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Ethics and Jurisprudence 
 
 for 
 
 Dentists 
 
 BY 
 
 EDMUND NOYES, D. D. S. 
 
 Professor of Ethics and Jurisprudence 
 
 in Northwestern University 
 
 Dental School 
 
 Printed and Boand by 
 TUCKER-KENWORTHY CO. 
 Chicago 
 
 I9I5 
 
 C. ^^.^dJ^.'Vv^^^^ow^-^ ^'^'^ 
 

 Copyright, January, 1915. 
 
 by 
 Edmund Noyes, D. D. S. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The writer of this book makes but little claim to originaHty 
 for most of its contents. The "Professional Ethics," the dis- 
 cussion of patents, and some small portions in other parts of 
 the book have been thought out and written without much con- 
 scious indebtedness to other writings. The portion on the 
 general subject of ethics is derived chiefly from the "System 
 of Ethics" by Friedrich Paulsen, translated by Frank Thilly, 
 Professor of Philosophy in Cornell University. 
 
 The "Jurisprudence" has been derived chiefly from the 
 "Dental Jurisprudence" by William E. Mikell, Professor of Law 
 in the University of Pennsylvania, with some help also from 
 the "Dental Jurisprudence" by Elmer D. Brothers, Professor 
 of Medical and Dental Jurisprudence in the University of Illi- 
 nois, and from the "Dental Jurisprudence" by William F. Reh- 
 fuss, D. D. S. 
 
 It is possible some may think that a disproportionate amount 
 of space has been given to the subject of general ethics. It is 
 the writer's belief, however, that it is worth while for young 
 men preparing themselves for any profession or any business 
 to give some time to a study of the fundamental principles and 
 sanctions of morality, and the powers and dispositions of mind 
 and heart by which the conduct of life should be determined 
 and the rules of duty should be obeyed ; in other words, the 
 virtues and duties which characterize good men. Professional 
 ethics can have little authority and command little respect unless 
 it is understood to rest upon the solid foundation of the general 
 principles of morality. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 ETHICS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. Page. 
 
 The Moral Ideal S 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Moral Evolution, Duty and Conscience 21 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Egoism and Altruism, Virtue and Happiness, Morality and Religion, Freedom of 
 
 the Will 37 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Doctrine of Virtues and Duties, Self-Control, Temperance, Courage 50 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Bodily Life — Food and Drink — Habitation and Clothing Rest and Recrea- 
 tion. The Economic Life — Profession or \''ocation — Frugality and Extrava- 
 gance 66 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 The Spiritual Life and Culture, Science and Art, Honor, Self -Knowledge 86 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 Compassion and Benevolence — Justice — Magnanimity 97 
 
 CB.AVTER VIII. 
 Love of Neighbor — Limitations — Charity — Selfishness — Love 116 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Veracity — Lie of Necessity — Promulgate the Truth — Martyrdom for Truth 121 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Ethics of Business — of Employment — of Professions 138 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 Professional Advertising — Winning a Practice — Duties to Patients..... 144 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 The Duty of the Dentist to Other Dentists and to the Dental Profession — Papers 
 
 Read at Society Meetings — Fees 150 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 Commissions and Split Fees — Codes of Ethics — Patents 157 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association 172 
 
 PART THIRD. 
 
 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 The Status of the Dentist — The Right to Practice — Power of the State to Regulate 
 
 Practice — Relation Between Dentist and Patient 184 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 Liability for Compensation — Wives, Minors, Parents, Guardians, etc. — For Breach 
 
 of Contract 201 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 Liability of Dentist to Patient for Malpractice — For Infecting a Patient — For 
 Operating Without Consent — Damages — Statute of Limitations — Definition of 
 Malpractice 217 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 Liability of the Dentist to the State — Liability for Illegal Practice— The Dentist 
 as a Witness — Privileged Communications — Expert Testimony — Identifying the 
 Dead — Jury Duty 234 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE MORAL IDEAL. 
 
 The moral obligations and duties which rest upon a man, 
 and which he is expected to assume and acknowledge by reason 
 of his occupation, are as important a part of his education and 
 as worthy of his earnest attention and effort as the sciences 
 and arts by the acquisition of which he seeks to prepare himself 
 for his profession or employment. 
 
 Dentistry has developed into a profession independently 
 of the medical profession — that is, by teaching in its own schools, 
 and conferring its own degree instead of teaching in the medical 
 schools and practicing under the medical degree, and this has 
 resulted in the past in a wider separation between the two pro- 
 fessions than is desirable or necessary. That dentistry is a 
 branch of the great art of healing is beyond controversy, and 
 the broadening scope and increasing thoroughness with which 
 the medical sciences are being taught in the dental schools is 
 gradually preparing the way for closer relations, a more intelli- 
 gent cooperation, and greatly increasing cordiality between the 
 two professions. These cordial relations, expressed by consulta- 
 tions together, the reference of suitable cases by members of each 
 profession to those of the other, and the mutual acknowledgment 
 that certain classes of cases belong exclusively to dental practice 
 and other classes of cases exclusively to medical practice, would 
 be impossible if the dental and medical professions did not 
 conform to essentially the same standards of ethical require- 
 ments. As a matter of fact, the ethical code of the dental pro- 
 fession has its source, its inspiration, and its authority from 
 that of the medical profession, and the "Principles of Medical 
 Ethics" as acknowledged and promulgated by the American 
 Medical Association are of equal force and obligation for the 
 dental profession, with a few exceptions, perhaps, of matters 
 which relate to things not included in dental practice, and one 
 or two in which dentists are not accustomed to apply the medical 
 rules with strictness. 
 
6 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 It is to the medical profession, therefore, that we must 
 look for the origin of our professional ethics, and I cannot intro- 
 duce our subject better than by reading from an editorial in 
 the Chicago Tribune for October 18, 1904: 
 
 "The Medical Ethical Code. 
 
 "Doctors are continually heard to say : 'No, I can't do 
 that. It's not professional.' It is comparatively seldom that 
 such an insistence on a professional code of ethics is noticed 
 in the conversation of lawyers or of engineers or of other fol- 
 lowers of specialized callings. 
 
 "What is the medical ethical code? What are the principles 
 which a profession, more profuse in its disinterested charities 
 than any other profession in the world, has established for its 
 guidance ? 
 
 "It was about 2,300 years ago that the practicers of the art 
 of healing began to take an oath emphasizing the responsibilities 
 which the nobility and holiness of that art imposed upon them. 
 Hippocrates, forever to be revered, gave the oath his name. 
 When a Greek physician took the Hippocratic oath and when 
 the graduate of a modern medical school takes it the act is one 
 not only of obligation for himself but of recognition for a great 
 benefactor of mankind. 
 
 "Here follows the Hippocratic oath in its essential parts : 
 
 " 'I swear by Apollo the physician and by ^Esculapius that 
 I will reckon him who taught me this art equally, dear to me 
 as my parents, to share my substance with him and relieve his 
 necessities if required, to look on his offspring in the same foot- 
 ing as my brothers, and to teach them this art if they shall wish 
 to learn it. I will follow the system of regimen which, according 
 to my judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients and 
 abstain from whatever is deleterious. I will give no deadly 
 medicine to any one if asked nor suggest any such counsel. 
 With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practice 
 my art. Into whatever houses I enter I will go into them for 
 the benefit of the sick and will abstain from every voluntary act 
 of mischief and corruption. Whatever in connection with my 
 professional practice or not in connection with it, I hear or see 
 
THE MORAL IDEAL. 7 
 
 in the life of men which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will 
 not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret.' 
 
 "No other secular profession has ever reached such a cor- 
 porate consciousness of duties which it corporately owes to the 
 rest of the world. The Hippocratic oath assumes that simply 
 because a man has learned the art of restoring the sick to health 
 he has passed into a realm in which the rules of personal selfish- 
 ness are immediately abridged, if not expunged, and in which 
 a new and special attitude toward human life must be taken. 
 
 "In modern times the Hippocratic oath has been adapted 
 and expanded till now it appears, as far as Chicago is con- 
 cerned, in a sixteen-page booklet, entitled 'Principles of Medical 
 Ethics of the American Medical Association.' The chapters 
 of this booklet cover, down to the smallest details, such subjects 
 as 'The Duties of Physicians to Their Patients,' 'The Duties 
 of Physicians to Each Other,' and 'The Duties of the Profession 
 to the Public' 
 
 "It seems that certain Chicago physicians have fallen from 
 their high estate in respect of one of these duties. When a 
 physician falls he falls from so great a height that the spectator 
 cannot but be affected. Robert Louis Stevenson was not far 
 wrong when he spoke of the modern scientific medical man as 
 probably the noblest figure of the age. Except the priest, the 
 physician is the first object of approach in distress. Except 
 the priest, the physician gets deepest of all men into the heart 
 of the community. The brethren of the physicians who have 
 erred in the present matter must now lift their standard higher 
 than ever." 
 
 Ethics and morality are synonymous terms and may be 
 defined, comprehensively, as "The science that treats of human 
 actions and mental affections considered as virtuous or vicious, 
 right or wrong," and also the application of this science to the 
 conduct of life; in other words, the art of right living. In 
 these matters, as in most others, the art preceded the science, 
 but nevertheless the chief purpose of understanding the science 
 is to enable us to perfect the art. 
 
 Professional ethics considers the character and conduct of 
 professional people with respect to their moral qualities ex- 
 
8 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 hibited or exercised in the practice of their profession. The 
 code of ethics is not, as some have seemed to suppose, a set 
 of rules and prescribed modes of procedure adopted and pro- 
 mulgated with sole reference to the purely selfish interests of 
 the profession, but it represents the discovery and application to 
 professional conduct of the fundamental rules of morality. 
 
 It is unreasonable to expect that a man's professional 
 conduct will be good if his character and conduct in other 
 respects are bad. We must have a general soundness of char- 
 acter and correctness of life if we expect to stand the tests of 
 time and of special temptations professionally. It is proper, 
 therefore, to consider, as concisely and briefly as we can, some 
 of the more important principles and requirements of ethics 
 before seeking to discover their application to professional 
 conduct. 
 
 Text books and treatises on ethics are numerous as well as 
 voluminous, and if we were to take one of them, like Frederick 
 Paulsen's "System of Ethics," for instance, which is a book 
 of 700 large octavo pages, and undertake to acquire a knowl- 
 edge of its contents, we would need two or three lectures a week 
 for the whole term of school, and much private study by each 
 member of the class, and have no time left for professional 
 ethics, which is the real object we have in view. 
 
 You must realize, therefore, that the best I can do for you 
 in the time we can devote to it will be extremely meager and 
 inadequate as a presentation of the great science and art of 
 morality. I hope that it may not seem so unsatisfactory consid- 
 ered merely as an introduction to the subject of professional 
 ethics. 
 
 The object of morality is human welfare, and the criterion 
 of character and conduct is the influence for good or evil 
 resulting therefrom. The one whose character produces evil 
 results to himself or others is bad, and acts whose natural and 
 expected results are harmful are evil acts. Conduct resulting 
 beneficially is good, and the best character and conduct is that 
 which produces the greatest good of the highest type and for 
 the longest time. 
 
 The most fundamental and important question or problem 
 
THE MORAL IDEAL. 9 
 
 of ethics relates to the nature of the moral ideal, the ultimate 
 or highest good, the object of life the accomplishment of which 
 may be considered a sufficient end or result in itself and not 
 merely as a means to some other and more satisfactory attain- 
 ment. It may as well be acknowledged at once that it is only 
 the nature and characteristics of the moral ideal that we may 
 hope to discover, and not its entire scope and content; for life 
 and the character and conduct which manifest its activities, is 
 progressive and what its final and perfected results may be, no 
 man can now foresee, if, indeed, the progress and development 
 of an immortal spirit shall ever cease. 
 
 The best brief statement I have seen is that the moral ideal 
 for man consists in the full development of his life — not the 
 life of one man, but the lives of all men; or rather, perhaps, 
 the moral ideal for any one man is the perfect development and 
 exercise of his own life, and the largest help he may be able 
 to give to promote the same end for all others within the reach 
 of his personal influence. This statement or definition must be 
 taken with due regard for proportionate and relative values, a 
 clear perception that the soul is better than the body, and the 
 growth and use of the intellectual, moral, and spiritual nature 
 is a higher good than the development of the body and the 
 performance of its functions or indulgence of its desires. 
 
 As a practical statement of the highest ideal of good, this 
 is necessarily vague, and must mean something different for 
 each individual life, because each has its personal inheritance 
 of powers and possibilities and its own environment and influ- 
 ences which help or hinder its unfolding, and all will differ 
 from and come short of an ideally perfect life. Notwithstand- 
 ing its vagueness, perhaps even better because of it, this ideal 
 of a life perfectly developed, and normally exercised, and influ- 
 encing others for good to the extent of its opportunity, should 
 be pictured in the imagination of every boy and girl, every man 
 and woman — a constantly changing, ever expanding goal, the 
 object of endeavor and emulation. 
 
 Something needs to be said in this connection about the 
 contention of many of the ethical philosophers that the highest 
 good consists in the feelings of pleasure that life procures. It 
 
10 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 is true that pleasure is the normal and usual accompaniment of 
 healthy life and right activity of body or mind. It may even 
 be considered one of the important signs or indications by which 
 we determine that welfare is being accomplished, but it is so 
 far from being the only criterion of welfare and the exclusive 
 object of pursuit that by universal consent the "pleasure seek- 
 ers" are classed as bad and not good. Pleasure should be 
 subordinated to personal welfare, to the welfare of others, and 
 to the law of right. 
 
 It may be urged that the phrase "pleasure seekers" is almost 
 exclusively applied to those who spend their lives in sensual 
 indulgences, and that those who restrict such gratifications still 
 have pleasure as their object, though of a higher and nobler, 
 or at least, of a different sort. This may be a very plausible 
 abstraction to argue about, but practically all good people must 
 often deny or restrict the indulgence of pleasures of all sorts 
 without any conscious expectation that better pleasures, either 
 near or remote, will be substituted for them. All we can say 
 is that they are denied to us, or we deny them to ourselves, 
 for the sake of welfare or a better life. Notwithstanding these 
 limitations and restrictions, it is proper to consider pleasure 
 as an important part of the ideal of good. We may say 
 that the moral ideal has two elements. The primary one 
 may be characterized as worth, or welfare, which we have 
 described as consisting in the full development and exercise 
 of human life. The secondary element is pleasure. To 
 these we might add a third element, beauty, which needs no 
 other justification than the pleasure of beholding it and the 
 indication of perfection it implies. All these expressions — 
 welfare, pleasure, beauty, are somewhat vague because of the 
 nature of the things. Because "A human value, experience or 
 pleasure, cannot be exactly weighed or measured." Also because 
 the development of life and the enlargement of its activities 
 brings into view a wider range of its possible activities and 
 attainments, so that the moral ideal of attainable perfection is 
 larger and higher for some men than others, and seems greater 
 and better to the apprehension of a man or a people as develop- 
 ment progresses, and we believe that the evolution or develop- 
 
THE MORAL IDEAL. 11 
 
 ment of man, either in his individual character or in society, is 
 yet very far from being completed. 
 
 There have been many, both of philosophers and theologians, 
 who have taken the opposite view, namely, that the human race is 
 and has been degenerating instead of developing. Probably 
 this view was almost universal among the early Christians. 
 The basis of it is a belief that originally man fell from a state 
 of moral perfection, since which time he has been tending 
 downward toward final destruction; salvation from evil char- 
 acter or evil destiny in this world or the next having reference 
 to the rescue of individuals, whether in small or great numbers, 
 from the general ruin. 
 
 I beheve that most thoughtful people, whether scientists 
 or theologians, now take a different view, one in general accord 
 with the theory of development or evolution, or at least a 
 belief that there have been introduced into the world succes- 
 sively higher and more complicated forms of life, and that the 
 evolution or advancement has been characteristic of moral and 
 spiritual life as well as of physical life. 
 
 I prefer, myself, to interpret the story of the Garden of 
 Eden as an allegory intended to represent the awakening of 
 man to a consciousness of God, of spiritual life and moral 
 responsibility. Previous to such an awakening the human race 
 was innocent, just as we suppose the lower animals to be, 
 because unconscious of moral quality in conduct. 
 
 It must be noticed particularly that this very doctrine of 
 evolution has a double aspect, and gives the pessimists (if we 
 may so call those who believe in the generally increasing wicked- 
 ness of the human race and their final destruction as a punish- 
 ment therefor) very substantial ground to stand upon, for the 
 plasticity of life which makes possible a gradual evolution and 
 increasing perfection from generation to generation necessarily 
 implies also the possibility, and what is easily observable in the 
 human race, the very great danger of degeneracy. There seems 
 no reason to doubt that in the long history of life in the world 
 there have been species that have remained stationary or have 
 degenerated instead of contributing anything toward the ad- 
 vancing evolution of life into higher forms, and it is a matter 
 
12 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 for easy enough observation that multitudes of individuals, many 
 families, and possibly some nations of men have degenerated to 
 final extinction. History records both the rise and the decline 
 of dynasties, reigning families and nations. Whether the nation 
 has yet appeared that will be found worthy to carry forward 
 continually the development of humanity, or whether it will 
 have to be done by some new nation formed out of such remnants 
 of the old nations as prove worthy of preservation, we can only 
 conjecture and hope. How often the sad story of decline and 
 destruction following upon development and success must be 
 repeated in the future history of nations or families, no man 
 is wise enough to tell. The hope of the world lies in the indi- 
 viduals, the families, the nations and races of men that have 
 and will continue to have, sufficient moral vigor and strenuous- 
 ness of purpose to carry forward a little, the evolution of indi- 
 vidual, and social, and national life, and at last, of all human 
 life — toward a more harmonious and perfect development. Men 
 are not passive in the hands of fate, or providence, or cir- 
 cumstances. They either grow better or worse by the effects 
 of their own choices and activities, and I need only to suggest 
 the supreme importance to each individual that he be morally 
 and spiritually progressive instead of a degenerate. 
 
 What the moral ideal may signify to any particular indi- 
 vidual depends upon what his understanding and imagination 
 may conceive of the perfections, the knowledge, the power and 
 influence, and variety of activities, and duration of existence 
 which a human being may attain. 
 
 The previous history of our morality and theory of life 
 which have been and still continue most influential in the life 
 of the Western nations, divides itself into three periods : 
 ^"The first embraces the development of the ancient 
 world to its conversion ; the second, the Christian development 
 with its two halves, the Christianity of the Old World, and 
 medieval Christianity; the third, the development of modern 
 times which has not yet come to an end." The best ethical 
 philosophy of the ancient world is that of the Greeks, which has 
 also, of all the ancient systems, most influenced the thoughts of 
 the modern western nations. 
 
 ^(Paulsen, page 34). 
 
THE MORAL IDEAL. 13 
 
 It is impossible for us to take time to give an account of 
 Greek ethics, and I can only quote a few sentences from 
 Paulsen's summary of its main features. 
 
 ^"It agrees with the popular Greek view that the highest 
 good consists in the perfection of man as a natural being. 
 Special stress is laid upon the development of the intellectual 
 side. Even the popular conception recognizes the great impor- 
 tance of the intellect for human perfection." 
 
 "The philosophers, the specific types of the Greek people, 
 as the prophets are of the Israelites, go still further and make 
 reason the root and crown of all human excellence. For them 
 wisdom or philosophy is both the means and the content of 
 eudoemonia — the former, in so far as it acquaints us with the 
 highest good and regulates practical life to the end of reahzing 
 it — the latter, in so far as philosophy, or the scientific contem- 
 plation of the universe, is the highest, freest function of human 
 nature, one that is desired solely for its own sake. It is said 
 that Anaxagoras, being once asked for what end he had been 
 born, answered : 'For the contemplation of the sun and moon 
 and heaven, and the order governing the entire universe.' This 
 is really the answer which the entire Greek philosophy, and the 
 Greek mind in general, gives to the question." 
 
 "Modern scientific research is, as compared with Greek- 
 philosophy, more like labor, often like petty and arduous labor. 
 The physical or historical investigator of our time employs an 
 enormous apparatus of learning and technical skill, collections and 
 instruments, in order to throw light upon some obscure nook 
 of reality. The result of his work may at some time, in some 
 connection or other, assist us somewhat in understanding 
 reality." 
 
 But no one now expects to be able to understand all of 
 reality or fully to understand the great order of the universe. 
 
 "The Greek philosophers, on the other hand, were happy in 
 the belief that it was possible, and that each one of them would 
 be able to unravel the ultimate mysteries of the universe by pure 
 contemplation. Even Aristotle, the great observer, declares that 
 
 '(System of Ethics, page 58). 
 
14 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 of all activities, scientific investigation is in least need of external 
 aids, so convinced is he that the apparatus of research is a 
 purely secondary affair." 
 
 On its practical side the Greek ethics or philosophy made 
 much of physical perfection and the pleasures of healthy bodily 
 activities, and of the duties of men to society and to the state. 
 Their games, sports, athletic competitions, etc., had both these 
 ends in view, namely, to develop the full capacity of bodily 
 powers for the sake of the zest and pleasure of living, and also 
 to produce a strong and hardy race of men for the defence 
 of the state in war. Their inculcation of the virtues of courage, 
 temperance, self-control of bodily impulses and desires, and 
 justice in social intercourse and in the administration of law 
 were for the same double purpose. Their ideals of life and 
 standards of conduct had reference to the present earthly life. 
 While the Greeks were not destitute of the hope and expectation 
 of immortality, it would seem that their beHef in a future life 
 had very little influence upon either the ideals or the conduct 
 of the present life. 
 
 Christianity turned the thoughts and desires of men toward 
 the immortal and spiritual life, whose transcendent value and 
 infinite duration made the bodily and earthly life seem insig- 
 nificant and worthless by comparison, and whose rewards and 
 punishments became the strongest motives and sanctions for 
 both the ideals and the conduct of the earthly life. The perse- 
 cutions, the poverty, and often the almost incredible hardships 
 which the early Christians endured, together with the belief, 
 then probably universal among the Christians, that this wicked 
 world was doomed to very speedy destruction, tended still 
 further to a glorification of the heavenly life and a contemptuous 
 disregard of the present, which, indeed, for many of them held 
 very little of comfort or pleasure. There is little room to doubt 
 that the early Christians greatly undervalued the earthly life, 
 and as a consequence gave too little heed to some of its duties 
 and opportunities as well as its perfections and pleasures. 
 
 The various orders of monks, nuns, hermits, and other 
 ascetics carried these ideas still further and believed that the 
 physical and earthly life is antagonistic and likely to be destructive 
 
THE MORAL IDEAL. 15 
 
 of spiritual life unless constantly suppressed and mortified. 
 These various orders, consecrated to chastity, poverty, and obe- 
 dience to the authority of the church as expressed in the com- 
 mands of the priests, bishops, and other officers, and finally of the 
 pope, probably served a useful purpose as a protest against the 
 prevalent self-indulgence, licentiousness and brutality of the 
 times, by showing, in living examples, the capacity of man to put 
 his physical fife and bodily impulses under a rigid discipline and 
 control. The ascetics went much further than this and attempted 
 and believed salutary, not merely self-control, and the moderate 
 and temperate satisfaction of natural impulses and desires, but 
 their extinction. They appeared to think pain, hunger, thirst, 
 cold, heat, ridicule, contumely, persecution — everything disagree- 
 able, to be good for a man's soul, in proportion to their severity, 
 so they tortured themselves, and sought to have the food and 
 drink they must take to sustain life as unpalatable and disagree- 
 able as possible, and generally "mortified" and punished them- 
 selves in every way they could think of. It seems very strange 
 to us that they should have thought it a deadly sin to commit 
 suicide, but meritorious in the highest degree to kill themselves 
 by inches. 
 
 Not all of the celibate orders were to be characterized in 
 this way. Much the larger number were too actively engaged in 
 useful services of various sorts to carry self-punishment to any 
 such extremes, and it was these, whose lives of self-denial and 
 unselfish ministry to the sinful and unfortunate were constantly 
 under observation of the communities in which they lived, who 
 exercised a salutary influence upon the world, while the more 
 extreme of the self-torturers were for the most part secluded 
 from public observation in monasteries and convents and their 
 harmful influence fortunately lessened therebyv 
 
 Modern ethics and modern Christianity appreciate both 
 earthly and heavenly, bodily and spiritual values, regarding the 
 physical life as the foundation and the instrument for the use 
 and manifestation of the intellectual and spiritual life during the 
 period of earthly existence. That the physical life should be 
 subordinate and subservient to the intellectual and spiritual life 
 is normal for man, and therefore conducive to the welfare of 
 
16 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 both body and soul, while a reversal of this order, making the 
 soul servant of the body first brutalizes, and finally destroys both 
 body and soul. Modern Christianity gives constantly increasing 
 attention and effort to procure a complete and symmetrical de- 
 velopment and sound health of physical life, always having the 
 purpose in view that intellectual and spiritual life are thereby 
 promoted and have a better instrument for their expression. 
 Life, whether physical or spiritual, is always confronted by 
 dangers as well as opportunities, and some men are so well con- 
 tent with the perfection of physical life that they neglect and 
 ignore the opportunity it offers them to cultivate the nobler ele- 
 ments of character, and so degenerate instead of develop, from 
 the very submit of physical perfection, which offers them the 
 opportunity and incentive for progressive development of higher 
 and spiritual powers. 
 
 Paulsen says (page 157) : "Three great truths Christianity 
 has engraven upon the hearts of men. 
 
 "The first is : Suffering is an essential phase of human life. 
 The Greeks were familiar with suffering but only as a fact which 
 ought not to be. * * * Christianity has taught us to appreciate 
 suffering; suffering is not merely a brutal fact, but essential to 
 the perfect development of the inner man; suffering withdraws 
 the soul from too complete devotion to the temporal and perish- 
 able; it is the antidote to vanity and the love of show; it is, in 
 Christian phrase, the great means of education by which God 
 turns our hearts from the earthly and temporal upwards, to the 
 eternal, to Himself. And so suffering leads to inner peace." 
 * * * 
 
 "The second great truth which Christianity has impressed 
 upon humanity is this : Sin and guilt are essential phases of 
 human life. This truth, too, the Greeks did not see, or at least 
 not in its entire force. * * * For Christianity, it is the most 
 serious and the most awful truth that the inclination to evil is 
 deeply rooted in the essence of the natural man. * * * it is 
 an undoubted truth that human nature contains, besides beautiful 
 and good capacities and impulses, inclinations which justify the 
 harsh remark that man is the wicked animal. * * * The 
 ancients were not conscious of the awfulness of the thing; it did 
 
THE MORAL IDEAL. 17 
 
 not seem to be incompatible with their demands upon human 
 nature. Christianity has raised the standard; it measures man 
 by the justice and holiness of God, which have become incarnate 
 in Jesus. * * * It is impossible for us to accept evil as com- 
 placently as did the Greeks." * * * 
 
 "The third great truth which Christianity has impressed 
 upon us is : The world lives by the vicarious death of the just 
 and innocent. Whatever system loving theology may have made 
 of it, it remains the profoundest philosophical-historical truth. 
 The nations owe their existence to the willingness of the best and 
 the most unselfish, the strongest and the purest, to offer them- 
 selves for sacrifice. Whatever humanity possesses of the highest 
 good, has been achieved by such men, and their reward has been 
 misunderstanding, contempt, exile, and death." * * * 
 
 "Joined with these three elements is a fourth: th.e longing 
 for the transcendent. Antiquity was satisfied with the earth; 
 the modern era has never been wholly free from the feeling that 
 the given (present) reality is inadequate. Something of the 
 mood which Christianity introduced into the Occident — the feel- 
 ing that the real home of the soul is not on earth, that this life 
 is a pilgrimage in a foreign land — constantly confronts us in the 
 poetry and in the life of the modern age, and not only among 
 those who accept the teachings of primitive Christianity, but also 
 among the children of the world. * * * After all this we 
 may say : the mixture, antagonism, and reconciliation of Christian 
 and Greek elements is characteristic of the modern conception of 
 life and the world. There are times when the former, and there 
 are times when the latter preponderate. * * * Indeed, if man 
 were a purely logical being, then he would have to draw the line 
 sharply between these extremes ; the affirmation and the negation 
 of this earthly life, Hellenic love of life and Christian yearning 
 for deliverance from all that is transitory, would be regarded by 
 him as contradictory opposites, between which there can be no 
 middle ground. But man is not mere intelligence, his inner life 
 is not a logical mechanism which rejects everything contradictory; 
 he is also and primarily a willing and feeling being, a being that 
 experiences pleasure and pain, hope and fear, love and hate, 
 admiration and contempt. The judgments, too, which he pro- 
 
18 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 nounces as such a being, he endeavors to comprehend into a 
 system; thus arise the different conceptions of hfe, and the 
 interpretations of the world based upon them, the religious sys- 
 tems. The greatest opposition which exists between them is that 
 obtaining between culture-religions or world-affirming religions, 
 and religions of redemption. But extremes do not exclude each 
 other here as in scientific systems. * * * The lines are not so 
 sharply drawn, there is more inconsistency, mixture, approxima- 
 tion, — nay, these are in a certain sense natural and necessary." 
 * * * 
 
 'Tn conclusion, let me say a word concerning an objective 
 approximation, which becomes apparent when we compare the 
 two types with a third, to which they are both opposed." 
 
 "We may distinguish between three conceptions of a good 
 life, and accordingly between three forms of conduct. The first 
 seeks the good in sensuous enjoyment; the second finds it in 
 the exercise of human spiritual powers in a varied civilisation; 
 the third, at last, transcends the earth and discovers the goal of 
 life in the blessedness of the hereafter, which is here enjoyed in 
 anticipation. The first view is, according to the Greek belief, 
 the ideal of the Asiatic barbarians ; the second, that of the 
 Greeks; the third, that of the Christians." 
 
 "It is plain that the second and third views make common 
 cause against the first. The rule of reason, the limitation and 
 discipline of the sensuous desires, is demanded by both as the 
 precondition of perfection. So far as that goes, an ascetic ele- 
 ment is by no means wanting even in Greek morality; it is 
 strongly enough emphasized by Plato, the Stoics, and still more 
 by the later philosophers. Indeed the word "Asceticism" is 
 derived from the Greek language, — it signifies, first of all, the 
 discipline of the animal nature, which was practiced in the 
 gymnasia, and also that of the inner life, which was practiced 
 in the philosopher-schools. * * * Qf course, Christianity, 
 with its demand of self-denial and holiness, goes much further 
 than Greek asceticism, which remained more or less a form of 
 self-preservation; the development and exercise of the spiritual 
 powers in philosophy and science formed the positive content of 
 life, for the sake of which the discipline of the senses was 
 demanded." 
 
THE MORAL IDEAL. 19 
 
 "On the other hand, however, we find attempts at a positive 
 treatment of the mundane world in Christianity; among them, 
 for example, the government of human life according to the 
 principle of brotherly love, the perfection of a kingdom of God 
 on earth. The love of neighbor becomes a definite and tangible 
 thing only in case an earthly goal is presupposed, which it is the 
 function of love to assist in attaining." 
 
 It seems to me this is a mistaken limitation, for it is hard 
 to see why it is not just as much the function of the love of 
 neighbor to assist in attaining the goal of life in the blessedness 
 of the hereafter as in the perfection of the earthly life. 
 
 Perhaps Paulsen is too much inclined to regard these three 
 ideals of life as antagonistic and exclusive of each other. They 
 are rather successive developments or enlargements of life, and 
 as the Greek ideal did not call for the extinction of the physical 
 and sensuous life, but only for its discipline and subordination 
 to a better use and expression of life, so the Christian ideal does 
 not call for the extinction of either the physical or the intellectual 
 life, but only for the discipline and subordination of both to a 
 better use of life in a disinterested service of humanity, with a 
 perfected moral and spiritual life in both this world and the 
 next as the ultimate object in view. As a matter of fact, estab- 
 lished by observtaion and experience, such a discipline and subor- 
 dination of the lower powers of life for the benefit of the higher, 
 is good for them. The discipline of the physical life and sensuous 
 pleasures by the Greeks resulted in a greater zest for sensuous 
 pleasures, a better physical development for endurance and service 
 and the preservation of health and life to a greater age than was 
 accomplished by the "outside barbarians" who were supposed to 
 have no better object in life than physical perfections and pleas- 
 ures. In like manner, the subordination and discipline of the 
 intellectual powers and the pursuits of science, philosophy and 
 art, for the better Christian ideals of service to moral and 
 spiritual ideals and the hopes for immortality, have helped to 
 develop an or I, a science, and a philosophy, beneficent in their 
 results and widespread and inclusive as to the numbers benefited, 
 in comparison to which the best attainments of Greek art, science, 
 and philosophy, were no more than a prophecy and a hope. 
 
20 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 It is to be remembered that so long as man is progressive 
 (any man, or the race of mankind), the moral ideal is receding 
 and enlarging, — always striven for but never attained. Every 
 good man can comprehend and imagine thoughts, feelings, and 
 motives, knowledge, and skill, and useful services, better than 
 those to which he has attained, and if by and by he shall succeed 
 in reaching his present ideals, his larger life and better activities 
 will bring to his comprehension still better powers and greater 
 usefulness. On the other hand, the moral ideal, the true purpose 
 of living, is realized day by day by every one in proportion as 
 he may accomplish such perfection and health of body and soul 
 as are possible to him and employ his strength and activity in 
 useful service. Therefore, though the chase after the moral ideal 
 in the perfection of life and conduct may never reach its goal, 
 yet is the pursuit neither hopeless nor fruitless, but captures all 
 along the way the richest rewards that human life may receive. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 MORAL EVOLUTION, DUTY AND CONSCIENCE. 
 
 The object of life is the perfection of hfe, but this cannot 
 be attained by individuals acting each by himself and for himself 
 alone. He who attempts that, will surely find the truth of the 
 paradox : "He that will save his Hfe shall lose it." Every good 
 life must be used to help all other lives it may influence, toward 
 such perfection and usefulness as may be possible for them, and 
 personal and individual ivelfare cannot be attained without such 
 service. Man is a social being; each must receive much from 
 many others; each should therefore give much to many others. 
 
 Scientific men describe the process of evolution as being 
 accomplished by a "survival of the fittest," and I believe some 
 have written about it as though they believed it characterized 
 by a wholly selfish and uncompromising "struggle for life" by 
 each individual against all comers, in which the strongest and 
 best developed survived and were able to develop new organs 
 and functions, or to modify and perfect old ones, and so gradu- 
 ally to adapt themselves more perfectly to their environment or 
 to accommodate themselves to the changes in their environment 
 brought about by the slow progress of the world. By this means, 
 higher and more complicated forms of life were developed out 
 of the lower. Evolution was always accompanied by the elimi- 
 nation of the weak and unfit, and the degeneracy and extinction 
 of many species that proved unable to adapt themselves to the 
 changes taking place in the environment in which they must live. 
 
 A disposition is sometimes seen to regard the ideas of service 
 and sacrifice for the good of others, and especially the sympathy 
 and philanthropy which seek to improve or preserve the weak 
 and unfit, as unscientific and of doubtful benefit to the progress 
 of the world, and probably it is necessary to take account of 
 moral and spiritual values in order to make out a case for the 
 preservation of the physically weak and unfit; however, it needs 
 but a moment's reflection to perceive that the "struggle for life" 
 even in its lower forms, is not wholly personal and selfish. The 
 dependence of individuals upon each other, and consequently. 
 
22 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 the "struggle for the lives of others" began to show itself long 
 before the advent of man upon the earth. Its first manifesta- 
 tions, of course, are in sexual relations and the care and pro- 
 tection of the young, but in varying forms and degrees of mani- 
 festation it has run parallel from the beginning with the struggle 
 for personal and individual life. The highest expression of these 
 two motives or impulses; the egoistic and the altruistic, working 
 in harmonious co-ordination to accomplish a good life, is formu- 
 lated in the "Golden Rule" : "Thou shalt love they neighbor as 
 thyself," and is as scientific as it is Christian. 
 
 The close relations of men in modern society and the vast 
 and exceedingly complex machinery of social, industrial and 
 political affairs, imposing upon every one such numberless and 
 varied duties corresponding to the rights and the needs of others, 
 and making needful so many limitations and restraints upon the 
 exercise of individual freedom and the indulgence of natural 
 impulses, is a comparatively recent development or evolution of 
 that portion of the human race to which we belong, and men 
 are yet very far from the completion of their adaptation to this 
 new environment. In fact, there is nothing upon which all men 
 and women are so well agreed as on the proposition that very 
 many things in social life and relations, in the conduct of business 
 and manufacturing, in the management of political parties and 
 the administration of government, the education of children and 
 youth, and the practice, if not the creeds, of religion, are in need 
 of improvement. When it comes to particular plans for improve- 
 ment, the agreement ceases, but whenever there is a general 
 agreement that some particular thing can be improved by some 
 definite method, there is immediate hope and usually speedy 
 accomplishment of some real progress. 
 
 Scientific men have long been engaged in a patient investiga- 
 tion and study of the laws of God in the physical world, with 
 the most astounding results in the harnessing of the forces of 
 nature in the service of man, exerting greater physical power 
 in useful work than could be done by untold millions of human 
 hands, and by discovering and obeying the laws of life, men 
 have been able in the vegetable and animal world to procure the 
 comparatively rapid evolution or development of primitive or 
 
DUTY AND CONSCIENCE. .23 
 
 wild types into forms incomparably better suited to human uses. 
 This is true conspicuously of domestic animals, fruits, vegetables, 
 and grains. Having accomplished so much upon these lower 
 levels, it is reasonable to suppose that similar patient and sincere 
 investigation may lead to the discovery of the laws of social, 
 economic, moral, and spiritual life, and the forces and circum- 
 stances that promote or hinder development, and so the intelli- 
 gence of men, by comprehending the Divine purposes, and 
 methods of operation, may guide or control human affairs in 
 accordance therewith to the accomplishment of a more rapid 
 development than the world has heretofore seen; for men have 
 too often been little better (as respects the evolution of life) than 
 passive instruments in the grasp of Divine forces, or at best have 
 been groping almost blindly for the path of progress, and too 
 often at cross purposes with each other and with the Creator. 
 
 That men may understand the laws and purposes of God 
 and actively co-operate with Him for their fulfilment, is an old 
 idea in the world as applied to moral and spiritual life and con- 
 duct. The New Testament teaches it in direct terms in such 
 passages as these : "We then, as workers together with him, 
 beseech you also that ye receive not the grace of God in vain." — 
 (2 Corinthians vi-1) and "Work out your own salvation * * * 
 for it is God which worketh in you." — Phil, ii, 12-13). It is 
 equally true that men are "Workers together with God" when 
 they discover and apply to beneficent uses the laws and resources 
 of the physical world, the laws and forces of vegetable and animal 
 life and development, or the facts, relations and duties pertaining 
 to economic, social, legal, and moral relations and duties of men. 
 
 Similar efforts, by a patient study of facts and relations, 
 with such differences of methods as the nature of the subjects 
 makes necessary, are beginning to be applied to the discovery of 
 the laws and solution of the problems of social, business, eco- 
 nomic, moral and spiritual life. Let us hope that in time the 
 useful results may be as astonishing and satisfactory as they have 
 been in the mechanic arts, in the practice of medicine, surgery and 
 dentistry, and many other activities by which the health, comfort, 
 duration, and breadth and scope of human lives have been so 
 greatly increased during the last hundred years. 
 
24 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 The first step in such progress, will be a better comprehen- 
 sion of the rights, and the needs of men and a moral quality, 
 responsive to such comprehension, that will insure respect for 
 human rights, and to the extent of power and opportunity, the 
 supply of human needs. At the present time, — perhaps it has 
 always been so, — the moral quality that leads men to do right is 
 lagging behind the comprehension of what is right. That is to 
 say, a very large number of people are not doing as well as they 
 know how to do. Here, as everywhere, the difference between 
 good and bad is fairly well understood by everybody in a general 
 way. Good men are careful and scrupulous about the perform- 
 ance of their duty, and less strenuous about maintaining their 
 rights, often yielding them rather than contend for them, espe- 
 cially when they judge that the contention may do more -harm to 
 themselves or others than the rights are worth in particular 
 instances. Bad men, on the other hand, are very careless and 
 indifferent about the performance of their duties, but usually 
 very particular and insistent to have their rights respected. 
 
 If the time could come when all men were developed to the 
 greatest perfection and efficiency which their natural abilities and 
 their circumstances in life make possible, and these perfected 
 lives were exercised for the benefit of others equally with them- 
 selves, all rights would be protected, all duties would be per- 
 formed, all the needy would be provided for, and the "Millen- 
 nium" would be here. 
 
 Until then, all good people must seek and expect to give 
 more than is due from them, to help carry the burdens and 
 perform the duties neglected by those who ought to do them. 
 It is right for a man to use his life for his own perfection and 
 welfare. It is his duty to use it for the good of those about him, 
 and since we receive far more from others than we can do for 
 ourselves, we should do far more for others than for ourselves, 
 and our lives should be trained and perfected wtih chief reference 
 to making them as efficient as possible in the service of others. 
 Moral worth is impossible of attainment otherwise. Man must 
 serve others if he would ennoble himself; he should ennoble 
 himself that he may serve others. 
 
 Although this writer is more largely indebted to "Paulsen's 
 
DUTY AND CONSCIENCE. 25 
 
 System of Ethics" than to any other souce, it must not be sup- 
 posed that everything preceding has been derived from Paulsen, 
 either directly or indirectly. Much less has any attempt been 
 made to epitomize the contents of the first four hundred and 
 seventy pages of Paulsen's work. Many things of great interest 
 and importance have been omitted, both respecting the historical 
 development of morality and its fundamental conceptions and 
 questions of principle, and for the most part, conclusions only 
 have been stated without any attempt to outline or reproduce the 
 facts or reasons by which he has fortified his conclusions or 
 opinions. Many subjects have been wholly omitted; for instance, 
 Paulsen has a whole chapter on the "Teleological and formalistic 
 conceptions of the good and the bad." "The former explains the 
 difference between good and bad by the effects which modes of 
 conduct and acts of will naturally produce upon the agent and 
 his surroundings. Acts are called good when they tend to 
 preserve and promote human welfare; bad, when they tend to 
 disturb and destroy it. Formalistic ethics, on the other hand, 
 claims that the concepts good and bad, taken in their moral sense, 
 designate an absolute quality of the will, without any regard to 
 the effects of acts or modes of conduct; that this quality cannot 
 be further explained, but must be accepted as a fact." Paulsen 
 advocates the teleological view. 
 
 The chapter on "The highest good" is a discussion of the 
 hedonistic and energistic conceptions. We can only quote a 
 statement of them. He says : "The highest good of an individual 
 as well as of a society consists in the perfect development and 
 exercise of life. This, of course, is a purely formal definition, 
 but we cannot make it more specific. It is as impossible to define 
 the perfect life as it is to define a plant or animal species. We 
 can simply give a description of it : this it is the business of the 
 doctrine of virtues and duties to do." 
 
 "Before giving a more detailed account of this conception, 
 however, I deem it wise to discuss another view of the nature of 
 the highest good. An influential ethical school contends that 
 welfare or the highest good does not consist in the objective con- 
 tent of life, but in the feeling of pleasure which life procures; 
 that pleasure is the thing of absolute worth, and that everything 
 
26 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 else has value only in so far as it conduces to pleasure. This 
 view is commonly called hedonism; the theory opposed to it we 
 have called energism." 
 
 Paulsen's chapter on pessimism opposes the views of the 
 pessimistic philosophers who contend that "Life has no value ; or, 
 if it contains valuable elements, their sum is so far exceeded by 
 the worthless ones that the total value falls below zero, and 
 hence, it is better not to live than to live." 
 
 We have no time to spare for this question, nor for his next 
 chapter on "The Evil, the Bad, and Theodicy" in which he at- 
 tempts to justify the existence of evil in the world. 
 
 The chapter on "Duty and Conscience" is of more conse- 
 quence to our purpose. There are forty pages of it and it is 
 difficult to discuss the matter briefly enough and impossible ade- 
 quately to epitomize his presentation of it. 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF THE FEELING OF DUTY. 
 
 *The normal human will, whether of the individual or of 
 society, "aims at the preservation and perfection of individual 
 and social life." "Here, however, we seem to be confronted with 
 a contradiction. Good, we may also say in conformity with 
 popular usage, is not what we will to do but what we ought to do. 
 To do good means to do our duty, and our duty does not (always) 
 seem to coincide with the natural will; hence there is a conflict 
 between duty and inclination. * * * We call that phase of 
 our nature which opposes inclination and manifests itself in the 
 feeling of obligation and duty, conscience." He next examines 
 "the origin of the feeling of duty." "How does obligation arise 
 in the willing being? Whence this conflict between natural incli- 
 nation and duty? Is it something supernatural, something break- 
 ing into the unity of the willing being from without?" "Accord- 
 ing to the religious view it is : for it, conscience, is the voice 
 of God." 
 
 "This notion contains a germ of truth, but it has no value as 
 an explanation. We have no more right to appeal to God as the 
 cause in morals than in physics. Both the natural law and the 
 moral law may point to something beyond them, to something 
 
 *Page 340. 
 
DUTY AND CONSCIENCE. 27 
 
 transcendent. But we cannot assume the transcendent in order 
 to deduce from it the facts of experience; we must seek for the 
 explanation within the empirical world; and I believe that we 
 can find it there." 
 
 I would state this a little differently, and say that we have 
 a perfect right "to appeal to God as the cause" in both morals 
 and physics. By observation and experience, by the collection 
 of numberless facts and the making of countless experiments ; 
 by the patient construction of theories and formulation of laws 
 which correspond to and are consistent with the observations, 
 experiences, facts and experiments, men have learned very much 
 about the will and laws of God as exerted and illustrated in the 
 material world and in physical life. And it does not seem unrea- 
 sonable that observation and experience, the recording of facts 
 in sufficient numbers, the making of experiments, and the formu- 
 lation of theories and laws that correspond to all these, may 
 teach us very much respecting the will and laws of God as 
 exerted and illustrated in the development of moral and spiritual 
 powers in men and their manifestations in life and conduct. It 
 would be as great a mistake, and one of similar kind to suppose 
 that a supernatural revelation is the only way in which we can 
 find out anything about the laws of God governing the moral 
 conduct of men, as to suppose that such a revelation is the only 
 way in which we can find out the law of God respecting the 
 atomic weight of oxygen. 
 
 THE AUTHORITY OF DUTY. 
 
 Paulsen says : *"The authority of duty springs from the 
 relation of the will to custom, or, what amounts to the same, of 
 the individual to society." "By the term 'custom' I mean the acts 
 performed by all the members of a tribe, which correspond to 
 the instincts of animals. The actions of animals are governed 
 by three principles : impulse, instinct, and individual experience. 
 Impulse regulates the vegetative animal functions — nutrition, 
 respiration, reproduction. The term instinct is applied to uniform 
 modes of behavior which solve more complicated problems of 
 animal life, like nest-building, migration, etc. * * * They 
 
 *Page 343. 
 
28 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 are transmitted by heredity, and practised without knowledge of 
 their purposiveness. They have been characterized as the organic 
 intelligence of the species. In addition to these, the animal also 
 acquires a small measure of individual intelligence through its 
 own experience." 
 
 "The same three principles again meet us in man. The 
 instincts undergo the most peculiar transformation, — they ap- 
 pear as customs. The latter resemble the instincts in that they 
 are stereotyped modes of conduct for the teleological solution 
 of complicated life problems as well as in that they are followed 
 without a knowledge of their purposiveness : they represent the 
 intelligence of the race, in which the individual participates. But 
 they differ from instinct ; the individual knows of them; in obey- 
 ing them, however, he is not conscious of their purposiveness, 
 but of their existence and obligation. He insists upon their 
 observance by others as well as by himself, formulating them 
 into those universal rules which begin with a "thou shalt" or 
 "thou shalt not." We may therefore define customs as instincts 
 that have become conscious of themselves. The difference is, 
 that customs are not, like instincts, inherited organically as nat- 
 ural characteristics, but transmitted by conscious activity, through 
 education. Moreover, customs are upheld by the conscious action 
 of the community: an animal that does not obey its instincts is 
 left to suffer the natural consequences of its behavior; a man 
 who acts contrary to custom causes a reaction in his surroundings, 
 which may assume many forms, all the way from a scarcely per- 
 ceptible form of disapproval to extermination." 
 
 We have not space for Paulsen's illustrative examples. He 
 goes on to say: "We can now understand why duty does not 
 appear to be rooted in the will of the individual, but seems to be 
 something external to him, something opposing him with absolute 
 authority. Custom forms the original content of duty. In the 
 higher stages of development the relation between duty and 
 custom changes; duty gradually assumes a more personal and 
 individual character. But, originally, duty enjoined a life in 
 acordance with custom. * * * Hence we may say: Duty is 
 invested with the authority of custom. ' In it, the will of parents 
 and educators, the will of ancestors, the will of the people. 
 
DUTY AND CONSCIENCE. 29 
 
 speak to the individual will. To these highest human authorities, 
 a still higher and final authority, the authority of the gods" (or 
 God), "is invariably added. * * * ^g religion develops, they 
 uniformly become the guardians of custom and law. This triple 
 authority of parents, people, and gods, reveals itself in the sense 
 of duty : it is a feeling of obHgation to a higher will, which sets 
 a limit to the inclinations. To be sure, this higher will is not 
 supra-powerful, like one governing by force or fear ; it is acknowl- 
 edged internally by the individual will as one having absolute 
 right to command." 
 
 ^RELATION BETWEEN DUTY AND INCLINATION. 
 
 * * * "Custom as such aims at the preservation and wel- 
 fare of the collective body. * * * \Ye may also say that 
 custom aims at the preservation and welfare of the individual. 
 And in so far as the individual desires the preservation and 
 welfare of his own life, he desires exactly what custom desires. 
 Indeed, he cannot realze his welfare except as custom prescribes, 
 — on the one hand, because this is the most appropriate means 
 of solving a particular problem of life, — on the other, because 
 departures from custom would produce a conflict between him 
 and the world, which would necessarily react unfavorably upon 
 his individual welfare. Hence, custom and the individual will, 
 duty, and inclination, really affect conduct in the same way. 
 Conflicts between the two are accidental and exceptional. * * * 
 But how does it happen that duty and inclination oppose each 
 other in consciousness, if not uniformly, at least frequently? 
 I believe this may be explained as follows : The individual 
 becomes clearly conscious of custom" (or duty) "only when his 
 inclinations are directed towards something contrary to it. So 
 long as they conform to custom" (or duty), "conscience has 
 nothing to say to him. * * * it may therefore be said that 
 duty uniformly arises as a limitation of impulses, whose existence 
 it presupposes ; without impulses there would be no duty. It is 
 in its origin essentially negative : Thou shalt not is the formula 
 with which custom, law, duty, originally oppose the individual 
 when his impulses go too far. The positive formula does not 
 
 *Page 346. 
 
30 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 read: Thou shalt, but: I will. Only when the natural impulse 
 or will is lacking, does the formula of duty make its appearance, 
 and change the : I will, into the : Thou shalt." * * * 
 
 CRITIQUE OF THE KANTIAN VIEW. 
 
 "According to Kant, the conflict between inclination and the 
 feeling of duty is essential to morality. An act, in his opinion, 
 has moral worth only when the feeling of duty determines the 
 will, in the absence of all inclinations or in spite of them. Hence, 
 he does not regard it as meritorious to do good from inclination. 
 * * * This view of Kant's called forth the ridicule of Schil- 
 ler's well-known lines : 'Gladly I serve my friends, but alas ! I do 
 it from inclination, hence I am plagued with the doubt that I am 
 not virtuous' (translation) whereupon he receives the following 
 advice : 'Your only resource is to try to despise them, and then to 
 do with aversion that which duty enjoins upon you' (translation). 
 This ridicule, we must confess, is not undeserved. According to 
 Kant's theory, a man's worth depends entirely upon his ability 
 to eliminate inclinations and impulses from his will, and to 
 determine it solely by the feeling of duty. Such a human being, 
 doing his duty solely for duty's sake, is the most wooden manikin 
 ever constructed by a system builder. Nevertheless, there is a 
 germ of truth in the view. The conflict between duty and in- 
 clination is not the rule, and the suppression of inclination by 
 the feeling of duty is not the condition of all moral worth. Still, 
 we may say that the true moral character is plainly revealed in 
 such a conflict." 
 
 I believe the true view is almost the oposite of Kant's ; 
 namely : that the best moral quality is attained by the education, 
 the restraint, and the exercise of inclinations and impulses in 
 such a way that the conflicts between inclination and duty become 
 less and less frequent and finally cease altogether. (Which 
 means by the formation of good habits of thought and conduct. ) 
 
 "The feeling of duty may have prevented much evil in the 
 world, but the beautiful and the good have never sprung from 
 the feeling of duty, but from the living impulses of the heart." 
 
 *"Let me add a remark concerning a few other errors of 
 
 *Paulsen. Page 3.55. 
 
DUTY AND CONSCIENCE. 31 
 
 the a-prioristic-intuitionalistic moral philosophy. It asserts that 
 the laws of duty are axiomatic formulae, which are recognized 
 with immediate and intuitive certainty, like the mathematical 
 axioms. We shall have to concede that the moral laws are imme- 
 diately and universally recognized as valid propositions. They 
 are nothing but the positive or negative expressions of custom, 
 and every member of the community is conscious of cutsom, if 
 he has any part in the life of the community. He knows of 
 custom through the countless particular judgments by which 
 others and he himself have approved and disapproved of acts; 
 the certainty with which he immediately decides in individual 
 cases depends upon practice. * * * Finally, it is no less 
 certain that the moral laws arise in consciousness as "categorical 
 imperatives." * * * So far, therefore, intuitional ethics 
 asserts facts which cannot be doubted. But it is in error when 
 it goes on to claim that these imperatives are objectively ground- 
 less, and that the sole business of ethics consists in systematizing 
 the particular commandments and prohibitions. * * * There 
 is unquestionably an objective ground for the existence and 
 validity of the moral laws, which appear in consciousness in the 
 form of absolute comands and prohibitions ; their observance is 
 the condition of the welfare of the individual and the species. 
 And it is the business of moral philosophy to discover this ground, 
 just as it is the business of a philosophy of law * * * to 
 prove its teleogical necessity by indicating the problems of 
 human collective life which it solves." 
 
 ^"Another error to which intuitional ethics inclines, is the 
 error that conscience invariably reveals to everybody, with 
 subjective certainty and objective infallibility, what duty de- 
 mands. Thus Kant contends that 'the commonest intelligence 
 can easily and without hesitation see,' what the moral law re- 
 quires to be done; or, 'what duty is, is plain of itself to every- 
 one ; but what is to bring true durable advantage, such as will 
 extend to the whole of one's existence, is always veiled in im- 
 penetrable obscurity.' The latter statement is certainly true ; 
 but it is certainly not true that no one is ever in doubt as to 
 what duty demands. In many cases, of course, our duty seems 
 perfectly clear immediately, but by no means in all." 
 
 *Paiilsen, page 357. 
 
32 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 It is just here, in the determination of what duty requires, 
 by a careful consideration of all the circumstances within our 
 knowledge, and their relations to our ideal of life and conduct, 
 that conscientious and rightminded people encounter their 
 greatest difficulties, make their successes or failures and show 
 their wisdom or their foolishness. "But," it may be retorted, 
 "this makes all moral questions uncertain, and subjects them 
 to unbridled casuistry. I do not believe it makes them un- 
 certain; they are uncertain, and will always remain so. The 
 matter is really not so simple as those imagine who hold that 
 an innate power, called practical reason, or conscience, infal- 
 libly regulates a man's conduct by subsuming each case under 
 a general rule. The problem surely does not consist merely 
 in deciding given cases according to a ready-made formula." 
 
 It is not necessary to repeat Paulsen's discussions and il- 
 lustrations under this head. To feel doubtful and uncertain 
 as to what duty requires, or as to which of several alternative 
 courses of conduct we ought to follow, is a not very uncom- 
 mon experience in the lives of most thoughtful and conscien- 
 tious persons. 
 
 CONSCIENCE. 
 
 "We defined conscience as the consciousness of custom or the 
 existence of custom in the consciousness of the individual. The 
 authority with which it speaks is the authority of all those who 
 support and protect custom and law against the particular devi- 
 ating will : first, the authority of parents and teachers, who impress 
 custom or objective morality upon the soul of the child; then, the 
 authority of the wider circles, which pronounce judgment upon the 
 conduct of the individual by the bestowal of praise and blame, 
 honor and disgrace ; further, the authority of the law and the mag- 
 istracy, which deters the offender by threats and punishments; 
 finally, the authority of the gods, which surrounds custom 
 and law with religious awe. The individual compares his con- 
 duct with the standard thus sanctioned and protected, and 
 regulates his individual will according to the universal will, 
 which, after all, is his own general or fundamental will. 
 Hence, arise those emotions which are experienced before the 
 deed as the deterrent or impelling conscience, and after the 
 
DUTY AND CONSCIENCE. 33 
 
 deed, as remorse or moral satisfaction. The content of con- 
 science is varied, as varied as the customs themselves, which 
 the different tribes and nations evolve according to their dif- 
 ferent natures and different conditions of life. The form, how- 
 ever, is universally the same: a knowledge of a higher will 
 by which the individual will feels itself internally bound. This 
 higher will, is, in the last analysis, universally regarded as the 
 will of a superhuman, of a divine power." 
 
 "Those who interpret conscience as a voice from above, 
 and regard their conception as an explanation of its origin, 
 reject the historical psychological explanation, not only as an 
 unsatisfactory, but even dangerous theory; supposing it robs 
 conscience of its sanctity, and hence also destroys its efficacy. 
 * * * I cannot share this view. It does not seem to me 
 that the loss of authority, of conscience, is either a logical con- 
 sequence or a necessary psychological effect of the anthropolog- 
 ical explanation. * * * Why should the moral laws lose 
 their validity because we are convinced that they express the 
 experience gradually acquired by the race in regard to what 
 is wholesome and harmful? On the contrary, what stronger 
 proof can we desire than the hereditary wisdom of a people? 
 In conscience, we have the subjective reflex of the objective 
 natural order of moral life, as it has developed in custom and 
 law ; surely, this knowledge cannot destroy the validity or the 
 teleological necessity of the order. * * * Here let me 
 simply say that in my opinion, the time will never come w^hen 
 men will cease to regard the morality and holiness which they 
 have evolved from their innermost being, as derived from the 
 essence of God or the nature of the All-Real. How could these 
 enter into the heart of man were they not rooted in the very 
 nature of things? Is man an anomaly in the universe? * * * 
 Moral laws are not the accidental injunctions of an arbitrary 
 being, but are inherent in the nature of things, in the nature 
 of man. So teleological ethics conceives them ; and conscience, 
 it conceives as the reflection of the objective uniformity of 
 moral life in the consciousness of the individual. Hence, it 
 regards conscience as a highly important organ for preserv- 
 ing life, which cannot be destroyed by speculations concern- 
 
34 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 ing its origin; any more than the value of language can be im- 
 paired by abandoning the old superstitions which explained it 
 as a direct communication from heaven. *Or do the rules of 
 grammar lose their validity as soon as we become convinced 
 that they originated in a human way? Well, then, neither 
 will the moral laws lose their validity. Whoever desires to 
 participate in the intellectual life of his people must speak 
 their language and obey their laws ; whoever desires to par- 
 ticipate in their moral life, must follow their customs and obey 
 the dictates of his conscience." * * * 
 
 "As Sidgwick admirably says : 'For though the imperfec- 
 tion that we find in all the actual conditions of human exist- 
 ence, is ultimately found even in morality itself, still, prac- 
 tically, we are much less concerned with correcting and im- 
 proving than we are with realizing and enforcing it. The 
 Utilitarian must repudiate altogether the temper of rebellion 
 against established morality, as something purely external and 
 conventional. * * * He must, of course, also repudiate as 
 superstitious, that awe of it as an absolute or divine code 
 which intuitional moralists inculate. Still, he will naturally 
 contemplate it with reverence and wonder, as a marvelous 
 product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth, show- 
 ing in many parts the same fine adaptation of means to com- 
 plex exigencies as the most elaborate structures of physical 
 organisms exhibit: he will handle it with respectful delicacy 
 as a mechanism, constructed of the fluid element of opinions 
 and dispositions ; by the indispensable aid of which the actual 
 quantum of human happiness is being produced ; a mechanism 
 which no politicians or philosophers could create, yet without 
 which the harder and coarser machinery of positive law could 
 not be permanently maintained, and the life of man would 
 become — as Hobbes forcibly expresses it — 'solitary, poor, 
 nasty, brutish, and short.' " 
 
 INDIVIDUALIZATION OF CONSCIENCE. 
 
 "Conscience is originally the manifestation of custom or ob- 
 jective morality in the consciousness of the individual; it acts 
 
 *Page 367. 
 
DUTY AND CONSCIENCE. 35 
 
 essentially as an inhibition of particular will impulses which 
 deviate from the normal. But this is not its iinal and highest 
 form. It exercises a more positive function in that it reflects an 
 ideal of the perfect life. * * * *In its religious and poetical 
 creations every nation produces concrete images of perfection; 
 these take possession of the consciousness of the individual, and 
 fashion his nature and will. He measures himself and his con- 
 duct by the ideal. * * * Conscience thus acquires a new 
 meaning ; * * * now it measures the actual life by its special 
 ideal. * * * This will not be unrelated to custom; still it 
 may differ widely from the universal conception and mode of 
 life, so widely, indeed, that it may even bring the person into 
 conflict with custom, and that this conflict may not arouse pangs 
 of conscience, but be recognized as a moral necessity. Objective 
 morality is now opposed by a subjective morality, a higher form, 
 which applies a new standard to things." 
 
 "Whenever the personality whose individual ideal brings 
 it into antagonism with the objective morality of the times, 
 and leads to a recasting of moral values, is endowed with re- 
 markable powers of intellect and will, those conflicts arise 
 which form the dramatic climaxes in history. The real heroes 
 of mankind have fought such battles. They rebel against the 
 conventional values, against the ideals, which have become 
 useless and false, against sham and falsehood, against the salt 
 that has lost its savor. They preach new truth, point out new 
 aims and new ideals, which instill new life into the soul and 
 raise it to a higher plane. Jesus fought this fight. He rose 
 above the religion and the customs of his nation ; he conceived 
 of a different and higher relation to God than that recognized 
 by his people; and hence, he was not satisfied with the right- 
 eousness of his people, with their punctilious and yet scant 
 and self-sufiicient fulfillment of the law. So he placed himself 
 and his disciples outside of the law of his people ; he broke the 
 Sabbath, he did not fast; he gave them, instead, a new com- 
 mandment : "Love ye one another." And the established sys- 
 tem, the objective righteousness, protested against the revolt, 
 he entered upon the struggle of annihilation which ended in 
 his death. What sustained him in his battles and sufferings 
 
 *Page 369. 
 
36 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 and led him to victory was his firm conviction that he was 
 sent by the Father to proclaim the new kingdom of love and 
 mercy. 'My meat is to do the will of him that sent me.' Thus 
 Jesus has become the eternal prototype of all those who are 
 thirsting after and battling for the kingdom of God, for truth 
 and justice, of all those for whom life, as they find it, has too 
 little force and spirituality, — too little love and freedom, — of 
 all those who from the fullness of their hearts reveal their feel- 
 ings and thoughts, and are then crucified and burned by the 
 rabble, high and low." 
 
 Paulsen has two additional heads in his chapter on duty 
 and conscience. Moral Nihilism ; and the answers to some 
 questions suggested by the notion of duty. It does not seem 
 necessary to our purpose to enter into the discussion of either 
 of them. 
 
 The individualized conscience, described by Paulsen in 
 the preceding quotations, is the strongest force in the world 
 to promote the moral and spiritual evolution of the human 
 race. Some ideal of character and conduct is clearly perceived 
 or imagined, and henceforth the person endeavors, more or 
 less steadily and consistently, to bring life and conduct into 
 conformity with the ideal, and to persuade others to adopt 
 and to strive after similar ideals. He is no longer content to 
 measure himself for approval or censure against the average 
 conscience, as indicated by the customs and expressed opinions 
 of the society in which he lives. On the contrary, he measures 
 the customary conduct and standards of life by his own ideal. 
 It is true that mistakes are sometimes made and some adopt 
 a personal ideal that is worse instead of better than the aver- 
 age life and conscience of the community in which they live, 
 but this opportunity is inevitable, for the plasticity and free- 
 dom of life which make development and growth possible 
 must also allow the possibility of degeneracy and even de- 
 struction. 
 
 The individualization of conscience and the setting up of 
 ideals and standards for one's self therefore calls for greater 
 wisdom, self control and courage, than simply to adopt the 
 conscience and standards of living prevalent in the society 
 in which one finds himself. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 EGOISM AND ALTRUISM, VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS, MORALITY AND 
 RELIGION, FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
 
 *"Acts are called egoistic when their motive is individual 
 weal or woe, — altruistic, when their motive is the weal and 
 woe of others. Some moralists regard these motives as mu- 
 tually exclusive, and contend that every act is the product of 
 either egoistic or altruistic motives." * * * 
 
 "This view gives rise to two opposing schools. Pure altru- 
 ism sets up the principle : Acts have moral worth only in so 
 far as they are determined by purely altruistic motives. Pure 
 egoism asserts : It is not only allowable but morally neces- 
 sary to make individual welfare the sole end of action." 
 
 The discussion or controversy between these two schools 
 appears to be a waste of time, for actions are never purely 
 altruistic or egoistic, and it is doubtful if motives ever are, 
 though they may sometimes nearly approach it. Paulsen is 
 undoubtedly correct when he says : 
 
 *'Tt is as impossible to distinguish absolutely between 
 egoistic and altruistic acts on the ground of their motives as 
 it is to separate them according to their efifects. Indeed, it is 
 a somewhat curious notion, this notion that every act must 
 have one motive. Nay, just as many causes cooperate in the 
 physical world to produce a movement, so many motives work 
 together to determine the will.* * * * jg t^g antithesis be- 
 tween egoism and altruism therefore meaningless?" * * * 
 
 "I do not, of course, claim that. Cases unquestionably 
 arise, in which individual interests conflict, or seem to con- 
 flict, with foreign interests. Acts doubtless occur in which 
 the individual seeks his own advantage at the expense of 
 others' welfare and conversely, there are acts in which indi- 
 vidual interests and inclinations are sacrificed for the welfare 
 
 *Page 379. 
 *Page 386. 
 
38 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 of others, from which it does not necessarily follow that in- 
 dividual welfare, if we take the word in its profoundest mean- 
 ing, is promoted in the former instance and retarded in the 
 latter. And it cannot be disputed that these facts have great 
 moral significance. The above reflections simply desire to 
 show that the opposition between individual and general wel- 
 fare, selfish and altruistic motives, is not the rule, but the 
 exception. As a rule, there is harmony in the effects as well 
 as the motives. Life is not such an antagonistic affair as 
 some moralists make it appear : it is not one constant struggle 
 between mine and thine. No human life, perhaps, is wholly 
 free from conflict, but there are many lives in which it plays 
 no prominent part. Persons who enjoy healthy domestic rela- 
 tions and live in well-regulated communities, and pursue hon- 
 orable and regular callings, do not experience many such con- 
 flicts, nor do they by any means believe that the altruistic 
 settlement of such conflicts forms the essential content of their 
 life and determines its moral worth." 
 
 A rather important aspect of this question seems to be that 
 unless there has been enough of egoism to develop a personality 
 having strength, wisdom, and moral and spiritual excellence, 
 altruistic motives and conduct will be impossible since there 
 will be no effective personality to exhibit them, and it is really 
 the surplus power and resources left over in the development of 
 the person that can be used for altruistic ends. There are two 
 important practical aspects of the matter : First, in a very large 
 proportion of the motives and conduct of life, there is no conflict 
 between egoism and altruism : what is good for others is good 
 for myself. Second, when there is conflict between one's own 
 interests and those of others, the greater or more important in- 
 terest or welfare should decide. We are not always called upon 
 to weigh and measure with cold-blooded indifference and disin- 
 terestedness the value of the various interests to be considered, 
 though even this may sometimes be desirable. 
 
 The motive power for altruistic actions is in the feelings and 
 sentiments of affection, pity, justice, kindness, philanthropy, 
 patriotism, etc., and usually it is the interests and welfare of 
 those nearest to us that must take precedence, especially those 
 
VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS. 39 
 
 whom it is generally understood to be our duty to provide for 
 and who are likely to be neglected if we do not. Doubtless, there 
 have been instances, however, in which a service has been ren- 
 dered for more remote interests of such commanding importance 
 and value as to justify the neglect of interests near at hand, that 
 should ordinarily be of first importance, even such as a provision 
 for one's wife and children. 
 
 VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS. 
 
 *Paulsen's seventh chapter, on "Virtue and Happiness," pro- 
 poses two questions: "(1) What influence has virtue upon 
 happiness? (2) What is the effect of happiness upon character?" 
 
 "First. The first great and fundamental truth to which all 
 peoples have been led in their reflections upon moral matters is 
 the truth that the good man fares well and the wicked man ill. 
 This conviction, which represents the experiences of the race, is 
 expressed in countless proverbs. * * * The theoretical devel- 
 opment of this thought forms the content of Greek moral 
 philosophy. Virtue and happiness are connected, not merely 
 accidentally, through the mediation of the gods, but in the very 
 nature of things. The conception of happiness, however, is 
 spiritualized ; not external happiness or good fortune, but internal 
 happiness, peace and repose of spirit, is directly joined with the 
 exercise of virtue, or follows as its necessary effect. External 
 welfare does not always fall to the lot of the wise and virtuous 
 man; but virtue tends to realize this also; and in case he does 
 not obtain it, he is sure of finding happiness in his own heart. 
 This is also the prevailing sentiment in modern ethics. Hobbs 
 and Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff, Shaftesbury and Hume, all 
 attempt to point out the necessary connection between righteous- 
 ness and welfare. * * * Virtue, welfare, honor, and inner 
 peace go together as well as vice, misery, disgrace, and inner 
 discord. This is especially true of the two extremes : virtue and 
 inner peace, vice and inner discord. The two middle terms of 
 the series are not so constant." 
 
 "A pessimistic conception runs parallel with this view of 
 the relation of virtue and happiness which may be called the 
 
 *Page 400. 
 
40 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 Optimistic view." According to this view "The evil doer is the 
 very one who fares well; fortune favors him; while the good 
 man fares ill.* * * *Strategy and violence, the latter against 
 the weaker, the former against the stronger, are the means by 
 which men rise and maintain themselves." * * * 
 
 "Which of these two views is the correct one? Is the truth 
 of the first overthrown by that of the second? I do not think 
 so. The sporadic pessimistic moods which now and then take 
 possession of every nation and every individual, may perhaps 
 be explained as follows, and reconciled with the optimistic view. 
 It is, of course, an undeniable fact that the good do not always 
 fare well outwardly. A man may become sick, even though he 
 is temperate and prudent, and, conversely, a man who has no 
 regard for his health may remain hale and hearty. An able and 
 honest man may fail in spite of all his exertions, and a scoundrel 
 may accumulate wealth by dishonest means. * * * But the 
 very fact that such occurrences attract so much attention and 
 arouse such indignation seems to indicate that they are not the 
 rule but the exception. * * * These cases would not cause 
 such excitement if they were not contrary to the nature of things. 
 It is the rule that honest labor is a surer road to economic welfare 
 than fraud and dishonesty ; that sincerity and truthfulness arouse 
 confidence ; that falsehood and deception are poor means of mak- 
 ing friends; in short, that virtue is approved before God and 
 man, and that vice is despised and condemned." 
 
 "There is, however, an important exception to the last rule : 
 The vicious do not love the virtuous, but hate them. * * * 
 "This explains the awful impulse to lead others into temptation 
 which is so common to vice. So, too, the flatterer and place- 
 hunter hates the honest and truthful man, who goes through 
 life with his head erect; he imagines that the latter watches, 
 sees through, and despises him." 
 
 "Should vice ever gain the ascendency in society, virtue 
 would arouse in most men, if not contempt, at least hatred and 
 aversion. And since the vices cannot make those who possess 
 them agreeable in the sight of men — for virtue is agreeable to 
 
 *Page 402. 
 
VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS. 41 
 
 the virtuous, but vice is not esteemed by the vicious, especially 
 not social vice — a feeling of universal hatred would take posses- 
 sion of society." We would have hell on earth. 
 
 *"We reach the conclusion that for the truly good man, for 
 one whose will is completely ruled by virtue, virtuous action is 
 always the greatest blessing, even though it should not bring 
 external happiness, and should prove hard for his sensuous 
 nature. * * * He, however, whose will is not ruled by virtue, 
 who does good from fear or calculation, may feel disappointed, 
 when the outward success which he hoped to realize from his 
 honesty, temperance, and benevolence, does not appear. To such 
 a person, virtue seems to be an unprofitable, or at least uncertain, 
 means of happiness, and he utters pessimistic complaints, holding 
 that the evil doers fare well and the good fare ill. This how- 
 ever, does not mean that he would have been better satisfied if he 
 had reached by crooked means the goal which he complains of 
 having missed by fair means. Hence the fact remains that there 
 is a universal inner relation between virtue and success or pros- 
 perity or happiness, while the connection between wickedness 
 and unhappiness is equally necessary." * * * 
 
 "2. *The second question is : What is the effect of happi- 
 ness upon character^ By happiness we here mean external hap- 
 piness : wealth, power, success, fame, honor, health, strength, 
 victory. What effect has the possession or pursuit of these upon 
 character ? 
 
 Observation of human affairs has convinced all the more 
 highly civilized nations of the second great fundamental truth 
 that happiness, or prosperity, or* good fortune, is a menace to 
 character, and finally also to welfare. We mentioned above, as 
 the first maxim of Greek wisdom, the proposition that the good 
 fare well and the wicked, ill. We may add as the second : 
 Eutuchia" (prosperity, success, good fortune, etc.), "is not 
 identical with eudsemonia" (real welfare and true happiness) ; 
 "unalloyed happiness is not happiness." 
 
 "Prosperity produces satiety, a fat heart, as the Psalmist 
 says. Such souls are filled with pride, and pride leads to iniquity, 
 
 *Page 406. 
 *Page 407. 
 
42 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 which calls down upon its head the wrath of God, and destruc- 
 tion. That is, according to the conception of the Greeks, as 
 expressed by their poets and historians, the natural course of 
 events. Only an unusual amount of good sense will enable a 
 man to bear prosperity." * * * 
 
 *"Hence we may say that real happiness is a proper mixture 
 of so-called happiness (good fortune) and misfortune, A man's 
 lot is not happy when all his desires are always and fully realized, 
 — but when he obtains a proper share of joy and sorrow, success 
 and failure, plenty and want, struggle and peace, work and rest, 
 and obtains it at the right time. * * * And so we may be 
 permitted to say that life, as we find it, is on the whole adapted 
 to the real needs of human nature; it brings to everyone good 
 and evil days, successes and trials." 
 
 It seems rather paradoxical to affirm that virtue tends 
 to produce happiness, success and prosperity, and then to say 
 that these have a tendency to destroy the virtue that produced 
 them. Perhaps it may be explained in part by the fact that 
 prosperity and success put to the test different elements and 
 qualities of character from those previously developed and 
 tested, and offer opportunity and temptation to forms of evil 
 for which there had been little opportunity or inclination pre- 
 viously. It is true, also, that virtue is only one of many 
 factors that must cooperate for the accomplishment of suc- 
 cess or happiness, either of external circumstances or inner 
 feelings. It has been said that the virtuous man is sure of 
 inner peace and satisfaction whatever the success or failure 
 of his outward circumstances and this is doubtless true in an 
 important sense, in that he may keep his self-respect and 
 steadiness and continuity of character and disposition, but 
 the man of even perfect virtue (if there be such a man), is 
 liable to have his inner as well as outer peace and satisfaction 
 very much disturbed by such things as poverty, hardship, 
 sickness and death, as they may affect his family or himself, 
 and still more so if one of his children becomes vicious. We 
 all understand that a man's virtue and personal character can- 
 
 *Page 411. 
 
MORALITY AND RELIGION. 43 
 
 not alone preserve him from calamity and misfortune, which 
 is the same thing as saying that virtue alone cannot procure 
 success, prosperity, and happiness. If then, other forces and 
 circumstance have important influence to procure prosperity, 
 it may well be supposed that the peculiar and dangerous temp- 
 tations that prosperity brings with it, may be attributed more 
 to these other forces and circumstances than to the virtue, 
 which also contributed to the result. It is a general rule that 
 results react favorably upon the forces that produce them, at 
 least in the moral and spiritual realm, — yes, — in the exercise 
 of physical life also. The exercise of strength increases 
 strength, and the success, prosperity and happiness which 
 are the normal result of virtue, react upon character to give 
 stimulus, confidence and courage to virtue. 
 
 Another matter to be considered is the fact that the evil 
 influences of prosperity, especially of wealth, are seen oftener 
 and more injuriously in the second and third generations than 
 in the persons who have won prosperity for themselves. In- 
 herited wealth more frequently results in moral injury to its 
 possessor than acquired wealth, always supposing that it was 
 acquired by honorable means. 
 
 When considerations such as these and others that may 
 apply are given their due weight, it will be seen that the pros- 
 perity and success won by virtuous character and conduct 
 are not especially dangerous to the virtue that won them. 
 
 MORALITY AND RELIGION. 
 
 In Paulsen's Chapter 8 : *"The Relation of Morality to Re- 
 ligion," he attempts to answer the question: "Is there an inner 
 connection — one inherent in the nature of things and therefore 
 indissoluble — between religion and morality, or are they inde- 
 pendent of each other, and merely accidentally related?" 
 
 "An historical reflection will prepare us for the answer. 
 It is one of the safest propositions of anthropology that a very 
 intimate relation exists between the religion and the morality 
 of a people, at least at a certain stage of its development. The 
 
 *Page 415. 
 
44 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 customs have the sanction of the gods ; the commandments of 
 religion and morality form a unified code of laws ; piety and 
 morality are regarded as one and the same thing. Let me sim- 
 ply call to mind the best known example. In the laws of 
 Moses, religious, moral, and legal duties appear as wholly 
 homogeneous parts of one law of God. * * * xhe fear 
 of God is the foundation of morality ; pious and good, godless 
 and bad, are synonymous terms. Christianity and Moham- 
 medanism accept this view. We find it also among the Greeks 
 and Romans, Hindoos and Persians, Egyptians and Assyrians. 
 The entire life of the individual and society is regulated by 
 religion ; all the institutions of state and society ; all customs 
 and usages which govern the life of the individual, have a 
 religious basis. We note the same connection between reli- 
 gion and morals among the most civilized tribes of all the 
 native peoples of America, among the Mexicans and Peru- 
 vians." Paulsen also quotes Waitz, an authority on anthrop- 
 ology, as saying, "There is hardly a more trustworthy sign 
 and a safer criterion of the civilization of a people than the 
 degree in which the demands of a pure morality are supported 
 by their religion and interwoven with their religious life."* 
 
 * * * ^"Morality and religion spring from the same 
 root, the yearning of the will for perfection. But that which is a 
 demand in morals becomes a reality in religion. Perfection is 
 described by morality in abstract formulae ; it is instituted in 
 religion in concrete form as a divine, holy, and blessed life. 
 And, too, morality and religion are seen to be two phases of 
 the same thing in the subject: the individual is moral in so far as 
 his willing and acting strive after perfection; pious, in so far 
 as his feelings, his faith, and his hopes, are inspired with the 
 image of the highest." 
 
 "Let us now consider the effect of the union of religion 
 and morals. There can hardly be a doubt that the religious 
 sanction of custom and the moral laws has, in a large measure, 
 assisted in the moral discipline of the individual. * * * 
 The belief in a life after death has been especially influential in 
 
 *(Th. Waitz: Anthropologic der Naturvolker. Vol. 4, 128) 
 
MORALITY AND RELIGION. 45 
 
 this direction. * * * The fear and the hope of the here- 
 after become powerful protectors of morality."* 
 
 Paulsen goes on with a very long discussion of whether 
 the close relation of morality and religion is essential and 
 permanent or "merely a passing phenomena, peculiar to a par- 
 ticular stage of development. Will the connection be severed 
 in the future? Will there then be a perfect morality without 
 any religiosity?" 
 
 "This question was not seriously debated till recently. For 
 centuries nothing seemed more self-evident than the insepa- 
 rableness of morality and religion." The question arises by 
 reason of a purely physical conception of the universe, which 
 some have supposed to imply the absence of any moral quali- 
 ties or values, and to lead, as a logical consequence, to the 
 ignoring of the moral laws. Paulsen does not support this 
 view, — "We shall prefer to say : Whatever may be a man's 
 notion of the nature of things, the laws of morality are none 
 the less binding upon him ; they are not arbitrary prescrip- 
 tions, the observance of which is advisable from the stand- 
 point of rewards and punishments. They are rather laws of 
 nature in the sense that the welfare of a life depends upon 
 their observance. And the opinions of men in nowise affect 
 them. Hence, if one were to infer from an atheistic material- 
 istic conception, that the laws of morality had no further claim 
 upon him, he would be in error, and would have to bear the 
 consequences of his error. * * * Still, I do not believe 
 that morality and religion are indifferent to each other." 
 
 "There are two views of the world which are radically 
 opposed to each other. The central thought of the one is that 
 the good is an essential element in the world, that reality 
 exists through the good and for the sake of the good. We can 
 call this conception idealistic, following Plato's terminology, 
 who bases the world upon the idea of good. W'e may also 
 call it theistic, if we mean by belief in God the trust that the 
 good is the ground and the goal of the world, or, to use 
 Fichte's expression, that the world-order is in the last analysis 
 a moral order. * * * 
 
 *Page 420. 
 
46 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 "Opposed to idealism, we have materialism; according to 
 it, the world-principle is in its essence absolutely indifferent 
 to distinctions of value. The atoms and their uniform mo- 
 tions, of which the whole of reality is composed, have origi- 
 nally absolutely nothing to do with the good and the evil, 
 the rational and the irrational." 
 
 Paulsen strongly supports the idealistic or theistic con- 
 ception, and recognizes the close relation and mutual support 
 and assistance of faith in God and conformity to his will which 
 are the essence of religion on the one hand, and the character 
 and conduct of life on the other hand. The chapter is long 
 and no attempt can be made here even to epitomize his 
 argument. 
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
 
 *"Let me discriminate, at the outset, between two senses 
 of the word; we may speak of freedom of the will in a 
 psychological or in a metaphysical sense. The former means 
 the ability to cause decisions and acts by one's own will (free- 
 dom of choice) ; the latter means that the will or the particu- 
 lar decisions themselves have no cause." 
 
 "In popular speech, the term 'free will' is employed solely 
 in the first sense. An act is called free when the will of the 
 agent is its immediate cause; determined, when it is caused 
 by an external force, that is, either directly, by physical com- 
 pulsion, or indirectly, by threats, misrepresentations, etc. In 
 the latter case, the will is really not the cause of the decision ; 
 but here there is a wide range between gentle persuasion and 
 irresistible compulsion, and therefore a corresponding gradual 
 transition from complete freedom to complete determinism." 
 
 "That there is psychological freedom has never been 
 doubted. But whether the will can be free in the other sense, 
 is a subject of endless debate." 
 
 The question of metaphysical freedom as against fatalism 
 or determinism, is not a practical one as related to the con- 
 duct of life and we need not spend any time in vain efforts at 
 a solution of it. "It belongs to philosophizing theology, or 
 scholasticism." 
 
 *Page 452. 
 
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 47 
 
 After a lengthy description of the heredity, the circum- 
 stances, conditions and relations that influence one's life and 
 character, he says : "Everyone has an immediate feeling of 
 certainty that he is not moulded into what he is from without, 
 that everything would have happened otherwise if he had 
 willed otherwise. And he is likewise absolutely sure that the 
 future shaping of his life depends upon his will. * * * j 
 could also, and perhaps ought to, says self-consciousness, 
 alter my mode of life, my behavior to others, my character. 
 Is all this an illusion?" 
 
 "Certainly not. Self-consciousness does not deceive us. 
 But what does it say? Surely this, — that to the influences 
 which have determined and will continue to determine my 
 life and character, must be added my wishes and inclinations, 
 my convictions and resolutions, and particularly these." 
 
 Paulsen goes on in a lengthy discussion of responsibility 
 and accountability, especially their practical aspects in the 
 treatment by society of offenders and criminals. Then he 
 says: 
 
 "The expression freedom of the will signifies in popular 
 speech a real, positive property of human nature. Animals, 
 too, have wills, but we do not attribute free will to them. 
 Wherein does the difference consist?" 
 
 "Animals are moved to action by momentary impulses 
 and perceptions. * * * Deliberation, hesitation, and choice 
 exist only in rudimentary forms among the most highly de- 
 veloped animals. Now such processes are characteristic of 
 man. He determines his conduct by resolutions. Resolutions 
 are the result of deliberation; in deliberation several possible 
 courses of action or modes of behavior are compared with the 
 ultimate aims of individual and social life, and chosen accord- 
 ingly. Man, therefore, is not determined by his impulses, but 
 he determines himself by ideas of ends. In his purposes, man 
 comprehends his whole life into a unity, as it were, and chooses 
 the particular acts according to their relation to this princi- 
 ple. * * * -pi-ig unity of practical self-consciousness or 
 conscience, exercises a constant control over the particular 
 processes of inner life, feelings, strivings, acts, thoughts. Well, 
 
48 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 this faculty of regulating and determining the particular func- 
 tions of life by an idea of one's life, is precisely what we mean 
 by free will. Hence, we may also say that a person's acts are 
 free, when he is determined, not by present stimuli and the 
 momentary desires aroused by them, but by ideas of ends 
 and ideals, by duty and conscience; in the former case, he is 
 driven, in the latter alone he acts." 
 
 "We may accordingly add that, in a certain sense, the 
 view that the human will is exempt, or forms a kind of con- 
 clave in nature, is correct. The animal is a point of transition 
 for natural processes; it is itself a part of nature, determined 
 from without by constantly approaching stimuli and influ- 
 ences. Man, on the other hand, in a certain manner, emanci- 
 pates himself from the course of nature ; he rises above nature 
 and opposes it as a self, he determines it and employs it, is 
 not determined by it; man becomes a personality. As such, 
 he is able to put his whole self, his ego, into every phase of his 
 life, and therefore he is responsible for every particular act." 
 
 'Tt is apparent that freedom in this sense is not an orig- 
 inal endowment of human nature, but an acquired character- 
 istic; it has been acquired by the entire race in the course of 
 history, and must be acquired anew by each individual. The 
 new-born child does not bring with it a ready-made freedom; 
 nay, it is driven like an animal by momentary cravings. But 
 gradually the rational will, supported by education, rises above 
 the natural impulses. This occurs in a different degree in dif- 
 ferent individuals ; some are wholly controlled by these im- 
 pulses during their entire lives, others acquire such a remark- 
 able control over nature in themselves that they seem to regu- 
 late even the smallest details of their lives by rational deliber- 
 ation, and never do anything or leave anything undone, ex- 
 cept by choice. It is to be observed, in this connection, that 
 though it is vulgar and base to give the impulses complete 
 mastery over one's self, yet the complete suppression of them 
 fills us with fear and awe. * * * Man seems to be in- 
 tended as a mean between an animal and a purely ratiorial 
 being." 
 
 "Hence, can a man determine himself by his own will? — 
 
FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 49 
 
 Can he fashion his will by means of his will? Yes and no. 
 Yes, for he undoubtedly has the faculty of educating him- 
 self; he can fashion his outer and inner man with conscious 
 purpose, according to his ideal ; he can discipline his natural 
 impulses, nay, even suppress them so that they will no longer 
 move him. To be sure, he cannot do this simply by wishing 
 or resolving it ; he can do it only by constant practice and by 
 employing appropriate means, in the same way that he acquires 
 bodily skill." * * * 
 
 "On the other hand, we shall have to say that this forma- 
 tive principle itself must be native to him ; this he cannot give 
 himself by his will, for it is the innermost will itself. * * * 
 We are everywhere confronted with the notion ; — The free- 
 dom of man means the control of the spirit, the slavery of 
 man means the rule of the animal desires." 
 
 "This is the positive significance of the freedom of the will. 
 And ethics should not permit the whimsical attempts of a few 
 metaphysicians to explain freedom of the will as the causeless- 
 ness of the individual will or volition, to induce her absolutely 
 to reject the so fruitful and necessary concept of free will. 
 Freedom of will means, according to the popular usage of all 
 men, these metaphysicians excepted, the faculty to determine 
 one's life, independently of sensuous impulses and inclinations, 
 by reason and conscience, according to purposes and laws ; and 
 that man has such a faculty, that this really constitutes the 
 very essence of man, no one has ever doubted." 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 DOCTRINE OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES. 
 SELF-CONTROL, TEMPERANCE, COURAGE. 
 
 Introducing his Book Third, "Doctrine of Virtues and 
 Duties," Paulsen has this quotation: 
 
 "I possess three treasures ; these I guard and prize highly. 
 The first is the love of humanity; the second, frugality; the 
 third, that I do not presume to be better than any one else. 
 Love of humanity — with this I can be fearless; frugality — 
 therefore I can give to others ; freedom from ambition — hence 
 I have no one above me. 
 
 "Nowadays we despise love of humanity and are inso- 
 lent ; we despise economy, and are wasteful ; we despise mod- 
 esty and strive to surpass everyone else. These paths lead 
 to death." 
 
 Laotsee, Taoteking 67. 
 (After translation of Noack.) 
 
 VIRTUE AND VICES IN GENERAL.* 
 
 "The doctrine of duties and the doctrine of virtues are dif- 
 ferent modes of presenting the same subject matter. The former 
 gives us a system of rules which, as commands or laws, specify 
 the modes of conduct essential to the solution of the problem 
 of life. The doctrine of virtues describes the system of pow- 
 ers by the exercise of which this end is realized. We have 
 already discussed the nature of duty. Let us now add a few 
 words concerning the nature of virtue." 
 
 "Virtues may be defined as habits of the will and modes 
 of conduct which tend to promote the welfare of individual 
 and collective life. Impulses form their natural basis. Vir- 
 tues are not inventions of the moralists ; they are natural pre- 
 dispositions. Predispositions only, remember; for impulses 
 are not themselves virtues : as impulses they have no moral 
 
 *Paulsen. Page 475. 
 
DOCTRINE OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES. 51 
 
 quality. The impulse to eat is not good or bad, but it is the 
 foundation of rational self-preservation. The sexual impulse 
 is not good or bad, but it is the natural basis of the virtues 
 on which family life depends. Compassion or sympathy, the 
 impulse to alleviate the pains of others, is not good or bad, but 
 it is the natural foundation of the virtue of benevolence. 
 Similarly, indignation at wrong and the impulse of revenge 
 form the natural basis of the sense of justice. Moreover, 
 impulses form the permanent basis of the virtues. They can- 
 not, as many moralists are prone to assume, be supplanted by 
 rational reflection. A being like Spinoza''s sage, who is deter- 
 mined to action, not by impulse, but by reason alone, does 
 not exist and cannot exist ; any more than Kant's dutiful man, 
 whose will is governed solely by respect for the moral law, 
 without impulse and inclination. Such a being would not be 
 a human being, but a phantom." 
 
 *'Tmpulses are fashioned into virtues or moral excellences 
 by the reason. We are educated, first, by the reason of others, 
 then by our own reason. Human life begins as a purely 
 impulsive life; the reason is developed slowly and at a late 
 stage. During the long period of youth, the collective reason 
 of the race, as represented by parents, educators and teachers, 
 takes the place of individual reason. Fixed habits are the 
 result of this education ; in them the customs of the commun- 
 ity become individualized. Acquired habits constitute an 
 extremely important part of moral culture; they obtain con- 
 trol over life and guide it with automatic certainty. The 
 important elementary functions of life, especially, are gov- 
 erned by them. Cleanliness, for example, against which the 
 child at first rebels, becomes a habit, which acts with the 
 regularity of a natural function. Most closely related to it, 
 is shame, which is implanted and established by education, 
 and soon acquires the force and certainty of an instinct. 
 So, too, aversion to falsehood, or politeness to others, be- 
 comes a second nature. The formation of such automatic 
 forms of reaction constitutes a primary and important phase 
 
 *Page 476. 
 
52 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 of moral education. The second stage is the gradual develop- 
 ment of the individual's appreciation of moral goods : this 
 is the function of moral instruction. The latter will always 
 have to consist, at first, in the presentation of concrete ex- 
 amples of the good, and provided the proper care is exercised, 
 — of examples of the evil also. After many concrete facts 
 have been handled, the abstract or philosophical treatment 
 of moral concepts will gradually be taken up. Perhaps our 
 public instruction is too cautious in this respect. Our schools, 
 the higher as well as the lower, are afraid of the evil effects 
 of premature abstract instruction in morals, and therefore 
 decide to omit it altogether. I fear that the omission is dis- 
 astrous. The time is bound to come in the life of every 
 young man when he will begin to inquire into the principles 
 of moral conduct and judgment; and there is danger that, 
 being wholly without guidance he will become the helpless 
 victim of his own crude thoughts or of the sophistry of 'en- 
 lightened' companions. Principles and moral instruction are 
 not in themselves necessary to secure correct judgment and 
 action, but they are necessary to protect the individual against 
 inadequate and misleading principles." 
 
 "But not only is the individual educated by others, he 
 gradually learns to educate himself. The important thing is 
 to learn the great art of governing the inclinations by means 
 of a rational will, one that is determined by principles, to 
 fashion and educate the impulses according to an idea of 
 perfection, which gradually assumes shape. When the child 
 leaves school and the parental home, his education by others 
 practically comes to an end. The most eventful period of 
 his life now begins, the period of incipient moral independ- 
 ence. His previous training is now put to the test ; it must 
 show whether it has succeeded in establishing the power of 
 self-government. Not many discover the right path at once; 
 the art of self-government, like everything else, has to be 
 learned. It can be acquired only by constant intercourse with 
 the world; hence there is an instinctive desire at this period 
 of life to come into frequent contact with men and things ; 
 these are the years of travel, which follow the years of ap- 
 
DOCTRINE OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES. 53 
 
 prenticeship. At the end of the IVanderjahre, between the 
 ages of twenty and thirty, or in some cases not until the 
 close of this period, the inner man has assumed definite and 
 permanent shape. The following years do not possess the 
 dramatic interest of their predecessors, the time of great 
 crises and decisions is past; the exercise of the physical, 
 mental, and moral powers and capacities which have been 
 acquired forms the content of the age of manhood. In old 
 age the powers diminish, life gradually loses itself in remin- 
 iscences, and so drifts into the past. Differences in moral 
 types correspond to these four ages of life. Pliant modesty 
 constitutes the inner habit of the well-trained boy ; hopeful, 
 optimistic idealism, that of youth ; persistent and energetic 
 action, that of the man ; the tranquil peace of contemplation, 
 that of old age." 
 
 *"This would answer the old question, the discussion of 
 which marked the beginning of Greek moral philosophy : 
 Can virtue be taught f We answer with Aristotle : It cer- 
 tainly can : but like all excellences, it must be practiced first 
 of all ; hearing others talk about it will not avail. We do not 
 learn to walk and to ride, to teach and to govern, by hearing 
 these things talked of; so it is with virtue. Of course, prac- 
 tice can and must afterwards be supplemented by theoretical 
 instruction; this applies to moral efficiency as well as to 
 physical dexterity and skill. The counsels and teachings 
 of parents and teachers, of spiritual advisers and preachers, 
 may assist the moral development in a most effective way. 
 * * * Of course, mere babble will not avail. Such instruc- 
 tion will prove effective only in case it comes from the proper 
 source, and rests upon a profound knowledge of life, its order, 
 and its laws." 
 
 "Virtues are normal powers of the will, tending to pre- 
 serve and unfold human mental life. Vices, on the other 
 hand, are abnormally-developed powers of the will, which 
 tend to destroy individual life and that of the surroundings ; 
 or, rather, not really powers of the will at all, if we mean by 
 will the rational human will, but abnormally-developed nat- 
 
 *Page 478. 
 
54 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 ural impulses. Vice aways indicates a lack of will; indeed, 
 all evil is, according to the old view, nothing really positive; 
 it does not belong to the essence of the will, but must be 
 defined as a lack of will. * * * The fundamental form 
 of vice is lack of will power to harmonize the impulses ; strong 
 natural impulses gain absolute supremacy, while weak ones 
 entirely disappear. When the sympathetic impulse or the 
 instinctive faculty to anticipate in feeling the more remote 
 consequences of acts, is poorly developed, and the defect is 
 not remedied by education and self-government, the habit of 
 selfishness and inconsiderateness arises. Certain impulses 
 may be hypertrophically developed, and may gradually crowd 
 out all the others. So for example, in the case of the alco- 
 holist, the desire for certain stimulants, gradually increases 
 in strength, and all other impulses die out, such as the impulse 
 to work and acquire, the love of knowledge and spiritual 
 activity. The sympathetic feelings and social impulses are 
 likewise weakened and finally extinguished, and with them 
 shame and conscience, which at first reacted against the ex- 
 cesses, disappear. In the same way, life is debauched by 
 other abnormally-developed impulses, by unbridled sexual 
 impulses, by the impulse to acquire and possess property, 
 which is intensified in rapacity and greed, by the love of 
 fame and honor, which degenerates into ambition, etc. ; these 
 monopolize all powers and all strivings, and finally render the 
 soul completely insensible to all other interests and con- 
 siderations." * * * 
 
 "*It is customary to distinguish between two kinds of 
 duties : duties toward self and duties toivard others. The no- 
 tion of duty toward self has been rejected by some; there 
 can be duties, it is held, only where there are legal rights. 
 It seems to me that this is an unnecessary contraction of 
 the concept. If the individual life has its moral problems 
 to solve, it likewise has its duties. * * * Hence, I shall 
 retain the old classification, reminding the reader, however, 
 that it is not a legitimate division : there are, as was shown 
 above, no acts which aiTect only the individual or society, 
 
 *Page 481. 
 
DOCTRINE OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES. 55 
 
 hence also no duties toward self which are not at the same 
 time duties towards others, and conversely." 
 
 "Corresponding to this classification of duties, we may 
 also divide the virtues into two groups : we may call them 
 individualistic and social virtues. The fundamental form of 
 the former is self-control; the fundamental form of the latter 
 benevolence. They are rooted in the two fundamental forms 
 of impulsive life : the impulse of self-preservation and the 
 sexual impulse." 
 
 SELF CONTROL. 
 
 "*The chief purpose of all moral culture is to fashion the 
 rational will so that it may become the regulative principle 
 of the entire sphere of conduct. We call the virtue or ex- 
 cellence which regulates our behavior and conduct by the 
 rational will, independently of momentary feelings, self-con- 
 trol. We may also define it as the capacity to govern life 
 by purposes and ideals. It is the fundamental condition of 
 all moral virtues, the fundamental precondition of all human 
 worth, nay, the fundamental characteristic of human nature. 
 Animals are determined by blind impulses, but the specific 
 excellence of man consists in his determining his life by his 
 will ; without self-control, no freedom and no personality. 
 The Greeks call the virtue of self-control healthy-mindedness. 
 Senseless, foolish, is the man whom fear, anger, and desire, 
 control, causing him to act irrationally and to ruin himself; 
 — healthy-minded, rational, on the contrary, is the man who 
 keeps his wits even in difficult situations, and acts in accord- 
 ance with the law of self-preservation." 
 
 "Self-control assumes different phases, corresponding to 
 the different forms of impulsive life. As its two fundamental 
 aspects we may, with the Greek moralists, designate tem- 
 perance and courage. Temperance may be defined as the 
 moral power to resist desires attracted by tempting enjoy- 
 ment, when the gratification of such desires tends to endanger 
 an essential good. Courage is the moral power to resist the 
 natural fear of pain and danger when the preservation of an 
 essential good demands such resistance." 
 
 *Page 483. 
 
56 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 TEMPERANCE. 
 
 *"Temperance or moderation, the ability to resist tempta- 
 tion to sensuous pleasure, is the precondition of humanization. 
 The animal is essentially blind impulse, in the satisfaction of 
 which its life consists. Man, too, is endowed with an animal 
 nature, but its purpose is to serve as the soil for a higher, 
 spiritual life; this soil is prepared by the discipline of the 
 natural impulses. The latter are not to be eradicated, that 
 would mean insensibility and finally death, but their satisfac- 
 tion is to be so regulated that they not only will not 
 disturb the development of higher life, but rather assist it. 
 The relation is reversed in the opposite habit, intemperance, 
 which is not merely a relapse into an animal state : nay, the 
 higher powers and gifts of man are here subordinated to sen- 
 suous desire. So in gluttony and the worship of the belly; 
 all the arts of civilization are here employed to excite and 
 satisfy sensuous desires. So pleasure-seeking and also sex- 
 ual dissipation have drawn into their service an entire in- 
 dustry of exquisite enjoyments." 
 
 "Even the most superficial examination of the facts can- 
 not leave us in doubt as to the value and effects of these two 
 contrary modes of action. Intemperance, dissipation, inor- 
 dinate love of pleasure, first of all destroy our sense and ca- 
 pacity for higher things; the will and the intellect are ex- 
 hausted by excesses ; finally the sensibility is blunted until 
 at last even the faculty for enjoyment is lost. All passive en- 
 joyments deaden the sensibilities; stronger and more refined 
 excitations are constantly needed to procure feelings of plea- 
 sure through the exhausted organ, until at last the chronic 
 state of dullness which is characteristic of the roue is reached ; 
 the powers of the organism and its irritability are exhausted ; 
 nothing is left but the repulsive dregs of life. Temperance 
 has the opposite effect; it makes the entire man healthy and 
 vigorous, capable of action and enjoyment." 
 
 "*This virtue, like all habits, is acquired by experience. 
 The foundation is laid by a good education. The best way to 
 
 *Page 485. 
 *Page 486. 
 
DOCTRINE OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES. 57 
 
 prevent the growth of excessive desires is to satisfy the 
 natural needs in an appropriate and orderly manner. This 
 can easily be done in a well-regulated household, but is ex- 
 tremely difficult under conditions of luxury as well as of 
 poverty. Perhaps we can still agree with John Locke that 
 an honest farmhouse is the best place for rearing a child. 
 Gradually, the child may be encouraged to give up little 
 things of its own accord ; we cannot begin too soon in teach- 
 ing the child the great art of life : to sacrifice today for to- 
 morrow. The child then educates itself. The sense of honor 
 may be appealed to as an ally against desire. The ability to 
 bear privation with equanimity is so closely related to cour- 
 age that the boy too sees the connection : it is weak and cow- 
 ardly to yield to desire. Greek ethics is full of excellent 
 moral advice on this subject. How disgraceful, it says, to be 
 compelled to obey the animal or child in us, which is full of 
 needs and desires ; how beautiful and praiseworthy and in 
 keeping with man's dignity, on the other hand, is the free- 
 dom and independence which is not disturbed by privation 
 and want ! Whoever succumbs to his desires is a slave to 
 objects; they draw him now hither, now thither, through 
 pleasure and fear. * * * These are sentiments which 
 the youth of all ages can understand. When the sense of 
 honor works in the opposite direction, as happens, to a large 
 extent, in our times, the relation is an unnatural one. There 
 are two essential reasons for such perverseness. The first is 
 the wish of the youth to show that he has the means, the 
 second, that he has the power and the courage to indulge him- 
 self. The latter motive exercises a particularly strong in- 
 fluence upon the young man. He is afraid of being looked 
 upon as a baby, standing in awe of the rod, or as a "goody- 
 goody" boy, who is afraid of hell and the devil. * * ♦ 
 The satisfaction of his cravings becomes a matter of show. 
 We are ashamed, to use Augustine's expression, of not being 
 shameless." * * * 
 
 "The most fruitful method of counteracting the growth 
 of cupidity and the inordinate love of pleasure is to train 
 the individual to efficient action. All successful exercise of 
 
58 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 natural powers and skill in labor and in play is, as Aristotle 
 teaches, accompanied by pleasure. And this pleasure is su- 
 perior to the pleasure of passive enjoyment. It can be pro- 
 cured without the sting of desire. It is more independent 
 of external conditions; enjoyment consumes, activity creates 
 commodities. It is intensified by repetition ; for while pas- 
 sive pleasure increases the intensity of desire but dulls the 
 faculty of enjoyment, action increases our efficiency; and the 
 greater the skill, the greater the pleasure of exercising it. As 
 in all cases, the better is here the enemy of the good ; the 
 pleasure which we derive from action, especially that result- 
 ing from play, is the most effective means of suppressing the 
 pleasures of passive enjoyment." * * * 
 
 "An ascetic life is characterized by the habitual renun- 
 ciation of even moderate and legitimate pleasures." Ascetic- 
 ism has undoubtedly performed a useful service in the past 
 as a protest against excessive indulgence, and an example of 
 the power of the human will to suppress and perhaps finally 
 to extinguish the normal impulses and desires, 'for wealth, 
 or material culture ; for fame and power, or ideal culture ; 
 and finally, of family life, that is, the preservation of the spe- 
 cies, or the precondition of all human culture.' Asceticism in 
 its extreme forms has few examples and few advocates in 
 these days. Perhaps it is because there is a general opinion 
 that examples of moderate and appropriate exercise or in- 
 dulgence of normal impulses and desires will have greater 
 influence for good upon all beholders than either abnormal 
 renunciation or abnormal excesses. 
 
 *"Unpretendingness or modesty is a modification of temper- 
 ance, its inner form as it were. It is a moderation of desire as 
 such, the moderation of the desire for wealth, and fame, position 
 and pleasure. Unassuming modesty consists in habitually lower- 
 ing one's pretensions to the level of one's fortunes. Its effect is 
 contentment; and hence it is the safest guide to happiness, just as 
 its opposite, covetousness, or cupidity is the surest means to un- 
 happiness. Everybody is complaining of the rarity of contentment 
 and of the prevalence of discontent. Although the conception of a 
 
 *Page 491. 
 
DOCTRINE OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES. 59 
 
 past golden age of universal happiness is an optical illusion, the 
 growing discontent among the European peoples of the present 
 is not an illusion. Discontent increases in direct proportion 
 with inordinate desire, for the development of which the con- 
 ditions are unusually favorable in our age * * * jg 
 there no cure for this disease? We are referred to the church 
 and the restoration of its power. If by this we mean, not 
 external povi^er, but an inner frame of mind, humihty and 
 piety, then there can be no doubt that the remedy would prove 
 effective. Perhaps nothing but true inner religiousness can 
 give us perfect peace in regard to earthly things." * * * 
 
 *"Again : if you have children help them. There are 
 two ways of looking at life, one of which will certainly make 
 it happy, the other unhappy. The first is the habit of regard- 
 ing everything good that life yields as surpassing your ex- 
 pectations, and every misfortune as falling below them; the 
 second is the reverse of this. You have it in your power to 
 give your child either mood. Grant all his wishes, give him 
 everything he sees, let him choose what he ought to eat and 
 drink, what he ought to do and to leave undone, remove all 
 obstacles from his path, bear his burdens for him, praise his 
 ability and goodness; in short, be all tenderness and devotion; 
 and you may be sure that he will, upon entering the world, 
 find it hard and niggardly; that he will be discontented and 
 unhappy. If you are unwilling that this should happen, steel 
 your own heart, and do not be afraid of being called an un- 
 natural mother by all educated mothers." 
 
 "Not long ago, I witnessed the following little incident: 
 Once there vvere two little girls, perfectly healthy and cheerful, 
 and blessed with the best of appetites. They went to visit an 
 aunt, who loved them very much, and did everything she could to 
 please them. She used to ask them before each meal what they 
 liked to eat, and when the meal was served, what they pre- 
 ferred to have. Before two weeks had passed, these tw^o little 
 girls no longer enjoyed their food; one of them couldn't eat this, 
 the other couldn't eat that; their plates were always half full, 
 and at the end of every meal they were discontented and in 
 
 *Page 494. 
 
60 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 tears. "How is it/' asked the aunt, when the mother of the 
 two girls came to see her, "that things are so different at home?"* 
 "I will tell 3'ou," she answered, "At home I never ask them 
 what they want, and never give them as much as they call for." 
 "Happy the man whom Fate treats in the same way. 
 He that is able to choose each day what to do and what not 
 to do, he that can have as much as he desires to have, will 
 soon tire of life. Hence, be thankful that you do not get 
 everything you ask for; learn to desire, so Marcus Aurelius 
 counsels you, not that things govern themselves according 
 to your wishes, but that your wishes govern themselves ac- 
 cording to the things." 
 
 COURAGE. 
 
 "By the side of temperance Greek philosophy places 
 courage, the ability to resist painful, dangerous, and terrible 
 impressions by means of a rational will. The former is the 
 normal conduct, in respect of pleasure; the latter, of pain 
 and danger. We may, with Aristotle, define both virtues as 
 a mean between two vices : temperance is the proper mean 
 between insensitiveness to sensuous enjoyment and licen- 
 tiousness; courage the mean between abject cowardice and 
 blind foolhardiness." 
 
 "'When an animal finds itself threatened by a hostile 
 attack, we notice one of two things : either the attack rouses 
 fear and impels it to flight ; or it produces rage and rouses 
 it to defend itself. The latter behavior is pecuHar to beasts of 
 prey, the former to their victims." * * * 
 
 "*Both modes of conduct are also found among men. 
 There are men who run away like sheep at the first sign of 
 danger. There are others, on the contrary, who, like beasts 
 of prey, are straightway impelled to blind and ferocious 
 attacks, when threatened or injured. Both modes of conduct 
 are condemned by men, the former as cowardice, the latter 
 as blind rage or foolhardiness. A different kind of behavior 
 is required of man, and that is courage. That man is brave 
 who, when attacked and in peril, neither blindly runs away 
 
 *Page 496. 
 
DOCTRINE OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES. 61 
 
 nor rushes into danger, but retaining his composure, carefully 
 and calmly studies the situation, quietly deliberates and de- 
 cides, and then carries out his resolution firmly and ener- 
 getically, whether it be resistance and attack, or defence and 
 retreat. Prudence, therefore, constitutes an essential part of 
 valor." * * * 
 
 "The origin of this virtue might be explained biologically, 
 as follows : The most dangerous enemy of man is man. In 
 battle with this adversary courage has been acquired ; it is 
 the means of defence against the most fearful weapon of 
 attack, the intellect. Against this, neither blind flight nor 
 blind aggression will avail, as is seen in the battle of man 
 with animals. Fear carries the fleeing ones into his net, while 
 rage brings the ferocious ones within range of his sword 
 or gun. Such an enemy can be resisted only by means of the 
 same weapon, the intellect ; that is, by courage, by presence 
 of mind in battle." * * * 
 
 "Martial courage is the first form in which this quality 
 receives recognition, perhaps the very first virtue which wins 
 admiration. Courage is originally the virtue, cowardice the 
 vice, as the Greek and Roman usage of language attests. 
 And youth has no sincerer regard for any virtue than for 
 stern and shrewd, and especially magnanimous courage." 
 
 ^ H< ^ 
 
 *"As civilization advances, other forms of resistance came 
 to surpass martial courage in importance. Chief among 
 these I mention what might be called civil courage, independ- 
 ence of thought, characterfid self-assertion against the great 
 pressure exerted by superior and inferior forces. Civilization 
 has the tendency to create relations of dependence ; depend- 
 ence upon men takes the place of dependence upon nature; 
 dependence upon superiors and patrons, friends and fellow- 
 partizans, customers and voters, society and public opinion. 
 Dependence has the tendency to pervert the will ; it inclines 
 the individual to accommodate himself, to let things take 
 their course, to obsequiousness, to cowardly self-denial, to 
 falsehood in every form. So the moral duty arises to develop 
 
 *Page 498. 
 
62 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 the inner power of resistance which calmly and firmly opposes 
 every attempt to subject the individual to established customs 
 and authority, which serves and remains loyal to truth and 
 justice, regardless of whether such conduct brings favor and 
 popularity or disfavor and contempt. To remain true to ones- 
 self, that is the aim of such ideal courage. No one can have 
 it, the center of whose life does not lie within himself; who- 
 ever makes external things his ultimate goal cannot attain 
 to inner freedom. Spinoza was, in his life and teaching, a 
 great preacher of this doctrine of freedom." 
 
 "Another form of courage is perseverance or persistence, 
 the power of the will to accept and continuously to endure 
 all kinds of hardships and exertions, which are necessary to 
 realize one's ends. It is the virtue of the working man. 
 Martial courage was the virtue of the heroic age ; perseverance 
 is the courage of the industrial age. It is in this virtue that 
 the civilized man so immeasurably surpasses the savage. 
 The savage is capable of great momentary exertions, but 
 not of making a continued effort to overcome the small 
 obstacles in which all work consists. A partial reason for 
 this is his inability to conceive far-reaching aims. Hence, 
 as soon as the momentary pressure of want or of the natural 
 impulse ceases, he yields to the law of inertia, which also 
 governs living bodies." 
 
 "The love of order may also be regarded as a phase of 
 perseverance, the habit of doing everything with business- 
 like regularity; a very valuable quality, which procures for 
 us freedom and tranquility. The consequence of disorder is 
 confusion, which begets fear and trouble. This is especially 
 true of the tendency to procrastinate. When our work is 
 done we feel at peace, but when we put off our tasks we are 
 constantly fretting about them, and are finally forced to per- 
 form them hastily and unsatisfactorily at an inopportune 
 time." * * * 
 
 "Patience, too, is related to perseverance. It is the ability 
 to bear pain and suffering without being overcome by them. 
 We may distinguish two aspects of patience : a somewhat 
 passive patience which bears sufferings without complaint 
 
DOCTRINE OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES. 63 
 
 and opposition, and the more active power of the soul, the 
 ability to survive defeats, disappointments, and losses, and to 
 begin life anew. Patience is feminine courage. Both forms, espe- 
 cially the former, are more characteristic of women than of 
 men; women not infrequently display a remarkable capacity 
 for enduring pain. This fact is evidently due to the natural 
 difference of the sexes; women are more experienced in all 
 kinds of suffering than men. A man's nature is impelled to 
 attack and defence : hence he finds it more difficult to yield 
 to the inevitable. But active patience, too, the elastic resist- 
 ance of the soul, is one of the most beatuiful and valuable 
 qualities of the woman. It is harder for a man to get up 
 again after he has met with misfortunes. A woman generally 
 finds less difficulty in beginning anew; she soon begins to 
 hope and fear again, to work and strive ; she has a more 
 flexible nature. Man's strength is more unbending and brittle. 
 A woman is also better able to battle with long-continued 
 troubles and obstacles ; when a man impatiently sinks beneath 
 the load, she retains her equanimity and even her cheerful- 
 ness. For that reason, woman is the born guardian of youth, 
 the nurse of the sick, and the counselor of old age." 
 
 "Great patience in suffering is the invariable mark of a 
 noble character ; courage and perseverance may belong even 
 to a selfish and malicious will. Patient resignation in suffer- 
 ing is a sign that the violent natural impulse to life, which 
 rebels against suffering, has been broken and silenced by a 
 higher will. This is why suft'erings which are accepted by 
 the heart and patiently borne are expiatory." 
 
 "A third form of self-control is calmness, the ability to 
 control, by the rational will, such emotions as result from 
 disturbances in our relations with our fellow men ; e. g., anger, 
 vexation, ill-humor.' To the lack of this virtue, and to envy 
 and pride, are due most of the disagreeable annoyances which 
 wear out the lives of so many men. Without the ability to 
 overcome the inevitable petty collisions, intercourse with 
 human beings becomes a constant torture." 
 
 " Tf you are going to bathe,' Epictetus admonishes us. 
 'place before yourself what happens in the bath ; some splash- 
 
64 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 ing the water, others pushing against one another, others 
 abusing one another, and some stealing; and then with more 
 safety you will undertake the matter if you say to yourself, 
 "I now intend to bathe, and to maintain my will in a manner 
 conformable to nature." So it is here : when you move into 
 an apartment house, think of what will happen there; the 
 neighbor's dog wnll bark, his boys will romp around, his 
 daughters will play on the piano ; if you cannot endure these 
 things, do not move in, but build yourself a house outside of 
 the city, be it ever so modest. But if you must move in, tell 
 yourself beforehand that you must, and yield to the inevit- 
 able." 
 
 "Indeed, it is very strange. We know that we must 
 always adapt ourselves to the nature of the things which we 
 desire to subject to our purposes; only when it comes to 
 human beings do we seem to forget it. A stone is in my way. 
 I do not scold it, but walk around it or push it aside. A 
 watch or a machine is out of order; w^e do not beat it, but 
 inquire into the cause, or hand it over to an expert to mend 
 the defect. But when a human being fails to do our bidding, 
 when a neighbor displeases us, or a friend acts in a manner 
 which we do not consider right, when a pupil does not know 
 his lesson, or the soup does not taste right, we get angry 
 and scold. As though abuse and anger were the panacea 
 for governing human souls ! A human soul is of all things 
 in the world the most complicated and most difficult to handle; 
 and hence the art of governing souls is the hardest of all arts. 
 And since it is the most important art for our happiness, it 
 surely deserves to be studied with greater care. The most 
 important thing in this art, however, is the ability to retain 
 one's composure; only calm and prudent investigation will 
 succeed in discovering the causes of the trouble, and not 
 until these have been found can the proper attempts be made 
 to remedy it. However this may be brought about, whether 
 by instruction, example, counsel, encouragement, assistance, 
 admonition, entreaty, threats, punishment — under all circum- 
 stances. Bacon's word will hold good that he alone can rule 
 Nature who obeys her. Any one, of course, can get angry 
 
DOCTRINE OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES. 65 
 
 and scold, but this is merely a confession of helplessness, and 
 does not tend to improve matters ; nay, it is apt to make 
 them worse. Even where punishment is the proper remedy, 
 it will be all the more effective if administered calmly and 
 firmly." 
 
 "The fruit of self-control, which reaches its completion 
 in the virtues of temperance and unpretendingness, courage and 
 perseverance, patience and tranquility, is imter peace and cheer- 
 fullness of mind. * * * This is not only in itself the 
 greatest part of human happiness, but also the source of 
 real human pleasures. The calm and cheerful soul is capable 
 of the quiet pleasures of reflection : the forms of things are 
 mirrored best in the tranquil lake. The social duties thrive 
 in the contented heart — justice, veracity, tenderness, benev- 
 olence, faithfulness ; and from these in turn spring the joys 
 which friendship and domestic happiness yield." 
 
 "This is the path which leads to self-preservation and 
 welfare. Wisdom is needed to find and follow it. Hence, all 
 peoples praise wisdom as the great guide of life. The royal 
 sage of the Hebrews mingles his praises with those of the 
 Greek philosophers : "Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, 
 and the man that getteth understanding. For the merchan- 
 dise of it is better than the merchandise of silver, and the 
 gain thereof than fine gold. She is more precious than rubies ; 
 and all the things thou canst desire are not to be compared 
 unto her. Length of days is in her right hand; and in her 
 left hand riches and honor. Her ways are ways of pleasant- 
 ness, and all her paths are peace. She is a tree of life to them 
 that lay hold upon her; and happy is every one that retaineth 
 her. The Lord by wisdom has founded the earth ; by under- 
 standing hath he established the heavens."* 
 
 *Proverbs 111, 13-19. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE BODILY LIFE — FOOD AND DRINK — HABITATION AND CLOTHING 
 — REST AND RECREATION. 
 
 THE ECONOMIC LIFE — PROFESSION OR VOCATION — FRUGALITY AND 
 
 EXTRAVAGANCE. 
 
 *"The function of the body is to serve as the organ and 
 symbol of the soul. There is no difference of opinion concern- 
 ing this practical estimate of the two phases of man's nature. 
 Even the materialist, who regards the soul as a passing func- 
 tion of matter, will accept our proposition ; for him, too, the 
 body is the servant of the soul. Every one is likewise agreed 
 as to what constitutes a good servant. To accomplish and 
 endure much and to demand little — these are the qualities 
 which we all consider valuable in a servant. These also 
 determine what is desirable in a body; the healthy, strong, 
 and hardened body endures much and wants little ; the sickly, 
 weak, and pampered body does little and makes great de- 
 mands. Hence follows the rule of duty: Do what is suited 
 to preserve and increase the health and strength of the body ; 
 avoid what impairs and weakens it. The other function of 
 the body is to express or symbolize psychical life. Beauty and 
 grace are the visible corporeal manifestations of a good and 
 beautiful soul. Grace is acquired beauty ; the quiet security 
 of the soul which is master of itself is reflected in quiet, steady 
 and appropriate movements. Hence follows the rule of duty : 
 Educate the body, so that it may appear in this visible world 
 as a pleasing expression of the invisible beauty of the soul." 
 
 "It must be left to dietetics and gymnastics to develop 
 these general formulae into a system of rules. * * * i 
 shall merely touch upon a few phases of the problem." 
 
 "Let us first consider the question of nutrition. It is 
 characteristic of human beings to prepare their food arti- 
 ficially and they do it universally with the aid of fire. The 
 use of fire for this purpose plays an important part in the 
 
 *Paulsen, page 505. 
 
THE BODILY AND ECONOMIC LIFE. 67 
 
 emancipation of man from nature. Whereas, the animal is 
 Hmited to the territory producing the plants or animals upon 
 which it feeds, and is itself a product thereof, man has made 
 himself lord of the earth ; everywhere he finds what may, 
 with the help of fire, be converted into food. In other re- 
 spects, also, the use of fire in the preparation of food has 
 exercised an important influence upon the development of 
 human life. Wundt calls attention to the fact that by neces- 
 sitating the common preparation of certain foods, it at the 
 same time led to their common consumption ; to it we owe 
 the origin of the common meal at the hearth. With the meal 
 is connected the sacrificial worship, growing out of the 
 funeral feasts; the hearth becomes the altar. The meal, 
 coming at regular intervals and dividing the day, also leads 
 to the first division of time. The child still receives its first 
 lessons in the discipline of the animal desires by governing 
 its appetite according to the meals." 
 
 "Let me add a w^ord or two concerning degeneracy in 
 nourishment. In emancipating himself from the natural guid- 
 ance of instinct, which controls and likewise preserves the 
 animal, man exposes himself to aberrations. The palate is 
 stimulated by artificially prepared food, and the reception of 
 food excites pleasure even when it is not needed. Gluttony 
 and hoggishness are universally characterized by the perver- 
 sion of the organs of nutrition into organs of pleasure. It 
 appears that such abuse never occurs among animals, but 
 that among human beings it is common to all ages and to all 
 peoples. Travelers bring us horrible reports of the coarse 
 forms of gluttony practiced by uncivilized tribes. All of 
 these seem also to have hit upon the manufacture of intoxi- 
 cating liquors, or to have introduced them into their countries 
 from abroad." 
 
 "Everybody knows to what extent the life of modern 
 civilized nations is devastated by drunkenness. It seems that 
 the Germanic nations have from time immemorial been more 
 predisposed to this vice than the Romance peoples, which is. 
 perhaps, to be explained by conditions of climate. In certain 
 parts of Germany a considerable part of the male population 
 
68 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 is directly ruined by drunkenness, and there is no country 
 in which this vice does not cause the most serious disturb- 
 ances. The immediate effects of drunkenness are these : the 
 economic Hfe becomes unsettled, family life is neglected and 
 destroyed, the moral-spiritual life is brutahzed and debauched. 
 Pauperism, crime, a host of diseases, insanity, suicide, degen- 
 eracy of offspring, follow in its melancholy wake." 
 
 "The conviction is growing among earnest and thought- 
 ful men that a very serious danger here confronts the future 
 progress of civilized peoples. How shall we meet it?" 
 
 Paulsen covers eight pages with a discussion of the drink- 
 mg and tobacco habits in Germany, and some of the other 
 countries of Northern Europe, and the laws, and the moral 
 and social influences by which it has been sought to diminish 
 the prevalence of these evils. 
 
 In this country there has been a constant controversy 
 for sixty years past between the advocates of a total prohibi- 
 tion of the sale of intoxicating liquors and those who advo- 
 cate a more or less severe control and supervision of such 
 sales, by a high licese, the prohibition of selling liquor to 
 minors or drunkards, the closing of saloons at midnight or 1 
 a. m., as in Chicago, and other restrictive measures. (I believe 
 there are now but few who would openly advocate leaving 
 the sale of liquors as free as that of groceries and meats.) 
 The wisest public policy respecting the liquor traffic will 
 vary in different communities, for the simple reason that the 
 question of what ought to be done can only be answered after 
 finding out what can be done. The principle of action should 
 be to adopt the most restrictive laws that can be made rea- 
 sonably effective in administration. This can be helped by 
 an extension of the privilege of local option, which should be 
 allowed in small units of territory, so that a township, a 
 precinct, even a single city block (the two sides of a street 
 between two intersecting streets) should have the power, by 
 a majority vote of the inhabitants, to exclude liquor saloons 
 from that particular territory. Everything should be done 
 that can be done by the enforcement of good laws, for tht 
 prevention and control of drunkenness, but the chief depend- 
 
THE BODILY AND ECONOMIC LIFE. 69 
 
 eiice for the prevention or reform of bad personal habits of 
 any sort must be upon moral and social influences, and these 
 should always be made as potent as possible by every right 
 thinking man and woman. 
 
 A potent social influence for evil in this country is the 
 custom of "treating," which means that each man in the company 
 in succession buys the drinks for all the company, with the 
 implied social pressure, if not a recognized obligation, that each 
 shall drink each time round. If there is a considerable number 
 in the company, excessive drinking is inevitable. It is an absurd 
 custom and all right-minded men should refuse to be governed 
 by it, for it is every man's right and privilege, and also his duty 
 (and is never a breach of really good manners) to control his 
 personal habits in respect to food, drink, and clothing, in con- 
 formity with his own needs and welfare. There is another form 
 of treating somewhat prevalent among temperate people to which 
 but little serious objection need be made; this is for one person 
 to invite the company, or several members of it, to go to the bar 
 and drink with him before sitting down to dinner. In this case 
 no one drinks but once and each exercises his own choice as to 
 what he will drink, and may take a whiskey, a cocktail, a beer 
 or ale, or a lemonade or mineral water. This custom takes 
 cognizance of the fact, which ought never to be forgotten, that 
 intoxicating liquors should not be taken except at meal times 
 (if they are to be taken at all). There is another matter of 
 importance concerning the drink habit : It is well known that 
 those who have once been slaves of drink and have freed them- 
 selves from such bondage, find it necessary ever afterwards to be 
 strict total abstainers, for the smallest taste of liquor, or some- 
 times even the smell of it, is liable to awaken the old, uncon- 
 trollable thirst. It is, therefore, a most urgent duty of everyone 
 knowing about such people carefully to avoid putting temptation 
 to drink in their way, and if they find such people in places or 
 circumstances subjecting them to temptation, every efifort should 
 be made to get them away from it and to support their will 
 power in resisting it. 
 
 The injury from the use of either liquor or tobacco is very 
 much greater to growing boys than to mature men. Every boy. 
 
70 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 therefore, who wishes to attain his maximum of growth, health, 
 strength and efficiency, should religiously abstain from all sorts 
 of liquors, even from beer and wine, and from all forms of 
 tobacco, at least till he is twenty-one years of age. The con- 
 sumption in the United States of both liquor and tobacco is 
 enormous and most deplorable. Liquor drinking is undoubtedly 
 far more injurious and destructive in the aggregate than the 
 use of tobacco, but the latter, even if it can be conceded that it 
 is sometimes beneficial to some individuals (which may admit 
 of doubt), must be regarded as doing far more harm than good. 
 Together, the liquor and tobacco habits constitute by far the 
 largest part of the economic, moral, and spiritual zvaste of which 
 our aggregate population is guilty. 
 
 HABITATION. 
 
 "The dwelling, originally a protection against heat and cold 
 as well as against hostile attacks, has gradually far outgrown 
 its original purpose : the cave, the tent, the hut, the house, the 
 burg, the city — mark the stages of its evolution. Its mission has 
 been enlarged so as to embrace the whole of civilized life. What 
 clothing is to the individual, the domicile is to the family. Within 
 the walls of the house the family finds protection against all 
 kinds of annoyances, and seeks refuge from inquisitive curiosity 
 and insatiate greed. In the home it reveals its character; the 
 occupation, the mode of life and thought of the family are 
 expressed in the form, furniture, and decoration of the house. 
 The memories of the past, both joyful and sorrowful, cling to 
 it, and so the dwelling becomes the necessary framework of the 
 family history. It is no less apparent that the development of 
 great historical institutions is closely connected with the evolution 
 of the home; without the dividing walls of the individual's own 
 hut, we cannot imagine the separation of the particular families 
 from the original herdlike unity of the horde. The evolution 
 of property rights is doubtless also closely related to the same 
 dividing walls. Moreover, by the side of the human dwelling 
 erected by the individual rises the house of the gods, the temple, 
 which has proved so stimulating to religion and the arts. The 
 temple has also had a great influence, as Wundt remarks, upon 
 
THE BODILY AND ECONOMIC LIFE. 71 
 
 the evolution of the sense of justice. The peace of God made 
 the temple the refuge for fugitives. The temple-peace reacted 
 upon the development of the house-peace : the gods avenged its 
 breach, whether the offense were committed against the host 
 or against the guest. Again, the first notions of international 
 law owed their origin to the reverence the tribes felt for the 
 temples of kindred gods." 
 
 "One of the most deplorable results of the recent develop- 
 ment of social life is the forced abandonment by larger and 
 larger portions of the population of the dwelling as the perma- 
 nent home for the particular family, and the crowding together 
 of great masses of people, who are unknown to each other, into 
 the tenement houses of our large cities. * * * j^ would be 
 a great blessing if the modern means of transportation could be 
 so perfected as again to disperse the crowds of people whom 
 they have poured into the large cities. Many families, who are 
 at present living in crowded tenement houses, to their great 
 injury, could, even now, if they so desired, and ceased regard- 
 ing a bad habit as a natural necessity, occupy their own homes 
 in the suburbs." * * * 
 
 CLOTHING 
 
 "The original purpose of clothing was partly to protect, 
 partly to decorate the body and to reveal the importance of the 
 wearer. Its negative object was to conceal the animal portions 
 of the body, leaving only the face, the symbol of the spiritual 
 powers, uncovered. Dress has retained this dual nature in the 
 vicissitudes of historical life. The costume symbolizes rank and 
 office, age and sex, joy and sorrow, temperament and mode of 
 thought, time and people. By means of clothing, the historical 
 and social position of the individual is constantly impressed upon 
 him and his surroundings. Indeed, we may say that dress is so 
 essential that historical life and social order cannot be imagined 
 without it ; naked men are unhistorical men. Sameness of ex- 
 terior marks brutes as unhistorical beings, dissimilarity in dress 
 is the outward manifestation of historical and social beings. 
 Hence, historical changes in the life of nations reveal themselves 
 in changes of costume ; try to imagine Luther in a swallow-tail 
 coat and a white cravat, or Goethe with a moustache and a cut- 
 
n SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 away, and you will see that dress is as characteristic of man as 
 an historical being as its skin is of the animal. The abolition 
 of the old class distinctions and the leveling tendency of the 
 nineteenth century clearly manifest themselves in the disappear- 
 ance of class costumes. On the other hand, the dress of the 
 state, the uniform, has become more prominent; distinctions 
 spontaneously created by society are giving way to distinctions 
 made by the state. Furthermore, the uniform is an excellent 
 means of uniforming and controlling the inner man. It compels 
 the wearer to represent the office and to obey orders; he cannot 
 retreat, he must seem to be what the uniform proclaims him to be, 
 and so becomes it. What would an army be without uniforms?" 
 "The difference between costume and fashion consists in 
 this : the latter is an arbitrary invention of particular individuals 
 and lasts only for a short time. Its climax is marked by the 
 complete decline of costume. Fashionable attire differentiates 
 its wearer, makes a 'distinguished' person of him, not so much 
 because it is a sign of taste, wealth or costliness, but because 
 it creates the impression that he is a leader in society or that 
 he stands close enough to the leaders to notice the changes 
 immediately and to keep pace with them ; hence, also, the need 
 of rapid changes. Fashion is the feminine form of sport or 
 speculation, and is, like all sport, capricious and tyrannical, stim- 
 ulating its followers to do their best. The health and welfare 
 of many a woman, the peace and happiness of many a home, 
 are sacrificed to this tyrant without a murmur. Should the 
 psychologist succeed in inventing a process for the transforma- 
 tion of psychical forces — as the physicist has for changing ther- 
 mal or electrical forces into motion — and should the process 
 ever succeed in converting but one-half of the energy which the 
 women who obey the dictates of fashion expend in destroying 
 their comfort, welfare and freedom, into other forces of self- 
 sacrifice, the invention would presumably produce a greater 
 increase in real happiness among civilized humanity than all the 
 inventions of this century put together." 
 
 EXERCISE. 
 
 "Another part of dietetics is the development and exer 
 cise of bodily poivers. Life is, according to Aristotle, action ; 
 
THE BODILY AND ECONOMIC LIFE. 7i 
 
 the body deteriorates when it cannot act. These powers are 
 exercised in two ways : in play and in work. Work is the exer- 
 cise of powers for an external end ; in play the activity is an 
 end in itself; it has no end outside of itself; it is free activity; 
 while work is constrained or unfree action. Play is especially 
 characteristic of youth. In the life of the adult it is overshad- 
 owed by work ; but it is not wanting here and cannot be wanting 
 without depriving life of an essential element. A country con- 
 sisting entirely of fertile cultivated fields would not wholly please 
 us; we should miss the heaths and the forests, the moor and 
 the wilderness ; we should miss the poetry of freedom. Nor 
 would a life please us that consisted wholly of useful work: 
 without play it would be without the poetry of freedom." 
 
 "It cannot be denied that with the advance of civilization, 
 certain dangers are threatening life from this side. The sphere 
 of play is becoming more and more restricted, and work is grow- 
 ing more monotonous and mechanical. In primitive stages of 
 civilization, work is freer and more varied; it has something 
 of the character and charm of play. That this is true may be 
 seen from the fact that civilized men indulge in hunting and 
 fishing as a kind of play and sport. ^Agricultural pursuits, too, 
 are quite free and full of change ; each season yields new forms 
 of action. The peasant practices a hundred arts ; he handles 
 numberless tools and comes in daily contact with a thousand 
 living and lifeless things. The work of the mechanic is not so 
 free ; he is tied to his workshop ; the circle of his activities is 
 narrow ; his work consists rather in the constant repetition of 
 the same performance, which consequently becomes more me- 
 chanical. He is not so dependent on nature, upon the weather 
 and the seasons, but more dependent upon human beings." * * 
 
 "The greatest sufferers are the young, and those of the 
 higher classes perhaps suffer most, because they are subjected 
 to such conditions for a greater length of time. The truth that 
 life is movement is especially applicable to the young. Their 
 impulses are directed towards the exercise of bodily powers ; 
 they desire to run and to climb, to jump and to dance, to build 
 and to destroy. There is neither room nor opportunity for such 
 action in the 'flat.' Free and unimpeded play is utterly impos- 
 
74 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 sible. * * * In polite society the child, instead of playing, 
 is taken out for a stroll by the governess, or goes to the doll 
 bazaar, or attends a children's party. But all these artificial 
 things do not satisfy our children, and inasmuch as their love 
 of movement and exercise cannot be suppressed, they are in 
 the way in the metropolitan household. Under these circum- 
 stances, the school proves to be a veritable refuge : there they 
 are taken care of and kept busy for a number of hours each 
 day, and then a few more hours are consumed at home in pre- 
 paring lessons. Among the upper classes a few more lessons in 
 music and drawing are deemed indispensable, and afterwards a 
 few more hours are devoted to novel-reading and card-playing. 
 And so it happens that young people, from fifteen to twenty 
 years of age, at a time when the body needs most exercise, 
 spend ten, twelve, or fourteen hours sitting down, until the body 
 gradually becomes accustomed to it, and the desire for exercise 
 gives way to a general feeling of torpor. In this way the foun- 
 dation is laid, during the period of youth, for the ailments by 
 which the members of good society might easily recognize each 
 other in case all the other charcateristics should ever disappear : 
 indigestion, nervousness, and near-sightedness. And all the 
 physicians and watering places in the world cannot restore what 
 nature gratuitously bestows upon him who keeps her command- 
 ments: namely, a state of healthy exhaustion and a sound sleep, 
 a good appetite and good digestion." * * * 
 
 RECREATION. 
 
 "In conclusion, let me allude, in a few words, to the opposite 
 of action, to rest and recreation. Activity means expenditure 
 of energy; hence nature demands that activity be suspended in 
 order that the loss may be restored. Regular, long periods of 
 rest for the entire psycho-physical system follow the changes of 
 day and night. Jewish tradition has established an additional 
 period of rest in the Sabbath. This is a highly beneficial insti- 
 tution : one that is so interwoven with our life and feelings as 
 to seem like a part of the natural order itself. How was it 
 possible for the Greeks and Romans to live without their Sun- 
 day? Finally, during more recent years, it has become customary 
 
THE BODILY AND ECONOMIC LIFE. 75 
 
 for those engaged in the higher pursuits to lay down their work 
 for longer intervals; vacations, which were originally confined 
 to schools, have gradually extended to other circles. The need 
 for them evidently grows as the work becomes more arduous, 
 systematic and monotonous. Hence, it is to be assumed that 
 greater portions of the population will be affected by the custom." 
 
 "Periods of rest have a double purpose : first, the restoration 
 of consumed energy; secondly, the exercise of functions not 
 employed in the regular calling. The latter, too, is recreation. 
 Those whose calling makes especial demands upon their mental 
 powers will find recreation in the proper exercise of their bodily 
 powers, in play, in travel, in mechanical activity; those, on the 
 other hand, whose work chiefly calls into play physical forces 
 will find relief in mental activity, in reading. Social pleasures, 
 music, games of all kinds, are excellent means of recreation for 
 all alike." 
 
 "A proper balance between work and recreation is an essen- 
 tial condition of health, efficiency, and happiness. An excess on 
 either side is equally dangerous. It is now universally admitted 
 that the development of industrial production has led to an intol- 
 erable excess of mechanical work. The efforts of the labor party 
 to shorten the working time merit our entire approval. Work 
 must not make a slave of man, but should enable him not only 
 to acquire commodities, Init to develop his powers. He should 
 not be a mere tool, but a personal end in himself. When this 
 becomes impossible, when daily labor leaves only time enough 
 for the necessary animal functions of nutrition and sleep, man's 
 life ceases to be a human life." 
 
 A very important part of education consists in the forma- 
 tion of good habits of living. This training should be begun 
 immediately after birth by the regular and proper feeding of 
 the young infant, and a fair amount of wisdom and attention 
 on the part of parents, nurses, and teachers during the forma- 
 tive period of childhood should result, by the time the child 
 is ten or twelve years old, in the establishment of a wholesome 
 routine of bodily habits and functions that will prove a good 
 foundation upon which the youth, between that time and, say, 
 twenty years of age, may consciously acquire such self-control 
 
It SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 and wisdom in the ordering of his own life as may pretty well 
 insure health and long life, except as life may be endangered 
 by what may be called accidental diseases or injuries. Good 
 habits of bodily life relate, first, to the character and amount 
 of food taken and the manner of taking it; the latter especially 
 is very important, and meals should be eaten at regular times 
 as nearly as practicable, and food should be thoroughly chewed 
 and mixed with saliva before it is swallowed. (The teachings 
 and example of Horace Fletcher in regard to the manner of 
 eating have benefited a great number of people, and it is much 
 to be desired that the whole population should form such habits 
 as he recommends.) 
 
 This fundamental requirement of long-continued good 
 health makes it imperative that a good chewing apparatus should 
 be acquired and preserved, which can only be done in most cases 
 by the faithful cooperation of the dentist and the individual from 
 childhood. It is very important, also, that food be not mixed 
 and contaminated with fermenting or decomposing remnants of 
 food left over in the mouth from previous meals. It is impor- 
 tant, moreover, to abstain from eating except at meal times. The 
 much too prevalent habits of taking candy, or sweetmeats or 
 almost any sorts of food or drinks that may happen to be con- 
 venient (except water, which may be taken freely at almost any 
 time) at any hour of day or night is very injurious and pretty 
 surely brings its punishment sooner or later, though young people 
 are often able to stand a great deal of abuse of this sort without 
 evil effects that they become much conscious of, and when the 
 evil consequences do manifest themselves so as to force atten- 
 tion, such effects are often attributed to the wrong causes. 
 
 Next in importance to eating proper food in a proper manner 
 is an abundant supply of pure air and a good habit of breathing 
 it. Filling the lungs to their capacity, repeated a number of 
 times in succession, and several times every day, in pure outdoor 
 air when possible, will do very much to ward off infections of 
 tuberculosis or pneumonia, and to promote the elimination of 
 toxic matters which accumulate in the blood, thus helping to 
 keep the mind awake and alert, and the disposition cheerful. 
 The movements of the diaphragm and abdominal muscles in deep 
 
THE BODILY AND ECONOMIC LIFE. 71 
 
 breathing will also help digestion. The control of a suflicieni 
 supply of pure air at the right temperature is not so surely or 
 easily under individual control as are habits of eating and breath- 
 ing, but most persons can do it at night by opening windows, 
 and when sleeping the temperature can be very much lowered 
 without injury or discomfort. Every one should use such 
 opportunities, influence, or authority as he may possess toward 
 procuring proper ventilation and heating for himself and others 
 with whom he is associated. (This is not the place to discuss 
 Problems of heating and ventilation.) 
 
 The problem of supplying sufficient moisture in air artifi- 
 cially heated is important, also, and practically rather difficult. 
 If air at a temperature of 70 degrees F. and saturated with mois- 
 ture be cooled to zero, it will part with a very large proportion 
 of its water, which will be deposited in dew or rain or snow. The 
 capacity of air to absorb moisture is so greatly increased by 
 warming it that even a saturated atmosphere at 20 degrees or 
 lower will be much too dry for wholesome breathing when 
 heated to 70 degrees. The colder it is out of doors, the dryer 
 it will be in the house, and if the cold air, instead of being satu- 
 rated, has only 60 to 70 per cent of humidity, it becomes corre- 
 spondingly dryer after being warmed. As a matter of fact, in 
 ordinary houses and offices, etc., heated by steam or hot-water 
 coils, the air all winter is much dryer than the dryest air of the 
 western desert plains. It seems pretty certain that the excessive 
 heat and dryness, together with the foulness of the air due to 
 imperfect ventilation, contrasted with the coldness and moisture 
 of the out-of-doors air, are chiefly responsible for the much 
 greater prevalence of colds, catarrhs, influenzas, tonsilitis, grippe, 
 and pneumonia in winter and spring as compared with the sum- 
 mer and autumn. The solution of the problem how to moisten 
 the warmed air sufficiently is not altogether easy, and has in 
 most cases received very little attention. Houses heated by a 
 hot-air furnace usually have a pan of water adjacent to the fire- 
 pot, which may evaporate from two to four gallons a day — 
 which helps some — but is only a fraction of what is needed. 
 The water pan should be much larger, exposing greater evapo- 
 rating surface, or be close enough to the fire to boil the water. 
 
78 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 which would probably increase the evaporation sufficiently. If 
 heating is by steam or hot-water coils, it is still worse, as usually 
 managed. If sufficient water can be boiled, allowing the steam 
 to escape into the rooms, that will solve the difficulty or if a 
 small jet of steam can be allowed to escape from the coils, not 
 more than will be absorbed by the air without condensing in 
 a drip, that would moisten the air. 
 
 Cleanliness is, of course, of the utmost importance. The 
 morning bath of cold water is hardening and invigorating for 
 those who react promptly and find it agreeable, but for cleanli- 
 ness, a bath with warm water and soap is needed, preferably 
 at bedtime. 
 
 It is an excellent habit, just before retiring, to wash face, 
 neck, and hands, and to thoroughly clean teeth, mouth, throat, 
 and nose, and to repeat the same on rising in the morning. 
 Such habits of cleanliness are necessary for personal health and 
 comfort. A dentist or physician is so constantly in close prox- 
 imity to other people that scrupulous personal cleanliness and 
 frequent changes of underclothing are more necessary from a 
 business point of view than for men in many other occupations. 
 And it is very needful that personal linen, office coats, and all 
 towels, napkins, and similar articles about the office should be 
 as nearly immaculate as possible. 
 
 A sufficient amount of physical exercise is as necessary for 
 health and long life as personal cleanliness. The daily routine 
 of a dental practice requires a much greater amount and variety 
 of physical exertion than that of a lawyer, a banker, a book- 
 keeper, and many other employments that might be named, but 
 it is not sufficient unless supplemented by regular or occasional 
 exercise of some sort in the open air. Probably the most certain 
 and satisfactory way to get it is in the ordinary routine of living ; 
 by walking back and forth to the office or to trains, taking care 
 of the furnace, cutting kindling, shoveling snow, making a gar- 
 den, cutting the lawn, and the other chores and errands which a 
 man of family is apt to find waiting for him at night or urging 
 him out of bed in the morning. If these are denied to a man, 
 the next best things are active outdoor amusements, like golf, 
 tennis, horseback riding, or "hiking" about with a camera : any- 
 
THE BODILY AND ECONOMIC LIFE. 79 
 
 thing he takes enough interest in that requires active exercise 
 in the open air. If none of these are available, gymnastic exer- 
 cises done with no other motive than the exercise itself may 
 answer fairly well, but these are better if done in the gymnasium, 
 and the swimming tank, with the added interest and stimulation 
 of comradeship and competition, than if done in solitude at home. 
 Efficiency and usefulness are very closely related to bodily 
 health and vigor; therefore, the duty to serve one's family and 
 society involves the primary duty to preserve health and strength 
 by every available means, to the end that one may be an efficient 
 instrument for service. Also, the personal satisfactions derived 
 from well-balanced and normal physical powers are very great 
 and are proper objects of desire and endeavor. 
 
 THE ECONOMIC LIFE 
 
 *"The economic life has its origin in the natural needs 
 which man shares with the brute. When the functions engaged 
 in the satisfaction of these needs are systematized by reason, 
 two institutions arise which form the basis of economic life : 
 labor and property. The accumulation of commodities, which is 
 the original form of property, enables man to free himself from 
 the slavery of monetary needs, to which the animal is subjected. 
 This freedom is the precondition of all real human life ; without 
 it there can be no systematic, purposive activity, no mental- 
 historical life. Through it, what remains a natural process in 
 the animal world is raised to the moral sphere." * * * The 
 acquisition and consumption of commodities impose moral duties 
 upon the individual. 
 
 "In the more highly developed stages of civilization, labor 
 assumes the form of a calling or profession. Professional effi- 
 ciency and fidelity to calling are the virtues peculiar to this field." 
 
 "Under healthy conditions, the duties of the calling form 
 the center of one's entire life. The boy practices his future 
 profession in play; the youth leaves the parental home to learn 
 it, and the man devotes his whole energy to it. The vocation 
 determines our essential relations to the external world ; it brings 
 us into contact with our colleagues during the periods of work 
 
 *Paulsen, Chapter 4, page 529. 
 
80 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 and rest; and upon it depends the manner ni which we exercise 
 our faculties in play. Hence the calling is the guiding principle 
 in life; it gives it steadiness and purpose." 
 
 "The teleological necessity of the calling becomes apparent 
 when we consider the consequences of its lack. Both rich and 
 poor may be without a calling. The individuals without a calling 
 who form the lower fringe of society constitute the proletariat. 
 This group is composed of those who have no steady work, but 
 wander from place to place and beg or steal, or otherwise gain 
 their livelihood. Aversion to work, dissipation, drunkenness, 
 recklessness, vanity, are the vices which draw individuals into 
 this group. Moreover, this mode of life is transmitted by hered- 
 ity; degenerate families raise degenerate offspring." * * * 
 
 "Another group of persons who have no calling is formed 
 at the upper fringe of society. I mean the professional idlers 
 who live on their interest and absolve themselves of the duty 
 of having a calling. Looked at from the outside, their manner 
 of life differs from that of the other class; seen from within, 
 however, it shows many points of resemblance. Besides, these 
 two classes come into personal contact with each other: they 
 meet in the demi-monde and among the gambling fraternity. 
 Both congregate in large cities, both have peculiarly perverse 
 notions of honor, both, above all, are restless in disposition and 
 unsettled in their movements. * * * Nothing is required of 
 the rich idler, so he takes up now one thing, now another, only 
 to abandon it again at the earliest opportunity. The ability to 
 will, which simply means the ability to persevere, even in the 
 face of temporary distractions, is gradually lost when not exer- 
 cised, and the victim perishes from an incurable softening of 
 the will." * * * 
 
 "Man was not designed by nature merely to enjoy, but to 
 w^ork and acquire. However plausible it may at first sight 
 appear, the attempt to live a life of enjoyment merely, has 
 invariably failed. Toil and pleasure, that is an old law of 
 nature ; without the former, we cannot obtain the latter." 
 * * * 
 
 "Not only do we owe it to ourselves to pursue a seri- 
 ous calling, but likewise to society at large. The man who 
 
THE BODILY AND ECONOMIC LIFE. 81 
 
 refuses to work in some way or other lives at others' expense. 
 This is no less true of one who idly spends his inheritance 
 than of the professional beggar or thief. From the legal 
 point of view, the former consumes what belongs to him and 
 does no wrong; from the moral standpoint, however, — that 
 is, in reality, — he accepts the products of others' labor without 
 making any return ; he lives as a parasite at the table of the 
 people, without helping to defray the costs." * * * 
 
 "An indirect accumulation and hoarding of products beyond 
 the amount needed for self-consumption is made possible by 
 converting them into money. But inasmuch as money pos- 
 sesses a conventional value only, society has, by adopting the 
 invention tacitly given its consent to the consequences 
 thereof." 
 
 "But to this (somewhat imaginary) contract, we might con- 
 tinue, society has, likewise tacitly, added a clause : it shall be 
 valid, only on condition that the person who thus becomes 
 possessed of wealth shall make some return for the surplus 
 which he acquires with the tacit consent of society. A con- 
 tract assumes that some return be made; otherwise it is a 
 donation ; and there is no reason to suppose that society 
 intended to donate anything to anyone, nor has society any 
 right to do so, at least if future generations are to bear the 
 burden. The individual may make such a return by assuming 
 public responsibilities: say, by leading and representing his 
 people in peace and war, by serving as a judge or legislator, 
 by performing the duties of the priestly calling, or by admin- 
 istering the spiritual possessions of a nation in science and 
 art. And it may still be regarded as such a return to system- 
 ize and guide economic production, — nay, even to influence 
 consumption in a manner conducive to welfare, by example 
 and encouragement, by public generosity and private benefi- 
 cence. During the time when the nobility and clergy still 
 were an active power in the body politic, they so conceived 
 and performed their functions. The man who does nothing, 
 ignores the obligations tacitly assumed by accepting prop- 
 erty, and therefore, has no right to it, from the moral point 
 of view. * * * The people fully appreciate this fact." 
 
82 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 "The law does not execute the judgment of morals, it does 
 not repudiate ownership in property when no return is made, 
 or in case of misuse, and it is probably well that it does not. 
 For it would not only be impossible to formulate the neces- 
 sary rules and to enforce them, but there would arise a feeling 
 of insecurity in reference to property which would carry 
 greater evils in its train than the most flagrant abuse of prop- 
 erty rights in particular instances could effect. In a certain 
 sense however, history realizes the judgment of morality. 
 Whenever the nobility and clergy renounced their obligations 
 and merely retained the corresponding privileges as an 
 inalienable right, things went along in this way for a while, 
 but the day of reckoning came at last, and they were cast off 
 from the social body as useless members or as harmful para- 
 sites. Thus history pronounced sentence upon the French 
 nobility in the French Revolution ; and the ecclesiastical revo- 
 lution of the sixteenth century condemned the clergy, who 
 had proved false to their trust. History will not hold the 
 capitalist more sacred than the nobility and the clergy." 
 * * * 
 
 "Whoever consumes rents without making some return or 
 other, is hastening the coming of the judgment. The eighth 
 commandment is never broken with impunity. The law, how- 
 ever, 'Thou shalt not steal,' is merely the negative formula 
 of the positive command. 'By the sweat of thy face shalt thou 
 eat bread.' " 
 
 *"Let us cast a glance at the other side of economic 
 life, at the question of consumption. The virtue peculiar to 
 this field is the virtue of frugality, or economy, the capacity 
 for managing one's affairs according to one's income as well 
 as according to the needs and obligations which grow out of 
 individual conditions and social rank. This virtue, too, we 
 may define, following the Aristotelian principle, as a mean 
 between two faults or vices, greed and prodigality. The 
 miser saves where he ought to spend, the spendthrift spends 
 lavishly where he ought to save. The good manager is dis- 
 
 *Page 536. 
 
THE BODILY AND ECONOMIC LIFE. 83 
 
 tinguished from the prodigal by the virtue of frugality, from 
 the miser by the virtue which Kant calls "liberalitas moralis" 
 (in opposition to "liberalitas sumptuosa") : he lives decently 
 himself and is generous to others who need his help." 
 
 "Of the two vices, avarice is the most disgraceful, extrava- 
 gance the more dangerous. Greed characterizes a base nature. 
 The soul in which it has taken root withers and dies ; all higher 
 aspirations disappear. The miser at last begrudges himself 
 and others all that is good. Extravagance, on the other hand, 
 may exist in connection with grand aspirations. It is closely 
 allied to a much admired virtue, generosity. The spendthrift 
 always regards himself as a liberal man, and is likewise 
 praised as such by those who profit by his extravagance. 
 Avarice, on the other hand, has no one to sing its praises ; nay, 
 even the virtue of which it is a degenerate form, frugality, 
 finds few admirers, especially when practiced by princes and 
 great lords." * * * 
 
 *'Tt is a well known fact that greed is confined almost 
 entirely to old age. * * * ji^w desires diminish as the 
 capacity for enjoyment becomes weaker in old age, while the 
 abstract desire for possession continues strong to the end. 
 Hence, we might, perhaps, regard this process as a strategy 
 of nature to transmit the products of the parent generation 
 to its successors." 
 
 "Avarice, therefore, debasing though it be, is not altogether 
 injurious in its effects. The consequences of extravagance, 
 on the other hand, are absolutely destructive to individual as 
 well as to social life. The first consequence of extravagance 
 is a lack of means for the necessaries of life, and the resulting 
 need of exercising strict economy in the wrong place. What 
 the wife wastes on dress and show, must be made up in the 
 home and on the table. What is spent on receptions and 
 sports, on horses and dogs, is deducted from the household allow- 
 ance. Still more often there is not money enough to meet 
 legitimate expenses : the servants are not properly fed, nig- 
 gardly wages are paid, public enterprises make vain appeals 
 
 *Page 537. 
 
84 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 for aid. * * * And just as extravagance leads to false 
 economy, it leads to improper methods of acquisition. 
 
 The landowner fleeces his tenants and day laborers, the 
 prince his subjects, the physician his patients, the lawyer his 
 clients, the gentleman of leisure takes to gambling, the merchant 
 speculates on the exchange, the tradesman adulterates his goods, 
 the ofiticial accepts bribes or fawns upon his superiors for promo- 
 tion or an increase of salary, the courtier begs for pensions and 
 presents, the author and scholar cater to the popular tastes, the 
 artist tickles the palate of the money bag; — money must be 
 made, money at any price, even at the price of freedom and 
 honor, body and soul." * * * 
 
 *"The most favorable condition for the development of 
 the economic virtues, is, as the old Greek sages already de- 
 clared, the possession of moderate means; wealth, our own 
 language significantly calls it. Pleasure in acquisition and 
 possession, efficient work, and moderation in the use of com- 
 modities, are most common in the middle classes. The "too 
 much" and the "too little" are equally dangerous. Riches are 
 dangerous in that they tend to encourage idleness, arrogance, 
 ostentation, and extravagance. Excess, however, begets sor- 
 row and ruin. Especially dangerous is sudden wealth not 
 acquired through labor. The money won in lotteries and stock 
 speculations usually soon goes the way it came, not, however, 
 without first ruining the life of the lucky (unlucky?) winner. 
 Inherited possessions are not so dangerous. A family that 
 has been long accustomed to certain conditions of life develops 
 the power to resist the temptations of riches; the man who 
 inherits the wealth of his ancestors in a certain measure 
 inherits their sense of duty and honor. The feeling that he is 
 destined to do great things serves to counteract the empty 
 feeling of power which easily turns the head of the 'nouveau 
 riche.' " 
 
 "Poverty is equally unfavorable to the development of 
 economic virtues. Inherited poverty deadens the sense of 
 
 *Page 540. 
 
THE BODILY x\ND ECONOMIC LIFE. 85 
 
 ownership. Children reared in utterly destitute families, hv- 
 ing from hand to mouth, fail to experience the pleasures of 
 acquisition and ownership. The desire to have more than is 
 required to satisfy daily needs does not manifest itself, or at 
 least remains an idle wish, and never grows into a strong 
 volition. When this state becomes a habit, the individual 
 becomes improvident and reckless, giving no heed to the 
 morrow. Poverty tends to blunt the sense of ownership in 
 another sense; it weakens the person's ability to discriminate 
 between 'mine' and 'thine.' When a man possesses property 
 himself, he appreciates the sacredness of property. When he 
 looks upon the institution of property merely as a barrier, as 
 a protection against him and not also for him, he naturally 
 feels less hesitancy in overleaping it than when he has been 
 accustomed from childhood to regard it as a means of self- 
 defence." * * * 
 
 *"The possession of moderate means secures the individual 
 from temptations in either direction. It saves him from the 
 slavery which is the companion of poverty ; it gives him the 
 free choice of a profession, without tempting him not to fol- 
 low any calling whatever. It develops in him a desire for 
 possession, as opposed to the proletarian supineness of pov- 
 erty. It arouses a pleasure in ownership, as opposed to the 
 arrogance of satiety, which follows upon superabundance. 
 It is plain, the conditions in this regard are not favorable in 
 our age. The marvelous growth of industry and commerce 
 during the nineteenth century, the concomitant development 
 of speculation and the stock exchange system, have enabled 
 particular individuals to accumulate enormous wealth, not 
 infrequently without any merit of their own, which now seeks 
 in vain for rational employment. The consequence is sense- 
 less extravagance, a great greed for gain, and an insane mania 
 for gambling. Universal poverty and proletarian misery form 
 the obverse of the picture." 
 
 *Page 542. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE SPIRITUAL LIFE AND CULTURE 
 SCIENCE AND ART, HONOR, SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
 
 *"By culture we mean the perfect development of spir- 
 itual life. It consists in the capacity, acquired by instruction 
 and practice, to take an active part in the spiritual life, first, 
 of a people and ultimately of humanity." 
 
 "We note as the two essential phases in the spiritual life of 
 a people, knozuledge and the creative fancy, philosophy and 
 science, art and poetry. Culture, therefore, means for the 
 individual the development of the intellect to the end that he 
 may know the truth, and of the senses and the imagination, 
 that he may comprehend and enjoy the beautiful." * * * 
 ''Knowledge has a double function. The intellect is, first, the 
 organ of the will; its function is to adjust the latter to its 
 environment. As was indicated before, the feeling of pleasure 
 and pain may be regarded as the most primitive form of 
 knowledge. The senses, * * * enable the animal to 
 understand its more remote surroundings and to adapt itself 
 to what is useful or harmful. Sensibility develops into intelli- 
 gence, which may be defined, in a general way, as the faculty 
 to know from what is given that which is not given. * * * 
 Man succeeds in discovering the ultimate and constant rela- 
 tions * * * which are expressed in the formulse which 
 we call laws of nature. The knowledge of them gives him 
 theoretical and practical control of the nature of things : he 
 is able not only to foresee the complex processes, which the 
 animal too, may, in a certain measure, foresee, but also to 
 explain them — that is, to deduce them from their causes, and, 
 in so far as the causes are in his power, to produce them. 
 Thus, the intellect has become the powerful instrument by 
 
 *Page 543. 
 
SPIRITUAL LIFE. 87 
 
 which man has made the earth his servant. He has tamed 
 the animals or exterminated them, he has selected and formed 
 the plants which cover the earth, he has compelled the forces 
 of nature to do his bidding. Knowledge is power." 
 
 "But knowledge also has another, an immediate value. In 
 the animal it is absolutely subservient to practical needs, in 
 man it becomes free; he takes a disinterested interest in con- 
 templation, so to speak. This holds even of sense perception. 
 The eye finds pleasure in forms and colors, the ear, in notes 
 and their rhythmical musical successions; hence arise music 
 and painting. From the same pleasure in the contemplation 
 of things springs philosophy. Philosophy is purely contem- 
 plative knowledge. * * * The Socratic school, in which 
 it was first used as a technical term, distinguishes philosophy, 
 as purely theoretical knowledge, from technical knowledge. 
 * * * In this most general sense, philosophy is a universal 
 human function ; mythology is its most primitive form ; it uni- 
 versally arises as an attempt to comprehend the whole of 
 things into one conception ; and to interpret the meaning of 
 the universe and especially of life." 
 
 "This estimate of knowledge will furnish us with a standard 
 by which to measure the value of particular forms of cogni- 
 tion. We shall say that a particular truth has value in so far 
 as it tends to increase our practical power, and our theoretical 
 insight into the nature of things in general. Knowledge which 
 has no value in either sense, which accomplishes nothing for 
 our technics or for our philosophy, has no value whatever. 
 The proposition * * * Everything that is, is worthy of 
 being known, is not infrequently proclaimed in our age as 
 the highest principle of scientific research. I cannot help 
 regarding this as a meaningless assertion — one, however, that 
 is accepted by many as a convenient means of silencing the 
 question concerning the value of particular investigations. 
 Apparently, however, the true scientist does not adhere to 
 this principle. In spite of the assertion that everything that 
 exists deserves to be known, no historian has ever undertaken 
 to ascertain what such and such a celebrity or "obscurity" 
 has had for breakfast or dinner every day of his life. * * * 
 Nor has any scientist ever attempted to count the grains of 
 
88 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 sand on the seashore, and to describe the forms of the separate 
 grains. Why not? Surely because healthy common-sense, if 
 not scientific insight, instinctively recognizes the uselessness 
 of such a task. It must be added, however, that we cannot 
 always tell in advance whether an investigation will yield 
 results which may have some bearing on knowledge in either 
 form or not. In no case, perhaps, has healthy common-sense 
 betrayed such shortsightedness as in its repudiation of scien- 
 tific research as useless trifling or curiosity." 
 
 There appear to be two rather distinct types of men engaged 
 in scientific or philosophical research ; those who distinctly 
 and avowedly have some utilitarian end in view, and those 
 who disclaim any such motive, and are sometimes disposed 
 to make the absence of any utilitarian motive the test of true 
 scholarship. Of the first type were the old alchemists, seeking 
 to transmute base metals into gold, Edison, working out the 
 problems of the telephone, the phonograph or the storage 
 battery; and our own Dr. Black determining the physical 
 properties of amalgams, of gold, and the enamel and dentine 
 of natural teeth. Men of the second type are mostly connected 
 with educational institutions, and much good work is being 
 done by some of them. There would seem to be little ground 
 for the assumption of superiority of one class of research 
 workers over the other, for men of the first sort have often 
 spent years of patient work and missed at last the utilitarian 
 end they sought, and on the other hand the most important 
 utilitarian ends have sometimes been accomplished by men 
 who were not seeking for them, and in some instances per- 
 haps did not recognize them when they saw them. 
 
 *"The same principle applies when it comes to judging 
 the value of knowledge for the individual. Cognitions have 
 no absolute value for the individual, they have value in so far 
 as they do something for him, either by solving his practical 
 life-problems, or by assisting him in his philosophical reflec- 
 tions, or, in other words, in so far as they make him wiser and 
 more prudent. Knowledge which does neither one nor the 
 other, which does not make him either more efficient in his 
 calling or more skillful in contemplation, has no value for 
 
 ♦Page 547. 
 
SPIRITUAL LIFE. 89 
 
 him whatever. If we call the knowledge upon which profes- 
 sional efficiency is based professional or technical education, 
 and that upon which rests the ability to contemplate, to par- 
 ticipate in philosophy, literature, and art, general culture, we 
 may say : Only such knowledge is valuable to the individual 
 as either serves to give him professional culture, or intensifies 
 his general culture, or does both." 
 
 "And this would give us a principle for the guidance of 
 instruction : Everybody ought to acquire such knowledge as 
 will assist him, on the one hand, in following his special 
 calling to the best possible advantage, and, on the other, in 
 understanding the world from his position in life." * * * 
 
 *"That school will be best for the individual which, on the 
 one hand, is suited to his individual talents and tastes, and, on 
 the other, to his future calling and position in life. * * * 
 The principle holds absolutely : Knowledge which the indi- 
 vidual cannot utilize, either on account of natural incapacity, 
 or in consequence of his external position, is of absolutely no 
 value to him." 
 
 "Yes, we may go further and say it is an evil. This becomes 
 self-evident when the individual is lacking in talent. To know 
 too much for his capacity makes a man not, wiser, but more 
 stupid. We must discriminate between stupidity and igno- 
 rance. Ignorance is a lack of knowledge ; stupidity is a lack 
 of judgment, and may go with great learning, nay, it may, 
 under certain circumstances, be due to this. A good anecdote 
 is told of the Duke of Wellington. A young man once applied 
 to him for an office. After conversing with him for a while, 
 the Duke refused his application, adding: "Sir, you have 
 received too much education for your brains." * * * 
 
 "If a man's inner life is consistently and harmoniously de- 
 veloped, if he has digested and, as it were, converted into 
 organic substance and living force whatever opinions and 
 experiences he has acquired at school and in the world, he is 
 a well-educated man. Not the mass of material, but the inner 
 form is what makes education. Matter without form produces 
 
 *Page 549. 
 
90 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 semi-education, over-education, pseudo-education, or what- 
 ever we may call this degeneration of the soul." 
 
 "^"Art, like philosophy, is also based, partially at least, 
 on pure contemplation. If play is, in distinction from work, 
 the free exercise of powers, and not a means to an external 
 end, while in work an external effect, or product, is desired, 
 art, as well as philosophy, belongs in the category of play. 
 All occupation with the fine arts is playful or purposeless exer- 
 cise of sensuous-spiritual powers." * * * 
 
 "Art is also partially rooted in feeling and zvilling. Every 
 strong emotion is accompanied by the desire to express and 
 communicate itself. The joys and pangs of love, martial 
 courage and sadness, yearning and reverence, seek and find 
 relief in poetry and song. By the rhythmical-melodious ar- 
 rangement of words and notes, the feelings themselves are 
 aroused. And so the will and the mood of a people and an 
 age are expressed and objectified in the great creations of epic 
 and dramatic poetry as well as in the creations of the plastic 
 arts and architecture. Gothic art manifests the mood of 
 towering supernaturalism, which contemns and repels the 
 earthly sensuous world, — corporeality with its pleasure and 
 heaviness. In the Renaissance the opposite mood asserts 
 itself; its architecture and fine arts, its costumes, and house- 
 furnishings, its poetry and music, all of them express the de- 
 termination of the age to abandon itself, with the enthusi- 
 asm and exhuberance of youth, to the contemplation and en- 
 joyment of everything charming and agreeable, till it seems 
 as if the age felt the need of making up for lost time." 
 
 "It is the highest function of art to shape and express 
 the ideals which the spiritual life of a nation creates. The 
 ideal world reaches its highest expression in a supra-mun- 
 dane superhuman world, in which perfection has absolute 
 reality for faith. Thus art becomes the organ of religion. 
 Its highest function is to realize the innermost cravings of 
 a people, to contemplate its ideas of perfection in concrete 
 forms. So the plastic arts produced concrete representa- 
 
 *Page 556. 
 
SPIRITUx'VL LIFE. 91 
 
 tions of the Greek gods, — glorious figures in which the 
 Greek's ideals of human culture were made visible to him. 
 Similarly Greek poetry gave to the people in its epics and 
 dramas living pictures of divine and human excellences, such 
 as courage, loyalty, devotion, magnanimity, prudence, wis- 
 dom, piety. Christian art, too, has performed the same neces- 
 sary function of converting the realm of faith into a world 
 of concrete intuitions. The entire mediaeval art, architec- 
 ture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry, had for its sole 
 object the presentation of the world of Christian faith, in 
 the form which this had assumed in the Germanic mind, to 
 the senses and the entire man." 
 
 "We may therefore describe the ejfect of art upon the 
 soul as follows: (1) It exercises our sensuous spiritual 
 powers and so fills our leisure moments with the purest and 
 most beautiful recreation and pleasure. (2) It satisfies and 
 quiets the cravings of the emotions to express themselves, by 
 providing them with the necessary stimulus and affording 
 relief. (3) It raises the soul above the world of work and 
 need, struggle and misery, to a world of freedom and ideals, 
 and purifies it from the dust of base feelings and passions 
 with which the affairs of daily life cover it. The inner uni- 
 formity and harmony which constitute the essence of all 
 art also bring uniformity and harmony into the soul. 
 Finally (4) it binds together and unites the members of the 
 nation, nay, all the members of a sphere of civilization ; all 
 those who have the same faith and the same ideals. Opin- 
 ions and interests dififer and produce discord ; art presents 
 in sensuous symbols the ideals which are cherished by all, 
 and so arouses the feeling, that all are, in the last analysis, 
 of the same mind, that all recognize and adore the same ulti- 
 mate and highest things." * * * 
 
 "If this is a correct description of the nature and effect 
 of art, it follows that it is a universally human function. Art 
 is not something peculiar to a few nations and to a few indi- 
 viduals among them, but all nations have an art to express their 
 emotions, as they have a language to express their ideas. And 
 just as all the members of a people participate in its language. 
 
92 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 though not equally, so all of them, in a measure, participate in 
 its art." 
 
 HONOR AND LOVE OF HONOR. 
 
 *"The love of honor may be regarded as a peculiar modifica- 
 tion of the impulse of self-preservation; it aims at the preser- 
 vation of the self in consciousness, in our own consciousness as 
 well as in that of others. We may call it the impulse of ideal 
 self-preservation." 
 
 "By honor in the objective sense we mean the opinion 
 which our surroundings have of us. By his character and his 
 acts, every man arouses sentiments in his fellows which 
 represent judgments of value; respect and disrespect, ad- 
 miration and contempt, reverence and aversion. These feel- 
 ings express themselves in judgments and are influenced, in- 
 tensified and harmonized by other feelings, and thus arises 
 something like a general estimate of the value of the par- 
 ticular individual in society: this is his objective honor." 
 
 * * H< 
 
 "There are as many different kinds of honor as there are 
 groups or sets to which a man belongs. As a member of a 
 political community, he has a political honor ; it measures his 
 value as a citizen. * * * Besides the political honor, there 
 is special social honor. Everybody is a member of society; his 
 value as such is measured by his social honor." * * * 
 
 "Within these comprehensive groups there are narrower 
 circles each having its particular form of honor : we speak of 
 the honor of a merchant, the honor of an artist, the honor of 
 an officer, the honor of a student, etc. Its possession signi- 
 fies that the individual satisfies the special demands that are 
 made upon him by the particular set to which he belongs." 
 
 "Collective bodies, too, like individuals, have their honor: 
 a family has its family honor among other families, * * * 
 a profession among other professions, a nation among other 
 nations. The individuals have a share in this collective 
 honor; let an Englishman's honor be what it may among 
 Englishmen; among foreigners he has the honor of an Eng- 
 lishman in general. This collective honor is a highly im- 
 
 *Page 569. 
 
SPIRITUAL LIFE. 93 
 
 portant factor in all collective life ; it firmly cements the mem- 
 bers of a community together. The family honor holds the 
 members of a family together, even after they have lost their 
 love and respect for each other ; all of them would have to 
 suffer the disgrace of a single member." 
 
 "The significance of honor for human conduct is obvious. 
 * * * As a rule honor is increased by everything that increases 
 the pozver and influence of an individual, or, in other words, 
 increases his capacity to help or harm others. \\'e may mention 
 such qualities as strength, skill, courage, military skill ; these qual- 
 ities are pre-eminently honorable in primitive society. * * * 
 Then come wealth, which too means social power; birth and rank, 
 which give power, namely through family connections ; and finally, 
 prudence, knowledge of the law, and eloquence, qualities which, 
 with the progress of political development, enable their pos- 
 sessors to attain to higher positions, either as leaders of the 
 people or as officers of the state. The types depicted in the 
 Greek epic are the simplest examples of these dififefrit forms 
 of fame and distinction. Achilles stands for strength and cour- 
 age ; Agamemnon, for rank and wealth ; Ulysses and Nestor 
 for prudence and eloquence. Finally, the moral excellences 
 also belong, in a certain sense, to the qualities which bring 
 honor and which the love of honor impels us to acquire. 
 Intemperance, dissipation, and extravagance, bring disgrace, 
 at least after they have ruined the person addicted to them, 
 for then the friends who once applauded him forsake him. 
 The opposite modes of behavior, on the other hand, preserve 
 wealth and strength, and so, ultimately at least, lead to 
 honor. Falsehood, on account of its kinship with cowardice, 
 if for no other reason, brings disgrace; likewise, deceit and 
 dishonesty. Veracity, trustworthiness, and uprightness, on 
 the contrary, give one a good name. Thus honor becomes 
 the guardian of morality ; the love of honor tends to deter- 
 mine the will to develop, first of all, the self-regarding vir 
 tues, and then also to acquire the social virtues, or at least to 
 avoid injustice, falsehood, and crime." 
 
 "No detailed account is needed to show the importance 
 of this impulse for the moral education of the race. The de- 
 
94 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 velopment of the human virtues in the species : courage, mag- 
 nanimity, justice, veracity, — the development of higher 
 capacities, economic as well as mental, is hardly conceivable 
 without this constantly acting impulse." * * * 
 
 *"The proper attitude of the individual towards honor, 
 the virtue into which the impulse of honor is fashioned, 
 we call the love of honor. We may define it as that habit of 
 will and mode of conduct which seeks to gain the recognition 
 of the virtuous and good by means of honest and virtuous ac- 
 tions. Perhaps we may characterize it suitably, from two points 
 of view, as proper pride and proper humility." 
 
 "Pride (which is not to be confused with haughtiness) 
 is the antithisis of two degenerate forms of the impulse of 
 honor: vanity and ambition." * * * 
 
 The distinction between pride, considered as a virtue, 
 (for the word 'pride' is often misused when vanity, self-con- 
 ceit, or ambition would be appropriate) and vanity and ambi- 
 tion, is that the two latter seek for admiration, influence, 
 power, etc., as a first consideration, and care little or nothing 
 for the quality of character and conduct except as means by 
 which to attain those ends. Pride, on the contrary, seeks 
 first the character, and conduct, and service, that will merit 
 admiration, honor and power, hoping that such rewards may 
 come, but holding fast to character and service whether they 
 do or not. The virtuously proud man holds himself so far 
 independent of either praise or blame that he will not allow 
 himself to be turned aside from either virtue or duty by 
 either." 
 
 "The other antithesis of the love of honor is proper humility. 
 Pride manifests itself in the proper acceptance of honor, humility 
 in the proper bestowal of honor." 
 
 "Humility is the opposite of haughtiness. The haughty 
 man despises others, he treats them condescendingly. By 
 refusing to show them proper respect, he endeavors to keep 
 it for himself, as it were, and so to have an advantage over 
 them. He does not seek converse with men, indeed he ac- 
 
 *Page 573. 
 
SPIRITUAL LIFE. 95 
 
 tually shuns it, because he finds that his expectations with 
 respect to honor are not realized, and because he is not will- 
 ing to satisfy the claims of others. It is evidently for this 
 reason that haughtiness and pride are so easily confused. 
 Haughtiness is, moreover, very commonly connected with 
 servility. The man who treats those whom he regards as his 
 inferiors with brutal haughtiness, crouches before the 
 mighty. He uses all the arts of subservient flattery towards 
 those who are unquestionably richer, more aristocratic, pow- 
 erful, and influential than he, in order thus to rise on the 
 ladder of rank ; he revenges himself on those below him, and 
 it affords him special satisfaction to kick his patron as soon 
 as he has outstripped him. In this way, he gets back his 
 capital with interest." 
 
 "Humility, on the other hand, gives everyone the honor 
 which is his due. It rejoices at the merit of others, and is 
 ever ready to recognize ability, to admire excellence, and 
 to reverence goodness. Genuine humility — this is its true 
 sign — and genuine free-mind edness go together. The hum- 
 ble, free-minded man bows before what is truly honorable, 
 even when it appears in menial form, and refuses to mere 
 external power what belongs to the venerable alone. It is 
 with pride that he sides with those who are outraged for the 
 sake of truth and justice, and he considers it an honor to 
 suffer disgrace and persecution with them. The word of the 
 judge on the judgment day applies to him : T was in prison 
 and ye came unto me.' " 
 
 "There are two well-known types : the servile-minded, 
 full of haughtiness and baseness and the free-minded, full 
 of noble pride and reverence and deep humility. We Ger- 
 mans have an example of a man of the latter type in Freiherr 
 von Stein. 'Humble before God, high-minded, magnanimous 
 towards men, a foe of falsehood and injustice,' so his epitaph 
 characterizes him." * * * 
 
 *"With true pride and true humility, true self-esteem 
 finally is joined. The proper estimate of oneself may be 
 defined as a mean between pusillanimity and supercilious- 
 
 *r:io-e 578. 
 
96 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 ness. Pusillanimity is habitual faint-heartedness in regard 
 to the problems which life sets before us; it weakens our 
 capacity to act and to suffer. Superciliousness springs from 
 underestimating our tasks and overestimating our powers; 
 it regards exertion as superfluous, and so is no less productive 
 of failure than is faint-heartedness. * * * True self- 
 esteem, which marks the efficient man, gives him confidence 
 in his own will and powers, and upon the latter depend 
 security in decision and firmness in execution. * * * The 
 proper estimate of one's own worth, of one's own powers 
 and achievements, knowledge of self, constitutes a particu- 
 larly difficult problem of self-culture. * * * How can we 
 learn to know ourselves? Never by contemplation, but 
 always by action. Try to do your duty, and you will know 
 at once what is in you."* * * * 
 
 "Modesty may be defined as the outward form of the love 
 of honor. The modest man shows by his entire behavior that he 
 does not despise the opinion of others, but that he desires to make 
 an effort to gain their esteem. The opposite demeanor is that of 
 the overhearing man ; his acts proclaim that he does not care what 
 others may think of him. When such conduct is displayed toward 
 especially venerable persons, we call it insolence and impudence, 
 the sign of a low and servile disposition." * * * 
 
 Paulsen's chapter seventh, on suicide is not necessary to 
 the purposes of these writings. 
 
 *Goethe's words in his Spriiche in Prosa. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 
 JUSTICE — MAGNANIMITY. 
 
 *"The sympathetic feelings and impulses form the natural 
 basis of the social virtues. Such will-impulses are called sympa- 
 thetic in distinction from idiopathic impulses, which originate 
 directly in the individual — as are aroused in us by transference 
 from others, by a kind of contagion. All feelings have the tend- 
 ency, though in dififerent degrees, to spread by sympathy, as for 
 example, pleasure and pain, fear and hope, love and hate, con- 
 tempt and admiration, cheerful exuberance and earnest solemnity. 
 The passions aroused by a speech in a large popular gathering 
 are much more intense than those which arise when the same per- 
 sons read or hear the same speech separately ; it seems as though 
 the feelings were reflected from every feeling-center in the meet- 
 ing to every other one, and the rays concentrated in each indi- 
 vidual as in a burning glass." 
 
 "Not only is the human heart sensitive to sympathetic 
 excitement, it likewise yearns deeply to have its feelings com- 
 municated to and reflected from other hearts. When we are 
 happy or in pain, we crave for human beings to reflect our 
 joy or sorrow; when we love or hate, admire or condemn, we 
 strive to diffuse our feelings, and are pained when our sur- 
 roundings remain indifferent to us. Every strong emotion 
 impels us to utterance; "out of the abundance of the heart 
 the mouth speaketh." 
 
 "Blood-relationship is the naturel starting point of the 
 sympathetic feelings. They manifest themselves most in- 
 tensely and directly in the relation between mother and child. 
 
 * * * From this point sympathy extends to the members 
 
 of the family, tribe, people, humanity, to all living creatures." 
 
 * * * 
 
 *Page 592. 
 
98 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 "Of all feelings pain seems most capable of arousing sym- 
 pathy. Language shows this : we have a term for sympa- 
 thetic pain only, in compassion. No terms have been coined 
 to designate sympathetic pleasure or fear. — It is doubtless 
 true that joy is not so easily transferred by sympathy." * * * 
 
 "Happiness may produce in others that peculiar form of 
 pain which is called envy; unhappiness or misfortune, on 
 the contrary may produce in others a malicious pleasure. 
 These are well known phenomena which the pessimistic 
 philosophers love to dwell upon. * * * i^ the troubles 
 of our good friends, says La Rochefoucauld, there is always 
 something that does not displease us, and with still greater 
 justice may we assert that there is always something in the 
 good fortune of our friends that does not entirely please us. 
 He goes on to say that one should beware of mentioning his 
 good fortune, especially to his less fortunate competitors. 
 On the other hand, if he has met with a misfortune, * * * 
 if he has been hooted as a speaker, or speculated and lost on 
 the exchange, he need not let the fear of paining his good 
 friends hinder him from telling it. He will have no difficulty 
 in finding persons to pity him, but — well, — everybody knows 
 how little we care for the pity of our friends on such occa- 
 sions." 
 
 It is however, a mean and ungenerous nature that finds 
 pleasure in the misfortunes and griefs of others and is pained 
 by their success or good fortune, and I prefer to reverse the 
 above rule and to show our confidence in the love and good 
 will of our friends by telling them freely of our joys, and suc- 
 cesses, and prosperity, believing it will give them pleasure 
 without exciting their envy. And on the other hand to avoid 
 paining them by a recital of our griefs, or misfortunes, or 
 difficulties unless they may be able to give us substantial 
 help, or by their sympathy and encouragement may strength- 
 en our courage and patience or inspire us with hope for the 
 future. 
 
 *"The sympathetic feelings, and especially compassion, evi- 
 dently have the same significance for conduct that all feelings 
 
 *Page 595. 
 
COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 99 
 
 have: their object is to guide the will in the business of life. 
 Just as idiopathic pain impels the individual to remove the evil 
 or the disturbance which threatens his own life, so compassion 
 tends to determine the will to remove the causes of pain from the 
 lives of others." * * * 
 
 "In human life, however, feeling impulses are never ade- 
 quate guides of action, but require the regulative control of 
 reason, * * * and to be guided by wisdom. The virtue 
 which thus arises, the general fundamental form of the so- 
 cial virtues, may be called 'benevolence' and defined as that 
 habit of the will and mode of conduct Avhich tends to pro- 
 mote the w^elfare of the surroundings by hindering disturb- 
 ances and producing favorable conditions of life." 
 
 "In benevolence, compassion is overshadowed by zvell- 
 doing beneficence. The benevolent and beneficent man pre- 
 vents or alleviates the sufferings of others without always 
 having to feel compassion himself. Nay, a certain power of 
 resistance is as much a part of benevolence as it is a part of 
 courage to be able to resist idiopathic pain, or a part of tem- 
 perance to be able to resist the temptations of sense. We do 
 not expect a physician to suffer with the patient all the 
 pains which he witnesses or perhaps causes himself. On the 
 contrary, a certain obduracy on his part is the condition of 
 beneficent action ; his compasssion would obscure the clear- 
 ness of his judgment and interfere with the steadiness of his 
 movements. It is well known that physicians do not like to 
 treat their nearest relatives because their pity interferes with 
 their skill. But not only is freedom from pity needed to give 
 the physician greater security in the practice of his art ; it 
 also has a directly beneficial influence. The physician enters 
 the sick room and makes his examination and gives his or- 
 ders with business-like serenity ; he does not pity nor lament. 
 His calmness has the most wholesome effect ; some of it is 
 communicated to the relatives and the patient. * * * 
 On the other hand, consider the influence of visits from rela- 
 tives and friends ! Frightened by the appearance of the 
 patient and overwhelmed with phy, they break out into 
 
100 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 tears and complaints, and so increase his sufferings by their 
 compassion and excitement." 
 
 "The same thing happens in other cases. A tender 
 mother doubly suffers the pains which her child feels. If 
 the child fall and hurt himself, she is overcome with pity. 
 The result is that the child now really begins to feel the 
 pain; he does not cry out until he has been pitied, when he 
 regards himself as an object of pity. And the permanent 
 effect of such treatment is a sort of whining nature, which 
 is not a pleasant endowment for life. Another mother, who 
 loves her child just as much, bandages the wound if neces- 
 sary, diverts the child's attention from the accident; and lo! 
 the pain actually disappears when it is resisted. As a permanent 
 consequence, the child, in a measure, becomes hardened to such 
 things, and so receives the best possible equipment for life 
 that education can give. To love one's children is natural, 
 and neither a virtue nor an art, but to educate children is a 
 great and difficult art, which demands, first of all, the ability 
 to control one's natural tender impulses. AVe must not let 
 our children know how much we love them says an old 
 wise maxim, which, however, does not suit the sentimental- 
 ism and vanity of modern mothers." 
 
 It is certainly possible to exercise the self-control and 
 wisdom indicated in the preceding quotation without in 
 the least concealing from our children the ardor and sin- 
 cerity of our love for them, and this we should strive to ac- 
 complish, for the consciousness of the unwavering, wise and 
 self-denying love of its parents is the strongest influence for 
 good that ever comes into the life of a child. 
 
 "We may therefore say : Compassion is the natural 
 basis of the social virtue of active benevolence, but it is by 
 no means a virtue itself. * * * Like every phase of im- 
 pulsive life, it must be educated and disciplined by reason; 
 in the rational will it is both realized and limited, — realized 
 in so far as it attains its end, the furtherance of human wel- 
 fare, limited in so far as it is prevented from doing harm." 
 * * * 
 
COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 101 
 
 JUSTICE. 
 
 *"We distinguish between two phases of benevolence : 
 a negative phase : not to retard welfare ; and a positive phase : 
 to promote welfare. These two phases, regarded as special 
 virtues, give us the virtues of justice and love of neighbor." 
 
 "Justice, as a moral habit, is the tendency of the will 
 and mode of conduct which refrains from disturbing the 
 lives and interests of others, and, as far as possible, hinders 
 such interference on the part of others. This virtue springs 
 from the individual's respect for his fellows as ends in them- 
 selves and as his coequals. The different spheres of interest 
 may be roughtly classified as follows : body and life ; the 
 family, or the extended individual life; property, or the 
 totality of the instruments of action ; honor, or the ideal of 
 existence ; and finally freedom, or the possibility of fashion- 
 ing one's life as an end in itself. The law defends these dif- 
 ferent spheres, thus giving rise to a corresponding number 
 of spheres of rights, each being protected by a prohibition : 
 Thou shalt not kill, commit adultery, steal, bear false witness 
 against the honor of thy neighbor, and interfere with his 
 liberty. To violate the rights, to interfere with the interests 
 of others, is injustice. All injustice is ultimately directed 
 against the life of the neighbor ; it is an open avowal that the 
 latter is not an end in itself, having the same value as the 
 individual's own life. The general formula of the duty of 
 justice may therefore be stated as follows : Do no wrong your- 
 self, and permit no wrong to be done, so far as lies in your poiver; 
 or, expressed positively : Respect and protect the right." 
 
 "The first part of this formula : 'Refrain from doing 
 wrong,' is the basis of the virtue of rectitude or probity. 
 * * * Justice, in this sense, enjoins limitation of self by 
 submission to a general rule. * * * 'p|-,g child is, at the 
 beginning of its life, naively inconsiderate. It has regard 
 only for itself, it does what pleases it, without being seri- 
 ously concerned about the effect of its behavior upon others. 
 Only gradually does it come to understand that its action 
 
 *Paae 599. 
 
102 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 has consequences not only for itself but for others. Its at- 
 tention is called to this fact by the reaction caused by its 
 acts in others. It deprives another child of its plaything; 
 that child becomes angry and reacts accordingly. We may 
 note a look of surprise on the face of the first child; only 
 gradually, after experiencing similar treatment from others, 
 does it begin to understand the meaning of this surprise. 
 Its teachers, too, help it to interpret the facts. So the indi- 
 vidual gradually acquires the habit of considering the influ- 
 ence of his own conduct upon the interests of others." 
 * * * 
 
 "This is one side of justice; he is a just man who lim- 
 its his acts so that their consequences will not interfere with 
 the interests of others." 
 
 "The other, active, side of justice is the non-sufferance, 
 the warding off of injustice, first, of the injustice done to 
 others, then also of that done to self.* * * * In a cer- 
 ain measure, it is the easier duty. To suffer wrong inflames 
 us; not only does the wrong which I myself suffer call forth 
 anger and the impulse to revenge, but the wrong which is 
 inflicted upon a third person also arouses in the disinterested 
 spectator a violent emotion, indignation, which may be de- 
 fined as disinterested anger at the injustice suffered by an- 
 other, and which impels us to take the part of the injured 
 person, and to punish the evildoer for the wrong. In the 
 impulse of retaliation we have the instinctive basis of pub- 
 lic punishment. In the latter the sympathy of the disinter- 
 ested party for the victim as against the offender, is system- 
 atized and made effective. In punishment the community 
 reacts against the attack made upon one of its members and 
 defeats it." 
 
 "The significance of justice for human conduct is shown by 
 the effects of injustice. The immediate effect of injustice is that 
 it disturbs or destorys the welfare of the person against whom it 
 is done. There are also indirect and secondary effects. Injustice 
 creates strife. The injured person seeks to re-establish his inter- 
 ests at the expense of his opponent, and to revenge himself for the 
 injury suffered. The aggressor in turn defends himself, and so a 
 
COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. lOJ 
 
 state of war arises, which has the tendency to spread to all those 
 who are related either to the victim or the aggressor by ties of 
 friendship or common interests. Another effect inseparable 
 from injustice is that it produces a feeling of insecurity, not 
 only in the person who suffers it, but in all those who wit- 
 ness it." * * * 
 
 "A condition of insecurity paralyzes life and action 
 wherever it extends. Human conduct differs from that of 
 animals, the conduct of civilized man from that of savages, 
 in that it is connected and systematic; the animal lives in the 
 present, man reckons with the future. But arbitrary interfer- 
 ences on the part of others render all calculations of the future 
 illusory. * * * Injustice, therefore, tends to undermine the 
 foundations of truly human life. A state of war has the same 
 effect ; it is necessarily a state of insecurity for all those who 
 actively or passively participate in it. It has the further effect 
 of consuming and paralyzing the powers of the participants, and 
 consequently to that extent, hinders them from solving the prob- 
 lems of individual and social life." 
 
 "Justice is, therefore, good because it has the tendency 
 to establish and maintain a state of security, the precondition 
 of systematized, i. e., human, activity and peace, the precondi- 
 tion of social life." * * * 
 
 *"We can now demonstrate the teleological necessity of posi- 
 tive right. Positive right has its place in the state. * * * gy 
 placing itself under the protection of might, the right becomes a 
 power in the world. In law, the state formulates the right as the 
 expression of its will, and invests it with its power to overcome 
 the resistance of individuals. * * * The penal right defines the 
 limits of the spheres (of rightful activity) from the negative side; 
 it determines which acts shall be regarded as encroachments or 
 violations and therefore punished. The private right deter- 
 mines them from the positive side ; it defines the spheres in 
 family rights and property-rights, within which the indi- 
 vidual may move and still enjoy the protection of the state. 
 * * * It is the business of the system of rights, on the 
 one hand, to assist the individual in regulating his conduct 
 
 *Page 603. 
 
104 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 with respect to others' spheres of action; it saves him the 
 trouble, or at least facilitates the process, of making difficult 
 and complicated computations as to what he may do without 
 injuring the just rights of others. It likewise checks his 
 inclination to do wrong, by threatening evil consequences. 
 * * * On the other hand it also protects him, within his 
 restricted sphere, against encroachments on the part of 
 others. The system of rights therefore, brings a certain de- 
 gree of objective justice or legality into the life and conduct 
 of the members of the legal community, and maintains it." 
 
 "But why is compulsion exercised here while so many 
 objectionable and pernicious modes of conduct, like intem- 
 perance, dissipation, ingratitude, mendacity, do not occasion 
 any interference on the part of the community with the indi- 
 vidual? This is due to the specific nature of injustice. The 
 pernicious eflfects of injustice directly affect the community 
 and its conditions of life. * * * This is the teleological 
 necessity which has impelled every nation to develop a legal 
 order and the technical means for administering the same, 
 and which encourages it constantly to improve the system. 
 All other ofifenses and vices are dealt with by custom, educa- 
 tion, spiritual ministration, and the personal insight of the 
 individual. By opposing injustice a nation defeats attacks 
 upon the conditions of its own existence." * * * 
 
 *"This also explains the right of the community to compel 
 lawful behavior on the part of the individual by force and punish- 
 ment. It has a right to compel and punish because it has a right 
 to preserve itself. And this right is at the sametime a duty, 
 because self-preservation is the first and almost only duty of the 
 community." 
 
 "The explanation of the penal right forms the subject of 
 endless debate. Here as everywhere in practical philosophy 
 we have the two opposing views which we have termed the 
 teleological and intuitional-formalistic. The latter attempts to 
 justify punishment as the immediately necessary, ethical- 
 logical consequence of crime ; the former explains it by its 
 effects upon human welfare." 
 
 *Page 606. 
 
COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 105 
 
 It is not necessary for us to enter at all into this contro- 
 versy. The objects that should be sought in the punishment 
 of crimes and offenses against the law are, to prevent future 
 offences by the same person, either by restraining his liberty 
 or inducing him to reform his character, or both; and to warn 
 and dissuade others from committing similar offenses. 
 
 *"From this standpoint we can also understand the 
 duty of the individual to cooperate in supporting the posi- 
 tive right and in battling against injustice. * * * This 
 duty is recognized by the state: I am compelled to resist 
 attacks upon the right by serving as a witness, juror, sol- 
 dier, or official. But the individual is also morally bound to 
 protect against injustice the injured right in general, even 
 when it is not protected by the law. It is the virtue of the 
 chivalrous man to defeat by personal intervention, or to call 
 to account before the courts every possible form of injustice 
 that interferes with the right, especially the rights of the 
 defenseless, either by violence, strategy, or temptation. We 
 must, of course, exercise due care in this regard, for injus- 
 tice and self-caused misery are fond of giving themselves the 
 air of injured innocence." * * * 
 
 "The jurist properly emphasizes the duty to respect and 
 protect others' as well as our own rights by lawful means, and 
 even by violent means if necessary. The moralist, on the other 
 hand, will insist, with equal propriety, that this duty is not abso- 
 lute, that the duty to respect and protect the right must be limited 
 and supplemented by the demands of equity and magnanimity." 
 
 ''Equity demands that we voluntarily resign claims and 
 acts to which we have an undoubted formal right, so that our 
 own interests may not be advanced at a relatively greater 
 damage to those of others. This is a demand, not of law, 
 but of morality, which, it must not be forgotten, is rooted 
 in the very nature of justice. * * * j'q insist rigorously 
 on one's rights would sometimes be violating the very spirit 
 of justice, for justice really demands that the different inter- 
 ests be fairly apportioned, but it cannot, on account of its 
 mechanical nature, wholly adapt itself to the individual cases, 
 
 *Pa2e 613. 
 
106 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 and hence can realize its end only imperfectly. It appeals 
 to the fairmindedness of the interested parties for help, and 
 now and then expressly authorizes the judge to make revis- 
 ions in the interest of equity." 
 
 ''Magnanimity is the virtue which does not requite per- 
 sonal injuries, but overlooks them, and does not embrace the 
 opportunity for revenge, even though it present itself. Chris- 
 tianity goes so far as to demand love of enemies: Love him 
 who sins against you, as a brother, and not only bear him 
 no grudge, but forgive him with all your heart, and return 
 good for evil." 
 
 "The command of the Gospel seems difficult and almost 
 unnatural. * * * fjas not nature herself taught all liv- 
 uig creatures to resist attacks so that they may defend them- 
 selves and have peace? Certainly, we must admit it; and 
 resistance and resentment, both private and public, are justi- 
 fiable in their proper place. But they are not in every case 
 the proper means of establishing and ensuring peace, and 
 hence the command, 'Resist every infraction of the law by all 
 lawful means,' cannot have absolute validity. A neighbor 
 insults me with a frivolous remark, or treats me unkindly. 
 Shall I summon him before court? Shall I obtain satisfac- 
 tion by private means? * * * Would he be more careful 
 in future? Perhaps. But another effect would surely fol- 
 low : my retaliation would leav€ a sting in him ; he would 
 consider himself the affronted party: 'For such a trifle — on 
 account of a mere word!' he would say. * * * jj-^g j^q_ 
 ment arrives when he can play me a trick or do me a favor, 
 protect me against damage. He makes use of his chance by 
 scornfully reminding me of my former conduct. And now it 
 is my turn again. I simply defended my good rights before; 
 his present treatment of me is an intentional injury: this I 
 shall not forget. And so we move our revenge back and 
 forth, intensifying it as we go, making our enmity deeper 
 each time. Here the 'struggle for the right' did not bring 
 peace, as it should have done, but the bitterest, most per- 
 nicious war, sapping the strength of both of us. How dif- 
 ferent it would have been, had the first act of revenge been 
 
COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 107 
 
 omitted, had the first act of injustice been met with complete, 
 free forgiveness! Perhaps the insulting remark, which inau- 
 gurated the war of revenge, might have formed the starting 
 point of a lasting friendship. * * * My forgiveness and 
 his acceptance of the same are guarantees of our mutual good 
 will. Thus, to speak with the Apostle, evil has been over- 
 come with good. There is no grander and more beautiful art 
 than this ; Jesus does not forget it in the beatitudes : 
 'Blessed are the peacemakers.' " 
 
 "Spinoza furnishes us with the psychological formula for 
 it : 'Hatred is increased by hatred, and can, on the other 
 hand, be destroyed by love. Hatred which is completely van- 
 quished by loves passes into love ; and love is then greater than 
 if hatred had not preceded it. Hence, 'the wise man en- 
 deavors, so far as he can, to render back love and kindness 
 for other men's hatred, anger, and contempt.' And with a 
 warmth not usual to him the mathematical judge of human 
 affairs adds : "He who chooses to avenge wrongs with 
 hatred is assuredly wretched. But he who strives to con- 
 quer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; 
 he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little need 
 of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, 
 not through failure, but through increase of their powers." 
 
 *"If, then, both modes of conduct are justifiable, the 
 question arises : How are we to limit the command of for- 
 giveness and the command of retaliation^ When is the former, 
 when the latter, in place? It will not be hard to give a 
 general answer : That form of conduct is always appropirate 
 and dutiful which in each case tends to realize the ultimate 
 end, the avoidance of further injustice and promotion of last- 
 ing peace. If to forget and to forgive were the means of 
 iiindering theft and of preserving the institution of property, 
 we should undoubtedly make exclusive use of this means. If 
 retaliation and punishment were the sole and surest means of 
 making him peaceful and kind who treats us impolitely, un- 
 kindly and uncivilly, we should also know what to do. The 
 trouble is, different cases require different treatment, and it 
 
 Page 619. 
 
108 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 will often be impossible to determine with certainty what is 
 the most effective, and hence, most appropriate method of 
 procedure in a particular instance. It certainly cannot be 
 indicated by moral philosophy in universal propositions or 
 categorical imperatives. Only experienced moral tact, which 
 takes into account all the concrete circumstances, can dis- 
 cover the proper course to pursue in each particular case, 
 which, however, does not exclude the possibility of error. 
 Moral philosophy can perhaps merely indicate the general 
 points of view from which each case must be considered. We 
 may mention the following: (1.) Forgiveness is possible 
 when the offence is directed against a particular person; pun- 
 ishment is necessary when the offence is directed not so much 
 against a particular person as against custom and law in gen- 
 eral. Theft, for example, is not a crime against the particu- 
 lar person as such, but against the owner as such, hence, 
 against the institution of property. * * * (2.) It is a 
 fact that we are apt to be reconciled and inclined to forgive- 
 ness by remorse. And justly so. Remorse is a sign that the 
 offence was not the expression of the offender's permanent 
 will, — that it was the result of error, accident, haste, or care- 
 lessness. If no attention is paid to his remorse, if we react 
 by punishing him or taking revenge, a revulsion of feeling is 
 likely to ensue. His remorse vanishes, he has expiated his 
 wrong, nay, he is apt to feel that he has more than expiated 
 it, and he now has, instead of a debt to pay, a claim which he 
 will take up as soon as opportunity offers. * * * When, 
 however, remorse is lacking, when a conscious and stubborn 
 will, when impudent malice, commits the wrong and boasts 
 of it and rejoices in its iniquity, punishment is necessary to 
 terrify and to break the wicked will ; perhaps the nature of 
 the will may even be transformed in this way. * * * The 
 criminal authorities too, endeavor to take these things into 
 account, but they cannot, in the very nature of things, easily 
 adjust themselves to the particular circumstances, and to this 
 is due the inadequacy of public punishment as compared with 
 that employed in education. It necessarily somewhat re- 
 Page 620. 
 
COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 109 
 
 sembles the mechanical process of nature, which does not con- 
 sider the intention, but merely the objective facts. Then, again, 
 the judge as a rule, has no means of testing the genuineness of 
 
 remorse. 
 
 * * 
 
 "The third item is the following: Wherever persons live 
 together in permanent relations, as husband and wife, brother 
 and sister, inmates of the same house, relatives, neighbors, etc., 
 the command of Jesus, not to forgive your brother seven times, 
 but seventy times seven, will be especially in place. Slight colli- 
 sions are always inevitable where persons live close together. 
 Whoever insists upon his rights in every instance, makes life in- 
 tolerable for himself and his surroundings. A certain measure of 
 toleration is an absolute precondition of peaceful intercourse. "Be 
 not righteous overmuch," the word of the Preacher, applies here ; 
 that is, be careful to give everyone his just dues, but do not 
 always rigorously insist upon your own rights. And also 
 remember the ninth commandment and the interpretation 
 put upon it: Speak well of thy neighbor and turn all things 
 to good ! To good ! This is excellent advice. Your brother 
 is close and rather fond of money, — say he is economical and 
 a good manager ; he has a tendency to express his views some- 
 what strongly and without regard for the feelings of oth- 
 ers, — say he is sincere and loves the truth; he is fonder of 
 enjoyment and social pleasures than you deem neces- 
 sary, — say he is cheerful and light-hearted. The man who 
 cannot see the good in things, who always looks at them 
 from the worst side, who is constantly finding fault, cannot 
 live with men, and will do well to avoid contact with them as 
 much as possible." * * * 
 
 "The Principle of Rights. * * * The question now 
 arises : According to what principle is the line to be drawn 
 which separates the spheres of the dififerent members of a 
 legal community from each other? * * * xhe system of 
 rights * * * limits the activity or the liberty of each 
 individual to a particular sphere, and at the same time defends 
 him in this against the encroachments of others." 
 
 "The principle of equality seems to suggest itself as the 
 most immediate and natural principle : Each man shall count 
 
110 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 for one; the interests of each man are as important as those 
 of every other one. This is the principle with which the 
 advocates of natural rights antagonized the positive and his- 
 torical system of law prevailing in the seventeenth and eight- 
 eenth centuries. Starting from the hypothesis of the natural 
 equality of individuals they demanded equal rights for all. 
 The conclusion wouM be correct if the premises were true.'' 
 * * * "Positive law has, however, never acknowledged 
 this principle of the absolute equality of all individuals; and 
 even the upholders of natural rights have always accepted 
 certain restrictions as self-evident. There never has been equality 
 of rights between adults and children, and it has never been 
 demanded." 
 
 There has never been equality of legal rights of men and 
 women, though in most of the countries of Europe and in 
 America very many of the inequalities have been removed. 
 
 "The principle which seems, on the whole, to have gov- 
 erned the development of positive right may be thus stated • 
 The spheres of rights of the different members of the legal 
 community are staked off according to the spheres of action 
 corresponding to their natures and powers. Equality of 
 rights extends as far as there is general natural equality; 
 corresponding to the great and essential differences inherent 
 in the nature of things, we have differences in rights." 
 
 Incongruity between Law and Morals.* 
 
 "If the fullest and freest development and exercise of 
 human powers and capacities is the highest good of human 
 life, the legal order may, according to the above, be defined 
 as a mechanism in the service of the good, whose function it 
 is to harmonize many individual forces, with the least expen- 
 diture of energy, or to balance many partially crossing 
 spheres of interest, with the least injury to those interests. 
 The more perfectly a positive legal order accomplishes this 
 result, the more closely it realizes the purposes of the law, or 
 what ethics demands and expects of the law." 
 
 "But the legal system can never absolutely realize this 
 end. It lies in the nature of a mechanism to act mechanic- 
 
 *Page 627. 
 
COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. Ill 
 
 ally, that is, according to general laws, and not according to 
 the requirements of a particular case. The legal system acts 
 in the same way : individual cases are decided according to 
 general rules. * * * The reason for this is obvious : 
 only when there are general rules or laws, can the individual 
 know and do the right with certainty and ease, and only in 
 this way, too, can the law be protected against the arbitrari- 
 ness of those administering it. * * * The safety of the 
 law depends upon its uniformity. The legal order here re- 
 sembles the natural order. * * * Xhe uniformity of the 
 process of nature is teleologically necessary for us as acting and 
 knowing beings ; and the uniformity of law is necessary for 
 the same reason." 
 
 "But this very uniformity of nature is fatal to our pur- 
 poses in particular instances. * * * There are no ex- 
 ceptions to the law of gravitation, — and our body universally 
 obeys it, like everything else. At times, however, it causes 
 injury and death. Precisely the same may be said of the 
 legal order: as a rule it tends to preserve and produce what 
 is by nature right, but cases occur in which, owing to its 
 necessary mechanical operation, the moral law is violated 
 and broken by the positive law. * * * xhe law protects 
 contracts which were made in legitimate business, without 
 regard to whether their provisions still conform to justice or 
 not. Owing to unforeseen circumstances, things may so have 
 changed as to cause the ruin of one of the contracting par- 
 ties should the contract now be carried out, perhaps without 
 substantially benefiting the other party. The law is not 
 concerned about that. * * * i|- proceeds on the assump- 
 tion that everybody always acts with a complete knowledge 
 of the law and with a full understanding of his interests, an 
 indispensable hypothesis which, however, as we all know, is 
 false." 
 
 "The same is true of criminal law. It embraces under 
 the same formula two acts which are, subjectively or morally 
 considered, infinitely different from each other. Murder is 
 the intentional killing of a man with malice aforethought. 
 and is punishable with death. This definition includes the 
 
112 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 open and honest killing of a dishonorable and base scoun- 
 drel who has ruined the honor and happiness of my family 
 through some dastardly act, without having rendered himself 
 amenable to the criminal law, as well as the most heinous deed 
 of the poisoner and assassin. It is true, the criminal law at- 
 tempts to make itself more elastic where the discrepancy is 
 greatest, in order to adapt itself to the individual case : the 
 discretionary powers of the judge in reference to the punish- 
 ment to be inflicted, the consideration of extenuating circum- 
 stances, and the possibility of pardon are means to this end. 
 But it is clear that these safeguards are not sufificient to coun- 
 teract the errors caused by the mechanical operation of the 
 law." * * * 
 
 "Absolute adaptation of the law to the particular in- 
 stance is possible only when the law appears in the form of a 
 personal will, as is the case in home education." (But few 
 parents are wise enough to make the law of their personal 
 will adaptable very closely to the requirements of each in- 
 stance of home discipline or administration.) From what 
 has preceded, it is apparent that it may sometimes be morally 
 right to do what is forbidden by the law. We may go far- 
 ther and say that it sometimes becomes a high moral duty to 
 perform some important service for individuals or the public, 
 that is forbidden by the law, and then to take the conse- 
 quences in prosecution and punishment if that should fol- 
 low. This happens oftenest of course, in the case of bad 
 laws, but may happen even when the law is good in its 
 usual application. 
 
 "* * * More frequent and more important is the 
 other case : it may be legally possible to do what is morally 
 impossible; a man may be guilty of the most serious viola- 
 tions of the moral duty of justice and yet remain strictly 
 within the limits of the law." 
 
 "The positive law defines, we may say, only a part of the 
 actual right. The mechanical nature of the legal order makes 
 such a limitation necessary. * * * Hence, the legal or- 
 der confines itself to enforcing that minimum of righteous 
 acts without which human social life would not be possible. 
 
COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 113 
 
 It thereby, of course, leaves a wide margin for injuries and 
 the unjust assertion of individual interests at the expense of 
 those of others. It does not enforce the payment of a just 
 wage, but simply of the stipulated one; it does not punish 
 the delivery of goods inferior to those the contract calls for, 
 but only fraud ; it does not compel a man to give to everyone 
 the honor that is due him, but merely punishes affronts. A 
 general survey of all the spheres of rights will bring out this 
 discrepancy between the demands of the law and the demands 
 of morality," 
 
 "The legal spheres correspond to the great spheres of action 
 or the circles of interests, for the protection of which the legal 
 order exists. The first and narrowest of these is that which we 
 may embrace under the heading, 'Body and Life. Encroachments 
 upon this domain are made by homicide, disfigurement, assault, 
 and all attacks upon life and health. * * * If we mean by 
 encroachments upon this domain only physical assaults, then the 
 law seems to leave no room for infractions. In fact, however, 
 every hurt is directed against body and life, and so boundless op- 
 portunity is offered for unpunishable offences against others : such 
 as causing them annoyance, arousing their anger or grief, ex- 
 ploiting and defrauding them." 
 
 "A second sphere of interests is bounded by the family, the 
 expanded individual life. Encroachments upon this domain are 
 made by adultery, abduction, substitution of children, seduction, 
 and similar crimes. The more pronounced and tangible forms of 
 such offences are reached by the criminal law ; the more subtle 
 forms of disturbing the peace of the home and the family : tale- 
 bearing, intriguing, — by which husbands are estranged from their 
 wives and parents from their children, do not come within the 
 reach of the law." 
 
 "A third sphere of interest is defined by 'Property,' which 
 includes the sum-total of external means of self-preservation and 
 voluntary action. Encroachments upon this field are made by 
 * * * all such offences as come under the head of crimes 
 against property. Here again the criminal law cannot reach the 
 more subtle methods by which property is illegitimately acquired 
 at others' expense. In spite of the efforts of the law to punish 
 
114 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 the offenders, the inventive genius of the lower and higher crim- 
 inal classes always outwits the law." 
 
 "As a fourth sphere of interests, may be mentioned, 'Honor' 
 or ideal self-preservation. Encroachments upon this domain are 
 made by insults, false reports, slander. In these cases, much more 
 than in the preceding ones, the criminal law can reach only the 
 more flagrant and careless, but not the more subtle and shrewd 
 violations, which are not the less injurious. There are a thou- 
 sand anonymous, indirect, undiscoverable ways of blasting a man's 
 reputation for which a penal formula never can be found." 
 
 "The fifth sphere of interests is the free exercise of volition. 
 Attacks upon the liberty of others are made by kidnapping, illegal 
 arrest, compulsion, threats. Breaches of domestic peace may also 
 be placed in this list. * * * ^q one enjoys freedom in the 
 full sense of the term whose life and strength are utilized merely 
 as means to others' ends. Hence, whoever uses men in this way, 
 or attempts to reduce them to such a state or to keep them in it, 
 acts contrary to the law of justice, which demands that the free- 
 dom of others be respected." 
 
 "Finally, we may also add a sixth sphere of interest, which 
 is closely connected with the fourth and fifth, the spiritual life. 
 which expresses itself in convictions, views, beliefs, religion, mo- 
 rality, and habits of life. Persecutions, aspersions, open or con- 
 cealed signs of contempt, scornful neglect, importunate attempts 
 at conversion, are some of the forms of interference with this 
 field. The inner state which tends to such forms of injustice, we 
 are in the habit of calling intolerance. It has its natural roots 
 partly in man's dependence and need of society, the gregarious 
 instinct, partly in his arrogance and the conceited belief in his own 
 infallibility." * * * "The opposite habit of mind is called 'tol- 
 eration,' liberality of mind would perhaps be a more appropriate 
 term. A liberal education shows itself in the ability to understand 
 what is strange and different. It is acquired only by frequent con- 
 tact with the extraordinary, be it personal, literary, or historical. 
 In narrow spheres the mind remains narrow; nations, classes, 
 scholastic sects, religious communities, which live for themselves 
 and scarcely come in contact with the customs and opinions of 
 others, are universally conspicuous for their intolerance." 
 
COMPASSION AND BENEVOLENCE. 115 
 
 "This is a field in which the law is most powerless. It can 
 reach violations only when they can be construed as libels, which 
 is not always the case. And yet such offenses may cause serious 
 injury. * * * xhe law is powerless against them. Never- 
 theless, toleration is not a favor, but a right; morally, every one 
 has the right to demand that we do not interfere with his habits, 
 his convictions, and his thoughts, if he is determined to adhere to 
 them ; and it is a duty to respect this right, provided, of course, the 
 individual's behavior does not violate the rights of others. I have 
 the right to win over others to my ways of thinking and acting, 
 only by example and by means of persuasion, and in the latter case 
 I must respect the rights of others to their own opinions. The 
 difficulty arises with the question : To what extent have tastes, 
 habits, assertions, opinions, of which we cannot morally approve, 
 a claim to toleration, that is, to what extent shall we concede them 
 equal rights ? It is obvious that I have not the right to censure or 
 express my contempt for every statement which cannot be justi- 
 fied morally, or which does violence to my moral sense or taste. 
 And it is equally obvious that I am not bound in duty to allow 
 everything to pass without contradiction : it may be in the highest 
 measure justifiable to express my contempt openly. Here again 
 no formula can be given which will enable us to decide each par- 
 ticular case. We must leave it to tact to discover what is proper 
 under these circumstances." 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 LOVE THY NEIGHBOR. SELFISHNESS, LOVE. 
 
 LIMITATIONS, CHARITY. VERACITY. 
 
 LIE OF NECESSITY. 
 
 PROMULGATE THE TRUTH, MARTYRDOM FOR TRUTH. 
 
 ^"Beside justice, the negative side of benevolence, we 
 have love of neighbor, the complementary, positive side. We 
 may define it as that habit of will and mode of conduct which 
 assists those in want, and strives to promote the welfare of oth- 
 ers by active sympathy. It is the great commandment of Chris- 
 tianity. In the last judgment man's worth will be measured 
 by this standard. "Then shall the King say unto them on his 
 right hand, — I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat : I was 
 thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me 
 in : naked, and ye clothed me : I was sick, and ye visited me : I 
 was in prison, and ye came unto me.' Three times more these 
 works of mercy are enumerated, — a sermon powerful in its 
 grand simplicity." 
 
 "The commandment is so simple and clear that no doubt 
 can arise as to its meaning." * * * Questions and difficul- 
 ties arise when we seek to obey the command in every day liv- 
 ing. If every opportunity to help others, with time or money, 
 were to be accepted, most people would soon be without money 
 for their own needs or the needs of their families, and without 
 time for their own affairs. It is evident therefore, that there are 
 practical limitations to the services to be rendered to one's neigh- 
 bors. 
 
 "(1) The duty to care for the welfare of others is lim- 
 ited first, by the duties that grow out of one's own life. The 
 individual's first duty is to develop and exercise the capacities 
 and powers which are given him, and to make his own life beau- 
 tiful and good. His own individual life is the field which it is 
 his special mission to cultivate. For this work he is especially 
 fitted by natural inclination and insight. In the last analysis 
 
 *Page 638. 
 
LOVE THY NEIGHBOR. 117 
 
 every man knows what is good for him better than anybody else. 
 
 * * * And so we shall be obliged to say : Each person does 
 the most for himself and others when he makes the most of him- 
 self." * * * 
 
 "We cannot question the validity of the universal proposi- 
 tion. The difficulty lies in its application to concrete conditions. 
 
 * * * This cannot be decided by the general formula of 
 duty, but only by a consideration of the concrete circumstances; 
 it will ultimately be decided not by the reason but by the heart. 
 And, as a rule, we shall feel inclined to applaud the man who 
 obeys his heart more than his reason in these things. We ad- 
 mire the heroism of a woman who resolves to follow her hus- 
 band into solitudes, into exile, or into imprisonment. We respect 
 the sister of charity who sacrifices her life and gives up every- 
 thing to nurse strangers upon their sick-beds during the long 
 weary days and nights. We say it is altogether possible that 
 such a nature develops and exercises the gifts with which 
 it is endowed — a warm heart, a skillful and tender hand, a 
 consoling courage — most perfectly in such a calling, and so 
 realizes the fullest and most beautiful form of life possible. 
 But — what is good for one is not good for all." 
 
 "(2) The duty of caring for the welfare of my neighbor 
 must be limited in another way ; I must guard against destroy- 
 ing his independence, * * * for self-reliance is a general 
 precondition of a healthy and normal life. The object of all 
 help is, after all, to make help superfluous. * * * j^ q^^. 
 cation we have an example of the most comprehensive and 
 deliberative care for others. It is governed solely by the 
 consideration that we must train the pupil so that he can take 
 care of himself." * * * 
 
 "(3) There is, finally, a third restriction, or rather nar- 
 rower determination, of the universal duty of love of neigh- 
 bor : that made necessary by our special duties toward spe- 
 cial neighbors. Every man is related to persons who have 
 special claims upon his benevolence and active sympathy — 
 to children and parents, relatives and friends, servants and 
 laborers, neighbors and inmates of the same house. His 
 strength and possessions belong to these first of all."* * * * 
 
118 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 "By these special conditions, the virtue of charity or love 
 of neighbor is confined to a fixed channel, as it were, through 
 which it flows as a permanent stream and fructifies its banks. 
 Here, too, everybody knows with some degree of certainty 
 what is good for those nearest to him, but it is much more 
 difficult and often impossible to tell how to help strangers. 
 And here, too, we must think of the collective bodies to which 
 the individual belongs. The community and the nation have 
 legitimate claims upon him, and their permanent charitable 
 institutions supply him with a safe channel in which to ex- 
 ercise his sympathy with others' welfare." 
 
 "The formula of the love of neighbor : care for the wel- 
 fare of others, must therefore be limited and supplemented 
 as follows : In so far as this can be done without neglecting 
 the problems of your own life, without violating the special 
 duties which arise from your special relations to individuals 
 and collective bodies, and, finally, without weakening the self- 
 reliance of others." 
 
 *"Common sense, by beneficence, means above all, so- 
 called almsgiving, and popular opinion is to this day some- 
 what inclined to regard almsgiving as absolutely meritorious. 
 
 * * * Moral philosophy cannot subscribe to this view, 
 except to a very limited extent. Promiscuous almsgiving per- 
 haps results in more evil than good. * * * If a beggar's 
 life is not a good life, then almsgiving, which promotes beg- 
 gary, is not beneficence. ***];{ i\^q flooding of a coun- 
 try with beggars is a plague, it is evidently an ofifense against 
 the welfare of the country to encourage the thing. To be 
 sure, the prohibition of mendicancy and almsgiving ought 
 simply to be the other side of organized public charity, which 
 finds work for the unemployed and helps those in need. 
 
 * * * A particularly deplorable form of almsgiving has 
 been developed of recent years : the charity-craze. Misfor- 
 tune, poverty, and misery are made the pretexts for entertain- 
 ments of all kinds, such as concerts, theatrical performances, 
 balls, bazaars — at which elegant and beautiful ladies bargain, 
 
 *Page 642. 
 
LOVE THY NEIGHBOR. 119 
 
 play, and flirt with elegant and rich gentlemen, all for sweet 
 charity's sake. I must confess that this union of amuse- 
 ment and 'charity' seems to me an extremely sad sign of the 
 times. This playing with distress shows how insensitive cer- 
 tain social classes have become to the seriousness and wretched- 
 ness of life." * * * 
 
 "*The opposite of love of neighbor is heartless selfish- 
 ness, which seeks its own advantage, regardless of others or 
 even at the expense of others. The intensification of it is 
 malice, which takes pleasure in the distress and sufferings of 
 others even without advantage to self. As cruelty it causes 
 physical or mental sufferings, simply in order to feed upon 
 them." 
 
 "This habit does not commonly express itself in those 
 brutal attacks upon the persons and interests of others which 
 the criminal law pursues, but in the thousand little inconsid- 
 erate, malicious acts which are observed in our daily inter- 
 course with men. * * * A field in which cold-hearted- 
 ness and malice are particularly common is the habit of sit- 
 ing in judgment upon one's neighbor. Everything that the 
 latter says or does is misconstrued and spitefully exposed to 
 the ridicule and ill-will of his fellows. An evil or a base 
 motive is always imputed to him, his prosperity is attributed 
 to evil means, his misfortune is regarded as his own doing." 
 
 "It is this base tendency in human nature which the 
 Gospel attacks with such zeal. Even if your opinion is cor- 
 rect, it is not your mission to sit in judgment upon your 
 neighbor. He is not accountable to you, but to God, and in 
 His sight you are no less guilty than he. Hence, 'Judge not, 
 that ye be not judged ; condemn not, that ye be not con- 
 demned.' " 
 
 "The opposite of unfeelingness is Love, as Paul describes 
 it : 'It suffereth long and is kind, envieth not, and vaunteth 
 not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, 
 seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, 
 
 * Page 648. 
 
120 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth 
 all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth 
 all things.' " 
 
 "The thirteenth chapter of Corinthians has been called 
 the Song of Love. Perhaps we may more properly call it 
 the simplest description of love in its most modest form, 
 * * * which does nothing extraordinary and grand and sensa- 
 tional * * * but simply consists in taking and bearing the 
 neighbor as he is, which does not court favors from him but meets 
 him every day with the same or greater kindness. This is 
 the real, true love of neighbor, and when it enters a house 
 it brings happiness, not the great happiness of which people 
 speak, but the little work-a-day happiness, the true happi- 
 ness. And this love and happiness as gladly abides in modest 
 homes as in proud palaces, or much rather; at any rate it 
 desires to dwell in modest hearts alone, not in haughty and 
 covetous souls." 
 
 "* * * The immediate efifect of active benevolence 
 is that it lightens, elevates, and promotes the life of him upon 
 whom it is bestowed.* It also inspires him with courage and 
 confidence for the future. It at the same time fills him with 
 kindly feelings, not only toward the benefactor, but towards 
 the whole world ; charity wants to be passed along, to go from 
 hand to hand, without end. * * * Active benevolence, 
 however, also enriches and blesses the life of him who prac- 
 tices it. We are not made poorer by giving, says an old 
 proverb : ('There is that scattereth and yet increaseth ; and 
 there is that withholdeth more than is meet, but it tendeth to 
 poverty.' — Proverbs 11:24.) Certainly not, we are made 
 richer, if not in outward, at least in inner blessings."* * * * 
 
 "And the reverse is also true. There is no surer way to 
 unhappiness than a selfish heart. * * * Benevolence 
 brings peace and joy; selfishness arouses enmity and unhap- 
 piness; love is life; selfishness, death." 
 
 Paulsen's discussion of gratitude, and its opposite, in- 
 gratitude, and love of home, of country and humanity, are in- 
 teresting but are too long for quotation and not readily epi- 
 tomized. 
 
 *Page 652. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 VERACITY. 
 
 "Veracity may be regarded as a form of benevolence; 
 it is benevolence manifested in the communication of 
 thoughts."* 
 
 "We may, as in the case of benevolence, distinguish two 
 phases of veracity : a negative side and a positive side. The 
 former, corresponding to justice, is expressed by the formula 
 of duty: Thou shalt not lie; the latter, corresponding to love 
 of neighbor, is expressed by the formula of duty: Serve thy 
 neighbor with the truth." 
 
 "Let us first discuss the negative side." "To lie, as we 
 are accustomed to define it, means willingly and wittingly 
 to tell an untruth in order to deceive others. Perhaps it will 
 not be unnecessary to make the definition a little narrower 
 by taking account of the fact that falsehood sometimes shel- 
 ters itself behind formal excuses. In the first place, of course, 
 words, be they spoken or written, are not essential to false- 
 hood. We can lie without words, by acts and gestures, or 
 even by keeping silent. An absent one is slandered in your 
 presence; you know that what is said is not true, but you 
 have not the courage to contradict it; * * * so you are 
 silent, or smile knowingly. That is lying. Or you wish an 
 evil report concerning a third party to be circulated, but you 
 are not willing to shoulder the responsibility, and so you 
 begin: 'Have you heard what is being said of so-and-so?' 
 The newspapers, as well as gossiping women, are in the 
 habit of lying in this way : Tt is said * * *' . 'j^^ circles 
 which are usually well informed it is rumored.' " 
 
 "Equivocation is another favorite trick of the liar. L. 
 Schmidt gives a few examples from Greek life : The Locrians 
 made a compact with the Sicilians, and swore that they 
 would keep it as long as they trod the same earth and car- 
 
 *Page 664. 
 
122 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 ried their heads upon their shoulders. Previously, however, 
 they had put earth in their shoes, and had placed garlic 
 heads upon their shoulders under their garments." 
 
 "Another favorite mode of procedure, developed to an 
 art by politicians and historians, is to let the facts them- 
 selves lie. In discussing one side of a question, an historian 
 chooses the most venomous speeches and deeds of its extreme 
 supporters, and the criticisms and self-reproaches of the mod- 
 erate wing; in presenting the other side, he selects the most 
 satisfactory tenets, the most commendable or tolerable acts 
 of its friends. Thus, by skillfully selecting and arranging, 
 we can make anything out of everything. This, too, is the 
 method of the reviewer who does not like a book; he tears 
 out a handful of phrases or sentences, surrounds them abun- 
 dantly with quotation marks, occasionally inserts a word or 
 two, and places the stuffed monster before the eyes of the 
 reader, thereby arousing his righteous indignation. There 
 is no absurdity that cannot be drawn from a book in this 
 way. A particularly favorite trick of recent years is to lie 
 by arranging the figures. Figures do not lie, it is said; this 
 
 is not true ; they will prove whatever is expected of them." 
 * * * 
 
 "All these things, then, come under the head of falsehood : 
 To lie means to influence others to accept views which you 
 do not regard as true yourself, by means of speech or silence, 
 by simulation or dissimulation, and by the selection and 
 arrangement of facts." 
 
 "Why is lying wrong? Intuitional ethics answers 
 with common sense : Because it is inherently wrong and 
 disgraceful. Kant reckons veracity among the duties to self: 
 he regards falsehood as the abandonment of one's dignity as 
 a man, and places it on a level with suicide: as the latter 
 destroys the physical life, so the former destroys moral life." 
 
 "This view is well fitted for the practical-rhetorical treat- 
 ment of the subject. Indeed, Kant is often an admirable 
 moral preacher. But it is the business of moral philosophy 
 to discover the objective ground of morality * * * in the 
 efifects which falsehood naturally tends to leave upon the 
 
VERACITY. . 123 
 
 conduct of human life. They are not hard to find. False- 
 hood directly injures the deceived party in so far as false 
 ideas lead to false acts. As a rule, this is the purpose of the 
 lie. Thus falsehood is a means of injustice, and therefore 
 shares in the judgment pronounced upon the latter. But 
 falsehood has a specific effect besides. So far as it can, it 
 destroys faith and confidence among men, and consequently 
 undermines human social life — the foundation of all real 
 human, of all mental historical, life. And this explains its 
 particular reprehensibleness. We may illustrate the influence 
 of falsehood by counterfeiting. * * * The existence of 
 spurious coin brings the good money into disrepute. Should 
 spurious coins become so numerous as to make it necessary 
 to test every piece before accepting it, this would be equiva- 
 lent to the abolition of money as such, for its purpose is to 
 relieve the individual of the necessity of testing its value. 
 Lies invalidate the truth, and the outcome is universal dis- 
 trust and isolation. * * * When the liar loses the con- 
 fidence of others, he also loses confidence in them; it is psycho- 
 logically necessary for the man who lies to expect others to 
 do the same. There can be no doubt that this dual distrust 
 is not a favorable condition of life : like a poisoned stratum 
 of air, it envelops a life and excludes it from fellowship with 
 human beings; the honest and sincere men, especially, are 
 repelled, for they cannot breathe an atmosphere of falsehood 
 and distrust." * * * 
 
 "Hence, it follows from the very nature of falsehood that 
 it poisons speech, undermines confidence, destroys collective 
 life, and so attacks the very fibers of human existence." 
 
 "Another factor helps to make the lie still more repre- 
 hensible ; it is a sign of cowardice. It steals upon its victim, 
 instead of vanquishing him in open battle. A brave man will 
 not lie. The accusation of falsehood always carries with it 
 the charge of cowardice, hence it wounds a man more deeply 
 than almost any other charge. 'You lie' means at the same 
 time : 'You are a cowardly knave.' " 
 
 "Everything that makes the lie despicable and base 
 is included in calumny.' We might rhetorically define it as 
 
124 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 the murderous attack of the assassin upon the ideal self of 
 another. In 'Othello' Shakespeare portrays the natural his- 
 tory of calumny with awful faithfulness and cruelty. lago 
 strangles the innocent wife by the hands of her husband. 
 Had lago killed Desdemona with his own hand and robbed 
 her as a pirate, he would have been an honest man beside 
 the real lago. The fact that he cannot even be called to 
 account before a human judge makes the matter all the 
 worse — for what did he do but act in good faith in calling 
 
 Othello's attention to the dangers threatening his honor?" 
 * * * 
 
 "Moreover, we must not forget that two persons are 
 always necessary to make a slander possible. Just as the 
 thief needs the receiver of stolen goods, the caluminator needs 
 a person to accept his words and to put them in circulation. 
 And just as stealing would be impossible on the large scale 
 without receivers of stolen goods, the business of calumny 
 would be impossible if there were not so many to delight in 
 it and encourage it." * * * 
 
 "Another modified form of the lie is flattery.* It is so 
 repulsive because it creeps in under the guise of friendship 
 to defraud its victim. However, here again two people are 
 necessary: one to do the flattering and one who allows him- 
 self to be flattered. As a plaster draws blisters, so self- 
 conceit provokes flattery. Hypocrisy is a form of flattery. 
 Religious -hypocrisy used to be common. * * * The ef- 
 fect of hypocrisy is the same as that of all lying: as forgery 
 makes us suspect the genuine, hypocrisy brings religion into 
 hatred and contempt. Hence, all truly religious natures hate 
 hypocrisy and all sincere persons hate assumed 'orthodoxy' 
 like death." 
 
 "Falsehood raised to the highest power is perjury. It 
 is the lie accompanied by the formal and solemn assurance 
 that it is the truth. Perjury has everywhere and always been 
 regarded as one of the greatest crimes, as a sign of extreme 
 viciousness and baseness. We can defend ourselves against 
 violence by violence, strategy, we meet with strategy : these 
 
 *Page 670. 
 
VERACITY. 125 
 
 are the means of war, which may be followed by an honorable 
 peace after the matter has been fought out. But perjury cuts 
 off all possibility of a return of friendship. There is no de- 
 fence, no weapon against perjury; helplessly and with a feel- 
 ing of horror, man appeals to the gods when he has been 
 deceived by perjury, to punish such an enormous crime." 
 
 "The Lie of Necessity.* A problem that has given 
 the moralists the greatest trouble is the lie of necessity. Is 
 deception under all circumstances morally wrong, or can con- 
 ditions arise under which it is permissible or even morally 
 necessary?" 
 
 "In our actual judgments and actions, we expreience no 
 difficulty in answering this question ; everybody acknowledges 
 the possibility of the 'necessary lie.' There is not a physician 
 in the whole world who does not at times give deceptive 
 answers to the questions of his patients, who does not arouse 
 hopes which he does not share. He does not reproach him- 
 self for doing so ; neither do others blame him. Indeed every- 
 body does the same thing under similar circumstances. * * * 
 Fire broke out during a performance in a theatre in Zurich. 
 When the stage manager discovered it, he appeared before 
 the scenes and announced that, owing to the sudden illness 
 of an actor, the performance would have to be suspended. 
 The theatre was emptied without any trouble, and then 
 burned to the ground. Will anyone dare to condemn this 
 happy idea as a lie? * * *" 
 
 "Only among moral philosophers do we still find per- 
 sons who regard the matter as serious. Kant declares : False- 
 hood, that is, intentional untruthfulness, is under all circum- 
 stances, 'by its mere form, a crime of man against his own 
 person, and a baseness which must make a man despicable in 
 his own eyes.' When a man misdirects a murderer in search 
 of his victim, and dexterously turns him into the hands of 
 the police, we cannot excuse him : he has told a lie ; he has 
 therefore forfeited his dignity as a man ! And Fichte once 
 said, with his usual rhetorical fanaticism, T would not break 
 
 *Page 672. 
 
126 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 my word even to save humanity.' Let us apply this principle 
 in practice. Suppose that I had promised some one to call 
 for him at five o'clock for a walk, and that on my way to his 
 house, I saw a child fall into the river. If I followed Fichte, 
 I should say to myself: 'If you pull it out, you will have to 
 go home and change your clothes, which will make it impos- 
 sible for you to keep your engagement ; hence you must hurry 
 on, sorry though you may be.' Or would it be right for me 
 to assume that my friend would give his consent in such a 
 case, and, acting on this belief, to break my engagement?" 
 Whether the friend would consent or not, the obligation to 
 save the child is paramount to the obligation to keep the 
 appointment. 
 
 "Practice not only contradicts the theory here, but is 
 even theoretically correct in its opposition to these theorists. 
 It may be that the lie of necessity does not fit into the system 
 of a moralist, but that merely proves the inability of his 
 system to comprehend moral things. A teleological ethics 
 finds no difficulty in explaining the phenomenon in question." 
 
 "Intentional deception is objectively reprehensible, as 
 was shown above, because it tends to destroy confidence, and 
 thus lead to the disintegration of the social organism. In 
 cases where this effect cannot possibly occur, owing to the 
 very nature of things, it is not reprehensible. Let us take an 
 example. No relation of confidence can be destroyed by de- 
 ceiving a burglar, because absolutely none exists, neither a 
 special relation, nor a universally-human one. In so far and 
 so long as such lawbreakers follow their calling, they stand 
 outside of the pale of confidence, and thereby forfeit all claims 
 to the truth, nor will they expect to receive it." 
 
 "The case is somewhat similar in war. * * * Decep- 
 tion is one of the rules of war : everybody practices it and 
 expects the enemy to do the same. The rules, however, apply 
 only to the game. Whenever in war an individual comes in 
 contact with another individual not as a foe but as a human 
 being, then the universal rule of human intercourse again 
 demands its rights. The same is true whenever the game of 
 war is temporarily suspended by mutual agreement : to break 
 
VERACITY. 127 
 
 an armistice, to ambush the bearer of a flag of truce, is dis- 
 graceful and dishonorable." * * * 
 
 "Another case which may make intentional deception 
 permissible or necessary is the inability of the other party 
 to understand or to bear the truth.* It may, for example, 
 under circumstances, have a quieting effect upon insane per- 
 sons to enter into their delusions. It is often necessary to 
 accommodate oneself to the weak-minded. This is true of 
 old people who have grown weak-minded ; they have lost the 
 faculty of seeing and judging things in their true relations, 
 but not the faculty of becoming excited by occasionally mis- 
 interpreting them. We are compelled, for example, to make 
 certain arrangements contrary to the wishes of our old par- 
 ents. Is it right to conceal our plans, or to deny them? It 
 is a hard thing to do ; it seems like a breach of old confidential 
 relations. And yet every one will at times decide to pursue 
 such a course, and justly so, for what good would it do to 
 tell them? * * * The case is different in our intercourse 
 with children ; and here we are often too ready to have re- 
 course to the most convenient form of deception that happens 
 to present itself. The deception persists in memory; when 
 the intelligence develops and recognizes it as such, it may 
 afterwards seriously undermine the child's faith. Besides, 
 another escape is always at hand ; we can refuse to answer 
 the child's questions by saying: 'You do not understand these 
 things yet,' or, 'They do not concern you.' It would, how- 
 ever, be wholly impossible to treat old people in this way, 
 even if it were proper." 
 
 "But, some one might ask in troubled tones, where, then, 
 shall we draw the line? The transition to childish old age is 
 a gradual one. Where may one begin to deceive? And if I 
 may deceive a weak-minded person, then why not a stupid block- 
 head? And where shall this end? And who is to decide how 
 to classify the individuals in question? Only one answer can 
 be made to such questions. Such fixed boundaries do not exist 
 in morals. The law draws hard and fast, and therefore arbitrary, 
 
 *Page 677. 
 
128 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 lines, while morality has everywhere to do with gradual transi- 
 tions. The particular case must necessarily be decided by the 
 individual's own insight and conscience, and with a view to the 
 concrete conditions. Morality cannot give him a scheme which 
 shall enable him to settle the matter with mechanical certainty. 
 It can merely indicate the general points of view from which the 
 decision is to be rendered." * * * 
 
 "To the same category belong the conventional half-truths 
 and untruths of social intercourse.* We welcome a visitor who 
 comes at an inopportune time; at the end of a letter we assure 
 a man whom we do not know, or whom we look upon as a 
 thorough villain, of our high esteem. The necessity and justifica- 
 tion for this lies in the fact that smooth and peaceful inter- 
 course is not possible among men as they are constituted, with- 
 out the exercise of some constraint. The customary politeness 
 is the oil which prevents, so far as possible, the creaking and 
 pulling of the machine. The angels in heaven do not need it. 
 Where there are no inner discords and outer obstacles, perfect 
 openness is possible; human beings as they are constituted can- 
 not endure it. * * * Of course, where is the boundary 
 between necessary politeness and repulsive flattery and false- 
 hood? No system of morals can draw the line; moral tact 
 alone must decide. And the thing is not without its dangers. A 
 person who lives much in society easily forms the habit of lying, 
 his conscience gradually becomes seared ; it becomes second 
 nature and finally a necessity for him to lie. We are therfeore 
 ready to suspect a man who exhibits great skill in the art of 
 polite speech. We are more apt to trust one who is somewhat 
 awkward and backward in speaking conventional untruths." 
 
 "Hence, our conclusion would be : Be truthful ; this holds 
 unconditionally; but 'speak the truth,' does not hold uncondi- 
 tionally." 
 
 "How shall we account for this strange 'rigorism' of 
 the moralists, which is everywhere contradicted by life? Are 
 they perhaps influenced by the curious notion that the 'stricter' 
 their systems, the better it will be for the morality of mankind? 
 
 *Page681. 
 
VERACITY. 129 
 
 It almost seems so. If our moral systems, they seem to think, 
 leave the smallest loophole for falsehood, man's inclination to 
 lie will gradually enlarge it, and he will always find an excuse 
 for not speaking the truth. * * * We feel the need, in the 
 face of our constant danger, of emphasizing to ourselves and to 
 others, often in the strongest terms, the value of truthfulness 
 and the disgrace of lying and of trifling with the truth." * * * 
 
 "We turn now to the positive side of veracity.* It 
 corresponds to love of neighbor, and is expressed in the formula 
 of duty: Serve thy neighbor with the truth. Since the conduct 
 of man is, to a considerable extent, dependent upon ideas, true 
 ideas are of prime importance to his welfare. The universal 
 duty of love of neighbor, therefore, includes the duty to assist 
 one's neighbor in ridding himself of false ideas and of acquiring 
 true ones." 
 
 "This phase of the question has been too much neglected 
 by moralists, a fact which accounts for their meager treatment 
 of veracity and also explains their inability to do justice to the 
 lie of necessity. Whoever lives a life of truth in the main, will 
 have no trouble in settling the question of deception whenever 
 it may become necessary or expedient. But the person whose 
 truthfulness consists solely in refraining from telling lies, will 
 be afraid of totally destroying his reputation in case he should 
 ever happen to say what is not true. Such purely negative 
 veracity is, of course, a rather paltry thing; it easily degenerates 
 into the mere art of avoiding direct falsehood. Had the 
 disciples of Christ, after the death of the Master, merely refused 
 to deny Him directly, had they returned to their former callings, 
 and obeying the commands of the authorities and the dictates of 
 prudence, locked up the memories of the past in their own 
 hearts, had they in pursuance of the maxim that it is not our 
 duty to say everything we believe, carefully evaded every dis- 
 cussion of their experiences, they certainly would have escaped 
 the reproach of falsehood, but they would surely never have 
 become what they now are : witnesses of the truth, whose testi- 
 mony is shaping the destiny of the centuries." 
 
 "Positive veracity, which first gives to negative veracity its 
 
 *Paffe 685. 
 
130 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 real meaning and value, manifests itself, first, in the personal 
 intercourse with individuals, where it assumes the form of advice, 
 instruction, admonition, and correction; secondly, in the public 
 communication of the truth, where it takes the form of research, 
 teaching, and preaching." 
 
 "According to the first form, it is my duty to help the 
 individual whom I find in search of the right path, or follow- 
 ing the wrong path, according to my better lights. This duty, 
 too, must be qualified. Just as the duty of love of neighbor 
 cannot mean that every one is to offer his aid to everybody he 
 meets, the duty of veracity cannot mean that we are at all times 
 to instruct and advise people, to admonish and set them 
 right. * * * xhe duty to instruct and set right pre- 
 supposes two things ; first, that I am myeslf sure of the right 
 path; secondly, that the interested party is inclined to profit 
 by my advice. We are essentially governed by these considera- 
 tions in our actual practice. I see a stranger in the mountains 
 turning into a road that leads nowhere; I do not hesitate to call 
 to him and to direct him. When, on the other hand, I find a 
 person on the point of embarking upon a mercantile or literary 
 venture, which I regard as sure to fail, I seriously deliberate 
 before advising him. If the man is a stranger to me I let him 
 alone. I do not know enough of his situation, his powers, his 
 resources, to know what he can do; nor can I assume that he 
 has confidence enough in my judgment to accept my advice: 
 Perhaps it would simply confuse him or anger him." * * * 
 
 "The ability to judge where and when it is proper to aid 
 others with advice and instruction may be called 'discretion.' 
 The opposite, 'indiscretion,' the inability to keep from advising 
 and instructing people, is a quality that will make a person dis- 
 liked by his fellows sooner than anything else, especially when 
 it appears in young men. It is particularly necessary for one 
 to be on one's guard when it comes to reprimanding or blaming 
 people. Uncalled-for blame angers a man and strengthens him 
 in his perverseness. The habit of finding fault and speaking 
 evil is a real vice. Here the purpose is not to serve the neighbor 
 with the truth, but to flatter one's self-love and vanity. The 
 Gospel does not warn us so earnestly against fault-finding for 
 
VERACITY. 131 
 
 nothing. Insinuating itself into our hearts in the guise of sin- 
 cerity and love of truth, this habit becomes a soul-destroying 
 vice. It extinguishes brotherly love. * * * jt prevents us 
 from being true to ourselves ; the man who is always beholding 
 the mote that is in his brother's eye, at last cannot see the beam 
 that is in his own eye. Hence, the rule is : Speak of evil only 
 when the good is promoted thereby; and, for the rest, turn all 
 good things to good." 
 
 "The other phase of the problem, the public communi- 
 cation of the truth, demands a somewhat more elaborate treat- 
 ment. To know the truth as a whole, as contained in philosophy 
 and science, is not a function of the individual mind as such ; a 
 people, or, in the last analysis, humanity, is the bearer of the 
 truth, the individual shares in it as the member of a people. The 
 little fraction which he possesses, he possesses as the heir of the 
 past; he thinks with the logical and metaphysical categories 
 which the popular mind has developed in the course of thousands 
 of years, and has incorporated into grammatical forms. He 
 sees things through the ideas and notions which his age places at 
 his disposal, he labors upon the solution of problems which it 
 suggests to him. On the other hand, it is no less true that the 
 collective mind exercises the functions only through individual 
 minds as its organs." 
 
 "Here a notable difference may be observed; individuals do 
 not stand in the same relation to this function. The masses 
 always participate in the truth in a rather receptive, passive 
 manner, while nature chooses only a few distinguished minds as 
 bearers and increasers of knowledge. If we designate the latter 
 with the old term of clergy (clerus), which includes all leaders 
 of the people, its investigators and teachers, its thinkers and 
 poets, we may say : The public communication of the truth is 
 the true life calling of the clerus, and veracity is the specific 
 duty, as it were, the professional virtue of the clericus." 
 
 "But we may again distinguish two phases in this virtue : 
 we may call them sincerity and the love of truth. The former 
 is the universal and elementary virtue of the clericus : it con- 
 sists in this, that he simply and clearly, conscientiously and 
 faithfully, employs the truth in teaching and preaching, in theory 
 
132 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 and in practice. It is the fundamental precondition of his powei 
 to do good in so far as the latter depends upon the confidence 
 which the laymen have in him. But confidence is gained only 
 by simplicity and sincerity of heart and intellect. Inquisitive 
 love of truth, on the other hand, is the special duty of the true 
 investigator and pathfinder; it is the passionate impulse which 
 incites the historical or natural-scientific investigator to discover 
 new facts and to penetrate more deeply into their relations. It 
 is the impulse which, urging the thinker constantly to test the 
 established views and theories, is forever on its guard against 
 error even in the form of established opinions. It is the love 
 of truth which inspires the poet and thinker who seeks to com- 
 prehend and express the secret meaning of life and the universe 
 in new thoughts and symbols. It is the love of truth, finally, 
 which impels the great leaders of mankind, the prophets and 
 reformers, to discover new untrodden paths of life. * * * 
 They are restrained by no authority, by no prejudice, be it ever 
 so sacred; they follow the light which burns in their hearts." 
 
 "The love of truth finds its highest expression in martyr- 
 dom. We should expect the nations to turn to their great 
 leaders and pathfinders in thankful admiration. And so they 
 do, but it is only after their death that mortal men are reck- 
 oned among the gods.* Martyrdom is the great purifier by 
 which humanity tests the genuineness of new truths ; it is 
 the narrow portal through which heroes pass into immortality. 
 This has been the method of humanity from times immemo- 
 rial, and it is not hard to see the historical necessity of this 
 fact, which is so surprising at first sight." 
 
 "Let me first try to show the psychological necessity. 
 
 The conceptions and truths of a people become — and 
 that is their true function — the basis of its institutions, of the 
 state and the law, of the church and the school. All kinds 
 of arts and practices depend upon our views and ideas of the 
 nature of things and of men, their relations to each other 
 and the universe. * * * Hence, it follows that every 
 attempt at a radical change in views is regarded as a menace 
 
 *Page 690. 
 
VERACITY. 133 
 
 to the entire life ; the weakening of the theoretical founda- 
 tions will result in the shattering of all the institutions 
 founded upon them. And this is not an illusion. All great 
 revolutions in the world of institutions had as their starting 
 point revolutions in the world of thoughts. * * * The 
 long series of revolutions which fill the pages of modern his- 
 tory are the after-effects of the changes in the world of ideas 
 which, after the fifteenth century, undermined the medieval 
 conception of the universe which had been systematized in 
 the dogmas of the church. The great historical and geograph- 
 ical, cosmical and physical discoveries, which were made in 
 surprising numbers in the neighborhood of the sixteenth cen- 
 tury, first made possible the ecclesiastical revolutions, then 
 the economical and political revolutions, which since then 
 have shaken Germany, England, and France, and which have 
 not yet come to an end. Wherever, however, the wor.ld of 
 thought remains stable, as was the case in China, the world 
 of institutions persists in its old forms." 
 
 It is natural, therefore, since the welfare of a people 
 depends upon the stability and trustworthiness of its insti- 
 tutions, that the church, the state, and society in general, 
 should resist and persecute the promulgation of any new 
 truths that threaten to undermine the authority or change the 
 organization or the activities of the church, the government, 
 or of society. It usually happens, therefore, that those who 
 promulgate revolutionary ideas meet with persecutions in 
 varying forms, and sometimes martyrdom. It is usual for all 
 sorts of agitators and would-be innovators, when repudiated by 
 their contemporaries, to appeal to posterity, but the appeal is 
 not always sustained. A great proportion of those who pro- 
 claim doctrines or ideas which they think will overturn or 
 transform existing institutions or customs are correctly judged 
 by their contemporaries, who repudiate them, and posterity, 
 instead of adopting their ideas, will forget them altogether. It 
 is right that society should resist changes in institutions and 
 customs, and the beliefs upon which they are founded until 
 the truth of new ideas is well established and until the changes 
 in institutions or usages founded upon them may be fairly 
 
134 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 expected to promote the welfare of mankind better than those 
 which they replace. 
 
 "Thus, the attitude of mankind to new truths is psy- 
 chologically necessary.* But it is also teleologically." 
 
 "Historical life is evidently not possible without fixed 
 and permanent institutions ; they are the means by which col- 
 lective reason determines and governs the life of the indi- 
 vidual. The many, we might say, somewhat modifying a 
 remark of Heraclitus, although they beHeve they are living 
 according to their own insight, are in reality governed by the 
 common reason. * * * Permanent conceptions are the 
 preconditions of permanent institutions. Hence, in order that 
 historical life may be possible, it is necessary that the thoughts 
 become fixed and take firm root in the minds of men, and 
 offer resistance to new thoughts which seek to push them oiit. 
 Perhaps they cannot be established firmly enough, at first, 
 without a transcendent sanction. This would explain the 
 teleological necessity of a religious metaphysic, which we 
 actually find everywhere, as the original foundation of the 
 faith and life of a people, of its morals and laws, and which 
 usually ofifers such great resistance to the introduction of new 
 truths. Nay, we can manifestly form no conception whatever 
 of a mental historical life in which we should not have to 
 battle for the truth against error and prejudice; of what 
 would it consist? Without friction, no motion. * * * 
 Owing to this beneficent arrangement, the spiritual leadership 
 of humanity is finally reserved for men of great, earnest, and 
 unselfish hearts." * * * 
 
 "I shall close this entire discussion with a considera- 
 tion of the question : Does the duty of communicating truth 
 universally demand the destruction of error wherever and 
 in whatever form it may appear? It is one of the great con- 
 troversies which have always moved mankind. We may 
 define it as the controversy between the will and the intellect, 
 between the practical and speculative sides of human nature. 
 The will, turned towards self-preservation, demands, as was 
 shown above, stability of institutions, and therefore also of 
 
 ♦Page 695. 
 
VERACITY. 135 
 
 the conceptions upon which they are grounded. The spiritual 
 and temporal authorities, which we may term the representa- 
 tives of the will in history, therefore always incline to demand 
 that certain things be fixed once and for all, which criticism 
 should not be permitted to disturb. The intellect, on the 
 contrary, refuses to close the debate ; to hinder the continua- 
 tion of the investigation means for it the perpetuation of 
 error. The end of all research is the absolute accommodation 
 of knowledge to reality. But this goal is infinitely remote, 
 and hence the attempt better to adapt the conceptual system 
 to reality must be constantly renewed. Nor are the funda- 
 mental principles excepted; they, too, must be subjected to 
 progressive changes, if only for the reason that the constant 
 extension and intensification of particular knowledge ulti- 
 mately demands a rearrangement of the facts." 
 
 "The antagonism between these two tendencies, formu- 
 lated as a conflict of principles, turns upon the question : Is 
 truth under all circumstances good and error harmful? Or 
 may the preservation of error at times be necessary, and its 
 destruction harmful? The politicians, if we may designate 
 the representatives of the will by this term, affirm the latter; 
 the philosophers, the representatives of the intellect, the 
 former question." 
 
 "If the question is asked absolutely and universally, it 
 will be impossible to answer it otherwise than with the 
 philosophers: Truth is good; error harmful. Since things 
 do not govern themselves according to our opinions, we must 
 govern our opinions according to things. Things, says Bishop 
 Buller, are what they are, and their effects will be what they 
 are; why should we wish to deceive ourselves?" * * * 
 
 "On the other hand, it seems to be impossible to deny 
 that the destruction of an erroneous idea does not, under all 
 circumstances, promote the welfare of him who harbors it. 
 Hence an inadequate idea may be better than none at all ; 
 and the conditions may be such as to make it possible to 
 undermine the false conception without establishing the true 
 one." * * * 
 
 This indicates the key to the situation, the attempt to 
 
136 SYSTEM OF ETHICS. 
 
 remove erroneous conceptions or beliefs should be conditioned 
 upon the likelihood of being able to substitute truer concep- 
 tions or beliefs, that will prove a better guide for life and 
 conduct. 
 
 "From this point of view the controversy between the 
 politicians and the philosophers, it seems to me, may be 
 settled." 
 
 "The philosophers are right in this : No limits are to 
 be set to research. Whatever new thoughts (that are true) 
 a nation produces, will be suitable and good for it. * * * 
 The investigator, as such, can therefore be concerned with 
 no other question than this: What is true? * * * The 
 scientific writer has but one concern : *How shall I most 
 clearly and definitely present the things as I see them? Who- 
 ever allows himself to be governed by considerations and 
 purposes of a different kind, whoever is thinking, first and 
 last, how he may please this man and avoid displeasing that 
 one, does not serve the truth, and therefore the truth also 
 despises him. Truth gives herself only to him who seeks 
 for her alone." * * * 
 
 "So far the philosophers are right. The politicians, on 
 the other hand, are right in this, that when it comes to 
 imparting knowledge by instruction, which is designed for 
 particular persons, we must be guided not only by a regard 
 for the subject but by a regard for the person. This con- 
 sideration may prevent the teacher from saying everything 
 he thinks, and from saying what he thinks just as he thinks 
 it in his own mind. We do not tell the simplest experience 
 to two different persons in the same way ; we take into 
 account the person, and govern our narrative and voice, the 
 selection and arrangement of the facts, accordingly. How 
 could we speak of greater things, how could we speak of God 
 and the world, to persons of different age, education, inclina- 
 tions, and views in the same words? It is the same history 
 of mankind which is taught in the grade school, in the high 
 school and the university ; and yet how different must be the 
 
 *PaRe 702. 
 
VERACITY. 137 
 
 method of treatment in order that it may be good, instructive 
 and edifying in each place. The same also applies to ulti- 
 mate principles. The world is one and the same, and so is 
 the truth ; but it cannot reflect the same countenance in every 
 mirror." 
 
PART SECOND. 
 
 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 ETHICS OF BUSINESS, OF EMPLOYMENT, OF PROFESSIONS. 
 
 All men, whether they will or no, and whether they ac- 
 knowledge it or not, are as surely under dominion of moral 
 laws as of physical laws and the consequences resulting from 
 obedience or disobedience are as sure to follow in the one 
 case as in the other. No human being, therefore, who has 
 intelligence enough to be responsible for his acts is free from 
 the obligation to be good and to do right. It is the province 
 of ethics to discover the principles upon which a good char- 
 acter may be formed, and to describe the rules and methods 
 by which right conduct may be guided. The preceding chap- 
 ters have attempted to do this, in a brief and imperfect way. 
 It remains now to apply these principles and rules to the 
 special circumstances, relations and obligations of profes- 
 sional life, and to discover and describe, if we can, how these 
 may differ from the duties and obligations resting upon men 
 in other walks of life. It ought to be recognized as a rule of 
 ethics, or morality that every man and woman having suf- 
 ficient health and mental capacity, should be engaged in some 
 employment or service useful to society; and in choosing a 
 profession or business or trade which one expects to follow 
 for a livelihood, the question is fundamental whether those 
 persons who are served or influenced will be benefited by it 
 or harmed by it. Probably most people choose their employ- 
 ment with little thought of anything except the prospect of 
 gaining a livelihood by it, and whether it will be suitable to 
 their abilities and congenial to their tastes; and fortunately, 
 most of the employments that are open to the choice of 
 young people are more or less useful as well as remunerative. 
 Such employments as are injurious or useless ought not to 
 be thought respectable. 
 
 The duty to follow some useful calling is no respecter 
 
ETHICS OF PROFESSIONS. 139 
 
 of persons, but rests upon the rich and the poor, the high and 
 the lowly, the learned and the unlearned, the wise and the 
 foolish, the strong and the weak, upon men and women. There 
 should be no exceptions except for disability. 
 
 The most important ethical requirement in every busi- 
 ness transaction is that all the parties to it are benefited by it. 
 Any business, like gambling and perhaps some forms of spec- 
 ulation, that does not admit of benefit to both parties in the 
 transaction, is not a legitimate business and the following 
 of It cannot be defended on grounds of morality. 
 
 In ordinary transactions of buying and selling the parties 
 are usually supposed to meet on equal terms, each able to 
 look out for his own interest. It is required of the seller to 
 tell the truth about what he sells and the best standards of 
 business morality as well as the best business policy lead the 
 seller to interest himself in his customer's point of view, 
 the use he can make of his purchase, whether this article or 
 some other will best serve his needs, and other matters that 
 make him satisfied with his purchase and so become a con- 
 tinuing customer. In the relations of employer and workmen 
 or the merchant and his clerks, the human element comes 
 in with more importance than with the seller and buyer, 
 and the employer has far greater responsibility for the 
 welfare of his employes. His duty is not cjccomplished 
 by paying them so much money for so much work, but he 
 should provide them a safe place to work, in pure air and 
 wholesome circumstances, with necessary conveniences for 
 personal comfort and cleanliness, and should take an interest 
 in their health, pleasure and general welfare. Not all em- 
 ployers do these things, in fact so many neglect them that 
 it has been found necessary to enact laws making specific 
 requirements for many of them. It has been slowly pene- 
 trating into the minds of men that the physical health and 
 moral welfare of men and women are more important than 
 the profits of business. However, in business and manu- 
 facturing, the health and welfare of employes is not the first 
 or primary consideration; the object of the shoe manufac- 
 turer, for instance, is to make shoes, and if he did not desire 
 
140 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 to make shoes he would not hire any men at all, nor assume 
 any interest or responsibility for their health and welfare; 
 he does not make shoes in order that he may provide for the 
 welfare of the people he employs, but he employs them and 
 takes good care of them in order that he may make shoes. 
 Generally, in all business or manufacturing or agriculture, 
 the matters of importance and chief consideration are the 
 things produced or manufactured, or bought and sold. It is 
 true that those engaged in all these pursuits may, and should, 
 make their employments and business relations minister to 
 the higher levels of life in moral and spiritual development 
 and expression, and these are the best and most important 
 fruits of living, to be won individually in whatever circum- 
 stance or conditions in life men find themselves. So far as 
 business itself is concerned the commodities produced and 
 distributed are the things of primary importance. 
 
 In such professions as medicine and dentistry the human 
 element comes to the front and becomes of primary and chief 
 importance. The practice of medicine and dentistry consists 
 in personal services to supply personal needs, and the mat- 
 ter of making something and selling something takes a sub- 
 ordinate and comparatively insignificant place. It is true 
 there is a business side to dentistry and medicine and there 
 is a bargain and sale of professional services, but the differ- 
 ence between selling professional services and selling com- 
 modities, or even one's time in some mechanical or routine 
 employment is so great that different terms are used to 
 describe them. We sell commodities, or time in ordinary 
 employments, for a price. We perform a professional service 
 for a fee. When you make a gold filling, or make a crown 
 or bridge you charge a fee for your services, you do not sell 
 the crown or bridge for a price. 
 
 The interests intrusted to practitioners of medicine and 
 dentistry are of the utmost importance, involving personal 
 symmetry and beauty, comfort and health, not infrequently 
 life itself. It is not surprising therefore that the community 
 should expect, and the professions should seek to maintain 
 in their ranks, a higher standard of fitness and training, a 
 
ETHICS OF PROFESSIONS. 141 
 
 better education, greater general intelligence, and above all, 
 a higher standard of moral excellence and more scrupulous 
 conscientiousness than is expected or exacted from other classes. 
 
 The relation of a dentist and his patient is not that of a 
 seller and buyer, nor that of employer and employe. It is a 
 trust, confided to the dentist by his patient, who entrusts his 
 future comfort, beauty, health, not infrequently the prolonga- 
 ion of life itself, to the knowledge, skill, good judgment, sin- 
 cerity, honesty and disinterestedness of the dentist. The 
 patient does not come as a buyer seeking to purchase some- 
 thing the dentist has to sell, so much money for a set of 
 teeth or a gold crown or filling; nor as an employer seeking 
 to hire a man to do a job of work; so much money for clean- 
 ing teeth, (prophylactic operation) treating an abscess, or 
 removing a pulp and filling a root. The patient expects to 
 receive, and the dentist should insist upon giving, something 
 more than the mere technical skill and craftsmanship that 
 enables him to do the work. Professional knowledge and 
 skill implies more than technical knowledge and skill. It 
 means the ability to understand present conditions, past his- 
 tory and future probabilities or results, and such knowledge, 
 experience and judgment as enable a man to advise and fre- 
 quently to dictate what should be done ; and this is a very 
 different matter from the mere technical skill to do it. This 
 is what makes the dentist's work a professional service instead 
 of mechanical or artistic work, and this is what makes it 
 worthy a professional fee instead of wages for work or a 
 price for something made. 
 
 A price is supposed to bear some pretty definite relation 
 to the cost of purchase or manufacture, with the added expense 
 of carrying it in stock and making the sale, and some suitable 
 percentage of profit added ; and wages or salary have a similar 
 rather definite relation to time consumed and the knowledge, 
 experience and ability of the person employed. There is much 
 greater fiexibility about fees, and several additional elements 
 come into the determination of them. The primary basis for 
 a fee is the same as for a price or wages, namely the cost of 
 production, the time consumed and the knowledge, skill and 
 
142 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 judgment required for the service, but a fee can be influenced 
 to a much greater extent by the art, the knowledge and skill, 
 but especially by the judgment and wisdom, and reputation 
 for success, than can a wage or a price, and more important 
 still in determining a fee is the importance of the service, the 
 risks attending it, the amount of benefit that may follow 
 from success and the extent of injury that may result from 
 failure. Added to all this is the ability or inability of the 
 recipient to pay for the service. These considerations serve 
 to make professional fees exceedingly variable, both as regards 
 the men who receive them and the people who pay them. 
 
 In the case of a lawyer, the amount of pecuniary interests 
 at stake has more to do with the amount of his fees than any 
 other one thing. It is conceivable that a lawyer might at 
 different times have two cases involving similar points of 
 law and procedure and taking similar amounts of time, in 
 one of which one hundred dollars was at stake and in the 
 other half a million dollars, and he might receive twenty-five 
 dollars for one case and a thousand dollars or more for the 
 other. No salaried man or wage earner could ever hope to 
 get such different amounts for similar services. These con- 
 siderations will indicate the objections against charging for 
 professional services by the hour. A good many dentists 
 have not got away very much from the mechanic's point of 
 view, and profess to charge their patients in strict relation 
 to the time spent. Many years ago a well-known man, in a 
 paper before the American Dental Association or in one of 
 the principal dental journals, said that for operations of filling 
 teeth he charged three dollars an hour for the time spent in 
 preparing the cavities and finishing the work and seven dol- 
 lars an hour for the time spent in introducing the gold, the 
 inference being that the additional charge would pay for the 
 gold he was using. 
 
 Another man told how he had an hour-glass which he 
 set going on his operating table when he seated his patient 
 in the chair and turned down upon its side if he were inter- 
 rupted during the sitting by the need to see other patients 
 or attend to other matters. In this way his patients were able 
 
ETHICS OF PROFESSIONS. 143 
 
 to see that he did not charge them for anytime he did not 
 give them. In dentistry, time is the most important of the 
 circumstances which determine the fee, but it should never 
 be allowed to constitute the only thing that determines it. 
 In the practice of medicine and surgery, time has a much 
 smaller influence in determining fees. A doctor in a place 
 where the standard fee for a house visit is two dollars, charges 
 that amount whether he is in the house five minutes or a 
 whole hour, and a surgeon whose fee for removing an appen- 
 dix is three hundred dollars and it usually takes half an hour, 
 does not charge six hundred dollars if it happens to take an 
 hour. 
 
 The difference between a fee and wages or price is not 
 merely arbitrary, a means by which certain classes of men 
 seek to make a distinction where there is no difference, but 
 the word fee is applied to a different kind of service, and 
 implies different standards of estimation or determination. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 PROFESSIONAL ADVERTISING — WINNING A PRACTICE — DUTIES TO 
 
 PATIENTS. 
 
 The attitude of the dental, medical and legal professions 
 toward advertising is based upon the differences I have been 
 trying to explain between professional services and business, 
 manufacturing and agricultural employments. 
 
 A man may advertise things, commodities, with the 
 utmost freedom if he does not misrepresent them, but there 
 is almost universal opinion in the professions of dentistry, 
 medicine, law, and some others, that the public, paid adver- 
 tisement of personal qualifications or character, professional 
 ability, fees for services, etc., etc., is improper, in bad taste, 
 and not consistent with personal self-respect or professional 
 dignity. A man may advertise his professional occupation 
 and the location of his office, but can scarcely go beyond that. 
 There are some men in both the dental and medical profes- 
 sions who are impatient under these restrictions and fail to 
 comprehend the reasonableness and necessity of them, be- 
 cause they have no clear idea of the difference between the 
 professions and commercial or manufacturing pursuits. 
 
 So deeply rooted and universal among professional men 
 is the conviction that public advertising of the commercial 
 sort is inconsistent with professional self-respect that nothing 
 else will so quickly and certainly cause a man to be ostracised 
 by his professional associates and cut off from all professional 
 societies. Moreover, the advertisements themselves are so 
 commonly untruthful or misleading and the practice they 
 represent so often incompetent and unscruplous that adver- 
 tising has come to be looked upon as the badge of quackery 
 by the community as well as by the profession, and the man 
 who descends to it must expect to find the better classes of 
 people shunning him. That is to say, such advertising is 
 quite as sure to repel the most desirable patients as it is to 
 attract a less desirable class of people. 
 
PROFESSIONAL ADVERTISING. 145 
 
 It is important that you understand the distinctions and 
 differences I have tried to make clear, and that you pass over 
 from the attitude and standpoint of workmen, technicians, or 
 even artists, to that of professional men, and take upon your- 
 selves the additional responsibilities and duties of profes- 
 sional men, associate yourselves with professional men in 
 places where you live and practice, and make your patients 
 respect you and treat you as professional men and not merely 
 as workmen whom they can hire to do a job. The importance 
 of these discriminations and of cultivating the professional 
 instead of the commercial spirit is greater than you can at 
 present fully realize. 
 
 The conventional rules in regard to signs and announce- 
 ments are matters of etiquette rather than ethics. "In New 
 York it would be deemed unbecoming to insert card with 
 residence and office hours ; or notice of removal in a medical 
 journal, much more in a newspaper, etc., but in some other 
 cities such notices are not considered improper." 
 
 ■'In Paris a professional doorplate is a deviation from 
 propriety. In New York a modest doorplate or sign is the 
 rule." 
 
 The above conventions or fashions apply primarily to 
 physicians, but most dentists conform to them with equal 
 strictness. 
 
 In some of the smaller towns it is not uncommon for the 
 professional men; lawyers, physicians and dentists, to keep 
 their professional cards standing in the local newspaper. This 
 may often be done more with a view to give loyal support to 
 the town paper than for any benefit that may be expected 
 from the advertisement. 
 
 In view of the restrictions which the codes of ethics 
 impose upon advertising, I am sure the question often arises 
 in the minds of young men how they may make their pro- 
 fessional ability known to a sufficient number of people to 
 win a living practice. It must be said that it is likely to take 
 time. A practice, like many other things, is not born full 
 grown, but must have time in which to develop. There are 
 many influences that may help that are perfectly proper and 
 
146 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 allowable by the code of ethics, and consistent with profes- 
 sional and gentlemanly conduct. First in importance is the 
 skill and wisdom with which the few patients that may come 
 are treated. Second in importance, though usually first in 
 immediate results, is the favorable impression made by the 
 personality of the young man, both upon his patients and 
 all those whom he meets in any of the circumstances and 
 relations of life. It is contemptible to "work for business" 
 a man's church, or lodge, or club, and a man who does so is 
 pretty likely to be recognized and meet the contempt he 
 deserves. A man should join a church or lodge or club for 
 the sake of promoting the ends for which such organizations 
 are maintained. If he does that the acquaintances and friend- 
 ships so acquired will inevitably react favorably upon his 
 business and it is perfectly right that business should be 
 benefited in that way. As a practical fact, most young men 
 of good professional ability and attractive personality do find 
 these two sets of influences sufficient to develop their practice 
 as fast as is good for them. If a good opportunity can be 
 found, a good way of beginning practice is to go into the 
 office of some established practitioner as his assistant. It 
 will give the opportunity to get those first few patients that 
 are to act as drummers (if we may use such a term) for his 
 future practice; but it gives opportunity to observe and absorb 
 very much that will be to his advantage, about the arrange- 
 ment and conduct of an office, the management of patients, 
 the keeping of records and accounts and collection of bills, 
 and numberless other things which help to make a practice 
 efficient, successful and easy, and of which little can possibly 
 be learned in a dental school. The custom of a pupilage 
 before entering the dental school is obsolete, but the desir- 
 ability of spending some time in close contact with some wise 
 and experienced man is as great as ever it was, and after 
 graduation is a much better time to do it than before entering 
 dental school. 
 
 Much help in winning a practice may come from having 
 the office well located, thoroughly equipped for the best serv- 
 ices and for all probable emergencies, conveniently arranged 
 
WINNING A PRACTICE. 147 
 
 for doing work without loss of time, in good taste and attrac- 
 tive in appearance, above all things scrupulously clean. There 
 should be arrangements for the comfort and convenience of 
 patients, and they should be seated in the operating chair so 
 as to be comfortable, and to permit physical and nervous 
 or mental relaxation instead of tension. 
 
 The primary object in the practice of dentistry, that for 
 which the profession of dentistry exists, is the welfare of the 
 patients committed to our care. This is paramount and if 
 other duties and obligations conflict with this one they should 
 yield to a greater extent than this one. A different object 
 of practice has been proposed by some and pursued by many, 
 namely : "Get the money" ; and a very well known man in a 
 paper before a great dental society characterized the ethical 
 attitude which makes the duty to patients paramount over 
 selfish considerations as "bunk." Of course, it is necessary 
 for the dentist to get money for his services and unless he gets 
 enough of it to provide comfortably for himself and his fam- 
 ily, and keep his office in first class condition, and meet the 
 social and public expenses that necessarily fall to his share, 
 he cannot give his patients the best possible service as he 
 ought. A man's interests and those of his patients are not 
 antagonistic but mutual. What is good for one is good for 
 both. It is a question of relation and comparison. As soon 
 as a man's skill and success make him independent enough to 
 do so he should establish a standard of fees high enough to 
 allow him to serve some of his patients, who are needy, for 
 fees much less than his standard. When a patient is examined 
 and the service needed is planned and arranged for, the atti- 
 tude of the dentist should not be to obtain the patient's con- 
 sent to the plan by which he can get the most money for the 
 easiest service, but it should be "how can I render the best 
 services to this patient that he can afford, or, if well to do, 
 can be induced to pay for, and I can afford to render." That 
 is what I mean by putting the welfare of the patient first 
 and the interest of the dentist second. 
 
 Patients will often require instruction, advice and per- 
 suasion as to the treatment Ihev need, sometimes several al- 
 
148 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 ternative methods of treatment will present themselves to 
 your mind as practicable, and it may require full consulta- 
 tion with the patient in addition to your own study of the 
 mouth before determining on the wisest course to be pur- 
 sued, for although you ought to be a far better judge than 
 the patient as to the conditions present, the future prospects 
 and the most desirable plan to pursue, the information the 
 patient may give as to financial ability, the command of time 
 and opportunity, and the past history of particular teeth or 
 of the mouth generally, may prove of indispensable assistance 
 in determining what is practicable and can be wisely under- 
 taken. 
 
 Professional, and still more, financial success depend almost 
 as much upon a man's manners and bearing and conversation 
 with his patients, as upon his knowledge and skill. This works 
 more or less injustice sometimes to those who have given their 
 best efforts to perfecting themselves in their profession and 
 have neglected to cultivate the pleasing manners and facility of 
 intelligent conversation, the tact and quick apprehension of fitness 
 and appropriateness to time and circumstances, which are the 
 current coin of society. It is not surprising that a man's per- 
 sonality should make a stronger impression upon his patient than 
 his professional skill, for people are usually good judges of 
 personal appearance, manners and conversation, and very poor 
 judges of the quality of professional services. 
 
 Almost all patients and especially all children should be 
 carefully instructed in the care they ought to take of their teeth 
 and mouths. Such directions should be plain and specific, and 
 care should be taken to require nothing that should be imprac- 
 ticable for them in the special circumstances in whihc they live. 
 It is usually necessary to show them how to handle the tooth 
 brush and floss silk, and they should be told what tooth powders, 
 pastes and mouth washes, etc., to use, if any. Many people and 
 all children should be urgently persuaded to chew their food 
 thoroughly, and to use plenty of food that is hard enough to 
 require chewing. Chewing gum would be useful if it could be 
 restricted to a half hour after meals and the gum is not too 
 much contaminated by flavoring and condiments. Many chil- 
 dren have their temporary teeth so much decayed that it hurts 
 
DUTIES TO PATIENTS. 149 
 
 to chew on them and they acquire a habit of eating without 
 chewing which persists later after they get permanent teeth which 
 they might use. Many other children are fed so exclusively on 
 soft food that they have little occasion to use the muscles of 
 mastication with any strength or vigor, and thus it happens that 
 many children go to the orthodontist and many who do not go 
 ought to, for little other reason besides the fact that the muscles 
 of mastication have never been used enough to perform their 
 normal function in the growth and development of the face 
 and jaws. 
 
 The object to be kept in view and never lost sight of, in 
 the case of each individual patient is the preservation of the teeth 
 and mouth in as nearly perfect health as possible, and both the 
 dentist and his patient should use their best efforts for its 
 accomplishment. 
 
 Be sure to have your patients understand that your profes- 
 sional services are the chief element of value in your fees. "No 
 trouble to show goods" is a maxim of trade only. You are not 
 selling goods and "consultations and examinations free" is the 
 brand of a quack. I believe that carpenters, masons and builders 
 often consult about jobs and make estimates without charg- 
 ing for the service if they do not get the contracts. 
 Physicians and lawyers seldom do that, and dentists should 
 not any oftener than physicians. If a patient is seated 
 in your chair and you make an examination and consult about 
 what is needed to be done, charge a fee for it, whether you do 
 anything more for that patient or not. For heaven's sake, don't 
 let anyone who ever comes into your office acquire there any 
 suspicion that she can go round to a dozen offices and get an 
 examination and an estimate of cost from each one and never 
 pay a cent to any of them. Such a custom is lamentably common 
 in some places. 
 
 Magnify the professional aspects of your services and make 
 your patients pay you fully as well for removing deposits, pro- 
 phylactic treatments, removal of pulps and filling root canals, 
 treating diseased teeth and gums, etc., as for fillings, inlays, 
 crowns, bridges and sets of teeth, and in all these latter opera- 
 tions put the emphasis on the professional services rendered and 
 not on the labor and material. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE DUTY OF THE DENTIST TO OTHER DENTISTS AND TO THE DENTAL 
 PROFESSION. PAPERS READ AT SOCIETY MEETINGS. FEES. 
 
 The code of ethics requires that all rejutable practitioners 
 are to be upheld and defended in every possible way with their 
 patients and the public, save only when the welfare of a patient 
 makes it unavoidable to condemn an operation that has been 
 made or some mode of practice that has been advocated. There 
 will occasionally arise awkward discrepancies between your 
 opinions of certain cases and the opinions of some other man 
 whom a patient may quote to you, which may prove ir- 
 reconcilable and may require tact and a careful speech and manner 
 to avoid injustice to the other man. You will often be very liable 
 to form unjust opinions of the skill and honesty of other prac- 
 titioners, especially in the first years of practice before your 
 observations of the patients in your own care have extended 
 over a long enough time to make you realize the great number 
 and variety of causes that may shorten the durability of opera- 
 tions or cause them to fail, besides the want of skill and thor- 
 oughness in making them. You must remember, too, that opera- 
 tions of other men which you find defective or useless may have 
 been made under difficulties too great to be overcome and of 
 which the present appearance and behavior of the patient give 
 no indication. 
 
 The code of ethics of the Illinois State Dental Society says 
 (Section 4), "One dentist should not disparage the services of 
 another to a patient. Criticism of work which is apparently 
 defective may be unjust through lack of knowledge of the con- 
 ditions under which the work was performed. The duty of the 
 dentist is to remedy any defect without comment." 
 
 Patients will sometimes complain to you of the treatment 
 they have received at the hands of some other dentist, and in a 
 large proportion of cases you will have the pleasure to make such 
 explanations as will (or ought to) restore their good opinion of 
 
DUTY OF THE DENTIST. 151 
 
 him, and show them that the unsatisfactory result is a misfortune 
 instead of a fault, or that it may be due to their own neglect. 
 
 There is no safety for you as regards the treatment of 
 other practitioners unless kindness and charitableness are rooted 
 in your character and find constant illustration in your conduct. 
 Patients will hold you in higher esteem if they find you c&reful 
 of the good name and professional reputation of others. Selfish 
 and envious men are tempted to disparage others in the hope to 
 exalt themselves in the minds of their patients ; the effect being 
 usually the reverse, or it may be only serving to lower the 
 patient's estimation of the entire profession. 
 
 There may be cases brought to' your notice occasionally in 
 which incompetence or dishonesty are so surely apparent as to 
 admit of no excuse or palliation. Usually it is wisest to pass 
 them in silence, but you are under no obligations to do so if the 
 welfare of your patient, or of other patients, or the community, 
 may be promoted by expressing your opinion of him in plain 
 terms. Dishonesty has no claims upon your charity or forbear- 
 ance, to restrain you from warning others who might become 
 its victims. 
 
 Patients who come to you because their regular dentist is 
 absent or sick or for any reason is inaccessible, require especially 
 careful treatment. Nothing should be done for them beyond 
 what is strictly necessary for their welfare till they can return to 
 their own dentist, and particular Avatchfulness should be exercised 
 not to discredit or excite suspicion of anything that has been 
 done for them. Of course fees may be taken for what is done, 
 though it is common for many men to perform trifling services 
 without a fee, as a courtesy to the other dentist. The courtesy, 
 however, is more to the patient than to the other dentist, for 
 if you take no fee for what you do, neither does the other man. 
 A good rule is to treat such patients as you would your own 
 patients. If the service is such that you would do it without a 
 fee for one of your own patients, then charge no fee to another. 
 If the service is such that you would charge a fee to one of your 
 own patients, then charge a fee to the patient of another dentist. 
 
 It is not necessary, if it were possible, to give many rules m 
 detail for the treatment of other dentists. The basis for them 
 
152 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 all is justice and kindness, having regard to both the patient and 
 dentist and those qualities of character acting freely will be 
 nearer right than if we attempt to follow arbitrary rules. The 
 same general rule holds good for the patients of other dentists 
 2'S for your own : the patient's good is the first consideration. 
 
 The dental profession of the present day has fallen 
 heir to a great accumulation of professional knowledge, skill 
 and experience, as well as a vast number of ingenious instru- 
 ments, appliances and apparatus, the free use of which makes 
 us all large debtors to our profession, both to the living and 
 the dead, whose efforts, observations, studies, successes and 
 failures have gradually established the standards of practice 
 for the present generation. 
 
 How can this large debt be discharged? The first thing 
 to say is that it cannot be discharged. The benefits have 
 been freely given and freely received. No man may hope to 
 give to his profession as much as he has received from it. 
 No children do as much for parents (if the parents are every- 
 thing they ought to be) as the parents have done for them. 
 The only way that debt can be discharged is by giving to 
 the next generation a similar care, instruction, guidance and 
 affection. No generation of men can add so much to the 
 permanent possessions of the world as they have received 
 from their long lines of ancestors. What is required of each 
 generation is that it use its heritage received from the past 
 wisely, without wasting it, and also add its own contribution 
 to the permanent possessions of the world instead of con- 
 suming everything it receives and produces for its own use 
 and pleasure. The best acknowledgement and the highest 
 honor a man can pay to his predecessors in the profession is 
 to make himself as well qualified as possible to discharge its 
 duties, and to conduct his practice upon the highest level of 
 ability and disinterestedness. The man who does his whole 
 duty to his patients has gone more than half way in the dis- 
 charge of his duty to his profession, but this is not enough. 
 The profession would degenerate very rapidly if every man 
 isolated himself in his own practice, read no professional 
 books or journals and did not cooperate in any way with his 
 
SOCIETY PAPERS. 153 
 
 professional brethren. It is indispensable that you belong to 
 one or more dental societies, attend their meetings and in- 
 terest yourself in their affairs. You must take and read 
 several dental journals. One is not enough. The time has 
 long passed when every paper of importance read anywhere 
 was published in all the journals. They now do very little 
 reprinting from each other except in the form of digests and 
 brief extracts. The Cosmos, The Review, The Items of In- 
 terest, The Digest and the Dental Summary and Oral Hy- 
 giene are any of them likely sometimes to have articles you 
 cannot well afford to miss but would miss unless you take 
 the journals that publish them. You cannot ignore dental 
 journals and dental societies for five years without becoming 
 a "back number" in your profession. And probably you would 
 not have the least idea that you were behind the times. It 
 is very bad policy to have your patients give you the first 
 information you have of new things and new methods of 
 practice that are being brought into use. 
 
 PAPERS READ BEFORE DENTAL SOCIETIES. 
 
 Papers to be read before dental societies or published 
 in the journals should be considered of importance enough 
 to give time for their preparation, and careful study and 
 thought sufiicient to make them as good as your ability and 
 resources for information will permit. A man ought to think 
 himself disgraced who comes before a dental society and says 
 that he was unable to make any preparation for his paper 
 and had to write it within the last few days before the meet- 
 ing, or on the way coming there, and therefore could not send 
 copies of it to the men who have been appointed to discuss 
 it. An exception must of course be made in the case of a 
 man who, from a few notes, gives an extemporaneous lec- 
 ture about matters which he has made a close study for 
 fifteen or twenty years. 
 
 Direct quotations should always be in quotation marks, 
 and usually, though not always, the authorship should be in- 
 dicated in the reading, and if thoughts or ideas have been 
 consciously received from known sources credit should be 
 given even though the phraseology is not quoted. Papers 
 
154 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 read before societies become the property of the societies 
 before whom they are read, unless the author stipulates to 
 retain the ownership. If a man reads the same paper before 
 some other society he should do so by the permission of the 
 society that first heard it, and the right of publication goes 
 with the ownership of the paper. It sometimes happens that 
 several societies, occasionally many societies, desire to hear 
 some important paper and I believe that men often read 
 such papers in several places without going through the 
 formality of asking permission from the society that first 
 heard it. Probably they do so on the presumption that there 
 would not be the least likelihood that permission would be 
 refused, but the society that first heard the paper has the 
 exclusive right to publish it. Some men in such cases re- 
 write their papers and make changes sufficient to destroy the 
 identity, and then, of course, the new paper is published by 
 the society before which it is read. 
 
 If an invitation to read a paper or take part in a discus- 
 sion before a dental society is accepted, every reasonable 
 effort should be made to keep the appointment. If unfore- 
 seen circumstances arise that make it quite impossible to do 
 so, immediate notice should be sent to the proper officer of 
 the society, and if practicable, the paper should be prepared 
 and sent to the meeting so that it may be read by some one 
 instead of the author. The same duty to fulfil the engagement 
 applies with equal force to those who accept invitations to 
 appear as operators or demonstrators in a clinic. In a list of 
 fifty or sixty clinicians there are usually several who fail 
 to appear and neglect to send any word of explanation or 
 apology. Such men justify the suspicion that their only 
 motive in accepting the appointment was to obtain the notor- 
 iety of having their names published in the announcement 
 of the meeting and feel no sense of obligation to fulfil their 
 promise. It would be proper if the society were to call such 
 men to account for unethical conduct and punish them in 
 some suitable way unless they were able to give a satisfac- 
 tory explanation and apology. The executive and adminis- 
 trative officers of a society should consider it their duty to 
 
FEES. 155 
 
 attend its meetings, and should make much greater efforts 
 to do so than is to be required of the unofficial members. 
 
 FEES. 
 
 The ethical requirements in respect to fees, so far as 
 stated in the code of ethics of the National Dental Associa- 
 tion are found in Article II section 4, as follows : "When gen- 
 eral rules have been adopted by members of the profession 
 practicing in the same localities in relation to fees, it is un- 
 professional and dishonorable to depart from those rules, ex- 
 cept when variation of circumstance requires it. And it is 
 ever to be regarded as unprofessional to warrant operations 
 as an inducement to patronage." 
 
 No maximum fee bill should ever be adopted by any 
 society, but I am convinced that in many localities the in- 
 comes of all the dentists could be somewhat increased and, 
 what is of much more importance, the average excellence of 
 operations would be raised, by an agreement among all the 
 dentists in the town or neighborhood upon a minimum scale 
 of fees considerably higher than the average fees the men 
 are getting now. It seems pretty evident that in many places 
 men are getting incomes too small for their education and 
 their abilities, and in order to get these inadequate incomes 
 they are obliged to hurry through too many operations in a 
 day to have it possible to make them as well as they should. 
 If the standard of average excellence of dental operations in 
 any community can be raised it will be worth far more to 
 that community than the increased amount of money they 
 will have to pay for them. No minimum fee bill should 
 prevent any man from doing charity work for needy persons 
 to the extent that he can afford and is willing, as occasion 
 may arise, but it is right to exercise some care not to be 
 imposed upon by persons not really needy. It is rather mor- 
 tifying to find, after cutting a bill heavily to some one you 
 suppose to be needy, that they have been round to half a 
 dozen ofifices to find out who they could get down to the 
 lowest figure. One remedy for "shopping" is for every dentist 
 to charge such a fee for examinations and consultations that such 
 people will be unwiling to pay it to half a dozen different 
 
156 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 men. Your standard of fees should be high enough so that 
 when you are busy in a fairly good practice (good in the 
 number of patients) you can take time enough for each opera- 
 tion to do it the best you are able to, and can have a reason- 
 able amount of time for charity work, enough to keep your 
 office in first class shape, well furnished and cared for, above 
 all things, clean, and equipped with everything needful for 
 the most perfect operations and the most efficient service, 
 provide for your family in at least moderate comfort, educate 
 your children, give something to a few of the calls for charity 
 and philanthropy, and provide for your old age. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 COMMISSIONS AND SPLIT FEES — CODES OF ETHICS. 
 
 The Principles of Medical Ethics, article VI, section 3, is 
 as follows : 'Tt is detrimental to the public good and degrad- 
 ing to the profession, and therefore unprofessional, to give 
 or receive a commission. It is also unprofessional to divide 
 a fee for medical advice or surgical treatment, unless the 
 patient or his next friend is fully informed as to the terms of 
 the transaction." 
 
 "The patient should be made to realize that a proper fee 
 should be paid the family physician for the service he renders 
 in determining the surgical or medical treatment suited to the 
 condition, and in advising concerning those best qualified to 
 render any special service that may be required by the 
 patient." 
 
 The Code of Ethics of the Illinois State Dental Society, 
 section 3, has this to say about commissions : "It is unpro- 
 fessional for dentists to pay or accept commissions on fees for 
 profesional services, or on prescriptions or other articles sup- 
 plied to patients by pharmacists or others." 
 
 There is some reason to fear that some men of otherwise 
 reputable standing do not observe these rules with strictness. 
 It has been intimated that some surgeons ask the physician 
 who brings them a patient to assist in the operation, and while 
 the assistance m^ay be only nominal, it furnishes the excuse 
 for splitting the fee, and more than one extracting specialist 
 and more than one orthodontist in the beginning of his special 
 practice has sought to induce other dentists to refer patients 
 to him by offering them some certain percentage of the fees 
 he received from such patients. Such transactions have been 
 defended with some show of plausibility, for the dentist or 
 physician who recommends a patient to go to some particular 
 .specialist, whose skill and wisdom he knows, performs a real 
 service to his patient, and the more so if he goes with the 
 patient to the specialist and consults with him about the case, 
 
158 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 and in the latter case, especially, he is entitled to render his 
 own bill to the patient for such services. He also renders a 
 real service to the specialist, for he wins the patient for him 
 and in many cases is the real salesman of the specialist's 
 services (if such an expression may be allowed in regard to 
 such a transaction), instead of the speciahst having to win the 
 patient himself, as he would have to do if the patient came of 
 his own initiative solely. One fundamental objection to com- 
 missions and split-fees is that usually neither of the parties 
 feels at all willing to have the patient know anything about 
 it. The only honorable and straightforward course is for each 
 to render his own bill to the person who is expected to pay 
 it. This leaves the general practitioner and the specialist 
 quite free each to set his own estimate of value upon the 
 service he has rendered to the patient. If it is objected that 
 the specialist's fees are usually much greater than those of 
 the general practitioner, and patients are often less willing 
 to pay the physician or dentist a proper fee for his services 
 in advising and sending them to the specialist than they are 
 to pay the specialist's large fee for making the operation, it 
 must be replied that an honorable man ought not to wish a 
 tee for which he is unwilling to render a bill. And if it is 
 further objected that the general practitioner has rendered to 
 the specialist a service of real value and importance, for which 
 he receives no pecuniary reward, it is answered that a fee or 
 commission paid under such circumstances subjects the prac- 
 titioner to the temptation to send patients where he can get 
 the best commission instead of where they can get the best 
 treatment, and if he is not in the least influenced by such a 
 consideration, he will surely fall under the suspicion of it, 
 and he can better afi'ord to do without the commission. The 
 right way is to charge a proper fee for consultation and advice, 
 and if time and money are spent in going with the patient to 
 the specialist, charge a fee and expenses for that, but so far 
 as the mere telling the patient what specialist to go to, call it 
 an act of good will and neighborliness and let it go at that. 
 You would not listen very patiently to a patient who came 
 and asked you to pay him a commission for sending you a 
 
COMMISSIONS AND SPLIT FEES. 159 
 
 patient, and the case would not be so very different from what 
 it would be for you to ask a commission for sending a patient 
 to a specialist, or, if we put it the other way and say that it is 
 the new patient who is served or benefited by the man who 
 tells him what dentist to go to, you never heard of a man who 
 was asked if he could recommend a good dentist replying: 
 "If you will give me a couple of dollars I will tell you of a 
 first class dentist." The truth is, a great many important 
 services are done, and must be done, without any payment for 
 them in money. 
 
 *Resolution (preceded by a long preamble — six "Where- 
 ases") offered by Dr. H. J, McKellops and adopted by the 
 American Dental Association, 1880: 
 
 "Resolved, That this Association discountenance in a 
 formal and emphatic manner the pernicious practice of mem- 
 bers of the profession, but more especially those holding high 
 positions in our schools, of allowing their names to appear 
 in advertisements as indorsing either any special material or 
 compound for filling teeth or any therapeutic agent whatso- 
 ever." 
 
 Dr. McKellops sent to the secretary's desk a dental jour- 
 nal containing the advertisement of a material for filling teeth, 
 with the recommendations of seven professors in dental col- 
 leges attached. 
 
 Dr. Buckingham, in discussion, said he had refused to 
 give recommendation if the formula was unknown to him. 
 
 Dr. Morgan said : "Regular physicians are not found 
 to recommend an article in this way. * * * jf ^^ physi- 
 cian knoAvs an article or preparation to be good, the pages 
 of the medical journals are open to him. The whole matter 
 appears to be in direct violation of the code of dental ethics. 
 It is no matter if the components and methods of preparing 
 are generally known, the tendency of the practice of giving 
 testimonials of this character is held to be to lower the dignity 
 of the profession." 
 
 The unwritten Law of Dental Ethics read before Ameri- 
 can Dental Association, 1880. Csomos, 1880, page 639. Last 
 paragraph but one : 
 
 ♦Cosmos, 1880. p. 538. 
 
160 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 "What I am urging is the creation of a goal towards 
 which we shall press. In our personal relations that goal 
 is the cultivation of mutual consideration; in professional 
 work, the highest good of those committed to our care ; in 
 professional conversation, the clear expression of positive 
 ideas ; in professional life, the maintenance of personal honor ; 
 in professional study, the securing of valuable information ; 
 in society relations, the devotion of one's best energies to the 
 promotion of the general good; in the labor of scientific re- 
 search, the exercise of that calm, persistent, wise discrimina- 
 tion that digs and tests, that gathers and sifts, so that golden 
 grain and not weightless chaff may be the product." 
 
 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION. 
 flint's commentary — INTRODUCTION 
 
 "In various points of view, the practice of medicine when 
 contrasted with other pursuits, is peculiar. The medical prac- 
 titioner does not deal with facts and laws having the exact- 
 ness of those pertaining to physics. In employing means for 
 certain ends, he cannot calculate results with mathematical 
 precision. The problems of disease * * * offer a wide 
 scope for the exercise of judgment in the practical applica- 
 tion of medical knowledge. It is by no means easy in all 
 cases for the practitioner himself to judge correctly of the 
 results of his practice, and for those not versed in the study 
 of disease it is an impossibility ; hence he is often blamed 
 undeservedly, and as often, perhaps, he receives praise not 
 strictly his due. People cannot judge with certainty of the 
 merits of a physician by the character of his work." 
 
 "Hence the choice of a family doctor is often determined 
 by other circumstances than his knowledge and skill. * * * 
 In no other profession or calling are extrinsic means avail- 
 able for competition to the same extent as in the practice 
 of medicine (or dentistry) and in no other pursuits are the 
 opportunities so great for ungenerous and unscrupulous ad- 
 vantages. Under these circumstances it is not to be won- 
 dered at that physicians (and dentists) are peculiarly sen- 
 sitive respecting their professional relations and rival prac- 
 titioners. * * * 
 
ORIGIN OF MEDICAL CODE. 161 
 
 "It is, perhaps, a common impression that the objects 
 of a code of ethics have exclusive reference to the interests 
 of the profession. So far from this, the objects are of far 
 more importance to the pubHc welfare than to physicians. 
 The truth of this will be apparent to all who read the code. 
 
 "Prior to 1847 the codes of medical ethics which existed 
 in this country were instituted in State or local societies, and 
 in many, probably in most of the States of the Union there 
 were none. At the convention which resulted in the organ- 
 ization of the American Medical Association in 1847 a com- 
 mittee of which Dr. Isaac Hays was chairman, were instructed 
 to report a code of ethics. The code which they reported was 
 adopted unanimously and has since been recognized as the 
 national code throughout this country. In his report Dr. 
 Hays says : 'On examining a great number of codes of ethics 
 adopted by different societies in the United States it was 
 found that they were all based on that prepared by Dr. 
 Thomas Percival (of England) and published in 1803, and 
 the phrases of this writer were preserved to a considerable 
 extent in all of them. Percival's code was prepared for a 
 son who was about to engage in medical practice, and who 
 died before its publication. It was dedicated to another son 
 who was studying medicine." 
 
 "The following is quoted from this dedication : 'The 
 relations in which the physician stands to his patients, to his 
 brethren and the public are complicated and multifarious, in- 
 volving much knowledge of human nature and extensive 
 moral duties. The study of professional ethics, therefore, 
 cannot fail to invigorate and enlarge your understanding, 
 while the observance of the duties which they enjoin will 
 soften your manners, expand your affections, and form you 
 to that propriety and dignity of conduct which are essential 
 to the character of a gentleman.' " 
 
 ARTICLE 1, SECS. 1 AND 2. 
 
 Sec. 2. "The physician does not compromise his self- 
 respect by submitting patiently to rudeness, or even to in- 
 
162 PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. 
 
 suits from a sick patient, to which he would be by no means 
 bound to submit quietly if the patient were well. 
 
 "The ethical rule is not, at least to the same extent, ap- 
 plicable to the freinds of patients, but allowance is often to 
 be made for the disturbance of mind arising from anxiety 
 and apprehension. * * * 
 
 "On the part of the physician (or dentist) it is a gross 
 impropriety to require the forbearance of his sick patients 
 and their friends. * * * Roughness and lack of courtesy 
 are inexcusable, and brutality toward patients or their friends 
 is a grievous offence against the medical (or dental) profes- 
 . sion. It is especially reprehensible toward hospital or in- 
 firmary or charity patients, because they have not the privi- 
 lege to change their physician (or dentist) if dissatisfied with 
 him, hence it is taking a mean advantage not to treat such 
 patients with attention and humanity." 
 
 "The binding force of secrecy as regards all information 
 obtained in connection with professional relations, whenever 
 it is desired, or desirable on the part of the patients or their 
 friends * * * jg not sufficiently appreciated by many 
 members of the medical profession and still less by the pub- 
 lic. * * * A more judicious reserve than is now practiced 
 by not a few physicians would soon lead to a better under- 
 standing of the ethical duty of secrecy on the part of the 
 public, * * * i3^^ thg ground is by no means to be taken 
 that nothing is to be communicated to friends, acquaintances 
 or the public respecting cases of disease. It would be sim- 
 ply absurd to take this ground. The condition of the patient 
 in respect of danger and, in some instances, the probable 
 duration of disease, may properly be made known. * * * 
 In respect of the knowledge of criminal acts the physician 
 is not to play the part of a detective or informer. * * * 
 A criminal has a right to medical services in sickness." 
 
 "In England the law makes the divulging of professional 
 secrets compulsory when called upon as a witness in court. 
 The law in France recognizes the obligations of secrecy." 
 
CODE OF ETHICS. 163 
 
 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE DENTAL SOCIETY. 
 ADOPTED MAY, 1909. 
 
 Section 1. In his dealings with patients and with the 
 profession, the conduct of the dentist should be in accordance 
 with the Golden Rule, both in its letter and its spirit. 
 
 Sec. 2. It is unprofessional for a dentist to advertise 
 by handbills, posters, circulars, cards, signs, or in newspapers 
 or other publications, calling attention to special methods of 
 practice, or claiming excellence over other practitioners, or to 
 use display advertisements of any kind. This does not ex- 
 chide a practitioner from using professional cards of suitable 
 size, v^'ith name, titles, address and telephone number printed 
 in modest type, nor having the same character of card in a 
 newspaper. Neither does it prevent a practitioner who con- 
 fines himself to a specialty from merely announcing his 
 specialty on his professional card. 
 
 Sec. 3. It is unprofessional for dentists to pay or accept 
 commissions on fees for professional services, or on prescrip- 
 tions or other articles supplied to patients by pharmacists or 
 others. 
 
 Sec. 4. One dentist should not disparage the services of 
 another to a patient. Criticism of work which is apparently 
 defective may be unjust through lack of knowledge of the 
 conditions under which the work was performed. The duty 
 of the dentist is to remedy any defect without comment. 
 
 Sec. 5. If a dentist is consulted in an emergency by the 
 patient of another practitioner who is temporarily absent from 
 his office, the duty of the dentist so consulted is to relieve 
 the patient of any immediate disability by temporary service 
 only, and then refer the patient back to the regular dentist. 
 
 Sec. 6. When a dentist is called in consultation by a 
 fellow-practitioner he should hold the discussions in the con- 
 sultation as confidential, and under no circumstances should 
 he accept charge of the case without the request of the dentist 
 who has been attending it. 
 
 Sec. 7. The dentist should be morally, mentally and 
 physically clean, and honest in all his dealings with his fellow- 
 
164 CODE OF ETHICS. 
 
 men, as comports with the dignity of a cultured and pro- 
 fessional gentleman. 
 
 CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NATIONAL DENTAL 
 ASSOCIATION. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 THE DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION TO THEIR PATIENTS. 
 
 > Section 1. The dentist should be ever ready to respond 
 
 to the wants of his patrons, and should fully recognize the 
 ' obligations involved in the discharge of his duties toward 
 them. As they are in most cases unable to correctly estimate 
 the character of his operations, his own sense of right must 
 guarantee faithfulness in their performance. His manner 
 should be firm, yet kind and sympathizing, so as to gain the 
 respect and confidence of his patients ; and even the simplest 
 case committed to his care should receive that attention which 
 is due to operations performed on living sensitive tissue. 
 
 Sec. 2. It is not to be expected that the patient will 
 possess a very extended or a very accurate knowledge of pro- 
 fessional matters. The dentist should make due allowance 
 for this, patiently explaining many things which may seem 
 quite clear to himself, thus endeavoring to educate the public 
 mind so that it will properly appreciate the beneficent efforts 
 of our profession. He should encourage no false hopes by 
 promising success when, in the nature of the case, there is 
 uncertainty. 
 ^^ f^t Sec. 3. The dentist should be temperate in all things, 
 ^ jy lieep'mg both mind and body in the best possible health, that 
 
 ^ his patients may have the benefit of that clearness of judg- 
 
 ment and skill which is their right. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 MAINTAINING PROFESSIONAL CHARACTER. 
 
 Section 1. A member of the dental profession is bound 
 to maintain it honor, to labor earnestly to extend its sphere 
 
CODE OF ETHICS. 165 
 
 of usefulness. He should avoid everything in language and 
 conduct calculated to dishonor his profession, and should 
 ever manifest a due respect for his brethren. The young 
 should show special respect to their seniors ; the aged special 
 encouragement to their juniors. 
 
 Sec. 2. It is unprofessional to resort to public advertise- 
 ments, cards, handbills, posters or signs, calling attention to 
 peculiar styles of work, lowness of prices, special modes of 
 operating; or to claim superiority over neighboring practi- 
 tioners; to publish reports of cases or certificates in the public 
 prints ; to circulate or recommend nostrums ; or to perform 
 any other similar acts. But nothing in this section shall be 
 be so construed as to imply that it is unprofessional for den- 
 tists to announce in the public prints, or by cards, simply 
 their names, occupation and place of business, or, in the same 
 manner, to announce their removal, absence from, or return 
 to business, or to issue to their patients appointment cards 
 having a fee bill for professional services thereon. 
 
 Sec. 3. When consulted by the patient of another prac- 
 titioner, the dentist should guard against inquiries or hints 
 disparaging to the family dentist, or calculated to weaken the 
 patient's confidence in him ; and if the interests of the patient 
 will not be endangered thereby, the case should be temporarily 
 treated, and referred back to the family dentist. 
 
 Sec. 4. When general rules shall have been adopted by 
 members of the profession practicing in the same localities in 
 relation to fees, it is unprofessional and dishonorable to de- 
 part from those rules, except when variation of circumstances 
 requires it. And it is ever tc be regarded as unprofessional to 
 warrant operations as an inducement to patronage. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 CONSULTATION. 
 
 Consultations should be promoted in difficult or protracted 
 cases, as they give rise to confidence, energy, and broader 
 views in practice. In consultations, that courtesy and just 
 dealing which is the right of all should be especially observed. 
 
166 CODE OF ETHICS. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 THE RELATIVE DUTIES OF DENTISTS AND PHYSICIANS. 
 
 Dental surgery is a specialty in medical science. Phy- 
 sicians and dentists should both bear this in mind. The den- 
 tist is professionally limited to diseases of the dental organs 
 and adjacent parts. With these he should be more familiar 
 then the general practitioner is expected to be ; and while he 
 recognizes the broader knowledge of the physician in regard 
 to diseases of the general system, the latter is under equal 
 obligations to respect his higher attainments in his specialty. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 THE MUTUAL DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION AND THE PUBLIC. 
 
 Dentists are frequent witnesses, and at the same time the 
 best judges, of the impositions perpetrated by quacks, and it 
 is their duty to enlighten and warn the public in regard to 
 them. For this and many other benefits conferred by the 
 competent and honorable dentist, the profession is entitled 
 to the confidence and respect of the public, who should al- 
 ways discriminate in favor of the true man of science and 
 integrity against the empiric and imposter. The public has 
 no right to tax the time and talents of the profession in 
 examinations, prescriptions, or in any way without proper 
 remuneration. 
 
PATENTS. 
 
 The medical code of ethics expressly declares that it is 
 unprofessional for any practitioner of medicine to hold a 
 patent on any surgical instruments or appliances, or upon any 
 medicine or pharmaceutical preparation. It is believed that 
 no similar clause is to be found in any code of dental ethics 
 hitherto adopted by any dental society. There has been 
 strenuous effort, however, on the part of some to hold the 
 dental profession to the same rule. The argument in favor 
 of it is that anything used for the healing of the sick or the 
 cure of deformities and the replacement or restoration of lost 
 members is so important to the welfare of humanity that its 
 use should not be restricted or its price increased by a patent 
 monopoly. It is true that the benefits of the healing art in 
 all its branches and applications should be available as nearly 
 as possible to the whole population, but no one objects to the 
 custom of individual practitioners receiving compensation 
 from the individual patients whom they serve, and it is difficult 
 to discover any ethical principle which does not apply with 
 equal force to the man who, through the invention of some 
 valuable instrument or appliance or apparatus, or the develop- 
 ment and introduction of some better process or mode of pro- 
 cedure serves all patients by helping all practitioners to be- 
 come more efficient. 
 
 Such patents as those upon automatic mallets, dental 
 chairs, dental engines, fountain cuspidors, Donaldson broaches 
 and almost innumerable other articles have encountered no 
 appreciable objection or opposition from the dental profession 
 so long as the price of the purchased article included the 
 compensation to the inventor, or the owner of the patent ; but 
 when the owner of a patent has sought to collect money 
 directly for the use of an invention, as for instance, the op- 
 pressive yearly license fee collected by the Goodyear Dental 
 Vucanite Co.. the similar one attempted by the Crown & 
 Bridge Co., and the moderate single fee demanded by Dr. 
 Taggart for the use of his inventions during the whole term 
 
168 PATENTS. 
 
 of his patents, the profession has shown intense antagonism 
 and much irritation and bitterness toward such patents and 
 the owners of them. It is probable that in the case of Dr. 
 Taggart, whose great services to the profession few or none 
 have seriously questioned, the opposition is due, in part at 
 least, to the attitude and habit of mind carried over from the 
 experiences with the Vulcanite Company and the Crown Com- 
 pany, both of which the profession generally regarded as little 
 better than robbers. In the case of the Goodyear Dental Vul- 
 canite Co. it was universally believed that the Cummings 
 patent was not valid and that Cummings was not the inventor 
 or originator of the process of making artificial teeth on rub- 
 ber plates, and nobody had any reason to suppose that any 
 of the vast sum of money collected from the dentists ever 
 benefited anyone who had ever rendered any service to the 
 dental profession or the patients they served. The same 
 things were true of the Crown and Bridge Co., except that 
 their attempts to collect royalties or licenses were prevented 
 by the Dental Protective Association under the leadership of 
 Dr. J. N. Crouse. 
 
 It has been sought to make a distinction between patents 
 for things that can be manufactured and sold to the dentists 
 and patents upon things to be made by the dentist for in- 
 dividual patients, like crowns, bridges and inlays, and these 
 latter have been called "process patents." Dr. Crouse used 
 to say that all patents are "process patents," and he was 
 pretty nearly right, for the first-class named above are patents 
 upon the "process" of making hundreds or thousands of like 
 things in a shop or factory, while the latter class of patents 
 are for making hundreds or thousands of similar things which 
 are not alike, but each adapted to an individual place or use. 
 Whether it is practicable to frame a law which will dis- 
 criminate clearly enough these different uses of invented 
 processes to grant patents upon one class and refuse them to 
 the other class, or whether it would be good public policy to 
 do so if it could be done, I will not attempt to affirm or deny. 
 This much appears to be plain enough, however, that so long 
 as the United States grants these so-called "process patents" 
 
PATENTS. 169 
 
 and upholds them in the courts it is futile and foolish to ignore 
 or resist a patent solely on this ground. If there is a 
 probability that a patent has been granted to some one who 
 was not the real inventor, or if for a process or article in such 
 common use before the patent was applied for as to be public 
 property, in other words if there is doubt about the validity 
 of the patent, of course it is the privilege of any man or asso- 
 ciation of men to test the validity of the patent in the courts. 
 In the "Principles of Medical Ethics," chapter second, 
 article first, section five reads as follows, "Patents and per- 
 quisites. — It is unprofessional to receive remuneration from 
 patents for surgical instruments or medicines ; to accept re- 
 bates on prescriptions or surgical appliances, or perquisites 
 from attendants who aid in the care of patients." There can 
 be no reasonable, doubt about the impropriety of accepting 
 rebates or prequisities (which has been discussed in another 
 place). 
 
 As regards patents there would seem to be room for 
 honest differences of opinion. It is difficult to say upon what 
 moral grounds a man can be denied any remuneration, except 
 what may accrue in his own personal practice ; for a discovery 
 or improvement he may make in the practice of medicine, 
 whether it be some new instrument or appliance, or some 
 new medicine. It is true that sentiments of philanthropy and 
 also professional duty would dictate that the benefits of im- 
 provements and discoveries be as widely diffused at as little 
 cost as possible, but in some cases this can better be done 
 by a monopoly in the manufacture. For instance, in the case 
 of many instruments and remedies it will be easy for one 
 manufacturing plant to supply the whole demand. It is evi- 
 dent therefore that if two, or perhaps half a dozen different 
 parties incur the expense of providing similar manufacturing 
 facilities, the price of the product must be increased if they 
 are all to get a fair profit on their cost of manufacture ; be- 
 sides which the pressure of competition offers the temptation 
 to cheapen the product by deteriorating its quality. Some one 
 has got to manufacture these things and it seems hardly 
 reasonable that the men who originated them should be the 
 
170 PATENTS. 
 
 only ones who are forbidden to profit by giving to tiie manu- 
 facture such supervision as may insure their perfection. 
 
 Whether the foregoing considerations can be considered 
 sound or not, it is nevertheless undoubtedly true that the 
 great body of the medical profession are steadfastly loyal to 
 the restrictions laid down in their "Principles of Medical 
 Ethics," in respect to patents, and remedies the ingredients 
 or mode of manufacture of which are kept secret. Probably 
 this loyalty rests not so much upon grounds of strict justice 
 and equity as upon motives of philanthropy and humanity, 
 for there is no other class of men who respond so freely and 
 generously, both individually and collectively, to the appeal of 
 the sufifering and the needy as do the physicians, and they take 
 the attitude, and dentists should also, that everything within 
 reason that they can do for the advancement or success of 
 their profession is due from them in acknowledgment of 
 what they have received from their profession. 
 
 A vast fund of knowledge, skill and experience has been 
 accumulated by the medical profession through hundreds of 
 years, — and by the dental profession also, though it is far 
 less ancient, — and all these acquirements are freely available 
 to the present generation, the only limitation being the indi- 
 vidual capacity to acquire and use it. Having received so 
 great a gift it would be shameful for any man to seek to ex- 
 ploit the giver financially for any return benefits he might be 
 able to confer. 
 
 When a man has made such great personal sacrifices in 
 conferring some great benefit upon his profession and hu- 
 manity as to impoverish himself and his family there ought 
 to be some provision by which he can be rewarded and taken 
 care of, but it is scarcely possible to have any rule or law 
 applicable to human affairs that will not work some injustice or 
 hardship in a few instances, and it is believed that the exploit- 
 ing for gain of every new thing in the practice of medicine, 
 as is done, rightly enough, in industrial and commercial affairs, 
 would work so much inconvenience, hardship, and actual 
 damage to life and health as vv^ould far outweigh the occasional 
 
PATENTS. 171 
 
 injustice and hardship to a few individuals that are caused by 
 the present rule. 
 
 The absence from the codes of dental ethics of any 
 prohibition similar to that in the "Principles of Medical 
 Ethics" leaves the dental profession freer, and we may, and 
 should by force of public opinion establish as firmly as pos- 
 sible the custom of the medical profession in respect to 
 patents, while we are also free to recognize the propriety, in 
 rare instances, for some man who has made great sacrifices, 
 and conferred great benefits, to compel from a reluctant pro- 
 fession by means of a patent some adequate remuneration for 
 great services. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE 
 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION.* 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE DUTIES OF PHYSICIANS TO THEIR PATIENTS. 
 THE physician's RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 Section 1. — A profession has for its prime object the service 
 it can render to humanity; reward or financial gain should be a 
 subordinate consideration. The practice of medicine is a pro- 
 fession. In choosing this profession an individual assumes an 
 obligation to conduct himself in accord with its ideals. 
 
 PATIENCE, DELICACY AND SECRECY. 
 
 Sec. 2. — Patience and delicacy should characterize all the 
 acts of a physician. The confidences concerning individual or 
 domestic life entrusted by a patient to a physician, and the 
 defects of disposition or flaws of character observed in patients 
 during medical attendance should be held as a trust and should 
 never be revealed except when imperatively required by the laws 
 of the state. There are occasions, however, when a physician 
 must determine whether or not his duty to society requires him 
 to take definite action to protect a healthy individual from be- 
 coming infected, because the physician has knowledge, obtained 
 through the confidences entrusted to him as a physician, of a 
 communicable disease to which the healthy individual is about to 
 be exposed. In such a case, the physician should act as he would 
 desire another to act toward one of his own family under like 
 circumstances. Before he determines his course, the physician 
 should know the civil law of his commonwealth concerning 
 privileged communications. 
 
 *Reprinted by permission from the pamphlet published by the Ameri- 
 can Medical Association. 
 
PHYSICIANS AND THEIR PATIENTS. 173 
 
 PROGNOSIS. 
 
 Sec. 3. — A physician should give timely notice of dangerous 
 manifestations of the disease to the friends of the patient. He 
 should neither exaggerate nor minimize the gravity of the 
 patient's condition. He should assure himself that the patient or 
 his friends have such knowledge of the patient's condition as 
 will serve the best interests of the patient and the family. 
 
 PATIENTS MUST NOT BE NEGLECTED. 
 
 Sec. 4. — A physician is free to choose whom he will serve. 
 He should, however, always respond to any request for his 
 assistance in an emergency or whenever temperate public opinion 
 expects the service. Once having undertaken a case, a physician 
 should not abandon or neglect the patient because the disease is 
 deemed incurable ; nor should he withdraw from the case for 
 any reason until a sufficient notice of a desire to be released has 
 been given the patient or his friends to make it possible for them 
 to secure another medical attendant. 
 
 CHAPTER n. 
 
 THE DUTIES OF PHYSICIANS TO EACH OTHER AND TO THE 
 PROFESSION AT LARGE. 
 
 Article I. — Duties to the Profession. 
 
 UPPIOLD honor of PROFESSION. 
 
 Section. 1. — The obligation assumed on entering the pro- 
 fession requires the physician to comport himself as a gentleman 
 and demands that he use every honorable means to uphold the 
 dignity and honor of his vocation, to exalt its standards and to 
 extend its sphere of usefulness. A physician should not base 
 his practice on an exclusive dogma or sectarian system, for "sects 
 are implacable despots ; to accept their thraldom is to take away 
 all liberty from one's actions and thought." (Nicon, father of 
 Galen.) 
 
 DUTY OF MEDICAL SOCIETIES. 
 
 Sec. 2. — In order that the dignity and honor of the medical 
 profession may be upheld, its standards exalted, its sphere of 
 
174 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS. 
 
 usefulness extended, and the advancement of medical science 
 promoted, a physician should associate himself with medical 
 societies and contribute his time, energy and means in order 
 that these societies may represent the ideals of the profession. 
 
 DEPORTMENT. 
 
 Sec. 3. — A physician should be "an upright man, instructed 
 in the art of healing." Consequently, he must keep himself 
 pure in character and conform to a high standard of morals, and 
 must be diHgent and conscientious in his studies. "He should 
 also be modest, sober, patient, prompt to do his whole duty with- 
 out anxiety; pious without going so far as superstition, conduct- 
 ing himself with propriety in his profession and in all the actions 
 of his life." (Hippocrates.) 
 
 ADVERTISING. 
 
 Sec. 4. — Solicitation of patients by circulars or advertise- 
 ments, or by personal communications or interviews, not war- 
 ranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally 
 unprofessional to procure patients by indirection through solicitors 
 or agents of any kind, (as) or by indirect advertisement, or by 
 furnishing or inspiring newspaper or magazine comments con- 
 cerning cases in which the physician has been or is concerned. 
 All other like self-laudations defy the traditions and lower the 
 tone of any profession and so are intolerable. The most worthy 
 and effctive advertismement possible, even for a young physician, 
 and especially with his brother physicians, is the establishment 
 of a well-merited reputation for professional ability and fidelity. 
 This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character 
 and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple 
 business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, 
 and sometimes of convenience, is not per s.e improper. As implied, 
 it is unprofessional to disregard local customs and offend recog- 
 nized ideals in publishing or circulating such cards. 
 
 It is unprofessional to promise radical cures; to boast of 
 cures and secret methods of treatment or remedies ; to exhibit 
 certificates of skill or of success in the treatment of diseases ; or 
 to employ any methods to gain the attention of the public for 
 the purpose of obtaining patients. 
 
PHYSICIANS AND THEIR PROFESSION. 175 
 
 PATENTS AND PERQUISITES 
 
 Sec. 5. — It is unprofessional to receive remuneration from 
 patents for surgical instruments or medicines ; to accept rebates 
 on prescriptions or surgical appliances, or perquisites from at- 
 tendants who aid in the care of patients. 
 
 MEDICAL LAWS — SECRET REMEDIES. 
 
 Sec. 6. — It is unprofessional for a physician to assist un- 
 qualified persons to evade legal restrictions governing the prac- 
 tice of medicine ; it is equally unethical to prescribe or dispense 
 secret medicines or other secret remedial agents, or manufacture 
 or promote their use in any way. 
 
 SAFEGUARDING THE PROFESSION. 
 
 Sec. 7. — Physicians should expose without fear or favor, 
 before the proper medical or legal tribunals, corrupt or dishonest 
 conduct of members of the profession. Every physician should 
 aid in safeguarding the profession against the admission to its 
 ranks of those who are unfit or unqualified because deficient 
 either in nioral character or education. 
 
 Article II. — Professional Services of Physicians 
 TO Each Other. 
 
 PHYSICIANS DEPENDENT ON EACH OTHER. 
 
 Section 1. — Experience teaches that it is unwise for a phy- 
 sician to treat m.embers of his own family or himself. Conse- 
 quently, a physician should always cheerfully and gratuitously 
 respond with his professional services to the call of any physician 
 practicing in his vicinity, or of the immediate family dependents 
 of physicians. 
 
 COMPENSATION FOR EXPENSES. 
 
 Sec. 2. — When a physician from a distance is called on to 
 advise another physician or one of his family dependents, and 
 the physician to whom the service is rendered is in easy financial 
 circumstances, a compensation that will at least meet the travel- 
 ing expenses of the visiting physician should be profifered. When 
 
176 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS. 
 
 such a service requires an absence from the accustomed field of 
 professional work of the visitor that might reasonably be ex- 
 pected to entail a pecuinary loss, such loss should, in part at 
 least, be provided for in the compensation offered. 
 
 0,NE PHYSICIAN TO TAKE CHARGE. 
 
 Sec. 3. — When a physician or a member of his dependent 
 family is seriously ill, he or his family should select a physician 
 from among his neighboring colleagues to take charge of the 
 case. Other physicians may be associated in the care of the 
 patient as consultants. 
 
 Article III. — Duties of Physician in Consultations. 
 
 CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE REQUESTED. 
 
 Section 1. — In serious illness, especially in doubtful or diffi- 
 cult conditions, the physician should request consultation. 
 
 CONSULTATION FOR PATIENT's BENEFIT. 
 
 Sec. 2. — In every consultation, the benefit to be derived by 
 the patient is of first importance. All the physicians interested 
 in the case should be frank and candid with the patient and his 
 family. There never is occasion for insincerity, rivalry or envy 
 and these should never be permitted between consultants. 
 
 PUNCTUALITY. 
 
 Sec. 3. — It is the duty of a physician, particularly in the 
 instance of a consultation, to be punctual in attendance. When, 
 however, the consultant or the physician in charge is unavoidably 
 delayed, the one who first arrives should wait for the other for a 
 reasonable time, after which the consultation should be con- 
 sidered postponed. When the consultant has come from a dis- 
 tance, or when for any reason it will be difficult to meet the 
 physician in charge at another time, or if the case is urgent, or 
 if it be the desire of the patient, he may examine the patient 
 and mail his written opinion, or see that it is delivered under 
 seal, to the physician in charge. Under these conditions, the 
 consultant's conduct must be especially tactful; he must remem- 
 
PHYSICIANS AND THEIR PROFESSION. 177 
 
 ber that he is framing an opinion without the aid of the physician 
 who has observed the course of the disease. 
 
 PATIENT REFERRED TO SPECIALIST. 
 
 Sec. 4. — When a patient is sent to one specially skilled in 
 the care of the condition from which he is thought to be suffer- 
 ing, and for any reason it is impracticable for the physician in 
 charge of the case to accompany the patient, the physician in 
 charge should send to the consultant by mail, or in the care of 
 the patient, under seal, a history of the case, together with the 
 physician's opinion and an outline of the treatment, or so much 
 of this as may possibly be of service to the consultant; and as 
 soon as possible after the case has been seen and studied, the 
 consultant should address the physician in charge and advise him 
 of the results of the consultant's investigation of the case. Both 
 these opinions are confidential and must be so regarded by the 
 consultant and by the physician in charge. 
 
 DISCUSSIONS IN CONSULTATION. 
 
 Sec. 5.— After the physicians called in consultation have 
 completed their investigations of the case, they may meet by 
 themselves to discuss conditions and determine the course to be 
 followed in the treatment of the patient. No statement or dis- 
 cussion of the case should take place before the patient or friends, 
 except in the presence of all the physicians attending, or by their 
 common consent; and no opinions or prognostications should be 
 delivered as a result of the deliberations of the consultants, w^hich 
 have not been concurred in by the consultants at their conference. 
 
 ATTENDING PHYSICIAN RESPONSIBLE. 
 
 Sec. 6. — The physician in attendance is in charge of the case 
 and is responsible for the treatment of the patient. Consequently, 
 he may prescribe for the patient at any time and is privileged to 
 vary the mode of treatment outlined and agreed on at a con- 
 sultation whenever, in his opinion, such a change is warranted. 
 However, at the next consultation, he should state his reasons 
 for departing from the course decided on at the previous con- 
 ference. When an emergency occurs during the absence of the 
 
178 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS. 
 
 attending physician, a consultant may provide for the emergency 
 and the subsequent care of the patient until the arrival of the 
 physician in charge, but should do no more than this without the 
 consent of the physician in charge. 
 
 CONFLICT OF OPINION. 
 
 Sec. 7. — Should the attending physician and the consultant 
 find it impossible to agree in their views of a case another con- 
 sultant should be called to the conference or the first consultant 
 should withdraw. However, since the consultant was employed 
 by the patient in order that his opinion might be obtained, he 
 should be permitted to state the result of his study of the case 
 to the patient, or his next friend in the presence of the physician 
 in charge. 
 
 CONSULTANT AND ATTENDANT. 
 
 Sec. 8. — When a physician has attended a case as a con- 
 sultant, he should not become the attendant of the patient dur- 
 ing that illness except with the consent of the physician who 
 was in charge at the time of the consultation. 
 
 Article IV. — Duties of Physicians in Cases of 
 Interference. 
 
 criticism to be avoided. 
 
 Section 1. — The physician, in his intercourse with a patient 
 under the care of another physician, should observe the strictest 
 caution and reserve; should give no disingenuous hints relative 
 to the nature and treatment of the patient's disorder ; nor should 
 the course of conduct of the physician, directly or indirectly, 
 tend to diminish the trust reposed in the attending physician. 
 
 social calls on patient of another physician. 
 
 Sec. 2. — A physician should avoid making social calls on 
 those who are under the professional care of other physicians 
 without the knowledge and consent of the attendant. Should 
 such a friendly visit be made, there should be no inquiry relative 
 to the nature of the disease or comment upon the treatment of 
 
PHYSICIANS AND THEIR PROFESSION. 179 
 
 the case, but the conversation should be on subjects other than 
 the physical condition of the patient. 
 
 SERVICES TO PATIENT OF ANOTHER PHYSICIAN. 
 
 Sec. 3. — A physician should never take charge of or pre- 
 scribe for a patient who is under the care of another physician, 
 except in an emergency, until after the other physician has re- 
 linquished the case or has been properly dismissed. 
 
 CRITICISM TO BE AVOIDED. 
 
 Sec. 4. — When a physician does succeed another physician 
 in the charge of a case, he should not make comments on or 
 insinuations regarding the practice of the one who preceded him. 
 Such comments or insinuations tend to lower the esteem of the 
 patient for the medical profession and so react against the critic. 
 
 EMERGENCY CASES. 
 
 Sec. 5. — When a physician is called in an emergency and 
 finds that he has been sent for because the family attendant is 
 not at hand, or when a physician is asked to see another phy- 
 sician's patient because of an aggravation of the disease, he 
 should provide only for the patient's immediate need and should 
 withdraw from the case on the arrival of the family physician 
 after he has reported the condition found and the treatment 
 administered. 
 
 WHEN SEVERAL PHYSICIANS ARE SUMMONED. 
 
 Sec. 6. — When several physicians have been summoned in a 
 case of sudden illness or of accident, the first to arrive should 
 be considered the physician in charge. However, as soon as the 
 exigencies of the case permit, or on the arrival of the acknowl- 
 edged family attendant or the physician the patient desires to 
 serve him, the first physician should withdraw in favor of the 
 chosen attendant ; should the patient or his family wish some one 
 other than the physician known to be the family physician to take 
 charge of the case the patient should advise the family physician 
 of his desire. When, because of sudden illness or accident, a 
 patient is taken to a hospital, the patient should be returned to 
 the care of his known family physician as soon as the condition 
 
180 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS. 
 
 of the patient and the circumstances of the case warrant this 
 transfer. 
 
 A colleague's patient. 
 
 Sec. 7. — When a physician is requested by a colleague to 
 care for a patient during his temporary absence, or when, because 
 of an emergency, he is asked to see a patient of a colleague, the 
 physician should treat the patient in the same manner and with 
 the same delicacy as he would have one of his own patients cared 
 for under similar circumstances. The patient should be returned 
 to the care of the attending physician as soon as possible. 
 
 RELINQUISHING PATIENT TO REGULAR ATTENDANT. 
 
 Sec. 8. — When a physician is called to the patient of another 
 physician during the enforced absence of that physician, the 
 patient should be relinquished on the return of the latter. 
 
 SUBSTITUTING IN OBSTETRIC WORK. 
 
 Sec. 9. — W^hen a physician attends a woman in labor in the 
 absence of another who has been engaged to attend, such phy- 
 sician should resign the patient to the one first engaged, upon his 
 arrival; the physician is entitled to compensation for the pro- 
 fessional services he may have rendered. 
 
 Article V. — Differences Between Physicians. 
 
 ARBITRATION. 
 
 Section 1. — Whenever there arises between physicians a 
 grave difference of opinion which cannot be promptly adjusted, 
 the dispute should be referred for arbitration to a committee of 
 impartial physicians, preferably the Board of Censors of a com- 
 ponent county society of the American Medical Association. 
 
 Article VI. — Compensation. 
 
 LIMITS OF gratuitous SERVICE. 
 
 Section 1. — The poverty of a patient and the mutual pro- 
 fessional obligation of physicians should command the gratuitous 
 services of a physician. But institutions endowed by societies, 
 and organizations for mutual benefit, or for accident, sickness 
 
PHYSICIANS AND THEIR PROFESSION. 181 
 
 and life insurance, or for analogous purposes, should be accorded 
 no such privileges. 
 
 CONTRACT PRACTICE. 
 
 Sec. 2. — It is unprofessional for a physician to dispose of 
 his services under conditions that make it impossible to render 
 adequate service to his patient or which interfere with reasonable 
 competition among the physicians of a community. To do this 
 is detrimental to the public and to the individual physician, and 
 lowers the dignity of the profession. 
 
 SECRET DIVISION OF FEES CONDEMNED. 
 
 Sec. 3. — It is detrimental to the public good and degrading 
 to the profession, and therefore unprofessional, to give or to 
 receive a commission. It is also unprofessional to divide a fee 
 for medical advice or surgical treatment, unless the patient or 
 his next friend is fully informed as to the terms of the 
 transaction. The patient should be made to realize that a proper 
 fee should be paid the family physician for the service he ren- 
 ders in determining the surgical or medical treatment suited to 
 the condition, and in advising concerning those best qualified to 
 render any special service that may be required by the patient. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION TO THE PUBLIC. 
 PHYSICIANS AS CITIZENS. 
 
 Section 1. — Physicians, as good citizens and because their 
 professional training specially qualifies them to render this serv- 
 ice, should give advice concerning the public health of the com- 
 munity. They should bear their full part in enforcing its laws 
 and sustaining the institutions that advance the interests of 
 humanity. They should co-operate especially with the proper 
 authorities in the administration of sanitary laws and regula- 
 tions. They should be ready to counsel the public on subjects 
 relating to sanitary police, public hygiene and legal medicine. 
 
 PHYSICIANS SHOULD ENLIGHTEN PUBLIC — DUTIES IN EPIDEMICS. 
 
 Sec. 2. — Physicians, especially those engaged in public health 
 work, should enlighten the public regarding quarantine regula- 
 
182 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS. 
 
 tions; on the location, arrangement and dietaries of hospitals, 
 asylums, schools, prisons and similar institutions ; and concerning 
 measures for the prevention of epidemic and contagious diseases. 
 When an epidemic prevails, a physician must continue his labors 
 for the alleviation of suffering people, without regard to the risk 
 to his own health or life or to financial return. At all times, it 
 is the duty of the physician to notify the properly constituted 
 public health authorities of every case of communicable disease 
 under his care, in accordance with the laws, rules and regulations 
 of the health authorities of the locality in which the patient is. 
 
 PUBLIC WARNED. 
 
 Sec. 3. — Physicians should warn the public agaiinst the 
 devices practiced and the false pretensions made by charlatans 
 which may cause injury to health and loss of life. 
 
 PHARMACISTS. 
 
 Sec. 4. — By legitimate patronage, physicians should recog- 
 nize and promote the profession of pharmacy ; but any pharmacist, 
 unless he be qualified as a physician, who assumes to prescribe 
 for the sick, should be denied such countenance and support. 
 Moreover, whenever a druggist or pharmacist dispenses deter- 
 iorated or adulterated drugs, or substitutes one remedy for 
 another designated in a prescription, he thereby forfeits all 
 claims to the favorable consideration of the public and physicians. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 While the foregoing statements express in a general way 
 the duty of the physician to his patients, to other members of 
 the profession and to the profession at large, as well as of the 
 profession to the public, it is not to be supposed that they cover 
 the whole field of medical ethics, or that the physician is not 
 under many duties and obligations besides these herein set forth. 
 In a word, it is incumbent on the physician that under all con- 
 ditions, his bearing toward patients, the public, and fellow practi- 
 tioner should be characterized by a gentlemanly deportment and 
 that he constantly should behave toward others as he desires 
 them to deal with him. Finally, these principles are primarily 
 
PHYSICIANS AND THE PUBLIC. 183 
 
 for the good of the public, and their enforcement should be con- 
 ducted in such a manner as shall deserve and receive the en- 
 dorsement of the community. 
 
PART THIRD. 
 
 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 THE STATUS OF THE DENTIST — THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE — POWER 
 OF THE STATE TO REGULATE PRACTICE — RELATION BETWEEN 
 DENTIST AND PATIENT. 
 
 ^"Perhaps a legal definition of Dentistry has not yet been 
 formulated. The statutes of some states imply that dentistry 
 is a branch of medicine or surgery. Thus the statute of Michigan 
 regulating the practice of medicine or surgery provides : 'from 
 practicing medicine or surgery {except dentistry).' The defini- 
 tions in some statutes of 'practice of medicine' are broad enough 
 to include the practice of dentistry and vice versa. Thus the act 
 of 1882 of Mississippi, section 20, provides that the words 
 'practice of medicine' shall mean to suggest, recommend, pre- 
 scribe or direct for the use of any person, any drug, medicine, 
 appliance, or other agency, whether material or not material, 
 for the cure, relief, or palliation of any ailment or disease of the 
 mind or body, or for the cure or relief of any wound, fracture 
 or other bodily injury, or any deformity.' " It is plain that this 
 definition is broad enough to cover the whole field of dentistry. 
 
 ^"The Mississippi Court of Errors and Appeals has held 
 that dentistry is a department of the medical art. In Whit- 
 comb V. Reid,^ the question before the court was whether a 
 dentist's instruments were exempt from execution under a 
 statute exempting the 'tools of a mechanic necessary for carry- 
 ing on his trade." The Court said: 'We do not think that this 
 provision can be extended to the description of instruments in 
 question. A dentist cannot be properly denominated a mechanic' 
 It is true that the practice of his art requires the use of instru- 
 ments for manual operation, and that much of it consists in 
 manual operation; but it also involves a knowledge of the 
 physiology of the teeth, which cannot be acquired but by a proper 
 
 'Mikell, p. 17, Chap 1. 
 
 ^Mikell, page 18. 
 
 '31 Miss. — 567 (1856). 
 
STATUS OF THE DENTIST. 185 
 
 course of study; and this is taught by learned treatises on the 
 subject, and as a distinct, though limited, department of the 
 medical art in institutions established for the purpose. It re- 
 quires both science and skill and if such persons could be included 
 in the denomination of mechanics because their pursuit required 
 the use of mechanical instruments and skill in manual operation, 
 the same reason would include general surgeons under the same 
 denomination, because the practice of their profession depends, 
 in a great degree, upon similar instruments and operative skill. 
 
 "Nor could such a pursuit properly be said to be a 'trade.' 
 That term is defined to denote the 'business or occupation' which 
 a person has learned, and which he carries on for procuring sub- 
 sistence, or for profit — particularly a mechanical employment, 
 distinguished from the liberal arts and learned professions and 
 from agriculture.' (Webster's Dictionary.) It is manifest that 
 a pursuit requiring a correct knowledge of the anatomy and 
 physiology of a part of the human body as well as mechanical 
 skill in the use of the necessary instruments, could not be properly 
 denominated a 'trade.' " 
 
 ^"There are a few decisions that dentistry is not a branch 
 or department of medicine or surgery. In State v. Fisher,- 
 (Missouri) this conclusion is reached by a bare majority of 
 four judges to three; * * * on the question whether the 
 relator, a dental surgeon, was exempt from jury duty under 
 the laws of Missouri. The statutes provided that persons 
 actually exercising the functions of a practitioner of medi- 
 cine were exempt. The majority of the Court after point- 
 ing out the rule of law that 'privileges and exceptions are not 
 favored in the law,' held that the relator was not a 'practi- 
 tioner of medicine and surgery in any of their departments.' " 
 
 "Of course it does not follow that because dentistry is a 
 branch or department of medicine or surgery, that a dentist 
 is necessarily a 'surgeon' or 'physician' within the meaning 
 of the statutes using those terms. It must depend in each 
 case on the intent of the legislature." 
 
 ^Case of DeFrance on question of being allowed to tes- 
 
 'Page 19. 
 
 =119 Mo., 344 (1893). 
 '104 Mich., 563 (1895). 
 
186 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 tify as to communications made to him by a patient. A statute 
 forbade a surgeon or physician from so testifying. The court 
 held the act did not apply to a dentist. 
 
 "The Supreme Court of Michigan has drawn a distinc- 
 tion between the mechanical and scientific work of a dentist. 
 In Maxon v. Perrott^ the court, in holding that a dentist's 
 instruments were exempt from execution under a statute 
 exempting 'mechanical tools' said : 'A dentist is in one sense 
 a professional man, but in another sense his calling is mainly 
 mechanical, and the tools he employs are used in mechanical 
 operations. * * * Qf late, however, as the physiology 
 of the human system has become better understood, and the 
 relations of its various parts and their mutual dependence 
 are more clearly recognized, dentistry has made great prog- 
 ress as a science, and its practitioners claim, with much jus- 
 tice, to be classed among the learned professions. It is, 
 nevertheless, true that the operations of the dentist are still 
 for the most part mechanical, and, so far as tools are em- 
 ployed, they are purely so; and we could not exclude these 
 tools from the exemptions which the statute makes without 
 confining the construction of the statute within limits not 
 justified by the words employed. The ordinary meaning of 
 'mechanical tools' it is plain, will include those in question, 
 and there is nothing in the context which will justify us in 
 saying that the legislative design would exclude them." 
 
 "Indeed the courts are more concerned in trying to do 
 justice and to interpret the legislation well than in making 
 nice distinctions between 'professions' and 'trades' and 'arts' 
 and 'sciences.' They have not hesitated, when justice seemed 
 to demand it, to hold that the practice of medicine was a 
 'trade' and a physician a 'tradesman.' " (The question was 
 on a claim for interest on a bill for services, the statute pro- 
 viding that accounts of 'merchants, tradesmen and mechan- 
 ics' should have interest.) 
 
 ^"The word 'tradesman' does not, perhaps, ordinarily 
 cover physicians ; but they have a trade, an art, a mystery. 
 
 m Mich., 332 (1868). 
 M7 Ga., 121 (1872). 
 
STATUS OF THE DENTIST. 187 
 
 They usually give it a more dignified name, to wit, profes- 
 sion. One of the definitions of trade given by Webster is 
 'the business a man has learned by which he earns his liveli- 
 hood.' And this at last, is the point of the word." 
 
 It will be noticed that one decision quoted refuses to 
 exempt the instruments of a dentist from execution for debt 
 under a statute exempting "the tools of a mechanic necessary 
 for carrying on his trade," while another decision, in another 
 state holds a dentist's instruments exempt from execution 
 under a statute exempting "mechanical tools." Contradictory 
 decisions like these, of course, leave the legal questions to 
 which they refer in uncertainty, but they have really but 
 little relation to what would constitute a legal definition of 
 dentistry. 
 
 A good many of the dental laws of the different states, 
 attempt a definition of dental practice for the purposes of the 
 law in each case. That of the Illinois law is a fair type. "Sec- 
 tion 5. Any person shall be regarded as practicing dentistry 
 or dental surgery within the meaning of this act, who shall 
 treat, or profess to treat any of the diseases or lesions of 
 human teeth or jaws, or extract teeth or shall prepare and 
 fill cavities in human teeth, or correct the malpositions of 
 teeth, or supply artificial teeth as substitutes for natural 
 teeth: Provided, that nothing in this act shall be so con- 
 strued as to prevent regularly licensed physicians or sur- 
 geons from extracting teeth." This does not specifically pro- 
 vide for other cases in which the field of the physician or 
 surgeon may overlap that of the dentist, as may sometimes 
 be the case in diseases and surgical operations upon the jaws, 
 the mucous membrane of the mouth, cases of ranula, etc. The 
 Maryland statute is more comprehensive, using the word 
 "mouth" instead of "teeth and jaws." "Section 10. Every 
 person shall be said to be practicing dentistry, within the 
 meaning of this act, who shall, for a fee, salary or other com- 
 pensation, paid either to himself or to someone else for serv- 
 ices rendered, perform operations or parts of operations of 
 any kind pertaining to the mouth, treat diseases or lesions of 
 the human teeth or jaws, or correct malpositions thereof." 
 
188 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 Using the word "mouth" instead of "teeth and jaws" 
 enlarges the field in which dentistry and medicine or surgery 
 may overlap each other, but this is provided for in a subse- 
 quent section by the broad provision, "nothing in this article 
 shall be so construed as to interfere with the rights and priv- 
 ileges of resident physicians and surgeons, etc." 
 
 As a matter of fact, and in a broad definition, it is beyond 
 question that dentistry is a branch of the healing art, a 
 specialty of medical and surgical practice, but in popular 
 speech, for the purposes of the law, and in methods and in- 
 stitutions of education Dentistry is a separate profession from 
 that of medicine and surgery. 
 
 THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE DENTISTRY — POWER OF THE STATE TO 
 REGULATE PRACTICE. 
 
 "The State has the right to regulate the practice of den- 
 tistry within its borders, and to prescribe such reasonable 
 conditions as a prerequisite to practice as are calculated to 
 exclude from the profession those who are unfitted to dis- 
 charge its duties."^ 
 
 "In England, Parliament, being supreme, may prescribe 
 what conditions it pleases as a prerequisite to the right to 
 practice. In the United States the right to practice is regu- 
 lated by the State Legislatures, and while their power to 
 prescribe conditions is large, it is limited by and must be 
 exercised in conformity with the constitution of the State 
 and of the Federal Government. As said by the court in 
 Wilkins v. State:- "The courts must take judicial knowledge 
 that it (the dental profession) is a profession requiring skill, 
 * * * and that one unskilled in the profession may injure 
 the person who employs him. As this is so, then, the Legis- 
 lature may prescribe the qualifications of those permitted to 
 practice that profession. * * * As it has plenary power 
 of the whole subject, it alone must be the judge of what is 
 wise and expedient, both as to the qualifications required and 
 as to the method of ascertaining those qualifications. The 
 court cannot exercise any supervisory power over the Legis- 
 
 'State ex rel Smith v. Dental Examiners, 31 Wash., 492 (1903). 
 ni3 Ind., 514 (1887). 
 
STATUS OF THE DENTIST. 189 
 
 lature as long as it keeps within the limits of the constitu- 
 tion." It is within those limits, "if the regulations and 
 conditions it prescribes are adopted in good faith, and they 
 operate equally upon all who may desire to practice, and 
 who possess the required qualifications, and if they are 
 adapted to the legislative purpose of promoting the health 
 and welfare of the people by excluding from the practice 
 those who are ignorant and incapable."^ * * * 
 
 "The requirement of a diploma as a condition of the right 
 to practice does not render the law unconstitutional."^ 
 
 "Nor does the fact that it requires the possession of a 
 diploma, as a condition of being allowed to practice, by those 
 not practicing in the State at the time the law was enacted, 
 while allowing those persons to practice without a diploma 
 who were practicing in the State at the time the law was 
 enacted, render the law unconstitutional as conflicting with 
 Section 2, Art. IV, of the Federal Constitution providing: 
 'The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privi- 
 leges and immunities of citizens in the several states,' or with 
 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution 
 providing : 'No State shall make or enforce any law which 
 shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
 United States. "^ 
 
 It is not necessary to quote the whole of Mikell's second 
 chapter. All the important provisions of the various dental 
 laws have been abundantly sustained by the courts. AVe 
 may specify ; the requirement of those in practice to be reg- 
 istered within a specified time after the passage of the law, 
 providing for the appointment of the State Board of Exam- 
 iners by the State Dental Association. The requirement that 
 all those desiring to practice shall pass examination, and 
 making it a misdemeanor to practice without a license from 
 the Board of Examiners. The requirement that legal prac- 
 titioners, if they remove to another state must be examined 
 and licensed by the Board of Examiners of the state to which 
 
 'State V. Creditor, 44 Kansas, 565 (1890). 
 
 'State V. Vandersluis, 42 Minn., 129 (1889). 
 
 State V. Mcintosh. 250 Mo., 589 (1907). 
 'Ibid. 
 
190 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 they remove. The provision excepting "from the operation 
 of the law students of dentistry during the period of enroll- 
 ment in a dental college in the state." 
 
 "The statute, however, to be constitutional, must not impose 
 special restrictions or burdens on, or grant special privileges to 
 some persons over others engaged in the same profession under 
 the same circumstances. Under this rule it has been held that a 
 statute providing that no person should practice dentistry with- 
 out having obtained a degree from some college, or a license 
 from the State Dental Society, and imposing a certain fee, but 
 exempting persons who have resided and practiced the profession 
 in the town or city of their present place of residence, for a 
 specified time, was unconstitutional as unduly discriminating 
 between persons of the same class. "^ 
 
 "A statute is not unconstitutional which requires good char- 
 acter as a condition to the right to practice, or which lodges the 
 power to determine the person's moral fitness in a legally con- 
 stituted body of men learned in the profession."- 
 
 "requirements of statutes regulating practice." 
 1. In General. — Statutes vary in the conditions they impose 
 on the right to practice dentistry. The most usual form of 
 statute provides as a requisite to the right to engage in practice : 
 (1) The possession of a diploma; (2) The passing of a satis- 
 factory examination; (3) Proof of good moral character; (4) 
 Receipt of a license from the Board of Examiners; (5) Registry 
 of the license with the proper officer; (6) Payment of a stated 
 fee. Some statutes do not require the passing of an examina- 
 tion if the applicant possesses a degree; others do not require a 
 degree if the applicant passes a satisfactory examination." 
 
 "license to practice, powers of the dental board.'" 
 2. Under this head it is not necessary to quote Mikell in de- 
 tail. Of course the powers of the dental board are conferred and 
 limited by the law in each state. The courts have usually been 
 liberal in their interpretation of the dental and medical laws, 
 and the dental and medical boards have large powers and much 
 
 ^State V. Hinman, (N. H.) 18 Atl., 194 (1889). 
 
 'See State v. State Medical Board, 32 Minn., 324 (1884). 
 
STATUS OF THE DENTIST. 191 
 
 discretion. I will make a few quotations. "The functions of 
 the Dental Board in granting or refusing a license is in whole 
 or in part quasi-judicial, involving investigation, judgment and 
 discretion, therefore an action for damages will not lie against 
 such board for refusing to grant, or for revoking a license 
 wrongfully, if in so doing they acted without malice."^ 
 
 "Where the law provides that the possession of a diploma 
 of a 'reputable dental college,' or Z' 'college in good standing,' 
 shall be a requisite to the issuance of a license by the board, the 
 board has power to decide what is and what is not a reputable 
 college, or a college in good standing, and whether the college 
 
 whose diploma the applicant holds is or is not such a college."^ 
 
 * * * 
 
 "The determination by the board of the question whether 
 or not a dental school is a 'reputable' school or a school 'in good 
 standing' is final, .and will not be reviewed by the courts unless 
 the board is clearly shown to have abused its discretion in the 
 matter, or to have been guilty of arbitrary, oppressive or male- 
 volent conduct."* * * 
 
 "A board of dental examiners may make any reasonable 
 rules and regulations they see fit by which to determine whether 
 or not a dental school is 'reputable' or in 'good standing.' They 
 cannot delegate the right to decide whether z- college is reputable 
 or not to a dental organization beyond the limits of the State. 
 Thus in Dental Examiners v. People,^ the board of examiners 
 refused to issue a license to an applicant until his application was 
 approved by the National Association of Dental Examiners, an 
 association composed for the most part of persons living outside 
 of the state. The State board having been shown to have been 
 otherwise satisfied with the reputability of the college of which 
 the applicant held a degree, the court granted a writ of mandamus 
 to compel the State board to issue the license." 
 
 "As the board, however, has power, when no rules are pre- 
 scribed by statute for determining the reputability of a college. 
 
 'People V. Dental Examiners, 110 111., 180 (1884) ; State v. Chittenden. 
 127 Wis., 468 (1906). 
 
 'People V. Dental Examiners, 110 III, 180 (1884). 
 '123 111., 227 (1887). 
 
192 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 to make any reasonable rules to determine this question, the fact 
 that a State board adopts the rules of a dental organiza-tion out- 
 side of the state, and is in large part governed by its recommenda- 
 tions in determining the reputability of colleges, is no ground for 
 the interference of the court, when it appears that the board 
 was not absolutely bound by the rules of the foreign association, 
 but could, in their discretion require more or less of a college 
 than the foreign association demanded."^ 
 
 "When the statute makes it a prerequisite to the right to 
 a license that the applicant shall be of good moral character, 
 and provides that on proof of conviction of a misdemeanor a 
 license granted shall be canceled, the board of examiners may 
 refuse to grant a license to a person who has been convicted 
 of practicing dentistry in the State without a license."- 
 
 "3. Registration — After the dentist has obtained his license 
 from the dental board, the next step required by the law 
 is the registration of such license. The language of the 
 statutes providing for registration is not identical. Some stat- 
 utes provide that the licenses shall be registered within sixty 
 days from the issuance thereof, some within thirty days, and 
 others are silent as to the time within which registration shall 
 take place." 
 
 When no time for registration is mentioned in the law 
 it is wise to presume that the license is to be registered before 
 beginning practice, and to act accordingly. 
 
 "The statutes vary, likewise, in their provisions as to the 
 place where, and the officer with whom the license must be 
 registered. Some provide that it shall be registered in the 
 county in which the holder expects to practice; some require 
 it to be registered with the judge of probate, others with the 
 clerk of the county." 
 
 "Some require separate registration in each county in 
 which the holder of the license intends to practice ; and pro- 
 vide for duplicate, etc., registration. It is not clear always 
 from the wording of some of the statutes, nor do the decisions 
 
 'Williams v. Dental Examiners, 93 Tenn., 619 (1894). 
 
 'See Battles v. Board of Registry in Dentistry, 16 R. I., 372 (1888). 
 
STATUS OF THE DENTIST. 193 
 
 make it any clearer, whether, under the statute, the license, 
 once registered in the proper place, entitles the holder to prac- 
 tice anywhere in the State, or whether the license must be 
 registered anew in each county where the holder does any 
 dental work. The statutes generally provide that if the license 
 is not registered within the time prescribed, the license shall 
 be forfeited. Statutes containing this provision usually pro- 
 vide that a duplicate may be obtained, in some cases with 
 and in others without an additional fee. * * * j^ view 
 of the uncertainty of the law in this regard under the phrase- 
 ology of many of the statutes, and the serious consequences 
 involved in its breach, a dentist should always register in 
 each county where he does any dental work, unless the statute 
 clearly provides that registry in one place entitles him to prac- 
 tice anywhere in the State." 
 
 "4. Revocation of License — Most of the statutes regu- 
 lating the practice of dentistry provide for revocation of the 
 dentist's license. In some of the statutes the grounds on 
 which the license may be revoked are specifically set out in 
 the statute." 
 
 "In others the grounds of revocation are not set out in 
 detail, but it is provided generally that it may be revoked 
 for dishonorable or unprofessional conduct. Under similar 
 statutes in relation to physicians, it has been held in the 
 United States that 'unprofessional' means 'dishonorable,' and 
 does not refer to matters of professional ethics only ; and that 
 a mere breach of professional ethics, such as advertising, etc., 
 is not ground for revoking a license."^ 
 
 <.* * * Jyi some states such statutes have been held to 
 be unconstitutional and void for uncertainty."- * * * 
 
 "Some statutes provide that the license to practice may be 
 revoked for 'fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation' in the prac- 
 tice of dentistry. Such a statute, it has been held, is not in- 
 valid for uncertainty." * * * 
 
 "A license once granted cannot be revoked without an 
 
 'See State v. State Medical Examining Board, 32 Minn., 324 (1884). 
 "Czarra v. Board of Medical Supervisors, 25 App Cas. (D. C.) 
 443 C1905). 
 
194 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 Opportunity given the holder, by timely notice, to appear 
 and defend himself against the charges preferred against 
 him. 
 
 "But the decision of the board, after a proper hearing, 
 that the dentist is guilty of professional misconduct is not 
 reviewable by a court, at least if there is any evidence on 
 which the Dental Board could reasonably hold that the den- 
 tist had been guilty of such conduct."^ 
 
 "5. Efifect of Fulfillment of Requirements — If the appli- 
 cant for the right to practice dentistry has fulfilled the legal 
 requirements, he is entitled to practice, and it is immaterial, 
 as far as his right to practice is concerned, how well he has 
 met the tests prescribed by the law. The ability shown by 
 him, however, in meeting these tests may subsequently be- 
 come of great importance to him. In the case of Wilkins v. 
 Ferrell,- (Texas) a dentist was sued by a patient for malprac- 
 tice. The dentist had offered evidences to prove his skill and 
 learning in his profession. The plaintiff thereupon offered to 
 prove by two members of the board of dental examiners that 
 the defendant, when he was examined for his license a year 
 previous, was unable to answer questions propounded to him 
 in anatomy, physiology and chemistry ; that he could not ex- 
 plain what the superior and inferior maxillary bones were, 
 and said, in treating an exposed pulp, he 'would kill the damn 
 thing' ; that he could not tell the number of bones in the 
 head or skull, and could not name the nerves in the head and 
 face. The defendant objected to the court's allowing this 
 evidence to go to the jury. The court, however, admitted 
 it and, on appeal, the supreme court held that the lower court 
 was right."* 
 
 RELATION BETWEEN THE DENTIST AND HIS PATIENT. 
 TIME AT WHICH THE RELATION COMMENCES. 
 
 "The mere opening of the dentist's office for practice, or 
 the display of his name-plate does not create any duty on the 
 part of the dentist or impose any obligation upon him to 
 
 'Hill V. Clifford, Eg. (1907) and others, 
 no Tex. Civ. App., 231 (1895). 
 ♦Page 39. 
 
STATUS OF THE DENTIST. 195 
 
 accept patients. He is no more required to accept any per- 
 son who comes to him as a patient than is a physician.^ 
 
 "It is not until he accepts a person as a patient that his 
 duties and the corresponding obligations arise. "- 
 
 THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 The relation between the dentist and his patient is, in 
 general, in the nature of a contract between them. This con- 
 tract may be written or oral, expressed or implied ; and in 
 our law there is no special sanctity or obligation to written 
 contracts over oral ones, and implied contracts are as binding 
 between the parties as expressed ones. The greatest advan- 
 tage of a written contract is that its terms are more easily 
 proven, and there is less opportunity for variance of under- 
 standing, forgetfulness, or misrepresentation. 
 
 The nature of a contract for services makes it subject to 
 the implied condition that both of the parties shall be in such 
 a state of health as to be able to fulfill their contract at the 
 appointed time.'^ If too ill to keep an appointment, therefore. 
 a patient must be excused. Likewise, the dentist, if too ill 
 to work, the patient, however, in that case may go to another 
 dentist if necessary or if he chooses to do so. 
 
 ''2. Contracts Required to be in AVriting. — By force of 
 a statute passed in England in 1677, known as the Statute 
 of Frauds and Perjuries, because it was intended to prevent 
 the commission of frauds and perjuries, certain contracts 
 unless in writing could not be enforced at law unless there 
 had been part payment under them, etc. 
 
 "The statute provided that 'no contract for the sale of 
 any goods, wares and merchandises for the price of ten pounds 
 sterling or upward, shall be allowed to be good except the 
 buyer shall accept part of the goods sold and actually receive 
 the same, or give something in earnest to bind the bargain, 
 or in part payment, or that some note or memorandum in 
 writing of said bargain be made and signed by the parties 
 
 •Becker v. Jamski, 15 N. Y. Suppl., 675 (1891). 
 'Huky V. Eddingfield. 156 Ind.. 416 (1900). 
 'Powell V. Newell. 95 Minn.. 406 (1894). 
 
196 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 to be charged by such contract, or their agents thereto law- 
 fully authorized.' This statute is still in force in England 
 and a substantially similar statute is in force in all the Amer- 
 ican States except Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, 
 Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
 Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Tennessee, Vir- 
 ginia and West Virginia. In the other states, where the 
 statute is in force, the amount prescribed by the statute varies 
 in the different states." 
 
 Probably the only application this statute would have 
 in dental practice is in relation to artificial teeth and the 
 decisions in the dififerent cases and in different states do not 
 agree. 
 
 "In the case of Lee v. Grifhn,^ the plaintiff, a dentist, in 
 pursuance of an oral order from his patient, prepared a model 
 for her mouth and made for her two sets of false teeth. After 
 the teeth were finished and she was notified of the fact, she 
 died before she could have the teeth fitted. The dentist sued 
 her estate through her executor for £21, the compensa- 
 tion she had agreed to pay for the teeth. If this transac- 
 tion was a 'sale' of teeth by the dentist, then since the con- 
 tract had not been put in writing, he was not entitled to re- 
 cover under the statutes. If it was, on the other hand, a 
 contract to do a certain piece of work, to perform certain 
 services, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover, for the 
 statute only applies to 'sales.' 
 
 "The court held the transaction to be a 'sale' and refused 
 to allow a recovery. The court laid down the following test 
 of when a transaction is a sale, and required to be in writ- 
 ing: 'If the contract be such that, when carried out, it would 
 result in the sale of chattel,' it is a sale ; 'but if the result of 
 the contract is that the party has done work and labor which 
 ends in nothing that can become the subject of a sale,' the 
 party can recover whether the contract is in writing or not. 
 The rule of this case has been adopted in Canada and Mis- 
 souri.^ Tests different from the above and differing from 
 each other have been adopted in the different American 
 
 *Eng., Best and Smith, 272. 
 'WilHston, Sales, Sec. 54. 
 
STATUS OF THE DENTIST. 197 
 
 States. It is believed that under none of them except in 
 Missouri, would a contract by a dentist to make a set of 
 teeth be required to be in writing. * * *" 
 
 In any case, "If the teeth were received and accepted by 
 the patient, or if all or part of the price had been paid/ the 
 contract would be binding though not in writing." 
 
 "Even when in the above cases the contract must be in 
 writing, all the terms of the contract need not appear in the 
 writing. It is sufficient if the names of the parties, the price 
 and the substance of the agreement appear in the writing, 
 and it is signed by the party who is being sued. * * *" 
 
 "Another contract that the law will not enforce unless 
 it is in writing, is the contract of one person to answer for 
 the debt or default of another." 
 
 If a patient is sent to a dentist by a person who promiess 
 to pay the bill such promise must be in writing unless the 
 patient is one for whose support the one sending is legally 
 responsible, as a wife, child or ward. 
 
 "3. Express Contracts. — The dentist may enter into an 
 express contract with his patient. Such contracts are becom- 
 ing more common than formerly." An express contract is 
 made when the terms of it are expressed and agreed upon 
 between the parties.- It is usually for certain specified oper- 
 ations or services to be performed, and for a specified fee, or, 
 in many cases, a minimum and a maximum fee may be named, 
 in view of the fact that the worth of many operations cannot 
 be known by the dentist beforehand except approximately. 
 Such contracts may be, but need not be in writing unless it 
 be of the sort required by law to be in writing, as described 
 previously. Of course a dentist must fulfil such contracts in 
 accordance to the terms of them, no matter how much of 
 extra or unexpected time or trouble may be required. 
 
 "4. Implied Contracts. — Most contracts between den- 
 tists and their patients are not express, but are so-called im- 
 plied contracts. The patient seats himself in the dentist's 
 chair, the dentist examines his teeth, makes notes of what 
 
 ^Some states require this payment to be at the time the contract is 
 made if payment is relied on to make the contract valid. 
 
198 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 work is needed, informs the patient of the extent of such 
 work more or less perfunctorily, and proceeds to perform the 
 necessary work without informing the patient of the length 
 of time necessary to complete it, the nature of the materials 
 he proposes to use, how skillfully he will perform it, whether 
 it will have the desired result, how long it will last, what he 
 will charge for it or when payment will be due. In such a 
 case as this where one or more of the terms of the contract 
 are not expressly agreed on by the parties, the law implies 
 a contract between them. * * *" 
 
 Implied contracts involve similar obligations upon both 
 parties as express contracts, and may be legally enforced. 
 Rehfus gives this rule of law in regard to them. 
 
 "The presumption in regard to implied contracts is that 
 agreements and stipulations are supposed to have been made 
 between the parties such as fair and honest men ought to have 
 made under like circumstances." 
 
 "5. Delegation of the Contract. — It is a general rule of 
 law that a contract to perform personal services cannot be 
 delegated to another by the person contracting to perform 
 them." 
 
 Of course it can be done by the consent of the parties. 
 
 "6. Contracts Made or to be Performed on Sunday. — 
 Since 1677 in England, and now generally in this country, 
 work done in a person's ordinary business or calling is for- 
 bidden by statute, and contracts therefor are unenforceable. 
 An exception is, however, that if the work done be a 'work 
 of necessity,' the person performing the work may recover 
 for his services. It has been held by the courts that the work 
 of a physician in healing the sick was a work of necessity." 
 
 Some dental work would undoubtedly be so regarded, but 
 the larger part of ordinary dental services probably not. 
 Services rendered to relieve pain, or to prevent harm likely 
 to happen by a delay till the next day would be "work of 
 necessity." 
 
 GIFTS BY PATIENT TO DENTIST. 
 
 "The relation between the dentist and patient, like that 
 between physician and patient, is a confidential one. It has 
 
STATUS OF THE DENTIST. 199 
 
 been held, however, that there is nothing in the latter rela- 
 tion that forbids the acceptance of a gift by the physician 
 from his patient. The same rule would apply in the case of 
 a gift by the patient to his dentist." 
 
 LIABILITY OF PATIENT TO DENTIST. 
 
 Mikell goes minutely into detail under each of the head- 
 ings of this chapter. A briefer statement or short quota- 
 tions will answer our purpose in most instances. 
 
 LIABILIT\' FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
 
 If a patient fail to fulfil his contract with the dentist, 
 (whether it be an express contract or an implied contract) 
 he is liable for such damages as the dentist may suffer in con- 
 sequence. If the breach of contract is a failure to pay the 
 bill the amount, of liability is the price agreed upon, or if 
 there were no express contract then the amount of the bill 
 rendered if it be reasonable, and in case of a law-suit, the 
 reasonableness of a bill is always for the jury to determine, 
 upon the evidence submitted to them, "and they may take 
 into consideration the ability of the practitioner and his stand- 
 ing in the profession."^ 
 
 *"In some jurisdictions it is held that the financial abil- 
 ity of the patient should be considered in estimating the 
 worth of the services. "- 
 
 "In other jurisdictions a contrary rule obtains."" 
 
 A breach of contract may relate to other matters than 
 compensation, oftenest, probably, to a failure to keep appoint- 
 ments. In these cases the dentist has a rightful claim for 
 the amount of damage he has sustained. He cannot claim 
 pay for the work he would have done, for he has not done 
 the work. If he is idle in consequence during the appointed 
 time he may claim the amount he would have charged if the 
 patient had kept the appointment. If he is employed for an 
 equal compensation he may not charge anything, for he has 
 
 'Heintz v. Cooper (Cal), 47 Pac, 360 (1896). 
 *Mikell. p. 52. 
 
 ^Succession of Haley, 5 La. Ann., 840 (1898). 
 'Robinson v. Campbell, 47 Iowa, 625 (1878). 
 
200 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 sufifered no loss. If he is employed for a less remuneration 
 than he would have received he may charge the difference. 
 The most satisfactory plan is to announce on the appoint- 
 ment card that if appointments are not kept a reasonable 
 charge will be made unless notice is received the day before ; 
 or, unless timely notice has been given ; or a definite sum may 
 be named. That would eliminate all controversy as to what 
 the lost time was worth or what the dentist did with it. 
 
 Rehfuss cites two cases of claims for missed appoint- 
 ments, both of which were allowed. The first that of Dr. 
 D. D. Smith of Philadelphia, Magistrate's Court No. 9, July 
 11, 1891. The patient desired the roots of some teeth be 
 filled with gold, which the doctor refused, deeming it im- 
 practical in that case, whereupon the patient left the chair, 
 and also failed to keep a subsequent appointment which had 
 been made. In the other case, "A dentist brought suit against 
 a lady in a Chicago court in 1875. The plaintiff charged that 
 the defendant made a series of appointments with him and 
 failed to keep them. His claim was for eighty dollars, charg- 
 ing at the rate of two dollars and fifty cents per hour. The 
 plaintiff secured judgment for the whole amount. Rehfuss 
 refers in this case to the Dental Cosmos ,Vol. XIX, p. 110. 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION — WIVES, MINORS, PARENTS, 
 GUARDIANS, ETC. — FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
 
 The most important part of this subject has been already 
 covered under the previous head. 
 
 If a patient has just ground to suppose the services of 
 the dentist are to be gratuitous, of course no claim for com- 
 pensation can afterwards be made. The legal question is 
 stated by the court in Prince v. McRae/ "Whether the plain- 
 tiff's services shall be deemed a gratuity or constitute a claim 
 for compensation must be determined by the common under- 
 standing of both parties. If they were intended to be and 
 were accepted as a gift or act of benevolence, they cannot, 
 at the election of the plaintiff, create a legal obligation to pay. 
 But their character is not controlled by the unexpressed and 
 revocable intentions of the plaintiff." 
 
 "A dentist has no authority to call in a consulting den- 
 tist (or physician) without the consent of the patient." 
 
 If, however, the patient receives the services of the con- 
 sultant without objection, or requests or consents that he be 
 called, he is of course liable for the consultation fee. 
 
 "If the dentist call in another dentist or a physician to 
 assist him, as to administer ether, or the like, without the re- 
 quest of the patient, the dentist is in the first instance liable 
 to such assistant for his services. "- 
 
 In such case, however, he can carry over the charge to 
 the patient in his own bill for services. 
 
 2. What Persons are Liable — Liability of Infants. 
 
 'Tn general the contract of an infant, i. e., a person under 
 twenty-one years of age is not binding. The law, however, 
 has made an exception to the rule in the case of necessaries. 
 If an infant not living at home under the care and support 
 of his parents, makes a contract for what the law considers 
 
 •84 N. C, 674 (1881). 
 
 "Fitzgerald v. Hanson, 16 Montana, 474 (1895). 
 
202 ' DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 a necessary, the infant is bound by such contract, and having 
 obtained the benefit of it must pay for it." 
 
 The preceding has practical appHcation chiefly to minors 
 having money or property of their own or to claims against 
 them after they become of age for services rendered during 
 their minority. There is some confusion and diversity of au- 
 thorities as to the power of a minor living at home to make 
 contracts for himself. In one case cited a minor was sued for 
 services and it was shown that he lived at home and paid 
 his wages to his father, who was very poor and wholly un- 
 able to pay the bill. It was held that the father was the 
 only one against whom a claim for payment could be made. 
 Two decisions or authorities state the two views. 
 
 "In Murphy v. Holmes^ the Supreme Court of New York 
 states that rule as follows : 'The theory upon which an in- 
 fant is made liable for necessaries is that they have been 
 furnished and were necessary, and that the person standing 
 in the relation of parent has not the ability to respond for 
 the amount thereof. Where they have such ability, no lia- 
 bility can attach to the infant.' " 
 
 And "Tyler^ states the rule thus : 'An infant when at 
 home under the care of his father, and supported by him, 
 cannot be made liable for necessaries.' " 
 
 LIABILITY OF PARENT. 
 
 Brothers, in his book,^ states it in this way: "At com 
 mon law the liability of a father for the support, mainten- 
 ance and education of his minor child, while recognized, was 
 not well defined and amounted to little more than an imper- 
 fect unenforcible obligation. The duty was always conceded, 
 but the manner of its discharge was exclusively within the 
 discretion of the parent. The party who voluntarily supplied 
 the wants of a minor had no legal claims against the parent, 
 and all that he did in this respect was at his own risk, unless 
 he had the express promise of the father to remunerate him. 
 
 ^87 App. Div. N. Y. (1903), li. 
 ^Infancy and Coverture, 2nd Ed., 108. 
 'Dental Jurisprudence, by E. B. Brothers, p. 100. 
 
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION. 203 
 
 or the circumstances were such that a promise of that char- 
 acter would reasonably be implied. In the absence of special 
 legislation, this obligation remains the same as at common 
 law, and the general rule prevails that where a person fur- 
 nishes necessaries to a minor without authority from the par- 
 ent, he does so at his peril and, in order to recover from the 
 parent, he must show by a preponderance of the evidence 
 either an express authority or circumstances from which such 
 authority may be implied. The parent is to be the judge of 
 the wants of his child and of his ability to supply them, and 
 the extent to which he shall respond to this obligation and 
 when no express authority has been given to the child to 
 bind the parent, it devolves upon the party supplying such 
 necessities to show the neglect or refusal of the parent to 
 provide the same." 
 
 MikelP states the same conclusion in fewer words : "In 
 order to hold a parent liable for dental services rendered to 
 his minor child, there must be shown either an express con- 
 tract by the father to pay for such services, or circumstances 
 from which a contract by the father can be inferred.' ' 
 
 In most cases when minor children come to the den- 
 tist without either parent accompanying them, they are to 
 be regarded as the "special agents" of the parent for making 
 the necessary contract for services (either express or im- 
 plied contracts). 
 
 Brothers- states it in this way : "Where the child has au- 
 thority to bind the parent it is usually in the nature of a spe- 
 cial agency, and the party dealing Avith the minor is bound 
 to know the extent of that authority." 
 
 Mikell cites this case in illustration: "In Dumser v. 
 Underwood,^ Underwood, a dentist, sued Dumser for $19.00 
 for dental services performed for Dumser's minor daughter. 
 The daughter had informed her father that her teeth needed 
 attention, whereupon he told her to go to Dr. Whedon, the 
 family dentist, and ask him to examine her teeth and make 
 
 ^Mikell's Dental Jurisprudence, p. 57. 
 'Brothers' Dental Jurisprudence, p. 101. 
 =■168 111. App., 121 (1896). 
 
204 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 an estimate of the cost of the work. This she did and re- 
 ported to her father that the cost as estimated by Dr. Whedon 
 would be $10.00. The father then told her to have Dr. Whedon 
 do the work. The daughter, however, went instead to Dr. 
 Underwood, who did the work, for which he charged $19.00. 
 It was admitted that $19.00 was a reasonable sum for the 
 work. On the refusal of the father to pay, Underwood sued 
 him for the amount of his bill. The court having ruled that 
 the work was not a 'necessary,' Underwood next contended 
 that as Dumser had given his daughter authority to have 
 dental work performed, he had made her his agent to pro- 
 cure such work, and was therefore liable for the cost of the 
 same. The court said : 'It is insisted that the permission, 
 thus delegated, clothed her with such apparent authority as 
 to render him liable although she acted contrary to his priv- 
 ate instructions. 
 
 "This contention loses sight of the distinction between 
 general and special agencies. 
 
 " 'The agency in this case was special, viz., to have the 
 work done by Dr. Whedon. A special agent is one author- 
 ized to do a specific act in respect to which his power is lim- 
 ited. A party dealing with him is bound, at his peril, to 
 ascertain the extent of his authority.' " 
 
 "liability of husband — FOR SERVICES BEFORE MARRIAGE. 
 
 "Before 1870, in England, when a woman married, all her 
 property became the property of her husband. The effect of 
 this was that the wife could not be liable for any debts con- 
 tracted by her before marriage, for after she became a wife 
 she had no property with which to pay them. As, however, 
 the husband on the marriage became the owner of what prop- 
 erty the wife owned before marriage, the law held him re- 
 sponsible for all debts, including debts for dental services, 
 contracted by her before her marriage."^ 
 
 "In 1870 the first 'Married Woman's Property Act' was 
 passed by the British Parliament. This statute was amended 
 by the Act of 1874, and in 1882 these two acts were super- 
 
 'Blackstone, Comm., bk. 1, chap. IS, p. 443. 
 
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION. 205 
 
 seded by the Act of 1882. This act radically changed the law- 
 existing before 1870. It first enacted that thereafter the wife, 
 on marriage, should continue to hold all the property that 
 belonged to her at her marriage or that should devolve on 
 her after her marriage, and then provided that thereafter not 
 only should the wife herself be liable for all debts contracted 
 by her before her marriage to the extent of her separate prop- 
 erty, but limited the liability of the husband for such ante- 
 nuptial debts of the wife to such property as he acquired 
 through his wife."^ 
 
 "Similar statutes are in force in the United States, but 
 as they differ in their terms, no general rule can be laid dowai 
 as to the effect of their provisions or the extent of a married 
 woman's liability for her contracts, and it is impossible in a 
 work of this character to attempt to treat the subject for 
 each State in the Union. * * *" 
 
 "For Services During Marriage — Previous to the enact- 
 ment of the statutes above mentioned, a wife was no more 
 liable generally for contracts made by her during the continu- 
 ance of her married state than by contracts made by her 
 before her marriage. But while the husband was liable for 
 all her debts contracted before marriage, he was not liable 
 for all debts contracted by her after marriage, but only for 
 debts contracted by her when acting as his agent, or under 
 an authority from him, express or implied. The Married 
 Woman's Property Acts have in general changed the law so 
 as to render the wafe herself liable for contracts made by 
 her on her own account during the marriage, but have not 
 altered the liability of the husband. He remains liable on 
 contracts made by her when, and only when, she is acting as 
 his agent in making the contract." 
 
 "The agency of the wife may be shown in the same w^ay 
 as the agency of any other person ; by actual authority, by 
 a ratification of the contract, or by a recognition of similar 
 contracts made by her. The most usual cases of such agency 
 is in contracts made by the wife for necessaries. If the 
 
 'Smith on Contracts, 337; McQueen's Husband & Wife, 71. 
 
206 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 parties are living together, the law invests her at the mar- 
 riage with an irrevocable agency to pledge his credit for what- 
 ever is necessary to her maintenance, unless he provides other 
 means. * * *" 
 
 "For Services During Separation — If the husband and 
 wife are not living together the presumption is that she has 
 no authority to bind him even for necessaries. To hold her 
 husband liable in such case, it must be shown that her absence 
 from her husband was for some cause that would justify her 
 absence, i. e., that it was not due to fault on her part." 
 
 Mikell has several pages of citations of cases in illustra- 
 tion of these propositions, and a few other minor points 
 which it is not necessary to quote further. 
 
 "Liability of Third Persons — The liability arising from 
 the family relation of one member of the family to pay for 
 services rendered to another does not extend beyond the cases 
 of father and child and husband and wife. A brother is not 
 liable, as such, for services rendered to a brother, even though 
 the brother for whom the services were performed was insane 
 at the time,^ nor a son-in-law for the services performed for 
 his mother-in-law." 
 
 "Liability of Employer — An employer, as such, is not 
 liable to pay for dental services rendered to his employe or 
 servant." Unless he has expressly agreed to pay for them 
 or has paid for services previously rendered for the same 
 person. 
 
 "Liability of County or State — For Services to Paupers, 
 etc. — There are in most, if not all, of our states, laws making it the 
 duty of the proper county officers to secure medical attendance 
 for the paupers and the insane of the county, and to persons 
 confined in jails and prisons, at the expense of the county or the 
 State. Medical attendance has been held to include surgical serv- 
 ice,- and there can be no doubt that such statutes would be con- 
 strued to include at least such dental services as were necessary 
 for the health of the paupers, and that the dentist performing 
 such services could recover against the county for the same. If 
 
 'Smith V. Watson, 14 Vt., 332 (1842). 
 
 'Clinton Co. v. Ramsey, 30 111. App., 577 (1886). 
 
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION. 207 
 
 his compensation was not fixed by his contract with the proper 
 officers, he should recover the reasonable value of his services."^ 
 
 "In order to recover against the county, however, the 
 dentist must show that the person at whose request he per- 
 formed the services was authorized by law to charge the 
 county for payment for the services rendered. "- 
 
 "If, however, an officer of the county engage for such 
 services without the requisite authority to bind the county, 
 he is himself personally liable to the dentist for the value of 
 the services."^ 
 
 "For Services at Coroner's Inquest — A coroner has au- 
 thority to pledge the county of which he is an officer for the 
 compensation for all auxiliary services which are necessary 
 to the proper execution of his office, and which he could by 
 no other means command." 
 
 It would be seldom that a dentist would be called for 
 any other services than as a witness. Oftenest, perhaps, as 
 an expert witness to assist in an identification by means of 
 the teeth, and his compensation in such cases would be in 
 the nature of witness fees. The fees of an expert witness 
 should be, but are not ahvays, greater than those of a common 
 witness. 
 
 "3. Liability for Services of Unlicensed Dentist — It 
 seems that to entitle the dentist to recover compensation for 
 his services, he must show affirmatively his compliance with 
 the law regulating the practice of dentistry. His right to 
 practice will not be presumed, even from the fact that he 
 has been practicing for a long time."* 
 
 Some dental laAvs expressly provide that illegal practi- 
 tioners cannot recover for their services, while others only 
 state that it shall be unlawful to practice until certain specified 
 requirements have been fulfilled. The difference is immate- 
 rial ; in neither case can an illegal or unlicensed practitioner 
 collect for his services by a suit at law. If a bill is contested 
 
 'See Tucker v. Virginia, 4 Nev., 20 (1868). 
 
 'Bay V. Cook, 22 N. J.. L. 343 (1850). 
 
 'Ibid. 
 
 *See North Chicago St. Rv. v. Cotton, 140 111., 486 (1892). 
 
208 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 on this ground, in most States the burden of proving that the 
 dentist is legally disqualified is upon the patient. "Some 
 States, however, hold that since the possession of a license is 
 a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the person claim- 
 ing to possess it, the burden of proving such possession is 
 on the dentist."^ 
 
 These are the essential matters. Mikell cites a number 
 of cases and mentions a number of details covering more than 
 three pages. 
 
 "4. Effect of Malpractice on Liability — In a suit by a 
 dentist for remuneration for services rendered, the patient 
 may successfully defend by showing that in rendering the 
 services for which compensation is demanded, the dentist 
 was guilty of malpractice."^ 
 
 "In some states it is held that if the patient proves facts 
 which amount to malpractice in the services for which re- 
 muneration is claimed, the defense is complete and goes to 
 the whole claim, and that the dentist can recover no part of 
 his charges, but forfeits all right to compensation.^ In other 
 States, however, it is held that though in an action to recover 
 for services the patient may defend on the ground of malprac- 
 tice in rendering the services, that proof of malpractice will 
 only be conclusive so as to prevent recovery of the whole 
 claim if the malpractice was such as to render the services 
 useless, or to make the damage suffered by the patient equal 
 to or greater than the value of the services or the amount 
 due under the contract; if the injury done to the patient is 
 not equal to the value of the services or the amount due 
 under the contract, the dentist should recover the difference."* 
 
 "5. When Compensation Is Due — When the contract 
 between the dentist and his patient provides a definite date 
 for payment for the dentist's services, payment is, of course, 
 
 >Dow V. Haley, 30 N. J. L., 354 (7863) ; Cooper v. Griffin, 13 Ind. 
 App., 212 (1895); Adams v. Stuart, 5 Harr. Del., 144 (1849). 
 
 'Brukman v. Kursheedt, 84 N. Y. Supp., 575 (1903). 
 
 'Abbott V. Mayfield, 8 Kan. App., 387 (1899) ; Patten v. Wiggin. 
 
 'Whitesell v. Hill, 101 Iowa, 629 (1897); Schofen v, Baldwin, 83. 
 Hun. N. Y., 234 (1894); Piper v. Menifee, 12 B. Mon. Ky.. 465 (1851). 
 51 Me., 594 (1862). 
 
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION. 209 
 
 due on that date, and on demand for payment and refusal 
 thereof, suit for payment may begin immediately." 
 
 "If no time for payment is fixed by the parties, the law 
 implies that the patient has promised to pay as soon as the 
 services are performed." 
 
 "Where it is the custom to send bills at certain times, as 
 monthly or quarterly, if the patient knows of such custom, 
 and the circumstances show that it was understood by the 
 parties that the patient was not to pay until such time arrived, 
 he cannot be sued until such time. The mere fact, however, 
 that it is the custom of the dentist to send bills to his patients 
 at certain intervals, as monthly or quarterly, will not be con- 
 strued as an agreement with the patient to extend credit to 
 him until the customary time of sending bills has arrived. In 
 the absence of other circumstances showing an agreement to 
 postpone payment, the dentist may demand payment as soon 
 as the service is rendered. * * *" 
 
 "6. Interest on Claim — Where interest is allowed gen- 
 erally on accounts, it seems that the dentist is entitled to 
 interest on his claim for services from the time such claim 
 became due." 
 
 In the case cited the "statute of the State provided that : 
 "Accounts of merchants, tradesmen and mechanics, which by 
 custom become due at the end of the year, should bear inter- 
 est." The court held that "while the statute did not mention 
 physicians, yet they were clearly within the equity of the 
 statute. * * * * The reasoning of the court would, of course, 
 make the act applicable to the account of a dentist."^ 
 
 "7. Evidence to Establish Liability — There is a general 
 rule of law that the evidence brought before the court to 
 establish a claim must be the best evidence of which the case, 
 in its nature, is susceptible. By this rule is meant that no 
 evidence shall be received by the court which is merely sub- 
 stitutionary in its nature, so long as the original evidence 
 can be produced." 
 
 "This rule has nothing to do with the amount of evidence 
 
 M7 Ga., 121 (1872). 
 
210 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 necessary to establish the claim ; nor does it prevent the intro- 
 duction of merely weaker instead of stronger proofs." 
 
 "There is a general exception to this rule, viz. : that if 
 the production of the best or primary evidence is not within 
 the power of the party, he may introduce secondary evidence 
 to prove his claim. It follows from the rule and the excep- 
 tion that if the contract between the dentist and the patient 
 is a written one, as in some cases it must be, to be enforcible, 
 and as in any case it may be, the written contract must itself 
 be produced or its absence accounted for or the dentist cannot 
 recover on the contract as such. If the contract is in posses- 
 sion of the patient, notice to produce it must be given him ; 
 if it is lost, proof of the loss must first be given." 
 
 "If the non-production of the writing is properly ac- 
 counted for, oral evidence of its terms may be introduced to 
 prove the claim." 
 
 "If the existence of the writing itself be disputed, as 
 where the dentist sues on a contract which, under the statute 
 of frauds must be in writing, and the patient denies that it 
 was ever put in writing, the writing itself must be produced ; 
 oral evidence cannot be offered as a substitute for it, even 
 after an effort to prove its loss."* 
 
 When a dentist is suing for compensation for services, it 
 may often be difficult or impossible for him to swear to the 
 various items of the services, the times when rendered and 
 the charges for each, without reference to his books of account. 
 "At first sight, his books of account might seem to be the 
 best evidence possible to prove his claim. It must be remem- 
 bered, however, that the law has to deal with the dishonest, 
 the careless, as well as the methodical, and to frame its rules 
 so as to do justice in the majority of cases; these books are 
 kept by the dentist himself and not even seen by the patient ; 
 the dentist may be dishonest and make any entry he pleases; 
 he may be careless and make an error in his entry; he may 
 make it some time after the service is rendered and from his 
 imperfect memory of what the service was and its value. It 
 
 *See Greenleaf Evidence, sees. 82 to 
 
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION. 211 
 
 is evidence made by himself, for himself. These and other 
 considerations have, to some extent, governed the courts in 
 framing rules as to the admissibility of books of account in 
 evidence." 
 
 "In the first place, it may be said that books of account 
 may be used in court for two purposes: (1) Merely to re- 
 fresh the mind of the dentist while he is testifying as to the 
 services and charges of which they contain a record ; (2) As 
 evidence themselves to prove the claim. The general rule is 
 that books of account may be used by the witness merely to 
 assist his memory, in any event, provided, after inspecting it, 
 he can testify to the facts from his own recollection, and pro- 
 viding the writing was made either at the time the service 
 for which suit was brought was performed, or shortly after- 
 ward."^ 
 
 "When the books of account are used not merely to 
 refresh the memory of the witness, but are sought to be intro- 
 duced as evidence of the claim itself, the rules of the several 
 States are not uniform as to their admissibility. In general 
 it may be said, however, that the books may be so used when 
 it is shown that the book is a book of original entries; that 
 the entries were made at the time the services were rendered 
 and by the person whose duty it was at the time to make 
 them ; that true and honest accounts were kept ; that the entry 
 was reasonably specific and particular. "- 
 
 Dentists usually keep a personal record of operations and 
 other services for each individual patient, but if the books of 
 record and account are to be used in court it is desirable, in 
 addition to the name of the patient, to have also the name 
 of the father, or husband, or other person who is expected to 
 pay the bill, if it is not to be collected from the patient indi- 
 vidually. Dentists are in the habit of using figures, letters 
 or a diagram to represent the several teeth, and sometimes 
 they use arbitrary signs or marks to designate the various 
 operations upon them or the replacement of lost teeth by 
 
 ^Greenleaf Evidence, sec. 438. 
 
 ^Greenleaf Evidence, sec. 118; also Wigmore Evidence, sees 1546 
 to 1562. 
 
212 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 artificial substitutes. If records and accounts are to be used 
 in court, the system of marks and signs should be as simple 
 as possible, and at any rate easily understood by a jury upon 
 proper explanation. 
 
 "8. Statute of Limitations — Statutes exist generally pro- 
 viding that if claims are not sued on within a certain time 
 fixed by the statute after they become due, no suit can be 
 maintained to enforce them. The general statute applicable 
 to other simple contracts applies, it has been held, to con- 
 tracts of physicians (except in Louisiana, where there is a 
 special statute governing contracts of physicians and attor- 
 neys)^ and would, therefore, be held to apply to contracts of 
 dentists, likewise. The period of limitation differs so greatly 
 in different states that no general statement of the law can 
 be given here. A distinction must be made, however, in the 
 different kinds of contracts a dentist may make. As we have 
 seen, certain contracts of the dentist have been held to be 
 contracts of sale, e. g., a contract to make a set of false teeth, 
 while other contracts are contracts for services. In most 
 States contracts for sale and contracts for services are gov- 
 erned by different statutes, the time within which suit must 
 be brought being different in the two cases.* * *" 
 
 "The time prescribed by the statutes begins to run against 
 the claim from the day the claim accrues, i. e., from the day 
 on which payment of the claim could be legally demanded. 
 
 "In general, both in England and in the United States, 
 if the patient makes a new unconditional promise to pay the 
 debt, either while the statute is running against the claim, or 
 even after the time fixed by the statute has actually expired, 
 the cause of action will revive and the right to sue be extended 
 for a further period equal to the time prescribed by the statute 
 for bringing the suit in the first instance. So an acknowl- 
 edgment of the debt, from which a promise to pay will be 
 implied, will have a like effect, as will likewise a conditional 
 promise to pay, if accompanied by a sufficient showing that 
 the condition on which the promise was made to depend has 
 
 '25 cvc, 1032. 
 
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION. 213 
 
 been performed. A partial payment of the debt by the patient 
 will, in most jurisdictions, have the same effect, and the date 
 of such payment mark the time from which such statute of 
 limitation begins to run anew."^ 
 
 LIABILITY OF DENTIST TO PATIENT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
 
 A contract, whether express or implied, between the 
 dentist and his patient means that both parties assume obli- 
 gations and duties, and a failure of performance by either 
 party may entitle the other party to compensation for such 
 actual injury or loss as he may have suffered in consequence. If 
 there is agreement or contract for a series of operations or 
 other services, the dentist must complete the services agreed 
 upon, and if without good cause he refuses to do so, he be- 
 comes liable for damages, but the patient must go to another 
 dentist, if there is one available, to complete the treatment 
 or he can recover no damages, and ordinarily in such a case 
 the damage would only be the difference between the com- 
 pensation agreed upon and that actually paid to the dentist 
 who completed the work. 
 
 Under ordinary circumstances it is the right or privi- 
 lege of a patient to terminate the services of a physician or 
 dentist by notifying him that he is no longer required, and 
 paying his bill. A dentist or physician must have the cor- 
 responding privilege or right to terminate his service by giv- 
 ing his patient sufficient notice to employ someone else. If 
 there is a definite agreement, either orally or in writing, the 
 terms of it must be fulfilled, whatever they may be. 
 
 FAILURE TO USE PROPER MATERIALS. 
 
 If the nature of the materials to be used for any opera- 
 tions, or in making crowns, bridges or sets of artificial teeth 
 is specified beforehand, of course the dentist may not sub- 
 stitute other and different materials, even though they be 
 as good or better. If he does so he is liable to lose all com- 
 pensation for his services, and may have to pay damages be- 
 sides. The same considerations apply to the quality of the 
 material used. 
 
 '25 Cyc, 1325 to 1370. 
 
214 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 If nothing is specified as to the nature or quality of the 
 materials to be used, the dentist must use such as are suit- 
 able for the work to be done and the circumstances of the 
 case ; such as a reasonably skillful dentist would use. 
 
 FAILURE TO COMPLETE WORK IN TIME. 
 
 "If the dentist expressly agreed to perform the work 
 undertaken in a specific time, he is bound by his promise, and 
 will be liable to his patient in damages for breach of con- 
 tract." This may involve entire loss of compensation for his 
 services, and damages besides. 
 
 "The liability of the dentist for the loss of the value of 
 his services, in addition to damages, is confined to cases where 
 time is of the 'essence of the contract,' as the legal expres- 
 sion is. That is, where the time within which the service is 
 to be performed is an important element of the contract, and 
 is so understood by both parties. The mere fact that a time 
 is fixed, as if the dentist should say : T will have this fin- 
 ished for you by Friday next,' or 'it will not take more than 
 three weeks,' will not render the dentist liable for the loss 
 of the value of his work, or for damages if the work is not 
 completed at the time mentioned." 
 
 "It is believed that the liability of the dentist for the 
 total loss of the value of his services in addition to damages 
 is confined to cases where, for the patient's purposes, the work 
 is practically valueless to him unless completed within the 
 time specified, or where the work is of such a character that 
 the patient can refuse to accept or enjoy the benefits of it." 
 
 If time is of the "essence of the contract" in the case 
 of a crown or bridge or artificial teeth, if not ready at the 
 time specified the patient may refuse to accept them, and 
 may have a claim for damages also, but if he accepts the work 
 he must pay for it, though he may offset the damage he has 
 suffered against the bill, and if greater than the bill, the den- 
 tist would have to pay the balance instead of the patient. 
 
 "Meaning of the Word 'About.' — Frequently the den- 
 tist does not make a definite promise to complete the work 
 for the patient by a certain date, but informs the patient that 
 
LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION. 215 
 
 it will take 'about' such and such a time." Ordinarily in such 
 cases a considerable variation from the time mentioned would 
 not affect the obligations or duties of either party, but if 
 there were a close relation of the time consumed and the 
 amount of the bill it might become "necessary to determine 
 what the word 'about' signifies. Since the very object the 
 dentist has in using the word is to guard against binding 
 himself to finish the work at a definite date, it is plain that 
 his promise to finish the work in 'about,' say two months, 
 will not render him liable for breach of contract if he fails 
 to complete it in exactly two months ; nor in such a case will 
 the patient necessarily be justified in refusing to pay him 
 for such services, after the two months have expired, as may 
 be necessary to complete the work." If however, the work 
 consumed three or fouth months, there might arise, under cer- 
 tain circumstances, a question for a jury to decide, whether 
 the word "about" could be stretched so far. 
 
 BREACH OF WARRANTY OF CURE. 
 
 It is unwise and professionally improper for dentists and 
 physicians to warrant cures, or the success or durability of 
 operations, or artificial substitutes for lost teeth, and the law 
 does not recognize any such obligation or duty on their part : 
 But if any dentist or physician is so foolish as to warrant 
 his work, the Ic.w will require him to make good his war- 
 ranty. "The rule 'no cure, no pay,' governs only where there 
 is an express agreement to that effect' says the court in 
 Bronson v. Hoffman.^ All that the law requires of him is 
 that he treat the patient in a reasonably skillful manner and 
 with due care. * * *" 
 
 "* * * ji", Wilkins v. Ferrell- a dentist was sued for 
 malpractice in extracting a tooth, whereby the patient's jaw- 
 bone was fractured. On the trial the dentist's counsel asked 
 the trial court to instruct the jury that 'a dentist never in- 
 sures the result and simply engages that he possesses a rea- 
 sonable degree of skill, such as is ordinarily possessed by 
 
 7 Hun. N. Y., 674 (1876). 
 
 ^Wilkins v. Ferrell (Texas), 30 S. W., 450 (1895). 
 
216 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 the profession generally, and to exercise that skill with rea- 
 sonable care and diligence.' The trial court refused to give 
 this instruction, and the appellate court held that the in- 
 structions asked for correctly stated the law, and should have 
 been given, and a verdict having been found against the den- 
 tist, the court reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial." 
 
 "There is no legal objection to a dentist and his patient 
 entering into a contract that the patient is not to pay the 
 dentist anything for his services unless he dentist effect 
 a cure." A self respecting professional man, should, how- 
 ever, never make such a contract unless the circumstances 
 are peculiar and unusual. 
 
 "Sometimes a dentist promises to make a plate that will 
 'please' or be 'satisfactory' to the patient. That this is a 
 very rash promise to make all courts are agreed. All courts 
 however, are not agreed as to the standard required by such 
 a warranty." 
 
 Some hold that the patient is the sole judge whether the 
 work "pleases" or is "satisfactory" and "if he is not sat- 
 isfied for any cause, no matter how whimsical, the dentist can- 
 not recover for his services. These courts leave it to the 
 jury to say whether the work is satisfactory to the patient or 
 not. * * * 
 
 "Other courts have treated such promises more leniently, 
 and hold that if the work ought to be satisfactory to the 
 patient the dentist may recover whether the work is satisfactory 
 or not." 
 
 Such controversies should very seldom arise between a 
 dentist and his patient, and very few of those that do arise 
 should be allowed to get into court. 
 
 A dentist should use every endeavor possible to make his 
 work right, and if it really is right, it will be very seldom 
 indeed that a patient cannot be convinced of it. A patient 
 should be made to understand, also, if they express dissatis- 
 faction after the utmost endeavors, that "if a set of teeth is 
 good enough to keep and to use, it is good enough to pay for." 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 LIABILITY OF DENTIST TO PATIENT FOR MALPRACTICE* — FOR IN- 
 FECTING A PATIENT — FOR OPERATING WITHOUT CONSENT — 
 DAMAGES — STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS — DEFINITION OF MAL- 
 PRACTICE. 
 
 "Malpractice, in law, as applied to physicians and sur- 
 geons, means generally professional misconduct toward a 
 patient which is considered reprehensible either because im- 
 moral in itself, or because contrary to law or expressly for- 
 bidden by the law. In a more specific sense, it means bad, 
 wrong, or injudicious treatment of a patient professionally 
 and in respect to the particular disease or injury, resulting in 
 injury, unnecessary suffering, or death to the patient, and 
 proceeding from ignorance, carelessness, want of proper pro- 
 fessional skill, disregard of established rules or principles, 
 neglect, or a malicious or criminal intent."^ 
 
 "This definition of malpractice applies to dentists, the 
 courts in suits against dentists for malpractice, applying the 
 same principles as in the case of physicians and surgeons. "- 
 
 Injury to the patient is an essential feature of legal mal- 
 practice. No matter how unskillful, incompetent, or careless 
 a dentist may be, he is not guilty of malpractice from a legal 
 point of view unless the patient suffers injury. It is true, 
 however, that unskillful, incompetent, or negligent operating 
 usually does injure the patient. The point is that in suits for 
 malpractice the injury must be affirmatively proven, and also 
 the neglect or failure of professional duty. 
 
 TIME AT WHICH LIABILITY COMMENCES. 
 
 "The liability for malpractice is founded on the duty the 
 practitioner owes to the patient. If that relation has not sub- 
 sisted no liability is incurred. Therefore a dentist is not 
 
 *Mikell. p. 102. 
 
 'Black's Law Diet. (2nd. Ed.), 751. 
 
 "See McCracken v. Smathers, 122 N. C, 799 (1898). 
 
218 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 liable for malpractice in refusing to treat a patient, even 
 though no other dentist is available and the case is urgent."^ 
 
 The case cited by Mikell is an extreme one. A patient, 
 alarmingly ill, sent for the doctor who had been the family 
 physician, and the messenger explained that the case was 
 urgent, that no other physician could be procured in time, 
 and tendered his fee. The doctor had no other patient re- 
 quiring immediate attention, but he refused to go. The 
 patient died, supposedly for want of the assistance the doctor 
 might have given, and the administrator brought suit "for 
 $10,000.00 damages in wrongfully causing the death of his 
 intestate. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the admin- 
 istrator appealed." The Supreme Court afihrmed the judg- 
 ment of the trial court and declared that a physician is under 
 no legal obligation to accept and treat a patient, that the 
 license of the state to practice medicine is permissive and not 
 compulsory, and that the "counsel's analogies, drawn from the 
 obligations to the public on the part of innkeepers, common 
 carriers, and the like, are beside the mark." 
 
 It is a well established legal proposition that a physician 
 or dentist may refuse to accept a patient for treatment, for 
 any reason, or for no reason at all, except his personal prefer- 
 ence or choice. If, however, a patient is accepted and treat- 
 ment begun or promised, it must be continued as long as 
 necessary unless he is dismissed by the patient or he notifies 
 the patient that he will discontinue treatment and gives suffi- 
 cient time in which he may procure the services of some- 
 one else. 
 
 LACK OF SKILL OR CARE GIVING RISE TO LIABILITY. 
 
 "1. In General. — In determining the degree of care and 
 skill which the physician, surgeon and dentist must exercise 
 in order to escape liability for damages that the patient may 
 suffer from his treatment, the courts are not entirely agreed. 
 All the courts hold that the practitioner cannot be held liable 
 by showing that he did not exercise the highest degree of 
 care and skill possible.^ All agree that to fasten such liability 
 
 'Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind., 416 (1900). 
 'See Simonds v. Henry, 39 Me., 155 (1855). 
 
LIABILITY TO THE PATIENT. 219 
 
 upon him, it is not necessary to show that he was grossly 
 negligent in a given case. It is certain that he must have 
 treated the patient 'negligently' in order to be liable, and 
 that if he exercised 'reasonable' care and skill, he is not liable." 
 
 "The negligence which renders a dentist liable in an 
 action for malpractice is simply a failure to perform the duty 
 which he, as a professional man, owes to his patient. This 
 duty is usually expressed in the formula; a physician, sur- 
 geon or dentist is required to possess and exercise that degree 
 of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and exercised by the 
 members of his profession in good standing, practicing in 
 similar localities; and it is his duty to use reasonable care and 
 diligence in the exercise of his skill and the application of his 
 learning, and to act according to his best judgment." 
 
 "2. Effect of Locality. — In determining the degree of 
 skill and care that must be exercised by the practitioner, some 
 courts lay down the rule that he is required to use only such 
 care and skill as is ordinarily exercised by practitioners in 
 the particular locality or neighborhood in which he practices."^ 
 
 "Other courts hold that the practitioner must exercise 
 such care and skill as is exercised by those practicing, not in 
 the same but in similar localities generally." 
 
 In the case cited by Mikell; McCracken v. Smathers,' the 
 court refused to instruct in accordance with the first of the 
 above rules. In affirming the judgment of the lower court, 
 the Supreme Court stated the second rule as follows : "The 
 degree of care and skill required is that possessed and exer- 
 cised by the ordinary members of his profession. It need 
 not be the highest skill and knowledge known to the profes- 
 sion, but it must be such as is ordinarily possessed by the 
 average of the profession. It cannot be measured simply by 
 the profession in the neighborhood, as the standard of meas- 
 urement would be entirely too variable and uncertain. 'Neigh- 
 borhood' might be construed into a very limited area and is 
 generally so understood among our people. It might con- 
 
 'Wood V. Wyeth, 106 N. Y. App. Du., 21 (1905); Mullen v. Flau- 
 ders. 7Z Vt.. 95 (1900); Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn., 167 (1893). 
 ^22 N. C, 799 (1898). 
 
220 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 tain but few dentists, in sparsely settled sections, perhaps 
 only one or two. Both might be men of very inferior qualifi- 
 cations, and to say that they might set themselves up as the 
 standard of a learned profession and prove the standing of 
 each by the ability of the other, would be equally unjust to the 
 profession and to its patients. * * *" 
 
 "3. Effect of the State of the Science. — Manifestly, when 
 judging of the degree of care and skill exercised by the prac- 
 titioner, regard must be had to the state of the science of 
 dentistry at the time the treatment alleged to be negligent 
 was given, and such is the doctrine of the cases." 
 
 The rule is not closely defined, as, indeed, it cannot be. 
 It does not require that a man attend a graduate school of 
 dentistry every few years in order to keep posted upon every- 
 thing new that is introduced or adopted by the best and most 
 advanced men of the profession, nor does it require that he 
 buy and read every new book or everything that is published 
 in all the dental journals, nor that he attend a certain number 
 of dental society meetings. But if he never does any of these 
 things that fact would be likely to have great weight in the 
 minds of a court and jury in case he were accused of negli- 
 gence. 
 
 "4. Effect of Established Methods of Treatment. — It is 
 generally agreed that practitioners are bound by what is 
 universally settled in the profession, and when an established 
 practice or a particular mode of treatment has been followed 
 for a long time and is upheld by the consensus of opinion 
 among the members of the profession, any departure there- 
 from is evidence of negligence sufficient to render the dentist 
 liable for malpractice, if injury results."^ 
 
 This rule, like the preceding one, cannot be closely de- 
 fined nor strictly applied. On the one hand it is not intended 
 to prevent all progress of the profession by the introduction 
 of new modes of treatment or new methods of practice. But 
 it is intended to prevent the reckless experimenting upon 
 patients. 
 
 'See Patten v. Wiggen, 51 Me., 594 (1862); Carpenter v. Blake, 
 60 Barb, N. Y., 488 (1871). 
 
LIABILITY TO THE PATIENT. 221 
 
 Whenever a man wishes to make an operation or apply a 
 mode of treatment not in common use by the profession, he 
 should obtain the consent of his patient. A man cannot ex- 
 periment upon his patient without liability if injury results. 
 
 "The rule protects the community against reckless experi- 
 ments, while it admits the adoption of new remedies and 
 modes of treatment, only when their benefits have been dem- 
 onstrated, or when, from the necessity of the case, the surgeon 
 or physician must be left to the exercise of his own skill and 
 experience." 
 
 "If it is shown that some practitioners have abandoned 
 the established mode of treatment, and applied a new mode, 
 and found it to succeed as well or better than the established 
 one, it is not negligent to resort to the system thus practically 
 tested. But before the new practice can be used, to shield 
 the practitioner from the charge of malpractice, it must 
 appear that the cases in which it was tested were substantially 
 the same as the case at bar, and that the treatment resorted 
 to has been successful in a sufficient number of instances to 
 establish satisfactorily the propriety and safety of adopting it. 
 The practitioner cannot try experiments on his patient."^ 
 
 "The dentist is not liable for malpractice in not follow- 
 ing the established method of treatment, if the condition of the 
 patient was such that this method of treatment would have 
 resulted in injury to the patient. "- 
 
 "5. Where Services are Gratuitous. — The rule was form- 
 erly laid down that the practitioner, when his services were 
 rendered gratuitously was liable for gross negligence only.^ 
 Later authorities deny this, and lay down the rule that when 
 one assumes to be a dentist and acts as such the fact that he 
 did not charge for his services will not affect the rule as to 
 the degree of skill and care required of him.* He is still 
 liable for any injury resulting to the patient from lack of 
 ordinary care and skill." 
 
 'Carpenter v. Blake. 60 Barb. N. Y., 488 (1871). 
 'Hallam v. Mean. 82 Ills., 379 (1876). 
 ^ Shearman & Redfield on Neg., 2nd Ed., sec. 604. 
 'Peck V. Hutchinson, 88 Iowa, 320 (1893). 
 
222 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 "Liability for Insufficient or Wrong Diagnosis. — If 
 through negHgence or the want of ordinary skill, care or dili- 
 gence, the practitioner fails to make such a sufficient exami- 
 nation as would enable him to correctly diagnosticate the case, 
 he is guilty of malpractice and liable for any damages result- 
 ing therefrom. * * *"^ 
 
 "It is said that an erroneous diagnosis alone, not followed 
 by improper treatment does not render the practitioner liable 
 for malpractice."- 
 
 "In that case, however, the erroneous diagnosis did not 
 result in injury to the patient, as the treatment followed was 
 equally proper whether the injury was as diagnosticated or as 
 claimed by the patient." 
 
 The rule means that if injury results from a wrong 
 diagnosis either by determining a wrong course of treatment 
 or no treatment at all, the dentist would be liable for mal- 
 practice unless ordinary care and skill were used. 
 
 "Liability for Advising Erroneous Treatment. — A dentist 
 is liable in a suit for malpractice not only when he negligently 
 performs work he has undertaken, but for advising a certain 
 course of treatment, operation, extraction, etc., if, in his 
 opinion, or in the opinion of a dentist of reasonable skill, such 
 treatment is unnecessary and unreasonable, and results in 
 injury to the patient, even though the actual treatment were 
 skillfully administered ; for when the patient submits his case 
 to the dentist he has a right to rely on the knowledge of the 
 dentist as to the proper course of treatment, and his good faith 
 in advising the proper course, as well as his skill in perform- 
 ing the actual work. Even though the patient does not ex- 
 pressly ask the dentist's advice as to the proper treatment in 
 the particular case, but merely requests the dentist to perforni 
 a certain work, say to extract a tooth, it is the duty of the 
 dentist if, in his opinion, extraction is unnecessary, to advise 
 the patient to that effect, and the patient would have the right, 
 in the absence of contrary advice by the dentist to assume that 
 the dentist considered the operation proper."^ 
 
 ni4 Kv., 20 (1902). 
 
 'Tomer v. Aiken, 126 Iowa, 114 (1904). 
 
 'Gramm v. Bocuer, 56 Ind., 497 (1877). 
 
LIABILITY TO THE PATIENT. 223 
 
 "If, however, the dentist advises the patient that the opera- 
 tion is unnecessary and improper, if the patient — at least if the 
 patient be of mature years and sound mind — insists on the opera- 
 tion, and the dentist thereupon performs it, doing the work skill- 
 fully, the dentist is not liable to the patient for any damage 
 sought on the ground that the operation was improper and 
 injurious." 
 
 The right thing to do in such a case is to refuse to make 
 an improper or injurious operation no matter how urgently the 
 patient may desire it. Even the knowledge that the patient will 
 go to someone else who will do it, will not justify a man in his 
 own estimation for doing a patient injury. 
 
 "Liability for Erroneous Prescription. — The care and skill 
 required of the dentist is not confined to his acts in actually treat- 
 ing the patient. The same care is required of him by the law in 
 writing prescriptions. If through negligence or ignorance in 
 writing a prescription the patient suffers damage, the dentist is 
 liable therefor in a civil action."^ 
 
 (If the injury were serious enough he would be liable in a 
 criminal action also.) 
 
 "Liability for Omission to Give Instructions. — It is the duty 
 of the dentist not only to use proper care and skill in the actual 
 work done by him for the patient, but to give proper instructions 
 to the patient as to the care or use of his teeth or mouth, so far 
 as such instructions are necessary to obtain the result desired 
 from the treatment. A failure to give any instruction when such 
 instruction should be given, or the giving of erroneous instruc- 
 tions will, if injury result, render the dentist liable for mal- 
 practice. * ''^ *"- 
 
 "Liability for Abandonment of Patient. — It has been de- 
 cided many times by the courts that the physician who under- 
 takes the treatment of an ill person, renders himself liable in 
 damages if. without the patient's consent, or notice to the patient, 
 he prematurely abandons the case." 
 
 Mikell has several pages under this head but the matters 
 of chief importance may be stated in a brief quotation. 
 
 ^Murdock V. Walker, 43 111. App.. 590 (1892). 
 
 'See Beck v. The German Klinik. 78 Iowa, 696 (1889). 
 
224 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 "The obligation of the dentist is only to continue to treat 
 the patient unless (1) he notify the patient that he does not 
 propose to continue his attendance, in time for the patient to 
 secure the services of another dentist; or (2) unless the patient 
 consents to the discontinuance of the treatment; or (3) the 
 condition of the patient is such as to no longer require treatment." 
 
 Each of these three propositions is elaborated and fortified 
 by quotations from court decisions, but nothing of much im- 
 portance is added to their meaning. 
 
 "Liability for Communication of Disease to Patient. — It is 
 the duty of the practitioner while treating his patient, to use 
 reasonable care and employ reasonable skill not to communicate 
 infectious or contagious diseases to the patient. This rule applies 
 not only to the communication of a disease from which the prac- 
 titioner himself is suffering, but also to the communication by 
 the practitioner from one patient to another. If a dentist, know- 
 ing he has such disease, allows the patient to visit him without 
 apprising the patient of the danger, and without taking proper 
 precautions on his own part, and communicates the disease to the 
 patient, he is liable to the patient for any damage the latter suffers 
 thereby."^ 
 
 "Not only is he liable for damages resulting from thus 
 communicating a disease from which he suffers, but he is also 
 liable if he negligently transmits a disease from one patient to 
 another, as where having treated one patient known to him to 
 have an infectious or contagious disease, he proceeds to treat 
 another patient without warning such patient, and without taking 
 proper precautions against the communication of the disease." 
 
 "The same rule applies whether the transmission of the 
 disease was effected through the medium of the practitioner 
 himself, or by the use of infected instruments." 
 
 "Liability for Improper Use of Anesthetics. — In the use of 
 anesthetics, as in the treatment itself, the dentist is liable for any 
 injury, due to lack of proper care and skill, the patient may suffer 
 If the particular anesthetic used was such as would not have 
 been used by a reasonably skillful and careful practitioner, or if 
 
 'See Piper v. Manifee, 12 B. Monroe, Ky., 465 (1851). 
 
LIABILITY TO THE PATIENT. 225 
 
 it was administered negligently either as to quantity or the length 
 of time during which it was used, malpractice may be inferred.^ 
 It was further held in the case last cited, that the dentist in using 
 an anesthetic is only bound to look to natural and probable effects, 
 that he is not answerable for negligence for results arising from 
 the peculiar temperament or condition of the patient, of which 
 he had no knowledge. This doctrine would seem to need quali- 
 fication. It being established at the present day that certain 
 anesthetics are dangerous to persons suffering from certain dis- 
 eases, it would seem incumbent on the dentist to use reasonable 
 care and skill to discover whether the patient had such disease 
 before administering the anesthetic, and to abstain from using 
 it if it would be dangerous." 
 
 -"Where the administration of an anesthetic is necessary or 
 advisable for professional purposes, and objection to its admin- 
 istration not appearing or being discoverable by careful and skill- 
 ful diagnosis, he is not liable for resulting damages unless at least 
 two facts co-exist, namely : 
 
 1. That he was guilty of negligence in reference to the ad- 
 ministration of the anesthetic; and 
 
 2 That the injury of which the patient complains was the 
 result of this negligence in the use of the anesthetic." 
 
 "The negligence in the administration of the anesthetic may 
 have consisted in administering it without sufficient preliminary 
 examination, or in administering an unfit and unsuitable drug, 
 or in the unskillful or careless manner of administration, or in 
 the excessive amount given. "-^ 
 
 "Extreme Responsibility in Fact. — In dealing with anes- 
 thetics, the practitioner must know that he is using instrumentali- 
 ties that are dangerous and deadly, and his care must be in pro- 
 portion to the risk involved to his patient. His responsibility 
 begins with the examination preceding the administration of 
 the drug and carelessness resulting in the determination to use 
 the same when clearly it should not have been given will make 
 him liable in malpractice for resulting injuries and, possibly, 
 for manslaughter, where the consequences are death. He cannot 
 
 'Bogle V. Winslow, 5 Phila., 136 (1863). 
 'Dental Jurisprudence by E. D. Brothers, p. 63-64. 
 'Bogle V. Winslow, 5 Phila., 136-139. 
 
226 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 trifle with the health or Hfe of his patient and not shoulder the 
 responsibility."^ 
 
 -"Liability for Treating Patient Without Consent. — Every 
 person has the right to the inviolability of his person. This right 
 forbids anyone, dentist, physician, surgeon or other as a general 
 rule, to do any act involving the physical touching of the patient, 
 without the patient's consent. 'The patient must be final arbiter 
 as to whether he shall take his chances with an operation, or 
 take his chances of living without it. * * * Consent, there- 
 fore, of an individual must be expressly or impliedly given before 
 a surgeon may have a right to operate.' "^ 
 
 "If the practitioner operates without the consent of the 
 patient when he is in a condition to be consulted, he is liable in 
 damages in an action for assault and battery, no matter how im- 
 perative the practitioner may deem the operation."* 
 
 The cases cited were in medical or surgical practice. In 
 dentistry it will very seldom happen that urgent necessity for an 
 immediate operation will arise when the patient is in such con- 
 dition as to make it impossible to consult him. It may happen 
 when extracting teeth under an anesthetic, and consent should 
 be obtained beforehand for such operation as may be necessary. 
 
 "Consent of Relatives. — If the patient himself is of the age 
 of discretion, it would seem that his consent is sufficient. It has 
 been held in State v. Housekeeper^ that if a married woman 
 consents to an operation on herself, it is not necessary to obtain 
 the consent of her husband also. Writers are not agreed, how- 
 ever, whether in the case of young children, or persons non 
 compos mentis the consent of the parent or guardian is necessary 
 to justify a practitioner in performing an operation.*"' It has 
 been held in one case that the consent of the father is not neces- 
 sary to justify an operation on a child, aged seventeen years.' 
 Certainly such consent should be secured whenever possible, and 
 
 ^State V. Baldwin, 36 Kan., 1. 
 
 ^Mikell p. 124. 
 
 'Kinkead, Torts, sec. 375; State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md., 162 (1888). 
 
 *State V. Housekeeper, 70 Md., 162 (1888). 
 
 70 Md. 162 (1888). 
 
 ''See 1 Kinkead, Torts, sec. 376. 
 
 'Bakker v. Welch, 144 Mich., 632 (1906). 
 
LIABILITY TO THE PATIENT. 227 
 
 the practitioner should never operate without such consent except 
 in extreme cases and when he is prepared to take the conse- 
 quences of a possible suit." 
 
 "Consent Presumed. — The consent of the patient to a partic- 
 ular act of the dentist need not be express. Such consent may 
 be presumed if the facts warrant it, and a consent to the greater 
 included a consent to the less if the less is included in the greater. 
 Under our law Shylock would have been entitled to draw the 
 blood necessary to taking the pound of flesh, if the contract for 
 the pound of flesh had been valid. If a patient consents to have 
 a tooth drawn, his consent will cover the necessary laceration of 
 the gum and consequent spilling of blood. A consent to the ex- 
 traction of a specifically designated tooth, however, is not a con- 
 sent to the pulling of another tooth, either instead of or in addi- 
 tion to the tooth indicated. This is true though the necessity for 
 pulling the second tooth was greater than for pulling the first, 
 and though that necessity was not discovered until the patient 
 was under the influence of an anesthetic and hence unable to be 
 consulted as to the extraction of the second tooth." 
 
 Under such circumstances a dentist should do what he 
 found indispensably necessary, and take his chances. But the 
 proper way is to have the terms of consent cover what may be 
 found necessary, instead of only some specific thing. 
 
 "Consent may be presumed not only to what is necessary in 
 the actual performance of the operation consented to, but to the 
 extension of the operation, or even to the performance of an- 
 other operation if the facts warrant the inference of consent. 
 Whether they do warrant it is a question for the jury to decide." 
 
 Effect of Admission of Lack of Skill. — So far as malpractice 
 cases are concerned, a short quotation from Mikell under this 
 head will suffice. 
 
 "If, when consulted, the dentist makes known to the patient 
 his lack of knowledge and skill, or the patient is in any way fully 
 aware of it, the latter cannot complain of the lack of that which 
 he knew did not exist. "^ 
 
 Liability for Malpractice of Others. — 
 
 "1. Assistant. — The dentist is liable for malpractice not only 
 
 ^Lorenz v. Jackson. 88 Hun. N. Y., 200 (1895). 
 
228 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 for his own negligence, but for the negligent treatment of an 
 assistant over whose actions in the premises the dentist has 
 dominion and control; or for such treatment by a person who, 
 under the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would 
 be justified in believing was aiding the dentist in his professional 
 work; or who was held out to the public as his assistant; if the 
 patient relying on such representations presented himself at the 
 dentist's office for treatment, and submitted himself to a dentist 
 in defendant's office, relying upon the defendant and not upon 
 the individual who, in fact, treated him as the responsible head 
 of the business."^ 
 
 "2. Partner. — A dentist is liable for the malpractice of his 
 partner. It is immaterial whether the partner alone treated the 
 patient, or whether he was treated jointly by both partners, or 
 whether the defendant first treated the patient skillfully and his 
 partner later, in the same, or another case, treated him unskill- 
 fully or negligently."- 
 
 "The doctrine is thus expressed by Simpson, C. J., in Hyrne 
 v. Erwin :^ 'In a partnership the parties associated are, in one 
 sense, agents of each other, and the act of one within the scope 
 of the partnership or business is the act of each and all, as fully 
 as if each was present and participating in all that is done. And 
 each guarantees that within the scope of the common business 
 reasonable care, diligence and skill shall be displayed by the one 
 in charge. * * *" 
 
 "3. Substitute. — While a dentist is liable for injury caused 
 by the malpractice of his assistant, or partner, he is not liable 
 for the malpractice of another dentist whom he has recom- 
 mended to the patient, the latter being in independent practice, 
 and having no business connection with the former, and not being 
 employed by the former as his agent."* 
 
 "4. Druggist. — The dentist is not liable for the negligence 
 of a druggist, over whom he has no control in filling a pre- 
 scription."^ 
 
 ^Wilkins v. Ferrell, 10 Tex. Civ. App., 231 (1895). 
 'Whittakei- v. Collins, 34 Minn., 299 (1885). 
 '23 S. C, 226 (1885). 
 
 ^Myers v. Holborn, 58 N. J. L., 193 (1895). 
 "Stretton v. Holmes, 19 Ont., 286 (1889). 
 
LIABILITY TO THE PATIENT. 229 
 
 "He is, however, liable for his own negligence in giving a 
 wrong prescription, and if he has negligently given a wrong pre- 
 scription, he is not excused by the fact that the druggist was also 
 negligent in filling the prescription, if the prescription was filled 
 as written."^ 
 
 "Efit'ect of Contributory Negligence of Patient. — It is the 
 duty of the patient to co-operate with his professional adviser, 
 and to conform to proper and necessary treatment, and if he will 
 not, or under the pressure of pain cannot, his neglect is his 
 own wrong or misfortune, for which he has no right to hold the 
 practitioner responsible. "- 
 
 "If, therefore, the patient disobeys the reasonable in- 
 structions of the dentist, he cannot recover damages even 
 though the dentist did not exercise proper skill and care, if 
 the patient's disobedience directly contributed to produce the 
 injury. * * *"^ 
 
 "It is not sufficient to bar recovery that the patient w^as 
 negligent, if his negligence only aggravated the effects due 
 to the malpractice of the dentist, but did not bring them about 
 or conduce to them; such negligence of the patient merely 
 goes to mitigate the damages he can recover, not to bar a 
 recovery."* 
 
 "Effect of Recovery of Fee. — In some states recovery by 
 the dentist in a suit at law for his services, bars an action by 
 the patient for malpractice founded on the same services. 
 The reason for this rule is that the patient, in the suit against 
 him for the dentist's fee, might have defended in whole or in 
 part, by showing that in rendering the services sued for, the 
 dentist had been guilty of malpractice. If he omits to set up 
 his defence and a recovery is had against him, he cannot 
 afterward litigate the question of malpractice."'"' 
 
 "In other states it is held that the above rule applied only 
 when, in a suit by the dentist for his fees, the patient appears 
 and bases his defence on the ground that in rendering the 
 
 'Murdock v. Walker, 43 111. App.. 590 (1891). 
 ^Shearman and Redfield, Neg. 2nd Ed., sec. 615. 
 "Hibbard v. Thompson. 109 Map., 286 (1872). 
 %IcCracker v. Smathers, 122 N. C. 799 (1898). 
 
 ^Bellinger v. Craigne, 31 Barb. N. Y., 534 (1860); Ely v. Wilber, 
 49 N. J. L., 685 (1887). 
 
230 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 services, the dentist was guilty of malpractice. If the patient 
 does not appear in answer to the suit for services, or appear- 
 ing, defends on some other ground than that of malpractice 
 of the dentist, he is not barred from subsequently suing the 
 dentist for malpractice."^ 
 
 The reason assigned for the latter view is that "the plain- 
 tiff's claim for damages resulting from malpractice constitutes 
 a separate and independent cause of action," and besides that 
 it might be unfair to compel the patient to present his claim 
 for damages in a justice's court, where the amount in litiga- 
 tion is limited to $200.00. 
 
 "Proof of Malpractice. — AVhen a patient has brought suit 
 against a dentist for malpractice, the burden of proof is on 
 the patient. To establish his case he must prove: (1) The 
 duty of the dentist to treat him properly, i. e., that the rela- 
 tion of patient and dentist subsisted between them ; (2) That 
 the dentist neglected his duty; (3) That the patient suffered 
 injury; (4) That the injury was caused by the negligence of 
 the dentist. It is not sufficient to prove that he has not 
 benefited by the treatment, the dentist does not, in the absence 
 of express agreement, undertake that his treatment will be 
 beneficial. Nor can he recover by showing merely that his 
 condition was worse after treatment than before ; the dentist 
 does not undertake that it shall be better. He only undertakes 
 that he will treat the patient with ordinary skill, care and 
 diligence. If he does this he is not ordinarily liable for the 
 result." 
 
 "iWhile the burden of proving negligence is on the plain- 
 tiff, he is not required to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, 
 as in the case where the negligence is made the basis of a 
 prosecution by the state, but only by a preponderance of the 
 evidence."' 
 
 "From the nature of the charge against the dentist, gen- 
 erally speaking, proof of his negligence can be made only by 
 expert witnesses. * * *3 Negligence cannot be presumed." 
 
 ^See Bigelow, Estoppel (2nd Ed.) 98; Goble v. Dillon, 86 Ind., 
 327 (1882); Ressequie v. Byers, 52 Wis., 650 (1881). 
 'Wood V. Wyeth, 106 N. Y. App. Div., 21 (1905). 
 =46 Kan., 78 (1891). 
 
LIABILITY TO THE PATIENT. 231 
 
 "The question whether a surgical operation has been un- 
 skillfully performed or not is one of science, and is to be deter- 
 mined by the testimony of skillful surgeons as to their opinion, 
 founded either wholly on an examination of the part operated 
 upon, or partly on such examination and partly on informa- 
 tion derived from the patient ; or partly on such examination, 
 partly on such information and partly on facts conceded or 
 proved at the trial. McClelland Civil Malpractice, 304. * * *" 
 
 "The injury may be of such a nature, however, as itself 
 to show negligence, at least prima facie. In such a case the 
 burden of disproving negligence is on the dentist. In Shock- 
 ley v. Tusker^ the patient was severely burned by X-Rays 
 while undergoing treatment for appendicitis. In an action 
 against the surgeon for malpractice, the court said : 'We think 
 the fact that plaintiff was severely burned is some evidence in 
 itself that the treatment was improper.' " 
 
 "When sued for malpractice the dentist should go to the 
 trial prepared both by his own knowledge and the evidence of 
 experts to disprove the charge of negligence. Many verdicts 
 have gone against practitioners for lack of this precau- 
 tion. * * *" 
 
 "Damages for Malpractice. — The damages recoverable in 
 an action against a dentist for malpractice may be: (1) Nomi- 
 nal; (2) Compensatory; or (3) Punitive. Nominal damages 
 are awarded by the jury where negligence of the dentist has 
 been proved but it is impossible to distinguish between the 
 consequences of the malpractice and the consequences of the 
 trouble the dentist was treating. Nominal damages are 
 usually computed at six cents. "- 
 
 "Compensatory damages are damages designed to com- 
 pensate the patient for the injury suffered by the maltreat- 
 ment of the dentist. They are measured by the loss or in- 
 jury to the plaintiff directly and naturally resulting from the 
 dentist's fault or negligence, not alone by such loss or injury 
 as an ordinary man might have expected would follow from 
 the negligence."^ 
 
 '127 Iowa. 456 (1905). 
 
 "Becker v. Taniski. IS N. Y. Supp.. 675 (1891). 
 Challis V. Lake, 71 N. H., 90 (1901). 
 
 3/- 
 
232 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 "In estimating the damages suffered by the patient, the 
 jury should take into consideration all the circumstances of 
 the case, the pecuniary loss, resulting from inability to labor, 
 the bodily and mental suffering, loss of time, actual expenses 
 incurred by the patient, the ephemeral or permanent character 
 of the injury, and the circumstances of the injured party and 
 award the patient such a sum of money as will compensate 
 him for what he has suffered, or will suffer as the result of the 
 dentist's treatment."^ 
 
 "Punitive or exemplary damages are given by way, not 
 only of compensation to the patient, but of punishment to 
 the dentist. The jury may properly award them when the 
 dentist in treating his patient has been guilty of gross negli- 
 gence amounting to reckless indifference, or where the man- 
 ner of treatment shows an evil motive toward the patient." 
 
 If a dentist is so unfortunate as to be sued for malprac- 
 tice he should seek carefully to find if there has been any 
 contributory negligence on the part of the patient, either in a 
 failure strictly to follow instructions, or to take such care 
 as a person of good sense ought to take in the circumstances, 
 and he should insist also upon a careful discrimination be- 
 tween the harm caused by the disease or injury itself (for 
 which, of course, no claim can be made) and the pain or 
 injury caused by fault of the dentist. And he will need to 
 call in some of his friends as expert witnesses to testify to 
 his general character, ability and skill, as well as to his treat- 
 ment of the case in question. 
 
 "Statute of Limitations. — In some states there are statutes 
 of limitation expressly applicable to actions for malpractice. 
 In those states, if the patient does not bring suit within the 
 time prescribed by the statute he cannot, of course, recover. 
 In most states there is no statute expressly applicable to 
 actions for malpractice. In these states, however, there are 
 statutes of limitations applying to actions for breach of con- 
 tract and sometimes a different statute applying to actions 
 of tort. As a patient may ground his suit for malpractice 
 either on the breach of the contract of the dentist to treat him 
 
 ^330 Cyc, 1590. 
 
LIABILITY TO THE PATIENT. 233 
 
 with care and skill, or may ground it on negligence, what 
 period of limitation will apply will depend on the remedy 
 chosen by the plaintiff. The statutes of the different states 
 vary in the length of time they prescribe within which the 
 action must be brought." 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 LIABILITY OF THE DENTIST TO THE STATE — LIABILITY FOR ILLEGAL 
 PRACTICE — THE DENTIST AS A WITNESS — PRIVILEGED COMMU- 
 NICATIONS — EXPERT TESTIMONY — IDENTIFYING THE DEAD — 
 JURY DUTY. 
 
 "1. In General. — The statutes regulating the practice of 
 dentistry usually provide that it shall be a misdemeanor to 
 practice dentistry without complying with the provisions of 
 the statutes as to license, registry, etc. Under these statutes 
 it is immaterial how well qualified a person is to practice 
 from the point of view of the profession ; if he has not strictly 
 complied with the law of the state in which he attempts to 
 practice, he is liable to criminal prosecution, and payment 
 of a fine ranging from twenty to five hundred dollars, and in 
 some cases to both fine and imprisonment." 
 
 "By the statutes of some states not only is the person 
 practicing liable to the punishment provided by law if he 
 fails to register his license when and where he begins to 
 practice, but he is likewise liable if he afterwards removes 
 into another county of the same state and there practices, or 
 if, while still practicing where he is registered, he practices 
 in any other county."^ 
 
 Most of the statutes make some provision for the prac- 
 tice necessary by students in obtaining their professional 
 education. 
 
 Some, like that of Illinois, restrict such practice posi- 
 tively to the dental school, others allow it under the personal 
 supervision of a preceptor, in his office, and at least one state 
 allows this during the interval between sessions of the dental 
 school. 
 
 Under this general head of liability for illegal practice Mikell 
 elaborates through six pages. It is not necessary for us to go 
 into all those minute details of all the different possibilities of 
 
 ^The Illinois law requires registry in each county in which one 
 practices. 
 
LIABILITY TO THE STATE. 235 
 
 illegal practice. "2. Liability for practicing under a false pre- 
 tence. * * * Some statutes make it an indictable offence 
 for an unqualified person to use the title 'dentist' or 'dental prac- 
 titioner' or any 'name, title, addition or description implying that 
 he is registered, or that he is a person qualified to practice 
 dentistry.' " The Illinois law makes practicing under an assumed 
 name one of the grounds for refusing a license or revoking a 
 license. It is not necessary to go into the details under this head 
 which occupy two pages of Mikell's book. 
 
 "3. Liability for Practicing After Revocation of License. — 
 The statutes, as a rule, provide for the revocation of the license 
 in certain events. As we have seen elsewhere a license once 
 granted cannot be revoked without opportunity to the holder to 
 be heard in his own defense." 
 
 "While the statutes generally make it a crime to practice 
 without first obtaining a license or certificate, they do not gen- 
 erally, in terms, provide that one whose license has been revoked 
 shall be guilty of a crime if after revocation he knowingly con- 
 tinues to practice. It would seem in reason, however, that such 
 person should be in the same position as though he never had had 
 a license. Under a rule of the criminal law, however, that penal 
 statutes shall be strictly construed, that is, construed in favor of 
 one accused of a crime, it has been held that when the statute 
 did not in terms make it a criminal offence to practice after a 
 license has been revoked, such practice was not indictable."^ 
 
 This construction apparently stultifies the clauses in most 
 of the laws providing for the revocation of licenses under cer- 
 tain conditions ; and it would seem desirable to amend the laws 
 by specifying what consequences shall follow the revocation of 
 licenses. 
 
 "4. Burden of Proving Right to Practice. — Where a statute 
 makes it an indictable offence to practice without having complied 
 with the requirements of the statute, the burden of proving that 
 the accused has complied with such requirements is generally on 
 the accused. "- 
 
 77 Cal. 164 (1888); Williams v. People, 17 III. App.. 274 (1885). 
 'People V. Fulda. 52 Hun, N. Y., 65 (1889); Williams v. People, 
 20 111. App., 92 (1886). 
 
Ud DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 "5. Construction of Statute. — On a prosecution for prac- 
 ticing without compliance with the requirements of the statute, 
 the statute will be strictly construed in favor of the defendant, 
 and if the facts of the case do not bring it clearly within the 
 terms of the statute, he cannot be convicted."^ 
 
 "6. Statute of Limitation. — In some states a prosecution for 
 illegally practicing dentistry is barred if not brought within a 
 certain time after the act or acts relied on as constituting the 
 practice were done. Where such statutes are in force, the burden 
 of proving that the offence was done within the time prescribed 
 by the statute is on the prosecution. "- 
 
 "assault and battery." 
 
 "Assault and Battery consists in any unlawful touching of 
 the person of another, and is a crime. If a dentist should 
 without the consent of the patient, pull a tooth, or perform any 
 other operation on the patient, he would be liable, not only 
 for a civil suit for damages, as we have seen, but also to an 
 indictment for this crime. A dentist should always, therefore, 
 inform the patient what he proposes to do before operating, and 
 procure the patient's consent thereto. Such consent may be gen- 
 eral or specific. If the patient puts himself into the hands of the 
 dentist, telling the dentist to do whatever may be necessary, this 
 will amount to a consent by the patient to any act of the dentist 
 which in his honest and bona fide judgment is necessary." 
 
 "If, however, the consent of the patient is to a specific act, 
 say to the pulling of a certain tooth, and the dentist should de- 
 liberately pull another tooth, the dentist would be guilty of assault 
 and battery. Nor would it be any defence that the extraction of 
 the tooth pulled was necessary to the welfare of the patient. If 
 the tooth extracted was pulled, not deliberately, but by mistake, 
 then whether the dentist would be liable for assault and battery 
 would depend on the question whether the mistake was an honest 
 one, and one that a cautious and skillful dentist would have made 
 under the circumstances. If it were, the dentist would not be 
 guilty ; but if the mistake were due to negligence it seems that the 
 dentist would be guilty. If the tooth wrongfully pulled were a 
 
 'Robinson v. People, 23 Col. 123 (1876). 
 'State V. Newton, Wash., 81 Pac, 1002 (1905). 
 
LIABILITY TO THE STATE. 237 
 
 front tooth, the dentist would be guilty of the graver crime of 
 mayhem. Mayhem being defined as the violently depriving an- 
 other of the use of such of his members as may render him less 
 able, in fighting, either to defend himself or annoy his adver- 
 sary."^ 
 
 "rape." 
 
 "There have been a number of accusations of rape brought 
 against dentists. Rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman by 
 a man by force and without her consent. It has long been de- 
 cided that intercourse with a woman while she is unconscious is 
 by force and without her consent, and therefore rape."- 
 
 "As said many years ago by a great judge, rape is the crime 
 of all others of which it is easiest to accuse and which it is most 
 difficult to disprove. Add to this that on a charge of this crime 
 the sympathies of- a jury are always strongly on the side of the 
 woman, that the punishment on conviction is very severe, and 
 that even if the charge is disproved, the defendant's reputation 
 is seriously injured and his business destroyed, it is readily seen 
 that precautions should be taken against even a charge of the 
 crime. If possible, the dentist should always, when treating a 
 woman, have some one in his office other than himself and his 
 patient. He should never, on any account, place a female patient 
 under the influence of an anesthetic without a third person, pref- 
 erably a woman, present during the whole time the patient is 
 under the influence of the drug, for it a well known fact that one 
 of the effects of anesthetics is to induce hallucinations of a sexual 
 character." 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 "* * * If the patient should die as the result of negli- 
 gence on the part of the dentist, the dentist may find himself 
 involved in a charge of manslaughter." 
 
 "Manslaughter is committed in causing the death of a person 
 by negligence. The negligence may consist either in doing an 
 act or in omitting to do an act. No intent to cause the injury, 
 no ill will to the person injured, not even an actual knowledge 
 that death is likely to result from the act or omission is neces- 
 
 ^Blackstone, Conn., 203. 
 
 'Payne v. State, 40 Tex.. Cr. R., 202 (1889). 
 
238 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 sary to constitute the crime. If the death of the patient was the 
 result of the negligence of the dentist, his inattention or ignorance, 
 he is guilty of manslaughter. By the weight of authority the 
 same rules apply whether the dentist is practicing with or with- 
 out authority of law." 
 
 "A dentist is not guilty of manslaughter merely because a 
 patient dies from his act in performing an operation or adminis- 
 tering an anesthetic, if it is done in good faith, even though the 
 dentist made a mistake or did not possess the highest skill. The 
 act or omission must be negligent to make him guilty. As to 
 just what degree of negligence is necessary, the courts are not 
 agreed. It is usually declared that it must be gross negligence."^ 
 
 PRACTICING ON SUNDAY. 
 
 "We have seen in treating of contracts that it is generally 
 forbidden to labor on Sunday, and that contracts for work on 
 that day are void. Many statutes not only make contracts made 
 on Sunday void, but also make it a criminal offence to work on 
 that day. Under these statutes a dentist is as liable to indictment 
 as anyone else, unless he can bring himself within the exceptions 
 usually made in the statute as to works of necessity." 
 
 "THE DENTIST AS A WITNESS." 
 "securing attendance." 
 "Ever since the statute of Elizabeth enacted in 1562-63, it 
 has been recognized as fundamental that the public has a right 
 to every man's evidence in a civil suit pending in a court of law, 
 and since 1701 that they have the same right in a criminal 
 suit.^ The dentist is not excepted from this rule and he, like 
 any other citizzen, is bound to attend the trial of any case in 
 court when properly summoned thereto to testify, like any other 
 witness, to facts of simple observation of eye and ear. To this 
 end a process called a subpoena is issued from the court and 
 served on the witness ordering him to appear at a certain court 
 on a certain day to testify what he knows in a cause between 
 certain parties, and to attend the court for that purpose until 
 discharged. The service should be made a reasonable time before 
 
 ^See 2 Bishop, New Criminal Law, sec. 664. 
 H Wigmore, Ev., sec. 2190. 
 
LIABILITY TO THE STATE. 239 
 
 the day specified for his attendance, and the witness is usually 
 not held in default unless the service of the process conforms to 
 these requirements."^ 
 
 "Sometimes expert testimony is as necessary as that of ordi- 
 nary witnesses. The following quotation from C. J. Biddle in 
 Dills V. State expresses the point of view of the State as regards 
 both common and expert testimony.* 'The administration of 
 justice is the highest duty and crowning excellence of a State, 
 and without the power to compel a witness to testify, this duty 
 would be embarrassed and this great public good unattained. 
 And in this we can perceive no difference whether a witness is 
 called as an expert or as to ordinary facts. In judicial trials 
 justice demands the truth as to facts in all departments of human 
 knowledge, and the State has the right to compel witnesses to 
 appear and testify concerning all matters within their knowledge 
 belonging to human affairs wherein their testimony is not pro- 
 hibited by law.' " 
 
 Theoretically an expert may be compelled to appear and 
 testify, but practically he will rarely be forced to do so unless 
 he is willing. Partly because an unwilling expert witness is 
 less likely to prove valuable and partly because it is easier to find 
 another expert who will be willing. A man should refuse to 
 give expert testimony if he feels that he has too little theoretical 
 knowledge or practical experience in the particular matters in 
 question to enable him to be of use in the promotion of justice 
 in the case. 
 
 EXCUSES FOR NON-ATTENDANCE. 
 
 "The dentist, like other witnesses, is excused from attending 
 on court if he cannot do so without direct and serious danger to 
 his health or to his family's welfare. In rare cases a witnesses 
 has been excused from attendance where the distance to be 
 traveled was great, the interruption to his business considerable, 
 and his testimony not very important. The general rule is well 
 expressed by Cowen, J., in People v. Davis :- 'The process of 
 
 ' Wigmore, Ev., sec. 2199. 
 *Mikell p. 156. 
 
 '15 Wend. (N. Y.) 602, 608 (1836). (Quoted in Wigmore Ev, 
 sec. 2204.) 
 
240 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 the subpoena demands great and extraordinary efforts on the 
 part of the witness to obey. It commands him expressly to lay 
 aside his business and excuses. * * * j^ ^g iiot denied that 
 serious sickness in his family, such as would prevent a prudent 
 father or husband from leaving home on his own important 
 business, would save him from the imputation of a contempt 
 and, perhaps, from an action. But such a case ought clearly 
 to be shown to the court. Above all, where the summons allows 
 him full time, he should struggle to get ready as he would to 
 go abroad on his own pressing business. If inevitably disap- 
 pointed, after exhausting every reasonable expedient, he ought 
 certainly be excused from the payment of a penalty which pre- 
 supposes some neglect at least.' "* 
 
 WITNESS FEES. 
 
 "The statute of Elizabeth provided, and ever since that 
 statute it has been required, that the witness be tendered in ad- 
 vance of the trial, and at the time of the serving of the subpoena, 
 the amount of the expense to which he will be put in attending 
 the trial, and on demand of such payment, at the time of service 
 of process, and refused, the witness is not bound to attend."^ 
 
 If he does attend, however, he cannot refuse to testify be- 
 cause his expenses have not been paid. "This law of the tender 
 of expenses in civil suits differs in the different states. Generally 
 the statutes provide for the tender of expenses for one day's 
 attendance and for travel one or both ways. In criminal cases 
 by statute in most jurisdictions, neither the prosecution nor the 
 accused is required to tender the witness' expenses in advance. "- 
 
 Expenses, in the preceding paragraphs include one day's 
 pay, or witness fee, and the same rules apply to the expert witness 
 as to the non-expert, except that as to the amount of the fee 
 demandable by the expert Avitness there is much difference of 
 opinion. 
 
 "It is contended on the one side — chiefly by the experts 
 themselves — that they should not be required to attend and 
 testify on tender of a fee equal only in amount to that de- 
 
 *Mikell p. 157. 
 
 'Wigmore Ev., sec. 2203. Mikell p. 158. 
 
 ''Wigmore Ev., sec. 2201. Mikell p. 158. 
 
LIABILITY TO THE STATE. 241 
 
 mandable by non-expert witnesses. It is contended that the 
 professional experience and knowledge of the expert are his 
 individual property, and that neither the public nor an individual 
 has a right to compel him to bestow them without adequate com- 
 pensation in addition to the fee paid the non-expert witness," 
 etc. Mikell quotes a court decision in "Buchman v. State"^ up- 
 holding this view and then Cjuotes Professor \Mgmore in opposi- 
 tion to it, as follows : 
 
 " 'The grounds upon which it may be concluded that no dif- 
 ferent privileges should be established for expert witnesses than 
 for others may be summarized as follows : ( 1 ) The expert is not 
 asked to render professional services as a physician or chemist or 
 engineer, he is asked merely, as other witnesses are, to testify what 
 he knows or believes. (2) The hardship upon the professional 
 man who loses his day's fees of fifty or one hundred or more 
 dollars is no greater relatively than that upon the storekeeper or 
 the mechanic who loses his day's earnings of two or ten dollars ; 
 each loses his all for the day ; moreover, though the recoupment 
 of the witness fee of one or two dollars is relatively greater for 
 the mechanic, yet his risk of losing continued employment by 
 enforced absence is greater than for the professional man and 
 more than equalizes the hardship to him. (3) It is only by acci- 
 dent and not by premeditation or deliberate resolve with refer- 
 ence to the litigation, that either has become desirable as a source 
 of evidence ; neither the expert in blood stains nor the bystander 
 at a murder has expressly put himself in the way of qualifying 
 as a witness, so that no claim based on a special dedication of 
 services for the case can be predicated of one rather than the 
 other. (4) The practical difficulty of discriminating between 
 various kinds of experts and their earnings, and between that 
 testimony which they give as such and that which they give as 
 ordinary observers, would be serious, and would introduce con- 
 fusion and quibbling into the law. (5) Finally, so far as con- 
 cerns the policy of doing whatever should attract and not deter 
 desirable witnesses. No one will ever refrain from entering a 
 professional calling because of the fear of having to spend his 
 time gratuitously at trials ; and yet an ordinary person is often 
 
 \S9 Iiul., 1 (1877). Mikell p. 158-160. 
 
242 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 deterred from observing (or disclosing his observation) a street 
 accident or the like, because of the apprehension of being sum- 
 moned as a witness; so that the latter sort, if either, should be 
 the one to be encouraged by special compensation.' " Professor 
 Wigmore adds : 'It has therefore been generally held that an 
 expert witness is not entitled to demand additional compensation, 
 other than the ordinary witness fees, before attending the testi- 
 mony on the stand.' "^ 
 
 "While, generally, the expert witness cannot demand before 
 testifying, in the absence of a statute, the tender of compensation 
 in amount above that of the non-expert witness, statutes have 
 been passed in some states providing for the payment of addi- 
 tional compensation to expert witnesses. These statutes com- 
 monly provide that the amount of such fees shall be fixed by the 
 court."- 
 
 If it is necessary for an expert to do any work preliminary 
 to his appearance in court, as for instance, to make a post- 
 mortem, or to examine or dissect a jaw, or make a chemical 
 analysis, he may demand a professional fee for such work. 
 
 Sometimes the opinion of an expert is required upon facts 
 or opinions brought out in the trial through other testimony than 
 his own, which requires his attendance at a part or all of the 
 trial besides the giving of his own testimony. When this is de- 
 manded of him he may refuse absolutely, or may require extra 
 compensation for it. 
 
 "While in most jurisdictions in the United States the expert 
 witness cannot demand extra compensation as a witness, it is the 
 practice in all important cases to pay him additional compensa- 
 tion, and such payment is not regarded as against the policy of 
 the law." 
 
 The above paragraph indicates the best practical solution of 
 the question. An expert witness should have an understanding 
 beforehand with the party in whose behalf he is to testify, as to 
 the special compensation he is to receive. 
 
 "A promise to pay an expert witness for giving testimony 
 on the condition that his testimony leads to a determination of 
 
 M Wigmore Ev., sec. 2203. 
 
LIABILITY TO THE STATE. 243 
 
 the suit in favor of the person making the promise is against 
 public policy and void."' 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 "Confidential communications between attorney and client, 
 priest and penitent, physician and patient, and husband and wife, 
 sometimes relate to matters wdiich then are, or subsequently be- 
 come the subject of judicial inquiry. When, by law, these com- 
 munications are excluded from disclosure in evidence they are 
 termed privileged coinmunications . When the disclosure of such 
 communications is forbidden by the law. it is upon grounds of 
 public policy on the presumption that 'greater mischief would 
 probably result from requiring or permitting their admission 
 than from wholly rejecting them.' "- 
 
 Under the common law communications between an attorney 
 and his client only were "privileged." Other privileged com- 
 munications are so only by statute law, and in most of the states 
 such laws have been passed relating to communications between 
 patient and physician for professional purposes, between priest 
 and penitent in confessional, and between husband and wife. 
 Mikell says "it is believed that there is not as yet any statute 
 expressly forbidding dentists, eo nomine, to testify as to in- 
 formation acquired by them in their professional capacity." 
 Dentists will therefore not be excused from testifying unless the 
 courts hold them to be included under the general terms, 
 "physicians and surgeons," as used in the statutes. Judging 
 from decisions in other matters it seems likely that some courts 
 will so include them and others would not. Mikell says he has 
 only been able to find one case in point, "People v. DeFrance."' 
 In this case the dentist was required to testify and the Supreme 
 Court upheld the lower court, and stated the reasons for it at 
 some length. Mikell urges several objections against this de- 
 cision and evidently believes that as regards privileged com- 
 munications dentists should be included with physicians and 
 surgeons. It is desirable that the laws be amended to include 
 dentists which would end all uncertainty about it. 
 
 'Pollak V. Gregory, 9 Bosw. (N. Y.) 116 (1861). Mikell p. 163. 
 ^Brothers Dental Jurisprudence, p. 165-166. 
 "104 Mich., 563 (1895). 
 
244 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
 
 "1. In General. — Ordinarily a witness testifying in a case 
 must confine his testimony to facts, he is not allowed to state his 
 opinion or judgment from other facts as premises; the jury are 
 as capable as he of forming their opinion. When, however, due 
 to the special knowledge or special qualifications of a witness, 
 his opinion will add something valuable which the jury have not 
 and cannot otherwise obtain from a rehearsal of the facts, such 
 opinion will be received in evidence."^ 
 
 " 'Experts' are persons examined as witnesses in a cause, 
 who testify in regard to some professional or technical matter 
 arising in the case, and who are permitted to give their opinions 
 as to such matter on account of their special training, skill, or 
 familiarity with it." - 
 
 "The dentist is an expert witness within the definition, and 
 therefore may be called upon to give expert as well as. ordinary 
 evidence. * * * The position of an expert witness is much 
 more difficult than that of the ordinary witness. The latter testi- 
 fies to facts he has seen. If he testifies truthfully the worst 
 he can be convicted of is that of making a mistake in what he 
 thought he saw. The former testifies to his professional opinion. 
 His opinion is the result of his knowledge of the learning of his 
 chosen profession, or that learning plus his observation of the 
 dental facts involved in the given case. If he is convicted of 
 error in his testimony it shows either a lack of learning in the 
 profession in which he claims to be an expert, or a lack of care, 
 or ignorance in the observation of the dental facts on which his 
 opinion is based. In either case his reputation as a dentist suf- 
 fers; not to speak of the humiliation he undergoes at the time." 
 
 When a dentist is called upon to give expert testimony he 
 should inform himself particularly about the matters he is ex- 
 pected to prove by his testimony, and he should investigate and 
 study with the greatest care all of the facts upon which his 
 opinion is to be based, and should consult as fully as possible 
 the available authorities on the subject, so that if counsel asks 
 
 ^See 1 Wigmore Ev., sec. 557. 
 *Black, Law Diet. (2nd. ed.) 466. 
 
LIABILITY TO THE STATE. 245 
 
 liini if such and such an authority does not hold a different 
 opinion than his own, he may not be taken by surprise and unpre- 
 pared to answer. 
 
 He should remember that other experts of equal or greater 
 knowledge and experience may be called by the other side, and 
 that the lawyers of both sides may have studied the case and the 
 authorities so carefully as to show an unexpected amount of 
 technical knowledge in the dentist's own field, and every effort 
 will be made to confuse him or induce him to contradict him- 
 self. An expert witness naturally feels reluctant to appear ignor- 
 ant about anything pertaining to the professional matter upon 
 which he is called to give testimony, but it is far better to con- 
 fess ignorance than to pretend to knowledge or experience he 
 does not possess, or to guess at answers he is not sure about. 
 The cross examination is pretty sure to expose any weak points 
 or uncertainties in his testimony, and "the only hope the wit- 
 ness can entertain of withstanding these attacks, lies in his hav- 
 ing told the simple truth, without exaggeration, evasion or reser- 
 vation, in a simple straightforward manner after thorough 
 preparation." 
 
 A witness should avoid as far as possible, the use of 
 technical words, the meaning of which the jury may not under- 
 stand. 
 
 Taylor^ relates a case in which, on a trial for assault, a 
 surgeon in giving his evidence testified that, on examining the 
 prosecutor, he found him suffering "from a severe contusion of 
 the integuments under the left orbit, with great extravasation of 
 blood and ecchymosis in the surrounding cellular tissue, which 
 was in a tumefied state, and that there was considerable abrasion 
 of the cuticle." Judge : "You mean, I suppose, that the man 
 had a black eye." Witness : "Yes." Judge : "Then why not 
 say so at once." 
 
 "Use of Books. — In England and in the great majority of 
 states in this Union, medical books are not admissible in evi- 
 dence to show the opinion of their authors. "- 
 
 ^Medical Jurisprudence, 52. 
 
 ^Contra Iowa and Alabama; See State v. Winter, 11 Iowa, 627 
 (1887); Stoudemuier v. Williamson, 29 Ala.. 558 (1857). 
 
246 DENTAL JURISPRUDENCE. 
 
 A man's opinion may be formed or adopted from those ex- 
 pressed in books, but it must be his own opinion he testifies to 
 and not that of the books. If, however, a witness has referred to 
 some book as the authority for his opinion the book may be read 
 in court for the purpose of contradicting the witness. 
 
 Probably the most important cases in which dental expert 
 witnesses are called are for the purpose of identifying the dead 
 who have been mutilated or disfigured or burned so as to make 
 identification otherwise difficult or impossible. The correspondence 
 of the teeth and the operations upon them with the records of the 
 dentist who has had charge of them has in a considerable number 
 of cases infallibly established identity when all other means had 
 failed. A number of Chicago dentists accomplished this for 
 some of the victims of the fire in the Iroquois Theatre who were 
 otherwise unrecognizable. 
 
 A very important and well known instance of this sort of 
 testimony occurred in the early fifties in the Webster-Parkman 
 murder trial. Professor Webster (of the chemical department 
 of Harvard University) had killed Mr. Parkman, his landlord, 
 probably in a fit of anger, under some provocation, and had con- 
 sumed the body and clothes in his laboratory furnace, in the 
 ashes of which were afterward found a lump of gold, some 
 carved blocks of porcelain teeth and some fragments of bones, 
 among them part of the lower jaw. Dr. Keep, the dentist who 
 had made the teeth, had preserved the model, marked with Mr. 
 Parkman's name. The carved blocks fitted this model and Dr. 
 Keep was able positively to identify them as the ones he had 
 carved for Mr. Parkman, and set on gold plates, the gold being 
 melted in the furnace. The testimony of Dr. Keep was one of 
 the strongest links in the chain of evidence which convicted Pro- 
 fessor Webster, who afterward confessed the murder. 
 
 Rehfuss in his Dental Jurisprudence gives several other 
 interesting examples of expert testimony for identification by 
 means of the teeth. 
 
 LIABILITY OF THE DENTIST TO JURY DUTY. 
 
 "The statutes of some states contain a provision, expressly 
 excusing dentists from serving on juries. * * * xhe exemption 
 is a privilege, however, not a disqualification, and if a dentist 
 
LIABILITY TO THE STATE. 247 
 
 who has been drawn on a jury chooses to serve he cannot be 
 rejected by the parties to the suit merely because of his 
 exemption."^ 
 
 Physicians are generally exempt by statute and in the states 
 where there is no statute specially exempting dentists they would 
 be required to serve unless the courts were to class dentists, for 
 this purpose, with the medical profession. An increasing num- 
 ber of courts seem disposed to do this, but Mikell says "the 
 question has arisen once under such a statute in State v. Fisher. "- 
 In this case the Supreme Court of Missouri by a bare majority, 
 four to three, refused to exempt dentists under the statute 
 exempting a "person exercising the functions of a * * * 
 practitioner of medicine." Mikell quotes at length the decis- 
 ion of the majority of the court and also the dissenting opinion 
 of the minority. 
 
 Efforts should be made to have specific enactments passed 
 in the states that have not yet done so, though it must be ad- 
 mitted that since the exemption is made for the benefit of the 
 public and not for the benefit of the profession, there is much 
 less urgent reason for it in the case of dentists than in the case 
 of physicians. 
 
 ^24 Cyc, 208. 
 *119 Mo., 344 (1893). 
 
INDEX 
 
 Action, as pleasure, 58 
 Advertising, professional, 144, 163, 
 
 165,174 
 Air, moisture in, 11 
 Air, pure, need of, 76 
 Almsgiving. 118 
 Altruism, 22-37 
 American Medical Association, 
 
 principles of ethics, 172-183 
 Arbitration of differences, 180 
 Art, definition, 90 
 
 effect upon the soul, 91 
 Avarice, 83 
 
 Benevolence, 99, 100 
 effects on individual, 120 
 
 Body, function of, 66 
 
 Business, difference from profes- 
 sion, 140 
 
 Calmness, 63 
 Calumny, 123 
 Character, influenced bv happiness, 
 
 41 
 Cheerfulness, 65 
 Children, instruction of, 148 
 Cleanliness, 78 
 Clothing, 71 
 
 Code of ethics, see Ethics, code of 
 Commissions, 163 
 
 and split fees, 157-159 
 Compassion, 99, 100 
 Compensation, for expenses, 175 
 
 when due, 208 
 Conscience, authority of, 12 
 
 definition of, 26 
 
 individualization of. 34-36 
 
 relation to custom, 32 
 Consultant, should not become at- 
 tendant, 178 
 Consultation, 163. 165, 176 
 
 discussions in, 177 
 Contentment, 59 
 Contracts, express, 197 
 
 for vk^ork on Sunday, 198 
 
 implied, 197 
 
 required to be in writing, 195 
 Courage, 60, 61 
 Creative fancy, 86 
 Criticism, to be avoided, 179 
 
 Crouse, Dr. J. N., 168 
 Crown and Bridge Co., 168 
 Culture, 87 
 
 Cures, not promised, 174 
 
 Custom, definition of, 27 
 
 relation to duty, 28 
 
 Damages, for malpractice, 232 
 Deception, intentional. 125-128 
 Degeneracy, 10-12 
 Dental Boards, powers of. 190 
 Dental laws, sustained by courts, 
 
 189 
 Dental Protective Association, 168 
 Dentist and physician, relative 
 duties, 166 
 
 as a witness, attendance of, 238 
 
 contract with patient. 195 
 
 duties to other dentists, 150-152 
 
 duties to the profession, 152 
 
 duty to join societies and read 
 journals, 153 
 
 relation to patient, 194-200 
 
 status of, 184-188 
 Dentistry, definition of, 184-187 
 
 a department of medicine, 184, 
 185 
 
 right to practice, power of the 
 state in regard to, 188 
 Deportment. 184 
 Development of man. 23-25 
 Drink habit, 67-70 
 Duties to patients, 164 
 Duty, authority of, 27 
 
 doctrine of, 50 
 
 kinds of, 54 
 
 relation to custom, 28 
 
 Eating, regular habits of, li 
 Egoism. 22, 11 
 Emergency cases, 179 
 Equity, 105 
 Equivocation. 121 
 Ethics, business, 139 
 
 Christian, 14-20 
 
 code of Illinois State Society, 163 
 
 code of National Dental Associ- 
 ation, 164 
 
 definition of. 7 
 
 dental, origin of, 5 
 
250 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Ethics 
 
 for employers, 139 
 
 Greek, 13 
 
 history of, 12-20 
 
 medical code, origin of, 161 
 
 professional, 138 
 Evolution, 10-12 
 Exercise, need of, 78 
 Expenses, compensation for, 175 
 Extravagance, 83 
 
 Falsehood, definition, 121 
 
 effects of, 123 
 
 relation to cowardice, 123 
 Fees, 165 
 
 ethics of, 155 
 
 of expert witnesses, 241 
 
 secret division of condemned, 181 
 Flattery, 124 
 Flint, introduction to commentary, 
 
 on code of medical ethics, 160 
 Forgiveness and retaliation, 107-109 
 Frugality, 82 
 
 Gifts, by patient to dentist, 198 
 Golden rule, 22 
 
 Gratuitous service, limits of, 180 
 
 H abitation, 70 
 Happiness, 41-43 
 Hippocrates, oath of, 6 
 Homicide, 237 
 Honor, 92 
 
 significance of, 93 
 Humility, 94 
 Hypocrisy, 124 
 
 I dealism, 45. 
 
 Illinois State Dental Society, code 
 
 of ethics, 163 
 Impulse, relation to virtue, 50 
 Instincts, relation to custom, 28 
 Intemperance, 56 
 Interest on claims, 209 
 Interference, duties of physicians, 
 
 178 
 
 J urisprudence, dental, 184-247 
 Jury duty, liabilitv of the dentist 
 
 for, 246 
 Justice, 101-105 
 
 formula of duty, 101 
 
 promotes security and peace, 103 
 
 Kant, intuitional ethics of, 30 
 Knowledge, 86-89 
 of self, 96 
 
 Law and morals, incongruity be- 
 tween, 110-113 
 Liability, evidence to establish, 209- 
 211 
 
 for abandonment of patient, 223 
 
 for "assault and battery" for 
 operating without consent, 236 
 
 for breach of contract, 199 
 
 for communicating disease, 224 
 
 for compensation, 201, 202-204, 
 206 _ 
 
 for failure to complete work in 
 time, 214 
 
 for failure to use proper mate- 
 rials, 213 
 
 for improper use of anaesthetics, 
 224 
 
 for malpractice, 217 
 
 for missed appointments, 200 
 
 for services of unlicensed dentist, 
 207 
 
 for treating patient without con- 
 sent, 226 
 
 of county or state, 206 
 
 of patient to dentist, 199 
 
 to patient for breach of contract, 
 213 
 
 to state for illegal practice, 234 
 License, revocation of, 193 
 Lie of necessity, 125-127 
 Love, 119 
 Love of neighbor, 116 
 
 limitations, 116-118 
 
 M agnanimity, 106 
 Malpractice, abandonment of pa- 
 tient, 223 
 
 admission of lack of skill, 227 
 advising erroneous treatment, 
 
 222 
 and the state of dental science, 
 
 220 _ 
 communicating disease, 224 
 contributory negligence of pa- 
 tient, 229 
 damages for, 231 
 definition, 217 
 due to lack of skill, 218 
 effect of locality, 219 
 effect of recovery of fee, 229 
 effect on liability, 208 
 erroneous prescription, 223 
 
INDEX 
 
 251 
 
 Malpractice 
 established methods of treatment. 
 
 220 
 improper use of anaesthetics, 224 
 liability for that of others, 227 
 omission to give instructions, 223 
 proof of, 230 
 statute of limitations, 232 
 when services are gratuitous, 221 
 wrong diagnosis, 222 
 
 Materialism, 46 
 
 Medical laws, 175 
 
 Medical societies, 173 
 
 Modesty, 58, 96 
 
 Moral ideal, 8-12 
 
 Morality, relation to religion, 43-45 
 
 National Dental Association, code 
 
 of ethics, 164 
 Nutrition, 66 
 
 Oath of Hippocrates, 6 
 
 Obstetric work, substituting in, 180 
 
 Opinion, conflict of, 178 
 
 Papers read at society meetings 
 rules in regard to, 153 
 
 Patents, 167 
 
 and perquisites, 175 
 process, 168 
 
 Patience, delicacy and secrecy, 172 
 
 Patience, relation to perseverance, 
 62 
 
 Patient, of colleague, 180 
 instruction of, 147 
 must not be neglected, 173 
 relinquishing to regular attendant, 
 
 180 
 welfare of, 147 
 
 Perjury, as worst form of false- 
 hood, 124 
 
 Perseverance, as courage, 62 
 
 Pharmacists, 182 
 
 Physicians, duties in epidemics. 
 181-182 
 duties to the public, 181 
 when several are summoned, 179 
 
 Play, IZ 
 
 Pleasure, relation to welfare, 9 
 
 Poverty, relation to economic vir- 
 tue, 84 
 
 Practice, by contract, 181 
 winning a, 145-148 
 
 Practicing on Sunday, 238 
 
 Prices and fees. 140-143 
 Pride, 94 
 
 Principles of medical ethics of the 
 American Medical Association, 
 172-183 
 Privilege, relation to duty to soci- 
 
 ety,_81 
 Profession, as basis of economic 
 life, 79-81 
 distinction from business, 142 
 honor of, 173 
 safeguarding, 175 
 service to humanity, 172 
 Professional character, maintaining 
 
 of, 164 
 Prognosis, 173 
 Proletariat, 80 
 Property, basis of economic life, 79 
 
 R ape, 237 
 
 Reason, influence upon impulse, 51 
 
 Recreation, 74 
 
 Registration, 192 
 
 Religion, relation to morality, 43-45 
 
 Remedies, secret, 175 
 
 Resolution adopted by American 
 Dental Association, condemn- 
 ing endorsements of medicines, 
 etc., 159 
 
 Ridicule of others. 119 
 
 Right, duty to protect, 101 
 of punishment, 104 
 to practice, burden of proving, 
 235 
 
 Rights, principle of, 109 
 
 Secrecy. 172 
 
 Secrets, professional, 162 
 
 Self-control, definition, 55 
 
 Selfishness. 119 
 
 Services, of physicians to each 
 other, 175 
 to patient of another physician, 
 179 
 
 Slander, 123 
 
 Social calls on patient of another 
 physician, 178 
 
 Specialist, patient referred to, 177 
 
 Spheres of interests, 113-115 
 
 Spiritual life, 86 
 
 Statute of limitations, 212 
 in malpractice cases, 232 
 in prosecutions for illegal prac- 
 tice, 236 
 
 Statutes, requirements of, 190 
 
252 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Struggle, for existence, 21 
 
 for lives of others, 
 Sympathy, 97-99 
 
 21 
 
 Temperance, 56 
 
 Testimony, expert, 244 
 
 Truth, adaptation to hearers, 136 
 duty to instruct in, 130 
 martyrdom for, 132-134 
 public communication of, 131 
 service of neighbor vi^ith, 129-137 
 
 Truthfulness, 128 
 
 Veracity, positive side of, 129-137 
 relation to love of neighbor, 121 
 
 Vice, definition of, 53 
 
 Virtue, definition of, 50 
 kinds of, 55 
 relation to happiness, 39 
 
 Virtue 
 
 relation to welfare, 
 Vulcanite Co., 168 
 
 39-41 
 
 Warranty of cure, breach of, 215 
 Wealth, as means to economic vir- 
 tue, 84 
 Welfare, relation to virtue, 39-41 
 Will, freedom of, definition, 48 
 
 freedom of, metaphysical, 46 
 
 freedom of, psychological, 46 
 Witness, excuses for non-attend- 
 ance, 239 
 
 expert. 239-244 
 
 expert, identification by the teeth, 
 246 
 
 expert, use of books, 245 
 
 fees, 240 
 
 fees of experts, 241-242 
 
 privileged communications, 243 
 
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