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AUTHOR: SEN, MOHIT CHANDRA TITLE: THE ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPH \ PLACE: LONDON DA TE: 1904 COLUMBIA UNIVEI^ITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICRUi URM TARGET Master Negative U SJl:/JJ^A'A Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record If !fl70 Se5 Sen, Mohit Chcndra The elements of moral philosophy ' London, Murray 1904 11 + 226 p 1 Id ed««« 38119; ) Restrictions on Use: TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA iQ V\> >v> REDUCTION RATIO: n< FILM SIZE: ^[ IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA (^ IB IID DAfE FILMED :_oJ2_^4I5A INITI ALS__1Edi1\X HLMEDBY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS, INC WOODI3RIDGE, CT r rl Association for Information and Image Management 1100 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/537-8202 Centimeter iiU 2 3 4 5 6 liiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiili llllllllllllllllllMllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllilllMlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Millie 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 mm liiiilmiliiiiliiiilimliinli rTT Inches I I I I I 1 TTT rTT .0 I.I 1.25 T 3 TTT T U^ 1 2.8 2.5 ^ 3.2 ■ 63 1 1^' 2.2 IS, 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.6 fTTTT TTT T 1 MfiNUFfiCTURED TO flllM STRNDflRDS BY fiPPLIED IMRGE. INC. 170 Se5 Columbia Itnitt^v^lta i THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY t> THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY BY MOHIT CHANDRA SEN, M.A. PROFESSOR, RIPON COLLEGE SECOND EDITION, REVISED LONDON JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET 1904 •a -4 4 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION The object I had in view in writing out these Ele- ments was mainly to help students to elaborate their moral ideas by criticising them from different stand- points. In preparing a new edition, I have not per- mitted myself to deviate much from the original aim, though I should have preferred greater freedom in the exposition of ethical systems. I had also, to my regret, to abstain from referring largely to Indian ethical systems, for an adequate treatment of these would have required more space than I could command. My use of the term " Eudaemonism " requires perhaps a word of apology. As I explained in the preface to the first edition, the present volume was partly based on Professor Seth's Studj^ of Ethical Principles; accord- ingly the term was adopted for its convenience. I have, however, retained it, because it implies two facts of great importance : first, that morality has an end ; and, secondly, that both Virtue and Happiness are con- stituent parts of the end. I have now to acknowledge my obligations to Dr J. H. Stirling, Dr A. C. Eraser, and Professor J. Seth (University of Edinburgh); Professors C B. Upton (Manchester College, Oxford) and D. G. Ritchie (St 4 m VI PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION Andrews, Scotland); and Rev. J. P. Hay thorn thwaite (Principal, St John's College, Agra), for their kind encouragement and ready sympathy. For these as well as for many valuable suggestions, I am indebted to Dr P. K. Ray (Presidency College, Calcutta), Professor H. R. James (Patna College), and Mr B. N. Seal (Principal, Victoria College, Cooch Behar). To Professor J. H. Muirhead (University of Birmingham) I owe an immense debt of gratitude, not only for much helpful criticism, but also for the personal interest which he took in my work, for kindly arranging for its publi- cation in England, and seeing the work through the Press. The questions at the end of the book are selected from the B.A. Examination Papers of the Calcutta University. M. C. S. Calcutta, July 1903. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION Perhaps the best apology for the present volume is that it grew out of notes dictated to students while lec- turing upon Professor Seth's Study of Ethical Principles. Published mainly at their request, it is designed to meet the wants of students who are preparing for the B.A. Examination in Philosophy as conducted by the Calcutta University. With this object, the subjects have been arranged, as far as possible, according to the syllabus fixed for that examination. It is hoped, however, that the treatment of the entire subject is sufficiently systematic to interest the general reader. Writing from the Idealistic point of view, I am deeply indebted to recent ethical writers who occupy the same standpoint, such as Professors Muirhead, Seth, and Mackenzie, Mr D'Arcy, and M. Janet. To Dr Martineau also, I owe a debt of gratitude ; his theory is rich in luminous expositions of those intuitions of our moral consciousness which should form the foundation of a truly philosophical system. M. C. S. Calcutta, December 1901. vii CONTENTS CHAPTER I THE NOTIONS OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LAW 1. The Notion of Good 2. Different Theories of the Highest Good 3. The Notion of Right (i) Right and Good (2) Right and Law 4. The Notion of Law . PAGK I 6 12 12 13 14 CHAPTER II THE SCOPE OF ETHICS ; ETHICAL METHODS 1. The Definition of Ethics 2. The Scope of Ethics 3. Relation of Ethics to Psychology . 4. Relation of Ethics to Metaphysics or Philosophy 5. Relation of Ethics to Sociology 6. Relation of Ethics to Politics 7. The Methods of Ethics ix 19 20 22 26 33 37 39 CONTENTS CONTENTS XI CHAPTER III THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS 1. The Analysis of Desire . • . . A. The intellectual element ; the object of desire B. The affective element ; desire as want C. The active element : desire, motive, intention, act 2. Classification of Desires 3. The place of Pleasure in moral life . 4. The place of Reason in moral life , 5. The place of Will in moral life 6. Relation of the Individual to Society PAGE 45 47 53 55 59 63 75 87 98 CHAPTER V MORAL OBLIGATION, DUTIES AND VIRTUES, THE HIGHEST GOOD 1. The Nature of Duty 2. The Foundation of Moral Authority 3. Right, Virtue, Merit, Responsibility 4. Good and Duty 5. Duties and Virtues 6. The Highest Good A. Hedonism B. Rigorism C. Eudaemonism Questions PAGE 167 171 175 181 186 189 192 206 214 221 CHAPTER IV MORAL JUDGMENT, THE MORAL FACULTY, MORAL SENTIMENT 1. The Analysis of the Moral Consciousness 2. Moral Judgment A. The Object of Moral Judgment B. The Standards of Right and Wrong C. The Mode of Moral Judgment (i) The Hedonistic view * (2) The Rigoristic view (3) The Eudaemonistic view 3. The Moral Faculty, or Conscience 4. Moral Sentiment 112 118 118 125 128 128 136 154 155 162 , THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY CHAPTER I THE NOTIONS OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LAW I. The Notion of Good, Xs applied to the end of human activity, "the Definition good" may be defined as "the object of desire." of ^^^e good. This is the popular meaning of the term, accord- ing to which every thing which is sought is held to be good, and every thing shunned is held to be evil : thus, health, wealth, kindness, courage, are desired as good ; but disease, poverty, cruelty, cowardice, are shunned as evil. More precisely, " the good " should be defined as " that quality in the desirable objects on account of which they are held to be proper objects of pursuit." Whether the quality be " pleasure," or a certain " worth or excellence which is irreducible into pleasure," is a subject of controversy to be discussed in its proper place. It is, however, evident, that what- ever be the nature of the quality, " it admits of The good degrees" — of being distinguished as better and ^^^i^s of worse, best and worst. Thus, health is looked ^^^^'' Material and immaterial goods. Personal and impersonal goods. Ill Good as means and good as end. 2 NOTIONS OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LAW upon as better than wealth, kindness than health, and so on. As different objects may possess the quality denominated "the good," the goods constitute a variety which may, without difficulty, be classified into material goods, such as health, wealth, etc., and immaterial goods, such as kindness, courage, etc. Of more importance, however, is the distinction between personal good and impersonal good. By the former is meant " a good which is desired by an individual for his own sake," by the latter, " a good which is desired by an individual for the sake of another, or the society or community at large." In a sense, indeed, every good may be called a " personal good " ; for every desire is "desire for a self"* Thus, whether a person desires his own health or that of another, he, in either case, desires to place himself in a certain state or condition conducive to the realisation of his object ; yet the reality of the distinction can- not be ignored. Another important distinction is between good as end and good as means. If the acquisition of health be good, the taking of medicine, by which the health is secured, is also good. This extension of the term is in accordance with the law of transference of feeling, by which the means become as interesting or desirable as the end ; "j- and it also makes clear the distinction between a relative good and the absolute or the * Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. 387. t Sully, op. cit., p. 393. 1 '.a THE ABSOLUTE GOOD 3 highest good. A " relative good " is " an object which is desired, not for itself, but for the sake of an ulterior end." Thus, health may be sought for the sake of the power to do one's duty, or wealth, for the sake of pursuit of knowledge. The "absolute good" is "the good which is desired for its own sake, and is not subordinate to any ulterior good." On investigation, it is found that most of the objects popularly taken as good are relative goods, being chosen, not for their sake, but for the sake of something else which again may be relative to a still ulterior end. It is evident, too, that there must be a final, absolute, or ultimate end, to which everything else which we desire is relative and subordinate ; else " we should go on ad infinitum, and desire would be left void and objectless." * The "absolute or the ultimate good" has the following essential characteristics : — (i) The absolute good is one ; or, there can be but one absolute or ultimate good. Were there a plurality of absolute goods, either they would be consistent with one another, and so, being simulta- neously obtainable, be constituent parts of one supreme good, or they would be inconsistent with * Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Peters's Tr.) i. 2. Cf. Mill : " We cannot prove that anything is excellent except by proving that it serves as a means for attaining another thing which is itself recognised as being excellent without any proof. The art of music is good, for the reason among others, that it produces pleasure ; but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good ? " Relative good and absolute or the highest good. There must be an abso- lute good. Character- istics of the highest good ! i Natural good and moral good. 4 NOTIONS OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LAW one another, and so, in the case of a conflict among desires, would be subordinated to and sacrificed for the one that is ultimately chosen. (2) It is good intrinsically y i.e. desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else. This, indeed, is a part of the definition of absolute good, given above. (3) It is the highest good {summuni bonuni)\ the ultimate end of human activity ; the one end, to which all human interests and all human pur- suits are subordinate ; the perfect consummation of human aims. A relative good is one which_, being realised, does not satisfy the whole self, but, as it were, a part of it. It is thus distinguished from the highest good. (4) It is a personal or private good, i.e. it is desired by a person for himself. But none the less is it an impersonal or common good, being desired by a person, not for himself only, but for all in similar circumstances. This quality of the highest good is connected with the strict universality of moral principles and the essential sociality of man's moral being. Another very important distinction among the goods is that between natural good diVid moral good. By " a natural good," is meant " any object which is desirable either for its own sake or for the sake of another." By "moral good," is meant "the right use of the natural goods with a view to realise the highest good." * Thus, " wealth " being * See Janet, Theory of Morals, P- 3i» THE NOTION OF MORAL GOOD s a natural good, " prudence," which consists in the right use of wealth (and other " opportunities " of life) with a view to realise man's highest good, is a moral good. Ij: is clear, from the definition, that the term "moral good" is applicable solely to "conduct," whereas the term "natural good" is applicable to the objects of human pursuit. " Con- duct" is "morally" good or bad according as it consists in the right or wrong use of natural goods, or (what comes to the same thing) of the " desires," for those objects, leading to the attainment or the non-attainment of the highest good. The notion of moral good involves, besides the notions of natural good and the highest good, the notion of "right" and "law," for "right" means " according to the law." Ethically, " moral good " cannot be determined without reference to the highest good and to the moral principles. With regard to origin, also, " the notion of moral good " grows out of " the notion of natural good," as the knowledge of the means grows out of the know- ledge of the end.* But the idea of end may gradually grow latent or implicit, and so gradually drop out of consciousness ; and in primitive com- munities which regulated their conduct solely by scriptural injunctions, as well as in the estimation of philosophers who, living in an age of reaction, were obliged to lay a strong emphasis on the supreme and absolute authority of the Moral Law (viewed as a Categorical Imperative), the notion of * Sully, op. cit.y p. 385. The notion of moral good grows out of the notion of natural good. How the no- tion of moral good or of the right becomes absolute. NUl Human good and cosmic good. 6 NOTIONS, OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LAW an end to be fulfilled by those injunctions or the Moral Law itself, was overlooked or lost sight of, and " moral good " or " right conduct " was viewed as the highest good, and the ''Moral Law" was regarded as an end in itself. In the use or application of the term "good," there is a further distinction to be drawn. In the foregoing account, the " good " was viewed as the object of desire, or the end of human activity. This is to view the good as human, "Human good" {avOpwiTLvov ayaOov) should be distinguished from " good that is other than human," i.e. good which is not realised through desire and rational activity : we call a flower good in a sense different from that in which we call a man good. In a wider sense, " good " may be defined as " the final cause or the end of being for every object." This may be taken as the definition oi cosmic good, 2. Different Theories of the Highest Good. Without entering into the details of the contro- • versy (postponed for subsequent treatment), I may here indicate the different views held of the nature of the highest good; for these different views underlie the different interpretations given of almost every term used in Moral Philosophy. These views can all be brought under the three lead- ing types of Hedonism, Rigorism, and Eudmnon- ism. Without proceeding into details, a simple analysis of moral consciousness shows man's moral being to consist, on the one hand, of certain ele- HIV HEDONISM 7 ments needing regulation (desires), and, on the other hand, of certain rational principles (moral laws) by which they are regulated, together with the power to regulate them (the will). The former roughly constitute his " sensibility," the latter his " rationality " ; they two, taken together, his " per- sonality." The different theories of the highest good arise from differently estimating the values of the constituent parts of a man's " personality." The theories of the highest good, or the ulti- mate end of action, are here briefly indicated : — (i) Hedonism {^Sovrh delight, enjoyment, plea- sure), or the theory that the highest good consists in pleasure, or the gratification of sensi- bility. " Hedonism " is either extreme or moderate, according as it either altogether ignores the need of regulative principles or admits them as necessary, though in a subordinate way, for the gratification of sensibility ; tithtr pessimistic or optimistic, accord- ing as it gives a negative or a positive definition of pleasure ; either egoistic or altruistic, according as it holds the pleasure of the individual himself or that of the community to be the ultimate end of his actions ; either non-evolutional or evolutional^ according as it is anterior or posterior to the incorporation in Ethics of the Theory of Evolution which has modified the view of the relation of the individual to Society ; €\\^^x psychological ox rational (otherwise called ethical), according as it derives the first principle of morals from a psychological The theories of the highest good as relat- ed to different aspects of man's person- ality. Hedonism defined. Forms of Heaonism. Rigorism defined. Forms of Ri- gorism. 8 NOTIONS OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LAW theory of the nature of desire (in which theory, pleasure is regarded as the invariable object of desire) (p. 47), or supposes the first principle to rest on its own evidence. (2) Rigorism (Lat. rigor, inflexibility, severity ; from rigere, to be stiff, to stand firm), or the theory that the highest good consists in good will, or right conduct, or strict obedience to the Moral Law out of a pure regard for it ; in other words, the theory that the Moral Law is an end in itself, obedience to which out of a pure selfless motive disregarding any painful consequences is, in itself and apart from any ulterior end to which it might lead, the highest good.* " Rigorism " is extreme, when it altogether ignores the claims of sensibility, denies the existence of natural good {i,e. declines to call the object of our desire or aversion good or evil), and looks upon " moral good " or " good will " as the only good. " Rigorism " is moderate, when it admits, though in a subordinate way, the claims of sensibility, and recognises a certain value in the objects of our natural (or uncorrupted) desires but subordinates all desires to the Moral Law, obedience to which is looked upon as the highest, though not the only, good. "Moderate Rigorism" appears in the * " To live by law, Acting the law we live by without fear, And, because right is right, to follow right. Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence." —Tennyson : CEnone. EUD^MONISM 9 Intuitional or Common Sense School of Moral Philosophy. (3) Eudcemonism {evSaiiJLovla, welfare, happiness, Eudaemon- perfection), or the theory that the highest good >sm defined, consists in self-realisation, in a reconciliation of the co-ordinate claims of both sensibility and rationality, in a perfect or harmonious synthesis established among the contents of moral con- sciousness. As the word eudcBmonia was used by Aristotle Aristotle's to indicate this view of the highest good, a brief 71^7 °/ ^ j o t> > highest good. account of his view on the subject will elucidate the meaning of the term. Eudcemonia (which liter- ally means happiness) is explained by Aristotle as the living well or the doing well. Aristotle shows that " happiness " alone answers to the description of the highest good, "for we always choose it for itself, and never for the sake of anything else ; while honour, and pleasure, and reason, and all virtue or excellence, we choose partly indeed for themselves (for, apart from any result, we should choose any of them), but partly also for the sake of happiness, supposing that they will help to make us happy." This " happiness " " results from the performance of the peculiar work which belongs to man as man," just as the excel- lence of the carpenter or cobbler lies in his definite function or activity. What, now, is the peculiar function of man as man ? " It cannot consist in merely living, for plants also live ; nor in having sensations, for they are shared by man with the ?. \ Ill lo NOTIONS OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LAW {a) It consists brute creation " ; it consists only in " the life of his in rational ac- j-a^joj^^i nature, with its two sides, or divisions, one tivity, ' * ' rational as obeying reason, the other rational as having and exercising reason." But the rational life of man may be viewed either as a moral state, as the mere possession of rational faculties and virtuous habits, or as moral activity, that is, the exercise of those faculties " in a life of action under the control of reason." Aristotle prefers the latter view ; he says, " It makes no small difference whether the good be conceived as the mere posses- sion of some thing, or as its use — as a mere habit or trained faculty, or as the exercise of that faculty. For the habit or faculty may be present, and yet issue in no good result, as when a man is asleep, or in any other way hindered from his function ; but with its exercise this is not possible, for it must show itself in acts, and in good acts. And as at the Olympic games, it is not the fairest and strongest who receive the crown, but those who contend (for among these are the victors), so in life, too, the winners are those who not only have all the excellences, but manifest these in deed." * While thus Aristotle holds the highest good to consist in rational ("honourable and virtuous") activity, he seems to be a Rigorist. But he does not ignore the claim of sensibility ; he looks upon pleasure as having an equal value with rational activity. Aristotle defines a " virtuous man " as * Aristotle, op. cit. (Peters's Tr.), i. 4, 7, 8. Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 172. THE VIEW OF ARISTOTL&W • , 'J « one who finds pleasure in performing virtuous acts." " No one," says he, " would call a man just who did not take pleasure in doing justice, nor generous who took no pleasure in acts of generosity, and so on " " Pleasure is the complement of (3) also in , . , . ., . 11 happiness, activity, it is an end in which activity naturally discharges itself and comes to rest. Pleasure is to activity what beauty is to the perfect physical development of youth. Pleasure is united with eudcemonia, and exists in the highest degree in connection with that highest eudcemonia, which results from knowledge." * Far from ignoring the value of natural goods (after the manner of the ex- treme Rieorist), Aristotle goes to the length of (0 and in the ^-^^ o -" . possession maintaining that though the greatest happiness ^nd right use is connected with the highest virtues, yet "for of natural /-/. . • • r goods. complete happiness a sufficient provision ot ex- ternal goods is essential, since these are necesary for the active manifestation of virtue, just as the equipping of the chorus is necessary for the repre- sentation of a dramatic work of art." f * Aristotle, op. cit., i. 8., x. 4, 7- Ueberweg, loc. cit. The analogy between pleasure and beauty is well explained by Mr Peters {op. cit., footnote, p. 329). " At other periods of life the various organs of the body may perform their functions completely, but in youth this is accompanied by an inexpressible charm which all other ages lack." The grace or charm of youth thus accompanies life at its highest and best; it is "an added perfection." Similarly, pleasure, far from being a useless appendage, is an added perfection, without which virtuous life does not attain its completeness or highest excellence (p. 64). See also Janet, op. cit., book i. ch. iv. t Ueberweg, loc. cit. See Aristotle, op. cit., i. 8, 10. Right in rela- tion to good. Right = means for the highest good (in Hedonism and Eudae- monism). Right = the highest good (in Rigorism). 12 NOTIONS OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LA W 3. The Notion of Right. The notion of " right " may be explained either in connection with the notion of " good " or that of " law." (i) Right and Good. As ordinarily understood, the notions of " right " and " good " are distinct ; for instance, we say that "health is good" but not that "health is right," whereas "the conduct which aims at health" is called both right and good. We thus see that "the good" is a wider notion, applicable both to conduct as well as to the end of conduct, whereas "the notion of right" (called also "the morally good ") is applicable exclusively to conduct. We also see that the right is a means for the realisation of the good. Accordingly, in all systems of Moral Philosophy except that of Rigorism, "right conduct " is defined as the conduct which leads to the attainment of the highest good " ; " wrong conduct," as " that which leads to the non-attain- ment of the highest good." In other words, in Hedonism and Eudaemonism the notion of right is subordinate to the notion of the highest good as the notion of means is to that of end. In Rigorism, however, the notions of "right" and "the highest good" are identified. In the extreme form of the theory, which declines to call anything good except " right conduct " or " moral good," "the right" is not only "the highest good," but also " the only good " ; whereas in the moderate RIGHT AND LA W 13 form of the theory, which admits the existence of goods other than " moral," since all those goods are subordinated to " right conduct " or " moral good," the latter is identical with the highest good. (2) Right and Law. "Right" literally means "according to rule"; Right in re- accordingly, " right conduct " is defined as " conduct which is in accordance with a moral law " ; wrong conduct is that which is in violation of a moral law. This definition of right conduct is consonant to the theory of Rigorism, according to which, right con- duct, being the highest good, consists in regulating all our actions according to strict moral principles. The notion of right involves in every instance the notion of law ; for example, a particular case of honest conduct is held to be right because, as a general principle. Honesty is right. The notion of law may be implicit in the notion of right ; it is Implicit and in accordance with psychological principles that the ^^^^'"^^ [^y* knowledge of the particular should precede, while it may presuppose, the knowledge of the general, and that particular cases of conduct should be judged to be right or wrong according to their own merits, without any distinct apprehension of the general principles involved in the judgment.* However, in all sound or valid estimation of the Tightness or wrongness of conduct, a distinct appre- hension of or an explicit rt^extncQ to, the Moral Law is necessary. It is by being sure of the law, that •^ Sully, op. cit., pp. 285-7. J Standard of right and wrong. Original meaning of law. ( Moral Law defined. 14 NOTIONS OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LAW we become assured of the moral quality of conduct. Accordingly, a moral law is called "a standard or test of right and wrong." The highest good, viewed as the ultimate or final standard of right and wrong, is called an Ideal. 4. The Notion of Law. A ** law " (originally equivalent to something laid or imposed) "is, in its primary signification, the authoritative expression of human will enforced by power." * In its original sense, it means, in the first place, " a rule of being or conduct " ; in the second place, "that the rule is established by authority"; and in the third place, "that the authority is able to enforce the will." But this primary sense of the term has been gradually sup- planted by the secondary or derivative senses which have grown out of it, and which exhibit a certain affinity of meaning. The word retains its original meaning in the political laws, which are imposed by the State for the protection of the person and property of its subjects. But the widest departure from the primitive sense is seen in the expression " natural lawl' which simply means an invariable order of facts without any reference to any ulterior (as e.g. Divine) will by whose authority it is estab- lished (though at first, when the use of the term was extended, there was such a reference). A " moral law " is a general principle for deter- mining the rightness or wrongness of conduct. * Argyll, Reign of Law, ch. ii. THE MORAL LA W 15 N'^d As in Hedonism and Eudaemonism the notion Law a means of right is subordinate to that of the highest good, ^'" ^ omsm the notion of moral law is also subordinate to that monism), notion ; and a moral law is held to indicate the general tendency of certain actions to produce, as well as that of the opposite actions to fail in pro- ducing, the highest good. A "moral law" is, accordingly, a statement of the value of an action which resides in its helpfulness or capability to produce the highest good. But in Rigorism, which Law an end identifies the rie:ht with the highest good, the ulti- 1?.^^^^.^^ ^!," 00 Rigorism). mate notion is that of moral law, which is held to be an end in itself In this theory, too, a moral law is a statement of the value of an action, but the value is supposed to be inherent in the action itself apart from any of its consequences. " Moral laws " are characterised by the following Character- qualities : — (i) Generality. They are universal in their scope, and applicable to all rational beings. In Rigorism and Eudaemonism, the universality is taken in the strictest sense, which Hedonism, regarding the laws as inductive generalisations, does not admit* * Laws differ considerably as regards their extent or scope ; some govern a vaster realm of objects than others. The law of causation, for example, prevails in the entire realm of phenomenal existence, while the laws of light and heat are limited to a special class of phenomena. It may be asked, Are there moral laws of such generality that all rational beings are subject to them? It cannot be denied that some laws, like the laws of fashion, are exceedingly limited in their istics of the Moral Law, Different views of moral authority. i6 NOTIONS OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LAW (2) Authority. They are regulative principles having the nature of commands or injunctions. Conduct should be in accordance with them, either for their own sake (Rigorism) or for the sake of the ulterior good to which they lead. They are im- perative of conduct, and are expressed in the forms " thou shalt " or " thou shalt not." The notion of authority is closely connected with the correspond- ing notion of duty. The authority of the Moral Law is conceived mechanically when it is supposed to be derived from penalties brought on by the course of nature, or imposed by the will of society or that of God. This is the view taken by Hedonism. On the other hand, the authority of the Moral Law is conceived scope ; the political laws of one country, again, differ from those of another. Even as regards more abstract principles, like those of honesty, industry, and kindness, it is alleged that they differ in different communities ; within the same community, again, a latitude is sometimes allowed in indi- vidual action— to lie as Desdemona lied {Othello, v. 2, 124), is not considered wrong. Do these facts go to prove that there are no universal principles to which all rational beings are subject ? Such a negative conclusion can, however, be hardly drawn. It may be remarked, /r^/, that the form of the moral law is universal with regard to the whole species— for every man there is an ideal to live by, a principle of action by which to realise his highest good or most complete virtue ; secondly, that every moral law is affirmed to be an objective truth, i.e. a truth which is regarded as valid for all similar persons in similar circumstances ; thirdly, that differ- ences in the moral laws of different communities, even where considerable, are scarcely fundamental ; diXidi fourthly, that it is possible to regard all differences as capable of being recon- ciled in a general convergence towards a common ideal. DIFFERENT FROM NA TURAL LAW 17 rationally when it is supposed to be due to rational considerations, which, without coercion, are the per- suasives to good conduct. This is the view of Rigorism and Eudaemonism. " A moral law " differs from " a natural law." Moral law The former is a statement of value, the latter of a ^'^erent from relation among facts. The former is a regulative ^^^^^ principle, and authoritatively urges upon the self the duty of obedience to it ; the latter is without this characteristic. " Moral laws " are either ultimate or first prin- Ultimate and ciples, or secondary laws which are derived from the derivative ultimate principles. ™°^^ ^^^* As Philosophy is a constant attempt to reduce multiplicity to unity, such attempts are necessarily made in Moral Philosophy, which is really a system of truths, and not a register of unconnected laws. The following examples of first principles are interesting : — (i) Rational Hedonism :—" Aim at the greatest total happiness, or the greatest pleasure on the whole, whether in our own experience or in that of the race." (Sidgwick.) (2) Rigorism:— "Do what is conformable to Nature, i.e., do what is in harmony with the course of nature, or the universal reason of the world." (Stoics.) " Act so that the maxim of thy will can likewise be valid at all times as the principle of a universal legislation." (Kant.) (3) Eudaemonism : — " Be a person, and respect others as persons." (Hegel.) B i8 NOTIONS OF GOOD, RIGHT, AND LAW Different standpoints of Ancient and Modern Ethics. While, in ancient Ethics, the central conception was that of the Good, in modern Ethics, the central conception is generally that of Law. " It is true that the thought of the gods' unwritten and un- faltering law was not by any means absent from the moral reflection of Greece," but, with the partial exception of Stoicism, the highest good was con- ceived as a state of the self, to be realised (it might be, even in this earthly life) and to attain which, the laws must be demonstrated to be the means. The notion of law was brought into the foreground in modern Ethics partly through the influence of Christianity and partly through the revived study of Roman Jurisprudence.* Chris- tianity, by awakening the deep sense of sin, or personal violation of the law of God, emphasised the notion of obedience, and, along with the study of Roman Law, the notion of a law of nature or nations (apart from that of revelation) determining our rights and duties, became prominent. * Sidgwick, "Ethics" (Art. Enc. Brit), CHAPTER II THE SCOPE OF ETHICS; ETHICAL METHODS I. The Definition of Ethics, Ethics,* or Moral Philosophy, may be briefly Definition of defined as "the philosophy of morality or conduct," ^^^^"• or "as the doctrine of human character." It is the rational explanation of our actions, our dispositions, and our relations, viewed in relation to the Moral Ideal, or the ultimate standard of moral judgment. Accordingly, it \s an investigation into the notions " good " and '* bad," " right " and " wrong," and the connected notion of " duty " as applied to conduct or voluntary action. It is the philosophy of life as subject to the Moral Law, a search after the first or central principle of moral life. It is the syste- matic knowledge of those regulative principles by Ethics is a which the values of the contents of that life are regulative or estimated, and by conformity to which the highest good is attained. In defining Ethics, regard must be had to the difference between "natural" or "positive" and "regulative'' or "normative" laws. There is a ^^* Derived from ^Bo,, character, from ^^os = Lat. 7nos^ 19 normative science. ,1 If Difiference between Is and Ought to be, sometimes obscured in Hedonism. lo ^COPE OF ETHICS; ETHICAL METHODS difference between the Actual and the Ideal, between the Is and the Ought to be, which is no other than the difference between an "observed order or relation among facts as it is " and " a relation among facts as it ought to be.'' For example, it is one thing to say that in a given man "meekness is stronger than anger," and another thing to say that in all men " meekness ought to be stronger than anger"; the one is a statement of an existing habit or disposition, the other is a statement of value. This distinction is emphatically recognised in Rigorism and Eudai- monism, and should be recognised in Hedonism, which, without self-contradiction, cannot overlook it. Thus Bentham, asserting that "the word * ought ' ought to be banished from the vocabulary of morals," uses the same word that he would discard.* Even if "pleasure" were the end of life, there is a clear difference between the state- ments, "All men seek pleasure" and "All men ought to seek pleasure " : the former means that " pleasure is an object of pursuit " ; the latter, that "pleasure is a proper or preferable object of pursuit." 2. The Scope of Ethics. The primary (i) The primary task of Ethics is an inquiry and secondary j^^^^ ^^ nature of the highest good together with task of Ethics. , . c lt^ )> j « j i. » the connected notions of "law" and "duty, a search after the central principle of moral life. Its * See Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii. p. 307. APPLIED ETHICS 21 secondary task is to lay out " a scheme of concrete duties" which are deducible from, or at least covered by, the central principle. (The latter task is, however, generally neglected in treatises on Moral Philosophy, for there is much less practical divergence concerning the concrete duties of life than in the interpretation of the central principle among different ethical systems.) * (2) In investigating the nature of the highest Indirect ,„ , r ^' 1 treatment of good, Ethics has indirectly to treat of certain prob- ^^^^^^ ^^^^ lems which are psychological, philosophical, socio- lems. logical, or political in nature, and connect Ethics with the respective departments of knowledge to which they properly belong. The psychological problems have regard to the nature of man as he now is, to the analysis and classification of his springs of action, to the origin of knowledge and the freedom of the will ; the philosophical, to man's place in the cosmos, to the theory of the self, the validity of knowledge, the existence and nature of God, the immortality of the soul ; the sociological, to the relation of the individual to society ; and the political^ to the relation of the individual to the State. (3) Having determined the highest good and the concrete duties of life. Ethics as a "practical science," or Ethics as applied to the details of Applied moral culture, proceeds to formulate the methods by which moral character is formed or the Ideal is realised in actual conduct. Here it is customary * A. Seth, " Philosophy " (Art. Enc. Brit.). I Distinction between " private Ethics " and " politics." Ethics dif- fers from Psychology. The former a normative, the latter a positive science. 22 SCOPE OF ETHICS; ETHICAL METHODS to distinguish between what are called "private Ethics " and " politics." The scope of the former is determined by the nature and extent of the " reforms suggested by the experience of enlight- ened and public-spirited citizens " ; * the scope of the latter is determined by the extent to which the Ideal can be realised by legislation. With regard to the latter, it is necessary to observe that the power of the State in forming the character of its citizens is strictly limited. Legislation does not directly promote morality; "compulsory morality/' it has been well said, " is no morality at all " (p. ^y) ; f all real progress is from within outwards, and cannot be forced from without. The State can only arrange for the improvement of the conditions of moral life for its citizens by education, by equit- able distribution of property, by restraining the criminal and removing temptation, and the like. 3. Relation of Ethics to Psychology. (i) While Ethics and Psychology both treat of the same subject, viz., human conduct, the aim of the former essentially differs from the aim of the latter. Psychology is one of the positive sciences ; it analyses conduct with a view to exhibit its intel- lectual, emotional, and purely volitional elements ; but it pronounces no judgment upon its " value " or its relation to the Ideal of conduct. Ethics also analyses conduct; it, however, does not push its * See Stewart, "Ethics" (Art. Enc. Brit. Supplement), t See Muirhead, Elements of Ethics^ pp. 91-93. ETHICS BASED ON PSYCHOLOGY 23 analysis to the extent demanded in Psychology, but only so far as to be able to determine the rightness or wrongness of conduct with reference to the Moral Ideal. It follows that Ethics, as the Philo- sophy of the Ideal in conduct, deals with principles that have authority over our life. (2) At the same time Ethics is founded upon Ethics is Psychology.* The good which Ethics seeks to p^'gychology, determine is, as Aristotle rightly says, a human good, connected with human personality. It is evident that, to determine the end of man requires a preliminary study of the opportunities and powers of man, their nature and limits — a study which belongs to Psychology. It is, however, necessary to observe that Ethics cannot be confined within the limits of merely introspective Psychology, which is, Man's conduct has reference to a physical as well hQw^v^";' ^°^ ^ '' merely mtro- as to a social environment Not to speak of the spective. influence which these exert on his entire mental development, it is obvious that the objects of desire as well as the means adopted to realise them, frequently arise out of his relations to his physical environment; and it is well known that " the temper of the mind and the passions of the heart " f closely correspond to the climatic and other conditions to which he is subject. Man is, again, essentially a social being (p. 99) — his conduct has always a direct or indirect reference to the social * In this respect Ethics resembles the cognate sciences of Logic and ^^sthetics. See Sully, op. cit.^ p. 13. t Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws ^ xiv. i. 'k ii i i 24 SCOPE OF ETHICS; ETHICAL METHODS order to which he belongs (p. 104) ; he cannot con- ceive the highest end of life otherwise than as a common good— a common concern in which there are fellow-workers (pp. 102-3) ; he cannot deter- mine his concrete duties and special rights without reference to the existing social conditions (p. 35); "the conditions by which man is surrounded and hemmed in, by determining his opportunities, must affect his duties." For these reasons, " it is inevitable that Ethics should run out beyond the circle of mere introspection, in order to determine the objects in whose presence man continually stands, the relation he bears to them, and the dealings he can have with them."* * Martineau, op. cit, vol. i. p. 2. It should be noted in this connection that Ethics cannot overlook the significance which the Theory of Evolution has discovered in man's relation to Society. It has shown in the field of biology, that the structure and the function of any organ are determined by relation to a given organic type. The process is gradual, and mvolves heredity, or the dependence on past forms i variation, or the tendency to assume new forms ; struggle or conflict with the environment, together with the growth of efficiency, or the survival of the fittest; it has also shown that no type can be set up as final— the unexpected, whether as a change in the environment or as a new variation, is always likely to happen, resulting sometimes in an unforeseen change of type. It is now apparent that in the evolution of moral ideals as well as moral character, the course of biological evolution is reproduced with such important differences as are imposed by man's peculiar being, his self-conscious intelligence and self- determining activity. The course of evolution, thus defined, may be traced in the determination of man's concrete duties as these vary from age to age ; in the inevitable " struggle of ideals " of different piembers of the social bod^, resulting in a completer hannony ETHOLOGY 25 lAj (3) There is a view of Ethics which reduces Ethics to a department of Psychology. This view is in accordance with Hedonism in certain forms. Hedonism tends to overlook the distinction between the Is and the Ought to be, and to ignore the " authority " of the moral (regulative) principles, or to conceive it mechanically (p. 16). This tendency on the part of Hedonism is in perfect accordance Ethics = a with the theory of human personality on which it psychology, rests. The theory is, that a man's self is entirely a possible phenomenal, and has no essential freedom, for it .^ °" has no real or noumenal basis. Accordingly, his conduct is entirely determined by his environment and his character, his character being itself the product of environment. On this view, Ethics instead of being a science of regulative principles binding always upon man as a being essentially rational and free, becomes a science of those laws by which under certain conditions a pleasant or a useful type of character is produced. The ethical inquiry becomes a part of the general psychological inquiry into mental processes and products. Ethics thus understood is sometimes called Ethology. of interests and better adjustment to environment ; in the fact that moral progress, though necessarily slow, is yet not to be despaired of, seeing that here also the unexpected is likely to happen ; as well as in numerous other details of moral growth and development. In the light of these discoveries of the evolutional theory, Ethics is obliged to take a larger outlook than is provided for by a merely introspective psychology. (See Muirhead, op. cit., book iii. ch. 3, and book v. ; also Prof. Stewart's article, cited above.) " m» 26 SCOPE OF ETHICS J ETHICAL METHODS A REGULATIVE SCIENCE 27 1'^ Philosophy defined. Philosophy and science compared with regard to their sub- ject-matter, 4. Relation of Ethics to Metaphysics or Philosophy* Philosophy or Metaphysics is the systematic study of the assumptions, the postulates, or the ultimate principles of all sciences. Every science, whether mental or material, positive or regulative, starts with certain assumptions. For example. Mathematics assumes the existence of space and time, Physics the existence of matter and energy. Logic the uniformity of nature, and so on. Again, the assumptions of the several sciences are inti- mately related to one another. It is the task of Philosophy to give a coherent and adequate account of these assumptions, and examine their validity. It follows that the scope of Philosophy is wider than that of any science. Every science has its own limited group of objects to investigate. But the objects studied in one science are intimately related to the objects studied in another science ; and, properly speaking, a thing cannot be properly understood unless it is viewed as part of a com- prehensive whole. It is the task of Philosophy to co-ordinate the results of scientific inquiry in their respective fields, to contemplate their relations to one another and to Reality as a whole. Accord- ingly, we may say that Philosophy takes up the task of explaining the phenomenal changes of the * Unless otherwise indicated, Metaphysics is here taken to be synonymous with Philosophy. It is sometimes held to be equivalent to Ontology, the study of the Real rather than the Phenomenal, while Philosophy is the comprehensive study of both the Real and the Phenomenal. world just at the place where science leaves it, and continues it therefrom. Every science is bound (i) to state the ultimate conditions of the and with re- phenomena it studies, and (2) to show how those ^^. °^ phenomena necessarily arise from the organic or interdependent relations of their conditions. But the problem of Philosophy is (i) to give an account of the universe of things as a connected or organic system of parts and relations, and to show how the ultimate conditions of the several phenomena are necessarily involved in, and arise out of, such a system ; and (2) (since such an account cannot be given without an inquiry into the ultimate nature of existence) to exhibit the relation of the universe of things to Reality as a whole. (i) Ethics is more closely related to Metaphysics Ethics is or Philosophy than to science ; for this reason it ^""^^ ^ P^^^°' ^ -' sophy than is called, by preference. Moral Philosophy rather a science, than Moral Science. This closer kinship with Philosophy, Ethics shares with Logic and Esthetics, which are, all of them, regulative sciences. In any because it is positive science, investigation may proceed to a a regulative certain length and stop, leaving us in possession of a fairly comprehensive knowledge of the phenomena as they arise out of certain ultimate conditions, of which, however, no explanation is vouchsafed.* But the regulative sciences are bound to dive deeper. Dealing with principles which have "authority" over our life, or which require us to think, act, or feel in certain ways rather than in •^ Muirhead, op. cit., pp. 23-25. and must in- quire into the source of moral autho- rity, and into con- nected prob- lems. The kinship with Meta- physics IS more ap- parent in Ri- gorism and Eudsemo- nism 28 SCOPE OF ETHICS J ETHICAL METHODS other ways, an investigation into the origin or the ultimate explanation of their authority becomes absolutely necessary. Thus, the regulative prin- ciples of Logic, to which thought must conform in order that it may be in accordance with fact or reality, have obvious reference to the ultimate nature of Reality ; again, Esthetics, which lays down principles to which our feelings must con- form in order that they may realise the beautiful in nature and art, is unintelligible without a study of the objective nature of Beauty. Similarly, Ethics dealing with principles which have authority over human conduct, and which urge upon the self the necessity of obeying them, is soon taken up with " the question of the essential nature of human personality and its place in the universe of actual existence." * Metaphysics is the study of the real, the objective, the absolute, rather than the study of the pheno- menal, the subjective, or the relative. In other words. Metaphysics deals with Reality as it is constituted by the Common Reason, rather than with the variable impressions, diversely " coloured " as pleasant or painful, which belong to the indi- vidual's personal experience. Following this current of thought, we see that the recognition of the kinship of Ethics with Metaphysics is more pronounced in Rigorism and Eudaemonism than in Hedonism. In Rigorism, the highest good is conceived to consist in strict obedience to laws * Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, p. 31. DEPENDENT UPON METAPHYSICS 1(^ which constitute a code of Divine appointment; and Ethics is conceived to be intimately related to Theology. In Eudaemonism the highest good than in He- is conceived to be objectively real and rational, and the principles of morality are not intelligible without reference to an objective standard of excellence. In Hedonism, which tends to view the highest good as subjective or dependent on the relative and variable experiences of pleasure and pain, the objective significance of the highest good tends to be overlooked, and Ethics becomes gradually dissociated from Metaphysics. Yet Hedonism cannot prove that the highest good is subjective without making certain assumptions regarding the nature of the self which are meta- physical in character, and that kinship with Meta- physics which in one form it would repudiate becomes reinstated in another form. (2) It follows, from the close relation of Ethics Ethics de- to Metaphysics, that " the conclusions of Philosophy Metaphysics" as to the nature of the world at large, and man's relation to it, are of the utmost importance to Ethics." Ethics is, in a manner, partly dependent upon Metaphysics ; for the view which we take of the cosmos as a whole is sure to affect our view of the essential nature of man's personality and of his Moral Ideal. Thus, if the cosmos be viewed illustrations, as wholly phenomenal, without any permanent foundation or rational basis, the self should be viewed as a series of ever-changing states, and the view of morality cannot admit the existence of a Ethics differs from Meta- physics be- cause its scope is limited, 30 SCOPE OF ETHICS; ETHICAL METHODS fixed standard of good, and tends to become Hedonistic in its extreme form. On the other hand, if the cosmos be viewed as wholly real, and the changes of the world be ignored as illusory modes, then the contents of human sensibility- all the manifold desires and affections which are adapted to those various modes— are judged to be essentially unworthy or evil, and the view of morality tends to become Rigoristic in its extreme form. Only by a proper synthesis of the two views of the cosmos, stated above, can we hope to form a correct view of the Moral Ideal.* (3) Though closely related to Metaphysics, the scope of Ethics is narrower than that of Meta- physics. Ethics deals with the highest human good while Metaphysics deals with the cosmos as a whole' embracing alike the efficient conditions of all pheno- mena as well as their final cause or end, which may be called the cosmic good, and towards which the cosmic processes are tending. And though the method of Ethics is philosophical rather than scien- tific (for it contemplates the facts of moral life in relation to the end rather than in relation to the * Buddhism seems to be the most remarkable theory which combmes a Nihilistic philosophy with a severe s>^tem of morals. This it does, partly because it rigorously admits the necessity of the causal relation (the law of Karma), and partly because its theory of the good is altogether negative and pessimistic As soon, however, as any positive signifi cance is attached to the notion of good, the denial of reality makes "good" intelligible only as pleasure," whose Ispecl changes continually with the drift of circumstances, and Ls d. fixed standard of morality becomes impossible. THE VIEW OF PLATO 31 origin), yet it is not by commencing our study with the cosmos as a whole that we can determine the highest human good, but by an analytical examina- tion of man's peculiar personality. Thus Ethics is a branch of inquiry different from Metaphysics, though closely related to it. It is possible, however, to take a view of Ethics which reduces Ethics to a department of Meta- physics. Such a view was taken by Plato, who identified the ultimate notions of Ethics and Meta- physics. According to Plato, to know anything truly is to know the general fact, the Idea, which constitutes its essence as well as its end, and being perfect, transcends it. In other words, we cannot be said to know any object until we know the class to which it belongs ; it is the class- idea, or the type, which gives it its peculiar distinction as a thing or object ; at the same time, the type is superior in worth to the indi- vidual, which only approximates it ; chairs, tables, trees, birds, men, are none of them exactly what they should be, but are only the shadows of perfect types or ideas, which they embody in various degrees. Every class has its Idea, and all ideas are subsumed under the Idea of Perfection, or of the Good, which is alike the essence of the uni- verse of things as well as its end. But just as the individual cannot be known except by knowing the class, so the perfect Type, or the Good, of any class cannot be known except by knowing the Type of Absolute Good, or the Universal Good. It follows and its method is different. Ethics = a branch of Metaphysics, a possible view taken by Plato, who subsumed Human Good under Uni- versal Good (and appar- ently under- estimated the value of the psychological method), and prevalent in certain pantheistic systems, as, e.g.^ in Spinozism, 32 SCOPE OF ETHICS J ETHICAL METHODS that the good of humanity, or human good, cannot be known except in relation to the Universal Good. Now it cannot be denied that the Platonic theory has a certain plausibility of its own. That the knowledge of the Universal Good, if attained, will elucidate the knowledge of man's particular good, may be admitted ; nevertheless man's immediate concern is to know the Good that is attainable and practicable by him in actual life, and this requires a study of his powers and limits ; — the psycho- logical point of view, therefore, cannot be altogether replaced by the philosophical.* In certain pantheistic systems, again, which over- look the distinction between the finite and the Absolute Self, Ethics is hardly dissociated from Metaphysics. Spinoza, it is well known, gave the name of " Ethics " to a treatise whose object is to contemplate all things under the form of eternity {sub specie ceternitatis), " to grasp the idea which represents the origin and sum of nature, and so to develop all our ideas from it that it should appear as the source of all other ideas." This funda- mental idea Spinoza finds to be the idea of Sub- stance — " that which is in itself and conceived by itself, i.e., the conception of which can be formed without the aid of the conception of any other thing." Of this Substance, which is infinite in nature, everything else is a mode, just as a triangle is a mode of space; everything, again, "follows from the primary idea by the same necessity with * Vide Aristotle's criticism of Plato, op. cit.y i. 6. ETHICS RELATED TO SOCIOLOGY 33 1' n which the properties of a triangle flow from its definition." The nature and duty of man, there- fore, can only be known by regarding him as a mode of the infinite Substance. Ethics is thus a department of Metaphysics. The weakness of where the Spinoza's theory is, however, apparent even in the ""^^"^ °^ '"^'" illustration which he employs. It is evident that Incris^^''^ lines, surfaces, figures, are only arbitrarily or r^ecessarily illusorily imposed on space from without ;— space °''^''^°''^^'^- has no tendency to determine itself into any figure whatsoever. Just in the same way, man appears as an illusory phantom projected by imagina- tion on the Universal Being, which has no ten- dency towards determination or differentiation; the phantom dissolves as soon as an ''adequate idea" of its nature is obtained. In this theory, man's individuality and moral freedom are both lost out of view, and the doctrine of human respon- sibility or obligation can hardly be maintained.* 5. Relation of Ethics to Sociology. Sociology is "the science of the structure of Sociology society ; of the laws of its development, of the '^^^"^'^• progress of civilisation, and other matters connected with social evolution, or the changes which society has undergone and will undergo under given con- ditions." (i) Ethics is closely related to Sociology. Man The kinship is a social being, and his individual well-beine ""^.^^o'" 1 1 . - , ° wiih Socio- has obvious reference to the well-being of society, logy * See Caird, Spinoza, ch. vi. follows from the kinship of individual with social good. Three views of the rela- tion of indi- vidual to social good. 34 SCOPE OF ETHICS; ETHICAL METHODS " We only know the individual man as a member of some society ; what we call his virtues are chiefly exhibited in his dealings with his fellows, and his most prominent pleasures are derived from inter- course with them ; thus it is a paradox to maintain that man's highest good is independent of his social relations, or of the constitution and condition of the community of which he is a part."* It is possible to take three views of the relation which the well-being of the individual bears to that of the society, (i) The well-being of the society may be looked upon as the supreme end to which the well-being of the individual is subordinate. This view prevailed in certain ancient ethical systems in which the importance of the individual was overlooked out of regard for the whole.f This is also the view of Evolutional Hedonism. (2) The well-being of the individual may be looked upon as the supreme end, to which the well-being of the society is subordinate. This is the view of Egoistic Hedonism, and of Rigorism in some of its extreme forms. (3) The well-being of the individual as well as that of the society may be looked upon as co- ordinate in value, and constituting parts or aspects of the highest good, which is, at the same time, personal and impersonal (p. 4). This is the view of Eudaemonism. * Sidgwick, " Ethics " (Art. Ertc. Brit) See ch. iii. § 6. t " Plato recommends the exposure and murder of un- promising infants." — See Republic; also Martineau, op. cit.^ vol. i. p. 112. -.-jf ETHICS DIFFERENT FROM SOCIOLOGY 35 (2) While closely related to Sociology, Ethics is a branch of inquiry different from Sociology. In the first place, Sociology treats of the development of society, and gives an account of the changes which the customs and institutions of society have under- gone in the process of time. But the moral value of those changes cannot be determined without a reference to the ethical ideal, or to the highest good as determined in Ethics. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that the nature of the highest good should be determined before we can interpret the social process as one of development or pro- gress, just as it is necessary to know the goal of a traveller's journey before we can say whether he is advancing or receding along his road. In the second place, while it is impossible to determine our concrete duties without a study of the social organisation of which we are the members, the highest good can be determined as an abstract or formal principle by examining the contents of an individual's personality without an explicit refer- ence to the social organisation of which he is a member. Thus, while it is impossible to discuss the propriety of the free giving of alms to the poor without a study of the social conditions under which they live, the general duty of benevolence can be determined without such a study. In so far, then, as the good of an individual man can " be separated as an object of study from the good of his community," Ethics remains different from, while related to, Sociology. Ethics differs from Socio- logy— because, (l) the for- mer inter- prets while the latter records the gradual so- cial changes, and (2) ethical inquiry is, to some ex- tent, inde- pendent of sociological inquiry. Ethics = a branch of Sociology — a view of Evo- lutional He- donism which over- looks the peculiar scope of Ethics, and mis- takes the re- lation of the individual to society. 36 SCOPE OF ETHICS J ETHICAL METHODS (3) It is possible to take a view of Ethics which reduces it to a department of Sociology. This is the characteristic view of Evolutional Hedonism, and rests mainly on the following suppositions : — {a) That the moral ideas of an individual are the product of social customs and institutions, which are themselves the result of the law of natural selection (or survival of the fittest), which favoured the conservation of those customs and institutions which were conducive to the preservation of the race. But in making this supposition it is for- gotten that, whatever be the origin of the moral ideas current in society, Ethics is not directly an inquiry into their origin, but into their authority. {U) That the well-being of the individual is sub- ordinate to that of the society. As the properties of any limb of a living body cannot be determined without reference to the whole body of which it is a part, so the duty of an individual cannot be determined without reference to the good of the community of which he is a member. Accordingly, it is said that the sociological inquiry should pre- cede the ethical. But this supposition rests on a false analogy, for we equally find that the duty of society cannot be determined without reference to the good of the individual. Society is not an organism in which the good of the part is subordi- nate to that of the whole, but rather an organisation of individuals, in which the good for all is also the good for each (p. 109). Accordingly, Ethics may \ RELATION OF ETHICS TO POLITICS 37 take up its problem from an individualistic point of view. 6. Relation of Ethics to Politics. Politics is the science of government. It treats Politics de- of man "as subject to laws, carrying with them "^^ judicial rewards and punishments." In a narrow jn a narrow, sense, the scope of Politics is limited to the enact- ^" ment of such laws as aim at the protection of the person and the property of individuals in a State. In a wide sense. Politics aim at the institution of in a wide, " an ideal arrangement of society which will be best fitted to enable the individual to realise his highest sense. aims. )> from Politics, (i) Ethics is closely related to Politics. Man, Ethics close- as Aristotle says, is a political animal ; even in the ^IxJizl simplest communities, he participates in a common life which is subject to laws enforced by authority. Accordingly, man as a moral being cannot be indifferent to the drift or tendency of the political laws to which he is subject. (2) Ethics, however, differs from Politics. The Ethics differs difference consists in the fact that Ethics is con- cerned with the determination of the highest good and the concrete duties of life, while Politics is concerned with the problem, how far the concrete duties of life may be enforced by a properly appointed system of rewards and punishments. For example, Ethics determines the several duties of parents to their children, while Politics considers how many of those duties it would be proper to Ethics = a branch of Politics — a view of Hedonism in certain forms, and of cer- tain ancient systems. 38 SCOPE OF ETHICS J ETHICAL METHODS enforce by the infliction of penalties in the case of non-performance. Ethics may be said to precede Politics, because the political code borrows its authority from that of the moral principles from which it is derived. (3) It is possible to take a view of Ethics which reduces it to a department of Politics. This view may rest on such an erroneous supposition, as was made by Hobbes, that the authority of the moral principles is derived from the penalties attached to the political code. In this theory the individual cannot discover any distinction of worth among his impulses, which are all egoistic in their nature and naturally bring him into conflict with his fellows. The only practicable rule for guidance is obedience to the State, which imposes restrictions on the individual in the interests of the Commonwealth. Apart from the psychological blunder involved in its reduction of all impulses to a single category (P- 55), and the ethical blunder involved in its view that morality is compulsory (p. 22), this theory ignores that the State itself represents the will of an individual or individuals, and as such has no autho- rity over the individual except such as the intrinsic excellence of its ends confers upon it (p. 170). The subordination of Ethics to Politics is established in a different way in those ancient systems in which the importance of the individual was overlooked out of regard for the welfare of the State. THE METHODS OF ETHICS 39 f 7. The Methods of Ethics. Though the science of Ethics is closely related to several departments of knowledge, such as Meta- physics, Psychology, Sociology, and Politics, yet, by reason of its unique scope or aim, it is different from them all, and cannot be looked upon as a department of any one of them. Accordingly, the method of ethical investigation must be a unique The true method, which is different from the methods of the .f j^^^ ™''^^^ other sciences. The nature of the true ethical being method may be indicated by the following con- siderations : — (i) The true method is philosophical, in so far as it is involved in a search after the end of human life, or after that "central principle of moral or spiritual life " by which the contents of that life are reduced to a harmonious system. It is, again, 7iot neither philosophical, in so far as it does not descend to the P^^^^^^P ^^* study of the ethical problem from a comprehensive view of the universe as a whole, but proceeds from an analytical examination of the facts of human personality with a view to determine the highest human good. (2) Again, the true method is psychological, in so far as it examines the facts of human personality with a view to determine the highest human good. It is, however, not psychological, in so far as it does norpsycho- not aim at the discovery of the " positive " laws of °^^^ ' conduct, but the discovery of " regulative " or " nor- mative " principles. \ neither bio- logical nor historical. 40 SCOPE OF ETHICS; ETHICAL METHODS (3) Again, the true method is not biological, though conduct may be biologically interpreted as a series of outward movements adapted as means to ends ; for the scope of Ethics is not an inquiry into the origin of conduct, but an inquiry into its value. (4) Again, the true method is not historical, for Ethics does not propose to study the customs, the institutions, the laws, and the moral ideas prevalent in human societies from the earliest known epoch to the modern times. Though such a study can- not fail to elucidate the laws of moral progress, yet the aim of Ethics is not to discover by induction the positive laws of human progress, but to inter- pret that progress as moral, or in relation to the Moral Ideal. The true ethi- The facts of moral Hfe are sufficiently unique to cal method, • i.-r .1 1 . /. J ^ though unique, J^^tity the adoption of a unique method in ethical investigation. The feeling of remorse, however akin it may be, for example, to regret for malpronun- ciation (p. 163), is something distinct ; it involves the sense of having freely determined oneself towards a worse object in the presence of a better. The ethical facts, as will be seen later on, derive their significance through connection with man's self-conscious and self-determining being, and any method which loses sight of this peculiarity of man's personality is bound to be erroneous. While vindicating the unique character of the true ethical method, it should be, however, admitted that the facts of moral life are sufficiently complicated to THE TRUE ETHICAL METHOD 41 justify the adoption of a combined method. A involves a proper combination of the methods above indicated combination would be corrective of the bias which would lean of several towards any one view in disparagement of the rest. ™^^ Prof Stewart has distinguished these methods as " the method of imaginative representation " and " the positive method," which latter, again, may be either "descriptive" or "genetic."* The method of imaginative representation corresponds to the philosophical method, as above indicated ; it lays stress on "the sweet hope which is the principle of life itself," the desire to be " as perfect as God is perfect," and sets forth, in vivid touches, the image of a perfect state as the highest goal of being. The descriptive and the genetic methods correspond to the psychological and the biological-and-historical methods respectively. The descriptive method confines its attention to the Type as it has been evolved in the civilisation of the race, and indicates the relations of the impulses and habits of the individual as well as the relations of the different sections of the community, to the prevalent Type. The genetic method sets forth the steps by which the type has been gradually evolved in the conscious- ness of the race, and indicates the lines along which further progress is practicable. That a proper com- bination of these methods would be exceedingly useful in elucidating the facts of moral life, goes without saying.-f* * See " Ethics " (Art. Enc. Brit. Supplement). t Cf. Cousin's maxim, borrowed from Leibnitz, that Martineau's classification of the ethical methods. 45 SCOPE OF ETHICS; ETHICAL METHODS Martineau * calls the true ethical method Idio- psychological {Uiov, one's own, peculiar). His classification of the ethical methods is here sub- joined. It should be noted that his classification of methods is also a classification of systems, for ethical systems differ through the adoption of different methods of ethical investigation. " systems are true by what they affirm, but false by what they deny" (Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 102 and P- 342)— a maxim which Sidgwick {Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau, p. 316) thus explains: li^rror m philosophy, or at least error that is or has been widely accepted, is never error pure and simple, but contains an element of truth, exaggerated and distorted by neglect of other elements." * Martineau's classification of ethical methods, which has considerable merit, brings into prominence the unique character of moral facts, together with the important distinc- tion between the psychological and the unpsychological methods. Morality seems to be peculiar to man as a being capable of self-consciousness and self-determination (pp. 83, 92). If we comprehend man within a wider group of objects,' if we regard " the phenomena of human mind as part of the whole aggregate of natural phenomena," we may just ignore his peculiar characteristic ;— hence the weakness of the philosophical method when it becomes unpsychological, i.e, when it ignores the necessity of beginning ethical investiga- tion with a study of man's moral nature as it now is. At the same time, Martineau's classification cannot be accepted without important reservations. The actual Types of ethical theory are not so sharply distinguishable as Martineau holds them to be. The psychological method has been largely, though subordinately, used in the systems which are classed as unpsychological. The biological method may be brought under the physical or even the metaphysical according as the theory of evolution involves purely " positive " or metaphysical and more or less theistic considerations. The "dianoetic" and the "aesthetic" methods, again, do not so widely differ from what Martineau calls the " idiopsychological " as to MARTINEAU'S CLASSIFICATION 43 justify their being placed in a different class. The dianoetic or rational moralists reduce the moral intuitions of men to general truths or principles ; the aesthetic or sentimental moralists give prominence, in our moral intuitions, to the feelings of liking and disliking which, it is said, good and bad things, like beautiful and ugly things, directly inspire. As such, their methods are different from Martineau's. But the difference just constitutes varieties within the "idio- psychological " method rather than species essentially different from it. > O ^ © T3 K a? > 40 PL, « ^ eS .to O o c si S s I.; n O ~ a o ■>« "^ i» o o 2 o - m ® 35 C3 o log e8 fl o 2.2 S***- a b! 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T/ie Analysis of Desire* It is the aim of Ethics to give us an insight into the nature of the highest good which is an object of human desire. It may be supposed that by analysing desire we shall get an insight into the nature of the highest good. To this supposition it may be objected that the analysis of desire will reveal only what men desire and not what men ought to desire ; in other words, that a purely psycho- logical method serves to discover only " positive " laws but not " regulative " principles. However, every regulative principle implies that man is subject to certain hindrances; a regulative prin- ciple of morals, for example, which commands us to desire certain things rather than other things, implies that it is possible for us to desire things other than those which we ought to desire. Hence * The word " desire " is here taken in the widest sense, to denote " any spring of action characterised by the idea or preconception of the object aimed at." It denotes the ego- istic springs of action as well as the altruistic (the affections). 45 How the analysis of desire be- comes neces- sary from an ethical point of view, — from the standpoint of the Good, of Law, 46 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS it is necessary to inquire and to determine what things men actually or positively desire, before we can answer the ethical question as to what things men ought to desire. The psychological inquiry should precede the ethical. The necessity of beginning with a psychological inquiry is also seen, if we review the scope of Ethics from a slightly different point of view. The and of conduct subject-matter of Ethics is "conduct." Now, con- LTe^eS ^"^^ ^^y ^^ defined from a biological point of view as "a series of acts adjusted to ends"; and in this sense we can speak of the conduct of insects, birds, as well as men. But conduct thus under- stood becomes too wide for ethical treatment. It is "human" conduct that Ethics treats of; and human conduct differs from that of the lower animals in this, that the ends of conduct emerge into view in the former, whereas in the latter they are kept out of view. The acts of men are per- formed with a conscious anticipation of their objects or perceptible results. Accordingly, Ethics, while retaining the biological view, cannot overlook the inner significance of conduct ; it proceeds to the consideration of conduct as determined by desire. It is found on analysis that every desire in- volves the following intellectual, affective, and active elements :—(^) An idea or representation of the object aimed at ; {b) a feeling of want or deficiency due to the consciousness of the inferiority of the idea to the reality ; {c) a state of tension or " striv- ing to aid the realisation of that which is only Desire ana- lysed : three elements. THE INTELLECTUAL ELEMENT 47 represented at the mbment, and recognised as such." * A. — The Intellectual Element : the Object of Desire. It is with regard to the intellectual element in desire, as above indicated, that psychologists are at issue. It is granted that every desire involves the idea of the object aimed at. But what is that object? Is it pleasure? Can we hold that in desiring anything we are aiming only at pleasure P The answers to these questions are by no means indifferent to Ethics. Psychological Hedonism rests on the postulate that pleasure is the invariable object of desire, that, in everything which we seek, we are always and universally moved by the idea of a pleasure, of either a pleasure to be gained (a positive pleasure) or a pain to be avoided (a negative pleasure).f But the postulate of Psychological Hedonism overlooks an important factor of human activity. It is overlooked that a living being is "stocked with forces that determine its lines of action in the field on which it is set." \ Life itself is the source * See Sully, op. cit., pp. 387-9. t Cf. Bentham : " Nature has placed mankind under the empire of pain and pleasure. He who pretends to with- draw himself from the subjection, knows not what he says. His only object is to seek pleasure and shun pain, even at the very instant that he rejects the greatest pleasures or embraces pains the most acute." — See Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. i. " Dream not that men will move their little finger to serve you, unless their advantage in so doing be obvious to them." — Deontology, vol. ii. p. 133. I Martineau, op. cit.^ vol. ii. p. 136, A. The intel- lectual ele- ment in desire = the idea of an end. That the end is pleasure, is the assump- tion of Psy- chological Hedonism, which is here criticised. There are impulses which are not for pleasure, because they are anterior to the expe- rience of pleasure. Two kinds of impulses, primary and secoJiaary, 48 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS of original impulses which cannot be traced to the experience of pleasure or pain. If we take hunger, for example, we cannot describe it as a desire for the pleasure of food, for \i\xvi^^x precedes the eating of food and the experience of pleasure, nor can we describe it as a desire to avoid pain by the eating of food ; for though hunger is a painful feeling,* yet the idea of betaking to food in order to avoid the pain, is consequent on the experience which _/b/A?z£/j hunger instead of preceding it. '' The experience- philosophers forget that without instinctive forces there would be no experience to be had, in a world where food does not drop into the mouth, etc." •)• There are original impulses which precede and de- termine the experience of pleasure or pain, as well as other impulses in which the idea of a pleasure takes the lead ; the former may be called the primary, the latter the secondary, springs of action.^ The fact that life itself is the source of activities anterior to the experience of pleasure and pain THREE KINDS OE ACTIVITY 49 * u Hunger," says Sidgwick, " is a neutral excitement ; it becomes definitely painful in the case of exceptionally pro- longed abstinence from food." — Methods of Ethics, p. 47. t Martineau, op. cit., p. 136. See also Muirhead, op. cit., pp. 147-8. \ There are, no doubt, several cases in which action originates out of an experience of pleasure. First a pleasuce is felt ; then its idea or image is formed in the mind ; and there is *' an action to procure it again." But there are cases in which impulse (here Q.2Xi^d. primary) takes the lead, and pleasure is consequent on the satisfaction of the impulse itself The pleasure thus produced may, in its turn, generate an impulse to procure it again. Impulse thus originated is, of course, secondary. 1%1 i^ ^ becomes apparent when we review the acts of the lower as well as the higher forms of life. A living being has to fulfil two ends, viz., self-preservation and race-preservation ; the former arising out of egoistic wants, or the imperfections of the organism itself; the latter arising out of altruistic wants, or the need of reproducing and (in the higher forms of life) supporting the life of its offspring. Now (i) in the lowest forms of life, such as plant-life, the ends are kept out of view, and the activities have no conscious concomitants. A plant feeds or flowers without being aware either of the process or the end. But (2) it is in the instinctive movements of animals that the activities themselves emerge into consciousness ; they are preceded by a feeling of excitement and attended with muscular conscious- ness, but their ends are still kept out of view. Under the circumstances, there cannot be a preconception of the end or anticipation of the result of the action. There is no previous experience or knowledge. Take an instance of egoistic activity : " the bird, just released from the shell, selects with infallible precision the insects or seeds proper for its food." * Take an instance of altruistic activity : the butter- fly, which does not live to see its eggs hatched, " places them on the very leaf which the coming caterpillar likes the most, and on the under side of the leaf, where they will be the least exposed."! In The forego- ing criiicism justified. The activity of a living being is of three kinds : — (0 Plant activity, in which there is no con- sciousness of end or pro- cess. (2) Instinc- tive activity, in which there is con- sciousness of the process, but not any idea of the end. **Martineau, op. cit., p. 137. t Drummond, Ascent of Man, p. 347. D 50 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS (3) x'\ctivity prompted by desire, in which there is con- sciousness of the process as well as idea of ihe end. The idea of the end is formed out of original impulse the former case, there is no idea of food as the determining cause of the action, for the bird has just come out of its shell ; in the latter, there is no idea of the welfare of the offspring, for the butterfly has never seen it. In both the cases, therefore, the determining cause of the action is an excitement which acts without the mediation of a conscious idea. We, of course, wonder at the marvellous adjustment of movement* to unforeseen ends, how the animal is driven in the precise direction in which it should move ; but the origin of instinctive movements is as yet shrouded in mystery.* (3) It is in the higher animals that the ends of their spontaneous movements gradually appear into view. " A hungry lion may be more or less clearly aware of the nature of the object it seeks." f It is at this stage that the activity may be said to be caused by desire. We have seen that the instinc- tive movements of animals are superior to the movements of plants, since the former are, but the latter are not, attended with conscious concomi- tants ; in both, however, the ends are o?(t of view. It is in desire that the end first comes into view ; hunger, as a desire for food, involves the idea of food — an idea which is clearly derived from experi- * See Stephen, Elernents of Psychology^ pp. 384-8. t See Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 45. " It is obvious that every instinctive act in an animal with a memory must cease to be * blind ' after being once repeated, and must be accompanied with foresight of its * end 'just so far as that end may have fallen under the animal's cognisance."-— W. James, Principles of Psychology^ vol. ii. p. 390. TtVO KINDS OF DESIRES 5t ence. But it must not be supposed that experience alone generates desire ; experience co-operates with the spontaneous impulse which it has followed. In the case of a newly-born child as much as in the case of a bird just released from its shell, hunger is an original impulse anterior to the experience of food, but, combined with the experience of food, the original impulse becomes (in the more intelli- gent animals) transformed into a desire for food. Is it also transformed, at the same time, into a desire for the pleasure of the food ? Now it is undeniable that even the first taste of food is pleasant: it satisfies the hunger. Should we not then say, with the Psychological Hedonist, that the desire for a pleasant object, like the food and the desire for its pleasure, are identical ? To identify the two desires, however, is to overlook an import- ant difference. There is a distinction between a pleasure in the idea and the idea of a pleasure. Food, for example, has a '' felicific aspect " of its own ; it not only has this aspect, but must have it, since it satisfies an original craving of the organ- ism. Were the taking of food unpleasant and at the same time necessary for the organism, then, since unpleasant things would be naturally avoided, there would be a perpetual discord between want and its fulfilment, and the organism would hardly be able to cope with the environment (p. 36). There is thus pleasure in the idea of food— yet the food may not be desired for the sake of the pleasure. {a) As we have seen, hunger as an impulse exists and a gratify- ing expe- rience, the latter being pleasant. But the de- sire need not htfor the pleasure. There are two kinds of desires — (i) for an object which is pleasant, and (2) for the pleasure of the object — which are thus distin- guished : — 52 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS (a) The for- mer, though conscious of the end, is still directed chiefly to- wards the object ; the latter is more com- plex, and suggests a pleasure- seeking disposition. ((5) The idea of pleasure is latent in the former, but dominant in the latter. (0 The for- mer seeks its object simply, the latter pursues its object with greater com- plexity, (O The for- mer, when satisfied, al- ways gives pleasure, the latter may be frustrated. even when there is no experience of food ; when that experience supervenes, the original impulse is not lost or destroyed, it is only transformed, it becomes self-conscious, it "contemplates its own effect " ; and though there is an affective element in the idea of food, yet it is/ood, and not Xh^ pleasure of the food, which continues to be the object of the impulse. In desiring food for the sake of its pleasure, we rise to a more definite point of view, we exhibit a pleasure-loving character or disposi- tion. {U) In the simple desire for an object which satisfies, the " felicific aspect " of the satisfaction may not emerge into distinct consciousness, whereas in the desire for the satisfaction itself, it is the felicific aspect which predominates, {c) Again, a gourmand desires food for the sake of its pleasure, even when he is not hungry ; knowing, however, that hunger gives an additional zest to the food, he performs " actions designated to stimulate hunger,'' * and often " controls the primary impulse in order to prolong and vary the process of satis- fying it." {d) It is, besides, a well-known paradox, that pleasures hotly pursued are lost, that the best way to get our pleasures is not to seek them at all but to act with an unselfish motive, and pleasure will be obtained by the way ; in other words, action from the idea of a pleasure often defeats its own aim, but action from a spontaneous impulse always gives an unexpected pleasure when the object is attained. We find, accordingly, reason to distin- * Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics^ p. 47. THE AFFECTIVE ELEMENT 53 guish between \h.(t primary desires and the secondary the former being those which urge towards "ap- propriate objects or natural expression," the latter being those in which there is the preconception of a pleasure to be attained. B. — The Affective Element : Desire as Want. Besides the intellectual element, which is an idea either of an object which satisfies or of the satisfaction itself, desire involves an affective ele- ment, a feeling of want or shortcoming which continues so long as the idea is not realised. Now, every desire is/^r a self, for some mode of personal existence from which a want has been removed, and, thus, every desire has an egoistic aspect. But we should not overlook an important distinction. There are wants which proceed from imperfection as well as wants which arise out of fulness or abundance. A weary, feverish eye shuns even the dim light of a cloudy day, and seeks relief in darkness ; a healthy, vigorous eye craves stimula- tion, and welcomes the burst of sunlight which breaks and scatters the clouds. A traveller may seek a companion either because he is afraid to make the journey alone, or because his heart is too full of a joy which he must share with another. Even among the lower animals it is seen that they do not spend their energy only to satisfy their own self-regarding wants, but give themselves up for the benefit of their offspring.* The mother's love * In contradiction of Bentham's caustic remark (quoted on p. 47), let me quote Spencer, " Without gratis benefits to B, The affec- tive element = a feeling of want ; hence every desire is, in a sense, egoistic. But there are two kinds of want — want from imper- fection, and want from fulness ; the latter cannot be resolved into the former. 54 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS for the child, friendship which is carried " greatly on one side without due correspondence on the other," * charity which spends out of its own abun- dance, are feelings which cannot be traced to the need of satisfying a selfish want. The desires that they give birth to cannot be described as aversions from personal pain— because the pain may be removed "most easily by merely turning our thoughts from the external suffering that causes it," but here the feelings prompt us " to do good to others for their sake and not our own." Nor can they be described as desires for pleasure, for the pleasure is " one which can only be obtained on the express condition of its being not sought." In cases like these, we find that the heart wants an object because it is fully prepared to love ; and, in fact, true genuine love of any kind arises from fulness rather than deficiency, and is as far re- moved as possible from a hankering after selfish satisfaction. It is a contention of Psychological Hedonism that the altruistic desires have grown out of the offspring, life could not have continued."— P^z'/za^/^i- of Ethics, vol. ii. p. 5. Prof. Stewart, op. cit., quoting Spencer, says : " Although egoism, biologically considered, comes before altruism, yet ' from the dawn of life altruism has been no less essential than egoism.' 'Self-sacrifice is no less primordial than self-preservation.' Scientific ethics has to recognise the fact that egoism «;?^ altruism co-exist." * " Why should I cumber myself with regrets that the re- ceiver is not capacious ? It never troubles the sun that some of his rays fall wide and vain into ungrateful space, and only a small part on the reflecting planet."— Emerson, Essays, THE ACTIVE ELEMENT 55 egoistic in accordance with the law of transference of feeling. According to this theory (associated with the name of Hartley), an object (such as the Hartleyan child to the mother) is interesting because it relieves ^^^^JJ °/ ^^^ a pain or yields a pleasure ; gradually, as * the altruistic "standing cause of numerous agreeable states, it '^^f^^^^^^^ gathers upon itself, by association of ideas, the interest of them all," and, drawing towards it a disinterested affection, like the miser's love for gold, begins to be desired for its own sake. — This ingen- ious theory overlooks the fact, that without a deep spontaneity, affection such as the mother's is un- equal to the feat of absolute self-sacrifice demanded of it. The miser cannot part with his gold ; but the Spartan mother was ready with her injunction to her son on his way to the battle-field, " Return with the shield, or on it." C—The Active Ele7nent : Desire, Motive, Intention, Act, If we now take the active element in desire into account, we shall find it to be more or less com- plicated by various factors. The simplest desire is a craving, it may be for the unattainable, as, for instance, the desire to return to the happy days of childhood ; it may be, again, a passing or fugitive desire, vanishing no sooner than formed. A desire of this description does not pass into any act, nor is it transformed into a wisk. In order that a desire may pass into an act, it must be converted into a motive by being combined with motor repre- C. The ac- tive element in desire may be simple or complex. Desire as simple crav- ing, how trans- formed into a motive. Motive de- fined. Desire, how transformed into a wish. Wish de- fined. A wish in- volves the simultaneous presence of desires, 56 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS sentations ; in other words, a "motive" is a "desire which combines with the idea of an object the idea of the particular line of action needed to attain the object," and is thus a " desire transformed into an incentive or excitant to action." * Again, as there are desires which are not motives, so there are desires which are not wishes. A desire may be a passing or fugitive state of the mind ; a wish is a desire preferred, and so made dominant! Suppose, while lying on a bed of illness, I begin to think of certain doctors of the locality ; I desire to call in this, that, or the other doctor, but I actually call in the doctor whom I wish to call in. I give him the preference, and in sending for him I exclude other alternatives. A wish thus involves the simultaneous presence of several desires, of which one is selected, appropriated by the self and made its own, while the others are excluded. The formation of a wish is analogous to the process of attention, which results in '' a raising in point of intensity, completeness, and definiteness of certain sensations or other psychical phenomena, and a corresponding lowering of other simultaneously- presented sensations, etc." J A wish involves the simultaneous presence of * Sully, op. cit, p. 392. t We may, as is commonly done, use the word " motive " in the sense of "wish" as here defined. In that case, we should distinguish between" motive" in a psychological sense (as defined above) and "motive" in an ethical sense, as identical with "wish." I •Sully, op. cit, p. 80, INTENTION 57 more than one desire, and also implies that those and in- r . 1 n- ^ -j-t- volves also a desires are m a state of greater or less conflict with ^^^^^^^ ^f one another. Suppose, in the instance given above, desires ; after mature reflection on their respective abilities, I wish to call in one of the doctors, but another doctor happens to be strongly recommended by a common friend ; there is naturally a conflict of desires, and, in acting upon my wish, I dare the displeasure of my friend. A wish or 7notive (see footnote, p. 56), thus complicated, becomes an it is thus an « . , .. /7-*^r intention, intention. An intention presupposes a co7ifltct ot desires as well as consent to a particular act. " To Intention de- act intentionally, is to have proposed to one's self the accomplishment of that very act, to have chosen it, to have consented to it, and to have accepted it with all its consequences." * An intention, accord- Intention and ingly, becomes indicative of cJiaracter or a settled disposition. In the foregoing instance, if I dis- regard the advice of my friend, I show an inde- pendent character. A boy who continues to eat his food in spite of the appearance of a big dog, shows an intrepid character ; a man who keeps his promise to " call " in spite of bad weather, shows a true or trustwo7'thy character. An intention f may be divided into two parts ; the first, being constituted by those considerations * Janet, op. cit.^ p. 276. t The word "intention" is very ambiguous. It some- times means the "motive," as "my intention in writing the book was to gain fame " ; sometimes a " project," as " I intend to go to Darjeeling this summer." It has also the sense given to it in the text, Character. \l f TT Motive and Intention. Intention = Motive + de- terrent. Intention and Act. 58 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS which urge tozvards an action (the persuasives), is the "motive"; the second, being constituted by those considerations which urge away from that action (the dissuasives), is the "deterrent." An "intention" is, accordingly, larger than the "motive"; "it comprises the whole contemplated results of an act, both those for the sake of which (the motive), and those in spite of which (the deterrent), the action is done." Thus, in the fore- going instance, when I have called in the doctor whom I have chosen, I have not only acted upon the motive of getting myself cured, but further intended to suffer the displeasure of my friend. The motive of a thief and an honest trader are the same, viz., love of gain ; but the thief wishes to enrich himself at the expense of another, and it is this circumstance that makes their intentions very different.* An intention, again, should be distinguished from the act which embodies it. Brutus intended to kill Caesar, but, as he explains himself in Shake- speare's play, — " Between the acting of a dreadful thing And the first motion, all the interim is Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream : The genius and the mortal instruments Are then in council ; and the state of man, Like to a little kingdom, suffers then The nature of an insurrection." t CLASSIFICATION OF DESIRES 59 * See Martineau, op. cit., p. 272. t Julius CcEsar^ II. i. 63-69. We thus see that between the intention and the act there is an "interim" which may be full of " insurrection," or a frequent renewal of the conflict which was only partially settled in forming the intention ; on account of this insurrection, it requires a strong " force of will " to carry out the intention.* 2. Classification of Desires, The foregoing analysis of desire has shown that the end of desire is either an object which satisfies, or the satisfaction itself; it is now possible to bring all desires under two cldiSSQS, primary and secondary ; the former consciously directed towards "appro- priate objects," the latter towards the pleasure that was found to accompany the gratification of the former. There are thus secondary desires which are the counterparts of the primary, each primary im- pulse being transformed by the supervening love of pleasure into a corresponding secondary impulse. It is necesssary here to observe that in classifying desires, we should take into consideration the idea of the end or object aimed at, and not the mere feeling or emotion which desire, besides the idea, involves. Emotions, as such, i.e, apart from the ends or objects with which they are intimately associated, cannot be classified save broadly into pleasures and pains ; it is only when the effects contemplated are taken along with the emotions * See, on the whole subject, the excellent analysis in Mackenzie, op. cit., book i. ch. i. Two kinds ot desires, primary and secondary. The classifica- tion of desires is properly a classification of ends. i 6o THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS PRIMA R Y DESIRES 6i The existence of mixed desires con- stitutes a difficulty in scientific classification, which, how- ever, need not be attempted in Ethics. Martineau's classification of " springs of action " — (psychological order). that spur from within, that a significant classifica- tion becomes possible. It should be noted that the foregoing rule has been observed in classifying desires into "primary" and "secondary." We should now ask if we can divide them still further, or systematically enumerate the various ends or objects that engage human endeavour. This is admittedly a difficult task — there is, in certain desires (love of fame, for example), a mixture of ends too intimate to allow their being placed in a proper class. But this difficulty, which properly belongs to the psychological study of desires, need not be insuperable in ethical investigation, i.e. in the determination of their moral values ; we may, for example, determine the moral worth of fame relatively with regard to the love of knowledge, beauty, or goodness, for its own sake, even though we do not precisely know the class in which to put "that last infirmity of noble minds," which "the clear spirit doth raise, to scorn delights and live laborious days." While, then, it is not strictly necessary to classify desires for ethical investiga- tion, Martineau's classification of what he calls the "springs of action," which possesses considerable interest, may be here taken into consideration. I. Primary. {a) Propensions, which arise from the necessity for maintaining or continuing the physical life. 1. Appetites, having reference to food and sex. 2. Spontaneity, or the impulse towards physical activity, alternating with repose, (b) Passions, which appear as repulsions, thrust- ing away what is hurtful or ugly, or with- drawing us thence. 1. Antipathy, or dislike for an evil which is present. 2. Anger, or aversion towards what has just hurt us. 3. Fear, or aversion towards a future evil. {c) Affections, which appear as attractions towards other persons or living beings reminding us of our kind. 1. Parental, directed towards the child in whom the parental being is con- tinued and the parental image re- newed. 2. Social, directed towards our equals, who are not, however, our absolute equals or mere self-repetitions. 3. Compassion, directed towards those who are in want. (r Reason, and not at all as it exists (if it exists at all) outside of Reason ; it is also meant that the various relations in which it exists are themselves the product of thought, and cannot exist apart from it. "The understanding," said Kant, ''makes nature." To comprehend this position rightly, let us begin, like Kant, to inquire how the knowledge of a given content or matter of experience becomes possible. We cannot at all entertain the supposition that the NECESSITY AND OBJECTIVITY 79 mind is a tabula rasa, a mere blank possibility which is passively impressed by an object — for, from the very beginning, there is no impression unless it is brought under the activity of conscious- ness or knowledge. The act of knowledge is co- ordinate with the experience, but is not subordinate to it. "Knowledge," said Kant, "begins on the occasion of experience, but is not derived from it," for the act of knowledge involves the application of certain principles which cannot be derived from experience by mere association of ideas. Those principles are characterised by {a) necessity, and ib) objectivity or impersonality. Unless we know a thing in necessary relation to another thing, we do not know it at all : thus, I cannot call an object fire, unless I know that it must burn ; if I suppose that it may burn or may not burn, I do not know it to be fire at all. Similarly, anything which is known to exist, manifests its existence as an object of knowledge to all rational beings ; this is what distinguishes it from the mere subjective phantasy of a dream, and makes it an objective fact or reality accessible to all intelligence. Now if know- ledge is based on necessary and strictly universal principles, it is clear that it cannot be derived from experience, for " experience teaches us what is, but not what inust be " ; again, experience is personal or subjective, but knowledge is impersonal or objective. By no merely mechanical aggregation of impressions, such as the Sensational theory* of * Sully, op. cit., p. 31.1. x>., which are presup- posed by the possi- bility of ex- perience it- self, and, hence, are co-ordinate with experi- ence : and which, being charac- terised by necessity and objectivity^ cannot be derived by (inductive) generalisa- tion from ex- perience — because ex- perience it- self is con- tingent and subjective ; \t hence ex/)e- rience cannot provide for its own syn- thesis. Summary of results. The relation of Reason to desire. 80 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS the origin of knowledge has in view, can know- ledge, characterised by necessity and objectivity, originate. Both the possibility of experience and the synthesis of its manifold are alike rational. The study of the relation of Reason to conscious life in general has thus led us to the following conclusions : — (i) Every object is intelligible only in relation to other objects. (2) Every object is intelligible only in relation to a knowing subject. This involves — {a) Every object exists /?r a knowing subject. (b) The knowing subject is the unifying principle in the whole cosmos of experience ; because Reason is the source of those necessary and strictly uni- versal principles which cannot be derived from experience but are presupposed by it. A mere aggi"egation of sensible impressions cannot provide for its own synthesis. {c) Reason " objectifies " an object, i,e, makes it true for all intelligent beings. Having now determined the relation of Reason to conscious life in general, we are in a position to discover the true place of Reason in moral life. Moral life consists of a series of acts performed with desire, and the function assigned to Reason in the economy of moral life is best discovered by investigating the relation of Reason to desire. (i) In the first place, we find Reason to be at work in the very evolution of desire out of blind instinctive or irrational impulse. Every desire REASON IN RELATION TO DESIRE 81 involves the idea of an object ; a rational being acting from desire, anticipates the end or result of his action ; even a child, crying for food, has already formed the idea of food. But what is here neces- sary to observe is that as a being advances in knowledge, the idea of the desired object grows more and more complex. We have seen that to a rational being an object is intelligible only in virtue of its relation to other objects ; and, accord- ingly, it is proper to conclude that to a rational being every object of desire exists in relation either of harmony or discord with the objects of other possible desires. It is of course possible to desire one thing exclusively ; but in the adult conscious- ness there is at least an implicit inclusion of other objects in, or implicit exclusion of other objects from, the given object of desire. As our inner and outer experiences taken together form a " universe of experience" (every part of which is related to other parts), so our desires taken together form " a universe of desire " (the object of every desire being related to the objects of other desires). Thus, for example, if we compare a child's desire for food with an adult's desire for the same object, we find that the latter is more complex than the former. On the one hand, the child's desire is for an object which satisfies a particular craving, the adult's desire is for an object which satisfies several desires which are in harmony with one another ; the child thinks of the food only, but the latter, with his broader view of the relation of things, F (i) Reason reveals the objects of de- sire in rela- tion to one another ; hence, by a rational be- ing, no ob- ject can be desired without its entering into relation, either of harmony or of discord, with the ob- jects of sim- ultaneous other desires. (2) Reason reveals the objects of desire in re- lation to a desiring sub- ject ; hence it follows that — (a) Nothing can be 82 T//E PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS thinks not of the food only but of other things, such as the resulting strength of body and the power to do one's duty. On the other hand, the child's self being comparatively simple, there is not much possibility of his mind being divided between con- flicting desires — and he is hardly capable of sacrifice ; but in the mind of the adult the idea of an object may stand in opposition to other objects which are also at the same time the objects of his desire ; so that he is called upon to make sacrifices, or exclude certain objects and give preference to others, and thus establish that higher unity which marks the growth of moral life ; like Sidney at Zutphen, he may decline to gratify his thirst, even at the risk of his own life, for the sake of a higher aim. We thus see that Reason reacts on the blind impulses with which we begin our animal life, and transforms them, subjecting them to a process by which they cease to be blind and mechanical — {a) with the induced idea or anticipation of the objects to be realised, and {U) with the revelation of those objects as they stand in various relations of harmony or discord with one another. (2) In the second place. Reason, in showing the objects of our desires in relation to one another, also exhibits them in relation to the self That all our desires exist in close relation to a thinking subject, becomes apparent from the following con- siderations : — {a) Every desire is desire //' his consciousness the whole vault of heaven and the whole infinity of space-relations and colour-relations which lie within his field of * Janet, op. cit., p. 372. THE INFLUENCE OF ACTIONS 97 vision." * So, too, the act by which a man controls his passion determines for himself a new character and a new moral world (or atmosphere). "The old order changeth, yielding place to new " ; not only is there a new order among his impulses, which do no longer maintain with regard to one another their former relative strength, but if he still lives amid his former circumstances, these have changed for him, for they do not excite him as formerly ; nay, gradually, change may be intro- duced into the circumstances themselves; his former companions, in whose society his passion found a congenial culture, may drop off; he perhaps seeks new companions ; and thus his newly-formed virtue creates round it a new society and a new atmosphere, in which it finds healthy development! * D'Arcy, op. cit., p. 28. t There are three distinct meanings of the term " freedom " as applied to the will. It may mean — (i) the power of choosing without motives ; (2) the power of acting in accord- ance with reason in spite of conflicting impulses ; (3) the quality of always acting in accordance with reason. The first meaning is involved in the Theory of Indifference criti- cised above. The second is the sense here adopted. The third meaning underlies the conception of man's highest state as a state of salvation or liberation from bondage — a state from which, not sin only, but the very possibility of sin has been eliminated. (See Sidgwick, "Ethics," Art. Enc. Brit.). Into the conception of man's highest state certain con- siderations enter which seem to justify the Theory of Determinism. In the first place, here is just that harmony of duty with interest, character with conduct, in which the greatest happiness becomes identical with the greatest pleasure ; and virtuous conduct no longer involves conflict, but is the spontaneous outcome of the highest and most complete virtue. It is with this view of a virtuous character G The current view does not adequately grasp the de- pendence of the individual life in its entirety upon the social life. 98 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS 6. Relation of the Individual to Society. We have thus far considered the moral life of the individual apart from that of the society of which he is a member. But it must be understood that the individual apart from the society is an unreal abstraction. The current view of the relation between the in- dividual and society is, that while society presents certain obvious advantages to the individual,* and, in consideration, makes certain obvious demands upon his time and energy — demands which he ought to fulfil in so far as he is a member of that society, or lives ^. public life — still he has di private life of his own, where he is the lord and master, where society does not intrude and should not that Emerson writes : " Our moral nature is vitiated by any interference of our will. We love characters in proportion as they are impulsive and spontaneous." In the second place, it is held that this ideal state, from which all struggle has vanished, can be secured only through the influx into the human soul of the life of God, the absolute and unqualified Bliss. As Emerson writes : " There is no merit in virtue. Either God is there, or He is not there. The less a man thinks or knows about his virtues, the better we like him " {Spiritual Laws). These views of man's final state of blessed- ness appear to justify Determinism. It is, however, a case of determination by the Good, in which also, as in all antecedent stages of moral endeavour, there is involved rational self- surrender on the part of the human will (p. 94, footnote). * "Society develops intelligence, comfort, the sentiments of justice, equality, fraternity, goodwill, and cheerfulness, which would have been unattainable in a severe and pro- longed solitude."— Elie Reclus, " Ethnography " (Art. Enc, Brit.). MAN ESSENTIALL V A SOCIAL BEING 99 interfere, where he is the creator of his own happi- ness and discharges duties that he owes to himself alone. It cannot be denied that this view is, at least partially, justified by considerations to be indicated afterwards. But it should not be allowed to rest on a misapprehension of the true nature of the bond that binds man to man. Man is essentially a social being. We cannot look upon society as a loose group of individuals accidentally, or by the merest casual combination of circumstances, brought together. Very little reflec- tion is needed to show that the individual man is Theindivi- not possible without a social organisation, however ^^^^ ^^ the rudimentary. He is descended from a social race, society both i.e. a race in which the altruistic tendencies have as regards his been already developed and a more or less complex ° ' ^ ^°^^ social structure (whether it be that of the tribe or the family) already established. The human infant is born in a state of such physical imperfec- tion and utter helplessness, that it must be the constant object of " tenderness, gentleness, unself- ishness, love, care, sacrifice," in order to continue in its merely physical life ; and the various comforts which are so necessary for its life are the result of an industry which involves the co-operation of a number of individuals. It is impossible, in any account of the social organisation, to start with the individual, to regard him and other individuals as isolated '* atoms," whose fortuitous concourse has built up society ; the true social unit is not the individual : it is the tribe or the family. and his men- tal develop- ment : consequently his life does not belong to himself alone, but also to society. loo THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS But society makes possible not only the indivi- dual li/ey but also the individual mind. This is at once evident when we consider the parts played by a common language — " essentially a social institu- tion " — in the development of intelligence, and by such agencies as imitation and sympathy in the development of emotions and movements. No less evident is the influence of society in the develop- ment of desires. These desires are ordinarily classified into the self-regarding or the egoistic, and the extra-regarding or the altruistic desires. But the ends of both kinds of desires so "cross and interlace" with one another, that any distinction among them cannot be made final or absolute.* It follows from the foregoing considerations that the life of every man does not, properly speaking, belong to himself alone, it belongs also to society. He cannot preserve, improve, or degrade it without affecting the life of the community. He may be more or less unaware of the bond which binds him to others, and act, as it were, from blind impulse ; * "Nothing seems more individualistic than the desire for life. But the moment we think of it, we see how in a rational being it is his social significance which makes life valuable to him. It is doubtful whether in a moment of peril a normally constituted individual thinks of himself first, or even at all, except so far as he is related to others. His thoughts fly, e.g., to his wife and family." Again, " love in its purer forms is commonly thought to be an altruistic emo- tion, having for its object the good of the loved object. Yet it may on occasions take forms (as it did in Romola after the death of her father) in which the good of the loved object does not enter as an element." — Muirhead, op.cit., pp. 166-7. THE HIGHEST GOOD A COMMON GOOD lol but he cannot rationally conceive the end of his activity without perceiving how it affects the whole community, he cannot conceive of himself except as part of that larger self (the "tribal self" or system) of which he is a member. If in aiming at a purely selfish good he harms the community, he, in truth, stands self-condemned. " The offender, being descended from a social race " — and having, in fact, from the social order in which he lives, derived that intelligence and those resources which he employs in his selfish pursuit — " is unable to escape his conscience, the voice of his tribal self" (or the common Reason), "which says, * In the name of the tribe, I hate myself for this treason which I have done.' " * It is now evident that the highest good cannot Hence the be anything else than a common good. By this is ^^^^ j^^° meant that, as a rational being, " man cannot con- vidual is a template himself in a better state or on the way to ^^"^"^°" ^°°^' *■ •'being share- the best, without contemplating others, not only as able with all means to that better state but as sharing it with "^^"' him."f The Ideal as revealed by the common or impersonal Reason in man- is a Common Ideal ; anything which is good or desirable in the highest sense is good or desirable for everybody. This principle has a positive as well as a negative side. On the one hand, it commands an individual to seek the supreme end of his life as a common good, * Clifford, Essays and Lectures^ quoted by Muirhead, op. cit., p. 159. t Green, op. cit.^ p. 210. See also pp. 414-5. to2 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS and not to be satisfied with his own perfection, but to aim at the perfection of the society to which he belongs ; to be always and in all that he does, led by the inspiring vision of a " kingdom of heaven," in which " a multitude of the redeemed " are united in partaking of the same blessed life. On the other hand, it forbids the individual to seek anything as his highest good which he cannot share with others ; he cannot obtain that self-satisfaction which attends virtuous activity if, while aiming at what he thinks to be his highest good, he hinders others from attaining their highest good ; we con- demn the despot who rides by enslaving others, and the thief who enriches himself by robbing others. We have already seen (p. 6Z) that the test or criterion of Virtue is a complete satisfaction or happiness — a happiness which is not the same as the pleasure that results from gratifying a single desire : which frequently results from refusing to gratify a desire, and is, therefore, frequently, as regards its quantity, a pain or loss of pleasure. We have now to rise to a higher point of view, and see that as Virtue does not consist in the gratifica- tion of a single desire unless that desire aims at Virtue itself or at complete self-satisfaction, so it does not consist in the attainment by the ing the larger individual of his own good except as this involves self, called ^.j^^^. good whicli satisfies the larger or social self; society, ^ , ^ ^ ' nay, he will have to sacrifice his own good {as pleasure) in order to accomplish a social good ; it must be said, however, that, as a natural impulse and being capable of satisfy THE LARGER SELF loj which is denied its gratification for the sake of Virtue is not destroyed but is transfigured (a mother, refusing to spoil her child with kindness, loves it with but a deeper love), so an individual sacrificing his own pleasure for the sake of the which self is social good is still perfectly satisfied when he '^^^'^^^ realises that he participates in a life larger than his self-sacrifice on own, in a blessedness ampler than what he could |||^ PfJ^^°| ^^^ have attained if he had lived in isolation. Of Christ, it is said that he dwelt among men ; and as Green points out with perfect justice, " the educated citizen of Christendom* is able to think of the perfect life as essentially conditioned by the exercise of virtues, resting on a self-sacrificing will, in which it is open to all men to participate, and as fully attainable by one man only in so far as through those virtues it is attained by all." f * It is the noble mission of Christianity to reveal the highest good as a common good, to show how man is united to man in the common Reason or the universal Logos, as the branches are united to one another in the vine. t The student should guard himself agamst a possible mis- conception. He should not suppose that every good which he seeks or every object of his desire, must be shared with all men. In most cases, such a supposition results in an absurdity. If I aim at a place in an office, and obtain it, I necessarily exclude others from obtaining the same. In fact, the quality of shareability does hardly belong to the objects of our particular desires, concerning which, Dante regretfully said — " O human race ! Why dost thou set thy heart Where interdict of partnership must be ? " — Purg.^ xiv. 86-7. Nor does the principle that the highest good is a social r Therefore the duties one owes to himself he also owes to society, and his vir- tues are meaningless apart from social insti- tutions. 104 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS It follows, that there is scarcely any duty which an individual owes to himself which he does not at the same time owe to society ; and his virtues, even those which are individualistic, i.e. which are not directly manifested in his dealings with other men {e.g. patience in scientific investigation), receive their significance only in the institutions of society, such as the Family, the State, and the Church.* Thus far, however, only one side of the question good, mean that what is right for one is right for every- body. It may be right for me to seek a place, but not right for another to do the same. The principle means simply this, that in desiring an object or in performing an action, one's aim should be the establishment of that peace among men, that perfect harmony of the impulses, enjoyments, and ideas of one person with those of another, which involves the exercise and the growth of those virtues which belong by right to all men. If I, inordinately or without reference to Virtue, desire any object {e.g. wealth), I am indeed guilty from a social as well as from a personal point of view. I may have desired that which does not rightfully belong to me but to another, whose personal development will be hindered if I obtain it ; and (supposing that I have a right to the object, still) in thus thoughtlessly surrendering myself to a particular desire, I have set a bad example which instigates others to follow it, and reduces society to a chaos in which the personal development of all is more or less hindered. ■* " Thyself and thy belongings Are not thine own so proper as to waste Thyself on the virtues, they on thee. Heaven doth with us as we with torches do, Not light them for themselves ; for if our virtues Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike As if we had them not. Spirits are not finely touch'd But to fine issues," etc. —Shakespeare, Measure for Measure^ I. i. 30-37. THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY 105 t ^ has been discussed ; the question has another side to it. If there is a sense in which the individual is dependent on the society to which he belongs, there is another very real sense in which he is independent of that society. His ideal is, without doubt, a social ideal ; his strivings are for an ultimate good, which is alike personal and impersonal. But he is independent of the existing order of the society about him ; this he is by virtue of his rationality and power of self-determination. He has the. right of private judgment, and may refuse to accept any belief prevalent in society without subjecting it to the scrutiny of his own reason. He has the right to refuse to submit to any social convention unless it tallies with his conception of the highest good as determined by his own reason. It is possible that he is what is called " a great man " — a man wiser than his generation ; society may repay all his attempts to teach and reform it with the dungeon, the stake, and the cross, with insult and ignominy ; but he is justified : for he is greater than society, because he is in deeper touch with "its blind longings and aspirations," and knows better than itself what it requires ; in the evolution of society he has " varied " in the right direction, and though there may be a temporary opposition from the other members of the social body, his life "sur- vives," and its influence stills the deep unrest in the heart of society, and introduces a higher order of social existence. There is a sense in which the individual is independent of society (/>. of the existing social order). His position in society may be that of '* a great man," who is superior to the existing social order because he comes closer to " the spirit of the time," and meets its requirements better. / The true basis of social union is rational self- determination. Two other views criti- cised. (i) Society is a mechan- ical system — the bond of union being self-interest. This view underlies the system of Psychological Hedonism, and is inade- quate for two reasons : — (a) It ignores the essential sociality of man. io6 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS If we now inquire into the basis of that union of individuals which we call society, we shall find it to be nothing else than rational self-determination. This becomes apparent when we examine two theories (both inadequate) which regard society as a mechanical and as an organic system respectively. (i) According to the one theory, what draws man to man is self-interest. Man has no spon- taneous tendency to seek the good of others. He seeks his own good ; and he has been induced to seek the good of others in order that he might thereby the better accomplish his own good. To him, other persons are only as instruments or tools to be looked after and cared for for his own sake. This theory underlies Hobbes' famous speculation regarding the origin of society ; * it underlies the system of Psychological Hedonism ; for if the postulate of this system be supposed to be true, if we suppose the individual to be incapable of seek- ing anything else than his own pleasure, it follows that he will not seek the pleasure of others except as a means for the attainment of his own pleasure. That this theory is erroneous, is evident from two considerations — {a) It ignores the essential sociality of man ; the individual man is impossible except * " The natural state of men is one in which all are at war with each other. But so unsatisfactory is this state, that it becomes necessary to emerge from it through a stipulated submission of all to the authority of an absolute ruler, to whom all render unconditional obedience ; thereby and thus alone ensuring the possibility of a really human existence." — Ueberweg, op. cit.^ ii. p. 40. H d THE MECHANICAL VIEW OF SOCIETY 107 in a social state where the altruistic instincts have been already formed. (^) It magnifies precisely that element in man's moral life (viz. sensibility) which is the fruitful source of discord among men ; if there are certain impulses in man (e.g. love, sympathy) which unite him to others, there are other impulses (e.g. hatred, antipathy) which create antagonism — nor can the greatest pleasure be proved to always accompany the former. In fact, what unites one man to another is his reason, which being common to all men, does not certainly magnify the individual at the ex- pense of the community. As Plato pointed out, "even pirates hold together so far as they are just, not so far as they are unjust."* In a different form, however, this theory, which views society as a mechanical system, underlies certain systems of extreme Rigorism. Here the interest of the soul does not lie in pleasure, but in the attainment of a self-hood v/hich is independent of the social organisation, though the practice of virtues may indeed be useful from a disciplinary point of view. It is impossible here to examine in detail these systems, which rest on the meta- physical supposition that the Self is altogether independent of its states. It should be said, how- ever, that these systems ignore those elements of •*^ Martineau, distinguishing between "the precarious combinations of profligate selfishness," and " the organised solidity of conscience and faith," quotes from Aristotle— " Single the path of the good, many the ways of the bad." — Study of Religion^ ii. 105. {h) Self-inte- rest cannot provide for the union of men in so- ciety. The mechan- ical view also underlies certain systems of extreme Rigorism, < which, how- ever, do not rigidly adhere to this view. (2) Society is an organic system — the bond of union being sympathy. This view underlies the system of Evolutional Hedonism, and is inade- quate for two reasons : — 108 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS human sensibility which naturally bind man to man ; and that we cannot think of any virtue except as a moral relation between one individual and another. From an ethical point of view, there- fore, these systems are imperfect ; and of this imperfection the systems themselves are apparently aware, for they make various attempts to bring back the Self from the severe solitude into which they flung it, and give back to it a society whether estab- lished in a " City of Zeus " (Stoicism), or organised into "a communion of saints" (Asceticism), or into a *' kingdom of universal intelligence " (Kant). (2) According to the other theory, what draws man to man is the growth of sympathy, by which the weal or the woe of the community becomes the weal or the woe of the individual himself. This theory is the basis of Evolutional Hedonism, which contemplates society as an organic system. *' It is as true that man is dependent upon his fellows, as that a limb is dependent upon the body." It is implied in the organic view of society, that the individual gains his properties in virtue of belong- ing to a whole (viz. society), and that the individual has no good apart from the good of the whole ; * and thus far this view is unmistakably superior to * "It would be as absurd to ask what would be the properties of a man who was not a product of the race, as to ask what would be the properties of a leg not belonging to an animal : or to ask what would be the best type of man, without considering his place in society, as to ask what would be the best kind of leg, without asking whether it be- longed to a hare or a tortoise."— L. Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. III. ORGANIC SYMPATHY 109 I \ the aforementioned mechanical view of society. But the idea of organic unity cannot be applied to society without being qualified by two very im- portant cansiderations — {a) What keeps united the parts of a living body, is a certain "organic" sympathy by which the weal or the woe of the whole becomes the weal or the woe of every part ; and the higher organisms have reached such a stage of perfected unity, that there is no " antagonism of interests " among their several parts. But what keeps men united in society, is not sympathy so much as rational self-determination ; and this for the following reason — because human sympathy has not yet attained such complete growth that an individual readily accepts the weal or the woe of the whole as his own weal or woe, and conse- quently there is always possible an antagonism of interests between one man and another, and there is always the need of self-sacrifice on the part of the individual, which self-sacrifice he cannot justify to himself save rationally {i.e. from a sense of the worthiness of the act apart from any pleasure or pain that it may bring), and which self-sacrifice he cannot perform without self-determination.* (b) In any organism a part may be amputated and thus destroyed to preserve the whole, therefore it cannot be said to possess a private good of its own. But though society apparently presents a spectacle in * "Mr Stephen prefers the term 'social tissue' to 'social organism,' because, though continuous, the race has not the unity of the higher organisms."— D'Arcy, op. cit.y p. 72. (a) Human sympathy is imperfect, and does not by itself pro- vide for self- sacrifice. (/5) The in- dividual has a personal good capable of being distinguished from the good of the whole. The true view. no THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS which " the individual withers, but the race is more and more," yet society cannot demand the destruc- tion of any individual unless his own good is thereby secured, nor does an individual rightly sacrifice himself for the community unless he attains by that sacrifice his own highest good or his own highest perfection.* The true view of society is thus neither mechanical nor organic. There is, no doubt, an instinctive factor which keeps together the units in a society. This is seen to be most powerfully active in the societies of" lower " animals ; in a hive, for instance, the bees not only "accept a common existence, avoid hurting one another, and give assistance," but live for a common aim, which exacts the utmost devotion and self-sacrifice. The instinctive factor is also present in our natural affections. But through the general feebleness of instincts in men,f or through the growth of self-consciousness, man requires to do that deliberately which an animal lower in the scale does instinctively, and that distinction between self and others, which is latent in animal consciousness, emerges in man as a discrepancy between individual pleasure and social good, to be resolved by rational action on his part. Human society is, properly, an organisation of individuals who permanently hold together only so long as they rationally direct themselves towards * "If, in the hour of reason, we should speak the severest truth, we should say that we had never made a sacrifice." — Emerson, Essays, t Sully, op. cit.^ p. 74. RATIONAL WILL III the highest good, which is, at the same time, personal and impersonal. It is in the rational will that a permanent basis of social union is to be found.* * See, on whole subject, Muirhead, op. cit.^ book iv. ch. i. ; Green, op. cit.^ book iii. ch. iii. ; Seth, op. cit.^ pp. 210-12. % n Hi i The analysis of moral consciousness reveals the facts of moral life, which Ethics seeks to explain. What " moral conscious- ness " in- volves over and above " conscious- ness." CHAPTER IV MORAL JUDGMENT, THE MORAL FACULTY, MORAL SENTIMENT 1. The Analysis of the Moral Consciousness. Hitherto, assuming that man has to realise the ultimate end of his being through desire and rational activity, we have been considering the different parts assigned to desire, reason, and the will, in the economy of moral life. These parts, though different, are inter-related ; and out of their relation to one another and to the highest good arise the cardinal facts of moral life, which Ethics seeks to investigate and explain. By " moral consciousness " is understood the con- sciousness of human life as subject to the Moral Law. As a rational self-conscious being, man is not only aware of his own acts and states and of their relations to one another — not only can he pass judgments about those acts and states, setting forth their relations of agreement, difference, and conjunc- tion in space or time — but he can pass judgments upon those acts and states, and determine whether they come up to or fall short of a certain standard 112 'A. CONSCIOUSNESS OF RIGHT And WRONG ii^ of excellence which, in the case of his ideas, is that of truth ; in the case of his feelings, is that of beauty ; and in the case of conduct, is that of goodness — in other words, he can not only discover the origin of his ideas, feelings, and acts, but also discover whether they are respectively true or false, beau- tiful or ugly, right or wrong. He shows himself to be a moral being in so far as he can make his own acts the objects of his reflection, and deter- mine whether they are right or wrong. Hence " the broad fact " which Ethics, applying the psychological method (p. 39) to the contents of moral life, has to take note of, analyse, and explain, is this consciousness of right and wrong ox this know- ledge of moral distinctions. It is in the process of analysing and explaining this consciousness of right and wrong that Ethics has to confront several problems which it undertakes to solve. It is neces- sary to see what these problems are, and how they naturally arise. The consciousness of right and wrong, like any other " complete psychosis," involves cognitive^ affec- tive^ and active elements. {a) Viewed as the result of intellection, it is a judgment. It is discriminative ; the " right " cannot be known without knowing the " wrong," or rather, the '* right " and the " wrong," as applied to op- posed alternatives of conduct, are known together. Besides being discriminative, the consciousness of right and wrong involves the consciousness of a Law or Principle which is the standard of right H The " broad fact " which Ethics has to explain is the consciousness of right and •wrong. The conscious- ness of right and wrong involves — {a) Moral judgment — which is dis- criminative, and involves the constious- ness of Law, 'im I which, in its turn, involves a theory of the Ideal. 114 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT and wrong ; />., it is " in application of a rational law of procedure for the guidance of the conduct of men generally, that power of discrimination is brought into exercise " * (p. 13). It may be, indeed, disputed whether there is always an explicit con- sciousness of the Law ; but neither is there always an explicit consciousness of right and wrong ; what is here contended is that the latter cannot be rendered explicit without an explicit reference to the Law. This consciousness of the Law in its turn involves the consciousness of the Ideal, or the ulti- mate end of our moral being — either the Law may be itself looked upon as the Ideal, or it may be looked upon as the means for the attainment of pleasure ox perfection. Here, again, it may be said that there may be the consciousness of the Moral Law without any explicit theory of the Ideal ; but, as before, the present contention is that there can be no explicit consciousness of the Law without an explicit theory of the Ideal. Regarded as a judgmejtt, then, the conscious- ness of right and wrong involves the following problems : — (i) What is the object of moral judgment ? (2) What is the mode of moral judgment? This question leads on to an inquiry into the nature of the Moral Faculty (Conscience), which passes moral judgments. (3) What is the nature of the Moral Law ? Is it simply an indispensable means for the attain- ♦ Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy, p. 39. THE ULTIMATE GOOD 115 ment of pleasure ? Or is it an unconditional pre- cept to be obeyed apart from all considerations of personal pleasure and pain ? (4) What is the nature of the Moral Ideal, or the ultimate Good ? ip) But the consciousness of right and wrong is not a purely intellectual act ; it involves a well- defined element oi feeling. We cannot be conscious of the right without approving it ; nor conscious of the wrong without disapproving it. There are no moral judgments apart from the moral feelings of approbation and disapprobation. As the presence of a belief in the mind is an indication that a judgment has been formed, so the presence of the one or the other of these feelings is an indication that a moral judgment has been passed. It is to be noted, how- ever, that the existence of the moral feelings is no criterion of the accuracy of the judgment. If the term "conscience" be restricted in meaning to signify '' moral feeling," then the conscience of an individual may be an erring conscience ; what he approves may not be truly right, nor what he blames truly wrong. This " perversion " of the conscience Ethics has to take note of and explain. Ethics has to account for the divergence of opinion among individuals and races regarding rules of conduct. It is, however, necessary here to indicate that the postulate upon which ethical investigation rests is that, in spite of the perversions of individual con- sciences, the truth regarding the regulative principles of conduct can be known, just as Logic postulates (J) Moral feelings, viz., approbation and disappro- bation — which always accompany moral judg- ment. These feel- ings are no criterion of the accuracy of the judg- ment : I: l but, since they differ from /thng and disliking^ they indicate the object of moral judg- ment which is here indicated. They also in- dicate the sociality of man's moral being. Ii6 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT that, in spite of the perversions of individual beliefs, the truth regarding the laws of nature can be known. While, however, the existence of moral feelings is no indication of the accuracy of the judgment, they give us sure information regarding the object of moral judgment. Here it is necessary to draw a distinction between the moral feelings and the feel- ings of liking and dislikifig. We like and dislike things which benefit and injure us respectively ; our likings and dislikings include within their sphere, not the acts of human beings only, but those of the lower animals as well as those of inanimate objects ; we like the rain, which fertilises the ground, and dislike the flood, which washes away our homesteads. But approbation is something more than liking. In approving of an action, we not only express our liking for it, but also imply that it was possible for the agent to do a wrong thing, but that he has 7iot done it. The moral feelings find their scope only in that sphere where alternatives of conduct are simultaneously possible, Le., as we shall presently see, in the sphere of free voluntary action. Besides indicating the nature of the object of moral judg- ment, the moral feelings also indicate the sociality of our being, the fact that we are members of a social organisation. In condemning my action when it harms another, I manifest my unity with the race to which I belong. The consideration of this aspect of the moral feelings leads on to the inquiry regarding the origin of the feelings them- selves. THE NOTION OF DUTY 117 Regarded as 2i feeling, the consciousness of right and wrong involves the following problems : — (i) What is the cause of the divergence of moral opinions ? (2) What is the origin of the moral sentiment ? {c) The consciousness of right and wrong, besides involving the moral feelings, involves also an active impulse, more or less strong, to do the right and avoid the wrong. This impulse is connected with a remarkable phase of moral consciousness, which is no other than the consciousness of duty or moral obligation. We are not only aware of " the right," but also aware that it is our duty to do the right. This consciousness of duty is the correlate of the consciousness of the authority of the Moral Law, and involves reference to the source of that authority. The notion of duty is connected with other notions, such as those of right, merit, and responsibility, which require to be separately examined. And as the performance of duties results in the formation of virtues, it becomes necessary to investigate the relation of duty to Virtue, especially as there is a theory of moral life which admits the possibility of performing what are called '' works of supereroga- tion," i.e., good deeds which are not enjoined upon men as their duties, but yield an extra merit when performed. Regarded as an active impulse, then, the con- sciousness of right and wrong involves the follow- ing problems : — (l) What is the nature of moral obligation ? (c) Moral im- pulse — which in- volves the consciousness of duty, and involves reference to the source of moral authority. The notion of duty is re- lated to the notions of right, merit, responsibility, and virtue. ii8 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT (2) What is the source of moral authority ? (3) What is meant by Right, Merit, and Responsibility, and what relation do these notions bear to that of Duty ? (4) What is the relation of Duty to Virtue? *' Can obligation be transcended ? '' 2. Moral Judgment. By '* a moral judgment " is meant " a judgment regarding the moral quality of an action," or "a judgment which sets forth whether an action is right or wrong." It will be seen from the definition that the questions to be asked regarding " moral judgment" are mainly three: — {a) What is the garding moral ^^,>^/ of moral judgment ? (b) What is the exact judgment. *^ J & \ J significance of the terms " right " and " wrong " ? {c) What is the mode or process of moral judgment, or how is the moral quality of an action determined ? Moral judg- ment defined. Problems re- " Voluntary action " (the object of moral judgment) defined. I. It must be performed with desire ; A. — The Object of Moral Judgment, The object of moral judgment is '* conduct," or " voluntary " action. In order to understand this, however, it is necessary to inquire into the precise sense of the term " voluntary " as used in Ethics. I. In the first place, by "voluntary action" is meant " an action which is performed with desire!' If a man who is on a visit to his neighbour, slips his foot on the ground, and, falling, smashes a delicate and exquisite piece of china to pieces, no blame is attached to him if his action is the result, not of desire, but of accident. He may be, indeed, THE OBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT 119 blamed for carelessness, i.e., for a certain disposition ^^^^^^^^^ which he has, by previous conduct, formed in him: because they but accidents like the one referred to may happen are undesired. even to the most careful. Instead of being the object of blame, he is rather the object of commisera- tion, and his host would gladly minimise his own loss to bring whatever consolation he may to the mind of his guest* But if, instead of being the result of an accident the action had been the result of desire, if it had been performed with an idea or anticipation of its result, it would have taken an entirely different aspect ; it would have been highly blameworthy. As in the case of a wrong action, so in the case of a right action, the essential condition which makes it wrong or right is that it is performed with desire. It is not suffi- cient that an action produces a good result; it is necessary to inquire whether that good result was anticipated and desired, before we can say that an act is right or praiseworthy. " If I," said Dr Johnson, " fling half-a-crown to a beggar with the intention to break his head, and he picks it up and buys victuals with it, the physical effect is good, but, with respect to me, the action is very wrong." 1" * When Mill brought to Carlyle the news that his manu- script of the first volume of the Frenck Revolution had been burnt, Carlyle's feelings on the occasion, as he after- wards expressed them to Mrs Carlyle, were, "Well, Mill, poor fellow, is terribly cut up : we must endeavour to hide from him how very serious this business is to us." t Quoted by Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 130. Non-volun- tary, and therefore non-moral, actions specified ; exception in the case of habitual actions. 2. It must be the result of reflection and choice, 120 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT Since the essential condition which makes an action the object of moral judgment is that it should be performed with desire, the following actions, which are all non-voluntary, are excluded from the scope of moral judgment. These actions are not performed with desire, i.e. are not pre- ceded by the idea or anticipation of an end which is to be realised. (i) The action of inanimate things. (2) Random action, or action which is the result of a spontaneous outflow of energy from a nerve-centre. (3) Reflex action, or automatic response to sensory stimulation. (4) Instinctive action (p. 49). (5) Ideo-motor action, or action due to " a fixed idea " ; such acts are sometimes done in spite of a desire ?iot to do them. It must be understood, however, that habitual actions, though they gradually become automatic, are not excluded from the scope of moral judgment ; for, in the first place, they are the result of repeated voluntary actions, or actions which were once per- formed with a distinct anticipation of the end to be realised, and in the second place, even when the idea of the end becomes latent, the initiative is always taken by a volitional impulse.* 2. In the second place, in order that volun- tary action may be the object of moral judgment, it is not suflficient that it is performed with desire : * See Sully,^^. cit., p. 405. \ *' INTENTION 121 it must be the result of choice, it must be the result of rational self-determination. In other words, it is not sufficient that there is the idea of an end, but the end must be so rationally realised in con- sciousness that it might be contrasted with other ends. We do not blame a simple child who, having no idea of property, and knowing not the distinc- tion between mine and thine, burns, say a valuable document, to enjoy the fun of seeing it burnt; for precisely the same reason, we do not blame the insane, for they also are incapable of reflec- tion, of rationally comprehending the ends of their actions. But we blame others for acts outwardly similar to these, for they are supposed to be capable of reflection, and to have set aside certain impulses in order to do what they have done. Therefore, an action which is the object of moral judgment must be not only performed with desire, but must be the result of an internal disposition which admitted the simultaneous possibility of action according to a different impulse. In other words, the action must be such that, co-existent with its motive, there was also a deterrent which was set aside. We thus come to a very definite conclusion regarding the object of moral judgment — it is an action pei formed intentionally (p. 57). And since intention indicates character (which, if it is not already formed, is in the process of formation), and since it is the result of choice or self-determination on the part of the agent, it follows that we can describe the object of moral judgment to be either consequently it is an action performed intentionally. Judgment upon the in- tention is also judg- ment upon / the character and upon the agent. The contro- versy as to whether the motive or the consequent is the object of moral judg- ment is settled by re- cognising — (a) That certain conse- quences must be anticipated before a state or attitude of the mind becomes the object of moral judgment. 122 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT the intention, or the character of the agent as revealed in the intention, or the agent himself. An action performed intentionally may, how- ever, be looked at from two sides. It is, on the one hand, the result of a motive (wherewith co-existed a deterrent), and, on the other hand, it yields con- sequences ; and we may ask whether the moral quality of the action depends upon the motive or upon the consequent. This question was much discussed between writers of the intuitional and the utilitarian school, the former insisting that the judgment is passed upon the inner spring of action, the latter that it is passed upon the action for its consequences. But it is rather arbitrary to draw a distinction between the inner and the outer aspects of the intention. This will be evident from the following considerations : — {a) In the first place, it must be understood that the motive itself involves the idea of some at least of the consequences of the action, and the motive is good or bad according as the ends sought after are good or bad. An inner spring of action, regarded merely as an emotion, has no moral value ; we cannot say, for example, whether love is good or bad without knowing what is it the love for, whether for pleasure, or reputation, or something else ; in other words, we must view the love as a desire to produce a certain result, before we can predicate of it any moral quality.* (p) In the second place, the moral quality of * See Muirhead, op. cii., pp. 59-60. See p. 65, footnote. INTENTION EMBODIED IN AN ACT 123 f 4 an action does not depend upon all the conse- quences of the action, but only upon those that were anticipated m the motive ; otherwise the action mentioned by Dr Johnson should be regarded as a right action. On the one hand, an evil-doer should not be allowed to take credit to himself if, without intending it, he has produced a good result ; nor, on the other hand, should a person be blamed who intended to produce a good result, but has, through the interference of circumstances, produced a bad result. There is yet another question to be discussed. We may ask whether the intention itself is the object of moral judgment, or must the intention be embodied in an ^r/ before judgment can be passed upon it? In discussing this question, it must not be overlooked that the intention itself is an action, though it may not be yet embodied in an overt act. By a good intention, is not meant a capricious or fitful project of the mind — a project whose execu- tion is always delayed till the morrow which never comes ; of such " good intentions," it is said that Hell is paved with them. But a "good inten- tion " means (in the sense in which we have hitherto used the term) an action on the part of the rational Self — it is the result of choice ; it is a determina- tion, " a fully-formed purpose, a determined effort to produce a good result." * Such intentions may not be embodied in overt acts, but they are still the objects of moral judgment. It is not only he ■^ Mackenzie, op. cit.^ p. 129. (0 That the judgment is not, however, on all the consequences, but upon those that were anti- cipated. Is it necessary for an inten- tion to be em- bodied in an overt act be- fore judgment is passed upon it? Not so ; for the intention itself is an action, and as such has moral value. 124 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT The act, how- ever, has also a distinct moral value. Summary of results. that kills, but " whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judg- ment." On the other hand, a ^^^<3^ intention, digood aspiration or determination, may fail to embody itself in an overt act. Browning asks : " What hand and brain went ever paired ? " and rightly says, " 'Tis not vi^hat man Does which exalts him, but what man Would Do." * Nevertheless, the act in which the intention is embodied is not indifferent from a moral point of view. The act is cast upon society like "bread upon the waters," and becomes endlessly fruitful for evil or for good. A man who has formed a good intention, and acts upon it, may be said to perform two good acts, and is consequently better than one whose good intention has not yet been embodied in an act. The same consideration is applicable to a bad intention and a bad act.f We conclude, then — (i) That the object of moral judgment is action performed with desire ; non-voluntary actions are non-moral. (2) That the object of moral judgment is the in- tention, as comprising both the motive and the deterrent, as being the result of choice, and thus indicative of character; what is really judged "is not a thing done, but 2. person doing!' J (3) That the object of moral judgment is neither * Browning, The Last Ride Together, vi. ; Saul, xviii. t See Muirhead, op. cit., p. 50. + + Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 135. RIGHT AND WRONG 125 the inner spring of action viewed solely as an emotion, nor all the consequences of the action ; it is upon the intended consequences that the judgment is passed. (4) That the intention, though not embodied in an overt act, is still the object of moral judgment. B, — The Standards of Right and Wrong. It is now necessary to inquire into the exact significance of " rightness." What is meant when we say that a man's action is right ? Now, as we have seen (p. 12) while analysing the notion of Right, we may mean either of two things. We may mean {a) that the action is right because, com- pared with a formal standard — a universal and strictly authoritative law which it is our duty to obey — it is found to conform to it ; or (b) that it is right because the end of the action — the object sought after, or the anticipated result or consequent — is good. With regard to this last interpretation, however, it is possible to take two views ; we may interpret the good either subjectively or objectively ; in the former sense, it means a subjective and agreeable mode of consciousness ; in the latter sense, it means something which is in itself good, though its proper place is in a system of ends which are all of them comprehended in the highest good (viz. perfection or self-realisation). We, accordingly, get three views of the Standard of Morality, viz., the Standard d.s formal or as law, the Standard as subjective or as pleasure, the Standard The notion of Right in- volves three possible views regard- ing its essen- tial nature. It signifies conformity to a Standard, which may be viewed either as Formal, or as Subjective, or as Objective. 126 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT as objective or as perfection — these three views being respectively those of the Rigoristic, the Hedonistic, and the Eudaemonistic schools. These differences are further indicated by saying that, in the view of Rigorism, it is duty which determines the good, or an action is good because it is enjoined as a duty ; in the view of Hedonism, it is pleasure which determines the good, or an action is good because it brings pleasure ; whereas in the view of Euda^mon- ism, it is perfection which determines the good, or an action is good because it leads on to perfection. An illustra- That these distinctions may not appear to be tion to show ^^^ j^j^g Qj. subtle, it is necessary to take an example divergencies in the standard of moral action and inquire in what different senses of morality. j|. j^^y ^e called right. It is deemed right on the part of a tradesman not to overcharge an inex- perienced purchaser. Now if we examine this action from the Rigoristic point of view, we should say that the action is right because it is our duty to be honest in our dealings with others irrespective of any considerations of profit and loss ; we might go further, and say that the action is right only when it is performed because it is enjoined as a duty, but if the tradesman has secretly thought of the possible advantage that would accrue to him from his conduct, then the worth of his action is destroyed. But if we examine the action from a Hedonistic point of view, it is precisely the anticipated advantage which confers upon the action its worth ; honesty is right because it is the best policy, its utility is its sole recom- f3* f THE STANDARD OF MORALITY 127 mendation. The Eudaemonist, like the Rigorist, recognises the unconditional character of moral obligation — he holds that, advantage or no advan- tage (for honesty is sometimes not the best policy as regards the individual agent), a tradesman should be honest ; but he also finds a new meaning in the principle of honesty when he discovers how it harmonises with the other principles of moral life, and how the precepts of morality, taken together, point to one and the same goal of our being, viz. self-realisation ; he points out that the tradesman who does not overcharge an inexperi- enced purchaser shows, on the one hand, that right attitude towards money and its uses which is indispensable for all true moral progress, and, on the other hand, that respect for the personality of another which does not at all consist with using him as a tool for self-aggrandisement. At the same time, the Eudaemonist regards the presence of a pleasure in the mind accompanying the per- formance of a right action to be a sure index or criterion of the " rightness " of the action, so that no action is, properly speaking, right unless, while it conforms to duty, it is also attended with delight (p. 64) ; he holds that, while the feeling of satisfac- tion depends upon the consciousness of the integrity of the action in so far as it conforms to duty (and thus presupposes the notion of duty, which is, therefore, to be regarded as the siiprenie good),* * The distinction between supremum bonmn and bonum consummatum was drawn by Kant himself: but his ex- t28 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT the knowledge that the action has been done in a consummate manner, or done with all that excel- lence with which it might have been done, involves a reference to the attendant feeling of satisfaction — (Duty and Happiness being thus the co-ordi- nate aspects of the same consummate or complete good).* The Hedon- istic view of the mode of moral judg- ment. C. — The Mode of Moral Judgment. These divergent views regarding the Standard of Morality naturally lead to different conceptions of the Mode of Moral Judgment. (i) The Hedonistic View. In estimating the moral value of an action, the habitual attitude of the Hedonist is to look at the action from an external point of view, with special regard to the consequences of the action. " Plea- sure," says Bentham, '' is the only good ; pain the only evil." "Actions," says Mill, "are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness tremely Rigoristic bent of mind prevented him from assign- ing to pleasure its true place in moral life. * The ethical notion of " Tightness " corresponds, in some measure, to the logical notion of "correctness." In estimat- ing whether a judgment (the conclusion of an argument) is correct or not, it is possible to apply three standards \—{a) ThQ formal standard, which determines whether the con- clusion is consistent with the principle (the major premise) on which it is based, {b) The subjective, which determines whether the judgment produces a feeling of certainty. {c) The objective, which determines whether the judgment agrees with objective fact or reality. THE HEDONISTIC VIEW 129 (pleasure), wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." And the rule for estimat- ing the moral value of action is apparently * summed up in a single sentence by Bentham, "Weigh pains, weigh pleasures, and as the bal- ance stands will stand the question of right and wrong." Let us see how the adoption of the Hedon- istic rule modifies our view regarding the object of moral judgment. If we look at an action solely from an external point of view, we, in the first place, obliterate all distinctions between moral actions and non-moral actions ; and, in the second place, discover that there is hardly any action, however gross and immoral, which cannot be justified, and hardly any action, how- ever beautiful and noble, which cannot be con- demned, on such a principle. There is a sense indeed in which " private vices " may be regarded as " public benefits." " The prosperity of nations," says Lecky, " and the progress of civilisation, are mainly due to the exertions of men who, while pursuing strictly their own interests, were uncon- sciously promoting the interests of the community." Had the Pharisees not killed Christ, the Cross would not have thus triumphed. Shall we justify the Pharisees, then, because the consequences of * I say "apparently," because, as will be seen in the sequel, the development of Hedonistic thought has been possible through the adoption of other rules of moral judg- ment which do not consist with its definition of good as pleasure (pp. 133-4). I The Hedon- istic theory of the object of moral judg- ment criticised* Not every action that benefits or harms us is the object of moral judgment, I30 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT their action are good ? Frequently, " through the swart arms of offence," has been " forged " " the silver seat of innocence," but woe has nevertheless been pronounced upon those by whom offences came. As we have already seen, we must take the intention into account, we must ask how far the consequences of the action were anticipated and intended. This a Hedonist also has to admit, but those that "The morality of an action," says Mill, "depends are performed ^pQ^^ j-^e intention — that is, upon what the agent intentionally. , Wilis to do. But the He- But the Hedonist will say that the admission donisi says j^^jgt made does not affect the soundness of the motive has ^^le given above; for the worth of the action, he nothing to do ^in say, depends upon the extent to which the with morality, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^s intended, are preponderantly pleasant. In other words, the Hedonist is disposed to think that " the motive, when it makes no differ- ence in the act, makes none in the morality." This is just the same as to declare that the. attitude of the agent has nothing to do with the morality of an action — a view which leads us to the conclusion that the charity of one whose heart overflows with the milk of human kindness and the charity of an ambitious schemer stand on the same footing. Nay, properly, as Martineau points out, the act of the latter should be declared, on the Hedonistic principle, to stand on a higher moral footing, because he intended to do good to himself in addition to the good he intended to do to others, whereas the former forgot his own good THE MOTIVE AND MORALITY 131 in the act, and thus aimed at a lesser amount of good. These considerations probably led Mill to modify the foregoing view, and hold that " the motive (even when it makes no difference in the morality of the action) makes a great difference in our moral estimate of the agent, especially as it indicates a good or bad disposition!^ But let us inquire what makes disposition good or bad. It cannot be, on the Hedonistic hypothesis, anything in the disposition itself (i.e. apart from its consequences) which makes it good or bad ; nor does the Hedonist mean anything of the kind. What he says is this — a disposition which is blamed is bad because it leads to a bad" result. But does it always lead to a bad result, or does it lead to a bad result only in a majority of cases ? We cannot prove (on inductive principles) that it always leads to a bad result ; and why should it be called bad in those cases where it does lead to a good result? Suppose I have some funds entrusted to me on behalf of a profligate minor. What prevents me from appropriating from the trust funds a large sum of money which in his hands will be spent in riotous living, but which in viy hands will be the instrument of a large bene- ficence to the public ? Suppose I can steal with- out the risk of being detected, so that my act neither entails a future pain nor endangers public morality, which it might do if it were known and imitated. Will it be said that the act will have an except in io far as it indicates good or bad disposition. But Hedon- ism cannot explain why a baddi-position is bad. even when it produces a good result. 132 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT Psychological Hedonism, even though it apparently admits the possibility of disinterested Tirtuous action, is effect Upon my character which, changing for the worse, will, sooner or later, be brought into the light that falls on the public eye ? " But," says Lecky, " in the first place, a single act has no such effect upon disposition as to counteract a great immediate good, especially when, as we have sup- posed, the act is not a revolt against what is believed to be right, but is performed under the full belief that it is in accordance with the one rational rule of morals ; and, in the next place, as far as the act would form a habit, it would appear to be the habit of in all cases regulating actions by a precise and minute calculation of their utility, which is the very ideal of utilitarian virtue." * In estimating the moral value of an action, the question of the motive (as comprised in the inten- tion) arises so naturally, that we wonder why the Hedonist has allowed himself to be led astray. What accounts for his mistake is the supposition that all motives are equal in value, since they all aim at pleasure (the only good), so that (as Bentham says) " there is not any such thing as a bad motive." Other Hedonistic writers have, however, sought to tone down the selfish aspect which belongs to Bentham's view of morality, by admitting the possibility of disinterested virtuous action. " Virtue," says Mill, " according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so"; in * Lecky, op. cit., vol. i. p. 45. HEDONISM RE All V SELFISH 133 other words, the love of virtue may be generated in the same way as the miser's love of gold. But the miser continues to love gold, even when it does not bring him any actual pleasure, because of a force of habit which it is painful to break ; consequently it is not strictly disinterested. Just for the same reason, the love of virtue, if gener- ated in the way supposed, cannot be called disinterested. In fact. Hedonism cannot justly free itself from the blame that its view of morality really selfish. is selfish. Having now determined that the real object Thedeter- of moral judgment is the intention of the agent, [^'J'^^j^'^j.^j^^ it would seem as if, on the Hedonistic principle, quality of an we could easily estimate its moral value. We have action simply to compare those of the intended conse- quences that are pleasant with those that are painful. But, even by the Hedonists, this principle (which may be called the Principle of Prudence) has to be modified by other principles requires which can hardly be justified on the Hedonistic ^^! ° ■^ •' pnnciples, ground. Thus Bentham advised the individual not to have regard solely for his own pleasures and pains, not to exalt himself so much as to look upon other men simply as tools for the advancement of his own interests, but " to count everybody for one, nobody for more than one." Mill, again, advised the individual not to seek any kind of pleasure, but only those kinds that are excellent ; in his view, all pleasures are not equal in rank. " Some moments in the in- I I such as those of Benevolence and Justice, which cannot be derived from the experience of pleasure and pain, 134 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT dividual are more important than others " ; it may be that " One crowded hour of glorious life Is worth an age without a name." " Some individuals in society, again, are more important than others." Accordingly, to the afore- mentioned principle of Prudence must be added two other principles, viz., Benevolence and Justice, the latter recognising "the true claim and vary- ing importance of each moment and of each individual." * But how is the adoption of these principles justified on the Hedonistic ground ? Hedonists, as a rule, are indisposed to allow the existence in man of any innate moral faculty which intuitively apprehends moral principles and discovers that one action is better than another. They hold that it is impossible to estimate the moral quality of an action without knowing the consequences in so far as they are pleasant or painful. " But it is the individual, after all, that feels pleasure and pain." And how can we prove that the adoption of the foregoing principles yields to the individual the greatest amount of pleasure? The amount of pleasure felt depends so much upon the circum- stances of the moment, upon the then prevailing disposition of the agent, that action according to any moral principle (even that of Prudence) is impossible without sacrificing the greater amount * Seth, op. cit., 1 1 1- 14. REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES t3$ of pleasure for the less, without being occasionally satisfied with the lesser pleasure for the sake of its greater worthiness or superiority in rank (p. 73). But how is the worth of the pleasure known ? The pleasure is worthy because the activity on which it depends (the motive, or the object aimed at) is worthy ; the knowledge of the worth of the former presupposes that of the latter. The validity of the foregoing principles is known intuitively or ration- ally ; it cannot be known by simply calculating the amount of pleasure produced (p. 109). In fact. Mill's admission of distinctions of rank among pleasures is fatal to the inductive theory of morality ; it is fatal to the ethical postulate of Hedonism that pleasure is the only good ; for pleasures, as pleasures, do not admit of any distinctions of moral quality save *' in virtue of the qualitative differences of the objects in connection with which they rise" (p. 73). We may here inquire into the exact signifi- cance of the term " regulative." We can distinguish between two kinds of regulative principles, those that are hypothetical and those that are cate- gorical ; a hypothetical principle is valid on the supposition of the existence of a desire in the mind, and indicates the means that are indispensable for attaining the end ; thus if I want to build a house with a certain object, I must build it in a certain way with certain materials. The principles of house- building are, therefore, hypothetical principles, and do not bind any one save those who intend to build houses. But a categorical principle stands on a but are intuitively apprehended. The admission of distinction of rank among pleasures is fatal to Hedonism as an inductive theory. Meaning of *' regulative." — Two kinds of regulative principles — (0 Hypo- thetical ; II (2) Catego- rical. Moral prin- ciples are categorical imperatives. The Rigorists hold that the mode of judg- ment is intui- tive, and t'lat the morality of an action depends upon the motive. 136 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT different footing: it binds, irrespective of any desire in the mind. I must tell the truth, whether I desire to tell it or not. Here "must" means " ought to " ; the desire to tell the truth may be strong or weak according as the amount of pleasure anticipated is great or small, but the authority of the law is not weakened with the weakening of desire. Hence a categorical principle is equally binding upon all. Now it cannot be questioned that the principles of morals are categorical, and, as they are imperative of conduct, they are what Kant called them. Categorical Imperatives. It follows that they are not derived by induction from the experiences of pleasure and pain; did we regard them as hypothetical ^x\\\c\^\^s for the attain- ment of pleasure, we could view them as inductive generalisations (p. 84). Now this is just the mistake on the part of the Hedonist: that he, assuming that all men naturally seek pleasure, regards the moral principles as practical precepts inductively drawn from experience for the attain- ment of pleasure. (2) The Rigoristic View. In opposition to the Hedonists, the Rigorists maintain that the knowledge of moral distinctions is obtained intuitively. Actions are right or wrong not because they are "attended with present or future pleasure or pain," but because they are what they are ; the moral value of an action depends upon that of its motive. THE RIGORISTIC VIEW ^o7 It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the two forms which the intuitive theory of morality has assumed. One of these forms, which we may trace throughout the speculations of "the Moral Sense or the ^Esthetic School," appears in Dr Martineau's able representation of the intuitive theory, after it has, in his hands, undergone con- siderable development and been freed from most of its latent inconsistencies. The other form of the theory appears in the speculations of the " Rational " moralists. (i) As interpreted by Martineau, the process of moral judgment may be thus indicated. The moral quality of an impulse or spring of action is not known unless it is contested by a rival impulse. " It is not till two incompatible impulses appear in our con- sciousness and contest the field, that we are made aware of their difference and are driven to judge between them. But the moment this condition is realised, we are sensible that one is higher, worthier, than the other, and, in comparison with it, has the clear right to us!' " Their moral vahtatiori intui- tively results from their simultaneous appearance!' Following this train of thought, Martineau finds that the springs of action dispose themselves " upon a scale of worth, every one of them lying between a lower and a higher, is right in competition with the former, wrong when resisting the latter, and cannot be judged without reference to its alterna- tive." Thus, for example, suppose we ask whether it is right to be angry, we must first inquire with Two forms of the Intui- tive Theory, (i) Martin- eau's theory. Moral judg- ment is the result of the comparison of individual impulses with one another. These im- pulses arrange themselves upon a scale of graduated worth. Classification of springs of action (moral order). 138 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT what impulse has anger, in a given instance, come into conflict ; suppose that the other impulse is a secondary social affection, an inducement to culti- vate social pleasures with a person whose con- duct has been grossly scandalous — then it is right to be angry, it is wrong to suppress anger for the sake of mirth and jollity ; but suppose that the other impulse is compassion, awakened by the sight of a repentant sinner — then still to harbour anger against him, or to refuse to forgive him, is wrong, is an offence " against reason and right." In this way, comparing one impulse with another as they both appear in consciousness, we construct our know- ledge of moral distinctions //^<:^;;/^<^/. " The develop- ment of knowledge is upwards, from single cases of alternative to the full contents of Right." * These contents may be exhibited in a tabular form, such as the following, in which the springs of action are presented in the ascending order of worth. Lowest. 1. Secondary Passions. 2. Secondary Organic Propensions. 3. Primary Organic Propensions ; — Appetites. 4. Primary Animal Propension ; — Spontaneous Activity. 5. Love of Gain. 6. Secondary Affections. 7. Primary Passions. * Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii. book i. ch. vi. : also book ii. br. ii. and iii. MARTINEAU'S THEORY 139 8. Casual Energy ; — Love of Power ; Love of Liberty. 9. Secondary Sentiments. 10. Primary Sentiments of Wonder and Admira- tion. 11. Primary Affections, Parental and Social. 12. Primary Affection of Compassion. 13. Primary Sentiment of Reverence. Highest. Martineau agrees with the " ^Esthetic " moralist in recognising among the springs of action an order to which a " proportionable affection " is due. But he rightly points out that, as represented by the " Esthetic " moralists, the quality oi goodness is not clearly distinguished from that oi beauty. It is held by the moralists of this school that there is in man ''a moral sense" — an inward eye which, as soon as actions are viewed, sees " the fair and shapely, the amiable, the admirable, apart from the deformed, the foul, the odious, or the despicable." But if the "right" be thus identified with the "beautiful," the quality of authority which goes along with the former is not adequately explained and justified ; nor can we identify the moral feel- ings of approbation and disapprobation with the aesthetic feelings of liking and disliking, seeing that the former involve, while the latter do not, the sense of the simultaneous possibility of alternative action. Martineau differs, also, from the " Rational " (or " Dianoetic ") moralists, who, he thinks, have The merit of Martlneau's theory. Vindication of the unique, nature of moral goodness as distinguished from pleasure, from beauty, and from truth. f The defect of Martineau's theory. 140 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND ^ENTIMMNT fallen into the error of supposing that the develop- ment of moral knowledge is downwards from general principles to particular cases ; he thinks that this mistake on their part has prevented them from perceiving the essential distinction between " goodness " and " truth." " Truth," says Martineau, " by simply displaying the logical nexus of its links of thought, necessitates assent ; while Duty, in spite of the clear vision of the right, does not necessitate obedience!' Again, the quality of truth does not admit of degrees : what is true, is absolutely true ; what is false, absolutely false. " But this law of intellectual judgment does not hold good of moral judgment. If it did, the same spring of action, once found right, would be right for ever ; its good- ness or its guilt would be something absolute, as the properties of a sphere or pyramid." This, however, is not the case. A spring of action that would not be condemned in a savage, would be justly condemned in a civilised man or man of refined feelings, because the impulses to be com- pared are absent in the former but present in the latter case. So far, Martineau has rightly vindicated the unique character of " moral goodness." But his theory must be, from a philosophical point of view, regarded as a failure. Martineau holds that moral consciousness repeats the same " story " in all men : that, given alternative cases of conduct, all men come to the same conclusion regarding their relative worth, and this they do by a process of intuition, just as they judge about differences in DIFFERENCE OF MORAL INTUITIONS 141 quality or quantity among colours or tones. But, There is no even admitting that there is an element of intui- ^^®^^^^« provision tion m our moral judgments, it may well be for ensuring disputed that all men hold precisely the same validity in . , ... ,. ^ , ^ our ordinary mtuitions regardmg cases of conduct. For the moral ordinary intuitions of moral consciousness resemble intuitions, the " apparent " intuitions of perception in which men differ, rather than the " real " intuitions in which they agree. Our judgments regarding the distances of bodies, for example, are " apparently " intuitive ; * hence men are seen to estimate the distance of a given object differently. This is also the case with our moral intuitions. These, through more or less incomplete representations of the effects produced, are different in different minds. Take the case of Torquemada burning his daughters at the stake " in a sacred frenzy " ; f he followed, no doubt, " the primary sentiment of reverence," but his act was decidedly wrong. Martineau in such cases appeals to what he calls " the canon of consequences." J He says, that when a spring of action, which is invested with greater authority over impulses that conflict with it, is accepted as the principle of conduct, " it has the choice of several possible actions, and among these election must be made by the balance of pleasurable and painful effects." § This is no doubt true ; but it is * Mill, Lo^c, Introd. t Read the story as powerfully told in Longfellow's Tales of a Wayside Inn. X Martineau, op. cit., pp. 275-6. § Martineau, op, cit., pp. 300-1. nor reduction of them into a system ; 142 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT tantamount to saying that we must compare the relative worth of the effects produced, such com- parison being necessary to correct the incidence of " personal equation," or the pure subjectivity of moral intuition. It is not by merely comparing our subjective impulses, but by philosophic reflec- tion on the total amount of good produced, that we can ensure validity in our moral judgments ; and the need for reflection such as this, constitutes a remarkable deficiency in the intuitive theory of morals. Then, again, admitting that Martineau has correctly indicated the relative worth of the sub- jective impulses, he is still far from completing the task of Moral Philosophy. Philosophy cannot rest contented with a mere inventory of facts or cata- logue of intuitions. It seeks to explain them by general principles (p. 17). But Martineau hardly makes any attempt to reduce the intuitions of the ordinary moral consciousness to a system. Yet they can be explained by the help of general principles. For example, the moral quality of anger, in the instances given above, may be determined by applying to it the Hegelian principle. Respect others as persons, i.e., do not treat them as instruments for personal gratification, but treat them with that Justice which is synonymous with Benevolence, which, on the one hand, does not overlook any fault, and, on the other hand, supplies those opportunities that are conducive to moral progress. Lastly, if we inquire into the validity of the ethical scale of impulses as proposed by Martin- MARTINEAU'S THEORY 143 eau, we find it fail seriously, at least in one particular. It has been objected that ''no such universal relation of higher and lower subsists between any pair of impulses as is here aflfirmed : the higher and the lower are only so generally, not always:'^ For example, in a conflict between "compassion" and "resentment," "it is by no means to be laid down as a universal rule that compassion ought to prevail " : resentment, when it is " directed against wrong, and operates in aid of justice," is to be regarded as " a salutary ' balance to the weakness of pity ' " ; '' its suppression would be gravely mischievous." It may be said, however, in defence of Martineau, that the case in which resentment appears to be superior to pity is just that in which it is combined with the love of justice, which is included in the highest of all impulses, viz., " reverence " ;— if the " higher " did not come in to aid the " lower," if it were a case of resentment pure and simple, it would be better to pass by the offence.f But this very defence of Martineau's * This and the subsequent quotations are made from Sidgwick, Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spenser, and Martineau, p. 355, et seq. t Cf. "All true justice is vindictive to vice, as it is re- warding to virtue. Only — and herein it is distinguished from personal revenge — it is vindictive of the wrong done : — not of the wrong done to us. It is neither educational, for men are to be educated by wholesome habit, not by rewards and punishments ; nor is it preventive, for it is to be executed without regard to any consequences ; but only for righteous- ness' sake, a righteous nation does judgment and justice." — Ruskin, Lectures on Art, iii. § 90. and the ethical scale of impulses, to which it may be ob- jected that it prescribes general, but not universal rules of con- duct, has little value as an ethical theory, for it does not really supply us with regula- tive principles, unless there is a constant appeal to " the ideal order of things" which is the object of '• reverence." 144 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT theory suggests its inherent weakness. As rational beings, seeking to realise the highest good, we cannot pause with merely setting one impulse against another as they occur, and being aware of their relative worth, but must carry each upward in the scale as far as possible, and so transform it by blending with it considerations of the highest moment, before we can decide which is really the higher. As Sidgwick observes, " If a serious ques- tion of conduct is raised, I cannot conceive myself deciding it morally by any comparison of motives below the highest : the case must be carried up for decision into the court of the motive which I regard as supreme." Martineau himself asks. Ought we not " to live at the top of the climax, and never descend ? " His reply, which in effect justifies the criticism here offered, is — " We must slightly qualify the hypothesis on which we have proceeded, viz., that we are to accept our rival incentives at the hands of circumstance, and consider that our duty begins with their arrival. It is from this point that the portion of our moral experience commences which I wished to illustrate ; but if there be at the command of our will, not only the selection of an alternative, but also a predetermination of what kind the alternative shall be, the range of our duty will undoubtedly be extended to the creation of a higher plane of circumstance, in addition to the higher preference within it." * But if we thus require to predetermine by what impulse we shall regulate * Martineau, op. cii., vol. ii. pp. 267-8. THE RATIONAL MORALISTS 145 6ur conduct in a given case, and if, to do this, we require to transform or restrain each contending impulse by considering how it affects the ''ideal order of things " (p. 149), which is the object of the supreme " sentiment of reverence " — then Martin- eau's ethical scale " can have only a quite subordi- nate interest," for it does not by itself supply us with any principle really regulative of conduct. (2) As interpreted by the " Rational " moralists, " moral judgment does not result from comparison of individual objects, but from comparison of a particular act or series of actions with a general truth, acknowledged as an imperative of rational life." It is held that there are " eternal and immut- able" principles of morality which are ultimate, universal, necessary, self-evident, and unquestion- able. They are known intuitively by Conscience (the Moral Faculty), which acts unerringly, and, as the discoverer of universal truth, cannot be edu- cated. '' As well teach the eye to see, and the ear to hear, as teach Reason to perceive self-evident truth." " There is no such thing," says Kant, " as an erring conscience." But how are we to account for the diversity of moral judgments, then ? If the same general principles are common to all men, whence, then, arises the dispute? It is held that " men differ not as to principles, but as to details of application." In other words, while Conscience cannot err, moral judgments may be erroneous a moral judgment being the application of a uni- versal or self-evident truth to a particular case. It K (2) The the) It is inade- That it is necessary to refer to the entire or total quatc, for it g^j^ j^ ^j^^ apparent, when we consider that the cannot resolve . , . n- the conflict of " ultimate " principles of morals sometimes conflict principles. y^\^}^ g^e another. The principle of Benevolence may conflict with the principle of Veracity. It is very difficult to resolve such conflicts. Is it right for a doctor, we may ask, to tell an anxious patient the truth regarding his condition? Martineau argues that, since veracity is the upholder of the social system, those persons who, by their crimi- nality, or partial or complete insanity (a patient is partially insane), have put themselves outside the pale of society, cannot rightfully demand that the truth should be told them ; he also argues that though reverence for the actual order of things (the patient's actual condition) may constrain the doctor to tell the truth, reverence for the ideal order of things (which is sure to be " desecrated " if the patient is informed of the actual state of things, for he will be so much perturbed in spirits as possibly to die before his time) commands him to tell a lie. " Yet," as Martineau himself confesses, " after all, there is something in this problem which refuses to be thus laid to rest." It is, indeed, very difficult to give a hard-and-fast rule for such cases ; Ethics is not a science so exact as Mathematics, because human life is vastly.more complex than number and magnitude ; and, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, "no greater exactitude should be demanded of a science than its contents admit of." * It is, how- * Aristotle, op. cit. (Peters's Tr.), i. 3. VER-SPECIALISM 149 ever, significant, that all conflicts among principles point out for us " an ideal order of things " by reference to which our duties should be determined. This ideal order involves the perfection of the in- dividuals and of society as a whole. With regard to the specific example before us, we can say that the doctor, if he be true to his profession, should have the power to minister to a yjiind diseased so that even truth from his lips will carry consolation, and produce that healthy tone of mind which casts all its cares upon God and takes no thought for the morrow.* If, while striving with his whole heart, soul, mind, and strength for the realisation of such an ideal, he is still obliged in a given instance to make a " compromise," he is no more to be blamed than the artist whose finished work is a compromise between the " ideal " in his mind and such materials as were accessible to him. Hitherto we have been discussing the views of ■^ The following sentences from Dr Schofield's Mental Factor i?i Medicine (pp. 14-15) well deserve to be quoted : — " Over-specialism has increased by such leaps and bounds, that the good all-round physician once so popular and so genial has well-nigh passed away, and only hardy specimens still exist scantily in isolated districts. To him has succeeded the pale, spectacled, serious, and most profoundly scientific student of one of the sixty or seventy parts into which, I believe, we are now segmented. It seems almost time that the ' man ' specialist appeared ; one who studies the * altogether,' to use poor Trilby's happy expression — a physician whose exclusive duty it should be to study men as men ; to master the marvellous intricacies and dependencies of spirit, soul, and body ; and to be skilled to know when and how to call on the one to help the other," The view of ex- treme Rigor- ism as opposed to that of mode- rate Rigorism. The theory of Kant. («) It dis- parages sen- sibility, and divides the contents of moral life into sharp opposites. 150 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT the " moderate Rigorists," who do not refuse to recognise a certain worth (a^/a) in our natural im- pulses (p. 212). If we now consider the doctrine of Kant, an extreme Rigorist, we find him to dissent from this theory of moral life in two important particulars : — (a) In the first place, Kant holds that actions are right only when they are done for the sake of duty. He distinguishes between what he calls the Autonomy and the Heteronomy of the Will. The will is autonomous when it is a law to itself, i.e., acts solely from a sense of duty, and " independently of any property of the objects of volition " ; if it is guided by the ideas of those objects, it is heter- onomous. Kant would condemn the act of one who from love or kindness nurses a sick person ; he would call such love pathological ; and praise the act only when it is done out of respect for the Moral Law, which commands love in a practical sense, or as active beneficence. Kant thus recog- nises no value in our desires or affections, and places them all under one general condemnation (making an exception, however, in the case of a single impulse, viz. respect for the Moral Law — an exception which shows the latent inconsistency of his theory). He draws a very rigid line of de- marcation between the transcendental part of our moral nature (where autonomy prevails) and the empirical part (where heteronomy is the rule). But this is to overlook that the mind is an organic unity, and that Virtue is the harmony of rationality KANTS THEOR V OF THE WILL 151 with sensibility.* " The pure will of Kant, being entirely formal and destitute of particular content, has been well described by Jacobi as a ' will that wills nothing^ f For, to will anything is to be moved by a desire, and the will is good only when the object desired is good ; but Kant refuses to see any intrinsic worth in the object. He says : " Intelligence, wit, His theory judgment, and the other talents of the mind, how- ^ji[ j^^^^j^^^^ ever they may be named, or courage, resolution, only good, is perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are un- defective, doubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which therefore constitutes what is called character, Is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. A good will appears to con- stitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness. Nothing can possibly be con- ceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good * Schiller has ridiculed this hard formalism of Kant's view in an epigram. An inquirer says to a Kantian philosopher-— " Willingly serve I my friends, but I do it, alas ! with affection, Hence I am plagued with doubt ; virtue I have not attained " ; — and receives the following reply — " This is your only resource, you must stubbornly seek to abhor them. Thus you can do with disgust that which the law may enjoin." — Quoted by Mackenzie, op. cit.^ p. 197. t Mackenzie, op. cit.^ p. 195. The good will is not the only good : it is but one aspect of the complete good. (/5) The Kantian • principle is formal, 152 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT will."* In these passages there is an admirable exposition of the relativity of the various natural goods, which Kant calls the gifts of nature and for- tune, and of the supremacy (p. 127) of the good will which is good in so far as it conforms to duty. But if the objects of our natural impulses have no goodness in them, it is difficult to see why the right use of them should confer goodness on the will which uses them rightly ; nor should it be forgotten that conformity to duty is but one aspect of the highest good, the other aspect being the transfiguration, the exaltation and refinement, under rational con- trol, of that sensibility in which lie the springs of rational action. {b) In the second place, Kant holds that all the moral principles are summed up in the formula — "Act according to a maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law." This formula very clearly exhibits the universal character of the Moral Law or the commonness of the ethical Ideal ; it signifies that, " assuming certain kinds of conduct to be right, we must not make exceptions on our behalf" f The formula has, however, a negative rather than a positive value ; we cannot deduce " a complete code of duty " from such a formal principle as this, just as from the formal principles of Logic we cannot deduce the knowledge of any actual law of nature.^ It is apparent, even in the examples * Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, p. i. t Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 195. \ A "formal principle "is a " principle of consistency." In Logic, it enables us to see whether we are arguing con- I THE KANTIAN PRINCIPLE 153 given by Kant, that we cannot deduce the concrete duties of life from this principle, seeing that these duties ^x^ presupposed in every application of the principle. Suppose that a man refuses aid to the distressed, then he cannot consistently expect aid from another if misfortune overtakes him. '' But there is nothing contradictory in willing that none should help others."* In other words, we first assume that it is our duty to aid the distressed, and then show that it is inconsistent to refuse and, at the same time, to expect aid. Similarly, as regards the duty of keeping one's promises, Kant argues that if promise-breaking be universal, then promises annihilate themselves or lose their significance. But there is nothing contradictory in willing that none should make promises. It is because it is our duty to make promises on occasions, that it becomes self-contradictory on my part if I break my promise and at the same time expect that another would keep his promise to me. It is evident that in these cases the concrete duties are determined by an examination of the contents of our sensibility and the ends of our moral life. As Abbot points out, " In eliminating the * matter ' {i.e. sistently, or whether our conclusions agree with our premises ; but it does not enable us to know whether the premises are themselves true or not. In Ethics, the value of a formal principle such as Kant indicates, lies in enabling us to see whether we are acting consistently, or whether our actions are consistent with our demands ; it does not enable us to know whether our demands are themselves reasonable or not. Abbot, Kanfs Theory of Ethics, Introd, and does not enable us to deduce from it the concrete duties of life, which cannot be determined without an examination of the ends of moral life. / The Eudse- monistic view 154 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT sensibility) Kant has eliminated that on which fre- This is admit- quently the whole question turns." And Kant lumself ^"^ seems to be aware of this defect; "he expressly states that the formula is only a negative principle, and that the matter of practical maxims is to be derived from a different source," viz., from the ends of our moral life, which are (according to Kant) our own Perfection and the Happiness of others (p. 187). (3) The Eudcemonistic View. The critical study of the two foregoing theories prepares us to discover the real nature of the pro- cess of moral judgment. We have seen that we cannot estimate the moral quality of an action unless we take into account the entire Self of the agent as it is manifested in and affected by his act ; in other words, we should compare the interest of his " partial " self, or of the particular desire with which he identifies himself at any moment, with the interest of his " total " self, with all that he has in him to become. Much has been said already on the distinction between "pleasure" and "happi- ness" (p. 68); much also on the need of uncondi- tional or categorical imperatives for the regulation How it differs of life (p. 84). In Opposition to the Hedonists, it from the He- has been maintained that the morality of an action the Rigoristic <^o^s not depend upon the consequent, but upon the entire attitude, of the agent at the time of the action (pp. 122, 130) ; it has been also shown that the principles of moral life are categorical, and are CONSCIENCE 155 views. to be obeyed whatever be the consequences. In opposition to the Rigorists, it has been shown that these principles, while they are intuitively appre- hended, are not inexplicable, for they are explicable in the light of that total good for the self which in- volves the transfiguration of sensibility under the control of Reason (pp. 103, 148). It is to be added It involves that we must avoid a too subjective standpoint in \^.^^^?'^^l^ •' ^ the objective estimating the value of an action : we must not be order of facts simply satisfied with the revelation of our sub- \' "^""t ^'.^° \ "^ ^ the subjective jective or introspective consciousness ; for though order of we are, by such revelation, assured of the honesty "^P^'ses. of our intention, yet we must satisfy ourselves that the act harmonises with the objective order of things, with all the laws of physical or social exist- ence, with the spirit of community, otherwise our acts might be distinguished by a foolish fanaticism. Not only must the motive be right, but the means selected be the most appropriate. We cannot (justifying the means by the end) defend the holy Crispinus, " who stole leather to make boots for the poor," nor the persecutor of heresy, whose weapons were " the thumbscrew and the stake," and whose intention the advancement of the glory of the Lord. 3. TJie Moral Faculty, or Conscience. From the standpoint of modern " scientific " Meaning of Psychology we can no longer view the Moral ^^" ^' Faculty as a separate power of the mind which acts in indifference to all the rest. An inquiry into 156 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT Hedonism identifies Con- science with Prudence, and is thus open to two serious objections — (a) It over- looks the innateness of the faculty. (J)') It does not provide an ex- planation for several moral facts : the nature of any faculty is really an inquiry into a function that depends on other functions or pro- cesses. The statement that a man knows the right from the wrong because he has a conscience, is, by itself, not more satisfactory than the state- ment that a man moves because he has the loco- motive faculty. What is really inquired into, is the nature of that function of the intellect or process of thought which enables us to distinguish between right and wrong. (i) The tendency of Hedonistic thought is to identify Conscience with Prudence. The Moral Faculty is a calculating faculty. There is no innate power to know the right from the wrong, but, with the accumulation of pleasant and painful experiences as the consequences of our actions, calculation begins. This calculation is based on laws (regarding the felicific or non-felicific tendency of actions) inductively generalised. But this interpretation of Conscience is open to two very serious objections. In the first place, it is contradicted by facts : Conscience operates long before the accumulation of experiences on the part of the individual. Very early in life we notice in- stinctive preferences and aversions. In the second place, it is a doctrine " which offends the unsophis- ticated conscience " ; for as it does not adequately explain the nature of moral authority, so it does not account for that feeling of bitter shame which is consequent on wrong-doing. If wrong-doing is no more than wrong calculation, "a casting-up the BAINS THEORY W columns of one's conduct-ledger wrong," then it is not worse or more shameful than wrong calculation elsewhere, e.g. in working out a problem of mathe- matics.* Again, the utilitarian conception of a virtuous man can hardly be justified. If virtue is no more than prudence ; if it does not admit the play of generous instincts and passions ; if it always sets up the risk of remote suffering against any immediate good that beckons us towards it — then what is here called virtue is indeed marked by a dryness and moral poverty shocking to the moral sense of mankind. The philosophy of calculated pleasures, as Janet points out, has a deserved reputation of being dreary, cold, narrow, and withering."!" That the Hedonistic writers are themselves alive to the force of these objections, is apparent in their attempts to outgrow the limitations of their theory. Of these attempts, those made by Bain, Mill, and Spencer deserve mention. (a) According to Bain," Conscience is the imita- tion within ourselves of the government without us." Bain attempts to explain how a moral law (which, in his opinion, is merely a general state- ment of the felicific tendency of an action) comes to be felt as a command or injunction restraining individual action. Anterior to the accumulation of experiences on the part of the individual, he, in his childhood, is subjected to the parental authority, * See Seth, op. cit., p. 141. t Janet, op. cit., pp. 12-13. it identifies remorse with regret, and re- presents virtue as a barren calculating machine. Hedonistic views criti- cised — (a) Bain's theory of the origin of Conscience — '^4 regards it as a compound of emotions, which is not eren equi- valent to the moral sentiment. 158 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT and has to learn the lesson of obedience. He hears commands as to what he should do and what he should avoid, and finds those commands to be en- forced with punishment. " A mental association is rapidly formed between disobedience and appre- hended pain, more or less magnified by fear." Respect or love for the parents may also induce the child to refrain from wrong-doing. After- w^ards, "when the young mind is able to take notice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed upon it, and to approve of the end intended by them, a new motive is added," and that is now done from prudence which was formerly done from fear or love. "Conscience is thus a triple com- pound, and begirds the actions in question with a threefold fear."* In this theory, Dr Bain has certainly provided for the appearance of Conscience early in life— but it is evident that the earlier form of Conscience differs considerably from its later form. In its later form, it is simply an intelligent forecast of the effects of actions — a view to which exception has been already taken. In its earlier form, when such intelligent forecast is wanting, it is a compound of emotions which, because it is not equivalent to the moral sentiment (for it is not seldom opposed to it, even children resenting certain commands as unjust), cannot, therefore, be * Compare Schopenhauer's analysis of conscience, into one-fifth, fear of man ; one-fifth, superstition ; one-fifth, prejudice ; one-fifth, vanity ; one-fifth, custom.—See Calder- wood, op. cit., p. 121. I THE GENESIS OF CONSCIENCE 159 regarded as Conscience, even if Conscience be looked upon as something wholly emotional. ib) Mill regrets that utilitarianism should be so often represented as "cold and unsympathising, dry and hard." But he can vindicate utilitarianism only by recognising qualitative distinctions among pleasures, and by making the remarkable admission that " in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realising such happiness as is attainable." These admissions, however, cannot be justified on the Hedonistic ground. In the first place, all distinc- tions of rank among pleasures must, as we have seen (p. 135), be made intuitively or rationally, and based upon qualitative distinctions among activities ; and accordingly Conscience must be an innate susceptibility independent of the experience of consequences (p. 87). In the second place, such disinterested action as Mill desiderates is impos- sible without the recognition of principles which are categorical imperatives, and which therefore can not arise from the need of gratifying sensibility. {c) Mr Spencer seeks to reconcile the inductive with the intuitive theory of morality. In his view, while pleasure and pain are the only good and evil respectively, the instruments for promoting pleasure and, indirectly, increasing life, or the adjustment to the environment, have been gradually discovered through variation and natural selection (p. 65). To make this discovery, a multitude of experiences, (J>) Mill's vindication of Hedonism is based on a disguised acceptance of the intuitive theory. (c) Spencer's theory of the genesis of Conscience. l6o JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT The theory of evolution can- not be applied to morals with- out rejecting Hedonism, or admitting things other than pleasure to be good. some favourable, others unfavourable, were needed. And when conduct of a certain type was found to be favourable to the growth of the race, it stereo- typed itself in the cerebral organisation of the race, was transmitted from generation to generation, and reappeared in the children with an instinctive preference towards itself and aversion towards its opposite. At this stage the origin of the prefer- ence is lost sight of, and the judgment is regarded as intuitive, as having been immutable for the race as it is innate in the individual. Now it cannot be denied there has been a gradual evolution of the conscience of the race till it has attained its present form. Conduct among the civilised races is not what it is among the savages. Between conduct regulated by custom and conduct regulated by a moral ideal, various intermediate stages may be recognised, in which conduct is regulated by law or by ideas (p. 190). The standard of judgment may also have varied in the progressive evolution of the race.* But Spencer's account is inadequate for this reason, that he seeks to evolve the moral out of the non-moral. From the very beginning some- thing other than pleasure must have been recognised as the good ; for that increase of life or that ad- justment of the individual to the community, which Spencer regards as the moral end, cannot be proved to be desirable or conducive to the individual's own pleasure (p. 202). Accordingly it was a good which, from the very beginning, must have been * See Mackenzie, op. cit.^ book i., chs. iv., v. THE MORAL SENSE 161 rationally, and therefore intuitively, i.e. without calculating consequences (p. 109), recognised as the good. (2) Among Intuitional thinkers, as we have seen, two theories of Conscience are current : one which views it as the Moral Sense, analogous in its operation to Perception, and the other which views it as the Moral (or Practical) Reason. {a) According to the former theory, there is an internal sense, which nature has made universal in the whole species ; it is to this internal sense that virtue appeals, and is recognised as good or desir- able on its own account, without " fee or reward." "The pleasure of moral sense is pleasure felt in the ' mere survey ' of an act, quite apart from any expectation of personal advantage or loss." Ac- cordingly, a person exercising his moral sense is in the attitude of a disinterested or impartial spectator contemplating an action, whether of him- self or of others. The defect of the Moral Sense theory (besides those already pointed out) is that it does not adequately discriminate between the motive and the consequent of the action, so that we are left in doubt whether the impartial spec- tator is approving of the act for the sake of its motive or for the sake of its tendency to produce pleasure. This defect appears in Butler's identi- fication of Conscience with Self-love. In his view, though virtue is an end in itself, and as such intuitively recognised by Conscience, "yet, when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify The intuitive theory of conscience appears in two forms. {a) Conscience as the Moral Sense. The defect of the theory — it is not free from certain Hedonistic elements which give to it an ambiguous import. 1 62 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT (/5) C nscience as the Moral Reason. Moral Senti- ment defined. to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least n< )t contrary to it." It is probable, however, that Butler's dissent from the intuitional theory is more apparent than real ; what he implies is, probably, the final accordance of moral conduct with the good of the total human being. The same may be said of Hutcheson's identification of Conscience with Benevolence. ib) The view of the " Rational " moralists regard- ing the nature of Conscience has been already indicated (p. 145). "Conscience," says Kant, "is practical reason, which, in every case of law, holds before a man his duty for acquittal or condemna- tion." The limits within which this theory may be accepted as true have been already indicated (pp. 147-9).* 4. Moral Sentiment. Kant defines "moral feeling" as "the suscepti- bility for pleasure or displeasure merely from the consciousness of the agreement or disagreement of our action with the law of duty." Accordingly, the feelings of approbation and disapprobation, in so far as they are moral, i.e. distinct from mere liking and disliking,/?//^zi/ the idea of the law, and do not precede it (p. 1 16). The Hedonistic account of the origin of the moral sentiment is therefore * For the Eudaemonistic theory of Conscience, the student is referred to ch. iii. § 4. It differs from the theory of the Rational moralists in this, that there is a deeper understand- ing of the bearing of the moral principles on the progress of the self towards perfection. MORAL SENTIMENT 163 beside the mark. Recognising the admittedly social character of the moral sentiment (p. 1 16), the Hedonist seeks to explain it as the product of the exercise of social authority over the individual (p. 158). It is forgotten, however, that the social authority must itself be viewed as conformable to the Moral Law, and its exercise approved of, before it can be accepted as an imperative of conduct. Doubtless the fear of man may often produce an acute feeling of distress ; an orator may pass a very bad night if he knows that he has mispro- nounced a word in public ; but such feelings of regret can be discriminated from a true feeling of remorse, in which there is not only pain, but the sense that the pain is a deserved sequel to the violation of a law. The Moral Law, as Butler points out, " necessarily includes in it at least an implicit promise in case of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience." From what we have already learnt regarding the mode of moral judgment, it should be no longer difficult to account for the diversity of moral judg- ment (p. 116). This diversity is supposed by the Hedonist to constitute a fatal objection to the soundness of the intuitive theory of morals. The Hedonist explains the diversity as the product of expediency, of the shifting needs of the times, of the individual and the social experience of pleasure and pain. But when we consider the extent of the alleged diversity, we rather get a corroborative evidence in favour of the intuitive theory. " The The relation of moral senti- ment to moral judgment is inverted in the Hedonistic account of its origin, which overlooks the fact that the social autho- rity, supposed to generate the sentiment, is itself the ob- ject of that sentiment. The diversity of moral judg- ments, on which Hedon- ism relies for its justifica- tion, is much less than is sup- posed, and can be satisfactorily accounted for from a non-Hedonic standpoint. 164 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT extent and force of agreement'' is very much greater than the extent of diversity. In the first place, it is curious that men do not so much differ regarding what is right as regarding what is wrong.* Even among savages, where theft, indolence, and other vices prevail, most of these are regarded as crimes in their own estimation. In the second place, as Janet rightly points out, " it is surprising how, amid great differences in time, place, and material circumstances, man has yet been every- where so nearly the same. The moral legislators of the Hindoos, the Chinese, the Persians, the Hebrews, and the Greeks, have all formed strik- ingly similar ideas of human morality ; and the more closely we study the civilisation of these different peoples, the more clearly we see simili- tude in diversity, the more numerous we find the ideas held in common amid all apparent contradictions.! It is not difficult from the standpoint of intuitive morality to at least partly account for the diversity. It is in part accounted for by the law of attention (p. 88). Inattention to the voice of the internal judge makes us unmindful of moral distinctions. This inattention may be due to negligence in cultivating the conscience, or to gross indulgence in vice, which gradually blunts the moral sense. Again, while there is an agreement in general principles, there may be difference of opinion in * Calderwood, op. cit., p. 75. t Janet, op. cit., p. 333. THE INTUITIVE THEORY 165 objective judgments, i.e. in the application of those principles to particular cases (p. 146). Lastly, diversity in moral judgments may be accounted for by the growth " of our human nature and the sense of brotherhood." Our feelings are being gradually refined through the evolution of the race ; new springs of action are emerging into consciousness ; and in the new light which dawns upon our consciousness it is but natural that we should see a shortcoming in actions where we had not suspected anything defective. A Rabbi, satu- rated with the spirit of the Mosaic dispensation, may rightly demand '' an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth " ; but for a Christian, the duty is " to forgive his enemies, and do good to them that hate him." But the intuitive theory fails to account for the diversity when the primary intuitions of men are opposed to one another, or when there is a conflict of ideals between the different sections of a com- munity or different races of men. In such cases the diversity is due to the absence of philosophic reflection, to the neglect of elements that ought to be considered in rightly valuing an action with regard to the total good of the Self. It should be noted that the individual generally accepts the current notions of the society in which he moves ; these notions are generally formed through the need of self-preservation on the part of that section of the community, and, it is obvious, are valid only to the extent of the place assigned to it as a factor i66 JUDGMENT, FACULTY, AND SENTIMENT in the economy of human progress towards indi- vidual and social perfection ; — but it is very likely that by the individual their value will be over- estimated. CHAPTER V MORAL OBLIGATION, DUTIES AND VIRTUES, THE HIGHEST GOOD I. The Nature of Duty. "Duty," or *' obligation," is a word which ex- presses the relation in which we as agents are placed with regard to the Moral Law. As a com- plete psychosis, the sense of duty involves a con- sciousness of this relation, as well as a sentiment in which is found the spring of obedience to the Law. The relation is one of necessity, which may be inter- preted either in an ideal or in a mechanical way. We may either define " Duty," with Kant, as " the Two^^iews of necessity of obedience to the Law out of respect for the Law," or we may define it, with Spencer, as " the indispensableness of using the means, if we would get the end " (which is pleasure). It is easy to see that these divergent views regarding the nature of Duty are dependent on divergent views regarding the nature of the Moral Law, which may be regarded either as a Categorical or as a Hypo- thetical Imperative. On the one hand, regarding the Law as a Cate- Duty. 167 (r) The intui- tive or rational theory. The authority of the Law re>ides in its convincing reasonable- ness — it de- mandsjbut does not coerce. (2) The He- donistic or * mechanical theory. The authority of the Law, when it means anything, i68 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD gorical Imperative, we find it to be independent of desire (p. 136). There may not be a desire to fulfil the Law ; obedience to it may be the most painful alternative— still the Moral Law is recognised to have a "binding force" upon our will. For we cannot know the right without knowing that it is absolutely or unconditionally obligatory. The "binding force" or authority of the Moral Law has in it, however, no element of coerciveness. It demands but does not compel. It presents the "right" in its intrinsic worth or excellence, and, generating the sentiment of reverence, persuades us to follow it; but it leaves the agent free to follow it or to reject it as he likes. Its authority is rationally recognised; apart from any promise of future pleasures, it, from its very nature, claims superiority over all the impulses of our nature. " To preside and govern," says Butler, " from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." On the other hand, if we regard the Law as a Hypothetical Imperative, it is evident we cannot entertain the foregoing view of Duty. On this theory, the " right " has no intrinsic worth, it is but a means for the attainment of pleasure ; hence the Law derives its authority from the prospect of pleasure. If, now, the "right" were uniformly pleasant, then men would always follow the right and need no injunction to do the same. Hence AUTHORITY OF THE LAW 169 from certain " sanctions," certain Hedonistic writers (Bentham, for example) think that "it is very idle to talk about duties." But this view cannot be consistently maintained ; it must be recognised that there are hindrances to right action — the right, for example, may not be immediately pleasant, or it may be pleasant for the community but not for the individual agent. On account of these hindrances. Hedonistic writers lay much stress on what are called the " Sanctions of is derived Morality," and derive from these the sense of duty. These sanctions being " persuasives to good con- duct," diVQ feelings raised by the representations of a possible harm incident on the violation of a law, as well as of a possible pleasure incident on con- formity to it. They are divided into — (a) the here enu- physical sanction, or pleasures and pains (diseases, "^e^^^^^^* etc.) brought on by the course of nature ; {b) the legal sanction, or the penalty attached by the State to an infringement of law ; {c) the social ox popular sanction, or pleasures and pains derived from public opinion ; (^) the religious sanction, or such pleasures and pains of this world and the next as are attached to actions by the will of God, or the Church acting as God's representative on earth ; {e) the internal or moral sanction, or the pleasure of self-approbation and the sting of remorse. It is evident that this theory of Duty differs essentially Difference from the foregoing: theory: — Whereas in that ^^^^een this ^ ° \ theory and the theory the Law is authoritative but does not foregoing, compel, here the authority of the Law is derived from the fact that it compels, the demand of the ', 170 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD Law being empty and unmeaning except for its moving the will with bribes or threats. The Hedon- That there is something remarkably inadequate criticised.^ ^^ ^^^ Hedonistic theory of Duty, is apparent from (fl) It does not the following considerations: — In the first place, dL^nteresTed ^ ^^^^^^ prompted by these sanctions is not right performance of duty. MORAL AUTHORITY 171 {h) The sanctions themselves derive their effectiveness from the sense of duty, rather than Duty derives its authority from the sanctions. action, or action done in the right spirit ; the man who requires to be prompted to do a right action by bribes or threats, is by no means a good man (p. 61). In the second place, these sanctions are inoperative except on the supposition of an already existing sense of duty ; else why should I forego my present good for fear of some remote calamity, whatever be the cause which brings this about — whether it be caused by the ordinary course of nature, or the will of the State, Society, or God ? I must first rationally realise that I deserve the pun- ishment — that it is proper for me to be punished — before the punishment can be efficacious, otherwise it only provokes a spirit of defiance against the alleged authority of the State, Society, or God. If there is no intrinsic excellence in the act which I am required to do, if I cannot be rationally con- vinced of its excellence (whether before or after the punishment it does not matter), by what right, I may ask, except that of selfish aggrandisement, does Society or the State or God make such a demand upon me? And if these "authorities" have a right to be selfish, why have I not a similar right ? The dependance of these sanctions on the sense of duty is very clearly seen in the last-named ! sanction, introduced into the list by Mill ; here the feeling of approbation or remorse is obviously sub- sequent to the consciousness that duty has been done or violated. The Hedonistic list of sanctions is far from being The Hedonic complete. It takes no account of the disinterested ^^ ° ®. ^ sanctions is Springs of moral conduct, viz., (i) Respect for the incomplete. Law, (2) Regard for the dignity of human personality ; and (3) Love of God, or the desire to be at one with Him in thought, feeling, and action. With regard to the first incentive, Kant's oft-quoted remark may here also be quoted : — " Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admira- tion and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them : the starry heavens above, and the Moral Law within." The nature of the second and the third incentives will be presently con- sidered. 2. The Foundation of Moral Authority. Rejecting now the Hedonistic account of obliga- tion, which traces it to the so-called " sanctions of morality," and regarding the Moral Law as in truth a Categorical Imperative, we find that the nature of the obligation is such as to give a clear indica- tion of its source. Inasmuch as the obligation is absolute and perfect, not to be avoided or evaded, it implies that we have not given ourselves the Law. We are the subjects of a Higher Power which we must conceive as the Highest and the Holiest, for any blemish in the Author of the Law A perfect obli- gation on our part implies an absolute perfection in the Author of the Law. But the iMoral Law is not the result of an arbitrary fiat, being ration- ally related to a divinely appointed end which is in- trinsically and immutably excellent. 172 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD would impair, in our estimation, the absoluteness of the obhgation ; in other words, the moral laws must be viewed as the commands of an absolutely Perfect Being. The voice of Conscience is the voice of God. But, in order to understand this doctrine rightly, we must inquire, Why does God lay His commands upon us ? Are the moral laws so many arbitrary decrees ? Can we say that God, if He wills, by an ukase, can turn infidelity to a virtue and fidelity to a vice ? The answers to these ques- tions must be in the negative. The Moral Law cannot rest on the arbitrary and tyrannical exercise of a power, however great. A rational law, appre- hended by the Reason as just and proper, has an intrinsic and immutable excellence. It is the intrinsic and immutable excellence of the end which necessarily creates obligation on our part to realise it. Fidelity, for example, is commanded because it \s good, but not good because it is com- manded. God might have refrained from creating human beings with appointed ends; but having created them, it is His Reason which discloses to them the eternal distinctions of good and evil as they were comprehended within it. We are the participators in His Reason, and it is this fact which enables us to rise above the thousand imper- fections of our nature, and grasp the Law or the Ideal in its universality. He \s "the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world," and in the " sweet reasonableness " of that THE RATIONAL WILL OF GOD 173 light, we not only perceive how just and fitting is it that we should be commanded as we are com- manded, but also realise that to wrong or affront the Ideal is in itself a degradation, horrible in its enormity and illimitable in its perspective, till with fear and trembling, aided by His gracious might, we work out our salvation. The foundation of morals is laid deep in the Rational Will of God, our Highest and Best. We shall be in a better position to understand the relation of man to God as revealed in the Moral Law, if we trace the stages through which the conception of the Law as the Law of God has been evolved in human consciousness. In the first place, the law might be conceived as something external, as a sacred injunction, whether recorded in scriptures or orally transmitted in the traditions of a sacred college. A primitive faith would accept the law without hesitation, and give to it an unquestioning obedience ; but such a faith would not long suffice. For, with the growth of intelligence, it is discovered, ^ri"/, that all parts of the scriptural code cannot have an equal authority (the precept, " seven days thou shalt eat unleavened bread," cannot have equal authority with the pre- cept, " thou shalt not kill ") ; secondly, that frequently the letter of the law has to be sacrificed for the spirit ; thirdly, that the external law not seldom conflicts with the law " written in the heart " ; * and * Read the fine drama, Visarjana, by Rabindranath Tagore. It is founded on the Rational Will of God. Different conceptions regarding the Law of God. It might be viewed as external, whether de- termined by scripture or oral tradition. Objections to this view. It might be viewed as in- ternal, re- vealed by conscience. Objections to this view. The true nature of the Law — it is as much a law of our rational being as a law of God. What union with God means. 174 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD lastly, various parts of the external code, judged to be equally authoritative, are found to be in conflict with one another. All these discoveries make the former unquestioning attitude of self-surrender very nearly impossible. In the second place, the law might be conceived as something internal, revealed by Conscience, which discloses principles to which an unquestion- ing obedience is demanded. But why unquestion- ing? It is said that there is an element of mystery in the Moral Law which is inexplicable. But we have seen that the Law can be explained by the End ; there is no more mystery in the Law than in the End, i.e. in the creation of rational beings with appointed ends. To put Duty before Good, is to put the cart before the horse. As we have already seen (p. 148), it is only by a reference to the End that we can hope to resolve all conflicts among the principles revealed by Conscience. We see from the foregoing that the command of God is recognised by us as just, because it is needful to develop and perfect our personality. One who rationally seeks to realise the end of his being, is, in truth, "a law unto himself";* the obedience he gives to the law of God is not unques- tioning, but rational, since it is based upon an understanding of its import. He understands the mystic sense of the words, " Henceforth I call you * In this sense we can justify what Kant calls the "Auto- nomy of the Reason," or the rational government of the self by the self. RIGHT AND DUTY 175 I not servants ; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth ; but I have called you friends ; for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known to you." And knowing God to be his friend, he knows Him to his Highest Self; not the self where he is weak, vain, and unprofitable, but that Highest Self which is identical with his highest personality, which freely communicates its own infinite spirit to the soul, and to which all obligation is due. His ardent desire is to be at one with that Self, not his own only, but common and universal, the ground of atonement with his fellows ; his earnest aspiration is to be united with that blissful Spirit from whose abundance all good- ness proceeds, where life will be no longer lived piecemeal, and where he, unprofitable servant that he is, having no sufficiency in himself nor any necessity of existence, will be blessed for ever. 3. Right, Virtue, Merit, and Responsibility. (i) By "right" is meant "that which one has Right defined. a claim to exact from another." The existence of Right is in- rights is involved in the existence of duties. If it be vol ved in duty, the duty of A to give anything to B, B has a right to demand it from A. Thus children have claims upon their parents, the country upon the people, creditors upon debtors, etc. Some of these rights are enforced by legislation, so that penalties are incurred if they are violated ; but a " legal " right must ultimately rest upon a " natural " right, it must be deducible from the common principles of obliga- 176 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD and involves duty. " Right " can- not be derived from " might." tion. There is another, and a much deeper sense, in which a right involves a duty. Not only has B a right to that which it is the duty of A to give to him, but it is also the duty of B to use it for the general good. If a general, stationed behind the army, deems it his right that the soldiers should march on to the death according to his directions, then he is all the more laid under an obligation to seek the general good. A man has a right to his own opinion, but it is his duty to make that opinion sound and legitimate. So in all the concerns of life. From the foregoing remarks it is evident that it is vain to try to deduce "right" from "might." " The good old rule, that they should take who have the power, and they should keep who can," does not confer any right upon those who take and keep. Take the rights of children, or of the weak against the strong. The right of these is indeed a power, but it is a fuoral power, a power derived from the idea of the duty that is owed to them. A man with a right is more powerful than he that, armed only with physical power, tries to override it ; for, though he may be vanquished and dishonoured, yet the victor has purchased his victory at a heavy price ; his moral strength has been undermined, his fall is not far distant* The biological prin- * " Adharmmenaidhate tavat tato bhadrani pa^yati tatah sapatnan jayati samulastu vinaQyati." — Manusamhita, iv. 174. " By immoral action a man indeed prospers, gains various objects, and defeats his enemies ; but in the end he perishes, root and branch." ARISTOTLES DEFINITION OF VIRTUE 177 ciple of the survival of the fittest, or the strongest, has no place in the moral world, unless by the strongest is understood, not he that lives for himself alone, but he that protects the weak, is kind as well as brave, full of resources that are spent in active beneficence. (2) Aristotle's definition of Virtue seems to be Virtue defined the best — "Virtue is a permanent state of mind, formed with the concurrence of the will, and based upon an ideal of what is best in actual life — an ideal fixed by reason according as the moral sense of the good man would determine its application." — Aristotle, op. cit, ii. 6 (Hatch's Tr.). Or, " Virtue is a habit or trained faculty of choice, the characteristic of which lies in moderation, or observance of the mean relatively to the persons concerned, as deter- mined by reason, i.e. by the reason by which the prudent man would determine it " (Peters's Tr.). From the foregoing definition it follows— (<2) and character- Virtue is a habit, a permanent disposition of the ^^^^' agent ; it is not knowledge merely, or emotion, but a trained faculty or skill, which makes a ready response to each demand of the occasion, {b) Virtue is acquired, formed with the assent of the will ; it is the result of uniform and repeated per- formance of duty ; a strong inherited bias towards good conduct may be a " capacity " for virtue, but not virtue itself {c) Virtue is to be realised in actual life ; it is no Utopian fancy or dream of per- fection in an imaginary world ; it is, besides, relative to the persons concerned, having reference to the M ty^ OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD total good which each has the power to realise. {ft) Virtue is rational, based on an ideal fixed by Reason ; it is the regulation of life, not in accord- ance with the varying demands of the senses, but according to immutable principles.* ie) Virtue admits of divers applications, which are left to the discretion of a good man ; there is nothing tedious or stereotyped in it ; it is analogous to the genius of a creative artist who, out of the materials at his dis- posal (avoiding, as Aristotle would say, both excess and deficiency), invents ever new types of beauty. Merit defined. (3) By " merit " is meant " the quality of having deserved praise " ; by " demerit," " the quality of having deserved blame." The praise and the blame, in whatever shape bestowed, should be strictly proportioned to the merit and the demerit respectively. Upon what does " merit " depend ? It is con- ♦ It should be noted here that Aristotle regards virtue as " a kind of moderation {fxeffdrrjs ns), inasmuch as it aims at the mean or moderate amount (r6 fieaov)." For example, courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice ; good temper, between passionateness and indifference ; magna- nimity, between vainglory and littleness of soul ; and so on. Without discussing the question whether all virtues can be arranged in a scheme, each lying between two vices, which err in respect of excess and deficiency respectively, it may be said that Aristotle is substantially right, when he says that to act "at the right times, and on the right occasions, and towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right fashion, is the mean course, and the best course, and these are the characteristics of virtue." Con- tinuing, Aristotle observes, that while there are many ways of going wrong, there is but one way of going right, and this is deteniiined by Reason. (See op. at., Peters's Tr.) MERIT 179 sonant to the externalism of the Hedonistic theory to hold that goodness must be embodied in an overt act before it can have merit ; but many a secret tear or upward effort may win merit in the sight of the inward judge. It is also held that the act must have some rare goodness in it in order that it may fetch a high price (in the shape of praise) in social transactions ; but this is to make merit depend on the capricious demands and the varying tastes of Society. The true view, as indi- cated by Martineau, is that merit depends on the force of temptation overcome. The greater the temptation, the greater the force of the will in carrying out the intention, and the greater the merit in well-doing. The exception in the case of the virtuous man, who scarcely feels a temptation, and yet has merit, proves the rule, for that great force of will which he has is the result of many hard-won victories in moral strife. On the other hand, the greater the temptation the more nearly is the action assimilated to spontaneous unreflective activity, and the less is the demerit in wrong- doing — unless, indeed, the greatness of the tempta- tion is due to previous vicious practices. " Merit," as applied to conduct, is sometimes dis- tinguished from " worth " or " goodness," as applied to character.* In so far as character is deliberately " formed with the concurrence of the will," the scale of worth corresponds with that of merit, and char- acter is deemed good or worthy in proportion as * See definition of " cosmic good," p. 6. The Hedon- istic theory of Merit criticised The true theory. . ''xMerit" distinguished from " worth," the latter covering and transcending the former. Responsibility defined. The Hedon- istic theory of punishment inadequate. The ends of punishment defined — I So OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD conduct manifests force of will in overcoming or neutralising temptation. At the same time, it should not be overlooked that a good or worthy character is sometimes the result of an implicit and unacquired synthesis of instincts and desires ; in such cases the will may be said to slumber, it is not called upon to play a conscious part. Here character has a certain excellence or beauty, but the conduct (being, strictly speaking, non-moral) is scarcely regarded as " meritorious," or deserving praise; we are charmed with the behaviour of bees or birds, and admire the winsome ways of children, but we no more ''praise" these things than we do the rose or the lily. (4) By *' responsibility " is meant " the liability to be punished for wrong-doing." It implies — {a) that the wrong is done intentionally (p. 121); (b) that there exists a superior being, who has the right of punishing for wrong-doing. Hedonism seeks the ground of responsibility in the desire of the Society to protect itself from the encroachments of the individual, and to reform his character, reducing the strength of the egoistic, and increasing the strength of the altruistic, tendencies. That the end of punishment is partly protective and partly reformative, cannot be doubted. But this theory of punishment misses the essential factor in responsibility ; it overlooks the retributive character of punishment. A wrong has been done ; a duty has been violated. When the wrong is done in a moment of insane frenzy, when the doing RESPONSIBILIT V 181 of it is unavoidable, when the criminal is a lunatic, then, indeed, punishment loses its retributive significance, and contents itself with instituting an asylum where the criminal is detained, and, if possible, restored to reason. But when the wrong is done intentionally, when the agent has deter- mined himself towards that which is evil, then punishment is retributive ; it is based on the recog- retributive, nition of demerit in the action. "The deepest warrant for the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent and reformative agent is," as Seth points out, " found in its ethical basis as an act of retri- bution. True reformation comes only with the acceptance of the punishment, by mind and heart, as the inevitable fruit of the act." But it is true protective and that "the purpose of chastisement is not mere ^^1°^^^^^""'' justice ; it has a subjective moral side, its object being to restrain a freedom which is still bound to nature, and to instil the universal into the agent's consciousness and will." * Its object is not only to protect the Society against the individual, but to protect the individual against himself 4. Good and Duty. Can we rise above duty? Is it possible to do Obligation, something- which is not enjoined as a duty, and ^^"&^P^°P o -' "^ ' erty and not yet is meritorious ? From what has been already an accident of said of the relation of good to duty, it appears ^^^ ^"""^ ^' ° ^ "^ \'' human, cannot that we cannot transcend obligation. It is not be tran- that a thing is good because it is obligatory, but it scended. * Hegel, Philosophy of Rights (Dyde's Tr.), p. 177. Other theories discussed. (i) Obligfation is determined by the mutu- ally under- stood ideal, and therefore can be tran- scended. But this theory is based on a limited and inadequate view of obliga- tion. 182 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD is obligatory because it is good. Were the former proposition tenable, then indeed the range of Good would be wider than that of Duty, and we could rise above duty and still be good ; but it is not so. It is possible, however, to separate the two notions of good and duty in our minds, and suppose that a thing may be good without being obligatory. It is to be seen whether such a sup- position can be justified by facts. (i) In the first place, we may take obligation in a very limited sense, we may suppose it to extend as far as " the mutually understood ideal," * i.e. as far as others have a claim upon our services — either a legal claim or a claim sanctioned by public opinion. Thus, if I have borrowed money, and promised to return it within a certain period, I am bound to keep my promise ; but I am not bound, in the same sense, to help a ruined prodigal, for the latter cannot rightfully demand my services. It is evident that obligation, thus understood, can be transcended. A clerk who works extra hours for the good of his employer, does more than his duty. But we arrive at this conclusion simply because we have taken a limited, a partial and one-sided view of obligation. Our obligation is not measured by the expectations of others, but by the magnitude of the Ideal as it has been revealed to us. (2) But, in the second place, we may think it possible to transcend obligation in another way. * Martineau, op. cit, p. 121. OBLIGA TION 183 Spencer thinks that, with the moralisation of the race, obligation will diminish. His theory is : " The sense of duty or moral obligation is transi- tory, and will diminish as fast as moralisation increases. Persistence in performing a duty ends in making it a pleasure ; and this amounts to the admission that while at first the motive contains an element of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform it." * In other words, with the complete adaptation to the social state, with the perfect conciliation of the interests of the individual with those of Society, that will be done from pure love and with delight which now requires the coercive influence of Society that it may be done. But it is evident that we can thus think of the possibility of tran- scending obligation because we have mistaken the nature of obligation. Obligation is not coercive (p. 170); it acts by moral suasion, and does not disappear, but has its authority only the better recognised when it is merged in delight. Kant, it is true, said, " The notion of obligation comprehends under it that of a good will, con- sidered, however, as affected by certain hindrances " ; whence it is possible to infer that, with the dis- appearance of the hindrances, duty will also dis- appear. It may be said that duty exists only in that transitional stage when the implicit synthesis of instincts and passions which constitutes the ■^ Spencer, of. cit., § 46, (2) Spencer's theory ihat obligation is coercive, and therefore can be tran- scended, is based on a mistaken view of obligation. Obligation does not dis- appear with moral hin- drances, be- cause — (a) We are always the subjects of the Law, never its rulers : (J>) Moral life is a life of progress ad mjinitum. (3) An objec- tion, drawn from theolo2:y, to the view that good and duty are co- ex lensive. The objection, (which is based on a supposed disan tion between a com- mand and a counsel), 184 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD natural innocence of childhood has been broken up, and the stage of perfected moral synthesis has not yet been realised. But such an interpretation of Kant's dictum is erroneous, because, even when the Ideal is attained, conformity to duty does not disappear ; we are still the subjects of a Law which we have not made — only our subjec- tion is glorified by a blissful "feeling of self- realisedness." Again, the pursuit of the Ideal is such an endless task — after one task has been fulfilled with delight, we are so surely called to " a fresh field and pasture new," duty rises up beyond duty in such illimitable perspective — that we can hardly think of a time when duty will disappear ; besides, the unremitting persistence of the obligation under w^hich we live becomes clearly apparent when we consider that it is the duty of every one to save, not himself only, but to labour for the redemption of the world, that so long as a single soul remains unredeemed, duty cannot be said to terminate. (3} In the third place, taking a deeper view of the relation of good to duty, it may be said that God has not made every virtue obligatory. An obligation, it is said, is nothing if not universal ; and there are certain virtues — poverty and celi- bacy, for example — which cannot be universalised. Hence theologians have distinguished between a command and a counsel " Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" is a command; but "Go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor " is a UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR DUTIES 185 counsel which cannot be universalised, for why should a man not enjoy the fruits of his labour which God has given him ? Again, having insti- tuted the sacred rights of the Family, God does not command celibacy. But how does there arise the necessity for any counsels, then ? It is said that "the time is out of joint," "this universal frame, which began from harmony," is now "jangled, out of tune, and harsh," and extra- ordinary Virtue is needed to restore it to its pristine harmony. Hence, as a king may call out volunteers to help him in an emergency, so God calls out volunteers, who willingly do more for Him than strict duty enjoins. This view of the relation of duty to good has a certain charm of its own which appeals to the heart, but it is doubtful whether it can be justified. To every man one is met by duty is clear— to realise all that is highest and best ^'^^i^g^i^h- ^ ° mg between for him. But the methods and instruments of universal and realising it must differ according to talents and Particular duties. circumstances. Hence there must be differences in the duties that are concrete and specific. There must be one duty for the magistrate, another for the man of business ; one for the poet, another for the philosopher. A man may find his hands so full of useful and benevolent work that he has hardly time to think of marriage ; another, when his act does not deprive others of their legitimate rights, may devote all his property to the founding of a hospital or an asylum. Numerous indeed, and divers, are the applications of Virtue ; the i i86 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD Virtuous are frequently called upon to be pioneers in new and untrodden fields, and bring back the news of a blessedness in which every one, accord- ing to his capacity and opportunities, may par- ticipate. Hence arises the distinction between universal and particular duties ; hence, also, the force of the precept, " Do the duty that lies nearest to thee." But the universal, as well as the parti- cular duties, are equally obligatory. Accordingly, we find much truth in Kant's remark : " We should not, like volunteer soldiers, take pride in placing ourselves above the idea of duty, and pretend to act out of our own impulse, without need of receiving orders. We should not, in our presump- tion, diminish the authority of the law by seeking anywhere save in the law itself, and in the respect we owe to it, the guiding principle of our will, even were this otherwise in conformity with the law."* 5. Duties and Virtues. It is our duty to cultivate every virtue ; accord- The classifica- ingly, there are as many duties as virtues. In tion limited classifying duties or virtues, two facts should be by certain •' ° considerations, bome in mind. First, that they are interde- pendent ; this interdependence necessarily results from the fact that the self which is sought to be realised is an organic unity — each duty or virtue may be said to interpenetrate all the rest. Secondly, that it is impossible to give an exhaustive list of * Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. See Janet, op. city book ii. ch. ii. DEFINITE AND INDEFINITE DUTIES 187 duties or virtues ; human nature is far too complex for an exhaustive analysis. With regard to the Duties, the usual classifica- Duty to God. tion is. Duty to one's self. Duty to society, and Duty to God. It is easy to see that these are mutually dependent. It has been pointed out that the Ethical Ideal is both individual and social. All duties are duties to God; nor is there any special duty to God (such as fasting or prayer) which has not a personal or a social import. "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar. This is the love of God, that we keep His commandments." Kant distinguished between Duty to one's self and Duty to society, by saying Duty to Self that the end of the individual is to seek his own ^" ^ ocietj. perfection and the happiness of others (p. 154). This distinction is justified by the consideration that " no man can save his brother's soul " ; all that he can do is to remove obstacles or supply oppor- tunities for the perfect development of others; and unhappiness "might easily become a great temptation to the transgression of duty." A dis- tinction is sometimes drawn between determinate and indeterminate duties. An indeterminate duty Definite and does not imply an imperfect obligation (for all ^^^^^^""^ obligation is perfect), but a duty whose content is indefinite. Thus, if I have borrowed money, I know definitely how much I have to return ; but if I have been saved from death, I do not know definitely how to manifest my gratitude. Justice requires that the tools of government should be Temperance. Courage. 1 88 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD Universal and given to the worthy — but who are the worthy ? particular -phe distinction between universal and particular duties. duties has been already dwelt on. With regard to the Virtues, the old Platonic division into Temperance, Courage, Wisdom, and Justice (the Cardinal Virtues) is still valid for modern times, if we just enlarge their connotation in view of modern requirements. Temperance does not consist only in restricting the indulgence of the appetites and the passions within proper bounds, but in the concentration of all energy on the execution of one's special life-purpose. Courage is shown both in work and endurance, in executing one's life-purpose, in fulfilling the precept so elo- quently preached by Carlyle, " Produce, produce, were it but the pitifulest infinitesimal fraction of a product, produce it in God's name." A courageous man is required " to consume his own smoke," to fight with an environment that is by no means friendly ; " to swallow down," as Carlyle said of Columbus, '* complaint, unreason, weariness, weak- ness — to cultivate a silence deeper than the sea, which is but ten miles deep." * He is also required to " compel sloth and scourge sin, as long as this wretched little dusty and volcanic world breeds nettles and spits fire."f Wisdom includes Pru- dence, and much more than Prudence. It com- mands the careful use of such opportunities for self-realisation as the environment offers ; it re- * Carlyle, Sartor Resartus, ii. 9 ; Past and Present, iii. 11. t Ruskin, Time and Tide, Letter 24. THE HIGHEST GOOD 189 Wisdom. quires circumspection in the choice of the means, as well as a lofty enthusiasm in the choice of the end. It consists in the right understanding of the value of everything that bears upon life, of the claims of self-culture as well as those of social action ; and while, perhaps, it most delights in the contemplation of the Ideal as the source and the synthesis of all the Beatitudes, it is mindful also *'of the lowliest duties of life." Justice has a justice. negative as well as a positive aspect ; negatively, it consists in non-interference with the legitimate rights of others ; positively, it requires us to supply opportunities to those who are hindered by their circumstances from realising the Ideal. To no small extent is the inequality of conditions in society due to neglect of duty or to actual wrong done by the past generations, the fruits of whose labours we have inherited and enjoy ; and much of what is now demanded of Benevolence should, in strictness, be demanded of Justice. Benevolence Benevolence. is, in its universal form, the love of man as man ; but it appears in numerous beautiful and diversified forms in " the dear relations and sweet charities " of the various institutions that impart to life all its meaning and worth — the Family, the University, the State, and the Church.* 6. The Highest Good. We have now discussed the significance of various The theories of ethical notions in the light of the interpretations ^^® ethical ideal dis- * Read the excellent account of the Virtues in Seth, cussed. op. cit., part ii. k The practical value of a theory of the moral ideal is seen in the necessity of the transition from customs and laws to ideas^ 190 OBLIGATION, ETC, THE HIGHEST GOOD put upon them by the different theories of the Ethical Ideal. It now remains to discuss the theories themselves.* But, first, it would not be out of place to consider what practical value a t/ieory of the moral ideal has in the economy of moral life. Moral life is, as we^ have seen, constituted by the inter-relations of] desire, reason and will ; in other words, a man lives' morally in so far as he desires to produce a certain effect, judges that effect to be good, and directs himself towards its accomplishment. It is evident that man as a moral being has ideas as to what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable. Ordinarily ' these ideas are imbibed as they are current in society, either as latent in its customs or habitual practices, or as imparted through its educational agencies — the voice of the parent or the tutor, the chieftain or the magistrate. There is a period in the life of the individual or that of society during which these ideas are sufificient for practical pur- poses ; people know distinctly whom to obey, what to do, and what to avoid in given circumstances ; as an instance may be mentioned the authority which in India until lately, was conceded to caste- regulations as transmitted by local tradition. But this period is bound sooner or later to come to an end. Through the assertion of the primary intui- tions of consciousness or the enlargement of ex- perience, things are found to be good which cannot * The account here given of the theories of the Ideal closely follows that in Seth, op. cit.^ part i. FROM IDEAS TO IDEALS 191 be brought under the old ideas, things are found to be evil which were sanctioned by them. The rise of new interests, new desires, become inevitable, and, as a necessary consequence, the old ideas become vague and indistinct ; their application becomes uncertain, their latent contradictions appear into view, their authority is disputed. It is at this stage that demand is made for " a moral from ideas to ideal " for the individual to go by, in place of the ^ ^^ "^' numerous *' ideas " which he, without criticism, derived from society. Now an ideal of the kind demanded cannot be formed without reflection ; but reflection may be more or less incomplete. Accordingly there arise not one but many " ideals," which conflict with one another. Loyalty to the sovereign, obedience to the Church, scriptural morality, what is called " code of honour " among gentlemen, individual good, public good, social life, retirement from the world — these and other " ideals " have distracted and divided the allegiance of men ever since the dawn of reflection. Hence there is recognised the supreme need of having a theory of the moral ideal — of reviewing the different and from ideals ideals and estimating their value ; of formulating, by *° ^t^ory of philosophic reflection on the sum total of human interests, a " theory " by which the perplexities of conscience * might be set at rest. It falls within * These perplexities of conscience are, as Green points * out, mistakenly represented as conflicts of duties. " There is no such thing really as conflict of duties. A man's duty / under any particular set of circumstances is always one, though the conditions of the case may be so complicated and The use of studying Ethics. Hedonism is prevalent in the world, but it does not satisfy the self, which is neither wholly nor even pre- dominantly sentient. 192 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD the scope of Ethics as a Philosophy of the Moral Ideal, to discuss the various " theories " proposed, and thus to render our ideas of right and wrong as scientifically accurate as possible ; and the study of Ethics is then undertaken in a proper spirit when, with the progress of thinking, morality is ex- plained but not " explained away," and authority does not slacken its bond unless to bind afresh to the Ideal, which is rationally conceived as the highest and best* A. — Hedonism. It cannot be doubted that the Hedonistic con- ception of the Moral Ideal is largely prevalent in the world ; but the fundamental proposition of Hedonism, that "pleasure is the only or the highest good," has no philosophic warrant. It s^^^v^s prima facie impossible to accept pleasure as the only good ; for pleasure is the good of sensi- bility, and human personality is not wholly sen- tient Pleasure cannot satisfy ourselves; Mill obscure as to make it difficult what the duty really is. That which we are apt to call a conflict of duties is really a com- petition of reverences for imagined imponents of duty, whose injunctions, actual or supposed, do not agree. A woman perhaps finds herself directed to act in one way by her father, in another by her confessor. . . . The actual per- plexity of conscience in such cases commonly arises from the habit of identifying duty with injunctions given by external authorities, and from the fact that in the supposed case the injunctions so given are inconsistent with each other." —Op. cit., book iv. ch. ii. p. 355. t See, on the above subject, Green, op. ciL, iv. 2 ; Muirhead, op, ciL, I. i. ; Mackenzie, op. cit., I. iv. sees. 4-8. THE CYRENAIC THEORY 193 admits that it is " better to be a Socrates dissatis- fied than a fool satisfied." We cannot hold that pleasure is the highest good ; that sensibility dictates the end, and the reason and the will are simply its ministers. This becomes apparent when we investigate the meaning of " pleasure." It will be seen that the term " pleasure," viewed as the highest good, is highly ambiguous. Its meaning has changed considerably in the history of Hedonism. It is proposed here to discuss some of the meanings attached to the term, in order that we may see whether any justification can be found for Hedonism as a theory of the Moral Ideal. (i) If we examine the extreme form of the theory as it was held by Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic School, we find that the highest good is conceived to lie in a series of isolated pleasures — each transitory, but each sufficient for the moment To have no regret for a past that is gone, and no trouble about a dubious future; to surrender oneself with a careless abandon to the present — this is the Ethical Ideal* Consistently The term " pleasure " is ambiguous. Discussion of its various meanings. (I) The Cyrenaic theory. — The highest good is the pleasure of the moment ; all pleasures are equal in kind. * This is also the view of pleasure entertained in the Charvaka system. "The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. ... It is not for us, through a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial. Men do not refrain from sowing rice because, forsooth, there are wild animals to devour it ; nor do they refuse to set the cooking- pots on the fire because, forsooth, there are beggars to pester us for a share of the contents . . . While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt." — Madhavacharya, op, cit., ch. i. N Impos-ible for this thfory to satisfy our- selves, tor man '* looks before and after." The theory is based upon a deep moral scepticism ; and, in its ex- treme form, was abandoned even by its leading advo- cates. 194 OBLIGATION, ETC,, THE HIGHEST GOOD Hedonic, Aristippus ignored all distinctions of worth among pleasures ; the only differences are those in degree and duration. It is evident that no one can accept this theory without doing violence to his nature. Man is a creature that necessarily " looks before and after " ; his total being is always larger than any fleeting interest of the moment. Accordingly, the theory we are considering is based upon a despair of ever attaining Happiness (p. 69). There is a profound melancholy at the core of this voluptuous philo- sophy * Hegasias, a Cyrenaic, known as the '* orator of death," " taught that life was so full of cares, and its pleasures so fleeting and so alloyed, that the happiest lot for man was death ; and such was the power of his eloquence, so intense was the fascination he cast around the tomb, that his disciples embraced with rapture the consequences of his doctrine, multitudes freed themselves by suicide from the troubles of the world." f Yet (as will appear subsequently) this extrerne theory is the only theory that can be consistently main- tained on the Hedonistic ground. But even Aristippus had to rise above his theory. He could not banish reason perpetually from the court of life ; he had to invoke its aid to make a selection among pleasures. What he advised was "the calm, resolute, skilful culling of such pleasures as circumstances afforded from moment 'I Seth, op. cit, p. 84. t Lecky, op. cii., vol. i. p. 227. THE EPICUREAN THEOR Y 195 to moment."* And Theodorus, a disciple, defined pleasure, not as " an isolated sensation," but as " a state of constant cheerfulness." f (2) We rise to a higher conception of "pleasure" in the ethics of Epicurus, which supplanted the Cyrenaic doctrine. " Pleasure " is conceived to be a state of "stable or permanent satisfaction." This state, of course, cannot be secured without careful reflection. " Epicurus would have the various feelings of pleasure and pain carefully estimated, and in consideration of the advantages and dis- advantages which they confer, would under circum- stances advise the good to be treated as an evil, and the evil as a good." But what is peculiar to Epicurus is his conception of pleasure as a negative good. Pleasure, he taught, does not lie in the gratification of desire except so far as such grati- fication removes " the pain of unsatisfied craving." But there is no end to desire, and desire as such is full of pain ; therefore, wiser in this respect than the multitude, Epicurus, knowing that the course of nature does not make provision for the satisfac- tion of all our desires, taught that the great secret of happiness lies in the reduction of our desires to a minimum, in arapa^la, or freedom from passion, calmness or repose, in " the freedom of the body from pain and of the soul from disturbance." He that does not measure the gifts of nature by his desires, says Epicurus, finds that Nature makes * Sidgwick, " Ethics " (Art. Enc. Brit.). t Ueberweg, op, cit., vol. i. p. 97. (2) The Epi- curean theory. — The highest good is stable pleasure, which cannot be secured without care- ful rejection, and without reduction of our desires to a minimum. The definition of pleasure is negative, and is based on a pessimistic view of the world's course. The pleasures of the mind are superior to those of the body. But the intrinsic superiority of one pleasure over another cannot be maintained without giving up Hedonism ; for what makes a plea- sure superior is not pleasure itself but some- thing else on which the pleasure de- pends. The incon- sistency of Epicurus. 196 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD ample provision for his happiness. Hence, also, Epicurus taught that the pleasures of the mind are superior to the pleasures of the body ; the former are "pure and incorruptible," the latter are "of short duration, and never attain their consumma- tion." " Mind only, by consoling us for the limited nature of our bodily existence, can produce a life complete in itself, and not standing in need of un- limited duration." But it may be asked, what justification is there, on the Hedonistic ground, for this theory of Epicurus. It should be recognised, once for all, that we cannot maintain the intrinsic superiority of certain pleasures over others without giving up Hedonism. For, what makes one pleasure superior to another is the difference in intrinsic worth of the activities on which they depend, and, therefore, pleasure cannot be regarded as the unconditional or the highest good ; it is good only when the activity is good. The stable pleasure which results from the reduction of desire is superior to the temporary pleasure, which results from the gratifica- tion of desire, because the act of reducing desire is by the intuitive Reason discovered to be superior to the act of gratifying desire. Hence there is something else than pleasure which is good, and which, being good, imparts its goodness to the pleasure which accompanies it. If we would avoid this anti-Hedonic conclusion, we should deny the intrinsic superiority of one class of pleasures over another. And this Epicurus is obliged to do. BENT HAM'S THEORY J97 " The greater importance of the ideal pleasures is ascribed to their greater force or duration as compared with the attractions which momentarily impress the senses." But this greater force or duration may occasionally belong to gross and carnal enjoyments, and, according to Epicurus, " we have no cause for rejecting these if they can liberate us from the fear of sufferings." Thus this theory loses the ground which it has won in improvement of the Cyrenaic position, and easily reverts to it."* (3) If we now turn to Bentham's theory of " pleasure," we find it to differ remarkably from Epicurus's theory ; for whereas the latter advised the reduction of desires, Bentham advises the gratification of desires as far as is consistent with a maximum of enjoyment and a minimum of pain. The highest good is conceived as "a sum of pleasures " ; the means must be discovered by the application of certain " metrics " already described (p. 73)- But a sum of pleasures cannot be thought of except on the supposition that all pleasures are equal in kind. Once admit qualitative distinctions among pleasures, and it becomes impossible to imagine a sum of pleasures. Pleasures differing in quality can no more be added to one another than a number of geese can be added to a number of swans. We can, of course, think of geese and swans as birds ; so we can think of bodily and * See Zeller, Stoics and Epicureans, ch. xix. (3) Ben- tham's theory. — The highest good is a sum of pleasures. But a sum of pleasures is an absurdity, be- cause of quali- tative distinc- tions among pleasures, which being ignored makes Bentham's theory no better than the Cyrenaic. (4) Mill's theory. — The highest good is noble pleasure. But this theory is, in its essence, un-Hedonic. 198 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD intellectual pleasures as pleasures, but we thereby lose all the concrete significance which belongs to each pleasure in the enjoyment or in the imagina- tion of it* How can we think of ourselves enjoy- ing a succession of intellectual and bodily pleasures without attending to qualitative differences, without making allowance for quantitative inferiority by noticing qualitative superiority (where such exists) ; without, in short, making our calculation essentially un-Hedonic ? And if all quahtative distinctions be ignored (p. 71), then Bentham's theory has no larger outlook of moral life than was provided for by the Cyrenaic theory. (4) Mill gives us a better and more reasonable theory of pleasure. At the outset he tells us that " some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others." A pleasure may possess '' a superiority in quality so far outweigh- ing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account." Hence Mill conceives the highest good to lie, not in intense or durable enjoyment, but in the enjoyment of noble, elevated, and dignified pleasures, even though these be of small intensity or short duration. Mill's theory is doubtless justified by facts, but that is because facts do not justify Hedonism. It has now been said more than once that pleasures as pleasures do not admit of distinctions of quality or rank, that the intrinsic superiority of one class of pleasures over another cannot be maintained * See Green, op. cit., p. 236. UTILITARIANISM 199 save on the supposition that pleasure is not an unconditional good, that it depends for its goodness on objective worth or excellence intuitively recog- nised. (5) Hedonism has been hitherto considered as egoistic, i.e. as having an ultimate regard for the private happiness of the individual. If we now examine the doctrine of universalistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism, we find that the highest good is conceived to be " the greatest happiness of the greatest number of individuals." The moral value of an action depends upon its utility, i.e. upon its capability to realise the end as thus conceived. But seeing that " it is the individual, after all, that feels pleasure," how can we prove that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is pleasure to the individual agent? Since this theory has generally been allowed to rest on the psychological postulate that the individual is bound, by his very nature, to seek only his own pleasure, the burden of proof lies heavy upon the Hedonist. It is a matter of fact that this theory cannot be proved with the help of sensibility alone. Neither with the help of the Hartleyan law of transference (p. 55), nor by referring to the mechanism of social rewards and punishments, can we show that always the greatest happiness of the greatest number coincides with that of the in- dividual (p. 74). Sensibility does not provide for the synthesis of passions in the individual life, nor for that of individuals in the community. Mill's de- (5) The theory of Utilitarianism or Altruistic Hedonism. — The hijjhest good is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But, on the ground of sensibility, the greatest happiness of the greatest number can- not be proved to be desirable. (6) The theory of Rational Hedonism. — Reason dic- tates the end as pleasure, as well as the principles of the distribution of pleasure. 200 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD fence of Utilitarianism claims a passing notice. He argues that " each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness therefore is a good to the aggregate of all persons." This is as much as to say, that since A desires the happiness of A, and B that of B, A and B both desire the happiness of A and B, and therefore A and B as individuals desire the happiness of both A and B. It is evident that the argument involves a double fallacy, first of composition, and then of division. (6) The impossibility of founding Hedonism on its usually accepted postulate induced Sidgwick to construct a different theory, known as that of Rational or Ethical Hedonism. Whereas in Psy- chological Hedonism it is held that pleasure is good because it is desired by all, in Rational Hedonism it is held that pleasure ought to be desired by all, even though it may not be actually desired. Pleasure is the end of moral life, the absolutely good or desirable, but it is pleasure of a certain kind which may not have sufficient quantitative fulness to make it always desired ; " the knowledge of what ought to be is irreducible to what is, has been, and will be." It is the good of the total life, and not that of passing moments ; the good of the community, and not that of the individual ; the greater good of the more worthy — that is to be regarded as the highest good. It is held that while the end is that of sensibility, the principles of the distribution of pleasure, viz. Prudence, Benevolence, EVOLUTIONAL HEDONISM 20 1 and Justice (p. 1 34), are determined rationally; these principles are recognised as self-evident truths. But is it possible to regard pleasure as "the absolutely good " ? Pleasure, it has been well said, has no value in itself ; it is only a sense of value* In other words, it is the object that has value to which reason as well as pleasure {i.e. our conscious- ness, both as rational and sentient) bear witness. Besides, pleasure attends the satisfaction of our momentary impulses as well as the satisfaction of the total self ; and it is not feeling but Reason that is competent to distinguish between the one pleasure and the other. Accordingly, the end of moral life cannot be described in terms of sentiency. (7) A profounder view of "pleasure" is taken in the system of Evolutional Hedonism. In this theory there is the application of biological principles to the study of moral life. Life, biologi- cally viewed, is "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." The ad- justment or adaptation of organic structure and function to the environment is a gradual process, regulated by the laws of self-preservation, variation, natural selection, and heredity. The exercise of those functions which are beneficial to the organism is in sentient beings attended with pleasure, hence pleasure is a sign of healthy life, or proper adjust- ment to environment. Applying these ideas to moral life, we find that moral life can be described as a continuous adaptation of the individual to a ■^ Mackenzie, op. cit., p. But pleasure has no value in itself ; it is only a sense of value resident in the object. Hence that which Reason indicates as the end, is the pursuit of worthy objects. (7) The theory of Evolutional Hedonism. — The highest good is the pleasure which accompanies the increase of social life. But this view of pleasure has reference to a far-off event, and has no validity for the present when there is a real need for self- sacrifice. 202 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD social environment, a growing conciliation of his interests with those of society ; and since moral conduct is that which conduces to the welfare of the social organism, it becomes naturally and in- creasingly pleasant. Thus pleasure is an indica- tion of the vitality, the health, and the strength of the social organism ; it is a sign of the increase of social life (p. 66), as well as the end of both the individual and of the society of which he is a member. In estimating the value of the Evolutional theory, it cannot fail to be noticed that what is here described as the synthesis of pleasure with moral conduct is an ideal, almost a Utopian, state. What is here proved is the yf;^<'^/ accordance of " pleasure " with "moral conduct." But what is the present state of things? Does pleasure now accompany all cases of moral conduct ? That there is an im- perious need for " real self-sacrifice," is admitted by Evolutionist writers. " When we say to a man, * This is right,' we cannot also say invariably and unhesitatingly, ' This will be for your happiness.' By acting rightly, I admit, even the virtuous will sometimes be making a sacrifice; and I do not deny it to be a real sacrifice ; I only deny that such a statement will be conclusive for the virtuous man. His own happiness is not his sole ultimate aim."* These are " important admissions." They prove that there is something very unsound in the Hedonic principle that pleasure is the only good. ■^ L. Stephen, quoted by Muirhead, op. cit., pp. 156-7. BIOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL GOOD 20' The warrant for self-sacrifice must be rational (p. 109). It is also apparent that the foregoing It confounds theory confounds biological with ethical good, ^j^j^j'^^^^^^^ The end of a physical organism is spontaneously realised, but the end of human personality cannot be attained save through the operation of the self- distinguishing Reason and the self-determining Will. Nor do the struggle for existence and the and gives a survival of the fittest bring about the progress of ^^'^"^^^7'^°''"' moral life (p. 177). "The Darwinian theory," says progress. Hutton, " is quite incapable of explaining the speci- fically human phenomenon of what may be called an anti-Darwinian Conscience, which restrains and subordinates the principle of competition!' * " The ethical progress of society," says Huxley, "de- pends not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it."t ■^ Cf, "It is the merest insolence of selfishness to preach contentment to a labourer who gets thirty shillings a week, while we suppose an active and plotting covetousness to be meritorious in a man who has three thousand a year. In this, as in all other points of mental discipline, it is the duty of the upper classes to set an example to the lower, and to recommend and justify the restraint of the ambition of their inferiors chiefly by severe and timely limitation of their own." — Ruskin, Time and Tide, Letter 2. + " The practice of that which is ethically best — what we call goodness or virtue — involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self- assertion it demands self-restraint ; in place of thrusting aside or treading down all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect but shall help his fellows ; its influence is directed not so much to the survival of the Where Hedon- ism is weak. Its strength lies — (I) in urging the cliim of sensibility, and (2) in de- manding ex- planation of moral prin- ciples. 204 OBLIGATION, ETC, THE HIGHEST GOOD It is now evident that the weakness of Hedonism lies in its view of " pleasure " as the ultimate end of action. Pleasure, of which everybody is supposed to know the meaning, and which therefore is held to prescribe a " definite and intelligible criterion of conduct, is now seen to be of uncertain significa- tion, and is not intelligible as a rule of conduct unless, first, qualitative distinctions are admitted, and secondly, the principles of its distribution are regarded as Categorical Imperatives. But to do either is to subvert the fundamental principles of Hedonism, viz., that pleasure is the only or the ultimate good, and that the means to it are empiri- cally discovered by calculation of consequences. Still Hedonism has certain elements of value which should not be overlooked. In the first place, by persistently striving for the recognition of the claim of sensibility, it has, in spite of its exaggera- tions, prepared the way for assigning to pleasure its true place in moral life (pp. 63-8). In the second place, it has repeatedly asserted the '' right of private judgment " in dealing with current moral ideas ; while dogmatism contented itself with pre- scribing an unquestioning acceptance of established moral principles. Hedonism always demanded and attempted explanation ; and though it is true that the explanation was wrongly sought in pleasure, fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence." — Evolution and Ethics, Romanes Lecture, 1893. See, in this connection, Maeterlinck's fascinating work, The Life of the Bee. VALUE OF UTILITARIANISM 205 and the " right of private judgment " above men- tioned was sometimes perverted into what Newman calls " the private right of unlimited haziness," still Hedonism kept alive the philosophic spirit in deal- ing with a matter of vital importance. Utilitarian- ism, again, weak and inadequate as a theory of morals, has been a potent instrument of good as a theory of legislation. Its interpretation of the highest good as " the greatest pleasure " is mean- ingless, but by regarding that good as by right belonging to " the greatest number " of individuals, and by laying stress on the reformative aspect of punishment, it has cleared legislation of many abuses, and powerfully disposed it for further progress.* Not less, but even more important, is the contribution of Evolutional Hedonism. It has been pointed out that the Hedonic bias, which leans to pleasure as the ultimate good, and the naturalistic bias, which ignores rational self-deter- mination as a necessary factor in moral progress, are both defects in the evolutional theory. Still the theory has certain elements too valuable to be ignored. By introducing the idea of "the social organism," it emphasises the importance of the well-being of the whole as the ethical end, and has * "Bentham's preaching of the doctrine of the Public Good bore fruit in the reforms, constitutional and legal, with which his name will always be associated : ' I do not know,' says Maine {Early History of Institutions, p. 397), *a single law of reform effected since Bentham's day which cannot be traced to his influence.' " — Prof. Stewart's Article, cited above. Value of Utili- tarianism as a theory of legislation. Evolutional Hedonism, considered as a system of philosophy, is weak, as mani- festing a Hedonic and naturalistic bias ; but is an improvement on non-evolu- tional Hedon- ism in its view / of society as an organism^ and of moral laws as neces- sarily or indis- pensably re- lated to the end, and is an improvement on intuition- ism in urging the import- ance of " the social tissue," and of changes in the en- vironment as factors in the progress of humanity. Rigorism characterised. 206 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD now made the mechanical view of man's relation to society an absurdity and an anachronism. By defining the end as the Health or Vitality of the social organism on which pleasure depends, it leads up to the view that moral principles are necessarily related to the end, and not empirical generalisations from consequences. By laying stress on the exist- ing social conditions, on what is called " the social tissue" — " the environment of laws, institutions, literature, tangible products of labour, scientific knowledge, logical and mathematical formulae," in which we grow up as human beings so unlike our arboreal ancestors — it gives the key to the dis- covery of our concrete duties. Finally, though its naturalistic bias leads it to exaggerate the import- ance of changes in external and material conditions, yet it does well to bring these forward as factors in moral progress.* These changes, while they do not generate the moral ideas, supply just the occasion for their powerful operation, since the moral ideas, kept alive by the example of reformers and martyrs in conditions that were highly antagonistic to their exercise, utilise these changes as powerful instru- ments for effecting progress in large sections of the community. B. — Rigorism. Rigorism is that view of moral life which sees in self-conquest, or rather self-suppression, the ideal * " Slave-emancipation," it is said, " was the result of the discovery that the system of industry founded on slavery was an unprofitable one, and unable to compete with free labour." —See Muirhead, op, cit, p. 247 ei seq. RIGORISM 207 of conduct. The highest good consists in a purely rational activity. " Reason," as the Stoics held, " as a spring of action, has for its aim harmony or self-consistency, a life proceeding upon a single plan ; in this there is a certain symmetry or beauty, the attraction of which excites rational impulse towards it." What this self-consistency is, is care- fully explained by Kant in the distinction he draws between the Autonomy and the Heteronomy of the Will (p. 1 50). The only unconditional good is the good will, i.e. the will which acts in conformity with a rational law out of pure respect for it; for the will to be guided by any other motive, to surrender itself to the dominion of instincts, passions, and affections, to wait for the dictation of external stimuli, is to forego its birthright of rational exist- ence. " Virtue," the Stoics said, " is the only good. Vice the only evil." Everything else is indifferent {aSia(f>opa)y towards which indifference or apathy (oLiraOeLa) is the proper attitude. The desire or aversion of the multitude for these indifferent things — such as health or disease, etc. — is based upon erroneous judgment as to what is to be sought or shunned. Hence, out of the Rigoristic temper was born a scorn for the multitude — for all the customs and conventions that they go by — which appeared with remarkable force and bitterness in the Cynic's insolence ; * though the Stoics modified this feeling of scorn with some regard for the customs of men in so far as these embodied the * Stories of Diogenes, the Cynic, are well known. The highest good is a purely ra- tional activity which does not admit the play of inclinations and desires within it. Things good, bad, and in- different. The theory that the Reason is radically op- posed to desire is strikingly apparent — in the Cynic's scorn, the Stoic's melancholy, the anchorite's horror of the flesh, and Kant's dis- paragement of the empirical self. The Rigoristic view of the Law. Rigorism criticised. 208 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD common or universal reason, or suffused it with a deep melancholy, suggested by the thought, how difficult it was for the multitude to live passionlessly for reason alone. In a similar temper the Christian Ascetics of the Middle Ages opposed the spirit to the flesh ; they held it to be, in the highest degree, meritorious to abstain from marriage and renounce the world ; and it is well-known how common this temper is among ascetics of all ages and climes, whether in Persia or India, whether in the second century or the twentieth. The same temper gave the keynote to the transcendentalism of Kant, who sharply distinguished between the " rational " self, which fulfils the law because it is obligatory, and the " empirical " self, which is always moved with the thought of pleasure. There is no merit in ex- ternal acts as such, even though they yield good consequences. The moral value of an action depends upon " the inner rational form," the inner disposition (JnoB^^ii) to conform to the Law out of pure respect for it — a disposition which, like the Law itself, should have, in order that it may be rightly called virtuous, a rigidity or inflexibility which, "like straightness in a line, admits of no degrees of less or more " ; out of the rigid rightness of the disposition " comes harmony, regularity, and consistency in all our acts, which alone is truly beautiful and honourable."* In criticism of the Rigoristic theory of morals, the following remarks may be made — * R. Hicks, "Stoics" (Art. Enc, Brit.). RIGORISM AND THE MORAL LA W 209 (i) It is true that Rigorism views the Moral Law as rational. But if we ask, in what sense rational, we find that the Law is held to be rational because it is not derived from sensibility ; were it derived from the principle of happiness, even universal happiness, it would be, as Kant rightly points out, a general rule but not universal, i.e., would be a " rule which on the average would most frequently fit, but not a rule which must hold good always and necessarily." * But we get no further explanation ; for the Law is regarded as an end-in-itself ; con- formity to it is, by itself, the ultimate good. The Law is accordingly not shown to be rational, to be capable of explanation, and so intelligible. An ex- planation cannot be given except by subordinating the Law to the End, Duty to Good ; and this is just what Rigorism avoids. Accordingly we find that in all Rigoristic systems the account given of the Law is more or less defective. The Cynics, for example, think that while the essence of Virtue lies in practical insight, the object of this insight is the Good which is identical with Virtue ; their defini- tion of Virtue (which amounts to this, that Virtue consists in insight into Virtue) moves in a circle.f The Stoics regard Virtue as conformity to nature ; and, since man's distinctive nature is rational, Virtue is defined as conformity to reason, or to the rational course of the world. This, however, is in turn conceived as that which, through ■^ Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (Abbott's Tr.), p, 125. t Ueberweg, op. cit., vol. i. p. 97. O (i) Its view of the Law is partial and inadequate. The Law is rational, not only in the sense of being not derived from sensibility, but in the sense of being intelligible by reference to the End. The Rigorist makes the Law unintelligible. — Examples from Cynicism, Stoicism, Asceticism, and Kant's theory. Kant's philo- sophy exhibits within itself a gradual ad- vance towards the Eudae mon- istic tlieory. no OBLIGATION, ETC, THE HIGHEST GOOD resignation on the part of man to the inevitable and destined sequences of nature, provides for virtue or apathy.* Thus is Virtue deprived of all real aim ih a world ruled by fate. By theologians, again, a new element in moral action has been recognised ; this is faith, which is held to be essentially distinct from knowledge ; f the Moral Law is regarded as inscrutable, the result of per- haps an arbitrary divine decree, demanding an unquestioning obedience to it (p. 172). Kant also regarded the Law as inexplicable. " Why does the Law exist ? We do not know. This is what Kant calls the primary fact of Practical Reason. Sic volo, sicjuheo (so I will, so I order), he says ; this is the formula of the Moral Law. We may recog- nise it by a certain sign which is the universality of the Law ; but we cannot explain it." \ Yet Kant was obliged to shift the basis of Ethics from the barren formalism (p. 154) o" which he at first placed it. In his second statement of the Law he gave the formula, " So act as to regard humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, always as an end, never as a means." The question here is — What does Kant mean by humanity? If he means no more than abstract humanity, or mere rationality, then his basis of Ethics stands just where it stood. But there is reason to think that Kant meant by humanity, the * Zeller, op. cit., p. 334. t Sidgwick, "Ethics" (Art. Enc. Brit.). \ Janet, op. cit., p. 26. RIGORISM AND HEDONISM 2il concrete personality of each man to himself. For Kant also substituted for his abstract formula the conception of a kingdom of ends (of a concrete social order in which each man has realised his end or good, which is organically related to the ends of others) to which all legislation is relative. The Law, thus, is valid because Humanity is an end to itself; and in this just conception of the Law we see that it is subordinated to the concep- tion of the End, which is the realisation of the individual and the universal Self.* (2) In the second place, the Rigoristic tendency to ignore the existence of natural goods claims to be noticed. It is held that there is nothing good in the objects of our natural passions and affections. In virtuous activity these impulses have no place. In this respect Rigorism may profitably be com- pared with Hedonism; whereas in the latter theory Virtue is subordinated to desire, and thus \s made to lose its sacred and inviolable integrity, in the former theory, in order that Virtue may keep its integrity, it is thought necessary to banish all desires which are regarded as elements that essentially conflict with Virtue and disturb the harmony of the soul. Thus, Hedonism and Rigorism both make Virtue impossible— Hedon- ism, because the synthesis of moral life is impos- sible, on the supposition that pleasure is the highest good; Rigorism, because it "eviscerates virtue," and makes moral life, essentially an active "^ D'Arcy, op. cit,, p. 274. (2) The Ri- gorist denies the existence of natural goods. Rigorism com- pared with Hedonism ; how they are both defective — both the theories make moral life impoissble. Kant's incon- sistencies. The theory of moderate Rigorism ex- plained and criticised. 2,2 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD life, impossible. For it is not knowledge that acts but impulse ; and if action is condemned when it proceeds from inclination or desire, then all species of conduct, moral as well as immoral, are equally condemned. There is no reason to regard all inclinations or desires with suspicion ; they do not all aim (as Kant thought, agreeing in this with the Hedonist) at pleasure; among pleasures, again, there are some that are quite innocent. Kant is remarkably inconsistent : he made an exception in the case of a single inclination (viz. respect for the Law) which his philosophy did not justify; in his later speculations he admitted (agreeing in this with the modern intuitional thtnkers) the worth of action with inclination, and in his conception of the bonum consumrnatum (p. 127) he was obliged to include that Happi- ness which is the affective concomitant of con- formity to duty. The impossibility of excluding the natural goods from the theory of moral life led the later Stoics to modify their theory that Virtue is Indifference. They recognised that " in the first stage of human life, which is non-rational, there are clear indica- tions of divine design, as when uncorrupted natural impulse effects what is afterwards the work of reason." In other words, man, from natural instincts and affections, seeks certain "primary ends," some of which are also approved by Reason. Hence the natural goods are no longer treated with indifference, but are divided into the preferable and THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF RIGORISM 213 the non-preferable, the former having a certain worth of their own. Nevertheless, though " in this way all or most of the things commonly judged to be goods — health, strength, wealth, fame, etc. — are brought within the sphere of the sage's choice, his real good is still solely in the wisdom of the choice, and not in the thing chosen ; just as an archer aims at a bull's eye, his end being not the mark itself but the manifestation of his skill in hitting it." * But even this moderate form of the theory does not completely satisfy. For we must distinguish between things and persons ; in our dealings with the former, Virtue may be described as the exhibi- tion of skill ; but the affections which centre round persons cannot be treated as temporal opportunities offered for the manifestation of skill, they have in them a worth which is as sacred and imperishable as the persons themselves. In estimating the value of Rigorism as a theory The practical of morals, we should not overlook its great helpful- Yf. "^ . * . . Rigorism. ness as a factor in moral education. By bringing Reason to the foreground as the essential quality of man, it helps him to rise above the solicitations of the senses ; it recognises the inherent dignity of the human mind as being always its own good, and encourages man in the midst of adverse circum- stances and decadent institutions to live still for reason, f By eliminating all considerations of personal pleasure and pain from the notion of duty, * Sidgwick, " Ethics " (Art. Enc. Brit.), t This trait of the Self, as being always its own good, is The Eudse- monistic view of the highest good 214 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD and by encouraging the spirit of self-sacrifice, even when the need for sacrifice is not clearly understood, it promotes just that readiness to suffer pain in which, considerably more than in a pleasure- seeking disposition (which Hedonism encourages), is found the promise and potency of moral excel- lence.* C. — Eudcemon ism. The Eudsemonistic theory has this merit, that it does not propose to unify the moral life by ex- punging either of its constituent elements, ration- ality or sensibility. It is in the harmonious realisation of our entire self (viewed as no less sentient than rational, as no less social than indi- vidual) that the highest good consists. By self- realisation is meant the realisation, in due measure, of every excellence that man has it in him to attain. No less earnest than Rigorism, Eudae- frequently very beautifully brought out in the Hindoo scrip- tures. Cf. — "Sarvam parava9am duhkham sarvam atmavagam suk- ham." — Manusafnkitd, iv. 160. "All that is subject to the not-self makes for pain ; but all that is subject to the self makes for happiness." " Apuryyamanamacalapratishtham Samudramapah praviganti yadvat Tadvat kama yam praviQanti sarve Sa ^antimapnoti na kamakaml." — Bhagavatgita, ii. 70. "As the sea keeps within its bounds though many rivers flow into it, so the sage keeps within himself though he gets many objects of desire : he attains peace ; but not he who seeks pleasure." * See Muirhead, op. cit., pp. 126-30. EUDjEMONISM 215 monism demands the control of all ignoble inclina- tions; sensibility is indeed a necessary factor of moral life, but its place is subordinate to that of the Reason, which reveals the Law as absolutely Imperative. "Each selfish impulse (and all im- pulses, even the benevolent, are selfish, in the sense that each seeks its own and disregards all other claims) must be denied, or brought under the law of the life of the total rational self." * Hence the force of the precept, " Die to live." " We must rise on the stepping-stones of our dead selves to higher things." It is not in a dreaming or fanciful way that we can hope to realise ourselves. Life is real ; its struggles are the keenest and the sternest ; the path to blessedness must be watered with many a bitter tear of sacrifice and renunciation. But the sacrifice is always the means— never the end. It is the precursor of self-fulfilment ; nay, it is then rightly performed when, in the light of the whole good which is being attained, it ceases to be regarded as a sacrifice (p. 1 10). Hence the concep- tion of Law in Eudaemonism is deeper than in Rigorism. Eudaemonism contemplates the Law in its bearing on our total human being. It, besides, sees in sensibility, not an evil to be eradi- cated, but a power and potency for good, which is to be transfigured. This transfiguration of the flesh (which is very different from the mere morti- fication of it) takes place under the control of Reason. No natural inclination has to be ex- * Seth, op. cit, p. 214. agrees with the Rigoristic in regarding the Law as absolutely im- perative, and in urging the need of constant self-sacrifice, but differs from it in so far as it regards the Law as relative to the End, and recognises the claims of sensibility, which requires to be trans- figured but not suppressed. Objections to Eudaemonism considered — {a) The defini- tion of the Ideal as Self- realisation, is vague. 2i6 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD punged ; each has its appointed place in the economy of life. " Let us not always say, * Spite of this flesh to-day, I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole ! ' As the bird wings and sings, Let us cry, * All good things Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul ! ' » * Nor is pleasure to be altogether despised. Rightly limited, in so far as it attends the satis- faction of particular desires, let it lose itself in that synthesis of pleasures which is called Hap- piness (p. 69), and which is no less an essential part of the realised self than conformity to duty (p. 127). It is objected to this theory that it leaves the meaning of the Ideal vague and indistinct. " Right, men know, and Duty, but what is ' self- realisation ' ? Every man has a clear notion of Duty ; hardly any man has, or can have, a distinct notion of Self-realisation. Yet a clear notion is needful, if there is to be a fulfilment of the demand." f Now, it may be readily admitted that the notion of self-realisation is not specially dis- tinct ; the mystery of life is too profound for us to have a perfectly distinct notion of the Ethical Ideal ; it is only progressively, as we through moral conduct uplift ourselves to a higher plane of existence, that the Ideal becomes clearer. But, * Browning, Rabbi Ben Ezra, xii. t Calderwood, op, cit., pp. 143-5. OBJECTIONS TO EUDMMONISM 217 it may be asked, is the notion of Duty particularly clear? Are there not conflicts among principles, and have we not, in cases of conflict, to refer to the Self as comprehending a synthesis of virtues in order that we may see the line of duty clearly ? (p. 148). The ideal of duty in this respect is summed up in the following " counsel of perfection " : — " Image the whole, then execute the parts — Fancy the fabric Quite, ere you build, ere steel strike fire from quartz. Ere mortar dab brick ! " * It has been also objected to the Eudaemonistic theory that it makes the Law hypothetical. It is said that the Ideal should be stated on this theory thus — " If you desire to be perfect, you should obey the Law"; and that one can avoid coming within the jurisdiction of the Law by declaring that he has no desire to be perfect. But this inter- pretation is untenable. It is true that the Law is based on a condition, but the condition is abso- lutely inalienable. We can no more reject it than we can reject the condition of desire for consistency which is its counterpart in the intellectual life. Another objection to the Eudaemonistic theory is that it prescribes an ideal which is too high for human attainment. It is said that the self can never be realised, for we are always haunted with a sense of shortcoming. Now, it may be admitted that there is a persistent sense of shortcoming ; but the explanation does not * Browning, A Gramniarian^s Funeral, 69-72. But, though vague, it is yet the notion by which the still vaguer notion of Duty is rendered more distinct. (J)) It makes the Law hypothetical, and there- fore weakens its authority. Not so, for it postulates an inalienable condition. (c) It pre- scribes an Ideal too high for attainment. Not so, for progress is inadequately represented as being always towards an ever-receding ideal. (J) It dis- parages moral activity. This it does not, but re- gards self- realisation 2i8 OBLIGATION, ETC., THE HIGHEST GOOD lie in the impossibility of self-realisation, but in the circumstance that with every step taken forward, the capabilities of the self are seen to grow larger, and admit of further realisation. Moral progress is quite inadequately represented as being on an interminable line, in quest of a goal which we never reach. Even if we look back, we perceive that during such progress as we have accomplished, the Ideal was not always like "one fair vision," that " ever fled Down the waste waters day and night, And still we followed where she led, In hopes to gain upon her flight." At various points of our career we indeed touched the Ideal whenever we did our duty, satisfying the demands both of reason and sensibility as completely as then possible. It has been further objected to the theory we are now considering, that it regards Virtue as a passive state, whereas Virtue essentially resides in activity. Calder wood, contrasting the notion of Duty with that of Self-realisation, says : " There is nothing in the notion Duty, nothing in the nature of moral law, to suggest that the perfection of the agent must bring with it the termination of the demand on ethical activity. What Lessing said of the search for truth, may be said of the activity of moral life — activity is more than life. The grandeur of self- realisation is dwarfed, and changed into an object of aversion, when it is interpreted as signifying the close of ethical existence." All this is urged with SELF - RE A LIS A TION 219 considerable truth, but is beside the mark. For and moral self-realisation is not to be conceived as a far-off activity as organic and in- pensionary existence, in which rest is sought, after terdependem. the accomplishment of life's task. The virtuous man is always active ; he not only is good, but does good : to cease from activity means death, no less for the moral than for the physical life. And though the performance of duties is valuable as a means for the formation of virtues, yet the virtues are not to be "wasted" on oneself (p. 104); they must be manifested in a ceaseless beneficence ; they must not be made the objects of self-admiring regard ; else, like Narcissus, the virtuous destroy themselves with admiration of their own beauty. The Self that is to be realised must be realised in every act. But activity is not more than life ; no action is valuable, except for the sake of the Self, and every act is valuable only in so far as it is an efflorescence out of the synthesis of all virtues in the agent. QUESTIONS 1. Discuss the question, whether the Good or the Right con- stitutes the fundamental notion of Ethics (pp. 5, 12, 125-8, 174 209-11). 2. Give the distinctive character of Ethics as a science. How does it differ from the natural sciences ? (pp. 19-20). Define the sphere of ethical science. Define Ethics, and indicate the scope (pp. 19-22). What is the use of studying Ethics ? (pp. 190-2). 3. Discuss the connection of Ethics with Psychology (pp. 22-5). 4. "Ethics is more closely related to Philosophy than to the natural sciences." Fully explain this statement (pp. 27-8). 5. Explain and illustrate the relation of Ethics to (^) Sociology (pp. 33-7), ifi) Politics (pp. 37-8). Examine the view that Ethics is merely a branch of Sociology (pp. 36-7). 6. Explain succintly the distinction between the Psychologic and the Unpsychologk methods in dealing with ethical facts (PP- 39-43)- 7. Give a psychological analysis of the state of Desire (p. 45 ^^ seq). Discuss the nature of Instinct (p. 49). Distinguish between Desire and Motive (pp. 55-6), Motive and Intention (p. 58). Determine the meaning of Motive in Ethics (pp. 56, 90, 130). 8. Explain the use which is made by the Utilitarian school of the Hartleyan principle of Association in order to explain the rise of disinterestedness (p. 55). Criticise the validity of the explana- tion in the psychological (p. 55) and the ethical (p. 133) spheres re- spectively. 9. Classify the springs of action (pp. 59-63)> and determine their mutual relations. (For Martineau's view, pp. 138-9 j Hed., p. 129 221 Ill QUESTIONS et seq.j Eud., p. 154.) Is a catalogue of "springs of action" {a) psychologically possible ? {b) ethically useful ? (p. 60). On what grounds is superiority claimed for the Judgments of Duty? (Account for the authority of the Moral Law, for the Intuitional view, see pp. 137, MS, 167-8, 171 ; Hed., 168-70; Eud., pp. 873, I72-7-) 10. Discriminate between the Psychological and the Ethical aspect of springs of action (pp. 112-3), and expound the doctrine of their ethical gradation (see ante^ Q. 9). 11. Examine the psychological presuppositions on which all Hedonistic systems are based. (For "theory of desire" and "theory of voluntary action," see pp. 47, 94-5 ; ^or "theory of self" and "theory of knowledge," see pp. 25, 79 ^^ ^^Q-)- ^^^ ^ conse- quent altruistic system be erected on a Hedonistic basis ? (pp. 74-5, 134-5, 199-200). In what sense can it be truly said that Pleasure is the end of all conduct? (As "sign of successful effort," pp. 64-5 ; as " Happiness," pp. 68-71 ; but "not as object of desire," pp. 66-8.) Discuss the importance of happiness in ethical theory. Can it be made the basis of a sound ethical system? (pp. 68-71, 214-9). 12. Show how the question as to the nature of the Ethical End is connected with the question as to the true nature of the Self. (Self, " neither wholly phenomenal nor wholly real " (p. 30) ; " neither wholly rational " (pp. 1 50-2) " nor wholly sentient " (pp. 193-4) ; " not altogether independent of its states" (pp. 91, io7) ; "the unifying principle" (pp. 83-4); "superior to character and circumstances" (pp. 91-3)- 13. What is the meaning of Kant's dictum, "You ought, and therefore you can"? (p. 93). It has been said that the idea of Self-determination combines the Libertarian and the Determinist theory. Examine this averment (pp. 94-7)- Has self-mastery any necessary limits? Consider the importance of the question for Ethics (pp. 90-1, 94-6). State clearly the scientific difficulty involved in the popular conception of the freedom of the will. (The popular view identifies "freedom" with "indifference" or " unmotived choice," p. 96 ; see also pp. 93-4, footnote.) 14. State clearly and fully what you understand by the state- QU EST IONS 111 ment that the End of conduct, which is the standard of moral judgment, is Common Good (pp. 101-4, 127). Dwell on the following points — {a) the relation conceived to exist between the individual and society ; {b) the facts (in broad outline) supporting this conception (pp. 98-101) ; {c) the sense in which the end is to be regarded as a personal one (p. 105) ; {d) the source (pp. 174-5) and nature (p. 127) of Duty under this form of Ethical theory. 15. "The realisation of human personality means its realisation in Society." Fully explain this (pp. 98-104, 107-8). 16. Examine the transcendental view of the nature of Con- sciousness, and point out the analogy that exists between Conscious- ness thus conceived and Conscience. (By " Consciousness " is here meant "Reason in relation to conscious life"; by conscience, " Reason in relation to Desire," see pp. 75-87, esp. ^narginal notes.) 17. What are the characteristic elements of the fundamental ethical fact of Consciousness ? (pp. 1 13-7). 18. What is the psychological distinction between a Spontaneity and a Volition? (Spontaneity = act of an undivided mind; volition = act of a divided mind (pp. 56-8.) Exhibit the import- ance of this distinction with reference to the Ethical theory (pp. 1 20-1). What is it that makes action fully voluntary? How does it further become moral? (pp. 11 8-21). 19. Is the moral judgment connected with the motive or the consequences of an action ? (pp. 122-3). 20. State the ethical problem which arises from the essential differences of the moral standard, and indicate the way to its solution. (The " differences " described on pp. 125-8; " problems " — (i) Which is the earlier notion, Duty or Good ? (2) If the latter, what is Good? See ante, Qs. i and 12.) Show by examples what you mean by a moral standard {^pp. 13-4, 126-8). How are the dis- tinctions of right and wrong known ? What various answers have been given to this question? (pp. 128-55). 21. Discuss J. S. Mill's statement, that "the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the act" (pp. 130-3). 22. Give an expository analysis of moral actions as distinguished ixom. non-moral i^"^. 1 18-21). OUESrJONS 23. Outline the leading features of Intuitionalism as an ethical theory, noticing the difficulties alleged to be involved in it (pp. 1 36-49)- 24. Give, an account of the nature and functions of Conscience as viewed {a) by the common man, {d) by the Common- Sense Philosopher ; state the objections to which these views are liable. (The view of the common man is unphilosophical, i.e. not reduced to first principles : he regards conscience as the product of custom, or of ideas current in society ; does not discriminate between conscience and moral sentiment; regards conscience as fallible and teachable (p. 115). Common-Sense Philosophy is Intuitionalism, see Qs. 23, 25.) Discuss the question, whether Conscience is to be considered as a special faculty of the mind (pp. 155-6). 25. Analyse the Conscience of the Intuitionalists (pp. 162-3). Is the Moral Law of the Intuitionalists a truly internal one? (Not so, for nothing is truly internal which is not intelligible to the rational self, pp. 209-11.) What is implied in the intuitionist claim, that the judgments of Conscience are ultimate? (p. 145). What attempts have been made to explain Conscience? (From Hed. standpoint, pp. 157-60; from Eud. standpoint, see pp. 83-7, 127.) Can Conscience be always trusted as the guide of life? If so, in what exact sense? (pp. 141-5, 146-9). 26. Give an account of the Ethical doctrine of Kant. Is his fundamental moral principle a purely formal one ? (pp. 1 50-4). 27. Examine critically Mill's doctrine of a gradation of pleasures in respect of quality, with reference to the fundamental principles of his philosophy (pp. 1 59-60). 28. Give an account of the Moral Sentiments, and discuss their relation to moral judgments (pp. 115-6, 162-3). Try to explain how is it that moral judgments vary in different ages and countries (pp. 164-6). 29. What means does Ethical theory supply for the solution of cases of "perplexity of Conscience" arising out of conflict of duties? (pp. 147-9); (^or the view of Rational Hedonism, see pp. 133-4). QUESTIONS 225 ft 30. State and review the objections which the advocates of " Self-realisation " raise against Intuitionalism as held by Calder- wood and similar writers (pp. 127, 147-9, ^74) 209-10). Show how the theory which views morality as determined by the End undertakes to correct and supplement the Intuitionalistic theory {ibid., also pp. 140-5, 154-5, 210-6). 31. Indicate the conditions on which the moral progress of the individual (pp. 146, 165-6) and the society (pp. 105, 108-11, 203, 206) depends. Show the interdependency of these two aspects of pro- gress. (Note the educative (pp. 99-104) and the reformative (p. 181) influence of society on the individual, and the need of instituting an ideal arrangement to help individual growth, p. 189.) 32. What account does Evolutionary theory as applied to Ethics give of the genesis of Conscience ? Do you think it possible to conserve the objective character of the authority of Conscience on the basis of this theory? (pp. 159-61). 33. What is the true significance of the "ought" of Duty? (pp. 135-6). How is the "ought" treated by the Hedonists? (pp. 19-20, 200, 168-70). How does moral obligation differ from other restraints on conduct? (pp. 135-6, 167-70). What is meant by sanctions of morality? Is conduct moral when guided entirely by regard for consequences ? (pp. 169-71). 34. Give a brief sketch of the different accounts that have been given of the source of Moral Obligation (pp. 169-75). 35. Explain the nature of Virtue (pp. 177-8). Is there such a thing as Merit? (pp. 178-80, 182). Is it possible to do more than one's duty? (pp. 18 1-6). Is duty the same for all? (pp. 185-6, pp. 103-4, footnote). 36. Indicate the lines on which a classification of duties and virtues may be undertaken (pp. 186-9). Examine the validity of the distinction between determinate and indeterminate duties (p. 187, also p. 184). 37. Describe Hedonism, both Egoistic (pp. 193-9) and Uni- versalistic (pp. 199-203). Review some of the objections brought against both as theories of the End of Conduct {ibid.). 38. Review and criticise the methods by which the leading 226 QUESTIONS Utilitarians attempt to pass from private to general happiness (pp. 74-5,92, 158-61, 198-204). 39. Review the importance and validity of the additions and modifications by which J. S. Mill endeavours to strengthen the system of Utilitarian Ethics. (For "gradations of pleasure," p. 159; "object of moral judgment," p. 131 ; "disinterested action," pp. 132, 1 59-) 40. Give a critical account of the principles of Evolutionary Ethics. Can Evolutionary Ethics claim to be not only a science of facts, but also one of ends? (pp. 108-11, 201-3). Discuss the influence of the doctrine of Evolution in the ethical sphere (pp. 24-5, footnote ; pp. 205-6). 41. "Evidently, then, with the complete adaptation to the social state, that element in moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation will disappear." Explain and examine the above statement, and show that a coincidence of the prudential and the moral does not eliminate the conception of duty (pp. 183-4). 42. Fully expound the Moral theory, according to which the highest good lies in the realisation of the highest Self (pp. 214-9). 43. "Each of the various Ethical theories has contributed some valuable element to the whole of Ethical thought." Discuss this statement. (Hed., pp. 204-6 ; Rig., pp. 213-4 ; Eud., pp. 214-6.) PRINTED BY OLIVER AND BOYD, EDINBURGH. Opinions on Professor Mohit Chandra Sen's " Elements of Moral Philosophy " Dr A. Campbell Fraser (Edinburgh) writes :— " 1 have found much th it is interesting and enlightening in [Mr Sen's] Elements 0/ Moral Philosophy, in which the author has presented in a reasoned form, luminously expounded, an Ethical Programme to which I know nothing superior in the same compass." Prof. J. Seth (Edinburgh) writes :— "It is admirably clear, methodical, and well-informed, and ought to prove most useful as a text-book for students. I should have perfect con- fidence in placing it in their hands. I hope it may obtain the success it so well deserves." Dr J. Hutcheson Stirling (Edinburgh) writes :— "Of [Mr Sen's] book I have formed a high opinion. I think these 'Elements' fully treat the subject, which, surely, these five chapters exhaust. Even the ' Examination Papers ' I find excellent. The writing is exceedingly clear and definite— of what is said, no one can miss the mean- mg, and this clearness is greatly added to by the orderly disposition of the sections— very much, also, it strikes me, by these careful and well-calculated reminders in the margin. Altogether, I regard this work as most un- deniably a first-rate class-book." Prof. Charles B. Upton (Manchester College, Oxford) writes :— " [Mr Sen's book] is very ably written, and will, I believe, be of great service to )-oung students preparing for the University Examinations. [The author] has had a difficult task in trying to combine into a harmonious whole the views of Hegelians (like Muirhead and Mackenzie) with those of thinkers of a very different school (like Dr Martineau and James Seth) ; but he has succeeded well. From his book, I should form a very high opinion of his philosophical culture and insight." Prof. J. H. Muirhead (Birmingham) writes : — "I have read [the book] with pleasure. It seems to me a most admir- able introduction to the subject, and to be of interest, not only to students preparing for examination, but to others also. I think the whole arrange- ment is comprehensive and clear. Some of the illustrations also are fresh and illuminating. The more I value the merits of the book, the more I regret that the printer has done it [the first edition] such poor justice. This seems to be the only obstacle to its wide adoption here and in the Colonies, as well as in America, as a text-book. I hope [the author] will not delay long in bringing out a corrected form." Prof. H. R. James (Patna College, Patna) writes :— *' Professor Sen's book has this great merit, that while it is specially intended ' to meet the wants of students who are preparing for the B.A. OPINIONS— continued Examination in Philosophy as conducted by the Calcutta University,' it yet maintains a definite point of view, and possesses a real unity. Professor Sen writes with admirable lucidity, and his presentation of ethical problems and theories has the order and system, and precision of statement, which is a sure sign of mastery. A student who can use books at all, will find Professor Sen's helpful and stimulating in the highest degree. Quotations are made with great judgment, and with a praiseworthy moderation in number. In short, the book justifies its appearance as a text-book for Calcutta students, which is really saying a great deal, when there are so many good books of the kind already in existence. ♦' But success in the more special aim might very easily become a dis- advantage from a wider standpoint. It is high praise of Mr Sen's treatise to say that this is not so. His presentment of the outlines of ethical theory stands also by itself, free of the syllabus of the Calcutta University. The standpoint adopted is the Eudaemonistic or Idealist, and the book owes a debt to the leading writers of this school, as also to Dr Martineau— a debt which the preface amply acknowledges. It is, nevertheless, an indi- vidual, and, so far as possible within the prescribed limits, a complete presentment of ethical theory and a contribution to the subject which has an independent value of its own. *' Professor Sen writes with consistent self-restraint, and there is an entire absence of every attempt at fine writing ; but this does not exclude a quiet eloquence, and a moral enthusiasm latent but sensibly felt." Principal B. N. Seal (Victoria College, Cooch Behar) writes :— " Professor Sen's Elements of Moral Philosophy is a delightful little com- pendium, extremely well-written, well-arranged, and well-reasoned. ^ It evinces vigorous grasp of the subject, clear insight, and forcible thinking. Though not a book of the sort that encourages cram or superficiality, it will be materially helpful to the candidates for the B.A. Examination." Prof. D. G. Ritchie (St Andrews, Scotland) writes :— •'I think you have produced a most admirable text-book on Moral Philosophy for students, which would be of use to students in our Uni- versities here, as well as to the candidates for the Calcutta University degree, whose requirements, I assume, you have specially considered. As an old pupil of the late T. H. Green's, I sympathise with your point of view. Moreover, you have made the subject most interesting. Your book is written in a clear and attractive style, and shows that you have thoroughly entered into inheritance of our English thought and language. *' A friend of mine— the assistant to the Professor of Moral Philosophy — has read your volume, and, like myself, thinks it would be most useful to our students." Rev. J. P. Haythomthwaite (Principal, St John's College, Agra) writes : — " What I have seen of Professor Sen's work on Ethics has impressed me most favourably. I like the clear and orderly arrangement of its subject-matter. It certainly is the best exposition of the subject that I have met with in so small a compass. I should think it will prove a most admirable text-book for Indian students, as, unlike the usual English text- books, it is written by one who understands the Indian mind, and the mode of treatment that is most likely to appeal to it successfully. ' / MO Sen Se5 The elements of moral philosophy APR£S ^^'^ COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 0032186460