U S. POLICY 
 
 mi 
 
 in the 
 Near East, 
 
 South Asia, 
 and Africa - 
 
 i 
 
 Department of State 
 
U. S. POLICY 
 
in the Near East, 
 South Asia, 
 and Africa - 19SS 
 
 The material in tliis pamplilet first appeared in three parts in the 
 Department of State BULLETIN of March 19, 26 and April 9. 1956 
 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 6330 
 Near and Middle Eastern Series 20 
 
 RELEASED MAY 1956 
 
 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
 Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. : Price 25 cents 
 
Contents 
 
 Page 
 
 Significant Political Issues 3 
 
 French North Africa 3 
 
 The Problem of Cyprus 7 
 
 Problems in the Arab-Israel Controversy ... 12 
 
 Other Issues 25 
 
 Problems of Regional Security 27 
 
 The Turco-Iraqi Pact, February 24, 1955 ... 19 
 
 Mutual Security Programs and U.S. Technical 
 
 AND Economic Assistance 33 
 
 Assistance Programs During 1955 35 
 
 Export-Import Bank Loans 45 
 
 U.S. Support for U.N. Assistance Programs . . 52 
 
 Reflections of United States Policy 52 
 
 The Outlook in United States Policy 53 
 
U.S. Policy in the Near East, 
 South Asia, and Africa— 1 955 
 
 The year 1955 witnessed no lessening of American interest in 
 the countries and peoples of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 
 and it brought no end to the difficult and complicated problems 
 which have come to the United States from this vital part of the 
 world.^ On the contrary, the old, basic issues, involving the resur- 
 gent and often strident nationalism of the peoples of the area, the 
 problem of self-determination or "colonialism," and questions of 
 the economic development of underdeveloped countries still per- 
 sisted 10 years after the end of the Second World War. In addition, 
 important individual problems such as the Arab-Israel controversy, 
 Cyprus, and French North Africa have also remained as a matter 
 of American concern, whether directly or otherwise, because of 
 the position of the United States as one of the leaders of the free 
 world. 
 
 Toward the end of the year, the United States, together with 
 other nations, was faced with a renewed and dynamic manifesta- 
 tion of Soviet interest in the general area of the Near East, South 
 Asia, and Africa. In line with an old imperial Russian tradition 
 and in accord with Leninist-Stalinist Communist doctrine, the 
 Soviet Union sought to take advantage of the "relaxation of 
 tensions" in Europe and pressed toward the achievement of 
 its secular interests. The Soviets exploited every weakness and 
 every problem and employed every art, artifice, and instrument at 
 their disposal, including their satellites and the international Com- 
 munist apparatus. There seemed little doubt that they were seeking 
 a dominant influence in the so-called uncommitted areas of South 
 Asia and the Middle East.^ Because of the seriousness of the 
 situation, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
 meeting at Paris on December 15-16, 1955, reviewed the "provoca- 
 tive moves and declarations by the Soviet Union regarding the 
 
 See footnotes on pp. 56-63. 
 
 1 
 
Middle East and Asia" and recognized that Soviet tactics, "coupled 
 with a continued increase in Soviet military capability, created new 
 problems and a new challenge to the Free World." ^ 
 
 As in years past, in his report on the work of the United Nations 
 for 1954-1955 * Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold touched on 
 a number of basic problems involving the Near East, South Asia, 
 and Africa. Among other things, he referred to the Bandung 
 conference (April 18-24, 1955), in which the nations of this area 
 played a prominent part, and noted the great upheaval in the 
 relations of nations and peoples which was under way, the direc- 
 tion of which, at least in some respects, seemed "clear enough." 
 He noted that : 
 
 The peoples of Asia today, of Africa tomorrow, are moving towards a 
 new relationship with what history calls the West. The world organization 
 is the place where this emerging new relationship in world affairs can most 
 creatively be forged. 
 
 The Secretary-General also dealt at some length with the trouble- 
 some issue of Palestine. He thought that too little attention had 
 been given to meet "the emerging problems of the continent of 
 Africa in a spirit consonant with the aims of the Charter," although 
 the United Nations had been concerned with these problems "on 
 a piece-meal basis." The issues, he said, were partly social and 
 economic, partly political, and partly they belonged to the realm 
 of trusteeship arrangements. In the Secretary-General's consid- 
 ered view : 
 
 The great changes that are under way in Africa present a challenge to 
 the rest of the world — a challenge to give aid in guiding the course of events 
 in orderly and constructive channels. It is apparent that in the next ten 
 years the peace and stability of the world will be strongly affected by the 
 .evolution in Africa, by the national awakening of its jjeople, by the course 
 of race relations and by the manner in which the economic and social 
 advancement of the African peoples is assisted by the rest of the world. 
 
 The Tenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted 
 considerable attention to problems of the Near East, South Asia, 
 and Africa and especially to the type of problems outlined above. 
 Representatives of the nations of this area particularly emphasized 
 the political, social, and economic problems confronting their 
 peoples, but they were not alone in discussing them. Secretary 
 Dulles laid special stress on the Arab-Israel conflict in his address 
 of September 22,^ and both British Foreign Secretary Harold Mac- 
 
 2 
 
millan and French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay pointed to- 
 ward the Middle East as an area of tension and controversy. In 
 line with recent Soviet policy, in his address of September 23 
 Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov gave the distinct impression 
 that the Soviet Union, now more than ever, was engaged in an 
 attempt to win over the states of Asia and Africa to the side of 
 the Soviet Union.'* Molotov reiterated Soviet opposition to "ag- 
 gressive military blocs and coalitions" in general, and to such 
 arrangements in the Middle East in particular. 
 
 Significant Political issues 
 
 As already noted, the United States was confronted during 1955 
 with a number of difficult political issues, some of which came to 
 it through the United Nations and some more directly. Of special, 
 although by no means exclusive, interest were those of French 
 North Africa, Cyprus, and Palestine. Some of these problems 
 became even more intense during the course of the year, although 
 others appeared to be on the road toward possible solution as the 
 year drew to a close. 
 
 FRENCH NORTH AFRICA 
 
 The United States had an interest in the issues involving Mo- 
 rocco, Tunisia, and Algeria not merely because of certain bases in 
 Morocco or because of its politico-strategic interest in the entire 
 Mediterranean region but also because it was interested in the sta- 
 bility of France as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ- 
 ization and in the development and welfare of the peoples of this 
 area. The problems of French North Africa had been discussed, 
 it may be noted, at the Bandung conference in April 1955, and the 
 29 Asian-African nations represented there adopted a resolution 
 supporting the "rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and 
 Tunisia to self-determination and independence" and urged the 
 French Government "to bring about a peaceful solution without 
 delay."' 
 
 Morocco— The problem of Morocco, which proved very trouble- 
 some during the first part of 1955, appeared on the road to solution 
 
 3 
 
by the year's end. Fifteen Arab, Asian, and African states on 
 July 26 requested the inclusion of the problems of both Morocco 
 and Algeria on the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly, charg- 
 ing that the situation in Morocco had suddenly deteriorated." 
 Although the item was inscribed on the agenda of the General As- 
 sembly, there was no immediate discussion. On November 5, 1955, 
 the former Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed Ben Yousef, once more 
 was formally recognized as the Sultan, and the country's political 
 and constitutional problems appeared to be moving toward solu- 
 tion. On his return to Rabat on November 18 as Sultan Moham- 
 med V, the new ruler proclaimed the end of the French protector- 
 ate and looked toward a "new era of freedom and independence," 
 although this was not to mean the end of all Franco-Moroccan ties. 
 President Eisenhower sent a special message to the Sultan, recalling 
 the relations which had existed between the United States and 
 Morocco since the earliest days of the United States and expressing 
 the hope that the reign would "open new vistas for that commu- 
 nity of purposes which had contributed so much to the greatness of 
 Morocco, and restore the peace and prosperity which the United 
 States so deeply desires" for the people of Morocco. At the same 
 time the United States indicated that the return of Mohammed V 
 marked a significant step in the development of Franco-Moroccan 
 cooperation, and it was felt that the already demonstrated friendly 
 spirit augured well "for success in working out the mutually satis- 
 factory arrangements" which, it was hoped, would "lead to the 
 peace and prosperity of the Moroccan community." " 
 
 Thanks to these favorable developments, virtually no discussion 
 of the Moroccan issue took place at the General Assembly. In- 
 stead, on December 3, 1955, the Assembly agreed unanimously 
 to postpone further consideration of the item. There was, indeed, 
 much commendation of France for the statesmanlike way in which 
 the problem had been handled. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, 
 Jr., the United States Representative, declared in the Political Com- 
 mittee that the constructive developments which had taken place 
 since 1954 had given great satisfaction to the United States. He 
 extended the American people's "best wishes" to Sultan Moham- 
 med V and the Moroccan people. In view of the Franco-Moroccan 
 agreement Ambassador Lodge felt it incumbent on the General 
 Assembly to do everything possible "to contribute to an atmosphere 
 
 :)84115 ()— i)6 .-i 
 
 5 
 
in which the parties directly concerned can work out the outstand- 
 ing problems between them," the solution of which would require 
 "the utmost good will, patience, and restraint on both sides." Am- 
 bassador Lodge expressed the hope that the pending negotiations 
 would "strengthen the links of friendship between the people of 
 France and Morocco." 
 
 Algeria — In distinction to Morocco, Algeria is a part of metro- 
 politan France, and a crisis developed in the United Nations with 
 regard to inscription of the Algerian item. The United States 
 opposed inscription because of the constitutional position of Algeria. 
 The question was inscribed on September 30 by a vote of 28-27-5, 
 despite the threat of the French delegation to boycott the General 
 Assembly. French Foreign Minister Pinay advised the General 
 Assembly to "weigh the consequences, all the consequences" of 
 such a decision; the "whole future of our organization" was at 
 stake, he warned. Mr. Pinay's basic argument was that Algeria 
 had been an integral part of France for over a century, and he 
 declared that the Algerians were citizens of France, with far more 
 rights than the citizens of some states whose representatives were 
 voting for inscription." Because of the action of the General As- 
 sembly, the French delegation withdrew entirely from the General 
 Assembly on September 30 and did not return until November 29 
 when, by unanimous action, the Assembly removed the Algerian 
 item from its agenda.^^ 
 
 Tunisia — The problem of Tunisia was not placed upon the 
 agenda of the Tenth General Assembly for the primary reason that 
 on June 3, 1955, the French Government and the Tunisian leaders 
 had reached an agreement whereby Tunisia was granted internal 
 autonomy. The agreement provided for a monetary and customs 
 union, with France retaining control over defense, internal security, 
 and finance and the exclusive right to extend technical and finan- 
 cial assistance. A French High Commissioner was to exercise all 
 powers remaining to France and to be responsible for the protection 
 of French interests; the French commanding general was to be 
 responsible, as Minister of Defense, for the naval and air bases at 
 Bizerte and other military installations. 
 
 Following approval of the agreement. Secretary Dulles on 
 August 10 expressed U.S. satisfaction that a new framework for 
 close Franco-Tunisian cooperation had been established.^'' He 
 
 6 
 
considered it significant that agreement had been reached "through 
 negotiations on a basis of equahty between the parties directly 
 concerned" and declared that France and Tunisia could "take real 
 satisfaction and pride in the achievement of this agreement." The 
 negotiations, in his view, demonstrated that "mutually satisfactory 
 progress can be made on such difficult problems if they are dealt 
 with in time by the parties concerned with determination, realism, 
 and good will." On August 27, the Bey of Tunis, Sidi Mohammed 
 el Amin, ratified and sealed the convention restoring internal 
 autonomy to Tunisia, and the documents were exchanged and 
 deposited in Paris on August 31. 
 
 THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS 
 
 A troublesome issue of special concern to the United Kingdom, 
 Greece, and Turkey, involving the problem of self-determination, 
 was that of Cyprus. It had been before the General Assembly 
 during 1954, but, after 2 days of discussion, that body decided 
 against further consideration at the time." During 1955, how- 
 ever, the problem became more intense, with growing violence 
 on the Island of Cyprus. On May 9, the Greek Government 
 advised the Secretary-General of the United Nations that develop- 
 ments in Cyprus were "unfortunately assuming a particularly 
 alarming character" and reserved "the right to consider such 
 action" as might be necessary. 
 
 With a view to a possible solution, the United Kingdom on June 
 30 announced invitations to the Greek and Turkish Governments 
 to a conference at London for discussion of "political and defense 
 questions which affect the eastern Mediterranean, including 
 Cyprus." Both Greece and Turkey accepted the invitation early 
 in July; the former, on July 23, requested inscription of the problem 
 of self-determination for Cyprus on the agenda of the Tenth Session 
 of the General Assembly. 
 
 When the London conference convened on August 29, three 
 essential elements appeared to be involved: (i) the Greek position 
 concerning self-determination, (2) the Turkish position regarding 
 the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority and Turkish 
 security, and (3) the British position that common security inter- 
 ests in the eastern Mediterranean should be considered. The con- 
 
 7 
 
ference ended on September 7, without having achieved substantial 
 result." Foreign Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos, who pre- 
 sented the Greek case on August 31, called for self-determination 
 within a reasonable time, pledging that Greece would give the 
 United Kingdom unlimited use of military bases on Cyprus and 
 offering other base rights on the Greek mainland, but indicating 
 that Greece would regard the discussions as a failure unless the 
 right of self-determination were recognized." Essentially the 
 Turkish view was that the agitation concerning self-determination 
 was largely artificial, that the right of the large Turkish minority 
 must be protected, and that, for reasons of Turkish security, the 
 island should remain in British hands.'" The United Kingdom, 
 which had stressed the security aspects of the problem, on Sep- 
 tember 6 offered Cyprus a new constitution giving island residents 
 more self-rule and a prospect of ultimate self-determination. But 
 it was obvious by September 7 that no agreement was possible, and 
 the final communique of the conference indicated that Foreign 
 Secretary Macmillan would study the Greek and Turkish 
 statements. 
 
 The failure of the London conference to achieve anything more 
 substantial, and the subsequent intensification of the problem, 
 appeared not only to weaken the Greek-Turkish- Yugoslav treaty 
 which had been signed on February 28, 1953, but also to sap the 
 strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the vital 
 eastern Mediterranean — matters in which the United States was 
 very much concerned. Moreover, it now seemed clear that Greece 
 would make every effort to have the problem inscribed on the 
 agenda of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly. 
 
 The riots in Istanbul and Izmir on September 6-7, and the vast 
 damage which they wrought, were also most disturbing to the 
 United States, although it did not comment publicly at once. On 
 September 18, the Department of State announced that Secretary 
 Dulles had sent personal messages to the Greek and Turkish Prime 
 Ministers." The announcement characterized 
 
 as most regrettable recent evidences of tension between the Governments of 
 Greece and Turkey. Present differences between these two countries re- 
 sulted in widespread violence in the cities of Istanbul and Izmir. We have 
 expressed to the Turkish Government our deep concern over these disorders, 
 which have not only caused extensive physical damage but have also exerted 
 
 8 
 
an adverse influence on Turkish-Greek friendship at a time when these two 
 allies are in great need of mutual understanding. 
 
 In his identical communications to Prime Minister Papagos and 
 Prime Minister Menderes, Secretary Dulles stressed the importance 
 which the United States attached to "continued close cooperation 
 between Greece and Turkey." He could not believe that, in the 
 light of their record of common achievement, any problem would 
 "long disrupt the course of Greek-Turkish friendship," nor that 
 "the unhappy events of the past two weeks" would reverse policies 
 of cooperation initiated under the leadership of Eleftherios Veni- 
 zelos and Kemal Atatiirk. Mr. Dulles recalled the assistance which 
 the United States had rendered to Greece and Turkey since 1947 
 because of its belief that the Greco-Turkish partnership constituted 
 "a strong bulwark of the free world in a critical area." But if 
 the bulwark were "materially weakened, the consequences could 
 be grave indeed," and he urged that every effort be made that the 
 partnership not be impaired "by present disagreements." He was 
 confident, however, that the spirit of cooperation which the two 
 countries had so often demonstrated as members of the United 
 Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Balkan 
 Alliance would enable them "to transcend immediate differences 
 in the interests of free world unity." 
 
 The Greek and Turkish replies to the Dulles communication 
 were made public on September 21. Premier Papagos expressed 
 appreciation of the message and noted the necessity of Nato unity, 
 but he felt that it did not take account of the fact that Greece was 
 an injured party, and he complained concerning Turkish "hostility 
 against Greece." He said that he expected moral and material 
 reparation from Turkey and held that the latter should take the 
 initiative in the renewal of mutual confidence. On the other hand, 
 Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey warmly thanked Secretary 
 Dulles for his message; he expressed regret for the events of Sep- 
 tember 6-7 and concern for continued Greek-Turkish friendship, 
 within the framework of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organ- 
 ization and the Balkan Alliance. 
 
 On September 29, President Eisenhower assured King Paul that 
 he remained convinced of "the paramount importance of the ties 
 of strong friendship which unite Greece and the United States." 
 Even if there were "differences of opinion over how the Cyprus 
 
 9 
 
question should be handled," that one issue would not be permitted 
 to "trouble our deep friendship and sympathy for Greece." ™ 
 
 Meanwhile, on September 21 the Greek request for inscription 
 of the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly 
 was considered in the General Committee. At the outset, An- 
 thony Nutting, the United Kingdom representative, expressed 
 regret that the London conference had produced no solution. 
 He declared that the United Kingdom devoutly hoped that con- 
 sultations would be renewed and was ready to consider "amend- 
 ments or counterproposals" to its recent "constructive and far- 
 reaching" suggestions concerning Cyprus, which were "designed 
 to lead to the fullest measure of internal self-government compati- 
 ble with the strategic requirements of the present international 
 situation." But he felt that extended discussion in the United 
 Nations would not prove helpful. He observed that the Greek 
 purpose was to acquire sovereignty over Cyprus and warned that 
 debate might generate heat which would "light flames else- 
 where." 
 
 On the other hand. Ambassador George V. Melas not only 
 maintained that Greece was sponsoring a legitimate petition of a 
 distinct national entity but rejected "with contempt" the charge 
 that Greece was a "troublemaker." He asserted that the British 
 proposals concerning Cyprus were a "denial of democracy." He 
 presented the case for self-determination, pointing out that the 
 principle was enshrined both in the Atlantic Charter and in the 
 United Nations Charter, and recalled the "very sad and depressing 
 things" which had happened in Turkey. In turn. Ambassador 
 Selim Sarper of Turkey took exception to the remarks of the Greek 
 representative, to whom he had listened with a feeling of "almost 
 physical pain." Ambassador Sarper declared that Turkey still 
 attached "importance to friendship and alliance with Greece," 
 which was a necessity for the maintenance of stability in the eastern 
 Mediterranean, but he warned against the effects of the self-deter- 
 mination argument for Cyprus and noted that Greece itself was a 
 mosaic of mmorities. 
 
 Ambassador Lodge, who did not enter into the substance of the 
 issue, expressed the view that such problems should be included 
 if there were reason to suppose that discussion would "promote 
 the purposes of the charter." '' The U.S. decision to oppose 
 inscription was a "painful" one because it was contrary to Greek 
 10 
 
desires, especially in the light of the "tragic events" which had 
 just occurred in Turkey. Nevertheless, the United States took 
 what seemed "the course of true friendship" in an effort to avoid 
 what might prove in reality to be "a disservice to our charter goals, 
 both those relating to non-self -governing territories and those relat- 
 ing to the development of friendly relations among nations." 
 
 In the end, by a vote of 4-7-4, the General Committee recom- 
 mended against inscription. The General Assembly upheld the 
 recommendation on September 23 by a vote of 28-22-10. 
 
 During the Assembly's discussion on inscription. Foreign Min- 
 ister Stephanopoulos contended that, under the charter, the United 
 Nations had both the right and the duty to offer an opportunity 
 for self-determination to the Cyprian people, and he repeated that 
 Greece had turned to the United Nations because of the failure 
 of diplomatic negotiations. Mr. Nutting, however, declared that 
 the "real aim" of the Greek Government was "acquisition of 
 Cyprus and not constitutional self-government in the island." He 
 closed with a solemn pledge on behalf of the United Kingdom, 
 through an unremitting endeavor "to work out a solution to this 
 tangled, difficult and delicate issue." Ambassador Sarper declared 
 that discussion would serve no useful purpose but would inflame 
 relations, and he challenged the competence of the United Nations 
 to deal with the status of Cyprus, which, he contended, had been 
 settled in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. 
 
 Ambassador Lodge reiterated the position which he had taken 
 in the General Committee, noting that a decision against inscrip- 
 tion "would not mean that nothing will happen." Rather it meant 
 that the matter could and would be dealt with "under different and 
 more auspicious conditions," in which "quiet diplomacy" might 
 prove more effective, and he pledged that the United States would 
 "continue an active interest in the Cyprus situation." V. K. 
 Krishna Menon of India, who abstained, favored independence 
 for Cyprus; he remarked: 
 
 But we do not think in the present circumstances, when negotiations have 
 been proceeding, and when there is violence in the area, and when this 
 undertaking has been given to carry on negotiations and bring about a 
 setdement in a peaceful manner, that the purposes of the Charter and the 
 prospects of a setdement would be advanced by public debate in this 
 Assembly.-^ 
 
 11 
 
At the close of the discussion, Mr. Nutting issued a statement 
 expressing British satisfaction with the "clear-cut decision by the 
 Assembly that inscription and discusson" of the Cyprus question 
 would be unwise. He was glad that the General Assembly had 
 "heeded our warning about the consequences of a debate which 
 could only be bitter and further arouse passions between friends" 
 and repeated that the United Kingdom would "now make unre- 
 mitting endeavors to find an acceptable solution to this problem," 
 which affected "three friendly countries." 
 
 PROBLEMS IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL 
 CONTROVERSY 
 
 As in years past, both the United States and the United Nations 
 faced many troublesome problems in connection with the Israel- 
 Arab controversy. The U.N. Secretary-General, in his annual 
 report, declared "with great regret" that the "lack of any improve- 
 ment in the political situation in the Middle East has continued to 
 prevent the United Nations from assisting countries in that region 
 in the way in which it should do so." The Secretary-General 
 pointed out that economic and social problems in this area were 
 accumulating and that, under existing conditions, some of the 
 means of economic and social development which had "proved 
 most effective in other regions" were denied to the Middle East. 
 The catalog of problems included the broad, perennial issue of 
 attempting to bring about some peaceful settlement of the specific 
 problems involved; the question of armed incidents along the 
 demarcation lines; restrictions on shipping within the Suez Canal 
 and Gulf of Aqa'ba; the need for equitable distribution of the 
 waters of the Jordan River for irrigation and hydroelectric pur- 
 poses; and the problem of the Arab refugees from Palestine. The 
 additional nuance of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrange- 
 ment further complicated the picture during the latter part of 1955. 
 
 The U.S. Program 
 
 Secretary Dulles expressed the basic concern of the United States 
 for peace and security in the Middle East in an address before the 
 Council on Foreign Relations at New York on August 26, when he 
 
 12 
 
outlined American policy with regard to Palestine issues and Arab- 
 Israel relations.'* He pointed to the progress which had been made 
 toward settling such Middle Eastern issues as that of the Suez 
 Base since May 1953, when he visited the area, but drew attention 
 to outstanding issues. He noted that Ambassador Eric Johnston 
 was then on his fourth visit to the Middle East in connection with 
 the Jordan River project. According to Secretary Dulles, there 
 were three basic problems which had been left unsolved by the 
 Armistice Agreements of 1949: (i) the tragic plight of 900,000 
 refugees who formerly lived on the territory now occupied by 
 Israel; (2) the pall of fear hanging alike over Arabs and Israelis; 
 and (3) the lack of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel and 
 its neighbors. 
 
 Solution of the refugee problem, in the Secretary's view, required 
 that these "uprooted people" be enabled to resume a life of dignity 
 and self-respect through resettlement and, where feasible, repatria- 
 tion. The need for more arable land could be met by practical 
 projects for water development. Compensation to the refugees 
 was due from Israel; if necessary, an international loan might be 
 made "to enable Israel to pay the compensation which would enable 
 many of the refugees to find for themselves a better way of life." 
 President Eisenhower would recommend substantial American 
 participation in such a loan, as well as an American contribution 
 "to the realization of water development and irrigation projects 
 which would, directly or indirectly, facilitate the resettlement of 
 the refugees." 
 
 Projects to aid refugee resettlement would do more than enable 
 people to enjoy a better life; they would also assist in eliminating 
 the problem of "recurrent incidents" which had plagued and em- 
 bittered life on both sides of the armistice lines. But security could 
 be assured "only by collective measures which commit decisive 
 power to the deterring of aggression." President Eisenhower had 
 authorized Secretary Dulles to state that, 
 
 given a solution of the other related problems, he [the President] would 
 recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to 
 prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries 
 between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 
 
 Secretary Dulles hoped that other countries would be willing to 
 support such a security guaranty and that the United Nations 
 would sponsor it. Under such collective security measures the 
 
 .S84115 0—56 :i 
 
 13 
 
fears could be resolved and political leadership in the Middle East 
 could "devote itself to constructive tasks." 
 
 Since the Armistice Agreements of 1949 had not determined 
 permanent frontiers, agreement concerning borders should pre- 
 cede a boundary guaranty. The overall advantages to be gained 
 by such a guaranty w^ere well worth the adjustments required to 
 convert "armistice lines of danger into boundary Hnes of safety," 
 and Secretary Dulles believed it "possible to find a way of recon- 
 ciling the vital interests of all the parties." The United States was 
 willing to assist in finding a solution to this problem, and, if agree- 
 ment could be reached on the basic problems of refugees, security, 
 and boundaries, it was thought possible to solve other issues, largely 
 economic, and also to reach an agreement concerning the status of 
 Jerusalem. The United States was ready to support a review of 
 the latter problem by the United Nations. 
 
 Secretary Dulles said that the purpose of his statement was to 
 demonstrate the possibility for improvement and make clear that 
 the United States was disposed to encourage that possibility by 
 contributions of its own, if desired . He concluded : 
 
 At a time when a great effort is being made to ease the tension which has 
 long prevailed between the Soviet and Western worlds, can we not hope that 
 a similar spirit should prevail in the Middle East? That is our plea. The 
 spirit of conciliation and of the good neighbor brings rich rewards to the 
 people and to the nations. If doing that involves some burdens, they are 
 burdens which the United States would share, just as we would share the 
 satisfaction which would result to all peoples if happiness, contentment, 
 and good will could drive hatred and misery away from peoples whom we 
 hold in high respect and honor. 
 
 U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold immediately welcomed 
 the Secretary's address and declared that American willingness to 
 participate substantially in an international loan to assist the Arab 
 refugees "might well prove to be an approach to this humanitarian 
 problem which would mark the beginning of a general stabiliza- 
 tion of conditions in the area." Similarly the United Kingdom, on 
 August 27, endorsed the proposals as "an important contribution 
 toward the solution of the most critical problem in the Middle 
 East." The United Kingdom was ready to play its full part "in 
 an effort to bring about more settled relations" and declared, as 
 had already been stated on April 4, that it was ready to guarantee 
 "by treaty or treaties with the parties concerned any territorial 
 
 15 
 
settlement so agreed." The United Kingdom welcomed Ameri- 
 can willingness to participate both in security guaranties and in 
 an international loan and hoped that the governments concerned 
 might be disposed to examine the possibilities of settlement. The 
 French Government also substantially endorsed the proposals. Sir 
 John Kotelewala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, declared on August 
 28 that the suggested program would "provide a useful starting 
 point" for a "further sinc-ere and determined effort" to settle out- 
 standing Israel-Arab differences; Ceylon, too, was ready to assist 
 "in the search for a peaceful solution." 
 
 At his news conference on August 30, Secretary Dulles declared 
 that his address had been "a very carefully considered statement" 
 and he did not desire to elaborate on it "in terms of substance" 
 until there had been responsible comment from Middle Eastern 
 Governments. 
 
 Although there was no official Arab comment concerning the 
 Dulles suggestions, unofficial comment was critical. The Israel 
 Government, on the other hand, appeared rather favorably im- 
 pressed but desired more information with regard both to frontier 
 guaranties and to frontier adjustments. In an address on Septem- 
 ber II, Abba Eban, Israel's Ambassador to the United States, de- 
 clared that, while Israel was "ready in the proper context for 
 mutual adjustments of the boundary lines," it would "accept no 
 unilateral territorial concessions." 
 
 Secretary Dulles again discussed the problem of peace in the 
 Near East in his address to the United Nations General Assembly 
 on September 22." He noted that the situation in that area re- 
 mained troubled, repeated his proposals, indicated that the United 
 Kingdom and a number of other governments had expressed their 
 support, and added that, if there was a favorable response from 
 the Near East, "many aspects of this problem would eventually 
 come to the United Nations for its action at some future session." 
 
 Problem of Arms Shipments 
 
 Closely related to the maintenance of peace in the Middle East 
 was the problem of arms shipments to that area. Secretary Dulles 
 indicated on August 30 that, although he had no direct proof 
 as yet, the Department of State had received unofficial reports that 
 the Soviet Union had offered to supply arms to some Arab States. 
 
 16 
 
Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt announced an Egyptian- 
 Czechoslovak arms arrangement on September 27. 
 
 On the same date Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Mac- 
 millan discussed the problem in New York.^* They declared that 
 the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom were 
 based on the desire, on the one hand, to enable the countries of 
 the Middle East to provide for internal security and defense and, 
 on the other, "to avoid an arms race which would inevitably 
 increase the tensions in the area." They hoped that other govern- 
 ments would also be guided by these principles. The Depart- 
 ment of State sent Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen to 
 Cairo on September 28 to look into the problem. 
 
 The Israel Government indicated that it would have to study 
 the implications of the report that Egypt was making arrange- 
 ments for the purchase of arms. Meanwhile, the Egyptian Gov- 
 ernment insisted on its sovereign rights in the matter and declared 
 that it had sought unsuccessfully to purchase arms from the United 
 States, the United Kingdom, and France. The French Govern- 
 ment alined itself with the Anglo-American position, but the 
 Soviet Government, as was to have been expected, held that each 
 state had the right to look after its defenses and to purchase 
 weapons for defense requirements on the "usual commercial 
 terms," a position which was echoed by the Czechoslovak Govern- 
 ment on October 3. Meanwhile, the Council of the Arab League 
 supported the Egyptian position, and Saudi Arabia and Syria indi- 
 cated their willingness to make similar arrangements. 
 
 Secretary Dulles commented on the Egyptian-Czechoslovak 
 arrangement on October 4,^" noting that as a result of Assistant 
 Secretary Allen's visit to Cairo there was a better understanding 
 of the problem, although he had no reason to believe that the 
 arrangement would not be implemented. Recalling his statement 
 of August 30 that the Arab countries were independent govern- 
 ments and free to do whatever they wished in the matter, Mr. 
 Dulles declared that, from the standpoint of Soviet-American rela- 
 tions, "such deliveries of arms would not contribute to relaxing 
 tensions," and he added : 
 
 It is difficult to be critical of countries which, feeling themselves endan- 
 gered, seek the arms which they sincerely believe they need for defense. 
 On the other hand, I doubt very much that, under the conditions which 
 prevail in the area, it is possible for any country to get security through 
 
 17 
 
an arms race. Also it is not easy or pleasant to speculate on the probable 
 motives of the Soviet-bloc leaders. 
 
 The Secretary of State referred to his address of August 26 and 
 repeated his proposal for a security guaranty under the United 
 Nations, which, he beUeved, "would relieve the acute fears which 
 both sides now profess." Since he did not know the precise char- 
 acter or extent of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arrangement, or 
 whether it might "seriously upset the balance of power" in the 
 Middle East, Mr. Dulles could not say whether the United States 
 might ship arms to Israel. In the main, he pointed out, it had 
 been American policy "to avoid participating in what might be- 
 come an arms race," and he still hoped that it would be possible 
 "to avoid getting into that situation." 
 
 Prime Minister Eden expressed similar views in an address at 
 Bournemouth on October 8, noting the "grave risks" of the "crudest 
 form of arms race" and declaring that, if an outside great power 
 stepped in to supply arms "on an infinitely larger scale," the risks 
 inevitably would be intensified. 
 
 The problem soon was complicated further by Soviet promises of 
 extended economic and technical assistance, and the situation be- 
 came more tense. Secretary Dulles touched upon the matter again 
 on October 18,"° indicating that there might be some informal 
 discussion of it with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov at the Geneva 
 conference. He did not consider that "very certain conclusions" 
 could be drawn from the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, 
 which was based on the broad concept of avoiding both a serious 
 imbalance of power and an armaments race in the Middle East. 
 Nor could he yet judge the military significance of the Czechoslo- 
 vak-Egyptian arrangement, since the "business of secondhand 
 arms" was "very difficult to appraise accurately" and the value of 
 the discards was not always easy to judge. 
 
 Israel Prime Minister Moshe Sharett also spoke at length on the 
 possible arms race in an address before the Israel Knesset on October 
 18, accusing Egypt of misdeeds along the Israel demarcation lines 
 and expressing approval of Mr. Dulles' address of August 26, al- 
 though he declared there could be "no unilateral territorial conces- 
 sions on the part of Israel." Mr. Sharett considered the 
 Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement a danger to Israel, along 
 with the British shipment of arms to Iraq and other Arab States. 
 
 18 
 
But because arms were a "prime necessity" for its defense, Israel 
 would "not refuse arms from any possible source." At the same 
 time, Mr. Sharett contended that no power was justified in with- 
 holding a security pact from Israel and attached "particular im- 
 portance" to one with the United States, to which Israel had 
 considered itself "entitled" for a long time.^^ 
 
 Prime Minister Sharett later journed to Paris and Geneva in order 
 to present Israel's position to the Foreign Ministers of the United 
 States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. He 
 visited the United States during November-December in the 
 interest of arms and a security guaranty. 
 
 The President's Position 
 
 Meanwhile, from Denver, Colo., President Eisenhower issued a 
 statement concerning peace in the Middle East on November, p.''' 
 He said he felt that nothing which had happened since 1954 had 
 invalidated "our fundamental policies . . . based on friendship for 
 all of the peoples of that area." In the President's view, true 
 security "must be based upon a just and reasonable settlement," 
 and he recalled the U.S. offer of August 26 to join in "formal treaty 
 engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter 
 by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors." 
 Recent developments had made a settlement all the more impera- 
 tive, and the President declared that the United States would con- 
 tinue to play its full part and would "support firmly the United 
 Nations," which had "already contributed so markedly to mini- 
 mize violence in the area." He hoped that other nations of the 
 world would cooperate in this endeavor, "thereby contributing 
 significantly to world peace." 
 
 Prime Minister Eden also discussed Middle Eastern problems 
 on November 9, referring both to the U.S. proposals of August 26 
 and to the "new element of danger" brought into the picture 
 through the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement.'^ He 
 paid tribute to the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision 
 Organization (Untso), regretted that the Jordan River Valley 
 project had not yet been approved, and said that the powers "must 
 somehow attempt to deal with the root causes of the trouble.'* 
 Because of its "long tradition of friendship with the Middle East," 
 the United Kingdom had "a special responsibility" in the area. 
 
 19 
 
The United Kingdom was aware of the respective Israel and Arab 
 positions concerning terms of peace, the resolutions of the United 
 Nations in 1947 and afterward, and the Armistice Agreements of 
 1949, and he felt that the only solution was some kind of com- 
 promise on territorial claims, in the interest of which the good 
 offices of the United Kingdom would be available. If there could 
 be some accepted agreement about boundaries, the Prime Minister 
 believed the United Kingdom, the United States, and perhaps 
 other powers would be prepared to give a formal guaranty to both 
 sides. This might, at last, bring "real confidence and security," 
 and there would also be financial and other assistance "over this 
 tragic problem of the refugees." 
 
 On November 15, in a message read at a rally in New York City, 
 President Eisenhower repeated the American willingness to sign 
 a Middle Eastern security guaranty, provided agreement was 
 reached between Israel and the Arab States concerning boundaries, 
 and stressed the view that current problems were capable of pacific 
 settlement.^ He considered a threat to Middle Eastern peace as 
 a threat to world peace and indicated that the United States would 
 continue to be guided by the policies of the 1950 Tripartite Declara- 
 tion, which, he thought, best promoted "the interest and security 
 of the peoples of the area." In the President's view: 
 
 The need for a peaceful settlement becomes daily more imperative. The 
 United States will play its full part in working toward such a settlement and 
 will support firmly the United Nations in its efforts to prevent violence in 
 the area. By firm friendship towards Israel and all other Nations in the 
 Near East, we shall continue to contribute to the peace of the world. 
 
 The Department of State indicated on November 16, following 
 visits of the Israel and Egyptian Ambassadors, that the United 
 States "would view with grave disapproval anything which would 
 lead to hostilities in the Middle East." Two days later, the 
 Department declared that the United States and the United King- 
 dom were "working closely together in their common interest in 
 the settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute." The two governments 
 saw "eye to eye" on the imperative necessity of an early settlement, 
 as had been clearly indicated by the President on November 9 and 
 by the Secretary of State on August 26. 
 
 Toward the end of November, Prime Minister Eden clarified 
 the British position before the House of Commons. On Novem- 
 ber 22, he reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and on 
 
 20 
 
November 24 he declared that (i) there was nothing in his address 
 of November 9 involving "very substantial" concessions of terri- 
 tory by Israel, (2) Israel should cooperate in solving the problem 
 of the 900,000 Arab refugees, and (3) there could be no real settle- 
 ment without Arab recognition of the right of Israel to exist. He 
 had not attempted to specify any details concerning a compromise 
 but was convinced that a settlement would be so valuable that 
 both sides would find concessions "more than worthwhile." The 
 Prime Minister added that, although he did not want to bind his 
 American friends to every word he had spoken, it was a fact that 
 the United Kingdom and the United States were in "close agree- 
 ment in this difficult business." 
 
 On December 6 Secretary Dulles, who had had a discussion with 
 the Israel Foreign Minister on the previous day, declared that the 
 United States continued "to feel very strongly that there should 
 be a solution" of the Israel-Arab problem.^" He held the need 
 for a solution to be imperative and hoped that both sides would 
 see the advantages of a settlement, but he would not say that there 
 were any "concrete developments which could be adduced as proof 
 that they have been so convinced as yet"; the possibilities, in his 
 view, still existed. 
 
 Tension Along Borders 
 
 But despite these efforts 1955 did not bring a settlement in the 
 Arab-Israel controversy. Tension along the demarcation lines " 
 continued unabated, with the Israel-Egyptian and Israel-Syrian 
 demarcation lines the major center of conflict, rather than the 
 Israel-Jordan boundary as in years past.^* 
 
 Israel-Egyptian relations worsened during 1955, with the con- 
 tinuance of Egyptian restrictions against Israel shipping in the 
 Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba and numerous infiltrating 
 raids across the demarcation lines in the Gaza region. The first 
 serious incident of the year was Israel's "retaliatory" raid in the 
 Gaza strip on February 28, in which 39 Egyptians and 8 Israelis 
 were killed and 30 Egyptians and 13 Israelis wounded, an act for 
 which the United Nations Security Council censured Israel on 
 March 29, 1955.*" 
 
 38411.5 O — 56 4 
 
 21 
 
In line with the suggestions of Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Chief 
 of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, 
 the Security Council on March 30 called upon the parties to co- 
 operate in (i) establishment of joint patrols along sensitive por- 
 tions of the demarcation line, (2) negotiation of a local comman- 
 ders' agreement, (3) erection of a barbed-wire obstacle along sec- 
 tions of the line, and (4) manning of all outposts and patrols by 
 regular forces.*^ The difficulties continued, however, and on April 
 13 General Burns declared that the significant element in the in- 
 creased tension had been the mining of tracks used by Israel army 
 trucks — an action which might have been in retaliation for the 
 Gaza incident/^ The increasing seriousness of the situation 
 prompted Ambassador Lodge, as President of the Security Council, 
 to express his concern to Council members on June 7 ; his letter 
 (copies of which were sent to the Egyptian and Israel representa- 
 tives to the U.N.) noted that, if General Burns did not receive the 
 necessary cooperation of the parties, another meeting of the Secu- 
 rity Council might be necessary.*^ 
 
 Nevertheless, incidents continued, and the discussions under 
 General Burns did not go well. Incidents which resulted in heavy 
 casualties and sundry claims and counterclaims had seriously in- 
 flamed the situation by the end of August. A cease-fire was ac- 
 cepted by September 4, but General Burns was convinced that a 
 repetition could be avoided only if the opposing forces were sep- 
 arated by a physical barrier and kept 500 meters on each side of 
 the line.^* The Security Council met on September 8 and unani- 
 mously adopted a resolution (i) noting the cease-fire, (2) calling 
 on Israel and Egypt to bring about peace and order in the Gaza 
 region and particularly "to desist from further acts of violence 
 and to continue the cease-fire in full force and effect," (3) endors- 
 ing the Burns proposals concerning separation of the opposing 
 forces, (4) calling for freedom of movement of United Nations ob- 
 servers (some of whom had been detained in Israel), (5) calling 
 for full cooperation with General Burns, and (6) requesting the 
 latter to report to the Security Council on implementation of the 
 resolution.*' 
 
 Although both Egypt and Israel conditionally agreed on Sep- 
 tember 27 to the Untso request to withdraw from the demilitar- 
 ized zone, the situation did not improve and shooting incidents 
 continued, with provocations on both sides. On November 2, 
 
 22 
 
following a statement of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion that Israel 
 was ready for peace with Egypt, Israel forces struck at Egyptian 
 positions which were beyond the old border in the demilitarized 
 zone, with the result that 50 Egyptians were killed and 40 
 wounded, and 4 Israelis killed. United Nations observers were 
 not permitted to go to the scene. On November 3, the U.N. Sec- 
 retary-General proposed a peace plan calling for clear delineation 
 of the demarcation lines and the withdrawal of armed forces. At 
 the same time he protested the detention of United Nations observ- 
 ers and expressed "grave concern" over the incident in a protest 
 to the Israel representative at the United Nations.** Two days 
 later the Department of State also issued a statement following 
 a conference of Assistant Secretary Allen with Ambassador Eban 
 and Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein ; it noted with concern 
 the "increasing tempo" of Israel-Egyptian hostilities and violations 
 of the Armistice Agreement by both sides. It strongly supported 
 the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a settlement by peace- 
 ful methods, particularly those proposed by General Burns, and 
 declared that United Nations observers should have "full liberty 
 to perform their peaceful functions." ^ 
 
 In contrast to the situation on the Egyptian-Israel demarcation 
 Unes and to that which had generally obtained in the period of 
 1949-54, the Israel-Jordan line was relatively quiet. On April 18, 
 a local commanders' agreement, designed to minimize incidents 
 and other hostile acts in the Jerusalem area, was accepted on an 
 informal basis.^" But the situation along the Israel-Syrian line, 
 always tense, flared into open conflict. There were occasional 
 Syrian forays across the Israel line and numerous charges and 
 countercharges, with mutual recriminations. On October 22 an 
 Israel force killed 3 Syrian soldiers, wounded 6, and took at least 
 5 prisoners, in what the United Nations Truce Supervision Organ- 
 ization termed a "well-planned" operation.™ On December 11 a 
 much more serious incident developed when Israel forces, esti- 
 mated at some 600 men, attacked Syrian outposts overlooking Lake 
 Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee), killing 56 Syrians and taking 29 
 prisoners, with at least 6 Israelis among the dead. The Israel 
 Government charged that Syrian troops had fired at Israel fisher- 
 men on the Sea of Galilee, but the Untso held that there had been 
 violations of the Armistice Agreement by both sides, pointed to 
 the increase in tension, and noted Syria's resentment at the denial 
 
 23 
 
of fishing rights. There was, moreover, mutual embitterment 
 because of failure to return prisoners. But the report of the 
 Untso held : 
 
 The Israeli action on the night of 11/12 December was a deliberate 
 violation of the provisions of the general armistice agreement, including 
 those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the Israel 
 forces which entered Syria. 
 
 Like the Kibya and Gaza incidents with which the Security Council has 
 had to deal, the Tiberias incident has been explained by Israel as a retaliatory 
 action on a large scale. In these three cases, Israel forces have acted by 
 surprise and after striking a heavy blow, they have returned to their base. 
 There is, however, a risk in such retaliatory action, viz that the attacker 
 may not be able to limit the extent of the operation to that planned. Such 
 actions may well produce a violent reaction by the forces of the attacked 
 country and what had been conceived as a limited raid develops into full- 
 scale hostilities. In the present atmosphere of tensions and military activity, 
 this possibility must be faced 
 
 Action in U.N. Security Council 
 
 There was some justification for the fears expressed by the 
 Untso. On December 15, the eve of the discussion of the problem 
 by the Security Council, the Egyptian Government advised the 
 Secretary-General that, in view of the Egyptian-Syrian Mutual De- 
 fense Treaty of October 20, 1955, Egypt considered the attack 
 against Syrian forces "an aggression against Egypt" and felt com- 
 pelled "to treat force with force." 
 
 During the discussions in the Security Council, Israel was unani- 
 mously condemned for the action against Syria.''^ The resolution 
 of January 19, 1956,''* held that interference by Syrian authorities 
 with Israeli activities on Lake Tiberias in no way justified the 
 Israel action. It reminded Israel that the Security Council had 
 already condemned the raid against the Jordanian village of Kibya 
 (October 14-15, 1953) and the retaliatory attack in the Gaza region 
 (February 28, 1955).^'' 
 
 The attack of December 11-12, 1955, was condemned as a 
 "flagrant violation" of the cease-fire provisions in the Security 
 Council resolution of July 15, 1948, and of the Syrian-Israel Armi- 
 stice Agreement of 1949. The Security Council also expressed "its 
 grave concern at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply 
 with its obligations" and called upon Israel to do so in the future; 
 otherwise the Council would have to consider "what further 
 
 24 
 
measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore 
 the peace." The resolution called upon the parties to comply 
 with their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement 
 to respect the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone and 
 requested the Chief of Staff of the Untso to pursue his suggestions 
 for improving the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias "without 
 prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of the parties and 
 to report to the Council as appropriate on the success of his efforts." 
 Both parties were called upon to arrange with the Chief of Staff 
 to implement the provisions of the Armistice Agreement in good 
 faith, and especially "to make full use of the Mixed Armistice 
 Commission's machinery in the interpretation and application of 
 its provisions." 
 
 On January 24, 1956, during his visit to the Middle East, Secre- 
 tary-General Dag Hammarskjold announced that Egypt had ac- 
 cepted the proposals with regard to the easing of tensions in the 
 vicinity of the demilitarized zone at El Auja (Nitsana), which had 
 been orginally set forth on November 4 and which Israel had 
 accepted on January 4. These proposals dealt with border mark- 
 ings and withdrawal of troops from the demilitarized zone. At 
 the end of his visit the Secretary-General indicated that he was 
 somewhat hopeful concerning the possibility of peace, although 
 he did not minimize the difficulties.^** Both Arab and Israel leaders, 
 he indicated, had reaffirmed their faith in the principles and 
 purposes of the United Nations, had expressed their determination, 
 "in accordance with their obligations under the Charter and under 
 the General Armistice Agreement, to abstain from any acts of 
 hostility or aggression and above all to settle conflicts, when they 
 may arise, by peaceful means." The Secretary-General was con- 
 vinced that such an attitude was essential for a lessening of tensions 
 and the development of that calm in which alone it would "be 
 possible to make a constructive approach toward the solution of 
 outstanding problems." " 
 
 OTHER ISSUES 
 
 There were many other issues, not always of direct concern to 
 the United States, but nevertheless matters of interest which bore 
 promise of one sort or another for the future. Thus, for example 
 
 25 
 
the Sudanese Parliament, on December 19, 1955, adopted a unani- 
 mous resolution for independence, which was duly proclaimed on 
 January i, 1956.^^ The United States extended recognition on 
 the same date, and on January 2 President Eisenhower sent a 
 message declaring that the United States looked forward to friendly 
 relations with the Government of the Sudan and wished it "every 
 success in establishing a stable, prosperous and happy nation." 
 The United States also endorsed the application of the Sudan for 
 U.N. membership, which the Security Council unanimously 
 recomrnended to the General Assembly on February 6."° 
 
 Another long-smoldering issue was that between the United 
 Kingdom and Saudi Arabia over Buraimi. Attempts at arbitration 
 had failed by the fall of 1955, and forces of Abu Dhabi and the 
 Sultan of Muscat, supported by the Trucial Oman levies, entered 
 the area on October 26. The Saudi Government informed the 
 Security Council in October that it reserved the right to bring the 
 matter before the Council; no further action has been taken, how- 
 ever, and the possibility exists that Saudi Arabia will discuss the 
 matter directly with the British.**^ 
 
 Still a third problem was that of Goa, involving India and 
 Portugal, which had broken relations concerning the question. 
 Secretary Dulles on August 2 stated that the United States was con- 
 cerned with tension in that area as in any other. He noted that 
 it had 
 
 always been our policy to favor the settlement of disputes by peaceful 
 means. That is, of course, a principle which is expressed in the charter 
 of the United Nations. That applies to Goa as well as to any other place 
 in the world. We are pleased to note that, as I recall, Prime Minister 
 Nehru affirmed that principle for his own Government, and I am confident 
 that that is also the view that will be taken by the Government of Portugal."^ 
 
 Subsequently, during the visit of the Portuguese Foreign Min- 
 ister to the United States on December 2, a joint communique 
 referred among other things to allegations concerning "the Por- 
 tuguese provinces in the Far East," in view of various statements 
 made during the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to India."^ In a state- 
 ment of December 6, Secretary Dulles pointed to the context of 
 the statement, which had been directed against the introduction 
 of hate and prejudice into a situation calling for calmness but 
 which had not taken "any position on the merits of the matter." 
 The United States believed that such problems should not be 
 
 26 
 
settled by force — a general approach which, he felt, Prime Minister 
 Nehru shared."* On December 29 the United States sent a note 
 to the Indian Government to this effect. 
 
 Problems of Regional Security 
 
 Since the end of World War II the United States has been very 
 much interested in the defense of the Middle East and has ex- 
 pressed that interest in a wide variety of ways, including assistance 
 to Greece and Turkey (1947) and support for the entry of those 
 countries into the North Adantic Treaty Organization (1952). 
 Together with France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, the 
 United States during 1951-1952 sought the establishment of a 
 Middle East Command or Middle East Defense Organization; 
 this concept failed to materialize, however, largely because of the 
 Middle Eastern preoccupation with local quarrels and with dis- 
 putes with the Western states. 
 
 Following his visit to the area in May 1953, Secretary Dulles 
 concluded that any sound regional defense arrangement would 
 have to rest on the desires of the peoples and governments in the 
 Middle East. Mr. Dulles found that the states of the Northern 
 Tier, more exposed to external danger, were more likely than the 
 others to find a solution of the problem and also were so situated 
 as to provide the greatest measure of protection to the area. He 
 therefore concluded that it should be the policy of the United States 
 to assist in strengthening the defenses of those countries which 
 desired such assistance in order to resist the common threat. It 
 was hoped that the states directly concerned would recognize the 
 common danger and would cooperate for collective regional de- 
 fense. The United States could encourage efforts which were con- 
 sistent with its own security goals and could help to fill gaps in the 
 evolving defense arrangement. But the countries of the area 
 should take the lead in establishing this arrangement; they should 
 also determine whether it should take the form of a single struc- 
 ture or of separate but related units and whether the arrangement 
 should be restricted to states in the area or should include Western 
 states interested in the defense of the area."" 
 
 27 
 
THE TURCO-IRAQI PACT, 
 FEBRUARY 24, 1955 
 
 It was within the framework of this general policy and of article 
 51 of the United Nations Charter that the United States looked 
 with approval upon the Turco-Pakistani treaty of April 2, 1954, 
 and signed mutual defense assistance agreements with Iraq (April 
 21, 1954) and Pakistan (May 19, 1954)."^ Pakistan, which thus 
 became linked by treaty in a Middle Eastern arrangement, was in 
 addition a signatory of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
 Treaty on September 8, 1954, together with the United States, 
 the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philip- 
 pines, and Thailand. 
 
 The United States also looked with approval on the Pact of 
 Mutual Cooperation which Iraq and Turkey signed at Baghdad 
 on February 24, 1955, despite the misgivings of certain other Arab 
 States, notably Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, and despite Soviet 
 strictures concerning the pact."^ The Turco-Iraqi treaty, in its 
 preamble, referred to the treaty signed by the two countries on 
 March 29, 1946, which had recognized that the peace and security 
 of Turkey and Iraq were an integral part of the peace and security 
 of the Middle East as a whole. It also noted that article 2 of the 
 Arab Collective Security Treaty had specified that that treaty did 
 not affect rights and obligations under the United Nations. Under 
 article i, "consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter," 
 Turkey and Iraq were to "cooperate for their security and defense" 
 and the specific measures to be taken in this connection were to be 
 the subject of "special agreements." The parties agreed not to 
 interfere in each other's domestic affairs and to settle disputes by 
 peaceful means, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 
 The new treaty was not in contradiction with any of their inter- 
 national obligations, and the parties undertook to assume no in- 
 compatible obligations. It was open to accession to any member of 
 the Arab League*"* and to any other state actively concerned 
 with the "peace and security" of the Middle East, "fully recognized 
 by both the High Contracting Parties." A permanent council of 
 ministerial rank was to be established under the treaty. The pact 
 would remain in force for a 5-year period, subject to denunciation 
 within 6 months prior to expiry. Attached to the treaty was an 
 
 384115 O— 56 5 
 
 29 
 
exchange of notes in which the parties placed on record their 
 understanding that it would enable Turkey and Iraq 
 
 to cooperate in resisting any aggression directed against either of them and 
 that in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region, 
 we have agreed to work in close cooperation for effecting the carrying out 
 of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine. 
 
 Despite certain gaps in both the Turco-Pakistani and the Turco- 
 Iraqi treaties, the United States held that the association of Middle 
 Eastern states under such defense arrangements, directed against 
 potential external aggression, was a safeguard also against their 
 involvement in possible aggression within the area. The willing- 
 ness of states to enter into such regional arrangements was an 
 earnest that their attention was directed toward the common threat. 
 
 Soviet Opposition 
 
 The Soviet Government bitterly denounced the Turco-Iraqi 
 Pact and, during the discussions of the Gaza incident in the 
 Security Council in March 1955, held the policy of "forming 
 military blocs" responsible for the tension in the Middle East. 
 In turn, U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and others 
 pointed to the purely defensive character of the arrangement. 
 Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper noted that the Soviet-Com- 
 munist Chinese treaty of 1950 had led to aggression in Korea, 
 while Nato and similar instruments looked only toward security.'"' 
 
 On April 15, 1955, the Soviet Union published a statement, 
 which was subsequently repeated on February 13, 1956, warning 
 against the development of a Middle East defense system and deny- 
 ing any threat of aggression on its part— this, despite the fact 
 that the Soviet Union itself since 1943 had built a formidable 
 bloc of states dominated by the Communist system. (The bloc 
 was formally consolidated in the Treaty of Warsaw on May 14, 
 I955-) The Soviet Government said it thoroughly approved of 
 the "neutralist" stand of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia and of 
 those countries' opposition to the Turco-Iraqi treaty and declared 
 it could not be "indifferent to the situation" in the Middle East, 
 since the creation of "military blocs" and the establishment of 
 "foreign military bases" in the area were "directly related to the 
 security of the U.S.S.R." 
 
 30 
 
Expansion of Pact 
 
 Despite the Soviet position, however, on April 4 the United 
 Kingdom had adhered to the treaty. By a special agreement the 
 U.K. at the same time terminated the Anglo-Iraqi alliance of June 
 30, 1930, and gave up its bases at Habbaniya, Shaiba, and Margil ; 
 Iraq hereafter was to assume full responsibility for its own defense. 
 When Pakistan adhered to the Baghdad Pact on September 23, 
 the United States expressed "sympathy with the desire of these 
 nations to provide for their legitimate self-defense through a 
 collective arrangement within the framework of the United Na- 
 tions." ™ Such an arrangement, especially between "the 'Northern 
 Tier' nations of the Middle East," contained "the elements needed 
 for an effective area defense structure." The United States, there- 
 fore, welcomed Pakistan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, since 
 it would "facilitate the cooperation of these nations for their 
 mutual benefit and common defense." 
 
 When Iran announced its intention to adhere to the Baghdad 
 Pact on October 11, the Soviet Foreign Minister summoned the 
 Iranian Charge d'Affaires, once more denounced the treaty, de- 
 clared it to be an instrument of Western colonialism and aggres- 
 sion, and charged that the action was inconsistent with the Soviet- 
 Iranian treaties of February 26, 1921, and Ocober i, 1927. In con- 
 trast, the United States welcomed Iran's adherence; a statement 
 issued on October 12 declared that Iran's decision was "further 
 evidence of the desire and ability of nations of the Middle East to 
 develop regional arrangements for collective self-defense -within 
 the framework of the charter of the United Nations." " More- 
 over, the drawing together of the Northern Tier nations "should 
 promote peace, stability, and well-being in the area." In no respect 
 could "this natural association be deemed hostile or threatening or 
 directed against any other nation." The statement continued: 
 
 The United States has had a longstanding interest in the territorial integrity 
 and sovereign independence of Iran. That has been amply demonstrated 
 in the past. That interest remains a cardinal feature of U.S. policy and 
 assures that the United States will not waver in its demonstrated purpose to 
 assist Iran and other free nations which are making their own determined 
 efforts to achieve defensive strength and economic and social progress. 
 
 Ratification by the Shah was completed on October 26, 1955. 
 Partly as a counterweight to the pact, Syria and Egypt, on Octo- 
 
 31 
 
ber 20, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia, on October 27, 1955, signed 
 defense pacts. On November 29, Syria and Egypt established a 
 joint command; Egypt and Saudi Arabia took a similar step on 
 December 26. 
 
 On November 21 and 22, an organizational meeting of the Coun- 
 cil of the Baghdad Pact v^^as held at Baghdad. The United States 
 was represented by Ambassador Waldemar Gallman and Adm. 
 John H. Cassady in the capacity of observers. During the session 
 on November 21, Ambassador Gallman reiterated U.S. approval 
 of the treaty, indicating that the presence of observers and the 
 intention to establish permanent political and military liaison con- 
 stituted "still further evidence of the continuing interest of the 
 U.S. in the pact and its objectives." " 
 
 Baghdad Pact Communique 
 
 The Council welcomed the intention of the United States to 
 establish liaison with it and to have an observer present at the 
 organizational meeting of the economic committee. Its final 
 communique also expressed appreciation of the "generous and val- 
 uable help" which the United States had extended to its members 
 "in the provision of arms and other military equipment to enable 
 them to strengthen their defence against aggression, and of the 
 support and encouragement" of the United States "in their efforts 
 to cooperate for peace." Appreciation was also expressed "for the 
 extensive economic assistance" which had been "freely accorded 
 by the Government of the United States." The five members of 
 the Council reaffirmed their intention, under the Baghdad Pact 
 and in consonance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 
 "to work in full partnership with united purpose for peace and 
 security in the Middle East, to defend their territories against ag- 
 gression or subversion, and to promote the welfare and prosperity 
 of the peoples in that region." Provision was made for a perma- 
 nent organization at Baghdad." The members agreed to appoint 
 deputy representatives, with ambassadorial rank, to the Council, 
 which would be in continuous session ; the Foreign Ministers would 
 meet at least once a year. A special session of the Council would 
 be held at Tehran during April 1956. 
 
 The Council set up an economic committee "to develop and 
 strengthen the economic and financial resources of the region." 
 
 32 
 
The committee would consider the sharing of experience in the 
 field of development and discuss problems on a regional basis 
 with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
 the World Health Organization, Unicef, and other specialized 
 agencies. The Council noted a British statement that the United 
 Kingdom was ready to use its experience in the atomic energy 
 field to assist other signatories with their projects for the peaceful 
 application of atomic energy." 
 
 The members of the Baghdad Pact appear to be laying a solid 
 foundation for the development of a new regional security arrange- 
 ment in the Middle East, based not merely upon military and polit- 
 ical considerations but also upon broad economic cooperation. 
 Shortly after their first session, Secretary Dulles noted the achieve- 
 ment as among the collective security arrangements forming a 
 "worldwide political warning system," and, in his state of the 
 Union message, President Eisenhower included the Baghdad Pact 
 as one of the "major gains for the system of collective security" 
 scored by the free world during 1955/'^ 
 
 Mutual Security Programs and U.S. 
 Technical and Economic Assistance 
 
 There was continued recognition, during the course of 1955, 
 of the positive necessity of technical and economic assistance, 
 especially in such underdeveloped areas as those of the Near East, 
 South Asia, and Africa. Although the Soviet Government spoke 
 much of technical and economic assistance, particularly during 
 1955, it had not participated in the United Nations Technical 
 Assistance Program, hitherto condemned as a design for colonial 
 exploitation, until 1953 and then under restrictions and with a 
 very small contribution.™ On the contrary, the United States 
 has long engaged, both directly and through the United Nations, 
 its specialized agencies, and regional organizations, in constructive 
 programs of assistance. U.S. participation is based on the realiza- 
 tion that the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
 preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity 
 of states, the promotion of political stability, and the processes of 
 orderly change are all interconnected. 
 
 33 
 
The record of the United States in this field is an impressive 
 one. Between July i, 1945, and September 30, 1955, the total of 
 United States grants and credits to other nations reached $52,287,- 
 000,000, of which no less than $41,340,000,000 was in net 
 grants. Some $17,248,000,000 went for economic and technical 
 assistance, famine relief, and other urgent relief. Of these 
 amounts, grants and credits in the Near East and Africa totaled 
 $4,466,000,000 the net grants reaching $3,934,000,000 and credits 
 $532,000,000. In South Asia, grants and credits totaled $548,- 
 000,000, with the net grants standing at $280,000,000. A more 
 detailed picture of the situation in the Near East, South Asia, and 
 Africa as a whole may be seen from the accompanying table." 
 
 A potentially important phase of the broad U.S. program was 
 the initialing of a series of atoms-for-peace agreements with Tur- 
 key (May 3), Lebanon (June 2), Israel (June 3), Pakistan (June 
 15), and Greece (June 22). Under these agreements, the govern- 
 ments concerned were to receive information concerning the de- 
 
 Summary of Net U.S. Grants and Credits in the Near East, South Asia, and 
 Africa 0945-1955') 
 
 
 Nat Granti 
 
 Nat Cradlts 
 
 Nat Total 
 
 Greece 
 
 $1, 208, 000, 000 
 
 $81, 100, 000 
 
 $1, 289, 000, 000 
 
 Turkey 
 
 226, 000, 000 
 
 94, 000, 000 
 
 320, 000, 000 
 
 Iran 
 
 147, 000, 000 
 
 54, 000, 000 
 
 201, 000, 000 
 
 Egypt 
 
 26, 000, 000 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 30, 000, 000 
 
 
 233, 000, 000 
 
 137, 000, 000 
 
 370, 000, 000 
 
 Jordan 
 
 25, 000, 000 
 
 25, 000, 000 
 
 Liberia 
 
 6, 000, 000 
 
 19, 000, 000 
 
 25, 000, 000 
 
 Unspecified (Near East 
 
 and Africa) 
 
 189, 000, 000 
 
 —7, 000, 000 
 
 182, 000, 000 
 
 Afghanistan 
 
 3, 000, 000 
 
 26, 000, 000 
 
 29, 000, 000 
 
 India 
 
 116, 000, 000 
 
 228, 000, 000 
 
 344, 000, 000 
 
 Pakistan 
 
 142, 000, 000 
 
 15, 000, 000 
 
 157, 000, 000 
 
 Unspecified (South 
 
 Asia) 
 
 19, 000, 000 
 
 
 19, 000, 000 
 
 Totals by Area 
 
 
 
 
 Near East and 
 
 
 
 
 Africa . . . 
 
 $1, 967, 000, 000 
 
 $532, 000, 000 
 
 $2, 499, 000, 000 
 
 South Asia . . 
 
 280, 000, 000 
 
 268, 000, 000 
 
 548, 000, 000 
 
 Near East, 
 
 South Asia 
 
 
 
 
 and Africa . . 
 
 $2, 247, 000, 000 
 
 $800, 000, 000 
 
 $3, 047, 000, 000 
 
 34 
 
sign, construction, and operation of research reactors and their use 
 as research, development, and engineering tools ; the United States 
 Atomic Energy Commission was to lease up to 6 kilograms (13.2 
 pounds) of contained U-235 in uranium enriched up to a maxi- 
 mum of 20 percent U-235. The agreements also provided for 
 exchange of unclassified information in the research reactor field, 
 and on the use of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological 
 research, medical therapy, agriculture, and industry. The agree- 
 ments would enable the countries involved to acquire valuable 
 training and experience in nuclear science and engineering for the 
 development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, including civilian 
 nuclear power.™ 
 
 ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS DURING 1955 
 
 The programs of economic and technical assistance during 1955 
 were within the broad framework which had been elaborated over 
 the years. As President Eisenhower explained in his foreign eco- 
 nomic policy message to the Congress on January 10, the self- 
 interest of the United States required "economic strength among 
 our allies" and "economic growth in underdeveloped areas" in 
 order to "lessen international instability growing out of the vul- 
 nerability of such areas to Communist penetration and subver- 
 sion." 
 
 President Eisenhower's theme was carried forward in his recom- 
 mendations for the 1956 mutual security program, transmitted to 
 the Congress on April 20, in which there was considerable stress 
 on the problems of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa." All 
 told, the President recommended that Congress approve funds to- 
 taling $3,530,000,000 for the mutual security program, of which 
 $712,500,000 was for economic programs, including $172,000,000 
 for a continuation of technical cooperation programs, $175,500,000 
 for special programs, and $165,000,000 for development assistance; 
 $179,000,000 was to be allocated to the Middle East. In all, about 
 $812,500,000, or about 25 percent, was requested for nonmilitary 
 programs. In a statement of May 5 before the Senate Committee 
 on Foreign Relations, Secretary Dulles declared : 
 
 International communism is pressing hard to extend its influence in Asian 
 countries which lack the economic strength to support an adequate defense 
 
 35 
 
establishment and to provide the necessary foundation of political stability 
 and steadily improving living standards.^^ 
 
 Mr. Dulles was convinced that a continuation of this "investment 
 of strength" under the mutual security program could meet the 
 Soviet challenge. 
 
 In the end, the Congress appropriated some $2,700,000,000 for 
 fiscal year 1956, including $1,700,000,000 for defense support, de- 
 velopment assistance, technical assistance, and other programs. It 
 may be observed that, of these funds, some $113,700,000 was de- 
 signed for defense support in the Near East and Africa, $73,000,000 
 was to go for development assistance in that area, and the general 
 authorization for technical cooperation amounted to $127,500,000. 
 Other items of interest were the appropriations of $14,500,000 for 
 the U.N. Children's Fund (Unicef), some $62,000,000 for the 
 U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
 East (Unrwa), and $100,000,000 for the President's Fund for Asian 
 Economic Development. For all purposes except direct military 
 assistance, approximately $317,000,000 was allocated to the Near 
 East, South Asia, and Africa during 1955.*^ 
 
 Assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Iran 
 
 Greece and Turkey had been the subject of special American 
 assistance, designed to strengthen their defensive positions and to 
 preserve their political independence and territorial integrity. De- 
 spite serious difficulties between Greece and Turkey concerning 
 Cyprus, Greek and Turkish armed forces continued to constitute 
 an essential element in the Western defense system. Both were 
 members of Nato and the Balkan Alliance, and Turkey was a 
 signatory of the Baghdad Pact (1955). 
 
 Among the noteworthy undertakings for strengthening the 
 Greek economy was an electric power project, which provided 
 Greece for the first time with a unified electric power generating 
 and grid system, more than doubling the prewar output." It was 
 announced on June 24 that new aid totaling $19,200,000, partly in 
 the form of a loan, had been made available to Greece to help 
 meet the economic pressures arising from earthquake damage.*" 
 
 The United States also continued to assist Turkey during 1955. 
 Under an agreement of November 1954, supplemented on April 
 
 36 
 
28, 1955/" million worth of American surplus agricultural 
 products was to be shipped to Turkey, in view of a crop failure and 
 diminished foreign exchange, the effects of which were felt during 
 1955. In order not to jeopardize either Turkey's military position 
 or its achievements under the program since 1950, the United States 
 agreed in June to increase the defense-support program in fiscal 
 1955 from $70 million to fioo million, the additional I30 million 
 to assist Turkey during the emergency period and to provide for 
 imports of raw materials, basic commodities, and spare parts for 
 its industrial establishment. 
 
 It was announced on January 17, 1956, that, at the request of the 
 United States and the Republic of Turkey, Clarence B. Randall, 
 the eminent industrialist and special consultant to President Eisen- 
 hower on foreign economic policy, had agreed to visit Turkey 
 late in January to discuss economic problems of interest to both 
 countries. It was expected that Mr. Randall's visit would greatly 
 contribute to the further development of American-Turkish eco- 
 nomic relations and to the advancement of mutual understanding 
 in this realm.*^ 
 
 Although the oil settlement of October 1954 had started the 
 flow of substantial oil revenues to Iran by 1955, financial assistance 
 was still necessary to meet urgent needs. The Foreign Operations 
 Administration (now the International Cooperation Administra- 
 tion), for example, made a loan of $32 million for defense pur- 
 poses, government employee payrolls, and other expenses. There 
 was increasing evidence of the success of technical assistance in 
 Iran during 1955. A program for the control of malaria had been 
 launched 4 years before by U.S. health technicians; by 1955, the 
 Iranians themselves were carrying on most of the work. Simi- 
 larly, U.S. technicians had taught the techniques of livestock cross- 
 breeding to Ministry of Agriculture employees, who in turn were 
 spreading the knowledge to rural areas. A teacher-training pro- 
 gram was now being carried out by the Ministry of Education, 
 involving some 12,000 teachers, or about 40 percent of the Iranian 
 teaching staff. There was also progress in the field of public 
 administration, and an Institute of Administrative Affairs was 
 opened at the University of Tehran in January 1955.^* 
 
 37 
 
Assistance to the Middle East 
 
 The United States has also engaged in significant development 
 projects in the Middle East. In the case of Egypt, which had 
 initiated a comprehensive lo-year economic development program, 
 for example, the United States made available a total of $40 million 
 in development assistance during fiscal year 1955, and, in addition, 
 $2 million was allocated for technical cooperation. The American 
 program stressed, among other things, railway and highway 
 improvement. A loan agreement provided for repayment of $7 
 million of the $40 million, and, as its share of the cost of the 
 projects, Egypt was to spend the equivalent of $43 million from 
 its resources. 
 
 In addition, the United States, together with the United King- 
 dom and other countries, was much interested in the project for 
 the construction of the High Aswan Dam on the Nile River, both 
 for hydroelectric and for irrigation purposes, the total cost of 
 which, over a 20-year period, was estimated at some $1 billion. 
 During a visit to the United States by the Egyptian Minister 
 of Finance, Abdel Moneim El Kaissouni, the problem of the dam 
 was discussed, and on December 17, 1955, it was announced that 
 the United States and the United Kingdom had assured the 
 Egyptian Government of their support of the project, "which 
 would be of inestimable importance in the development of the 
 Egyptian economy and in the improvement of the welfare of 
 the Egyptian people." The assistance was to take the form of 
 grants toward defraying foreign exchange costs of the initial stages 
 of the construction, involving the coffer dam, the foundations for 
 the primary dam, and auxiliary work. Assurance was also given, 
 subject to legislative authority, that the United States and the 
 United Kingdom were prepared "to consider sympathetically in 
 the light of then existing circumstances further support toward 
 financing the later stages to supplement World Bank financing." 
 
 The problem of assistance to Iraq differed from that of aid to 
 Egypt both because of the former's signature of the Baghdad Pact 
 and because of its oil revenues of about $140 million a year. How- 
 ever, the United States has assisted in developing Iraqi military 
 potential under the mutual defense agreement of 1954. 
 
 The primary key to Iraqi development lies in harnessing the 
 waters of the Tigris-Euphrates river system; construction is now 
 
 38 
 
under way on a series of dams. Iraq initiated its second Five- 
 Year Plan on April i, 1955, and the Iraqi Development Board pro- 
 posed that the equivalent of some $800 million be made available 
 from petroleum to finance the program, much of the emphasis of 
 vi^hich was on projects to raise living standards. Under the techni- 
 cal cooperation program in Iraq an agricultural college was estab- 
 lished at Abu Ghraib with the assistance of technicians from the 
 University of Arizona, while the Technical Institute at Baghdad 
 was established with similar assistance from the Bradley Institute 
 of Technology. 
 
 With its limited resources and the presence of some 450,000 
 Arab refugees from Palestine, Jordan continued to be confronted 
 with serious economic problems. During 1955 the United States 
 made $5 million available to the Jordanian development program, 
 I3.6 million of it in the form of local currency purchased with 
 pounds sterling generated from the sale of American coal to the 
 United Kingdom. The assistance took the form of road construc- 
 tion, afforestation, and waterspreading activities; some 50 miles 
 of roads were completed, about 5,000 acres of formerly unproduc- 
 tive land were brought under cultivation, and many thousands of 
 new trees were planted. Some $2,200,000 was provided for tech- 
 nical cooperation, with projects in agriculture, natural resources, 
 health, and education. Nineteen agricultural centers serving 300 
 villages are now in operation in Jordan. Sound beginnings have 
 been made in education, and about 100 Jordanian trainees in the 
 field of education have been sent abroad.^" 
 
 During 1955, a large part of the program in Lebanon was de- 
 signed to assist in improving the Lebanese road system, in view 
 of its importance to the country's economic development. An 
 agreement in June 1955 provided for $5,700,000 to help finance con- 
 struction of a modern highway from Beirut to the Syrian border, 
 connecting with the road to Damascus, one of the important high- 
 ways in the Middle East. While the Lebanese Government was 
 to pay the major cost, $5 million of American assistance was to be 
 in the form of a 15-year loan at 3 percent, which the Lebanese Gov- 
 ernment has not yet taken up. The remaining $700,000 was to be 
 used to purchase American road-building equipment and to 
 finance an engineering survey by an American firm. Other forms 
 of assistance included provision of $1.4 million for improved agri- 
 cultural equipment, the establishment of 30 agricultural extension 
 
 39 
 
offices under the guidance of American extension specialists, the 
 estabhshnnent of the Lebanon Industry Institute, and the setting up 
 of the National Litani Board for the development of the Litani 
 River."' 
 
 The United States also continued to support the program of 
 assistance to Arab refugees under Unrwa. Some 900,000 refugees 
 were involved, about 300,000 of whom were completely supported 
 by Unrwa in camps, while the rest received both food rations and 
 basic medical services, at an average cost of $28 per annum."^ It 
 is partly in connection with the refugee problem that the United 
 States has sought to promote the development of the Jordan River 
 Valley, which would permit the irrigation of some 225,000 acres 
 of land in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel and make possible 
 eventual settlement of some 200,000 refugees. 
 
 At the same time, the United States continued its assistance to 
 Israel, with special attention to programs for orderly industrial 
 development. The program for 1955 centered on projects de- 
 signed to make maximum use of local raw materials, without 
 neglecting agriculture.^^ On April 29 an agreement was signed 
 with Israel providing for the sale of $8.3 million worth of surplus 
 commodities, including 50,000 metric tons of wheat and 40,000 
 metric tons of feed grains. The Israeli pounds derived from the 
 purchase of these commodities were to be used for various purposes, 
 including American expenditures in Israel; some were to be loaned 
 for the purpose of economic development in Israel.^ 
 
 Neither Yemen nor Saudi Arabia received economic or technical 
 assistance during 1955 from the United States. By 1954, however, 
 Saudi Arabia was receiving royalties from the Arabian American 
 Oil Company at the rate of about $260 million annually. As 
 President Eisenhower declared on August 11, 1955, when receiving 
 the credentials of Saudi Arabian Ambassador Sheikh Abdullah 
 al-Khayall, "from the earliest years of our country, traders, doctors, 
 and educators have gone [to the Middle East] to contribute, 
 through their careers, to the growth and development of the 
 area." 
 
 On November 22, it was announced that Yemen had granted 
 a concession to the Yemen Development Corporation, the first 
 oil and mineral concession in the history of the country. The 30- 
 year agreement provided for exclusive exploration and develop- 
 ment rights over 40,000 square miles, or the northern two-thirds 
 40 
 
of the country, with the exception of the narrow coastal strip 
 (Tihana). All net profits were to be divided equally, but the 
 agreement could be voided if commercial quantities either of petro- 
 leum or minerals were not found within 6 years. 
 
 Assistance in Africa 
 
 Among the projects of economic and technical assistance in 
 Africa, examples may be cited from Liberia, Ethiopia, and Libya. 
 Classes began in the new Booker T. Washington Institute in 
 Liberia during August 1955. The project was launched under 
 a contract with Prairie View (Texas) Agricultural and Mechani- 
 cal College, which provided assistance in improving teaching 
 methods and planning an educational curriculum. A project for 
 demonstrating the techniques of growing swamp rice was com- 
 pleted in 1955, with the results disseminated in many parts of 
 Liberia through an agricultural extension system organized with 
 American assistance. 
 
 A joint Ethiopian-American educational commission made a 
 thorough examination of Ethiopian educational needs, through 
 the technical assistance program. The educational program in 
 agriculture and the mechanical arts was already showing results 
 in Ethiopia. The 3-year-old Jimma Agricultural Secondary 
 School and the Handicraft School at Addis Ababa, were financed 
 entirely by the Ethiopian Government, except for the cost of Amer- 
 ican technicians. In addition, an apprentice trade school was 
 established at Addis Ababa by technicians from the Oklahoma 
 Agricultural and Mechanical College, as part of a program for 
 developing agricultural and mechanical training. On October 3 
 the Export-Import Bank announced that it would establish a $24 
 million credit in Ethiopia's favor for the development of commer- 
 cial airfields and aviation facilities throughout the country."" 
 
 On presenting his credentials as Ambassador, Sayyid Siddiq 
 Muntasser, on May 6, 1955, noted that the Libyan people had 
 placed much trust in the friendship of the United States and re- 
 called the role which the United States had played during the con- 
 sideration of the future of Libya in the United Nations. Ambas- 
 sador Muntasser also noted that the decision to recognize the legiti- 
 mate right of self-determination had been made on American soil. 
 
 41 
 
But independence had not solved all problems, and Libya still 
 counted on the assistance of the United States to overcome some of 
 its difficulties to insure its complete independence in all fields. 
 President Eisenhower replied that he was aware of the complex 
 problems facing Libya and indicated that the United States was 
 "deeply sympathetic" with the efforts which were being made to 
 raise Libyan standards of living.^^ 
 
 The Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission, with an 
 American as executive director, was established to help supervise 
 American economic assistance. Under a revised technical assist- 
 ance agreement, projects were being integrated within Libyan 
 government departments to pave the way for Libya to assume 
 greater responsibility for project activities. Preventive and other 
 public health services were introduced by the Libyan-American 
 Joint Service in Public Health. 
 
 The International Cooperation Administration announced on 
 August I that it would ship 6,800 tons of surplus American wheat 
 to Libya in an emergency move to relieve distress occasioned by a 
 poor grain harvest, and on September 2 a further agreement was 
 signed covering an additional grant of 6,000 tons and bringing to 
 45,000 tons the total of wheat shipments authorized over a period 
 of some 20 months.^ 
 
 Assistance in South Asia 
 
 In South Asia, where the Soviet Union made considerable prop- 
 aganda with large offers of assistance during the fall of 1955, the 
 United States had long been active under the United Nations and 
 its own bilateral programs. 
 
 Both military and economic assistance has been rendered to 
 Pakistan, which has taken a firm position on the side of the free 
 world, within the framework both of the Southeast Asia Collective 
 Defense Treaty and the Baghdad Pact. In the 6 years ending on 
 June 30, 1955, the United States provided Pakistan with some 
 $361,850,000 in economic assistance. Because of its urgent need 
 for assistance, some $71.8 million— $20 million on a loan basis- 
 was provided during fiscal year 1955, of which $40 million was for 
 commodity imports. The program also included $20 million for 
 defense support, $5.5 million for flood relief, $5.3 million for tech- 
 
 42 
 
nical assistance projects, and $i million for freight costs in ocean 
 transport of surplus agricultural commodities. 
 
 The technical assistance program in Pakistan during 1955 in- 
 cluded projects directed toward improvement of transportation 
 and industry. Among other things, Pakistan International Air- 
 lines and Pan American World Airways signed an agreement in 
 May providing for American technical assistance in expanding 
 Pakistan's air transportation system, and a group of American tech- 
 nicians assisted in this work. American technicians also cooper- 
 ated in agricultural production, land reclamation, public health, 
 vocational education, and the community development program. 
 The United States assisted in designing a multipurpose hydro- 
 electric dam to be constructed on the Karnafuli River in East Pak- 
 istan, electric power from which will stimulate industrial devel- 
 opment and also contribute to flood control and irrigation. In 
 May the United States and Pakistan signed an agreement making 
 possible guaranties for private investments in Pakistan, designed 
 to encourage private industry.'" 
 
 During the latter part of 1955, India was visited by Premier 
 Nikolai Bulganin and Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and also 
 received tantalizing offers of Soviet economic and technical as- 
 sistance.^™ The United States, for its part, had long engaged in 
 programs of economic and technical assistance in India. Indeed, 
 since 1951, the United States had provided India with gross assist- 
 ance totaling more than $500 million, divided almost equally be- 
 tween grants and loans. In all there were more than 50 joint proj- 
 ects, toward the completion of which India was contributing about 
 $400 million. In addition, American foundations and voluntary 
 agencies have contributed some $48 million to various projects in 
 India. 
 
 While the problems with regard to India were complicated, re- 
 sults were already evident in a number of fields, involving both 
 agriculture and industry. During fiscal year 1955, the United 
 States allocated $84.3 million to Indian projects, of which $45 mil- 
 lion was on a loan basis. Of $69.1 million in development assist- 
 ance funds made available during 1955, $30 million was programed 
 for cotton and wheat purchases in the United States; the rupees 
 acquired by the United States from these purchases were part of 
 the $45 million loan and were to be utilized for the development 
 of power, river valley projects, and other joint projects. 
 
 43 
 
Technical assistance projects continued to stress community de- 
 velopment and increased agricultural production. Contracts were 
 negotiated with five American universities and colleges for tech- 
 nical support to several Indian states and agricultural institutions. 
 A village water supply and sanitation system was inaugurated and 
 attention given to small irrigation projects, soil conservation, and 
 farm management. The University of Tennessee was to assist 
 Indian women's colleges in home economics; the University of 
 Texas was to cooperate in the establishment of teacher-training 
 institutions in the field of secondary education. 
 
 There were also other forms of assistance. Up to June 1955, 
 for example, some $38,875,000 had been earmarked for the purchase 
 of railway rolling stock and locomotives, and early in September 
 450 freight cars were received under the American aid program. 
 On October 4 the United States and India announced an exchange 
 of notes covering the extension of emergency assistance totaling 
 $4.7 million in the form of 10,000 tons of wheat and 10,000 tons of 
 rice from the stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation to help 
 relieve victims of flood disaster in northeast India."" On January 
 5, 1956, the fourth anniversary of the assistance program in India, a 
 new agreement was signed, providing $10 million for importation 
 of 100,000 tons of steel and 6,000 tons of DDT for malaria control."'^ 
 
 During the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Afghanistan in De- 
 cember 1955, much was made of the announcement of a $100- 
 million Soviet loan to Afghanistan and of the reaffirmation of 
 Afghanistan's "neutral" policy.'"'' On the other hand, the United 
 States has endeavored over the years, although on a relatively small 
 scale, to assist Afghanistan in a variety of ways. Through the 
 Export-Import Bank, loans totaling $39,500,000 were made for 
 the multipurpose Helmand Valley project for irrigation, flood 
 control, and power development. In addition, some $4 million 
 had been granted in the form of technical assistance. 
 
 During 1955 stress continued to be placed on the Helmand River 
 project, and a group of American experts assisted in such technical 
 projects as engineering, agriculture, health and sanitation, com- 
 munity development, and public administration. Moreover, under 
 contract with the Foreign Operations Administration, Columbia 
 University Teachers College sent a group of four specialists to 
 Kabul to assist the Ministry of Education in teacher training and 
 general education. The University of Wyoming sent 23 specialists 
 44 
 
to assist in technical education and agriculture; helped in the 
 establishment of the Afghanistan Institute of Applied Science, 
 with two subsidiary schools, the Afghan Institute of Technology 
 and the Vocational Agricultural School; and aided the Ministry 
 of Agriculture in research and demonstration. The Near East 
 Foundation, long experienced in such matters, assisted in a project 
 for community development in Afghan villages. 
 
 Work in Nepal during 1955 looked primarily toward reparation 
 of flood devastation, and a project for reclamation in the Rapti 
 Valley, where an area of some 130,000 acres was to be opened for 
 resettlement, was undertaken. The village improvement program 
 involved six development centers, which have trained more than 
 175 Nepalese to demonstrate more effective use of insecticides, 
 fertilizers, and farm implements. Assistance was also given in the 
 field of public health. The University of Oregon assisted in an 
 educational project, under which more than 100 villagers were 
 trained as teachers to work in schools throughout Nepal. Since 
 1951 approximately $6 million in U.S. aid has gone to Nepal, 
 including $1.5 million in flood relief. 
 
 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOANS 
 
 Even before the inauguration of the American program for 
 technical and economic assistance, the Export-Import Bank of 
 Washington had authorized a number of loans in the Near East, 
 South Asia, and Africa for the economic development of countries 
 in that area. By July i, 1955, these loans were substantially as 
 shown in the accompanying table. 
 
 45 
 
Export-Import Bank Loans, 1945-1955 
 
 Country 
 
 Date 
 
 Authorized Credit 
 
 Purpose 
 
 Egypt 
 
 
 
 
 Fertilizer and Chemical Industries of 
 Egypt. 
 
 Egyptian Spinners (Barclays Bank 
 
 D. C. O.)- 
 United Spinning and Weaving Co., 
 
 S. A. E. 
 
 Total 
 
 7/16/47 
 
 $7, 250, 000 
 
 Construction of fertilizer plant 
 
 5/6/55 
 6/13/55 
 
 60, 000 
 25,000 
 
 Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Works) 
 Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Works) 
 
 
 $7, 335, 000 
 
 
 Greece 
 
 
 
 
 Kingdom of Greece 
 
 Kingdom of Greece 
 
 Piraiki-Patraiki Industrie de Coton, 
 S. A. 
 
 Total 
 
 1/9/46 
 6/13/55 
 12/16/54 
 
 $25, 000, 000 
 300, 000 
 625, 000 
 
 U.S. products and services. Some $10,436,- 
 
 687.39 cancelled 
 Crawler tractors with angle-dozers and 
 
 motor graders 
 Textile machinery 
 
 
 $25, 925, 000 
 
 
 Iran 
 
 
 
 
 Government of Iran 
 
 11/11/54 
 
 $53, 000, 000 
 
 Economic development 
 
Israel 
 
 
 State of Israel 
 
 State of Israel 
 
 State of Israel 
 
 1/19/49 
 
 3/16/49 
 3/23/49 
 
 
 9/7/49 
 iu/zo/*fy 
 
 
 
 Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
 1 l%lAf> 
 1/ j/'rO 
 
 
 
 
 
 Turkey 
 
 
 Sumer Bank (Republic of Turkey) . . . 
 
 Republic of Turkey 
 
 Etibank (Republic of Turkey) .... 
 
 Republic of Turkey 
 
 Republic of Turkey 
 
 Republic of Turkey 
 
 10/13/48 
 1/26/46 
 3/16/49 
 5/25/49 
 5/25/49 
 
 11/19/54 
 8/31/49 
 
 $70, 000, 000 
 9, 535, 243 
 25, 000, 000 
 5, 000, 000 
 
 5, 464, 757 
 20, 000, 000 
 
 $135, 000, 000 
 
 $25, 000, 000 
 15, 000, 000 
 
 $40, 000, 000 
 
 $417, 584. 33 
 
 431, 263. 64 
 
 104,000 
 3, 750, 000 
 4, 250, 000 
 
 500,000 
 
 999, 524. 92 
 
 Agricultural production 
 Transportation. Some $544.52 cancelled 
 Housing materials 
 
 Telecommunications equipment. Some 
 
 $1,256.10 cancelled 
 Development of ports 
 
 Raw materials and equipment. Some 
 
 $15, 000, 000 cancelled 
 Public works and development projects. 
 
 Some $10,232,483.60 cancelled 
 
 (International General Electric Co.) 
 State seaways and harbors 
 Ingersoll Rand Co. 
 
 State railways. Some $37,155-58 cancelled 
 State seaways and harbors 
 State seaways and harbors 
 U.S. rails and accessories 
 
Export-Imfort Bank Loans, 1943-1955 — Continued 
 
 Country 
 
 Turkey — Continued 
 
 Etibank (Republic of Turkey). 
 Etibank (Republic of Turkey). 
 
 Republic of Turkey 
 
 Republic of Turkey 
 
 Cukurova Itholat ve Ithracat, T. A. O. 
 
 Total . . 
 
 Afghanistan 
 
 Royal Government of Afghanistan. 
 Royal Government of Afghanistan. 
 
 Total . 
 
 Ethiopia 
 
 Ethiopian Empire 
 
 9/28/49 
 3/17/55 
 
 11/26/47 
 11/4/54 
 1/6/55 
 
 11/23/49 
 4/29/54 
 
 6/22/50 
 
 AuthorlzMl Cradlt 
 
 $500,000 
 785, 000 
 
 8, 000, 000 
 4, 235, 000 
 1, 020, 000 
 
 $24, 992, 372. 89 
 
 $21, 000, 000 
 18, 500, 000 
 
 $39, 500, 000 
 
 $1, 000, 000 
 
 PurpoM 
 
 Earth-moving equipment 
 
 Materials, equipment and service for coal 
 
 washing plant (McNally Pittsburg Mfg. 
 
 Corp.) 
 
 Reconversion of vessels. Some $819.74 can- 
 celled 
 
 Equipment, storage and handling of grain 
 
 (Colombian Steel Tank Co.) 
 Spare parts for tractors (Caterpillar Tractor 
 
 Co.). Some $1,020,000 cancelled 
 
 Construction of dam and canal 
 Helmand River Valley Development 
 
 Aircraft and spare parts. Some $27,731.82 
 cancelled 
 
Ethiopian Empire 
 
 7/10/46 
 
 2, 000, 000 
 
 Communication equipment and industrial 
 machinery. Some $250,027.57 cancelled 
 
 Total 
 
 
 $3, 000, 000 
 
 
 Liberia 
 
 Republic of Liberia 
 
 Republic of Liberia 
 
 1/11/51 
 6/14/51 
 1/20/55 
 
 $5, 000, 000 
 1, 350, 000 
 15, 000, 000 
 
 Highway improvement and construction 
 Water supply and sewerage system 
 Highway construction projects 
 
 Total 
 
 
 $21, 350, 000 
 
 
Loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1949-1955 
 
 Country 
 
 Ceylon 
 India 
 
 India (Guarantor) 
 
 Indian Iron & Steel Company . . . . 
 Tata Hydro, Andhra and Tata Power 
 Companies 
 India (Guarantor) 
 
 Industrial Credit and Investment Corp. 
 of India 
 
 Iraq 
 
 Lebanon (Guarantor) 
 
 Litani River Authority 
 
 7/9/54 
 8/18/49 
 
 9/29/49 
 
 4/18/50 
 
 1/23/53 
 
 12/18/52 
 11/19/54 
 
 3/14/55 
 6/15/50 
 
 8/25/55 
 
 Original 
 Amount 
 
 $19, 110, 000 
 34, 000, 000 
 
 10, 000, 000 
 
 18, 500, 000 
 
 19, 500, 000 
 
 31, 500, 000 
 16, 200, 000 
 
 10, 000, 000 
 12, 800, 000 
 
 27, 000, 000 
 
 Purp«M 
 
 Electrical power development 
 
 Railway rehabilitation. Some $1,200,000 can- 
 celled or refunded 
 
 Agricultural development. Some $2,796,187 
 cancelled or refunded 
 
 Electric power development. Some $690,000 
 cancelled or refunded 
 
 Electric power development, flood control and 
 irrigation. Some $9,000,000 cancelled or 
 refunded 
 
 Expansion of iron and steel production facilities 
 Electric power development 
 
 Foreign exchange for development of private 
 industry 
 
 Construction of a flood control project. Some 
 $6,506,054 cancelled or refunded 
 
 Electric power development and irrigation 
 
Pakistan (Guarantor) 
 
 Sui Gas Transmission Co 
 
 Karachi Electric Supply Corporation 
 Ltd 
 
 Karnaphuli Paper Mills, Ltd .... 
 Trustees of the Port of Karachi . . . 
 
 Turkey 
 
 First Tranche 
 
 Second Tranche 
 
 Turkey (Guarantor) 
 
 Industrial Development Bank of Turkey 
 
 Industrial Development Bank of Turkey 
 
 Ethiopia 
 
 Total 
 
 14, 000, 000 Construction of natural gas transmission line 
 
 13, 800, 000 Electric power development 
 
 4, 200, 000 Construction of paper and pulp mill 
 
 14, 800, 000 Port construction and development 
 
 3, 900, 000 Construction of grain storage facilities 
 12, 500, 000 Port construction and development 
 3, 800, 000 Port construction and development 
 25, 200, 000 Electric power development, irrigation and 
 flood control. Some $2,356,000 cancelled or 
 refunded 
 
 9, 000, 000 Foreign exchange for development of private 
 industry 
 
 9, 000, 000 Foreign exchange for development of private 
 industry 
 
 5, 000, 000 Highway rehabilitation 
 
 2, 000, 000 Foreign exchange for Development Bank 
 1, 500, 000 Rehabilitation and extension of telephone and 
 telegraph systems 
 
 $317, 310, 000 
 
U.S. SUPPORT FOR U.N. 
 ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
 
 The United States continued during 1955 to contribute in major 
 degree to United Nations programs of technical assistance, many 
 of which were concentrated in the Near East, South Asia, and 
 Africa."^ It also maintained its contributions to various United 
 Nations agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization 
 (Fag), World Health Organization (Who), United Nations Edu- 
 cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco), and 
 Unicef which have given basic assistance to underdeveloped areas 
 in a wide variety of ways."" 
 
 The United States on December 5, 1955, completed the action 
 required for membership in the International Finance Corpora- 
 tion, established under Resolution 823 (IX) of the General As- 
 sembly/"' This country, as in the past, made a large contribution 
 to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
 which assisted in a number of development programs in the Near 
 East, South Asia, and Africa. By June 30, 1955, out of an author- 
 ized capital of $10,000,000,000, some $9,028,000,000 had been sub- 
 scribed."* The United States had subscribed $635,000,000, with 
 31,750 shares in the amount of $3,175,000,000. By September 30, 
 1955, effective loans reached $1,837,262,494, of which $317,310,000, 
 as illustrated in the table above, were for development purposes 
 in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. A development survey 
 was completed in Syria during 1955 and one was organized in 
 Jordan."^ 
 
 REFLECTIONS OF UNITED STATES POLICY 
 
 That the United States continued to look upon the problems of 
 stability and security in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa 
 from a broadly based point of view, and that it was prepared to 
 meet the new challenges which had arisen, was indicated by a 
 number of developments toward the end of 1955 and the begin- 
 ning of 1956. The American attitude was reflected in the unani- 
 mous view of the United States delegation to the Tenth Session of 
 the General Assembly of the United Nations that economic and 
 social questions were "assuming increasing importance on the 
 
 52 
 
international scene" and had moved to the forefront in "the strug- 
 gle between Communism and freedom," particularly since the 
 Soviet Union was using "economic and social collaboration as a 
 means for jumping military as well as political barriers," as in 
 India, Egypt, and Burma, for example. The delegation believed 
 that the United States should counter the Soviet efforts, not by 
 outbidding it in sheer amounts of economic assistance but "by mak- 
 ing newly independent and newly articulate peoples feel that they 
 can best satisfy their wants by becoming and remaining part of 
 the community of free nations." The delegation warned that the 
 United States was "in a contest in the field of economic develop- 
 ment of underdeveloped countries which is bitterly competitive" 
 and that defeat in this contest "could be as disastrous as defeat in 
 an armaments race." 
 
 President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles endorsed these views. 
 Mr. Dulles had already declared, on December 20, that the United 
 States sought no monopoly in the field of economic assistance and 
 welcomed "any grant of economic aid" which invigorated less 
 developed countries and made them more independent, as had 
 been the aim of American policy since the Second World War. 
 Not one country had "lost any particle of freedom or independ- 
 ence" as a result of American assistance. Mr. Dulles hoped that 
 Soviet assistance was "not offered as a Trojan horse to penetrate, 
 and then take over, independent countries"; he felt that the experi- 
 enced statesmen of the areas concerned were well aware of the 
 dangers."^ 
 
 President Eisenhower sounded a similar note in his state of the 
 Union message on January 5, 1956, declaring that the mutual 
 security program must be sustained and fortified and noting that 
 "because the conditions of poverty and unrest in less developed 
 areas make their people a special target of international com- 
 munism, there is a need to help them achieve the economic growth 
 and stability necessary to preserve their independence against 
 Communist threats and enticements." 
 
 The Outlook in United States Policy 
 
 Such were the major developments in United States policy 
 during 1955. As the year drew to a close and another dawned, it 
 
 53 
 
was clear that the problems were as manifold, complex, and per- 
 sistent as they had been in the past and that there were no simple 
 or easy solutions to any of them. There was a recognition of the 
 basic elements in the situation in the discussions between Prime 
 Minister Eden and President Eisenhower, January 30 to February 
 I, 1956, in which the problems of the Near East, South Asia, and 
 Africa were both broadly and specifically discussed. 
 
 It was agreed that every effort should be made to reduce the 
 sources of misunderstanding between the Middle Eastern nations, 
 whose peoples should be helped to achieve "their legitimate aspira- 
 tions." Similarly, an Arab-Israel settlement was considered ur- 
 gent, but possible only if both sides were "willing to reconcile the 
 positions" hitherto taken. The United States and the United 
 Kingdom reiterated their willingness to contribute to a settlement 
 through financial assistance on the Arab refugee problem and 
 guaranties of "agreed frontiers," reaffirmed the Tripartite Declara- 
 tion of May 25, 1950, and announced arrangements for discussions, 
 with French participation, as to "the nature of the action" to be 
 taken in the event of violence. It was also clear that security in 
 the Middle East could not rest upon arms alone but must be based 
 on the establishment of good neighborly relations. Soviet policy 
 in arms supplies to Middle Eastern countries was viewed as adding 
 to the tensions and increasing the risk of war — a risk which the 
 United States and the United Kingdom desired to mitigate. In 
 that interest they fully supported the U.N. Truce Supervision Or- 
 ganization and were ready favorably to consider "recommenda- 
 tions for any necessary enlargement . . . and improvement of its ca- 
 pabilities." They were also agreed concerning the significance of 
 the Baghdad Pact, and the United States indicated that it would 
 "continue to give solid support to the purposes ... of the Pact" 
 and that its observers would "play a constructive part in the work 
 of its committees." The belief was expressed that difficulties in 
 Arabia and the region of the Persian Gulf could be solved through 
 "friendly discussions." 
 
 The Declaration of Washington, which emanated from these 
 discussions, reaffirmed the goal of self-government and independ- 
 ence of "all countries whose people desire and are capable of sus- 
 taining an independent existence" and noted that, in striking 
 contrast to the Soviet record in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
 600 million people "in nearly a score of lands" had attained nation- 
 54 
 
hood since World War II with American and British assistance 
 and that many more millions were "being helped surely and 
 steadily toward self-government." Since political independence 
 alone was insufficient, the need for technical and economic assist- 
 ance was recognized, and it was stressed, again in contrast to 
 Soviet aggrandizement, that the United Kingdom and the United 
 States had "not sought nor desired extension of either economic or 
 political power." It was also pointed out that Soviet aims had not 
 changed, that "military and political force" had been used in the 
 past, and that now "economic inducements" had been added to 
 the "methods of penetration." There were a warning lest under- 
 developed nations lose their independence through "threat, promise 
 or enticement" and a notice that some 50 nations which cherished 
 their freedom had "drawn together in voluntary associations for 
 their collective security." 
 
 The policy of the United States was reconfirmed both generally 
 and specifically on a number of occasions in the period immediately 
 following the Anglo-American discussions, whether with regard 
 to North Africa, Middle East security and the shipment of arms, 
 South Asia, the Soviet challenge in the area, or the problems of 
 economic development. Secretary Dulles suggested to the Senate 
 Foreign Relations Committee on February 24, 1956, that Israel's 
 security could be better assured, in the long run, through meas- 
 ures—including reliance on the United Nations — other than the 
 acquisition of additional arms in circumstances which might 
 "exacerbate the situation." He did not exclude the possibility, 
 however, of arms shipments, either to Israel or to the Arab States, 
 at a time when it would "preserve the peace." 
 
 President Eisenhower reiterated this position at his news con- 
 ferences on March 7 and 15, emphasizing that the United States 
 was trying to avoid the initiation of an arms race in the Middle 
 East, stressing the need for action under the United Nations and 
 for the avoidance of incidents, and noting continued adherence 
 to the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950. At the same time, the 
 President indicated that the conflict between the Communist and 
 the free worlds was now undergoing a "very great broadening" 
 into the economic and political fields, a very serious development 
 which demanded "flexibility" in the American foreign assistance 
 program."'' 
 
 55 
 
FOOTNOTES 
 
 'For background, see Harry N. Howard, "The Development of United 
 States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951," Bulletin of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 
 809, and Nov. 26, 1951, p. 839; "The Development of United States Policy 
 in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1951-1952," ibid., Dec. 8, 1952, 
 p. 891, and Dec. 15, 1952, p. 936 (also available as Department of State 
 publication 4851); "The Development of United States Policy in the Near 
 East, South Asia, and Africa During 1953," ibid., Feb. 22, 1954, p. 274, Mar. 
 I, 1954, p. 328, and Mar. 8, 1954, p. 365; and "The Development of United 
 States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1954," ibid., 
 Feb. 14, 1955, p. 256, Feb. 21, 1955, p. 301, and Feb. 28, 1955, p. 338 (also 
 available as Department of State publication 5801 ) . 
 
 " Recent Soviet actions called to mind the position of the Soviet Union in 
 November 1940 that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general 
 direction of the Persian Gulf" be "recognized as the center of the aspirations 
 of the Soviet Union." See Nazi-Soviet Relations, ig^g-ig^i (Department 
 of State publication 3023), pp. 217-258; also, H. N. Howard, "Germany, 
 the Soviet Union and Turkey During World War II," Bulletin of July 18, 
 1948, pp. 63-78. 
 
 ' Ibid., Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1047. 
 
 * U.N. doc. A/2911, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Wor^ 
 of the Organization, i July ig^/f-i^ June 7955, pp. xi-xvi. 
 ' Bulletin of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 523. 
 " U.N. doc. A/PV. 520, pp. 44-52. 
 
 ' For text, see Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D. C, Report on Indo- 
 nesia, Vol. VI, No. 9 (June 1955), p. 30. 
 ^ U.N. docs. A/2923/Add. I, A/2924/Add. I, and S/3414. 
 ^ Bulletin of Nov. 28, 1955, p. 894. 
 ^° Ibid., Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1040. 
 
 On Jan. 26, 1956, the Department of State announced its intention to 
 request congressional action to end U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in Mo- 
 rocco. The rights had been accorded in 1787 and renewed in 1836. In the 
 light of progress being made by France and Morocco "in working out their 
 future relationships," the United States considered it appropriate to modern- 
 ize its own treaty relationship with Morocco with regard to extraterritorial 
 rights (Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 204). 
 
 On Mar. 2, 1956, France and Morocco signed an agreement virtually end- 
 ing the 1912 protectorate, and France confirmed its recognition of Moroccan 
 independence; see Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466. 
 
 56 
 
" U.N. doc. A/PV. 530, pp. 193-6. For "Basic Factors on Algeria," see 
 Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d' Information, No. 24 (November 
 1955). For Ambassador Lodge's statement of Sept. 22 in the General Com- 
 mittee, see Bulletin of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 546. 
 
 Ibid., Dec. 19, 1955, p. 992. 
 
 Ibid., Aug. 22, 1955, p. 301. 
 
 For brief background, see H. N. Howard, The Development of United 
 States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1954. 
 
 See British Information Services, Eastern Mediterranean: Proposed Con- 
 ference, T. 23 (July I, 1955); Cyprus — A New British Initiative (August 
 1955), pp. 8-10. 
 
 See the United Kingdom, The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern 
 Mediterranean and Cyprus held by the Governments of the United Kingdom 
 of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey, London, August 
 2g-September j, 7955. Cmd. 9596. 
 
 ^' For certain aspects of the Greek case, see Royal Greek Embassy Informa- 
 tion Services (Washington), Cyprus Demands Self-Determination ( 1954) and 
 British Views on Cyprus (1955). 
 
 Turkish Information Office (New York), Tur\ish Views on Cyprus 
 (1955)- 
 
 Bulletin of Sept. 26, 1955, p. 496. 
 ™ Ibid., Oct. 10, 1955, p. 560. 
 " U.N. doc. A/BUR/SR. 102, pp. 2-3. 
 22 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
 
 Bulletin of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 545. 
 ^ For the discussion as a whole, see U.N. doc. A/PV. 521, pp. 53-65. 
 See also the statements of Foreign Secretary Macmillan on Dec. 5, 1955, 
 and of Field Marshal Sir John Harding, the Governor of Cyprus, Jan. i, 
 1956, in British Information Services, T. 53 (Dec. 6, 1955) and T. i (Jan. 
 10, 1956). 
 
 After 5 months of direct negotiation with the Cyprians, the British Gov- 
 ernment announced on Mar. 3, 1956, that it had failed to reach agreement 
 on the character of an amnesty, the responsibility for public security, and the 
 composition of an elected majority in the Assembly; the principle of self- 
 determination had not been under discussion. 
 
 ™ Bulletin of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378. 
 
 '"Ibid., Oct. 3, 1955, p. 523. See also the remarks of Ambassador Eban 
 in the General Assembly on Oct. 3 in U.N. doc. A/PV. 532, pp. 215-19. 
 Bulletin of Oct. 10, 1955, p. 560. 
 Ibid., Oct. 17, 1955, p. 604. 
 ^ Ibid., Oct. 31, 1955, p. 688. See also the address of Assistant Secretary 
 Allen before the New York Herald Tribune Forum on Oct. 17, 1955, ibid., 
 p. 683. 
 
 On Oct. 24 the Knesset approved a resolution expressing its anxiety con- 
 cerning the arms shipment to Egypt and the continued arming of Iraq and 
 other Arab States. 
 
 57 
 
^ Bulletin of Nov. 21, 1955, p. 845. 
 
 ^•^ For text of this address, made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, see British 
 Information Services, T. 48 (Nov. 10, 1955). 
 
 ^ Bulletin of Nov. 28, 1955, p. 894. 
 On Nov. 10 the Department announced that it had "let it be known 
 that we would be strongly opposed to the side which starts a war and would 
 be very favorably disposed to the side which convinces us that it desires 
 to maintain peace." 
 
 ^ Bulletin of Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1009. Foreign Secretary Macmillan told 
 the House of Commons on Dec. 12 that the Soviet Union was doing every- 
 thing possible to make the problems of the Middle East "utterly insoluble." 
 
 For a map of Israel showing boundary and demarcation lines, see ibid., 
 Feb. 21,1955, p. 303. 
 
 ^ One serious incident occurred on the Israel-Lebanese demarcation line 
 on Sept. 22; an armed gang attacked a bus, killing three persons and wound- 
 ing nine, one of whom was an American citizen. 
 
 ''^See, for example, the Israel complaint of Sept. 27, 1955 (U.N. doc. 
 S/3442). 
 
 ^''For U.S. statement and text of resolution, see Bulletin of Apr. 18, 
 1955, p. 659 and p. 661. 
 « Ibid., p. 662; U.N. docs. S/3373 and S/PV. 693. 
 « U.N. doc. S/3990. 
 Bulletin of June 20, 1955, p. 1016. 
 See U.N. docs. S/3425, 3426, 3427, 3428, 3430, 3431, 3433. 
 For U.S. statement and text of resolution, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1955. 
 p. 458. 
 
 ^See also Israel protests of Nov. i and 8, 1955, and Mar. 13, 1956. (UN. 
 docs. S/3454, 3456, 3559). 
 
 " Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1955, p. 786. 
 
 Of the disturbances during the first 10 months of 1955 for which respon- 
 sibility has so far been determined, Egypt was held responsible by the Untso 
 for some 30 incidents, in which 4 Egyptians and 16 Israelis were killed and 
 4 Egyptians and 59 Israelis were wounded, while Israel was held responsible 
 for 21 incidents, in which 47 Egyptians and 9 Israelis were killed and 45 
 Egyptians and 13 Israelis wounded. 
 
 During the first 10 months of 1955 there appear to have been 12 incidents 
 for which Israel was held responsible, in which 4 Jordanians and 3 Israelis 
 were wounded. Jordan was held responsible for 18 incidents, in which 8 
 Jordanians and 6 Israelis were killed and i Jordanian and 13 Israelis 
 wounded. 
 
 ^" See also U.N. docs. S/3448 and 3451. 
 
 '^U.N. doc. S/3516 and Add. i, Corr. i. According to official Israel 
 estimates, during the first 6 months of 1954 Israel casualties in clashes on 
 the Sea of Galilee totaled 2 killed and 7 wounded. At least 25 incidents 
 were reported in the first 10 months of 1955 "causing loss of life and prop- 
 erty," but without specification. Most of the clashes occurred when Syrian 
 
 58 
 
military outposts dominating the corner of the sea opened fire to defend Arab 
 fishermen threatened by Israel police patrols or to interfere with Israel 
 shipping. On the other hand, according to the Untso, Israel complaints 
 concerning incidents in 1954 reached 14, involving 2 killed and 8 wounded, 
 while there were 24 complaints in 1955, with no casualties. Again accord- 
 ing to Untso, there were 14 Syrian complaints during 1954, involving 
 5 killed and 6 wounded; in 1955 there were 26 complaints involving two 
 wounded. 
 
 On Mar. 4 there was an incident on the Sea of Galilee involving Syrian 
 forces and Israel police; 4 of the latter were killed (U.N. docs. S/3554, 3555, 
 and 3558). 
 =^U.N. doc. S/3514. 
 Ambassador Eban made a spirited defense of Israel on Jan. 17, among 
 other things charging that, as a result of "acts of aggression organized on 
 the responsibility of Arab Governments," some 884 Israelis had been killed 
 or maimed since 1951 (U.N. doc. S/PV. 713, p. 36). 
 Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 183. 
 
 For the discussions, see U.N. docs. S/PV. 707-715; for various drafts of 
 the resolution, see U.N. docs. S/3519, 3528, 3530 and Revs. 1-2, S/3532, 
 S/3536, and S/3537. See also the Israel memoranda of Dec. 21 and 29, 
 1955 (U.N. docs. S/3518, 3524). Although the Council recognized some 
 provocation, all members felt that Israel's action was out of all proportion to 
 the provocation; as Ambassador Lodge declared on Jan. 12, 1956, it could not 
 "be accurately described as a retaliatory raid." Ambassador Lodge added, 
 "The Security Council must do more than condemn. It must warn the 
 Government of Israel that another transgression will compel it to consider 
 what further measures under the charter are required to maintain or restore 
 the peace" (Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 182). 
 
 Meanwhile, it may be noted that the Untso did not accept the Israel 
 charges that Egypt had sabotaged General Burns' attempt to ease the situation 
 in the Gaza region. The primary difficulty continued to lie in the fact that 
 the Egyptians desired to demarcate all three sides of the demilitarized zone 
 triangle, whereas the Secretary-General had proposed demarcation of only 
 the side which constituted the old Palestinian-Sinai frontier. Despite Israel's 
 charge that Egypt had rejected the proposals, the Untso for the third time 
 denied the Israel charge and stated that "disturbance of public opinion in 
 Arab countries," following Israel's retaliatory action in the Sea of Galilee, 
 had made further progress in negotiations impossible. There had been no 
 serious clashes in the El Auja area since Nov. 2. It may be noted that the 
 Untso denied a similar Israel charge on Nov. 18. 
 '"U.N. press release SG/464, Jan. 30, 1956. 
 
 See also U.N. doc. S/3539 (Jan. 24, 1956) for Israel memorandum. 
 
 The Anglo-Egyptian controversy concerning the Sudan, in the settle- 
 ment of which the United States was much interested, ended formally with 
 the agreement of Feb. 12, 1953. 
 
 Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 85. 
 
 59 
 
Ibid., Feb. 27, 1956, p. 354. 
 
 For the British and Saudi positions concerning the matter, see U.N. 
 docs. S/3450, 3452, 3465. 
 
 Bulletin of Aug. 15, 1955, p. 263. 
 '^^ Ibid., Dec. 12, 1953, p. 966. 
 Ibid., Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1007. 
 
 See John D. Jernegan, "Middle East Defense," Bulletin of Apr. 4, 
 
 1955. P- 564- 
 
 "•^ For a brief background, see Harry N. Howard, U.S. Policy in the Near 
 East, South Asia, and Africa — 795^ (Department of State publication 5801), 
 pp. 36-42. 
 
 •'^ For partial text and exchange of notes, see Embassy of Iraq (Washing- 
 ton, D. C), Bulletin, vol. II, No. 3 (March 1955). 
 
 At the time of the signing of the Baghdad Pact the League included 
 Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen; the 
 Sudan joined on Jan. 19, 1956. 
 
 See especially U.N. docs. S/PV. 693, 695, and 696. 
 
 Bulletin of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 534. 
 
 Ibid., Oct. 24, 1955, p. 653. 
 
 Ibid., Dec. 5, 1955, p. 926. 
 
 Awni Khalidy of Iraq became Secretary General. 
 
 ^* For text of communique, see Bulletin of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16. 
 
 " Ibid., Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1003, and Jan. 16, 1956, p. 81. 
 
 Riots occurred in Jordan during December 1955 and January 1956 in 
 connection with the possibility that Jordan might adhere to the Baghdad 
 Pact. Secretary Dulles on Jan. 8 expressed to the Jordanian Charge d'Af- 
 faires his deep concern at reports of mob violence at Amman on Jan. 7 
 and in the Jordan-occupied sector of Jerusalem, where American property 
 was damaged and American lives endangered (ibid., Jan. 16, 1956, p. 85). 
 
 '^'For a U.S. statement on Soviet participation, see Bulletin of Mar. 5, 
 
 1956, p. 395. 
 
 This article does not cover the contribution of the Department of State 
 International Educational Exchange Service in this area. For a brief account 
 of activities under this program, see The International Exchange Program, 
 15th Semiannual Report to Congress (Department of State publication 6293, 
 1956). 
 
 Department of Commerce, Foreign Grants and Credits by the United 
 States Government, September 1955 quarter, tables i and 2. Net figures 
 cited here differ from certain of the individual country figures cited below 
 because they are computed on another basis. 
 
 '"For text of the agreement with Turkey, which entered into force on 
 June 10, see Bulletin of July 11, 1955, p. 55. The agreement with Lebanon 
 entered into force on July 18; that with Israel on July 12; Pakistan on Aug. 11; 
 and Greece on Aug. 4, 1955. 
 
 Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 1 19. 
 
 Ibid., May 2, 1955, p. 711. 
 
 60 
 
^'^Ibid., May 23, 1955, p. 855. See also the Secretary's statement of May 
 25 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, ibid., June 6, 1955, p. 
 911, and that of Harold E. Stassen before the House Committee on June 
 8, 1955, ibid., July 4, 1955, p. 29. 
 
 ^ For a summary of the uses to which mutual security funds were put in 
 individual countries during the first half of 1955, see Report to Congress on 
 the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended ]une jo, /955, H. 
 Doc. 266, 84th Cong., ist sess., p. 20 (Pakistan), p. 21 (India), p. 22 
 (Afghanistan and Nepal), p. 25 (Greece and Turkey), p. 26 (Iran), p. 27 
 (Arab States and Israel), and p. 32 (Africa). 
 
 Direct American participation in the project ended on July 15, 1955. 
 On June 10 Greece signed an agreement with the United States for defense 
 use of technology, designed to foster the exchange of technology for defense 
 purposes (Bulletin of July 11, 1955, p. 84). 
 
 Bulletin of July 18, 1955, p. 100. 
 ^Ibid., May 16, 1955, p. 814. 
 
 Ibid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 171. Since the beginning of 1948 Turkey has 
 received $463 million in economic assistance from the United States for 
 development assistance related to the upkeep of its armed forces and for 
 technical assistance. During the same period, Turkey has borrowed some 
 $25 million from the Export-Import Bank and about I63 million from the 
 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, while short-term 
 government and commercial debts in Europe were estimated at about $150 
 million. 
 
 For text of a U.S.-Iranian agreement signed on Feb. 20, 1956, on surplus 
 agricultural commodities, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 
 3506. On Feb. 26, 1956, the Export-Import Bank signed a I14 million 
 credit agreement with Iran for railroad improvement. 
 
 Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1050. For the agricultural commodities 
 agreement vvith Egypt signed Dec. 14, 1955, see Treaties and Other Inter- 
 national Acts Series 3439. 
 
 ™ On Oct. 30, 1955, the Jordanian Parliament approved an agreement per- 
 mitting Edwin W. Pauley, an independent American petroleum producer, 
 to explore Jordan for oil. It provided for 50 percent sharing after payment 
 of exploration expenditures and for cancellation after 8 months if oil was 
 not found; all oil wells were to become the exclusive property of Jordan after 
 55 years. 
 
 It was announced on Mar. 2, 1956, that an Export-Import Bank loan of 
 $105,000 to Syria would assure the beginning of a program to bring a de- 
 pendable supply of drinking water to various parts of Syria. 
 ^ See also U.N. docs. A/2978 and Add. i, A/2989, A/3Q57. 
 Israel also receives large-scale assistance from unofficial sources in the 
 United States. During 1955, for example, some $42,318,500 was subscribed 
 in Israel bonds, bringing the total sold since 1951 to $216,594,450. 
 Bulletin of May 16, 1955, p. 815. 
 ®^ Department of State press release 486, Aug. 1 1, 1955 (not printed) . 
 
 61 
 
^ Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617. 
 Department of State press release 244, May 6, 1955 (not printed). 
 
 ^ Bulletin of Aug. 15, 1955, p. 263, and Sept. 12, 1955, p. 427. For a 
 U.S.-Libyan agreement on relief supplies and equipment, see Treaties and 
 Other International Acts Series 3480. 
 
 ''^ Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 157, and June 20, 1955, p. 1018. Greece, 
 Israel, and Turkey have signed similar agreements with respect to the pro- 
 tection of private investments. 
 
 For a U.S.-Pakistan agreement on mutual security signed Jan. 11, 1955, 
 see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3183; for an agreement on 
 surplus agricultural commodities signed Jan. 18, 1955, see TIAS 3184; for a 
 technical cooperation agreement signed Jan. 18, 1955, see TIAS 3185. 
 
 ^"^ India and the Soviet Union had signed a loan agreement on Feb. 2, 
 1955, for the construction of a i-million-ton steel plant in central India at a 
 cost of some I91 million to be completed by i960. 
 
 ^"^ Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617. 
 
 ^•^The steel import brought to 700,000 tons the total which India had 
 obtained from the United States. The first 4 of 100 locomotives arrived at 
 Bombay on Jan. 3, 1956; for an address by Ambassador John Sherman Cooper 
 on that occasion, see Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 205. For text of air trans- 
 port agreement signed with India on Feb. 3, see ibid., Feb. 13, 1956, p. 264. 
 
 Since 1954 the Soviet Union had loaned some I14 million to Afghani- 
 stan for road construction, storage tanks, flour mills, etc. 
 
 ^"^ Export-Import Bank of Washington, Twentieth Semiannual Report to 
 Congress for the Period January-June ig55, appendix C. Loans in Africa 
 as a whole totaled $198,669,661.60 and in Asia $632,676,462.89. 
 
 "°See U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the President to the 
 Congress for the Year (Department of State publication 5769), pp. 
 
 235-39, f*"" tables of contributions. 
 
 ^"'In general see U.N. docs. A/2943: Report of the Economic and Social 
 Council covering the period from 7 August ig^4 to 5 August 1955, passim; 
 E/2740 (ST/ECA/32): Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945- 
 1954, passim; ST/TAA/SER.C/21: Fourth United Nations Social Welfare 
 Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East (Baghdad, 6-21 March 1954); 
 ST/TAA/K/Israel/4: United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, 
 Revenue Administration and Policy in Israel (Second Report); Seeds of 
 Progress: Stories of Technical Assistance (1955); E/CN.5/303/Rev. 1/ 
 ST/SOA/26: Social Progress Through Community Development (1955). 
 
 Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 54. The charter of the International 
 Finance Corporation requires a subscription of $75,000,000 before the cor- 
 poration can come into being; by Jan. 10, 1956, $56,761,000 had been sub- 
 scribed. Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to complete action for 
 membership (Dec. 16, 1955). 
 
 ^'^ Afghanistan and Israel became members of the IBRD during 1955. 
 
 ^*^See also U.N. docs. A/2906 and A/3065 for material on the proposed 
 Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. 
 
 62 
 
^^"International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Tenth An- 
 nual Report ig^4-jg^^, appendix F. See also International Bank for Re- 
 construction and Development press release 427 (Nov. 3, 1955), Financial 
 Statements for First Quarter ending September 30, 1955. In addition to 
 the above, the IBRD on Aug. 26, 1955, made a loan of $10 million for 
 electric power in Algeria and on Mar. 5, 1956, announced that it was 
 sending a survey mission to the Trust Territory of Somaliland. 
 Bulletin of Jan. 23, 1956, p. 1 17. 
 
 ^^^For transcripts of the Secretary's news conferences of Dec. 20, 1955, 
 and Jan. 11, 1956, see ibid., Jan. 2, 1956, p. 8, and Jan. 23, 1956, p. 118. Mr. 
 Dulles indicated that mutual security requests for the next fiscal year would 
 total about $4,900,000,000, of which about $1,900,000,000 would be for the 
 economic part of the program. See also the transcript of the Secretary's press 
 conference of Jan. 17, 1956, ibid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 155. 
 
 Ibid., Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79. See also excerpts from the President's 
 budget message, ibid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 147, and his message transmitting the 
 1957 mutual security program, ibid., Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545. 
 
 ^^*For texts of communique and Declaration, see ibid., Feb. 13, 1956, 
 p. 231. 
 
 Ibid., Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368. See also the Secretary's statements of 
 Feb. 7, ibid., Feb. 20, 1956, p. 279, and of Feb. 28, ibid.. Mar. 12, 1956, p. 409. 
 See also the correspondence of Secretary Dulles with certain members of 
 Congress, ibid., Feb. 20, 1956, p. 285. For the Department's statement of 
 Feb. 18, concerning the shipment of 18 tanks to Saudi Arabia under the 
 Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 
 1954, see ibid., Feb. 27, 1956, p. 325. 
 
 See also Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, "First Annual Report of 
 the Council Representatives, March 1956," ibid.. Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403, and 
 the final communique of the SEATO Council meeting at Karachi, Mar. 8, 
 1956, ibid.. Mar. 19, 1956, p. 447. 
 
 II. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ; 1956 O - 384115 
 
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