
 But how does Mr. Spencer apply it in the course of his 
 works 1 Language is integrated, feelings are integrated, expe- 
 riences are integrated, the whole intellectual and moral history 
 of man in society is a series of integrations. The question is, 
 are they integrations of Matter accompanied by dissipations of 
 JMotion? There is no pretence that they arc. The Formula 
 of Evolution, then, is straightway abandoned, and the unifica- 
 tion of knowledge is simulated by the word " integration," 
 which expresses a general characteristic of all evolutions, with- 
 out disclosing its factors, nor the nature of their interrelations 
 by which the steps and interdependence of the actual events in 
 their history could be understood. 
 
 In our previous criticism we referred to several instances, and 
 we now refer the student to the " Psychology," Part iii. chap, x., 
 for further illustrations of this deceptive method of treatment 
 Here Mr. Spencer speaks of the integrations of correspondences 
 of the inner organism with complex circumstances of the environ- 
 ment, and through this progressive integration suggests the 
 unity of intellectual evolution with evolution in general. Yet 
 there is no explanation of integration of correspondences, nor 
 how it is comprised within the Formula of Evolution, which 
 treats of the integration of Matter and the conaomitant dis- 
 sipation of Motion. This is a simulation of unity, but not 
 
 I* 
 
 the unity that is only to be effected by means of a general truth 
 from which all the changes of the universe are deducible. 
 A<^ain, in considering " the substance of mind," Mr. Spencer 
 
 savs * — 
 
 " It is possible, then— may we not even say probable ?— that 
 something of the same order as that which we call a nervous 
 shock is the ultimate unit of consciousness; and that all the 
 unlikenesses among our feelings result from unlike modes of 
 integration of this ultimate unit." 
 
 Thus the word "integration," being capable of expressing 
 combinations and associations in all the sciences, is able to give 
 the appearance of unificatory efficiency to any formula in 
 which it is used when the particular limitations of it and the 
 specified conditions attached to it are ignored. 
 
 And again t — 
 
 " Possible answers are at once supplied if we assume that 
 diverse feelings are produced by diverse modes, and degrees, and 
 complexities, of integration of the alleged ultimate unit of con- 
 sciousness." 
 
 It cannot be pretended that the integration here referred to 
 is identical with the integration of the Formula of Evolution. 
 
 1 
 
 14. General Summary, 
 
 As before observed, the course of this criticism has not been 
 the examination of one distinct theory for the unification of 
 knowledge clearly stated by Mr. Spencer, nor even of several 
 conflicting methods set out in definite language. It has been 
 the examination of several sets of propositions, each of which 
 might be justifiably represented as the one which Mr. Spencer 
 advances, in all the various meanings of which they are capable. 
 Each separate proposition or examination, under, the heads of 
 Mystical, Metaphysical, Physical, Supraphysical, or Symbolical, 
 lias proved inadequate either on the ground of indefiniteness of 
 meaning or on the ground of inadequacy of effect, in afi*ording 
 us the requisite means of unifying knowledge. And our argu- 
 
 * n 
 
 rinciples of Psychology, vol. i. p. 151. 
 
 flbid., p 154. 
 
90 
 
 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 GENERAL SUMMARY. 
 
 91 
 
 
 
 ment is, that since each in itself is insufficient for our purpose, 
 so are all taken together. The ordinary reader is apt to suppose, 
 in the vast and diverse fields of knowledge through which he 
 passes, that if words and phrases suitable to the processes of 
 a special science have other meanings applicable to the processes 
 of other sciences, then in this verbal and accidental similarity 
 there exists essential identity; but careful examination will 
 show that no such identity of the processes under study really 
 exists, and that the supposed unification of knowledge is a trick 
 of words only. 
 
 It has been our duty to define in what the unification of 
 knowledge would really consist, and to insist upon a rigid and 
 inflexible method of procedure and statement. We have shown 
 that the goal must be worked up t6 by processes of induction 
 from the knowledge embodied in actual science, and that if 
 hypotheses are framed, they must be intelligible, and must be 
 capable of verification deductively by a process of drawing 
 corollaries, which corollaries shall represent the actual processes 
 of nature. "We have also expressed our doubt as to the possi- 
 bility of such an attainment, and have reserved for treatment 
 in another volume the attitude of the mind with regard to the 
 Unknowable Power as a factor in Ethics and Sociology generally. 
 The reader may perhaps think that in the foregoing examina- 
 tion we have insisted too rigidly upon the logical consistency 
 and conclusiveness of the philosophic attempt, and that after 
 all, although Mr. Spencer's theory may be wanting in logical 
 consistency, yet that he really has constructed a philosophical 
 system which only wants a clearer and more consistent state- 
 ment. He may think that the work has been done in the 
 rough, and only wants going over again. We would willingly 
 think so, but cannot see our way to this conclusion. We think 
 that the attempt is so ambitious, so immensely beyond the 
 reach of knowledge, that it is an impossible attainment now, if 
 not for ever. We will consider in another place the true merits 
 of Mr. Spencer's work, which we have no wish to disparage ; 
 but as a system of philosophy pitched in the high aim which 
 Mr. Spencer expressly claims for it, his or any other system 
 must be a failure. We think this will be the more apparent 
 
 when we have completed this work by the criticism of the 
 
 " Principles of Biology." . .-^ ^ r 
 
 It may, again, be thought that the identity of methods of 
 development^ and the apparent universality of the Laws of 
 Force throughout all the activities of Physics, Biology, and 
 Sociolo-y afford the requisite unification of knowledge. These 
 are, as before remarked, very suggestive of community of origin 
 and of identity of process ; but in the absence of a complete 
 knowledge of the original factors in their relations, and more 
 particularly in the absence of knowledge of the place and rela- 
 tion of ** Feeling " in respect to the physical factors, it is quite 
 impossible to understand the history of the cosmos, including 
 organisms, as a series of sequences from these original factors, 
 vet this is requisite in order to put meaning into a theory of 
 identity of methods of development and universality of Laws of 
 
 Force. , 
 
 Again, it may be said that the unification of knowledge and 
 the goal' of Philosophy may not be attained perhaps by Mr. 
 Spencer in the deduction of corollaries from one ultimate 
 truth, and that he is too severe upon himself when he imposes 
 it upon his system, but that it may be attained, and has been 
 effected by him, in the statement of a body of truths, related 
 and consistent, and together affording a full explanation of the 
 history of the cosmos, including Biology. We admit that the 
 unification of knowledge and the construction of a cosmical 
 theory might theoretically be effected in this way, and the 
 requirements of the logical faculty be fully satisfied ; but again 
 we venture to submit that Mr. Spencer has not stated any such 
 connected and complete theory. He has formulated a" number 
 of truths, some of them valuable, and others of them very crude, 
 as in the " Biology," but they do not cohere in that organic and 
 scientific interdependence which is requisite; nor are they 
 stated in that scientific and inteUigible language which is 
 essential to true philosophy. 
 
 The remainder of this book will be occupied by the con- 
 sideration in Chapter 11. of ]SIr. Spencer's re-statement of his 
 position contained in the recently published Appendix to "First 
 Principles ; " by a study in Chapter IIL of various related 
 
i 
 
 I- 
 
 92 
 
 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 subjects ; by a detailed study in Chapter IV. of the " Principles 
 of Psychology," so far as regards the unification of knowledge ; 
 and by a criticism in Chapter V. of Mr. Spencer s very interest- 
 ing and ambitious attempt to deduce the histories of biological 
 development from certain original factors. AVe shall find, wo 
 believe, in all these studies that Mr. Spencer does not keep the 
 one clear aim before him with which he sets out— that he does 
 not keep to a single intelligible method— but that his ends and 
 methods are of that uncertain and changeful cliaracter with 
 which we have charged him in this introductory chapter. We 
 believe that these detailed studies will be found to justify the 
 criticisms now made, and to show that Mr. Spencer has failed 
 to produce a consistent and complete work. At the same time 
 we testify our admiration for the attempt, and still more for 
 some grand generalisations in special departments, and we do 
 not regard his failure as due to any other cause than the 
 impossibility of the attainment of the end proposed. Fortu- 
 nately for the sake of continued intellectual activity, there still 
 remains a vast Unknown and an impenetrable Unknowable. 
 
 ( 93 ) 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 REPLY TO MR. spencer's CRITICISM. 
 
 § I. Justification of our Previous Criticism. 
 
 Our former examination of Mr. Spencer's " First Principles »» 
 was undertaken on the supposition that the object sought after 
 was the unification of knowledge, and the methods by which 
 this unification is to be effected have now been more fully 
 considered. At the same time we then clearly recognised that 
 such unification was only to be accomplished wdien all processes 
 could be recognised as corollaries of some primordial truth or 
 set of factors. These factors we took to be the Indestructibility 
 of Matter, the Continuity of Motion, and the Persistence of 
 Force. Our first course of criticism was to the effect that, if we 
 attached any definite meanings to the terms employed, we would 
 find our ultimate factors insufficient to explain many processes, 
 more especially the processes of Biology and the processes of^ 
 Feeling and Intelligence. Seeing that Mr. Spencer advanced 
 the Formula of Evolution as the formula of the interrelation of 
 the three factors, we took that as the main subject of investiga- 
 tion, and found that, whatever definite meaning we attached 
 to the terms therein employed, we were unable to work out our 
 deductive process in the respects just specified. 
 
 In this conclusion it would appear we are quite justified, for 
 Mr. Spencer says in his reply that any definite conception of 
 them involves alternative impossibilities of thought. These 
 definite conceptions— of a materialistic and mechanical char- 
 acter — were the subjects of our previous criticism. Taken on 
 its own merits, such an investigation is useful, and by brin;::;- 
 ing it out into a clear statement, helps to disillusionise the 
 
fill 
 
 % 
 
 i! 
 
 § 
 
 If It 
 
 1 I I 
 
 94 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 mind of any one who would be inclined to suppose tliat these 
 materialistic explanations were sufficient to account for biological 
 and psychical histories. Taken as a piece of criticism of Mr. 
 Spencer, it may or may not be judged applicable. We distm- 
 cruished in our own minds between the chapters in the book on 
 Ihe Unknowable dealing with ultimate scientific ideas, as treating 
 of these ideas " in their ultimate nature " or what they are " in 
 themselves," and the chapters explaining Matter, Motion, and 
 Force in the book on the Kncmahle, as defining them for future 
 use in the attempt at the unification of knowledge. It did not 
 occur to us that we could unify knowledge by means of terms 
 that had no definite meanings. This theory we shall therefore 
 discuss separately. In the meantime we justify our criticism of 
 Mr. Spencer from the point of view of having definite meanmgs 
 by references to chapters treating of them in the book on the 
 
 Knowable. 
 
 And first as to " Matter." At page 167 we find :— 
 " We may therefore deliver ourselves over without hesitation 
 to those terms of thought which experience has organised 
 in us. We need not, in our physical, chemical, or other 
 researches, refrain from dealing with Matter as made up of 
 extended and resistant atoms ; for this conception, necessarily 
 resulting from our experiences of Matter, is not less legitimate 
 than the°conception of aggregate masses as extended and resistant. 
 The atomic hypothesis, as well as the kindred hypothesis of an 
 all-pervading ether consisting of molecules, is simply a necessary 
 development of those universal forms which the actions of the 
 Unknowable have wrought in us. The conclusions logically 
 worked out by the aid of these hypotheses are sure to be in 
 liarmony with all others which these same forms hivolve, and 
 will have a relative truth that is equally complete." 
 
 A further justification may be found in the fact that Mr. 
 Spencer, adopting the nebular hypothesis, which regards all 
 chan-es as incidents in the cooling of a primordial nebula, 
 must^consider that all changes are resultants of the properties 
 and relative quantities and positions of its constituent elements, 
 which are described in treatises of chemistry. 
 
 Yet another justification can be drawn from the actual treat- 
 
 JUSTIFICATION OF PREVIOUS CRITICISM. 95 
 
 ment of the processes of biology by Mr. Spencer himself, in 
 which, starting with the factors from which they are all merely 
 resultants, he enumerates these as oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogenV 
 carbon, &c., for internal factors; and heat, light, motion, &ci 
 for external factors. It is true that Mr. Spencer does not 
 explain the cause of the differentiations of the so-called elements 
 oxygen, hydrogen, &c., and so much the worse for the unification 
 of knowledge. But heat, light, motion, &c., he professes to be 
 knowable, like the properties of oxygen, &c., while even the 
 all-potent "polarities" are merely regulative attractions and 
 repulsions dependent in some manner upon sizes and shapes. 
 In fact, it is due to our having definite notions of these that 
 his science of biological interpretation is at all justifiable in its 
 very first inception. As a matter of fact, Mr. Spencer through- 
 out his works uses the terms Matter, Motion, &c., in their 
 ordinary or vulgar meanings. In the "Biology" he never 
 supposes we do not know what he means by them, and never 
 tells us that all he refers to is x, y, and z: we do not think he 
 even once uses these symbols. 
 
 We are further justified by a study of Dissolution ; for if 
 we are to reason from aggregates to constituents, following Mr. 
 Spencer, we have to argue the properties of the atoms of the 
 so-called elements from what we know of the aggregates ; and 
 the unification of knowledge is not complete, according to the 
 requirements of "First Principles," p. 548, until this is done. 
 
 The definition of " Motion " is less precise ; * indeed, it is so^ 
 obscure that it does not seem capable of scientific or logical use. \ 
 The conception of ^Motion involves conceptions of Space, Time, 
 and Matter. A something (ie., Matter) that moves, a series 
 of positions (i.e., positions relative to other things) occupied in 
 succession, and a group of constant positions (z.e., of other 
 things) united in thought with the successive (ie.f relative) 
 ones — these are the constituents of the idea. Mr. Spencer pro^ 
 ceeds to trace up the conception of Motion to experiences of 
 Force, but what we require to know is the precise sense in which 
 Motion is to be used in the formulas, scientific generalisations, 
 and logical uses of the book on the Knowable. 
 
 * First Principles, p. 168. 
 
96 SPENCER'S VNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 The definition of *' Force " as it is to be used in the book on 
 the Knowable, as distinguished from its use in the book on the 
 Unknowable, is still raoje indefinite and confusing. Surely, as 
 one of those factors in the formulation of the relations of which 
 is to be found the unification of knowledge, and which is to be 
 a constituent in the proposition by which is to be explained all 
 the processes of the physical and biolocjical sciences, we are en- 
 titled to look for a precise definition. How otherwise are we 
 to understand our propositions, or how can they be real and not 
 pretentious generalisations of knowledge ? 
 
 What do we findl We find ourselves at once plunged into 
 confusion. Instead of Force being a co-equal factor with two 
 other factors, making a total of three, the interrelations of which 
 have to be formulated— it is at once stated to be that from which 
 Matter and Motion are built up. " Matter and Motion, as we 
 know them, are differently conditioned manifestations of Force." 
 We are permitted to know Matter and Motion, the first as 
 "extended and resistant atoms," having the chemical and 
 physical properties ascribed to them in scientific treatises ; and 
 we are permitted to know Motion, but scarcely as a factor, only 
 as a phenomenal result— a relative series of positions ; and then 
 we find that the third factor. Force, is nothing but as mani- 
 fested in the other two— namely. Matter and Motion— Force 
 itself being inscrutable. These are the scientific definitions 
 upon which we are to base our formulas and propositions of the 
 Knowable, and by which its sequences and relations are to bo 
 explained. This attempt is made to the best of our ability in 
 our previous work— keeping within the bounds of intelligibility 
 
 and we found it to fail We attempted to work it out by 
 
 means of every intelligible meaning that could be attached to 
 the terms, and Mr. Spencer's reply to it is that these were not 
 the meanings he attached to them, and thinks we were unjust 
 in attributing such meanings to him. Let him then give us his 
 own intelligible and precise definitions, and we shall be glad to 
 do our work over again. 
 
 However, to resume the statement of our previous criticism, 
 we have to remind the reader that, on the failure of the mate- 
 rialistic explanations, we called his attention to the fact that 
 although Mr. Spencer stated his intention of including three 
 
 JUSTIFICATION OF PREVIOUS CRITICISM. 97 
 
 essential factoi-s in his formula, all of which were necessary in 
 the explanation of things, yet he had omitted the one from 
 which we had been led to expect the most — namely, the term 
 " Force." Here we found (like Mr. Spencer, no doubt) that we 
 could not include it, and also we found, like him, that it had 
 * no definite meaning. This seemed to show that the unification 
 of knowledge could not be eff'ected by the aid of this term. At 
 the same time, we now know from Mr. Spencer that this unifi-^ 
 cation can be accomplished by terms of which we do not know) 
 the meaning; and we shall resume the consideration of the 
 value of this term in this aspect, and of the method of unifi- 
 cation by means of symbolism, in a special section of this 
 chapter. 
 
 Part IV. of. the previous criticism consisted of a study of Mr. 
 Spencer s exposition with the view of framing a formula which 
 should be a general expression of it. Here we found that the most 
 general characteristic of all processes was to be found not in the 
 "nouns" but in the " verbs" — not in matter and motion, force 
 and mind, feeling, &c., but in " integrate," " dissipate," &c. This 
 would most likely be found to agree with Mr. Spencer's theory 
 that knowledge can be unified by a formula expressive of the 
 most general relations of factors, the factors themselves being 
 unknowable. This theory is the same as the one just referred 
 to as unification by means of symbolism, hereafter to be spe- 
 cially considered. In our previous criticism we framed a formula 
 in the sense indicated, endeavouring to make the factors inde- 
 finite and their relations precise. It was as follows : — 
 
 " Evolution is integration, during which every existence 
 passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, 
 coherent heterogeneity, and during which the activities undergo 
 a parallel transformation." 
 
 The fault of this formula is that it is not a proposition from 
 which corollaries can be made, so as to deduce the whole process 
 of the universe, but a merely outside description of the process. 
 A second defect lies in the fact that the concomitance of the 
 dissipation of something else as a correlative of integration would 
 have to be abandoned. Of course it could be said — 
 
 " Dissolution is disintegration, during which " the converse 
 
98 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 happens ; and it could be added — " Evolution and dissolution 
 are necessarily concomitant." 
 
 But even then the formula would fail, taken simply as an 
 universal description ; for there are some integrations which do 
 not seem to have any concomitant dissipations — such as the 
 integrations of languages, of music, of biological correspon- 
 dences in general, of psychological correspondences in general, 
 or again the integrations of machinery, of trades, of professions, 
 and of sociology generally. 
 
 And^ then, in any case, it is only a mode of definition of 
 words ; it explains the meaning of the words evolution and 
 dissolution by means of other words, integration and disintegra- 
 tion ; these in their turn are only varied expressions for combi- 
 nations and decombinations, which are the very things we wish 
 to have explained ; and to translate them into the mysterious 
 words evolution and dissolution is not doing anything at all, 
 unless they disclose the interdependence of sequences, and the 
 final dependence upon some original calculable factors. The 
 only gain is that the word evolution has the meaning of deve- 
 lopment by gradual natural processes, and we are made to slip 
 into a theory unawares, notwithstanding the strictly limited 
 definition of concentration which Mr. Spencer gives to it when 
 propounding his formula. 
 
 It may be, indeed, that the word " integration " is merely 
 "symbolical," and represents some process of which we have 
 no conception ; and, if we attempt to attach to it any definite 
 meaning, we shall be landed in alternative impossibilities of 
 thought ; but in every view we take of it, it seems to fail as an 
 unification of knowledge. 
 
 The result of this criticism was to show that any materialistic 
 and mechanical explanation of the universe was inadequate, and 
 in these terms is comprised all the properties of the so-called 
 elements as described in books on chemistry, and all the laws 
 of the physical relations of bodies, including Polarities, Equili- 
 brations, Motions, &.C. This was the clear and definite result 
 of our study. We do not say that Mr. Spencer is antagonistic 
 to it. He probably agrees Avith it. At the same time we assert 
 that whenever he docs attempt explanations, they are all of this 
 
 ON THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 99 
 
 materialistic and mechanical character. In the surpassingly 
 interesting study of Biology his constructive process is purelw 
 materialistic, as exhibited in our criticism of his exposition oi 
 the origin of organic matter in our former volume, and in our 
 examination of the Biology in Chapter V. of the present work. 
 Therefore we hold, despite Mr. Spencer's general admissions of its 
 insufficiency, nevertheless the most important part of his work is 
 attempted on the lines of materialistic and mechanical explana>-^ 
 tions, and are open to the criticisms we have advanced. DoeiT 
 he, or does he not, formally abandon these materialistic explana- 
 tions ? If he abandons them, his two volumes on " Biology " 
 go for nothing. If he does not, then let the objections made^ 
 be fairly met and replied to in detail. 
 
 There are only two modes of escape from this position of 
 dilemma. One is by adopting a theory of " symbolism," which 
 we have already partially considered, and w^hich is the position 
 taken up by Mr. Spencer in his reply to our criticism, and which 
 we shall proceed immediately to consider. The other is by way 
 of the so-called " double-aspect " theory, which we shall take 
 next in order. 
 
 § 2. Considerations leading up to a study of Mr. Spencer^s 
 position as re-stated by him in tlie Appendix to ^^ Fird 
 Fri7iCfpIe8." 
 
 (a.) On Theoiies of Knowledge. 
 
 The endeavour to accomplish an unification of knowledge 
 sippoiirs to necessitate a theory of knowledge, and this again 
 implies a theory of the origin of Psychology. We do not wish 
 to undertake a treatise upon this science ; yet it is necessary 
 to give it some consideration in order to understand what Mr. 
 Spencer means by the summary of his system of Philosophy, 
 stated in reply to our former criticism at page 579 of his '* First 
 Principles." 
 
 For our part, we do not see that such a perfect science of 
 the origin of Psychology is yet possible. Until the fundamental 
 relationship of the chemical elements towards consciousness is 
 
loo SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 capable of being fonnulated, we do not think that any theory 
 either of the historic origin of Psychology, as part of one universal 
 process, or of the Unification of Knowledge, is possible. 
 
 Mr. Spencer's system of Psychology, as regards its genesis 
 and organic development, is one of chemical and mechanical 
 origin. It forms part of the processes of his Biology, from 
 which Feeling as a factor is expressly excluded. In biological 
 development, as will be shown in Chapter V. of this work, Mr. 
 Spencer relies entirely upon the properties of certain chemical 
 elements and of the environment, for the most part expressed 
 in terms of the laws of motion, equilibration, and polarity. 
 From these result structure and function of organisms and their 
 parts. The theory of the "double-aspect" merely gives a 
 second or subjective side to events and effects detemiined by 
 these mechanical agencies, without allowing that the processes 
 are in any way the results of any feeling or consciousness, so 
 that in a history of origin and development they may be 
 altogether excluded. 
 
 Founded upon this system of Biology, which may be more 
 fully studied in the chapters referred to, is Mr. Spencer's system 
 of Psychology. In his eyes Psychology, regarded historically, 
 is merely the physiological function of the nervous system. 
 This system, produced by way of equilibration in response to 
 forces of the environment, becomes ever more complex and inte- 
 grated; and since it is accompanied by a subjective aspect, 
 emotions, feelings, intelligence, and knowledge become more 
 organised and integrated at the same time. We must confess 
 we do not see under this system (whatever rough justification 
 we may find for it in what is called "automatic response" to 
 environment) how abstract and general ideas and memories can 
 be localised in structure. But this and many other points of 
 criticism have to be passed over. 
 
 The great principle of the *' Psychology " is the establishment 
 of " correspondences " between the inner organism and the com- 
 plex environment. In pursuance of this process, the nervous 
 system is differentiated so as to cognise different modes of the 
 environment : the eye is developed in correspondence with the 
 ethereal undulations having the subjective aspect of sight and 
 
 ON THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 loi 
 
 the colour sense, &c. ; the ear is formed in response to undula- 
 tions of the air having the subjective aspect of the sense of 
 sound ; and the organs of taste and smell are also similarly 
 specialised from the rest of the nervous tissue. Why these 
 different motions or chemical actions should be correlated with 
 these various subjective affections we do not know, and is 
 beyond the scope of the mechanical and chemical system under 
 our consideration. 
 
 What we particularly wish to point out in this system is the 
 fact that according to it there is nothing in the organism save 
 what has been produced in it directly or indirectly by the 
 environment, acting in some unknown way upon the chemical 
 elements of which it consists, such organism being itself, so 
 to speak, but a part of the external environment in the first 
 instance. The conclusion we would draw from this is, that 
 we are able to place full reliance upon the actual experiences 
 supplied us by our senses. The very organs of sense themselves, 
 being produced by the environment, have nothing else to justify 
 their existence : their presence implies the action of the environ- 
 ment upon the organism. On this hypothesis knowledge is 
 found to be fundamentally trustworthy and to be specifically dif- 
 ferentiated according to the particular modes of action of the 
 exteoiial world upon us. This is direct knowledge, and it con- 
 sists of a countless number of individual experiences, extending 
 over every moment of our lives. 
 
 But in addition to this direct knowledge, there exists — 
 whether capable of a physical interpretation or not, and without 
 considering the question as to whether Feeling is a factor in 
 organic development — a cognition of these cognitions, a memory 
 of them, and a discriminating power by which likenesses and 
 differences are determined, and the order and relations of events 
 are discerned. WTiat, therefore, results from the exercise of 
 this faculty within the organism of the race is an interior 
 growth, and may or may not be a " correspondence " with 
 external actualities. 
 
 Again, we have to leave out of account the question as to 
 how these secondary products are registered ip the actual 
 organism of the brain and nervous system, so as to render 
 
I02 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 memory and reasoning functions of some organ. But granted 
 this, we see how these, not being in direct response to the action 
 of the environment, may not always be in true correspondence 
 with it, errors and false notions being the result. The history 
 of knowledge will then be the history of the endeavours to form 
 a system of correspondences within this portion of the nervous 
 system with the vastness and complexity of the external world. 
 In the attempt to grasp this vastness and complexity within 
 the purview of a limited intellect, various devices have been 
 resorted to, of which the principal ones have been generalisation 
 and abstraction. General terms have been formed to sum up 
 groups of objects of which similar predicates can be asserted ; 
 but in the common and ordinary use of them they have often 
 been transformed from mere terms of totality into unitative 
 general existences expressed in the singular, though they have 
 evidently come at last to be regarded as actual individual entities; 
 and thus a mere idea becomes objectivised, and treated of as if 
 it actually existed in the environment. The same thing has hap- 
 jjened with abstractions. The attributes of bodies, being shared 
 more or less by other bodies, could be spoken of in the same 
 terms ; and the effect produced upon the consciousness by simi- 
 larities of action came for convenience to be spoken of by the same 
 word. These abstractions being named in the singular number, 
 assumed the character of individual existences, and being thus 
 objectivised, played a part in thought as if they had an indi- 
 vidual objective existence in the surrounding universe. These 
 objectivised generals and abstractions becoming thus objects 
 of thought, have played an important part in philosophy and 
 speculation, giving rise to much error and confusion. Witness 
 how difficult it is to learn that there is no objectivity answering 
 to the terms Time and Space — that Matter and Motion have no 
 existence as generals modified into particular modes. This is 
 a hard lesson. 
 
 But, on the other hand, the intellect has the power to learn 
 this lesson, and to correct error and confusion by a recourse to 
 actual contact with the environment, and a reconstitution of 
 the internal mental organism. It is able in tlie development of 
 a race to move more and more towards establishing a system of 
 
 ON THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 103 
 
 internal correspondences in accord with the system of external 
 correspondences. It is able, in the first place, to discern 
 between the nature of the external action and the nature of the 
 resulting subjective feeling. It can state the differences of 
 colour in terms of reflected ethereal undulations, and thus 
 separate the objective action from the sensational result. The 
 same process takes place with respect to the differences of 
 sound. We distinguish between the subjective sensations and 
 the objective undulations of the air. The probability is that 
 we shall also be able eventually to discern the varied chemical 
 action of substances upon the organs of the mouth and nose, and 
 thus objectively to describe the differences of taste and smell. 
 
 Hereupon arises the question how we know things. Do we 
 know them as they are in themselves, or only as they appear 
 to us and affect us 1 Is knowledge actual or phenomenal ? 
 
 It must be granted at once that fundamental knowledge 
 is only of the modes by which outward bodies affect us. It will 
 be true, then, to say that all knowledge is phenomenal ; and it 
 therefore follows that we can have no absolute knowledge ; and 
 again, that we cannot know things in themselves or out of 
 relation to us. 
 
 In such statements there is a great mixture of truth and 
 error. It appears to us that in a great many philosophical 
 studies at the present time we should commence our thinking 
 de novo. It has been usual to enter upon philosophical study 
 in continuance of previous theories. Thus the old questions 
 remain and the old controversies continue to be beaten out. 
 But during the last twenty-five years science has made such 
 immense progress, more particularly in the abstruse studies of 
 light, heat, molecular physics, and the relations of the energies 
 of nature, that the whole groundwork of thought is changed. 
 Moreover, the doctrine of development, and more particularly of 
 biological evolution, has completely changed the nature of the 
 problems to be solved and the modes of solving them. These, 
 taken together, constitute no less than a revolution in philo- 
 sophic thought ; and it seems to us that to pursue the new 
 studies weighted with the old ideas is a very cumbrous method 
 of procedure. It is best to bid good-bye for a while to Berkeley, 
 
I04 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Hume, Kant, and the others, though coming back to tl em 
 respectfully afterwards, it may be, to correct and compare. 
 Even Mill — one of the most clear and satisfactory of writers — 
 ^ since he wrote anterior to this revolution of thought, is now 
 in some respects out of date. 
 
 Mr. Mill's favourite object of study is an orange. Let us 
 take it and ask ourselves what we know of it In the first 
 place, we know that it is yellow and has a recognisable odour 
 and flavour. It affects the senses of sight, smell, and taste. In 
 the next place, it has shape, size, and relative position. In the 
 third place, it has weight or attraction towards the centre of 
 the earth. 
 
 Various questions have arisen as to what we know of this 
 orange. Do we only know it as it afl'ects our senses, or do we 
 know it as it is in itself ? Is the orange yellow, scented, and 
 sweet or acid in itself, or has it only the properties of affecting 
 sentient beings in such a manner as to produce in them these 
 feelings ? It has been decided that colour, taste, and smell are 
 not properties of the object, but affections of the senses produced 
 by the object. The orange is not yellow, odorous, nor sapid 
 to the table upon which it lies. Science has penetrated the 
 secret of colour, and is able to assign a physical explanation to 
 the various colours. The length of a wave of red light is 
 
 ON THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 lo: 
 
 Red, 
 
 Yellow, 
 
 Violet, 
 
 TJ¥T¥X7 of an inch. 
 
 
 
 
 So, speaking of yellow, we mean objectively waves of j^^^^ of 
 an inch and the rate of impingement on the retina of the eye ; 
 or subjectively the feeling produced by these motions upon a 
 sentient being fitted to cognise them. So again sound has been 
 explained as undulations of air. Science has not yet been 
 able in a similar manner to formulate tastes and odours, but 
 there is every reason to suppose that this will be accomplished 
 some day. When it has been done, then, in a similar manner, 
 each taste and smell will have a physical explanation and a 
 subjective accompaniment, the correlation of the subjective and 
 
 the objective aspect, however, remaining as yet beyond prospect 
 of explanation. 
 
 The conclusion drawn from this dependence upon the senses 
 for knowledge has been that all knowledge is phenomenal, and 
 cannot be freed from the subjective aspect attached to every 
 cognisance of objectivities. The further conclusion has followed, 
 that we cannot know things in themselves. 
 
 Another mode of stating this conclusion is, that all knowledge 
 is relative, and that we cannot know things absolutely or as 
 they exist independently of the cogniser. The discussion of 
 these theories has been very subtle, and when it has been 
 complicated by the recognition of objectivised abstractions as 
 amongst the things-in-themselves which have been considered, 
 has led to labyrinthine verbiage. 
 
 We desire to study the question whether, granting all know- 
 ledge to be relative or phenomenal, we are nevertheless able to 
 understand and know the objective world in the relations of 
 things to one another independent of consciousness? Whether 
 there is not within consciousness a fundamental fact which 
 corresponds with the fundamental fact of the environment by 
 which tlie history of the objective universe anterior to the 
 emergence of consciousness can be understood, and by which 
 the present objective universe can be understood as it acts 
 within itself independent of the observant consciousness, and 
 which constitutes it an independent active external world, and 
 not mere phantasmagoria of the mind ? 
 
 Let us return to our orange and ask what it is in itself? 
 Well, it is not a thing-in-itself at aU ; it is an aggregate,— it is 
 composed of a certain number of atoms of certain of the 
 chemical elements. We have already considered the question 
 what these are in themselves, and the orange is but a certain 
 combination of them. 
 
 Moreover, the orange does not exist by itself ; it has relations 
 to the objects around it, not merely of relative position, but of 
 actual force. It presses upon the table on which it rests,— 
 It will weigh down one side of a balance,— it will break an 
 insufficient support. Nothing exists by itself, and therefore 
 nothmg can be studied in itself. 
 
\. 
 
 io6 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 We are accordingly forced, with whatever object we start, to 
 a consideration of the chemical elements ; and these we have 
 already found to be merely bundles of properties in relation to 
 
 each other. 
 
 The question whether these properties are the actual re- 
 lationships of things amongst themselves, and whether our 
 knowledge of them is affected by our subjective consciousness, 
 as is the case with the effects of external actions of objects 
 upon, our senses of colour, taste, and smell, is a very inter- 
 esting one. The fact that there is no colour, no light or 
 dark, no sound, no taste, no smell, in the objective universe 
 is difficult for any sentient being to realise ; and when it is 
 realised, it acts with such impressive force, and affects such a vast 
 extent of knowledge, that an universal scepticism sets in, and 
 everything seems to be unreal. The question suggests itself, 
 Is the cognition of the universe as reconstituted of differential 
 relative attractions, resistances, modes and rates of motion, 
 shapes, sizes, &c., &c., only known to us relatively to our senses, or 
 do these factors indeed form a cosmos interacting thus indepen- 
 dently of our senses, yet truly cognisable by us ? Is there a com- 
 mon ground upon which the objective and the subjective meet ? 
 
 Science so far seems to say Yes ; and although we cannot say 
 that we know a thing (i.e., a chemical element) in itself, we can 
 know things amongst themselves, expressible in terms of attrac- 
 tion, resistance, repulsion, shape, size, modes and rates of motion. 
 
 Philosophy in the hands of Mr. Spencer corroborates this 
 view, as we see in Part YII. of the " Psychology." This part 
 is valuable in its mode as well as in its results. It is a vindi- 
 cation of reason as overriding the reliability or non-reliability 
 of the senses, and indeed is a vindication and rectification of 
 the senses themselves. 
 
 We hold that those properties of objects which are known to 
 us by attractions or resistances in relation to our muscular sense 
 are known to us as they are amongst themselves, or rather as 
 they are to that material portion of ourselves which forms our 
 physical frame ; and that all the senses of colour, sound, &c., 
 are interpretable in terms of relations of resistance ; that our 
 bodies and the external world possess a community of attri- 
 
 ON THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 107 
 
 butcs which gives us a knowledge of the relations of things 
 amongst one another— a knowledge not of nature, but only of 
 
 relation not of original properties, so as to afford knowledge 
 
 of actions and sequences, but of the general nature of objective 
 relationships, independent of subjective impressions. 
 
 We can understand by processes of reasoning that the re- 
 lations of external objects to ourselves through the organs of 
 si^ht and hearing are relations of muscular resistance; and 
 although the nature of the action of odorous and sapid bodies 
 upon the organs of the nose and mouth is not yet under- 
 stood, yet in the end, no doubt, it will receive a similar 
 explanation. Mr. Spencer himself argues that this impression 
 of resistance is the mother-tongue of thought, into which all 
 language has to be translated. If he had said attraction and 
 resistance, it would have been a more perfect statement 
 
 Thus we find a physical history long anterior to ourselves, of 
 which we can take cognisance. Natural operations of physics, 
 chemistry, &c., which we can cognise, although not witnesses 
 of their occurrence ; chemical processes which from their 
 minuteness or gaseous invisibility we cannot perceive ; operations 
 of physical forces which escape our senses ; — all these we can 
 ideally grasp, although beyond sentiency, by means of the intel- 
 lectual imagination, which, abjuring all feelings but those of 
 attraction and resistance and their derivatives, is able to inter- 
 pret all the present in these tenns, and picture all the past. 
 
 So also we have sciences called abstract or exact, which are 
 universal in their application and precise in^their statement, 
 l)ecause they are general truths of these all-constituent factors 
 of the cosmos. We refer to mechanics, geometry, and mathe- 
 matics. These are sciences of the universal relations of things 
 amongst themselves, cognisable in the first instance by those 
 primordial feelings of attraction and resistance of which we 
 have spoken. They consist of tlie knowledge of relations of 
 shape, size, attraction, resistance, and aggregation : into these, 
 in all probability, all physical knowledge will ultimately be 
 resolved. Here we have a knowledge of " things amongst 
 themselves " independent of the superficial senses. 
 
 Hence it will be found that while we hold all knowlcd.re 
 
io8 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 ON THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 109 
 
 to be relative, yet since we are part of the objective, we can 
 understand the interrelations of things amongst themselves 
 independent of sentiency ; that in this sense we can have 
 absolute knowledge ; but that this absolute knowledge is also in 
 a sense relative knowledge ; that knowledge is only partly pheno- 
 menal in respect of the superficial Senses ; that there is a common 
 ground on which the phenomenal and the absolute meet, namely, 
 in the fundamental sense of muscular resistance. This is the 
 same as Mr. Spencer's teaching that all terms have to be tran- 
 slated in the end into terms of the feeling we call resistance. 
 
 This language may seem paradoxical ; but that only shows the 
 necessity for repudiating a good deal of the old language which 
 has been used in Philosophy, and indicates why there is so much 
 discussion about terms, and so much misunderstanding. If 
 "absolute" means non-relative, there is no absolute knowledge. 
 If "absolute" means knowledge of things amongst themselves 
 independently of sentiency, there can be no knowledge without 
 a sentient being capable of knowing ; but yet sentient beings 
 having fundamental experiences of the bodies with which they 
 are correlated can have such a knowledge of things amongst 
 themselves. If "absolute" means knowledge of things in 
 themselves, since objects only exist in relation, we cannot 
 know each object individually in itself. All knowledge is 
 Relative in the double sense of being the relation of things to 
 the knower ; and of being concerned with objects interrelated 
 to each other. In a sense all knowledge is phenomenal ; but 
 in respect of the expression of knowledge in terms of attraction, 
 resistance, shape, size, &c., it is a real knowledge of the actual 
 relations of things amongst themselves. 
 
 Our general conclusion is, then, that in so far as our know- 
 ledge consists of colours, light and shade, sounds, smells, odours, 
 it is phenomenal, and does not represent objectivities, except in 
 so far as they are the special effects wrought by the attractions, 
 repulsions, and motions of objectivities upon the senses, but 
 that these objective actions are not represented by the subjective 
 terms, which terms are only applicable to the feelings of the 
 receptive sentient organism. 
 
 Again, we hold that we do not know things in themselves, 
 
 but that we only know the chemical elements as bundles of 
 properties in relation to each other, aggregated into simple and 
 complex objects called things, which things are related to each 
 other as results of their constituents and their interrelations ; 
 that we are therefore capable of forming a science of things 
 amon^t themselves independent of sense, anterior to and sub- 
 sequent to the existence of sentient organisms, which science 
 can be expressed in terms of attraction, repulsion, resistance, 
 shape, size, modes and rates of motion. 
 
 So far we have treated only of objective science. As regards 
 subjective knowledge, the knowledge of emotions, thoughts, 
 ideas, and feelings generally, we are not prepared to treat. Nor 
 are we in a position to speak of the interrelation and mutual 
 dependence of subjective and objective. It is still an open 
 question in our mind how far each is a factor in any action of 
 an organism, and the question remains over for future study. 
 
 As regards the study of " things among themselves," it may 
 be divided as follows : — 
 
 Primary — 
 
 Attractions. 
 
 Resistances or Repulsions. 
 
 Denvative — 
 
 a. Relations of Space : 
 
 Size, Shape, Distance, Position, Aggregation. 
 h. Relations of Time : 
 
 Co-existence, Succession. 
 
 These may all be regarded as fundamental knowledge, in 
 terms of which all objective knowledge may be expressed ; and 
 if Feeling is not a factor in biological development, then the 
 history of biological development, as of all other developments, 
 may be described in these terms, and its causes and conditions 
 can all be contained within these terms. And inasmuch as the 
 subjective aspect of these terms corresponds with the actual 
 interrelationships of external, present, and anterior existences, 
 the knowledge so expressed is not only phenomenal and relative, 
 but is also — obliterating the word " absolute " from all future 
 philosophic use — a true picture of the history of things amongst 
 themselves independent of subjective cognisability. 
 
no SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 (b.) Digression: being an Examination of the Second CJiaptcr 
 of Mill's " Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's PJiilosophy,'' 
 entitled '^ The Relativity of Human Knowledge^ 
 
 The doctrine of the Eelativity of Knowledge is variously 
 accepted by different philosophers. AVe might understand 
 it, as — 
 
 " All our knowledge is relative to us, inasmuch as it is we 
 that know it ; " or, 
 
 " We can only know what we have the power of knowing." 
 
 But these, Mr. Mill says, are trivialities, insignificant truisms, 
 which no one ever did or could call in question, and which 
 apparently are of no value when expressed. 
 
 Again, there is an acceptation of the doctrine in which it 
 means that we only know anything by knowing it as dis- 
 tinguished from something else ; that all consciousness is of 
 difference. But this view, although valuable, may be put aside 
 as not appropriate to our present pur{x>se. 
 
 " All language," says Mr. Mill,* " recognises a distinction 
 between myself, the Ego, and a worid either material or spiritual, 
 or both, external to me, but of which I can, in some mode or 
 measure, take cognisance. The most fundamental questions in 
 Philosophy are those which seek to determine what we are abh; 
 to know of these external objects, and by what evidence we 
 know it." 
 
 Mr. Mill then proceeds to take an object — an orange — and 
 study what we know of it. We have already given our study 
 of it. The conclusion which he comes to is this t — 
 
 " When thus analysed, it is affirmed that all the attributes 
 which we ascribe to objects consist in their having the power 
 of exciting one or another variety of sensation in our minds ; 
 that to us the properties of an object have this and no other 
 meaning ; that an object is to us nothing else than that which 
 affects our senses in a certain manner ; that we are incapable of 
 attaching to the word * object ' any other meaning. . . . This is 
 tho doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge in the simplest, 
 
 * Mill on Hamilton, p. 6, second paragraph. 
 + Ibid., p. 7, bottom. 
 
 MEANING OF RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE, iii 
 
 purest, and, as I think, the most proper acceptation of the 
 words." 
 
 Mr. ^lill then goes on to consider two forms of this doctrine. 
 
 Before proceeding with them, let us remark upon the ex- 
 ceedingly narrow view of the subject as taken by Mr. Mill, as, 
 indeed, by most metaphysicians. The circumstance that always 
 strikes the reader is the absence of reference to the general 
 res^dts of science and of large scientific generalisations. Mr. 
 Mill says, *' Let us take an object." This object is not considered 
 as an aggregate of chemical elements, but as " an object," an 
 individual existence. 
 
 Again, most metaphysicians, as in this case, content them- 
 selves with a statical view of an object. They do not take 
 objects in visible action or sensible relation to each other, but 
 take a single object, as Mr. Spencer does the piano. They 
 isolate one aggregate, and then study it as far as possible stati- / 
 cally ; whereas dynamics is the great natural study. Mr. Mill 
 says nothing about light and the undulatory motions which 
 impinge upon the eye, nor about the chemical action of the 
 material particles which affect the nose and the mouth. Kor 
 does he speak of the attraction of the orange to the centre of 
 the earth, nor of the resistance of the table upon which it rests. 
 
 By some philosophers it is held, he says, *' that the attributes 
 which we ascribe to objects consist in their having the power 
 of exciting one or another variety of ^^nB^iion in our minds ; 
 that to Its the properties of an object have this and no other 
 meaning ; that an object is to m nothing else than that which 
 affects our senses in a certain manner." 
 
 In considering this, we are not disposed to deny that objects 
 are to us as stated when they are in actnal relation with our 
 senses, and when we take them in both their subjective and 
 objective aspects. In such a case an orange is yellow, odorous, 
 and sapid. Suppose, again, a heavy object falls upon it and 
 ci-ushes it, and the juice stains the white cloth of the table. 
 The objects are still to us as they affect us, and our knowledge 
 of them is as our senses inform us. The study is correct as far 
 as it goes, but it does not go far enough : it does not recofirnise 
 the relations between the aggregate called an oran^^e. and the 
 
112 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 falling object, the table, and the tablecloth. These objects have 
 relations amongst themselves. To one another they are not 
 coloured, sapid, or odorous, nor do they hear the noise of the 
 catastrophe ; but they have relations of attraction and resistance, 
 of shape, size, relative position, and consequent change, as well 
 as (in the case of the stained tablecloth) of chemical or molecular 
 combination. All these changes take place quite independently 
 of the sentient onlooker, and are capable of being expressed in 
 terms non-connotative of sentiency. Yet Mr. Mill says that the 
 only properties of an object are its powers of exciting in us certain 
 sensations. Certainly he limits the assertion in respect as they 
 are cognisable ''to m" but then these are not all the proper- 
 ties of objects, but only their properties in regard to us. They 
 have properties in regard to one another ; they interact inde- 
 pendently of our volition ; their laws are not laws of thought. 
 The different sciences are studies of external processes, not laws 
 of mental associations. We interfere volitionally, but only in the 
 application of external powers, and our mental associations are 
 produced by actual external associations of independent objects. 
 We follow, we do not lead. 
 
 Mr. Mill then goes on to describe the most extreme form of 
 the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge as held by the 
 Idealists and Sceptics, including Berkeley and Hume and all 
 their followers, which schools we are inclined to think should 
 now, for reasons previously stated, be reckoned out of date. 
 
 This, however, is far from being the shape in which the 
 doctrine is usually held. To most of those who hold it, the 
 difiference between the Ego and the Non-ego is not one of 
 language only, nor a formal distinction between two aspects of 
 the same reality, but denotes two realities, each self-existent, 
 and neither dependent on the other. They believe that there is 
 a real universe of " things-in-themselves," and that whenever 
 there is an impression on our senses, there is a **thing-in- 
 itself " which is behind the phenomenon and is the cause of it 
 But as to what the thing is " in itself," we, having no organ 
 except our senses for communicating with it, can only know 
 what our senses tell us ; and as they tell us nothing except 
 the impression which the thing makes upon uSy we do not 
 
 MEANING OF RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 113 
 
 know what it is in itself at all. It is supposed that it must 
 be something in itself. External things exist and have an 
 inmost nature, but their inmost nature is inaccessible to our 
 faculties. We know it not, and can assert nothing of it with 
 a meaning. But the representations generated in our minds 
 by the action of the things themselves, these we may linow, 
 and these are all that we can know respecting them. Let 
 us take for consideration, for example, the chemical element 
 oxygen and the chemical element iron. We know all about 
 the properties of these substances. The properties are two- 
 fold: firstly, their objective relation to the Ooher elements, 
 to the earth, and the rest of the physical universe ; and, 
 secondly, their relations to our subjectivity. The whole of 
 their properties are relations with other things. Out of this 
 relationship we do not know them at alL All that we know 
 of them is that they are bundles of properties, and these proper- 
 ties are relationships. We also know that such of these proper- 
 ties as are cognised by the superficial senses are explainable by 
 the fundamental senses, and can be set down in mathematical and 
 chemical formulae. It may be argued there must be something ' 
 which difi*erentiates the substratum or nexus which holds these 
 various distinguishing properties of oxygen and iron together, 
 and which constitutes oxygen and iron in themselves. If so, 
 let those who argue for it make what practical use they can of 
 it. It does not concern us until these elements can be decom- 
 posed and we add to our actual knowledge. It seems strange 
 to us that when philosophers have once decided that this kind 
 of knowledge is inaccessible to us, there should be so much 
 discussion about it. Why not let it drop altogether? It is 
 unwise to discuss things in themselves too much, for men may 
 talk about them till they believe in them. 
 
 It is in the form just considered that the doctrine of the 
 Relativity of Knowledge is held by the greater number of those 
 who profess to hold it, attaching any definite idea to the term. 
 A great deal of importance has been attached to the doctrine, 
 but we are inclined to think its importance has been over- 
 ^ estimated. It seems to have merely a negative value in shuttino" 
 out useless discussion as to the ultimate causes of physical and 
 
 H 
 
114 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 subjective processes, and to be useful principally in causing us 
 to limit our attention to the actual sequences in nature, and 
 to confine our explanations, so far as they will go, within the 
 bounds of the knowable ; and if they will not go far enough, to 
 let them remain incomplete. As a doctrine of positive value, 
 we think that logically it is deceptive ; ior if an orange is known 
 to us only relatively, it is yellow ; whereas we know that it is 
 not — in itself— yeViow. The impression yellow is a subjective 
 fact — an incident in the relativity of knowledge, and not a pro- 
 perty of the orange in respect of non-sentient physical bodies. 
 This falsifying influence of the relativity of knowledge is 
 shown in that form of the doctrine next explained by Mr. Mill. 
 This is the form in which it is held by Kant and his followers. 
 Beyond the immediate sensations and their unknown outward 
 cause it is held that the mind adds something of its own. 
 These additional elements do not belong to the objects them- 
 selves, but to our perceptions and conceptions of them. The 
 attributes of filling Space -and occupying a portion of Time 
 result from the nature of mind itself, which is so constituted 
 that it cannot take any impressions from objects except in 
 those particular modes. Time and Space are oidy modes of 
 our perceptions, not modes of existence. These and others 
 are not properties of the things, but of our mode of conceiving 
 them. 
 
 Merely referring by the way to our belief that Space and 
 Time are relations of " distance between " and contemporaneous 
 or successive action, which are experiences of objective relations, 
 we observe that, firstly, they have no existences as objective 
 entities ; and, secondly, as Mr. Spencer has pointed out, if they 
 are forms of thought, it is because they are correspondences 
 with universal objectivities. The universality of the experience 
 has evolved the fundamental thought. The fundamental facts 
 of physical interrelations named attraction and resistance, and 
 their derivative relationships, correspond with that universal 
 language of the feeling of resistance to which Mr. Spencer refers; 
 and if we are obliged by the laws of our mentality to conceive 
 of objects as thus and thus, it is owing to the laws of biological 
 evolution, by which the actual universality of these external 
 
 ME A NING OF RELA TI VITY OF KNO W LEDGE, 1 1 5 
 
 facts is registered organically in the physical constitution of 
 the race as the primordial "correspondence" between organism 
 and environment. 
 
 A modification of the doctrine is that by which it is held 
 that Place, Extension, Substance, Cause, and the rest, are con- 
 ceptions put together out of ideas of sensation by the known 
 laws of association. It is not stated whether this " putting 
 together" is done by the individual or the race, but probably it was 
 supposed to be done by the individual, as the doctrine is ante- 
 Darwinian. The fact of placing the origin of these notions in 
 the laws of mental association without going farther, and assign- 
 ing an exterior cause in the direct relations of things amongst 
 themselves, should be sufficient to condemn it under the new 
 philosophy. The doctrine of the association of ideas depends 
 upon the association of the things which they represent, and has 
 been produced by them. 
 
 Mr. Mill proceeds to say that the Relativity of Knowledge 
 means the inaccessibility to our faculties of any other knowledge 
 of things than that of the impressions they produce on our 
 mental consciousness. We have already shown that even the 
 impressions produced upon our mental consciousness are not 
 knowledge, such as the yellowness of the orange, the rising and 
 setting of the sun, &c. These impressions have to be rectified 
 by reason. On the other hand, we maintain that some of the 
 impressions produced upon our mental consciousness are true 
 notions of the properties of things amongst themselves, and in 
 this respect differ from the impressions produced through the 
 superficial senses. If the doctrine of relativity has any value 
 at all, it is in the validification of the existence of a true rela- 
 tion between the knower and the known, and in giving us 
 confidence in the reasoned results of this relation, as against 
 the sceptical results of a mere phenomenalism. 
 
 Again, Mr. Mill remarks r " It is obvious that what has been 
 said respecting the unknowableness of Things *in Themselves' 
 forms no obstacle to our ascribing attributes or properties to 
 them, provided these are always conceived as relative to us." 
 On this we remark that, clearly, if all knowledge be a rela- 
 tion between an action of things-amongst-one-another and a 
 
I 
 
 ii6 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 knower, all knowledge must be conceived as described; but inas- 
 much as no action takes place except between two or more things, 
 there must be a relation between these things of which we be- 
 come cognisant. The generalisation of these relationships is the 
 triumphs of modem science. Mr. Mill proceeds : " If a thing 
 produces effects of which our sight, hearing, or touch can take 
 cognisance, it follows, and indeed is but the same statement in 
 other words, that the thing has power to produce these effects. 
 The various powers are its properties, and of such, an indefinite 
 multitude is open to our knowledge. But this knowledge is 
 merely phenomenal. The object is known to us only in one 
 special relation, namely, as that which produces, or is capable 
 of producing, certain impressions on our senses ; and all that we 
 really know is these impressions." On this we would remark, 
 that a thing never produces effects by itself, but only in relation 
 to other things, and that the only things to which the word 
 "thing" can be philosophically applied are the atoms of the 
 chemical elements; all other objects are merely aggregates of 
 them in relation. The .question is, are their powers or proper- 
 ties in relation to one another, or only to us ? We do not see 
 how it can be supposed to be otherwise than the former. 
 Then the question arises, can we know what these relations 
 are ; as, for instance, when we speak of chemical affinities ? 
 "We certainly do, as they are set forth in books on chemistry, 
 although we do not know the nature of these afiBnities. 
 Now, if this is all that is meant by saying that all knowledge 
 is phenomenal, and that we do not know the inmost motive 
 and essence of the things — oxygen, hydrogen, &c. — then all 
 knowledge is phenomenal, but it is none the less actual 
 knowledge. Reason is still at liberty to penetrate as far as 
 it can into the constitution of these elementary substances, 
 and we need not even despair of acquiring that knowledge 
 whicli would explain and account for aU the phenomena which 
 the thing exhibits to us in relation to other things, notwith- 
 standing that, when so discovered, the new truth would also be 
 relative to us, the knowers, and more might remain behind. 
 They would then become known modes of Being. Mr. Mill 
 adds : " We might invent new names for the unknown modes ; 
 
 ON CONCEPTIONS. 
 
 117 
 
 but the new names would have no more meaning than the x, ?/, 
 and 2, of algebra." He might have added, " or apply old ones." 
 The question is to what the term " knowledge " is applicable. 
 Is chemistry a body of knowledge, or mechanics, or the other 
 sciences ? Apparently so, for in practical life there are immense 
 and widespread organisations for teaching them. The question 
 whether such knowledge is to be called phenomenal or absolute 
 is of little importance. 
 
 . (c.) On Conceptions. 
 
 Conceptions are mental representations of experiences relating 
 to the subjective purely, or mediately to the objective. We 
 have only to consider the latter for our present purposes. Con- 
 ceptions differ greatly in their character. They may be very 
 simple, as that of an individual simple object, such as my tea- 
 cup ; or they may be rather more complex, as that of my watch. 
 In fact, it may be doubted if I have a clear conception of my 
 watch, as I have of my tea-cup. I have never thoroughly exa- 
 mined my watch, so as to understand its construction. I have 
 a very indefinite knowledge of the relations of its springs, wheels, 
 and check actions. So that complexity is very often accom- 
 panied by indefiniteness of conception. Here we find another 
 characteristic of conceptions in that they vary in definiteness. 
 
 A very important distinction between conceptions is whether 
 they are of individual objects or of a class of similar objects. 
 I have a distinct conception of my dog, but when I speak of 
 dogs, the conception I have is very indistinct on account of 
 the great variety of breeds. So that in this respect also we 
 have definite and indefinite conceptions. 
 
 Again, with regard to objects of great'magnitude,'the intellect 
 fails to grasp them, more particularly if they are at the same 
 time complex in their contents. The mind is able to form but 
 a very uncertain and changeful concept 
 
 Once more, if we go beyond those aggregates of things called 
 objects and consider their mutual actions, we again are able to 
 form but very imperfect conceptions. If I say, " I bought a 
 dog," the conception produced in the mind of the hearer is of a 
 very indefinite character. He has his conception of me, he has 
 
ii8 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 a conception of a dog, but not of the particular dog which was 
 purchased ; and he has a conception of " buying," but not of 
 this particular transaction. Yet he has in result received some 
 specific information, and notwithstanding the want of all this 
 definiteness of conception, he knows that an event has taken 
 place, and is able to estimate the import and essential character 
 intended to be conveyed by the words employed. 
 
 The consideration of conceptions always leads to a considera- 
 tion of the words which are employed to denote them, and by 
 which we are able to make our thoughts and wishes known to 
 one another. Words differ from conceptions in being, instead 
 of mental representations of objects, only the marks or symbols, 
 verbal or written, by which those mental representations are 
 denoted. They are a system of symbolisation. 
 
 We have already called attention to the fact that the inter- 
 course of the mind with the objective universe is simply between 
 the individual concretes and the individual mind; and that 
 whatever thereafter ensues is a mental process merely. In this 
 manner we justified the original experiences, and claimed the 
 right to rectify the working of the subsequent inner growth. 
 We required that the error of using mere terms of totality 
 as generals having an unitative objective existence should be 
 rectified, as has often previously been urged. 
 
 We have now to consider another class of so-called conceptions, 
 namely, those known as abstract These are altogether bad, 
 and, like ill weeds, grow apace. They arise from a comparison of 
 similars. We experience similar effects, such as that of the sen- 
 sation red, and form a conception of redness ; and then the mind 
 having formed a noun, straightway imagines an objective existence 
 answering to it. These are called objectivised abstractions, and 
 represent no concrete existences whatever. On this subject, 
 also, we have already had occasion to remark. 
 
 The difficulty arises in this way. In order to cope with the 
 vast numbers, bulk, variety, and complexity of individual ex- 
 periences, and with the vast results of scientific investigation, 
 the mind is obliged, in the first place, to form indefinite concep- 
 tions, to generalise, and to abstract, and then to express itself 
 with respect to such conceptions in words of still more indefinite 
 
 ON CONCEPTIONS, 
 
 119 
 
 and variable meaning on account of the rough and imperfect, 
 cliangeable and individual imports of the terms employed. 
 This evil is so great that except by the greatest care men do 
 not clearly understand one another when they go beyond very 
 simple and concrete language. 
 
 The object of this sub-section is to lead up to a considera- 
 tion of Mr. Spencer's theory of symbolism, and the question is. 
 Are conceptions symbols? A symbol, according to Webster's 
 Dictionary, is a sign by which one knows or infers a thing. 
 Now we cannot make out that a conception is a sign at alL 
 Symbols are accepted signs between two or more people for the 
 purpose of indicating what conceptions are desired to be under- 
 stood — conceptions themselves being the mental representation 
 of external objects or events, definite or indefinite, simple or 
 complex, perfect or incomplete, coincident or non-coincident, or 
 however they may exist in the minds of each. Of these the 
 words are symbols. Mr. Spencer maintains that conceptions 
 or some classes of them are symbols. Now the merit of a 
 symbol is in proportion to its definiteness, but conceptions, 
 according to Mr. Spencer, are symbolic proportionately to their 
 indefiniteness. In proportion as our conceptions of a thing are 
 obscure, indefinite, and incomplete, do they become symbolic ; 
 60 that in the end the most obscure, indefinite, and incom- 
 plete conception is the most symbolic. He goes on further to 
 hold, that only when the most symbolical, and therefore the 
 most indefinite, obscure, and incomplete conceptions are reached, 
 are we able to propound philosophical formulas which shall 
 unify knowledge, and make clear the order of the universe. 
 
 Mr. Spencer does not call all conceptions symbolic, only those 
 which are obscure, indefinite, and incomplete — those which the 
 mind fails fully and completely to picture to itself, as, for 
 instance, " The World." Now the symbol here is the word, 
 written or spoken, " World." This word is the sign or symbol 
 by which we make known to one another the subject of our dis- 
 course. It calls up to our minds, when we are asked to think 
 about it without a limiting context, a number of indefinite, 
 varying, complex, and incomplete conceptions, which in any 
 two minds are not likely wholly to coincide. But again, if we 
 
I20 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 are asked to limit our conception to that of the earth as a 
 member of the solar system, or by itself as a sphere variously 
 exhibiting oceans and continents, or again merely as an oblate 
 spheroid of certain dimensions — it is held that since we are 
 unable to form a representation of it in our minds commen- 
 surate with the object, our conception, in proportion to our 
 inability so to realise it, is symbolic. Well, philosophers are 
 entitled to use words as they please, but we fail to see the 
 utility of thus transferring the signification of a written or 
 verbal sign to a conception. Suppose we call the conception 
 of the earth as a planet a symbolic conception, it does not 
 in the least alter the value of the word or of the conception — 
 it does not add to our notion of the earth, nor vary the value 
 of any proposition in which it occurs. In the same way the 
 notion of a watch is symbolic, as are the conceptions of all 
 animals and vegetables — as are, indeed, the conceptions of all 
 the chemical elements. There are no conceptions, or very few, 
 that are not symbolic. The only use of the suggestion is, so to 
 speak, a misuse of it, as leading us to suppose that those abstract 
 and general conceptions which are most symbolic in respect of 
 their indefiniteness have a value for logical purposes which 
 they really do not possess. 
 
 These are the conceptions symbolised by the terms Matter, 
 Motion, Force, Space, Time, &c., with perhaps Integration, 
 Polarity, and Equilibration. As these are very obscure, indefi- 
 nite, incomplete, if not indeed unpicturable conceptions, it is 
 held that they are symbolical. We have already shown these 
 terms to be the expression of some general laws of relationship 
 of the chemical elements, which are themselves only bundles of 
 properties in relation to each other. They are not entities at 
 all, nor factors ; as such they have no existence ; they are mere 
 abstractions — fictions of the imagination. The mind has no 
 conceptions of abstractions and generals ; the terms, as thus 
 used, only connote concrete experiences of the relationships of 
 the chemical elements, and are only of value in proportion as 
 they are representations of those relationships, and are only 
 useful in logic in their power of expressing large classes of 
 individual facts or events. 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S POSITION AS RE-STATED. 121 
 
 We do not ne'ed to enforce our position by a consideration of 
 the import of each of the terms referred to at the commence- 
 ment of the last paragraph. We are not engaged in writing 
 a treatise on logic, and do not wish to say more than is suffi- 
 cient for the purposes of this particular criticism. We charac- 
 terise the term Matter as a term of totality including all the 
 chemical elements in the universe, and therefore as a general 
 concrete term of particular meaning in any proposition as 
 specifically defined or as indicated by the context. As a con- 
 ception, we hold that we have no conception of it otherwise 
 than in response to some one of the meanings just indicated, 
 namely, either as a conception of the sum-total of the chemical 
 elements in the universe, or in the solar system, or in the world; 
 or as a conception of each unit, or all units, in relation to each 
 other in terms of attraction and resistance ; or as a conception 
 of resistance only ; or as resistance in relation to our muscular 
 energy, &c And if it be urged that these are imperfect con- 
 ceptions, and that the facts transcend the conceptive powers of 
 the mind, so be it But again, if it is held that nevertheless 
 we can grasp the scientific value of them, and by regarding our 
 conceptions as symbols, can reason about them with intelligence 
 and scientific security, again well and good ; but it must be on 
 tlie understanding that we can comprehend with definiteness 
 what we are talking about. Granted the chemical elements, we 
 have merely to classify their properties of attraction, resistance, 
 position, aggregation, cohesion, affinity, polarity, equilibration, 
 &c., and with these concrete applications we can go far in 
 scientific generalisation ; but we can make no progress whatever 
 when we quit the concrete reference. 
 
 (d.) Mr. Spencer's Scheme as Re-stated in his Appendix 
 
 to ^^ First Principles." 
 
 We are now in a position to judge of Mr. Spencer's scheme 
 for the unification of knowledge as re-stated by him in reply to 
 our criticism. It is to be efifected indeed by the terms Matter, 
 Motion, and Force, but Mr. Spencer repudiates as insufficient 
 for his purpose any of the specific or general concrete meanings 
 
122 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 of these words — notwithstanding that in various places, and 
 more especially in the " Biology," the attempts actually made to 
 work out the processes of the universe are from the concrete 
 factors of the chemical elements in response to a concrete en- 
 vironment. The terms referred to are to be taken as ** symbols " 
 standing for symbolic concepts, and they are symbolic concepts, 
 not because, like the term " The World," they can take their 
 ^places in a proposition in some definite and limited meaning 
 ^ representative of a concrete reality understood but not 
 fally and perfectly conceived by the mind ; but because they 
 neither represent any such concrete reality, nor are capable 
 of having any definite meaning, so as to be of any intelligible 
 value in a proposition or in processes of reasoning. They 
 are of the class of symbolic concepts which are symbolic 
 not on account of vastness of number or bulk, but because 
 they are obscure. Whereas the term "The World" has a 
 concrete value in any of its meanings, notwithstanding our 
 inability to form an adequate conception of it; the terms 
 Matter, Motion, and Force are abstractions, and the fact that 
 the mind fails to make any conception of them, does not put 
 them upon the same footing as those other symbolic concepts 
 which can have a value in a process of reasoning. As abstrac- 
 tions, they can have no place as factors in the actual universe, 
 and can have no value as symbolic concepts. They can only 
 be of value as symbolic concepts when they represent sum- 
 totals of concrete experiences, expressing the general facts of 
 the actual individual relationships of the objective world. 
 
 Now it is evident that the unification of knowledge, 
 taken as the understanding of the sequences of the cosmos 
 from the interrelations of original factors, requires that we 
 should know these original interrelations, and is not to be 
 effected by means of our want of knowledge of them, no 
 matter what artifice of symbolism we may resort to. It will 
 be observed that we speak of a knowledge of the interrelations 
 and not of the nature of these original factors ; for, as already 
 observed in sub-section (a), the knowledge of the interrelations 
 or properties of things is a knowledge of things amongst them- 
 selves, and it is futile to look beyond these. 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S POSITION AS RE-STATED. 123 
 
 We therefore come to the conclusion that if Mr. Spencer has 
 framed his system on a scheme of terms which are symbols 
 of symbolic conceptions, and symbolic because of our mental 
 incapacity to grasp their meaning, he empties out of his 
 scheme every vestige of intelligibility, and gives us only pale 
 ghosts of thoughts in a shadowy world.* 
 
 But in actual practice we find that this method is only used 
 to fill up the blanks in a scheme mainly worked out by mesMS 
 of concrete factors. Whenever and wherever the processeajle 
 actually or presumably capable of definite explanation, tHat 
 course has been pursued (as mainly in the " Biology "), but where, 
 this plan has been found inefficient, we have been put off 
 with the other shadowy and intangible method. 
 
 This is the more easy because the two methods are pursued 
 Tinder the same guise. We have already seen that the set of 
 terms employed by Mr. Spencer is used by him in the two 
 senses. Matter, and Motion, and Force, while correctly meaning 
 the sum totals of certain contained definite meanings, are also^ 
 employed to represent impossible abstractions and still more im- 
 possible symbolic conceptions. By this inclusion of the definite 
 and the incomprehensible in a single set of terms, we are pre- 
 pared to attack a universe which is partly known and partly 
 unknowable, and somehow or another surely we have unified^ 
 knowledge ! 
 
 It is true that whenever we venture upon a definite statement 
 of doctrine, such as the universal concomitancy of the concentra- 
 tion of Matter with the dissipation or transference of Motion, 
 it is difficult to keep to it as soon as we come to changes where 
 the Motion is retained or locked up, and to changes which are 
 not concentration of Matter nor dissipation of Motion, such as 
 the integrations of language and the psychical correspondences 
 generally ; but then, when we begin to reflect that Matter, and 
 Motion, and Force are only symbolic conceptions, and that by 
 attaching definite meanings to them we land ourselves in 
 alternative impossibilities of thought, it is clear that we ought 
 not to attach definite meanings to them where those definite 
 meanings do not work. 
 
 The whole process is very succinctly summarised by Mr. 
 
124 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 Spencer in a single page of his reply ("First Principles," 
 Appendix, p. 578). 
 
 Firstly, lines 29 to 31 — " Over and over again it has been 
 shown in various ways that the deepest trutJis we can reach are 
 simply statements of the widest uniformities in our experience of 
 the relations of Matter, Motion, and Force." 
 
 Here the foundation of knowledge is very properly put within 
 our experience. Now, our experience is very varied, and is 
 generalised in the various sciences, more particularly in the 
 sciences of Mechanics, Physics, and Chemistry. Here are 
 presented some very wide uniformities of nature, which we 
 naturally formulate ; and the formulations arrived at are the 
 deepest truths we can reach. 
 
 At this point we part company with Mr. Spencer in two direc- 
 tions. Firstly, because he uses the terms Matter, Motion, and 
 Force, not as terms of totality commensurate with the whole of 
 our concrete knowledge — not as general terms summing up 
 what we actually know — but as abstract terms representing 
 entities that have no existence. Secondly, because he describes 
 the uniformities of nature, in that whatever the factors, the 
 history of the interrelations of those factors is a history of the 
 progress from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, 
 coherent heterogeneity. This universal characteristic is very 
 much relied upon throughout his works as constituting the 
 unification of knowledge, and although the truth is admitted, 
 its efficacy in this respect is denied by us, and is not consistent 
 with that requirement of Mr. Spencer's which looks for the 
 unification of knowledge in the ability to deduce all processes 
 V as corollaries from some idtimate truth. 
 
 The next step which Mr. Spencer takes in this re-statement 
 of his position is in his treatment of these terms, Matter, 
 Motion, and Force. And on this same page, one of his 
 principal confusions of thought is very neatly presented. In 
 the first place, he speaks of Matter and Motion as being de- 
 pendent upon Force; and then again he puts all three upon 
 a level as equally dependent upon an Unknowable Power. 
 Thus we find (line 7), " There is one ultimate component of 
 thought into which our conceptions of external existences are 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S POSITION AS RE-STATED. 125 
 
 resolvable;" and again (line 17), ** The truths that Matter is^ 
 indestructible and Motion continuous can be known to us only 
 as corollaries from the truth that Force is persistent — that 
 Force is that *out of which our conceptions of Matter and 
 Motion are built.' I have gone on to say that * by the 
 Persistence of Force we really mean the persistence of some 
 power which transcends our knowledge and conception.* 
 Throughout all which arguments the implication is that I hold 
 Matter and Motion to be conditioned manifestations of this 
 unknown power." 
 
 Here we have a series of dependent terms : — ^ 
 
 (i.) The Persistence of Force, which means some power which j 
 transcends our knowledge, and which is a constant quantity : 
 
 (2.) Corollaries therefrom : namely — 
 
 The Indestructibility of Matter. 
 
 The Continuity of ^Motion.* ^ 
 
 Now either the two latter are the authority in experience 
 for the former, of which it is the sum-total ; or the former is 
 known independently to be a constant quantity, having only two 
 modes of manifestationy in which case the latter are corollaries 
 of the former. But we do not know that Force or the Unknow--^ 
 able Power has only two modes of manifestation, for it is not 
 knowable. We may only know two, but really there may be 
 many more. The question is. What is our authority for the 
 assumption that Force is a constant quantity, and that it only , 
 has two modes of manifestation ? If our authority is the In- 
 destructibility of Matter and the Continuity of Motion, these 
 are independent truths, and the Persistence of Force is the 
 corollary. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer next proceeds to put Matter, Motion, and 
 Force all upon the same level 
 
 Line 33 — " A Power of which the nature remains for ever 
 inconceivable, and to which no limits in Time or Space can be 
 imagined, works in us certain efi'ects. These efi'ects have certain 
 likenesses of kind, the most general of which we class together 
 under the names of Matter, Motion, and Force." 
 
 * The logic is much confused if the Continuity of Motion proves not to 
 be a truth at all. See § i of Chapter III. 
 
126 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Here we find that we have three classes of experience ; not 
 one — viz., Force : nor two, which we often make dependent upon 
 that one — viz., Matter and Motion — but three which are distin- 
 guished and classified in separate and distinct categories ; and 
 all three are made dependent upon a fourth — viz., the Unknow- 
 able Power. Here Force and its persistence are not identified, as 
 above, with this Unknowable Power, but, along with the other 
 two classes of experience, are made dependent upon it. All this 
 results from the first fault of manufacturing abstractions which 
 have no corresponding entities — from the error of changing 
 general terms from mere expressions of sums-total into terms 
 representative of actual existences ; for when we come to use 
 these objecti vised generals or objecti vised abstractions in 
 reasoning, since they are so very shadowy, we can use them 
 almost any way we like, and in return they can use us any way 
 they like, if such an expression can be pardoned. Witness, 
 for instance, the fault so often referred to of Mr. Spencer's 
 attempt, after elaborate preparation, to formulate the inter- 
 relation of three factors in the Formula of Evolution, when one 
 is dropped out in the process, and only two find a place 
 there — these two themselves becoming mere shadows, and the 
 interrelation of concomitance being so attenuated that it is 
 completely forgotten by the time we arrive at psychological corre- 
 ^ spondences. This confirms the view that Mr. Spencer has no 
 well-defined opinion in his own mind of the order of dependence 
 
 between 
 
 The Unknowable Power, 
 
 Force ; 
 
 Matter ; 
 
 Motion. 
 
 It is an inconsistency to state that Matter, Motion, and Force 
 are conditioned manifestations of the Unknowable Power, and 
 again, that Matter and Motion are the conditioned manifes- 
 tations of Force. Mr. Spencer confuses the two statements 
 thus : — 
 
 Line 24 — " Throughout all which arguments the implication 
 is that I hold Matter and Motion to be conditioned manifestations 
 of this unknown Power." 
 
 MR, SPENCER'S POSITION AS RE-STATED. 127 
 
 Line 33 "A Power of which the nature for ever remains 
 
 inconceivable . . . works in us certain efi"ects . . . Matter, 
 Motion, and Force." 
 
 Matter is further on spoken of as "a certain conditioned 
 eff'ect wrought in us by the Unknown Power;" and on p. 579 j 
 we are told, " Matter and Motion are both regarded by me as 
 modes of manifestation of Force." 
 
 Now suppose for the sake of the theory we admit that Matter 
 and Motion are conditioned manifestations of Force, or that 
 Matter, Motion, and Force are conditioned manifestations of the 
 Unknowable Power ; and suppose, too, we regard those conditions 
 as permanent. It is evident that the conditions have the superior 
 power over the Unknowable : the Unknowable is in bonds, andj 
 is not at liberty to uncondition itself, or change about from one 
 condition to another ; and it is as thus conditioned, and only 
 by means of its conditions, that it is known to us. The con- 
 ditions appear in our experience, and not d priori^ to be constant ; 
 and it is this constancy of the conditions of the seventy or eighty 
 so-called elements that is our warrant for the constant quantities 
 of their properties in detail, and in their sums-total as expressed 
 in the terms Matter, Motion, and Force. 
 
 We have to consider, what right have we to go beyond the 
 manifestations as conditioned, and therefore as known to us % 
 The Unknowable Power works in us certain definite effects, and 
 we cannot go beyond these effects. Mr. Spencer wants to convert 
 the totalities of certain classes of efi'ects into actual existences 
 making them into entities which are acting factors in the uni- 
 verse. But this is a very different process from the legitimate 
 although perhaps impossible intellectual endeavour so to analyse 
 the actual working factors of the universe into their simplest 
 constituents that we may understand all processes as the result- 
 ants of certain simple original factors. 
 
 The fourth position is the introduction of subjectivity. 
 
 " Matter and Motion are both regarded by me as modes of 
 manifestation of Force, and that Force, as we are conscious of it 
 when by our own efforts we produce changes, is the correlative 
 of that Universal Power which transcends consciousness." 
 
 Now this is a hard thing to understand. Matter and Motion 
 
 ( 
 
128 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 are manifestations of Force. Does this mean a manifestation to 
 us, or that Matter and Motion are conditions of Force indepen- 
 dently of ns ? The question arises — Can we know anything as 
 independent of us? I and We are evidently forces, for we 
 produce changes ; yet consciousness is not a mode of Force, for 
 it is not included in Balfour Stewart's list of Forces and 
 Energies, and is not interchangeable with members of the 
 series. Presumably Mr. Spencer does not mean that consciousness 
 produces changes, but only that the forces of the organism (in 
 response to the environment), of which we are merely conscious, 
 produce the changes in question ; and that this force (or forces) 
 is the correlative of that Universal Power. Yet this cannot be, 
 because the forces of the organism are manifestations of, and 
 therefore cannot be the correlative of, that Unknowable Power. 
 But what is the meaning of correlative 1 Must a correlative of 
 an Unknowable Power be itself a force or power? If so, that 
 force or power is not all-inclusive. What, then, is consciousness, 
 and what is effort, and what is the Ego which exercises them 
 and produces changes? 
 
 Tl^en, again, can we speak of the physical universe as inde- 
 pendent of us, as antecedent to us, and so treat of it that we 
 are corollaries of its original factors ? Either we can do so, and 
 we are able to elaborate organisms from purely physical factors, 
 as attempted in Mr. Spencer's " Biology," consciousness coming 
 in mysteriously and unaccountably as the subjective aspect of 
 a physical event over which it has no controlling influence, and 
 in which the biological function of feeling is not a factor — 
 or else we cannot do so, but must recognise consciousness as 
 a factor, requiring a position to be assigned to it in the scheme 
 of things. Is it a factor or is it not ? If so, when and where 
 did it come in ? At the beginning, or at some subsequent stage 
 of j)hysical development ? 
 
 But what we have more particularly to point out is that in 
 Mr. Spencer's scheme, as thus announced by him, we have the 
 whole treatment of knowledge made dependent upon subjective 
 experiences, without recognising an objectivity independent of 
 us, of which we have but a kind of picture. Yet in his expo- 
 sition the objectivity is treated as antecedent and independent — 
 
 MR, SPENCER'S POSITION AS RE-STATED. 129 
 
 a universe of whose interrelations we are but incidents. In the 
 latter case we must recognise physical factors independent of 
 us ; and if, as Mr. Spencer says, we are unable to do this, but 
 only know force in our own consciousness, and can have no 
 notion of external force, even knowledge itself, and much more 
 its unification, is impossible. 
 
 But if Mr. Spencer means only that our consciousness is cor- 
 relative with the externality in the sense of corresponding with 
 it, and enabling us to recognise it and its changes, he only means 
 that consciousness is consciousness of forces independent of itself, 
 and amongst which it has no place, and its connection with 
 which cannot be understood. All which considerations throw no 
 light upon the unification of knowledge, but rather the reverse, 
 and do not make Mr. Spencer's scheme any more intelligible. 
 
 We now come to the last position, which is the theory that 
 all knowledge can be unified by a statement of the relations of 
 factors, the factors themselves being unknown. Our previous 
 exposition as to the nature of abstractions (Chap. i. § 6 and 
 Chap, il § 2) shows conclusively, we think, that everything 
 is its relations and nothing more — everything is noticing 
 ** in itself " — every entity consists of its properties, and its 
 properties are nothing but relations. Therefore to consider a 
 thing " in itself " is an impossible proceeding. Each factor is 
 a factor in relation to other factors, and its properties are 
 properties in relation to other factors. Each factor is a bundle 
 of relations. It is aU very well to say that it must be some- 
 thing in itself, and that this self must be differentiated in order to 
 produce the differentiated relations ; but it amounts to nothing ; 
 for it is only in the actual intercourse or relations of things 
 that any changes take place, and this is all that we know and all 
 that takes place in the actual physical universe. If Science is 
 ever able to recognise things in themselves, all well and good ; 
 it will not add anything to knowledge ; for even if all things 
 were reduced to two factors, knowledge will refer to the inter- 
 relations of these two factors, for there can be no interrela- 
 tions of one factor. When we come to that position. Science 
 ceases, and only speculation proceeds to dream about self-deter- 
 mination or the instability of the homogeneous. 
 
I30 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 But when Mr. Spencer speaks of unifying knowledge by 
 means of formulas expressing the relations of factors, the factors 
 themselves being unknown or even unknowable, we reply,— If 
 the relations of the factors are known, the factors themselves 
 are known. The interrelations constitute the factors. We seek 
 for Mr. Spencer to state where he formulates these relations 
 and thereby accomplishes the unification of knowledge Does 
 he do so in the Formula of Evolution or does he noti If 
 so, does he mean to say that we can have a conception of 
 concentration and dissipation without having a notion of units 
 of resistance and therefore of extension 1 Or can we have a 
 conception of motion without the same 1 To throw the stress 
 upon integration and dissipation, and ignore the limitations of 
 Matter and Motion, is simply to say that aU changes of every 
 combination are either changes of combination or changes of 
 decombination, which is only a change of words, and to say 
 that the change is from homogeneity to heterogeneity is 
 merely descriptive. The addition that the contained motion 
 undergoes parallel transformation is either descriptive also, 
 or involves a specific definition of motion, which Mr. Spencer 
 
 repudiates. 
 
 The question really is whether Mr. Spencer shall be kept to 
 definite meanings when he speaks of the interrelations of factoi-s, 
 or shall he be allowed sometimes to use them in their definite 
 meanings (which are all that come into our calculations), and 
 sometimes run away from them behind the scenes, letting them 
 come out again in definite shapes when they have to do con- 
 crete work. This brings us to the end of the first stage of Mr. 
 Spencer's reply and to his algebraical illustration of the theory 
 we have just been considering. 
 
 (e.) On the Algebraical Illustration of the Theory that Knowledge 
 can be unified by means of the Formulation of the Relatione 
 of Factors^ the Factors themselves being Unknowii. 
 Mr. Spencer says (p. 578, line 32)— "Matter, Motion, and 
 I Force are but symbols of the Unknown Reality." 
 
 Line 40 — " The interpretation of all phenomena in terms of 
 Matter, Motion, and Force is nothing more than the reduction 
 
 THE ALGEBRAICAL ILLUSTRATION. 
 
 131 
 
 of our complex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols ; and 
 when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms, the 
 symbols remain symbols still." ^ 
 
 The question hence arises, what does Mr. Spencer mean by a 
 symbol? Does he mean a sign which stands for something 
 known, or a sign which stands for something unknown ? Evi- 
 dently the latter, if we may judge from the expression that 
 ** symbols remain symbols still," more particularly as he has just 
 said that " our idea of a unit of matter or atom is regarded 
 by me simply as a symbol which the form of our thought obliges 
 us to use, but which 3 cannot suppose answers to the reality 
 without committing ourselves to alternative impossibilities of 
 thought." What, then, is the use of a symbol if symbols remain 
 symbols still and are not convertible into definite knowledge? and 
 how can actual knowledge be unified by means of symbols which 
 do not answer to anything definite? How can knowledge be 
 unified by means of propositions framed of symbols that are 
 merely symbols, and which, if we attach definite meanings to 
 them, land us in alternative impossibilities of thought ? How. 
 can an ultimate truth be expressed in mere untranslatable sym-/) 
 bols, from which all other truths are deducible as corollaries ? 
 As long as symbols remain symbols, the formula in which they 
 are employed is utterly useless for the unification of knowledge. 
 Mr. Spencer says that his method consists in the reduction of 
 our complex symbols of thought to the simplest, but this 
 process of reduction to simplicity is in reality the illegitimate 
 process of abstraction, followed by the objecti vising of these 
 abstractions. 
 
 Mr. Spencer proceeds to illustrate his position algebraically. 
 He says — 
 
 " I have repeatedly made it clear that our ideas of Matter, 
 Motion, and Force are but the ar, y, and z with which we work 
 our equations, and formulate the various relations among pheno- 
 mena in such way as to express their order in terms of ar, 1/, 
 and 2." 
 
 We fail to see that Mr. Spencer is justified in the use of 
 this illustration, and we have examined his works in order to 
 inquire whether he has anywhere thrown his doctrines into 
 
132 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 THE ALGEBRAICAL ILLUSTRATION. 
 
 133 
 
 proper algebraical form. Of course, wherf a science such as 
 that of mechanics or chemistry can be couched in rigid mathe- 
 matical language, it has attained the highest point of certitude 
 and unification. But we think it must be the opinion of 
 every candid reader that Mr. Spencer has not worked out his 
 scheme by means of equations at all, and we do not know what 
 Mr. Spencer could have been thinking of when he says he has 
 done so. Would he specify where the equations are 1 
 
 We also ask, is it really the fact that Mr. Spencer has treated 
 Matter, Motion, and Force as a:, y, and z1 The " Principles 
 of Biology " is the most important of his works, and in it his 
 factors are the well-known properties of oxygen, hydrogen, 
 nitrogen, carbon, and other elements, as internal factors ; to- 
 gether with incident molecular motion, ethereal motion, &c., 
 as external factors. He advances all these as if his readers 
 would be able to assign to them all definite values, and as 
 if they would understand him when he spoke about them. 
 He did not tell us that they were only symbols standing for 
 something we did not know, and that at the end we knew 
 as little about them as at the beginning — that the symbols 
 were but symbols stilL Of course, if Mr. Spencer means 
 that we do not know what oxygen is "in itself," and that 
 we can only speak of its relations with the relations of other 
 unknowable things "in themselves," we quite understand that, 
 and are quite aware that we have to deal with the relations or pro- 
 perties of the factors alone. We perfectly apprehended the nature 
 of the calculation, but found ourselves unable to arrive at Mr. 
 Spencer's results. It seems quite beside the question and out- 
 side this calculation altogether to speak of x, y, and z as having 
 anything to do with it, either as representing the specific differ- 
 entiations of oxygen, nitrogen, &c., "in themselves," or as repre- 
 senting the differentiations of some shadowy abstractions of 
 absolute Matter, Motion, or Force. We really do not see that 
 they had anything to do with it. Most certainly if they had, 
 the calculation was vitiated for us. It is absolutely impossible 
 for us to draw out the resultants of a mixed quantity of known 
 and of unknowable factors. If we have known factors plus an 
 unknowable reality, we cannot do our work. Then as to equa- 
 
 tions in anything like algebraical form, there are none of them 
 in the " Biology." Mr. Spencer is under a delusion when he 
 thinks he has been working equations. 
 
 As to Inorganic Evolution, surely we ought to be able to 
 express the process of equilibration — by which the union of 
 oxygen and hydrogen (forming water) is effected — in terms of 
 X, y, and z ; and similarly with some of the other processes of the 
 biological factors ; so that we might mount up gradually to the 
 equation of a moving equilibrium, and afterwards of a depen- 
 dent moving equilibrium. Such a task would be difi&cult, no 
 doubt, but possibly some future philosopher might be able to 
 furnish us with equations of the manner in which the adjust- 
 ments of direct and indirect equilibration of dependent moving 
 equilibria are effected, and explain by means of an algebraical 
 formula the law of the redistribution and redirection of the in- 
 terior forces of an organism in antagonism to incident forces 
 which would otherwise destroy it. And might we not, indeed, 
 look for an algebraical explanation of genesis and reproduc- 
 tion, and of the need for the continuance of species'? In 
 the meantime, we venture to submit that although Mr. Spencer 
 may think he has given us equations, he really has not done 
 
 so. 
 
 Mr. Spencer seems to say that the unification of knowledge 
 is effected if we can " formulate the various relations of pheno- 
 mena in such way as to express their order in terms of a;, y, 
 and z" although the realities for which x, y, and z stand cannot 
 be conceived by us. 
 
 We know the properties (ie., the mutual relations) of the 
 chemical elements, and we know the laws of physics. The 
 problem is first to classify them, to ascertain their most general 
 relations, and then to express their order. When we express 
 their order, we must do so in those general terms which are 
 commensurate with the facts to be expressed. If we symbolise 
 them by means of names, these names are symbols of those 
 most general relations, and have definite values. Each term 
 implies an appreciable differentiation of meaning. We do not 
 say that much can be effected in this way— probably not; for 
 we do not believe in the possibility of the unification of know- 
 
 r 
 
134 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 ledga But evidently, if it is to be done at all, it is to be done 
 in this way. 
 
 Mr. Spencer says, make the terms indefinite — make them 
 symbols which do not mean anything so definite as to em- 
 barrass you when you are required to bring them into actual 
 application with the phenomena you wish to unify. Do not 
 allow them to be retranslatable, but let them remain symbols 
 stilL But is anything accomplished? An obvious criticism 
 would be that unless x, y^ and z have definite meanings attached 
 to them, there is no difi'erentiation which justifies them — what 
 then is the cause of their being distinguished at all? Why 
 'should there not be two only? or why, on the other hand, 
 should there not be ten or twenty ? Evidently they have been 
 arrived at by a process of analysis, generalising, and distinguish- 
 ment of difiference ; and in order to justify us in distinguishing 
 X from ?/, and both from z, they must have had previous 
 histories and some differentiation of meaning. Nay, what is 
 more, this meaning and this value must be strictly dependent 
 upon such previous history. We cannot use experience to 
 mount as by a ladder to abstractions, and then, despising the 
 foundations, allow abstractions from their high position to lord 
 it over obedient concretes. Therefore we utterly dispute the 
 truth of Mr. Spencer's dictum that x, y, and z can be used with- 
 out definite meanings, and that the order of phenomena can 
 then be expressed by their means. 
 f ^ Such a method is a parody upon algebra. It would seem 
 that although reasoning by means of symbols, as in algebra, is 
 very abstract, still it is reliable and useful when its empty forms 
 are filled in with concrete things. It starts from the concrete, 
 it symbolises concretes, it reasons about them, it comes to 
 conclusions about them, it retranslates itself into the concrete, 
 and the result can be tested by practical application. Reason- 
 ing like this is only a leap into the air of abstraction. It 
 starts from actual facts and it ends in concrete knowledge. 
 Symbols are signs that stand for something — symbols that 
 do not symbolise lose their functions. To say that we can 
 reason about the relations of symbols, while the symbols them- 
 selves do not mean anything definite, is most unphilosophicaL 
 
 THE ALGEBRAICAL ILLUSTRATION. 
 
 135 
 
 Relation implies knowledge ; we cannot say anything about 
 the relations of symbols without knowing something about 
 the things symbolised, namely, their relations or properties 
 by which they are distinguished from one another and by 
 which they are related to one another; in fact, that is all 
 ,we know about them. If we can generalise these relations in 
 such a way as to be able to express them all in a general 
 formula, that is well: the problem is how to do it. Even 
 then our result will only be a general description, and will not 
 be the unification of knowledge, which requires all phenomena 
 to be deduced as corollaries from an ultimate truth correspond- 
 ing to processes resultant from the properties of primordial 
 factors. 
 
 And after all, the argument comes to the same thing, whether 
 we use the terms a;, t/, and z, as Mr. Spencer proposes, or 
 the terms Matter, Motion, and Force. If the latter mean no 
 more than the former, they are mere symbols, although they 
 are more to look at, and their employment seems to give more 
 satisfaction to the mind of the reader than would the actual 
 replacement of them in the text by the symbols x, y, and z. 
 
 If the unification of knowledge is effectible by means of the 
 relations of x, y, and z, we naturally ask what these relations 
 are. We should have a list of them. Is it, for instance, a rela- 
 tion of X that it manifests resistance ? If so, what is it in rela- 
 tion with when it manifests resistance ? Some other x ? X then 
 is in relation to x in manifesting resistance. Is x in relation 
 to a: in mutual attraction also? Has it also the relation of 
 extension? Is x related to x in respect of polarity? Are 
 there varieties of these relationships consequent upon diversities 
 and correspondences of Resistance, Attraction, Extension, and 
 Polarity ? We suppose we are not going beyond the terms of 
 the hypothesis in taking these to be the relationships of x. 
 
 Then as to the relationships of y. Has y any relationships 
 in respect of other ?/'s? Has it any relationship to x'i or, 
 again, is it only a manifestation of ic? Or still again, is it 
 a result of the relationship of ic's consequent on the Attrac- 
 tions, Resistances, Extensions, and Polarities of ar's ? And 
 again, can we speak of x's in the plural at all, implying a 
 
136 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 difTerentiation of x^s ? Yet how can we deal with it in the 
 singular ? 
 
 According to the Formula of Evolution, the approach to- 
 gether of some x's implies the retrocession of some other ar's, 
 80 that the measurements apart of all ;r's in their totality is 
 constant. This means that y is constant — so much y one way, 
 so much y another way. But note how difficult it is to speak 
 of y without having one eye on Motion, so as to speak of it in 
 an intelligible manner. It does not seem possible to speak of 
 the integration of x and the dissipation of y without bring- 
 ing in the notions of Resistances, Attractions, Extension, 
 Polarity, and consequent Motion. Does Mr. Spencer allow 
 these terms to come into account in his hypothesis that all 
 knowledge is to be unified in terms of the relations of x, y, 
 and zl If not, then he should show us how it is to be alge- 
 braically worked out. But if so, then we submit that we did 
 not trespass beyond these in our fonner criticism, which his 
 reply does not in the least respect touch. 
 
 The matter is still more complicated if we go beyond this 
 and speak of the relations of z to x + y. Can Mr. Spencer 
 express the relations of z to x + y in terms of any of them ? Is 
 z = x-^ y'\ Is it ever z by itself ? Is z = x + y + something else ? 
 Is it z singular or z's plural ? What are the special relations 
 of z to Xy or of z to y ? Can Mr. Spencer tell us what are the 
 relations of z to the special relations of x called Attraction, 
 Resistance, Extension, and Polarity ? 
 
 Then, again, is there any other factor beyond the end of 
 the alphabet altogether, say << ? and how is that related to 
 Xj y, and z ? 
 
 To us it seems illogical to speak of the relations of terms 
 having no meaning. We think it is due that some pains 
 should be taken to explain the unification of knowledge when 
 some or all of the so-called factors are merely symbols, having 
 no definite meaning. 
 
 It appears, then, that if we change the terms Matter, Motion, 
 and Force into a*, y, and z, it does not make the least difference 
 either in Mr. Spencer's reasoning or in our criticism. The 
 actual conceptions involved remain the same, and whether we 
 
 THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY, 
 
 137 
 
 speak of Matter, Motion, and Force, or of x, y, and z, the 
 argument remains the same. In either case we are actually 
 dealing with Attractions, Resistances, Extensions, Polarities, 
 and Motions, of specific chemical elements, and their inter- 
 relations. It is impossible, if we are to make anything of our 
 doctrine at all, to treat it otherwise than as having definite 
 factors. We cannot deal with concrete changes except from 
 the properties of concrete factors. 
 
 At the same time there still remains the question whether 
 by either of these sets of terms Mr. Spencer could treat each 
 mode of manifestation as pre-existing or co-existing. But these 
 notions seem to be so very abstract as not only to transcend 
 actual experience, but also the power of " scientific imagination." 
 One might perhaps imagine ultimate units having equal pro- 
 perties. Attraction, Resistance, Extension, Polarity, and Motion, 
 but it is difficult to see of what use such a supposition would 
 be ; and it would be impossible to suppose Matter and Motion 
 as independent and unrelated factors. 
 
 On the other hand, are we to consider these Attractions, 
 Resistances, Extensions, Polarities, and Motions as combined 
 into bundles indecomposable, as we know them in the seventy 
 or eighty so-called elements, so that what we have to deal 
 with would be not a;, y, and z in the abstract and impossible 
 manner of Mr. Spencer, but so many diverse bundles of «, y, 
 and z1 
 
 § 3. The Double-Aspect Theory. 
 
 The only other method of escape from the effect of our 
 criticism is by means of what is known as the Double- Aspect 
 Theory. Mr. Spencer maintains that his theory is neither mate- 
 rialistic nor spiritualistic. The school of thought to which he 
 belongs holds that all knowledge has two aspects. All events 
 are both objective and subjective, and are stateable in two 
 different ways, in two different sets of terms, according as the 
 fact or event is regarded. In a great many cases the sub- 
 jective language is used when the main interest is in regard 
 to its subjective importance. In other cases objective terms 
 are employed because the main import is in regard to physical 
 
138 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 interrelations. But as a matter of fact, any event may be 
 described in language drawn from either department. It will 
 be our duty later on to discuss this theory in detail. At pre- 
 sent it is sufficient for our purpose to ascertain how it affects 
 the unification of knowledge upon the lines we have been 
 pursuing. 
 
 The criterion of accomplishment which we have kept steadily 
 in view throughout all our studies is that passage from Mr. 
 Spencer's Summary of " First Principles," which will be found 
 quoted in extenso at page 9 of this work. Therein the task 
 propounded was the formulation of the whole series of changes 
 passed through by every existence, both anterior and subsequent 
 to their having concrete forms, and in their passage from the 
 imperceptible state to the perceptible state. Presumably this 
 task is identical with that by which we look for the philosophic 
 imification in the formulation of one primordial truth or fact 
 from which cosmical histories can be deduced by a series of 
 corollaries. It is no doubt identical also with the statement 
 that the unification of knowledge is effected in the recognition 
 of these histories as one process, being resultants of the rela- 
 tions of primordial factors. 
 
 How then does the theory of the Double Aspect assist in the 
 solution of the cosmical problem, and how are Mr. Spencer's 
 detailed explanations of developmental histories facilitated by 
 its aid 1 
 
 We recall the account given in Appendix to vol. L of the 
 "Biology" of the development of organic molecules from inor- 
 ganic, and we recall the history of biological evolution which 
 takes up the study of the process from that point. In this latter 
 we recollect that all morphological and functional developments 
 were accounted for as due firstly to the nature and peculiarities 
 of the chemical compounds in relation with a certain physical 
 environment, and afterwards to the polarities and equilibrations 
 of physiological units and masses. 
 
 These explanations are all effected in purely objective terms. 
 Feeling, or the subjective, is excluded as not having anything to 
 do with the organised result. If the explanation were good and 
 sufficient (which it is not), then that explanation which Mr. 
 
 THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY, 
 
 139 
 
 Spencer deems sufficient would be accomplished in the objective 
 aspect purely. Let us see how (feeling being excluded as a factor) 
 the explanation is assisted by an attempt to give the objective 
 terms used in the explanation a subjective aspect also. Take, 
 to begin with, the building-up process by which crystallisation is 
 effected. This natural process is ascribed to the mutual attrac- 
 tions and repulsions of atoms or molecules, which, having 
 special sizes and shapes, produce when thus ranged together 
 definite structural forms of aggregation. What is the subjec- 
 tive aspect of the process? The subjective aspect of this inde- 
 pendent natural event is simply the mode in which it affects us, 
 and which we have to take into account in our description of 
 the observed combinations, but it is not at all an element in 
 the actual changes which have taken place. The subjective is 
 of course present in all statements of knowledge. Knowledge 
 implies both the subjective and the objective, and therefore all 
 knowledge may be supposed to have a double aspect, namely, 
 the aspect of how the objective affects the subjective, as, for 
 instance, the manner in which ethereal undulations jj^jj of an 
 inch affect the consciousness; and an objective aspect, for in- 
 stance, the independent relations of the chemical elements and 
 their changes amongst themselves. But when we come to in- 
 troducing the subjective aspect into such objective explanations, 
 we can only mean one of two things — firstly, either that the 
 subjective is a factor in the combinations, a theory which could 
 not be maintained ; or, secondly, that in order to understand 
 explanations in objective processes we must have some common 
 element in the objective and the subjective, some simple stan- 
 dard of knowledge common to botL This would be found, as 
 Mr. Spencer partly suggests, in the objective fact and the sub- 
 jective impression of resistance, and in the objective fact and 
 the subjective impression of attraction (weight). Here, truly, we 
 have a double aspect of fundamental terms, but even thus the 
 series of events is determined by the objective, and the sub- 
 jective aspect merely follows. The cosmical explanation as 
 given by Mr. Spencer in physical terms is full and complete in 
 itself ; it is double-aspected because the knowledge of it by the 
 subjective adds to it the feelings of the subjective. Hence all 
 
I40 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 knowledge has a double aspect. But the series of sequences 
 which make up the cosmical history, as given by Mr. Spencer, 
 is independent of the subjective. 
 
 From this it may be asserted, that since all knowledge im- 
 plies the subjective, there can be no unification of knowledge 
 without the subjective. Be it so. Is there any unification of 
 knowledge with it ? Suppose that the fundamental knowledge 
 of attraction and resistance is true knowledge, and that the 
 subjective is implied in all the objective processes described by 
 Mr. Spencer in objective language as resultants from these 
 fundamental conceptions which have the double aspect. Sup- 
 pose, even, that we add to them the conception of Force, which 
 is a term capable of a double aspect, and try to effect our ex- 
 planations by means of Attractive Force and Resistive Force. 
 Still, in working out the cosmical history, including biological 
 evolution, we should have to follow Mr. Spencer, and never stray 
 beyond the bounds of the objective aspect. The whole series of 
 determining causes would be found to be in the objective aspect 
 of the problem. The explanations would be effected in the lan- 
 guage of Attraction and Repulsion and their derivatives, size, 
 shape, distance, approach, retrocession, aggregation, disintegra- 
 tion, polarity, equilibration, &a Although essential to the 
 knowledge of these processes, still by no means could we intro- 
 duce the subjective as a factor, even if it is included in our 
 appreciation of the original factors. Kor can we even introduce 
 it as an accompaniment until most unaccountably it introduces 
 itself gradually into the objective processes, some will think 
 as a factor, although Mr. Spencer repudiates it. This growth of 
 self-consciousness amongst factors which we only recognised as 
 unconscious is most unaccountable, and is a difficulty not to 
 be got over by mere nomenclature. Surely there was no double 
 aspect anterior to organised living beings ? Whence then came 
 the double aspect ? Knowledge is not to be unified until this 
 explanation can be given. 
 
 As the unification of knowledge is only to be accomplished 
 in the formulation of a syllogism which is to explain every 
 differentiation, every structure, every organism, and which shall 
 be the key to loDg and intricate series of sequences, including 
 
 THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 
 
 141 
 
 the origin and development of organised consciousness, as 
 resultants from the relations of some simple factors, then that 
 original simple state of things from which all these compli- 
 cated results ensued must be expressible in terms which specify 
 the relations of the two aspects ; and if the original relations 
 and the subsequent developments are expressed and worked 
 out in terms of one only of these aspects, then such an expo- 
 sition is imperfect as a representation of the actual course 
 of things and fails of being a complete and true picture of the 
 history of the cosmos. 
 
 This is what Mr. Spencer has done ; he has worked out his 
 scheme by means of one aspect only, by means of the objective 
 set of terms only. And when he has done that, it is not fair 
 to say, *' After all, things have a double aspect, and this ex- 
 planation is not complete if you take the terms in the limited 
 meanings of materialistic and mechanical interpretations," 
 when all the while he has so employed them apparently to his 
 own full satisfaction, without at the same time making a 
 completion of his work by specifying the relationship between 
 the two aspects which would accomplish it If he cannot 
 do this he must abandon as impossible the claim of unifying 
 
 knowledge. 
 
 If all knowledge has a double aspect, then knowledge cannot 
 be unified until the relation of the two aspects is understood ; 
 until we know the value of the terms we use in both aspects ; 
 and until the whole series of cosmical events is capable of 
 being formulated in two corresponding sets of terms parallel 
 and without break of continuity nor interchangeableness. To 
 employ one set of terms to commence with, and another set of 
 terms to end with in a history of cosmical evolution, is not 
 a conformity with the requisite conditions. To begin with 
 oxygen, hydrogen, and a cooling nebula, and to end with 
 emotions and thoughts, is not a concomitant " double aspect,' 
 but a revolutioiL We do not get at the sequences of events as 
 "resultants" of the original state, but find ourselves turned 
 round and occupying a different position altogether from the 
 deductive intentions with which we started. 
 
 This kind of Double- Aspect Theory is a looking at a series of 
 
142 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 sequences from two ends. We mentally stand at the begin- 
 ning of things, looking down the long vista of physical change, 
 and again we stand in this modern age — an ego — looking back 
 through the ages. We recognise from each point of view long 
 lines of sequences merging into each other in the misty mid 
 distance, but there they intermingle, and the nature of their 
 connection we cannot discern. 
 
 The Double-Aspect Theory is of no use for the comprehension 
 of cosmical history. It is at best but another method of 
 stating the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge. There is 
 no knowledge without a knower, and no knowledge of the 
 objective but as the knower is capable of knowing it. But if 
 fundamental knowledge is the impression of resistance and 
 attraction, and fundamental objective facts are resistances and 
 attractions, the objective can be known as it is. Here the 
 Double-Aspect Theory is a key to knowledge by the subjective 
 of the objective, but it is merely a key to the sequences of the 
 objective; it does not aid us in accounting for consciousness 
 making its appearance in the series of physical events, nor does 
 it assist us in the failure of the physical explanations of biology. 
 
 The most plausible ground on which this theory is main- 
 tained is in the fact of the concomitance of feeling with some 
 of the processes and actions of the physical organisms of living 
 creatures. It is a favourite method of representing it to say — 
 Here we have a certain nervous change in the optic nerve, and 
 a concomitant feeling of yellow. This is not two events, but 
 one event, and we speak of it in either mode according to the 
 point of view from which we regard it. It is one fact with a 
 double aspect. On this we would observe, that, in regard to the 
 unification of knowledge, it is all quite beside the mark. We 
 are engaged in investigating a series of consequences ; at one 
 time there was no double aspect — now there is. Whence came 
 the double aspect 1 It may be quite true now that physiologi- 
 cal phenomena have double aspects, but this does not afford an 
 answer to the question of origin, and the advancement of it 
 does not assist in the solution of the problem of the unification 
 of knowledge as propounded by Mr. Spencer in the passage 
 quoted. Unless, indeed, the unification of knowledge is aban- 
 
 UNANSWERED CRITICISM, 
 
 143 
 
 r 
 
 doned in this view of it, and is sought to be effected by those 
 other separate and independent sets of methods treated of in 
 our criticism of Mr. Spencer's psychological methods. But these 
 we have seen to be of no value or interest, as not being of a 
 kind to give us insight into the sequences of the universe. 
 
 § 4. Criticism to which Mr. Spencer has not Replied, 
 
 It is desirable to call attention to some of the detailed criti- 
 cism of our former work to which Mr. Spencer has not replied, 
 but which he holds has been answered by implication in his 
 general reply. This general reply is to the effect that if we had 
 correctly understood his terms Matter, Motion, and Force as 
 merely symbols, and borne in mind his position, that by attach- 
 ing definite notions to them any argument founded thereupon 
 landed us in contradictions of thought, then we could not have 
 written the book at alL Our work, however, would seem to 
 enforce Mr. Spencer's dictum and to exhibit the truth of his 
 remarks. And indeed his own great works do but bear out 
 the truth of the same proposition, for whenever Mr. Spencer 
 attaches any definite meanings to his terms, although we may 
 proceed safely for some distance, yet in the end we are landed 
 in alternative impossibilities of thought In our criticism we 
 did but illustrate the truth of Mr. Spencer's views against him- 
 self, and his own work is but a vindication of the mysticism or 
 scepticism — which is it? to which he gives expression in his 
 reply to criticism. 
 
 Let us ask in detail what efficacy there is in this vague 
 reply to our definite charges of want of logical continuity of 
 exposition in the omission from the Formula of Evolution of 
 one of the three factors proposed at the outset as essential to its 
 formulation? What answer is it to the charge of inapplica- 
 bility of the formula to the differentiations of feelings, to the 
 integrations of society, language, aesthetics, and superorganic 
 evolution generally, in respect of the universality of the con- 
 comitance of integration of matter and dissipation of motion ? 
 What reply does it afford to the criticism as to the Instability 
 of the Homogeneous ? How does it help to explain the passage 
 of the inorganic to the organic which we found impossible ? 
 
144 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OP KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 ( 145 ) 
 
 l! 
 
 M 
 
 § 5. Summary. 
 Our previous criticism of Mr. Spencer's work was to the 
 effect that he could not escape choosing between two alter- 
 natives, namely — 
 
 Definiteness with Insufficiency, or 
 Indefiniteness with Incomprehensibility ; 
 
 in either of which cases the unification of knowledge is not 
 effected ; for this unification requires that the whole operation 
 should be within the sphere of the known and knowable, other- 
 wise it is beyond the bounds of science, and is not knowledge 
 at all. The partial unifications of knowledge which constitute 
 the sciences are definite and comprehensible, so much so as to 
 give us the power of prevision. Philosophy at the outset of 
 our studies was set forth as merely the extension of this kind 
 of knowledge, and therefore should be, although more general, 
 yet just as definite, comprehensible, and precise, conferring the 
 same power of prevision, which is the same thing as the calcula- 
 tion of sequences from known factors. This is the same thing 
 also as the deduction of corollaries from ultimate truths. 
 
 Mr. Spencer's reply amounts to this, that he does not accept 
 the alternative of Definiteness with Insufficiency, but that he 
 accepts the alternative of Indefiniteness with Incomprehensi- 
 bility. We therefore deny that he has effected the unification 
 of knowledge. It is for the student to judge for himself. 
 
 It is true Mr. Spencer may maintain that he holds a clear 
 and definite theory. But we believe that he has failed to make 
 himself generally understood in regard to his main point as to 
 the unification of knowledge ; and if so, then it is his duty to 
 set himself right with the thinking world, as otherwise he has 
 failed in the main object he has in view in writing at all, 
 namely, to get people to understand and intelligently accept his 
 doctrines. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS. 
 
 § I. TJie Continuity of Motion. 
 
 We have seen in our endeavour to understand Force that we 
 have been obliged to recognise it as manifesting itself in two 
 ways, and two ways only, namely, the way in which it presses 
 and the way in which it resists, otherwise stated as attraction 
 and repulsion. 
 
 This view meets with a singular confirmation in " First Prin- 
 ciples," p. 514, where Mr. Spencer says — 
 
 " We have seen (§74) that phenomena are interpre table only 
 as the results of universally coexistent forces of attraction and 
 repulsion. These universally coexistent forces of attraction 
 and repulsion are, indeed, the complementary aspects of that 
 absolutely persistent force which is the ultimate datum of 
 consciousness. . . . And from this necessary correlation results 
 our inability, before pointed out, of interpreting any phenomena, 
 save in terms of those correlations." 
 
 We now wish to compare several statements of Mr. Spencer's 
 with the results thus arrived at, and more particularly his theory 
 of the " Continuity of Motion." 
 
 This theory is explained in chap. v. of " First Principles," 
 p. 180 : — 
 
 "The Continuity of Motion, like the Indestructibility ol 
 Matter, is clearly a proposition on the truth of which depends the 
 possibility of exact science, and therefore of a Philosophy which 
 unifies the results of exact Science. Motions of masses and of 
 molecules, exhibited by bodies both organic and inorganic, form 
 the larger half of the phenomena to be interpreted ; and if 
 such motions might either proceed from nothing or lapse into 
 
146 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 nothing, there would be an end to scientific interpretation of 
 them. Each constituent change might as well as not be sup- 
 posed to begin and end of itself." 
 
 Page 182—" Whether that absolute reality which produces in 
 us the consciousness we call Motion, be or be not an eternal 
 mode of the Unknowable, it is impossible for us to say ; but 
 that the relative reality which we call Motion never can come 
 I into existence, or cease to exist, is a truth involved in the very 
 nature of our consciousness. To think of Motion as either being 
 created or annihilated— to think of nothing becoming something, 
 or something becoming nothing — is to establish in consciousness 
 a relation between two terms, of which one is absent from 
 consciousness, which is impossible. The very nature of in- 
 telligence, negatives the supposition that Motion can be conceived 
 \(much less known) to either commence or cease." 
 
 We will compare these statements with " Lessons in Elemen- 
 tary Mechanics," by Magnus, afterwards with Mr. Spencer's 
 chapter on " Equilibration," and finally with Professor Balfour 
 Stewart's "Conservation of Energy." 
 
 Magnus divides his treatise into three parts — ist. Kinematics 
 or Motion ; 2d, Dynamics or Eorce ; 3d, Statics or Rest. 
 
 We find (p. 6)— 
 
 " We thus see that bodies themselves and their molecules are 
 constantly in motion or tending to move ; that absolute rest no- 
 where exists ; and that what we call rest, which is really rest 
 relatively to us, can be analysed into counteracted tendencies 
 
 to motion." 
 
 It will be convenient for us to commence with the second 
 part, and consider the nature of Dynamics, or the science which 
 deals with the cause of motion— that is to say, Force. 
 
 Parre 61 — "The principal properties of matter, with which 
 we are concerned, are, that it moves and offers resistance to the 
 motion of other bodies. Kow, force is the name given to the 
 unknown causes of all the various phenomena which matter 
 exhibits : and as all these phenomena are accompanied by 
 motion or the tendency to motion, we shall understand by force 
 whatever produces or tends to produce motion or change of motion^ 
 . We shall find it convenient and desirable to consider force 
 
 THE CONTINUITY OF MOTION DISPUTED. 147 
 
 as the cause of motion, and wherever we find motion or change 
 of motion we shall assume the existence of force." 
 
 It would appear from this that Force is the tendency to move 
 (t.e.f Attraction). Motion is the result of that tendency when 
 not opposed. It would also appear that the tendency or Force 
 does not result in Motion when counteracted by other tendencies 
 or Forces, and that the relation of equilibrium between the 
 tendency or Force and the opposing Force is a state of rest or 
 equilibrium. A study of Mechanics would also show that there 
 are cases of the pure acceleration and retardation of Motion, thus 
 proving the variability of the quantity of Motion. 
 ■ Mr. Spencer says it is impossible for us to say that " motion 
 can ever come into existence or cease to exist." " To think 
 of Motion as either being created or annihilated — to think of 
 nothing becoming something, or something becoming nothing . . . 
 is impossible." But surely this is an erroneous way of putting 
 the case, for Motion is not a thing at all. It is not an existence 
 — that is to say, it is not a mode of Force. It is neither a force 
 of attraction, nor a force of repulsion, — the only two modes of 
 Force known to us — but simply one of the results of the inter- 
 action of these modes of Force, the modes of Force themselves 
 remaining quantitatively the same whether resulting in actual 
 motion or not. Thus when a motion begins it does not come 
 into existence or get created, and when it ceases it does not go 
 out of existence or become annihilated. The fact is simply 
 this : that quantums of attractive or repulsive forces become 
 related to each other in a different manner — i.e., the manner 
 of rest or equilibrium — instead of the manner of motion. 
 
 ^lagnus clearly recognises this fact of the commencement and 
 the ending of motion. (See pp. 2 and 3.) The picture on the 
 wall tends to fall, and 
 
 " Let a window or fireplace be opened, let the air be freed in 
 some direction from restraint, and it will at once obey its ten- 
 dency and f)€gin to move. . . . All that observation teaches us 
 is that bodies tend to move." 
 
 It is singular that Mr. Spencer takes all his instances in proof 
 of the continuity of Motion from cases of the retardation of 
 Motion. Bodies in motion come to rest not so much in con- 
 
148 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 sequence of the attraction of the earth or counteracting forces, as 
 in consequence of the resistance of the atmosphere, of friction, 
 and of actual contact with other bodies, which all cause so many 
 subtractions from the motion of the moving body until none is 
 left, so that finally aU the motion in the moving body is trans- 
 ferred to other bodies. Even amongst cases of the retardation 
 of motion, the most simple case of a body projected upward is 
 not taken notice of, but only the more complicated and obscure 
 instances are adduced, in which the influence of gravitation is 
 smaU and obscure, and the influences of resistance and fnction 
 
 are conspicuous. 
 
 Cases of acceleration of motion are not even alluded to. The 
 case of the acceleration in motion oLa falling body is not men- 
 tioned, nor is it easy to see how the doctrine of constant quantums 
 of motion could be maintained if these accumulated accelerations 
 were taken into account, without any means of predicating a cor- 
 responding decrement of motions elsewhere, which indeed in the 
 case of a rock falling from a state of rest on a precipice cannot 
 
 be discerned. 
 
 If we consider the case of a body projected upwards— say a 
 cannon-ball— we find that it imparts some of its motion to the 
 air, and finally it comes to a state of rest, having expended all 
 its motion : and yet in its immediate descent it imparts just as 
 much motion as before to the atmosphere, and finally on its 
 impact with the ground originates a certain amount of heat 
 therein as weU as in itself. The motion imparted to the air in 
 its ascent, according to Mr. Spencer's theory, is continuous for 
 ever, and is not received back again by the cannon-ball in 
 the course of its descent, but instead thereof it imparts another 
 modicum of motion to the air, which motion also continues for 
 ever. And it must be borne in mind that we are now discussing 
 not the constancy of the quantity of force, but of actual motion. 
 It will be worth our while again to consider the case of an ex 
 plosion of gunpowder or dynamite. Here there is no evidence of 
 avast amount of motion actually going on unseen in the solid parti- 
 cles of the substance. The substances are as quiescent as sugar or 
 salt Their ignition causes a vast amount of motion. Yet the 
 inference that a corresponding amount of motion was actually 
 
 THE CONTINUITY OF MOTION DISPUTED. 
 
 149 
 
 in existence in the molecules of gunpowder or dynamite is not 
 justifiable. Here is a commencement of motion, an enormous 
 increment of motion consequent upon the small amount of motion 
 used in the ignition of the substance. 
 
 The theory of "Continuity of Motion" implies that motion 
 is always and necessarily caused or produced by an equivalent 
 antecedent motion transferred from one body to another, and not 
 by a Force. 
 
 It will be noted that in this argument we do not take account 
 of the quantum of force or energy, which remains the same, but 
 question merely the quantum of actual motion. And the difficulty 
 is not disposed of by Mr. Spencer's device of "locked-up motion." 
 Motion is not intermittent. It must be continuous. It is this 
 continuity that is the point of the discussion. If Motion is 
 locked up, it means that it is intermitted ; it is not going on — 
 it is not Motion. The locking up of Motion is a denial of the 
 continuity of Motion. ^lotion stops and begins again. Motion, 
 therefore, is not continuous. In various parts of Mr. Spencer's 
 works occur references to " locked-up motion," as in coal and 
 nitrogenous compounds. Is motion " locked up " in a stone 
 upon the edge of a precipice ? 
 
 Having now considered the case of the beginnings and end- 
 ings of motions, and the consequent increments and decre- 
 ments of the sum-total of motion, let us next view the matter 
 from the point of view of Statics, Rest, and Equilibrium, as 
 set out by Magnus and by Mr. Spencer himself. We begin by 
 quoting Magnus (p. 167) : — 
 
 " Problem of Statics. — The problem of Statics is to deter- 
 mine the conditions under which several forces acting on a body 
 produce equilibrium." 
 
 Page 168. — " Forces in Statics are supposed to be prevented 
 by some kind of resistance from producing motion." 
 
 *' If two forces act upon a body, it is clear that, in order that 
 they should produce no efi"ect, they must act (i) at the same 
 point ; (2) in opposite directions ; and (3) they must be equal in 
 magnitude." 
 
 Page 169. — " When the forces produce equilibrium, their joint 
 effect equals zero, or the resultant vanishes." 
 
I50 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 " If any number of forces acting at a point be in equilibrium, 
 and one of them be removed, the resultant of all the rest is 
 equal in magnitude, but opposite in direction to the removed 
 force ; for, since the forces were originally in equilibrium, the 
 removal of one force must destroy the equilibrium, since all the 
 other forces served to counteract the effect of this one." 
 
 This view of equilibrium is recognised by Mr. Spencer in his 
 chapter (First Principles, chap, xxii.) on Equilibration. 
 / Page 484.— "In all cases there is a progress towards equilibra- 
 tion. That universal co-existence of antagonist forces which, 
 as we before saw, necessitates the universality of rhythm, and 
 which, as we before saw, necessitates the decomposition of 
 every force into divergent forces ... at the same time necessi- 
 tates the ultimate establishment of a balance. Every motion 
 being motion under resistance is continually suffering deduc- 
 tions, and these unceasing deductions finally result in the cessa- 
 tion of the motion." 
 
 As usual, this conclusion, according to Mr. Spencer, is de- 
 ducible from the Persistence of Force. 
 
 Page 515.—*' But the forces of attraction and repulsion being 
 universally co-existent, it follows, as before shown, that all 
 motion is motion under resistance. . . . This being the condi- 
 tion under which all motion occurs, two corollaries result. The 
 first is, that the deductions perpetually made by the commu- 
 nication of motion to the resisting medium, cannot hut bring 
 the motion of the body to an end in a longer or shorter time. 
 The second is, that the motion of the body cannot cease until 
 these deductions destroy it. In other words, movement must 
 continue till equilibration takes place ; and equilibration must 
 eventually take place. Both these are manifest deductions from 
 the persistence of force. . . . Hence this primordial truth is our 
 immediate warrant for the conclusions, that the changes which 
 Evolution presents cannot end until equilibrium is reached ; and 
 that equilibrium must at last be reached." 
 
 This passage is open to two or three interpretations. Firstly, 
 it may mean that all forces eventually counteract each other, 
 and all motions cease, which seems a reasonable proposition. 
 In this case, the theory of the Continuity of Motion comes 
 
 THE CONTINUITY OF MOTION DISPUTED. 151 
 
 to an abrupt end. Secondly, it may mean that " the changes 
 which evolution* presents" must finally result in an equilibrium. 
 In this case it would be equivalent to saying that all matter 
 will have been integrated and all motion dissipated, and that 
 there can be no more changes. This is the ultimate equilibri- 
 um. But this statement is utterly incomprehensible. Such an 
 utter separation of matter and motion is impossible to conceive. 
 Thirdly, it may mean that we arrive ultimately at an equilibrium 
 mobile — an universal alternation of motion — a dissolution of the 
 cosmos into its ultimate units, having equal alternate motions : 
 either that or no motion at all ; for if there be an universal 
 counteraction of forces there will be an universal quiescence. 
 
 But even if there is not the assertion of such an universal 
 quiescence, there is in Mr. Spencer's statement an acknowledg- 
 ment of the fact of the combination of forces resulting in 
 absence of motion. He recognises the state of rest described 
 by Magnus, and this recognition of a state of rest is an admission 
 of the possibility that forces tending to motion may not effect 
 that result on account of the counteracting tendency of other 
 forces. The theory of a statical equilibrium is inconsistent 
 with the theory of the Continuity of Motion. 
 
 We argue, therefore, that whether we consider the matter 
 from the point of view of the beginnings and endings of motion, 
 causing occasional increments and decrements of motion, or 
 whether we consider it in relation to the theory of equilibrium, 
 we find the theory of the Continuity of Motion to be unten- 
 able. We also find that it is not a deduction from the Per- 
 sistence of Force, since different manifestations of force can 
 counteract each other. And we do not find it justified nega- 
 tively from the suggested difficulty as to the creation or anni- 
 hilation of motion. 
 
 This view of the case is corroborated by a reference to Professor 
 Balfour Stewart's ** Conservation of Energy." Throughout this 
 book a broad distinction is recognised between energy in 
 actual motion and energy in a state of rest, or potentiality, 
 or equilibrium. There is energy of actual motion and energy 
 of position. These are capable of change, the one into the 
 
 • Considered in its rigid definitions as per formula. 
 
i;2 
 
 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 other. The sum-total of energy remains constant. The sum-total 
 of energy of position is not constant, nor is the sum-total of the 
 energy of actual motion. For this see § 34 at p. 23 on the Energy 
 of Position. In § 64 we find the case succinctly stated. 
 
 " Here it is well to bear in mind that all energy consists 
 of two kinds, that of position and that of actiial motion^ and 
 also that this distinction holds for invisible molecular energy 
 just as truly as for that which is visible." 
 
 Professor Stewart gives us two lists — one of the Forces 
 of Nature, and one of the Energies of Nature, including 
 both classes of energies, commencing with the Energy of Visible 
 Motion, and proceeding to the Visible Energy of Position, such 
 as in a stone on the top of a cliff, in a head of water, in a 
 rain-cloud, in a crossbow bent, in a clock or watch wound 
 up, and in various other instances. 
 
 This list seems to us a little defective, in that it does not 
 fully describe each case in the two states of motion and posi- 
 tion of advantage. 
 
 The enumeration of energies is followed up by a statement of 
 the law of conservation, according to which (A) + (B) + (C) -1- 
 (D) + (E) + (F) + (G) + (H) = a constant quantity, and then 
 comes a list of the transmutations of these different kinds of 
 energies, the one into the other, in the course of which it is 
 shown that energy of actual motion and energy of position are 
 interchangeable, the conclusion being against the theory that 
 there is a constant quantity of either kind, and therefore against 
 Mr. Spencer's theory of the Continuity of Motion. 
 
 The question then arises, how does this overthrow of the 
 Continuity of Motion affect the working out of Mr. Spencer's 
 arguments? He advances it in the "First Principles" as one of 
 the three factors the formulation of whose interrelations is to 
 unify knowledge. Clearly it ought to find no place in the 
 Formula ; and the relation specified in the Formula of Evolution 
 and Dissolution of concomitance with the integration of Matter 
 does not hold good — indeed, as a matter of fact, we found in 
 our previous criticism, when we came to apply it, that it did not 
 prove satisfactory. Practically also we found that this theory 
 landed us in all sorts of confusions, notably in the foundations 
 
 THE ULTIMATE PROBLEM, 
 
 153 
 
 of Biology, with respect to the vast quantity of " locked-up " 
 Motion in nitrogenous compounds. So also it is the cause of 
 Mr. Spencer's indefiniteness of expression in all those cases of 
 latent and retained Motion which abound so plentifully in his 
 " First Principles." With respect to the Formula of Evolution, 
 its essential point — namely, the concomitance of the integra- 
 tion of Matter and the dissipation of Motion — disappears. The 
 processes are not pari passu ; Evolution and Dissolution need 
 not be concomitant. 
 
 With respect to the formula which was to unify knowledge, 
 we now come to this rather absurd position, that of the three 
 factors which Mr. Spencer proposed to formulate, one (Force) 
 is quietly ignored, another (Hie Continuity of Motion) is proved 
 to be erroneous, and the third contains a term, "matter," to 
 which Mr. Spencer refuses to attach any definite meaning. 
 And we shall see that in practice, as applied to biological 
 and psychical phenomena, this formula is wholly inapplicable, 
 except as a description of the advance from an indefinite inco- 
 herent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity. All 
 it amounts to is merely an assertion of the natural gradual 
 development of changes, and we get no insight whatever into 
 those relations of original factors and their necessary sequences 
 which constitute an intelligent history of the cosmos. 
 
 It seems to us that the whole subject of the Persistence of 
 Force, the Conservation of Energy, and the continuance or non- 
 continuance of Motion, should be re-stated by scientists. 
 
 § 2. The Ultimate Problem, 
 
 Already in Chap. I. § i we have stated the nature of the pro- 
 blem to be solved in attempting the unification of knowledge. 
 We have to frame a proposition which, specifying certain 
 factors, shall enable us by a series of deductions to form a 
 continuous picture representing the sequences of the objective 
 universe as they have actually occurred. The ideally perfect 
 unification would consist in the specification of every incident 
 in the entire series of sequences ; but the unification might be re- 
 garded as practically effected if the general nature of all incidents 
 
154 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 could be deduced from the sum-total of certain generalised (not 
 abstracted) factors. This would be reached (if at all) in the 
 natural course of discovery by means of an alternative series of 
 analyses and deductions, of hypotheses and verifications ; but 
 each hypothesis requires clear statement, and each j testing a 
 rigid exactness. Now Mr. Spencer does not clearly tell us the 
 state from which he starts. If he starts from the state of a 
 nebula consisting of the seventy or eighty so-caUed elements in 
 a gaseous condition in known quantities, and irregularly distri- 
 buted, we have a starting-point with definite factors. If also 
 there is an environment of ether with which this nebula is in 
 relation, we can so define the interrelation that it shall not be a 
 cause of uncertainty to us. Then within the limitation of 
 space and factors so defined we can set out on our deductive 
 process, which is also a process of construction. 
 
 But clearly this is not the unification of knowledge ; for we 
 have here seventy or eighty factors, whose differentiations have 
 to be accounted for. These seventy or eighty factors have what 
 we call properties — properties of special attractions, relative 
 size, shape, weight, &c., and until these differentiations are ex- 
 plained, no generalised factors can be used in the explanations 
 of their subsequent interrelations of combination, disintegra- 
 tion, &c. We are tied down strictly to the specific properties 
 of our seventy or eighty factors. We cannot talk of Matter as 
 a general factor, nor of Force, nor of Polarity, nor of Equili- 
 bration, for we do not know anything about them. All we 
 know are specific resistances, extensions, attractions, repulsions, 
 feelings (?), &c. We are only entitled to speak of a general Matter, 
 Force, Polarity, &c., when we know their fundamental relations, 
 and when we know them in such a way that we are able to reason 
 from them to the so-called elements, and through them to the 
 following sequences. 
 
 It is perhaps to expect too much of Philosophy to require 
 that it should reduce its ultimate factors to two. But all 
 philosophers of a very speculative character endeavour to start 
 with a state of the simplest possible constitution — a state con- 
 taining as few factors as possible, and these in the simplest 
 and most uniform mode of relation. 
 
 vj 
 
 NO EXPLANATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS, 155 
 
 Mr. Spencer, in his chapter on Dissolution, would seem to 
 resolve the universe ultimately into forces of attraction and 
 repulsion, and would seek to impose upon it the state of homo- 
 geneity, or equal and symmetrical distribution. Both at p. 542 
 of "First Principles" and in the Formula of Evolution we find 
 a possible homogeneity stated, and the general tenor of Mr. 
 Spencer's process is from a state of homogeneity. To this 
 meeting-point the studies of all philosophers seem to tend. 
 The religious philosopher finds an original Divine Mind, the 
 subjective philosopher finds Absolute Unconditioned Being, the 
 physical philosopher finds a homogeneity of attractive and repul- 
 sive forces or Absolute Force. All unite in saying that this 
 primordial factor is Unknowable. How, then, to make a begin- 
 ning 1 Mr. Spencer seemingly attacks the problem in his theory 
 of-the Instability of the Homogeneous, but when we examine it, 
 we find he only means that the Homogeneous is unstable when 
 attacked by external forces, but when not so attacked it is 
 stable. Hegel propounds the theory of Self-Determination. 
 It would seem that this, being contrary (as it is) to experience 
 and incomprehensible in its statement, has no warrant save in 
 the necessity we feel for assigning a cause in our own minds to 
 the commencement of changes, in order to justify our onward 
 course of thought. 
 
 The problem is made more complex from the necessity we 
 are under of including in our original factors not only such as 
 will account for the seventy or eighty so-called elements in their 
 purely physical combinations, but also such as will account for 
 feelings and their combinations, which constitute also psychical 
 life, and which affect biological changes. 
 
 § 3. Mr. Spencer's Admissions of his Failure to Account for 
 
 Consciousness. 
 
 There is one principal difficulty in Mr. Spencer's scheme. As 
 we have so often observed, Mr. Spencer defines the scope of Philo- 
 sophy as the accounting for every existence. Among existences ^ 
 are those of organisms ; and if by existence we mean every fact f 
 relating to material existences, then we have the facts of con-^ 
 
m 
 
 4 
 
 156 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 sciousness and mind, and these have to be explained. Surely 
 the facts of feeling have had some influence upon the morpho- 
 logical and physiological development of organisms. Yet Mr. 
 Spencer distinctly states that the facts of feeling, and therefore 
 of mind, though exhibiting a parallelism with those of Matter and 
 Motion, cannot, nevertheless, be comprehended in the Formula 
 of Evolution. How, then, is knowledge unified ? how is the end 
 of Philosophy fulfilled ? Mr. Spencer says (" Psychology," § 62, 
 p. 157) :— " So far from helping us to think of them as of one 
 t kind, analysis serves but to render more manifest the impossi- 
 
 ^.Ibility of finding for them a common concept — a thought under 
 which they can be united. Let it be granted that all existence 
 distinguished as objective, may be resolved into the existence of 
 units of one kind. Let it be granted that every species of 
 objective activity may be understood as due to the rhythmical 
 motions of such ultimate units ; and that among the objective 
 activities so understood, are the waves of molecular motion 
 propagated through nerves and nerve-centres. And let it 
 further be granted that all existence distinguished as sub- 
 jective, is resolvable into units of consciousness similar in 
 nature to those which we know as nervous shocks ; each of 
 which is the correlative of a rhythmical motion of a material 
 unit, or group of such units. Can we then think of the sub- 
 jective and objective activities as the same ? Can the oscilla- 
 tion of a molecule be represented in consciousness side by side 
 with a nervous shock, and the two be recognised as one ? No 
 
 \ effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit of feeling has 
 nothing in common with a unit of motion, becomes more than 
 ever manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition. And 
 the immediate verdict of consciousness thus given, might be 
 analytically justified were this a fit place for the needful 
 analysis." 
 
 And again on p. 508 he says : — " Specifically stated, the pro- 
 blem is to interpret (Q. explain?) mental (Q. sulrjedive?) evolution 
 in terms of the redistribution of Matter and Motion. (Q, do 
 Matter and Motion here mean the relations of attractive and 
 repulsive forces, or do they mean X and Y?) Though under its 
 subjective aspect Mind is known only as an aggregate of states 
 
 NO EXPLANATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 157 
 
 of consciousness, which cannot be conceived as forms of Matter 
 and Motion, (Q. repeated) and do not therefore necessarily 
 conform to the same laws of re-distribution; (Q. is not this a 
 denial of the all comprehensiveness of the Formula of Evolution ?) 
 yet under its objective aspect. Mind is known as an aggregate 
 of activities (Q, Motions?) manifested by an organism— is the 
 correlative ( Q. antecedent cause or co-existing fact ?), therefore, 
 of certain material transformations (Q. of attractive and re- 
 pulsive forces or of X and Y?) which must come within the 
 general process (fX formula?) of material {Q. X and Y?) 
 evolution {Q. concentration of X and dissipation of Y?), if that 
 process is truly universal. Though the development of Mind 
 ITSELF (Q. subjective?) cannot be explained by a series of 
 deductions from the Persistence of Force, yet it remains 
 possible that its obverse (d antecedent cause?), the development 
 {Q. combination?) of physical changes in a physical (Q. the 
 combination of attractive and repulsive forces, or of X and Y, 
 and the recombination of combinations of these attractive and 
 repulsive forces, or of X and Y ?) organ (Q. aggregate ?), may be 
 so explained ; and until it is so explained, the conception of-v 
 MENTAL EVOLUTION (Q. and even when it is so explained ?)} \. ^ 
 as a part of Evolution in general, remains incomplete." / 
 
 Mr. Spencer speaks in a language that we do not understand. 
 We formed our notions of the meaning of the terms he employs 
 from the analysis of his doctrines, but when we come to read 
 his more advanced doctrines, we find they have undergone an 
 evolution ; hence all the difficulties we experience, as indicated 
 above, in understanding his meaning in many important 
 passages. As we understand the above, Mr. Spencer maintains 
 that by a series of deductions from the Persistence of Force 
 and by means of the Formula of Evolution the causes of the 
 production of an organism such as a man can be explained^l 
 although his feelings and his mind cannot thereby be explained/ 
 There are several inferences from this. Firstly, there is more in 
 the results of the Persistence of Force and the Formula of Evo- 
 lution than the results of attractive and repulsive forces ; and ^ < 
 that since we are unable to understand this plus, or its rela- 
 tions to the attractive and repulsive forces which we do 
 
i 
 ■i 
 
 158 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 understand, therefore, although we may be able to recognise a 
 regular I process of lieveiopment due to th«^ permanence and 
 regular order of these relations, yet we cannot unify our know- 
 ledge. Secondly, we infer that Mr. Spencer maintains the 
 proposition that feeling and mind have not been factors in any 
 morphological and physiological development ; for he says that 
 an organism is explainable on physical grounds only, which 
 means that we can deduce and build up an organism from the 
 relations of the chemical elements and the laws of physics 
 alone. An organism is thus physically explainable up to the 
 most complex development. The result is feeling and mind : 
 but the organisation would be the same were there no such 
 result as feeling and mind. It may be that feeling and mind 
 are necessary results of these relations of the original factors, 
 although we cannot conceive it; but, nevertheless, they are 
 nothing more than such results, and it is deducible from 
 these premises that there might be complex organisms with- 
 out feeling apd without mind. Thirdiy^if-JEe—ailaw tliat 
 feeling and/^ind have had any influence as factors in morpho- 
 logical and physiological development^.then we admit as factors 
 in that development more than the factors recognised in a 
 physical explanation — i.e,, attractive and repulsive forces. If 
 feeling cannot be explained from physical antecedents, and yet 
 feeling is a factor in the structural and functional development 
 of physical organisms, then a physical explanation of organisms 
 is not possible, and organisms escape altogether from the 
 Formula of Evolution and the unification of knowledge. It 
 is true there is one last resource, namely, to abandon to the 
 chemical elements the definite terms of attractive and repul- 
 sive forces having definite results, and to deal only with ar, ?/, 
 and z. That, indeed, releases us from our dilemma, for we can 
 make x mean sometimes one thing and sometimes^another ; and 
 surely a protean world requires protean words to represent it. 
 
 v' 
 
 § 4. Does Mr. Spencer Profess to Explain the Universe ? 
 
 In reply to our previous volume, some critics have said that 
 Mr. Spencer does not profess to explain the universe, and that, 
 
 7 
 
 DOES HE PROFESS TO EXPLAIN THE UNIVERSE ? 159 
 
 therefore, our criticism in this respect is not applicable. Let 
 us consider this point. We advance this as Mr. Spencer's 
 object for the following reasons, viz. : — 
 
 Firstly, Because he recognises it at the outset of his work, in 
 the chapter on the " Scope of Philosophy," from which we have 
 already quoted. Here he looks for the unification of know- 
 ledge in the gradual advance of Science, which in various de- 
 partments unifies great diversities of individual facts by means 
 of some wide proposition, and we seek the goal of Philosophy in 
 some widest of all propositions, which shall include everything 
 in its organic explanations. 
 
 Secondly, We justify this view of Mr. Spenqer's object from 
 his summing up at the end of " First Principles," when he has 
 finished all his work, and says to himself, " It is good." This 
 passage is very precise ; it is almost legal in its phraseology. 
 
 It runs as follows (p. 541) : — "In commencing our search, . . . 
 it was shown that a Philosophy stands self-convicted of inade- 
 quacy, if it does not formulate the whole series of changes passed 
 through by every existence in its passage from the imperceptible to 
 the perceptible, and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible. 
 If it begins its explanations with existences that already have 
 concrete forms ; or leaves off while they still retain concrete 
 forms ; then, manifestly, they had preceding histories, or will 
 have succeeding histories, or both, of which no account is given. 
 And as such preceding and succeeding histories are subjects of 
 possible knowledge, a Philosophy which says nothing about them, 
 falls short of the required unification. Whence we saw it to 
 follow that the formula nought, equally applicable to existences 
 taken singly and in their totality, must be applicable to the 
 whole history of each and to the whole history of all." 
 
 From this it would seem that the unification of knowledge is 
 to be found in the formulation of " the whole series of changes /. , 
 passed through by every existence." Here, of course, there is 
 the obscurity of the term formulate ; but we take it that that 
 word must refer to the dependence of change upon anterior con- 
 ditions, these anterior conditions being fewer and more simple 
 the farther we go back, until we discern in one or two simple 
 conditions the then future sequences. 
 
158 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 understand, therefore, although we may be able to recognise a 
 regular I process~of~deTelopinent due to th^ permanence and 
 regular order of these relations, yet we cannot unify our know- 
 ledge. Secondly, we infer that Mr. Spencer maintains the 
 proposition that feeling and mind have not been factors in any 
 morphological and physiological development ; for he says that 
 an organism is explainable on physical grounds only, which 
 means that we can deduce and build up an organism from the 
 relations of the chemical elements and the laws of physics 
 alone. An organism is thus physically explainable up to the 
 most complex development. The result is feeling and mind : 
 but the organisation would be the same were there no such 
 result as feeling and mind. It may be that feeling and mind 
 are necessary results of these relations of the original factors, 
 although we cannot conceive it; but, nevertheless, they are 
 nothing more than such results, and it is deducible from 
 these premises that there might be complex organisms with- 
 out feeling ajMi without mind. JThirdly^ if-JEe_allaw that 
 feeling and/^ind have had any influence as factors in morpho- 
 logical and physiological development, then we admit as factors 
 in that development more than the factors recognised in a 
 physical explanation — ie., attractive and repulsive forces. If 
 feeling cannot be explained from physical antecedents, and yet 
 feeling is a factor in the structural and functional development 
 of physical organisms, then a physical explanation of organisms 
 is not possible, and organisms escape altogether from the 
 Formula of Evolution and the unification of knowledge. It 
 is true there is one last resource, namely, to abandon to the 
 chemical elements the definite terms of attractive and repul- 
 sive forces having definite results, and to deal only with ar, ?/, 
 and 2. That, indeed, releases us from our dilemma, for we can 
 make x mean sometimes one thing and sometimes^another ; and 
 surely a protean world requires protean words to represent it. 
 
 § 4. Does Mr. Sjpencer Profess to Explain the Universe ? 
 
 In reply to our previous volume, some critics have said that 
 Mr. Spencer does not profess to explain the unfverse, and that, 
 
 7 
 
 DOES HE PROFESS TO EXPLAIN THE UNIVERSE ? 159 
 
 therefore, our criticism in this respect is not applicable. Let 
 us consider this point. We advance this as Mr. Spencer's 
 object for the following reasons, viz. : — 
 
 Firstly, Because he recognises it at the outset of his work, in 
 the chapter on the " Scope of Philosophy," from which we have 
 already quoted. Here he looks for the unification of know- 
 ledge in the gradual advance of Science, which in various de- 
 partments unifies great diversities of individual facts by means 
 of some wide proposition, and we seek the goal of Philosophy in 
 some widest of all propositions, which shall include everything 
 in its organic explanations. 
 
 Secondly, We justify this view of Mr. Spencer's object from 
 his summing up at the end of " First Principles," when he has 
 finished all his work, and says to himself, *' It is good." This 
 passage is very precise ; it is almost legal in its phraseology. 
 
 It runs as follows (p. 541) : — "In commencing our search, . . . 
 it was shown that a Philosophy stands self-convicted of inade- 
 quacy, if it does not formulate the whole series of changes passed 
 through by every existence in its passage from the imperceptible to 
 the perceptible, and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible. 
 If it begins its explanations with existences that already have 
 concrete forms ; or leaves off while they still retain concrete 
 forms ; then, manifestly, they had preceding histories, or will 
 have succeeding histories, or both, of which no account is given. 
 And as such preceding and succeeding histories are subjects of 
 possible knowledge, a Philosophy which says nothing about them, 
 falls short of the required unification. Whence we saw it to 
 follow that the formula nought, equally applicable to existences 
 taken singly and in their totality, must be applicable to the 
 whole history of each and to the whole history of alL" 
 
 From this it would seem that the unification of knowledge is 
 to be found in the formulation of " the whole series of changes /. ; 
 passed through by every existence." Here, of course, there is 
 the obscurity of the term formulate ; but we take it that that 
 word must refer to the dependence of change upon anterior con- 
 ditions, these anterior conditions being fewer and more simple 
 the farther we go back, until we discern in one or two simple 
 conditions the then future sequences. 
 
Ill 
 
 I i 
 
 1 60 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Thirdly, We hold this to be Mr. Spencer's theory because 
 his work is mainly a process of construction. Starting from 
 the comparatively simple and undifferentiated, he proceeds by 
 gradual steps to the more complex. In his actual work, and 
 in its effect upon our minds, Mr. Spencer undertakes a pro- 
 cess of building up. We see before our eyes the formation of a 
 solar system out of a nebula. The world cools, the geological 
 strata are formed, oceans and continents appear. Plants and 
 animals creep into life, till in their gigantic strength they rise 
 superior to the elements and defy their brute creators. Man is 
 developed as the resultant of oxygen, nitrogen, carbon, &c. in 
 relation with external factors of heat, light, &c. Strange 
 sciences of Ethics, Politics, and Esthetics supervene. Intelli- 
 gence and emotion have come out of physical arrangement of 
 the chemical elements. We see it all before our eyes. Is it 
 not unfolded by Mr. Spencer in his series of works 1 
 
 Fourthly, Mr. Spencer states distinctly in several places that 
 he regards this evolution as a single process from first to last. 
 What does a single process mean but the dependence of 
 changes upon anterior conditions, and what can the under- 
 standing of the process be but the understanding of the initial 
 conditions 1 
 
 The "Biology" is essentially a constructive undertaking, which 
 is the same thing as a deductive process of reasoning. From 
 certain factors in the primal cosmos, whenever we may fix the 
 time, we have to deduce, or, which is the same thing, construct 
 the cosmos as we now know it. Mr. Spencer's is not merely an 
 inductive gathering up of all knowledge into one scientific pro- 
 position, but a deductive process from primordial principles. 
 It is not sufficient, according to him, that we should know all 
 that is, but that we should know it as what it must have been, 
 and could not have been otherwise. Therefore the "Biology" 
 comes to be a constructive process. We first see the construction 
 of organic molecules out of inorganic, and then the building up 
 of organic molecules into plants and animals represented as strict 
 deductions from the properties of the original factors. 
 
 This is what Mr. Spencer says (" Psychology," p. 136) : — 
 . • " Evolution being a universal process^ one and continuous 
 
 DOES HE PROFESS TO EXPLAIN THE UNIVERSE ? 161 
 
 throughout all forms of existence, there can be no break, np\ 
 change from one group of concrete phenomena to another witly 
 out a bridge of intermediate phenomena.'* He ,then goes on to 
 show how Geology is only a branch of a particular science 
 which is in its totality Astronomy. Biology is only a specialised 
 part of Geology, and Psychology is only a specialised part of 
 Biology. *^ Theoretically all the concrete sciences are adjoining 
 tracts of one science^ which~~ha5~-for-it9--obj«ct-matter the con- 
 tinuous trans fo r m ation which the universe undergoes." 
 --We therefore come to the conclusion that Mr. Spencer does 
 undertake an explanation of the universe. He is not content, 
 nor indeed is it sufficient merely to specify the general character- 
 istics of cosmical history in all its branches. He rigidly lays 
 down the necessity for the deductive process, and attempts the 
 correlative constructive problem. 
 
( i62 ) 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 AK EXAMINATION OP THE "PRINCIPLES OP PSYCHOLOGY'' WITH 
 REGARD TO ITS POSITION IN THE SYSTEM FOR THE UNIFICATION 
 OP KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 This chapter is undertaken for the purpose of ranging Psycho- 
 logy in its proper place in the deductive order of the sciences 
 upon the scheme for the unification of knowledge propounded 
 by Mr. Spencer. We wish to ascertain its place relatively to 
 the other sciences in a properly ordered system of knowledge, 
 and we also wish to ascertain in what respects it assists in the 
 proper understanding of Mr. Spencer's system. 
 
 In this undertaking we do not propose to criticise the " Psy- 
 chology" on its merits as an independent work, and we therefore 
 pass over some of its most important features without note or 
 comment. To do otherwies would be beside our purpose. 
 Accordingly we omit many valuable and interesting inquiries, 
 and confine ourselves strictly to the object we have in view. 
 
 In summarising the remarks that have occurred to us in our 
 studies of the work, we find them to fall under three headings, 
 and we divide our chapter accordingly. We shall first treat of 
 a method for the unification of knowledge propounded in the 
 body of the work, which is one altogether separate and difi'erent 
 from the main and scientific unification upon the lines of which 
 the great constructive portions of Mr. Spencer's works are car- 
 ried out. Next, we shall consider the " Principles of Psycho- 
 logy " in regard to the constructive methods, to see how they 
 fall in with the general plan. Thirdly, we shall consider how 
 any of the difficulties we may have met in the course of 
 our study are to be got over by means of the Double- Aspect 
 Theory. 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD, 163 
 
 § I. The Psychological Method far the Unification of 
 
 Knowledge, 
 
 (a.) Study of Part VIL of the " Principles of Psychology." 
 We shall first direct the attention of the student to Part VII 
 of the " Principles of Psychology," in which wiU be found the 
 pecuHar method for the unification of knowledge already referred 
 to. It is entitled " General Analysis," and its object is defined 
 to be ^«' An Inquiry Concerning the Nature of Human Know- 
 ledge." We shaU find it necessary to pursue a somewhat detailed 
 inquiry, a procedure which, although more tedious to the general 
 reader, is more satisfactory to the student and more just to the 
 author than criticisms giv.en in general terms. We find in 
 §385 (vol. ii. p. 307):— 
 
 " Knowledge implies something known and something which 
 knows ; whence it follows that a theory of knowledge is a 
 theory of the relation between the two.* Observe how dis- 
 tinct are the three things. 
 
 " Here, on the one hand, is an aggregate of propositions re- 
 specting objects ; and each group of these propositions, as, for 
 instance, those constituting the science of Astronomy, we regard 
 as expressing certain connections, which continue to hold 
 whether we continue conscious or not. Here, on the other 
 hand, IS an aggregate of propositions concerning states of con- 
 sciousness; and we regard these propositions as expressing 
 certain connections which continue to hold irrespective of the 
 continuance of any other connections. And now here are cer- 
 tain propositions which do not assert connections among Things, 
 and which do not assert connections among Thoughts, but 
 which assert connections between Things and Thoughts ' Or 
 to speak strictly, though they tacitly assert certain connections 
 among Things, and certain connections among Thoughts which 
 are indispensable elements of them, yet the connections with 
 wluch they are immediately concerned are those between Thin-s 
 and Thoughts." ^ 
 
 PrilS''§ 4^ "'''^ ^' ^P^^^^'^ ^^^^^*^^^ ^^ ^^^l^dg« ^ "First 
 
1 64 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 The rest of the section is taken up with a further explana- 
 tion of the object sought for in a Theory of Knowledge. And 
 this brings the author back to the main object of his Philosophy, 
 and causes him to revert to the statement of that object made 
 in the " First Principles." 
 
 This reference is made in § 386, and as we are now dealing 
 with Mr. Spencer's main argument, and as careless or obscure 
 references to long anterior passages of his work are likely to be 
 misleading unless properly examined, it will be our duty to 
 carefully study the connection between the train of thought 
 therein set forth, and the final outcome in the chapters now 
 before us. Thus at the outset we are obliged to make a long 
 digression from our immediate study in order to estimate pro- 
 perly that original thought to which the new reasonings have to 
 be joined. And first let us see if the representation now made 
 of the argument set forth in the " First Principles " is correct. 
 
 The salient point of the reference is found to be (p. 310, line 
 16), "the complete unification of knowledge, in which Philo- 
 sophy reaches its goal." This unification is declared to be found 
 (line 15) in the complete establishment of the congruity of 
 certain fundamental intuitions with all other dicta of conscious- 
 ness. This process of proving or disproving the congruity is 
 therefore seen to be (line 14) " the business of Philosophy," in 
 the accomplishment of which is to be found the required unifi- 
 cation of knowledge. 
 
 The following is a quotation of the passage in full, part of 
 
 which we italicise : — 
 
 "§ 386. To do this will be to redeem the promise made by 
 implication in ' First Principles,' when dealing with the * Data 
 of Philosophy.' It was there argued (§ 39) that ' developed 
 intelligence is framed upon certain organised and consolidated 
 conceptions of which it cannot divest itself ; and which it can 
 no more stir without using than the body can stir without help 
 of its limbs. In what way, then, is it possible for intelligence, 
 striving after Philosophy, to give any account of these concep- 
 tions, and to show either their validity or their invalidity? 
 There is but one way. Those of them which are vital, or cannot 
 be severed from the rest without mental dissolution, must be 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD. 
 
 165 
 
 assumed as true provisionally. The fundamental intuitions that 
 are essential to the process of thinking, must be temporarily 
 accepted as unquestionable : leaving the assumption of their 
 unquestionableness to be justified by the results. And it was 
 further argued (§ 40) that setting out with these fundamental 
 intuitions provisionally assumed to be true — that is, provision- 
 ally assumed to be congruous with all other dicta of conscious- 
 ness — the process of proving or disproving the congruity becomes 
 the bitsitiess of Philosophy ; and the complete establishment of the 
 congruity becomes the same thing as the complete unification 
 of knowledge^ in which Philosophy reaches its goal." 
 
 We find it, therefore, clearly stated, first, that the goal of 
 Philosophy is the unification of knowledge ; secondly, that this 
 unification is accomplished when certain fundamental intuitions 
 are found to be congruous with all the other dicta of conscious- 
 ness ; and, thirdly, that the proving or disproving this congruity 
 is the business of Philosophy. 
 
 We will now refer back to the " Data of Philosophy " to see 
 whether this is a correct representation of the passage. And we 
 may as well say at once that we find there no such clear and 
 concise statement, but a very long, difi'use, and indefinite discus- 
 sion containing a variety of imperfectly conceived propositions. 
 
 Firstly, we think we come upon the primordial datum in § 41, 
 which is thus presented to us : — * 
 
 "What is this datum, or rather what are these data, which 
 Philosophy cannot do without 1 Clearly one primordial datum 
 is involved in the foregoing statement. Already by implication 
 we have assumed, and must for ever continue to assume, that 
 congruities and incongruities exist, and are cognisable by us." 
 
 The italicised proposition, therefore, is the first fundamental 
 (latum of philosophy, further explained towards the end of 
 p. 141 : — 
 
 " And here we get to the bottom of the matter. The per- 
 manence of a consciousness of likeness or diff'erence, is our 
 ultimate warrant for asserting the existence of likeness or differ- 
 ence ; and, in fact, we mean by the existence of likeness or dif- 
 ference, nothing more than the permanent consciousness of it." 
 
 * First Principles, p. 140. 
 
i66 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 This, however, is not enough. 
 
 § 42. " But Philosophy requires for its datum some substan- 
 tive proposition. To recognise as unquestionable a certain 
 fundamental process of thought, is not enough : we must recog- 
 nise as unquestionable some fundamental product of thought, 
 reached by this process. If Philosophy is completely-unified 
 knowledge — if the unification of knowledge is to be effected 
 only by showing that some ultimate proposition includes and 
 consolidates all the results of experience; then, clearly, this 
 ultimate proposition which has to be proved congruous with all 
 others, must express a piece of knowledge, and not the validity 
 of an act of knowing. Having assumed the trustworthiness of 
 consciousness, we have also to assume as trustworthy some 
 deliverance of consciousness. 
 
 "What must^this be? Must it not be one affirming the 
 widest and most profound distinction which things present? 
 Must it not be a statement of congruities and incongruities 
 more general than any other ? An ultimate principle that is to 
 unify all experience, must be co-extensive with all experience. 
 . . . That which Philosophy takes as its datum, must be an 
 assertion of some likeness and difference to which all other like- 
 nesses and differences are secondary. If knowledge is classifying, 
 or grouping the like and separating the unlike; and if the 
 unification of knowledge proceeds by arranging the smaller 
 classes of like experiences within the larger, and these within 
 the still larger ; then, the proposition by which knowledge is 
 unified, must be one specifying the antithesis between two ulti- 
 mate classes of experiences, in which all others merge." 
 
 From this passage it would appear that the unification of 
 knowledge, wliich is the goal of Philosophy, is to be reached by 
 a different method altogether from those which we discussed 
 in our former criticism. The theory of this latest method is : 
 Since knowledge is classification, the more complete the classi- 
 fication the more completely unified is the knowledge, and the 
 nearer we approach to a philosophy. When, therefore, we have 
 all knowledge comprehended in two large classes, we can pro- 
 ceed no farther : knowledge is unified and Philosophy has 
 reached its goal. 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD. 
 
 167 
 
 However, to proceed. We have to bear in mind that the " sub- 
 stantive proposition " which Philosophy requires for its datum 
 has not been found in § 42. We pass on to §43. 
 
 This section is a disquisition on the faint and vivid manifes- 
 tations which compose knowledge, and which possess seven sepa- 
 rate characters by which they are distinguished. 
 
 Section 44 groups these two classes of manifestations into 
 self and non-self. The " vivid manifestations indissolubly bound 
 together in relatively immense masses and having independent 
 conditions of existence we call the Non-ego." « 
 
 It must be borne in mind that we are now on the look-out 
 for the " substantive proposition," the "ultimate proposition," 
 proposed to be sought in §42. Taking into consideration that 
 this proposition is described as " one specifying the antithesis 
 between two ultimate classes of experiences, in which all others 
 merge," as " one affirming the widest and most profound dis- 
 tinction which things present," we are tempted to put down as 
 the second datum this proposition, namely, that all knowledge 
 — i.e., Philosophy — is comprised in the proposition that " the 
 widest and most profound distinction which things present is 
 the distinction between the Ego and the Non-ego." 
 
 But there crops up here and there another datum, for which 
 see §44, p. 154. 
 
 " Or, rather, more truly, each order of manifestation carries 
 with it the irresistible implication of some power that mani- 
 fests itself ... in the faint forms . . . and in the vivid 
 forms." 
 
 Page 156. — "And so we are made vaguely conscious of an 
 indefinitely-extended region of power or being, not merely 
 separate from the current of faint manifestations constituting 
 the Ego, but lying beyond the current of vivid manifestations 
 constituting the immediately-present portion of the Nonrego." 
 
 These lead up to the datum or " postulate that the manifes- 
 tations of the Unknowable" {Power 1) "fall into the two 
 separate aggregates constituting the world of consciousness and 
 the world beyond consciousness." 
 
 This seems to be the fundamental proposition which has to 
 be found congruous with every result of experience, direct and 
 
 n 
 
i58 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 indirect, and which shall thereby become the unification of 
 knowledge aimed at by Philosophy. 
 
 On p. 156 it is described as the "fundamental cognition." 
 
 " The establishment of this distinction precedes all reason- 
 ing; and while, running through our mental structure as it 
 does, we are debarred from reasoning about it without taking 
 for granted its existence ; analysis, nevertheless, enables us to 
 justify the assertion of its existence, by showing that it is also 
 the outcome of a classification based on accumulated likenesses 
 and accumulated differences. In other words — Reasoning, which 
 is itself but a formation of cohesions among manifestations, 
 here strengthens, by the cohesions it forms, the cohesions which 
 it finds already existing." 
 
 In §45 we seem to realise the substantive proposition pro- 
 posed to be sought in § 42. "I have thus . . . indicated the 
 essential nature and justification of that primordial proposi- 
 tion which Philosophy requires as a datum." This seems to 
 refer to the previous passage at the end of § 44. 
 
 " And so we are made vaguely conscious of an indefinitely- 
 extended region of power or being, not merely separate from the 
 current of faint manifestations constituting the EgOy but lying 
 beyond the current of vivid manifestations constituting the 
 immediately-present portion of the Non-ego." 
 
 The whole argument is summed up on the following page. 
 We are never, however, given one fundamental proposition, but 
 several ; and their coherence, so as to form an unification of all 
 knowledge, cannot, on the face of it, be recognised. 
 
 Page 157. — "In brief, our postulates are: — an Unknowable 
 Power; the existence of knowable likenesses and difi'erences 
 among the manifestations of that Power ; and a resulting segre- 
 gation of the manifestations into those of subject and object." 
 
 What is segregation ? It is a term derived from, and, pro- 
 perly speaking, exclusively applicable to, material bodies, and 
 it refers to the process by which the like separates itself from 
 the unlike, and each kind of substance under proper conditions, 
 8uch as heat or liquidity, gathers itself together in separate 
 places. We know of no possible method by which different 
 kinds of manifestations of the Unknowable separate and gather 
 
 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD. 
 
 169 
 
 themselves together, so as to form on the one hand faint mani- 
 festations which we call feelings, and on the other vivid mani- 
 festations which we call the world beyond consciousness. Who 
 has perceived or will venture to describe the process ? Can we, 
 indeed, assert that we mean anything when we say that the faint 
 manifestations of the Unknowable segregate and the vivid mani- 
 festations of the Unknowable segregate '? 
 
 These, then, are the "organised and consolidated conceptions " 
 referred to in the " Psychology," which have to be found con- 
 gruous with all the other dicta of consciousness, and in which 
 the unitative object of Philosophy is attained. 
 
 We have remarked throughout this chapter a great amount 
 of vagueness, not merely of language, but also of thought. . We 
 seem to be carrying on two arguments, if not more, at the same 
 time. We are apparently occupied mainly with an inquiry as 
 to the data or groundwork of knowledge, the result of which 
 inquiry is summed up on p. 157 as just quoted; and we are also 
 on the outlook for the definite and substantive proposition pro- 
 posed at the commencement of § 42 as requisite for the datum 
 of Philosophy, and which the summary hardly supplies. 
 
 To revert now to the " Psychology," we find that the funda- 
 mental intuitions with which all other dicta of consciousness 
 have to be found congruous, in order to accomplish a perfected 
 philosophy and unification of knowledge, are these : — 
 
 1. The existence of an Unknowable Power. 
 
 2. The existence of knowable likenesses and differences 
 among the manifestations of that Power. 
 
 3. A resulting segregation of the manifestations into those 
 of subject and object. 
 
 The business of Philosophy, therefore, is the proving or dis- 
 proving of the congruity between all other dicta of consciousness 
 and these fundamental intuitions. 
 
 According to this statement, the proper course would be to 
 ask three questions : — 
 
 Firstly, Are all the dicta of consciousness congruous with the 
 belief in the existence of an Unknowable Power ? 
 
 Secondly, Are they congruous with the consciousness of 
 knowable likenesses and differences? 
 
I70 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Thirdly, Are they congruous with the segregation into sub- 
 ject and object 1 
 
 And if we give affirmative replies to all these questions, know- 
 ledge is unified and Philosophy attained. 
 
 At the same time, we fail to see that we are any wiser or 
 better off for the fact. If this is the highest point to which 
 Philosophy can attain, it seems to us a very vapid result. It 
 gives us no insight into the relations of things; throws no light 
 upon the sequences of the universe; affords no explanations; 
 gives us no power over the course of events, because it gives us 
 no knowledge of their relations ; imparts no information as to 
 our place in the historic cosmos, and is altogether a vain and 
 empty conclusion. 
 
 In addition to this, it is to be observed that the unification 
 thus effected does not conform to the requirements of the 
 objects of Philosophy, as explained elsewhere in Mr. Spencer's 
 works and quoted by us in the first chapter of this work. The 
 object of Philosophy is to trace back the order of sequences*of 
 the Cosmos, so that given the relations of certain original factors 
 in property and distribution, all the range of sequences can bo 
 understood as resultants therefrom. 
 
 To place the unification of knowledge in the finding of con- 
 gruities between the multitudinous experiences of consciousness 
 and those fundamental experiences out of which all conscious- 
 ness has been evolved, is no more than finding congruities 
 between a mass and the parts which make up that mass. In 
 this respect, indeed, it might be said that if we find the present 
 -constitution of the cosmos and its past history congruous with 
 some anterior simple state, although we do not understand the 
 order of the sequences, then knowledge might be considered 
 unified. But as a matter of fact, we do not find the requisite 
 congruity between the known history of the cosmos and the 
 supposed constitution of the primordial nebula, for the former 
 includes subjective feelings which are not congruous with the 
 contents of the latter. 
 
 But truly this is not Mr. Spencer's idea : his teaching seems to 
 refer to the primordial experiences of individuals, or to indivi- 
 dual conceptions of general primordial experiences of living crea- 
 
 DIGRESSION. 
 
 171 
 
 tures. Here again we would observe that the simple finding of 
 congruities between the sum-total of experience and individual 
 experience is nothing very important. «What shall we say if 
 this final result is no more than the bare statement that all 
 experiences are manifestations of an Unknowable Power, which 
 manifestations segregate into two orders, namely, the faint and 
 the vivid ? 
 
 (b.) Digression. 
 
 In our previously published criticism of Mr. Spencer we gave 
 a different account of his unification of knowledge, gathered 
 from his ** Summary and Conclusion " in " First Principles." 
 Let us now consider the teachings of the " Principles of Psy- 
 chology " in regard to this question. We found that the unifi- 
 cation of knowledge, which it was the object of Philosophy 
 to accomplish, was the formulation of the whole series of changes 
 passed through by every existence. Referring to " First Prin- 
 ciples," we find — 
 
 Page 541. — "It was shown that a Philosophy stands self- 
 convicted of inadequacy, if it does not formulate the whole 
 series of changes passed through by every existence in its pas- 
 sage from the imperceptible to the perceptible, and again from 
 the perceptible to the imperceptible. If it begins its explanations 
 with existences that already have concrete forms, or leaves off 
 while they still retain concrete forms; then, manifestly, they had 
 preceding histories, or will have succeeding histories, or both, of 
 which no account is given. And as such preceding or succeeding 
 histories are subjects of possible knowledge, a Philosophy which 
 says nothing about them, falls short of the required unification. 
 Whence we saw it to follow that the formula sought, equally 
 applicable to existences taken singly and in their totality, must 
 be applicable to the whole history of each and to the whole 
 history of all." 
 
 The succeeding paragraph (p. 542) refers to the Formula of 
 Evolution, which is said to be the requisite formulation. 
 
 The question arises, which of Mr. Spencer's two methods is 
 the one he really advocates, or, if he propounds both of them, 
 are they identical? In the one case, Mr. Spencer states that 
 
172 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 Philosophy accomplishes its object, namely, the unification of 
 knowledge, by formulating some " ultimate proposition " which 
 shall be found congruous with all other experience. Now a pro- 
 position is composed of three parts — a subject, a predicate, and 
 a copula. The following sentence, which seems to be the sum- 
 ming up of the chapter on the ** Data of Philosophy," to which 
 we have been referred from the chapter of the *' Psychology " 
 now under consideration, is not a proposition at all : — 
 
 "In brief, our postulates are: — an Unknowable Power; 
 the existence of knowable likenesses and differences among the 
 manifestations of that Power ; and a resulting segregation of the 
 manifestations into those of subject and object." 
 
 Yet we can find no other proposition which is clearly stated as 
 the one which is to unify all knowledge. The question then 
 arises, have these postulates the efi'ect intended 1 Assuming 
 them to be correctly stated, do they unify knowledge ? At first 
 sight they seem to be comprehensive enough, but not to throw 
 much light on the relation of sequence or process. They do 
 not, for instance, explain the combination of oxygen and hydro- 
 gen into water, nor the varied states of ice, water, and steam. 
 Again, they do not explain the nature of heredity. Nor do 
 they throw much light on the sensitiveness of the eye to those 
 undulations called light. Clearly the postulates do not explain 
 the order of cosmical sequences. 
 
 Let us now consider the question as to the identity of the 
 two methods of unification proposed by Mr. Spencer, viz. : — 
 " Evolution, is," &c. 
 " In brief, our postulates are," &c. 
 
 To us there do not appear to be any common elements of com- 
 parison. Let us, however, again refer to the " Summary and 
 Conclusion," to enable us to determine what is the proposition 
 which afi'ords the desired unification of knowledge. The fol- 
 lowing is a short summary : — 
 
 Page 538. — A proposal to review the completed organisation 
 of knowledge. 
 
 Page 539, ist Par. — Philosophy is the unification of know- 
 ledge. 
 
 DIGRESSION. 
 
 173 
 
 2nd Par.— The data with which Philosophy must set out, as 
 
 already stated in detail 
 
 3rd Par.— The primary truth. The Persistence of Force 
 (Query, is this the PhUosophy required?) includes the "Inde- 
 structibility of Matter" and the " Continuity of Motion." 
 
 Page 540. — Further corollaries. 
 
 § 186. All these truths co-ordinated will form a philosophy. 
 " That which alone can unify knowledge must be the law of 
 co-operation of all the factors— a law expressing simultaneously 
 the complex antecedents and the complex consequents which any 
 phenomenon as a whole presents." 
 
 2nd Par. — The law sought must be the continuous redis- 
 tribution of Matter and Motion . . . Hence we may be cer- 
 tain, d> priori, that there must be a law of the concomitant 
 redistribution of Matter and Motion, which holds of every 
 change ; and which, by thus unifying all changes, must be the 
 basis of a Philosophy. (Query, does this mean, must be the 
 Philosophy required ?) 
 
 3rd Par. — Then comes the categorical statement of what is 
 required of a Philosophy which affords our researches a standard 
 of efficiency, and by which we find all Mr. Spencer's endeavours 
 
 to fail. 
 
 Pa^^e 542, ist Par. — The formula in view is the Formula of 
 Evolution, but this is not the same kind of unification as that 
 which was proposed to be effected in the formulation of a 
 primary conception or fundamental proposition congruous with 
 all other dicta of consciousness. 
 
 Page 543. — The Formula applied in detail 
 
 Page 545. — Evolution one in principle and one in fact. 
 
 Page 547.— Still Philosophy is not complete as long as ' 
 Evolution is only an induction. What is required is the state- 
 ment of one fact or principle from which all the facts of Evolu- 
 tion and Dissolution can be deduced. 
 
 " Our next step, therefore, was to show why. Force being 
 persistent, the transformation which Evolution shows us neces- 
 sarily results." 
 
 We appear now to be coming in view of the grand ultimate 
 formula or proposition which shall completely unify knowledge 
 
174 SPENCER^S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 and constitute a Philosophy; for it turns out, after all, that the 
 Formula of Evolution is not sufficient. The one comprehensive 
 truth, therefore, would seem to be 
 
 " The Persistence of Force,'' 
 which it is necessary to examine separately on its own merits 
 as to meaning and efficacy, and which is so dealt with in our 
 previous criticism. 
 
 Page 547 shows how the principle of the Persistence of Force 
 involves as a consequence the instability of the homogeneous, 
 and this being accomplished, everything else follows. The full 
 consideration of this curious reasoning is given in our previously 
 published criticism, and the weakness of it is manifest in the 
 section now under consideration ; for Mr. Spencer, we find, does 
 not really treat of the homogeneous, but of a heterogeneous 
 complex cosmos containing some "finite homogeneous acrrrre- 
 gates " and " diverse forces," thus begging the question of'^'the 
 heterogeneity for which, according to the statement on p. 541, 
 he had to account. 
 
 Page 549 ought to disclose the unificatory proposition of 
 Philosophy; and it is stated that "each of these laws of the 
 redistribution of Matter and Motion, was found to be a deriva- 
 tive law— a law deducible from the fundamental law. The 
 Persistence of Force being granted, there foUow as inevitable 
 inferences, &c. . . . And thus discovering that the processes 
 of change formulated under these titles are so many different 
 aspects of one transformation, determined by an ultimate 
 necessity, we arrive at a complete unification of them— a 
 synthesis in which Evolution in general and in detail becomes 
 known as an implication of the law that transcends proof 
 . . . Which further unification brings us to a conception 
 of the entire plexus of changes presented by each concrete 
 phenomenon, and by the aggregate of concrete phenomena, as 
 a manifestation of one fundamental fact—a^ fact shown alike 
 in^the total change and in aU the separate changes composing 
 it,"— and thus answers to the requirements given on p. 541. 
 
 In § 191, p. 551, we come upon a rounding off of the aW 
 ment by a reversion to the other statement of the method of a 
 Philosophy, namely, by showing that the fundamental datum 
 
 DIGRESSION, 
 
 175 
 
 of consciousness is congruous with all other dicta of conscious- 
 ness. We could not in its proper place find out with exactness 
 what that datum was, but it is given here — " The recognition 
 of a persistent Force, ever changing its manifestations" but un- 
 changed in quantity throughout all past time and all future 
 time, is that which we find alone makes possible each concrete 
 interpretation, and at last unifies all concrete interpretations. 
 . . . Our synthesis has proceeded by taking for granted at every 
 step this ultimate truth ; and the ultimate truth cannot, there- 
 fore, be regarded as in any sense an outcome of the synthesis." 
 
 We do not think that the original datum as thus expressed was 
 given very clearly in the chapter on the " Data of Philosophy." 
 If it was, then we find the proposition, " There is a Persistent 
 Force or Power," alike the fundamental fact from which the 
 Formula of Evolution is derived and the fundamental con- 
 ception with which all other dicta of consciousness are con- 
 gruous. This is, of course, Mr. Spencer's own statement. The 
 difficulty we ourselves find is in understanding the meaning 
 of the word Force, and then in deriving the corollaries. We 
 have elsewhere stated that unless we can attach clear ideas to 
 the terms Force, Matter, Motion, &c., none of the propositions 
 in which they are used can be intelligible, and therefore such 
 propositions are incapable of expressing an item of knowledge, 
 a fact of cognition, a truth of Philosophy. They are out of 
 court altogether, and Mr. Spencer himself states that they 
 cannot be understood. 
 
 " There is a Persistent Force or Power ever changing its 
 manifestations." The more we think over this proposition, the 
 more incapable we find it of affording any satisfactory outcome. 
 It is said to have corollaries, but we struggle about inside the 
 hard bounds of our prison-house, and we cannot get out of it. 
 Force shows no inclination to solidify into Matter or to mani- 
 fest itself in Feeling, and we do not know that Motion even 
 is a necessary mode of Force. 
 
 Section 192 is a general vindication of unity and a challenge. 
 
 " If it can be shown that the Persistence of Force is not a 
 datum of consciousness ; or if it can be shown that the several 
 laws of Force above specified are not corollaries from it ; or if 
 
176 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 it can be shown that, given these laws, the redistribution of 
 Matter and Motion does not necessarily proceed as described ; 
 then, indeed, it will be shown that the theory of Evolution has 
 not the high warrant here claimed for it. But nothing short 
 of this can shake the general conclusions arrived at." 
 
 To this challenge we have previously replied by anticipation. 
 We deny that the proposition predicating Persistence as an 
 attribute of Force — Force itself being unknowable — has any 
 corollaries, and we do not hold that the quantitative Persistence 
 of Force is a datum of consciousness. 
 
 Section 193 is a re-statement of the unification effected 
 throughout all knowledge by the theory of the Persistence of 
 Force. 
 
 "Given the Persistence of Force, and given the various 
 derivative laws of Force, and there has to be shown not only 
 how the actual existences of the inorganic world necessarily 
 exhibit the traits they do, but how there necessarily result 
 the more numerous and involved traits exhibited by organic 
 and super-organic existences — how an organism is evolved? 
 what is the genesis of human intelligence 1 whence social 
 progress arises 1 " 
 
 This places the unification of knowledge and the attainment 
 of the goal of Philosophy on the basis of the definition on 
 p. 541 rather than on the attainment of congruity of know- 
 ledge. 
 
 Section 194 is a repudiation of Materialism as ordinarily under- 
 stood. With the statement and argument in this section we find 
 we entirely agree. We believe there is as much mystery in the 
 nature of the relations of Matter and Motion as there is in the 
 nature of sentiency, in the relations of body with body, or in 
 the relations of body with consciousness. Our contention is 
 that in the face of so much mystery no unification of knowledge 
 such as that described in § 193 and § 186 is possible, i.e., an 
 unification which shall show the necessary sequence of the traits 
 of all existences, both inorganic, organic, and super-organic, from 
 some primordial homogeneity. If we say there is the Persistence 
 of Force, and then that there is Matter and Motion, logic stands 
 impotently staring at propositions made up of symbols utterly 
 
 DIGRESSION. 
 
 ^77 
 
 incomprehensible, and cannot set to work till the ghosts depart 
 and comprehensible realities only are left. Even supposinc^ that 
 we agree with Mr. Spencer that the controversy as between 
 Spiritualism and Materialism is merely a war of words, still it 
 does not follow that we can formulate all phenomena in terms 
 of Matter, Motion, and Force. And if we do, then one of two 
 things happens. Either, first, we attach no definite meaning to 
 
 the words, and they are mere symbols without much content 
 
 the playthings of inquiring philosophers ; or, secondly, we must 
 insist that all the facts of the universe should be explained 
 in terms of Matter, and Motion, and Force, according to the 
 accepted meanings of these terms, and this is obviously a mate- 
 rialistic interpretation. In the former case explanation is clearly 
 acknowledged to be impossible ; in the latter it is insufficient 
 
 Therefore we see no injustice in pressing upon Mr. Spencer, 
 notwithstanding all his disclaimers, the charge of Materialism 
 as ordinarily understood ; and he can only escape it by having 
 recourse to Mysticism— a confession of the inefficiency of any 
 formula to explain all that he requires a Philosophy to explain, 
 and a resort to a Power that cannot be understood 
 
 It must be remembered that we entered upon this examina- 
 tion of the " Summary and Conclusion " in the " First Prin- 
 ciples " for the purpose of ascertaining if the method of the 
 unification of knowledge propounded in the " Psychology " was 
 really identical with the method of unification propomided at 
 p. 541 of the "First Principles." We found that an attempt 
 was made to identify, or rather to comprehend, the two methods 
 by inclusion in a larger proposition than either of them, viz., in 
 the proposition that " There exists an Unknowable Power, ever 
 changing its manifestations ; " and our conclusion respecting 
 that method of unifying knowledge was that it was ineffective^ 
 because it had no meaning and no corollaries. Indeed, one 
 might just as weU say that the alphabet is an unification of 
 knowledge, since all knowledge is contained in its ever-varying 
 changes and combinations. One would obtain just as much in"^ 
 formation out of the one proposition as out of the other. And 
 as to Force— there is just as much efficiency in the magician's 
 potent word "Abracadabra." 
 
 !fi 
 
178 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 We therefore find that the only unification between the 
 two methods for unifying knowledge is a mystical and in- 
 comprehensible one, and that if either of them is separately 
 able to accomplish it, they must be considered separately. The 
 one we fully considered in our former criticism, and found it 
 utterly impotent. The other we think we have now also shown 
 to be inefficient ; but we must proceed further with our conside- 
 ration of it in the part of the " Psychology " we have selected 
 for our present study. 
 
 (c.) Remmption of the Study of Part VIL of the « Psychology" 
 
 It must be remembered that we proceeded with our exami- 
 nation of " Psychology," part vii., up to p. 310. To return to 
 that page, we are reminded (line 18) that the organised con- 
 ceptions forming the Data of Philosophy were only accepted 
 provisionally; it is also explained that throughout the pre- 
 vious works composing the system of Synthetic Philosophy 
 these organised conceptions have been assumed; and that all 
 the detailed phenomena have been found to be congruous with 
 such assumptions. We are then informed that "we are now 
 called upon to reconsider these provisional assumptions . . . 
 the question here to be met is, whether they admit of being 
 unified * with the coherent body of conclusions to which accep- 
 tance of them has led us." ..." In other words, we have to 
 take up the vexed question of Subject and Object. The rela- 
 tion between these, as antithetically-opposed divisions of the 
 entire assemblage of manifestations of the Unknowable, was 
 
 our datum." 
 
 We would have the reader carefully consider what he is about 
 here. A transformation of the argument seems to be going on, 
 and it is necessary to be watchful. The transformation seems 
 
 to be this : — 
 
 Our object, as stated in the first half of p. 310, is the "uni- 
 fication of knowledge." Having abandoned the unification of 
 
 * Query, does "unified" mean merely "shown to be non -contradictory," 
 or does " unification " mean that they are both the necessary result of 
 some common original activity ? 
 
 EXAMINATION OF THE ''PSYCHOLOGY.'' 
 
 179 
 
 knowledge as an unification of sequences by means of the 
 Formula of Evolution, we seek it now in the establishment of 
 congruities between organised primordial experiences and all 
 the other dicta of consciousness. After a reference to the " Data 
 of Philosophy," where these primordial assumptions are fully set 
 out, Mr. Spencer states, in the second half of p. 310, that 
 " Since then we have been occupied in carrying on the unifica- 
 tion indicated, ... we are now called upon to reconsider these 
 provisional assumptions." " The process of unification . . . has 
 brought us at length to these assumptions themselves ; and the 
 question here to be met is, whether they admit of being unified 
 with the coherent body of conclusions to which acceptance of 
 them has led us ... it becomes needful to look closely at these 
 postulates, and to test the arguments of those who deny their 
 validity." 
 
 So far we understand our author. There were certain postu- 
 lates assumed provisionally, and indeed necessarily, for they 
 were such that the mind could not move without them any more 
 than the body could move without the aid of its limbs ; and 
 we are now called upon to re-examine these postulates which 
 were thus only assumed provisionally, our object being to test 
 their validity. This is to be done by seeing if they are con- 
 gruous with the coherent body of conclusions to which acceptance 
 of them has led us. 
 
 Waiving the question as to the necessity and propriety of 
 judging the validity of postulates by the congruity of their 
 logical results with themselves, we take Mr, Spencer's statement 
 as it stands. To do what he wishes evidently requires that 
 the postulates to be thus tested should be carefully enumerated 
 in definite language, and then, on the other hand, that the 
 coherent body of conclusions by which they are to be tested 
 should be summarised in some clear and formal statement. 
 When that is done, we shall have to compare the two, and find- 
 ing that the logical results of the postulates are congruous with 
 them, we shall know that the postulates themselves are valid 
 and trustworthy. 
 
 But if the reader expects this course to be pursued by Mr. 
 Spencer, he will be disappointed. On p. 311 all the postulates 
 
i8o SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 are arbitrarily " unified " into one datum, and this is not the 
 old favourite " Power or Force continually changing its mani- 
 festations," but it is the relation between subject and object as 
 antithetically opposed divisions of the entire assemblage of 
 manifestations of the Unknowable, which was our datum. The 
 plural is changed into the singular ; the whole is unified into 
 one of its parts ; and the congruity sought must be between this 
 one datum and the coherent body of conclusions before referred 
 to. In the next sentence, indeed, it seems to be inferred that 
 all this coherent body of conclusions has been derived from this 
 single datum, and not from all or any of the others we have 
 had to consider ; for Mr. Spencer says, " The fabric of conclu- 
 sions built upon it must be unstable if this datum can be proved 
 untrue or doubtful." 
 
 Now the consideration in question may be essential to Philo- 
 sophy, but surely this is not the unification of Philosophy, nor 
 is it the mode of unification of knowledge which Mr. Spencer 
 has previously set out on page 310, and which we have just 
 examined. While one side of the comparison is ignored alto- 
 gether — i.e., " the coherent body of conclusions," to which the 
 acceptance of the primordial data led us — on the other side these 
 primordial postulates or primary conceptions are all most unwar- 
 rantably and unjustifiably amalgamated into the narrow limits 
 of a single datum, and the whole question is transformed into 
 one respecting the validity of the distinction between Subject 
 and Object, and the reality of the existence of these two. 
 
 If this were logical and allowable, it would follow that the 
 accomplishment of this task would prove the congruity of all 
 the primary assumptions or postulates with the coherent body 
 of their logical results, and the accomplishment of this task we 
 are to take for granted It is one of Mr. Spencer's principal 
 characteristics that he states very clearly what has to be done 
 and then fails to do it. But what can we expect of any one 
 who would grasp the universe in his arms perpetually ? Some- 
 times the world of feeling eludes his hold; sometimes the 
 physical universe still goes astray. 
 
 It is clear that our logical continuity has come to a stop. We 
 abandon the comparison and verification we had intended, and 
 
 THE FINAL QUESTION. 
 
 181 
 
 which was to have been the final unification of knowledge, and 
 now set out to follow Mr. Spencer in new and disconnected 
 lines of thought. 
 
 (d.) The Final Question, 
 
 Collecting ourselves for a fresh start, we find the above head- 
 ing to the chapter, and are refreshed. We have come across so 
 many apparent finalities, and found they were not final, that 
 we are glad to see it stated in a formal way that we have 
 reached the final question at last. And we take it to be ex- 
 pressed in § 387, p. 311, viz., " The vexed question of Subject 
 and Object." The question allowing of an affirmative or nega- 
 tive reply would seem to be this : — 
 
 " Are Subject and Object antithetically opposed divisions of 
 the entire assemblage of manifestations of the Unknowable ? " 
 
 Our first inquiry must be. Is this a fair statement of the 
 " vexed question," or is it a statement which, by including too 
 much, or tacitly asserting some theory, would not be accepted by 
 all philosophers as a proper statement of the controverted point ? 
 But Mr. Spencer asks us to be satisfied with this statement of 
 the question, and to accept it as one which the idealist, the 
 sceptic, the dualist, and the realist would all recognise. 
 
 If it is answered in the negative, Mr. Spencer states that, so 
 far as he is concerned, ** The fabric of conclusions built upon it 
 must be unstable if this datum can be proved either untrue or 
 doubtful." 
 
 The importance of this as a " final question " is not apparent, 
 but we proceed with Mr. Spencer's course of thought. This 
 leads us through Chapters II., III., and IV., which deal respec- 
 tively with the assumptions, words, and reasonings of metaphysi- 
 cians, who are here taken as Idealists. Chapters V., VI., VII, 
 and VIII. are justifications of Kealism ; Chapters IX. to XIIL 
 deal with the test of validity— all these chapters being neces- 
 sary to the elucidation of the argument, and leading up to 
 Chapter XIV., the Positive Justification of Realism, a short 
 chapter, which is elaborated in Chapters XV., XVI, and XVII. , 
 which latter expounds " The Completed Differentiation of Sub-' 
 ject and Object." We have not thought it necessary to enter 
 
i82 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 upon a minute examination of these chapters, because we do 
 not see much to disagree with, and because they do not seem 
 to present salient points for criticism so far as regards our main 
 object of examination, viz., the unification of knowledge to be 
 attained by the recognition of the two classes of manifestations, 
 or in any other way. The result of all these chapters appears to 
 be summarised and expressed in the concluding paragraph of 
 Chapter XVII., thus :— 
 
 "The general result is that the vivid aggregate, both as mani- 
 festing passive resistance and as manifesting active energy, 
 inevitably comes to have associated with it in consciousness, 
 the idea of power, separate from, but in some way akin to, the 
 power which the faint aggregate perpetually evolves within 
 
 itself." 
 
 This general result, then, is, after all, very ambiguous, and 
 therefore not very efficient in the unification of knowledge, 
 except upon the principle that the Knowable can only be pro- 
 perly understood by means of our ideas of the Unknowable. In 
 order to understand the passage just quoted, we have to under- 
 stand the power which the faint aggregate perpetually evolves 
 within itself, and then we have to form some idea of " akm- 
 ness," and attribute the same kind of power thus manifested to 
 the vivid aggregate. The result of this attribution would be 
 widely various, according to the different conceptions of the 
 power which the faint aggregate perpetually evolves within 
 
 itself. 
 
 But we now proceed to the study of Chapter XVIII., which 
 seems to require a detailed examination. It is upon the " De- 
 veloped Conception of Object." 
 
 It is here pointed out in §§ 347. 34^, that the impression 
 we call resistance *' is the primordial, the universal, the ever- 
 present constituent of consciousness." " It is primordial in the 
 sense that it is an impression of which the lowest orders of 
 creatures show themselves susceptible." ... " It is universal, 
 both as being cognisable by every creature possessing any sen- 
 sitiveness, and usually as being cognisable by all parts of the 
 body of each." ... " It is ever present, inasmuch as every 
 creature, or, at any rate, every terrestrial creature, is subject to 
 
 THE FINAL QUESTION. 
 
 183 
 
 it during the whole of its existence." And it was shown that 
 this, consequently, " becomes the mother-tongue of thought, in 
 which all the first cognitions are registered, and into which all 
 symbols afterwards learned are interpre table." 
 
 This is evidently another first primordial datum, and is a very 
 useful passage, because it gives us some clue by which to work 
 out the use and value of the symbols which we have been con- 
 stantly using in the course of our studies. It is a kind of key 
 to the interpretation of the symbols Matter, Motion, Force, 
 Evolution, Dissolution, Integration, &c. We find that they 
 have all to be interpreted into ** the impression we call resist- 
 ance," and we find that all the " first cognitions," which we pre- 
 sume to be the fundamental data of philosophy, the primary 
 assumptions, the original postulates,* are " registered " in this 
 " impression of resistance." To this interpretation and registra- 
 tion we shall recur at a more convenient point. We must not 
 allow too many digressions to mar the consecutiveness of our 
 criticism. Mr. Spencer next says : — 
 
 " Hence along with the segregation of our states of conscious- 
 ness into vivid and faint, the consciousness of something which 
 resists comes to be the general symbol for that independent 
 existence implied by the vivid aggregate." 
 
 Here we notice that "the consciousness of something 
 which resists " comes to be " the general symbol " of external 
 existence. 
 
 Again, " We have just seen that mutual exploration of our 
 limbs, excited by ideas and emotions,! establishes an indissoluble 
 cohesion in thought between active energy as it wells up from the 
 depths of our consciousness^ and the equivalent resistance opposed 
 to it ; as well as between this resistance opposed to it and an 
 equivalent pressure in the part of the body which resists. Hence 
 the root-conception of existence beyond consciousness, becomes 
 that of resistance 2?^ws some force which the resistance measures." 
 
 * " In brief, our postulates are : An Unknowable Power ; the existence 
 of knowable likenesses and diflferences among the manifestations of that 
 Power ; and a resulting segregation of the manifestations into those of Sub- 
 ject and Object." — First Principles, p. 157. 
 
 t Elsewhere Mr. Spencer repudiates Feeling as a factor in Biology. 
 
 
1 84 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 The statement seems to be this, we have the active conscious 
 energy + the physical forces of the exploring limb = the resist- 
 ance of the explored limb, i.e., " a force which the resistance 
 measures." This, firstly, implies a correlation of conscious force 
 with physical forces — a theory not recognised by scientists. 
 Secondly, it exhibits a confusion between the modes of the 
 physical forces. Thirdly, it fails to show the correlation be- 
 tween the forces of mutual resistance of limbs and the impres- 
 sion of resistance. Fourthly, it fails to explain the dififerentia- 
 tion of feelings in terms of the differentiations of resistances. 
 
 Mr. Spencer endeavours to reduce all knowledge to the rela- 
 tions of two factors. Object and Subject. Philosophy requires 
 their unification as a corollary from one fundamental proposi- 
 tion. If this can be done, then the final proposition must be 
 formed from the Persistence of Force, from which object and 
 subject must as corollaries be derived. This Persistence of Force 
 has many corollaries; but we submit that subject and object 
 are not logically deducible from it. 
 
 Mr. Spencer proceeds to say — 
 
 **This essential element in our consciousness of the vivid 
 aggregate, is also the essential element in our consciousness of 
 each part distinguished as an individual object. The unknown 
 correlative of the resistance opposed by it, ever nascent in 
 thought under the form of muscular strain— the unknown 
 correlative which we think of as defying our efforts to crush 
 or rend the body, and therefore as that which holds the body 
 together, is necessarily thought of as constituting body. On 
 remembering, &c. ... we shall see clearly that this unknown 
 correlative of the vivid state we call pressure, symbolised in the 
 known terms of our own efforts, constitutes what we call mate- 
 rial substance." 
 
 This we can only interpret as meaning those mutual attrac- 
 tions according to known or ascertainable laws of chemical 
 elements, causing combinations of such coherency that chemical 
 elements otherwise combined, and forming an individual coher- 
 ent body under the direction of the Will, are unable to dispart 
 them. The nature of the coherency of the external body and 
 of the body seeking to dispart it is the same, viz., chemical and 
 
 THE FINAL QUESTION. 
 
 i8s 
 
 cohesive forces of the elements which produce the formation of 
 diversely coherent bodies ; but the nature of the Will being 
 unexplained does not imply an equivalence either of Will or 
 Force, or anything else in the external existence. Nor does the 
 aggregation of the elementary substances in any case imply con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 Section 467 gives us a definition of Existence as the permanent 
 in the midst of that which has no permanence. Not that the 
 definition is very clear, nor that it is of any practical utility. 
 
 Section 468 requires careful study. 
 
 " On changing from passivity to activity — on evolving* the 
 feeling which excites muscular motion, and using the limbs 
 for mutual exploration, this partial differentiation is completed. 
 For such exploration shows that muscular tension, resistance, 
 and pressure, are correlatives and equivalents ; that the vivid 
 aggregate can initiate two out of these three correlatives — the 
 pressure and the resistance ; and that these imply a something 
 equivalent to the third." 
 
 The reasoning is this : — Firstly, we have muscular tension, 
 resistance, and pressure, as three correlatives. Secondly, of 
 these the vivid aggregate (i.e., external existence) can initiate 
 (i.e., render us conscious of) two, namely, pressure and resist- 
 ance. Thirdly, these two correlatives imply a something equi- 
 valent to the third, namely, to the muscular tension. 
 
 We find a great diflficulty in understanding this. Is muscular 
 tension subjective or objective 1 Is it part of the vivid or the 
 faint aggregate ? The nearest approach we can make to a repre- 
 sentation of the state of the case is that muscle being composed 
 of nitrogen, &c., organised in a particular way, is caused by some 
 incomprehensible power to press against some external object, 
 or some other part of the body of which itself forms a part, 
 and is then met by a resistance. Now these are external 
 existences to each other. The active energy which evolved the 
 feeling which caused the muscular tension is incomprehensible. 
 But it is not said that this active energy, nor the evolved 
 feeling, requires any correlative ; but it is said that the mus- 
 cular tension implies a something. It is indeed said that 
 
 * Used in the popular sense, and not as defined in " First Principles." 
 
1 86 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 pressure and resistance imply a something equivalent to the 
 third, i.e., muscular tension, but it is difficult to see the necessity 
 for such an implication. Perhaps it is thus : the muscular ten- 
 sion causes the pressure ; this implies a something which causes 
 the resistance. The argument takes it for granted that there must 
 be an equivalence between the cause of the pressure and the cause 
 of the resistance. If we take, firstly, the cause of the resistance, 
 we should say that it was due to the mutual attractions of 
 ultimate units constituted into separate and diversified bodies, 
 according to shapes, sizes, modes, and rates of motion, which 
 diversities are traceable to the original physical laws of attrac- 
 tion and repulsion of these ultimate units ; and if we ask for 
 the equivalent as the cause of the pressure, we should give the 
 same reply. And this reply would be true, save and except 
 the evolution of the feeling which caused the pressure— a plus 
 is here revealed. But if, on the other hand, we demand an equi- 
 valent for the pressure and its cause, we have to say it is met 
 with in resistance and its cause ; but for the cause of the resist- 
 ance we need go no further back than the laws of attraction and 
 resistance of ultimate units; and if equivalence is absolutely 
 demanded, our only course is to limit the cause of the pressure 
 to the cause of the resistance, or otherwise to expand the cause 
 of the resistance to the cause of the pressure, namely, Will— 
 a plus over and beyond merely physical explanations. 
 
 Mr. Spencer may suppose not only something equivalent in the 
 external world to conscious force, but something analogous to it. 
 This is a subject which is beyond the scope of our inquiry, for 
 it is clear that if Feeling is not a factor in Biology, our studies 
 are limited to the known relations of physical factors, and the 
 unification of knowledge is to be confined to terms thereof. If 
 consciousness and something analogous to it in the external 
 world are necessary to that unification, it is obvious that we 
 require to know more of this analogous force before we can 
 unify our knowledge. 
 
 But to proceed with our examination. "Hence the vivid 
 aggregate necessarily comes to be thought of as not simply 
 independent of the faint, but as being, like it, a fountain of 
 power. And this conception of it as a fountain of power, is 
 
 THE FINAL QUESTION. 
 
 187 
 
 made distinct by experiences of changes directly caused in us 
 by it, like those directly caused in us by our own energies." 
 
 The principal thought to master here is *' a fountain of 
 power." This evidently means from the context *' a cause of 
 changes." The faint aggregate is a " fountain of power," i.e., a 
 cause of changes. The vivid aggregate is also a " fountain of 
 power," i.e., a cause of changes. An aggregate to be a cause 
 of changes means that the items of the aggregate are so inter- 
 related as not to be in a state of equilibrium or mutual adjust- 
 ment, such as proximately exists in the case of the solar system, 
 and so precludes change.* The supposition of a faint aggregate 
 as a cause of change means nothing ; taken in itself as apart 
 from connection with the vivid aggregate, it is unknown ; and 
 in the latter connection it is a fountain of power — i.e., an ante- 
 cedent of changes in the vivid aggregate — only if it is indepen- 
 dent and not merely a concomitant ; and then, even if the laws 
 of its action are understood, the manner of the connection is 
 not understood, the " how " is mystery. If a man wills to pull 
 down an opposing scale, he can only do so according to the 
 relative weight of his body and the weight in the opposite scale. 
 It is a matter settled for him by the laws of attraction of bodies ; 
 and whether he stands in the scale and throws the tension of 
 his weight into the supporting chains, or hangs on to the beam 
 with his hands, and experiences the muscular tension caused by 
 the attraction of his body to the centre of the earth, the result 
 is the same ; his will, or his evolved feeling and his conscious- 
 ness of muscular tension, weigh nothing ; they find and imply 
 no equivalent in the weight on the opposite scale. 
 
 Hence it follows that the fountain of power in the vivid 
 aggregate and the fountain of power in the faint aggregate 
 mean no more than this, that each exhibits changes and implies 
 merely a cause or causes of changes, but towards an intelligible 
 unification of these changes there is no approach. 
 
 * If it means anything more than this — if it is taken to mean that the 
 items of the aggregate are caused, then it means that there is some other 
 fountain of power which caused them, t.«., laws of attraction and repulsion 
 of ultimate units ; or again, if we go further back still, we arrive at an 
 ultimate fountain of power, or ultimate cause, and " fountain of power " 
 means "ultimate cause." 
 
1 88 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 If herein the argument is in favour of a duality of the causes 
 of changes, it seems to be effective. 
 
 "The general conception thus formed of an independent 
 source of activity beyond consciousness, develops into a more 
 special conception when we examine the particular clusters of 
 vivid states aroused in us. For we find that each cluster, dis- 
 tinguished by us as an object, is a separate seat of the power 
 with which the objective world as a whole impresses us. We 
 find that while it is this power which gives unity to the cluster, 
 it is also this power which opposes our energies. And we also 
 find that this power, holding together the elements of the 
 cluster notwithstanding the endlessly- varied changes they 
 undergo in consciousness, is therefore thought of by us as per- 
 sisting, or continuing to exist, in the midst of all these mani- 
 festations which do not continue to exist." 
 
 Here we start with the idea of "an independent source of 
 activity beyond consciousness." We not only recognise activi- 
 ties beyond consciousness, and independent of consciousness — 
 I.e., the changes of the external world — but we recognise an 
 independent source of themu It does not seem to us that we 
 do recognise a source of them. But it also " develops into a 
 more special conception." Let us watch the development 
 of a general conception into a more special conception. " We 
 find that each cluster, distinguished by us as an object, is a 
 separate seat of the power with which the objective world as a 
 whole impresses us. We find that while it is this power which 
 gives unity to the cluster, it is also this power which opposes 
 our energies." If we start with the power which opposes our 
 energies, we find it to be a specialised mode of the attraction of 
 ultimate units. The temporary unity of any object is due to the 
 accidents of the law of attraction and repulsion of ultimate 
 units j and so long as no other body interferes with its stability, 
 it is a separate seat of the same power — i.e., the attraction of 
 matter — and has special relations according to the shapes, 
 sizes, modes, and rates of motion of the particles of which it 
 consists, with other separate states of the same power, viz., the 
 attractions and repulsions of ultimate units differently arranged 
 and combined. The single power is thus seen to be the alternate 
 
 THE FINAL QUESTION, 
 
 189 
 
 law of the mutual attractions and repulsions of ultimate units. 
 Any other " Power " we do not know in the external world ; it 
 is the only " independent source of activity " we can recognise 
 ** beyond consciousness." 
 
 " And we also find that this power holding together the 
 elements of the cluster ... is therefore thought of by us 
 as persisting . . . " 
 
 To proceed with the next paragraph. " So that these several 
 sets of experiences unite to form a conception of something 
 beyond consciousness which is absolutely independent of con- 
 sciousness ; which possesses power, if not like that in conscious- 
 ness yet equivalent to it; and which remains fixed in the 
 midst of changing appearances. And this conception, uniting 
 independence, permanence, and force, is the conception we have 
 of Matter." 
 
 We have shown that the previous considerations unite to form 
 a conception of something beyond and independent of conscious- 
 ness, namely. Matter — that is to say, if we call the laws of 
 attraction and repulsion of ultimate units Matter, or if we call 
 ultimate units acting under laws of attraction and repulsion 
 Matter, we have a conception at once of Matter and of that 
 external world and power beyond consciousness. So far this 
 is quite intelligible ; whether we call the ultimate units units 
 of matter or units of force or the chemical elements is quite 
 immaterial ; all we know of them is that they are separate 
 units, and attract and repel each other, and nothing more. The 
 forms in which we, then, know their combinations — as differen- 
 tiated aggregates — are merely the result of those primal laws, 
 and are the separate seats of the primal powers or forces called 
 attraction and repulsion ; and it is these which possess power 
 " which remains fixed in the midst of changing appearances." 
 
 Mr. Spencer says that this power, if not like that in conscious- 
 ness, is yet equivalent to it. Now, we do not see how any one 
 can possibly understand this assertion. What is the power he 
 refers to as in consciousness ? The power that is in conscious- 
 ness we take to be "our own energies," or " evolving the feeling 
 which excites muscular motion." Mr. Spencer does not say that 
 the " power " he speaks of in the external world and inde- 
 
« ' 
 
 II J 
 
 190 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 pendent of consciousness is like it; but it is, nevertheless, 
 equivalent to it. Equivalency is applied to numbers, spaces, 
 values, matter in motion mechanically, sometimes figuratively 
 to the meanings of words, &c. Power, as we have just ascer- 
 tained it to mean, as an external fact means the mutual attrac- 
 tion and repulsion of ultimate units, atoms, molecules, and 
 masses. Does Mr. Spencer mean that the power we are per- 
 sonally conscious of in the exercise of our own feelings and 
 energies has a mechanical value, and that the sum-total of all 
 conscious beings is equivalent to the sum-total of the power 
 exhibited over the attractions and repulsions of the material 
 world 1 Evidently there is no common measure by which to 
 judge of their equivalence ; and, again, before the existence of 
 consciousness there was nothing for the material world to be 
 equivalent with. The proposition that the external world pos- 
 sesses a power equivalent to that in consciousness is an impos- 
 sible conception. It may be practically correct in the experi- 
 ence of the weight of a book in our hand, where there is an 
 equivalence of exertion and weight, but it is only a temporary 
 equivalence, for our hand tires, and the book falls to the 
 ground. Or we put half a dozen upon our hands, and they obey 
 the law of gravitation immediately, and fall to the ground. In 
 this sense the power manifested in the external world is more 
 tJian an equivalent for that in consciousness, and therefore is 
 not equivalent. 
 
 It may be, however, that Mr. Spencer uses the term " equi- 
 valent " in a loose way for " analogous." There must be some- 
 thing in the resistance of inanimate matter analogous to what 
 we feel in the resistance we make to pressure. But this involves 
 an analysis of the " Ego." Is it more than the physical forces of 
 the organised mechanism ? If not, then the analogy between 
 the forces of the Ego and the forces of the external inorganic 
 world holds good. And if consciousness is merely a concomi- 
 tant, the analogy is not interfered with, for it is not a force, but 
 merely an unexplainable accompaniment. But if it is a force, 
 then the analogy does not hold good ; and if an analogy is neces- 
 sary, then there is a something behind the external forces ana- 
 logous to the conscious force of the organism. But what is the 
 
 THE FINAL QUESTION, 
 
 191 
 
 use of the supposition if all its manifestations of this force are 
 known as manifested 1 
 
 In §469 Object is described as the "unknown permanent 
 nexus which is never itself a phenomenon but is that which 
 holds phenomena together." 
 
 Subject, in like manner, is the unknown permanent nexus, 
 which is never itself a state of consciousness, but which holds 
 states of consciousness together. 
 
 Now, when Object is spoken of as a permanent nexus, it 
 means that the nexus of the properties of the chemical elements 
 is permanent, or at the furthest that the properties of the ulti- 
 mate units are permanent. Surely Mr. Spencer cannot mean 
 that every individual aggregate has an individual nexus or bond 
 constituting it an object, otherwise than as the result of the 
 varied forces which produced the combination ? 
 
 What is the meaning of the permanency of the Subject? 
 Apparently the permanent nexus of the Subject comes to an end 
 when the physical organisation with which it is connected 
 comes to an end. We do not know that we can recognise 
 anywhere " an unknown permanent nexus " which ever forms 
 the Subject. In fact, Mr. Spencer says it is unknown, and if 
 it is unknown, how can there be any meaning in our discourse 
 
 of it? 
 
 What Mr. Spencer means, however, is seen in the next para- 
 graph, and it only amounts to this, that as long as the organised 
 body lasts the Subject is permanent, and the nexus of the Sub- 
 ject is permanent notwithstanding all the changeful conscious- 
 ness of which it is the scene. But this is a different thing 
 altogether from the permanence of the power, force, &c., of the 
 independent, external, objective world, and is rather a considera- 
 tion affecting the nature of that unity of conscious life which 
 we call the Ego. 
 
 The further course of the argument shows the difference in 
 the treatment of the permanency of the Subject nexus and the 
 permanency of the Object nexus, for the discussion of the former 
 naturally leads us to the discussion of the Ego in § 470. 
 
 At the conclusion of this section, which is the end of the 
 chapter, there is a claim for "akin "-ship between the force 
 
\ 
 
 192 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 • 
 
 manifested in the Ego and the force manifested in the Non-ego,* 
 but it is badly and obscurely expressed, and does not make clear 
 the question how far the persistence of force is affected by the 
 variability of the quantity of conscious energy, nor how these 
 two modes can be derived as corollaries from the Persistence of 
 Force. 
 
 Here we refer to " Psychology," vol. i. p. 98, and find, with 
 respect to the Subject : — 
 
 " Now, however, we turn to a totally distinct aspect of our 
 subject. There lies before us a class of facts absolutely without 
 any perceptible or conceivable community of nature with the 
 facts that have occupied us. The truths here to be set down 
 are truths of which the very elements are unknown to physical 
 science. Objective observation and analysis fail us, and sub- 
 jective observation and analysis must supplement them. 
 
 " In other words, we have to treat of nervous phenomena, as 
 phenomena of consciousness. The changes which, regarded as 
 modes of the Non-ego^ have been expressed in terms of motion, 
 have now, regarded as modes of the Ego^ to be expressed in 
 terms of feeling. Having contemplated these changes on their 
 outsides, we have to contemplate them from their insides." 
 
 And again, "Psychology," vol. i. p. 140 : — 
 
 " Under its subjective aspect, Psychology is a totally unique 
 science, independent of, and antithetically opposed to, all other 
 sciences whatever." . . . "Mind still continues to us a some- 
 thing without any kinship to other things; and from the 
 science which discovers by introspection the laws of this some- 
 thing, there is no passage by transitional steps to the sciences 
 which discover the laws of these other things." 
 
 What, then, are the results of our examination of this chapter ? 
 It is to be regarded in two aspects, according to the point of 
 view from which dt is criticised. If it is studied with a view 
 
 * In Chap. XIX., p. 494, we find a reference to a previous chapter in the 
 " Psychology," thus : " In the next chapter, on the * Relativity of Relations 
 between Feelings,' it was similarly shown that no relation in conscious- 
 ness can ' resemble, or be in any way akin to, its source beyond conscious- 
 ness.' " We do not know that this statement involves a contradiction, but 
 it is rather puzzling. 
 
 THE FINAL QUESTION, 
 
 '93 
 
 to ascertain "how can there be found within consciousness 
 this notion of an existence that is not within consciousness 1 " 
 it may be regarded as a satisfactory and conclusive argument. 
 But on the other hand, if it be studied with a view to unifica- 
 tion of knowledge, an unification which shall enable us to 
 understand the connection and relations of all sequences, or 
 even only an unification which consists simply in the abolition 
 of incongruities of knowledge, it does not seem to be of any 
 value whatever, and it must be remembered that it was in 
 pursuance of this latter object that we entered upon the present 
 study. * 
 
 In the following chapter on Transfigured Realism, in which, 
 being the last of Part VII., one would naturally expect to find 
 a connection of the results with the object of the inquiry, we 
 find only a summary of the process of reasoning leading up to 
 the conclusions of Realism, and without the requisite argumen- 
 tative connection with p. 310. 
 
 The general summary is worth quoting on its own merits. 
 
 " The conclusion to which our General Analysis has brought 
 us, is in perfect harmony with these conclusions, yielded by 
 inductive inquiry at the outset. While sonie objective exist- 
 ence, manifested under some conditions, remains as the final 
 necessity of thought, there does not remain the implication 
 that this existence and these conditions are more to us than 
 the unknown correlatives of our feelings and the relations 
 among our feelings. The Realism we are committed to is one 
 which simply asserts objective existence as separate from, and 
 independent of subjective existence. But it aflSrms neither 
 that any one mode of this objective existence is in reality that 
 which it seems, nor that the connections among its modes are 
 objectively what they seem. Thus it stands widely distin- 
 guished from Crude Realism, and to mark the distinction it 
 may properly be called Transfigured Realism." 
 
 Mr. Spencer says in the last paragraph of Part VII. p. 502 — 
 
 "Thus ends our examination of the Ultimate Question. 
 We saw, when considering its nature, that Philosophy reaches its 
 goal when it establishes universal congruity (" First Principles," 
 Part II. Chap. I.) Before stirring a step towards this goal, 
 
 N 
 
> k 
 
 194 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 however, Philosophy had to assume the validity of certain 
 primary dicta of consciousness; since hefore there can be 
 thought there must be some data of thought. A general survey 
 brought us to the conclusion that the relation of Subject and 
 Object was a dictum of consciousness which must be thus 
 provisionally accepted. Accepting it, the process of establish- 
 ing congruities was pursued, until at length it brought us round 
 to the original dictum ; and we had then to consider whether 
 this could be absolutely justified. The foregoing chapters have 
 led us not only to the result that it harmonises with all other 
 dicta of consciousness, but also to the result that every ad- 
 verse proposition is absolutely and in every way incongruous 
 
 with them." 
 
 Here is to be noted some confusion of statements. 
 
 Philosophy had to assume certain dicta. 
 
 The relation of Subject and Object was a dictum, 
 
 Congruities were established with the original dictum. 
 
 The original dictum harmonises with all other dicta of con- 
 sciousness, i.e., both the other primary dicta and all the 
 secondary consciousnesses. 
 
 Therefore the relation of Subject and Object, being found 
 congruous with all other consciousnesses, primary and secondary, 
 affords the unification of knowledge, which is the goal of 
 Philosophy. 
 
 It is to be presumed that any other of the primary dicta of 
 consciousness — for there appear to be others treated in the same 
 -way — would also afford the unification of knowledge, which is 
 the goal of Philosophy. Philosophy is rich in methods, all 
 equally useless for any object of enlarging our definite and useful 
 knowledge, and all equally inefficient in informing us of our 
 place in the cosmical history. 
 
 After having thus settled '*The Ultimate Question" we come 
 to " The Final Question." 
 
 ** Finally, then, we resume this originally-provisional assump- 
 tion but now verified truth. Once more we are brought round 
 to the conclusion repeatedly reached by other routes, that 
 behind all manifestations, inner and outer, there is a Power 
 manifested. Here, as before, it has become clear that while the 
 
 SUMMARY OF SECTION. 
 
 195 
 
 nature of this Power cannot be known ... we learn that 
 the one thing permanent is the Unknowable Reality hidden 
 tinder all these changing shapes." 
 
 We confess we do not see anything in this leading to the uni- 
 fication of knowledge according to any of the various modes 
 proposed by Mr. Spencer. Neither the finaUty of the relation 
 of Subject and Object, nor the finality of an Unknowable 
 Power, are of any use to organise knowledge, and give it that 
 structural unity which is the characteristic of completed science, 
 and for which we look in a science of the sciences. 
 
 (e.) Summary of this Section. 
 
 The general consideration involved in this section is, whether 
 the problem of the unification of knowledge is rightly pro- 
 pounded by Mr. Spencer in the passage so often referred to by 
 us, in which it is placed in the explanation of all things and 
 events as resultants of original factors, requiring of us a system 
 of historical reconstruction, or whether it is to be rightly sought 
 in the correlation of the objective and the subjective, or by some 
 of the other methods of the class advanced in this section 1 It 
 is true it might be held that they are all identical, but cer- 
 tainly Mr. Spencer has not undertaken to explain that they are 
 so. Failing this unification, one class must be held to exclude 
 the other, and the student is in doubt which to pursue. But 
 of the two classes, the one we have just been considering does 
 not possess the greater value. The deductive or historical pro- 
 blem is the one of all-absorbing interest to humanity. 
 
 "With respect to the treatment of the subject by Mr. Spencer, 
 we have shown, we think, that he has not treated it with clear- 
 ness and logical continuity. The argument passes through many 
 phases, and is characterised by changefulness and uncertainty 
 of thought and language. In its final result, as an explanation 
 of the relations of Realism and Phenomenalism, we think it 
 exceedingly valuable, and if our object were other than the 
 examination of Mr. Spencer's system of the unification of know- 
 ledge, we should have more to say than this mere acknowledg- 
 ment of the substantial merits of his teachings on this subject. 
 
 We cannot help thinking that Mr. Spencer, in Part VII. of 
 
196 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 the Psychology, confounds a theory of knowledge with a theory 
 of the um'ficatian of knowledge. What he there advances is the 
 former, not the latter, although it professes to be the latter. 
 Yet his own criterion of the unification of knowledge is placed 
 not in forming a theory of knowledge, but in forming a cos- 
 mical reconstruction. We therefore consider that all the claims 
 made in this^part for effecting the unification of knowledge are 
 wrongly made, and rightfully appertain to a theory of know- 
 ledge, placing them therefore as only subordinate considerations 
 in the more general inquiry. 
 
 § 2. The Problem of the " Psychology" being a Consideration 
 of the Science of Psychology with Regard to its Place in 
 Mr. Spencer's Constructive Scheme. 
 
 The problem sought to be elaborated in the " Principles of 
 Psychology" may be gathered from Part I., Chapter VI., 
 «^stho° Physiology;" Chapter VIL, "The Scope of Psy- 
 chology ; " Part III., Chapters I. and XI., " Life and Mind as 
 Correspondence;" Part V., Chapters VI. to X., *'The Rela- 
 tion of Psychical Laws to the Physical Synthesis." 
 
 The problem to be solved from our point of view is the 
 affiliation of the Evolution of Pyschology upon Evolution in 
 general. Thereupon arises the question, What is Psychology ] 
 and what is meant by Evolution 1 
 
 (a.) Wliat is Psychology ? 
 
 We will first consider what Psychology is not. In the first 
 place, it is not Biology. The whole process of biological 
 evolution is a purely physical process, wrought out by the 
 action of environment upon organic masses, and, down to the 
 very minutest detail of the arrangements of the completed 
 orf^anism, the result of physical and chemical relationships under 
 the guiding law of that physical law of equilibration by 
 which a moving equilibrium adjusts its forces to counterbalance 
 external forces threatening its destruction. 
 
 When we come to study the " Biology," we shall find that 
 Feeling is carefully excluded as a factor, as indeed not being 
 
 WHAT IS PSYCHOLOGY ? 
 
 197 
 
 one of the circle of energies it is bound to be — for it is 
 incapable of doing work by changing into other forms of 
 energy. We must therefore understand that the action of 
 the organism throughout, including every nervous current 
 and every cerebral change, is part of an unbroken physical 
 sequence. With these sequences, therefore. Psychology has 
 nothing to do as a factor, that is to say, as an active agency 
 being the cause of change. 
 
 These actions of the organism, however, are accompanied 
 in great measure by subjective feelings. These feelings vary 
 qualitatively and quantitatively. They are found to be speci- 
 ally localised, and to vary in intensity with physiological con- 
 ditions. The study of these localisations and variations with 
 physical conditions is not, however, the science of Psychology, 
 but is called " iEstho-Physiology." 
 
 " iEstho-physiology has a position that is entirely unique. 
 It belongs neither to the objective world nor to the subjective 
 world ; but taking a term from each, occupies itself with the 
 correlation of the two." * 
 
 Mr. Spencer here very happily states the case, but he does 
 not tell us which are the two specific terms, nor does he attempt 
 to express the nature of their correlation. All that he has done 
 in the preceding chapter has had reference to the localisation 
 and the dependence of the variations of feelings. The generali- 
 sation is not attempted which would express the general relation 
 of subject and object. 
 
 We rather think Mr. Spencer considers such a generalisation 
 impossible, for at the commencement of the chapter he says — 
 
 " Now, however, we turn to a totally-distinct aspect of our 
 subject. There lies before us a class of facts absolutely with- 
 out any perceptible or conceivable community of nature with 
 the facts that have occupied us. The truths here to be set down 
 are truths of which the very elements are unknown to physical 
 science. Objective observation and analysis fail us ; and sub- 
 jective observation and analysis must supplement them. In 
 other words, we have to treat of nervous phenomena as pheno- 
 mena of consciousness. The changes which, regarded as modes 
 
 * Psychology, vol, i. p. 130. 
 
I !«; 
 
 198 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 « 
 
 of the Non Ego, have been expressed in terms of motion, have 
 now, regarded as modes of the Ego, to be expressed in terms of 
 
 feeling." * 
 
 Are we, then, to consider that the science of Psychology relates 
 to the subjective only, that is to say, to the distinguishment, 
 connections, order, and general relations of feelings, ideas, emo- 
 tions, (feci Is it merely the subjective mode of speaking of 
 the nervous and cerebral changes — changes which we have 
 already seen are wholly biological, and determined by the 
 physical interaction of the organism with its environment ? If 
 80, it is but a subjective aspect of physical processes which 
 somehow have that aspect, and since the determining causes 
 are wholly physical, are more properly to be regarded as coming 
 within the science of Biology. To treat them separately would 
 in this case be merely a matter of convenience ; for although 
 the real agencies are actions of the brain and nervous systems, 
 they are beyond the reach of our observation, and are only 
 known to us subjectively. 
 
 However, this does not accord with Mr. Spencer's definition 
 of Psychology, and we now approach the inquiry as to what is 
 meant by the term. For this purpose we study the chapter 
 on " The Scope of Psychology." It commences by a negation of 
 Biology and ^Estho-Physiology as included in the study. Biology 
 is regarded as a purely physical study ; " the direct meanings 
 of all the propositions set down have nowhere implied con- 
 sciousness or feeling; and, ignoring consciousness or feeling, 
 they have left out that which is tacitly or avowedly contained 
 in every proposition of Psychology." t This is a first approach 
 to a recognition of the contents of that science. Nevertheless, 
 it is distinct from ^stho-Physiology, because the latter is con- 
 fined to propositions expressive of relations of phenomena occur- 
 ring wholly within the organism. 
 
 Mr. Spencer proceeds to say that this is the case with regard 
 to Biology also. He endeavours to make out that the science 
 of Biology is a science complete within the limits of the 
 organism. He has to admit that "distinct or tacit reference 
 has, indeed, been made to some external force. . . . But such 
 
 ♦Psychology, Tol. i. p. 98. t Ibid, p. 130. 
 
 WHAT IS PSYCHOLOGY ? 
 
 199 
 
 references, vague or distinct, have been made merely because it 
 was needful to suppose something by which an organic change 
 was set up; not because this something had to be included 
 in the proposition set down, which in every case formulated an 
 internal relation only." * 
 
 " Now so long as we state facts of which all the terms lie 
 within the organism, our facts are morphological or physio- 
 logical, and in no degree psychological. Even though the 
 relation with which we are dealing is that between a nervous 
 change and a feeling, it is still not a psychological relation so 
 long as the feeling is regarded merely as connected with the 
 nervous change, and not as connected with some existence lying 
 outside the organism." 
 
 Mr. Spencer here seems to speak of Morphology and Physio- 
 logy as if they could be sciences in them.selves without reference 
 to the environment, and as if they could now be studied in 
 that old-fashioned isolated way; whereas the great object of 
 his work on Biology is to show that all the facts of that science 
 have been produced by the action of the environment on cer- 
 tain peculiarly constituted masses of matter, from which also 
 the subjective presumably results. Therefore we do not under- 
 stand the distinction which he proceeds to make. 
 
 " For that which distinguishes Psychology from the sciences 
 on which it rests, is, that each of its propositions takes account 
 both of the connected internal phenomena" {gn^ry, objective 
 or subjective?) "and of the connected external phenomena to 
 which they refer. In a physiological proposition an inner 
 relation is the essential subject of thought ; but in a psycho- 
 logical proposition an outer relation is joined with it as a 
 co-essential subject of thought. A relation in the environ- 
 ment rises into co-ordinate importance with a relation in the 
 organism. The thing contemplated is now a totally different 
 thing. It is not the connection between the internal pheno- 
 mena " {gttery, objective or subjective ?), " nor is it the connection 
 between the external phenomena ; but it is the connection be- 
 tween tliese two connections. A psychological proposition is 
 necessarily compounded of two propositions; of which one 
 
 * Psychology, vol I p. 113. 
 
200 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 concerns the subject and the other concerns the object; and 
 cannot be expressed without the four terms which these 
 two propositions imply. The distinction may be best ex- 
 plained by symbols. Suppose that A and B are two related 
 manifestations in the environment — say the colour and taste of 
 a fruit ; then so long as we contemplate their relation by itself, 
 or as associated with other external phenomena, we are occupied 
 with a portion of physical science. Now suppose that a and b 
 are the sensations produced in the organism by this peculiar 
 light which the fruit reflects, and by the chemical action of its 
 juice on the palate ; then, so long as we study the action of 
 the light on the retina and optic centres, and consider how 
 the juice sets up in other centres a nervous change known as 
 sweetness, we are occupied with facts belonging to the sciences 
 of Physiology and ^Estho-Physiology. But we pass into the 
 domain of Psychology the moment we inquire koto there comes 
 to exist within the organism a relation between a and h that 
 in some way or other corresponds to the relation between A and 
 B. Psychology is exclusively concerned with this connection 
 between (A B) and (a h) — has to investigate its nature, its 
 origin, its meaning, &c." * 
 
 Mr. Spencer then proceeds to combat the opinion that 
 Psychology is part of Biology, on the ground that all biolo- 
 gical structures and functions are produced by the intimate 
 actions of the environment upon organic masses and organ- 
 isms. " The life of every organism is a continuous adaptation 
 of its inner actions to outer actions ; and a complete interpre- 
 tation of the inner actions involves recognition of the outer 
 actions." f But Mr. Spencer thinks that " throughout Biology 
 proper, the environment and its correlated phenomena are either 
 but tacitly recognised, or, if overtly and definitely recognised, 
 are so but occasionally ; while the organism and its correlated 
 phenomena" {query, subjective?) "practically monopolise the 
 attention. But in Psychology, the correlated phenomena of the 
 environment are at every step avowedly and distinctly recog- 
 nised ; and are as essential to every psychological idea as are 
 the correlated phenomena of the organism." \ 
 
 * Psychology, vol. i. p. 134. t Ibid., p. 132. X Ibid., p. 134. 
 
 WHAT IS PSYCHOLOGY? 
 
 201 
 
 This reply is based upon the statical aspect of Biology, 
 whereas by no one more than by Mr. Spencer has Biology been 
 taught as a continuous process. And it is surprising to find 
 him say — 
 
 " In brief, then, the propositions of Biology, when they imply 
 the environment at all, imply almost exclusively its few general 
 and constant phenomena, which, because of their generality and 
 constancy, may be left out of consideration; whereas the pro- 
 positions of Psychology refer to its multitudinous, special, and 
 ever-varying phenomena, which, because of their speciality and 
 changeability, cannot be left out of consideration." * 
 
 Now, any one who will refer to the " Biology," and study the 
 detailed instances by which it is made clear that the whole of 
 the morphological and physiological history of every animal and 
 plant, down to the minutest detail, is the result of the action 
 of the environment upon the organism, and who is able to master 
 the general principle of biological equilibration as propounded 
 by Mr. Spencer, through which all this comes about, will be 
 astonished at such a passage as the foregoing from the pen of 
 the self-same writer. 
 
 However, this matter does not affect our present criticism. 
 Here our point of interest lies in studying the problem of " the 
 connection between these two connectio7is." On the one side we 
 have the objective connection (A B), and on the other side we 
 have the clearly subjective connection (a b). 
 
 The problem of Psychology is to ascertain how there comes 
 to exist within the organism the subjective connection (a b). 
 We note in the first place that it is a historical problem, " how 
 it comes to exist," and in this view of it we consider the true 
 and only manner in which it is to be regarded is with the 
 object of assigning its place with regard to evolution in general. 
 Our studies, as ^Mr. Spencer indicates, should be directed to an 
 inquiry as to " its nature, its origin, its meaning," &c. To this 
 we will recur, but in tKe meantime would point out that the 
 subjective connection (a b) only exists as the subjective aspect 
 of some physical arrangement of the cerebrum or nervous 
 system ; and if this cerebrum or nervous system, being part of 
 
 * Psychology, vol. i. p. 135. 
 
202 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 the physical organism, has been produced by ordinary biological 
 evolution, its subjective aspect can only come within the 
 purview of the science of " ^Estho-Physiology," and therefore 
 the origin of the connection (a b) is to be accounted for on its 
 objective side as the particular nervous arrangement (sym- 
 bolised by A b) produced by the object (A B), and the 
 only remaining question appertaining to the inquiry is as to the 
 nature, origin, and meaning of the subjective aspect of (a b) 
 which is symbolised by (a h). This mode of stating the inquiry 
 implies three sets of connections instead of two. The cause 
 (A B), the effect (a b), and the concomitant (a b). And it 
 results in the statement that every representation of the sub- 
 jective in italics is but the unaccountable concomitant of all 
 arrangements of the small capitals representing the result of 
 their interaction with the environment, symbolised by large 
 capitals, or of their own interaction. 
 
 Mr. Spencer next proceeds to dispute the demarcation of 
 Psychology from Biology by a sharp line. Evolution is one 
 and continuous. This is shown by a study of the relative 
 connections of the different sciences. 
 
 " Theoretically, all the concrete sciences are adjoining tracts 
 of one science, which has for its subject-matter the continuous 
 transformation which the Universe undergoes. Practically, how- 
 ever, they are distinguishable as successively more specialised 
 parts of the total science."* 
 
 "And Psychology is a specialised part of Biology, limited in 
 its application to the higher division of these peculiar aggregates, 
 and occupying itself exclusively with those special actions and 
 reactions which they display, from instant to instant, in their 
 converse with the special objects, animate and inanimate, amid 
 which they move." 
 
 We must say this is not very clear. As long as the actions 
 and reactions are the interrelations of the physical environment 
 with the physical organism, they come within the scope of 
 Biology, and the whole thing is complete in itself without 
 Psychology at all, as witness the work on Biology and the 
 exclusion of Feeling as a factor in these interrelations. Mr. 
 
 * Psychology, vol. i. p. 137. 
 
 WHAT IS PSYCHOLOGY? 
 
 203 
 
 Spencer enters upon an argument in which he calls some of 
 the complex results of simple factors "additional factors," 
 adding to the results of the previous complexity. By this 
 means he makes a broad distinction between Molecular Physics 
 and Chemistry, and by analogy implies a similar connection yet 
 difference between Biology and Psychology. 
 
 "In this way it is, then, that the conspicuous presence of 
 additional factors differentiates Psychology from Biology proper ; 
 although in Biology proper these factors make an occasional 
 appearance."* 
 
 There is evidently some confusion of statement in Mr. Spencer's 
 works as to what Psychology really is. Obviously it is a branch 
 of knowledge. Is it a knowledge of subjective impressions, 
 feelings, memories, &c., as a body of knowledge complete in 
 itself, and further added to by a knowledge of the physical 
 conditions under which they occur and with which they are 
 universally associated, and of which they are thereby one aspect, 
 although they have no place as factors in the interrelation or 
 changes of these physical concomitants 1 If so, then clearly, in 
 the absence of the knowledge by which, in pursuance of these 
 physical interrelations, the subjective arose, and in the absence 
 of any influence of the subjective upon the physical organism, 
 Psychology is a separate science, cut off from the hierarchy of 
 the sciences by a sharp line. 
 
 Is it, on the other hand, but a study of the higher complexi- 
 ties and organisation of the physically-constituted nervous 
 system by which the various incident motions are traced to 
 their effects upon multitudinous centres of nerve force and to 
 the regulative action of these centres, resulting eventually in 
 efferent currents of reaction upon the external world 1 If so, 
 then it is merely a higher branch of Biology. 
 
 Is it, again, a study of the connection between these two sets 
 of connections ? Then, as pointed out before, all we can do at 
 the present time is to note the relation of definite feelings with 
 special parts of the organism and of concomitant variations. 
 Until the general relation of feeling and physical change is 
 formulated, this knowledge is merely a body of unorganised 
 
 * Psychology, voL i. p. 140. 
 
204 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 facts not yet arrived at the dignity of a science. This would be 
 the science of ^Estho-Physiology. 
 
 If to this has to be added a knowledge of the relation of 
 bodies external to the organism, this knowledge is of two kinds, 
 one in regard to the physical relationships, and again in regard 
 to the manner in which external objects affect the subjective 
 percipient. But the former seems clearly a branch of physical 
 science, and the latter to be only capable of study interme- 
 diately through Biology and ^stho-Physiology — unless, indeed, 
 it is a branch of that unknown science, not yet formulated, 
 which will deal with the historic relationship of the objective 
 and the subjective. From all which we judge that Psychology 
 cannot yet be ranked in the deductive sequence of the sciences, 
 and that the unification of knowledge is not complete. 
 
 The fundamental problem is considered by Mr. Spencer, 
 when, in the chapter " On the Substance of Mind," he treats 
 of units of consciousness as in some way analogous to nervous 
 shocks (though more simple than them), and suggests a theory 
 of the differences of the sense-impressions as due to differences 
 in these nervous shocks. This is a reasonable and suggestive 
 hypothesis, but one which, until it is worked out in the formu- 
 lation of relations, ought not to be made too much of; and 
 failing that formulation, still leaves the history of the organism 
 completely within the range of physical science, the subjective 
 being something merely added to and incident upon the opera- 
 tion of the physical factors. 
 
 (b. ) What is Evolution ? 
 
 Having now considered what is meant by " Psychology," we 
 must next inquire what is meant by Evolution. 
 
 If by Evolution is meant a gradual growth from a state of 
 "indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent hetero- 
 geneity," then undoubtedly there may be proved to have taken 
 place such a development of correspondences, symbolised by 
 small capitals and by italics, as to attain a result more and 
 more representative of the ever-growing complexities of the 
 realities symbolised by the large capitals. The acceptance of 
 this truth involves, indeed, only the purely descriptive portion 
 
 WHAT IS EVOLUTION? 
 
 205 
 
 of the Formula of Evolution, but then the part of it which 
 does imply some connection of sequences is only applied by Mr. 
 Spencer in simple physical evolutions, and is practically of little 
 
 account. 
 
 Except in the definition of Evolution given in " First Prin- 
 ciples," Mr. Spencer seldom uses the word in the sense there 
 defined as the concentration of matter and the concomitant 
 dissipation of motion, but he universally employs it (like every- 
 body else) as meaning the advance from a state of homogeneity, 
 indefiniteness, and simplicity, to a state of definite, coherent 
 complexity. 
 
 The history of Mind accords with this idea. The ques- 
 tion is, does this similarity of modes of development constitute 
 an unification of knowledge ? Mr. Spencer seems to think it 
 does, for in his " General Synthesis " he considers it sufficient 
 to show this gradual growth of mind in the manner specified. 
 
 Perhaps this is hardly correct. Considering mind as part 
 of Biology, he shows not an independent but a dependent and 
 concomitant development of mind pari passu with the evolu- 
 tion of physical organisms, and then says, see how mental 
 evolution conforms to general evolution ! We submit that this 
 conformity of characteristics of development, however signifi- 
 cant it may be, does not bring Psychology within the deductive 
 process from original factors which the unification of know- 
 ledge requires. It is something, however, if the Evolution of 
 Psychology by natural growth is recognised. It is something 
 more if this development is found coincident with another order 
 of development. But still, the mere establishment of the fact 
 of Psychological Evolution is not an explanation of it, and until 
 it finds its place amongst the deductions from the properties of 
 original agencies, it cannot be held to rank in a system of 
 unified knowledge. 
 
 (c) Digression on Verbal Modes of Identifying Processes, 
 
 Before proceeding with an investigation of the second or true 
 mode of presentment of Evolution, let us consider the manner 
 in which the development of Psychology is identified verbally 
 with the processes of Biology, and thus the semblance of an 
 
2o6 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 identity of sequence wrought out. This is effected by the 
 employment of the same set of terms in the description of both 
 processes. It is for us to inquire if the likeness of process 
 giving warrant for the common methods of description is one 
 of similarity of process only, or one of identity of sequence. 
 
 For the study of this question we take Part III. of the 
 " Principles of Psychology," entitled " General Synthesis," com- 
 mencing with the idea of **Life and Mind as Correspondence," 
 and followed by chapters showing the development of this 
 correspondence from the direct and homogeneous, through 
 various accretions of heterogeneity of space, time, speciality, 
 generality, and complexity, eventuating in their co-ordination 
 and integration. 
 
 The primary relations between an organic mass and its 
 environment are direct— that is to say, are merely chemical and 
 physical; but when this mass has become a "moving equili- 
 brium," these direct equilibrations are overborne by the power 
 which the mass now possesses of adapting or rearranging its 
 structure or motions, so as to resist the disintegrative effect of 
 the direct equilibrations, and thus counterbalance force by 
 force. This is the special characteristic of all biological change, 
 and the ruling cause of all biological development. Therefore, 
 whenever an adaptation, rearrangement, or adjustment of an 
 organism to its environment is spoken of, it is this kind of 
 change which is referred to, the terms just mentioned being 
 merely used for variety of expression, but are really representa- 
 tive of the same thought. 
 
 The term " correspondence," which is the one made use of 
 so largely in the " General Synthesis " to cover the development 
 of Mind on the same method as the development of Life, is 
 but another term having the same reference. Vital chan^^es, 
 instead of being spoken of as biological equilibrations, are spoken 
 of as ''correspondences." Thus, speaking of the locomotion of 
 organisms, Mr. Spencer says — 
 
 " Thus then, the addition of mechanical changes to the changes 
 displayed by motionless organisms, is the addition of new inter- 
 nal relations in correspondence with new external relations." * 
 
 * Psychology, vol. L p. 298. 
 
 MODES OF IDENTIFYING PROCESSES, 
 
 207 
 
 Of course a correspondence is displayed, but the effect of 
 regarding the development in this indefinite manner is to 
 throw into obscurity the assigned cause of the change in the 
 special law of biological equilibration, and to bring forward a 
 general indefinite notion of correspondence which shall after- 
 wards cover psychological as well as physiological develop- 
 ments. 
 
 We could review each chapter, pointing out how this funda- 
 mental fault of the argument vitiates its teachings ; but to do 
 so would produce too great a bulk of criticism, and after all 
 that has already been done, the student will be able to take up 
 these points for himself. We might instance passages on pages 
 
 3oi» 304, 305* 3^9) 33o» &c. 
 
 There is a most singular passage on page 331 : — 
 " Out of the primordial irritability which (excluding the 
 indeterminate types that underlie both divisions of the organic 
 world) " {query y how then can it he primordial ?) " characterises 
 animal organisms in general, are gradually evolved those various 
 kinds of irritability which answer to the various attributes of 
 matter." ( What then are the various attributes of matter ?) 
 "The fundamental attribute of matter is resistance. The 
 fundamental sense is a faculty of responding to resistance." 
 (Query y what does "responding" mean ? What is sense, and how 
 does it originate^ and in what does it inhere ?) " And while in 
 the environment, associated with this attribute of resistance, are 
 other attributes " {note that tliese attributes are of a different 
 kind, and not composed of the fundamental attribute) "severally 
 distinctive of certain classes of bodies " {what they are we 
 shall see just now)] "in the organism there arise" {by Mr. 
 Spencer's law of biological equilibration ?) " faculties of respond- 
 ing to these other attributes — faculties which enable the 
 organism to adjust its internal relations to a greater variety of 
 external relations; faculties, therefore, which increase the 
 speciality of the correspondence. We see this not only in the 
 rise of the senses that are affected by the sapid, odorous, visible, 
 and sound-producing properties of things," &c. 
 
 We find, therefore, that Mr. Spencer considers bodies to 
 have the attributes or properties of producing odour, visibility, 
 
2o8 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 and sound, which properties are associated with, but are not 
 composed of, the fundamental attribute, resistance. We under- 
 stood that the latest teachings of science are to the effect that 
 sound, visibility, colour, &c., are merely the names of subjec- 
 tive sensations, the result of vibrations aerial and ethereal. 
 Surely Mr. Spencer does not mean to say that they are attri- 
 butes of matter, but only the relations of the series (a 5), &c., 
 to the series (a b), &c., which, again, are related to the series 
 (A B), &c. 
 
 If the fundamental sense is the response to fundamental 
 resistance, then the solution of the whole question is to be 
 found in some theory of the nature of the response. But to 
 say that the senses are an increase of the degree of subjective 
 correspondence (or response) is to throw no light upon the 
 explanation of the correspondence or the necessity for it, and, 
 as we have before said, the introduction of this term only tends 
 to confuse the consideration of the argument. Correspondence, 
 adaptation, and adjustment should all be abolished in favour 
 of the real ruling principle of biological equilibration as taught 
 by Mr. Spencer. 
 
 Eventually we come upon the term " integration," and would 
 ask what this means in relation to biological equilibration. 
 Is it one of its results 1 We could easily frame a theory of it 
 in relation to ordinary mechanical equilibration. But in Chap- 
 ter X. we have an account of the integration of correspondences. 
 Does this mean an integration of the series (a b), &c., or of the 
 series (a h), &c. The use of the word " integration " is no doubt 
 meant by Mr. Spencer to carry the mind back upon the For- 
 mula of Evolution. But we must remember that the integra- 
 tion taught there was the integration of matter, and we must 
 also remember that the essence of the formula was the con- 
 comitance of the dissipation of something, viz.. Motion. Now 
 in this case, if we have the series (a i), &c., in view, we have 
 not only no integration of Matter, but also no concomitant dissi- 
 pation of anything. Therefore if the present use of the word is 
 intended to convey the idea that we are here effecting the uni- 
 fication of knowledge, it is merely one of the simulations of 
 unification treated of in Chapter I. § 13. It is still more diffi- 
 
 MODES OF IDENTIFYING PROCESSES, 
 
 209 
 
 cult to say how psychological integration is related to Mr. 
 Spencer's law of biological equilibration ; and when we come 
 to consider the integration of psychological correspondences as 
 part of that process, we believe that we have arrived at a 
 problem of which we can form no conception, and which it is 
 impossible to solve. 
 
 Under cover of the term " correspondence," Mr. Spencer 
 elaborates his argument in a series of chapters, through which 
 the greater part of its course is carried on by means of physical 
 development, until in the end he is able to say : — 
 
 " Thus then we find illustrated in all ways the truth enun- 
 ciated at the outset, that the connexions among vital actions 
 directly or indirectly correspond with the connexions among 
 actions in the environment. That method by which we sought 
 out the fundamental fact on which to base a Synthetic Psycho- 
 logy, is justified by its results. On comparing the phenomena 
 of mental life with the most nearly allied phenomena — those of 
 bodily life — and inquiring what is common to both groups, a 
 generalisation was disclosed which proves on examination to 
 express the essential character of all mental actions. Kegarded 
 under every variety of aspect, intelligence is found to consist in 
 the establishment of correspondences between relations in the 
 organism and relations in the environment, and the entire 
 development of intelligence may be formulated as the progress 
 of such correspondences in Space, in Time, in Speciality, in 
 Generality, in Complexity." * 
 
 No doubt Psychology has made the development described, 
 no doubt Biology, including Morphology and Physiology, has 
 made the development described, but while for the latter there 
 is a hypothetical explanation in the special law of biological 
 equilibration, there is none whatever for the former, and it is 
 this which is looked for in a scheme of unified knowledge. To 
 call the psychological developments by a term which may be 
 applied as descriptive of the biological series, but which does 
 not disclose the law of their connection with the preceding and 
 continuous evolution, is not to find a place for Psychology in 
 Evolution in general. 
 
 * Psychology, vol. L p. 385. 
 
 i 1] 
 
2IO SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Nevertheless, Mr. Spencer considers this has been accom- 
 plished, and says — 
 
 " The presentation of Intelligence as an adjustment of inner 
 to outer relations .... leaves us with a conception which 
 obviously requires further development. The various degrees 
 and modes of Intelligence known as Instinct, Memory, Keason, 
 Emotion, Will, and the rest, must be translated in terms of 
 this conception. If, as above alleged, the several grades of 
 Mind and its component faculties are phases of the corre- 
 spondence and factors in the correspondence, they can be 
 interpreted as such, and to complete the argument it is needful 
 that they should be so interpreted." * 
 
 To this task Mr. Spencer forthwith proceeds in Part lY. It 
 is sufficient, however, for our purpose if we confine our considera- 
 tions to the essential preliminaries of such an explanation. 
 
 We do not quite understand Mr. Spencer's position when he 
 says that the psychological relations take part in the determin- 
 ing of events " as factors in the correspondence." Probably he 
 does not wish to convey this meaning, as he has elsewhere ex- 
 cluded all modes of feeling from the factors of Biology, and he 
 nowhere teaches that a Psychic Force finds its place in the 
 circle of the physical energies by which the work of the organ- 
 ism is carried on, and we know already that no such mode is 
 included in Balfour Stewart's list of energies. 
 
 The whole onus of the affiliation of Psychology upon Evolu- 
 tion in general is thrown upon the term " correspondence," and 
 upon the translation of all biological developments into the 
 same terms. It is evident, however, that this is a verbal and 
 not a logical connection. To make it a logical connection it 
 would be necessary to show that all correspondences were 
 identical in their law of origin, and since all biological corre- 
 spondences are occasioned from the law by which moving 
 equilibria generate arrangements for counterbalancing destruc- 
 tive forces, it would have to be shown that not only the rela- 
 tions (a b) were thus generated, but that the relations (a b) also 
 were thus originated, and that they reacted as counterbalancing 
 forces like the arrangement (a b). 
 
 • Psychology, vol I p. 392. 
 
 MODES OF IDENTIFYING PROCESSES. 
 
 211 
 
 In the first place, amongst the constituents of the organism 
 we cannot recognise anything which could be transformed into 
 the relation (a 6), and in the second, since it is out of the list of 
 Physical Energies, we do not see that it could react against its 
 external originator. 
 
 Mr. Spencer says : — 
 
 " These two progressions are in truth parts of the same pro- 
 gression. Without dwelling upon the fact that the primordial 
 tissue displays the several forms of irritability in which the 
 senses originate, and that the organs of sense, like all other 
 organs, arise by differentiations of this primordial tissue — with- 
 out dwelling on the fact that the impressions received by these 
 senses form the raw materials of intelligence, which arises by 
 combination of them and must therefore conform to their law 
 of development — without dwelling on the fact that intelligence 
 advances pari passu with the advance of the nervous system, 
 and has the same law of development as the other systems — 
 without dwelling on these facts, it is sufficiently manifest that 
 as the progress of organisation and the progress of correspon- 
 dence between the organism and its environment are but 
 different aspects of the evolution of Life in general, they cannot 
 fail to harmonise. In this organisation of experiences which 
 constitutes evolving Intelligence, there must be that same con- 
 tinuity, that same sub-division of function, that same mutual 
 dependence, and that same ever-advancing consensus, which 
 characterise the physical organisation," * 
 
 If the argument commenced with the properties of primordial 
 tissue, and this tissue were known to have the two sets of pro- 
 perties of balancing itself physically with the environment 
 according to Mr. Spencer's law of moving equilibria, and of 
 organising itself pari passu in a subjective manner, then the 
 whole of Mr. Spencer's argument would hold good. But since 
 he has set himself the task of explaining the order of the 
 cosmos from a simple state of unorganised matter consistino* 
 of the chemical elements, we never get as far as the primor- 
 dial tissue or its irritability, while the law of biological equili- 
 bration — a purely physical one — is also never established. 
 
 * Psychology, voL I p. 388. 
 
212 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Many other objections could be raised, but contenting our- 
 selves for the present with showing the merely verbal natui-e 
 of the unification developed in Part III., we proceed to a con- 
 sideration of the affiliation of Psychology upon that view of 
 the unification of knowledge which presents it to us as the 
 reconstruction of the cosmos from original factors, or what is 
 the same thing, deducing it in a series of corollaries from 
 primordial truths. 
 
 (d.) P^chology Consider ed as a Direct Deduction from the 
 
 Persistence of Force. 
 
 Are we to deduce Psychology from the doctrine of the Per- 
 sistence of Force? Manifestly, if Force is unknowable the 
 logical process is an impossibility. Are we, again, to deduce it 
 from Professor Balfour Stuart's list of Forces and Energies? 
 It will become merely a physical problem shortly to be con- 
 sidered. 
 
 It is a curious question, and one deserving of consideration, 
 whether the Subjective is a mode of Force. In the face of Mr. 
 Spencer's disavowal of Feeling as a factor in Biology, it is, in 
 regard to Mr. Spencer's Philosophy, a superfluous question; 
 for in that Philosophy the whole series of changes are within 
 the constant quantity of the Forces and Energies of Nature, 
 not as the Unknowable, but as actually manifested in knowable 
 modes of Force quantitatively persistent and equal. 
 
 For those, however, who think that passion, emotion, will, 
 &c., are not mere concomitances of molecular changes within 
 the physical organism, it is an interesting, curious, and difficult 
 question about the action of these subjective feelings, considered 
 as beyond the absolute quantity of Force, and yet regarded as 
 having power with which to act upon the energies of the phy- 
 sical organism. Whence and how do they derive this power, 
 and how come they to be specifically differentiated as tending 
 to act thus and thus ? 
 
 Is it possible, again, to suppose that the physical energies 
 are capable of transformation into subjective forces? Is Energy 
 capable of becoming under certain circumstances self-conscious ? 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSICAL HISTORIES. 213 
 
 Is there an element of Consciousness, or unorganised Feeling, 
 in all operations of Force or Energy ? 
 
 We shall see in the next sub-section that Mr. Spencer con- 
 siders that mind cannot be explained by a series of deductions 
 from the Persistence of Force. 
 
 (e.) Psychology Considered as an Indirect Deduction through 
 
 Physical Histories, 
 
 Let us now consider the problem of Psychology as associated 
 with a physical synthesis. 
 
 The first part of the " Psychology " is devoted to an account of 
 the nervous system and its functions. Chapters I. and II. lead 
 up to Chapter III. where these functions are more explicitly 
 generalised. The functions of the nervous system are — (i.) the 
 reception of motion, (2.) the liberation of locked-up motion, 
 (3.) the direction of motion. The reception of motion is the 
 reception of motion from the external world by molar contact, 
 undulatory action, chemical action ; in fact, of heat or light, the 
 mechanical action of other bodies, &c., the disturbances set up by 
 which motions run along certain definite lines of nerves accord- 
 ing to circumstances. The liberation of motion is founded 
 upon the conception — not properly explained anywhere by Mr. 
 Spencer — of " locked-up motion," but which we can indefinitely 
 picture to ourselves as " energy " capable, under given circum- 
 stances, of effecting motion. The direction of motion is not to 
 be confounded with the directive power of any subjective will 
 or personality. The direction referred to is only an engineer- 
 ing arrangement by which, under given circumstances, certain 
 small stores of energy are given off along specific channels. 
 Treating nerve actions on their physiological side we have to 
 ignore the subjective side, and in doing this we have no option 
 but to formulate them in terms of motion.* Hence the first 
 five chapters of the "Psychology" consist of "propositions which 
 are exclusively morphological and physiological. In them the 
 structure of the nervous system, its functions, the conditions to 
 its action, &c., have been dealt with purely as physical pheno- 
 mena — phenomena as purely physical as the absorption of the 
 
 * Psychology, §§ 18 and 24. 
 
214 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 nutriment or the circulation of the blood. Whatever impli- 
 cations may have arisen from the use of words that carry with 
 them indirect meanings, the direct meanings of all the pro- 
 positions set down have nowhere implied consciousness or 
 feeling ; and, ignoring consciousness or feeling, they have left 
 out that which is tacitly or avowedly contained in every pro- 
 position of Psychology." * 
 
 We have already sufficiently considered the parts treating of 
 Psychology proper, and proceed to Part V., which deals with 
 the Physical Synthesis. The problem here is, " How is mental 
 evolution to be affiliated on Evolution at large, regarded as a 
 process of physical transformation ? " It is not enough that the 
 general syntheses of psychical life have been traced up along 
 with the phenopiena of physical life, and have been observed 
 to progress in integration, in heterogeneity, and in definiteness, 
 while from first to last intelligence has found its growth due to 
 the repetition of experiences, the effects of which are accumu- 
 lated, organised, and inherited. "It may yet be asked — By 
 what process is the organisation of experiences achieved? 
 Granting that a survey of the facts proves it to take place ; 
 still, no answers are given to the questions — Why does it take 
 place ? And how does the transformation which brings it about 
 come within the formula of Evolution in general ? " t 
 
 To effect this affiliation it is necessary to bring Psychology 
 within the terms of the Formula of Evolution, which terms are 
 Matter and Motion and their interrelations ; and although the 
 Persistence of Force finds no place in the formula, yet as it is 
 the main idea of the work. Psychology must also be affiliated 
 upon that truth. However, we are saved this trouble, for Mr. 
 Spencer says : — 
 
 " Though the development of Mind itself cannot be explained 
 by a series of deductions from the Persistence of Force, yet it 
 remains possible that its obverse, the development of physical 
 changes in a physical organ, may be so explained ; and until it 
 is so explained, the conception of mental evolution as a part of 
 Evolution in general, remains incomplete." 
 
 "Specifically stated, the problem is to interpret mental 
 * Psychology, vol. i. p. 129. f Ibid., p. 507. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSICAL HISTORIES. 215 
 
 evolution in terms of the redistribution of Matter and Motion. 
 Though under its subjective aspect. Mind is known only as an 
 aggregate of states of consciousness, which cannot be conceived 
 as forms of Matter and Motion, and do not therefore necessarily 
 conform to the same laws of redistribution; yet under its 
 objective aspect. Mind is known as an aggregate of activities 
 manifested by an organism—is the correlative, therefore, of 
 certain material transformations, which must come within the 
 general process of material evolution, if that process is truly 
 
 universal." 
 
 We are at a loss to foresee how Mr. Spencer will regard our 
 criticism. For the sake of properly apprehending the problem, 
 we refer to his Appendix to " First Principles " for information 
 as to the import of the terms Matter and Motion. Evidently 
 we have to interpret mental evolution in terms of the redistri- 
 bution of Matter and Motion. The development of Mind 
 cannot be explained by a series of deductions from the Persis- 
 tence of Force, but only mediately by means of the Formula of 
 Evolution. But if we go further, and ask what Mr. Spencer 
 means by Matter and Motion — what conceptions we should 
 have of them when we wish to understand the development of 
 mind by means of their interrelations, he replies : — 
 
 " Though I have repeatedly made it clear that our ideas of 
 Matter, Motion, and Force are but the x, y, and z with which 
 we work our equations, and formulate the various relations 
 among phenomena in such a way as to express their order in 
 terms of x, y, and z — though I have shown that the realities 
 for which x, y, and z stand cannot be conceived by us as actually 
 existing thus and thus without committing ourselves to alter- 
 native absurdities ; yet," &c.* 
 
 In spite of this, we are asked to interpret physical evolution, 
 and mental development as involved therein, in terms of realities 
 which cannot be conceived by us as actually existing thus or 
 thus without committing ourselves to alternative absurdities. 
 We naturally ask what is the good of an explanation at all under 
 these conditions, and how is it possible to interpret the order 
 of nature by such instruments of thought. 
 
 * First Principles, p. 580. 
 
2i6 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 However, we take up the thread of our inquiry where we 
 left it, and we find that we are led to an investigation of the 
 genesis of nerves proposed as a physical problem. *' If from a 
 corollary to the Persistence of Force, we can legitimately draw 
 the conclusion that, under certain conditions, lines of nervous 
 communication will arise, and having arisen, will become lines 
 of more and more easy communication, in proportion to the 
 numbers and strengths of the discharges propagated through 
 them; we shall have found a physical interpretation which 
 completes the doctrine of psychical evolution, as set forth in the 
 last two parts. It will be made manifest how the experience 
 of an external relation produces a corresponding internal rela- 
 tion — how, as experiences of the external relation become more 
 numerous, the internal relation becomes more coherent — how 
 perpetual repetitions of the one cause indissolubleness of the 
 other — how outer persistences that are almost or quite absolute, 
 establish, in the course of generations, inner cohesions that are 
 automatic or organic ; and thus the interpretation of instincts 
 and forms of thought wiU be assimilated to that of the ordinary 
 phenomena of association." * 
 
 It is always well to consider whether the mode of stating a 
 problem is satisfactory or not, before considering the proposed 
 solution. We are not by any means certain that the finding 
 of sundry physical processes to be corollaries of the Persistence 
 of Force (considered as a symbol of the Unknowable) is the 
 same thing as the proposal to interpret mental evolution in 
 terms of the redistribution of Matter and Motion (taken as 
 sums total of the chemical elements and physical energies) so 
 as to bring our reasonings within the scope of the Formula of 
 Evolution. 
 
 In furtherance of the inquiry, the problem next proceeded 
 with is the Genesis of Nerves. This is an inquiry as to the 
 origin of the Biological connections (a b), &c., represented 
 by the small capitals as correspondences to the external rela- 
 tions (A B), (fee, and not as to the origin of the Psychological 
 relations (a b), &c. As such, it is an inquiry which we reserve 
 for criticism in our next chapter. But it is obvious that the 
 
 * Psychology, vol. i. p. 509. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSICAL HISTORIES 217 
 
 mere ascertainment of concomitance of development between 
 some of the connections (a b), &c., and the connections (a b), 
 &C., is not an explanation of the origin of (a J), &c., in the 
 same manner as the origin of (a b), &c., is supposed to be 
 accounted for as logically deducible from the interrelations with 
 
 (A B), &c. 
 
 Nor is the logical difficulty avoided by merging the question 
 into one of Function studied in Part V. Chapter VI. In the 
 preceding chapters the origin and development of nervous 
 structure have been studied. The function of this structure is 
 evidently the reception of motion, the storage of energy, the 
 liberation of motion, altogether forming a highly complex 
 mechanism, with a vast number of little engines and channels 
 for the reception, redirection, and expenditure of energy. Not- 
 withstanding its wonderful complexity and delicacy of construc- 
 tion, it is a purely physical arrangement, and its actions are 
 altogether physical. To characterise its natural actions by the 
 term Function is correct enough so long as this term carries 
 with it a biological meaning only. But if it is used as a cover 
 for '* nascent " intelligence, we have to protest against the slip- 
 ping in of the subjective. We are engaged upon a truly deduc- 
 tive study, and not upon an inductive one. So again the study 
 of " reflex action" and " the gradually increasing excitement of 
 the new motor apparatus " is followed by the statement- — 
 
 " Thus, then, results what we call perception; for we have here 
 a cluster of real feelings caused by the presented object, joined 
 with a cluster of ideal feelings, representing certain other real 
 feelings which the object has before produced and can again 
 produce."* 
 
 " Between a perception physiologically considered and a per- 
 ception psychologically considered, the relation now becomes 
 manifest," &c.t 
 
 A physiological perception is, for instance, the action of the 
 rays of reflected light coming from a body and falling upon 
 the eye, which motions are continued into the cerebrum and 
 thereafter redistributed. In this application of the term " per- 
 ception " we do not think Mr. Spencer is justified. *' Percep- 
 
 • Psychology, vol. i. p. 561. t Ibid., p. 562. 
 
2i8 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 tion " we hold to be a purely subjective term. We can under- 
 stand the action (a b) as the result of the connection (A B), but 
 although experientially we know of the concomitant (a 6), we 
 "cannot discern it as a deduction from the relations of (A B) and 
 (ab). 
 
 By the same method of identifying the physical and the sub- 
 jective concomitants in the terms of biological function, Mr. 
 Spencer affords supposed explanations of ideas and afterwards 
 of fmotions. Since we know as a matter of fact that the 
 intimate concomitance he describes does exist, and judge that 
 the antecedent concomitant history he refers to did take place, 
 it seems ungracious to argue against him ; but as a matter of 
 logic, in the deductive study he proposes the subjective con- 
 nections (a b), &c., are not explainable as to origin, history, 
 meaning, &c., by any of the methods he attempts. 
 
 (/) General Considerations with Regard to the Unification 
 
 of Knowledge. 
 
 To all such criticisms Mr. Spencer undertakes a reply in 
 Chapter X. The general result of criticism, as Mr. Spencer 
 truly anticipates, is a charge of *' Materialism." But in his 
 reply to this charge Mr. Spencer singularly misses the point of 
 the criticism so far as it is of value from a logical point of view, 
 and it is with this aspect only that Mr. Spencer and his 
 scientific critics are concerned. He considers " Materialism " a 
 term of opprobrium, and by the mouths of two Materialists 
 makes reply. The first vindicates the delicacy and sensitive- 
 ness of the mechanical motion of some material bodies, and then 
 proceeds to impress upon us the wonderful complexity of the 
 constitution of inorganic bodies. The second identifies Mind 
 with Motion — that is to say, the connection (a b) with the action 
 of the connections (a b), or with the delicacy and vivacity of 
 ethereal motions. Both of these vindications are in the ser- 
 monising strain, and deal with the charge of Materialism as a 
 term of opprobrium. In the oratorical reply, the coolness and 
 accuracy of pure logic are lost sight of. However, Mr. Spencer 
 remarks that neither of these are true replies to the criticism 
 advanced, and he proceeds to meet it in his own way. 
 
 GENERA L CON SID ERA TIONS. 
 
 219 
 
 The criticism, as we take it, is to the effect that from the 
 given factors of premises, oxygen, nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen, 
 &c., and a various environment of solids, liquids, and gases, 
 together with the action of light, heat, electricity, &c, we are 
 
 not able to deduce — 
 
 Firstly, Biological histories. But if biological histories are 
 capable of being so deduced, then it forms a purely materialistic 
 history, using materialistic as a term expressive of the sum- 
 total of the above factors and as excluding all other agencies. 
 
 Secondly, Psychological histories. For even supposing biolo- 
 gical histories are deducible as just specified, which is a logically 
 possible problem, still the psychological histories present results 
 which are not logically deducible from our conceptions of the 
 given factors. 
 
 In this view, the charge of Materialism simply means that 
 the explanations given of biological histories being merely mate- 
 rialistic explanations, they do not account for the subjective 
 accompaniment, and most decidedly shut it out from taking any 
 part in the processes of the sequences. For whatever the con- 
 sciousness of conflict, or doubt, or choice, or determination, they 
 are merely the concomitants of physical processes in the brain, 
 and this consciousness is not a factor influencing the result. 
 
 We have nothing to do in our present study with any ethical 
 or sentimental estimation of this mode of representing human 
 action. We have merely to view it in its logical aspect, and the 
 logical view of it is that the subjective result is not contained 
 in the given premises which are termed materialistic, but that 
 nevertheless if subjective sequences are wholly determined by 
 these materialistic factors (the subjective being merely concomi- 
 tant), then most certainly the explanations are materialistic, 
 however much Matter may be advanced in our estimation by 
 
 oratorical efforts. 
 
 What is Mr. Spencer's reply ? He speaks about the unknow- 
 ability of the ultimate nature of Mind, and the unknowability 
 of the ultimate nature of Matter and of Motioa But it is at 
 once seen that our premises have nothing to do with " ultimate 
 natures." The reasonings in the "Biology" all proceed from 
 the known properties of the elementary substances named and 
 
220 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 the laws of the physical environment. To place the question 
 upon more remote antecedents is to alter the problem com- 
 pletely, and to make it not only impossible but altogether incon- 
 ceivable. If, again, the non-knowability of the ultimate nature 
 of mind is an obstacle in our way, then truly we must be forced 
 to admit failure in the unification of knowledge. 
 
 Confessedly we end in a predicament, but a predicament is 
 not the unification of knowledge. 
 
 " See our predicament. We can think of Matter " {oxygen^ 
 ^c.) " only in terms of Mind " {consciousness). ** We can think 
 of Mind only in terms of Matter" (i.e., as the concomitant of 
 some physiological actions). " When we have pushed our ex- 
 plorations of the first to the uttermost limit, we are referred to 
 the first for a final answer ; and when we have got the final 
 answer of the second, we are referred back to the first for an 
 interpretation of it. We find the value of x in terms of y ; 
 then we find the value of y in terms of x ; and so on we may 
 continue for ever without coming nearer to a solution. The 
 antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while 
 consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that 
 Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are united." 
 
 What are we to understand by this 1 The first impression 
 is that Mr. Spencer has adopted Talleyrand's use of language. 
 But what are we to understand by it ? Does it mean that the 
 two volumes on the evolution of Biology are adhered to or 
 abandoned? Does it mean that the factors upon which that 
 great deduction proceeded are inconceivable, and the whole of 
 our reasonings upon them worthless ? Or, again, does it mean 
 that not knowing the ultimate nature of Mind, our reasoning 
 powers are unreliable? We can imagine no other practical 
 application of the above passage ; and if so, what becomes of 
 the unification of knowledge ? We would contrast it with Mr. 
 Spencer's criterion of the unification of knowledge quoted by 
 us at the outset of our task,* and ask the student to consider 
 whether this is a satisfactory outcome of the enterprise we have 
 undertaken. For our part, we think a more damnatory con- 
 demnation than the above passage could not have been written 
 
 * Supra, p. 4. 
 
 THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 
 
 221 
 
 by any opponent of Mr. Spencer. Yet he has written it in re- 
 gard to his own undertaking. 
 
 Nevertheless, this predicament is said to bring us to the 
 true conclusion, " that it is one and the same Ultimate Reality 
 which is manifested to us subjectively and objectively. For 
 while the nature of that which is manifested under either form 
 proves to be inscrutable, the order of its manifestations through- 
 out all mental phenomena proves to be the same as the order 
 of its manifestations throughout all material phenomena." 
 
 This may be so ; but if we can form no conception of this 
 Ultimate Reality so as to be able to deduce the histories of the 
 cosmos from it, knowledge is not unified. We observe the 
 universality of its manner of operation, but we do not discern 
 the secret of the sequences, or rather, we discern it partly, and 
 would extend our scientific knowledge to the whole. The 
 deficiency of our knowledge is not made up by recognising 
 the universality of modes with its implication of community of 
 
 origin. 
 
 It would be well, however, to give a separate consideration 
 to the suggestion made in this reply as to the Ultimate Reality 
 manifesting itself by a " double aspect." 
 
 § 3. The Double-Aspect Theory. 
 
 As we have somewhat anticipated the subject of this section 
 in Chapter III. by showing the futility of the Double-Aspect 
 Theory in any attempt to find an explanation of the historical 
 series of events culminating in the subjective aspect itself, as 
 deductions from primordial factors, there is not much left to 
 say. It would be as well, however, to give a little more atten- 
 tion to Mr. Spencer's treatment of the subject, and to the lan- 
 guage employed in the statement of his views. 
 
 We first direct attention to § 194, being the closing section 
 of " First Principles," of which the following is a summary:— 
 
 The deepest truths we can reach are the widest uniformities 
 in our experiences of Matter, Motion, and Force. 
 
 These are but symbols of the Unknown Reality. 
 
 An Unknowable Power works in us certain effects. . 
 
222 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 These effects we class together under the names Matter, 
 Motion, and Force. 
 
 Between these effects there are likenesses of connection. 
 
 Analysis reduces these effects to one kind of effect. 
 
 Analysis reduces the kinds of uniformity to one kind of 
 uniformity. 
 
 " And the highest achievement of Science is the interpretation 
 of all orders of phenomena, as differently conditioned mani- 
 festations of this one kind of effect, under differently conditioned 
 modes of this one kind of uniformity." 
 
 Science, therefore, merely systematises our experience. 
 
 We do not know that these uniformities are absolutely neces- 
 sary — only that in our thoughts they are necessary. 
 
 We cannot conceive how the one is related to the other. The 
 connection between the phenomenal order and the ontolof^ical 
 order is for ever inscrutable. 
 
 (We remark here that the classification and systematisation 
 of our experiences is not the same kind of unification of 
 knowledge as that by which all sequences are to be deduced as 
 corollaries from one ultimate truth or from primordial factors.) 
 
 The connection between the conditioned forms of beinf' and 
 the unconditioned form of being (query — is there any ?) is also 
 inscrutable. 
 
 The interpretation (query — what does interpretation mean ?) 
 of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force is 
 nothing more than the reduction of our complex symbols of 
 thought to the simplest symbols. 
 
 "Hence the reasonings contained in the foregoing pa^^es 
 afford no support to either of the antagonistic hypotheses 
 respecting the ultimate nature of things. Their implications 
 are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic ; and no 
 more spiritualistic than they are materialistic." 
 
 This all depends upon the meaning given to the terms. The 
 discussion after all does not relate to ultimate natures. Ulti- 
 mate natures, being absolutely unknowable and inconceivable, 
 do not enter into the discussion at all. But taking the materials 
 and facts of chemistry and the laws of physics as imagined in ;i 
 nebula, can we from these primordial factors deduce the solar 
 
 THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY, 
 
 223 
 
 system, and the forms of life with which we are acquainted on 
 the earth at the present time ? This is what would generally 
 be called a materialistic explanation, and that it appears to us 
 Mr. Spencer attempts. To discUss the ultimate nature of these 
 bases of knowledge is going beyond science. Either their ulti- 
 mate natures are all conditioned as we know them, and hence 
 the deduction is possible ; or they are not aU conditioned and 
 known, which makes (as is the case) the deduction impossible, 
 and causes knowledge to remain ununified. 
 
 However, Mr. Spencer says — 
 
 " The Materialist, seeing it to be a necessary deduction from 
 the law of correlation, that what exists in consciousness under 
 the form of feeling, is transformable into an equivalent of 
 mechanical motion, and by consequence into equivalents of all 
 the other forces which matter exhibits ; may consider it there- 
 fore demonstrated that the phenomena of consciousness are 
 material phenomena." And the SpirituaUst may argue the 
 
 converse. 
 
 " Manifestly, the establishment of correlation and equivalence 
 between the forces of the inner and the outer worlds, may be 
 used to assimilate either to the other ; according as we set out 
 with one or other term. But he who rightly interprets the 
 doctrine contained in this work, will see that neither of these 
 terms can be taken as ultimate. He will see that though the 
 relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these 
 antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter, the one is no less 
 than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the unknown 
 reality which underlies both." 
 
 We submit that the correlation and equivalence between the 
 inner forces and the outer, between the subjective and the 
 objective, has not been made out except in regard to the 
 dependence of the' former upon the latter. Mr. Spencer 
 repudiates Feeling as a factor in Biology, and makes all his 
 interpretations as resultants of certain elementary substances 
 and certain physical conditions. And we have before shown. 
 Chapter I. p. 43, that subjective consciousness is excluded 
 from the list of energies which are acknowledged by scien- 
 tific men as correlated. So that Mr. Spencer's explanation 
 
i 
 
 224 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 of the order of sequences is couched in materialistic terms, and 
 to say that the unknowability of ultimate natures invalidates 
 the explanation is to say that Mr. Spencer's explanation fails, 
 and to^undo all the work that he claims to have performed. 
 
 Can Mr. Spencer complete his work, on the double-aspect 
 theory, by making a complementary explanation in subjective 
 or spiritualistic terms and processes ? Can he explain chemistry 
 and physics and the growth of organic molecules and organisms 
 in terms of the subjective, and derive all as deductions from 
 certain spiritualistic factors? When this is done we may 
 acknowledge that the series of events is a process one and 
 continuous, having a double aspect, and capable of being de- 
 ductively demonstrated and explained in two sets of terms, 
 materialistic and spiritualistic. At present it seems to us we 
 can only explain the course of cosmical events in materialistic 
 language down to a certain point at which the materialistic 
 language fails us, and then the spiritualistic or subjective 
 comes in as necessary for other explanations, though still 
 dependent upon the materialistic. We find that we have to 
 begin our explanations with one aspect, and end them with 
 two. How came the second to be evolved ? ' 
 
 If materialistic explanations now take the language of dynamics 
 rather than of geometry, they are still materialistic in the sense 
 of not being subjective. If we use the terms affinity, attrac- 
 tion, repulsion, polarity, equilibration, &c., they are all objective 
 terms. So also are segregation, integration, dissipation, rhythm, 
 &c. These are the terms of Mr. Spencer's explanations. Can 
 we graft upon them other meanings, so as to render them 
 capable of expressing the order of sequences in a subjective 
 cosmical explanation 1 
 
 Is it to be done by means of the term Force, which may be 
 considered common to both aspects ? Our studies all point in 
 that direction ; but it is at present no more than a suggestion, 
 for even with his powerful and acute mind Mr. Spencer cannot 
 work it out into a logical, coherent, and systematic deductive 
 system. 
 
 Mr. Spencer refuses to allow Matter and Motion to bear 
 definite meanings. He maintains that Matter, Motion, and 
 
 THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 
 
 22; 
 
 Force are merehj symbols ; not symbols standing for something 
 known, but indefinite symbols, standing for something not 
 known or only partly known. We are allowed to use them in 
 physical studies of their combinations and aggregations. We 
 are allowed to use generalisations about matter in the expla- 
 nation of objective processes, but when we come to processes 
 in which occur phenomena not so explainable, we are asked 
 to give Matter another aspect. Now it is evident that up 
 to a certain point the view of Matter which takes it in its 
 known conditions as chemical elements is able to furnish expla- 
 nations. Why then should we be called upon to view it up to 
 this point in some other aspect? Because we have to argue 
 backwards, and infer that since Matter becomes self-conscious, 
 there must have been something in the original factors which 
 was capable of becoming organised into consciousness. Ad- 
 mitting this to be the case, it would appear that the ulti- 
 mate units of Matter were units of attraction and resistance, 
 and something more ; or else Matter was not units of attrac- 
 tion and resistance, nor yet a conscious subjectivity, but some- 
 thing between the two ; not either of them, but a something 
 of which neither subjectivity nor objectivity could be predi- 
 cated something of which neither attraction nor resistance 
 
 could be predicated, nor yet consciousness. Thus we are lost 
 in the Unknowable Force ; we are thrust beyond the limits of 
 Philosophy ; we are in the presence of an Unknowable Power. 
 As long as we contemplate it, Philosophy has nothing to do but 
 to sit waiting patiently till it manifests itself in some definite 
 form. If it does so manifest itself, and eventually resolves 
 itself into a quantitative Attraction and Kepulsion, then Philo- 
 sophy seizes upon it as her raw material, and builds up systems 
 of worlds until she comes to Consciousness. Then she says, 
 ** Surely I have got more in my hands than I thought ; there is 
 something that feels." This does not alter the definite know- 
 ledge of the interrelations of Attraction and Repulsion, nor the 
 conceptions of them. It does not alter the aspect of looking at 
 them, nor change their value, operation, or quantity in the least 
 degree. If it is said that they have a subjective aspect also, 
 it is saying something that cannot be understood, and which 
 
^ 
 
 226 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 those who hold that view must explain. Let the subjective 
 aspect of units of Attraction and Resistance be described. Let 
 the subjective aspect of the formation of the sixty or seventy 
 so-called elements be described also. What is the subjective 
 aspect, for instance, of the union of oxygen and hydrogen into 
 the compound called water ? 
 
 The dilemma at which we arrive in the course of evolution 
 is this : By a formula of Attraction and Repulsion we may be 
 able to generalise all physical processes, and explain the exist- 
 ence and history of every aggregate, but by and by we reach 
 events which the physical formula will not explain, namely, 
 subjective phenomena. The difficulty is to account for and 
 explain these in a general formula. We find the old one will 
 not do. What must be done 1 Will it do to say that Matter 
 and Motion, Attraction and Resistance, are not really objective — 
 they have another aspect also ? If so, we thereby destroy the 
 definite meaning of our formula, as already so much insisted 
 upon. 
 
 If every event has a double aspect, and to treat of the his- 
 tory of events under one aspect is insufficient, we must amend 
 our formula, so that by exhibiting the double? aspect we shall 
 be able thereby to deduce the double-aspected evolution. The 
 formula to account for a double-aspected evolution must itself 
 be double-aspected. 
 
 Thus we should have to say — 
 
 Evolution is ( integration 1 of feeling and 
 
 THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 
 
 227 
 
 and a concomitant ( integration of matter and dissipation of 
 
 motion, wherein, &c, 
 
 filling in all the blanks in terms of the other aspect; 
 
 It is asserted, however, that the process of evolution is not 
 two concomitant evolutions, but one evolution. Notwithstand- 
 ing Mr. Spencer's exclusion in the "Biology" of Feeling as 
 a factor, yet in the passage quoted above he says — " The 
 Materialist, seeing it to be a necessary deduction from the 
 law of correlation, that what exists in consciousness under 
 the form of feeling is transformable into an equivalent of 
 
 mechanical motion, and by consequence into equivalents of all 
 the other forces which matter exhibits." We, however, noted 
 at the time that Professor Stewart did not include Feeling in 
 his list of energies which were mutually equivalent or trans- 
 formable. Mr. Spencer has in various places maintained that 
 in conscious beings the subjective never interferes in any phy- 
 sical action. It is said to be inconceivable that any muscular 
 reaction from an external stimulant has been at all interfered 
 with or influenced by any subjective feeling. There is a course 
 of molecular motion along a nerve, there is some change caused 
 thereby in the substance of the nerve or brain, and there is a 
 molecular reaction due to the previous action ; but to suppose 
 that this reaction is at all influenced by feeling is out of the 
 question ; we are merely conscious of it. All molecular move- 
 ments in an organism are not two events, but only one. A 
 muscular motion may be described mechanically or subjec- 
 tively, but it is one and the same event. The amount of 
 energy has not been augmented nor diminished by the action 
 of any feeling, nor could feeling augment or diminish it 
 without being itself a mode of motion, which it is not. It 
 is inconceivable that feeling should have a mechanical function. 
 Muscular and all other actions of an organism are all chains 
 of mechanical action uninterf ered with by feeling. Yet they are 
 one and the same ; the subjective and the objective within the 
 organism are one and the same thing viewed differently. The 
 question arises, are all external changes to be regarded in the 
 same way as objective and subjective at the same time ? 
 
 As a proposition limited to the actions and consciousnesses 
 of organisms, the "double-aspect" theory is one which is capable 
 of being understood, if not accepted; but as a general truth 
 applicable to the historic explanation of the inorganic universe, 
 we cannot understand it. And if, impelled by a desire to so 
 represent it, we endeavour to frame a formula explanatory of 
 the universe in this double-aspected way, as attempted above, 
 we find it is impossible to formulate any proposition of an 
 intelligible character. 
 
 The double-aspect theory may serve a very useful purpose 
 after the stage of biological evolution has been attained, as 
 
228 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 affording diversified modes of description of the complex occur- 
 rences affecting organisms, in which one or other set of terms 
 may be used, according as the incidents of a series of events 
 may have their chief import objectively or subjectively ; but as 
 a key to the order of events, and as a means of cosmical expla- 
 nation, it is useless. 
 
 It is worthy of remark that the " double aspect " is not claimed 
 for all the operations of the physical organism. There are 
 some changes which have the double aspect and some which 
 have it not. What are called the organs of sense have the 
 concomitance of subjective feeling ; so have muscular motions 
 and other events of the organism ; but the processes of accre- 
 tion and secretion have not this accompaniment. We must 
 certainly consider this a shortcoming iji the Double-Aspect 
 Theory. 
 
 Again, the " double aspect " is confined within the limits of 
 organisms. When we speak of the double aspect, it is the 
 double aspect of changes of a conscious organism. Therefore 
 if knowledge is some arrangement or state of the molecules and 
 fibres of the brain and nervous system, then all knowledge has 
 a double aspect, 'of which the physical arrangement is one side, 
 and the concomitant subjective is the other. This is indeed a 
 method of representing the theory of the Relativity of Know- 
 ledge, since all knowledge is subjective, and the subjective is 
 but the consciousness of certain physical organisations, which 
 organisation is produced by physical interrelations. But when 
 certain portions of this physical arrangement (with which goes 
 the subjective) have effected that mechanical arrangement, with 
 which is concomitant the consciousness of there having been an 
 antecedent condition of the cosmos in which there was no con- 
 sciousness, no subjective aspect, then the physical arrangement 
 of the brain which is the objective process of reasoning is 
 unable to bring about that other physical state of the brain 
 which is the physical state of an explanation of the origi- 
 nation of the subjective concomitant ; and also that general 
 arrangement of the molecules and fibres of the cerebrum and 
 cerebellum which would produce the consciousness of the 
 unification of knowledge has not been effected. We assert, 
 
 THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 
 
 229 
 
 in short, that the physical arrangement of the brain which is 
 equivalent to the argument of the Double- Aspect Theory does 
 not produce the cerebral organisation which is the analogue 
 of the unification of knowledge. It is true we are unable to 
 examine the physical changes in a direct manner, for they are 
 beyond our reach. We can only judge by our consciousness of 
 them. 
 
 The real solution of the difficulty would have to be placed 
 in the statement of an ultimate truth or factor, from the 
 double nature of which as a series of corollaries the conscious 
 double aspect of organised living beings could be deduced. 
 This problem is attacked by Professor Clifford with his usual 
 intrepidity of thought in the bold hypothesis of "Mind-Stuff." 
 He says,* " The reality external to our minds which is repre- 
 sented in our minds as matter, is in itself mind-stuff." "The 
 universe consists entirely of mind-stuffl Some of this is woven 
 into the complex form of human minds, containing imperfect 
 representations of the mind-stuff outside them, and of themselves 
 also, as a mirror reflects its own iinage in another mirror ad 
 ivfinitum. Such an imperfect representation is called a 
 material universe. It is a picture in a man^s mind of the real 
 universe of mind-stuff." " Matter is a mental picture in which 
 mind-stuff is the thing represented." " Reason, intelligence, and 
 volition are properties of a complex, which is made up of ele- 
 ments themselves not rational, not intelligent, not conscious." 
 
 Thus it will be seen that the term " mind-stuff" is equivalent 
 to " mind-matter," a double-aspect word supposed to be repre- 
 sentative of the factor of the universe. This theory is examined 
 by us very fully in the Appendix to our former work. We 
 only note here the kind of factor which the Double-Aspect 
 Theory forces us to look for, the impossibility of forming any 
 conception of it, and finally, the impossibility of deducing the 
 sequences and evolution of the cosmos from it by way of 
 corollaries. 
 
 In the first section of this chapter we referred to Mr. 
 Spencer's account of the faint and vivid manifestations which 
 presumably forms another account of the Double - Aspect 
 
 * Mind, No. ix. p. 66. 
 
230 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 Theory. But we do not see that it assists us at all in escaping 
 from our difficulties. There are two dififerent orders of mani- 
 festations of Force. They segregate, and apparently segregate 
 in parallel groupings, the one corresponding to the other, but 
 whence the parallelism and correspondence does not appear. 
 Again, we found that all knowledge would have to be expressed 
 in terms of the impression we call Resistance, implying both 
 the impression and the mutual action of pressing and resist- 
 ing bodies ; again implying the double aspect. But then, as a 
 matter of fact, when events have to be considered as corol- 
 laries, or such of them as can be so considered, the terms used 
 are all of the objective or physical side, and valid explanations 
 can be given on this aspect only. 
 
 Mr. Spencer's term " Force " itself appears to be a " double 
 aspect " term in that it manifests itself objectively as opposed 
 to our consciousness and subjectively in our consciousness. 
 But Mr. Spencer himself acknowledges that we can form no 
 conception of it, although he apparently proposes to get 
 corollaries from it — only that his corollaries are from, not the 
 factor itself, but only its adjective of "Persistence." Here, again, 
 we only obtain any meaning when we consider the objective 
 aspect in the scientific doctrine of the " Conservation of Energy," 
 and that of a definite and limited character. 
 
 If the evolution of the subjective is to be unified with 
 evolution in general, as part of one universal process on the 
 ground of the conformity of its modes with the modes of the 
 f^eneral evolution of Force : if because its characteristics are 
 such that they can be deemed corollaries from the theory of 
 the Persistence of Force in the same way in which the evolution 
 of physical bodies can be deemed deductions from that theory, 
 then subjectivity must itself be a mode of Force, and take its 
 place in the circle of the interchanges of correlative forces, 
 and is not a mere aspect of modes of physical forces. It must 
 be one of them. Otherwise it is a merely dependent something 
 unrelated as a corollary with any general primordial factor. 
 
 For the further study of the theory in its practical application 
 we append an examination of Clifford's " Seeing and Thinking," 
 and of Dr. Bain's " Mind and Body." 
 
 CLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 231 
 
 APPENDIX TO THIS SECTION. 
 
 (a.) Professor Clifford on tlie Double- Aspect Theory. 
 In the third chapter of " Seeing and Thinking," the late 
 Professor Clifford makes an ingenious attempt to represent the 
 double-aspect theory. The first object is to show how all 
 external events come upon the human organism as motions, and 
 as such are transmitted to ganglions and other still larger ner- 
 vous centres, where other groups of motions are set up which 
 either immediately or after an interval react upon the environ- 
 ment in certain definite manners. This is, in fact, a chain of 
 physical events, and the supposition is that man and all his 
 actions can be so represented, and would have come into 
 being and worked as a thoroughly complete and perfect 
 machine, even had there been no feeling or consciousness at 
 all; that this latter has been no factor in his evolution, but 
 that his existence and all his doings are incidents in the chain 
 of physical development— the mechanical explanation being com- 
 plete in itself. 
 
 What is required, therefore, is a full and complete represen- 
 tation of human actions in physical terms. Now, since it is 
 ascertained that all the facts of sensation and action are con- 
 nected with the nervous system, the problem resolves itself 
 into a description of the nervous system as a complicated 
 mechanical arrangement, and of all events as a series of motions 
 of this mechanism. 
 
 The first stages of this description are comparatively simple 
 and easy, and tend to bear out the theory. The further stages 
 are more and more surmise, and rely for acceptance on presumed 
 analogies, and on the probable continuance of processes, ren- 
 dered more plausible by the consideration of the structure of 
 the brain ; while the final stages slip out of the reckoning alto- 
 gether, even surmise finding no vague mode of expression in the 
 language of physics. Here Professor Clifford is forced into the 
 exclusive use of subjective terms, seeing his facts utterly escape 
 a physical representation. 
 
 Let the reader carefully examine this chapter, with the 
 
232 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 steady resolve to keep to language of physics, and see how he 
 fails. He will find, in the first place, a very liberal use of the 
 terms "message" and "messages." All of these he will cross 
 out, substituting in the margin the term "motions." He will 
 see that motions of the nerves are the result of incident 
 motions of light, heat, contact, &c., of the environment ; and 
 will remember that the function of the nerves was hereto- 
 fore stated to be the transmission of these motions. Therefore 
 he will at once discard the other more indefinite term " message " 
 and keep rigidly to the term " motion." The substitution of 
 terms is just as illegitimate in philosophical studies as is the 
 substitution of chemical substances by chemists in their experi- 
 ments. 
 
 This substitution will have to be made eleven times up to 
 page 77, where the problem is re-stated : — 
 
 " How out of that simple process we can build up that 
 exceedingly complicated thing which we call human life." 
 
 So that in a microscopical examination of the brain of a 
 living man, if it were possible — 
 
 " You would see nothing more than the merely mechanical 
 actions that we have described hitherto." 
 
 How then does Professor Clifford describe the interrelation 
 of mind and brain, and formulate mental processes in terms of 
 mechanical actions 1 He simply states the co-existence of 
 the sensation of sight with certain motions of a special part 
 of the nervous system, and speaks of the sensation as being 
 " in the mind." And from this point he begins to confuse his 
 subject. He does not keep to his stated problem, how out of 
 simply mechanical processes to build up human life. Instead 
 of this, he introduces sensation as a factor in the chain of events ; 
 not merely as an accompaniment, but as a link in the course of 
 the motions, which by the supposition is excluded, and by 
 some is said to be inconceivable ; for it would be equivalent 
 to saying that that which is not Energy (which is quanti- 
 fatively invariable) affects Motion, and would thus vary the 
 quantity of Energy. If he does not indeed do this directly, he 
 does so by implication ; as thus (p. 8 1 ) — 
 
 A sensation comes into the eye or the ear. 
 
 CLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY, 233 
 
 A disturbance, i.e., a set of motions, comes into the eye or 
 the ear. 
 
 A sensation comes into the mind. 
 
 It gives rise to a train of thought. 
 
 It goes on to manifest itself in an action ; as thus — 
 
 It causes a feeling of wanting to do something. 
 
 It causes exertion to satisfy that feeling. 
 
 From this point the sequence proceeds objectively, the imme- 
 diately following description being given in physical language, 
 p. 82 (bottom) to p. 85. In reading these pages the terms " mes- 
 sages" and "disturbances" must be translated into the mechanical 
 term "motions." 
 
 "A motion is produced in the eye." 
 
 " A motion is produced in the optic nerve." 
 
 "A set of motions is produced in the mechanical arrangement 
 called the brain." 
 
 " The brain was in a state of complicated motions." 
 
 "The new motion alters the motions of the mechanism of 
 the brain." 
 
 The motion is rearranged "according to the ordinary laws 
 of action in the brain," i.e., mechanical — these laws being 
 explained as " dependent upon the shape of it, upon the way 
 in which these white threads in the interior are arranged, that 
 connect the different parts together," making the procedure " an 
 orderly sequence of purely material events in the brain." 
 
 This is followed (p. 85) by a message, i.e., a motion, going 
 out from the brain to the muscles. "Here we have some 
 disturbance " (i.e., motion) " which has come into the brain " 
 (i.e., a mechanism) " from without, and which has re-arranged 
 itself " (i.e., produced certain mechanical effects upon the 
 mechanism according to the laws of motion) " in the brain " 
 {mechanism), "going out again along certain muscles" (or con- 
 nections of other j)arts of the mechanism), " and passing away 
 from the brain" (a partictdar part of a larger mechanism) 
 "altogether. It" (the motion) "goes to those muscles" 
 (mechanism) " and moves them, and that is all the brain " 
 (part of the mechanism) " has had to do with it." 
 
 How do we stand now ? We have examined the subjec- 
 
234 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 tive chain of events, and have seen its dependence upon the 
 physical chain, and its apparent interference with the subse- 
 quent chain of physical events. We have also traced the 
 mechanical sequences of an incoming motion till we have lost 
 them in the complicated motions of the mechanism of the brain, 
 and we have failed to discern how the motions constituting, say, 
 the perception of a purse on the ground, can mechanically explain 
 the sequence of picking it up. We trace motions from the eye 
 to the brain ; we discern consequent motions in the bram. 
 But we cannot see the mechanical connection necessitating those 
 further motions of the mechanism which, issuing to the muscles, 
 result in picking up the purse. 
 
 If we ask what was the cause of the " picking up," are we 
 to be told that it is a purely mechanical action, the begin- 
 ning of which we can explain in detail, and the latter part of 
 which we can explain mechanically in an intelligible manner, 
 but the middle part of which we are, as yet, from want of suffi- 
 cient knowledge of the mechanism of the brain, unable to set 
 out in detail, though we judge from the first part and from the 
 latter part of the explanation that it must be of the same 
 nature— i.e., mechanical ? Then the fact of tHe " picking up " 
 * as a sequence from the perception is a purely mechanical event 
 from first to last, and would have happened quite independently 
 of any sensation, feeling of want, or feeling of exertion. 
 
 If we say, however, that this sensation, feeling of want, and 
 feeling of exertion were factors in the series of sequences with- 
 out which the *' picking up " would not have taken place, then 
 we manifest the insufficiency of the mechanical explanation, and 
 also affirm the existence of a force or power which is capable 
 of interference in a mechanical manner so as to the direct the 
 motions of material particles, which, indeed, is no less a miracle 
 than the removal of a mountain by word of mouth, and a plain 
 contradiction of the constant quantity of Energy or of Motion, 
 or of that more abstract proposition, the Persistence of Force. 
 
 How is this difficulty to be got over? Professor Clifi'ord 
 says by the theory of parallelism or of a double aspect to the 
 phenomena. This parallelism is well described on p. 85 : — "A 
 sensation apparently comes into my mind from without ; it is 
 
 CLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 235 
 
 turned over in my mind ; conclusions are drawn from it and 
 an action follows. A disturbance comes into my bram from 
 without, a purely mechanical disturbance ; it is turned over and 
 reverberated in my brain, and then it is sent out from my bram 
 again to a muscle to move it." ^^ 
 
 Let us carefully examine this theory of " parallelism and 
 the " double aspect," to see that it does not confuse our scien- 
 tific intentions. The object of Science is to understand the 
 sequences of the cosmos— the object of Philosophy is to express 
 in one formula the whole series of sequences. What we wish 
 to know is whether the whole series here illustrated is a 
 series of mechanical sequences derivable from the actions of 
 light and colour upon the eye, the optic nerve, and the mechani- 
 cal construction of the brain, and ultimately from the laws 
 of the interrelation of aggregates of the chemical elements ; or 
 whether, on the other hand, no such result would have taken 
 place if it had not been for certain subjective facts which 
 affected the mechanical motions of the brain. In the latter 
 case, a mechanical explanation is evidently insufficient. Yet, if 
 we say that we are only speaking of the same event, and use dif- 
 ferent language merely to denote the aspect from which we view 
 it we do not escape from the responsibilities of a mechanical' 
 explanation— we are not speaking of a subjective event which 
 has a mechanical side, but of a mechanical event which has a sub- 
 jective side. The whole weight of the explanation rests with the 
 mechanical theory, unless we are prepared to grant subjectivity as 
 a separate factor interfering with the mechanical. We are obliged 
 to say, then, that when we speak of a mental event as having 
 a double-aspect, we mean a physical event with a subjective 
 aspect. We must also say that there are, correctly speaking, no 
 mental events nor mental sequences, but only mechanical events 
 and mechanical sequences, which have also a subjective aspect 
 The real factors are the chemical elements, or aggregates of 
 attractions and resistances ; but certain combinations and inter- 
 relations of them (why is admittedly a mystery) are accompanied 
 by subjectivity, which subjectivity does not in the least interfere 
 with the course of the mechanical sequences. If this is so, then 
 it must be admitted that mental science exists merely by courtesy 
 
236 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 or by way of convenience, and that every fact, event, law, and 
 correspondence finds an independent representation and expla- 
 nation objectively in the structure and actions of the brain and 
 nervous system regarded as mechanisms — these mechanisms 
 not being in the least dependent upon the sensations, the feel- 
 ings, or the exertions of the subjective in their construction or 
 actions. 
 
 We do not think there is any reason here for charging us 
 with a misunderstanding of the double-aspect theory. It may 
 be urged that we do not look at the matter exactly as our 
 teachers would have us look at it. They will say, " You keep 
 the aspects too much separated ; you mil divide them when you 
 ought to unify them." We reply that when we look at the action 
 of a man, as it were, " statically," we can, we think, place our- 
 selves fully at the point of view of those who hold the double- 
 aspect theory ; and even when we take a man as he is con- 
 structed, and view him under the influence of some external 
 motions, as before described, we are almost able to regard the 
 series of events as equally subjective and mechanical, though at 
 the same time we fail to see how the external incident motion, 
 either directly or indirectly, through the consequent motion of 
 the nerve substance, can originate or influence or change the 
 subjective. But when we come to study the structure and 
 actions of man as part of the history of the cosmos — when we 
 have, that is to say, to study the subject historically, tracing 
 all existences and actions as consequents of previous existences 
 and actions; when we come to a time when those chemical 
 aggregations with which the subjective is indissolubly connected 
 did not exist, we find ourselves quite unable to account for 
 the origination of the double aspect of certain existences and 
 events. The origin, structure, and functions of thiese aggre- 
 gates hypothetically rely upon that mechanical explanation 
 which seems to be sufficient for the explanation of all preced- 
 ing events and existences. Certain compounds in certain aggre- 
 gations, however, seem to possess the property of a double 
 aspect, and it is not correct, considering their physical origin, 
 to say of them that they are the same series of events having 
 two aspects, one subjective and the other objective, but that 
 
 CLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY, 237 
 
 they are a special and limited class of objective events occurring 
 in duo order of physical sequences, which have, we know not 
 why, a subjective aspect. 
 
 The word " parallelism " almost confutes the theory of the 
 " double aspect." It would partly imply that a double yet 
 independent series of events went on at the same time. It is, 
 indeed, a figure of speech, and is therefore a very unsafe term 
 to use. Parallel lines run on for ever, and never affect each 
 other, and never meet. They are separately independent, and 
 are only in relation in our minds ; and if we regard them as 
 the motions of bodies, still they do not affect each other; one 
 does not diverge because the other does, for that would be a 
 dependence or sequence to the action of the other ; one does not 
 move faster or slower in accordance with the movement of the 
 other, for that, again, would mean dependence. Parallelism may, 
 it is true, mean that the initiative is taken by one line and is 
 followed by the other ; and this, indeed, would seem to be the 
 meaning intended when people speak of the parallelism of the 
 mental with the physical operations of the brain and nervous 
 system ; but then the onus of all the explanations rests with 
 the mechanical processes to which the mental run parallel. 
 But if, on the other hand, it is held that the mechanical 
 runs parallel with the subjective, then the difficulty of the 
 explanation of the dependence of the physical upon the 
 mental process seems insuperable. If, again, we adopt a 
 mixed explanation, then sometimes the mechanical will run 
 parallel with the mental, and sometimes the mental will run 
 parallel with the mechanical ; and we have a contradiction 
 of parallelism altogether. We have then to resort to the suppo- 
 sition of two perfectly independent courses running parallel 
 without any intermediate line of connection, the course of each 
 independent movement being explainable in itself and on its 
 own grounds, though each has a uniform correspondence with 
 the other, the cause of this correspondence being explainable 
 otherwise than as one of mutual interaction. The theory of 
 paraUelism is explained from pages 85 to 89. Parallelism is, 
 indeed, a weaker mode of representing the theory than that of 
 the double aspect. The latter, indeed, is one that could be 
 
238 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 adopted if the mechanical explanation were shown to he capahle 
 of accounting fully for all the facts of the origin and evo- 
 lution of life, and if the relation of the subjective to the objec- 
 tive in the original simple factors could be formulated. 
 
 This brings us back to Professor Clifford, who now proceeds 
 to some such explanation. He first takes the case of hunger and 
 
 feeding (p. 90). 
 
 " Let us first take a very simple connection between sensation 
 and action — that is to say, suppose that at a time when we are 
 hungry a piece of food is put into our mouth, and we instinc- 
 tively begin to go through the very complicated motion of chew- 
 ing and swallowing it. This involves, in the first place, a pre- 
 vious state of the brain implied in saying that we are hungry." 
 We stop the quotation here in order to ask what is the state of 
 the brain viewed as a mechanism 1 There is not the slightest 
 attempt to describe this state mechanically, nor even a hint at 
 the kind of mechanical condition of the brain that would be 
 produced by hunger. Professor Clifford continues :— " And it 
 then involves a very complicated and combined message " (i.e., 
 motions) " to be sent up from the tongue and from the muscles 
 of tjie mouth, and then an exceedingly complicated message " 
 (i.e., motions) "comes back to direct the motion of the tongue 
 and the teeth in chewing and swallowing the food." 
 
 " Here the important things to notice are two : first of all, what 
 are the messages which go in 1 and secondly, what are the mes- 
 sac^es which go out? . . . That instinctive movement of the 
 mouth does not follow in cases where we have already had 
 enout^h to eat It is necessary that there should be beforehand 
 that state of the mind, and that concomitant state of the brain 
 which we express by saying that we are hungry. 
 
 *' What is the meaning of that ? It means that We get mes- 
 sages " (motions) "to our brain, not only from those organs 
 which we call the five senses, . . . but that we also get mes- 
 sages " (motions) " from the inside of our bodies. The sensa- 
 tion " (subjective) "of hunger is a message" (i.e., motion), 
 ** which is sent to me from my stomach and from the rest of 
 my body, to say " (this does not seem to be either a mechanical 
 or a subjective term, but a figure of speech) " that there is a want 
 
 CLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 239 
 
 of nutriment. But this sensation" (subjective) "of hunger 
 differs from the other sensations in this. It suggests" (a 
 mental, i.e., a subjective term) " that I " (subjective) |' should 
 get " (subjective, endeavour to get) " something to eat" Here, 
 then, we see that the mechanical explanation attempted as being 
 a process complete in itself utterly fails in an instance which 
 Professor Clifford has selected as a simple illustration. We do 
 not say that such a mechanical explanation may not some day 
 be possible. * We do not say that it is, in fact, not a purely 
 mechanical process, part of a larger course of mechanical causa- 
 tion, of which the subjective aspect is merely one side ; but we 
 do mean to say that a mechanical explanation is not now pos- 
 sible, and therefore no one has any right to claim it ; and we 
 do mean to say that as long as those who desire to explain 
 the process drag in subjective terms, so long are we obliged to 
 infer that subjective feelings are factors in the result, however 
 impossible it may be for us to conceive of that which is not 
 Energy affecting a series of mechanical processes. 
 
 Professor Clifford, then, in a very careless manner, by way 
 of " &c , &c.," refers to " stomachic sensations," and " appetites * 
 and their "promptings," as if to imply that the illustration 
 selected having been so plainly rendered, all these other things 
 
 " go without saying." 
 
 The outgoing nerves move the muscles or pmch the blood- 
 vessels. The blood-vessels feed and reconstitute the wasted 
 parts, more particularly the nerves which have become worn out, 
 &c. All this is saying nothing. We require the mechanical 
 nature and connection of the whole process explained. 
 
 We do not know that it is worth while to take up the 
 explanation as resumed on p. 95, and examine it in detail. If 
 Professor Clifford wishes merely to show the concomitance of 
 feeling with mechanical changes of the organism, he succeeds. 
 If he means to prove that all the actions of organisms are parts 
 of a course of mechanical sequence in which the formation of the 
 organism is itself an incident, and in which feeling has no part 
 and is no factor, he does not succeed, because his explanations 
 are full of subjective terms. 
 
 It is tedious to writer and reader, and, moreover, expensive to 
 
1^1 
 
 240 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 have printed in a book these long-detailed examinations of 
 verbal intricacies ; and yet we consider it important both that 
 writers should be required to be precise, and that readers should 
 be taught to be critical, so as not to be misled by the reputation 
 of the°author. Therefore, let us resume our study. 
 
 " Now, let us go back to the case where the stomach has sent 
 up a message " (motion) " saying " (figure of speech) " that it 
 wants " (doubtful meaning) " food " (also ambiguous). " This 
 message " {motion) " has produced " (mechanical change) " the 
 sensation" (subjective) "of hunger, and the incoming message" 
 (motio?i) " would naturally have to go out again " (why ?) " and 
 move something or other. But if you have no food at the 
 time it is unable to go out and move your muscles, so as to 
 make you eat food, which is the natural " (ambiguous term) 
 " thing for it to do ; it must, therefore, do something, and 
 what ft does is to direct " (ambiguous) " your attention " (again 
 ambiguous) " to the fact that you are hungry " (ambiguous). 
 " That is what we call having an appetite, that is to say, the 
 concomitant states of the mind and body in which we are more 
 particularly ready to reply to certain suggestions from without 
 These are really states which again are produced in these grey 
 centres, the centres of grey matter which connect together the 
 sensations " (motions) " which are to come in, and the motions 
 which are to follow, so that, in fact, the state of having an 
 appetite means the state of bemg attentive to those connections 
 whereby, when a piece of food is put into your mouth, you wiU 
 naturally proceed to masticate and to swallow it." 
 
 Here again it seems to us that there is a want of logical 
 coherence." Suppose we say that the use of the word " hungry " 
 is to denote a mechanical state and a subjective state, and 
 that these states are always concomitant. It is admitted 
 that this state is produced, and it is admitted that certain 
 actions result from this state. We will ask, firstly, what pro- 
 duces the state. The physical state is produced by the giving 
 off of Matter and Motion from the body, so that there is a lack 
 of material in the mechanical organism to continue its action. 
 This implies a certain physical or mechanical change in the 
 organism. Since this results in hunger and thirst, the acting 
 
 CLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 241 
 
 cause of the mechanical state of hunger and thirst is a mecha- 
 nical one, and the sensations of hunger and thirst are merely 
 concomitants. This mechanical state of hunger and thirst pro- 
 duces actions. It is argued tliat the lack of incident forces on 
 the coats of the stomach or elsewhere, or perhaps a change or 
 faUing off in the motions from the stomach or elsewhere, pro- 
 duces°a change in the actions of some of the mechanically con- 
 stituted molecules and structural arrangements of the mechanism 
 called the brain, and results in the process of going to the cupboard 
 to get a cake and some wine. The question is, has the feeling 
 of hunger and thirst anything to do with this result ? or would 
 it have°taken place had there been no such feeling 1 We under- 
 stand it to be argued that the feeling is not a factor in the 
 series of events, but is only a concomitant. The whole expla- 
 nation is supposed to rest with the mechanical process. It is 
 right that we should clearly understand the position, but it is 
 ri-ht also that we should ask for the whole series of changes to 
 be given to us in mechanical terms ; and when physiological 
 science is sufficiently advanced, we shall even demand that the 
 series of changes shall be represented by means of diagrams 
 
 and models. . , 1. . j 
 
 Next Professor Clifford deals with the emotional state, and 
 shows the transformation of sensation into action, which we take 
 to be the transformation of the subjective into the objective 
 (See pages 97 and 98 down to the second sentence of the second 
 
 paragraph.) . 
 
 Kesuming at p. 102, we come upon the question of proposi- 
 tions and their physical counterparts. WTiat is the mechanical 
 nature of a proposition? Is it a molecule of the brain, or two 
 molecules connected together? or is it a motion of two mole- 
 cules or what is it ? and how are two propositions compared by 
 means of a mechanical process ? Are some sets of molecules 
 broucrht from different parts of the brain to a common centre, 
 to b"e there adjusted in relation to each other? Professor 
 Clifford thinks there is every reason to suppose that propo- 
 sitions are packed somewhere in the cerebral hemispheres. He 
 thinks that the formation of a proposition is effected by a 
 
 Q 
 
 h 
 
<" 
 
 242 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 physical connection between different parts of the sheet of grey 
 matter which lies just inside the skull. 
 
 In this theory we have a duplex difficulty-a difficulty which 
 presents itself both from the subjective side and from the 
 mechanical side. We ask how propositions are packed away? 
 How a memory of any fact is mechanically effected? What is 
 the mechanical description of a logical process of classification, 
 of generalisation, of deduction? ^ 
 
 And again, on the other side, what is the nature of the bram 
 of the infant with its mass of grey matter, and its emptiness 
 of propositions 1 Are the molecules of the brain like empty 
 boxes ready to be filled, and what is the nature of the 
 mechanical change as the propositions are formed and as they 
 become more general 1 Professor Clifford calls it packing, and 
 packing, and still closer packing, a term we very well under- 
 stand in its usual sense, but of which we do not see the appli- 
 cation in the present instance. We pack a number of simple 
 propositions into general ones, and we pack general propositions 
 into words, and so on. Does Professor Clifford mean that mole- 
 cules of grey matter are packed into bundles,^ or that pairs of 
 them get so packed, and are then compressed into a smaller 
 size like trusses of hay under a hydraulic press, or what does 
 
 he mean ? j i tt 
 
 Evidently Professor Clifford thinks he has succeeded. He 
 
 says — . 
 
 "We have so far then successfully built up out of one 
 
 elementary process " {we mppose this means the cancomitancy of 
 a nerve motion with a nerve shock or unit of feeling) " the corre- 
 spondence of action to sensation ; we have got as far as what 
 takes place in the mind » {subjective) " of the thinker who com- 
 bines together " (s2/?>/ec^iVe) "our old signs" {ambiguous) "or 
 rearranges them and produces new ones out of them. We first 
 of all combined " {mbjedive or mechanical ?) " a number of very 
 simple messages " (motions) "coming along" (mechanical) « the 
 nerves" {mechanical) "by means of a lump of grey matter 
 (mechanical), " we then combined a number of outgoing messages 
 by means of another lump of grey matter, and produced 
 
 CLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASLECT THEORY. 243 
 
 a complicated action " {mechanical), " then we combined these 
 together by means of propositions " {subjective), " so that any 
 number of complicated sensations" {m(ytions ? subjective?) 
 "coming in" {mechanical) "could find" {intelligently?) "their 
 appropriate" {ambiguous) "propositions" {subjective), "and by 
 being coupled with them " {mechanical) " could bring about the 
 appropriate" {ambiguous) "action" {mechanical)) " and lastly, 
 we have combined together a great number of propositions " 
 {subjective) " into a general conception " {subjective) " which is 
 expressed in language" {mechanical and physical), "and which 
 requires language" {physical) "in order to express" (physical) 
 " it, and that is what makes for us a picture " (a very curious 
 term, evidently highly figurative) " of the universe, which is the 
 one" (le., the picture I) "we have in our minds" (subjective) 
 " from day to day " ( i.e., continuously— query, Jixed or change- 
 able?) "although it is not the one" (i.e., the picture) "which 
 we immediately see " (i.e., in our minds) " when we get parti- 
 cular perceptions " (subjective or motions ?) 
 
 There is one last achievement of the mechanical explana- 
 tion, viz., choice. 
 
 Kead the paragraph beginning " But there is one class," &c., 
 
 and pass on to the next. 
 
 « Now let us see what it is that determines the strength of 
 them. When a sensation " (motion and subjective) " comes in " 
 (i.e., to the brain and the mind), " and there is time to deliberate " 
 (ambiguous) " about it, and to act voluntarily " (ambiguous),^ 
 "messages" (motions) "go out" (mechanical) "from that part" 
 (physical) " of the brain " (mecJianical) " which receives these 
 messages " (motions), " and go out to all parts of the cerebral 
 hemisphere " (a mechanical arrangement), " and there they are 
 compared together." (How are motions compared together? 
 We never heard of a machine comparing the motions that arise 
 in it from the introduction of different substances or from 
 applied forces.) " So, then, if two sensations " (motions or sub- 
 jective?) "come in" (to the brain) "together, these messages" 
 (motions) " will go out from each of them " (mechanical) " to all 
 parts of the cerebral hemisphere, and they will also be compared 
 together." {Here we have " compared " again.) " But that 
 
244 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 one" (i.e., that motion or mhjedive sensatim) *' which has the 
 strongest connection " (mechanically read, this must mean either 
 the greatest harmony of motion, or the toughest or thickest thread 
 or fibre connecting molecules or aggregates of molecules) "with 
 the memories" (evidently we icere wrong when we took the 
 mechanical interpretation, unless we can render memories into 
 mechanical terms) "of past sensations" (here evidently the 
 phy^cal result of smne motions) « leading to a certain action 
 (mechanically) "if that is all that takes place, if only the 
 cerehral hemispheres themselves are consulted " (a strange new 
 term, partaking of intelligence) " will have the strongest effect 
 (notice— not in directing, but miscellaneously) " upon the muscles, 
 because it wiU excite the greatest numhei'' (why the greatest 
 number ?) " of outgoing messages " (motiwis, bid whence the con- 
 nection of the choice thus mechanically explained in the cereh'al 
 hemispheres, and the direction of the muscular motions ?) 
 
 There is an undoubted and intimate connection between cere- 
 bral action and mental action, and the above explanations of the 
 order of sequences is so intermixed by the indiscriminate use of 
 objective and subjective terms that we may feel ourselves forced 
 to adopt a theory of concomitance or double aspect ; but as a 
 branch of the study of the unification of knowledge, where 
 each fact and event is viewed as the result of a previous set 
 of circumstances, forming altogether one dependent chain of 
 sequences, it is necessary to know whether the facts and events 
 of Biology, including mental action, are continuous with that 
 chain of'' physical sequences which lead us up to its threshold : 
 —whether organic processes, although accompanied by subjec- 
 tivity, are themselves capable of mechanical explanation from 
 first to last, the subjective being merely their obverse aspect, 
 and never interfering from beginning to end in the chain of 
 biological events. We need to know, supposing this important 
 aspect of things bfe left out of the reckoning altogether, if the 
 course of the history of a physical organism or of a species 
 would have been just the same without it as it actually has 
 been with it. If so, we shall be satisfied that we understand the 
 proposed unification, although we shall find in the next chapter 
 that even this is ineffective within its own Hmitations. But 
 
 DR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 245 
 
 when, in addition, we take into account the historical fact 
 of the appearance of the subjective amongst the results of this 
 physical process, we feel that the limitations of our factors are 
 transcended. We are obliged to recognise amongst our pre- 
 ceding factors more than we supposed, or else to recognise an 
 interfering cause. But if the burthen of explanation is thrown 
 upon the physical factors only, then the double-aspect theory is 
 seen to be really beside the question ; it does not fall within 
 tlie scope of our deductive interpretation at all. We trace the 
 sequence of events, and if they are all capable of mechanical 
 explanation, it is not to the point that a certain range of the 
 events under our consideration has another aspect. The inter- 
 dependence and continuity of our chain of sequence is wholly 
 complete and independent of this concomitant, and perfect 
 without it. The subjective aspect comes in, we know not how, 
 we know not why, at a certain stage, and at a certain stage it 
 disappears; but whatever the intensity of the experienced 
 pleasure and pain, whatever the desires, the sorrows, the joys 
 included in the immense varieties of the subjective aspect, they 
 do not interfere with the exact mechanical course of the machines 
 we call animals and plants. 
 
 (b.) Dr. Bain on tJie Double-Aspect Theory.* 
 
 Dr. Bain's book may be read as a work complete in itself, or 
 in connection with some theory of the cosmos. Katurally we 
 read it in connection with Spencer's theory of the unification of 
 knowledge. It is valuable to us in relation to our present study 
 of the double-aspect theory, which is the one held by Dr. Bain. 
 Mind, according to him, forms the subjective aspect of certain 
 physical phenomena; the history of mind details the subjec- 
 tive aspect of a certain series of physical events. Apparently 
 these physical events are part of the cosmical series, which, at a 
 certain stage, assume a subjective aspect, a fact which does not 
 in the least interfere with the onward course of the physical 
 events. The whole series of sequences might, through the 
 
 ♦ " Mind and Body. The Theories of their Relation." By Alexander 
 Bain, LL.D. London : C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1878. 
 
246 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 period of double-aspectedness, remain purely physical, and be 
 all quite explicable simply as physical processes. 
 
 It is a satisfaction to meet with a theory so plainly stated- 
 Dr. Bain does not say that these physical processes are due to 
 the laws of Matter and Motion, or ultimately of Force, and 
 then turn round and say that these are unknowable factors, yet 
 the explanation nevertheless stands good. He maintains the 
 physical explanation in a plain, straightforward way, and we 
 are able to deal intelligibly with it. Dr. Bain does not connect 
 the study with any cosmical scheme ; nor does he even connect 
 it with any theory of heredity and propagation. He does not 
 advance any hypothesis of Biology. We infer that he approves 
 some doctrine of development, although we nowhere detect that 
 he adopts Mr. Spencer's System of Evolution. 
 
 We cannot but believe that he establishes the concomitance 
 of nervous change and mental change. We also recognise the 
 fact that the actual study of this concomitance is, from the 
 nature of the case, very difficult and obscure, more particularly 
 as a study of individual events ; for the brain cannot be observed 
 in action, and he who observes the subjective cannot at the same 
 time observe the concomitant physical changes. 
 
 Yet there are individual facts and large general observations 
 which go to establish the theory of the concomitance of brain 
 and nerve action with mental events. But as to the question 
 whether the ruling cause of the double-aspected change be alto- 
 gether physical, or whether (although in the present state of 
 our knowledge it is certainly inconceivable) feeling enters as an 
 interfering factor, observation does not show any result, con- 
 sciousness'' does not reveal any sign ; it merely gives a prima 
 facie probability, and reasoning does not altogether make the 
 
 matter clear. 
 
 The two principal chapters claiming our study are Chapters 
 y. and YI. The former contains an account of the physical 
 organism and its changes, the subjective aspect of which is Mind; 
 and the latter contains an account of the double-aspect theory 
 
 in general. 
 
 Apparently' Dr. Bain presents more modest claims for the 
 present age than does Mr. Spencer. He confines himself 
 
 DR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 247 
 
 within the limits of actual knowledge. He looks forward 
 hopefully to the extension of knowledge and of consequent light 
 in the future without aiming at the universalistic. The expla- 
 nations he recognises are those which are justified by actual 
 experience (pp. 127-129). It is good that we can reduce the 
 elements of experience in a last result, if not to one, at least to 
 two. These two are the mental series and the physical series, 
 and " it remains to consider the expression most suited to this 
 union of the two distinct and mutually irresolvable natures." 
 
 Dr. Bain says that the old theory of the independence of the 
 mind, as taught by Aristotle and Aquinas, is now out of date, 
 and that the modified opinion of modern times can no longer 
 be held. " It is now often said that the mind and body act 
 upon each other ; that neither is allowed, so to speak, to pursue 
 its course alone; there is a constant interference, a mutual 
 influence, between the two." 
 
 Dr. Bain thinks *'we have every reason for believing that 
 there is, in company with all our mental processes, an unbroken 
 matei'ial succesbHon'' (i.e., uninfluenced by any mental aspect or 
 feeling). " From the ingress of a sensation " {query, impact) " to 
 the outgoing responses in action, the mental succession is not 
 for an instant dissevered from a physical succession " (which it 
 does not influence). " While we go the round of the mental 
 circle of sensation, emotion, and thought, there is an unbroken 
 circle of thought, there is an unbroken physical circle of effects " 
 (i.e., part of the general physical sequences of the cosmos). " It 
 would be incompatible with everything we know of the cerebral 
 action to suppose that the physical chain ends abruptly in a 
 physical void, occupied by an immaterial substance, which 
 immaterial substance, after entering alone, imparts its results 
 to the other edge of the physical break, and determines the 
 active response— two shores of the material with an intervening 
 ocean of the immaterial. There is, in fact, no rupture of nervous 
 continuity. The only tenable supposition is that mental and 
 physical proceed together, as undivided twins." (Here we have 
 an ambiguity ; it is better to say that the chain of events is phy- 
 sical, having a subjective aspect.) »' When, therefore, we speak 
 of a mental cause, a mental agency, we have always a two-sided 
 
 f|i' 
 
1 
 
 248 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 cause ; the effect produced is not the effect of mind alone, but 
 of mind in company with body." 
 
 Here we find that Dr. Bain endeavours to unify an already 
 accepted ultimate duality by means of word-compounds. After 
 insisting upon the unbroken chain of physical sequences, from 
 incident forces upon an organism to the outgoing actions, he 
 speaks of mental causes and mental agencies as a two-sided cause, 
 Kow a cause, we take it, is that which produces change. A 
 mental cause, if there is such a thing, is that which produces 
 change or effect, according to its properties under given con- 
 ditions, for we are only able to understand and speak of 
 causes 'and effects according as we understand these properties 
 and conditions. Therefore, when we speak of a mental cause 
 producing effects, we must ask what are its properties'? The 
 properties are evidently not those of mind alone, but of mind 
 in company with body. Are we also to suppose that the effect 
 produced is not of body alone, but of mind in company with it? 
 If so, the purely physical theory is abandoned. Or are we to 
 suppose that what Dr. Bain means is that a certain physical 
 state has a mental aspect, and this physical state is the cause 
 of other physical states which also have their mental aspects ? 
 The produced mental aspect is not the effect of the precedent 
 mental aspect, but is the mental aspect produced by a physical 
 change consequent upon a precedent physical condition. The 
 expression a " tico-sided cause " is one of those figures of speech 
 which are the crutches of metaphysics, and enable halting 
 theories to make progress. We find the same difficulty in real- 
 ising in our mind the conception of a " two sided cause " as we 
 have in realising a blue sound or a three-sided motion. The 
 term " cause " is a mode of naming a particular set of known 
 agencies, which, acting together with another set of known 
 agencies, produces certain changes. The study of them gives 
 us knowledge of their uniform relations. Thus the term cause 
 is a general term or term of totality, connoting such sets of 
 circumstances. That which acts is nothing without that which 
 is acted upon, and vice versa. There is no singular " cause ;" 
 there are, in fact, no plural " causes," except as indicating the 
 interactions just referred to. There is of course no abstract 
 
 DR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY.^ 249 
 
 " cause," and no objectivised abstraction which is to be recog- 
 nised under that name. A " two-sided cause," taken figuratively, 
 can only mean that of certain sets of active properties producing 
 effects, some of the active properties are capable of separate 
 classification, but they are co-operative in producing the result. 
 Therefore we take it that when we speak of a mental cause or 
 mental agency, we speak of a set of active properties which 
 may partly be classified as mental and partly as physical. In 
 what respect the former differ from the latter we do not know, 
 nor whether they are subjective, but Dr. Bain says that the 
 effect produced is not the sole product of either class, but the 
 result is the effect of their co-operative action. This is some- 
 thing more than the double aspect of a physical chain of events, 
 and is not in harmony with the preceding passage maintaining 
 the unbroken chain of physical sequence. But Dr. Bain does 
 say that mind is a cause ; tlie effect produced is not " the effect 
 of mind alone, but of mind in company with body." Now the 
 effect produced is a physical change, i.e., a change in the brain 
 substance, nerves, muscles, &c., of the organism. Dr. Bain 
 says that this is partly produced by the mind and partly pro- 
 duced by the physical cause. But he cannot mean that, for he 
 holds that the physical series of events has been unbroken 
 and uninfluenced. Does he, then, mean that the changed 
 mental aspect has been produced by the incident mental 
 aspect '\ But this cannot be true, because the changed mental 
 aspect is the mental aspect of a physical change, which change 
 has been produced by a precedent physical state; therefore 
 this state is the cause of the changed mental state. Accord- 
 ingly Dr. Bain cannot be right in speaking of a mental state as 
 a cause of an effect. The cause of any change in the brain and 
 nervous system is a preceding physical state, and the mental 
 change is the accompaniment or subjective aspect of that 
 physical change— a change with which it has had nothing to 
 do. And, indeed, t)r. Bain immediately reverts to his position : 
 ** It is, after all, body acting upon body." But even after that 
 statement he considers that " mind-body giving birth to mind- 
 body" is "a much more intelligible position." We think the 
 only intelligible position is not contained in any compound 
 
a a a ^S i'WiN fflr^ l i wt ttw aa 
 
 250 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 word which resolves aU mysteries by means of a hyphen, but in 
 a proposition which discloses the sequences of events with single 
 intelligible words for its terms. It would appear as if philo- 
 sophers were incapable of stating their doctrines without resort- 
 incT alternately to figures of speech, untranslatable abstractions, 
 capital letters, and hyphens. The difficulty arises in the histo- 
 rical fact of the precedence in order of development of the 
 physical, unless, indeed, the subjective be reckoned amongst the 
 initial causes, and is admitted as a factor. 
 
 Keturning to Dr. Bain's exposition, is it not sufficient to end 
 here, at this assertion of the continuity and independence of 
 physical changes, and of mind as the subjective aspect of the 
 changes in a physical organism 1 Apparently not, for Dr. Bain 
 proce°eds to discuss their relation. But in the succeeding por- 
 tion of the chapter it seems to us that Dr. Bain is fighting 
 with extinct Satans ; he is attempting to deal with difficulties 
 that do not arise after we have rendered all mental changes 
 into a subjective aspect of certain independent physical changes. 
 He says a mental fact is the subjective aspect of those classes 
 of physical facts which have a subjective ^ aspect (p. 133). 
 Then he goes on to speak of the tmion of mind and matter, 
 which can mean nothing else than the question why certain 
 classes of physical changes should have a subjective aspect con- 
 joined with them ; yet he speaks of the mind as if it were 
 something, and says, p. 136 — 
 
 « This, then, it appears to me, is the only real difficulty 
 of the physical and mental relationship. There is an alliajice 
 icith matter, with the object, or extended world ; but the thing 
 allied, the mind proper, has itself no extension, and cannot be 
 joined in local union." 
 
 Here Dr. Bain speaks of " the mind " when there is no 
 existence which can be called mind, except the subjective 
 aspect of the changes of the brain and organism. He speaks 
 of "the mind proper." He speaks of it as a thing or 
 entity, and of its being allied to matter, just like any ordi- 
 nary thinker. Indeed, most philosophic works exhibit such 
 instances of what Mr. Darwin caUs *' survivals." Dr. Bain con- 
 cludes that " the only adequate expression is a CHANGE OF 
 
 DR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE^ASPECT THEORY, 251 
 
 STATE : a change from the state of the extended cognition to 
 a state of unextended cognition." What is the meaning of an 
 extended cognition 1 Perhaps Dr. Bain means a change from 
 the cognition of the extended to a cognition of the unextended. 
 But the question arises, what is a cognition 1 and what is the 
 meaning of a cognition changing its state ? Does a cognition 
 remain the same cognition when a cognition of the subjective 
 aspect as of the objective aspect of any fact^ The word "un- 
 extended " is a negative word ; it has no positive meaning, 
 and declares that a certain substantive or noun is not amicable 
 with a certain other word, " extended," as thus " unextended 
 cognition ;" that is to say, the word " extended " is not applicable 
 to^he word "cognition." Again, if we are to speak of "the 
 unextended," we have an objectivised abstraction apparently 
 referring to some entity which has no existence. Dr. Bain 
 seems to have adopted this method of expressing himself, not 
 from pursuing the paths of science, but from sitting at the feet 
 
 of theologians : — 
 
 " By various theologians heaven has been spoken of as not a 
 place, but a state ; and this is the only phrase that I can find 
 suitable to describe the vast, though familiar and easy, transi- 
 tion from the material or extended to the immaterial or un- 
 extended side of our being." 
 
 We desire to know what it is which undergoes transition, 
 and what is meant by the process caUed transition. If we are 
 speaking of the brain and nervous system, it changes its state 
 constantly, but only to other states of the brain and nervous 
 system. It never changes its state by becoming immaterial 
 and unextended. There is never any transition from the one 
 condition to the other. The only transition is that relating to 
 the double-aspect theory, where the passage is from one point 
 of view to another," from one kind of language to another, from 
 a set of objective terms to a set of subjective terms or vice 
 versa. There is certainly no change of state implying the 
 transition of the material and extended into the immaterial and 
 unextended, or vice versa. 
 
 The question is certainly interesting : How came the material 
 and extended under certain laws of its own to have a subjective 
 
 N 
 
I|! 
 
 252 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 aspect? This is a natural question to ask, but it meets with no 
 elucidation from Dr. Bain's treatment of the subject. He may 
 not indeed admit that the material was prior to the subjective, 
 or he may not consider that the problem is a historical one 
 
 at all. 
 
 The last paragraph of this chapter is also mystical : — 
 
 " The only mode of union " (i.e., of Mind ami Matter) " is 
 the union of close succession " (is close succession union ?) " in 
 time." {Time is not anything hut succession, yet it is often thus 
 used, as if it were an entity containing other entities.) 
 
 Or again — 
 
 "The only mode of union that is not contradictory is the 
 union of . . . position in a continued thread of conscious life." 
 
 That is to say, the only mode of union between Mind and 
 Matter is not one that we can explain, but one of which we are 
 merely conscious. So that if this paragraph was really intended 
 to convey any definite explanation, it has failed. 
 
 " We are entitled to say that the same being is, by alternate 
 fits, object and subject, under extended and unextended circum- 
 
 stances." 
 
 This, again, is not explaining a mode of union nor a change 
 of state ; it is merely stating an inexplicable mystery. 
 
 "And that, without the extended consciousness, the unex- 
 tended would not arise." 
 
 We know nothing of "extended" or "unextended" con- 
 sciousness. We have a consciousness of our limbs and body, 
 and we may say that we have so many cubic feet of consciousness 
 as we may each individually displace in a vessel of w^ater ; but 
 we do not see that this method of measuring consciousness throws 
 any light upon the nature of the union between the physical 
 body so measured (which would measure just the same if the 
 body remained in it, and no consciousness was left) and the con- 
 sciousness which formed the subjective side of it. Nor do we 
 see how the unextended consciousness can " arise " out of the 
 extended consciousness. 
 
 Let us next examine Chapter Y. Our object will be to see 
 whether the operations of the intellect can be explained by 
 chan^^es in the brain and nervous system. The operations of the 
 
 DR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 253 
 
 intellect are composed of three powers or three facts (p. 83): 
 *'(i.) Discrimination, the sense, feeling, or consciousness of dif- 
 ference; (2.) Similarity, the sense, feeling, or consciousness of 
 agreement ; and (3.) Retentiveness, or the power of memory or 
 acquisition. These three functions, however much they are 
 mingled, and inseparably mingled, in our mental operations, are 
 yet 'totally distinct properties, and each the groundwork of a 
 different superstructure. As an ultimate analysis of the mental 
 powers, their number cannot be increased nor diminished : fewer 
 would not explain the facts, more are unnecessary. They are 
 the intellect, the whole intellect, and nothing but the intellect." 
 Dr. Bain next goes on to show how Discrimination is the 
 foundation of all knowledge, and then considers the physical 
 embodiment of that fact. This is found to consist, firstly, in 
 the particular organ and nerves employed, and secondly in the 
 degree of energy of the motion. So far, all that Dr. Bam 
 establishes is the concomitance of consciousness with nervous 
 structure and nervous change, and we await the further deve- 
 lopment of our study. He says, " These two circumstances— 
 namely, the separate consciousness of separate nerves and the 
 changing intensity of the currents— we may regard as the 
 primitive mode of diversifying the consciousness; but it is in the 
 countless combinations of these simple elements that we are to 
 seek for the physical concomitants of our ever-varying conscious- 
 ness. The union of different stimulations in different fibres 
 and in different degrees would unavoidably give birth to a 
 complex and modified consciousness." 
 
 The second power is that of Kecognition, the sense of simi- 
 larity or agreement, and implies "a great power of reproducing 
 our past experience and acquisitions, an extension of the 
 resources of memory." We first remark that this sense of simi- 
 larity must be dependent upon memory. Dr. Bain has been 
 arguing upon the principle, "No change, no cognition ; no sense 
 of difference, no knowledge." He has been considering the 
 changes of nervous structure, and the changes of intensities of 
 motions therein, as causing or being changes of consciousness. 
 Now he is apparently arguing that continuity of state or simi- 
 larity of the continuing current is also a knowledge ; which 
 
 1/ 
 
254 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 statement is not consistent with the first. But we find that this 
 sense of identity or agreement really means the identity or simi- 
 larity of a motion in a nervous structure with an antecedent 
 motion. It is an identification with a remembered one, and in 
 this respect the background of memory is common both to the 
 sense of Discrimination and the sense of Agreement. What 
 is the nature of the process of the obliteration of impressions 1 
 How is it possible to forget 1 Indeed, it is as important a 
 problem to solve how is forgetting possible as to solve how is 
 
 memory possible. 
 
 The next remark we have to make is to the effect that, 
 whereas Dr. Bain endeavours to assign a physical basis for the 
 sense of Discrimination, he omits altogether any attempt at 
 assigning a physical basis for the sense of Agreement How- 
 ever, it appears that he omits this designedly, finding, in fact, 
 that his study forces him to. rest his ultimate explanation 
 on that of the " remaining intellectual function, Retentiveness, 
 or memory. This explanation would make all the rest easy 
 
 enough." 
 
 The exposition of Memory is commenced^ on p. 89, and we 
 find a difficulty at the outset in the statement that Retention is 
 the power of continuing in the mind impressions, &c., and of 
 recalling them at after-times by purely mental forces. How- 
 ever, we pass this difficulty by to get at the physical explana- 
 tion, and we find that the renewed feeling occupies the very 
 same parts as the original feeling and in the same manner, 
 not any other parts, nor in any other manner that can be 
 
 conceived. 
 
 Dr. Bain illustrates this, not by any memory of figures or 
 abstract laws, but by recollections of sound, sight, taste, &c. 
 He supposes the case of a clapper striking a bell and producing 
 certain vibrations of the air, which impinge upon the ear, and 
 are transmitted by means of motions of the nerve substance to 
 some nervous centre in the structure of the brain. The motion 
 in this particular system of nerves with the connected brain 
 centre as weU as its intensity has, of course, a mental counter- 
 part in our consciousness. The first question is, what becomes 
 of the motion] The sound of a bell when struck gradually 
 
 DR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 255 
 
 dies away till it ceases altogether. Dr. Bain seems to argue that 
 the motion does not so die away, but goes on for ever in the 
 mechanism of the brain and nervous system, and this consti- 
 tutes memory : — 
 
 « If we suppose the sound of a bell striking the ear and then 
 ceasing, there is a certain continuing impression of a feebler 
 kind, '^he idea or memory of the note of the bell, it would 
 take' some very good reason to deter us from the obvious 
 inference that the continuing impression is the persisting (al- 
 though reduced) neme currents aroused by the original shock." 
 And'again, " If that be so with ideas, with ideas surviving their 
 originals, the same is likely to be the case with ideas resuscitated 
 from the past— the remembrance of a former sound of the bell." 
 The case so far stands thus :— The sound of a bell has caused a 
 persistent motion of, say, a small fibre between two ceUs of the 
 grey matter of the brain, which either goes on for ever or comes 
 wholly to a state of rest. If it comes wholly to a state of rest, 
 the memory of that sound perishes ; but putting aside the diffi- 
 culty of imagining a perpetual continuance of this motion, we will 
 suppose it persistent, constituting a standing memory ; then we 
 have to suppose the recurrence of a similar sound. What is the 
 physical explanation of the identification of the present sound 
 with the past one ? Of course, the nervous and cerebral changes 
 are identical, and so are the physical changes of the bell itself ; 
 the whole process is identical from first to last, yet the bell has 
 no memory or sense of agreement or difference, while the conscious 
 organism has. Even if the bell were conscious, it would have 
 no° memory. Consciousness would come and go in accordance 
 with the incidence and intensity of shocks, but there would be 
 no memory of them. Wherein lies thee ause of the retention of 
 the motion by some particular nervous matter, or wherein lies 
 the physical explanation of a resuscitation of memories 1 
 
 Dr. Bain also introduces the doctrine that the consciousness 
 produced by intense motions, i.e., energetic motions of a nervous 
 system, may be reproduced in a reduced form, or represented by 
 feebler motions in some nervous connections in the brain. We 
 should like to know what warrant he has for this doctrine from 
 the physical sciences. 
 
256 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 But again, Dr. Bain speaks of memory as " revived currents 
 of the brain," as if the sound of the bell had produced, not a 
 continuing movement, but a change of structure capable of re- 
 producing the memory when put in motion again. But whether 
 this structure is capable of destruction or reconstruction by some 
 other incident force or not. Dr. Bain does not say. 
 
 This, however, seems to be all preliminary. 
 
 " And now, as to the mechanism of Retention. 
 
 " For every act of memory, every exercise of bodily aptitude, 
 every habit, recollection, train of ideas, there is a specific group- 
 ing or co-ordination of sensations and movements, by virtue of 
 specific growths in the cell functions." 
 
 The proof of this proposition seems to be its general proba- 
 bility : — -. 1, • ^ 
 
 First, From the fact of the connection between the bram and 
 nervous system, on the one hand, and memory, bodily aptitude, 
 &c., on the other, as well as the concomitant complication of 
 
 the two. 
 
 Second, From the fact of reflex action in simple cases, im- 
 plying reflex action of a complicated nature in more complicated 
 
 cases. , , . 
 
 Third, From the known effects of diseased brain or nerve 
 
 upon the memory. 
 
 Fourth, From the limit of acquisition corresponding to the 
 
 limit of brain and nerve substance. 
 
 It is not quite certain whether pages 94 and 95 are addi- 
 tional reasons, or come under the fourth heading. A great deal 
 of the matter contained in them seems to refer to subjective ex- 
 periences, which do not imply any physical counterpart. What, 
 for instance, is the physical counterpart of the suffix " ness," by 
 which thirteen hundred adjectives are connected with abstract 
 nouns? Again, how is the "great principle of the will" 
 represented mechanically, and shown to be by its nature self- 
 correcting? 
 
 However, so far we have made no progress beyond the fact 
 of the intimate correlation of the mind with nervous and cerebral 
 structure and change. What we want to ascertain is the actual 
 mechanical process. 
 
 DR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 257 
 
 Dr. Bain next proceeds to a comparison of the number of 
 mental acquisitions with the number of nervous elements in 
 the brain. This is interesting and curious, but it does not touch 
 the main question. It is aU very well for Dr. Bain to say 
 that " every special acquirement is the re-compounding of the 
 elementary groupings above sketched. A science, for example, 
 such as arithmetic, is a vast aggregate of new, sensible group- 
 ings ; the elements being our conceptions of number gained 
 from numbered things, the ten ciphers, and their union in the 
 decimal system," &c. If he could describe to us the specific 
 changes in the brain produced by learning the multiplication 
 table, this little bit of solid information would be far more use- 
 ful than so much conjecture. Moreover, like most philosophers 
 who deal with the subject, he fails in consistency of language. 
 Is the science of arithmetic, for instance, made up of " notions 
 of number " ? or is it made up of motions of nerves and cell 
 junctions ? and how do these new growtha or structural changes 
 and increments rule all the processes treated of in continuance 
 
 by Dr. Bain 1 
 
 After this comparison between the number of acquisitions 
 and the number of nervous elements in the brain Dr. Bain 
 proceeds to the study of structure ; and this portion is evidently 
 of higher importance than the other. The essence of Dr. Bain's 
 theory is connection and modes of connection. The molecules 
 of grey matter and the ganglions and nerve junctions are after 
 all only centres of force, varying according to size and state of 
 exhaustion. They are merely centres of energy, furnaces and 
 boilers, springs, galvanic batteries, or what not; and the actions 
 to which they give rise are due simply to the channels by which 
 incident motions enter, and the channels by which liberated 
 motions pass out. 
 
 The explanation of the system of nervous connection is given 
 on pages no to 116, after which Dr. Bain says— 
 
 "Having thus considered how to provide for every new 
 mental connection demanded for our /progressive acquirements 
 a special nervous track for that connection, the remaining point 
 is to consider by what means the connections are permanently 
 fixed in the several tracks. That is, to assign the physical 
 
 B 
 
I 
 
 258 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 bond underlying memory, recoUection, or the retentive power 
 
 of the mind." 
 
 Dr. Bain's explanation so far amounts to this : he accepts 
 the fact of a child being bom, without inquiry as to the causes 
 of its production and constitution. Nevertheless, he seems 
 in some places to refer to the question as to the origin of 
 nerves and the causes of a nervous system, and as to the de- 
 velopment of the nervous and cerebral mechanism simply as a 
 mechanism, and not only to give an explanation of it as it is, 
 but also to show why it must have been so. However, he does 
 not state what he aims at distinctly, and we are left in a state 
 of doubt. The general impression he prodjuces is that he is 
 explaining not merely an actual existence, but also the origin of 
 that existence (i.e., the brain and nervous system) ; but since he 
 does not treat this question thoroughly, he does not do it well. 
 Moreover, seeing this is really necessary for the explanation of 
 the organism as it is, he only presents us with a crude, a very 
 crude mass of general considerations, lacking scientific order 
 
 and precision. 
 
 In the main, Dr. Bain represents the nervous system as a 
 system of wires for the conveyance of motion to centres of 
 energy, and the giving off of motions from these centres of 
 energy to other wires. And since all incoming motions, or 
 some of them, set up new connections or new wires, which 
 grow into every wire they cross, thus forming new cell junc- 
 tions, and since also each new wire produced by incoming 
 motions is perhaps duplicated by an outgoing one, there arises 
 at last a very complicated system, which is continually receiving 
 motion from the external world, and imparting motion in 
 return to the external world. In accordance with the nature 
 of the incident energies will be their far-ramifying mechanical 
 results in the system of connections and forces; and as the 
 centres of energy may be fully charged or otherwise, so will be 
 the effect along the outgoing wires, and the result in muscular 
 
 action. 
 
 It is all a matter of nerve currents and their connections, 
 together with any extra impetus arising from the storage of 
 enerf^y in any of the nerve centres. There is no difference in 
 
 DR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 259 
 
 structure of the nervous substance for different feelings or dif- 
 ferent ideas ; it is merely a matter of how the centres branch 
 off in different directions. 
 
 There is just sufficient show of warrant in the faets to lend 
 some plausibility to this explanation, and Dr. Bain himself 
 merely advances the view as " hypothetical ; " but how far off 
 from a real explanation is it after all ! So far as we recognise 
 it to be true, it only accounts for the simpler reflex actions ; 
 all beyond is surmise, and the hypothesis, while wholly fail- 
 ing to account for feeling and consciousness, does little to 
 explain human action, and falls short of a physical explana- 
 tion of memory, of reasoning, of the prudent regulation of 
 
 action. 
 
 Dr. Bain has been at some trouble to explain memory as an 
 alteration of the structure and redirection of the nervous cur- 
 rents in the brain. This is connected with habit and explains 
 motive. It also explains perhaps the slow process of learning 
 a language. But how does he explain rapid and enormous 
 memo°ry of incident, such as will enable a man in coming home 
 from a theatrical performance to give an account to a friend of 
 all the incidents of a party going to the play— how they dined, 
 what they ate and drank, what they talked about, what they 
 did, how they got ready, the occurrences during the drive and 
 on the arrival at the theatre, the auditorium, the people, the 
 overture, and then the wonderful combinations and successions 
 of sights, sounds, language, expressions, costumes, gesture, music, 
 and "the varied incidents that crowd up the next two or three 
 hours 1 Yet a person with a good memory can give a wonder- 
 fully long and correct account of such an evening. 
 
 We cannot but remark that Dr. Bain's argument winds up 
 very imperfectly, for though he begins by saying that the phy- 
 sical explanation of the processes of Discrimination and Iden- 
 tification depends, after all, upon the physical explanation of 
 memory, still, when that explanation has (in a manner) been 
 made, he does not return to the processes of Discrimination and 
 Identification to show how comparisons of present and past 
 motions or growths of nerves and brain are physically effected. 
 Indeed the word " Discrimination " appears to belong to the 
 

 260 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 subjective class, and the problem is to give it a physical ana- 
 logue. Any way, there is a want of completeness in the argu- 
 ment owing to this omission. 
 
 Given the proposition that the facts of Biology are all expli- 
 cable as interrelations of aggregates of the chemical elements 
 with environment, and given the proposition that Feeling and 
 Consciousness are but the subjective aspect of the physical pro- 
 cesses of Biology, without in any way entering into or expressing 
 these processes, which are entirely independent of subjectivity, 
 and constitute in themselves an unbroken chain of physical 
 causation, then two questions arise, or rather two lines of inves- 
 tigation present themselves to the student : — 
 
 The first refers to the concomitance of subjective mentality 
 with physical development, and gives rise to such questions as 
 the following : — 
 
 What is the weight and structure of an infant's brain, and 
 what mentality is represented by it ] 
 
 What structural or physical change is effected in the infant's 
 brain in learning to talk, and in learning the properties of the 
 objects in its environment 1 
 
 What structural or physical change is efi'ected in the brain 
 in learning the alphabet and spelling, and in learning the 
 multiplication table] There are sixty-six propositions in the 
 latter; what sixty-six structural changes are effected in the brain 
 in connection with the oral and visual teaching of these propo- 
 sitions ? 
 
 Again, How can we explain the physical analogue of the feel- 
 ing of sympathy 1 
 
 What is the physical explanation of Imagination? of Motive 1 
 -t)f Temptation ? of Indecision 1 of Remorse ? of Self-control, 
 Prudence, Reflection, Determination, Benevolence, or Intro- 
 spection 1 
 
 Or a^ain : — What is the cause and what is the result of the 
 lengthening of a nerve ? of the thickening of a nerve 1 of two 
 nerves which cross each other uniting together 1 
 
 What is the cause and effect of a growth in or of the cell- 
 junction ? 
 
 Or, taking a different view of the subject — 
 
 DR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 261 
 
 What is the physical description of that state of the nerves 
 which gives the sense of pain or of pleasure ? 
 
 What is the difference, (Ascribed physically, between the 
 state of the nerves which give the sense of sight, the sense of 
 smell, and the sense of taste 1 Mere locality is not a sufficient 
 explanation ; it is not that we are conscious of a sensation in a 
 particular place; there must be some differentiation either in 
 the molecular construction of various sense organs or in the 
 motions taking place in them. The recipient structure must 
 be suitable for the incident energy. 
 
 We have already noted that Dr. Bain treats his subject in a 
 very imperfect manner, in that he deals with it too much by 
 itself, instead of treating it as part of a general science of 
 Biology. In his hands it is an isolated study. But it is 
 evident that the greater rules the less. He cannot treat of cere- 
 bral structure and changes as complete in themselves. If he 
 has to consider nervous or cerebral change in connection with 
 memory, if he has to speak of growths in the cell-junctions or 
 ganglions of nerves, he has to consider the origin, causes, and 
 history of nerves and their changes in general. He has to 
 adopt a theory of Biology. Indeed, he may have to go further, 
 and find a theory of the cosmos before he is able to give an 
 explanation of even one of its details. And in this respect, 
 again. Dr. Bain's argument is deficient. 
 
 The second great consideration which presents itself to our 
 minds in relation to the theory under consideration refers to 
 Subjectivity as a cause of action. This the theory precludes. 
 It is held impossible to conceive of Feeling acting upon 
 matter and causing the motion of matter. We know that the 
 action of matter in motion upon other matter causes motion. 
 Physical science teaches us in the domain of Dynamics, Physics, 
 Chemistry, and the like, how aggregates of matter and motion 
 affect each other ; and the highest sci -;nces teach us the conser- 
 vation of energy and the indestructibility of matter, and tell 
 us that no energy comes into existence to effect a change but 
 has had an anterior physical existence. Science teaches, in 
 fact, the unvarying totality of the quantity of energy or motion, 
 and the unvarying totality of the quantity of matter. Hence 
 
262 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 motion is caused only by some mode of energy, but since Feel- 
 ing is not a mode of energy, it cannot be a cause of muscular 
 motion. 
 
 But is this so ? It seems to contradict our experience. "We 
 are apt to tbink that we select our viands from anticipation of 
 pleasure, and reject those which are offensive to our feelings. 
 Perhaps this is not a matter of feeling, but of motion and 
 structure of nervous system ; but still it seems to us that it is 
 the pleasure or the feeling of disgust which rules our action. 
 It would seem also that all our voluntary actions are thus 
 caused by the desire to secure feelings of pleasure and to avoid 
 painful ones. We are apt indeed to claim for Feeling a mono- 
 poly of rule as regards our voluntary acts. We take all pre- 
 cautions to avoid pain ; and as we act ourselves so we act 
 upon others. In our relations with them, we deal with them 
 in respect of anticipated pleasures, or the prospect of avoiding 
 discomfort or pain. In all descriptions of occurrences it is 
 seldom that we give a mere narration of events, but either in 
 speech or in emotional expression there is a large admixture of 
 the varying feelings of pleasure or pain. 
 
 Indeed, the principle " The greatest happiness for the greatest 
 number " is a subjective rule. Happiness is the end and aim of 
 all philosophies and most religions, thus recognising a subjective 
 motive as the main spring of human actions. 
 
 The question thereupon arises, is there any mechanical, i.e., 
 physical means of recognising feeling? It is impossible to 
 conceive of it. Nor can we build up a physical system, a 
 structure of nerves and brain, which, as mere recipients of 
 motion, collectors and reservoirs of motion or force, shall 
 explain to us the methods of memory, the process of com- 
 parison, emotional changes, or the influence of rules of conduct, 
 as purely mechanical independently of the feelings; and yet 
 we cannot conceive of feelings influencing action. Still we 
 cannot but recognise that the desire for present, and still more 
 extraordinary, the anticipation of future pleasure?, and the 
 avoidance of present and future pain, are the ruling causes of 
 the whole of our voluntary actions — the principal part of our 
 life. And although Dr. Bain's proposal is to show the opera- 
 
 DR, BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 263 
 
 tion of a "two-sided cause," i.e., of subjective and physical as 
 co-equal factors, still we find that he is obliged to make all his 
 explanations in terms of physical arrangements and sequences, 
 the subjective being merely the concomitant of the physical, 
 and in no way entering into the processes as an agency having 
 a determining effect. 
 
( 264 ) 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 AN EXAMINATION OF THE "PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY " WITH 
 REGARD TO ITS PLACE IN MR. SPENCER's SYSTEM. 
 
 § I. General Conbideraiio7is, 
 
 To study a work individually, and to study it as part of a 
 larger scheme, obviously require dififerent methods of treatment, 
 which may end in very different estimates of its real value. 
 The present examination is undertaken not with the view of 
 estimating it on its own merits, but with the object of ascer- 
 taining the place of the " Biology " in Mr. Spencer's great scheme 
 of philosophy. If, as we suppose, the main idea of this scheme 
 is the unification of knowledge, then the natural question to 
 ask is this — How does the " Biology " fall in with the system 
 proposed for that object ? If Mr. Spencer had propounded one 
 distinct and intelligible method, our inquiry would have been 
 of a very simple character ; but, as the reader has already seen 
 in Chapter I., the methods proposed or suggested by Mr. 
 Spencer in the course of his works are numerous and confus- 
 ing, if not indeed mutually destructive. To which of them 
 then are we to look for the affiliation of the " Biology " ? 
 Probably to several. Let us therefore first distinguish between 
 those which are likely to aid us in our endeavour, and those 
 which are wholly inadmissible. 
 
 • 
 
 (a.) The Mystical Method Excluded. 
 
 In the first place, we may exclude all those methods which 
 are of a mystical character. If any terms are used the import 
 of which is not precise and definite, it is evident that any 
 xplanaiions in which they occur are vitiated at their source. 
 
 BIOLOGY— GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 265 
 
 It is impossible to explain the known by the unknown. If 
 in the explanations of Biology the factors, or relatively general 
 and simple antecedents, of all biological change are known, 
 then explanations founded upon them are valid ; but if they 
 are not wholly and completely known, but are in some respects 
 unknown, then these explanations cannot but fail How much 
 more so if the original factors are represented in our minds by 
 symbols standing for unknowables of which we are unable to 
 form any mental representation, while the very attempt to do 
 so only lands us in ultimate contradictions of thought. 
 
 (b.) The Metaphysical Method Excluded. 
 
 We are also justified in excluding from our consideration all 
 methods of a metaphysical character. We have seen in § 6 
 of Chapter I. that these delusive methods are worked out by 
 means of ideal entities — entities invented by the mind itself, 
 but having nothing to correspond with them in the actual 
 universe. For the most part they are objectivised abstractions. 
 These non-entities have taken too large a part in the history of 
 human thought; but any one who would clearly study the 
 science of Biology must steadfastly repudiate the use of terms, 
 or all those senses of the terms he is obliged to employ, which 
 connote any such ideal factors. 
 
 (c.) Tlie Psychological Method Excluded. 
 
 We have already pointed out that Mr. Spencer's psychological 
 
 methods do not harmonise with his main idea of unifying 
 
 knowledge by means of explanations of the sequences of the 
 
 cosmos. They form a class of methods altogether apart from 
 
 . the main course of his constructive system. 
 
 In the first place, the methods expounded in Part VII. of 
 the " Psychology " are theories rather of knowledge than of the 
 unification of knowledge, and do not relate to the explanation of 
 historical sequences at alL In the second place, the Double- 
 Aspect theory also has been shown to be a theory of know- 
 ledge rather than a theory of the unification of knowledge. 
 The explanations of the order of sequences are all on the physi- 
 
266 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 cai side — feeling and consciousness being merely concomitants, 
 whose presence is altogether unexplained. These do nothing — 
 they perform no part — they are not even directly related. As 
 far as any share in the unification of knowledge is concerned 
 they may be thrown out of consideration altogether, for the 
 knowledge we wish to unify is but the subjective aspect of 
 certain physical arrangements of the brain, and its unification, 
 therefore, is but the subjective aspect of a complicated and 
 co-ordinated cerebral arrangement. 
 
 (d.) Feeling and Consciousness Excluded. 
 
 Feeling and Consciousness are so universally associated with 
 living things, that it seems strange to have to commence our 
 study of biological changes and developments by a strict disso- 
 ciation of all Feeling and Consciousness from every part of our 
 inquiry. We have first of all, in what laborious and patient 
 manner we may, to unlearn our supposed knowledge of the 
 influence exerted by Feeling upon muscular motions, and to 
 believe that these are only accompaniments and not causes 
 of biological change. We have to learn that all that takes 
 place in the human frame and in all other animal and vegetable 
 organisms is the operation of bodies under mechanical and 
 chemical laws, and that feeling and consciousness have no place 
 whatever in the process. 
 
 That this view is held by Mr. Spencer is clear from his com- 
 bating the theory of Feeling as a factor in the structure of 
 organisms, as taught by Dr. Darwin and Lamarck. The passage 
 to which we refer occurs in §§ 145-147 of the " Biology," voL L 
 At p. 404 Mr. Spencer quotes Dr. Darwin thus : — ** From their 
 first rudiment or primordium, to the termination of their lives, 
 all animals undergo perpetual transformations; which are in 
 part produced by their own exertions, in consequence of their 
 desires and aversions, of their pleasures and their pains, or of 
 irritations, or of associations ; and many of these acquired forms 
 or properties are transmitted to their posterity." Mr. Spencer 
 hereupon remarks : " True though it is, as Dr. Darwin and 
 Lamarck contend, that desires, by leading to increased actions 
 
 FEELING AND CONSCIOUSNESS EXCLUDED. 267 
 
 of motor organs, may induce further developments of such 
 organs ; and true as it probably is, that the modifications hence 
 arising, are transmissible to offspring ; yet there remains the un- 
 answered question, * Whence do these desires originate 1 ' The 
 transference of the exciting power from the exterior to the in- 
 terior, as described by Lamarck, begs the question. How comes 
 there a wish to perform an action not before performed ? ... To 
 assume that in the course of evolution there from time to time 
 arose new kinds of actions dictated by new desires, is simply to 
 remove the difficulty a step back." 
 
 We have here to remark that although the general tenor of 
 Mr. Spencer's criticism is in full accordance with his own philo- 
 sophy, yet he seems to us to be inconsistent with it when he 
 admits in the beginning the truth of the fact that " desires " lead 
 to increased action of the motor organs, and thereby to increase 
 of structure. Is not this an admission of the factor of Feeling 
 into the evolution of structure at some stage, and does it not 
 involve the admission that Feeling has in more and more obscure 
 forms had an influence on the actions of organic matter from 
 
 the very first ? 
 
 By this admission, and the concomitant repudiation of Feeling 
 as a factor at the beginning, Mr. Spencer lands himself in the 
 conclusion that Feeling is developed in some way from the 
 mechanical arrangements of Matter and Motion in those complex 
 organisations of colloids which we find in plants and animals, 
 and thereafter it becomes a factor in the further development of 
 those structures. If so, this is a department of Evolution that Mr. 
 Spencer has altogether overlooked, and it would thereby indicate 
 the insufficiency of the formulas and explanations which he 
 gives us— an insufficiency which we already feel, and which, in 
 his admissions of the unknowableness of the principal terms of 
 those formulas and explanations, he seems himself to acknow- 
 ledge, notwithstanding the precise and all-inclusive claims he 
 sometimes makes for his explanations. 
 
 However, we have to take Mr. Spencer's words as we find 
 them, and since he deliberately controverts the position of 
 Lamarck and Darwin as to the influence of Feeling and Con- 
 sciousness on biological development and the differentiation of 
 
268 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 species, we must hold that our inquiry is purely one of physical 
 science, free from any such influences. For in any case he 
 implies the origin of Feeling from the original relations of an 
 aggregate of chemical molecules with its environment. And as 
 a matter of fact we find Mr. Spencer's ** Biology " is an attempt 
 to describe the genesis, structure, and functions of all organ- 
 isms, both as individuals and as races, in the terms of Mechan- 
 ics. Witness his declaration (" Biology," vol i. p. 444), where 
 he says : — 
 
 "This survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to 
 express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr. Darwin has 
 called * natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races 
 in the struggle for life.' " 
 
 And in the same manner, in his account of morphological 
 and physiological development in Vol. II., Mr. Spencer en- 
 deavours to give a mechanical interpretation to all the occur- 
 rences in animal and vegetable life. 
 
 It is worthy of notice that in Mr. Spencer's actual dealing 
 with the origin and development of the changes included in 
 biological science, he treats them not as subjects beyond our 
 understanding, but as events occurring in the mutual relations 
 of the chemical elements as we know them under the influence 
 of physical environments and the conditions of heat and cold, 
 gravitation and light, and their recurrences. He explains all 
 biological development in the physical language of molar and 
 molecular motion, segregation, difi"erentiations by incident forces, 
 equilibrations, and the like. Feeling and Consciousness do not 
 enter as factors into the process at all. Biologic changes are 
 treated of as events in a physical history, and the theory is that 
 all plants and all animals are merely organised aggregates pro- 
 duced in the chain of physical events, and modified, propagated, 
 or destroyed according to the exigencies of physical conjunc- 
 tures. It is held that Feeling and Consciousness have not been 
 factors in any structural organisation or development of function, 
 have not been the causes of any action, nor of any motion — have 
 not, in fact, had the least influence upon any fact in biological 
 history. The whole series of events from the beginning to the 
 end of a life-history is a series of physical sequences, and the 
 
 FEELING AND CONSCIOUSNESS EXCLUDED. 269 
 
 whole history of a race is but the aggregate of a large number 
 of these individual series of physical events. 
 
 This view of the case is justified by some writers on the 
 ground of the Continuity of Motion, and it is in complete 
 accordance with "First Principles." "Can we suppose the 
 motions coming upon the body and received by the sensory 
 organs, and transmitted by them to the brain, to go off there," 
 it is asked, " into vacuity— whatever you may call this vacuity, 
 whether Will, Consciousness, or Soul— and to be thence trans- 
 formed into return motions, which shall act upon the outer 
 world 1 " Upon the theory of the Conservation of Energy we 
 can suppose no such thing. If we believe in this doctrine, the 
 motions carried by the nerves to the ganglions or to the brain 
 must produce a physical result, which physical result must be 
 either change of structure in the nervous mechanism or a dis- 
 charge of the motion in a return action through established 
 channels of nervous energy. We can neither conceive of the 
 physical motion of the nerves ending in nothing nor of the 
 origination of motion in motor nerves out of nothing. Such 
 motion can only arise from an antecedent physical motion. If 
 there is any ending of motion without the production of other 
 motion, or if there is any commencement of motion without its 
 being produced by antecedent physical motion, there is an end 
 to the theory of the Conservation of Energy, or at any rate of 
 the Continuity of Motion. Therefore, since we cannot con- 
 ceive of Feeling or Consciousness as Motion, neither Feeling 
 nor Consciousness can be factors in any chain of biological action. 
 They cannot be comprised in the circle of changes of motion. 
 They are not even part of the endless band included in the 
 Conservation of Energy, whose members are mutually conver- 
 tible, viz., heat, molar motion, electricity, magnetism, gravita- 
 tion, &c. Therefore they have to be left out of account in 
 considering the history of the origin and development of plants 
 
 and animals. 
 
 It may be asked what Mr. Spencer has to say about Feeling 
 and Consciousness as factors in biological development. The 
 reply is not easily found. Some passages of his works would seem 
 to imply that he regards them as mysteries, their place in Biology 
 
270 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 as unknowable, and their influence as incapable of appraisement. 
 In other places they are assigned a place as factors (see " Psycho- 
 logy," Part 11. , chap, ix.) At other times they are treated 
 as merely accompaniments of changes of physical states (see 
 "Psychology," Part L, chap, vi.) In the first case, Philosophy 
 must be incomplete and incapable of completion. The second 
 case will be reserved for separate study. The third case is the 
 one actually countenanced by Mr. Spencer in his " Principles 
 of Biology," and as it throws the burthen of explanation upon 
 the interrelations of physical factors, it is reserved for examina- 
 tion in the succeeding sections of this chapter. In this view, 
 Feeling and Consciousness are regarded merely as the sub- 
 jective aspects of physical events. 
 
 In the "Psychology," when Mr. Spencer treats of the Sub- 
 stance of Mind, he assigns something like a very simple form of 
 nervous shock as the ultimate unit of consciousness from the 
 integration of which in successively higher degrees of complexity 
 all the feelings, &c., arise and are accounted for. But upon 
 what does this integration and growing complexity and differen- 
 tiation depend? 
 
 " If each wave of molecular motion brought by a nerve-fibre 
 to a nerve-centre, has for its correlative a shock or pulse of 
 feeling, then we can comprehend how distinguishable differences 
 of feeling may arise from differences in the rates of recurrence 
 of the waves, and we can frame a general idea of the way in which, 
 by the arrival through other fibres, of waves recurring at other 
 rates, compound waves of molecular motion may be formed, and 
 give rise to units of compound feelings : which process of com- 
 pounding of waves and production of correspondingly-com- 
 pounded feelings, we may imagine to be carried on without 
 limit, and to jproduce any amount of heterogeneity of feel- 
 ings."* 
 
 According to this reading, the burthen of explanation rests 
 with Physics. Upon this supposition, all biological changes 
 have to be explained in a physical manner, and if tjiis can be 
 done, it is of no consequence to the unification of knowledge 
 that Consciousness somehow arose and became the accom- 
 
 * Psychology, p. 154. 
 
 FEELING AND CONSCIOUSNESS EXCLUDED. 271 
 
 paniment or additional aspect of changes upon which it had no 
 influence whatever as a factor. For if it can indeed be shown 
 that without it organisms originated, continued, underwent 
 modification, propagated, separated into races, all as incidents in 
 an unbroken chain of physical sequences, the whole thing is com- 
 plete, and it is but idle to inquire the place of the subjective 
 aspect, and to ask why certain of these motions are accompanied 
 by pleasures or by pains. 
 
 So we must cleariy understand in the biological inquiry into 
 which we are about to enter, that Feeling and Consciousness 
 find no place, and as a matter of fact in Mr. Spencer's study 
 of the subject no place is assigned to them. We shall see that 
 the factors of Biology are certain of the so-called elements and 
 certain external physical conditions. The language used is that 
 of Physics— namely, matter, motion, incident forces, aggregation, 
 equilibration, polarity, and so on. Our explanations of motives, 
 emotions, hunger, passion, memory, &c., will all have to be 
 effected by means of physical structure and function. One in- 
 stance of the nature of this mode of treatment we have already 
 had when considering Dr. Bain's explanation of memory in 
 the preceding chapter. We shaU find that we have not only 
 to consider the inquiry as relating to one long continuous indi- 
 vidual, but to generation, reproduction, and the continuance of 
 species and races of individuals. We shall have boldly to grasp 
 the whole problem of Biology, including aU the races of plants 
 and animals, and expound it as a physical history. 
 
 According to this explanation, a man does not eat because he 
 is hungry, nor drink because he is thirsty. He does not marry 
 and surround himself with a household for his pleasure and 
 comfort, for this would be introducing subjective causes for 
 physical events, which cannot be conceived, and contradicts the 
 theory of the Conservation of Energy. He does aU these things 
 because of certain interrelations of the physical states and 
 structures of his nervous mechanism. The fear of pain, the 
 hope of pleasure as such, are excluded from the causes of human 
 actions. The subjective has no place in the chain of ^cosmical 
 
 events. 
 
 We wish to impress this upon the reader before entering 
 
272 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 upon the explanations of Biology. It may be regarded as an 
 incomplete or unfair statement of Mr. Spencer's views. But Mr. 
 Spencer's works contain many inconsistent theories. All the 
 critic can do is to consider each one of them in its turn, bring 
 it out into clear statement, and taking it as the real opinion 
 for the time being, subject it to a rigorous examination. We 
 have therefore to ask the student to free his mind from all 
 associations of Feeling or Consciousness in connection with 
 animals and plants, and to set out in his constructive task with 
 the materials provided for him in Chapters I. and II. of Mr. 
 Spencer's " Principles of Biology." 
 
 (e.) Sirmdations of Unification, 
 
 Before entering upon our studies of Mr. Spencer's actual ex- 
 planations, it would be well to call the reader's attention to 
 the various " Simulations of Unification " in order to free the 
 scientific inquiry into the sequences of Biology from all mis- 
 leading influences. 
 
 It will be remembered that Mr. Spencer's leading idea is the 
 deduction of all sequences as corollaries from some primordial 
 truth or truths. These primordial truths are variously given 
 as the Persistence of Force, or as the laws of the relations of 
 Matter and Motion ; or else are vaguely referred to as " Evolu- 
 tion in general." Now, with regard to these it may be said, 
 that none of the so-called corollaries are drawn out in proper 
 logical form, and that none of them can be put into the shape of 
 syllogisms at alL And Mr. Spencer's presentment of concrete 
 developments in their relation to these so-called primordial truths 
 is not always an implication of such logical connection. Very 
 frequently he uses the phrase " will be found in harmony with ; " 
 but to find a certain process *' in harmony with," or, what is 
 much the same thing, ** non-contradictory of," a given principle, 
 is not identical with the logical process of deducing a corollary 
 from some antecedent truth. The latter is a true explana- 
 tion, a deductive warrant, and the mind is fully satisfied by it. 
 But to find that one truth is in harmony with another simply 
 means that they are not mutually destructive. Thus a house 
 
 SIMULATIONS OF UNIFICATION. 
 
 273 
 
 is built in harmony with the laws of gravitation, but that fact 
 does not explain the building of the house. So a plant or an 
 animal develops in harmony with a great number of physical 
 laws, but until we know the particular relations of the physi- 
 cal factors which have caused the origination of that plant 
 or animal, we have not found an explanation of its exis- 
 ence. Accordingly when in the course of our studies we find 
 that certain developments, certain processes, certain facts are said 
 to be *' in harmony wuth" primordial truths, we shall understand 
 that the required explanations have not been efiected by this 
 simple statement — it is a mere simulation of unification. 
 
 We would further call attention to the misleading use of the 
 term Evolution, and to the very partial use of that Formula 
 of Evolution which was promulgated in the " First Principles " 
 as the means of unification of all processes. Mr. Spencer 
 appears at different times to mean many different things 
 by the term Evolution. In the preceding section we have 
 taken his meaning to be a deduction from the relations of 
 certain given original factors. But in the " First Principles " 
 it is defined for us as meaning merely the concentration of 
 Matter (whatever that may be) accompanied by the transference 
 of Motion. On page 133 of the " Biology," vol. i., we are told 
 that it may mean growth or increase of bulk, and develop- 
 ment or increase of structure, and that it is reserved for occa- 
 sions when both are implied. Mr. Spencer very often em- 
 ploys it in its ordinary reference to recognisable development 
 by the operation of natural laws, as opposed to special creation. 
 In this respect further light is thrown upon Mr. Spencer's real 
 opinion about Evolution by some of the chapters in Part III. 
 of the *• Biology." In Chapter I. it is expressly declared that 
 the truths of Biology are in harmony with " those primordial 
 truths set forth in * First Principles.'" We are then told, 
 " What interpretation we put on the facts of structure and 
 function in each living body, depends entirely upon our con- 
 ception of the mode in which living bodies in general have 
 originated." "We have to choose between two hypotheses — 
 the hypothesis of Special Creation and the hypothesis of Evolu- 
 tion. Either the multitudinous kinds of organisms that now 
 
 s 
 
274 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 exist, and the still more multitudinous kinds that have existed 
 during past geologic eras, have been from time to time separately 
 made ; or they have arisen by insensible steps, through actions 
 such as we see habitually going on." * Here arises the point of 
 our criticism. Mr. Spencer takes it for granted that the defini- 
 tion of Evolution ought to be " an accumulation of insensible 
 differentiations," whereas his own well-known definition runs, 
 "Evolution is an integration of matter and a concomitant dissipa- 
 tion of motion," &c.t Now if Mr. Spencer is able to establish 
 the theory that an insensible increment of differentiations accounts 
 for the different species of living organisms, and if he calls this 
 theory by the name of Evolution, it is clear that he establishes 
 a verbal connection between the "Biology" and the "First 
 Principles " which may well pass in an immense work like this 
 for a logical connection ; but when we notice the different 
 meaning attached in the two places to the word Evolution, we 
 perceive that it is a verbal connection only, and that there is 
 a grand severance in thought between the formula going forth 
 in all-conquering might to enclose and reign over all know- 
 ledge, and the sham king which here usurps the rule in its 
 stead The authority of the nominal sovereign is never once 
 appealed to throughout the work, but in its room we find a 
 principle which is clothed in its raiment, and which is called 
 by its name, though when its mantle is cast aside it is dis- 
 covered to be only a counterfeit. This is largely exemplified in 
 Chapter III., " General Aspects of the Evolution Hypothesis." 
 Throughout this chapter, Evolution is taken to mean differen- 
 tiation by means of natural laws, — insensible differentiation, 
 gradually accumulating and resulting in wide divergences ; and 
 this meaning of the term Evolution is amplified till it not 
 only is held to include organic development, but the whole 
 operations of the cosmos. " The interpretation of phenomena as 
 resulting from Evolution, has been independently showing itself 
 in various fields of inquiry, quite remote from one another. 
 The supposition that the Solar System has been gradually 
 
 ♦ Biology, vol. i. p. 331. 
 + See also First Principles, § 97. 
 
 SIMULATIONS OF UNIFICATION. 
 
 275 
 
 evolved out of diffused matter, is a supposition wholly astro- 
 nomical in its origin and application. Geologists, without being 
 led thereto by astronomical considerations, have been step by 
 step advancing towards the conviction, that the Earth has reached 
 its present varied structure through a process of evohdion. The 
 inquiries of biologists have proved the falsity of the once 
 general belief, that the germ of each organism is a minute 
 repetition of the mature organism, differing from it only in 
 bulk ; and they have shown, contrariwise, that every organism, 
 arising out of apparently-uniform matter, advances to its ulti- 
 mate multiformity through insensible changes. Among philo- 
 sophical politicians, there has been spreading the perception that 
 the progress of society is an evolution : the truth that * consti- 
 tutions are not made but grow,' is a part of the more general 
 truth that societies are not made but grow. It is now uni- 
 versally admitted by philologists, that languages, instead of 
 being artificially or supernaturally formed, have been developed. 
 And the histories of religion, of philosophy, of science, of the 
 fine arts, and of the industrial arts, show that these have passed 
 through stages as unobtrusive as those through which the mind 
 of a child passes on its way to maturity. If, then, the recog- 
 nition of Evolution" {i.e., gradual differentiation, according to a 
 natural law, the working of which is not given, and which 
 cannot be the Formula of Evolution), "as the law of many 
 diverse orders of phenomena, has been spreading ; may we not 
 say that there thence arises the probability that Evolution will 
 presently be recognised as the law of the phenomena we are 
 
 considering ?" * 
 
 Mr. Spencer then proceeds to vindicate organic evolution. 
 He says, in § 118, that although the hypotheses of special crea- 
 tion and of Evolution are both symbolic conceptions, y^ " the 
 one belongs to that order of symbolic conceptions which are 
 proved to be illusive by the impossibility of realising them in 
 thought ; the other is one of those symbolic conceptiOy s which 
 are more or less completely realisable in thought." f We we 
 are glad to notice that the hypothesis of Evolution is o\^ that 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 347. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 348. 
 
lij 
 
 ^ll 
 
 276 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 can be grasped. That is satisfactory. So much indeed would 
 seem to be necessary for a hypothesis which is to unify know- 
 ledge. Yet, to say the truth, we were doubtful of it in con- 
 sidering the Formula of Evolution, which contained two terms, 
 viz., Matter and Motion, which we were told could not be grasped 
 and were not realisable in thought. However, we find that this 
 is not the evolution now referred to, but that the symbolic 
 conception which is more or less completely realisable in thought 
 is a much simpler principle : — " The production of all organic 
 forms by tfie slow accumulation of modifications upon modifi^a- 
 tionSy and by the slow divergences resulting from the continual 
 addition of differences to differences^ is mentally representable 
 in outline, if not in detail." The words we have italicised 
 form the working definition of Evolution as acted upon by Mr. 
 Spencer throughout his works. The original formula of Evolu- 
 tion is abandoned. The new use of the term is a sufficient 
 covering for all phenomena, although it does not disclose its 
 rationale, or mode of universal applicability, nor afford corol- 
 laries which coincide with the actual order of sequences. In 
 the separate departments of Physics and Biology it may ^\\q us 
 independent descriptive propositions, and it thereby affords us 
 a single descriptive proposition applicable to both, but it is not 
 of that explanatory character which would enable us to deduce 
 all developments as corollaries from one ultimate proposition. 
 How completely Mr. Spencer has identified the idea of graduality 
 with the essence and scope of Evolution is singularly evident 
 in his illustration, p. 348 : — 
 
 ** There is no apparent similarity between a straight line and 
 a circle. The one is a curve ; the other is defined as without 
 curvature. The one encloses a space ; the other will not enclose 
 a space though produced for ever. The one is finite ; the other 
 may be infinite. Yet, opposite as the two are in all their pro- 
 perties, they may be connected together by a series of lines no one 
 of which differs from the adjacent ones in an appreciable degree. 
 Thus, if a cone be cut by a plane at right angles to its axis, we 
 get a circle. If, instead of being perfectly at right angles, the 
 plane subtends with the axis an angle of 89° 59', we have an 
 ellipse which no human eye, even when aided by an accurate 
 
 SIMULATIONS OF UNIFICATION, 
 
 277 
 
 pair of compasses, can distinguish from a circle. Decreasing 
 the angle minute by minute, the ellipse becomes first perceptibly 
 eccentric, then manifestly so, and by and by acquires so im- 
 mensely elongated a form, as to bear no recognisable resemblance 
 to a circle. By continuing this process, the eUipse changes insen- 
 sibly into a parabola. On still further diminishing the angle, 
 the parabola becomes an hyperbola. And, finaUy, if the cone be 
 made gradually more obtuse, the hyperbola passes into a straight 
 line, as the angle of the cone approaches 180°. Now, here we 
 have five different species of line,— circle, ellipse, parabola, 
 hyperbola, and straight line— each having its peculiar proper- 
 ties and its separate equation, and the first and last of which 
 are quite opposite in nature, connected together as members of 
 one series, all producible by a single process of insensible modifi- 
 cation,''— ie., Evolution ; of which the last italicised line is the 
 new definition. 
 
 But the process of general evolution is clearly illustrated by 
 the special evolutions in the life-history of each plant and animal 
 " Each organism exhibits, within a short space of time, a series 
 of changes which, when supposed to occupy a period indefinitely 
 great, and to go on in various ways instead of one way, give us 
 a tolerably clear conception of organic evolution in general" * 
 
 " What can be more widely contrasted than a newly-born 
 child and the small, semi-transparent, gelatinous spherule con- 
 stituting the human ovum? The infant is so complex in 
 structure that a cyclopaedia is needed to describe its consti- 
 tuent parts. The germinal vesicle is so simple that it may 
 be defined in a line. Nevertheless, a few months suffice to 
 develop the one out of the other ; and that, too, by a series of 
 modificatigns so small, that were the embryo examined at suc- 
 cessive minutes, even a microscope would with difficulty disclose 
 any sensible changes. Aided by such fa^ts, the conception of 
 general evolution may be rendered as definite a conception as any 
 of our complex conceptions can be rendered. If, instead of the 
 successive minutes of a child's foetal life, we take successive 
 generations of creatures— if we regard the successive generations 
 
 • Biology, vol. i. p. 349- 
 
278 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 as differing from each other no more than the foetus did in 
 successive minutes ; our imaginations must indeed be feeble if 
 we fail to realise in thought, the evolution of the most complex 
 organism out of the simplest. If a single cell, under appropriate 
 conditions, becomes a man in the space of a few years ; there can 
 surely be no difficulty in understanding how, under appropriate 
 conditions, a cell may, in the course of untold millions of years, 
 give origin to the human race." 
 
 We are not now engaged in the study of the correctness or 
 incorrectness of this theory of development. We are engaged 
 in the task of examining Mr. Spencer's theory of the unification 
 of knowledge, and we fail to see how his new definition of the 
 term Evolution affords the requisite explanation. It is, indeed, 
 a kind of all-inclusive generalisation, but it does not give any 
 organic unity to our knowledge, such as that aimed at but not 
 effected in the Formula of Evolution. It is only a vague 
 description of the external appearance of Evolution. It sup- 
 plies us with no key to its processes. 
 
 The idea of graduality of change and of the increment of 
 differentiations^ as containing the meaning of Evolution, is 
 carried on throughout the chapter, and indeed throughout the 
 whole work. 
 
 " Evidence that all organic beings have gradually arisen 
 through the actions of natural causes. . . . May we not, from 
 the small known modifications produced in races of organisms 
 by natural agencies, similarly infer that from natural agencies 
 have sloicly arisen all those structural complexities which we 
 see in them? The hypothesis of Evolution, then, has direct 
 support," &c.* 
 
 Thus we see that the problem of Biology as a part of Evo- 
 lution is not to understand the process viewed as a deduction 
 from the interrelations of original factors, but merely to form 
 an opinion favourable to the theory of graduality of change and 
 development by natural laws, as opposed to the contrasting 
 theory of Special Creation. ^Nevertheless, frequent reference is 
 made to the truths of Evolution as taught in the " First Prin- 
 
 Biology, vol. i. p. 352. 
 
 THE THEORY OF ''ADDITIONAL FACTORS:' 279 
 
 ciples." Accordingly, when Evolution is referred to we do not 
 know which of the several meanings is intended. But the 
 unification of knowledge is scarcely effected by the inclusion of 
 the various modes of knowledge in the different meanings of 
 one word. Such an unification is merely verbal. 
 
 (/.) The Theory of " Additional Factors.'* 
 
 There is still another misleading idea against which it is 
 necessary to guard ourselves in our studies of the " Biology." 
 It is the theory of " additional factors." Keference is made 
 to it in the discussion of the relations of Biology and Psychology 
 in a passage occurring in the latter work. 
 
 "§55. The admission that Psychology is not demarcated 
 from Biology by a sharp line, will perhaps be construed into 
 the admission that it cannot rightly be regarded as a distinct 
 science. But those who so construe the admission, misconceive 
 the natures of the relations among the sciences. They assume 
 that there exist objectively those clear separations which the needs 
 of classification lead us to make subjectively. Whereas the fact 
 is that beyond the divisions between the three fundamental 
 orders of the Sciences, Abstract, Abstract-concrete, and Concrete, 
 there exist objectively no clear separations at all : there are only 
 different groups of phenomena broadly contrasted but shading 
 off one into another. To those who accept the doctrine of 
 Evolution,* this scarcely needs saying ; for Evolution, being a 
 universal process, one and continuous throughout all forms of 
 existence, there can be no break— no change from one group of 
 concrete phenomena to another without a bridge of intermediate 
 phenomena. . . . Astronomy and Geology are regarded as dis- 
 tinct. But Geology is nothing more than a chapter, continuing 
 in detail one part of a history that was once wholly astronomic 
 ... The separation between Biology and Geology once seemed 
 
 ♦ « Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of 
 motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, ^coherent 
 homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and durmg which the 
 retained motion undergoes a parallel transfonnation."-Ftr*f Pr^nc^ple,, 
 
 p. 396. 
 
28o SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 impassable, and to many seems so now. But every day brings 
 new reasons for believing that the one group of phenomena has 
 grown out of the other. Organisms are highly-differentiated 
 portions of the matter forming the earth's crust and its gaseous 
 envelope, and their differentiation from the rest has arisen, like 
 other differentiations, by degrees.* The chasm between the 
 inorganic and the organic is being filled up. . . . Thus the 
 . distinction between Biology and Psychology has the same justi- 
 fication as the distinctions between the concrete sciences below 
 them. Theoretically, all the concrete sciences are adjoining 
 tracts of OTie. science^ which has for its subject-matter the con- 
 tinuous transformation which the universe undergoes. Practi- 
 cally, however, they are distinguishable as successively more 
 specialised parts of the total science — parts further specialised 
 by the introduction of additional factors. The Astronomy of 
 the solar system is a specialised part of that general Astronomy 
 which includes our whole sidereal system ; and becomes spe- 
 cialised by taking into account the revolutions and rotations of 
 planets and satellites. Geology ... is a specialised part of 
 this special Astronomy . . . Biology is a specialised part of 
 Geogeny, dealing with peculiar aggregates of peculiar chemical 
 compounds formed of the earth's superficial elements — aggre- 
 gates which, while exposed to these same general forces molar 
 and molecular, also exert certain general actions and reactions 
 on one another. And Psychology is a specialised part of Bio- 
 logy," &c.t 
 
 From this it is quite clear that all the sciences are to be 
 worked through from the original laws of Physics and Che- 
 mistry, and are explainable thereby; and the change of the 
 argument attempted by Mr. Spencer in the passage we have 
 quoted is utterly unjustifiable. Let us, however, proceed with 
 our present quotation, since it discloses a peculiar notion of 
 the process of Evolution which does not harmonise with the 
 authoritative Formula of Evolution, and since it also leads up 
 
 * Notice here that it is not said to be a continuation in, detail of the 
 history of Geology, but is vaguely stated to be a differentiation " by 
 degrees," which may mean a differentiation of kind. 
 
 t Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 135. 
 
 THE THEORY OF ''ADDITIONAL FACTORS:' 281 
 
 to a new and curious theory of Evolution expounded in the 
 *' Principles of Biology " which we are about to consider. Mr. 
 Spencer proceeds to say, " Psychology," p. 138 : — 
 
 " But this introduction of additional factors, which differen- 
 tiates each more special science from the more general science 
 including it, fails in every case to differentiate it absolutely, 
 because the introduction of the additional factors is gradual." 
 
 The only factors we know under the Formula of Evolution 
 are Matter and Motion; therefore the only additional factors 
 whose introduction is allowable are specialised differentiations 
 of Matter and Motion, and these are new factors only in the 
 sense of being newly formed compounds, but as to the nature 
 of their relations to previously existing combinations of Matter 
 and Motion, they are included in the same general laws. Under 
 these circumstances, it seems a mistake to call their formation 
 under the evolutionary process an " introduction of new factors." 
 A real introduction of a new factor would be such as the intro- 
 duction of the factor of feeling— a totally distinct agent, which 
 takes its part in future changes and growths ; but to admit this 
 or any other really new factor would invalidate the formula 
 under which we are working and the process of reasoning with 
 which we are now occupied. 
 
 If we endeavour to ascertain from Mr. Spencer's subsequent 
 i marks what he means by " a new factor," we are unable to 
 gather anything more from them than the gradual increment of 
 differentiations due to the continuous process of evolution, and 
 if evolution is merely the mechanical operation described in the 
 Formula of Evolution, these gradual increments of differentia- 
 tion must all be of the same order, and be due to the properties 
 of the original factors. He treats in the first place of " the new 
 properties of the order we call chemical, as is shown by their 
 changed aflBnities for the molecules of other substances." What 
 is the meaning of the word " properties" under the Formula of Evo- 
 lution, and what is the interpretation of "chemical changes"? 
 Mr. Spencer defines " a truly chemical change " as the " union 
 or disunion of unlike molecules." Is this not to be explained me- 
 chanically 1 If not, then chemistry is not included in the Formula 
 of Evolution ; and even here, at this early stage, the unificatory 
 
282 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 proposition fails. It would seem that Mr. Spencer recognises 
 an occult " property," or rather an endless number of individual 
 properties, by virtue of which elementary bodies have special 
 affinities and degrees of affinity with other elementary bodies, 
 which property or agent or factor, called " chemical affinity," is 
 unexplainable and ultimate, and is not derivable from any 
 wider and more general law ; is not a corollary from any propo- 
 sition, nor capable of being included in the merely mechanical 
 process of evolution defined in the formula. 
 
 Mr. Spencer says, "The new factor which differentiates 
 chemistry from molecular physics, is the heterogeneity of the 
 molecules with whose redistributions it deals. And the contrast 
 hence resulting is too strongly marked to be obliterated by 
 transitional cases." 
 
 Here it would seem that heterogeneity is the new factor. Of 
 course this heterogeneity has been produced out of homogeneity 
 by the Formula of Evolution. It was produced by the integra- 
 tion of some of the homogeneous units and the dissipations 
 which would in this case be differentiations of their motions. 
 Upon the production of this heterogeneity of molecules there 
 result fresh relations and further integrations, being a fresh 
 stage in evolution, which can be separately marked off in the 
 classification of the sciences. But the new stage is conducted 
 upon essentially the same principles as was the primary stage. 
 The properties of the first-stage molecules are solely those of 
 different attractions and repulsions, and are the resultants of 
 the properties of the contained ultimate units. Amongst the 
 first-stage molecules thus formed there will be considerable 
 differences. Amongst these differences there will be some fitting 
 them to form further combinations with others, according to 
 their properties of attraction and repulsion, size, or motion (still 
 mechanical attributes), and thus the second stage of evolution — 
 chemistry, or the union of unlike elements — is attained. To 
 caU this a new factor is misleading ; it is a further complication, 
 a new condition ; but there is no introduction of a new agency 
 or property or affinity into the history of sequences. If chemical 
 affinities can be explained on mechanical or physical principles, 
 then no new factors are introduced. But if they are not 
 
 THE THEORY OF "ADDITIONAL FACTORS," 283 
 
 so explainable, then not one new factor, but sixty or seventy 
 new factors are introduced. 
 
 The introduction of a new factor, indeed, would destroy the 
 value of the Formula of Evolution and upset the theory of the 
 unification of knowledge ; and if either Biology or Psychology 
 introduce terms and properties that are not interpretable in the 
 language and formulas of the one inclusive science, clearly 
 knowledge is not unified, and Mr. Spencer's attempt is a failure. 
 
 It is therefore quite clear that the unification of knowledge 
 here sought is to be attained by a unification of processes and 
 sequences as deducible from certain original factors without 
 the assistance of " additional factors." We recognise originally 
 the Persistence of Force ; we have to deduce somehow from 
 that principle the two complementary forces of attraction and 
 repulsion ; we must then apparently deduce the formation of 
 the elementary bodies, followed, according to the Formula of 
 Evolution, by a concentration into solar systems. Geology 
 is governed by the same laws as astronomy ; biology is only 
 a specialised form of geology ; psychology and sociology, again, 
 being specialised forms of biology. Therefore there is a depen- 
 dence and coherency throughout the sciences which is interpre- 
 table by means of the rules of the primary science. If this 
 science is placed in knowledge of the relations of the primary 
 attractive and repulsive forces, then into the terms of this 
 ultimate science, if the unification is complete, must all the 
 terms of the subordinate sciences be translatable. 
 
 Mr. Spencer, however, says : — 
 
 "§ 23. But the truths which it is here our business especially 
 to note, are quite independent of hypotheses or interpretations. 
 It is sufficient for the ends we have in view, to observe that 
 organic matter does exhibit these several conspicuous reactions, 
 when acted on by incident forces : it is not requisite that we 
 should know how these reactions originate." * 
 
 This passage we entirely dispute. It is a very common and 
 correct thing to teach that man can never understand the 
 ultimate why and how; but here the teaching is misapplied 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 57. 
 
284 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 to the evasion of a logical requirement. We do not know the 
 how of gravitation, but we know its law, and we are able to pre- 
 dict its operation on any body under any given circumstances. 
 In the case before us — namely, a unification of all knowledge 
 similar to the unification of the special knowledge of the motions 
 of bodies given us by the law of gravitation — although we can 
 never know the how of primary active principles, yet if we 
 know their law we are bound to find its application to all the 
 included sequences, and to be able to predict, and thus to account 
 for, all the changes included in the items of our knowledge. 
 If we fail of this, it shows that our pretended unification is not 
 complete. It does not do to turn round and say, " We cannot 
 see the application of our law in this instance; we cannot 
 account for it ; all the same we are certain that it is unified by 
 the general law." If we do not see the application of the 
 unificatory law, if the unificatory proposition does not grasp 
 this particular case, the law or the proposition is not — to us — 
 unificatory. To fall back upon a primordial mystery to fulfil 
 our unificatory proposition is clearly a logical evasion, and an 
 admission of the insufficiency of that unification. 
 
 We would further ask the reader to compare the above 
 quotation with "First Principles," p. 541, giving the criterion 
 of a Philosophy, as quoted by us at the commencement of the 
 present work. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that Mr. Spencer introduces us to 
 the study of Biology quite unprepared with scientific con- 
 ceptions as to its place in any definite history of the cosmos. 
 Our principal requirement at the commencement of our deduc- 
 tive study is to know the factors with which we have to deal, 
 so that we can thereafter recognise in all their sequences and 
 combinations the interrelations of these original factors, and of 
 these alone. If we could do this, then Biology would be com- 
 plete in itself. If in addition we could see that these original 
 factors themselves were no more than relations of certain know- 
 able ultimate units, then we should recognise that all biology, 
 as immediately the resultant of its special factors, and mediately 
 the resultant of the primordial factors, would fall into its place 
 in a system of unified knowledge. This preliminary science is 
 
 EXPLANATION BY CONCRETE METHOD. 285 
 
 not thoroughly expounded. Nor do its difficulties of explana- 
 tion as between mechanical properties and those of affinity 
 seem to be clearly appreciated But notwithstanding this 
 default of clear initial definitions, Mr. Spencer enters upon the 
 study of Biology as a part of the cosmic process, involving the 
 argument from the outset in such obscurities of thought that 
 he'' and his readers are ready prepared to fall into any sort of 
 delusion as to the unification of knowledge being effected, even 
 to the extent of accepting " additional factors." 
 
 (g.) An Intelligible Explanation only to he Attempted by the 
 
 Physical or Concrete Method. 
 
 Let us now approach the only method by which Biology, 
 freed from the confusing intermixture of Feeling and ad- 
 ditional Factors, is to be affiliated upon the Unification of 
 Knowledge. This is to be done by regarding knowledge as 
 the knowledge of one universal history ; and this universal 
 history is to be regarded as the history of a process. This pro- 
 cess, again, is to be conceived of as commencing in the com- 
 paratively simple conditions of a primordial nebula in a state 
 of fervent heat, composed of the chemical elements in certain 
 proportions and distributions. We call it primordial, because 
 it is the furthest point to which scientific imagination can carry 
 us and to which scientific investigation points,— a state of 
 things actually precedent to the solar system. It is a theory 
 apparently accepted by Mr. Spencer. If he has theories of states 
 precedent to this, they are only effective as explanatory of this ; 
 and since they have to pass through it on their way to the pre- 
 sent, they are in every way bound by it. Or if they do take 
 part in present histories, then let it be stated, and we shall know 
 that our deductions from the postulated nebula are manifestly 
 insufficient to explain post-nebular things. The affiliation of 
 Biology upon Evolution in general must consist in showing how 
 out oi the primordial material organisms arose, and how they 
 developed into all the different forms with which we are ac- 
 quainted. It is not enough to be conversant with the facts of 
 
f » 
 
 286 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Biology and the details of its processes ; it is not enough to 
 know something of genesis, growth, assimilation, reproduction, 
 heredity, decay, death ; it is necessary also to know their 
 rationale. It is not sufficient even to be convinced of Mr. Dar- 
 win's great scientific generalisations ; we have to give them such 
 an explanation as will show them to be natural results arising 
 out of precedent physical conditions. The biological develop- 
 ments must be shown to be physical developments ; and if tho 
 task is to be done well and thoroughly, it must be wrought 
 out in terms of physics and mechanics alone. 
 
 Our work, then, as limited to an examination of the ** Bio- 
 logy," consists in the inquiry if it is complete in itself, and 
 how far it harmonises with the "First Principles." It will 
 be seen from this point of view that it is a task which need 
 not necessarily require a special acquaintance with the science 
 of Biology. Many literary people hesitate to controvert Mr. 
 Spencer on account of their scientific deficiencies, while scien- 
 tific men, immersed in the details of -their vast studies, are not 
 apt at encountering his philosophical and psychological positions. 
 The examination now proposed, however, is the work not of 
 the scientist but of the logician. The task is one requiring 
 assiduity of comparison between general principles and details, 
 — a patient following of lines of reasoning to see that there 
 is no breach of continuity — a cold marking oflf of deficiencies 
 of comprehension within a proposition, — a rigid appraisement 
 of postulates of reasoning and factors of processes, — a stern 
 exposure of any mixing up or changefulness in the meanings 
 of terms and the purport of propositions — a strict supervision of 
 the use of words, for we must remember that : — 
 
 " There are also idols formed by the reciprocal intercourse 
 and society of man with man, which we call idols of the market, 
 from the commerce and association of men with each other. 
 For men converse by means of language, but words are formed 
 at the will of the generality : and there arises from a bad and 
 unapt formation of words a wonderful obstruction to the mind. 
 Nor can the definitions and explanations with which learned 
 men are wont to guard and protect themselves in some instances 
 afford a complete remedy, — words still manifestly force the 
 
 EXPLANATION BY CONCRETE METHOD. 287 
 
 understanding, throw everything in confusion, and lead man- 
 kind into innumerable controversies and fallacies" ("Novum 
 Organum," Book i., Aph. xliii.) 
 
 It will not be necessary for us to criticise throughout Mr. 
 Spencer's detailed treatment of the science of Biology : his work 
 on that subject is a very valuable treatise, apart from its logical 
 dependence upon the " First Principles," and apart from the 
 theory of the unification of knowledge expounded both there and 
 in the " Principles of Psychology." We shall examine it merely 
 on the ground of its logical connection with these two works and 
 with the unificatory theories which form the gist and; essence 
 of Mr. Spencer's Philosophy taken as a whole— an interdepen- 
 dence for which Mr. Spencer himself strenuously contends, and 
 which is supposed to form the crown and glory of all his labours. 
 But we shall see that if the unification of knowledge consists in 
 an unificatory explanation of processes by which all differentia- 
 tions, including all organisms and the interrelations of the organic 
 and inorganic worlds, are accounted for from their origin in 
 the homogeneous, then the proposed explanation advanced in 
 "First Principles "—namely, the Formula of Evolution— is 
 wholly inadequate; for immediately Mr. Spencer sets seriously 
 to work with it, he has to abandon its terms, and| implicitly to 
 substitute for it a definition which is merely descriptive of its 
 external aspect, abandoning all real explanation as outside the 
 possibility of human thought. If, again, we take unification 
 as consisting in the methods proposed in the " Psychology "— 
 say in the finding of a congruity between our primordial expe- 
 riences and all other dicta of our consciousness, or in the fact 
 that all our experiences can be translated into experiences of the 
 feeling we call resistance, or in the resolution of all experiences 
 into those of subject and object; then what have Biology, 
 Geology, Astronomy, and Physics to do with it ? Do any of 
 these supposed unificatory propositions form the one universal 
 science of which Astronomy, Geology, Biology, Psychology, and 
 Sociology are successively dependent parts? If not, whence 
 the systematic organisation and interrelation of these sciences 1 
 In fact, unification is so bandied about from one ultimate 
 unificatory proposition to another, that when it is finally 
 
288 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 thrown upon The Unknowable, we feel it must stay there, at 
 least for a time. 
 
 Mr. Spencer thus states the problem of the affiliation of 
 Biology upon evolution in general : — 
 
 ** The point at issue is, how this inscrutable Cause has worked 
 in the production of living forms." * 
 
 " The task before us is to deduce the leading facts of organic 
 evolution, from those same first principles which evolution at 
 large conforms to." t 
 
 And again : — 
 
 " To say that functional adaptation to conditions, produces 
 either evolution in general, or the irregularities of evolution, 
 is to raise the further question — Why is there a functional 
 adaptation to conditions? — why do use and disuse generate 
 appropriate changes of structure 1 Neither this nor any other 
 interpretation of biologic evolution which rests simply on the 
 basis of biologic induction, is an ultimate interpretation. The 
 biologic induction must itself be interpreted. Only when the 
 process of evolution of organisms is affiliated on the process of 
 evolution in general, can it be truly said to be explained. The 
 thing required is to show that its various results are corol- 
 laries from first principles. We have to reconcile the facts 
 with the universal laws of the redistribution of matter and 
 motion." X 
 
 The result of our study of Mr. Spencer's "Principles of 
 Biology " will be to show that it is a constructive system carried 
 on mainly upon the lines of the physical relations of certain con- 
 crete factors and their aggregates amongst each other and in 
 relation to their physical environments ; that this is aided in its 
 simulation of explanation, although not in its reality, by certain 
 metaphysical abstractions and false supraphysical laws ; that the 
 sense of accomplishment is increased by identifying " harmony 
 with truths" with " corollaries from truths," as well as by certain 
 verbal ingenuities such as " additional factors ; " and that even 
 teleology has to be called in at last to make up the still remain- 
 ing deficiencies. And although, therefore, the main examination 
 
 * Biology, voL i. p. 332. ^t Ibid., p. 402. X Ibid., p. 409. 
 
 THE DATA OF BIOLOGY. 
 
 289 
 
 will be upon the lines of the physical inquiry, yet we shall have 
 perpetually to diverge according as we come upon one or other 
 of these misleading influences. 
 
 § 2. The Data of Biology. 
 
 The study is best commenced by a perusal of Chapter YII. 
 on " The Scope of Biology," with the preceding six chapters, 
 which are there summarised. The first three treat of the 
 factors of Biology ; the latter three are devoted to a discussion 
 of the definition of Life. We will begin by examining the 
 factors of Biology. 
 
 The first criticism we have here to make is with reference to 
 the difficulty the reader experiences in properly realising Mr. 
 Spencer's position and his inability to understand the terms 
 employed. This is due to Mr. Spencer's omission of a work 
 on the precedent inorganic evolution, an omission which he, 
 indeed, explains, though such a work, as being the foundation 
 of all the others, must be judged an indispensable prelimi- 
 nary. The deficiency in question is partly supplied in the 
 Appendix to vol. i. of the " Biology," which contains an account 
 of the origin of "organic matter." This account formed the 
 subject of a very close examination in our previous work, to 
 which we would now refer the reader. The result of our 
 studies was to show that the only change which took place in 
 the evolution described was a gradual increase of complexity, 
 and a consequent increase of mechanical sensitiveness and 
 instability of the most highly complex and comparatively large 
 molecules. Mr. Spencer characterised these molecules as 
 displaying motions approximating more and more to those of 
 organisms, so that in the end the only distinction between 
 inorganic and organic molecules was one of degree of com- 
 plexity, and consequent changefulness under the influence of 
 the environment. • 
 
 The four chief elements which so combine into these complex 
 and changeful molecules termed " organic " form, therefore, the 
 starting-point in biological evolution. As Mr. Spencer argues, 
 " It follows from the Persistence of Force that the properties 
 
 T 
 
290 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 of a compound are resultajits of the properties of its components 
 —resultants in which the properties of the components are 
 severally in full action, though greatly obscured by each other." 
 It is, therefore, necessary to enter upon a study of the proper- 
 ties of these four chief factors. Mr. Spencer does not, however, 
 give a full account as a chemist would do of the properties of 
 oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon. He rather treats them 
 with regard to their physical characteristics. One of the leading 
 properties of each substance is its degree of molecular mobility. 
 We scarcely think Mr. Spencer makes out his case in proving 
 that the solid and liquid forms of compounds derived from 
 these gases, which possess molecular mobility in a high degree, 
 themselves possess this same molecular mobility, however much 
 their action is naturally obscured As we remarked before, the 
 work requires a precedent study of inorganic evolution. In 
 such a preliminary treatise, the modifications of molecular 
 mobility would have been properly explained, together with 
 the meaning of the proposition that -actions can proceed yet 
 can mutually obscure each other. It would also have been 
 explained how such a fact would harmonise with the Formula 
 of Evolution, which asserts that when substances integrate, 
 motion is transferred to other substances. In the next few 
 pages frequent references are made to the distinctions be- 
 tween "chemically" and '* physically," between "chemical 
 activity " and " molecular activity," between " chemical energy " 
 and "chemical inactivity," all implying a previous inorganic 
 evolution by which the various substances were differentiated 
 physically and chemically. Besides, no sufficient account is 
 given of the main distinction between chemistry and physics, 
 nor is the theory that the former is a branch of the latter at all 
 
 discussed. 
 
 Throuf^hout the whole course of this examination we shall 
 find occasion to deplore this initial omission ; for not only in 
 the points just specified shall we feel the want of it, but also 
 when we have to consider the action of Mr. Spencer's great 
 constructive agencies, Polarity and Equilibration. To under- 
 stand these operations properly would require a preliminary 
 elucidation, from Mr. Spencer's point of view, in abstract 
 
 THE DATA OF BIOLOGY. 
 
 291 
 
 mechanics, aTid it is to be hoped that he yet may be able to 
 write it. In it would have to be specified in a clearer manner 
 than appears in his works the place which the Formula of 
 Evolution maintains in all these operations. However, one 
 thing is clear, namely, that when Mr. Spencer speaks of matter 
 it is the chemical elements he refers to. Organic matter, from 
 which all living organisms are constructed, consists of oxygen, 
 nitrogen, hydrogen, carbon, &c., and, as we shall see shortly, 
 the forces which work amongst them are those classed by 
 physicists. This is to guard against Mr. Spencer's reply to 
 the effect that by Matter and Force he only means the symbols 
 X and ?/, symbols which stand for modes of the Unknowable, 
 and to which if we attach any definite conceptions we can only 
 be landed in ultimate contradictions of thought. 
 
 Amongst the ambiguities abounding in these first three 
 chapters is the employment of the term " force " and the 
 plural "forces." Chapter II. treats of the actions of forces on 
 organic matter, the latter forming part of or being altogether 
 an organism, whether plant or animal. Chapter III. is con- 
 cerned with the reactions of organic matter on forces, which 
 we find very difficult to translate into terms of Matter and 
 Motion : sect. 1 8 in particular we cannot understand in the 
 defined language of Evolution. For instance, " forces at work 
 among the molecules," " the force which ... is that which 
 causes the union of different substances with each other," &c. 
 Sect. 21 contains an allusion to " nerve force ;" this also requires 
 translation into the recognised language of Evolution. Sect. 2 2 
 gives an account of sensible motion as a " reaction called fortli 
 from organisms by surrounding actions." 
 
 There is great ambiguity throughout all these chapters for 
 want of a definite meaning to the term " forces." Among these 
 are included " chemical affinity," " nerve force," and " sensible 
 motion." There are also curious uses of the word " force ;" 
 such as, p. 39, "a sudden and great evolution of force ; " p. 57, 
 " these evolutions of force are rigorously dependent on these 
 changes of matter;" p. 42, "these units, reacting differently on 
 the different parts of the force," &c. It is an easy and common 
 error, after expending great care in the delimitation of the 
 
ii 
 
 292 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 meaning of words for scientific purposes, to descend from the 
 high philosophic platform and employ the tenns so set apart 
 in° their ordinary colloquial usage. This carelessness and ob- 
 scurity of language, though apparently of trifling effect, really 
 vitiates cumulatively all Mr, Spencer's reasonings. In so often 
 caUing attention to these defects, we fear we may be thought 
 captious; but we hold it to be an essential criticism of Mr. 
 Spencer's works, as these obscurities and this changefulness of 
 meaning are so all-pervading as to form a complete network of 
 error, from which the cautious reader is constantly endeavouring 
 to free himself, and in which the undiscerning student may 
 become hopelessly and completely entangled. 
 
 Amidst all this use of the term " forces " we are at a loss to 
 apply the scientific statement of the doctrine of the Conserva- 
 tion of Energy as taught by Professor Balfour Stewart. Therein 
 we learned to distinguish between forces and energies, the 
 latter of which terms in particular was well defined, and its 
 interchanges of mode expounded in detail. How are they to 
 be applied to the interrelations of the constituents of organic 
 matter and their relations with modes of energy? 
 
 At the same time we do not know whether Mr. Spencer con- 
 fines himself to this account of the Conservation of Energy, for 
 in his footnote to the chapter on " The Persistence of Force " 
 he seems to object to the term " Conservation of Force,'* 
 because it does not imply the existence of the Force before 
 that particular manifestation of it with which we commence, 
 and he even regards this term Persistence itself as faulty because 
 it has not such an implication ; yet what is the use of this im- 
 plication for scientific purposes, or even for the purposes of 
 philosophy, which is but the higher science 1 
 
 Section 5 is supposed to furnish us with the principles of 
 General Physics, both Molecular and Molar, which shall enable 
 us the better to understand the preceding sections, and supply 
 the want before expressed. Here we find that the molecular 
 mobility of a substance is not a constant property upon which 
 other sequences depend, as we would have supposed from the 
 first section, but a variable property, dependent upon other 
 properties of a substance, as foUows : — Firstly, upon " the 
 
 THE DATA OF BIOLOGY. 
 
 293 
 
 inertia of its molecules " (query, atoms ?). But what is inertia 1 
 
 motion, or rest, or continuance of either? Is, then, inertia 
 
 a constant property of any molecules or atoms? Secondly, 
 " on the intensity of their mutual polarities." Is the sub- 
 stance in question homogeneous or heterogeneous ? Say homo- 
 geneous, since we are investigating the nature of the molecular 
 mobility of oxygen, for instance. The atoms of oxygen, 
 then, have mutual polarities, and differ from the atoms of 
 say gold in that these polarities have different degrees of 
 " intensity." This must mean that they attract each other less 
 and repel each other more, so that they remain at fixed but 
 varying distances, according to the intensity of the polarity. 
 But this is a matter of position or distance, and does not refer 
 to activity or mobility at all, except in the recovery of the 
 relative normal position after the removal of constraint. To 
 anticipate, on the next page (p. 15), we are told that polarity 
 itself is ascribable to contrasts of dimension, so that in tracking 
 molecular mobility to its ultimate source we find it due to 
 relations of dimension. Thirdly, the molecular mobility of a 
 substance depends upon the " mutual pressure " of its molecules, 
 " as determined by the density of their aggregation" But we 
 have just been considering mutual pressure and density of 
 acrgregation as due to degrees of intensity of polarity or mutual 
 attraction and repulsion. Fourthly, "on the molecular mobilities 
 of their component molecules." Here we find that, after all, 
 Mr. Spencer had in view a heterogeneous substance, whereas 
 we had in view an elucidation of the molecular mobility of 
 those constituent substances of which all organic compounds 
 are the resultants^ so that, understanding our original factors, 
 we would be able to calculate the results. Does not this latter 
 sentence imply a fixed molecular mobility as a constant property 
 of the constituent molecules, or rather atoms ? and does not the 
 whole passage imply that these are modifiable amongst them- 
 selves, or as the effect of chemical union with other substances, 
 so that the result is not the resultant of the original molecular 
 mobilities, but a confusion of terms out of which no progress can 
 be made, or out of which any progress can be made ? Can any 
 one understand the inference that, "any three of these remain- 
 
294 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 ing constant, the molecular mobility will vary as the fourth " ? 
 However, it results in this — " Other things equal, therefore, the 
 molecular mobility of atoms must decrease as their masses 
 increase," &c. ; from which it appears that the large-atomed 
 substances are not the resultants of their constituents, or else 
 that it is not a property of the original constituents to be pos- 
 sessed of *' great molecular activity " as a fixed property. Page 
 15, treating of polarity, distinguishes between simple attraction 
 and polar attraction. The question is, What are the original 
 properties from which all others are resultants, and what are 
 dependent and variable properties 1 In turn we think each is the 
 fixed original factor, and afterwards we find it to be dependent 
 
 However, it is not our design to criticise the biological pro- 
 gress in every detail ; suffice it to point out the obscure treat- 
 ment of the preliminaries. The general result of the first 
 chapter is to the effect that the materials employed in the 
 construction and processes of living organisms are in every 
 way fit for the purpose. At the same time we naturally ask 
 what of constructive efficacy appears in the account ? 
 
 The constructive or formative process would appear to consist 
 of simple attraction, chemical affinity, and polarity. Equilibra- 
 tion does not yet make its appearance ; but no doubt, as it is 
 an universal process, although it fulfils a larger function later 
 on, it must have a place in the more minute rearrangements of 
 molecular physics. In view of the large part taken by Polarity 
 and Equilibration in the constructive processes of Biology, we 
 have given them separate study in later sections of this chapter, 
 and would recommend the reader to take them out of their proper 
 order at this point of the study, as they form the main operative 
 factors throughout the work, which we find it convenient to 
 treat on other lines of arrangement However, in this first chap- 
 ter the factor of Polarity is distinctly brought forward, and the 
 foundation laid for much constructive work in the establish- 
 ment of colloidal molecules, which possess at the same time 
 two incompatible properties — the property, that is to say, of 
 definite polarity, by means of which (like crystals) they have 
 the power of aggregating into definite forms, and the property 
 of plasticity, by which they adapt themselves with great readi- 
 
 ORGANIC MATTER AND ''FORCES. 
 
 n • 
 
 295 
 
 ness to their environment This wonderful combination will 
 be found of enormous potency in biological construction, for 
 a substance which can sometimes determine structure, and on 
 the other hand can easily adapt itself to structure— a substance 
 which can originate function and which can also adapt itself 
 to taking on any function, is capable of accomplishing almost 
 everything with the assistance of Equilibration. The difficulty 
 is to understand the coexistence of definite constructive polarity 
 and of plasticity in the same molecule. 
 
 § 3. The Actions of Forces on Organic Matter^ and the Reactions 
 
 of Organic Matter on Forces. 
 
 Let us now take a broader view of the factors of Biology. 
 The first class, as already seen, consists of the so-called elements 
 — oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, and a few others. The 
 second class consists of everything else that in any way becomes 
 related to molecules of the above, or to aggregates of them. 
 These are the external factors, and are treated of in Chapter 11. , 
 entitled "The Actions of Forces on Organic Matter." They 
 comprise: (i.) Incident mechanical force, (2.) Quasi-mechanical 
 force, i.e., (a.) Capillary affinity, (6.) Osmose, (c.) Heat, or a 
 raised state of molecular vibration, (d.) Light, (e.) Chemical 
 affinity, (/.) Induced changes, such as fermentation. The chief 
 criticism on this chapter is, .that it does not seem correct to 
 speak of the actions of external forces such as chemical affinity, 
 without taking into account the fact that the organic matters 
 themselves possess affinities of this kind, and that the action is 
 therefore mutual. Thereupon Mr. Spencer has a chapter upon 
 "The Reactions of Organic Matter on Forces." We can under- 
 stand the reaction of the organic substances upon substances 
 external to them only in the sense of mutuality of action, in 
 which it is just as correct to speak of the operation of either as 
 action or reaction. The actions, being mutual action and reaction, 
 are contemporanobus and therefore identical. But we must say 
 that we cannot understand the reaction of organic matter on such 
 forces as heat, light, electricity, &c., and much less can we under- 
 stand the reaction of organic matter on nerve force and sensible 
 
296 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 motion, which are not external forces at all to be reacted upon. 
 lint as a matter of fact, Mr. Spencer has quitted the consideration 
 of the relations of unorganised organic matter, and is really- 
 treating of the reactions of organisms on — well, it is difl&cult to 
 say on what. The first illustration is with respect to heat. 
 Now heat, as applied to the end of a dry stick, causes it to 
 bum, and then the reaction on heat is said to be that the end 
 causes the middle to burn, and from the middle it spreads to 
 the remaining end ; therefore the organic matter of the wood 
 has reacted upon the force called heat which burned up one 
 half of it, by itself sacrificing the other half. One would think 
 that the whole event was a single process; at any rate, the 
 reaction of the organic matter upon the force called heat is not 
 made apparent. 
 
 The second illustration is thus stated : — 
 " Among the forces called forth from organisms by reaction 
 against the actions to which they ar§ subject is light— i.e., 
 phosphorescence. " 
 
 We presume that phosphorescence of vegetables and animals 
 is a consequence of antecedent factors, internal and external, 
 but we scarcely see that it is a reaction against anything. It 
 seems to us merely a joint product, like the results of the 
 chemical affinities before discussed. 
 
 Nerve force (§21) and sensible motion (§ 22) are classed as 
 reactions upon forces. In the first place, we are outrunning 
 our studies to speak of nerve force and sensible motion at all. 
 These are the very things we wish to have explained. They 
 are said to be " reactions called forth from organisms by sur- 
 rounding actions," which is begging the question at issue. In 
 § 23 Mr. Spencer says that these are truths of induction quite 
 independent of hypotheses, and it is not necessary to know 
 how these reactions originate. But it seems to us, if we are to 
 understand them as resultants of original factors, we must see 
 that what is produced is really an outcome commensurate with 
 
 those factors. 
 
 Mr. Spencer says of Chap. II. : *' This chapter will have served 
 its purpose if it has given a conception of the extreme modifi- 
 
 THE DEFINITION OF " LIFE." 
 
 297 
 
 ability of organic matter by surrounding agencies." * To this 
 estimate of its value no exception can be taken. It is otherwise 
 with Chap. III., in which amongst the reactions of organic matter 
 are classed the known reactions of organisms called nerve force 
 and sensible or muscular motion. These are evidently amongst 
 the results of biological evolution, but we are not in a position 
 to say that they are amongst the properties of that combination 
 of some of the elements which we have agreed to call organic 
 mattery nor can we assert that owing to this fact the same reac- 
 tions are conspicuous in the completed organism Indeed, the 
 reactions referred to are only possible in a completed organism, 
 and cannot be said to appertain in any way to the constituent 
 organic matter. Also it is clear that whatever reactions organic 
 matter may exert, they are not reactions upon things called 
 Forces ; but that all Mr. Spencer refers to are the changes in 
 the organism itself consequent upon the impingement of inci- 
 dent forces. 
 
 § 4. Tlie Definition of " Life.'' 
 
 A state of equilibrium is one in which two or more forces 
 acting upon an intermediate body are so equal as to produce no 
 motion. Strictly speaking, it is a term of the science of me- 
 " chanics, but it can be and is frequently applied to conditions 
 coming within the other physical sciences, and even to circum- 
 stances comprised in the domain of chemistry. In these wider 
 applications it refers to the state of quiescence due to the equal 
 balance of any forces or energies. 
 
 Mr. Spencer very often teaches us that all physical changes 
 are to be understood as stages in a process towards a state of 
 equilibrium, and he looks forward to a time when aQ the 
 energies of nature will be so mutuaUy balanced as to produce 
 universal quiescence or death. This process is called equilihra- 
 Hon, and it evidently rules aU the physical changes of the cosmos. 
 In this view it is clearly co-extensive with the ordinary law 
 of universal causation in the production of physical changes. 
 Every chemical process and every physical action in all classes 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 41. 
 
298 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 of sciences are simple equilibrations of various energies on their 
 way towards a state of balance or quiescence. 
 
 We have now, however, to consider another and altogether 
 distinct idea of Equilibration. 
 
 Physical processes are simple equilibrations having results 
 due to the direct and calculable relations of the properties of 
 the bodies or motions in interaction. Biological processes, 
 though coincident to a certain extent with the former, are yet 
 not wholly so, but exhibit a power on the part of certain aggre- 
 gates of developing fresh rearrangements, which shall counter- 
 balance these direct equilibrations and prevent them from 
 accomplishing their due and direct effect ; and this with the 
 definite object of self-preservation. Thus, a creature's rate of 
 food-assimilation is increased in consequence of a decrease of 
 temperature, or else it is changed in kind, or the energy expended 
 is lessened by a state of torpor, or by the thickening of its fur, 
 so that the altered relation in the surrounding medium may thus 
 be protectively counterbalanced. The aggressive forces, which 
 by simple equilibration would destroy the aggregate, are, by 
 means of the law of special biological equilibration, met by the 
 rearranged forces of the aggregate, and being thereby counter- 
 balanced, the aggregate is preserved. 
 
 Contrast these instances with the phenomena exhibited by 
 a storm-glass. "Outside there is a constant change; inside 
 there is a change of atomic arrangement. Outside there is 
 another certain change ; inside there is another change of atomic 
 arrangement. But, subtle as is the dependence of each internal 
 upon each external change, the connection between them does 
 not, in the abstract, differ from the connection between the 
 motion of a straw and the motion of the wind that disturbs it. 
 In either case a change produces a change, and there it ends. 
 The alteration wrought by some environing agency on an in- 
 animate object, does not tend to induce in it a secondary altera- 
 tion, that anticipates some secondary alteration in the environ- 
 ment" * 
 
 But it is altogether different with living organisms possessing 
 
 the power of anticijpatory counterbalance. 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 78. 
 
 THE DEFINITION OF " LIFE." 
 
 299 
 
 " It is manifest a pnon, that since changes in the physical 
 state of the environment, as also those mechanical actions and 
 those variations of available food which occur in it are liable 
 to stop the processes going on in the organism; and since the 
 adaptive changes in the organism have the effects of directly or 
 indirectly counterbalancing these changes in the environment ; 
 it follows that the life of the organism will be short or 
 long, low or high, according to the extent to which changes 
 in the environment are met by corresponding changes m the 
 
 organism." * . * ^^ • 
 
 If we now recur to the account of the Origination of Organic 
 Matter given by Mr. Spencer in the Appendix, we must resume 
 our study of it on the understanding that matter is inorganic 
 so long as it acts according to simple equilibration, and becomes * 
 organic when it acts according to the law of special biological 
 equHibration-that is to say, when, acting in antagonism to 
 threatened destruction by processes of simple equilibration, it 
 sets up rearrangements to counterbalance the external forces, 
 and so ensures its own self-preservation. We shall therefore 
 find that Mr. Spencer's account of the origin of organic matter 
 fails in that it places the attainment of the organic stage in the 
 degree of complexity, mechanical sensitiveness, changefulness, 
 and plasticity to which some chemical compounds attain. Only 
 when certain molecules or several molecules banded together, 
 attain the power of rearranging their forces or processes, so as 
 to counterbalance external adverse influences, can they be pro- 
 perly called organic. 
 
 The affiliation, therefore, of biological processes upon preceding 
 inorcranic evolution depends upon our ability to affiliate this anti- 
 cipatory biological equilibration upon general physical processes. 
 The problem is to account for this physical law as derived from 
 wider and more universal laws. We can scarcely say that the 
 biological action is for the purpose of self-preservation, for that 
 is teleologicaL It implies a foreseeing mind, and action towards 
 a given end, whereas aU evolution is simply from a beginning. 
 Development is wholly dependent upon antecedents. We must 
 look at every existence as a resultant of preceding circumstances— 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 82. 
 
300 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 not of expected ones. Hence we have to look for the warrant 
 of the special biological law in antecedent modes of activity. 
 
 Can we say it is a law of nature that all actions produce 
 not simple physical reaction, but counter preventative action t 
 Scarcely ! Mr. Spencer himself holds to the special dififeren- 
 tiating character of the biological equilibration, and repudiates 
 it as universal. Still he regards it as a true physical law, and 
 explains it as the law by which moving equilibria sustain them- 
 selves against destructive forces. 
 
 Having thus stated the problem of affiliating Biology upon 
 Evolution in general, we leave the discussion of it together with 
 the general treatment of its application to a separate section. 
 We shall also have to consider whether the subjective feelings 
 or consciousness arise by way of equilibration, and to see that 
 the term equilibration is truly applied in a developmental and 
 not in a teleological sense. With regard to Objective Psycho- 
 logy or the science of the nervo-muscular apparatus, Mr. Spencer 
 fitates in Chapter YIL that it clearly falls within the range of 
 biological study. Subjective Psychology, dealing with its direct 
 or indirect subjective concomitants, is not included in it. 
 
 It now only remains to note that the three chapters devoted 
 to the differentiation of biological processes are not clearly 
 wrought out in terms of this central idea, but that the exposition 
 is obscured by the employment of such indefinite terms as 
 "correspondence" and " correspondences." It is evident that 
 all biological counterbalances are correspondences ; but to end 
 a clear explanation by adopting indefinite language is apt to 
 widen its application beyond its legitimate capacity, and enable 
 it to explain things that are not included in it ; such, for instance, 
 as feelings, memories, and the subjective aspect generally, and 
 perhaps many purely physical arrangements as well. 
 
 § 5. The Inductions of Biology, 
 
 The next part of Mr. Spencer's work, after the statement of 
 the factors, gives a summary of the Inductions of Biology, that 
 is to say, the known general processes which are the things to 
 be explained, this statement being itself accompanied by partial 
 
 THE INDUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY, 
 
 301 
 
 explanations. The full explanatory exposition is, however 
 reserved for Parts IV. and V. in the second volume, entitled 
 respectively "Morphological Development" and " Physiologica 
 Development," in which Mr. Spencer undertakes to deduce al 
 the recognised effects of biological history from the original 
 factors to which we have just given our attention. 
 
 The part devoted to the Inductions of Biology is therefore 
 preparatory in character, and in a criticism Hke this, which is 
 of a general rather than of an exhaustive nature, we cannot 
 undertake to follow the various chapters with any closeness of 
 detail We must not attempt to do more than indicate the 
 principal formative agencies. The most effective of these, 
 namely "Polarity" and "Equilibration," being separately 
 treated,' we shaU do no more here than note their mam 
 
 applications. 
 
 Growth —There is an essential commnnity between organic 
 and inorganic growth ; they both result in the same way There 
 is the same segregation or union of like units and the same 
 parting of unlike units. The deposit of a crystal from a solu- 
 tion exhibits this segregation, and since a plant is surrounded 
 by elements that are like the elements of which it is composed, 
 they are attracted to and segregate with it. Nor does the 
 animal fundamentally differ in this respect from the plant and 
 the crystal. But there is, also, a distinction : the aggregation 
 of inanimate matter is produced by simple attraction, and the 
 process may continue without end, whereas the aggregation of 
 organic bodies is produced by polar attraction, and is of a defi- 
 nite kind which appears to have fixed limits ; nevertheless, the 
 aggregation of iaorganic crystalloids is also limited and definite. 
 The main thesis at this point becomes rather confused. The 
 proposition- advanced at the commencement was to the effect 
 tl*t inorganic growth and organic growth are similar. There 
 are various modes of inorganic growth. There is simple non- 
 selective physical accretion ; there is crystaUisation ; there is 
 the union produced by chemical affinity. Inasmuch as organic 
 bodies are composed of chemical substances and possess aU the 
 physical properties of inorganic bodies, they will exhibit all the 
 physical properties and modes of inorganic growth, and there- 
 
 
302 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 fore similarities will be found. The question rather is whether, 
 in addition to these modes, organisms possess special modes 
 of growth 1 And the inquiry will resolve itself into this ques- 
 tion — whether the growth of inorganic aggregates is not the 
 result of the physical and chemical properties of their con- 
 stituents, and whether, on the other hand, organic growth is 
 not the production and adaptation of physiological units out of 
 the raw material of the environment by the organism for its 
 own growth 1 It will be found that Mr. Spencer himself adopts 
 this latter view, and so overthrows the proposition of the iden- 
 tity of the two modes of growth. He recognises an essential 
 distinction between them. 
 
 In this chapter it would have been well if Mr. Spencer had 
 devoted some space to the consideration of growth as variously 
 exhibited by crystalloids and colloids. It can easily be under- 
 stood that the accretions of the former must assume definite 
 forms, and the growth will be a definite result due to the par- 
 ticular shapes of the constituent molecules. But since organisms 
 are mainly composed of colloids of protean form, it would have 
 been very instructive to have considered their modes of accretion, 
 and to have inquired how far the results were determined by 
 their molecular structure. For it would seem ct priori that 
 protean colloids could not produce aggregates of definite 
 
 shapes. 
 
 Development.^— Development means increase of structure, not 
 increase of bulk, and the study of development means the study 
 of the variations from and additions to structure. The chapter is 
 devoted to a description of the great varieties of organic structure 
 and to a very interesting classification of the modes of develop- 
 ment from rudimentary centres or axes. The point of interest 
 to us is the deductive warrant for development from either. 
 This consideration Mr. Spencer necessarily has to postpone till 
 he comes to the fourth and fifth divisions of his work.* At 
 the same time he says that " the general law of development as 
 displayed in organisms, is readily shown to be necessary, if the 
 initial and terminal stages are such as we know them to be." 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 150. 
 
 THE INDUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY, 
 
 303 
 
 We are at a loss to know what place the terminal stage holds m 
 a process of deduction. The real question is as to the deductive 
 warrant for the terminal stage regarded as purely the result of 
 the initial factors. Passing over the inconsistent proposition of 
 a "homogeneous organism," Mr. Spencer betrays. himself when 
 he says, " Grant that each organism is at the outset homo- 
 creneous, and that when complete it is relatively heterogeneous ; 
 and of necessity it follows " {from the two facts, not the initial one 
 only) " that development is a change from the homogeneous to 
 the heterogeneous— a change during which there must be gone 
 through all the infinitesimal gradations of heterogeneity that he 
 between these extremes. " Mr. Spencer does not specify whether 
 the " homogeneous organism " he refers to is the germ of an 
 embryo or some prehistoric mass of protoplasm. However, he 
 pursues the argument through the terms found in the Formula 
 of Evolution, and the conformity of the process with Evolution 
 in general is self-evident, whatever may become of the postponed 
 deductive interpretation. 
 
 Development is assisted, if not initiated, by growth or as- 
 similation. Like units tend to segregate, and this universal 
 physical truth is held to demonstrate d, prion the necessity 
 for selective assimilation. Therefore, taking for granted that 
 organs have already been developed, we can understand why 
 *' Each organ, at the expense of the organism as a whole, inte- 
 grates with itself certain special kinds and proportions of the 
 matters circulating around it. . . . So that the organs are 
 qualitatively differentiated from each other, m a way analogous 
 to that by which the entire organism is qualitatively differen- 
 tiated from things around it." * 
 
 This arcniment is taken from the section meant to snow thft 
 deductive "interpretation of development. The special result 
 arrived at is » that organs are qualitatively differentiated ; ' the 
 reason given is that they, the organs, being already qualitatively 
 differentiated, segregate to themselves divers matters m the 
 environment. But this does not explain the origin of the 
 qualitative differentiation, it only explains the growth of organs. 
 
 * Biology, vol. L p. 151. 
 
304 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 It does but illustrate the truth " that the pre-existence of a 
 mass of certain units " (an organ ?) " produces, probably by polar 
 attraction, a tendency for diffused units of the same kind to 
 aggregate with this mass, rather than elsewhere." 
 
 Function. — This chapter, taken as a portion of the Inductions 
 of Biology, must be regarded mainly as a description of some 
 general results of biological evolution requiring explanation 
 rather than as an argument to be examined from a deductive 
 point of view. Nevertheless, it is necessary to translate the 
 general facts of function into the language of the precedent 
 inorganic evolution, in order that at the proper time the 
 problem of the origin of function may be suitably dealt with, 
 and in order that clear conceptions of what is meant by the 
 term from the deductive point of view may be elaborated. For 
 such a purpose the first and last sections of the chapter call for 
 more special attention. 
 
 We must always and clearly remember that the distinction 
 between an organic and an inorganic -action, although both are 
 purely physical, is a difference of mode. The latter takes place 
 by simple equilibration, the former takes place as an adaptation 
 or adjustment within an aggregate of its constituent material 
 particles or their motions, in order to preserve its own con- 
 tinuity of existence against some external force ; it is an action 
 of counter-balance. It is supposed to be purely of a physical 
 character, and is specially considered by us elsewhere. The 
 question we have now to ask is this — Is this counter-balance 
 or adaptation to be called a structural change or a function? 
 Upon it depends the question as to the relation of structure and 
 function. 
 
 A molecule of organic matter differs from a molecule of 
 inorganic matter in being a moving equilibrium able to present 
 to its environment a counter-balance. Since it is composed 
 of smaller molecules or atoms, this counter-balance can only 
 be one of rearrangement of parts or rearrangements of their 
 motions. It is to be presumed that the former would be called 
 a structural change and the latter a functional adaptation ; but 
 since it is probable that both changes would be effected simul- 
 taneously, it is to be. judged that the adaptations of structure 
 
 THE INDUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY. 
 
 :o5 
 
 and function go together. Therefore the precedence of either 
 is not a point worth discussing. Nevertheless Mr. Spencer 
 decides that function precedes structure. But he does not 
 show what place *^ function" occupies in inorganic science, 
 from which organic science is held to be deducible. 
 
 Questions more to the deductive purpose of our studies are 
 those regarding the origin of moving equilibria, their aggrega- 
 tion, and the validity of the law of counter-balance on a purely 
 
 physical basis. 
 
 Waste and Repair.— Aitei considering the facts of waste 
 and repair as biological inductions, Mr. Spencer regards the de- 
 ductive interpretation of repair as by no means easy. He does 
 not consider the tendency of an organism to return to a state of 
 intecrrity when it has undergone the waste due to activity as 
 man°ifestly deducible from first principles, although it appears 
 in harmony with them. If in the blood there existed ready- 
 formed units exactly like in kind to those of which each organ 
 consists, there would be no difficulty in accounting for it as 
 ordinary segregation. An explanation is, however, suggested 
 in the hypothesis that complex molecules possess the power 
 of manufacturing out of the fluid bathing their surface other 
 similar molecules, which are then fit to assimilate with the 
 mass. The consideration of this subject generally, as treated 
 of in ^ 65 and 66, throws the onus of explanation upon 
 Polarity, and receives examination from us in the chapter bear- 
 ing that title. 
 
 Adaptation.— As an induction of Biology, the phenomena of 
 adaptation are of remarkable interest, and in the hands of Mr. 
 Darwin they have achieved a position of immense historical 
 importance. With the individual facts we are all more or 
 less acquainted, while the grand import of the accumulated 
 results and of the general principle is every day becoming more 
 and more recognised. Mr. Spencer's account of this matter is 
 a very fair and adequate representation. Nor, granted the 
 validity of the previous deductive explanations, and granted a 
 further satisfactory deductive warrant for genesis and heredity, 
 is the deductive interpretation of the various modes of adap- 
 tation difficult. But until these precedent deductive explana- 
 
 TT 
 
 I 
 
 »'■ 
 
3o6 • SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 tions are properly settled, there is not much satisfaction in 
 pursuing the beautiful ramifications of reasoning by which 
 organisms can thereupon be ideally reconstructed. 
 
 Of the modes of adaptation, there are several for which Mr. 
 Spencer offers suggestions of explanation. There is the adapta- 
 tion by which excess of function is compensated for by increase 
 of bulk. There is, however, a limit to this process both in the 
 changes of individuals and in the adaptations of a race, and 
 the consequent reconstruction is not maintained unless the 
 increase of function is permanent. But this chapter on Adapta- 
 tion, treating rather of the changes in organisms after they have 
 established their existence, is of comparatively less importance 
 to us than the study of the origination of organisms; and 
 although the same principles apply at the end as at the be- 
 ginning, and in the beginning as at the end, we must, in a deduc- 
 tive interpretation of the histories of biology, carefully define 
 our initial conceptions of adaptation as a physical counter-bal- 
 ance by a moving equilibrium to destructive forces. This view 
 of adaptation will be considered in our studies of Equilibration. 
 
 § 6. General Causes of Physiological Development. 
 
 Reserving our main examination of Mr. Spencer's method for 
 affiliating physiological development upon Evolution in general, 
 we will now ask the student to form for himself a general idea 
 as to the problem before him and its mode of treatment by a 
 review of Part V. The problem is thus stated in Chapter I. : — 
 
 '*The problems of Physiology, in the wide sense above de- 
 scribed, are, like the problems of Morphology, to be considered 
 as problems to which answers must be given in terms of incident 
 forces. On the hypothesis of Evolution these specialisations of 
 tissues and accompanying concentrations of functions, must, like 
 the specialisations of shape in an organism and its component 
 divisions, be due to the actions and reactions which its inter- 
 course with the environment involves ; and the task before us is 
 to explain how they are wrought — how they are to be compre- 
 hended as results of such actions and reactions."* 
 
 * Biology, vol. iL p. 223. 
 
 CAUSES OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 307 
 
 " Here, as before, we must take into account two classes of 
 factors. We have to bear in mind the inherited results of 
 actions to which antecedent organisms were exposed, and to 
 join with these the results of present actions. Each organism 
 is to be considered as presenting a moving equilibrium of func- 
 tions^ and a correlative arrangement of structures, produced by 
 the aggregate of actions and reactions that have taken place 
 between all ancestral organisms and their environments."* 
 
 The succeeding chapters of this part contain a detailed account 
 of a probable historical development from unorganised organic 
 matter to all the highly organised forms with which we are 
 acquainted, accompanied by a supposed deductive justification. 
 This history reveals a process analogous to all other cosmical 
 liistories, and possesses characteristics which give it the outside 
 appearance of uniformity with all other kinds of evolution. 
 Physiological development is shown to display an advance from 
 a state of incoherent, indefinite homogeneity to a state of cohe- 
 rent, definite, and complex heterogeneity. It is shown to exhi- 
 bit features throughout in harmony with the " First Principles," 
 and in the Instability of the Homogeneous, the Multiplication 
 of Effects, Segregation, Rhythm, and the redistribution of Matter 
 and Motion, it shows an agreement with Evolution in general. 
 One cannot but admire the great ability displayed in the expo- 
 sition of the progress of physiological development, and in the 
 marshalling of the supporting facts ; but after all, the question 
 with which this criticism is more immediately concerned is not 
 the inductive justification but the deductive validity of the 
 
 argument. 
 
 The general summary of the deductive warrant for physio- 
 logical development is given in a very excellent manner in 
 Chapter X., to which we now direct attention. We would desire 
 to quote this chapter in extenso were it not for the space re- 
 quired ; but that consideration compels us to content ourselves 
 with a brief outline. 
 
 " In summing up the special truths illustrative of this general 
 truth, it will be proper here to contemplate more especially 
 
 Biology, vol. ii. p. 224. 
 
3o8 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 their dependence on first principles. Dealing with biological 
 phenomena as phenomena of Evolution, we have to interpret 
 not only the increasing morphological heterogeneity of organ- 
 isms, but also their increasing physiological heterogeneity, m 
 terms of the redistribution of matter and motion. While wo 
 make our rapid re-survey of the facts, let us then more particularly 
 observe how they are subordinate to the universal course of this 
 
 redistribution."* i. , tt 
 
 The first step is to show how the " Instability of the Homo- 
 geneous" operates in initiating change in a homogeneous mass 
 of organic matter. The general fact to which Mr. Spencer 
 refers is no doubt a common principle of physical change ; but 
 his representation of it as the *^ Instability of the Homogeneous " 
 is fruitful of confusion. In our present study he regards it as, 
 " strictly speaking, the inevitable lapse of the more homogeneous 
 into the less homogeneous." There are, however, no degrees 
 of comparison in the "homogeneous;'' a thing is either abso- 
 lutely homogeneous or it is not homogeneous at all. The only 
 degrees of comparison are as to heterogeneity. Probably there 
 is no such state of homogeneity ; but if there is, there is no 
 reason to suppose that it would "lapse" into any other state. 
 It would not be unstable ; a self-generating cause of change is 
 contradictory to the Persistence of Force. 
 
 The absurdity of this cause of Evolution we have exhi- 
 bited in our previous work, and when we find Mr. Spencer 
 liimself characterising it on p. 3^5 as ''but another name 
 for the absence of balance between the incident forces and 
 the forces which the aggregate opposes to them," we can 
 only come to the conclusion that as the homogeneous means 
 a perfect balance between incident forces and the forces of an 
 acrarecrate, the condition of homogeneity never existed, and that 
 
 "■CO D ' . 1 Jf 
 
 if it ever did exist, it would for ever remain homogeneous. It 
 the Instability of the Homogeneous was, as it is sometimes 
 stated to be, the cause of Evolution, considered either as con- 
 centration of Matter and concomitant dissipation of Motion, or 
 as organic growth and accretions of differentiations, this means 
 
 * Biology, vol. ii. p. 377- 
 
 CAUSES OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 309 
 
 that " the absence of balance " was the cause of Evolution, and 
 thus "Absence of Balance" is elevated to the dignity of capital 
 letters, and becomes the original power which initiated all sub- 
 sequent changes, and was the cause of aU inorganic and organic 
 Evolution. Is " Absence of Balance," then, a corollary from the 
 Persistence of Force? If so, then the tendency to equdibnum 
 is not Yet Mr. Spencer teaches elsewhere the tendency to 
 equilibration, and speaks of an ultimate equilibrium to which 
 all things tend It would be interesting to know if eqmlibra- 
 tion is a corollary from the Persistence of Force. But again, it 
 is not clear but that the law of Rhythm prevents equilibration, 
 and keeps up the " Absence of Balance." In that case Rhythm 
 would seem to be a corollary of the Persistence of Force. 
 But as Mr. Spencer has not thoroughly worked out d. pnon 
 the order of the corollaries of the Persistence of Force, we are 
 all alona left in a state of obscurity. At any rate, it is some- 
 thing to\now that the Instability of the Homogeneous means 
 nothing more than the "Absence of Balance." 
 
 Taken in this meaning, it is a condition and not a law. The 
 action consequent upon such a state of things is the tendency 
 to a balance or state of equilibrium, and thus we find physiolo- 
 Cical development to be part of the more general process of 
 equilibration. Mr. Spencer expresses his conclusion thus :- 
 
 "Physiological development, then, is initiated by that insta- 
 bility of the homogeneous which we have seen to be everywhere 
 
 a cause of evolution." * , , , ^ v 
 
 The next section shows how physiological development has 
 all alon" been aided by the multiplication of effects, how each 
 differentiation has ever tended to become the parent of new 
 differentiations. The ruling cause of changes under this head- 
 ing is however, found to lie in the operation of the process of 
 cquilibration-a tendency to a state of balance either by means 
 of simple equilibration or by the special equilibration of the 
 
 moving equilibrium. 
 
 Section 3.3 brings before us in a more direct manner the 
 ruUng principle of aU change as operative also in Biology. 
 
 • Biology, voL iL p. 382. 
 
3IO SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 " The general truth next to be resumed, is that these pro- 
 cesses have for their limit a state of equilibrium— proximately 
 a moving equilibrium and ultimately a complete equilibrium. 
 The changes we have contemplated are but the concomitants of 
 a progressing equilibration. In every aggregate which we call 
 living, as well as in all other aggregates, the instability of the 
 homogeneous is but another name for the absence of balance 
 between the incident forces and the forces which the aggregate 
 opposes to them ; and the passage into heterogeneity is the pas- 
 sage towards a state of balance. And to say that in every aggre- 
 gate, organic or other, there goes on a multiplication of effects, 
 is but to say that one part which has a fresh force impressed on 
 it, must go on changing and communicating secondary changes, 
 until the whole of the impressed force has been used up in 
 generating equivalent reactive forces."* 
 
 These considerations lead us in the following section to the 
 affiliation of all these changes upon the principle which governs 
 the universal process of equilibration. This is the Persistence 
 
 of Force. 
 
 "§314. In all which universal laws, we find ourselves again 
 brought down to the persistence of force, as the deepest know- 
 able cause of those modifications which constitute physiological 
 development ; as it is the deepest knowable cause of all other 
 evolution. Here, as elsewhere, the perpetual lapse from less 
 to greater heterogeneity, the perpetual begetting of secondary 
 modifications by each primary modification, and the perpetual 
 approach to a temporary balance on the way towards a final 
 balance, are necessary implications of the ultimate fact that force 
 cannot disappear, but can only change its form." * 
 
 The f^eneral remark upon this doctrine is to the effect that 
 all changes may be found in harmony with it ; but that, never- 
 theless, this statement of the principles of change in general is 
 not sufficient to explain any particular change. We saw, for 
 instance, in our study of the " Conservation of Energy," under 
 Professor Stewart, that the change from one kind of energy 
 necessitates an equivalent increase in some other kind ; but by 
 
 * Biology, vol. ii. p. 384. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 387. 
 
 HOW IS ORGANIC EVOLUTION CAUSED? 
 
 ^11 
 
 no effort of the deductive faculty could we deduce any special 
 change from this abstract law. So in all other physical change, 
 and so in all biological change, we can make no concrete deduc- 
 tions from abstract statements, but only from concrete ante- 
 cedents, by applying to these given facts the known general 
 properties or modes of relation thereof summarised m the 
 abstract law. This remark will hold good as well of simple 
 equilibrations as of the special biological equilibrations They 
 may indeed be discerned as being in harmony with the Per- 
 sistence of Force, but they can never be derived from it m 
 their special forms. This has to be done intermediately through 
 special concretes. Thus we are thrown back upon our concrete 
 study as carried on in the previous sections of this chapter 
 But since we found that all the processes therein dealt with 
 depended upon certain views of equilibration, we shall best 
 continue our study by examining the chapters in vol. 1. of the 
 " Biology " dealing with the causes of Organic Evolution. 
 
 § 7. How is Organic Evolution Caused ? 
 
 This is the question proposed by Mr. Spencer in Part III., 
 Chapter VIIL, and it receives an answer in the foUowmg 
 
 chapters. • . ^ 
 
 « The task before us is to deduce the leading facts of organic 
 evolution, from those same first principles which evolution at 
 
 large conforms to." 
 
 " To say that functional adaptation to conditions, produces 
 either evolution in general, or the irregularities of evolution 
 is to raise the further question-Why is there a functional 
 adaptation to conditions ?-why do use and disuse genemte 
 appropriate changes of structure? Neither this nor any other 
 interpretation of biologic evolution, which rests simply on the 
 basis of biologic induction, is an ultimate interpretation. The 
 biologic interpretation must itself be interpreted. Only when 
 the process of evolution of organisms, is affiliated on the process 
 of evolution in general, can it be truly said to be explained. 
 
 ♦ Biology, vol. i. p. 402. 
 
312 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 The thing required is to show that its various results are corol- 
 laries from first principles. We have to reconcile the facts 
 with the universal laws of the redistribution of matter and 
 
 motion." * 
 
 How is this done ? How is the process of the evolution of 
 organisms to be affiliated upon evolution in general, by which 
 this functional adaptation is to be explained 1 
 
 It is done by taking for granted that organisms exist, and 
 then proceeding to show how the conditions of their environ- 
 ment have been affected, first, by astronomical changes (§ 148) ; 
 secondly, by geological actions (§ 149); thirdly, by consequent 
 variations of the meteorological conditions (§ 150); fourthly, by 
 changes in the incident forces which organisms exercise on one 
 another (§ 151) ; and lastly, by the increasing complexity of the 
 organism thus modified, which brings it into contact with a 
 greater variety of environment, and so itself produces stiU fur- 
 ther complexity in the future (§ 152). ' 
 
 This is clearly not an answer to the question proposed, for it 
 presupposes throughout the existence of organisms, and thus 
 begs the question at issue. Therefore, in Chapter X., we are 
 brought to consider the *' Internal Factors " thus acted upon, 
 involving a reference to the first chapters of the work, giving an 
 account of these factors, which we considered at the outset. 
 Mr. Spencer then proceeds — 
 
 "§154- Our postulate being that organic evolution in general 
 commenced with homogeneous organic matter, just as the evo- 
 lution of individual organism commences, we have first to 
 remember that the state of homogeneity is an unstable state " 
 
 ("First Principles," § io9).< 
 
 " Hence the gravitation from a state of homogeneity, to a 
 state of heterogeneity, will be conspicuously shown in propor- 
 tion as the environment is complex." t 
 
 This is not saying much. "Organic matter" is nothing 
 more than combinations of some of the chemical elements—t.e., 
 those which we now know to be the constituents of organisms, 
 and whose compounds we therefore call "organic matter." 
 
 ♦ Biology, vol. i. p. 409- 
 
 t Ibid., p. 421. 
 
 HOW IS ORGANIC EVOLUTION CAUSED ? 313 
 
 Supposing a great quantity of this to be so formed and to be 
 similarly constituted, it would be caUed " homogeneous ; and 
 because it is "homogeneous" it does not remain so, but forth- 
 with differentiates itself, because of the " first principle " that 
 the homogeneous is unstable. If we ask why it is unstable, we 
 are told that after all it is not because it is homogeneous, but 
 because of external influences, and it becomes differentiated 
 because these external influences are of diverse characters. This 
 being so, we can understand that homogeneous organic matter 
 should become differentiated. 
 
 But surely it is saying too much to call such changes " differ- 
 entiations of structure." There are many changes produced in 
 bodies by external forces ; whether they are structural changes 
 or not depends in great measure upon the properties of the con- 
 stituents. We should judge from the modifiability of organic 
 matter that it never possessed sufficient stability of character 
 to be capable of assuming any definite structural arrangement. 
 Thereupon Mr. Spencer, boldly assuming genesis and heredity, 
 
 RDcaks 01 — 
 
 " This transition from a uniform to a multiform state, must 
 continue through successive individuals. Given a series of 
 organisms, each of which is developed from a portion of a pre- 
 ceding organism, and the question is," &c.* 
 Thus we see that — 
 
 " Omitting for the present those circumstances which check 
 and qualify °its consequences, the instability of the homoge- 
 neous must be recognised an ever-acting cause of organic evolu- 
 tion, as of all other evolution." t .11. 
 
 We find that the multiplication of effects aids continually to 
 increase that heterogeneity into which homogeneity inevitably 
 
 ^T^dn, " One of the universal principles to which we saw that 
 the redistribution of matter and motion conforms, is that in 
 any a-cTregate made up of mixed units, incident forces produce 
 segreg°ation-separate unlike units and unite like units ; and 
 it was shown that the increasing integration and definiteness 
 
 Biology, voL i. p. 421. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 422. 
 
 : Ibid., p. 423- 
 
314 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 which characterises each part of an evolving organic aggregate, 
 as of every other aggregate, results from this." * 
 
 Having thus passed in review the extehial factors and the 
 internal factors, Mr. Spencer concludes — 
 
 " It is quite conceivable that aggregates should be rendered 
 more heterogeneous by changing incident forces, without having 
 given to them that peculiar form of heterogeneity required for 
 carrying on the functions of life. Hence it remains now to 
 inquire, h6w the production and maintenance of this peculiar 
 form of heterogeneity is insured." f 
 
 § 8. Equilihration. 
 
 (a.) Introductory. 
 
 We will now ask the reader to enter upon an inquiry as to 
 Equilibration ; and first let us glance at the terms in which this 
 inquiry should be conducted- It is evident that if we com- 
 mence our studies with one set of terms and end them with 
 another, there may possibly be involved some change of thought. 
 Mr. Spencer commences the investigation in terms of Motion 
 and concludes in terms of Force. The completed doctrine and 
 its application in the explanation of Biology receives its fullest 
 exposition in the language of the Equilibration of Forces, 
 whereas we commence our studies with an inquiry as to the 
 Equilibration of Motions. 
 
 (6.) Equilihration of Motion. 
 
 From Mr. Spencer's treatment of the subject in " First Prin- 
 ciples" it would almost appear as if he taught that all motion 
 tended towards a state of quiescence or no-motion. J This, of 
 course, would be contradictory to his theory of the Continuity 
 of Motion. We have already given our reasons for supposing 
 this theory to be incorrect ; but we can scarcely expect Mr. 
 Spencer to involve himself in the inconsistency of repudiating 
 
 * Biology, voL i. p. 426. f Ibid., p. 431, 
 
 X First Principles, pp. 483, 484. 
 
 EQUILIBRATION. 
 
 315 
 
 that which is one of the two essentials of the Formula of Evo- 
 lution. We decide, however, that he has in view the theory of 
 the Dissipation of Energy, which would be more correctly de- 
 nominated the Degradation or Equalisation of Energy. This 
 is an accepted scientific doctrine, recognising the universal ten- 
 dency of all the forms of energy specified in Professor Stewart's 
 list towards an eventual equal distribution in the form of uni- 
 versally diffused heat, when all energy should have lost its 
 efficacy in doing work in consequence of having sunk to a dead 
 level of uniformity of kind in a state of equal distribution. But 
 even in this last resort the quantity of energy remains constant, 
 and Mr. Spencer's theory of the Continuity of Motion need not 
 suffer from it. Therefore if we confine our inquiry to the facts 
 of Motion, we shall see that the processes are all towards an 
 ultimate state of equal distribution. 
 
 (c.) Equilibration and the Conservation of Energy. 
 We have found, however,* that Motion is not continuous, 
 that its various forms are only modes of energy, all of which are 
 capable of being transformed into modes of Energy of Position, 
 in which no actual motion takes place, although the Energy of 
 Position is capable of reconversion into energy of motion. It is 
 the sum of both kinds which is constant ; and even should all 
 suffer degradation by conversion into an universally diffused and 
 equalised heat motion, still the total quantity would remain the 
 
 same. 
 
 The changes which take place in the cosmos may pos- 
 sibly be spoken of as equilibrations of energy, so much of 
 one kind being converted into so much of another kind. In 
 this view equilibration becomes identical with the conception of 
 Universal Causation, unifying the idea of the latter at the ex- 
 pense of the definiteness of the former. Whether it is advisable 
 to regard all changes of dynamical relations, all physical inci- 
 dents, all chemical processes, all actions of light and heat, all 
 motions of liquids and gases, all electrical and other manifesta- 
 tions, as processes of equilibration, is a question well worthy 
 
 ♦ Supra, chap. iii. § I. 
 
3i6 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 of study, as is also the question what is involved in such a 
 mode of regarding the cosmos. The essential idea undoubtedly 
 is the attribution of quantitative to qualitative relationship, and 
 involves progression towards a state of universal rest or quies- 
 cence, or towards a state of universal uniformity of distribution 
 —a state of homogeneity or equal balance from which no farther 
 
 changes ensue. 
 
 {d.) Equilibration and Force. 
 
 Perhaps the more general acceptation of the term Equilibrium 
 would be in the sense of an equipoise of force or forces. Pro- 
 bably the most typical of all modes of equilibrium is that of 
 the scales or balance. The idea of opposing force by force, with 
 the involved idea of relative proportion, must have entered very 
 early into the range of human conceptions. But neither the 
 vulgar notion of the play of forces; nor Mr. Spencer's equally 
 vao-ue symbol **2," is available for any scientific purpose, nor 
 for"* our present special object, in ascertaining the meaning of 
 equilibration. We are obliged always to resort to the concrete 
 when we desire our reasoning to be effective in understanding 
 the laws of concretes or in our practical dealing with them. 
 
 Take, for instance, a pair of scales. We may, if we please, 
 consider that each side is drawn to the earth by a force, 
 and for ordinary everyday thought there is no need to quarrel 
 with the supposition. But for actual use, and in reasoning 
 processes, we are obliged to consider the Mb. weight we place 
 in the scale as the embodiment and measure of so much force, as 
 in fact being itself *' a force ; " and if we place two J-lb. weights 
 in the opposite scale, we have the conception of a force balanced 
 by another and equal force, by which an equilibrium is at- 
 tained. As thus used, '* a force " would not be a vague abstrac- 
 tion, but a concrete body. Taken generally, a force would be a 
 definite concrete, which, either from its motion or its position, 
 would possess a definite quantity of ''energy" capable of doing 
 
 work. 
 
 Thus, we are not at liberty to indulge in vague notions of 
 the force of chemical or other attractions, but in all cases we 
 
 EQUILIBRATION. 3^7 
 
 V.1V.1 fn recrard heat or molecular motion, light or ethereal 
 Z£Tl^^^^^i<^^o^^' cohesive aU.aetions, &c., as defi- 
 
 S: "t" irJuf es, again we .ay do so Wng Jn 
 JThowever, the necessity for detailed and defimte state- 
 n,ent of the relations of the energies ^ef«"«^^o 
 
 We shall therefore ^^^^^l^^^^'^^^ ZT^^r.s 
 
 rSt inXSr slltt-slS^of the .odes of energy^ 
 afforded us m x ^ ^ c^npncer's looser expositions with 
 
 and afterwards examine Mr. bpencer s luu^ ^ . . 
 
 .,e involved corollari. ^^^^Jj^^ZZi^X^Z 
 Z:^.:'Trr^i^oi tX^ is to examine the vanity 
 of thU tCry. it will be necessary for us so to employ the term, 
 though we take exception to it, 
 
 (e.) Equilihration as a Universal Process. 
 
 Rec^arded in this light, all actions which take place in the 
 nnfver e bein. incidents in the interrelation of modes of energy, 
 universe Dem^ i ^ ^^^ ^ state of equilibrium. 
 
EQUILIBRATION, 
 
 319 
 
 318 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 fusing effect We have now to consider it in its general physical 
 application. 
 
 As an instrument of reasoning, however, it is not of much 
 use. For if we are to postulate a state of equilibrium at the 
 beginning of things, it is clear that in the absence of something 
 to disturb that equilibrium there could have been no initiation 
 of change. In this respect a state of perfect equilibrium is 
 equivalent to a state of homogeneity ; and to commence changes 
 we should have to suppose the instability of equilibrium, or a 
 self-determination to change similar to the instability of the 
 homogeneous. Any reasoning from such a basis is ridiculous, 
 and may be made to lead anywhere according to the fancy of 
 the reasoner. 
 
 The commencement of our reasonings, therefore, must be in a 
 state of want of balance, with a tendency towards an equal dis- 
 tribution of energy. Thereupon arises the suggestion of two 
 modes of procedure towards a state of equilibrium. Taking the 
 original state of which we can form any scientific conception as 
 one of an incandescent nebula composed of the seventy so-called 
 elements or their primitive constituents, we would conclude that 
 under the law of equilibration they would all resolve themselves 
 into their constituents and produce a uniform state of ultimate 
 units of matter equally distributed. But since this is not the 
 process which actually took place, we must suppose that these 
 constituents, being unresolvable, each being a bundle of proper- 
 ties incapable of dissociation, the equilibration towards which 
 they worked was one which would secure to all of them a state 
 of rest or quiescence. This would take, in the first instance, 
 the form of segregation according to the specific gravity and 
 polarities of the various atoms, their position in the mass, and 
 the general motion of the nebula itsell 
 
 Our conception of this process of cosmic equilibration, there- 
 fore, is limited to a conception of the equilibrations of the 
 chemical elements, and thus we find our study is not capable 
 of any treatment in terms of a general or abstract nature, 
 but we are continually forced to a consideration of it as a 
 complex concrete problem. The task before us is to deduce 
 the universe as we now know it from some conception of an 
 
 incandescent nebula composed of the chemical elements m cer- 
 tain quantities and distributions. To call these interactions by 
 the general term equilibrations is not to effect any explanation. 
 It may be of interest to know that mechanical, chemical, and 
 other modes of energy are interchangeable, and we may think 
 it adds to our knowledge to term these changes equilibra- 
 tions ; but the definite knowledge of any given change, evolu- 
 tion or development must be knowledge of the relations of 
 antecedent concretes, before it can take its place in any vahd 
 
 system. • 1 * 
 
 The problem from beginning to end must be conceived of as 
 a concrete inquiry and not as a problem of mere nomenclature 
 of processes. We, however, still proceed with our inquiry in 
 terms of equilibration, and would next study the various kinds 
 of equilibration referred to by Mr. Spencer. 
 
 (/.) Modes of Equilibration. 
 
 Equilibration, of course, in principle is only of one kind, but 
 for convenience sake it may be regarded as effectuating itself by 
 various modes. Simple equilibration (sometimes called direct) 
 is a term which may be applied to all interactions of energies, 
 but is generally limited to those which terminate immediately 
 and are not the beginning of a long series of changes. When a 
 chancre is initiated in a complex set of conditions, the results 
 are complex and set up long lines of change. Each little change 
 in the series is a sitnple or direct equilibration, but viewed as a 
 whole the process may be regarded as compound, complex, or 
 indirect equilibration. These, however, are merely names given 
 for our convenience, and do not indicate anything pecuhar or 
 varied in the modes of the process. 
 
 If we Hmit the use of the word Equilibration to the mechanical 
 relations of masses, the term loses its general vagueness, and in- 
 stead of being understood as co-extensive with causation m 
 general, it becomes a term in the science of Mechanics. This 
 science is usually divided into the three branches of Kinematics 
 (Motion), Dynamics (Force), and Statics (Rest), the latter mvolv- 
 ing a theory of equilibrium. Whether all the processes of the 
 
Ill 
 
 320 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 universe, including the chemical, ethereal, electrical, and others, 
 will ultimately be resolved in terms of mechanics is an open 
 question ; but until we are able so to deal with them we must 
 hold the laws of mechanics as applicable only within the purview 
 of that science. If we extend the use of the terms employed 
 there into other sciences, we must understand that they do not 
 carry with them the same meaning. 
 
 (g.) Unstable Equilibrium. 
 
 In mechanics equilibrium may be of three kinds, (i.) The 
 body may be in such a position that if slightly displaced it tends 
 to return to its original position, in which case the equilibrium 
 is stable. (2.) Or it may tend to move farther away from its 
 position, in which case the equilibrium is unstable. (3.) Or it 
 may remain in its new position, in which case the equilibrium is 
 neutral. A body when displaced assumes a position of unstable 
 equilibrium in passing from one position of stable equilibrium 
 into another. The potential energy or Energy of Position which 
 a body in a given position possesses varies with its condition of 
 equilibrium. In neutral equilibrium the potential energy is 
 the same for all positions of the body. In stable equilibrium 
 the potential energy is a minimum, in other words, the body is 
 in the most unfavourable position for doing work; whilst in 
 unstable equilibrium the potential energy is a maximum, and 
 the application of the smallest force can at once convert this 
 Energy of Position into Energy of Motion. A body in unstable 
 equilibrium may be said, therefore, so far as its position is con- 
 cerned, to be charged with the greatest amount of potential 
 energy it can possess. * 
 
 The considerations herein involved are illustrated in books on 
 mechanics by the relations of bodies, but it may be considered 
 that they are applicable also to other cases of Energy of 
 Position included in Professor Stewart's list— that is to say, 
 to chemical separation, electrical separation, molecular separation, 
 and so forth. 
 
 ♦ Magnus, Lessons in Mechanics, p. 253. 
 
 MOVING EQUILIBRIA. 321 
 
 (h.) Moving Equilihria. 
 
 In the preceding section we found it stated that a body when 
 displaced assumes a position of unstable equilibrium m passing 
 from one position of stable equilibrium to another This is 
 in truth an untenable proposition, for a state of unstable 
 equilibrium is one of actual equilibrium, but one which is 
 capable of being very easily disturbed. The body, in passing 
 from one position of equilibrium to another, is never m a state 
 of equilibrium, unless, indeed, a body in motion is to be 
 rec^arded as at every moment of time successively m a state of 
 equilibrium. In this case, everything at every instant is in 
 a state of equilibrium, whether it be in rest or m motion, and 
 all distinctiveness of meaning is lost. It is weU to keep ngidy 
 to the distinction between Equilibration, the process, and Equi- 
 librium, the statical result. An equilibrium implies a balance 
 of enerc^y in place, exhibiting no motion. An equilibration is 
 tr^oL resullant upon the unequal relations of energies 
 seekL an equality. The former implies rest, the la ter 
 mpUe: motion. A difficulty certainly arises if we contemplate 
 ^e final state of the cosmos as one of the universally diffused 
 deeded energy of equal heat motion; but this is perhaps a 
 Sy s^^^^^^^^ difficulty, to be got over by regarding the 
 final Jtate as one of uniform spatial rela^n, and -d -t^ ; 
 ticaUy be taken into account. An equilibration, in tbe widest 
 sense may be regarded as the passage from some s ate of 
 E^rgy of Position through the state of Energy of Motion to 
 another state of Energy of Position. , . 
 
 Our view of an equHibration is much affected by its relative 
 length InTsimpliciV The fall of a body to the ground the 
 flow of a liquid, or' an instantaneous cher^ical c^^^^^^ 
 affects our senses as a direct and simple equilibration. On the 
 other hand when we see a series of quick changes ending in a 
 It of Sescence, the mind travels along the line o events a^^^^^ 
 regarding the beginning and the end, considers it as an indirect 
 
 ^IS^'tone class of equilibrations worthy of^ special 
 
322 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 study. If rotary motion be imparted to bodies of various 
 conficniration, with or without other relative motions, a com- 
 plicated resulting process ensues. The body having this rotary 
 motion may be placed upon the ground like a top, or projected 
 through the air like a rifle-ball. Evidently we could produce 
 illustrations, varying by insensible gradations from cases where 
 the rotary motion terminated abruptly, up to cases where the 
 rotary motion, having considerable initial energy and small 
 amounts of resistance to overcome (like the Japanese spinning- 
 top), might continue for a very considerable time. We direct 
 attention to the latter case, and ask the question— Is it to be 
 recrarded as a process of equilibration, or are we to consider the 
 top as in a state of equilibrium 1 We think there can be no 
 doubt as to the reply : it is a case of protracted equilibration ; 
 it is absurd to call it a state of equilibrium. Yet the top 
 is called, when in this condition, "a moving equilibrium." 
 Now, these are terms of convenience which are quite justi- 
 fiable when properly employed, but which, when extended 
 to logically reasoned investigations of the unknown, are very 
 dangerous ; and as a large application is made of this term in 
 Mr.° Spencer's biological explanations, we would have it weU 
 
 understood. 
 
 Let us now pass on to another kind of rotation to which 
 the same term is applied. It is that in which various bodies 
 have related motions, forming altogether a complete system 
 amongst themselves. The typical instance is that of the Solar 
 System. Here we have quite a number of planets and asteroids 
 circling round a central sun, with apparently inappreciable 
 diminution of velocity ; but the reasonings of astronomers lead 
 them to predict a time when the motion of these bodies will be 
 overcome by the resistance of the fine medium through which 
 they pass, and all will be precipitated into the central mass. 
 Evidently this also is a case of protracted equilibration, 
 although it may be convenient in certain aspects to regard the 
 solar system as a moving equilibrium. We do not know that 
 this system is at all of a complicated character. The main 
 movements of the members are so preponderatingly due to their 
 initial motion and their relation to the sun, that their influence 
 
 EQUILIBRATION AND STRUCTURE. 
 
 323 
 
 ,,pon one another is quite a minimum, and the term system, f 
 it implies complicated interrelationship of part with part, is 
 almost inapplicable. The system, although to the eye possessing 
 great complexity, is mechanically one of great simplicity. Nor 
 does the fact of some of the members of the system having 
 satellites affect our statement of the case cc^.vin^ 
 
 There is another class of cases to which the term moving 
 equilibrium" is applied. It comprises all kinds of tools, 
 machines, engines, or instruments designed and used by an 
 intelHgence for the intentional change of some kinds of energy 
 into rearrangements of matter. The most conspicuous illustra 
 tion is that of the steam-engine. The energy of position m he 
 coal is transformed into energy of molecular separation of he 
 water, which again finds a channel in the molar motion of thp 
 piston-rod, beam, wheels, &c., of the engine and is finally ^ 
 expended in the production of some work. Altog^^h^^' ^^;^ ^^ 
 a process of equilibration in the scientific sense of he term- 
 but where is the equilibrium^ To call an engine a dep ndent 
 moving equilibrium" may look scientific, but will not stand a 
 moment's investigation. A ''self-feeding" engine is m this 
 respect to be regarded as identical with an ordinary engine. 
 
 The supposition has been advanced that " molecules, or per- 
 haps more strictly " atoms," are systems of a construction 
 something like the solar system, and are there ore moving 
 equilibria." This is a mere hypothesis, and all such suppo- 
 sitions are very difficult to work out to their extreme results. 
 To do so we should have to decide whether they were merely 
 protracted equilibrations or absolute moving equilibria. But 
 to interpret chemical affinities, to explain the attractions of 
 polarity, to understand the normal velocities of atoms and to 
 reason out the resulting combinations on the hypothesis of 
 atoms as being either protracted equilibrations or absolute 
 moving equilibria, transcends our knowledge and capacity at the 
 present time. 
 
 (i.) Equilibration and Structure. 
 Yet Mr Spencer undertakes to explain molecular structure by 
 means of polarities and equilibrations. Are they more than mere 
 
324 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 words roughly symbolising some of the leading characteristics 
 of the process, but very far from affording us a strictly scientific 
 knowledge of each special formation ? To know the mode of 
 crystalloid aggregation, to be aware of polar attractions, to have 
 discovered the laws of chemical combination, are great accessions 
 to real knowledge from which we can reason ; but we can only 
 reason from the known factors and their known relationships. 
 We are not justified in reasoning from general characteristics. 
 We cannot satisfy the logical faculty by the lavish use of terms 
 derived from actual physical processes but of unspecialised 
 
 application. 
 
 There is no reason from analogy to suppose any similarity of 
 structure between a chemical element and the solar system, but 
 rather the reverse. The latter would undoubtedly lose its indi- 
 viduality if brought into union with another similar system, and 
 • could not be extracted thereafter from the intermixture; whereas 
 an atom of a chemical element never loses its individuality, but 
 can be separated and recovered from its various combinations. 
 Therefore if it is a moving equilibrium it remains intact, and 
 may practically be considered solely as operating according to 
 its known modes, quite independently of the hypothesis of its 
 being a moving equilibrium. Atoms as moving equilibria may 
 be left out of account. Can the same be said of molecules? 
 
 With regard to crystalloid molecules, we have no reason to 
 suppose that they aggregate otherwise than by mere attraction, 
 the components being ranged by their polarities, and producing 
 a general shape and structure resulting from the shapes and sizes 
 of the constituents. With regard to colloidal molecules, the 
 inquiry becomes more interesting and more obscure. 
 
 A moving equilibrium may be defined as a body or set of 
 bodies having a maximum of motions in relation to itself or to 
 each other, and a minimum of motions in relation to the en- 
 vironment, so that their initial mechanical energy is slowly 
 expended in overcoming the slight resistances of the medium 
 or the environment. We state it in purely mechanical terms, 
 because we cannot imagine any other mode of stating a moving 
 equilibrium which shall retain any special meaning. It accords 
 with ^Ir. Spencer's examples, although he extends the applica- 
 
 EQUILIBRATION AND STRUCTURE. 
 
 325 
 
 tion of the term equilibration so as to make its meaning identical 
 
 with cjeneral causation. 
 
 If we begin with ammonia, NH3, and replace one of the 
 atoms of hydrogen by an atom of methyl, and produce methyl 
 amine, l^iC^fi,). what is the nature of the process 1 How 
 are we to regard NH3 in the first place ? Is it simply an aggre- 
 gate of atoms sticking together like small magnets, or is it a 
 moving equilibrium composed of atoms having relative motions 
 accordrn- to their bulk and velocities ? Let us accept the latter 
 supposition as more favourable to progress in the direction we 
 wish. What must we suppose happens when an atom of hydrogen 
 is extracted and its place is taken by an atom, or rather a mole- 
 cule of methyl ? Granting this to be the removal of one member 
 of a moving equilibrium and the introduction of others, we can 
 onlv imagine that the system of motions has been readjusted 
 according to the bulk and velocities of the new factor. Are we 
 then to conceive of chemical combinations on the hypothesis of 
 absolute permanent velocities of gases, and are we to regard the 
 molecules formed from them as permanent moving equilibria 
 which suffer no diminution of motion 1 There would m this 
 case exist such things as absolute moving equilibria and not 
 protracted equilibrations ending in a final equilibrium of disso- 
 lution. The theory of the absolute velocity of atoms and conse- 
 quent absolute moving equilibria of molecules,-according to 
 which each kind of chemical element in a gaseous condition 
 has its characteristic velocity and perhaps mode of motion, which 
 it never loses under any condition, and in virtue o which it 
 enters into relation with other bodies,-contradicts all the recog- 
 nised principles of mechanics and those processes of equilibra- 
 tion through which, according to the theory the dissipation 
 or degradation of energy, all motion eventually finds a dead 
 level of equal distribution either in the form of energy of 
 motion or equality of distance. 
 
 It would appear that an absolute moving equilibrium can have 
 no relation to environment as such, for if it is thus, in relation 
 it must lose energy and gravitate towards final equilibrium. 
 Is there any reason to suppose that water is such a protracted 
 equilibration, tending ever, but slowly, towards dissolution] 
 
326 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 We think it is not so regarded. Yet if it were an absolute 
 moving equilibrium it would not as such have any relation to 
 the environment. We must therefore suppose that when part 
 of it enters into combination with iron, this combination is 
 effected otherwise than as the rearrangement of a moving equi- 
 librium, more especially when such a recombination is selective 
 in the throwing off, for instance, of the hydrogen and the pre- 
 ference for the oxygen. The explanation of preferential chemical 
 affinities is to be sought rather in primary polarities than m 
 the mechanical relations of moving equilibria. 
 
 Is there such a thing as the equilibration of polarities ? That 
 supposition is, we think, beyond the reach of conception. It 
 escapes mental representation altogether. It would imply a 
 quantitative equalisation of all attractions and repulsions, the 
 despecialisation of all special affinities, and indeed of all the 
 characteristics of the chemical elemonts. 
 
 Let us now return to a consideration of complex molecules 
 as moving equilibria. Mr. Spencer speaks of their formation 
 as " a change of the molecule into equilibrium with its environ- 
 ment." * In so using the term he cannot refer to the rearrange- 
 ment of a moving equilibrium as above defined, but can only be 
 employing it as a term connoting the quantitative aspect of 
 qualitative causation. It is true he attempts to specialise ^it as 
 "aw adaptation, as it were, to new surrounding conditions ; " but 
 here he does not use the term "adaptation" in the biological 
 sense we shall have to consider in the next section, but only in 
 the sense by which every change whatsoever, chemical or 
 physical or otherwise, may be termed an adaptation. 
 
 We have come to this point, then, that molecules however 
 complex are not to be regarded as moving equilibria in the 
 mechanical sense previously defined They are to be regarded 
 rather as specially arranged portions of atoms than as specially 
 arranged motions of atoms, and are neither absolute moving 
 equih^bria nor protracted equilibrations subject to loss of energy 
 
 and final dissolution. 
 
 If we can suppose the dissolution of complex molecules, not 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 483. 
 
 MOVING EQUILIBRIA. 
 
 327 
 
 from chemical attacks, but from their own expenditure of energy 
 and final incoherence, how are we to imagine the. ongmal form - 
 tion 1 It could not have been from their own resources, for that 
 wM h f med them would hold them together. The hypothesis 
 Tf the natural decay of molecules necessitates the supposition 
 of a superior external agency in their formation, the influence 
 whirrestrains them for a period, and then, 1^ coercive 
 nower beinc. lost, allows the dissolution. But as there is no 
 Theory of tSe natural dissolution of molecules through failure 
 of such internal energy, we must abandon the hypothesis th. 
 bein. protracted equilibrations like the solar system We have 
 aKund the thLy of their being -rely ^^^^f ^^^^^^^^ 
 eauilibria untenable. Thus the purely mechanical theory of 
 m'otcular relationship by which biological changes are effected 
 Tn detail is found not to be true. We have now to see how it 
 ^sou ht to bring biological changes within th^ J^^^ 
 chanical laws, by means of the phenomena presented by mov 
 ing equilibria." 
 
 (k.) Tlie Motions of Moving Equilibria. 
 
 We have two, possibly three, types of moving equilibria to 
 conliderof wWch the spinning-top, the solar system, and the 
 steam-en-'ine may be taken as representatives. 
 
 TspTnning-top has no parts moving in relation to one ano her 
 huf is'l Je solid body, and even in its most e-ntn^- i- 
 these are all relative to other bodies, not to itself. AVhen leav 
 ^ZunA, it has two motions besides the rotary motion- 
 one by wS it travels a short distance from the operator, and 
 
 r-wobbiin.-" motion by which the plane of its axis inclines 
 a ^obbun J ^^^.^^ .^ ^^^^ exhausted. 
 
 to one side or the ot'^^'re slowly overcome until the rotary 
 The second motion is more siowij uv u^ippn. 
 
 Ltion only prevails, and the top acquires ^e^t^ le^P 
 
 • » Tf +>iP initial rotary motion is not greai, \yin^^ 
 Ihfust is X - ^^ '^o.LeMe declination, the top never 
 I, the teadv rotary motion at all, and presently falls 
 X^otn^dr^hLelsifUistakentose.^^ 
 these motions, the top will very speedily acquire the sleepm. 
 
-^28 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 state, and wiU remain in motion a considerable time. It is 
 an instance of protracted equilibration. The opposing forces 
 are sHcrht, the losses of motion slow. The principal point of 
 interest in the matter is as to how the '' wobbling " motion is 
 overcome by the rotary motion and the language by which it is 
 to be described. We think there can be no difficulty in ascrib- 
 ing the process to the class of cases in mechanics in which one 
 powerful energy by sheer momentum nullifies a weaker opposite 
 energy, and with slightly diminished or divergent force pursues 
 its way. We do not think that there is any occasion to speak of 
 counterbalance, of adaptation, or rearrangement We find no 
 such terms made use of in treatises on mechanics with regard 
 to the case before us. 
 
 The next instance we shaU take is that of the steam-engine. 
 This case is extremely complicated in appearance but very simple 
 in principle. A certain amount of Energy of Position is con- 
 verted into an equivalent of Energy of Motion, which is either 
 given off freely to the air and solid bodies in the form of mole- 
 cular motion, or is reconverted into some other mode of Energy 
 of Position or Energy of Motion. The engine itself has no 
 motion except as the means of transfer. If its motions lasted 
 a long time after receiving the energy, it would be a case of 
 protracted equilibration ; but that is not so. When the energy is 
 removed, rest speedily ensues. The attainment of a state of 
 rest is one of great simplicity. There is no complication in our 
 thoughts as to counterbalancing, adaptation, and rearrangement 
 
 of motion. 
 
 The case of the solar system requires greater consideration. 
 Here we have quite a number of separate bodies, each with its 
 own momentum and gravitative attraction towards each of the 
 other members of the system. This is not a simple moving 
 equilibrium like the spinning-top, but a complex one, and it 
 leaves room for speculation. What, for instance, would happen 
 were another planet to be introduced into the system 1 Startling 
 as such a supposition might be, we make no doubt however that, 
 given the size, momentum, and point of incidence of such a 
 visitor, a mathematician would be able to calculate the amount 
 and nature of the disturbance which it would set up within the 
 
 MOVING EQUILIBRIA. 
 
 329 
 
 system. The incoming mass might be as small as an asteroid, 
 making no appreciable difference in the motions o the planetary 
 System' or ifmight be of such magnitude as to destroy the 
 general balance. But suppose a planet of medium size to be 
 projected into the system-there would no doubt be some re- 
 arrangement of the motions of the various members tiU a nonnal 
 rhythm was again attained. We believe the problem would be 
 recognised as a purely mechanical one of the composition of 
 motions. Possibly it would be fair to speak of such rearrange- 
 ments as adaptations or counterbalances, but the terms would 
 be understood in purely mechanical senses. 
 
 (Z.) Moving EquiUhria— Waste and Repair. 
 
 In the case of the spinning-top there is a loss of motion, but 
 no loss of substance. In the case of the solar system there is 
 again loss of motion, but no loss of substance. W%" 
 know if this accords with the fundamental conception of waste. 
 Of course there is no decrease in the quantity of energy m the 
 cosmos, but each of these cases presents a local d™f ^^ ^f 
 energy without loss of substance. Thus we may speak of waste 
 of energy, but we apprehend the word "waste" usually impbes 
 loss of substance. Moving equilibria, so far as we are acq-;f ^ 
 with them, are not subject to loss of substance, but only to 
 diminution of motion. If a member of the solar system lost 1 
 motion, it would not be left behind or thrown out as wast^ ; it 
 would 'fan into the central sun, with --^^^ ^^f ^.^ ^^^^^ 
 necessary to consider. Should, however, a member of the system 
 be abstracted therefrom, there would be a ^earrangement^^^^^ 
 mutual motions. Yet we cannot suppose for a moment that this 
 missing planet would leave a hiatus which the system would 
 rndeavour to make good. The system would in its way be just 
 afperLct and harmonious as before. It would not need repair 
 nor s ek completion of its former model. Thus a movmg 
 equilibrium does not imply loss of substance on the one hand 
 nor the replacement of lost substance on the other hand, ihe 
 :Sy meaning of a moving equilibrium is a continuous re^ahve 
 and rhythmic motion of bodies constituting a system of motions 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 330 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 subject to constant, although perhaps inappreciable diminution, 
 and thus subject to an eventual dissolution. 
 
 (m.) TJie Evolution of Moving Equilibria, 
 
 In Sub-section (i) we considered the conception of atoms and 
 the evolution of molecules as moving equilibria, resulting in an 
 opinion adverse to that hypothesis. We have now to ask the 
 student's attention to the evolution of systems of molecules as 
 moving equilibria. 
 
 The radical weakness of all these speculations is that we know 
 nothing whatever about the ultimate structure and motions of the 
 chemical elements. This, in our judgment, is an absolute bar 
 to all sound thinking from the cL priori side. However far back 
 we penetrate, we never get back far enough to reach the funda- 
 mental explanations ; and if we begin our work at a later point, 
 we find ourselves continually being thrown off at a tangent from 
 the great cosmic circlings. Until we can penetrate to the very 
 heart of the matter, no deductive reasonings will carry us far. 
 If we enter upon such speculations, it is merely to show the 
 futility of all such endeavours, including those of Mr. Spencer. 
 How, for instance, are we to set about the d, priori study of 
 the evolution of systems of molecules as moving equilibria] 
 Are we to conceive of the completed result as a system similar 
 to the solar system ] And again, how are we to conceive of the 
 molecules and of their aggregation 1 Are they brought together 
 by polarity, and so arranged into certain forms of structure 1 
 Are we to suppose that in this concentration they acquire veloci- 
 ties wjiich in the system they form result in relative rhythmic 
 motions] and these motions, are they rotary, or those of 
 mutual approach and retrocession? In all such cases there 
 would be preliminary difficulties to settle as to the confinement 
 of the term equilibration to the mechanical conception of the 
 motions of bodies, or as to the enlargement of its application to 
 the polarities of atoms and molecules. To disentange the con- 
 ceptions of equilibrations of polarities is, however, beyond our 
 powers of analysis. Another difficulty would lie in the conception 
 of such a state of things as would allow the moving equilibrium 
 
 MOVING EQUILIBRIA. 
 
 331 
 
 of molecules any sensible time for its existence, so as to give it 
 suffic ent warrant in continuance to entitle it to be regarded as 
 a pr tracted equilibration. It is supposed that the formation of 
 a movinc. equilibrium of molecules could only take place m water 
 of a cel^inlmperature. But one would suppose that the fricUon 
 and resistance of the water would very speedily subtract so muh 
 motion from the system as to lead to an ahnost immediate dis- 
 
 '°if7e are to consider systems of molecules as moving equili- 
 bria from a purely mechanical point of view, there is no doubt 
 of the above result. Can we then regard them from any 
 other conceivable point of view t We cannot conceive of equ - 
 librations of polarity otherwise than as the statical arrange^ 
 ment of structure involving the conception of relative posiUon 
 rather than the conception of relative rhythmic motion Can 
 we then form the latter conception out of any o the other 
 Tneies of motion mentioned in Professor Stev^art's list, such 
 as molecular motion, electrical motion, ethereal -lotion, &a 1 
 We fear we can form no conception of motion free from the 
 mechanical limitations of body,momentum, velocity, and position 
 If this difficulty attends the . prion synthesis of system, f 
 molecules as moving equilibria, how -«<^l^^'»°^^'^f ^"^.T J 
 be the synthesis of systems of systems o moving equilibria 
 formin.- still more complicated moving equilibria ( 
 
 S fresh combinatL involves the double difficulty of con- 
 sidering the cause and nature of the combination. Is it merely 
 sf^egaUon or simple polarity 1 Then what is segrega^on 1 Is 
 chemical affinity? Then what is chemical affinity 1 is it 
 po a" ty Then what is the result of polarity beyond relative 
 position? Is it mechanical equilibration? Then how are we o 
 conceive of atoms and molecules and their correlations as purely 
 mechanical relations? And when these systems of systems of 
 moving equilibria are formed, how do they interact? 
 
 We ask aU these questions, supposing them ^capable o 
 reply; but we do not forget that Mr. Spencer himself has 
 given a hypothetical account of the evolution of such systems^ 
 Ct us recur to it with the view of testing the deductive warrant 
 and examining the language he makes use of m his reasonings. 
 

 I 
 
 332 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 We have to direct attention to the Appendix to vol. i. of the 
 "Biology." The especial point to be kept in view in this 
 account of the evolution of moving equilibria is not, as Mr. 
 Spencer would imply, the growth of complexity and consequent 
 susceptibility to change from the slightest alteration of incident 
 forces. Nor is it the question how from the known chemical 
 and physical properties of certain of the chemical elements the 
 properties of their aggregations are to be deduced. In our 
 previous criticism we animadverted upon the purely verbal 
 process and verbal result. What we would now specially im- 
 press upon the student is that from first to last this process of 
 reasoning should be carried on in terms of the conception of 
 a mechanical moving equilibrium. We hold that any other 
 special conception of equilibration is not possible, and the 
 general conception of it as identical with universal causation is 
 valueless as an instrument of definite thought. 
 
 The passage in question takes equilibration in this wide sense 
 and altogether overlooks the treatment of the subject in the 
 special mechanical sense. It is, therefore, ineffective in its ex- 
 planations taken as preliminary to those subsequent higher com- 
 binations and [events which are to be interpreted under the 
 special aspect of moving equilibria. The second part of this 
 Appendix deals with the evolution of physiological units, and 
 is also characterised by the absence of any treatment of the 
 subject in the terms of " moving equilibria " and by the constant 
 introduction of "polarity." Here again the onus of the con- 
 structive process is thrown upon the known properties of the 
 original chemical elements. The only special use made of the 
 term equilibration is in the influence of parts upon parts in 
 changes of the molecular condition of bodies. Otherwise it is 
 employed in its universalistic sense. 
 
 (w.) Moving Equilibria and Simple Equilibration, 
 
 AU direct physical actions, such as the fall of a body to the 
 ground, the passage of a current of electricity, a chemical com- 
 bination, &c., from one of Mr. Spencer's points of view, may be 
 regarded as " simple " equilibrations. In what relation do they 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S ACCOUNT OF EQUILIBRATION. 333 
 
 stand to "moving equilibria" if the latter exist in the shape 
 of molecules or systems of molecules ? How do simple eqm ibra- 
 tions affect moving equilibria] or how do moving equilibria 
 affect simple equilibrations? Do molecules or systems of mole- 
 cules ever acquire such a characteristic corporate or co-ordinate 
 existence as moving equilibria that they can nullify or coerce 
 simple equilibrations; that is to say, render nugatory mere 
 physical actions which are inimical to their own continuance ? 
 in these and many similar questions arise and require replies 
 before the doctrine of complex molecules or systems thereof can 
 be understood in the mechanical or any special sense as moving 
 equilibria. 
 
 § 9. Mr. Spencer's Account of Equilibraiion. 
 Mr. Spencer's account of equilibration is to be studied in 
 " First Principles," Chapter XXIL, and in vol. L of « Principles 
 of Biology," Part III., Chapters XI. and XIL 
 
 (a.) Tlie Equilibration of Motions. 
 Mr Spencer presents equilibration under the two forms indis- 
 criminately of equilibration of motions and equilibration of 
 forces These are by no means identical, and the course pur- 
 sued leads to confusion of thought and incoherence of argument. 
 The primary concrete instances are rendered in terms ot the 
 former, whereas the reasoned extensions are all expressed in 
 terms of the latter ; besides which there is an implied reference 
 to a method of equilibration in terms of the scientific doctrine 
 of the equivalence of energies. 
 
 The simple mechanical equilibration of motion, by which an 
 equal distribution of motion and an equal distribution of mate- 
 rial substances is eventually attained, is identical with the 
 doctrine of the dissipation of energy. According to his theo y 
 dl the various forms of energy which from their heterogeneity 
 of distribution are now capable of effecting work or change, 
 constantly suffer degradation to a condition from ^hich no 
 work is to be obtained. There is a continued tendency to sink 
 
334 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 to a dead level of a uniform low state of molecular motion. The 
 final outcome of this tendency would be a state of universal 
 equal molecular motion from which no changes would ensue. 
 Yet Mr. Spencer sometimes indicates that the end would be a 
 state of universal quiescence, a state of the energy of position 
 known as molecular separation rather than a state of energy of 
 motion known as molecular motion. 
 
 " And if the actions observed be electrical or chemical, we 
 still find that they work themselves out in producing sensible or 
 insensible movements, that are dissipated as before, until quies- 
 cence is eventually reached." * 
 
 " Every motion being motion under resistance is continually 
 suffering deductions; and these unceasing deductions finaUy 
 result in the cessation of the motion." t 
 
 The consideration of the nature of this final state of things 
 is, however, of no importance in our present inquiry. 
 
 ' The fundamental fault of Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy 
 is its formal limitation to the terms Matter and Motion (the 
 former having tAe mechanical meaning of resistance and exten- 
 sion only), whereas the actual elaboration of his constructive 
 scheme is effected in terms of Forces. The formulas are all 
 purely mechanical ; the work done is very various. Thus if we 
 are given a nebula to commence with, and treat it mechanically 
 as having a tendency to equilibration of motion, we would 
 naturally expect it to proceed directly upon a course of dissolu- 
 tion towards a state of homogeneity in equal distribution of 
 matter and motion, even to the dissolution of the chemical 
 constituents: instead of which we are met, firstly, by the 
 instability of the homogeneous, which turns out to be change 
 caused by external agencies, and, secondly, by segregation or 
 changes caused by internal heterogeneity, which internal hete- 
 rof^eneity or want of balance is not expressible in terms of 
 mechanics, but, setting the mechanical formula of equilibration 
 at defiance, spontaneously initiates equilibrations of its own. 
 These equilibrations are due to the specific gravity and affinities 
 
 * First Principles, p. 484. 
 t Ibid., pp. 484, 485. See also § 176 of "First Principles." 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S ACCOUNT OF EQUILIBRATION. 335 
 
 of the various constituents of the nebula, which quite over- 
 power the merely mechanical redistributions of extension, resist- 
 ance, and motion. How then shall we still say the ensuing 
 general process is one of equilibration? Simply by calling 
 the new classes of actions equilibrations also ; and thus by a 
 verbal ingenuity equilibration remains the ruling principle of the 
 universe. StQl it is not one process but two processes which 
 are included under that name. 
 
 Mr. Spencer, in order to furnish us with an adequate concep- 
 tion of the process of equilibration, gives an account of its four . 
 different orders.* The first order includes the comparatively 
 simple motions which, being quickly divided and subdivided into 
 motions communicated to other portions of matter, are presently 
 dissipated. The second order comprehends various kinds of 
 vibration or osciUation exhibiting a visible rhythm which is 
 soon lost in invisible rhythms. The third order obtains in those 
 agcrregates which continually expend as much motion as they 
 receive, such as the steam-engine. The fourth order comprises 
 all moving equilibria, such as the solar system, in which the 
 resistance to motion being inappreciable, the equilibration is 
 indefinitely protracted. 
 
 This account of equilibration, it will be seen, is purely mecha- 
 nical. No reference whatever is made to those equilibrations 
 of chemical affinity or polarity which do so much biological 
 work, nor to the equilibrations of specific gravity, which with 
 the chemical energies effect segregation both of colloid masses 
 and crystalloid structures. All these, it is true, might be found 
 to act mechanically in some fundamental science, but in the 
 absence of such a science, or even with a correct conception of 
 such a system of fundamental mechanics, it is clear that they 
 do not act conformably to the idea of a mechanics of which the 
 ruling principle is the equal distribution of resistances and 
 motions. 
 
 (h.) The Equilihration of Forces. 
 The change of thought which is effected when, instead of 
 speaking of equilibrations of motions, we speak of equilibrations 
 
 * First Principles, p. 487. 
 
336 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 of forces, is very difficult to analyse. No doubt all the former 
 changes can be conceived of vaguely as equilibrations of forces, 
 since'' they are recognised as modes of energy in the scientific 
 list ; and modes of energy, in Mr. Spencer's phraseology, may 
 be regarded as modes of force, and therefore we arrive at the 
 notion of equilibrations of forces ; but then, again, what may 
 not be caUed forces ? Thus equilibration loses all special mean- 
 ing and becomes commensurate with universal causation. Mr. 
 
 Spencer says — 
 
 " Every change is of necessity towards a balance of forces ; 
 and of necessity can never cease until a balance of forces is 
 
 reached."* 
 
 " In all cases then, there is a progress toward equilibration. 
 That universal co-existence of antagonist forces which, as we 
 before saw, necessitates the universality of rhythm, and which, 
 as we before saw, necessitates the decomposition of every force 
 into divergent forces, at the same time necessitates the ultimate 
 establishment of a balance." t 
 
 Taken in this sense, Equilibration is merely another name 
 for the general interaction of factors resulting in a changed 
 state. In this sense it is employed by Mr. Spencer under the 
 term Simple Equilibration, and includes all the changes of one 
 kind of energy in Professor Stewart's list into any other kind. 
 It may be held to comprise all mechanical changes, all chemical 
 or electrical processes, and to embrace all actions of heat and 
 * light. Nor can we exclude from it the processes of molecular 
 construction and the action of what Mr. Spencer calls polarity, 
 to whatever complexity and degree of mechanical sensitiveness 
 we may in our studies arrive. 
 
 (c.) Mr. Spencer's Interpretation of Moving Equilibria. 
 The change of thought we have indicated is of peculiar 
 interest when we come to consider the translation of mechanical 
 moving equilibria into moving equilibria of forces. Of course 
 mechanicalmotions among the members of a moving equilibrium 
 may be regarded as forces ; and the general constitution of this 
 
 ♦ Biology, vol. i. p. 432. 
 
 t First Principles, p. 484. 
 
 MR. SPENCER ON MOVING EQUILIBRIA. 337 
 
 moving equilibrium may be described in terms of forces. 
 Thereupon other things called forces may be substituted in the 
 abstract statement, and new moving equilibria may be worked 
 on the lines of the old ones. 
 
 The first thing is to render the mechanical moving equili- 
 brium into abstract terms. The three concrete instances adduced 
 by Mr. Spencer are the spinning-top, the solar system, and the 
 steam-engine. We have already shown that the first is a very 
 simple case of the mechanical relations of motions, and that the 
 last is not a case of moving equilibrium at all. The case of 
 the solar system is the purest case of all ; and since it is an 
 instance of a system of bodies having continuous relative motion, 
 it affords the best concrete example for the object now in 
 view. Mr. Spencer says of it : — 
 
 " For any system of bodies exhibiting, like those of the Solar 
 System, a combination of balanced rhythms, has this peculiarity ; 
 — that though the constituents of the system have relative 
 movements, the system as a whole has no movement. The 
 centre of gravity of the entire group remains fixed. Whatever 
 quantity of motion any member of it has in any direction, is 
 from moment to moment counterbalanced by an equivalent 
 motion in some other part of the group in an opposite direction ; 
 and so the aggregate matter of the group is in a state of rest. 
 Whence it follows that the arrival at a state of moving equili- 
 brium, is the disappearance of some movement which the aggre- 
 gate had in relation to external things, and a continuance of 
 those movements only which the different parts of the aggregate 
 have in relation to each other." * 
 
 " This penultimate state of motion is the moving equilibrium ; 
 which, as we have seen, tends to arise in an aggregate having 
 compound motions, as a transitional state on the way towards 
 complete equilibrium. Throughout Evolution of all kinds, there 
 is a continual approximation to, and more or less complete main- 
 tenance of, this moving equilibrium. As in the Solar System 
 there has been established an independent moving equilibrium 
 an equilibrium such that the relative motions of the consti- 
 
 * First Principles, p. 488. 
 
338 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 tuent parts are continually so counterbalanced by opposite 
 motions, that the mean state of the whole aggregate never vanes ; 
 so is it, though in a less distinct manner, with each form of 
 dependent moving equilibrium."* , 
 
 We do not here examine the various analogies suggested in 
 continuation, as we wish to understand the working of the 
 solar system first. Mr. Spencer proceeds to say :— 
 
 " And the fact which we have here particularly to observe, 
 is, that as a corollary from the general law of equilibration 
 above set forth, the evolution of every aggregate must go on 
 until this equUibnum mobile is established ; since, as we have 
 seen, an excess of force which the aggregate possesses in any 
 direction, must eventuaUy be expended in overcoming resis- 
 tances to change in that direction : leaving behind only those 
 movements which compensate each other, and so form a moving 
 equilibrium. Respecting the structural state simultaneously 
 reached, it must obviously be one presenting an arrangement of 
 forces that counterbalance all the forces to which the aggregate 
 is subject So long as there remains a residual force in any 
 direction— be it excess of a force exerted by the aggregate on its 
 environment, or of a force exercised by its environment on the 
 aggregate— equilibrium does not exist ; and therefore the redis- 
 tribution of matter must continue. Whence it follows that the 
 limit of heterogeneity towards which every aggregate progresses, 
 is the formation of as many specialisations and combinations of 
 parts, as there are specialised and combined forces to be met." 
 
 The question to be considered is whether this abstract state- 
 ment is a correct representation of the history of the solar 
 system, the only known instance of a mechanical moving equi- 
 librium. 
 
 The first point concerns the evolution of the moving equili- 
 brium. Mr. Spencer says that "the evolution of every aggre- 
 gate must go on until this equilihrium mobile is established." 
 Is it because ** every equilibrium commonly regarded as absolute, 
 is in one sense a moving equilibrium ; because along with a 
 motionless state of the whole there is always some relative 
 
 ♦ First Principles, p. 489. 
 
 MR. SPENCER ON MOVING EQUILIBRIA. 339 
 
 movement of its insensible 'parts " ? Apparently Mr. Spencer 
 means more than this, for this is the ultimate state, and he 
 wishes to show that every aggregate must pass through the 
 universal penultimate state of which the solar system is typical 
 This he endeavours to establish not a posteriori, but deductively. 
 The reason he gives is : " Since, as we have seen, an excess^of 
 force which the aggregate possesses in any direction, must even- 
 tually be expended in overcoming resistances to change m that 
 direction : leaving behind only those movements which com- 
 pensate each other, and so form a moving equilibrium." We 
 really cannot say that we understand the above passage. Is 
 Mr. Spencer speaking of the solar system or of every aggregate? 
 We are asked to conceive of "an excess of force." This 
 excess of force cannot be that of molecular motion, nor light, 
 nor chemical action, for the force spoken of is referred to as 
 having a spatial direction, and it is expended in overcoming 
 resistances to change again specified " in that direction "-givmg 
 the reasoning apparently a mechanical limitation. Moreover it 
 is said to leave movements behind it, and these movements 
 are compensatory of one another— thus establishing a moving 
 equilibrium. We should be inclined to characterise this 
 reasoning as a chaos of thought, without definite beginning, 
 process, or result. The structural state reached simultaneously 
 with this arrangement of motions must, Mr. Spencer says, " be 
 one presenting an arrangement of forces that counterbalance all 
 the forces to which the aggregate is subject." We wiU ask 
 what are the forces to which the solar system is subject ? The 
 only force adduced by Mr. Spencer is the inappreciable resistance 
 of the ethereal medium. We will, however, suppose it appre- 
 ciable. What is the meaning of the solar system counter- 
 balancing this force to which it would be thus subject? We 
 presume the meaning of counterbalance is to render ineffective ; 
 the question therefore arises. Would the solar system alter its 
 structure in order to render ineffective the increased resistance 
 of the resisting medium ? We cannot suppose any such thing. 
 Leaving the problem of the origin of moving equilibria un- 
 solved, let us now take the case 'discussed in the chapter on 
 "Direct Equilibration" in the *' Biology." 
 
340 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 " The case of the Solar Systenl will best serve our purpose. 
 An assemblage of bodies, each of which has its simple and com- 
 pound motions, that severally alternate between two extremes, 
 and the whole of which has its involved perturbations, that now 
 increase and now decrease, is here presented to us. Suppose 
 a new force were brought to bear on this moving equilibrium 
 say by the arrival of some wandering mass, or by an additional 
 momentum given to one of the existing masses— what would be 
 the result 1 If the strange body or the extra force were very 
 large, it might so derange the entire system as to cause its 
 collapse : by overthrow of its rhythmical movements, the moving 
 equilibrium might rapidly be changed into a complete equih- 
 brium. But what if the incident force, faUing on the system 
 from without, proved insufficient to overthrow it 1 There would 
 then arise a set of perturbations which would, in the course of 
 an enormous period, slowly work round into a modified moving 
 
 equilibrium." 
 
 This statement will be accepted without question. It is a 
 hypothesis in mechanics. The conception of the moving equili- 
 brium is a mechanical one, and the conception of the incoming 
 force must take the form of a mechanical one ; and the result is 
 expressed in terms of the rearrangement of the positions and 
 motions of the members of the system. Can we make an 
 abstract statement of this case in terms of modes of energy so 
 as to comprise an account of a moving equilibrium of energy 
 other than mechanical motion? It appears to us that failing a 
 fundamental mechanical explanation of these modes of energy, 
 such a task is impossible. The essentials of the statement are 
 relative movements of bodies which form a system and have 
 little if any relation with the environment. Again we fail to see 
 that these rearrangements of position and motion can be spoken 
 of as structural changes effected to counterbalance the incident 
 force ; they are only the direct result of that incident force. 
 
 Referring to the abstract statement that "so long as there 
 remains a residual force in any direction, be it excess of a force 
 exerted by the aggregate on its environment, or of a force exerted 
 by its environment on the aggregate, equilibrium does not exist," 
 we would ask, with reference to the solar system, what is its 
 
 MR. SPENCER ON MOVING EQUILIBRIA. 34i 
 environment 1 Is it anything but intersteUar ether? Is its 
 excess of force molecular motion not possessed by the ether, 
 and does the ether possess a force which it exerts on the 
 
 orrcrresate nebula 1 ,. ., 
 
 Mr! Spencer continues : " Whence it follows that the limit 
 of heterogeneity towards which every aggregate progresses, is 
 the formation of as many specialisations and comhmations _ of 
 parts as there are specialised and combined forces *^^^^\ 
 
 In all these passages the thought sought to be evolved is that 
 of counterbalance, with rearrangements of motion and position 
 in order to effect it In such a conception the idea of simple 
 equUibration is lost sight of. The resulting rearrangements of 
 the moving members of a system due in a most direct manner 
 to an incident force, are regarded as counterbalancing that 
 force • whereas the new force has really become an mtegral part 
 of a new system. It has been amalgamated with it as a consti- 
 tuent It does not nullify any amount of energy previously 
 possessed by the system, but adds to it There is no warrant 
 for introducing the notion of any count«rae mg process or 
 arrangement The idea of oppositions, of attacks and defence, 
 of a balance even against an intruding force, does not find place 
 t the consideration of the case at all But if the ensuing 
 process is to be called by the names "adaptation "adjust- 
 Lnt," "counterbalance," &c., it must be on the distinct un- 
 derstanding that nothing more is meant than the calculable 
 mechanical result of new dynamical relationships. 
 
 Mr Spencer's conception of a moving equilibrium, in itself, 
 and apart from the hypothesis of an external force impingmg 
 upon it, is that of a system of ">''''^l'^''^''I":\^\'T; 
 "Whatever quantity of motion any member of it has ^n any 
 
 direction, is from moment to moment '^-^^'''^^'^'''"''^^^12 
 equivalent motion in some other part of the group in an op^site 
 direction " We do not know whether this description of the 
 solar system is correct, but even supposing it to be so, any new 
 incoming member would take its place in a similar manner to 
 the others. There would be no general movement of opposition 
 to it It could not be treated as an object external to the 
 system and its entrance resisted. 
 
342 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 In one of the foregoing passages Mr. Spencer speaks of 
 moving equilibrium as having a tendency to self-maintenance. 
 Having the solar system in view as the typical case, let us ex- 
 amine the correctness of this theory. It is admitted that the 
 solar system is a protracted equilibration. Are we to suppose 
 that the solar system supplies itself with increasing energy to 
 make good that which is expended in overcoming the resistance 
 of the medium ? Such a supposition cannot for a moment be 
 entertained. Does Mr. Spencer mean, however, that it main- 
 tains itself, or could maintain itself, against any external attack ? 
 This cannot be, for he says :— " For the new motion given to the 
 parts of a moving equilibrium by a disturbing force, must either 
 be of such kind and amount that it cannot be dissipated before 
 the pre-existing motions, in which case it brings the moving 
 equilibrium to an end ; or else it must be of such kind and 
 amount that it can be dissipated before the pre-existing motions, 
 in which case the moving equilibrium is re-established."* 
 Thus if an attacking body should be relatively very large, or 
 possess great momentum, the moving equilibrium would be 
 destroyed, whereas if it should be relatively small, it would find 
 its place as a member of a re-arranged system. To term the 
 latter process a tendency to self-maintenance is merely a refe- 
 rence to the theory of the inertia of bodies. 
 
 Having now considered the nature of the only moving equili- 
 brium of which we have any knowledge, let us next consider 
 what is not included in it. It does not, for instance, as we 
 have just seen, take any account of environment. In the first 
 place, it has no environment to speak of. It does not seem to 
 have any established *' correspondence" with any other solar 
 system ; the only general relation it may have is that of move- 
 ment round a common centre. 
 
 In the next place, beyond the faint mechanical connection 
 just mentioned, it is not a member of a mutually dependent 
 system. In this respect there is a distinct difference between a 
 mechanical system and an organic system. Nor does it appear 
 possible that the solar system could be brought into relatively 
 
 MR. SPENCER ON MOVING EQUILIBRIA. 343 
 
 near contact with other similar systems so as to form an organic 
 whole, and yet that each should maintain its separate existence 
 The only result that could be predicted would be a general 
 destruction. This is to illustrate the difference between a 
 ilTaSmoving equilibrium and the relations of atoms and 
 molecules which can form chemical combinations without loss 
 of individuality. Any attempt to treat chemical aggregat-^ 
 and processes upon the same theories as the equilibrations o the 
 Lmenta-motions and mechanical aspects of bodies-must be 
 
 " Again, we find in the solar system no reception of ener^ and 
 no means for the storage of energy. Every indmdual change 
 that can be imagined is one of simple and direct mechanical 
 
 *' Finally, we recur to the question how the conception of 
 counterbalance, readjustment, &c., in the motu,ns and position^ 
 of the bodies composing the solar system under - hypothetical 
 incursion of a foreign body, is to be made applicable to any of 
 irr" tions or changes of aggregates of the chemical elements 
 Id the conditions of Professor Stewart's list of energies 
 
 That these chemical substances act ^P°^. o^^/r^'V'',;! 
 that they are affected in their relationships by hea 1 gh 
 electricity, &c., is matter of ordinary knowledge; but their 
 r a ^n are altogether different from those of mass and velo- 
 Syltoms and molecules are not related to each other as 
 Sibers of one unrelated revolving system, nor are they related 
 To each other as one solar system would be to another in relative 
 to each o'l^^ . y distinction between the purely 
 
 S;Sl reltSLwps of the one and the " polarities," if such 
 Tey are to be called, of the others. The theory and all the 
 Conceptions connected with "--ing equilitaa are pu^^y 
 mechanical. The only common conception is tha of quantita 
 ": S onship. If one mechanical force is re ative y gr^, i 
 III overcome the movementsof another. If ^^l^^'^^ly^^f ' '* 
 will influence and finally balance with the movements of the 
 
 other. 
 
 * First Principles, p. 516. 
 
344 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 (d.) Suggested Identical Interpretation of Organic Evolution. 
 
 The foregoing considerations derive their importance from the 
 fact that Mr. Spencer affiliates biologic evolution upon physical 
 evolution by means of the laws of moving equilibria. We have 
 given a very inadequate study of the ramifications of the argu- 
 ment as presented by Mr. Spencer, but we consider it wiser, on 
 the whole, to afford the student a conception of the general 
 position rather than to overwhelm him with a large bulk of 
 detailed criticism. We now proceed to examine Mr. Spencer's 
 interpretation of the origin and development of organisms. The 
 question as to origin we shall postpone, on account of its 
 obscurity, until we have fully considered the meaning of organ- 
 isms as moving equilibria. 
 
 Organisms are regarded by Mr. Spencer as dependent moving 
 equilibria. In this respect they are classed with the steam- 
 engine which receives and expends energy. It cannot but be 
 reckoned a very rough analogy, and we should be inclined to 
 reject it altogether, for beyond the mere fact of receiving and 
 expending energy there is nothing in common. Nor does the 
 analogy play any important part in Mr. Spencer's argument. 
 The specialty of the treatment is in the analogy with the pro- 
 tracted equilibration of the solar system. 
 
 " Kow though instead of being, like the Solar System, in a 
 state of independent moving equilibrium, an organism is in 
 a state of dependent moving equilibrium (' First Principles,* 
 § 130), yet this does not prevent the manifestation of the same 
 law. Every animal daily obtains from without, a supply of 
 force to replace the force which it expends ; but this continual 
 giving to its parts a new momentum, to make up for the mo- 
 mentum continually lost, does not interfere with the carrying 
 on of actions and reactions like those just described. Here, as 
 before, we have a definitely- arranged aggregate of parts, which 
 we call organs, having their definitely-established actions and 
 reactions, which we call functions. These rhythmical actions or 
 functions, and the various compound rhythms resulting from 
 their combinations, are in such adjustment as to balance the 
 
 MOVING EQUILIBRIA AND ORGANIC EVOLUTION. 345 
 
 actions to which the organism is subject : there is a constant or 
 periodic genesis of forces, which, in their kinds, amounts, and 
 directions, suffice to antagonise the forces which the organism 
 has constantly or periodically to bear."* 
 
 Here we have an attempt to establish an analogy between 
 an organism and the solar system. We leave the question of 
 the supply and expenditure of energy out of account, except in 
 re-ard to the ascription of momentum. We think this is a 
 proper term to apply to moving bodies, but an improper term 
 to apply to chemical processes ; and the use of it here is to be 
 condemned as unwarrantably affording help to a verbal ana- 
 logy which ought to be considered on its own merits. It is 
 more to the point to consider whether the definite arrangement 
 of parts called organs bears any analogy to the relations of 
 members of the solar system, and whether their actions are 
 related to each other like the relative motions of the sun and 
 
 ^ Evidently the organs of the body are not related to each 
 other as the members of the solar system, for they are not 
 separate, nor do they revolve round one another in free space. 
 Nor is the method of equilibration the same, for in one case it is 
 due to the slight resistance of the resisting ether, and in the other 
 case it is due to the giving off of molecular motion and other 
 forms of energy. It is difficult to say in general terms what the 
 relations of the actions of the organs may be to each other, but 
 they are certainly not the purely mechanical relations of the 
 movements of the solar system. Is the analogy furthered by 
 calling these actions of the organs - rhythms ? " We fear not. 
 Rhythm means a recurrence of action or position in a definite 
 time It is applied to vibrations, osciUations, revolutions, &c., 
 all forms of the movements of bodies visible or insensible. 
 Or-anic actions may have times of recurrence, but the mam 
 characteristic of an organ is the nature of the work done rather 
 than its periodicity. The special function of the liver is to 
 secrete bile rather than to act rhythmically. The latter term 
 maybe truly appUed to the revolution of a planet, and its differ- 
 
 ♦ Biology, vol. i. p. 433- 
 
346 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 entiation from the movement of another planet may be explained 
 in terms of rhvthm : but the differentiation of the liver from 
 the kidneys could not be so explained. If we take the case of 
 an organism which is an accumulator of energy only and ^not 
 an expender, if such should be the correct description of a plant, 
 we do not see that the analogy is at all facilitated, for in this 
 case we have the reverse of a protracted equilibration, such as 
 is exemplified in the expenditure of energy by the Solar System. 
 Nor do the parts of the plant hold similar relations to each 
 other as do the bodies composing the Solar System. 
 
 The most suggestive point, however, is the alleged analogy 
 between the mutual readjustments of motion in a solar system 
 on the hypothetical intrusion of an invading body and the 
 actions of an organism with regard to its environment. Where 
 the analogy lies we are at a loss to discern. We have already 
 seen that the solar system has practically no environment with 
 which it is in relation except the retarding ether; and if we 
 suppose a new body brought within the sphere of its influence, 
 we find that it becomes part of a readjusted system and no 
 longer remains an element of the environment. In fact, we do 
 not think that the solar system, as such, ever could have an 
 environment. It is not an organic whole capable of self-main- 
 tenance, and therefore every environment must become part of 
 itself, its own individuality must be lost in the environment. 
 But in an organism we find an entirely different characteristic, 
 rendering analogies of action utterly impossible. An organism 
 presents " a constant or periodic genesis of forces, which in 
 their kinds, amounts, and directions suffice to antagonise the 
 forces which the organism has constantly or periodically to 
 bear." The solar system does nothing of the sort, nor under 
 any conceivable circumstances would it ever do so. 
 
 The analogy is here left as we have rendered it, and further 
 confirmation is sought in two ways only— Firstly, in ct priori 
 reasonings from the persistence of force, conducted in such a 
 manner as to include in one and the same final statement the 
 actions of solar systems and organisms : — Secondly, in a render- 
 ing of the histories and actions of organisms in terms of 
 mechanics, in order to give the semblance of an analogy with 
 
 MOVING EQUILIBRIA AND ORGANIC EVOLUTION, 347 
 
 the solar system, more especially by emphasising the supposed 
 resemblance between the interior counterbalance possessed by 
 the latter and the counterbalancing or antagonising of exterior 
 
 forces by the former. l^ ^ 
 
 And first as to the & priori reasoning. It really appear to • 
 be a double process-one A priori, the other concrete Thus, 
 reasoning from the Persistence of Force never proceeds alone, 
 but is always illustrated by some concrete matter or motion. 
 We have terms of both combined in propositions, and we never 
 know whether our thought is being pushed forward by the one 
 or the other. The A priori reasoning showing the necessary 
 origin of dependent and independent moving equihbna and the 
 necessary condition of their conservation in seH-mamtenance :s 
 eiven from S 176 of " First Principles." 
 
 The postulate is. " Phenomena are interpretable only as results 
 of universaUy coexistent forces of attraction and repubion 
 these being " complementary aspects of that absolutely persis- 
 tent force which is the ultimate datum of consciousness. The 
 reasoned conclusion is that equUibration must proceed until 
 equilibrium is reached. In this process of equilibration, moving 
 equilibria must arise, because the motions of an aggregate are 
 dissioated by the resistances they encounter, and these being 
 toughUo a close, others will continue longer. But Mr. Spencer 
 does not show how moving equiUbria necessarily arise; he begs 
 the question, and continues by speaking of an unaccounted for 
 "diversely moving aggregate," out of which arise dependent 
 and independent moving equilibria, the latter of which may 
 reasonably be held to apply to the solar system as evolved f^m 
 the nebula, leaving the former, stated m mechanical terms, 
 neither accounted for nor applicable to any concrete existence 
 
 " wtnlwapproach the study of the special law which consti- 
 
 tutes biological change. , 
 
 Several kinds of equilibration contribute to biological evolu- 
 tion. We have already seen that all chemical, phyBioal, and 
 mechanical changes may be termed equilibrations ! jl^' « ^^ the 
 processes in the growth of so-called organic molecules studied in 
 the Appendix to "Biology," vol. i., as well as aU methods of 
 
348 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 aggregation, selective or otherwise, all manufacturing of mole- 
 cules, and all direct chemical and physical relations of the 
 organism with its own constituents or with the environment are 
 to be reckoned simple equilibrations. But as such they are not 
 of any biological character or import As the fundamental 
 material for the construction and processes of the organism it is 
 difl&cult to conceive of them as acting otherwise than according 
 to the special proclivities of each atom or molecule ; but the 
 hypothesis is that such is not the case, for if it were, the origin 
 and history of organisms would be one to be worked out from 
 the relations of the chemical elements aggregated and influenced 
 in a direct manner by the physical relations of the environment. 
 
 But this is not the theory. The theory is that these atoms 
 and molecules are governed in their arrangements and move- 
 ments by a higher power, namely, the balance of the organism 
 as a whole. The nature of this governing principle we are 
 now about to examine. It must first, however, be distinctly 
 recognised that no change which is not thus influenced is a 
 biological change, and that the special characteristic of biological 
 action lies in this coercive influence together with the adapta- 
 tion to the environment. 
 
 The question naturally suggests itself whether the develop- 
 ment of organisms cannot be worked out completely by means of 
 simple equilibration alone; and whether Mr. Spencer in his own 
 detailed explanations of waste and repair, growth and conse- 
 quent adaptation, does not in reality accomplish all that he does 
 accomplish in this manner, rather than in the manner to which 
 he more prominently calls our attention 1 On this we remark, 
 that if biological explanations were left completely upon the 
 ground of the simple equilibrations above specified, we do not 
 think they would be effective ; but a special work would have to 
 be written on the lines of the deductive method and under these 
 limitations, before we could be in a position to judge how far 
 that might be the case. In all probability the attempt would 
 prove ineffective, and we take it that Mr. Spencer so regards the 
 question, since he supplements this simple scheme by the special 
 theory of biological equilibration. 
 
 When referring, a little above, to the power of the organism 
 
 MOVING EQUILIBRIA AND ORGANIC EVOLUTION. 349 
 
 -warded as a balance having an influence as such upon the 
 taple equilibrations which perform the detailed constract,.e 
 Trk we proposed considering this theory ^-^dependently of 
 The view which regards this same balance as a balance with 
 external forces. In this aspect the question for consideration 
 wS he-Is the organism, as a whole, a balance o forces of 
 i sort that if one of its parts falls out of balance there xs set 
 r Jolhout the system on the one hand an endeavour to 
 ^fstor^ aat part to due symmetry, or on the other hand a reduc- 
 fton of the whole system to the reduced proportions of the 
 Un mX bearing in mind that this -adjustment wouM 
 itself have to be effected by means, after all, of simple eqm- 
 
 " w'eT'not think that such a theoretical balance could even 
 be conceived. No doubt the interdependence of organs -nbe 
 shown and to a very considerable extent explained ; but from 
 f„;Tp"n conception of the mechanical -lat-ns o^ ba^^nce 
 .ve'feTr no biological deductions could be made. The f unda 
 mental notion of balance is equal relation. The tendency oi 
 Tblnce disturbed by any addition to or subtract.n f^m i J 
 factors is towards a readjustment in accordance with the new 
 proportionate distribution of forces, and is not towards a resto^^ 
 U^n of its former condition, to which it has no prochvity what- 
 
 '° From these considerations we perceive that the fundamental 
 biolo°"al idea is not the restoration of a disturbed ba Unce, but 
 a readiustment of balance in accordance with the introduct on 
 of netartors. According to Mr. Spencer's illustration of the 
 lokr Tystem, this adjustment is purely receptive and assimja- 
 tWe Tie whole incident force. On the other hand, his 
 account of the biological equilibration implies that the moving 
 rquTbrium seeks to secure self-maintenance by warding off 
 Se natural effects of the incident forces. It endeavours to 
 receive from the environment only such forms of force as it can 
 assimilate and expend in this contest for self-maintenance. 
 
 Here we find that the conception of counterbalance ,s not 
 
 that referred to in the account of the solar system, where per- 
 
 Siat ons caused by the incoming of a new member would pro- 
 
350 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 duce counterbalances of interior rearrangement by which the 
 new member would find its place in the readjusted system ; but 
 it is the conception of a counterbalance by which the entry of 
 incident forces into a system is met or combated, — antagon- 
 ised in such a manner as to prevent their entry. And if such 
 a principle be admitted in biology, there is no end to the changes 
 which this counterbalance could efifect 
 
 We will first present the matter in its full aspect as given 
 by Mr. Spencer, and then consider the position in which the 
 argument stands. 
 
 Mr. Spencer says, in continuation of the quotation given on 
 p. 344:— 
 
 " If then there exists this state of moving equilibrium among 
 a definite set of internal actions exposed to a definite set of 
 external actions, what must result if any of the external 
 actions are changed? Of course there is no longer an equili- 
 brium. Some force which the organism habitually generates, 
 is too great or too small to balance some incident force ; and 
 there arises a residuary force exerted by the environment on 
 the organism, or by the organism on the environment. This 
 residuary force — this unbalanced force of necessity expends it- 
 self in producing some change of state in the organism. Acting 
 directly on some organ and modifying its function, it indirectly 
 modifies dependent functions, and remotely influences all the 
 functions. As we have already seen (§§ 68, 69), if this new force 
 is permanent, its effects must be gradually diffused throughout 
 the entire system, until it has come to be equilibrated in work- 
 ing those structural rearrangements which produce an exactly 
 counterbalancing force."* 
 
 The conception aimed at in this description is that of a mov- 
 ing equilibrium which combines the properties of the solar 
 system and of the steam-engine. Are we to suppose that this 
 combination produces unique results, or are the changes limited 
 to the analogies of the solar system, the analogy of the steam- 
 engine merely relating to the supply and expenditure of energy, 
 while the actual changes are due to the properties of the former 
 
 • Biology, vol. i. p. 434. 
 
 MOVING EQUILIBRIA AND ORGANIC EVOLUTION. 351 
 svstem only 1 Or, on the other hand, do the steam-engine analo- 
 ; e a" ist the anllogies of the solar system in f^^^^^^^^ 
 which the mere renewal of their energies alone would not 
 rccomplish? In these considerations we find ourselves endea- 
 voS to form a mechanical conception perfectly unique and 
 If a most complicated character.-a conception which findB no 
 concrete representative except the organism itself for which 
 we are trying to put forth an abstract mechanical statement. 
 We fail, in the first place, to apprehend an organism as a mov- 
 ing equilibrium either upon the model of the solar system or 
 upon the model of the steam-engine ; and we further fail to 
 amalgamate the two in thought. 
 
 It is suggested that an incident force wdl act, not on the 
 organism as a whole, but upon a particular part of it. Is there 
 
 anlr reason to suppose that the ^^'^^^^^J^'^'Z^?!^ 
 itself to the restoration of this part? In thus talking, we find 
 our endeavour towards an abstract conception fail ; for we can- 
 not think of a part which is not a part of ^^^ .^1^°1^'-^™ 
 case, of a mechanical moving equilibrium having other par s 
 Mr Spencer says the moving equilibrium in question has a 
 
 defii^t'e set of Internal actions," but ^^^ /-Pl-^^^VL^but 
 equilibrium, not as regards the balance o the -^ern^l;; > ^" 
 J regards its balance with "a definite set of external actions. 
 We therefore have to consider what is meant by a moving equi- 
 librium of forces, not only internally balanced, but also balanced 
 with the environment We can only take the meaning to be 
 the negative one that such an equilibrium is not being mterf e ed 
 with and so continues in existence. But this cannot be he 
 meaning intended, because there is interaction. In this case the 
 meaning can only be that the actions of the environment upon 
 rifing equilibrium are not such as to des^oy '^ /^^^l 
 actions then such as to become amalgamated with lU ^o ; they 
 tend-some of them at any rate-to destroy it. Their destruc- 
 tive action, however, is met or counterbalanced, so as to coun- 
 teract their prejudicial influence. But whence comes this coun 
 teraction for the purpose of retaining continued existence on the 
 part of the moving equilibrium 1 This property of organismshas 
 no analogue in abstract mechanics. Mr. Spencer asks. What 
 
352 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 must result if any of the external actions are changed 1 Of 
 course there is no longer an equilibrium." Nor was there before 
 in any true mechanical sense. There was a process of equili- 
 bration in the sense of general causation ; there was an aggre- 
 gate of connected equilibrations in progress. The connection 
 of the interdependent equilibrations is affected by a change ; 
 still, there is no special tendency in a consensus of equilibra- 
 tions to restore one of them, but simply to accept the direct 
 results of the new action even to the extent of dissolution of 
 all the connections. The conception of setting up a counter- 
 balance for mutual protection is foreign to all mechanical 
 theories and experiences. Mr. Spencer's explanation is given 
 in terms of forces — "Some force which the organism habitually 
 generates " . . . " is too great or too small " ..." to balance 
 some incident force." This is not the equilibration of general 
 cause and effect, nor is it the equilibration of the reception and 
 amalgamation of force, such as would be exhibited by the recep- 
 tion of a new member in the solar system, but it is an opposi- 
 tion to the incident force in order to antagonise its effects. We 
 have the conception of a moving equilibrium composed of forces 
 which balance incident forces of the environment. The balance 
 is not merely an interior balance, but a balance with the exterior. 
 If there is a new incident force, then there is a want of " bal- 
 ance," which the moving equilibrium forthwith proceeds to 
 supply by a counteracting force. 
 
 It is quite clear that this is merely an attempt to represent the 
 changes in an organism in mechanical language, under the belief 
 that the mere employment of such language enables us to frame 
 for ourselves a good mechanical conception, and thus renders 
 organic evolution capable of affiliation upon physical evolution. 
 We have to submit that there is no analogy whatever in any 
 purely mechanical process or conception for the organic processes 
 so described. 
 
 Can we further our object by endeavouring to form a concep- 
 tion of an equilibrium of forces ? In these terms Mr. Spencer 
 seems disposed to speak of an organism. Each organ may be 
 regarded as a force, and the total as an equilibrium of forces. 
 But how is it a moving equilibrium ? Certainly not in the sense 
 
 MOVING EQUILIBRIA AND ORGANIC EVOLUTION. 353 
 
 of mechanical relationship. Is it in the sense of the reception 
 and expenditure of energy 1 But this is not the sense which 
 would effect change of mutual relationships of balance. Then, 
 again, the whole has to be regarded as in counterbalance to 
 external forces. We must confess ourselves unable to form 
 any conception in the description of which the abstract term 
 " force " finds a place. The mutual equilibrium of an aggregate 
 of forces, which itself is a counterbalance to an environment of 
 forces, and which generates new forces in counteraction to new 
 incident forces, is a formula incapable of conception, and inca- 
 pable, too, of application to any concrete save that from which 
 it was derived. Thus the method fails to effect any such general 
 affiliation as would accomplish a genetic union with universal 
 
 evolution. 
 
 We have purposely avoided making an inquiry as to the 
 genesis of such an equilibrium of connected forces. If all mole- 
 cules are to be regarded as forces, how do some of these become 
 united so as to effect an internal equilibrium, and that a moving 
 one ] From what does it happen that, when so constituted, if 
 the presumed circumstances in the environment which brought 
 them together change, they should change not in correspondence 
 but in antagonism 1 For the essence of biologic action is not 
 the change of simple equilibration, but a change in antagonism 
 to simple equilibration, in order to avert its destructive conse- 
 quences. 
 
 But passing over this question of origin, Mr. Spencer proceeds 
 to show how there has been continually going on "a rectification 
 of the equilibrium " according to the alteration of surroundmg 
 circumstances, thus producing, by modification upon modifica- 
 tion, structural and functional changes of great heterogeneity. 
 
 ''Any fresh force brought to bear on an aggregate in a state 
 of moving equilibrium, must do one of two things : it must 
 either overthrow the moving equilibrium altogether, or it must 
 alter without overthrowing it ; and the alteration must end m 
 the establishment of a new moving equilibrium."* 
 
 This is a good statement of abstract truth as applied to moving 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 435- 
 
 Z 
 
354 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 equilibria like the solar system ; but it is not applicable to a 
 moving equilibrium which antagonises or counteracts the new 
 force brought to bear upon it. It would appear that Mr. Spencer 
 does not distinguish between the two cases, and the question 
 arises, Does he mean any more by the phraseology indicating 
 the latter than the facts belonging to the former ? Yet we think 
 he does clearly teach the theory of the self-protective balancings 
 of a moving equilibrium, as distinct from and very often in 
 resistance to the purely assimilative process of effecting equili- 
 bration. . ,. 
 
 This antagonistic tendency may be regarded as the specially 
 characteristic feature of biologic change. Without it, the change 
 is not biologic ; with it, the change belongs to that class. It con- 
 fers on an aggregate the coherence and continuity which consti- 
 tute life We have already seen that Mr. Spencer regards life as 
 continuance of correspondence ; but the correspondence intended 
 is not the general correspondence which characterises aU the 
 direct relationships of an aggregate with its environment ; it 
 must be of the kind which is able to maintain such correspon- 
 deuces in spite of new incident forces tending to destroy it 
 
 As we proceed with our studies this specially characteristic 
 law of Biology becomes more and more pronounced, as thus :— 
 "Whence^Ve found it to follow that the final structural 
 arrangements must be such as will meet all the forces acting on 
 the aggregate, by equivalent antagonistic forces. What is the 
 implication in the case of organic aggregates, the equilibrium of 
 which is a moving one 1 We have seen that the maintenance 
 of such a moving equilibrium requires the habitual genesis of 
 internal forces corresponding in number, directions, and amounts 
 to the external incident forces— as many inner functions, single 
 or combined, as there are single or combined outer actions to 
 
 be met."* ^ . . ^, . 
 
 All this reasoning, it will be noted, is on the supposition that 
 the maintenance of the moving equilibrium "requires," &c 
 But what requires the maintenance of the moving equihbrium 1 
 We merely note this feature in the argument at present, reserv- 
 
 ♦ First Principles, p. 501. 
 
 STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT. 
 
 355 
 
 ing for separate treatment the use which Mr. Spencer makes of 
 the necessity for the maintenance of organisms and of species. 
 
 (e.) Statement of the Argument. 
 
 Let us now review the position of the argument. Our object 
 is the unification of knowledge, and we seek to accomplish this 
 object by a process of reconstruction from the supposed contents 
 and conditions of the primordial nebula. This is a deductive 
 process, and it has to be carried on from our knowledge of the 
 properties of the constituent factors, and of the general laws of 
 their interrelation. 
 
 The evolution of organisms by gradual change in the manner 
 taught by Mr. Darwin we accept on a posteriori grounds. This 
 advance in heterogeneity, this growth of modification upon 
 modification by gradual and natural response to change of en- 
 vironment, is acknowledged; and since these organisms are 
 composed of some of the chemical elements, and are surrounded 
 by others, we cannot doubt that ordinary laws of physical and 
 chemical action prevail among them, and help so far to affiliate 
 them upon preceding inorganic evolution. 
 
 But there are many things that cannot be explained ; for if 
 the modes of development are d. postenori understood on the 
 supposition of original undifferentiated organic matter, still the 
 origination of such organic matter having the specially charac- 
 teristic biologic function is unexplainable either ^^ prioH or d 
 posterion. How did it ever happen that a moving equilibrium 
 having the tendency to oppose new arrangements in order to 
 antagonise the destructive influence of external forces first came 
 into existence ? To this question no answer can be found. The 
 finding of moving equilibria which receive and assimilate inci- 
 dent forces is not the slightest assistance to us in understanding 
 the origin of moving equilibria which resist the reception of 
 incident forces. A still greater difficulty arises when amongst 
 the interior forces thus generated in the organism is that of 
 feeling and consciousness. 
 
 It will thus be seen that our quarrel is not with Evolution as 
 set forth in Mr. Darwin's truly scientific teachings, as far as they 
 
356 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 go We accept tliese on the imderstanding that they do not 
 pretend to explain the origin of life nor the affiliation of organic 
 upon inorganic existence. Our contention is that Mr. Spencer s 
 attempt to accomplish this latter object has not succeeaed. 
 
 (/.) The Oricrin and Maintenance of Moving Equilibria. 
 Mr Spencer nowhere gives us a satisfactory account of the 
 a prion necessity for moving equilibria. Nor does he attempt 
 to explain their origin out of the chemical elements. It is true, 
 in the Appendix to vol. i. of the " Biology," he gives a hypothe- 
 tical account of the genesis of organic molecules, but he only 
 deals with them as regards their attainment of a high degree of 
 complexity, great modifiability, and extreme sensitiveness to 
 chan-e, which cause them to manifest more and more those 
 charTcteristics that we call vital; he never treats of them as 
 re-ards their attainment of the special characteristic of biologic 
 function just elaborated. Evidently it was his duty to consider 
 their constitution as moving equUibria before he could apply to 
 them the term " oi-anic," and to have shown how they or the 
 primitive body which several of them might form became a 
 movin- equilibrium. He should have shown why the circum- 
 stances which formed them did not enable them to retain the 
 individuality so reached; and why, on the contrary, this continu- 
 ance of individuality entailed an expenditure of force requiring 
 constant renewal. All this should have been set forth m ex- 
 planation of their origin as moving equilibria before he began 
 to treat of those counterbalances with the forces of the environ- 
 ment which constitute biology proper. 
 
 It must be clearly understood, therefore, that in all our sub- 
 sequent investigations we take the origin of moving equilibria 
 for granted, and continue our studies with the fuU conscious- 
 ness of this great initial hiatus between inorganic and organic 
 
 evolution. 
 
 We must also take for granted the a prion necessity for the 
 maintenance of moving equilibria, whether the conviction of 
 this necessity be derived from a consideration of their constitu- 
 tion or furnished by our own minds. For out part, we think 
 
 ORIGIN OF MOVING EQUILIBRIA 
 
 357 
 
 the essential idea of a moving equilibrium involves the contmual 
 expenditure of energy, and therefore its tendency is not towards 
 self-maintenance but the reverse. Nevertheless, if there were 
 no necessity for the continued individuality of a moving equili- 
 brium there would be no necessity for antagonising those external 
 forces which are detrimental to its existence. 
 
 Properly speaking, we ought to enlarge our conception of the 
 biologic problem by admitting the complementary process of adap- 
 tation for the assimUation of such forces in the environment as 
 would assist in the maintenance of the equilibrium, thus initiat- 
 ing changes of structure to this end. We do not understand, 
 since this is one of the main features of biologic change, why 
 Mr Spencer has not brought it forward in full prominence for 
 A priori interpretation. It may be that he regards the assimi- 
 lation of forces tending to the continuance of the moving equi- 
 librium as coming within the scope of simple equilibration ; 
 but then it appears to us that organisms show adaptations for 
 the reception and assimUation of favourable forces quite as 
 much as they exhibit arrangements to guard them from the 
 effects of destructive forces. And since many of the external 
 forces may be regarded as either favourable or unfavourable to 
 the maintenance of moving equilibria according to their varying 
 amounts, the question of the balance to secure an adequate 
 quantity and to guard against a destructive excess becomes a 
 complex one. But regarding the problem in the abstract, can 
 we at all conceive of a moving equilibrium of bodies, or of 
 forces of such a nature that it not only so arranges itself 
 as to^ounterbalance incident forces which imperil its con- 
 tinuance, but accommodates itself in the manner of balance 
 or counterbalance to incident forces which favour its conti- 
 nuance ? Such a suggestion is inconceivable. We cannot con- 
 ceive of a solar system which adapts itself to receive motion, 
 nor of an equilibrium of forces expending force in rearrange- 
 ments for securing a commensurate reception of force. The 
 thought is altogether foreign to the idea of the balance of forces. 
 We can find no concrete instance whatever which throws any 
 light upon such a conception. If we consider the steam-engine 
 as a case in point, the steam-engine is but an inert mass of 
 
358 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 metal, incapable of any adaptation either for the reception of 
 force or for warding off injurious attacks. 
 
 Therefore if we find in Biology structural arrangements as 
 well for securing forces favourable to the maintenance of the 
 moving equilibrium as for protective purposes, we must under- 
 stand that the ct prim'i explanation is to be sought in other ways 
 than by an abstract theory of balances and counterbalances. 
 
 (g.) General Survey of the Counierhalances. 
 
 In order to attain a general conception of Biology, considered 
 as a system of counterbalances to external forces, let us now 
 briefly review the list of forces presented to us by Mr. Spencer 
 in his works as effecting those antagonisms of structure and 
 function which we desire to have explained. 
 
 As indicated in the preceding sub-section, the study is not by 
 any means a simple one, for organisms have had to adjust them- 
 selves to the presence or absence, the excess or defect of various 
 forces. Now, viewing the biologic function as a counterbalance 
 to an external incident force, it is not possible to conceive of a 
 counterbalance to a force which is not present and in action. 
 Yet Mr. Spencer proposes to overcome this difficulty by regard- 
 ing the negations themselves as forces. The absence of a force 
 is a force which has to be counterbalanced. As in old times 
 cold was classed in the same category as heat, so Mr. Spencer 
 regards cold as a force which has to be counterbalanced by 
 changes of structure and habit. Doubtless Mr. Spencer veils 
 this representation under the form of "changed conditions," 
 necessitating change of structure ; but on the special biologic 
 theory of counterbalance, the force in this instance is decreased 
 molecular motion. As a counterbalance to this " force " we find 
 a great variety of rearrangements of organisms. The thickening 
 of the fur of some animals on the approach of winter is a case 
 in point. Absence of food, again, is thus transformed from the 
 negative aspect into a positive force, which has to be counter- 
 balanced in the organism by structural arrangements to secure 
 food. Hence the necessity for counterbalances of locomotion 
 to search for, and counterbalances of appliances to secure 
 
 I 
 
 SURVEY OF THE COUNTERBALANCES. 359 
 
 and assimilate, the forces necessary to maintain the moving 
 equilihrium. If the absence of water is a force, is there not the 
 counterbalancing cistern of the great desert tortoise 1 
 
 It may be that the changes in organisms produced by absence 
 of heat, absence of food, absence of enemies, &c., may all be 
 explainable in various ways ; but we think that, considered as 
 a method of logical explanation, it is not A priori correct to say 
 that these changes are counterbalances to the presence or absence 
 of external forces in relation to a moving equilibrium. 
 
 Another curious exigency of the argument is the counter- 
 balancing by an organism of s. future force. This future force 
 itself may be either of a positive or of a negative kind. Thus 
 the thickening of the fur on the approach of winter is anticipa- 
 tory to change of temperature rather than occurring in direct 
 response to such change ; and various animals counterbalance by 
 anticipation the force of absence of food by laying up stores of 
 provender to secure their existence during the inclemencies of 
 winter Cases of precautionary counterbalance are also to be 
 found in the means taken for the protection of the embryo and 
 the voun" animal. The shell of an egg is a counterbalance to 
 future external mechanical forces. In all the apparatus for 
 self-defence we find the same principle to prevail. In those 
 floral defences by which plants protect their poUen from the 
 incursions of the wrong insects we also notice a counterbalance 
 to an anticipated external incident iorce. The ^onAevM 
 variety of methods by which seeds are protected exhibit the 
 same remarkable prevision of counterbalance. 
 
 It is not to be denied that aU these are cases of equilibra- 
 tion in the sense of equivalence of relation, and presumably 
 they are cases of that biological counterbalance which Mr 
 Spencer is at such pains to explain ; but since it is evident that 
 the principle of a moving equilibrium adjusting itself to forces 
 not in actual relation, but only going to be, cannot be maintained, 
 we shall have to search for some other explanation of these 
 
 ""^Athird difficulty occurs in regard to the evolution of Feeling 
 and Consciousness. According to Mr. Spencer's biological 
 theory these must arise in the organism as counterbalances to 
 
 
36o SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 the forces of the environment Their raison d'etre lies in the 
 preservation of the moving equilibrium, ostensibly by way of 
 a counterbalancing force acting against some force detrimental 
 to its continuance, but also, in a wider view, to assist in the 
 assimilation of forces which will aid this continuance. 
 
 Various corollaries result from this. In the first place, it 
 follows that feeling and consciousness are not merely concomi- 
 tants of physical change, but that, as feelings and consciousness, 
 they take an active part in the counterbalances of Biology. If 
 the merely mechanical arrangements of nerves and their motions 
 were sufficient to provide this counterbalance, they alone, 
 according to the theory, would have been evolved without any 
 concomitance of a subjective aspect. But since the subjective 
 aspect has been evolved over and above the physical arrange- 
 ments, all the feelings which animals possess must have been 
 essential in the consensus of antagonistic forces which did 
 battle for existence with the environment. They are not 
 merely lookers-on in the strife, but active agencies. For if 
 feelings as feelings were not essential in the activity of the 
 organism, then the biologic work, either of the protective char- 
 acter or of the assimilative, would be done by physical 
 arrangements without the accompaniment of feeling. This we 
 judge to be the case, both from the fundamental conception of 
 the moving equilibrium derived from the solar system and steam- 
 engine, and from the actual facts of biology. In organisms we 
 find that feeling only accompanies those actions which are 
 directly related to changes of the environment, whereas much 
 work is done by organs in an unconscious manner. The 
 difference existing between the conscious and the unconscious 
 actions of organism is only explainable by the theory under 
 consideration, on the ground of the concomitant consciousness 
 of the former being an essential and actual factor in the coun- 
 terbalances which the organism presents to the external world. 
 
 This, again, implies the possible conversion of physical ener- 
 gies into modes of feeling, and the possible conversion of feeling 
 into modes of muscular action. 
 
 Thus we are forced to the conclusion that feeling and con- 
 sciousness have been actual factors in biological evolution ; that 
 
 FEELING AND CONSCIOUSNESS AS EXTERNAL. 361 
 
 any account of this evolution which omits these as factors and 
 explains its developments by merely physical interrelations must 
 be conspicuously deficient 
 
 (h.) Feeling and Consciousness as Extenml Forces. 
 Reserving the f uU consideration of the theme broached in the 
 last subsection, let us next consider the recognition, in the 
 structure of plants and animals, of feeling and consciousness as 
 forces in their environment We wish to inquire whether m 
 their adaptations to the external world organisms exhibit not 
 merely counterbalances to physical forces, but also adaptations 
 which clearly imply a recognition of feeling as such m the envi- 
 roning organisms. 
 
 Take the sense of smeU to commence with. The skunk, 
 when pursued by an enemy, projects upon him a most offensive 
 fluid. This is evidently a means of defence. Is the action to 
 be interpreted by the mechanical or chemical operation of the 
 juice upon the nervous system of the enemy, through which 
 certain molecular changes are set up, eventuatmg m motions of 
 retreat 1 Or are we to suppose that the subjective sensation is 
 essential to the result 1 In accordance with the argument con- 
 tained in the preceding sub-section, the subjective feeling is an 
 active factor in such a case, and is recognised in the structure 
 and functions of the skunk. 
 
 So, also, there are some plants and animals which derive 
 their protection from bitterness of taste. 
 
 On the other hand, many plants and insects display m their 
 structure and functions a recognition of external sentiency to 
 attractive tastes and odours. The flowers which provide feasts 
 of honey for the bee and moth and butterfly seem to imply an 
 acknowledgment of the subjective. The sweet scents which 
 pervade the summer air surely have more than a mechanical 
 effect, and indicate the relations of the floral world to the 
 olfactory sensations of the animal environment. 
 
 But by far the most important instance of the recognition 
 of external sentiency registered in the structure and functions 
 of or-anisms refers to the sense of sight Whence all the 
 
362 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 bright hues of flowers but for the sentiency of the insect retina ? 
 The same relation seems to hold between the colours of fruits 
 and the eyes of birds. The glorious plumage displayed by the 
 latter bears reference often to the appreciative taste of the oppo- 
 site sex. Sometimes, however, the colourings of the bird may 
 be of a protective character ; and this introduces us to the won- 
 derful and interesting study of mimicry. 
 
 The whole rationale of animal mimicry, both of form and 
 colour, is to be found in the recognition by organic structures 
 of the subjective sense of sight on the part of surrounding 
 animals, together with the recognition of the colour and forms 
 of the inanimate surroundings. In response or counterbalance 
 to these forces of the environment, and more especially to the 
 fact of the presence of enemies having the sense of sight, fishes 
 adjust their colourings to the adjacent masses, moths and other 
 animals make themselves indistinguishable from the rocks and 
 walls upon which they rest, and the stick and leaf insects, both 
 in form and colour, simulate the refuse of the forest. 
 
 We cannot, however, here do more than briefly indicate the 
 nature of an argument which might be amplified to almost any 
 extent 
 
 If it can be made out that all these instances of natural 
 adaptation on the part of animals and plants are explicable 
 simply as the direct results of motions in ether, or air, or of 
 other physical properties of the environment acting upon a me- 
 chanical nervous system, our suggestion fails; but we think 
 these arrangements all imply not only a subjective counterbal- 
 ancing force, but also a recognition of feeling as an external or 
 objective factor over and above the physical interrelation, more 
 particularly when taken in connection with the argument of the 
 preceding sub-section. 
 
 (i.) Feeling and Consciousness as Counterbalance. 
 
 In § 174 of "First Principles " Mr: Spencer undertakes to 
 explain the equilibrations of nervous actions. But it will be 
 found that the phenomena there explained are not the equili- 
 brations by which the nervous system attains its structure 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS AS COUNTERBALANCE. 3^3 
 
 as a counterbalance to external destructive forces, but those 
 mechanical equilibrations by which motions are dissipated and 
 brou-ht to a close. This idea receives a changed import in an 
 account of the daily rhythms by which the force expended 
 during the period of mental activity is compensated by forces 
 renewed during the state of rest. The argument proceeds by 
 pointing out how to all external associations there arise answer- 
 fncr internal associations, showing a progress towards equilibrium 
 between the relations of thought and the relations of things 
 It is pursued further by showing the attainment o. moral and 
 social equilibrium. But it is evident that these processes of 
 equilibration are not identical with the biological equilibration 
 which finds the genesis of structural and functional arrangements 
 in the fact that these are counterbalances to external destructive 
 forces It is indeed merely the verbal process of representing 
 all correspondences and all social relations as equilibrations. 
 
 Mr Spencer anticipates one objection to his exposition but 
 in reality there are two. The first objection is that the physi- 
 cal structure of the nervous system is not explained upon the 
 special biological principle. To this he does not reply But, 
 considered strictly as a physical arrangement of material mole- 
 cules, and as a moving equilibrium having a varied entourage 
 of forces, we hold that the nervous system is not shown to 
 be the outcome of that biological law by which structure origi- 
 nates as a force in counterbalance to an external force, which it 
 
 proceeds to antagonise. , . , T.r o,^n„onr 
 
 The second objection, and the one to which Mr Spencer 
 replies, is that the explanation he affords is purely materialistic, 
 and does not account for the subjective concomitant. The 
 reply, however, is exceedingly defective. It is based upon the 
 « double-aspect " theory. What we know objectively as modes 
 of force we know subjectively as states of consciousness; so 
 much feeling is the correlate of so much motion ; the per- 
 formance of any bodily action is the transformation of a cer- 
 tain amount of feeling into its equivalent amount of motion. 
 The latter sentence, indeed, implies the mutual transformation 
 of feeling and motion-a doctrine altogether different from the 
 « double-aspect " theory. The final statement is— 
 
364 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 "And tlius the ultimate state, forming the limit towardg 
 which Evolution carries us, is one in which the kinds and 
 quantities of mental " {qicery — subjective ?) " energy daily gene- 
 rated and transformed into motions, are equivalent to, or in 
 equilibrium with, the various orders and degrees of surrounding 
 forces which antagonise such motions." * 
 
 This passage tends to confirm the supposition that in Mr. 
 Spencer's opinion modes of physical energy can be transformed 
 into feeling and retransformed into modes of physical energy, 
 having in these transformations quantitative relations. They 
 are thus able to take their places as active agencies in the biolo- 
 gical counterbalance, by which preservative forces are assimi- 
 lated, or by which destructive forces are antagonised. And if 
 so accepted, they must be recognised as active agencies in the 
 biological development 
 
 On no other view can their existence be accounted for and 
 justified. On reviewing the organic arrangements, we find that 
 some of the work done by the organism is of such a character 
 as not to require the accompaniment of subjective sensation. 
 Accordingly, the necessary physiological processes are automatia 
 The liver, the spleen, the kidneys perform their normal func- 
 tions without the accompaniment of feeling, which, indeed, would 
 be detrimental to the general balance ; but we find that these 
 organs and others manifest pain when the normal functions are 
 not properly performed, thus exhibiting an active agency of the 
 subjective kind when requisite for the safety of the organism. 
 Apparently the merely physical arrangements of the eye, ear, 
 nose, mouth, and fingers would not be able to do their work in 
 this automatic mechanical manner. They seem positively to 
 require differentiated modes of feeling over and above the 
 currents of the nerves, by which a cojisensus of physical 
 action is secured. Thus feelings and special modes of feeling 
 ds feelings are proved to be factors in biological action. The 
 biological explanatory view implies their place as forces in 
 action, as counterbalances to incident external forces, which 
 would otherwise tend to destroy the moving equilibria of 
 
 * First Principles, p. 507. 
 
 CONSCIO USNESS AS CO UNTERBA LANCE. 365 
 
 which they form a part. The theory which ^eg^^ds them 
 :nerely as a secondary aspect of physiological events which they 
 Le L power to influence, is insufficient t« satisfy the hio- 
 logical law of the moving equiUbrium, which necessitates the 
 supposition that each fact in the organism is a potent acting 
 
 ^° W'is worth while to consider the position of those who hold 
 the "double-aspect " theory in regard to the argument we 
 are here pursuing. It is held by them that the subjective 
 aspect is not " secondary " but complementarj-. The answer to 
 Sis is that that aspect in which the relations of sequences 
 ptsent themselves, and by means of which the order of 
 sequences is to be described and aetuaUy calculated as hyp<> 
 thetically conceived, must be regarded as primary ; and a second 
 aJlt if any, which is merely concomitant, and which does not 
 is'e the order of sequences, must be secondary or dependent 
 whether the nature of that dependence is known or not. A 
 lomlmentary aspect can only be one which is necessary in 
 Torder of the sequences, and without which that order would 
 be incomplete. But if it is shown that a deveh>pment is com- 
 pLtely explainable by a physical process, the concomitant 
 Sective IS not complementary. Thus, when biological develop- 
 ment is held to be explainable in the same way that chemistry 
 Tr the solar system is explainable, it is a purely physical 
 L anaL. And, again, when all the ^-1°?--*^. ^^ 
 S rentiations of organisms are held to be explamable as 
 clTerbalances by which active factors of the orgam- are set 
 UP in anta<n)nism toexternal forces, those feelings which we find 
 to e^isUn or<ranisms are bound to be considered as amongst 
 
 I e tors not merely as concomitants, but as essential factors 
 n the b Ic^cal balance. This can only be done by co-relating 
 
 II quantitatively with physical transformations as M. 
 Spencer .has done, yet without thinking it necessary to explain 
 
 ^'^ Burshould Mr. Spencer go further, and say that the sul. 
 iecSe Lpect is primary-is the one thing known-the objecUve 
 tet" inferential, then the explanation he proposes m the 
 ^Slo^y "-as being from certain chemical factors and certain 
 
m 
 
 366 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 external physical factors acting under the laws of moving 
 equilibria in general— is propounded in the wrong language, 
 and necessitates a theory of universal subjectivity co-extensive 
 with the objective, so as to show that subjectivity does not 
 appear by accident in a few organisms. But this Mr. Spencer 
 does not attempt, and in it Professor Clifford has failed. All 
 we are concerned with, however, at the present time, is to show 
 how, according to the principles of the biological theory under 
 review, all the facts of the organism are to be regarded as 
 "forces" wrought out in the organism in antagonism to forces 
 of the environment which they counterbalance, and that the 
 "feelings" of organisms and their functions must so be ranged. 
 They are thus brought into the circle of the modes of energy, 
 which are not aspects of each other, but separate and mutually 
 transformable modes of energy. Thus " feelings " are established 
 as active factors in biology, this being their only raison d'etre. 
 
 In § 168 of the "Biology" we find it stated of Indirect 
 Equilibrations — 
 
 "It is scarcely possible too much to emphasise the conclu- 
 sion, that all these processes by which organisms are refitted to 
 their ever-changing environments, must be equilibrations of 
 one kind or other. As authority for this conclusion, we have 
 not simply the universal truth that change of every order is 
 towards equilibrium ; but we have also the truth which holds 
 throughout the organic world, that life itself is the main- 
 tenance of a moving equilibrium between inner and outer 
 actions — the continuous adjustment of internal relations 
 to external relations ; or the maintenance of a correspondence 
 between the forces to which an organism is subject and the 
 forces which it evolves. For, if the preservation of life is the 
 preservation of such a moving equilibrium, it becomes a corol- 
 lary that those changes which enable a species to live under 
 altered conditions are changes towards equilibrium with the 
 altered conditions." * 
 
 What these Indirect Equilibrations are we shall hereafter 
 consider. At present we simply note the import of the above 
 
 * Principles of Biology, vol. i. p. 462. 
 
 ■ CONSCIO USNESS AS COUNTERBALA NCE. 367 
 
 passage in regard to the origin and place of feelings in the 
 L'ntenance of the moving equQibria in which they occur 
 which is a vindication of their nature as acting factors over and 
 above the physical organisation. 
 
 We now direct the attention of our readers to the chapter 
 on "Pleasures and Pains" in voL L of the "Psychology, in 
 which what we may by analogy term the functions of pleasure 
 
 and pain are exhibited. «, . ^t v • 
 
 "L24 Let us first glance at the fact, sufBciently obvious 
 and sufficiently significant, that the extreme states, positive and 
 ne<^ative, along with which pains occur, are states inconsistent 
 with that due balance of the functions constituting health; 
 whereas that medium state along with which pleasure occurs, is 
 consistent with, or rather is demanded by, this due balance 
 This we may see A priori. In a mutually dependent set of 
 organs having a consensus of functions, the very existence of 
 a special organ having its special function, impbes that the 
 absence of its function must cause disturbance of the con^nms; 
 impUes, too, that its function may be raised to an excess, which 
 must cause disturbance of the consensus; implies, therefore, that 
 maintenance of the consensus goes along with a medium aegree 
 of the functidn. The i priori inference involved, that these 
 medium actions productive of pleasure must be beneficial, and 
 the extreme actions productive of pain detrimental, is abun- 
 dantly confirmed d. posteriori where the actions are of aU- 
 
 essential kinds." * , . ^ i.- • • , 
 
 Thus we find that pains are the correlatives of actions inju- 
 rious to the organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of 
 actions conducive to its welfare.t 
 
 It is a coroUary from this that the seeking of pleasures as 
 such, and the avoidance of pains as such, have jointly tended 
 to the maintenance of the moving equilibrium of organisms, 
 and that they have therefore, as feelings, performed a very active 
 part in the evolution of organisms, and in their structural and func- 
 tional development. Spoken of in the abstract language of force 
 
 • Principles of Psychology, vol. L p. 278. 
 + Ibid., p. 279. 
 
 ik 
 
If 
 
 I 
 
 368 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 or forces, they may therefore be regarded as taking part in the 
 equilibrations of forces in the system of which they form a por- 
 tion, and as affecting the actions of that whole, considered as an 
 unit in its immediate environment and as an unit in an organ- 
 ised society. And thus they might be considered to faU into 
 the general equilibrations of evolution at large, as well as to 
 maintain their special characteristic as forces in a moving equi- 
 librium antagonising destructive forces in the environment 
 
 § 10. Mr. Spencer^s scheme of biological reconstruction considered 
 as the outcome of the laws of the moving equilibrium. 
 
 # 
 
 We have now to witness the conversion of the abstract pro- 
 cess into a concrete one. The abstract model was arrived at by 
 an induction from the concrete instances of the solar system 
 and the spinning-top, which are mechanical moving equilibria ; 
 and its formulation was effected by the substitution of forces 
 for the separate members or motions of these systems. It is 
 supposed that the conception of mutual mechanical movement 
 is retained in this substituted idea because the mutual relation 
 of forces implies mutual motion of some sort, and so implies 
 a moving equilibrium. To this has to be joined the notion 
 of the reception and expenditure of force, derived from the 
 case of the steam-engina The analogy of the counterbalance 
 of opposite movements in the solar system is translated into a 
 conception of counterbalancing forces, or of the generation of 
 forces which shall antagonise external forces. Thus we reach 
 at last the fanciful conception of a self-sustaining moving 
 equilibrium, which adapts itself in a twofold way : firstly, 
 by assimilating favourable forces, and, secondly, by generating 
 forces which counterbalance any destructive forces of its envi- 
 ronment 
 
 This conception is supposed to be one derived from a study 
 of the physical universe ; and if by its means biological develop- 
 ment can be explained, it is supposed that the latter is shown 
 to be a mere continuation of the former, without any change of 
 methods or introduction of new factors. Into this abstract 
 mould the concrete processes of biology have now to be run. 
 
 BIOLOGY AND THE MOVING EQUILIBRIUM. 369 
 
 The ideal outline has to be filled in with actual biological 
 developments. 
 
 Whether the preliminary methods by which this conception 
 is arrived at are justifiable or not we have just considered. We 
 must, however, ask the reader to consider it as established for 
 the sake of continuing the argument, and with the view of fur- 
 ther considering its applicability— a task upon which we are now 
 
 about to enter. 
 
 The course of our studies brings us to the account given by 
 Mr. Spencer in the second volume of the " Biology " of mor- 
 phological development and physiological development, with 
 the view of ascertaining what part is played in these processes, 
 not by that equilibration in general which is simply another 
 name for the direct and free action of bodies upon each other 
 in accordance with the natural relations of their properties, but 
 by that special kind of biological equilibration which we have 
 been considering, and without which no event can be classed 
 as included in the science of Biology. 
 
 " The problems of Morphology fall into two distinct classes, 
 answering respectively to the two leading aspects of Evolution. 
 In things which evolve there go on two processes— increase of 
 mass and increase of structure."* 
 
 "The task before us is to trace throughout these phenomena 
 the process of evolution ; and to show how, as displayed in 
 them, it conforms to those first principles which evolution in 
 f^enerai conforms to. Two sets of factors have to be taken into 
 
 o 
 
 account. Let us look at them. . 
 
 " The factors of the first class are those which tend directly to 
 change an organic aggregate, in common with every other aggre- 
 gate, from that more simple form which is not in equilibrium 
 with incident forces, to that more complex form which is in 
 equilibrium with them. We have to mark how, in correspon- 
 dence with the universal law that the uniform lapses into the 
 multiform, and the less multiform into the more multiform, the 
 parts of each organism are ever becoming further differentiated ; 
 and we have to trace the varying relations to incident forces, 
 
 * Principles of Biology, voL ii. p. 4. 
 
 2 A 
 
•lli! 
 
 
 370 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 by which further dififerentiations are entailed. We have to 
 observe, too, how each primary modification of structure, induced 
 by an altered distribution of forces, becomes a parent of secondary 
 modifications ; how, through the necessary multiphcation of 
 effects, change of form in one part brings about changes of form 
 in other parts. And then we have also to note the meUmor- 
 phoses constantly being induced by the process of segregation 
 —by the gradual union of like parts exposed to Uke forces, 
 and the gradual separation of like parts exposed to unlike 
 
 ^^" The factors of the second class, which we have kept in view 
 throughout our interpretations, are the formative tendencies of 
 organisms themselves-the proclivities inherited by them from 
 antecedent organisms, and which past processes of evolution 
 have bequeathed. We have seen it to be a necessary inference 
 from various orders of facts (§§ 65, 84, 97) that organisms 
 are built up of certain highly complex molecules, which we 
 distinguished as physiological units — each kind of organ- 
 ism being built up of physiological units peculiar to itself. We 
 found ourselves obliged to recognise in these physiological 
 units powers of arranging themselves into the forms of the organ- 
 isms to which they belong, analogous to the powers which the 
 molecules of inorganic substances have of aggregating into specihc 
 crystalline forms. We have consequently to regard this pola- 
 rity of the physiological units as producing, during the develop- 
 ment of any organism, a combination of internal forces that 
 expend themselves in working out a structure in equilibrium 
 with the forces to which ancestral organisms were exposed ; but 
 not in equilibrium with the forces to which the existing organ- 
 ism is exposed if the environment has been changed. Hence 
 the problem in all cases is to ascertain the resultant of internal 
 organising forces tending to reproduce the ancestral form, and 
 external modifying forces tending to cause deviations from that 
 
 "Moreover, we have to take into account, not only the 
 characters of immediately preceding ancestors, but also those 
 of their ancestors, and ancestors of all degrees of remoteness. 
 Settincr out with rudimentary types, we have to consider how, 
 
 BIOLOGY AND THE MOVING EQUILIBRIUM. 371 
 
 in each successive stage of evolution, the structures acquired 
 during previous stages have been obscured by further integra- 
 tions and further differentiations ; or, conversely, how the linea- 
 ments of primitive organisms have all along continued to mani- 
 fest themselves under the superposed modifications." * 
 
 In the Summary of Morphological Development we find— 
 " And here, indeed, we may see clearly that these truths are 
 corollaries from that ultimate truth to which all phenomena of 
 evolution are referable. It is an inevitable deduction from the 
 persistence of force, that organic forms which have been pro- 
 gressively evolved must present just these fundamental traits 
 of form which we find them present. It cannot but be that, 
 during the intercourse between an organism and its environment, 
 equal forces acting under equal conditions must produce equal 
 effects ; for, to say otherwise, is, by implication, to say that 
 more force can produce more or less than its equivalent effect, 
 which is to deny the persistence of force. Hence, those parts 
 of an organism which are by its habits of life exposed to like 
 amounts and like combinations of actions and reactions, must 
 develop alike ; while unlikenesses of development must as un- 
 avoidably follow unlikenesses among these agencies. And, this 
 being so, all the specialities of symmetry and unsymmetry and 
 asymmetry which we have traced are necessary consequences." t 
 If we turn now to the problems presented to^us in the study 
 
 of Physiology we find — 
 
 " The problems of Physiology, in the wide sense above de- 
 scribed, are, like the problems of Morphology, to be considered 
 as problems to which answers must be given in terms of inci- 
 dent forces. On the hypothesis of Evolution, these speciali- 
 sations of tissues and accompanying concentrations of functions, 
 must, like the specialisations of shape in an organism and its 
 component divisions, be due to the actions and reactions which 
 its intercourse with the environment involves; and the task 
 before us is to explain how they are wrought— how they are 
 comprehended as results of such actions and reactions. 
 
 « Or, to define these problems still more specifically -.—Those 
 
 ♦ Principles of Biology, vol. ii. p. 7- + ^^^^ » P- 217- 
 

 * • 1 
 
 .if 
 
 n 
 
 372 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 extremely unstable substances which compose the P^jotoplasm 
 of which organisms are mainly built, have to be traced through 
 the various modifications in their properties and powers, tha 
 are entailed on them by changes of relation to agencies of all 
 
 kinds " * 
 
 "Here, as before, we must take into account two classes of 
 factors. We have to bear iu mind the inherited results of 
 actions to which antecedent organisms were exposed, and to 
 ioin with these the results of present actions Each organism 
 is to be considered as presenting a moving equilibrium of func 
 tions, and a correlative arrangement of structures, produced by 
 the aggregate of actions and reactions that have taken place 
 between all ancestral organisms and their environments. The 
 tendency in each organism to repeat this adjusted arrangement 
 of functions and structures, must be regarded as from time to 
 time interfered with by actions to which its inherited equ. i- 
 brium is not adjusted-actions to which, therefore its equili- 
 brium has to be readjusted. And in studying physiological 
 development we have in all cases to contemplate the progressing 
 compromise between the old and the new, ending in a restored 
 
 balance or adaptation." t . • v ti. 
 
 The plan of exposition favoured by Mr. Spencer is in both 
 
 classes of development thus described ;— 
 
 " Two ways of carrying on the inquiry suggest themselves. 
 We may go through the several great groups of organisms, with 
 the view of reaching, by comparison of parts, certain general 
 truths respecting the homologies, the forms, and the relations 
 of their parts ; and then, having dealt with the phenomena in- 
 ductively, may retrace our steps with the view of deductively 
 interpreting the general truths reached. Or, instead of thus 
 separating the two investigations, we may carry thefti on hand 
 in hand-first establishing each general truth empirically, and 
 then proceeding to the rationale of it. This last method will. 
 I think, conduce to both brevity and clearness." I 
 
 The programme thus roughly sketched is very faithfuUy 
 
 * Principles o£ Biology, vol. ii. p. 223. 
 + Ibid, p. 224- , * ^"'*-' P- 9- 
 
 !l 
 
 BIOLOGY AND THE MOVING EQUILIBRIUM. 373 
 
 adhered to and very ably carried out by Mr. Spencer in this 
 second volume of the " Biology." Each process of stricture 
 and function is set forth in considerable detail, and is followed 
 bv its suitable deductive warrant. These deductive warrants 
 consist sometimes merely in the fact that the results are found 
 harmonious with one or other of the coroUaries from the Per- 
 sistence of Force. At other times the reasoning is of a cor- 
 rectly deductive character, although the student wiU probably 
 find that the a priori argument is conspicuously inadequate to 
 account for the complicated concrete results sought to be ex- 
 plained by its means. But it is a characteristic of most of the 
 explanations that they are drawn from the various corollaries 
 of the Persistence of Force known as the Instabihty of the 
 Homogeneous, Segregation, the Multiplication of Effects, &c. 
 and that no single instance is ever adduced of the action of that 
 special law of equilibration drawn from the abstract moving 
 equilibrium to which we have given our attention, though that 
 process is the one promulgated as specially characteristic of bio- 
 logical changes. 
 
 It is true that the term "equilibration" is very frequently 
 brought into use, but it only appears in two several ways, 
 neither of which implies any special power either of seeking 
 to effect the assimilation of forces conducive to continuance 
 or of freshly arranging internal forces in antagonism to external 
 destructive forces. The first use of the term to which we refer 
 relates to the simple and direct action between forces according 
 to their natural relations, and in this sense equilibration is 
 merely another name for general causation, and is indistin- 
 guishable from the equilibrations or mutual relations of forces 
 which are not of a biological character. The second use of the 
 term is in the application of the expression " moving equili- 
 brium" to the result of all these primary equilibrations aggre- 
 gated into a complex consensus of relationship. But it is 
 evident that the mere application of the term in this way is an 
 indication of result rather than an explanation of process. If 
 we find that the approach of winter is accompanied by the 
 thickening of the furry coat of an animal, it is easy to say that 
 this is the readjustment of a moving equilibrium, but it affords 
 
374 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 no explanation of the process. We are unable in thought, 
 taking into account the decrease of molecular motion, to follow 
 out the various steps from the conception of the moving 
 equilibrium to the concrete result mentioned. Nor does Mr. 
 Spencer ever seek to show how the necessity for balance and 
 counterbalance does actually produce any of the changes and 
 developments he has set himself to explain. 
 
 To effect these explanations he makes use of a variety of con- 
 crete knowledge and of the well-known mechanical laws ; and 
 his explanations must be appraised on their own merits. All 
 we are concerned with at present is to divest the inquiry of all 
 those speculative influences which we have just been consider- 
 ing. These, although exalted to the first place in constructive 
 efficacy, are found in reality to be the outcome and not the cause 
 of change. In their statement they present to our minds a 
 semblance of analogy with some physical aggregates, but in reality 
 they turn out of an entirely diflferent constitution. 
 
 We have just remarked that the conception of organisms as 
 moving equilibria is the result rather than the original cause of 
 biological development. And it is singular that in Mr. Spencer's 
 exposition we have no attempt whatever at an explanation of 
 the origin of biological moving equilibria. The whole exposi- 
 tion takes organisms for granted, and then seeks to account 
 for subsequent growth or development and for the modification 
 of function. The question as to the origin of any such systema- 
 tisation or co-ordination of parts accompanied by the habit of 
 motion, which constitutes even the simplest life, is not even 
 referred to. Mr. Spencer's scheme requires some simple or- 
 ganism to commence with. This given, he claims from the laws 
 of equilibration to work out any and every process of develop- 
 ment even to the highest complex forms. But the problem of 
 the origin of this simplest biological form he does not attempt 
 to solve. It is not to the purpose to say that it is a condition 
 gradually attained by insensible modifications from the inor- 
 ganic state. Slight though the distinction may appear to be 
 between the highest inorganic molecule which acts towards its 
 environment strictly in accordance with chemical and physical 
 laws, and the lowest organic form which has a law of action 
 
 BIOLOGY AND THE MOVING EQUILIBRIUM. 375 
 
 overpowering the operation of the former and coercing them to 
 the furtherance of its own preservation and continuance, that 
 distinction nevertheless is a radical one. By no means can we 
 convert the former into the latter, or derive the latter from the 
 former as a mere continuance, a state into which it developed 
 out of its own properties. 
 
 This we regard as a fundamental defect of Mr. Spencer's 
 system, and one which entitles us, should we so decide, to 
 declare that we need proceed no further with the consideration 
 of his scheme. 
 
 We hold that Mr. Spencer's theory of an organism being a 
 moving equilibrium, ai^d, as such, governing the adaptation of 
 its forces to meet those of the environment, and influencing the 
 mutual balancings of its own parts with their accompanying 
 functions, implies a theory of the coercive power of the moving 
 equilibrium over the ordinary chemical and physical laws of its 
 units. The moving equilibrium is, therefore, not the simple 
 result of its constituents, but the necessity for its protection 
 and sustenance produces coercion of the units. If this is 
 not the case, and the moving equilibrium is to be considered 
 as the result of its constituents, then the theory of the moving 
 equilibrium as a cause of development has to be abandoned. 
 With it would go all the arguments by which external forces 
 are said to generate counterbalancing internal forces of struc- 
 ture and function, which are meet for antagonising particular 
 external inimical influences. Casting this on one side, the 
 special characteristic of biological change is obliterated, and 
 what we call biological change is then really but a continua- 
 tion of previous inorganic development, and the problem would 
 be, from the known factors of chemistry and physical environ- 
 ment, to deduce the developments of vegetable and animal life 
 free from the embarrassing associations of the laws of the moving 
 equilibrium. As a matter of fact this is the course actually 
 pursued by Mr. Spencer, thus practically abandoning and in- 
 validating his elaborate arguments drawn from the presumed 
 analogy between organisms and inorganic moving equilibria. 
 
376 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 § 1 1. General Review of Mr. Spencer's Scheme of Biological 
 
 Reconstruction, 
 
 Thoroughly to perform the task indicated by the title of this 
 section would require a separate book. Our intention, however, 
 is rather to review the lines upon which the problem of biological 
 reconstruction is attempted by Mr. Spencer than to criticise his 
 actual performance in detail. At the same time, while we point 
 out the difference between the actual methods employed and 
 the method indicated in the preceding sections, we shall also 
 have to show their inadequacy viewed even in themselves. 
 
 It will be convenient to divide our subject into two parts — 
 one concerning the formative action of external agencies, and 
 the other concerning the formative powers of the constituents 
 of the organism itself. It is true, these have to be regarded as 
 operating conjointly, but we do not think the inquiry will suffer 
 from our taking it in the manner proposed. There is indeed 
 a third agency, in the " need " for the continued existence of 
 individuals and species ; but as this is an inquiry beyond the 
 reach of science, we reserve the consideration of it till a later 
 period. 
 
 We have now to study the part played in the evolution of 
 organisms by the well-known laws of motion, by the action of 
 heat, light, moisture, &c., by chemical environment, and by 
 other factors of an external kind. 
 
 It seems strange that our first endeavour should not be 
 directed to an inquiry respecting the origin of organisms ; but 
 so it is. This subject is passed over by Mr. Spencer in silence. 
 Organisms of some simple character being taken for granted, our 
 study is limited to the less difficult task of ascertaining the laws 
 of their modification, so that out of the nearest approach to 
 homogeneity and the inorganic, we shall be able to evolve the 
 most highly complex forms. It is true that in the Appendix 
 to the first volume of the ** Biology " Mr. Spencer gives a 
 hypothetical account of the origin of ** organic matter," verging 
 indeed upon the origin of organisms ; but in our previous work 
 we have had occasion already to show that the endeavour, if 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 377 
 
 it really aimed at the problem of explaining the origin of 
 organisms, was not successful. 
 
 Mr. Spencer very properly from his point of view denies that 
 any distinct line of demarcation ever existed between the organic 
 and the inorganic. According to the doctrine of Evolution, the 
 former must have acquired its differentiation from the latter by 
 insensible degrees. Yet we cannot but think that there is one 
 essential distinction between the very lowest organism and the 
 highest complex inorganic molecule in the origin of its exist- 
 ence. As a matter of scientific fact, it is not known that any 
 even of the simplest organisms ever come into existence other- 
 wise than from the substance of preceding organisms of a similar 
 character. And as a matter of theory, there is an essential dis- 
 tinction between the continuous existence of a highly complex 
 molecule which does not expend energy nor require sustenance, 
 and the temporary existence of an organism continually expend- 
 ing energy which has to be restored, and carrying with it the 
 means of propagation in view of a certain termination to its 
 own existence. 
 
 However, taking the case as it is presented to us, let us see 
 how simple and homogeneous organisms can be developed into 
 hi<Thly complex ones. We find the inquiry divides itself into 
 two portions — namely, that relating to Morphological and that 
 relating to Physiological Development. In pursuing these in- 
 quiries separately, Mr. Spencer takes all needful precautions for 
 
 notifying their conjoint and contemporaneous action. 
 
 « 
 
 (a.) General Principles of Morphological Development 
 
 We do not know how far Mr. Spencer may be justified in 
 the use of the terms " morphological units " and " physiological 
 units." If they are ex post facto terms, their use is limited to 
 the later stages of scientific inquiry. If they are some of the 
 things which have to be explained, we beg the question at issue 
 by making use of them in our initial inquiries. However, they 
 are so employed by Mr. Spencer ; and we are asked first to con- 
 sider the aggregation of morphological units. Presumably these 
 morphological units are already differentiated and specialised in 
 action as physiological units. They have various modes of 
 
378 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 aggregation, which form the first problem in morphological studies. 
 The second problem of the science consists in the changes of 
 shape that accompany changes of aggregation. Two sets of fac- 
 tors have to be taken into account 
 
 " The factors of the first class are those which tend directly 
 to change an organic aggregate, in common with every other 
 aggregate, from that more simple form which is not in equi- 
 librium with incident forces, to that more complex form which 
 is in equilibrium with them. We have to mark how, in corre- 
 spondence with the universal law that the uniform lapses into 
 the multiform, and the less multiform into the more multiform, 
 the parts of each organism are ever becoming further difi'eren- 
 tiated ; and we have to trace the varying relations to incident 
 forces, by which further difi'erentiations are entailed. . . . 
 The factoi-s of the second class which we have to keep in view 
 throughout our interpretations, are the formative tendencies 
 of organisms themselves — the proclivities inherited by them 
 from antecedent organisms, and which past processes of evolution 
 have bequeathed." * 
 
 The class of changes referred to in the first portion of the 
 above quotation receives from Mr. Spencer a very masterly and 
 interesting treatment in the first portion of the part entitled 
 "Morphological Development." Here are explained the diffe- 
 rentiations of structure which must ensue from differences in 
 morphological units, and from different modes of their aggre- 
 gation. Afterwards Mr. Spencer exhibits in great detail the 
 differentiations which must naturally ensue in organisms ac- 
 cording as they are similarly or differently exposed in their 
 parts to the action of the environment. This is accompanied 
 by an account of the manner in which changes of shape and 
 arrangement are affected by pressures and strains of various 
 characters, whether caused by gravitation, action of wind or 
 water, or contiguity of growth. As the study becomes more 
 advanced, and the structure of the plants and animals attains 
 greater complexity, the surrounding conditions produce still 
 greater variety. Thus abundant or diminished food-supply 
 
 * Biology, vol. ii. p. 8. 
 
 MR, SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 379 
 
 may play a part in morphological change, and the different 
 exposures of different parts in competitive growth may produce 
 great variety of development. 
 
 In all this morphological evolution, however, the prime fact 
 to be borne in mind is the internal power of growth. It is this 
 which does the work ; and all that can be said of the agencies 
 just referred to is that they possess the power of modifying the 
 action of that interior force. It is not suggested that the in- 
 terior forces are called into being by the external forces, but 
 only that their action is modified by them. The action of the 
 inner power is restrained for instance by gravitation, while, on 
 the other hand, its natural tendencies may be heightened by 
 the heat and light of the sun. It is therefore evident that the 
 main interest of the inquiry must be concentrated on these inner 
 formative powers, which, indeed, throws the inquiry back upon 
 the study of the origin of organisms. How comes it that such 
 an arrangement of inorganic molecules is attained as to form an 
 aggregate which expends energy for the purpose of securing and 
 assimilating energy, so as to prolong an existence which would 
 otherwise come to a speedy termination? And however much 
 we may be convinced of the fact of a gradual evolution, and 
 however much the stages of this evolution may be known or 
 reasoned out, the extent and beauty of the harmonies thus 
 brought under our notice should not cause us to overlook the 
 need^'for mastering this primary element of the problem. 
 
 ' (b.) The Morphological Development of Animals. 
 The study of the action of external agencies upon the morpho- 
 logical development of plants is comparatively simple. That of 
 animals is more complex. In the latter case, a new factor makes 
 
 its appearance. . . 
 
 " This new factor is Motion— motion of the organism in rela- 
 tion to surrounding objects, or of the parts of the organism m 
 relation to one another, or both. . . . What, among plants, is 
 an inappreciable cause of morphological differentiation, becomes, 
 among animals, the chief cause of differentiation." * 
 
 * Biology, vol. ii. p. i66. 
 
 f 
 
38o SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 We have to remark here the introduction of a new factor 
 "without any explanation of its appearance. We are elsewhere 
 told that the organs of locomotion are generated by the neces- 
 sity for seeking food when that food is not in perpetual conti- 
 guity, but is diffused in the neighbouring environment; and 
 hence they seem to have no explanation other than in the 
 hypothetical need for the continuance of existence. But granted 
 the capacity for motion on the part of animals, we can discern 
 the modifying eflfects which surrounding agencies would have 
 upon them. 
 
 " Animals that are rooted or otherwise fixed, of course pre- 
 sent traits of structure nearest akin to those we have been lately 
 studying. . . . But animals which move from place to place are 
 subject to an additional class of actions and reactions. These 
 actions and reactions affect them in various ways according to their 
 various modes of movement Let us glance at the several leading 
 relations between shape and motion which we may expect to find. 
 
 *' If an organism advances through a homogeneous medium 
 with one end always foremost, that end, being exposed to forces 
 unlike those to which the other end is exposed, may be expected 
 to become unlike it ; and supposing this to be the only constant 
 contrast of conditions, we may expect an equal distribution of 
 the parts round the axis of movement — a radial symmetry." 
 This instance is expanded, and leads up to a conclusion rea- 
 soned out d priori; after which Mr. Spencer passes on to a 
 consideration of the facts presented by science, in order to show 
 how this conclusion is confirmed ct posteriori. 
 
 Needless to say, this account is of the greatest interest, and 
 tends to confirm our belief in the gradual evolution of organised 
 beings. The main question, however, remains — Do we know 
 all the factors and understand the processes fully, so as to be 
 able to say that an explanation of them has been effected ? It 
 is true, we discern some of the conditions and some of the 
 factors concerned in this great history ; but however vast the 
 proportion of our attention that we concentrate upon them, and 
 however much we elaborate them in printed books, there are 
 some things which remain unexplainable, and some factors un- 
 known which are essential to our calculations. 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 381 
 
 (c.) Mr. Spencei^'s Exposition of Physiological Development 
 
 Let us take for granted the fact of the existence of organisms, 
 let us take for granted, too, the power of motion possessed by 
 animals, and let us leave out of consideration altogether the 
 factor of Feeling. Then the task of accounting for physio- 
 logical development as presented to us by Mr. Spencer involves 
 the study of the manner in which previously existing organisms 
 must have been modified by alterations in their relation to the 
 
 environment. • , xi, 4. 4.1, 
 
 This account is very able, and it cannot be denied that the 
 proof of gradual evolution and the impossibility of finding lines 
 of demarcation between various developments of a particular 
 class is so well set forth that the representation carries with it 
 the force of conviction. But it is a conviction wrought in our 
 minds by inductive evidences rather than by a priori reason- 
 incr For instance, the account given by Mr. Spencer of the 
 te^umentary appendages shows very clearly the unity of nature 
 be°tween hair, feathers, scales, and the other clothing of animals, 
 to-ether with the horny appendages ; from which can be recog- 
 nised the fact of their development from a common origin. 
 But the account of their origin is quite hypothetical Having 
 arrived at a stage of development when the organism is pos- 
 sessed of a skin— a skin subject to waste and possessing the 
 powet of repair— we have to suppose the growth and casting 
 off of horny cells all over the skin in general. Next, we have 
 to imagine a small pit formed in that skin, or rather a number 
 of small pits. Then from the larger area of the surface of 
 the pits compared with the area of the apertures thei-e is a 
 proportionately increased production of homy cells, which from 
 the limited area of the cavity are condensed or integrated into 
 rudimentary hairs.* Thus established, it is easy to work out 
 the process of their extrusion beyond the surface of the skin 
 and their subsequent modification into the great variety of 
 forms mentioned above. 
 
 • Biology, vol. ii. p. 30^- 
 
 ■ -J 
 
382 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 We have selected this case because it takes us back to the 
 initial physiological development presented by Mr. Spencer in 
 the differentiations between the outer and inner tissues. We 
 are reminded * that this is a differentiation common also to inor- 
 ganic masses whose outer parts are differentiated from the inner 
 by oxidisation, by drying, and by the action of light, moisture, 
 or frost. In the same manner an originally homogeneous por- 
 tion of protoplasm will acquire a skin. Evidently this skin is 
 formed of the substance of the protoplasm, and is hardened, not 
 for the purpose of protection, but as the direct and simple effect 
 of the action of the environment Here ought to be introduced 
 the ^ priori explanation of the fact of waste and repair. Inor- 
 ganic surfaces are not subject to waste; and should abrasion 
 take place, there will be renewed action of the environment upon 
 the exposed surface, with resulting similarity. If it is argued 
 that the case of an organism is identical in principle, there is 
 nothing more to be said. But if it is advanced that there is a 
 natural waste which is supplied from the organism itself, or that 
 the abraded surface is re-formed by the action of the orf^anism 
 then we are introduced to a process which finds no analogue in 
 the inorganic world, not even in the self-repair of a crystal. It 
 is evident, however, that in order to account for the various 
 clothing and appendages of animals we require to have a con- 
 tinuous expenditure of energy and a continuous repair of waste. 
 It is not our intention to discuss this question at present ; we 
 only wish to show how the notion of the expenditure of energy 
 and the necessity for fresh assimilations of energy are the funda- 
 mental fact and the fundamental difficulty of Biology. 
 
 It follows that, if this fundamental principle be taken for 
 granted, as in the above instance, vast progress can be made even 
 in ct priori reconstruction ; while the principle materially assists 
 us in appreciating the facts of gradual change brought under 
 our notice in our inductive studies. 
 
 As indicated in our notice of " Morphological Development," 
 the main process is one of inner growth modified by external 
 influences. The inner forces are not called forth in response to 
 
 * Biology, vol ii. p. 226. 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 383 
 
 the action of the environment, but in their tumultuous growth 
 are cabined, cribbed, and confined by the restraints of the oppos- 
 ing environment ; or on the other hand, should the environment 
 be favourable, then the inner forces make use of it for the con- 
 tinuance of the organism's existence. 
 
 The development of the organs of sense is by means of diffe- 
 rentiations of the outer tissues. This is a truth arrived at by 
 inductions from various sources.* The question is whether 
 it can be deduced d priori from a consideration of the rela- 
 tions between a moving equilibrium of organic matter and the 
 surrounding light, aerial vibrations, and floating particles of 
 matter 1 Mr. Spencer thinks that possibly light may have aided 
 in setting up certain modifications by which the nervous parts 
 of the visual mechanism are formed, and that the complexities 
 of the sensory organs are thus explicable. These must have 
 arisen by the natural selection of favourable variations. 
 
 The development of the means of locomotion Mr. Spencer does 
 not mention. Locomotive organs are evidently produced by 
 the action of the inner forces in seeking food, aided by the sub- 
 sequent necessity of escape from enemies ; and they are not 
 a priori deducible from the action of the environment. In the 
 chapter on the "General Shapes of Animals" in the preceding 
 part, Mr. Spencer has shown how - the one ultimate principle 
 that in any organism equal amounts of growth take place in 
 those directions in which the incident forces are equal serves 
 as a 'key to the phenomena of morphological differentiation. 
 By it we are furnished with interpretations of those likenesses 
 and unlikenesses of parts, which are exhibited in the several 
 kinds of symmetry; and . . . we are enabled to comprehend, 
 in a general way, the actions by which animals have been 
 moulded into the shapes they possess." t . 
 
 But this view is subordinate to the question concerning the 
 origination of that habitual motion which constitutes an or- 
 ganism, of the consequent necessity for repair of waste, and of 
 
 the origin of locomotion. . ^t. t 
 
 In the chapter treating of the " Differentiations of the Inner 
 
 * Biology, vol. ii. p. 3^3* 
 
 t Ibid., p. 189. 
 
384 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Tissues of Animals," we find the same course pursued. The 
 study is mainly an inductive one, with hypothetical explanations 
 of differentiation and development from a common origin, — 
 certain essential primary stages in the evolution of an organism 
 being taken for granted. The first class of developments com- 
 prises those which take their origin from a simple intestinal 
 canal. Out of this, by varied causes, arise differentiations in the 
 successive parts of the canal. Firstly, the different conditions 
 of the food in its passage produce different states, and finally 
 different arrangements of its parts. Hence originated the sto- 
 mach with its secreting juices. Hence also can be explained 
 the gizzard, the arrangements for the storage of food by rumi- 
 nants, and the crop possessed by some birds. The liver, the 
 pancreas, and various smaller glands are not to be accounted 
 for in the same way, but by the segregation which takes place 
 amongst mixed colloids and crystalloids even in inorganic 
 mixtures, the tissues giving ready entrance to the substances 
 that decompose them and ready exit to the substances into 
 which they are decomposed. The question is one as to the 
 excretion of waste and the specialisation of organs for that 
 purpose. In some cases, this is determined by the mechanical 
 actions of organisms ; in others, by facilities for escape. In the 
 case of the liver, the waste products of which are utilised, 
 " natural selection " will determine the most beneficial spot. 
 
 The respiratory system is one of the means by which an 
 animal organism is supplied with some of the necessary con- 
 stituents for prolonged action. Mr. Spencer traces its origin 
 inductively to a differentiation in the alimentary canal. How is 
 this differentiation deductively established ? By the hypothesis 
 of fish swallowing air-bubbles, and the consequent change in 
 the forces acting upon the alimentary canal causing special 
 differentiations to suit that new circumstance. The habit of 
 taking in air-bubbles is likely to become established, and the 
 organs for utilising them developed. The relative effects of 
 direct and indirect equilibration in producing this further 
 heterogeneity must, as in many other cases, remain undecided. 
 
 Mr. Spencer next proceeds to consider the differentiations 
 that take place in those truly inner tissues which lie between 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 385 
 
 the external tegumentary system, exposed to the action of 
 external objects, and the internal tegumentary system, exposed 
 to the action of food. The first set of tissues to come under 
 notice is the vascular system. This is found to arise primarily 
 from the osmotic action which must go on between two dis- 
 similar fluids separated by an intermediate diaphragm. The 
 osmotic action, however, is not a simple one terminating in a 
 state of equal distribution ; but since there is an abstraction 
 of nutritive liquid either for growth or function, more nutri- 
 tive liquid will be forced towards the point of utilisation, 
 which is the direction of least resistance. This osmose is a 
 cause of redistribution which is at work even before any central 
 organ of circulation exists. Changes of internal pressure will 
 tend to increase the circulation. Other causes assist those 
 differentiations which eventuate in the complicated vascular 
 system as we now know it in the higher organisms. 
 
 The osseous structure is determined by the strains to which 
 the body is subject in the mutual actions of the environment 
 and the moving organism. These strains cause hardening in 
 some of the gelatinous constituents ; such constituents harden 
 into cartilage, which again in the parts most exposed to strains 
 or pressures harden into bone. The process is completed by 
 the deposit of some of the calcareous elements contained in 
 the food ; and thereafter the problem is merely one dependent 
 upon the action of waste and repair, and the modifications due 
 to increments of repair, wrought by excessive actions in certain 
 directions, on the one hand, and deficiencies of repair, occasioned 
 by the non-exercise of other parts, on the other hand. The 
 osseous structure is due mainly to direct equilibration of a 
 mechanical character, although some of its parts appear rather 
 to be due to indirect equilibration. 
 
 The question as to the probable origin of nerves and the 
 cerebral system is treated of by Mr. Spencer both in the " Psy- 
 chology " and in the " Biology." In the former our attention 
 is primarily directed to the abstract laws of dynamics set forth 
 in " First Principles," which are supposed to rule the formation 
 of the nervous system. 
 
 " In ' First Principles,' Part II., chap. 9, we found that in 
 
 2 B 
 
386 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 all cases * motion * follows the line of greatest traction, or the 
 line of least resistance, or the resultant of the two." We also 
 saw " that motion once set up along any line becomes itself a 
 cause of subsequent motion along that line, equally when the 
 motion is that of matter tlirough space, that of matter through 
 matter, and that of molecular undulations through an aggregate 
 of molecules." 
 
 As this is to be our instrument in reconstructing the Genesis 
 of Nerves, wherewith goes the concomitant of Mind, it is 
 essential that we should clearly understand the materials with 
 which we have to deal, and the laws of Motion which afifect 
 them. " Motion follows the line," &c. ; of course this means 
 that Matter in motion or the motion of Matter *' follows," &c. ; 
 forjwe cannot dissociate Motion from Matter. Either Matter 
 means, firstly, combinations of ultimate units of attraction and 
 repulsion, each aggregate and combination of aggregates having 
 properties deducible from the shapes, sizes, modes, and rates of 
 motion of its constituents, and their modes of combination. Or 
 else, secondly, Matter means the seventy so-called elements as 
 known by us. With these meanings, the first enunciated prin- 
 ciple can be accepted. 
 
 We now come to the principle " that motion once set up 
 along any line becomes itself a cause of subsequent motion 
 along that line" — a proposition which, to say the least, is 
 ambiguous. Let us refer to Mr. Spencer's own statement in 
 " First Principles." It is all contained in one short paragraph 
 on p. 226. 
 
 " Movement set up in any direction is itself a cause of 
 further movement in that direction, since it is the embodiment 
 of a surplus force in that direction" 
 
 Here we have an assertion and the reason for that assertion. 
 The reason is founded on the conception or the fact of there being 
 such things as " surplus forces." Mr. Spencer's system of Philo- 
 sophy, founded as it is upon Force, is deficient in not having a 
 chapter *' On Abstract Laws of Force and their Interrelations." 
 If we had this, we could tell what was meant by " a surplus force." 
 Failing it, we must guess. We suppose that the changes of the 
 cosmos, being incidents in a process of equilibration, are such by 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 387 
 
 virtue of the imparting by some matter to other matter of motion 
 when the former has it in excess of the latter, so as to establish 
 an equality between the two, much as water finds its level. 
 In this case the excess of the motion in the former over the 
 average of the two would be called surplus motion or surplus 
 force. Is this what Mr. Spencer means 1 When he speaks of 
 " surplus force " we presume he does not speak of force pure 
 and simple, which we do not know, but of some manifestation 
 of it which we do know. Yet .we are not able to understand 
 what state of things other than this Mr. Spencer refers to 
 when he speaks of " surplus force " and " surplus motion." 
 
 Let us take the case of steam out of the spout of a kettle, or 
 what is much the same thing, the steam waste-pipe from an 
 engine. The surplus force or motion is shot forth into the still 
 air— is this to be called " the embodiment " of a surplus force 
 " in that direction 1 " If the force or motion of the steam and 
 air is in a given direction, is the continuance of the force or 
 motion in that direction, on account of the continuance of the 
 conditions, an embodiment of surplus force in that direction 1 
 We are unable to argue the question in the abstract and 
 without recourse to concrete instances. Here Mr. Spencer 
 advances as the reason why movement once set up in any 
 direction becomes itself the cause of further movement in 
 that direction, " because it is the embodiment of a surplus foitie 
 in that direction." The fact is, Mr. Spencer does mean some- 
 thing, accurate, but not coming into contact with actual dis- 
 cussion, his statement is not clarified by criticism. Absorbed 
 in his own studies, and expressing himself by his own phrase- 
 ology, he does not realise the difficulty which other people 
 have 'in understanding him, with the momentous consequence 
 that the greatest of all scientific questions, namely, that as 
 to the genesis of Mind, is left in doubt owing to the obscurities 
 
 of half a page of his book. 
 
 Mr. Spencer proceeds to say that this law holds good of the 
 transit of Matter through space. We suppose Mr. Spencer 
 refers to interstellar space. This implies that if a body was 
 projected in a certain direction, then a similar one, projected 
 in a like manner, would take the same direction. This, no 
 
388 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 doubt, would be the case from the parity of conditions ; but 
 it is not to be supposed that the first would compel a second 
 mass to follow it in the same direction. For how would it be 
 if the second mass were projected at an angle from the course 
 of the first 1 Would the previous event exercise any influence 
 upon the succeeding one 'i Certainly not. Mr. Spencer's illus- 
 tration merely exhibits the law of inertia, and it amounts to 
 this : — Motion in any direction is a cause of its own continuance. 
 The motion of the earth round the sun one day is a cause of 
 its continuing its journey the next, and its circuit one year is 
 the result of its previous circuit. Its revolution upon its axis 
 is caused by previous revolutions. 
 
 The next illustration is the transit of matter through matter. 
 Let us take the example given. " Any breach made by one 
 solid through another, or any channel formed by a fluid through 
 a solid, becomes a route along which, other things equal, sub- 
 sequent movements of like nature take place." Notice here 
 that Mr. Spencer says the subsequent movements " take place," 
 and not that they are caused by the previous movements. In 
 fact, he says that other things must be equal, ?.e., that the causes 
 of the first movement must be present to ensure the like result 
 in the second, and the conclusion is that the repetition of 
 movements in a given direction requires the same set of causes 
 as produced the movement in the first instance, and not that 
 *• motion once set up along any line becomes itself a cause of 
 subsequent motion along that line." 
 
 We have next the case of " molecular undulations through 
 an af^frref^ate of molecules." We do not see that this case 
 
 DO O 
 
 differs in the least from the flow of water through accustomed 
 channels. We may find that certain vibrations are hindered 
 in their passage through a body by the irregular constitution 
 of that body, and they may be able by their own motions to 
 effect such a readjustment of the molecular condition of that 
 body as to facilitate the transmission of subsequent vibrations. 
 Thus the conditions under which future movements will take 
 place are changed, and the facilities for their transmission im- 
 proved, if they should come, but the new arrangement certainly 
 does not cause them. The same causes which determined the 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 389 
 
 first determine the second. Indeed, we know very little about 
 the passage of undulatory motion. 
 
 The only illustration in the non-biological world which Mr. 
 Spencer can find to illustrate his meaning is drawn, not from 
 cases of molecular motion, but from the science of hydro- 
 dynamics, and will be found illusory. The passage of water 
 down a hillside or through almost level country is accompanied 
 by a process of washing away the portions of the ground in 
 the lower levels along which the water pursues its way, in 
 obedience to the law that motion takes the line of greatest 
 traction and least resistance. In pursuance of the same law a 
 second sheet of water will follow the same course, and with 
 greater facility, because of the previous removal of obstructions. 
 But this is not a parallel case at all with the propagation of 
 undulatory motions through a mass of organisable protoplasm. 
 The action of the water is disintegrative ; the action of the 
 latter is supposed to be formative. The former removes ob- 
 structions by means of its mechanical momentum ; the latter is 
 supposed to place molecules in lines— a process in which no 
 doubt the polarities of the molecules play a part-a process 
 which might perhaps more fitly be placed under the class 
 which Mr. Spencer calls " Segregation." 
 
 Mr. Spencer would undoubtedly draw a parallel between the 
 formation of a river system and the formation of a nervous system 
 —between a disintegi-ative system and a formative system. But 
 we cannot admit the analogy, more particularly when we take 
 into account the fact that nervous systems are double, having 
 both a system for the reception of motion and a system for the 
 expenditure of energy, the origin and development of which Mr. 
 Spencer does not sufficiently explain. 
 
 Let us now summarise the instances that have been adduced. 
 We have seen that the passage of a solid through a solid does 
 not cause or set up movement in a similar direction ; we have 
 seen that the movement of bodies through space does not cause 
 movement in the same direction ; we have seen that the move- 
 ment of gases through gases does not cause movement in the 
 same direction. The only valid instance affording any pre- 
 sumption in favour of the supposed law is the flow of water 
 
;88 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 doubt, would be the case from the parity of conditions ; but 
 it is not to be supposed that the first would compel a second 
 mass to follow it in the same direction. For how would it be 
 if the second mass were projected at an angle from the course 
 of the first 1 Would the previous event exercise any influence 
 upon the succeeding one 1 Certainly not Mr. Spencer's illus- 
 tration merely exhibits the law of inertia, and it amounts to 
 this : — Motion in any direction is a cause of its own continuance. 
 The motion of the earth round the sun one day is a cause of 
 its continuing its journey the next, and its circuit one year is 
 the result of its previous circuit. Its revolution upon its axis 
 is caused by previous revolutions. 
 
 The next illustration is the transit of matter through matter. 
 Let us take the example given. " Any breach made by one 
 solid through another, or any channel formed by a fluid through 
 a solid, becomes a route along which, other things equal, sub- 
 sequent movements of like nature take place." Notice here 
 that Mr. Spencer says the subsequent movements " take place," 
 and not that they are caused by the previous movements. In 
 fact, he says that other things must be equal, i.e., that the causes 
 of the first movement must be present to ensure the like result 
 in the second, and the conclusion is that the repetition of 
 movements in a given direction requires the same set of causes 
 as produced the movement in the first instance, and not that 
 *• motion once set up along any line becomes itself a cause of 
 subsequent motion along that line." 
 
 We have next the case of " molecular undulations through 
 an afTcrre^ate of molecules." We do not see that tliis case 
 differs in the least from the flow of water through accustomed 
 channels. We may find that certain vibrations are hindered 
 in their passage through a body by the irregular constitution 
 of that body, and they may be able by their own motions to 
 effect such a readjustment of the molecular condition of that 
 body as to facilitate the transmission of subsequent vibrations. 
 Thus the conditions under which future movements wiU take 
 place are changed, and the facilities for their transmission im- 
 proved, if they should come, but the new arrangement certainly 
 does not cause them. The same causes which determined the 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 389 
 
 first determine the second. Indeed, we know very little about 
 the passage of undulatory motion. 
 
 The only illustration in the non-biological world which Mr. 
 Spencer can find to illustrate his meaning is drawn, not from 
 cases of molecular motion, but from the science of hydro- 
 dynamics, and will be found illusory. The passage of water 
 down a hillside or through almost level country is accompanied 
 by a process of washing away the portions of the ground in 
 the lower levels along which the water pursues its way, in 
 obedience to the law that motion takes the line of greatest 
 traction and least resistance. In pursuance of the same law a 
 second sheet of water will follow the same course, and with 
 greater facility, because of the previous removal of obstructions. 
 But this is not a parallel case at aU with the propagation of 
 undulatory motions through a mass of organisable protoplasm. 
 The action of the water is disintegrative ; the action of the 
 latter is supposed to be formative. The former removes ob- 
 structions by means of its mechanical momentum ; the latter is 
 supposed to place molecules in lines— a process in which no 
 doubt the polarities of the molecules play a part— a process 
 which might perhaps more fitly be placed under the class 
 which Mr. Spencer calls " Segregation." 
 
 Mr. Spencer would undoubtedly draw a parallel between the 
 formation of a river system and the formation of a nervous system 
 —between a disintegrative system and a formative system. But 
 we cannot admit the analogy, more particularly when we take 
 into account the fact that nervous systems are double, having 
 both a system for the reception of motion and a system for the 
 expenditure of energy, the origin and development of which Mr. 
 Spencer does not sufficiently explain. 
 
 Let us now summarise the instances that have been adduced. 
 We have seen that the passage of a solid through a solid does 
 not cause or set up movement in a similar direction ; we have 
 seen that the movement of bodies through space does not cause 
 movement in the same direction ; we have seen that the move- 
 ment of gases through gases does not cause movement in the 
 same direction. The only valid instance affording any pre- 
 sumption in favour of the supposed law is the flow of water 
 
390 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 down declivities to its level, by means of channels previously 
 formed, thus obeying the law of movement in the line of the 
 greatest traction and of least resistance. But we do not find 
 that movement set up. 
 
 Having thus discussed the preliminaries, let us now approach 
 • the practical problem, as dealt with by Mr. Spencer. 
 
 We find the examination of Mr. Spencer's explanation of 
 the genesis of nervous systems more difficult than anything we 
 have yet undertaken, on account of the obscure and compli- 
 cated lines of thought pursued. The first difficulty arises from 
 the circumstance that he does not define his starting-point. It 
 would appear from p. 512 of the "Psychology" that we have 
 to start from an '* undifferentiated organism." We do not under- 
 stand how there can be such a thing as an " undiffijrentiated 
 organism;" for it is a contradiction in terms. And next we are 
 referred to " a living animal " and an " organism " which pos- 
 sesses different parts. This is begging the question. 
 
 We find, however, a better and clearer explanation in § 302 
 of the "Biology," which is really very plausible. It is too 
 concise to summarise and too long to quote. We must ask the 
 student to refer to it himself. It amounts to this ; in a mass 
 composed of various kinds of protoplasmic molecules, an inci- 
 dent force impinging upon it at any point will cause mole- 
 cular change, which change will propagate itself continuously 
 in suitable molecules, and thus form a continuous line of similar 
 molecules, changed and placed by the motion in segregated order, 
 which constitute the rudiments of a nerve. The obscure part 
 of the statement is that the incident force is not named. We pre- 
 sume it must not be a general force equally distributed over the 
 surface, such as heat or light, but a force incident upon some 
 particular point, such as a mechanical strain, or a ray of light 
 or heat falling upon a point, or a vibratory motion, or something 
 else of a local nature. 
 
 It is quite possible to imagine that a mechanical arrangement 
 of differentiated molecules in continuous lines is a conceivable 
 occurrence in a mass of protoplasm under the action of external 
 forces such as heat, light, and mechanical motion, simultaneously 
 with the segregation of other kinds of protoplasmic molecules. 
 
 MR, SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 391 
 
 It is possible to imagine such a result, although we may 
 not be able to work it out a priori in all its complications. 
 But when it is complete it is but a mechanical arrangement. 
 Mr. Spencer, however, goes beyond this, and takes one step 
 which appears quite unwarranted by the terms of the problem, 
 
 namely — . , , . j c 
 
 " Every repetition will help to increase, to integrate, to detine 
 more completely, the course of the escaping molecular motion- 
 extending its remoter part, while it makes its nearer part more 
 permeable-will help, that is, to form a line of .discharge, a 
 line for conducting impressions, a nerve." * 
 
 The unwarranted step is to call the incident force " a stimu- 
 lus," and the line of molecules, "a line for conducting im- 
 pressions," instead of a line for the conduction of motion Ihis 
 is followed up in the succeeding section by speaking of irrita- 
 bility as a property of protoplasm, and by inference a property 
 of the mechanical molecules arranged in a line. 
 
 We must ask here if this stimulating property, this quality 
 of irritabUity, this power of transmitting "impressions is 
 objective language ; and if so, is it language which could up 
 to this point be applied to any of the combinations of Matter 
 and Motion, or to the ultimate units out of which aU molecules 
 are built 1 Or does this mark the transition of the objective 
 into the subjective 1 If so, it would seem to imply that the 
 subjective is not only dependent but consequent upon a certain 
 combination of the objective when molecules are formed in 
 lines by incident motion, and in an aggregate are variously 
 changed according to the varieties of incident motions Here- 
 upon would arise irritability, impressions, feelings, and afterwards 
 an organised consciousness. Both "irritability" and "sensi- 
 tiveness " have definite objective meanings, but inasmuch as 
 thev have subjective connotations also, it is necessary in the 
 study of a physical process to restrain their meaning to the 
 mechanical limits of the problem, lest inadvertently the verbal 
 Kuise should cover an undetected transition of thought answer- 
 ing to an explanation of the origin of the subjective. 
 
 • Biology, vol. ii. P- 35'- 
 
I 
 
 392 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 " From beginning to end, therefore, the development of nerve 
 results from the passage of motion along the line of least resist- 
 ance, and the reduction of it to a line of less and less resistance 
 continually. The first opening of a route along which equili- 
 brium is restored between a place where molecular motion is 
 in excess and a place where it is in defect, comes within this 
 formula." 
 
 We have no room to consider the evolution of ganglia, 
 the storage of nervous force, and the development of efferent 
 lines for its discharge, nor for the study of the development 
 of the directive machinery of the nervous system. We only 
 observe that the evolution is accomplished by a process with 
 which feelings and consciousness have nothing to do ; and if 
 it takes place at all as described, it is effected upon purely 
 mechanical and physical principles. 
 
 Our next inquiry concerns the development of muscular tissue. 
 Contractility as well as irritability is a property of protoplasm or 
 sarcode, and it is not improbably due to isomeric change in one 
 of its component colloids. But the questiop remains, " What 
 causes the specialisation of contractile substance ? What causes 
 the growth of colloid masses which monopolise this contractility, 
 and leave kindred colloids to monopolise other properties ? Has 
 natural selection gradually localised and increased the primordial 
 muscular substance 1 or has the frequent recurrence of irritations 
 and consequent contractions at particular parts done it ? We 
 have, I think, reason to conclude that direct equilibration rather 
 than indirect equilibration has been chiefly operative. The 
 reasoning that was used in the case of nerve applies equally in 
 the case of muscle. A portion of undifferentiated tissue con- 
 taining a predominance of the colloid that contracts in changing, 
 will, during each change, tend to form new molecules of its own 
 type from the other colloids diffused through it: the tendency 
 of these entangled colloids to fall into unity with those around 
 them, will be aided by every shock of isomeric transformation. 
 Hence, repeated contractions will further the growth of the con- 
 tracting mass, and advance its differentiation and integration." * 
 
 * Biology, vol. ii. p. 354. 
 
 MR. SPENCER'S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 393 
 
 To conclude, Mr. Spencer resumes the study of the problem 
 of the repair and growth of the differentiated tissues. 
 
 « When treating inductively of that restoration which takes 
 place in worn organs, it was admitted that little in the way of 
 deductive interpretation is apparent— nothing beyond the har- 
 mony between the facts and the general principle of segregation." 
 However, Mr. Spencer is able to point out relations and 
 conditions of osmotic exchange, which render it clear that the 
 amount of exchange must be proportionate to the amount of 
 consumption and decomposition; so that the materials for 
 consumption and reintegration of tissue must be supplied in 
 proportion to the demand. To this must be added the cir- 
 cumstance of osmotic distension, by which the nutritive fluid 
 is thrust to the parts where there is the greatest escape for it 
 — i.e., to the parts in which it is absorbed by local expenditure 
 
 of energy. , 
 
 Although this hypothesis is a reasonable one so far as tne 
 operations of existing organisms are concerned, we fail to see 
 the origin of such a self-maintaining process in any combination 
 of inorganic molecules ; and the theory therefore seems to lack 
 deductive warrant. The originally homogeneous portio. of 
 protoplasm is merely due to segregation, and the causes which 
 originated it would also naturally lead it to retain its aggregation 
 intact. We are not to suppose that it immediately commences 
 to expend energy in order to retain its aggregation, and that the 
 energy so expended has to be replaced. If its outer surface has 
 become differentiated from its inner, we do not see any necessity 
 for the process of osmose : nor do we see the applicabihty of 
 the theory of repair when there is no expenditure of energy. 
 
 We have thus shortly si^mmarised these important chapters 
 for the purpose of forming a judgment on the methods employed 
 and have come to the conclusion that they contain a system of 
 hypotheses suggested by the scientific inductions which lead us 
 to the conviction that all organisms have arisen by insensible 
 modifications from some simpler forms. These hypotheses are 
 all of a concrete character, and they are applied to some hypo- 
 thetical simple organism already possessing the essential charac- 
 teristic of animal life. It has the property of motion, which 
 
394 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 means the expenditure of energy, and implies the power of 
 seeking, or at any rate of assimilating fresh energy from its 
 environment for the purpose of self-sustenance. It exhibits 
 the phenomena of waste and repair. All the developments are 
 effected by means of these original powers of the organism ; and 
 Mr. Spencer's system is essentially one relating not to the origin 
 but to the development of organisms. And seeing that it is 
 deficient through this immense initial hiatus, it is merely Mr. 
 Darwin's great work put into another form. It is not a system 
 going behind that work and giving to it an explanatory or de- 
 ductive connection with the general order of physical sequences. 
 It is merely commensurate with Mr. Darwin's work, and fails 
 of the attempted extension into antecedent histories. 
 
 (d.) How Organic Development is Affiliated upon Evolution 
 
 in General. 
 
 The affiliation of morphological and physiological develop- 
 ment upon Evolution in general must be managed by proving 
 their conformity with "First Principles." It is asserted* that this 
 can be done in terms of the redistribution of matter and motion. 
 This is evidently a reference to the Formula of Evolution. On 
 this we have to remark, that the terms matter and motion cannot 
 be regarded as mere symbols like the symbols x and ?/, as asserted 
 by Mr. Spencer in his reply to our former criticism. They must 
 be held to refer to the chemical substances adduced as factors 
 in the early chapters of the " Biology," namely, oxygen, nitro- 
 gen, carbon, hydrogen, &c., in relation with various substances 
 and motions of their environment. It is worthy of remark that 
 no reference is made anywhere to the concomitance between 
 integrations of matter and dissipations of motion, thus showing 
 the inutility of the Formula of Evolution for any practical ex- 
 planations. However, the harmony with " First Principles " is 
 exhibited in other ways. 
 
 The instability of the homogeneous is endlessly exemplified 
 in the changes wrought upon the homogeneous by incident 
 forces. The multiplication of effects has also been exhibited, 
 
 * Biology, voL ii. p. 377. 
 
 BIOLOGY AND ^^ FIRST PRINCIPLES:' 395 
 
 and we have been given innumerable cases of equilibration. 
 These equilibrations have in many cases been due to the simple 
 and direct operation of natural chemical combinations and phy- 
 sical relations. All the biological changes we have contemplated 
 are but incidents in a progressing equilibration. 
 
 With respect to this point, however, we have to raise the 
 inquiry previously suggested-Does Mr. Spencer mean the 
 mechanical equilibration suggested by implication m the For- 
 mula of Evolution-or, again, a physical equilibration of energies 
 on the way to an universal state of dissipation or degradation 
 energy ? Or does he only mean by equilibration an equivalent 
 to gfneral causation regarded quantitatively? In this latter 
 aspect we are inclined to regard Mr. Spencers use of the term 
 If it has a more limited meaning, it is insufficient for an 
 explanation of Biology ; but if it is used in this larger sense, 
 it is too vague for scientific purposes. , , . , . «,,. ,. „ 
 
 Mr. Spencer concludes the summary of biologic affiliation 
 by terming the completed organism «' a moving equilibrium 
 This, however, is evidently but a name descriptive of the re- 
 suits of biologic evolution-that is to say, of the direct and 
 indirect equilibrations of the chemical components with their 
 physical surroundings-and not a name for the cause of such 
 
 '^Hethen winds up with the usual reference to the Persistence 
 
 ° " In'il which universal laws, wo find ourselves again brought 
 down to the Persistence of Force, as the deepest knowable 
 cause of those modificiltions which constitute Ptjs.o ogic 
 development ; as it is the deepest knowable cause of all other 
 
 '^IWstapossible to follow this process of reasoning, more 
 particularly'if Force is merely a symbol. We can only argue 
 Lt if FoL manifests itself in modes, then fen one mod 
 changes it must be into another mode. But why the first 
 shoufd change, and what are the conditions of its change can- 
 not be dedu^ei <i priori ; it can only be understood a poster^or^ 
 
 * Biology, vol. ii. p. 3^7- 
 
396 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 from inductive studies. The warrant for the perpetual lapse of 
 the homogeneous (?) into the heterogeneous, for the multiplica- 
 tion of effects, for segregation, for equilibration of both orders, 
 lies in experience, — in the very experience of which they are 
 supposed to be the ^ priori explanations. 
 
 § 1 2. Indirect Equilibration. 
 
 It must be remembered that the line of thought we are now 
 following is in pursuance of an examination into the argument 
 set forth in the latter portion of Part III. in the first volume, 
 with regard to the question ** How is organic evolution caused ? " 
 In answer to this question we first of all considered rather elabo- 
 rately what was meant by equilibration, and more particularly 
 by the special laws of biological equilibration. In the preceding 
 section we have shortly reviewed the more detailed account of 
 morphological and physiological development presented to us in 
 voL ii. so far as the external factors are concerned. We now 
 propose returning to the principal course of the argument in 
 vol. i. by considering the chapter on "Indirect Equilibration," 
 as preliminary to a study of the operation of the internal factors 
 given in the same account of morphological and physiological 
 development. 
 
 The chapter on " Direct Equilibration " suggested certain ex- 
 planations as due to this process ; but it was there stated that 
 many biological developments were not so explicable ; and these 
 were relegated to consideration under the head of indirect equi- 
 libration. Among them were defensive appliances, respecting 
 which Mr. Spencer says — 
 
 " These defensive appliances, though they aid in maintaining 
 the balance between inner and outer actions, cannot have been 
 directly called forth by the outer actions which they serve to 
 neutralise ; for these outer actions do not continuously affect 
 the functions of the plant even in a general way, still less 
 in the special way required . . . since the individuals 
 devoured could not bequeath changes of structure, even were the 
 actions of a kind to produce them ; and since the individuals 
 
 INDIRECT EQUILIBRATION. 
 
 397 
 
 that perpetuated themselves, would be those on which the new 
 incident force had not fallen." * , ^. * 
 
 Another class of organs similarly circumstanced are those of 
 reproduction.+ A third class consists of the precautionary 
 arrangements for the protection of embryos and seed-vessels, an 
 instance of which is adduced by Mr. Spencer J in the case of 
 the secretion of an egg-shell round the substance of an egg 
 in the oviduct of a bird,-a fact quite inexplicable as a con- 
 sequence of some functionally wrought modification of structure, 
 immediately caused by external conditions. 
 
 There are other peculiarities which again cannot be accounted 
 for by direct equilibration, such as the lengthening of bones, as 
 in the elongation of the metatarsals in wading birds.§ 
 
 " Hence there must be at work some other process, which 
 equilibrates the actions of organisms with the actions they are 
 
 exposed to Besides direct equilibration, therefore, there 
 
 must be indirect equilibration." || 
 
 The first of these causes, as given in the chapter now under 
 study, is "the survival of the fittest." Even in a race con- 
 sidered as a whole, since its various ancestors must have been 
 exposed to slightly differing conditions, some differences must 
 exL in relative proportions of different functions: and in the 
 struc^ele for life those individuals which have been most fitted 
 to the conditions of existence will survive and propagate- 
 producincr a continual tendency in the direction of greater 
 correspondence to the permanent conditions. This is the same 
 principle as that to which Mr. Darwin has given the name of 
 " natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the 
 stru-le for life." The point to which Mr. Spencer would call 
 attention is that by means of this principle, adaptations may 
 not only be maintained but even produ^ed^ and he quotes 
 this as one of Mr. Darwin's greatest discoveries. 
 
 The instances given by Mr. Spencer as lUustrations of thi 
 truth are, firstly, "A soil possessing some ingredient in unusual 
 quantity, may supply to a plant an excess of the matter required 
 
 • Biology, vol. i. p. 438. .^ + ^'^'^ ^'^f' ^ ^^, 
 
 J Ibid., p. 440. § Ibid., p. 441. II Ibid., p. 442. f Ibid., p. 445. 
 
398 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 for a certain class of its tissues; and may cause all' the parts 
 formed of such tissues to be abnormally developed." This is 
 a case of direct equilibration : but the consequences of such 
 development in the individuals of a species might be such as 
 to secure them some advantage of propagation or otherwise in 
 the struggle for life, whereby the new type of the race becomes 
 established and the old type is crushed out of existence alto- 
 gether. 
 
 In a similar manner Mr. Spencer thinks that the thick 
 coverings of the mollusc or the tortoise might have been pro- 
 duced and established. " Thus, too, is it with the production 
 of colours in birds and in insects ; the formation of odoriferous 
 glands in mammals ; the growth of such excrescences as those 
 of the camel. Thus, in short, is it with all those organs of 
 animals which do not play active parts in the compound rhythms 
 of their functions." * 
 
 A second class of indirect equilibrations consists in the changes 
 brought about by the use and disuse of parts,! and the alterations 
 initiated by such changes of habit upon the rest of the organism. 
 Following upon this comes natural selection, which presupposes 
 that some of these changes may give the possessor an extra 
 chance of life. The acquired change will thus be transmitted 
 to posterity, t although it is not to be supposed that the indivi- 
 dual peculiarity is likely to be further developed by this means. 
 
 It can scarcely be claimed that the classes of development 
 reserved from the preceding chapter have been satisfactorily 
 accounted for in this. The protective appliances have been 
 partially considered ; the organs of reproduction have scarcely 
 been noticed ; the precautionary arrangements for the protection 
 of the embryo and seed vessel have been very inadequately con- 
 sidered; and the elongation of bones has not been noticed at all. 
 
 Nevertheless, sufficient has been advanced to show us what 
 is meant by Indirect Equilibration. Taking the term equilibra- 
 tion as merely a general name indicative of the interrelations 
 of various substances and motions, we can well understand 
 that as regards the relations of those aggregates which we call 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 448. f Ibid., p. 449. 
 
 * Ibid, p. 454. 
 
 INDIRECT EQUILIBRATION. 
 
 399 
 
 organisms there wiU have been formed some of a very complicated 
 character ; and under the influence of varying incident forces 
 the consequences of some of these incident forces upon the 
 or-anism will be very remote. These remote effects not being 
 the immediate and direct results, are-if we may use such a 
 phrase to indicate the relations of changes— indirect equilibra- 
 tions although the value of such exegesis must lie more in the 
 proper understanding of the relations between the sequences 
 than in the mere nomenclature of the general process. 
 
 Mr Spencer proceeds, however, in section 167, to consider 
 how this hypothesis may be expressed in terms of the general 
 doctrine of evolution. " It remains to be shown that this pro- 
 cess conforms to the same general mechanical principles as do 
 all other equilibrations."* . .. r 
 
 We have to regard a species as *' an aggregate m a state ot 
 moving equilibrium." " Its powers of multiplication give it an 
 expansive force which is antagonised by other forces ; and that 
 throu-h the rhythmical variations in these two sets of forces, 
 there^is maintained an oscillating limit to its habitat, and an 
 osciUating limit to its numbers." Thus a species as a whole 
 has a kiud of existence analogous to the existence of an 
 individual. It is, in fact, a moving equilibrium. We have 
 therefore to " call to mind in what way moving equilibria in 
 general are changed." t If, however, we recur to the only cases 
 of moving equilibria recognisable in the inorganic world, namely, 
 those of the solar system, the spinning-top, &c., we are afraid 
 that Mr. Spencer's attempted analogy will not apply. io 
 make it apply we must recall the ideal moving equilibrium of 
 Mr. Spencer's own imagining-a moving equilibrium ostensib y 
 drawn by induction from inorganic instances, but in reality 
 drawn from organic life. In other words, we must place the 
 paraUel as an analogy with itself ! In pursuance of this prin- 
 
 ciple Mr. Spencer says— 
 
 -In the first place, the necessary effect wrought by a nev7 
 incident force falling on any part of an aggregate with balanced 
 motions, is to produce a new motion in the direction of least 
 
 ♦ Biology, vol i. p. 457- 
 
 t Ibid., p. 457. 
 
400 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 resistance. In the second place, the new incident force is 
 gradually used up in overcoming the opposing forces, and when 
 it is all expended the opposing forces produce a recoil — a reverse 
 deviation that counter-balances the original deviation. Con- 
 sequently, to consider whether the moving equilibrium of a species 
 is modified in the same way as moving equilibria in general, 
 is to consider whether, when exposed to a new force, a species 
 yields in the direction of least resistance ; and whether, by its 
 thus yielding, there is generated in the species a compensating 
 change in the opposite direction. We shall find that it does 
 both these things." 
 
 Let us take the case of the protective appliances mentioned 
 above. These are explained as due to increased supply and 
 assimilation of food procured in a new habitat, and consequent 
 survival of the fittest in competition with the old race. We 
 do not see that the abstract rendering just given at all tends to 
 make the explanation plainer or more reasonable. Nor do we 
 see how it can be applied to the origination of the organs of 
 reproduction, nor to the precautionary adaptations for the pro- 
 tection of embryos and seed vessels, nor to the elongation of the 
 metatarsals in wading birds. 
 
 However, it appears that Mr. Spencer has quitted the con- 
 sideration of these cases, and furnishes us with illustrative con- 
 crete instances in the case of species exposed to the attack of 
 new classes of enemies. " The disappearance of those individuals 
 which meet the destroying forces by the smallest defensive 
 forces, is tantamount to the yielding of the species as a whole 
 at the places where the resistances are the least." * But then 
 our desire is to find an explanation for these defensive forces or 
 appliances, and not to ascertain their subsequent relations to the 
 offensive forces. To proceed, however. " Or if by some general 
 influence, such as alteration of climate, the members of a species 
 are subject to any increase of certain external actions that are 
 ever tending to overthrow their equilibria, and which they are 
 ever counter-balancing by the absorption of nutriment, which 
 are the first to die ? Those that are the least able to generate 
 the internal actions which antagonise these external actions." 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 459. 
 
 THE INNER FORCES OF ORGANISMS-POLARITY. 401 
 
 This conclusion is fuUy comprehensible quite apart from any 
 theory of moving equilibria, which indeed does not assist us at 
 aU and fails to render the process analogous to morg^ic pro- 
 cesses, as is essential in any cosmical interpretation. The suc- 
 ceeding section we reserve for consideration in our general 
 review of the argument in § 14. We have therefore to conclude 
 that "Indirect Equilibration" merely means the more distant 
 effects of any sets of causes, but is not the enunciation of any 
 definite formula or principle by which any special range of 
 sequences is to be explained. Placed as it is in the senes of 
 biological explanations, it is assigned a rank to which it has 
 not the slightest logical pretension. 
 
 m 
 
 § 13. The Inner Formative Forces 0/ Organism— Polarity. 
 
 (a.) General Considerations. 
 
 Why did not Mr. Spencer write a chapter on Polarity ? We 
 find it playing such an important part in the construction of 
 inorganic and organic molecules, and in the further construction 
 of crystaUoid masses and of organisms, that a specml study of 
 the subject would seem imperative. Yet we are left to gather 
 Mr. Spencer's opinions about it in a very fragmentary manner. 
 Perhaps the best plan would be to coUect them together in the 
 first ii^tance, and then consider them. After that, we should be 
 able to look at the factor of Polarity in relation with the other 
 established propositions of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. 
 
 For this purpose we shall take the two volumes of the 
 " Biology," where the factor Polarity is most frequently brought 
 
 '° wf meet with Polarity at the very outset We have firstly 
 "ultimate units," some of which have "extreme mobihty. 
 Then comes the theory that » the properties of a compound are 
 resultants of the properties of its components." Hence in some 
 compounds molecular mobility follows from the extreme mobility 
 of the ultimate units. But what is mobility? Does it mean 
 that the ultimate molecules are in a state of rapid motion to and 
 from each other? Does it mean that they are in a state of 
 
 2 C 
 
402 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 rapid rotation around each other, or each on its own axis ? Or 
 does it mean that their mutual relations of connection are so 
 slight that they are easily separated from each other, or that 
 their motions are easily altered in rate or direction by external 
 increments or decrements of motion ? The term mobility is a 
 very indefinite one ; it may mean " easily moved by an external 
 force," as opposed to " immobility," or it may mean " possessed 
 of rapid motion." 
 
 This is said to be a mechanical view of the matter. Then 
 on page 14 we are asked to consider the organic elements 
 "chemically instead of physically." What is the difference 
 between chemistry and physics 1 The differentia would appear 
 to lie in the doctrine of affinities. Some of the so-called 
 elements are narrow in their range of affinities and low in 
 the intensity with which they maintain them. Hydrogen, 
 carbon, and nitrogen will combine with few other elements; 
 and then the bonds are but weak. And if we consider further, 
 we shall find between one of them and oxygen an extreme 
 contrast in respect of " chemical activity." " Oxygen displays, 
 alike in the range and intensity of its affinities, a chemical 
 energy exceeding that of any other substance. . . . Nitrogen 
 displays the greatest chemical inactivity." 
 
 Physics, then, is the science of the molecular mobilities (?) of 
 ultimate units, and the resultants of their combinations ; and 
 chemistry is the science, not of ultimate units at all apparently, 
 but of the affinities of the seventy or eighty so-called elements. 
 The latter is a purely concrete science. The former has an 
 abstract side in the theoretic study of those ultimate units from 
 which the atoms of the so-called elements are composed, and a 
 concrete side in the study of the actual " mobilities " of these 
 atoms themselves. 
 
 It would follow that concrete physics and concrete chemistry 
 relate to the actual properties of the seventy or eighty so-called 
 elements, the former relating to their molecular mobilities, the 
 latter to their affinities. Now of the former [it may be said 
 that the study of the mobilities of the elements is rather a 
 vague inquiry. As before explained, " mobility " is a very 
 indefinite term. Does this study reveal tc us that oxygen has 
 
 POLARITY— GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 403 
 
 always a certain rate and mode of motion, and that nitrogen 
 has another, and that these rates are fixed, foming an essential 
 property of each? Again, does it reveal to us that this is a 
 property of the element in itself, i.e., in its own internal 
 organisation, or that it affects the relations of atoms amongst 
 
 each other 1 
 
 Apparently the latter, for Mr. Spencer proceeds to note the 
 relations of oxygen and nitrogen, the former having extreme 
 mobility (?) and an extensive range of affinities, and the latter 
 little of either. He asks us to suppose a mass of them. In 
 trying to do so, we naturally suppose oxygen and nitrogen 
 combining by mutual attraction. But how is union affected by 
 the extreme mobility of one and the immobility of the other? 
 That will depend upon what mobility means. ^^ 
 
 But Mr. Spencer says, " Let a force fall upon this mass. 
 But this is too indefinite. What " force" are we to suppose ? 
 ShaU we say heat or light? The result would be segregation ; 
 all the nitrogen would gather itself together, and all the oxygen 
 would separate itself from the nitrogen. We cannot say that 
 it is quite clear to us d priori why the incident force should 
 
 produce this effect. . ^ .v 
 
 But there is a graver difficulty than this, referring to the 
 distinction, if any, between chemistry and physics. Mr. Spencer 
 does not sufficiently explain this distinction, nor show how they 
 mutually affect each other, if there is any. How do the mobi- 
 lities of the elements affect their combinations, and how far do 
 they interfere with the combinations due to the affinities ? and, 
 conversely, how do the affinities affect the mobilities of the 
 elements ? Again, to which of them are due the phenomena of 
 allotropism, isomerism, polymerism, atomic weight, &c. ; or are 
 there other properties of substances besides those of molecular 
 mobility and chemical affinity? Are there properties, for in- 
 stance, of relative weight (attraction of gravitation), shape size, 
 &c, which affect the combinations and dissociations of the 
 
 ^ Tsect. 5 Mr. Spencer proposes the enquiry how "mechanical 
 principles" may solve all these questions, and indicates the 
 result of such a study. 
 
;rN 
 
 404 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 Firstly, as to ** molecular mobility," Mr. Spencer says that 
 " the molecular mobHity of a substance " (saij a cubic foot of 
 water or a cubic foot of oxygen) " must depend partly on the 
 inertia of its molecules " (jinertia = continuance in the same 
 state either of motion or of rest), '' partly on the intensity of 
 their mutual polarities " (polarities not defined), « partly on 
 their mutual pressure" (intensity of mutual polarity ?) *' partly 
 on the molecular mobilities of their component molecules" 
 (molecular mobility is not defined, ncrr is it stated whether it is a 
 constant or a changing propeHy of the molecule), . Mr. Spencer 
 says that any three of these four remaining constant— of which 
 four molecular motion is one— the " molecular mobility will 
 vary as the fourth." So that molecular mobility is really 
 regarded as being a variable, and only the first three remain 
 constant. Molecular mobility, then, is not an essential and fixed 
 property of any substance, and the contrast heretofore made 
 between oxygen and nitrogen in this respect does not hold good 
 as an essential property of either. We cannot say that oxygen has 
 extreme mobility, because its mobility depends upon inertia, 
 mutual polarity, and mutual pressure. It is a variable quality 
 dependent upon these. Molecular mobility of a substance 
 decreases towards the centre of a mass, and thus the molecular 
 mobibty of oxygen is not a constant property ; but a mass of 
 oxygen would exhibit less molecular mobility towards its centre 
 than perhaps would be manifested by the outside atoms of a 
 mass of nitrogen. Therfefore the contrast in this respect be- 
 tween the two substances would seem not to be an essential one 
 but dependent upon conditions. ' 
 
 The next conclusion to which Mr. Spencer would come, is 
 derived from the application of a mechanical law known to hold 
 good of masses to the case of molecules. This law is that 
 " inertia and gravity increase as the cubes of the dimensions, 
 while cohesion increases as their squares," by which " the self- 
 sustaining power of a body becomes relatively smaller as its bulk 
 becomes greater." From this it would result that large mole- 
 cules are not as stable as smaller ones. Mr. Spencer then pro- 
 ceeds to say that this " must be accompanied by a decrease of 
 those contrasts of dimension to which Polarity is ascribable " 
 
 POLARITY— GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 405 
 
 Polarity, then, is to be considered under the heading of Mecha- 
 nics. It is ascribable to contrasts of dimension. This is not 
 very clear ; does it mean that Polarity, in other places regarded 
 as the attraction of Polarity, depends upon size and shape ? 
 
 Simple mutual attraction results in a sphere, which is the 
 figure of equilibrium. When, in addition to simple mutual 
 attraction, there is polar attraction, then the result is different. 
 Polarity being due to contrasts (or harmonies) of dimension, the 
 spherical grouping will be overcome by the tendency towards 
 some more special form, determined by the mutual polarities 
 of the units. This will more especially be the case if the 
 number of units or atoms is small. " But it is manifest that 
 in proportion as an aggregate atom becomes larger, the effects 
 of simple mutual attraction must become relatively greater; 
 and so must tend to mask the effects of polar attraction. 
 There will consequently be ... a less distinct polarity than 
 in simpler atoms. If this inference be correct, it supplies us 
 with an explanation both of the chemical inertness of these 
 most complex organic substances, and of their inability to 
 
 crystallise." 
 
 Here the argument becomes confused. We have had so far 
 three factors : Mechanics, or simple mutual attraction ; Polarity, 
 or special attractions apparently due to properties of dimension ; 
 and Chemistry, or the affinities of atoms. We found that 
 increase of bulk meant the predominance of mechanics over 
 Polarity, and consequent greater liability to rearrangements and 
 decompositions of molecules. Then we had bulk-mechanics, 
 overriding Polarity and resulting in chemical inertness and 
 inability to crystallise. The latter may be impossible from the 
 premises, but how can we possibly understand chemical inert- 
 ness? Has chemistry anything to do with Polarity? Has 
 chemical affinity anything to do with bulk ? Are the affinities 
 of oxygen affected by increase or decrease of bulk ? Are they 
 in inverse ratio to the bulk ? What has chemistry to do with 
 either simple mutual attraction, or with polar attraction, or with 
 
 Based upon these nebulous theories there follow some highly 
 ingenious reasonings in the succeeding pages, which from the 
 
4o6 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 vagueness of the commencement it is difficult to follow and 
 impossible to criticise. The conclusion is stated in sect. 9. 
 
 Here it is said that "the mutual affinities of the chief 
 organic elements are not active within the limits of those tem- 
 peratures at which organic actions take place." This implies 
 a dependence of polarity upon mechanical motion. What are 
 affinities? Are they forces or motions? What are tempera- 
 tures? Motions? Then, how does Motion affect affinities so 
 as to render them active ? Again, complexity means instability. 
 " And those most complex compounds into which all these four 
 elements enter . . . have an instability so great that decom- 
 position ensues under ordinary atmospheric conditions." But 
 on the other hand we have already seen (p. 1 5) that we had an 
 explanation " of the chemical inertness of these most complex 
 organic substances " as due to colloidal sphericity. 
 
 Next we have the "tendency to unite in multiples." Then 
 molecular mobility again, which gives a plastic quality fitting 
 for organisation. And it is remarked of these compounds that 
 "the absence of power to unite together in polar arrangement, 
 leaves their atoms with a certain freedom of relative movement 
 which makes them sensitive to small forces, and produces plas- 
 ticity in the aggregates composed of them." 
 
 The distinction between a colloid and a crystalloid molecule 
 seems to be that the latter is more simple in construction 
 smaller in bulk, and has a definite shape, while the former, 
 in consequence of its bulk and complexity, loses the special 
 polarities due to the shapes of its constituents, and its own 
 spherical form is due rather to general or simple polarity (the 
 attraction of gravitation), which holds the constituent atoms 
 together by a loose and elastic sort of bond, with a liability to 
 give way to pressure, to stretch out with tension, and to spring 
 back to its original sphericity when relieved of the external 
 force (p. 25). But notwithstanding this quality, which facili- 
 tates temporary alterations of form, it is a quality which also 
 assists, strange to say, permanent alterations. Continued pres- 
 sure destroys this inherent property of colloidal molecules, 
 gradually diminishing and finally annihilating its power of 
 resuming the outline it had at first. The fact is here stated. 
 
 POLARITY-GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, 407 
 
 but the a prion reason for it is not given, and indeed it seems 
 contradictory of the constitution and powers of the coUoidai 
 molecule as previously explained. 
 
 This chapter is a study having for its 'object an ex- 
 planation of '^ polarity," but we have to take up other con- 
 siderations by the way, to see how they stand with regard 
 to it. On pages 25 and 26 various forces are mentioned which 
 affect molecules, viz., quasi-mechanical forces, capiUary affinity, 
 evaporation of water, osmose, &c. ; then again (p. ^n^f"^^ ^^ 
 a raised state of molecular vibration ; and finally light, or 
 ethereal undulations (p. 28). On page 32 is set out a theory of 
 the action of these ethereal undulations in effecting changes of 
 molecular combination. The ethereal waves are treated as it 
 they were waves of solid substance. One atom is held to 
 another by a positive force (Polarity, presumably), and it is 
 detached from it by the superior force or peculiar harmony 
 of the rates of motion of the ethereal waves, and brought 
 within the reach of other atoms with which it has some 
 affinity, although a weaker one than that operating m the 
 oricnnal combination ; and thus. Polarity is overcome, and some 
 other Polarity supervenes. Thus we see the relations of atomic 
 polarities and ethereal undulations in changes of molecular com- 
 bination. £ X.' t ;^ 
 We next come to chemical affinity, the agency of chief im- 
 portance in the changes of organic matter. Organic matter is 
 extremely modifiable by chemical agencies. We must presume 
 that chemical agencies are the special polarities of atoms, and 
 a chemical change is effected when a set of molecules come into 
 contact with other molecules for which they have polar affinities 
 and pair off with them accordingly. This again is a process which 
 propagates itself, and when a change of this sort is set up ma 
 mass by some external force, the change will be continued m 
 neighbouring similar matter, as in the case of fermentation. A 
 slight local disturbance inducing more intimate combmations of 
 contiguous atoms wiU communicate a motion of combination 
 throughout a mass. 
 
4o8 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 (b.) Polarity J Growth and Development 
 
 The next important teaching of the author bearing upon the 
 subject of our special study is in the chapter on "Growth." 
 Here we find that the aggregation of matter produced by simple 
 attraction may go on without end, but there appears to be a 
 limit to that more definite kind of aggregation which results 
 from polar attraction. Thus we find that each element or com- 
 pound has its usual size beyond which there is a tendency to 
 form new crystals rather than to increase the size of those 
 already formed. The organic world is then surveyed to illus- 
 trate the same truth, leading to the inference that the limit 
 of growth is there due to the same cause as in the case of 
 crystals, which would imply polarity on the part of these 
 colloid molecules, though we have already decided that they 
 have no polarities. However, the tenor of the argument is 
 immediately changed, and we lose sight of the influence of 
 special polarities, and even of simple polarity in respect to 
 growth and its limits. Organisation comes in as affecting the 
 bulk of plants and animals, and other considerations supervene 
 which do not concern our present study. 
 
 Our interest recurs in the relation of Polarity to Develop- 
 ment (p. 151). Polarity is at the bottom of segregation, and 
 segregation not only is the accretion of mass from suitable 
 materials in the environment, but it also explains the interior 
 differentiations of a mass of organic matter. So that polarity, 
 possibly under the influence of externally communicated motions 
 such as light and heat, determines the gathering together 
 within the mass of like molecules in one part, and diverse like 
 molecules in another part. This implies a degree of unlikeness 
 amongst the constituent units which negatives the conception 
 of original homogeneity, and also contradicts the theory of the 
 loss of polarity of colloids due to their bulk and sphericity. 
 
 The process is called "selective assimilation, and illustrates 
 this general truth, that the pre-existence of a mass of certain 
 units produces, probably by polar attraction, a tendency for 
 diffused units of the same kind to aggregate with this mass, 
 rather than elsewhere Particular parts of the or^^anism 
 
 POLARITY AND FUNCTION, 
 
 409 
 
 are composed of special units, or have the function of secreting 
 special units, which are ever present in them in large quantities. 
 The fluids circulating through the body contain special units 
 of this same order. And these diffused units are continuaUy 
 being deposited along with the groups of Uke units that already 
 exist How purely physical are the causes of this selective 
 assimilation," &c Again, " Where the component units of an 
 organ, or some of them, do not exist as such in the circu ating 
 flidds it is clear that the process of differential assimilation 
 
 is of 1 more complex kind. StiU, however, it seems not impos- 
 sible that it is carried on in an analogous way. If there be 
 an aggregate of compound atoms, each of which contains the 
 constituents A, B, C, and if round this aggregate the con- 
 stituents A and B and C are diffused in uncombined states ; it 
 mav be suspected that the coercive polar force of these aggre- 
 gated compound atoms A, B, C, may not only bring into union 
 with themselves adjacent compound atoms A, B, C, but may 
 cause the adjacent constituents A and B and C to unite into 
 such compound atoms, and then aggregate wrth the mass 
 However, this theory of the manufacture of its constituents 
 out of the raw material is set forth only as a theory, and the 
 hypothetical theory of a " coercive polar force " which does 
 this work must be held in abeyance. 
 
 (c.) Polarity and Function, 
 Polarity apparently has nothing to do with Function for it 
 is not mentioned in the chapter on that subject. Yet they 
 must be indirectly related. Function preceded structure (p. 
 167). Function is equilibration or the opposing of an inner 
 force to meet, resist, or balance an external force. Equilibration 
 in the sense in which it is applied to a moving equilibrium is 
 the cause of structure. How then are equilibration and polarity 
 related, more particularly as regards their dealings with masses 
 of homogeneous organic matter 1 U we are to regard collmd 
 molecules as destitute of polarity, polarity is out o court. The 
 burthen of construction would consequently be thrown upon 
 equilibration. What then is the relation of equihbration to 
 the operations of simple and special polarities? 
 

 1$" 
 
 4IO SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 (d.) Polarity and Waste and Repair. 
 
 Mr. Spencer acknowledges that it is not easy to find a de- 
 ductive interpretation of the phenomena of Repair. 
 
 " The tendency displayed by an animal organism, as well as 
 by each of its organs, to return to a state of integrity by the 
 assimilation of new matter, when it has undergone the waste 
 consequent on activity, is a tendency which is not manifestly 
 deducible from first principles, though it appears to be in 
 harmony with them." 
 
 Is the difficulty got over by the theory of a " coercive polar 
 force," as already partially discussed (§ 54), by which " groups 
 of compound units have a certain power of moulding adjacent 
 fit materials into units of their own form " ? Is there not reason 
 to think that such a power exists ? 
 
 Mr. Spencer then proceeds to establish inductively the belief 
 that there is such a power. It is shown that the blood has the 
 power of forming blood molecules in specialised forms, and the 
 same power is claimed for each organ. 
 
 " Indeed the assertion of this power is little more than an 
 assertion of the fact, that organs composed of specialised units are 
 capable of resuming their structural integrity, after they have 
 been wasted by function. For if they do this, they must do it 
 by forming from the materials brought to them, certain special- 
 ised units like in kind to those of which they are composed ; 
 and to say that they do this, is to say that their component 
 units have the power of moulding fit materials into other units 
 of the same order. 
 
 " The repair of a wasted tissue may therefore be considered 
 as due to forces analogous to those by which a crystal reproduces 
 its lost apex, when placed in a solution like that from which it 
 was formed. In either case, a mass of units of a given kind, 
 shows a power of integrating with itself dififused units of the 
 same kind : the only difference being, that the organic mass of 
 units arranges the diffused units into special compound forms 
 before integrating them with itself." ' 
 
 There are two ways of looking at this statement—firstly, as 
 regards its deducibility from first principles. It is manifestly 
 
 POLARITY AND WASTE AND REPAIR. 41 1 
 
 a hypothesis arrived at inductively, and possibly a correct hypo- 
 thesis, but it does not seem a deduction from any first principle ; 
 if so what is that first principle, and how is the deduction 
 effected ^ If anything, it is a deduction from polarity ; but then 
 polarity in its rigidity, as due to dimensions and as exemplited 
 in crystaUisation, is not applicable to the more bulky and spe- 
 cial and unstable morphology of a colloid molecule. And again 
 the coercive force or coercive polarity of a mass over adjacent 
 units, as exemplified in the force of a magnet over iron-filmgs, is 
 very indistinct in its analogous appHcation to the coercive force 
 of an organ over the materials in the blood Is the assimila- 
 tipn of material in the nervous system, the muscular tissue, the 
 olseous structures, the skin matter, &c., only an arrangement m 
 certain different shapes or orders of the materials assimilated | 
 No • the assimilation is a process of selective assimilation, and 
 apparently a process of molecule-manufacturing before assimi- 
 laUon which cannot be deduced from the polarity of molecules 
 nor from the coercive polarity of organs, without more definite 
 comprehension of what is meant by polarity. Therefore the 
 deductive interpretation of a possibly correct statement of the 
 facts fails This is the more certain when Mr. Spencer himselt 
 makes the important confession ^^that polarity is - a power of 
 whose nature we know nothing" (p. 179)- 
 
 Secondly, the question arises, Has equilibration anything to 
 do with repair? Function modifies structure under the law 
 applicable to moving equilibria, that opposing external forces 
 are met by resistive inner arrangements. Therefore the incre- 
 ment of parts, which is the result of this law of equi ibration, 
 is due to it, and not to polarity. The thickening of fur, for 
 instance, is due to equilibration. But the thickening of fur is 
 the deposit of suitable molecules of that portion of the organic 
 economy. Therefore the deposit of special molecules in this 
 case is not due to coercive polar force of the mass over the 
 adjacent molecules, but to the establishment /^^^^^^^^ 
 between the organism and its environment^ What we need 
 to know is, how this general equilibration effects the increased 
 assimilation of materials in the fur ? Is it effected by means of 
 the coercive polar force of the existing fur? If so, how is this 
 
4 1 2 SPENCER'S UN I PICA TION OF KNO W LEDGE, 
 
 coercive force regulated by the law of equilibration t What are 
 the relations between the general equUibration of an organism 
 and the coercive polar forces by which the detaHs of fresh 
 arrangements are carried out ? 
 
 We may remark parentheticaUy that polarity seems to have 
 nothing to do with waste, but only with repair, and in the 
 latter no reference is made to chemical affinity, with which, 
 perhaps, it is regarded as identical Yet in regard to waste,' 
 are we not bound to suppose a waste or expenditure of polarity \ 
 If so, we are bound to range polarity within Professor Stewart's 
 list of energies. 
 
 The principal view in which Mr. Spencer regards it is as ;,o 
 its power of restoration of parts to a damaged organism. The 
 process is comprehensible in a crystal where particles of similar 
 shape in a moving liquid condition fall into suitable arrange- 
 ments with a mass with whose particles it has polar affinity, 
 but is not to be understood when applied to colloids of such 
 bulk as to imply a spherical shape in which the special polarities 
 of its constituents are lost. 
 
 Yet Mr. Spencer says, " We must in the case of the organism 
 assume an analogous forca" Hence the restoration of a lizard's 
 leg or tail, by the fiUing out of the original outline. This 
 implies not only a coercive polarity in the mass, but the 
 coercive polarity of the colloid molecules of the lizard's blood 
 We already know, however, that colloid molecules are destitute 
 of polarity. Nevertheless Mr. Spencer suggests the hypothesis, 
 " That the form of each species of organism is determined by a 
 peculiarity in the constitution of its units— that these have a 
 special structure in which they tend to arrange themselves; 
 just as have the simpler units of inorganic matter." This, it 
 seems to us, is in direct contradiction to the doctrine of the 
 morphologic instability and loss of polarity by the bulky and 
 complex and colloid molecules as taught in the Appendix. Mr. 
 Spencer says (p. i8o) — 
 
 "We have therefore no alternative but to say, that the living 
 particles composing one of these fragments, have an innate ten. 
 dency to arrange themselves into the shape of the organism to 
 which they belong. We must infer that a plant or animal of 
 
 POLARITY IN GENERAL. 
 
 413 
 
 any species, is made up of special units, in all of which there 
 dwells the intrinsic aptitude to aggregate into the form of that 
 species : just as in the atoms of a salt, there dwells the intrinsic 
 aptitude to crystallise in a particular way." 
 
 It would be well here to have gone a little more into detail. 
 We can understand how the polarity of a salt wiU cause the 
 completion of the outline in a mass due to the outline of its 
 constituent particles. It is thereby homogeneous throughout. 
 But even if we granted the same power to organic molecules to 
 aggregate into a mass of a definite form or shape in accordance 
 with their own peculiar specific shapes, yet the only result we 
 could arrive at would be a similar homogeneous mass, the 
 form or shape of which would be the result of the building up 
 of specific shapes. . But animal and vegetable masses are not 
 homogeneous, nor aggregated in such a general form as to be 
 the calculable result of the forms of constituent particles. We 
 defy any one to draw the outline of a particle which by building 
 up should produce the resultant outline of a horse. And if we 
 examine the horse, we find a heterogeneous structure and com- 
 position which would seem to upset the theory that its construc- 
 tion is due to specific shapes of constituent molecules. In fact, 
 so contrary is this theory to the general facts of vegetable and 
 animal life, that one is tempted to characterise it as absurd. 
 But this gives Mr. Spencer an opportunity of treating of— 
 
 (e.) Polarity in General. 
 
 He takes it as a name for the force by which inorganic units 
 are aggregated into a form peculiar to them. 
 
 Let us examine this statement before proceeding farther. 
 Inorganic units may be simple or complex. We may take it 
 that simple units are aggregated into complex units by polarity. 
 It is not clear whether this aggregation commences with similar 
 units or with diversified forms of units, but in any case aggrega- 
 tions proceed under the force of polarity, and whether from 
 difi'erent modes of aggregation or from original diverse forms, 
 great diversities of form and aggregation are eventuaUy produced. 
 By and by certain stable and completed forms of aggregate 
 units are produced, and then there goes on a construction into 
 
414 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 masses due to the forms of these completed molecules. This is 
 effected by means of polar force. 
 
 Now with respect to this polar force several questions arise. 
 Firstly, Is it an energy that is interchangeable with the other 
 energies, viz., those chemical separations, those variable rates 
 of molecular motion called heat, light, &c., which we formerly 
 considered? Secondly, Has it anything to do with chemical 
 energy and activity or chemical inertia or indifference ] Thirdly, 
 Has it anything to do with equilibration, and if so, are its 
 equilibrations confined to the equilibrations of polar forces, or 
 do polar forces ever come into antagonism with other ener- 
 gies, viz., heat, light, electricity, gravitation, &c.? Fourthly, 
 Is it a corollary from anything, or are its manifestations 
 corollaries from anything, and what are the corollaries from 
 polarity ? Generally speaking, what is its scientific position in 
 physics ? 
 
 Mr. Spencer says (p. i8i) that we may apply the word 
 " polarity " to the analogous force displayed by organic units. 
 Yet he says it is " but a name for something of which we are 
 ignorant— a name for a hypothetical property which as much 
 needs explanation as that which it is used to explain. Never- 
 theless, in default of another word, we must employ this: 
 taking care, however, to restrict its meaning. If we simply sub- 
 stitute the word polarity for the circuitous expression— the power 
 which certain units have of arranging themselves into a special 
 form, we may, without assuming anything more than is proved, 
 use the term organic polarity, or polarity of the organic units, 
 to signify the proximate cause of the ability which organisms 
 display of reproducing lost parts." 
 
 With regard to this we have to say, in addition to what has 
 gone before, that we apprehend the main distinction of organic 
 aggregates from inorganic aggregates consists in the power of 
 the one to coerce its constituents, while in the other the con- 
 stituents determine the form of the aggregate. "The power 
 which certain units have of arranging themselves into a special 
 form " results in that special form, and is the special cliaracter 
 of 'inorganic crystalloids. The power of the aggregate in 
 specialising the forms of the constituent units is an opposite 
 
 POLARITY AND PHYSIOLOGICAL UNITS. 415 
 
 power, and is the characteristic of organic aggregates. The two 
 processes are not analogous, but diametricaUy opposed. 
 
 (/.) Polarity and Physiological Units. 
 
 Always bearing in mind the teachings of Mr. Spencer with 
 regard to the non-polarity and morphological instability of 
 colloid molecules, let us now consider those physiological units, 
 " which possess the property of arranging themselves into the 
 special structures of the organisms to which they belong." 
 
 Mr. Spencer teaches us (p. 182) that this property does not 
 reside in the chemical units nor in the morphological units. By 
 this he does not mean, as one would suppose, that there are 
 chemical units and morphological units existing separately m 
 the blood, but only this, that structure is not due to chemical 
 combinations of oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, &c., nor to the 
 particular shapes of some combinations of these. Therefore, he 
 says we must conceive of some intermediate units, which we 
 may caU physiological. The term intermediate would indicate 
 an intermediate position of the same order ; that is to say in 
 the order of constructive aggregation. But elsewhere Mr. 
 Spencer defines physiology as the function or habit of action 
 of the same unit which, otherwise viewed, is a morphological 
 one, having specific structure, shape, and size. We will not, 
 however, minutely reflect upon the loose language of this 
 explanation, but take the positive teaching as it stands, viz., 
 that not to the chemical qualities of certain molecules, nor 
 to the shape of them, is due the polarity which produces that 
 peculiar aggregation of heterogeneous structure and composition 
 which we call an organism. It is due to certain aggregates of 
 these chemical units, exceedingly complex, which have a dis- 
 tinctive character. Some slight differences in the composition of 
 these complex molecules and their consequent display of forces 
 produce these distinctions of character. These distmctions of 
 character again produce the differences of form which the aggre- 
 gates exhibit. 
 
 Does this mean that the physiological unit of a horse, which 
 unit is something more than a chemical unit or a morphological 
 
1^ 
 
 4i6 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 unit, produces the aggregate horse, and that the horse is a 
 consequent of its units, as the crystal is a consequent of its consti- 
 tuents 1 No ; for the crystalline structure is due to the chemical 
 affinities, the simple polarities and shapes of the constituent 
 molecules, whereas these are deemed insufficient in the case of 
 the organic constituents. Physiological units display forces over 
 and above these simple properties. 
 
 In the next two chapters on " Adaptation and Individuality " 
 polarity finds no place ; but, as remarked under the heading of 
 " Function," it is not easy to see what is the relation of polarity 
 as subordinate to biological equilibration — that is to say, in the 
 anticipatory opposition of inner forces to outer forces. Neither 
 are we enlightened on the subject of the disintegration of or- 
 ganisms, which again seems opposed to, and in certain circum- 
 stances overcomes, the polar forces which prbduce integration. 
 
 (g.) Polarity and Genesis, 
 
 Polarity makes its appearance again in the chapter on 
 "Genesis." On page 220 we find that — 
 
 ** Conclusive proof obliged us to admit, that the component 
 imits of organisms, have inherent powers of arranging them- 
 selves into the forms of the organisms to which they belong." 
 
 Hence sperm-cells and germ-cells have the same powers. 
 
 From page 221 it would appear that the physiological units 
 which have produced an organic aggregate have themselves 
 become variously modified in the process, these modifications 
 being efi'ected not by means of incident forces but by means 
 of ancestral forces ; and the question arises. Is the organic 
 aggregate still to be regarded as the result of the distinctive 
 character of the physiological units? It would seem not, 
 for in the process the physiological units have themselves 
 become modified. The sperm-cells and the germ-cells differ from 
 the other physiological cells of a completed organism in not 
 having become modified. But if an organism has specific phy- 
 siological cells, and great masses of these physiological cells of 
 which it is composed have become modified into organs — which 
 are the genuine physiological cells which have produced the 
 
 POLARITY AND GENESIS. 
 
 417 
 
 organism? It is said that the great bulk of them, without 
 being subject to external influences, as in the growth of the 
 embryo, have departed more or less from the original and general 
 type. Of germ-cells and sperm-cells it is said, " Not that they 
 are peculiarly specialised, but rather that they are unspecialised ; 
 such specialisations as some of them exhibit in the shape of 
 locomotive appliances, &c., being interpre table not as intrinsic, 
 but as extrinsic, modifications, that have reference to nothing 
 beyond certain mechanical requirements." Here Mr. Spencer 
 admits that structure is not due to polar forces of physiological 
 units, but that these physiological units become modified by ex- 
 ternal forces. He does not surely mean that these modifications 
 of physiological units go to the extreme of furnishing them with 
 locomotive appliances, &c. But in all this it seems to us the 
 arfTument of construction as dependent upon the distinctive 
 characters of physiological units becomes very much attenuated. 
 After the union of sperm-cells and germ-cells what has polarity 
 to do ? Does coercive polarity set in ? Mr. Spencer does not 
 follow this up. Two equilibria unite (p. 223) and destroy each 
 other's equilibrium, and set up changes and cell-multiplication, 
 or the manufacture of physiological units fit for assimilation ; 
 and it is to be presumed that coercive polar force is the instru- 
 ment by which this manufacture and assimilation is effected ; 
 also by means of the distinctive character of the physiological 
 unit and its polarity these aggregations are worked into a depen- 
 dent and consequent structure. After this external mechanical 
 forces are supposed to modify these physiological units, and pre- 
 vent the structure that would logically result from their distinc- 
 tive character ; yet, none the less, the result is a copy of the 
 parent organism, with an exact repetition of all those peculiari- 
 ties which are set down as the result of modifications of the 
 physiological units by mechanical forces — those external forces, 
 namely, which are in actual relation with the physiological 
 units • for how can those pre-existent ones which modified the 
 physiological units of ancestors act otherwise than through the 
 modified polarities of the sperm-cells and germ-cells ? Surely 
 there is much yet to explain in the part played by the polarity 
 of physiological units in the development of the embryo as 
 
 2D 
 
r^ 
 
 IMl 
 
 418 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 against modifying forces, which, neither as forces acting in the 
 past on ancestral organisms nor in the anticipated future, are 
 directly in relation with these actual developments consequent 
 upon the properties of the physiological units so as to modify 
 them. The difficulties are enhanced when we come to consider 
 the chapter on " Heredity." 
 
 (h.) Polarity and Heredity. 
 Page 253. — "The power which organisms display of repro- 
 ducing lost parts, we saw to be inexplicable except on the 
 assumption that the units of which any organism is built have 
 an innate tendency to arrange themselves into the shape of that 
 organism (§ 65). We inferred that these units must be the 
 possessors of special polarities, resulting from their special 
 structures ; and that by the mutual play of their polarities they 
 are compelled to take the form of the species to which they 
 belong. And the instance of the Begonia phyllomaniaca left us 
 no escape from the admission that the ability thus to arrange 
 themselves, is latent in the units contained in every undifferen- 
 tiated cell" 
 
 The theory is much the same as that of the building up of 
 crystalloid aggregates. We are to suppose a number of phy- 
 siological units, very complex, being made up of aggregates of 
 molecules, the result being a special shape, and special polarities 
 which are the laws of their mutual combination. The resulting 
 combination in this case will be a shape and construction due 
 to the shapes and polarities of the constituent units. 
 
 The result from the bare statement given would be the 
 formation of a homogeneous colloidal mass without any de- 
 finite shape. There is no reason to suppose anything more 
 than an irregular lump of material Besides which we have 
 to point out, that although we are using the term physiologi- 
 cal unit, the result, together with that of the analogous crys- 
 talloid process, is purely morphological. The whole course 
 of the reasoning would be precisely the same were the term 
 "morphological unit" substituted for the term "physiological 
 unit \ " the only utility of the latter is that it is apt to lead 
 better towards the affiliation of organic processes upon inorganic, 
 
 POLARITY AND HEREDITY. 
 
 419 
 
 and in effecting one of those verbal transformations of a logical 
 process by which the theory of evolution is worked out. 
 
 Again — 
 
 " And here the assumption to which we seem driven by the 
 ensemble of the evidence, is, that sperm-cells and germ-cells are 
 essentially nothing more than vehicles, in which are contained 
 small groups of the physiological units in a fit state for obeying 
 their proclivity towards the structural arrangement of the spe- 
 cies they belong to. 
 
 " We must conclude that the likeness of any organism to 
 either parent is conveyed by the special tendencies of the phy- 
 siological units derived from that parent. In the fertilised 
 germ we have two groups of physiological units, slightly differ- 
 ent in their structures. These slightly different units severally 
 multiply at the expense of the nutriment supplied to the un- 
 folding germ — each kind moulding this nutriment into units 
 of its own type. Throughout the process of evolution, the two 
 kinds of units, mainly agreeing in their polarities and in the 
 form which they tend to build themselves into, but having 
 minor differences, work in unison to produce an organism of the 
 species from which they were derived, but work in antagonism to 
 produce copies of their respective parent-organisms. And hence 
 ultimately results, an organism in which traits of the one are 
 mixed with traits of the other." 
 
 Again, if the organism be changed in response to environment, 
 as when, for instance, in a chilling climate fur thickens, or from 
 the necessity of escaping capture fish attain the power of adapt- 
 ing their colour to that of their environment, then the physiolo- 
 gical units undergo some slight modification, of such a nature 
 that, when rebuilt into new organisms, the new shape or the 
 acquired power is exhibited and established. And thus — 
 
 " Bringing the question to its simplest and ultimate form, we 
 may say that as, on the one hand, physiological units will, 
 because of their special polarities, build themselves into an 
 organism of a special structure ; so, on the other hand, if the 
 structure of this organ is modified by modified function, it will 
 impress some corresponding modification on the structures and 
 polarities of its units. The units and the aggregate must act 
 
420 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 and re-act on each other. The forces exercised by each unit on 
 the aggregate, and by the aggregate on each unit, must ever tend 
 towards a balance. If nothing prevents, the units will mould 
 the aggregate into a form in equilibrium with their pre-existing 
 polarities. If, contrariwise, the aggregate is made by incident 
 actions to take a new form, its forces must tend to re-mould the 
 units into harmony with this new form. And to say that the 
 physiological units are in any degree so re-moulded as to bring 
 their polar forces towards equilibrium with the forces of the 
 modified aggregate, is to say that when separated in the shape 
 of reproductive centres, these units will tend to build them- 
 selves up into an aggregate modified in the same direction." 
 
 Thus when, in obedience to the law of moving equilibria, 
 the animal preceding the moose-deer opposed to the incident 
 external forces the enormous and weighty horns and power- 
 ful neck muscles and fore-quarters, the change so effected pro- 
 duced in its physiological units some corresponding modification 
 of structure and polarities, so that when they came to be built 
 up again, they produced the hind-quarters as they were before, 
 and the fore-quarters and horns as newly modified. It seems 
 strange that the efl'ect of building up the modified physiologicol 
 units of the sperm-cells and germ-cells should be confined to one 
 part of the animal, and should not extend to the whole of it. 
 
 In the next chapter, on " Variation," and in the chapter on 
 " Heredity," certain instances are quoted of the hereditary trans- 
 mission of peculiarities of parts, such as deafness, malformations 
 of limbs, fingers, &c. Are we to suppose that the transmission 
 of peculiarities of parts is due to alterations in the constitution 
 of physiological units from which the whole structure is built 1 
 If so how and in what manner are the sperm-cells and the 
 germ-cells modified by the changed developments of the animal 
 so as to reproduce the peculiarities of parts, such as deafness or 
 malformations ? 
 
 {{.) Polarity and Variation, 
 
 This chapter deals with the equilibration of organisms in 
 response to incident external forces ; with the consequent modi- 
 fication of the physiological units ; with the admixture of the 
 
 POLARITY AND VARIATION. 
 
 421 
 
 slightly different physiological units of two parents ; with the fact 
 that every organism is built up not of one class of physiological 
 units but of two or more ; with the fact that the germ-cell and 
 sperm-cell each contains not one class of physiological units but 
 two or more, by which, according to the predominance in quan- 
 tity and particular distribution, will be the form of different parts 
 of the resultant organism. 
 
 This view of the subject effects a serious change in the char- 
 acter of our studies. Hitherto it has been a simple matter to 
 suppose (what indeed we found to be quite insufficient practi- 
 cally) that the construction and shape of an organism are conse- 
 quent upon the construction and polarities of simple and like 
 physiological units. But we have now to suppose that the 
 structure and form of an organism are due to the structure and 
 polarities of four or eight classes of physiological units derived 
 from immediate or remote ancestors. These mixed up together 
 segregate, and thus, by their coercive force on incoming material, 
 form'^and add to themselves fresh physiological units. But 
 while preserving the original type they will reproduce special- 
 ties of shape and function of various ancestors ; not, however, 
 that dissymmetry will be produced, in that one leg will be longer 
 than another, or one arm longer than another. 
 
 We are not, however, engaged in examining the correctness 
 of the theory, but in ascertaining what part is played by 
 , polarity in biological history ; and here it would seem that the 
 alteration of shape or function of an organism has the effect of 
 altering the structure and polarities of the constituent units. 
 How this is effected is not set out. It is merely a general infer- 
 ence that it must be so. An alteration of equilibrium in the 
 growth of horns in balance with some external force causes a 
 general readjustment of equilibria throughout the body, and 
 therefore the structure and polarities of the physiological units 
 must be so altered that in succeeding generations the building- 
 up of these units must result in a creature with horns. It is 
 difficult to conceive the nature of such an alteration, nor is its d 
 prion justification at all apparent. We do not see how the 
 addition of horns can alter the constitution of the physiological 
 units in the sperm-cell and germ-celL 
 
422 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 However, what we actually find is, that alteration of shape 
 or function in an animal affects the shapes and polarities of 
 physiological units; and these altered shapes and polarities 
 reproduce the alterations in the new organisms. Polarity is 
 said to be the agency by which the change is carried forward. 
 What is the nature of this change of polarity ? Is the polarity 
 of a colloid molecule the result of the polarities of its consti- 
 tuent atoms 1 
 
 It seems to us, however, that when we talk of physiological 
 units — which are colloid molecules — being so modified by the 
 changes of an organism as to reproduce these changed forms as 
 a consequence in their building-up, and are therefore to be re- 
 garded rather as morphological units, we are talking quite out of 
 the reach of our knowledge, and are trespassing far beyond the 
 range of legitimate deduction. We have no warrant either 
 from induction or deduction for our attempt, and we are un- 
 able to work out our problem. We are brought to a perfect 
 stand-stiU. 
 
 (k.) Polarity as a Factor in Genesis, Hei'edity, and Variation. 
 
 Genesis, Heredity, and Variation are made to depend largely 
 upon Polarity for their operations. This has already been made 
 manifest. In a new chapter Mr. Spencer gives us an ensemble 
 of the operations. The comprehension of the general history 
 of biological change not being our present purpose, there is no 
 need for us to consider the necessity for the overthrowing of 
 an equilibrium, nor for the expenditure and reception of force, 
 nor for growth and its cessation. We are only concerned with 
 the part played by polarity, and as regards that point we only 
 find a repetition of what has gone before. Physiological units 
 have special structures and polarities. They are not exactly 
 alike. Several similar but not exactly identical molecules are 
 mixed together in a fertilised germ. Incoming materials are 
 variously appropriated by each. The constituent physiological 
 units exert a coercive force, apparently a polar force, over the 
 raw materials, in conformity with which the materials range 
 themselves. 
 
 POLARITY IN GENESIS, HEREDITY, ETC. 423 
 
 We certainly do find ourselves in a state of confusion when 
 we read that there are in the organism (which is the result of the 
 special structures and polarities of its physiological units) certain 
 molecular forces antagonistic to the forces exercised over them 
 by the aggregate (p. 275). Is the result of a cause antagonistic 
 to its cause 1 Whence have come the forces of the aggregate 
 but from the molecular properties 1 How then can the aggre- 
 gate turn round with forces antagonistic to its constituent 
 molecules 1 The whole of the very abstruse reasoning on this 
 pac^e is rendered unintelligible from this enigma. 
 
 On p. 278 we find that polarities can be balanced or partially 
 balanced, and that they have a great deal to do with the first 
 stages of the developments incident upon the union of sperm- 
 cells and germ-cells. ,,,.•../ t 
 And one of the most remarkable things in all this history of 
 intecrrations and disintegrations is the absence of any reference 
 to the law of co-operation between the three factors in the uni- 
 verse—Matter, Motion, and Force— as set down in the Formula 
 of Evolution. We ourselves have only just recollected it, and 
 Mr Spencer seems to have forgotten it altogether. The con- 
 comitance of the dissipation of motion with these integrations 
 of matter is never mentioned at all, never asserted, never ex- 
 plained. All these complicated processes go on, and that which 
 is supposed to be the key to them all is never advanced either 
 to receive illustration or to throw light upon the intricacies of 
 our study.. Indeed, life while it integrates matter also mte- 
 jrrates motion instead of dissipating it. 
 
 In § 07 Mr. Spencer recapitulates for us the general bio- 
 logical forces. We have, in the first place, units of organic 
 matter which are large, heterogeneous, and unstable ma high 
 de-ree Of these are formed other units. What must be their 
 properties? *' Already the colloidal atoms are extremely un- 
 stable-capable of being variously modified in their characters 
 bv very slight incident forces ; and already the complexity of 
 their polarities prevents them from readily falling into those 
 positions of polar equilibrium which result in crystaUisation. 
 Now the organic atoms composed of these colloidal atoms, must 
 be similarly characterised in far higher degrees." 
 
^,,.fi9f^-4pP^B5?S9»^4. ^i- --^^iCwiSi^Si^S^i*-; 
 
 a wji>ww«wM'*»* 'i ^** ^^* ^^ 
 
 Mi 
 
 424 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. ' 
 
 But, on the other hand, Mr. Spencer supposes that each organ 
 is built up of those highly plastic units peculiar to its species. 
 The question arises, Have these plastic units any defined specific 
 properties sufficiently settled to enable a building-up process to 
 take place ? However, he says that these units, when mixed, 
 work towards an equilibrium of their complex polarities. One 
 would think that if this was all they did, some half-dozen of 
 them or fifty of them would soon be able to do it in a very 
 direct manner. But no ; they do it by adding raw material to 
 themselves, and by producing an aggregate due to their specific 
 properties ; the difficulty of their mechanical modification into 
 bone, muscle, &c. , not being explained, and the difficulty of their 
 eccentricities of form not being explained. Then a modified 
 aggregate modifies the constituent physiological units, and so on 
 over again. 
 
 Nor is the difficulty explained how in an organism where 
 nearly all the physiological units become specialised into difi'erent 
 organs, there are some few which do not become specialised by 
 the organs they occupy : — on the contrary, special organs exist, 
 and are apparently constructed, for the express purpose of secret- 
 ing them, preserving them, and excreting them as unspecialised. 
 This explanation is partly attempted on p. 288, where we are 
 told it is due to an excess of manufacture of physiological units 
 which cannot be amalgamated with any special organ, and 
 which will arrange themselves into the structure peculiar to the 
 species if freed from controlling forces and placed in fit condi- 
 tions of nutrition and temperature. We presume a plastic 
 molecule, which we would have supposed perfectly contented to 
 retain any form in which it found itself, would not so arrange 
 itself into a definite form. And again, how can we imagine 
 that the structure in which it is placed protects it, and supplies 
 it with nutriment ? 
 
 Mr. Spencer winds up the exposition with the usual moral, 
 namely, that all these biological changes are thus seen to be 
 corollaries from those universal principles implied in the Per- 
 sistence of Force. 
 
 THE DOUBLE POWER OF PHYSIOLOGICAL UNITS. 425 
 
 (I.) The Double Potcer of Physiological Units in Construction 
 
 and Modifiahility. 
 
 We have now described with sufficient amplitude Mr. Spen- 
 cer's teachings respecting the part which Polarity plays in biolo- 
 gical changes. 
 
 The main question respecting them is— Are colloid molecules 
 80 decided in their polarities and shapes that their interre- 
 lations sufficiently resemble those of crystalloids to justify an 
 analogous reasoning with regard to their power of effecting 
 similar results in structure : or whether, on the contrary, they 
 are so weak in polarity, so unstable of form, and so suscep- 
 tible to change, that their mutual interrelations cannot produce 
 structure and organisation? On this point we have two sets of 
 teachings. On the one hand, we are told that general structure 
 results from the stnicture and polarities of physiological units. 
 On the other hand, we are told that colloid molecules are un- 
 stable in shape and indecisive in their polarities. 
 Thus we find in " Biology," vol. ii. p. 11:— 
 " We set out with molecules one degree higher in complexity 
 than those molecules of nitrogenous colloidal substance into 
 which organic matter is resolvable ; and we regard these some- 
 what more complex molecules as having the implied greater 
 instability, greater sensitiveness to surrounding influences, and 
 consequently greater mobility of form." We find them forming 
 an aggregate, " showing vitality only by a higher degree of that 
 readrness to change its form of aggregation, which colloidal 
 matter in general displays ; and by its ability to unite the nitro- 
 genous molecules it meets with, into complex molecules like 
 those of which it is composed." 
 Again, vol. ii. p. 346 : — 
 
 "There is good reason for ascribing it to the extreme in- 
 stability of the organic colloids of which protoplasm consists. 
 These, in common with colloids in general, assume different 
 isomeric forms with great facility, and they display not only 
 isomerism but polymerism. Further, this readiness to undergo 
 molecular rearrangement, habitually shows itself in colloids by 
 the rapid propagation of the rearrangement from part to part 
 
r'fmi^mimsm 
 
 426 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 As Professor Graham has shown, matter in this state ^pectizes' 
 almost instantaneously." 
 
 " Biology," vol. i. p. 486 :— 
 
 " Step by step as the aggregate molecules so resulting, grow 
 larger and increase in heterogeneity, they become more unstable, 
 more readily transformable by small forces, more capable of 
 assuming various characters. Those composing organic matter 
 transcend all others in size and intricacy of structure ; and in 
 them these resulting traits reach their extreme. As implied by 
 its name protein^ the essential substance of which organisms are 
 built, is remarkable alike for the variety of its metamorphoses, 
 and the facility with which it undergoes them ; it changes from 
 one to another of them on the slightest change of conditions." 
 
 The question thereupon arises how such units, so devoid of 
 stable shape and form, so susceptible to the least change of 
 conditions, can form the definite units by which structures are 
 built up, and result in shapes due to the definite units of which 
 they are so built up 1 
 
 If we follow out the latter idea in a structure containing 
 millions of millions of units, it is not so certain that, even if 
 any did contain units of a particular shape, there would be 
 much difference, for the differences of shape are lost in an 
 immense mass. A large building, for instance, may be built 
 as well of solid hexagons as of cubes. 
 
 However, to return to the question. Is it possible to get these 
 unstable, and indefinite, and changeable forms so fixed as to 
 have some definite result in structure, yet not so fixed as to 
 be incapable of change 1 We do not see how it can be done. 
 We are unable logically to follow Mr. Spencer's d priori process 
 to this result. If it is of the essence of complex colloid mole- 
 cules to be unstable, changeable in shape and polarities, we do 
 not see how they can ever reach definite properties. And even 
 though we grant that in a mass this changeableness to external 
 conditions would produce changes in different parts of the mass, 
 we do not see that any typical unit would be produced. The 
 undifferentiated and unspecialised unit in the interior would 
 remain unspecialised still, just as unstable and shapeless as ever. 
 And even if it be granted that differentiation and speciali- 
 
 A CONCRETE CASE OF RECONSTRUCTION, 427 
 
 sation took place throughout the mass, then still less is there 
 any typical physiological unit which, separated, would aggre- 
 gate to itself other molecules to form a similar heterogeneous 
 mass, by a process analogous to that seen in crystalloids. 
 
 We must, therefore, leave in the hands of the reader and 
 student the question how we can reconcile the unstable, sensi- 
 tive, changing character of colloid molecules with the structure 
 and' polarities of a physiological unit, aggregating in modes 
 analogous to crystals. We must also leave to his consideration 
 the question how an aggregate composed of bone, muscle, nerve, 
 &c., can have any specific physiological unit. We must further 
 leave him to decide how the physiological unit can be unspe- 
 cialised, when the germ-cell and sperm-cell are supposed to con- 
 tain physiological units differentiated as coming from different 
 ancestral sources, and therefore presumably specialised and pro- 
 ducing special results. To us it seems that the physiological 
 unit is a fast and loose object, which can be most effectively 
 used in the logic of biological reconstruction, but without being 
 capable either of definite application or definite criticism. 
 
 (m.) A Concrete Case of Biological Reconstruction. 
 
 We will now study a concrete case of biological reconstruction 
 in the definite history of a fertilised germ. We will take, for 
 instance, the case of an egg hatched upon an artificial incubator. 
 
 Now we are to suppose that one particular spot on the sur- 
 face of the yolk is a fertilised germ containing ten slightly 
 different physiological units, derived partly from the male and 
 partly from the female progenitor. The theory is that these 
 physiological units have the power of manufacturing by means 
 of their own structure and polarities the raw material of their 
 environment into units of the same constitution and polarities 
 as themselves ; and that the aggregation so formed will conse- 
 quently be homogeneous with the original physiological units : 
 with this proviso, that if there were slight differences in the 
 original units, the mass will be made up of patches of different 
 
 sorts. 
 
 This, it seems to us, would be the end of the process. To 
 
 
%; 
 
 428 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 proceed further we must refer to Mr. Spencer. We will first 
 quote a passage from " Biology," vol. ii. p. 8 : — 
 
 " We found ourselves obliged to recognise in these physio- 
 logical units, powers of arranging themselves into the forms of 
 the organisms to which they belong, analogous to the powers 
 which the molecules of inorganic substances have of aggregating 
 into specific crystalline forms. We have consequently to regard 
 this polarity of the physiological units, as producing, during 
 the development of any organism, a combination of internal 
 forces that expend themselves in working out a structure in 
 equilibrium with the forces to which ancestral organisms were 
 exposed ; but not in equilibrium with the forces to which the 
 existing organism is exposed, if the environment has been 
 changed. Hence the problem in all cases is, to ascertain the 
 resultant of internal organising forces, tending to reproduce the 
 ancestral form, and external modifying forces, tending to cause 
 deviations from that form." 
 
 The first remark to make is that we do not see how, during 
 this development (if such it can be called), the forces at work 
 inside the egg ever come into contact with " the forces to which 
 ancestral organisms were exposed." We might suppose, indeed, 
 that the fertilised germ containing the ten physiological units is 
 the result of those forces ; but when we have got these, they 
 become " a combination of internal forces," and are not subject 
 to any contact with external forces, storms, «fec., of a hundred 
 years ago. The problem has to be worked out from the factors 
 within the limits of the egg-shell, plus a certain amount of 
 communicated molecular motion — the ct priori result of which 
 would appear to be a jelly-like mass of patches manufactured 
 by the slightly different physiological units out of the substance 
 of the egg. 
 
 Elsewhere Mr. Spencer says that this internal development 
 proceeds as stated, subject to the modifying influences of 
 mechanical forces ; but in the case of an egg there are no such 
 interfering causes, except the simple and uniform force of the 
 communicated molecular motion called heat. 
 
 Let us how take the Appendix to vol. L Mr. Spencer says 
 (p. 484) :— 
 
 A CONCRETE CASE OF RECONSTRUCTION. 429 
 
 " There is no kind of rearrangement among molecules (crys- 
 tallisation being one) which the modern physicist does not 
 think of and correctly reason upon, in terms of forces and 
 motions like those of sensible masses. Polarity is regarded as 
 a resultant of such forces and motions ; and when, as happens 
 in many cases, light changes the molecular structure of a crystal, 
 and alters its polarity, it does this by impressing, in conformity 
 with mechanical laws, new motions on the constituent mole- 
 cules." 
 
 From this it appears that polarity is not a fixed and constant 
 property of the so-called elements. Polarity is only the resultant 
 of the internal forces and motions of the atom, which internal 
 forces and motions may be so altered by communicated motion 
 as to alter its polarity, and thereby its relations to other mole- 
 cules of the same sort and to molecules of other sorts will be 
 changed. But if this is the case, and if we are therefore unable 
 to tell the manner of these atomic variations of polarity, it seems 
 to us that we have no foundation for chemical science or mole- 
 cular physics. If polarity is a variable instead of being a fixed 
 and constant cause, and if it is liable to be affected in the 
 manner indicated, it surely loses its position as a ruler of struc- 
 tural change, and the confidence we are asked to repose in it as 
 an explanation of crystallisation and of organic structure is 
 
 destroyed. 
 
 But Mr. Spencer is talking about the influence of communi- 
 cated mechanical motion upon masses of molecules having 
 polarities— as, for instance, the influence of light upon crystal- 
 lisation. Now we apprehend that this kind of influence can 
 cause change of structural combination without supposing any 
 change of polarity in the molecules. 
 
 Then follows, on p. 486, a long account of the cumulative 
 aggregations of atoms into molecules, and of these into still 
 more complex molecules and systems of molecules, already par- 
 tially quoted, in order to show the changefuhiess, sensitiveness, 
 and morphological instability of these aggregates in proportion 
 to their complexity— to show a continually increasing diver- 
 gence from the well-known formative properties of crystalloids, 
 implying a continually decreasing typical form, and a conso- 
 
 le 1% 
 
430 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 quent continually decreasing power of construction into special 
 shapes. So much, indeed, are the polarities of these complex 
 molecules reduced, that they have little bond of union amongst 
 themselves — they seem only capable of being held together by 
 the simpler molecules of sulphur and phosphorus. 
 
 The next step in the argument is in the paragraph at the foot 
 of p. 486, where the fact of the existence of " physiological 
 units peculiar to each species of organism ^ is asserted. But 
 the statement is immediately weakened by the admission that 
 as the organism is made multitudinous in kind, so are these units 
 made multitudinous in kind. Which, then, of these is the 
 " physiological unit peculiar to the species ? " Which remains 
 undifferentiated and entitled to the name, and what becomes of 
 it 1 How comes it that it remains undifferentiated when, like 
 the others, it is in contact with larger organic masses exercising 
 coercive force ; and, producing others, is able at the proper time 
 to continue its work of reproduction ? And again, how are the 
 necessary arrangements to be made for effecting that combination 
 with the physiological units of another slightly differing indi- 
 vidual, in order to disturb its equilibrium, and set up a repetition 
 of changes in that portion of its constituents which is to undergo 
 a like series of differentiations ? 
 
 To return to our special study, the question arises how, in 
 the egg we have under consideration, these multitudinous 
 differentiations of the typical physiological unit are effected — 
 differentiations, we presume, into bone, muscle, nerve, and other 
 substances 1 
 
 " Every physicist will endorse the proposition that in each 
 aggregate there tends to establish itself an equilibrium between 
 the forces exercised by all the units upon each and by each 
 upon all." 
 
 This is a kind of proposition that can be accepted in its 
 absolute form, but is not capable of much practical illumination 
 nor of much d priori effect. If we apply it to our practical 
 problem, we do not get a chicken ; we are still in want of a 
 formula that will hatch the egg. 
 
 The next passage, on the one hand, is a reassertion of the 
 formative power of colloid molecules due to the equilibrations 
 
 t? 
 
 A CONCRETE CASE OF RECONSTRUCTION, 431 
 
 of their polarities, while on the other hand it seems to take 
 away almost as much from it by a reassertion of their morpho- 
 logical instability. 
 
 " As certainly as molecules of alum have a form of equili- 
 brium, the octahedron, into which they fall when the tempe- 
 rature of their solvent allows them to aggregate, so certainly 
 must organic molecules of each kind, no matter how complex, 
 have a form of equilibrium in which, when they aggregate, their 
 complex forces are balanced— a form far less rigid and definite, 
 for the reason that they have far less definite polarities, are far 
 more unstable, and have their tendencies more easily modified 
 by environing conditions. 
 
 "Equally certain is it that the special molecules having a 
 special organic structure as their form of equilibrium, must be 
 reacted upon by the total forces of this organic structure ; and 
 that if environing actions lead to any change of this organic 
 structure, these special molecules, or physiological units, subject 
 to a changed distribution of the total forces acting upon them, 
 will undergo modification — modification which their extreme 
 plasticity will render easy. By this action and reaction I con- 
 ceive the physiological units peculiar to each kind of organism, 
 to have been moulded along with the organism itself." 
 
 We will see how this applies to our egg. Firstly, the 
 physiological units manufacture similar units out of their en- 
 vironment, and then they range the new units with themselves 
 according to the "form of equilibrium in which . . . their 
 complex forces are balanced," resulting in a special organic* 
 structure. We do not know why the term organic is introduced 
 here. If it implies an organism, we have not arrived at that 
 yet as the result of the process of ranging the new molecules 
 into the " form of equilibrium " of the colloid molecules. 
 Suppose, however, that they may possibly range themselves 
 into such a regular form as to be caUed a structure. Then the 
 individual physiological units will be reacted upon by the total 
 forces of the structure. Still we do not see our way to any 
 definite structure. However, we find that the process is sup- 
 plemented by the action of external forces, and thus we have 
 a perpetual readjustment of balance, not only between units 
 
432 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 and the aggregate, but intermediately between the units and 
 the environment. Mr. Spencer sets down the balance to — 
 
 " Actions and reactions of the two, in which the units ever 
 tended to establish the typical form produced by actions and re- 
 actions in all antecedent generations, while the aggregate, if 
 changed in form by change of surrounding conditions, tended 
 ever to impress on the units a corresponding change of polarity, 
 causing them in the next generation to reproduce the changed 
 form — their new form of equilibrium." 
 
 But what about our egg expectant of the farmyard and 
 green fields? We do not see how any very great structural 
 change is effected beyond the patches of similar physiological 
 units accreted around the several original physiological units 
 with which we commenced. The theory of the reaction of the 
 aggregate on the units does not assist us towards the desired 
 differentiation of parts forming altogether a co-ordinated struc- 
 ture. The theory of the action of the environment is reduced 
 to the minimum of communicated warmth, for the contents of 
 the egg are not subjected to mechanical strains, or other exter- 
 nal forces. 
 
 However, we must bear in mind "that the proclivity of 
 units of each order towards the specific arrangement seen in the 
 organism they form is not to be understood as resulting from 
 their own structures and actions only ; but as the product of 
 these, and the environing forces to which they are exposed." 
 They must be " subject to heat of a given degree, that is, to the 
 unceasing impacts of undulations of a certain strength and 
 period ; and, within limits, the rapidity with which the physio- 
 logical units pass from their indefinite arrangement to the 
 definite arrangement they presently assume " (whij ?) ** is pro- 
 portionate to the strengths of the ethereal undulations falling 
 upon them." 
 
 This means that the definite form into which physiological 
 units aggregate is due not only to their structures and polarities, 
 but also to molecular and ethereal undulations. Yet, after all, 
 these only assist, not by modifying the shape or construction 
 of the aggregate, but by allowing full and free play to the con- 
 stituent molecules, and permitting the result the more fully and 
 
 l|i 
 
 BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION, 
 
 433 
 
 distinctly to be that consequent upon the structures and polari- 
 ties of these physiological units. So far our egg remains in the 
 state already described, and makes no progress towards a chicken. 
 
 The full statement is given thus: — "In its complete form, 
 then, the conception is that these specific melecules, having 
 the immense complexity above described, and having corre- 
 spondingly complex polarities which cannot be mutually balanced 
 by any simple form of aggregation, have for the form of aggre- 
 gation in which all their forces are equilibrated, the structure 
 of the adult organism to which they belong ; and that they are 
 compelled to fall into this structure by the co-operation of the 
 environing forces acting on them, and the forces they exercise 
 on one another — the environing forces being the source of the 
 power which affects the rearrangement, and the polarities of the 
 molecules determining the direction in which that power is 
 turned." 
 
 Here the theory is that the physiological units have such a 
 complex structure, and such complex polarities,— although these 
 latter, according to former statements, are in inverse ratio to the 
 former in degree of strength, — that the diverse molecules cannot 
 balance themselves with each other otherwise than by forming a 
 structure, in part resembling the organism from which they were 
 disparted, and more clearly assuming a complete likeness to it 
 (subject to external influences) in the adult form. We can only 
 say that we cannot discern the necessity for such a result. As 
 a matter of fact, we know this to be the actual course of things ; 
 but Mr. Spencer's object is to make us understand how it 
 comes about ; and to tell us that physiological units can only 
 balance one another's polarities by forming a structure like that 
 of the parent organism, is telling us nothing. We have only a 
 cloud of words. We need to know how the polarities of these 
 physiological units work so as to produce bone, and muscle, and 
 nerve, arranging them into a workable skeleton, a series of 
 muscles, nerves, and brain, organs of sight, hearing, &c., appar- 
 atus for breathing, food, assimilation, reproduction, &c., means 
 of locomotion, feathers, &c. To say that this is all explained 
 by the equilibration of the polarities of the original physiological 
 units, together with the assimilated units with ancestral forces, 
 
 2 E 
 
 1 ' f ■ 
 I -f 1 
 
 hi : 
 
434 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 or with present or anticipated forces, does not throw any light 
 
 upon the process. 
 
 We fail then to find a formula which shall hatch an egg. We 
 cannot in any definite manner say why one egg should turn out 
 a black Spanish cock, why another should bring forth a Brahma 
 hen, nor how it is that a third should produce a gosling. The 
 theory of aggregation analogous to that of crystallisation, by 
 which form and structure is produced according to the structure 
 and polarities of units, does not carry us beyond a homogeneous 
 jelly-like mass. To say that they must equilibrate by pro- 
 ducing the parental structure, without showing us the depen- 
 dence of each step of the process, is leaving the matter in such 
 a state of indefiniteness, incompleteness, and obscurity that it 
 cannot be said to be real knowledge, nor to constitute even an 
 intelligible hypothesis. 
 
 As mentioned on a previous occasion, we hold that Mr. 
 Spencer's main fault as a philosophic writer is in the misuse 
 of terms. He takes a word of definite meaning and concrete 
 application. He evolutionises it after the manner in which 
 he himself describes evolution, and of which he gives an 
 illustrative instance (p. 348), in showing how by insensible 
 modifications a circle can be transformed into a straight line. 
 We commence with the base of a cone, which gives a circle. 
 An insensible slicing process up one side of the cone gradually 
 gives various undistinguishable conic sections, till we finally 
 arrive at the straight line of the side of the cone. "Here we 
 have five difi'erent species of line— circle, ellipse, parabola, 
 hyperbole, and straight line, each having its peculiar proper- 
 ties and its separate equation, and the first and last of which 
 are quite opposite in nature, connected together as members of 
 one series, all productive by a single process of insensible 
 modification." By a similar method Mr. Spencer undertakes to 
 elude the logical faculty. In a similar manner by a series 
 of insensible modifications Mr. Spencer in the course, not of 
 processes, but of sentences, so changes the meaning of words as 
 to make them bear the most diverse applications. We have 
 already seen how the term Force has been universalised. We 
 have seen also how the term Equilibration has been made 
 
 AFFILIATION OF POLARITY ON EVOLUTION. 435 
 
 equivalent to Universal Causation ; and we have now a similar 
 instance in the remarkable growth and expansion which has been 
 given to the term Polarity, and to, the term physiological unit. 
 All these are words of definite meaning and limited application 
 in the first instance ; but by a system of gradual stretching, and 
 by perpetually concentrating the attention upon them, they are 
 forced to wider and wider applications, till at last they are so 
 universalised as to lose all real meaning. 
 
 In the case before us, polarity, which we can thoroughly 
 understand as applied to the crystallisation of inorganic sub- 
 stances, is so overloaded with properties and powers, and is so 
 expanded for the purpose of explaining all chemical and physio- 
 logical arrangements, that it ends in meaning nothing at all. 
 Fresh requirements, fresh properties needed — call them polari- 
 ties and let them equilibrate. We want growth and accretion 
 — we want modification of molecules — we want fresh aggre- 
 gates produced out of these modified molecules — call them 
 polarities and let them equilibrate. Anything, everything, is 
 polarity — anything, everything, is equilibration. Make these 
 terms vague and all-embracing, and you can deduce whatever 
 you will Put into them all that you want to get out of 
 them, and the deduction, though obscure, will be sufficient. 
 
 (n.) The Affiliation of Polarity upon Evolution in General, 
 and its Relation to Physical Science. 
 
 Our object now is to consider Polarity in its place in the 
 scheme for the unification of knowledge. Since this unification 
 is to be found in the process resulting from the interrelations of 
 primordial factors, it is necessary to inquire what part Polarity 
 plays in that process, and in what manner it is related to those 
 primordial factors. 
 
 In the first place we ask. Is it an original factor itself? 
 But in " First Principles," Mr. Spencer, in proposing to express 
 the correlations of the cosmic factors, does not even mention 
 Polarity. He says : — " The three factors are the Persistence of 
 Force, the Indestructibility of Matter, and the Continuity of 
 Motion." The law of their co-operation is expressed in terms 
 
436 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 of two of them in the Formula of Evolution. We will first 
 ask if Polarity is expressed or implied in the Formula of 
 Evolution. Is it implied, for instance, in Matter or in Motion, 
 in Integration or in Dissipation 1 We suppose we could not say 
 of Polarity that it is that manifestation of Force called Matter, 
 nor can we say that it is that manifestation of Force called 
 Motion. Neither can we say that it is a process like inte- 
 gration or dissipation. It seems to cause integration if not 
 dissipation, and therefore to be a cause of motion. If it is 
 to be called anything, it must be called a Force, or rather, since 
 there is not one polarity but many,— Forces. But no other kinds 
 or manifestations of Force other than Matter and Motion are 
 included in the Formula of Evolution ; and since the Forces of 
 Polarity are amongst the most important factors in cosmical 
 changes, it is evident that that Formula is very deficient in 
 definite intelligibility. 
 
 What then are we to say of Polarity as a mode of Force ? 
 Mr. Spencer teaches the interchangeableness of modes of Force. 
 Heat, light, electricity, &c. 1 Is then Polarity interchangeable 
 with 'them 1 Can the Polarity of an atom or molecule be 
 changed into the motion of that molecule or atom whereby it 
 loses°its Polarity? We do not see that such an interchange 
 can take place, for we do not discern that Polarity can be 
 a rate or mode of motion as the others are. The question 
 arises. Can Motion retain its place at all as one of the 
 primal factors of the cosmos, or is it only a result of the inter- 
 action of the primal factors 1 ^Must we dethrone the Continuity 
 of Motion from the important position in the unitative formula, 
 assigned to it by Mr. Spencer ] 
 
 Acrain, what are the relations of Polarity to Matter and the 
 indestructibility of Matter ? Matter may be regarded as a*, of 
 which we know nothing ; and in this case we have nothing to 
 say of the relations of Polarity to it. Or Matter may be regarded 
 as the sum total of the bundles of properties known to us as the 
 chemical elements. In the latter case, what position does 
 Polarity hold ? Is it something difi'erential in each kind of atom, 
 something inherent in it and essential to it, which it never loses 
 in any combination, but which rules these combinations in 
 
 AFFILIATION OF POLARITY ON EVOLUTION. 437 
 
 accordance with some laws of which we know nothing 1 Is it 
 something which cannot be disparted from each atom, and which 
 governs its behaviour to other atoms and molecules. If so, then 
 we have to speak of the Indestructibility of Polarity as one of 
 the fundamental facts of the universe. 
 
 If such be the case, then what is the law of the distribution 
 of polarity amongst the chemical elements, and what is the law 
 of their interrelations, by which some have superior affinities for 
 each other, and some have small affinities for each other, in infi- 
 nite varieties ? 
 
 The pursuit of this theme would lead us to an investigation 
 of chemical affinities. It would also lead to the consideration 
 of the constitution of molecules, if not of atoms, as well as to a 
 study of the nature of the correlations of the motions of mole- 
 cules and atoms with shapes and sizes and with special polari- 
 ties, undertaken with the view of ascertaining how polarity 
 worked, how it was dependent upon shapes and sizes, and how 
 far it was interfered with by molecular motions, all which 
 mi^ht help us to understand chemical combinations and 
 changes. Wliat is the cause, or rather what are the conditions, 
 of varieties of Polarity, and how far are they connected with 
 varieties of shape and modes and rates of motion 1 
 
 Then, again, we should have to consider the relation of special 
 polarities with simple polarity. How far does one affect the 
 actions of the other 1 How far do they coincide ? how far do 
 they counteract each other ? And indeed one might go so far as 
 to ask. Could the special polarities all be resolved into the one 
 simple polarity ? Further, one would ask of this simple polarity, 
 as of the special polarities, Is not all polarity double, involving 
 repulsion as well as attraction 1 
 
 We would also have to ask. Does polarity exhaust itself in 
 action ? is energy expended in the exercise of Polarity 1 Surely 
 yes ; and yet surely no, for what would atoms and molecules 
 be if they lost their polarity ? 
 
 In a more concrete investigation we should also have to 
 inquire into the action of that molecular motion called heat, 
 not only in disparting molecules associated together presumably 
 either by simple attraction or by special polarities, but also to 
 
i^iiiMxmssiMtmM 
 
 438 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 some extent in facilitating recombinations of atoms and mole- 
 cules. How does communicated motion aifect the mutual 
 polarities of intermixed masses, and what is the manner of the 
 influence exerted? 
 
 This would lead to a consideration of polarity as regards 
 equilibrium. Is equilibrium an equilibration of motions, an 
 equipoise of weights, a balancing of attractions, a balancing of 
 attractions and repulsions, a generating of opposing forces, or 
 what is it? Mr. Spencer throughout the *' Biology" largely 
 applies it to the balancing of polarities. It is not very clear 
 what this or its effects can be until we thoroughly understand 
 how far polarity varies, the laws of its variations, whether 
 dependent upon shape and size, whether differentiated in 
 strength, whether variable in mode or strength in the same 
 atom or molecule, modifiable by motion, different from and 
 affected by simple attraction or the attraction of gravitation, 
 how far polarities are negative and positive, &c. ; all of which 
 circumstances enter into the consideration of the balance of equi- 
 libration of polarities, and must be understood before anything 
 can be deduced from the bare statement that structure results 
 from the equilibration of the structure and polarities of mole- 
 cules. 
 
 The uncertainty as to the terms in which fundamental physical 
 science is to be discussed renders any unificatory endeavour par- 
 ticularly difficult. Apparently there are two primary concep- 
 tions as to the nature of the elementary factors. The first is 
 founded upon notions of pure mechanics, and carries out its 
 explanations in terms of the relations of shape and size, together 
 with the motions consequent upon simple attraction. A modi- 
 fication of this theory is that which looks for fundamental 
 explanations in rates or modes of motions or relative velocities. 
 The second theory recognises as ultimate certain special polari- 
 ties or affinities, although this theory may only hold a mediate 
 position, and may itself be explainable by the first. Between 
 these two theories, which may be termed respectively the 
 mechanical and the physical, Mr. Spencer wavers, basing his 
 explanations sometimes upon one and sometimes upon the other, 
 — a method which is rendered still more confused by the appli- 
 
 ' GENERAL REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT. 439 
 
 cation to the latter of the terms used to describe the general 
 facts of the former. This transferred application of mechanical 
 language to physical processes is a cause of endless confusion. 
 Until scientific men are agreed as to the terms in which funda- 
 mental physical science is to be discussed, no unificatory system 
 is possible. If, in addition, we have to find a jjlace in this 
 fundamental science for Feeling as a factor amongst the sequences 
 of the cosmos, the study is still farther, and perhaps hopelessly, 
 complicated. Yet to this conclusion we are almost inevitably 
 forced, for we cannot suppose that Feeling and Consciousness 
 entered upon the history of life uncaused and unrelated to 
 precedent inorganic developments. Consequent upon this con- 
 sideration is the " double-aspect " theory favoured by Mr. Spen- 
 cer, which can, however, furnish no explanations. 
 
 § 14. General Review of the Argument. 
 
 Our study, commencing with the Data of Biology and the 
 Definition of Life, resolved itself into the inquiry, *' How is or- 
 ganic evolution caused ? " The answer to this question furnished 
 us by Mr. Spencer is couched in terms of Equilibration. He 
 begins by recognising certain aggregates, the origin of which is 
 unexplained; and his omission of any explanation on this 
 point forms a fundamental defect in his historical account of 
 the sequences of the cosmos. These aggregates are moving 
 equilibria, possessed of inner formative forces which not only 
 equilibrate amongst themselves, but act under the restraints of 
 external forces. As moving equilibria they expend energy 
 which they endeavour to replace, and adapt themselves by a 
 process of counterbalance so as to antagonise such forces of the 
 environment as tend to their destruction. This theory of mov- 
 ing equilibria we have already sufficiently discussed. 
 
 We have found that these aggregates or organisms are 
 changed through the action of the environment by simple and 
 direct processes, according to the mechanical, chemical, or other 
 relations subsisting between them ; and also that such relations 
 involve indirect consequences. These are called Indirect Equili- 
 brations, because although they consist of successive or continuous 
 
440 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 processes, the action of the original incident force is not immedi- 
 ately, but only mediately and in a deferred manner, manifested 
 in some established change of the organism. 
 
 In the detailed account of morphological and physiological 
 evolution, however, we do not find that the explanations are 
 given in terms of abstract laws of force, but in terms of the con- 
 crete factors of which a list is furnished us in the three first 
 chapters of the first volume. These chapters recount on the 
 one hand a list of chemical elements forming the basis of organic 
 matter, and describe to us on the other hand the nature of those 
 forces which compose the external factors. In the detailed 
 accounts of development referred to, the term Equilibration is 
 employed simply as a general term alluding to the mutual action 
 of these factors, and not as a term of explanation ; nor is the 
 conception of a moving equilibrium of the least use in enabling 
 us to understand any process of organic evolution : it is merely 
 a general name applicable to the grand results which are sup- 
 posed to be really explicable from the known relationships of 
 concrete factors. 
 
 We also noted the defect in the argument from which it 
 would appear that feelings and facts of consciousness, up to their 
 most complex modes of existence, must, under the analogy of 
 the moving equilibrium, be regarded as forces generated by the 
 organism in antagonism to adverse external agencies, and there- 
 fore must be actual acting agencies as feelings in the physical 
 relations of the organism with its environment. This d priori 
 conclusion we justified by references to inductions from the 
 manifest physical arrangements of some organisms which recog- 
 nised feelings, as feelings, on the part of other organisms. We 
 thus established the fact that the subjective plays a part in the 
 physical changes and developments of organisms quite indepen- 
 dently of any theory as to the merely double aspect of such 
 subjectivity. [Nevertheless, we found that in Mr. Spencer's 
 account of physiological development the subjective obtained 
 no place, but that the whole of that development, including even 
 the origin of nerves and the evolution of the nervous system 
 with its consequent actions, was all wrought out in terms of 
 mechanical motion alone. 
 
 GENERAL REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT. 441 
 
 We found it necessary also to refer in a more marked manner 
 to a fundamental confusion of thought which pervades Mr. 
 Spencer's argument with regard to the factors of evolution, and 
 more particularly of organic evolution. The confusion of thought 
 is between the concrete factors themselves, and general pro- 
 cesses regarded as factors — a confusion of the concrete with the 
 abstract. Thus, as just indicated, the factors given to us at the 
 outset of our biological inquiry were the concrete chemical 
 substances oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, carbon, and a few others, 
 the properties and relations of which were very carefully con- 
 sidered. We were also furnished with an account of the vari- 
 ous external forces which played a part as factors in relation to 
 aggregates composed of the foregoing elements. Our inquiry, 
 therefore, was one as to the interaction of the formative tenden- 
 cies cd the elements (leaving unexplained the biologic tendencies 
 in the expenditure and replacement of energy) with the actions 
 of the external forces. The investigation was purely a concrete 
 one. The result was instability of the originally simple organic 
 aggregate ; segregation of like and unlike molecules ; the changes 
 due to the laws of mechanical agencies of various kinds ; the 
 multiplication of effects, rhythms, evolutions, dissolutions ; the 
 whole of which, again, can be summed up in the general term 
 Equilibration, or afterwards specialised as the equilibrations of 
 moving equilibria. 
 
 But singularly enough Mr. Spencer occasionally appears to 
 regard some of these terms themselves as factors. It is true 
 that in his resume of " External Factors," given in Chapter IX. 
 of Part III., he recounts the concrete agencies of an astronomic, 
 geologic, and meteorologic character, and also refers to the general 
 organic environment of animals and plants : but in the succeed- 
 ing chapter on " Internal Factors " the reference made to the 
 concrete chemical factors is but slight* The stress of the 
 explanation is placed upon the abstract factors; and first let 
 us see what he says as to the instability of the homogeneous, 
 from which it would appear that Mr. Spencer considers the 
 homogeneous must inevitably lapse into something else. 
 
 "Our postulate being that organic evolution in general 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 420. 
 
442 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 commenced with homogeneous organic matter, ... we have 
 first to remember that the state of homogeneity is an unstable 
 state." How Mr. Spencer can say this, and then proceed to 
 say that it requires external agencies to produce a change in this 
 homogeneous state, we cannot imagine. This, however, not 
 being enough, we are further asked to suppose the case of ** a 
 given whole," which, "instead of being absolutely uniform 
 throughout, consists of parts distinguishable from each other,"— 
 a distinction presupposed by Mr. Spencer in the differentiation 
 of the contractile molecules into muscular tissue, and of the irri- 
 table molecules into nervous tissue. Nevertheless Mr. Spencer 
 speaks of the gravitation from a state of homogeneity to a state 
 of heterogeneity,* although it will be more conspicuously shown 
 in proportion as the environment is complex. Thus : " Omitting 
 for the present those circumstances which check and qualify 
 its consequences, the instability of the homogeneous must be 
 recognised an ever-acting cause of organic evolution, as of all 
 
 other evolution." t 
 
 Next as to the Multiplication of Effects. " ^Vhen consider- 
 ing the causes of evolution in general, we further saw ('First 
 Principles,' § ii6) that the multiplication of effects aids con- 
 tinually to increase that heterogeneity into which homogeneity 
 inevitably lapses. . . . How this multiplication of effects con- 
 spires with the instability of the homogeneous to work an 
 increasing multiformity of structure in an organism, was shown 
 at the time ; and the foregoing pages contain further incidental 
 illustrations. Under the head ' Adaptation ' (§ 69) it was shown 
 that a change in one function must act and react through ever- 
 complicating perturbations on the rest; and that, eventually, 
 all parts of the organism must be modified in their states." J 
 
 The fact that a whole section of the chapter on " Internal 
 Factors " is devoted to its consideration would almost lead to 
 the presumption that the multiplication of effects is regarded 
 as a factor or cause instead of a result of evolution ; although 
 such a position is not actually claimed for it. 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 42T. 
 t Ibid., p. 422. + Ibid., p. 424. 
 
 GENERAL REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT, 443 
 
 The next section is devoted to " Segregation." 
 
 " One of the universal principles to which we saw that the 
 redistribution of matter and motion conforms, is that in any 
 aggregate made up of mixed units, incident forces produce 
 segregation, . . . and it was shown that the increasing integ- 
 ration and definiteness . . . results from this ('First Princi- 
 ples,' § 126)." 
 
 Here again the redistribution of matter and motion is said 
 to conform to a principle of which the proof is merely an in- 
 duction from their own actions. Nevertheless it is stated that 
 increasing integration and definiteness result from this principle. 
 Segregation is said to be produced, and we are therefore at a 
 loss to assign its place. Is it the name of the results or of the 
 principle which produced the results ? 
 
 It is clear, however, that these are but names of some of the 
 general processes resulting from the relations of the actual 
 factors, and it is doing Mr. Spencer an injustice to suppose that 
 he means otherwise, although his language and occasional dis- 
 proportionateness of treatment warrant the notice we have 
 taken of it. Even Equilibration holds its position but as the name 
 of a process and not as the name of a factor ; and although 
 Mr. Spencer's chapter on *' The Co-operation of the Factors " is 
 mainly concerned with summarising the relations of the pro- 
 cesses, yet it is only as processes resulting from the relations of 
 the true factors — the chemical constituents of the aggregate 
 organism, and the physical forces and varying conditions of the 
 environment 
 
 The great argument drawn from the laws of the moving 
 equilibrium is more a statement of results than a key to expla- 
 nations. In the summaries of biological development given in 
 Chapter I. it is very prominent. In the detailed explanations 
 of Chapter IL it is not given as an explanation of the means 
 for securing fresh energy in order to replace the expended 
 energies of the moving equilibrium; nor of the means for 
 effecting those adaptations by way of antagonism to external 
 destructive forces which it is supposed to necessitate; nor of 
 the means by which a species, considered as a moving equili- 
 brium, effects its continuance by reproduction of individuals, 
 
! .{ 
 
 444 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 which by analogy with the case of an individual moving equili- 
 brium should be considered an assimilation rather than a repro- 
 duction. Altogether, Mr. Spencer's grand principle of biologic 
 description is not a means of explanation at all, but only a 
 nomenclature of results. 
 
 The general tendency of the whole argument is merely to 
 give an" a priori justification for the doctrine of gradual and 
 natural development, in support of the similar inductions which 
 result from our concrete studies. Mr. Spencer endeavours to 
 show that such a view is not only reasonable but also necessary. 
 In this we hold that he has fully succeeded ; and if he had so 
 limited his claims, we should have had no occasion to subject 
 his works to so close a criticism. But there can be no doubt 
 that Mr. Spencer not only distinctly claims for that philosophy 
 at which he aims the full explanation of every existence, but 
 also endeavours to furnish us with a coherent system of sequences 
 from the primordial nebula to the present time. In this attempt 
 we consider he has failed, although in that bold endeavour he 
 has been successful in throwing light upon many great processes 
 of the cosmos, enlarging and giving definiteness to many of our 
 ill-formed conceptions, and pointing the way to further triumphs 
 of thought in the future. 
 
 An important consideration refers to the value and meaning of 
 those " mechanical interpretations " which Mr. Spencer claims 
 to have given * to the evolution of organisms generally, and to 
 the causes of organic change taught by Mr. Darwin in '' natural 
 selection," &c., specially. What Mr. Spencer means by "me- 
 chanical" is not very apparent. Clearly he cannot claim to 
 have made these ** interpretations " within the limits of the 
 terms in their strict applications as we find them in a work on 
 mechanics. Undoubtedly Mr. Spencer must refer to those first 
 principles of abstract dynamics which he derives from the Per- 
 sistence of Force. These abstract principles, however, being 
 derived by induction from a study of their sequences, the con- 
 verse result is inevitable. One part of the reasoning is but 
 
 ♦ Biology, vol. i. pp. 445, 457. 466, and generally the chapters on "Indirect 
 Equilibration " and " The Co-operation of the Factors." 
 
 THE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS. 445 
 
 complementary to the other. The inductive law becomes the 
 deductive principle. The process of deduction simply retraces 
 the steps of the inductive process. The Formula of Evolution 
 is as much the result of an induction as the means of a deduc- 
 tion. Indeed these abstract laws are of little use in deductive 
 explanations, as we have seen in our previous studies. All solid 
 and useful deductions have to be made from original concretes. 
 The onlv use of abstract laws is to show the uniformity of pro- 
 cess, which enlarges our view of the unity of nature, and facili- 
 tates the reasonings from concretes to concretes by expressing 
 their truths in general terms. Abstract terms are of no use 
 but as generals, and derive all their value from what they con- 
 tain of the concrete. A priori reasoning, is only useful as a 
 means of applying ci posteriori experience. 
 
 Therefore to find the unity of sequence which would unify 
 knowledge and attain the goal of philosophy as quoted from 
 Mr. Spencer at the outset of this work, we must be able to 
 deduce the origin of organisms and all their developments 
 from the concrete internal and external factors before referred 
 to. The identification of the general characteristics of these 
 processes with those of inorganic changes is not an explanation 
 of sequences at all. Notwithstanding Mr. Spencer's elaborate 
 work, we still find that the origin of organisms and of their 
 special characteristics cannot be deduced from their concrete 
 antecedents, whether we regard them as biologic moving equi- 
 libria, or as manifesting feeling and consciousness, or as having 
 the power of reproduction, which last aspect we shall now pro- 
 ceed to consider. 
 
 § 15. Tiled, priori Explanation of Genesis and Reproduction. 
 
 Hitherto we have taken the fact of genesis and reproduction 
 as unquestioned, and have considered each species of organism 
 very much as though it were one continuous existence. If a 
 species could be studied in this way— as being itself a con- 
 tinuous moving equilibrium acting in the same manner as an 
 individual organism, adapting itself by readjustment of its 
 inner forces so as to antagonise detrimental external forces, 
 
aiiiiiliiiHii'r''irrT 
 
 446 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 and so as to secure assimilation of those external forces which 
 are favourable to the continuance of its existence— the study 
 of biology would be very much simplified. But we hold that 
 the cases are not parallel. The suggested analogy between the 
 life of an individual and the continuance of a species does 
 not hold good. Although it is possible to find sufficient points 
 in common to enable us to formulate certain modes and pro- 
 cesses applicable to both, yet a deeper investigation shows an 
 essential distinction between the methods of continuance. The 
 life of the individual is protracted by the assimilation of energies 
 from the environment in replacement of the energies expended. 
 The species is continued not in this manner, but by the actual 
 multiplication of individuals ; and no analogy can be made out 
 between these two processes. Again, it would be difficult to 
 show that any individual, or even any group constituting part 
 of a species, had the same relation to the whole which any 
 separate organ bears in relation to the whole of an organism. 
 In the latter case there is a distinct interdependence of struc- 
 ture and function, in many instances of such a nature that 
 upon its sudden stoppage or severance the whole organism 
 perishes. The analogy between the constitution of an organism 
 and the constitution of a state was early recognised, as shown 
 in ^sop's fables and St. Paul's Epistles ; but we do not think 
 that Mr. Spencer's analogy carries the matter one step in ad- 
 vance. The writers referred to used the analogy for rhetorical 
 purposes. We have to regard its import scientifically and logi- 
 cally, and we do not find that the conception of a species as a 
 moving equilibrium accords with the conception of an indivi- 
 dual organism as a moving equilibrium, so that the existence and 
 modes of continuance of both can be explained and expressed in 
 common language as deductions from the ideal abstract con- 
 ception of a moving equilibrium. 
 
 Before entering farther upon this inquiry, let us first consider 
 the question whether, upon the supposition of the continuous 
 existence of an individual organism, the same diversity of morpho- 
 lo^ncal and physiological development could have taken place 
 as under the system of successions of individuals. 
 
 *' It is manifest ct priori, that since changes in the physical 
 
 THE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS. 447 
 
 state of the environment, as also those mechanical actions and 
 those variations of available food which occur in it, are liable 
 to stop the processes going on in the organism ; and since the 
 adaptive changes in the organism have the effects of directly 
 or indirectly counter-balancing these changes in the environ- 
 ment ; it follows that the life of the organism will be short or 
 long, low or high, according to the extent to which changes in 
 the environment are met by corresponding changes in the 
 organism. Allowing a margin for perturbations, the life will 
 continue only while the correspondence continues^ the com- 
 pleteness of the life will be proportionate to the completeness 
 of the correspondence ; and the life will be perfect only when 
 the correspondence is perfect." * 
 
 From this it would appear that there is no a priori necessity 
 for death ; and when we consider the characteristics of the 
 ideal abstract moving equilibrium from which the working 
 principles of the concrete organism are deduced, it is clear 
 that a moving equilibrium which possessed the power not only 
 of adapting its inner forces so as to counter-balance inimical 
 external forces, but also of doing this continuously from its 
 other faculty of replacing the energies thus expended by assi- 
 milating external energy, — might continue in existence for ever 
 in some modified form. 
 
 Although, however, there is no ct priori necessity for death, 
 still we can see the great probability of its occurrence in the 
 accumulation of failures of adjustment on the part of the mov- 
 ing equilibrium, and in the possibilities of the failures of supply 
 of the replacing energy. Failing the means of reproduction, 
 moving equilibria would therefore become extinct, or might be 
 originated de novo in the same manner as existent or preceding 
 organisms ; but the life history of each would be determined 
 absolutely by its own relations to its own environment. The 
 suggestion we here wish to make is, that such developments 
 could never attain to the complexity and variety we see 
 exhibited in the actual world. We find, accordingly, that re- 
 production and heredity play a very important part in Mr. 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 82. 
 
448 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Spencer's scheme of biological reconstruction. Without their 
 assistance we believe Mr. Spencer could not theoretically have 
 accomplished any of his explanations. The inquiry, therefore, 
 as to the d, priori explanation of genesis, reproduction, and 
 heredity assumes great importance. 
 
 Such an inquiry must, according to the terms of our hypothe- 
 sis, be worked out with reference to the requirements and consti- 
 tution of our ideal abstract moving equilibrium. From the 
 conception of the nature of this moving equilibrium and its 
 relations to external forces, it is required that we should deduce 
 the reproduction of other moving equilibria which are copies of 
 itself. 
 
 We must attempt this problem either independently or by 
 the means furnished us by Mr. Spencer. We are afraid, how- 
 ever, that, as an independent logical endeavour, we are unable to 
 make a single deductive step in the direction desired. The con- 
 crete instances in the physical world from which we derived our 
 conception of a moving equilibrium were the solar system and 
 the spinning-top ; and to these were superadded the conception of 
 the supply and expenditure of energy derived from the steam- 
 engine, although the latter is a mental act which we are not 
 really able to achieve, and merely allow for the sake of the argu- 
 ment which Mr. Spencer advances. We wish to pursue the sub- 
 ject beyond tlie initial steps, but to thosestepswe nevertheless offer 
 the strongest objections. Given such a conception, we can, it is 
 true, deduce protracted if not eternal existence, so long as there 
 are external forces to be assimilated and used up in the mainten- 
 ance of the moving equilibrium, and so long as the external inimi- 
 cal forces which have to be antagonised are not of such a nature 
 as absolutely to destroy the moving equilibrium itself. But we can- 
 not see the least reason to suppose that, under any circumstances 
 whatever, this moving equilibrium would propagate itself — would 
 ever out of the superabundance of supply receive more energy 
 than it expended; and even if it did, that it would do more than 
 auf^ment in bulk. We cannot imagine that it would ever tend 
 to organise these supplies into separate and independent copies 
 of itself. 
 
 Let us therefore see what Mr. Spencer has to say upon the 
 
 ,\ 
 
 ) 
 
 THE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS. 449 
 
 subject. It is evident that the d, priori explanation must be 
 found either in abstract considerations such as those just dis- 
 cussed, or in the relations and properties of the concrete 
 chemical elements, and their complex combinations out of 
 which organisms have originated, and are supposed to have been 
 developed in conjunction with their environment. To carry 
 out our examination of Mr. Spencer's views, we shall have 
 to study principally Chapters VIL to X. in Part II. of the 
 " Biology." 
 
 Chapter VII. is devoted to an account of the " Inductions of 
 Genesis " leading up to the statement — 
 
 " The above induction is an approximate answer to the 
 question — When does gamogenesis recur ? but not to the ques- 
 tion which was propounded — WJiy does gamogenesis recur? — 
 Why cannot multiplication be carried on in all cases, as it is 
 in many cases, by agamogenesis ? As already said, biologic 
 science is not yet advanced enough to reply. Meanwhile, the 
 evidence above brought together suggests a certain hypothetical 
 answer, which it may be well to set down. 
 
 *' Seeing, as we do, on the one hand, that gamogenesis recurs 
 only in individuals that are approaching towards a state of 
 organic equilibrium ; and seeing, on the other hand, as we do, 
 that the sperm-cells and germ-cells, thrown off by such indi- 
 viduals, are cells in which developmental changes have ended 
 in quiescence, but in which, after their union, there arises a 
 process of active cell-formation ; we may suspect that the 
 approach towards a state of general equilibrium in such gamo- 
 genetic individuals, is accompanied by an approach towards 
 molecular equilibrium in them. And the need for this union 
 of sperm-cell and germ-ceU, is the need for overthrowing this 
 equilibrium, and re-establishing active molecular change in the 
 detached germ — a result which is probably effected by mixing 
 the slightly different physiological units of slightly different 
 individuals." * 
 
 Mr. Spencer, however, professes to consider the question 
 more fully in Chapter X., after having considered the subjects 
 
 ♦ Biology, voL i. p. 233. 
 
 2 F 
 
MHMH 
 
 
 450 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 of heredity and variation. In the meantime, is it not singular 
 that the question as put by Mr. Spencer is not, " Why does 
 genesis take place?" but "Why does gamogenesis recur ^ 
 Surely what we desire to have explained in the first place is 
 the necessity for genesis at all. Taking this for granted as 
 Mr Spencer does, it may be comparatively easy to hnd 
 answers to subordinate questions ; but the mind of the reader 
 will remain unsatisfied as long as no answer is found to the 
 great preliminary question. This question Mr. Spencer passes 
 over in absolute silence. And on examining the course of 
 thoucrht pursued in suggesting an answer to the special question 
 proposed, we find the whole burden of the d priori explana- 
 tion rests upon a supposed but unproved -need" or necessity 
 for the continuance of the species. This requires the re-estab- 
 lishment of active molecular change in the detached germ, and 
 explains "the need for overthrowing this equilibrium," and 
 the " need for the union of the sperm-ceU and the germ-cell, 
 which are supposed to be in a state of " molecular equilibrium " 
 (whatever that may be), consequent upon the approach of the 
 organism to a state of general equilibrium. This, again, implies 
 the "need" for those organs which ensure the union of the 
 two cells ; and if " feeling " is a factor in the organism, caUed 
 forth by the action of the forces in the environment as a means 
 of defeating them, if not in individual sur-ival, then in vicarious 
 survival, we perceive the " need " for those feelings which bring 
 the orcranisms together in effectuating such an union of sperm- 
 ceUs and germ-cells. But this throws the whole onus of the 
 arcrument upon the "need" for the continuance of species-a 
 ** need " which ought to be explicable from the constitution 
 of the ideal abstract moving equilibrium, but which we have 
 seen is not thus deducible. Obviously upon the hypothesis 
 genesis should be explicable as a rearrangement by an organism 
 of its own forces, for its own individual maintenance against 
 some destructive force of the environment. 
 
 The important part which this " need " for the continuance 
 of the species has actually played in the development of 
 organisms, if Mr. Darwin's theories are true, cannot but be 
 acknowledged as wonderful, both for its extent and the immense 
 
 
 THE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS. 451 
 
 variety of its influences. It is as though Nature had said, 
 " I have need of the continuance of species," and all the adjec- 
 tives in the vocabulary rushed to offer their aid jointly and 
 severally ; — softness that should contain the seed and protect 
 it uninjured, hardness that should defy the outrage of the 
 elements, solidity that should present a firm resistance to the 
 shocks of earth, lightness that should waft the seed on zephyr wings 
 through the air, profusion that should defy destruction, whatever 
 individuals might perish in the chances and changes of the great 
 life conflict. Then the flowers and their sexual loves afford a 
 wonderful contemplation in connection with their servants the 
 insects. How wonderful the structural developments in rela- 
 tion to their winged messengers of love ! how beautiful, how 
 sweet their varied attractions ! how rich the banquet provided 
 for the welcome guests ! how sharp the defences against the 
 intrusion of the smooth-coated plunderer, who would despoil 
 without rendering the erotic service! Then again the birds, 
 with their wings and their plumage and their antics, all to win 
 the love and admiration of their mates ; the soft nest, the hard 
 coating provided for the eggs, and the instinct of the parents 
 for the care of the young. But in the insect world is displayed 
 the most wonderful adaptation for the preservation of the 
 race. The ant tribe seems almost to exist for the continu- 
 ance of its species alone. The whole life-interest of the com- 
 munity seems concentrated on preservation. Bee communities 
 also partake of the same characteristic. By force or persuasion, 
 all animated nature is urged on involuntarily to the union of 
 the sperm and the germ. Even in the human race, where 
 the volitional is partially predominant, sexual feeling is one 
 of the strongest passions; and in spite of all prudential 
 considerations, in spite of the responsibilities of a family, and 
 the risks or certainties of harassing and lifelong poverty and 
 care, youths and maidens are forced on to the propagation of 
 the race. It is true that in man there are often many hi^^h 
 and noble motives engaged in the fact of a marriage; but 
 sexual love is the fundamental basis. For this master-pas- 
 sion men and women will sacrifice much. It is the parent of 
 noble endeavour, of wonderful industrial energy, of beautiful 
 
 II 
 
452 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 self-sacrifice and self-rule, and alas ! also of sacrifices of all that 
 is good and noble— the destruction, as by a fire-blast, of character 
 and position, of domestic happiness and of self-respect. Thus 
 even man is made the sport of this need for the preservation 
 of the species, and all animated nature seeks its continuance. 
 
 But whence this ''needl" Surely to say that the necessity 
 for the continuance of the species produced the means and 
 the desire, and the adaptations for effecting it, is to confound 
 the end with the cause. It is to reverse the order of an 
 evolution which derives all its force and all the direction of 
 its developments from an initial activity. If the need for 
 the continuance of the species caused the means for its continu- 
 ance, then structure and function have a teleological purpose ; 
 design is implied, and a designer. The means are provided for 
 an end ; the end is foreseen ; and according to the necessities of 
 each case the means are provided. This is enough to shake 
 our faith in non-teleological theories to the very foundation. 
 Evolution has no explanation to offer for genesis ; it can show no 
 need for it in the primal constitution of things ; it can deduce 
 it from none of its factors. 
 
 We do not indeed ask if there is any need for the propagation 
 of the elementary substances, for they remain a constant quan- 
 tity. But we might ask, Is there not just as great a need for 
 the continuance of any of the chemical compounds as for the 
 continuance of an organism 1 We might ask, Is there not a 
 need for the propagation of the solar system, which is a moving 
 equilibrium t We might ask. Is there not just as much a need, 
 and a need founded only upon precisely the same deductive 
 necessity, for the continuance of the compound called water, or 
 air, or salt — compounds which are not quantitatively permanent, 
 but which are subject to dissolution. If we can deduce the 
 need of their continuance, we can deduce the need for their 
 propagation ; and if we cannot deduce from " First Principles " 
 the need for the continuance of chemical compounds or species 
 of organisms, we cannot deduce from it any of the structural and 
 functional arrangements of organisms for effecting that object. 
 
 We see, then, that, as a purely deductive reasoning process, 
 this chapter affords no explanations. The premisses from 
 
 M 
 
 THE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS. 453 
 
 which we are to deduce our explanations are nowhere given ; 
 and any that we guess at as probable premisses turn out to 
 be inadequate. 
 
 We have searched the chapter on the " Differentiation of the 
 Outer Tissues " and that on the " Differentiation of the Inner 
 Tissues" for a deductive warrant for genesis and reproduction, but 
 all in vain. The chapter on "Physiological Development" also 
 fails to throw any light upon this subject. Only when we come 
 to the chapter on " Direct Equilibration " is the matter referred 
 to at all. Direct equilibration is the balancing of a new incident 
 force by a new structural arrangement, which has already been 
 explained. Mr. Spencer says in this chapter that although 
 many functional adaptations are explicable in this way, there 
 are many that are not so explicable^ as there is no external 
 incident force to be set over against them as their cause — and 
 amongst these he mentions genesis or reproduction. There is 
 no incident force tending to produce a counter-force of function, 
 similar to the case of the production of nerves by incident 
 motions, of eyes by incident light, &c. 
 
 Therefore this, along with other cases, is left over for expla- 
 nation in the succeeding chapter, which treats of "Indirect 
 Equilibration." What, then, is indirect equilibration? It 
 turns out not to be equilibration at all. It is not equilibration 
 in the ordinary mechanical sense of working towards a state of 
 quiescence, nor is it equilibration in the arbitrary meaning 
 accorded to it by Mr. Spencer, of one force directly or indirectly 
 producing a counter-force or opposite motion in a moving equi- 
 librium ; and the instances given show that it is not an equili- 
 bration of any kind. A case adduced is this : Suppose the 
 seed of a tree (which seed has light hairs or down) is blown by 
 the wind upon a soil having in it material by which this down 
 in subsequently-produced seeds is made to grow longer ; the 
 seeds will thereafter be scattered over a wider area, and the tree 
 will increase and multiply over a greater extent, than it would 
 have done before. This, we take it, is merely an interfering 
 cause producing a certain new effect; but what there is of 
 equilibration about it we fail to see, unless all effects are 
 equilibrations of all causes. However, be it what it may, the 
 
454 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 fact remains that none of the important cases specially reserved 
 to be dealt with under this heading are even referred to. All 
 we know is that Mr. Spencer says genesis cannot be accounted 
 for by direct equilibration, and that he does not attempt to 
 account for it even by indirect equilibration. 
 
 If we proceed now to examine the suggested d, priori ex- 
 planation of heredity given on p. 253, we find, firstly, that 
 no such explanation is to be expected in the present state 
 of Biology. The suggested analogies between the process of 
 crystallisation and organic structure we considered in a pre- 
 vious section. Variation, treated of in Chapter IX., depends 
 upon the explanation of genesis and heredity. Thus we are 
 brought round at last to resume the study of the d, priori ex- 
 planations of genesis postponed by Mr. Spencer from Chapter 
 VII. to Chapter X. The argument quoted by us from the 
 former is reproduced for consideration in the latter. How is it 
 dealt with? 
 
 We are surprised to find that the question considered is not 
 the ct jyriori explanation of genesis, but the question, " Wliy 
 does gamogenesis recur T' The answer is an explanation of 
 the necessity for gamogenesis. This necessity is found in 
 the end, and not, strange to say, in the primary conditions. 
 Mr. Spencer's statement is to the effect that those moving 
 equilibria called organisms, in the course of their individual 
 growth and development, arrive at a time when they attain a 
 certain definite balance of parts and of external relations. The 
 attainment of this state causes the physiological units of which 
 they are composed also to exhibit an approach to equilibrium ; 
 although it is not clear whether Mr. Spencer refers to all the 
 physiological units of the organism, or only to those which are 
 freely floating in the interior fluids, or to those, again, which are 
 specially secreted in the organs of reproduction. It is on ap- 
 proaching this state of general equilibrium that the organism gives 
 off those physiological units which are to form the nucleus of fresh 
 organisms. These being almost in a state of equilibrium, — a 
 state which is effected very shortly after parting from the parent 
 organism — are not fitted of themselves, Mr. Spencer argues, to 
 fulfil the office of reproduction ; though the reason why is not 
 
 u 
 
 K i 
 
 THE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS. 455 
 
 apparent. But since the union with a slightly different physio- 
 logical unit from a slightly different organism would be calcu- 
 lated ct priori to initiate constructive changes, these combined 
 activities under favourable conditions would cause such growth 
 and development as to result in a new organism, combining in 
 varied forms the properties of both parent organisms. Mr. 
 Spencer shows indeed the reasonableness of this supposition ; 
 but he shows it too well ; for he implies an adaptation of means to 
 the accomplishment of an end. The process is essentially teleo- 
 logical. The need for the continuance of species being taken for 
 granted, then, since the simple casting off of physiological units 
 is insufficient to accomplish it, means for the union of two 
 cells are requisite : therefore they are produced. But this is 
 not d, priori reasoning. The deductive process requires that we 
 should be able to discern why those moving equilibria called 
 organisms should cast off certain portions of themselves made 
 out of the assimilated forces, not in the way of manufac- 
 ture by each special organ of units suitable for its own repair, 
 nor yet in the way of floating units in the general circulation 
 of such nature as to produce results due to their own pro- 
 perties and polarities, but in a special manner and by special 
 organs. This first act, however, is not explained. There is 
 no reason d priori in the nature of moving equilibria, nor in 
 their relations to the environment, to justify any such process. 
 Now granting such a process, is there any ct priori necessity 
 in the admitted incapacity of the physiological unit to repro- 
 duce its parent (which by the analogy of crystallisation it ought 
 to do) — is there any logical necessity for supposing that organ- 
 isms, having regard to this failure, should produce adaptive 
 arrangements for accomplishing an union of two such slightly 
 different units? It is not even deducible ct priori that the 
 union of two slightly different physiological units of separate 
 organisms would result in another perfect organism. We 
 must conclude that Mr. Spencer's ct priori explanation of 
 genesis and reproduction is a complete failure. 
 
 We do not know that it is requisite to examine Mr. Spencer's 
 reasoning in detail. He commences by endeavouring to establish 
 as an universal doctrine the theory that the aggregate exercises 
 
456 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 a coercive force over its units.* This is shown by references to 
 chanjres in the molecular arrangement of iron and unannealed 
 glass, and by the process of crystallisation. Organisms are 
 said to display the same characteristics. But this we dispute ; 
 for while the characteristic of the inorganic changes referred to 
 lies in the fact that the whole coerces the parts into uniformity 
 of arrangement, the characteristic of organisms is the incoer- 
 cibility of the parts, the retention of individuality by the separate 
 organs. 
 
 Mr. Spencer argues that in the early stages of the evolution 
 of an organism the molecular forces possess "an immense 
 excess " over " those antagonist forces which the aggregate 
 exercises on the molecules." We do not consider this intelli- 
 gible, but " while this excess continues, it is expended in growth, 
 development, and function, — expenditure for any of these pur- 
 poses being proof that part of the force embodied in molecular 
 tensions " (query) ** remains unbalanced Eventually, however, 
 this excess diminishes." But can Mr. Spencer show that the 
 units of a moving equilibrium, the only characteristics of which 
 are due to their position as members of a mutually balanced 
 system of forces, possess any power when separated from that 
 system of reconstructing from the forces of the environment a 
 copy of the system of which they formed a part ? And then can 
 he show that the molecular activities of this member, together 
 with those which it succeeds in coercing, will jointly possess such 
 a reconstructive power, until a complete system of balance is 
 attained, after which this system of balance coerces its origina- 
 tors ? And can he further show that under these circumstances 
 the balance of forces requires that some should be expended in 
 reproduction? "We do not think that he can establish this 
 theory by any process of abstract reasoning, not even if we 
 begin by granting the theory that a species is itself a moving 
 equilibrium. The whole of the reasoning on pages 274 and 
 275 is merely an attempt to translate the facts of Biology 
 relating to reproduction into terms of the relations of forces, 
 without any endeavour at all to show the deductive connection ; 
 and yet this is supposed to be an ct priori explanation ! 
 
 * Biology, vol. i. p. 274. 
 
 * 
 
 
 C 
 
 4 
 
 THE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS. 457 
 
 But it is evident that the mere translation of all biological 
 processes into terms of force, the mere representation of them 
 in other language, albeit the language is of the most abstract 
 and universal applicability, does not amount to an explanation 
 of the order of sequences by which we would be able to under- 
 stand how such and such a particular phenomenon occurred. 
 
 Section 96 exhibits in a very remarkable manner the faulty 
 conclusions to which a consistent ct priori thinker is inevitably 
 
 led. 
 
 " And so we reach the remarkable conclusion, that the life of 
 a species, like the life of an individual, is maintained by the 
 unequal and ever-varying actions of incident forces on its 
 different parts. An individual homogeneous throughout, 
 and having its substance everywhere continuously subject to 
 like actions,* could undergo none of those changes which life 
 consists of ; and similarly, an absolutely uniform species, having 
 all its members exposed to identical influences, would be 
 deprived of that initiator of change which maintains its exis- 
 tence as a species, t Just as, in each organism, incident forces 
 constantly produce divergences from the mean state in various 
 directions, which are constantly balanced by opposite divergences 
 indirectly produced by other incident forces ; and just as the 
 combination of rhythmical functions thus maintained, constitutes 
 the life of the organism ; so, in a species, . . . it is similarly 
 by the rhythmical production and compensation of these con- 
 trary deviations, that the species continues to live." The point 
 to be here considered is this — Does a species live except as by 
 the existence of the individuals composing it? Mr. Spencer seems 
 to regard it as having an individual and corporate existence 
 capable of being spoken of in analogous terms. And since a 
 homogeneous organism under homogeneous circumstances would 
 not be an organism, he argues that an absolutely uniform species 
 under identical influences would not maintain its existence as a 
 
 * This is an impossible supposition according to Mr. Spencer's teaching 
 in thechapteron the "InsUbility of the Homogeneous" in "First Principles." 
 
 + Surely this is a new theory, that the initiators of change maintain the 
 existence of species. Mr. Darwin's theory is that they cause the origin 
 and change of species. 
 
 \ 
 
458 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 species because it would not manifest those adaptations which 
 constitute life. Does he mean that the species would die out 
 because it had become perfectly adapted to its homogeneous 
 circumstances 1 " The moving equilibrium in a species, like 
 the moving equilibrium in an individual, would rapidly end in 
 complete equilibration or death, were not its continually dissipated 
 forces continually resupplied from without." What is the 
 " without " of a species considered as a whole, and how does it 
 as a species dissipate its forces, and get resupplied from without 1 
 The argument requires that changed incident forces should be 
 the forces supplied; but surely changed conditions are not 
 necessary for the continuance of a species. 
 
 A priori reasoning, begins in words and ends in words; and 
 this Chapter X. exemplifies throughout in a remarkable manner 
 the futility of all such efforts for the investigation of truth. 
 
 In the chapter on the *' Laws of Multiplication " in vol il we 
 find a half-suppressed, half-expressed recognition of the need 
 for the continuance of species. 
 
 p. 291. — "If organisms have been evolved, their respective 
 powers of multiplication must have been determined by natural 
 
 causes." 
 
 P. 393, § 317. — "The individuals of every species being thus 
 dependent on certain environing actions ; and severally having 
 their moving equilibria sooner or later overthrown by one or 
 other of these environing actions ; we have next to consider in 
 what ways the environing actions are so met as to prevent 
 extinction of the species." 
 
 Here is disclosed the whole tenor of Mr. Spencer's theory. 
 The necessity for multiplication of the species does not arise 
 from inherent necessities of the constituents of the cosmos, and 
 is not one of the inevitable sequences from their existence, 
 but it arises from the final aim and intention of preserving the 
 species from extinction. This is the great end for the accom- 
 plishment of which adequate means have to be provided. 
 
 Having this necessity in view, Nature seeks the preservation 
 of all special modes of life in various ways (pp. 394 and 395). 
 
 Firstly, in the preservation of the individual. 
 
 Secondly, in the reproduction of the species. 
 
 
 I ^ 
 
 THE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS, 459 
 
 The favourable and adverse influences affecting both processes 
 are recounted, and Mr. Spencer continues : — 
 
 "§318. Such are the factors with which we are here con- 
 cerned. I have presented them in abstract shapes, for the 
 purpose of showing how they are expressible in general terms 
 of force— how they stand related to the ultimate laws of re- 
 distribution of Matter and Motion." 
 
 The unification sought, then, is to be found in ultimate 
 universal propositions. 
 
 " For the purposes of the argument now to follow, we may, 
 however, conveniently deal with these factors under a more 
 familiar guise. Ignoring their other aspects, we may class the 
 actions which affect each race of organisms as forming two con- 
 flicting sets. On the one hand, by what we call natural death, 
 by enemies, by lack of food, by atmospheric change, &c., the 
 race is constantly being destroyed. On the other hand, partly 
 by the endurance, the strength, the swiftness, and the sagacity 
 of its members, and partly by their fertility, it is constantly 
 being maintained. These conflicting sets of actions may be 
 generalised as the forces destructive of race and the forces pre- 
 servative of race." 
 
 Surely this is a bad piece of generalisation which specifies 
 natural death, lack of food, &c., as forces, and classifies together 
 fertility, strength, sagacity, &c., as forces. The word "force" 
 seems to lend itself to any emergency, and appears able to cover 
 up in its mysterious folds all awkward transitions in Mr. 
 Spencer's arguments. 
 
 The argument so far stands thus :—We have to see how the 
 laws of multiplication stand related to the ultimate laws which 
 aff'ect the redistribution of Matter and Motion ; and the factors 
 with which we have to deal are the favourable forces and the 
 adverse forces aff'ecting the continuance of the individual ex- 
 istence and the continuance of the species. This leads us to 
 Chapter II., the " 1 Priori Principle." 
 
 Sections 319, 320, and 321 show how Forces always tend 
 through rhythmical movements towards an equilibrium— a 
 moving equilibrium— and thus species are continuous moving 
 equilibria. 
 
46o SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 "While, therefore, on the one hand, we see that the con- 
 tinued existence of a species necessarily implies some action by 
 which the destructive and preservative forces are self-adjusted ; 
 we see, on the other hand, that such an action is an inevitable 
 consequence of the universal process of equilibration." 
 
 So far it is not made out that there need be in the nature 
 of things any continuance of an individual or of a species. 
 Nor do we see why the individual, when once formed, should 
 not exist for as many thousand years as the external conditions 
 are favourable. But if there is an external force of cats acting 
 adversely to the internal force of mice, it is clear that the mouse 
 force will be limited; and if it were not for the favourable 
 forces of nimble legs, scraps of food, reproduction, &c., mouse 
 force would come to an end. All these competitive organisms, 
 however, are subject to such mutual adjustment and rhyth- 
 mical predominances of forces as prove preservative of all of 
 them in some kind of re-adjustment. 
 
 P. 394. — " We have next to consider in what ways the envi- 
 roning actions are so met as to prevent extinction of the spe- 
 cies." This is evidently a teleological thought. Again, " There 
 are both active and passive adaptations by which organisms are 
 enabled to survive adverse influences." Once more, " The first 
 class consists of self-protective arrangements. The second pro- 
 cess by which extinction is prevented — the formation of new 
 individuals to replace the individuals destroyed — is carried on 
 as described in the chapter on * Genesis.* " 
 
 A little farther on the matter is complicated by a change of 
 idea, when it is observed (p. 401), "The forces preservative of 
 race are two — ability in each member of the race to preserve 
 itself, and ability to produce other members ; power to maintain 
 individual life, and power to generate the species." Passing 
 over the strange application of the term forces, we are brought 
 back to the preservation of the race in the theory that, given 
 the need for such preservation, these miist vary inversely. Mr. 
 Spencer certainly limits his ifemarks to races which continuously 
 survive ; but there is a suggestion in the background that 
 unless extinguished by utterly overthrowing forces, races ought 
 in the nature of things continuously to survive. 
 
 < i 
 
 
 THE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS. 461 
 
 For example, Mr. Spencer says on p. 410 — 
 " Thus, then, the condition which each race must fulfil if it 
 is to survive, is a condition which, in the nature of things, it 
 ever tends to fulfil. In the last chapter we saw that a species 
 cannot be maintained unless the power to preserve individual 
 life and the power to propagate other individuals vary inversely. 
 And here we have seen that, irrespective of an end to be sub- 
 served, these powers cannot do other than vary inversely. On 
 the one hand ... it is requisite that they should have great 
 ability to form new individuals, and vice versa. On the other 
 hand that they should have great power of self -maintenance." 
 
 It is needless to say that there is nothing in a mechani- 
 cal theory, or in the laws of force, or in the Formula of 
 Evolution, or even in the laws of equilibration — however 
 Mr. Spencer would prefer his theory of the universe to be 
 named — which has any regard for the survival of any of its 
 productions. Aggregates are formed in the working out of its 
 constituents: and if we could make out that organisms are 
 among the aggregates so formed, we can see no reason why these 
 should be preserved any more than a piece of salt rock or 
 crystal Nature is indifferent to her productions, and has no 
 7i€ed for any organism to continue. If organisms do continue 
 and if organisms propagate, it is not for the purpose of continu- 
 ing a race or species. These are merely incidents in the 
 cosmical history : and if we cannot understand why organisms 
 should continue to exist and to reproduce themselves, then we 
 have not the key to the history of the cosmos. If Mr. Spencer 
 is unable to explain it, he cannot claim to have succeeded in 
 the unification of knowledge. 
 
 The abstract statement of Mr. Spencer's theory is briefly as 
 follows : — 
 
 Moving equilibria continue to move and to preserve their 
 equilibrium. 
 
 If moving equilibria part with motion, they must receive 
 
 motion or come t6 a stop. 
 
 If moving equilibria are likely to stop from lack of motion 
 received, they will try to get a supply of it. (Adaptations for 
 assimilation.) 
 
462 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 If moving equilibria are interfered with by an external 
 force likely to destroy them, they will generate an opposite 
 force, for the purpose of self-preservation, (Adaptations for 
 self- protection.) 
 
 If moving equilibria are likely to come to an end from the 
 expended motion being in excess or otherwise, they will throw 
 off a portion of themselves which shall unite with a portion of 
 a similar moving equilibrium in order that the same kind of 
 moving equilibrium shall continue to exist. 
 
 We cannot but consider it a matter of regret that Mr. Spencer 
 has not composed a separate book on ideal or d, priori mechanics. 
 A work like his, the main principles of which are founded on 
 mechanics, would be far more easily understood and would 
 receive far readier acceptation from the general public if it 
 were accompanied by a special treatise showing the nature and 
 laws of all those mechanical conjunctures which occur in a 
 scattered form throughout his d priori expositions. 
 
 § 1 6. Natural Selection — Its ct priori Interpretation. 
 
 We have had occasion in various places to call attention to 
 some passages in Mr. Spencer's exposition of biological develop- 
 ment where teleological implications appear. Teleology may 
 possibly find a place in Biology when organisms arrive at such 
 a stage of development as consciously to adapt means to ends, 
 in the intelligent appreciation of certain suitabilities, and 
 in what we may regard as semi-volitional activities, such as 
 some of the actions relating to the attainment of food or 
 the escape from enemies. But it is evident that in a system of 
 deductive interpre.tation, where all explanations are sought as 
 the resultants of the properties and relations of original factors, 
 teleology or anticipatory adaptation for the purpose of securing 
 definite objects, such as the continued existence of an organism 
 or of a race, are quite outside the range of the hypothesis. It 
 therefore appears singular that in so many passages Mr. Spencer 
 should admit by implication the adaptation of means to secure 
 these ends. We consider that even if Mr. Spencer repudiates 
 teleology, and uses this manner of statement merely by way of 
 
 o 
 
 NATURAL SELECTION— ITS INTERPRETATION. 463 
 
 convenience, it is a very faulty method of presenting his argu- 
 ment when the real question at issue is this very one as 
 between teleology on the one hand, and deduction or unfore- 
 seeing development on the other hand. It is only right under 
 these circumstances to call attention to a passage in which Mr. 
 Spencer justifies his procedure in this respect, and in which he 
 claims for natural selection all that Paley claims for design. 
 
 " While the explanation of the teleologist is untrue, it is often 
 an obverse to the truth ; for though on the hypothesis of Evo- 
 lution, it is clear that things are not arranged thus or thus for 
 the securing of special ends, it is also clear, that arrangements 
 which do secure these special ends, tend continually to establish 
 themselves, — are established by their fulfilment of these ends. 
 Besides ensuring a structural fitness between each kind of organ- 
 ism and its circumstances, the working of * natural selection ' 
 also ensures a fitness between the mode and rate of multiplication 
 of each kind of organism and its circumstances. We may, 
 therefore, without any teleological implication, consider the 
 fitness of homogenesis and heterogenesis to the needs of the 
 different classes of organisms which exhibit them." * 
 
 It is clear from this that when the student finds any passages 
 in Mr. Spencer's works which imply the adaptation of means to 
 ends in a teleological sense, he must render them into terms 
 of those deductive interpretations which are recognised as 
 " natural selection." This theory, as an inductively established 
 truth, is now very generally and correctly understood from the 
 writings of Mr. Darwin and the more popular expounders of his 
 text. By it is meant the survival amongst species of those 
 individuals which are best fitted to the environing inorganic 
 and organic conditions. Thus if fleetness is an essential to 
 escape from enemies, those animals will survive which possess 
 in a superior degree the structure and powers enabling them 
 to surpass their fellows in speed ; and these, since they sur- 
 vive, will propagate and reproduce their own superior quali- 
 ties. On the other hand, those individuals of the attacking 
 species will survive who, by their wariness or comparative 
 
 * Biologj', vol. i. p. 234. 
 
464 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 speed, relatively to their companions, are able to overtake or 
 otherwise secuie the slowest or unwariest of their prey. These 
 again will propagate their superior qualities, whUe their clum- 
 sier companions perish. 
 
 At the same time that the increased use of parts thus leads to 
 their further and still further development, changed conditions 
 of habitat and environment sometimes cause disuse and con- 
 • sequent reversal of the process. Thus, established structures 
 gradually dwindle away and finally disappear. 
 "^ That which takes place amongst the individuals of a species 
 takes place also amongst species regarded as wholes ; so that 
 entire species may become extinct from the superior fitness of 
 other species to the environing conditions. 
 
 In these ever-fluctuating processes, with accompanying dis- 
 appearances of intervening links, the distinctions between spe- 
 cies have grown more and more marked, until at last schematic 
 classifications, although difficult, become justifiable. 
 
 This process of "natural selection" may be regarded as 
 a thoroughly established truth, and one which has received 
 the recognition not only of experts, but also of all thoughtful 
 men who have given their attention to the subject It is now, 
 in fact, a commonly taught truth of popular science. 
 
 Our business concerns only the deductive interpretation of 
 the doctrine ; and our first question refers to the necessary 
 requirements of a deductive interpretation. Three methods of 
 procedure are open to us. Either we may justify "natural 
 selection " by abstract reasoning from the relations of ideal mov- 
 ing equilibria, which may be regarded as a mechanical problem 
 on the one hand of the relations of bodies in motion, or on the 
 other hand of the relations of energies or "forces" in aggre- 
 gation, related to other energies or " forces ; " each such aggregate 
 of energies expending and receiving energy, and counterbalanc- 
 ing external inimical forces by means of antagonistic adaptations 
 of ''its own "forces." Or, secondly, we may deduce "natural 
 selection," through various intermediate stages of development, 
 from the properties of the chemical elements, as set forth by 
 Mr. Spencer in the first chapter of his work, in interrelation 
 with the physical factors of the environment, as described 
 
 NATURAL SELECTION— ITS INTERPRETATION. 465 
 
 in tlje chapters immediately following. Or, thirdly, taking 
 organisms and their reproduction for granted, and perhaps tak- 
 ing the origin of variations for granted, we may deduce the 
 probability of " natural selection," or the continuous adaptation 
 of organisms to their environment, implied in the survival and 
 propagation of the fittest, with the consequent variations of 
 species. 
 
 We fear, with regard to the first of these problems, that we 
 shall find ourselves unable to take a single step beyond the 
 initial statement. Regarding the moving equiKbrium in its 
 purely mechanical aspect, as instanced by the solar system, there 
 is no reason whatever to suppose either adaptation of the biolo- 
 gical sort, or assimilation, or reproduction, all of which are 
 requisite on the hypothesis under consideration. If, again, we 
 consider a moving equilibrium as composed of separate energies 
 or forces, that is to say, organs with their concomitant functions 
 which constitute a balance, jointly and severally antagonising 
 distinct forces of the environment, the energy expended 
 therein being ever replaced by the assimilation of favourable 
 forces from the environment, — if, we say, it is possible to 
 suppose such an aggregate on purely physical grounds, even 
 then reproduction and heredity, which are not deducible from 
 our premisses, have to be taken for granted; and the chain 
 of abstract reasoning is not continuous. 
 
 Should we once more endeavour to fill in this abstract model 
 with the known properties of the concrete elements which are 
 our physical factors,— namely, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, car- 
 bon, &c., in relation to environment, — the same difficulties 
 attend us as before. We shall not even then be able to 
 deduce genesis and reproduction. If we see our way to organ- 
 isms at all, it is merely in the direct equilibrations by which 
 different parts of a mass of organic matter are differentiated. 
 We can take no deductive steps towards the accumulation and 
 expenditure of energy, much less towards any effort for self- 
 preservation. Here, again, we fail ct priori to account for 
 reproduction ; and failing this, our theory of natural selection 
 is not derivable in a ratiocinative way from our given factors. 
 
 As a matter of fact, Mr. Spencer in his d priori interpretation 
 
 20 
 
466 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 of natural selection does not proceed so far back as -these 
 abstract hypotheses. All he attempts to do is to show the 
 probability that organisms which have the power of adaptation 
 to circumstances, and which also have the power of reproducing 
 copies of themselves, will continually develop in directions favour- 
 able to their continuance. The process is shown to be facili- 
 tated and the results heightened by the aid of gamogenesis. 
 In this endeavour it cannot but be admitted that Mr. Spencer 
 has succeeded. It is not a difficult thing, after a theory has 
 been established inductively, to show that it is reasonable 
 (t priori. Given the earlier stages of biology, it is easy to prove 
 that the subsequent stages are reasonable probabilities : and this 
 is all that Mr. Spencer has done. 
 
 The great defect of the explanation lies in the fact that it 
 still leaves unexplained the question of origins. Failing an 
 explanation of the expenditure of energy for self-preservation or 
 sustenance; failing an explanation of reproduction, of gamo- 
 genesis, of heredity, of the part played by feeling, of varia- 
 tion ; all the subsequent developmental work accomplished by 
 "natural selection," — and it is vast indeed, — remains still unex- 
 plained. Granted these, we acknowledge the grandness of the 
 explanation ; but the fact that these fundamentals remain un- 
 explained cuts off the latter explanation from the primordial 
 physical hypothesis ; and until this great hiatus is bridged over 
 we cannot admit that the deductive process is complete. 
 
 It would be desirable to have cleared up, before this question 
 is further discussed, what are the limits of the application of 
 "natural selection." Is it a term, for instance, applicable to 
 molecules of every sort ? Are we to say that all the molecules 
 and aggregates of molecules now existing in the world have 
 their present state and form by virtue of "natural selection " or 
 the survival of the fittest ? Do we say of the granite mountains 
 which have survived their more friable companions that their 
 present existence is due to natural selection? Do we regard 
 tlie solar system as an instance of the survival of the fittest ? 
 Do we imagine that any inorganic molecule exhibits the traits 
 which we characterise by those terms ? 
 
 Or, on the other hand, are these theories or descriptions 
 
 4^ 
 
 NATURAL SELECTION— ITS INTERPRETATION. 467 
 
 wholly inapplicable to inorganic aggregates and essentially 
 characteristic of organisms or organic matter? If so, then 
 there is a breach of continuity between inorganic development 
 and organic. Another deductive failure exhibits itself. We 
 come again upon the gulf which — approach the inorganic by 
 what terms and theories we may — continually manifests itself 
 and severs the two classes of phenomena, though not widely yet 
 too deeply to fathom. 
 
 If it is to be fathomed, it must be by the careful and close 
 study of the behaviour of the most minute organisms. Actual 
 observation and experiment upon these, and upon highly complex 
 inorganic molecules, can alone inform us of the law by which 
 one is transformed into the other, should such indeed be the 
 case at all. IS'o amount of ingenuity of thought can ever be 
 expected to solve the problem. If the evolutionary philosopher 
 takes refuge from his difficulties in the mere terms and phrases 
 applicable to the more developed branches of his science when 
 he meets with problems in those precedent inquiries which 
 are more obscure, he is liable to be called upon to demonstrate 
 their applicability. Can " natural selection " penetrate below 
 organisms so as to explain the origin of organisms ? 
 
 Again, the term " spontaneous variation " needs more scien- 
 tific precision. To what depth of investigation is it legitimate to 
 employ it, and what meaning will it carry with it in its applica- 
 tion to inorganic processes ? Can it be used in connecting the 
 development of the inorganic with the evolution of the organic ? 
 
 To say that those forms which survived must have answered 
 to the conditions of survival (while those forms which perished 
 did not answer to the conditions), and to say that those forms 
 propagated which answered to the conditions of propagation 
 (while those which did not propagate did not answer to the 
 conditions), is not reasoning at all either by the deductive or 
 the inductive method, and does not carry the mind forward to 
 any new proposition. It is merely an identical proposition 
 with its complementary negative. It is merely looking at the 
 beginning and at the end of a process, and saying that somehow 
 or other — even although the nature of the dependence is not 
 discernible — every intermediate step in the whole range of 
 
468 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 sequences is the result of the interaction of preceding factors. 
 And even if some of the conditions of survivorship and propaga- 
 tion are discernible, then to make any partial predication as to 
 the conditions is not tantamount to a complete deductive 
 interpretation. Thus the theory of natural selection or survival 
 of the fittest is valid and useful in the Darwinian account, but 
 of no value in the Spencerian attempt to affiliate biology upon 
 inorganic evolution. 
 
 It is claimed for natural selection that it not only accounts 
 for the variation of species but also for the origin of species ; 
 but it must be noted that the origin referred to is not the 
 origin of the simplest biologic forms, but the origin of one 
 species out of another; and the claim thus made does not 
 differ in its significance from the power of accounting for varia- 
 tion of species. When we are told that natural selection 
 accounts for the origin of species, all that is meant is such an 
 extension of its application as to give it a power of account- 
 ing for all the most complex forms of life, granted some original 
 simple form. But it is certainly not able to explain the origin 
 of those simple forms, nor even the origin of many variations. 
 Granting these, however, and granting heredity, it is of immense 
 value in explaining the subsequent development. 
 
 It is noteworthy that natural selection can make no progress 
 without the accident of origins and the accidents of spontaneous 
 variation. Some accident of origin must have occurred amongst 
 inorganic molecules by which such an arrangement was effected 
 as to set up a habit of motion or function necessitating waste 
 and instituting repair. Some of these aggregates acquired 
 somehow the power of reproduction. Some by other happy 
 accidents acquired other accretions of function, more particu- 
 larly relating to nutrition. The more fortunate acquired 
 motions to secure food supply. Others, still more lucky, ac 
 quired organs of locomotion. All these happy variations were 
 preserved by "natural selection ;" but not one of them is expli- 
 cable thereby. Natural selection cannot account for a single 
 form, a single function, or a single feeling; it can only 
 explain their growth and competitive preservation after they 
 are once originated. 
 
 B 
 
 -4 
 
 THE THEORY OF ACCIDENTAL ORIGINS. 469 
 
 Thus, however much the mind may be filled, and whatever 
 satisfaction it may derive from the investigation of the vast 
 and interesting field of inquiry opened out by the theory of 
 "natural selection," still this branch of explanation is not 
 equivalent to the continuity of explanation which we seek. 
 It is not the bulk of explanations which constitutes the unifi- 
 cation of knowledge, but the linear continuity of sequences. 
 Each individual portion of these successive and dependent 
 explanations is of enormous importance, and is to be valued 
 accordingly; but until it is properly placed in due order of 
 succession, and the mode of its dependence fully ascertained, 
 the logical faculty which aims at the unification of all know- 
 ledge by its power of deducing all phenomena from original 
 factors is not satisfied. 
 
 § 17. Tlie T7ieory of Accidental Origins. 
 
 A review of the Evolution hypothesis would be incomplete 
 without an examination of what may be termed the " Happy 
 Accident " theory. This theory is inadequately treated both by 
 Mr. Spencer and by Mr. Darwin. Upon the latter it was not 
 incumbent to go further back than was necessary for the limited 
 scientific purpose he had in view, namely, the study of the 
 variation of species and of the so-called origination of species 
 by natural selection. Mr. Darwin need do no more than accept 
 the scientific fact of accidental variation, and upon the favour- 
 able influence of such chance variation on the survival of 
 certain individuals he might build up his views of their develop- 
 ment into a species by one or other of the various modes of 
 natural selection of which he gives an account. But it was 
 not requisite to explain these accidental variations, nor to con- 
 sider biology as a series of deductions from preceding factors ; 
 he was at liberty to accept certain acknowledged facts of nature 
 and to reason therefrom. With Mr. Spencer it is otherwise. 
 It is incumbent upon him, seeking as he does to give an expla- 
 nation of universal sequence, to explain fully the part played 
 in biologic evolution by accidental variations, lest, under cover 
 of such an indefinite notion, we should fancy we understand 
 
 ! 
 
arsffli^sapfei!^^;' - 
 
 i 
 
 470 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 more than we really do of the connections of sequences. How- 
 ever, before we proceed with our criticisms let us have the bear- 
 ings of the question fully laid out before us. 
 
 This is best done by quitting our author, and taking for con- 
 sideration two charming little books written by Mr. Grant Allen. 
 We refer to his " Evolutionist at Large " and his " Vignettes 
 from Nature," works obviously intended and. well adapted to 
 popularise the theory of development by natural selection. In 
 a very interesting manner he familiarises the mind with the 
 changes effected by the use and disuse of parts ; with the deve- 
 lopments effected in a species by the survival and consequent 
 propagation of those individuals best fitted to the conditions of 
 their environment ; with the divergent effects of different influ- 
 ences acting upon a common stock; with the developmental 
 influence of sexual preferences ; with the important results of 
 protective colourings, shapes, textures, tastes, and odours ; with 
 the part played by means of attractions offered to the senses of 
 various animals ; and with the other methods of biologic evolu- 
 tion. All these are presented to us in a familiar manner as 
 lessons to be learned by any of us in the study of common 
 objects by the wayside. 
 
 Given in this form, it is scarcely to be expected that the 
 author should take into account philosophical difficulties. Nor, 
 like Mr. Darwin, is he committed to any universalistic deduc- 
 tive theory, and therefore he is quite free to work out the 
 methods of natural selection without being obliged to account 
 for origins. Our criticism, therefore, does not apply to the 
 accomplishment of his task, but only to the general position of 
 Evolutionists, and we merely make use of his works as illus- 
 trative of this position. 
 
 One of the principal characteristics of the works in question 
 is the amount of teleological language and the amount of teleo- 
 logical implication. This, however, has to be wholly ignored if 
 the work is to be regarded scientifically. The author would 
 justify himself no doubt in the same manner as Mr. Spencer in 
 the passage referred to in the preceding section. We constantly 
 read of the means adopted by plants " in order to " accomplish 
 some end essential to their own preservation or propagation ; of 
 
 -»• 
 
 THE THEORY OF ACCIDENTAL ORIGINS. 
 
 471 
 
 some " device " or " plan," either of function, of construction, 
 or of colouring, for ensuring their own existence or the fertili- 
 sation or preservation of their seeds. The same anticipatory 
 or foreseeing prearrangements are constantly predicated of the 
 functions, structures, and colourings of animals. Although the 
 author indicates that this teleological language is only figura- 
 tive, yet we hold that its very extensive employment is highly 
 detrimental to the scientific value of his work, and highly incon- 
 sistent with the special object he has in view, which is natural 
 development as opposed to teleology. So marked is this char- 
 acteristic, that in some passages the author would seem to imply 
 intelligent adaptation on the part of plants to the eventualities 
 of the future in their own race. But the abundant use of such 
 metaphors tends to obscure rather than to illustrate the author's 
 object. 
 
 This object is mainly to explain biologic evolution by natural 
 methods. To these methods we have already referred. All we 
 are concerned with at present is, firstly, to notice that they are 
 limited in their application to races of creatures which possess 
 the power of propagation, and therefore that an unexplained 
 power of genesis is antecedent to the operation of " natural 
 selection." In the next place, we have to observe that " natural 
 selection" does not originate variation, but only selects such 
 variations as are advantageous to the preservation of the race. 
 Katural selection thus requires a basis of accidental origins 
 upon which to work. Of these accidental origins or variations, 
 some, being useless to the race, perish in their inception by a 
 natural law, and others, being serviceable, are preserved by 
 natural selection, and are developed by use and continued by 
 heredity. Of these accidental origins our author says — 
 
 *' The lucky accident, the casual combination of circum- 
 stances, which produced the first elongation of the receptacle in 
 the strawberry has never happened to befall its more modest kins- 
 folk. For on such occasional freaks of nature the whole evolu- 
 tion of new varieties entirely depends. A gardener may raise a 
 thousand seedlings, and only one or none among them may 
 present a single new and important feature. So a species may 
 wait for a thousand years, or for ever, before its circumstances 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 . t 
 
 V*4 
 
472 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 may happen to produce the first step towards some desirable 
 
 improvement." * 
 
 Again—" An accidental variety of leaf or flower, like the mon- 
 strosities which we cultivate in our gardens, means, as a rule, 
 very little indeed, because it is not correlated with any need or 
 habit of the plant. It affords no material upon which natural 
 
 selection can work." 
 
 And we find continued reference made throughout the work 
 to the " original accidental possession" of some property, to indi- 
 viduals which by chance " happen to show any tendency," which 
 " take " (at first by accident) to some habit, or which " happen 
 to have developed " some function or rudimentary structure. 
 
 It is upon these bases that natural selection works. They 
 are pre-essential to it, and, therefore, in any deductive system 
 have to be accounted for before the process of natural selection 
 is introduced. Natural selection itself does not account for 
 them, but only for their consequences. Let us therefore con- 
 sider the nature and extent of the happy accidents which gave 
 rise to and assisted in biologic evolution. Their extent must 
 have been coequal with every special arrangement of structure 
 and function by which the preservation of the individual has 
 been secured either in the procurement of food or in protec- 
 tion from enemies, as weU as with those by which the propaga- 
 tion of the species has been effected. 
 
 What then is " an accident ] " Of course, our study, being a 
 scientific one, does not admit of the use of the term in any occult 
 sense, but only within legitimate scientific meanings. For in- 
 stance, the generalised relations of bodies known as the laws of 
 mechanics hold good of all bodies in their mechanical relations; 
 but any special mechanical relation of which we do not know 
 the preceding conditions is regarded as accidental. This mode 
 of statement does not place particular events beyond the laws 
 of mechanics, but only expresses our ignorance of the particular 
 line of sequences which led up to the particular concrete instance 
 of which we make the predication that it is accidental. The 
 same remarks apply to chemical combinations. We under- 
 stand the general relations of the chemical elements, and we 
 
 ♦ The Evolutionist at Large, p. 24. 
 
 ,. 
 
 
 THE THEORY OF ACCIDENTAL ORIGINS. 473 
 
 understand our own special chemical experiments ; but of many 
 chemical events we say they are accidental because of our igno- 
 rance of some of the particular sequences which led up to their 
 occurrence. We would call the solar system an accident, or the 
 arrangement of the seas and continents of the planet on which 
 we reside — if we are not too pessimistic — a happy or lucky acci- 
 dent. These arrangements are understood as due to certain 
 great laws of physics and chemistry ; and if we call them acci- 
 dental, all we mean is that we cannot trace their special ante- 
 cedents. Nevertheless, our general knowledge of physics and 
 chemistry is just as true and just as valid for all the concrete 
 cases within our cognisance as if the whole individual history 
 of all atoms was known to us. 
 
 Now let us consider some cases to which the term "accidental " 
 is applied, but which do not fall within the scope of the above 
 explanation, and in which the employment of the term tends to 
 false reasoning. Suppose we say of some inorganic molecules or 
 systems of molecules that they accidentally acquired the habit of 
 motion or of self-sustenance. If by that we meant no more than 
 that some particular atoms known to possess certain properties 
 in relation with other atoms accidentally got together and so 
 were enabled to display those properties in actual relation, then 
 the meaning is scientific; but if it is meant that they displayed 
 properties not known to be included in our primary knowledge 
 of them, then the *' accidental " outcome implies a something 
 wanting in our knowledge of those primary properties, or else it 
 implies that something new has accidentally come into existence. 
 The former conclusion does not militate against inductive science, 
 but it does militate against the validity of a deduction based 
 upon a hypothesis as to the properties of these primary factors ; 
 and the latter conclusion is subversive of any logical scheme 
 
 whatsoever. 
 
 Again, suppose we say that some of these systems of molecules 
 
 accidentally acquired the habit of multiplication by propagation, 
 
 and that the habit of heredity was accidentally introduced. It 
 
 is clear that if these circumstances occurred there could be no 
 
 new principle or property accidentally introduced into the 
 
 cosmos, but that only some event unexplainable from its imme- 
 
 I 
 

 474 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 diate concrete antecedents had taken place. If such pheno- 
 mena, however, are to he regarded as " accidental in any other 
 sense, it simply means the introduction of new Actors of 
 which we have no knowledge. Events have occurred which 
 are not explainahle by our general deductive theory, implying 
 an ignorance of theory as well as of immediately preceding con- 
 crete relations. . , „ • iv. ,„<„„ 
 This mode of applying the term "acc.denal" is therefore 
 found not to be equivalent to the mode of applying it to parti- 
 cular physical and chemical combinations whose general laws 
 we understand, but whose particular concrete conjunctions we are 
 unable to explain. Our ignorance in the latter case is merely of 
 immediate special antecedents and not of general law or theory ; 
 whereas in the cases referred to our ignorance is of general law 
 and theory as well as of immediate antecedents. It is some 
 general law or factor of which we are ignorant rather than 
 some particular series of sequences, the general law o which 
 is known. In one case the scientific system is not interfered 
 with by the " accidentals ; " in the other case the theory with 
 its deductive explanations is found to be altogether valueless. 
 In the one case the accidentals fall within the line of sequences ; 
 in the other case events occur which cannot be recognised as 
 falling within the deductive system. 
 
 If we say of some aggregate of molecules that it accidentally 
 acquired the means of locomotion, we introduce under cover of 
 the word " accidentally " new properties not deducible from the 
 known properties of any combination of the chemical elements. 
 The expression of our ignorance, again, is not merely that of the 
 particular order of sequence of known factors, but is indicativo 
 of the impossibility of connecting in thought the new phen<v 
 mena with any of the known properties of the preceding factors. 
 It indicates a deductive failure. 
 
 Lastly, should we say that some aggregate of molecules acci- 
 dentally developed a sense of feeling, our term « accidentally 
 masks the entrance of a very important and powerful factor 
 in organic development, and indicates our ignorance of its rela- 
 tion to preceding factors. . , , , 
 Thus by means of the continuous accretion of accidental com- 
 
 ,. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 475 
 
 binations and by means of the accidental entrance of new fac- 
 tors, natural selection is afforded most extensive bases, botli in 
 extent and diversity of nature, to work upon in biological deve- 
 lopment. Evolutionists exhibit very clearly the interaction of 
 organisms with environment and of organisms with organisms, 
 showing how natural selection has worked amongst all these 
 accidentally produced combinations and accidentally produced 
 factors ; but it must not be supposed that by thus extensively 
 ilwelling upon the wonderful history of natural selection we 
 have exhausted the explanation of biological history or even 
 found a basis of explanation. We have only been afforded a 
 means for understanding an intermediate portion of it. AVhat 
 is required in addition is to show that the accidental variations 
 are within the limits of the properties of the primary factors 
 from which it is proposed to reconstruct biology. If the 
 " accidental " is shown to be within the limits of the original 
 properties it is legitimate and logical, but as actually used it 
 appears to us to mask the introduction of factors not properly 
 included in the premisses. 
 
 § 1 8. Summary. 
 
 Thus we have seen that whether we set out to deduce bio- 
 logical evolution from the relations of the concrete internal 
 and external factors as described at the outset of vol. i., or from 
 the nature of mechanical moving equilibria as given in reply 
 to the question, " How is organic evolution caused ? " we have 
 equaUy failed in that deductive endeavour. Therefore the 
 evolution of biology is not affiliated upon evolution in general. 
 
 With regard to Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy taken 
 as a whole, we come to the conclusion that, admirable as is 
 the boldness, magnificent as is the sweep, extraordinary as is 
 the connectiveness of his reasonings, he nevertheless fails m 
 his vast attempt. At the same time we must admire the 
 grandeur of the outline he has sketched, acknowledge the 
 greater breadth of view he has given to human speculation, and 
 appreciate the abounding wealth of suggestion displayed through- 
 out the work, which not only enriches human knowledge, but 
 
 I 
 
476 SPENCER'S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 is sure to give rise to further earnest, bold, and penetrating 
 
 .esearct into the ^y''''^l°\^^^,^,,„^ deduction may give 
 At the same time, we f el ^^'^ « ^ ^^ ^^. 
 
 miity and consolidation to s««i^««- « "^ j ^^^ .^Hd 
 
 perience and induction that we - jo -J^.f^ ^, , ^,,1 
 
 tra:::n,ththt£t.:rH - . ^^ the patle. lahour 
 of the human race through ages yet unborn. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 ,RIN1KD BY BALCANTYNK. HANSON AND CO. 
 BUlNBURCiH AND LONDON. 
 
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