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 BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICES 
 
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 REFERENCE DIVISION 
 
 I . D . 8 0 7 , FEBRUARY 1948 
 
 BRITISH 
 
 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 
 DEBATE IN 
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
 
 EXCERPTS FROM THE SPEECHES OF 
 MR. BEVIN, MR. EDEN, MR. MCNEIL, 
 
 MR. CHURCHILL AND MR. ATTL^fi-:^ 
 
 JANUARY 22 AND 23, V* - 
 
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BRITISH FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE IN THE 
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS 
 
 Excerpts from the speeches of 
 
 Mr. Bevin, Mr. Eden, Mr. McNeil, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Attlee 
 
 on January 22 and 23, 1948 
 
 The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr, Ernest Bevin): I 
 realize that there is intense interest in the House in this Debate, which 
 is to last two days. I am also so conscious that what I say can so easily 
 be misinterpreted in other countries that I propose to exercise very great 
 care in the presentation of the Government’s position. We are, indeed, 
 at a critical moment in the organization of the post-war world, and de¬ 
 cisions we now take, I realize, will be vital to the future peace of the world. 
 What, however, I have first to put before the House is the factual back¬ 
 ground against which decisions must now be taken. I do not propose to 
 weary the House with a long history, because every Member is already 
 conversant with it; there have been so many Debates in connection with 
 these problems. I must, however, recapitulate in so far as it is essential for 
 an understanding of His Majesty’s Government’s proposals for the future. 
 
 The story begins with a series of conferences which were held during 
 the war, and at which many ideas were formed. Some were crystallized. 
 Some were not. In this connection, of the political developments that 
 have taken place, one of the main issues at that time affecting the line of 
 subsequent policy was connected with the future of Poland. The solution 
 arrived at at Yalta was looked upon by His Majesty’s Government at that 
 time as a sensible compromise between conflicting elements, but there is 
 no doubt that, as it has evolved, it has revealed a policy on the part of the 
 Soviet Union to use every means in their power to get Communist control 
 in Eastern Europe, and, as it now appears, in the West as well. It there¬ 
 fore matters little how we temporize and maybe appease, or try to make 
 arrangements. 
 
 Soviet Control in Eastern Europe 
 It has been quite clear, I think, that the Communist process goes ruth¬ 
 lessly on in each country. We have seen the game played out in Poland, 
 Bulgaria, Hungary, more recently in Romania, and, from information in 
 our possession, other attempts may be made elsewhere. Thus, the issue is 
 not simply the organization of Poland or any other country, but the con¬ 
 trol of Eastern Europe by Soviet Russia, whose frontiers have, in effect, 
 been advanced to Stettin, Trieste, and the Elbe. One has only to look at 
 the map to see how, since the war, Soviet Russia has expanded and now 
 stretches from the middle of Europe to the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin. 
 Yet all the evidence is that she is not satisfied with this tremendous expan¬ 
 sion. In Trieste we have difficulties. We had hoped that the method of 
 international agreement would be allowed to work; but it has not been 
 allowed to work, and so what should have been a great experiment in 
 
 5 
 
post-war international collaboration has only been a continuing source of 
 friction and bother. 
 
 Then we have the great issue in Greece, which is similar to the others 
 I have mentioned. It has been assumed—in fact, said—that the Soviet 
 Union can wait; that the United States of America and Great Britain will 
 get tired; and that the so-called Government of Communist rebels can be 
 recognized later on without danger; and then, in the end, that a Com¬ 
 munist Government will be forced upon Greece, and she will be incor¬ 
 porated in the Soviet system of Communism with the rest. Here, let me 
 make His Majesty’s Government’s position quite clear. We had hoped 
 to be out of Greece. We had hoped that after the first election a Govern¬ 
 ment would be formed; that in time subsequent elections would take place, 
 and the whole process of democratic development would be allowed to 
 function. But that has not been allowed, because a state of virtual civil 
 war has been perpetuated the whole time. So, it is not a question of what 
 sort of elected Government there is in Greece—Liberal, Coalition, or what¬ 
 ever it might be—but it is a ruthless attempt, constantly maintained, to 
 bring that country in the Soviet orbit. 
 
 Like Trieste, the Greek issue involves the signatures on treaties recently 
 signed by all of us, all the Allies, including the Great Powers. I would 
 remind the House that Greece had claims for an alteration of her frontiers. 
 I came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that probably Greece would 
 be more secure if Great Britain did not insist upon that, and that the 
 signatures on the Peace Treaty would have been a guarantee on our honor 
 of her integrity, and there would be no attempt to pursue and trouble 
 her further. But that has not been permitted. I know that I have been 
 pursued in this country on this Grecian question as if it were a question 
 between a Royalist and a Socialist Government or Liberal Government. 
 It is nothing of the sort, and never has been. I beg all my friends in this 
 House to face the fact: this is a dangerous situation. It is a case of power 
 politics. We have been trying to leave Greece an independent country, 
 and to get out of it; but we also want her northern neighbors, and every¬ 
 body else, to leave her alone, and to get out of it. We will do that im¬ 
 mediately they lift their fingers, and honorably agree. 
 
 I would remind the House that the United Nations have been brought 
 in, but they have been flouted by the Balkan neighbors of Greece. There 
 is a very real danger that they and their Soviet mentors may make a great 
 blunder over this business. In all solemnity, I would advise great care. 
 Provocations like these lead sometimes to serious developments which we, 
 and I hope they, are anxious to avoid. It would be better to settle this 
 matter in accordance with the decisions of the Assembly of the United 
 Nations than in the promotion of civil war, or giving any kind of recog¬ 
 nition to the Markos junta, or in attempting the methods which have been 
 applied elsewhere. There is the Assembly decision, and if we accept As¬ 
 sembly decisions in other matters, we should accept the decision in the 
 case of Greece. I say no more than this, that it is dangerous in international 
 affairs to play with fire. 
 
 4 
 
Wc have had other examples since the war, which I need not go into 
 now _ wa rs of nerves and pressure upon weaker neighbors. It is the con¬ 
 sidered view of His Majesty’s Government that attempts to settle inter¬ 
 national affairs by political barrages and by wars of nerves reduce the 
 chances of finding acceptable solutions, and make agreement difficult, if 
 not impossible. Propaganda is not a contribution to the settlement of in¬ 
 ternational problems. They are all so important that the only way to 
 solve them is coolly and calmly to deal with them on their merits. So 
 much for the background of Eastern Europe. I would remind the House 
 that it is under three years since the war ended, and I hope still that, 
 with the right use of power and organization, these difficulties may be 
 overcome. Meanwhile, we must face the facts as they are. Our task is 
 not to make spectacular declarations, nor to use threats or intimidation, 
 but to proceed swiftly and resolutely with the steps we consider necessary 
 to meet the situation which now confronts the world. 
 
 Germany 
 
 Let me now turn to the background in Germany, which has led to 
 considerable difficulty. Here again, there were recent Debates, so I will 
 confine myself to a limited survey. There was a discussion at Yalta about 
 the dismemberment of Germany. His Majesty’s Government have always 
 considered that dismemberment would inevitably start an irredentist 
 movement, causing a resurgence not of a peaceful Germany, but of a 
 spirit of war. For those reasons we have been against it. We, therefore, 
 welcome the change of attitude that appeared to have evolved by the time 
 we got to Potsdam. In a sentence I will make clear what it was. The pro¬ 
 posal was limited to central agencies, to the evolution of a new German 
 State on a new basis; and to do it there was to be economic unity, and a 
 gradual evolution on a Four-Power basis which would lead ultimately to 
 a peace treaty and a German Government competent to sign it. 
 
 That, I think, describes in a sentence the approach to the whole prob¬ 
 lem. After we left Potsdam, things began to go wrong. The central agen¬ 
 cies did not materialize, and it was not long before we discovered, in the 
 Four-Power Conferences in Berlin, that the Soviet Government had taken 
 to hurling accusations at the Western Allies at meeting after meeting, 
 instead of trying to evolve a common policy. Real progress seemed almost 
 impossible. I do not deny that many things were done, and I want to pay 
 my tribute to the Russian representatives who, when free to discuss things on 
 their merits, are grand people to get on with, but who, when it comes to 
 this political business, are held up and this delay and irritation then 
 proceeds. The military governors left to themselves could have settled far 
 more than they did in Germany on the basis of Potsdam, if they had been 
 permitted to do so. 
 
 We have had discussions about these problems at the Council of 
 Foreign Ministers, where at every step we have tried to meet anything 
 which might look like a legitimate claim. But the Moscow Conference 
 last spring was certainly very revealing. We were there over six weeks. It 
 
 5 
 
is a matter of historical knowledge that His Majesty’s Government devoted 
 time and energy to trying to give that conference a working basis; but 
 any rational meeting, where there was a will to do business, could have 
 done in a week everything we did in that six weeks. It was, I must 
 confess, very wearying, and even difficult to keep one’s temper at times. 
 Calm judgment in the conditions under which we had to work was very 
 difficult. 
 
 Then, between the Moscow and London Conferences, other events took 
 place. I will not enumerate many of them, but perhaps the most important 
 development, which brought all this to a head, and caused the whole issue 
 of Europe to be focused, was the proposal by Mr. Marshall for a European 
 recovery program. That brought out what must have been there before. 
 In other words, this program brought vividly to light what must have been 
 under the surface, and what was responsible for these attitudes ever since 
 the war, and, if I may say so, for some of the events we had to face during 
 the war. 
 
 European Unity 
 
 The conception of the unity of Europe and the preservation of Europe 
 as the heart of Western civilization is accepted by most people. The im¬ 
 portance of this has become increasingly apparent, not only to all the 
 European nations as a result of the post-war crises through which Europe 
 has passed and is passing, but to the whole world. No one disputes the 
 idea of European unity. That is not the issue. The issue is whether 
 European unity cannot be achieved without the domination and control 
 of one great power. That is the issue which has to be solved. I have tried 
 on more than one occasion to set forth, in this House and at international 
 conferences, the British policy which has been carefully considered in 
 connection with Europe. 
 
 This policy has been based on three principles. The first is that no one 
 nation should dominate Europe. The second is that the old-fashioned 
 conception of the balance of power as an aim should be discarded if pos¬ 
 sible. The third is that there should be substituted Four-Power co-opera¬ 
 tion and assistance to all the states of Europe, to enable them to evolve 
 freely, each in its own way. As regards the first principle, I am sure this 
 House and the world will realize that if a policy is pursued by any one 
 power to try to dominate Europe by whatever means, direct or indirect- 
 one has to be frank—one is driven to the conclusion that it will inevitably 
 lead again to another world war and I hope that that idea will be dis¬ 
 carded by all of us. It is this which His Majesty’s Government have striven 
 and will continue to strive to prevent. 
 
 With the old-fashioned balance of power, it was a question of having 
 a series of alliances, and so manipulating them that, as each state moved 
 in a particular direction, it was counteracted. I have no doubt that that 
 led to intrigues and all kinds of difficulties, particularly for the smaller 
 states, which often became the instruments of great powers. On behalf of 
 His Majesty’s Government, I have stated that we will not use smaller 
 powers as instruments of policy to produce difficulties between the larger 
 
 6 
 
powers; thereby giving the smaller powers a chance to evolve, under the 
 umbrella of the Four Powers, without the feeling of fear or conflict. His 
 Majesty's Government cannot agree to Four-Power co-operation while one 
 of those Four Powers proceeds to impose its political and economic system 
 on the smaller states. On the contrary, as public opinion in those states 
 changes, and as their economic and social development progresses, none of 
 them will willingly submit to the Great Powers interfering and preventing 
 the introduction of economic changes, or any other changes, which they 
 deem to be for their own good. 
 
 The Police State 
 
 There is another factor giving great cause for anxiety. It evolved 
 largely with Hitler and Mussolini, and now, I am afraid, it has become 
 an instrument of a very dangerous kind in Europe, and that is what we 
 describe as the “police state.” We did not imagine that this would be 
 maintained after the war, but it is, and it is carried out with ruthless 
 efficiency. I must say, while we hear talk about elections and democracy, 
 that where the police state exists, votes count for very little. It is true that 
 the votes have not disappeared, but it is the voter himself who disappears, 
 and the successful candidate, if he dares to have an opinion of his own. 
 
 As we saw in the press the other day, some members of parliament in 
 Bulgaria said that they objected to the Budget, and they were immediately 
 threatened because they had objected to the taxation proposed. The 
 Americans and ourselves were immediately condemned, and made respon¬ 
 sible for these men’s opinions about their Budget. I have never known 
 anybody welcome a Budget, especially when it involves increased taxation; 
 and all this is purely nonsensical. I regret these statements, especially by 
 a man like Dimitrov, the former hero of the Reichstag, who now seems 
 to have taken to himself some of the characteristics of the bully and the 
 braggart. This kind of thing creates very great difficulty. 
 
 As another illustration, we have the case of Jacob Kaiser, the leader 
 of the German democratic party, the Christian Democrats, who has been 
 prevented from leading his party in the Soviet Zone of Germany for not 
 bowing to the Soviet will. His friends have been visited in their houses, 
 and have been intimidated. The Social Democrats, I may add, had been 
 dealt with and, indeed, suppressed in the Soviet Zone much earlier. 
 
 One could give hundreds of instances of the subtlety and cruelty of 
 this police state instrument, and I cannot see how a healthy democracy 
 can grow up while it exists. If there was one thing that aroused Britain 
 and made her fight so hard in the world war, it was when she realized 
 fully, for the first time, what the Gestapo meant. We hoped that the end 
 of the war would mean the end of the police state, as well as of all instru¬ 
 ments of that character. We have always accepted—I would emphasize this 
 —and I repeat it now, that the friendliest relations should exist between 
 Russia and the states on the Russian frontier; indeed, not only on the 
 frontier—we want these friendly relations with everybody. It is madness 
 to think of anything else if we are ever to have peace. That is quite a 
 
 7 
 
different thing from cutting off Eastern Europe from the rest of the world, 
 and turning it into an exclusively self-contained bloc under the control 
 of Moscow and the Communist Party. 
 
 Mr. Gallaclier (Communist): That is not true. 
 
 Blocs in Europe 
 
 Mr. Bevin: The European Recovery Program brought all this to a head, 
 and made us all face up to the problem of the future organization. We did 
 not press the Western union—and I know that some of our neighbors were 
 not desirous of pressing it—in the hope that when we got the German and 
 Austrian peace settlements, agreement between the Four Powers would 
 close the breach between East and West, and thus avoid the necessity of 
 crystallizing Europe into separate blocs. We have always wanted the 
 widest conception of Europe, including, of course, Russia. It is not a new 
 idea. The idea of close relationship between the countries of Western 
 Europe first arose during the war, and in the days of the Coalition it was 
 discussed. Already in 1944 there was talk between my predecessor and the 
 Russian Government about a Western association. 
 
 His Majesty’s Government at that time indicated to the Soviet Govern¬ 
 ment that they would put the establishment of a world organization first 
 on their list. In any case, they proposed to rely on the Anglo-Soviet 
 Alliance for the purpose of containing Germany, and eventually there 
 might be similar arrangements between France and Great Britain, and 
 France and the Soviet Union for this purpose. That was in 1944. We also 
 indicated that it might be desirable to have defense arrangements with 
 Western Europe for the purpose of instituting a common defense policy 
 against the possible revival of German aggression, and to determine what 
 role each State should play in the matter of armaments and the disposal 
 of Forces. We indicated that when these matters arose, we would keep 
 the Soviet Government informed, which we did. In 1945, however, there 
 was a great deal of Soviet criticism, especially of this country, over the 
 supposed formation of a Western bloc against the Soviet Union, which 
 was quite untrue. At that time, we had not even had a meeting with our 
 Western Allies to discuss the matter; and yet daily this criticism was poured 
 out on the radio and in Pravda and the rest of it—a constant repetition. 
 
 When I was in Moscow, therefore, in December, 1945, and saw General¬ 
 issimo Stalin, I explained that the United Kingdom must have security 
 arrangements with France and other neighboring countries, just as the 
 Soviet Union had with their neighbors, to which he raised no objection. 
 I stated that whatever we did would not be directed against the Soviet 
 Union. To this he replied, “I believe you.” Anything His Majesty’s 
 Government does now in this matter will not be directed against the 
 Soviet Union or any other country, but we are entitled to organize the 
 kindred souls of the West, just as they organize their kindred souls. As 
 late as January, 1947, Stalin took a similar line with Field-Marshal Mont¬ 
 gomery. 
 
 In 1946, I communicated to Mr. Molotov our intention of entering 
 
 8 
 
into negotiations lor an Anglo-French Treaty. Mr. Molotov expressed 
 interest, and asked to be kept informed. He made no comment. I kept 
 him fully informed about the Treaty of Dunkirk. I have had no com¬ 
 munication since about that matter. When the European recovery proposal 
 was put forward in the same spirit, it was offered to the whole of Europe, 
 including Russia. There were no grounds, therefore, for the fear that it 
 was to be directed against the Soviet Union or used for any ulterior 
 purpose. So clear was it that it was intended for the whole of Europe, 
 that in Poland we know that even the Communist Party were anxious 
 to participate. So they were in Hungary and Romania, and Czechoslovakia 
 even announced her intention to accept the invitation. About Yugoslavia 
 and Bulgaria I never had any precise information. Eventually all these 
 states were ordered to abstain. What about sovereignty? We took no step 
 to advise; we merely sent out our invitation for people to answer, and 
 come freely if they wished to. If they did not, we knew that they were not 
 staying away of their own volition. 
 
 The House will remember the conversations I had with M. Bidault 
 and Mr. Molotov. At first, I was reasonably hopeful that everyone, includ¬ 
 ing Russia, would play their part in this great offer. What was the idea 
 behind this European recovery program? First, that we should do what we 
 could for ourselves and in co-operation with one another, and then secure 
 from the American people supplementary aid. If we want to maintain our 
 independence we have got to do all we can for ourselves. I think it is 
 quite right when all neighbors co-operate together to see what they can do 
 for one another. Then if they find they are stuck they can go to a pal to 
 borrow something to help them through. I do not think that that is taking 
 away one’s independence. 
 
 In the course of the discussions in Paris there came a change as it was 
 decided by the Soviet Union—and I have very good grounds for accepting 
 this—that rather than risk the generosity of the United States penetrating 
 Eastern Europe, and Europe itself joining in a great co-operative move¬ 
 ment, the Soviet Union preferred to risk the Western plan or Western 
 union—that is to say they risked the creation of any possible organism in 
 the West. My further opinion is that they thought they could wreck or 
 intimidate Western Europe by political upsets, economic chaos, and even 
 revolutionary methods. 
 
 Mr. Piratin (Communist): Why not give the facts? 
 
 Mr. Bevin: I will tell the lion. Gentleman in a minute. 
 
 Mr. Piratin: The right lion. Gentleman is not telling the facts; he is 
 skipping them. 
 
 Mr. Bevin: What Mr. Molotov said at Paris to M. Bidault and myself— 
 
 Mr. Piratin: Yes. 
 
 Mr. Bevin: —on the last day when we were there was that if we proceeded 
 with this plan he indicated to us quite clearly that it would be bad for 
 both of us, particularly for France. 
 
 9 
 
Mr. Piratin: If the Foreign Secretary will give way for one moment— 
 [Hon. Members: “No.”] Why does he not say what Molotov said in the 
 first place? 
 
 Mr. Bevin: As the discussions went forward since the Paris Conference 
 last June we knew almost the precise dates as to when these troubles were 
 going to take place, and when these upsets were likely to occur. I must 
 say this is rather unpalatable for me to have to do, but I suggest the world 
 will never get right unless the thing is seen in all its nakedness and prob¬ 
 ably we will get on a better footing then. 
 
 The Cominform 
 
 As I have already said, it is no secret that Mr. Molotov threatened both 
 ourselves and France that we would have to look out for these squalls if 
 we went on with the European Recovery Program. My answer to him, 
 not boastfully but quietly, was that Great Britain had been accustomed 
 to threats, that we should face them, and that they would not move us 
 from doing what we believed to be right. We have not, nor has France or 
 any of the other nations who assembled in Paris, deviated from that course. 
 The best evidence that what I am saying is correct, as I am sure the hon. 
 Member for Mile End (Mr. Piratin) will agree, is that the Cominform 
 came into existence very quickly. Mr. Zhdanov and Mr. Malenkov are 
 closely associated with it. 
 
 It has been clearly stated that the object of that body and of Soviet and 
 Communist policy is to prevent the European Recovery Program succeed¬ 
 ing. I do not object to them coming to that conclusion, but because they 
 came to that conclusion I do not see why I should be a party to keeping 
 Europe in chaos and starvation. I cannot accept that proposition simply 
 because the Cominform says it in their proposals. The fact is there have 
 been great political strikes in France. Who disputes that they are behind 
 them? 
 
 Mr. Gallacher: I dispute it. On a point of Order. When a Minister 
 challenges hon. Members to dispute something and one of them accepts 
 his challenge, is it not recognized courtesy for the Minister to give way in 
 order that the Member can dispute the statement? 
 
 Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of Order at all. It is for the Minister 
 co decide whether he should give way, and if he does not choose to give 
 way he need not do so. 
 
 Mr. Bevin: I am following the Communist philosophy never to give way. 
 Mr. Piratin: Except to Marshall. 
 
 Mr. Speaker: If the hon. Member continues to rise in his place, and 
 shouts across the Chamber I shall be compelled to take drastic action. 
 
 Mr. McGovern (Labor): Watch your heads. 
 
 Mr. Gallacher: Communists don’t sell out. 
 
 Mr. McGovern: That is what every Communist does, sells out. 
 
 10 
 
Mr. Bevin: 1 was once accused by a Communist newspaper of selling out, 
 and the courts gave me £7,000 damages. Perhaps the House will be inter¬ 
 ested to know I never got the order. 
 
 I was indicating that these strikes have been taking place, and that 
 the intention of the Soviets was to anticipate the interim aid from America 
 so that by the loss of production at home American aid would be nullified. 
 That is not the way to express love of one’s country and for one’s own 
 people. 
 
 European Recovery Program 
 
 Now for the steps we have taken in connection with this European 
 Recovery Program. As soon as I saw it, I submitted it to my colleagues 
 and we felt that here was an opportunity of really trying to get Europe 
 on its feet. The House will agree that we acted with promptness in order 
 to get it going. We had no ulterior motive at all, and we did not intend 
 to attack anyone. I should like to congratulate the staffs of the various 
 Foreign Offices and Governments for the magnificent way in which they 
 worked on this plan with vigor and agreement which I think was amazing. 
 When the plan was completed, the United States officials were prompt to 
 render the friendly aid promised by Mr. Marshall. I should like to pay my 
 tribute to everyone who worked for the practical realization of the ideas 
 expressed in Mr. Marshall’s Harvard speech. The issue is now before the 
 American Congress, and I say no more about it than that we in Europe 
 are not holding back awaiting the decision of Congress; we are doing our 
 best individually and in co-operation to help one another. We shall be 
 able to do it still more when we know the final decision of the United 
 States Congress. 
 
 With all these influences the London Conference was bound up. In 
 spite of what was going on—on which our information was very good—I 
 still went on arranging for the London Conference in November. I confess 
 that events were not encouraging. The flood of abuse against ourselves 
 and the world by Mr. Vyshinsky in New York was calculated to rouse 
 tempers, but I am glad to say it fell very flat with no effect on public 
 opinion anywhere outside the Soviet zone of influence. We still went on 
 trying to get the Conference on a proper basis as I reported to the House 
 before the Recess. Every day when there was a proposal discussed and an 
 effort made to reach a practical conclusion, we had to waste a whole day 
 listening to abuse of the Western Powers. It is all very well, but everyone 
 in this House is a public man. I ask each one here to try to imagine what 
 it is like to sit there hour after hour and to have thrown at one almost 
 every invective of which one can think and not answer back. I felt very 
 often like the boy who was asked what he would do if he were hit on the 
 one cheek by his schoolteacher. He said he would turn the other. His 
 schoolteacher said “That is a good boy, Tommy, but supposing you were 
 hit on the other cheek, what then?” The boy replied, “Then heaven help 
 him.” I must confess that I felt very much like the schoolboy, and we had 
 to suppress our feelings. 
 
 11 
 
Now wc have to lace a new situation. In this it is impossible to move 
 as quickly as we would wish. We are dealing with nations which are free 
 to take their own decisions. It is easy enough to draw up a blueprint for 
 a united Western Europe and to construct neat looking plans on paper. 
 While I do not wish to discourage the work done by voluntary political 
 organizations in advocating ambitious schemes of European unity, I must 
 say that it is a much slower and harder job to carry out a practical pro¬ 
 gram which takes into account the realities which face us, and I am afraid 
 that it will have to be done a step at a time. 
 
 But surely all these developments which I have been describing point 
 to the conclusion that the free nations of Western Europe must now draw 
 closely together. How much these countries have in common! Our sacri¬ 
 fices in the war, our hatred of injustice and oppression, our parliamentary 
 democracy, our striving for economic rights, and our conception and love 
 of liberty are common among us all. Our British approach, of which my 
 right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spoke recently, is based on principles 
 which also appeal deeply to the overwhelming mass of the peoples of West¬ 
 ern Europe. I believe the time is ripe for a consolidation of Western 
 Europe. 
 
 Consolidation of Western Europe 
 
 First in this context we think of the people of France. Like all old 
 friends, we have our differences from time to time, but I doubt whether 
 ever before in our history there has been so much underlying goodwill 
 and respect between the two peoples as now. We have a firm basis of 
 co-operation in the Treaty of Dunkirk, we are partners in the European 
 Recovery Program, and I would also remind the House of the useful and 
 practical work being done by the Anglo-French Economic Committee. 
 Through this Committee, we have already succeeded in helping one an¬ 
 other in our economic difficulties, though at first, to tell the truth, neither 
 of us had very much with which to help the other. But it was useful, and 
 the work it did was useful at a very critical moment. We are not now 
 proposing a formal political union with France, as has sometimes been 
 suggested, but we shall maintain the closest possible contact and work for 
 ever closer unity between the two nations. 
 
 The time has come to find ways and means of developing our relations 
 with the Benelux countries. I mean to begin talks with those countries 
 in close accord with our French Allies. I have to inform the House that 
 yesterday our representatives in Brussels, The Hague, and Luxemburg 
 were instructed to propose such talks in concert with their French col¬ 
 leagues. I recall that after I signed the Dunkirk Treaty, on my way 
 through Brussels to Moscow, I was asked by a newspaper correspondent, 
 “What about a treaty with other countries including Belgium?” My reply 
 was—I will quote it: 
 
 “I hope to sign a similar one with Belgium and with all our good neighbors in 
 the West. The Labor Government will do everything possible to prevent misunder¬ 
 standings arising from which aggressions might result. You have suffered from 
 two wars; you have twice been occupied in two wars, and England has twice had 
 
 12 
 
to fight very linrd. Great Britain is still conscious oT iho great role she has to 
 play. She will do everything possible to prevent a new conflict in the West, whethei 
 it will come from Germany or elsewhere.” 
 
 1 hope that treaties will thus he signed with out near neighbors, the 
 Benelux countries, making with our treaty with France an important 
 nucleus in Western Europe. We have then to go beyond the circle of our 
 immediate neighbors. We shall have to consider the question of associating 
 other historic members of European civilization, including the new Italy, 
 in this great conception. Their eventual participation is, of course, no 
 less important than that of countries with which, if only for geographical 
 reasons, we must deal first. We are thinking now of Western Europe as 
 a unit. The nations of Western Europe have already shown, at the Paris 
 Conference dealing with the Marshall Plan, their capacity for working 
 together quickly and effectively. That is a good sign for the future. We 
 shall do all we can to foster both the spirit and the machinery of co-opera¬ 
 tion. In this context, I am glad to be able to tell the House that, as a 
 practical immediate measure to make our relations with Western Europe 
 closer. His Majesty’s Government are proposing to relax the ban on tourist 
 travel. I shall have more to say on this subject a little later. 
 
 Our formal relations with the various countries may differ, but be¬ 
 tween all there should be an effective understanding bound together by 
 common ideals for which the Western Powers have twice in one genera¬ 
 tion shed their blood. If we are to preserve peace and our own safety at 
 the same time we can only do so by the mobilization of such a moral and 
 material force as will create confidence and energy in the West, and in¬ 
 spire respect elsewhere, and this means that Britain cannot stand outside 
 Europe, and regard her problems as quite separate from those of her Euro¬ 
 pean neighbors. 
 
 Tourist Traffic 
 
 Now with regard to the tourist traffic. This is a step which we propose 
 to take pretty soon, I hope in the early summer, providing such arrange¬ 
 ments can be made without involving us in the expenditure of gold or 
 dollars, and I believe that is possible to negotiate. In our view a system 
 can be worked out bilaterally with different countries which will enable 
 a start to be made in the early summer. We hope to be able to publish 
 in March a list of countries to which travel will be possible, and travel 
 would then resume about 1st May. We are anxious to create conditions 
 in which the peoples of the respective countries can associate, and I know 
 of nothing more important to serve this end than the tourist traffic. 
 
 I would like to make it clear that we are not doing this merely to 
 cater for people with lots of money. Adults will be allowed £35 and chil¬ 
 dren £25 per annum. In this connection there are a number of organi¬ 
 zations which provide cheap holidays abroad. These organizations have 
 handled thousands of people, and have rendered a great service in this 
 field. I myself helped to create the Workers’ Travel Association out of 
 almost nothing, and in the progress of years it has grown to handling the 
 foreign travel of many thousands of people. There is also the Polytechnic, 
 
 13 
 
and many other bodies of a similar kind. Therefore, foreign travel is no 
 longer a privilege of the few. It is the desire of large numbers of people. 
 We hope to allow this exchange to take place both ways at the earliest 
 possible moment. 
 
 Western Europe’s Overseas Resources 
 
 Perhaps I may now return to the subject of the organization in respect 
 of a Western union. That is its right description. I would emphasize 
 that I am not concerned only with Europe as a geographical conception. 
 Europe has extended its influence throughout the world, and we have 
 to look further afield. In the first place, we turn our eyes to Africa, where 
 great responsibilities are shared by us with South Africa, France, Belgium 
 and Portugal, and equally to all overseas territories, especially of South- 
 East Asia, with which the Dutch are closely concerned. The organiza¬ 
 tion of Western Europe must be economically supported. That involves 
 the closest possible collaboration with the Commonwealth and with over¬ 
 seas territories, not only British but French, Dutch, Belgian, and Portu¬ 
 guese. 
 
 These overseas territories are large primary producers, and their stand¬ 
 ard of life is evolving rapidly and is capable of great development. They 
 have raw materials, food and resources which can be turned to very great 
 common advantage, both to the people of the territories themselves, to 
 Europe, and to the world as a whole. The other two great world powers, 
 the United States and Soviet Russia, have tremendous resources. There 
 is no need of conflict with them in this matter at all. If Western Europe 
 is to achieve its balance of payments and to get a world equilibrium, it is 
 essential that those resources should be developed and made available, 
 and the exchange between them carried out in a correct and proper man¬ 
 ner. There is no conflict between the social and economic development 
 of those overseas territories to the advantage of their people, and their 
 development as a source of supplies for Western Europe, as a contributor, 
 as I have indicated, so essential to the balance of payments. 
 
 What is to be the best method of dealing with this matter? We have 
 been considering and planning for the territories for which we are respon¬ 
 sible so as to establish, particularly out of our capital production year by 
 year, and also out of our production of consumption goods, a proper pro¬ 
 portion in the right order of priorities to assist this development. Coinci¬ 
 dent with that planning, welfare and cultural development are being 
 pushed ahead with great speed. Therefore, if we get the plan, we intend 
 to develop the economic co-operation between Western European coun¬ 
 tries step by step, to develop the resources of the territories with which 
 we are associated, to build them up a system of priorities which will pro¬ 
 duce the quickest, most effective, and most lasting results for the whole 
 world. We hope that other countries with dependent territories will do 
 the same in association with us. 
 
 We shall, thus, bring together resources, manpower, organization and 
 opportunity for millions of people. I would like to depict what it really 
 
 14 
 
involves in terms of population whose standard of life can be lifted. We 
 are bringing together these tremendous resources, which stretch through 
 Europe, the Middle East and Africa, to the Far East. In no case would it 
 be an exclusive effort. It would be done with the object of making the 
 whole world richer and safer. We believe there is an opportunity, and 
 that when it is studied there will be a willingness on the part of our friends 
 in the Commonwealth to co-operate with us in this great effort. 
 
 The Middle East 
 
 In the Middle East we have pursued a similar policy. We have a long 
 standing friendship with the Arabs. The development of the Arab coun¬ 
 tries in the 30 years of their revived national independence has been re¬ 
 markable, and our own country has made a very good contribution to¬ 
 wards it. We shall continue these efforts, to build up a system of co-oper¬ 
 ation in the economic and social fields which will carry with it responsi¬ 
 bility for mutual defense on both sides. I have repeatedly said to repre¬ 
 sentatives of the United States and of the Soviet Union that the Middle 
 East is a vital factor in world peace. In addition, it is a life-line for the 
 British Commonwealth. That statement has never been challenged. I 
 think it is accepted by all. It is in that spirit that we have worked. 
 
 I think the House welcomes with me the recent Treaty with Iraq, 
 negotiated and signed upon a basis of equality. There has been a lot of 
 excitement in the morning papers about the reactions to the Treaty. There 
 must have been some misunderstanding in Baghdad, but the Iraqi dele¬ 
 gates should be able to remove it upon their return. The Iraqi Prime 
 Minister, in a statement issued this morning, has said that that is his con¬ 
 fident belief. Hon. Members may not have seen the statement so I will, 
 with the permission of the House, read it. It is as follows: 
 
 “During our temporary absence some destructive elements in the country, whose 
 number is fortunately limited, exploited some innocent students, and succeeded in 
 creating disorders. On our return to Iraq, we shall explain the intentions of the 
 new Treaty to the Parliament and people of Iraq. We are confident that it will 
 be found that the national aspirations of the country are fully realized in this 
 Treaty and that the overwhelming majority of the country will support it. It is 
 with this belief that my colleagues and myself signed this Treaty.” 
 
 Neither I nor the Iraqi Prime Minister would have set our signatures 
 to any document which ignored the aspirations of the people of Iraq. We 
 assure our Iraqi friends that we intend to face the problems common to 
 us, whether they are problems of defense or of social and economic 
 development. I hope that the Treaty, which has been worked out with 
 such care, will serve as a model, when it has been carefully studied, for 
 other Middle East defense arrangements. I am discussing the situation 
 first with Transjordan, whose Prime Minister is coming here to talk with 
 us in a few days. The Emir Feisal will be here at the beginning of next 
 month, and we shall have a talk with him, and through him with our 
 good friend, his father, King Ibn Saud. I hope that other such talks will 
 follow. I ought to say a word about Egypt, where a different set of his¬ 
 torical conditions has to be taken into account. I want to get away from 
 
 75 
 
the atmosphere of past disagreements, and to concentrate upon what is 
 mutually acceptable in the interests of both countries. I am not without 
 hope of being able to do so at an early date, but it may take some little 
 time. 
 
 The United Nations 
 
 Now I turn to the United Nations. All the steps I have mentioned, 
 in the Middle East and in the Western union, are in keeping with the 
 Charter of the United Nations. When the ideological quarrel between 
 the powers is set aside—and it will be, sooner or later—and provided that 
 the will to peace takes its place, all the things of which I have spoken 
 will fit into a world pattern. They are all designed upon a regional basis 
 to fit in with the Charter of the United Nations. It will be remembered 
 that my right hon. Friend the Minister of State attended the General 
 Assembly of the United Nations in New York. He will deal with matters 
 relating thereto in his speech. He will deal also with any information 
 that hon. Members may want. 
 
 I have to confess that the United Nations up to now has been dis¬ 
 appointing, but it might have been under any circumstances, and it may 
 be better to have the disappointments at the beginning than to have the 
 enthusiasm at the start, and the disappointments later on. In any case, I 
 do not despair. There is an enormous amount of work being done in the 
 United Nations—economic, social, cultural, and so on—all of which is lead¬ 
 ing to world understanding. At the same time, the nations have colla¬ 
 borated in many fields, and they have collaborated a good deal in the 
 settlement of disputes—none of them major disputes, as we understand 
 them—and even in the Security Council itself there have been some very 
 good discussions, and good decisions taken. 
 
 It has achievements as well as failures, but it is handicapped by this 
 ideological thing that is constantly coming up, and the extensive use of 
 the Veto which was never contemplated, I am quite sure, by anyone who 
 took part in its creation. There have been commissions in Greece and 
 Korea. The tasks are hard. There is one going to India and Pakistan 
 now, and I wish them well. At last the one in Indonesia seems at least 
 to have created a truce which may lead to a settlement, and I express the 
 hope that, notwithstanding our disappointments at the beginning, the 
 whole country will remain behind it because we have to have some world 
 organization in any case. We must try to make it work if we can. 
 
 The United States 
 
 Now I want to say a word about the United States, which seems to be 
 a sort of bogey in the minds of a good many people. Everybody has the 
 idea that the United States has a great fund of dollars which it is trying 
 to hurl at everybody for some ulterior motive. All I can say is that if 
 anybody follows the hearings in Congress to try to get these appropri¬ 
 ations, I do not think they bear that interpretation. They are a demo¬ 
 cratic country trying to look where they are going, and what responsibili¬ 
 ties they are undertaking. Our primary task, as I have said, is to build 
 
 16 
 
up with our friends in Western Europe. We have to get resources to¬ 
 gether, and repair a war-damaged continent, and we have to carry out the 
 development of these new resources overseas. The United States and the 
 countries of Latin America are clearly as much a part of our common 
 Western civilization as are the nations of the British Commonwealth. The 
 power and resources of the United States—indeed, I would say the power 
 and resources of all the countries on the continent of America—will be 
 needed if we are to create a solid, stable, and healthy world. 
 
 When I speak of the United States, I am not thinking of the country 
 misrepresented in propaganda as a sort of Shylock of Wall Street, but a 
 young, vigorous, democratic people. It is a country not only of great 
 wealth and great resources but one whose people are moved by a goodwill 
 and a generosity which many of us in the Old World are apt to take for 
 granted. American policy, like the policy of ail great countries, must 
 have regard to American interests, but it has been so often traduced as 
 purely selfish that I think it is time to pay a tribute to the great heart of 
 the American people which found expression in the European Recovery 
 Program. I was quite convinced, and I am now, that there was no politi¬ 
 cal motive behind the Marshall offer other than the valuable human mo¬ 
 tive of helping Europe to help herself, and so restore the economic and 
 political health of this world. That is, of course, an American interest; 
 but it is everybody’s int< rest, it is not exclusively American. This does 
 not make the offer less unselfish. 
 
 If we take the sequence of events in the United States from Lease-Lend 
 in the war—and I cannot let it go by though I have mentioned it before— 
 I think it is worth calling the attention of the House again to the tre¬ 
 mendous work in connection with UNRRA. What sort of Europe we 
 should have had without UNRRA, I really do not know; it is too horrible 
 to contemplate. I think it would have been swept with epidemics. Every¬ 
 body had a share of UNRRA, including Soviet Russia and the Eastern 
 States—everybody—and that cost the United States £675 million, Canada 
 £35 million, and it cost this country, even in our impoverished condition, 
 £155 million. It was an event which stemmed the horrible disease we had 
 following the 1914-18 war, which most have forgotten. Therefore, the 
 European Recovery Program is a natural sequence in order to try to help 
 rebuild. 
 
 It is true that the Americans are as realistic as we are. They see the 
 greatest dangers to world peace in economic chaos and starvation. It was 
 the argument used over and over again that we made a mistake with Ger¬ 
 many in leaving her in such depression that it allowed a Hitler to arise. 
 The instinct is that it is much better to spend money now on rebuilding 
 a healthy and self-reliant Europe than to wait for the devils of poverty 
 and disease to create again conditions making for war and dictatorship. 
 It is sound sense, and His Majesty’s Government welcome it. Neither can 
 I see anything wrong in America insisting that the nations of Europe 
 should do everything in their power to put their house in order as a con¬ 
 dition of American aid. If we are to look for hidden political motives, 
 
 17 
 
then I detect them much more clearly behind the attempt to sabotage the 
 Paris Conference than behind the great Marshall offer. I am afraid I am 
 wearying the House, but it is a very long subject. [Hon. Members: “No.”] 
 
 Bizonia 
 
 May I turn as quickly as possible to Germany and German organiza¬ 
 tion, where we and America are in partnership? In this connection I 
 would like to call the attention of the House to the conflict over the politi¬ 
 cal organization of Germany, which is bound up with the zonal problem. 
 We stand for a united Germany, not a dismembered or divided Germany. 
 We have been in favor of a centralized German Government but not an 
 over-centralized German Government which in our view could be a danger 
 to peace. In this I believe the Americans, the French, and ourselves, de¬ 
 spite slight differences between us, can reconcile our views. On the other 
 hand, the Soviet Government are pressing fdr an over-centralized Govern¬ 
 ment which we know could be used in the same way to develop a one- 
 party dictatorship as has been done in the Eastern European countries, 
 and we cannot agree to it. 
 
 It became clear a year ago that Germany was to be made, as a result of 
 the series of disagreements between the Great Powers, a terrific financial 
 liability on the United States and ourselves. No food was to come from 
 the East into the West, no exchange, and hen :e the burden would fall 
 upon our exchequers. I indicated that we had to make it pay by hook 
 or by crook. We really had to make our zone go, and take the liability 
 off the taxpayer here. Then the Americans offered fusion of the two 
 zones in 1946, and negotiations for the first fusion agreement then took 
 place in New York. 
 
 After the failure of the Moscow Conference, I was pressed very hard 
 to agree to some kind of parliamentary instrument in the bizonal area. 
 I opposed it then because I felt that, if that step was taken, it would mean 
 probably the creation of the final division of Germany and of Europe. 
 We therefore kept our arrangements to the economic field. While it is 
 not bound to succeed, we have tried to make this fusion work, and work 
 better, by setting up an Economic Council. We are still hopeful in Ger¬ 
 many, and I hope I shall not be told I am too patient—because I am not 
 waiting. We are going on with the work. By taking the right lines in 
 our bizonal organization in Germany, I believe that in the end we shall 
 achieve a proper organization of Central Europe. We have first to get the 
 organization on our own side efficient. 
 
 Later in 1947, we proceeded with a new fusion agreement. Now, as 
 a result of talks between the American Military Governor, and our Mili¬ 
 tary Governor we have improved, expanded, and extended the Economic 
 Council as an interim basis. But that is an interim matter, and in a few 
 weeks’ time it is intended that the British, French, and Americans shall 
 have an exchange of views on the three zones, as well as the two. Those 
 talks will take place at a very early date. What we have done up to now 
 is an interim arrangement. 
 
Another big problem for Germany, which we are still trying to deal 
 with on a Four-Power basis, is currency reform, which is absolutely im¬ 
 perative, but very difficult to arrange. We are not going to assume that 
 the Four-Power arrangement is ended at all. We are going to make our 
 three zones work economically in order to take the load off our Exchequer 
 here. But we will go on to try to see whether in the end we can make 
 it work. The Germans have a part to play in this. After all, the Germans 
 are more responsible than anyone else in the world for the mess the world 
 is in, and if they are to win the respect of the world again, and come back 
 into the comity of nations, they must work hard, and act, and administer 
 their decisions; it cannot be given to them. 
 
 1 had a sense of disgust when I read of German farmers holding back 
 food from their own kith and kin, and I can assure the House that the 
 most resolute steps will be taken to put an end to that. But we would 
 like the German administration, to whom we have handed powers, to do it, 
 because it is important, if confidence is to be established, to see that that 
 is done. General Clay and General Robertson are to be congratulated on 
 the work carried on in the two zones. When the Frankfurt Agreement 
 is completed, I will circulate it to Members of the House, so that they can 
 see it in its detail, and I will not weary the House with it now. 
 
 I must also say that in working for this German recovery we have to 
 bear in mind all the time the countries which had suffered from her at¬ 
 tack, rather than to put German recovery ahead of the recovery of those 
 who were her victims, and that we shall continue to do. We are making 
 trade agreements between Western Germany and Eastern Europe. All 
 kinds of steps are being taken to develop the export trade, and to put 
 Germany back on her feet. But I must say once again that if the German 
 people are going to rely on us, or act as if we are to feed them all the time, 
 they are suffering from a delusion. Germany must work and produce, 
 like other countries. . . . 
 
 There have been agreements made with Poland, and we are going on 
 with that policy, which we think a right one to follow. We are doing 
 nothing to break down the contacts, in spite of all the political difficulties. 
 Time will not permit me to go into all the difficulties associated with Ger¬ 
 many, and I must leave it to my colleagues, who will speak later. 
 
 We have persistently endeavored to make a Treaty for Austria. I can¬ 
 not understand why a great nation of 200 million people like Soviet Rus¬ 
 sia should find it necessary to delay a settlement with a small country of 
 seven millions. Whatever the causes may be, I think this torturing of 
 Austria for all these years is really reprehensible. However, at the end 
 of the conference there was a sign that there was a possibility of a settle¬ 
 ment. I seized it at once, and referred it to the Deputies and I have been 
 promised a new Soviet proposal in January. I hope they will do it, and 
 let us have a chance of settling that problem. 
 
 The Far East 
 
 One other matter I must mention in passing is Japan. There is a con- 
 
 V) 
 
llict again because it is desired by the Soviet that we should reler the 
 Peace Treaty to the Council of Foreign Ministers; not a very encouraging 
 prospect. Really, it is very difficult to agree to it. Here are Australia, 
 New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Burma, and the Netherlands, who were all 
 in the Japanese War from the very day of Pearl Harbor, and while I am 
 ready to admit that the maintenance of great Russian armies in the Mari¬ 
 time Provinces probably had an effect before they came into the war, the 
 actual time that Russia was in the Japanese War was but a few days. Yet 
 I am asked to agree that they should take a predominant position over 
 the Allies who fought in the Japanese War all the way through. Really, 
 we cannot expect people to accept that. What we propose is that the 13 
 or 14 countries which were involved should form the Peace Conference. 
 In that way I think we are more likely to clear up the Far Eastern posi¬ 
 tion, and I hope the Soviet Government will see their way clear to accept 
 that, and let us get on with the business of at least making one good peace 
 treaty. That, of course, includes the United States, Canada and other 
 countries. 
 
 Burma has already been debated in the House, and our relations with 
 Burma now become the responsibility of the Foreign Office. We are look¬ 
 ing after their interests as well as those of the other Far Eastern countries 
 by means of the system which has been developed there. . . . 
 
 To conclude. His Majesty’s Government have striven for the closer 
 consolidation and economic development, and eventually for the spiritual 
 unity, of Europe as a whole; but, as I have said, in Eastern Europe we 
 are presented with a fait accompli. No one there is free to speak or think, 
 or to enter into trade or other arrangements of his own free will. The 
 sovereignty of the Eastern European nations is handicapped. What of 
 the West? Neither we, the United States nor France is going to approach 
 Western Europe on that basis. It is not in keeping with the spirit of 
 Western civilization, and if we are to have an organism in the West it 
 must be a spiritual union. While, no doubt, there must be treaties or, at 
 least, understandings, the union must primarily be a fusion derived from 
 the basic freedoms and ethical principles for which we all stand. It must 
 be on terms of equality and it must contain all the elements of freedom 
 for which we all stand. That is the goal we are now trying to reach. It 
 cannot be written down in a rigid thesis or in a directive. It is more of 
 a brotherhood and less of a rigid system. 
 
 A European Settlement 
 
 In spite of criticism leveled at her, Europe has done an amazing job 
 since the end of the war. One has to be conversant with it to understand 
 just what it has been like, with all the economic confusion that was in¬ 
 volved everywhere. The countries of Europe are returning now to estab¬ 
 lished law and order. There had never been a war like this before. Never 
 had it been so difficult to make peace. It is not a question of sitting down 
 together, as it was at Versailles, and then at the end signing a treaty. This 
 time it is systems, conceptions, and ideologies which are in conflict. I do 
 
 20 
 
not want to take an irrevocable step which will make future generations 
 pay, just because I was over-anxious to gain a settlement lor settlement’s 
 sake. This time it has to be a real settlement which lasts for a long time. 
 
 In this new settlement, Germany, like all other European nations, must 
 find her place, but, as I have said, she must not come before her recent 
 victims. As other nations settle down, Germany can settle down, but she 
 must be prevented from becoming aggressive again. We shall welcome 
 her return as a democratic nation. In all our efforts, that is the objective 
 for which we have been working, but I must repeat to the Germans that 
 although I am not blaming the whole German people, they were the great 
 factor which brought the world to this condition. They must realize that, 
 as a people, they have got to work hard to get their own country and the 
 world back to a proper equilibrium. I have been glad to note the grow¬ 
 ing realization of this fact among the Germans themselves. 
 
 Despite all the artificial barriers set up, and the propaganda blared out, 
 which no doubt will increase after this Debate, we shall pursue a course 
 which will seek to re-unite Europe. If the present division of Europe con¬ 
 tinues, it will be by the act and the will of the Soviet Government, but 
 such a division would be inconsistent with the statements of the highest 
 Soviet authorities and of Stalin himself. He told Mr. Stassen in Moscow 
 last April that “for collaboration it is not requisite that peoples should 
 have an identical system.” Similar statements have been made on other 
 occasions. We have always tried, and we are still trying, to co-operate 
 with the peoples of Eastern Europe on that basis, although the activities 
 of the Cominform, like those of its predecessor the Comintern, afford the 
 greatest hindrance to mutual confidence and understanding. 
 
 However, we shall not be diverted, by threats, propaganda, or fifth 
 column methods, from our aim of uniting by trade, social, cultural, and 
 all other contacts those nations of Europe and of the world who are ready 
 and able to co-operate. The speed of our recovery and the success of our 
 achievements will be the answer to all attempts to divide the peoples of 
 the world into hostile camps. I may claim for myself, at least, that my 
 whole life has been devoted to uniting people and not dividing them. 
 That remains my objective and purpose now. That is the object and pur¬ 
 pose that His Majesty’s Government, of which I am the instrument, seek 
 to promote in dealing with other countries 
 
 Significance of the Debate 
 
 Mr. Eden (Conservative): . . . Even in my recollection of Foreign Office 
 Debates, which goes back longer than I sometimes care to remember, it 
 would be hard to recall one where the significance of the views expressed 
 and, above all, the significance of the national policy which I trust will 
 emerge, could be greater than it should be in this discussion. So for that 
 reason I shall attempt to address myself to this problem so far as I can in 
 as constructive a spirit as possible. 
 
 21 
 
I do regard the present international situation with a gravity which 
 it is not easy to exaggerate. The Foreign Secretary will remember that 
 just before Christmas, when we were about to adjourn, he asked us to 
 postpone the holding of this Debate so as to give him and his colleagues 
 an opportunity to consider the situation in the light of the breakdown of 
 the Foreign Ministers’ Conference and then he would propose a definite 
 policy to this House. . . . We felt in the existing conditions that was a 
 request with which, in the national interest, we ought to agree, and so 
 the Debate has taken place today. 
 
 Let me say at the outset, on behalf of all my right hon. and hon. Friends on 
 this side of the House, that we welcome the broad lines of the statement 
 made by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. I have no doubt at all that 
 in the circumstances which prevail in Europe today the policy which he 
 has outlined offers the best hope of restoring European political stability, 
 and through that, of providing a basis for an enduring peace, f welcome 
 what the right hon. Gentleman had to say about the proposed agreements 
 with Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, now generically described by a 
 rather ugly, but no doubt expressive, word, f also welcome what he had 
 to say about Italy. It is indeed desirable that we should do everything in 
 our power to bring Italy back as an active member in the European family. 
 As it seems to us, the proposals that the right hon. Gentleman described 
 this afternoon are constructive. They menace no one, and they do show, 
 surely, in unmistakable terms our determination to maintain our own way 
 of life, and to join with others like minded with us to give practical effect 
 to our purpose. 
 
 The right hon. Gentleman said that what he was outlining today was 
 the result of thought which had gone on long before and back into 1944. 
 That is true, and I agree that what he said today was only a beginning. 
 There are many spheres in which the conception of Western union can, I 
 believe, be further developed. Our aim ought to be to create such a union 
 not only in the political sphere, but in the economic sphere, and in the 
 cultural sphere also. Therefore, I welcome the lead the right hon. Gentle¬ 
 man has given and I am glad he has given it in conjunction with France. 
 If there is anybody in this House who still has doubts as to the urgent 
 need for the initiative that the right hon. Gentleman has taken, and the 
 importance of expanding that lead to other fields with the utmost vigor, I 
 would like him to consider for a moment, not the survey which the right 
 hon. Gentleman properly gave us of the post-war years, but simply what 
 has been happening in some countries in these very few weeks since we 
 last met. . . . 
 
 The Cold War 
 
 We have got to admit . . . that unhappily, even in that space of time, 
 the international situation has deteriorated. There is nothing to be gained 
 by seeking to ignore that very unpleasant fact. It does not cease to be a 
 fact if it is ignored. What happened from the moment the Four Power 
 Conference broke down? The Soviet Government and their satellites in 
 Eastern Europe intensified their efforts through the Comintern, the Comin- 
 
 90 
 
form and by every other means. We have seen this happening in Greece, 
 where the notorious Markos tried to set up a so-called “government.” 
 Does anyone think that took place without the approval of Markos’s 
 northern neighbors? Certainly it was warmly welcomed in the propaganda 
 of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and even Moscow. At the same 
 time, Markos made a military offensive and tried to seize a small town in . 
 G reece, which he could claim would give him some pretext for recogni¬ 
 tion. The tactics employed in this Markos business are a new develop¬ 
 ment in the disruptive offensive which the Communists are pursuing. The 
 fact is that in that particular sphere what has been called the “cold” war 
 is hotting up. I saw what I thought was a good description of the whole 
 business given by The Economist the other day: 
 
 “Armed intervention by remote control and with limited liability to themselves.” 
 
 I think that that about accurately describes it. Perhaps I may mention 
 two impressions which I formed on a very brief visit to Greece the other 
 day about the effect of these events. The first is that what has been done 
 by the Markos initiative has resulted in bringing to Greece a greater 
 measure of unity than she has had at any time since Mussolini’s act of aggres¬ 
 sion in the autumn of 1940. That was one result. The second result, I fear, 
 is to inflict a great deal of suffering on a very large number of people, 
 because in innumerable villages and small towns up and down the country 
 the people have fled before the menace of these possible raids. I am told 
 that there are now something like half a million people in Greece who 
 are homeless as a result of this guerrilla warfare, and are making no 
 contribution to their country’s economic recovery, and are unable to earn 
 their daily bread. 
 
 I turn to France. I will not follow the right hon. Gentleman, because I 
 might get into a similar controversy. I would only say this: Would anybody 
 dispute that effort after effort has been made by the Communist Party in 
 France to make the parliamentary machine there completely unworkable- 
 part, no doubt, of the general offensive against the free nations? M. 
 Jouhaux has had a welcome measure of success and we are all glad of it, 
 in the formation of his force ouvriere; but it unhappily remains true that 
 the C.G.T. [Confederation Generate du Travail] itself, which is still 
 powerful, is now completely under the control of the Communist Party. 
 In Italy, the Communists, with the open connivance of Nenni and those 
 who follow him, are intensifying their activities in advance of the April 
 election. In this endeavor we know that they have received the reinforce¬ 
 ment of Mr. Pollitt. Then in Romania, the last appearance of the demo¬ 
 cratic regime has been swept away. All this further intensified in the few 
 short weeks of our adjournment. 
 
 In Austria, as everybody knows, the right hon. Gentleman had to tell 
 the House that agreement could not be reached on a treaty. To mitigate 
 that, he and the American Government approached the Soviet Government 
 to try to get them to mitigate to some extent the heavy burdens the 
 Austrian Government were carrying, and to try to give them some liberty 
 
 23 
 
of action so that they might be a Government in something more than 
 name. All these attempts, as I understand it, have been rejected. As a 
 consequence, further strains are being imposed daily on Austrian economy. 
 I believe that the price of oil was doubled this morning. Every new burden 
 is imposed. Is it anything remarkable that in these conditions the Austrian 
 Ministers themselves should find the situation almost intolerable? I have 
 no doubt myself that it is deliberately being made intolerable. 
 
 Finally, we have the example of Germany and of Jacob Kaiser which 
 the right hon. Gentleman gave. Over and above this ... we have been 
 witnesses for months past of a campaign of calumny and abuse of the 
 Western democracies, their way of life and all they stand for, carried on 
 by press and by radio. Ministers themselves in this country, with others, 
 have been the victims of this campaign. It may be true—personally, I 
 think that it is true—that it is no part of the design of the authors of this 
 propaganda that it should lead to hostilities. I think that that is so, but 
 he must be an optimist indeed who considers that it is possible to continue 
 for month after month in a Europe living as it is today, with its present 
 distress, and with its clouded and anxious future, with the use of that 
 language continuing, without imperilling the very existence of peace itself. 
 One cannot continually wage a war of nerves without eventually getting 
 on somebody’s nerves. That is the position which we are now approaching. 
 
 Threats to Peace 
 
 Therefore, I say to this Elouse that there seem to be two immediate 
 threats to peace, and they are very serious. One is the violence of the 
 language used by this Communist propaganda everywhere, and the violence 
 of Communist action in countries like Greece, at a time when Europe is 
 still littered with kindling which it is so easy to set alight. The second is 
 the risk that the Western democracies may fail to make a success of their 
 own efforts to rebuild the prosperity of their countries with the aid of 
 the Marshall Plan which in itself is surely one of the most generous acts 
 in history. 
 
 There seems to be another aspect of the policy which the right hon. 
 Gentleman announced today. I think it will be accepted in all parts of 
 the House that it is the wish of all of us, if we can contrive it, to improve 
 our relations with the Soviet Union. Certainly it has always been my 
 earnest wish, and for many years past I have done what I could to give 
 effect to it. If that be our wish, I am sure there is only one way in present 
 conditions in which we can hope to do it. That is by showing that the 
 free nations without the curtain possess both the means to restore their 
 collective prosperity and the dynamic leadership to enable them to do so. 
 Above all, the Kremlin are realistic. Once they have understood that our 
 system is strong enough to withstand their propaganda barrage, or any 
 other method of undermining, then I think that the right hon. Gentleman 
 will find his task easier than it is now. 
 
 It is a little sad to reflect upon the extent to which political develop¬ 
 ments in our continent of Europe have failed to keep pace with the needs 
 
 24 
 
of the modern world. It is not only that nationalist feeling grows more 
 intense, apparently with every year that passes, though I think that that 
 is true, but also that national units themselves in Europe and the Middle 
 East have tended to become smaller and smaller at the very time when 
 development in other spheres would have led us to look for larger and 
 looser political and economic associations. 
 
 There is no doubt at all, to my mind at any rate, that part of the 
 great advantage which the United States enjoys today is because that great 
 country is of a size to make the best use of all modern scientific and 
 industrial development. Also, it has got the essential unity which allows 
 free play of thought and the free movement of goods over a wide area 
 unhampered by tariff restrictions of any kind. In 1914 it was possible for 
 any one of us, if we were old enough then, to go to any single country in 
 Europe, save two, without a passport or a formality of any kind. We could 
 go to every country except to Tsarist Russia and to Turkey. But today, 
 unfortunately, we must admit that, just at the time when scientific progress 
 should have loosened these barriers, they are more rigid both to thought 
 and to economic life than they were 40 years ago. There is something for 
 us to reflect upon in all that. 
 
 I remember, and so does the right hon. Gentleman, the morning when 
 my right hon. Friend [Mr. Churchill] proposed to us in the Cabinet the 
 offer which he made to France in 1940. My right hon. Friend is being a 
 little bashful about that, but I remember that morning, and I thought 
 today, as I was walking down to this House—Is the international situation 
 any less grave now than it was then? Quite true, the complexion is differ¬ 
 ent. Then, it was an immediate military menace that confronted us. Now, 
 both economically and politically, who can claim that Europe is much 
 more peaceful than in 1940? Yet, we have failed, at a time like this, so 
 far, to make that wider association between the free Western nations which 
 the hour seems to call for, in the judgment of us all. 
 
 European Collaboration 
 
 I tried to express in a sentence or two before Christmas what I thought 
 ought to be our considered purpose, and I repeat it now. We want—and I 
 think I speak for all my hon. Friends on this side of the House—the closest 
 and most effective collaboration, economic, political and cultural, with all 
 the free nations of Europe. That collaboration can take one of any number 
 of forms. It can take, if we like—and some do—the form of a customs union. 
 Some people speak of a United Europe, and others again speak of a union 
 of the nations of Western Europe. In my judgment, each and all of these 
 objectives can be reconciled, and each and all of them needs to be pursued 
 with the greatest possible vigor under our leadership. 
 
 There are one or two questions I would like to ask the Minister of 
 State who, I understand, is to reply to the Debate. I understand that, for 
 some months past, the French and Italians have been discussing something 
 in the nature of a customs union and have nearly reached agreement. Is 
 that so, as I think it is? I have seen it reported that we have now joined 
 
 25 
 
in these conversations, and that would seem to me to be all to the good. 
 Can the right lion. Gentleman tell us a little about our commercial rela¬ 
 tions with Benelux? He spoke of political agreements, which I said we 
 welcomed, but we would like to know whether any further action is being 
 taken. None of us is unaware of the difficulties in a position of this sort. 
 We have our own special position at the heart and center of the British 
 Commonwealth, and I refuse to believe that it is past the wit of man to 
 devise ways and means, economic, political and cultural, whereby we and 
 these free countries, which also control great overseas territories, may be 
 brought closer together than at the present time. That is what we seek, 
 and that is why I, personally, supported the Briand Memorandum as long 
 ago as 1930. Never has the European need for a proposal such as this been 
 greater than it is today. We hope that what the right hon. Gentleman has 
 suggested today will lead by stages to a freer and fuller life for Europe. 
 
 U. S. S. E. 
 
 Here I want to make a comment or two which I know will not be 
 palatable to all hon. Members, though I must say it. It would, in my 
 judgment, be absolutely wrong to try to bring about a closer integration 
 of the free nations of Western Europe on the assumption that one political 
 faith is going to prevail among them all. That, let me say, is most unlikely 
 to happen; nor is it in any way necessary that it should happen. There 
 has been talk—and this is what I am referring to—of a United Socialist 
 States of Europe. In Western Europe, there are today many Governments— 
 in free Western Europe—most of which are coalitions, comprised of all 
 parties except the Communist Party. In these coalitions, the Socialists are, 
 in most instances, not even the largest party. That may show a lack of 
 discrimination on the part of the electors, in the view of hon. Gentlemen 
 opposite, but I am dealing only with the facts, and it is the position that 
 obtains in France, in Holland, and in Belgium. It is the position in Italy, 
 of course, where until recently, on the most welcome accession of the 
 adherence of Signor Saragat’s minority group, there was no Socialist support 
 for the Government at all. I could quote the further examples of Austria 
 and Hungary, where, until the Smallholders’ Party was destroyed by out¬ 
 side intervention, it was the largest party. 
 
 What I am submitting—and particularly, to certain hon. Members who 
 signed an interesting letter in the Daily Herald this morning—is that it 
 would be impracticable, indeed fantastic, to attempt to build the unity of 
 Western Europe solely on a basis of united Western European Socialism. 
 That is not what we must look for. What we have to try and realize is 
 something much wider than that, and I know that all hon. Members will 
 agree. We need the help of all parties in all these countries, whether they 
 are in the Government or not, who are supporters of the Marshall Plan. 
 That help is imperative, and I say to the right hon. Gentleman that, if 
 he has such an illusion—and I do not suppose he has—it is really not possible 
 to do that on the basis of Socialism alone. 
 
 26 
 
Germany 
 
 I want to make one or two reflections about Germany and to ask one 
 or two questions. For quite a while past—and this is not a criticism; it is 
 part of the legacy of agreements made—the Western Powers have been 
 holding their hands in Germany in the hope of getting some measure of 
 agreement between the Four Powers. I fully understand the right hon. 
 Gentleman’s desire to achieve that, but for many months now we must 
 all have come to realize that it is not going to be possible to get that 
 agreement, and that Soviet maneuvers are really directed to try and delay 
 those essential measures of reconstruction which the Western Powers them¬ 
 selves want to develop in Germany. I feel that to be true, and I think 
 that what is so essential today is that every possible effort should be made 
 to restore the economic life in the three Western zones of Germany, while 
 maintaining the indispensable military safeguards. 
 
 What does that mean? It means, amongst other things, that the Ruhr 
 should be given a real chance to live. There may be differences as to how 
 to do this, but, personally, I have always felt sympathetic towards the con¬ 
 ception of some form of enduring international regime for the Ruhr. As 
 conditions are now, it must be obvious to everyone that the Soviet Gov¬ 
 ernment have now no claim to partake in such a scheme. They could not 
 have, because of the manner in which they have failed to carry out the 
 Potsdam Agreement, the extent to which they have flouted its express 
 provision that Germany must be treated as an economic whole. All this 
 deprives the Soviet Union of any claim to participate in an international 
 administration concerning an area of Germany now cut off from the rest 
 of Germany. 
 
 I cannot believe that it would be impossible to bring our French friends 
 along with us on a plan of this kind, or some similar plan. It is really 
 indispensable, if we are going to do that, to treat the French as equal 
 partners from the beginning in this matter of the discussion on Germany. 
 If we do not do that, we shall raise again all those old suspicions to which 
 the French are so properly sensitive. I was sorry to note what apparently 
 happened the other day, and I do not know who was responsible, or 
 whether I have got the facts right. The new Robertson-Glay proposals, 
 which radically altered the machinery of the Bizonal Economic Council, 
 were apparently first announced in the press, and the French, it seems, had 
 heard nothing of them until that moment. The explanation that appeared 
 afterwards was that the proposals were not final, and the suggestion about 
 consulting the Germans was hardly a form of explanation which was likely 
 to reassure the French. It is just that sort of thing which we have to avoid 
 in making this approach jointly with the French. 
 
 I now want to raise some fundamental administrative problems about 
 Germany. We would like some more information, either today or to¬ 
 morrow, about what is actually happening in the Ruhr. I read in The 
 Times this morning, as no doubt, did many other hon. Members, the report 
 
 27 
 
of their Frankfurt Correspondent on the Frankfurt regime. He has two 
 very serious things to say. He says: 
 
 “Well placed observers are convinced that, given the necessary confidence the 
 output of many factories in Western Germany could he more than doubled over¬ 
 night, even in the present condition of plants. . . . For various reasons”— 
 
 this is the point to which I want to draw the right hon. Gentleman’s 
 attention— 
 
 ‘‘notably the fear of dismantling for reparations and the complete lack of con¬ 
 fidence in the Reichsmark”— 
 
 these he gives as the two chief reasons why there is a go-slow policy in these 
 factories, and continues: 
 
 “In the opinion of the Allied Control Office in Frankfurt, large stocks of vital 
 materials are being withheld from the market.” 
 
 I hope that the Government will tell us later today whether they endorse 
 this view, and whether, even with existing materials, the output could be 
 doubled, because, if that is the position, then I think it is our duty, with 
 our Western Allies, to seek to do something about it. 
 
 This afternoon the right hon. Gentleman told us that he was hoping 
 to get currency agreement between the Four Powers. Of course, that is 
 desirable, but nobody knows better than he that previous experience of 
 Four-Power agreement has not been particularly encouraging. What is to 
 happen if it cannot be got? I am sure the House will feel that we cannot 
 permanently sit waiting for the fourth power to agree to currency reform. 
 Therefore, I hope the Government will be able to tell us that, while they 
 will try to get this agreement, if they cannot, then the Three Powers will 
 go ahead in respect to their own zones with what seems to them the most 
 practical proposal. This applies equally to the question of dismantling 
 and reparations. 
 
 It is the action of the Soviet Government which has torn up the real 
 validity of the Potsdam Agreement. That cannot be denied by anybody. 
 The fundamental conception of Potsdam was that Germany should be 
 treated as an economic whole. The Soviet Union has never made its con¬ 
 tribution to the life of Germany as a whole. Therefore, they can have no 
 complaint if we have to go ahead with whatever plans seem to us to be 
 best. I am sure that is the course the Government ought to pursue. 
 
 The coal output figures seem very disturbing. I do not know whether 
 they are due to the railway wagon position. I read somewhere that there 
 is more coal at the pithead now, despite the poor output, than can, in 
 fact, be moved. If that is so, cannot something be done to ease the wagon 
 situation? We know that there is here a vicious circle. Strikes in France, 
 which have some Communist responsibility, have resulted in the loss of 
 two million tons of coal. Owing to that fact, the French are more anxious 
 than ever to get more coal from Germany. If they get it, then the result 
 will be that German industries will suffer, and, as a consequence, the 
 whole German contribution to the Marshall Plan will suffer. The only 
 way in which this matter can be settled is by the most complete and frank 
 
 28 
 
discussion between the three partners in Western Germany—ourselves, 
 France, and the United States. 1 was glad to hear the right lion. Gentleman 
 say that such a discussion was contemplated. I hope we can also be told 
 that, while we shall still seek a measure of agreement with the fourth 
 power on the proposals, if necessary, and if that agreement is not forth¬ 
 coming, we shall go ahead on our own. 
 
 Mr. Bevin: The right lion. Gentleman may take it that is so. 
 
 Balkan Peace Treaties 
 
 Mr. Eden: I have one other comment to make. I cannot conclude without 
 some reference to the Peace Treaties which have been ratified by the former 
 Balkan satellites of Germany since our last review of affairs in Eastern 
 Europe. The violation of the human rights clauses of those treaties is, 
 perhaps, the most tragic commentary of all on the decline of that good 
 faith which is the essence of international agreements and international 
 conduct. Petkov has been executed, Stanchev has been imprisoned for 
 life, Kovacs has vanished, and Maniu is in solitary confinement. These 
 are melancholy events which, surely, lay upon us the obligation not to 
 ignore the practical issues that remain. Therefore, I ask the Government 
 to tell us their view on the prospects of the fulfillment of the other clauses 
 of the agreements—for example, of the Danube clauses. Are we to accept as 
 abandoned the undertaking of the Riparian States to observe the principle 
 of free trade and navigation on this great artery of Europe? 
 
 Another important point about these treaties is the limitation of mil¬ 
 itary forces. I raise this point especially in regard to Bulgaria because we 
 were told before the Recess that the total number of forces under arms 
 in Bulgaria is still far above that specified in the treaty. In view of the 
 inflammatory character of Bulgarian propaganda against Greece, and in 
 view of the fact that these large Bulgarian forces exist, though the Bulgarian 
 frontier is supposed to be demilitarized by the terms of the treaty recently 
 signed, I should have thought this was a matter which called for urgent 
 investigation. I hope the Government will be able to give us some informa¬ 
 tion about it. 
 
 During the last few weeks, I have had the opportunity of visiting some 
 of the countries of Southern Europe and also of the Middle East. Every¬ 
 where, I found the utmost goodwill towards this country. I endorse what 
 the right hon. Gentleman has said about Baghdad, and I hope, with him, 
 that wiser counsels will prevail. As one travels through those lands and 
 talks to their political leaders, or to their individual citizens, one cannot 
 but be impressed by the extent to which their lives, like ours, are shadowed 
 by the ever-present menace of a darkening international situation. 
 
 The ordinary people there, like the ordinary people here, ask nothing 
 more than to be allowed to take their part in rebuilding the national life 
 of their countries, to be able to till the soil, to work in industry, and to 
 bring up their children in some measure of confidence and security. That 
 is all they want. In some countries I was amazed at what has already been 
 
 29 
 
done to repair the ravages of war. In others, great new plans of irri¬ 
 gation, and so forth, are going to bring increased prosperity to those 
 countries. Yet, despite all that, there is the oppressive, brooding fear. If I 
 was asked one question by almost everybody it was, “What are the chances 
 of maintaining peace? What is the danger of war?” Every time that was 
 the question put to me. That is the fear which, owing to the relations 
 that at present exist between the Great Powers, makes itself felt in the 
 smallest villages in the most remote parts of the world. 
 
 I will conclude, as I began, by saying that it is the earnest desire—and I 
 hope that Moscow will believe it, because it is true—of every lion. Member 
 of this House to bring about some improvement in the relations between 
 this country and the Soviet Union. I am convinced that there is now only 
 one way by which we can do it, and that is by showing that we can make 
 our way of life work. It is only on the basis of our own unshakable strength 
 and the prosperity of our own free system of society that we can hope to 
 enter upon a period of reasonable relations with the Kremlin. I do not, 
 by any means, despair of that, but those relations will only be established 
 in the world as it exists today by negotiating on a basis of strength. If we 
 are strong we shall deserve success and command it; if we are weak, we 
 shall suffer failure, and deserve it. 
 
 British Initiative in E. R. P. 
 
 Hie Minister of State (Mr. Hector McNeil): ... It is not true that His 
 Majesty’s Government or the Foreign Secretary have allowed events to 
 push them around. Whenever opportunity has offered itself, this Gov¬ 
 ernment and my right lion. Friend have seized the initiative. I need not 
 labor the point that the Paris Conference was convened on the joint initia¬ 
 tive of M. Bidault and my right hon. Friend; I need not labor the point 
 that the proposals offered by Mr. Marshall have been made flesh from 
 that initiative. I should also like to add that, although there may have 
 been little publicity since the Paris Conference was convened, His Majesty’s 
 Government have played their part in pushing forward the consequences 
 of that Conference. 
 
 The right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington [Mr. Eden] 
 asked me a number of questions in that connection. FIc asked, first, 
 whether we were in close contact with the Benelux countries in connec¬ 
 tion with our commercial relationships. The answer is that we are in 
 close and frequent contact with both the Belgian and Dutch Governments 
 on this subject. We have just had a Belgian delegation here in London, 
 and we are about to resume conversations with a Dutch trade and finance 
 delegation; while, in addition, as I understand it, these two Governments 
 have kept in close touch with each other on this subject and in their re¬ 
 lationships to us. Several hon. Members referred to the Benelux arrange¬ 
 ment. Like all of us, they welcomed it; but it is proper that we should 
 not expect too much, nor over-estimate exactly what the arrangement is. 
 
 30 
 
Mr. K. Lindsay (Independent): It is not yet in force. 
 
 Mr. McNeil: It has come into force in the sense that it is a tariff union. 
 More may come of it, but that is all it is at the present moment. The 
 right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington also asked me about 
 the French-Italian conversations on a possible customs union, as did my 
 hon. Friend the Member for Widnes [Mr. Shawcross]. It is true that those 
 two Governments have had delegations discussing this subject in, I think, 
 Rome; and it is also true, as I understand it, that the delegations have 
 returned to their respective Governments interim reports of a generally 
 favorable character. We have not been associated bilaterally in any dis¬ 
 cussions on customs unions because, as the House will understand, at the 
 Paris Conference it was decided to set up a study group to deal with the 
 subject of a European customs union. Some meetings have already taken 
 place, at which I understand our delegation has played a full part. The 
 study group is to re-assemble in Brussels early in February, but more than 
 that I cannot say at this stage because their work is incomplete. 
 
 The right hon. Member and the hon. Member for Windsor [Maj. Mott- 
 Radclyffe: Conservative] asked me various questions about treaty imple¬ 
 mentation. I quite agree that I have not been able to give very precise 
 answers in reply to Questions. Today, I was asked about the Danube 
 Conference, and about the demilitarized zones of the Bulgarian frontier. 
 Also, various references were made to the human rights clauses. With the 
 permission of the House, I would seek to escape from making any decisive 
 statements on implementation just now. I am not in a position to do so, 
 and the subject is delicate. 
 
 Balkan Peace Treaties 
 
 When we secured these clauses, we were not looking for political vic¬ 
 tories. By these clauses we sought to benefit the people of the various 
 countries affected by them. The question of their implementation is of 
 great delicacy. I have been trying to group together the various clauses 
 in the three treaties which require implementation, with the Danube and 
 human rights clauses as examples. What we would, of course, hope is 
 that the signatories would honorably offer to implement these clauses, but 
 if this is lacking, we must still make our first concern the people whom we 
 sought to benefit by them. We have, therefore, been giving considerable 
 thought to the best method of approach to the whole question, and our 
 studies are well advanced. I do not want to promise too much from the 
 studies, and I would prefer to leave it by saying that when these studies 
 are completed, my right hon. Friend will report to the House upon the 
 broad question of implementation. 
 
 There is one other category about which I have had specific questions 
 put, and that is the clause governing the military strengths. We have 
 already given answers to the House covering the forces of Romania, Bul¬ 
 garia and Hungary, respectively. These are estimates, based on the best 
 information available. The Hungarian and Romanian figures arc, in our 
 judgment, approximately in conformity with the limits laid down in the 
 
 31 
 
respective treaties. The Bulgarian figures, however, 1 have to admit are 
 unsatisfactory, particularly in relation to the irregular forces. It is true 
 that under the treaty there are rights to verify these figures, but, in the 
 terms of the general answer I have given about implementation, the House 
 will, perhaps, await to hear my right lion. Friend when we have completed 
 our studies, because I cannot truthfully give an answer which will advance 
 the subject at this point. 
 
 Mr. Eden: This is really a very important matter, namely, the fulfillment 
 of these treaties. I do not want to press the right lion. Gentleman tonight, 
 but can we be given an indication whether at some time an account of the 
 Government’s views and what they propose to do will be given? 
 
 Mr. McNeil: I thought that I had already indicated that. I am not seeking 
 to escape an answer, but asking to be excused from giving an answer 
 which avou Id be incomplete, or might prejudice or jeopardize any possible 
 action we can take. I promise that my right lion. Friend will report to 
 the House when we have something more definite and final to say on 
 this subject. 
 
 Germany 
 
 In addition to the broad outline of the German situation which was 
 given by my right hon. Friend, I have been asked several questions, all 
 of which are important. Anxiety was expressed by the right hon. Gen¬ 
 tleman on the fact that France has not been too closely associated in the 
 development of the Frankfurt Agreement. It is quite plain that no one 
 wall ever find my right hon. Friend, or this Government, lacking in an 
 understanding of the legitimate French anxieties on all aspects of German 
 policy. In the case of the Frankfurt Agreement, this was an arrangement 
 which had to be made quickly in order to try to improve the emergency 
 conditions inside Germany. The Agreement was primarily economic and 
 administrative in character, and was certainly not meant as a major politi¬ 
 cal decision. However, the House should know that, while I agree that, 
 in this instance, there has been complaint from Paris, there is real hope 
 that we shall soon reach a type of agreement which will make criticism 
 of this kind impossible in future. We have fixed a tripartite meeting be¬ 
 tween the United States, the French and ourselves. It is to be held in 
 London about the middle of next month, and only the exact date has still 
 to be fixed. We all hope that from this meeting may emerge a fuller and 
 wider partnership, not only in relation to Germany. 
 
 In relation to Germany, it has also been urged that we must give the 
 Ruhr a chance to live. That, of course, has been the primary objective in 
 our policy from the beginning. It has also been said—and I know that 
 here I shall have wholehearted support from the Government benches— 
 that we ought to consider the possibility of an international regime for the 
 Ruhr. There are many difficulties here, mainly of an operative kind, but 
 the House can be assured that it is an idea to which my right hon. Friend 
 is sympathetic, and one which will be given the fullest examination by 
 His Majesty’s Government. 
 
 52 
 
It was also said that production is being impaired, first, by our dis¬ 
 mantling program, and, secondly, by currency difficulties. I would not 
 accept—and the authorities would not accept—the suggestion that we can 
 double production just by tackling these two points; but let me deal with 
 them. I can assure the right lion. Gentleman that no dismantling is per¬ 
 mitted, except of plant which is surplus to the permitted global potential 
 of the joint Zone. Indeed, I can go further than that, and assure the right 
 lion. Gentleman that there is much more plant available than there is 
 manpower, material and coal to operate it. 
 
 Sir P. Macdonald (Liberal National): Has the final list been settled of 
 the plant that is definitely to be removed or dismantled, because until 
 that list is finalized there will be uncertainty in the minds of many as to 
 the position? By this time, the list should be ready. It should be a final 
 list, and they should be told exactly the position. 
 
 Mr. McNeil: The list has not been settled. 
 
 Sir P. Macdonald: Why not? 
 
 Mr. McNeil: Because a great deal of work lias had to be done on it, but 
 it will be, in the very near future, completed. However, I would not sug¬ 
 gest for a second, and I do not think that it will be contended, while I 
 admit that there has been this uncertainty, that that has been the major 
 cause of retarding production. I know that the right hon. Gentleman very 
 carefully protected himself by not offering his opinion. 
 
 Mr. Eden: I did not offer my opinion because I did not know. 
 
 German Currency and Food 
 
 Mr. McNeil: On currency, however, I agree with the best advice available 
 to us, that this is a much more important factor, operating much more 
 widely. The present bad currency affects the whole economic life of the 
 country, leading, among other things, to hoarding, black marketeering, and 
 impairment of production. Hitherto, all our efforts to deal with this 
 problem on a quadripartite basis have met with failure. It is our considered 
 view that it is impossible to accept continued postponement of reform which 
 is fundamental to the whole German economy. There is a plan before the 
 Control Council in Berlin, and I believe it is due to be dealt with on 30th 
 January. As a result of these discussions on the currency reform plan, we 
 will know where we stand, and the way will be cleared for the urgent 
 decisions which the House can be assured we will take. 
 
 The other important factor of production is food. Today the Eco¬ 
 nomic Council at Frankfurt has been discussing this subject. An announce¬ 
 ment on the ration scale for the period beginning 2nd February will be 
 made very shortly, and I think will show an improvement. Our general 
 experience is that production, particularly in heavy industries like coal, 
 moves almost exactly in ratio to the food. Since the Debate started I have 
 been told on the telephone that the Germans themselves have accepted a 
 very improved principle upon which they are to be congratulated, and 
 
 33 
 
that is, they are going to impose a system of different scales of rations for 
 the urban areas of Hamburg and the Ruhr and for the country areas 
 where the people have better access to the food. The industrial areas will 
 be guaranteed a higher scale, and I do not know exactly what the differ¬ 
 ence will be. ft may be 100 or 150 calories lower in the country areas, 
 where we can expect the people to have access to some kind of indigenous 
 food. This will not relieve the two Governments from the efforts that are 
 being made just now to improve the imported food position. 
 
 Mr. Stokes (Labor): It sounds pretty useless to me. 
 
 Mr. McNeil : I cannot agree with the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. 
 Stokes). We all know that regulations are laid down, but in a country area 
 where food is grown people are bound to retain some of it. It is the 
 Germans themselves who accepted this principle. 
 
 It might be appropriate here to make a passing reference to the “M” 
 Plan, and to say that my right hon. Friend, the Parliamentary Secretary 
 and myself have been considering, so as to meet the very real interest in 
 this matter, placing a photostatic copy of this document in the Library, 
 and subject to the proviso that there is no real security risk we will do so. 
 
 The hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. Zilliacus) launched a full-scale 
 attack against the Marshall Plan, in which he was supported by the hon. 
 Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher). In all these attacks there is just 
 one simple question which I should like to put to the attackers and that is: 
 Do they say without reservation that they do not want to share in the 
 benefits of the Marshall proposals at all? Will they say that in Fifeshire 
 and Gateshead before their constituents? The picture that the hon. Member 
 for West Fife drew of some militant American bashing his way into the 
 various capitals of Europe, and forcing the people to accept dollar credits, 
 dollar food, dollar tobacco, and dollar petrol is, of course, quite ludicrous. 
 
 Policy Not Dictated from Abroad 
 
 Whatever conditions may be attached—and allegations about some of 
 the conditions are quite without foundation—whatever conditions may 
 eventually be attached, no one is compelled to come into the scheme or 
 accept its aim. I should, however, like to make reference to the condition 
 to which the hon. Member for Gateshead alluded. The Ghancellor of the 
 Exchequer has made it plain that the suggestion that the cut in ship¬ 
 building is being imposed as part of the Marshall aid plan is quite without 
 foundation and the hon. Member for Gateshead is much too intelligent 
 to have missed that reply, or to be at all deceived as to how the suggestion 
 arose. It came from the Harriman Committee, and is not a condition 
 attached to the Marshall Plan. 
 
 Mr. Zilliacus (Labor): May I interrupt the right hon. Gentleman? I 
 never suggested that. I pointed out that the Marshall Plan introduced 
 the proposal that we should cut shipbuilding. 
 
 Mr. McNeil: Well, indeed it does not; but, at any rate, so long as it is 
 plain in the hon. Gentleman’s mind that the Government’s activity in 
 
this respect is not being dictated from abroad, then that is satisfactory, 
 but it is very difficult to understand why he should drag this point into 
 his speech. 
 
 Mr. Zilliacus: Because it is in the Marshall Plan. 
 
 Mr. McNeil: Another point put to me by the hon. Member for Gateshead 
 (Mr. Zilliacus) was about the R.A.F. personnel we are retaining in Greece. 
 There was here the inference that this was a fighting unit being kept in 
 use at the dictates of Washington. That was quite plainly the inference 
 given in the context of the hon. Gentleman’s long argument. The truth 
 is, of course, that this is not a fighting unit at all. Outside our training 
 mission we have no R.A.F. men of that character in Greece. This is a 
 communications squadron, and it is the only dependable method of com¬ 
 munications which we have between Athens and Salonika. It has no other 
 function, and I make that plain on behalf of the Government. 
 
 Mr. Zilliacus: Will the right hon. Gentleman explain why the squadron’s 
 leave to go home was cancelled? Why were plans put through to go home 
 and suddenly cancelled as they were having a farewell dinner? 
 
 Mr. McNeil: I expect the reply—but I do not offer this officially—is the 
 obvious one that the relief had not come through. 
 
 Mr. Baird (Labor): Why not bring them all home? 
 
 Britain and U. N. 
 
 Mr. McNeil: They are not fighting men. The hon. Member for Gateshead 
 also lashed himself into a fury about the United Nations Charter and the 
 United Nations machinery. He asked whether we were prepared to base 
 our policy on this, and he inferred that we should do so because the Soviet 
 so based their foreign policy. But it is very relevant to remind the House 
 here that this is precisely a place where the Soviet Government and where 
 three associated Governments of the Soviet have refused to accept the ruling 
 of the United Nations at all. 
 
 Again, I am certain that the hon. Gentleman is such a good and con¬ 
 vinced student of international literature, which for long enough was his 
 professional job, that he has read the two reports from the United Nations 
 Commission on this subject. But he makes no reference to the fact that 
 these two reports, from independently appointed people, made to the Com¬ 
 mittee and to the Assembly of the United Nations and debated most fully— 
 and they have not been refuted—showed that, wherever the rebels did come 
 from, they were receiving assistance from outside the borders of Greece. 
 If United Nations policy is to be applied in Greece—and his Majesty’s 
 Government have always supported application of its policy in Greece and 
 elsewhere—then all the signatories to the Charter, or members of the organ¬ 
 ization, should at this moment be helping the servants of the United 
 Nations in Greece. If those servants had such assistance, it would be quite 
 idle to pretend that their job would be easily discharged: it would be as 
 nonsensical as to pretend that there are two clear black and white camps 
 in Greece, a pretence which the Government has never attempted. But if 
 
 35 
 
the servants of the United Nations had such assistance their job would, 
 tor the first time, have been advanced in a systematic fashion, and a degree 
 of peace and security would have been afforded to those 500,000 refugees 
 to whom the hon. Gentleman referred. . . . 
 
 If the hon. Gentleman is going to further his subject, and if he is going 
 to help His Majesty’s Government with its difficulties, then that is the 
 question which must be answered—“how can the relationships, not only 
 between the Soviet Government and this Government, but between the 
 Soviet and almost all other elected and representative Governments in 
 the world, be improved?” That is the question which the House has been 
 asking itself in various ways and in various areas—in Germany, in France, 
 in Italy, in Greece—this afternoon. That is undoubtedly the question which 
 ordinary men and women throughout the length and breadth of Europe 
 are asking themselves this evening, and every evening. 
 
 What is the Soviet foreign policy? What is their purpose with us? 
 What kind of people do they consider that we are? How do they interpret 
 the statements of our policy, and the actions we offer in corroboration of 
 those statements? For example, are we warmongers? I have not dealt at 
 any length with United Nations proceedings because other questions were 
 raised; but I would not agree with the suggestion which has been made, 
 that the United Nations has been completely unsuccessful. It is a confusion 
 of ideas to think that it was ever offered as a method of bringing a dispute 
 between two great powers to an end. In a limited way the United Nations 
 has had its successes, the latest being Indonesia. It had one in Persia. When 
 the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) tells us that the Soviet 
 Government never seeks to exploit or develop, he might tell us what Soviet 
 forces were doing in Persia. Not that I necessarily would think that was 
 a criticism of the Soviet Government. But there is a limited range of 
 United Nations successes. If governments would proceed as I hope and 
 believe our own Government does, and admit the comparative weakness 
 of this young organization instead of heaping huge tasks upon it, we might 
 see further successes. 
 
 W armongering” 
 
 But, Sir, at Lake Success, from the first day almost to the last, we found 
 ourselves pursued with the cry that the United States and ourselves were 
 warmongers, and this cry is still pursued in the Soviet press. There may 
 be some good internal reasons for such a gross misapplication of words, 
 but in the outside world there can be no understanding of them. Any¬ 
 body can tell this tale. What are the facts? There can be no comparison 
 between the aggressive potentialities of this country and those of the Soviet 
 Union. The Soviet Union has under arms just now some four million 
 men—not an inconsiderable number as one hon. Member indicated—and 
 considerable numbers are distributed throughout Central and Eastern 
 Europe. The air force has some half-million men manning some 50,000 
 aircraft, and the navy, with about the same number of men, has about 
 200 submarines. 
 
Contrast these figures with the figures for the United Kingdom. Our 
 Armed Forces whic h reached a peak of about four and a half million during 
 the war, have been reduced, as the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
 Defense have shown, to about one million. The Royal Navy, which totaled 
 some eight hundred thousand personnel in wartime, numbers today about 
 one hundred and fifty thousand. The Army, by a rapid process of de¬ 
 mobilization, has discharged and released about three million men since 
 1945 and is now about half a million strong. The Royal Air Force has 
 about two hundred and fifty thousand. If facts like these are to be made 
 available to all people, then there can be no charge that we are war¬ 
 mongers, or monopolistic or capitalistic or imperialistic exploiters, as we 
 have been told that we are during tonight’s discussion. 
 
 I am not suggesting that we are at the stage of competitive rearmament. 
 In New York, we have had repeated obstruction from the Soviet delega¬ 
 tions. The delegations of France and the United States and, I am glad to 
 say, of Great Britain, have sought to find a way round it, and there is still 
 a hope that we may keep this work alive. What limited arrangements, in 
 a military sense, we make, are quite clearly shown to be defensive arrange¬ 
 ments of the most unambitious and frugal kind, of a completely non¬ 
 threatening nature; but, although, as I have said, we are not in any danger 
 of competitive rearmament at the moment, it is, nevertheless, understand¬ 
 able that the people of the Western world, which has twice been so savagely 
 battered and impoverished for taking the burden of the assault of tyranny, 
 should feel anxiety at the tension of the present time. But we are still free 
 from an armaments race. It is healthy that there is this anxiety, because, 
 twice in this century, we have drifted into war because the constitution 
 of a democratic people makes it almost impossible for them to start a de¬ 
 fensive war. Their history and feelings make them shrink, not in terror, 
 but in horror, from the barbarities we normally associate with war. So, 
 Mr. Speaker, this is a matter, not for complaint but for satisfaction, to 
 discern the anxiety which our peoples throughout the Western world are 
 displaying about the deterioration in international relationships. 
 
 Russian Policies 
 
 In this situation what they most want, and what must be primarily 
 applied to remedy this situation, is a clarification of Soviet policy and 
 Soviet intentions outside their own borders. No study of speeches, no 
 study of Communist doctrine, no private conversations, apparently, can 
 be taken at their face value when we are up against this problem. None 
 of them give us any indication of Soviet policy. They are conflicting. They 
 are inconsistent. By quotations one could show inconsistency and contra¬ 
 diction again and again. One of my hon. Friends referred to the report 
 by Mr. Elliott Roosevelt of his interview with Generalissimo Stalin on 
 21st December, 1946. I will not bore the House with it, since Members 
 have already heard it before, but confine myself to repeating Stalin’s con¬ 
 cluding words. Stalin said: 
 
 37 
 
“I do not doubt that the possibilities of peaceful collaboration will not only not 
 decrease, but may even increase.” 
 
 Sir, you can put against that statement dozens saying almost exactly the 
 opposite. . . . Generalissimo Stalin again and again tells us, as we in this 
 party probably know, that his direction, deduction and methods of think¬ 
 ing are based on Lenin and his teaching. In 1924, and again a year be¬ 
 fore the war, and after the signing of the German treaty, and in another 
 recent declaration after the establishment of the Cominform, Stalin in¬ 
 sisted that in that context: 
 
 ‘‘We are living not merely in one state but in a system of states, and the existence 
 of the Soviet Republics side by side with imperialistic states for a long time is 
 unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. Before that end intervenes 
 a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Union and the bourgeois states 
 will be inevitable.” 
 
 One can find further contradictions in statements by Mr. Molotov and 
 statements by Mr. Vyshinsky. But none of these really worry me—not even 
 the inconsistencies between the teaching of Lenin and the speeches of 
 Generalissimo Stalin. What worries everyone is the inconsistencies be¬ 
 tween Generalissimo Stalin and Generalissimo Stalin. As my right hon. 
 Friend said, probably there will be an outcry, another blare of propaganda 
 following his statement, and this Debate. But the outcome of this Debate, 
 this association upon which we are entering, has not been built up by 
 anyone else except Generalissimo Stalin. He is the architect of any coali¬ 
 tion which forms against him; and it is difficult to see where the coalition 
 will end, unless there is an explanation, not only in words but in deeds, 
 as to which of the two declared Soviet policies the present Soviet adminis¬ 
 tration is following out. 
 
 I was very tempted to go back and quote from the Atlantic Charter, 
 to quote Articles 3, 4, and 5, where the rights of governments, where the 
 rights particularly of small peoples, where sovereignty, where territorial 
 integrity, are all guaranteed by this country and also by Generalissimo 
 Stalin. That statement is still the policy of His Majesty’s Government. 
 Nothing will cause us to deviate from it, but of course our task will be 
 made much easier, and all over the world hopes would be raised, and 
 there would be a new turn of effort, a new development would be possible, 
 if we knew that the Soviet Government’s policy was still the same. 
 
 Mr. Gallaeher: Would the right hon. Gentleman excuse me? Does he 
 want to impress me and this House, and the people generally, that he gets 
 on all right with the Tory capitalists of America, but he cannot get on 
 with the Socialists of the Socialist Union? 
 
 Mr. McNeil: I do not want to impress the hon. Gentleman with that at 
 all. It is the other thing with which I want to impress him. We cannot 
 do it; we try to do it everywhere. I noticed that the Daily Worker said a 
 fortnight ago that their correspondent looking over the Gallery had never 
 seen the Attorney-General, myself or any other member of the British 
 Delegation to the United Nations conferring with the Soviet Delegation, 
 but always with the American. That is not true. I had a fierce letter 
 
 38 
 
chicling me for a photograph showing me talking and smiling with Mr. 
 Vyshinsky. We were available any time they wanted us. We made re¬ 
 peated approaches to them, and there is nothing we want more than to 
 get on with them. But what is social affability if we still do not know 
 the policy? 
 
 No one pretends that the policy of the right lion. Gentleman is the 
 best policy. It is not the policy we would have chosen. We were chided 
 for not having made sooner the decision on our future policy, and for not 
 having started sooner on this work of building up a Western association. 
 It is true we took risks, but this Government will always be prepared to 
 take the risks for peace that one would take for war provided that we do 
 not barter our liberties or betray our principles. We have delayed, and 
 we would still delay if w r e could get understanding and clarity. 
 
 The lion. Gentleman the Member for Widnes (Mr. Shawcross) com¬ 
 plained about the smallness of our action. That is a dangerous and wrong 
 way to look at it. It is a complex matter, developing these associations, 
 and it will be better, in the words of the ordinary cliche, to “build soundly 
 by building slowly” and not on too little. We are not resting simply on 
 this one political step. The consequence of the Paris Conference and the 
 consequences of the Marshall aid, if and when it does come, will be mani¬ 
 fold, and we are planning already for some of them. 
 
 Much of the association will not rest exclusively upon the physical 
 understandings or the political understandings on the quid-pro-quos which 
 we may expect inside a treaty or commercial arrangements which will de¬ 
 velop. Much of the understanding will develop on the plane to wdiich 
 my right hon. Friend alluded, on the plane to which the Prime Minister 
 in his broadcast alluded when he said that we had a philosophy in our 
 own right. It is this distinctive Western European characteristic, dis¬ 
 cernible in our laws, in our governments, in our churches, in our social 
 institutions, which gives hope that there can be a successful attempt to 
 build an association which will circumvent the political difficulties fre¬ 
 quently experienced in treaty-making and the commercial difficulties every¬ 
 one meets whenever he considers the economic systems of countries that 
 were not designed to be complementary. 
 
 There is a great area of the world where our common characteristics 
 are accepted as the hallmark of trust, and the platform upon which under¬ 
 standing can be developed. I wonder if the hon. Gentleman who sneered 
 at the United States will look at the document presented by Congress, and 
 see there the admission that the Socialist parties of Western Europe are the 
 parties which are distinguished for their concentration upon the rights of 
 the individual and their democratic practices. I hope everyone will re¬ 
 member that in each of the territories of our Commonwealth from their 
 foundations these same ideas are found, rich and profound, and I believe 
 that it is this spiritual and cultural basis which makes the beginning which 
 we have announced today more important than anyone dreams. Perhaps 
 this is a time when very small events throw a long shadow. That can be 
 true of the good events as well as of the bad events. 
 
 39 
 
Mr. Bowles (Labor): Might I ask a question about my right hon. Friend’s 
 statement about steel in the Marshall Plan? I understand that the Chan¬ 
 cellor of the Exchequer, after he made a statement about cuts in steel, 
 was particularly questioned on the cuts affecting shipbuilding. He was 
 asked by a journalist whether they were in conformity with the Marshall 
 Plan and he did not think they were, thereby implying that there were 
 some conditions dealing with shipping so far as steel is concerned. 
 
 Mr. McNeil: The Chancellor of the Exchequer said plainly that the 
 activities of the Government were quite uninfluenced by those conditions. 
 In any case, we are not yet at the stage where there are actual conditions. 
 
 Polish Frontiers 
 
 Mr. Churchill (Conservative): I think I may say that this is the 
 first time in my experience I have ever been called upon to follow the hon. 
 Lady the Member for Epping (Mrs. Manning) [who raised the question 
 of the Polish frontiers]. I hope she will forgive me if I do not attempt to 
 reproduce from memory the intricate discussions which took place at 
 Yalta and afterwards at Potsdam. Broadly speaking, at Yalta we reached 
 an agreement about the eastern frontiers of Poland on the basis of full 
 Polish independence. We did not reach the point of deciding what com¬ 
 pensation should be given to Poland for the changes on her eastern fron¬ 
 tiers in favor of Russia—what compensation should be given her at the 
 expense of Germany—but there had been some talk, even during the days 
 of Teheran, about the line of the Oder. . . . 
 
 The Oder forks into the Eastern Neisse and the Western Neisse, and 
 we had always thought that up to the Eastern Neisse was fair compensa¬ 
 tion for Poland at the expense of Germany, having regard to her gains 
 on the Baltic shore, and of fair compensation for the concessions she had 
 made of districts which, though large in territory, consisted mainly of the 
 Pripet Marshes, to Russia in the East, and which was an essential part of 
 the strategic defense of the Soviet Union. When we got to Poland, every¬ 
 thing was in flux. Great masses of people were being driven about by 
 the advancing Soviet Armies. The Poles pressed on accordingly and not 
 only the Eastern Neisse was occupied, driving millions of refugees before 
 them, but the other tracts between the Eastern and Western were occupied. 
 These two added together comprise a very large part of the arable land 
 of Germany. The feeding grounds of Germany were thus, in a marked 
 manner, separated from the mouths of Germany, and millions of people 
 were driven from the frontiers into the British Zone, in the main, where 
 they now are under conditions which no one can contemplate without 
 growing anxiety. The hon. Lady [Mrs. Manning: Labor] says that we 
 must recognize the fait accompli; that they have been driven out and the 
 newcomers have settled themselves down there. All I can say is, we have 
 not agreed to that; and it was only agreed to by the United States on the 
 basis that it would be provisional until a peace treaty was made. Well, 
 
 40 
 
that is how the matter stands, and no one can possibly doubt that it re¬ 
 mains a complication and a dark cloud over the map of Europe. 
 
 Naval Affairs 
 
 I am sorry, and a little surprised, that the depressing declaration about 
 the destruction oi so large a part of our material reserve of battleships 
 should have been announced at the very time that the Foreign Secretary 
 was about to make so serious and important a pronouncement, because I 
 have no doubt this unwise and improvident step will have its effect upon 
 our influence and authority in international discussions. I do not, of 
 course, intend to discuss the merits here. We shall ask for formal debate 
 in due course, upon this and other aspects of our naval administration at 
 the present time, particularly directed to the point of what value we are 
 getting for the unprecedented peacetime sums of money which are being 
 voted, and for the very large assignments under Vote A. 
 
 There is, however, another question of a Foreign Office character, con¬ 
 nected with old battleships and warships, on which I must say a word. 
 At the time the Italian Fleet surrendered I had a great desire, personally, 
 to give Italy the feeling that they would be welcomed into the Allied 
 ranks, and to show respect, as far as possible, for their national sentiment 
 and pride. My colleagues in the National Coalition agreed to try to avert 
 the proposed division of the Italian Fleet between Russia, Britain, and 
 America, and we were successful in this so far as the United States was 
 concerned. We also persuaded Russia—by a very considerable sacrifice on 
 our part, namely, the loan of a battleship and 14 other vessels—to forgo 
 any claim she might have on the Italian Navy. The Americans gave one 
 ship, and we gave 14 out of the 15 that were used. They were a timely 
 reinforcement to our Soviet Ally. I hope this arrangement will stand, and 
 that the Soviets will keep our British ships, which they have adapted to 
 their own uses, rather than insist upon having a proportion of the reduced 
 Italian Navy handed over to them. It is very important that Italy should 
 feel we have a regard for her feelings and sentiments in a matter like this, 
 in which they can be so much more easily satisfied than, for instance, on 
 the question of colonial possessions. We should do our best in that direc¬ 
 tion, and if we fail we shall not have lost any goodwill in that part of the 
 world. 
 
 There is another point I should like the Prime Minister to mention, 
 if he will, when he replies. It is only a very small point. I beg your par¬ 
 don; it is only a very precise point, and not a small point at all. It is: 
 What has happened to the negotiations with Albania by which we were 
 to have some satisfaction given to us for the murder of 40 British naval 
 men and the grievous injury to many more by a state we had helped and 
 nourished to the best of our ability? That is not a matter which can be 
 ignored or forgotten, because it occurred in time of peace, and cannot be, 
 as it were, swept into the vast, confused catalog of human injuries and 
 wrong deeds which were done in the course of the great war on both sides. 
 This was a very special matter. I think the representative of the Admir- 
 
 41 
 
alty, the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary, used very direct language 
 upon the subject, which I believe was supported by the Foreign Office 
 in their diplomatic negotiations. We trust that some statement may be 
 made upon this, and that we shall certainly not allow the matter to rest in 
 its present state of deadlock and stalemate. 
 
 Bipartisan Foreign Policy 
 
 On the whole, the Government have maintained a continuity in foreign 
 policy with that pursued under the National Coalition Government of 
 which I was the head, and of which my right hon. Friend the Member for 
 Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Eden) was Foreign Secretary. We have, 
 therefore, tried to give them all possible help, and thus keep the foreign 
 policy of Britain outside the area of party controversy. ... In Greece, 
 the Government have pursued exactly the same policy which my right hon. 
 Friend and I flew to Athens that stormy Christmas time in order to assert; 
 and which at the time the present Foreign Secretary so loyally and courage¬ 
 ously defended at the Trade Union Congress with great success, and for 
 which he achieved acceptance by that body at that time.— [Hon. Members: 
 “The Labor Party.”]—Well, it was formally accepted. Let there be no 
 doubt about that. Not only has this policy been carried through with 
 persistence and perseverance by this country, but it has now also received 
 the active and growing support of the United States, who have relieved 
 us of a large part of the burden and responsibility which we were finding 
 it hard to bear. 
 
 When I look back at the attacks made upon our Greek policy three 
 years ago by The Times and Manchester Guardian , and by hon. Members, 
 some of whom are important Ministers today, at the bitter prejudice that 
 existed, and still exists in some quarters of the House, and at the violent 
 attacks which were made upon it by men who now fill the important offices 
 of Minister of Health and Secretary of State for War, who are now leading 
 Ministers of the Crown, I must congratulate the Foreign Secretary on hav¬ 
 ing been able to make his will effective, and to procure the support and 
 acquiescence of the Socialist Government and Party, including these Min¬ 
 isters, for a clear, steady policy—for what? For preventing the vast majority 
 of the Greek people from being conquered and enslaved by a Communist 
 minority, steeped in bloodshed and crime, and aided and tormented by 
 Communist intrigues and incursions from Albania and Bulgaria, inspired 
 and directed by Soviet Russia. 
 
 Mr. Cocks (Labor): The right hon. Member did not say that in 1944. 
 It was not the position then. 
 
 Mr. Churcliilh It is quite true that in 1944 Mr. Stalin did not oppose the 
 action which we took. Izvestia and Pravda were silent, while The Times 
 and Manchester Guardian were vocal in their attacks. But then, it must 
 be remembered that we had with the leaders of the Russian State very 
 intimate relations, which had grown up in the comradeship of the long, 
 bloody and terrible war which we thought was reaching a happy and filial 
 
 -42 
 
conclusion. Those agreements were kept when they were made, even 
 though they were hard sometimes. 
 
 I am also very glad to see the great change that has taken place in 
 American opinion on this subject. Four years ago, the views we held so 
 strongly about Greece, and the action we took in consequence, were the 
 subject of widespread disapproval throughout the United States. Not 
 only the large majority of the press, but the State Department also were 
 highly critical of what was then held to be an imperialist and reactionary 
 policy on the part of Great Britain. However, in the interval, the United 
 States Government have entirely come round to our view, and are acting 
 in exactly the same upright and disinterested spirit and intention as that 
 which animated the National Coalition Government, in which I was 
 associated so cordially with both the present and former Foreign Secretaries. 
 My hope is that having put their hand to the plow, the United States will 
 not look back, and Greece will be allowed and enabled to settle its affairs 
 in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the majority of the 
 people, and that it will not be reduced to another Communist-ridden police 
 state, such as have been set up against the will of their peoples behind 
 what has come to be called “The Iron Curtain.” I cannot help also feeling 
 content to see that not only the British, but the American Government, 
 have adopted to a very large extent the views which I expressed at Fulton 
 nearly two years ago, and have, indeed, gone in many ways far beyond them. 
 
 Mr. Gallacher: That is where the trouble started. 
 
 Fulton Speech 
 
 Mr. Churchill : I am only reporting facts, which are naturally a source 
 of satisfaction to me. I was much criticized on both sides of the Atlantic 
 for the Fulton speech, but in almost every detail, and certainly in the spirit 
 and in its moderation, what I there urged has now become the accepted 
 policy of the English-speaking world. The language used by the Prime 
 Minister and the Lord President of the Council about Soviet Russia, and 
 about the dangers of a new war, far exceed in gravity and menace anything 
 which I said at that time, or, indeed, have ever said on this subject since 
 the war. The joint use of bases, the maintenance of the common staff 
 arrangements between Great Britain and the United States, and the close 
 integration of our foreign policies, are being pursued throughout the 
 English-speaking world without any prejudice to the overriding and 
 supreme status of the world instrument of the United Nations, which it is 
 our solemn duty to sustain to the best of our ability, and, ultimately, to 
 bring into effective reality as the sovereign instrument of world government. 
 
 In another sphere, events are also moving along the lines which I have 
 earnestly desired. It is a year ago since I spoke at Zurich. There I pleaded 
 for the ideal and objective of a United Europe, and later we formed a 
 committee of all parties in this country to promote that cause. 
 
 Mr. Gallacher: Not all parties. 
 
 Mr. Churchill : Oil work of gathering together the strength and friendship 
 
 43 
 
of Europe, trying to weave it into one body, and forgetting some of the 
 feuds and quarrels of the past, we should certainly not have asked for the 
 assistance of those whose declared purpose it is to rupture all that happy 
 program. As I say, we formed this all-party committee, with the exception 
 of the Communists, whom we did not invite, and whom we do not now 
 invite to join us in that or in any other form of social and political activity. 
 The essence of my conception at that time, which was certainly not a new 
 one—and the right hon. Gentleman said that it was 12 years ago since he 
 had this idea— 
 
 Mr. Bevin: Twenty years ago. 
 
 Mr. Churchill: It shows how durable is truth. The essence of my concep¬ 
 tion was that France should forgo her thousand-year quarrel with Germany, 
 and rise again to a leading position in Europe by bringing the German 
 people back, with all our aid and goodwill, into the comity of nations. 
 That implied a sublime act of faith on the part of France, but we are now 
 in a region where such acts are perhaps the only ones which will be decisive. 
 
 Committee for a United Europe 
 
 I must say a word about our unofficial Committee for a United Europe, 
 and also about its limitations. I am most anxious to reassure the Govern¬ 
 ment and the Foreign Secretary on this subject. We do not aspire to com¬ 
 pete with governments in the executive sphere. What we seek to do is to 
 build up moral, cultural, sentimental, and social unities and affinities 
 throughout all Europe, or all those parts of Europe where freedom still 
 reigns. We are anxious to spread the idea of the men and women of many 
 countries being good Europeans, as well as patriotic citizens of their native 
 lands, ready and eager to meet and work with one another on terms of 
 honor and amity, to forget past tragedies as far as possible, to recognize 
 that what has happened in the past is unpayable by mortal man, and that 
 to exact its payment will wreck the world, and to build for a future which 
 may one day make amends for all. 
 
 I was very glad to observe that six months ago Mr. Marshall spoke of 
 our movement as a link in the chain of thought which had led him to 
 his memorable decision. Of course, we are watching with the greatest 
 sympathy all the steps which are being taken under the Marshall Plan 
 by the governments of 16 countries to bring about economic unity and 
 w r ell-being over these wide areas, in which I have heard it said 270 million 
 people dwell. But that is primarily the business of the responsible execu¬ 
 tive governments in every country. There is also the question of measures 
 of common defense which is now coming in to the fore. That again is a 
 matter for the executive governments. The relationship of this committee 
 to the executive responsible governments is very similar to that of U.N.A. 
 to the United Nations, or the old League of Nations Union to the League 
 of Nations. It is an unofficial body of private persons engaged in carrying 
 forward the ideas on which these institutions are founded. 
 
 We welcome everything that was said by the Foreign Secretary about 
 
 44 
 
the more intimate relations we are to seek with France and with what 
 are called the Benelux countries, and I presume with Switzerland, it she 
 would wish it, and also, I am glad to hear, with Italy. On this side of 
 the House we give our lull support to this policy. We are sure that, as 
 my right lion. Friend said last night, and as the lion. Member for Epping 
 [Mrs. Manning] said just now, this European policy of unity can perfectly 
 well be reconciled with and adjusted to our obligations to the Common¬ 
 wealth and Empire of which we are the heart and center. I cannot believe 
 that those difficulties will not be settled by patience and care. It is no 
 help to draw sharp lines of contradiction between them. We need both 
 as pillars in a world of reviving prosperity. 
 
 Nothing in the activities of our unofficial movement and committee 
 can hamper the progress of the policy of His Majesty’s Government. On 
 the contrary, we hope to provide at least the atmosphere, and even con¬ 
 tribute to the foundation of that scheme for a united Europe of all free 
 countries who, without giving up their customs and traditions, will come 
 to regard themselves as parts of that great entity of Europe from which 
 the civilization of the modern world has sprung, and without whose co¬ 
 herent existence it cannot be preserved. I hope that the Prime Minister 
 and the Foreign Secretary will not commit the great mistake and failure 
 of duty of trying to divert this movement of European unity into party 
 channels. For instance, we are told that there should be a European 
 association of Socialists or Socialist parties. This has been brought forward 
 as a reason for opposing the all-party movement which some of us have 
 tried to set on foot and which has many connections in Europe, but surely 
 nothing could be more unwise and more reactionary that that. Once we 
 try to make a united Socialist Europe we put ourselves on the same level 
 as those who are trying to make a united Communist Europe. It is simply 
 the ideas of the Cominform with another label, and there would no doubt 
 come into being on this strange theory a united Liberal Europe, a united 
 Roman Catholic Europe, and a united Right Wing Europe and so on, all 
 quarreling with each other. 
 
 That, is not the way to recreate the new historical continental entity, 
 the structure of which is now recognized as vital to the modern world. On 
 the contrary, it would only be a means of introducing strife and disorder 
 in a scene already racked by hideous stresses. Let us try to keep the idea 
 of a united Europe above the party divisions which are inevitable, per¬ 
 missible, and even tolerable in all free countries. Let us try on a basis 
 bove party to bring the collective personalities of the anxious states 
 and nations as a whole into the larger harmony on which their future 
 prosperity—aye, and indeed their life—may well depend. 
 
 Mr. Scollan (Labor): We cannot do that in this country, never mind 
 Europe. 
 
 United on Fundamentals 
 
 Mr. Churchill: We have very great unities in this country. The vast 
 majority of the people of this country are united on fundamentals both 
 
 45 
 
in regard to constitution and freedom. They are also united in resistance 
 to continental forms of totalitarianism and also united in their pride of 
 their past and will I trust become united in their hopes for their future. 
 
 It is evident to anyone who listened to the Debate—I am afraid I was 
 not in my place last night, though I gather that there were some very 
 interesting speeches and some very interesting reactions to those speeches— 
 that there are differences in foreign policy in the party opposite and that 
 not all are agreed with the line which has been definitely adopted by the 
 leading Ministers in His Majesty’s Government. At the same time I had 
 the feeling yesterday while the Foreign Secretary was speaking that he 
 was the toiler, the man on the laboring oar, and deserved the effective 
 support of the House of Commons without consideration of party. More¬ 
 over, I am quite sure that at least 75 per cent of the people of this country 
 and an equal majority of this House will support him and sustain him in 
 the painful, wearisome, and anxious task to which he has been called 
 owing to the free and accepted workings of our Constitution. I have the 
 feeling that the British people as a whole will recognize him as represent¬ 
 ing important elements in their decent way of life, and also as one who 
 possesses strong and brave qualities above personal interest or factional 
 clatter. Therefore, I do not intend in anything I say willingly to add to 
 the burden that he bears. When we on this side of the House give our 
 support to a Minister and to the general trend of his policy, we shall take 
 care that it is not only a fair weather gift. . . . 
 
 Will There Be War? 
 
 After the various grave things that have been said by the Foreign 
 Secretary, and, out of doors, by other Ministers, it would be wrong to let 
 this Debate evaporate in benevolent and optimistic platitudes. We are, 
 after all, the guardians of the ordinary, humble, hard-working people, not 
 only here at home, but in many lands. It is so little that they ask—only to 
 get their daily bread by the sweat of their brow and enjoy the simple 
 pleasures of life which were meant for all and should be denied to none. 
 
 “To make a happy fire-side clime 
 For weans and wife 
 There’s the true pathos and sublime 
 Of human life.” 
 
 But now all these millions of humble humans are hustled and harried 
 this way and that, first by nationalistic or imperialistic ambitions or 
 appetites, now by ideological doctrines and hatreds, and all their small 
 lives may be shattered and convulsed, millions at a time, and they may 
 be only regimented up to suffering wounds and unrewarded toil. We, 
 their representatives in this world-famous assembly, have a great respon¬ 
 sibility, and we cannot always discharge it by treading easy paths and 
 saying smooth things. 
 
 I am often asked, “Will there be war?” and this Is a question I have 
 often asked myself. Can you wonder, Sir, that this question obtrudes 
 itself upon us when the Lord President of the Council speaks, as he did 
 
 46 
 
10 clays ago, of the “risk of war” with Russia—twice, I think, he used that 
 phrase— and speaks of: 
 
 “The availability and, it necessary, the readiness of armed force to prevent the 
 outbreak of violence”— 
 
 and when the Prime Minister says—and I agree with him when he says: 
 
 “Soviet communism pursues a policy of imperialism in a new form—ideological, 
 economic, and strategic—which threatens the welfare and way of life of the other 
 nations of Europe.” 
 
 These are statements from men whose whole lives have been spent in 
 denouncing the dangers of militarism, when they have not been actively 
 engaged in fighting for their lives against tyranny. These are the speeches 
 of Socialists. It is not a question of jingoism. These are the speeches of 
 Socialists and the Ministers responsible. 
 
 Can you doubt that times are grave when the word “sabotage” is used 
 in accusation of one of the greatest powers of the world, both by Mr. 
 Marshall in the United States and by the Foreign Secretary in this House? 
 Such language in any previous period would have been incompatible with 
 the maintenance of any form of diplomatic relations between the countries 
 affected. I think it quite right to say the things said, but when they are 
 said it is certainly not odd that we should have to ask ourselves this grim 
 and hateful question, “Will there be war?” When I last spoke on these 
 questions in the House in October, 1946, 15 months ago ... I said: 
 
 “I am not going to attempt to examine this afternoon whether war, which would, 
 of course, be total war, is imminent or not. I cannot tell at all what the men at the 
 head of the different Governments will do. There are too many of what Bismarck 
 called ‘imponderabilia.’ It was easier in Hitler’s day to feel and forecast the gen¬ 
 eral movement of events. But now we have not to deal with Hitler and his crude 
 Nazi-gang. We are in the presence of something very much more difficult to 
 measure. We are in the presence of a collective mind whose springs of action 
 we cannot judge. Thirteen men in the Kremlin hold all Russia and more than 
 a third of Europe in their grip. Many stresses and pressures are working on them. 
 These stresses and pressures are internal as well as external. I cannot presume to 
 forecast what decisions they will take. Even less can I attempt to foresee the time- 
 factor in their affairs. Still, it is certain that these 13, or it may be 14, men have 
 it in their power to loose on the world horrors and devastations, compared with 
 which all we have gone through would be but a prelude. We are told that they 
 would never do such a thing, and I earnestly hope this may be true. They are 
 certainly calculating, ruthless men, officially divorced from Christian ethics in any 
 form, and with Asiatic views of the value of human life and liberty. On the 
 other hand, they have a vast expanse of the land surface of the globe and all its 
 populations to guide and develop as they choose, with arbitrary power and with 
 all that science—if not perverted—can bestow upon future generations of mankind.” 
 
 I beg the House to permit me to remind them of this, because I do not 
 wish to say the same thing again, but I would use very much the same 
 language now. 
 
 “Eight months ago”— 
 
 speaking on this subject 15 months ago— 
 
 “I made a speech at Fulton in the United States. It had a mixed reception and 
 quite a number of Members of this House put their names to a Motion condemning 
 
 47 
 
me for having made it; but as events have moved what I said at Fulton in the 
 presence of the President of the United States lias been outpaced and overpassed 
 by the movements of events and of American opinion. At that time, I said that I did 
 not believe that the Soviet Government wanted war. I said that what they wanted 
 were the fruits of war, and I pointed to the heavy impact of Soviet Russia upon 
 Eastern and Central Europe—the Iron Curtain and so forth—their demands in the 
 Dardanelles and Persia, and their aspirations in the Far East. I fervently hope 
 and pray that this view, which I then expressed, is still correct. But now I can¬ 
 not tell. I should not blame His Majesty’s Government if, even with all the in¬ 
 formation at their disposal, they also were not able to come to a definite conclusion. 
 For all these reasons there, I expressed no opinion tonight upon the future, upon 
 what the Soviet Government intend, or upon whether war is imminent or not.” 
 
 Certainly, in the interval that has passed, the Soviet Government have 
 not used their overwhelming military power in Europe to march westward 
 to the North Sea, the Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean. Nevertheless, it 
 is common ground between all parties that the situation has deteriorated, 
 especially in the last six months. No, indeed, it is not odd that this ugly 
 question should still be put, and force itself upon us: “Will there be war?” 
 I will only venture now to say that there seems to me to be very real danger 
 in going on drifting too long. I believe that the best chance of preventing 
 a war is to bring matters to a head and come to a settlement with the 
 Soviet Government before it is too late. This would imply that the 
 Western democracies, who should, of course, seek unity among themselves 
 at the earliest moment, would take the initiative in asking the Soviet for 
 a settlement. 
 
 Hope for a Settlement 
 
 It is idle to reason or argue with the Communists. It is, however, 
 possible to deal with them on a fair, realistic basis, and, in my experience, 
 they will keep their bargains as long as it is in their interest to do so, 
 which might, in this grave matter, be a long time, once things were settled. 
 When this Parliament first assembled, I said that the possession of the 
 atomic bomb would give three or four years’ breathing space. Perhaps it 
 may be more than that. But more than two of those years have already 
 gone. I cannot think that any serious discussion which it may be necessary 
 to have with the Soviet Government would be more likely to reach a favor¬ 
 able conclusion if we wait till they have got it too. 
 
 We may be absolutely sure that the present situation cannot last. The 
 Foreign Secretary spoke yesterday of the Russian frontier line which runs 
 from Stettin to Trieste. This was exactly the line which I mentioned in 
 my speech at Fulton—Stettin to Trieste. He also mentioned the Elbe, and 
 who can ever believe that there will be a permanent peace in Europe, or 
 in the world, while the frontiers of Asia rest upon the Elbe? But now this 
 line runs farther south along the Adriatic shore, and there is actual fighting 
 now going on in Greece to decide whether it shall not curl round Athens, 
 and so to the Dardanelles and Turkey. Surely, there can be no doubt in out 
 minds that this is highly dangerous, and cannot endure. It is not only 
 here in Europe that there are these iron curtains and points of actual 
 collision. In China and in Korea there are all kinds of dangers which we 
 
 48 
 
here in England find it baffling to measure. There is also much to be 
 considered in the Middle East. There are very grave dangers—that is all 
 I am going to say today—in letting everything run on and pile up until 
 something happens, and it passes, all of a sudden, out of your control. 
 
 With all consideration of the facts, I believe it right to say today that 
 the best chance of avoiding war is, in accord with the other Western democ¬ 
 racies, to bring matters to a head with the Soviet Government, and, by 
 formal diplomatic processes, with all their privacy and gravity, to arrive at 
 a lasting settlement. There is certainly enough for the interests of all if 
 such a settlement could be reached. Even this method, I must say, how¬ 
 ever, would not guarantee that war would not come. But I believe it would 
 give the best chance of preventing it, and that, if it came, we should have 
 the best chance of coming out of it alive. 
 
 The Prime Minister (Mr, Attlee): Yesterday, my right lion. Friend the 
 Foreign Secretary gave an extended survey of recent events and of the 
 present position in the field of foreign affairs, and he made a remarkable 
 speech giving, I think, a new initiative. His speech was followed and sup¬ 
 plemented by the speech of my right hon. Friend the Minister of State. 
 I do not intend to speak at any length this afternoon or to traverse the 
 ground which he covered. I desire only to deal with some points which 
 were either implicit or explicit in that speech, to develop these points and 
 to reply to some of the questions which have been put in the course of 
 this Debate. 
 
 Unsettled Issues 
 
 I would like to deal first of all with one or two specific questions. The 
 senior Burgess for Cambridge University (Mr. Pickthorn [Conservative]) 
 put forward rather an obscure point, I think, of alleged inconsistency in 
 the speech of my right hon. Friend. There really is no inconsistency. My 
 right hon. Friend said that we were trying to build up trade relations be¬ 
 tween Western Germany and Eastern Europe, and he subsequently said 
 that in trade matters the satellite countries had to take their orders from 
 Moscow. There is nothing inconsistent in that, because the orders from 
 Moscow obviously allow them to enter into trade relations. The second 
 question he asked was whether we could lay down an exact date on which, 
 if we had failed to get quadripartite agreement on currency reform in 
 Germany, we would proceed with the other two powers. It is quite 
 obvious that we cannot give a date when the negotiations have not yet 
 begun. 
 
 The next point asked specifically was by the hon. Lady the Member 
 for Epping (Mrs. Manning), who made an interesting speech with regard 
 to Poland. The boundaries of Poland were not finally settled at Potsdam. 
 It was made perfectly clear that the line of the Western Neisse was adopted 
 provisionally because, obviously, if we were going to have any resettlement 
 at all, we must have some boundaries on which people could work. But 
 
 49 
 
there is a claim there, and there are other claims from the Dutch, the 
 French and others for a redrawing of the map of Europe and a retroces¬ 
 sion to them of certain parts of Germany. We proposed that these matters 
 should be dealt with by a boundary commission, and it is not our fault 
 that these have not been made definite owing to the long delays of com¬ 
 ing to the peace treaty. 
 
 Naval Affairs 
 
 I come next to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of 
 the Opposition, whom we are all pleased to see back again, in good health, 
 and in so robust a form of oratory. He asked, first of all, about the scrap¬ 
 ping of the obsolete battleships. I can assure him that this action has 
 been taken on the best technical advice of our Admirals and that every 
 consideration was carefully examined as to whether this would strengthen 
 us or weaken us, and we came to the definite conclusion with our advisers 
 that the scrapping of these battleships would not materially weaken our 
 strength. 
 
 The next point he raised was in regard to the Italian Fleet. He re¬ 
 ferred to the ships which were lent by the British and American Govern¬ 
 ments to Russia in 1944 until such time as it was possible to arrange for 
 Russia to receive a share of the Italian Fleet. If I understood him cor¬ 
 rectly, he suggested that we should let the Russians keep our ships if they 
 left any Italian ships allotted to them under the Peace Treaty. We and 
 the Americans have already decided to allow the Italian Government to 
 scrap the ships they were to have delivered to us, and that was a generous 
 act appreciated in Italy. 
 
 Major Tufton Beamish (Conservative): To keep them or for scrap? 
 
 The Prime Minister: As scrap. The agreement is as to scrap. It is open 
 to the Russians to act likewise, and we shall be delighted if they do so. 
 That would be a further help to Italian economy. However, I can see no 
 reason why we, in return for such help by Russia to Italy, should leave 
 our ships in Russian hands. We are entitled to get those ships back; and 
 the scrap would be extremely useful to us at the present time. 
 
 The right hon. Member asked a further question with regard to the 
 dispute with Albania. The Security Council recommended that the dis¬ 
 pute between Albania and Great Britain should be submitted to the In¬ 
 ternational Court of Justice. That was on 9th April, 1947. Our plead¬ 
 ings were filed in that court in September. The Albanian pleadings were 
 due to be delivered in December, but Albania submitted a preliminary 
 objection, arguing that the International Court had not the right of juris¬ 
 diction in this case. Thereupon, the court ordered that the United King¬ 
 dom should submit observations on this objection, and that has been done. 
 If the court decides it has jurisdiction, the Albanian Government will be 
 ordered to file its pleadings. If it does not, I take it that judgment will 
 be given in default to Great Britain. 
 
 Mr. Boycl-Carpenter (Conservative): And then? 
 
 50 
 
The Prime Minister: Then, I think we shall have to await an appeal. 1 
 am afraid so. There would be an appeal to the court, who would natu¬ 
 rally be concerned with the action recommended. 
 
 Agreement on Basic Issues 
 
 This Debate has naturally ranged over a fairly wide field, and there 
 have been some extremely interesting speeches. . . . 
 
 Before dealing with the objections, I think it worth while recalling at 
 the end of this Debate a very large measure of agreement in the House. 
 First, there is general apprehension at the state of the world two and a 
 half years after the end of a war. I do not think it is good to be talking 
 of war; but, on the other hand, it is no good shutting our eyes to the pos¬ 
 sibilities of war. I do not believe war to be imminent, but I do believe 
 that we must use our greatest exertions to do away with the causes of war 
 and to prevent war arising. Secondly, there is a realization of the danger 
 of the world being divided on ideological lines, and there is great anxiety 
 at the course of action of the Russian Government. There is a general 
 desire to know what is the real object of the rulers of Russia. That ques¬ 
 tion was asked several times, but there was no answer, even from those 
 who seem to be the habitual exponents of the Russian point of view and 
 the apologists for Soviet Russia. Thirdly, there is a recognition of the 
 need for leadership in the non-Communist world. Finally, there is gen¬ 
 eral support of the policy indicated by the Foreign Secretary for the closer 
 integration of Europe—for the closer political integration and closer eco¬ 
 nomic integration, coupled, I believe, with a recognition that Western 
 Europe cannot live by itself as an economic unit. Hence the desire for 
 wider integration with Africa and other overseas territories, and with the 
 great Western Democracies and with our own Dominions. Union of 
 Europe is a fruitful idea. It has been put forward many times in the past, 
 it has been taken up and dropped again; but it is a fruitful idea. It is, 
 as the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, something that wants to be 
 done under the larger unity of the United Nations. European civiliza¬ 
 tion has spread all over the world, and our democratic ideas are not con¬ 
 fined to Europe, but have spread throughout the world. While I think 
 that the idea of a united Europe is one which is most fruitful, we must 
 be careful not to think that it is something exclusive, and something which 
 excludes the rest of the world. 
 
 There was some criticism because my right hon. Friend was alleged 
 not to have laid before the House enough details and a cut-and-dried plan 
 for political and economic integration. I do not think it would be wise 
 straight off to say “Here is a plan.” 
 
 Mr. Bevin’s Contribution 
 
 It would be much better first to try and get results, and to build on 
 those results. I believe it is right to get the idea formulated, and then, 
 through conversations, build up support for it, rather than to have some 
 kind of dramatic meeting with a concrete plan, where probably all the 
 
 51 
 
difficulties of the plan would come out most clearly, and all the details 
 would cause dissension. There is one statement which I thought was 
 quite false, and that was that enough initiative had not come from this 
 country and from this Government. My right hon. Friend has been 
 rightly praised for the very great patience he has shown. He has again 
 and again shown initiative in these difficulties in trying to find a way out, 
 and it is due to his initiative in seizing on the historic speech of Mr. Mar¬ 
 shall that we owe the gathering together of the 16 nations, and the be¬ 
 ginning of this practical integration. The hon. Member for East Coventry 
 [Mr. Grossman: Labor] asked certain questions on this, and what was 
 being done. 
 
 The British and French Governments have already initiated consulta¬ 
 tions with the other countries which participated in the Paris Conference, 
 with a view to furthering European co-operation and considering what 
 preparatory steps could be taken in setting up a joint organization. They 
 have certainly not lost sight of the possibility of reassembling the full con¬ 
 ference of the 16 countries at an appropriate time, but such a conference 
 calls for careful preparation and timing. A great deal can be achieved 
 through direct consultations, such as those which are now in process, as 
 well as through various technical committees which are meeting from time 
 to time under the aegis of the Economic Commission for Europe. There¬ 
 fore, it is not true to think that nothing is being done. With regard to 
 the actual practical steps being taken on European economy, there is 
 already machinery for programming an allocation of wheat, rice, oils, fats, 
 fertilizers, cocoa, and tin on a world-wide basis, and coal and timber on a 
 European basis. If the examination of the possibility of a Western Euro¬ 
 pean customs union, which is now passing through its technical stages at 
 Brussels, results in the decision of a number of countries forming such a 
 union, it will mean that trade will eventually become free throughout that 
 area. While I cannot state now exactly what measures may eventually be 
 agreed upon by the many countries concerned, I can assure the House that 
 we shall press ahead with the utmost vigor consistent with the immense 
 complexities of those problems. To turn to the major points— 
 
 United Europe Committee 
 
 Mr. Churchill: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves the question of a 
 United Europe, I hope he will say a word about the All-Party Committee 
 which has been formed here— [Hon. Members: 'Why?”] May I not express 
 the hope, and may the right hon. Gentleman not gratify it or dispel it? 
 [An Hon. Member: “Why should he?”] It is a committee which contains 
 supporters of his own as strong as Mr. Gollancz, and others. May he not 
 say whether a lead should be given so that people might join that com¬ 
 mittee— [Interruption.] Hon. Members need not join it unless they like 
 to do so. It is not compulsory. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will say 
 a word about it. It would be a pity if he did not. 
 
 Mr. Delargy (Labor): May that request be strengthened from this side 
 of the House also? 
 
 52 
 
The Prime Minister: 1 have already said that we welcome the fullest 
 support for the United Europe idea. As regards any particular organiza¬ 
 tion, it would not be right for the Government to pronounce an opinion 
 on it, but we have always welcomed and supported it. It is a voluntary 
 organization for the propagation of ideas. 
 
 Mr. Churchill : With very great respect, all I am asking is that the Gov¬ 
 ernment should let it be free and open for all to do what they think right. 
 
 The Prime Minister: It is really not a matter about which the Govern¬ 
 ment can take a decision. It is free for anybody to join in the organiza¬ 
 tion. We ought to recognize that the task on which we are engaged is a 
 very difficult one. . . . We have to recognize that there is in Communism 
 a dynamic force. It is a fanatical movement which enlists the support of 
 people of a certain type of mind or people in a certain condition of society, 
 and it has become the official creed of a great nation. It is a propagandist 
 creed, and its adherents seek to force their creed on other nations. Russian 
 Communism is distinctively Russian. Communism is an old word with 
 very respectable antecedents. This particular form of Communism is Rus¬ 
 sian Communism, an economic doctrine wedded to the policy of a back¬ 
 ward state, which has but very slight appeal to those who have experience 
 of Western civilization, but makes a strong appeal to backward peoples 
 who have never known anything better. [Laughter .] This is a serious 
 statement. It behooves us all to remember that, because the policy that 
 this country is pursuing with regard to the less advanced countries of the 
 world for which we have responsibility must be to see that we raise the 
 standards of those peoples so that they can appreciate what a free and 
 democratic life means rather than that they should fall a victim to totali¬ 
 tarianism. Like all fanatical movements, Communism has certain ad¬ 
 vantages. It has a single narrow outlook. It sees everything in black and 
 white, or rather in black and red. 
 
 It is rather like the attitude of the early adherents of Islam. Every 
 one outside it is an infidel. The orders from Moscow are obeyed, not only 
 by the satellite countries, but by Communist parties in other countries. 
 There is just one party line; there is no room for thought or other views, 
 although, of course, they are required to bless one day what they have 
 cursed the day before. But there is here a tremendous driving force. Now 
 we can, and we wish to have the friendliest relations with the people of 
 Soviet Russia. We can have the friendliest relations with the Communist 
 state. There is no quarrel between our peoples but we are not prepared 
 to accept Communism. We are resolutely opposed to the Communist way 
 of life. The police state is utterly repugnant to the people of Western 
 Europe who have enjoyed freedom for so long— [Interruption.] I am sure 
 it would be equally repugnant to the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. 
 Gallacher) if he actually went to live in Russia. Knowing as we do in this 
 House his genial nature, I do not think that he would last long. 
 
 Mr. Gallacher: I have been in Russia a number of times, and I have 
 behaved in Russia in exactly the same way as I behave here. 
 
 53 
 
The Prime Minister: The lion. Member is much more fortunate than a 
 large number of prominent politicians in Russia, whom I can remember 
 being held up to me as examples of great democratic Socialists about 20 
 years ago, and a few years afterwards they all seem to have been traitors. 
 
 Mr. Churchill: Liquidated. 
 
 The Prime Minister: Yes, liquidated. We shall not try to foist our system 
 on the Soviet Union, but equally we demand that they should not try to 
 foist theirs on us. I am quite sure that Mr. Stalin is enough of a realist to 
 appreciate the complete failure during the difficult inter-war years of the 
 Communist creed to make any effective advance in this country. There¬ 
 fore, he should give up that idea that somehow or other this country is 
 going to turn to Communism. Rut we who believe in freedom have to 
 evoke an equal enthusiasm and an equal loyalty to our own ideals. We 
 are opposed to the Communist conception of uniformity. Diversity, the 
 essence of democracy, is difference of opinion, free discussion, toleration of 
 other people’s point of view, and the world we want to see is a world in 
 which there is a number of diversified and different units as compared with 
 the Communist world in which they try to make Bulgaria and Jugoslavia 
 little copies of Russia. 
 
 Unity Not Uniformity 
 
 Yet, if Western civilization is to stand against, this ideological assault— 
 I am talking in terms of influence and ideas, not of war and of bombs and 
 guns—it must obtain a degree of unity. But if we attempted to get uni¬ 
 formity it would defeat the very object which we have in view. I naturally 
 desire to see all countries embracing the principle of Democratic Socialism, 
 because I believe that here is a dynamic counter to Russian Communism, 
 but it is no part of Socialist policy to force Socialism upon other nations. 
 Here again I do not look for uniformity but for diversity. Other coun¬ 
 tries will find the kind of economic arrangements which suit the char¬ 
 acteristics of their people and their countries. What we want is the same 
 spirit. Further, I do not take a static view of society. I do not think that 
 when a large part of land and capital has been nationalized, one says, 
 “Here is a finish; we have Socialism, and there is nothing more to be 
 done.” I do not hold that view of finality. I believe that all communities 
 are in a state of becoming. 
 
 In all the free countries of Europe today there is a mixed economy in 
 course of evolution, and, I believe, evolving towards Social Democracy. 
 The Scandinavian states have many very fine achievements to their credit. 
 We have had great experiments in our Southern Dominions, outside Eu¬ 
 rope. And even the United States of America have the remarkable ex¬ 
 ample of the T.V.A. But I am not claiming that all these states are likely 
 to go Socialist tomorrow, or even to have Socialist majorities. [An Hon. 
 Member: “Perhaps some will give it up.”] That is quite possible. I be¬ 
 lieve they will all work together, and that, despite these differences, there 
 is one point they all have in common. . . . They all believe that, in the 
 
 54 
 
modern world, we must have a planned eeonoiny. 1 think they all in¬ 
 creasingly recognize that the national plan in each country must be fitted 
 into a wider plan, a plan for Europe and a plan for the world. Therefore, 
 that 19th century conception of a self-acting anarchic economic system of 
 private enterprise is dead today. I really doubt whether today many of 
 the more experienced hon. Members opposite hold that we could go back 
 to the kind of economic system which flourished in the middle of the 19th 
 century. . . . 
 
 Human Rights 
 
 But there is here a point which unites us all in Western Europe—we 
 have a common interest in the economic field. None, I think, of the coun¬ 
 tries of Western Europe, if it wants a full life, can imagine itself being 
 completely self-contained. We are not a continent like the United States 
 of America or Russia. Europe is composed of a number of small countries, 
 and, even if they all come together, they are not economically comple¬ 
 mentary. There comes in the point which my right hon. Friend stressed, 
 the importance of Africa and Asia, and also the importance of the close 
 economic relations with the Western Hemisphere. There is another thing 
 which unites us—equally important—and that is the recognition of human 
 rights. The United Nations organization is devoting much time to work¬ 
 ing out a charter of human rights, and that is good work. But it is still 
 better to accord these rights to human beings. In the countries of Eastern 
 Europe, whose representatives attend U.N.O., these human rights are dis¬ 
 regarded. In the long fight of the working class, there have been many 
 battles for human rights, freedom of speech, conscience, public meeting, 
 the vote, personal freedom, the right of association, and the right to work. 
 
 Mr. Churchill: And the right to strike. 
 
 Hon. Members: Elear, hear. 
 
 The Prime Minister: In the Socialist Movement, we revere the fighters for 
 all this freedom, a great many of whom came from right outside our own 
 ranks. In the old days, when we assessed the progress of the workers in 
 the various countries, these things were taken into account. It is curious 
 that there should be people who claim to be on the Left, and who deny 
 those rights to their fellows. It is still more curious that there should 
 be some would-be left-wingers who shut their eyes to the absence of hu¬ 
 man rights when they look to Eastern Europe. Those people who deny 
 human rights have no right to claim that they are in the van of human 
 progress. The only van they are in is the police van, and in the field of 
 human rights today Russia and Eastern Europe are right at the back end 
 of the queue. I was amazed at the effrontery of the hon. Member for West 
 Fife in appealing to the memory of the leaders of the Peasant Revolt, 
 Charles James Fox, and William Morris. Charles James Fox stood against 
 kings, but he also clenched his fist against the French aggression when it 
 came under the rule of Napoleon, and William Morris was the last man 
 in the world who would ever have bowed to any Marxian authority. 
 
 55 
 
Mr. Gallacher: “Ye rich men, fear and tremble.” 
 
 The Prime Minister: Yes, I think he could have said that to some in 
 Russia as well as here. 
 
 Help Needed 
 
 The Leader of the Opposition referred, in a very moving passage in 
 his speech, to the sufferings of the innumerable humble people who only 
 desired to be allowed to live in peace- 
 
 Mr. Churchill: And freedom. 
 
 The Prime Minister: And freedom. These people are forever in our 
 minds when discussing foreign affairs. In view of the great economic 
 stringency, and we are only too well aware of the precarious and low 
 standards in Western Europe, there are great difficulties in Germany. We 
 are doing our best to help them, and we will do what we can, though 
 what we can do is limited. The main burden of administration now rests 
 on the Germans themselves, but it has been made plain that we will give 
 them power and authority to take such measures as they consider essential 
 to ensure efficient administration. I would here add a word to encourage 
 the Minister-President of Rhine-Westphalia and the trade unions in the 
 difficult task which they have got. If we are to bring help to these people 
 we need help from the Western Hemisphere. 
 
 I cannot understand how people can oppose the Marshall Plan when 
 they have nothing whatever to put in its place, unless they are prepared 
 to march towards the realization of their ideas through the death and 
 starvation of millions. How are we to try to bring peace, security and 
 prosperity to these millions? Not by imposing a way of life upon them, 
 but by saving them to live their own way of life. But just as we know that 
 political freedom and security from war can only be attained in the larger 
 organization of the United Nations, and, within that larger organization, 
 smaller groupings, so we must have a planned economy for the world, an 
 economy in which we shall not be the sport of gamblers but in which we 
 shall try to see that the supplies in the various parts of the world move 
 where they are most required. Herein lies the importance of this depar¬ 
 ture. My right hon. Friend has always kept his feet firmly on the ground 
 in dealing with economic matters. Here, in this country, we have a chance 
 of giving a great lead because we are showing how what amounts to a 
 social revolution can be brought about by peaceful and democratic means. 
 We are showing how we can get an over-all economy without sacrificing 
 human rights and liberty. That is the work we have before us today. 
 
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