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A UTHOR: 
 
 TURTON, THOMAS 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 NATURAL THEOLOGY 
 CONSIDERED ... 
 
 PLACE: 
 
 CAMBRIDGE 
 
 DA TE: 
 
 1836 
 
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 Turton, Thomas. 
 
 Natural theology considered|:h[microf orm] :t^bwith a reference to Lord Br 
 ougham's discourse on that subject/i^cby Thomas Turton« 
 
 Cambridge:^bPitt Press;t^aLondon:t:bJohn William Parker, West Strand, {=01 
 
 836. 
 
 354 p. ;rCl9 cm. 
 
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 05-18-93 
 
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 CONSIDERED. 
 
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 TO THE SECOND EDITION, 
 
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 CSJ 
 
 The intimations I have received — with re- 
 gard to the attention which has been paid to 
 the former edition of this work, considered rather 
 as a treatise on Natural Theology, than a review 
 of Lord Brougham's Discourse — are the more 
 agreeable, because they accord with my own pur- 
 poses, in submitting it to the judgement of the 
 public. There would, I was aware, be no small 
 difficulty in executing the design I had formed ; 
 but I was persuaded that the opinions and the 
 sentiments, intended to be advanced and en- 
 forced, might be presented, along with those 
 of Lord Brougham, in such a manner as to 
 communicate a larger portion of information, 
 and excite a greater interest, than could be 
 effected by a simple statement of my individual 
 views. Diversity of expression might, as I 
 
 -' *'^( = KQr~a 
 
J 
 
 I 
 
 IV 
 
 advp:rtisement. 
 
 believed, engage the reader in useful reflections, 
 even when there was a coincidence of thought ; 
 and a contrast of thought, if properly managed, 
 might be of signal service in the discovery of 
 truth. Although my wishes in these respects 
 have not been fully attained, yet I trust that, 
 from the very design with which the work was 
 written, it may possess some advantages, as a 
 dissertation on those parts of Natural Theology 
 to which it relates. As to the remaining parts 
 of the science, I should have satisfaction in pre- 
 paring for the press a volume of " Essays on 
 subjects connected with Natural Theology,'** if 
 I could feel confident that I had a sufficient 
 warrant to devote myself to the undertaking; 
 and such a volume would comprise all that I 
 should be disposed to put forth on those sub- 
 jects, notwithstanding their manifest importance. 
 
 
 
 I* 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFACE 1 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS — ARRANGEMENT 13 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY 34 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY fi7 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY 164 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 ADVANTAGES OF THE STUDY OF NATURAL THEOLOGY 201 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI 237 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS 277 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 1^ /i.Xli5U XVX\/iS •■••iii«iiitiii«ii(iaiiti]iiij|»i«iiifiiiiii»ii«ii«iiiiiiiiiai*«ii Olft/ 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The Discourse of Natural Theology by Lord 
 Brougham could not fail to attract very general 
 attention; and, on the publication of the work, 
 I anxiously looked forward to a season of leisure — 
 being confident that I should derive, from the per- 
 usal of it, both pleasure and advantage. Having, 
 besides, heard the Noble Author's volume men- 
 tioned, even by some of his Lordship's friends, as 
 " obscure"" and as " hard reading,"" I wished to 
 ascertain how a Discourse, by such a writer on 
 such a subject, could have been composed, so as to 
 be spoken of in that manner. On examining Lord 
 Brougham"'s production, I found it, as might be 
 expected from the great talents and attainments 
 of the Author, abounding in enlarged and philo- 
 sophical views of things; but still there was an 
 impression left upon my mind, by the entire trea- 
 tise, that the complaints, respecting obscurity and 
 
 -A 
 
 ■Cr 
 
 '51 
 
 X 
 
 if' 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 V 
 
 III 
 
 f 
 
 hard reading, were by no means unwarranted. I 
 was moreover astonished at the inaccuracies wliich 
 were presented, without being sought for, in ahnost 
 every part ; for of them I had received no intima- 
 tion. 
 
 With regard to the present work, but little 
 information will be required. It was not till I 
 had repeatedly surveyed the remarks which had 
 been put down during the perusal of the 'Dis- 
 course/ that I determined to prepare them for the 
 press. Reflection at last induced me to believe 
 that, although I might fail to elucidate what was 
 obscure^^ or to facilitate the reading of what was 
 hard," I certainly should, in many instances, be 
 enabJed to correct what was erroneous. In addi- 
 tion to such considerations, not a few of Lord 
 Brougham's animadversions, on some of our most 
 valuable writers, appeared to be founded on mis- 
 takes, which might be rectified without much 
 difficulty. The endeavour, as I then thought, to 
 effect what I could, in these several ways, would 
 at least require a statement of my own views of 
 Natural Theology ; and there probably was no dfe- 
 
 C( 
 
 u 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 B 
 
 i 
 
 inclination to leave some permanent foot-marks, 
 on ground over which I had been accustomed to 
 wander from my earliest years. 
 
 The Treatise, which suggested the observa- 
 tions contained in the following pages, is in fact a 
 Preliminary Discourse to Paley's Natural Theo- 
 logy, which is intended to be illustrated by Lord 
 Brougham and Sir Charles Bell; and we are in- 
 formed, in the Dedication to Earl Spencer, that 
 the plan of publishing the work, by the Society 
 for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, was aban- 
 doned, from the apprehension " that the adoption 
 of it might open the door to the introduction of 
 religious controversy among the members of the 
 Society, against their fundamental principles."' 
 There is something curious in the notion of a 
 Society not unlikely to be drawn into religious con- 
 troversy, by a work designed to prove the Being 
 and Attributes of God ; but be that as it may, we 
 cannot but rejoice that the plan should be carried 
 into execution, by the individual exertions of the 
 two eminent persons already named. In the 
 remarks now offered to the world, I have no in- 
 
 a2 
 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 ( 
 
 ■i 
 
 ill 
 
 tention to " open the door to the introduction of 
 religious controversy,"" among the members of any 
 Society whatever. The remarks might have been 
 made by one whose views of Natural Religion are 
 not very different from those of Lord Brougham ; 
 and they are addressed to such readers as are of 
 opinion that what is written ought to be under- 
 stood — and that what is understood ought to be in 
 accordance with truth.* 
 
 It has long been deemed the glory of Socrates, 
 that he brought philosophy from the schools of 
 the learned to the habitations of men — by strip- 
 ping it of its technicalities, and exhibiting it in 
 the ordinary language of life. There is no one, 
 in modern times, who has possessed the talent and 
 disposition, for achievements of this kind, to an 
 equal extent with Paley ; and we can scarcely con- 
 ceive any one to have employed such qualities with 
 greater success. The transmutation of metals into 
 gold was the supreme object of the Alchemist's 
 
 • I have been informed, by a person to whom the circumstances 
 ulluded to in the preceding paragraph are well known, that the 
 apprehension was, that one treatise, expressly on Religion, might 
 lead to another treatise on Religion ; and so, by degrees, " to the 
 introduction of religious controversy."— Note to second edition. 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 aspirations. But Paley had acquired a more en- 
 viable power. Knowledge however abstruse, by 
 passing through his mind, became plain common 
 sense— stamped with the characters which ensured 
 its currency in the world. At present, the ten- 
 dency is in the opposite direction. The disposition 
 is to dignify almost every thing with the semblance 
 of science. Matters which have long been under- 
 stood, sufficiently for all practical purposes, are 
 worked up into a system ; and the most pliant of 
 ancient languages is ransacked for combinations 
 of syllables, to be employed in the service of the 
 new scheme of classification. To correspond with 
 all this, the infant science is taught to speak in 
 phrases of large import, and to use expressions 
 familiar only to the Mathematical Philosophers. 
 Now, it is undoubtedly possible to give, to many 
 departments of knowledge, the formalities here 
 described; and so, by their aspect at least, to 
 recommend them to men of science : and this ap- 
 pears to have been Lord Brougham's intention 
 with respect to Natural Theology ; for he informs 
 us that " the composition of his Discourse was 
 
)i i 
 
 6 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 undertaken in consequence of an observation which 
 he had often made, that scientific men were apt 
 to regard the study of Natural Religion as little 
 connected with philosophical pursuits.'*'' The inten- 
 tion, indeed, is manifest throughout the Discourse ; 
 and if I do not mistake, much of the obscurity^ 
 which has been felt to pervade the work, arises 
 from His Lordship''s manner of communicating to 
 Natural Theology a more scientific character than, 
 in his opinion, had been previously assigned to it. . . 
 Beyond doubt, the truth of science may exist with 
 little or nothing of the form ; and in that state 
 the great object of inquiry is, after all, the most 
 accessible to inquirers of every order. Such being 
 the fact, whoever ventures to invest any portion 
 of human knowledge with a more scientific ex- 
 terior, ought to take especial care that it do not, 
 from want of clearness or consistency, appear, to 
 those for whom the change is designed, to have 
 the form of science, with little or nothing of the 
 truth. . . .The reader will bear in mind that these 
 remarks are intended to direct his attention, and 
 not to bias his opinion. His decision, in (he 
 
 ' 
 
 /! 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 case under consideration, will depend upon the 
 evidence to be adduced. 
 
 It is difficult to speak of the inaccuracies pre- 
 sented by the ' Discourse of Natural Theology.** 
 Of their number, I will only observe, that those 
 persons who would rather go wrong with Lord 
 Brougham, than right with the author of the 
 present volume, will have sufficient opportunities 
 of showing that mark of respect for His Lordship''s 
 character. As to the origin of the inaccuracies, 
 I suppose them to have arisen from the habit of 
 taking rapid glances at subjects: — from seeing a 
 little, and so conjecturing the rest. If truth be 
 sought in this manner, the probability is that it will 
 not be found ; and no proceeding can be imagined 
 more fatal to the reputation for knowledge. 
 
 But however obscure and inaccurate the Dis- 
 course may be deemed, it contains many things 
 well deserving the attention of those " scientific 
 men,'*'' for whom it appears to have been mainly 
 designed :— some of whom are described as "men 
 of religious habits of thinking;'' others as "free 
 from any disposition towards scepticism, rather 
 
'il 
 
 •V 
 
 II' 
 
 ! 
 
 8 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 because they have not much discussed the subject, 
 than because they have formed fixed opinions 
 upon it after inquiry ;" w^hile " the bulk of them 
 rely little upon Natural Theology, which they seem 
 to regard as a speculation built rather on fancy 
 than on argument — or, at any rate, as a kind of 
 knowledge quite different from either physical or 
 moral science."" Considering Lord Brougham's 
 extensive acquaintance with men of science, this 
 account of them cannot but be thought important. 
 The whole of it is very remarkable ; and there is 
 something far from satisfactory in the information 
 respecting the prevailing opinions on the subject 
 of Natural Theology. In what way the men of 
 science, within Lord Brougham's sphere of obser- 
 vation, have become obnoxious to such a reproach, 
 does not appear. At all events, the highest praise 
 is due to His Lordship, for having taken so 
 much trouble to effect its removal. 
 
 The object of the following pages is not less 
 to maintain what is held to be right in Lord 
 Brougham's Discourse, than to correct what is 
 apprehended to be wrong. Moreover, in exe- 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 cuting this latter purpose, the author will not in 
 any instance be found to manifest the slightest dis- 
 position to make the most (as it is termed) of his 
 own views of the matter under consideration ; for 
 an attempt of that sort is very seldom much bet- 
 ter than an endeavour to leave a false impression 
 on the reader's mind. On the contrary, his great 
 aim will be to state facts and opinions as accurately 
 as his power of language will enable him to state 
 them; at the same time taking the utmost care, that 
 no inferences shall be drawn, without furnishing 
 the amplest means of determining their propriety 
 or impropriety. 
 
 That, in discussions like those to which the sub- 
 sequent pages are devoted, the present writer is 
 incapable of adding or altering a single word, for 
 the sake of effect — Lord Brougham would, it is 
 imagined, at any moment, readily avow his be- 
 lief. The Noble Author would assuredly give the 
 writer credit for the resolution to make truth the 
 sole object of his researches, and for the intention 
 to represent things exactly as they are. And 
 finally, His Lordship would probably number him 
 
10 
 
 PKEFACE. 
 
 1 
 
 \ 
 
 among those who are entitled to express their ad- 
 miration of the sentiment contained in the fol- 
 lowing passage : " I look upon the discovery of 
 any thing which is true as a valuable acquisition 
 to society ; which cannot possibly hurt or obstruct 
 the good effect of any other truth whatsoever : for 
 they all partake of one common essence, and ne- 
 cessarily coincide with each other ; and like the 
 drops of rain which' fall separately into the river, 
 mix themselves at once with the stream, and 
 strengthen the general current*." 
 
 * Middletou's Works, Vol. 1. p. viii. 8vo. 
 
 ir 
 
 1^ 
 
 At the head of each division of the pre- 
 sent volume, I have specified those pages 
 of the ' Discourse of Natural Theology,' 
 to which the division relates ; and previously 
 to the perusal of any such division, I would 
 recommend an attentive consideration of the 
 corresponding portion of the * Discourse.' 
 
 It may be proper to state that the re- 
 ferences are made to the second edition of 
 Lord Brougham's work. 
 
 In this republication of the ' Natural 
 Theology considered,' the fourth edition of 
 the ^ Discourse,' will be referred to, as well 
 as the second ; for the purpose of pointing 
 out such corrections as may be discovered, 
 in the quotations laid before the reader. 
 
 'i* 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS — ARRANGEMENT. 
 
 » J • 
 
 
 (Discourse, Introduction, pp. 5 — 14.) 
 
 Lord Brougham, in the outset of his Discourse, 
 notices the frequent use of the words Theology 
 and Religion as synonymous; and observes that 
 " Natural Theology and Natural Religion are by 
 many confounded together.*" His Lordship then 
 proposes that Theology should be considered as 
 the science, and Religion as its subject. According 
 to this distinction, if I rightly apprehend it, we, by 
 means of Theology^ investigate and establish the 
 truths of which Religion consists. There is great 
 reason to lament that Lord Brougham, having thus 
 marked the difference between Theology and Reli- 
 gion in general, did not at once present his views 
 of Natural Theology and Natural Religion in par- 
 ticular ; and state exactly the objects of the study 
 which he was anxious to recommend to general 
 attention: — for, in the first place — as His Lord- 
 ship complains — each of the terms Natural The- 
 
14 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 
 ology and Natural Religiwi has had somewhat 
 different significations attached to it by different 
 writers ; and in the second place, as the opening of 
 the work is now left, the reader speedily becomes 
 sensible of a degree of obscurity, which could 
 scarcely have existed had such illustrations of the 
 subject been duly afforded. 
 
 The noble and learned author next remarks 
 that " there is, as regards Natural Theology^ a 
 more limited use of the word, which confines it 
 to the knowledge and attributes of the Deity; 
 and regards the speculation concerning his will, 
 and our own hopes from and duties towards him, 
 as another branch of the science, termed Natural 
 Religion y in contradistinction to the former." .... 
 Even here we begin to feel the want of those expla- 
 nations of terms, the absence of which has already 
 been alluded to. There is some difficulty in per- 
 ceiving what is intended by " a more limited use*" 
 of the term Natural Theology — when nothing has 
 been before mentioned of any use of it at all. 
 Again, His Lordship probably meant to say that 
 the term Natural Theology^ in its "more limited 
 use,'" had been employed to denote, not " the 
 knowledge and attributes of the Deity,'' but " the 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 
 
 15 
 
 knowledge of the existence and attributes of the 
 Deity." The inference to be drawn is, I sup- 
 pose, that Natural Theology consists of two parts : 
 the first part, evincing the being and attributes of 
 God; the second. His designs respecting our ex- 
 istence in another world, and our principles and 
 conduct in the present:— but it would have added 
 greatly to the clearness of the Introduction, if 
 all this had been specifically stated; instead of 
 being left to be inferred or not inferred, accord- 
 ing to the habits of the reader's mind Lord 
 
 Brougham, however, goes on to exemplify his re- 
 mark, by referring to Dr Paley and Bishop Butler. 
 ^Concerning Dr Paley, His Lordship employs the 
 following language : 
 
 •J. 
 
 "Dr Paley hardly touches on this latter branch [the 
 designs of God respecting our future existence, and our 
 own hopes from and duties towards him] in his book; there 
 being only about one-sixtieth part devoted to it, and that 
 incidentally in treating of the attributes. Indeed, though 
 in the dedication he uses the word Religion as synonymous 
 with Theology, the title and the arrangement of his dis- 
 course show that he generally employed the term Natural 
 Theology in its restricted sense." (pp. 5, 6.) 
 
 • There is ample scope for doubt whether Dr 
 Paley hejd the distinction here attri})uted to him. 
 
11 ' 
 
 16 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 So far, indeed, as I can judge, neither the title nor 
 the execution of his work tends to prove that he did 
 hold that distinction. When he entitled his Volume 
 — Natural Theology ; or^ Evidences of the exist- 
 ence and attributes of the Deity ^ collected from the 
 appearances of Nature — we are led to suppose that 
 he assumed the term Natural Theology as a com- 
 pendious and convenient indication of the contents 
 immediately subjoined — rather than that he had 
 any intention of assigning what he conceived to be 
 proper limits to the province of Natural Theology 
 as connected with Natural Religion: — a view of the 
 subject, which his use of the term Natural Religion^ 
 as the equivalent of Natural Theology, seems to 
 confirm. Moreover, since the work simply professed 
 to contain Evidences of the existence and attributes 
 of the Deity, collected from the appearances of 
 Nature — any systematic and extended observations, 
 on the " will of God, and our own hopes from and 
 duties towards him,"" would have been entirely out 
 of place. At the same time, the observations on 
 those topics, which are found towards the close of 
 the work, entitle the Author to far greater honour 
 than could have been derived from the most rigid 
 adherence to a faultless plan. They afford an in- 
 
 % 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 
 
 17 
 
 teresting proof of his reluctance to take leave of 
 an important study, which had long engaged his 
 thoughts ; and of his anxiety to impress upon the 
 reader's mind those moral and religious consider- 
 ations, which were so familiar to himself, and so 
 suited to the subject under discussion. 
 
 In what manner Dr Paley disposed of " the 
 speculation concerning the will of God, and our 
 own hopes from and duties towards Him," may 
 perhaps appear from a few observations, which I 
 shall venture to offer, on Dr Paley 's works, when 
 regarded as parts of a system, A little attention 
 to his works, in that point of view, will probably 
 have the effect of showing that the author had no 
 purpose of nicely tracing the boundaries between 
 Natural Religion, and the departments of know- 
 ledge the most nearly related to it; and indeed 
 may be the means of preventing some not quite 
 trifling mistakes, in estimating the literary labours 
 
 of that extraordinary man Dr Paley 's great 
 
 object, then, appears to have been — to place every 
 portion of that knowledge, which to responsible 
 agents is of deeper moment than any other, upon 
 what he deemed its firmest foundations. His in- 
 tention was, that the student should begin with 
 
 B 
 
 "^^^T 
 
18 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 his Natural Theology ; in which are to be found, 
 "collected from the appearances of nature,'' evi- 
 dences of that fact on which Religion rests;— 
 namely, the existence of a Creator and Preserver 
 of all things; a Being of boundless power and 
 wisdom — whose providential arrangements are ob- 
 viously formed to promote the happiness of his 
 sensitive creation. Taking that fact as established, 
 Dr Paley's next step— in the Preparatonj Con- 
 siderations to his Evidences of Christianity— h to 
 remark that there are circumstances which appear 
 to give countenance to the supposition, that the 
 Supreme Being may vouchsafe to his rational 
 creatures an express revelation of his will. Dr 
 Paley then clearly intimates that the present con- 
 dition of human life affords various indications of 
 a future state of existence. Yet, in his view of 
 the case, these matters need not be strenuously 
 insisted upon. In the Preparatory Consideratmis 
 abovementioned, after stating these two propo- 
 sitions -namely, 1. that a future state of exist- 
 ence may be destined by God for his human 
 creation; and 2. that, being so destined, He 
 may acquaint them with it— the author thus pro- 
 ceeds : 
 
 KXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 
 
 19 
 
 " It is not necessary for our purpose that these propo- 
 sitions be capable of proof; or even that, by arguments 
 drawn from the light of nature, they can be made out to 
 be probable. It is enough that we are able to say con- 
 cerning them, that they are not so violently improbable, 
 so contradictory to what we already believe of the Divine 
 power and character, that either the propositions them- 
 selves, or facts strictly connected with the propositions 
 (and therefore no farther improbable than they are im- 
 probable), ought to be rejected at first sight, and to be 
 rejected by whatever strength or complication of evidence 
 they be attested." 
 
 Let us now see by what steps the argument 
 advances: — It is not impossible — say, not utterly 
 improbable — that a Divine Revelation may be 
 vouchsafed to the human race; but if there ever 
 has been a Revelation, the only method, by which 
 we can conceive its reality to have been evinced, 
 is by Miracles : have then miracles ever been 
 professedly wrought for such a purpose .'* The 
 object of The Evidences of Christianity is to prove 
 that on Miracles really wrought was founded the 
 Christian dispensation — a dispensation which, by 
 its internal excellence, recommends itself to our 
 best judgment and feelings, as worthy of the pre- 
 viously-ascertained attributes of God. The truth of 
 Christianity being so established, a new importance 
 
 b2 
 
w 
 
 INTRODUCTION'. 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 
 
 21 
 
 w given to the present state of existence, by the 
 certainty of its connexion with another. In this 
 manner "life and immortality are'' fully "brought 
 to light.'' Dr Paley thus determines that great 
 truth, the probabilities of which, as manifested 
 by the condition of the human race in this world, 
 have been collected by various writers, and made 
 to form part of their systems of Natural Theology. 
 And what is the practical bearing of all the in- 
 formation, natural and revealed, which has been 
 thus afforded? The answer to this question is 
 to be found in Dr Paley's Moral Philosophic; in 
 which he shows that there are grounds for con- 
 sidering the deductions of reason as combining 
 with the precepts of Christianity, in pointing out 
 the principles and conduct which become us, as 
 probationers for eternity. With such intentions, 
 Dr Paley laid before the world, to adopt his own 
 language, " the evidences of Natural Religion, the 
 evidences of Revealed Religion, and an account 
 of the duties that result from both *." If his entire 
 object be kept in view, there will be no difficulty in 
 understanding why he dwelt but little on several 
 
 ♦ Dedication of Natural Theology to Bishop Barrington. 
 
 particulars, which many will deem — and rightly 
 deem — of real consequence in inquiries of this 
 kind ; which indeed he might, under other circum- 
 stances, have himself enlarged upon, as deserving 
 the most serious attention. For instance, it is not, 
 I am persuaded, to be inferred, from Dr Paley's 
 method of proceeding, that he cared not for " the 
 presumptive proofs of a future retribution from the 
 light of nature;" but that he held his own system 
 to be strong and complete without them *. In con- 
 firmation of this account of Dr Paley's purposes, 
 I refer the reader to a passage near the close of his 
 Evidences of Christianity ; from which it appears 
 that he considered " the argument drawn from the 
 light of nature" as quite sufficient to show the pro- 
 bability of a future state ; that " one truth" which 
 " gives order to confusion," and " makes the moral 
 world of a piece with the naturaJ." To the same 
 
 * See Moral Philosophy, Book ii. chap. 3. end, " To us," says 
 Paley, "there are two great questions: 1. Will there be after this 
 life any distribution of rewards and punishments at all? 2. If there 
 be, what actions will be rewarded, and what will be punished ?...The 
 first question comprises the credibility of the Christian Religion, 
 together with the presumptive proofs of a future retribution from the 
 light of nature.". ..Such proofs, if his plan had required them, would 
 undoubtedly have formed part oi his system of Natural Theology or 
 Natural Religion. 
 
22 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 
 
 23 
 
 i 
 
 I 
 
 end, I extract the following passage from the 
 concluding chapter of his Natural Theology: 
 
 " The existence and character of the Deity is, in every 
 view, the most interesting of all human speculations. In 
 none, however, is it more so, than as it facilitates the belief 
 of the fundamental articles of Revelaiio?i. It is a step to 
 have it proved that there must be something in the world 
 more than what we see. It is a farther step to know that, 
 amongst the invisible things of nature, there must be an 
 intelligent mind, concerned in its production, order and 
 support. These points being assured to us by Natural 
 Theology, we may well leave to Revelation the disclosure 
 of many particulars which our researches cannot reach, 
 as respecting either the nature of this Being as the original 
 cause of all things, or his character and designs as a moral 
 governor ; and not only so, but the more full confirmation of 
 other particulars, of which, although they do not lie alto- 
 gether beyond our reasonings and our probabilities, the 
 certainty is by no means equal to the importance." 
 
 From the preceding estimate of Dr Paley's 
 views, we shall be warranted in concluding, that 
 he did not draw the distinction, attributed to him 
 by Lord Brougham, between Natural Theology 
 
 and Natural Religion Before I take leave of 
 
 this subject, I observe that neither the title-page, 
 nor the preliminary matter, of Dr Paley's Natural 
 Theology leads us to expect any account of *' the 
 
 designs of God respecting our future existence and 
 our principles and conduct in this life"" — and yet, 
 his work is censured by Lord Brougham for the 
 omission of such account. In the course of the 
 present volume, I shall have occasion to point out a 
 similar omission in His Lordship's work — although 
 the plan laid down expressly demanded the intro- 
 duction of ethical considerations M 
 
 But to proceed — Lord Brougham animadverts 
 on the term Natural Religion, as used by Bishop 
 Butler, in the following manner: 
 
 "Bishop Butler seems to have used Natural Religion 
 in a sense equally restricted, but certainly little warranted by 
 custom; for that portion of his work which treats of Natural 
 
 • 
 
 • In the review of the principal productions of Dr Paley, I 
 have not mentioned the Hovie PuuIuke ; which admirable work must 
 be considered as intended to strengthen the Evidences of Christianity. 
 It has been called the most original of the author's productions ; and 
 in its execution it appears to have been so. It was suggested how- 
 ever, if I mistake not, by the following remarks, at the conclusion of 
 Dr Doddridge's Introduction to his Paraphrase and Notes on the 
 
 first Epistle to the Thessalonians " Whoever reads over St Paul's 
 
 Epistles with attention will discern such intrinsic characters in their 
 genuineness, and the Divine authority of the doctrines they contain, 
 as will perhaps produce in him a stronger conviction than all the 
 external evidence with which they are attended. To which we may 
 add, that the exact coincidence observable, between the many allu- 
 sions to particular facts in this as well as in other Epistles, and the 
 account of the facts tlienisclves as tlicy are recorded in tlie history 
 of the Arts, \^ a n'mark:il>!c ( onfirmalion of the truth of each." 
 
24 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 
 
 25 
 
 It 
 
 i I 
 
 f: 
 
 Religion is confined to a future state and the moral govern- 
 ment of God, as if he either held Natural Religion and 
 Natural Theology to be two branches of one subject, or 
 Natural Religion to be a branch of Natural Theology." (p. 6.) 
 
 Whoever will examine The Analogy of Rdu 
 gion, Natural and Revealed, to the constitution and 
 course of Nature, will find that the author under- 
 took to arbitrate between the friends of Religion 
 and the adversaries of Religion -meaning, by Reli- 
 gion, a system of moral, practical truths, whether 
 deduced by the faculties of the mind or promul- 
 gated by Revelation :— in other words, between the 
 friends and the adversaries of Religion, Natural 
 and Revealed. Now, however widely persons may 
 differ, there must be some principles in common, 
 or the matter in dispute can never be decided. 
 What, then, were the principles common to the 
 two parties in the case under review? They 
 were these : the being of a God-and the actual 
 constitution and course of nature. And thus. 
 Bishop Butler was led to trace the analogy ex- 
 isting between Religion, Natural and Revealed, 
 on the one hand— and the course of nature, on 
 the other ; thereby endeavouring to prove the high 
 probability of their having both proceeded from 
 
 the same Divine Being, whose existence was ad- 
 mitted on all hands. The signification, therefore, 
 given to the term Natural ReUg'wn, may be well 
 accounted for, without supposing the author to 
 have adopted either of the alleged distinctions 
 between Natural Religion and Natural Theology. 
 In confirmation of this opinion, it may be observed 
 that, when Bishop Butler is not writing with 
 reference to the Analogy, he assigns to Natural 
 Religion a much wider range ; as will appear from 
 the following extract from his Charge to the Clergy 
 of the Diocese of Durham : " Now, the evidence of 
 religion [meaning, both natural and revealed] may 
 be laid before men without any air of controversy. 
 The proof of the being of God, from final causes 
 or the design and wisdom which appears in every 
 part of nature, together with the law of virtue 
 written upon our hearts ; the proof of Christianity 
 from miracles, and the accomplishment of pro- 
 phecies — these evidences of religion might 
 
 properly be insisted on, in a way to affect and 
 influence the heart, though there were no professed 
 unbelievers in the world.'' From this extract it 
 appears that, in Bishop Butler's judgment, "the 
 proof of the being of God, from final causes, or 
 
 I 
 
;i 
 
 26 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 J 
 
 \ 
 
 the design and wisdom which appears in every 
 part of nature,'*'' belongs to Religion; that is, 
 undoubtedly, to Natural Religion. . . .With respect 
 to the Bishop's notions of Natural Theologt/^ 
 as distinguished from Natural Religion, it is not 
 likely that they should be ascertained; for I very 
 much question whether the term Natural Theology 
 is to be found in his writings. 
 
 In support of the opinion, which I have virtually 
 avowed, that any science may, when compared with 
 the different departments of knowledge to which it 
 is related, be not improperly held to comprise very 
 different particulars — I take the liberty of adducing 
 some remarks of Lord Brougham himself, in a note 
 on the Classification of the Sciences (p. 218) : "In 
 _all such classifications,"" His Lordship writes, " we 
 should be guided by views of convenience, rather 
 than by any desire to attain perfect symmetry ; and 
 that arrangement may be best suited to a particular 
 purpose, which plants the same things in one order, 
 and separates them and unites them in one way, 
 when an arrangement which should dispose those 
 things differently might be preferable, if we had 
 another purpose to serve.'*'" This is precisely the 
 consideration by which I conceive Tlr VAvy and 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 
 
 27 
 
 r 
 
 Bishop Butler to have been influenced, in their 
 classifications; and by which they cannot but be 
 completely justified in the estimation of every 
 reasonable person. 
 
 To be fully aware of the perfect adaptation 
 of Bishop Butler's great work to the circumstances 
 of the times in which it appeared, we must bear in 
 mind that, during the earlier part of the eighteenth 
 century, lived certain eminent philosophers, who 
 admitted the being and natural attributes [wisdom 
 and power] of God, and a Divine Providence in 
 the world around them; but denied his moral 
 attributes, and a future state of rewards and 
 punishments for the human race. Amongst such 
 philosophers Lord Bolingbroke became particularly 
 conspicuous. . .This casual mention of Lord Boling- 
 broke brings to recollection that he was inclined to 
 distinguish between Natural Theology and Natural 
 Religion ; but in what manner, I believe he has 
 
 not explained*. 
 
 The foregoing comments on the terms Natural 
 Religion and Natural Theology would appear to 
 render it needless to do more than quote Lord 
 
 * Warbui ion -View of Lord Bolingbrokf's riiilo^opliy, I-cUer iv. ; 
 Works, \o\. xii. p. 2(>2, 2(j4, 
 
 I 
 
I 
 
 28 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Brougham's concluding observations in relation to 
 the same topics: 
 
 "The older writers, Clarke, Bentley, Derham, seem to 
 have sometimes used the words indifferently, but never to 
 have regarded Natural Religion in its restricted acceptation. 
 The ancients generally used Religion in a qualified sense, 
 either as connected with an obligation, or as synonymous 
 with superstition." (p. 6.) 
 
 It is, however, requisite to point out the pecu- 
 liar infelicity of the statement—that Clarke, Bent- 
 ley and Derham "seem to have sometimes used 
 the words indifferently, but never to have regarded 
 Natural Religion in its restricted acceptation.*" The 
 facts of the cases are these : After Dr Clarke had 
 published his Demonstration of the being and attri- 
 butes of God, he published his Discourse on the un~ 
 changeable obligatioiis of Natural Religion, and the 
 truth and certainty of the Christian Revelation— 
 more briefly denominated, The Evidences of Natural 
 and Revealed Religion *. We shall therefore have 
 an opportunity to ascertain what Dr Clarke here 
 understood by the term Natural Religion. Nor 
 have we far to seek for information. In the very 
 
 * I'nder llii> latter title it is rtl'ened to h\ I.ord l^iouglu 
 (Discourse, p. 201 ) in connexion with tlic Dninniiiinifion of il, 
 iteing inifl nil) ihiilrs of God. 
 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 •14 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &:c 
 
 29 
 
 outset of his latter work he observes — " I proceed, 
 upon this Jbundation, of the being and attributes of 
 God, to demonstrate in the next place the unalter- 
 able obligations of Natural Religion."" Natural 
 Religion therefore, as Dr Clarke at that time 
 understood it, did not comprise the proof of the 
 being and attributes of God ; and so it is undeni- 
 ably certain that he then regarded Natural Religion 
 in as restricted an acceptation as Bishop Butler has 
 done. Nay, in a far more restricted acceptation ; 
 for Dr Clarke had demonstrated — or believed that 
 he had demonstrated — even the moral attributes of 
 God, in the first work, which was the foundation of 
 the second. That he never used the term Natural 
 Religion in a more extensive signification, I will 
 not affirm ; because I do not suppose that he at 
 that time intended, any more than Bishop Butler in 
 the case of the Analogy intended, formally to assign 
 limits to Natural Religion. ... It is, at least, not 
 unreasonable that, under circumstances so similar 
 as those of Dr Clarke and Bishop Butler, their 
 language should be interpreted on similar principles. 
 . . . .With regard to Bentley — there appears not, 
 in his Confutation of Atheism, the slightest men- 
 tion either of Natural Theology or Natural Reli- 
 
 i. 
 
it 
 
 II 
 
 II I 
 
 30 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 gion. Throughout his Sermons, the terms Religion 
 and Atheism are opposed to each other. . . .And, 
 finally, from what I have observed of Derham'^s 
 style of writing, I should be much surprised to find 
 the words Natural Theology and Natural Religion 
 "used indifferently/'. . . .The matter may not be 
 thought very important; but as it has been brought 
 forward, let justice be done to all parties. 
 
 Leaving the distinctions which have now been 
 considered. Lord Brougham gives us a glimpse of 
 Natural Theology, by means of the information, 
 that it is "a science, the truths of which are dis- 
 covered by induction, like the truths of Natural 
 and Moral Philosophy;'' and also that "it is a 
 branch of science partaking of the nature of each of 
 those great divisions of human knowledge, and not 
 merely closely allied to them both."" (p. 7.) Now, 
 a science the truths of which are discovered by 
 induction, " like" the truths of two other sciences — 
 which partakes "of the nature of each" — and "is 
 not merely closely allied to them both" — seems to 
 be in some respects different from both; but as 
 neither the points of connexion nor those of sepa^ 
 ration are hinted at, we are yet in uncertainty as 
 to the real nature of Natural Theology. 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &c. 
 
 31 
 
 It may here be observed that, through the 
 whole Discourse, Lord Brougham has laid great 
 stress upon Induction^ as a mode of arriving at 
 truth. For the sake, therefore, of those who may 
 not be very conversant with terms of this kind, 
 I will venture upon a few words of explanation. 
 When by long continued observation of particular 
 facts, or by manifold experiments on particular 
 substances, in any department of inquiry — certain 
 laws or properties or truths are inferred, as uni- 
 versally belonging to the subjects of observation 
 or experiment, the method of proceeding is called 
 the method of induction ; and such laws or pro- 
 perties or truths may be employed as established 
 principles from which, by means of reasoning, 
 other laws or properties or truths may be derived. 
 On this method of induction, the physical sciences 
 for the most part depend; and Lord Brougham, 
 throughout his work, takes great pains to show 
 that the psychological and moral sciences equally 
 rest upon induction. 
 
 Subsequently to all this, His Lordship employs 
 nearly three pages — which, I believe, have deterred 
 many persons from reading the book itself — in 
 uselessly discriminating between intellectual and 
 
. f 
 
 32 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 moral science — the intellectual and active powers^ 
 Ontology and Deontology. He also determines— 
 not on the ground of rigorous exactness, but that 
 of great convenience— that all inductive science 
 may be considered "as consisting of three com- 
 partments —Natural, Mental and Moral ; or, taking 
 the Greek terms— Physical, Psychological and 
 Ethical;^ The first of these divisions, then, will 
 be appropriated to matter; the second, to mind; 
 the third, to duty: with this understanding how- 
 ever, that, from the very nature of things, the 
 lines of demarcation between these divisions are 
 but faintly drawn. Lord Brougham concludes by 
 deciding that Natural Theology is co-extensive 
 with inductive science; and in like manner, has 
 its Physical, Psychological and Ethical branches. 
 In this part of Lord Brougham's Introduction, 
 we find a tolerably distinct account of the objects 
 of Natural Theology; which are stated to be, 
 1. "the discovery of the existence and attributes 
 of a Creator, by investigating the evidences of 
 design in the works of the creation, material as 
 well as spiritual;'' and 2. "the discovery of his 
 will and probable intentions with regard to his 
 creatures, their conduct and their duty." We are 
 
 (ll 
 
 EXPLANATION OF TERMS, &o. 
 
 S3 
 
 also informed that, with respect to the former of 
 these objects, Natural Theology ^^ resembles the 
 physical and psychological sciences;" and that, 
 with regard to the latter, it '' resembles rather the 
 department of moral science." Now resemblance, 
 when thus spoken of, implies at the same time 
 some distinction: implies, in other words, that 
 the things which resemble each other are not 
 identical. As, however, no distinction is pointed 
 out, the uncertainty already alluded to (p. 30.) 
 still remains. There is in fact — and, I believe, 
 in a great measure from this cause— a mist hang* 
 ing over the whole subject. 
 
 The Introduction terminates with an analysis 
 of the Discourse ; which consists of two parts : — 
 the first part treating " of the nature of the sub- 
 ject, and the kind of evidence on which Natural 
 Theology rests" — the second, of " the advantages 
 derived from the study of the science.". . .The three- 
 fold distribution, into matters Physical, Psycholo- 
 gical and Ethical, forms the ground-work of Lord 
 Brougham's sub-divisions, in the first and most 
 important part of his Discourse; and upon that 
 distribution will entirely depend the arrangement 
 of the work now in the reader's hands. 
 
 ^ 
 
 ■■l 
 
i« 
 
 »• 
 
 34 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 35 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH OP NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 (Discourse, Section T. & II. pp. 15—51.) 
 
 Experience is the school appointed for the human 
 race. In infancy, the senses are impressed by 
 external objects. Impressions are continually re- 
 peated. Then, observation is awakened; and, 
 with observation, a fondness for things new and 
 strange. Soon after, another kind of feeling shows 
 itself: — a new curiosity about things — an eager- 
 ness to know what they are — what they contain — 
 what is their construction — what they are intended 
 for. Meanwhile, this lesson is thoroughly learned 
 — that things are made — that they are contrived — 
 that there are those by whom they are contrived 
 and made. There has been going on, at the same 
 time, a process of thinking and willing and acting 
 — of which the individual becomes more and more 
 conscious to himself; and those faculties— of think- 
 ing, willing and acting— of which he is himself 
 conscious, he is unavoidably led to attribute also 
 
 ( 
 
 to others. They are ultimately perceived to be 
 the regular means by which effects are produced. 
 In this manner arises a conviction never to be 
 effaced — that whatever manifests arrangement for 
 a purpose must have originated in thought — under- 
 standing — mind. There is an irresistible feeling 
 that — without skill to adapt means to ends, toge- 
 ther with a disposition to second that skill, and 
 power to carry designs into execution — the objects 
 with which the individual is mainly conversant 
 could not have been formed as they are. Hence 
 the knowledge of the existence of agents possessing 
 
 intelligence and will and effective power Nor, 
 
 is there any necessity to ascertain the ultimate 
 purpose of an object, in order to be assured of 
 its having had a contriver. To produce the final 
 result, whatever that result may be, the subordinate 
 parts of the machinery — so to call it — must be 
 adjusted to each other; and thus the existence of 
 a contriving mind may be inferred, even from the 
 working of individual portions of the machinery. 
 
 If any one should think that the subject is 
 elucidated by saying that the knowledge thus 
 acquired is the result of induction, he may justly 
 say so. From the continual observation of par- 
 
 c 2 
 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 iW 
 
36 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 37 
 
 \r 
 
 ticular instances, a general conclusion has been 
 drawn. Experience has led to the belief that 
 wherever adaptation can be traced, such adaptation 
 must have proceeded from design — there must 
 have been an intelligent designer. 
 
 In our earliest years, our attention is mainly 
 directed to the effects consequent upon that degree 
 of ingenuity and power which is possessed by our 
 own species; but we are placed in the midst of 
 objects in the formation of which, if they we7'e 
 formed, we feel the strongest assurance that human 
 faculties can have had no concern. What account 
 can be given of such things ? Do they attest their 
 adaptation to certain ends ? Do such parts of 
 them, as come under our observation, indisputably 
 display contrivance ? If we are satisfied that there 
 do exist marks of adaptation and contrivance, what 
 inference is to be drawn from the fact ? Such are 
 the questions suggested by what are called the 
 appearances of nature. Now most undoubtedly, 
 experience has so constantly proved to us that 
 adaptation and contrivance have had their origin 
 in intelligence, that it has become, as it were, an 
 inalienable part of our mental constitution, to be- 
 lieve that to intelligence only can contrivance and 
 
 adaptation in any case be ascribed. Moreover, we 
 have no difficulty in imagining the existence of 
 intelligence and power far superior to our own ; 
 such indeed as to produce results obviously im- 
 possible to human forethought and agency. Under 
 the kind of circumstances now detailed, we engage 
 in the contemplation and study of the material 
 world. 
 
 On an actual survey of external nature, we find 
 things on all sides so connected with each other, 
 that the idea of adaptation and contrivance irre- 
 sistibly forces itself upon the understanding. We 
 feel that they could not exist in their present 
 relations, unless there had been a previous inten- 
 tion that they should so exist. Every object 
 therefore, in the natural world, must have been 
 foreseen, contrived, formed to be — exactly as it 
 is. No fact, besides, can be more contrary to all 
 our experience than that any thing should foresee 
 and contrive, except mmd— that is, an intelligent 
 being, exercising volition and possessing power. 
 In other words we find ourselves surrounded by 
 objects, none of which can we conceive to exist 
 as we behold them existing, otherwise than by 
 the primal and continued agency of some intel- 
 
 % 
 
(I 
 
 58 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 39 
 
 ^ 
 
 y 
 
 ligent and powerful Being. And yet more, the 
 various instances of adaptation and contrivance 
 have such a decided tendency to the completion 
 of one grand plan, that we are led to the con- 
 clusion, that the entire scheme of nature must 
 have originated with One supremely wise and 
 powerful Being — whom we call God. 
 
 Such are, in brief, the leading principles of 
 the first, or physical branch of Natural Theology. 
 The student is directed by it to evidences without 
 number of the existence of a Deity ; but the full 
 and practical belief of that great truth will depend 
 upon the fairness of mind and the diligence with 
 which he conducts his inquiries. 
 
 The science then, of which we are treating, 
 rests upon observation ; such observation, in the 
 first instance, as any one, who is endowed with the 
 ordinary powers of reason, is competent to under- 
 take with success. Even the most obvious facts, 
 in every department of Natural Knowledge, afford 
 undeniable proofs of design and adaptation; and 
 thus may be collected, without the necessity of 
 formal study, very striking evidences of the exist- 
 ence of a Creator and Preserver of all things. But 
 new and surprising instances of design and con- 
 
 
 trivance await the more scientific inquirer at every 
 step ; and to him, who is enabled to range through 
 the vast expanse of Physical Knowledge, the at- 
 testations to the Divine wisdom and power will 
 come with the full force of demonstration. There 
 may indeed be an understanding so dull and insen- 
 sible to every thing not materially present— that 
 the marks of adaptation may be unheeded from 
 first to last; and so, not a thought be directed 
 to Him who formed the system which is the object 
 of study, and commissioned it to bear unceasing 
 witness to himself. I will only say that such 
 a case presents an anomaly in the intellectual 
 world; which, however accounted for, may be 
 considered as of at least some service, in remind- 
 ing us, by its rare occurrence, of the law by which 
 the human mind is generaUy governed in such 
 
 investigations. 
 
 On the whole, Natural Theology— I mean, the 
 present branch of the science— is founded on the 
 observation of nature ;— on the study of nature, by 
 whatever means— experimental or mathematical— 
 that study may be conducted. Natural Theology 
 is, in fact. Natural Philosophy-Physical science, 
 in its utmost extent-studied with especial attention 
 
\M 
 
 [' I 
 
 ^ 
 
 }■/ 
 
 40 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 to the marks of design, which are in succession 
 furnished by the objects of inquiry. 
 
 The first teachers and preachers of Christianity, 
 among the heathen, were of course aware that 
 there must be some fact or principle, universally 
 admitted, which should form the basis of their 
 instructions and exhortations ; and that which they 
 required was furnished by the world around them. 
 That great fact or principle we can be at no loss 
 to discover, when we observe in what manner they 
 dwelt upon the natural evidences of a Divine Being, 
 and a Providence ruling over all. St Paul com- 
 mences his address to the Athenians with senti- 
 ments to which the better feelings of their nature 
 could not but respond— dwelling on "God that 
 made the world and all things therein;'' who 
 " giveth to all life and breath and all things, and 
 hath made of one blood all nations of men;" in 
 whom " we live and move and have our being;''— 
 and thus endeavours to withdraw them from their 
 idolatrous observances, to repentance and the be- 
 lief of a resurrection and a judgement to come :— 
 when writing to his Roman converts, he avails 
 himself of the argument arising from " the things 
 that do appear," to prove that while the Gentiles 
 
 ^ 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 41 
 
 thus knew God, or might have known him, they 
 were "without excuse" in that "they glorified 
 him not as God:" — and when addressing the in- 
 habitants of Lycaonia, he appeals to the bounties 
 showered down upon them on every side, as indica- 
 tions of a God whose attribute is goodness *. On 
 leaving the Apostolic age, we find the argument, 
 from contrivance and adjustment for beneficial 
 purposes, much employed by the ancient Apologists 
 for Christianity ; and at no subsequent period has 
 the state of mankind, in a religious point of view, 
 rendered the argument of little consequence. As 
 we descend to ages nearer to our own, there is 
 satisfaction in the thought that the argument sus- 
 tained no injury from the lapse of time ; but that, 
 on the contrary, every accession to human know- 
 ledge has constantly given it new stability. Modern 
 science has thus abundantly ministered to the cause 
 of Religion. It is indeed, comparatively speaking, 
 but recently that the great discoveries in science 
 have been made ; and he who has penetrated the 
 farthest, into regions of knowledge previously unex- 
 plored, never fancied that, as he travelled onward, 
 the marks of design were growing dim. Never, for 
 
 * Acts xvii. 24, &c. Rom. i. 20, and Acb xiv. 15, &c. 
 
42 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 43 
 
 II 
 
 f 
 
 f 
 
 a moment, did the notion occur to him, that he 
 was tending towards the boundary Hne of Intel- 
 hgence-beyond which lie the domains of darkness 
 and confusion. Into whatsoever new region the 
 adventurer may have advanced, he always found 
 himself, as he went along, surrounded by the mani- 
 festations of the Deity. We have, indeed, lately 
 seen the most recondite departments of science 
 attesting the attributes of God, in characters as 
 vivid, to the eye of the Philosopher, as those in 
 which the grand and obvious processes and appear- 
 ances of nature attest the same attributes, to the 
 common eye.... Need I say that allusion is here 
 made to the great variety of important information 
 communicated to the world, on subjects connected 
 with Natural Theology, by the Authors of the 
 Bridgewater Treatises? Let me farther observe 
 that, in imitation of Lord Brougham, I have, in 
 the preceding observations, directed attention solely 
 to such material objects as, by their own mani- 
 fest organisation, or by their indisputable relation 
 to each other, prove contrivance. His Lordship 
 has, in my opinion, done wisely in confining his 
 remarks to such objects. Arguments indeed have 
 been drawn, in proof of a Deity, from the very 
 
 existence of the material world, independently of 
 the contrivance which it displays ; but arguments 
 of that nature, whatever may be their validity, 
 do not seem well adapted to Discourses like the 
 present. 
 
 Such are my views of this branch of Natural 
 Theology ; which, I am inclined to believe, are not 
 far from coinciding with those of Lord Brougham, 
 although they are somewhat differently unfolded. 
 The first section of His Lordship's Discourse, 
 entitled Introductory view of the method of investi- 
 gation pursued in the physical and psychological 
 Sciences, appears to be occupied by the statement 
 and refutation of an objection to the plan of de- 
 ducing Theological knowledge of any kind, from 
 the observation and study of natural phenomena. 
 Now, very seldom can either an objection, or the 
 reply to it, be fairly estimated, till the matter 
 objected to is tolerably well understood ; and 
 therefore, in addition to the preceding account of 
 Natural Theology, I shall give an abstract of 
 Lord Brougham'^s opinions on the same subject, 
 before I advert to the contents of the first section. 
 
 The second section (pp. 28—51) purports to 
 furnish a Comparison of the physical branch of 
 
44 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 : I 
 
 I 
 
 Natural Theology with Physics From the 
 
 remarks which have already been offered, the 
 reader will have no difficulty in comprehending 
 the statement — that nature may be observed and 
 studied solely for the purpose of ascertaining facts ; 
 —and that it may also be studied with the addi- 
 tional purpose of tracing the marks of contrivance 
 and adaptation which may be presented. In the 
 one case, we are simply attaining Physical Know- 
 ledge or Science; in the other, according to the 
 degree of attention paid to the proofs of design, 
 we advance into the regions of Natural Theology. 
 Lord Brougham states the matter thus: — 
 
 ** The two inquiries — that into the nature and consti- 
 tution of the universe, and that into the evidence of design 
 which it displays— ... .are not only closely allied one to the 
 other, but are to a very considerable extent identical. The 
 two paths of investigation for a great part of the way com- 
 pletely coincide." (p. 28.) 
 
 Some notice has already been taken (pp. 30 
 and 32) of a previous account, by Lord Brougham, 
 of this matter : namely, that the physical part of 
 Natural Theology "partakes of the nature'^ of 
 physical science, and «« resembles'' it; the con- 
 clusion apparently to be drawn being, that there 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 45 
 
 is some difference between Natural Theology and 
 physical science, although they are very like each 
 other. . . .We are now informed that they are " to 
 a very considerable extent identicaP' and "for a 
 great part of the way completely coincide;'' that 
 is, are the same study. In all this there is an un- 
 steadiness of view, which causes much embarrass- 
 ment. If His Lordship had throughout the Dis- 
 course maintained the doctrine which here appears 
 to be laid down— that the results of physical science 
 are themselves the facts which prove design and 
 adaptation, and so become principles of Natural 
 Theology— much of that obscurity would have 
 been avoided which is now, I believe very gene- 
 rally, felt to pervade the work. The purport of 
 the following extract does not seem very clear: 
 
 « It is impossible to deny, that what induction thus 
 teaches forms the great bulk of all Natural Theology. The 
 question which the theologian always puts upon each dis- 
 covery of a purpose manifestly accomplished is this ; * Sup- 
 pose I had this operation to perform by mechanical means, 
 and were acquainted with the laws regulating the action of 
 matter, should I attempt it in any other way than I here see 
 practised?' If the answer is in the negative, the con- 
 sequence is irresistible, that some power capable of acting 
 with design, and possessing the supposed knowledge, era- 
 
I 
 
 \f 
 
 l! 
 
 46 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 ployed the means which we see used. But this negative 
 answer is the result of reasoning founded upon induction, 
 and rests upon the same evidence whereon the doctrines of 
 physical science are discovered and believed. And the infer- 
 ence to which that negative answer so inevitably leads is 
 a truth in Natural Theology ; for it is only another way of 
 asserting that design and knowledge are evinced in the 
 works and functions of nature." (p. 32.) 
 
 Whatever effect, produced by the constitution 
 of nature, is under consideration, we might venture 
 to allow " the theologian'' to go a step farther than 
 Lord Brougham has permitted him to proceed; 
 and let him ask, ' Is not the operation performed 
 with far greater ease, and far more effectually, 
 than it would beforehand be possible for me even 
 to imagine?' — and the answer would certainly 
 lead to the acknowledgment of an agent wise and 
 
 powerful in the highest degree What the cause 
 
 may be, I know not; but the latter part of the 
 quotation— beginning, ' But this negative answer,' 
 &c.— seems to add nothing to the stability of the 
 conclusion; and indeed, by multiplying words, 
 tends rather to excite doubt. Physical know- 
 ledge, which is founded on induction, furnishes 
 results, which when duly examined present evi- 
 dences of design. We know moreover, from con- 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH, 
 
 47 
 
 stant observation, or if you please from an induc- 
 tion of particulars, that contrivance never exists 
 except as the effect of an intelligent agent. In 
 this manner, the facts of physical knowledge be- 
 come the principles of Natural Theology. Hence, 
 Natural Theology is an inductive science. This 
 is probably what Lord Brougham intended to 
 
 state. 
 
 With the general views which are developed 
 in this section, the noble and learned writer com- 
 bines several appropriate instances of the manner 
 in which, as knowledge of the subject is increased, 
 the proofs of design and contrivance become more 
 convincing. For example: Consider the relation 
 between the eye and Hght. The effect is-distinct 
 vision ; and at the very first thought, we cannot 
 help feeling that in some way the medium and the 
 organ of vision must have been designedly adjusted 
 to each other.. ..Again, in order that any object 
 may be distinctly seen, an exact image of the 
 object must be formed in the back part of the 
 eye:— iii other words, the light proceeding from 
 each point of the object must pass through the 
 eye, and converge to a corresponding point on the 
 retina. When the manner in which this takes 
 
I 
 
 48 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 place IS understood, the impression, that there 
 must have been an intentional adjustment, is ex- 
 ceedingly strengthened. Light is not only re- 
 fracted, in passing from one medium into another, 
 but refracted unequally ; and the consequence, un- 
 less counteracted, would be, that objects would 
 appear discoloured. Now the figure and consti- 
 tution of the eye are such, that light, with all 
 its different degrees of refrangibility, is made to 
 converge upon the retina, and form the image 
 required for distinct vision. The difficulty over- 
 come is extreme, as is well known to all who 
 are conversant with optical instruments. Here 
 then must have been intelligence; here must have 
 been contrivance; here must have been creative 
 power. Moreover, the mode in which, as the 
 Anatomist demonstrates, the eye is enabled to 
 perform its various functions, introduces an almost 
 endless series of instances of design, all confirming 
 the same truth. We may here observe a par- 
 ticular example confirming the general position, 
 that, while every department of physical know- 
 ledge contributes its own proofs' of adaptation, it 
 also gives new force to the proofs derived from 
 correlative sources. 
 
 * i 
 
 ^1 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 49 
 
 After dwelling upon the wonderful power of 
 contrivance manifested in the structure of the 
 human eye. Lord Brougham touches on the re- 
 markable variations in the organ of sight, by which 
 that organ is in the most exquisite manner adapted 
 to the use of different animals, according to their 
 respective conditions and habits of life. I should 
 have great delight in describing, in my own lan- 
 guage, these and several other instances of design 
 adduced by the noble author; not from any hope 
 of rendering them more striking than His Lord- 
 ship has done— but because a person who takes 
 his own point of view, and writes from the im- 
 pression of his own mind, will generally hit on 
 something, not generally noticed, which may be 
 worthy of consideration. Believing, however, that 
 neither Lord Brougham's interesting observations, 
 nor Dr Pale/s forcible arguments, on such sub- 
 jects, will be unknown to any reader of these 
 pages, I will not attempt to add strength to the 
 conviction which their statements cannot fail to 
 produce. If therefore I venture to offer a few 
 remarks upon His Lordship's instance, drawn from 
 the Planetary System, my object will be to illus- 
 trate the mode of reasoning which leads to the 
 truths of Natural Theology. 
 
 D 
 
i:, 
 
 mm 
 
 I 
 
 f 
 
 50 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 On the first intelligent survey of the heavens, 
 we feel as if some Great Power had been in opera- 
 tion. " The heavens declare the glory of God : 
 and the firmament showeth his handy work.'' Such 
 is the first impression: — and the feeling, arising 
 from the vastness and magnificence of the scene, 
 is strengthened by the adaptations which are suc- 
 cessively presented to the attention. The obvious 
 relation of the earth and moon to the sun — the 
 general scheme of the solar system — the bodies of 
 which it consists — their masses and distances from 
 the common centre — their various revolutions, 
 which are by degrees familiarized to our appre- 
 hension — all these things fill the mind with ideas 
 of contrivance and power in combination — far 
 exceeding any which had before been excited. 
 But when, by the aid of principles derived from 
 observation and experiment, and applied by means 
 of the strictest mathematical processes — we trace 
 the effects of the law by which the bodies "in 
 their courses'' gravitate towards each other; — 
 when we prove that certain changes, which might 
 be supposed to indicate an eventual derangement 
 of the whole system, are the inevitable conse- 
 quences of the bodies' mutual gravitation — and 
 that although such changes may go on increasing 
 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 51 
 
 for thousands of years, yet the time must arrive 
 when they will begin to decrease by similar de- 
 grees—and so on, by continual alternations of 
 increase and decrease ;— when we thus ascertain 
 that, as the system now exists, its stability is 
 secure;— and finally, when we know, as a matter 
 of demonstration, that, if the masses and distances 
 and forms of the orbits of the bodies had been 
 materially different from what they are, the dis- 
 turbances arising from their mutual actions, instead 
 of being periodical, would soon have thrown every 
 thing into confusion ;— we are lost in astonishment 
 at the wisdom with which the whole has been 
 ordained. There is, in all this, what no man 
 can account for, otherwise than by saying, that it 
 was the Will of the Supreme Being, that so every 
 thing should be. 
 
 Here, then, we have observation, experiment, 
 induction and the most refined processes of ma- 
 thematical investigation — all conducing to the 
 establishment of facts, which at once lead to the 
 fundamental principle of Natural Religion. In 
 what manner we learn to pass, as by necessary 
 consequence, from facts displaying contrivance 
 and adaptation, to the existence of some Great 
 
 D 2 
 
i 
 
 HI 
 
 ii 
 
 H 
 
 til 
 
 52 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Intelligence from whom they originated, I have 
 
 endeavoured to explain, in the beginning of the 
 
 present section. The transition is effected by the 
 
 constant observation of the connexion between a 
 
 thinking agent and the appearances of design ; or, 
 
 as Lord Brougham states the matter, by a process 
 
 of induction. But on this important subject, His 
 
 Lordship shall be allowed to express his own 
 
 sentiments in his own language: 
 
 " The position which we reach by a strict process of 
 induction, is common to Natural Philosophy and Natural 
 Theology — namely, that a given organ performs a given 
 function, or a given arrangement possesses a certain sta- 
 bility, by its adaptation to mechanical laws. We have said 
 that the process of reasoning is short and easy, by which 
 we arrive at the doctrine more peculiar to Natural The- 
 ology — namely, that some power acquainted with and acting 
 upon the knowledge of those laws, fashioned the organ 
 with the intention of having the function performed, or 
 constructed the system that it might endure. Is not this 
 last process as much one of strict induction as the other? 
 It is plainly only a generalization of many particular facts ; 
 a reasoning from things known to things unknown; an 
 inference of a new or unknown relation from other relations 
 formerly observed and known When we see that a cer- 
 tain effect, namely, distinct vision, is performed by an 
 achromatic instrument, the eye, why do we infer that some 
 one must have made it? Because we nowhere and at no 
 time have had any experience of any one thing fashioning 
 
 I 
 
 ' 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 53 
 
 itself, and indeed cannot form to ourselves any distinct 
 idea of what such a process as self-creation means ; and 
 further, because when we ourselves would produce a similar 
 result, we have recourse to like means. Again, when we 
 perceive the adaptation of natural objects and operations 
 to a perceived end, and thence infer design in the maker 
 of these objects, and superintender of these operations, why 
 do we draw this conclusion? Because we know by expe- 
 .rience that if we ourselves desired to accomplish a similar 
 purpose, we should do so by the like adaptation; we know 
 by experience that this is design in us, and that our pro- 
 ceedings are the result of such design ; we know that if 
 some of our works were seen by others, who neither were 
 aware of our having made them, nor of the intention with 
 which we made them, they would be right should they, 
 from seeing and examining them, both infer that we had 
 made them, and conjecture why we had made them " 
 (pp. 42—44.) 
 
 In confirmation of these views of the subject, 
 which for the most part appear to be correct, Lord 
 Brougham adverts to the recent speculations on 
 the remains of animals, the whole species of which 
 are extinct ; dwelling upon the conclusions, respect- 
 ing the forms, magnitudes and habits of the animals, 
 which have been drawn from a careful examination 
 of those remains. His Lordship considers the in- 
 ference " from examining a few bones, or it may 
 l>€ a single fragment of a bone"— that, '* in the 
 
54 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 fl' 
 
 wilds where it was found there lived and ranged, 
 some thousands of years ago, an animal wholly 
 different from any we ever saw, and from any of 
 which any account, any tradition, written or oral, 
 has reached us, nay, from any that ever was seen 
 by any person of whose existence we ever heard''' — 
 as founded on a strict and rigorous induction ; and 
 not less so the inference of the being of an un- 
 seen God, from the consideration of the contri- 
 vances and adaptations which prevail throughout 
 nature. Most assuredly, the facts of contrivance 
 and adaptation in nature are as certain as the 
 existence of the remains in question; and as cer- 
 tainly does the observation of design refer the 
 mind to a designer, as the view of the remains to 
 an animal to which they belonged; but I have 
 some doubt whether the illustration from the 
 remains will render the reasoning from design 
 more cogent. 
 
 i^When we compare the grand operations of 
 nature, as they are presented to us in the heavenly 
 regions, with the minuter processes which prevail 
 in the animal and vegetable kingdoms as existing 
 on this earth, we find the latter remarkably dis- 
 tinguished from the former, by the law of pro- 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 55 
 
 
 auction and reproduction which belongs to them. 
 Now, the evidences of contrivance and adaptation 
 are nowhere so immediately conspicuous as in the 
 individual instances of organised existence ; hence 
 Dr Paley and some other philosophers draw, from 
 this latter source, what they consider to be the 
 most convincing proofs of a creating and preserving 
 power. It is not for the purpose of disputing 
 the justness of such an opinion that I mention the 
 subject ; for indeed an argument of this sort will 
 leave different impressions on different minds, and 
 even on the same mind at different times. My 
 intention is rather to point out the peculiarity of 
 each mode of argument; without the least wish 
 to exalt either of them, at the expence of the 
 other. . . .In the language of Scripture, " the earth 
 bringeth forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then 
 the ear, after that the full corn in the ear*;"" and 
 thus, with regard to one great division of the 
 natural world, there is a cause of existence to which 
 reference is immediately made. Throughout the 
 animal kingdom also there is an immediate cause 
 of existence. Now Dr Paley has shown, in the 
 
 * Mark iv. '2R- 
 
^MUM 
 
 tl 
 
 m 
 
 56 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 most admirable manner, that, if the subject be 
 well considered, these proximate causes of existence 
 do not in the least impair the force of the argument 
 for a First Cause, drawn from the appearances of 
 contrivance and adaptation. Yet in some way or 
 other — it may proceed from not duly considering 
 the matter — but in some way or other, the proxi- 
 mate cause does with some minds, as I have fre- 
 quently had occasion to observe, raise a difficulty 
 in the reasoning, which is frequently not to be 
 surmounted without much time and attention. . . . 
 On the contrary, when we betake ourselves to 
 the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, and 
 think that they are still, as for ages they have 
 been, performing their various revolutions — we 
 can conceive no material — no intervening' — cause 
 of their existence ; and we ascend without inter- 
 ruption to that Almighty Being, who " commanded, 
 and they were created." Ever since the author 
 of these pages has had the capacity to engage in 
 speculations like the present, he has availed him- 
 self of such opportunities as occurred to him, to 
 ascertain, as far as might be, the effects of natural 
 appearances, upon the minds of intelligent persons, 
 without pretensions to learning or science. On 
 
 \ 
 
 i 
 
 J 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 57 
 
 occasions of that kind, he has been struck with 
 the depth of religious feeling, produced by a view 
 of the heavens. More than once he has witnessed 
 some particular phenomenon pointed out, as a full 
 proof of the being of a God ; and more than once 
 heard the simple but emphatic declaration — That 
 is enou^rh !,. .There is, therefore, reason to infer 
 that the marks of design and adaptation are, in 
 the one case, more obvious; and that, in the 
 other, the transition is easier from the work to 
 the Artificer. But the fact is that, whether we 
 direct our attention to the heavens or the earth, 
 there is a voice which proclaims, in language not 
 to be misunderstood, the existence of that Being, 
 by whose power and wisdom "all things con- 
 sist.^ ^ 
 
 Having stated my own views of the physical 
 branch of Natural Theology, in connexion with 
 those of Lord Brougham, I now proceed to the 
 objection — which was mentioned page 42— to the 
 mode of reasoning adopted in this section. The 
 reader will bear in mind that the observations, 
 which immediately follow, are intended to present, 
 in a compressed form, what is contained in the 
 'Discourse' from page 15 to page 27- 
 
/, ^ 
 
 Pit 
 
 58 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 The objects of conteriiplation and those of 
 active pursuit — into which all that occupies the 
 attention of mankind may be divided — have in- 
 fluence upon each other. Physical science, even 
 when studied for its own sake, is frequently made 
 subservient to the ordinary concerns of life: and 
 the mind, while engaged in practical matters, may 
 hit upon an important scientific truth. In the 
 same way, the study of the mind may suggest 
 practical means of regulating its own operations ; 
 and what is followed from a mere desire of mental 
 enjoyment may suggest a valuable truth in mental 
 science. Moreover, the objects of contemplation 
 in these sciences, so connected with each other, 
 are made known to us either by our senses or by 
 internal consciousness; and those are the objects, 
 physical or mental, of which we investigate the 
 properties and relations. This is human science. 
 But we may leave the study of individual objects ; 
 and betake ourselves to the consideration of mind 
 and matter in general— the first cause of their 
 existence — the purposes for which they exist — 
 and their final destination. Hence, it may be con- 
 tended, arises another science, entirely distinct 
 from the former, and resting upon evidence pccu- 
 
 THYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 59 
 
 liarly its own. This is Divine Knowledge -Theo- 
 logy — Religion— or by whatever name the science 
 may be called. 
 
 Such, if I mistake not, is the substance of the 
 objection detailed in the 15th, l6th, 17th and 18th 
 pages of the ' Discourse.' An objection of this 
 kind seems to rest upon a vague reasoning before- 
 hand—upon a mere theory— concerning that which 
 is to be ascertained only by actual examination of 
 the things so lightly disposed of. Nothing, in my 
 opinion, can be more absurd, than thus to decide 
 that the objects of contemplation, whether physical 
 or mental, do not present indications of their 
 having originated in creative power; and if, on 
 inquiry, we find that they do present sufficient 
 indications to that effect, we shall do well to trace 
 the consequences of such a fact, and see whether 
 we have not the means of obtaining as much in- 
 formation as ought to satisfy us— respecting both 
 their present existence and their final destina- 
 tion. 
 
 Lord Brougham answers the objection by put- 
 ting the case of a "superficial reasoner,'' who 
 might imagine that he had done a great thing 
 when he had " divided the objects, with which phi- 
 
60 
 
 SECTION L 
 
 losophy, Natural and Mental, is conversant, into 
 two classes— those objects of which we know the 
 existence by our senses and our consciousness — 
 and those objects of which we only know the 
 existence by a process of reasoning, founded upon 
 something originally presented by the senses or 
 bv consciousness;' His Lordship then shows by 
 examples that, however distinct these objects may 
 appear to be— the distinction cannot in point of 
 fact be rigorously maintained ; and concludes, that 
 "the evidence upon which our assent to both 
 classes of truths reposes is of the same kind, 
 namely, the inferences drawn by reasoning from 
 sensations or ideas, originally presented by the 
 external senses, or by our inward consciousness.*" 
 Hence, " there may he no better ground for ad- 
 mitting an essential difference'" in the case pre- 
 viously stated, than in this of the "superficial 
 reasoner."" The result of the whole discussion is, 
 that plausible as may appear the distinction be- 
 tween human science and divine science, such a 
 distinction is too precarious an assumption for any 
 one to adopt, who is in quest of real knowledge ; 
 and that we must actually study the science of 
 Natural Tlieology, before we venture to determine 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 6l 
 
 the nature of its evidence, or the validity of the 
 reasoning on which it depends. 
 
 Lord Brougham having appropriated twelve 
 pages of his Discourse to the consideration of an 
 objection to Natural Theology, which he thought 
 requisite to be removed before the main subject 
 was entered upon, I could not but present, as I 
 have now done, at least an outline of the argu- 
 ment on each side. That the matter is made 
 very intelligible, I cannot expect; for — whether 
 from His Lordship's mode of treatment, or from 
 some inherent difficulty — the subject of discussion 
 is exceedingly obscure from first to last. Having, 
 however, ventured to intimate, that the objection 
 is, from its very nature and form, of little or no 
 weight, I need only say that, in my opinion, there 
 is the less reason to be solicitous about the reply; 
 the tendency of which is simply to furnish an 
 answer, in the negative, to the Noble Lord's 
 question — " If, then, the distinction which at first 
 appeared solid, is found to be without any war- 
 rant in the different kinds of human science, has 
 it any better grounds when we apply it to draw 
 the line between that branch of philosophy itself, 
 and the other which has been termed Divine, 
 
Crz 
 
 SKCTION I. 
 
 V, 
 
 or Theology?" — And thus, the student is very 
 properly sent to the science itself, to ascertain 
 the validity of its ovrn claims to attention. 
 
 To give a summary account of what has been 
 laid before the reader, and so to bring this part 
 of the subject to a close:— From a steady con- 
 templation of the appearances of nature we deduce 
 the being of a God, whose attributes are wisdom 
 and power. Wisdom is knowledge manifesting 
 itself in action. Knowledge, therefore, and power 
 belong unto God. In treatises on Natural The- 
 ology, it is usual to show the necessity of expand- 
 ing our notions of these perfections to the utter- 
 most, and of considering Omniscience and Omni- 
 potence as the attributes of the Deity. These 
 subjects are briefly discussed by Dr Paley ; more 
 fully by Dr Clarke; and at still greater length 
 by Abernethy, in his Discourses on the Being and 
 Natural Perfections of' God. The same authors 
 have dwelt, more or less, upon the Eternity, the 
 Spirituality and the Unity of the Divine Being. 
 The Attributes now enumerated are generally 
 called the Natural Attributes of the Deity. 
 
 After all that has been observed with regard 
 to the perfections of the Supreme, there is yet 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 63 
 
 one point, connected with this branch of the sub- 
 ject, which deserves especial notice. In our survey 
 of the material world, we can scarcely avoid being 
 bewildered by the numberless manifestations of 
 the Divine power and wisdom, which force them- 
 selves upon our attention. But what, it may be 
 asked, are the general efTects of the arrangements 
 . and operations we behold, upon the well-being 
 and happiness of the myriads of sensitive creatures 
 which, in succession, live for a time on this earth ? 
 In other words, what is the character of the Deity, 
 in relation to animated nature ? The Benevolence 
 of the Deity, in this respect, has been repeat- 
 edly evinced. Abernethy, already referred to, has 
 written ably and warmly upon the subject. Dr 
 Balguy, in his Divine Benevolence asserted and 
 vindicated, discusses the matter philosophically. 
 But whoever would wish to know nearly the 
 whole of what can be advanced upon the subject, 
 may experience the gratification of having it pre- 
 sented to him — with fairness and precision — with 
 an imagination teeming with striking illustrations, 
 and in language which never loses its freshness — 
 above all, with grateful piety towards God and 
 kindliness of feeling towards every thing that 
 
64> 
 
 SECTION 1. 
 
 PHYSICAL BRANCH. 
 
 65 
 
 breathes— by Dr Paley, in his chapter, On the 
 Goodness of the Deity. 
 
 No mean proof of the real value of an argu- 
 ment is afforded, by the consideration that its 
 force has been acknowledged, by the most en- 
 lightened of our race, from the first moment of 
 recorded time to the present. The simple men- 
 tion of the Old Testament will suggest numerous 
 passages, in which the glories of the world, and 
 its various adaptations to the well-being of man- 
 kind, are held forth, as clear manifestations of 
 the greatness and power and wisdom and good- 
 ness of God. We find the obvious purposes and 
 contrivances, prevailing on every side, mentioned 
 by the most celebrated writers of Greece and 
 Rome, as evidences of a Divine Creator and Na- 
 tural Governor of the Universe. Socrates, accord- 
 ing to the narrative of Xenophon, discourses with 
 great intelligence on the proofs of the Divine 
 wisdom exhibited by the various adaptations of 
 the parts of the human frame ; and, on a subse- 
 quent occasion, on the provision so beneficently 
 made for mankind, by the constitution of nature.* 
 Plato, towards the conclusion of his Timseus, dis- 
 
 * Xen. iMemorab. 1. iv. 4—11, and IV. in. 3—10. 
 
 cusses the same subjects, at considerable length. 
 The greater part of the second book of Cicero's 
 Treatise, On the Nature of the Gods, is occupied 
 by a statement of the admirable arrangements of 
 the visible world, in proof of an overruling Pro- 
 vidence. It is not because the arguments em- 
 ployed, by these and other ancient philosophers, 
 are more convincing than those of modern writers, 
 that the preceding references have been given; 
 but because it is of importance to know and 
 recollect, that the appearances of design, which 
 every where abound, have really had the effect of 
 raising the minds of men, whose means of acquiring 
 knowledge differed most widely from our own — 
 men, whom we cannot think of without reverence — 
 to the existence of an Intelligent Cause of all 
 things. 
 
 2 O n bringing this section to a close, I would 
 exhort the younger students to read Dr Paley's 
 Natural Theology again and again ; not merely 
 for the purpose of obtaining the information which 
 that treatise cannot fail to communicate, but also 
 to learn from it, the art of observing the pheno- 
 mena of the universe for themselves. Let me 
 also advise them, when in the midst of their philo- 
 
 E 
 
 t" — 
 
66 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 sophical speculations, to keep steadily in view the 
 Theological bearings of the objects of their pursuits. 
 Should they happily resolve to act upon this sug- 
 gestion—whatever may be their future condition in 
 life, they will be deeply sensible of the wisdom of 
 their determination^ 
 
 
 6*7 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 (Discourse, Section HI. pp. 52 — 80.) 
 
 Thk object of the preceding and the present branch 
 of Natural Theology is the same — to trace the 
 evidences of the being and attributes of God; which 
 is also effected in each case by the same means — 
 by the consideration of facts, and by reasoning on 
 their relations to each other. In this consists the 
 ditference between the two branches — namely, that 
 in the preceding, the argument depends upon the 
 constitution of external nature — in the present, 
 upon that of the human mind. Now, things ma- 
 terial address themselves to our senses in a manner 
 not to be gainsaid ; many of their uses and adapta- 
 tions are incontrovertible ; and thus the characters 
 of design stamped upon them are, to rational crea- 
 tures, as certain as the existence of the things 
 themselves: — whereas the faculties of the mind, 
 becoming known to us by internal consciousness 
 
 E2 
 
m 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 and reflection, are — although, as facts, equally 
 certain— yet of a more recondite nature ; and do 
 not very distinctly unfold their mutual relations, 
 except to those persons who have been trained to 
 somewhat of a subtile mode of thinking. From 
 this account, we see clearly that the physical branch 
 of Natural Theology will always be more popular 
 than the psychological ; for the former well accords 
 with the usual tendency to reason through the 
 medium of sensible objects— while the latter, to 
 adopt one of Lord Brougham^s happy expressions, 
 "requires a process of abstraction alien from the 
 ordinary habits of most men.'' (p. 25.) What, 
 however, is difficult, to the generality of people, 
 is not on that ground dubious in itself. For 
 any thing, therefore, that has here been stated, 
 the truth may be that, to those who are able to 
 pursue the inquiry, the result will prove as satis- 
 factory in the psychological, as in the physical 
 
 branch. 
 
 Very seldom, even under favourable circum- 
 stances, do the conformation and properties of 
 any one's mental faculties begin to attract his 
 own attention, till his understanding has been 
 much exercised in the acquisition of knowledge ; 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 69 
 
 and amidst the various pursuits of after-life, very 
 seldom does the human mind, although so wonder- 
 ful in its operations, become an object of continued 
 study. Some information indeed, respecting the 
 intellectual frame, is occasionally derived from 
 Metaphysical Writers ; and if, on a little reflection, 
 that information appears to accord in a moderate 
 degree with what people have experienced in them- 
 selves, they are for the most part satisfied with 
 the knowledge so obtained. Those persons how- 
 ever, who are so disposed, have the means of 
 making out a series of facts, concerning the various 
 mental powers, their modes of operation, and their 
 relations and adaptations to each other; which 
 facts constitute the most valuable part of what is 
 called psychological science, or the philosophy of 
 the human mind. Moreover as the conclusions, 
 in the physical branch of Natural Theology, are 
 drawn from the facts of physical science — so are 
 the conclusions, in the psychological branch, from 
 the facts of mental science. The adjustments dis- 
 coverable in the intellectual system bear witness, 
 no less than the marks of contrivance in the 
 material world, to the existence and attributes 
 of a Supreme Intelligence. From the foregoing 
 
70 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 observations, some general notions may possibly 
 be obtained, respecting the nature of that branch 
 of science which forms the subject of the present 
 
 section. 
 
 That there are, on this earth, beings possessing 
 
 the power of thought— is a fact which, the more it 
 is considered, will the more distinctly prove the 
 existence of a Creator, from whom all power of 
 thought is derived. We may feel difficulty with 
 regard to the origin of matter, but the existence 
 of reason and understanding can be assigned to 
 nothing less than " the inspiration of the Al- 
 mighty*" If my purposes, in the course of the 
 present section, did not require me to cite the 
 opinions of several eminent writers, in relation to 
 this subject, I should here venture briefly to state 
 
 my own. 
 
 With regard to the various faculties of the 
 
 human mind. Lord Brougham has shown, at some 
 length, in what way they certify, by their adapta- 
 tion to each other for the attainment of important 
 ends, that they could have been formed only by 
 that wisdom and power, to which we can assign no 
 limits. In this department of the science, a few 
 
 • .Tol) xxxii. R. 
 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 71 
 
 slight sketches, suggested by His Lordship's draw- 
 ings, (pp. 59 — 71.) may not be uninteresting. 
 
 Firsts It is manifest that ideas, derived from 
 external things and from internal consciousness, 
 form but the materials of knowledge. Knowledge 
 arises from the comparison of ideas, by the power 
 of reasatiing. But without the power of attention^ 
 to fix the mind upon the ideas to be compared, 
 reasoning would be of little avail. For the pro- 
 duction, therefore, of any considerable results, these 
 two powers ought to bear some proportion to each 
 other; and accordingly, we find each of them by 
 exercise becoming more effective. This fact belongs 
 to a law which pervades our mental frame — that 
 those of its powers, on which its energy mainly 
 depends, are strengthened by Mbit. Here then is 
 design — contrivance. Two powers of eminent 
 utility co-exist in the mind, which by their co- 
 operation render the understanding capable of 
 accomplishing great works ; and they are strength- 
 ened by use and habit, when either or both of them 
 might in that way have been enfeebled. Moreover, 
 to mention another remarkable and apparently in- 
 tended advantage of a similar kind — the exertion 
 of those powers becomes more easy and agreeable 
 
^o 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 by repetition, when sucli exertion might in conse- 
 quence have been more difficult and distasteful. 
 
 Secondly, To incite us to the exercise of the 
 reasoning power, which exercise is in every respect 
 of importance to us, there is the principle of 
 curiosity— 2^ desire of knowing what, as yet, we 
 know not. This principle, by connecting the 
 idea of gratification with fresh acquirements, still 
 urges us onwards in the pursuit of them. For 
 a very similar purpose, but of greater moment— 
 although not mentioned by Lord Brougham- 
 there is the love of truth ; not as something that 
 is new, but as something that is in conformity 
 with the actual state of things— representing them 
 exactly as they are. Correlative with the love 
 of truth, is the aversion to what is false or erro- 
 neous. This is a painful feeling; and to rid 
 ourselves of it, we willingly encounter the most 
 
 laborious exertions of the understanding In all 
 
 this there is contrivance. The exercise of the 
 reasoning faculty conduces to the well-being— 
 the improvement— of the mind; and we are 
 prompted to that exercise by curiosity after what 
 is new, when novelty might have had no charms 
 for us. Many considerations, also, lead us to 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 73 
 
 infer that we are designed for the attainment of 
 truth ; and we are so constituted as to love truth 
 and hate falsehood, when we might have been 
 indifferent to them both. 
 
 Thirdly, There is the faculty of memory — 
 the power of retammg knowledge. On this faculty 
 we remark, as on the faculty of reasoning, that it 
 depends upon attention and is strengthened by 
 Imhit. In proof of the important purposes to 
 which memory is subservient, the following par- 
 ticulars, amongst innumerable others, may be ob- 
 served :— it is the most tenacious of things striking ; 
 things interesting; things felt to be intrinsically 
 valuable; things well considered; things which 
 there is an anxiety to remember. Can all this 
 have possibly arisen, otherwise than from the 
 will of a Being all-wise and powerful ? . . . And yet 
 more, what would have been the consequence, 
 if there had not been such a faculty.? Without 
 such a faculty, in vain would the senses have 
 presented objects to the mind, and reason have 
 compared the ideas they excited. Knowledge, 
 there could have been none. We could have had 
 nothing approaching to knowledge, but a suc- 
 cession of transient perceptions. We might in- 
 
74 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 75 
 
 deed have derived a passing amusement from the 
 aspect of what is new ; but truth could have 
 afforded no gratification, for we should not have 
 had the power or the consciousness of possessing 
 
 it But still farther, how ill would memory, if 
 
 unimproved by habit, have been adapted to the 
 continual means of information, with which almost 
 every condition of life abounds; — how fatally have 
 been opposed to the beneficial tendencies of an 
 increa.sing power of attention, and a more skilful 
 exertion of the reasoning faculty. Aiding each 
 other, then, as these intellectual powers are in fact 
 found to do, the unavoidable conclusion seems 
 to be that all this must have originally been so 
 ordained Finally, if neither the attention be- 
 stowed on things, nor certain qualities appertain- 
 ing to them, had the eflfect of fixing objects more 
 firmly and more prominently in the memory — 
 that is, if every portion of knowledge (however 
 much or however little regarded) were carelessly 
 and confusedly deposited in the memory as a 
 matter of course — how much would the difficulty 
 be increased, of finding what might at any time 
 be especially wanted ; how much at variance would 
 l)e the constitution of the memory, with that of 
 
 other most important mental faculties, exercising 
 as they do the powers of discrimination and pre- 
 ference ! In this point of view then, as well as 
 in the others, we find the evidences of design 
 and contrivance signally displayed. 
 
 Fmtrthly, It is not only requisite that we should 
 retain what we acquire, but in numberless instances 
 of vast moment that our knowledge should be at 
 hand when called for. Now, there can be no 
 doubt that things similar, things connected by 
 place or time, even things strongly contrasted 
 with each other, are, to use a common expres- 
 sion, naturally associated in the mind— that is, by 
 an arrangement independent of the] will ; so that 
 the recollection of one thing brings its associates, 
 almost to a certainty, along with it. Moreover, 
 by habit, artificial associations of things may be 
 formed, leading to the same result. Without the 
 means of thus eliciting our knowledge when wanted, 
 to what little purpose would our intellectual stores 
 have been accumulated ! In this manner, we find 
 the proofs of design multiplying upon us at every 
 step we take. 
 
 Fifthhj^ Although the effect of habit^ upon the 
 faculties of the mind, has been more than once 
 mentioned, the subject is deserving of a separate 
 
76 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 notice. We rely, indeed, almost entirely on prac- 
 tice and habit, for acquiring the power of producing 
 the most striking results we can in any case hope to 
 produce. In our first attempts, whatever the intel- 
 lectual operation may be, we are able to perform 
 but little; and that little with great labour, and 
 very awkwardly withal. And this is not merely 
 because our ability is defective ; for our ability 
 appears to be less than it really is, from being 
 improperly applied. By degrees, under the influ- 
 ence of habit, our power is increased; and, what 
 is of equal moment, applied to less disadvantage. 
 The process goes on, till at last there is scarcely 
 the consciousness of the slightest exertion. And 
 thus, the ultimate effects of our faculties are fre- 
 quently such as to astonish even our own minds 
 by the promptness and facility with which they are 
 produced. Lord Brougham gives, as an instance 
 of this, the performance of a practised extempore 
 speaker; and, as might be expected, we every 
 where trace, in his representation, the hand of a 
 great master of the art. I cannot refrain from 
 quoting the passage: 
 
 *'A practised orator will declaim in measured and in 
 various periods — will weave his discourse inlo one texture — 
 form parenthesis within parenthesis — excite the passions, 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 77 
 
 ' 
 
 or move to laughter — take a turn in his discourse from an 
 accidental interruption, making it the topic of his rhetoric 
 for five minutes to come, and pursuing in like manner the 
 illustrations to which it gives rise — mould his diction with a 
 view to attain or to shun an epigrammatic point, or an alli- 
 teration, or a discord; and all this with so much assured 
 reliance on his own powers, and with such perfect ease to 
 himself, that he shall even plan the next sentence while 
 he is pronouncing off-hand the one he is engaged with, 
 adapting each to the other, and shall look forward to the 
 topic which is to follow and fit in the close of the one he is 
 handling to be its introducer ; nor shall any auditor be able 
 to discover the least difference between all this and the por- 
 tion of the speech which he has got by heart, or tell the 
 transition from the one to the other." (p. 63.) 
 
 This, indeed, is not an attainment which will 
 rank high in the estimation of persons of sober 
 judgment; but it admirably displays the effect of 
 Jiabit upon those faculties, which, of course, we are 
 capable of directing to objects of greater or of less 
 importance. ... If any one should object that much 
 time is consumed, before habit has communicated 
 the power of producing the striking results just 
 treated of — the remark is true ; but, supposing the 
 faculties to have been originally stronger, without 
 being susceptible of improvement in point either of 
 strength or adroitness, is there not ground to infer 
 
 utBaMti^Ha 
 
II 
 
 I' ' 
 
 f 
 
 il 
 
 78 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 that, whether we consider the time which must 
 have been occupied by individual exertions or the 
 aggregate of the results, the advantage is in favour 
 of the present constitution of the human mind? 
 Besides, the possession of faculties susceptible of 
 improvement is an indication that they might to 
 be improved. This view of the matter, indeed, 
 relates to men considered as moral agents ; and 
 thus, encroaches upon what, according to Lord 
 Brougham's division of Natural Theology, belongs 
 to the ethical department of the science. In truth, 
 there is very great difficulty in keeping the depart- 
 ments perfectly distinct from each other; and in 
 the endeavour to do so, almost a certainty of weak- 
 ening the force of our conclusions. 
 
 Sixthly^ There are the passions and affections 
 and sympathies of our nature; without which, 
 mankind would not have been fitted for the various 
 relations of social life. To state the fact is to prove 
 design: and that, worthy of the highest wisdom. 
 Then again, there is Iwpe ; to afford, even amidst 
 prosperity and ease, something that may exercise 
 and interest the mind — and sustain our resolutions 
 amidst toil and trouble : —fear; to inspire prudence, 
 and to protect from danger: — and so on. Indeed, 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 79 
 
 
 imperfectly acquainted, as we still are, with the 
 entire workings of the human mind, there is scarcely 
 a feeling or a sentiment, natural to man, which does 
 not indicate to us that it exists for some end which 
 may be referred to the providence of God. 
 
 After discussing these topics, the Noble and 
 Learned Author once more adverts to the principle 
 of curiosity^ the object of which is novelty ; and 
 shows the great efficacy of that principle, in ex- 
 citing the mind to the acquisition of knowledge. 
 In connexion with the same principle. His Lord- 
 ship mentions, as a powerful means of diffusing 
 knowledge, the desire of communicating it. There 
 might have been only a disposition to accumulate — 
 to lock up the treasures amassed ; but how much 
 more fully in accordance with the condition of 
 human existence is the fact, that he who pos- 
 sesses information has satisfaction in communi- 
 cating it to others. . . .In addition to this, I may 
 perhaps be allowed — although at the risk of some 
 repetition — to observe that, before the faculties 
 of reason and judgment have been much brought 
 into act, the attention is mainly excited by novelty ; 
 but as the powers of discrimination are developed, 
 the qualities of things become more and more the 
 
II 
 
 ill 
 
 80 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 objects of regard. To the last, indeed, there is some 
 attraction in novelty ; yet, after a time, the mind 
 is not contented without propriety, utility and 
 truth. As life advances, we expect, even in 
 fiction, the semblance of reality. Truth — in his- 
 tory and in natural and moral science — is pursued 
 with avidity. The fascination of mathematical 
 inquiries arises mainly from this — that they present 
 a succession of truths unmixed with error. Now, 
 we can conceive that knowledge might have been 
 recommended solely by its novelty; and so, whe- 
 ther correct or erroneous, might have been equally 
 acceptable ; but truth being conducive to the well- 
 being of the individual and of society, there ap- 
 pears to have been an intention, on the part of 
 the Supreme, that the human mind should be 
 attached to truth for its own sake. With regard 
 also to the diffusion of knowledge, we feel that, 
 supposing a man to have an equal opportunity of 
 communicating solid truth and specious fallacy, 
 there would be an unwarrantable perversion of the 
 faculties, in giving currency to the latter. The 
 tendency of all this, to prove design, is incon- 
 trovertible. So likewise is the evidence that our 
 intellectual frame originated in that Being, whose 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 81 
 
 purposes were to make every thing work together 
 
 for good On these subjects, I only throw out 
 
 hints, which might be easily expanded into essays. 
 While the structure of the body, by the wonderful 
 adjustments of its various parts, affords a decisive 
 proof of the existence of creative wisdom, the 
 mental constitution — with all "its bearings and 
 its ties, its strong connexions, nice dependencies'" 
 '■ — proclaims, in no less convincing language, 
 the primal agency and intelligence of its Divine 
 Author. 
 
 Lord Brougham, having discussed the subjects 
 thus imperfectly noticed, takes a view of "the 
 intellectual world as a whole ; " and of the progress 
 which the mind of man has been able to make, 
 in consequence of its capacity, structure and dis- 
 positions. His Lordship justly considers the dis- 
 coveries in various departments of knowledge-^— 
 the wonders of Chemistry, of Optical Science, of 
 Astronomy and of Pure Mathematics — as proving 
 the surprising strength, activity and variety of the 
 mental faculties ; and thereby affording irresistible 
 evidence of their derivation from that Power and 
 Knowledge, to which we are utterly incapable of 
 assigning any bounds. Upon this subject, although 
 
 ,/ 
 
i 
 
 82 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 of vast consequence, I need not here dwell; as 
 there will be occasion to adduce the sentiments 
 of various writers, with respect to it, in the course 
 of the following pages. 
 
 In Lord Brougham's enumeration of the quali^ 
 ties of the human mind, there are some extra- 
 ordinary omissions— which I now seem called 
 upon in some measure to supply. 
 
 In the first place, the Noble Author takes no 
 notice of the faculties appertaining to the Imagi^ 
 nation: a class of faculties which are of great 
 importance in themselves, and frequently exert 
 very considerable influence over the understanding 
 and the affections. These faculties, therefore, can 
 scarcely fail to present sufficient indications of 
 their purposes and their origin Now^, the ob- 
 servation has already been more than once made 
 that, in our earliest years, we are for the most 
 part moved by mere curiosity :— things please us 
 simply because they are new. We afterwards 
 expect that knowledge should be the vehicle of 
 truth. This view of the matter has reference to 
 the reason— the judgment. With respect to the 
 imagination also, we learn to survey, with indif- 
 ference, objects which appear to be only new; 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 83 
 
 and they must possess various recommendations, 
 besides novelty, effectually to secure our regard. 
 We are by no means greatly delighted, unless we 
 discover some traces of the quality called beauty ; 
 nor are we forcibly impressed, but by certain 
 modifications of grandeur and sublimity. It is 
 through the medium of the Imagination, that we 
 become sensible of the glories of the material world. 
 By means of that faculty, the symmetry, the mag- 
 nificence and the immensity of external nature 
 excite our admiration and astonishment; and 
 under the impulse of such feelings, we at once 
 attribute whatever we behold of good and fair 
 and great — all that indicates beneficence and skill 
 and power, throughout the Universe — to the Will 
 of the Supreme. 
 
 Poetry and the fine arts are considered as the 
 peculiar province of the faculty, of which we are 
 now treating; and when we recollect how surely 
 the nobler productions of the Poet, the Painter 
 and the Sculptor tend to carry the mind onward, 
 in the search after excellence which is unattained, 
 unseen, unconceived — and so to shadow forth 
 modes of being, unspeakably more exalted than 
 any of which we have ever been witnesses — we 
 
 f2 
 
84 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 can entertain no doubt of the effect of Imagination 
 in raising the mind to thoughts of the Most Hi^h, 
 with whom alone dwelleth perfection. 
 
 The bearings of Imagination, upon subjects 
 generally held to be under the sole dominion of 
 reason, have never, I believe, been duly estimated ; 
 and I suspect that they would be found to be of 
 far greater moment than might in the first instance 
 be supposed. By some operation of that faculty, 
 we are aided at almost every step we take, in 
 the attainment of knowledge. In demonstrative 
 science, it might be thought that Imagination 
 could scarcely interpose without some injury; 
 and yet — to mention only one case, amongst 
 many, to the contrary— I am persuaded that no 
 student of Astronomy ever passes from the con- 
 temjJation of the diagrams required for the proof 
 of his propositions to all that they represent in 
 the heavenly regions, without a very considerable 
 
 effort of Imagination Again, the love of truth 
 
 of every kind, for itself, is a valuable principle; 
 but too indefinite, as a principle of action : being 
 indeed, without some other motive, almost in- 
 compatible with the pursuit of any one object. 
 In the intellectual, as well as in the material 
 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 85 
 
 world, the contrariety of equal attractions would 
 be productive of rest. Imagination however, by 
 communicating to some one class of truths a pecu- 
 liar power of attraction, determines the direction 
 which the mind shall take. We thus behold the 
 provision that has been made for the exertion of 
 the mental faculties in the case of the individual ; 
 and at the same time for that diversity in the 
 application of them, by different individuals, which 
 tends to secure the cultivation of such various 
 departments of knowledge, as may advance the 
 general good. 
 
 Very striking, moreover, is the influence of 
 the Imagination over the passions, the affections 
 and the sympathies of our nature. Through 
 that faculty, indeed, our affections and sympathies 
 mainly act. Divest their objects of all the colour- 
 ing of the Imagination— and, instead of the feel- 
 ings really existing, we should be left to little 
 more than the perceptions of the senses and the 
 conclusions of the understanding. How wisely 
 therefore has it been ordained that an interest 
 should thus be given to our relations to each 
 other— by means of a power, which, at the 
 same time, elevates the individual character, and 
 
86 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 ensures the most beneficial consequences to the 
 entire system of social life. 
 
 Lord Brougham, in the second place, omits to 
 mention the Human Will; — the power of moving 
 and acting, according to the suggestions of the 
 various faculties of the mind. Without such a 
 power, indeed, we might indulge in contemplation, 
 but what account could be given of the purposes of 
 the bodily frame? The truth is, that the power 
 of volition is that by which the mental and the 
 corporeal faculties of man are adapted to each 
 other ; and it is quite impossible not to perceive, in 
 that adaptation, the evidences of Supreme Wisdom. 
 But the last omission which I shall notice — 
 and by far the most remarkable of all — is that 
 of the power of Conscience ; — the power by which 
 every man is compelled to pass sentence of appro- 
 bation or condemnation upon himself, on account 
 of his own conduct. When, by means of the Will, 
 the individual is enabled to carry his resolves — the 
 combined result of his mental faculties — into effect, 
 who sees not, and feels not, the important uses of 
 this reflex operation of the mind, upon what has 
 been done.'' In what manner the Conscience ac- 
 quires the power, and vindicates to itself the right, 
 
 ' 
 
 \ 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 87 
 
 of approbation and condemnation, needs not, for 
 the present purpose, to be decided. The fact is 
 sufficient ; and every one becomes, in consequence, 
 a moral agent— an accountable being. Now, con- 
 sider man apart from conscience, and there is 
 nothing to restrain him from the exercise of his 
 mental and corporeal faculties to the injury of 
 others .—consider him under the controul of con- 
 science, and he becomes a law unto himself. We 
 can scarcely err in asserting that there is not, 
 throughout the whole of external nature, a more 
 striking instance of Divine adaptation, and Divine 
 will, than is here presented. But this is not all. 
 If God designed that man should thus become a 
 moral agent, an accountable being— then has 
 God intimated that He is Himself a Moral 
 Governor of his intelligent creatures. In the 
 preceding steps of our inquiry, we were enabled 
 
 to discern the Natural Attributes of the Deity 
 
 as his power and wisdom ; together with his bene- 
 volence in providing for the physical happiness of 
 his sentient creatures j but having now taken into 
 account the moral nature of man, as attested by 
 the supremacy of conscience in the human con- 
 stitution, we catch a glimpse of God's Moral 
 
88 
 
 SECTION IL 
 
 I 
 
 Attribute of Justice— and of his purpose of finally 
 rendering to every one according to his works. 
 On this subject, thus writes Jeremy Taylor:— 
 " It was soberly spoken of Tertullian, Comcientia 
 optima testis Divinitatis ; our conscience is the 
 best argument in the world to prove there is a 
 God. For conscience is God's deputy; and the 
 inferior must suppose a superior; and God and 
 our conscience are like relative terms, it not 
 being imaginable why some persons in some cases 
 should be amazed and troubled in their minds 
 for their having done a secret turpitude or cruelty ; 
 but that conscience is present with a message from 
 God, and the men feel inward causes of fear, when 
 they are secure from without; that is, they are 
 forced to fear God, when they are safe from 
 men."*... Whether Lord Brougham has omitted 
 to notice this moral faculty, from inadvertence or 
 from design — is uncertain. I have not observed, 
 in any part of his ' Discourse,' that he has made 
 the usual distinction between the Natural and 
 the Moral Attributes of God. 
 
 • Ductor Dubitantium, p. 2. fol. 1676. I might adduce the 
 sentiments of recent writers, in confirmation of these views ; but 
 I content myself with referring to Reid's Essays, Vol. m. p. 308, 
 and Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. iv. p. 531. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 89 
 
 Having, in this section, stated the proof, af- 
 forded by individual consciousness, of the existence 
 of a thinking principle, possessing properties alto- 
 gether distinct from those of matter ; having touched 
 on the intellectual powers of man, as attesting 
 their derivation from the Divine Intelligence; 
 having adduced a few of the adaptations of the 
 faculties of the mind— as the reason, the affections, 
 the imagination, the will and the conscience— to 
 each other, and to the condition of human life; 
 it is now time to advert to Lord Brougham's 
 opinions, respecting the grounds of our confidence 
 in the truth of this department of science. Of 
 the nature and validity of those opinions the reader 
 will have an opportunity of judging, from the fol- 
 lowing extract: 
 
 " The evidence for the existence of mind is to the full as 
 complete as that upon which we believe in the existence of 
 matter. Indeed it is more certain and more irrefragable. 
 The consciousness of existence, the perpetual sense that we 
 are thinking, and that we are performing the operation quite 
 independently of all material objects, proves to us the exist- 
 ence of a being different from our bodies, with a degree of 
 evidence higher than any we can have for the existence of 
 those bodies themselves, or of any other part of the material 
 world. It is certain— proved, indeed, to demonstration— that 
 many of the perceptions of matter, which we derive through 
 
il 
 
 §0 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 the senses, are deceitful, and seem to indicate that which 
 has no reality at all. Some inferences which we draw re- 
 specting it are confounded with direct sensation or percep- 
 tion, for example, the idea of motion : other ideas, as those 
 of hardness and solidity, are equally the result of reasoning, 
 and often mislead. Thus we never doubt, on the testimony 
 of our senses, that the different parts of matter touch, that 
 different bodies come in contact with one another, and with 
 our organs of sense ; and yet nothing is more certain than 
 that there still is some small distance between the bodies 
 which we think we perceive to touch. Indeed it is barely 
 possible that all the sensations and perceptions which we 
 have of the material world may be only ideas in our own 
 minds: it is barely possible, therefore, that matter should 
 have no existence. But that mind — that the sentient prin- 
 ciple — that the thing or the being, which we call "/" and 
 "ire," and which thinks, feels, reasons — should have no 
 existence, is a contradiction in tenns. Of the two existences, 
 then, that of mind as independent of matter is more certain 
 than that of matter apart from mind." (p. 56.) 
 
 Had His Lordsliip been content to maintain 
 that " the evidence of mind [arising from con- 
 sciousness or reflection] is to the full as complete 
 as that [of the senses] upon w^hich we believe 
 in the existence of matter*" — his argument in 
 defence of mental science vv^ould have assuredly- 
 been " to the full as complete'' as it is now felt 
 to be, when thus connected with observations un- 
 favourable to the evidence for the existence of 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 91 
 
 ' 
 
 material objects. On this subject, Mr Dugald 
 Stewart expresses himself more cautiously : " From 
 these considerations,'" he writes, " it appears that we 
 have the same evidence for the existence of mind, 
 that we have for the existence of body; nay, if 
 there be any difference between the two cases, 
 that we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch 
 as the one is suggested to us by the subjects of 
 our own consciousness, and the other merely by 
 the objects of our perceptions.""*. . . Lord Brougham 
 might perhaps imagine that the loss (should there 
 be any) sustained by physical science, in conse- 
 quence of his observations, would be more than 
 counterbalanced by the advantage gained, in the 
 comparison, by mental science; but such, I fear, 
 will not generally be the result, in the estimation 
 of people. Satisfactorily to discuss a topic of 
 this kind falls not within the scope of the present 
 work. I may, however, be allowed to say that, 
 anxious as I am, for what I deem good reasons, 
 to support the validity of the evidence afforded by 
 the human mind to the attributes of the Supreme, 
 I cannot persuade myself that " the perpetual sense 
 that we are thinking, and that we are performing 
 
 * Philosophy of the Human MinH, Vol. i. p. 3. 8vo. 
 
 J 
 
9« 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 the operation quite independently of all material 
 objects,*" has any distinct meaning; much less 
 that it "proves to us the existence of a being 
 different from our bodies, with a degree of evidence 
 higher than any we can have for the existence of 
 those bodies themselves, or of any other part of 
 the material world'' 
 
 Provided that the principles of any department 
 of inquiry be sound, and the consequences deduced 
 from them correct, tliere is no need to be solicitous 
 by what term the mode of reasoning is designated. 
 Lord Brougham, however, appears to think that 
 additional weight will be given to the psychological 
 branch of Natural Theology, by considering it as 
 a portion of inductive science; and thus, from 
 the preceding statements, he draws the subsequent 
 conclusions : 
 
 « It follows that the constitution and functions of the 
 mind are as much the suhjects of inductive reasoning and 
 investigation, as the structure and actions of matter. The 
 mind equally with matter is the proper subject of obser- 
 vation, by means of consciousness, which enables us to 
 arrest and examine our own thoughts: it is even the 
 subject of experiment, by the power which we have, through 
 the efforts of abstraction and attention, of turning those 
 thoughts into courses not natural to them, not spontaneous, 
 and watching the results." (p. 58.) 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 9S 
 
 That an individual may, by long-continued 
 attention to the operations of his own mind, ac- 
 quire very considerable knowledge of its various 
 faculties ; that he may compare his own experience 
 of its operations, with that of others, as mentioned 
 or recorded by them ; that he may also compare 
 the results of its operations, with the results of 
 the operations of other minds; and that he may 
 in this manner arrive at important facts connected 
 with the economy of the human mind — there can 
 be no doubt. If, in consequence, we should be 
 told that some advantage may arise from calling 
 this process — induction, the term may very pro- 
 perly be employed. But when we are given 
 to understand that, as portions of matter may 
 be submitted to experiment, so likewise may 
 "our own thoughts;"" — which, we learn, may be 
 "arrested,'' and "examined," and "turned into 
 courses not natural to them;" — we shall for the 
 most part be slow to believe either that such pro- 
 ceedings are practicable — or, the practicability 
 being granted, that any satisfactory conclusions 
 can be drawn from them. We shall not fail to 
 recollect that not every part even of external 
 nature can be thus brought under our controul. 
 
94 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 95 
 
 The philosopher may observe the bodies of tlie 
 Planetary System, but he cannot subject them to 
 his experiments. 
 
 Lord Brougham having given, in another part 
 of his volume, some instances of experiments on 
 the thoughts, the subject will again require notice. 
 What, therefore, has already been stated with 
 regard to it may suffice for the present. This, 
 however, appears to be the proper place to lay 
 before the reader His Lordship's views of that 
 long-continued experiment, on the human mind, 
 which is usually denominated Education ; a subject 
 which is well known to have occupied much of 
 the Noble Author's attention: 
 
 "At first sight, it may be deemed that there is an 
 essential difference between the evidence from mental and 
 from physical phenomena. It may be thought that mind 
 is of a nature more removed from our power than matter- 
 that over the masses of matter man can himself exercise 
 some control— that, to a certain degree, he has a plastic 
 power— that into some forms he can mould them, and can 
 combine into a certain machinery— that he can begin and 
 can continue motion, and can produce a mechanism by 
 which it may be begun and maintained and regulated- 
 while mind, it may be supposed, is wholly beyond his 
 reach; over it he has no grasp; its existence alone is 
 known to him, and the laws by which it is regulated;— 
 and thus, it may be said, the great First Cause, which 
 
 alone can call both matter and mind into existence, has 
 alone the power of modulating intellectual nature. But 
 when the subject is well considered, this difference be- 
 tween the two branches of science disappears with all 
 the rest. It is admitted, of course, that we can no more 
 create matter than we can mind; and we can influence 
 mind in a way altogether analogous to our power of mo- 
 dulating matter. By means of the properties of matter 
 we can form instruments, machines and figures. So, 
 by availing ourselves of the properties of mind, we can 
 affect the intellectual faculties— exercising them, train- 
 ing them, improving them, producing, as it were, new 
 forms of the understanding. Nor is there a greater dif- 
 ference between the mass of rude iron from which we 
 make the steel, and the thousands of watch-springs into 
 which that steel is cut, or the chronometer which we form 
 of this and other masses equally inert — than there is 
 between the untutored indocile faculties of a rustic, who 
 has grown up to manhood without education, and the skill 
 of the artist who invented that chronometer, and of the 
 mathematician who uses it to trace the motions of the 
 heavenly bodies." (pp. 71—73.) 
 
 We are to conclude then, from Lord Brougham's 
 view of the subject, that the process of education, 
 so far as the mind is concerned, is "altogether 
 analogous" to "that of modulating matter;" to 
 that, for instance, of taking " a mass of rude iron" 
 —and converting it into steel— and by hammering 
 and tempering and filing and polishing, reducing 
 
14 
 
 96 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 SECTION U. 
 
 97 
 
 it to forms adapted to the most refined pur- 
 poses. Now, in my judgment, no two things can 
 be more unlike than the processes in question. 
 If, indeed. His Lordship could take " the untutored 
 indocile faculties of a rustic, who has grown up 
 to manhood without education*"— and by some in- 
 genious methods, that he has invented, work up 
 the said faculties, without fail, into powers qualified 
 to improve and adorn man's condition— we might 
 then fancy that there is some analogy between 
 the smelting, the hammering and whatever else is 
 applied to " the mass of rude iron''— and the opera- 
 tions performed upon the human mind. But the 
 Noble Lord is too sagacious to engage in such a 
 project. He knows that, unless education is com- 
 menced at almost the earliest period of life, and 
 followed up with the greatest attention, there is 
 but little chance of a result which he could con- 
 template with satisfaction. The effect of education, 
 in developing the faculties of the mind, has been 
 justly compared with that of constant exercise, 
 in giving symmetry and strength and agility to 
 the body; and who that is capable of reflection 
 ever attempted to illustrate the exercise, so bene- 
 ficial to the corporeal frame, by the method of 
 
 converting a piece of iron ore into the main-spring 
 of a chronometer.? Again, the progress of the 
 mind, when properly educated, has been held 
 similar to that of a plant, under due cultivation; 
 and this has been done, because there is, in each 
 case, a principle of vitality and of increasing 
 strength, which cannot exist in materials exposed 
 to the action of the furnace and the hammer. In 
 mental, as in vegetable culture, the true system 
 seems to be, to give encouragement, direction and 
 liberty, to the energies of nature. No one doubts 
 the effects of education upon the mind ; but every 
 one, who duly considers the subject, must doubt 
 the wisdom of presenting them under the semblance 
 of "instruments, machines and figures, formed by 
 the properties of matter.'" 
 
 But to proceed: — From facts deduced from 
 observation and reflection, as stated in this section, 
 we conclude that the human mind — with all its 
 various faculties, admirably adapted as they are 
 to each other, and to the condition of man as con- 
 nected with the external world and with society — 
 must have been derived from the One Supreme. To 
 this conclusion we come, as the only explanation, 
 that can be given, of the facts before us. Lord 
 
 13- 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 .)« 
 
98 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Brougham, in his anxiety that every part of 
 Natural Theology should be considered as induc- 
 tive science, thus endeavours to make out the 
 inductive character of the transition from the 
 facts to the conclusion just mentioned : 
 
 " The facts thus collected and compared together we are 
 enabled to generalize, and thus to show that certain effects 
 are produced by an agency calculated to produce them. 
 Aware that if we desired to produce them, and had the 
 power to employ this agency, we should resort to it for 
 accomplishing our purpose, we infer both that some being 
 exists capable of creating this agency, and that he employs 
 it for this end. The process is not like, but identical with, 
 that by which we infer the existence of design in others 
 (than ourselves) with whom we have daily intercourse. 
 This kind of evidence is not like, but identical with, that 
 by which we conduct all the investigations of intellectual 
 and natural science." (pp. 11 ^ 78.) 
 
 With regard to the preceding sentences, I 
 feel confident that they were intended to convey 
 some valuable information to the world ; although, 
 through what cause I know not, they seem to 
 have failed in executing their commission. This, 
 indeed, appears to be one of the instances in which 
 the love of system has involved a plain matter in 
 obscurity — and, so far as I can perceive, without 
 any recompense for the evil inflicted. 
 
 i 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 99 
 
 Lord Brougham's Discourse was designed to 
 present a general view of the nature and objects 
 of Natural Theology, without the details of the 
 science. His Lordship, however, has discussed the 
 psychological branch with an attention, to the par- 
 ticulars of which it consists, not to be found in 
 any other part of the work; and has stated his 
 reasons for having done so. Those reasons I now 
 proceed to consider " Nothing is more remark- 
 able," the Noble Author observes, " than the care 
 with which all the writers upon this subject, at 
 least among the moderns, have confined them- 
 selves to the proofs aflforded by the visible and 
 sensible works of nature, while the evidence fur- 
 nished by the mind and its operations has been 
 wholly neglected.'' (p. 52.) For the purpose, 
 therefore, of supplying the omissions of others — 
 or what are deemed their omissions— His Lord- 
 ship has devoted himself with the utmost ardour 
 to the Psychological branch of Natural Theology. 
 Not content with the general charge of " neglect," 
 of " the mind and its operations," by preceding 
 writers, Lord Brougham has specified four, who 
 have individually to answer for the oversight — 
 Ray, Derham, Clarke, Paley. Let us, therefore, 
 
 g2 
 
 \\ 
 
 1 
 
 ■f 
 
 
 "'^1 
 
I 
 
 100 
 
 SECTION IL 
 
 see what can be alleged in each of these cases, 
 before we advert to "all the writers upon this 
 subject, at least among the moderns.*" 
 
 Against a well-known production of the first 
 of the above mentioned authors, His Lordship 
 advances the following charge : — " The celebrated 
 book of Ray, on the Wonders of the Creation, 
 seems to assume that the human soul has no sepa- 
 rate existence—that it forms no part of the created 
 
 system." (p. 52) Now, as Counsel for the De- 
 
 fendent — His Lordship himself being allowed to be 
 Judge— I submit, 1. That a person about to pub- 
 lish a book, has a right to select his own subject; 
 and 2. That he who fairly discusses his subject is 
 not to be censured because he does not discuss other 
 subjects: for example, a writer on Optics is not 
 to be blamed for neglecting Electricity. I would 
 submit also that the first edition of Ray's Wisdom 
 of God manifested in the xiDorks of the Creation was 
 published in the year 1691, and the second much 
 enlarged edition in 1692; and therefore long be- 
 fore the days of universal knowledge in which it 
 is our happiness to live. The author, moreover, 
 informs us, in his title-page, what are the worTcs of 
 the Creation of which he treats, viz. " The hea- 
 
 , 
 
 ip 
 
 k 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 101 
 
 venly bodies, elements, meteors, fossils, vegetables, 
 animals,'' and so on— enumerating only material 
 objects. Furthermore, he tells us, in his preface, 
 on what principle he had decided the course to 
 be taken:— "I have," he writes, "made choice of 
 this subject, as thinking myself best qualified to 
 treat of it:" — a mode of considering matters well 
 deserving attention, even in times subsequent to 
 those of Ray. From the preceding account of 
 the purposes of this excellent man, the fact might 
 have been that he had left the mental powers 
 unmentioned— the mention of them not being ab- 
 solutely required by his subject. Ray, however, 
 was not only a Philosopher, but a Religious 
 Philosopher; and, as shall be distinctly proved, 
 was very far indeed from "assuming," as Lord 
 Brougham imagines, "that the human soul had 
 no separate existence," or " that it formed no part 
 of the created system." In his l65th page, to- 
 wards the conclusion of the second edition of the 
 
 work, he thus writes: 
 
 " Let us hence duly learn to prize and value our souls. 
 Is the body such a rare piece, what then is the soul ? The 
 body is but the husk or shell, the soul is the kernel ; the 
 body is but the cask, the soul the precious liquor contained 
 in it; the body is but the cabinet, the soul the jewel; the 
 
 i. 
 
 /f 
 
 h 
 
102 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 body is but the ship or vessel, the soul the pilot ; the body is 
 but the tabernacle, and a poor clay tabernacle or cottage too, 
 the soul the inhabitant; the body is but the machine or 
 engine, the soul that evBov Tt that actuates and quickens it; 
 the body is but the dark lanthorn, the soul or spirit is the 
 candle of the Lord that bums in it.". . . .And afterwards 
 (p. 168.) "We highly esteem and stand much upon our 
 nobility, our birth and breeding, though we derive nothing 
 from our ancestors but our bodies and corporeal qualities ; 
 and it is useful so far to value and improve this advantage, 
 as to provoke us to imitate the good examples of our pro- 
 genitors, not to degenerate from them, nor to do anything 
 imworthy of our breeding; and yet the divine original of 
 our souls, which are beams from the Father of Lights, and 
 the immediate offspring of God Himself — rod ydp Kal yei/os 
 ec/xei;— hath little influence upon us to engage us to walk 
 worthily of our extraction, and to do nothing that is base 
 or ignoble and unsuitable to the dignity of our birth." 
 
 Admitting, therefore, that the great Naturalist 
 did not introduce into his work — what did not 
 belong to it — a formal disquisition on the Soul, 
 as proving the existence of the Deity, yet how 
 deeply was he impressed with the excellence of 
 the nature of the Soul, compared with that of the 
 body ! Read the preceding extracts from " the 
 celebrated book of Ray'*'' — and then think of Lord 
 &ougham''s declaration, that the volume "seems 
 to assume that the human soul has no separate 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 103 
 
 existence— that it forms no part of the created 
 system !" To say the truth, I should have thought 
 that Ray's general character, with regard to reli- 
 gion, would have secured him from such a censure 
 from His Lordship's pen. 
 
 I now proceed to the case of Derham ; of whom 
 the Noble Author writes in the following manner : 
 
 " Derham has written upon Astro-theology and Physico- 
 theology as if the heavens alone proclaimed the glory of 
 God, and the earth only showed forth his handy-work; for 
 his only mention of intellectual nature is in the single chap- 
 ter of the Physico-theology on the soul, in which he is con- 
 tent with two observations: one on the variety of mans 
 inclinations, and another on his inventive powers-giving 
 nothing which precisely proves design " (p. $3.) 
 
 Now, if Derham, after professing to give a 
 view of ALL the evidences of every kind, for the 
 being and attributes of God, had treated of " the 
 heavens alorwr or " the earth o%," as bearing 
 testimony to that great truth, Lord Brougham's 
 observation would have had some weight; but 
 when he denominated one of his works Astro^ 
 theology, what could he properly discuss, but the 
 appearances presented by "the heavens?'' He 
 entitled his other work Physko^theohgy ; and if 
 in that work he had omitted all mention of the 
 
 / 
 
 \ 
 
104 
 
 SECTION n. 
 
 human soul — such a proceeding ought not to be 
 deemed an objection, by One who draws a 
 broad line of distinction between the physical 
 and psychological branches of Natural Theology. 
 Derham, however, giving an unusually extensive 
 range to the physical department of Theology, 
 has expressly devoted a chapter, of this latter 
 work, to the human soul ; and I proceed to com- 
 pare the materials of that chapter with Lord 
 Brougham's account of them. 
 
 In the chapter alluded to, Derham, according 
 to the Noble Author, is content with two obser- 
 vations. The reply is, that, whatever their number 
 may be, the observations, together with the notes 
 attached to them, occupy rather more than six 
 folio pages of the "Boyle"'s Lectures."" With 
 regard to the opinion that they contain " nothing 
 which precisely proves design"' — I would remark 
 that the author supposed^ at least, that design was 
 abundantly proved. But to come to particulars. 
 Derham opens the subject as follows: 
 
 ** My survey of man I shall begin with the soul of man, 
 by reason it is his most noble part, the copy of the Divine 
 Image in us, in which we have enough to fill us with 
 admiration of the munificence, power and wisdom of the 
 Infinite Creator, when we contemplate the noble faculties 
 
 ; 
 
 \ 
 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 105 
 
 of this our superior part; the vast reach and compass of 
 its understanding, the prodigious quickness and piercing- 
 ness of its thought, the admirable subtilty of its invention, 
 the commanding power of its wisdom, the great depth of 
 its memory, and, in a word, its Divine nature and ope- 
 rations." (B. V. c. 1.) 
 
 What, I would ask, are these but the very 
 
 topics on which Lord Brougham has so eloquently 
 
 expatiated, through three pages of his Discourse ? 
 
 (pp. 68—71.) — But Derham goes on: 
 
 « I shall not dwell on this, though the superior part 
 of man, because it is the least known. Only there are 
 two things I cannot easily pass by, because they manifest 
 the especial concurrence and design of the infinitely wise 
 Creator, as having a particular and necessary tendency 
 to the management and good order of the world's afiairs." 
 
 The subjects, which he was thus induced to 
 dwell upon, are — the various inclinations of men's 
 minds — and the inventive power of the soul ; and 
 it appears that he selected them because they 
 eminently displayed adaptation — adaptation to the 
 circumstances and condition of mankind in the 
 world. These matters are discussed— if not very 
 philosophically or with very good taste— yet with 
 competent knowledge and strong indications of 
 zeal in the cause in which the writer was en- 
 
 < 
 
 I 
 
 / 
 
 f 
 
106 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 gaged. He has given pertinent quotations from 
 Cicero, Galen and other old writers; and if the 
 substance of his remarks be compared with the 
 purport of the passages from the ancient philo- 
 sophers, adduced and praised by Lord Brougham, 
 (pp. 223 — 226) on the same subjects, there will 
 not, I am persuaded, be found any inferiority 
 on the part of Derham. In fact, he has brought 
 together as much that, "precisely proves design,'^ 
 as can easily be discovered in the whole of the 
 passages from the ancient philosophers just re- 
 ferred to, when taken together. 
 
 From Lord Brougham's censure of Derham, 
 I pass on to his reprehension of a more celebrated 
 individual — Dr Samuel Clarke. His Lordship's 
 dissatisfaction with this great scholar, philosopher 
 and divine, is expressed in the following terms: 
 
 " Dr Clarke maintains that the evidences of design 
 are much more to he traced in the natural than in the 
 moral world; but he plainly means, by this proposition, 
 not so much to compare the proofs of Divine wisdom 
 exhibited in the phenomena of the material with those 
 exhibited in the phenomena of the intellectual world, as 
 to show that the designs or intentions of the Deity are 
 more easily perceived in the arrangements of the world 
 with which we are most conversant, than his plans for 
 our happiness, and his general intentions respecting our 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 107 
 
 fate, are to be inferred from moral considerations. It is, 
 however, to be remarked that, like all other reasoners 
 upon Natural Theology, Dr Clarke confines his attention 
 entirely to physical, and never adverts to psychological 
 proofs." (p. 221, being a note to p. 52.) 
 
 There is something, in this paragraph, per- 
 plexing in the extreme. Dr Clarke — when proving 
 the being and attributes of God— " confines his 
 attention,'' as is generally supposed^ to the argu- 
 ment a priori ; that is, to abstract reasoning, 
 intended to be independent of the material world : 
 If so, how can it be said that he "confines his 
 attention entirely to physical proofs?"" Again, 
 Lord Brougham has devoted an entire section 
 (pp. 81—97) to a review of Dr Clarke's argument 
 a priori^ an argument which purports to derive 
 its force from other sources than the observation 
 of external objects ; what then can be His Lord- 
 ship's meaning, when he intimates that the argu- 
 ment is entirely drawn from " physical" considera- 
 tions ? To those who, in reading a book, happen 
 to recollect, in one part, what they have met 
 with in another part, a paragraph of this kind 
 cannot but cause the utmost embarrassment; and 
 therefore, having formed some conjectures as to 
 the origin of this (I have no doubt) undesigned 
 
 I a 
 
 i 
 
 p^fm 
 
108 
 
 SECTION 11. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 109 
 
 misrepresentation, I will venture to detail what 
 I conceive to be the facts of the case. . . . Dr darkey's 
 Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion^ as 
 I have already stated (p. 29), present no regular 
 argument for the being and attributes of God; 
 that subject having been fully discussed in the 
 learned author^s preceding work, The demoiistra- 
 tion of the being and attributes of God, containing 
 the argument a priori. Yet, Lord Brougham, 
 judging from the title, The Evidences of Natural 
 and Revealed Religio7i, may possibly have sup- 
 posed that this was intended to prove the being 
 and attributes of God, amongst other matters ; 
 and finding a section purporting to show " why 
 the wisdom of God is not so clearly and plainly 
 seen in his government of the moral, as in the 
 fabric of the natural world" — made the mistake 
 we are anxious to rectify. This part of Dr 
 Clarke''s work belongs to what His Lordship has 
 denominated the Ethical branch of Natural The- 
 ology — the object being to collect the natural inti- 
 mations of a future state of rewards and punish- 
 ments. Something of the kind, indeed, appears 
 to have been perceived by Lord Brougham; who 
 might also have discovered various psychological 
 
 considerations made use of, in the same part of 
 the same treatise. For instance, in the section 
 immediately preceding that just referred to, the 
 argument turns upon " the design of God's creating 
 such rational beings as men are— endued with 
 such noble faculties, and so necessarily conscious 
 of the eternal and unchangeable differences of 
 good and evil;" and in the section immediately 
 following, upon " the immortality of the soul and 
 the natural proofs we have of it." ..I conclude 
 therefore, that, in consequence of some misappre- 
 hension, respecting the object of the Evidences of 
 Natural and Revealed Religion, Lord Brougham 
 was led to the notion that Dr Clarke " confines 
 his attention to physical and never adverts to 
 psychological proofs." How injurious the notion 
 is to the character of that Divine, will now be 
 my business to evince, in a manner which no one 
 shall be able to controvert. 
 
 On Dr Clarke's Demonstration of the being 
 a/nd attributes of God, I shall have occasion to 
 offer a few remarks in a subsequent section. It 
 will be sufficient, for my present purpose, to give 
 some account of a small portion of that work ; 
 from which the reader cannot fail to discern the 
 
 ; V 
 
 
flO 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 Ill 
 
 exact truth of the matter now at issue Dr 
 
 Clarke''s eighth proposition is this — The Self- 
 
 eanstent and Original Cause of all things must be 
 
 an Intelligent Being ; and, " in this proposition,^ 
 
 he observes, "lies the main question between us 
 
 and the Atheists." Respecting the method of 
 
 proving the proposition, he thus writes: 
 
 " Now, that the self-existent Being is not such a blind 
 and unintelligent necessity [as the Atheists hold] but in 
 the most proper sense an understanding and really active 
 Being — does not indeed so obviously and directly appear 
 to us by considerations a priori; because (through the 
 imperfection of our faculties) we know not wherein intelli- 
 gence consists, nor can see the immediate and necessary 
 connexion of it with Self-existence, as we can that of 
 Eternity, Infinity, Unity, &c.: But a posteriori^ almost 
 every thing in the world demonstrates to us this great 
 truth ; and affords undeniable arguments to prove that the 
 world, and all things therein, are the effects of an Intel- 
 ligent and Knowing Cause." 
 
 Dr Clarke, therefore, has recourse to arguments 
 a posteriori ; that is, those derived from the ex- 
 perience of things actually existing; — amongst 
 which arguments we find the following: 
 
 " Since in men in particular there is undeniably that 
 power which we call thought, intelligence ^ consciousness, 
 perception or knowledge— there must of necessity either 
 have been from eternity, without any Original Cause at all. 
 
 an infinite succession of men, whereof no one has had a 
 necessary^ but every one a dependent and communicated 
 being; or else these beings, indued with perception and 
 consciousness, must at some time or other have arisen purely 
 out of that which had no such quality as sense, perception 
 or consciousness; or else they must have been produced by 
 some Intelligent Superior Being." 
 
 And then, after proving how groundless are 
 the first two suppositions, Dr Clarke dwells at 
 great length upon the considerations which estab- 
 lish the last. At the conclusion of his work, also, 
 he sums up the argument, depending upon observa- 
 tion and experience, in such a manner as to show 
 how highly he estimated the evidence afforded by 
 the intellectual powers, in proof of the existence 
 and attributes of the Deity. Of this, let the reader 
 judge, from the following extract: 
 
 " The notices, that God has been pleased to give us of 
 himself, are so many and so obvious; in the constitution, 
 order, beauty and harmony of the several parts of the world ; 
 in the frame and structure of our own bodies, and the won- 
 derful powers and faculties of our souls ; in the unavoidable 
 apprehensions of our own minds, and the common consent of 
 all other men; in every thing within us, and every thing 
 without us : that no man of the meanest capacity and great- 
 est disadvantages whatsoever, with the slightest and most 
 superficial observation of the works of God, and the lowest 
 and most obvious attendance to the reason of things, can 
 be ignorant of Him, but he must be utterly without 
 
 1 
 
 excuse. 
 
112 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 More than this I need not adduce, in order 
 that the reader may know how to dispose of Lord 
 Brougham's statement, that Dr Clarke " never 
 adverts to psychological proofs.*". . . It is well 
 known that Bishop Butler, when a young man, 
 wrote five letters to Dr Clarke, respecting some 
 of the arguments employed in the Demonstration : 
 and that to each of those letters Dr Clarke replied 
 with great courtesy and ability. In the course of 
 his treatise, Lord Brougham has referred to the 
 correspondence two or three times; and in a 
 manner which, connected with other circum- 
 stances, induces me to suspect that the Noble 
 Lord's last impressions respecting the Demonstra- 
 tion are derived from those letters. To decide 
 upon the contents of works, by virtue of such 
 imperfect recollections, is very dangerous; and if 
 my suspicion be just, I am surprised that His 
 Lordship was not secured from the risk he en- 
 countered, by the tenor of professional studies 
 and the habits of professional life. 
 
 PThe time is now come to examine the case of 
 Dr Paley ; with regard to whose labours — together 
 with those of his predecessors, Ray, Derham and 
 Clarke — Lord Brougham delivers the following 
 summary judgment : 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 113 
 
 " Dr Paley, whose work is chiefly taken from the writ- 
 ings of Derham, deriving from them its whole plan and 
 much of its substance, but clothing the harsher statements 
 of his original in an attractive and popular style,* had so 
 little of scientific habits, so moderate a power of general- 
 ising, that he never once mentions the mind, or any of the 
 intellectual phenomena, nor ever appears to consider them 
 as forming a portion of the works or operations of nature. 
 Thus all ibese authors view the revolutions of the heavenly 
 bodies, the structure of animals, the organisation of plants, 
 and the various operations of the material world which we 
 see carried on around us, as indicating the existence of 
 design, and leading to a knowledge of the Creator. But 
 they pass over in silence, unaccountably enough, by far the 
 most singular work of divine wisdom and power — the mind 
 itself. Is there any reason whatever to draw this line ; to 
 narrow within these circles the field of Natural Theology; 
 to draw from the constitution and habits of matter alone the 
 proof that one Intelligent Cause formed and supports the 
 universe ? Ought we not rather to consider the phenomena 
 of the mind as more peculiarly adapted to help this inquiry, 
 and as bearing a nearer relation to the Great Intelligence 
 which created and which maintains the system ?" (pp. 53, 54.) 
 
 I have already shown, in defence of Ray, that, 
 although his undertaking led him only to the con- 
 
 * ** This observation in nowise diminishes the peculiar merit of 
 the style, and also of the homely, but close and logical, manner in 
 which the argument is put ; nor does it deny the praise of bringing 
 down the facts of former writers, and adapting them to the improved 
 state of physical science — a merit the more remarkable, that Paley 
 wrote his Natural Theology at the close of his life." Note by Lord B. 
 
 H 
 
lU 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 115 
 
 templation of external nature, yet he considered 
 the human mind as bearing an incomparably 
 stronger testimony, than the material world, to 
 its Divine origin. In defence of Derham, I have 
 alleged the mode in which he dwelt upon the 
 mental faculties, in proof of the power and wis- 
 dom of the Supreme. In defence of Clarke, I 
 have produced one passage, in which he decided 
 " the main question between us and the Atheists," 
 by means of an argument arising from the exist- 
 ence of the human soul; and anotlier, in which 
 he numbered "the wonderful powers and faculties 
 of our souls'" amongst the things which leave 
 people, who believe not in God, " utterly without 
 excuse."" Where, then, is Lord Brougham's war- 
 rant for asserting, that these authors "pass over 
 in silence, unaccountably enough, by far the most 
 singular work of divine wisdom and power — the 
 mind itself.?"' Where are the indications of any 
 wish, on their part, "to narrow within these 
 circles the field of Natural Theology;"" — or, "to 
 draw, from the constitution and habits of matter 
 alone, the proof that one Intelligent Cause formed 
 
 and supports the universe?"" And, now, with 
 
 regard to Paley: — let every one be estimated by 
 
 
 what he does engage, and not by what he does 
 not engage, to perform. As I stated in the 
 introductory section, Paley entitled his work — 
 Natural Theology ; or^ Evidences of the existence 
 and attributes of the Deity ^ collected from the ap- 
 pearances of Nature: and what was thus professed 
 to have been done, the universal voice of mankind 
 has declared to have been done well. To those 
 who may be disposed to search the volume for 
 psychological facts, I would suggest that the 
 mind and its operations are not amongst "the 
 appearances of Nature."" If a work were entitled 
 — as it properly might be — Natural Theology; 
 or^ Evidences of the existence and attributes of the 
 Deity ^ collected from the operations of the Human 
 Mind — who would expect the work to contain 
 discussions on physical phenomena ? To say the 
 truth, there appears to be something beyond mea- 
 sure strange in Lord Brougham's objection ; and, 
 if I do not much mistake, the reader wiJl agree 
 with me in thinking that it is crushed to pieces 
 by the very circumstances of the case. 
 
 Again, although Paley, so far as I recollect, 
 does not adduce the mental faculties in proof of 
 the Divine power and wisdom, the assertion is 
 
 h2 
 
 ^ 
 
116 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 not quite correct that "he never once mentions 
 the mind, or any of the intellectual phenomena."" 
 The whole argument of the volume depends 
 upon the following position, which occurs in the 
 second chapter : " Arrangement, disposition of 
 parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation 
 of instruments to a use, imply the presence of 
 intelligence or mind/' And, to omit other in- 
 stances, after suggesting considerations which may 
 lessen the difficulties, respecting a future state, 
 felt by those "who have taken up the opinion 
 that the acts of the human mind depend upon 
 organisation^ or " that the mind itself consists in 
 organisation"" — Paley declares such considerations 
 to be little, if at all, wanted by those " who refer 
 the operations of mind to a substance totally and 
 essentially different from matter; who "adopt 
 perhaps a juster reasoning and a better philosophy"" 
 — "as most certainly these operations, though 
 affected by material causes, hold very little affinity 
 to any properties of matter with which we are 
 acquainted ""*... The fact indeed, that Paley has 
 not employed the mental powers in support of his 
 main argument, is attributed by Lord Brougham 
 
 • Natural Theology, 4th and 3rd paragraphs from the end. 
 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 117 
 
 to his having had " so little of scientific habits — 
 so moderate a power of generalising."" His Lord- 
 ship, however, lays no claim to infallibility. Let 
 us, then, suppose — and there is nothing absurd 
 in the supposition— that it was not from want of 
 intelligence that Paley did not engage in psycho- 
 logical disquisitions; and see what account may 
 still be given of the matter. Now, when a man 
 of sense — such as, on the whole, I believe His 
 Lordship holds Paley to have been — undertakes 
 to write a book, for the instruction of all who 
 ever read books, he naturally takes into con- 
 sideration, not only the kind of reasoning which 
 he can himself manage, but that also which his 
 readers can comprehend. Lord Brougham"s opi- 
 nion is, that psychological views were beyond 
 Paley"s "power of generalisation:"" — would they 
 then have come within the " power of generalisa- 
 tion"" possessed by the great mass of his readers .'* 
 Locke is usually allowed to have been no mean 
 proficient in mental science — let him therefore 
 furnish a reply to the query: — "Though he that 
 contemplates the operations of his mind, cannot 
 but have plain and clear ideas of them, yet unless 
 he turn his thoughts that way, and consider them 
 
 y 
 
I 
 
 118 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 attentively, he will no more have clear and dis- 
 tinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and 
 all that may be observed therein, than he will 
 have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or 
 of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not 
 turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the 
 parts of it. . . .The first years are usually employed 
 and diverted in looking abroad. Men's business 
 in them is to acquaint themselves with what is 
 to be found without; and so, growing up in a 
 constant attention to outward sensations, seldom 
 make any considerable reflection on what passes 
 within them, till they come to be of riper years ; 
 and some scarce ever at all.*"* But if the 
 thought should be entertained, that the diffi- 
 culties, attending these abstract speculations, have 
 subsequently been removed, and that to perceive 
 the most subtile distinctions is now quite an 
 ordinary acquisition— let Lord Brougham answer 
 for the present times : " Although undoubtedly 
 the process of reasoning [respecting the mind] 
 is the shortest of all, and the least liable to 
 deception, yet so connected are all its pheno- 
 mena with those of the body, that it requires a 
 
 * Essav on ITuman T^mlerslandini,', I', ti. <\ i. s. 7, 8. 
 
 ' 
 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 119 
 
 process of abstraction alien from the ordinary 
 habits of most men, to be persuaded that we 
 have a more undeniable evidence of its separate 
 existence than we have of the separate existence 
 of the body;' (p. 25.) Of all this, Dr Paley, as 
 a man of sense, must assuredly have been aware ; 
 and however great his talents for metaphysical 
 inquiries, he must have known that to exert 
 them on such an occasion would inevitably frus- 
 trate his own purposes. Had abstract disquisi- 
 tions of the kind mentioned by Lord Brougham 
 been scattered through the 'Natural Theology," 
 the work might have been praised by a few philo- 
 sophers, but could not possibly have instructed 
 and convinced the thousands of all conditions who, 
 as the volume now exists, have lingered over its 
 pages with never-failing delight. 
 
 As I have already intimated, Dr Paley \s 
 Natural Theology was undoubtedly designed for 
 the information of all classes of society. Lord 
 Brougham, indeed, has noticed the "attractive 
 and popular style'' of the treatise; and yet His 
 Lordship censures the omission of topics, which, 
 even in his own opinion, are far removed from 
 ordinary apprehension. Although I do not believe 
 that, after the preceding remarks, His Lordship's 
 
 y 
 
120 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Psychological branch. 
 
 121 
 
 M 
 
 censure will have much weight, I have great 
 satisfaction in presenting the view of the matter 
 which has been taken by a philosopher of great 
 celebrity — to whom the noble author of the 
 ' Discourse'' has repeatedly referred, in terms of 
 high and well-deserved commendation. When 
 Mr Dugald Stewarfs predilection for psycholo- 
 gical inquiries is borne in mind, his praise of 
 Paley will be felt to be peculiarly creditable, as 
 well to the giver as the receiver. Thus then writes 
 the author of The Elements of the Philosophy of' 
 the Human Mind: — "Among the disciples of 
 Law, one illustrious exception to these remarks 
 occurs in Dr Paley, whose treatise on Natural 
 Theology is unquestionably the most instructive 
 as well as interesting publication on that subject 
 which has appeared in our times. As the book 
 was intended for pojjular use, the author has 
 wisely avoided, as much as possible, all metaphy- 
 sical discussions; but I do not know that there 
 exists any other work, where the argument from 
 Jinal causes is placed in so great a variety of 
 pleasing and striking points of view.**'* 
 
 * Dissertation on the progress of Metaphysical, Ethical and 
 Political Philosophy, Part ii. p. 117. 
 
 Having mentioned my disposition to observe the effects of things 
 upon minds not much improved hy cultivation. I will venture, in a 
 
 nol( . 
 
 «) 
 
 4 
 
 With regard to Lord Brougham's statement — 
 that Paley's work is "chiefly taken from the 
 writings of Derham, deriving from them its whole 
 plan, and much of its substance"" — I remark, 
 1. that, in Paley's "Life'' published by his Son, 
 we find the following information touching the 
 preparations for the work on Natural Theology. 
 " There are three or four large manuscript books 
 filled with observations and short substantial hints 
 taken from various authors, and in the order in 
 which they are here set down : Boyle, Gregory, 
 Cheselden, Derham [Physico-theology, I suppose], 
 Ray, Monro, Derham's Astro-theology, Adams, 
 Wilkins's Principles of Natural Religion, Search, 
 Sturm, Goldsmith, Lesser, Smellie, Religious 
 Philosopher, Spectator, Seed, Nature Displayed, 
 Hervey, Addison, Keill, Watson, St Pierre, 
 
 note, to state a fact which came under my own observation An 
 
 intelligent working- gardener — who did me the justice to think that 
 I should attend to such a matter— requested of me an old copy of 
 Paley's Natural Theology. On inquiring in what manner he had 
 become acquainted with the work, it was, I found, by means of some 
 extracts, which had been met with, and had excited the greatest 
 admiration and curiosity. From the extracts then specified, and from 
 the remarks made after the perusal of the treatise, I am thoroughly 
 convinced that, if the work had been of the metaphysical cast which 
 would have pleased Lord Brougham, the individual in question 
 
 would not have taken the slightest interest in the subject From 
 
 this case, we may learn the mode in which Paley's writings are 
 operating upon the public mind. 
 
 A 
 
 (! 
 
I 
 
 ]■ 
 
 122 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 ( 
 
 rSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 123 
 
 * I I 
 
 Cappe's Causes of Atheism, Memoirs of Natural 
 History by the Royal Academy of Paris, Priestley, 
 Maclaurin.""* We see, therefore, from what a 
 variety of sources, besides Derham— and there are 
 many others referred to in the book itself— Paley 
 collected "short substantial hints," which he 
 worked up in his own peculiar and masterly 
 manner:— I remark 2. that, according to the 
 best of my judgment, no two books, on the same 
 subject, can be well imagined more different, both 
 as to plan and substance, than those of Derham 
 and Paley:— and 3. that, from whatever quarters 
 Paley may have derived " short substantial hints,'' 
 he took care to see things with his own eyes, to 
 examine them for himself, and to exercise the 
 faculties of his own powerful mind upon every 
 object that was presented to him. And thus, 
 there is scarcely a page of his Volume which 
 bears not the impress of decided originality. 
 
 But Lord Brougham's complaints of Paley's 
 unfitness for his undertaking are not yet exhausted. 
 Duly to understand the nature of the accusation 
 now to be considered, the following extract, 
 together with tlie note subjoined to it, must be 
 read: 
 
 * Life of Or Paley, by ihr Rev. Edimmd raKy. p. 311. 
 
 i: 
 
 ,1 
 
 1 1 
 
 " Such is the process of reasoning by which we infer 
 the existence of design in the natural and moral [qu. 
 intellectual?] world. To this abstract argument, an addi- 
 tion of great importance remains to be made. The whole 
 reasoning proceeds necessarily upon the assumption that 
 there exists a being or thing separate from, and inde- 
 pendent of, matter, and conscious of its own existence, 
 which we call mind. For the argument is — *♦ Had I to 
 accomplish this purpose, I should have used some such 
 means;" or, "Had I used these means, I should have 
 thought I was accomplishing some such purpose." Per- 
 ceiving the adaptation of the means to the end, the infer- 
 ence is, that some being has acted as we should ourselves 
 act, and with the same views. But when we so speak, 
 and so reason, we are all the while referring to an intelli- 
 gent principle or existence ; we are referring to our mind, 
 and not to our bodily frame. The agency which we infer 
 from this reasoning is, therefore, a spiritual and immaterial 
 agency — the working of something like our own mind — 
 an intelligence like our own, though incomparably more 
 skilful. The being of whom we thus acquire a knowledge, 
 and whose operations as well as existence we thus deduce 
 from a process of inductive reasoning, must be a spirit, 
 and wholly immaterial. But his being such is only inferred, 
 because we set out with assuming the separate existence 
 of our own mind, independently of matter. Without that 
 we never could conclude that superior intelligence existed 
 or acted. The belief that mind exists is essential to the 
 whole argument by which we infer that the Deity exists. . . . 
 It is the foundation of Natural Theology in all its branches; 
 and upon the scheme of materialism no rational, indeed no 
 
 •<i 
 
 y 
 
I 
 
 ) 
 
 \ 
 
 124 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 intelligible, account can be given of a first cause, or of the 
 creation or government of the universe. " (pp. 78, 79 ) 
 
 To this passage, the note is as follows: 
 
 " It is worthy of observation, that not the least allusion 
 is made in Dr Paley's work to the argument here stated, 
 although it is the foundation of the whole of Natural 
 Theology. Not only does this author leave entirely un- 
 touched the argument a priori (as it is called) and also 
 all the indm^tive arguments derived from the phenomena 
 of mind, but he does not even advert to the argument 
 upon which the inference of design must of necessity rest — 
 that design which is the whole subject of his book. Nothing 
 can more evince his distaste or incapacity for metaphysical 
 researches. He assumes the very position which alone 
 sceptics dispute. In combating him they would assert that 
 he begged the whole question; for certainly they do not 
 deny, at least in modern times, the fact of adaptation. 
 As to the fundamental doctrine of causation, not the least 
 allusion is ever made to it in any of his writings, even in 
 his Moral Philosophy." 
 
 Now, the argument as stated by Lord Brougham 
 in the preceding extract— to which. His Lordship 
 says, " not the least allusion is made in Dr Paley's 
 work''— somehow seems—possibly in consequence 
 of the mode of statement — rather to elude the 
 understanding. The hand might almost as well 
 attempt to grasp quicksilver. But, at a venture, 
 I will [)roduce a passage, from Paley's Natural 
 
 ■A 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 125 
 
 Theology, which, I strongly suspect, does allude 
 to the very same argument : which, if I am right 
 in my conjecture, not only alludes to the argu- 
 ment, but expresses all that it was intended to 
 support, in language so plain and forcible as at 
 once to carry the most complete conviction to 
 the mind. The following observations occur in 
 his twenty-third chapter, on The perscmcdity of 
 the Deity: 
 
 ** Contrivance, if established, appears to me to prove 
 every thing which we wish to prove. Amongst other 
 things, it proves the personality of the Deity, as distin- 
 guished from what is sometimes called nature, sometimes 
 called a principle : which terms, in the mouths of those who 
 use them philosophically, seem to be intended to admit and 
 to express an efficacy, but to exclude and to deny a personal 
 agent. Now, that which can contrive, which can design, 
 must be a person. These capacities constitute personality, 
 for they imply consciousness and thought. They require that 
 which can perceive an end or purpose ; as well as the power 
 of providing means, and of directing them to their end. 
 They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from 
 which volitions flow ; which is mind. The acts of a mind 
 prove the existence of a mhid; and in whatever a mind 
 resides, is a person. The seat of intellect is a person.'*. . . . 
 And afterwards, to show in what manner we arrive at such 
 conclusions, he goes on : — " Wherever we see marks of con- 
 trivance, we are led for its cause to an intelligent author. 
 And this transition of the understanding is founded upon 
 
126 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 uniform experience. We see intelligence constantly contriv- 
 ing; that is, we see intelligence constantly producing effects, 
 marked and distinguished by certain properties ; not certain 
 particular properties, but by a kind and class of properties, 
 such as relation to an end, relation of parts to one another, 
 and to a common purpose. We see, wherever we are wit- 
 nesses to the actual formation of things, nothing except 
 intelligence producing effects so marked and distinguished. 
 Furnished with this experience we view the productions of 
 nature. We observe them also marked and distinguished in 
 the same manner. We wish to account for their origin. 
 Our experience suggests a cause perfectly adequate to this 
 account. No experience, no single instance or example, can 
 be offered in favour of any other. In this cause, therefore, 
 we ought to rest ; in this cause the common sense of man- 
 kind has, in fact, rested, because it agrees with that, which, 
 in all cases, is the foundation of knowledge-the undeviatin J 
 course of their experience. . . .In like manner, and upon the 
 same foundation (which in truth is that of experience) we 
 conclude that the works of nature proceed from intelligence 
 and design ; because, in the properties of relation to a pur- 
 pose, subserviency to a use, they resemble what intelligence 
 and design are constantly producing, and what nothing 
 except intelligence and design ever produce at all. Of 
 every argument, which would raise a question as to the 
 safety of this reasoning, it may be observed, that, if such 
 argument be listened to, it leads to this inference, not only 
 that the present order of nature is insufficient to prove the 
 existence of an inteUigent Creator, but that no imaginable 
 order would be sufficient to prove it; that no contrivance, 
 were it ever so mechanical, ever so precise, ever so clear.' 
 
 
 127 
 
 ever so perfectly like those which we ourselves employ, 
 would support this conclusion. A doctrine, to which I con- 
 ceive no sound mind can assent." 
 
 The subject now under discussion is really 
 important; and I entreat the reader closely to 
 compare the preceding extract, with the previous 
 paragraphs from Lord Brougham^s Discourse. In 
 each instance, the object is-from the experience 
 of contrivances and adaptations having originated 
 in our own mind, and from the observation of 
 similar effects having originated in the minds of 
 others— to explain the manner in which we ascend 
 to the Supreme Mind, as the great Cause of all 
 the adaptations and contrivances throughout nature. 
 If I do not mistake, the transition, from Lord 
 Brougham's account of the matter to Dr Paley^s 
 wiU be somewhat like a transition from the mirage 
 of the desert, to the living landscape of some genial 
 climate. 
 
 But, continues Lord Brougham in the note 
 cited in page 124, "Not only does this author"— 
 meaning Dr Paley-« leave entirely untouched 
 the argument a priori (as it is caUed)''— Now, 
 in answer to this objection, i. I must repeat 
 that "this author'^ never undertook to give all 
 
128 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 the evidences of every kind, for the existence 
 and attributes of God;— 2. I remark that the 
 argument a priori, if strictly so, has no concern 
 whatever with the "evidences collected from the 
 appearances of Nature," which the author did 
 undertake to give;— and 3. that Lord Brougham 
 himself, as will hereafter appear, condemns the 
 argument a priori, as unintelligible and incon- 
 clusive. With what propriety, therefore, can 
 His Lordship state, as a matter of reproach to 
 Dr Paley, that he has left this argument " entirely 
 untouched''?*. . .As to the Noble Author's opinions 
 respecting Paley's not adverting to " the argument 
 upon which the inference of design must of neces- 
 sity rest," and his begging " the whole question" 
 — I again refer to the two passages, from Dr Paley 
 and Lord Brougham, which I have brought to- 
 gether for the purpose of comparison ; and if any 
 one who is sceptical after reading Paley, should be 
 convinced by Lord Brougham, I shall begin to 
 think that there is some ground for relying upon 
 His Lordship's judgment in the matter. . . .That to 
 
 * Lord Brougham rejects the argument a priori, in the following 
 terms: " This is another, and to my mind, a very strong, additional 
 reason for resting the evidences of Natural Theology upon the argu- 
 ment a posteriori alone." (p. 238.) 
 
 129 
 
 i 
 
 •Uhe fundamental doctrine of causation, not the 
 least allusion is ever made, in any of his [Paley's] 
 writings, even in his Moral Philosophy" — may be 
 true, if the remark be understood to apply to any 
 discussion of the doctrine of cause and effect in 
 the abstract ; but it is also true that the doctrine, 
 as explained (p. 231) by Lord Brougham— namely, 
 that from experience of the connexion between our 
 own volitions and the movements resulting from 
 them, we are enabled to rise to the notion of effects 
 consequent upon the volitions of the Supreme 
 Being— although not perhaps formally laid down 
 by Paley, is frequently (as in the passage lately 
 quoted) worked up into his argument, with a force 
 which seldom attends the abstract statement of 
 things. Throughout His Lordship's sections, on 
 the physical and psychological branches of Natural 
 Theology, there is not, I believe, " the least allu- 
 sion" to the doctrine of causation; and yet there 
 would be difficulty in showing that the conclu- 
 sions lose any portion of their probability on 
 that account. .. .With regard to the final com- 
 plaint against Paley, that, "even in his Moral 
 Philosophy," there is no allusion to the doctrine, 
 I can only confess my utter inability to imagine 
 
130 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 in what part of the work, or for what purpose, a 
 chapter on that subject could have been introduced. 
 Although Lord Brougham has acquitted Paley's 
 language, of any tendency to materialism, His 
 Lordship seems to doubt whether he was "fully 
 impressed with the evidence of mental existence.*" 
 In my own opinion, the last extract from his 
 Natural Theology could scarcely have been writ- 
 ten by any one who was Twt "fully impressed^' 
 with that evidence. As, however. His Lordship 
 has mentioned such a doubt, and has moreover 
 avowed, without reserve, his conviction of Paley''s 
 "distaste or incapacity for metaphysical re- 
 searches,'' I would refer the reader to the last 
 three paragraphs of his Evidences of Christianity. 
 On this occasion, there may not, perhaps, be 
 any impropriety in stating that the first inclina- 
 tion to such researches, felt by the present writer, 
 was excited, very early in life, by those para- 
 graphs; which he still believes to contain more 
 information on such subjects than can easily be 
 found in the same space. One of the paragraphs 
 shall be transcribed: 
 
 " Thought is diflferent from motion, perception from 
 impact: the individuality of a mind is hardly consistent 
 
 « 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 131 
 
 with the divisibility of an extended substance; or its voli- 
 tion, that is, its power of originating motion, with the 
 inertness which cleaves to every portion of matter which 
 our observation or our experiments can reach. These dis- 
 tinctions lead us to an immaterial principle : at least, they 
 do this — they so negative the mechanical properties of 
 matter, in the constitution of a sentient, still more of a 
 rational being, that no argument drawn from these pro- 
 perties can be of any great weight in opposition to other 
 reasons, when the question respects the changes of which 
 such a nature is capable, or the manner in which these 
 changes are effected. Whatever thought be, or whatever 
 it depend upon, the regular experience of sleep makes one 
 thing concerning it certain, that it may be completely 
 suspended, and completely restored." 
 
 This is a mode of writing which excites curio- 
 sity, and enforces reflection. Such remarks are 
 not to be forgotten: they become the materials 
 of future contemplation. The author who can 
 so think, and so express his thoughts, can scarcely 
 be said to have a " distaste," certainly not an " in- 
 capacity," for metaphysical researches. But now 
 that we are adverting to Paley's supposed "distaste"" 
 and " incapacity" for abstract speculation, let us 
 consider the circumstances under which his Natural 
 Theology — with which alone we are concerned — 
 was drawn up. And, in the outset, we are enabled 
 
 to give, on his own authority, the reasons for 
 
 12 
 
132 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 undertaking what appeared to him ^^as, in all 
 probability, his last labour.^ His " last" it proved 
 to be. 
 
 " A weak, and, of late, a painful state of health, de- 
 prived me of the power of discharging the duties of my 
 station in a manner at all suitable, either to my sense of 
 those duties, or to my most anxious wishes eoncering them. 
 My inability for the public functions of my profession, 
 amongst other consequences, left me much at leisure. 
 That leisure was not to be lost. It was only in my study 
 that I could repair my deficiencies in the church: it was 
 only through the press that I could speak."* 
 
 We are also enabled to present a similar testi- 
 mony from the pen of his Son : 
 
 "The circumstances under which he finished, and in- 
 deed, it may very fairly be said, begun his work, added 
 a great interest to it for those who were anxious for his 
 health. He had been long struggling with those attacks 
 which are the usual symptoms of diseased viscera ; and this 
 constitutional disorder had gained so much upon him, that 
 his intervals of ease became few and far between. It was 
 quite admirable at such times to observe, not only how 
 lively were his animal spirits, but how his mind, quite un- 
 subdued, seemed to labour to show itself as happy as could 
 be, with the very privilege of existence ; but even this was 
 not equal to the calmness and patience and composure 
 which he showed under the severest bodily sufferings, even 
 at the very time when he was busily engaged in contem- 
 
 * Natural Theology, Dedication to Bishop Barrington. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 t 
 
 I 
 
 133 
 
 plating and describing the benevolence of the Deity, and 
 the provisions for man's enjoyment."* 
 
 Lastly, we are enabled to survey the same scene 
 from the representation of Dr Clark, a highly- 
 esteemed Physician at Newcastle, who had the 
 satisfaction of contributing to the comfort of Dr 
 Paley at that period: 
 
 " That truly eminent man [Dr Paley] was then engaged 
 in finishing his Natural Theology; but the completion 
 of that great undertaking was frequently interrupted by 
 severe accessions of a painful disorder, under which he had 
 long laboured. Dr Clark often expressed his admiration 
 at the fortitude with which he bore the most painful 
 attacks; and at the readiness, and even cheerfulness, with 
 which, on the first respite from pain, he resumed his literary 
 labours. When it is considered that the twenty-sixth 
 chapter [on the Goodness of the Deity] was written under 
 these circumstances, what he has said of the alleviations 
 of pain acquires additional weight. It is not a philosopher, 
 in the full enjoyment of health, who talks lightly of an 
 evil which he may suppose at a distance. When Dr Paley 
 speaks of the power which pain has " of shedding a satis- 
 faction over intervals of ease, which few enjoyments ex- 
 ceed;" and assures us that "a man resting from severe 
 pain is, for the time, in possession of feelings which un- 
 disturbed health cannot impart;" the sentiment flowed from 
 his own feelings." t 
 
 • Life of Paley, by the Rev. Edmund Paley, p. 337. 
 
 t Meadley's Life of Paley, p. 205, 2nd ed. ; the passage, as there 
 found, is taken from Dr Fenwick's Sketch of the pmfeiisional Life and 
 Character of Dr Clark. 
 
 f 
 
134 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 I will not injure the effect of these simple 
 statements, by any observations upon them. They 
 disclose, in a manner which attests their accuracy, 
 the situation of our Christian Philosopher, when 
 composing his Treatise on Natural Theology ; and 
 if borne in mind, cannot fail to give new interest 
 to the perusal of the work. That great work, 
 indeed, needs no allowance, on any ground what- 
 ever. It depends upon its own intrinsic value. 
 But there are occasions when a few pages will 
 certainly be again read, for the purpose of refresh- 
 ing our recollection of its aptness of illustration 
 and precision of language; and while reading for 
 that purpose, we may also have an opportunity 
 of reassuring ourselves of the possibility of a pro- 
 duction so instinct with vigour of mind and kind- 
 liness of disposition, having been written during 
 such precarious intervals of ease, as were allowed 
 by a most painful disorder, which speedily con- 
 signed its author to the tomb^ 
 
 Enough but, I trust, not more than enough — 
 for it is right that these matters should be clearly 
 understood — has now been laid before the reader, 
 in defence of Ray, Derham, Clarke and Paley. 
 Let us now proceed to consider what can be al- 
 leged, in favour of "all the writers'' on Natural 
 
 6 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 135 
 
 Theology, "at least among the moderns'"— who, 
 as Lord Brougham affirms, have, in their disqui- 
 sitions on that subject, " wholly neglected the mind 
 and its operations.'' This is the more needful, 
 inasmuch as, according to His Lordship, "there 
 cannot be a doubt that this extraordinary omission 
 had its origin in the doubts which men are prone 
 to entertain of the mind's existence independent 
 of matter." (p. 54.) We have a farther reason for 
 investigating the subject, in the circumstance, that 
 the affirmation, respecting "all the writers, at 
 least among the moderns," has been by a recent 
 author, deemed adverse to the received doctrine of 
 the immateriality of the soul. " Did it not occur 
 to the Noble Lord," inquires the author alluded 
 to, "that the writers on Natural Theology who 
 had preceded him, and, as he admits, omitted 
 to discuss or entertain this metaphysical and 
 vexatious doctrine, did so with design, and because 
 they were of opinion that it was neither neces- 
 sary nor useful to introduce doubtful doctrines, 
 in the hope of extending certain knowledge— -and 
 that therefore the negative precedent was one 
 which ought to be followed.?"* Now, there is 
 
 * Observations on the Discourse of Natural Theology, by Henry 
 Lord Brougham. By Thomas Wallace, Esq. LL.D. One of His 
 Majesty's Counsel at Law in Ireland, p. 18. 
 
 f 
 
136 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 k 
 
 in philosophy one maxim which is on all sides 
 allowed to be most excellent : the maxim is this — 
 first be sure of the fact, and then endeavour to 
 account for it. The fact, stated by Lord Brougham, 
 is, that, "modern writers'' on Natural Theology 
 have "wholly neglected the mind and its opera- 
 tions.'' At this moment, I cannot but feel 
 the awkwardness of my situation; for the fact, 
 which I am under the necessity of stating and 
 proving, is— that "modern writers" on Natural 
 Theology have ver^ generally employed "the 
 mind and its operations," asj evidences of the 
 being and attributes of God. So far, indeed, as 
 I can depend upon my memory, that topic has 
 scarcely ever been omitted by them. But be 
 that as it may, I shall venture to show, by actual 
 quotations from authors of no small account, the 
 kind of consideration which has really been be- 
 stowed upon the subject. The following extracts 
 are taken from such works as immediately occurred 
 to recollection and were within reach ; and I would 
 persuade myself that they will amply reward the 
 trouble of perusal. 
 
 Out of compliment to the Legal Profession, 
 of which Lord Brougham is so distinguished a 
 MembfT, I begin with the testimony of Sir 
 
 \ 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 137 
 
 Matthew Hale; who, in his Primitive Origi- 
 nation of ManMnd, dwells at great length upon 
 the intellectual faculties. Of the mode of thinking, 
 with regard to them, adopted by the great Lord 
 Chief Justice, I give the following specimens: 
 
 " There are many excellencies in the Human Nature, 
 which manifest a far more eminent excellency in his First 
 
 Efficient The symmetry, beauty, majesty and admirable 
 
 composure of his body: to which there can be nothing 
 added, nor detracted without a blemish to it. The admirable 
 faculties of his soul, those that concern him in his lowest 
 rank of life, the faculty by which he is nourished; those that 
 concern him in his middle rank of life, soul and sensation, 
 memory and appetite; those that concern him in his supreme 
 rank of life. Intellect and Will The admirable union of his 
 soul to his body; whereby he becomes one intellectual being, 
 though consisting of principles of different natures." 
 
 " His faculties of sense are accommodated to a sensible 
 being: forasmuch as he is to converse in a corporeal world 
 and with corporeal beings, there is no one quality of cor- 
 poreal nature that he hath occasion to use or converse with, 
 but he hath a faculty by one of his five senses to receive 
 and discern. In his intellectual faculty, it admirably serves 
 him for the ends of his being : he was appointed to govern, 
 direct and rule other animals; and therefore he hath the 
 advantage of a superior faculty above them, whereby he 
 is able to exercise that direction and government. He was 
 made to be the spectator of the fj:reat works of God, to 
 consider and observe them, to glorifv and serve that God 
 
I 
 
 4 
 
 138 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 that made them ; and he is accordingly furnished with an 
 Intellectual Faculty answerable to his condition."* 
 
 In the estimation of this learned writer, these 
 and other considerations, arising from a survey of 
 the mental constitution of man, lead the thoughts 
 to the First Cause of all finite intelligence. 
 
 I now appeal to Bishop Wilkins ; who men- 
 tions, as affording special evidence of an Intelli- 
 gent Creator, " that kind of frame which relates 
 to our Understanding Power, whereby we are 
 able to correct the errors of our senses and ima- 
 ginations ; to call before us things past and future ; 
 and to behold things that are invisible to sense." 
 We also find him writing as follows: 
 
 " If a man doth but consider how he is endowed with 
 such a natural principle, whereby he is necessarily inclined 
 to seek his own well-being and happiness: and likewise 
 with one faculty whereby he is enabled to judge of the 
 nature of things, as to their fitness or unfitness for this end : 
 and another faculty whereby he is enabled to choose and 
 prosecute such things as may promote this end, and to 
 reject and avoid such things as may hinder it: — and 
 this may be another argument to convince him that the 
 Author of his being must be infinitely wise and powerful." 
 
 Bishop Wilkins moreover adduces, in proof of 
 
 a Moral Governor of the world, "Natural Con- 
 
 * Primitive Origination, pp. 32^, 327. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 139 
 
 science, which is God's deputy, and doth inter- 
 nally witness for Him, as other creatures do 
 externally." * 
 
 The next extracts shall be taken from Dr 
 Cud worth's Intellectual System ; a work abound- 
 ing in thought as well as learning. It ought to be 
 premised that the language is somewhat rugged : 
 
 "The sum of all is, that there are two kinds of sub- 
 stances in nature: The first — extension or magnitude, 
 (really existing without the mind) which is a thing that 
 hath no self-unity at all in it; but is infinite alterity and 
 divisibility, as it is only mere outside and outwardness, it 
 having nothing within; nor any other action belonging to it, 
 but only locally to move when it is moved :— The second — 
 life and mind ; or the self-active cogitative nature, an inside 
 being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal 
 energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker 
 himself, or in the inside of him ; which therefore (though 
 unextended, yet) hath a certain inward recess, (3d6o^, or 
 essential profundity. And this is a thing which can act 
 all of it entirely, upon either a greater or lesser quantity 
 of extended substance or body, and its several parts, pene- 
 trating into it, and co-existing in the same place with it." 
 (p. 832.) 
 
 " And now we have made it manifest that these Atheists 
 are so far from being able to disprove a God, from this 
 topic of cogitation, knowledge or understanding, that they 
 
 * Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, pp. 82, 83, 90. 
 6tli ed. 1710. 
 
I 
 
 140 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 cannot possibly salve the phenomenon thereof without a 
 God ; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his ex- 
 istence. For first. If no life or cogitation, soul or mind, 
 can possibly spring out of matter or body, devoid of life 
 and understanding, and which is nothing but a thing 
 extended into length, breadth and thickness— then is it 
 so far from being true that all life and understanding is 
 junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof, that 
 of necessity, either all lives and souls were self-existent 
 from eternity, or else there must be One perfect unmade 
 life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were 
 derived: there must be an eternal knowledge before sense 
 and sensibles; which is that that hath printed the stamps 
 and signatures of itself, upon the matter of the whole 
 world." (p. 871.) 
 
 In the seventh of Dr Barrow's Sermons on 
 the Creed, entitled— T'A^ being of God proved 
 from the frame of human nature — the bearing 
 of the intellectual part of man, upon the argu- 
 ment, is discussed at considerable length. The 
 views of the subject, entertained by this great 
 man, may be collected from two quotations, which 
 I shall here give: 
 
 " To think a gross body may be ground and pounded 
 into rationality, a slow body may be thumped and driven 
 into passion, a rough body may be filed and polished into a 
 faculty of discerning and resenting things; that a cluster of 
 pretty thin round atoms (as Democriins forsooth conceited), 
 that a well mixed combination of elements (as Kfnppdocleft 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 141 
 
 fancied), that a harmonious contemperation (or crasis) of 
 
 humours (as Galen, dreaming it seems upon his drugs 
 
 and his potions, would persuade us), that an implement 
 
 made up of I know not what fine springs, and wheels, 
 
 such mechanick knacks (as some of our modern wisards 
 
 have been busy in divining) should without more to do 
 
 become the subject of so rare capacities and endowments, 
 
 the author of actions so worthy and works so wonderful; 
 
 capable of wisdom and virtue, of knowledge so vast and 
 
 desires so lofty; apt to contemplate truth and affect good; 
 
 able to recollect things past and to foresee things future; 
 
 to search so deep into the causes of things, and disclose 
 
 so many mysteries of nature; to invent so many arts and 
 
 sciences, to contrive such projects of policy and achieve 
 
 such feats of prowess; briefly, should become capable to 
 
 design, undertake and perform all those admirable effects 
 
 of human wit and industry which we daily see and hear 
 
 of; how senseless and absurd conceits are these; how can 
 
 we, without great indignation and regret, entertain such 
 
 suppositions?" 
 
 " I shall to these only subjoin one farther consideration 
 worth attending to; that the wisest and most considerate 
 men in several times, only by reflecting upon their own 
 minds, and observing in them what was most lovely and 
 excellent, most pure and straight, have fallen upon and 
 conspired in notions concerning God, very suitable to those 
 which we believe taught us by revelation; although con- 
 trary to the prejudices of their education, and to popular 
 conceits: many admirable passages to this purpose we 
 may find dropped from the mouth of Socrates and the 
 pen of Plato; in Cicero, in Epictetus, yea in the least 
 
142 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 credulous or fanciful of men, Aristotle himself. Whence 
 plainly enough we may collect how near affinity there is 
 between God and us; how legible characters of the divinity 
 are written upon our souls ; how easily we may know God, 
 if we be not ignorant of ourselves; that we need not go 
 far to fetch arguments to prove that God is, nor to find 
 lessons to learn what he is; since we always carry both, 
 about us or rather within us ; since our souls could indeed 
 come from no other than such a Being, whom they so 
 resemble and represent."* 
 
 Bishop Stillingfleet discourses at great 
 length, on the human soul, in proof of the being 
 of a God; as will appear from the intimations 
 contained in the following passage: 
 
 " I come now to fhe third evidence of a Deity ; which 
 is, That there are some beings in the world, which cannot 
 depend upon matter and motion ; i. e., that there are some 
 spiritual and immaterial substances or beings; the con- 
 sequence of this for the proving a Deity neither hath been, 
 nor I suppose will be denied, by those who question an 
 Infinite Being ; the same principles leading to the denying 
 and the proof of both, and immaterial beings being the 
 strongest proof that there is something above matter in 
 the world. If there be then such things in the world, 
 which matter and motion cannot be the causes of, then 
 there are certainly spiritual and immaterial beings, and 
 that I shall make appear both as to the minds of men, 
 and some extraordinary effects which are produced in the 
 world." t. 
 
 • Works, Vol. II. pp. 104, 108. fol. 1683. 
 
 t Origines Sacrae, B. in. c. 1. s. 17. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 143 
 
 I next adduce Wollaston, the author of 
 The Religion of Nature delineated. This learned 
 writer, after maintaining that "the frame and 
 constitution of the world, the astonishing mag- 
 nificence of it, the various phenomena and kinds 
 of beings, the uniformity observed in the pro- 
 ductions of things, the uses and ends for which 
 they serve, do all show that there is some Almighty 
 Designer, an infinite wisdom and power at the 
 top of all these things''— dwells upon this pro- 
 position, namely, that "Life, sense, cogitation 
 and the faculties of our own minds show the 
 existence of some Superior Being from whom 
 they are derived." He also enlarges upon the 
 distinction between the soul and the body; prov- 
 ing that the thinking faculty cannot arise from 
 matter, whatever may be its magnitude, form, 
 texture or motion.* 
 
 Lord Brougham has, on several occasions, re- 
 ferred to Dr Bentley's famous sermons at Boyle's 
 Lecture ; not indeed without a remark upon " the 
 vituperation rather than sermon" with which the 
 course is opened, but still with manifest respect 
 for the talents of " that most learned preacher." Of 
 
 * Religion of Nature, pp. 347—353, 7th ed. 1750. 
 
144 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 -if 
 
 Dr Bentley's sense of the value of the intellectual 
 part of man, we may form some judgment, when 
 he declares that — "if we consider the dignity of 
 an Intelligent Being, and put that in the scales 
 against brute inanimate matter, we may affirm, 
 without over-valuing human nature, that the soul 
 of one virtuous and religious man is of greater 
 worth and excellency than the sun and his planets, 
 and all the stars in the world."^* His second 
 sermon is entitled — Matter and motion camwt 
 think: or, a confutation of Atheism, Jrom the 
 Jaculties of the human said. From this discourse 
 I will give two short extracts belonging to the 
 same argument: 
 
 "And first, I say, there is an immaterial substance in 
 us, which we call Soul, essentially distinct from our bodies. 
 I shall lay it down as self-evident, that there is something, 
 in our composition, that thinks and apprehends, and reflects 
 and deliberates ; that determines and doubts, consents and 
 denies ; that wills and demurs and resolves and chooses and 
 rejects; that receives various sensations and impressions from 
 external objects, and produces voluntary motions of several 
 parts of our bodies.". ..." And now that I have sufficiently 
 shown that sense and perception can never be the product 
 of any kind of matter and motion, it remains that it must 
 necessarily proceed from some incorporeal substance within 
 
 • Eighth Sermon, near the beginning. 
 
 U.') 
 
 us. And though we cannot conceive the manner of the 
 soul's action and passion, nor what hold it can lay on the 
 body when it voluntarily moves it, yet we are certain that it 
 doth so as of any mathematical truth whatsoever I dis- 
 cern some excellent final causes of such a vital conjunction 
 of body and soul; but the instrumental cause I know not, 
 nor what invisible bands and fetters unite them together. 
 I resolve all that into the sole pleasure andjiat of our Omni- 
 potent Creator ; whose existence is so plainly and nearly 
 deducible from the established proof of an immaterial soul, 
 that no wonder the resolved Atheists do so labour and bestir 
 themselves to fetch sense and perception out of the power of 
 matter. I will despatch it in three words. For, since we 
 have shown that there is an incorporeal substance within 
 us, whence did that proceed, and how came it into being? 
 It did not exist from all eternity ; that's too absurd to be 
 supposed; nor could it come out of nothing into being, 
 without an efficient cause. Something therefore must have 
 created our souls out of nothing ; and that something (since 
 no thing can give more than it has) must itself have all the 
 perfections that it hath given to them. There is therefore 
 an immaterial and intelligent Being that created our souls; 
 which Being was either eternal itself, or created immediately 
 or ultimately by. some other Eternal, that has all those 
 perfections. There is therefore originally an Eternal, 
 Immaterial, Intelligent Creator; all which together are 
 the attributes of God alone." * 
 
 Such was Dr Bentley's view of the faculties 
 of the human mind, as affording a convincing 
 
 * Sermons, pp. ,51, 68. ed. 1735. 
 
i 
 
 146" 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 « 
 
 I 
 
 
 proof of the existence of a Supreme Intelligence. 
 On looking over the sermons preached at Boyle's 
 Lecture, I find the intellectual powers of man 
 adduced, in evidence of the same fact, by Gastrel, 
 Harris, Clarke, Hancock, Woodward, Derham, 
 Leng, and Gurdon. 
 
 The third sermon, in Abernethy's Discourses 
 concerning the being and natural perfections of 
 God, is entitled. The being of God proved from 
 human intelligence and morality. Instead of pre- 
 senting any of the arguments employed in this 
 Discourse — which are somewhat metaphysical, and 
 too extended for brief extracts— I transcribe the 
 general view which he takes of the subject, at the 
 beginning of that discourse: 
 
 " I have endeavoured, in the two preceding discourses, 
 to prove the being of God from his works ; that is, as the 
 question is properly stated between Atheists and us, to 
 prove an active intelligence in the formation of tlie universe. 
 Indeed the existence of the very lowest things we see, the 
 most contemptible pebble or clod of earth, cannot be ac- 
 counted for without the agency of an intelligent and power- 
 ful Cause; much less this beautiful system of the world, 
 disposed in such exquisite order, and having its parts so 
 exactly fitted to each other, as to make up one regular whole. 
 But above all, that understanding, which we are conscious 
 of in ourselves, even constrnins us to acknowledge the 
 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 147 
 
 Supreme Eternal Mind as its Author. For if inanimate 
 matter formed into a system discovers his glorious wisdom 
 and activity, much more his own living image in our per- 
 ceptive and self-determining powers. This last well de- 
 serves a more particular consideration, as containing a 
 peculiarly illustrious manifestation of the divine wisdom; 
 and I hope by a due attention to what passes in our own 
 minds, we shall find ourselves obliged to recognize the All- 
 ruling intelligence of our Maker, and to adore Him who is 
 pei^fect in knowledge.^' 
 
 We find Dr Foster writing of the mental 
 faculties in the following strain: 
 
 " We have, as yet, only surveyed the tenement of man, 
 and have not, properly speaking, conversed with man him- 
 self; nor taken a view of the essential, and more noble, 
 principles in his constitution. Let us go on, therefore, to 
 search a little into the make of his mind, his powers of 
 reason, his moral faculties, his implanted social instincts 
 and benevolent propensions ; which are the things that most 
 honourably distinguish, and mark out humanity, and render 
 it capable of an association with angels, and the life of God. 
 In the supreme directing and executive powers of human 
 nature -~ powers by which alone man justly sustains his 
 
 rank, prosecutes his end, and can arrive at due perfection 
 
 in these, I say, we may reasonably expect to find the plain- 
 est delineations and strongest characters of his former, his 
 father, after whose image his mind was originally made. 
 For, surely, it can never be imagined that the parent of 
 being has lavishly expended his greatest care and art upon 
 inferior designs and meaner compositions; and is least 
 
 K 2 
 
148 
 
 SECTION 11. 
 
 visible and has left the faintest traces of his divine skill, 
 in his most excellent workmanship."* 
 
 Dr Foster proceeds to consider, at great length, 
 
 the particulars thus laid down. Did my limits 
 
 permit, I should be glad to give some extracts 
 
 from his remarks. I must, however, be content to 
 
 present his view of the relative value of the proofs, 
 
 of the divine power and wisdom, as derived from 
 
 external nature, and from the intellectual frame : 
 
 " Thus have 1 suggested several instances of most ador- 
 able and stupendous wisdom, that are apparent in the works 
 of nature ; and have endeavoured to fix on such, chiefly, 
 as for the facts themselves are unexceptionable, and where 
 the evidence lies most obvious to the common apprehension 
 of mankind, unimproved by deep science and skill in philo- 
 sophy. And as many of these are proofs that strike our 
 very senses, which, by the wise appointment of the God of 
 nature, are always open to let in some light upon passive 
 minds; and prevent, by this means, the whole human race, 
 a very few excepted, from sinking into rude and savage 
 ignorance: these, I say, being sensible proofs, must be 
 better adapted for yielding universal conviction, than more 
 abstruse deductions of reason. It is natural for me to 
 observe that the same method is taken in the Holy Scrip- 
 tures, to impress the minds of men with a stronger idea of 
 the supreme wisdom of the Deity ; and that many of the 
 
 * Discourses on all the principal branches of Natiiral Religion 
 and Social Virtue. By James Foster, D.D. p. 101. 4to. 1749. 'I'his 
 was the " Modest Foster" of Pope. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 14.9 
 
 most remarkable displays of wisdom in the fabrick of the 
 world, which I have particularly mentioned, are therein 
 also distinctly taken notice of, and especially by David, in 
 the 104th Psalm; which shows the pious adoration therein 
 expressed to be not the enthusiastic flight and transport 
 of a poetical genius, but the result of deliberate reflection ; 
 and we may likewise collect from hence, in some measure, 
 the general corresponding sense of human nature." * 
 
 From the Sermons of Samuel Bourn, an 
 
 eminent Dissenting Minister, I select the following 
 
 excellent remarks, from many others which might 
 
 be adduced : 
 
 ** In the beginning of life the human soul subsists with 
 few ideas, according to its minute capacity. But they 
 multiply fast: every thing is then new, and consequently 
 an object of wonder; and the inquisitive curiosity is adapted 
 to, and gratified with, a continual accession of new objects. 
 And when the stock of ideas is sufficiently encreased, the 
 comparing and judging faculty begins to operate upon the 
 materials which sense hath furnished — It orders and 
 disposes, unites and separates, divides and compounds, 
 distinguishes like and unlike, equal and unequal, fit and 
 unfit, beautiful and deformed, good and evil. Here reason 
 commenceth ; and is henceforward continually employed in 
 disposing the intellectual furniture of the mind; arrang- 
 ing every thing in due place and order, reviewing its 
 internal fund of knowledge, and by new images and new 
 reflections still adding to the number, variety, form and 
 
 ■* Discourses, p. 109. 
 
150 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 order of the whole; rising continually from things more 
 simple, clear and easy, to things more complex, obscure 
 and difficult ; from material to moral and spiritual objects ; 
 and finally ascending to the highest and noblest degree 
 in the scale of human knowledge ; and from the whole of 
 what we previously see and know, learning to know this : 
 that an Eternal, All-perfect Being is the cause of all, to 
 whom we belong, and from whom we derive all good. — 
 Is there no design of Creative Wisdom in this admirable 
 and evident process of nature ? " * 
 
 Mr Burke having at one time been led to 
 the consideration of some of the intellectual facul- 
 ties, recorded in the following language his feeling 
 with regard to the marks of their divine origin 
 which are impressed upon them: 
 
 *' The more accurately we search into the human mind, 
 the stronger traces we every where find of His wisdom 
 who made it. If a discourse on the use of the parts of 
 the body may be considered as an hymn to the Creator — 
 the use of the passions, which are the organs of the mind, 
 cannot be barren of praise to Him, nor unproductive to 
 ourselves of that noble and uncommon union of science 
 and admiration, which a contemplation of the works of 
 infinite wisdom alone can afford to a rational mind ; whilst 
 
 * A series of Discourses on the Principles and Evidences of 
 Natural Religion and the Christian Revelation. Vol.i. p. 39. 1760. 
 I have referred to the writings of Dissenters, as well as those of 
 (Churchmen, for the purpose of showing how very generally our 
 English Tiicologians have strengthened their arguments, for the 
 being of a God, by an appeal to "the mind and its operations." 
 
 
 rSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 151 
 
 referring to Him whatever we find of right or good or 
 fair in ourselves, discovering his strength and wisdom in 
 our own weakness and imperfection, honouring them 
 where we can discover them clearly, and adoring their 
 profundity where we are lost in our search, we may be 
 inquisitive without impertinence, and elevated without 
 pride; we may be admitted, if I may dare to say so, into 
 the counsels of the Almighty by a consideration of his 
 works." * 
 
 In Dr Crombie's Natural Theology— a modern 
 
 work of great value — this subject, namely, The 
 
 intellectual and moral faculties of man furnish 
 
 evidence^ that he is the production of an Intelligent 
 
 and Wise Beings occupies more than one hundred 
 
 pages. From the just-cited portion of the work, 
 
 I shall select a single passage, and with it bring 
 
 my series of quotations to a close: 
 
 " We are so habituated to the operation of these three 
 powers [sensation, memory and imagination], and so fami- 
 liarized to their effects, that they excite no astonishment; 
 and yet they present to us a fact, to which in part we 
 have already alluded, and which is calculated powerfully 
 to excite admiration. It is this. By sensation we perceive 
 present objects, and become acquainted with events now 
 passing before us; by memory we are enabled to retain 
 or recal past perceptions, and the ideas of objects now 
 removed both in time and place ; when by imagination wo 
 
 * On the Sublime and Beautiful. Pnrt i, s. IP. 
 
152 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 can look forward to future events and future ages. Thus 
 does man bring the past and the future into combination 
 with the present. Though existing only in one spot, and 
 living only in the passing moment, he is capable of ranging 
 through the varied events of preceding years, and through 
 former scenes now far distant, and at the same time of 
 expatiating through the ages of futurity and the boundless 
 regions of space. He lives in the present, the future and 
 the past. There is something, in this capacity, astonishing 
 and incomprehensible. It presents a phenomenon which 
 strikes us with wonder; combining contrarieties which seem 
 mutually irreconcilable; indicating the ordination of an 
 Intelligent Power, whose eye embraces eternal ages and 
 immeasurable space." * 
 
 For the purpose I have now had in view, I 
 might have devoted entire pages to the names of 
 English Writers, who have dwelt upon the mental 
 powers, as indications of an Intelligent Creator^ 
 or have filled whole volumes with extracts from 
 their works; but I preferred a less extensive 
 plan of proceeding. Lord Brougham's strange 
 misapprehensions, and consequent misrepresenta- 
 tions of the matter, recjuired to be met by some- 
 thing more satisfactory than a bare assertion that 
 His Lordship was in total error; and, I trust, 
 the passages adduced, although few in comparison 
 with the numbers that were at hand, will evince 
 
 * rrnnibieV NalnrnI Tlicolnijy. A'nI. n. p. 33. 1829. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 \53 
 
 
 
 his error, beyond all possibility of doubt. Who- 
 ever, besides, will consider the charge brought 
 against modern writers — which is, that they have 
 neglected " the mind and its operations," from 
 the want of a sufficiently firm belief of its imma- 
 teriality — must be sensible how completely the 
 importance of the subject will justify the circum- 
 stantial method, which has been adopted, of esta- 
 blishing the exact truth of the case. Many ill 
 effects might be produced, by His Lordship's 
 statement, upon the public at large; and thus — 
 to prove that such statement has not the slightest 
 foundation in fact — is to do something more than 
 justify the literary character of this country in 
 the estimation of the world. 
 
 In reality — taking the series of English Writers 
 who have touched on subjects connected with Na- 
 tural Theology— they have much more frequently 
 appealed to "the mind and its operations,'"' as 
 evidences of a Supreme Intelligence, than might 
 previously be expected ; and as will probably soon 
 be seen, there are reasons for thinking that the 
 argument has been placed by them in that precise 
 point of view which renders it the most striking 
 to ordinary understandings. 
 
154 
 
 SECTION II, 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 155 
 
 1 1 
 
 Lord Brougham not only condemns the neglect 
 
 of psychological proofs by the moderns, but also 
 
 contrasts their conduct with that of the ancients, 
 
 in relation to such proofs. This will be manifest 
 
 from the following extract : 
 
 " la these speculations of the ancient philosophers, we 
 cannot find any process of strict inductive reasoning ; and, 
 accordingly, the facts are not turned to the best account for 
 the purposes of the argument. But this defect appears, at 
 the least, as much in the physical as in the psychological 
 portion of the reasoning. Indeed, the latter comes more 
 near to our own philosophy ; and certainly we must admit 
 that those old writers upon Natural Theology, in the place 
 which they assigned to intellectual phenomena, pursued a 
 more sound and consistent method of philosophising, than 
 the moderns have done when speculating upon the same 
 subject."' (p. 227, being part of a note to p. 52.) 
 
 Having produced several instances of modern 
 psychological speculation, my plan, of enabling 
 the reader to form his own judgment on every 
 topic that may be discussed, now leads me to give, 
 from Lord Brougham's note just referred to, the 
 whole of the specimens there found of psychological 
 speculation amongst the ancients. I shall present 
 them as they occur in the note — the Greek pas- 
 sages translated into English, and the Latin in 
 their original language. 
 
 *' Nor has the Deity been satisfied with taking care of 
 the body alone: he has implanted in man what is a far 
 greater work to have made — a most excellent soul: — for 
 what other animal possesses a mind that can perceive the 
 existence of the Gods by whom all these vast and fair works 
 have been formed? What other creature than man wor- 
 ships those Gods ? What other intelligence is superior to 
 man s in providing against hunger and thirst and cold and 
 heat ? or in curing diseases, or in exercising strength, or in 
 cultivating learning, or in storing up the recollection of 
 things heard and seen and learnt."* 
 
 " They [the Gods] have implanted reason in our nature, 
 whereby we inquire touching external things ; and, arguing 
 and remembering, we learn the uses of each, and hit upon 
 many contrivances for attaining good and avoiding evil. 
 Have they not also given us the gift of speech, by which 
 we can communicate mutually all we have learnt, and 
 thus instruct each other, and make laws, and regulate 
 civil polity." •!• 
 
 " The constitution of the understanding, whereby it 
 not only receives impressions through the senses, but also 
 deals with the ideas thus received, and combines and com- 
 poses something out of them, proceeding from things that 
 are near to things that are quite remote, proves the exist- 
 ence of an Artificer; since things carrying such marks 
 of contrivance could not exist spontaneously and without 
 design." $ 
 
 " Aliud a terra sunisimus, aliud ab humore, aliud ab 
 igne, aliud ab aerc eo quern spiritu ducimus: illud autem 
 
 * Xen. ^leiiior. i. iv. 13. 
 t Kpicl. Knell ir. i. 9. 
 
 t Ibid. i\ . iii. II. 
 
 1 
 
 f 
 
156 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 157 
 
 ll 
 
 quod vincit hsec omnia, rationera dico, et si placet, pluribus 
 verbis, mentera, consilium, cogitationem, prudentiam, ubi 
 invenimus, unde sustulimus?"* 
 
 "Jam vero animura ipsum, mentemque hominis, ratio- 
 nem, consilium, prudentiam, qui non divina cura perfecta 
 esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi videtur carere — 
 Ex quo scientia intelli^itur quam vim habeat, qualis sit, 
 qua ne in Deo quidem res est uUa praestantior. " •{■ 
 
 " Sic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum 
 non vides, tamen ut Deum agnoscis ex operibus ejus, sic ex 
 memoriii rerum et inventione et celeritate motus omnique 
 pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis agnoscito."$ 
 
 Such were the psychological speculations of 
 ancient times; and it is truly gratifying to find 
 the most illustrious sages of Greece and Rome 
 thus appealing to the faculties of the human mind, 
 as proofs of Creative power and wisdom. But 
 how was it possible for Lord Brougham to suppose 
 that there was nothing parallel to such specula- 
 tions, in the writings of the moderns ? The means 
 of deciding that point are now in the reader's 
 hands; and even a slight comparison, of the ex- 
 tracts contained between the 137th and the 152nd 
 page of the present volume, with those just given, 
 will show how much more effectually the same 
 
 * Cireio do TSat. Deoi. ii. H. 
 I Cic. Tusc. Ilisp. i.-2R. 
 
 t Ibid. ii. 59. 
 
 argument is urged by the authors there quoted, 
 than by the philosophers of antiquity. Lord 
 Brougham has taken the trouble (p. 222) to ac- 
 count for this supposed modern neglect of an old 
 argument. The reasoning, although somewhat 
 metaphysical and obscure, is ingenious; and if 
 there had been a fact to account for, might per- 
 haps have been considered as sufficient to account 
 for it. 
 
 The manifest adaptations of things to each 
 other prove the existence of an Intelligent Agent : 
 — this is the principle upon which the Physical 
 branch of Natural Theology depends. At least, 
 the generality of treatises on the subject, intended 
 to be popular, have been constructed on this prin- 
 ciple; which also forms the ground-work of the 
 Physical department of the science, both in Lord 
 Brougham'*s ' Discourse,' and in the present volume. 
 Now, if the reader will once more refer to the 
 various passages ancient as well as modern, (pp. 137 
 — 156), connected with the Psychological branch, 
 he will find the excellence of the mental faculties 
 enlarged upon, and the important uses, to which 
 they are subservient, described ; — while the various 
 adaptations of those faculties to each other are but 
 
158 
 
 SECTION 11. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 159 
 
 j{ 
 
 slightly noticed. The conclusion seems to be, 
 that the writers on such topics considered the 
 modifications of material things, as affording much 
 more striking evidences of a Deity, than their 
 existence — and the existence and primary uses of 
 the mental faculties, as of greater weight, in that 
 respect, than their adaptations to each other. Can 
 any satisfactory reason be given, for so remarkable 
 a distinction ? It may be worth while to consider 
 the point. ... In the first place, although plain men 
 may be bewildered by subtleties, they will still 
 believe that there is nothing of which they can 
 be more certain than of the existence, and, in 
 numberless instances, the mutual adaptations of 
 material objects. Whatever difficulties they may 
 feel — and they do feel great difficulties— with re- 
 gard to solid substances beginning to be, they know 
 that things actually existing do admit of modifi- 
 cations; and they are certain that such modifica- 
 tions, for a determinate end, can have originated 
 only in intellectual power. Hence the propriety 
 of avoiding, in professedly popular discourses, all 
 discussions respecting the first existence of material 
 things; and of expatiating upon the wonderful 
 contrivances whicii abound throughout the visible 
 
 world — as the most generally convincing evidences 
 of a Supreme Being. In the second place, plain 
 men are conscious of intellectual endowments ; and 
 although they may, as before, be bewildered by 
 subtleties, they feel that the mind within them is 
 something essentially different from matter — and 
 that their own, as well as all other finite intelli- 
 gence can have been in the first instance derived 
 from nothing but that Intelligent Being, whose 
 existence is attested on every side. Such persons, 
 moreover, being enabled to apply their mental 
 faculties to many valuable purposes, and observing 
 the beneficial effects resulting from the mental 
 faculties of others, can easily trace the intellectual 
 adaptation of human beings to their external 
 coadition. Hence the propriety of dwelling, in 
 popular discourses, upon such particulars as mark 
 the wisdom with which the internal frame of man 
 has been adjusted to his temporal state. In the 
 third place, when plain men, who are chiefly 
 occupied by material objects, have their attention 
 directed to the various powers of their own minds 
 — the nice adaptations of those powers to each 
 other, as well as the modes in which they re- 
 spectively control or facilitate each other's opera- 
 
](>0 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Il 
 
 tions — plain men, I say, having nothing sensible 
 here to guide them, are speedily lost in the maze. 
 Such persons understand the conformity of parts 
 in the structure of the body, because there is 
 something submitted to the sight and the touch; 
 but having little inclination for abstract inquiries 
 and having devoted scarcely any time to them, 
 they listen to a discourse on the conformity of the 
 parts of the mental system, as to a disquisition on 
 words without ideas. They have some conception 
 of the manner in which the different members of 
 the corporeal frame, while to each is assigned its 
 appropriate action, are combined so as to constitute 
 one body ; but they perceive not in what way the 
 various mental faculties, each with its peculiar 
 office, are formed into one mind. Hence, I appre- 
 hend, the little notice which has been taken, in 
 popular treatises on Natural Theology, of the 
 adaptation of the intellectual powers to each 
 other. 
 
 The reader will not infer, from the foregoing 
 paragraph, that Lord Brougham is at all to be 
 blamed for having employed a few pages in 
 describing some of the adjustments which may 
 Ik? discovered amongst the faculties of the human 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 161 
 
 i 
 
 mind. His Lordship was writing, not solely per- 
 haps, but principally, for persons versed in philo- 
 sophical speculation ; and therefore was warranted 
 in discussing psychological topics in the manner he 
 has adopted. Although my own expectations, with 
 regard to philosophical readers, are by no means 
 so exalted as those of the Noble Author, I have 
 followed the path which he has traced out; and 
 it will be satisfactory to know that the reasoning 
 from intellectual adaptations, as given in these 
 pages (pp. 71—81), is thought to strengthen the 
 cause of religion. My intention, however, has 
 all along been to state, as I have now done, what 
 I conceive to be the most striking arguments for 
 the Divine power and wisdom, which can be 
 drawn from psychological sources. 
 
 To review the main objects of the present 
 section: The first purpose was to show that, in 
 whatever light we consider the mental faculties— 
 whether as simply existing; or as by their force 
 and variety producing eminently great and bene- 
 ficial effects; or as admirably adjusted to each 
 other;— we can neither fail to acknowledge the 
 vast addition of strength they afford to the argu- 
 ments, drawn from external things, for the being 
 
 L 
 
162 
 
 SECTION II 
 
 of God and his attributes of power and wisdom 
 and goodness — nor to be struck with the complete 
 accordance of the testimony, borne by the Intel- 
 lectual and Material worlds, to the same mo- 
 mentous truths. Moreover, to supply an omission 
 on the part of Lord Brougham, a few observations 
 have been made, on the Imagination, on the Will, 
 on the Capacity, possessed by the human race, of 
 distinguishing between right and wrong — and on 
 the judicial character with which Conscience has 
 been invested in the frame of man — as attesting 
 the moral attributes of the Deity. Lastly, con- 
 siderable pains have been taken to vindicate not 
 only Ray, Derham, Clarke and Paley — but also 
 modern writers in general — from Lord Brougham's 
 reproach of having entirely neglected the evidences 
 of the Divine Nature presented by " the mind and 
 its operations.^'. . . That in discussing the state- 
 ments of this part of the * Discourse,' the Noble 
 Author's meaning has always been fully appre- 
 hended, I can scarcely hope; but I have no 
 scruple in declaring that his meaning has never 
 been intentionally misrepresented. 
 
 Towards the close of the section. Lord 
 Brougham has introduced two or three pages of 
 
 i 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL BRANCH. 
 
 163 
 
 remarks, well deserving attention, on the Instincts 
 of animals— as in some degree belonging to this 
 portion of the inquiry. The same subject has been 
 illustrated by the genius of Paley ; whose reason- 
 ings upon it have received the highest commend- 
 ation from Mr Dugald Stewart.* The subject, 
 indeed, is extremely interesting; and there are 
 few phenomena in which we find brighter mani- 
 festations of the Supreme power and wisdom 
 and goodness, than in the instincts of animated 
 nature. 
 
 * Dissertation on Metaphysical, kc. Philosophy, Part n. p. 202. 
 
 L2 
 
164 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH OF NATURAL THEOLOGY, 
 
 (Discourse, Section V. pp. 98 — 137.) 
 
 The Psychological and Ethical branches of 
 Natural Theology are closely connected with each 
 other. They are connected in various ways — 
 in particular, by means of this principle, common 
 to them both; namely, that the mind is some- 
 thing which exists, and yet is not material. In 
 the last section, the mind, its manifold faculties, 
 and their respective uses and relations, were ad- 
 duced, as evidences for the being of a God — 
 his power, his wisdom and his goodness. In the 
 present section, the mind and its operations will 
 be appealed to, as affording intimations of a fu- 
 ture life ; and thus we shall be prepared to take 
 into consideration the moral bearing of the whole 
 subject. 
 
 According to Lord Brougham'^s statement in 
 the portion of his ' Discourse' now to be treated 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 165 
 
 1 
 
 of, the Ethical branch of Natural Theology, com- 
 prises " the probable designs of the Deity, with 
 respect to the future destiny of his creatures: — 
 and the means of investigating those designs are 
 derived, l. "from the nature of the human mind,'' 
 and 2. "from the attributes of the Creator." 
 Each of these points, therefore, will require a 
 distinct notice. In this, as well as in the Psy- 
 chological branch. His Lordship has taken much 
 more than a cursory glance at the various objects 
 presented to his attention; his purpose, as in 
 the preceding section, having been to discuss the 
 matter somewhat at large, with the design of 
 supplying an alleged defect in professed works 
 on Natural Theology. Lord Brougham, indeed, 
 informs us that the doctrines of the Ethical de- 
 partment "have been much less cultivated, by 
 scientific inquirers," than those even of the Psy- 
 chological department.* In the foregoing section, 
 I explained the Noble Author's views of the 
 Psychological branch of the science; and also 
 examined his statement — that arguments drawn 
 from the nature of the human mind had hardly 
 ever before found a place in the speculations of 
 
 * Discourse, p. 99. 
 
166 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 the Natural Theologian. Several of the passages 
 from works on Natural Theology, there laid 
 before the reader, are so related to the subjects 
 to which the present section is appropriated, that 
 very serious misgivings must already be felt, as 
 to Lord Brougham's representations of the neg- 
 lect, by preceding writers, of the topics now to 
 be dwelt upon. It is, undoubtedly, not a little 
 singular that His Lordship should have put forth 
 such a representation ; for on adverting to the 
 subject of a future existence, as indicated by the 
 nature of the human mind, and the Divine attri- 
 butes — we find that scarcely any other portion 
 of Natural Theology has been more fully dis- 
 cussed, by writers of reputation and ability. But 
 leaving the generalities which are almost insepar- 
 able from introductory observations, I proceed to 
 the first of the two divisions, which have been 
 marked out, for the more distinct survey of the 
 Ethical department. 
 
 I. Psychological argument, or evidence of 
 THE Deity's designs drawn from the na- 
 ture OF THE mind. 
 
 Under this head, Lord Brougham, in the first 
 place, resorts to experience, as deciding that no- 
 
 r> 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 167 
 
 thing but what is material can arise from either 
 the combination, or the modification, of matter. 
 An acid and an alkali, when mixed, produce a 
 third body, and nothing more. A block of marble, 
 although chiselled into the most beautiful of human 
 forms, is senseless matter still. There may be the 
 semblance of that character which thought com- 
 municates to the exterior, but the internal power 
 of thought will ever be wanting. That mind, 
 therefore, should originate in any combination, or 
 modification, of matter, is contrary to experience. 
 But His Lordship shall state the argument in his 
 own language: 
 
 "We may first of all observe that if a particular com- 
 bination of matter gives birth to what we call mind, this 
 is an operation altogether peculiar and unexampled. We 
 have no other instance of it; we know of no case in 
 which the combination of certain elements produces some- 
 thing quite different, not only from each of the simple 
 ingredients, but also different from the whole compound. 
 We can, by mixing an acid and an alkali, form a third 
 body, having the qualities of neither, and possessing qua- 
 lities of its own different from the properties of each; 
 but here the third body consists of the other two in com- 
 bination. There are not two things— two different exist- 
 ences—the neutral salt composed of the acid and the 
 alkali, and another thing different from the neutral salt, 
 and engendered for the first time by that salt coming into 
 
^ 
 
 16B 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 existence. So when, by chiselling, ' the marble softened 
 into life grows warm,' we have the marble new moukled, 
 and endowed with the power of agreeably affecting our 
 senses, our memory and our fancy ; but it is all the while 
 the marble: there is the beautiful and expressive marble 
 instead of the amorphous mass, and we have not, besides 
 the marble, a new existence created by the form which 
 has been given to that stone. But the materialists have 
 to maintain that, by matter being arranged in a particular 
 way, there is produced both the organized body, and some- 
 thing different from it, and having not one of its proper- 
 ties — neither dimensions, nor weight, nor colour, nor 
 
 form If, therefore, their theory is true, it must be 
 
 admitted to rest upon nothing which experience has ever 
 taught us: it supposes operations to be performed, and 
 relations to exist, of which we see nothing that bears the 
 least resemblance in any thing we know." (pp. 102 — 104.) 
 
 The extracts already given from Dr Barrow 
 
 (p. 140.) and Dr Bentley (p. 144.) show that, in 
 
 their estimation, the modifications of matter are 
 
 quite insufficient to account for the powers of the 
 
 human mind. I quote the following passage from 
 
 Dr Clarke, because the manner of thinking bears 
 
 considerable resemblance to that employed by 
 
 Lord Brougham : 
 
 **It will easily appear that perception or intelligence 
 is really a distinct quality or perfection, and not a mere 
 effect or composition of unintelligent figure and motion: 
 and that, for this plain reason — because intelligence is 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 169 
 
 not figure, and consciousness is not motion. For what- 
 ever can arise from, or be compounded of any things, is 
 still only those very things, of which it was compounded. 
 And if infinite compositions or divisions be made eternally, 
 the things will still be eternally the same; and all their 
 possible effects can never be anything but repetitions of 
 the same."* 
 
 To persevere in quotations of this kind, for 
 the purpose of proving how unadvisedly Lord 
 Brougham has censured preceding writers, for 
 neglect of such doctrines, would assuredly be 
 superfluous. The materialism of Hobbes in the 
 seventeenth century — and that of Collins and 
 Priestley in the eighteenth — excited and kept up 
 attention to the inquiry; and the names, in 
 succession, of Archbishop Bramhall and Richard 
 Baxter — Dr Clarke and Andrew Baxter — Dr 
 Price, Mr Bryant, Dr Reid and Dr Beattie — 
 not to mention many others of equal celebrity — 
 show that the docrine of the souFs immateriality 
 has not been in want of defenders. But by whom- 
 soever this doctrine may have been previously 
 maintained, we cannot but rejoice that it has 
 found a vindicator in Lord Brougham. 
 
 * Clarke on the TJeing nnd Attributes of God, Prop. viii. See 
 nho his Evidences of Natural and 1U'\ ealetl Religion, Prop. iv. 
 
170 
 
 SECTION 111. 
 
 M 
 
 His Lordship's second argument, in support of 
 the same opinion, is derived from the consciousness 
 of possessing the power of thought, and from 
 reflection upon the operations of our own minds. 
 Although the subject — as treated by the Noble 
 Author— has already been glanced at (pp. 90— 9^-)^ 
 there may be some advantage in considering the 
 case once more. External phenomena, as ascer- 
 tained by means of our senses, assure us of the 
 existence of something external to us, without 
 which there would be no such phenomena; and 
 certain internal acts of thinking, willing, &c., made 
 known to us by our own consciousness, assure us 
 of the existence of something within us, that per- 
 forms those acts. Moreover, the external phe- 
 nomena and the internal acts are so completely 
 dissimilar, that we cannot suppose them to have 
 the same origin. We are impressed with the 
 conviction that they arise from causes essentially 
 distinct from each other. And thus, external phe- 
 nomena being attributed to something material, 
 or body — the internal acts of thinking, willing, 
 &c. are attributed to something immaterial, or 
 mind. Higher than this it is impossible to as- 
 cend, in our attempts to trace the sources of our 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 171 
 
 knowledge. Our senses and our consciousness are 
 the primary means of intelligence: our reason 
 enables us to judge of the notices they present: 
 and if at last we doubt the truth of the inform- 
 ation thus afforded, there remains for us nothing 
 but hopeless scepticism. Such is the ground 
 wisely taken by the disciples of Dr Reid ; amongst 
 whom, in the main, is to be numbered the highly- 
 gifted Author of the ' Discourse of Natural The- 
 ology.' There is, indeed, reason to lament that, 
 from a wish to strengthen what he deems his 
 principal position, he should appear to weaken a 
 station of scarcely less importance. To insinuate 
 a doubt, as His Lordship does, respecting the 
 evidence of the senses, by no means tends to 
 inspire confidence in the evidence of consciousness. 
 He who is taught to doubt the truth of testimony 
 upon which he has been accustomed to rely — will 
 have some hesitation in relying upon any other. 
 Lord Brougham's previous arguments on this sub- 
 ject — concerning which I ventured to express my 
 opinion (p. 90.) in the foregoing section — are 
 enforced on the present occasion with great zeal. 
 The notices from without and the intimations 
 from within are made the subjects of the follow- 
 
I, 
 
 172 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 ing comparison— the import of which is diffused 
 
 through a pretty long paragraph: 
 
 "We believe that matter exists, because it makes a 
 certain impression upon our senses, that is because it pro- 
 duces a certain change or a certain effect ; and we argue, 
 and argue justly, that this effect must have a cause, though 
 the proof is by no means so clear that the cause is some- 
 thing external to ourselves. But we know the existence of 
 mind by our consciousness of or reflection on what passes 
 within us; and our own existence as sentient and think- 
 ing beings implies the existence of the mind which has 
 sense and thought. To know, therefore, that we are, and 
 that we think, implies a knowledge of the souVs exist- 
 ence. But this knowledge is altogether independent of 
 matter, and the subject of it bears no resemblance what- 
 ever to matter, in any one of its qualities, or habits, or modes 
 of action. Nay, we only know the existence of matter 
 through the operations of the mind; and were we to doubt 
 of the existence of either, it would be far more reason- 
 able to doubt that matter exists than that mind exists." 
 (p. 105.) 
 
 No one will dispute Mr Dugald Stewards 
 anxiety that the principles of mental philosophy 
 should appear in all their strength. Some obser- 
 vations of that excellent author, on the subject 
 of the preceding paragraph, have already been 
 offered (p. 91); and I now present a short sen- 
 tence from his pen, in relation to the same 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 173 
 
 matter. "The belief," he writes, "with which 
 Consciousness is attended has been considered as 
 the most irresistible of any; insomuch that this 
 species of evidence has never been questioned: 
 and yet it rests on the same foundation with 
 every other kind of belief to which we are de- 
 termined by the constitution of our nature."* 
 By anything like exaggeration, we are put upon 
 our guard, as by the representations of an advo- 
 cate ; but to a statement, like that of Mr Stewart, 
 we listen, as to the decision of a judge. 
 
 From the latter, however, as well as from the 
 former arguments of Lord Brougham, we wil- 
 lingly admit the correctness of his inference, that 
 the intellectual principle is immaterial; and the 
 
 * Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 18. Let me here adduce 
 the remarkable, and apparently well-weighed, words of Locke: 
 " Sensation convinces us that there are solid extended substances- 
 and Reflection, that there are thinking ones: experience assures us 
 of the existence of such beings ; and that the one hath a power to 
 move body by impulse, the other by thought : this we cannot doubt 
 
 of. But beyond these ideas, as received from their proper sources, 
 
 our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire farther into their 
 nature, causes and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension 
 clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any far- 
 ther, one is as easy as the other ; and there is no more difficulty to 
 conceive how a substance we know not should, by thought, set body 
 into motion, than how a substance we know not should, by impulse, 
 set body into motion." Essay on Understanding, B. 11. c. xxiii. 
 s. 28. 
 
ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 174 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 175 
 
 next consequence (p. 107.) is, that, although the 
 body may be resolved into its elements, the mind 
 cannot be so resolved— having no parts— being 
 absolutely one and simple. This consequence is 
 enlarged upon from page 108 to page 111; in a 
 manner which, however well intended, really in- 
 volves the subject in uncertainty. Whether His 
 Lordship employed so much disquisition, from 
 an impression that the argument had been neg- 
 lected by preceding writers, I know not ; but, in 
 truth, the argument is common to nearly all who 
 have touched upon the natural evidences of a 
 future state. It will be sufficient to give the 
 observations of Dr Clarke, on the subject : 
 
 "Since the powers and faculties of the soul are the 
 most remote and distant from all the known properties of 
 matter that can be imagined, it is at least a putting great 
 violence upon our reason to imagine them superadded by 
 
 Omnipotence to one and the same substance It is 
 
 highly unreasonable and absurd to suppose the soul made 
 up of innumerable consciousnesses, as matter is necessa- 
 rily made up of innumerable parts ; and on the contrary, 
 it is highly reasonable to believe the seat of thought to be 
 a simple substance, such as cannot naturally be divided 
 and crumbled into pieces, as all matter is subject to 
 
 be Consequently the Soul will not be liable to be 
 
 dissolved at the dissolution of the body; and therefore 
 
 it will naturally be immortal. All this seems to follow, 
 at least with the highest degree of probability, from the 
 single consideration of the Soul's being endued with sense, 
 thought or consciousness."* 
 
 For the purpose of illustrating the possibility 
 of the existence and activity of the mind inde- 
 pendently of matter, Lord Brougham has recourse, 
 in the next place, to some experiments upon the 
 corporeal frame, during sleep — when " the bodily 
 functions,*" those at least which depend upon vo- 
 lition, are suspended. The experiments in ques- 
 tion are effected by means of such external 
 applications to the senses as can be ventured 
 upon " without awakening the sleeper."" ..." The 
 consequence," His Lordship observes, " of the ces- 
 sation which takes place of all communication of 
 ideals through the senses^ is that the action of 
 the mind, and above all, of those powers con- 
 nected with the imagination, becomes much more 
 vigorous and uninterrupted. This is shown in 
 two ways— first, by the celerity with which any 
 impression upcm the senses^ strong enough to be 
 felt without awaking, is caught up and made 
 the groundwork of a new train of ideas, the mind 
 
 * Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, Prop. iv. 
 
176 
 
 SECTION 111. 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 177 
 
 instantly accommodating itself to the suggestions 
 of the impression, and making all its thoughts 
 chime in with that; and secondly, by the pro- 
 digiously long succession of images that pass 
 through the mind, with perfect distinctness and 
 liveliness, in an instant of timer Now, even 
 prior to all information respecting the nature of 
 the experiments to be tried, do we not feel that 
 there is something like a contradiction between 
 the expressions which I have given in Italics? In 
 other words, if " an impression upon the senses 
 is caught up," how can there be " a cessation of 
 all communication of ideas through the senses?" 
 But to proceed to the experiments themselves: 
 
 " Every one knows the efiFect of a bottle of hot water 
 applied during sleep to the soles of the feet: you in- 
 stantly dream of walking over hot mould, or ashes, or a 
 stream of lava, or having your feet burnt by coming too 
 near the fire. But the effect of falling asleep in a stream 
 of cold air, as in an open carnage varies this experiment 
 in a very interesting, and, indeed, instructive manner. You 
 will, instantly that the wind begins to blow, dream of be- 
 ing upon some exposed point, and anxious for shelter, but 
 unable to reach it; then you are on the deck of a ship, 
 suffering from the gale— you run behind a sail for shelter, 
 and the wind changes, so that it still blows upon you— 
 you are driven to the cabin, but the ladder is removed, 
 
 r; 
 
 
 f 
 
 or the door locked. Presently you are on shore, in a 
 house with all the windows open, and endeavour to shut 
 them in vain; or seeing a smith's forge, you are attracted 
 by the fire, and suddenly a hundred bellows play upon 
 it, and extinguish it in an instant, but fill the whole 
 smithy with their blast, till you are as cold as on the 
 road." (pp. 112, 113.) 
 
 Mr Dugald Stewart mentions some external 
 applications of the same kind— not as experiments, 
 but as remedies; and infers, from their effects, 
 that "our dreams are frequently suggested to us 
 by bodily sensations.". ..." I have," he observes, 
 " been told by a friend, that having occasion, in 
 consequence of indisposition, to apply a bottle of 
 hot water to his feet when he went to bed, he 
 dreamed that he was making a journey to the 
 top of Mount ^tna, and that he found the heat 
 of the ground almost insupportable. Another per- 
 son, having a blister applied to his head, dreamed 
 that he was scalped by a party of Indians." Such 
 I take to be the origin of Lord Brougham's ex- 
 periments. The bodOy frame is out of order; 
 and a blister is applied to the head, or a bottle 
 of hot water to the feet. Whatever the effect 
 may be, who shall decide how much is to be 
 attributed to disorder, and how much to the 
 
 M 
 
178 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 bottle or the blister ? When Mr Stewart adds— 
 "I believe every one, who is in the habit of 
 dreaming, will recollect instances, in his own case, 
 of a similar nature''— we see the limitation in- 
 troduced, namely, "one who is in the habit of 
 dreaming r and we ought also to consider the 
 limitation implied, namely, one who is suffering 
 from bodily indisposition. From such particular 
 premises there is no warrant to draw general 
 
 conclusions.* 
 
 Supposing however, for the sake of argument. 
 Lord Brougham's representations to be correct, 
 their real tendency is only to show to what a 
 perturbed state of existence, to what a perverted 
 activity, some of the mental faculties are con- 
 signed, during sleep. We learn from such repre- 
 sentations the excitability and wildness of the 
 Imagination, under the circumstances ahready de- 
 tailed ; and the importance of its being under the 
 direction of the reasoning powers. Something 
 indeed, of the kind above described, may have 
 happened to an individual, once in his life-time, 
 even when perfectly well— or, from peculiar tem- 
 perament, may have happened to him more than 
 
 • Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. i. p. 336. 
 
 1^ 
 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 179 
 
 once; but how great is the number of persons to 
 whom nothing of the kind ever has happened, or 
 ever will happen, or indeed ever could happen ! 
 In making experiments upon things material — 
 after many trials producing an invariable result, 
 we may safely rely upon the information derived 
 from a process of induction so decisive; while the 
 cases here dwelt upon serve but to convince us 
 of our inability to subject the mind to direct 
 experiment, and thus teach us the propriety of 
 not drawing our conclusions, in mental philosophy, 
 from such methods of investigation. This, at least, 
 is the only opinion which a full consideration of 
 the subject has enabled me to form. If I am in 
 error, my mistake can do no harm — inasmuch 
 as the reader has the means placed before him, 
 of judging for himself. 
 
 For reasons similar to those just stated, I am 
 unable to perceive how any doctrine, respecting 
 the human mind, can be satisfactorily established 
 •on some other experiments subsequently men- 
 tioned by Lord Brougham. If we take the case 
 of the man "who being extremely overpowered 
 with drowsiness — as after sitting up all night, 
 and sleeping none the next day — lies down, and 
 
 u 2 
 
^mmsmmmm^r. 
 
 180 
 
 SECTION III 
 
 begins to dictate:''— the first thing that strikes 
 us is the strange condition and employment oi 
 the person, the operations of whose mind we 
 are about to observe. " He will^ as His Lord- 
 ship truly predicates, " find himself falling asleep 
 after uttering a few words.'' The next part of 
 the business is not so self-evident. " He will be 
 awakened by the person who writes repeating 
 the last word, to show he has written the whole ; 
 not above five or six seconds may elapse, and 
 the sleeper will find it at first quite impossible 
 to believe that he has not been asleep for hours, 
 and will chide the amanuensis for having fallen 
 asleep over his work— so great apparently will 
 be the length of the dream he has dreamt, ex- 
 tending through half a lifetime." (p. lU.) And 
 this intercourse between the dozing dogmatist 
 and the unhappy scribe is supposed to continue 
 for some time. To estimate the matter arith- 
 metically. His Lordship supposes the amanuensis 
 to write two words in a second, and four words* 
 to be dictated at once. There are, then, two 
 seconds between each act of dictation; and if 
 half that interval be consumed in falling asleep, 
 the dream, which "seems to last for years,'' is 
 
 0^ 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 181 
 
 in reality but for one second. With such rapidity 
 do the images of things pass through the human 
 mind ! Now, in the first place, the circum- 
 stances here detailed, if intended to furnish general 
 conclusions, ought to be general in their occurrence ; 
 whereas there are very few, I suspect, by whose 
 experience they have ever been confirmed. In the 
 second pJace, the mere wanderings of the imagi- 
 nation, during so feverish a state of the body, 
 can afibrd no criterion of the healthy and unob- 
 structed operations of the intellectual powers In 
 
 fine, I would compress my opinion of all these, 
 and all similar experiments, into one question — 
 How is it possible — by means of such mechanical 
 kinds of operations of the senses — to ascertain any 
 thing, respecting the nature and properties of the 
 mind, when the whole system of the bodily 
 functions shall be no more.f^ 
 
 In addition to such experiments and reason- 
 ings, the Noble Author has given several in- 
 stances of remarkable dreams, occasioned by cor- 
 poreal pain or excitement of mind; the inferences 
 from which are all liable to the various objections 
 just adduced. If, however, the reader is curious 
 about the subject, he will refer to the ' Discourse,' 
 
182 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 pp. 115—118.) and determine for himself what 
 weight is really due to the statements there pre- 
 sented. 
 
 On leaving the topics above mentioned, Lord 
 Brougham occupies much the same ground with 
 that previously taken by Bishop Butler, in the 
 first chapter of his Analogy-On a future state. 
 Did the limits, which I have assigned to myself, 
 allow me, I should gladly discuss this part of 
 the argument ; but having dwelt so long on the 
 preceding subjects, I will only recommend that 
 His Lordship^s observations (pp. 118—126.) should 
 be perused in connexion with the disquisitions of 
 that great prelate. 
 
 Before I pass on, to the second head, I will 
 venture to mention an argument, for the imma- 
 teriality of the soul, which Lord Brougham might, 
 perhaps not improperly, have introduced into this 
 part of his * Discourse.' The argument depends 
 upon the inertness— the inability to move of itself, 
 which is proved by all observation and experi- 
 ment to be a property of matter— contrasted with 
 the power of originating motion, which is in- 
 disputably possessed by the human mind. This 
 distinction between mind and matter deserves the 
 
 -♦ 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 183 
 
 most attentive consideration. Bishop Butler has 
 availed himself of the distinction, in the chapter 
 just referred to ; and Mr Andrew Baxter has en- 
 larged upon it, with great effect, in his Inquiry 
 into the nature of the Human Scnil!^*. . ." A power 
 of beginning motion," says Mr Dugald Stewart, 
 "is an attribute of mind, no less than sensation 
 and thought; and wherever motion commences, 
 we have evidence that mind has operated."*' t 
 
 ii. moral argument, or evidence of the 
 Deity's designs, drawn from his attri- 
 butes IN CONNEXION WITH THE CONDITION 
 OF THE SPECIES. 
 
 The study of the works of creation, as daily 
 exhibited to our view, has ever been deemed, by 
 thinking men, one of the most certain means of 
 acquiring valuable knowledge ; and of the world 
 within us, we may with truth affirm, that its 
 wonders, if duly contemplated, cannot fail to 
 afford increase of wisdom. The soul of man, 
 in its very nature, bears tokens of a divine 
 origin, as well as a destination to eternal life; 
 and although, while carefully examining the tex- 
 
 * The first edition of the work was published without date, the 
 second in 1737 
 
 t Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 165. 
 
184 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 ture (so to speak) of the human mind, we some- 
 times find it enwrought with mysterious characters 
 — those very characters impress us strongly with 
 the idea of their having been inscribed by the 
 finger of God. But amidst much that is obscure 
 in the intellectual frame, we there discover un- 
 questionable intimations of a future state of 
 existence; and the time is now come to inquire 
 how far those intimations are confirmed by the 
 information, which we have been able to obtain, 
 
 respecting the attributes of the Deity There 
 
 is, indeed, a certain temper and disposition, which 
 is peculiarly suited to investigations of this nature ; 
 and on no occasion could Lord Brougham have 
 more properly enforced the necessity of a ** humble 
 and submissive spirit,'' than that on which he has 
 done so — namely, when he was about to consider 
 the attributes and designs of the Deity, as affecting 
 the destiny of the human race. 
 
 The first argument employed by Lord Brough- 
 am, in proof of a future state of existence, is 
 drawn from the goodness of God, conjointly with 
 the desire of immortality common to all men. 
 The benevolence of the Deity is manifested by 
 His providential arrangements for the temporal 
 
 l^'i 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 185 
 
 well-being of our species. Not only does the mind 
 appear by its very nature destined for immor- 
 tality — but even the certain knowledge of the 
 inevitable dissolution of the body cannot abate 
 the expectation of endless life. If, then, that 
 life be a reality, how clearly do we see the com- 
 plete accordance between the goodness of God, 
 and the hopes of future existence which he has 
 implanted in the mind. In short, suppose that we 
 are intended for endless life — and the intimations 
 of it which have been afforded, and the longings 
 after it which form part of ourselves, correspond 
 exactly with other manifestations of the Creator's 
 superintending care: — suppose the contrary — and 
 we involve that portion of the Divine dispensa- 
 tions, which is of the deepest moment to the 
 whole human race, in perplexity not to be dis- 
 entangled. Under such circumstances, our un- 
 derstandings will not permit us to hesitate about 
 
 drawing our conclusions The Noble Author has 
 
 treated the subject in other and better language — 
 which I recommend to the reader's attention. 
 
 In connexion with the longing after immor- 
 tality, may be mentioned the improvement of 
 which the mental powers are susceptible, as life 
 
 X 
 
186 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 ]\\ 
 
 I 
 
 HI 
 
 advances — their more extended range through the 
 material and intellectual worlds — their growing 
 anticipations of higher and better modes of ex- 
 istence than experience has afforded, or even 
 imagination suggested. This capacity of the 
 mind, for greater attainments, in whatever con- 
 stitutes the excellence of our rational nature, 
 seems to assure us, in the most agreeable and 
 convincing manner, that the present state of 
 existence is but introductory to another — in 
 which our faculties will be directed to objects 
 stai more brightly reflecting the Divine Per- 
 fections. 
 
 Lord Brougham next adverts to the affections 
 of our nature, as combining, with our sense of 
 the Divine goodness, to assure us of a future 
 existence. No doubt, the importance of those 
 affections, during the present life, is abundantly 
 manifest; and did they cease with the apparent 
 termination of the relations which called them 
 forth, no farther account of them could be re- 
 quired. But when we consider them as, in num- 
 berless instances, continuing unimpaired by the 
 separation caused by death— the fact seems to 
 afford grounds of hope that the separation will 
 
 , 
 
 v-Tj 
 
 KTHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 187 
 
 be but temporary; and that, in another state, 
 our best sympathies will still exist, and under 
 happier auspices. Lord Brougham has touched 
 the subject with great feeling; and when his 
 reflections on this occasion are compared with 
 a remarkable passage at the close of his Dedica- 
 tion to Earl Spencer, we have convincing evi- 
 dence of that kindliness of disposition which is 
 attributed to the Noble Author, by those to 
 whom he is intimately known. In truth, I can 
 easily imagine him to have frequently derived far 
 greater satisfaction from the recurrence of such 
 sentiments, than he has ever derived from the 
 recollection of all the triumphs of his eloquence, 
 and all the various achievements of his extra- 
 ordinary powers. ... There may occasionally be 
 discovered in the following extract— as in much 
 of His Lordship's writing— an attempt to add 
 strength to the argument by giving force to the 
 expression— an attempt which scarcely ever suc- 
 ceeds, by whomsoever it may be made:— in 
 other respects, the extract will be read with 
 
 pleasure by every one. 
 
 " The tender aflFections so strongly and so universally 
 operating in our nature aflford another argument of a 
 like kind. No doubt the purpose to which they are sub- 
 
 ) • 
 
w 
 
 W 
 
 188 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 servient in this life is much more distinctly perceivable; 
 yet still it is inconsistent with the provisions of a bene- 
 volent Power to suppose that we should be made sus- 
 ceptible of such vehement feelings, and be suffered to 
 indulge in them, so as to make our happiness chiefly 
 consist in their gratification, and that then we should 
 suddenly be made to undergo the bitter pangs of sepa- 
 ration, while, by our surviving, those pains are lengthened 
 out without any useful effect resulting from our suffer- 
 ings. That such separations should be eternal appears 
 irreconcilable with the strength of the affections wounded, 
 and with the goodness so generally perceived in the order 
 of the universe. The supposition of a re-union hereafter 
 overcomes the difficulty, and reconciles the apparent in- 
 consistency." (p. 129.) 
 
 Amongst the most remarkable indications of 
 a future life, Lord Brougham justly numbers 
 those feelings of our nature which attest their 
 existence, by religious observances of one kind 
 or other, in whatever region of the earth human 
 beings are to be found. Every age has witnessed 
 the universal prevalence of such observances; 
 which, originating in apprehensions, inseparable 
 from the mind itself, of an unseen world, will 
 unquestionably continue, through all succeeding 
 generations, to indicate the hopes and fears which 
 will still agitate the human breast. Now, it is 
 not easy to believe that such apprehensions can 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 189 
 
 be permitted so to occupy the mind, unless they 
 are intended to forewarn men of that state of 
 existence which assuredly shall be hereafter. 
 Those apprehensions, indeed, are of the utmost 
 importance during the present life — as encourage- 
 ments to good, and restraints from evil. If, on 
 this account, an objector should allege that the 
 apprehensions are of the same importance, even 
 supposing there is no future state corresponding 
 to them — nothing, it may be replied, can be 
 imagined more directly opposed to all that we 
 have observed of the Divine proceedings, than 
 the notion that, in a matter of such consequence, 
 the conduct of rational creatures is providentially 
 influenced by hopes which must inevitably be 
 disappointed, and fears of that which shall never 
 come to pass. In this case therefore, as in the 
 instances before adduced, the supposition, that 
 the present life comprises the whole of our ex- 
 istence, involves our earthly condition in utter 
 perplexity — while the assurance of another life 
 accounts for some of the most striking properties 
 of our mental constitution, and eminently displays 
 the wisdom of the appointments of the Deity 
 with regard to us. 
 
190 
 
 SECTION 111. 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 191 
 
 I 
 
 But the great argument of all, in proof of 
 a future existence— I am sorry to record the 
 fact— is despatched by Lord Brougham in the 
 
 following paragraph: 
 
 "The unequal distribution of rewards and punish- 
 ments in this world, that is, the misery in which virtue 
 often exists, and the prosperity not seldom attendant upon 
 vice, can in no way he so well accounted for, consistently 
 with the scheme of a benevolent Providence, as by the 
 supposition of a future state/' (p. 130.) 
 
 When we contrast the strong language em- 
 ployed by Lord Brougham, in enforcing other 
 arguments for a future state, with the slight and 
 almost hesitating manner in which the argument, 
 frmi the unequal distribution of rewards and 
 punishments in this wcrrld, is noticed— we can 
 scarcely avoid feeling some uneasiness of mind; 
 and our uneasiness gains strength, when we re- 
 collect the previous omission (pointed out p. 86.) 
 of all reference to the moral constitution of man, 
 as leading the thoughts to a Moral Governor 
 OF THE WORLD. That a state of final retribu- 
 tion is "consistent with the scheme of a bene- 
 volent Providence'' there can be no doubt— and 
 it is clear that the act of retribution implies the 
 Divine attribute of justice ; but why is the moral 
 
 character of the Deity thus veiled from the sight ? 
 Had the power of conscience been duly insisted 
 upon, in the Psychological branch of the science, 
 with a view of indicating the Moral Attributes 
 of God — here would have been the place to 
 point out its operation in other respects. The 
 judicial authority which conscience bears — the 
 right of acquittal and condemnation which it is 
 commissioned to exercise —the premonitions which 
 it fails not to afford, that its decisions will be 
 ratified hereafter — might on this occasion have 
 been introduced with great advantage. To that 
 topic would naturally have succeeded the various 
 intimations that men are, during the present life, 
 in a state of probation ; so that on their con- 
 duct while on this earth will depend their future 
 welfare. And finally. His Lordship might have 
 availed himself of the considerations which, not- 
 withstanding the moral disorders abounding in 
 the world, lead us to infer that God is no in- 
 different spectator of virtue and of vice ; that 
 the marks of his righteous dispensations are even 
 now perceptible; and that such inferences, com- 
 bined with the evidences of the Divine attri- 
 butes derived from other sources, fully warrant 
 
192 
 
 SECTION III 
 
 our belief in an ultimate adjudication of every 
 one's lot, in strict accordance with his real cha- 
 racter. ... Discussions like these would have well 
 become the Ethical department of Natural Theo- 
 logy; and the omission of them cannot fail to 
 excite the most serious regret. 
 
 Lord Brougham closes his review of the 
 Ethical department of Natural Theology, by 
 comparing the weights of the arguments respect- 
 ively resulting from the first and the second 
 divisions of this branch of the subject. "The 
 most satisfactory proofs," he observes, "of the 
 soul's immortality are those of the first, or psy- 
 chological class, derived from studying the nature 
 of mind; those of the second class which we 
 have been surveying, derived from the condition 
 of man in connexion with the attributes of the 
 Deity, are less distinct and cogent." If His 
 Lordship intends to maintain, as I conclude he 
 does, that the entire evidence with regard to a 
 future state, afforded by the nature of the human 
 mind, is more "distinct and cogent" than the 
 evidence afforded by the condition of man in 
 connexion with the attributes of the Deity- 
 I cannot but tWnk that he has formed a very 
 
 nil! 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 193 
 
 \ 
 
 i 
 
 erroneous estimate of the matter. Suppose the 
 mind to be, by its very nature, secure of exist- 
 ence after the bodily frame shall have been re- 
 solved into its component particles — who can 
 tell, from that consideration alone, whether the 
 mind''s future being may not consist in mere con- 
 sciousness — or in restless activity — without hap- 
 piness and without hope? The truth is, that, 
 after reflection on the immaterial nature of the 
 human mind has given probability to the opinion 
 that it will survive the body, we must have re- 
 course to all the other intimations of a future 
 state which we can discover — all the aspirations, 
 the capabilities, the sympathies, the moral and 
 religious apprehensions of our intellectual nature — 
 all the indications that we are now in a state of 
 trial — all the manifestations of the power and 
 wisdom and goodness and justice of God — be- 
 fore we can indulge in any thing like rational 
 hopes of reward for those who take heed to that 
 which is right. Mr Dugald Stewart appears to 
 have somewhat understated the value of the 
 argument derived from "the nature of mind;"" 
 but his view of its bearing upon the whole ques- 
 tion is assuredly far more correct than that of 
 
 N 
 
*tf 
 
 1 
 
 u 
 
 194 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 195 
 
 Lord Brougham. "In collecting^ says Mr Stewart, 
 " the various evidences which the light of nature 
 affords for a future state, too much stress has 
 commonly been laid upon the souFs Immateriality. 
 The proper use of that doctrine is not to de- 
 monstrate that the soul is physically and neces- 
 sarily immortal; but to refute the objections 
 which have been urged against the possibility of 
 its existing in a separate state from the body. 
 Although our knowledge of the nature of Mind 
 may not be sufficient to afford us any positive 
 argument on the subject ; yet, if it can be shown 
 that the dissolution of the body does not neces- 
 sarily infer the extinction of the soul ; and still 
 more, if it can be shown that the presumption 
 is in favour of the contrary supposition; the 
 moral proofs of a future retribution will meet 
 with a more easy reception, when the doctrine 
 is freed from the metaphysical difficulties which 
 it has been apprehended to involve.''. . ."Where,'' 
 he also asks, "is the sober Metaphysician to be 
 found, who now speaks of the immortality of the 
 soul as a logical consequence of its immateriality ; 
 instead of considering it as depending on the will 
 of that Being by whom it was at first called into 
 
 existence? And, on the other hand, is it not 
 universally admitted by the best philosophers, that 
 whatever hopes the light of nature encourages 
 beyond the present scene, rest solely (like all 
 other anticipations of future events) on the gene- 
 ral tenor and analogy of the laws by which we 
 perceive the universe to be governed." * These 
 sentiments of Mr Stewart might be confirmed 
 by quotations from writers who do not advance 
 opinions without due reflection; but it is be- 
 lieved that little more can be needed to enable 
 the reader to form a correct judgment on the 
 point at issue. 
 
 The mind — even if, by the nature with which 
 it has been endowed, not liable to destruction — is 
 
 * Outlines of Moral Philosophy, p. 209, and Dissertation on 
 the progress of Metaphysical Philosophy, Part i. p. 88. It may 
 here be observed that Lord Brougham's division of the Ethical 
 part of Natural Theology seems to have been derived from the 
 ' Outlines' of Mr Dugald Stevi^art ; who in that work treats — 1. Of 
 the argument for a Future State, derived from tlte nature of mind — 
 and 2. Of the Evidences for a Future State, arisin;'; from the Human 
 Constitution, and from the circumstances in which 7nan is placed. 
 (pp. 209, 217.) Let me farther state, that the general arrangement 
 of the * Discourse' very closely resembles that adopted by Dr Crom- 
 bie, in his excellent work on Natural Theology, already referred to. 
 I have, however, good reason to believe that Dr Crombie's work 
 was unknown to Tord Brougham, till loni? after his ' Discourse' 
 was published. 
 
 N 2 
 

 196 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 still dependent for existence on the Supreme Being. 
 Wliat has been created may be annihilated-may 
 be disposed of, according to the pleasure of the 
 Creator. The case of the human soul is not a 
 case of simple existence - apart from all other 
 considerations. There are moral considerations 
 which may seriously affect its destiny. In our 
 anxiety, therefore, for information respecting our 
 future condition, we must have recourse, not so 
 much to the nature of the mind, as to the various 
 intimations of the Divine Will, which have been 
 vouchsafed to us, on the subject. 
 
 On looking over the Ethical Branch of Na- 
 tural Theology, as treated by Lord Brougham, 
 it presents so little which can properly be caUed 
 Ethical, that some curiosity is excited, to revert 
 to the Introduction to the ' Discourse' ; for the 
 purpose of ascertaining how far the original plan 
 has been carried into effect. Lord Brougham, 
 then, in his introductory remarks, seems to con- 
 sider Natural Theology as having two objects :— 
 1. "the discovery of the existence and attributes 
 of a Creator, by investigating the evidences of 
 design, in the works of the creation, material 
 as well as spiritual"— which was intended for 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 197 
 
 
 the Physical and Psychological branches; — and 
 2. "the discovery of his will and probable inten- 
 tions with regard to his creatures, their conduct 
 and their duty'*"' — which was reserved for the 
 Ethical branch. When however, as the reader 
 will find stated in page 16'5, we arrive at the 
 section appropriated to the Ethical branch, we 
 are simply told that it comprises "the probable 
 designs of the Deity with regard to the future 
 destiny of his creatures;*" — and thus, all that 
 relates to "their conduct and their duty" — from 
 which, in fact, the Ethical branch derives its 
 name — is dropped by the way. The conduct 
 and the duty of men are not touched upon in 
 the course of the section; nor do I recollect 
 that they are brought forward in any other part 
 of the ' Discourse.' If it be said that the Will 
 of God, with regard to the conduct and duty 
 of men, forms the subject of Moral Philosophy, 
 and therefore could not j)roperly be introduced 
 into a 'Discourse of Natural Theology '' — the 
 reply is easy — that the plan of the work, as 
 described in the Introduction was most undoubt- 
 edly the result of very different views of the 
 matter. But to state every thing fairly, had the 
 
 i 
 
|Qg SECTION III. 
 
 subject of Morals been discussed, the Noble Au- 
 thor must have extended the limits which he had 
 probably assigned to himself; unless, indeed, there 
 had been -what I think there might have been, 
 without any disadvantage— considerable omissions 
 and abbreviations, in various parts of the work. 
 At the same time, if the neglect, here observed 
 upon, be in any way connected with the neg- 
 lect, previously pointed out, of certain moral 
 bearings of the subjects under consideration— 
 the proceeding cannot be too strongly condemned. 
 However the case may be, the omitting to place, 
 distinctly before the readers mind, the Moral 
 attributes of God— the Moral nature of man— 
 and the Moral conduct of man— will be deemed, 
 by thinking persons, most detrimental to the credit 
 of the ' Discourse; The defect is the more re- 
 markable, in consequence of Lord Brougham^s 
 censure of Dr Paley, for omitting to elucidate in 
 his Natural Theology— what he never promised 
 even to notice-" the designs of God respecting our 
 future existence, and our principles and conduct 
 
 in this life. 
 
 ^ * 
 
 '^ Set pp. Ic— 'i'i. 
 
 ETHICAL BRANCH. 
 
 199 
 
 \ 
 
 The subject of Morals is much too weighty 
 and extensive, to admit of discussion at the end 
 of a Section — more especially, in a work like the 
 present. In what consists the difference between 
 that which is right and that which is wrong, 
 in liuman conduct— how we become sensible of 
 the distinction — on what principles, and from 
 what motives, we choose the right— are questions 
 which, for more than a century and a half, have 
 exercised the talents of some of the ablest au- 
 thors whom this country lias produced. Although 
 those of my readers, who are acquainted with 
 the literary history of that period, need not the 
 information, it may be advisable to state that I 
 particulariy refer to the labours of Cudworth, 
 Cumberiand, Clarke, Butler, Hutcheson, Adam 
 Smith, Paley, Dugald Stewart and Brown. In 
 
 1 
 
ir I . ' 
 
 200 
 
 SECTION 111, 
 
 the writings of these eminent men, the subject 
 is presented in a great variety of views — which 
 cannot fail to enlarge the student's mind. The 
 systems adopted by them, even when different, 
 are seldom contradictory; and the very fact — 
 that there are so many considerations which 
 separately point out the same conduct, as that 
 which men ought to pursue — manifests in the 
 most striking manner the futi]ity and danger of 
 all attempts to withdraw themselves from the 
 power of moral obligation. 
 
 201 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 ADVANTAGES OP THE STUDY OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 (Discourse, Part II. pp. 175 — 213.) 
 
 LoED Brougham has discoursed, on the advan- 
 tages arising from the study of Natural Theo- 
 logy, with so much eloquence and ability — and 
 indeed they are of themselves so manifest — that 
 my remarks on the subject may with great pro- 
 priety be but few and brief. The study is con- 
 sidered, by His Lordship, as affording, first, the 
 pleasures which attend scientific pursuits in general 
 —secondly, the pleasures and advantages peculiar 
 to itself — and thirdly, aid to the cause of Revela- 
 tion. The last of these topics is that which will 
 require the greatest attention; but let each of 
 them be taken in its order. 
 
 I. That the pleasures attendant on scientific 
 pursuits belong to the study of Natural Theology 
 will not be disputed, when it is borne in mind 
 that the study is founded on the knowledge of 
 
I. f 
 
 202 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 i 
 
 nature — on science in general. He who reads 
 the book of nature for himself proceeds from 
 fact to fact : observes things, connected with each 
 other by resemblances with shades of difference — 
 and separated by diversity with marks of resem- 
 blance: is struck with instances followed by in- 
 stances of affinities and dependencies and adjust- 
 ments and co-operations. He who, for the pur- 
 pose of enlarging his views, has recourse to the 
 labours of others — whether affording information, 
 or presenting artificial means of improving the 
 power of observation — finds his knowledge of 
 the processes of nature, and the mutual relations 
 they involve, greatly increased. He who, in 
 addition to such methods of inquiry, avails him- 
 self of the light of mathematical science, to as- 
 sist him in his researches into physical [)heno- 
 mena, is amply repaid by the new and surprising 
 lustre shed upon facts previously known, as well 
 as by the discovery of numberless other facts, 
 which only that science can enable him to com- 
 prehend. Whatever, besides, can be ascertained 
 respecting the moral and intellectual faculties of 
 tlie human race— and the moral tendencies of the 
 svstem of which wc form a part — is of the ut- 
 
 'i 
 
 4 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 203 
 
 most importance to him who has the leisure and 
 the capacity to collect and examine the various 
 indications, which are presented, of the truth of 
 the doctrines of Natural Theology. A science, 
 so connected with the physical, the intellectual 
 and the moral world, cannot fail to abound in 
 interesting objects of contemplation. So long, 
 therefore, as accessions of knowledge, derived 
 from the most extensive range of observation, 
 of experiment and of reasoning, can gratify the 
 human mind, the student of Natural Theology 
 may be secure of finding, in his investigations, 
 that satisfaction which is pecuUar to mental exer- 
 tions in the pursuit of truth. AVe are, indeed, 
 so formed as to be delighted even with truth in 
 the abstract, without regard to what Bacon calls 
 its "gross and material utility;" with a mathe- 
 matical theorem, for instance, a physical fact, a 
 law of nature — independently of its application 
 to practical purposes. We love to generalize; to 
 trace resemblances and analogies; to compare the 
 quantities of things. We are fond of resolving 
 what is complex into its simplest elements, and 
 verifying our results by the reverse operation. 
 We feel an elevation of mind in accompanying 
 
 I 
 
I. «' 
 
 V 
 
 .J 
 
 204 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 ft 
 
 the great Masters of Science in their discoveries, 
 and beholding the mysteries of nature laid open 
 
 before us But although the satisfaction arising 
 
 from our inquiries into the constitution of nature 
 is amply sufficient to incite us to perseverance — 
 yet, on reflection, we cannot but feel some anxiety 
 respecting the purposes to which the knowledge 
 we have obtained may be applied. And here, the 
 subject takes two directions: — the one leading to 
 the uses of our knowledge with regard to the 
 present life — the other, to its uses in a Theo- 
 logical point of view. After a very few remarks 
 upon the former of these topics, I shall discuss 
 the latter in the second division of the section. 
 
 By observing the processes throughout the 
 system of the Universe — by studying the mecha- 
 nism (so to speak) of the material world, with 
 the various compensations and adjustments which 
 every where abound — men learn various modes 
 of applying the powers of nature. In a limited 
 sphere, they acquire a dominion over the ele- 
 ments, which they may almost be said to wield 
 at pleasure. They are thus enabled to make 
 their knowledge of external things conducive to 
 the well-being and embellishment of private life ; 
 
 I 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 205 
 
 facilitate the intercourse of communities ; and es- 
 sentially contribute to the prosperity of empires. 
 
 It is to the relations of things— their mu- 
 tual adaptations— and the purposes to which 
 they are subservient— that, as has been stated 
 again and again, the attention is especially di- 
 rected by Natural Theology; and in no other 
 points of view are the objects of our contem- 
 plation capable of filling the mind with finer 
 feelings of delight and admiration. There is, 
 moreover, such a tendency to similarity in those 
 ends and adjustments, that the student is speedily 
 led by them to compare results — to form classes 
 —to establish systems. Long-continued observa- 
 tion at last warrants probable conjecture. The 
 careful interpreter of nature becomes the saga- 
 cious prophet. One age has announced to it the 
 anticipations of the philosopher— another wit- 
 nesses their fulfilment. 
 
 Lord Brougham, following the footsteps of 
 Mr Dugald Stewart, has very properly made 
 some remarks, with a view of showing how im- 
 portant, to the extension of physical knowledge, 
 is the consideration of the purposes of things, 
 required by Natural Theology. From the dili- 
 
 n 
 
•206 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Il' 
 
 gent study of natural phenomena, a conviction 
 arises, that all things are useful in one way or 
 another; so that, whenever the student finds an 
 object, of the tendency of which he can give 
 no account, he at once attributes his embarrass- 
 ment to his own ignorance. His curiosity is 
 excited; and in his subsequent endeavours to 
 resolve the difficulty, he probably lights upon 
 some unexpected manifestation of the wonderful 
 economy of nature. By attentively considering 
 the reason that could be assigned for the valves 
 of the veins, Harvey was led to discover the cir- 
 culation of the blood The anecdote, as first 
 
 related by Mr Boyle, is given by Lord Brougham, 
 in the 185th page of his 'Discourse,' and by Mr 
 Stewart, in the 185th page of his 'Outlines of 
 Moral Philosophy.' In this part of his Lordship's 
 work, there are many observations well deserving 
 attention. But I must now pass on to the second 
 head. 
 
 II. What has already been advanced leads 
 us to conclude that the study of Natural Theology 
 has its peculiar pleasures and advantages. In the 
 first place, indisputable relations, dependencies, 
 adjustments, ends, purposes — or whatever term 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 207 
 
 \ 
 
 \ 
 
 m I 
 
 I 
 
 may be employed— indicate contrivance— -under- 
 standing— foreknowledge. We feel, indeed, that 
 it was not by some slow and cautious process 
 of reasoning, that the Supreme Intelligence pro- 
 duced the results we witness — however astonish- 
 ing the mode in which they are connected with 
 each other; but we feel also that, by a careful 
 and modest application of the faculties, with 
 which we have been endowed, to the Divine pro- 
 ductions, we may become wiser, and yet more 
 sensible of our ignorance, as we contemplate " the 
 manifold wisdom of God."* The tracing of de- 
 sign in the works of the creation furnishes a 
 wholesome exercise to the intellectual powers. 
 Such an employment calls forth our ingenuity — 
 strengthens our reason — and delights our imagina- 
 tion. Moreover, by constantly referring every 
 thing to a Creating and Superintending Mind, 
 we can scarcely fail to preserve a solemn im- 
 pression of responsibility, in the conduct of our 
 inquiries; and to recollect that we aee in the 
 PRESENCE OF GoD. . . .In the second place, the 
 study now treated of is not one which can be 
 
 * Eph. iii. 10. II TToXviroiKiXo^ arotpia tov Beov, is the beautiful 
 expression of the original. 
 
208 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 209 
 
 il 
 
 it 
 
 I'll 
 
 pursued only in our libraries— amidst books of 
 science, and various kinds of experimental ap- 
 paratus: — not one which is confined to some 
 favoured region of the earth, especially abounding 
 in the materials adapted to such investigations: — 
 every climate furnishes ample means for the 
 purpose— and, like the air that is breathed, 
 without expense. The appearances of nature are 
 obvious to all; and though superior talents and 
 learning, in these as well as other pursuits, se- 
 cure important advantages to the philosophical 
 inquirer— yet the art of observing the arrange- 
 ments and processes of the material world, so as 
 greatly to inform and gratify the mind, is under 
 the ordinary circumstances of life by no means 
 of difficult attainment. . . .In the last place, the 
 study of Natural Theology traces every thing that 
 exists, from that which by its minuteness eludes 
 the unaided senses, to that which overwhelms 
 the imagination by its magnitude — every law 
 that is observed to prevail throughout the vast 
 extent of the visible creation — to the will of 
 God ; and thus, the peculiar kind of contemplation 
 which is required constantly tends, by its very 
 nature, to exalt our conceptions of the power 
 
 
 \ 
 
 \ 
 
 and wisdom and good providence of the Creator. 
 This habitual ascent of the thoughts, from things 
 material to the Supreme Being, can scarcely fail 
 to have a permanently beneficial effect upon the 
 minds and characters of men; and when we con- 
 sider the intimations, in various ways presented 
 to us, of a future existence, the condition of 
 which as to happiness will depend upon our moral 
 improvement in this life, we cannot but feel that 
 such views of the economy of the world are of 
 the deepest interest to us, as creatures designed 
 for immortality. ... It is, then, not merely for 
 the confutation of those who believe not in the 
 being of a wise and righteous Governor of the 
 Universe, that the study of Natural Theology is 
 to be undertaken. When arguments for that 
 purpose have been familiarized to the mind — 
 when we have traced the consequent indications 
 that the present state is appointed for probation, 
 the next for retribution— and satisfied ourselves 
 as to the Divine will, with regard to the dispo- 
 sitions and conduct required of us — the study 
 may still be pursued with pleasure and advantage. 
 New conceptions of the attributes of God will 
 be formed within us; new reasons be suggested, 
 
 o 
 
 M 
 
 L' 
 
I 
 
 l|i 
 
 210 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 for acquiescing in the dispensations of bis pro- 
 vidence; and new incitements aiforded, for adora- 
 tion of his greatness and obedience to his laws. . . . 
 On these topics, my limits will not allow me to 
 expatiate; and therefore, content to have thrown 
 out a few imperfect hints respecting them, I refer 
 those readers who would wish to see considerations 
 of that kind eloquently enforced— to the pages of 
 Lord Brougham. 
 
 III. We have now to ascertain the aid, 
 rendered by the study of Natural Theology, to 
 the cause of Revelation; or, in other words, 
 the connexion between Natural and Revealed 
 Religion. Such an inquiry seems to be right in 
 itself; and indeed becomes quite indispensable, 
 under the circumstances stated by Lord Brougham, 
 
 in the following terms: 
 
 "An objection [against Natural Theology] has some- 
 times proceeded, unexpectedly, from the friends of Reve- 
 lation — who have been known, without due reflection, to 
 contend, that by the light of unassisted reason we can 
 know absolutely nothing of God and a Future State. 
 They appear to be alarmed lest the progress of Natural 
 Religion should prove dangerous to the acceptance of 
 Revealed; lest the former should, as it were, be taken 
 as a substitute for the latter. They argue as if the two 
 systems were rivals, and whatever credit the one gained 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 211 
 
 were so much lost to the other. They seem to think 
 that if any discovery of a First Cause and another world 
 were made by natural reason, it would no longer be true 
 that life and immortality ujere brought to light by the 
 Gospeir (pp. 199, 200.) 
 
 The preceding paragraph is so general in its 
 views of the subject to which it relates, as to 
 leave the mind in great uncertainty with regard 
 to the extent to which the opinions there re- 
 corded have prevailed; and therefore, without 
 attempting — what yet would be neither unin- 
 teresting nor unimportant — a regular history of 
 those opinions — I will endeavour to present a 
 few distinct notices of their rise and progress, 
 since the time of the Reformation. 
 
 So far as I can at present recollect, Socinus 
 — Faustus Socinus — first maintained the opinions 
 mentioned by Lord Brougham. In the life of 
 Socinus, by one of his modern followers and 
 admirers, the following statement occurs: 
 
 "With respect to the power of man to discover, by 
 the light of nature, the being of God, and the truths 
 of what is called Natural Religion, Socinus thought that 
 these principles were above his natural powers; and that 
 the first notices of a Divine Being were derived from 
 Revelation, or immediate communications from God."* 
 
 * Touhnin's Memoirs of Faustus Socinus, 1777. p. 216. 
 
 o 2 
 
 
 mtm 
 
212 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 m 
 
 St PauFs declaration -that the mvisihle things 
 of God^frcm the creation of the ivorld^ are clearly 
 seen, being" understood by the things that are made, 
 even his eternal poiver and Godhead — stood in 
 the way of the opinion, " that it cannot be 
 proved from the creature that there is a God;*" 
 and so was to be set aside by some means or 
 other. Bishop Pearson, in one of his learned 
 notes, has well disposed of what he calls the 
 " pitiful criticisms'" of Socinus, for that purpose — 
 Such then, on these points, were the sentiments 
 of the individual, who is generally accounted the 
 father of the Unitarianism of the present day.* 
 
 During the seventeenth century, the opinions 
 of Socinus did not flourish in this country. 
 The seed was sown, but the ground was not 
 quite prepared for it; nor were there, till after 
 the middle of the eighteenth century, any great 
 signs of vegetation. And the fact is remarkable, 
 that, with the increase of Unitarian doctrines- 
 while they were avowedly maintained by some, 
 and regarded with complacency by others — 
 there undoubtedly was a tendency to a revival 
 of the opinions of Socinus, touching Natural 
 
 * Horn. i. 20. See Pearson on the Creed, Art. i believe in God, 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 215 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 Religion. Indications of the existence of such a 
 tendency may be traced even in our own times. 
 T do not quote the late Bishop Watson, as a 
 person symbolizing with the Unitarians, but as 
 one who appears to have felt no dissatisfaction 
 at the progress of their tenets; and we find 
 him thus expressing his sentiments, respecting a 
 future state, in a letter to Mr Gibbon : " I have 
 no hope of a future existence except that which 
 is grounded on the truth of Christianity." The 
 reason subsequently given to The King, for such 
 a declaration, is certainly a good one, supposing 
 the doctrine involved to be well founded ; but it 
 leaves that point untouched. " I had,'*'' he says, 
 "frequently met with respectable men, who che- 
 rished an expectation of a future state, though 
 they rejected Christianity as an imposture, and 
 I thought my publicly declaring that I was of 
 a contrary opinion might perhaps induce Mr 
 Gibbon, and other such men, to make a deeper 
 investigation into the truth of religion than they 
 had hitherto done.''* The late Mr Gilbert Wake- 
 
 * Bishop Watson's Anecdotes of his own Life, Vol. i. p. 107. 8vo. 
 The letter to Mr Gibbon was written in 1779 ; and (Vol. ii. p. 197) 
 we find a letter, dated 1804, expressing the same opinion, in almost 
 the same words. 
 
214 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 n 
 
 hi 
 
 field's Unitarian principles are well known; and 
 in the course of his writings, he frequently pre- 
 sents the following views; "The reason why 
 I never took any pleasure in moral ethics, and 
 would not give one penny for all the morality 
 in the world, is because there is no foundation 
 for virtue and immortality, but in Revelation: 
 and therefore I could never see any advantage 
 
 from moral writings.''* 1 do not affirm, nor 
 
 do I suppose, that such opinions are universally 
 held by Unitarians — although well according 
 with their peculiar views. Unitarians, in truth, 
 have this difficulty to contend with -.—Christianity, 
 as explained by them, differs but little from the 
 Religion of Nature. Is this credible, with regard 
 to a Dispensation promulgated in so wonderful 
 a manner.? Now if Natural Religion be an ima- 
 ginary thing, the difficulty is apparently lessened. 
 May not such considerations have had some 
 effect in forming their opinions on the subject 
 now discussed.? My purpose, however, is to 
 state facts ; and I would only farther observe, 
 that there seems to be this difference between 
 Socinus and the Modern Unitarians alluded to — 
 
 * Wakefield's i\Ienloi^^ of his own Life, \'ol. i. p. 512. 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 215 
 
 
 Socinus denied that the being of God, as well 
 as all its important consequences, could be de- 
 duced by the power of reason— the modern Uni- 
 tarians rather restrict their denial, to the conse- 
 quences that are said to flow from the existence of 
 a Deity. ... But to proceed to a class of Theo- 
 logians, very remote, in their sentiments, from 
 Socinus and his modern disciples. 
 
 In the latter part of the seventeenth century 
 — to counteract the mischievous tendency and ill 
 effects, in a practical point of view, of the indis- 
 creet mode in which certain high doctrines had 
 been preached— there were divines of great emi- 
 nence, who thought themselves bound to impress 
 upon the conscience a serious sense of moral obli- 
 gation. They dwelt much upon the duties of 
 life. Some of them, unfortunately, called Christ- 
 ianity a Republication of the Law of Nature :— 
 not intending, most assuredly, that Christianity 
 is a mere republication, but designing to hold it 
 forth as a Religion abounding in new motives 
 to the observance of all that is required of men 
 in their present state of being. The Adversaries 
 of the Gospel affected to understand what was 
 said, of the '* republication of the law of nature,'' 
 
 i 
 
t 
 
 ll 
 
 !^ 
 
 i>l6 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 in its strictly literal sense ; and availed themselves 
 of the opportunity to show, that Christianity is, 
 on that principle, " as old as the creation.*" Con- 
 troversies arose: in the midst of which appeared 
 certain zealous, but not very prudent, friends of 
 Revelation, whose aim was to prove that there 
 is no such thing as Natural Religion at all. 
 Before the disputes alluded to were closed, a Lay 
 Divine and Religious Philosopher presented to the 
 w^orld some lucubrations which attracted a good 
 deal of notice. "A very curious and inquisitive 
 person (as Mr Whiston justly calls him) Mr 
 Hutchinson, thought that, by the light which 
 revelation afforded him, compared with his own 
 observations, he saw farther into the constitution 
 of the universe, and the operations carried on 
 in it, than Sir Isaac [Newton] had done.*"* 
 Such is the account, given by Bishop Home, of 
 the philosophy of Hutchinson; who deriving the 
 principles of " the constitution of the universe and 
 the operations carried on in it**^ from Scripture, 
 could scarcely allow that any thing appertaining 
 
 • Bishop Home's Works, Vol. i. p. 445. It may be observed, 
 by the way, that Hutchinson has asserted that he was the principal 
 collector of the Fossils bequeathed by Dr Woodward to the Univer- 
 sity of Cambridge. What the fact may have been I know not. 
 
 ? 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 217 
 
 to ReUgion could be collected from other sources. 
 Accordingly, we are informed that " he looked 
 upon Natural Religion as Deism in disguise; an 
 engine of the devil, in these latter days, for the 
 overthrow of the Gospel; and therefore boldly 
 called it the Religion of Satan or Antichrist^* In 
 such opinions, philosophical and religious, Hutch- 
 inson had several followers of great respectability, 
 as the names of Home, Parkhurst and Jones 
 (not to mention others) will testify; but the 
 Hutchinsonian philosophy was not formed to 
 endure the scrutiny of the eighteenth century— 
 and the inferences from that philosophy, as to 
 religion, would have entirely disappeared, had 
 there not been some attempts to evince their 
 correctness by other considerations. By main- 
 taining the senses to be the only natural inlets 
 to knowledge— that is, by discarding reflection, 
 on the operations of the mind, as another source 
 of information— Dr Ellis, the author of a Treatise 
 entitled. The Knowledge of Divine things from 
 Revelation, not from Reason or Nature, under- 
 took to prove that neither the being of a God, 
 
 * Preface to the second edition of Jones's Life of Bishop Home, 
 p. XX. See the first Volume of Homo's Works. 
 
I 
 
 218 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 ADVANTAUEJ^. 
 
 219 
 
 nor any other principle of religion, could possibly 
 be deduced from the study of the phenomena of 
 the Universe. To give some notion of the purport 
 of the book, I extract the following passage : 
 
 "A mind that has no knowledge but of sensiblcs, 
 sees and hears no other objects, can abstract no ideas 
 from matter, but what are material; and had he moun- 
 tains of them, his attempt would be as fruitless, as the 
 giants invading Jupiter. Heap matter upon matter, it 
 will never amount to immateriality, nor open to his view 
 the new scene of insensibles and invisibles. Without an 
 instructor to open his eyes, it would not be possible to 
 conceive an angelic being, because it can have no re- 
 semblance, no idea of a substance purely spiritual; yet 
 vastly remoter from matter is an omnipotent Being, com- 
 prehending in itself all the possibilities of things." * 
 
 The volume now cited — and a collection of 
 tracts, with the title of The ScJwlar armed 
 against the Errors of the Time (3rd ed. in 1812) 
 zealously enforcing the same principles — undoubt- 
 
 * Knowledge of Divine things, &c. p. 460. 3rd ed. The first 
 edition of the work was published in 1743 ; the second in 1771 ; and 
 the third in 1811. Dr Ellis appears to have been educated at 
 Oxford and established in Dublin. The reader who would see a 
 strange interpretation of Rom. i. 20. is referred to pp. 266, &c. of 
 the Volume here quoted. This may perhaps be a proper place to 
 observe that the late Archbishop Magee was a follower of Dr Ellis, 
 in his sentiments respecting Natural Religion. To avoid crowding 
 my pages with correlative matter, T reserve, for another work, various 
 remarks, which have occurred to me, on these topics. 
 
 edly had, for a season, some effect upon the 
 opinions of people, with regard to Natural Re- 
 ligion ; but those principles do not appear to have 
 taken any firm or permanent hold of the public 
 mind. I am not aware that, during the last thirty 
 years, there has been, in the University of Cam- 
 bridge, more than one learned man, who avow- 
 edly professed the leading doctrines of Dr Ellis's 
 Treatise. It has, indeed, occasionally happened 
 to me to hear a surmise that that numerous class 
 of Churchmen who have long looked up to the 
 late Dr Milner, and his brother the Rev. Joseph 
 Milner, with respect, in matters of religion, have 
 generally adopted the peculiar views of Dr Ellis. 
 This I believe to be very far from the truth; 
 although amongst them, as amongst other per- 
 sons, such views are now and then to be found. 
 Of Dr Milner I can state that, during the latter 
 part of his life, I had several conversations with 
 him on the subject of Dr Ellis's book; in the 
 course of which, he condemned, in the strongest 
 terms, the scheme of rejecting the operations of 
 the human mind, as one of the primary sources 
 of knowledge. He seemed to think of the book 
 altogether with great dissatisfaction; and men- 
 
220 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 221 
 
 tioned it as a production, of which " the more 
 
 he read, the less he could understand."" His 
 
 brother has left his ov^n opinions, on the sub- 
 ject of Natural Religion, on record. From his 
 Answer to Gibbon, I present the following ex- 
 tracts; which, I believe, will be new to most of 
 my readers — and, I trust, acceptable to them all : 
 
 "Thus, St Paul being judge, God has not left him- 
 self without teitnesSy even in the natural world. The 
 works of creation speak to us from without; and the 
 moral nature, which he has given us, speaks to us from 
 mthin. In conjunction they declare his Being and Sove- 
 reign authority, his power, wisdom, and goodness, his 
 equitable government, and the accountableness of the 
 human race for all their moral conduct before him. And 
 this is the utmost stretch of natural religion, an intuitive 
 feeling rather than the result of any laborious investiga- 
 tion. Strong and deep in its nature, though confused 
 and indeterminate in its degree, it lays, however, all man- 
 kind under a formal obligation of obedience, because all 
 mankind feel its force, and of necessity acquiesce in its 
 authority, while they strive in vain to reason away its va- 
 lidity." Again, " Let any man coolly attend to what passes 
 within himself, and ask what account can be given of that 
 principle within him which we call Conscience. However 
 it has been derided, it is not derided out of the world; 
 and any person may, if he pleases, convince himself of 
 its power, by attending to the energy of its rebukes, in 
 spite of the most subtile reasonings which he may have 
 
 / 
 
 made use of to drown its voice. Still it speaks, and 
 speaks not like other principles and instincts of human 
 nature; but with an authority steady and strong, yet 
 ever upright and equitable, commanding the whole man, 
 and commanding no less the esteem than the fear of the 
 whole human race. All render themselves more or less 
 obnoxious to its rebukes; but to bribe it into silence, or 
 rather to stupify and intoxicate it, would ask a long and 
 enormous course of confirmed flagitiousness ; and if it be 
 ever effected at all, it leaves a man in a state too mon- 
 strous and unnatural, to excite any other ideas than those 
 of horror and detestation. If any man might be conceived 
 to have conquered in himself this awful principle, so as 
 to have lost all idea of its influence, one is tempted to 
 think it was Mr Hume : yet hear how elegantly as well as 
 emphatically, he describes it. Speaking of Somerset, the 
 murderous favourite of James I. he says, *The favourite 
 had hitherto escaped the enquiry of justice ; but he had 
 not escaped that still voice which can make itself be heard 
 amidst all the hurry and flattery of a court, and asto- 
 nishes the criminal with a just representation of his most 
 secret enormities.' And a little after, * the grace of his 
 youth gradually disappeared; the gaiety of his manners 
 was obscured; his politeness and obliging behaviour were 
 changed into sullenness and silence.'"* 
 
 Such were the sentiments of that learned and 
 pious man, with regard to Natural Religion. 
 Something, I may remark by the way, of the 
 
 • Gibbon's Account of Christianity considered. By Joseph 
 Milner, M.A. pp. 198, 202—204. 1781. 
 
 \r 
 
*-Z2'Z 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 223 
 
 M 
 
 1^ 
 
 same turn of thought, would have given, to 
 Lord Brougham's 'Discourse,' a moral dignity — 
 an influence over the human mind, which neither 
 acuteness nor eloquence can command. But to 
 bring the whole matter into a small space — 
 Socinus long ago, and various Unitarians of mo- 
 dem times — certain Trinitarians also, for more 
 than a century past — have taken credit to them- 
 selves for their opposition to Natural Religion, 
 as an invention of man — at once unwarrantable 
 and mischievous. Lord Brougham considers such 
 "reasoners'' as "neither the most famous advo- 
 cates of revelation, nor the most enlightened;'' 
 and yet, as his Lordship observes, "we may do 
 well to show the groundlessness of the alarms 
 which they would excite." 
 
 The Noble Author truly states that the most 
 eminent writers on Natural Theology have been 
 sincere and zealous Christians ; who were there- 
 fore most unlikely to support a cause that could 
 place any thing, appertaining to Christianity, in 
 danger. Ample scope was afforded, for the de- 
 fence of Natural, as well as Revealed Religion, 
 by the Lecture founded by Mr Boyle ; at which 
 Lecture, accordingly, were delivered, by Christian 
 
 Preachers, some of the ablest vindications of Na- 
 tural Religion, that have ever been presented to 
 the world. From the time of Hooker, in short, 
 to our own, the great Divines, by whose labours 
 our literature has been so wonderfully enriched, 
 never seem to have thought it possible that Na- 
 tural and Revealed Religion, if properly under- 
 stood, could be in a state of hostility with each 
 other. On the contrary, they believed that they 
 were largely contributing to the advancement of 
 divine truth, when they taught the world to con- 
 sider Natural and Revealed Religion as appointed 
 by the Almighty, to "work together for good" 
 to the human race. In such sentiments, moreover, 
 they were sustained by the most illustrious phi- 
 losophers that ever appeared to develope the laws 
 by which material things are governed— by Bacon 
 and Boyle and Newton. ... But not to rest solely 
 upon the authority of names, however venerated— 
 it may be useful to point out some of the bearings 
 of Natural Religion upon that which is Revealed. 
 
 Let us, then, suppose that an individual lays 
 claim to be a messenger sent from God; and 
 that, in proof of his claim, he appears to work 
 miracles. Now, on the one hand, this person 
 
 \ 
 
« 
 
 I 
 
 '^ 
 
 224 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 may be, as he represents, a messenger from God 
 —or a clever enthusiast— or an artful impostor — 
 or partly enthusiast and partly impostor : — on the 
 other, however important it may be to admit his 
 claims in the first case, it is equally important 
 to reject them in the other cases. To decide the 
 point at issue, those opponents of Natural Re- 
 ligion, who are consistent with themselves, hold 
 that the evidence for the reality of the miracles 
 is the only test of the divine mission. In other 
 words, they disregard the internal evidence, re- 
 sulting from the moral character of the commu- 
 nication — and depend upon the external evidence, 
 arising from the manifestation of supernatural 
 power. "They,*" says a learned writer of this 
 class, "who insist upon proving the truth of 
 Revelation by its internal evidence, or by a de- 
 monstration of its fitness and expediency, treat 
 it as if it were of human^ not of Divine origin. 
 For man, indeed, has no right to expect assent 
 from his fellow-creatures to the truth of any 
 system he proposes, unless he can show that it 
 is, in itself, wise and good. But God commands 
 with authority. His word is sufficient evidence, 
 or sufficient surety at least, that whatever lie pro- 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 905 
 
 poses to us must be true and perfect.^^*. .. Those, 
 on the contrary, who conceive that " the world 
 and all that it inhabit" bear witness to the 
 existence and attributes of the Deity, are per- 
 suaded that a Revelation, from the same Being, 
 will come recommended to men, by its accord- 
 ance with the conclusions of their reason and 
 their moral perceptions — and not merely overawe 
 them by " the signs and wonders'" by which it 
 appeals to their senses. Their study, indeed, of 
 the natural world has taught them that, in the 
 ways of God, there are "many things hard to 
 be understood" — many things far beyond the 
 reach of their intellectual powers; and thus, in 
 the dispensations of the Almighty towards men 
 considered as accountable beings — dispensations 
 which have become known only by express re- 
 velation — they are prepared to expect mysteries 
 still farther removed from human comprehension. 
 In this manner, they conceive that men will 
 be addressed as what they are, rational creatures 
 of finite capacity. So likewise they conclude 
 that a real revelation from God will exhibit in- 
 dubitable marks of its divine origin, in its entire 
 
 ♦ Van Mildert's Sermons at Boyle's Lecture, Vol.11, p. 221. 
 
- 
 
 Iil 
 
 i\ 
 
 \ 
 
 226 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 adaptation to the nature and condition of man, 
 as a moral agent. This internal evidence, more- 
 over, is felt to be of so much importance, that 
 we find some authors deserting their own prin- 
 ciples, and zealously availing themselves of its 
 assistance, in defence of the Christian Religion. 
 As an example, I will mention Mr Gill)ert 
 Wakefield — already shown (p. 214.) to have been 
 a determined opponent of all morality, except that 
 derived from Revelation. This gentleman wrote a 
 book in behalf of Christianity ; and the volume is 
 almost entirely confined to the internal evidences 
 and moral excellence of the system. It is not un- 
 pleasant to observe the natural feelings of people 
 thus completely overthrowing their theoretical 
 positions.* 
 
 "Natural Religion,"' Dr Hey observes, "is 
 presupposed in Revealed."" t A person, claiming 
 to have been sent from God, appeals to miracles 
 wrought by himself, as proofs of his mission;—* 
 and our antecedent notions of the divine power 
 warrant the belief, that miracles may have been 
 wrought in attestation of such a fact. The com- 
 
 * Wakefield's Evidences of Christianity, 2nd ed. 1793. 
 t Lectures in Divinity, Vol. i. p. 14. 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 "227 
 
 munication made by that individual indicates the 
 highest degree of mercy and goodness, on the 
 part of the Deity, towards the human race; — 
 and the intimations of the divine benevolence, 
 presented by the world around us, allow us to 
 trust that the Creator and Preserver of mankind 
 may vouchsafe expressly to reveal to them his 
 purposes on their behalf. The character of the 
 same person, and his instructions respecting the 
 dispositions and conduct which become men in 
 their present state, transcend our best concep- 
 tions of what is morally excellent; — and the 
 moral nature, with which we have been endowed, 
 affords the strongest assurance that God would 
 affi^ that seal to a dispensation coming immedi- 
 ately from Himself. On such foundations we 
 may safely build our faith. An individual, so fur- 
 nished with evidences of his divine appointment, 
 has a right to demand that the fullest credit 
 should be given to his declarations regarding the 
 future destinies of the human race. Whatever 
 he may unfold— concerning the nature of God, 
 and his dealings with men both here and here- 
 after — is to be received with the utmost humility 
 of mind; for the little that can be previously 
 
 p2 
 
I 
 
 f 
 
 M 
 
 228 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 known on tliese subjects is only sufficient to show 
 how much must remain unknown, unless it should 
 please the Almighty to remove the obscurity in 
 which they are involved. 
 
 The moral and intellectual faculties may be 
 weakened and perverted. Hence the distorted and 
 discordant views, of the Deity and a future state 
 and human duty, which are found in the writings 
 and opinions of the ancient philosophers. Hence 
 the degrading representations of the Christian Re- 
 ligion, in the systems of various Christian sects. 
 As the differences and contentions, amongst these 
 Christian sects, throw no doubt upon the reality 
 of a Revelation, common to them all — so neither 
 ought the scarcely more discreditable disputes, 
 amongst the philosophers, to bring into question 
 the reality of Natural Religion. 
 
 With regard to the opinion which has been 
 held— that Natural Religion tends to supersede 
 Revelation — I will only say, that it is perfectly 
 incomprehensible to me, how such a notion can 
 even be hinted at by any person who has taken 
 the trouble to compare the intimations of the 
 one with the decisions of the other, on many 
 important points — and the profound silence of 
 
 !i 
 
 ' 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 229 
 
 the one with the authoritative declarations of the 
 other, in matters of still greater moment. When 
 the utmost has been made of Natural Religion, the 
 notices derived from that source can give little or 
 no information on subjects on which Revelation is 
 the most copious — the various dispensations of God 
 towards man — our redemption from the effects of 
 transgression— and in the language of the Creed 
 — " the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of 
 the body, and the life everlasting." 
 
 I have seen Lord Brougham'^s account of the 
 connection between Natural and Revealed Reli- 
 gion (pp. 204 — 209.) quoted with approbation. 
 Although it contains a few expressions which I 
 do not quite like, I gladly recommend it to the 
 
 reader's attention The next service mentioned 
 
 by His Lordship (pp. 209 — 211.), as rendered by 
 Natural Religion to Revelation, is of a very 
 ambiguous character. Without transcribing the 
 whole paragraph in which this service is point- 
 ed out, I will extract a few sentences, which 
 will assuredly be sufficient to convey the writer's 
 meaning : 
 
 '• Were our whole knowledge of the Deity drawn from 
 Revelation, its foundation must become weaker and weaker, 
 as the distance in point of time increases from the ac- 
 
. 
 
 230 
 
 SECTION IV 
 
 i\ 
 
 I ? 
 
 i. 
 
 tual interposition Upon testimony all Revelation must 
 
 rest. Every age but the one in which the miracles were 
 wrought, and every country but the one that witnessed 
 them— indeed, all the people of that country itself save 
 those actually present— must receive the proofs which 
 they afford of Divine interposition upon the testimony of 
 eye-witnesses, and of those to whom eye-witnesses told 
 
 it We are by no means affirming that Revelation 
 
 would lose its sanction by lapse of time, as long as it had 
 the perpetually new and living evidence of Natural Re- 
 ligion to support it. We are only showing the use of 
 that evidence to Revelation, by examining the inevitable 
 consequences of its entire removal, and seeing how ill 
 supported the truths of Revelation would be, if the prop 
 were withdrawn which they borrow from Natural Theo- 
 logy : for then they would rest upon tradition alone." 
 (pp.209— 211.) 
 
 Lord Brougham's representation seems to be 
 to this effect: — The evidences of Revelation, 
 being founded on human testimony, are continu- 
 ally growing weaker, in consequence of transmis- 
 sion from hand to hand ; whereas the evidences of 
 Natural Religion are constantly gaining strength : 
 and thus, as ages pass away, Natural Religion 
 acts to greater and greater advantage in support 
 of Revelation— which, it seems, woidd otherwise 
 *« lose its sanction.'' On tins subject, my remarks 
 shall be brief. About the beginning of the last 
 
 ADVANTAGES 
 
 231 
 
 century, a Scotch Mathematician made the validity 
 of the argument, arising from human testimony, 
 the subject of calculation— subsequently applying 
 his principles to determine the year of our Lord, 
 after which it would be unbecoming a philosopher 
 to give credence to the miracles, on which our 
 Religion is held to have been founded ; and I have 
 been informed that, not many years ago, some 
 learned Germans were busily employed in the 
 same investigation.* In spite of calculation, how- 
 ever, the world has gone on believing ; and there 
 are, as yet, no indications of a belief regulated 
 by mathematical theorems. The credit indeed 
 given to matters of well-authenticated history is 
 but little affected by the lapse of time. We 
 are as well assured of the events of the reign 
 of Henry VIII. as of those of the reign of 
 Charles I. or of George I. The acts of Julius 
 Csesar are no less certain to us than those of 
 Oliver Cromwell. Now the miracles, which in- 
 
 * This writer's name was Craig. His work-a 4to pamphlet 
 ot 36 pages, entitled ' Theologiae Christianae principia mathematica' 
 -was published in 1699. The mathematician was quite willing 
 that Christianity should be received, on its present evidence, till 
 A. D. 3153. Such arc the speculations of men who arc rather learned 
 than wise. 1 am not aware that Craig meant to injure the cause of 
 Revealed Religion. 
 
 I 
 
l! 
 
 H 
 
 !l 
 
 232 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 troduced the Christian Religion, are facts—his- 
 torical facts— facts recorded by the friends of 
 that Religion, and allowed by its enemies. Who- 
 ever now believes in those miracles — and who, 
 after all, will venture to say that he does not 
 believe in them? — believes, with as firm a faith, 
 as he who lived at an interval of one hundred 
 years from the period at which they were wrought. 
 Moreover, the continual progress of the Gospel 
 in the world — new instances of the accomplish- 
 ment of prophecy— and various unexpected illus- 
 trations of circumstances connected with external 
 and internal evidence — may greatly overbalance 
 all that the original testimony can be imagined 
 to lose, by transmission through a long series of 
 ages. Till, therefore, we know from experience 
 something more of the effect of time, in impairing 
 the credibility of facts so well attested, we will 
 postpone all consideration of the mode by which 
 the waning evidence of Christianity — if such it 
 should then be deemed— may be aided with sub- 
 sidiary light. To say the truth, there is, in 
 Lord Brougham's notion, something which too 
 much resembles a falling back upon Natural Re- 
 ligion, when the direct defence of Revelation can 
 
 i 
 
 \ 
 
 ADVANTAGES. 
 
 233 
 
 be no longer maintained. But is not such a view 
 of the matter altogether at variance with those 
 Scriptures, by which, when we have acknow- 
 ledged their authority, we cannot, without incon- 
 sistency, refuse to abide.? When our Lord pre- 
 dicted the perpetuity of the Church which he was 
 about to found, who can imagine that he referred 
 to the means of protection afforded by Natural 
 Religion.? Those, who doubt not the fulfilment 
 of that prediction, believe that the Church of 
 Christ is founded upon a rock, and is in itself 
 secure alike from external violence, and the silent, 
 insidious encroachments of time. 
 
 After alluding to "the recourse had by the 
 inspired penmen, to the views which are de- 
 rived from the contemplation of nature, when 
 they would exalt the Deity by a description of 
 his attributes, or inculcate sentiments of devo- 
 tion towards him""— a subject which would admit 
 of much interesting discussion — Lord Brougham 
 remarks (p. 213.) upon the "little that is to be 
 found, of particularity and precision, in any thing 
 that has been revealed to us respecting the na- 
 ture of the Godhead"— "the mystery in which ^ 
 almost all the divine attributes, beyond what 
 natural reason teaches, are wisely veiled;'' — con- 
 
* 
 
 H 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 234 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 ADVANTAGES 
 
 235 
 
 cliuling that ^' those attributes are nearly the 
 same in the voUime of nature and in that of his 
 revealed word/' With reference to observations 
 of this kind, we shall do well to consider that 
 Revelation is effected through the medium of 
 language; from the imperfections of which, it 
 may be impossible to make known, in any de- 
 gree, the essential nature of the Deity:— we 
 shall do well to consider how unequal the human 
 mind must be, in the present state, to compre- 
 hend the mode of existence of " The High and 
 Lofty One, that inhabiteth eternity/^ Moreover, 
 the knowledge of the Supreme Being, afforded 
 by the Revelation vouchsafed to us, is undoubt- 
 edly of that kind, with which we are the most 
 concerned. Such knowledge was evidently not 
 intended to gratify our curiosity, but to "make 
 us wise unto salvation." In this respect, the views 
 presented to us are so momentous, that there is 
 great difficulty in conceiving how any one can 
 suppose that the intimations, of the attributes of 
 the Deity, collected from the study of nature, can 
 bear a moments comparison with those glorious 
 manifestations of the Divine Perfections wliich 
 illuminate the pages of Holy Writ. 
 
 \ 
 
 I have now followed Lord Brougham through 
 those departments of Natural Theology which are 
 most usually the objects of attention— offering, 
 as I proceeded, such remarks, whether in the 
 way of explanation, of approbation or of caution, 
 as the matters successively brought under con- 
 sideration appeared to demand. A work like the 
 present can scarcely be mistaken for a complete 
 system of Natural Theology, or even a complete 
 outline of the science. Many points, of great 
 importance, have been left untouched; but the 
 reflections, suggested by the 'Discourse', may, 
 as I am willing to hope, render some service to 
 the cause of Religion. Had I been engaged in 
 writing a regular treatise on the subject discussed, 
 I should have aimed at greater precision of lan- 
 guage, than will be found in the present volume. 
 My wish has been to write clearly, without that 
 painful attention to accuracy of composition which 
 is sometimes attributed to Academical persons :— 
 an attention equally forbidden, in my own case, 
 by the want of time and the want of inclination. 
 If, in executing what T conscientiously believed 
 
 »'f> 
 
M 
 
 l> ! 
 
 
 w 
 
 236 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 to be my duty, I shall be thought to have shed 
 additional light upon any portion of Natural 
 Theology — or if I shall have interested even a 
 few readers, in inquiries of unquestionable im- 
 portance, I shall feel myself to be amply re- 
 warded for my labour. 
 
 The remainder of the volume will be devoted 
 to matters variously related to what has preceded ; 
 and may possibly be not unacceptable to those 
 who are fond of abstruse and learned specula- 
 tions. There are, indeed, several subjects, ex- 
 amined with great acuteness in Lord Brougham's 
 Notes, which yet appear susceptible of farther eluci- 
 dation; but circumstances compel me to restrict 
 myself, for the present, to three topics — to each 
 of which a section will be appropriated. The 
 topics are — The argument d jjriori, as it is called 
 — The sentiments of the Ancient Philosophers — 
 and The opinions of Bishop Warburton. 
 
 I 
 
 237 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 (Discourse, Section IV. pp. 81— 97.) 
 
 I NOW proceed to review Lord Brougham's ac- 
 count of what is called the argument a prioriy 
 in proof of the being and attributes of God — 
 an abstract mode of reasoning, the nature of 
 which will be better understood from the pre- 
 sent section, than from any formal definition. 
 Thus much, however, it will be needful to state 
 in the outset— that the proof hitherto described 
 mainly rests upon the marks of design and con- 
 trivance abounding in the world; whereas the 
 proof yet to be considered, through the medium 
 of the Noble Author's representations, is pri. 
 marlhj independent of those marks. So far, the 
 argument a priori is, to adopt his Lordship's 
 language, "without reference to facts;" for in- 
 stances of design and contrivance are facts. Lord 
 Brougham, however, first taking the ground that 
 
 I 
 
 
 w 
 
^238 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 the argument a priori is absolutely and entirely 
 "without reference to facts/"' draws out a long 
 array of objections to which the deductions from 
 that mode of argument are in consequence liable. 
 He then shows that the argument is, in reality, 
 not "without reference to facts." Now, under 
 such circumstances, unless there is some evidence — 
 and none appears — that the advocates of the argu- 
 ment maintain that it is altogether "without re- 
 ference to facts," to what purpose are the objections 
 brought forward ? But not to dwell on this point, 
 the objections shall be extracted without abridge- 
 ment: 
 
 J^ "The first thing that strikes us on this subject is the 
 consequence which must inevitably follow from admitting 
 the possibility of discerning the existence of the Deity 
 and his attributes d jyrioriy or wholly independent of 
 facts. It would follow that this is a necessary, not a 
 contingent truth; and that it is not only as impossible 
 for the Deity not to exist, as for the whole to be greater 
 than the sum of its parts, but that it is equally impos- 
 sible for his attributes to be other than the argument is 
 supposed to prove they are. Thus the reasoners in ques- 
 tion shov/, by the argument a priori, that he is a being 
 of perfect wisdom and perfect benevolence. Dr Clarke is 
 as clear of this as he is clear that his existence is proved 
 by the same argument. Now, first, it is impossible that 
 any such truths can be necessary; for their contraries 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORT. 
 
 239 
 
 are not things wholly inconceivable, inasmuch as there 
 is nothing at all inconceivable in the Maker of the uni- 
 verse existing as a being of limited power and of mixed 
 goodness, nay of malevolence. We never, before all expe- 
 rience, could pronounce it mathematically impossible that 
 such a being should exist, and should have created the 
 universe. But next, the facts, when we came to examine 
 them, might disprove the conclusions drawn d priori. 
 The universe might by possibility be so constructed that 
 every contrivance might fail to produce the desired effect : — 
 the eye might be chromatic and give indistinct images — 
 the joints might be so unhinged as to impede motion — 
 every smell, as Paley has it, might be a stink, and every 
 touch a sting.* Indeed we know that, perfect as the frame 
 of things actually is, a few apparent exceptions to the 
 general beauty of the system, have made many disbelieve 
 the perfect power and perfect goodness of the Deity, 
 and invent Manichean theories to account for the exist- 
 ence of evil. Nothing can more clearly show the absur- 
 dity of those arguments by which it is attempted to de- 
 monstrate the truths of this science as mathematical or 
 necessary, and cognizable d priori.'' (pp. 81 — 83.) 
 
 Being very far from giving credit to the pos- 
 sibility of proving the being of a God, in a man- 
 ner similar to the demonstration of a geometrical 
 theorem — and not being aware of any one who 
 
 * I am happy to say that this is not exactly " as Paley has 
 it." Paley's words are these : ** fie [the Deity] might have made 
 every thing we tasted bitter ; every thing we see loathsome ; every 
 thing we touched a sting ; every smell a stench ; and every sound 
 a discord." Moral Philosophy, B. ii. c. 57/ 
 
240 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 conceives the possibility — I have no motive to 
 vindicate the propriety of the word "necessary,*^ 
 when applied to the Deity, on the principles laid 
 down by Lord Brougham. There is, however, 
 something from which the mind recoils, in the 
 idea of making the Divine existence "a contin- 
 gent truth."" "Contingent,*" Johnson informs us, 
 has the signification of " falling out by chance ; 
 accidental ; not determinable by any certain rule.'*' 
 How far such expressions belong to such a sub- 
 ject, I will leave to the reader's judgement: — 
 observing only that the being of God is a fact 
 which differs from every other fact; — that every 
 other fact depends upon Will, and so is contin- 
 gent; that is, contingent to us, not to Him who 
 possesses all power and all knowledge.* 
 
 With regard to the method of proving the 
 goodness of the Deity — to which Lord Brougham 
 
 * On referring to Dr Reid, since the publication of the first 
 edition, I observe that he takes the same view of the subject. " The 
 necessary truths," he writes, " that fall within our knowledge are for 
 the most part abstract truths. We must except the existence and 
 nature of the Supreme Being, which is necessary. Other existences 
 are the effects of will and power. Their nature is such as the 
 Supreme Being was pleased to give them." Essays on the Powers 
 of the Human Mind, A'ol.ii. p. 295. ed. 1812. I am always glad 
 to find my own judgement confirmed by that of such a writer as 
 Dr Reid. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 -241 
 
 adverts in the subsequent part of tiie extract, 
 when referring to Dr Clarke — I shall shortly 
 have occasion to show, that His Lordship's state- 
 ment involves as great a mistake as can well be 
 committed. When the subject is resumed, it will 
 be under circumstances which will enable us to 
 render the discussion more complete than we can 
 hope to do at the present moment. 
 
 Towards the close of the paragraph, the Noble 
 Author seems to attribute the invention of Ma- 
 nichean theories to the disbelief of the perfect 
 power and perfect goodness of the Deity. The 
 fact is — we have good evidence that it was for 
 the purpose of reconciling the existence of evil 
 with the Divine power and goodness that the 
 Manichean theories were invented. There is 
 scarcely any writer whom Lord Brougham re- 
 spects more highly— and scarcely any more worthy 
 of his respect— than Dr Cudworth ; and we find 
 that great Christian philosopher adopting the fol- 
 lowing language: 
 
 " Now as for that fore-mentioiied Ditheism or opinion 
 of two Gods, a ^ood and an evil one, it is evident that its 
 original spriinj? from nothing? else, but first a firm per- 
 suasion of the Essential, Goodness of the Deity ; together 
 with a conceit that the evil that is in the world was 
 
242 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 altogether inconsistent and irreconcileable to the same; 
 and that therefore, for the solving of this phenomenon, 
 it was absolutely necessary to suppose another animalish 
 principle self-existent, or an Evil God.'* 
 
 Let me farther observe that the opinions of 
 M. Beausobre, Dr Lardner and Dr Hey, coincide 
 with those of Dr Cudworth, respecting the origin 
 of Manichean theories. ... But to resume the main 
 subject— From the preceding observations, the 
 reader will justly infer that I hold, with Lord 
 Brougham, the absurdity of all attempts "to 
 demonstrate the truths of this science as mathe- 
 matical or necessary, and cognizable a pr'iorir 
 I only lament that His Lordship should have 
 censured Dr Clarke, in particular, for employ- 
 ing a demonstration of that kind— when he was 
 on the point of undertaking to show that Dr 
 Clarke had really used an argument of a very 
 different kind. Moreover, the Noble Author is, 
 in my judgment, perfectly right, in assigning a 
 different character to Dr Clarke's reasoning. If 
 then, as Lord Brougham contends and as I admit, 
 Dr Clarke's reasoning is not the argument a priori, 
 already treated of— the question naturally occurs 
 
 • Intellectual System, p. '213. 
 
 ,. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 24^3 
 
 — How came it pass that the term a priori was 
 ever applied to that reasoning? Now, although 
 a tolerable answer may be given to this question, 
 there is, I confess, cause to lament that the term 
 has ever been so applied. The misapplication 
 indeed, for such an expression may be justly 
 employed, has occasioned great ambiguity — many 
 involuntary mistakes — and probably some not un- 
 designed misrepresentations. The case, however, 
 appears to have been as follows: Philosophers 
 had, for many ages, turned their thoughts to the 
 discovery of a proof of the being of a God, alto- 
 gether independent of facts. A proof, if so con- 
 structed, must wholly consist of purely abstract 
 reasoning; and supposing the possibility of the 
 thing, would be properly called the argument 
 a priori. On the other hand, the common proof 
 of the being of a God, being founded on the 
 innumerable facts and marks of design and con- 
 trivance prevailing throughout the world, was 
 contradistinguished by the title of the argument 
 a posteriori. At length, however, a proof, of an 
 intermediate kind— bearing some affinity to each 
 of those just described — was ventured upon. The 
 proof alluded to proceeded from this one simple 
 
 a 2 
 
r 
 
 £44 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 fact^ihat something does actually exist ; — in other 
 respects disregarding, in the first instance, the 
 numberless phenomena of the material world. 
 This mode of proof was, from its nature of a 
 very abstract character; and being made, in its 
 progress, partly to depend upon reasoning which 
 may be fairly called a priori ^anA not because 
 the reasoning was a priori from first to last — was 
 termed the argument a priori — a distinction being 
 thus made between this mode of proof, and the 
 common one, a posteriori The statement now 
 offered, if well considered, will, I think, be suffi- 
 cient to account for the name given to the reason- 
 ing adopted by Dr Clarke, and other learned men ; 
 but will not completely justify the correctness of 
 the appellation. Law, in one of the notes to his 
 translation of King's 'Origin of Evil,' has ex- 
 pressed, in few words, the sense in which the 
 phrase a priori is to be understood, when applied 
 to Dr Clarke's method of reasoning— namely, prior 
 to the examination of' particular phenomena'^— and 
 so, not prior to the conviction that there is some- 
 thing which exists. In confirmation of my view 
 of the matter, I will adduce two passages— one 
 
 ♦ King's On^Mn of Kvil, p. 58. 4th e.l. 1758. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 245 
 
 f, 
 
 from Lord Brougham's favourite author, Dr Cud- 
 worth— another from a writer more recent than 
 Dr Clarke, whose adherent he was, in the main. 
 To the first of the passages, although long, I re- 
 quest the reader's especial attention ; for it throws 
 great light upon the present subject of inquiry. 
 
 " True indeed, some of the ancient Theists have them- 
 selves affirmed that there could be no demonstration of 
 a God; which assertion of theirs hath been by others 
 misunderstood into this sense, as if there were therefore 
 no certainty at all to be had of God's existence, but only 
 a conjectural probability ; no knowledge or science, but only 
 faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of those 
 ancient Theists, who denied that there could be any de- 
 monstration of a God, was only this, that the existence 
 of a God could not be demonstrated d, priori, himself 
 being the first cause of all things. Thus doth Alexander 
 Aphrodisius, in his Physical Doubts and Solutions, after 
 he had propounded an argument for a God, according 
 to the Aristotelick principles, from motion, declare him- 
 self: ti lei^i^ Kara dvdXvaiVj ov yap olovre rfi<: Trpiartj^: 
 dpxn'i dit^lei^iv efi/a/, dWd lei diro r(^v vareptov t€ Ka\ 
 (Pavep^v dp^afxevovi, Kara Tf/V irpd'i iraOra <rvtx<pa)viay 
 dvaXva-a ^^pcojueVouc avarijaai rijv CKeivov (ptiaiv — that 
 this argument or p'oof of his was in the way of analysis 
 only : it being not possible that there should be a demon- 
 stration of the first principle of all. Wherefore we must 
 here fetch our beginning from things that are after it, and 
 manifest ; "tid thencr, by way of nnaly.m, ascend to the 
 
ri 
 
 246 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 proof of that first nature which was before them. And to 
 the same purpose Clemens Alexandrinm, having first af- 
 firmed, o)? Su(r/ji€TaxC'/>'<rTOTaTO<; 6 -nepi roZ deoC \6r>f<K' 
 iire) yap a>x»/ ^oi/tcJ? wpdyfiaro^ lvaevp€ro<:, TraVTWC 
 TTou rj trpoirn koi wpe^rf^vTaTr) dpxn BuVBeiKTO?, rin^ tcai 
 TOK ofAAoi? dVacrii. aWla roO yeviadai Ka\ yevofXCPOVK 
 eJvat, that God is the most difficult thing of all to be dis- 
 coursed of; because since the principle of every thing ts 
 hard to find out, the first and most ancient principle of ail, 
 which was the cause to all other things, of their being 
 made, must needs be the hardest of all to be declared or 
 manifested: he afterwards subjoins, dwd oCle cir.ffTiy^j? 
 \anl3dverai rtj diroZeiKTiK^' avrrj yap €k rrpoTeptav kui 
 yvopiixiarepmv (Twiararai' rod Se dyevvtJTov ovBeV irpov- 
 Trdpx^i. but neither can God be apprehended by any de- 
 monstrative science. For such science is from things 
 before, in order of nature, and more knowable; whereas 
 nothing exists before that which is altogether unmade. 
 And certain it is that it implies a contradiction, that God 
 or a Perfect Being should be thus demonstrated, by any 
 thing before him as his cause. Nevertheless, it doth not 
 therefore follow that there can be no certainty at all had 
 oi' the existence of a God, but only a conjectural proba- 
 bility; no knowledge, but faith and opinion only. For we 
 may have a certain knowledge of things, the Ii6ti whereof 
 cannot be demonstrated a priori, or from antecedent ne- 
 cessary causes : As for example, that there was something 
 eternal of itself, without beginning, is not at all demon- 
 strable by any antecedent cause, it being contradictious 
 to such a thing to have a cause. Nevertheless, upon 
 
 r 
 
 ABGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 247 
 
 supposition only, that something doth exist, which no man 
 can possibly make any doubt of. we may not only have an 
 opinion, but also certain knowledge, from the necessity of 
 irrefragable reason, that there never was nothing, but 
 something or other did always exist from eternity, and 
 without beginning. In like manner, though the existence 
 of a God or Perfect Being cannot be demonstrated d priori, 
 yet may we notwithstanding, from our very selves (whose 
 existence we cannot doubt of) and from what is contained 
 in our own minds, or otherwise consequent from him, by 
 undeniable principles of reason, necessarily infer his ex- 
 istence. And whensoever anything is thus necessarily in- 
 ferred, from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is 
 a demonstration— though not of the 3iot/, yet, of the on 
 of it: that the thing is, though not why it is."* 
 
 The foregoing valuable passage, from Dr Cud- 
 worth's work dated lf)78, shows how clearly the 
 distinction, between the veritable argument a pri- 
 ori and the argument now so called, was per- 
 ceived, even at that time. The passage shows us, 
 moreover, not only that the writer agreed, with 
 one of the most acute of Aristotle's commentators 
 and one of the most learned of the Fathers, in 
 thinking that the pure argument a priori was 
 altogether inapplicable— but also that he admitted 
 the validity of the kind of argument so fully after- 
 
 * Intellectual System, pp. 715, 716. 
 
 y 
 
248 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 wards drawn out by Dr Clarke. Let me also 
 remark that, notwithstanding the fondness of the 
 Schoolmen for metaphysical speculation on this 
 very subject, they appear to have placed no re- 
 liance upon the argument a priori, as originally 
 understood.* I now present the opinion of a 
 more recent author, respecting the modern argu- 
 ment a priori ; concerning which he thus writes : 
 
 •* Here then lies the groundwork of the argument we 
 are entering upon: something now exists, or has a real 
 being; therefore something has always existed, or had 
 a real being. This is the only method in which we can 
 prove the existence of the first cause, by beginning a pos- 
 teriori ; for the argument a priori does not, nor indeed 
 can prove, that there is a first cause, but supposes it 
 already proved ."t 
 
 The distinction between the old imaginary 
 argument a priori, and that at present known by 
 
 » Thus, for example, writes Thomas Aquinas : " Deum esse, 
 quamvis non a priori, a posteriori tamen demonstrari potest." 
 
 t Knight, On the Being and Attributes of God, p. 10. 1747. . . . 
 I have the materials for an Historical and Critical Account of the 
 modern (so called) Argument a priori, with remarks upon its proper 
 use ; but considering that there are probably not above half a score 
 persons in the kingdom who would care to peruse a work of that 
 kind, the propriety of devoting to the composition so much time, as 
 
 it would unavoidably require, is very questionable Let me add, in 
 
 the present edition, that the assurances 1 have received, of the interest 
 which would l>c taken in the above-mentioned Arrount. will indnro 
 me not to !»»m -ight ol the undertaking. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 249 
 
 the name, has, I trust, become perfectly manifest; 
 and I will proceed to show, by one remarkable 
 instance, the importance of keeping the distinction 
 in mind. ... Mr Hume devotes the ninth part 
 (or section) of his 'Dialogues concerning Natural 
 Religion^ to the argument a priori.^Demea thus 
 introduces the topic: -"If so many difficulties 
 attend the argument d posteriori, had we not 
 better adhere to that simple and sublime argu- 
 ment a priori, which, by offering to us infallible 
 demonstration cuts off at once all doubt and diffi- 
 culty?" Now the argument so described is un- 
 questionably the imaginary a priori reasoning of 
 the ancients. But to attend to the dialogue: 
 Clea7ithes interposes, and requests an explanation 
 of the argument ; of which Dmm gives the fol- 
 lowing account : " The argument, which I would 
 insist on, is the common one. Whatever exists 
 must have a cause or reason of its existence; 
 it being absolutely impossible for any thing to 
 produce itself, or be the cause of its existence. 
 In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, 
 we must either go on in tracing an infinite suc- 
 cession, without any ultimate cause at all; or 
 must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, 
 
 V 
 
 I 
 
 1 ■' 
 
250 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 
 that is necessarily existent.^ Here instead of " the 
 simple and sublime argument offering infallible 
 demonstration;^ we have a slight representation 
 of the 7nodern argument a priori To all this, 
 CUanthes rejoins—" I shall begin with observing, 
 that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to 
 demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by 
 arguments a priori Nothing is demonstrable, 
 unless the contrary implies a contradiction.'' And 
 so he goes on ; attacking Demeans actual argument 
 " from effects to causes,'' as if that were the ancient 
 abstract argument first mentioned. Now, it is 
 only by duly apprehending and recollecting the 
 distinction between the ancient and the modern 
 argument of the same name, that the reader of 
 Mr Hume can be aware of the substitution of one 
 thing for another, which is constantly taking place 
 in the course of the discussion. In fact, we are 
 here presented with an exquisite specimen of that 
 intellectual juggling, which is so often played off, 
 in the philosophical writings of this great master 
 of the dialectic art. Did Mr Hume know the 
 distinction, or was he deceived by his own dex- 
 terity ? I am unwilling to suppose that he 
 intended to mislead his readers. 
 
 I 
 
 \i . I 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 251 
 
 We are led by the distinction which has 'been 
 drawn between the ancient and the modern ar- 
 gument a prwri, together with Lord Brougham's 
 strictures on Dr Clarke's reasoning, to the in- 
 quiry, whether Dr Clarke considered that he was, 
 from the very outset, using the pure argument 
 d priori It is clear that he had no such no- 
 tion. To a correspondent, who had objected to 
 " arguing at all a priori,'" he replied, that " the 
 argument a posteriori is by far the most gene- 
 rally useful, and ought always to be distinctly 
 insisted upon;" but that, "forasmuch as Athe- 
 istical writers have sometimes opposed the being 
 and attributes of God, by such metaphysical rea- 
 sonings, as can no otherwise be obviated, than by 
 arguing a priori, therefore this manner of arguing 
 also is useful and necessary in its proper placed * 
 In allusion moreover to the primary propositions 
 of his argument, he informs another correspondent 
 that " when once a thing is known, by reasoning 
 a posteriori, to be certain, it unavoidably follows 
 that there is in nature a reason d priori (whether 
 we can discover it or not) of the existence of 
 
 * Answer to a seventh letter, at the en<l of liis work On the Being 
 and Attributes of God. 
 
 
252 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 ^53 
 
 I 
 
 that which we know cannot but exist.''* Besides 
 
 these, there are many indications that Lord 
 
 Brougham has not pointed out any thing, really 
 
 belonging to the mode of reasoning, which was 
 
 unknown to Dr Clarke. But let us now attend 
 
 to His Lordship's remarks, upon Dr Clarke's 
 
 argument, which are thus offered: 
 
 *• Dr Clarke is the chief patron of this kind of demon- 
 stration, as he terms it; and though his book contains 
 it more at large, the statement of his fundamental argu- 
 ment is perhaps to be found most distinctly given in the 
 letters subjoined to that celebrated work. The funda- 
 mental propositions in the discourse itself are. That some- 
 thin*^ must have existed from all eternity, and That this 
 something must have been a being independent and self- 
 existent. In the letters he condenses, perhaps explains, 
 certainly illustrates, these propositions (see Answers to 
 Letters 3, 4 and 5) by arguing that the existence of space 
 and time (or, as he terms it, duration) proves the exist- 
 ence of something whereof these are qualities, for they 
 are not themselves substances: he cites the celebrated 
 Scholium Generale of the Principia; and he concludes 
 that the Deity must be the infinite being of whom thoy 
 are qualities." (pp. 83, 84.) 
 
 The Noble Author, then, has stated, in print, 
 his conception that, in the answers to letters 
 .3, 4 and "J, the two propositions, which he has 
 
 ' Ansuti lo n ^ixlh l<.'Ucr, as lxt«io. 
 
 enunciated, are condensed, perhaps explained, cer- 
 tainly illustrated. This is extraordinary ; for the 
 unquestionable fact is, that those two propositions 
 are embodied in the first, second and third propo- 
 sitions of Dr Clarke's Discourse— while the sub- 
 ject discussed in the letters is the sixth proposition 
 of the Discourse. In other words, we find in 
 Dr Clarke's Discourse, 1. That something has 
 existed from eternity; 2. That that something 
 is an immutable and independent Being ; 3. That 
 that Being is self-existent :--we find in Dr Clarke's 
 letters, Prop. 6. That that Being is infinite and 
 omnipresent. So that in the letters, it is assumed 
 as a point already proved, that there is an eternal, 
 immutable, self-existent Being ; and new principles 
 —namely, the existence of space and time— are 
 introduced, to prove the infinity and omnipresence 
 of the same Being. So far are the letters from 
 presenting a restatement of the fundamental argu- 
 ment. His Lordship, however, may have the 
 satisfaction of thinking that Mr Dugald Stewart 
 has taken the same erroneous view of the matter. 
 That learned metaphysician was, indeed, as I 
 strongly suspect, the person who led His Lord- 
 ship into the mistake. Thus writes Mr Stewart : 
 
254 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 "Proceeding on these principles, Dr Clarke argued, 
 that, as immensity and eternity are not substances but at- 
 tributeSy the immense and eternal Being, whose attributes 
 they are, must exist of necessity also. The existence of 
 God therefore, according to Clarke, is a truth that follows 
 with demonstrative evidence, from those conceptions of 
 space and time which are inseparable from the human 
 mind."* 
 
 How any person, who had ever read Dr 
 Clarke's sixth proposition, could arrive at such 
 a conclusion as this — is to me quite inexplicable. 
 Instead of the immensity being taken, in order 
 to prove the existence, as Mr Stewart and Lord 
 Brougham suppose— the existence is assumed as 
 certain, in order to prove the immensity. I 
 know not whether any one has before noticed 
 this remarkable misapprehension of Dr Clarke's 
 meaning, t 
 
 The Noble Author next advances some spe- 
 cific objections to Dr Clarke's argument; but I 
 think it no illegitimate inference, from his Lord- 
 ship's mistake respecting the scope of the argu- 
 
 • Dissertation on Metaphysical Science, Part n. p. 67. 
 
 t Butler, in his correspondence with Dr Clarke, thoroughly un- 
 derstood the matter. " In your Demonstration, Prop, vi." (he writes) 
 •' you propose to prove the infinity or omnJ/)rfS«wce of the self-existent 
 Being." It may be worth notice that Butler appears to have been 
 satisfied with the argument as far as Prop. vi. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORL 
 
 255 
 
 ment, to say, that there may very possibly be 
 far more in the substance of the argument, than 
 His Lordship has discovered. This, indeed, is 
 not the place to discuss the merits of an abstruse 
 method of reasoning ; nor am I at all concerned 
 to defend the validity of the reasoning adopted 
 by Dr Clarke. On Lord Brougham's objections, 
 therefore, I shaU trouble the reader with but 
 few observations. 
 
 Dr Clarke's argument depends upon the realiti/ 
 of space and time. Lord Brougham denies that 
 reaHty. "What is time," he asks, "but the 
 succession of ideas, and the consciousness and the 
 recollection which we have of that succession ?" 
 From this may be collected His Lordship's notion 
 of space. In these opinions he follows certain 
 continental philosophers. Thus Leibnitz-" Space 
 is nothing but the order of things co-existing, 
 and time nothing but the order of things suc- 
 cessive : "—so also D'Alembert, but with less de- 
 cision— *S"i/ ri'i/ avoit point de corps et de stic- 
 cessim, Tespace et le temps seroient possible, mats 
 ils rCexisteroient pas. For my own part, I am 
 content to follow Locke and Newton, in believ- 
 ing the reality of space and of time. I cannot 
 
^^ 
 
 N 
 
 256 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PR/OH/. 
 
 257 
 
 persuade myself that the co-existence of things 
 cmistHides space, or that their succession consti- 
 tides time ; but I can well understand that the 
 co-existence of things enables us to measure space, 
 and their succession to estimate time. Mr Dugald 
 Stewart declares that he " cannot even form a 
 conception of the proposition contended for by 
 Leibnitz;"" acknowledges that space must always 
 appear something real to him, " while the frame 
 of his understanding remains unaltered ; *" and asks, 
 "Of what data is human reason possessed, from 
 which it is entitled to argue in opposition to truths, 
 the contrary of which it is impossible not only to 
 prove, but to express in terms comprehensible by 
 our faculties?'"* 
 
 In considering Dr Clarke's sixth proposition, 
 the real difficulty is to satisfy the mind respecting 
 the notion that space and time are attributes of 
 the self-existent Being; on which point no one 
 who has not studied, with the closest attention, 
 the correspondence between Butler and Clarke, 
 can be capable of forming any judgment. To 
 that correspondence, therefore, I refer the reader, 
 who has any curiosity on the subject. To one 
 
 * Spe Dissertation on Alptaphysical Science. Part ir. p. 69. 
 
 objection however, mucli enlarged upon by Lord 
 Brougham, I will just advert. 
 
 " If space be deemed a quality, and if infinite space 
 be the quality of an infinite being, finite space must also 
 be a quality, and must, by parity of reason, be the quality 
 of a finite being. Of what being ? Here is a cube of one 
 foot within an exhausted receiver, or a cylinder of half an 
 inch diameter and three inches high in the TorriceUian 
 vacuum. What is the being of whom that square and 
 that cyhndrical space are to be deemed ns qunhties?" 
 (p. 85.) 
 
 To this it may be replied, that Omnipre- 
 sence is not locality; and that, to the Being 
 who exists everywhere, space must appertain in 
 a manner altogether different from that in which 
 it belongs to whatever may be (as every thing 
 finite may be) successively in different parts of 
 space. In other words, the modes of existence of 
 an Omnipresent Being and a limited being, with 
 relation to space, are entirely dissimilar ; and 
 there is no " parity of reason'" which is applicable 
 to the two cases. All that I mean to assert is, 
 that, whether Dr Clarke's view of the matter be 
 right or wrong. Lord Brougham's argument is 
 inconclusive. 
 
 Lord Brougham's next object is to give a kind 
 of general view of Dr Clarke's Demonstration, 
 
 K 
 
 \ 
 
 -■^>_ 
 
258 
 
 SKCTION V. 
 
 from beginning to end; which he does in the 
 
 following terms: 
 
 "It is truly astonishing to find so profound a thinker, 
 and, generally speaking, so accurate a reasoner [as Dr 
 Clarke] actually supposing that he can deduce from the 
 proposition. That a self-existent Being must have existed 
 from all time, this other proposition, that therefore this 
 Being must be infinitely wise (Prop, xi.) and that 'he 
 must of necessity be a Being of infinite goodness, justice 
 and truth, and all other moral perfections such as would 
 become the governor and judge of the world.' (Prop, xii.) 
 With the general texture of this argument we have at 
 present nothing to do, further than to show how little it 
 can by possibility deserve the name either of an argu- 
 ment a priori, or be regarded as the demonstration of a 
 necessary truth. For surely, prior to all experience, no 
 one could ever know that there were such things as either 
 judges or governors; and without the previous idea of u 
 finite or worldly ruler and judge, we could never gain 
 any idea of an eternal and infinitely just ruler and judge : 
 and equally certain it is that this demonstration, if it 
 proves the existence of an infinite and eternal ruler and 
 judge to be a necessary arid not a contingent truth (which 
 is Dr Clarke's whole argument), would just as strictly 
 prove the existence of finite rulers and judges to be a 
 necessary and not a contingent truth; or, in other words, 
 it would follow, that the existence of governors and judges 
 in the world is a necessary truth, like the equality of 
 the three angles of a triangle to two right angles; and 
 that it would be a contradiction in terms, and so an 
 impossibility, to conceive the world existing without go- 
 vernors and judges." (pp. 88, 89.) 
 
 ARGUMENT A PHIORI. 
 
 259 
 
 Every one who has read tlie preceding para- 
 graph will, of course, conclude that Dr Clarke 
 must have immediately inferred that the self- 
 existent Being is of necessity infinitely wise. Let 
 us, then, trace Dr Clarke's argument in its pro- 
 gress. The sixth proposition, as we have seen, 
 is intended to prove that the Self-existent Being 
 is omnipresent; the seventh, that the same Being 
 is but One; and the eighth, that the Self-existent 
 Being, arid original cause of all things, must be 
 an intelligent Being. Here, as I have already 
 (p. 110.) had occasion to remark, is discussed 
 "the main question between us and the atheists;" 
 and here we see the Self-existent Being described 
 as the Creator of " the things that do appear." 
 Dr Clarke, moreover, distinctly declares that, to 
 establish the Intelligence of the Self-existent Being, 
 we must have recourse to the phenomena of the 
 world ; with which view he occupies nearly twelve 
 closely-printed octavo pages, in pointing out the 
 indications of intelligence with which the world 
 abounds. The ninth proposition is to prove that 
 the Self-existent and original Cause of all things 
 is a Being endued witli liberty and choice ; which 
 is proved both from what has gone before, and 
 
 R 2 
 
260 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 also by an appeal to the disposition of things in 
 the world — from final causes — and from the na- 
 ture of created beings. The proof of the tenth 
 proposition — That the Self-existent Being, the 
 Supreme Cause of all things, must have infinite 
 power — mainly depends upon the actual consti- 
 tution of things, as ascertained by perception and 
 consciousness. After this apparatus, comes the 
 eleventh proposition — adduced by Lord Brougham 
 — That the Supreme Cause and Author of all 
 things must of necessity be infinitely wise. And 
 here, after availing himself of the information 
 afforded by the foregoing propositions — proved 
 as well by reference to the phenomena of the 
 universe, as by abstract reasoning — Dr Clarke 
 again dwells upon "the wisdom and perfection 
 of ^the works of God, evidenced more illustri- 
 ously in the late discoveries in Astronomy and 
 Natural Philosophy*" — at the same time recom- 
 mending the writings of Galen and Cicero, among 
 the ancients — and Boyle, Ray and Derham, 
 among the moderns, in confirmation of his views. 
 It would be an ill compliment to the readers 
 penetration to suppose that anything more can 
 be wanted, to enable him to estimate the cor- 
 
 [i 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 261 
 
 rectness of Lord Brougham's representation — 
 that "from the proposition — that a self-existent 
 being has existed from all time*" — Dr Clarke has 
 deduced, "that therefbre this being must be in- 
 finitely wise"". . . . But, according to the Noble 
 Author, Dr Clarke has, from the same premises, 
 also deduced "the infinite goodness, justice and 
 truth'' of the same being, together with "all 
 other moral perfections, such as become the Su- 
 preme Governor and Judge of the world:"" the 
 point which remains finally to be considered. 
 Our attention, indeed, is now called to Dr Clarke's 
 closing proposition. It was shown, in the pro- 
 positions immediately preceding — not solely, the 
 reader will recollect, by abstract reasoning, but 
 also by the evidence of the world around us — 
 that the Supreme Being possesses infinite know- 
 ledge and the perfection of wisdom — and is abso- 
 lutely independent and omnipotent. Now, "all 
 evil," Dr Clarke argues, "and all imperfections 
 whatsoever, arise either from shortness of under- 
 standing, defect of power, or faultiness of will; 
 from all which, it being manifest that the Su- 
 preme Cause and Author of all things cannot 
 but be infinitely removed — it follows undeniably 
 
 h 
 
 '''mi%_ 
 
t 
 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 that he must of necessity be a Being of infi- 
 nite goodness, justice and truth, and all other 
 moral perfections.'' The importance of some rea- 
 soning on the divine benevolence and moral at- 
 tributes, previous to the examination of such 
 appearances of good or evil as may be found in 
 the world, was strongly felt by Mr Dugald 
 Stewart. " It is difficult,'' he observes, " to con- 
 ceive what other motive [than that of benevo- 
 lence] could have induced a Being completely 
 and independently happy, to have called his crea- 
 tures into existence. — In this manner, without 
 any examination of the fact, we have a strong 
 presumption for the goodness of the Deity; and 
 it is only after establishing this presumption 
 a priori, that we can proceed to examine the 
 fact with safety."* Here is a sentence, weighty 
 with truth, and momentous in its bearings. In 
 this manner, we are i^repared to contemplate, to 
 the best purpose, the providential arrangements 
 and moral tendencies of the system of things pre- 
 sented to our view. More, than what has now 
 been adduced, cannot be required to vindicate the 
 reasoning here adopted by Dr Clarke. At all 
 
 * Outlines of Moral Pliilosophy. p. 190. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 261 
 
 events, with regard to the Noble Author's state- 
 ment—that there is, as it were, but one step, 
 between the supposition of a Self-existent Being 
 and the proof of a Being of infinite goodness, 
 justice and truth— we now see how many im- 
 portant propositions are interposed, and conse- 
 quently how little the statement is borne out by 
 fact. Indeed, I can scarcely conceive how any 
 one, intent on sketching an object placed before 
 him, could possibly have produced a picture more 
 unlike the reality, than Lord Brougham's descrip- 
 tion is, in all its parts, to Dr Clarke's original .... 
 I have now redeemed the pledge which was given 
 in the 241st page. ...The Noble Author's observa- 
 tions, respecting " the existence of governors and 
 judges in the world being a necessary truth, like 
 the equality of the three angles of a triangle 
 to two right angles," can have arisen solely from 
 a total misapprehension of Dr Clarke's method 
 of reasoning. There are weightier considerations, 
 which induce me to lament that the latter part 
 of the paragraph should ever have been published. 
 . . .Why His Lordship should have taken so much 
 trouble, with regard to Dr Clarke s labours, does 
 not appear ; but, in addition to all the objections 
 
 <' 
 
 I 
 
« 
 
 n^ 
 
 I 
 
 264 
 
 SECTION V 
 
 alleged against the substance and validity of the 
 general argument, we find some strictures, on its 
 originality, which cannot be allowed to pass with- 
 out examination. 
 
 Lord Brougham's language tends to leave, 
 upon the reader's mind, an impression that Clarke's 
 argument was derived from Locke's Essay on 
 Human Understanding. His Lordship gives the 
 preference to Locke's argument. I have no wish 
 to arbitrate between Locke and Clarke ; although 
 several matters are alleged, which are well en- 
 titled to consideration. It is, however, beyond 
 doubt that the primary position of Locke "does 
 not materially differ" from that of Clarke; and 
 in fact, this primary position had been taken ad- 
 vantage of, long before the time either of Clarke 
 or of Locke*. But as to any appropriation, of 
 any part of Locke's Essay on the part of Clarke, 
 I can state that, in the Preface to the Evidences 
 of Natural and Revealed Religion, the latter had 
 occasion to notice some abusive remarks (by a 
 Cartesian) upon his work. On the Being and 
 Attributes of God; on which occasion he thus 
 wrote: "The rest of the book is all either an 
 
 ♦ Sec the quotation from Tudworth, pp, 245 — ^247. 
 
 1 
 
 ARGUMENT A PHIOIil. 
 
 265 
 
 indecent and unreasonable reviling of the learned 
 Mr Locke : from whom I neither cited any pas- 
 sage, nor (that I know of) borrowed any argu- 
 ment from him: and therefore is altogether im- 
 pertinent." Believing that, on this point, Dr 
 Clarke's word ought to go farther than any other 
 person's surmise, I proceed to the next charge 
 of plagiarism which has been advanced. 
 
 Mr Dugald Stewart's mistake— in supposing 
 that Dr Clarke intended, from the nature of 
 space and time, to prove the existence of God, 
 when he really was proving the omnipresence- 
 has been pointed out. While discussing that 
 subject, Mr Stewart made use of the following 
 language— "An argument, substantially the same 
 with this, for the existence of God, is hinted at 
 very distinctly by Cudworth, Intellectual System^ 
 Chap. V. Sect. 3, 4."* From this suggestion, I 
 believe— for it is not expressly so stated— Lord 
 Brougham concluded that Dr Clarke probably 
 took his own argument from Dr Cudworth. The 
 
 Noble Author thus writes: 
 
 " Dr Cudworth, in the fifth chapter of his great work, 
 has, in answering the Democritic arguments, so plainly 
 anticipated Dr Clarke, that it is hardly possible to con- 
 
 * Dissertation on Metaphysical Philo^opby. Fart ii. p. 67. n. 
 
 
I 
 
 II 
 
 266 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 ceive how the latter should have avoided referring to it. 
 ♦If space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and 
 a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend, then will it 
 undeniably follow, from this very principle of theirs, that 
 there must be incorporeal space [substance] and (this 
 space being supposed by them to be infinite) an infinite 
 incorporeal Deity.' " (p. 92.) 
 
 It is clear from the structure of the sentence 
 from Cudworth, more especially from the words 
 in Italics, which Lord Brougham by some acci- 
 dent omitted in transcribing— as well as from 
 other parts of the Intellectual System— that the 
 argument was intended for a confutation of the 
 followers of Democritus, on their omi principles. 
 There is no reason to conclude that Cudworth 
 would have stood by the argument, in any other 
 point of view. His Lordship, however, has quoted 
 another passage ; and so much of it as may throw 
 light upon the present question, I will extract: 
 
 " We conclude, therefore, that from this very hypothesis 
 of the Democritic and Epicurean atheists, that space is 
 of a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it 
 follows undeniably that there must be some incorporeal 
 substance whose affection its extension is; and because 
 there can be nothing infinite but only the Deity, that 
 it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity ; just 
 as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted: 
 (p. 93, or Cudworth, p. 769.) 
 
 illii 
 
 AHGUMENT A PIUORI. 
 
 267 
 
 •4 
 
 The concluding words, here printed in Italics 
 — which also Lord Brougham accidentally omitted 
 in transcribing — show that such notions of space 
 were at that time well known to " learned Theists 
 and Incorporealists;"" with whose writings Dr 
 Clarke, as well as Dr Cudworth, may have been 
 
 acquainted* The truth is that, prior to the 
 
 time of Dr Clarke, there had been much abstract 
 speculation, on the proof of the being and attri- 
 butes of God ; and he had read, I have no doubt, 
 every thing of the kind, that was worth reading. 
 But when he sat down to write, it was no crude 
 information that he had to communicate. Every 
 thing bore the impression of his own mind. By 
 continued meditation, his knowledge had acquired 
 
 the form and coherence of system In former 
 
 days, he seems to have been more justly estimated. 
 Bentley and Clarke were particularly associated 
 with each other in the mind of Johnson. The 
 great moralist, when asked whether some one 
 
 * Since the preceding remarks on the passages from Cudworth 
 were written, I find that Mosheira, in his Latin Translation of the 
 Intellectual System agrees with mc in my view of the argument. 
 " Ad hominem, ut in scholis loqui solent, hie disputat vir longe doc- 
 tissimus, et ex ipsis eorum, qui cum Democrito et Epicuro faciunt, 
 de'natura spatii decretis argumentum eorum ad versus Deum corporc 
 vacantem evertit." p. 1007. ed. 1733. 
 
268 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 studied hard, replied, "No, Sir: — I do not be- 
 lieve he studied hard. I never knew a man who 
 studied hard. I conclude, indeed, from the effects, 
 that some men have studied hard, as Bentley and 
 Clarke.'' At another time, " Snatches of reading,'' 
 he said, "will not make a Bentley or a Clarke."* 
 
 These are assuredly not the men to be placed 
 
 on their trial for literary larceny. 
 
 There is, indeed, another author, besides Cud- 
 worth, from whom Lord Brougham supposes Dr 
 Clarke's abstract argument to have been derived; 
 namely. Sir Isaac Newton. In page 90, His Lord- 
 ship adverts to the ScJwllum Generale, at the 
 end of the Principia, which, he says, " is thought 
 to have suggested it;" and again in page 150, to 
 that " celebrated Scholium, upon which Dr Clarke's 
 argument a priori for the existence of a Deity is 
 built." Here, likewise, I take it for granted that 
 Lord Brougham directs his course, as Mr Dugald 
 Stewart points the way. This latter gentleman, 
 in his Dissertation so frequently quoted, men- 
 tions Newton's Scholium as "the germ" of Clarke's 
 "celebrated argument « priori;'''' gives an anec- 
 
 * Boswell's Life of Johnson, Vol. i. p. 47, and Vol. iv. p. 20. 
 ed. 1807. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PHIORL 
 
 269 
 
 dote of Clarke, from whicli it appears that, even 
 while yet a boy, he had a clear conviction of 
 the absolute and independent existence of space ; 
 and then goes on — " With this early and deep 
 impression on his mind, it is easy to conceive 
 how Newton's Scholium should have encouraged 
 him to resume the musings of his boyish days, 
 concerning the necessary existence of space; and 
 to trace, as far as he could, its connexion with 
 
 the principles of Natural Theology."* This is 
 
 so delightful a vision, that one is almost afraid 
 to move or breathe, lest it should vanish into 
 air ; but the dull reality is, that Dr Clarke's work 
 came out in 1704 — and "the celebrated aS'c^o- 
 lium''^ first made its appearance in 1713, when 
 the second edition of the Principia was published ! 
 Such is the value of refined speculation, in mat- 
 ters of this kind. Mr Stewart's mistake is the 
 more remarkable, because he has himself recorded 
 that " the Scholium first appeared at the end of 
 the second edition of the Principia, printed at 
 Cambridge in 1713; the former edition, published 
 at London in 1687, having no Scholium annexed 
 to it." Having mentioned this inaccuracy, I 
 
 * Dissertation, p. 69. 
 
o 
 
 570 
 
 SECTION V 
 
 may, without in the least detracting from the 
 merits of Mr Stewart as a philosophical writer, 
 observe, — that his literary notices are by no means 
 to be depended upon. From several instances 
 which might be adduced, I will select one; and 
 as it has no relation to the subject now discussed, 
 the reader will find it given in a note, at the end 
 
 of the present section After all, Mr Stewart 
 
 may, in this instance, have been misled by the 
 circumstance that, in Clarke's fifth letter to Butler 
 (at the end of the Demonstration), the Scholium 
 is quoted in the margin. The letter, however, 
 bears date April 8, 1714, and therefore was KTitten 
 after the publication of the second edition of the 
 Principia. It appears also that Dr Clarke was 
 in the habit of adding marginal notes, in the suc- 
 cessive editions of his work, on the Being and 
 Attributes of God*. 
 
 * Since the publication of the first edition of this work, a hint 
 has been thrown out, that Mr Dugald Stewart might possibly have 
 derived his notion, of the connexion between Newton's scholium and 
 Clarke's argument, from the Lectures of Dr Reid, at Glasgow. This 
 is very likely to have been the case. In Dr Reid's Essays on the 
 \>o\cers of the Human Mind, Vol. i. p. 439. ed. 1812. the following 
 passage occurs: — "Sir Isaac Newton thought that the Deity, by 
 existing every where, and at all times, constitutes time and space, 
 immensity and eternity. This probably suggested, to his great friend 
 Dr Clarke, what he calls the argument ii priori, for the existence of 
 
 an 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 271 
 
 There is, to my mind, something unaccount- 
 able in these modern attempts to lower the cha- 
 racter of Dr Clarke. He opposed not the usual 
 mode of proof: on the contrary, a reference to 
 the 111th page of this volume will show how 
 highly he estimated the indications, of the Divine 
 being and perfections, presented by the material, 
 the moral and the intellectual worlds. With Dr 
 Cudworth, he seems "neither to have had any 
 mind to quarrel with other men''s arguments ^jro 
 Deo, nor yet to be thought to lay stress upon 
 anything which is not every way solid and sub- 
 stantial.""* Mr Whiston has given an anecdote, 
 respecting Dr Clarke and his Discourses at Boyle''s 
 Lecture, which I trust will be interesting to every 
 
 reader : 
 
 "After this, a.d. 1704, and 1705, Mr Clarke preached, 
 and soon after published his sixteen Sermons at Mr Boyles 
 Lecture, in two Volumes ; containing ' Discourses concern- 
 ing the Being and Attributes of God ; the Obligations of 
 Natural Religion; and the Truth and Certainty of the 
 Christian Revelation.' And I have been informed, that 
 Dr Smalridge said, of one or both of those volumes, * It 
 
 an immense and eternal Being. "...Dr Reid's surmise, however, is of 
 a less definite character than the opinions expressed by Mr Dugald 
 Stewart and Lord Brougham ; although he seems to have fallen 
 mto the mistake of supposing that Dr Clarke proved the eri>itence of 
 the Deity from the existence of space and time. 
 * Intellectual System, p. 721. 
 
272 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 was the best book on those subjects that liad been written 
 in any language.' When Mr Clarke brought me his 
 book — it was the first volume, I suppose — I was in my 
 garden over against St Peter's College in Cambridge, where 
 I then lived. Now I perceived that in these Sermons he 
 had dealt a great deal in abstract and metaphysic rea- 
 sonings. I therefore asked him how he ventured into 
 such subtilties, which I never durst meddle with? And 
 showing him a nettle, or the like contemptible weed in 
 my garden, I told him, 'That weed contained better ar- 
 guments for the Being and Attributes of God than all 
 his Metaphysics.' Mr Clarke confessed it to be so; but 
 alleged fur himself, *That since such Philosophers as 
 Hobbes and Spinoza had made use of those kind of sub- 
 tilties against, he thought proper to shew that the like 
 way of reasoning might be made better use of on the 
 side of Religion.' Which reason or excuse I allowed not 
 to be inconsiderable.'* 
 
 My inference, from all this, is —that whatever 
 objections are brought against the writings of 
 Dr Clarke, ought to bear the marks of deliberate 
 inquiry, and indicate respect for the character of 
 a great man ; and I am the more confirmed in 
 my conclusion, on finding Lord Brougham at last 
 adopting a considerable portion of the following 
 sentiments from the pen of Mr Dugald Stewart : 
 "Although the argument, as stated by Dr Clarke, does 
 not carry complete satisfaction to my mind, I think it must 
 
 * Winston's Memoirs ot Dr Clarke, pp. 7, 8. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 273 
 
 be granted that there is something peculiarly wonderful 
 and overwhelming in those conceptions of immensity 
 and eternity, which it is not less impossible to banish 
 from our thoughts, than the consciousness of our own 
 existence. Nay, further, I think that these conceptions 
 are intimately connected with the fundamental principles 
 of Natural Religion. For when once we have established, 
 from the evidences of design every where manifested around 
 us, the existence of an intelligent and powerful cause, 
 we are unavoidably led to apply to this cause our con- 
 ceptions of immensity and eternity, and to conceive Him 
 as filling the infinite extent of both, with his presence 
 and with his power. Hence we associate with the idea 
 of God those awful impressions which are naturally pro- 
 duced by the idea of infinite space, and perhaps still 
 more by the idea of infinite duration. Nor is this all. 
 It is from the immensity of space that the notion of in- 
 finity is originally derived ; and it is hence that we transfer 
 the expression, by a sort of metaphor, to other subjects. 
 When we speak, therefore, of infinite power, wisdom 
 and goodness, our notions, if not wholly borrowed from 
 space, are at least greatly aided by this analogy; so 
 that the conceptions of Immensity and Eternity, if they 
 do not of themselves demonstrate the existence of God, 
 yet necessarily enter into the ideas we form of his nature 
 and attributes." * 
 
 Something of the misapprehension already 
 pointed out, respecting the object of Dr Clarke's 
 sixth proposition, pervades the whole of the pre- 
 
 * Dissertation, &c. p. 67. 
 S 
 
f 
 
 ►-( 
 
 274 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Hi 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 275 
 
 i^ I 
 
 ceding extract. Had Mr Stewart perceived the 
 real import of the proposition, he would have 
 more distinctly seen how greatly it may assist 
 the mind, in forming those sublime conceptions 
 of the Deity, on which he has expatiated with 
 so much eloquence. Of that eloquence I would 
 not weaken the effect. I despair, indeed, of closing 
 the section more happily, than by means of a sen- 
 tence which I have just met with. The sentence 
 falls in with the present train of thought; and 
 Lord Brougham will agree with me, in not 
 liking it the less, because it was written by a 
 learned non-conformist. " The consideration of 
 the infinite distance between God and the crea- 
 ture, which strongly appears upon reading such 
 a book as Dr Clarke's, directly tends to promote 
 humility, perfect resignation, and all those other 
 dispositions, which ought to be constantly preva- 
 lent in our bosoms, towards our Great Creator, in 
 whom we live and move and Jtave our being.""* 
 
 • Rev. S. Clark's Letter to Doddridge, See Diary and Corre- 
 spondence, Vol. I. p. 39. 
 
 Note referred to p. 270. 
 
 There are, in the Letters of Junius, some 
 verses, cited by Mr Home, as the words of his 
 "ancient monitor.'' The same verses also are 
 thus cited by Mr Dugald Stewart : " In the fol- 
 lowing rude lines of Churchill, which Mr [Home] 
 Tooke's Letter to Junius has made familiar to 
 every ear, the feelings which give to the stone 
 arch its peculiar character of grandeur are painted 
 with equal justness and spirit : 
 
 'Tis the last key-stone 
 
 That makes the arch ; the rest that there were put 
 Are nothing till that comes to bind and shut. 
 Then stands it a triumphant mark : then men 
 Observe the strength, the height, the why and when 
 It was erected ; and still , walking under, 
 Meet some new matter to look up and wonder." 
 
 Now the difficulty here is, to imagine how 
 any one could have failed to perceive that these 
 lines must have been written at least a century 
 prior to the time of Churchill. In fact, they are 
 Ben Jonson's ; and form part of An Epistle to Sir 
 Edward SacJcville, Earl of Dorset, to be found 
 
 s 2 
 
278 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 279 
 
 naTo^ Kal votiTifi.Y -^ a bodiless and intelligent 
 beingr... Now, vorjTt] is not intelligent, but iw- 
 telligible ; that is, perceivable, or conceivable, hy 
 the understanding. If intelligent had been the 
 meaning, intended to be conveyed, voyitikyi would 
 have been the word. Cudworth observes that 
 Plato "uses the expression oiaia i^ofjri) intel- 
 ligible substance, in opposition to the other, which 
 he caUs o^aia aL(r9rtT^ sensible;' or perceptible 
 by the senses, t And this correction of Lord 
 Brougham's mistake is the more important, be- 
 cause there can be no doubt that the oCaia voyit^ 
 
 • The correction of .o>,x„ for .o„t^v appears in the fourth edition 
 of Lord Brougham's ' Discourse' : -the only correction I have as 
 yet discovered. 
 
 t See Cudworths Intellectual System, Chap. i. Sect. 19 Mo- 
 sheim, m h.s translation, has completely misunderstood the pas- 
 sage; as the following version will convince the learned reader- 
 o..,«. .o,.,., substantiam inteUigeniem [appellat] ut discrimen 
 carum ab altero .llo rerum ordine indicaret, quas o<„ia, aM.rX, 
 suhstant.^ sentiemis mmine «g»i;ic«(. "-thus giving to «M„t,; 
 the meanmg of sentient, as well as to .„,x,i that of inteUigent. 
 These are strange mistakes for Mosheim to have raade-extending 
 not only to Plato's Greek but to Cudworth's English. A history 
 of mKtakes, m a.ny department of literature, would he a curious 
 document. Olymp.odorus, an old Greek commentator, wished in 
 one ..^tance to give .„„.„• an active signification, although against 
 he rule as he observed. Proclus, better acquainted with the Pla- 
 tonic philosophy, assigned to the word its usual meaning. One of 
 .he rs, requisites in ,he study „f tha, philosophy, is to comprehend 
 «ha. ,s signified hy the o.V.'a .„„t,;, and the oM„ „;,«.,.,; 
 
 
 refers to Plato's notion of the ideas, or the Jbrnis 
 of things ; to which also the passage next quoted 
 by Lord Brougham— and, as it happens, the next 
 by Cudworth— equally relates : ra dcrdfiara, koX- 
 \i(TTa ovra kol fjieyifira, Xoyip fxovov, a\\(f) oe 
 ovSevi, Ga(j>m SeiKvvrai — the things incorporeal, 
 being the most excellent and greatest of all, are 
 made manifest, or discovered, by reason aUme, and 
 no otherwise. Lord Brougham goes on to cite a 
 passage from Plato, for the purpose of represent- 
 ing the body as the prison of the soul ; but it is 
 given so incorrectly— €tKoi/a SeafiwTrjpiov eivai ovu 
 T^S ^^X^^ avTO eo)? rjv ra oCpeiKofxeva to awfia — 
 as to be divested of all meaning. In the Cratylus 
 (s. 38.) we find the following account of the word 
 (TWfxa : loKOVGi julcptol julol /na\i(TTa OeaOai oi 
 duAfpl *Op(p€a Tovro to ovofia, m SiKtjv cioovarj^ 
 T^s xl/iyv^S', wv Srj eveKa oiowai' tovtov oe 
 TrepifioXov e')(€iv, wa aw'CviTai, SeafJLWTtjpiov eiKova' 
 eivai ouv tvjs y^X*^^ tovto, a>s irep avTO ovofia- 
 ^CTai, €W9 dv eKTicrri Tci ocpciXoneva, to awfia. 
 Orpheus and his Jblhicers seem to me to have 
 given the best etymology of this word aw^a (from 
 rrw'C^eGOai) —that the soid is here in a state of 
 
 \ 
 
m 
 
 264 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 alleged against the substance and validity of the 
 general argument, we find some strictures, on its 
 originality, which cannot be allowed to pass with- 
 out examination. 
 
 Lord Brougham's language tends to leave, 
 upon the reader's mind, an impression that Clarke's 
 argument was derived from Locke's Essay on 
 Human Understanding. His Lordship gives the 
 preference to Locke's argument. I have no wish 
 to arbitrate between Locke and Clarke; although 
 several matters are alleged, which are well en- 
 titled to consideration. It is, however, beyond 
 doubt that the primary position of Locke "does 
 not materially differ" from that of Clarke; and 
 in fact, this primary position had been taken ad- 
 vantage of, long before the time either of Clarke 
 or of Locke*. But as to any appropriation, of 
 any part of Locke's Essay on the part of Clarke, 
 I can state that, in the Preface to the Evidences 
 of Natural and Revealed Religion, the latter had 
 occasion to notice some abusive remarks (by a 
 Cartesian) upon his work. On the Being and 
 Attributes of God; on which occasion he thus 
 wrote: "The rest of the book is all either an 
 
 • Sec the quotation from Tudworth. pp. •245 — 247. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 265 
 
 indecent and unreasonable reviling of the learned 
 Mr Locke : from whom I neither cited any pas- 
 sage, nor (that I know of) borrowed any argu- 
 ment from him: and therefore is altogether im- 
 pertinent." Believing that, on this point, Dr 
 Clarke's word ought to go farther than any other 
 person's surmise, I proceed to the next charge 
 of plagiarism which has been advanced. 
 
 Mr Dugald Stewart's mistake—in supposing 
 that Dr Clarke intended, from the nature of 
 space and time, to prove the existence of God, 
 when he really was proving the omnipresence — 
 has been pointed out. While discussing that 
 subject, Mr Stewart made use of the following 
 language—" An argument, substantially the same 
 with this, for the existence of God, is hinted at 
 very distinctly by Cudworth, Intellectual System^ 
 Chap. V. Sect. 3, 4."* From this suggestion, I 
 believe — for it is not expressly so stated — Lord 
 Brougham concluded that Dr Clarke probably 
 took his own argument from Dr Cudworth. The 
 
 Noble Author thus writes: 
 
 *• Dr Cudworth, in the fifth chapter of his great work, 
 has, in answering the Democritic arguments, so plainly 
 anticipated Dr Clarke, that it is hardly possible to con- 
 
 * Dissertation on Metaphysical Philosophy, Part u. p. 67. n. 
 
 (\ 
 
 V 
 
 \ 
 
264 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 i 
 
 alleged against the substance and validity of the 
 general argument, we find some strictures, on its 
 originality, which cannot be allowed to pass with- 
 out examination. 
 
 Lord Brougham's language tends to leave, 
 upon the reader's mind, an impression that Clarke's 
 argument was derived from Locke's Essay on 
 Human Understanding. His Lordship gives the 
 preference to Locke's argument. I have no wish 
 to arbitrate between Locke and Clarke; although 
 several matters are alleged, which are well en- 
 titled to consideration. It is, however, beyond 
 doubt that the primary position of Locke "does 
 not materially differ" from that of Clarke; and 
 in fact, this primary position had been taken ad- 
 vantage of, long before the time either of Clarke 
 or of Locke*. But as to any appropriation, of 
 any part of Locke's Essay on the part of Clarke, 
 I can state that, in the Preface to the Evidences 
 of Natural and Revealed Religion, the latter had 
 occasion to notice some abusive remarks (by a 
 Cartesian) upon his work, On the Being and 
 Attributes of God; on which occasion he thus 
 wrote: "The rest of the book is all either an 
 
 * See the quotation from rudvvorth. pp. 245 247. 
 
 ill 
 
 ^ll 
 
 ARGUMENT A PltlOlU. 
 
 265 
 
 indecent and unreasonable reviling of the learned 
 Mr Locke : from whom I neither cited any pas- 
 sage, nor (that I know of) borrowed any argu- 
 ment from him: and therefore is altogether im- 
 pertinent." Believing that, on this point, Dr 
 Clarke's word ought to go farther than any other 
 person's surmise, I proceed to the next charge 
 of plagiarism which has been advanced. 
 
 Mr Dugald Stewart's mistake — in supposing 
 that Dr Clarke intended, from the nature of 
 space and time, to prove the existence of God, 
 when he really was proving the omnipresence — 
 has been pointed out. While discussing that 
 subject, Mr Stewart made use of the following 
 language—" An argument, substantially the same 
 with this, for the existence of God, is hinted at 
 very distinctly by Cudworth, Intellectual Si^stem^ 
 Chap. V. Sect. 3, 4."* From this suggestion, I 
 believe — for it is not expressly so stated — Lord 
 Brougham concluded that Dr Clarke probably 
 took his own argument from Dr Cudworth. The 
 
 Noble Author thus writes: 
 
 " Dr Cudworth, in the fifth chapter of his great work, 
 has, in answering the Democritic arguments, so plainly 
 anticipated Dr Clarke, that it is hardly possible to con- 
 
 * Dissertation on IVIetapliysiral Philosophy, Part it. p. 67. n. 
 
266 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 ARGUMENT A PlilOlil. 
 
 267 
 
 ceive how the latter should have avoided referring to it. 
 * If space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and 
 a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend^ then will it 
 undeniably follow, from this very principle of theirs, that 
 there must be incorporeal space [substance] and (this 
 space being supposed by them to be infinite) an infinite 
 incorporeal Deity.' " (p. 92.) 
 
 It is clear from the structure of the sentence 
 from Cudworth, more especially from the vi^ords 
 in Italics, which Lord Brougham by some acci- 
 dent omitted in transcribing — as well as from 
 other parts of the Intellectual System — that the 
 argument was intended for a confutation of the 
 followers of Democritus, an their own principles. 
 There is no reason to conclude that Cudworth 
 would have stood by the argument, in any other 
 point of view. His Lordship, however, has quoted 
 another passage ; and so much of it as may throw 
 light upon the present question, I will extract: 
 
 " We conclude, therefore, that from this very hypothesis 
 of the Democritic and Epicurean atheists, that space is 
 of a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it 
 follows undeniably that there must be some incorporeal 
 substance whose affection its extension is; and because 
 there can be nothing infinite but only the Deity, that 
 it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity ; just 
 as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted" 
 (p. 93, or Cudworth, p. 769.) 
 
 » 
 
 
 
 The concluding words, here printed in Italics 
 — which also Lord Brougham accidentally omitted 
 in transcribing — show that such notions of space 
 were at that time well known to " learned Theists 
 and Incorporealists ; " with whose writings Dr 
 Clarke, as well as Dr Cudworth, may have been 
 
 acquainted* The truth is that, prior to the 
 
 time of Dr Clarke, there had been much abstract 
 speculation, on the proof of the being and attri- 
 butes of God ; and he had read, I have no doubt, 
 every thing of the kind, that was worth reading. 
 But when he sat down to write, it was no crude 
 information that he had to communicate. Every 
 thing bore the impression of his own mind. By 
 continued meditation, his knowledge had acquired 
 
 the form and coherence of system In former 
 
 days, he seems to have been more justly estimated. 
 Bentley and Clarke were particularly associated 
 with each other in the mind of Johnson. The 
 great moralist, when asked whether some one 
 
 * Since the preceding remarks on the passages from Cudworth 
 were written, I find that Mosheim, in his Latin Translation of the 
 Intellectual System agrees with mc in my view of the argument. 
 " Ad hominem, ut in schoiis loqui solent, hie disputat vir longe tloc- 
 tissimus, et ex ipsis eorum, qui cum Democrito et Epicuro faciunt, 
 de natura spatii decretis argumentum eorum adversus Deum corpore 
 vacantem evertit." p. 1007. ed. 1733. 
 
268 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 studied hard, replied, "No, Sir: — I do not be- 
 lieve he studied hard. I never knew a man who 
 studied hard. I conclude, indeed, from the effects, 
 that some men have studied hard, as Bentley and 
 Clarke.'' At another time, " Snatches of reading," 
 he said, "will not make a Bentley or a Clarke."**** 
 .... These are assuredly not the men to be placed 
 on their trial for literary larceny. 
 
 There is, indeed, another author, besides Cud- 
 worth, from whom Lord Brougham supposes Dr 
 Clarke's abstract argument to have been derived ; 
 namely, Sir Isaac Newton. In page 90, His Lord- 
 ship adverts to the Sckolium Generale, at the 
 end of the Principia, which, he says, " is thought 
 to have suggested it;" and again in page 150, to 
 that " celebrated Scholium, upon which Dr Clarke's 
 argument a priori for the existence of a Deity is 
 built." Here, likewise, I take it for granted that 
 Lord Brougham directs his course, as Mr Dugald 
 Stewart points the way. This latter gentleman, 
 in his Dissertation so frequently quoted, men- 
 tions Newton's Scholium as " the germ" of Clarke's 
 "celebrated argument « priori;'''' gives an anec- 
 
 * Boswell's Life of Johnson, Vol. i. p. 47, and Vol. iv. p. 20. 
 cd. 1807. 
 
 Ill 
 
 ARGUMENT A VRIOHI. 
 
 26'9 
 
 dote of Clarke, from which it appears that, even 
 while yet a boy, he had a clear conviction of 
 the absolute and independent existence of space ; 
 and then goes on — " With this early and deep 
 impression on his mind, it is easy to conceive 
 how Newton's Scholium should have encouraged 
 him to resume the musings of his boy'ish days, 
 concerning the necessary existence of space; and 
 to trace, as far as he could, its connexion with 
 
 the principles of Natural Theology."* This is 
 
 so delightful a vision, that one is almost afraid 
 to move or breathe, lest it should vanish into 
 air ; but the dull reality is, that Dr Clarke's work 
 came out in 1704 — and "the celebrated Sclio- 
 Hum'''' first made its appearance in 1713, when 
 the second edition of the Principia was published ! 
 Such is the value of refined speculation, in mat- 
 ters of this kind. Mr Stewart's mistake is the 
 more remarkable, because he has himself recorded 
 that " the Scholium first appeared at the end of 
 the second edition of the Principia, printed at 
 Cambridge in 1713; the former edition, published 
 at London in 1687, having no Scholium annexed 
 to it." Having mentioned this inaccuracy, I 
 
 * Dif^sertation, p. 69. 
 
 I 
 
-^i 
 
 •270 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 fi 
 
 may, without in the least detracting from tlie 
 merits of Mr Stewart as a philosophical writer, 
 observe, — that his literary notices are by no means 
 to be depended upon. From several instances 
 which might be adduced, I will select one; and 
 as it has no relation to the subject now discussed, 
 the reader will find it given in a note, at the end 
 
 of the present section After all, Mr Stewart 
 
 may, in this instance, have been misled by the 
 circumstance that, in Clarke's fifth letter to Butler 
 (at the end of the Demonstration), the Scholium 
 is quoted in the margin. The letter, however, 
 bears date April 8, 1714, and therefore was written 
 (ifter the publication of the second edition of the 
 Principia. It appears also that Dr Clarke was 
 in the habit of adding marginal notes, in the suc- 
 cessive editions of his work, on the Being and 
 Attributes of God*. 
 
 * Since the publication of the first edition of this work, a hint 
 has been thrown out, that Mr Dugald Stewart might possibly have 
 derived his notion, of the connexion between Newton's scholium and 
 Clarke's argument, from the Lectures of Dr Reid, at Glasgow. This 
 is very likely to have been the case. In Dr Reid's Essays on the 
 poicers of the Human Mind, Vol. i. p. 439. ed. 1812. the following 
 passage occurs: — "Sir Isaac Xewton thought that the Deity, by 
 existing every where, and at all times, constitutes time and space, 
 immensity and eternity. This probably suggested, to his great friend 
 Dr Clarke, what he calls the argument «i priori, for the existence of 
 
 an 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 271 
 
 There is, to my mind, something unaccount- 
 able in these modern attempts to lower the cha- 
 racter of Dr Clarke. He opposed not the usual 
 mode of proof: on the contrary, a reference to 
 the 111th page of this volume will show how 
 highly he estimated the indications, of the Divine 
 being and perfections, presented by the material, 
 the moral and the intellectual worlds. With Dr 
 Cudworth, he seems "neither to have had any 
 mind to quarrel with other men's arguments pro 
 Deo, nor yet to be thought to lay stress upon 
 anything which is not every way solid and sub- 
 stantial.'"* Mr Whiston has given an anecdote, 
 respecting Dr Clarke and his Discourses at Boyle's 
 Lecture, which I trust will be interesting to every 
 
 reader : 
 
 "After this, a.d. 1704, and 1705, Mr Clarke preached, 
 and soon after published his sixteen Sermons at Mr Boyle's 
 Lecture, in two Volumes ; containing ' Discourses concern- 
 ins the Beinsr and Attributes of God ; the Obligations of 
 Natural Religion; and the Truth and Certainty of the 
 Christian Revelation.' And I have been informed, that 
 Dr Smalridge said, of one or both of those volumes, * It 
 
 an immense and eternal Being.". ..Dr Reid's surmise, however, is of 
 a less definite character than the opinions expressed by Mr Dugald 
 Stewart and Lord Brougham ; although he seems to have fallen 
 into the mistake of supposing that Dr Clarke proved the exi'^tence of 
 the Deity from the existence of space and time. 
 * Intellectual System, p. 721. 
 

 SECTION V. 
 
 'I 
 
 was the best book on those subjects that had bceu written 
 in any language.' When Mr Clarke brought me his 
 book — it was the first volume, I suppose — I was in my 
 garden over against St Peter's College in Cambridge, where 
 I then lived. Now I perceived that in these Sermons he 
 had dealt a great deal in abstract and metaphysic rea- 
 soninsrs. I therefore asked him how he ventured into 
 such subtilties, which 1 never durst meddle with? And 
 showing him a nettle, or the like contemptible weed in 
 my garden, 1 told him, *That weed contained better ar- 
 guments for the Being and Attributes of God than all 
 his Metaphysics.' Mr Clarke confessed it to be so; but 
 alleged for himself, 'That since such Philosophers as 
 Hobbes and Spinoza had made use of those kind of sub- 
 tilties against, he thought proper to shew that the like 
 way of reasoning might be made better use of on the 
 side of Religion.' Which reason or excuse I allowed not 
 to be inconsiderable."* 
 
 My inference, from all this, is —that whatever 
 
 objections are brought against the writings of 
 
 Dr Clarke, ought to bear the marks of deliberate 
 
 inquiry, and indicate respect for the character of 
 
 a great man ; and I am the more confirmed in 
 
 my conclusion, on finding Lord Brougham at last 
 
 adopting a considerable portion of the following 
 
 sentiments from the pen of Mr Dugald Stewart: 
 
 ''Although the argument, as stated by Dr Clarke, does 
 
 not carry complete satisfaction to my mind, I think it must 
 
 * \Vlii>ton's Memoirs o\ Dr Clarke, pp. 7, 8. 
 
 II 
 
 \ 
 
 I 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 273 
 
 be granted that there is something peculiarly wonderful 
 and overwhelming in those conceptions of immensity 
 and eternity, which it is not less impossible to banish 
 from our thoughts, than the consciousness of our own 
 existence. Nay, further, I think that these conceptions 
 are intimately connected with the fundamental principles 
 of Natural Religion. For when once we have established, 
 from the evidences of design every where manifested around 
 us, the existence of an intelligent and powerful cause, 
 we are unavoidably led to apply to this cause our con- 
 ceptions of immensity and eternity, and to conceive Him 
 as filling the infinite extent of both, with his presence 
 and with his power. Hence we associate with the idea 
 of God those awful impressions which are naturally pro- 
 duced by the idea of infinite space, and perhaps still 
 more by the idea of infinite duration. Nor is this all. 
 It is from the immensity of space that the notion of in- 
 finity is originally derived ; and it is hence that we transfer 
 the expression, by a sort of metaphor, to other subjects. 
 When we speak, therefore, of infinite power, wisdom 
 and goodness, our notions, if not wholly borrowed from 
 space, are at least greatly aided by this analogy; so 
 that the conceptions of Immensity and Eternity, if they 
 do not of themselves demonstrate the existence of God, 
 yet necessarily enter into the ideas we form of his nature 
 and attributes." * 
 
 Something of the misapprehension already 
 
 pointed out, respecting the object of Dr Clarke's 
 
 sixth proposition, pervades the whole of the pre- 
 
 * Dissertation, &:c. p. 67. 
 S 
 
r 
 
 274 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 tfi * 
 
 ceding extract. Had Mr Stewart perceived the 
 real import of the proposition, he would have 
 more distinctly seen how greatly it may assist 
 the mind, in forming those sublime conceptions 
 of the Deity, on which he has expatiated with 
 so much eloquence. Of that eloquence I would 
 not weaken the effect. I despair, indeed, of closing 
 the section more happily, than by means of a sen- 
 tence which I have just met with. The sentence 
 falls in with the present train of thought; and 
 Lord Brougham will agree with me, in not 
 liking it the less, because it was written by a 
 learned non-conformist. " The consideration of 
 the infinite distance between God and the crea- 
 ture, which strongly appears upon reading such 
 a book as Dr Clarke's, directly tends to promote 
 humility, perfect resignation, and all those other 
 dispositions, which ought to be constantly preva- 
 lent in our bosoms, towards our Great Creator, in 
 whom we live and move and Jiave our being."^* 
 
 • Rev. S. Clark's Letter to Doddridge. See Diary and Corre- 
 spondence, Vol. 1. p. 39. 
 
 %\ 
 
 AHGUMENT A PRIORI. 
 
 275 
 
 / 
 
 Note referred to p, 270. 
 
 There are, in the Letters of Junius, some 
 verses, cited by Mr Home, as the words of his 
 "ancient monitor.'' The same verses also are 
 thus cited by Mr Dugald Stewart : " In the fol- 
 lowing rude lines of Churchill, which Mr [Home] 
 Tooke's Letter to Junius has made familiar to 
 every ear, the feelings which give to the stone 
 arch its peculiar character of grandeur are painted 
 with equal justness and spirit : 
 
 'Tis the last key-stone 
 
 That makes the arch ; the rest that there were put 
 Are nothing till that comes to bind and shut. 
 Then stands it a triumphant mark : then men 
 Observe the strength, the height, the why and when 
 It was erected; and still, walking under, 
 Meet some new matter to look up and wonder." 
 
 Now the difficulty here is, to imagine how 
 any one could have failed to perceive that these 
 lines must have been written at least a century 
 prior to the time of Churchill. In fact, they are 
 Ben Jonson's ; and form part of An Epistle to Sir 
 Edward Sackville, Earl of Dorset, to be found 
 
 s2 
 
276 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 277 
 
 in the Underwoods. Home's Letter, of which 
 the preceding verses form the conclusion, is the 
 51st of the series; and we find a quotation from 
 the same poem in the 53d letter. 
 
 Ben Jonson died in the year 1637; and Churchill, 
 at the age of thirty-four, in the year 1764 :—so that 
 Jonson died nearly a century before Churchill was 
 
 bom The quotation from Mr Stewart will be 
 
 found in p. 412 of the second edition of his Phu 
 hsophical Essays. 
 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 THE OPINIONS OP THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 (Discourse, Notes, pp. 263—280.) 
 
 This subject is introduced by Lord Brougham, 
 primarily in confirmation of his views of Natural 
 Theology ; and in the next place, on account of 
 its bearing upon the doctrines of Bishop War- 
 burton, yet to be discussed. The opinions in 
 question relate, 1 . to Mind ; 2. to The Deity and 
 matter ; and 3. to The immortality of the soul. 
 On each of these I shall offer my remarks with 
 all possible brevity. 
 
 1. Ancient opinions respecting Mind. Notwith- 
 standing much discrepancy of sentiment on topics 
 of this nature, there existed amongst the ancients 
 a very general belief of the immateriality of the 
 soul. Lord Brougham quotes Plato and Aristotle, 
 as holding nearly the same language on the sub- 
 ject. " Plato,'' he observes, " speaks of the ovaia 
 
 r-. I I ' ; ' ' 
 
 aawjuaros Km vofjrri^ [it ought to he oucria aa-o)" 
 
278 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 fiaT09 Kal vot,Tf],]* -- a bodiless and intelligent 
 beingr.,. Now, vorjrtj is not intelligent, but in- 
 telligible ; that is, perceivable, or cmceivable, by 
 the understanding. If intelligent had been the 
 meaning, intended to be conveyed, voyitikyi would 
 have been the word. Cudworth observes that 
 Plato *'uses the expression ovaia vorjr^ intel- 
 ligible substance, in opposition to the other, which 
 he caUs oirria aiaetjT^ sensible;^ or perceptible 
 by the senses, t And this correction of Lord 
 Brougham's mistake is the more important, be- 
 cause there can be no doubt that the oiaia roi/rij 
 
 • The correction of .o„t„ for .o„r„. appears in the fourth edition 
 of Lord Brougham's ' Discourse' : -the only correction I have as 
 yet discovered. 
 
 t See Cudworths Intellectual System, Chap. ,. Sect. 19. Mo- 
 she.m, ,n h,s translation, has completely misunderstood the pas- 
 sage; as the following version will convince the learned reader- 
 o..«.. .o,.,., substantiam inteltigentem [appellat] ut discrimen 
 earum ab altero .Ilo rerum ordine indicaret, quas oMa. al.e,.,-, 
 sub,tanu<t sentientU nomine significat :"-.thm giving to aM,n^ 
 the meaning of sentient, as well as to .„„.^ that of iutelligen,. 
 These are strange mistakes for Moshe.m to have made-extending 
 not only to Plato's Greek but to Cudworth's English. A histor^ 
 of mistakes, ,n any department of literature, would be a curious 
 document. ()lympl«|orus, an old Greek commentator, wished in 
 one instance to give .o„T,i an active signification, although against 
 .be rule as he observed. Proclus, better ,c,ua,„ted w.th the Pla 
 tome ph.losophy, assigned to the word its usual meaning. One of 
 the firs, requi„,es in the study of ,h„ philosophy, is to comprehend 
 «ha, ts s,gn,fic.l by the o,:<r!„ .„„.,;, ,„,, ,h, „■,„,„ „.^^ 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 279 
 
 
 refers to Plato's notion of the ideas, or the Jbrms 
 of things ; to which also the passage next quoted 
 by Lord Brougham— and, as it happens, the next 
 by Cudworth— equally relates : to, dawfiara, koK- 
 Xiara ovra /cat neyifTTa, \6y(t) fxovov, a\X^ oe 
 ovSevi, aa(f)m SeiKvurm — the things incorporeal, 
 being the most excellent and greatest of all, are 
 made manifest, or discovered, by reason ahne, and 
 no otherwise. Lord Brougham goes on to cite a 
 passage from Plato, for the purpose of represent- 
 ing the body as the prison of the soul; but it is 
 given so incorrectly— etfcom Seanwrripiov eivai ovv 
 TVjs '^t^X^^ avTO eo)? rjv ra o(j)€i\oiJ.€va to crwfxa — 
 as to be divested of all meaning. In the Cratylus 
 (s. 38.) we find the following account of the word 
 aoo/JLa: SoKOvai nxeifToi /mot fxahiGTa OeaOai oi 
 diUL(pt *Op(pea TOVTo to ovofxa, o)s ^iKrjv SiSovarj^ 
 Ttjs xl/yyij^, wv Srj evcKa Siowai' tovtov oe 
 wepifioXov €)(€iUj 'ivcL (Twi^rjTai, Sea^xwTrjpiov eiKOva' 
 elvai ovv ttjs yVX^^ tovto, w9 irep avTO ovofia- 
 terai, ews ai; cKTiari to, ocpciKoneva^ to awfia, 
 Orpheus and his Jblhwers seem to me to have 
 given the best etymology of this word dwfxa (from 
 crw^eaOai) —that the soul is here in a state of 
 
280 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 punishment for its offences^ its body being a prison 
 
 to it, wherein it is kept in custody, till its debts, err 
 
 faults be expiated; and is therefore called ato/ua* 
 
 His Lordship then quotes an expression of 
 
 Aristotle — ova la y^wpiarri kuI Ke-^^wpiGfxevti rwv 
 aicrOriTiZv — to show that philosopher's belief in 
 a substance separable and separated from fhinfrs 
 perceivable by the senses. It is employed by Cud- 
 worth (c. i. s. 19. as before) with the same view 
 
 The two subsequent passages, also from Aristotle— 
 adduced by Lord Brougham with the design of 
 proving that philosopher's opinion to be, that the 
 soul (thereby meaning the highest intellectual 
 power) is always connected with matter of some 
 kind or other— are entirely misunderstood. We 
 have first a passage from the treatise de generatione 
 animalium (ii. 4.), which will be sufficiently intel- 
 ligible to the learned reader: icjTi U to jutv (rwfxa 
 €K Tou OrfXeos, rj de \j/v)^t} €k too appevo^' ^ 
 yap ^l^v^f} ovaia ato^aro^ tivos ccttiv — coipus 
 igilur ex femind est, anima ex mare ; anima enim 
 est corporis alicujus substantia. Lord Brougham 
 gives only the latter part of the sentence. The 
 whole would have shown that Aristotle was pro- 
 
 • f'lKlwoitli. Chap. iv. Sect. 17. p. -iNQ. 
 
 11- 
 
 _ » 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 281 
 
 bably writing, as he really was, not of the animus 
 peculiar to man, but of the anima which is common 
 
 to men and animals The next passage, from 
 
 the treatise de anima (ii. 2), is very imperfectly 
 transcribed; and, as in the preceding case, does 
 not refer to the vov^^ Aristotle is here discus- 
 sing the ^I'fX^' the perishable anima, belonging 
 to plants and animals, in general. His words 
 are these: Koi Sid tovto KuXm viroXafxjiavovdtv 
 oh SoK€L /uLrJT avev aoofJiaTOs elvai fxrire awfj-a 
 Ti t) "^vyri' acoiua /met/ yap ovk eari, awfiaro^ 
 Se Ti: in Lord Brougham's version— Those there- 
 fore rightly hold who tJmik that the soid cannot 
 exist without the body, and yet that it is not 
 body ; it is not the body, but somewhat of the 
 body. To what senses the word ^vx^ was to 
 be considered as extending, is sufficiently clear 
 from the whole tenor of the discussion; but to 
 prevent mistakes, Aristotle, not many lines be- 
 fore, had positively stated that he did not include 
 the understanding'-'as will appear from the fol- 
 lowing quotation : -rrepl ve rod uov kui rrjs Oeoprj- 
 TiKYi<s ^(^la.ufft)? oviev ttw (pavepov, dXX* eoiKC 
 \\/v\(r\% yevo^ erepou eivui, kul tovto ^xovou evce- 
 X^'^^^'- X^*^(n(€aO(n, KaOdirep to didiov tou (pOap- 
 
II 
 
 S82 
 
 |l 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Tou — concerning the understanding and the con- 
 templative faculty^ nothing is yet manifest ; but it 
 seems to be another kind of soul, and this alone is 
 capable of separation — as the eternal from the cor- 
 ruptible. And thus Lord Brougham's citations 
 from Aristotle have not the slightest connexion 
 with the subject they were designed to illustrate. 
 ... A passage from Plato {de legg. x. 12) here ad- 
 duced — €7r6£ oe ael ^j/vy^ avvTeray^evrj aduxaTi, 
 Tore ^lev aWio Tore Se aXXoD, since the soul is 
 always annealed to a body, sometimes to one and 
 sometimes to another — is more to the purpose ; for 
 although it does not indicate any impossibility of 
 the existence of the soul apart from the body, 
 yet, by referring to the transmigration of the soul, 
 it involves the distinction between the soul and 
 the body. . . .His Lordship''s next appeal to an- 
 tiquity will require more attention. I give the 
 paragraph as I find it: 
 
 ** This corporeal connexion is stated by Plutarch, in the 
 QucBst. Platon., still more plainly to have been the Platonic 
 doctrine — V/i^^f/i* aei Trpea/SvTepav tou ffw/iaroc ainav re 
 T»;v €K€ivovy€v€cr€a)<i Kai ap'^rjv ovk av yevea-dai \\/vvrjp 
 av€v (TiofxaTo^ avc€ vow avev V/fV*;*?, a\Aa "^vytjv fjiCP 
 fv avufxuri, vow ce ev t»/ \'/u^j7. The snnl is older than 
 *Jfe body, n?id, ihr muse a?id origin of its existence; not 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 283 
 
 that the soul exists without the body, or the understand- 
 ing without the soul; but that the soul is in the body, 
 and the understanding in the soul!' (p. 265.) 
 
 I am surprised that the Noble Author was 
 not here aware that the course of thought did 
 not exactly " run smooth.'' For, not to mention 
 other points, What is the meaning of the soul 
 being " the cause and origin" of the body's ex- 
 istence .? The fact is— Plutarch is writing on 
 a totally different subject ; namely, the formation 
 of the world; as the passage, when fairly laid 
 before the reader, will abundantly testify: " r* 
 hri iroT€ Tfjv yf/v^^fjv del irpeafiuTepav airoCpal^ 
 vwv Tov (TW/maTos, alriav oe Trj^ CKeivov yeve- 
 aeu)^ Kai dp')(^v, fraXiv (prjcriv ovk av yeveaOai 
 \}/VYrjv avev awiuaTGS, ovoe vouv avev ^v^rj^, 
 dWd "^vxn*^ MeV ei' awfxaTt, vovv Se ev rfj ^^u')(ri ; 
 — Sofei yap to aw/ua Kai elvai Kai firj elvai, 
 (TvvuTrapy^ov a/ua tyi ^v^lh 'f"' yevwfievov vtto 
 T^v ^v^^' rj TO TToXXaKi^ v(f> tjfjLWv Xeyo/ULC- 
 vov dXrjOe^ ecTTiv ; v i^ev yap avov^ ^^^X*) Kai 
 TO afxopcjyov awfjia ovvvwripyov aXXriXoi<s del, 
 Kai ovleTepov avTWv yeveaiv ea-x^ev ovce dpyrjv' 
 eirei Se rj ^^^X^ ^'^^ fxeTeXafie Kai apiiopiag, 
 Kai yfVO/iA€i't] ^id avv(pwvins hfKppcvu, fiernftoXn^ 
 
■■ 
 
 284 
 
 SECTION Vl. 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 285 
 
 v 
 
 ii 
 
 aiTia yeyove rrj i/Xr/, Kai Kparricraaa Tai% avTtj^ 
 KivtjaecTi Tas eKeivr/s eirediracFaTo Kai eirecrTpe- 
 yl/ev, ovTtx) TO gw/jlu tov Kocrfiov yeveaiv edyev 
 vTTo T^s ^I'X'^^ — Wk^ does Plato — after he has 
 held that the soul is older than bodi/, and the 
 cause and origin of its existence— say that neither 
 does said exist without hody^ nor understanding 
 without sold; but soul in body, and understanding 
 in the soul; — so that body appears to be and not 
 to be at the same time— to exist along with soid, 
 and yet to be formed by it ? Or is that true, 
 which we have often maintained— that the soul 
 without understanding, and body witliout form, 
 always co-existed— neither of them having cause 
 or origin ; but that when the soid acquired tinder- 
 standing and harmony, and thus became wise, it 
 produced a change in matter, and by the potency 
 of its own operations, controuled and directed tlie 
 motio7is of matter? And so the body of the world 
 had its origin in the soul* Enough has now 
 
 • Plut. Op. Xyland \o\. ii. p. 1002. According to the pre- 
 ceding representation, the soul of the world (anima jnunrfi), as well 
 as its body, being acted upon by the Supreme Mind, produced the 
 various adjustments which actually exist. The ambiguity attributed 
 to Plato seem-i to arise from the word i/^vx^i. which sometimes in- 
 cludes iiitdrr^iiii Ihic: ( vovs:) and sometime.-, not. 
 
 been given, to show the Noble Author's misappre- 
 hension on the subject. . . . From the extracts from 
 Plato and Plutarch, His Lordship draws the fol- 
 lowing inferences; which, whether true or not, 
 are certainly not established by evidence: "Ac- 
 cording to these representations and quotations 
 taken together, Plato held the [human] soul to 
 be an immaterial substance, separable from any 
 given body, but incapable of existing without some 
 body or other; and the mind or understanding to 
 be a part of the soul." 
 
 After a quotation from Plato, indicating that 
 the soul is a self-moving substance, we find a 
 well-known declaration of Epictetus, stating that 
 the human soul is actually a part of the divine 
 substance; and then another extract from Plu- 
 tarch, also appearing to affirm that the soul is 
 a portion severed from the substance of the 
 Deity. This last passage has been adduced by 
 various learned persons, besides Lord Brougham 
 Warburton is in the number — under the im- 
 pression that it relates to the human soul; 
 whereas it is as far from being connected with 
 that subject as I have shown the preceding pas- 
 sage from Plutarch to be. In the incomplete 
 
dLu 
 
 III 
 
 286 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 shape, indeed, in which it is presented by His 
 Lordship, there is nothing about it tending to 
 excite any suspicion of mistake : " >; ce "^v^rj 
 ovK epyov cctti ixovoVy aAAa Kai fxepos ovo vir 
 avTov dW dir avTov kuI e^ avTov yeyovev — 
 the soul is riot only his work, but a part of him- 
 self; it was not created hy him, hut from him, 
 and otit of him."" 
 
 The real passage however, with a little of the 
 context, will evince the error of supposing that 
 this sentence affirms anything with regard to the 
 human soul : tovtwv ce /maXiaTa rfj^ IWaTwvo^ 
 diTTOiievwv oo^rj99 eiridTrja'ov ei KqiKclva Xe^^jyere- 
 rat wiOavoky on ovoiv oPToitf e^ u>v 6 koct/ulo^ 
 avvecTTrjKc, awjuaTos' Kai ^vy^rj^, to fxev ovk eyev- 
 vrfae Oeo^, aWa ttj9 uXrjs Tra^ac^O/uei/yys', efnop- 
 (bwae Kai avvrjpniode, irepacriv o'lKeioi^ Kai o'yrj- 
 /macTi o>7(ja? Kai opiaas to direipov' rj ce ^^v^ri 
 \yov ix€Tao")(ovaa Kai Xoyiafxov Kai apixoi/ia^^ ovk 
 epyov ccttI tov Oeov fiovov, aWa Kai /uepo^' ovo' 
 VTT avTov, aW' air avTov, koI e^ avrov yeyovev,^ 
 From this, it appears that Plutarch wished his 
 reader to consider the correctness of some opinions 
 
 • Plutarch, p. 10()1. 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 287 
 
 connected with those of Plato : namely, that there 
 were two things, body a/nd soul, from which God 
 composed the world : the former [body] God did 7iot 
 create, but talcing the boundless, shapeless matter 
 that was presented, gave it form and symmetry; 
 while the latter [the soul before mentioned] par- 
 taking of understanding and reason and harmony, 
 was not only the work of God — but part of himself 
 —from himself and out of himself . . . The long 
 continued mistake, of believing that any doctrine 
 respecting the human soul was laid down in this 
 passage of Plutarch, is now sufficiently exposed. 
 This passage, and the preceding one from the same 
 writer, throw light upon each other; and I will 
 only observe farther upon it, that if, in quoting 
 the latter part of the sentence, the words which 
 I have enclosed within brackets had not been 
 omitted, an inquirer, anxious to know the truth 
 of things, would have been led by them to examine 
 the original, and judge for himself. 
 
 Having now gone through Lord Brougham's 
 quotations and observations under the first head, 
 I may observe, in conclusion, that but little has 
 really been made out. At the same time, it is 
 but right to state that I have no wish to gainsay 
 
I 
 
 288 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 289 
 
 the inferences which His Lordship would draw 
 from the whole. My notion is, that some slight 
 intimations have been afforded, of what might be 
 distinctly shown by a copious induction of par- 
 ticulars; namely, that, in the schools of ancient 
 philosophy, an opinion very generally prevailed that 
 the human soul was originally a portion severed 
 from the divine substance, and therefore by nature 
 immortal— and that it was destined — after a series 
 of migrations from one body to another — accord- 
 ing to Plato, for moral purposes, as punishment, 
 reward and purification — to constitute, once more, 
 a part of the divine substance— its individual ex- 
 istence being lost in the existence of the Deity. 
 
 2. Ancient opinions respecting the Deity and 
 matter. Lord Brougham appears to think more 
 highly, of the ancient opinions respecting the Deity, 
 than he is warranted in doing by the evidence ad- 
 duced on the subject. The note now to be con- 
 sidered opens thus: 
 
 "The notions of the Supreme Being entertained by 
 the ancient philosophers were more simple and consistent 
 than their theory of the soul; and but for the belief, which 
 they never shook off, in the eternity of matter, would very 
 nearly have coincided with our own. They give him the 
 verj- same names, and clothe him apparently in the like 
 
 attributes. He is not only adavaro^ij a(pQapro<if uvM\edpo<:, 
 — immortal, incorruptible, indestructible — but ayevtjroc, 
 avToyevrj's, auTO0u»;c, avduTroarraro^ — uncreated, self- 
 madey self -originating, self- existing. Zvoov -rraaav ex^v 
 fxaKapiorrira fX€T' a(pdap<Tia^j says Epicurus — A being 
 having all happiness, with an incorruptible nature. Again, 
 he is TravTOKparup, TrayKparrj^ — omnipotent, all-powerful; 
 Ivvarai jap airav-ra, says Homer (Odyss. ^)—He has 
 power over all things. The creative power is also in words 
 at least ascribed to him. — KoatAoiroiriTrj';, hrffxiovpyof: — 
 the maker of the world, the great artificer.'^ (pp. 260, 267.) 
 
 The preceding paragraph was, I have no doubt, 
 suggested by a passage in Cudworth's Intellectiwl 
 System; the remarks, however, of that learned 
 writer show the necessity of caution in drawing 
 inferences, of the kind intended by Lord Brougham, 
 from many of the expressions enumerated by His 
 Lordship. I cannot but think the matter of suffi- 
 cient consequence to warrant my requesting that 
 the sentiments of Cudworth may be compared 
 
 with those of the Noble Author. 
 
 "Even the Atheists readily acknowledge it for an in- 
 dubitable truth, that there must be something djevrirov, 
 something which was never made or produced, and which 
 therefore is the cause of those other things that are made ; 
 something avro^ve*: and avdviroa-Tarov, that was self- 
 originated and self-existing ; and which is as well ai/w- 
 
 T 
 
290 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 29i 
 
 I 
 
 \€0pov and aipdaprov as d'^evtjrov, incorruptible and un- 
 destroyable as ingenerable ; whose existence therefore must 
 needs be necessary, because if it were supposed to have 
 happened by chance to have existed from eternity, then 
 it might as well happen again to cease to be. Where- 
 fore all the question now is, what is this dyevrjTov and 
 dvaXeOpov, avT6<f>v€<: and avdviroaraToui or, this ingene- 
 rable and incorruptible, self-originated and self-existent 
 thing, which is the cause of all other things that are 
 made ? " * 
 
 The fact thus recorded by Cudworth— that 
 the Atheists had no hesitation in applying, to 
 the Cause of all things, the epithets dyeprjrov, 
 acpOaproi', and so on— shows how little can be 
 deduced from Lord Brougham's premises, in fa- 
 vour of the ancient creed on this important point. 
 On a matter so evident, it would be a waste of 
 time to dwell; and therefore I proceed to His 
 Lordship's quotation from Epicurus— whose dis- 
 position to allow a Deity in name, provided that 
 he removed the reality, has been long ago cele- 
 brated by Cicero. Epicurus then, according to 
 the Noble Author, describes the First Cause, as 
 i^wov irdaav e-^^ov ^aKapiorrjra per acpOapala^ 
 — a being having all happiness with an incm'^ 
 
 * Intellectual System, Civ. Sec. 3. p. 194, 
 
 ' 
 
 ruptihle nature. Now when I consider that this 
 expression of Epicurus occurs in Cudworth, within 
 a few pages of the preceding extract, I cannot 
 but suppose that it was derived from that source ; 
 on which supposition, it is to be lamented that 
 the dictum of the old philosopher, if extracted 
 at all, should have been given without some of 
 Cudworth's remarks. Let me therefore supply 
 the omission. 
 
 "Now, of all those, whosoever they were, who thus 
 maintained two self-existent principles, God and the matter, 
 we may pronounce universally that they were neither better 
 nor worse than a kind of imperfect Theists, They had a 
 certain notion, or idea, of God, such as it was; which 
 seems to be the very same with that expressed in Aris- 
 totle, ^ioov apiffTov diltov, an animal, the best, eternal; 
 and represented also by Epicurus in this manner, ^wov 
 Trdaav eyov fxaKupioTtjra /act d<f)0ap<Tia<!, an animal 
 that hath all happiness with incorruptibility. Wherein 
 it was acknowledged by them that, besides senseless mat- 
 ter, there was an animalish, and conscious or perceptive 
 nature, self-existent from eternity."* 
 
 We can now understand the kind of Theism 
 indicated by the expression of Epicurus ; a Theism 
 which we find in great abundance amongst the 
 philosophers of ancient times. Asserting, as they 
 
 * Intellectual System, Civ. Sec. 7. p. 198, 
 
 t2 
 
29^ 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 did, the eternity of matter, they had no scruple 
 in allowing the eternity and incorruptibility of a 
 sentient principle, distinct from matter. This they 
 endowed, in their imaginations, with the most ex- 
 cellent qualities which they supposed it capable of 
 possessing; calling it apiarov Kal /uaKapiwrarov, 
 the best and most happy. Beyond this, many of 
 the philosophers did not go ; while others exalted 
 their minds to the idea of a Supreme Intelligence 
 or Understanding, not creating matter, which they 
 also believed to be eternal— but moulding it into 
 all its varied forms, and giving order and stability 
 to the universal fabrick : hence the names Srj/uLiovp" 
 yos, TravTOKpariop, indicating the boundless power 
 of the Deity, as the maker and governor of the 
 world. Plutarch has recorded his approbation of 
 Plato's doctrine, on this subject, in a passage quoted 
 by Cudworth and Lord Brougham. After stating 
 the opinions of Heraclitus, Plutarch prefers those 
 of Plato in the following terms : " BcXtiov ovu 
 UXaTwii ireSofievovs tou fiev koctjulov vtto Oeov 
 yeyovevai Xeyeiv Kal ^Seiv 6 fiiv yap /faXXicrro? 
 Twv yeyovoTwu, 6 Se apiaro^ twv a'lTtwv' tyjv 
 Se ovaiau Kal vXtfi; e^ jfy yeyovev, ov yevofxevrjv, 
 aXXa vTTOKetfievrjv aei tw Srjiuioupyw eU SidSecriu 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 293 
 
 Kai TCL^iv avTt]^, Kal tt^os avTou e^o^oiwcriv, cos 
 Suimrov riv irapaax^lv ov yap €k tov firj ovro^i 
 ij yei/eais, dXX' e/c tou fir) /caXws fxrjc iKavm 
 eyorros, a;? oiKia^ Kal \iULaTiov Kal avopiavTo^. 
 It is therefore better Jbr us to folloio Plato, (than 
 Heraclitus) a7id loudly to declare that the world 
 was made by God. For as the world is the best of 
 all works, so is God the best of all causes. Never- 
 theless the substance or matter, out of which the 
 world was made, was not itself made ; but always 
 ready at hand, and subject to the artificer to be 
 ordered and disposed by him. For the making 
 of the ivorld was not the production of it out of 
 nothing, but out of an antecedent bad and dis- 
 orderly state, like the making of an Iwuse, gar- 
 ment or statue.""* 
 
 Several passages from Aristotle, which Lord 
 Brougham has quoted with great propriety, indi- 
 cate a similar opinion on the part of that most 
 acute philosopher. The doctrine moreover, that 
 no substance could be created or destroyed, was 
 applied to the soul as well as to matter; and the 
 philosophical writings of those ages abound in 
 
 * Intellectual System, C. iv. Sec. 6. p. 197. 1 have given Ciwil' 
 worth's translation. 
 
 ,i 
 
294 
 
 SKCTION VI. 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 295 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 speculations on the subject. On the pre-existence 
 of the soul, implied in its derivation from the 
 divine essence— its natural immortality — and its 
 ultimate restoration to its primary source — a few 
 observations were offered under the preceding head. 
 This very prevalent doctrine of ancient times is, 
 as the Noble Author has stated, "most unsatis- 
 factory ; "" and has, in a moral point of view, some 
 important consequences which will by and by re- 
 quire consideration Under the present head, 
 
 I need only farther observe, that Lord Brougham 
 has fairly stated the difference of sentiment among 
 the philosophers, respecting a divine providence; 
 exemplifying his remarks by referring to the 
 Epicureans on the one hand, and Plato on the 
 other: — for while the Epicureans held that the 
 Gods were altogether indifferent to the affairs of 
 men —Plato opposed the tenet, in the strongest 
 language of condemnation. 
 
 3. Ancient opinions respecting the immortality 
 of the soul. Much of what has been advanced 
 under the two preceding heads, if not equally ap-* 
 plicable to the present topic, undoubtedly bears 
 upon it with great force. Aristotle, as Cudworth 
 has truly remarked, asserts that " the ancient 
 
 philosophers were afraid of nothing more than 
 this one thing, that anything should he rnade out 
 of nothing pre-existentr Hence their derivation 
 of the rational soul from the substance of the 
 Deity. The soul, moreover, thus being in their 
 estimation a part of the Deity, was by its very 
 nature immortal. They therefore held it to be, 
 like the Divinity himself, a(peaprov Kai avwXe- 
 Opov, something incorruptible and indestructible. 
 To that effect writes Plato, as cited by Lord 
 Brougham: oTroVe ^>; to dOdvarov Kal dSid(f>Oo' 
 pov ecTTiv, aXXo ti y\fvxv, f ^^ dOdvaTO^ rvyx^vu 
 olaa, Ka\ dvwXeOpo^ dv eir] ; arguing, from the 
 general principle, that, since whatever is immortal 
 must be incorruptible, the soul, being immortal, 
 must also be indestructible. Their belief, then, was, 
 that the soul did not begin to be, along with 
 the individual body which it informed. It pre- 
 existed. So firm, indeed, and so widely spread 
 were their sentiments on this subject, that there 
 is reason to doubt whether any one of the ancients, 
 before Christianity, ever believed the soul to sur- 
 vive after death, who did not also believe that it 
 had pre-existed.* This pre-existence, moreover, 
 
 * See Intellectual Sysiom, Ci. Sec. 31. p. 38. 
 
296 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 I 
 
 r, 
 
 of itself led them to the notion of post-existence. 
 Such is the view of the matter taken by Plato, in 
 a passage adduced by the Noble Lord: ^v ttov 
 i^fiwv tj yl^vxv 'TTplv iv Twh rw avOpwirivw eSei 
 yeveaOai, wcttc Kal ravrrj aOdvaroif ti €oik€v 
 V i^vx^ eJuai, Our soul was somewhere, befiyre it 
 began to exist in this present human form ; and 
 so on that account the soul also appears to be 
 something immortal*. , .With regard to the man- 
 
 * Lord Brougham gives an indistinct reference to the rimtrus of 
 Plato. Nearly the same words occur in the Phcedo, c. 18. His 
 Lordship has quoted the passage in p. 271, and again in p. 274; 
 giving a somewhat different version in each instance. The latter 
 clause, oi'ffTe Kai -ravTri, k. t. k. is, in the first instance, rendered— 
 as also it seems to be immortal afterwards ; and, in the second, so it 
 seems to be immortal also. The illative import of the word Tavrj; 
 being in each case neglected. In the next page another passage is 
 quoted from Plato (Phcrdo 47.); which, being of no great conse- 
 quence to the subject discussed, I notice in this place, merely to 
 correct an oversight :_a\\a yap dv (f,aii]u 6KdaTr]v tH^v xf/vx^v 
 voXXd aMfxa-ra KaTa-rpipeiv, aWws re kov iroWd eV»/ /Stw : which 
 Lord Brougham thus translates— Bi/t / should rather say that each 
 of our souls wears out many bodies, though these should live many 
 years. Here are two mistakes : /Stoi refers to e/caV-rt, twi; xj/vx^v, 
 or rather to xl/vx*}, and not to o-a,>axa— and aWws -re Kai means 
 especially and not thouirh, as His Lordship has imagined. Plato 
 writes of the soul living many years, in the sense in which every 
 one would acknowledge it to be living, 1 should say that the 
 soul wears out many bodies, especially if it should live many years; 
 and he farther explains his meaning by the mention of the constant 
 
 change and repeated renovation to which the body is subject 
 
 I have observed that, in his fourth edition. Lord Brougham has trans- 
 lated eiffTe Kai rav-rri dQdvarm ri Hoikci' '] \j/vx') fUnii (p. 271) 
 
 thus 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 297 
 
 ner of existence, we have seen, under the first 
 head of the present section, that, according to 
 the same philosopher, the soul was always con- 
 nected with some bodi/, or other ; its final destina- 
 tion, after the allotted number of migrations, being 
 — a re-union with the Deity. Such, in brief, was 
 the leading philosophical doctrine of ancient times. 
 
 There are some circumstances, which ought now 
 to be considered, with reference to the preceding 
 account. Every reader will be aware that, during 
 the time when those abstruse speculations, respect- 
 ing the Deity and mind and matter, were in pro- 
 gress, there existed a popular creed — which re- 
 quired the acknowledgement of many Gods, and 
 impressed the imagination with notions of rewards 
 and punishments in a future life. Now, it is clear 
 that the conclusions of the philosophers were in- 
 consistent with what may be called the established 
 religion of their country. If the philosophers be- 
 lieved in One God, they could not easily be poly- 
 theists : if they held the already-described doctrine 
 of the soul, they must have rejected the vulgar 
 apprehensions of retributive justice in the realms 
 
 thus — so ihal ahn it seems to he immortal afterwards ; and (p. 274) 
 th'is so that it srems to hr immortol also. 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 
 t. 
 
 298 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 below. What, then, shall be said of Plato, for 
 example, who in his various works usually writes 
 of The Gods — and, what is more, on some occa- 
 sions seems to maintain the doctrine of a separate 
 existence of the soul after death, and a future state 
 of rewards and punishments? Lord Brougham, 
 indeed, mentions no difficulty in the case. He 
 thus notices the fact: 
 
 *' It must be admitted that the behef of the ancients 
 was more firm and more sound than their reasons were 
 cogent. The whole tenor of the doctrine in the Pheedo 
 refers to the renewal or continuation of the soul as a se- 
 parate and individual existence, after the dissolution of 
 the body, and with a complete consciousness of personal 
 identity — in short, to a continuance of the same rational 
 being's existence after death. The liberation from the 
 body is treated as the beginning of a new and more per- 
 fect life — TOT6 'yap avTi] Kad avrtjv rj "^v-^tj ecrrat 
 y«doi? Tov o-(w/>iaTo«' irpoTcpov V ov.'* (p. 276.) 
 
 After this, we have from the Phado — which, 
 as His Lordship justly observes, presents " a some- 
 what fanciful picture of the next world "^ — two 
 or three short extracts, in proof of the belief of 
 a future state; and a passage, from the twelfth 
 book Of Laws, the purport of which is worth 
 notice. Plato, after stating that every one (to 
 adopt Lord Brougham's version) s/iall ^o to other 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 299 
 
 Gods (or Gods in another world) to render an 
 account {Trapd Oeov'; aX\ov9 oLTrievai owaovTa Xo- 
 
 yov) immediately adds, as the laws of the state 
 declare {KaOairep o i/o,aos o warpio^ Xeyei). Now 
 without meaning to infer from this passage, that 
 Plato held "the laws of the state'"* to be the sole 
 ground for the notion of a future account, there 
 is something in the phrase, which, when connected 
 with his philosophical opinions, may warrant a 
 request that the turn of thought may be borne in 
 mind — when the subject is more fully discussed 
 in the next section. 
 
 In farther illustration of the strenuous belief,, 
 of the ancients, Lord Brougham adduces a passage 
 from Xenophon's Cyropaedia (viii. 7), containing 
 part of Cyrus's address to his children, when on 
 his death-bed; and subjoins Cicero's beautiful 
 translation of the same passage.* We there find 
 the superiority of the intellectual to the corporeal 
 nature of man pleasingly described, and the libera- 
 tion of the soul from the body mentioned as a 
 
 * " Milii quidem nunquam persuader! potuit, animos, dum in 
 corporibus essent mortalibus, vivere ; quum exissent ex iis, emori ; 
 nee vero turn animum esse insipientem, quum ex animo insipienti 
 evasisset; sed quum omni admixtione corporis liberatus, purus et 
 intcRcr esse rcirpisset, turn esse sapicntem." Cic. dr Smrci. r. 22- 
 
li 
 
 .'?00 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 I 
 
 i; 
 
 happy event. His Lordship, however, would have 
 done greater justice to his subject, if he had gone 
 on with his quotation. . . . Cyrus, after pointing 
 out the similarity between death and sleep, and 
 observing that in sleep the soul especially mani- 
 fests its own divinity, thus proceeds — "Wherefore, 
 if these things be so, reverence me as a God; 
 but if the mind perish with the body, yet will 
 you, fearing the Gods, who protect and govern 
 the world, preserve my memory inviolate."* Here 
 we ra^Ly first remark the extreme uncertainty of 
 the speaker — instead of that firm belief, which 
 Lord Brougham supposes this address to indicate ; 
 secondly, the notion which was entertained of the 
 soul, supposing it to survive — namely, that it was 
 a portion of the divine substance, and so to be 
 considered as a deity; and thirdly, that the senti- 
 ments, attributed to Cyrus, appear to be adopted 
 by Cicero. In the Somnium Scipionis, indeed, 
 the same conception of the soul may be noticed — 
 " Know therefore that thou art a God ; if he be a 
 God, who lives and perceives and remembers, and 
 
 * " Quare, si haec ita sunt, sic me colitote ut deum : sin una 
 est interiturus animus cum corpore, vos tamen deos verentes, qui 
 hanc omnem pulchritudinem tuentur et regunt, memonam nostri 
 pie inviolatcqur servahitis." 
 
 4 
 
 { 
 
 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 301 
 
 governs the body, as the chief God governs the 
 world;'' and, in this very treatise de Senectute 
 already quoted, death is represented as " an event 
 to be disregarded, if it extinguish the soul — 
 to be wished, if the soul is eternal: inasmuch 
 as no third state could be devised''*. So imper- 
 fect were the notions even of Cicero, respecting 
 a future state of retribution. Undoubtedly, the 
 works of this great philosopher present several very 
 striking representations of heroes and lawgivers and 
 other great benefactors of mankind, associated in 
 the enjoyment of supreme felicity in another world ; 
 and Lord Brougham has very properly made use 
 of such representations, in his disquisition on an- 
 cient opinions. His Lordship, however, seems 
 not to have taken the trouble to trace the con- 
 nexion between those lofty speculations, and the 
 avowed doctrines respecting the origin and desti- 
 nation of the human soul. Had this connexion 
 
 * Deum te igitur scito esse: siquidem Deus est, qui viget, 
 qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur, 
 et movet id corpus, cui praepositus est, quam hunc mundum ille 
 princeps Deus: et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse 
 Deus aBternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet." 
 Somniiim Scipionis. 
 
 '• Mors aut plane negligenda est, si omnino extinguit animum, 
 aut etiam optanda, si aliquo eum deducit, ubi sit futurus aeternus. 
 Atqui tertium certe nihil iuveniri potest.'' de Senect. c. 19. 
 
^1 tt-^ 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 L 
 
 302 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 been carefully considered, and the expressions of 
 doubt — perhaps more than doubt — which are found 
 in the productions of those early ages, been duly 
 taken into account, His Lordship's decisions would 
 most assuredly have been invested with much more 
 of the judicial character than they can at present 
 be allowed to exhibit. 
 
 To express my view of the matter in few words. 
 There is an apparent contradiction between the 
 philosophy and the religion of those ancient times. 
 It ought, then, to be shown either that the appa- 
 rent, is not a real contradiction ; or that the sages 
 in question fairly abandoned their philosophy, and 
 adhered to their religion. Something at least of 
 this kind ought to be done, before any one can 
 justly infer the " firm and sound belief,'' of those 
 old philosophers, in a future state. 
 
 SOS 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 (Discourse, Notes, pp. 281—296.) 
 
 About this time Warburton began to make his appearance in 
 the first ranks of learning. He was a man of vigorous faculties, 
 a mind fervid and vehement, supplied, by incessant and unlimited 
 inquiry, with wonderful extent and variety of knowledge ; which 
 yet had not oppressed his imagination, nor clouded his perspicacity. 
 To every work he brought a memory full fraught, together with 
 a fancy fertile of original combinations ; and at once exerted the 
 powers of the scholar, the reasoner, and the wit. — Johnson. 
 
 The first impression of the character of War- 
 burton, upon the mind of Johnson, is here pre- 
 sented, for the purpose of fixing the reader's at- 
 tention, at the opening of the section, upon the 
 intellectual qualities of the individual, some of 
 whose opinions are about to be considered. An 
 interest in the subject may thus be excited and 
 sustained; for, to confess the truth, it would not 
 be easy to infer, from the tenor of Lord Brougham's 
 observations, that the author of The Divine Lega- 
 tion of Moses demonstrated had ever drawn forth 
 such language, from the great biographer. 
 
304 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 I 
 
 Should any one, on the opening of the volume, 
 be attracted to the present section by the name of 
 Warburton, it may be useful to observe that the 
 subjects here considered are dependent upon those 
 discussed in the preceding section; which there- 
 fore is, in the first instance, recommended to the 
 reader's perusal. The sentiments of the ancient 
 philosophers, there detailed, will form an excellent 
 introduction to the following paragraph, from the 
 pen of Lord Brougham, with which his animad- 
 versions on Warburton are introduced: 
 
 ♦* To any one who had read the extracts in the last note, 
 but still more to one who was familiar with the ancient 
 writers from whose works they are taken, it might appear 
 quite impossible that a question should ever be raised upon 
 the general belief of antiquity in a future state, and the 
 belief of some of the most eminent of the philosophers, at 
 least, in a state of rewards and punishments. Nevertheless 
 as there is nothing so plain to which the influence of a pre- 
 conceived opinion and the desire of furthering a favourite 
 hypothesis will not bhnd men, and as their blindness in 
 such cases bears even a proportion to their learning and 
 ingenuity, it has thus fared with the point in question; 
 and Bishop Warburton has denied that any of the an- 
 cients except Socrates really believed in a future state of 
 the soul individually, and subject to reward or punishment. 
 He took up this argument because it seemed to strengthen 
 his extraordinary reasoning upon the Legation of Moses." 
 (p. 281.) 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 805 
 
 On the contrary, the difficulty seems to be, 
 to reconcile such a belief of a future state, as His 
 Lordship attributes to those old philosophers, with 
 the very extracts which he had himself previously 
 given from their works. As to Warburton, the 
 real question is, whether— when he employed the 
 argument alluded to, in aid of his reasoning upon 
 the Legation of Moses— he had grounds for so 
 doing, which would justify an honest and learned 
 inquirer. Language is pliable; and thus, with 
 reference to the opinion— that the ancient philo- 
 sophers did believe in a future state of retribu- 
 tion -an adversary might, after His Lordship^s 
 example, allege that Lord Brougham "took up 
 the argument because it seemed to strengthen his 
 own notions of Natural Religion.^' Remarks of 
 this kind I should decidedly condemn, when ap- 
 plied to His Lordship's case; and I am equally 
 adverse to them, when applied to that of War- 
 burton. We have little or nothing to do with 
 the question, why Warburton " took up the argu- 
 ment;' The great object ought to be, to ascertain 
 whether or not the argument is valid. The Noble 
 Author, however, has explained in what manner 
 Warburton's estimate of the creed of the philoso- 
 
Mi 
 
 S06 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 phers bears upon the reasoning of his great work ; 
 the explanation being to the following effect: 
 
 « His reasoning is this. The inculcating of a future 
 state of retribution is necessary to the well being of so- 
 ciety All men, and especially all the wisest nations of 
 antiquity, have agreed in holding such a doctrine neces- 
 sary to he inculcated. But there is nothing of the kind 
 to he found in the Mosaic dispensation. And here he 
 pauses to observe that these propositions seem too clear 
 to require any proof. Nevertheless his whole work is 
 consumed in proving them; and the conclusion from the 
 whole, that therefore the Mosaic law is of Divine ongmal, 
 is left for another work which never appeared ; and yet 
 this is the very position which all, or almost all who 
 may read the book, and even yield their assent to it, 
 are the most inclined to reject. Indeed it may well be 
 doubted if this work, learned and acute as it is, and 
 showing the author to be both well read and well fitted 
 for controversy, ever satisfied any one except perhaps 
 Bishop Kurd, or ever can demonstrate anything so well, 
 as it proves the preposterous and perverted ingenuity of 
 an able and industrious man." (p. 282.) 
 
 The propositions-respecting the necessity of 
 a belief in a future state to the well being of 
 society, the agreement amongst the wisest nations 
 of antiquity in inculcating such a belief, and the 
 want of such a doctrine in the Mosaic Law-al- 
 though plain to Warburton, had yet been frequently 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 ."507 
 
 placed in so different a light from that in which he 
 viewed them, that, as he soon found, their "full 
 elucidation'' required "a severe search into the 
 civil policy, religion, and philosophy of ancient 
 times" — as well as " a detailed account of the na- 
 ture and genius of the Jewish dispensation."*' War- 
 burton gives us this information at the beginning 
 of his work ; and I know not that there is any- 
 thing in the information to call either for censure 
 or defence. Lord Brougham's objection— that the 
 proof, that " the Mosaic Law is of Divine original, 
 was left for a further work, which never appeared" 
 — may perhaps be not ineffectually met by the 
 following statement. The first volume of the 
 Divine Legation, as originally published, contained 
 the first three Books ; in which were discussed the 
 necessity that exists, and the necessity that was 
 in ancient times felt to exist, for the belief of a 
 future state, to the well-being of society. The 
 second volume, comprising Books iv. v. and vi., 
 was intended to show that the doctrine of a future 
 state was not inculcated in the Mosaic Law. 
 These were the premises to be established; and 
 from these premises, together with all their bear- 
 ings, Warburton believed that the conclusion fol- 
 
 u2 
 
1 
 
 i 
 
 ] i! 
 
 I 
 
 M 
 
 SOS 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 lowed of course— namely, that the Law of Moses 
 is of Divine original. Why, then, was another 
 volume promised? Warburton has answered the 
 question. " It was promised— to remove all con- 
 ceivable objections against the conclusion, and to 
 throw in additimal light upon the premises:' In 
 fact, the seventh book was intended to unfold the 
 progress of religious opinions amongst the Jews, 
 from the time of the earlier Prophets to the time 
 of the Maccabees, when the doctrine of a future 
 state of rewards and punishments became national ; 
 the eighth book, to pourtray the character of Moses 
 as a Law-giver; and the ninth, that is, the last 
 book, to explain the nature and genius of the 
 Christian Dispensation *... Amongst Warburton's 
 numerous assailants during his life-time, was no 
 less a personage than that most acute, eloquent, 
 philosophical, inaccurate and versatile Nobleman, 
 Lord Bolingbroke ; and although he does not ap- 
 pear to have joined in the censure, respecting an 
 unfinished undertaking, then expressed by some, 
 
 • Divine Legation, vi. 6. near the end. That the argument of 
 the Divine Legation is complete appears from the plan laid down at 
 first ; and even from the original title-page, which showed that the 
 work was divided into six books. The three books of illustrative 
 matter were an after-thought. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 309 
 
 f 
 
 and now advanced in the * Discourse of Natural 
 Theology', yet the following remarks, by the author 
 of the Divine Legation, cannot be duly estimated, 
 without recollecting the part taken in the contro- 
 versy by that eccentric statesman : 
 
 "This is the plain and simple argument of the Di- 
 vine Legation; whioh the first and the second volumes 
 of that work are employed to explain and illustrate. 
 And it must be owned, Lord Bolingbroke saw it in its 
 force, as appears from his various contrivances to evade it. 
 This praise it would be unjust to deny him, when others 
 have understood so little of the argument, as to imagine 
 that the two first volumes had left it unfinished; and 
 that the third was to complete the syllogism; though 
 the author had told us, more than once, that the pur- 
 pose of the last volume was only to enforce the various 
 parts of the foregoing argument, by many new consider- 
 ations." * 
 
 The reader is now sufficiently aware of the 
 objects of that "further work,'' of Warburton, 
 " which never appeared.". . . Lord Brougham, more- 
 over, intimates a doubt whether any one, except 
 perhaps Bishop Hurd, was ever satisfied with the 
 Divine Legation. Now, whatever I may be en- 
 deavouring to elucidate, it is not my plan to pro- 
 duce names, without at the same time producing 
 
 » View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy, Letter iv. near the 
 beginning: or Warburton's Works, Vol. xii. p. 244, 
 
It 
 
 310 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 the opinions or statements for which they are in- 
 tended to vouch ; and therefore conceiving myself 
 to be, on this occasion, restricted to the mention 
 of but few individuals, although several occur to 
 recollection, the first shall be neither a Bishop nor 
 even a Churchman — but a Non-conformist, whose 
 learning and judgement entitle him to attention. 
 Thus, then, writes Dr Doddridge, in the notes to 
 
 his Family Expositor: 
 
 Luke xvi. 31. "It is true, Moses no where expressly 
 mentions a future state of rewards and punishments; yet 
 the facts recorded by him strongly enforce the natural 
 
 arguments in proof of it." Again, 2 Tim. i. 10. ''Life 
 
 and immortality is put by a usual Hebraism for immortal 
 life, as Archbishop Tillotson well observes in his discourse 
 on these words, in which he has shown how uncertain the 
 heathens were as to the doctrines of a future state of retri- 
 bution; and the comparative obscurity of that light in 
 which it was placed in the Old Testament. But what 
 Mr Warburton has written upon this subject in his Divine 
 Legation, and what is said upon it in the last edition 
 of the Critical Inquiry into the opinions of the ancient 
 philosophers, has done abundantly more than anything 
 else to vindicate the propriety of this expression." — Finally, 
 Rom. i. 21. "I think what Paul charges upon the philo- 
 sophers is, that though they actually knew there was one 
 Supreme God, they neglected him, to conform (for low and 
 base considerations) to the established idolatry, which was 
 really the case, to their aggravated guilt and conderana- 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 S\\ 
 
 tion, as appears from most of the passages in which the 
 Pagan writers bear testimony to the doctrine of the Unity r 
 
 There is only another individual whose senti- 
 ments I shall here record. He is, indeed, a Church- 
 man; but at the same time a Churchman as un- 
 likely to be misled by the name of Warburton, 
 as can possibly be imagined. Having already 
 produced this person's opinion in favour of Natural 
 Religion, I shall now be enabled to show how 
 compatible are such opinions with the belief that 
 those ancient sages, whose notions we are consider- 
 ing, having voluntarily abandoned the true road 
 to divine truth, were speedily lost amidst the mazes 
 of a heartless philosophy. 
 
 « The learned reader will soon satisfy himself, from 
 Cicero de senectute and his Tusculan Disputations, that 
 this proud atheistic system was really the creed of the 
 philosophers. We are easily dazzled by the glare of some 
 luminous sentences, considered in a detached point of view, 
 to suppose them to have been much nearer Christian truth 
 than the Pagan vulgar. But their notions, reduced to a 
 whole, do really appear to have been still more remote 
 from the Gospel. Bishop Warburton has, I think, amply 
 proved the point before us. It is worth any man s while 
 to peruse him, in order to gain a clear insight into that 
 text, the world by wisdom kneiv not God:"* 
 
 • Milner's Answer to Gibbon, p. 113. The author, of course, 
 refers to the third book of the Divine Legation. 
 
312 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 The approbation therefore, of the Divine Le- 
 gation, was confined neither to Bishop Hurd, nor 
 yet to the Church to which he belonged. ... I was 
 glad to transcribe the closing sentence of Lord 
 Brougham''s observations, last presented, on account 
 of the praise of Warburton which it involves : — not 
 that I think the idea of " an able and industrious 
 man, well read and well fitted for controversy,*" 
 bears a very striking resemblance to Johnson's 
 
 Warburton I After a paragraph, condemning 
 
 Warburton'*s use of the word Demonstration, as 
 applied to his argument in defence of the Divine 
 Legation of Moses — on the use of which word I 
 refer the reader to the extract given from Cud- 
 worth, pp. 245 — 247 — the Noble Author indulges 
 in the following strain of animadversion : 
 
 " The two things which the author always overlooked 
 were, the possibility of a human lawgiver making an imper- 
 fect system, and of sceptics holding the want of the sanction 
 in question to be no argument for the divine origin of the 
 Mosaic law, but rather a proof of its flowing from a hu- 
 man and fallible source. As these 'mere possibilities' are 
 wholly independent of the admission that every word in the 
 book is correct, and all the positions are demonstrated, and 
 as nothing whatever is said to exclude such suppositions, 
 it is manifest that a more useless and absurd argument 
 never was maintained upon any grave and important sub- 
 ject." (p. 283.) 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 313 
 
 This, I rather think, is strong language; to 
 which I shall, as usual, endeavour to reply, by 
 detailing, with all possible plainness, the circum- 
 stances of the case Much that has been written, 
 
 respecting the argument of the Divine Legation, 
 from the time of its publication to the present, 
 naturally leads to this conclusion — that the author, 
 fancying that he had discovered for himself that 
 the retribution of a future state had not been en- 
 forced in the Law of Moses, had, from the mere 
 love of paradox, employed the supposed fact, as an 
 argument for the truth of the Jewish Dispensation. 
 Lord Brougham''s remarks upon the subject, in the 
 beginning of the foregoing paragraph, appear to 
 confirm that notion. Now although the current 
 of thought — perhaps from want of an especial 
 consideration of the subject — had flowed in a con- 
 trary direction, yet there were persons, and those 
 too of great name, who had maintained the opinion 
 adopted by Warburton. Grotius, Episcopius and 
 Bishop Bull may be mentioned in this point of 
 view. Their sentiments on the matter will be 
 found in the note.* Moreover, immediately prior 
 
 • Grotius: "Moses in Religionis Judaic ae Institutione, si di- 
 serta Legis respicimus, nihil promisit supra hujus vitaB bona, terram 
 uberem, penum copiosum, victoriam de hostibus, longam et va- 
 
 lentem 
 

 S14 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 315 
 
 II 
 
 I'' 
 
 I!' 
 
 If 
 
 
 to the time when Warburton fixed his attention on 
 Theological inquiries, Deistical writers had strongly 
 urged the omission of the sanction of a future state 
 in the Law of Moses, as a proof that the Jewish 
 economy could not be of divine origin. Is it, then, 
 likely that Warburton, in the immensity of his 
 reading, should be ignorant of all these circum- 
 stances ? . . . But not to dwell upon the probabilities 
 of things, we have, as a matter of fact, his own 
 evidence to appeal to. At the end of the fourth 
 section of the sixth book, he has quoted at length, 
 the passages of Grotius, Episcopius and Bull, from 
 which I have given extracts; for the purpose of 
 showing that the doctrine he held was not of his 
 own invention. Nay, the very title-page of the 
 work, which called forth the kind of criticism now 
 under notice, might have shown the authors of 
 such criticism how wide it was of the mark. In 
 the title-page we read as follows : The Divine Le- 
 gatimi of Moses demcmstrated on the principles of 
 A RELIGIOUS DEIST, Jrom the omission of the doctrine 
 
 lentem senectutem, posteros cum bona spe superstites. Nam, si 
 quid est ultra, in umbris obtegitui, aut sapienti ac difficili ratioci- 
 natione colligendum est.". .. .Episcopius : "In tota Lege Mo- 
 saica nullum vitae aeternae praemium, ac ne aeterni quidem prajmii 
 
 indicium vel vestigium extat." Bull: '* Lex enim promissa 
 
 habuit terrena et terrena tantum." 
 
 of a future state of reward and punishment^ in the 
 Jeivish Dispensation. So far, indeed, was War- 
 burton from having "always overlooked the pos- 
 sibility of sceptics holding the want of the sanction 
 in question to be no argument for the divine origin 
 of the Mosaic Law, but rather a proof of its flow- 
 ing from a human and fallible source*" — that his 
 work bears upon its very front an indelible mark 
 that it was written in designed opposition to such 
 sceptical conclusions. Again, in the first section 
 of the first book, we find this declaration from the 
 pen of Warburton: " Wliy I choose this medium, 
 namely, the omission of a future state in the Jeioish 
 Disjy'ensation, to prove its div^ine original, is, Jirst, 
 for the sake of the Deists : being enabled hereby 
 to show them, That this very circumstance of omis- 
 sion, which they jn-etend to be such an imperfection 
 as makes the dispensation unworthy the Author to 
 whom zve ascribe it, is, in truth, a demonstration 
 that God only could give \V\ . . . And finally, not 
 to mention many other instances in which War- 
 burton has opposed the sceptical inferences from 
 the omission, and vindicated his own — to the fifth 
 book he has added an Appendix, consisting of more 
 than forty closely printed pages, in which Lord 
 
\ n 
 
 316 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 317 
 
 ■» 
 
 if 
 
 Bolingbroke's arguments on the subject, as the 
 most important he could discover, are formally 
 taken into consideration. On the whole, so copious 
 is the evidence of Warburton's attention to the ob- 
 jections that were advanced against his system, 
 that when Lord Brougham alludes to such objec- 
 tions, as having been overlooked, I am at a loss 
 to imagine in what manner he can have read the 
 Divine Legation. The indications indeed, of a 
 thorough acquaintance with the purport and exe- 
 cution of the work, are hitherto so faint, that there 
 will be, to most people, an appearance (to use a 
 gentle expression) of something premature in His 
 Lordship's judgement— "that a more useless and 
 absurd argument was never maintained upon any 
 grave and important subject.''. .. In truth, when 
 the Deists had once pressed the omission of a 
 future state, as fatal to the belief of the divine 
 origin of the Jewish Polity — there were but two 
 courses for the advocates of Revelation to pursue : 
 — either to show that there was no such omission, 
 or to trace out the consequences of the omission, 
 supposing it to be granted. The former was con- 
 sidered as the safe course ; but it evinced rather 
 the good intentions than the success of those who 
 
 V 
 
 adopted it. Warburton took the latter; and by 
 combining the omission of a future state, with the 
 Theocratic government under which the Israelites 
 were placed— the retributive providence to which 
 they were subjected in this life—and the singular 
 character and condition of the people themselves— 
 he framed an argument, for the divine origin of 
 the dispensation, which it was easy to censure as 
 paradoxical, and difficult to prove to be unsound. 
 The presumption of Warburton, however, in taking 
 what was deemed, by many friends of Revelation, 
 the wrong course, was an offence not to be for- 
 given by those who had more zeal than discretion. 
 He was, therefore, assailed, even by Churchmen, 
 with a violence of invective, which, as he said, 
 could scarcely have been susceptible of increase, 
 if he had attempted to demonstrate the Divine Le- 
 gation of Mahomet. What was the consequence ? 
 Disdaining to soften that malignity which he did 
 not dread, he employed the language of contempt, 
 I lament that he did so, but I do not wonder at 
 it The provocation was great; and I have too 
 often seen the language of contempt employed, in 
 cases in which I could discover no provocation 
 whatsoever. It may, I think, be observed that 
 
318 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 319 
 
 t 
 
 H 
 
 what has been clamorously censured or unreason- 
 ably applauded has for the most part afterwards ex- 
 perienced an interval of unmerited neglect. Some- 
 thing of this kind ap))ears to have befallen the 
 Divine Legation; and although I have ventured 
 to offer a few remarks on the subject, I am fully 
 aware that the time is not yet come for duly esti- 
 mating the labours of— Warburton. 
 
 My object, in placing the following sentiments 
 of Lord Brougham before the reader, is not so 
 much to state any objections to them — as to have 
 an opportunity of mentioning a circumstance in 
 the highest degree honourable to the personal cha- 
 racter of the Historian of the Decline and Fall of 
 the Roman Empire: 
 
 *• The merit of the Divine Legation lies in its learning 
 and in its collateral argument ; indeed nearly the whole is 
 collateral, and unconnected with the purpose of the rea- 
 soning. But much even of that collateral matter is fanciful 
 and unsound. The fancy that the descent of ^neas to 
 hell in the sixth book of the yEneid is a veiled account of 
 the Eleusinian Mysteries, has probably made as few pro- 
 selytes as the main body of the 'Demonstration'; and if 
 any one has lent his ear to the theory that the ancients 
 had no belief in a future state of retribution, it can only 
 be from being led away by confident assertion from the 
 examination of facts. * (p. 283.) 
 
 / 
 
 To employ the language of Mr Gibbon, " the 
 descent of Mneas and the Sybil to the infernal 
 regions, to the world of spirits, expands an awful 
 and boundless prospect, from the nocturnal gloom 
 of the Cumaean grot, to the meridian brightness 
 of the Elysian fields; from the dreams of simple 
 nature, to the dreams of Egyptian theology and 
 the philosophy of the Greeks. But the final dis- 
 mission of the hero through the ivort/ gate, whence 
 
 Falsa ad coelum mittunt insomnia manes.. 
 
 seems to dissolve the whole enchantment, and leaves 
 the reader in a state of cold and anxious scepticism." 
 The circumstance indeed, just mentioned, had per- 
 plexed the commentators, and mortified the ad- 
 mirers of the great Roftian poet. "VirgiJ, says 
 Dr Jortin, "after having shone out with full 
 splendour through the sixth book, sets in a cloud. 
 He first represents the state of the departed souls 
 in Aides as a reality, and this he was obliged to 
 do by the very nature of his subject ; and then he 
 intimates that the whole is a lying fable, and he 
 intimates it in such a manner, that it seems scarcely 
 possible to clear him from this imputation.*"* The 
 incident of the ivort/ gate had been by some ac- 
 
 * Six Dissertations, p. 296. 
 
320 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 321 
 
 11 
 
 i ! 
 
 )( 
 
 '! 
 
 
 counted an oversight in a work not completely 
 revised ; by others, as we have just seen, a proof 
 of the author's Epicurean disbelief of a future state. 
 Warburton's interpretation, mentioned by Lord 
 Brougham, tended at least to lessen the difficulty, 
 if not entirely to remove it. " The hypothesis,'' 
 as Mr Gibbon informs us, " had been admitted by 
 many as true ; it was praised by all as ingenious ; 
 nor had it been exposed, in a space of thirty years, 
 to a fair and critical discussion." And thus, the 
 future historian, being "ambitious of breaking a 
 lance against the giant's shield," published ano- 
 nymously (1770) his 'Critical Observations on the 
 design of the sixth book of the iEneid;' in which 
 "he aimed his strokes against the person and the 
 hypothesis of Bishop Warburton." Heyne, the 
 editor of Virgil, praised the learning displayed 
 in the ' Observations', but condemned the severity. 
 Mr Hayley, whom I need not describe, was dis- 
 posed to justify even the acrimony of the style. 
 But Mr Gibbon, when reviewing the events of 
 his life, saw the matter in a different light. "I 
 cannot," he writes, "forgive myself the con- 
 temptuous treatment of a man who, with all his 
 faults, was entitled to my esteem; and I can less 
 
 forgive, in a personal attack, the cowardly con- 
 cealment of my name and character." There is 
 indescribable satisfaction in pointing attention to 
 an acknowledgement of error, so creditable to the 
 " name and character" of Mr Gibbon ; and I am 
 inclined to hope that the statements contained in 
 this paragraph may have the effect of showing 
 that Warburton's speculations are not quite so 
 visionary, as Lord Brougham's expressions would 
 lead his readers to suppose*. 
 
 After all, Warburton's position — that the an- 
 cient philosophers had no belief in a future state 
 of retribution — was, as the Noble Author observes, 
 by no means necessary to the proof of his ge- 
 neral theory; which, however, would certainly be 
 strengthened, if it should appear that, from a con- 
 viction of the absolute necessity of the belief of a 
 future state to the well being of society, the very 
 same persons enforced in public what they rejected 
 in private. Of the fact, indeed, of doctrines exoteric^ 
 distinct from doctrines esoteric^ in that respect, 
 
 * See Gibbon's Memoirs of his Life and Writings, pp. 208 
 
 212. 8vo. ed. 1814. It may be added that Dr Parr has recorded 
 the information given him, that " the original edition" of the Criticnl 
 Observations " had been suppressed." ( Bibliotheca Parriuna, p. 620. ) 
 The work however was republished by others in 1794; soon after the 
 death of Mr Gibbon on the 16th .Tanuary in that year. 
 
322 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 323 
 
 Ifl^ 
 
 li 
 
 having been held by those old phUosophers, Lord 
 Brougham has no doubt. According to His Lord- 
 ship, the first notions of religion, having originated 
 in fear and ignorance, were first embellished and 
 recommended by the fancy of poets, and then 
 sanctioned and enforced by the power and autho- 
 rity of Rulers. Hence philosophers themselves, 
 having neither the inclination nor the liberty « to 
 expose the errors of the popular faith^—" taught 
 one doctrine in private, while in public they con- 
 formed to the prevaiUng creed.^* So far, then, 
 
 * Discourse, p. 284. As the present volume may perhaps be 
 read by some who are not aware of Plato's caution in divulging his 
 real opinions, respecting the Deity and the origin of things-I may 
 here state that his second epistle, addressed to Dionysius, contains 
 a remarkable proof of such caution. Dionysius. having asked his 
 sentiments touching the nature of the First Being [^e^i ^-fj, ^ov 
 'Trpa.Tov <pv<rco„:\, and some difficult subject connected with it he 
 observes, in reply, that he must speak enigmatically [0^a.r.'o. ^,i 
 coc cc a.ucyf.a-r^.^ lest the letter should fall into hands for which 
 It was not mtended; and finally requests that the letter, after it 
 had been carefully perused, should be destroyed. On this proceeding 
 of Plato, the following remarks of Mr Gray are well deserving atten- 
 tion :_ ' V^ e here see that Plato, as well as the Pythagoreans whom 
 he imitated in many respects, made a mystery of his art : for none 
 but adepts were to understand him. It was by conversation only that 
 he cared to communicate himself on these subjects. In the seventh 
 epistle he professes never to have written any thing on philosophy ; 
 and all that has been published in his name he attributes to Socrates 
 As I am not mitiated, it is no wonder if this passage is still a riddle to 
 me, as it ^vas designed to be. Thus much one may divine indeed • 
 namely, that it is a description of the Supreme Being, who is the 
 
 cause 
 
 there appears to be no essential difference of opi- 
 nion between Warburton and Lord Brougham. 
 His Lordship's complaint, immediately afterwards, 
 is that Warburton makes "the tenor of the 
 doctrine the criterion of the writings, w^hich 
 contain it, being esoteric or exoteric;'''* and he 
 thus enlarges upon Warburton's mode of pro- 
 ceeding : 
 
 " It seems hardly credible that so acute and practised 
 a controversialist should so conduct an argument, but it 
 is quite true. As often as anything occurs in favour of 
 a future state, he says it was said exoterically ; and 
 whenever he can find anything on the opposite side, or 
 leaning towards it (which is really hardly at all in the 
 Platonic or Ciceronian writings) he sets this down for 
 the esoteric sentiments of the writer. But surely, if there 
 be any meaning at all in the double doctrine, whatever 
 may have been its origin, the occasion is every thing; 
 and there can be no difficulty in telling whether any 
 given opinion was maintained exoterically or not, by the 
 circumstances in which, and the purposes for which, it 
 was propounded." (p. 285.) 
 
 Now, to myself, I confess, it does not appear 
 so easy, as to His Lordship, to distinguish between 
 
 cause and end of all things, which is an answer to Dionysius's first 
 question; the second seems to be concerning the origin of evil, which 
 Plato does not explain, but refers to a conversation which they had 
 had before." Mathias's Gray. Vol. ii. p. 492. 
 
 X 2 
 
*^ 
 
 324 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 325 
 
 I 
 
 writings exoteric and writings esoteric; but that 
 is, on either side, a mere opinion, from which it 
 would not be safe to draw any conclusion: let 
 therefore this part of the subject pass without 
 farther remark. ... With regard to the assertion, 
 that Warburton made the mention of a future 
 life, or the omission, the immediate reason for 
 designating a treatise as exoteric or esoteric — I 
 must refer the reader to some circumstances, which 
 yet remain to be developed, in the present section. 
 ...On a similar account, I must also request a 
 suspense of judgment, in relation to Plato and 
 Cicero, as mentioned by His Lordship. . . . Further- 
 more, I observe that Lord Brougham is of opinion, 
 as well as Warburton, that a double doctrine was 
 held by the philosophers. If, then, Warburton 
 is pressed by a difficulty, when a future state ap- 
 pears to be admitted, in writings which may not 
 unreasonably be thought esoteric -^is not Lord 
 Brougham equally pressed by a difficulty, when a 
 future state is denied in writings which may as 
 reasonably be thought exoteric ? Suppose a book 
 were published in England— one part of it denying 
 a future state, or arguing against it, or ridiculing 
 the notion, and another part admitting the popular 
 
 creed — what should we consider the author to be — 
 
 an infidel or a believer.?* 
 
 But enough of generals: — we now proceed to 
 
 particulars; to which we are introduced by the 
 
 Noble Author in the following manner: 
 
 " The argument, on which Warburton dwells most, 
 is drawn from the allusion made by Caesar in the dis- 
 cussion upon the punishment of the conspirators, as re- 
 lated by Sallust: * Ultra (mortem) neque curae neque 
 gaudio locum esse:' and from the way in which Cato 
 and Cicero evade, he says, rather than answer him, 
 appealing to the traditions of antiquity, and the authority 
 of their ancestors, instead of arguing the point. {Div. 
 Leg. III. 2. 5.) Can any thing be more inconclusive than 
 this? Granting that Sallust, in making speeches for 
 Caesar and Cato (whom, by the way, he makes speak in 
 the selfsame style, that is, in his own Sallustian style) 
 adhered to the sentiments each delivered; and further, 
 that Caesar used this strange topic, not as a mere rhe- 
 torical figure, but as a serious reason against capital 
 punishment, and as showing that there is mercy and 
 not severity in such inflictions (a very strong supposition 
 
 * Jortin's remark on Seneca may not unjustly be extended to the 
 philosophers in general. " Seneca," he writes, "on this subject is 
 dWoTrpoaraWo^, wavering and inconstant in his sentiments. What 
 Homer says, of one of his heroes, might be applied to him : 
 TvSeidijv 6' ovk dv yj/otj;s, TroTepoiari fiCTeiri, 
 'Hk fieTu Tpciea-aiv ofxiXeoi, rj fxer 'Axaiols. 
 
 II. e. 85." 
 Discourses concerning the Christian Religion, p. 291. 
 
326 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 to make respecting so practised and practical a reasoner 
 as Caius Caesar); surely so bold a position as practical 
 atheism brought forward in the Roman Senate was far 
 more likely to be met, whether by the decorum of Cato 
 or the skill of Cicero, with a general appeal to the 
 prevalence of the contrary belief, and its resting on an- 
 cient tradition, than with a metaphysical or theological 
 discourse, singularly out of season in such a debate. 
 To make the case our own: let us suppose some mem- 
 ber of Parliament, or of the Chamber of Deputies, so 
 ill-judged as to denounce in short but plain terms the 
 religion of the country, would any person advert fur- 
 ther to so extravagant a speech, than to blame it, and 
 in general expressions signify the indignation it had ex- 
 cited? Would not an answer out of Lardner, or Paley, 
 or Pascal be deemed almost as ill-timed as the attack ? 
 To be sure, neither Cato nor Csesar are represented as 
 testifying any great disgust at the language of Csesar; 
 but this, as well indeed as the topic being introduced 
 at all by the latter, only shows that the doctrine of a 
 future state was not one of the tenets much diffused 
 among the people, or held peculiarly sacred by them." — 
 (pp. 285—287.) 
 
 Near the beginning of the foregoing paragraph. 
 Lord Brougham seems rather to have admitted for 
 the sake of argument, than to have acknowledged 
 as an historical fact — that Caesar opposed the capital 
 punishment of the conspirators, on the ground that 
 death would at once put an end to sufferings, the 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 327 
 
 continuance of which was demanded by the enor- 
 mity of their crimes. When, indeed. His Lordship 
 observed upon "the selfsame Sallustian style,'' in 
 which Cato and Csesar are made to speak— and still 
 more, when he denominated the notion of such a 
 reason against capital punishment being seriously 
 employed by " so practised and practical a reasoner 
 as Caius Csesar''—" a strong supposition"— he cer- 
 tainly must have intended to throw some portion 
 of doubt upon the whole matter. Now, in the 
 first place, if we had received the account on the 
 sole authority of Sallust, it would be difficult to 
 assign a cause for misrepresentation on the part 
 of the historian, or incredulity on our own part. 
 But in the second place, we have an independent 
 testimony, to the accuracy of the statement, in 
 the writings of an illustrious individual, who was 
 actively engaged in the proceedings on that occa- 
 sion. In short, we have in our possession Cicero's 
 fourth oration against Catiline, which was drawn 
 forth by the very subject under consideration. I 
 will state, as briefly as possible, the circumstances 
 
 of the case The question proposed to the Senate 
 
 was— What should be done, with regard to those 
 of the agents in Catiline's conspiracy, who were in 
 
328 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 329 
 
 custody?* Julius Silanus, as Consul Elect, spoke 
 first, and was of opinion that they should be put 
 to death. Caesar, who, it will be recollected, was 
 an Epicurean, dwelt upon their deeds, as crimes 
 to which no sufferings that could be devised would 
 be adequate ; represented death as, in cases of grief 
 and wretchedness, the termination of sorrows, not 
 the exacerbation— all the ills of life being dissipated 
 by that event, beyond which there was neither 
 trouble nor joy ; t and recommended the severest 
 punishment that was consistent with the continu- 
 ance of life. Cato, a Stoic — in a speech also given 
 by Sallust — mentioned, with commendation of the 
 manner and no dislike of the matter, Caesar'^s dis- 
 sertation on life and death ; slightly observing that 
 he supposed Caesar to consider as false the things 
 that were reported of the infernal regions ; namely, 
 the separation of the good from the bad, who were 
 consigned to places abounding in every thing dis- 
 
 * Quid de his fieri placeat, qui in custodiam traditi erant. Sal- 
 lust. Bell. Cat. c. 50, 
 
 t Equidem ego sic existumo, Patres Conscripti, omnis cruciatus 
 minores quam facinora illorum esse. . . .De poena possumus equi- 
 dem dicere id quod res habet : in luctu atque miseriis mortem 
 aerumnamm requiem non cruciatum esse: earn cuncta mortalium 
 
 mala dissolvere: ultra neque curaB neque gaudii locura esse. 
 
 Beli. Cat.c.51. 
 
 agreeable and horrible.* So far we have depended 
 upon the authority of Sallust ; and notwithstanding 
 the " Sallustian style,'' in which he has reported 
 the speeclies of Caesar and of Cato, there is ample 
 reason to believe that he has accurately given the 
 substance of what was spoken. Let us now turn 
 to the orations of Cicero ; and see what informa- 
 tion can be gathered, from that great master of the 
 Academic school, in his own style. In the course 
 of his address, he mentions the two opinions which 
 had been delivered: the one enforcing death— the 
 other the severest punishment in this life: the 
 former, as demanded by the danger to which the 
 Roman people had been exposed — the latter, as 
 being more efficacious than death, which was not 
 ordained for punishment at all. He goes on to 
 describe Caesar's plan, as subjecting those miscreants 
 to chains and imprisonment and poverty and de- 
 spair; as leaving them nothing but life — which 
 being taken away, they would be freed from the 
 punishment of their wickedness. So that, by way 
 of terror to the evil, the ancients were of opinion 
 
 * Bene et composite C. CaBsar paullo ante in hoc ordine de 
 vita et morte disseruit; falso, credo, existumans, quae de inferis 
 memorantur: diverse itinere malos a bonis loca tetra, inculta, 
 fjEda atque formidolosa habere, c. 52. 
 
 V 
 
 I 
 
 
 
330 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 331 
 
 that some punishments should be assigned to the 
 impious in the infernal regions, conceiving that, 
 without such punishments, death would not be an 
 
 object of dread.* We see, then, how completely 
 
 Sallusfs account of the debate is confirmed by 
 Cicero's oration, as preserved in his own works ; 
 and in consequence, how needless is Lord Broug- 
 ham's hesitating language, respecting the accuracy 
 of the historian. We see, also, with what indiffer- 
 ence the avowal, of Caesar's Epicurean disbelief of 
 
 * Video duas adhuc esse sententias : unam D. Silani, qui censet, 
 eos, qui hffic delete conati sunt, raorte esse multandos : alteram 
 C.'caesaris, qui mortis poenam reraovet, caeterorum suppliciorum 
 omnes acerbitates amplectitur. Uterque et pro sua dignitate et 
 pro rerum magnitudine in summa severitate versatur. Alter eos, 
 qui nos omnes, qui populum Romanum vita privare conati sunt, 
 qui delere imperium, qui populi Romani nomen extinguere, punc- 
 tum temporis frui vita et hoc communi spiritu non putat oppor- 
 tere.... alter intelligit mortem a diis immortalibus non esse supphcn 
 causa constitutam ; sed aut necessitatem naturae, aut laborura ac 
 
 miseriarum quietem esse Mjungit gravem poenam raunicipi- 
 
 bus, si quis eorum vincula niperit : horribiles custodias circumdat, 
 et digna scelere hominum perditorum sancit— ne quis eorum poe- 
 nam, quo3 condemnat, aut per senatum aut per populum levare 
 possit. eripit etiam spem, quaB sola hominibus in miseriis consolan 
 solet. bona pr^terea publica publicari jubet : vitam solam relm- 
 quit nefariis hominibus : quam si eripuisset, multas uno dolore 
 animi atque corporis, et omnes scelerum poenas ademisset. Itaque 
 ut aliqua in vita formido improbis esset posita, apud inferos ejus- 
 modi quffidam illi antiqui supplicia impiis constituta esse voluerunt, 
 quod videlicet intelligebant, his remotis non esse mortem ipsam 
 pertimescendam. In Catal. iv. 4, 5. 
 
 a future retribution, was treated in the Roman 
 Senate. Considered simply as a matter of Reli- 
 gion, it seems not to have been deemed worthy 
 of a remark. There certainly was no " meta- 
 physical or theological discourse"" on the subject; 
 and as to the " appeal to the prevalence of the 
 contrary belief and its resting on ancient tradi- 
 tion,*" we are aware, from the narrative before us, 
 how little the most eloquent man that Rome ever 
 produced was disposed to avail himself of the 
 topic. . . . The fair conclusion seems to be that War- 
 burton was completely warranted in arguing from 
 so remarkable a manifestation of the sentiments 
 of philosophers, on that most important article of 
 religious faith. . . . While looking through Cicero's 
 fourth oration against Catiline, in the edition of 
 Graevius, my eye caught a note of Muretus, in 
 which he states his opinion — and no man was more 
 capable of forming a just opinion — of the ancient 
 notions, respecting a future state. He is, of course, 
 writing of the philosophers ; of whose disbelief, he 
 seems to have no doubt — as will be clear from the 
 
 following extract : 
 
 *• Plerique veterum in ea sententia fuerunt, ut crede- 
 rent ea quae de inferis dicerentur nihil esse aliud quam 
 fabulas ad territandos imperitorum aniraos confictas; ip- 
 
332 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 333 
 
 sumque ita sensisse Ciceronem demonstravimus in anno- 
 tationibus Horatianis." 
 
 Lord Brougham's parallel, between the English 
 Parliament and the Roman Senate, appears to be 
 a complete failure ; for it is supposed by His Lord- 
 ship that, in the English Parliament, a disavowal 
 of the Religion of the Country would be met 
 with expressions of blame and indignation — whereas 
 there were in the Roman Senate no expressions of 
 the kind. Allowing, moreover, that in the British 
 Senate, an answer out of Lardner or Paley would 
 be ill timed, where would be the impropriety of 
 reminding a Member, who should in that manner 
 shock the feelings of those around him, of the 
 many, far greater men than himself, who had sat 
 in that house, and reverenced the Religion of 
 which he had ventured to speak in terms of con- 
 tempt? In short, every new light thrown upon 
 the subject has the effect of showing more dis- 
 tinctly the sceptical opinions of the Roman philo- 
 sophers. From the fact, however — that sceptical 
 opinions were divulged in the Roman Senate— the 
 Noble Author infers " that the doctrine of retribu- 
 tion was rather more esoteric than exoteric among 
 the ancients."" There is something in this notion 
 
 —if I have not undesignedly mis-stated it — which 
 I do not comprehend ; and therefore as it appears, 
 from what follows, to be connected with War- 
 burton's view of the Eleusinian Mysteries, I will 
 first present His Lordship's subsequent observa- 
 tions, and then consider them : 
 
 "The elaborate dissertation of Bishop Waiburton upon 
 the Mysteries proves this effectually, and clearly refutes 
 his whole argument. For to prove that the doctrine of 
 future retribution was used at all as an engine of state, 
 he is forced to allege that it was the secret disclosed to 
 the initiated in the Sacred Mysteries; which, according 
 to Cicero, were not to be viewed by the imprudent eye. 
 (Ne imprudentiam quidem oculorum adjici fas est. De 
 Legg. 11. 14.) Surely this would rather indicate that such 
 doctrines were not inculcated indiscriminately, and that at 
 all events, when a philosopher gives them a place in 
 his works, it cannot be in pursuance of a plan for de- 
 ceiving the multitude into a belief different from his 
 own." (p. 287.) 
 
 From the mode of expression adopted in the 
 preceding extract, it seems probable that Lord 
 Brougham does not object to Warburton^s account 
 of the purposes of the Mysteries. At all events, 
 His Lordship reasons Jrom that account ; which 
 therefore must here be distinctly explained. First, 
 then, with regard to the lesser Mysteries, which 
 
33^ 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 were by no means difficult of access : " To support 
 the doctrine of a Providence;' says Warburton, 
 "which, they taught, governed the world, they 
 enforced the belief of a future state of rewards 
 and punishments, by every sort of contrivance.''* 
 And here, let Warburton's words be duly noticed. 
 He does not affirm that the Mysteries revealed the 
 doctrine, but that they eiiforced the belief, of a 
 future state. The initiated in the lesser Mysteries 
 had their previous belief recommended to them by 
 interesting representations and impressed by solemn 
 sanctions. This is Warburton's real position, which 
 he maintains with every variety of argument. How 
 different is this, from the Noble Author's account 
 of Warburton's hypothesis, where he says— in the 
 extract just given-that " to prove that the doc- 
 trine of future retribution was used at all as an 
 engine of state, Warburton is forced to allege that 
 it was the secret disclosed to the initiated !" In 
 fact, two accounts of the same thing cannot pos- 
 sibly be imagined more directly opposed to each 
 other than that of Warburton himself, and that 
 attributed to Warburton by Lord Brougham. No 
 one wiU suspect Dr Jortin of favouring an opinion 
 
 ♦ Divine Legation, B. 11. s. 4. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 335 
 
 because it is Warburton's; and thus writes Dr 
 Jortin : "It appears from Plato's Phaedo, and 
 from Isocrates, that they who were initiated were 
 taught the doctrine of a future state, and had a 
 promise of happiness in it."* No one, at all ac- 
 quainted with Dr Jortin's writings, will imagine 
 him to be maintaining that they were taught that, 
 of which they had received no previous intimations. 
 When Warburton goes on, to unfold the pur- 
 pose of the greater Mysteries, he observes — "the 
 secret in the lesser Mysteries was principally con- 
 tained in some hidden rites and shows to be kept 
 from the open view of the people, only to invite 
 their curiosity; and the secret in the greater, 
 some hidden doctrines to be kept from the people's 
 knowledge, from the very contrary purpose:" — 
 and afterwards, when declaring what the doctrines 
 of the greater Mysteries were not, he says — " they 
 were not the common doctrines of a Providence 
 and future state; for ancient testimony is express 
 that these doctrines were taught promiscuously to 
 all the initiated, and were of the very essence of 
 these Rites — These doctrines were not capable of 
 being hid and secreted, because they were of uni- 
 
 * Tracts philogical and critical, Vol. i. p. 438. 
 
 i 
 
336 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 337 
 
 versal credit amongst the civilized part of mankind 
 —There was no need to hide them, because the 
 common knowledge of them was so far from being 
 detrimental to society, that, as we have shown, 
 society could not even subsist without their being 
 generally known and believed/' — Warburton finally 
 makes out the secret of the greater Mysteries to 
 have been— that the Gods of the vulgar creed 
 were only dead mortals; and that there was, in 
 reality, but one God, the creator of the universe ; 
 and gives reasons why this doctrine was reserved 
 for the greater Mysteries. So much for War- 
 burton's explanation of the Mysteries of ancient 
 times. To say the truth, Lord Brougham, by 
 his statement of Warburton's doctrine respecting 
 the Mysteries, has brought himself into a dilemma, 
 from which he can never be extricated, either by 
 learning or by talent* On the assumption how- 
 ever, of what is quite contrary to the truth, that 
 Warburton held the notion of the doctrine of a 
 
 ♦ I will observe, in a note, that Lord Brougham seems to have 
 mistaken the import of the expression— ** Ne imprudentiam qui- 
 dem oculorum adjici fas est." The meaning will be understood 
 from the context : " Quid autera mihi displiceat in nocturnis, poetaj 
 indicant Comici. Qua licentia Romai data, quidnam egisset ille, 
 qui in sacrificium cogitatam libidinem intulit, quo ne imprudentiam 
 quidem oculorum adjici fa^ est." 
 
 future state being revealed in the Mysteries, as 
 something new — and not eri/brcedj as something 
 well known — the Noble Author indulges in what 
 looks very like an invective against that learned 
 person — if I do not mistake the character of the 
 following remarks: 
 
 "Among the many notable inadvertencies of his ar- 
 gument, concealed from himself by an exuberant learn- 
 ing and a dogmatism hardly to be paralleled, is the 
 neglecting to observe how difficultly the appearance of the 
 doctrine in the places where we find it is reconciled with 
 the notion of its having formed the subject of the Mys- 
 teries. What part in those Mysteries did Cicero's and 
 Plato's and Seneca's and Xenophon's writings bear? 
 There we have the doctrine plainly stated; possibly to 
 the world at large — possibly, far more probably, to the 
 learned reader only — but assuredly not by the Hierophant 
 or the Mystagogue to the initiated. This is wholly incon- 
 sistent with the notion of its being reserved for these 
 alone." (p. 288.) 
 
 Such is the commencement of a long para- 
 graph ; the consistency of which is maintained to 
 the end. As the paragraph has nothing what- 
 ever to rest upon except His Lordship's strange 
 misrepresentation of Warburton's opinion, I will 
 only observe that, in my own judgement, it did 
 not present the happiest opportunity for denounc- 
 ing "the dogmatism hardly to be paralleled" of 
 
338 
 
 SKCTION VII. 
 
 the man, or "the many notable inadvertencies'' 
 of his argument. 
 
 In revising these sheets, a perversion of War- 
 burton's opinion, that the initiation into the Eleu- 
 sinian Mysteries is shadowed out in the sixth book 
 of the ^neid— a perversion by Voltaire, so mon- 
 strous as to be almost incredible— has occurred to 
 recollection ; and there may be some use in here 
 placing it before the reader. Voltaire, to lower 
 the importance of the fact, that the Unity of God 
 was inculcated upon the Jews throughout the Old 
 Testament, alleges that the same principle was held 
 by the Heathen. « This doctrine concerning the 
 Unity of God,'' he observes, " was taught in the 
 Eleusinian Mysteries ; which Mysteries Virgil has 
 admirably described ; and introduced one Phlegyas 
 as crying out, in the infernal regions, 
 
 Soyez justes, mortels, et ne craignez qu' iin Dieu." 
 
 Now, in a case like the present, I willingly 
 
 allow to Voltaire all the advantage that belongs to 
 excessive ignorance. He knew nothing of the dis- 
 tinction between the greater and the lesser Mys- 
 teries. He had not the slightest conception that 
 Tartarus, where Phlegyas appeared, was the place 
 in which only a future retribution was impressed 
 upon the mind of the spectator; and that it was 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 339 
 
 not till the arrival of ^Eneas in the Elysian fields, 
 that he learned, from the shade of his father An- 
 chises, the doctrine of One Supreme Intelligence. 
 But— 
 
 "Discite justitiam moniti, et non temnere Divos" 
 is the language of Virgil ; and something probably 
 less pardonable than ignorance impelled Voltaire 
 to render et non temnere Divos (and not to despise 
 THE gods) by et ne craignez qu" un Dieu^ and 
 then adduce the passage, as enforcing the Divine 
 Unity, He who gives a translation in rhyme will 
 occasionally have great difficulty in preserving such 
 distinctions as these. Pitt, for example, here makes 
 " by these torments aw'd" — correspond to — " not 
 to scorn a god." Pitt, however, would not, I am 
 persuaded, have converted his version into an argu- 
 ment against the Mosaic Economy* 1 now 
 
 return to Lord Brougham. 
 
 The next paragraph (pp. 289—291) relates to 
 the circumstance of opinions exoteric and esoteric-^ 
 or in other words, some passages favourable to the 
 doctrine of a future state, and others adverse to it 
 
 * I have no doubt of the accuracy of the preceding statement ; 
 but I ought to observe that it is taken from an extract made some 
 time ago ; and that I have not, at the present moment, access to 
 the works of Voltaire. 
 
 Y 2 
 
340 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 .S41 
 
 —being found in the same treatise— of Plato, for 
 instance, or Cicero. Now, I cannot discover the 
 great absurdity into which Warburton is supposed 
 to be driven, when Lord Brougham describes him 
 as maintaining "that Plato and Cicero pretend 
 to believe a future state of retribution in order to 
 deceive the multitude, by stating it in the same 
 writings in which they betrayed their real senti- 
 ments to be the very reverse." Perhaps they might 
 thus consult their own safety. Some concessions, 
 they might imagine, were due from them, as 
 citizens, to the popular feeling — so long as they 
 could at the same time convey, to the intelligent^ 
 their opinions as philosophers. Are there not, 
 in the writings of Mr Hume, traces of a similar 
 proceeding.? But not to persevere in these ge- 
 neral speculations, which can seldom lead to any 
 satisfactory conclusion, I will now take, in their 
 order, the particular cases, which Lord Brougham 
 has proposed for consideration. 
 
 " 1. There can be no doubt that both the Greek and 
 Roman philosophers disbelieved part of the popular doc- 
 trine as to future retribution ; those punishments, to wit, 
 which are of a gross and corporeal nature; and accord- 
 ingly, what Timgeus the Locrian and others have said of 
 the TtfAwpiai ^€vai proves nothing; for it applies to those 
 only. Strabo plainly speaks of these only in the passage 
 
 where he observes that women and the vulgar are not 
 to be kept pious and virtuous by the lessons of philosophy, 
 but by superstition, which cannot be maintained without 
 mythology (fable-making) and prodigies (Sia hcKn^aifxo' 
 via^' TovTo B' ovK av€u fjivdotroiia^ koi rcpareiwi^y for 
 he gives as examples of these, Jupiter's thunder, the 
 snakes of the Furies, &c." (p. 291.) 
 
 Warburton, in the first section of his third 
 book, adduces some "testimonies of ancient sages 
 and philosophers, concerning the necessity of the 
 doctrine of a future state, to civil society.*" The 
 first is that of Timaeus the Locrian, a very early 
 Pythagorean ; who having mentioned the use of 
 philosophy, in promoting the virtue and happi- 
 ness of well-disposed minds, enforces the necessity 
 of religious terrors, and the apprehension of pun- 
 ishments after this life, to restrain the perverse 
 and evil. The next is that of Polybius, much 
 to the same effect. The third is that of Strabo, 
 referred to by Lord Brougham ; and the last that 
 of Pliny the elder, who, although an Epicurean, 
 held the importance of the fear of the Gods to 
 the interests of society. In the second section, 
 Warburton mentions the quotations, before ad- 
 duced from Timaeus, Polybius and Strabo, as con- 
 ducive to the proof of his next proposition — that 
 
342 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 343 
 
 I 
 
 while the aforesaid sages and philosophers, with a 
 view to the public good, enforced the necessity 
 of a general belief of a future retribution, such 
 retribution did not form a part of their own creed. 
 His Lordship affirms that the old philosophers 
 rejected onlythose future punishments which were 
 of a gross and corporeal nature ; meaning to say 
 that they still held the doctrine of a future retri- 
 bution. To this account of the matter, there are 
 two objections: — !. No witness is produced spe- 
 cifically to show, that any one, who eschewed 
 the vulgar notion of rewards and punishments, 
 adhered to the principle which the notion involved ; 
 — 2. On His Lordship's own representation, the 
 passage of Strabo leads to a contrary conclusion ; 
 for the points under consideration are—not modes 
 of future punishment, more or less gross and cor- 
 poreal—but "the lessons of philosophy'^ on the 
 one hand, and "the popular doctrine'' on the 
 
 other With respect to the Tijuuypiat ^evai of 
 
 Timseus the Locrian, Lord Brougham is not quite 
 correct in thinking that they apply to the fore- 
 going vulgar apprehensions only. They, in fact, 
 immediately refer to the ancient Pythagorean doc- 
 trine of the transmigration of souls ; and from the 
 
 entire passage there is reason to suppose that those 
 who inculcated even that doctrine in public, did 
 not in secret believe it.*. ... I now proceed to the 
 
 next paragraph: 
 
 "2. Nothing can be more vague than the inference 
 drawn from such passages as those in Cicero and Seneca, 
 where a doubt is expressed on the subject of a future 
 state, and a wish of more cogent proofs seems betrayed — 
 as where Cicero makes one of his prolocutors, in the 
 Tusculan Questions, say, that when he lays down the 
 Phgedo which had persuaded him, *Assensio omnis ilia 
 elabitur' (i. 11.), and when Seneca speaks of the philoso- 
 phers as 'rem gratissimam promittentes magis quam pro- 
 bantes,' and calls it 'helium somnium.' Epist. 102. No 
 one pretends that the ancients had a firm and abiding 
 opinion, founded on very cogent reasons, respecting a 
 future state; and with far sounder theologians than they 
 were, the anxiety naturally incident to so momentous an 
 inquiry may well excite occasional doubts, and even ap- 
 prehensions." " (pp. 291, 292.) 
 
 The turn of sentiment, through the whole of 
 this paragraph, is not only founded on the know- 
 ledge of human nature, but indicates the most 
 becoming feeling for human weakness, with re- 
 
 * See the passage, in Divine Legation, B. in. Sec. 3. The fol- 
 lowing extract may here suffice : Tcts y\fvxd^ direlpyo^e^ i/^euoe'o-i 
 Xoyois, et/ca fit] ayijTai aXaOeVi" \eyoivTo S" dvayKaloi^ koI ti- 
 fitopiai. ^evai, aJs fieTevSvofiivav Tav \\/vxaVy twv fiev SeiXtav es 
 yvvaiKca crKavea irod' vftpiv eKSidofxeva' twv Se fuai<povMVf es 
 Bfipiwu (TwfiaTa irori KoXaaiu. k. t. e. 
 
344 
 
 SECTION VIL 
 
 gard to the concerns of a future life. To my 
 mind, there is something so pleasing in the view 
 which Lord Brougham has taken of this matter, 
 that I wish to retain the impression unimpaired. 
 Whether in this instance, as in some other cases, 
 Warburton went rudely to work — I do not re- 
 collect, and will not examine. I am ready, with- 
 out farther inquiry, to acquiesce in the justness 
 
 of the Noble Author's animadversions The 
 
 next paragraph now demands attention: 
 
 " 3. When Strabo speaks of the Brahmins having in- 
 vented fables, like Plato, upon future judgement, it is 
 plain that he alludes to those speculations in the Phsedo, 
 which are avowedly and purposely given as imaginary, 
 respecting the detaUs of another world. To no other 
 part of the Platonic doctrine can the Brahminical my- 
 thology be likened ; nor would there be any accuracy of 
 speech at all in comparing those fables to the more ab- 
 stract doctrines of the immortality of the soul as the 
 words literally do—,S<T7rep ku) Uxdrafp irepl re d(pdap^ 
 aia^ yl/v-^ij^:* (p. 292.) 
 
 Having already mentioned the object of the 
 first and second sections of the third book of 
 the Divine Legation, this may not be an impro- 
 per place to observe, that the third section of 
 the same book is mainly occupied by an exami- 
 nation of the character and genius of the Pytha^ 
 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 345 
 
 gorean, the Platonic, the Peripatetic and the 
 Stoic Sects; with a view of showing that not 
 one of them believed the doctrine of a future 
 retribution. From the remarks of antiquity re- 
 specting the public and private instructions given 
 by Pythagoras, and his principle of a transmi- 
 gration of souls without any moral purpose — 
 from the double doctrine of Plato and his prin- 
 ciple of transmigrations and purgations, by which 
 the soul was prepared for absorption into the 
 divine substance, whence it was taken — from the 
 sceptical intimations of Aristotle and the Peripa- 
 tetics — and the decided language of the Stoics — 
 Warburton inferred that a state of rewards and 
 punishments hereafter could not be an article of 
 faith amongst those philosophers. The Noble Lord's 
 last-quoted paragraph relates to a passage from 
 Strabo, tending to prove a long existing persua- 
 sion, that Plato's descriptions of future rewards 
 and punishments were rather put forth with popu- 
 lar views, than as conveying his own sentiments. 
 This, indeed, appears to be His Lordship's opi- 
 nion; although he does not, on that account, 
 admit Plato's infidelity on the subject. With 
 regard to the similarity between the Brahminical 
 
I 
 
 346 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 347 
 
 V 
 
 
 and Platonic speculations on the origin, nature 
 and destination of the soul, as mentioned by Strabo, 
 there appears to be a greater degree of it than his 
 Lordship supposes. But this point is of so Httle 
 consequence to our present inquiry, that I pass 
 on to the subsequent paragraph: 
 
 "4. The quotation from Aristotle may refer to this 
 world merely ; but it is certainly made a good deal stronger 
 in Bishop Warburton's translation— ^o/Jf^wVaToy 3' 6 
 
 oSt€ ayadSu oUe kukSu eluau * Death is of all things 
 the most terrible; for it is the final period of existence; 
 and beyond that, it appears, there is neither good nor 
 evU for the dead man to dread or hope/ This is at best 
 a mere paraphrase. Aristotle sa.ys— Death is most ter- 
 rible, for it is an end {of us) and there appears to be 
 nothing further, good or bad, for the dead. Even were 
 we to take this as an avowal of the Stagyrite's opinion 
 in the sense given it by Bishop Warburton. it proves 
 nothing as to Plato." (p. 292.) 
 
 Lord Brougham's version appears to be very 
 nearly as adverse as Bishop Warburton's, to the 
 idea of any credit being given, by Aristotle, to 
 the existence of good or evil, after this life. The 
 commentators indeed are unwilling to think that 
 Aristotle is there expressing his own sentiments ; 
 and Dr Gillies, in his translation, dexterously in- 
 
 
 
 troduces a parenthesis, which removes the oppro- 
 brium from the philosopher and fastens it upon 
 the people — " death seems of all things the most 
 formidable; because, in common opinion, it is the 
 ultimate limit of all our pains and pleasures, beyond 
 which there is neither good nor evil." On this 
 interpretation I shall merely remark, that, when 
 the translator ventured upon it, he ought to have 
 given his readers some reasons for the step he had 
 taken.*. . . . However, what only concerns Aristotle, 
 Lord Brougham truly observes, "proves nothing 
 as to Plato" — or indeed the other philosophers ; and 
 therefore this being probably the only remaining 
 occasion of referring to their religious tenets, I 
 will here put down what will at least evince that 
 Warburton is not singular in his notions, respect- 
 ing the ancient opinions of a future state. The 
 following is the testimony of Grotius — and a more 
 competent, and in every way more unexceptionable 
 witness cannot be named — to the general unbelief, 
 or utter uncertainty, prevailing upon the subject, in 
 those remote ages : 
 
 ** Gentes nuUam habebant de ea re [sc. de resurrec- 
 tione et vita setema] Divinam revelationem. Epicurus et 
 
 * See Arist. Eth. Nic, in. 6. Also Gillies' Translation, Vol, i, 
 p. 309. 
 
348 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 349 
 
 [\ 
 
 Aristoteles nihil ejus credebant. Stoici animas putabant 
 manere, sed non ultra quam ad tempus eKwvp^^em, 
 Platonici animas perpetuis vicibus nunc beatas nunc vero 
 miseras fieri. Quicquid dicebant, conjecture erant in- 
 certSB, vag8B, fragiles."* 
 
 When Warburton published the third book of 
 Lis Divine Legation of Moses, he might with great 
 propriety have formally announced that the pre- 
 ceding passage was the text on which he was about 
 to enlarge. What Grotius had affirmed, as the 
 result of his own reading— ^Aa^ Warburton under- 
 took to establish, by proofs from the writings of 
 the philosophers themselves. I am well aware 
 of the difficulty of the subject ; and by no means 
 disposed to assert that Warburton always placed 
 every thing he discussed in the precise point of 
 view in which it ought to be seen ; but justice 
 requires that he should be cleared of what Lord 
 Brougham's animadversions tend to fix upon him 
 —the suspicion of having availed himself of an 
 unheard of paradox, for the purpose of supporting 
 a favourite hypothesis. ... Of all the ancient Grecian 
 sages, Socrates is universally allowed to be the one 
 who had the clearest conceptions and the firmest 
 conviction of a future state ; and yet, at the very 
 
 * Giolii Annotata in Ep. ad Kphe^^io^ ii. 12. 
 
 close of his life, in what terms of hesitation and 
 doubt, according to Plato, he expressed his senti- 
 ments on the subject ! At the end of the Apology^ 
 he is made to say — But it is now time to depart ; 
 I indeed to die^ but 7/ou to live. To which of us 
 is assigned the Jmppier lot^ is "known to God only ; 
 and in the Phado he again and again speaks dubi- 
 ously of the future — not without hope, but mani- 
 festly in great uncertainty.* On these passages the 
 learned Gataker has written so fairly, that I am 
 tempted to extract his remarks: 
 
 ** Dissertationem denique de argiimento hoc suam his 
 tandem verbis concludit [Socrates], Harum sententiarum 
 qucB vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit: quid sunt autem liaec 
 omnia, nisi ignorantisB bac in re propriae ingenua con- 
 fessio, claram satis et illorum perstrictionem in se con- 
 
 tinens, qui certi aliquid de ea statuerent?" "Sunt 
 
 enim utique et hsec, prout priora ilia, optantis sperantis- 
 que potius quam spondentis statuentisve vera esse quae 
 opinatur; et in minore damno ponentis, etiamsi falsa 
 autumet. Scite proinde Tertullian«s de anima c. 1. Adeo 
 
 * 'AXXa yap ijSij &pa d'jnevai, e/jLoi fihv aTrodauovfievio, vfiXv 
 ie PioDoro/ievoi^. oiroTepoi 6e tj/iwi/ epxovrat eiri afieivov irpdyfia, 
 
 aSri^ou iravrl irXtji/ rj Tva detS. Apol Nui/ Se ev to-TC, oti 
 
 Trap' dvSpai tc eXiri^a) dipi^ea-dai dyadov9, Kai tovto fxhv ovk 
 uv trdvv di'icrxvpto'aip.riv, K.x.e. Plmdo. There is, moreover, some- 
 thing inexpressibly mortifying in the concluding scene : "^Q Kpirutv, 
 €(t)r}, T(u ' AcrKXtjiriM 6(f}€i\ofi€v dXcKTpvova' dWd d-jrodore Kai 
 fii] a/Lie\ij<rtjTe. 
 
350 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 i 
 
 1, 
 
 ■i I 
 
 I 
 
 I' 
 
 omnis ilia tunc sapientia Socratis de industria venerat con- 
 sultts (squanimitatis, non de Jiduda compertee veritatis. 
 Ita summi illi philosophi, sapientiae nomine turgidi, ani- 
 mse SBteraitatem vitamque futuram, fide dimidiata, ut 
 Minutius loquitur, credebant, et quasi per nebulam ista 
 intuebantur, conjecturis meris atque humanis suspicioni- 
 bus nitentes."* 
 
 If such was the uncertainty of Socrates, who 
 relied, far more than the other philosophers were 
 accustomed to do, upon the natural feelings and 
 apprehensions of the mind— what must have been 
 the perplexity of those who, if they held a future 
 state at all, had to reconcile the notion to the trans- 
 migrations and purifications and revolutions and 
 diffusions and absorptions, to which they deemed 
 human souls to be destined? There are some 
 verses of Milton, descriptive of those ancient sages ; 
 and when we consider to whom the sentiments are 
 assigned, we cannot doubt the sincerity with which 
 they were entertained by the Poet himself— 
 
 *' Much of the soul they talk, but all awry. 
 And in themselves seek virtue, and to themselves 
 All glory arrogate, to God give none ; 
 Rather accuse him under usual names, 
 Fortune and Fate, as one regardless quite 
 Of mortal things." t 
 
 * Gataker, Annct. in Marc. Ant. de rebus suis, iv. 21. 
 t Paradise Regained, iv. 313. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 351 
 
 Lord Brougham's next paragraph refers to the 
 Stoics, of whose opinions, respecting a future retri- 
 bution. His Lordship is too wise to undertake the 
 defence. Nothing, therefore, now remains, but 
 to proceed to the case of Cicero: 
 
 " The authority of Cicero presses our author the 
 most closely; and accordingly he makes great efforts to 
 escape from it. After showing some circumstances, ra- 
 ther of expression than anything else, in his philoso- 
 phical treatises, he cites the oration Pro Cluentio^ where, 
 speaking of the vulgar superstition, he says it is gene- 
 rally disbelieved ; and then asks, * Quid aliud mors eripuit 
 prseter sensum doloris?' But this at best is a rhetorical 
 flourish ; and being delivered in public (though before the 
 judges) never could be seriously meant as an esoteric attack 
 on the doctrine." (p. 293.) 
 
 Let us examine the case somewhat more par- 
 ticularly. *The charge under consideration was, 
 that Oppianicus, a man living in exile and wretch- 
 edness, had been destroyed by poison, under the 
 direction of his enemy Avitus. Cicero contends 
 that the enmity of Avitus, instead of prompting 
 him to compass the death of Oppianicus, would 
 have been exerted in prolonging, to the uttermost, 
 a life so miserable and ignominious. " For what 
 evil," he asks "has death inflicted upon him — 
 unless, indeed, we are induced by silly fables to 
 
V 
 
 {. 
 
 352 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 imagine that he is enduring the punishments of 
 the wicked in the infernal regions ? .... But if these 
 things be fictions, as all understand, of what has 
 death deprived him beyond the sense of pain?^* 
 Here, then, we have again presented to us the 
 very argument which was employed by C«sar, in 
 the case of Catiline's conspirators ; without more 
 appearance of « rhetorical flourish'' in the one in- 
 stance than in the other. The argument, as em- 
 ployed by Cicero, distinctly proves two points: 
 1. the slight degree of credit given, to a future 
 retribution, by the higher ranks of the Roman 
 people at that time ; and 2. the absolute rejection 
 of a future retribution, by those who rejected the 
 vulgar notions on the subject. It is on the vulgar 
 notions that the idea of such a state is made en- 
 tirely to depend. . . . There is far greater difficulty 
 in the matter than is admitted by Lord Brougham. 
 But I now proceed with his Lordship's animad- 
 versions : 
 
 " The doctrines in the De Officiis relate only to the 
 Deity's being incapable of anger or malevolence, on which 
 
 • Nam nunc quidem quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? nisi 
 forte ineptiis et fabulis ducimur, ut existimemus ilium apud in- 
 feros impiorum supplicia perferre quje si falsa sunt, id 
 
 quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit, pra- 
 ter sensum doloris?" Vro Cluentw, 61. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 353 
 
 account he praises Regulus the more for keeping his oath, 
 when all philosophers knew nee irasci Deum nee nocere ; 
 which shows, according to our author, that Cicero could not 
 believe in a future retribution. But this is said by Cicero 
 only in reference to immediate punishments, or judg- 
 ments, as the vulgar term them. At any rate, the pas- 
 sage is quite capable of that sense We may here 
 
 observe, in passing, the gratuitous manner in which 
 works are held esoteric and exoteric, just as suits the 
 purposes of the argument. The Offices contain the above 
 passage; and therefore. Bishop Warburton says it is the 
 work which *bids the fairest of any to be spoken from 
 the heart'." (p. 294.) 
 
 Punishment can proceed only from anger : the 
 Deity is not susceptible of anger: therefore the 
 
 Deity will not punish Such appears to have 
 
 been the reasoning of ancient times; and that 
 reasoning was one of the difficulties which the 
 Christian doctrine, of future punishments for evil- 
 doers, had to contend with. Cicero declares the 
 belief, that the Deity could not be angry, to be- 
 long to philosophers of every sect. His words 
 are remarkable: "At hoc quidem commune est 
 omnium philosophorum, non eorum modo, qui 
 Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt et nihil 
 exhibere alteri, sed eorum etiam qui Deum semper 
 agere aliquid et moliri volunt, nunquam nec 
 
S54 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 355 
 
 V 
 
 :. t 
 
 iRASci Deum NEC NOCERE.* With the validity 
 of the reasoning we have no concern. We are 
 sure, however, that the reasoning was understood 
 to be universal; and so, according to the views 
 then entertained, would hold good for a future 
 life as well as the present. This is another indi- 
 cation of the broad line of distinction between the 
 
 philosophical and the popular creed Let me 
 
 here intimate a reason, which may have moved 
 Warburton to think the work de Officiis to be 
 the one which "bids the fairest of any to be 
 spoken from the heart.'' It is a better reason than 
 Lord Brougham has given ; and, I venture to pre- 
 dict, will be received without a dissentient voice. 
 Cicero wrote the treatise de officiis for 
 
 THE INSTRUCTION OF HIS OWN SON To the 
 
 passage from the Somnium Scipiwiis^ subsequently 
 quoted by theNoble Author— "Omnibus qui patriam 
 eonservarint, adjuverint, auxerint, certum esse in 
 coelo definitum locum ubi beati aevo sempiterno 
 fruantur"— similar passages might be added, from 
 
 * De Officiis, iii. 28. The reader will find this reasoning of the 
 ancients very ably discussed by Warburton, Divine Legation, iii. 4. 
 Let me here observe that Bentley, who attributes to Cicero an Aca- 
 demic belief in a future state, thinks " the books, De Officiis, Tuscu- 
 hina, De Amicitia, De Senectute, De Legibus,'' the most likely to 
 contain his " true sentiments." Answer to Collins, end of 2nd part. 
 
 the works of Cicero, representing the future feli- 
 city of GREAT MEN. Whether Warburton's expla- 
 nation of the existence of such passages be correct 
 I will not affirm. The difficulty is, to account 
 for them in a manner which shall not be entirely 
 at variance with the philosophical principles avowed 
 on other occasions ; those, for instance, alluded to 
 by Lord Brougham, in this last quotation from the 
 'Discourse' which will require attention: 
 
 " The main proof, however, against Cicero's belief is 
 drawn from the Epistles, where alone, says our author, 
 we can be sure of his speaking his real sentiments. Yet 
 never did proof more completely fail. Writing to Tor- 
 quatus, he says, * Ncc enim dum ero, angar uUa re, cum 
 omni vacem culpa — et si non ero, sensA omnino carebo', 
 (VI. 41) ; and to Toranius, ' Una ratio videtur, quicquid 
 evenerit, ferre moderate: praesertim cum omnium rerum 
 mors sit extremum.' (vi. 21.) And this, which really means 
 nothing more than a common remark on death ending all 
 our pains and troubles, the learned author calls ' professing 
 his disbelief in a future state of retribution in the frankest 
 manner'. Div. Leg. iii. 3." (p. 295.) 
 
 Now, the Noble Author having first stated 
 that Warburton's " main proof is drawn from 
 the Epistles", and having then proceeded to par- 
 ticulars, the natural inference is, that the whole 
 of tlie proof — or, at the least, the principal part 
 of it — is given. His Lordship, liowevcr, has con- 
 
11 
 
 ij 
 
 I 
 
 t 
 i 
 
 If 
 
 356 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 tented himself with a selection ; and, as it ap- 
 pears to me, not without an eye to the maxim 
 of Horace — 
 
 Et quae 
 
 Desperat tractata nitescere posse relinquit. 
 
 The first passage adduced by Warburton, and left 
 by Lord Brougham without notice, is from an 
 epistle to L. Mescinius : " Sed ut ilia secunda 
 moderate tulimus, sic banc non solum adversam, 
 sed funditus eversam fortunam fortiter ferre debe- 
 mus ; ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni conse- 
 quamur, ut mortem, quam etiam beati contem- 
 nere debeamus, propterea quod milium sensum 
 esset habitura, nunc sic affecti non modo contem- 
 nere debeamus, sed etiam optare.*" Now if, in 
 this passage, Cicero has not expressed his belief, 
 that the consciousness of good and evil is termi- 
 nated by death, I am at a loss to imagine in what 
 manner that belief could have been expressed, in 
 
 the Latin language The next passage is that, 
 
 from the epistle to Torquatus, given by Lord 
 Brougham — "Nee enim dum ero, angar ulla re, 
 cum omni vacem culpa — et si non ero, sensu omnino 
 careho r the import of which Warburton illus- 
 trated, by adducing the similar language of the 
 Epicureans, from Lucretius: 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 357 
 
 "Scilicet baud nobis quidquam, qui non erimus turn, 
 Accidere omnino poterit sensumque raovere." 
 
 From another epistle to Torquatus, Warburton 
 quotes what Lord Brougham has not quoted: 
 "Deinde, quod mihi ad consolationem commune 
 tecum est, si jam vocer ad exitum vitse, non ab 
 ea republica aveller, qua carendum esse doleam, 
 presertim cum id sine ullo sensu futurum sit." And 
 then finally appears the passage indicating that 
 death is " omnium rerum extremum.'" So that 
 many proofs might be mentioned which "more 
 completely fair** than the proof here drawn out 
 by the author of the Divine Legation. For the 
 purpose of more distinctly perceiving the effect of 
 such declarations, expressed under such circum- 
 stances, in deciding the character of the writer, 
 let us consider what would be our feelings if it 
 should appear that our own Locke, for instance — 
 or our own Johnson — had, in their confidential 
 letters, avowed the same Ciceronian views of 
 human destiny. Could we any longer place re- 
 liance upon that regard for a life to come, which 
 is manifested in their published works.? Are we 
 not, indeed, the more strongly affected by the 
 religious tendency of their writings, because we 
 
 -^\ 
 
358 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 know that they really have availed themselves of 
 the unreserved intercourse of friendship, to impress 
 the very sentiments they have enforced as the in- 
 structors of the world ? How striking is the lan- 
 guage of Locke, in the Letter written, to be de- 
 livered after his own decease, to his friend, Collins : 
 "I know you loved me living, and will preserve 
 my memory now I am dead. All the use to be 
 made of it is, that this life is a scene of vanity, 
 that soon passes away ; and affords no sofid satis- 
 faction, but in the consciousness of doing well, and 
 in the hopes of another life. This is what I can 
 say, upon experience ; and what you will find to 
 be true, when you come to make up the account." 
 Let it not, however, be supposed that I would 
 measure the faith of Cicero and of Locke, as to 
 a future state, by the same standard. My only 
 wish is that every thing, appertaining to the 
 subject under review, should be fairly estimated. 
 Passages, indicating a persuasion that death brings 
 with it a total and eternal extinction of conscious- 
 ness, have been produced from the familiar letters 
 of the great Roman Orator. Now, the most 
 effectual method of averting the conclusion, to 
 which that circumstance naturally leads, would be 
 
 WARS UR TON. 
 
 S59 
 
 the production of passages of a different character, 
 from the Epistles. That passages, from the Epis- 
 tles, expressing hopes as to the future, cannot be 
 cited, I will not assert — not having gone through 
 them, for the purpose of ascertaining the point; 
 but there is to myself a strong presumption 
 against the existence of such passages, arising 
 from the recollection that Dr Middleton — with 
 all his zeal, and it was great, to establish the 
 opinion of Cicero's belief— has not availed himself 
 of a single passage from the Epistles. Dr Mid- 
 dleton seems reluctantly to admit that Warbur- 
 ton's quotations relate to an utter extinction of 
 our being; and entreats his readers to bear in 
 mind that Cicero was an Academic — that he might 
 probably be writing to Epicureans — or that he 
 might be stating the impression of a melam^clwly 
 hmr,^ But, as I have already observed, a more 
 convincing argument would have been, that, when 
 writing to those who were not Epicureans, or when 
 writing altogether under happier auspices, he had 
 adopted a loftier jstrain of sentiment. I should be 
 glad to see the case of Cicero in a more favourable 
 Lght than is permitted by the facts by which it is 
 
 * Middleton's Life of Cicero, Vol. ir. p. 561. 4to 1741. 
 
N^ 
 
 360 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 'r 
 
 :' : 
 
 
 i 
 
 W 
 
 encompassed. My own notion is, that there was 
 something, in the nature and genius of the old 
 philosophy, which withdrew the minds of its ad- 
 herents from those simpler considerations which 
 would have led them to the truth. 
 
 Enough, I trust, has now been adduced — as 
 well with regard to what Lord Brougham has 
 called Bishop Warburton's "grand paradox,"" as 
 to "the minor paradox'' concerning "the real 
 opinions of the ancients" — to show that the great 
 prelate had far stronger grounds, for his opinions, 
 than His Lordship appears to have suspected. I 
 cannot, however, take leave of the subject, with- 
 out recommending to the Noble Author's atten- 
 tion — ^if he should do me the honour to glance 
 his eye over these pages — a short treatise on 
 the opinions of the ancients, respecting the Deity, 
 human duty and a future life, by a Bishop, of 
 the English Church, still living— and, if I mis- 
 take not, one of His Lordship's most intimate 
 friends — I mean, Dr Maltby, the present Bishop 
 of Durham. The treatise in question will be 
 found in that learned person's ' Illustrations of the 
 truth of the Christian Religion.' It is, in fact, 
 a Thesis maintained in the Divinity Schools of 
 
 -■^■i^Si 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 361 
 
 this University, as an exercise for the degree of 
 Bachelor of Divinity. In that Thesis, Lord 
 Brougham will find precisely the same views, of 
 "the opinions of the ancients," as those which 
 pervade the Divine Legation— presented too in 
 the purest Latinity. It would be an injury to 
 the reader not to extract a few sentences. 
 
 " Scite et composite, dum in exercitatione umbratili 
 
 versabatur, Cicero de h^c qu£Bstione [sc. de animi immor- 
 
 talitate] diseruit. At vero, cum ad verum el ventum est, 
 
 languescere ccepit et infringi, qualiscunque demum esset, 
 
 ejus persuasio. — Nullum el attulit doloris levamentum, 
 
 nullum aegritudinis remedium, nullum contra mortis ti- 
 
 morem solatium. TuUiola ilia tantopere amata cum ei 
 
 erepta esset, neque in patris mcestissimi, neque in amici, 
 
 qui eum consolabatur, argumentis locus est datus ei 
 
 opinioni, quae mortem statuit, *non interitum esse omnia 
 
 toUentem atque delentem, sed quandam quasi migratio- 
 
 nem commutationemque vitao.' Nee in oratione cor^m 
 
 populo habita, Cicero ipse, quae viri inconstantia fuit, null^ 
 
 omnind poena apud inferos sceleratissimum hominem affici 
 
 contendit .... Verba haec a sapientissimorum virorum sen- 
 
 tentiis minime fuerunt aliena. Fuit enim plerisque eorum 
 
 persuasissimum, animam, etsi post mortem durasset, nuUis 
 
 esse suppliciis obnoxiam : omnia ea quae de Oreo diceren- 
 
 tur, poetarum esse portenta ad plebeculam minaciter et 
 
 inaniter terrendam aptissima : Deos, si qui essent, ab ira 
 
 esse vacuos; — homines igitur, si revivescerent, omnino 
 
 omnes futures esse felices."* 
 
 * Illustrations, &c., pp. 396—398. ed. 1802. 
 
 A A 
 
362 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 mi 
 
 Those sentiments, therefore, of the author of 
 the Divine Legation, which, in Lord Brougham's 
 judgement, could be entertained only by a man 
 who, having, with "preposterous and perverted 
 ingenuity,'' discovered one paradox in the Law of 
 Moses, went forth into the regions of ancient 
 philosophy, resolved to find another paradox to 
 uphold the first — those very sentiments have 
 been publicly avowed and defended by a person- 
 age still living amongst us — of the greatest 
 eminence for learning — not because he had any 
 hypothesis to support, but simply because he 
 believed them to express the truth of the case. 
 
 In the preceding edition of this work, I devoted 
 a vacant page to a few general observations on 
 Lord Brougham's Discourse; and I feel gratified 
 by the knowledge that they have given pleasure 
 to many of His Lordship's friends. They might 
 easily be extended; but I think it better to re- 
 print them in their original form — stating only 
 that my views of the subject have undergone no 
 change. 
 
 WARBURTON. 
 
 363 
 
 Lord Brougham's great object appears to have 
 been, to give stability to Natural Theology, by 
 connecting it with such departments of human 
 knowledge as are the most remarkable for truth 
 and certainty. In the attainment of that object. 
 His Lordship has, in numerous instances, mani- 
 fested those extraordinary powers, by which he 
 is distinguished. While, indeed, the leading prin- 
 ciples of his volume are generally entitled to 
 commendation, their developement and application 
 too often call for animadversion. That, in the 
 preceding pages, many serious mistakes — some of 
 them highly injurious to the characters of de- 
 servedly-celebrated individuals— have been pointed 
 out,, is beyond controversy. Yet it must be con- 
 sidered, that Natural Theology, as viewed by 
 Lord Brougham, is a science of vast extent; and 
 that, in discussing such a subject, no talents, 
 however splendid, can supply the place of long- 
 continued study and reflection. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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