HX00017191 Columbia (HnitJcrBttp^^^'^ intI)rCttpofJlfttjgork (College of p^psticianfi anb burgeons llifararp /etc MENTAL DISEASE. Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive in 2010 witin funding from Open Knowledge Commons http://www.archive.org/details/lecturesonmentalOOsank LECTURES MENTAL DISEASE W,. H. O. SANKEY, M.D. Lond., F.R.C.P. Late Lecturer on Mental Diseases, University College, and School of Medicine for Women, London ; Formerly Medic-al Superintendent of Female Department of the Hanwell Asylum, and Prciii- dent of Medico-Psychological Society, etc., etc.; Proprietor of Boreatton Park Asylum. SECOND EDITION, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS. LONDON H. K. LEWIS, 13G GOWER STREET, W.C. 1884 LONDON PRINTED BY H . K . LEWIS I3C JWCR STREET W.C. TABLE OF (CONTENTS. PART I. MENTAL SCIENCE, OK PHYSIOLOGY. SECTION I. Mental Products . . . . . . . . 1 SECTION II. Mental Processes or Statics . . . . ' , 32 SECTION III. Mental Processes or Dynamics ..... 59 PART II. MENTAL DISEASE, OE PATHOLOGY. SECTION I. Ordinary Insanity, Acute Stage ..... 100 SECTION II. Ordinary Insanity, Chronic Stage . . . . .140 VI CONTENTS. SECTION III. Recurrent Insanity . . . . . . ,103 SECTION IV. Varieties of Ordinaky Insanity 190 SECTION V. Examples and Cases in illustration . . 199 SECTION VI. Etiology, Morbid natomy, and Pathology of Ordinary Insanity . ....... 21 G SECTION VII. General Paresis 250 SECTION VIII. Etiology, Morbid Anatoihy, and Pathology of General Paresis . . '. 280 SECTION IX. States of Idiocy and Mental Weakness . . . 827 PART III. SYMPTOMATIC MENTAL DISEASES. SECTION I. Epileptic Insanity 814 CONTENTS. SECTION II. I'agc Alcoholismus 855 SECTION III. Spinal Cases 3G4 SECTION IV. Organic Brain Diseases ....;.. 370 PAR'i^ IV. Treatment ......... 875 PART V. Legal Eelations of Insanity ...... 400 APPENDIX. Classification of Insanity 440 PLATE I. Sections of Normal Braiu from Specimens prepared by Dr. Herbert 0. Sankey. Fig. 1. Portion of second layer of cortex. Fig. 2. Showing giant cells fi-om Paracentral lobe. Tissues stained with aniline blue, and drawn to the scale of \ of an inch to xxrW* k : • • % • • , , .» fi^ k • > PLATE II. Sections of Braiu in General Paresis from specimens prepared and lent by Dr. Wigleswortb, M.D. Lond. Fig. 1. Portion of upper portion of Cortex Cerebri, a vertical section tbi'ougb ■v\liole of first layer, and a small portion of second from middle frontal gyrus. Tbe first layer presents a marked fibrillated appearance (scarcely sufiiciently marked in tbe engraving), and numerous large, mucb brancbed neuroglia corpuscles scattered tkrougbout. Tbere are indications of nerve cells, and brancbes of vessels enveloped in byperplasic tissue. Fig. 2. Vertical section of a deeper layer of tbe same pre- paration in wbicb tbe byperplasia of connective tissue (Binde- gewebewucberuug) is more apparent. See page 202 et seq. Drawn from tbe preparations by tbe autbor to tbe scale of ^ of an incb to xoVo. ai \ -^ *^^ tt^->- Cv ^"N ^C'^ d *■ -^ - ■ A V \ PLATE III. Small Arteries of the Pia Mater and Cortex Cerebri, Fig. 1, 4, 5 and 6 prepared under a stream of water, by washing away the cerebral tissue ; Fig. 2 and 3 are from sections prepared in the usual way. Fig. 1, 2, 3, 4 show the appearance of the arterioles in general paresis as described at pp. 304 and 305. Fig. 5 and 6 are vessels taken fi-om cases of Chronic Insanity and ImbeciUty and show hypertrophy of the arterioles as des- cribed at pp. 236 and 245. *»* Figs. 1, 2, 3, and 4 were drawn from the preparations themselves by Mr. Tuffen West and before the-author and artist met. PLA'PR 111 A COURSE OF LECTURES MENTAL DISEASE. PAET I. Section I. Science of Mind — Schools of Philnsophy — History — Augusta Oomte, liis Account of Positive Philosophy — Psycliolooy a Brancli of Physiology — Division of the Subject — Statics ;incl Oynamifxs, or Priiducts and Processes— Products considered — liocke's D(^fiiiition of Ideas — Concrete and Abstract Ideas, their difference — Examples of Concrete and Abstract Ideas, Mind, Life, Ego, &c. — The Products of Sensa' ion —Persistence of Sensation — Memory — Association of Ideas— Consciousness— Emotions — Will— Belief— Imagination— Judgment. I THINK it expedient in commencing a course of Lectures on Mental Disease to introduce the subject witli some remarks on the science of Mind. In other medical treatises the pathologist may assume that the physiology of each organ, the diseases of which he is about to describe, is already acquh-ed by the student. This cannot be said to be the case when the disease is mental. The physiology of the mental functions or psychology, is omitted of late years in the text books. It is not possible therefore to appeal to the student's knowledge, and besides this the subject is a very wide one and is discussed by writers from very differ- ent stand-points. The study of Mind, formerly called Philosophy as though it were the only subject of learning, is of very ancient date, and was almost the first subject which excited the attention of con- templative minds. In those early times it was of course consi- dered entirely apart from the body. Mental philosophy long preceded the study of anatomy. 2 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. The large amount of attention that has been given therefore to this subject, through such a series of years, has resulted in the formation of what is called the various schools of philosophy. Each school in its turn had its own system — one school has yielded to another through many changes. The history of the schools is treated in two volumes by the late Mr. Lewes.* It would be of no use to us to review these several systems, or the doctrines of the Spiritualist, Materialist, Nominalist, Realist, Idealist, Sensuahst, and others ; though allusion may be made to some of the tenets during our course. In England the tendency has been to adhere chiefly to the practical, and transcendentalism has not found so much favor with us as with the German schools. One of the last systems of philosophy is that of Comte, a French professor, and his writings have had a large influence on French philosophy, and have brought it into more accordance with English views — it was called by him the Positive Philoso- phy. Comte gives in a short compass an epitome of the history of philosophy, and his part in the progress of it, which I will here quote. History of the Positive Philosophy of the School of Comte. — Auguste Comte was born in 1798 and died in 1857. His chief work is his Cours de Philosophie Positive in six volumes. The following passage from vol. i., p. 14, of his work, gives his own account of the Positive Philosophy. " In order to explain," he says, "the true nature and real char- acter of the Positive Philosophy in a convenient form, it is abso- lutely necessary to cast a general coup d'oeil over the gradual progress of human knowledge viewed in its entirety ; for any understanding of the subject can only be gained from its history." "In studying the development of the entire human understand- ing in its different spheres of activity, from its earliest soarings to the present time, I believe I have discovered a grand funda- mental law, to which, by an invariable necessity it is sub- jected This law consists in the fact that each of our principal conceptions, each branch of knowledge passes through • Lewea' History of Philosophy. STUDY OF MIND. 3 three diflferent theoretical states : the first, theological or fictional ; sccouti, metaphysical or abstract ; thii'd, scientific or positive." He goes on to point out that the mind in its first efforts, and which he would also consider as the lowest point of its develop- ment, simply refers all natural phenomena to the direct inter- vention or operation of an intelligent agent — to God. That from this simple and early mode of explanation the next stage, which is the metaphysical, invented the hypothesis of an intermediate power as Nature, Life, Vital Principle — as the active cause of the phenomena of the universe — and the object of philosophy at this stage was to enquire into the nature of these prime causes. This, the metaphysical stage, took as strong a hold on men's minds as did the theological, and to this day it influences the judgments and opinions and modes of thought of a great many. As an example, there is at present no dogma more prevalent perhaps than that which attributes certain phenomena of the body to some distinct agent as " the Will," " Mind," " Vital Principle," etc. The positive philosophy as described by Comte has, he says, been gradually extending its power during the last two centuries and embraces to day every order of phenomena. All pheno- mena according to him fall under five grand categories — Astro- nomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and Sociology, and the •chief characteristic of this philosophy, or the philosophy of science, is this — "that it seeks no more to investigate the inti- mate nature or character of causes, but rather occupies itself in the discoveiy of the Eules or Laws which regulate the universe." The positive school made no sudden change in the views generally entertained. Opinions had been for more than two centuries gradually undergoing change, and tending toward the same direction. The writings of Comte perhaps merely stated positive views more dogmatically, and the name of Comte is now most generally associated with them ; there are many mat- ters, however, in the writings of Comte which are by no means accepted — views on religious and political questions, which par- take rather of atheistic and materialistic views, and which, at all events are quite foreign to our present purpose. More especially 4 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. was there in the later writings of Comte much of the mystical and obscure, and which have given rise to an adverse opinion concerning him. It should be borne in mind that much of tliese peculiar doctrines form no essential part of Positivism, and these views were broached only in the latter part of his life, and after a severe attack of mental disease. Mr. Lewes sums up the position of Comte in relation to phi- losophy thus : — " tlie positive philosophy is novel as a j^hiloso- phy, not as a collection of truths never before suspected. The novelty is in the organization of existing elements. (History of Philosophi/, vol. ii., p. 696J. Psychology being, then, a section of physiology it is to be stu(3ied in the same way as that pursued with other portions of the subject; we may, however, take advantage of what we find prepared for our use in all previous investigations by former methods. The subject may be studied, as in other physical investiga- tions, from two points of view — or statically and dynamically. In other words, we may examine the organ and the function — or the process and the product. Only a brief review of the chief matters will be attempted here. It will be the most convenient to consider, firstly, the pro- ducts, and secondly, the process. As these, however, are very intimately blended it will not be possible to keep them perfectly distinct thi'oughout our examination. THE PKODUCTS OF MIND. I. Products. It is in this division of the subject, in which the earliest labours of the schools will be alone available. A classification of mental products has been made by many authorities. The division of Professor Bain, and which it appears he adopted from a suggestion of Professor Sharpey, is a good practical arrangement, viz., into the Senses, the Intellect, the Will, and the Emotions. These, however, are not strictly products, but rather groups of processes, the products of the senses would be Sensations ; of the intellect. Ideas, Beliefs, Judgments, etc. ; of the will, Volitions ; of the emotions, Feelings, etc. MENTAL PRODUCTS. 5 For our purpose I think a more useful mode will be to begin with the most simple product and proceed to the more complex. Locke, whose work on the Human Understanding really laid the foundations of what has since been called the positive school, commenced his examination of the understanding by the study of the Ideas. Ideas may be considered the units of our investigation. Other resultants are as it were secondary as regards Mind ; for example, Sensations and Emotions are mental products when they give rise to Ideas. It is as well, therefore, to commence with the examination of Ideas. Locke used this term in a very general manner. " It is the term," he says, " which I think serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a man thinks. [On the Human Understanding, chap, i., § 8). Ideas are of two kinds : — 1. Concrete. 2. Abstract. It is important that the student should thoroughly examine the differences between these. Very much of the difficulty of the whole subject, in my opinion, lies in the understanding of what these terms signify. 1. A Concrete Idea represents only an object as it is, that is, it is the first impression that is produced upon the organism by the action upon it of an external object; the impression in its crude state, as received, constitutes the concrete idea. In this state the object with all its attributes unseparated — whole — concreted — or in its compound and unanalysed condition, affects the individual and gives him — produces in him — a con- crete idea. This will be still more clearly seen by contrasting it with the other kind of idea. 2. The Abstract Idea. — An abstract idea does not relate to an object as, or in the condition in which, we see it, or know it, but to some attribute only of the object or objects. Though an object is acting upon our organism, the abstract idea is in relation only to a particular quality, attribute, or portion of the object, drawn away — abstracted from the whole or concrete object, and presented to us only after analysis ; and since it relates only to a portion of the idea formed, it does not correspond to any object in its actual condition as found in nature. LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. To illustrate this by an example: — I have before me a table, and I see it exactly as it is before me, in its entirety ; such an idea thus begotten is a concrete idea. But almost at the same moment of receiving the first positive effect upon my organism, there is another process within the mind which is evoked, for directly I say that the object is a table it is obvious that I liken it to some other table ; beyond the simple passive impression there is an action commencing, and "which is a mental process. I may recognise the object as a table and perceive that it has the attributes of other tables, I must have, therefore, a distinct idea of "table" quite indepen- dent of the one before me, or indeed, of any table in particular. 1 know tables of various shape, size, material, colour, uses, etc., and yet all are to me tables, thus I have an idea of table, which is an abstract idea — because it is abstracted from many tables and of all kinds — I call this abstract idea " table," and in mak- ing use of the term I conceive it entirely apart from, and inde- pendent of the rest of the properties of tables. As a further illustration of the attributes of the abstract idea, I will take the idea " Blue." "We have undoubtedly a distinct idea of that which is signified by the term "Blue." Yet when used, as it most commonly is, adjectively, there is nothing in existence exactly corresponding to this term — we all know blue Bky, blue paint, blue books, but if we take away (abstract) the idea corresponding to the terms sky, paint, books, we have only blue, but it remains only in idea. We do not imagine that there is anything, any entity in nature, corresponding to the idea. The abstract and concrete ideas difl:'er then in the following particulars : — 1. A concrete idea results from the action and reaction of an external object on the organism, in which the organism is a passive recipient of the impression. 2. The action has relation only to a single increment of time. 8. The concrete idea carries with it a conviction that it re- presents a real object as it exists in nature. Consequently "a concrete name is the name of an object ; an abstract name the name of an attribute." (Mill's Loffic, vol. i., p. 80). " A real concrete object, such as a plant could not be annihilated witbout alteration to the whole cosmos. But abstracts as classes — orders MENTAL PRODUCTS. 7 genera, etc., — one and all might be annihilated and would cause no perturbation in the system of things." (Lewes). 1. The abstract idea is the result of a process within the organism. 2. It is not in relation only with a single increment of time, but may extend over a wider field. 3. It does not represent objects in then- actual state in nature, but has relation with portions, or the qualities of things. 4. The abstract idea produces conviction, or belief, but not that it corresponds to any thing or things in then- actual state — the conviction only is of the existence of an attribute of an object. There is some difference in different writers in the em- ployment of abstract and general terms as expressing ideas. A general term should properly denote a class of attributes, but it of course then denotes an abstract idea, and an abstract term Mill would confine to denote an attribute of a single object, and to mean the opposite to concrete."''' There are certain fallacies in regard to these two kinds of ideas which are very commonly met with, viz. : — 1. To attribute a real or objective existence to what is a mere abstract idea. 2. To confound the one kind of idea with the other. Though these are separable they may be conveniently con- sidered together. Exa'nples in illustration of the above fallacies. With the double view of illustrating the above statement by examples, and pointing out some of the errors which have prevailed, and obscured our present subject, I will select examples bearing on the Science of Mind. 1. The confusion arising from attributing an objedtive existence to an abstract idea. This error is one abundantly discussed by writers of the posi- tive school. Indeed, a just appreciation of what is a mere abstract idea is the distinguishing feature of this school of philo- sophy. * The nietapbysical schools believed that that which we call an abstract really did correspond to a real object, whicli they named the essence; as Mill expresses it, they believed in the existence of real entities corresponding to general terms, for instance, they would believe in a certain general substauiive table. The Anbient Doctrine of Essences, vide Mill, vol. i,, \k 123. 8 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. Comte, in fact, points out that this tendency was a distin- guishing mark of one era in the history of philosophy, for while in his first era man attributed the origin of all things to one, or Universal, maker; in the second, or metaphysical age of philoso- phy, everything was attributed to certain general agencies, as gravitation, vital force, &c., and which were viewed as real and existent agencies, or as actual entities. But there is no difficulty in meeting with illustrations. The word " Mind " itself affords a good example, and we may con- veniently give it precedence, for a proper conception of what the word really symbolizes is very necessary to the comprehension of what is to follow. Mind. I prefer, in explaining errors that have commonly arisen with regard to the abstract idea, to make use of extracts from authors, as such illustrate and give authority to my own state- ments. Dr. Maudsley writes* " with regard to the manifold mental phenomena by observation of them, and abstraction from the particular, we get the general conccpt.'o ), or essential idea of mind, an idea which has no more existence out of mind, than any other idea or general term. In virtue, however, of that powerful tendency in the human mind to make the reality con- formable to the idea, a tendency which has been at the bottom of so much confusion in philosophy, the general conception has been converted into an objective entity, and allowed to tyrannize over the understanding — a metaphysical abstraction has been made into spiritual entity." " The mind," says Mr. Lewes, (Problems, &c.,p. 216, vol. i.), " is commonly spoken of in oblivion of the fact that it is an abstract term expressing the sum of mental phenomena : as an abstraction it comes to be regarded in the light of an entity, or separate soui-ce of the phenomena which constitute it." " By a similar illusion Ave come to regard the process of thinking apart from the product— thought; and, generalizing the process, we call it Mind or Intellect, Avhich then means no longer the phenomena condensed into a term, but the source of these phenomena." When we speak of mental disease, or disorder of the mind ; • Maudsley'e Physiology and Pathology of Mind^ First Edition, p. 41. MENTAL PRODUCTS. 9 terms wliicli are legitimate because they represent a general notion — it is not that we would intimate that Mind can be separated from body ; but that the body is diseased, and gives rise to alteration of those functions called mental or Mind. Another abstract term which is often used in the same way is Life. '■^ Life is often spoken of as something independent of Living." (Lewes, op. cit., p. 110). " The analogy of Life and Mind is the closest of all analogies, • if indeed the latter is anything more than a special form of the former. Hence what is known of Life, is the best guide to what is knowable of Mind. Both are processes, or under another aspect functional products. Neither is a substance, neither is a force. To speak of Vitality as a substance would shock all our ideas — but many speak of it as a force. What then is meant by Vitality or vital forces ? If the abstraction be resolved into its concretes it will be seen that a certain process, or group of pro- cesses, is condensed into a simpler expression. VitaHty and Sensibility, Life and Consciousness, are abstractions having real concretes. These are compendious expressions of functional processes conceived in their totality and not at any single stage." (p. 111). " Co-ordination, Mind, Life, are abstractions; they are reali- ties in the sense of being drawn from real concretes ; but they are not realities existing apart from their concretes, otherwise than in our conception : and to seek their objective substratum we must seek the concrete objects of which they are the sym- bols." The terms denote generalizations and express in a convenient and concise form a wide series of phenomena. But when they are taken to mean something distinct — standing over and direct- ing as it were the functions or actions of the body as so many agents, they are grossly misapplied and lead to much confusion. " Tke Ego.'' — The next mental product which I will mention is the Idea included in the term " Ego," or " the Ego." Much use has been made of this term, and it may be said to have played a foremost part in metaphysical discussion generally. What is meant by the term is the subject, as when we say Ego sum, the sum is predicate of Ego, and the Ego is subject of 10 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. the sum. The word therefore signifies one's self, while Bpeak- iiig of one's mental functions — it, the Self — or the " I." Now the term is used in two ways, and hence the confusion which has arisen in its employment. The error is the same as already pointed out with other ideas, or the confounding the concrete and the abstract ; for the word Ego, or I, is sometimes the symbol of a concrete idea and sometimes an abstract idea. It is sometimes put merely as one element in a single re- action, in which case it refers also to a single increment of time, as in the expression "I am writing," " I am here," it is then the name of a concrete. But it is also used, and perhaps more frequently — and espe- cially when the words "the Ego" are employed — to represent an abstract idea, and as such it is not confined to the signifying of one increment of time, as in the following passage from Dr, Carpenter " the control which the Will can exert tends to render the Ego a free agent," or "the conscious Life of every individual man con- sists in an action and reaction between his mind and aU that is outside it, the Ego and the Non-Ego." In both these phrases the word is clearly employed as a general term to signify a per- sistent agent, or an agent acting throughout a life. For illustration's sake, I may say, I know that I have existed 60 years and upwards, and consider myself to be the same in- dividual tln'Oughout> though I have been changing during the whole of that time. When I use the term I, or speak of myself as the Ego — as an abstract term, I include myself throughout all these changes, and in using it in this sense it is a general term as much as any other already alluded to as Life and Mind— and in considering its effect in analysmg any particular act this must be borne in mind : for example, in the expression — I exist — the signification of these words may be either, that I am existing at the particular moment of time, or that I am in a continuous state of existence. As this Ego, or I, is usually one term in every mental analysis of ourselves, it is necessary to thoroughly appreciate its exact value in each proposition. Thus, in the expression "I am a free agent," this is certainly true if the "I" means the abstract condition of " Self," In the expression which Dr. Cai'penter quotes from Mr. H. G. Atkinson and Harriet Martiueau (and with obvious pain at the sentiment MENTAL PRODUCTS. II expressed) the Ego or I is used in its concrete sense, and as regards sevei-al distinct and separate acts : " Instinct, passion, thought," they write, "are effects of organised substances, all causes are material ciuses, I am what I am, a creature of necessity, &c., &c." What is true of these statements is this, that each individual concrete act of the individual is the re- sultant of the concrete Ego, at that particular time under the particular circumstances. The Ego is the concrete idea of the man only as he is at that one increment of time. It includes unseparated all his inclinations, convictions, desires, appetites, feelings, passions, and every other attribute to which a name has been given, and such an Ego, under such an influence gives rise of course to necessary results. If either of the two conditions vary, the result will also vary. But when the expression is used in the abstract sense, as the general condition of the in- dividual and his inclinations, dispositions, &c., then, since the conditions are no longer the same, the result will be different. The proposition then becomes a different one, and the result is no longer predicated as necessary but only probable. If the surroundings change, the Ego will not be the same Ego mentally. The Ego — the abstract Ego, is thus a change- able not a constant quantity, and the resultant will be a contin- gency and not necessary, the result changing with the change of the Ego ; the action so far depends on the Ego, that since the man and the Ego are one and the same, the man changes according to his own bent — according to his own in- clination generally, and therefore must be said to act just as he chooses. Sensation. — The next mental product which we have to con- sider is Sensation. It will be first necessary to make some remarks as to the meaning of this term. The words sensory, sense, sensible, sen- sibility, sensational, have become so incorporated into conversa- tional language, that a considerable ambiguity as to the proper application of the words sensation and sense, &c., has resulted. Thus a man has been called sensible, or a man of sense — or of common sense, in relation to his intellectual qualities, rather than his perception. A certain school of philosophy has been called sensual, because they placed a primary importance npon 12 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. the functions of the senses ; and to the same word sensual has been given the meaning in common phraseology of grossness, immorality, &c. But the word sensation in mental science is entirely used to express the particular function of the different special senses — as Vision, Hearing, SmeUing, Feeling, Tasting, to which various authors would add certain other kinds which may be called organic, or those on which the emotions of appe- tite and desires seem to depend. "With respect to the operation of the organs of Sensation, this difference in function may be pointed out, that the idea produced from the sensation is in some objective, and in others, more or less subjective. We attribute the effect produ.ced on ourselves through Vision, Hearing, Smelling and Tasting, to the qualities of the object. We attribute the qualities derived from touch and other organic sensations to ourselves — that is, subjectively, but ourselves considered objectively. Thus we do not imagine after an impression produced on our eye, that the object is near or close to the organ, but we refer it to a distance, and the same with the action of the auditory and olfactory senses — these are senses for distant perception ; there are other impressions — modifications of sensation from touch within the organism and called organic, and whicli are subjective. Mr. Lewes writes : " When the mental phenomena are con- sidered as wholly within the mind, they are Sensation, Emotion, Impulse. When passing out of the organism, they are Percep- tion, Ideation, and Volition." {Problons, vol. i., p. 138, § 29). In other words one is the passive and the other the active effect. A sensation thus limited is the impression produced on the organism by external objects, for a sensation to furnish an idea it must become a perception, '•■ in other words it must be a conscious act. The question involuntarily arises then, what can sensation furnish, and what can it not furnish ? This has been the point on which the different schools have expended much argument ; this part of the question will be more in its place when we come to consider the mental processes, or the dynamics of mind : it may be pointed out, however, that by limiting the meaning of • Dr. Ferrier {Fundinns of the Brain, p. 4'i) suffpests the use of the word sestbesis — for the sensation as above, and noesis — to signify a perception. MENTAL PRODUCTS. I3 the ■word to its proper sphere, it will be evident to every one that all that the special senses can directly give us are material objects, and these in the concrete. No abstract notion can be an object of any of the special senses. We may see a man, but not man- kind — a brave man, but not valour — a blue book, but not the abstract idea blue. If we cannot obtain the abstract idea through sensation, we are naturally led to enquire how the abstract is obtained. Locke answered this question thus "by the operation of our minds" — this for the present must suffice until w^e come to consider the processes. There are some properties connected with sensation which should be mentioned here. Sensations vary in power, psychologists admit of two kinds, which Mr. Spencer calls Vivid and Faint. Sensation implies feeling, the word feeling, however, has been employed like the word sensation very loosely — but in the sense of something felt, sensation and feeling are, as James Mill says, the same thing, the names are two but the things are one. Another attribute of sensation, most peojDle would say, would be that it is always accompanied by consciousness. We have naturally a difficulty in understanding how the two functions can be separated. We must . be conscious of what we ieel. This must depend, it will be seen, however, upon the exact signification that is put upon the words " feeling or sensation " by those who would object to the axiom, that a sensation must be accompanied by a consciousness of the act. Before we discuss that point, we may add that another property of sensation is, that it produces an effect on the mind of a more or less per- sistent character. And the degree of persistence appears to de- pend a good deal upon the force of the original impression, whether it is Faint or Vivid. This property of the persistence of the impression is one on which much depends, and unless the fact of persistence is granted, the explanation of many of the phenomena to be discussed would fail ; it should not therefore be passed over without careful examination. But if we admit the action of the object on the organism at all, which is the primary axiom — we shall have no difficulty in allowing that the impression may persist, and the 14 LKCTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. property may be formulated in a second axiom " that the im- pression upon the organism by its environment may show its persistence in the organism." With regard to the connection of sensation and consciousness, we may now explain that some authors would include under this word sensation, every effect produced on the organism through the sensory nerves, in other words the whole effect of the afferent nerves. It must be remembered that there are no strong lines of demarcation in nature. We have admitted that the impression may be stronger or weaker, faint or vivid, the?e great differences are appreciable, but their limits are not sharply defined, the vivid impressions produce vivid conscious- ness, the faint impressions weaker effect, and the weakest produce so faint an impression that consciousness is either evanescent or unappreciable ; who can decide that it is absent, this will be further discussed in the sequel. The Persistence of a sensation is the basis of the faculty of memory. A sensation has always a tendency to produce motion ; in the primitive state of the nervous system, the whole of the sensation is expended in motion, and the action called excito- motor or reflex is the result ; in the higher organisms there re- mains, after the motor act, a future source of energy, the whole is not expended, and there is what is called a " remanent." Another question in connection with sensation is one that has been greatly discussed in different schools of philosophy, and is in relation to the nature of Sensation; this will be considered rom our point of view when we have to examine the genesis of mind generally. But the question which the metaphysical school have been occupied with is, how the object affects the subject, or the mode by which a quality of an object passes from the object to the subject— and whether the quality or property of an object which we recognize, belongs to the object or the subject, that is ourselves ; that the blue, for example, of a blue book belongs to the book, or whether the idea of blue is only an effect produced on persons seeing it. The positivist school declines this discussion, and accepts as real the Sensation produced on the organism by external objects; by resolving sensation into feelingi it accepts that feeling as real, and under certain conditions it furnishes a sufficient basis, or MENTAL PRODUCTS. 1 5 datum for our investigation. " Science is compelled," says Lewes {Problems of Life and Mind), "to accept certain limits as final, and these limits may be arbitrary when they suffice for the immediate purpose of the research (conventional ultimates), or necessary when they abut on some dead-wall of ignorance which may be one day removed, or some ultimate of feeling which can never be passed beyond." With respect to the reality of feeling, Lewes remarks " that the sensation, or presentation, is fitly considered real because it has objective reality for its antecedent stimulus. The re- presentation, whether image or symbol, is ideal, because its antecedent is a subjective state. Keality always indicates that antecedent which excites sensation when in direct relation with the sensory organism. Hence we say that a feeling is real when it is felt, ideal when it is only thought, not felt. To feel cold and to think of cold are two markedly different states." [Pro- bleins, vol. i., p. 149). In this way our abstract ideas are indirectly though not im- mediately based on sensation. That the positivist school accept as real the sensation pro- duced on the organism by external objects, is not asserting, however, that our senses necessarily yield us real facts, the organs of sense may be imperfect, and other causes may exist to impede the action of the organ. The metaphysician on the other hand, as Kant, affirms that the true is only in the abstract idea, and some go so far as to main- tain that every general term (or abstract idea) such as man, vir- tue, has a real and independent existence, these are the realists; the nominalists, on the contrary, maintain that all general terms are but the creations of mind, designating no distinct entities being merely used as marks of aggregate conceptions. (Lewes' History, vol. i., p. 242). Though we cannot fathom the mystery how any quality passes from the object into the subject and produces what we call sen- sation, we may examine some of the attributes of the sensation. "We simply say it produces an effect, and this effect is intensified in some cases by special mechanical arrangements, and diffused by other means, but there are some laws attending these functions "which have been studied. It would appear that the mode by which the influence is diffused, is chiefly if not universally by iG I.KCTUKES UN MENTAL DISEASE. vibrations, with the Kense of hearing this is capable of ready proof and the fact has been utihzed in the telephone. Hermann writes {Pliijsiului/jj, by Gamgee, p. 47-1), the excitation of the auditory nerve is most intense when it takes place thirty-three times a second, the excitation of the optic nerve is most in- tense when it takes place seventeen to eighteen times in a second: in what is called the " bruit musculaire " distinct and regular vibrations occur, their number in tetanus have been estimated at nineteen and a half per second. But besides these the phenomena of respiration and contrac- tion of the heart are instances of the kind, the heart of a frog or turtle, for example, continues to contract for hours in regular time after removal from the body, and even pieces of the muscular tissue separated from the muscular walls will continue regularly to contract. The periodicity ot many of the other functions probably is due to the action of the same law. In considering the effect of rhythmical excitants this fact may be remembered. It has been shown, that in the higher organisms the sensory impression docs not wholly terminate in an action, but in most instances, and more especially when the original impression has been strong, there remains behind, or persists, or is stored, a latent energy, which is liable to be callel forth in a future operation. Memory is a faculty founded upon, or arising out of, this per- sistence of a former sensation. A thing is remembered only when a previous impression is resuscitated by a new or present impression. The tendency of a present impression to recall an old impression depends upon what is called the association of ideas. All ideas arc associated — concrete ideas are in fact an association of abstract qualities; any abstract quality occurring in a new sensation recalls the same quality met with before, though differently associated ; a comparison of quality with quality, or idea with idea, forms the genesis of Judgments. The Association of Ideas depends of course on the faculty of memory, there would seem to be a natural cohesion between different ideas, so that a given idea will resuscitate another in a way recognizable as normal or natural. In disease this associa- tion is often disturbed and the current of ideas flows in an in- coherent manner. MENTAL PRODUCTS. I7 Memory, in tlio usual way in which the term is employed, would a23pear to be necessarily associated with consciousness. Memory is the remembrance of a thing felt. We can scarcely imagine we could remember an act, of which we had never been conscious. It seems unfortunate that the term unconscious memory should have been introduced, as it has been, to signify certain phenomena which are observed. The question, however, will be better deferred for the present ; it will be enough to state here, that Memory is much stronger, the more vivid or strong the original impression was, that is re-called. Hence a new sensa- tion proditces more effect than an old one. An action which is stale and performed in a perfunctory manner is soon forgotten. Next to a strong impression an often repeated impression pro- duces a greater degree of memory. As different persons are affected differently through the different sense organs, so the memory of one kind is easier than another in different indivi- duals. One remembers things seen, another what they hear, one man's memory is for form, colour, or for harmony, music, &c. The question of unconscious memory will be deferred till the faculty of consciousness has been considered, and which we will now proceed to do. Consciousness can scarcely be viewed as a product, and some consider it rather as a faculty ; but it may require a few lines of remark in this place, on account of its intrinsic importance, and the difference of the views which have been expressed con- cerning it. It will scarcely need a definition, for everyone is aware of its existence and operation in himself; the differences of opinion, which have arisen connected with it, have been owing chiefly to the different systems of mental science, by which it has been examined. Dr. Charlton Bastian in an article "On Consciousness " in the Journal of Mental Science, Jan. 1870, quotes the following passage from Sir W. Hamilton : — " Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, and philosophers in general, have regarded Consciousness not as a particular faculty but as the universal condition of intelligence. Keid on the contrary, following probably Hutchinson, and followed by Stewart, Eoyer- Collard, and others, has classed consciousness as a co-ordinato faculty with the other intellectual powers ; and as the particu- lar faculties have each their particular object, so the peculiar l8 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. object of consciousness is the operations of tlie othrr faculties themselves, to tiie exclusion of the objects about ^vhich these operations are conversant." Again Dr. Bastian, quoting from James Mill, writes, " If we are in any way sentient, that is, have any feelings whatsoever of a living creature, the word conscious is applicable to the feeler and consciousness to the feeling." These views are not identical ; they contain probably no- thing but what is true, yet scarcely make the question clear. Every thing of which we are conscious, of course must be a feeling, but does consciousness embrace every kind of feeling. In the former quotation the feeling is limited to a particular field of operation. The object of consciousness, according to the views of the authors named, are 'the other faculties,' hence, by way of illustration, as the external environment is the object of sensation — sensation is one of the objects of consciousness ; (an imperium in imperio) and therefore it diflfers from sensation according to this view. As regards the second quotation of Dr. Bastian, or that the word consciousness is applicable to the feeling of the feeler, it may be asked if feeling or sensation is nothing more or less than consciousness ? A sensation as it appears to me is the impres- sion produced by an external object, but consciousness is the impression or recognition of the sensation, and this is the mean- ing conveyed in the first quotation. In this there is this differ- ence between sensation and consciousness, the special senses give ITS one set of ideas, acquaint us with external objects, their presence and qualities, but consciousness makes us cognizant of the operations within us. Sensation depends therefore upon the special senses. Exter- nal objects are the objects of the special organs. Internal opera- tions the objects of conscioiisness. We may next ask how far it is a condition of intelligence — in two ways. In the first place our special senses may make us cognizant of the physical characters around us. Everything which we can see, hear, taste, smeU, or feel, can be made known to us tlu-ough these organs, but we have many other cognitions than those de- rived from special senses ; all the operations going on within us MENTAL PRODUCTS. IQ nre objects of consciousness and beyond the sphere of the special senses. Secondly, there is a wide difference between the cognitions obtained by special sense and through the operations going on in the mind. The ideas received by the special senses relate wholly to our environment, to external things and their relations. When we see an object, we receive the idea of the object external to ua. It is the same with the object of hearing, the sound is attributed to its producer, and even when we touch ourselves, we attribute the quality to ourselves as an object : but when any idea be- comes a part of our consciousness, it is viewed as belonging to the organism, and to a process connected with the organism. A sensation, it is true, becomes conscious as soon as we are conscious of it, at first it is only a sensory stimulus ; but when thus incorporated with consciousness it is a perception, and we do not any longer consider that it belongs to the external en- vironment, but to be an attribute of the internal organism ; it thus becomes an idea, and, as an idea, may remain as stored force. Various degrees of consciousness are recognizable. Authors speak of semi-consciousness, feeble- consciousness in all degrees, to a state of complete unconsciousness. Consciousness is a necessary part of several other mental faculties ; as. Volition — which is in other words motion with consciousness : Emotions — or sensations with consciousness : Memory — though of late a memory without consciousness has been spoken of. Though all the voluntary movements imply the presence of consciousness, it is well established that the quality of conscious- ness is in no way operative in producing the motion. Hence physiologists have been speaking of unconscious motions under the term automatic movements. And beyond this of late they have claimed other kinds of memory -as an unconscious memory, this term is to designate the tendency expressed by Lewes in the words " discharge along the line of least resistance," which means that many even very complex movements originally acquu'ed by such vivid im- pressions along the afferent track as to produce a vivid con- c2 20 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. sciousncss of the operation, may by constant repetition become less and less conscious in their performance, in other words be- come more and more mere reflex or spinal actions. Such as learning to read or write, to play the piano, walk, etc., all of which by practice become almost unconsciously performed. Gratiolet says — " Every organ has its own memory." Griesinger, as quoted by Lewes, says, " there is a memory for all tJie central organs including the spinal cord. There is one for reflex images as well as for sense images." This to my mind is only adding another difficulty to what is already considered intricate enough. Much opposed as one may be to new names however, this phenomenon would cer- tainly deserve a better name, and a more distinctive term to denote it, than that of unconscious memory. The tales that are told of actions performed unconsciously, from result of cerebral disease or cerebral sleep, are among the most wonderful histories of medical literature ; they are at the same time proofs that co-ordination in no way depends on con- sciousness. M. Trousseau (Lectures, translated by V. Bazire, p. 58) gives several examples of acts performed unconsciously by epileptics while in their attack, and which partook of the character of acts of Will, as : an architect who, when attacked by his disease, ran along the planks of a high scaffold, and this he did frequently and without ever falling; a musician, who in his attack continued to play his part in an overture ; a priest, who continued to incense the bishop from the thurible ; the president of a provincial tri- bunal who would leave his seat to go into the next room and perform some incongruous act, and return to continue his duty. Professor Huxley, in an address at the Meeting of the British Medical Association, August, 1874, related the case of a man who after receiving a shot which fractured his parietal bone, recovered, but was subject to attacks, in which he be- came, as it were, purely automatic for two or three days in every month. In this state he would appear neither to see or hear ; but if the materials for a cigarette were put in his way, he proceeded to fold them into proper form, but could not dis- tinguish if it were sawdust or tobacco which was given him. He could perform other equally comphcated acts, avoid obstruc- tions in walking, &c. MENTAL PRODUCTS. 21 Emotion. — The next mental product which we may consider ia Emotion. Emotion is closely allied to the products which we have been occupied upon — Sensation and Memory. The word Emotion is an abstract term, and is used to group together those effects which are produced on the organism from without, and are attended with pleasure or pain. The effect which any external object produces on the subject is one, — whole and concrete. It is by a mental process, that this single effect can be separated into the abstracts of Sensation, Emotion, Volition, &c. Emotion is so closely related to, as to be scarcely separable from. Sensation ; the ground for separating the one fi-om the other, is this quality of being attended with pleasure or pain. So much of the effect produced on the organism by any external object, which excites painful or pleasurable feelings is emotion. It has, therefore, reference entu-ely to the mental product, or the subjective effect, or the effect produced on the subject. "Whenever the mental phenomena," writes Lewes, "are considered as wholly within the organism, they are Sensations, Emotions, Impulse. When passing out they are Perceptions, Ideation and Volition." (Lewes, op. cit., vol. i.,p. 138, § 29). " We divide feelings into central, called Emotions, and the peripheral, commonly called Sensations," (Spencer's Principles of Psychology, vol. i., § 112). Thus the term Sensation has a somewhat more circumscribed meaning than Emotion. A Sensation is the product of an object in its concrete form, and is the concrete or primary effect produced on the Organism. Whereas Emotions may be pro- duced by ideas of high abstraction ; the highly moral actions, or valiant deeds described by poets, the contemplation of virtues or of the attributes of the Deity, give rise to Emotions; as the awe insph-ed by grandeur, antiquity, goodness, ideal beauty and the like, is Emotion, and which may eventually be traced back to Sensation as the origin ; yet certainly acts upon the mind, thi-ough ideas of the abstract kind. A very slight examination will convince us that nearly every idea is accompanied by some degree of emotional feeling, from that of the faintest kind, to an impression of the most disturbing or overwhelming description. 22 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. The following is the definition given by Prof. Bain — "Emotion is the name used to comprehend all that is under- Btood by feelings, states of feeling, pleasures, pains, passions, sentiments, affections." {Emotwns and Will, p. 1). " The fundamental proposition respecting Emotion generally may be expressed in these words : — The state of feeling, or the subjective consciousness which is known to each person by his own experience, is associated with a Jijfusive action over the system, through the medium of the cerebral hemispheres. In other words, the physical fact that accompanies and supports the mental act, without making or constituting that fact, is an agitation of all those bodily members more immediately allied with the brain by nervous communication," {Op. cit., p. 5). The Emotions have been differently enumerated; that ar- rangement of them given by Dugald Stewart is practical, and will serve to give exami^les of the chief vaiieties. He enu- merates five kinds: — 1. Appetites; 2. Desires; 3. Affections; 4. Moral Sense ; and 5. Self Love. All kinds of Emotions play an important role in Insanity. We may examine their agency and influence from two points of view : 1. From their kinds ; 2. From then* degree ; but which will be better deferred to the chapter on Mental Processes. Will, Volition. — The next product which claims our attention is the "Will, and their is no product of the mind of more im- portance to us in the study of mental disease than this. Will, voluntary motion, volition, free will, responsibility, and irresponsibility, all are connected with the mental faculty we call the Will. The question is treated by writers of all schools, but scarcely with the fulness which its imi)ortance from the medical point of view deserves. Firstly, it is obvious that the term is an abstract term ; and the idea of Will is an abstract idea. Plainly as this should appear to anyone who knows what an abstract idea is, it has been frequently overlooked. If an abstract, from what, we may ask, is it abstracted? Every time we use the term I, or lie, in connection with an active verb, we have iiresented to our minds an action and the cause or agent (I or he). This agent by abstraction is generalised into a power that initiates an action, but to attiibute to this power an independent existence MENTAL PRODUCTS. 23 and call it the "Will of the agent, is simply unTvarrantable ; by no niauo3uvrc can we separate the Will from the agent. But to go more fully into this question as it is of importance. In such a sentence as "I move," the meaning is intelligible, and it contains two ideas which we can separate in our minds, and place the one among a group of agents, and the other among a group of actions. We may say of the word "move" that it is of the same kind as walk, stand, run, &c., in fact it is a verb. With regard to the word "I," it is the symbol representing the agent ; and it may be classified with nouns in general, as far as its functions are concerned. By considering this '• I " in conjunction with other active verbs, as : I walk, I strike, I select, &c,, we become possessed with the general idea of something which plays a similar part in so many acts. This general idea, with such general power to act, is the power we call " Will." It denotes an attribute of the " I." It is purely, therefore, an abstract idea ; when used it signifies only an abstract power. It has abeady been pointed out that the word I, or the Ego, is also used sometimes to denote an abstract, and sometimes a concrete, idea. The word " Will" is thus clearly the name of an abstract idea and an attribute of the subject. It cannot in that sense be a separate and independent agent — an attribute except in con- junction with its object has no existence. Will, then, is an attribute of Mind, it is included in the term mental functions, it cannot exist separated from mind, as mind cannot exist out of body. We have seen that various func- tions — Emotions, Sensations, &c., are included as mental func- tions, and Will is in the same category. Will, Emotion, Intel- lect, are abstractions of the idea of mind, as Mind is of bodily functions. Mind, is merely the grouping of all these faculties, and as expressed by Dr. Maudsley in a passage already quoted, *' with regard to the manifold mental phenomena, by observation of them and abstraction from the particular, we get the general conception or essential idea of mind, an idea which has no more existence out of mind than any other idea or general term." Will is necessarily attended by consciousness, since it is one 24 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. of the factors of consciousness, and it may be defined in the words of Hermann : " The state of consciousness coincident with excitation of tlie central organ, by means of the centripetal fibre is called Sensation, and that coincident with excitation by means of the centrifugal fibre — Will." (Hermann, by Gamgee, p. 474). Mr. Spencer says, that the mistake that persons of confused conceptions make on the subject of Will "appears to consist in supposing that at each moment the Ego is something more than the composite state of consciousness which then exists," that is, for the passage is very epigrammatic, that in speaking of our- selves we mean our minds, and it is obvious in speaking of any voluntary performance this is eminently the meaning, though we are apt to imagine we may speak of ourselves — divorced, as it were, for a time from ourselves — that we are able to put off our composite state of consciousness, which is in fact our only existence, — that we put this aside and sit in judgment, or as outside observers, of what is going on in our mind ; whereas, what is going on is our mind, and is in fact all ourselves. " A man," says Mr. Spencer, " who after being subject to an impulse consisting of a gi'oup of psychical states performs a certain action, usually asserts that he determined to perform the action," this group of psychical states being inducements presenting themselves at the moment, or the result of former impressions, and that he performed the action under their im- pulse, "and," says Mr. Spencer, "by speakmg of himself as having been separate from the group of psychical states, consti- tuting the impulse, he falls into the error of supposing that it was not the impulse alone which determined the action." The man himself me]itally considered, or mentally constituted, was nothing more than these "psychical states." When a man speaks of himself as an agent in any voluntary act, he means his mental self ; for his state of mind is himself, and consti- tutes his Ego, or indivUlualtwss ; and, therefore, it is the same thing to say that he performed the act, and that the mental im- pulse performed it. " The entire group of psychical states which constituted the antecedent to the action, also constituted himself at that moment — constituted his psychical self, that is, as distinguished from his physical self. It is alike true that he MENTAL PRODUCTS. 2$ determined it, seeing that during its existence the impulse con- stituted his tlien state of consciousness, that is himself." l^i^rin- ciples of Pt^ijchuliKjij, First Edition, vol. i., p. G17, § 219). In this example here cited from Spencer, hy viewing a single act of Volition, the impulse at that particular moment was the man — the Ego, and all the relations that were present around the Ego, acting with the Ego, necessarily resulted in a certain way. The result was as necessary as that 2 and 2 make 4 ; the laws of nature being admitted to be at all thnes fixed. That we have, however, an idea that we are not subject to this fixed law in our various volitions, results from the fact that most frequently we do not judge this question on the one act in its concrete state, but we take a general and abstract view of our entire existence, and consider the problem with a general Ego, and placed in a general position of surrounding circum- stances : such a problem, i.e., of the variable Ego, in a variable position, gives of course but a variable and general result ; and the outcome is an abstract and general idea of a power of choice. In fine, the idea of "Will considered as a faculty of mind, must be always united with its subject, and that is the Ego. The Ego, Consciousness, Emotion, Will, are abstracts of one "whole conception, and as such, cannot separately determine any concrete act. Where the popular idea of a separate and distinct agent, called Will, has been derived, is from the metaphysical school — a school which was the most popular during a previous genera- tion, and whose tenets still linger in the minds of many, and which, as pointed out by Comte, invented the hypothesis of an intermediate power, as "nature, life, vital principle, as the ac- tive causes of the phenomena of the universe." It was this source of error which led Dr. Carpenter to quote Cardinal Manning, and to state his unhesitating acquiescence : " That there is (in man) still another faculty — and more than this, another distinct ngent, distinct from the thinking brain." (Car- penter, Mental Phyniology, p. G). This is exactly the error, I fancy, to which Mr. Spencer alludes, when he wrote about men of confused mind. If such a faculty, however, could be proved to exist in the sense described by Dr. Carpenter, it would behove us to study it. 26 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. But if we arc to consider tlie Will a distinct agent, why are we not to consider other abstract faculties as Emotions, Intel- lect, Sensation, as separate agents, or indeed why stop at such, and not include all abstract ideas ? There is another product of mind, or resultant of the mental functions, which it will be as well to allude to, •' Belief." This of course is largely discussed in all works on Mental Philosophy, and finds an important place in all treatises on Logic. It has special relation to our studies, though perhaps from a dififerent point of view from that on which the works alluded to discuss the question. The word "Belief," like most others in common use, is em- ploj^ed in a very loose manner in ordinary writings. Thus it is used to express both a doubt and a certainty ; in the expression "I am not sure, but I believe so," it expresses uncertainty, though in works on Logic it signifies usually a " Creed." Ori- ginally, or etymologically, however, the term meant a per- suasion of truth, rather than an absolute certainty ; of fact. Locke says, " Belief is the assent to any proposition not made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the pro- poser." This is certainly one phase of the matter. It is in this sense in which it is chieflj' of interest to us as pathologists. The various schools of philosophy treat of it, and have of course their special views on the subject. Before proceeding to examine any of these it will be as well to note some of the chief characteristics of Behef. Firstly. BeUef is not a voluntary act, we cannot believe or disbelieve as we choose ; though the feelings may have weight in biasing opinion they cannot control it. Secondly. Belief does not depend absolutely on truth. Philosophers have examined and have had discussions at great length on a ' basis of certitude' ; though what a man believes is what he judges to be true, this belief is no test of the truth of any proposition. The agreement of the belief of many, the con- sensus of opinion of many, may produce a great degree of pro- bability of the truth, but can go no farther than probability. It is beyond a doubt, that dififerent men truly and firmly beheve in very opposite propositions. MENTAL PRODUCTS. 27 We are more concerned here on the state of mind called belief than on how it is produced. Thirdly. A belief, to be a belief, must be a certitude to the believer. Fourthly. As already stated, certitude, or the truth of a pro- position, has been based by one school, upon the ultimate appeal to feeling or sensation, and to an inherent faculty of the mind by another. It must be allowed that feeling, or the direct evidence of the senses, is often at first view deceptive, and until it is veri- fied, as particularly insisted upon by Lewes ; as an example, the relative movements of the Earth and Sun may be quoted, as well as various other illusions of the senses. While as to inherent evidence of certitude, as insisted upon by Kant in what he calls the a priori judgments, these are often disturbed in disease. The axiom, for example, " I exist, there- fore I am," may be singularly disturbed by insanity. One cannot refrain from remarking here, that if these innate and funda- mental beliefs are independent of the organism, and their origin, as Kant maintains, quite anterior to it, it is difficult to under- stand how a disease of the organism can overturn them. Fifthly. Beliefs are by no means confined to the direct sensa- tions or concretes ; on the contrary our belief in abstract pro- positions is equally strong. It is claimed indeed for the abstract the greater power of mducing belief, this is due to the greater exactness of abstract propositions, and the elimination of dis- turbing conceptions on them. Such an abstract proposition as all A is A, which is called an identical proposition, produces absolute belief by the force of its high abstract nature, or the conciseness to which the terms are reduced. Lastly it must be granted that in the ordinary meaning of the word, belief admits of several degrees from the strongest convic- tion of certitude to a degree of probability. There is no doubt that the facility of belief exists in different degrees in different individuals. This is a necessary result of the different amount of experience and knowledge in different individuals ; the simpler the minds, the few^er the number of stored observations and judgments, the quicker is a behef ar- rived at, and the firmer is it held. 23 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. In the ultimate analysis of the foundation of belief, we come to that primitive reaction between the environment and the organism, in other words — to sensations, as held by the positive school. For though there may be a fallacy in first impressions made by an object, and an illusion of the particular sense, while the wrong impression is in operation, belief exists— though it be a belief of error ; and belief in error, may be, as all history shows, as strong as in truths. Belief may be corrected, reviewed, or modified, by subsequent sensation, or by the memories of pre- vious sensation, but that does not alter the fact that belief rests primarily on sensation — in other terms on Feeling. Jmafjination has been treated by some as a separate faculty or power, but considered from the point of view which has been pursued in all the previous pages, it must be held to be simply an abstract product. We gi-oup all phenomena under the word mind, and we may on the other hand separate various parts of the whole by the process of abstraction, and one set of pheno- mena observed — we call imagination.* Those who would treat it as a power or an active principle, would endow it with a creative power for which there is no warranty. If we examine any idea which is supposed to be due to this power, that is to the Imagination, and which idea has characteristics, which are easily recognised and grouped, we shall find it simply an abstraction, and the process of its for- mation appears to depend wholly upon the process which we have alluded to in speaking of the association of ideas. The new idea, however high its imaginative character, will be seen to be simply a result of one impi-ession upon a previous or stored impression, which is called forth by association and com- parison. However grand or highly poetical the new idea is, it will be found to be simply a sensation from some physical object which calling up a previous sensation, forms with it a new combination, and more often than not, the new idea is only the expression of a simple association of ideas. • The business of conception says Dugald Stewart is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. But we have also a power of modifying our conceptions by conibiniDg the parts ol different uncs, so as to form nevr wholes of our own creation. MENTAL PRODUCTS. 29 Poetical expressions are chiefly the expression of similes. No doubt one mind is more readily impi-essed with one phase of natural objects than with another. Thus one man, as Bacon re- marks, is occupied with likenesses and another with the differ- ences. Some men are impressed by magnitude, others with the minutiae. Imagination is thus not occupied with a present sensation, but with the secondary result which a sensation calls forth. It de- pends upon memory, it is wholly an abstract idea having no j)hysical object. This will readily be seen by an example ; as a poetical example due to pure Imagination, the following from Shelley to a lady may be cited : — " As the moon's soft splendour O'er the faint cold starlight of heaven Is thrown, So thy voice most tender To the string without soul has given Its Own, &c " The likening of the charm w^hich the human voice gave to the mstrument, to the effect which the moon sheds over the cold starlight, is simply the comparison of two impressions. AH having originally a physical origin, the poetry probably con- sists in the description of the resemblance of the two emo- tions. These emotions may not be associated at first in every mind, individual minds are differently sensitive, still every one can trace the natural association of the emotions, produced by these two sensations, the comparison of the sensation of sight to that of hearing, when once put into a formula of words. As soon as ihese ideas are associated for ns, their connexion is realised and they produce in us an emotion of pleasure or satisfaction, and new associations give us a wider vieAV of nature and enlarge our spheres of intellect. The point however to be insisted upon is, that the results which are called imaginative ideas, are not due to any independent agent or faculty, but the word Imagination includes only a j)ar- ticular kind of abstract idea, whicli is the product of one idea operatmg upon another. In insanity many of the ideas expressed m'glit, and indeed have been attributed to disordered imagina- tion, it would be more correct to say they were due to abnormal 30 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. ussociatiou of ideas. SomotirncR idt-iis in the insane exhibit merely an unusual association, that is that the stored idea which is aroused by a sensation, appears to a sane person to have no natural connexion with the excitant — it is incongi'uous ; to us the mind of the patient is simply wandering, or it may be called incoherent. A still greater abnormal condition of mind is observed in some when every word seems disconnected. Judgment. The next mental product which we have to mention is "Judgment." This subject has some important bearings from our point, owing to the various doctrmes that have prevailed in the different schools of philosophy in regard to it. More espe- cially is it of interest in relation to the question of Innate Ideas. It is said that the doctrine of the independent faculty of judgment is still the most accepted in Germany and the meta- physical school generally, and even in this country it prevails as one of the legacies of metaphysics. If the power of judgment is a separate faculty of the mind, it would of course be of primary importance to the alienist phy- sician to examine it. The definition of the word judgment is thus given by Lewes {op. cit., vol. ii., p. 141) : — " The operation named Judg- ment has a much more extensive sphere than the text-books assign to it. Judgment is inclusion, or grouping. The operation is one which connects an action with a feeling (more accurately one feeling with another) and the ordinary logical process of connecting a predicate with a subject is but a particular mode of this operation." That is, though what is technically called a Judgment, is simply predication, or the assertion that some- thing is this or that, yet according to Mr. Lcwcs, the process is equally concerned with Emotions or Perception, as well as to Ideas, Thoughts, or to Judgments or Conception. When con- cerned with Perception and Emotion he prefers the term " The Logic of Feeling," and when concerned with Conception " The Logic of Signs." According to most writers, a judgment is the outcome of a proposition, but the words judgment and proposition have been used indiscriminately (Mill's Logic, vol. i., chap. v.). When, for example, two ideas or conceptions are compared, as when we MENTAL PRODUCTS. 3I say gold is yellow. Here a process takes place in our minds — by which two ideas, namely that of yellowness and that of gold, are brought together, and the result viz., that gold is yellow is a judgment. It is said that yellowness is predicated of gold — and the one is said to be predicate of the other. It is not, however, necessary that either of the elements, the subject, or the predicate, should be a material object nor the symbol of it, in fact the things compared are the ideas produced by objects, and they inay be abstract and very complex ideas. But the judgment, Mill says, has always reference to the things, and not to our conception of them. The process it will be seen is for the purpose of grouping — or inclusion. The example, gold is yellow, groups or includes gold among yellow objects. The following phrase " the breeze which whispers through the lime trees is peculiarly agreeable to the feeHugs of a hot and wearied pedestrian," is equally a proposi- tion in which one feeling is predicated of an action and the whole is also a judgment, though the subject— that is the particular sort of breeze, and the predicate or the condition produced in a x^ai'ti- cular kind of individual, are somewhat complex. In as much as a judgment is grouping, in other words placing the object operated on into a group of resembling objects, the judgment is the expression of the quality and the predicate is the name of a quality, consequently, the judgment is an abstract idea ; and that whether the result has reference to an object or to a feeUug or emotion. Judgment too is not confined to a single increment of time, but usually it relates to the past, or to the future, it compares previous feeling with the present, or with still prior feeling, and in this it differs from a mere definition. When we come to speak of the processes or the dynamics of mind, the subject will be further discussed from the point of view of the Metaphysical school. Section II. PEOCESSES. Development of iriirl — Tlpflex acts, primitive effect in movement— Organs un- differentiiiteJ— {Jrailu.il Evolution of Special Orffanss; for Sense; for FiOco- motion — Appearance of Neural Appnr:itu8 — (Jenesis <>f Choice — ReHex Actions of Simple Kiii"l — Coinpouiiil R.'H.'X Actions — Instincl — Atqiiired Actions — Ek'olution nf Memory — Persistence ot Sensory linpn-spions — Emotions — Sto'cd Impressions and Ili-manents; tlieir influence — Judfjment; Kantian aud ilutapliysical Doctriues— Will— Keaponaibility— Cliaructer — Ecsuine. Hitherto the sul»jecfc treated has related to a consideration of the nature of the chief products of mind — this may be called the statics of mind ; we will next consider the processes on which these products depend, or the dynamics of mind. This portion of the subject admits of two divisions. In the first portion of the following pages we will examine the genesis of mind, aud in the second part the mechanism on which the mental functions depend. Pakt r. — On the Deyelopitent of Mind. Notwithstanding a fear that it may be thought that many of the facts about to be adduced are very trite and elementary, yet for the sake of tracing the genesis of mind from its earliest manifestations, it will be nccessai'y to commence with such. The first indication of the reaction between the external, or what is called the inorgnnic portion of creation, aud the organic or living animal, is in a movement of the latter. This simple effect of movement does not vary greatly from what is seen to occur in the action between certain agents wholly inorganic ; as in the expansion of inorganic bodies by heat, say for example the movement of the mercury in the thermometer; or from what occurs in the transference of motion from a moving body to a similar body at rest. And indeed there would seem to be no distinct line of demar- MENTAL PROCESSES. 33 cation between the movement caused by the reaction of ex- ternal and physical agents upon the organism, and that between two inorganic bodies, anymore than there is in nature between what is organic and what is inorganic. This, however, is our starting point in tracing the processes of mind, an animal is acted upon by an external agent of some kind and a motion follows. The polypes may be cited as an ex- ample. When anything, whether fit for the animal's nutrition or not, floats into the vicinity of the tentacles of the polype, these close around it, and it is digested or rejected if not digestible. A second stage in ascending the scale of creation is to be observed when the animal is itself more composite, when it con- sists of parts symmetrically arranged as in the radiata. In these may be seen rudimentary organs of sense, — points which are believed to be more sensitive, and on which the action of ex- ternal agents is greater, the consequence of which is simply, that the animal thus endowed is more easily influenced. The influ- ence remains of the same general character, we must call it sensation, without defining it either as tactile, visual, or other kind of impression ; we are of course not in the position to say whether this effect, this sensation, approaches more to one kind of special sense or another, there is this evidence only — that what produces in us that which we call light, and what we experience by actual contact with a solid, have more effect on the lower organisms than sounds or odours. In these compound animals consisting of several distinct parts we observe a decided spreading of the local excitant to the surrounding parts. The influence at first affects the parts adjacent. As we ascend the scale of nature we perceive that the local irritant extends also to the distant organs ; and we can trace distinct lines of nerves, by which we know such in- fluence can be propagated. So far, we are speaking of but very uncomplex organisms. Natural history would afford innumerable grades of development, each giving more and more complex functions and endowments. Next to this low form of nerve function, it will suffice to instance the tribe of animals, who besides having organs in con- nection with each other, but all endowed with the same faculties, have distinct organs for separate functions. There is clearly 34 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. no esseutial diti'ereuce between the act of seizing a floating object by the polype, and the seizing of a simihii* object by tentacles placed around an oral opening, and conveying it into the special organ for digestion, or a stomach as may be seen in Bryozoa, etc. Such tentacles for seizing the object or prey are clearly rudi- mentary arms ; and since in the lower tribes, as in the jelly-fish, such organs as well as seizing the prey act as paddles or loco- motive organs, there can be little difference in principle be- tween these and the limbs of some higher animals which serve entirely for locomotion. The organs of locomotion, which in the lowest, are mere cilia lashing the water in which the animal floats, move the animal simply in an undefined direction ; but when the visual organs are developed, there is a means of bring- ing the movements under the control of a common principle of action. In all the above examples we recognize a movement in obedience to a direct excitant from the surroundings; in the primitive state the impulse of the external irritant is ex- pended in the immediate neighbourhood of the point of contact, in the more complex it is propagated to a wider sphere. Thus we have the first rudiments of a nervous system, and of a nerve current. It may be as well to stop here and ask ourselves how far there is yet shown anything approaching mind, there is nothing ap- parently like choice, but it is evident that all that is received into these rudimentary stomachs is not digested. There is thus a selection made by some part of the organism, and this kind of selection is not widely difi'erent from that which is shown by the caterpillar, which affects one kind of leaf rather than another. We may cite as example of the next degree, that which we observe in the larvro of moths or butterflies; the egg is in the first place deposited upon a particular Icind of leaf, immedi- ately the egg is hatched, the young larva commences to feed upon the leaf; thus far the event is not different from the seizure of the floating particles by the polype or any of the zoophytes ; but if we move the larva on to a different kind of leaf the animal no longer eats. Children who rear silk worms obtain if possible the mulberry leaf ; if this is not procurable they substitute the lettuce leaf and the worm wiU feed on this ; but if a leaf of some other species is offered the animal refuses MENTAL PROCESSES. 35 it. Here we have decidedly an instance of selection or choice. On closely examining the details of this experiment it is clear that the result is due to the operation of two agents, the animal is ready to eat, but it must he excited thereto by its proper excitant or stimulant. We may be prone to attribute all the selection to the animal, but this is clearly a fallacy, and one arising from want of a due examination of all the phenomena. In choosing, there must be the two agents, not only a chooser, but a thing chosen, and for the thing to be chosen it must excite the animal in a given way, it must be possessed of quaUties that will attract the animal. In this way for the consummation of a choice, the two agents must operate, and the act forms no ex- ception to the rule of the reaction between the animal and its environment, or in the words of Mr. Spencer : — " Manifestly, if there is an entire absence of adaptation be- tween its acts and surrounding circumstances, the animal must quickly cease to live, and if it exhibits any adaptation, it can do so only in virtue of the fact that certain impressions made upon it call forth one kind of action, while others call forth another kind." (Sx3encer, Principles of Psychology). There is in the organisms an innate capability of acting thus or thus accord- ing to the nature of the stimulus. There are other faculties in this larva which are equally excited, the animal moves in regular manner to reach its food and its locomotion is very symmetrical and complex. It is not only directed by its faculties of taste, its nascent emotion of hunger, but its movements are in a proper dkec- tion. The animal consists of distinct parts, some for directing its movement, others for conveying, and storing, and digest- ing its nutriment within its body. So that we find organs for seeing or other special sense located in one point, organs for locomotion in another, and these are brought into an unison of action by a distinct nervous system. The same cause which in- cited the animal to eat, excites it to move though the result is brought abqut by more complex mechanism. Now this very animal in process of time and development becomes an animal with still greater and higher faculties, for the insect world as a rule has a larval stage. The pupa becomes a perfect insect and in some insects much d2 36 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. higher faculties are discoverable — in the aut and the bee for example. We must admit from the experiments and observa- tions of naturalists, that these animals not only show mental attributes in selecting and procuring food, but, as we are told, they learn to store it, they are prepared to protect it, and there is even a division of labour among their tribes. These very wonderful tales, if admitted, would prove that nearly all the higher attributes called mental, as memory, deduction, foresight, contrivance or actual reasoning faculty, may be developed in a very simple organism ; but it is true that there is no means of verifying the actual identity of these functions in the insect with those in ourselves. And is it not merely an approach and not an identity of functions ? There is a difference which must not be lost sight of between the actions, however comphcated, of the lower kind of animals and those of the higher as in man. Formerly, but without any very stable reason, one kind was ascribed to Instinct and the other to Keason. Instinct was assigned to the lower tribes which could not be allowed to i^ossess a faculty of Reason without shock- ing the prejudices of mankind. A close examination does not show that there is anything in the quality of the act, which can distinguish between acts of reason and instinct, for the act itself is perfoi*med as perfectly and completely as any act of an iuteUi- gent and thinking man. We may express this in other terms and say that the result which is the outcome of a given animal placed in a given posi- tion, is itself a necessary result. If we admit the intelligence of the ant to the full extent claimed, there is scarcely a mental faculty, under whatever divi- sion of the faculties we like to make, that has not its analogue, or prefigurement in these animals. Senses, Intellect, Will, and Emotion, must be allowed to them, as well as Memory and Consciousness. But it may bo admitted that the problem cannot be so well examined in the insect life, and observations with the mammahans would be more convincing. However, in this early development we have at least this addition — the movements of the animal in a concerted direction, and this excited by a complex interaction between the animal and its surroundings. We have examples, MENTAL PROCESSES. 37 of the use of the special sense of sight and perhaps of smell. We have no satisfactory foundation for attributing to insects anything more than a very rudimentary degree of consciousness, and we cannot demonstrate the faculty of memory. In the most primitive phase of excited actions, as they are called, in which we readily observe the motion to follow immedi- ately on the action of an excitant, and in which the resulting movement is of the simplest character, we have no difficulty iji admitting the result to be due to reflex action ; there is nothing in the character of the more complex actions cited of the insects, to remove them from the category of excited move- ments. If we observe the first movements of some vertebrate animals it must be admitted that they also are the result of the same dual action. A duck just hatched rushes to the water, it swims and exercises all its limbs, chases the insect, turns and performs complex muscular movements, in whatever du'ection it appears to will. We see in such phenomena the commencement of the evolution of those actions called volun- tary. Closely scrutinized these actions differ only from other excited actions in being of more complex character. In the above cases, however, there is yet no evidence of the faculty of memory. This faculty evidently exists in some birds as in the parrot ; but it is obvious that the first act of the duckling is not due to memory in any way, — the bird can have no recollec- tion of being in a similar position ; in it at least it is an excited action, and must be due moreover to a particular formation of the organism ; all ducks in all times and places perform the same acts, and the same circumstances will continue to produce the same results. We may cite the above facts as proving the same law of the interaction of the environment and the organism, and as proof that many acts, which have apparently aU the characteristics of contrived or devised actions, are the result of the law of reflex action, or the necessary outcome of the environment and the organism ; and such is the cause for almost every habit in the lower animals. It is seen in the various propensities of tribes of animals, as the disposition to point in one kind of dog, to set in another ; to watch and lay wait, and to torment its captured prey in the cat ; and which propensities are alike in all in- 38 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. dividuals of the same class and variety. We may even witness the same results in the propensities exhibited by children, who are found to follow certain modes of play and to have disposi- tions for like i^ropensities in all cHmes, in savage as well as civiHzed hfc — and particularly to show an early inclination to imitation, exliibitiug as Mr. Lewes would say, " organised ten- dencies to particular actions." These actions which are usually called instincts show great uniformity of character, though under certain influences, they occasionally present slight variations in detail, and this more and more as the organism visibly shows greater and more com- plex development. Since, however, they clearly depend upon the original organisation for the particular features, they must be admitted to be, in some sense, innate. These instinctive actions give no intellectual superiority to the individual over its fellows, though in their performance the ac- tions themselves, m well observed instances, are evidently objects of consciousness ; still they do not depend in any way on con- sciousness, nor are they either the result of memory, nor, as far as we can i^erceive, do they leave behind a memory, in the usual signification of that word. These faculties which must be considered mental, equally as those of higher kind, have this peculiarity besides their tribal quality or hereditary character ; that they are perfect from their first manifestations, in other words do not require to be learnt nor are they performed more readily by practice. The ants, the bees, and the beavers of to-da}', go through the same perform- ances as their ancestors of old ; their progeny will repeat what they are doing now. Acquired Acts. — But we next meet with another plienomenon, which is faintly exhibited in some of the lower forms of verte- brata, such as actions which are acquired or learnt by the par- ticular animal, and not being born with the animal are not transmitted or transmissible to then* offspring. Birds have been taught to perform certain motor evolutions and to imitate certain sounds by instruction. Besides those movements which are common to the particular animal or the Bong which is the natural one of the species, new combinations are engrafted ah initio upon the animal, and their motor organs acquu-e a wider range of action. MENTAL PROCESSES. 39 It is important to note that this is only accoini)lished after long and frequent repetition. The bird can only acquire a new song or a new action after much pains hestowed, but the higher we ascend in the scale the more easily is the new action acquu-ed. In the dog or the elephant, the power of learning is greater, and in man it is in its highest perfection. The power of acquiring actions follows in the inverse ratio of the greatest perfection of the instincts. In the human infant the instincts are the fewest, and the motor functions at first at the lowest state of perfection. But in the human infant the pro- pensity is innate or the tendency of the race may exist, but the mechanism is not in a state to carry out the actions. We must place in similar category the natural tastes, the appetites, and even many higher qualities, or natural gifts, with which we find every man more or less endowed and which each in- herits. It is, however, only the ability to perform and not the skill to execute, which is innate ; this results and doubtless de- pends on particular development of the organism. New func- tions require even some degree of cultivation to perfect them, and are intermediate and form a transition from purely in- stinctive acts to the acts of reason or the higher mental attri- butes. These acts of Eeason, which are found in a limited degree in very many other animals besides man, but which are by far in the most perfect condition in man, seem to exist in exact ratio to the degree of development of the cerebral hemispheres, and have in fact an anatomical basis. In connection with them there may be certain other faculties resembling them, though it is doubt- ful to what extent they exist in those animals which are dependent upon what ar3 called instincts. The anatomical facts on which both depend, however, have all this basis, this law — the law of afferent excitement and efferent motion ; for as the action in the lowest kind of function depends upon the reaction of the environ- ment and the organism, which in the simplest form of ani- mal life is abundantly evident, so also does each variation of it upward. Man himself is acted upon from without, it is the environments which affect him through his special senses, pro- ducing sensation and all the other train of mental phenomena ; 40 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. but in him there is a more complex machinery and a more com- plicated function. The fact that the functions are only imperfectly performed in man at birth depends, however, rather upon the stage of growth at which birth takes place ; the infant has all the me- chanism in an imperfect condition, no new or fresh faculty is needed ; but none of the functions are perfectly performed until the organism has arrived at its perfect growth. Every animal is prone to perform certain actions in prefer- ence to certain other actions ; each kind has its special kind of acts, and even the same kind of act is performed differently in different species. The primitive actions of all animals are in connection with the seizing of their prey ; the mode of seizure depends on the organism; the animal is provided with organs of sense for finding, organs of locomotion for approacliing, and organs of prehension for seizing the prey, and these organs are more and more special as we ascend the scale of animal life; but still the parlicular mode in each animal differs. One animal is chiefly aided by its organs of special sense — the sight and the scent, one captures its prey by its swiftness of pursuit, another Hes ui wait, one which feeds on vegetables reaches its food by a special formation of diflerent kind ; but all, whatever mode is adopted and whatever organism is applied, are impelled by a desire. This desire is special, in one it is for vegetable, in an- other for flesh; in one herbage, another fruit; in one for insects, another for fish, another birds, &c. In other words each organ- ism has as well as its special organs, its special desires, its special fitness, or its choice ; and such, it may be allowed, are innate, as they dejDend on the special endowment of the organism : i.e. the animal is directed or impelled to one or other kind of food, according to the efi'ect which one or other kind of food produces on the animal. The animal is pleasurably excited by one kind of food and unpleasantly or painfully affected by another kind, and pleasure and pain are terms used to signify the sum of the effects pro- duced by different excitants of whatever kind, upon the organism. The efi'ect thus produced is Emotion. For the production of emotion, however, what is called con- Bciousness is essential, and for consciousness to exist the im- MENTAL PROCESSES. 4I pressiou produced by the excitant must have some degree of persistence. The -persistence of an impression over a distinct interval of time is an important property in mental processes — the mechanism on which it depends will be spoken of hereafter. It is a fact founded on pure observation, and is as uncontrovertible as any other fact derived from a similar source. If every impression derived from one of our special senses — if what we saw, immediately faded as an object passing a mirror, mind could scarcely be said to exist : this property, therefore, is a factor in all mental processes ; without it every act would simply be a reflex act, that is to say, the whole force produced by an object would be expended in a motion. But observation and the simplest introspection of ourselves prove to us that when we see any object we recognise it as a concrete, and im- mediately compare it with some object previously seen — we must do this to name it. It is clear, therefore, that some influence of former impression had remained with us. The persistence of the impression is, therefore, an important faculty on which much depends ; as, for example, all conscious acts. Emotion, Memory, and those acts attributed to Will. As a very familiar example of the operation and property of this persistence may be cited that which occurs when an artist draws from nature — when he transfers the lines from the object to his paper : and in many instances this is not done immediately, but often after a very considerable interval of time : or when a musician returning from a concert continues to hear the airs passing through his mind, sometimes even to his annoyance. Without such persistence there could be no comparison of present impressions with the past, in fact, there could be no store of knowledge of any kind. Emotion. There remains the fact that each impression, and the recollection of it, gives rise to pleasure or pain ; m other words, to emotional feehngs of some kind, and the co-operation of such emotional feelings of past and present impressions de- termines often the direction of the resulting acts of life. In some acts, especially the more simple, the pain or pleasure are felt to give a preponderance to the direction into which the action shall tend, but in the more complex cases it may not be so 42 LECTURES O.N MENTAL DISEASE. easy to recognize all the stages, by whicli the result is ultimately reached. It uncloubteiUy happens that the Emotions are more distinctly called forth from a direct sensation, or by a concrete than by an abstract idea. The higher the abstract the less vividly does it produce emotion ; and such abstracts as mathematical prob- lems are quite free from emotional feeling. Even a description or narration of sensations and actions, which can be realised, causes emotion. Dramatic ^^Titing, or any narration to be suc- cessful should deal with facts in the concrete ; sermons by very learned men often fail to interest, by dealing almost entirely in abstractions ; such preachers speak of sin in the abstract sense, instead of instancing some act which is sinful. In the higher abstract reasonings — in judgments properly so called — the agency of pleasure or pain forms but a minor part, and should, indeed, be wholly inoperative, but into which it often intrudes itself. In deciding upon any course of action for oneself, of course emotional feelings will be a factor in forming a conclusion, but the man who is the most able to suppress (inhibit) emotion has the best judicial mind. Such a condition of mind it was the object of the Stoics to cultivate. To accomplish such a mastery of the emotional feelings requkes a mind of power. It is, however, to be acquired by constant cultivation, and a large experience or a large store of observation. The young, and women as a rule, are less able to accomphsh such mastery. I have said that the ultimate action of a man takes the course on which the preponderance of emotions weighs, there is httle doubt that an impulse to act in a particular direction may be suppressed. Some writers appear to believe that this alteration of the former impulse is due to an " inhibition." Such inhibition would seem with them to be an active process, — an action to ar- rest the first impulse. I have always viewed the result to be, and I beheve this is the view of former writers, that the first impulse is overpowered by a second. We see, in fact, in certain cases an intermediate effect (hesitation) to be produced. Such at all events is felt, in coming to any conclusion, or opinion, or judg- ment. The question of inhibitory centres will be alluded to in the sequel. MENTAL PROCESSES. 43 There remains the question why some emotions are painful and some pleasurable, how does an excitant cause one feeling at one time and another at another. The recollection of any event which was followed by painful cu'cumstances may produce a painful feeling when any reference to the same event occurs through the association of ideas ; but in what does the pain or pleasure consist ? How does this re- realization in the mind act upon the system ? What is the process by which pleasurable or painful effects are produced ? The remembrance of a sad event would be a cause of remote kind, the question here is what is the proximate cause or the organic condition at the basis of these feehngs. Emotion, says Professor Bain, is invariably associated with a " diffusive action over the system." While there is this tendency for a sensation (impression on the sensory organs) to terminate in a motor act, in many instances such motor act is more or less suppressed, as by a counter- action in any opposite direc- tion, or by inhibition according to some views, yet there will be in every case some outgoing effect on the motor or glandular apparatus. If the excitant be too powerful for the inhibitory mechanism there will be some manifestation of emotion, from merely what Professor Bain calls a diffusive action to a more violent outbreak of laughter or crying. Sometimes the efferent may be expended in action of the capillaries or heart, causing blushing, palpitation, or pallor, or arrest of the heart, or evacu- ation of the bladder, etc., etc. For an excitant to produce pleasurable feelings it must be regulated in its force. There is a degree to which an excitant produces pleasure, and beyond which the same excitation will produce pain. Another thing requisite to give rise to pleasura- ble emotions appears to be a certain diversity in the sensations aroused, that while a repetition of the same sensation which is in fact a monotony, produces a feeling of sadness, duluess, and such depressant emotions, a rapid change of effect produces a liveliness, joyfulness, and pleasurable ideas, accompanied with a pleasurable bodily effect. A changing scene in a landscape, a gradual and flowing sound, give rise to a sense of enjoyment, accompanied with a gentle play in the muscles concerned in ex- pression, facial or bodily ; while sudden change or break in a con- 44 LECTUKES ON MENTAL DISEASE. nected flow of ideas produces the violent and convulsive move- ments of laugliter, as in the effects of epif^'rams, riddles, and such jeiix lie muts. In analysing any witticism it will be seen, as often pointed out, that to produce the effect of mirth, and laughter, it is necessary in the recital of the stcry to lead the hearer's mind along a beaten track of ideas, and suddenly, un- expectedly, and abruptly to turn the whole current of thought into an opposite channel ; the change must be complete and sud- den as in the last word of the epigi'am — brevity is the soul of wit. Pleasurable fcehngs therefore clearly require variation in the current of ideas — these ideas may be derived direct from sensa- tion, as in viewing a scene of varied character or listening to music of varying notes, etc., or they may be produced by the description in words. There is this proviso, however, connected with the production of pleasure or pain, that events of tragi- cal character are often sudden and abrupt and produce pain. When this is the case, it is owing not only to a continuance of impressions in one line, but to the degree of the excitant, for even too great pleasure of all kinds borders on the painful, and may be carried to an extent to become actually so. So when the excitant of a tragical character occurs, the excitant is pain- ful from its intensity, and also from sympathy which is called forth in our own systems — leading us almost to reahze the uijury to ourselves, such at least is the effect in witnessing some tragi- cal event. But some scenes even if tragical, have an element of pleasure in them or people would not resort to theatres to witness them as they do. It is not meant here that pleasures and pains are mere degrees in a variety of successive sensations. The different kinds of emotion called forth, and which depend upon the nature of the external object which causes it, have some effect, thus the pleasure of music, of poetic imagination, of a land- scape, of sculptures, produce different feelings ; yet the pleasure derived from either requires some kind of change. It is clear thus that to produce a feeling of pleasure a varia- tion in ideas is essential ; if the variety is abrupt, the effect is abrupt, if the variation flows from one change to another, the mind is pleased in a less active manner, and when one can almost MENTAL PROCESSES. 45 anticipate the coming tnrn in thought, it gratifies and even soothes. In Hstcning to a piece of famihar music, not too fre- quently repeated, the mind is carried through the change in a way which is even more pleasurable, because more soothing, than to listen to a new and unknown melody : but when the same has been heard so often as to produce no surprise on the mind, or when a joke, is told so often as no longer to cause unexpected variation of ideas, they cease to produce the same effect ; thus the actor ceases to laugh at the jokes he makes, and the musician to care to repeat his music ; by the repetition of the same words many times, as a priest with his rosary, the process becomes at last monotonous, or automatic, and causes either depression or no feeling at all. The power of external agents to act upon the organism in a way to produce pleasure or pain becomes, at least, a powerful agency in directing all actions. If one need not go so far as to assert that everything in a man's life and conduct depends upon the attributes of pleasure and pain, yet undoubtedly these are important factors in all human actions, including all kind of effects, and by no means limiting them to what are specially dis- tinguished as psychical. Jtidcpnent. — On no question connected with mental philosophy are the differences of opinion wider apart than on Judgment. From the positivist point of view, the matter seems simple enough, the difficulties are connected with the doctrines of the metaphysicians. There is one source of confusion, however, which has in some way crept in among the most rigid positivists. It is this that ideas are spoken of as something more than sen- sations. Of course there is a distinction in the meaning of these words, but there is not therefore a separate existence for both, an idea is an abstract term only and its concrete is feehng or sensation, whichever word best expresses the impression on the organism made by an object: by making them two things we are interposing another step or stage in what seems a straitforward process. This process is, that the external object affects the organism producing an impression, this is the first axiom on which we have been going, and secondly that the impression there produced may be exliausted entirely in a motor act, or only partially used, 46 LF.CTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. jiml tliiis there is a remanent of enerj^y ; what is left we may call a sensation or an idea, but it is still part of and identical in miture with the new impression. If it be more convenient or clear to anyone to call it an idea there can be no objection, pro- vided he does not exalt it into a faculty, power or agent. The primary action produces an impression in the concrete. This is named, and persists. By the law of association of ideas (that is, of impressions), if another object presents itself, allied to it in time or space, the second idea awaking the first, the two pro- duce a joint effect, and two forces thus acting, the direction of the outcome will be according to the diagonal. The new effect will receive probably a new name, the last excitant will be jnihjed to be like or unlike, similar or dissimilar — in the comparing the process of judging is inaugurated. When more objects are presented these are compared with impressions made by jirevious objects, and the quahties of one compared with the qualities of the other; to compare is to judge. In the formation of abstract ideas the process is a judg- ment. Judgment has therefore for its basis the power of the organ- ism to receive an impression and to retain a portion of such im- pression, and the operation of these contending or co-operating impressions produces a new result, which may be a new abstract idea and a judgment. By a further mental process and the reaction that takes place between two abstract ideas, or between abstract ideas and fresh concrete ideas, the higher abstract judgment results. These judg- ments through the reaction of ideas have reference, however, to the subject of such ideas, the result may be suppressed or formu- lated in words, and when so expressed it becomes what is called a proposition. The result may or may not be reduced into language, but whether it be so or not, the proposition or judjfment thus pro- duced becomes the basis of all inteUectual operations — operations which distinguish man from the rest of the creation by their much higher development. By this explanation of the genesis of intellect the basis of the process rests ultimately upon the effect produced on the organ- ism ; and as this is called a sensation, the school which advocates MENTAL PROCESSES. 47 the doctriue lias been called the sensualistic : it is stated to liold the doctriue expressed in the following : — "Nihil ill intelloctu quod non fuerit prius in sensu." Such, however, is not the case of the modern English school, nor indeed was it the doctrine of Locke to whom they are con- sidered to owe their opinions. Locke's words were, as often quoted; "All our ideas come from Sensation and Reflection" which he explains to mean " the operation of our minds." The operation of our minds is generally admitted to be the more important factor in the intellectual process of forming judgments or ideas. In every intellectual act the impressions previously produced on the Emotions, in other words on the mind, remain as a memory to influence, direct, divert, or arrest a judgment or an act. And, as already stated, there is no doubt that a man's inclinations, propensities, or biases, continually modify his thoughts, words, deeds, inclinations, propensities, &c. But the schools which are the greatest ojpponents of such views of the intellectual process, and accuse those who hold such opinions of being sensualists, maintain, that besides the basis of sensation and reflection, there is an entirely distinct agent or property in operation, namely a property inherent in mind. They hold that the knowledge from this source is innate, and the doctrine of innate ideas is tluis a part of their creed. This doctrine belongs to the metajphysical school generally, and since the ideas of this school were at one time very much in vogue, so much so as to imbue the general public with their opinions, and to affect even the very language of the Hterature of the times, the opinion demands some attention. The exposition of these opinions will be best stated in their own words, and as one of the chief exponents of the school we may take the words of Kant, which I quote from Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i., p. 110, and vol. ii., p. 470, et seq. : — In contradistinction to the doctrine that our knowledge is wholly derived from experience, Kant affirms, that not only is experience (by which he means the ideas dependent for their origin on sensations) not the source of our ideas, in other words not the foundation of our knowledge, beliefs, &c., but that these are matters which transcend all experience, w^hich are indeed 4^ LHCTUKES ON MF.NTAL DISEASE. anterior to it iuid without which experience itself would be of no avail. In passing it may he remarked, that if this is so, it is of essen- tial consequence in any study of mental diseases. It may also be noted that the word " experience," which was the word used by Locke, is here limited to sensations ; a common error in Locke's foreign critics, but as already has been shown a distinct misinterpretation of his words, Locke too, is consi- dered the champion of the opponents of the doctrine of Innate Ideas. No modern writer of Locke's school will deny the influ- ence of innate propensities, of temperaments, hereditary tenden- cies, &c., these help to make one factor in every mental operation, or in every interaction between the external world and the indi- vidual. The sun produces in the body the idea of light, but both factors must combine for the idea to be produced, and the susceptibility is an innate endowment, and so far there is an innate faculty, but such is not the sense which Kant claims for the existence of the Innate Idea. Kantian doctrine on Judgments. — Kant divides Judgments into : 1. Synthetical; 2. Analytical; and he further di\ndes each of these in two, a. a priori, j3. d posteriori, according to Kant there- fore judgments are of four kinds : — 1. Synthetic « p?7on. 2. Synthetic a posteriori. 3. Analytic a priori. 4. Analj*tic a posteriori. As an example of a synthetical judgment Lewes gives the fol- lowing : — All bodies are heavy; Acids redden litmus; which are judgments which extend our knowledge. By which he means, as I understand the subject, that such a judgment is a resultant from a process of putting things together (synthesis) and com- paring them, and the product or result is an addition to our store of knowledge. Whereas the analytical judgment is formed by analyzing the existing qualities of a subject, as when we say a triangle is a body xiith three sides — body is extended. This is not any addi- tion to our store of facts, but it merely analyses our previous observations. Of more importance to our present inquiry is that division of the subject into a prioH judgments and d posteriori judgments, according to Kant's classification both the analytical and synthe- tical judgments admit of subdivision into these heads. MENTAL PROCESSES. 49 A priori judgments are those, according to the metaphysicians, which are 7tot derived from experience, but belong to the natural structure of the mind, and which structure is one of the condi- tions of experience and makes experience possible. A posteriori judgments are those derived from experience, that is to say they are the products of the mind and external objects. As examples of judgments of the a priori kind, are given the following: — A straight line is the shortest path between two j^oints ; two parallel lines cannot enclose a space or can never meet ; two and^ two make four ; the ivhole is greater than its paH ; that A is A, The examples of a posteriori judgments are those of every day occurrence, as Gold is ductile, which is a knowledge derived clearly from experience. Kant affirms that all cognition is unstable unless it is a priori. The following are the five fundamental propositions respecting judgments according to Kant. 1. " Experience does not furnish the whole of our knowledge." 2. " That what it does furnish has the character of contingency and variabihty." 3. " That the mind also furnishes an element, which element is an inseparable condition of all knowledge and without it know- ledge could not be." 4. " That this element has the character of universaHty and necessity." 5. " That the principle of all certitude is precisely this univer- saHty and necessity." Before proceedhag to criticise these propositions and the exam- ples in detail, it may be as well to remark, that on this question hinges many of the chief differences between the two schools with respect to the doctrine of innate ideas, and also that of nominalism, materialism, and idealism, &c. The upshot of the dogma, as stated by Kant, is that according to him there exists, independent of the senses and other inlets of knowledge connected with the organism, or at all events with the brain and nervous system, another element, which existed anterior to the organs and continues to exist independently of them ; that this in fact is the surer and safer monitor of the truth. If this be so, it behoves us especially as physiologists and psychologists to become acquainted with it. 50 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. This view too is favoured I think very commonly, or until very lately by physiologists, who in speaking of mental functions speak always of mind as quite independent of mental actions, and existing as a totally separate entity. But firstly or before we set ourselves to examine the attributes of this inherent power, or a priori factor, in obtaining our know- ledge, it is necessary to examine the evidence of its existence. This seems to rest upon the following evidence. It is asserted that certain cognitions which are called necessary truths, as two parallel lines cannot meet, &c., cannot be given by experi- ence and therefore they must be n prion of all experience. To quote again very largely from Lewes. {History of Philo- sophy, vol. i., § 7). "We have," says Mr. Lewes, "to examine whether we learn necessary truths or bring them with us into the world as the heritage of a higher life." That two paraUel lines can never meet is a necessary truth, that is to say it necessarily follows from the definition of a straight line. To call it, however, an a priori truth, a truth independent of experience, is to have a very imperfect analysis of the mind's operations. An attempt is made to prove that the idea could never have been gained through experience, because it com- mands universal assent, and because experience itself could never give necessity. Dr. Whewell's argument is, that let us follow two parallel lines out as far as we can, we are still unable to follow them to infinity ; and for all our experience can tell to the contrary, these lines may possibly begin to approach imme- diately beyond the farthest point to which we can follow them, and so finally meet. Now what gi'ound have we for beheving that this possibihty is not the fact ? In other words how do we know the axiom to be absolutely true ? Clearly not from experi- ence says Dr. "Whewell foUowiug Kant. "We answer," says Mr. Lewes, "yes, clearly from experience. For our concept of two parallel hues formed from experience is precisely this, they do not enclose space, and directly we con- ceive them to approach each other, they cease in our concep- tion to be parallel lines." "The whole difficulty hes in the clearness or obscurity with which the mind makes present to itself past experience.... No sooner do we make present to our minds the image of parallel MENTAL PROCESSES. 5I lines, than in that very act wo make present the imiiosBibility of their meeting, and only as the imago becomes obscure does the idea of meeting become possible." That this is a fact therefore gained from experience is clear. (Lewes, loc, cit.) But in fact the attribute of not meeting is the distinguishing property of parallel lines ; they are named from this attribute, and so soon as they lose it, they would no longer answer to the definition, on this depends the necessity and the certainty of the cognition. Again to take another example, if all necessary truths are a priori judgments, then that three and two make five must be an a priori judgment, because by no effort, or freak of thought can we imagine three and two to make seven. If they are d ]}riori they cannot be a posteriori, or in other words the outcome of experience. " Certainly by no freak of thought," says Mr. Lewes, "can Dr. Whewell believe that two and three are seven." This is quite true, and that it makes five, is to him a necessary truth, but that is evidently a matter of pure experience and slowly acquired knowledge too. One might easily believe that 472 and 274 made 646 or that 365 and 365 made 720, Yet when one had made an accurate calculation, he would find that the first two numbers made 746 and not 646, and the latter 730 and not 720 ; and having once obtained the correct result, the correct figures would be necessary truths, which by no power could we believe to be incorrect, but the result was a labori- ously acquired knowledge. Not only therefore are these, and many similar judgments which might be quoted, not a priori, though they have all the character of necessity. This character of necessity is therefore not due to what is attributed to some independent and innate faculty of the mind. To what then can we trace it ? It will be seen that it depends upon the precision of the terms used in expressing the judgment ; these necessary truths consist of abstractions, and the terms used to note them are free from ambiguity. " The truth depends," as Lewes says, " on the exactness of the terms." All A is A is true and necessary, but vary the terms as some A is some B, and there is no longer any necessity. The more ab- stract the term used the less does it include ; therefore the higher the abstraction the greater generally is there the quahty of neces- £2 52 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. Bity in the judgment, but it is not because these abstractions are furnished as Kant says exclusively by the mind, that they are necessary or free from contingency, but because the terms used are more precise and exact. There is no evidence therefore of any element furnished by the mind which is prior to all experience. The whole fallacy of these views rests on that which is at the base of all metaphysical doctrines ; the operations of the mind are treated as though mind were a material object or entity of some kind, and pre-existed, and were anterior to and indepen- dent of the organism. That is, to the metaphysical school, there is the idea of mind, whether it is a concrete or abstract idea would appear to be uncertain, but if an abstract idea of what is it an abstract ? It is difficult to say even from the metaphysical point of view. Judgments are usually more dependent upon the influence of abstract ideas than upon the more simple or concrete ideas directly derived from sensations ; judgments are concerned, however, with a wide scope of mental impressions; a judgment may be derived from a balance between two present impressions, which would be a judgment of the most simple kind, and of the kind usual with undeveloped or low class of mmds, as in children and imbeciles. In such, an action takes place quickly, the person is said to jump to a conclusion. Such a simple, that is uncomplex condi- tion of mind, has but few stored impressions to modify or divert the present sensation ; the same result follows more uniformly upon the same sensation and the actions following are said to be instinctive. To a mind in which impressions have accumulated in greater store, the process of mental weighing (deliberation) one against the other, is longer. The result or outcome is dehvered, not only more slowly, but with less force ; after deliberation of any large number of stored impressions, the scale preponderates eventually, but feebly, in one direction, so that the word delibera- tion becomes to signify a slow process of coming to a conclusion. There is no doubt that in dehberatious of all kind, from the simplest to the most abstract, the emotions enter largely as elements in giving a preponderance to the force of the nervous cm-rent in its outward progress. The emotions are antagonised by experiences gathered during a life, and they themselves pro- MENTAL PROCESSES. 53 bably are less strong as life progresses. In other words by long experience, external impressions and sensations of all kinds have a tendency to produce less bodily commotion, while several strong excitants grow feeble from bodily or physical decay. This is especially the case with all the appetites and more especially of course with all connected with sex. In man certain strong emotions and many higher mental faculties, poetical, imagina- tive, &c., are developed, and decay at certain periods of life, and they therefore have less influence in the resulting conclusions, that is, such emotions act with less force in the old than in the young. The difficulty in considering any resultant, whether a cogni- tion, or judgment, or act, as dependent upon the influence of abstract ideas uxDon abstract ideas, is experienced by many, be- cause they desire to interpose a directing agent, or independent power, which is called by them the Will, Soul, Mind, the I, &c., according to various views which they have imbibed. As an example of the mode of reasoning on the metaphysical doctrine in contrast to that of the positive school, the genesis of the ideas of time and space may be quoted. Spencer writes, "the abstract of all sequences is time, the ab- stract of all co-existences is space," First Principles, p. 163. The ideas therefore are abstract ideas formed upon obvious concretes. When we observe one act or action following upon another, by a simple abstraction, we arrive at the idea of time which is a neces- sary part of such action, as knowledge of outward or inward actions are objects of sensation, undoubtedly the basis of the idea of time is in sensation. So with space, we see any body before us, or many bodies, by simple abstraction we can con- ceive that the space they occupy can be void. We have thus an abstract idea of space which appears perfectly simple and intel- ligible. The objection which the metaphysician raises to this, is that to imagine any thing existing in space we must first have the idea of space to be occupied. " The Kantian formula is," says Cousin " that the pure rational idea of space comes so little from ex- perience, that it is the condition of all experience." Cousin points out that though this may be logically the order, it is not chronologically, and suggests that wc must first have the idea 54 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. of body before we can obtain the idea of space. Kant would as- 8ort of course that tlio idea of space was an d prion judgment. Will. — It may be necessary to say a few words on the sub- ject of Will considered as a mental process. It has already been pointed out that Will is merely the expression of a psychi- cal process going on in our minds just prior to the termination of any excitant into a movement. When certain impressions are produced to our minds through the medium of our senses, the tendency is for such to cul- minate in a motion, and in special actions, as far as we are cognizant, that is all that occurs ; the stimulus passes from the sense centre to the motor centre and thence to a muscle : but in other actions instead of passing directly to the motor mechanism, say of a limb or leg, it is controlled by passing through a higher centre, where it is delayed an appreciable time. The delay is due probably to a ganglionic interposition ; at which centre the original impulse may be modified by a previous or stored impression, or turned in some other direction ; this conflict of impulses is a conscious condition. When at length the primary excitant overpowers the direction of other impulses, the neural discharge is felt to be emitted and to pass in the dhection in which the preponderance of different forces points ; these opposing forces are the man's wishes, desires, &c., when the discharge is about to occur, the feeling or the consciousness of the impending result we call our Will, and the act when ' made a volition. Voluntary acts are therefore slower than the involuntary, and it has been shown by direct experiment that it is a tendency of a ganglion to arrest the neural current. Before concluding this part of our subject, it will be convenient to append a few remarks upon some matters bearing upon the mental functions, which have been supposed to be in opposition to the views here described, and which arise as it were incident- ally, this is the more advisable as the subjects have a bearing on mental disease. I allude to the subjects of responsibility and character. Ilespoiisibility. — If a man's actions depend so much on exter- nal circumstance it may occur to any one to ask how it is that men differ so widely in temper, intellect, and mental faculties generally. Two men of equal mental powers, placed in the eame MENTAL PROCESSES. 55 position, according to such a view should always act alike, and since a man has no control over his own organization, and not often over his own surroundings, how is it, firstly, that men differ 60 widely, and secondly, that they can be held responsible for their acts. The answers to these questions appear to be in the first place, no two men are exactly alike, and it is rare to find two men exactly in the same position as to their surroundings, and there- fore, any difference that is observed does not invaHdate the pro- position that men's conduct may differ normally. Secondly, since he is the object of his surroundings over which he may have no control, how can a man be responsible. A man is not responsible for any acts over which he has no control ; but he is for those under his control, and if we analyse an act we shall find that he is only responsible for such that arise out of his own organic actions ; the case is put by Miss Martiueau in the words I quote from Dr. Carpenter, as follows : "Instinct, passion, thought, etc., are effects of organized substances. All causes are material causes. In material conditions, I find the origin of all religions, all philosophies, all opinions, all virtues, all spiritual conditions and influences, in the same manner that I find the origin of all diseases, and of all insanities in material conditions and causes. I am what I am, a creature of necessity. I claim neither merit nor demerit. I feel that I am as com- pletely the result of my nature, and compelled to do what I do, as the needle to point to the north, or the puppet to move according as the string is pulled. I cannot alter my will, or be other than what I am, and cannot deserve either reward or punishment." A great deal of the above sentence is superfluity; such as that which asserts the causes of this and that being material, etc. The gist of the sentence hes perhaps in the last paragraph. " I cannot alter my will" ; of course the will is the man, if altered it would make a different man ; a different man, would probably do differently, at all events he would do as he willed to do. If a man wills to do an act, of course he wills or elects to do the act with all its consequences, and punishment might be one. "I am what I am, a creature of necessity," this is mere verbiage or flourish, and might be put into a more sober proposition, when it would be more intelligible, it means probably only that, I own that the laws of nature are definite. As to not deserv- ing either reward or punishment — since, as he says he cannot 56 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. alter and control the laws of nature or change them, which he admits by his proi)06ition, when he wills a certain course, he wills to take all the consequences, he deserves what he invites, and what he will get, and he does exactly what he wills. The passage is scarcely worth quotmg, except as an example of a mistaken idea concerning the faculty of " Will " ; which the writer first '• exalts into a separate entity, and then allows it to tyrannize over his understanding." Character. — But undoubtedly there are found in different men, very different powers to act, and each individual has his special characteristic, or in other words the natural characters of men dififer. They differ intellectually, emotionally and morally, and the causes for such variations may be in the organism of the man or in his cu-cumstances or envii'onmcnts. The organic causes of difference may be due to different cere- bral development — the gross weight of the organ varies, as a rule, the big cerebrum gives a greater mental power, but more particularly perhaps, the difference of mental power may be due to shape — that is to the preponderance of particular faculties. In one man the faculty of observation is large, the man is a large collector or storer of facts. In another the powers of reason- ing, of estimating differences and likenesses is greater. A third may have both capacities large and be a more intelligent person than the others. On the other hand, one man's energies may be feeble, another weak. Such a faculty added to either of the above special endowments would considerable modify the result. One man's emotional faculties may be over sensitive, or duller. Especially is the character influenced by a man's appetites and organic feeUngs, bj' his health and strength, etc. A man who is possessed of good powers of observation and of reasoning, who is not swayed by his animal appetites and feelings to any degree, will have faculties of the highest char- acter. According to my own personal experience through a long life, when two men are met with who arc equal, or nearly BO, in these respects the one who has the largest power of digestion will prove the best man. That on the whole the size of the brain has considerable in- fluence is shown in the weights of the brain in men of great MENTAL PROCESSES, 57 mental power, cxamplee of which may be found in any class book on physiology. Again it is observed that one faculty is often developed at the expense of another, as when the blind show a develop- ment of musical talent ; and no one can see a body of musi- cal performers without observing how many are obliged to resort to glasses for some defect of sight. The substance of the foregoing is as follows : — SUMMAEY. 1 . The organism is acted upon by the environment, and from their conjoint action, a movement in the organism is the result. The action from the euwonment to the organism is the afferent. The action at the organism is the central sesthesis. The action from the centre to the environment is the efferent ; the afferent is the sensitive, and efferent the motor effect ; this law pervades the whole neural system, 2. The afferent may be wholly expended in the motor act as in the simplest reflex act, or it may be partially expended, the remainder may persist, the remanent. 3. The XDersistent remainder or remanent is dormant until revived by a fresh excitant. 4. The persistent remanent is recalled by an impression or feeHug of any kind previously associated with it. This property is called the association of ideas. 5. The persistent remanent when recalled has power to modify the fresh impression from the environment, by strength- ening or weakening it, and thus give greater variety to the dh-ec- tiou of the motor outcome. 6. The excitant or impression from without may cause plea- sure or pain either directly, or in combination with a former im- pression. Such states are the eniotions and are usually accom- panied by an efferent or motor current of some kind. 7. Upon the property of the persistence of impressions is founded the faculty of memory, consciousness, emotion, vohtion, perception and the higher intellectual faculties. "The percep- tion of any object is possible only by the classing of a present 58 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. group of attributes and relations with a past group (Spencer, op, cit., p. 330), 8. The comparison of a present group with a past group is a Juclgmeut. " All mental action whatever may be defined as the continuous differentiation and integration of states of conscious- ness." — Spencer. 9. Judgments may be influenced by the emotions and emo- tions are influenced as much by the organism as by the environ- ment. 10. Consciousness of the excitation which precedes the motor result is Will. In the words of Spencer "the difference between an involuntary movement of the leg and a voluntary one is, that whereas the involuntary one takes place without any previous consciousness of the movement to be made, the voluntary one takes place only after it." Section III. THE PKOCESSES OE DYNAMICS OF Mmi).— continued. Dynamics — Gradual Development of Neural Functions — First Effect, Movement the Genesis of a Nervous System — Nature of Neural Force, its Properties — General Scheme of Nervous System — Development of Nerves — Forms of Nervous Systems — the Gang-lion, its Office and Forms — Cells, varieties of — Motor and Sensory — Origin of Neural Current — Nervous Mechanism in Man — Spinal Cord, its Division into Motor and Sensory Columns — its Con- nection with the Cerebrum — Homology of Brain and Cord — Community of their Functions, as shown Anatomically, Pathologically and from a De- velopmental point of view — the Gradual Controlliug Power of the Brain — the Differentiation of Brain and Cord — in their Functions — iu Construction — Automatic Movements — Signification of the Term — Dr. Marshall Hall's views — the Control of Cerebrum showu by Experiment— Functions of Cere- bral Hemispheres — Localization of Functions — Dr. Hughling Jackson's views — Anatomical basis of Intellect — Persistence of Impressions — Inhibi- tion — Synthetical Review of Mental Function — Retlex Acts in Childhood — Subsequent Brain Development — Other Neural Functions ; Co-ordination, Equilibriation, Tone. In the next division of our subject we have to consider the dynamics of the nervous system in respect to the mechanism. We may proceed upon the same plan, namely, we may com- mence at the lower, which is at the same time the simplest form, and proceed toward the higher organism. I shall here only dwell upon some of the principal matters connected with this subject; as, the nature and operation of the nervous energy, its mode of hberation, and transmission centripetally and centrifugally from the centres from which it emanates, throughout the system gen- erally. In the previous pages we have traced the gradual evolution of the mental processes themselves. We have now to follow the mechanism by which these processes are performed. It will be less necessary to enlarge on this subject, since this question is treated from the same point of view in all text books, which is not the case with that aspect of the subject, which we have hitherto been considering. In any comparative investigation of the animal functions we assume that there is one general principle extending through Go LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. the whole scries of animals. We also, as already eubmitted, take it as a law that in the gradual development from the lower order to the higlier, this general principle is modified only, and is perfected by a differentiation of function and by specialization of organs. We may also lay it down as a postulate, which the preced- ing pages have had the object of establishing ; that the organ- ism is acted upon by its environment, from whence arise the phenomena which we have to consider as mental products. We have to consider what the nature of this influence is, and secondly, in what way it acts upon the organism. The crude result of the action of the environment on the organism is motion — and this is all that occurs in the lowest kind of action as in a reflex movement. This effect does not differ materially fi-om the action of one inorganic object upon another, and is simply a mechanical distribution of force. There are also like effects produced on inorganic bodies as when a body is said to be expanded by heat, and when two bodies act chemically upon each other, in this latter case there is an entire re- arrange- ment of the molecules. The force exerted upon the organism by different surrounding objects is exhibited in some cases by motion only, and in other cases by molecular changes, as in nutrition and waste of tissues. The acting force in one case has been attributed to chemical affinity — or to be identical with elec- tric force — it has also been called the vital force to mark its distinct species ; and the processes have been said to be due to vital force and chemical attraction. One of the differences formerly much insisted upon, was that chemical combinations, (which were considered to be electrical) were necessarily binary, and that the combinations due to vital affinity were. ternary. That these forces are not identical seems to be proved by their antagonism, when the vital affinities cease the organism is acted upon by chemical affinity, and its elements re-arranged ; as when dead animal substance undergoes decomposition, and is re- solved into various other products, chemically distinct. But the electrical force which holds the elements together in chemical composition, can be isolated as galvanism, and can be conducted through metallic conductors to distant parts. In this MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 6l there is both resemblance and difference between these forces ; for the power, which dominates over organic combinations, is found to be transmissible through special conductors, the nerves, though it has not been isolated. The problem, whether these acting forces are identical or dif- ferent, has naturally become one which has occupied the atten- tion of physicians ; their identity has not been proved, their simi- larity, and the similarity of the laws which govern them, must be admitted by every one. As we find a great difficulty in drawing a line between organic and inorganic bodies, so we find a similar difficulty in distinguishing the phenomena which take place in organic bodies from the changes in the inorganic. And for explanation of organic changes and especially all ex- cretory processes, we still invoke the laws of chemistry. The question, however, with which we are now concerned, is the force that we find transmitted through the nerves ; we might of course admit the fact that the nerves convey a force to a dis- tant organ and look upon the enquiry as to its nature as useless, and, it may be worth the while, however, to consider certain opinions which have been broached concerning it. It is generally admitted that though the force resembles the electrical it is not electricity. Mr. Herbert Spencer would explain the current to be due to the extreme instabihty of the or- ganic colloids, or protoplasm of which the nerves largely consist. This protoplasm or colloid substance, he supposes to undergo isomeric changes, to which changes all colloids are jDarticu- larly prone. This explanation appears to be only the substitution of one unknown thing for another, and isomeric changes must have somethmg to induce them. The electric current is cer- tainly a good example of transmission of force without change of place, as when in magnetism N — S, N — S, N — S, N — S, becomes S — N, S — N, S — N, by merely reversing the poles, by the approach of a more powerful magnet at the end of the series. A similar change may be instanced as an example in sound in the metrical arrangement of words, when iambs may become trochees, by the ablation of the first syllable, thus AB AB AB will become BA BA BA by removal of the first A and again changed by replacing it. The main objection to Mr. Spencer's theory is, that it is a C)2 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. Bimple chemical change, and chemical changes are electrical, and the phenomena of tlie neural current do not accord with the electrical theory according to general consent of authorities. We must in our present state of knowledge, I thhik, either con- sider the nature of the neural transmission as one of those dead walls, which for the present must remain as a houndary of in- vestigation, or he satisfied by saying that it is called "vital force. ""■'= If, however, the nature of this neural current or transmitting influence is uncertain, we may investigate its action and some of its chief properties. It has been calculated that normally, the rapidity of neural cun*eut varies slightly in different individuals, and is according to Helmholtz at the rate of about 26 — 27 metres per second, or from 29 — 30 yards. The neural current is initiated or started from one of its ends, peripheral or central, and passes to the other. The nerve itself is passive as regards the passage through it, the genesis of the current therefore must be either at the periphery through the apparatus called the end organ, and which has its special organization, or centrally in, as it is believed, a ganglion cell. The neural or initiating force is capable of accumulation, and by action for a long time becomes gradually exhausted, this occurs by its natural action ; but it is made more apparent by direct experiment. It is believed also that upon undue accumu- lation of force, explosion or abnormal discharge may occur. It was found that in the experiments upon guinea pigs in which artificial epilepsy was induced, the fit could be produced at the operator's will by pinching the animal's cheek ; the first pinch threw the animal into strong convulsions ; on the animal's recovery, a second pinch produced a convulsion of less severe • Lewes arguing upon this point makes the following remarks upon the ori- ginal force in organic bodies (On Animal Automatism, p. 320, et seq., Pliysical Basis of Mind). "Clearly the nature of the forces must be taken into account, the Materialistic doctrine attempts to reduce Biology to a problem of Mechanics," "But vitality and sensibility are co-efficients which must render the mechanical problem insoluble. The Vitalist turns his back on all eyidonce and would explain organic phenomena without any aid from physics and chemistry." " Vital facts, especially facts of sensibility, have factors neither discernible in machines, nor expressible in mechanical terms. "We cannot ignore them, although for analyti- cal parposes we may proTisionally set them aside." MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 63 character, a third still less severe, until after many stimula- tions, no effect followed. We may next consider the organism concerned in the trans- mission, which consists in the end organs, the nerves and the central organs. In other terms, there is the apparatus for the liberation of the neural force, consisting of the organs of the special senses ; the organs which convey the action from the environment to the central organs ; the central nerve organs ; the organs which transmit the impulse back to the periphery to muscles, tissues, glandular organs, &c. The apparatus when perfected, as in man, has all these organs differentiated, but their genesis may be traced from the lower grades in which, however, the same principles rule their action. General principles or scheme of neural functions. — We may trace the process briefly in the following manner: — We find that the mechanism by which the animal is put into relation with his envu'onment, and by which the several parts of his organism are brought into unison with each other, is at first of very simple kind ; in this primitive condition it appears to be by simple extension of the impression through the tissues, so that there is a communism in function. When the functions are differentiated, when the organs of nutrition and motion are separated, then only the development of lines of communication becomes necessary. There are three types of the arrangement of these "means of inter-communication ; the cu'cular as found in the radiata ; the diplo-neurose in the articulata ; spini-cerebratal as in mam- malia and man ; these are examples of arrangement not differ- ences of principle. In the circular form there is uniformity of function through every portion of the animal. In the diplo-neurose there are gan- glions of large size at the head and these surround the cesopha- gceal opening, there are ganglions in both forms placed at more or less regular intervals, and fi'om these points the nerves proj)er arise, thus bringing the creature's eyes and locomotive organ, &c., into direct communication. Such is the apparatus which suf- fices for bringing the various parts of the animal intf» harmony of functions, and for performing the reflex movements which we find in this low organisation. But with this form of enervation 64 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. the movements of complex character are performed and apparently are as elaborate, or nearly so, as those which exist in the higher organisms. One of the chief differences between their perform- ance, and that of the higher kind, is the fixity, or as it were the stereotyped character, of the acts. One individual at one period goes through the same action as another, without any accumu- lation of experiences or improvement in the process. The ants of this epoch do what the ants in Solomon's time did. They are, as it were, machines, which when once wound up, go through a given set of evolutions. In following the development of the higher functions in mam- malia and in man, we find the mechanism more complex, the distribution of nerves of communication and their consensus or co-ordination in action requu-e other arrangements of more com- plex character. This necessity is met by the development of ganghons ; these may be Hkened to stations on a railway — or in railway terms, to junctions, fi-om which anew direction may be initiated in a pass- ing neural current ; and the simile holds good in several respects, for the train may pass through the junction or continue in its original direction, or in fact it may be turned into a branch line out of the primary com-se. We have thus developed a step in the differentiation of func- tion and we have the special organs of the ganghon and the nerve, which we will consider briefly in succession and sepa- rately. 1. Ganglion : — If we may not say it is proved, it seems pret fully admitted, as had been a long time surmised, that the gan- ghon is a most important or chief organ and centre in neural functions. It is not meant by this that it exercises any active or possesses any inherent energy, though it may have the power of exciting or calling forth energy — as exhibited in its connection with a peripheral organ, as muscle, gland, &c. — Its main office is rather in directing, and it has also apparently the power of stor- ing energy, in like manner that a Leyden jar has the property of accumulating electric power. In this latter capacity, it must even arrest the neural energy, for Wundt experunentally showed that a stimulus is both retarded and weakened in its passage through a ganglion. " He interpreted this as proving that the MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 05 cells retard every impulse, whereby they are enabled to store up latent force like locks in a canal." Lewes' Flujsical Basis, p. 249. This property is one on Avhich pr()l)ably much depends, and it will be referred to again in the sequel. The ganglion itself has received considerable attention from the physiologist ; and its position, form, and every thing that is known concerning it seem to suggest that its office is one of essential character in the neural processes. A ganglion consists of ganglionic cells and the neuroglia. In such sense the whole cortex cerebri and cerebelh, thalamus opti- cus, corpus striatum, and other basal gangha, as well as the grey portions of spinal cord are ganglionic. The neuroglia, as its name implies, may be looked upon as the special connective medium of the more essential parts, or the cells and their processes with the vessels of nutrient and functional supply. The ganglionic cell is described to consist of a body and pro- cesses. The body of the cell is composed of numerous minute fibrils which form a kind of network, and according to Mons. Luys, the fibrillaa are interlaced " hke the wickerwork of an osier basket." Each cell contains also a nucleus and nucleolus ; the processes of the cell vary in number, some cells are without any and are called apolar, some have one or more and are called unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, &c., the rest of the contents of the cell is considered to be protoplasm. The processes connected with^''' the cells are both branched and unbranched. The cells are met with singly or in groups. They also differ in size as well as in shape and complexity, as for example the cells of the anterior horn or motor tract of the cord are larger than the cells of the posterior or sensory tract. The cells of the cerebrum differ in size at different depths of the cortex ; the more superficial are smaller, more ovoid, and many appear to be non-caudate, those of a deeper stratum are pyramidal (or * It is obviously a difficult microscopic feat to prove the number of poles that are connected with any given cell, since in a section, -filaments may escape observation by passing out of section downwards or upwards, &c. We niny readily prove the positive existence of multipola;- cells ; the negative proof of the number of poles is impossible. F 66 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. parsnip-shaped?), their large extremity directed centrally, and at the upper end terminating in a process or filament, that ex- tends toward the pia mater. Still deeper the colls are larger, and in certain positions are specially large and are known as giant cells. These latter, it should be noted, exist in small quantity only in very young children, hut are specially detected in old people. (See plate I.) The fact that the largest cells are found in the motor centres of the cord, has been construed to signify that the tracts of the cerebrum, in which the large cells are found, are motor centres also, which is corroborated by the fact that they are more numerously developed in mature age and in certain locali- ties in the brain. The cells of the cerebellum are of different shape from those found in other parts of the nervous system ; they consist also of a body and one process which is branched ; the body is of more rounded form and is without angular projections. These cells are also arranged in a different way, being placed in regular lines between the white and grey matter ; there are also in the cerebellum numerous non-caudate cells, of rather more circular form than those in the cortex cerebri. "We are therefore justified in concluding that the functions of these different cells differ, and that their use is of various kinds. 2. Nerves : — With respect to the nerves and their office, the nerves are simply conductors through which inter-communication is made between the different organs of the body ; they exercise no function which may be called energy. The current through them can pass either way, as shown in the well-known experi- ment in which a rat's tail was first grafted by its tip into the back of the animal and afterwards severed at its root, and the neural current was re-established passing in an opposite direction to its normal course. There seems no doubt, however, that the amount of energy or if we liken it to a current, the strength of the current may vary in degree in a nerve, if we measure its power by the different degrees of action that result from its influence, and there is evi- dence adduced to show that energy accumulates in its onward course. The neural current, however, may probably be increased MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 67 in its rapidih' by rei^etitiou of its initiating stimulus, rather than by its actual power. It may, however, also be wholly and per- haps partially weakened by inhibitory action, to be considered further on, and by this means vary in its power. The increase of muscular power, or the increase in a glandular secretion, &c., must be due to the muscle when the increased power is motion, or to the state of the glandular organ when the increase is in that dii'ection. But since the nerves conduct in both directions or from the periphery to the centre and from the centre to the periphery, the fountain of this hberated energy must be either in these peri- pheral end organs or in the central organ. Dii-ect experiment has shown that the nerve current does not gain strength but rather the contrary, in passing through a gan- glion (see ante p. 64) ; if we accept this view of Wundt, then the ganglion has no influence in the genesis of the neural force, but acts more as a storage for it. It follows that we must look for the genesis of the neural force in the peripheral end organs. It is also in the anatomical arrangement of just these special organs that we find the apparatus for receiving and intensifying external impressions ; the optical and auditory apparatus are both formed on mechanical principles to collect and intensify their particular excitant. So again is the dermal surface, for receiving the sensory impression of touch, as is obvious to every tyro in physiology. Our review of the whole subject so far points out, how in the higher animals the environment of an individual acts upon the special organs of sense, and thus initiates or liberates the neural force, which is propagated along the nerves to the central gan- glion, from Avhence the neural force is distributed. The neural force may be sui rjcn^ris or analogous to the chemi- cal force, which performs the same function for organic opera- tions that the electrical force does for inorganic combinations ; in our present state of knowledge concerning it, we simply give it a distinctive name and call it the neural force. It, however, is clearly an attribute of the organism ; so that the proposition that vital actions are due to the conjoint action of the organism and the environment still holds good. f2 68 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. Examinalion of the yerve Functions ; 1. AnaUjticalbj; 2. Syntheti- cally. — J. Analytical Kxamination of Nerve Functions. We have now to consider liow these general i)rinciples are speciahsed to perform the various functions of hfe which we call nervous or mental in man. We shall do well in studying the centres of the higher facul- ties, to commence with an examination of the spinal cord. Not only because this is pursuing our prescribed course in proceed- ing from the lower to the higher, but particularly because the physiology of the cord has received more attention of late and has been studied with much success, and the neural functions of the cord may afford us a key to the brain functions. The following functions of the cord are recognised ; for the description of which I avail myself of the work by Dr. B. Bramwell on Diseases of the Sjnnal Cord. The spinal cord may be looked upon as consisting of a num- ber of segments. Each being as it were a separate organ for a definite area, to which its roots proceed, whether skin, muscle, mucous membrane, viscus, &c. Each segment consists of a double set of organs, arranged side by side ; each segment may be described as a disc of nervous tissue to which a pan* of spinal nerves is attached; each nerve arising by an anterior and posterior root ; the halves are sepai'ated by the anterior and posterior fissures. Li this anatomical arrangement we perceive the separation into the sensory and motor organs, and viewed with regard to the functions, we have the primitive mechanism necessary for a simple reflex action such as we find in the lower organisms. But in a segment of the cord, there are other organs besides the mechanism necessary for a reflex action. We have besides the sensory and motor ganglion cells, certain fibres which form the roots of the afferent and efferent nerves, and which are mostly horizontal in their direction ; and other or perpendicular fibres which connect segment with segment, which also can be tr iced upwards and downwards. These perpendicular fibres may be described as forming bun- dles and columns which are an-anged side by side, and form three principal columns on each lateral half of the cord. Each of the three columns is further divisible into secondary columns, as shown in the accompanying diagram. MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 69 These separate portions of the cord are not only divided by then- anatomical characters, but physiologically by performing separate functions, as determined both by experiment and patho- logical observation. The functions of the different columns are as follows ; dividing each half of a segment into three parts, we have the posterior third as a sensory tract, the two remam- ing thirds motory. Fig. 1. AH Anterior Horn, ph Posterior Horn. AC Anterior Column. LC Lateral Column. PEC Postero-External Column, ric Postero-Internal Column. The sensory tract, or posterior column, or that portion situated between the posterior median fissure and the posterior cornu of grey matter, is further subdivided into two parts, which Dr. Gowers has proposed to call postero-internal pic and postero- external columns pec, (the internal being the column of Goll, and the external formerly called the column of Burdach.) The postero-internal portion of the sensory tract is smallest in the lumbar region, and gradually increases upwards towards the cervical. From this circumstance it is evidently an ascend- ing tract, increasing as it reaches its destination and collecting the impulses on its way. This column in its internal portion has fibres connecting it with the posterior grey cornu and the grey commissure. The postero-external portion is said to bo composed of 70 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. fibres passing inwards to the posterior cornu, and of the fibres of the roots of the nerves which pass through it, and conveying impressions resulting in sensation " probably of touch and pain" (Bramwell), and also afferent fibres for reflex, movements " in- cluding probably the deep reflexes " (Bramwell), as knee-jerk, and foot clonus. Motor tracts (1 and 2), these constitute the rest of the white matter of the cord, and occupy two of the three portions into which the cord is artificially divided ; the motor tracts therefore occupy the anterior and lateral columns. The lateral column Lc is composed of thi-ee portions, or according to some four, viz. : anterior lateral lc3 ; cerebellar tract lc5 ; and posterior lateral Lc4, which is the crossing portion of the pyramidal tract, or crossed pjTamidal tract ; the fourth enumerated hes between the latter and the cornu ; the functions of the anterior lateral and the fourth are uncertain. The anterior column ac is wholly motor and consists of two portions, the column is divided from its feUow by the anterior fissure, which extends to the commissure where the cornua meet; the trac.t which lies internal or next to the fissure, the in- ternal anterior acI tract, is narrow and constitutes the uncrossed or du-ect pyramidal tract, the other tract or external anterior is also motor ac2. Besides the perpendicular columns there are numerous hori- zontal fibres to be obsei-ved in each segment ; some being due to the course of the roots of the nerve of which they consist, and others being the fibres which connect segment with segment. Besides these white columns, an important portion of the seg- ment consists of the central columns of grey matter, which on these transverse sections constitute the cornua, these ai-e com- posed of grey matter and contain ganghon cells imbedded in neuroglia. In the anterior cornua the ganglionic cells are larger and are the motor cells, those of the lesser cornua are smaller and more spindle-shaped, and are considci-ed to be sensory. These cells are caudate and difi"er from the cells of the cerebrum principally in size, and in having a more stellate form : they are collected into groups, the arrangement of those groups varies at different levels of the cord ; besides gi'oups which occupy the anterior horn in the dorsal and lumbar regions, there is a dis- MEiNTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 7 1 tinct group situated near to the central canal, called the vesicular column of Clarke ; the ganglionic cells are largest in the lumbar region and fibres of white matter connect the columns of Clarke with the cerebellar tract described. Relations of Cord and Cerebrum considered anatomically, patholo- gically and by embryology. The most interesting point connected with this differentiation of the cord is in its relation to the cerebrum ; these various columns of white and grey matter can be traced uxDwards to their connexion w^ith different parts of the cerebrum ; on tracing this relation a few words relative to the medulla will be necessary. The continuation of the cord upwards is by connexion with the medulla oblongata, cerebellar, and cerebral or basal ganglions, the corpora striata, thalami optici, corpora quadrige- mina, and cerebral hemispheres ; which shall next be briefly reviewed. The medulla oblongata or superior termination of the cord, consists of the continuation of the different columns of the cord upwards. It will be remembered that after reaching the fora- men magnum of the skull, the cord slightly expands and is called the medulla oblongata. This increase of size being partly due to the addition of fresh developments, as the olivary bodies, but partly also to a spreading out laterally of the columns correspond- ing to those of the cord ; these columns have unluckily received different names in this part of their course and are called often the anterior pyramids. Posteriorly, or in the sensory region, the cord is, as it were, sht open and the central commissure laid bare ; the postero-in- ternal columns of Gowers are here called the posterior pyramids, between these and by their separation a triangular space is left called the fourth ventricle, which is in fact the central foramen of the cord. The postero- external columns of Gowers lie external to these posterior pyramids, and are here called restiform bodies. The destination of these columns is doubtful, it is affirmed by some that the two become blended and pass as inferior pedun- cles into the cerebellum ; " but Burdach and Arnold affirmed that the postero-internal ascend to the cerebrum." (Quain). But the anterior or motor columns of the cord, at the lower part of the medulla, decussate with their fellows from the oppo- 72 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. site side, and pass through the pons Yarohi where they form connection %\'ith the grey matter of the pons, and with the trans- verse bundles which proceed from the lateral lobes of the cere- bellum ; the course of the tracts is traversed by the roots of some of the cranial nerves, in their passage to the medulla oblongata (Ferrier). " Beyond the pons Varolii and reinforced by fibres derived from it and its connections, the anterior tracts appear as two peduncles or limbs, the crura cerebri ; these slightly diverge in their upward course. On the posterior aspect of the crura, and anterior to the cerebellum, are situated certain ganghonic masses, termed the corpora quadrigemiua or optic lobes," (Ferrier). This description from Dr. Fen-ier, it may be pointed out, is of the course of the posterior spinal column, or from a back view of the sensory tract, the additional developments to be mentioned hereafter are necessitated by the corresponding elaboration of the sensory functions. The spinal columns, motory and sensoi-y, up to a certain point, are thus united in their upward course, but on reaching the interior of the cranium their perpendicular position is converted of course into a more horizontal one. " In the crura there is a distinct separation betiveen the sensory and motor tracts, the lower or inferior (crusta or basis) being the motor, and the upper or superior {tegmentum) forming the sensory tract. The two being separated from each other by a layer of dark coloured nerve cells called locus niucr. The teijmentwn or sen- sory tracts also contain, or enclose, a mass of nerve cells called the red nucleus, which is in connection with the cerebellum and corpora quadriyemina." The crura cerebri pass into the two great basal ganglions, the optic thalamus, situated anteriorly, and the corpus striatum behind it. The sensory tracts pass into the thalamus and the motor tracts of the crura pass into the corpus striatum ; fi-om these the white fibres radiate in the form of a hollow cone called corona radiata, and by their expansion, when covered by the grey matter of the cortex {coiiche corticale of the Fre;ich). form the surface of the cerebral hemispheres. The upper part of the crus connected with the sensory functions, was named by the old anatomists the tegmentum, and the lower part the foot, and MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. "J T, is connected with the motor functions. "Anatomically con- sidered the optic thalamus is the ganghon of the tegmentum, and the corpus striatum the ganglion of the base or foot." (Ferrier). As the white fibres emerge from the thalamiis and corpus striatum, they are called the diverging fibres ; besides these, which are arranged m a radiating manner, there are others which pass from front to back, and across or laterally, connect- ing the distant parts of the same hemisphere together. There are certain portions of the cerebral hemisphere which have received considerable attention of late years in consequence of their connection with certain lesions which affect both spinal and cerebral functions simultaneously, and which it will be in- teresting to follow, since they connect the whole neural system into one common apparatus. Before entering upon the subject of the cerebro- spinal con- nections, I would remark, that physiology and that part of it which has been called teratology, leads to the conclusion, that the skull may be considered as a homologue of vertebrte, and to consist of the elements of four vertebrae : — viz., 1. the nasal ; 2. frontal ; 3. parietal ; 4. occipital ; and the different cranial nerves have their analogues in the spiaal nerves. Each of these segments has its corresponding portion of nerve gan- glions and homologues of the cord."^- The observation is of interest as bearing out the principle of uniformity that pervades the entire animal creation, and we are justified by it in viewing the cerebrum as a modified and higher differentiation of the cord, and to be the elaboration of so many segments of it ; thus we may look upon the white matter of the cerebrum as continuation of the six columns of the cord, expanded from its bulbar end. The grey columns accompany- ing the crura or columnar expansion, occupy the same position as locus nifjer. The posterior horns increased in size become the tubercula cinerea ; the grey commissure of the cord, as the white columns separate, is exposed at the back of the meduUa as the floor of the fourth ventricle. 2. Emhryological evidence of the cerebro- spinal connexions. — But there are certain other facts in connection with pathology and embryology, which thi'ow considerable light upon the com- * This qaestiou was treated in au article by Dr. Ilugliliugs Jackson. 74 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. munism of function between the cerebrum and cord, which will well deserve attention. The first of these is in connection with the internal capsule, as it is called. It is found that any lesion of the capsule in its anterior two- thirds, causes hemiplegia on the opposite side of the body with- out anaesthesia ; while rupture or lesion in the posterior one-third portion, causes hemi-anaesthesia ;* thus clearly show- ing that both sensory and motor fibres are contained in this part, which as we know is an extension of the crura, and that the tracts are distinct ; the motor occupying as in the cord the an- terior, and the sensory the posterior position ; also as regards this motor tract itself, physiologists are able to trace distinct connections between this part of the cord with a cerebral region. In the cord there are, as stated, two j)yramidal tracts — one direct and the other the crossed pyramidal tract (the first 1. and the second 5. in the diagram). In the new bom child, if a section of the cord be treated with osmic acid, these particular tracts alone are stained, the rest of the section remains clear ; these tracts are thus by a histological test proved to be similar in properties. In the new born infant the cerebrum is in a very rudimentary condition, and the functions of the nervous system are in a manner exclusively concentrated in the medulla and spinal cord (Billard quoted by Charcot). At this early period such acts as are accomplished, however complex (as in suckmg), are purely reflex ; that such acts are spinal the case of the an- encephalic infant, who will suck, proves. . These pyramidal tracts by the action with the osmic acid show an earlier development than the rest of tlie cord, and they are stained because their myeloid sheaths are developed, which is not the case with the other columns. The pyramidal fibres may be traced through the pons to the crus cerebri ; before reaching this part they decussate with their fellow of the op- posite hemisphere. In the pons the nerve elements, which had previously formed the bulbar pjTamids, intermingle with the spinal fibres of the pons, and as it were, emerging from the pons become parts of the crura cerebri. • Charcot. Localisation of Cerehrai Diseases. Translated by Dr. Hadden, New Syd. Soc, p. 85. MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. /3 The crus cerebri is here composed of an upper and lower por- tion, the former called the tegmentum and the latter the foot, as ah-eady stated. In the foetus or newly born child, the foot may be distinguished as consisting of three segments, internal, exter- nal and middle ; in the two first, the medullary sheaths are not yet developed, and on treating with osmic acid remain clear ; the middle segment is rendered opaque, and this opaque portion is according to Flechsig, the re-arranged prolongations of the pyramidal tract. " This," says M. Charcot, "is unquestionally important, since it seems to indicate that the development of the pjTamidal tracts proceeds from the cerebrum proper." "The pyramidal tract may be followed beyond the foot into the cerebral hemisphere, and its presence can be recognised in the opto-striato ganglionic masses in the region called the internal capsule, which is in short, at least to a considerable extent, no other than the expansion of the fasciculi which form the lower layer of the crura," Charcot, op. cit., p. 177. The pyramidal tract may be traced upwards even to the grey cortical matter of the convolutions and terminates in what is called the motor zone, " paracentral lobuli or upper extremity of the ascending frontal and parietal convolutions." (See j)late I.) The above is Flechsig's account as quoted from Charcot, who adds, that his conclusion requires confirmation in more than one point. Professor Parrot examined this question by testing it in ninety-six autopsies of children under one year ; the only differ- ence would appear to be, that the latter observer considers that the development of the motor tracts of the cerebrum jiroceeds from more than one centre, and proceeds gradually downwards. ■3. Cerebro-spinal connexions as sJwicn by pathology. The same connection or community of function between cord and cere- brum, is shown pathologically, by what are called the secondary lesions of the cord ; that is when a lesion of any kind, which may affect the cerebrum, leads to a secondary degeneration below in the course of the tract by which it is connected with the cord ; or wiien disease of the cord or atrophy of an inferior portion leads to degeneration above. It is found that these secondary lesions of the cord, on the pyramidal tract, only occur when the primary lesion is in the anterior two- thirds of internal capsule ; they never occur when the lesion invades the posterior 76 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. third ; and this obviously is the reason, that in one case the neural current is centrifugal, and therefore the function of the parts below are interfered with ; in the other case, the current is centripetal, and therefore it has no effect on the point below, thus showing also that the differentiation of function in brain and cord are similar. The connection or identity rather, of the cord and cerebrum, ia thus made clear hy anatomical and pathological investigations, as regards both motor and sensory functions. That the development of the cord advances prior to that of the cere- brum. A very important question, as pointed out in the foregoing quotations and remarks, is that the development of the cord ad- vances prior to that of the cerebrum. Comparative anatomy might have led us to suspect this. We readily admit that the higher intelligence in animals corresponds with the greater development of the brain. The intelligence of animals stops at a given point, and the development of their brain is finished at a correspond- ing degree of perfection. We know that complexity of movements with co-ordination of the various motor impulses, occur in the lowest kind of or- ganisms; there are also sensori-motor developments as indi- cated by expression of pain and discomforts, as well as by move- ments to escape from pain ; there is also the exhibition of choice of food and many very complex operations in the very lowest animals. And at a certain period of the child's life we find the intelligence or the mental functions on a par with such sim- ple manifestations. Before the brain is developed and even in the anenceplialous infant, it has been established that the child is capable of performing certain complex and co-ordinated mo- tions as in the operation of sucking ; it is therefore obvious that such functions are performed through or by the means of the spinal cord. In observing the gradual development of the child, we find that all the first signs of life are of the same kind, the crying, sucking, evacuation of the dejections, the rolling of the ej'es, movements of the Hmbs, are clearly of the character of spinal reflex motions, and excited through the usual channels of sensory centres. We may note also the fact, that in the fre- quent crying on any uneasiness, the sensations, especially of the skin, are perfectly developed. MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 77 By degrees the child begins to direct its eyes more regularly, then also to move its arms and legs with gradually increasing evidence of purpose ; though still we witness the predominant excited or reflex movements in the contortions of the features and eyes in any slight gastric disturbance. And we know that up to a term of several years, a child is particularly prone to affections depending on the spinal centres, as to infantile con- vulsions ; while he has but feeble control in checking all ex- cited actions, as by crying when hurt, in falling, or even when hungry or uncomfortable in any way. It corresponds with the period of the completion of the brain centres, that these excited reflex centres are first more con- trolled; that the child begins to control its evacuation to a given time ; that it can wait more readily for its food ; and gradually to acquire its full powers of volition. Thus the brain becomes gradually a controlling power. With this increase of function consciousness is also established. The higher mental powers are also slowly developing, and it is not till the age of puberty, that the faculties can be said to reach their completion. The Differentiation of the Neural functions into cerebral and spi' nal. The foregoing facts have been chiefly brought forward to show the intimate connexion that exists between the cerebrum and spinal cord, both with regard to their functions and their anatomical substrata. We may now proceed to view the question from the opposite point of view, and to examine the distinction between the func- tions of these organs. Facts gleaned from pathology and experimental physiology abundantly show the difference of influence of these centres as regards one faculty — that is, consciousness. We may premise that states of consciousness and uncon- sciousness exist in different degrees as already shown, and we may also divide them into kinds arising from different causes. Consciousness naturally is subject to a certain degree of periodicity — as in sleep, when it is in greater or less abeyance. During perfect sleep all functions which are performed con- sciously or which when they take place are attended by conscious- ness, as Volition, Emotions, Memoiy, Ideation, cease; while those 7iS LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. of ^vllic•ll \vc arc uiiconsciouB, or less conscious, continue undis- turbed, as the action of respiration, of blood circulation, the tonic contraction of the sphincters, and certain other so-called automatic actions. Mr. Durham, taking note of what occurred in a patient, who had a portion of his brain exposed by a fracture of the skull found, that as the patient dozed the brain grew pale, receded, and shrunk, and on waking the brain gradually swelled afresh, and discharged before it a quantity of serous fluid. This experiment is as satisfactory as any in experimental physiology, it shows that sleep has a marked effect in the cerebral organ, and that it depends upon a lessened supply of blood to the brain. Sleep then, is a natural condition of unconsciousness, having for its anatomical substratum a state of anaemia, or spanfemia. A similar state of unconsciousness is produced also by the sudden abstraction of blood, especially while the patient is in the erect posture, the older physicians used to prescribe venesection in the standing position ad deliquium animi, the patients usually recovered on being laid on their back. That the functions of respiration and other spinal movements continued, showed that the brain function was alone arrested, and that the cord was isolated from its immediate co-operation with it. The above instances are of two kinds, and the »wdus operandi was different in them ; in normal sleep the ch-culation was arrested by the vaso-motor nerves, and probably by their centres becoming exhausted. The other case was due to a direct deficiency of blood produced artiQcially ; this loss must be sudden to produce the full effect, for a simply deficient supply, only lowers the activity of the cerebral function, affecting its energy especially in its func- tion of memory, or the reproduction of a former impression : as when anaemia occurs in exhaustive diseases after fevers, or in old age, when the neural energy or activity of neural discharge is lessened. But in certain other cases, the cerebral function is cut off by distinct lesion, as by compression of the brain, and in some cases temporarily by concussion also. The well authenticated cases of men who have lived for years in the state of mere autom- atons and have boon suddenly restored by trepliining are well MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 79 known ; in these cases the brain -function has been suppressed by compression on the cerebral surface. Many of those persons were able, nevertheless, to perform very complicated and higlily co-ordinated movements, but entirely without knowledge of the fact ; and on being restored, awoke with a period of their life completely a blank in memory. So that not only a lesion affect- ing the blood- supply, but one acting on the nerve-tissue more directly, throws the cerebrum out of action. Even without gross lesion, or mechanical injury, we ob- serve the same state of unconscious existence to be pro- duced by an excessive neural discharge, as in different kinds of epileptic seizure. In the cases of p^tit vial or grand vial, we have in fact the different functions of the brain as it were analyzed before our eye. In some slighter attacks there is, as Dr. Hughlings Jackson reasons, different degrees of discharge or discharges of different areas, and affecting portions of the brain in different and corresponding degree, producing in some a false sensation — an aura — in some, visions of colour; flashes of light; in some, a taste ; and going on to motor discharge in cramps, convulsions, &c., and when the discharge is from the highest centres, unconsciousness. The action of anesthetics might also be cited, but the exam- ples already instanced will suffice. The foregoing facts, at all events, show that consciousness is a cerebral function, and since without consciousness all the chief purely psychical functions could not exist, as Emotion, Volition, Perception, Memory, they afford proof, if any were wanting, that all the higher or true intellectual powers depend on the brain solely. There are, however, several functions to which we have not yet alluded, which require examination, and which depend on the action of the Brain and Cord conjointly or separately. The spinal cord, besides being the centre of reflex movements has, it is believed, also trophic nerves or centres to control many of the vaso-motor functions. We have less to do with these from our special point of view except to indicate how a moral impression may act through these centres in producing those perturbations that Bain points out as accompanying all emotional feeling, as blushing, acceleration of pulse, palpita- 8o LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. tion, micturition, &c., and which are doubtless all spinal; and hence they are more prone to occur in early life than in mature age, and in the woak-minded rather than what is called strong- minded ; or in other words, in those in which the lower centres are less under the control of the upper centres. But these in- dications come chiefly under what have been called the auto- matic movements, on which we must make some reference here. Automatic Movements. — It has been the fashion of late to class many of the spinal reflex movements under the head of auto- matic. The term automatic has, I consider, been an unfortu- nate introduction, and has come to mean in some people's notions, movements without cause, or without a substratum of a physiological process. When this term was first employed I beHeve it was apphed to those movements which, though at first obviously acquired by conscious efforts, and only by close attention, become by fre- quent practice and repetition more frequently executed without attention, or scarcely with consciousness, such as walking, or as in forming the letters in writing, striking the notes on a piano, which people, after a long practice, are able to do while talking or thinking of a perfectly different subject. The word " automatic"* is certainly not very appropriate for such performances, except it be used metaphorically, or as a simile signifjdng that persons know as little of their actions as would an automaton toy. It was only subsequently that the term was made to include other actions, such as breathing, car- diac and peristaltic movements, wdnldng, swallowing, coughing, flying, and such necessary functions which have the appearance of spontaneous initiation ; while the acquired movements first mentioned arc called secondarily automatic. The term in my opinion is a mistake and implies a power of which there is no proof, the words reflex or excito-motor introduced by Marshall Hall were applied or invented for these phenomena and especi- ally for the primary automatic. He showed in his lectures, which I attended, a frog. " You observe this frog, its voluntary and sensory functions are obvious. I ddviAe the spinal marrow below the occiput, with these scissors, all is still ; there is no • Lewes in a chapter ou Automatism remarks that the word "Automatic" is an unfortunate mctnplior wliicli has led to the theory of Automatism. MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 8l trace of spontaueoiis motion. The animal would remain in tins very form and position without change, until all signs of vitality were extinct. But now I pinch a toe with the forceps ; you see how both i^osterior extremities are moved. All is now still again, there is no spontaneous motion, ?io sign of ^min from the wound in the neck. It is without sensibility, without vohtion ; the power to move remaining, the will is extinct. I now pinch the integument. You observe the result, the immediate re- currence of excito-motory phenomena. I now destroy the whole spinal marrow with this probe. It is in vain that I pinch the toes, the animal, the limbs are motionless," (Lectures on the Nervous System, § 30). Such phenomena as these, which Dr. Marshall Hall quoted to explain what are now often called automatic actions, clearly are excited actions. The gradual sovereignty wliich the brain acquires, as it comes to maturity, over all spinal or excito-motory actions, is shown in various ways, and defective control is often exhibited when the brain is diseased as in insanity, but more distinctly is this action of cerebral control illustrated in certain lesions in which a physical separation of brain and cord occurs, and voluntary movements are annihilated, and all the reflex are in excess, a condition which is found in certain affections of the nervous system in which the reflexes are exaggerated. In man not only can the cerebrum control the reflex spinal movements, but it is obvious to everyone in his own person that it can initiate them. In ordinary cases it is probable that walking, for example, is mainly performed, as to its neural force, through the lower centres and the cord, that is, when one performs the feat without attending to it, when it is auto- matic according to the original meaning of that term. When a person in walking has to avoid certain obstructions the action becomes a conscious and a cerebral act, but it is very well known that in certain cases of compression of the brain, and in certain states of epilepsy, that complicated actions do occur quite unconsciously, as they do also in sleep-walking. But direct experiment has been invoked to illustrate the same point. By removal of the cerebral hemispheres. Dr. Ferrier found in animals the result to be, that whereas an animal with " brain intact exhibits a varied spontaneity of actions " not 82 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. obviously conditionetl by present impressions on the organs of sense, after the removal, it moved only by excitation of its aflforent nerves, that is in other •words, its actions were reduced to simple reflex acts. He found that animals de- prived of the cerebral hemispheres besides being able to maintain their equilibrium, are also capable of locomotion in their usual manner. He also inferred from experiment (p. 69) that ani- mals deprived of consciousness by removal of the cerebral hemi- spheres gave indications of pain : the removal, "was found to have no effect on vision, nor on hearing, nor upon co-ordination and maintenance of the equilibrium, (p. 64, § 27.) It is not so, however, when certain lower centres or the cor- j)ora quadrigemina are u-ritated or removed, these con-espond to the optic lobes of inferior animals and constitute the chief part of their encephalon. Dr. Ferrier concludes by remarking that electrical irritation of the corpora quadrigemina gives rise to effects mainly of reflex character which depend on the trans- ference of irritation of sensory to motor centres. At this point, therefore, may we make the anatomical division between these lower centres and the higher centres existing in cerebral hemispheres. As regards the purely cerebral function the cerebral hemi- spheres have been .the subject of du-ect experiment in this coun- try and abroad; Dr. Terrier's work on the Brain gives the results of his o-\^ai investigation and that of others. His experiments are now well known, and speaking in very general terms, they showed that irritation of given points of the cerebral surface was uniformly followed by a certain motor act. I am disposed to bcHcve that with regard to the centres of special functions mapped out on the hemisj)heres, the proper conclusion to be drawn from a consideration of all the circum- stances connected with them, is that such centres are the usual foci of given movements. To say that they are the real organs of the particular movements, is going beyond what experimenta- tion proves, and beyond what I believe is claimed for them. For firstly, as a pi-inciple of uexwe action, it is well recognized that the current is continuous, that is, a sensory nerve at the peri- phery communicates through its central organ to a motor nerve going to the periphery, in other terms, there is afferent centrum MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 83 and efferent, and motion must follow excitations in any part of this tract. Excitation of tlie peripheral termination of the sensory terminates in movement, so the excitation of any part of the nervous loop produces the same effect. Of course this was well known to the experimenter, and all that the experiments can bear out, is that certain points indicated in different parts of the cex-ebral surface produce the most uniform results. Again, the chief thing that the experiments on the lower animals show, is the movement of limbs, eyeballs, ears, etc., all of which phenomena together will go to form a very scanty catalogue of mental functions. It is not, I am quite aware, supposed that they do show psychical functions. Yet, the parts connected with the limb movements, occupy a great portion of the whole, while limb movements are but primitive nerve func- tions compared to psychical. These mapped out centres, therefore, can only be looked upon as points on the usual paths, along which there is least resist- ance, and are the mechanism by which the tendency for a nerve current to travel in the paths previously traversed is shown anatomically. And that they are only such is corroborated by various well known facts. It has been observed, that though destruction of a centre is followed by paralysis of the particular function in the lower animals, they soon re-acquire that function. Again, if these particular points were so many centres — bo many little brains, one would expect them to be symmetrically placed, which, as is well known, is not the case. (Ferrier, § 89). To quote authority on the question. Dr. Hughlings Jackson wi-ites {West Fading Bejwrts, vol. vi., p. 283), "I have never be- lieved in what I call abrupt localisations. I do not believe, for example, that there is any part where the movements of the hand are solely represented ; but that there are numerous parts where these movements have special or leading representations ; there being in each, as the term ' leading ' implies, a represen- tation of other parts serving subordiuately with the leading movement. I have never acceded to the opinion that speech is to be localized in any one spot, although I do believe most firmly that the region of Broca's convolutions is, so to speak, a2 84 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. the yellow spot for epoecli, as the macula lutea is the centre of the greatest acutcucss of vision, although the whole retina sees. "To take an arbitrary and Umited illustration. Supposing one centre in Hitzig and Ferrier's regions to represent the hand ; another, especially the face ; another, the foot ; I should beheve that each one of them represented all the movements of the chest." Two main conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing: — 1. It has been well estabhshed that, as a rule, the cutting off or separation of the cerebrum from the cord, as it were emanci- pates the spinal cord from control ; in the lesions of the motor cerebral centres, the reflex actions of the extremities are increased, as in lateral sclerosis of the cord, when all the re- flexes are exaggerated. This is evidence of the continuous con- trol of lower centres which is exercised by the cerebrum. 2. On the other hand, the control exercised by the cerebral centres over the purely spinal functions varies, not only on account of the degree of development of the ccrebi-al organ, as shown in the gradual perfectioning of the cerebrum fr-om child- hood to manhood ; it differs also almost naturally in different individuals, also in youth and in the sexes, and varies with the cultivation and education of the mental faculties. But while the control is almost complete in regard to certain functions, over some other functions it is Umited, or over which we can exercise control partially, as the resijfration, the move- ments of laughter, of the bladder and bowels. When we say we control an act, the act is necessarily attended by consciousness ; but consciousness is no necessary adjunct to movement as has been shown, though it is of vohtion. Intellectual faculties and their phjfuical basis. Our physio- logical examination of the functions performed by the nerv- ous apparatus so far, has related only to two faculties — Sensation and Motion, whence come then the other mental faculties, as Judgment, Ideas, Thought, &c., or what are called the iisychical functions. Motion and sensation appear no more than functions of a sim- ple kind, and which we have seen the spinal cord to be capable of performing. No satisfactory proof exists, however, that the purely spinal functions have the attribute of consciousness connected MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 85 with them. It is true that the tactile surfaces of the hmhs give rise to a conscious impression, but only when the way is open to the cerebrum, that is, that the cord is intact, and so can convey the sensation upward. And though the origin of all the sensory nerves called special are within the cranium, anatomi- cally they are as much spinal as those of the tactile sensations of the trunk. We may take the faculty of consciousness as the general re- presentative of the psychical functions. Since it is a necessary concomitant to such functions which are usually called the psy- chical functions. In all the recent investigations of the brain functions, the results gleaned, and they are not few, relate, it will be seen on examination, but to the two main and general functions of (1) Sensation, (2) Motion. Some psychologists, the so-called followers of Locke, have no difficulty in ascribing all the intellectual attributes to sensation primarily ; but Locke, notwithstanding what has been said to the contrary, also admitted a subsequent operation of the mind which he called reflection, and which he clearly intimated was a mental jjrocess. The dual or sensori-motor process, is not dissi- milar from the dual process of reflex action generally, or in fact to the law that sensation is allied to motion ; or thinking to action : and in thinking and acting we embrace pretty well all the intel- lectual faculties. But, Nihil in intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu, requh'es an addition to indicate the mental process of "reflection," admitting the axiom that the environment acts upon the organism, the effect of which is distributed throughout the system, we have to explain the anatomical substratum of the after mental process from which abstrac- tions result. Abstractions as explained in a previous page are composed of two or more sensations, that is, of present and past effects of the environment. We have to explain how the previous impressions remain to form the gi-ound-work for the compari- son of past with present efiects or to ascertain the seat of the persistence of previous impressions. This we fix to be in the cerebral hemispheres as one seat, since as ah'eady shewn, con- scious impressions are thus located : is there any other organ 86 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. in wLich former impressions are Btored ? The impression, Low- ever, 18 only one half of the interaction between the environment and the organism. We have to take into consideration the efifect (say a motion) also, and viewing the two together it seems to show that spinal impressions are also stored, as well as cere- bral or conscious impressions (ideas). "There is a memory," says Griesiuger, "for the spinal cord." It may be confusing to call the faculty a memory, but undoubtedly the impressions on the spinal centres persist as well as those of the cerebral centres. The persistence of an impression is due, we may almost say undoubtedly, to the action of the ganglion cell. "NVe have seen how the uem-al current is arrested in passing through a gan- glion. We can trace the action through various phases of completion.' In the lowest organisms, the whole of the impression is ex- pended in movement, the simplest reflex action is the result, there is no ganglion and no evidence of any influence left behind. We next find traces of influences of former impressions — evidence of memory in the animal's acts. As we proceed higher, co- ordination of movements is observed in a rudimentary state, and repetition of the same series of movements. Then we find newly-combined movements acquired, and the fact that the same are often repeated in the same order, gives evidence of an effect of a former impression persisting. These may only amount to a function, or disposition of the neural current or efferent, to pass along lin s of least resistance, or along lines previously traversed ; and that such disposition does exist as a fundamental property of the organism, rests upon the same basis, as that the organism is acted upon at all by the environment. Undoubtedly these two properties have abundant proof of existence from observation, viz. : — 1. The persistence of an impression, which is connected with afferent current. 2. The tendency to pass in tracks previously traversed con- nected with the eflerent. The former property may be exercised consciously or uncon- sciously ; in the former case it is in a function of the highest centres ; in the latter, it is connected with the lower. MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 87 If we admit these premises we sliall have no difficulty in allow- ing that the numher of stored impressions may be limited only by the capacity of the organ ; nor of understanding those curi- ous phenomena called automatic actions. If we admit that the impression of an object leaves on our conscious memory the form and other qualities of an object, or the pleasure or pain attending a previous action, we need have no difficulty in under- standing how an action once performed by us may be easier than an entirely new action, since the process has already passed in given tracks. Now, these two properties — the one cerebral, the other spi- nal—merge into each other, the cerebral governs, and as a rule, in man it is always supreme ; but in certain functions it, as it were, abrogates its influence to the cord. As example, with such actions as reading, writing, piano playing, and the like, and even walking, the first efforts are through the cerebral organ, and are therefore all conscious move- ments ; but after long practice the whole process is rele- gated to the lower centres. Even co-ordination of movement probably passes through the same stages, especially let us say, in such a case as learning to dance — and indeed, in most of the motor functions, as in various games, shooting, and in manual work of all kind, which come to be performed,, as it is called, automatically, or from the lower centres without reaching or invoking the influence of the cerebrum at all. These functions, however, are mechanical. We have to account for the process on which some that are deemed higher mental attributes depend, as the reasoning faculty. Emotion, Volition, &c. In investigating these, which are called the psychical func- tions, we are unable to resort to direct experiment ; but some light is thrown upon the subject by the phenomena of disease, and introspection of ourselves. We cannot anatomize the origin of an idea, nor detect the organism which gives rise to the faculty of judging ; but the examination of these various facul- ties shows their close connection with sensation and motion. The law seems without exception, that each sensation results in a motor impulse of some kind, and in a very large number of instances the motor impulse is speech — not always audible, but 88 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. still speech. " There is every reason to believe," says Prof. Bain, " that there is in company with all our mental processes, an unbroken material succession. From the ingress of a sen- sation to the outgoing responses in action, the mental succes- Bion is not for an instant dissevered from a physical succession. A new prospect bursts upon the view. There is a mental re- sult of Sensation, Emotion, Thought, terminating in outward displays of speech or gesture." (Bain, Body and Mind, p. 131). But with regard to those so-caUed higher mental faculties — Ideas, Judgment, the power of reasoning, &c., one school have no hesitation in declaring that these are wholly founded upon a basis of sensation. This view, by excluding the influence of innate or organic influences, is considered too restricted by another school. Much of the misunderstanding here arises probably out of the inexactness of words which are employed to define the significa- tion of the authors. The force of an impression is doubtless considerably modified by the organism. A man's disposition, inclinations, tastes, and desires, are certainly considerably in- fluenced by his conformation, or variation of his organism; but if these which influence a man are not through sensation, they at least quaHfy or are allied to sensation. Hereditary tenden- cies also modify a man's organic tendency, and in this way are elements in any impression or action. To say an impression is modified is to admit that an idea re- sulting from such impression is also modified bj' the recipient organism, and so necessarily must subsequent ideas in suc- cession. Idea, then, acts upon idea, and a new idea or judgment re- sults. All reasoning, writes Mr. Spencer, is definable as the classi- fication of relations. The process of reasoning has for its object the forming of judgments. Notwithstanding the more modern theory of inhibition and centres of inhibition, there can be no doubt, I think, that one sensoiy impression may be arrested in its consummation into a motion, or say into a verbal utterance, by a stronger impression in an opposite direction. Motives for and against every act MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 8g occur quickly on each other. This is oljservccl in the lowest organisms, even in the caterpillar there is a choice or selection of food. " The condition on "which every creature exists is that it ehaU act in special ways under special stimuli ; that contact with nutritive matter shall modify its actions in a manner dif- ferent from that in which contact with innutritive matter modi- fies them." (Spencer, Principles of Psycliology, p, 331). lu other words, there is in the organism a special faculty for the reception of one kind of stimulus in preference to another, and also there is a variation in degi'ee of power of different stimuli to effect the organism. Two stimuli, therefore, occurring in close sequence may influence each other, the second may over- whelm or merely modify or change the direction of the other. The stimulus may be an external one, or internal, or the remembrance of a previous excitant — as the externals are in a continuous state of action on the organism, there must be a continuous comparison taking place, resulting in a continuous conflict of ideas. The outcome of this weighing of one impression against another (this deliberation) may be an overt act, as a bodily move- ment, or an expression of speech ; or it may be a subdued act, or an unspoken formula of words. The comparison thus made is a process of reasoning ; the result, a judgment ; if expressed aloud it becomes a statement, if logically formulated a syllogism. But for the process to be one of reasoning, it must be at- tended with consciousness — it is thus an operation of the highest centres and it is mentally a comparison of impressions, and quality is compared with quality, present impression with j)re- vious impression — thus, abstract ideas are the result. In other words, ideas are collected into groups, and thus are more easily dealt with. To group is to classify. A gi'oup, or class, forms a general idea ; all general ideas are necessarily abstract, and they are composed of the abstract qualities of the objects grouped. In classifying the animal kingdom, itself a group of objects, into MammaUa, &c., it is one quality, that of the development of the mammae. Having thus enclosed a variety of objects under one class, and noted it by a name, henceforth, the name becomes the symbol of a general idea, and remains as an element in subsequent mental opera- go LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. tious — a stored feeling or power, to affect a motor outgoing here- after. A higher generahzation of objects is carried on by the recall of a former impression for comparison : this former impression appears to be recalled by a likeness or contrast in character or position, in time or place of occurrence. One idea is brought to mind by the process called the association of ideas — a quahty in any object, which is an abstract idea, spontaneously recalls the concrete of which it was an abstract — it also recalls other concretes, in which the same abstract quality was associated, thus is awakened, by every new product from sensation, a whole series of ideas, i.e., impressions, which occupy and pass through the mind, and which have a tendency, sooner or later, to ter- minate in a movement of some kind of speech or action. This law of association of ideas appears to have much to do with recollection. While the persistence of the impression, which appears to be attributable to the functions of the cerebral cortex or ganglions, is at the basis of memory, the recall is influenced by the law of association. That the impression pro- duced upon the organism from without gives rise to ideas, that this effect is more or less persistent, and that a former impres- sion may modify the effect of a subsequent impression is readUy intelhgible. The simple analysis of observations support such an explanation of the formation of mental products, but our present enquu-y has for its main object, to trace the mechanism on which the ti'ue psychical processes depend. Our review, hitherto, of the facts of the intellectual faculties has been chiefly analytical. We may proceed to investigate the question synthetically. 2. Syyithetical cxaminativn of the basis of the psychical functions. — For this purpose we may examine the phenomena historically, and examine their evolution in human physiology in relation with that of the organism. As already shown, the first indications of nervous functions in the child are all purely reflex, in other terms spinal, and are per- formed with scarcely a scintilla of consciousness ; and anatomy shows us that the spinal cord is much more advanced in structure than the cerebrum : nevertheless there are many complex move- ments perfectly performed, showing a considerable advance in the MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. QI function of co-ordination. The act of eiicldng must bring into play a very complex system of actions; and we know, as already quoted, that this occurs entirely independent of cerebral influ- ence, and can occur without the existence of a cerebrum. The same may be said of other movements ; if a finger be placed in the infant's hand it is grasped, and in the respiration, crying, action of sphincters, eyelids, &c., and in tonic condition of some at least of the muscles. "With the growth of the child, the connection of the cord with the cerebral hemispheres gradually takes place as pointed out on page 74. I quote the following from M. Charcot's volume, translated by Dr. Hadden : " The cerebrum of the young child bears little resemblance to the adult, except in its external configuration. It is a soft organ of uniformly grey colour, the grey and white matter being intermingled ; the neuroglia predominates every- where ; the reticulum is homogeneous and less distinctly fibril- lated than in the adult. The nerve tubes are universally absent or at any rate barely represented in outline." " To sum up, the cerebrum in the new-born child is still, as it were, in a rudi- mentary condition, whereas the medulla oblongata and spinal cord ah-eady present the characteristic features of the adult state" (p. 160). "You see, gentlemen," concludes M. Charcot, " that the cerebrum at this age has, as yet, no existence ; it is from a triple point of view — anatomical, functional, and patho- logical, an indifferent organ." M. Parrot's researches, as quoted by M. Charcot, show at seventeen days old the infant's brain in its anterior and posterior regions presented an almost uniform dark-grey colour. It is only at the end of the month that the substance of the occipital lobe begins to grow white, and it is not until four months afterwards, that is to say, towards the fifth month, that the anterior regions commence to undergo development, which is not completed until about the ninth month. Such being the anatomical condition of the human infant, who, nevertheless, is able to perform several highly complex movements, and to begin to direct such movements, though im- perfectly, towards external objects. Still the earliest indications of mental functions are confined 92 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. to movements, and as early as the seveuteenth day M. Parrot waB able to trace the commencement of a motor tract through the central ganglionic masses. •* The median or sub-Rolandic part of the cerebrum is marked by the presence of nervous fibres en- sheathed in myeline. By treating the parts with osmic acid the myehne become stained, and are thus rendered apparent. These tracts are the commencement of the pyramidal tracts, and their development starts from two points, according to M. Parrot, " the one situated in the central nuclei is the first in age, the other has its starting point in the grey matter of the Eolandic convolution, otherwise called the motor zones," so that, " of all parts of the hemispherical cortex, the so-called motor regions are developed earliest, and they are the first to enter into rela- tion with the bulbo-spinal system, through the medium of the pyramidal tracts." (p. 177). In correspondence with the anatomical facts, we observe the first indications of volition or cerebral acts in motor functions. " In man," writes Dr. Ferrier. p. 205, " disorganisation of the cortical centres, or the above parts, causes lasting paralysis of voluntary motion on the opposite side of the body." Now, though the motor functions play an important part in all mental phenomena, and especially when we include speech, still our examination would not be complete until we take into consideration certain functions under-lying speech, as thought, &c. We must bear in mind that many of the purely reflex, that is, purely spinal movements, are not perfected at once. Co- ordination of the limb movements are not perfected until con- siderable advance is made in the cerebral development, and still later, are the directed movements. The child's arms and legs have a certain amount of co-ordination soon after birth ; they have a certain feature alike in all infants. Its earhest attempts to seize an object are at first futile, and resemble the irregular movements of lateral or disseminated sclerosis of the cord, while the movements of respiration are regular, and calm, and per- fectly co-ordinated ; though they are thrown into over-action very readily, as when the child cries ; — the nerve-tissues are less stable, and excited movements more readily induced. This unstable condition of what is called the neural dis- MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. 93 charges, is ameliorated as age increases ; but childhood is the period when irregular discharges, epilepsies, are frequent. With the gradual growth of the cerebrum, we may observe the gradual increase of the mental faculties ; at first, simple concrete ideas are acquired — mere impressions through the spe- cial senses, the organs of special sense being perfected at a very early stage. The knowledge of objects seen, the power of discrimination of sounds, the musical talent, is also early shown. In certain instances, the condition may be arrested at this point. By too early synostosis of the bones of the cranium, the en- largement of the cerebral organ is stopped^ and the child remains au idiot, and in many other instances probably the develop- ment is finished at different degrees of its growth, and different mental capacities result. It may be mentioned in passing, that imperfect co-ordination of movements is a frequent effect in idiocy. Up to the age of puberty, the knowledge chiefly acquired is a simple accumulation of facts, and ordinary education up to very recent periods, in many instances did very little to cultivate a faculty for comparing facts. The intellect is better brought out in the children's association with their elders, which is the natural mode, and we perceive the power of this in the effects of the gamin or street boy. The child, however, in spite of his education, acquires the power of comparing or judging in the playground, and obtains there an experience, which children kept more strictly perhaps seldom acquire so thoroughly. In the human subject there are but few complex actions per- fected at birth, the chief have to be acquired afterwards ; but if we take two of the most important, walking and speaking, we find that both of them have to be acquh-ed subsequently, and learnt too by a very slow process, it is clear also that they have to be acquu'ed through a cerebral process, i.e., through the organ the latest in developing. With respect to speech especially, we have clear evidence that the cerebrum is the organ utilized, we know that in the majority of instances the motor centre is in a x^articular convolution of the frontal region as now fully established by pathology. Speech may be viewed from many points as : — 1. Its performance as a motor act — this requires co-ordination 94 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. of Bovoral movcmonts, as of the respiration, lip, tongue, glottis, all of wliicli have to be regulated and co-ordinated. "We know that the ordinary movements of expiration are possible through the spinal centres, as are also many movements of the lips and ton- gue which are used in sucking. What then is the relation of Broca's convolution to the motor spinal centres? It is evident that in the first place the higher centre modifies the lower and adjusts the various actions, the process is learnt ; it is a conscious operation, it is only acquired by frequent trials and failures ; this is one view, it may be called the efferent part of the opera- tion, 2. From another point, the sound, including its tone, note, tim- bre, etc., has to be predetermined, modulated according to the emotions, and this may be, and at first is, an unconscious out- come of all the emotions awakened by the same cause that in- duces speech. When people are overcome with emotion, the speech is altered ; there are in other words two causes exciting the motor act, and the motor result is influenced accordingly. The emotional tone can be imitated voluntarily by the actor, ■when he recalls or assumes a painful incident. From both aspects speech is evidently a cerebral act, at first a slow and difficult motor act, each step in it making an impression sufficiently strong to be 'attended by consciousness, by frequent repetition the neural current passes along a line of feeble resistance, the steps are easier, awaken no, or scarcely any, con- sciousness, so far as the operation is concerned the motor act passes quickly to the medulla and to the motor mechanism through well co-ordinated tracks, so quickly as to become like a reflex act, and like it especially in awakening little conscious- ness, and this may occur without reference to the subject matter of speech. After constant use of the same formula of words, the words may be repeated in the manner called automatical. It is known as a phenomenon in aphasic patients, that they are capable of using phrases of simple exclamation, the priest, it is said, sometimes can repeat his paternosters without a conscious- ness of the meaning of the words. So perfectly is then the transit thi-ough the cerebral region, that perhaps the impulse never reaches the highest centre. We have diagrams in books to show bow a neural current may pass, as it were by a short MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. g5 cut, directly through a lower centre from the afferent. These dia- grams are hypothetical only, and it is difficult to say whether, as it were, they pass by the higher centre, or pass through it too rapidly to leave any persistent impression behind. It would be more in accordance with other facts that have been observed, to assign to the speech-centre the higher office of being the centre of various neural currents collected from all 'sources, and to be the arena in which the ultimate struggle, between contrary inducements culminate in an efferent stimulus to motion ; this arena, will then be a centre, where all the stored impressions converge, and are co-ordinated, and brought into order. The Broca convolution appears to be essentially the "way out " for the motor action of sjDeech, not necessarily the centre of thought, which probably has a wider field ; aphasic patients can think or even in some cases write. Ideas are probably derived from wider areas, that is from the centres of auditory, visual and tactile impressions. It would seem that in the case of speech, though the move- ments all pass through a lower centre, they are never wholly relegated to the class of reflex or absolutely unconscious acts. It may be asked, are other kinds of movements ? In walking, there is little doubt that a man may walk while unconscious, but the power of walking, the art of walking is an wholly acquu'ed power, and one which requu'es much attention. It is coeval with known cerebral growth, as shown above. After a few years the feat is performed entu'ely without attention, and clearly it is du-ected by currents passing down the spine ; the alternation of the move- ments is also first acquired by careful practice, the infant has at first great difficulty in alternating its limbs, in after hfe it is performed apparently entirely automatically, the co-ordination appears a property of the cord, though at first acquired through a higher centre, and in this again it would seem that the action first performed by a purely cerebral act at length never reaches the higher centres, but that the excitant by a cross or more direct channel reaches the motor centres. It must be owned, however, that there is no anatomical proof of this, but here again a more satisfactory explanation would seem to be that the neural cur- rent was direct from the brain, though from a lower co-ordinat- ing centre in the brain. g6 Ll-CTURKS ON MENTAL DISEASE. Wo know tliiit injury in the Eolandic convolutions produces hemiplegia, though the co-ordination of the limb movements may be still purely spinal, since in the disease disseminated sclerosis of the cord, the co-ordination of the limbs is a marked symptom. But if walking is automatic, that is, reduced to an uncon- scious act, it is probably also always cerebral, the track of the neural current is easier in one direction than another, the combination of movements have also a tendency to move in old lines. Every one knows how difficult certain un- accustomed actions are in comparison to the accustomed, such as to rotate a leg in a different circle to the arm, to button the coat with the right hand, etc., the law that the neural current has a tendency to pass in a track previously traversed is sufficient to explain the phenomena. So long as the track is ox^en, the traversing of the current awakes no consciousness, makes no impressions, recalls no associations in the cerebral hemispheres, but directly this path is disturbed — if a man kicks his toe against a stone in his path — the consciousness is aroused, a vivid impression is made of intensity enough to ex- cite attention, to bring into action all associated impressions the remanents of former impressions. If disease in the motor tract occur the performance of walking is difficult, in certain cases of ataxy in which the afferent columns of the cord are at fault, the patient must look at his feet to direct them, that is, he must call in the aid of the cerebrum. The various actions frequently performed may awaken httle or almost no consciousness, but they are not therefore reflex in the sense of being necessarily spinal, though the spine has func- tions probably which assist in both voluntary and involuntary actions. Thus it appears probable, as suggested by Dr. Wiglesworth in a paper read at Liverpool in August, 1883, '■■ that in the cerebrum itself there are centres above centres, the one con- trolling the other, as the cerebrum controls the spinal centres ; and analogy, which bears out this fact, would also lead us to conclude that some of these may form the anatomical basis of certain so-called automatic acts, of those acts in other words * Published in Jounuil of Mental Science, Jan., 1884, MENTAL PROCESSEvS OR DYNAMICS. 97 which are performed without consciousness, or only semi- consciously, such as the formation of words in speech, &c. Dr. Wiglesworth's words are as folloAvs : — " The nervous arc consisting of afferent and efferent fibres and intervening cor- puscle, shows us the unit out of which the nervous system ia built up ; and it is by the combination of two or more such reflex arcs, fibres from which meet in a common centre, that the highest nervous centres are elaborated. The union of a number of nerve fibres from a number of nerve cells in one centre, permits of the action of such nerve cells being con- trolled and co-ordinated by that centre ; and by the union of a number of such centres of co-ordination in one higher centre, it is possible for the numerous plexuses of cells and fibres in- dividually combined in such lower centres of co-ordination, to be all co-ordinated together in such higher centres ; and the process of evolution implies a perpetual super-position of higher upon lower centres of co-ordination, so that what were at one stage of development, the highest centres, become at a more advanced stage subject to the control of still higher centres, and are therefore themselves relegated to an inferior position, so that when we reach the last term of evolution at present ex- pressed, we have an infinity of lower centres of co-ordination, controlled and co-ordinated by one or a few higher centres. These highest co-ordinating centres are of course the latest de- veloped. '' There are still some functions of the nervous system which will require a few words though they do not appear to be so ob- viously connected with the mental functions, viz., co-ordination, equilibriation, and muscular tone. With respect to co-ordination, from the often quoted fact, that a decapitated bird when thrown into the air can fly, that a headless frog can swim, and can even jump out of the water and climb up the side of the tank, it would seem that the co-ordina- tion of movements in them depended upon the cord. Whatever may occur in these animals may be due to the deficient differen- tiation of function. In the more highly developed, the experi- ment is not available ; although it has been established (Ferrier, op. cit., p. 64) " that animals deprived of the cerebral hemispheres, besides being able to maintain their equilibrium, are also capa- gS LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. ble of locomotion in their normal manner" but this applies only, of course, to co-ordination of limb movements. Equilibriation of course must be dependent upon co-ordination, the two functions therefore may be spoken of together, though as Dr. Ferrier remarks, one " can conceive such a case, as an animal which could maintain its equilibrium, but could not sufficiently co-ordinate its movements to walk." Disorders of equilibrium are found to follow upon lesions of the cerebellum, and that in a very regular manner, which may be stated in very general terms to correspond to the seat of the lesion ; when the injury is on the mesial hue, the disturbances are of no marked importance ; when the anterior part of the middle lobe is injured, the animal has a tendency to fall forward, when the posterior part is injured, to fall backward, lesion of the lateral lobes, causes a tendency to turn on the axis, usually towards the side injured. Hence, the cerebellum, seems to be "a complex arrangement of individually differentiated centres, which regulate the various muscular adjustments to maintain the equilibrium, the action being a reflex one, and the excitant or afferent the disturbance of equilibrium in the various directions." (Ferrier). This is corroborated by the observation, that the balancing of the body is a much more complex act in man, and in man is found the most complex cerebellum. Though Dr. Ferrier mentions the displacement of equihbrium as acting as a stimulus to the special centre which calls into play the compensatory action, it seems equally well established that other factors exist in the " tactile, visual and labyrinthine im- pressions." In an excito-motor or reflex act such as exists in cerebellar function, a lesion of afferent centre, or efferent, may disturb the equilibrium. Such occurs in cases of locomotor ataxy when both co-ordination and equilibriation are frequently fouud to be affected, as through a tactile lesion ; or again in cases of laby- rinthine affections (Meniere's disease), producing giddiness and reeling, or by rotation of the body, as familiar in waltzing, caus- ing a slight staggering, attended with giddiness. The tactile, visual and labyrinthine causes, however, are attended with con- Bciousness, but in certain cases the disturbance is unconsciously MENTAL PROCESSES OR DYNAMICS. QQ produced. This is evidently caused through the free cotnmuni- catiou of the cerebellum and cerebrum through the peduncles. Tone. — This word is used to signify a condition of the muscu- lar system, and it depends on the spinal cord. The experiment quoted from Marshall Hall in illustration of the functions of the cord, in which the decapitated frog continued to respond to an excitant, until its spinal cord was destroyed, is an illustration of the influence of the cord in producing tone. It will be remembered that certain muscles are normally in a persistent state of contraction, while others contract only on a stimulus being applied. In the muscles which keep the jaw closed and the sphincters of the rectum and bladder, tonic ac- tion is persistent; but when cut off from nervous influence, they relax as in facial and vesical paralysis. There are other conditions of tonic action which are to be seen in the state of antagonism which is constant between the flexors and extensors, these also are disturbed by certain spinal diseases, when the limbs become contracted. "What is termed automatic action," says Dr. Ferrier "is in great measure reflex action of a constantly operative'nature." {Functions of Brain, ^. 21). Similarly reflex operation may be invoked to explain the tonic conditions of all muscles, including those of the system of the small arteries. It is well estabhshed that in certain morbid conditions of the spinal cord, there is a tendency to what is called the foot clonus action, it appears to me that this is due to a disturbance of the balanced state of tension and contraction of the antagonistic muscles, the flexors and extensors for example ; and is not a like cause to be found for other irregular movements as in shaking palsy, tremors, etc. ? It has been attempted to be shown that there is in muscles a natural or inherent and independent condition of tone, where an explanation in accordance with general laws is suflicient to ex- plain a phenomenon, it is at least gratuitous to seek for an ex- ceptional cause. " It is," says Mr. Lewes, " a rule always to prefer the simplest hypothesis compatible with the observed facta." m2 PART II. MENTAL DISEASE. Section I. Preliminary Remarks — Definition of Disease — Necessity of Classification — Pro. per basis of Classification — Classification adopted — Two classes, Idiopathic and Symptomatic — Consideration of Idiopathic Disease — Subdivision into two classes, Ordinary Insanity and General Paresis — Ordinary Insanity, description of, preliminary view of its nature, its stages, symptoms — First stage, progress and terminations, recovery, death, bodily symptoms — Second stage. Acute Mania, symptoms, mode of progress, terminations. As the first part of these Lectures has heen devoted to the con- sideration of Mind, this the second part will he occupied with a description of its Diseases and their Treatment. Before entering upon the description of the different forms of mental disease, it will he well to say a word concerning what is here meant, by the term Forms of Disease. By the word Disease, is meant the sum of aU the phenomena which are observed in a given case, including the first indica- tions of deviation from health, the evolution of the symptoms, their progress, order of succession, and mode of termination. No two cases are, it is true, exactly alike, yet they resemble one another, by theu* general characters, sufficiently to be grouped together. To group is to classify. We use classifica- tion merely to facihtate the study of disease, or as a kind of memoria technica, to assist us in obtaining a wider grasp of facts. In describing the characters of a group or class, the terms used must have a general or wide signification. So that pro- bably no single case, that is met with in practice, will correspond in all particulars to such a general description. FORMS OF DISEASE. 101 Such liai^peus even in examples of acute disease ; two cases of measles differ in many particulars, though the period occupied is but short. It is not surprising, therefore, that cases of insanity of the same artificial species, show consider- able variation, since their duration is so much longer. There- fore, in grouping cases of mental disease, a much wider latitude of variation of the phenomena must be allowed. On this account it is, perhaps, even more necessary, in order to obtain a grasp of those innumerable variations, to resort to a grouping of the whole into classes. Cases of mental disease vary much in their course or pro- gress. At one period, the subject will present phenomena totally different from the symptoms presented at a different period. I maintain, however, that the case must be considered to be of one species throughout ; such is the rule in general pa- thology and there are no grounds for having a different system in Insanity, however long the case may last. For a case to be placed under a different name, it should differ from all other cases, as distinctly as acute rheumatism from typhoid fever. The very object of investigating symptoms or groups of symp- toms, such as make up what we call a disease, is to trace and to follow the alterations that are going on within the organism. To know the changes that have taken place up to any given time is useful, but to know what is the next step, or what is likely to follow, is of greater importance. So to know a disease we must know its stages and its mode of progress, towards one goal or another. The study of disease must, then, be a study of a changing condition ; but great confusion must arise, if we isolate the dif- ferent changes or stages, and after disconnecting them, call them by fresh names and look upon them as fresh species of disease. This, however, is the course frequently foUowed by writers on mental disease, and which renders the hterature of the subject so complicated. The multitude of so-called diseases thus imported into the question, has necessitated systems of classification, which have become very various ; in reading the different treatises, Enghsh or foreign, one may at once perceive that most of the 102 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. varieties of disease are called according to eome prominent feature at the period ■when the case was first seen by the physi- cian, irrespective of its history or probable termination. Most of such varieties are in fact diseases of a day. Thus the classification of mental diseases really has become a prominent feature in the literature of our subject. But besides a classification for a systematic arrangement of insanity, as a part of a scientific pathology, every author al- most necessarily divides the subject, for the purposes of his own book, and to suit his own convenience. A classification of disease, nevertheless, is by no means an arbitrary matter, for the result or deductions Avill be very much influenced by the basis, which is chosen for forming the classi- fication upon, A multitude of facts or objects may be grouped in some way, upon almost any basis ; but the result will be in each case, according to the basis chosen. It is necessary, there- fore, to bear in view the object for which a classification is re- quired. In illustration of this, we might group plants into trees, ehrubs, and herbs ; or trees into deciduous and evergreen ; but the i)roduct in one case, would be only a grouping of the habits of plants, and the other, that of their vernation. The process would not convey to us, any knowledge of the family of plants, unless it could be shown, that a certain vernation or a certain habit, was always alhed with certain essential characters of the individual plant. I maintain, therefore, that the basis of a classification of disease, should be a grouping of essential characters of disease. The essential characters of a disease, speaking in general terms, are the symptoms and their evolution, progress, and mode of termination. It Ave group a certain number of cases, Avhich re- semble each other in these essential characters, it is as much as we can expect to accomplish. The symjitoms may vary more or less in general character, within such limits as will fairly ap- jiroximate the phenomena generally ; but after all, every disease must be considered in its entirety. A disease must be a single process to be worthy of a separate name. For the purpose of completing the literature of our subject, it may be necessary to describe the various systemB of classifi- FORMS OF DISEASE. IO3 cation, that have been proposed by different authorities ; but it will be better to defer this until the diseases themselves have been described. Of course every writer on the subject must have some kind of arrangement, but from among all the various systems of clas- eification proposed, I do not adopt any, for I do not consider they fulfil the desired object, of giving one general survey of the whole subject; and because, in my opinion, most of them are formed upon a totally wrong basis. The ground, on which I consider the classification should be formed, is some essential character of the morbid process pre- sent in its entirety, not, that is, upon any particular phase through which a certain case may pass, but rather upon the kind of morbid process which is at the root of the altered func- tions. I repeat ; a case of disease must be viewed, as a single process, from its first phenomena to its last. In grouping thus all the cases met with in Asylums, it will be found, that they may be divided into two grand divisions. It will be found that the disease in some is really idiopathic ; in other terms, it is distinct from all other known forms of dis- ease ; while, on the other hand, in the rest of the cases the mental symptoms are only a part of some other well-recognised malady, such as epilepsy, or organic disease of the brain, in which there happens to be much disturbance of the mental faculties. In the former cases the mental aberration is an at- tribute ; in the latter, an accident in the course of the disease. We have thus two grand divisions, viz., Division A, in which the mental symptoms are primary, or essential, or idiopathic ; and B, in which they are secondary, or symptomatic. This grand division (A), or the purely mental cases, may be further divided into two subdivisions, viz. (a), in which the cases depend upon a purely pathological change, or on what is really disease ; and (b), in which the mental symptoms are due rather to develojymental causes. In the former category (a) 1 can recognise as yet but two species morhi, viz. : — I. Ordinary insanity or insanity proper ; and II. General paresis. In the subdivision (h) there are also two kinds of cases ; (1), 104 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. in which the developmental anomaly is in original conforma- tion, or idiocy; and (2), in which it is due to decay, or senile imbecihty. This forms, therefore, the classification of all the cases of primary, or idiopathic insanity, and which may be clearer in the form of a table. Class A. — Idiopathic Disease. Subdi\'ision (aj — Pathological: 1. Ordinary insanity. 2. General paresis. Subdivision (b) — Developmental : 1. Idiocy. 2. Senile decay. The Class B — in which the mental phenomena are only symptomatic, or accidents, forms, perhaps, a smaller moiety of all the cases in asylums ; and the most frequently occurring kind of cases are the four following : — I. Epileptic insanity. II. Alcoholismus. III. Spinal disease, extending to the cerebral regions. IV. Organic disease of brain, as the result of apoplexy, etc. Or to arrange the .whole in a tabular form, it would be as below : — ^ . ,, , ., f 1. Ordinary insanity. 1.1 Morbid . . . I 2. General paresis. (A). iniOPATHIO ■< > g TTJogy 2. ( Developmental . \ ' a.,,-?-L (B) . — Symptomatic \ 4. Senility. 5. Epileptic insanity. 6. Alcoholismus. 7. Spinal diseases. 8. Organic cases. And this corresponds very closely to the result arrived at by the International Committee at Paris in 18G7. Class A. — Subdivision (a) — Pathological : "We commence then, with a consideration of the cases, which depend upon a true pathological cause, and which will give us therefore Disease in the_ purest signification of the term. FORMS OF DISEASE. IO5 According to my experience, the diseases as already stated are but two in number, viz : — - Ordinary insanity ; and General paresis. It will naturally occur to any one, at all conversant with the literature of the subject, to ask what becomes of the infinity of varieties, which one reads about. The terms in use are almost numberless ; M. Guislain in describing Mania as a disease, (which I do not), says: "Vingt trois formes de manie, sans compter plusieurs formes composees non indiquees, voila, me direz vous peut-etre, un bagage symptomalogique passablement lourd pour la memoir e." These so-called varieties, — to which distinct names have been given, are merely cases having some non-essential peculiarities in their course : the names attached are very arbitrarily chosen. Some are coined from a prominent symptom only, as klepto- mania, where the patient has a propensity to steal ; oinomania, dipsomania, erotomania, nymphomania, homicidal and suicidal mania, and several others of similar origin, which will be again alluded to in the sequel. There are besides, several other synonyms, for one and the same condition, all of which shall be alluded to in the descrip- tion of the chief variations in the course of the disease. Symptoms of ordinary insanity. — This is the disease which in its course, presents such varying phenomena, and has thus given occasion for multiplying the names. Its course is of very vari- able duration ; in acute cases it may last from three to six months only, in other cases it may last many years and con- tinue throughout the rest of a long Hfe, that is, from thirty to forty years. It is only very lately, that this disease has been differentiated from General Paresis ; this separation was first made, by the French pathologists, Dr. Calmeil being probably the earhest. In this country, these two diseases were still generally consi- dered to be mere stages or varieties of one disease, so lately as 1864 ; at which time I wrote a paper on the question, which was translated in the Annales Medico-Fsychologiqucs, in 18GG, by Dr. Koussillon. Before describing the symptoms of either disease in detail, it I06 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. may probably assist the memory, if I here state in a general way, what I believe to be the pathological difference, between the two diseases we are about to consider. In every mental act or act of cerebration, there are two chief agencies in operation; 1st, the nerve tissue; 2nd, the blood supply. A careful consideration of the early symptoms tends to show, that one disease commences through the first of these agencies ; the second through the other. To illustrate this, as briefly as possible, I will point to the well observed fact that the acts of cerebration can be distinctly affected through the blood, as by the injection of certain substances into the veins, and by the introduction of substances, as alcohol, into the system by the stomach ; and that while one agent will produce one effect, another agent causes a different result ; and in most of these, according to the quality of the agent employed, the effect is more or less transient. It is equally well known that disturbances of the digestion produce a depressing effect on the system.* Now, the early stage of ordinary insanity very closely resembles such a condi- tion. In nearly every case well marked symptoms of impaired digestion are present, and are the first to appear — such as capricious appetite, loaded tongue, flatulence, anxious feeling located at the praecordia", constipation, etc., all of which point to an error in the process of blood-making, though, as the mental symptoms increase, these may be lost sight of by the patient. • "So many alterations in the constitution of the blood, account for certain of the mental phases as the hypochondriacal and melancholic. "In relation to this, we may bear in mind the mental colouring, usually asso- ciated with certain states of toxa?mia, as for example, the depression attending cbolaeraia; the ill temper, anxiety, and depression of chronic lithffiniia, and the apathy and unconcern of pyiEinia- So also in phthisis, briglit, swift, and lively, as are often the mental powers in the early periods, — yet later, and when probably the blood is much altered — caprice, fickleness, variability and impatience are observed for more than the so-called spes phthisica." — (Dr. Mickle on General J'arahjsis, page 153). "Drs. Bucknilland Tuke refer to the case of a lady, whose character had always been distinguished for conscientiousness, whose religious education had been of a sombre kind, and who after suffering an attack of small-pox, attended with congestion of the brain, recovered with the natural bent of her disposition greatly altered." — (Hammond, Treatise on Insanity, p. 25). "The mental characteristics after cerebral haemorrhage, will be found to have undergone a radical change." — (Hammond, p. 24). ORDINARY INSANITY. lOJ And tlio mental symptoms at first closely resemble those of im- paired digestion. The mental symptoms are at first merely emotional ; they extend but slowly to the intellect and move- ments, and affect the latter, only occasionally. If, on the other hand, we trace a typical case of general paresis, we can trace from the commencement, or from a very early period, symptoms which embrace every artificial division of nerve force, as will be shown hereafter ; intellect, emotions, volitions, including also what used to be called sympathetic sys- tem or the nerves of organic control. At first all is excitement, and then soon all is feebleness ; while the general health, digestion, &c., remain unaffected. Ordinary insanity. — To avoid multiplying names already too numerous, I prefer this name to others that have been proposed, and in this term it is intended to include the disease through all its stages and variations. The disease has its well marked and definite symptoms and runs its course, in a manner which observation enables us to describe. It often extends over very long periods, so that it is perhaps difficult, for a single observer, to watch many cases from first to last; nevertheless, its course and progress are fairly well known by the labours of many different investigators. Like other diseases it may be artificially divided into separate stages, and this is useful for facilitating description, but such artificial divisions must not be looked upon as different species of disease. The course of ordinary insanity like every other malady, may progress in three or four ways ; it may terminate in recovery, in death, or by passing into a chronic condition — that is in three ways ; the fourth, may be in a certain periodical variation of its symptoms. Thus, a case in the primary attack commences by symptoms of melancholy ; these may, when successfully treated, pass off, and the patient recover, or the melancholic stage may be aggra- vated, and the patient die in this stage ; or if the patient does not die, — the disease may exhibit symptoms of violence and be- come acutely maniacal. There is no ground on this account to say, that the patient has a new disease, any more than the appearance of an eruption in an eruptive disease would be the io8 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. inauguration of a diflereiit kind of malady. A patient, without becoming maniacal Lowever, may continue melancholic, and the disease become chi-onic. The case of the patient, who has passed into a condition of mania, may also become chronic in that stage, and he may recover or die. Next the chronic case may alternate in different waj's, between a melancholic and maniacal condition ; and lastly if the patient does not die in this stage, or recover, the chances of which would be shght, he may pass into a condition of imbecility or dementia. The following table is given to render these changes more clearly traceable. DIAGRAM OF THE EVOLUTION OF ORDINARY INSANITY. First Stage. Melancholia Second Stage.. .> -< .M. Third Stage. Mania. -M.. Chronic Chronic Alternating. Ma nia Melanc ;holia .1^ Fourth Stage. Imbecility. and Dementia. _WJ ORDINARY INSANITY FIRST STAGE. lOQ In adopting the usual course of dividing the disease into stages, m the above diagram, I have indicated four epochs in the progress of a case. It must not be inferred, however, that there are well defined lines of demarcation between the stages into which the case is divided. In most cases one division may run into another in a manner that no separation could be made. The first stage in Ordinary Insanity, may be called the stage of Acute Melancholia. It presents five sets of symptoms, namely; 1. Depression of spirits. 2. Morbid apprehensions. 3. Alteration of affections and moral instincts. 4. Illusions. 5. Alterations of motility. These are of course general terms only, under which many concrete facts are grouped; and it will be seen, as the symptoms are described in detail, that they include all the phenomena. It may be premised of all of them, that they are to a very large degree connected with the emotions. The feelings at aU events take precedence in the symptomatology of the disease in this stage. Depression of sjnrits. — This is of course an abstract and general term, and serves to include a large number of par- ticular phenomena. It has reference entirely to states of emotion. Emotions (see ante, pp. 21 and 41) may be divided into painful, and pleasurable. Depression of spirits of course, is connected with the former only, and it would seem that the impression of pain or pleasure is in direct ratio to the variety and modifications of the sensations produced in the mind, without reference to the kind or quality of the excit- ant. If the organ is unimpressionable, the natural variation of ideas cannot take place, the ideas will be monotonous. It does not of course always require an external object to produce aU the changes of thought and emotion in the mind, a memory will equally act ; and from this source it is chiefly, perhaps, that the variety is supplied. These stored ideas may be faulty, or there may be an absence of fresh ideas from recent sensation, owing to the condition of disease. The sources of misery or depression of spirits, are thus con- no LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. nected with as great a variety of subjects as ideas themselves are ; the degree of pain will vary also in degree or intensity ; as from that slight state described by Sir B. Bi'odie, {Psycholo- gical Inquiries, p. 120). He wrote, " On some occasions I have laboured under depression of spirits, having what I call an abstract feeling of melancholy, there being no external cause to which it can be attributed ; and it being at the same time, as far as I can judge, not connected with any derangement of any of the animal factors." A degree of depression is apt to occur after an unusually pro- longed state of pleasure, after fatigue and certainly, as is well known, after the exaltation produced by inebriation. A gloomy view of every thing sometimes is felt from slight indisposition and debility on first awaking in the morning. Each circumstance reflects some impending harm or inconveni- ence — things seem to be all " going wrong," and which after the bath and breakfast, spontaneously right themselves, and the evil forecasts evaporate. These are all doubtless of the same source as the graver and more permanent degrees of depression, which constitute true melancholia or insanity. The ingravescence is gradual in all the cases, the descrip- tion of the state of Hamlet's mind, gives a graphic and very accurate picture of the mind in the early stage of mental dis- ease — "I have of late (but wherefore I know not) lost all my mirth, foregone all custom of exercise ; and indeed it goes so heavily with my disposition, that this goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory — this most excellent canoj^y, the air, look j'ou this brave overhanging firmament, this majesti- cal roof fitted with golden fire, why it appears no other thing to me than a foul and pestilent congi'egation of vajiours." This feeling of melancholy, also so fascinates the subject of it, that he is loath to endeavour, by any voluntary eflfort, to shake it off; "thus much," says old Burton, "we may say of melancholy; that it is most pleasant at first, hlanda ah initio, a most dehghtsome humour to be alone, dwell alone, walk alone, meditate alone. He in bed whole days, dreaming awake as it were, and frame a thousand phantastical imaginations unto themselves." The depression often exists for long periods and even becomes habitual, without encroaching upon the higher intellectual facul- ORDINARY INSANITY FIRST STAGE. Ill ties. The depression is a state only of the feehngs, or moral faculties ; patients exhibit even at a comparatively advanced stage of melancholy, perfect mental lucidity, they can carry on their affairs, perform the functions of high offices of state, or in commerce, and without evident deterioration, particularly when their own feeling or interests are not greatly implicated. The characteristics of this condition may be summed up in the general terms of : — Taciturnity, and love of solitude. Indifference to every thing. Such is the state of mind at the commencement of the dis- ease ; the consideration of the bodily symptoms, for the sake of clearness, will be reserved. Morbid apprehensions. — The second set of phenomena which I have included under the general term Morbid Apprehension, is of even more varied character, and it succeeds or follows upon the state of depression, or rather becomes added to it, for the depression persists ; both depression and apprehension are alike connected with Emotions, and are but morbid states of the Emotions. Morbid apprehensions take many and often very phantastic forms, they may be considered under two heads. 1. Apprehensions connected with the present life. 2. Apprehensions connected with the future state. With regard to apprehensions of the first kind, one of the most frequent perhaps, is a fear of impending ruin, of poverty, or injuries ; in some cases, the patients express a sensation of fear without being able to state its nature— the sensation is then more of a bodily pain and is attributed to the heart, and per- haps arises absolutely from irregular action in that organ ; fear of bodily danger of any kind by wounds, poison, di'owning, fire, will often lead patients to assert that they are to be burnt alive, suffocated, &c. The fear may vary in intensity, and in the degree of conviction with which it is accompanied ; often and at the earliest stages, the danger is not actually believed but only feared ; by degrees it becomes more and more real, but at that point the disease will have passed into my next artificial division of the symptoms. In this stage, now under considera- tion, the fear of injury, starvation, &c., leads or induces the 112 LECTURES ON MEIsTAL DISEASE. patient to seek suicide. "Etsi mortem timent tameu plerumqxie mortem conciscimt."* Tlie apprehensions are often, not only fiuitiistic and absurd, but even of ludicrous character. Such is the usual development of the disease, and the characters as given by Burton, which he gathered from older authors, prove the universality of these characters from all time. Among such trivial and phantastic fears, are the following from Burton, " they are afraid of some loss, danger, that they shall surely lose their goods and all that they have, but why they know not." One special kind of fear also given by Burton, is that of being watched or followed, " semper fere vidisse militem nigrum pre- sentem." This, according to the investigation of M. Thomeuf, (Annales Medico-psycholor/iques, Oct., 1859, p. 574), is more par- ticularly associated with Alcoholismus in its acute stage — but it occurs occasionally in ordinary insanity. Among morbid apprehensions connected with the present state, are fears about the health; this is called Hypochondriasis. It is a question with writers on medicine, whether hypochon- driasis is insanity at all, I have no doubt of the fact myself. Hypochondi'iacal fears are met with in two forms, as recent, and as chronic and confirmed. All the symptoms of Hypo- chondriasis resemble in general character other cases of insanity, the differen-ce being merely in the form which the apprehension assumes. This difference is not sufficient to constitute the case a particular species of disease, for it conforms to all the rest in its progress and termination. The term hypo- chondriacal melancholia is, however, quite admissible as denot- ing a variation which the symptoms may assume. Nearly every object of fear shown in the insane, has given rise to a new name, and multiplied the compound terms ending in -phobia, {vide infra). The second kind of morbid apprehensions is that connected with the patient's future state ; this is an important and common form, such as : — fears of eternal punishment, or loss of salva- tion, of being accursed of God, of having forfeited redemption, of having committed " the unpardonable sin." These fancies Hke the other, commence as fears or apprehensions only, but become • This is quoted from Burton, Anatomy of Melanclwly, who says of it, "it ia Hippocrates' observation, Galen's sentence." ORDINARY INSANITY — FIRST STAGE. II3 fixed and believed when they are delusions, and come under an- other section in the division of our subject. These apprehen- sions appear to be attended, very often, with the same physical sensation of dread at the prfecordia or region of the aortic arch. They form a part and cause of depression, which is aggravated, and, as it were, authorised by them. Tliey lead the sufferers to resort to reading religious books in their soUtude, to be con- stantly on their knees in prayer — to be attending at every avail- ing religious service, regardless of fatigues, distance, hours, &c.* This excess of zeal, however, may be and probably more often is, due to a perversion of feeling, rather than to an apprehen- sion of their reHgious state. These cases have been called Reli- gious Melancholy. This leads naturally to the next division of phenomena. 3. Alterations of Affections and Moral Instincts. As morbid apprehension is a state or condition of the moral faculties, so is this the next artificial division of our subject. Dugald Stewart, as quoted — vide p. 22, divides the moral faculties, into appetites, desires, afi"ections, moral sense, and self-love. The alteration observed in insanity may be conveniently examined by referring to this arrangement ; but the change in any of these emotions is still, in some instances, a change of condition only; for example a morbid apprehension is perhaps only an exaggeration of a nor- mal state, but iu other cases, there is an alteration in kind. In this section the change is a difi'erence more in kind, or is a perverted state. As in the previous paragraph, we have seen, that the excess of religious zeal, is at first due to fears about the patient's religious safety ; this zeal of the sufferer often proceeds to an exalted condition or fervour, and not unfrequently the love of the deity leads to amatory feel- ings towards the minister of religion. In youth, and perhaps more frequently in females, religion is more a matter of emotion than intellectual conviction. Love is, * In connection with morbid fears and apprehensions, fresh names have been introduced for almost any kind or feature that the symptom may take — as pan- phobia, as well as syphiliphobia and even hydrophobophobia. Dr. Westphal is credited with the invention of an Agaraphobia, but which Gelineau says should be called Kenophobia or the fear of spaces. Some of these terms will bo found explained in a future page. On what will not people try to erect a fame I I 114 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. as is known, a tenet enjoined by Christian doctrine ; it is an easy transition from tlie love of the Christian doctrine to a love of less chastened kind ; the strong emotion of love being called forth, is easily perverted by being uncontrolled. The love en- couraged by rehgion is a highly abstract emotion ; it is an abstract from all kinds of love. Now one of the strongest kinds, and that which exerts the greatest influence on the organism, is undoubtedly, the sex- love ; this kind of emotion is at one end gross and debasing — and at the other extreme, it is considered to be one of the highest attributes of human nature. In fact this feeling forms the basis of the emotion of the highest kind, in the same manner that all abstract ideas are formed upon impression on the senses. It is an easy transition therefore, for the disturbed mind to go from the love of pure or abstract kind, to that of the less pure or absolutely sensual kind. Erotism or amatory feehngs, and especially among females, is a frequent symptom in the progress of melancholia. It is a fact also, that this symptom is more common among the reli- gious melancholies, than among others. This erotism may have a centric origin, or it may be due to eccentric ixTitation, it is difficult to decide which : and jiro- bably the truth is, that the origin is difi'erent in dififerent cases. Undoubtedly it does' arise as a mental perversion — though some have aj)peared to consider, that it Avas brought about, by an irri- tation at the periphery or in tJie sexual organs. It was proposed by one surgeon to perform what he called chtoridectomy, and castration also was tried in one case. The question was thus brought prominently before me at one period, but I never found a clear case, in which the erotic symj^toms of insanity were distinctly of eccentric origin ; the subject will be referred to in a subsequent page. Connected with the sexual functions, are various illusions and delusions, which may be mentioned here. Female patients as- sert that they are about to be ravished — they may have at first an apprehension only, then this apprehension becomes a false sen- sation, passuig thus from the first stage of morbid ai>prehension into that of altered sensation. Another change as regards the affections, is pretty frequent in the early stage, viz., dishke of friends or relations, as wife to bus- ORDINARY INSANITY — FIRST STAGE. II5 band, or in males, of husband to wife, and indifference to all those for whom formerly they had the greatest regard — as for off- spring and parents. From indifference they i)roceed to dishke, and then to accusations of cruelty, unkindness, and actual hatred, and fears in consequence. Connected also with the alterations of the affections, must be mentioned a morbid self- accusation ; examples of which are given among cases appended ; patients accuse themselves of great crimes — of deserving of punishment, &c ; one case referred to, was related by its author as an example of hysterical insanity; it is nevertheless only an example of insanity proper, it may be accompanied by the fear of punishment or other kind of apprehension. Besides the alteration in the attachment to others, or altera- tions of affection, — the moral instincts, are frequently cJianged in other respects or toward themselves ; the patients are perhaps regardless of ordinary decency. They cease to attend to theii' per- sonal cleanliness, they become neglectful of their persons, they do not provide for their own wants, they will eat anything and in any way ; they thus become altered and slovenly in appearance, and dh-ty in habits, and are perfectly regardless of their condition ; besides this want of decency, there is also an absolute indiffer- ence to the opinions of others ; an absence of normal shame. They not only do disgusting acts openly but use disgusting lan- guage : they, even delicate females, lose all reticence before the opposite sex, and show an enth-e loss of i^ropriety and modesty. Among other changes there is also often an absolute i)er- version of the instincts, the most common of which is refusal of food ; the instinct of appetite or hunger, appears to be lost. This symptom, refusal of food, becomes often one of great difficulty to deal with. It probably occurs from different causes. Its precise connection with the mental function, is difficult to trace ; undoubtedly it is caused in some cases, from what is just mentioned, and it is a perversion of a normal desire. In other cases, it appears to be connected with morbid apprehen- sions, as with the fear of poison ; in others with false sensations of taste, a dislike or a suspicion of impure condition of the food ; the food they say tastes of canker or dirt, or other foreign ad- mixture. Patients sometimes appear to desire food ordrhik.but i2 Il6 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. are unable to command the volition to take it. One patient I knew who would not take food, but would submit to the use of the stomach pump, as placidly as to the barber to be shaved ; another would entreat for food, but when given to him, he would hold it for hours to his mouth without taking it. In most cases, it seems to be due to a perversion of the normal calls of appetite and instincts for taking food. Connected with this question, is the perversion of instinct in eating nauseous or indigestible articles, dirt, coal, or even faeces, (see Macintosh, Journal of Mental Science, Jan. 18G6, p. 512). This perver- sion of the instincts is met with in some cases, in regard to other animal functions. It is not uncommon for a patient to voluntarily retain the ejections ; the patient appears afraid to evacuate the bowels. He will endeavour with great energy to prevent the action, and after taking aperients will submit voluntarily to all the torment, which he evidently feels, rather than allow anything to pass away. Perhaps will be greatly alarmed, when he no longer can retain his discharges. The same alteration of ordinary instincts, occurs with respect to the urinary secretion. The symptom may be founded upon an ab- surd perversion of reasoning. One patient of mine asserted that he ought to retain everything for strength ; but such a statement may be dependent on the perversion of the instinct. There is also the perversions of the sexual passions ; not only an increase of passion but actual perversions, but the state is more likely to occur in the chronic lunatic or in senihty than in the early stage of iudanity, this condition has been found to be due to local irritation or disease of sexual organs in some instances.** Self Love. — The next division of the moral affections according to Dugald Stewart's classification is that of self love, and this may be aptly considered here in connection with the perverted instincts. The suicidal propensity is clearly a perversion of a moral instinct, the instinct of self preservation. The subject of suicide will be fm-ther discussed in some of its relations in a future page, it must be considered here as a symptom of the early stage of insanity only. This symptom occurs quite in the first stage of the disease, * Maciatosb, he. cit. ORDINARY INSANITY FIRST STAGE. II7 but in another form as will be shown hereafter, it occurs also in a different stage. When the propensity is present in this stage the patient makes no secret of it, and often repeatedly endeavours to carry out his desire, and usually selects one particular mode of achieving it : thus a patient 'who attempts his life by drowning will make no attempt by hanging, or the knife, and one that attempts to injure himself by fire will adhere to that mode. However, of course too much reHance must not be placed on this feature except to provide special care against the favoured mode ; great care is of course necessary with this class of patient, yet his constant attempts and his repeatedly ex- pressed desire to commit suicide puts the attendants on their guard, and thus it is not often that the act is effected in asylums. Suicides in connection with insanity are said to have this pecu- liarity, the insane do not leave behind any statement of the rea- son why they committed the act. This is due doubtless to the fact, that the act is not one of any dehberation, but more of sudden impulse ; these cases have been called suicidal melan- choly, but of course they are not different species of disease and their pathology is the same as that of other cases.* All the symptoms yet described, it wiU been seen, are con- nected plainly with states of the emotions, they merge it is true into convictions or beliefs, which would bring them into ano- malies of the intellect proper, yet in the early stage all are emotional. So with suicide it is sought at first as a remedy or rehef from mental agony, when it continues, it becomes more like a perverted instinct and borders upon an intellectual anomaly. * Suicidal propensity was reported to be present in 29i per cent, of the patients admitted into asylums in 1879, according to returns of the Commis- sioners in Lunacy, or 26 per cent, amoc"' males and 32 per cent, among females. It occurred in greater numbers among the married (especially among married women) than in any other class. Altogether there were admitted in 1879, 3877 suicidal out of 11,758 patients and it tells well for the successful care in Asylums that out of this large num- ber there were only 11 actual suicides, especially as the above number does not take any account of the patients that were admitted previously. The gross number of patients in Asylums was 40,088, if the same proportion of suicidal patients to admissions were taken to hold good, there must have been in the Asylums 29i per cent, of the whole or upwards of 13,000 suicidal patients under care, and less than one per thousand of suicides. The moral treatment of the suicidal propensity will be found in a subsequent page. Il8 LECTURES ON MENTAL DISEASE. Ilhisions or Ilallminations or alteration connected witli tlie special senses. Illusion must by distinguished from delusion. In my previous edition, I pointed out the difference and some of my critics be- lieved that they had completely discomfited me on this point. It seems therefore that there is room for misunderstanding. This is the sum of what I ^\Tote. " A disordered sensation is called an illusion or hallucination. These terms are synonymous. You will find in books definitions of each, but I hold that the terms are perfectly synonymous and I account for the confusion that has arisen from the variation of prefix in the French and English languages. In French there is no such Avord as delu- sion, the French for the English word delusion is illusion and the French of the English word illusion is hallucination." Now there are but two kinds of symptom, viz., an error in sensation : — 1. Known to be an error, 2. Not so known but believed to be real. We require two names only and unfortunately illusion must be one, hallucination would not exactly meet all the require- ments. Examples are the best kinds of definition of the Illusion : — In the examination of a patient on this point, I was told that he once while sitting in his drawing room, saw the figure of a white dog pass across the room, he added in the same moment, "Of course I knew there was no dog, yet I saw it quite distinctly; " another patient, a medical practitioner, said to me once — " As I was standing looking out of this window I distinctly saw the figure of my wife appear above the garden wall, and in her arms she carried a white bimdle and as I looked the vision disap- peared," "what was that? " he asked, — I replied, " an admirable example of what we call, an illusion" (or if you like a hallucina- tion) it would be called hallucination at all events in French, for he knew that it teas not real. These examples seem to make "illusions" more allied to imagination, say to a morbid activity of that faculty. It could not be a memory or an actual recollection of a former impression, for in the one case — the medical man — he could never have seen his wife on the top of the wall, or in the other case the white ORDINARY INSANITY — FIRST STAGE. IIQ