I S6"7 
 
 
 PAM. 
 
 M13C. 
 
 F. P. A. 
 
 Pamphlet No. 35 
 Series of 1925-26 
 
 The Significance 
 
 OF 
 
 Locarno 
 
 'Discussed by 
 
 Mlle. Louise Weiss 
 
 Mr. James G. McDonald 
 
 AND 
 
 Dr. Paul Leverkuehn 
 
 Miss Christina Merriman, (Chairman 
 
 8 it/ Luncheon Discussion 
 
 HOTEL ASTOR, NEW YORK 
 NOVEMBER 21, 1925 
 
 of the 
 
 Foreign Policy Association 
 
 NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
 
 NINE EAST FORTY-FIFTH STREET 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
SPEAKERS: 
 
 MLLE. LOUISE WEISS 
 
 Editor, V Euro pc Nouvclle (Paris) ; Chevalier of the Legion of Honor 
 
 MR. JAMES G. MCDONALD 
 
 Chairman, Executive Board, Foreign Policy Association 
 
 DR. PAUL LEVERKUEHN 
 
 Of the staff of the German-American Mixed Claims Commission 
 
 MISS CHRISTINA MERRIMAN, Chairman 
 
 GUEST TABLE 
 
 Mr. Brent Dow Allinson 
 Mr. James B. Alley 
 Mr. Donald Brodie 
 Mile. Baudains 
 Mrs. Linzee Blagden 
 Dr. Wendell T. Bush 
 Hon. Charles R. Crane 
 Mr. Keith Hutchinson 
 Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn 
 
 Dr. 
 
 Mr. Albert Lieberfeld 
 Mr. Maurice Mercadier 
 Dr. Parker T. Moon 
 Mr. Bernard Naumberg 
 Mr. George W. Ochs-Oakes 
 Mr. Chester Rowell 
 Mr. and Mrs. Andre Siegfried 
 Mr. Jesse I. Straus 
 Dr. Mary Evelyn Townsend 
 Ernest Jackh 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LOCARNO 
 
 Miss CHRISTINA MERRIMAN, Chairman 
 
 T HE TREATIES concluded at Locarno were the culmination — a 
 regional and partial solution, if you prefer—of the post-war dis¬ 
 cussion of European security; and I shall try to sketch very briefly in¬ 
 deed some of the major European attempts to solve this problem of 
 security and its twin sister, disarmament, in the seven years leading down 
 to Locarno. 
 
 The first attempt, you will remember, was when the French delegates 
 to the Paris Peace Conference made three demands: (1) That the west¬ 
 ern frontiers of Germany be fixed at the Rhine; (2) that the Rhine 
 frontiers be occupied permanently by an inter-Allied force under the 
 League of Nations; and (3) that one or more independent states be 
 created on the left bank of the Rhine. 
 
 Moreover, the French members of the Commission drafting the Cove¬ 
 nant of the League of Nations proposed to make of the League a strong 
 defensive alliance with an international army and an international general 
 staff. 
 
 We remember also that these attempts failed, and because of this fail¬ 
 ure France has never considered the Treaty of Versailles alone an ade¬ 
 quate guarantee of security. 
 
 In order to reassure France, the Tripartite Pact was then put forward 
 in 1919 by President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George. It proposed that 
 Britain and the United States should jointly assist France in case of 
 unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany. But it was not put 
 through, as you know, because our Senate failed to ratify it. 
 
 The Treaty of Versailles itself provided for the permanent demili¬ 
 tarization of the left bank of the Rhine and certain zones on the right 
 hank, also for drastic reduction and limitation of German armament 
 under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. More¬ 
 over, the Allies were to occupy the Rhine bridgeheads for fifteen years, 
 the occupation to be partially withdrawn over five and ten year periods 
 —final evacuation to be contingent upon Germany’s fulfilment of her obli¬ 
 gations under the Treaty. And Great Britain attributed her refusal to 
 evacuate Cologne on January 10 last, as provided in the Treaty, to the 
 report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control that Germany had failed 
 to carry out all the disarmament provisions of the Treaty. 
 
 Before this, however, France had sought security in other directions, 
 and had entered into a military convention with Belgium and into treaties 
 of alliance with Poland and with Czechoslovakia. With the friendly 
 cognizance of France there was formed also the so-called Little Entente, 
 
 3 
 
which binds together by treaty Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Jugo¬ 
 slavia. i Umrn 
 
 Meanwhile, the idea of an Anglo-French alliance had never been wholly 
 abandoned. In 1922, you will remember, Lloyd George proposed to 
 Briand at Cannes a treaty similar to the defunct Tripartite Treaty of 
 1919. Under this new treaty proposal, Britain engaged to come to the 
 aid of France in the case of ‘‘unprovoked aggression against the soil of 
 France” by Germany. But this was doomed to failure, as was the sub¬ 
 stitute draft later proposed by Briand’s successor, M. Poincare. For the 
 French felt they must have a guarantee which would cover also the eastern 
 frontiers of Germany, and to this Great Britain would not assent. 
 
 Parallel with these efforts, covering three years, the League of Nations 
 was attempting to carry out Article VIII of the Covenant, which enjoins 
 the Council to formulate plans for the “reduction of national armaments 
 to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement 
 by common action of international obligations.” The 1922 Assembly of 
 the League was the first to endorse the conclusion arrived at after months 
 of study by the disarmament commissions of the League that disarmament 
 and security were indissolubly linked. 
 
 In the 1923 Assembly, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, some¬ 
 times called the Cecil-Requin Treaty, which embodied a rather intricate 
 system of sanctions and made provision for defensive alliances, was re¬ 
 ferred by the Assembly to the states members of the League. It was 
 not, however, approved by the requisite number of governments. 
 
 Its successor, the justly famous Geneva Protocol of the 1924 Assem¬ 
 bly, was conceived in an uprush of liberalism in which the Labor Govern¬ 
 ment of Great Britain and the Herriot Government of France vied with 
 each other in a will to peace that brought forth the definition of an 
 aggressor as that nation which refused to go to court to arbitrate its 
 differences. The Protocol, they tell us, is dead—rejected by the Con¬ 
 servative Government of Britain. But we may live to see the day when 
 that vital definition of an aggressor will become the cornerstone of a new 
 Protocol, or series of Protocols, which shall gain the adherence of all 
 civilized nations. 
 
 Nevertheless, we must note now that the Protocol failed of adoption, 
 and we must turn back for a moment to 1922 for the direct forerunner 
 of the Locarno Treaties. 
 
 In December, 1922, Chancellor Cuno of Germany proposed that France, 
 Germany, Great Britain and Italy “engage themselves towards one another 
 and promise the United States” not to go to war for at least a genera¬ 
 tion, say thirty years, unless war was decided upon by popular vote, which 
 Cuno declared would make war virtually impossible. You will remember 
 that the Allies were then involved in a dispute with Germany over repara¬ 
 tion payments. Cuno’s proposal was flatly rejected, and characterized 
 by Poincare as a “clumsy maneuver” on the eve of a new conference on 
 reparations. 
 
 A month later, in January, 1923, France occupied the Ruhr, and 
 Franco-German relations became so strained that German overtures toward 
 European security went temporarily into the discard. 
 
 4 
 
But in February of this year Germany again brought forward her pro¬ 
 posals, re-written, expanded, and much more definite. After several ex¬ 
 changes of notes, these proposals were accepted as a basis for discussion; 
 and that brings us down to the Locarno Conference and the resulting 
 treaties. And here I will turn the meeting over to the proper authorities, 
 who will tell you what happened at Locarno and what is to come of it all. 
 
 I T IS a very great pleasure for me to introduce the first speaker of the 
 afternoon. She has been so helpful and so gracious to officers of the 
 Foreign Policy Association on recent visits to Paris that we are repaying 
 her by asking her to condense into twenty minutes an account of what 
 has happened in Europe in the last seven years, which made the Locarno 
 Conference possible. 
 
 There are few people, I think, in Europe that have had a better op¬ 
 portunity than she has had to get this information at first hand. I think 
 I talked to no one in France who was better informed than she. She is 
 a friend of M. Herriot—in fact, she tells me she had a letter from him 
 today. The financial editor of her magazine is the Minister of the Budget 
 in the new French Cabinet. The Paris correspondent of the New York 
 Evening Post referred to her, upon her arrival here, as the most famous 
 woman in France, if not in Europe, and the French Government has re¬ 
 cently made her a Chevalier of the Legion of Honor. It is an honor, 
 therefore, as well as a pleasure, to introduce Mile. Louise Weiss, Editor of 
 VEurope Nouvelle of Paris. [Applause.] 
 
 Mlle. LOUISE WEISS 
 
 W HEN my dear friends of the Foreign Policy Association, Miss 
 Christina Merriman and Mr. James G. McDonald, whose work I 
 had admired in Paris and in Geneva, asked me to speak this after¬ 
 noon, I not only thought that it would be a pleasure and an honor to 
 address a fine audience of citizens of Manhattan, the City of Towers, 
 but I really felt that I had something to say on Locarno, not only as a 
 Frenchwoman devoted to her own country, but also as a citizen of 
 Europe devoted to the welfare of the old continent. A citizen of Europe 
 indeed I feel. 
 
 I very heartily thank you for having come. If I were you I would 
 not have come, I would have left for Boston to see the Harvard-Yale 
 football game [laughter] ; and if you had not come here today I would, 
 myself, have gone to the game. [Laughter.] So that though James 
 McDonald is a fine fellow and Christina Merriman really works hard for 
 peace with knowledge and hope, it would have meant the end of the 
 Foreign Policy Association luncheon for me. 
 
 Imagine if I were to declare here very strongly that I hope the 
 Harvard boys were going to defeat the Yale men. [Applause.] Half 
 of this audience would immediately interrupt and shout and feel very 
 strongly that they would rather have the Yale men win. [Applause.] 
 Imagine further some authority thinking that a partisanship for Yale 
 or Harvard was working against the progress of education in America. 
 Imagine that this authority forbade the press to write about the game, 
 and would not allow the names of the boys of the teams to be printed 
 
 5 
 
in the papers, that this authority would fight the excitement going on. 
 I, being already 100 per cent. American, would think this man very un¬ 
 popular, and, knowing nothing about America, laugh at him, scorn him, 
 and vote and have my friends vote against him. 
 
 However, the men in Locarno were strong enough to take this atti¬ 
 tude toward national excitement, to master the press in their own re¬ 
 spective countries, to fight with success the partisanships for their 
 national teams, and, what is more, to make us hate the idea of begin¬ 
 ning any of our contests again somewhere down the Rhine frontiers 
 or in the Balkans, or even further east, in Silesia or the Carpathian 
 Mountains. Indeed, they were good men, they were strong men, and 
 they had a very difficult task. 
 
 I must warn you that I am full of prejudice; having worked very 
 hard in Europe for the Locarno agreements, I am not going to criticize 
 them here. What I shall try to do is to point out to you what events 
 in my eyes made possible such agreements for peace. 
 
 I understand that the next speaker is going to tell you the contents 
 of the Locarno agreements with preciseness. I will only, for my part, 
 state this: if those agreements are finally ratified, they will have brought 
 to France a feeling of security which she has not had since the Treaty 
 of Versailles. I hope that they will bring to Germany the feeling that 
 the way of international arbitration is open to her for the regulation of 
 her own difficulties and that she would henceforth be treated on an 
 equal footing with the other powers in the councils in which the fate 
 of the world is decided. They have given assurance of viability and 
 stability to Czechoslovakia and Poland. Italy agreed. And England, 
 conscious of her rights and of her duties as a European power, has 
 guaranteed the integrity of the Rhine frontier, thus making this complex 
 ensemble of agreements possible and efficacious. 
 
 But Locarno is only one of the aspects of the big changes which 
 have taken place in Europe since the Armistice. My hope is to make 
 clear to you today in a few words what those big changes have been— 
 how they work or will work in connection with the Locarno agreements. 
 Thus you will see the social, the economic, in one word, the human 
 background of the Locarno agreements, and also the hopes and the diffi¬ 
 culties that we Europeans foresee in the near future. 
 
 The first of those big changes I should like to emphasize is the 
 agrarian reform, which since 1917 has transformed the face of Central 
 and Eastern Europe from Vienna to the Ural Mountains and from Danzig 
 to Constantinople. These agrarian reforms in countries like Russia are 
 now complete. They are about ready to go through in other countries, 
 thus bringing into political life masses who, until now, had no voice 
 or but a small voice in the government of their respective countries. This 
 is a very important fact. Millions of peasants have become small owners 
 looking out for the preservation of their property and are now hostile 
 to any military venture. These gradual reforms have destroyed all of 
 the remnants of the feudal system which still existed in Europe, and 
 have wiped away the traditions of feudalism of which war was not the 
 least. 1 hese reforms also have socially stabilized immense countries, 
 huge areas, and have brought men into power who were, until now, 
 
 6 
 
unconscious of the political part they could play. They have given to 
 those masses the task of becoming politically educated so as to pre¬ 
 serve and defend their little property. So that these reforms have 
 given support, conscious or unconscious, to the Treaties of Locarno, of 
 millions of men who have fields about their huts and an alphabet in 
 their heads, when formerly they had nothing—nothing indeed. I saw 
 them in their huts and in their poor little houses over in Central and 
 Eastern Europe. They had nothing except their religion and their hope 
 of issuing from their wretchedness into a future world. Those masses 
 support new democratic governments, of which perhaps the government 
 of President Mazaryk in Czechoslovakia is the best symbol; and this 
 support is used to urge ideas of peace in Europe. [Applause.] 
 
 The second point I would like to make clear to this audience as re¬ 
 gards the changes which have taken place in Europe since 1918 is the 
 collapse of the middle class, the sufferings of the intelligentsia in all 
 the countries where the national money fell and lost its value. The old 
 people with pensions, the crippled and wounded, all the employees with 
 fixed salaries, the professors in the countries where the money sank, had 
 very, very hard days, and some of them died because they had nothing 
 to eat. I was in Germany when she underwent this terrible national 
 catastrophe of the collapse of the money, and I must say that the pro¬ 
 fessors and the leaders of the young generation suffered tremendously 
 and that I could not pity them enough. They lost their savings, their 
 means of work; they couldn’t buy books. I cannot tell you the emotion 
 1 had when some of my friends over the border of the Rhine said that 
 they had to spend their strength in long trips in the fields to try to find 
 some potatoes instead of training the younger generation to new inter¬ 
 national ideas. 
 
 I cannot tell you either how much I am worried and concerned about 
 the fate of my own country. We are now facing the same problems, 
 and our professors, all of the leaders, the fine brains which have the task 
 of training our young French generation, are suffering more than I can 
 describe. Please understand the tragic problem of our best men, of our 
 internationally famous scholars, the tragic problem of our universities. 
 
 However, in connection with Locarno, this collapse of the middle 
 classes worked along a double line. First, in France at all events, and I 
 think in other countries, the intelligentsia looks now toward Geneva and 
 the steps for peace made possible through the League of Nations as the 
 way out. They are going to train the younger generations, and if you 
 had been in Europe and in Geneva for years as I have been you would 
 see the crowds, every year more important, of younger minds now devoted 
 to the ideas that made Locarno possible. 
 
 Secondly, the collapse of the middle classes brought face to face em¬ 
 ployers and employees, breaking the thousand links between the employers 
 and the middle classes and between the middle classes and the labor party. 
 Labor problems and difficulties about wages, production and all eco¬ 
 nomic problems are bigger now than they have ever been in those 
 countries, and they have to be dealt with very carefully. In this respect 
 Locarno is also an element of social peace. If the men in charge of the 
 European governments could not prove that they are doing their very 
 
 7 
 
best for peace they would not be supported by the people. Thus the peas¬ 
 ants, the intellectual classes, the labor classes, consciously or not, are 
 supporting the policies of their respective countries which lead to Locarno. 
 The democratic governments, half leading, half following, rush or totter 
 to Locarno, but there they are. The best elements of toiling and still 
 bleeding Europe are behind the men of Locarno. [Applause.] 
 
 But a third point must be stated. There is also a kind of orientation 
 in Europe leading to higher and higher tariffs between the states. After 
 the war every nation felt impatient as regards political independence. 
 Every one of them felt like this: “Well, let us shut our borders and 
 become very rich.” I think there is something of this feeling in America. 
 
 | Laughter.] 
 
 I should like to take for an example the industries along the Rhine 
 border. There was the French pre-war industry, the German pre-war 
 industry, the French war industry, and the German war industry. Then, 
 as Alsace-Lorraine came back to France and Germany built other plants 
 to make up for or replace those lacking industries, five industries had to 
 be dealt with by governments instead of two. This brings us to a dead¬ 
 lock, and if we don’t deal with economic realities as we have dealt with 
 political ones 1 believe that the political agreements will not work in the 
 future, because, after all, shaking hands across walls of tariffs, across 
 skyscrapers of tariffs—that is a very dangerous position. [Laughter and 
 applause. ] 
 
 So we have to consider now, we Europeans, an economic Locarno 
 without which the political one would lose its meaning in the future, but— 
 and this is my fourth and last point—there is Geneva. Geneva, for us 
 Europeans, is a town that we now have learned to cherish. I am not— 
 not yet—an American expert on foreign affairs and I speak only for 
 Europe; but speaking for Europe I must hail and greet the men in Geneva 
 for the splendid work they have been doing for us. Geneva is a method 
 and Geneva is a hope—a method because there we have a crowd of young 
 people knowing how to deal with the press, with the men, with the meet¬ 
 ings and how to carry international steps for peace further; it is a hope 
 because we know that there is somewhere in Europe a crowd of people 
 who have nothing to do but to bring about better conditions on our devas¬ 
 tated continent. France is behind Locarno. 
 
 After having left America I know that I shall dream of a Europe 
 somewhat resembling the United States, where certain large districts of 
 Central Europe, with their minorities, would only mean for us in Paris 
 something like Idaho would for you. I shall dream of a Europe worthy 
 and satisfied with some kind of a silent President [laughter] living in 
 a federal capital, and only breaking his wise silence to state that Europe 
 is now rich and intends to be kind to America. [Applause and laughter.] 
 
 That is our dream and I know that American audiences can only 
 approve of such a dream. [Applause.] 
 
 Our Chairman, Miss Christina Merriman, pushes my elbow. That 
 means, “Stop now with your European everlasting talk!” If she knew 
 what I have to say to finish my little address she would not feel that way. 
 1 want to state, from the point of view of Europe, what beautiful work 
 
 8 
 
she and Mr. McDonald and the staff of the Foreign Policy Association 
 have done. [Laughter and applause.] They have brought the spirit of 
 America to Europe. Through them we have understood the finest things 
 _ ca could bring to us, and also they have given a chance to 
 
 European speakers to explain themselves and their countries to America. 
 It is a great service they have pledged to the cause of better understanding 
 between nations, and it means peace. 
 
 I heaitily thank them and thank their American audiences. [Applause.] 
 
 1 he Chairman : I shan’t attempt to introduce the next speaker. It 
 is too difficult. If I were to praise his power of keen analysis and concise 
 observation—I hope it will be concise this afternoon—it would seem to be 
 praising the Foreign Policy Association, and that would not be fitting. 
 We have had our due meed of praise this afternoon, I am sure. I will 
 only tell you that he has recently spent two and a half months in Europe 
 when he was very badly needed at home. 
 
 By mutual agreement he is to have his twenty minutes extended by 
 some seven or eight minutes because he is going to analyze and summarize 
 the Treaties of Locarno. But I will venture to remind our habitual Chair¬ 
 man that he has established a tradition for keeping speakers within their 
 time at these meetings, which will be enforced sternly, if necessary, by 
 the usurping Chairman. Mr. McDonald. [Applause.] 
 
 Mr. JAMES G. McDONALD* 
 
 I ALWAYS KNEW that the women members of the Foreign Policy 
 Association staff could run the Association and do all of the important 
 things. I didn’t know until today that they could also perform the 
 public functions at the luncheons, so I have the happy thought that if 
 anything happens to me in the immediate future it will make not the 
 least difference at all. [Laughter.] 
 
 Now about this Harvard and Yale matter [laughter] which Made¬ 
 moiselle Weiss speaks about. It may be true that the Yale people would 
 like to go to that meeting today, but, having had some years of association 
 with Harvard and remembering a story which I heard in Cambridge two 
 weeks ago, I am not at all sure that I would have cared to go. It was 
 the day of the William and Mary game. I was told by one of the fellows 
 at Harvard College that he had just heard a rumor on the stock exchange 
 to the effect that Harvard might win the game that particular week if 
 William didn’t come. [Laughter.] 
 
 Mademoiselle Weiss, from a tolerant and broadly liberal French view¬ 
 point, has surveyed brilliantly many of the sources from which the first 
 real peace conference since the Armistice grew. Dr. Leverkuehn will 
 later give his interpretation from the German viewpoint of the results of 
 Locarno. Mv task, supplementary to these two presentations, is two-fold: 
 (1) the difficult and ungrateful job of summarizing clearly and without 
 
 * p? e PO’.'tfon of Mr. McDonald's statement dealing with the summaries of the Treaties 
 is amplified in the printed form below in order to allow a more detailed analysis of the 
 Treaties. 
 
 9 
 
insufferable dullness the chief provisions of the agreements initialed in 
 that lovely Italian-Swiss village a few weeks ago, and (2) the much easier 
 task, but one which I fear will be less worth while, of giving my own 
 interpretation of these significant treaties. 
 
 Summary of the Treaties 
 
 The written agreements of Locarno were nine: a general preamble, 
 seven treaties, and a letter. 
 
 The preamble, called technically “The Final Protocol,” was signed by 
 all of the countries represented—Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, 
 Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In it the signatories declare their 
 intention to establish through common accord the “means for preserving 
 their respective nations from the scourge of war and for providing for 
 the peaceful settlement of disputes of every nature which might eventually 
 arise between them.” They pledge themselves to co-operate sincerely in 
 the efforts already undertaken by the League of Nations looking towards 
 disarmament and in seeking its realization through a general entente. 
 
 The seven treaties may logically be divided into three classes: 
 
 The first and most far reaching of all of these I am christening 
 the Treaty of Security and Mutual Guarantee (the Rhineland Pact) ; 
 it was signed by Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy. Its 
 chief provisions are: 
 
 1. Individually and collectively, all of the signatories guarantee the 
 maintenance of (a) the present boundaries in the west, and (b) the 
 inviolability of the demilitarized zone as defined in the Treaty of 
 Versailles. 
 
 2. France and Belgium on the one hand, and Germany on the other, 
 agree never to attack each other or invade the territory of the other, and 
 never in any case to go to war with each other, except (a) in the exer¬ 
 cise of the right of legitimate defense, or (b) in application of Article XVI 
 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (the “Sanctions” Article), or 
 (c) in case of an action taken at the request of or as a result of a de¬ 
 cision of the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations, or 
 against an aggressor in pursuance of Article XV, paragraph 7, of the 
 Covenant (permitting States to use their own discretion after the Council 
 has failed to reach a unanimous decision). 
 
 3. Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France, pledge themselves 
 to settle by peaceful means all questions, whatever they may be, which 
 may arise between them and which they have been unable to settle by 
 the ordinary diplomatic channels, in the following manner: 
 
 » 
 
 (a) All justiciable questions shall be submitted to judicial settle¬ 
 ment, and the parties concerned pledge themselves in advance 
 to accept the decisions rendered. 
 
 (b) All other questions are to be submitted to a Commission of 
 Conciliation, or failing settlement through it, to the Council 
 of the League of Nations under Article XV of the Covenant. 
 
 10 
 
4. If one of the parties believes that the Treaty has been or is being 
 violated, it will submit the question immediately to the Council of the 
 League of Nations. If the Council decides that there has been a viola¬ 
 tion, it will without delay notify all of the signatories to the Treaty, and 
 each of them pledges itself to go immediately to the aid of the State 
 attacked. 
 
 In case of flagrant violation of the Treaty, each of the signatories 
 pledges itself to go immediately to the assistance of the party attacked, 
 without waiting for any action by the Council, if they are satisfied that 
 the aggression is unprovoked and calls for immediate action. None the 
 less, in this case the Council of the League of Nations before which the 
 question has been brought will announce its decision, and the parties to 
 the Treaty pledge themselves in this case to act in accordance with such 
 recommendation if reached by unanimous vote not including the vote of 
 the representatives of the parties engaged in hostilities. 
 
 If either France, Belgium, or Germany refuses to carry out an 
 arbitral or judicial award or to “submit a dispute to peaceful settlement,” 
 and violates the demilitarized zone or resorts to war, the sanctions 
 described above come into play. 
 
 In the case where, without committing an act of war or violating 
 the demilitarized zone, France, Belgium or Germany refuses to accept 
 a peaceful method of settlement or to carry out an arbitral or judicial 
 decision, the other party to the dispute will refer the question to the 
 Council of the League of Nations, which will propose action to be taken. 
 The signatory powers agree to carry out such decision. 
 
 5. The provisions of the Treaty do not modify the rights or obliga¬ 
 tions of the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, nor do they modify 
 the rights and duties of the members of the League to take proper meas¬ 
 ures to safeguard effectively the peace of the world. 
 
 6. The Treaty is to be registered with the League of Nations, and 
 is to remain in force until twelve months after the decision of the Council, 
 by a two-thirds vote, that the League gives to the signatory parties suffi¬ 
 cient guarantees of security. 
 
 7. The Treaty imposes no obligations on any of the British Do¬ 
 minions or on India unless the Government of such Dominion or India 
 signifies its acceptance of the Treaty’s obligations. 
 
 8. The Treaty, even when signed and ratified, does not go into effect 
 until Germany has become a member of the League of Nations. 
 
 The second class of treaties includes four arbitration treaties between 
 Germany and France, Germany and Belgium, Germany and Poland, and 
 Germany and Czechoslovakia. These treaties, identical in all respects 
 except for one additional article in the treaties with Poland and Czecho¬ 
 slovakia to make them conform to one of the provisions in the Rhine¬ 
 land Pact, may be summarized as follows: 
 
 1. All justiciable questions which may arise between the signatory 
 parties and which cannot be settled by the ordinary diplomatic procedure 
 will be submitted for settlement either to an arbitral tribunal or to the 
 
 11 
 
Permanent Court of International Justice. This sweeping commitment 
 is weakened (just how much it is difficult to say) by the following quali¬ 
 fication, which is easy to translate but whose meaning is far from clear: 
 
 “This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events prior 
 to the present Convention and belonging to the past.”* 
 
 Before referring a dispute to arbitral procedure or to the Permanent 
 Court of International Justice, the parties may, by mutual consent, sub¬ 
 mit it to the Permanent Commission of Conciliation, provided for in 
 each treaty. 
 
 Failing agreement before the Permanent Commission of Conciliation, 
 a justiciable question is to be referred by means of a special agreement 
 (par voie de compromis) either to the Permanent Court of International 
 Justice or to an arbitral tribunal under the conditions laid down in the 
 Hague Convention of 1907. A very important step in advance is the 
 additional provision that in default of agreement between the parties on 
 the terms of the compromis, one or the other of them may bring the dis¬ 
 pute directly before the Permanent Court of International Justice by 
 means of an application. 
 
 2. All non-justiciable questions which cannot be settled by diplo¬ 
 matic means will be submitted to the Permanent Commission of Concili¬ 
 ation, which will be charged with suggesting to the parties an acceptable 
 solution, and in every case with presenting a report. 
 
 If within a month after the ending of the labors of the Permanent 
 Commission of Conciliation the two parties are not in agreement, the 
 question shall, at the request of one of the parties, be brought before the 
 Council of the League of Nations under the terms of Article XV of the 
 Covenant. 
 
 3. In every case, and particularly if the dispute which divides the 
 parties is the result of action already taken by one of the parties or 
 of an action about to be taken, the Commission of Conciliation or the 
 arbitral tribunal or the Permanent Court of International Justice, in 
 conformity with Article XLI of its statute, or the Council of the League 
 of Nations, will lay down in the shortest possible time whatever pro¬ 
 visional measures should be taken; the signatory powers agree to accept 
 these suggestions and to abstain from every action which might prejudice 
 a peaceful settlement. 
 
 These four treaties, even when signed and ratified, do not come 
 into effect until the Rhineland Pact also becomes effective, that is, until 
 Germany enters the League of Nations. 
 
 The third class contains the two guarantee treaties between France 
 and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia. These are, in effect, 
 France’s guarantee, always within the provisions of the Covenant of the 
 League of Nations, to give her eastern allies immediate assistance in 
 the event of unprovoked aggression against them by Germany. Like the 
 four arbitration treaties, these two guarantee conventions do not come into 
 effect until the Rhineland Pact has also become effective, that is, until 
 Germany enters the League of Nations. 
 
 * Cette disposition ne s’applique pas aux contestations n6es de faits qui sont ant&rieurs 4 
 la presente convention et qui appartiennent au pass&. 
 
 12 
 
The chief provisions of these treaties are illustrated by the following: 
 
 1. In case Poland or France (or Czechoslovakia or France) should 
 suffer from a breach of the obligations entered into between them 
 and Germany for the purpose of maintaining the general peace, 
 France and reciprocally Poland (or Czechoslovakia), acting in accord¬ 
 ance with Article XVI of the Covenant of the League of Nations, pledge 
 themselves to go immediately to each other’s aid and assistance, if the 
 breach of obligations is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms. 
 
 2. In the case where the Council of the League of Nations, acting 
 on a question brought before it under the terms of these (Locarno) ob¬ 
 ligations, has not been able to draw up a report acceptable to all of its 
 members other than those parties to the dispute, and where France or 
 Poland (or Czechoslovakia) should he the subject of an unprovoked 
 attack, France or reciprocally Poland (or Czechoslovakia), acting in 
 conformity with Article XV, paragraph 7, of the Covenant, will imme¬ 
 diately lend each other aid and assistance. 
 
 3. Nothing in the present treaty shall affect the rights and obliga¬ 
 tions of the high contracting parties as members of the League of Nations, 
 or be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take measures 
 appropriate to safeguard effectively the peace of the world. 
 
 The ninth document is the draft of a letter to be sent, after the sign¬ 
 ing of the treaties, to the German delegation. It is to be signed by the 
 representatives of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia, 
 and Poland. The substance of this communication is intended to satisfy 
 Germany’s doubts as to Article XVI of the League of Nations Covenant. 
 Disclaiming any right to speak for the League of Nations, the signatories 
 to the letter write: 
 
 . . . the obligations resulting from the said Article on the members of the 
 League must be understood to mean that each State member of the League 
 is bound to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant 
 and in resistance to any act of aggression to an extent which is compatible 
 witb its military situation and takes its geographical position into account. 
 
 These nine documents—I do not here enter into the informal and 
 unofficial promises which are said to have been made to Germany but 
 which were not a part of the official record*—the Final Protocol, the 
 Treaty of Security, the four Arbitration Treaties, the two French Guar¬ 
 antee Conventions, and the Allies’ letter to Germany, all are parts of a 
 single unified peace program. None become effective until Germany enters 
 the League of Nations, with full rights and full responsibilities. All of 
 them supplement the provisions of the Covenant but do not supplant it. In 
 short, they are all closely integrated with the League of Nations peace 
 system. 
 
 * These were: (a) The prompt evacuation of Cologne. 
 
 (b) The sof ening of the Rhineland occupation and perhaps the completion 
 
 of its evacuation before the fifteen-year period stipulated in the Treaty 
 
 of Versailles. 
 
 (c) The fixing of an earlier d'ate than 1S35 for the plebiscite in the Saar, 
 
 provided for in the Treaty of Versailles. 
 
 (d) The lessening of the restrictions on German aerial development. 
 
 (e) Substitution of League for Allied supervision of German armament. 
 
 (f) Possibly some suggestion as to the return of one of the former German 
 
 colonies under a League mandate. 
 
 (a), (b) and (e) have already been publicly forecast. 
 
 13 
 
Question of Ratification 
 
 But none of these treaties are yet ratified.* Indeed, only the protocol 
 has been signed. The seven treaties and the letter have been merely 
 initialled. Their formal signature is set for December 1. At no time 
 has there been any doubt as to the Allies’ signature and ratification; the 
 only doubt has been as to Germany’s attitude. Dr. Leverkuehn will dis¬ 
 cuss this aspect of the problem with vastly greater knowledge and author¬ 
 ity than could I. I am going, however, in reference to it, to venture 
 one guess and to offer one apology. My guess is that Germany will both 
 sign and ratify. My apology is to President Plindenburg, who as much, 
 if not more, than any other man will have made German ratification 
 possible. 
 
 Prior to the German election, I, like many other students of European 
 politics, wrote that the election of Hindenburg would be a blow at re¬ 
 publicanism in Germany and a danger to the peace of Europe. I was 
 exactly one hundred per cent wrong. President Hindenburg has been 
 scrupulously punctilious in following the advice of his constitutional ad¬ 
 visers ; he has materially strengthened the Republic; he has discredited 
 the extreme nationalists and militarists; and strengthened the peace 
 forces throughout his country. If now Germany enters the League under 
 his Presidency it will be an action as irrevocable and momentous as if 
 we were to enter the League under the Presidency of Senator Borah. 
 
 INTERPRETATION 
 
 But assuming ratification to be assured, what estimate may we fairly 
 make of the significance of the treaties? They seem to me to mean 
 that Europe is setting her house in order. They constitute the second 
 great bridge (the Dawes Plan being the first) across the yawning chasm 
 of hatred and bitterness and suspicion which the war created and which 
 the peace, in some respects, intensified. They are Europe’s answer to the 
 challenge that she should live at peace with herself. 
 
 Why may we reasonably expect such decisive results from these agree¬ 
 ments ? 
 
 First, because they are merely the concrete embodiment of the present- 
 day dominant opinion on both sides of the Rhine, F ranee and Germany 
 are in a settling mood; the Locarno pacts express the prevailing con¬ 
 viction that the status quo should be accepted and maintained. Germans 
 and Frenchmen do not love each other yet, but they have come to see 
 that the old game is up, that the period of ultimata and invasion, on the 
 one hand, and passive resistance and sabotage on the other, has been 
 played out. Germany and France are prepared to live at peace with 
 each other on the basis of the status quo. As between Germany and 
 Poland there is a much more difficult question. Though no German will 
 admit that the Polish boundaries are right, the dominant German opinion 
 is that it is better to leave them as they are and hope for peaceful ad¬ 
 judication later, than to go to war. Therefore, Germany pledges her¬ 
 self in these eastern treaties never to go to war to change those fron- 
 
 * As of November 21. At the time of going to press, December 1, 1925, the British Par¬ 
 liament and the German Reichstag had ratified the Treaties. 
 
 14 
 
tiers. All of the treaties are based, therefore, on the solid foundation 
 of recognized self-interest and admitted national necessity. 
 
 Second, the treaties are not the brilliant inspirations of any one man 
 or any group of men; on the contrary, they are the results of the painful 
 and laborious efforts of the last seven years. They are the logical de¬ 
 velopment of previous attempts to supplement the Covenant and thus 
 give a greater degree of security in middle Europe. They borrow from 
 and improve on: 
 
 (a) The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee of 1923—the Cecil-Requin 
 Treaty—which was in turn the result of previous years of work of the 
 League commissions. But, unlike the effort of 1923, these treaties of this 
 year do not try to give France security by a union against Germany: now 
 Germany is brought into the agreements; they become bi-lateral. They 
 protect Germany against France as well as France against Germany. 
 
 (b) Some of the ingenuous provisions for permanent commissions 
 of inquiry are borrowed from post-war arbitration treaties, notably 
 between Germany and Switzerland and Germany and Sweden and between 
 the Scandinavian countries themselves. 
 
 (c) To the Protocol of Geneva of last year Locarno owes much. Its 
 emphasis on security, and its great progress towards compulsory arbitra¬ 
 tion, its moral fervor, are all reminiscent of the Fifth Assembly’s effort. 
 But Locarno is at once more moderate and more practical than the too am¬ 
 bitious and idealistic Protocol proposals. It is assured of a much larger 
 measure of general approval, and should contribute more towards European 
 security than any previous effort since 1919. 
 
 Third, they strengthen the principles of judicial settlement, and in par¬ 
 ticular the Permanent Court of International Justice, as follows: 
 
 (a) Both in the security treaty and in the four arbitration treaties 
 Germany, Belgium, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia pledge themselves 
 to refer all justiciable questions which may arise between them to arbitra¬ 
 tion or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
 
 (b) In the case of Germany and her western neighbors this pledge is 
 not merely to refer such cases for judicial settlement, but—and this is very 
 important—to accept in advance the decisions to be rendered. 
 
 (c) In the four arbitration treaties, failing an agreement between the 
 two parties, in the case of justiciable questions, any one party may sumhion 
 the other party before the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
 
 Thus in these three ways, Locarno represents strides towards the 
 acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Inter¬ 
 national Justice. 
 
 Fourth, the treaties center in, are closely integrated with, the League 
 of Nations, and immeasurably strengthen the League system. Why? 
 
 (a) Because the treaties are built upon the entrance of Germany into 
 the League. Germany in the League will end the charge that the League 
 has been merely a continuation, in a veiled form, of the war-time alliances. 
 Turkey and Mexico may be encouraged now to enter also, leaving outside 
 
 15 
 
the League only two great Powers—the most radical and the most con¬ 
 servative. [Applause.] 
 
 But the entrance of Germany into the League will do more than en¬ 
 courage the weak and the timid. [Laughter.] (This isn’t a partisan dis¬ 
 cussion and I hope you won’t read into my words any meaning I did not 
 intend them to contain.) It will give a degree of reality and of moral 
 content to the discussions in the Council and the Assembly which these meet¬ 
 ings have sometimes not had. They may be less peaceful than before, but 
 they will be much more real. 
 
 (b) The Council is strengthened in other ways by being made specific¬ 
 ally the board of conciliation of last resort in the treaties; the special 
 boards of conciliation in the treaties supplement but do not supplant the 
 Council’s conciliatory functions. 
 
 (c) Most important of all, as far as the League is concerned, Locarno 
 will give it time. Time is the essence of the League’s needs. A genera¬ 
 tion of peace will give it an essential opportunity to develop its latent possi¬ 
 bilities. Locarno, by creating what the signatories called a “moral relaxa¬ 
 tion of the tension between nations,” promises the League this opportunity 
 for growth. 
 
 Fifth, Disarmament. The Final Protocol declares that one of the pur¬ 
 poses of Locarno is to make possible the carrying out of Article VIII of 
 the Covenant, the ideal of general disarmament. Do these agreements con¬ 
 tribute towards that end ? No positive answer can yet be given. My answer 
 would be No and Yes—No, not immediately; Yes, once the treaties become 
 really effective and after Russia has somehow been brought into normal 
 relations with her neighbors. But even before better relations have been 
 established with Russia, initial steps can and probably will be taken. But 
 where? Washington or Europe? Not in Washington, probably, and for 
 these reasons: 
 
 (a) France is unwilling. Her unwillingness is due to her experiences 
 at the Washington Conference, Caillaux’s recent experience in the debt 
 negotiations at Washington, and perhaps even more than either of these, 
 the undoubted advantage which France enjoys in a conference in a 
 European atmosphere. 
 
 (b) But even were France willing, the nations of the League have 
 committed themselves to a conference under the League auspices; the 
 Council was authorized at the last Assembly to begin preparatory work, 
 which will be only a continuation of its efforts during previous years. 
 
 (c) Europe’s general tendency is to look away from the United States 
 in matters of this sort. Only Germany, and to a much less degree Great 
 Britain, might for special reasons prefer a conference here. 
 
 But what about this submarine matter ? Lady Astor waked up the other 
 day and discovered that the submarine was a great menace to the peace 
 of the world. [Laughter.] One difficulty with the British propaganda in 
 favor of the abolition of the submarine is that when the submarine is abol¬ 
 ished the British Navy, relatively speaking, will be stronger than before. 
 Of course, the British, being—like Americans—highly moral, didn’t empha¬ 
 size that point of view about the submarines. [Applause.] It is none the 
 
 16 
 
less a point of view which Frenchmen remember, and which the small 
 nations of Europe cannot forget. Until Britain and we, the dominant 
 powers on the sea, are willing to give up our right to blockade and starve 
 an enemy country and destroy neutral trade, any attempt to rob the weak 
 countries of what they consider to be a means of self-defense comes with 
 bad grace from us. [Laughter.] Not that I am making a defense of the 
 submarine; I am trying merely to get away from those moralistic sophistries 
 which sometimes carry us off our feet. 
 
 In short, Locarno, because it grows up out of the actual situation of 
 today, because it is based upon previous precedents and is practical and lim¬ 
 ited, because it strengthens the principle of judicial settlement and the 
 Court, because it vastly strengthens the League system with which it is 
 tightly integrated, and because it may prepare ultimately for disarmament, 
 is Europe’s latest, most dramatic, and far-reaching answer to the charge 
 that she cannot live at peace. It marks definitely the end of the war after 
 the war. 
 
 But we are very apt, at a moment like this, to forget that Locarno has 
 its limitations. We are apt to feel that the whole job is done. As a matter 
 of fact, Locarno does not touch at all many of the most vital and the most 
 critical world problems. Russia is still outside the picture. Britain is 
 hearing a terrible burden of economic difficulties. France is facing fiscal 
 problems of appalling complexity; she is enmeshed in Morocco and in 
 Syria, and her entanglements there are serious not merely for France: 
 they are symptomatic of the failure of the western states to learn how they 
 ought to deal with Africa and Asia. [Applause.] Many of France’s diffi¬ 
 culties in Africa and Syria are not primarily French difficulties at all; they 
 are difficulties which come out of the growing racial consciousness of 
 the people of Africa and Asia, a growing feeling of unity against what 
 they believe to be the abuses of the western and so-called Christian world. 
 
 |Applause.] China is another and the most challenging of these tests. 
 Obviously Locarno does not deal with these problems; it does not solve 
 them; it leaves them where they were, except that it makes possible a 
 greater unity of Western Europe in meeting them. 
 
 But where does Locarno leave us? Locarno was a “domestic” matter. 
 Even with a vast stretch of the imagination we can’t claim any credit 
 for it, official or otherwise [laughter], unless perhaps we can say that 
 being a rather persistent creditor during the period has helped along the 
 cause. We have done nothing towards Locarno. Officially we did little, 
 unofficially we did somewhat more in reference to the Dawes Plan. 
 
 What are our opportunities? The Court is the first test. Prompt 
 adherence on the basis suggested by two Republican Presidents and two 
 Republican Secretaries of State is of the highest importance—not because 
 such action in itself is a large step, but precisely for the reason that it 
 would be a small step. If we cannot take this first halting step we must 
 confess ourselves impotent and futile. If we can’t win this fight, we 
 can’t win any fight. Our adherence will mean little to the Court, and 
 despite the President’s statement in his address here last Thursday night, 
 our adherence will mean little to the rest of the world. But it will mean 
 everything to us. It will be a moral victory, strengthening and hearten¬ 
 ing us for the next and much greater task. 
 
 17 
 
A night or two ago, Mr. Root, speaking at the Pilgrim dinner, came 
 very near saying a courageous thing. [Laughter.] I don’t mean to say 
 that what he said was not courageous, but he came very near saying a 
 still more courageous thing. He said, in effect, ‘‘The world, is organized 
 
 for peace through the League of Nations. It is America’s duty-” 
 
 and for a minute I thought he was going to say, “It is America’s duty 
 to enter the League,”.but instead he said, “It is America’s duty to co¬ 
 operate with the community of nations.” [Laughter.] 
 
 It is not enough that we should be a lenient creditor; it is not enough 
 that we should try to be just in our relations with other states, it is 
 not enough that we should occasionally co-operate with the League for 
 limited and non-political purposes. I he world, if it is to save itself 
 from war, must so organize its life, so habituate all people to peaceful 
 means of settlement of international disputes, that in any crisis public 
 opinion will demand a peaceful solution as automatically as now, when 
 stirred by passion and anger, it automatically demands war. 
 
 Personally, but not as Chairman of the Executive Board of the For¬ 
 eign Policy Association, I would add that we can make towards this 
 end no contribution really worthy of our unique strength, our unique 
 wealth, save through whole-hearted co-operation with, and at the earliest 
 possible moment entrance into, the League of Nations. [Applause.] 
 
 The Chairman : Mr. McDonald, by the way, points out that he still 
 has a minute and a half to spare. I congratulate him. [Laughter.] 
 
 The next speaker has come from Washington to be with us today 
 and I feel that we are very fortunate to have secured him. He served 
 for three years with the German military commission in Persia, and if 
 any of you have seen that very interesting moving picture called “Grass” 
 you will be interested to know that he was the first white man to pene¬ 
 trate some of those passes in Turkestan. For the past two years he has 
 been a member of the staff of the German-American Mixed Claims Com¬ 
 mission in Washington. It is a great pleasure to introduce Dr. Paul Lever- 
 kuehn. [Applause.] 
 
 M ADAM CHAIRMAN, ladies and gentlemen: This is an hour 
 full of hopes for a new Europe. If anybody has a right to look 
 with longing eyes into the future, it is the younger generation, 
 and I deem it a great privilege if you will let me add to the expressions 
 of experienced leaders in political thought a few words from an unknown 
 member of the younger generation of Germany. 
 
 You have heard the eloquent expression of the views of France. It 
 is well to remember the century-old community of thought between 
 France and Germany; moreover, the indebtedness of Germany to French 
 art and literature, the comfort derived from French philosophy by 
 Prussia’s greatest king. Voltaire’s scepticism, the enthusiasm for free 
 thought and the liberation of the human mind, have always found a 
 ready echo in Germany’s intellectual life, however strong may have been 
 the political antagonism during 300 years. This most wonderful mixture 
 
 18 
 
of scepticism and enthusiasm in the French mind has never been rever¬ 
 berated with the same force in my country: criticism and pessimism 
 have been the more pronounced features of the German attitude toward 
 problems of a high order and significance. 
 
 I. think this difference in mental attitude should be remembered if 
 perhaps in these days you should be led to believe that the response of 
 Germany appears to be lacking in enthusiasm; it is only an outside ap¬ 
 pearance; the dominant underlying factor of the will for peace, of the 
 longing for better days, is only too strong after long years of sufferings 
 of the war—they have been followed by the agonies of a period of infla¬ 
 tion, an economic breakdown which might well be compared to a general 
 nervous breakdown of a whole nation. The after-effects of a nervous 
 breakdown have not quite passed away yet, and the general attitude of a 
 person suffering from such after-effects is to a certain degree still sub¬ 
 ject to instability and sensitiveness to irritation. Let not these passing 
 conditions obscure the reality of a sincere goodwill and practical effort 
 to return to normal and more than that, to definite stabilization and genuine 
 peace. 
 
 I have personally no doubt that the Locarno treaties will be signed 
 and ratified by Germany. They are approved by the majority of the 
 people and the political parties. The energy of Chancellor Luther and 
 the ability of Foreign Minister Stresemann will not fail to carry out 
 what they suggested and agreed upon at Locarno. They are assisted by 
 the President, von Hindenburg, whose popularity assures every action 
 backed by him of success. And here I desire to thank Mr. McDonald 
 very warmly for his kind words about President von Hindenburg. 
 
 The central question today is this: what is the understanding and 
 inherent meaning of Locarno from the standpoint of the nations who 
 assembled there, and for me to outline: what is it that Germany considers 
 as particularly significant in the Locarno agreement? 
 
 When the Treaty of Versailles was signed, it was over the unanimous 
 protest of the German people, who did not believe that they should have 
 been excluded from all deliberations leading to that treaty; they have never 
 since ceased to express the view that certain provisions of the treaty 
 were not in accord with the armistice and with the very idea of the 
 League of Nations, which formed the first part of the treaty. It was 
 the desire of the German Government now to come to a peace based 
 on an agreement which led to the suggestion of covenants as you find 
 them a result of Locarno. Germany has solemnly recognized the fron¬ 
 tiers with Belgium and France; that means she has abided by the status quo 
 on her western border. 
 
 There are three basic problems between France and Germany in the 
 Versailles Treaty: the common frontiers, reparations, and the security of 
 France. These three problems have now found definite solution: the 
 reparations question was settled by the Dawes Plan; there is no reason 
 whatsoever why any question should arise that could not be settled by 
 arbitration; the boundary question has been acquiesced in, and the ques¬ 
 tion of the security of Belgium and France is the further achievement 
 of Locarno. The system of guarantees works, furthermore, both ways, 
 for Germany as well as for France. The disarmament of Germany is 
 
 19 
 
now passing out of discussion on Geiman soil, and so is the demilitariza 
 tion of the western frontier. It would considerably add to international 
 pacification if general disarmament, one of the chief aims of the League 
 of Nations, should now speedily progress, and it would particularly increase 
 Germany’s confidence in the Locarno agreements if the system of de¬ 
 militarized zones were made bi-lateral. The practical situation is at pres¬ 
 ent that the German western frontier is demilitarized but that no respec¬ 
 tive zone has as yet been set up on the French border. 
 
 In discussions the expression is frequently used: “demilitarization of 
 the Rhineland.” It would be more correct to say “the German Rhine¬ 
 land.” For the French army stands on the Rhine. A consistent demili¬ 
 tarization on both sides might go far towards creating a real zone of 
 quiet between the nations. 
 
 That the League is conscious of the necessity of treating all powers 
 on a footing of equality with respect to such zones is already evidenced 
 by the fact that the first draft of a security arrangement fostered by the 
 League of Nations contains a passage to that effect, and the discussions 
 of disarmament now so prevalent all over the world might advantageously 
 take this question into consideration. 
 
 The result of Locarno is thus that all basic questions directly con¬ 
 cerning France and Germany are now substantially taken out of the range 
 of dispute. This being achieved, the road is open to consideration of 
 other questions that might still be cause of unrest. It has been frequently 
 asked why the eastern frontiers of Germany could not be treated in the 
 same way as her western boundaries. The answer can already be found 
 in the way in which they were treated in the Versailles Treaty: while 
 Alsace-Lorraine was immediately turned over to France, the question of 
 the eastern boundaries was, in the treaty, in many respects made subject 
 to decision by the inhabitants. This shows that there was even then felt 
 to be an amount of uncertainty with respect to national claims and the 
 will of the people. East Prussia has decided by an overwhelming 
 majority for adherence to Germany, while Upper Silesia as a whole car¬ 
 ried a German majority, but such districts as had the more considerable 
 minority of non-German votes were turned over to Poland by the de¬ 
 cision of the League of Nations. It is further interesting to note that 
 the recent elections for the popular assembly of the district of Memel 
 resulted in a 9-10 majority of the population for adherence to Germany. 
 This district as well as other territories in the east has been separated 
 from Germany without consulting the will of the people. 
 
 I do not want to go into details as to the German position with respect 
 to these countries; I do not want to quote voices in this country support¬ 
 ing the German view-point. But I think I am absolutely safe in con¬ 
 tending that the question of the eastern boundaries from the very outset 
 showed considerable difficulties, and is still, to say the least, debatable. 
 The view-points of the nations have not yet come close enough together 
 to have had these questions discussed at Locarno; but the arbitration 
 treaties between Germany and her eastern neighbors are manifestations 
 of the will on both sides to resort to arbitration instead of war, and it 
 may be hoped that the same courage in tackling difficult problems, evi¬ 
 denced so remarkably at Locarno, when applied to the eastern questions, 
 
 20 
 
may result in bringing this state of affairs to an end and lead to a 
 satisfactory, permanent solution. 
 
 In entering into the agreements of Locarno, Germany asked for cer¬ 
 tain measures with respect to the occupied territory, and with respect to 
 her position within the League, which would manifest the new position 
 and would safeguard her from being turned into a battlefield of other 
 powers. Quite as France would have security first in all considerations 
 so Germany is bound to emphasize this point for herself. Germany is’ 
 with respect to boundaries, most unfortunately placed: the German army 
 has been reduced to 100,000 men; ail countries surrounding her keep 
 up aimies that aie considerably larger; there are three countries, each 
 of which have far larger armies; any conflict arising in any part of 
 Europe must necessarily affect her, if not in the military sense, then 
 m the economic sense, as provided for in Article XVI of the Covenant 
 of the League of Nations. Germany has also no interest in any present 
 01 futuie disputes between Lussia and her neighbors or other countries. 
 1 he collective note to Germany, which is an inherent part of the Locarno 
 undei standing, puipoits to take care of the exigencies arising out of the 
 geographical situation. But of course something more than that is of 
 vital interest to Germany, and I think for the pacification of Europe as 
 a whole, and that is, that the program of the League of Nations as 
 
 well as of the United States with respect to disarmament be carried 
 into effect. 
 
 * • 
 
 ! d_ 
 
 A general survey of the results of Locarno shows a definite settle¬ 
 ment of questions of the past and an open road to the future. The 
 European situation has passed out of a stage of constant open disputes 
 into a new phase which is in many respects perhaps not so much to be 
 evaluated with a view to the immediate results, but with a view to future 
 developments. 
 
 Speaking in the broadest sense, Locarno is a state of mind. The 
 question is, are the countries concerned really willing to take the con¬ 
 sequences of the treaties they accept, and will they continue in this state 
 of mind? This question, asked with respect to Germany can, I am 
 com meed, be answered emphatically in the affirmative. In saying this 
 I am not just following my own sentiment; I am not relying only on 
 indications in the press and public utterances which may not always be 
 dependable. 1 here are facts which, I believe, support my opinion most 
 distinctly. dhese facts show the perfect readiness of Germany to 
 answer in equal merit the generous policy of other nations, and to build 
 up international understanding and co-operation, not only in politics, but 
 in the larger field of intellectual life. 
 
 Let me give you an example. It is well known that Germany has always 
 resented the fact that all decisions for carrying out the Treaty of Versailles 
 w^re taken by the Iveparation Commission, a body in which Germany was 
 not represented. The United States could have chosen to enter the Repara¬ 
 tion Commission or to set up a similar body to settle the American war 
 claims. The United States, however, followed her tradition of 
 handling international disputes, and suggested a Mixed Claims Com¬ 
 mission, that is, a commission in which the United States and Germany 
 were equally represented by a national commissioner, while questions 
 
 21 
 
on which the two national commissioners could not agree were to be 
 submitted to an umpire. The umpire in commissions of this character 
 is generally a neutral, appointed by agreement of the two governments, 
 and so it was stipulated between the two countries. But Germany was 
 fully aware of the significance of the fact that the United States wanted 
 all disputes settled on the fair basis of a judicial decision, and that 
 the United States would have been fully within her treaty rights had 
 she chosen a different way. The generous act of the United States 
 was answered by Germany in the same spirit by asking the President of 
 the United States to appoint the umpire, an unprecedented event in 
 international affairs. 
 
 This has proved to be a most satisfactory basis. I may perhaps 
 assume that many of you are not aware that for three years there has 
 been a commission in existence settling all disputes arising out of the 
 war. On very few occasions has the public been advised at all of 
 what was being done in Washington by this commission. The reason 
 is that the work was carried on under the auspices of a generous 
 understanding between the two countries, and never was any complaint 
 voiced. But the work was done in silence, and it has been done speedily, 
 in remarkable co-operation. 
 
 Another example of what I am speaking of. When the Dawes Plan wias 
 enacted it was provided that on all commissions and bodies called into life 
 for taking care of the various activities under the plan, Germany should be 
 represented. Since the plan went into effect no complaint has ever been 
 heard about lack of cooperation or about dissatisfaction of any party. 
 
 What I want to say, by calling your attention to this, is that Ger¬ 
 many, when treated as an equal by her former enemies, has not failed 
 to recognize the inevitable but has been anxious to contribute in co¬ 
 operation to solve difficulties, to make the spirit of war disappear, and 
 to establish conditions of peace. 
 
 It has been indicated in some quarters that Locarno might be a new 
 lining up of the Powers. It is to be regretted if suspicions of such 
 nature should draw a shadow across the proper outlook opened by 
 Locarno. They are, first of all, naturally premature. What has been 
 accomplished is that Germany and France are now arriving at the basis 
 that was already reached between the United States and Germany three 
 years ago, when the two nations arrived at the conclusion to wind up 
 the war business on the basis of co-operation instead of command and 
 obedience. It was two years ago that a treaty of friendship and com¬ 
 merce was signed between the United States and Germany, which has 
 since been ratified by both countries. So far the present status as exist¬ 
 ing between the United States and Germany is still but an aim as 
 between France and Germany. 
 
 I need hardly mention that a treaty of friendship and commerce 
 between France and Germany is a consummation devoutly to be wished, 
 and the economic and geographic position of the European Powers does, 
 of course, call for a much closer economic alliance. 
 
 So much about Germany’s state of mind in the political field. In 
 the exchange of intellectual and spiritual matters between European 
 
 22 
 
countries, so fruitful for centuries, she is ready to redouble the efforts 
 already so well on the way in this field, in which not only the govern¬ 
 ments and leaders take action, but where every individual has to make 
 his contribution and can make his contribution. 
 
 E^ cn in 1922, students of the Ijmversity of Cambridge collected 
 more than £2,000 to assist their impoverished fellow-students in Central 
 Europe. This was one group of a nation assisting its comrades in a 
 former enemy country. 1 here has since grown up a thorough under¬ 
 standing between the younger generations of many countries, one of the 
 unmistakable signs of the desire for understanding and peace. 
 
 As between France and Germany, I need hardly say anything, since 
 the splendid work of reconciliation carried on by Mile. Weiss and her 
 associates has been so eloquently praised. It is sure to find a resonance 
 everywhere, much more pronounced since Locarno. 
 
 I do not want to over-estimate the importance of the younger gen¬ 
 eration, but 1 am sure you will forgive me for mentioning their efforts 
 to indicate^ the state of mind of the younger generation all over the 
 world. 1 hey are not often brought to public attention, but they are 
 theie, to come to light, and come to full effect, in later days, a strong 
 under-current in the stream of world development on which now the 
 ship of Locarno is setting sail. 
 
 I have spoken at the outset of the pessimistic trend in the German 
 mind. I do not want to say any more than I can conscientiously 
 say; I do not want to say anything that, in the enthusiasm over the 
 accomplishment of today, might later on lead to disappointment, misinter- 
 pietation, or distrust. But neither scepticism nor pessimism can obscure 
 the fact of the necessity of peace, of the desire for peace, of the will 
 for peace. [Applause.] 
 
 1 he Chairman: Ihe meeting is open now for the usual period of 
 questions and discussion from the floor. In order to give opportunities 
 to as many as possible, we insist that the discussion must be brief and we 
 prefer, if I may borrow a phrase, that it should be brilliant. 
 
 Mr. F. A. Colt: May I ask Mile. Weiss what influence, if any, in 
 her opinion has so profoundly apparently changed, or did change, the 
 attitude of France in the latter part of the Locarno Conference? 
 
 The Chairman : Mr. Colt is asking Mile. Weiss what potent in¬ 
 fluence changed the attitude of France in the latter days of the Locarno 
 Conference. She does not know that there was any change. 
 
 Mr. Colt : Then my premises are not well founded. 
 
 Ihe Chairman: The next question? 
 
 Mr. Kohler : I would like to say that while Mr. McDonald was 
 speaking and so forcibly referring to the fact that the Locarno Treaties 
 really as between those countries are a cause of outlawing war, I was re¬ 
 minded of the fact that long before the Great War began, both Andrew 
 
 23 
 
D. White and David J. Hill condemned Germany in connection with the 
 Hague Conference for having avowedly declined to join in any plan for 
 absolute international arbitration, Count Muenster even saying it would 
 be foolish for Germany to give up the advantages of her military pre¬ 
 paredness by agreeing to arbitrate while possibly other countries would 
 be getting ready to tight. 1 was also recently reading some of Roose¬ 
 velt's letters and was struck by the fact that in connection with these 
 Hague Conferences he records the circumstance that Russia, which called 
 the Hague Conferences, was secretly at those conferences declining to 
 join in any workable plan for international arbitration, and Roosevelt 
 himself says in his letters to Lodge that he cannot join and approve of 
 any compulsory international arbitration agreement that did not have 
 express and important reservations and exceptions. 
 
 Now, to get down to my question: I want to ask whether, in line 
 with that, during the last few months, either at Locarno or on the part 
 of publicists or statesmen of the countries represented there, any have 
 publicly, in print or verbally, taken that same position; that is, that they 
 are so powerful now as compared relatively to their rivals, disarmed or 
 partly disarmed, that it would be foolish for them to join in any agree¬ 
 ment for compulsory arbitration without exception and reservation. 
 
 The Chairman: Mr. McDonald is ready to answer that question. 
 [Laughter.] 
 
 Mr. McDonald : The answer to the question, as far as Europe is 
 concerned, would, I think, be in the negative. I am sorry, however, to 
 have to add that the United States—while it has not made any general 
 statement to the effect that it is so strong that it does not need to make 
 a general treaty of arbitration with anybody, it did, the other day, make 
 a treaty—I think it was with Sweden—to arbitrate all questions except 
 those of “vital interests and national honor.” It makes me feel a little 
 ashamed to think of our country in 1924 and 1925 being the great out¬ 
 standing proponent of this outworn and mediaeval exception, “vital 
 interests and national honor.” [Applause.] 
 
 One of the great things about the League and one of the great things 
 about Locarno is that there are no exceptions such as vital interests and 
 national honor, and as far as those states are concerned those phrases 
 have gone into the discard. It would seem to me that we, at any rate 
 in treaties with such dangerous neighbors as Sweden, might let them 
 go into the discard also. [Applause.] 
 
 Mrs. Emmons Blaine: I figure that questions look to the future 
 and not to the past. I would like to ask the German spokesman if, 
 when Germany enters the League of Nations, Germany would offer up 
 prayer with the other nations that we too, the United States, would 
 catch the light that is being shed in Geneva, which Geneva, perhaps, and 
 Europe first caught from some of us—that we may catch it again and 
 receive inspiration from Germany’s doing likewise? 
 
 Dr. Leverkuei-in: Anything that Germany can do to better the con¬ 
 ditions between the United States and Germany will certainly be done, 
 and that Germany is anxious to have the United States in the League 
 of Nations, I think, is absolutely obvious. 
 
 24 
 
Mr. Brent Allinson : May I ask Mr. McDonald whether he would 
 think it fair to regard the Locarno Conference as in some sense caused 
 or explained by the desire of the Allies to purchase the admission of 
 Germany to the League, and whether a result of the Locarno Confer¬ 
 ence will be in effect the opening of a way to the abrogation of parts 
 of the Treaty of Versailles? 
 
 Mr. McDonald: As to the first part of the question—whether the 
 concessions in the Treaties of Locarno are the price of Germany’s entrance 
 into the League—I don’t know. The two things happened at the same 
 time and are closely related. France has taken the position for many 
 months that Germany must come into the League as a part of any thor¬ 
 ough-going plan for security. I think, roughly speaking, it would only 
 be fair to say that Germany has hesitated for reasons of her own to enter 
 the League, and then the Allies at Locarno offered certain concessions to 
 bring her in. 
 
 As to the second question—whether the Treaty of Versailles may now 
 be modified through the machinery of the League—Mr. Allinson knows 
 as much about that as I do; nobody really knows about it. The machin¬ 
 ery for modification under the terms of the League is defined in Article 
 XIX of the Covenant, which provides that treaties may he reconsidered 
 which have ceased to fit conditions. But the Treaty of Versailles is not 
 being modified by formal arrangement. It is not being modified as 
 some of us used to say it ought to be and as many of my radical friends 
 continue to say it ought to be modified, by formal edict and decree. The 
 Dawes Pian is an enormous modification of the Treaty of Versailles. 
 Locarno in itself is a modification of that Treaty. My guess is that in 
 the future, if this state of mind which we call Locarno continues or 
 improves, we shall have many additional and fundamental modifications— 
 many of them without knowing that the thing is happening at all. 
 [Applause.] 
 
 Mrs. H. H. Moorhead: Following that remark of Mr. McDonald, 
 may I ask Mile. Weiss if she believes that the “state of mind called 
 Locarno” will seriously modify the working of the Dawes Plan? 
 
 Mlle. Weiss: I think that the state of mind called Locarno can 
 modify the Dawes Plan, but only in the way of closer understanding 
 between France and Germany. [Applause.] 
 
 The Chairman : I am surprised that nobody here has been as curious 
 about the Locarno Treaties as some of the members of the British Par¬ 
 liament, who recently asked some very searching questions. 
 
 Mr. Albert Muldavin : I should like to know how they would en¬ 
 force the Locarno Treaty in case one of the parties should break away 
 from it? 
 
 Mr. McDonald: Of course you have to discriminate between trea¬ 
 ties, but the sanction provisions of the Treaty are set forth in great detail 
 in Article IV of the Western Treaty. The substance of it is this: 
 In the West there is a definite test of aggression. That test of aggression 
 is the violation of the demilitarized zone either by France or Germany or 
 Belgium, in which case the other parties have the right to resist, and 
 
 25 
 
Britain and Italy must join them. That is one test. The second test is a 
 violation of other provisions in the Treaty, in which case the matter will 
 be referred to the Council of the League. The whole business is extremely 
 complicated and technical but there has been a serious attempt to devise a 
 system of sanctions and tests based largely on the example of the Pro¬ 
 tocol last year which would, as they say, tighten the gaps in the Covenant 
 and really make the sanctions effective.* 
 
 The Chairman: We will have questions and discussion from the 
 speakers’ table now, just to give a little variety. We will hear from 
 Canon Ernest Dimnet, who was the French spokesman at the Williams- 
 town Conference two years ago and afterwards delivered the Lowell lec¬ 
 tures at Harvard. 
 
 Abbe Dimnet: What I am about to say is not to ask a question 
 but to propound a doubt: why is it that the Locarno agreement seemed 
 to be such a surprise in America? I was positively amazed on land¬ 
 ing, three weeks ago, to discover a sort of bland surprise accompanied 
 by the usual doubt when you hear that Europe is going to be at peace; 
 but this time it does seem to be serious. 
 
 The other point may be correlated with the first, but I think it is a 
 useful thing to bring out—the extraordinary boost which I find in Re¬ 
 publican circles that the Locarno agreement has given to the League of 
 Nations. I see a great many Republicans in this town and generally 
 in America. I used to ask them repeatedly the question, “Why is it 
 that this World Court, which was your platform in the election of Presi¬ 
 dent Harding, is never referred to?” And now, at last, here is this 
 agitation in America for the World Court, in Mrs. Mead’s proposal in 
 Detroit, President Hibben’s Convention next December, and finally the 
 words of President Coolidge which I devoured yesterday in the Times. 
 
 But it seems to me that it is almost a pity at the present moment 
 that this World Court question is being mooted. What is the World 
 Court, after all, viewed as it is here? Strictly and entirely an effort to 
 prevent war? Certainly we are farther away from war than we have 
 been for years, and everybody feels that. There is a tremendous differ¬ 
 ence between the spirit of Locarno, the Locarno state of mind, and the 
 previous condition. I feel it in myself. Then somebody comes with 
 an insistence on the World Court just when it seems to me that the League 
 of Nations ought to be entirely monopolizing attention. [Applause.] 
 It seems to me that Americans have never quite realized the extraordinary 
 difference between the League of Nations as just a mere expedient or 
 stratagem to stave war off, and what it really is. It is something much 
 larger. The Americans who visit Geneva see that it is something like 
 a world bureau in which the affairs of the world are transacted—affairs 
 of all kinds, even statistics. You can get information free in Geneva 
 on any question—the labor question, the opium question, *the white slave 
 question—and in a few months probably the most important economic 
 conference called by the League, which may result in the United States 
 of Europe, in the sense that your United States were not formed until 
 1787 by economic unity. This is, I think, the real important point on 
 which stress ought to be laid. [Applause.] 
 
 * For an elaboration of these points, see supra, p. 11. 
 
 26 
 
The Chairman: Since no one else volunteers, I shall venture to 
 answer Abbe Dimnet’s question as to why some were surprised about the 
 Locarno Treaties. I believe the surprise—if there is surprise—arose from 
 the disillusionment and disappointment which many have felt since 1918, 
 which made many determined not to hope for too much. 
 
 Do I hear any further questions from the floor? If not, I am going 
 to call for a few moments on Mr. Chester Rowell of California, former 
 editor and publisher of the Fresno Republican. Perhaps some of the 
 very fortunate ones among you have read Mr. Rowell’s debate with Sen¬ 
 ator Borah on the World Court, which I consider the most brilliant an¬ 
 alysis of the World Court I have yet read. Mr. Chester Rowell. 
 [Applause.] 
 
 Mr. Chester Rowell : The time is too short for me to say much, 
 and it would be impossible for me to add much to what has already been 
 said beyond a few generalities. 
 
 It seems to me that the war did not end on Armistice Day, 1918— 
 only the shooting part of the war ended then; and for the rest, if there 
 was an Armistice Day, it was at the signing of the Treaty of Locarno 
 on October 16th, or its ratification on next December. Now at last, 
 for the first time the war is over. I think we may add one more thing, 
 and that is that Locarno is one of the vital steps in the evolution of 
 the League of Nations, and that America is more interested than any 
 other country in the subsequent steps of that evolution. We, a lawyer- 
 ridden country, are inclined to think of everything as a document, and 
 we analyze that document. The League of Nations is not a document; 
 it is an institution, and it grows. The Locarno Treaty is a regional 
 agreement; it is one step in an evolution whose goal we do not yet know, 
 but there is danger that America will hope that the goal will be an iso¬ 
 lated United States of Europe. If that goal were reached, then there 
 would be another isolated Monroe Doctrine for the two Americas. Europe 
 could live on that basis and America could live on that basis; but there 
 is still Asia, and we who live face to face with Asia recognize how im¬ 
 portant to America Asia is. If we were to misuse this evolution so 
 that the League of Nations should produce a United States of Europe 
 and a Monroe Doctrine of America, we could not say “No” to the same 
 thing happening in Asia. Then there would be three Leagues in the 
 world, and the situation in Europe, which made war inevitable, would 
 merely have been expanded to a world scale. [Applause.] Therefore, 
 the United States may shut its eyes to Europe all it likes, but it has 
 never shut its eyes to Asia; it does not dare to shut its eyes to Asia; 
 and the only way to keep from isolating the United States and Asia 
 destructively is to expand the world League constructively so that it may 
 be, if necessary, a federation of regional agreements, but that they shall 
 not be isolated and the world League shall be really a world League. 
 Otherwise, America’s isolation will mean disaster when America begins 
 to get the consequences of Asia’s isolation. [Applause.] 
 
 The Chairman : It is too bad Mr. Rowell could not have been at our 
 last meeting to hear the discussion on the United States of Europe. 
 
 Mr. Antonoff: I would like to ask Mile. Weiss a question—if 
 there is a moral spirit in the Locarno Conference since the French intel- 
 
 27 
 
lectuals led the French people to believe that Germany has accepted at 
 Locarno conditions imposed upon them by France? This opinion held 
 by the French is bitterly felt in Germany. 
 
 Mlle. Weiss : I should like to know to what Mr. Antonofif refers. 
 
 Mr. Antonoff:I refer to the editorial in the last issue of your 
 paper in which is printed the Locarno Treaty. In this you say: “L’Alle - 
 magne accepte de bon grc ce qui avait ete impose” 
 
 Mlle. Weiss: I am sorry to have to confess that I have not had 
 a chance to read my own paper since I left Paris. I think that 
 it is always very difficult to cut two or three sentences from an 
 article and understand the meaning of the article by those chosen sen¬ 
 tences. [Applause.] I believe that my contributor thought in this edi¬ 
 torial that he was obliged to state this: that Germany had, during those 
 seven years, understood that France would not abandon here her fight 
 for security and had realized that France would not be restful if this 
 security was not attained. So the author states that we made security 
 the point of our policy and the policy of our friends, and shows thus 
 that Germany, having understood that this was a condition of France’s 
 life from the French point of view, understood also that it was a con¬ 
 dition of Germany’s life to see that she would have a right to arbitra¬ 
 
 tion. After all, Germany in Locarno was compelled to understand our 
 point of view. But I believe the Locarno agreement meant a sacrifice for 
 us as it meant a sacrifice for Germany; there are things to be accepted 
 by us in the Locarno agreement that we don’t so very much like as 
 there are things in the Locarno agreement that Germany doesn’t so very 
 much like. Well, we have to play the game of our public opinion and 
 show that if Germany was compelled to do some things, which is always 
 a feeling of victory for us, on the other hand, on the other side of the 
 line, the Germans can say that we were compelled to do some other 
 
 things. That is precisely why we have this excitement in the press 
 
 which I was referring to when I was speaking of the Yale-Harvard 
 game. The leaders in Germany and in France were strong enough to 
 fight that excitement, but as the treaties have not yet been ratified by 
 our Parliament we have to make it easy for them—don’t you see—as 
 they have to make it easy on the other side. [Applause.] So that I 
 think the question of Mr. Antonofif only gave me the occasion to show 
 that our press and the press of Germany had to make us swallow our 
 sacrifices. We had been fed with hatred, fed with armament, fed with 
 the idea of fight. Finally those things have come to an end for the 
 victory of every one. [Applause.] 
 
 Mr. Arthur Reese: Mav I have four or five minutes? 
 
 m/ 
 
 The Chairman: It is already time for adjournment, but we should 
 be glad to have your question if you can put it in one minute. 
 
 Mr. Arthur Reese: I want to instill a note of cynicism. I approve 
 of the Locarno Pacts and I would like to support the World Court and the 
 League of Nations, but it does seem to me that there are four exceptions 
 to these Locarno Treaties wherein they can be the sole judge without inter¬ 
 national authority. If you will notice in the sixth article of the Treaty, 
 
 28 
 
France still has the same rights and obligations as she had under the Treaty 
 of Versailles. She can come in again as she did in the Ruhr two or three 
 years ago. 
 
 The white Allies have the mastery of the world; they will not give 
 it up, and as long as that white mastery is supreme, they will make all 
 kinds of agreements and will not allow anything to come before the World 
 Court or the League of Nations within the period of their white mastery. 
 1 here is no use in thinking that anything is going to be done in the 
 future to surrender voluntarily, on the part of the white Allies, the dom¬ 
 inating supremacy of their position. 
 
 The Chairman: I’m sorry but your time is up, Mr. Reese. Mile. 
 Weiss wants to answer the first part of your question. 
 
 Mlle. Weiss: I want to answer it very briefly. I regret that this 
 gentleman, Mr. Reese, seems not to have benefitted by the explanations 
 I gave, Mr. McDonald gave, and Mr. Leverkuehn gave, because in fact 
 if the Locarno agreements are signed we cannot—we French cannot— 
 enter the Ruhr any more. [Applause.] 
 
 [The Meeting Adjourned at 4 o’clock.] 
 
 The texts of the Locarno Treaties 
 may be obtained from the World 
 Peace Foundation , 40 Mt. Vernon 
 Street , Boston , Mass. 
 
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