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AUTHOR: 
 
 TAYLOR, ISAAC 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 PLACE: 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 DA TE : 
 
 1851 
 
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 Beshle t/w main topic, this book also treats of 
 Subject No. On page \ Subject No. On page 
 

 ELEMENTS OF TirOUGH[Ei 
 
 / , 
 
 v: 
 
 OR, 
 
 CONCISE EXPLANATIONS 
 
 or THB 
 
 PRINCIPAL TERMS EMPLOYED IN THE SEVERAL BRANCHES 
 
 or 
 
 INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ; 
 
 ISAAC TAYLOUr ] 
 
 Nee mauuB mulu, noc intt^llerl 
 Sibi pcrmissits, mullum vjtlet. 
 
 J\ 
 
 
 ■'r 
 
 T9 » ■i'MI^, 
 
 SECOND AMER 
 
 I C A N ^ ..^ 
 
 V.li> 
 
 «1^ 
 
 ^ 1^ <* 
 
 FROM THE NINTH LONDON EDITION. 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 WILLIAM GOWANS 
 
 1851. 
 
 \ ,^V.^.**>-"^>^'^'*'*' 
 
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 ' ■'/ 
 
 rREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 R. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER AND STEREOTVPER, 
 112 FULTON STREET. 
 
 The design of this volume is to impart, in ci familiar form, 
 elementory explanations and instructions on subjects connected 
 with the intellectual faculties; to afford gradual and easy 
 exercises to the powers of abstraction ; and thus to conduct 
 the young reader, by an accessible path, into that region of 
 thought where the mind acquires force, accuracy, and com- 
 prehension. 
 
 A writer who invites the attention of young persons to 
 subjects which demand a continued effort of thought, is 
 tempted to win that attention by some promise of amuse- 
 ment; or to profess that he has the art of communicating 
 knowledge without the cost of labor on the part of those who 
 receive it. No such promise or profession can be offered in 
 the present instance. The author believes that when the 
 object intended is to give tone and vigor to the understanding 
 by exertion, trivial digressions and gaieties of style should be 
 avoided. Relaxation from efforts of attention is perhaps 
 always better provided for away from books than in them ; or 
 at least it should be entirely disjoined from serious studies. 
 
 The writer, therefore, does not treat his young readers as 
 children, who must be allured by the promise of entertain- 
 ment to advance in the course of mental improvement, and 
 to whom knowledge must be administered, like a nauseous 
 drug concealed in a sweetmeat. On the coiitrarv, he boldly 
 claims their undiverted attention ; he invites them to THijsK, 
 
 15112 
 
m^ 
 
 . ^ I i» ■ — 1 « I > 1 1 »'^<«*« 
 
 IV 
 
 PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 and suggests no inducements besides the proper pleasures and 
 advantages of intellectual cultivation. He has indeed endea- 
 vored to make this introduction to the study of the raind as 
 familiar and intelligible as possible, and has presumed upon 
 no higher quali6cations in his young reader than an ordinary 
 measure of intelligence — a moderate proOcieucy in the several 
 branches of education, together with a deliberate and efficient 
 desire for the improvement of the mind. 
 
 In explanation of the form into which these elementary 
 instructions are thrown, it may be proper to say, that the 
 writer has been guided by the opinion that comprehensive 
 and systematical books are little adapted to the purpose of 
 initiation in studies of the kind to which this volume relates. 
 A treatise on any branch of intellectual philosophy, if it be 
 complete and Sf/stcmaticalj must include many topics which 
 no simplicity or perspicuity of stylo can render easily compre- 
 hensible. One portion of the book may l>c readily under- 
 stood, while another portion, though not h.vss lucid in ius style, 
 may baffle the etl'urts of the unexercised fieulties; and thus 
 perhaps may occasion to the youthful reader tinal discourage- 
 ment and disgust. The writer, therefore, has not aimed to 
 compose regular elements either of Metiiphysics or of Logic, 
 believing that the fii*st book whieh is put into the hands of 
 a young person with the view of inviting his attention to 
 objects purely intellectual, should be rather select than com- 
 preh<^nsive in its topics. 
 
 r 
 
 LIBHARV ; 
 
 mxT.-h mdm> fh,jt**- V -* 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 TO THE NINTH EDITION 
 
 In sending this little volume again to the press, after the 
 lapse of several years, the author has been induced to rewrite 
 it; and although he Las retained portions of the original 
 work, has superseded more, and has thrown the whole into a 
 new form. 
 
 The volume is now offered to the public, first, as 
 
 A BOOK OF REFERENCE, 
 
 to which recourse may be had by those who are not fully and 
 familiarly conversant with Intellectual IMiilosophy, when 
 explanation is needed of those abstract and scientific words 
 which occur in the course of reading the best authors, and 
 which find a place, more or less frequently, in the conversation 
 of the educated classes. It is especially with a view to facili- 
 tate this use of the book, that the articles have been placed 
 in alphabetic order. 
 
 The author has, furthermore, borne in view the advantage 
 of those, who, although neither their tastes nor their oppor- 
 tunities may admit of their engaging in the study of Intel- 
 lectual Philosophy, or of their perusing larger works, would 
 
VI 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 A 
 
 TO THE NINTH EDITION. 
 
 VJl 
 
 gladly acquire some general knowledge of these subjects, 
 such as should be at once correct, precise, and easily retained. 
 The author is not aware that any modern work, except his 
 own, is to be met with adapted to the use of the class of 
 readers he is now speaking of; and ho has especially endea- 
 vored to suit his style to the range of such persons. The 
 method he recommeds them to pursue, in availing themselves 
 of his labors, is, after perusing the preliminary synthetical 
 explanation of terms, to read each article of the vocabulary in 
 the order in which it occurs in the synthesis ; by which means 
 the whole will present itself as a connected system (though 
 brief indeed) of the three principal branches of Intellectual 
 Study, and so form a compendious 
 
 SUMMARY OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 
 
 There is yet another, and a very important purpose to 
 which the author would fain believe his little volume may be 
 found applicable ; he means that of catechetical instruction 
 in schools on these subjects, indispensable as they are to 
 a good education. The book is therefore explicitly offered 
 to Tutors and Teachers as 
 
 A CLASS BOOK OF PUILOSOrUIC THEMES ; 
 
 and without presuming to dictate to those whose experience 
 in the arduous business of education qualifies them to select 
 the most eflicient and practicable methods of instruction, the 
 author suggests, that each pupil, having first been directed in 
 what way to avail himself of the prefixed synthesis of terms, 
 as a means of bringing together the several articles that are 
 naturally related one to the other, should then (the books 
 being laid aside) express, in writing, his sense of each article, 
 and that, after a short interval, the class should be ques- 
 tioned on the chief points of the three branches of Intellectual 
 
 Science ; as, for example, the Teacher asks for a definition of 
 MIND, as distinguished from matter ; he next inquires what 
 correspondence mind has with matter, and by what means, 
 namely, the senses for perception, and the nervous muscular 
 system for the exertion of its innate power of resisting and 
 moving matter. He goes on to interrogate on the difference 
 of those several states of the mind which connect it with the 
 external world ; and in doing so will find it easy to render 
 the subject at once intelligible and attractive by illustrations 
 1^ readily drawn from familiar experience, or from the regions 
 of poetry. 
 
 A single branch of any of these subjects may be quite 
 ^M enough to fill the portion of time allotted to the exercise ; or 
 the rule might be to assume the words belonging to one 
 paragraph of the synthesis as the materials of each catecheti- 
 cal lecture. Thus, for instance, the terms of physical science 
 (page 12) would be explained on one occasion, those belong- 
 ing to the proof of historical facts (pages 12 and 13) on 
 another ; and again the phrases of argumentation at a differ- 
 ent time. 
 
 The author will only subjoin a hint to the Teacher on the 
 importance of imparting to the pupil, and of maintaining in 
 his own mind, a clear conception of the essential independ- 
 ency and dissimilarity of those three branches of study, 
 namely — the science of the mind, or its Physiology— Meta- 
 phyics, or the philosophy of abstraction — and Logic, or the 
 science and art of acquiring and communicating knowledge ; 
 since from confounding these subjects, not only does the mind 
 lose itself in endless obscurities, but is liable to practical 
 mistakes, in matters of opinion, which are easily avoided if 
 the distinction be kept in view. 
 
 Without attributing a paramount importance to the culti- 
 vation of Intellectual Science— physical or abstract— it may 
 
T 
 
 Vlll ADVERTISEMENT TO THE NINTH EDITION. 
 
 fairly be affirmed, that a well conducted and early initiation 
 in this branch of philosophy secures a mental advantage of 
 great practical value ; and which, if it were generally possessed, 
 would go far in accelerating the universal diffusion of the 
 highest Truths. 
 
 November, 1833. 
 
 I » 
 
 SYNTHESIS, 
 
 OR 
 
 SYSTEMATIC VIEW OF THE TERMS EXPLAINED 
 
 IN THIS VOLUME. 
 
 The terms employed in the several departments 
 of abstract and mental science are readily 
 separable into Three Classes : — 
 
 The First Class, containing those which 
 belong to the Physiology of the human Mind ; 
 and which designate its several faculties, and 
 modes of feeling, and acting ; such, for example, 
 as sensation^ emotion, itnagination, Sfc, 
 
 The Second Class comprehends those terms 
 which represent purely abstract notions, such as 
 essence, extension, space, power, substance, mode, 
 &c., and which belong to Metaphysics. 
 
 The Third Class are those that express the 
 operations of the Mind, its methods, and its 
 artificial processes, in acquiring and in com- 
 municating knowledge. These terms belong 
 to Logic. 
 
 I 
 
ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 We have therefore before us — 
 1st. Mental Philosophy, which treats of the 
 nature of the Mind ; 
 
 2d. Metaphysics, or the science of Abstrac- 
 tion ; 
 
 3d. Logic, or the method of gaining know- 
 ledge for ourselves, and of conveying it to 
 others. 
 
 CLASS L 
 
 TERMS BELONGING TO THE PHYSIOLOGY OF 
 
 THE MIND. 
 
 The Mind is that which feels, and knows, 
 and thinks ; or which is conscious of existence ; 
 and is distinguished from Matter, which 
 affects the mind through the senses; and is 
 moved by the voluntary effort of the mind, 
 exerted through the muscles. 
 
 That Consciousness of existence which 
 belongs to the mind, and which extends with- 
 out interruption from one period of life to 
 another, imparts the notion and conviction of 
 personal Identity. 
 
 The human Mind is distinguished from the 
 brute mind, not only by the greater extent of 
 its faculties, and especially of the faculty of 
 
 — ■ t-^^ a^ ^^ i r^ ^t < kJ fc j « 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 3 
 
 abstraction ; but by its being guided, in almost 
 all its operations, by its • knowledge of the 
 connexion of cause and effect : whereas, 
 animals are more often guided by an unknown 
 influence, called Instinct, than by any calcula- 
 tion of means, as conducing to an end ; or by 
 a knowledge of consequences. The words 
 Reason and Instinct are used to express this 
 important difference between man and animals. 
 Whenever the state of the mind is changed by 
 some cause exterior to itself it is said to be the 
 subject of an Impression. 
 
 The Mind is conscious of impressions from 
 the external world through the organs of sight, 
 hearing, taste, smell, and touch : changes in its 
 feehngs, so produced, are called Sensations; 
 and when two or more sensations, coming from 
 the same object, through different senses, lead 
 the Mind to think of that object as an external 
 cause of its feelings, it is said to perceive, or to 
 have a Perception. The recalling of a former 
 perception, or sensation, is Conception. The 
 mental image, so recalled, is an Idea ; and is 
 distinguished from a Notion, which is a 
 thought, purely mental or abstract. 
 
 Independently of any act or effort of the 
 mind, there is incessantly going on within it a 
 Succession of Ideas or emotions ; and these 
 
fl 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ideas follow each other in consequence of some 
 circumstance of real connexion, or of accidental 
 relationship. This is called the Association 
 OF Ideas. In other words, there is a something 
 in each thought which brings some other before 
 the mind ; this is Suggestion. When former 
 perceptions or emotions recur to the mind, 
 attended bj circumstances of time and place, 
 we are said to remember ; and the power of 
 remembering is Memory. 
 
 The power which the mind possesses, not 
 only of recalling ideas, or of having conceptions, 
 but of separating such conceptions, and of 
 recomposing them in new modes, is Imagina- 
 tion. 
 
 Besides impressions from the external world, 
 received through the senses, the mind is liable 
 to feelings which arise from the several organs 
 and functions of the body, such as its Appetites, 
 and other corporeal sensations. It is moreover 
 subject to states of feeling which, though 
 belonging to the Mind, never take place with- 
 out, at the same time, affecting the body, either 
 in a gentler or a more violent degree : these 
 feeUngs are called Emotions; such as love, 
 hatred, fear, wonder, &^c. 
 
 When the Mind acts in bringing together, 
 comparing, or separating its ideas, or notions, 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 5 
 
 it exerts its Intellectual powers. The 
 emotion or desire to know, which is the imme- 
 diate cause of this exertion, produces a con- 
 tinuance of certain ideas or notions in the mind, 
 longer than they would continue in the ordinary 
 course of the succession of ideas. This act, 
 producing continued thought, is Attention. 
 
 If two or more objects or ideas are compared, 
 and the relation between them is instantly 
 perceived, the Mind is said to know by Intui- 
 tion. When, either by such intuition, or by 
 continued attention, the relation between two 
 ideas is perceived, we are said to Apprehend. 
 
 Single properties, or sensible qualities of 
 bodies, or the parts of complex notions, are 
 thought of separately and apart from all other 
 properties, by the power of Abstraction. This 
 power is the principal distinction of the human 
 Mind. The power of considering the qualities 
 of things apart, leads to the process of com- 
 bining them in new forms, called Invention. 
 - Two or more objects or notions are detained 
 before the Mind, and are compared the one 
 with the other, and their agreement, or disa- 
 greement, or relative proportion, is ascertained 
 by the faculty of Judgment. 
 
 Reasoning, is the bringing together a series 
 of things, or notions, which are found to be 
 
am 
 
 h 
 
 >li 
 
 m0^^^^^*^^^^k^^i^^»<%^»^^^^'> 
 
 6 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 successively dependent one upon the other, or 
 between which there exists a real connexion. 
 
 The principal states and operations of the 
 human Mind, considered in the simplest form, 
 and apart from all the diversities, and peculiari- 
 ties, and accidents to which, in individual cases, 
 it is liable, are designated by the above-named 
 terms. 
 
 CLASS II. 
 
 ABSTRACT OF METAPHYSICAL TERMS. 
 
 The notions which are the subject of the 
 science called Metaphysics, all result from the 
 faculty of Abstraction ; as, for example, when 
 various objects are perceived, and compared, 
 which agree in form, we think of for7n apart 
 from colour, hardness, Sfc., and then think of the 
 several sorts of form, or figure ; as round, 
 square, Sfc, And in the same way the notions 
 of the mind are separated, and compared, and 
 analysed, and combined. These abstract 
 notions, as they are less instantly intelligible, or 
 less readily compared than sensible images, are 
 often called Abstruse. 
 
 From our own consciousness, after separating 
 from it all idea or recollection of particular states, 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 or emotions, we derive the simple abstract notion 
 of Existence ; otherwise called Being. 
 
 All the sensible and inseparable properties of 
 anything, thought of together, constitute its 
 Nature, or Essence ; and we think of this 
 nature, as containing a hidden something, called 
 Substance; which supports or sustains, first, 
 its Primary qualities, or those essential to it ; 
 and then its Secondary qualities, which are 
 imagined to be separable. 
 
 These qualities are the Modes, or Affec- 
 tions, or Attributes, or Adjuncts, or Acci- 
 dents, of the substance in which they are found. 
 The entire collection of properties belonging 
 to a substance forms the Aggregate. The 
 qualities spoken of as so associated are Con- 
 crete ; and a being, or a notion, consisting of 
 parts or qualities that may be abstracted (in idea) 
 one from the other, is Complex. 
 
 The thinking of two things or notions 
 together, comparing the one with the other, gives 
 the notion of Relation ; which may be the 
 relation of Agreement, or of Difference, or of 
 Proportion, or of Power. 
 
 The thought of a quality as present, or as 
 removed, and absent, suggests the relative notions 
 of Positive and Negative modes. 
 
 The acquaintance which the mind gains with 
 
8 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 matter, by its own sensations, leads it to form 
 a notion from which all particular forms, colors, 
 and other variable qualities, are withdrawn, and 
 which we call Extension. Removing again 
 from this notion all idea of the sensible proper- 
 ties of matter, we acquire the simple abstract 
 notion of Space. By a similar process our 
 general consciousness of continued existence, 
 apart from particular events, suggests the notion 
 of Duration. Extension or duration, without 
 limit, is Infinite. 
 
 The consciousness which the Mind has of 
 Its ability to control its own states, and to move 
 the body, gives the notion of Power Whatever 
 possesses, or is supposed to possess Power, is 
 called Active: that which is acted upon is 
 Passive. That which exerts Power, or which 
 by a natural prejudice, is thought to exert 
 power, is a cause ; and the change produced is 
 an Effect. Cause and Effect, thought of as 
 simply connected in time, are called Antece- 
 dent, and consequent. Where a similar order 
 of causes is supposed to exist in different classes 
 of beings, the resemblance or sameness is ex- 
 pressed by the word Analogy. 
 
 Power, operating without restraint,is Liberty. 
 The existence of restraint ; or, as sometimes, the 
 infallible connexion of causes and effects, is 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 9 
 
 called Necessity, and is opposed to Contin- 
 gency; which means the absence of any real 
 or settled connexion of causes and effects. 
 
 When the established order of causes and 
 effects is calculated upon, and causes are put in 
 operation with an express view to obtain the 
 effects they will produce, this intelligent exercise 
 of power is Design. Supposed connexions of 
 cause and effect, thought of as contradictory, or 
 absurd ; or not so, give the notions of Possi- 
 bility, and Impossibility. An effect which 
 will not take place, unless a certain cause is 
 assumed as present, is Conditional. 
 
 This synthesis of abstract terms might be 
 enlarged, almost without end; but it is here 
 purposely confined to the few which are either 
 of principal importance, or which most frequently 
 occur in metaphysical discussions. 
 
 CLASS III. 
 
 logical terms. 
 
 Truths which are not intuitively perceived, 
 must be ascertained by successive efforts of the 
 mind : or when ascertained, must be communi- 
 cated to others in successive portions. These 
 methods of thinking and of discoursing, together 
 
 1* 
 
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 ^k^Mmmmm mi^^m^0,»^m m m i »^^ »^^ m^^^^^^m.^ m. ^.^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ ..y^j^^m. ^ .^^^^gyj ^ ^ 
 
 10 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 11 
 
 with the states of the mind in relation to the 
 subjects of its knowledge, are designated by the 
 following terms, which may be arranged under 
 four heads: — 1st. Those which belong to the 
 separation and sorting of ideas or notions. 2d. 
 Those that relate to the discovery of the laws 
 of nature, and belong to physical science. 3d. 
 The terms that are connected with the proof of 
 historical facts. 4th. The terms of reasoning 
 by the statement of successive propositions. 
 
 1st. Terms of separation and sorting, and 
 which belong in part to the discovery, but more 
 to the conveyance and preservation of know- 
 ledge. 
 
 Generally, any placing of multifarious things 
 in sets or in series, for the ease of the mind in 
 thinking, or in learning, is Method; of which 
 Order is either the means, or the end, according 
 to the sense in which that word is understood. 
 The least artificial kind of method is that of 
 mere Division ; which reduces many to a few 
 parcels. But if many things are sorted with 
 some reference (more or less accurate) to their 
 real differences, then the sorting is called an 
 Arrangememt (in reference to things) ; or a 
 Disposition (in reference to thoughts). After 
 an arrangement has been planned, the things for 
 
 t 
 
 II 
 
 which it is intended are assigned to their places 
 by Distribution. 
 
 A more exact or philosophical sorting of 
 things or notions, is effected, Jirst by an effort 
 of abstraction which, when completed, in relation 
 to a complex body or notion, is an Analysis. 
 After an analysis has been completed the parts 
 or qualities which have been taken asunder, 
 may be re-composed • this is Synthesis. 
 
 When organized bodies (especially) which in 
 some things are alike, and in some unlike, are 
 sorted according to their resemblances and 
 differences, the process is Classification. The 
 larger sets or sorts are genera; and the smaller 
 species. Words representing many individuals 
 sorted together, are common terms. A question 
 concerning the objects of common terms, gave 
 rise to the distinction of Nominal and Real. 
 
 A Definition is the naming of the larger 
 sort, or genus, to which any thing belongs; and 
 then of that Difference which is the Distinc- 
 tion, between it, and others of the same genus. 
 To mention more differences than is essential 
 to a Definition, is to give a Description. 
 
 2d. The principal terms employed in relation 
 to the discovery of the laws of nature, or the 
 terms of physical science, are these :— 
 
12 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 13 
 
 Any natural fact or event, considered as an 
 object of philosophical curiosity, is a Pheno- 
 menon ; or facts known, and which are to be 
 explained, are Data. The supposition formed 
 concerning the cause of a phenomenon, is an 
 Hypothesis. A complete set or system of such 
 suppositions, is a Theory. A trial made for 
 the purpose of discovering the cause of an effect, 
 and which is guided by some hypothesis, is an 
 Experiment. The inferring of general facts, 
 or the laws of nature, from many particular facts, 
 is Induction ; and the expressing or sorting of 
 such laws is Generalization. General and 
 well-established truths, in matters of natural phi- 
 losophy, are Science. Special truths, applied 
 to human industry, constitute an Art. 
 
 3d. The terms belonging to the proof of his- 
 torical or particular facts, are these : 
 
 The subject of enquiry is— a Fact, or actual 
 event, not known to us by personal observation. 
 In support of the affirmation that such an event 
 has taken place, we seek for Evidence, which 
 may be either human Testimony, or other facts, 
 whence an inference may be drawn, bearing 
 upon the matter in question. If this evidence 
 is conclusive, it produces Belief: or if insuffi- 
 cient, Doubt : and then the fact has attached 
 
 to it, in our minds, the idea of Probability, or 
 the reverse.. 
 
 If the matter in question be rather an abstract 
 principle, than a matter of historical fact, it is 
 established by Argument ; or if susceptible of 
 absolute proof, by Demonstration. The con- 
 viction produced by good argument is Opinion : 
 or if that conviction be influenced by improper 
 motives, it is Prejudice. A deceptive or un- 
 sound argument, is a Fallacy ; and if employed 
 for the purpose of deluding those to whom it is 
 addressed, it is a Sophism. 
 
 4th. The terms employed in establishing a 
 truth by the real connexion of a series of propo- 
 sitions, or Reasoning, are these : — 
 
 That which is the object of the process is 
 Truth. Truths when so evident as to be in- 
 capable of being made more so, are Axioms. 
 Axioms from which many inferences are to be 
 derived, are Principles. All reasoning is carried 
 on by the means of words, or other arbitrary 
 
 Signs. 
 
 ^ne thing affirmed or denied, concerning 
 
 mother, is a Proposition. The words express- 
 ng these two things aud their connexion, are 
 he Terms. Terms which may be exchanged, 
 •ne for another, without destroying the truth 
 
^^^■■^■''^^^^^^^^f^^M 
 
 14 
 
 «* ^<fS^it^^,m^^i„^t^^m 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 "^'•■^■■-■■^■^^■■~— - , — — -)j — - _f 
 
 of an affirmation, are Convertible. Terms 
 which inipli/, one the other, are Correlative. 
 
 A positive and unconditional proposition is 
 Categorical. A proposition which offers for 
 choice one affirmation of two, is a Dilemma. 
 Propositions are either Affirmative, or Nega- 
 tive ; Indefinite, Disjunctive, or Universal. 
 
 The thing concerning wbich an affirmation 
 or negation is made, is the Subject of a propo- 
 sition. The thing affirmed is the Predicate. 
 
 The connecting of propositions, for the pur- 
 pose of exhibiting the relation which subsists 
 between them, is a Syllogism ; in which the 
 facts granted are called the premises; the fact 
 inferred — the Conclusion; or the three con- 
 nected propositions, are called the Major, 
 Minor, and Middle terms. 
 
 lil 
 
 VOCABULARY, &c. 
 
 abstraction. 
 
 From Abstraho, to draw off, or to draw apart ; 
 or to separate and take away one thing from 
 among a number. 
 
 Things that differ very greatly, one from 
 another, are often found to be alike in some 
 single quality; and when this one quality is 
 distinctly taken notice of, we readily learn to 
 think of it apart from the other quahties with 
 which it may have been joined ; and thus the 
 mind acquires the habit of drmving of certain 
 properties of things, and of giving names to 
 them : tbis habit is called abstraction ; and the 
 words employed on such occasions are called 
 abstract terms. 
 
 There are, for instance, placed before us, a 
 cricket-ball, a marble, a glass bubble, an apple, 
 and an orange ; and we are asked if these things 
 are alike ; we answer, No t for the first is brown, 
 and may be indented ; the second is heavy, and 
 
Ij/: 
 
 16 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 17 
 
 K'Sp^.^Sp^^^^'^^ 
 
 impenetrable; the third is transparent, and 
 fragile, and light ; the fourth is green and pulpy ; 
 the fifth is yellow and fragrant. But is there 
 then no respect wherein they are alike 1 Yes ; 
 they are alike in shape, or form— they are 
 round. Roundness then is the quality or cir- 
 cumstance in which these five objects agree, and 
 which may be thought of, and spoken of, apart 
 from the tceight, hardness, color, or smell, of 
 these five things. Thus we have obtained two 
 abstract ideas — namely, that of form or figure, 
 and that of roundness; roundness being a par- 
 ticular sort of form. Examples of this kind are 
 easily multiplied ; we will take another. Water, 
 and glass, and spirits, and diamonds, admit the 
 rays of light to pass through them; so that 
 objects may be discerned almost as clearly when 
 they intervene, as when they are removed. 
 Some other bodies possess the same quality in 
 a less degree; such as amber, and the ame- 
 thyst, and the ruby, &c. We want a name for 
 this property, belonging as it does to things so 
 different as water, glass, and stones; and we 
 call it Transparency, 
 
 Each of the five senses has its class of ab- 
 stractions ; that is to say, each sense separates 
 single qualities from other qualities, discerned 
 by itself, or by other senses. The eye separates 
 
 redness from yellowness, or whiteness, &c., 
 and brightness from duhiess ; — and again sepa- 
 rates colour from figure, and it separates 
 colour and figure from the notions obtained 
 by the other senses, such as hardness, or 
 weight, or fragrancy, or fluidity. The sense of 
 taste not only distinguishes sour from sweet and 
 bitter, but separates them from the qualities 
 that are made known to the mind by the sense 
 of touch, as heat and cold, asperity and 
 softness, &c. 
 
 Thus it is that likeness, or sameness of 
 quality, in things otherwise unlike, leads the 
 mind to form abstract notions, and to use ab- 
 stract words. But having acquired this habit, 
 it employs the power of separation in many 
 other instances than those that belong to the 
 five senses : — for example. If a man restores 
 freely the property of another, which he could 
 not have been compelled to relinquish ; or if he 
 speaks the exact truth when it might have been 
 advantageous to him to utter a falsehood ; or if 
 in any way he regards the welfare of other men, 
 when he is tempted to secure his own benefit, 
 we form a notion which we separate from the 
 particular circumstances that may have belonged 
 to the man's conduct ; — we feel that there is a 
 peculiar quality, that belongs to his conduct, on 
 all these several occasions, and we call it — In- 
 
18 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 tegritj ; and the so acting is— Justice. Justice 
 is not the name of one action, or of one kind 
 of action ; but of the abstract notion which 
 belongs to any action wherein a man pays strict 
 regard to the rights and property of others. Or, 
 if, in his actions, he goes beyond what might 
 have been demanded of him ; — if he prefers the 
 welfare of his neighbour to his own ; then we 
 form the notion of another sort of quahty, and 
 call it — Generosity, or kindness. And in any 
 new instance, even if all the circumstances 
 are different, yet if a friend or stranger confers 
 upon us a benefit which he might properly have 
 withheld, we are reminded of the notion we had 
 before formed, and call the action or the person 
 generous. 
 
 Some abstract notions are simple ; that is to 
 say, they cannot be described or made known 
 otherwise than by single words, or by pointing 
 to the objects in which they are to be seen or 
 felt. Such are, redness, whiteness, heat, cold, 
 siveetness, pleasure, pain, and many others. If 
 the person to whom we would convey our mean- 
 ing has never himself perceived the quality we 
 are speaking of, we cannot impart to him our 
 idea by words : or if he does not understand 
 the word we first use, we must find some other, 
 of the same meaning; — if he does not know 
 what the word pain means, we must try the word 
 
 K^i 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 19 
 
 dolor, or some other; but if he have never felt 
 pain, the most ingenious description of it would 
 be utterly useless. 
 
 But there are abstract notions that are Com- 
 plex, or made up of two or more ideas ; and 
 may therefore be described by mentioning those 
 constituent ideas. Thus in the instances al- 
 ready mentioned, Justice may be described as 
 the paying a strict regard to the rights and in- 
 terests of others ; or the not preferring our own 
 welfare to that of others. Generosity is the 
 conferring of benefits upon others beyond what 
 they could claim. Form or figure is the rela- 
 tion to each other of the several surfaces of a 
 solid body. Distance is extension between two 
 points, divided into parts, and numbered. Place 
 is the relation betw^een one point and some other 
 points on a surface. Perfection is the existence, 
 together, of all the parts or properties that 
 are assigned to some complex body or being. 
 Design is the relation of all the parts of a com- 
 plex body to the last effect which it is intended 
 to produce. Truth is the relation of sameness 
 between things and our notions of them ; or be- 
 tween notions and thoughts, and our affirmations. 
 Liberty is the absence of restraint upon choice 
 or action. Necessity is the certain connexion 
 between cause and effect. In all such instances 
 
20 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 there is a notion conveyed by the word we em- 
 ploy which admits of being resolved into two 
 or more ideas. 
 
 Now it is peculiarly important to understand 
 the difference between simple and complex ab- 
 stract notions, because, on the one hand, much 
 time is often wasted in the vain attempt to de- 
 scribe or analyse what is simple ; and on the 
 other hand, much confusion often arises from 
 neglecting to analyse notions that complex : 
 hence it is that so many words are used in 
 argument to which the disputants attach differ- 
 ent ideas, and therefore are never able to come 
 to an agreement even when they are really of 
 the same opinion. It is a good exercise to de- 
 fine or analyse complex abstract notions. 
 
 The faculty of abstraction, conjoined with 
 the use of language, is that chiefly which dis- 
 tinguishes human nature, and raises man far 
 above all other animals. 
 
 After having thought of certain qualities apart 
 from the things in which they are found, the 
 human mind takes another step, and proceeds 
 to bring together such quahties, and to compose 
 them in new forms ; — this is Invention. 
 The same faculty enables man to think of the 
 quality, or goodness, or badness of actions, and 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 21 
 
 ^^^^-^^^^H^t^^-^tlft,^ 
 
 is therefore essential to accountableness, and 
 forms the basis of our moral nature. 
 
 Those differences of intellectual character 
 and taste which distinguish mankind individu- 
 ally, depend very much upon the faculty of 
 abstraction. One man possesses eminently the 
 power of separating color from form, and he 
 becomes a painter : another, in connexion with 
 sensibility and delicacy of tastes, readily sepa- 
 rates or draws off those qualities of things which 
 excite the imagination, and he becomes a poet : 
 another discerns and separates the mechanical 
 properties of matter, and he is an inventor of 
 machines : another discriminates mathematical 
 properties, and he addicts himself to abstract 
 science. Each department of science, and 
 each walk of active life, has its peculiar kind 
 of abstraction ; nor can a man be very success- 
 ful in any line, if nature has denied him the 
 special faculty which is demanded in that line. 
 
 What is called a natural taste for particular 
 pursuits is most commonly a peculiar power of 
 considering some one class of qualities, apart 
 from all other qualities or circumstances. It is 
 well when the choice of a profession is made 
 in conformity with the original conformation 
 of the mind. 
 
 I! 
 
22 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ABSTRUSE. 
 
 From abstrudo, to hide, or thrust out of sight. 
 This is a word of indefinite meaning, for it 
 may be applied to whatever is not readily un- 
 derstood or explained ; and that which to one 
 mind is very obscure or difficult, is to another 
 perfectly intelligible. It is a frequent inaccu- 
 racy to confound the words abstruse and abstract ; 
 or to use them as if synonymous. It is very true 
 that abstract notions or principles are often ab- 
 struse ; or, at least, may seem so to those who 
 are not conversant with subjects of that sort. 
 
 ACCIDENT. 
 
 From accido, to fall close by, or to happen. 
 When used in its philosophical sense, the term 
 accident is applied to some quality, or property, 
 or condition, which does not invariably belong 
 to the thing in which it is found, or which 
 makes no part of its essence ; as heat in iron, 
 polish to a diamond, learning to a man. 
 
 ACTIVE and PASSIVE. 
 
 Whatever produces a change in another body 
 is active : the body which undergoes the change 
 is passive. The same being may at one time 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 23 
 
 ^h^M^^^^^^^^ 
 
 be active, at another passive ; or at one and the 
 same moment may be in part active, in part 
 passive. Thus the human rnind is often at 
 once active and passive. It is passive when it 
 admits, and is influenced by impressions from 
 the senses ; or when moved by the appetites 
 and passions that belong to the animal or moral 
 constitution ; or when it is influenced through 
 the medium of language, by other minds ; and 
 also when it merely follows the current of 
 thought, and is in that state in which it may be 
 likened to a person sitting at a window, who 
 idly gazes at the crowd that passes before him. 
 This is the state of the mind in sleep ; and also 
 in what is called reverie. It is only in an im- 
 proper sense that we can be said to think, when 
 thus indolently musing. The mind acts, either 
 when it exerts its power over matter — that is, 
 over the muscles of the body ; or over itself, by 
 directing, changing, or fixing at pleasure, the 
 course of its thoughts. The possession of this 
 active power is essential to what is termed 
 moral agency, or accountableness ; without it, 
 the mind, like the minds of animals, is swayed 
 and governed by external and internal influences. 
 The same power shows itself in all those acts 
 of life by which man raises his condition above 
 
24 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 that of the brutes. Energy and dignity of 
 character bear proportion to the degree in which 
 the mind is more active than passive. 
 
 If the human mind were merely ruled, from 
 one moment to another, by its appetites and 
 passions, it would never imagine a better con- 
 dition than the one it is in, nor fix its attention 
 upon the means proper to attain an end. What 
 is called attention, is the exercise of the active 
 principle of the mind. It is usual to speak of 
 physical causes as active ; but when any series 
 of natural changes is scrutinized, it appears that 
 what at first we called a cause, is itself the 
 effect of some preceding event, which was, in 
 its turn, also an effect We come, at length, to 
 what are called the hidden powers of nature, 
 such as gravitation — chemical affinity — the prin- 
 ciple of life, and so forth ; and these, though 
 beyond human knowledge, are, probably, them- 
 selves only effects of some relation between one 
 element and another. Strictly speaking, Mind 
 is the only active principle. The movements 
 of nature are the effects of the Divine Mind. 
 The changes that take place in the world of 
 living and conscious beings, are the effects of 
 the living power which the Creator has im- 
 parted to man and animals. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 25 
 
 ADJUNCT, 
 
 From adjunctum, joined to. The words ad- 
 junct and accident are thus distinguished ; — an 
 accident is a quality or condition that may or 
 may not belong to the thing spoken of: an ad- 
 junct is a thing which may or may not be at- 
 tached to something else. The binding is an 
 adjunct of a book : the brightness of the paper, 
 and blackness of the ink, are its accidents. 
 Praise is an adjunct of virtue; celebrity, of 
 genius. Mental refinement, or taste, is an ac- 
 cident of virtue ; self-confidence, of genius. 
 
 AFFECTIOxV. 
 
 From affectus, changed or qualified by the 
 operation of some cause. The properties of 
 any body are called its affections, in distinction 
 from the matter or substance of the body, which 
 we are prone to think of as a something to 
 which its properties are attached. In trutli, we 
 are acquainted with nothing but those qualities 
 or affections, which make themselves known to 
 us through the senses ; and all the usual quali- 
 ties, taken together, are, so far as our know- 
 ledge extends — all the thing. The distinction, 
 therefore, between substance and affection, is 
 not real or important. This, and many such 
 
26 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 terms, though still occasionally employed, belong 
 to the obsolete metaphysics and logic which 
 were in fashion two centuries ago. 
 
 AFFIRMATIVE and NEGATIVE, 
 
 Are terms belonging to the art of reasoning 
 and of disputation. All discourse may be re- 
 solved into a series of propositions, each of 
 which declares or asserts that somethings or is 
 not ; may be, or may not be ; that one thing is 
 equal, or like to, unequal, or unlike to, some 
 other thing. Every verb with its nominative ; 
 or, if it be transitive, with its nominative and 
 objective cases, is an affirmative proposition ; 
 or becomes a negative one by the addition of a 
 negative particle. The altered termination 
 w^hich fixes the tense of the verb is a concise 
 way of attaching to the affirmation another 
 affirmation, which conveys the time of the 
 alleged fact. Again, the mood is a third affir- 
 mation, succinctly attached to the principal one, 
 and which declares the circumstances of possi- 
 bility, or doubt, or desire, which belong to it. 
 An adverb is another condensed proposition, 
 attached to the first. For example, — ** Alex- 
 ander might long have ruled the world." This 
 affirmation contains four distinct assertions, as, 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 27 
 
 1st, an implied negative ;— Alexander did not 
 long govern the world. 2d, An affirmative im- 
 plied ;— Alexander had the pow er of long go- 
 verning the world ;— ^. e, if he had restrained 
 his appetites and passions. 3d, An affirmation 
 of the time;— he inight have done so: viz. in 
 that distant age in which he lived. 4th, An 
 affirmative conclusion ;— If Alexander had not 
 destroyed himself, it is probable that his con- 
 quests would have remained in his possession 
 to the end of the longest term of human life. 
 
 We do not often stop to recollect how much 
 meaning is condensed within five or six words 
 by the aid of grammatical forms. If it were 
 not that these methods of compression enable 
 language to keep pace with the rapidity of 
 thought, it would be almost useless as a medium 
 of intercourse ; for the mind could not confine 
 itself to a movement so very much slower than 
 that which is natural to itself Let any one 
 attempt to listen continuously to a narrative, 
 every word of which should be spelt by the 
 speaker ; he would find it utterly impossible to 
 do so. 
 
 AGENT. 
 
 Whatever is supposed to be endowed with 
 power is called an agent. When the word is 
 
28 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 applied to physical causes — as we speak some- 
 times of chemical or mechanical agents, it is 
 understood to be used in a tropical or improper 
 sense. Strictly speaking, Minds are the only 
 agents. See Active, Power, and Cause. 
 
 AGGREGATE, 
 
 From dggrego, to gather together as a flock 
 of sheep. Things which, when collected or 
 brought into contact, form a whole in the mind 
 only, and are not susceptible of any actual com- 
 bination, may be said to form an aggregate. The 
 word is used with the strictest propriety when 
 the things or qualities so associated make up 
 some complete abstract notion. 
 
 The aggregate of qualities, acquirements, 
 natural advantages, and external recommenda- 
 tions, which are necessary to form an accom- 
 plished statesman, or a successful advocate, 
 comprise many special endowments, or faculties, 
 which would not be called for to complete the 
 character of an accomplished gentleman. We • 
 form an abstract notion of what a statesman or 
 lawyer ought to be ; and the pecuHar qualities 
 which we think of as necessary, make up the 
 aggregate of his endowments. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 29 
 
 AGREEMENT, 
 
 Is something less than absolute sameness. 
 Identity excludes every difference, even of sub- 
 stance or person. Sa?neness implies the pre- 
 sence of two or more things, which being com- 
 pared, are found to have no other difference 
 than that of substantial or personal identity. 
 Agreement may subsis't between things that are 
 alike only in one quality, or in one point of rela- 
 tionship. John yesterday, and John to-day, is 
 identically one and the same person. Two circles 
 struck with the same radius, are the same in all 
 respects, except absolute identity. Between a 
 chest of tea and a bale of raw silk, there may 
 be an agreement of exchangeable value ; that 
 is to say, the one may be purchasable by the 
 same number of pieces of money as the other. 
 
 ANALOGY ; 
 
 From avaXoyia, couformlty of reason, or causa- 
 tion. Analogy is a real or true agreement, or 
 similarity of causes. A similarity in appear- 
 ances, or in effects, or in incidental circumstances, 
 is the foundation of metaphor, allegory, emblem, 
 and rhetorical figure. Analogy addresses itself 
 to the reasoning faculty. Allegory and meta- 
 phor address the imagination. Analogy, care- 
 
''^i^*^^^^^tl0a^^l^0*0*0^l^0^0^0^ 
 
 30 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 fully pursued, may afford a solid foundation of 
 argument. Metaphors prove nothing, and are 
 useful only in the way of illustration, or embel- 
 lishment. Whenever we anticipate or predict 
 certain effects to take place, on the supposition 
 that certain causes, with which in some other 
 case we have become acquainted, are in opera- 
 tion, we reason from analogy. After it had 
 been observed that rice flourishes in the hot and 
 humid plains of Egypt, it was by reasoning 
 from analogy that it was inferred that it might 
 advantageously be cultivated in the sultry 
 swamps of Carolina. The heat of the climate 
 and the abundance of water, are presumed to 
 be the causes of the productiveness of rice ; 
 and it is inferred that an ardent sun and a 
 marshy soil will, in any country, favor the 
 growth of the same species of grain. We rea- 
 son from analogy when we suppose that the 
 stars, like the sun, are surrounded with planets, 
 which derive from them light and heat. The 
 same Divine WisdiiUi which is seen to have 
 made this admirable arrangement in one in- 
 stance, is presumed to have made it also in others. 
 When we see that every part of the earth's 
 surface, and every drop of water, is crowded 
 with animated beings, we reason from analogy 
 in supposing that the Divine Benevolence, 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 31 
 
 which has filled one spot of his universe with 
 life, has done the same in other places of his do- 
 minion. The strength of such an argument 
 from analogy consists in an implied series of 
 propositions of this sort : The Divine Wisdom 
 and Goodness display themselves around us in 
 the production of innumerable orders of sentient 
 beings. These attributes of the Divine nature 
 are unchanging and universal. They are pre- 
 sent in one system as well as in another. It is 
 therefore certain that they produce alike in all 
 systems their proper effects, unless some special 
 reason interposes to confine them. An argu- 
 ment from analogy is strong ; but not absolutely 
 conclusive, or demonst?'ative ; because, as we 
 carry our reasoning from a circle that is known 
 to us, to one that is unknown, we can never be 
 assured that there may not be, within that un- 
 known sphere, some antagonist cause at work, 
 of which, in our own sphere, we see no traces. 
 Nevertheless, an argument from analogy falls 
 very little short of demonstrative force, when 
 we reason upward from effects to causes; or 
 infer that causes must be the same^ when the 
 effects are so. As if it were found that rice 
 flourishes wherever the climate is hot, and the 
 soil humid, we might, with confidence, infer 
 
mtf 
 
 32 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 that heat and huniiditj are ia some manner the 
 causes of the productiveness of that grain. 
 
 It is an argument of this latter kind which 
 has been so successfully pursued by Bishop 
 Butler, in his Analogy of Natural and Revealed 
 Religion, wherein he shows that the same great 
 principles which take effect in the world, as we 
 see it to be constituted, prevail also in the sys- 
 tem of Christianity ; whence it maybe inferred 
 that both proceed from the same Author. Or at 
 least Christianity can never be reasonably re- 
 jected on pretence that it is irreconcileable 
 with the actual constitution of the moral sys- 
 tem, for a strict analogy subsists between the 
 two. 
 
 Errors in argument very frequently arise from 
 confounding resemblances or metaphors, with 
 analogies. Minds imperfectly cultivated, are 
 peculiarly open to this sort of mistake. The 
 beauty or appropriateness of some comparison, 
 captivates the imagination, and imposes on the 
 understanding ; and so truth is lost sight of 
 amid the illusions of poetry. Thus, for exam- 
 ple, it may be said that the mind of man is like 
 a garden, which, if neglected, will become 
 choked with rank and noxious vegetation ; but 
 which, when sedulously cultivated, produces 
 whatever is beautiful, fragrant, delicious, and 
 
 
 ♦ 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 33 
 
 useful. So far the resemblance holds good; 
 and the metaphor well serves the purpose of 
 illustration. But if a real analogy between the 
 vegetable world and the intellectual and moral 
 system were presumed to exist, many utterly 
 erroneous consequences might be drawn from 
 it : — as for instance, it might then be said that, 
 though the feeble tribes of the garden may need 
 culture, the robust and magnificent species of 
 the forest spurn the hand of art, and tower the 
 highest where they are the least interfered with : 
 — and so that the noblest natures can receive 
 no advantage from culture ! This were to argue 
 on the absurd supposition that the internal struc- 
 ture of oaks, and of human minds is the same. 
 
 ANALYSIS, 
 
 From avaXuw, to unloose or dissolve. Abstrac- 
 tion is the separation of some single quality or 
 property from all others, without giving any 
 attention to those other qualities. Analysis is 
 the separation of some compound body into its 
 several component parts, while we give equal 
 attention to all those parts or elements. Abstrac- 
 tion carries the mind from object to object, 
 wherever a certain quality can be detected. 
 Analysis fixes the mind upon a single object, 
 
 2* 
 
> m mm > 
 
 lam^^i^t^m^ 
 
 ^A^^^k^N^S^ta^^tfl^^^^^^^^l^^^^^^^^^^ 
 
 •■ — -^^■^-^'^^— — '^'-■^'^—'^—■^ — ^ "^"" i ^ u — Ln i .rinfLn_n.rij~j~i, 
 
 84 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 until all its parts have been brought to light. 
 In chemistry, analysis is the separation of all 
 the elements that may be combined in any sub- 
 stance. Thus, atmospheric air, when analysed, 
 is found to consist of two gases, and often to 
 contain some portion of others. Water is the 
 union of oxygen and hydrogen. Chemical 
 phrases express, in a concise manner, those com- 
 binations that have been discovered by analysis. 
 The notions or feehngs of the mind admit also 
 of being analysed; and to do so with absolute 
 precision, requires a peculiar excellence of the 
 intellectual faculties; an excellence which is the 
 principal ingredient in the philosophic character. 
 The power of abstraction, and the power of 
 analysis, when both possessed in an eminent 
 degree, fit the mind to pursue the higher and 
 more abstruse branches of science. 
 
 An analysis of the notions, sensations, or 
 states of the mind, demands close attention, and 
 some practise also, to effect it with absolute pre- 
 cision. An easy example or two of this sort of 
 analysis may thus be given. — We suppose there 
 to be now present to the mind the idea of a 
 country mansion, with its garden, and lawn, 
 and shrubbery. This idea, or image, or mental 
 picture, as we might call it, though made up of 
 various parts, is yet all of one kind : it is a 
 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 35 
 
 mental perception of objects which have actually 
 passed through the organ of vision. But we 
 now suppose there to be joined to this image a 
 feeling or conviction, that the image is not com- 
 pounded by the fancy; but that it corresponds 
 to a real object, and that we have seen that 
 object, at a certain past time : the image is con- 
 nected in the mind with a train of events — a 
 journey, or a visit. This conviction is expressed 
 by the word me7nory; and we say that we 
 recollect, or remember, having see such a resi- 
 dence. But beside the image, and the recollec- 
 tion of it, there is perhaps, in the mind, some 
 vivid emotion of pleasure or regret, arising from 
 circumstances that occurred at the time: we 
 there parted with a dear friend, or there enjoyed 
 the society of some distinguished persons. Now 
 these emotions of pleasure or regret, and this 
 conviction of past time, are so intimately con- 
 nected with the image of the mansion, that we 
 find it impracticable to recal or dwell upon the 
 idea without bringing up also the memory and 
 the emotion. And unless an effort of the mind 
 is made — an effort of analysis, we feel as if there 
 were but one undivided and indivisible idea or 
 remembrance present to us. Or to take an 
 instance of another sort. — The notion excited 
 in the mind by the words Prodigality and Par- 
 
36 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 simony, may at first seem to be simple and un- 
 compounded ; but not so when we ask ourselves 
 what precisely we mean by the terms. Is the 
 mere spending of a large income prodigality! 
 or is the spending of a small one parsimony? 
 no ; something more belongs to the idea. To 
 spend a large income well and liberally, is not 
 to be prodigal, but munificent. The spending 
 a small one with care and self-denial, is frugahty. 
 To be prodigal is to spend much wastefully, or 
 without reason, or utility. To be parsimonious 
 is to spend less than reason and charity demand ; 
 it is to refrain from those expenses which a 
 man's income would fully cover, and so to re- 
 frain, for the sake of accumulating money. 
 
 This sort of analysis of complex notions is 
 indispensable to accuracy of thought, and to pro- 
 priety in the use of language. 
 
 What is a straight line? What is a circle? 
 Our idea of them seems siniple, and at first we 
 may doubt whether they are capable of being 
 analysed; but we shall find that both may be 
 described, and therefore must be complex : for 
 to describe a thing is to mention its component 
 parts or elements. A line is a continued series 
 of points ; a straight line is that series which 
 makes the shortest distance between its two 
 extremes. A circle is a succession of points, all 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 equally distant from one and the same point, 
 called its centre. The analysis of complex 
 notions leads naturally to a discovery of the 
 properties and relative value of the things 
 analysed. 
 
 Those who do not possess, or who have not 
 cultivated and exercised the faculties of abstrac- 
 tion and analysis, when required to explain 
 what they mean by some word which expresses 
 a complex abstract notion, such, for example, as 
 Liberty, seek for a synonymous word, and 
 reply. Liberty is freedom ; or they find a particu- 
 lar instance, and say " a man who is not in prison 
 has liberty." But this sort of answer, though 
 sufficient on ordinary occasions, can serve no 
 purpose when exactness of thought is required, 
 as in cases of argument. It is a fault of an 
 opposite kind to busy one's self in the vain 
 attempt to analyse ^mj^Ze abstract notions, such, 
 for example, as those expressed by the words 
 space, existence, pain, pleasure, &c. Persons who 
 have more activity and subtilty than strength or 
 clearness of understanding, are prone to this 
 error; they delight in whatever is abstruse, 
 confound the obscure with the abstract; are 
 reluctant to assent to simple and perspicuous 
 propositions ; and while perpetually in search 
 of what may seem new and profound, become 
 
~ ^ i " ~ ii ~ i f j ~ ~ ~M^rt. » ^j 
 
 38 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 restless and variable in their opinions: and 
 employ themselves with infinite labour upon 
 endless and unintelligible questions. They in- 
 vent or introduce new names for common ideas; 
 and often believe themselves to have made great 
 discoveries in abstruse philosophy, which how- 
 ever none can comprehend ; or they laboriously 
 affirm and demonstrate what no one denies ; or 
 what has no meaning. 
 
 APPETITE ; 
 
 From dppeto, to desire. All those desires 
 which arise from bodily organs, and which are 
 necessary to the preservation of the animal sys- 
 tem, are called appetites ; and are usually dis- 
 tinquished from those which belong more to the 
 mind, and which are called passions or emotions. 
 In his appetites man is not greatly distinguished 
 from the inferior orders, but essentially so in his 
 passions ; for although the dog, the horse, the 
 lion, the elephant, are susceptible of anger, pride, 
 ambition, as well as of affection ; these emotions 
 are little more than transitory impulses ; but the 
 passions and affections of the human heart take 
 permanent possession of the mind, and rule the 
 character and conduct. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 APPREHENSION ; 
 
 39 
 
 From appreliendo, to take hold of. This 
 word is used when the mind fully admits the 
 ideas intended to be conveyed by a proposition ; 
 or when the terms of an argument, and their 
 relation one to another are recognized as being 
 familiar and unquestionable. Apprehension is 
 distinguished from the next act of the mind, 
 which is to form a judgment of the truth or false- 
 ness of some proposition founded upon, or 
 derived from what is known. If it were affirmed 
 that sparrows build nests of clay under the 
 eaves of houses, we should indeed at once appre- 
 hend the assertion ; all its terms are intelligible, 
 and relate to matters familiarly known; but we 
 immediately deny it to be true ; the affirmation 
 is perspicuous, but false. It is otherwise if an 
 uninformed person is told that the class ?w«w- 
 malia suckles its young ; for in this case he can 
 neitlier assent to the proposition nor deny it: 
 he does not apprehend it — the terms being un- 
 known to him. Many judgments are formed 
 on the assumption that we apprehend, or are 
 familiar with the terms, when in fact this is not 
 the case. Phrases may be familiar to the ea?^ 
 which are not so to the mind. 
 
 I 
 
40 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ARGUMENT, 
 
 Is the artificial process by which some propo- 
 sition that is open to doubt, or which may be 
 denied, is shewn, or probably shewn to be true, 
 or worthy of belief, in a higher or a lower degree. 
 A proposition that may be established beyond 
 the possibility of doubt is said to be demons- 
 trably certain. But this sort of infallible reason- 
 ing belongs to very few except mathematical 
 truths, and matters of testimony, when the evi- 
 dence is of the most satisfactory kind. A sound 
 argument consists of a number of propositions, 
 each one of which is separately true, and true 
 also in its relation to the one which precedes, 
 and the one which follows it. It is necessary 
 also to a sound argument, that its several propo- 
 sitions should stand in a just order. It is more- 
 over implied, in a complete and satisfactory 
 argument, that the person to whom it is addressed 
 already admits, or assents to, each of the sepa- 
 rate propositions ; and that he will grant the 
 truth of the connexion affirmed to exist between 
 them when clearly exhibited. If he denies, 
 either some one of the propositions, or some one 
 of the connexions, then means must be used for 
 ascertaining the truth in that particular instance. 
 
 r 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 41 
 
 before any further progress can be made in the 
 controversy. We take an example of the most 
 famihar sort, and one that will exhibit the 
 difference between demonstation and argument. 
 B. affirms that in going from London to Nor- 
 wich, it is better to pass through Dunmow, 
 Clare, and Bury, than to take the road through 
 Chelmsford, Colchester, and Ipswich. C. denies 
 this assertion. B. then says he Cdn demonstrate 
 the truth of his proposition ; and forthwith pro- 
 ceeds to compute the distances from place to 
 place ; that is, he affirms, in due succession, a 
 number of ad??iit ted truths ; such as that Rom- 
 ford is twelve miles from London, Brentwood 
 six miles from Romford, and so on throughout 
 the route ; and he connects and computes these 
 several distances on admitted principles, and 
 truly sums up the entire series. So far this is 
 a demonstration, and is unanswerable when com- 
 pared with a similar computation of the other 
 route. But C. replies, * You have indeed de- 
 monstrated that the road through Dunmow is 
 shorter than that through Chelmsford ; but yet 
 have not convinced me that one had better go 
 that way than the other; on the contrary, I 
 can bring an argument to prove that the longer 
 road is actually preferable to the shorter; and 
 that in fact time will be gained by going eight 
 
 Ml 
 
'*^^>''^^'^>^>'^«^«''*w^^>^^^^^^>^^%'WViM^lWW^^«iM^^^IMiki«^iWVSi<^«^ 
 
 42 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 or ten miles about/ For this purpose he affirms 
 a number of facts, none of which perhaps his 
 opponent will deny; but which are of too in- 
 definite a kind to form part of a methematical 
 demonstration, although very proper to be con- 
 sidered in the general argument. These in- 
 definite facts are such as — the narrowness and 
 ruggedness of the roads — the probable delay 
 arising from the want of horses, and so forth. 
 Now these assertions, though founded in truth ; 
 may have been misstated or exaggerated; and 
 hence it may become necessary to examine 
 each separate proposition, of which the general 
 argument consists; and the disputants nmst 
 agree upon all the particulars, before they can 
 agree upon the conclusion. — That is to say, the 
 necessary conditions of every sound argument 
 must be complied with on both sides; each 
 proposition must be assented to, and its con- 
 nexion with the one which precedes, and the 
 one which follows, must also be admitted by 
 both disputants. 
 
 It is evident then that an argument is strictly 
 conclusive only when all the facts contained in 
 it are truly known by the disputants, and are 
 understood also in their relation one to another. 
 An argument is of no avail for discovering 
 things unknown ; but can serve only to set forth 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 43 
 
 the connexion of a certain fact with another, 
 which, hitherto, we have not perceived to be 
 related to it 
 
 A very large proportion of all controversies are 
 fruitless and inconclusive, simply because the 
 disputants, on both sides, in their eagerness to 
 carry their opinion, or to confound their oppo- 
 nent, assume many things to be known and un- 
 questionable, which are not so ; or because they 
 neglect to ascertain the sense in which they them- 
 selves use the terms they employ ; at the same time 
 they refuse to give due attention to the explana- 
 tions of their opponent's meaning. Thus argu- 
 ment is converted into wrangling; and often ter- 
 minates in a personal contest. Thus it is, too, 
 that differences of opinion are perpetuated, and 
 that men learn to love truth only when it favours 
 the faction to which they attach themselves, and 
 to hate and fear it when it favours an adversary. 
 Beside that accuracy and strength of under- 
 standing which is the first requisite in the dis- 
 covery of truth, it is not less necessary to possess 
 a conscientious preference of truth to interest, 
 favour, or prejudice, and especially so when re- 
 ligious principles are in question. In this in- 
 stance there is need that the mind should be 
 freed from those evil inchnations and those uni- 
 
44 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 versal corrupt prejudices which belong, in 
 greater or less degrees to every human mind, 
 and which render every mind inimical to the 
 great principles of Christianity. 
 
 ARRANGEMENT, 
 
 Differs from Classification, which is a sorting 
 of things according to their real differences ; 
 whereas this is a sorting them for some parti- 
 cular purpose, in the manner that may be pre- 
 scribed by special reasons of convenience. 
 The books of a library may be classified ac- 
 cording to the subjects of which they treat ; or 
 they may be arranged in that order which will 
 bring those most often wanted within reach. 
 It is often of more practical importance to ar- 
 range our thoughls in an artificial manner, such 
 as shall give the mind a ready command over 
 its stores, than to think precisely in the mode 
 that is rigidly philosophical. 
 
 Skill and address in the arrangement of our 
 thoughts is peculiarly advantageous to those 
 whose business it is to teach or to persuade 
 others ; while habits of analysis, classification, 
 and abstraction, are proper and indispensable to 
 those who addict themselves to the discovery 
 of truth. 
 
 u 
 
 it 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ART, 
 
 45 
 
 Is distinguished from science, rather by an ac- 
 cidental, than a real difference. Art is the know- 
 ledge of general facts, and science is so too. But 
 it is only that part of such knowledge which is 
 immediately convertible to practical purposes 
 that is called art ; while that which is either 
 not at all applicable to common purposes, or 
 only so in a remote manner, is called science. 
 A knowledge of the chemical laws of fermen- 
 tation is applicable to the preparation of an 
 ordinary beverage, and when so applied is called 
 the art of brewing. If no such fermented 
 liquor were in use, then the knowledge of the 
 same facts would stand undistinguished, as part 
 of the science of chemistry. 
 
 The art of navigation (in a principal branch 
 of it) is an application of the knowledge of the 
 places and movements of the heavenly bodies, 
 to the purpose of ascertaining a ship's latitude 
 and longitude. If men never adventured them- 
 selves upon the wide bosom of the sea, they 
 might still know the same facts ; but would call 
 their knowledge science. In the natural order 
 of discovery, art, in a rude form, precedes 
 science ; and then science instructs art ; and 
 again, these amended arts give man so much 
 command over the operations of nature, that 
 
46 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 wealth is accumulated ; and many individuals, 
 in every community, are, by that means, set free 
 from the necessity of labouring for subsistence, 
 of whom some addict themselves to the culti- 
 vation of philosophy, from the influence of mere 
 taste. In this manner new discoveries are 
 made ; and these, more or less directly, improve 
 the arts of life ; and so a perpetual advance- 
 ment goes on by the mutual influence of me- 
 chanical skill and philosophical principles. 
 
 ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. 
 
 It is the law or usage of the human mind 
 long to retain any connexion, even of the most 
 accidental kind, which has once been formed 
 between two or more thoughts or states of feel- 
 ing. If one of these linked or associated ideas 
 is brought back to the mind, the other, most 
 often, returns with it. No one can need in- 
 stances of this sort to be mentioned, for every 
 moment presents them to every mind. It is 
 however important to distinguish what may be 
 called the natural, or spontaneous association 
 of ideas, from that which is the consequence of 
 certain habits of the mind. The law of spon- 
 taneous association shows itself most com- 
 pletely in dreaming, when ideas of all kinds 
 
 
 \\ 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 47 
 
 follow one the other, in a disorderly and fantas- 
 tic manner ; and yet so that we can (when 
 dreams are recollected with sufficient distinct- 
 ness) often perceive the link or tie which made 
 one image succeed to another. In musing or 
 reverie the same law of accidental connexion 
 makes itself apparent in the succession of ideas 
 and emotions. The prattle of children, and 
 the idle chat of uncultivated or frivolous per- 
 sons, very commonly presents the same sort of 
 fortuitous succession of ideas, connected only 
 by incidental and unimportant circumstances 
 of similarity, or of juxta-position, in time or 
 place. The strength and culture of the mind 
 may be fairly estimated by the degree in which 
 it ordinarily yields itself to this current of spon- 
 taneous or accidental associations. 
 
 When certain habits of mind have been 
 formed and settled by exercise and application, 
 they displace and supersede, to a great extent, 
 the law of accidental association. A mind 
 naturally vigorous, and which has acquired 
 much control over its movements, and has ad- 
 dicted itself to particular employments, no 
 longer follows the fortuitous course of ideas ; 
 but pursues, in some one chosen path, the real 
 or rational connexion of ideas one with another. 
 That is to say, the idea which follows the one 
 
48 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 last present to the mind, will be that which in 
 fact and nature, is the most nearly related to its 
 predecessor. Thus, if the whole series of ideas 
 were expressed or uttered, those who listened 
 to it would not have to search for the Hnk 
 which connected one thought with another, hut 
 would perceive it in the very nature of the 
 subject. 
 
 The mathematician, the mechanician, the 
 statesman, the poet, the artist, the man of busi- 
 ness, each acquires his proper habit of associa- 
 tion, and each is prompt and successful in his 
 line, just in proportion to the rationality and 
 the closeness of the connexions that have been 
 formed in his mind. This principle of the as- 
 sociation of ideas is sometimes, or by some 
 writers, called the law of Suggestion. The 
 meaning of the two phrases is much the same. 
 
 ATTENTION. 
 
 Not even the most frivolous, childish, or 
 feeble mind, is always, or entirely, governed by 
 the fortuitous association of ideas (spoken of in 
 the preceding article.) Nor how strong soever 
 may be any particular habit of thinking, is any 
 mind absolutely incapable of breaking off its 
 customary meditations, and of fixing itself upon 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 19 
 
 another set of ideas. Every one is conscious 
 of possessing a power (more or less perfect) of 
 detaining some one thought, or class of thoughts, 
 in the mind, and of considering, or viewing a 
 particular subject successively, in all its parts 
 and relations. This power is called Attention. 
 It is the proper and distinguishing excellence of 
 the human mind; and, in connexion with the 
 faculty of abstraction, forms the essential differ- 
 ence between man and the brute, as well intel- 
 lectually as morally. The degree in which it 
 is possessed distinguishes also one human mind 
 from another. 
 
 The exertion of this power of attention sup- 
 poses some motive or desire to be present, or 
 some inducement to be within view, which at- 
 tracts the mind in one direction rather than 
 another. It is a great excellence in the mental 
 conformation, when a tranquil motive will en- 
 sure a high degree of attention ; and moreover, 
 when attention can be readily and fully trans- 
 ferred from one object to another ; and it is a 
 still higher excellence when attention can be 
 given in an efficient degree^ to several objects at 
 the same time. 
 
 A sluggish mind is one which can be roused 
 to attention only by the most urgent or stimu- 
 lating motives. A weak mind is one that may 
 
 3 
 
I 
 
 'ft 
 
 50 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 be quickly roused to attention, but which as 
 quickly spends itself by the effort. An acute 
 mind is one that is capable of a very vigorous, 
 momentary effort. A profound mind is one ca- 
 pable of long-continued attention, upon the 
 same subject ; and which can sustain its atten- 
 tion by motives of the most tranquil sort. A 
 comprehensive and efficient mind is capable, both 
 of long-continued efforts of attention, and of 
 what may be called multifarious attention : that 
 is to say, it does not lose itself in its regard to 
 a single class of ideas, but sees all objects in 
 their various connexions and dependencies. 
 Yet whatever may be the natural power of the 
 mind, in these respects, it is susceptible of vast 
 increase and improvement, by a well conducted 
 education. Indeed the difference between an 
 educated and uneducated person (supposing 
 their natural faculties to have been equal) is 
 manifested in nothing so conspicuously as in 
 the greater command over its powers of atten- 
 tion which the former has acquired. 
 
 ATTRIBUTE; 
 
 From attrihio, to give to, or impute. A 
 quality, or manner of feeling or acting, asserted 
 to be essential to any being, is called an attri- 
 
 \ 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 51 
 
 bute of that being. The word expresses or 
 implies the act of assigning such or such a pro- 
 perty to a substance or person ; and is most 
 often employed in theology, and when the di- 
 vine perfections are spoken of. 
 
 AXIOM; 
 
 From cJf .'w/xa, a sentence or affirmation, worthy 
 to be received. By philosophical usage the 
 term is applied only to propositions that are at 
 once unquestionable, or self-evident and funda- 
 mental; or important, on account of the conse- 
 quences which flow from them. Mathematical 
 axioms are such as— That the whole is greater 
 than any of the parts ; or, that equal things, 
 added to equal, n)ake equal. Metaphysical 
 axioms are such as this— That there can be 
 nothing more in an effect, than was contained 
 in its cause. It is an axiom in morals, that the 
 will of God is the rule of right and wrong. 
 
 BEING : 
 
 The most comprehensive of all simple ab- 
 stract terms. It expresses the notion which 
 results from our own consciousness, thought of 
 as a tvhole ;— we feel that we are, or that we 
 exist, God is emphatically called the Supreme 
 
52 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Being ; both because He, and He alone, is 
 self-existent ; and because He is tlie author or 
 cause of all other existences. 
 
 BELIEF, 
 
 Is that state of mind which is produced by 
 arguments that appear to be good, or sufficient. 
 Belief rests upon evidence of the kind that is 
 not absolutely demonstrative, or irresistible ; 
 hence it is susceptible of various degrees of 
 strength, proportioned either to the intrinsic 
 force of the evidence, or to the power of the 
 understanding to perceive its force. There is 
 much difference in different minds in this re- 
 spect. Some instantly and clearly discern the 
 soundness of an argument, or the consistency 
 of testimony, and retain ever after an unshaken 
 conviction of the truth of the fact or principle 
 as so established. Other minds can but con- 
 fusedly catch the connexion of reasons or evi- 
 dences, and almost immediately lose whatever 
 rational conviction they may, for a moment, 
 have acquired ; or if they adhere to their 
 opinion, do so blindly, and often with many se- 
 cret misgivings. Some, on the other hand, in- 
 capable of comprehending evidence, or impa- 
 tient of the effort necessary for the purpose, 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 53 
 
 embrace opinions, just as they choose their 
 friends, by favour and prejudice, and adhere to 
 them with a passionate resolution, and defend 
 them with vehemence and dogmatism. 
 
 It is a general, though not universal principle, 
 that the calmness or the violence with which 
 matters of belief are entertained, bears propor- 
 tion to the soundness or the unsoundness of the 
 mental process by which conviction has been 
 attained. Those who by patient attention to 
 argument have convinced themselves of the 
 truth of certain opinions, are, for the most part, 
 ready to exercise patience and forbearance to- 
 wards an opponent ; while he who is conscious 
 of being unable to give a good reason for his 
 belief, betakes himself either to flippancy and 
 banter, or to contumely, when his opinion is 
 impugned. 
 
 It is important to remark that, in almost all 
 the affairs of life, even when the most momen- 
 tous interests, or life itself, are at stake, we are 
 ordinarily required to act upon the strength of 
 rational belief, and must not wait for demon- 
 stration, or certainty. Nay, on some of the 
 most signal occasions, we proceed on the 
 ground only of some probable opinion, which 
 falls very far short of full persuasion. But it 
 is found (if a large number of instances are 
 

 ><»*■ »■»»- . , *-. ^^^ r - I ->. ^ 
 
 54 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 taken into the acconnt)to be more advantageous, 
 and less really hazardous, to act, and to venture 
 upon some degree of probabihty, than to adhere 
 habitually to the impulse of a suspicious and 
 timid caution. It is on the whole safer to be 
 bold and believing, than sceptical. In by far 
 the larger number of instances, we are called to 
 rely upon testhnony, rather than to act upon 
 our personal knowledge of facts ; and it is found 
 that human testimony (if certain cases are ex- 
 cepted where there is a peculiar temptation to 
 falsify) is a very sufficient ground of confidence. 
 It is so especially when testimony is supported 
 by incidental proofs (see Testimony). To 
 withhold belief in such cases, evinces either 
 an infirm judgment or a petulant and captious 
 temper. 
 
 It is by no means always the case that we 
 have the power of understanding the whole of 
 what we are required, by good evidence, to be- 
 lieve. The contrary most often happens ; that 
 is to say, a certain fact is fully established, and 
 yet nothing more is known than the general 
 fact, or than its external significance. In the 
 mathematical sciences there are not few propo- 
 sitions which, though demonstrably certain, are 
 at the same time apparently incredible or im- 
 possible; so that though they cannot but be 
 
 •*••• « > ... ...>. 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 55 
 
 assented to, they can never be followed home 
 by the human mind. Nevertheless, such facts 
 or principles are taken confidently as the foun- 
 dation of other principles. There are other 
 truths which, though not seemingly incredible, 
 yet so surpass the powers of the human mind 
 to grasp them, that, while they are necessarily 
 admitted as certain, we can advance no further, 
 or little further, than to blind assent. Of this 
 sort is the notion of eternity — or of duration, 
 without beginning, as well as without end : and 
 of this kind, too, are other great principles of 
 natural religion, and much that relates to the 
 omniscience, the power, the providence, and the 
 moral government of God. These are subjects 
 concerning which certain comprehensive pro- 
 positions may be affirmed, with the most per- 
 fect confidence, even while the mind feels its 
 utter inability to comprehend what it assents 
 to, or to reconcile one such principle with 
 another. 
 
 Those hidden powers that are developed in 
 the movements and changes of the material 
 world, such as gravitation, chemical and mag- 
 netic attraction, electricity, vegetable and animal 
 life, and so forth, demand assent, while nothing 
 concerning them can be understood, beyond the 
 external facts which make themselves known to 
 
•'•'^^•■•^•^^•^*^^^*^^^^^^0^0^^^0^ 
 
 56 
 
 ELEMENl'S OF THOUGHT 
 
 **«#%»^^*^^»«f%^^^^'W^>^^^^N^i»<^^»^li»^^ 
 
 the senses. Nothing then can be more absurd, 
 or unphilosophical, than the determination ex- 
 pressed by some persons that they will believe 
 nothing which they do not understand. 'J'o carry 
 such a purpose into effect on all subjects, would 
 be to reduce a man to universal ignorance and 
 idiotcy. Rational belief stands midway be- 
 tween credulity and scepticism ; both of which 
 are faults, as well of the understanding as of 
 the temper. Credulity is the error of sanguine, 
 imaginative, and weak minds, which, in their 
 eagerness to receive and hold whatever dazzles 
 the fancy, or moves the sensibilities, or awakens 
 pleasing emotions of wonder and admiration, 
 believe whatever, of this sort, may be presented 
 to them, without inquiring upon what evidence 
 it rests, or perhaps rejecting contrary testimony. 
 It may be noted as a frequent fact, that those 
 who believe the most readily, and in opposition 
 to reason, are the most slow to believe, or hard 
 to be convinced, where evidence is good and 
 abundant. The cause of this is easily assigned. 
 — Good evidence appeals to the understanding ; 
 but the credulous have, by the long indulgence 
 of their credulity, enfeebled their understand- 
 ings, and have become actually incapable of per- 
 ceiving the force of argument : at the same 
 time, the fruitless effort which they may make 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 57 
 
 in a single instance, to do so, chills and con- 
 founds the mind, and dispels those lively feel- 
 ings of confidence with which they are wont 
 to entertain other convictions. They can be- 
 lieve only by impulse, not by reason. 
 
 Scepticism, though apparently an opposite 
 error, not seldom proves itself to be nearly allied 
 to credulity : the reason is, that both spring 
 from infirmity of the understanding, or what 
 might, if we were to use a figurative expression, 
 be termed a paralysis of the reasoning faculty. 
 By pride, or jealousy, or petulance, or coldness 
 of temper, the habit of distrusting all evidence 
 has been indulged, until it has grown so strong, 
 that even the most conclusive reasons fail to 
 take effect upon the mind : all things appear 
 alike uncertain ; a dimness affects the faculties. 
 But as the human mind cannot exist without 
 its convictions, of some sort, it often becomes, 
 in this enfeebled state, the prey of some childish 
 delusions. Many noted sceptics have been ab- 
 surdly superstitious, or credulous, in certain par- 
 ticulars It may be affnmed that credulity is, 
 on the whole, much less absurd, and less mis- 
 chievous too, than scepticism ; because it is less 
 at variance with the constitution and course of 
 the system in which man is placed. Upon the 
 great field of human life, belle/ is the general 
 
 3* 
 

 58 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 rule ; disbelief belongs only to the exceptions 
 from that rule : he, therefore, who always be- 
 lieves, will be much less often in the wrong, 
 than he who always doubts. The credulous 
 has the mass of ordinary facts on his side : the 
 sceptic has only the single instances. 
 
 CATEGORY. 
 
 Karrivopla, a class of things concerning which 
 something is affirmed absolutely ; not hypothe- 
 tically, or liable to a condition. This is a 
 technical term of logic. In popular use, a cate- 
 gorical assertion is a positive one, admitting 
 neither of exception nor uncertainty. 
 
 CAUSE and EFFECT. 
 
 The human mind is not merely acted upon 
 through the senses, by external objects, but it 
 acts also upon matter : that is to say, upon the 
 muscular system ; and by that means upon 
 foreign bodies. It also acts upon its own 
 thoughts, changing and ruling them at pleasure. 
 In consequence of this constitution of our na- 
 ture, we produce many changes in the things 
 around us. The consciousness of being able 
 to do so, generates the notion which is called 
 Power ; and then whatever has, or is imagined 
 
 ' * * * fc » * » , „»^^ , _^,__ j 
 
 * ^ ^ ^ " — m ^t~ H l~^'Mf t t- t .f\.t l 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 59 
 
 to possess, a power to produce changes in other 
 things, or in itself, is called a Cause ; and the 
 change so produced, is called an Effect The 
 words cause and effect are a pair of inseparable 
 or correlative terms, indicating the presence or 
 the supposed presence, of that faculty to pro- 
 duce changes which we feel to belong to our 
 own minds, and which we call power. In the 
 exercise of this power of mind, we first imagine, 
 and invent, and contrive, and then, by muscular 
 actions, we put the material substances around 
 us into new forms, corresponding to the con- 
 ception we had formed ; and these new combi- 
 nations of matter are found to answer the end 
 we had in view. Now this ordinary process of 
 our own minds furnishes us with a very simple 
 and convincing argument, whence we infer the 
 existence of an Almighty and Intelligent Being, 
 who, in a far higher degree than ourselves, pos- 
 sesses both reason and power ; the effects of 
 which are displayed on every side, in the ad- 
 mirable contrivances of the material world. 
 We thus attain the idea of a First Cause ; and 
 assign to it all that actually exists, as its effect. 
 Having acquired, from our consciousness, the 
 notion of power, followed instantly by some 
 proper effect, we fall into a natural, and almost 
 involuntary custom, of imputing or imagining 
 
k <^>^>S>fc.Aj'h^^>fcM'^A 
 
 60 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 W-^w-",-*-" ■ 
 
 the existence of power, wherever we find some 
 one event to precede immediately and invari- 
 ably another, which is called its effect. We 
 carry this supposition much farther than we are 
 philosophically warranted in doing, and thus 
 learn to speak of the powei-s of nature, of the 
 power of chemical agents, &c., when, in truth, 
 we know nothing but the fact, that a certain par- 
 ticular event always follows another. The 
 warmth and the showers of spring are followed 
 by the bursting of buds, and the rise of plants 
 from the earth ; — the rising of the sun is followed 
 by the ascent of mists from the valleys ; — the 
 friction of two hard bodies is followed by a 
 sensible heat ; — and in these, and innumerable 
 other instances, we unthinkingly impute power 
 to the antecedent event, calling it the cause; 
 and call the consequent event its effect. What 
 may actually be the nature of the connexion 
 between the one and the other is absolutely 
 unknown : but it is only in an improper sense 
 that any material substance can be called a cause. 
 Whenever, even by a mere coincidence, one 
 event has been observed frequently to accom- 
 pany another, there is a propensity in the mind 
 to regard the first as the cause of the second. 
 
 But we never suppose this without, at the 
 same time, imputing to the one some sort of in- 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 61 
 
 fluence over the other. Thus, when in the 
 minds of the vulgar, certain trivial occurrences, 
 such as the croaking of a raven, or the breaking 
 of a goblet, or the spilling of salt, are supposed 
 to be the precursors of calamity, there is also 
 imagined to exist an invisible influence, which 
 connects the one event with the other. 
 
 The mere connexion or sequency (as it is 
 called) of events, does not give rise to the idea 
 of cause and effect, unless there be room 
 (whether justly or not) to impute power to one 
 of them. If, by the road-side, mile after mile, 
 trees are seen to be growing in pairs, no. one 
 imagines that the first tree in each pair is the 
 cause of the second. But when it is seen, on a 
 large meadow, that wherever a heap of decayed 
 vegetable matter has lain, the grass is much 
 more rank than in other places, it is involuntarily 
 believed that the heap was, in some manner, 
 though unknown, the cause of that increased 
 vegetation. It may, perhaps, hereafter be dis- 
 covered, that there is nothing in the manure 
 which can, with any propriety, be called power ; 
 nevertheless it is certain that there is some 
 relation between the chemical properties of the 
 manure, and the growth of the plant ; just as 
 there is a real relation between the act of put- 
 ting a weight into a scale, and the rise of the 
 
W"^* !!! ^^^*^^ fi 
 
 ^^^^Arik^K^«^«|^^«l^ 
 
 62 
 
 '**'^'^'^w*"'*>^-*'»^ * l«^^^«^.^%H^ 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 opposite end of the beam. This relation, 
 whether known or unknown, being real and 
 constant, niay, without inconvenience, be spoken 
 oi asif'W, were cause and effect. It is only ne- 
 cessary always to recollect that i)ower, in the full 
 and strict sense of the word, belongs exclusively 
 to MIND ; and that what are called the powers of 
 nature are nothing more than secret relations, 
 between one property or form of matter and 
 another. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION, 
 
 Isjhe sorting of things that differ in some 
 respects, and are alike in others : the greatest 
 difference being the rule of separation, and the 
 greatest likeness the rule oi association. Classi- 
 fications are always founded on some real and 
 intrinsic qualities of the things sorted ; whereas 
 arrangements are founded upon accidental qua- 
 lities or circumstances. Arrangements are made 
 for convenience and the accomplishment of a 
 particular purpose. Classifications are formed 
 for the permanent advantage of the mind, which 
 can become conversant with a multitude of 
 objects only when they are distributed into sorts, 
 corresponding with their real and intrinsic dis- 
 tinctions. An analysis is made by observing 
 differences only : a classification is accomplished 
 
 "O"**-***.^-^**.* 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 63 
 
 by looking, first at resemblances, and then at 
 differences. An analysis serves to make us ac- 
 quainted with things of which hitherto we have 
 been ignorant. A classification is useful for 
 presenting a simple and comprehensive view of 
 things already known. 
 
 The assortments that are made of the objects 
 of natural history are properly called classifica- 
 tions, and are affected by bringing together all 
 the animals that agree in some one distinct and 
 unalterable peculiarity, such as shall be liable to 
 no uncertainty, or confusion, in particular in- 
 stances. Thus, according to the system of 
 Linnaeus, all animals that suckle their young are 
 included in one class called Mammalia. All 
 birds are included in another ; all that live in- 
 differently in air and water, in a third ; all 
 fishes in a fourth; all insects in a fifth; and 
 worms in a sixth. But then, if all the animals 
 of the first class, for example, are brought toge- 
 ther, it is found that, though alike in the im- 
 portant circumstance of suckling their young, 
 they are unlike in a thousand other particulars ; 
 so that it becomes necessary to classify this class. 
 For the purpose of doing so with precision, 
 another particular and invariable circumstance is 
 fixed upon, and which is liable to no uncertainty. 
 Such is found to be the number and position of 
 
64 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 the teeth ; and there are known to be seven 
 constant forms of diversity in this particular ; 
 which therefore divide the class Mammalia into 
 seven orders. i^gain, each order comprises 
 animals widely differing one from another, and 
 needing, therefore, a new classification, for it 
 brings together men, monkeys, rabbits, and bats. 
 These are sorted into four genera, or kinds. 
 But each genus has also different kinds ; as, for 
 example, the monkey tribe, of which tbere are 
 almost innumerable varieties : these varieties of 
 a genus are called sjjecies. Thus, it appears, 
 classification must be carried on so long as any 
 number of beings are observed to agree in one 
 or more particulars (if those particulars are de- 
 finite and constant) and yet to disagree in 
 others. 
 
 COMMON TERMS, 
 
 Or names, are words which, in consequence 
 of some sort of classification, are applied to 
 many individuals that are alike in some re- 
 spects; or in all but identity. Thus the word 
 animal is a term common to all sentient, loco- 
 motive, voluntary, and corporeal beings. The 
 word quadruped is common to all animals that 
 have four legs ; the word dog to all quadrupeds 
 of that genus; and the word mastiff X.o a spe- 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 65 
 
 cies of dog. But Caesar is 7ny dog or yours : 
 and though his name may be appropriated to 
 ten or twenty dogs, it is proper to each as his 
 individual distinction. Comuion terms belori'^ 
 to things. Abstract terms belong to qualities, 
 Connnon terms are used in classification ; ab- 
 stract terms are employed in generalization. 
 
 COMPLEX, 
 
 Is that which consists of several elements, 
 which are to be separated, or made known by 
 analysis. 
 
 CONCEPTION, 
 
 Is the bringing before the mind, by a volun- 
 tary act, some image of what has heretofore 
 been perceived ; and which yet is thought of 
 apart from any distinct recollection of past time, 
 otherwise the idea would belong to memory. 
 Sensation and perception take place when an 
 external object is actually present to the senses. 
 Imagination is complex conception ; that is to 
 say, it is the joining together of images, in new 
 forms, or combinations. We entertain the con- 
 ception of a palace ; but we imagine a palace 
 of gold, or a river of molten brass, or a centaur, 
 or a griffin. The power of vivid conception is 
 
66 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 important to the poet ; for the mind works from 
 the stock of its conceptions, not from its im- 
 mediate perceptions : — but it is still more im- 
 portant to the painter, who can only become a 
 mere copyist, if his conceptions are faint or 
 confused. Propriety of description, and appro- 
 priateness and copiousness in the use of lan- 
 guage, depend in a great measure, upon the 
 vigor of the faculty of conception. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 A single affirmation is a proposition : — as that 
 A is equal to B. But if it were necessary to 
 prove this equality, by stating, in a series of 
 propositions, the component parts of A and B ; 
 then this last affirmation, which brought all the 
 preceding ones to a point, would be the conclu- 
 sion. The last proposition in an argument is 
 not called the conclusion because it concludes 
 or finishes it ; but because it is the truth, for the 
 sake of which all the preceding propositions 
 were advanced : — it is that which comprises, or 
 shuts up in one, the train of facts, bringing the 
 last into contact with the first, as thus : — 1. An 
 habitual disregard of truth draws upon a man 
 the distrust and contempt of all who have to 
 do with him. 2. But if a man be the object of 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 67 
 
 distrust and contempt among his neighbours, he 
 will be compelled to deal with them always 
 under a great disadvantage ; for his most solemn 
 asseverations in matters of fact will produce on 
 their minds an impression the very reverse of that 
 which he intends ; so that he becomes his own 
 adversary whenever he urges his rights or his 
 pretensions. 3. But he who labours under a 
 disadvantage of this sort, will find it a bar to 
 his success, in whatever he undertakes. 4. 
 Therefore, an habitual disregard of truth will, 
 in most cases, impede, or utterly prevent a man's 
 prosperity. This, then, is our conclusion. 
 
 CONCRETE, 
 
 From concresco, to grow together, or to be 
 formed into a mass. When a quality is spoken 
 of as joined with other qualities, the word ex- 
 pressing it is used in a concrete form ; as white 
 paper, equitable conduct ; whiteness and equity 
 are abstract terms ; that is to say, the qualities 
 are spoken of apart from any particular sub- 
 stance. Or all the properties of a thing are 
 spoken of together, as a whole, and that whole 
 is — the concrete ; — opposed to the abstract. 
 
68 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 This word, though used often in an indistinct 
 manner, is employed most properly when taken 
 to represent tlie mind's act of looking in upon 
 itself, as the sid^ject of all its feelings and various 
 operations. 1 he mind, most commonly, is en- 
 gaged fully with some sensation, or conception, 
 or emotion, or ahstract idea; but sometimes it 
 reflects upon itself as the permanent and iden- 
 XvQ.'i\ feeler and actor. The faculty of memory 
 is especially concerned in this notion of con- 
 sciousness ; and when the mind thus, and with 
 the aid of memory, looks inward, it gains the 
 notion of personal identity. It is however plainly 
 an error to suppose that identity consists in this 
 notion of it ; so that if a man retained no re- 
 collection of yesterday, and did not at all think 
 of self he would not in fact be the same to-day 
 that he was yesterday. 
 
 CONDITIONAL. 
 
 Whatever will not he, or will not happen, or 
 must not be affirmed, unless something else ex- 
 ists, or happens, or is true, that dependent fact 
 or proposition is conditional, '' If it be fine to- 
 7norrow, I shall walk to town :" the event of my 
 walking then is conditional ; not absolute. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 69 
 
 If virtue is to he tried, men must be placed in 
 circumstances wherein they are tempted to do 
 wrong That men rmist be exposed to temp- 
 tation, is not true, or certain, unless it be true, 
 that virtue is to be tried. 
 
 CONSEQUENT. 
 
 In a conditional proposition, such as the one 
 advanced above, the second afifirmation, which 
 depends upon the first, is the consequent. 
 
 CONTINGENCY ; 
 
 From contingo, to touch upon, or happen. 
 In popular language, whatever event takes place 
 of which we do not discern the cause, why it 
 should have happened in this manner, or at this 
 moment, rather than another, is called a contin- 
 gent event ; or an event without a cause : as 
 for example, the falling of a leaf on a particular 
 spot, or the turning up of a certain number, 
 when dice are thrown. 
 
 But any one who reflects must perceive that 
 though, in familiar speech, such expressions are 
 allowable, there is no philosophical propriety, 
 that is to say, no truth in them. 
 
 Contingency and chance are words of no 
 positive meaning ; but which may yet be con- 
 
==^ 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 veniently employed when we have to express 
 our absolute ignorance of the cause of an event 
 The leaf falls on a particular spot in conse- 
 quence of the combined influence of gravitation 
 and the movement of the air: and if we could 
 know precisely the force and direction of the 
 wmd, when the leaf was floating in the air we 
 might, combining this with the laivs of gravita- 
 tion, predict the spot on which it would alight • 
 —and then, we should no longer speak of that 
 event as contingent. The rising of the sun 
 to-morrow is not spoken of as a contingent 
 event, because it is thought of as certainly fol- 
 ^wmg from the established order of causes 
 But the fineness of to-morrow we think contin- 
 gent, because we are ignorant of the many 
 causes upon the concurrence of which fine 
 weather depends. Yet, if we knew all the laws 
 of the atmosphere, and the actual state of the 
 lower heavens to-day, then the fineness, or the 
 ram and wmd of to-morrow, would be spoken 
 of just as we speak of the rising of the sun. 
 
 And thus too the future actions of men are 
 thought of as contingent, because the motives 
 of human conduct are far too multifarious, too 
 much hidden, and liable to too many disturbing 
 influences from without, to be known, or even 
 surmised beforehand. We can go no further 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 71 
 
 ' t 
 
 II 
 
 in our anticipations of the conduct of men, 
 than to say conditionally— if such and such 
 events take place, it is probable that M. or 
 N. will act in this or that manner. Our 
 notion of contingency and of certainty depends 
 so much upon our knowledge or ignorance of 
 causes, that involuntarily we think an event that 
 is to happen to-morrow, much less contingent 
 than a similar event that is to take place a year 
 hence ; although it is evident, both stand pre- 
 cisely upon the same ground, as to the causes 
 whence they are to spring, or by which they 
 are to be governed. 
 
 Every event has a cause ; in this sense there- 
 fore nothing is contingent. But in philoso- 
 phical language there is another, and a very 
 proper sense of the word contingency, and 
 which is nearly synonymous with the" word 
 condition, and is opposed to the word necessity. 
 Mathematical principles are necessary ; that is 
 to say, nothing could make them otherwise than 
 they are. It cannot even be imagined that the 
 three angles of a triangle should be equal to 
 less or more than two right angles. The ex- 
 istence and attributes of God are also in the 
 same sense necessary. But the existence of 
 any particular creature, or class of creatures, or 
 the actual conformation or powers of such 
 
11 
 
 72 
 
 V.A.A.>b.'«^ -J* J* 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 * -"u^W^^^-V** 
 
 beings, are contingent; that is to say, they 
 might not have existed at all, or they might 
 have been otherwise constituted than they are. 
 
 CONVERTIBLE TERMS 
 
 Are such as may be exchanged, the one for 
 the other, without affecting the sense, or des- 
 stroying the truth of the proposition in which 
 they occur. Convertible terms are not always 
 synomjmous, or of the same meaning abstrac- 
 tedly ; but yet they are of the same value in a 
 particular instance. Man is responsible to his 
 Creator for his conduct.— Every moral agent is 
 responsible to the Supreme Being for his ac- 
 tions. In these two propositions we assert the 
 same general truth ; but in other terms, and in 
 reference to snch a proposition, the words man 
 and moral agent ;— and the words Creator and 
 Supreme Being ; and the words actions and con- 
 duct, are convertible ; though not synonymous. 
 If they were strictly synonymous, we might 
 employ them on all occasions, the one for the 
 other without error. But this is not the fact. 
 We must not say every moral agent is mortal ; 
 for angels are not so ; nor say every man is 
 responsible for his actions ; for madmen are 
 not so. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 CORRELATIVE TERMS 
 
 73 
 
 Arc such as have no sense, strictly speaking, 
 apart from some other. Thus the \woyAs father 
 and son, husband and irife, suppose, or tacitly 
 include the other term. The words creature 
 and Creator, king and subject, and all adjectives 
 of comparison, are correlatives. If we speak 
 of something that is better, or greater, or wiser, 
 we suppose something worse, or smaller, or 
 less wise. 
 
 DATA, 
 
 The plural of datum, a thing given or granted. 
 Those facts or principles which are known and 
 acknowledged, and from w liich inferences are 
 to be drawn, are called the chta: as when the 
 actual order and position of mud, clay, sand, 
 rock, &c , in the crust of the earth, arc de- 
 scribed, these are the data, whence some theory 
 is to be derived that shall adequately explain 
 the formation of that crust. 
 
 DEFINITION. 
 
 To define a thing is to mention some parti- 
 cular mark, or circumstance, which universally 
 and infallibly distinguishes it from those things 
 to which it is most nearly allied. A definition 
 
V 
 
 74 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 consists of the genus and the difference ; that is 
 to say, it mentions the class to which the thing 
 belongs ; and then what makes it to differ from 
 other things of that class. One hifallible mark 
 is enough for a definition ; for if an object be 
 but made known beyond possibihty of mistake, 
 whatever more is added, contributes nothing to 
 our certainty. What is added to a definition is 
 desmption. An elephant is a quadruped (this is 
 i\iQ genus) having an elongated and flexible pro- 
 boscis (this is the difference). If we go on to 
 say that his color is a dingy brown ; his ears 
 large and pendulous ; his tail like that of a hog, 
 &c., this is description. 
 
 The definition of words is not like the defi- 
 nition of things ; for the ideas attached to words 
 are variable and vague, and dependent upon the 
 knowledge, prejudice, and habits, of those who 
 use them. To define the sense of a word is to 
 describe the thing, or notion, to which we apply 
 it. We can fix our meaning, or secure it 
 against mistake, only by declaring, as often as 
 necessary, that we intend by it such and such 
 things, or notions. By the word virtue, some 
 persons understand mere fortitude and manli- 
 ness of character ; others understand by it only 
 the avoidance of open offences against justice 
 and temperance ; while those who think ancj 
 
 ^^*^»»E1VTS OF THOUGHT.- 
 
 speak more accurately would apply the word 
 virtue to nothing less than that universal good^ 
 ness which springs from the love of God, and of 
 our fellow-creatures. But, in so using it, we 
 must guard against common errors by affixing 
 to our discourse a description of our notion 
 which may serve to dejine the sense of the' 
 term. 
 
 m 
 
 DEMONSTRATION, 
 
 Is a sliowing or making manifest. Demon- 
 strative reasoning is applicable only in those 
 cases where the objects to which it relates may 
 be fully seen and known, as it were l)y a glance. 
 If some degree of obscurity or uncertainty be- 
 longs to any one of tlie things spoken of, no 
 demonstration of the truth of the proposition 
 can be had ; or before the argument can proceed 
 the obscurity must be cleared up by a full ex- 
 amination of the obscure portion of the problem 
 When it is affirmed that 2 and 3 are equal to 
 4 and 1, the mind at a glance, or by an instan- 
 taneous effort, perceives the trutli of the propo- 
 sition ; or even if it could be doubted, it might 
 be rendered incontestable by taking five coun- 
 ters and dividing them into two parcels, first of 
 3 and 2, and then of 4 and ]. But if it be 
 said that 342 is a 7th part of 2,394, although 
 
 J 
 
'^■i'N*^^ 
 
 76 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 this affirmation is equally certain and demon- 
 sir able as the other, there are very few minds 
 that would instantaneously perceive the truth of 
 it And it will therefore be necessary, before it 
 can be intelligently assented to, as an unques- 
 tionable truth, to dissect it, if we might so speak, 
 or to attend separately, to the particulars of 
 which the proposition consists : and in going 
 through such a dissection each of these parti- 
 culars will be an affirmation or axiom, so simple 
 that the truth of it may be perceived at once. 
 The arithmetical processes of division, multi- 
 plication, &c. are nothing else than concise 
 methods of attending in due order to all the 
 constituent parts of a complicated proposition, 
 and by this means of ascertaining the amount 
 of the whole. After we have so attended to 
 each part, we may rely as fully upon the truth 
 of the result as we do upon the certainty of the 
 simplest proposition. It makes no difference 
 in the certainty of a mathematical product, 
 whether the path by which we reach it is long 
 or short. Thus for example, to discover at 
 what instant of time an eclipse of the moon 
 will take place fifty years hence, may require a 
 very operose and coniplicated calculation; never- 
 theless the fact, though future, may as certainly 
 be known as tbat 3 times 9 are 27. 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 \ 
 
 fl 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 77 
 
 V I 
 
 The great practical difference between what 
 is properly called demonstrative reasoning, and 
 the other kinds, is this, that the one is capable 
 of being drawn out to any length, without in- 
 creasing the probability of error. But in every 
 other kind of argument, if we pass circuitously 
 through a great number of propositions, several 
 of which are in some degree obscure, the pro- 
 bability of error is great. In such cases the 
 only satisfactory means of attaining certainty 
 is by endeavoring to establish the same point in 
 several independent lines of argument. But 
 when a proposition has been so established by 
 two, three, or more series of proofs, which 
 though distinct and unconnected, meet all in 
 the same point, we may rely upon the result as 
 confidently as if it were, in the strictest sense, 
 demonstrated. For nothing but truth can give 
 consistency to a multitude of insulated facts. 
 It is thus that, in courts of justice, the guilt or 
 innocence of the accused is placed beyond all 
 doubt by the agreement or discrepancy of several 
 independent lines of evidence ; as, for example, 
 when the accordant testimony of a number of 
 unconnected witnesses is confirmed by its coin- 
 cidence with facts, the truth of which is ascer- 
 tained in some manner that has no connexion 
 whatever with that testimony. And it is thus 
 
a 
 
 ^l»— i »^»gg*gSig 3 
 
 78 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 too that the truth of Christianity may, with 
 strict propriety, be said to be demonstrated : in- 
 asmuch as the assumption of its truth is the 
 only means of reconcihng a vast number of in- 
 dependent facts, which facts rest upon evidence 
 that is not to be disputed. If some one line of 
 argument were thought to fall short of absolute 
 certainty, the doubt is removed by the agree- 
 ment of that single argument with three or four 
 other series, or chains of evidence. 
 
 DESCRIPTION, 
 
 Differs, as we have seen, from definition. A 
 description is complete when it has enumerated 
 the most obvious or remarkable peculiarities of 
 an object ; a definition is complete w hen it has 
 fixed upon the single peculiarity which distin- 
 guishes the object from others nearly resem- 
 bhng it. 
 
 DESIGN. 
 
 What does not take place by accident, nor 
 is effected simply for its own sake ; but is the 
 fruit of an intelligent purpose to produce a cer- 
 tain effect, is said to be the result of dengn. 
 That is to say, it indicates, not merely the pre- 
 sence of some power, producing a change ; but 
 of knowledge also, and of choice or intention. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 79 
 
 I 
 
 The fitness or relation of cause and effect, it is 
 manifest, has been perceived ; and that same effect 
 has been desired by the Power that produced 
 it. Design implies — motive, knowledge, and 
 power. When a house is overthrown by a 
 hurricane, it is true that the velocity of the air 
 was a proper means for effecting the overthow ; 
 but there was no purpose or intention in the 
 tempest to produce this effect. We do not 
 always suppose the presence of an intelligent 
 power whenever we perceive means conducing 
 to an end. As, for example ; if, in travelling 
 over a desolate region, we find the trunk of a 
 tree, lying across a deep and rapid stream, so 
 as to form a bridge, it is by no means certain 
 that it was placed there for any such purpose ; 
 it may have fallen in that position from the spot 
 where it grew, in consequence of the decay of 
 the root on the side next the stream. Some 
 other than an intelligent cause might have pro- 
 duced the effect. But if we find three or four 
 trunks of trees, laid in order across the stream, 
 and firmly bound together, there is then not 
 merely a combination of things subserving an 
 important purpose — not merely a fortunate co- 
 incidence, but it is such a combination as be- 
 speaks intelligence : there is a language in this 
 combination which we understand, and which 
 
80 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 says — a mind — a hnowing powei' has brought 
 these things together, and for a specific purpose. 
 It is then, 1st, a combination of parts; and, 2d, 
 a combination effecting some special object; 
 and, 3d, a combination showing that the real 
 relations of things have been understood, which 
 proves the existence of an intelhgent cause. It 
 is thus that we infer irresistibly the being and 
 agency of the omnipotent and omniscient 
 Creator from the organization of plants and 
 animals ; and indeed from the entire structure 
 of the material system. 
 
 DIFFERENCE, 
 
 In a logical sense, is that one quality, or cir- 
 cumstance, Avhich distinguishes a thing, or a set 
 of things, from others which it resembles in 
 other respects. 
 
 The difference makes the species within a 
 genus ; and to name the gen7/s and the diffir- 
 ence, is to give a definition. The circumstance 
 of not shedding its foliage in winter, is the 
 difference which distinguishes one species of 
 oak from others. 
 
 DISJUNCTIVE PROPOSITIONS, 
 
 Are those in w Inch something is affirmed as 
 true of so7?ie one, of two or more things that 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 81 
 
 are mentioned ; as — The vase was broken by 
 James, or Thomas, or John ; 07ie of the three 
 must have broken it. If then we can prove 
 that it w^as not broken by James, nor by 
 John, the conclusion follows that Thomas 
 broke it. 
 
 DILEMMA : 
 
 AiXrifjLfxa, when two conditional propositions 
 are advanced, out of w hich a choice must be 
 made, a dilemma, or, taking hold of two ways, 
 is said to be presented : as thus ; it might be 
 said to a servant, " You were present when 
 your master's house was plundered ; or you 
 were not. If present, you connived at the rob- 
 bery, by not resisting or revealing it. If absent, 
 you abandoned what had been committed to 
 your care ; and, therefore, in either case, you are 
 culpable." The servant in this case could not 
 escape from the dilemma. 
 
 DISPOSITION. 
 
 To dispose, is to place a multitude of things 
 in a particular order, for the sake of conveni- 
 ence. The word arrangement, which is nearly 
 of the same meaning, is properly applied to 
 things: the word disposition, to the ideas or 
 themes of a discourse. 
 
 4* 
 
82 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT, 
 
 DISTINCTION, 
 
 Is the expressing, in words, some difference 
 which has been observed. To make a distinc- 
 tion without a difference, is, therefore, to utter 
 an unmeaning proposition : as if one were to 
 say, " I deprived jou of your rights ; but I did 
 you no wrong." 
 
 DISTRIBUTION, 
 
 Is the assigning of things to the places or 
 compartments which have been prepared to re- 
 ceive them. There nmst aheady have been a 
 classification of some kind, when a distribution 
 is made. Minds fond of classification, and of 
 order, think very much by the method of dis- 
 trihution ; that is to say, whatever new subject 
 is presented to their consideration, they rid 
 themselves of perplexity, not so much by a 
 strict and true analysis of it, as by distributing 
 the parts of which it seems to consist, accord- 
 ing to their customary mode of classifying 
 all things. 
 
 DIVISION, 
 
 Is the separating one and the same thing 
 into parts, or parcels, one of which is of the 
 same quality as another ; it is therefore distin- 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 88 
 
 guished from analysis, which is the separation 
 of the unlike component parts of a compound 
 body. 
 
 DOUBT, 
 
 Is some degree of belief, or supposition, that 
 what has been affirmed is true. Disbehef is 
 knowledge that it is not true. To admit a propo- 
 sition carelessly, or without regard to evidence, 
 is credulity : to affirm such a proposition posi- 
 tively, and authoritatively, is dogmatism. To 
 refuse assent to evidence, proportioned to its 
 force or validity, is scepticism ; that is to say, it 
 is to prefer doubt or io^noraiice to knowledge, 
 in some instance where a degree of certainty is 
 actually attainable. For any one to profess to 
 disbeheve a proposition when he does not know 
 that it is false, is an absurdity of the same sort 
 as to embrace opinions without evidence : it is 
 a real dogmatism concealed under the affecta- 
 tion of avoiding dogmatism. 
 
 DURATION 
 
 Is successive existence. Time is successive 
 existence measured into equal parts. We acquire 
 the notion of duration, or of continuous exist- 
 ence, thus : — when a thought, or sensation, 
 or feeling, ceases to engage the j^rijicipal atten- 
 
84 
 
 *-N.V.V .**•..<« 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 E L K M E N T S OF THOUGHT. 
 
 85 
 
 ll*"N<*N- ^>l,N., 
 
 tion of the mind, it does not instantaneously 
 and entirely disappear ; but seems gradually to 
 fade or retire, while another image or sensation 
 is taking its place; just as when, in travelling, 
 the objects we have passed keep in sight for a 
 while. The mind does not pass from one state 
 to another by sudden starts, but by insensible 
 transitions. We learn in this manner to think 
 of continued existence, or of successive con- 
 sciousness. And moreover by the constitution 
 of the mind, an image, or sensation, or feeling 
 often returns to it after a long interval has 
 elapsed, accompanied by the particular circum- 
 stances which were joined with it when first it 
 occurred ; and we are then impressed with the 
 conviction that it is not new to the mind, but a 
 repetition only of what long ago occupied the 
 thoughts: this is memory; and memory, to- 
 gether with the insensible passage of the mind 
 from one state to another, imparts the notion of 
 duration. In a manner analogous to this, we 
 acquire the notion of extension by touching 
 successively the contiguous parts of a solid body, 
 and by fixing the eye, successively, upon its 
 parts. The notion of extension is acquired by 
 means of the senses ; the notion of duration is 
 purely mental. 
 
 EFFECT, 
 
 Is, in a strict sense, a change produced by 
 jwxce?' (see Cause) ; but, in popular language, 
 whatever event invariably and immediately fol- 
 lows another, in such way that the idea of 
 power may be attributed to the first, is called 
 its effect. Thus, the dissolving of ice before 
 the fire, is said to be the effect of heat ; it being 
 supposed that heat has a power to dissolve 
 ice. But if the facts be examined more atten- 
 tively, it will seem quite as proper to say that 
 water, in a solid state, has a power to bring 
 heat into combination with itself, as to speak 
 of the power of heat. The fluidity of water 
 is the result of a mixture which takes place 
 w^here the two elements are brought into con- 
 tact ; and it is fair to presume that it takes 
 place in consequence of a fitness of the one 
 to the other. 
 
 ESSENCE. 
 
 All those properties, or qualities, which are 
 supposed to be necessary to any thing, or with- 
 out which it could not exist, are, when so 
 existing together, deemed to constitute its 
 essence. These essential qualities are dis- 
 tinguished from sucli as are accidental, or separ- 
 able, or are mere adjuucls. Three right lines 
 
 i 
 
86 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 joining are the essence of a triangle ; if one 
 be wanting, or if the three do not fall one upon 
 another, there is no triangle. But whether this 
 triangle be formed by the tracing of ink upon 
 paper, or by the junction of beams in a build- 
 ing, or by the stretching of cords on the earth, 
 is a mere circumstance, not affecting the essence, 
 and not altering any of its properties. A living 
 body united to a reasonable soul, is the essence 
 of a man : the form of that body may be 
 varied, or its parts removed, and the dispositions 
 of the mind changed : but the man remains, so 
 long as body and soul are united. 
 
 EVIDENCE, 
 
 Is a fact, or a series of facts, adduced for the 
 purpose of proving the truth of some other fact 
 that has been affirmed. It is asserted that John 
 Smith stole Samuel Brown's coat, and the 
 evidence adduced is, the two facts, 1st, that 
 John was seen to enter Samuel's apartment, 
 during his absence ; and, 2d, that a coat, which 
 Samuel knows to be his own, was found in 
 John's possession : very little is wanting in this 
 evidence to render it a complete proof of the al- 
 leged theft, audit maybe deemed absolutely con- 
 clusive, if the additional fact can be ascertained, 
 that John had been overheard, before the theft, 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 87 
 
 agreeing with a companion for the sale of 
 Samuel's coat, if he could steal it. The con- 
 clusiveness of evidence consists in such a con- 
 junction of a number of facts, that there re- 
 mains only one way in which they can all be 
 consistently explained ; and when that one way 
 does actually bring them all to an agreement. 
 
 EXISTENCE, 
 
 Is the same as being. That which is, is 
 said abstractedly to he, or to have exigence. 
 
 EXPERIMENT. 
 
 When what is passing before our eyes is at- 
 tentively observed, for the purpose of acquiring 
 a knowledge of the causes, or established order 
 of things, we are said to learn by observation. 
 But we learn by experiment, when, for the same 
 purpose, we put what we suppose to be causes, 
 in operation. After certain events have been 
 observed to take place, we form a conjecture as 
 to the cause of them ; and on the ground of 
 this conjecture, or hxjpothesis, as it is called, we 
 make experiments. For example; if the cause 
 of the aurora borealis, or northern lights, is 
 sought for, we observe the appearances they 
 assume at different times ; and by comparing 
 
88 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 these appearances— the colors, the coruscations, 
 the movements— with tliose of the electric fluid, 
 or of ignited gases, or of phosphoric fluids, we 
 endeavor to trace the efTect to its cause ; or, at 
 least, to establish a probable supposition on the 
 subject. But these aerial changes are far* 
 beyond our reach, and therefore cannot be sub- 
 jected to experiment. Not so that other at- 
 mospheric phenomenon— thunder and lightning. 
 Dr. Franklin surmised that lightning is the 
 same active and brilliant element which is pro- 
 duced by the friction of amber, and some other 
 substances. This was his hypothesis, or sup- 
 position. To ascertain its truth, he flew a kite 
 beneath a thunder cloud, having a small wire 
 attached to the string. From the lower end of 
 this wire he drew sparks which exhibited all 
 the properties and appearances of those pro- 
 duced by an electrical machine : this experi- 
 ment proved his first conjecture to have been 
 well founded. The science of chemistry is al- 
 most wholly founded upon experiment : that is, 
 the bringing of various substances together, for 
 the purpose of discovering in what manner they 
 act, one upon another. The mere observation 
 of such chemical changes as take place in the 
 course of nature, would affbrd a very Hmited 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 89 
 
 knowledge on such subjects, and would leave 
 almost all doubtful matters undecided. 
 
 EXTENSION. 
 
 The notion acquired by the sense of touch, 
 in moving the hand on the surface of a solid 
 body, and by comparing this sensation with the 
 sight of the same body, conveys to the mind 
 the notion of extension. From this abstract 
 idea we may separate the idea of solidity, or 
 resistance, and it is then designated by the word 
 space. Or we may add to it the idea of succes- 
 sive parts, numbered, and we gain the notion of 
 distance. Or again, to the notion of extension 
 may be added the idea of successive points, re- 
 lated to each other, and we then think oijigure 
 or shape. 
 
 FACT. 
 
 Either a particular event, proper to be ad- 
 duced as evidence, in proof of something affirm- 
 ed ; or a common event, happening in the ordi- 
 nary course of nature, and proper, therefore, to 
 form part of an inductive argument (see Induc- 
 tion), is called a fact. In the former sense, 
 facts are the basis of judicial proceedings. A 
 series of facts constitute a history. In the latter 
 sense, facts are the materials from which the 
 physical sciences are formed. 
 
90 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMRNTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 91 
 
 FALLACY. 
 
 An argument which seems conclusive, but is 
 not so, is fallacious ; that is to say, deceptive. 
 When such fallacies are designedly framed, for 
 the purpose of misleading those to whom they 
 are addressed, they are called sojMsms. A fal- 
 Jacy takes place—] st. When some one of the 
 things affirmed in an argument, and which is 
 important tQ the conclusion, is not true. 2d, 
 When the connexion between one fact and 
 another is not truly stated. 3d, When the 
 words implied are used in one sense, in one 
 part of the argument, and in another, in another 
 part : or w hen the sense assigned to such terms 
 is so vague or ambiguous, that an error slips in, 
 as it were, unperceived, in the course of the 
 argument. For instance : the argument by 
 which papists defend the usurpation of the 
 bishop of Rome is fallacious, because the facts 
 affirmed are not true, or not known to be as 
 they are stated. Our Lord, it is said, conferred 
 upon St. Peter a universal power, or jurisdic- 
 tion, over the souls and consciences of all man- 
 kind ; this authority St. Peter transferred to his 
 successor, the first bishop of Rome ; and it has, 
 in like manner, been handed down from bishop 
 to bishop, through all ages. To resist the au- 
 
 f 
 
 thority of the pope, is therefore to rebel against 
 the Lord. Now even if it were granted that 
 St. Peter received an authority of this kind 
 from Christ, it is not true, or at least can never 
 be proved to be so, that he transferred it to any 
 other. Again, it is not true, or can never be 
 proved to be so, that the first bishop of Rome 
 was appointed by St. Peter, or was in any 
 other sense his successor, than that in which 
 Clemens, and Polycarp, and Ignatius, w^ere the 
 successors of Paul, and John, and Peter. This 
 argument is also fallacious by its taking for 
 granted the connexion of one fact (even if in 
 itself true) w ith another. Again ; the pretended 
 proof of the real presence of Christ's body in 
 the sacramental bread, is a fallacy, by attribut- 
 ing a literal sense to words w Inch the nature of 
 the subject, as well as our Lord's usual mode 
 of teaching, demands to be understood in a 
 tropical or figurative sense. And that such is 
 the true value of the words is proved by apply- 
 ing the same rule of interpretation to other 
 instances. To detect fallacies, requires that 
 the truth of all the facts either affirmed or implied^ 
 should be inquired into ; that the alleged depen- 
 dence of one fact upon another should be ex- 
 amined ; and, that the sense assigned to each of 
 the important terms should be ascertained. 
 
92 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 93 
 
 GENERALIZATION, 
 
 In the Strictest sense, is gathering tip, from 
 a multitude of facts, a conclusion, or inference, 
 or rule, which is applicable to all, or which is 
 suggested by all. By an effort of abstraction, 
 we separate some one property, or peculiarity,' 
 from among others ; and after observing this 
 peculiarity in a number of instances, we di- 
 gest, or bring together, the co??i?non part of all 
 the instances : this mental process is generaliza- 
 tion. The propensity to generalize, constitutes 
 what is called the philosophical temper. It is 
 a desire to know, wol particular facts, but those 
 universal facts which, when known, enable us 
 to explain whatever particular facts present 
 themselves to our notice. When the tendency 
 of a certain mode of conduct, as, for instance, 
 procrastination, has been observed in a great 
 number of cases, we bring the conviction 
 that has gradually formed itself in our mind, 
 into the form of a general proposition, which,' 
 though it may be worded variously, contains 
 the ininciple, or truth— that, to defer till to- 
 morrow what should be done to-day, is a course 
 of conduct which often ends in ruin or disgrace. 
 This general truth we may safely apply to any 
 new instance of the same kind, and may pre- 
 
 dict the issue, as at least probable. Or, when 
 we learn from history that nations addicted to 
 agriculture have been easily subjugated, unless 
 they were also, to some considerable extent^ 
 commercial, we derive the general inference — 
 that the combination of agriculture and com- 
 merce is favorable to the political strength of a 
 nation. The process of deriving these infer- 
 ences from a number of facts, is generalization. 
 
 GENUS and SPECIES, 
 
 Are correlative terms, the one having no 
 meaning apart from the other. The resem- 
 blance or sameness of many things that are not 
 absolutely alike, brings them together in our 
 minds ; and we call the collection a genus, or 
 family. When the differences which distin- 
 guish some from others is noted, we distribute 
 them into species, (See Definition and 
 Difference.) 
 
 hypothesis, 
 
 From tifokcfig, a supposition. Experiments, 
 made with the intention of discovering the 
 causes of the effects we observe, would be vague 
 and fruitless, if we did not, in each instiance, 
 follow some probable conjecture or hypothesis. 
 
94 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT 
 
 That is to say, a cause is first guessed at, and 
 then experiments are instituted for the purpose 
 of trying whether we have been right or 
 wrong in our surmise. If wrong, we guess 
 again, and make a new trial. An hypothesis, 
 therefore, is not an unproved mpposition, to 
 which we give an idle assent ; but a means, or 
 instrument for gaining true knowledge. The 
 instance adduced under the word Experiment, 
 may be again referred to, for showing the use 
 of an hypothesis. The American philosopher 
 asked, " What is lightning V His supposition 
 or hypothesis was— it is electricity— or the 
 brilliant and active fire which is generated by 
 the friction or resin, or amber. It was to prove 
 or disprove his hypothesis that he made his ex- 
 periment. Or, to take another example: we 
 have observed that a certain spot in a meadow 
 produces a greater quantity of grass than the 
 rest of the field. We remember, too, that a 
 heap of various matters, rubbish, ashes, litter, 
 «&c. had for some time lain upon that spot ; now 
 (supposing that we were entirely ignorant of 
 the virtues of manure) we should, as it were 
 involuntarily, imagine that the heap of rubbish 
 had been, in some way, the cause of the su- 
 perior fertiUty of the spot. To ascertain the 
 correctness of this hypothesis, we cover another 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 95 
 
 spot with earth, or sand, in order to find whether 
 the mere circumstance of covering the sward, 
 for a time, was the reason of the fact in ques- 
 tion. But no such eflfect is found to be pro- 
 duced in this instance. Our next supposition 
 is, that some one of the several matters con- 
 tained in the first heap was the true cause we 
 are in search of, and we proceed to deposit a 
 parcel of each ingredient — ashes, sea-weed, 
 stable litter, decayed vegetables, &c. separately, 
 on diffierent spots ; and, after the lapse of some 
 time, observe that, on one there is no increased 
 fertility, while the others exhibit increased ver- 
 dure in various degrees. This experiment, or 
 trial, has determined our hypothesis. It is in 
 this manner that all substantial knowledge of 
 the laws of nature is acquired. And almost 
 every addition to our knowledge suggests some 
 new hypothesis, and leads to new discoveries. 
 
 IDEA. 
 
 This word is /)ften applied to any kind of 
 thought, or notion, or belief; but its more proper 
 use is restricted to such thoughts as are images 
 of visible objects, w^iether actually seen and 
 remembered, or compounded by the faculty of 
 
96 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 imagination. The words notion, or opinion, 
 would often be well substituted for the word 
 idea, 
 
 IDENTITY, 
 
 Is absolute sarneyiess in substance; and is 
 affirmed more usually of persons, than of 
 things. John yesterday, and John ten years 
 ago, and to-day, is identically the same person, 
 although the matter of his body has undergone 
 many changes, as well as the dispositions and 
 habits of his mind. The conviction or con- 
 sciousness of personal identity, or of continued 
 sameness, from the commencement to the end 
 of life, is conveyed by memory ; but does not 
 depend upon, or consist in memory. A man 
 who by disease, or intemperance, loses all recol- 
 lection of his early years, does not cease to be 
 the same person, though he is ignorant of being 
 so. We grant that to be identically the same, 
 through a long course of time, which has un- 
 dergone none but gradual and partial changes. 
 It is thus that the human bady, in its course 
 from infancy to age, is thought of as identically 
 the same. The identity of the soul, or rational 
 power, is believed to depend upon its unalter- 
 able and imperishable spirituality. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 IMAGINATION. 
 
 97 
 
 The power of the mind to decompose its 
 conceptions, and to recombine the elements of 
 them at its pleasure, is called its faculty of ima- 
 gination. Imagination is distinguished from 
 memory, not merely by the activity of the mind 
 in the former case, but by the diversified com- 
 poshion of its ideas. To think of the heavens, 
 as glowing like a furnace, and peopled with 
 aerial armies, is to imagine, or to bring together 
 the parts of many actual conceptions. This 
 sort of mental creation is carried on, usually, 
 under the influence of the taste for what is 
 beautiful and sublime. To imagine things 
 neither pleasing, nor grand, nor in any way 
 adapted to excite agreeable emotions, belongs 
 to a fantastic or disordered mind. Poetical 
 genius seems to include, 1st, A power of ab- 
 straction in the senses, which enables the mind 
 to separate the qualities and appearances of 
 objects one from another : for unless they were 
 so separated, they would not offer themselves 
 ready for recombination ; 2d, A power of vivid 
 conception ; 3d, A great susceptibility to the 
 emotions of beauty and sublimity ; 4th, A 
 prompt correspondence between these emotions 
 and the moral sentiments ; 5th, A nice judg- 
 
 5 
 
•-V . .-N.- 
 
 98 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ment, in fixing the boundary between sobriety 
 and extravagance ; 6th, A quick recollection 
 of words : and 7th, An ear, or sense of the 
 rhythm, or mutual relations of words, as mere 
 sounds, 
 
 IMPOSSIBLE ; 
 
 That which cannot be affirmed, or imagined, 
 without involving some absurdity ; as, that all 
 the parts of a thing together should make more 
 or less than the whole. When it is said, as 
 sometimes, that it is impossible that God should 
 do so and so, all that can be properly intended 
 is, that a contradiction in terms, or a direct 
 absurdity, is contained iu the supposition of the 
 
 contrarv. 
 
 IMPRESSION. 
 
 Whenever, either through the senses, or from 
 its own feelings, the mind has undergone a 
 change, or has passed from one state to another, 
 passively, it is said to have received an iinpres- 
 sion — in allusion to the image that is imprinted 
 upon softened wax. 
 
 INDEFINITE PROPOSITIONS, 
 
 Are those which do not limit the affirmation 
 they contain, or declare whether it be universal, 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 99 
 
 or proper to a part, or an individual. "Men 
 are creatures of habit," 9?iight be understood 
 to mean, that 77iani/ men, or so??ie men are so ; 
 though the nature of the proposition implies 
 that it is intended to be universal. An indefi- 
 nite form of speaking is proper when no ambi- 
 guity is likely to arise; as if it were said, 
 "Men are mortal;" but then the abstract forni 
 is preferable—" Man is mortal." If it were 
 said—" Men are knaves," the indefinite form of 
 the proposition would seem to convey a false 
 assertion— namely, that all men are knaves. 
 
 INDUCTION, 
 
 Is the drawing, or leading off an inference, 
 or general fact, from a number of instances. 
 Or, it is the summing up of the result of obser- 
 vations and experiments. It was Lord Bacon 
 who introduced this term into philosophy ; and 
 who moreover taught the true method of ac- 
 quiring a knowledge of the laws of nature, by 
 attending to facts, and by carefully comparino- 
 a great number of instances ; instead of the old 
 method of philosophising, which consisted in 
 forming a theory, or supposition, independently 
 of all facts, and then explaining the appear- 
 ances of nature on the blind assumption that 
 
<.• •».'VV^*.-v%.^ 
 
 100 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 the theory was true. The old method was the 
 shortest and easiest ; but it w^as utterly falla- 
 cious. The niodcrn, or Baconian method, is 
 laborious, and difficult ; but it is successful, and 
 has proved in the highest degree beneficial. 
 See the words Experiment and Hypothesis. 
 
 INFERENCE. 
 
 Is a fact or truth, affirmed on the ground of 
 its known or supposed connexion with some 
 other fact, or truth, which is already established, 
 or admitted. A. and B. are known, or believed, 
 to be inseparable companions : if therefore we 
 see A. we infer that B. is not far distant. The 
 confidence with which we rely upon tlie truth 
 of inferences, results from that persuasion, 
 which is natural to the human mind, and which 
 is insensibly produced by the uniformity of 
 nature (and it springs also from the conscious- 
 ness of power) that every effect has a cause, 
 and that tbe connexion between causes and 
 effects is invariable : or that events which have 
 been seen constantly to succeed one the other, 
 in a certain order, will continue to do so. The 
 manner in which inferences are to be drawn from 
 facts, may be thus exemplified: — On landing 
 upon an unknown shore, we observe the prints 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 101 
 
 of human feet on the sands, and infer that the 
 country is inhabited ; for the mould of a human 
 foot must be the result, not of the impression of 
 the waves, but of a cause proper to its produc- 
 tion ; and this can be nothing else but the foot of 
 man. These prints are fresh, and are found below 
 the level of high water. — We infer then again, 
 that some human being is not far distant ; for 
 the action of the waves must (according to the 
 established order of nature) have obliterated 
 them, had they been impressed before the last 
 flow of the tide. Again, the prints are those, 
 not only of naked feet, but of feet that have 
 never been confined by the habit of wearing 
 shoes : — it is then prohable, if not certain, that 
 these men are savages. In these instances of 
 assuming a fact, of which we have none but 
 indirect evidence, all the confidence of our be- 
 Hef springs from the persuasion, both that every 
 effect must have a cause, and that every effect must 
 have a cause suited to it, in all its conditions. Or, 
 in other words, that every jiart, ^inAjvoperty, and 
 circumstance of an effect, must have a cause pro- 
 per to itself. Independently of any process of 
 reasoning, effects with which we are familiar, 
 instantaneously suggest to the mind their causes ; 
 —the inference is immediate. 
 
 Inferences are liable to be erroneous, chiefly 
 
102 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 from two causes : 1st, Certain events are sup- 
 posed to be connected, as cause and effect, 
 when the connexion between them is in truth 
 merely accidental. Superstitious inferences 
 are of this sort; as, for instance, when some 
 trivial occurrence, or simple accident, is supposed 
 to be a prognostic of calamity or death, because 
 in fact it has happened more than once soon 
 before some such disastrous event. This is a 
 false inference, because there is no real con- 
 nexion between such occurrences and the mis- 
 fortunes or death with which they have been 
 associated. 2dly, Inferences are false, when, 
 from among two or more causes that might 
 have produced a certain effect, we hastily fix 
 upon one, without attending to the others ; as 
 thus :— A letter is received professing to contain 
 a note or cheque ; but it is not in fact there ; 
 and moreover the seal presents some appear- 
 ance of having been broken, and repaired ; and 
 the letter passed through the hands of a servant, 
 whose integrity we have some reason to doubt. 
 The inference which immediately suggests itself 
 is, that this servant has withdrawn the note. 
 But it is not a conclusive inference, and may 
 actually appear to have been a false one. On 
 writing to his correspondent, the person learns 
 that, after he had sealed the letter, he re-opened 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 103 
 
 it to add a postscript, and that, in so doing, the 
 note fell out, and was not seen until after the 
 letter was dispatched. This mode of account- 
 ing for the fact might have been imagined, as 
 well as several other suppositions, and ought to 
 have prevented the hasty inference which im- 
 plied the dishonesty of the servant. Nothing 
 is more characteristic of a sound and calm mind, 
 than the habit of suspending the judgment 
 when evidence is ambiguous ; or of abstaining 
 from plausible but inconclusive inferences. 
 Weak minds from fear, and ardent minds from 
 presumption, usually fix upon the first or most 
 obvious inference which the circumstances of 
 the case suggest. The important distinction 
 between a conjecture and an inference should 
 always be kept in mind : the former is the sup- 
 position of a particular cause, where more than 
 one are before us, from which to choose. An 
 inference, when just, is the only cause that can 
 be rationally assumed, by which to account for 
 the effect in question. 
 
 INFINITE ; 
 
 That which has no limits; or to which limits 
 have not actually been assigned. A line is said 
 to be infinite, though not more than an inch in 
 
104 
 
 ELKMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 105 
 
 length, if drawn as a mere line, without regard 
 to Its length : a finite line is one that is hounded 
 bj two given, or known points. The word 
 infinite is very frequently used iniproperly, in- 
 stead of the \n ox A^ perfect, or ahsolute. When 
 qualities are spoken of which can neither be 
 numbered or measured, there can be no proper 
 idea attached to the phrase, if they are called 
 either finite or infinite. Snow is not infinitely 
 but perfectly white. If the divine attrif)utes of 
 wisdom, power, goodness, are spoken of as in- 
 finite, It is only by an allowable accommodation 
 of the term. All that is intended is, that the 
 perfections of the Divine Being surpass all our 
 knowledge, or faculties of comprehension 
 God IS perfectly, and absolutely, rather than in- 
 finitely, wise, holy, and good. 
 
 INSTINCT. 
 
 Many of the animal tribes, and insects, and 
 especially birds, perform operations which implv 
 not merely forethought, and a calculation of 
 cause and effect, but a perfect Imoivledge of the 
 most difficult problems of geometry ; as, for in- 
 stance—the construction of the honey-coinb, 
 which, in the figure and combination of thJ 
 cells, is strictly conformed to the highest mathe- 
 
 
 matical principles. And yet this knowledge 
 cannot be imagined to reside in the animal. 
 For if it did, we should see that it would be 
 more or less perfect in different individuals ; and 
 would be improved by experience, and would 
 
 show itself in other modes,and on other occasions ; 
 and we should almost certainly find mistakes to 
 be sometimes committed. But the contrary in 
 all these points is the fact. We are compelled, 
 therefore, to impute the knowledge and the fore- 
 thought to the Creator, and to consider the 
 animal only as the unconscious or unreasoning 
 instrument of what it performs. This blind 
 mode of operation — quite inconceivable by the 
 human mind, is what we mean by the word 
 Instinct. Reason, as distinguished from instinct, 
 is the knowledge of the relation between 
 means and end ; or cause and effect. And in 
 this sense animals are, though in an inferior 
 degree, endowed with reason. They act just 
 as man acts, from knowledge and forethought, 
 in a considerable part of their movements. 
 
 INTELLECTUAL POWERS, 
 
 Are distinguished from the animal appetites, 
 and from the moral faculties, or sensibilities : 
 that is to say, from all mere sensations, and 
 
 5* 
 
•■^•s^ * ««u% 
 
 106 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 desires, and emotions, and tastes. To perceive 
 external objects, to conceive of them, to re- 
 member, to imagine, to compare, to judge, to 
 abstract, and to analyse, to connect thought 
 with thought, according to the real relation be- 
 tween one notion and another ; — these are the 
 employments of the intellectual powers ; and 
 these occupations of the mind, though most 
 often, if not always connected with, or preced- 
 ed, or followed by desires or emotions, of some 
 sort, are essentially different from loving, hating, 
 fearing, hoping, &c. 
 
 INTUITION, 
 
 From intueor, to look upon, or to look into 
 with some attention. Whatever relation of one 
 thing to another may be perceived or under- 
 stood imtanthj, and without the aid of any in- 
 termediate comparisons, is said to be known by 
 intuition: as that these two lines are of equal 
 length. 
 
 But if it were affirmed that these 
 
 are to each other as seven is to ten, very few 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 107 
 
 persons would intuitively/ perceive the truth of the 
 assertion ; and to prove it we must have recourse 
 to a comparison of the parts of both ; or, in 
 other words, to a number of intuitions. This 
 sort of proof is a demonstration which differs 
 from intuition, by its consisting of several in- 
 tuitive truths. Truths intuitively perceived are 
 called axioms. 
 
 INVENTION. 
 
 This word, though derived from the Latin 
 invenio, to find, or meet with, has acquired a 
 different sense, and signifies to devise, or imagine, 
 or to put together. It is thus applied to two 
 very different operations of the mind, namely, 
 poetical, and mechanical invention. Poetical 
 invention is the bringing together images and 
 sentiments adapted to excite certain pleasurable 
 emotions, or to enkindle the imagination, and 
 gratify taste; and it depends upon the ready 
 perception of external resemblances, or apparent 
 analogies. But mechanical invention results 
 from an effort of abstraction, in discerning and 
 bringing together certain properties of bodies, 
 for the production of a particular result. An 
 end is proposed ; as for instance, the raising of 
 a massive stone to its lofty place in a building. 
 How shall this be done? — naked human strength 
 
108 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 IS altogether insufficient. In what way then 
 may human strength, or other forces, be applied 
 to the stone witJi such advantage as shall render 
 the operation facile, safe, and not too costly ? 
 The exchange between power and time, which 
 IS effected by the lever, the inclined plane, the 
 screw, the pulley, are then thought of; and a 
 choice is niade, first among these various means, 
 and then among the various modes of apnlvin<r 
 each. ' "^ "= 
 
 The vast difference between the reasoning 
 faculty of man and animals, is especially dis- 
 played in the extent to which the power of 
 devising means for the attainment of an end is 
 carried by man, in consequence of his greater 
 power of abstraction :— the most simple instru- 
 ment, or tool, is a product of the faculty of ab- 
 straction ; nor is there reason to suppose that, 
 even if the paws of animals were better fitted 
 than they arc to the holding of tools, animals 
 could construct or employ them, unless their 
 mental faculties were also enlarged. 
 
 Men and beasts alike betake themselves to 
 the shelter of trees, or rocks, during a storm • 
 thus far they both seek to accomplish an end 
 by the use of means. But the animal advances 
 no further than to recollect, on after occasions, 
 the connexion between the tree, or rock, and 
 
 »„i» •*>* 1^ "N-'W 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 109 
 
 the feeling of protection from rain and wind, 
 which it has afforded. Man not merely re- 
 members this connexion, but thinks abstract- 
 edly of the several objects which have screened 
 him from the tempest. He thinks of shelter ; 
 this is an abstract notion, and having formed it, 
 whether consciously or not to himself, he per- 
 ceives that it may belong to other things than 
 the tree, or the rock, or the cavern ; and he 
 brings together, in the most advantageous 
 manner, such materials as will, when so united, 
 realize most completely his abstract idea : — the 
 hut of the savage, constructed of rough branches 
 and wattled boughs and leaves and dried grass, 
 is nothing else than the embodying of an ab- 
 straction. The same may be said of all, even 
 the most finished works of human ingenuity. 
 When animals — the bee, or the beaver, or the 
 white ant — embody an abstract idea, they do 
 so in an invariable manner : — they commit no 
 blunders ; — make no improvements ; — and ex- 
 ercise their skill at once, and without instruction. 
 This is manifestly not the product of a mental 
 process, like that of man, when he exercises 
 invention. We must therefore attribute the 
 knowledge to the Creator, and designate the 
 unintelligent agency by another term ; or call 
 it INSTINCT. Invention is distinguished from 
 
110 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT, 
 
 discovery, which is the finding out something 
 already existing ; whereas invention is a sort of 
 creation. The finding out the polarity of 
 the magnet was a discovery : the apphcation of 
 that discovery to the purposes of navigation, 
 by suspending a magnetic wire on a pivot, over 
 a circular index, was an invention. 
 
 JUDGMENT, 
 
 Is the action of the mind in deciding, or pro- 
 nouncing, concerning two things, when placed 
 in comparison, that they are equal, or unequal ; 
 hke, or unHke ; that the one contains the other, 
 or bears such or such a relation to it. It is by 
 successive judgments, or by the regular compar- 
 ing of one idea or notion with another, until 
 we reach some one which at first was seen in 
 the distance, that a process of reasoning is 
 carried on. 
 
 The excellence of the judgment, as a faculty 
 of the mind, depends, in the first place, upon 
 the clearness of its ideas, the precision or jex- 
 actness of its power of abstraction ; and upon its 
 power of attention. But the moral character, or 
 the habitual motives of the mind, have very 
 much to do with the soundness and excellence 
 of the judgment This will appear if we ex- 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 Ill 
 
 amine the real meaning of those epithets which 
 are most frequently applied to the judgment, 
 by way of distinction. Most of them express 
 the freedom of the mind from some sort of pre- 
 judice, or improper motive, or disturbing in- 
 fluence. The mind never acts without some 
 motive ; now the ruling motive, when it is to 
 exercise judgment, should manifestly be — the 
 desire to arrive at a true result. A nd this motive 
 should be both vivid and permanent, or it will 
 not prevail over opposite impulses, or over the 
 inertness of the mind. The phrase, a sound 
 judgment, means that the mind has so healthy, 
 or vigorous a habit of pursuing truth, that it is 
 not diverted or led astray by those tastes, or 
 prejudices, or preferences, which are always at 
 hand to influence our decisions. A calm judg- 
 ment is one which is not swayed or intimidated 
 by the passions or vehemence of other men ; or 
 which can serenely carry on its intellectual 
 operations, amid many surrounding agitations. 
 A cool judgment is nearly the same thing; or 
 if distinguishable from the calmness o{ t\\Q ]v\Ag- 
 ment, it refers to freedom from external disturb- 
 ances : while coolness relates to such as are in- 
 ternal ; namely — a nervous irritability of the 
 body ; a lively and excitable imagination ; an 
 excessive sensibility of the moral feehngs ; — or 
 
112 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGH T 
 
 113 
 
 the prevalence of malignant passions. Those 
 who are distinguished bv this cahnness and 
 coolness of judgment possess a great advantage 
 in their transactions with others ; for it is a rare 
 excellence, and enables a man both to attain a 
 true result more certainly, and to attain it more 
 speedily than those with whom he has to 
 do. While they are carried hither and thither, 
 by their prejudices, their wishes, their hopes, or 
 their fears, he has gained a just view of the 
 business in question ; and is, at his leisure, cal- 
 culating all the consequences of the line of con- 
 duct he means to pursue. It may however be 
 observed, that this calmness and coolness of 
 mind, when belonging to vulgarity and sordid- 
 ness of character, commonly generates a self- 
 conceit, or vanity, which becomes an indirect 
 motive, and leads the understanding astray. 
 Men of this sort, in order to gain the immediate 
 gratification of having reached an unfair ad- 
 vantage over the simple, confine their views to 
 the present moment ; and while they snatch at 
 a trifling profit, are blind to their own greater 
 and future interests. Cunning, or worldly wis- 
 dom, is the usual designation of this sort of 
 intellectual short-sightedness, which is produced 
 in vain and vulgar minds that possess the ad- 
 vantage of a cool judgment. 
 
 The epithets acute, profound, and comiirehcn- 
 sive, appUed to the judgment, express diffl'rent 
 degrees, or kinds, of activity, and of force, in 
 the intellect. Next to the many perverting 
 motives which are the great sources of errors 
 of judgment, a principal cause of false or im- 
 perfect conclusions is that indolence, or inert- 
 ness, from which very few minds are altogether 
 exempt. In many minds intellectual action 
 ceases, or falters, before the process of compar- 
 ing objects or notions is completed. These 
 unfinished comparisons, if deemed to be perfect, 
 are necessarily false judgments. The activity, 
 or the energy, which resists this inertness, dis- 
 plays itself in different modes, as for example : 
 — A mind that is capable of a short vigorous 
 effort, will complete a single process of thought, 
 and produce a perfect comparison of two or 
 three objects. This is what constitutes an acute 
 judgment. A 7?/7?/^?/wrf judgment is one that is 
 capable of long-continued and patient exertion, 
 and in which the desire of truth is tranquil and 
 steady, so that every comparison is carefully 
 made, and the entire series of comparisons is 
 pursued, until the matter in question is examined 
 in all its breadth and depth. 
 
 When a vivid and steady desire of truth is 
 conjoined with modesty and with great tran- 
 
114 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 quillitj, and ingenuousness of temper, there will 
 be a frequent return of the mind to the same 
 subject, as if to examine anew its former con- 
 clusions. This will leave room for the admis- 
 sion of new considerations, which heretofore 
 may have been neglected ; and thus frequent 
 amendments, or revisions of such conclusions 
 will take place : and a habit will be formed of 
 suspending the mental process in expectation 
 of new light or more evidence. These habits 
 form what is termed a ^^w;;;-^//^^z.sw judgment; 
 or an enlarged mode of thinking. Acute minds 
 are often hurried into error from the want of 
 this sort of revision of their opinions; and pro- 
 found minds are liable to err by the too con- 
 tinuous and unbroken fixing of the mind upon 
 a single train of ideas ; so that facts or princi- 
 ples whicb, though nearly connected with the 
 subject before them, Uc on one side, are over- 
 looked. — It is thus often that the learned lose 
 themselves in depths, where common minds 
 easily find their way. Acuteness, profoundness, 
 and even comprehensiveness of judgment, are 
 not seldom found apart from evenness or serenity 
 of temper ; in such cases the intellectual excel- 
 lence shows itself only in favorable seasons, or 
 when no vivid motive agitates the spirit. Some 
 persons exhibit consunnnate ability, and great 
 
 *»%A»*V^*,^*y* 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 115 
 
 soundness of judgment in managing other men's 
 affairs, or in giving advice where they are not 
 personally interested ; though ihey invariably 
 mismanage their own concerns: — m their own 
 concerns, their intellectual faculties are perturbed 
 by their hopes, fears, passions, or anxieties. It 
 is thus, often, that studious men, who display 
 the highest degree of acuteness or force of 
 mind, while occupied in their closets, with 
 literary or scientific matters, act like children, 
 if exposed to the agitations of public life. 
 
 LIBERTY, 
 
 As an abstract term, is opposed to necessity, 
 and means the absence of restraint, or hin- 
 drance, or interruption in the performance of an 
 action, or the fulfilment of any desire. (See 
 Necessity.) 
 
 LOGIC, 
 
 Considered as a science, explains the opera- 
 tion of the mind in reasoning, or in discovering 
 truth. As an art it teaches the method of 
 managing the faculties of abstraction, generah- 
 zation, and judgment, to the greatest advantage ; 
 and gives rules also for detecting fallacious or 
 sophistical arguments. Logic has, in modern 
 times, been much neglected and despised, in 
 
116 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 consequence of the futile matter, or the un- 
 meaning jargon, with which, formerly, it 
 abounded. It is well that the ancient system 
 of wrangling about trifles should be discarded ; 
 but it is nevertheless true that the mind maybe 
 greatly strengthened and aided by that sort of 
 training and exercise which is scarcely at all 
 attempted in modern education. A man may 
 be both strong and brave who is taken un- 
 trained from the plough ; but neither his strength 
 nor courage will be of much service in a field 
 of battle, until he has learned to employ both 
 with the precision, promptitude, and subordina- 
 tion, which are taught by the military exercise. 
 And thus too, good sense, and strength of mind, 
 are often baffled or overthrown by the subtilty 
 of a crafty reasoner, merely because the mind 
 wants the training which a sound and rational 
 system of logic might afford. 
 
 MAJOR, MINOR, and MIDDLE TERMS 866 
 
 SYLLOGISM. 
 
 MATTER, 
 
 That which occupies space, which, when so 
 occupied, is called extension. Matter becomes 
 known to the mind by its obstructing the move- 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 117 
 
 ments of the body, and by its affecting at the 
 same time the organ of sight. Having gained 
 the knowledge of that which is solid and visible, 
 we think of it as a substance, which supports, 
 or contains all the various qualities of color, 
 figure, density, fragrance, taste, &c. that affect 
 the senses. All we have knowledge of is either 
 7nind or matter. The former feels, and knows, 
 and moves the latter ; the latter makes impres- 
 sions on the senses, and resists the power of 
 movement. 
 
 MEMORY, 
 
 Is the presence of some image or notion in 
 the mind, attended by those accidental circum- 
 stances which connect it with our past consci- 
 ousness. It is this faculty of memory which 
 maintains in the mind, from day to day, and 
 from year to year, the conviction of personal 
 identity, amid the greatest changes of disposi- 
 tion, or external condition. And, by a tacit 
 inference from this feeling of past and continuous 
 existence, we learn to look forward to a remote 
 futurity. The faculty of memory, in different 
 minds, has various excellencies and defects. In 
 some minds it is ready ; that is to say, it in- 
 stantly brings forward the particular recollec- 
 tions that are required by the occasion. In 
 
118 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 otiiers it is retentive of whatever has once been 
 impressed on it ; bin does not act so promptly, 
 when called to produce its evidence. In others 
 It receives with great facihty new impressions ; 
 retains them in perfection for a short time but 
 very quiciilj loses every trace of its acquisitions. 
 The memory is perhaps more nearly, than any 
 other faculty, connected with the state of the 
 bram as a hodihj organ ;— it is most perfect in 
 youth, and is the first of the mental powers to 
 exhibit the effects of age : it is impaired, or 
 sometimes entirely lost, in consequence of in- 
 juries on the head ; and has been recovered 
 when such injuries have been remedied. The 
 memory also is susceptible of very great im- 
 provement, by exercise ; and, on the contrary 
 becomes almost torpid, if neglected. The' 
 training and exercise of the memory should 
 therefore be a principal business of education. 
 1 here is however nothing which more enfeebles 
 the reasoning powers, and checks the imagina- 
 tion, than an excessive or exclusive exercise of 
 the memory. 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The knowledge of things actually existing 
 whether material or immaterial, is comprehended 
 under the different branches of physical or na- 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 1J9 
 
 tural philosophy ; such as natural history, me- 
 chanical philosophy, chemistry, &c. or pneiima- 
 tology, which is the science of mind. But 
 there are abstract or universal truths — principles 
 which would be true whether or not the world 
 and its inhabitants existed ; or if the world, and 
 all it contains, were altogether unlike what it 
 is. The knowledge of these universal truths, 
 and their relation one to another, is taught by 
 metaphysics. The pure mathematics, or higher 
 principles of geometry and arithmetic, stand in 
 the same relation to mechanical science, and to 
 what is called the mixed mathematics, which 
 exists between metaphysics and the philosophy 
 of the human mind. As for example— the pro- 
 portion between the diameter and circumference 
 of a circle, which is nearly as 113 to 355, 
 would be the same, though no material world 
 existed, and is absolutely independent of all the 
 laws and arrangements of the actual world. 
 But such principles as the laws of gravitation, 
 which regulate the movements of the planets,' 
 and the attractions and repulsions that exist 
 among different bodies, and the refraction of 
 Hght, are facts in the constitution of the ma- 
 terial system, and are learned by observation 
 and experiment. And thus, in like manner, 
 those facts which have been mentioned under 
 
120 
 
 E L E M E IV T S OF THOUGHT. 
 
 the articles Judgment, Memory, Imagination, 
 belong to the real and actual constitution of the 
 human mind ; which might have been otherwise 
 framed than it is. But such trutlis as these— 
 Every effect must have a Cause— There must 
 be a First Cause— and a Self-existent Being, 
 are abstract and unchangeable principles; and 
 belong to Metaphysics, 
 
 METHOD, 
 
 Is the arranging of our knowledge in that 
 order which renders it most intelligible to others, 
 whom we wish to instruct. It is a disposition, 
 having in view a specific object. Methodical 
 halHts of thinking should not be mistaken for 
 philosophical habits, in which there is more of 
 analysis, and of generalization, than of obvious 
 arrangement. 
 
 MIND, 
 
 Is that which perceives, feels, remembers, 
 acts, and is conscious of continued existence. 
 
 MODE. 
 
 The manner or conditions under which a 
 thing exists, is called its mode :— figure and 
 color are modes of matter. This term is merely 
 logical, and of little utility. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 121 
 
 NATURE. 
 
 All the properties or qualities, taken together, 
 which are deemed proper to a thing, or insepa- 
 rable from it, constitute its nature or essence. 
 The word nature is a mere term of conveni- 
 ence, which briefly signifies all the ordinary 
 or most important qualities of the thing we 
 speak of. 
 
 NECESSITY. 
 
 As an abstract term, is opposed, 1st, to Con- 
 tingency, which means either the happening of 
 events without any cause why they should 
 happen, and then necessity means only that 
 every effect has a cause ; or contingency means 
 that there is no absurdity or contradiction in sup- 
 posing that something which does exist, might 
 not have existed ; as for example, some parti- 
 cular species of animals ; for we can conceive 
 very well of a world in w4iich there were no 
 lions, or no elephants : — lions and elephants are, 
 therefore, contingent, not necessary beings. Or, 
 2dly, Necessity is often opposed to liberty ; but 
 an improper or unintelligible sense is assigned 
 to the word, when so employed, unless it is 
 merely intended to affirm, that no cause can 
 operate beyond its sphere, or that no being can 
 
 6 
 
122 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 go beyond its powers and faculties ; — but then 
 some such word as limitation is to be preferred. 
 A stone necessarily remains where it Hes, until 
 it be moved by some foreign cause. An animal 
 necessarily pursues the instincts of its nature ; 
 and a necessity of nature denies to man the 
 liberty of soaring through the air. These forms 
 of speaking add nothing to the clearness or 
 precision of our notions ; and have arisen out 
 of absurd disputations. Necessity, certainty, 
 possibility, impossibility, i&c. are words (as they 
 are familiarly used) which indicate only a higher 
 or lower degree of knowledge of the hidden 
 causes of things. One man regards a future 
 event as contingent — probable — possible, which 
 another pronounces to be necessary, certain, or 
 impossible. As thus: — A bowing wall, or a 
 tottering house, is looked at by two persons; 
 one, if asked whether it will stand a year 
 longer, replies, <* That it viay stand so long, but 
 its doing so is contingent, or probable, or im- 
 probable." But the other, who is a builder, and 
 who has examined the foundations and the 
 fissures, and held his plumb-hne to the up- 
 rights, affirms, that the whole will fall to the 
 ground in a few days ; — he says it will neces- 
 sarily fall : that is to say — he who speaks iwc^zr^ 
 the causes on which the event depends ; the 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 123 
 
 other is ignorant of them, and thought the 
 event in question a chance. (See Contingency 
 and Liberty.) 
 
 NEGATIVE and POSITIVE, 
 
 Are correlative terms, when causes or qualities 
 are spoken of. Beneficence is a positive virtue. 
 Justice may, in a sense, be called a negative 
 virtue ; for it may be defined as consisting in 
 not invading the rights of others. Negative 
 and affirmative are the correlative terms, if ap- 
 plied to propositions. As — *' Piety, with con- 
 tentment, is great gain :" this is a positive pro- 
 position. *' Riches will not ensure happiness," 
 
 IS negative. 
 
 NOMINAL and REAL, 
 
 Are terms occurring in the history of intel- 
 lectual philosophy, and refer to an absurd dispute, 
 long carried on with great violence and rancor, 
 on the question, whether general ideas, or essen- 
 tial forms, have any real existence — no one can 
 say where — as Plato imagined ; or whether 
 they are nothing more than the notions formed 
 in the human mind, after contemplating things, 
 as genus and qyecies. The adherents of the 
 former opinion were called Realists, those of the 
 latter Nominalists. 
 
~»~ J^ 
 
 124 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 125 
 
 NOTION. 
 
 The word idea is most properly applied to 
 images of things in the mind, retained or re- 
 called ; while the word notion signifies complex 
 abstractions of some kind, such as those of 
 justice, truth, equality, disproportion, &c. 
 
 ORDER, 
 
 Is a fixed succession of many things — which 
 succession has reference to some intention, and 
 is the consequence of arrangement. Or the 
 word order is used more abstractedlv, in rela- 
 tion to number, spoken of, not in the aggregate, 
 but as consisting of successive integers, the 
 relative place of each being noted — as the 7th, 
 8th, 9th. 
 
 OPINION. 
 
 Facts or principles which rest upon demon- 
 stration are known. Facts established by good 
 and sufficient evidence, are helieved. Abstract 
 or speculative principles, confirmed by argu- 
 ments which we deem conclusive or satisfac- 
 tory, though they may not seem so to others, 
 are matters of opinion. We know, or may 
 know, that a square, raised upon a hypothenuse, 
 is equal to the two squares together, that are 
 
 raised upon the upright and base line of a right- 
 angled triangle. We believe that Brutus killed 
 Caesar. It is our opinion, that a Umited mon- 
 archy is preferable to a democracy. The word 
 opinion is most frequently applied to abstract 
 propositions, which are matters of dispute, and 
 which excite a lively interest, such, for example, 
 as political or religious principles. 
 
 The circumstances of education, habit, and 
 interest, or association ; or even the tastes and 
 incHnations that belong to the imagination, have, 
 with most men, more influence in the determi- 
 nation of their opinions, than the mere argu- 
 ments that support such principles. It is to be 
 remembered, that in questions which do not 
 admit of demonstrative reasoning, or on which 
 the evidence is not of the most obvious and 
 irresistible kind, there is always room for the 
 establishment of a contrary supposition ; so that 
 even the most improbable opinion, if viewed 
 exclusively in the light of those few evidences 
 which give it an appearance of truth, may seem 
 reasonable. And if the mind has acquired the 
 habit of timidly, or resentfully, or perversely 
 turning away from all evidence but that which 
 favors its prejudices, or interests, its pride, or its 
 indolence, it may hold or defend an error of 
 opinion, without direct insincerity, or conscious 
 
126 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 dishonesty. And after a while, the inconcki- 
 sive evidence, which at first perhaps by no means 
 satisfied the understanding, has made itself so 
 famihar, so intelligible, and has assumed so fair 
 an aspect, and has insensibly drawn to itself so 
 many little corroborations, that all doubt and 
 suspicion is for ever dismissed ; and the mind 
 becomes absolutely enslaved by its own delu- 
 sions. 
 
 Though the majority of mankind adhere, 
 through life, to the opinions they may have 
 adopted from education, or interest ; instances 
 of a change of opinion are not uncommon. 
 Such changes take place from various causes. 
 Some men are very often veering from point to 
 point, in consequence of instability of disposition. 
 There is a feeble activity — an irresolute force, 
 iii the mind, which at once prevents its attain- 
 ing complete conviction on any disputed matter, 
 and tempts it to wander, hither and thither, in 
 search of what it can never find— undoubted 
 certainty. A melancholic timidity also, breeds, 
 in some minds, a distrust of all evidence : — 
 persons of this temper change their opinions, 
 again and again, from the mere fear of having 
 been deceived in those they last held. There is 
 also an affectation of independence and freedom 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 127 
 
 from vulgar prejudice, which impels some per- 
 sons frequently to profess a new creed. 
 
 There are those who abandon the principles 
 of their education from the influence of a strong 
 peculiarity of temper. — The accident of birth 
 has perhaps placed them in an atmosphere 
 which they cannot breathe, and when the in- 
 tellectual powers expand, they betake themselves 
 to what they feel a more congenial region. He 
 whose temper is at once arrogant and timid, 
 will probably go over to the party which pro- 
 fesses arbitrary principles of government; he 
 w ill abhor republicanism ; rail at the defenders 
 of popular rights : and court the favor of the 
 noble : — he will have little sympathy with the 
 poor, and the inany ; while he approves of the 
 force, and apologizes for the corruption, by 
 which the privileges of the fete are supported. 
 On the other hand, he whose pride and arro- 
 gance are of a more active and malignant kind, 
 will be the friend of the populace, and the foe 
 of the great and noble ; — he will profess opinions 
 which give a show of reason to a turbulent 
 hostility towards those who administer the go- 
 vernment, let their measures be what they may. 
 The spirit of contradiction, and the love of 
 wrangling, is the ruling principle in some minds ; 
 and persons affected by it may be driven, by 
 
128 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 opposition, into the profession of any opinion, 
 how absurd soever, or contrary to their former 
 professions. In order to secure themselves as 
 far as possible against the danger of finding no 
 opponents, they declare themselves the advo- 
 cates of whatever is most paradoxical and fla- 
 grantly extravagant. 
 
 But although the profession of this or of that 
 new order of opinions is too often the result of 
 improper motives, there are not wanting in- 
 stances of the renunciation of one set of prin- 
 ciples, and the adoption of another, in conse- 
 quence of an ingenuous attention to evidence 
 and argument. Such revolutions, especially 
 when religion is the subject of them, and when 
 they spring from genuine motives, will be at- 
 tended with modesty, and with a respectful and 
 kind treatment of those who may still adhere 
 to the principles that have been renounced. A 
 noisy and insolent dogmatism distinguishes, not 
 only blind and obstinate pertinacity, but versa- 
 tility also ; and he who to-day turns round 
 offensively upon the party to which yesterday 
 he belonged, may be expected to-morrow to 
 make some new movement, that shall compel 
 him to criminate his own most recent profes- 
 sions. 
 
 The great principle— so little thought of. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 129 
 
 though so obvious that the statement of it seems 
 unnecessary — That nothing but Truth can in 
 the end be advantageous or safe, would, if al- 
 ways kept in sight, secure us from a thousand 
 influences which lead us into error. 
 
 PASSIVE — see active. 
 
 PERCEPTION, 
 
 Is distinguished from sensation and conception. 
 The mere impression produced upon the mind 
 through the senses by external objects, is called 
 a sensation : and if this impression were un- 
 connected with others, belonging to different 
 senses, we should perhaps not be led to regard 
 it as caused by an external object. Thus, 
 for example, a taste or smell, or the prick of a 
 pin, alone, would be regarded merely as ^feeling 
 of the mind. But when that which is tasted is 
 at tlie same time felt, and has just before been 
 seen, we involuntarily combine the several sen- 
 sations ; or think of them as derived from one 
 and the same source. And it is thus, especially, 
 that when we see and touch an object, the 
 two very dissimilar sensations, combined, give 
 
 6* 
 
130 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 the conviction of an external object, as the one 
 cause of both. Conception is the recovery of 
 some past perception. 
 
 PHENOMENON, 
 
 From ^aivo'fxsvov — something which makes its 
 appearance. This term of physical science is 
 most properly applied to the visible objects of 
 natural philosophy, and especially to facts or ap- 
 pearances which have not yet been fully ex- 
 plained. Phenomena arc invitations addressed 
 by nature to the rational curiosity of man. 
 
 POWER— «ee CAUSE. 
 
 Having derived the notion signified by the 
 word power, from our own conscious abihty, 
 both to affect or move matter, and to control 
 our own thoughts, wc impute it to whatever is 
 seen, or to whatever seems to produce a change 
 upon another body; and thus learn to speak of 
 the powers of nature : — but when these powers 
 are closely examined we find nothing beyond 
 the facty that a certain event invariably and im- 
 mediately follows another ; as that if fire be 
 applied to lead — the solid becomes a fluid. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 131 
 
 PREDICATE, 
 
 Is that which is affirmed or denied, in a 
 proposition, concerning its subject : as that — 
 Etna is — a volcanic mountain : or, Etna has 
 not lately vomited Jire. 
 
 PREJUDICE. 
 
 An opinion adopted or maintained, without 
 proper regard to the evidence on which it rests, 
 and especially if it be adhered to under the in- 
 fluence of improper motives, is called a pre- 
 judice, whether or not that opinion be in itself 
 well founded. Two persons may believe the 
 same thing, or hold the same opinion, the one 
 from rational conviction, the other from preju- 
 dice. Prejudices may be classed, according to 
 the quality of motives from which they spring. 
 Of these motives, some are of a pleasurable, or 
 comparatively innocent, or social kind ; while 
 others are malignant and pernicious. Among 
 prejudices of the first class may be mentioned 
 — Those springing from personal vanity. — 
 When our own endowments, or qualifications, 
 or acquirements, or external advantages, are 
 placed in comparison with those of others, the 
 emotion of self-love so much disturbs the judg- 
 ment, that we are in great danger of falling into 
 
132 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 133 
 
 egregious errors of estiQiation, and often believe 
 those virtues or talents to be splendid, which in 
 truth are only of an ordinary kind. There are 
 prejudices of the heart which are rather w^eak- 
 nesses than vices. Thus the fondness of parents 
 for their children leads them often to overrate 
 their good qualities, and to be blind to their 
 faults. What is called the love of country, or 
 the warm preference of the land of our birth 
 to all others, usually brings with it some false 
 judgments, which cannot be deemed better than 
 prejudices. There are prejudices of a more 
 indefinite nature, though perhaps they may be 
 traced to some modification of self-love. Such 
 are the capricious and fond preferences which 
 weak minds exhibit tow ards things, persons, or 
 pursuits, they have accidentally become attached 
 to. And such is that eager fondness for, and 
 exclusive attention to, frivolous or comparatively 
 unimportant amusements, in matters of science 
 or literature, which fill some men's days with 
 laborious idleness. So strong are prejudices of 
 this order, in some cases, that the attainment of 
 a rare coin, or shell, or insect, or plant, for com- 
 pleting a collection, or the purchase of a scarce 
 book, shall entirely engross the mind, and ap- 
 pear a matter of more grave importance than 
 the most momentous affairs of real hfe ! Of 
 
 such pursuits it may be said, that though they 
 seem innocent, they are not so, if they with- 
 draw the mind from the offices of charity and 
 philanthropy ; or render a man useless in the 
 world, abounding as it does with miseries that 
 might be alleviated by zeal and kindness. 
 Prejudices springing from malignant motives 
 have already been referred to (see Opinion) : 
 they are always both injurious and odious : — 
 such are those which arise from the pride of 
 rank, wealth, or learning ; — from capricious an- 
 tipathies against individuals ; — from personal 
 jealousies, or opposition of interests ; — from 
 party spirit, in matters of rehgion, or politics; — 
 or from national, provincial, or corporate ani- 
 mosities. There may indeed be something 
 amiable in the prejudice which impels a man 
 to think that the climate, and the produce, and 
 the institutions of his native land are the best 
 in the world; though in fact they may be 
 among the worst. But the prejudice which 
 leads an Englishman to hate, or to hold in con- 
 tempt, an American or a German, is altogether 
 
 vicious. 
 
 Candor may be defined as a w^illingness to 
 revise or examine our opinions, on subjects in 
 reference to which we are exposed to the influ- 
 ence of some improper motive, and hkely, there- 
 
134 
 
 ELEMENTS OF Tli OUGHT. 
 
 fore, to entertain a prejudice. False candor is 
 — a prejudice, against prejudice. That is to 
 say, it is such a feeble and foolish jealousy of 
 being influenced by prejudices, as prevents our 
 making a decided choice between truth and 
 error. 
 
 PREMISES, 
 
 Things laid down, or aflirmed as known, or 
 granted, from which some conclusion is to be 
 derived: — as thus, 1st, If all men, without re- 
 straint, pursue their private advantage, there 
 can be no security of life or property to any. 
 2d, But if there be no security to life or pro- 
 perty, there will be no industry. 3d, And 
 if there be no industry, men must remain 
 in a savage state. 4th, Therefore some 
 form of government, which shall have the 
 power to restrain the cupidity or ferocity of 
 individuals, is necessary to civilization. In this 
 argument the three first propositions are the 
 premises, and arc assumed as facts, or principles 
 that will not be denied ; the 4th proposition is 
 the conclusion, which must be granted, because 
 of its evident connexion with the premises. 
 
 PRIMARY and SECONDARY QUALITIES 
 
 Are distinguished on the supposition that 
 certain properties are inseparable from a sub- 
 
 ^»^<^^^^^^.^^SJH^^i*^^fc^^l«^^^^ni^^».^^^»i^l^^l^^^^^»«.>.^«>^ 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 135 
 
 Stance ; or that the want of any one of them 
 would destroy its essence; while other qualities 
 may be thought of as present, or absent, without 
 affecting the nature of the thing. — Thus exten- 
 sion and solidity are called primary qualities of 
 matter : — color, flavor, fragrancy, are secondary. 
 These distinctions are of little importance. 
 
 PRINCIPLE, 
 
 From 2)rincipium, a beginning. The ele- 
 ments, or the most important qualities, or parts 
 of a substance, are called its principles ; w^ience 
 its other properties take their rise. The princi- 
 ples of a science, are those axioms, or great 
 facts, which, though not always first discovered, 
 are first to be learned, and which, when under- 
 stood, lead the way to the comprehension of all 
 the branches of a science. 
 
 PROBABILITY. 
 
 This word, though a higher sense is often 
 attached to it, represents only the extent of our 
 ignorance, either of the causes which will in- 
 fluence some future event, or of the actual facts 
 of some past event, affirmed or surmised to 
 have taken place. Our ignorance leads us to 
 think of facts as being in themselves, more or 
 
Sm'^,^^^^^^^l^r^^^^f^^^l0^^l^^l^t0^0t 
 
 136 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 less certain : but this is a mere prejudice of the 
 understanding. Historical affirmations are 
 either true or false, absolutely : yet, when not 
 incontestably established, it is usual to speak of 
 them in some such terms as these. — We say, 
 for example — It is probable that the temple of 
 Belus was founded on the site of the tower of 
 Babel. — It is highly probable that Plato had 
 perused some parts of the Hebrew Scriptures. 
 — There is a slight probability in the conjec- 
 ture that the Egyptian pyramids were built by 
 the enslaved Israelites. — It is in the highest de- 
 gree probable, that the planets are inhabited. 
 Or w^e speak of events now occurring at a dis- 
 tance, in a similar manner; and say — It is 
 probable that my friend has already left his home, 
 and is on his way to pay me a visit. — Or of 
 future events in the same terms — It is probable 
 that a communication may one day be opened 
 through the Isthmus of Suez, between the 
 Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. Now 
 all these propositions, whether they relate to 
 the past or the future, are absolutely true, or 
 absolutely false. — Degrees of probability belong 
 altogether to the degree, or extent, of our know- 
 ledge of the facts (in past events) or of the 
 causes that are to influence w hat is yet future. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 137 
 
 PROPOSITION, 
 
 The affirming or denying of one thing, con- 
 cerning another — Every complete sentence is 
 a proposition, directly or obliquely declaring 
 some truth ; and every such sentence contains 
 — 1st, A subject ; — or that concerning which 
 an affirmation is advanced : 2d, A predicate, or 
 truth afiirmed ; and 3d, A form of connexion 
 between the two, called a copula : as thus. — 
 (The sun) (is) (risen). Or, The people of 
 India {the subject) are {the copuhi) divided into 
 castes {the predicate). An argument, or chain 
 of reasoning, consists of a series of propositions, 
 each of which, after the first, is true, because^ 
 the one which precedes it is true. Every pre- 
 ceding proposition in an argument, contains^ 
 or is alleged to contain, its successor. 
 
 REASON 
 
 Has already been distinguished from Instinct. 
 It is distinguished from the other faculties of the 
 mind by its relating always to knowledge, and 
 consisting in the action of the mind upon its 
 knowledge ; either separating its ideas, or 
 notions, one from another; or comparing or 
 combining them. If the mind constantly 
 obeyed external impulses, or invariably yielded 
 
139 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 139 
 
 itself to the current of its ideas, it would not 
 deserve to be called — an intelligence, or a ra- 
 tional nature. Its power over itself, a power 
 directed hy knowledge, and employed for the 
 accomplishment of some purpose foreseen, is 
 what constitutes Reason. 
 
 REASONING, 
 
 In the acquired sense of the word, is not 
 any employment of Reason ; hut that particular 
 employment which has for its object the dis- 
 covery of truth, by tracing the connexion of one 
 admitted fact with another, through a longer or 
 a shorter series of propositions. In a sound 
 argument, that is to say, in conclusive reasoning, 
 the predicate of each proposition must be true 
 of its subject ; and the connexion between the 
 successive propositions must be truly stated. 
 If this be the case, then the last proposition, 
 for the sake of establishing ichich the process 
 has been passed through, may be assented to as 
 certain. Such processes of reasoning become 
 necessary only on account of the limitation of 
 the human mind, which docs not admit more 
 than a very few facts to be contemplated at 
 once. The more vigorous and comprehensive 
 any mind is, the less need it has of reasoning, 
 
 to reach a distant conclusion. On the contrary, 
 a feeble and contracted mind must, as it were, 
 creep from point to point, of an argument ; and 
 when it has reached the termination, it lias per- 
 haps lost its hold of the connexion of facts, and is 
 rather so much the more perplexed, than con- 
 vinced, by its own effort to attain the desired 
 conclusion. But much facility may be acquired 
 in reasoning, by exercise ; and this sort of ex- 
 ercise ought to form a capital part of eve^y good 
 education. 
 
 The real nature of the operation w^hich is 
 passed through, in a process of reasoning, may 
 be exhibited by dissecting, if we may so speak, 
 the working of an easy arithmetical problem. — 
 I affirm, for instance, that if you take 432, nine 
 times over, you will have 3888. — This is my 
 ultimate proposition, which I assume as true, 
 and profess to be able to establish. I do so, by 
 presenting to you a number of lesser proposi- 
 tions, the truth of which you have either already 
 ascertained, or which you can peixeive to be true, 
 as soon as presented to you : and then, when 
 all these propositions are taken together, or 
 summed up in succession ; — that is to say, when 
 the connexion between all of them is exhibited, 
 you cannot refuse your assent to my conclusion. 
 — As thus, — The figures 432 represent, in a 
 
140 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 141 
 
 condensed form, three distinct quantities ; 
 namely, four hundred, and thirty, and two. We 
 will therefore separately take each of these 
 quantities nine times, and then join the several 
 products : — 2, nine times taken, is 18 : and 30, 
 nine times, is 270 :— but 270, and 18, are 288. 
 Again ; 400, nine times taken, is 3600 ; and 
 3600, added to 288, is 3888 ; which was at first 
 affirmed. Now, if any one were not convinced 
 of tiie truth of this affirmation, as thus proved, 
 it would be necessary, in the first place, to dis- 
 sect each of the above-named propositions fur- 
 ther; that is, to reduce each one to several 
 smaller propositions, the truth of whicli might 
 be more readily perceived ; — as for instance, we 
 should show how 2, nine times, makes 18, &c. 
 And after this more minute dissection had been 
 gone through, we should explain the general 
 principle of the argument ; by proving that all 
 the parts of a thing, taken together, must be 
 reckoned equal to the whole of it ; and that 
 therefore the summing up of all the propositions, 
 must give a true result. It is often necessary, 
 after a particular argument has been brought to 
 a conclusion, to go back, in this manner, to a 
 more general argument ; for the purpose of jus- 
 tifying the mode of conducting it. 
 
 But whatever may be the subject of reason- 
 
 ing, or whatever xh^form it is made to assume, 
 it is always, in substance, the same, namely — a 
 showing, in succession, all the lyarts of a com- 
 plex proposition, and all the connexions of those 
 parts. It is obvious to remark, that an immea- 
 surable advantage rests on the side of vigorous 
 and practised minds, over the feeble and un- 
 taught : — for the very necessity of examining, 
 one by one, all the minute parts of a proposi- 
 tion, adds so much to the labor of the mind, 
 and so much increases the apparent confusion, 
 that the weaker understanding is almost, or quite, 
 as much embarrassed as aided by the endeavor 
 to attain satisfaction. Meanwhile, the strong 
 and well-taught mind, which has discerned the 
 truth of the proposition in two or three large 
 masses, if we might so speak, and has not de- 
 scended to the lesser particulars, suffers no 
 fatiiruc, is conscious of no confusion : but con- 
 templates, at leisure, what has exhausted all the 
 powers of the other to reach. Hence we may 
 infer the serious responsibility which rests upon 
 superior minds, in dealing with the simple and 
 uninformed. — How careful should such be not 
 to abuse the advantage they possess ; — an ad- 
 vantage which there are always so many temp- 
 tations to abuse ! It would be thought a poor 
 triumph for an adult to exhibit his strength in 
 
i^BI 
 
 142 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 crushing an infant. And is it not a paltry 
 triumph which men of intellectual acuteness 
 obtain, when they employ their powers of rea- 
 soning to mislead and confound the uninformed 
 by specious sophisms ? 
 
 RELATION. 
 
 That which gives rise to a comparison be- 
 tween two things, and which leads us hence- 
 forward to think of each, not as if alone, but 
 as if connected with the other, though in truth 
 there is no other connexion than what has been 
 formed in our own minds. Tf we think of a 
 house as high, it is because we have (mentally 
 at least) compared it with one not so high. — 
 There exists in our mind a relation of ine- 
 quahty between the two houses. If we see 
 these two lines, 
 
 we can hardly avoid comparing xhem, first, in 
 regard to their length ; and we perceive them 
 to be equal: or, in other words, they are related 
 to each other by their equality in length. We 
 then think of their position, one to the other; 
 and perceiving that they are equally distant, 
 from end to end, we say they are parallel lines. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 143 
 
 — Now this word parallel represents nothing 
 that actually exists, or that can be shown in 
 either of the lines ; but it declares the notion 
 the mind has formed of their relation, one to 
 the other, of equal distance, at all points. 
 
 A very large proportion of all our abstract 
 notions are relations : — that is, the result of some 
 coniparison between two things, or notions ; as 
 for example. — Truth is a relation of sameness, 
 or agreement, between an affirmation, and the 
 thing spoken of. Value, or worth, is a relation 
 of equality, between one mode of employing or 
 consuming a commodity, and another mode. 
 In analysing relative notions, we have first to 
 ascertain what the two things are which are 
 supposed to be compared ; and then, what is 
 the proportion which the one bears to the other. 
 
 SENSATION— «<?« PERCEPTION. 
 
 Is the mere effect produced upon the mind, 
 through the senses, by some external object. 
 The construction of the organs of sensation — 
 the eye — the ear — the palate, &c. may, to a 
 certain extent, be understood, and laid open ; 
 and again we may examine our consciousness, 
 and distinguish one kind of sensation from 
 another ; but we are utterly ignorant of the 
 
144 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 reason of the connexion between the falling of 
 light upon the retina of the eye, and the sensa- 
 tion produced on the mind thereby. It is, how- 
 ever, certain, that it is the mind, not the body, 
 which feels and perceives ; and it may well be 
 imagined that the organs of sensation are, in 
 fact, limitations of the sensitiveness of the mind ; 
 or are the means of the confinement of its uni- 
 versal faculty of seeing, hearing, tasting, &c. to 
 a particular spot or portion of the nervous sys- 
 tem. It may be conceived, that if the nerves 
 of the hand, for instance, were exposed to the 
 impression of light, in the same degree as 
 they are upon the retina, that we should see 
 there, as well as in the eye ; — and the same of 
 the other senses. We may then imagine that 
 the mind, if separated entirely from the body, 
 or set free from all limitation, would, by its 
 proper and uniform sensibility, perceive inces- 
 santly all external objects. This supposition is 
 at least as probable as that the being which, in 
 the body, perceives, should lose its sensibility 
 when separated from it. Nor is it improbable 
 that the dissolution of the body may set the 
 spirit free to perceive some new qualities of the 
 external world. 
 
 ■ 
 
 I 
 
 ij 
 
 III 
 It 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 145 
 
 SIGNS, 
 
 Are not resemblances, or images of things, 
 but sounds or marks, associated by inere usage 
 in the mind, with certain ideas or notions. 
 This use of arbitrary signs, connected as it is 
 with the power of giving modulations to the 
 voice, and subserving, as it does, the faculty of 
 abstraction, not only affords the means of inter- 
 course between man and man ; but is the great 
 instrument of all intellectual operations, and the 
 principal means of all improvement. — The use 
 of signs may be taken as the distinguishing 
 difference between man and the inferior tribes. 
 Whether it he possible to think or reason at all 
 concerning abstract notions without the use of 
 words, may be questioned ; but it is certain that 
 words facilitate, and abbreviate, ^mdjix the pro- 
 cesses of thought in an incalculable degree. 
 This must be allowed, although it were granted, 
 on the other hand, that words are a very im- 
 perfect instrument of mental operations, and that 
 they convey abstract notions, and mental facts, 
 very vaguely, and often erroneously. 
 
 Let any one attempt to think without a 
 mental reference to words, and he will find how 
 much (though unconsciously) he is ordinarily 
 indebted to them. 
 
146 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 If there had been but one language in the 
 world, and that language permanent from age 
 to age, it would have been very difficult, per- 
 haps impossible, not to have supposed that there 
 is a real connexion between certain sounds, and 
 the things of which they are the signs. But 
 the diversity of languages enables us readily to 
 perceive that all signs are purely arbitrary, and 
 that man means man, only hy usage ; for after 
 crossing a channel or a river, we find that 
 Jiomme means man ; — or homo ; or av^pwro?. 
 The diversity of language though attended 
 with many inconveniences, has unquestionably 
 operated to set the human mind free from what 
 would otherwise, probably, have been a sort of 
 despotism of words over ideas, and notions, and 
 opinions. This diversity has, without depriving 
 us of the usefulness of language, as an instru- 
 ment of thought, enabled us to use \i freely, and 
 independently — as a mere instrument, and no- 
 thing more. 
 
 SOPHISM, 
 
 From tfo^pitffjLa, a device, or fraudulent contriv- 
 ance. Though any sort of false and specious 
 argument is sometimes called a sophis?n, the 
 epithet is most properly applied to those falla- 
 cious reasonings which are constructed for the 
 
 t m 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 147 
 
 purpose of recommending error ; and which he 
 who employs them strives to shield from ex- 
 amination, by subtilty, and the ambiguity of 
 language. In books of logic are to be found 
 methodical descriptions of the various sorts of 
 sophisms, together with rules, which may fur- 
 nish aid in detecting the lurking error of all 
 such fallacious arguments. But, however good 
 these rules may be, it requires much attention, 
 and some acuteness, as well as frequent exercise 
 in disputation, to make any practical use of 
 them, or to retain in the memory the abstract 
 distinctions on which they are founded. In- 
 stead of attempting, in this place, to give a 
 summary of any such rules, two or three plain 
 directions and hints are offered, which may 
 serve to secure the mind against the danger of 
 having important principles overthrown by the 
 craft of disingenuous wranglers. 
 
 1st. A sophistical argument is very commonly 
 expressed in a style of affected nicety, and of 
 refined precision. The sophist will seldom 
 consent to state his reasons in any other terms 
 than those he has artfully selected. But sub- 
 stantial and important truths, as they are always 
 independent of words, may be conveyed, with 
 nearly equal advantage, in several forms of ex- 
 pression ; and an honest reasoner, if indeed he 
 understands what he advances, will, if he fails 
 
^^i^W^^'w'^M' 
 
 148 
 
 ■■ JN^^^^^^ ^•^i<rf'>^S>^^<^^>.^ 
 
 * **^^* »^»»,»j> ^ ^»^ ^ ^ — ^^ .— , g- ^ j^ ^ — ^ — ^ ^^j—j-^ j-,_^ j^_p 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 149 
 
 to make himself intelligible in one mode, readily 
 find another, and yet another set of phrases, 
 until his proposition, whether true or false, 
 stands out fairly in the light. Whoever sus- 
 pects that an argument which he finds it diffi- 
 cult to overthrow, is sophistical, may well 
 demand that it should be presented to him 
 in another form of expression ; and that no 
 stress should be laid upon certain words ; 
 especially if they are of an abstruse or ambi- 
 guous kind. 
 
 2d. Sophistical reasoning, if not subtile and 
 nice, is often bold, abrupt, and dogmatical, and 
 affects to force assent, by the power of demon- 
 stration ; and that too on subjects which do 
 not admit of demonstrative reasoning. 
 
 Now, as a defence against this sort oi vio- 
 lence, or tyranny, it should be borne in mind, 
 especially when questions are discussed which 
 have long been matters of controversy, that if 
 these pretended demonstrations were indeed 
 sound and good — if they were as conclusive as 
 they may seem to be, to those to whom they 
 are netc, they would long ago have brought 
 the controversv to a conclusion, and have com- 
 pelled the assent at least of all intelligent and 
 honest men. Demonstrative reasoning either 
 supersedes all other arguments ; or it is utterly 
 useless. It is good for e7iery thing, or good for 
 
 W 
 
 ( 
 
 nothing. Of this sort, for example, is the brief 
 method which has often been resorted to for 
 the purpose of disproving the Christian miracles. 
 — All our knowledge, it is said, is drawn from 
 experience : — we nmst therefore always be 
 guided by our experience, in what we believe, 
 or disbeheve. Now it is contrary to our expe- 
 rience that the dead should return to life, or 
 that cripples should be made to walk, by a word. 
 But on the contrary, it is agreeable to experi- 
 ence that men should invent and propagate 
 marvellous tales. — Therefore, it is reasonable to 
 suppose the narratives of the Evangelists to be 
 fabrications. If this demonstration were a 
 sound one, it would not only destroy our belief 
 in Christianity, but put an end to all science, 
 and give the lie to the greater part of history ; 
 for it would make it unreasonable to believe 
 any thing of which we had not some personal 
 knowledge. As when a native of northern 
 climates declares, to the inhabitants of some 
 tropical island, that, in his country, water is 
 often as hard as a stone. According to the 
 above mentioned sophism, the islanders would 
 do well to treat such an account with scorn ; 
 for it contradicts their experience, and is far less 
 credible than that travellers should relate fie- 
 
150 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 tions. But \vc see that such a rule would be 
 fallacious. 
 
 3d. When sophistical reasoning is neither 
 subtile nor dogmatical, it is often flippant and 
 epigrammatic. This style is adopted by those 
 who, being incapable of thinking vigorously, 
 employ jests and irony to disguise the poverty 
 of their understandings; — or, who having adopt- 
 ed profligate principles, which they well know 
 will not bear examination, have recourse to wit, 
 as the best weapon for keeping off' the attacks 
 of sound reason. By far the greater part of all 
 that has been written against the Bible, is 
 sophistry of this sort. 
 
 4th. The real question at issue is often co- 
 vertly taken for granted, in a sophistical argu- 
 ment ; or is silently assumed, as a general prin- 
 ciple, which no one disputes. A whimsical 
 instance of this sort is the one which has fre- 
 quently been related of the witty Charles II. 
 who proposed it as a grave question — Why a 
 pail of water weighed no more after a fish was 
 put into it than before ? After much learned 
 controversy had taken place on the subject, the 
 difficulty was dispelled by simply denying the 
 assumed fact. An easy means of exposing 
 many sophisms, is to examine, one by one, the 
 propositions which are tacitly or obliquely 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 151 
 
 affirmed in the argument. A single w ord some- 
 times contains within it the very point in dis- 
 pute, by having a double, or doubtful sense. 
 Thus it niav be said — a virtuous man need not 
 trouble himself with matters of faith, or forms 
 of piety ; for virtue must ever be the object of 
 the Divine favor ; and those who possess it can 
 have nothing to fear in the future life. The 
 questionable point is here indirectly affirmed, 
 by calling a man virtuodSy who is destitute of 
 faith and piety ; or whose only virtue consists 
 in temperance and honesty. — We may deny 
 this to be virtue, and then the sophism is stript 
 of all appearance of force. 
 
 5th. Sophisms often consist in assigning the 
 wrons: cause of an effect, when two causes 
 have become accidentally associated. As when 
 it is affirmed that Christianity has been the 
 cause of massacres, persecutions, and sangui- 
 nary wars. It is true that the name of Chris- 
 tianity, and its authority, have been used as a 
 pretext to justify the ambition and cupidity of 
 princes, or their advisers : but it is these malig- 
 nant passions, not the Gospel of peace, which 
 have been the scourges of mankind. 
 
 6th. Sophisms consist sometimes in the use 
 of a general principle, as if it were universal. 
 It is perhaps generally true, or true to some ex- 
 
152 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 tent, that Portuguese are perfidious, Spaniards 
 proud, Italians revengeful, &c., but it is far from 
 universally true, and nothing can be more illi- 
 beral than to assume the truth of such proposi- 
 tions, in particular instances, without proof. 
 Persons who attempt to decide practical ques- 
 tions by vulgar maxims, are often in the wrong 
 on this ground. There is, perhaps, some ge- 
 neral truth contained in certain popular apo- 
 thegms; but nothing that can be confided in, 
 as a rule. Or the exceptions are quite as many 
 as the instances in point. It may be observed 
 that persons of cultivated minds and of exten- 
 sive experience, sometimes err by placing too 
 little reliance upon general rules, which they 
 know to be open to many exceptions ; while 
 on the contrary, uncultivated minds make a 
 rude and blind use of such rules, without allow- 
 ing at all for exceptions. 
 
 It should ever be kept in mind, that the 
 soundness of an argument is not to be esti- 
 mated by our pei*sonal ability to defend, or to 
 expose it. We may be much embarrassed, or 
 quite overthrown in our endeavors to establish 
 the principles we believe to be true : and may 
 be utterly at a loss to reply to the objections of 
 those who impugn them. But it by no means 
 follows that those principles are erroneous, or 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 153 
 
 those objections valid. All the difficulty may 
 arise from our particular ignorance, or want of 
 address, in argumentation. There is no de- 
 fence against sophistry better than an intelli- 
 gent modesty. Indeed, a true firmness of mind 
 implies an habitual recollection of the hmited 
 extent of our powers and acquirements ; and 
 there is a union of diffidence and of courage 
 which true wisdom approves : — that is to say- 
 diffidence of ourselves, and courage in resist- 
 ing the attempts of others to strip us, in a mo- 
 ment, of our principles. It rarely happens that 
 important truths are acquired in consequence 
 of disputation. To read— to think — to con- 
 verse calmly with the best informed persons ; 
 and, if the matters in question belong to reli- 
 gion — to implore Divine teaching — these are 
 methods of learning far more likely to lead us 
 to truth, than to wrangle whh wranglers. So- 
 phistry is the common fruit of disputation ; and 
 even when our cause is good we are in danger 
 of falling into disingenuous methods of argu- 
 ment, if hardly pressed by an adversarv, or if 
 the temper be roused by a sense of unfairness 
 on his side. Simple truth then not serving our 
 purpose, we turn to any subterfuge that may 
 offer itself at the moment. 
 
154 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 SPACE. 
 
 By the diffusion of sensation through the 
 body, and by combining the sensations of touch 
 and of sight, we acquire the notion of Exten- 
 sion : if from this notion, which is conjoined 
 with that of sohdity, or resistance, we detach, 
 or abstract, the ideas of visible and tangible 
 substance, the notion that remains is signified 
 by the word Space, 
 
 SUBJECT, 
 
 In a proposition, is that, concerning which 
 the predicate is affirmed, or denied. Or when 
 speaking of things, it is that to which some 
 quality that has been mentioned is supposed to 
 belon' 
 
 ^g- 
 
 SUBSTANCE : 
 
 A mere word of convenience, representing 
 the involuntary notion that is formed of a some- 
 thing hidden, which supports, or sustains all the 
 qualities by which any thing is made known to 
 us. Or it may represent, abstractedly, the most 
 inseparable and permanent of those qualities. 
 Matter is called a solid, extended, and colored 
 substance : Mind — a thinking, or rational 
 substance. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 155 
 
 SUCCESSION OF IDEAS, 
 
 Is that incessant flow, or continuous move- 
 ment of images, feelings, notions, which belongs 
 to the mind, both waking and sleeping, and 
 which is again and again diverted, interrupted, 
 and controlled, by impressions on the senses — 
 by internal sensations ; or by the exertion of 
 the active power of the mind. There are cer- 
 tain principles which seem to influence this 
 flow of ideas, and these are called the laws of 
 
 ASSOCIATION, or 
 
 SUGGESTION ; 
 
 That is to say, whatever it is that connects 
 one involuntary thought with another ; or causes 
 this image to follow that. Any one who re- 
 traces the musings which have occupied him 
 in an idle hour, will find that the most incon- 
 gruous or dissimilar ideas have succeeded each 
 other : and yet, if he can distinctly recollect the 
 train of images, or feelings, he will discover, in 
 each instance, some trivial or incidental circum- 
 stance which has served to fink them together. 
 Some circumstance of resemblance, or of dis- 
 similarity ; — of proximity in space, or time : — 
 some jingle or rhythm of words ; — or some 
 
156 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 \ 
 
 -I I r- i ru- i LT ii 1 -1 r a T- i r- ■*-■■" ■*■-"'■*■ — ■»-^*--^"*»* 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 157 
 
 unison of the emotions which attended both 
 
 ideas. 
 
 This principle of suggestion prevails to a 
 
 great extent, even when the mind is in an active 
 state :— or there is, if we might so speak, an 
 alternate regency of the mind, by its involun- 
 tary suggestions and its active power ; and in 
 the issue of our meditations, there is commonly 
 a mingling of both. Infirm minds are more 
 controlled by suggestion, and less by voluntary 
 power. Strong and cultured minds are less 
 influenced by suggestion, and more by their 
 rational force. The diversities of intellectual 
 character take their rise very much from the 
 differences that exist in this principle of sugges- 
 tion. One man's thoughts are chiefly suggested 
 by words, phrases, and modes of expression, 
 that have fixed themselves in the memory ; 
 such a one may speak fluently, and perti- 
 nently, but will seldom or never be profound, 
 or original. Another man's thoughts are 
 suggested chiefly by his habitual emotions, or 
 by what might be called— the color of his 
 imagination.— Sentiments of benevolence, or 
 anger, or contempt; or the love of freedom, 
 or the emotions of piety ;— or impressions 
 of sublimity, or ideas of beauty, rule the 
 current of his thoughts, and enable him, 
 
 1 J 
 
 with vivacity and force, to bring forward such as 
 are most proper for exciting similar emotions in 
 other men. But then he will be dependent, for 
 his power of speaking effectively, upon the de- 
 gree of excitement his mind may happen to be 
 under. In another mind perhaps, external re- 
 semblances, or casual analogies, are the ruling 
 principles of suggestion ; and such will be in- 
 genious, striking, witty, and see?ningly original, 
 in their discourse. But if it be the real analo- 
 gies, and abstract qualities of things, that form 
 the principles of suggestion, they will constitute 
 the philosophical character. When, from a 
 man's ordinary or careless conversation, the 
 particular law of suggestion in his mind is dis- 
 covered, we may, as if by the use of a key, un- 
 derstand much of his conduct, and often unravel 
 his character ; and sometimes even anticipate 
 what, in certain circumstances, he will say and 
 do. A true knowledge of the law of suggestion, 
 in our otcn minds, if kept in view, will often 
 guard us against the follies or evils into which 
 we are most prone to fall. 
 
 SYLLOGISM, 
 
 From (fvWoyKfiiog, a putting together of reasons. 
 An inference from admitted principles, or pre- 
 
158 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 mises (as they are called) when expressed in 
 due form, is called a syllogism ; as thus — 
 
 1. No one who lives in perpetual fear can be 
 happy ; 
 
 2. But a miser lives in perpetual fear: 
 
 3. Therefore a miser cannot be happy. 
 
 If we know concerning the ivhole of a thing 
 that it is so and so ; or not so ; we may then 
 safely affirm the same of any part, as thus — 
 
 All the space between the hues A, B, C, is 
 green — 
 
 But the little space d, is included within the 
 lines A, B, C ; 
 
 Therefore the little space d, is green. 
 
 All the artificial forms of the syllogism, as set 
 forth in books of logic, may be reduced (in one 
 manner or another) to this rule ; and, for all 
 practical purposes, it is quite as well to drop the 
 forfii of logical inference, and simply to state 
 the inference, with an allusion to the general 
 truth, whence it results as thus—A miser can 
 never be happy because he lives in perpetual 
 alarm. Every one well knows that this state 
 of incessant trepidation is incompatible with 
 happiness ; nothing is gained by formally de- 
 claring it. 
 
 In the technical language of logic, the two 
 preceding propositions are called the pretnises ; 
 
 Ni*»^^^«^-^»'Si 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 159 
 
 or the antecedents : and the first of them the 
 major, the second the minor, and the third the 
 conclusion. This method of formal reasonins 
 by syllogism, was long believed to be adapted to 
 the discovery of things unknown. But it is 
 manifest that it can safely be applied only to the 
 setting forth, distinctly, of things already known. 
 If the major proposition be uncertain, or if it 
 contains more than we are fully acquainted 
 with ; or if it be uncertain whether the minor 
 be properly a part of the major, then our con- 
 elusion must be also uncertain ; and if owing 
 to this appearance of rigid reasoning, we are in- 
 duced to think that to be ascertained, which in 
 fact is not so, our logic serves only to fortify us 
 in error. It was thus that during many ages, 
 the most egregious errors in religion and philo- 
 sophy, were held to be unquestionable truths. 
 
 SYNTHESIS, 
 
 From (Ti^v^cCi^, a putting together, is opposed 
 to Analysis, which is the separation of parts, or 
 elements. Analysis is employed on things un- 
 known, for the purpose of becoming acquainted 
 with them. Synthesis is employed on things 
 already known by analysis, and which are re- 
 compounded for the purpose of contemplating 
 
•30 
 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 them in their symmetry, and their mutual 
 relations. 
 
 TERMS 
 
 Of a proposition, are its two ends, namely the 
 suhjecty and the predicate. 
 
 TESTIMONY, 
 
 Is the conveyance of facts, by speaking or 
 writing, from those who have personal knowledge 
 of them, to those who have not : the accepting 
 of such evidence is Belief, (See Belief and 
 Evidence ) By far the larger portion of all 
 the evidence by which we are directed in the 
 affairs of common life, and almost the entire 
 mass of the sciences, and of what is called 
 Learning, in its various branches, is received 
 upon the faith of testimony. And in truth the 
 human mind is so constituted as to receive, and 
 to rely upon this sort of know ledge, with as 
 much confidence as upon that w^hich it acquires 
 by personal inspection. It is only after having 
 found it, in several instances, fallacious, that we 
 learn to withhold our confidence, or to ask for 
 corroborative evidence. 
 
 Testimony may be fallacious, either in con- 
 sequence of the unintentional error of the wit- 
 ness ; or in consequence of his wilful faUifica- 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 161 
 
 tion. In estimating therefore the value of testi- 
 mony, the process resolves itself into two 
 inquiries. 
 
 1st Is the witness competent to give evi- 
 dence in the instance before us 1 or in other 
 words, had he the means of fully knowing the 
 fact which he reports ; — and was that fact one 
 in relation to which he was likely, or not likely, 
 to be deceived ? As for example, if a witness 
 declares that he has been robbed and beaten on 
 the road ; this is a matter concerning which he 
 could not have been mistaken ; and if any doubt 
 rests upon the fact, it must attach to his veracity. 
 But if he affirms that the man whom now he 
 sees in court was the perpetrator of the deed, 
 it is possible that, without any design to deceive, 
 he may be in error ; and especially so, if the 
 robbery took place after sun-set : on this point, 
 therefore, we are not only to consider the vera- 
 city of the witness, but his competency also. 
 
 2d. If satisfied on these points, we next con- 
 sider the character of the witness, or judge of 
 the probability of his being influenced by mo- 
 tives which may lead him to a falsification of 
 the fact. As for example, if a man has a great 
 interest at stake in the determination of a con- 
 troversy, there exists so strong a probability that 
 he may yield to the temptation to misrepresent 
 
162 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 
 
 163 
 
 the truth, that his evidence is cither not asked 
 for at all, or is received with great caution. 
 Tlieveracili/ of a witness is established (chiefly) 
 in the four methods following : — 
 
 ]st. His known or ordinary character is ex- 
 amined. Character is in fact the chief ground 
 of confidence in Testimony. Falsehood is ab- 
 horrent to a man of virtue ; and the cases are 
 extremely rare in which those who possess a 
 well-established reputation, as honest men, are 
 found to forfeit it, how much soever their testi- 
 mony may be opposed to their personal inter- 
 ests. We believe a friend of whose integrity 
 we have no suspicion, even when lie affirms 
 what may seem highly improbable. But a man 
 of no character, or a known liar, receives 
 scarcely any credit, even on the most ordinary 
 occasions. Our reliance upon character is so 
 firm, that nothing seems to us so incredilfle as that 
 several men of good understanding, and tried 
 integrity, should concur in affirming an untruth. 
 The veracity even of men who lived in distant 
 ages may safely and fairly be judged of, if his- 
 tory has recorded the general course of their 
 conduct; or if their writings have descended 
 to our times, and given, as it were, a portrait of 
 their dispositions and principles. 
 
 2d. We estimate, as far as we have the means 
 
 I 
 
 of doing so, what may be called the 7noral j^osi- 
 tion of the witness, in relation to the facts 
 of which he speaks: — that is to say, how 
 those facts, or his testimony concerning them, 
 affected, or was likely to affect, his personal 
 welfare. Even if we confide in his character, 
 we shall feel a slight diminution of confidence, 
 if this evidence was, in its tendency, highly ad- 
 vantageous to the witness ; and on the contrary, 
 even if we know nothing by other means of 
 the character of the witness, we shall readily 
 impute to him a good character, if we find him 
 persisting in testimony which immediately ex- 
 posed him to peril or disadvantage : — and then, 
 if by some indirect channel, we are assured of 
 his general integrity, it will be scarcely possible 
 to entertain a doubt of his veracity. 
 
 3d. The value of Testimony is, in most cases, 
 easily estimated by comparing one part of it 
 with another ; especially in points of a trivial 
 or unimportant kind. The lesser circumstances 
 of a story that has been invented to deceive, 
 will seldom be found compatible, one with 
 another. Nothing but the real consistency of 
 truth, can give consistency to a long relation of 
 facts. The minute particulars of place, and 
 time, and persons, and accidents, can never be so 
 calculated and arranged by a fabrication, as to 
 
164 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 165 
 
 remove every clew to the detection of the 
 fraud. Testimony that is completely in ac- 
 cordance with itself, is very rarely found to be 
 untrue. 
 
 4th. Tl>e conclusive method of detecting the 
 false, and ascertaining the true, in matters of 
 Testimony, is — The comparison of the evidence 
 of independent witnesses. A set of false wit- 
 nesses, whatever pains they may take in arrang- 
 ing their evidence, never fail to be at fault in 
 some notable instance. And much more is that 
 probability increased, if they give their evidence 
 without previous concert, or in an incidental 
 manner, which admits of no contrivance. 
 Again, if there are witnesses to the same fact, 
 some of whom are opposed in interest to others, 
 or who are absolutely unconnected, one with 
 another, their concurrence must be held to place 
 the matter beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
 It is by these methods that Testimony is 
 estimated in courts of justice, and that questions 
 of property and of life, are determined: — and it is 
 by a full and fair application of the very same 
 rules that the most important of all questions 
 is brought to an issue — namely, that which re- 
 lates to the Truth of Christianity. The Tes- 
 timony which supports the great facts recorded 
 by the Evangehsts and Apostles, is confirmed 
 
 in each of the methods above mentioned, and 
 by the combination of them all. Indeed it may 
 boldly be affirmed that no fact whatever, in 
 ancient history, is nearly so well and fully at- 
 tested as is the Gospel history. If that history 
 is rejected, then not only is all history an illu- 
 sion, but the entire system of human affairs is 
 removed from its foundation, and no man can 
 rely upon anything but what is immediately 
 present to his senses. The young reader is re- 
 commended, both as an exercise of his power 
 of investigation, and as a means of establishing 
 his religious principles, to apply /^r himself, the 
 preceding four rules to the evangelical history. 
 He will not be at a loss to obtain the informa- 
 tion requisite for doing so, if he refers to any 
 of the well-known works which exhibit at large, 
 the Christian Evidences. 
 
 THEORY 
 
 Is sometimes distinguished from 'practice ; as 
 thinking differs from acting : or as science differs 
 from art. But in its strictest sense, the word 
 signifies a system, or set of principles, intended 
 to explain certain facts not as yet confirmed 
 by demonstrative reasoning. A hypothesis is a 
 single supposition, relating to the cause of a 
 
 I 
 
166 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGFIT. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 167 
 
 particular effect. A theory is a complete set of 
 suppositions, comprehending a hypothetical ex- 
 planation of all the facts helonging to one hranch 
 of science. As for example — a hypothesis may 
 be advanced relative to the luminous stream 
 which attends a comet : or there have been 
 several theories of the heavens, explaining all 
 the appearances and movements of the hea- 
 venly bodies, on different principles, as the 
 Ptolemaic, the Copernican, and the Newtonian. 
 
 TIME, 
 
 Is duration measured, or divided, into equal 
 parts ; as distance is extension, so measured. 
 
 TRUTH, 
 
 Is the agreement of our notions with the 
 reality of things ; or it is the agreement of pro- 
 positions with the notions, or things, or facts, 
 concerning which an affirmation is made. The 
 word truth is often improperly employed, in a 
 vague sense, as if there were an abstract exist- 
 ence, somewhere to be found, which is inde- 
 pendent both of propositions and of notions. 
 But truth, as it is an agreement, or a sameness, 
 implies necessarily, a thing, or notion ; and a 
 representation, or affirmation concerning it. 
 
 / 
 
 f 
 
 Truth in propositions does not exist, unless 
 the terms employed are understood in the same 
 sense by the speaker, and by the person ad- 
 dressed. As well utter a formal falsehood, as 
 use a word in a sense which those to w hom we 
 speak do not suppose us to intend. 
 
 In relation to the truth of notions, or concep- 
 tions, a distinction of some importance is to be 
 observed, between a perfect and an iinpeifect 
 agreement of our notions with the things that 
 are the objects of them. The notion we form 
 of a triangle, and of its properties, may be per- 
 fect : — that is to say, complete as well as fault- 
 less. But our notions of the operations of 
 nature — of the constitution of our own minds, 
 and especially of the attributes of the Divine 
 Being, can never be better than imperfectly true : 
 — for our knowledge on these subjects is very 
 limited. The notion which a child has of the 
 moon, who w^ould fain have it given to him as 
 a plaything, is altogether false. The notion of 
 the astronomer, who rightly estimates its size 
 and distance, and calculates, with precision, its 
 movements, is true — but imperfectly so ; inas- 
 much as he knows little more of the moon than 
 those mathematical facts. 
 
 Such, too, arc the notions which the chemist 
 forms of the properties of bodies; they are 
 
166 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 particular effect. A theonj is a complete set of 
 suppositions, comprehending a hypothetical ex- 
 planation of all the facts helonging to one hranch 
 of science. As for example — a hypothesis may 
 be advanced relative to the luminous stream 
 which attends a comet : or there have been 
 several theories of the heavens, explaining all 
 the appearances and movements of the hea- 
 venly bodies, on different principles, as the 
 Ptolemaic, the Copernican, and the Newtonian. 
 
 TIME, 
 
 Is duration measured, or divided, into equal 
 parts ; as distance is extension, so measured. 
 
 TRUTH, 
 
 Is the agreement of our notions with the 
 reality of things ; or it is the agreement of pro- 
 positions with the notions, or things, or facts, 
 concerning which an affirmation is made. The 
 word truth is often improperly employed, in a 
 vague sense, as if there were an abstract exist- 
 ence, somewhere to be found, which is inde- 
 pendent both of propositions and of notions. 
 But truth, as it is an agreement, or a sameness, 
 implies necessarily, a thing, or notion ; and a 
 representation, or affirmation concerning it. 
 
 / 
 
 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 
 
 167 
 
 Truth in propositions does not exist, unless 
 the terms employed are understood in the same 
 sense by the speaker, and by the person ad- 
 dressed. As well utter a formal falsehood, as 
 use a word in a sense which those to whom we 
 speak do not suppose us to intend. 
 
 In relation to the truth of notions, or concep- 
 tions, a distinction of some importance is to be 
 observed, between a perfect and an impeifect 
 agreement of our notions with the things that 
 are the objects of them. The notion we form 
 of a triangle, and of its properties, may be per- 
 fect : — that is to say, complete as well as fault- 
 less. But our notions of the operations of 
 nature — of the constitution of our own minds, 
 and especially of the attributes of the Divine 
 Being, can never be better than imperfectly true : 
 — for our knowledge on these subjects is very 
 limited. The notion which a child has of the 
 moon, who would fain have it given to him as 
 a plaything, is altogether false. The notion of 
 the astronomer, who rightly estimates its size 
 and distance, and calculates, with precision, its 
 movements, is true — but imperfectly so ; inas- 
 much as he knows little more of the moon than 
 those mathematical facts. 
 
 Such, too, are the notions which the chemist 
 forms of the properties of bodies; they are 
 
'■- •'■* — — — — — '^--^-^-■-^ ■-'^ r i Tf j~ ' r 
 
 168 
 
 ELEMENTS OP THOUGHT. 
 
 precise to a certain extent ; but beyond that 
 point, are vague, or erroneous. It is important 
 in all cases to discern, and ingenuously confess, 
 the imperfection of our knowledge. This in- 
 genuousness is now commonly exercised in all 
 branches of natural science. But in matters of 
 rehgion it is often much wanting, and not a few 
 of the controversies which divide the Christian 
 world would instantly disappear, or be held in 
 abeyance, if things which surpass the range of 
 our conceptions, or the limits of our actual in- 
 formation, were seen and acknowledged to be, 
 as they are, unknown, except so far as the bare 
 affirmation of Scripture offers them to our as- 
 sent, as facts partially revealed. All that is 
 imagined, or dogmatically affirmed, beyond this 
 limit, is not true, how nearly soever it may be 
 connected with truth ; but is positive error. 
 To adhere firmly to what is known, and to 
 reject all those surmises and inferences by 
 which the mind labors to fill up the vacant 
 spaces in its systematic notions, is a prime part 
 of wisdom. 
 
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