' vV -V \ Al-ri C8V\ \ inait ^ 1 ^ V 1 £ C Slavery The African Slave Trade, 1850 a-V'£ ^T'odi.^ y 4 % THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE. 1850.“ REPORT from the Select Committee of the House of Lords appointed to consider the best Means 'which Great Britain can adopt for the final Extinction of the African Slave Trade. Presented in Session 1850. That the Committee have met and considered the Subject Matter to them referred. In following out the Inquiry intrusted to them as to the most effectual means for suppressing the African Slave Trade, have felt it to be their duty, first, to examine the means hitherto employed for this end; to ascertain the amount o f success which had attended their employment; whether they could be rendered more effectual, and if so, by what means ; the objections urged against them; and whether any other means could be devised, either as substitutes for these, or as accessory to them. The means which have been hitherto employed are: (1.) The formation of Treaties with the various civilized States for the prohibition and suppression of the Slave Trade, and the punishment of those who engage in it by confiscation of their ships. (2.) The formation of Treaties with the Chiefs of Africa, prohibiting the exportation of Slaves from their territories. (3.) The maintenance of certain Forts upon the African Coast. (4.) The maintenance of armed Cruizers on the Coast of Africa, to enforce these Treaties. As regards the first of these means, a large measure of success has attended the efforts of this Country. At first. 2 with the exception of the United States, she stood alone in denouncing the Slave Trade as a crime; whilst every State possessing American Colonies actually encouraged this iniquitous traffic; but gradually it has been renounced by all civilized countries; and the concurrence of the Leading Powers in the principles, and to a considerable extent in the measures, of England, has now been obtained. The Slave Trade is now entirely limited to Brazil, and, in a very reduced degree, to the Colonies of Spain, in which it is carried on in a reduced degree; both those Powers being bound by Treaties with England entirely to abolish the traffic, which is condemned by the laws of both as a great crime. Thus, as to those Nations by whom alone the Slave Trade is now carried on, England possesses an unquestionable right to insist on its total cessation. (2.) The Treaties concluded with the native Chiefs of Africa are of great value, from the power which they give us of enforcing their stipulations upon the Slave-trader. Where they have been concluded, no question can be raised as to the lawfulness of the destruction of the goods stored in the barracoons for the prosecution of the trade—a course of action which (as the evidence of all competent witnesses proves) strikes the greatest blow at the trade; but a mis¬ conception with regard to tire legality of destroying Slave Factories which was not explained until the year 1848, prevented the execution of the Treaties concluded previously with the native Chiefs, so that the full efficacy of this means has not yet been practically experienced. These Treaties are also of eminent service in directing the attention of the Chiefs to the possibility of their obtaining by lawful com¬ merce those European goods, the desire of which alone leads them to maintain the Slave Trade. Much has been done already to this effect. (3.) Closely connected with this means of repression is the occupation of certain Forts upon the Coast of Africa. Of these, the principal is that of Cape Coast Castle. The effect 3 of this Fort is described by the witnesses as being very great along the Coast, on each side of it, and even far inland; so that the Slave Trade is entirely suppressed over a district extending 100 miles to the southward, and 60 to the north; while the total expense of the whole government of the Gold Coast is only 4000/. a-year. In the neighbourhood, more¬ over, of the Danish Forts, a similar good result has followed. (4.) With respect to the effect of the Squadron on the Coast of Africa, it appears, in the first place, that all other means of direct repression, as well as all moral influences which tend to the same result (such as the extension of Christianity and commerce, the return of liberated Africans and others to their native countries. See.), depend on its maintenance; that, in proportion to its efficiency, these become more widely spread and more deeply rooted; but, if withdrawn, or materially reduced, that these secondary means could not continue to exist. With regard to the actual and direct effect of the Squadron in suppressing the Slave Trade, it has been proved, that when its operations began, the traffic extended over almost every part of Africa, from the Equator, as far as Cape Verde, a distance of nearly 2,500 miles. To this quarter the efforts of the Cruisers were entirely confined from 1815 to 1839; the Slave Trade south of the Equator, from which Brazil was almost altogether supplied, being prosecuted with perfect security, and indeed protection. Yet, within this time, the Slave Trade has been expelled from every quarter north of the Line, except from the Bight of Benin, a space of less than 300 miles. In the Bight of Biafra (in which 15,000* Slaves per annum were very recently exported from the River Bonny alone, while a large export also took place from the Old and the New Calabar, the Cameroons and other Rivers), the Slave Trade has been entirely ex¬ tinguished. Complete Treaties, enabling the British force to land and put it down, if resumed, have been concluded; * By an error of the press, this was printed 1500 in the Report. 4 and a Consul, resident at Fernando Po, periodically visiting these Rivers, and assisted by an occasional visit from a vessel of Aval', will, it is expected, be able to secure their ful¬ filment. In the place of the Slave Trade a great and increasing commerce is springing up in this Bight. Mission Stations have been established, and the comparatively small means which suffice to prevent the revival of the Slave Trade, com¬ pared with those which Avere required to put it down, shoAV that Avherever the Slave Trade has once been effectively sup¬ pressed, a large reduction of force may follow Avithout danger of its revival. On the Gold Coast the influence of the English Forts has entirely eradicated the traffic. At Cape Palmas to the northward, as far as Cape Mount, the settlements of Liberia have been equally efficacious to that end. At Gallinas, under the Treaty of 1840 (the operation of which Avas long suspended by a doubt as to the legality of destroying factories), the Slave Trade has been recently entirely rooted out, mainly by the assistance of the surround¬ ing natives. In this quarter a Government Agent or Consul on shore, aided by the presence of a single Cruiser, will, there is reason to hope, prevent the Slave Trade breaking out afresh, so that here, as Avell as in the Bight of Biafra, effectual repression may be followed by a great reduction of force. Further north the natives themselves have risen against the traffic, requesting the Captain of a Cruiser to land and destroy the factories. A profitable trade has sprung up in its place, and the Sierra Leone Commissioners report, that not a Slave has been shipped for the preceding tAvelvemontli. To the south of the Equator the continuance of the Slave Trade is OAving partly to the shorter period during which repressive measures have been tried; partly to the inade¬ quacy of the force Avhich has hitherto been employed in that quarter; and in some degree to the assistance derived from 5 the occasional connivance of certain of the authorities in the Colonies of Portugal. But there is no reason to doubt that an adequate force, employed on the best system, would soon reduce that traffic to a very small amount. The general tenor of the Evidence establishes in our minds, beyond all doubt: (1.) That the English Cruisers have greatly checked and crippled the Slave Trade. (2). That their removal would be the signal for its breaking out with unexampled vigour at every available port along the whole sea-board. (3.) That this would lead, amongst other results, to the whole coast swarming with piratical vessels, which would utterly destroy the legitimate trade, now daily increasing in value between Great Britain and Africa; whilst all the beginnings of civilization, and all attempts to Chris¬ tianize Africa, would be wholly defeated and destroyed. All the witnesses agree that the legitimate trade cannot co-exist with the Slave Trade; and that its slower returns cannot compete in immediate apparent profit to the Chiefs with the Slave Trade ; but that, if the Slave Trade be suppressed for any lengthened period, its revival would be prevented by the lawful trade. Turning now to the suggestions which have been made to the Committee for rendering these means more effectual, they would call the attention of the House to the following as most worthy of consideration:— (1.) The habitual disregard of Treaties on this subject with this Country, on the part of Brazil, and, to a great extent, also on the part of Spain, appears to be the main hindrance to the suppression of the trade; and to this, there¬ fore, especially, the attention of Her Majesty’s Ministers and of Parliament should, in our opinion, be directed. The suppression of the Slave Trade can never be declared impossible to England, until she has at least attempted to oblige Brazil to fulfil her Treaties. A plan for obtaining greater practical efficiency for these Treaties has been suggested, which will be found fully detailed in the Evidence, and which the Committee consider 0 worthy of the best consideration. Its main feature is the giving;, by Treaty, to Mixed Commission Courts at Iiio and the Ilavannah, power to declare free all Slaves brought before them who shall have been imported after a day to be fixed. There appears to be in Cuba a large, and in Brazil an increasing, party, who might be expected to support this country in requiring and maintaining such a Treaty. It is also, in our judgment, worthy of consideration, whether the three great Maritime Powers, France, the United States, and Great Britain, could not at the present time be brought to combine in joint representations, and, if need be, active measures, for obtaining from Spain and Brazil an actual suppression of this traffic. The admission of Slave-grown Sugar into the markets of Great Britain, which, in the judgment of all the witnesses, is a great and direct stimulus to the Slave Trade, seems to require of Great Britain that she should use every effort in her power to prevent so great an evil accruing to Africa from her new commercial policy. (2.) The Committee would recommend the consideration of the wisdom of extending; further our Forts and Settle- ments on the Coast of Africa; of encouraging the free Settle¬ ment of Liberia, which secures 350 miles of coast. The Committee have learned with satisfaction that a Treaty has already been entered into with Denmark for the purpose of obtaining possession of the Danish Settlements on the Gold Coast. (3.) Of countenancing the Settlement, on differents parts of the Coast of Africa, of Free Blacks from our own possessions. (4.) Of establishing Consular Agents on the points of the Coast where the Slave Trade has been extinguished, and which are best fitted to become emporiums of trade. This last recommendation leads them to another. The Slave Trade cannot be permanently suppressed by any means which do not at the same time foster a lawful trade by which the desires of the native Chiefs for European goods can be supplied. To promote, therefore, this trade should be one chief object of our exertions: it appears to be capable of almost unlimited increase. The present great hindrance to its extension is the existence of the Slave Trade, which, wherever it continues, renders all security for life and pro¬ perty impossible in Africa; prevents the due cultivation of its most fertile soil, and the consequent increase of lawful commerce. Cotton and almost all tropical productions might, it appears, be largely produced in Africa, if this one master impediment were removed; whilst the habits and inclinations of the Africans are such as would naturally incline them to become an eminently commercial people, and thus at once secure a supply of most important productions for our own markets, and open an unlimited demand for our manufac¬ tures. Direct trading establishments should be encouraged under the protection of every British Fort on the Coast of Africa. Various important suggestions bearing upon this point will be found in the Evidence we have reported. (5.) As the maintenance of the cruising Squadron on the Coast of Africa is, in our judgment, an essential condition towards the success of every other effort, we have paid especial attention to any suggestions made to us for increasing its efficiency, and we would especially report as worthy of attention those which follow. The testimony of all witnesses goes to prove, that the Squadron has never been maintained in the efficiency needful for its full success; and hence the bravery and skill of our Naval Officers has been continually thwarted by the insuffi¬ ciency of the means at their disposal. The ships employed have been unfit and ill-equipped for that peculiar service. We would specially recommend that much smaller vessels, victualled on their stations by trans¬ ports, should be substituted for those now in use. A large proportion of these should be Screw-steamers, which are peculiarly suited for this service from their power of ordinary sailing, and of using their steam when extraordinary speed is required. Many of the captured Slave-vessels might, as has 8 already been done in more than one instance, be fitted up at a very slight cost, for use amongst our cruisers. By a judi¬ cious adoption of this recommendation, the efficiency of the Squadron might, it appears, be doubled at no, or a very slight, additional expense. The Evidence we have taken would also prove, that the efficiency of the Squadron has been greatly injured by the frequent, though unavoidable, change of its Commanding Officers, rendering it of the first importance that special instructions, founded on the aggregate experience of all his predecessors, should supply the place of personal acquaint¬ ance with the service on the part of each new Commodore. Hitherto no uniform system of operations has ever been laid down to guide those who have assumed the command, without any previous knowledge of that peculiar service. Thus, the best system has at no period been acted upon by the whole force employed; and the want of clearly defined objects and consistency in the mode of action, combined with an insuffi¬ cient numerical force, composed of vessels not suited to the service, fully accounts for the degree of failure we have encountered. It appears by the concurrent testimony of all the naval witnesses, with perhaps a single exception, that in¬ shore cruising, directed to prevent the shipment of Slaves, is the most effective mode of employing the Squadron. We would recommend that the Commanding Officers on this station should receive from the Admiralty such general instructions as would embody the experience of their prede¬ cessors in command. It appears to us that the gallantry of our officers and men have been further impeded by uncertainty as to the extent of their powers, and the apprehension of exposing themselves to be harassed afterwards by legal proceedings. We would specially instance the proceedings instituted against the Honourable Captain Denman for burning the slave barra- coons, and the stimulus afterwards given to the trade by the spread of an impression that such a course was illegal. On this head we Avould recommend: (1.) The giving to our 9 Officers more explicit instructions; and, (2.) That any prac¬ ticable legislative measures should be taken to secure them from such legal proceedings. We would further recommend that a small force of Screw- steamers should be stationed on the Coast of Brazil, to inter¬ cept any vessels which have escaped our Cruisers on the Coast of Africa. The witnesses agree that nothing would more tend to suppress the Slave Trade than to render all persons found on board Slave-ships liable to punishment; and it was sug¬ gested to the Committee, by a witness of great authority, that the needful power might be obtained by merely passing an Act of Parliament to that effect, which should save the rights of other nations, by allowing them in all cases to claim their own subjects. The Committee would recommend the consideration of this suggestion. We think it further worthy of consideration, whether it is not expedient to alter the system of fixing the amount of prize-money by the number of the Slaves on board the prizes which are captured by our Cruisers, since the tendency of such a system must be to direct the chief attention of our Naval Officers to the intercepting vessels with Slaves on board, rather than to prevent their embarking their cargoes, which is the great object. This, though perhaps inoperative, from the high feelings which animate our Naval Commanders, is unjust, and opposed to the principles on which prize-money is granted, and has exposed our Navy to the most unfounded imputations. We have taken Evidence upon the chief objections urged against our present system, and especially against the main¬ tenance of the Squadron. These objections have been:— 1st. The assertion, that the maintenance of the British Cruisers enlists the national honour of Brazil against the suppression of the trade. From the best evidence we have been able to collect, we believe that this opinion is wholly unfounded, and that, on the contrary, the Anti-Slavery party in Brazil, and a large and increasing party in Cuba, are 10 unanimous in desiring the maintenance and success of our Cruisers. The second objection we would notice is, the assertion, That an unrestricted Slave Trade would soon ex¬ tinguish itself, through the fears which would be excited in Brazil and Cuba by an unlimited importation of Africans. This opinion, so far as it applies to Brazil, the great market for Slaves, appears to us to be wholly unsustained by the Evidence we have taken. The vast tracts of virgin land as yet uncultivated in Brazil allow of the scattering of an un¬ limited number of new hands, and it is only the combination of newly-imported Africans which is dreaded. The third objection to which we refer is the allegation. That the exist¬ ing Squadron increases the sufferings of the transported African. Even if this had been established, we do not con¬ ceive that it would have been a sufficient reason for with¬ drawing the Squadron, since the sufferings of the transported Africans, fearful as they are, is the least evil of a system which fills the populous Continent of Africa with intestine war, insecurity, and bloodshed. But, further, we cannot conclude, from the Evidence before us, that these sufferings are increased by the presence of the British Squadron, when compared with the horrors of the middle passage, even under the regulated trade. The presence of the Squadron has led to the employment of faster transports; it has greatly in¬ creased the value of the living cargo; and the withdrawal of the Cruisers would, in the judgment of some, even of the witnesses most favourable to such a course, lead to the employment of a worse class of vessels than those now used in the trade. Finally, we would report, from a full examination of all the Evidence brought before us, that, in our opinion:— 1. The past efficiency of the cruising Squadron has been greatly undervalued. 2. That its cost has been much exaggerated. 3. That, with proper precautions, it is not an unhealthy service. 4. That to withdraw the Cruisers in part, and to administer 11 a regulated Slave Trade (as lias been suggested), would be impossible of execution, no material saving of the cost of the present system, and utterly at variance with every past pro¬ fession of Great Britain on this subject since she abolished the British Slave Trade. 5. That against the present cost of the Squadron should be set the advantage of nourishing and maintaining a valu¬ able and increasing lawful trade, which must be utterly extirpated if the Cruisers were withdrawn, and which might be developed to an unlimited extent if the Slave Trade were suppressed. 6. That to abandon the suppression of the Trade, to which, in the face of the whole civilized world, Great Britain is solemnly and repeatedly pledged, would be a fatal blow to her national honour. 7. That there is every reason to believe that the present system is susceptible of a large and immediate increase of efficiency by the adoption of such improvements as we have recommended ; and that if these improvements be adopted, aided by the other measures recommended, there is reason to believe that this great object may be speedily and certainly obtained. And the Committee have directed the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, together with an Appendix and Index thereto, to be laid before your Lordships. 15th July, 1850. LONDON: FEINTED BY HAEBISON AND SON, ST. MAETIN’S BANE. Now ready, and may be had of the Publishers of this Pamphlet. I. REMARKS ON THE AFRICAN SQUADRON. By J. S. MANSFIELD, Of the Middle Temple, Barrister. Price 6 d. II. REGULATED SLAVE TRADE. Reprinted from the Evidence of Robert Stokes, Esa., given before the Select Committee of the House of Lords, in 1849. With a Plate of a Slave-ship. Price 6 cl. III. EXTRACTS FROM THE EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE COM¬ MITTEES OF THE TWO HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, RELATIVE TO THE SLAVE TRADE; With Illustrations from Collateral Sources of Information. BY A BARRISTER OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE. With a Map. Price Is. IY. THE BRITISH SQUADRON ON THE COAST OF AFRICA. BY AN AMERICAN MISSIONARY. With Notes, by Capt. H. D. Trotter, R.N. And a Map. Price 6 d.