MASTER NEGATIVE NO. 93-81419- MICROFILMED 1993 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the • r. • *» "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project Funded by the ,„ ,„ , xtt'ttcc NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from ^ Columbia University Library * COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The coDvright law of the United States - Title 17, United States CodI - concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and arcwiesafe authorized to ""^n'^h a photocopy or o^^^^^^^ reproduction. One of these sjpec" '««* <^°"tl^°"tlVf^^^^^^^^ photocopy or other reproduction is not to be used for any ^C?pose other than private study, scho'arsh.p or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes m excess of air Ese," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a cSpy order it in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would Involve violation of the copyright law. A UTHOR: ABBOT, FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD TITLE: THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY OR . PLACE: BOSTON DA TE: 1906 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT BIBLIOGRAPHIC MirROFO RM TARHFT Master Negative # Restrictions on Use: Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record 191Ab2 W D191Ab2 W mtmifmtmmm <«k Abbot, Frands EUingwood, 188fr-1908. The syllogistic philosophy or Prolegomena to science, by Francis Ellingwood Abbot ^. Boston, Little, Brown, and company, 1906, 2t. 211- Copy in Philosophy. 1906 • ^Philosophy. ^Ontolocj. Library of Congresi o BD881JU4 6— fiOTOB TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA REDUCTION RATIO: /l>^ FILM SIZE: IMAGE PLACEMENT:~~IA hA IB DB DATE FILMED: ^lli3 INITIALS _ FILMED BY: RESEARCH PI JRLIC aVionk; im p wnnnRiri^p~rf iU^Ly^^^, c ^ Association for information and image Management 1100 Wayne Avenue. Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 12 3 4 5 6 lllliMlllllllillllllMllMlllllllllllllllll MIllllilliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliMiliiiiL 8 mi I r Inches I fT 10 n iImiiIiiiiIiiiiIi 12 13 14 15 mm 1 'l|Niliiimiiiliii[liii|liii|liiiH^ 1.0 U^ |2.8 1^ m i^ |3|6 u La u li. ^ 1.4 2.5 |2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 I.I 1.25 MONUFRCTURED TO fillM STPNDRRDS BY APPLIED IMRGE, INC. ■ \ ISIAbS. W I in ilxc ®itu 0f %Xstv l^ovU GIVEN BY THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY OB PROLEGOMENA TO SCIENCE THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY OB PROLEGOMENA TO SCIENCE BY FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT, Ph.D. Knowing is the measure of the man. By how much we kuow, so much we are. Ralph Waldo Emkbsov. The man who knows not that he knows not aught- He 18 a fool ; no light shall ever ro«. ;. him. Who knows he knows not and would fain be taught — He 18 but simple ; fake thou him and teaoh him. But whoso, knowing, knows not that he knows — He is asleep ; go thou to him and wake him. The truly wise both knows and knows he knows — Cleave thou to him and never more forsake him. Arabian Proverb, IN TWO VOLUMES Vol. I BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 1906 Copyright^ 1906^ Bt E. Stanley Abbot. All rights reserved Poblished October, 1906 THE UNIVERSITV PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, U. 9. A. li TO THE MEMORY OF MY WIFE IN WHOSE DIVINE BEAUTY OF CHARACTER, LIFE AND SOUL O > ^O I I FOUND THE GOD I SOUGHT Oct. 18, 1839 : Oct. 23, 1893 tt She made home happy^ and was all the world to her own ** I I ~ f c r- 400412 c» CONTENTS VOLUME ONE Chapter ^^®* I. The Axiom of Philosophy 1 II. " CoGiTO, ergo Sum " ^^ in. The I : Empirical, Rational, Real .... 93 rV. Threefold Origin of the Real I 115 V. Traditional Origin of Self-consciousness: Ego and Non-Ego ^28 VI. Origin of the Tradition; The Aristotelian Paradox ^^^ VII. The Two Theories of Universals .... 171 VIII. Transition from the I to the We .... 210 IX. The Transition in Kant 215 X. The Transition in Fichte 225 XI. The Transition in Hegel : The Hegelian Paradox 261 TABLES Table I. Hume and Kant ^^^ IL Unreal I and Real I ^l^ III. I. Empirical Antithesis of I and Not-I ... 142 IL Rational Antithesis of We and Not-We . 143 III. Irrational Antithesis of I and Not-We . 143 Jl PREFACE In bequeathing to my fellow-men the best I have to give them in the results of a lifetime of patient and single-eyed search for the highest truth, which at last have been wrought into the form of a new system of philosophy grounded on the principle of absolute logic that whatever is evolved as consequent must he involved as antecedent) I hope they will not deem it a mark of obtrusive self-feeling if I leave on record here a true and simple statement of its origin, both as a thought-system and as a biographical fact. No one can be more conscious than I am of its manifest deficiencies of content and faults of form, and no one could regret these more than I do. Yet at the opening of the twentieth century I conceive it to be the supreme need of the human spirit to understand that the mechanical phi- losophy of mere evolution — the evolution without involu- tion, which is the half-truth more dangerous than a lie — is but a step towards the organic philosophy of evolution through involution, as itself but a step towards the spirit- ual philosophy of the identity in difference of evolution and involution as the continuity of Being in the Absolute Ethical I. This is the philosophy whose foundation is the absolute nature of the syllogism as necessary relational equation of the involved and the evolved in the world-process — that universal and eternal self-realization of Being through Knowing in Doing which determines the immanent and necessary relational constitution of the world itself to be that of the Absolute Ethical I. It is the grounding of this philosophy in the absolute nature of the syllogistic process, r vm PREFACE as at once the Apriori of Being, the Apriori of Truth, and the Apriori of Eight, and as itself the identity in difference of evolution and involution, which renders it a system of philosophical objectivism or scientific realism, in distinction from all systems of philosophical subjectivism, whether as subjective, critical, or absolute idealism, and which not only justifies but requires its name as the Syllogistic Philosophy. Nothing short of this grounding of philosophy in abso- lute logic can possibly fit it to be itself the ground of absolute religion; and nothing short of absolute religion, as free and intelligent obedience to an absolute moral law, which, in Emerson's words, " lies at the centre of Nature and radiates to the circumference," can redeem the world from the imperialism, militarism, commercialism, and gen- eral reviving barbarism which are threatening to drown civilization itself at the beginning of this new century. It was the ambition of my youth to interpret in terms of thought and philosophically to justify the " blazing ubiqui- ties " of the Declaration of Independence, and to hold up to the world a proud example of their truth, not only in the Constitution of my country, but in my country's free obe- dience to iz and to them. But it is the sorrow and humilia- tion of my age to see my country herself trample both it and them under her feet, and retreat under treacherous leadership to betray a trusting ally, conquer a free people, crush a young republic founded on her own principles in the Philippine Islands, and reintroduce into her own body politic that poison of human slavery which she once hero- ically expelled. All that I can do to lighten the sense of my own unwilling complicity as a citizen in these national wrongs is to leave this work as my solemn piotest against them, and to hope that reviving wisdom and virtue may yet lead my country to a better mind and better deeds. To Sir William Hamilton I owe the great service of awakening my philosophical consciousness, — not, it is true, by way of agreement, but by way of polarization to opposite fl PREFACE IX opinion. In a three-page pencilled note, dated Sept. 20, 1859, at the end of his then just published " Lectures on Metaphysics," I recorded my dissent from his famous Law of the Conditioned, holding that space is knoivn to be in- finite because it is infinite, and cannot be otherwise. This is the principle of philosophical objectivism, namely, that in knowledge the object determines the subject, as opposed to the principle of philosophical subjectivism, namely, that in knowledge the subject determines the object. The three- page note became the germ of two articles in the North American Review for July and October, 18G4, in the earlier of which the two important principles of the perceptive understanding and the objectivity of relations had already been deduced from the principle of philosophical objec- tivism in this more than hint : " Suffice it to say that, if we really know the objective relations of things, there must be some faculty of pure and immediate cognition of relations." But the logical development of philosophical objectivism could not and did not end here. The simple objectivity of relations necessarily led to the trichotomy of existence, as things, relations, and conditions; and this triple deter- mination of the object, as existence in general, necessarily led to the further development of the doctrine of the per- ceptive understanding into the trichotomy of perception itself, as sensuous, intellectual, and rational. These two trichotomies, of which the entire Syllogistic Philosophy is the natural and necessary outgrowth, were reduced to writing in the last months of 1864, as the foundation of two tables of " Cosmical Categories " and " Mental Cate- gories." But the further development of the nascent philosophy was checked and retarded for many years by untoward circumstances, in fact until 1879, since when it has been the supreme aim of all the energy and leisure I could command. If the desire of the late Prof. Francis Bowen, of Harvard University, to have me appointed as his assistant professor of philosophy in 1866 (a desire of which I knew nothing definitely at the time) could have / PREFACE been gratified, this book would beyond a doubt have been ready for publication twenty or thirty years ago.* But it was not to be. Silent heterodoxy may be no bar to such appointments, but heterodoxy that talks or prints is fatal, or at least was fatal in the sixties. The first chapter of this book was written in 1893, the last in 1903, and the rest between. That explains many defects and needless repetitions. In the Appendix are contained papers all written in the last three months of 1889 and scarcely changed at all. The Fundamental Phi- losophemes were then in their tenth draft, and had been drawn up as the ground-plan of five volumes, in order to unfold in accordance with the one undeviating method of evolution through involution the logical content of the Axiom of Philosophy, not as "I think, therefore I am," but rather as " Human knowledge exists." But I saw soon that it would be necessary to explain the absolute self- groundedness of this original position in a sixth introductory volume, and the explanation has grown into this present work. I must leave to other hands, if the syllogistic method of evolution through involution approves itself at last in philosophy to the consensus of the competent, the task of converting this rude path blazed through the wilder- ness into a beaten highway. The Fundamental Analyses, if carefully compared point by point with each other, ex- hibit the steady deepening of characteristics in the passage from machine to organism and from organism to person, and the inclusion of each lower type of reality in the next higher and of all in the highest. The Schemas present a * In a letter dated 11 Quincy Street, Cambridge, Feb. 29, 1892, the late Prof. Andrew P. Peabody, D.D., wrote to me : " Professor Bowen was so much more of a conservative in theology than myself that any objections that I might have had would, I think, have been more than met in my mind by his endorse- ment of you. I have, however, this distinct remembrance. When Mr. Bowen and I conferred about j'our Ph.D. degree, he said, * I wish I could have had Abbot as my assistant teacher.' He undoubtedly referred to the transaction of 1866-7, but I did not know the full meaning of it till your statement in your pamphlet explained it." (In that pamphlet the date was erroneously given from memory as 1866-7 ; as other letters prove, it was early in 1866.) PREFACE XI similar progress of thought in a wholly different aspect, as relation of individual to universal, of knowledge to life, and of human to Divine, in the world as one. The Cate- gories of Being, Mind, Evolution, and Constitution require to be supplemented and to some extent corrected by the tables at the close of Chapter XVIII, in which the unity of method and form in Syllogistic Philosophy is very suc- cinctly set forth in systematic completeness. The lack of elegance and polish in this system is something of which I am only too keenly conscious ; yet when I stand back and look at the statue from a distance, I cannot help recognizing in it the majesty of truth. My earlier books on "Scientific Theism '' (1885) and " The Way out of Agnosticism" (1890), as well as the weekly files of The Index from Jan. 1, 1870, to July 1, 1880, not one word of which do I retract, were only attempts to save something from the threatened ship- wreck on a stormy sea; but in this book I bring my battered barque to port, after a fashion, with whatever cargo of value it may prove to hold. If at last it shall receive sober, just, and intelligent appreciation, I believe that it will be found to have done for philosophy what was done for botany in transition from the artificial Linna3an classification to the natural system of classification by total organic and genetic relationship — a revolution never to be reversed; and to give to ethical and free religion what it has never yet had, a basis in scientific reason. The days of philosophical sub- jectivism are numbered; and who can conceive a more solid or lasting foundation for objectivism than the principle of absolute logic, the identity in difference of evolution and involution in all Being, Knowing, and Doing, as identity in difference of Nature and Spirit in the Absolute I? Not until absolute logic is seen to be the necessary and only possible foundation of absolute religion and absolute moral- ity, not until the childish and degrading fear of reason is thoroughly outgrown, can the world ever become civilized, — that is, thoroughly moralized. There is no civilization but moralization, and nothing can ever persuade the " heed- Xll PREFACE less world " of this supreme and saving truth except the overmasteringness of absolute logic. May this book help the world, taught at last to be heedful and not heedless, to tread the path of the only possible salvation from its own follies and sins — the path of free self-moralization in the Absolute Ethical I. FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT. 43 Labch Koad, Cambkidox October 13, 1903. EDITOR'S PREFACE The manuscript of this book, finished in September, 1903, was revised by the author before his death on October 22, 1903. In accordance with his wish it is printed in detail as he left it, even to the punctuation, upon which he be- stowed much care. The sections are numbered as in the manuscript, and it will be seen that sections 38 and 39 are absent ; they were not written. During the proof-reading all quotations and references have been carefully compared with the text of the works cited, with the exception of two which, being comparatively unimportant and not easily accessible, have not been verified. Many causes, some avoidable, others not, have contrib- uted to the three years' postponement of the publication of the book. In that time De Vries' theory of the origin of species by mutation has come into marked prominence. Since it is not mentioned in the book, and since it combats (how completely or successfully only the future can show) the so-called " fluctuation " theory of Darwin, which is re- ferred to in many places, especially in Chapter VII, I am loth to let the book go forth without calling attention to the fact that, in the recognition of the existence and know- ability of the individual difEerence and the reality and mutability of species, the two theories are philosophically in complete harmony. It is only in their biological aspects that they differ. De Vries himself says " My work claims to be in full accord with the principles laid down by Darwin." I take this opportunity to thank cordially all those who by advice and in innumerable other ways have aided and encouraged me in the publication of this, my father's ^^^^" THE EDITOR. September, 1906. THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY CHAPTER I THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY § 1. Philosophy has always been held to be a search for Knowledge. On this point there has never been any differ- ence of opinion. Ancient philosophy sought for knowledge of Being (to oi/to>s 6v). Modern philosophy seeks for knowl- edge of Thought {Beivusstseyn uberhaupt). Reformed mod- ern philosophy seeks for knowledge of Knowledge, as the indissoluble union of Being and Thought. § 2. Conceived as purified from all the crudities of "common sense," — that is, from all the errors, prejudices, preconceptions, misjudgraents, and false inferences which are due to an unreflective habit of mind, and from every distortion of truth which may be referred to " merely indi- vidual experience " or to the " personal equation,'' — the Knowledge of Knowledge becomes the Science of Science. As yet, however, science is scarcely conscious of existing otherwise than as a number of more or less loosely allied particular sciences. If it were to be developed in its ideal unity and universality, the Science of Science would become the Philosophy of Philosophy ; and this, perhaps, is the highest expression for the self-consciousness of human reason. Certainly, philosophy is very much more than a mere succession of individual philosophical systems, un- critically expounded without bringing out their internal rational connection. It is very much more, also, than even a profoundly critical history of such systems ; for nothing could be more shallow or more untrue than the strangely admired dictum that " the history of philosophy is philoso- VOL. I. — I THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY phy itself." Philosophy itself can be nothing short of a unitary and universal system of the Knowledge of Knowl- edge, containing within itself all principles of discovered truth, animated by an organic life-principle of its own, and capable of perpetual growth as a living whole. Whatever is known must be set by it in due relation and proportion to whatever else is known ; whatever is learned must be promptly incorporated and assimilated by it as so much food for the natural systemic development of the whole. Mere criticism is not philosophy ; nay, criticism unregu- lated by a system of philosophy is itself unphilosophical. The " professional " critic who assumes his office without first qualifying himself for its duties by conscientiously mastering a necessary system of necessary truths as the only just standard of measurement for philosophical values, plays the part of a buccaneer on the high seas, criticises from mere caprice, attacks better craft than his own with broadsides of blunders, and preys on the commerce of human reason under no other flag than the pirate's skull- and-cross-boues, — the empty skull of ignorance over the cross-bones of detraction and personal conceit. In fact, the criticism which presumes to philosophize without a philoso- phy is the most offensive form of " naivete '^ and "com- mon sense." The only criticism which deserves to be considered as in the least degree philosophical is such as is prompted and guided at every step by a philosophy already demonstrated to be true. Hence the mere history of phi- losophy, however critical, is never philosophy itself ; this can never be other than the Philosophy of Philosophy, — an all-inclusive and perfectly rational system, absorbing whatever is true in all prior and partial systems, yet, so far from being arbitrarily eclectic, substantiating what- ever truths it thus absorbs by a rigorous deduction of them from its own all-permeating principle, — in short, a phi- losophy which shall philosophize all philosophies. § 3. This conception of philosophy is the ideal aim of human reason itself. It is more or less clearly hinted at, THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 3 perhaps even partially expressed, in Aristotle's vorjai^ voT/crccos, Fichte's Wissenschaft von einer Wissenschaft iiher- haupt or Wissen vom Wlssen, Hegel's Begriff des Begriffes, and so forth. But it means something very different here. From the simple fact that every philosophy which can re- ceive critical consideration must appear (1) in the history of human thought^ and, in order to appear in the history of human thought, must appear, also, (2) in the form of lit- erature, it follows that every such philosophy must possess a literary or serial form ; that is, it must begin with an initial affirmation, proceed by intermediate affirmations, and end with a final affirmation. This, from the nature of the case, must be just as true of the ideal Philosophy of Philosophy as it is true of all the philosophies it must philosophize. Hence, as a reasoned literary exposition of the Knowledge of Knowledge, the series of affirmations or philosophemes constituting the Pliilosophy of Philosophy must begin with a known or absolutely necessary and certain starting-point, proceed by a known or absolutely rational method, and end with a known or absolutely demonstrated result. § 4. But how is it possible for any philosophy to start with an affirmation, proposition, or judgment which shall reconcile and realize in itself the necessary requirements of being, at the same time, (1) absolutely necessary and cer- tain, and yet (2) rationally first? In the combination of these conditions there lies an apparent contradiction. Philosophy, as such, neglects all affirmations of pure feeling, imagination, memory, will, and so forth, and limits itself to rational affirmations alone. The former are all subjective, contingent, and individual, while the latter are all objective, necessary, and universal. Now every rational affirmation is a known or absolutely certain one; it must affirm knowledge, that is, either of an actual experience or of a valid reason ; and the actual experience or the valid reason is the ultimate ground on which it unconditionally depends, as the necessary condition of its own rationality. 4 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY To affirm what is known is rational, but to affirm what is not known is irrational or at least non-rational; for the existence of this ultimate ground of knowledge is what makes an affirmation rational. This principle is well expressed by Descartes, when he says that " the light of nature dictates to us, never to make a judgment except about something which is known." ^ This ultimate ground, however, being necessarily implied and presupposed by every rational affirmation as the condition of its own rationality, may always be affirmed, and, being affirmed, rationally precedes the affirmation which it conditions. It would appear, therefore, that every known or uncon- ditionally certain affirmation depends of necessity upon a prior ground of knowledge, either in experience or in reason; and this prior ground of knowledge, when af- firmed, constitutes a rationally prior and really first affirma- tion. Hence it is an apparent contradiction to require that the starting-point of the Philosophy of Philosophy shall be at once absolutely certain, yet really and rationally first. The starting-point must be a truth, or else what follows from it cannot be true. Yet, says Schopenhauer, *< every truth is the reference of a judgment to something outside of itself, and intrinsic truth is a contradiction in terms. . . . Truth is the reference of a judgment to something outside of itself, as its sufficient ground." ^ How, then, can the first judgment or starting-point of philosophy be a truth not dependent on some rationally prior truth ? How can this seemingly insuperable difficulty be overcome, not by a 1 Principia Philosophiae, I. 44: "Lumen naturae nobis dictat, nun- quam nisi de re eognita esse judicandum." 2 A. Schopenhauer, Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureich- enden Grunde, §§ 30, 33. So, also, J. G. Fichte, Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 424: " Der Grund fallt, zufolge des blossen Denkens eines Grundes, ausserhalb des begrundeten ; beides, das begriindete und der Grand, werden, inwiefern sie dies sind, einander ent- gegengesetzt, an einander gehalten, und so das erstere aus dem letzteron erkliirt." Again, Zweite Einleitung, Werke, I. 456 : *' Der Grund liegt alle- mal ausserhalb des begrundeten, d. i. er ist demselben entgegengesetzt." THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 5 trick, but by a rational solution ? How can the Philosophy of Philosophy find a known or absolutely certain starting- point, that is, an affirmation which shall be grounded on knowledge, yet to which the affirmation of its ground shall not be rationally prior ? § 5. Whatever else, indeed, may be true of the starting- point or required initial affirmation of the Philosophy of Philosophy, these two conditions, it seems clear, must be fulfilled in it : — I. The rationally first affirmation of philosophy, in order to be necessarily affirmed or absolutely certain, must be grounded on knowledge. But — II. The affirmation of its ground must not be rationally prior to it. These two conditions of the actuality of an affirmation which can serve as a rationally first or fundamental propo- sition in philosophy, however contradictory they may seem, must be found capable of a strictly rational reconciliation, and must be actually reconciled, if philosophy, as the sys- tem of universal reason, can actually begin. For, unless the first affirmation of philosophy is strong enough to bear the combined weight of all the affirmations that rest upon it, it needs no argument to show that they must all crumble together in one common ruin. How, then, shall the two conditions above mentioned be actually and rationally reconciled ? § 6. The solution of this problem lies almost in the statement of it. It needs but to draw the necessary inference from the two conditions themselves, as fol- lows : — I. The rationally first affirmation of philosophy, in order to be absolutely certain, must be grounded on knowledge. But — II. The affirmation of its ground must not be rationally prior to it. Therefore — III. The affirmation of its ground must be rationally simultaneous with it, that is, must be contained in it. In 6 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOrHY other words, the content and the ground must be identical, and the afhrniation itself must be thus self-grounded. If a rational affirmation can be found which shall affirm its own universal ground as its own particular content, and if both content and ground can be thus expressed in one and the same form of words as one indivisible judgment, then it is clear that a separate affirmation of the universal ground will be in no degree different from the original affir- mation itself, — will be, not prior to it, but simultaneous and identical with it. The two separate affirmations of the universal ground will be really one and the same affirma- tion repeated; the two together will say no more than either will say alone; the original affirmation will be in itself the identity of content and ground, and thus con- stitute an absolute starting-point for philosophy. The con- tent will be affirmation of the ground, and the ground will be affirmation of the content ; neither will be rationally prior to the other, but both will be equally, simultane- ously, and absolutely necessary or certain. Thus one and the same affirmation will be both absolutely necessary and certain and rationally first, because it is exclusively seJf- grounded, — grounded in itself on the affirmation of its ground, and rationally independent, therefore, of any prior or separate affirmation of that ground. What Schopen- hauer denied to be possible will have been actually found, — an "intrinsic truth." Sucli a self-grounded affirmation, therefore, provided it can be found, will reconcile and realize in itself the two apparently contradictory conditions of a real starting-point for the Philosophy of Philosophy. Moreover, it will stand as the rational norm, type, or criterion of all philosophical beginnings ; its identity of content and ground will become a universal principle of philosophical criticism by which to test and determine the validity or invalidity of these begin- nings. Not the subjective principle of "self-evidence," measuring the legitimacy of a starting-point in philosophy by the degree of clearness with which it appears to some THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY individual philosopher, but the objective principle of irfen- tity of content and ground in the starting-point itself, meas- uring the legitimacy of it by its internal rational necessity, will become the criterion of philosophical beginnings for all philosophers. Nothing, therefore, could be more im- portant than the discovery of such a self-grounded affirma- tion, for philosophy can find nowhere else a beginning which will really begin. Philosophy cannot begin nowhere, nor everywhere, nor yet anywhere at random ; it must be- gin somewhere in particular, and must abide rigorously by its own beginning. Hence the incalculable importance of beginning aright, since to begin amiss is to foreordain fail- ure in the end. § 7. Now, every philosophy being necessarily constituted (so far, at least, as criticism can take cognizance of it) as a series of rational affirmations appearing under the form of literature in the history of human thought, the question as to a self-grounded affirmation is a question as to the uni- versal ultimate ground of all rational affirmation itself. If this ground can be determined, and then made the content of a first affirmation, such an affirmation will exhibit that absolute identity of content and ground, that absolute indif- ference between separate affirmations of the two, which is necessary to make it a self-grounded affirmation, and there- fore an absolute starting-point or real beginning for philos- ophy itself. From the very nature of the case, there can be but one such beginning. If all rational affirmations have but one ultimate and universal ground, it follows that the taking of this one ground for the one content of one affirmation will render this one affirmation the only possible self-grounded affirmation. It must be an absolutely unique judgment, in the sense that no other judgment could possi- bly fulfil the unique function of furnishing to philosophy a starting-point absolutely certain, yet rationally first. Every other judgment, from the very fact that it is another judg- ment, must have another content, — not the universal ground of all rational affirmation, but some other content ; 8 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 9 yet that universal ground is rationally prior to all its con- sequents, and the affirmation of that ground is rationally prior to all its consequent affirmations. If, then, the uni- versal ground is made the content of a particular afflrma- tion, the affirmation thus self-grounded will constitute the only philosophical beginning which really begins. § 8. Since, then, what makes an affirmation rational is as we have seen (§ 4), nothing but the existence of human knowledge as its ground or reason, - since, in other words we cannot rationally affirm anything to be so or so, unless we actually know it to be as we affirm it, and since, as phi- losophers we affirm it simply because we know it, - the form of the only possible self-grounded affirmation is deter, mined by its nature to be the affirmation of human knowl- edge itself. Its form, then, will be essentially this : _ Human Knowledge Exists. Superficially considered, no proposition could be more flat or more uninteresting than this formless and colorless statement. Objection will at once be made: "Human knowledge exists, of course ; but what of it ? Surely, noth- ing follows philosophically from that ! - On the contrary everything philosophical follows from that. If nothing but actual human knowledge can be the ground of any ratt,„al affirmation, nothing but the affirmation of actual human knowledge can be self-grounded, that is, can afflrmTts ground in and with its content ; and nothing but a self! grounded affirmation can be the ground of a raLnal ph los- ophy or constitute its first and all-su.staining judgment If this IS true,- and how can it be disputed ? -then the existence of human knowledge is the very first principled phiosophy Itself. It covers all that is known by man philosophy itself is simply its methodical development li will reward us to study patiently the extraordinary charac- teristics of this altogether unique judgment. § 9. "Human knowledge exists." This judgment pre sents Itself under a variety of aspects. ^ I. Looked at as content alone, it is an empirical or experiential judgment, because the content is a pure matter of fact. Human knowledge exists now, but it did not always exist ; it certainly did not exist before man himself existed, and man himself did not exist from all eternity. Hence the existence of human knowledge can be asserted, not at all as a necessary deduction from some principle which is rationally prior to it, but solely as a given fact, a pure datum of experience. Consequently, when philosophy begins with affirming the existence of human knowledge, it begins with an affirmation of pure experience, so far as its content alone is concerned. II. Looked at as ground alone, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists" is a rational judgment; for the content (t. e. "the actual existence of human knowledge is a pure datum of experience ") is affirmed because of the ground {L e. " the actual existence of human knowledge is the condition, ground, or reason for affirming that human knowledge exists "). If the content and the ground were to be separately asserted, the original affirmation would be resolved into two identical assertions, the second depending upon the first: "Human knowledge exists that human knowledge exists " — that is, human knowledge is affirmed to exist because it is hnoimi to exist. Here the first asser- tion, though its content, as before, is purely empirical or experiential, is pure ground in relation to the second, while the second, though potentially pure ground to a possible identical third, is pure content in relation to the first. But the absolute identity of the two assertions is their rational simultaneity; it reveals and demonstrates the absolute identity of content and ground in the original affirmation ; and the resolution of the latter into the two assertions is useful merely as showing the two fundamentally different aspects under which the original affirmation may be viewed. The two identical and rationally simultaneous assertions, in fact, say absolutely no more than the original affirmation says; for the latter contains the former as simply two 10 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY aspects of itself. Consequently, when philosophy begins with affirming the existence of human knowledge, it begins with an affirmation of inire reason, so far as the dependence of its content on its ground is alone concerned. III. Looked at as both content a?id yround in one, the affirmation that *• human knowledge exists" is both em- pirical and rational : empirical as this particular judgment, rational as the universal ground of all particular judgments. Such a self-grounded affirmation furnishes to the philoso- pher an unconditionally necessary and universal beginning, a " presuppositionless starting-point." For the fact of human knowledge is not itself a necessary fact, but, to tlie philosopher, the affirmation of that fact is a necessary affirmation. As the necessary system of uni- versal human reason, philosophy cannot possibly begin except with a rationally self-grounded affirmation. The only alternatives would be to begin (1) with an absolutely ungrounded affirmation, or (2) with an affirmation grounded in another affirmation, expressed or implied, which is prior to itself. On the one hand, to begin with an absolutely ungrounded affirmation would be to begin with a pure dogma, that is, an assertion without a reason ; and dogma- tism is not philosophy, which requires a valid reason for every assertion without exception. On the other hand, to begin professedly with an affirmation grounded in another affirmation, expressed or implied, Avhicdi is prior to itself, would be to begin really with that prior affirmation ; the prior affirmation would be the real beginning, and the pro- fessed beginning would be no beginning at all. If, whatever it may be, the first affirmation of philosophy has a philo- sophical ground in some prior affirmation, it is a false beginning, and philosophy must affirm that ground as its true beginning. But here again that ground must be a self-grounded affirmation; otherwise, the ground of that ground must be affirmed, and endless regress ensues, and philosophy becomes powerless to begin anywhere. In order to begin at all, therefore, philosophy must begin THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 11 with a self-grounded affirmation, — that is, with the only possible "presuppositionless starting-point." But, as has been shown in §§ 7 and 8, no affirmation except ^Miuman knowledge exists" can be self-grounded. Therefore, in order to begin at all, —that is, in order to be, — philosophy must begin with the necessanj affirmation of the empirically known existence of human knowledge. Similarly, while the fact of human knowledge is not a strictly universal fact, since man himself is not a universal being, the affirmation of that fact, to the philosopher, is a universal affirmation; for it covers and includes (1) all human beings, and (2) all cognitions of each human being. As the necessary system of universal human reason, phi- losophy cannot possibly begin with a merely individual affirmation, such as, coglto, ertjo sum. An individual affir- mation is here to be understood as one which expresses a merely individual experience, — that is, has a merely indi- vidual content; unless its ground, then, is a merely indi- vidual ground, the identity of content and ground, which is the necessary condition of a real philosophical beginning, cannot obtain. But an affirmation which has only an indi- vidual content and an individual ground can possess no significance for philosophy, as the necessary system of universal human reason. For instance, "my knowledge exists," or "I know," is an individual affirmation, with an individual content and an individual ground; if both are separately expressed, it becomes, "my knowledge exists that my knowledge exists," or, shortly, "I know that I know," — but not ^^ human knowledge exists that mij knowledge exists," except so far as "human" can be con- tracted and narrowed down to merely "my." Here, in the "I know that I know," we have, indeed, the required identity of content and ground, but no universality; and the lack of universality deprives the affirmation of all sig- nificance and value for philosophy, as the necessary system of universal human reason. A mere affirmation of indi- vidual knowledge without an absolutely universal ground »« 12 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY possesses not the flimsiest title to a philosophical position or rank, as part of such a system; in scope and signifi- cance, it has no more to do with philosophy than have such affirmations as "I feel hot," *'I thrill with pleasure," "I conceive a mermaid," "I remember the battle," "I refuse to stir," or any other affirmation of purely subjective sen- sation, emotion, imagination, memory, will, and so forth. In all such cases, the original and common ground of affir- mation is an implied prior affirmation that "I know : " "I know that I feel hot," ^'I know that I thrill with pleas- ure," "I know that I conceive a mermaid," "I know that I remember the battle," "I know that I refuse to stir." Here, it is true, universality obtains within the limited range of subjective thought or personal experience. But this inferior degree of universality is altogether insufficient to give to exclusively personal affirmation an entrance into the circle of philosophical propositions or ideas. No affir- mation is philosophical unless it expands and elevates the relative and narrow universality which obtains in indi- vidual reason into the absolute universality which obtains in universal reason. Rational necessity is not for you or for me, but for all rational beings; philosophy is nothing if not absolutely universal. Suffice it now to point out that, in order to begin at all, —that is, in order to be, — philosophy must begin with the universal affirmation of the individually known existence of human knowledge. § 10. In the foregoing section it has been thus far shown : (1) that the primordial affirmation of philosophy, "human knowledge exists," looked at as content alone, is a purely empirical judgment; (2) that, looked at as ground alone, it is a purely rational judgment; and (3) that, looked at as both content and ground in one, it is both empirical and rational at once, as a self -grounded judgment. Further, it has been shown that this self -grounded judgment, being rooted equally in experience and in reason, is (1) empiri- cally known, yet rationally or necessarily affirmed, and (2) individually known, yet rationally or universally THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 13 affirmed. It now remains to show that this unique and extraordinary judgment, with respect to its origin and its validity, is (1) subjective as to content, (2) objective as to ground, and (3) both subjective and objective per se. I. Experience as such affirms what is actually so or so to the individual subject of knowledge here and now, while reason as such affirms what must be so or so to all individual subjects everywhere and always {oIk ivSexerat oAAws €X€lv). Hence a purely empirical judgment (e. r/. " I hear music ") is valid for the individual subject alone because it declares an incommunicable experience of that subject, and is itself, therefore, exclusively subjective; while a purely rational judgment (e. g. "all equal ratios are one and the same ratio, as 2 : 4 = 3 : 6 = J ") is valid for all individual subjects because it declares a necessary and universal relation inher- ent in the object affirmed, and is itself, therefore, exclu- sively objective. So far, consequently, as the affirmation that " human knowledge exists " is a purely experiential content alone, it is exclusively subjective, because it simply declares the incommunicable experience or actual present thinking of the particular human subject that affirms it, and does not at all transcend that experience. II. So far, however, as the affirmation that "human knowledge exists " is a purely rational ground alone, it is exclusively objective, because it simply declares the uncon- ditional dependence of human knowledge as content upon human knowledge as ground, and does not transcend that inherent, necessary, and universal relation of the two in the affirmation itself. That human knowledge is known to exist, as a fact, is a pure datum of experience ; but that the affirmation of its existence, if it is to be affirmed at all, must be unconditionally grounded upon actual knowledge of that existence (the very affirmation itself being an actual case of human knowledge), — this is a pure necessity of universal reason. Hence the affirmation, as pure ground, does not depend in the least on the particular subject that happens to affirm it as pure content ; on the contrary, it 14 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 15 simply constitutes the absolute rational or logical condition under which alone that affirmation can be made. In other words, if the existence of human knowledge can be affirmed at all, it can be affirmed solely on the ground or warrant of human knowledge itself. This necessary connection of con- tent and ground, or of consequence and condition, so far from being dependent in any degree upon any particular affirming subject, though it is of course dependent on some affirming subject, is lodged immanently in the essential nature of the affirmation as a self-grounded affirmation ; it is the absolute condition of the possibility of any self- grounded affirmation, originates in universal reason, and transcends all limitations of any particular subject. The affirmation as ground alone, therefore, is necessary, univer- sal, and objectively valid for all possible human subjects. III. The affirmation that "human knowledge exists," therefore, being subjective in its content and objective in its ground, is equally rooted in subjectivity and objectivity, is both subjective and objective per se ; for it is itself the identity of content and ground in a self-grounded affirma- tion which originates both in the subjectivity of the subject and in the objectivity of the object, yet constitutes, as uttered affirmation, an object which transcends tlie individ- ual subject altogether, and is objective to all possible human subjects. Utterance in some one of its myriad forms, — literature, speech, gesture, expression, symbolism in gene- ral, — is the only known medium of communication between different human subjects, and must be recognized in all philosophies ; yet every form of it constitutes a veritable object of knowledge, distinct from and external to the sphere of pure subjectivity in any particular human consciousness. Hence the affirmation that " human knowledge exists," like every other utterance of human thought, must have its own essential and distinctive nature per se ; it must be subjec- tive ^er se, in that it originates in and outwardly expresses the particular experience of one human subject, but it must also be objective per se, in that it originates in, and is itself an object to, the universal reason of all human subjects. This is a necessary consequence of what has preceded, and it leads necessarily to further consequences. The subjective particularity of personal experience, and the objective universality of human reason interpenetrate inextricably, though distinguishably, in this first and fund- amental principle of the Philosophy of Philosophy. Con- tent and ground, experience and reason, actuality and necessity, individuality and universality, subjectivity and objectivity, are indissolubly united, yet absolutely without contradiction, in the momentous affirmation that " human knowledge exists." In this one, and only possible self- grounded affirmation, therefore, the Philosophy of Philoso- phy consciously effects what the History of Philosophy and the Criticism of Philosophy have thus far failed to ex- hibit: namely, an absolutely self-grounded beginning or starting-point, necessary, universal, and objectively valid for all philosophers. Furthermore, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," involves two, and only two possible interpreta- tions : (1) " My knowledge exists," and (2) " Our knowl- edge exists." In the first place, the word "human," necessarily in- volves both the one and the mantj, both the /and the We. "My knowledge exists," is precisely equivalent to the shorter and more idiomatic, " I know," while " Our knowl- edge exists," is precisely equivalent to " We know." Thus, out of the seemingly barren generality of the affirmation that '* human knowledge exists," there immediately starts forth the sharp and all-important issue between philosophi- cal Individualism and philosophical Universalism, of which the "I know " and the "We know" may be taken as con- venient typical formulas. In the necessary emergence of this issue lies the first rational development of the original principle or starting-point of philosophy. Its mere phrase- ology irresistibly suggests the necessary evolution of it as a living first principle. 16 THE SYLLOGISTIC rniLOSOPHY But, in the second place, there exists a deeper reason for the same evolution. The content of the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," originates, as has been shown, in the particular experience of the individual sub- ject, while the ground of it originates in the universal reason of the race. But the race itself, with whatever belongs to the race, is necessarily objective to the individ- ual subject. Hence the issue between Individualism and Universalism not only itself emerges, but inevitably and immediately generates the still further issues between Subjectivism and Objectivism, Idealism and Realism. It is sufficient for the present merely to indicate the course of development which is necessitated by the essential nature of the principle with which we start, and to relegate these issues to subsequent chapters. It still remains to show here that the principle itself is (1) indubitable, (2) un- deniable, and (3) undemonstrablc from other grounds than itself. § 11. Doubt is only a sort of knowledge. It is nothing but the self-consciousness of ignorance, while yet self- consciousness itself is nothing but self-knowledge. Abso- lute or universal ignorance is simple unconsciousness; a stone, as such, is absolutely ignorant because it is abso- lutely unconscious. But relative ignorance, or doubt, is consciousness of the absence of some particular knowl- edge — want of that particular knowledge; a man may be absolutely ignorant of many things of which he is un- conscious, but he can be relatively ignorant, or doubtful, only of what he wants to know. Doubt cannot exist where nothing has been affirmed; it is necessarily related to affirmation as a conscious reaction against it, or, more accurately, a conscious deadlock between affirmation and negation of the same thing. Hence, only a self-conscious or self-knowing being can possibly be in a state of doubt. But negation itself is only one form of affirmation. Eela^ tive ignorance, therefore, or doubt, as a conscious deadlock between two opposing affirmations or pair of contradict- THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 17 ories, is just as definite and positive a mental state as knowledge itself ; and, being conscious of itself, it there- by knows itself. In other words, doubt is only a form of knowledge — knowledge of knowledge accompanied with knowledge of ignorance — knowledge of itself as ignorant which of two known contradictory affirmations it ought to accept ; it is only a bewildered question, " Which of these two is true?" But nothing save knowledge of the two could possibly put that question. In short, doubt is a mere shadow, and knowledge is the substance which casts it. For these reasons, it is impossible to make doubt the first principle of any rational philosophy. When Des- cartes, for instance, seemed to derive from absolute doubt (de omnibus dahitandam) his first and fundamental principle of knowledge {coglto, ergo sum), on the ground that his own doubt, as a mode of thought and his own first certain fact, was immediate and certain knowledge of himself as doubting and thinking, he seemed to make doubt itself the absolutely first principle of his system. Yet, since no one can doubt without doubting something which is known to be there as the object of doubt, doubt manifestly presup poses, as its condition or ground, knowledge of the exist- ence of that which is doubted ; and what Descartes doubted was the known mass of prejudices or prejudgments which he had formed before learning to think clearly and distinctly (iHiria de rehus scnsihUlbus jtidlcla — multa jyraejudicia). Before his doubt began or could begin, therefore, he hiiew the existence of these prejudices, as a fact prior to his doubt ; and his doubt itself was simply, "Are they true or false?" Thus, the Cartesian philosophy really founded itself, not on doubt, but on knowledge, as its first principle. That recognition of the existence of human knowledge, from the nature of the case, must precede all doubt, and that doubt itself has never been either a first principle or a first fact, can be just as easily shown with regard to every other system, even the most sceptical, that has ever appeared in the history of human thought. In truth, ab- VOL. I. — 2 18 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 19 solute scepticism, as a rational system of universal doubt, is an absolutely impossible philosophy, because it would of necessity presuppose the known existence of something to doubt, — that is, some known pair of contradictory affirma- tions with one and the same essential content. But that would be to destroy itself as scepticism. The only doubt, therefore, which can possibly be directed against the self-grounded affirmation that " human knowl- edge exists" must take the form of two contradictory affirmations: namely, "human knowledge exists," and " human knowledge does not exist." Absolute scepticism would be absolute indecision and uncertainty as to which of these two reciprocally exclusive judgments is true; and this doubt, unresolved, would be the infanticide of philos- ophy at its very birth. But the doubt of the existence of human knowledge inevitably resolves and annihilates it- self. For it is itself conditioned on human knowledge (1) of the contradictory affirmations themselves, and, further, (2) of the necessary exclusion of one of the two by the other. If the contradictories themselves and the nature of contradiction in general were not known, the necessary exclusion of one by the other could not be known, and the doubt itself, which is generated solely by knowledge of this reciprocal exclusion, would instantly vanish. In other words, doubt of human knowledge is possible through human knowledge alone. Thus universal doubt of human knowledge absolutely extinguishes itself, either in complete unconsciousness and cessation of all thought, or else in complete certainty of the existence of human knowledge. Consequently, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists " is indubitable. § 12. No less certain is it that this affirmation is unde- niable. But, supposing that it can be denied, the denial will read: "Human knowledge does not exist." This de- nial must be either (1) grounded in a prior judgment, or (2) grounded in itself, or (3) ungrounded or dogmatic. Now no prior judgment can be alleged as ground of the denial, for it, like the judgment it denies, can have no prior condition or ground itself. The insertion of the word " not " adds nothing whatever either to content or to ground ; these both remain unchanged. If the positive affirmation that " human knowledge exists " can have no ground in a prior affirmation (§ 9), neither can the nega- tive affirmation that "human knowledge does not exist" have any such ground. A prior ground must be assigned to both or to neither; and, since it cannot be assigned to the positive affirmation, it cannot be assigned to the denial of that affirmation. But, even if a prior judgment could be assigned to the denial as its ground, it would be no ground at all, unless it were a known ground; yet, if it were a known ground, it could not possibly be a ground for the denial of the existence of knowledge, because it would be a ground for the assertion of it. The denial, therefore, is not grounded in a prior judgment. But, if the denial is grounded in itself, its content and its ground must be identical. Expressing the two in separate affirmations, the denial will then read : " Human knowledge does not exist that human knowledge does not exist." If we omit to press the obvious criticism that this would no longer be a denial of human knowledge, but rather an indirect admission of it, it is clear that, if (as has been shown in §§ 4, 8, and 9) the existence of human knowledge is the ground of all rational affirmation, then, from the ground principle that human knowledge does not exist, nothing follows but the utter impossibility of rational affirmation as such, or, in other words, the utter irration- ality, absurdity, or falsity of all affirmations whatever. But this conclusion overthrows the denial itself, as irra- tional, absurd, or false. Manifestly, therefore, the denial cannot be rationally grounded in itself. If, however, despite this overthrow, it is still insisted that the denial is a rational affirmation, then it must have for its own ground the universal ground of all rational affirmation: namely, the existence of human knowledge. 20 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY II THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 21 Expressed in full, the denial will then read: ''Human knowledge exists that human knowledge does not exist." But here the content is flat contradiction of the ground ; and, if the identity of content and ground in a self-grounded affirmation is the strongest possible proof of rationality, certainty, and truth, then the contradiction of content and ground in one and the same affirmation is the strongest possible proof of irrationality, absurdity, and confusion. If, for instance, the sceptic affirms, " Knowledge does not exist," the critic inquires, "/s it known that knowledge does not exist ? " Two replies alone, yes or no, are pos- sible without evasion, and either is complete surrender of the sceptic's position. If he answers, '* No, it is not even known that knowledge does not exist," tlie critic retorts, " Then your original denial, so understood, contradicts and destroys itself by denying its only rational ground." But, if the sceptic answers, "Yes, it is known that knowledge does not exist," then the critic retorts, "So understood, your original denial contradicts and destroys itself by deny- ing its only actual content." In either case, since knowl- edge is the only ground of a rational judgment, the self-contradiction lies imbedded in the very heart of the denial itself, as internal negation either of its own ground or of its own content : either the content compels negation of the ground, or the ground compels negation of the con- tent. Such a contradiction as this, so much more profound than when one judgment merely contradicts another judg- ment external to itself, can arise only when the content is itself denial of the ground ; and this is possible only when the content is denial of the existence of human knowledge, — the universal ground of every rational judgment. Being self-contradictory in its very nature, therefore, the denial of the existence of human knowledge cannot be rationally grounded in itself. If, then, this denial is neither grounded in another judg- ment nor yet in itself, it must be wholly ungrounded, or absolutely dogmatic. Dogmatism in philosophy can be nothing but assertion without reason ; and it was a misuse of the word, unfortunately perpetuated by his successors, when Kant applied it to the doctrine that " things in them- selves " can be known, a doctrine for which, as will appear later (§ 86), very weighty reasons can be rendered. But an assertion without reason, in philosophy at least, is an assertion against reason ; and scepticism, if it ever ventures on the denial of the existence of human knowledge in so many words, becomes its own antipode and figures as abso- lute dogmatism. To show, however, that a given judgment is without reason or against reason is the only rational way to discredit it. Hence, by proving that the denial of the existence of human knowledge can be rationally grounded neither in another judgment nor in itself, but, on the contrary, vanishes instantly in pure irrationality and ab- solute dogmatism, the conclusion is made rationally certain that the affirmation of the existence of human knowledge is undeniable. § 13. Lastly, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists " is undemonstrable from other grounds than itself. For the attempt to demonstrate it from other grounds than itself must Lake for granted that those other grounds are themselves already known. If they are not known, the demonstration, of course, does not demonstrate. But if they are known, then the demonstration assumes and uses in the proof the very fact which it professes to prove : namely, the existence of human knowledge itself. Hence the affirma- tion cannot be demonstrated from other grounds than itself without a manifest begging of the question ; and a j^etitlo principii is no demonstration at all. But, while wholly undemonstrable from other grounds than itself, the affirmation has been proved to be self- grounded, that is, self-demonstrated, from the identity of its content and its ground. The ground is the reason, explanation, and demonstration of the content; and the affirmation that " human knowledge exists " is self-demon- strated because the statement of its content is at the same THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHT THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 23 time statement of its ground. The reason why it cannot be demonstrated from without itself lies in the fact that it is already demonstrated from within itself ; the identity of its content with its ground precludes the allegation of any other or different ground. This self-demonstration is far more than ♦' self-evidence," although it includes self-evi- dence, too. Self-evidence is merely subjective certainty; it is certainty to some particular subject; it is incommuni- cable to other subjects ; and, if denied, it can in no way substantiate itself by universal reason. But self-demonstra- tion is objective necessity; it is necessity to all rational subjects ; and, if denied, it substantiates itself by reducing the denial to absurdity, as in § 12. It is in this sense that the affirmation of the existence of human knowledge has been shown to be (1) undemonstrable from other grounds than itself, but (2) self-grounded or self -demonstrated, — in other words, necessary, universal, and objectively valid, as the absolute beginning or starting-point of the Philoso- phy of Philosophy. * § 14. "But," it may now be urged in objection, "you make the absolute beginning of philosophy in a merely ex- periential recognition of fact as fact ; you allege a merely given actuality of experience as ultimate ground of the rational affirmation with which philosophy must begin. Your identity of content and ground is an imperfect ration- alization of this first affirmation. The * human knowledge 1 "Der Hauptgrund aller Irrungen dieser Gegner mag wohl derseyn dass sie sich nicht recht deutlich gemacht, was hewtism heisse, und daher nicht bedacht, dass aller Demonstration etwas schlechthin Undemonstrir- bares zu Grunde liege." (Fichte, Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschafts- lehre, Werke, I. 508.) If this were true, if all demonstration rested ultimately on the undemonstrable, it would follow that there is no such thing as demonstration ; it would be just as reasonable to deny as to affirm the undemonstrable, since no reason, no ground, could be assigned against the denial. This self-stultification of all philosophy, however, is now shown to be as unnecessary as it is humUiating. The positive ascertain- ment of a self-derrwnstrcUed starting point is the emancipation of philos- ophy from all such humiliation, the condition of its existence, and the guarantee of its final success. i I, '.'I .•V exists,' as experiential content alone, is indeed rationalized by the 'human knowledge exists,' as its rational ground; but the ' human knowledge exists,' taken as rational ground^ has itself a merely experiential content, and therefore re- mains itself unrationalized. Now this mere actuality of experience in the ground itself must be rationalized, before it can make the first affirmation of philosophy completely rational. There is but one way to do this. Granting that the actual existence of human knowledge, as a fact y cannot be logically demonstrated from other grounds than itself without begging the question, it yet ought not to be affirmed or assumed or admitted as a philosophical principle, least of all as the first and fundamental principle of all philoso- phy, without being first demonstrated as a possibility. If philosophy must be rational knowledge, and if all rational knowledge is knowledge by reasons, how can philosophy admit even the existence of knowledge itself as a bare or unrationalized fact, — that is, without first establishing the ultimate reasons or conditions which make it, as a fact, possible ? Surely, the question, < How is knowledge pos- sible ? ' must be answered. Philosophy must prove knowl- edge to be at least a possibility, before it can begin with knowledge as a fact."^ * "Nun ist die Thatsache der Erkenntniss unter der dogmatischen Voraussetzung so wohl des Empirismus als des Rationalismus weder er- klart uoch zu erklaren. Daher ist die nothwendige Folge, dass ihre Moglichkeit vemeint wird. Dies geschieht durch Hume's Skepticismus, in welchem die entgegengesetzten Richtungen convergiren und ihren Lauf vollenden. Die Philosophie steht an einem neuen, entscheidenden Wendepunkt, sie darf die Moglichkeit der Erkenntniss nicht voraussetzen, sondern muss dieselbe an erster Stelle untersuchen und begriinden. Die Natur der Dinge ist bedingt durch ihre Erkennbarkeit. Das Erkenntuiss- problem ist das erste aller Probleme. Hume hat den dogmatischen Schlummer der Philosophie gestort ; der erste, den er geweckt hat, war Kanty der Begriinder der kritischen Epoche (1781), die den Entwicklungsgang der neuen Philosophie in die dograatische und kritiache Periode scheidet und die Philosophie unseres Jahrhunderts beherrscht." (Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neuem Philosophie, I. 144.) But it is quite inaccurate to represent Hume's scepticism as "denying the possibility of knowledge," 24 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 25 § 15. This objection certainly wears a plausible look, although the plausibility disappears on close and keen inspection. The answer to it falls into two parts. In the first place, we must admit that the demand for a complete rationalization of the " human knowledge exists," in order to fit it for its function as starting-point, is a perfectly just demand. No affirmation which is not itself completely rational can be the first or fundamental affirma- tion of a rational philosophy. Likewise, we must admit that there is but one way to rationalize the " human knowl- edge exists." But this one way is not the way indicated. No inquiry into the "possibility" of human knowledge would have even a remote tendency to establish its actuality, much less to rationalize it ; for mere possibility, however thoroughly determined as to its conditions and grounds, will neither establish nor rationalize the actuality of any- thing. The actual existence of a thing proves its possi- bility, but its mere possibility does not prove its actual existence ; as was well expressed in the old logical maxim, Ab esse ad posse valet, a posse ad esse non valet consequentia. Moreover, the question of possibility cannot be raised at all as to any present fact — it is a question of the future alone ; yet the existence of human knowledge, presupposed by the very question itself if it is a known question, is strictly a fact of the present. Knowledge certainly may be, if it IS ; there can be no question of its possibility, if it is a present fact of experience, and, if it is not this, the question itself cannot be asked rationally. In truth, the question propounded is absolutely irrational, and no answer to it would rationalize anything. The only way to ration- alize the "human knowledge exists," when looked at as ground alone, is to apply to it once more precisely the Hume was not so wanting in acuteness as to deny that, and thus involve himself in the contradiction explained above in § 12. His very scepti- cism was founded on recognition of the " fact of knowledge," for it would have been absurd to reduce all knowledge to imjpremons and ideas, if these were not knovm to exist. il :i .1 \\ same principle which was applied to the original affirma- tion as a whole. That is, it must be distinguished within itself as both content and ground, identical as before ; and the ground of the ground, if separately expressed, will be a prior " human knowledge exists." The same will be true of the ground of the ground of tlie ground, and so on forever. Thus, by continually expressing the antecedent ground of each ground, an endless regress arises : " Human kuowl- f edge exists that human knowledge exists that human knowledge exists," and so on forever. But this endless regress differs from every other in the fact that all the terms in the endless series of affirmations are absolutely identical. Consequently, each one of the seriated affirma- tions contains in itself the whole meaning of the endless regress ; each one affirms absolutely all that they all affirm together; the apparently successive terms of the series, being in truth absolutely simultaneous, are all simultane- ously affirmed in the one original affirmation that " human knowledge exists ; " and the identity of content and ground in this is identity of its one content with the totality of the endless regress or series of grounds. Here, then, in the original affirmation that "human knowledge exists," we have simply one experiential content and one rational ground which are identical with each other, simultane- ously affirmed in one judgment, and completely rational- ized by the limitless depth of a reason which can be explicated only by a limitless series of reasons, yet which cannot possibly transcend the content of the judgment itself. § 16. In the second place, we must deny that the ques- tion which the objection emphasizes and makes necessarily preliminary to the admission of human knowledge as a fact of existence — the question, namely, ^^How is knowl- edge possible ? " — is even an intelligible question. The " possible " is that which may be, but is not yet ; it is the non-actual which may yet become actual. Hence the question, '*How is knowledge possible?" if it has any 26 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY meaning at all, must mean, " How is knowledge a non- actual which may yet become actual?" But this ques- tion is the acme of irrationality. Assuming as it does that knowledge is a non-actual, a pure potentiality, a pure non-existent, it is at bottom denial or doubt of the very existence of human knowledge. It proposes to investigate, on the hypothesis that knowledge does not exist — as if investigation itself were not an assumption of its existence ! But the affirmation that " human knowledge exists " has been already proved to be indubitable (§ 11), and undeni- able (§ 12), and self -demonstrated (§ 13). Consequently, the question, " How is knowledge possible ? '' at least as a question which must be solved prior to the admission of knowledge as an actually existing fact, is in no sense and m no degree a reasonable question. What, indeed, could be more unreasonable than to try to prove or explain what IS not known to exist ? Knowledge of the existence of a thing must in the order of reason precede, not follow, any and every attempt to prove it or explain it or account for it. Even if its existence is purely imaginary or hypothetical^ Its actual existence in imagination or in hypothesis must be certainly known and understood, before it can be criti- cally investigated. The irrational question, therefore, which the objection requires to be answered before the existence of human knowledge can be allowed or affirmed, is not even entitled to a respectful consideration. The question itself presupposes the already known existence of human knowl- edge, for it must at least be known to be a question, and not an affirmation or a command. A great deal of acute think- ing has been wasted in trying to answer preliminarily this impossible question as to the « possibility of knowledge " the "possibility of experience," and so forth; the destruc- tive inversion of the order of reason which is involved in these futile inquiries has diverted many otherwise admira- ble intellects from the sober and scientific study of real human knowledge to the ghost-world of unrealities, poten- tialities, and profitless apriorisms. ff Itt THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 27 "Ter conatus ibi coUo dare brachia circum, Ter frusti-a comprensa manus eflfugii imago, Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno." § 17. What may justly be demanded here, however, is an answer to a very different question : namely, not " How is knowledge possible ? " but " How is knowledge neces- sary ? " The possible is that which may be, but is not yet ; the actual is that which may be, and is already j the necessary is that which may be, and is already, and must be everywhere and always. To determine the "conditions of the possibility^^ of human knowledge, as prior to its actuality, is a problem raised by unreason alone, for it is the imbecile question, "How is possibility possible?" But to determine the conditions of human knowledge itself, by investigating the grounds of its necessity in the mode of its actuality^ — this is a problem of reason, and the solution of it is philosophy. A problem correctly stated is already half solved ; and the problem of human knowledge is one, not of possibility at all, but of actuality in necessity and of necessity in actuality. Consequently, the a priori method of investigating this problem is based on a mis- statement of it ; experience is actuality, reason is necessity, and there is no way to investigate either except by the a posteriori method of distinguishing the two elements of human knowledge without separating them, and deter- mining their laws as they stand self-manifested in the historico-literary form of seriated affirmation. The abso- lute condition of such an a posteriori investigation is the known existence of human knowledge, as an actual yet self-grounded fact ; and it can find a starting-point nowhere but in the primordial affirmation that " human knowledge exists." ^ * "In diese drei Fragen zerlegt sich daher das Gnindproblem der kritischen Philosophic : 1. was ist Erkenntniss ? 2. ist die Erkenntniss factisch ? 3. wie ist dieses Factum moglich ? Die Fragen sind so geord- net, dass nur, wenn die vorhergehende gelost ist, die folgende gestellt werden darf." (K. Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, III. 291.) !l (I 28 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY I To repeat what was said in § 3, every philosophy which can be critically considered must appear (1) in the history of human thought and (2) under the form of literature. These simple and indisputable requirements, however, nec- essarily determine its historical form to be that of a written concatenated series of essential or constitutive affirmations, a written body of philosophemes rationally linked together in one seriated and systematic whole. It must have, therefore, a first and fundamental affirmation, — first in the order of reason, at least, if not in that of exposition, and first in both orders at once, if it effects an unexceptionable beginning both as philosophy and as literature. Further, in order really and rationally to begin, this first and fundamental affirmation, as is plain from §§ 6 and 7, must exhibit absolute identity of content and ground, which, again, can be exhibited only in the affirmation that "human knowledge exists;" and this affirmation, therefore, either expressed or implied, either confessed or unconfessed, is the actual beginning of every philosophy known to history. So far, indeed, as any given philosophy fails to meet these several requirements, just so far it will be justly criticised as failing to be genuinely or completely philosophical; but none the less must it appear historically as a series of successive affirmations which, as a system, more or less adequately declare the rational principles of human knowledge. This necessarily historico-literary form of human knowledge, which is common to all the particular sciences as well as to phi- losophy or universal science, is what we mean here by its mode of actualiti/, and it is only in this historico-literary form, only in this mode of actuality, that the true grounds of necessity which are inherent in human knowledge as such can be rationally investigated. Hence the question, " How is knowledge necessary ? " is not preliminary, but subsequent, to the admission of human knowledge itself as actually existiyig in the historico'literary form of seriated affirmation. !| .'t 4 THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 29 § 18. In order, then, to investigate those grounds of neces- sity in human knowledge which lie latent or immanent in its mode of actuality, — that is, in its historico-literary form of seriated affirmation, — let us begin with a restate- ment of some of our results and place them in a fresh light. The affirmation that " human knowledge exists," as con- tent, does not differ in mmning from the affirmation that " human knowledge exists," as ground ; the single affirma- tion that " human knowledge exists," has precisely as much meaning or content and precisely as much ground as the double affirmation that " human knowledge exists that human knowledge exists." Thus the single affirmation, taken as a first principle inclusive of all its own grounds and pregnant with all its own rational consequences is a self-grounded affirmation, which, as such, constitutes for philosophy an absolute starting-point. But it should be noticed that the identity of content and ground thus exhibited is not identitij without essential difference^ but identitij in essential difference, since two cannot be one unless they are two as well as one. For in- stance, A = A is identity without essential difference; but A = B X C is identity in essential difference. Such, like- wise, is the identity of color and form in every object of vision, the identity of resistance and form in every object of touch, the identity of pitch, intensity, and timbre in every object of hearing. Such, likewise, is the identity of sub- ject and object in all self-consciousness, the identity of Space and Time in every event of history, the identity of content and ground in the one self-grounded affirmation. This identity of content and ground does not mean their in- difference, but rather their absolute interpenetration in an actual cognition, a particular judgment, just as color and form interpenetrate in an actual object of vision. The color is wherever the form is, and vice versa; extinction of one would be extinction of the other; suppression of either would be the destruction of both, as a visual object. Such identity as this interpenetration in space, time, and V^i 30 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE AXIOM OP PHILOSOPHY SI essence is profounder than even "indissoluble union," which might be merely indissoluble juxtaposition without interpenetration. To mark this profoundest interconnec- tion, the word "identity" will serve, if protected from meaning indifference or absolute sameness, by bearing in mind that the two elements are not only identical, but also different and distinguishable. For instance, when Kant teaches that " intuitions without concepts are blind, and concepts without intuitions are empty," he declares their indissoluble union, but not their absolute interpene- tration; for he derives them from experience and reason respectively as separate products of separate actions, and not as one inseparable product of one inseparable action (§ 24) — as if color could be known by sense without form being known by understanding, in one indivisible act of sense-perception. Color and form are inseparable in the object as mere phaenomenon ; therefore, sense and under- standing are inseparable in the perception of it as mere phaenomenon. Content and ground are equally inseparable, equally identical in difference, in the self-grounded judg- ment. Content as content is not ground as ground ; it is only when ground is taken for content, also, in a par- ticular judgment which is its own ground, that identity of content and ground, as identity in difference, can possibly arise. Inasmuch, further, as rational affirmations, in order not to be one and the same affirmation, must have different contents, yet, in order to be rational, must all have one and the same ground in existent human knowledge, it is clear that there can be only one self-grounded affirmation, — that in which the existence of human knowledge, as this one universal ground, is taken as particular content, also. This affirmation alone will exhibit that identity in difference between content and ground which is necessary in order to render the affirmation itself self-grounded, self- demonstrated, and therefore both first and certain^ as a philosophical starting-point. h II ( But, as appeared in § 15, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," even when taken as ground alone, must be itself resolvable into content and ground, and this ground again into content and ground, and so on indefi- nitely. Thus an endless regress arises, which may be exhibited to the eye as follows: — Human knowledge \ Con^nt "i«'«= (Ground = Content II Ground = I Content II ( Content r Ground = Ground = ( Content \ Ground, etc. But, in this extraordinary regress, all the contents are absolutely one without difference, and all the grounds, likewise, are absolutely one without difference; while the regress itself, from the equation in each term of content and ground as identity in difference, is the absolute equa- tion of all the terms as identity without difference. That is, the whole endless regress is absolutely contained in each of its own terms, and so is itself abolished; for such a series as 5 = 5 = 5 = 5 = 5 is no real series at all, but is absolutely equivalent to 5 alone. § 19. At this point, however, a formidable objection may be interposed : " You offer us, then, as the first prin- ciple and only possible starting-point of philosophy, an absolutely self -grounded affirmation. But, if self -grounded, it must be self-existent. Whatever has no ground outside of itself must derive its existence from itself alone; it must exist solely from some inner causal necessity of its own being or nature. In proving, therefore, that your affirmation is self-grounded, you cut it off from all depend- ence on any cause but itself; you prove it to be an abso- lute causa sui, a self-existent being; and, since this, if maintained of a mere judgment or proposition, is undeni- ably absurd, you overshoot the mark, prove too much, and leave philosophy, at last, without any rational beginning at all." This objection, strong as it may seem, has the weakness I 32 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOrHT 11^ f I of confounding the distinction of ground and cause. The ground is a reason of knowing (principium ratlonls svffi. eientis cof/noscendi, which Schopenhauer interprets as, "No one can admit anything to be true without knowing why," — this Wiy being the ground). The cause, however, is a reason of becoming {p>rlncipium rationis sufficientis fiendi, which Schopenhauer would interpret as, "No change can take place without a determinant in an entire state of antecedent conditions or factors," — this detei^inant being the cause). The law of rationality (ground and result, or reason and consequent) is by no means the law of causality (cause and effect) ; yet the above objection rests wholly on a confused identification of the two. It must be admitted, however, that an inquiry as to ground leads at last to cause, as will a])pear below, and that both laws are neces- sarily involved in the present instance. The affirmation that " human knowledge exists " is self- grounded, but not self-caused. Every rational affirmation or judgment, as such, has a cause as well as a ground, because it is essentially an act of knowledge. As an "act of ktiotvledf/e," it must have a rational ground, or reason why it is known; as an ^^ act of knowledge," it must have a i)ractical ground, a purpose or reason why it is dojie ; but, as an ''act of knowledge,'' it must also have an efficient cause, or knowing agent, from which it proceeds. So far as its meaning alone is concerned, it is a manifestation of intelligence; but, so far as its production or pronunciation alone is concerned, it is a manifestation of energy. Apart from its character as an act, every rational affirmation is a cognition, a judgment, a linking of subject and predicate; it must, therefore, have a rational ground, and involve the law of rationality. But, apart from its character as some special purport, every affirmation, whether rational or ir. rational, is an event, a change of state, an effect; it must, therefore, have a cause, and involve the law of causality. Considered, therefore, as at once a cognition and an effect, every rational affirmation must have its ground and THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 33 \ i, its cause in one^ distinguishable but inseparable. This ground-cause, then, can be nothing but a knowing energy, an active intelligence, whence the affirmation, as both cog- nition and effect, proceeds. In other words, the ground- cause or cause-ground of every rational affirmation can only be a rational affirmer affirming for a reason ; for ex- ample, a philosopher philosophizing. But no affirmation as such can be its own cause. It may be its own ground, pro- vided the content is identical with the reason why it is known, but it cannot be its own cause, because it is not itself a knowing energy or active intelligence. Conse- quently, the affirmation that "human knowledge exists," although (as already explained) self-grounded, is not self- caused. So far, therefore, as the objection infers self- causation or self -existence from simple self-groundedness or self-explanation, it has no critical force whatever. Never- theless, it serves a useful purpose in developing the neces- sity of distinguishing the cause and the ground of the affirmation in question. § 20. But the subject is not yet exhausted. A strictly rational regress of grounds as such leads to the same con- clusion as to cause, strengthening, deepening, and enlarging it, — not, of course, the regress of grounds already consid- ered in §§ 15 and 18, which explains the content as content alone, and abolishes itself, but rather the regress which is to explain that identity of content and ground which con- stitutes the self-groundedness of the affirmation as a whole. As sufficiently explained in what has preceded, the affir- mation that "human knowledge exists," taken as content alone, has its ratio cognoscendi in the same affirmation that " human knowledge exists," taken as ground alone ; and this identity of content and ground makes the affirmation self-grounded. But what is the ground of this identity itself, and why must it be affirmed ? If, as is said above, the cause of every rational affirmation is a rational affirmer affirming for a reason, what is his reason for making this particular affirmation, and why is it a necessary reason? VOL. 1, — 3 I' THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 35 84 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY The reason why the affirmation is known to be true, when once made, is the fact that the affirmation of its content is identical with the affirmation of its ground or ratio cognos- cendi ; but what is the necessary reason why it must be made at all ? Now the rational necessity for making it, as an actual affirmation, must lie in the deeply hidden ground of the strange and paradoxical identity it exhibits. What is this necessity? Even as identity in difference, how can a purely experiential content be identical with a purely rational ground ? Clearly, it cannot, — clearly, there can be no self-grounded affirmation at all, — if experience and reason cannot be identical themselves. But, if experience and reason can be identical themselves, they must be identical in a self-grounded affirmatiou, provided such an affirmation can be produced. The identity of a purely experiential content and a purely rational ground, therefore, in an actu- ally producible affirmation, will be the necessary consequence, in that particular case, of a necessary and universal condi- tion: namely, the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge itself. Now the affirmation that " human knowledge exists " is a self-grounded affirmation, and does actually exhibit the identity of an experiential content and a rational ground. This has been proved above, in §§9 and 10, beyond all rea- sonable denial or doubt. The mere fact, then, that a self- grounded affirmation in which this identity demonstrably exists, and which stands, therefore, as a proved concrete case of it, can be and has been actually produced, itself dem- onstrates the still deeper identity of experience and reason in human knowledge as such. For, as has just been shown, the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge itself is the necessary condition of the identity of experien- tial content and rational ground in the affirmation of human knowledge : or, conversely stated, the identity of content and ground in the affirmation of human knowledge is the necessary consequence or result of the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge itself. But, as Kant pointed out, if a conditioned is given, the totality of its conditions is given in and with it. Since, then, the identity of content and ground in the affirmation is given as an a>ctual conditioned, the actual identity of experience and reason in human knowledge is given in and with it, as its immanent necessary condition : the actuality of the condi- tioned demonstrates both the actuality of the condition and its necessity as a condition. Hence the affirmation that " human knowledge exists " is not only actual identity of its own content and ground, but also both actual and rela- tively necessary identity of experience and reason in the human knowledge whose existence it affirms. Here, then, we have discovered that deeper ground of the "human knowledge exists," — that rational necessity of human knowledge immanent in its mode of actuality, — of which we were in quest (§ 17). Still, however, we have not yet reached a necessary ground or reason why this particular affirmation must be itself made. To find it, we must look deeper still. § 21. Evidently, the identity in difference of experience and reason in human knowledge must be itself explained. As already stated in § 9, the existence of human knowledge is not a necessary fact per se ; it did not always exist ; how, then, can it be at all necessary to affirm its existence ? Nay, how can its "existence," in any intelligible sense be affirmed at all ? Knowledge itself is neither a person nor a thing ; it neither experiences nor reasons ; how, then, can it exist as the identity in difference of experience and reason ? Is not this a pure paradox ? These questions are perfectly fair, and the objections they express must be as fairly met. To find answers to them which shall be neither evasive nor vague, let us pursue a little farther the path of the rigorous regress of grounds or conditions. The identity of experience and reason in human knowl- edge, although it is the necessary condition and ratio suffi- dens cognoscendi of the identity of content and ground in the 86 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY affirmation that "human knowledge exists," must have itself a necessary condition, a ratio sufficiens cognoscendi. Taken by itself alone, it is clearly not an ultimate condition or ground, for in itself it is not an explanation, but a para- dox. In truth, this identity of experience and reason in human knowledge, at which we have arrived as a necessary result, must be candidly admitted to be a direct contradic- tion of the fashionable metaphysic ; for, if true, it subverts and sweeps away that doctrine of the necessary separation of sense and intellect, of experience and reason, which lies at the very foundation of the whole idealistic philosophy, — notably as illustrated in the "pure reason" and "pure a priori knowledge " of Kant, and the " pure thought," " absolute idealism," or " panlogism " of Hegel. All these are merely different names for reason divorced from experi- ence. The "pure," in these and kindred phrases, means " purified from all experience ; " it has no other meaning. Hence the denial of any possible or conceivable separation of experience and reason, which is of course implied in the doctrine of their necessary inseparability or identity in difference, as the essential nature of human knowledge itself, marks the profound character of the change which reformed modern philosophy, aiming at that Philosophy of Philosophy which is more than the history or any possible criticism of it, finds it necessary to make in its treatment of the philosophical problem. In opposition to the tradi- tional idealistic way of seeking the necessity, universality, and objective validity of reason through a rigorous exclu- sion of all empirical elements (an exclusion never yet accomplished, as Trendelenburg, Prantl, und others, have so ably and conclusively proved in the case of Hegel), re- formed modern philosophy seeks the same object by the realistic way of recognizing the necessary inseparability (that is, the identity in difference) of experience and reason in all human knowledge whatever, and thereby finding room for all the facts, instead of crushing half the facts out of sight. How it arrives at this identity of experience THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 37 and reason has now been shown ; but, if it stops there, it falls short of explanation, and ends in a paradox. Hence the deep-lying ground of this very identity must now be sought, as the only possible explanation and the only con- vincing proof of the scientific soundness of the realistic way of philosophizing. § 22. The proof that experience and reason are identical in human knowledge was drawn above, in § 20, from the simple actuality of a self-grounded affirmation, which merely exemplified it in one proved and concrete case. This, however, was a proof of the mere fact or actuality of the identity in a particular instance, not of its inherent rational necessity. Hence this proof had to be supple- mented by another, showing that experience and reason must be identical in human knowledge, because that identity is related to the identity of content and ground in the self- grounded affirmation as necessary condition to necessary consequence. But this necessity, again, is not an absolute or inherent rational necessity, but only a relative necessity with reference to a consequence different from and external to itself ; that is, the condition (identity of experience and reason in human knowledge as such) and the consequence (identity of experiential content and rational ground in the self-grounded affirmation), being a pair necessarily re- lated to each other by their rational connection as condition and consequence, are only as a pair that necessary rational condition which had to be discovered, in order to convert the self-grounded affirmation itself from the mere actuality which it apparently was into the rational necessity which it really is and is now seen to be. So far, now, the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge is certainly shown to be necessary per aliud — necessary itself through the necessary consequence to which it stands related as the necessary condition. But it is not yet shown to be inher- ently necessary per se, as being itself the necessary conse- quence of another ground lying more deeply still as its own condition: it must remain a mere fact, although a 38 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY necessary fact, until it is shown to be inherently necessary from an immanent ground of its own. Not until this im- manent ground of its own is discovered and proved, will the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge be explained, comprehended, or relieved of its seemingly paradoxical character. The problem before us, therefore, is to discover and prove that this identity is not only the necessary condition of a consequence, but also itself the necessary consequence of a condition — a condition which shall be immanent in itself, yet at the same time more widely universal. Can the problem be solved ? § 23. The problem itself is to show that the identity of experience and reason in human knowledge, already proved as a fact, is necessarily grounded in a deeper identity, immanent in itself, yet more widely universal. If soluble at all, this problem can be solved only by analyzing the identity in which the deeper identity must lie hidden, as the immanent necessary condition of which the former is itself the necessary consequence or result. What, then, is meant by " experience, " and by " reason," and why must they be at once different and identical, dis- tinguishable yet inseparable, in human knowledge ? Experience is observation of single existent facts, per- ception of given particulars, knowledge of actual individual units of existence {Erfahrungsgegenstdnde) ; while reason is knowledge of their principles, their necessary relations and universal kinds and constitutive forms {Principien^ Schlussreihen, Ideen). It is altogether immaterial whether these units exist in Being, as particular things in them- selves or particular relations in things, or whether they exist merely in Thought, as particular ideas, feelings, con- cepts, intuitions, sensations, states of consciousness in general: experience remains knowledge of the units, and reason remains knowledge of the universals. Nothing, at bottom, but the difference in the objects known determines the difference in the modes of knowledge ; and the in- separability of the units and the universals is the insepara- THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 39 bility of experience and reason. No unit of existence, whether in Being or in Thought, can exist unrelated to its kind; to be out of relation is to be out of existence itself, for all existent units must coexist, and coexistence is itself a relation of kind. No unit of existence, more- over, can exist either out of particular relations (e. g. to others of its kind) or out of universal relations (e. g, to the whole of its kind), — every unit must exist in both at once ; for every unit exists only as one of its kind, and every kind exists only as all of its units. Since, then, experience is knowledge of actual particulars or units of existence, and reason is knowledge of necessary universals or kinds of existence, it follows that the distinctive difference be- tween experience and reason, as modes of knowledge, is determined by the essential difference of their objects as such; units of existence are the objects of perception ("external" and "internal"), while universals of exist- ence are the objects of intellect, and the difference of sense and intellect, or of experience and reason, as modes of knowledge, is in the last analysis determined by a difference of nature in the objects known. At bottom, experience and reason are identical in knowledge because units and universals are identical in existence, — identical, that is, in difference, not without difference, — as specimens and species. From the necessity, therefore, that every thing and every kind (that is, every real or possible object of human knowl- edge) must be at once both individual and universal^ it necessarily follows that every possible human cognition must be derived both from experience and from reason, — that is, must be at once both experiential and rational. In general, human knowledge itself can exist only as the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason in man, because man himself, as the unit-object of his own self-knowledge, is necessarily both individual and univer- sal, — individual as a unit of existence, universal as a kind of existence. Human self-consciousness itself is nothing but man^s knowledge of his own existence. From the fact 40 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY that his existence is both individual and universal, it necessarily follows that his knowledge of it is both ex- periential and rational. Consequently, the identity in difference of experience and reason in human knowledge, as a necessary consequence, is rationally grounded upon the deeper identity of existence and knowledge in human self-consciousness, as its necessary condition. And this deeper identity, immanent in the former identity as its self-contained, yet more widely universal condition, is pre- cisely what we sought to find. § 24. This result is itself a sufficient criticism of philo- sophical or speculative idealism. Idealism, in its typical form as developed in Germany during the first third of the nineteenth century, has for its distinctive foundation or characteristic principle the complete separation of experience a7id reason, and the complete isolation of reason as "pure reason," "pure thought," "pure productivity," "pure thinking-process," or, in the last degree of abstraction, " pure law of the thinking-process." Its final and logical result is that " pure thought " produces the total object of knowledge absolutely out of itself, according to a law im- manent in its own constitutive process and known as Dia- lectic. That is, nothing is at last knowable but ideas, notions, or states of consciousness, which *^ pure self -ac- tivity " creates out of itself and to which it imparts all those forms, elements, categories, or relations, which render them possible objects of knowledge. The word " pure," in all the above or kindred phrases, simply means " pure from experience," and has no other meaning ; it formulates the absolute separation of experience and reason, as, for in- stance, is done by Kant, when he expressly defines the word " pure " as " containing nothing empirical." ^ Ideal- 1 "Bei einer Untersuchung der reinen (nichts Empirisches enthalten- den) Elemente der menschlichen Erkenntniss gelang es mir," u. s. f. (Pro- legomena, Werke, IV. 71, ed. Hart). Still more emphatically: "Wir werden also im Verfolg imter Erkenntnissen a pi'iori nicht solche ver- stehen, die von dieser oder jener, sondem die schlechUtrdings von aller THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 41 ism thus reduces all knowledge, as such, to reason alone, separates it from experience, and denies the name of knowledge to experience altogether, except so far as experience takes and keeps the ^^ a priori concepts" or " categories " of reason itself. Hence it finds nothing in- telligible in simple "existence," "the actual," or "the given." ^ For example, Cohen, ridiculing the "given thing in it- self," says pithily enough : " To be sure, this ' being given [in itself]' we positively cannot understand; for *to be given' means Ho be related to experience.' "^ In point of fact, " to be given in itself " means " to be at the same time related to experience and internally self-related ; " for Erfahrung uuabhangig stattfinden. Ihnen siud empirisclie Erkenntnisse, oder solche, die uur a posteriori, d. i. durch Erfahrung moglich sind, ent- gegengesetzt. Von den Erkenntnissen a priori heissen aber diejenigen rein, denen gar nichts Empirisches beigemischt ist." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 34.) '*Alle unsere Erkenntniss hebt von den Sinnen an, geht von da zum Verstande und endigt bei der Vernunft, iiber welche nichts Hciheres in uns angetroffen wird, den Stoff der Anschauung zu bcarbeiten und unter die hochste Einheit des Denkens zu briugen." {Ibid. in. 247.) This is separation, and not merely distinction, of expe- rience and reason. Falckenberg so understands the matter : " Die Scho- lastiker bezeichneten mit a priori die Erkenntnis aus den Ursachen (aus dem, was vorhergeht), mit a posteriori die aus den Wirkungen. Kant benutzt, nach Leibnitz' und Lamberts Vorgang, die Termini zum Ausdruck des Gegensatzes : Erkenntnis aus Vernunft — aus Erfahrung. Apriori ist ein ohne Beihilfe der Erfahrung gewonnenes Urteil, und zwar, wenn der Satz, aus dem es abgeleitet worden, auch wiederum von Erfahrung unab- hiingig ist, absolut apriori, anderenfalls relativ apriori." (Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 1892, p. 272, footnote.) 1 J. F. Reiff, Der Anfang der Philosophie, 1840, p. 10 : *' Es gibt keine Leiter zur Philosophie ; denn sie entsteht nur da, wo ich mit einem Male alles Gegebne von mir werfe." 2 H. Cohen, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, 1885, p. 503 : " Zwar dieses Gegebensein konnen wir schlechterdings nicht verstehen ; denn gegebensein heisst 'auf Erfahrung bezogen sein.' . . . Indessen muss sich doch die Erfahrung selbst als Ganzes und somit als Ding denken lassen : das ist das Ding an sich, nicht als Ding des analytischen Denkens, noch als Gegenstand der Erfahrung, sondem Erfahrung selbst als Gegenstand gedacht." ^/^•f^rnt 42 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE AXIOM OF PHILOSOPHY 43 internal self-relation necessarily renders the "object of experience " a "thing in itself." But a sufficient reply to Cohen's airy sophism is simply to ask : Is not experience itself given ? And is it anything but given ? And, if we cannot understand experience, what can we understand? Cohen had been already answered in advance by Lotze, when he said : " Metaphysic has not to construct reality, but to recognize it, — to investigate the inner order of the given, not to deduce the given from that which is not given." * But Cohen unconsciously and amusingly refutes himself on the same page, by confessing that experience as a whole is, after all, at once an "object of thought" and a "thing in itself!" If an "object of thought "can be thus a merely given " thing in itself," so likewise may an "object of experience " be a merely given "thing in it- self;" and Cohen, now conceding that he can "think" (/. e. " understand ") the " given thing in itself," pricks the bubble of his own objection. The present condition of philosophical thought in Ger- many, as the complete decay of speculative idealism in the land of its birth and complete recognition of the identity of experience and reason, is well indicated by Professor Paul- sen, of Berlin, as follows : — " It is the common and fundamental characteristic of the Philos- ophies of Fichte, Schelliug, and Hegel, that they are convinced of their ability to produce a system of absolute knowledge of reality through a new process of rational thought, independently of ex- perience and the experiential sciences. * The Wissensckajlslehre^' says Fichte, < makes absolutely no inquiries about experience, and pays not the slightest heed to it. It would necessarily be true, even if there could be no experience at all ; and it would be certain a priori that all possible future experience would have to conform to the laws which it has established.' Similarly, at the beginning 1 H. Lotze, Metaphysik, 1884, p. 163 : " Die Metaphysik hat nicht die Wirklichkeit zu machen, sondern sie anzuerkennen ; die innere Ord- nung des Gegebenen zu erforschen, nicht das Gegehene abzuleiten von dem, was eben nicht gegeben ist." of the * Chief Features of the Present Age,' he declares : * The philosopher would pursue his business (here the construction of history) without regard to any experience, and absolutely a priori, and would of necessity be able a priori to describe the whole course of time and all possible epochs of it.' Precisely as Fichte deduces history a priori, SchelUng constructs Nature a priori, occasionally pouring out his scorn upon ' the blind and senseless kind of natu- ral science which has everywhere established itself since the de- struction of philosophy by Bacon and of physics by Boyle and Newton.' In Hegel, the speculative philosophy attains its ripe perfection ; all reality is constructed by him out of pure categories (Begrijffe) ; reality and truth coincide in his system. By its side stand the empirical sciences; not ex principiis, out of internal reason, but ex datis, out of external experience, they heap up a mass of superficial information of all sorts about particulars. Genuine knowledge of reality is the philosophical ; its form, the dialectical development of the Begrijf, is nothing else than the sub- jective repetition of the objective development-process of the Idea, that is, of reality itself." ^ But: " Our age no longer believes in the possibility of knowing a priori the sense or intellectual content of reality through dialectical de- velopment of the Begriff, As it knows only one reaUty, so it knows only one truth and only one way to it : thinking experience. Thought without experience leads to the knowledge of reality just as little as experience without thought. The philosopher has no royal road to knowledge ; speculative idealism is in truth nothing but a distorted reflection on cognitions which are due to uncon- fessed experience." * 1 F. Paulsen, Einleitung in die Philosophic, 1892, p. 29 : " Es ist der gemelnsame Gnindcharakter der Philosophien Fichtes, Schellings, Kegels, dass sie durch ein neues Verfahren rein begrifflichen Denkens, unabhangig von der Erfahrung und den empirischen Wissenschaften, ein System absoluter Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit hervorzubringen zu konnen iiber- zeugt sind," u. s. f. 2 Ibid. p. 16: "Unsere Zeit glaubt nicht mehr an die Moglichkeit, durch dialektische Begriffsentwickelung die Gedanken oder den Sinn der Wirklichkeit a priori zu erkennen. Sie kennt, wie nur eiue Wirklichkeit, so nur eine Wahrheit und einen Weg zu ihr: die denkende Erfahrung. Erfahrungsloses Denken fuhrt so wenig zur Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit, als gedankenlose Erfahrung. Der Philosoph hat keine via regia zur 44 THE SYLLOGISTIC PfflLOSOPHY The persistent attempt of speculative idealism to elimi- minate from philosophy all recognition " of the given," as simple "fact of existence" or "datum of experience," has been an historical failure because it was a logical failure from the start. For the "pure reason," *f § 40. Modern philosophy was born into distinct self- consciousness in Bacon and Descartes : Bacon, the founder of empiricism or empirism, and Descartes, the founder of rationalism. In this fundamental opposition between ex- perience and reason, sense and intellect, sensation and thought, as in the last analysis two necessarily separate or reciprocally exclusive origins of all human knowledge, modern philosophy not only had its conscious beginning, but has ever since lived its conscious life. As opposed principles (disregarding all illogical compromises of the two, which are valueless in philosophy), empirism holds that all human knowledge is at bottom self-transformed sensation— i^nre sense-activity, gradually transforming itself into thought without drawing on any other original element or energy than itself; while rationalism holds that all human knowledge at bottom is thought transforming se7isa- tion—puve intellect-activity, gradually constructing knowl- edge out of a sense-activity that is itself neither knowledge nor an origin of knowledge. But, inasmuch as both sense and intellect are merely different modes of activity of an energizing subject, both empirism and rationalism agree in holding that all human knowledge originates solely in the knowing subject, and that nothing in knowledge is either derived or derivable from the object known, at least as an actually given reality whose existence and nature are inde- pendent of all humanly subjective activities or conditions. In other words, both sense and intellect are simply modes of consciousness, sense giving all the " matter '^ and intel- lect giving all the " form " of human knowledge ; and all u COGITO, ERGO SUM" 65 so-called knowledge of a phenomenally external world is reduced to mere inference — which is nothing but an act of consciousness. This, mutatis mutandis, is as true of Bacon as of Descartes, of Locke's " observation and reflection " or Hume's " impressions and ideas" as of Kant's "sensibility and understanding." In this manner, empirism, or the Apriorismus of sense, and rationalism, or the Apriorismus of intellect, equally resolve all human knowledge into states of human consciousness, and find its ultimate origin and explanation in the subject alone. For this reason, the two great parallel streams of " modern philosophy " flow from one and the same source in their common recognition of the fact of individual self -consciousness as the sole and un- supplemented origin of all human knowledge. When, there- fore, Descartes laid down his " I think, therefore I am," as the first absolute certainty from which all philosophies of self-consciousness must take their start, and made it the fountain-head of his own rationalism, he spoke no more for rationalism than he did for empirism; he spoke simply as the founder of systematic modern philosophy itself, in clear contradistinction from ancient philosophy; he fi'rst unequivocally planted himself on the modern affirmation, not of Universal Being, but of the Being of Indivdual Hu- man Thought, and thereby made himself, not Kant (who erroneously claimed the honor), the Copernicus of the modern philosophical revolution. To Descartes, the being of an external world, nay, the being of God himself, was simply an inference from his own individual being, simply a consequence from his own individual thought ; each infer- ence, therefore, admitted of rational doubt at the start, and was held by him to be provisionally false. ^ But as is proved in Chapter I, the being of God is the ultimate neces- *" Sic autem rejicientes ilia omnia, de quibus aliquo modo possumus dubitare, ac etiam falsa esse fingentes ; facile quidem supponimus nullum esse Deum, nullum coelum, nulla corpora ; nosque etiam ipsos non habere manus, nee pedes, nee denique ullum corpus ; non autem ideo nos qui talia cogitamus nihil esse." (Principia PhilosoMln. p, I. 7.) VOL. I. — 5 66 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY sary condition of the ahsolutely certain fact of Human Knowledge. Of this principle, if the immanent regress of conditions is once clearly understood, there can be no rational doubt at all ; and this principle is the standpoint of reformed modern philosophy, the philosophy of the future. But it is with good reason that all reputable his- torians and competent critics agree in acknowledging that Descartes's pithy formula, " I think, therefore I am," is the earliest adequate and accurate declaration of the funda- mental principle, the distinctive standpoint, and the histori- cal beginning of modern philosophy, so called. § 41. Now it has been made sufficiently plain, in §§ 3-7, that no real starting-point in philosophy can possibly be found except in a self-grounded judgment, proposition, or affirmation, and that self-groundedness consists in the ac- tual identity in difference of ground and content. If any professed beginning in philosophy depends upon some other and prior judgment or presupposition, it is no real or absolute or " presuppositionless beginning ; " the real beginning lies in that presupposition. The only way to" avoid an interminable regress of relative beginnings is to find a judgment which affirms its own ground as its own con- tent, and thereby affirms both in itself. Here, then, such a self-grounded judgment having been actually ascertained, we possess a critical principle by which we can scientifically de- termine the validity or invalidity of any and all starting- points in the historical series of philosophical systems. The only possible " presuppositionless beginning " must be one which contains in itself all its own presuppositions or grounds. Such a beginning is the Axiom of Philosophy, "Human knowledge exists," in which each condition in the imma- nent regress stands as simply an actualized particular case of the more widely universal condition on which it depends as a consequence, and in which, therefore, the whole series of conditions inheres, according to the principle that every universal inheres wholly in the totality of its own particu- lars, and partly in each and every one of them — just as •'COGITO, ERGO SUM" 67 the organic constitution is immanent in the entire organism, and both immanent and transcendent in each and every separate organ. In the case of every other judgment, the regressive concatenation of conditions can be expressed solely by a chain of prior and separate judgments, of which each has a peculiar content different from that of every other • but, in the case of the Axiom of Philosophy, the regress of conditions, being immanent, is expressedin one and the same judgment, of which judgment this regress simply consti- tutes the necessary rational significance. In other words, whoever affirms that " Human knowledge exists " has af- firmed objectively, whether he subjectively understands his own affirmation or not, the one given fact of which philosophy itself, in its entire rational development both as regress to conditions and as progress to consequences, is neither more nor less than the absohUely necessary meaiiiiig. All philosophical education consists in gradually learning to understand this rational necessity, that is, in gradually expanding the mind to comprehend this necessary meaning of the Axiom of Philosophy. For the " existence of human knowledge " includes all that has yet been learned by the human mind, and the "advancement" of it consists in discovering its conditions and its consequences through the inseparable and ever-increasing co-activity of experience and reason. Philosophy itself is the self-comprehension of human knowledge as an organic whole, and its first problem IS to understand the germ out of which that whole has grown. In the knowledge that knowledge exists lies that original germ ; for, rationally developed, it is self-conscious- ness, race-consciousness, world-consciousness, and God- consciousness, all in one. It is at once beginning, principle, and universal explanation, in the wide meaning of the Greek ^Xn\ and all other knowledges, whether of conditions or of consequences, of particulars or of universals, are but "cases " of it. Because it is the only possible real begin- ning or principle of philosophy, it is the necessary presup- position of all merely apparent beginnings, and to it, 68 THE SYLLOGISTIC PniLOSOPHY "COGITO, ERGO SUM" 69 ll u I expressed or implied, confessed or unconfessed, all these must be referred. In the Axiom of Philosophy, therefore, we possess an unconditionally valid principle of philosophi- cal criticism, by which we can determine the validity or invalidity of any and all professed starting-points in the historical series of philosophical systems. With respect to every such starting-point, this question must be put: Is it an " intrinsic truth " or self -grounded judgmertty in the sense that its ground is identical with its content ? In other words, Is it a legitimate form of the Axiom of Philosoj^hg ? If, then, the affirmation, "I think, therefore I am," is in truth equivalent to the one and only self-grounded affirma- tion, ** Human knowledge exists," modern philosophy has already effected a real beginning. Otherwise, there exists a rational necessity for rethinking philosophy as the neces- sary outgrowth of that self-grounded affirmation — a ne- cessity so profound and inexpugnable that nothing short of a philosophical revolution can satisfy the demands of reason. Such a rethinking of philosophy as the universal and necessary science of human knowledge will be the Philoso- phy of Philosophy, as distinguished from the history or the criticism of it. § 42. That such a rational necessity exists, and that such a philosophical revolution is impending, will appear indis- putable to any thoughtful mind that frees itself from preva- lent preconceptions so far as to examine with due care and candor the actual state of philosophy to-day. This presents no more striking characteristic than an ill-concealed despair of the possibility of philosophical construction on a uni- versal scale — despair of the ability of the human mind, at least in its present stage of culture, to arrive at a world' science at once unitary, universal, and demonstrative. This despair crops out in myriad ways and forms in the philo- sophical literature of the period, especially in Germany, the birthplace of reines Denken, where the deep river of constructive philosophy seems for the present to have spread itself out, with the consequent sacrifice of depth. into a wide and relatively shallow lagoon of historical and critical investigation. For instance, in the first third of our own century, Hegel attempted to think the universe as necessarily and demon- stratively one, by means of a dialectical and genetical de- velopment of the "categories of pure thought." But to-day, in one of the latest and most scholarly of the numerous recent histories of philosophy, Windelband limits himself to "the history of problems and of conceptions," as "a continuous and everywhere self-correlated whole," — that is, as " the historical intertwisting of the various trains of thought out of which has grown the modern view of the world and of life ; " and he concludes that this purely his- torical aim is to be fulfilled, "not by a dialectical evolution of categories, but only by an all-sided, unprejudiced, and thorough investigation of the facts." ^ Hence he empha- sizes this definition : " The history of philosophy is the process by which European humanity has stored up its view of the world and its estimate of life in scientific concepts."* This scrupulous regard for historical truth prompts and justifies his animadversions upon Hegel's dis- regard of it, in forcing facts to suit his theory, and construct- ing an historical order after the pattern of the dialectical order of the categories.' But Windelband's own stand- point is a frank confession that (in his opinion) Kant has "demonstrated the impossibility of a philosophical (meta- physical) world-science at the side of or above the particular sciences, and thereby once more limited and revolutionized the conception and problem of philosophy ; " that thus " the province of philosophy as a particular science is narrowed to the Kantian self-criticism of reason," while its only uni- versal function is the " practical direction of life ; " and that this Kantian conception of philosophy is " new and to all appearance final," notwithstanding the candidly admitted 1 W. Windelband, Geschichte der Pbilosophie, Vorwort, 1892. 2 Ibid. Eiuleitung, p. 8. * Ibid. Einleitung, p. 9, 70 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY "COGITO, ERGO SUM" 71 fact that the nineteenth century manifests a strong " incli- nation to absorb all human knowledge into philosophy and expand it into world-science." ^ This standpoint it is not unjust to characterize as despair of the ability of the human mind, in any possible stage of culture, to arrive at a world-science at once unitary, universal, and demonstrative. § 43. Granting, however, for the sake of argument, that this standpoint is well taken, precisely what does it mean ? It is summed up in these four positions : (1) Philosophy is impossible as a world-science, a uni- versal science of science. This is true, because Kant "demonstrated" it. (2) Philosophy is possible only as a particular science, — the Kantian self-criticism of reason. (3) The history of philosophy is the process by which the European mind has formed a mass of scientific con- cepts respecting the world and human life. (4) This purely historical mass of scientific concepts must be understood as a continuous and everywhere self- related whole {ein zusamvienhangendes und uberall in ehian- der greifendes Gauzes), that is as a rational unity. But is there no inherent difficulty in uniting these four positions with each other ? Examination and comparison reveal a fundamental self-contradiction in Windelband's complex standpoint. The fourth position directly con- tradicts the first. To understand all scientific concepts as a rational whole is of itself to realize philosophy as a universal world-science. If these ultimate concepts of the European mind are left in their naked and brutal actuality as mere historic facts, unphilosophized, unrationalized, uncomprehended in their unity and universality as a rational or demonstrable system, it is self-evident that the fourth position must be surrendered. But, if they are understood as a rational system, then it is equally self- evident that the first position must be surrendered. The contradiction here seems insuperable. To succeed in re- 1 W. Windelband, Geschichte der Philosopliie, Einleitung, p. 8. ducing the mass of ultimate scientific concepts, as a fact of European history, to a rational or demonstrable whole, is to succeed in doing what Kant " demonstrated " cannot be done; it is to demonstrate the opposite, and overthrow Kant's asserted demonstration. If it is indeed " impossi- ble " to arrive at philosophy as a unitary, universal, and demonstrative world-science, it is equally impossible to understand the mass of European scientific concepts as a rational whole. But, if it is indeed possible to under- stand the mass of European scientific concepts as a rational whole, then it is not only possible, but rationally and historically necessary, to arrive at philosophy as a unitary, universal, and demonstrative world-science. Waiving all other criticisms, it is obvious that, if Windelband has succeeded in his avowed purpose of understanding the historical mass of scientific concepts as a rational whole, he has himself refuted Kant by actually creating " a world- science at the side of or above the particular sciences," the " impossibility " of which he says that Kant " demon- strated;" and he has himself illustrated the practical necessity of a philosophy of philosophy, as the indispen- sable condition of a philosophic history of it. To the his- torian, the existence of a mass of European scientific concepts is a mere fact of history, a pure datum of experi- ence, a simple affair of manuscripts, books, editions, libraries, given first of all to the historian's senses ; and it would be idle to interpret the conversion of European concepts into a conceptual or rational whole as part of the "particular science" of the Kantian "self-criticism of reason," unless Europe itself, its history, and all the monu- ments and records of its history, can be shown to be deductions of "pure reason a priori J^ In truth, there are but two logical alternatives : either Kant failed to " demon- strate the impossibility of a philosophical world-science," or else the historian himself has failed to " understand " the mass of scientific concepts gained historically by "European humanity" as a rational whole, and thereby 72 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY failed to achieve his "principal aim" (meine hauptsdch- liche Ahsicht). The first and the fourth positions noted above are irreconcilable with each other. Nay, more. Windelbaud's fourth position is nothing but an unconscious admission of the falsity of his own first position. Evidently, he himself has begun to outgrow the cramping Kantian apriorism. The philosophy which is to inherit the future, however, will recognize the falsity of that first position with complete and vigorous conscious- ness; Windelband's unconscious self-contradiction is but a dim dawning of that consciousness. The truth is that Kant utterly failed to demonstrate the impossibility of a philosophical world-science — utterly failed to restrict philosophy, as a particular science, to the self-criticism of reason — utterly failed to separate reason from experience as even possibly " pure," or to isolate it at all as a faculty which is capable of restricting itself in its cognitive func- tion to self-criticism a pnon. Most certainly, if reason could possibly abdicate its cognitive function as knoivledge of the world in itself, it would have absolutely disqualified itself for its practical function as direction of human life; for ignorant direction is incalculably worse than no direction at all. How could reason direct practical life in a world of which it really knows nothing ? If it is once admitted that the particular sciences are real knowledge of the world, as itself a reality existing independently of the mere individual subject (and Kant himself admits this in his doctrine of "consciousness in general," the universal consciousness of a human race which includes a multitude of individual subjects as " things in themselves "), it must be admitted that reason does not restrict itself (as Kant teaches that it does) to a particular science of philosophy as mere "criticism of reason by itself," but necessarily furnishes, in the mass of particular sciences, all the materials, data, or premises from which to construct a "philosophical world-science" (Gesammtwissensehaft or philosophische Welterkenntniss), Windelband's fourth u COGITO, ERGO SUM" 73 position, unconsciously contradicting his first, is an unde- niable recognition of this truth, an unintended recognition of Kant's failure. To this extent, at least, Windelband has unconsciously repudiated the Kantian standpoint which he yet conceives himself to retain. That stand- point of " pure reason " is philosophy in a swoon ; and the first symptom of its revival will be a conscious reversal of the Kantian revolution, — a conscious advance to the standpoint of the identity in difference of experience and reason in the self grounded judgment, as the necessary and effective starting-point for a philosophy of philosophy. § 44. There must, then, be a " philosophical world-sci- ence." Kant's admission of the possibility of philosophy as a particular science logically involved the admission of its possibility as a universal science ; for the particular can be grounded in and explained by the universal alone. This necessary consequence has been practically, though uncon- sciously, deduced by his successors, as we have just seen in one instance. No philosophic history of philosophy, such as Windelband has consciously aimed to produce, can pos- sibly be written, unless it derives its principles of criticism and interpretation from the philosophy of philosophy, as its ground, explanation, and omnipresent guide. If, that is, a " philosophical world-science " is impossible, a philo- sophical history of philosophy is impossible ; while, if philosophy is possible as a " particular science," it can be so only as a part of a universal science of science — a " philosophical world-science," or philosophy of philosophy. Such a world-science, when it comes, will be philosophy itself, unitary, universal, and demonstrative; and this it cannot be, unless it is the necessary and universal develop- ment of a single syllogistic principle, absolutely self- grounded in the sense that it contains within itself the entire regress or series of its own conditions, and abso- lutely comprehensive in the sense that the entire progress or series of its own consequences, involved in it and wait- ing to be evolved from it in strictly logical sequence, is 74 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY identical with the entire actual and potential development of universal human knowledge as a whole. Now a single principle with these characteristics can be found nowhere but in the self-grounded and all-comprehen- sive affirmation that "human knowledge exists." The development of this principle can lead to the establishment of no system as a rigid finality incapable of growth, but rather to the establishment of a new conception of human knowledge itself, as an organic unity of everywhere inter^ penetrating experience and reason, whose growth can be limited by nothing so long as the human spirit continues to expand. It is a principle of infinite fertility, and dis- sipates at once the vain conceit of setting up fixed " limits of human knowledge.'' That is a philosophical supersti- tion of the past, the irrationality of which will be explained in a later chapter. But the germinal judgment that "hu- man knowledge exists " has been already shown to be at once empirical and rational — empirical as itself a fact of experience, rational in affirming the whole reason of that fact, and self-grounded in affirming both fact and reason simultaneously through the identity of its own ground and content. This is subsumption of experience under reason in cognition — the syllogism itself. The regress of grounds which is immanent in that affirmation, when this is under- stood as at once cognition, act, and effect, ends only in that ultimate Ground of Grounds which is the bottom reason or cause-ground of all facts as such — in the ultimate Reason- Energy of the World. Human knowledge knowing and affirming itself as rea^ — this is the whole germinal fact of experience, of which all science and all philosophy are but the immanent development and elucidation by reason ; the chronicles of philosophy are the whole literary record or contemporaneous self-registry of that elucidation through- out the ages, as the gradual coming to consciousness of rea- son in experience; and a genuinely philosophical history of philosophy will be a lucid, comprehensive, and reasoned digest of that vast record, determined throughout by the (( COGITO, ERGO SUM" 75 philosophy of philosophy as the matured self-consciousness of reason in experience. That germinal fact of human knowledge, the actualized identity in difference of experi- ence and reason, is the seed of all philosophy ; denial of it, doubt of it, proof of it except from itself — these are alike impossible without an utterly destructive self-contradiction. Out of the Axiom of Philosophy, therefore, must be made the starting-point of the philosophy of philosophy, no matter how this fundamental principle may be phrased ; it is the only possible test, standard, or criterion of the various starting-points which have been made from time to time in the history of philosophy ; and the application of it must consist in a critical inquiry whether these various starting- points are identical with that Axiom in essential meaning. § 45. But, in order to understand that inquiry, it is of the first importance to observe that the Axiom of Philoso- phy is no empty form of words, but both expresses and constitutes a vital act — an act of living self-realization — a veritable Thathandlung. The universal knowledge which it affirms becomes a particular reality in that very affirma- tion, and exists then and there as a fact of experience in the affirming subject. It realizes and proves itself ; for the con- scious self-affirmation of knowledge is its self-demonstration by deed. The judgment that " human knowledge exists " cannot be understandingly uttered except as a conscious act of human knowledge itself — knowledge which is simul- taneously actual, necessary, and one : actual^ as a fact of experience then and there in the affirming human subject ; necessary^ as the absolute condition, reason, ground, of any rational affirmation by any human subject ; and one, as the real genus inclusive of all rational affirmations by all hu- man subjects, — immanent in all these affirmations as a whole, and both immanent and transcendent in each of them as a part, — phaenomenally known, therefore, as an actual unit of experience in each human subject, and noumen- ally known as a necessary universal of reason both in and beyond each human subject. ■^ 76 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY €€ COGITO, ERGO SUM 77 Consequently, the uttered or^ written Axiom of Philoso- phy, as starting-point, positive affirmation, and funda- mental principle, is at once a fact of being and a fact of thought, an indissoluble union of existence and knowledge. It is a particular instance or concrete case of the identity in difference of experience and reason, which is here and now exemplified or illustrated by the identity in difference of its own content and ground. On the one hand, when fully understood, it declares the existence of "human knowledge " in a twofold form : (1) unitanj knowledge, as an individual mode of reality in the form of an actual cognition in particular, or experience as knowledge of a single rational judgment with a definite content ; and (2) universal knowledge^ as a generic mode of reality in the form of cognition in general, or reason as knowledge of the necessary ground of all rational judgments with whatever content. On the other hand, it is itself a case of the very "existence" of human knowledge which it declares; (1) unitary existence, as a single cognitive act performed by the affirming subject in the moment of affirmation; and (2) universal existence, as the actual presence in one cognitive act of that necessary generic reason or ground without which no cognitive act is possible. The only valid reason for affirming the existence of knowledge is the actual ex- istence of the knowledge which is affirmed; for nothing can be rationally affirmed to exist, unless it both exists and is known to exist. That is, the affirmation of the actual and particular existence of knowledge here and now, as a fact of experience in the affirming subject, is conditioned on its actual, universal, and relatively necessary existence, as the absolute ground of all rational affirmations. Thus both the content and the ground of the Axiom are not only affirmations, but facts, too. The content is a particular fact, and the ground is a universal fact ; and here, as always, the particular is conditioned by the universal. The content and the ground are identical in difference, just as the par- ticular and the universal are always identical in difference • the content is a particular vital act of self-knowing knowl- edge in the affirming subject, while the ground in its en- tirety is that series of grounds which, at once immanent and transcendent in the particular act, is at bottom the universal, necessary, and absolute Ground of Grounds the self-knowing activity or Keason-Energy of the World, without which, as the absolutely conditioning and self- knowing universal (God), the particular subject could neither exist nor rationally affirm itself to exist as a con- ditioned and self-k7iowing individual (Man). This great conclusion, reached apodeictically through the regress to conditions immanent in the Axiom of Philosophy itself, may be reached no less apodeictically in the progress to consequences evolved from that Axiom ; whence it will appear that God is at once the Alpha and the Omega of all human thought, as the explanation of experience by reason in philosophy. For the entire process of philosophy, when- ever it comes to comprehend itself as the universalized scien- tific method, can be nothing else than the rational evolution of that World-Axiom, affirming the total knowledge of man in a seemingly lifeless and indeterminate universality, into the determinate organic unity of a living and growin*» World-Science as the knowledge of God. The whole proc- ess is immanent in human knowledge, and the beginning and the end are one. § 46. When, therefore, reformed modern philosophy makes its " presuppositionless beginning" in the self- grounded affirmation that "human knowledge exists," it begins with no abstraction whatever, no empty verbal formula, but with the objective reality and indivisible identity of the particular and the universal, as (1) con- tent and ground, (2) experience and reason, (3) existence and knowledge, (4) causality and rationality, and (5) causa 8ui and ratio sui, or Being and Thought: not without dif- ference, but in difference, as distinguishable but insepa- rable in the empirically apprehended and rationally comprehended fact of human knowledge. The criterion 78 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY of all philosophical beginnings, and therefore of the "I think, therefore I am," must be the critical principle of self-groundedness, or identity of content and ground; be- cause, if the judgment which constitutes the starting-point of philosophical exposition is not self-grounded, it is not a starting-point at all, but the real starting-point must be sought in some presuppositionless prior judgment external to it. As literature, philosophy must begin its reasoned process with some verbally stated principle which admits neither of denial nor of doubt nor of demand for proof. Hence it lies under a twofold necessity : the practical ne- cessity of beginning with some positive affirmation, and the rational necessity of beginning with no ungrounded affir- mation. The only way to reconcile these two necessities and effect a start at once positive and rational is to begin with a judgment which affirms its own rational ground as its own empirical content, and thus meets the demand for self-groundedness through the identity of its own content and ground. Now, on the one hand, tne judgment that " human knowl- edge exists" is the only rational affirmation which could not be denied without involving an absolute intrinsic con- tradiction between content and ground in the naked denial itself (§ 12). On the other hand, the content of the affir- mation is itself a mere matter of fact; there was a time when human knowledge did not exist at all, and it is remarkable that what cannot be denied without absolute absurdity should yet not exist of absolute necessity. It is the combination of these two characteristics in one judg- ment, and in only one, which assigns to the Axiom of Philosophy an altogether unique position among rational affirmations, and makes it the only possible real starting- point in philosophy itself. For what the Axiom estab- lishes beyond the possibility of denial or doubt is this : I. The actual, not the necessary, existence of human knowledge as a particular fact of experience in the par- ticular affirming subject. "COGITO, ERGO SUM" 79 II. The relative, not the absolute, necessity of the exist- ence of human knowledge as the universal fact of reason, if that existence is to be affirmed at all as a particular fact of experience by any particular subject. III. The absolute necessity of the dependence of partic- ular fact on universal fact, consequence on condition, or content on ground, as both immanent in the affirmation itself, whenever, wherever, and by whatever subject that affirmation may be made. From the very nature of the case, no other judgment than the " human knowledge exists " can possibly satisfy the twofold practical and rational necessity above pointed out, or effect a self-grounded beginning for philosophical procedure. If the "I think, therefore I am," says in sub- stance precisely the same thing as the "human knowledge exists," then it has effected a rational or self-grounded philosophical start. But if it says something less or other than this, then it really depends on this as unacknowledged presupposition, and has effected a merely artificial or con- ventional, not a self-grounded or rational beginning in the history of philosophy. To determine this point is the aim of the following examination. § 47. The " I think, therefore I am," is an affirmation, proposition, or judgment, and, if true, must be grounded on real knowledge. But no affirmation is itself the real knowledge on which it is grounded. The knowledge is an original fact of existence ; affirmation of it is a dependent and derivative fact of thought and speech, not at all neces- sary to the existence of that original fact, since we all know multitudes of things of which we are not at present thinking or speaking; and the original fact itself is the only rational ground for affirming it. Consequently, as has been shown, unless the particular content of an affir- mation is its own universal ground, the affirmation itself cannot be self-grounded, that is, cannot be a first or self- demonstrative affirmation in philosophy, but necessarily depends on some prior and different affirmation, expressed 80 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY "COGITO, ERGO SUM" 81 or implied, which has its own ground as its own content. Self-fjroundedncss, then, is the necessary mark of any phil- osophical beginning that shall begin in a rational and not merely historical sense — the universal test or criterion of all actual beginnings in the history of philosophy — the only possible realization of the philosophical ideal of " presuppositionlessness " ( VoraussetziuKjslosigkeit)} Now the real ground of the judgment that "human knowledge exists " is the fact that human knowledge does really exist. If the judgment, in which content and ground are identical, should be resolved into two judgments affirm- ing content and ground separately, it could only take this form : " human knowledge exists that human knowledge exists." Here the former expresses the ground, and the latter the content. But the double judgment says neither more nor less than the original single judgment — adds to it absolutely nothing of essential meaning; for the entire ground of it was already fully and completely expressed in the content. Hence it is impossible to discover a prior affirmation on which, as a ground different from itself the original affirmation may depend ; and tliis, therefore, is an absolutely first and underived affirmation — that is, one which, as content, is derived solely from itself, as ground. Thus the Axiom of Philosophy meets the critical test of self-groundedness, or unconditionedness, or "presupposi- 1 "Die erste Frage sonach ware die : wie ist das Ich fiir sich selbst ? das erste Postulat : denke dich, construiro den BegrifT deiner selbst, und bemerke, wie du dies machst." (Fichte, Werke, I. 458.) " Ein voraus- setzungsloser Anfaiig wie ihn die Philosophic braucht, ist iiicht durch eine Behauptung oder einen Satz zu fiiiden, sondern durch eine Furderung, welche Jederniann zu erfiilleii im Stande sein muss : * Denke dich selbst ! ' " (Windelband, Geschichte der Pliilosophie, 1892, p. 464.) Manifestly enough, there is no ''presuppositionless beginning" here. A postulate presupposes a posfulator; a demand presupj>oses a demander. The only possible " presuppositionless beginning" must remain a judgment which carries all its own presuppositions, conditions, or grounds in itself — an *' intrinsic truth." Only in that can philosophy really begin. Every other oateuaible beginning is a delusion and a snare. tionlessness," as the only philosophical criterion of philo- sophical beginnings. § 48. Tested, however, by the same criterion, how does it stand with the " I think, therefore I am " ? Descartes well understood and deeply felt the rational necessity of discovering somewhere an absolute certainty to begin with, an unconditionally certain starting-point, if he was ever to escape from the maze of universal doubt in which he found himself. " I will reject everything which admits of even a particle of doubt, no less severely than if I had found it to be altogether false ; and I wiH go on until I learn some- thing for certain, even if it proves to be no more than the certainty that nothing is certain. Archimedes demanded nothing but a point that should be firm and immovable, in order to move the whole earth from its place ; and great things may be hoped for, if I shall discover even a most trivial truth that is certain and unshaken.'' ^ He believed that he had found this Archimedean point of absolute cer- tainty in the "I think, therefore I am." That this maxim was deliberately and advisedly adopted by Descartes himself as the foundation and rational start- ing-point of his whole philosophy cannot be doubted in view of his own repeated statements of the fact. For in- stance: "Observing that this truth, I think, therefore lam, was so solidly based that all the most extravagant vagaries of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I judged that I could receive it without hesitation as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking." ^ And again: "It is a self-contradiction to suppose that that which thinks does not exist at the very time in which it thinks. Hence this cognition, ' I think, therefore I am,' is of all cognitions the first and most certain that occurs to any methodical philos- opher {cuilibet ordine iMlosophanti):' « From Descartes the maxim has been received with substantial unanimity ^ Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, Med. II. " Disc'ours de la Methode, (Euvres, ed. Cousin, IL 158. ' Principia Philosopliiae, I. 7. VOL. I. — 6 82 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY by all succeeding thinkers as the first clear and epochal formulation ^ of that principle in which consists the char- 1 Windelband claims for Augustine the honor of having first effected this clear formulation of subjectivism. He maintains that, ''as a philos- opher, he made the principle of the self-certaiiUy of consciousness the centre of all his ideas ; " that "all these ideas have their ultimate basis and their inner union in the principle of self-certain inwardness, whicli Augustine first expressed with complete clearness, and formulated and treated as the starting-point of philosophy ; " that, in virtue of this advanced prin- ciple of pure subjectivism, "he shot far ahead of his own time and no less the centuries which succeeded, and became one of the founders of modem thmight ; " and that he anticipated Descartes in extracting from universal doubt the special argument for "the valuable truth of the reality of the conscious being: even if I should err in everything else, I cannot err in this, for, in order to err, I must be." (Oeschichte der Philosophic, pp. 217, 218.) Indeed, Arnauld had already quoted Augustine to Descartes himself on this last point (Meditationes, Objec- tiones, Quartae, p. 108, ed. 1663). In support of the above claim for Augustine, however, Windelband cites from the latter's De Vera Religiane, 39: 72, the following passage: " Noli foras ire ; in te ipsum redi : in inte- riore homine habitat Veritas." But, by quoting these words alone, and italicizing the words "interiore homine" instead of the word "Veritas," Windelband misses the main drift of Augustine's far profounder meaning, which is, not to assert the mere subjective certainty or " reality of the conscious being," but, on the contrary, to emphasize his absolute oltjee- tive dependence on that universal reason, truth, or light —that "lumen rationis " which Augustine himself explains, in § 73, as "lumen verum quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum " ( Joan. I. 9) — which is at once immanent and transcendent tn the individual. The importance of this point is so great, rationally as well as historically, as to justify citation of the whole passage, in which we italicize the words that most pointedly correct Windelband's too subjective interpretation: *' 72. Quaere in corporis voluptate quid teneat, nihil aliud invenies quam convenientiam : nam si resistentia pariant dolorem, convenientia pariunt voluptatem. Recognosce igitur quae sit summa convenientia. Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi ; in interiore homine habitat Veritas; et si tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, transcende et teipsum. Sed memento cum te transcendis, ratiocinantem animam te transcendere. Illuc er^o tende, unde ipsum lumen rationis accenditur. Quo enim pervenit omnis bonus ratiocinator, nisi ad veritcUem f cum ad seipsam Veritas non utique ratiocinando perveniat, sed quod ratiocinantes appetunt, ipsa sit. Vide ibi convenientiam qua superior esse non possit, et ipse conveni cum ea. Confi- TERE TE NON ESSE QUOD IPSA EST I siquidem se ipsa non quaerit ; tu autcm "COGITO, ERGO SUM" 83 acteristic standpoint of modern philosophy, namely, the "self-certainty of individual consciousness." But, what- ad ipsam quaerendo venisti, non locorum spatio, sed mentis affectu, ut IPSE INTERIOR HOMO CUM suo INHABITATORE, non infima et camali, sed summa et spirituali voluptate, conveniat. 73 . . . Deinde rcgulam ipsam quam vides, concipe hoc modo: Omnis qui se dubitantem intelligit, verum intelligit, et de hac re quam intelligit certus est : de vero igitur certus est. Omnis igitur qui utrum sit Veritas dubitat, in seipso habet verum unde non dubitat ; NEC ullum verum nisi veritate verum est. Non itaque oportet eum de veritate dubitare, qui potuit undecumque dubitare. Ubi videntur haec, ibi est lumen sine spatio locorum et tem- porum, etsine ullo s|Mitiorum talium phantasmate. Numquid ista ex aliqua parte corrumpi possunt, etiamsi omnis ratiocinator intereat, aut apud carnales inferos veterascat ? Non enim ratiocinatio taHafacit, sed invcnit. Ergo antequam inveniantur, in se manent, et cum inveniuntur, nos inno- vant." (Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia, ed. J. P. Migne, Paris, 1861, III.) All that Windelband gets out of this wonderfully luminous passage is mere evidence to prove that the "self-certainty of consciousness," construed as no more than &fact of " inner experience," is the central or pivotal principle of Augustine's entire philosophy : "The rescue from doubt, therefore, consists in the Avgvstinian argument of the reality of the conscious being. But Descartes's application of it is not the same as that made by Augustine and the majority of those who were influenced by him in the transition period. For the latter, the self-certainty of the soul was simply the surest of all experiences, the bottom fact of internal per- ception ; in consecjuence of which, internal perception came to outweigh external perception in their theory of knowledge. . . . But for Descartes, on the contrary, the projiosition cogito sum had not so much the meaning of an experience, as rather that of the primary, fundamental, rational truth, the evidence of which was not that of a conclusion, but that of immediate intuitive certainty J" (Oeschichte der Philosophic, p. 309.) Nothing could be more unhistorical than this treatment of Augustine, and it is not neces- sary to travel beyond the passage quoted in order to become convinced of the one-sidedness of such treatment. Augustine's essential positions here are these: (1) all pleasure is explicable as harmony; (2) the highest har- mony, and therefore the supreme felicity, is harmony of the individual soul with the universal truth ; (3) on the one hand, universal truth is im- manent in the " inner man," as his spiritual " indweller " {inhabitator) — as that universal reason from which his own " reasoning soul " derives the "light of reason " itself; (4) on the other hand, universal truth is tran- scendent to the " inner man," is " itself that which thou art not," but is, nevertheless, that to which thou must rise by "transcending thyself;" (5) the " inner man " ought to harmonize himself with " his own indweller," 84 THE SYLLOGISTIC PIIILOSOPriY I ever loose or extravagant claims may have been made for this formula, it cannot be the rational beginning of any and through this harmony attain that pure pleasure which is not of the flesh, but rather of the spirit ; (6) universal truth exists above the indi- vidual "conscious being," constitutes that universal 'Might of reason " which conditions all his perceptions of particular truths, and constrains him to recognize its own transcendent existence just as soon as he comes to know a single particular truth, even that of his own existence as a mere doubter ; and (7) this universal truth or reason exists " in itself," can be only discovered, not created, by the «' reasoning being " {ratiocumtor), and would still exist "in itself," although "every reasoning being should perish." This doctrine of the ontological reality or necessary objectivity of *^ truth," ^ that universal "light of reason" which is independent of " every reasoner " and conditions his very existence as a " reasoning soul,'* is the diametrical opposite of the Kantian doctrine of the necessary subjec- tivity of truth, as the totality of " laws prescribed to Nature " by the legis- lative human "consciousness in general." No penetrating student of philosophy will confound these two doctrines. The fact that Augustine made the former doctrine the true " centre of all his ideas in philosophy" renders him, notwithstanding the identity of one of his arguments with one of Descartes's and other minor but superficial resemblances to modern writers, a formulator, not of the one-sided moilern subjectivism, not of the merely subjective "self-certainty of consciousness " or " reality of the con- scious being," but of the broader and profounder objectivism of ancient Greek philosophy, aa applied to religion by Neo-Platonism and Christian- ity. In short, Augustine is not correctly to be regarded as " one of the founders of modern philosophy," as distinguished from ancient philosophy by the principle of subjectivism. Neither is it correct to represent Augus- tine as taking the " reality of the conscious being" to be a mere fact of inner exiierience, and Descartes as taking it to be the jnimary truth of reason; for this distinction to the disadvantage of Augustine is prohibited by the lattcr's words above, where he lays down his reyula ipsa: " Every one who knows that he doubts knows a particular truth (vcrum), and, con- cerning this fact which he knows, is certain. Every one, therefore,' who doubts whether universal truth (veritas) exists, has in himself a particular truth about which he does not doubt ; and no particular truth is true, ex- cept through universal truth." Descartes himself never asserted theimi- versality of rational truth so profoundly or so precisely as Augustine here asserts it. For to Descartes universal truths are immanent alone (Prin. Phil. I. 48 : — aeternas veritates, nullam existentiam extra cogitationem nostram habentes) ; while to Augustine, as shown aljove, they are both immanent and transcendent. Augustine was a Greek Realist ; Descartes, like all subjectivists, was a Conceptualistic Nominalist (Prin. Phil. I. 68 ': In if li [ "COGITO, ERGO SUM n 85 philosophy, unless it meets the critical test of self-ground- edness through the identity of its own ground and content. What, then, is its own ground ? § 49. What renders an affirmation rational is the fact that there is a valid reason for 7tiakmg it in knowledge that it is true. This knowledge — actually existent knowledge is the only valid reason or ground for making the affirma- tion at all. If it is not known that the content, the thin"- affirmed, actually is as it is aflSrmed to be, then the affirma- tion itself is not rational — has no valid reason or ground at all. A true affirmation is one which has this only valid reason or ground in real knowledge ; an untrue affirmation is one which has no such ground. If the knowledge is not real, actual, existent, — if the affirmation is made on no better ground than a mistake or false semblance of knowl- edge, — then the affirmation itself is a mistake, not a rational affirmation at all. Only the true affirmation can be a rational affirmation ; its truth is its rationality, and its rationality is its actual groundedness in knowledge, not in mistake or mere semblance of knowledge, as the reason why it is affirmed. It would not be relevant here to object that we cannot tell whether a given affirmation is true or not, unless we possess some absolute criterion of truth, some infallible test by which to distinguish between real knowledge and its false semblance. The objection, if it were relevant, would have to be met by seeking at once to determine such a criterion or test. But it is not relevant here, because that is not the point under consideration. In §§ 11, 12, and 13, demonstrative proof has been found that the existence of human knowledge can neither be denied, nor doubted, nor proved except from itself; the affirmation of it, therefore, is well grounded, rational, and true, since the content or thing affirmed is the very ground of all ration- — numenis ... est modus cogitandi duntaxat, ut et alia omnia quae uni- versalia vocamus) ; and inappreciation of this pregnant fact is the root of Wiudelband's misinterpretation. 86 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY ality and truth in human judgments. The immediate ques- tion now is whether the judgment, "I think, therefore I am," the truth of which is not in the least impugned or doubted, but, on the contrary, fully conceded, is equally self-grounded, equally a real beginning in philosophy. If its ground is identical with its content, it is self-grounded in this very identity. Otherwise, it must have a ground different from its content, and for that reason alone, how- ever true as a judgment, be neither self-grounded nor a philosophical beginning. Now the ground of the judgment, "I think," as a rational judgment, must be the fact that "I know." If this be expressed, the affirmation becomes, " I know that I think." Shall we say, then, that knowing and thinking are abso- lutely identical, in so strict a sense that the content of the affirmation, " I think," is absolutely one and the same with its ground, " I know " ? This must be conclusively estab- lished, if the cogito ergo sum is to meet the critical test or be a really first affirmation in philosophy. § 50. Probably, however, when this question is explicitly put, no one will venture to maintain^that " I think " and " I know " mean absolutely one and the same thing.* Think- 1 Kant himself, however inadequately, distinguishes the two : *' Sich einen Gegenstand dcnkcii und eineu Gegenstand crkermcn ist also nicht einerlei. Zum Erkenntnisse gehiiren namlich zwei Stiicke : erstlich der BegrifiF, dadurch iiberhaupt ein Gegenstand gedacht wird (die Kategorie) und zweitens die Anschauung, dadurch er gegeben wird." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III, 123-4). A man who in the dark takes a white horse for a ghost has both "concept" and "intuition," but certainly no " knowledge " of the " object of experience." A concept and an intui- tion together are not enough to constitute knowledge ; this requires a third element not recognized by Kant, namely, truth, or re>al agreement of the concept with its object. It would avail nothing to argue that to subsume the intuition of the "object" under the concept "ghost" is to subsume the intuition under the wrong concept ; for what makes the concept "ghost " a wrong concept, except the fact that it fails to agree vnth the object ? Both intuition and concept must agree with the object, or there can be no knowledge, no truth, as Kuno Fischer sees and says {cf, next footnote). This insight is at least as old as Aristotle : " Ein Urtheil iat "COGITO, ERGO SUM" 87 ing may be, and often is, no better than a tissue of falsi- ties, mistakes, delusions, confusions, contradictions. It may be either (1) a truth grounded on knowledge, or (2) an error grounded on ignorance, or, as more commonly hap- pens, (3) a mixture of truth and error grounded on half knowledge and half -ignorance — on mere inaccuracy. Thought may be either true or false. But knowledge must be thought which is true — thought which actually conforms the relational constitution of the concept to that of the object conceived, whether this object be interpreted as mere phaenomenon or as both phaenomenon and noumenon.^ Every object may be "thought" to be what it is not; but no possible object can be "known" to be otherwise than as it is. This fundamental diiference between thought and wahr, wenn das Denken, dessen innere Vorgange durch die Sprache be- zeichnet werden, dasjenige fur verknupft oder getrennt halt, was in der Wirklichkeit verknUpft oder getrennt ist, falsch, wenn das Gegentheil stattfindet." (E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. ii, 219 f.). * Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, 1889, I. i. 4 : " Wahr ist nur diejenige Vorstellung, welche der Sache oder ihrem Gegen- stande vollkommen entspricht. Hier aber giebt es bloss die beiden M'oglich- keiten, dass die Uebereinstimmung zwischen Vorstellung und Sache entweder stattfindet oder nicht; in dem ersten Fall ist die Vorstellung wahr, in dem andern falsch." Fischer here indicates the third element of knowl- edge which Kant omits (see previous note): namely, agi-eement of the concept with its object — for Bcgriff, as well as Amchauung, is Vorstellung. Even Hegel recognizes this agreement as necessary to knowledge in the sense of " correctness " : " Unter Wahrheit versteht man zunachst, dass ich wisse wie etwas isL Diess ist jedoch die Wahrheit nur in Beziehung auf das Bewusstsein, oder die formelle Wahiheit, die blosse Richtigkeit." (Werke, VI. 386.) What he calls ' * truth in the deeper sense " {Ibid. 334, 386-7) is nothing but agreement of \he object with its own idea or ideal — ethical truth^ in a sense which identifies the truth with the good and the untrue with the bad, and which has, therefore, no relevancy to the purely scientific problem. The latter concerns only the agreement of con- cept and object, as Hegel himself understands: ''Das Ziel aber ist dem Wissen eben so nothwendig, als die Reihe des Fortganges, gesteckt ; es ist da, wo es nicht mehr iiber sich selbst hinaus zu gehen nothig hat, wo es sich selbst findet, und der Begriff dem Gegenstande, der Gegenstand dem Begrifie entspricht." (Werke, II. 65.) 88 THE SYLLOGISTIC rHILOSOPHY "COGITO, ERGO SUM 89 knowledge, whatever inferences may be drawn from it, con- stitutes the only possible foundation of a scientific episte- mology. Thought and knowledge, then, are not identical, and cannot be scientifically identified, so long as ignorance and error, that is, facts of thought which are not facts of knowledge, continue to make a i)art of human experience. Clearly, then, to affirm that "I tliink" is by no means to affirm that "I know." To take the famous Cartesian maxim, therefore, as a rationally first affirmation in philos- ophy, is altogether to lose sight of the truth that every philosophical affirmation, in order to be rational, must have its bottom reason or ground in real knowledge, as an abso- lutely undemonstrable yet absolutely undeniable fact of existence; it is to mistake a derivative for a self-derived judgment; it is not to see that, back of the "I think, therefore I am," lies necessarily the simple "I kncAv," as its rigorously implied prior affirmation, its rational ground different from and external to itself, since the " I think," or content, is by no means identical with this ground, and since knowing, not mere thinking, is that ab- original fact with which all philosophy must begin. Hence the '* I think, therefore I am," failing to exhibit identity of content and ground, cannot be the rationally or logically first affirmation of any philosophy whatever. In other words, it completely fails to meet the philosophical test of self-groundedness, and is no real beginning in philosophy at all. § 51. If, nevertheless, the " I think, therefore I am " has been accepted by modern philosophy as the aboriginal " presuppositionless position" of self-consciousness, the thinking subject, or thought as such, and therefore its own rationally first affirmation, ^ — if, in strict consequence, mod- 1 It is unnecessary to cite many illustrations of this general acceptance. A few will suffice. ** Mit der sicheren Einfachheit, welche das Genie kenn- zeichnet, vollbringt er [Descartes], was Not thut, indem er der Philosophie im Selbstbewusstsein einen festen Ausgangspunkt l)escheert, in der Fol- gerung aus klaren und deutlichen Begriffen ein des Erfolges sicheres Ver- ern philosophy has aimed persistently at the knowledge of thought rather than at the knowledge of knowledge, — and if, still in strict consequence, modern philosophy has ar- rived at the conclusion that there is no real knowledf^e whatever except the knowledge of thought, — the bridge- lessness of the chasm between modern philosophy and modern science in their present condition is but the severe penalty entailed upon a seemingly trivial, yet in reality a momentous error. How great was this error, and how nec- • essarily it lurked in this false beginning, appears conspicu- ously in the very first consequence which Descartes himself drew from his own first principle. fahren darbietet und in der niecbanischeu Naturcrkliirung die dringlichste und zukunftsreichste Aufgabe stellt." (K. Falckeiiborg, Gcschicbte der neucren Pliilosopliie, 1892, p. 70.)— "Seine Pliilosopliio will eine Univer- salniathenuitik sein. . . . Urn so [gitisser aber war die Macht seiner Ein- wirkung auf die philosophische Entwickhing, in der er der Ixiherrscliende Geist fiir das 17. Jahrhundert und duriibur hinaus geweseu ist. Den- jenigen metliodischen Gedanken, welche Bacon und Galilei genieinsani sind, fugte Descartes ein Postulat von gi-usster Tragweite hinzu : er ver- langte, dass die inductive oder resolutive Methode zu eineni einzigen Prlncip hiklistcr und ahsulutcr Gewiss/tcU fuhren solle, von dem aus als- dann nach com^wsitiver Methode der gesamnite Unifang der Erfahruuf^ seine Erkliirung finden luUsse. Diese Forderung war durchaus originell und wurzelte in dem Bediirfniss nacli eiuein systematischen Ziisammen- hange aller menschlichen Erkenntniss : sie beruhte zuletzt auf dem Ueber- druss an der traditionellen Aufuahme des historisch zusammengeleseneu Wissens und auf der Sehnsucht nach ciner neuen philosophischen S(^hop. fung aus Einem Guss. So will denn Descartes durch eine inductive Enu- meration und eine kritische Sichtung aller Vorstellungen zu dem einzig gewisseu Tunkte vordringen, urn von hior aus die Ableitung aller weiteren Wahrheiten zu gewinnen. ... Die Seimgcicisshcit des Bcwusstseins ist die einheitliche und fundamentale Wahrheit, welche Descartes durch die analytische Methode findet." (W. Windelband, Geschichte der Philoso- phie, 1892, pp. 307-309.) — *"Ccs^ moi, que jc peins!' Dies ist der Standpunkt, auf welchem Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) im Schluss- punkt der philosophischen Renaissance erscheint ; dieser Satz ist das ausgesprocheue und durchgangige Thema seiner Selbstschilderungen oder Essays (1580-1588). . . . Montaigne steht an der Schwelle der neuen Philosophie, die er nicht iiberschreitet. Diese beginnt, wo jener endet : mit dem auf die Selbstbeobachtung und Solbstpriifung gegriiudeten Zwei- 90 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY "COGITO, ERGO SUM'' § 52. The "I think, therefore I am," having been laid down as the one self-evident certainty and absolute start- mg-point of his philosophy, Descartes's first question was • "What am I?" He thus answered his own question-' "Hence I knew that I was a substance of which the whole essence or nature is merely to think, and which, in order to be, needs no place and depends on no material thing; so that this I, that is to say, the soul by which I am whit I am, is totally independent of the body, is still easier to un- derstand than the body, and, even though the body did not exist, would continue to be all that it is." ^ Similarly : « Of those things which I attributed to the soul, what [really fel, der auch den Glauben an die Natur, aber an die Erkennbarkeit der- selben in sich schliesst. Es ist der die Erkenntniss suchende and erzeugende Zweifel, der Bacon und Descartes, die Begriinder der neuen Philosophie, bewegt." (K. Fischer, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, 1889, I. 1, pp. 107, 108.)— "Das Denken muss von sich anfangen, und diess ist der voraussetzungsloseAnfang der Philosophie." (C. Prantl Die Bedeu- tung der Logik fur den jetzigen Standpunkt der Philosophie, 1849, 1. 1, p. 122). — " Die Philosophie ist voraussetzungslos. Diese Vorausset' zungslosigkeit ist ihr Anfang, derjenige Anfang, durch welchen sie sich Ton alien andern Wissenschaften unterscheidet, und erst als eigentumliche selbstandige Wissensehaft enteteht. Sie ist der Begriff der Philosophic' 80 wie derselbe in ihrem Anfange auftritt. ... Die Aufhebung aller Vor' aussetzung muss also zugleich absolute Setzung sein Die Setzunc wie gefordert wurde, ist zugleich Setzung aller Realitat . . . Dieser An^ fang der Philosophie ist absolut ; die Philosophie fangt schlechthin an Er 1st grundlos, unbeweisbar ; aber er bedarf auch keines Beweises* Beides, well er eine Setzung ist, die alle Voraussetzung aufhebt Der Anfang der Philosophie ist das reine Ich. ... Rein ist es, weil es' was es ist, nur als sein Thun ist. Das reine Ich ist daher Eine Handlun J- m unendhch vielen, so dass jede einzelne nur Handlung ist, indem sie zug eich alle ist, und die Einheit der Handlung selbst in der Fonn der Vieheit sich darstellt Die Aufhebung aller Voraussetzung, welche zugleich absolute Setzung ist, ist in dem beriihmten Satze des Cartesius • duhito, cogiio, ergo sum, und in seiner Lehre von Gott, als dem Erkennt^ nisspnncip des Realen, ausgesprochen. " (J. F. Reiff, Der Anfang der Philosophie 1840, pp. l.ll.)-"Jener Satz, urn den, wie man Len kann, sich das ganze Interesse der neuen Philosophie dreht . . . ^iu> ergo mm." (Hegel, Fncyclopadie, Werke, VI. 132.) . . v,^ - 1 Discours de la Me'thode, (Euvres, I. 168-159. 91 belongs to it] ? To be nourished, or to walk ? If I no longer have a body, these things, too, are nothing but fan- cies. To feel ? This, also, does not happen without a body, and in dreams I have seemed to feel very many things which afterwards I knew I had not felt. To think ? Here I make a discovery ; thought is — this alone cannot be separated from me — I am — I exist -that is certain. But how long ? Verily, a^ long as I think; for, if I should wholly cease to think, it might happen, perhaps, that I should instantly and wholly cease to be. I concede noth- ing now except what is necessarily true. To speak pre- cisely, therefore, I am only a thing which thinks [ta7itum res cogitansl that is, a mind, or soul, or intellect, or reason — words of a meaning before unknown to me. I am, then, a real and really existing thing. But what sort of thing ? I have told : a thing which thinks." ^ Here Descartes fully and freely develops, in his own way, the whole meaning or intellectual content of his own fundamental principle: ''I think, therefore I am. What am I ? I am only a thing which thinks " (tantum res cogU tans — cogitationem solam). Applying, therefore, the equa- tion thus carefully established, « I = a thing which thinks," and substituting in his principle the second for the first member of this equation, as its precise equivalent, the prin- ciple takes this cruel form: "^ thing which thinks thinks, therefore a thing which thinks is only a thing ivhkh thinksJ* So fatal is it to begin amiss ! This is the necessary and only logical result of taking individual thought, and not universal knowledge, as the first fact of philosophy. But is it a rationally significant result? "^ thing ichich thinks thinks, therefore a thing which thinks is a thing which thinks.'' This platitude exhausts the rational significance of the ego cogito, ergo sum, and shrivels it up into the empty tautology of a purely abstract identical proposition. All that it actually affirms may be condensed into the short single judgment : « Individual thought exists." But what 1 Meditatio Secunda, ed. 1663, pp. 10, 11. 92 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY here becomes of the individual I — what becomes of the " self-certainty of the conscious being " as a particular coiisciausness here and 7ioiv? § 53. The truth is, Descartes unconsciously plays fast and loose with his ego, and modern philosophy keeps up the same game to the present day. The (ef/o) cogito, ergo sum, afhrms, indeed, the existence of individual thought; but this Descartes himself interprets, now as present con- sciousness or indiuidual experieiicej and now as universal reason — now as a concrete or "empirical I," and now as an abstract or " pure I," that is, a rational I pure from all experience. In other words, he takes the ego now as an empirical unit, now as a rational universal, not determining accurately in his own mind the relation of the two, but leaving his treatment open to the charge of confusion of thought. In order to arrive at clearness on this subject a threefold distinction must be made between the purely em- pirical I, the purely rational I, and the real I, both empirical and rational at once. The first two concepts rest on the separation of experience and reason, while the third concept rests on their identity in difference. If it is true, as Erdmann maintains, that "the course of modern philosophy henceforth is, not to reach the self by starting from the world or God, but to find the way back to a world and to God by starting from the self," ^ then it is evident that Descartes led and still leads the "modern" phil- osophical movement as Subjectivism, and it becomes of paramount importance to clear away all confusion from the concept of the self or I. To this end the distinction named is essential, and we shall now proceed to consider it at length. 1 J. E. Erdmann, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic, II. 4, 3ded. CHAPTER III THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL § 54.^ The purely empirical I is an attempt to conceive the self as a collection of units without a universal, a suc- cession of differing states of consciousness without a neces- sary ground of identity, a series of transient and multiple acts without a permanent and unitary conditioning activity. The most forcible expression of this theory, perhaps, is that of Hume; — " But, further, what must become of all our particular percep- tions upon this hypothesis? All these are different, and distin- guishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately considered, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their existence. After what manner, therefore, do they belong to self, and how are they connected with it? For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can ob- serve anything but the perception. . . . Setting aside some meta- physicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of differ- ent perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. . . . The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different (times), what- . ever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind ; nor liavft we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed. 94 THE SYLLOGISTIC PinLOSOPnY ... It is evident that the identity which we attribute to the human mind, however perfect we may imagine it to be, is not able to run the several different perceptions into one, and make them lose their characters of distinction and difference, which are essen- tial to them. It is still true that every distinct perception which enters into the composition of the mind is a distinct existence, and is different, and distinguishable, and separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive. But as, notwith- standing this distinction and separability, we suppose the whole train of perceptions to be united by identity, a question naturally arises concerning this relation of identity, whether it be something that really binds our several perceptions together, or only asso- ciates their ideas in the imagination; that is, in other words, whether, in pronouncing concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real bond among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of them. This question we might easily decide, if we would recollect what has been already proved at large, that the understanding never observes any real connection among objects, and that even the union of cause and effect, when strictly examined, resolves itself into a customary association of ideas. For from thence it evidently follows that identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and unit- ing them together, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination when we reflect upon them." ^ § 55. The concept of the purely empirical I, therefore, is that of a succession of perceptions which contain no principle of union whatever, each subsisting independently in itself as a "distinct existence" which is "different, and distinguishable, and separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive," and which has "no need of anything to support its existence." But this is a self-contradictory and self-destructive concept, because it is an attempt to conceive units of a kind, yet without con- cdving any kind. Hume's "succession of perceptions," however self-subsistent he may imagine these to be, is necessarily conditioned on pcrceptio7i itself, on that unitary 1 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section 6. (Philosophical Works, ed. 1854, I. m2-3i>l.) W THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL 95 and universal perceiving energy of which each particular perception is merely a single case, and which of itself must really connect all particular perceptions, if these are to constitute a real " succession of perceptions " at all. In con ceiving and designating his « related objects » as in them, selves something more than mere non-resembling existences or self-subsistences, as in themselves actual and " resem bhng perceptions," he inadvertently acknowledges among these "related objects" a real resemblance, a real ground of union, a real unity and identity of kind, which is the absolute condition of his "succession of perceptions," and constitutes their real and known connection. Hume himself unwittingly recognizes this fact when he speaks, in the very first line of the quoted passage, of "all our particular per- ceptions." Particulars of what? Surely, not of nothin- If our perceptions are all particular cases of something that something is as real as they. " Perceptions, " as cases, units, or specimens, can be no more real and no more know- able than "perception," as principle, universal, or species — that is, as perceptive activity or perceiving energy in general. This "perception" in general, without which it IS ridiculous to speak of "perceptions" in paHicidar, is Itself their common condition and their common origin and consequently their real and known connection as "re- lated objects." Consequently, when he maintains that the understanding never observes any real connection among objects," he confounds his own argument, destroys his own concept, satirizes his own phraseology, and falls into a contradiction, which is irremediable because he is so naively unconscious of it. Even the great apostle of empiricism, when he tried to conceive a purely empirical I, could frame no other than an unscientific concept, be- cause he had no scientific theory of universals. Granting as Hume correctly maintains, that, "when I enter most intimately into .vhat I call my.df, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure, "-granting that 96 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY " I never can catch myself at any time without a percep- tion," — it follows that it is absurd to maintain at the same time, as Hume does, that " I never can observe any- thing but the perception." For, self-evidently, unless I observe, not only the particular perceptions one by one, but also a connection aiiiony them which makes them all "perceptions," and vhichy therefore, is just as real as the perceptions themselves, I never can observe that there is any *' succession of perceptions" at all — can never connect, without the warrant of this observation of a real connection, the isolated occurrences as a class by themselves, or con- ceive them as alike in kind, or designate them all by one and the same term. Precisely the same necessity holds good of the series of conscious states in general; every conscious state is necessarily conditioned on that of which it is a state, that is, on consciousness itself, as a unitary, universal, and continuous conscious energy, of which each particular conscious state is merely a single case. The thing cannot possibly be thought otherwise. In short, the concept of a purely empirical I is that of a collection of things of a hind without any kind, a series of units without any universal, and, therefore, as absolutely unthinkable and self-destructive as the concept of a spherical cube. § 50. On the other hand, the purely rational I is an attempt to conceive the self as a universal without any units, a rational self-consciousness pure from all empirical elements or conscious states, a universal and conditioning thought-activity isolated from all particular and condi- tioned thought-functions or thought-acts, — that is, a mere logical subject abstracted from all real determinations. The typical form of this theory, and tlie root of all later forms of it, is undoubtedly that of Kant. The substance of it is as follows : — I. Every single mental presentation or representation (Vorstellung), whether state or act, intuition or concept, or whatever else, must, in order to be w// representation, be accompanied possibly, if not actually, by another and It THE I: EMPIRICAL. RATIONAL. REAL 97 omnipresent representation, / think (ich denke). This omnipresent I think is the necessary condition of the combination ^ of the manifold content of each intuition into one representation, and of the manifold stream or series of representations into the empirical consciousness of one subject. II. This invariably concomitant representation / think is an act of spontaneity. That is, it cannot belong either to the outer or to the inner sensibility, as simple recep- tivity of impressions from objects of experience; for it is a universal act of the determining subject, not a unitary representation of the subject determined as its own object. The latter is empirical self-consciousness or "empirical apperception." But the former is rational self-conscious- ness or "pure apperception;" it is, likewise, "original apperception," "since it is that self-consciousness which, just because it produces the representation / think that must accompany all other representations, and just because it is one and the same in every conscious state, can be accompanied by no representation beyond itself," that is, as its own condition. In other words, the omnipresent / think is the " original " or " spontaneous act " of that purely rational self-consciousness which conditions every act or state of the empirical conciousness ; which is immanent 1 "Combination" is Verbuutimg, conjunctio, or syjithesis a priori, as a "putting together." Kant selects this name, as he says, "in order to emphasize the facts that we can represent to ourselves no elements as com- bined in the object, unless we have ourselves previously combined them, and that of all representations comhination [/. e. relation] is the only one which cannot be given through objects, — that it can be brought about by the subject alone, because it is an act of the subject's self-activity." This is to teach in the clearest and most emphatic manner the principle of the exclusive subjectivity of relations. Of course, if relations do not inhere in the objects related, but are imposed upon these by the relating subject, there is absolutely nothing to know but the subject itself and its modes of spontaneity. The necessary logical consequence of this denial of the objec- tivity of relations is absolute solipsism — which is avoided merely by that unreflective or vnlvr kind of philosophizing which is comfortably indiffer- ent to losic. {Of. Chap. IX.). •7. VOL. I. 98 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY and unchangeable in each of these acts or states (in alletn Bewusstsein ein und dasselhe ist) as their constant common element; and which itself is conditioned by no act beyond itself. It is that unconditioned or unoriginated unity of self-consciousness which antedates and transcends all ex- perience, and constitutes the source of all pure knowledge a priori; for the diverse representations which are given in a particular intuition would not in their totality be wy representations at all, unless in their totality they belonged to one self-consciousness. That is, as my representations, whether I am conscious of them or not as mine, they must necessarily conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in a tiniversal se/f-consciotisness, because otherwise they would not, whether singly or all together, belong to me. I therefore call the unity of this pure, spontaneous, and original apperception the "tran- scendental unity of self-consciousness," because it tran- scends experience and is the source of knowledge a priori — that is, knowledge independent of all experience. III. The empirical consciousness is simply of particular or single states, fragmentary, isolated, and disconnected; there is no real connection whatever among these single states as such, because the empirical consciousness in each of them contains no reference whatever to the identity of the subject. This reference arises, not because I accom- pany every representation with consciousness of it, but because / add one to another and am conscious of what I do. The universal or purely rational self-consciousness is that "act" of "synthesis" by which I join one conscious state to another and am conscious of joining them. Solely through the fact that I am able in this way to combine a diversity of given conscious states in one consciousness, does it become possible for me to conceive the "identity of consciousness" in a connected series of conscious states. Hence the " synthetical unity of apperception " conditions the analytical unity of apperception; it is the work of the understanding, nay, the understanding itself, as the faculty THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL 99 of conjoining and uniting a priori a multitude of given conscious states which in themselves are disjoined and dis- united. In short, it is the relating activity in which all relations originate, and, therefore, "the highest principle in all human knowledge." IV. In the "synthetical unity of apperception," which transcends all actual or possible experience, I am conscious of myself neither as a noumenon nor as a phaenomenon, but simply as a pure and empty existence — - "I am." This representation {Vorstellung), this formal, contentless, and objectless thought (ein Gedanke der Form nach, aher ohne alien Gegenstand), is an act of pure reason {ein Denken), not an act of empirical intuition (ein Anschauen). Since, however, both of these acts are necessary to knowledge of ourselves (Erkenntniss unserer selhst), my purely rational I remains unknown; only my empirical I is known, as determined by intuition of particular conscious states. " I have no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of one's Self, there- fore, is very far from being knowledge of one's Self." "Now by this I, or He, or It, the thing which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental or non- empirical subject of thoughts, an unknown x, —unknown that is, except by means of the thoughts which are its predicates. Apart from these thoughts we never have the least conception of it. Yet we revolve about it in a con- stant circle, since we are compelled to use it in making any judgment concerning it." Consequently, in the / thinks "the concept of a subject is taken in a purely logical sense, and it remains undetermined whether sub- stance is, or is not, to be understood by it (so ist der Begriff eines Subjects hier bios logisch genommen^ und es bleiht unbestimmtj ob darunter Substanz verstanden werden solle oder niclit)." * V. Consequently, the / think, which is "the only text of rational psychology," can contain, if applied to my Self 1 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, IlL 285, etl. Hart. 100 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY as an object, nothing but non-empirical predicates of it, since "the least empirical predicate would destroy the rational purity of the science and its independence of all experience." But it follows from this that "there is no rational psychology, as a doctrine which would furnish an addition to the knowledge of our Selves, but only as a discipline which sets impassable limits to speculative rea- son in this field; " and that "rational psychology originates in a mere misunderstanding."^ § 57. Let us inquire, then, whether this attempted con- cept of a purely rational I proves to be any more thinkable than Hume's attempted concept of a purely empirical I. If, adopting Kant's own expressions, we denote by "x" the unknown "I, or He, or It, the * thing which thinks; ' " and if we denote by A, B, C, D, E . . . the "succession of perceptions," or series of conscious states which together compose the consciousness of the purely empirical Ego, then the two conceptions of Hume and of Kant may be thus expressed in equations: — Hume (1) The Purely Empirical Ego = A + B-fC + D+E... (2) The Purely Rational Ego = 0. Kant (3) The (mixed) Empirical Ego = a:A -f a:B + a:C + xD + xE r.. rm. ^ = ^T (A + B + C + D + E. . .' ) ^ (4) The Purely Rational Ego = x. According to Kant, therefore, the "synthetical unity of apperception " or " transcendental unity of self-conscious- 1 Kritik derreinen Vernunft, Werke, IH. 114 131, 273-288, ed. Hart On the other hand how could) Kant refute this arffinmiitam mi hominem'f Whatever really acts is real substance ; the pure I really acts in the tran- scendental synthesis of all states of the empirical consciousness, and in all combination of the manifold in inner or outer phaenomena ; therefore, the pure I is a real substance, and not, as above declared, a mere lomcal subject. ** THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL 101 ness," which is the only identity or unity of the Self recognized by him at all, consists, not in any real unity or real connection of the conscious states per se, but solely in the transcendental or non-empirical " synthesis " — that is, in the subjective relation of unity artificially bestowed, or conferred, or imposed upon them from without by the purely rational I, which (in what is in truth a merely mechanical fashion) unites them as disconnected beads by a connecting string. These beads of the empirical con- sciousness, A, B, C, D, E, whether separate or strung, contain in themselves no consciousness of the Self; the string of the rational Ego, x, holds them together as a series of conscious states, but all the self-consciousness is in the string itself. We must look, then, to the rational string alone, separated from all the empirical beads, to discover the unity of the Self, the purely rational I. What is this string? The answer to this question depends unconditionally on what Kant meant by the *' inner sensibility," *' inner sense," or ** inner empirical intuition," ^ by which alone the Ego can take cognizance of itself, through becoming aware of the isolated phaenomenal states which it is its own sole function to join together in one self-consciousness. Does he, or does he not, ascribe this " inner empirical intuition " to the jmrely rational Ego ? I. If he does, then the purely rational Ego, intuiting A as well as x in the compound conscious state a;A, — that * " Der Satz aber : ich denke, so fern er so viel sagt, als : ich cxistire denkend, ist nicht bios logische Function, sondern bestimmt das Subject (welches denn zugleich Object ist) in Ansehung der Existenz, und kann ohne den inneren Sinn nicht stattfinden, dessen Anschauung jederzeit das Object nicht als Ding an sich selbst, sondern bios als Erscheinung an die Hand gibt" — "Welches [d. h. sich ala Noumenon zu erkennen] aber unmoglich ist, indem die innere empirische Anschauung sinnlich ist und nichts als Data der Ei-scheinung an die Hand gibt, die dem Objecte des reinen Bewusstseins zur Kenntniss seiner abgesonderten Existenz nichts liefem, sondern bios der Erfahrung zum Behufe dienen kann." (Werke, III. 290, 291). I 102 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY is, ceasing to be purely rational and becoming incontrover- tibly empirical as well as rational, — vanishes altogether. II. But, if he does not, then the purely rational Ego, taking no cognizance whatever of the separate empirical states, xA, xB, xC, xJ), xE . . . cannot possibly combine them into one series, confer its own unity upon them, or in any way bring them under the "synthetical unity of apperception." Discerning nothing whatever to combine or relate or synthesize, it remains utterly incapable of that "spontaneous act" of "synthesis" which constitutes its only being or function. If it cannot intuite A, B, C, D, E, it cannot combine jc with A in one term, or icA, a-B, xC ... in one series. of terms. If it is absolutely blind to the terms, it is incapable of relating them in a judgment. Again, therefore, the purely rational Ego vanishes altogether. In either case, consequently, the string of pure reason which was to connect the otherwise disconnected beads of experience, yet was to be conceived as a purely rational Ego, turns out to be a pure myth. The Ego cannot at one and the same time be purely rational and yet partly em- pirical. Yet the purely rational Ego, by Kant's own showing, has nothing whatever to do as the " synthetical unity of apperception," unless it is at the same time partly empirical, as " intuition " of conscious states to be synthe- sized. Clearly there neither is nor can be any such "white blackbird " in the constitution of the human mind.^ Kant's * This internal collapse of Kant's theory of a purely rational Ego, or "pure consciousness," betrays itself in Kuno Fischer's inevitably contra- dictory summary of it : **Das empirische Bewusstsein ist so wechselud und verschieden, wie die menschlichen Individuen ; das reine Bewusstsein ist identisch, unwandelbar und darum in jedem dasselbe. Was dieses Bewusstsein vorstellt oder verkniipft, gilt daher fiir alle, d. h. es hat den Charakter allgemeiner und iiothwcjidiger oder ohjectiver Geltung. Erst dadurch kommt in unsere Ercheinungen und Wahmehnmngen Objectivitat, d. h. sie werden Erfahrungsobjecte und Erfahrungsurtheile. Nun ist das reine Bewusstsein nicht receptiv, sondem thiitig und productiv, es verhalt sich nicht empfindend oder stoffempfangend, sondem bios verkniipfend oder formgebend, es verhalt sich in seiner Formgebung nicht anschauend. THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL 103 concept proves to be absolutely as unthinkable as Hume's, for no genius, however superb, can think the self-contra- sondern denkend oder urtheilend ; daher sind die Formen, die es giebt, Urtheilsformen oder Kategorien ; daher sind es die reiuen Verstandes- functionen oder die reinen BegrifTe, welehe die Erfahrungsobjecte be- griinden ; sie niachen die Erfahrung und gelten deshalb, so weit dieselbe reicht. Dies war der zu beweiseude Punkt, das Thema der Frage, die jetzt gelost ist." (Geschichte der neuern Philosophic, III. 368.) Here we see the " pure consciousness" explained as at once capable and incapable of '* inner empirical intuition." (1) On the one hand "this con- sciousness presents (vorstellt) or combines (verkniipft) ; " and, because it is identical and unchangeable in each of us, — because, that is, it is a whole universal inhering inimanently in each and every whole individual sub- sumed under it, — whatever it "presents or combines " in one empirical consciousness must be "presented or combined" in all empirical con- sciousnesses. Its entire and sole function is to be "active and productive," "combining or form-giving," "thinking or judging." Consequently, its whole essence is to act, ])roduce, combine, give form, — to judge, and there- fore of necessity to present, i»erceive, or intuite the particular subject and predicate of which the judgment consists, — in general, to relate, and there- fore, since not to perceive what it relates would be simply not to think the relation at all, to present or intuite tfie particular terms related. But this is Vorsfellung as "inner empirical intuition," and the " pure consciousness" ceases thereby to be " pure." (2) On the other hand, the " pure conscious- ness "is "not receptive," "not sensitive or capable of receiving sense- material," " not intuitive " at all. It can "present " {vorstellen) nothing whatever as a unit-object of thought; it can take cognizance of no mere unit as such, for instance, a conscious state xA ; it cannot per- ceive or intuite the particular subject and predicate of any judgment, or the particular terms of any relation ; it can only combine, or judge, or relate, wfiat it can not perceive at all f This "pure consciousness" is certainly "pure," but only as pure zero ; it is pure form without matter, and, whatever its "necessary and universal or objective validity" may be, it can have absolutely nothing to do with "experience." (3) The only escape from this destructive contradiction in the very heart of the Kantian theory is to abandon the theory altogether ; to admit that Anschauung and Begriff are absolutely inseparable, and can not even be thought as ** pure ;" to admit that Sinnlichkeit and Verstandy experience and reason, apprehension of units and comprehension of universals, are necessarily identical in diflFerence ; and to renounce, as a wild and exposed delusion, the epistemology which builds on the possibility of "pure concepts," "pure knowledge a priori" or "pure rational consciousness." The 104 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY dictory. Its source, however, is obvious. Kant's attempt to separate reason from experience, the rational I from the Kantian Erkenntnisslehre is a superb construction of inventive specula- tive genius, but it is a statue of gold with feet of clay. Kant himself, however, sought to escape from the above dilemma by means of " productive imagination." This he conceived as *'an operation of the understanding on the sensibility" (in his own words, "eine Wir- kung des Verstandes auf die Sinnlichkeit,") and interposed it as a medi- ator between the purely rational Ego and the world of empirical intuitions, — as a faculty at once intellectual and sensuous, whose function it is (1) to reproduce these intuitions in a synUiesis speciosa^ (2) to carry into effect unconsciously the laws of the understanding, and (3) to combine or relate phaenomena according to these laws in a synthesis iiUelledualis. Fischer thus states the theory for Kant in brief: **Die sinulichen Objecte, die das Bewusstsein vorfindet, sind ein Werk der sinulichen, die gegebenen Vorstellungselemente componirenden Einbildungskraft ; die Einheit und Ordnung, die aus jenen Objecten einleuchten, sind das Werk der intel- lectuellen, vom Verstande durchdrungenen Einbildungskraft. Die ge- meinsame Sinnenwelt, die dem Bewusstsein als eine gegebene ei-scheiut, ist ihra durch die Einbildungskraft gegebeu, welcho bewusstlos die Gesetze ausfiihrt, die der Verstand giebt, und die Erscheinungen so verkniiplt, wie es das reine Bewusstsein fordert : daher das letztei-e seine Formen (Kategorien), nach welchen die Einbildungskraft die Ersch«*inungen ver- kniipft hat, in dieser nicht bios erkennt, sondern wicikrerkennt." {Ibid. IIL 373.) Now what do these "laws of the understanding " prescribe ? Nothing but various modes of cmnbination of particulars. The i)articulars, as units, can be known only by outer or inner empirical intuition, and the modes of combination, as universals, only by reason. This distinction in the nature of the objects known is necessarily, even for Kant, the only assign- able ground for his own distinction and separation of the sensibility and the understanding, as fundamentally unlike faculties of the mind. Be- cause, then, the understanding can not perceive or intuite particulars, and the sensibility cannot think or originate combinations, and because these two faculties must be not only different in their nature but also separate in their action, Kant could conceive no way for them to co-operate except through the mediation of a third faculty, the "productive imagination," which should partake of the nature of both — that is, which should (1) consciously perceive particulars, yet (2) unconsciously (bevmsstlos) combine them as the laws of the understanding require. Unfortunately, the absurdity which was to be avoided by this device forces itself here into view as obstinately as before. Whatever thinks or prescribes "laws " THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL 106 empirical consciousness, sprang from the mistaken presup- position that it is possible to think a universal without any units. This presupposition, in turn, sprang from an unscientific theory of universals : namely, that the univer- sal wholly inheres in the individual and can be wholly abstracted from the individual, while the individual is only " subsumed " under the universal. That Kant built on this merely inherited theory of the Aristotelian Paradox appears very plainly above in equation (3), where x, the universal, wholly inheres in each and every term as their common element, and in equation (4), where x is abstracted and retained alone. In this way, h*s purely rational I became necessarily a mere "logical subject" of which " substance " may or may not be predicated; while yet it is certain that a mere "logical subject" which 7nai/ not be *'substa7ice" and hence viat/ not " act^^ at all, cannot possi- bly perform that "spontaneous act of synthesis" which is its sole and necessary function in the "synthetical unity of for the combination of particulars must be aware of the particulars to be combined: the "pure consciousness" must intuite them, or it can not legislate how to combine them, much less impart to the "productive imagination" even an "unconscious" knowledge how to combine them. On the one hand, how can "laws of combination " be even mediately pre- scribed for particulars by a consciousness which cannot jKjrceive them at all ? Yet, on the other hand, how can a consciousness which perceives them be non-empirical or pure ? The conception of a pure rational con- sciousness legislating a priori for empirical consciousness is simply self- destructive. The conception is not in the least helped by dividing it by making the "pure consciousness" conscious of the laws but uncon- scious of the particulars, and inventing a "pure imagination" conscious of the particulars but unconscious of the laws ; for in this case a fourth faculty must be invented to mediate between the " pure consciousness " and the "pure imagination," and so on forever. The case is a hopeless one. But Fischer makes unwittingly a vast concession. If the sensuous " imagination " can become " intellectual " in virtue of " being penetrated by the understanding," so can tJie sensibility in general. But reciprocal interpenetration of the sensibility and the understanding is nothing but the identity in difference of experience and reason, — the impossibility, therefore, of "pure knowledge a priori,'* 106 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY apperception." If it does -act- it must he -suhstamer^ If It does not ''act;' what becomes of Kant's "highest prin- ciple of all human knowledge" as a combining, relating, or active " faculty " ? ^ In fine, the purely empirical I and the purely rational I are but two forms of the unreal L The necessity of such a concept of the real I as shall not, like the concepts of these merely imaginary entities, totally ignore the ques- tions of real origin, real form, and real kind, must surely force Itself upon all sagacious thinkers. § ^. The concrete or real I, as opposed to both forms ot the abstract or unreal I, unites in itself both the " suc- cession of perceptions" and the "synthetical unity of ap- perception," ^ both the empirical consciousness and the Un adopting above Kant's phrase, the -synthetical unity of apper- ception, as an expression for the real universality of self.conscioiisne.ss. it IS necessary to point out distinctly that this is done with reservation and m order snuply to avoid embarrassing neologisms. Kant means by the phrase that iKimdoxical -spontaneous act " of the unknwwn, ahslrad, a,ui tra,,scemlental subject {bios loglsch genommcn) whicli is the absolute origin of all combination of the manifold " in every i»ossible object of knowleLe - the exclusively subjective origin, therefore, of all relation as such. As adopted above, however, the phrase means that spontaneous activity of the known concrete, ami immanent s«// which makes it (1) the percipient of combination of the manifold "in the immanent n3lational constitutions of real olyects of knowledge, (2) the recipient of that " combination of the manifold m the reproducing concept of it, and (3) the origin of re-combi- nation of the manifold in hypothetical anticipations of possible objects of knowledge -not. therefore, the subjective origin of all relation as such. That IS, Kant would determine the whole "succession of perceptions" as solely the work of the human mind, through its spontaneously re- lating activity as the "synthetical unity of apiK^rception ; " while we would determine the "succession of perceptions" as partly the work of the human mmd and partly the work of the world (§§ 65, 72, 5) and determine the "synthetical unity of apperception " as the elabomtion of percept^concepts in the unity of one self-consciousness. These are impor- tant difrerences, since Kant's notion results from the principle of the ex- clusively subjective origin of conceptual relations, while ours results from that of the combined subjective and objective origin of conceptual rela- tions. Yet there is a sufficient likeness in the two notions to justify THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL 107 rational self -consciousness, both experience and reason, in the indivisible identity of the knowing I. Neither the purely empirical I nor the purely rational I can know; if alone, they are nothing but empty abstractions, incapable of real knowledge. The real I alone, the I that feels and wills and knows, is the seat of all real or possible knowl- edge (§ 99, III). On the one hand, considered as to its origin, all real knowledge springs out of an active double-functioning of the real I, (1) as experience or perception of units, and (2) as reason or conception of universals; and these two com- plementary or reciprocally conditioning functions inter- penetrate each other inseparably in every real act of knowledge, because every real or conceivable object of knowledge is at once a universal to its own constituent units and a constituent unit to. its own universal — some kind of tiling^ or thing of some kind (§ 23). On the other hand, considered as to its form, all real knowledge exists as the percept-concept of some kind of thing. Whatever is known, however, must be known as it is— -cannot be known as it is notj if it is really known by me at all, it must be known in accordance with its own real nature no less than in accordance with mine. Hence, if "human knowledge exists," the double -constitution of the object of knowledge, as at once unit and universal, necessarily determines the double-functioning of the knowing I as experience and reason, and thereby gives its necessary form to the per- cept-concept, in which, as at once empirical and rational, the double-constitution of the object reappears as its own double-constitution. Thus the real I, empirical in the perception of units or facts, rational in the conception of universals or principles, and simultaneously active or real in both functions, kiiows^ or becomes the knowing /, by reproducing in the concept, as at once a unit and a univer- retention of Kant's phrase, provided these differences are kept well in mind; for they both recognize that universaUty of self-consciousness which the phrase was devised to express. 108 TUE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL 109 sal in Thought, the double-constitution of the object of knowledge, as at once a unit and a universal in Being. For thus alone is attainable that agreement between the concept and its object, that essential identity in the numerical difference of their two immanent relational constitutions, in which alone consists truth (§ 50, with footnotes). Briefly, the double-constitution of every real object of knowledge, as both unit and universal (thing of some kind, some kind of thing), determines the double- constitution of the knowing process itself, as both experi- ence and reason (perception of things and conception of kinds); while this double-constitution of the knowing process itself determines the double-constitution of its product, as true thought (percept-concept in agreement with the object). Or, viewed more profoundly still, the nature of Being, as identity of unity and universality in the object (§ 36), determines the nature of Knowing, as identity of experience and reason in the subject, and througli this the nature of Knowledge or True Thought, as identity of unity and universality in the concept. In order, therefore, that the concept of the real I may be true thought or knowledge, it is necessary that the real I itself shall be the real identity of subject and object — that is, shall be a real object of knowledge to itself, as a real subject of knowledge. Like every possible object of knowledge, the real I, as object, must be a thing of some kind, that is, must be both a unit and a universal; it must, as a unit, be known by experience, and it must, as a uni- versal, be known by reason; and the concept of it must, like every true concept, be both empirical and rational at the same time, that is, a percept-concept. Since, more- over, in all real self-consciousness, the I that is known is itself the I that knows, the known constitution of the I as object must be identical with the constitution of the I as subject, which, therefore, must be equally known; other- wise, there is no identity of subject and object, no agree- ment of object and concept, no truth, no knowledge of self, no self-consciousness at all. But this is absurd. Hence, whether considered as object or as subject, the real I is at once empirical and rational ; and the judgment of real self- consciqusness, "I know myself in each and all of my con- scious states," which unites in itself both the "succession of perceptions" and the "synthetical unity of appercep- tion," is so far the concept of the real I. If the "I," as rational subject, and the "myself in each and all of my conscious states," as empirical object, were not identical in difference (through the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason, § 20), then it would follow that the judgment of real self -consciousness is itself altogether false, since it falsely affirms that identity in difference of subject and object in which all self-consciousness consists. The unconditional condition of all real self -consciousness, however, is that the " I " and the " myself in each and all of my conscious states " shall be at once identical and dif- ferent, universal and unitary, rational and empirical. The real I must be, not a mere abstract logical subject with no object at all, but real subject and real object at once, as real in their identity as in their difference and in their difference as in their identity. In other words, every con- scious state being ipso facto an act of knowledge, the real I, as a universal activity, inheres really in all its own conscious acts, as the self-related totality of all its own units; and its real identity as subject-object consists so far in this real universality — that is, in this universally self-percipient or self-conscious energy of the Self, as (1) immanent in all its conscious acts as a whole, and (2) both immanent and transcendent in each of its conscious acts as a part. And this self-knowing energy, this identity in difference of subject and object in the Self, is the necessary principle of all real Self-Consciousness. § 59. But the concept of the real I would remain fatally defective, if this were all. It would give the self as a universal, but not as a unit. It would give the univer- sality of the self as real identity of subject and object in 110 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY each and all of its own conscious states, but would not give this universal subject-object as a thing of any kind. It would fail, therefore, to give the self as a real object of knowledge, since, as we have seen, every real object of knowledge must be constituted as both universal and unit at once — must be not only a universal to its own constituent units, but also a constituent unit to its own universal, must be not only some kind of thing, but also a thing of some kind. The real I, however, if it can be at all an object of knowledge to itself, must fulfil the conditions determining every such object, and be individualized as well as universalized. The concept of self-consciousness, tliorefore, which, as the '* synthetical unity of apperception/' unites the "succession of perceptions" in an indeterminate series, but which is quite incapable of determining this as a unit in any other than the vague, abstract, and merely general aspect of "a series " or "a succession," gives indeed yie real universality of the suhjcct'ohject, but cannot possi- bly give its real unity as a real /, unless it is complemented, completed, and rounded out by the concept of race-con- sciousnessy which alone can give the subject-object as one of a kind (§§ 68, 69). Recognizing, then, this indispen- sable race-consciousness — this indispensable complement of the " synthetical unity of apperception " which alone can give it real unity in itself, and by which alone the concept of the real I can be brought into that necessary agreement with its object which constitutes its truth — as the Generic Unity of Apperception, it becomes clear that I do not know myself at all as a real Self, a real I, a real Person, until I know myself, not merely as the indeterminate universality of a series of conscious states, but also as a determined unit in a higher universal: namely, as One of the We, And the judgment of all real race-consciousness will be, "I know myself as One of the We." ^ 1 " Das Bewusstseyn der Individ nalitat [i. e. real unity of the I] ist nothwendig von einem anderen Bewusstseyn, dem eines Dn, begleitet, und nur unter dieser Bedingung nioglich." (Fichte, Werke, I. 476.) THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL 111 This principle of the generic unity of apperception as necessarily complementing the "synthetical unity of ap- perception," and as constituting in combination with this the personal unity of apperception, or principle of personal identity, must hold a commanding position in the philos- ophy of philosophy; for it is the very foundation, the necessary condition, of the history of philosophy as the work of personal philosophers. The I cannot be known as a real unit or person, unless it is determined, not only with reference to itself as subject-object, but no less with refer- ence to others of its kind; for knowledge of the thing and knowledge of the kind are one and the same knowledge in every true thought, as that union of percept and concept which is identity in difference of experience and reason, because it agrees with the object as identity in difference of unit and universal. In other words, the real I must be (1) empirical in the series of conscious states, (2) rational in the universality of the series, and (3) real in the uni- versality and the unity of the series as a whole. Tlie real unity of the I, as personal identity, is necessarily both internal and external: internal as the "synthetical unity of apperception" in the "succession of perceptions," and external as the " synthetical unity of apperception " in the generic unity of apperception. Its internal unity is its determination as a universal in all of its own units, and its external unity is its determination as a unit in its own universal; and each of these determinations is the abso- lutely necessary condition of the other, since the two together, as essential factors, are necessary to determine the I as a real unit, whether as " object of knowledge " or "subject of knowledge." Hence Kant's failure to discover the real unity of the I , or to conceive " the I, or He, or It, the thing which thinks," otherwise than as a mere "un- known X " which can never become an " object of knowl- edge," was the direct, inevitable, and very instructive consequence of his failure to conceive the "synthetical unity of apperception " as itself conditioned on the generic 112 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE I: EMPIRICAL, RATIONAL, REAL 113 unity of apperception; for the identity in difference of these two, being the condition of the I's real unity in itself, is the very condition under which alone the I could possibly become an " object " or be " known '' at all. Solely through race-consciousness could the vague consciousness of " self " become determined and unified as the conscious- ness of "a self," or take the necessary form of "w// self" as opposed to "your self," that is, as a constituent unit with other constituent units in the higher universality of the kind. Self -consciousness and race-consciousness recip- rocally condition each other, as the two essential and inseparable factors of all personal consciousness; and the concept of the real I unites them in itself as the concept of real personality. For, while the I is a universal with respect to its own states as units, it cannot be a unit ex- cept with respect to its own kind as its universal ; yet it cannot become an object of knowledge at all, unless, like every such object, it is constituted as both unit and uni- versal at once. Personal consciousness both unifies and universalizes at once in knowing the r«al I as a unit-uni- versal (the thing) in a higher universal-unit (the kind), which it must be in order to be an object of knowledge at all. The generic unity of apperception, therefore, is itself the identity in difference of experience and reason, knowl- edge of units and knowledge of universals. Kant saw only the principle of spoiitaneitij, as the transcendental synthesis of self -consciousness, but wholly disregarded the correlative principle of herediti/, as the continuity of race- consciousness ; but the necessary result of this one-sided- ness was to lose all insight into the intelligibility of the I as a real thing or unit of existence. It was inevitable, therefore, that Kant should fail to derive from "pure self- consciousness" alone any concept whatever of the I as "object;" for "pure self-consciousness" yields only the I's universality, not its unity, which must be found in order to make it an "object," yet cannot be found out of its kind. If, then, the judgment of all real self-consciousness is that "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states," and if the judgment of all real race-consciousness is that "I know myself as One of the We," then the judg- ment of all real personal consciousness, or real personality, or real personal identity, will be that "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states as One of the We." And this, accordingly, is the concept of the real I, or per- son as such, in its simplest form — personality, so to speak, reduced to its lowest terms; for in it are united the "succession of perceptions," the "synthetical unity of ap- perception," and the generic unity of apperception^ in a form at once empirical, rational, and personal. § 60. Repeating here, for convenience of comparison, the table in § 57, the results of the last six sections may be set forth succinctly in tabular form, as follows : — TABLE I Hume I. The Purely Empirical Ego = A-}-B + C4-D + E II. The Purely liational Ego = 0. Kant III. The (mixed) Empirical Ego = xA + xB + a:C + xD + xE . . . = x(A+B + C + D + E...) IV. The Purely Rational Ego = x, TABLE II I. Separation of Experience and Reason \kher Purely Empirical Object without Rational Subject — Mere "Succession of Percep- tions" — Mere Units without Univer- sal, — Purely Rational Subject without Empirical Object — Mere "Synthetical Unity of Apperception " — Mere Universal with- out Units. VOL. I. — 8 Unreal I, as « or \ 114 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY n. Identity in Difference of Experience and Reason (both Real I, as and in Empirical Object — "Succession of Percep- tions "—Units in their own Universal, — Rational Subject — " Synthetical Unity' of Apperception " — Universal in All its own Units, — Personal Subject-Object - Self Knowing Self in Knowing its Kind — (Jeneric Unity of Apperception — Universal in Units (I as Subject-Object of Personal Conscious- ness) = Unit in Higher Universal (I as a Man in We as Mankind). i ^1^'^'V""^- ^"""'^^ ""'^"^''' '"^^' ^""'*^^^ of philosophy consists simply in bnnging into explicit consciousness what has lain iniplicitlv in the consciousness of all men from antiquity down. Philosophy, therefore establishes nothing new ; what we have arrived at by reflection is alreadC irrrl'^*' prejudgment of everybody." (Encyklo,,adie, Werke, VI. 4d, 44.) But the abysmal difference between the results at which Hegel amves and the results arrived at above will be plain to any one who com- pares the doctrine of the real I, set forth in these tables, with Hegel's doctnne of the pure I : - / is the pure being-for-self in which every, thing particular is denied and abolished, this ultimate, simple, and pure fact o consciousness. We can say, ' / and thought are the same,' or more definitely, '/ is a thing which thinks ' [Da.. Dmken ah Denlntdes - res titans: cf. die logisch^ Idee . . . ist die absolute :,'uhsfanz des Gcistes vie der Natur (Ibid. 353)] . . . Every man is a whole world of repi^senta. tions which are buried in the night of the I. / is thus the universal in which abstraction is made from everything particular, but in which at the same time everything lies concealed. Hence it is not the merely abstract universality, but the universality which contains eveiything in itself " {Ibid 47-48.) This is abstraaing, yet not aj,stracting ! Hegel's / like Kant's, vanishes in a. o » CHAPTER IV THREEFOLD ORIGIN OF THE REAL I § 61. The concept of the real I, however carefully de- termiDed with respect to its form, must still remain fatally defective as knowledge, or true concept, until the real I as object of knowledge, ha^ been no less carefully determined with respect to its origin. In these modern days, when all scientific investigation aims to explain classification by gene- sis or heredity, it would be superfluous to urge that knowl- edge of form without knowledge of origin falls far short of either science or philosophy. That may safely be taken for granted. Analysis, however, discloses that the proxi- mate origin of the real I is threefold: (I) its origin as a real unit; (II) its origin as a real universal; and (III) its origin as a real but partial concept of itself as a real unit- universal. § 62. I. The oneness or real unity of the I is its real determination as a unit separated from, yet inseparably and necessarily related to, other units of the same kind. That is, the I, aa a real unit, is simply My Self as One of the We, The origin of the I as a real unit, therefore, is neces- sarily the We as a real universal. The universal is the only origin of the individual ; the kind alone is the origin of the thing. Out of the species springs the specimen ; the species is the specimen's necessary condition and expla- nation just because it is the specimen's only possible source. Nothing but evolution at last explains. The human I (and the human I, as the subject of human knowledge, is alone considered here) cannot originate in itself; it cannot origi- nate in another human I ; it can originate solely in the 116 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THREEFOLD ORIGIN OF THE REAL 117 human We, and its actual or historical origin is birth — that is, derivation from two I's, each of which is derived from two other I's, and so from an act of the We, When Kant teaches that the apperceptive "I think," as a, priori synthesis of the manifold in one and the same subject,^ is that original synthetic " act " of the rational self-con- sciousness which conditions every act or state of the em- pirical consciousness, is one and the same in every such act or state, and is conditioned by no act beyond itself, — when he teaches that this aboriginal " I think " is itself that very " faculty " of " understanding " which conjoins a priori the manifold content of " my " consciousness into one series and makes it " mine," — he incontrovertibly begins with the individual subject as his absolute first, his "highest prin- ciple of human cognition," his unconditioned and underived source of " pure knowledge a priori " in a merely given I. Nowhere does he seek to account for it rationally, to explain its "bare existence," to trace its existential origin (§ 101). But, self-cvidently, that which is merely given is never anything but a datum of experience ; and, paradoxical as it appears, pure experience becomes thus the sole foundation of the Kantian system of pure reason ! In this way, how- ever, no real unity of the I is arrived at — nothing but the abstract unity of the " I think," as isolated common ele- ment of an indeterminate series of empirical states in an empirically given I ; whereas no indeterminate series can be known as a real unit until determined as a whole series in relation to other whole series of the same kind. Hence the mere universality of the " I think " in " my " conscious states is insufficient to yield any intelligible unity of the I, so long as the I is taken as an absolute or unconditioned first, and Kant was perfectly logical when, from such premises, he inferred the I as a mere " unknown x ; " for mere indeterminate universality is by no means real unity. 1 "Also hat alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung eine nothwendige Be- ziehung auf das : ich denke^ in demselben Subject, darin dieses Mannig- faltige augetroffen wird." (Werke, III. 116.) It is only when every I is known to be conditioned and determined by the We, only when the synthetic act of the I in the " I think " is known to be conditioned by the synthetic act of the We in generation and determined in the I itself by heredity from the We, that the real unity of the I becomes itself both empirically and rationally known. Experience explains the origin of the I by birth, and reason explains it by the strictly necessary derivation of the indi- vidual from the universal, of the I from the We; the "I think" itself is an impossible judgment or " act," until the subject has attained to consciousness of itself as / in the We through the generic unity of apperception. Thus the origin of the I, as a real unit, is explained empirically by the fact of birth, and rationally by the reformed theory of universals ; and the absolute coincidence of the two explanations is itself explained by the necessary identity in difference of experi- ence and reason in all human knowledge. § 63. II. The wholeness or real universality of the I is its real determination as a self-conscious series of conscious states or acts, — a self -knowing and partly determined, partly self-determining Whole of Thought, Feeling, and Will, which is identical with all like wholes in so far as it shares their common constitution as subject-object, yet is differentiated from them all in so far as it has its own pe- culiar, unique, and unshared content of self-consciousness, its real individual difference. That is, the I, as a real universal, is My Self in each and all of My Conscious States. To seek the origin of the I as a real universal, therefore, is, in other words, to seek the origin of personal conscious- ness in the I as a real unit. From these two real determi- nations of the I, as a unit-universal or object of knowledge, there originate in the I itself, as subject of knowledge, two modes or forms of consciousness, as knowledge of the ob- ject by the subject: (1) race-consciousness or knowledge of the We, and (2) self-consciousness or knowledge of the I. Now, in general, knowledge of a thing and knowledge of its kind are one and the same knowledge of the object, 118 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THREEFOLD ORIGIN OF THE REAL I which is necessarily both a unit in its own universal and a universal in all its own units as a whole; consequently, this one knowledge of the object is both empirical, as knowledge of units, and rational, as knowledge of univer- sals. Hence, in particular, knowledge either of the I or of the We is necessarily empirical and rational knowledge of both in one. It is evident, therefore, that the two modes of consciousness must interpenetrate one another; neither can originate alone ; each involves the other ; both at once are essential and indispensable to any real knowledge whatever of "A Self' or "My Self" or "Me." Hence results a principle of the utmost importance in philosophy, inasmuch as it unites the two traditionally opposed and seemingly irreconcilable principles of the mere " succession of percep- tions" (empiricism) and the mere "synthetical unity of apperception " (rationalism) in the higher truth of the ge- neric unity of apperception (identity in difference of expe- rience and reason): namely. Race-consciousness is the Ps knowledge of itself as a unit in its own universal^ and self- consciousness is the I's knowledge of itself as a universal in all its awn units ; but neither race-comciousness nor self- consciousness is possible in any real /, except in one personal consciousness of the I in the We, as a universal unit in its own unitary universal} The origin of the I as a real uni- versal, therefore, is the origin of personal consciousness in the simultaneous development of its two essential and re- ciprocally conditioning factors, inherited race-consciousness and spontaneous self-consciousness (see below, § 68). § 64. III. The community or common element of the I, abstracted from all your or my real peculiarities as individ- uals, is that self-relational constitution of « subject-object " which, being common to all I's, is real in every I, yet con- stitutes the whole reality of no I ; it is altogether unreal 1 Multiple personality in an individual (c/ Pierre Janet, L'Automa- tisme Psychologique, 1889) is so manifestly a form of disease as to militate in no degree against the truth of the above principle. 119 by itself alone, except as part of each I — the incomplete object of an imperfect concept. The perfection of any con- cept is its perfect truth, which must consist in its perfect agreement with the complete object — that is, in its abso- lute comprehension of the object's concrete constitution, as at once whole universal and whole unit in a higher luiiversal. On the one hand, the imperfect concept (concept of a part abstracted from the whole concrete unit-universal or real object) is an inadequate thought, which apprehends part of the reality, but does not comprehend the whole of it ; it conceives the common element in all the units, but con- ceives neither a whole unit nor a whole universal. On the other hand, the perfect concept (concept of the whole con- crete unit-universal or real object) would be an adequate thought which should apprehend and comprehend the reality in its wholeness as an object both of experience and reason — should conceive, not only the common element in all the units, but also the whole universality and the whole unity of each and every unit, and thereby the whole higher universal. Thus the imperfect concept of the I, as mere " subject-object " or " Each of the We,'' conceives the common element in all I's, but conceives neither a whole I nor a whole We ; while, since the thing cannot be known out of its kind, the perfect concept of the I would conceive, not only the common element of all I's, but also (1) the entire personal consciousness of every I, as a real individ- ual, and (2) all the correlations, interconnections, and in- teractions of the personal consciousnesses of all I's in the We, as their higher universal. Such a perfect concept as this, being both empirically and rationally adequate to the object in its wholeness, and therefore absolutely true, is possible only as absolute and infinite knowledge; it cer- tainly is not found in human knowledge, but constitutes the unrealized ideal of it. The actual human concept of the I, as mere " subject-object " or "Each of the We," is necessarily imperfect, because it conceives merely the com- mon element in all I's, and does not conceive either a whole I 120 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY or a whole We — abstracts from the « I in the We " (real genus) so much only as belongs to all I's (abstract specific or class essence), and thereby fails to conceive either the I or the We in the fulness of its reality ; while at the same time It IS necessarily concrete, that is, both empirical and ratwnal, because it could not be a true concept at all, unless It conceived the "subject-object- itself to a certain extent ^shoth a unit and a universal For, since every possible object of knowledge must be concrete, as identity in dif- ference of unit and universal, every true concept, whether perfect or imperfect, must be likewise concrete, as identity in difference of experience and reason. Hence the imper- fect concrete concept of the I as mere "subject-object'' is tne inadequate thought of the common element of all Ps without the real peculiarities of any I - the human cog- nition, necessarily partial, yet none the less indispensable of '^Each of the We;'' for the only exhaustive cognition' of "Each of the We" would be tlie identity in difference ot intuition and concept as perfect concrete concept, that is, as absolute percept-concept, ?,t once exhaustively empiri- cal and exhaustively rational, of Each and Every I as ill of the We,^ 1 No one with the least capacity of intellectual aiscrimination will con- « V %rT'' '°"''P*' "^ ^^^' explaincHl, with Hegel's konkrcter Begpff. The former is the concretion, or identity in difference, of percent and concept ; it is detennined as such, in accordance with the pnndple of ^.t 21 T '''''' '^ experience and reason, by the necessary nature of the oljcct known, as identity in difference of unit and universal But the latter, as reines Denkai, is the absolute separation of pon.ept and con- cept-pure Begriff without Ansclmuung ; it is determined as such in (W"kr Vr46 t.f I't' ^"""'^^ ''^' ^'°"^*^^ '' *^^ ^"^^ «"^«^-- IvverKe, VI. 46, 353), by the necessary nature of the knowim subject as VnreBegrifdesBegrifes. What Hegel means by saying that "thek Srrz/f IS the absolutely concrete,"he himself explains at once, in the same connection, by saying that "the moments of the 2?.^J [universality, par- ticulanty, mdmduahty] cannot be separated ; " that, - inasmuch as their Identity IS po^ed in the Be^rriff, each of its moments can be immediately apprehended only from and with the others ; " that the Begrif can properly be called an "abstraction," so fur as "its element is Thought in general THREEFOLD ORIGIN OF THE REAL I 121 § 65, Now the origin of the I as a conceptual universal, an imperfect concrete concept of the "subject-object" or " Each of the We,*' is explained in the following considera- tions respecting the origin of the human concept in gen- eral. Since the only form of human knowledge is that of the percept-coticept which to a greater or less extent agrees with the object as unit-universal, and since the only growth of human knowledge is the gradual increase of this agreement through the continuous activity of experience and reason, the origin of the human percept-concept in general (for shortness' sake, " the concept ") is the origin of all human knowledge itself. I. If the concept originated spontaneously and solely in the activity of the object, it would be the object's concept, not the subject's; there would be no subject but the object itself. If absolutely inactive, the subject would vanish out of human knowledge. This, if it were tliinkable, would be absolute materialism, or absolute absorption of the subject by the object. II. If the concept originated spontaneously and solely in the activity of the subject, it would be the subject's con- and not empirically concrete Sense ;" and that "the absolutely concrete is Spirit or Miud [dcr Geist]." ( Werke, VI, 323-324.) P>ut this is simply the rational or ideal concretion, or identity in difference, of the abstract elements of an abstraction ; Hegel's konkrelcr Bcgrlff remains still rcincr Begriff, pure reason without experience, pure concept without intuition. Only phenomenal dulness could confound it with the real concretion, or identity in difference, of(l) unit and universal in every possible object, (2) exiKjrience and reason in every possible subject, and (3) intuition and concept in every possible cognition. To the principle of pure experience (empiricism) and to the principle of pure reason or pure thought (rational- ism), the scientiHc theory of universals opjmses the principle of their neces- sary concretion, or identity in difference, in every percei>t-concept or real cognition (scientific realism). This note is a sufficient reply to the attempt by Professor Josiah Royce, in the Appendix to his "Spirit of Modern Phi- losophy," to refute (without first understanding) the scientific theory of universals, outlined in part in " The Way out of Agnosticism ; " and to misrepresent my philosophy as derived from Hegel's, in the " International Journal of Ethics " for October, 1890. 122 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY cept, indeed, but the concept of no object; there would be no object but the subject itself. The object, if absolutely inactive, would vanish out of human knowledge ; its place would be held by an absolute illusion, and illusion is the reverse of knowledge. This, if it were thinkable, would be consistent idealism, that is, absolute solipsism, or absolute absorption of the object by the subject. III. If the concept, then, is possible at all as knowledge, or true thinking of the object by the subject (§ 50 and footnotes), it must originate in their co-activity, in action and reaction between the object and the subject, as equally active and therefore equally real. This is scientific realism, or dynamical correlation of subject and object.* 1 This scientific realism is at least as old as Aristotle's doctrine of im- mediate knowledge: ** Jenes unniittelbare Erkennen wild daher nur eine Anschauung, und ini Unterschied von der siniilichen Wahrnehniung nur eine geistige Anschauung sein konnen. Da aber doch der menschliche Geist die Begrifle nicht als angeborene in sich hat, wird audi die Anschauung, durch die er sie findet, nicht in einer Selbstanschauung, einem Akt der Selbstbeobachtung bestehen, durch den er sich der Principien als einer vorher schon in ihm liegenden Wahrbeit bewusst wiirde ; sondern darin, dass gewisse Gedanken und Begriffe jetzt erst durch eine Einwirkung des Gedachten auf den denkeuden Geist in ahnlicher Weise entstehen, wie die Wahrnehmung durch eine Einwirkung des Wahrgenommenen auf das Wahrnehmende entsteht. Und an diese Analogic halt sich Aristoteles wirklich, wenn er sagt, der Nus [voOs] verhalte sich zum Denkbaren, wie der Sinn zum Wahrnehmbaren ; er erkenne das Denkbare, in dem er sich mit demselben beriihre ; und wie die Wahrnehmung als solche immer wahr sei, so sei es auch das Denken, sofem es sich auf die Begriffe als solche beziehe." (E. Zeller, Die Philosophic derGriechen, II. ii. 195 f.) Despite the crudities of this doctrine, it has had enough vitality and truth to maintain itself successfully against the worst crudities of the current relativism of the present day ; for without it in some form there can be no such thing as knowledge of a world external to the individual con- sciousness. For example, it reasserts itself in Professor Riehl : ** Unsere Erkenntniss ist die Erkenntniss von Erscheinungen der Dinge, der Ur- sprung unserer Ideen daher weder ausschliesslich in uns noch ausschliess- lich in den Dingen ausser uns zu suchen, sondern sowohl in uns als in den Dingen, die auf unser Bewusstsein einwirken." (A. Riehl, Der philo- sophische Kriticismus und seine Bedeutung fiir die positive Wissenschaft, THREEFOLD ORIGIN OF THE REAL I 123 IV. The subject, therefore, cannot possibly create the object or originate knowledge out of itself alone. There is no such thing as "pure knowedge a jirioriy On the one hand, the subject must be stimulated to activity as experience by the active presence of the object as unit (the thing), and it must be stimulated to activity as reason by the active presence of the object as universal (the kind) ; this is simply saying that there can be no knowl- edge, either empirical or rational, without something to know — that is, a thing of some kind. On the other hand, the subject itself, reacting against the activity of the ob- ject, must determine its own stimulated activity and fix tlie form of its own product as either perfect concept or im- perfect concept, according to its own definite capacity for experience and reason. If the subject be infinite, the re- sultiint concept must be determined as infinite, adequate, or perfect ; if the subject be finite, the resultant concept must be determined as finite, inadequate, or imperfect. But in either case, whether perfect or imperfect, the con- cept must be concrete, that is, both empirical and rational ; it can never be the product either of "pure experience" or of " pure reason." Even the so-called abstraction or ab- stract concept is never abstract in the sense of being purely empirical or purely rational, that is, in the sense of con- ceiving the object as either pure unit or pure universal : this is impossible, because each of these two real deter- minations of the object is the necessary condition of the other, and the reality or real constitution of the object as necessarily a unit-universal or thing of some kind, neces- sarily determines all real knowledge of it. The inade- Bd. II. Th. II. s. 175, 1887.) Riehl thinks that his "critical realism" rests on a Kantian foundation ; but he breaks away here from Kant, to whom Erschcinung = Vorstellung^ and to whom, therefore, Ersclicinungcn are not ** phaenomena of things^ but merely " phaenomena in us " — not the " influence of things upon our consciousness," but the mere activity of consciousness itself without any external knowable "cause." For the causality of the Kantian I/inge an sich, whatever it may be, contributes nothing either to the form or to the content of a real cognition. \i 124 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THREEFOLD ORIGIN OF THE REAL I 125 quacy or imperfection of the imperfect concept consists in its apprehending partially or dimly the double-constitution of the object, and failing to comprehend it in its whole extent. Consequently, even the imperfect concept is nec- essarily concrete^ that is, both empirical and rational, so far as it goes, inasmuch as it partly conceives both the unity and the universality of the object in their insepara- ble union ; but it is at the same time abstract, that is, inade- quate, in the sense that it conceives only a part abstracted from the whole. Hence, every human concept is both empirical and rational, or concrete, so far as it goes ; but it is at the same time abstract, inadequate, or imperfect, be- cause it is neither exhaustively empirical nor exhaustively rational, but necessarily apprehends the object under the human condition of a more or less limited capacity for experience and reason alike. V. Thus the object of knowledge, as identity in differ- ence of unit and universal, is necessarily an active concrete reality or unit-universal of energy, which as unit, or object of experience, is wholly immanent in its own universal, while as universal, or object of reason, it is (1) immanent in all of its own units as a whole, and (2) both immanent and transcendent in each of them as a part. Hence, the concept of the object, as identity in difference of experience and reason, is (1) concrete, so far as it conceives the object as at once unit and universal, and (2) imperfect, so far as it fails to conceive the object exhaustively as whole unit and whole universal ; that is, it is concrete so far as it knows the ohject, and imperfect so far as it fails to kiiow it. This is the necessary form of human knowledge in general, since knowledge itself consists in the truth or agreement of the concept with the object, and since it can never transcend the subject's capacity of experience and reason. This partial but necessary imperfection of all human concepts, which con- stitutes the only assignable limit of human knowledge, is the inherent and ineradicable defect of the human con- cept per se, and stamps it as at once the strength and the \ \ weakness, the glory and the infirmity, of the human mind (§ 93). VI. Every human concept, being concrete so far as the subject both empirically and rationally knows the object in part, and being imperfect so far as tlie subject fails to know the object exhaustively in its wholeness, has its origin neither in the subject alone nor in the object alone, but in their co-activity, action and reaction, or dynamical corre- lation. That is, it originates (1) objectively, in positive stimulation of the subject by the object to activity as ex- perience and reason, and (2) subjectively, in negative limi- tation of this activity by the bounds of the subject's capacity of experience and reason. While, however, the origlii of the human concept is thus the origin of all human knowl- edge, it must not be overlooked that the growth of the concept depends (3) on the subject's positive reaction upon the object in experimental investigation, directed by scientific imagination in the free formation of hypothe- ses. This is a topic not germane to tlie present discussion, but necessary to consideration of the scientific method, and is mentioned here only to avoid the appearance of failing to recognize the subject's free activity as essential to knowledge. VII. Consequently, the concept of the real human T, personal subject-object, or Each of the We, being concrete and imperfect in the sense just explained, has its origin neither in the I as rational subject alone nor in the I as empirical object alone, but in the I as real identity in dif- ference of the two. That is, it originates, (1) as concept of the " succession of perceptions," in the I determined by its own origin in the We to be an active object of experi- ence and reason ; (2) as concept of the " synthetical unity of apperception," in the I determined by its own origin in the We and its inherited capacity to be an active subject of experience and reason ; and (3) as concept of the generic unity of apperception, in the I determined by its origin, its inherited capacity, and its free activity, to be an active 126 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THREEFOLD ORIGIN OF THE REAL I mhjecUohject of experience and reason, a personal conscious- ness, a real person. As real object, the I is constantly determined by stimulation or action from without; as real subject, the I constantly determines itself by its own reaction from within ; as real subject-object, therefore, the I is^a unitary-universal self-conscious energy wliich origi- nate*s the ever-growing concept of itself out of itself. The origin of the concept of the real I, therefore, is the generic unity of apperception, identity in difference of race-con- sciousness and self-consciousness, or personal consciousness as I in the We ; its necessary form is that of a concrete but imperfect thought, true so far, and so far only, as it agrees as concept with the real I as object ; and its growth IS Its gradual increase in truth, in proportion as this agree- ment is enlarged through perpetual stimulation of the I from without and perpetual reaction of the I from within. § m. To the problem of § 61, therefore, touching the threefold proximate origin of the real I, a solution has now been found, as follows : I. The I as a real unit ('^My Self as One of the We") originates in the We, through hinh or heredity. II. The I as a real universal (" My Self in each and all of My Conscious States,") originates in the I as a real unit, through the identity in difference of heredity and spontaneity — through the simultaneous evolution of in- herited race-consciousness and original self^onsciousness, as two distinguishable, inseparable, and reciprocally con- ditioning factors of one personal consciovs7iess. III. The imperfect concrete concept of the I as a real unit-universal, thing of some kind, or object of knowledge (" My Self in each and all of My Conscious States as One of the We,") originates in the I as one personal conscious- ness or real person, through the yeneric unity of appercep- Hon — through the co-activity of inherited race-conscious- ness and original self-consciousness in one gradually evolved personal consciousness, subject-object, or real personality, producing the concept of itself out of itself in 127 agreement with itself, and therefore arriving at the truth of itself as partial but real knowledge of the I in the We.^ 1 The further problems of the ultimate origin and the ultimate destiny of the / in ilie We do not belong here. For the sake of completeness, however, it may be well to say briefly (not dogmatically) tliat the ultimate origin of the We can be only the Absolute I, whence necessarily results a third element in the jwrsonal consciousness as God-consciousness, condi- tioning and conditioned by both race-consciousness and self-consciousness ; further, that the ultimate destiny of the We, which includes that of the I,' is a problem that cannot rationally arise except out of ethico-religious con- siderations, and therefore belongs to Chapter XVIII. It may also be here pointed out that inherited race-consciousness, which is more than mere "inherited habit," is the true significance of instinct. CHAPTER V TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS ; EGO AND NON-EGO § 67. It will not fail to be noticed that this account of the origin of self-consciousness, as absolutely conditioned on race-consciousness in the generic unity of apperception (antithesis of Ego and Other-Egos), differs irreconcilably from the traditional account of its origin in the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego.^ It is, of course, a mere logical truism to say that " the opposition of A and Not-A divides the universe."' The opposition itself, however, posits the universe, that is, recog- nizes it as existent ; there could be no division of a universe without a universe to be divided. Moreover, the universe ^ '* Der an die Spitze der gesammten theoretischen Wissenchaftslehro gestellt(i Satz : das Ich setzt sich als hestimmt durch das Nicht-Ich — ist vollkomrnen erschopft, und alle Widerspriiche, die in domselben lagen, gehobcn. Das Ich kann sich nicht anders setzen, als, dass cs durch das Nicht-Ich bostimint sey (kein Object, kein Subject). Insofern setzt es sich als bestimmt. Zugleich setzt es sich auch als l>estimmend ; weil das begrenzende im Nicht-Ich sein eigenes Product ist (kein Subject, kein Object)." (Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 218. For the mystical "Anstoss von aussen," which cannot be ex- plained either by the Ego or by the Non-Ego, see the same, pp. 227-231). Again, in varied form : "Die Gnindbehauptung des Philosophen, als eines solchen, ist diese : So wie das Ich nur fiir sich selbst sey, entstehe ihm zugleich nothwendig ein Seyn ausser ihm ; der Gnind des letzteren liege im ersteren, das letztere sey durch das erstere bedingt : Selbatbewusstsein und Bewusstsein eines Etwas, das nicht wir selbst — seyn soUe, sey noth- wendig verbunden ; das erstere aber sey anzusehen als das bedingende, iind das letztere als das bedingto." (Zweite Einleitung in die Wissen- schaftslehre, Werke, I. 457.) See further, below, Chapter X. « Cf. E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. ii. 214-221. So Kant, Logik, Werke, VIII. 101 : " Alles Mogliche ist entweder A oder won A." TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 129 could not be divided, unless it was previously undivided, that is, one universe ; and « division » of it is simply dis ' tinction of some known units from other known units, dis- tinction of two classes of units in a universe of units Hence the opposition of A and Not-A cannot obtain ex- cept within one universe of units or things (in the widest sense of "thing" as unit of existence, of whatever sort or nature). It means the recognition of two species within one genus, two sub-kinds within one kind, two classes of existences within Existence, as summum genus opposed to mere Non-Existence. It can have no meaning at all, un- less A denotes " things which are A " and Not-A denotes "things which are not A," — unless these two classes of things, q^ia things, exist independently of each other as equal and co-ordinate units of existence, — unless, in short, it is an opposition set up within the category Thing. For^ if A and Not-A could denote Thing and Not- Thing,' Some- thing and Nothing, it would become the purely formal or unreal opposition of Existence and Non-Existence, which in no sense divides the real universe ; the universe, being necessarily a universe of units or things, can be divided only as some-things and other-things, and the opposition of A and Kot-A, except as dichotomy of the real kind, Thing, is really no opposition at all — no division of the universe. ' Further, A must be already posited before it can be negated ; the negation of A in Not-A is impossible except through the prior position of A, not only as a unit of existence, but also as an object of knowledge. That is, A cannot be negated unless it is known. But every object of knowledge is necessarily a something or thing of some kind, and every human concept is necessarily imperfect knowledge of a thing of some kind (§ 65, IV, V, VI). Since, therefore, the intrinsic imperfection of the human concept as such consists in knowing its object in part only, the object itself must be a something partly known and partly unknown ; and A must not only denote its object so far as it is a thing with known marks or determinations, but also VOL. I. — 9 130 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY connote it so far as it is a thing with known and unknown determinations. Now the negation of A negates the denota- tion of A, but does not negate the connotation — negates the marks which A denotes, but does not negate what has those marks — negates known marks, but does not negate thing ; for, if Not-A negated more than what A denotes (that is, if it negated both denotation and connotation, both " known marks" and "thing"), it would itself denote absolute Nothing. In this case, the universe would be absurdly divided into Somethings and Nothings as two classes of Things ; A would denote all Somethings, and Not-A would denote all Nothings or pure Nothing; and the opposition of A and Not-A would not divide the universe at all. But this is contrary to the original thesis that it does divide the universe. Hence Not-A, negating all the known marks of A as a part or element of the universe, but at the same time positing things with other marks, known and un- known, as the residue of the universe, negates the deno- tation of A, but still posits its connotation. That is, just as we found before, A must be understood as " things which are A," and Not-A as "things which are not A;" but both alike must be understood as denoting the same known marks, as either present or absent, and connoting things as a kind, or else the opposition of A and Not-A altogether fails to divide the universe.^ 1 The above doctrine that Negation, as a thought-function, applies to the denotation of A, but cannot apply to its connotation, is founded on the necessary principle that all negation must be negation of something in par- ticular, and cannot possibly be negation of everything in general. For negation of everything-in-general^: position of nothing in-particular ; but this would negate the positing subject iUtelf, as something-in-particular, and thereby prevent the possibility of its positing nothing-in-particular ; whence it follows that negation of everything in general is absolutely impossible. For example, we may say, "There is no such thing as the devil," for this merely negates the denotation of devil as a particular thing, or unit of ex- istence, and does not negate its necessary connotation of things as a kind, or existent universe of units. But we cannot say, ** There is no-thing at all," for both the judging subject and the judgment itself are soww-things I TRADTTIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 131 Out of these necessary results of analyzing the necessary conditions of the problem, however, there necessarily or units of existence ; consequently, what we say we ourselves unsay, and what we try to say remains unsaid. Hence negation itself must posit, or it cannot negate ; it must connote things, or it cannot denote anything. There is, therefore, a measure of truth in Hegel's conception of Negation as not ein letres Nichis, die Leerheit, or das reine NicJUs, but rather as das Nichts dessejiy woraus es resuUirt, as hcstimtnle Negation, or as the Nothing' which ist ein hestimmtes und hat einen Inhalt. His famous "dialectical movement," which consists essentially in Position, Negation, and Nega- tion of Negation as New Position, and thereby perpetuates itself through an inner necessity of generating a new object out of the old, is, he main- tains, •* not a merely negative movement ; " the result of each new triad is not "pure Nothing," not "the empty Nothing," but rather "the deter- minate Nothing which has a Content ; " and each new Position, developed by this double Negation, is only a higher moment or stage in the progress towards " truth." Scepticism, he argues, takes its coarse negations as the Nothing of pure emptiness, which precludes all possibility of rational ad- vance, whereas his own successive results, as "determinate Negation " or "Nothing with a Content," are so many "new forms of consciousness" or "new objects," whereby knowledge advances through a succession of constantly changing forms to its final goal in the agreement of Concept and Object, Object and Concept. (Phanomenologie des Geistes, Einleitung, Werke, II. 65, 71.) But the "content" of Hegel's "determinate Nega- tion " is only a pure th/mght-determination, only a moment or phase which is speedily and completely "sublated" (aitfgeJwhcn) in the self-transfor- mation of the Begriff, striving to free itself absolutely from all empirical elements; it is radically different from the connotation of real things as a kind, an existent universe of units known both ratimmlly and empirically. The weakness of the Hegelian dialectic of Negation is the fatal weakness of all " pure thought " — namely, the separation of experience and reason ; the whole movement is a futile attempt to eliminate all experience from the final result, and to end in Begriff des BcgHffes, reine Idee, or the pure self-activity of reason alone, to which, in each new triad, the mere imma- nent " necessity " of its own proaedure, which is to be absolutely independ- ent of all experience, becomes itself "the origination of a new object with a new essence." Manifestly enough, this is a theory of Negation which is incompatible with the theory that both Position and Negation equally connote "things as a kind," because they equally involve the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason, experience as the knowledge of things or units, and reason as the knowledge of kinds or universals. Prantl half recognizes the necessity of our doctrine here in his interpretation of Aristotle's ovk dvdpojTros or 6vo/m ddpcaroy, when he saj's : 132 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY emerges a further and decisive conclusion : namely, what- ever knowledge is possessed of the marks of A must have originated prior to setting up the opposition of A and Not- A, and, therefore, cannot possibly have originated in that opposition itself. For, before I can oppose A to Not- A as "things which are A" to " things which are not A," I must already know, not only that things exist, as a divisible universe of units (§ 72, 6), but also that certain marks exist in A, as one class of things, which do not exist in Not-A, as another class of things. Otherwise, I cannot possibly negate A in Not-A, or set up the opposition at all. This prior knowledge in the negatiug subject is the abso- lutely necessary condition of the negation itself. In the very opposition of A and Not-A, there are logically involved three positioyis: (1) knowledge of a divisible universe of units ; (2) knowledge of certain units. A, as a part or ele- ment of it ; and (3) knowledge of other units, Not-A, as the residue of it. These three positions are three absolute conditions of the division or opposition itself ; negation of any one of them would render the opposition impossible. A posits and denotes something already knoimiy namely, "things which are A;" Not-A contraposits and denotes something else already known, namely, " things which are not A ; " and this knowledge, in both cases, is the condition, not the consequence, of the opposition as such. Clearly, the opposition can originate in me no knowledge of A which I did not bring to the opposition itself. Knowledge of A is (1) the absolute privs or condition of (2) the nega- tion of A in Not-A and (3) the opposition of Not-A to A, as dichotomy or division of the universe. Consequently, knoivledge of A cannot jmssihly originate in an opposition which itself dejyends on that very knowledge. "After abstraction of all that which is 'man,* there remains real a residue of the existent, although not so great, yet always positive, which as sucli is likewise a unity," — which is the manifest meaning of Aristotle's cited words, tv ydp irwj fftfixalvii koI rb ddpiarov. (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, I. 143, 145.) TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 133 § 68. The bearings of this result on the traditional account of the origination of self-consciousness in the oppo- sition of Ego and Non-Ego are plain enough. The Ego cannot possibly originate knowledge of itself in itself by setting up an opposition which is conditioned on its own prior possession of that very knowledge. It cannot origi- nally discover itself to be conscious by discovering sur- rounding objects to be unconscious; on the contrary, it cannot discover these to be unconscious, unless it has al- ready discovered itself to be conscious, and thereby learned the ground of the difference between consciousness and unconsciousness. For A nmst be known before Not-A can be known; knowledge of likeness (*' things which are A ") necessarily precedes and conditions knowledge of unlikeness ("things which are not A'^. Hence the Ego must have discovered so7ne things to be like itself (con- scious) before it can possibly discover other things to be U7dike Itself (unconscious) ; it must have discovered itself to be one of a kind (conscious things) before it can possibly discriminate itself from o7ie of another kind (unconscious things) ; it must have arrived at knowledge of other Egos (the We) before it can possibly oppose itself to the Non- Ego (the World). Consequently, just as any two con- stitutive factors condition their own product and thereby condition each other as factors, so race-consciousness and self-consciousness, the two constitutive factors of personal consciousness, must have been already evolved pari passu in the nascent Ego, before the Ego itself, as developed personal consciousness, can possibly set up the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego in any sense whatever. Self-conscious- nesSf therefore, cannot possibly originate in that a^itithesis as such. In fact, however, the simultaneous prior appearance of these two factors in personal consciousness is itself the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego in its germinal form: namely, antithesis of My-Consciousness and Another-Con- sciousness in the We. For it is only as " My Self as One 134 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY of the We " that the Ego can discover its own unity or think itself as a unit at all ; yet not till it has discovered its own unity and thought itself as a unit can it make itself a unitary term in any antithesis or any relation whatever. However obscure, rudimentary, instinctive, or even pos- sibly ante-natal, the original act of generic unity of apper- ception may be, it appears that the necessary fundamental opposition of My-Consciousness (the babe) and Another- Consciousness (the mother) is itself the Ego's discovery of its own unity and the germ of all personal consciousness as / in the We ; for the babe's consciousness buds out of the mother's consciousness in original unconsciousness, and only gradually differentiates itself from it. The babe originates in the mother, comes to nascent consciousness or becomes dimly aware of itself only in and with the mother, continues long after birth to draw its life from the mother, exists at first only as part of the mother, separates its existence from hers only by degrees, and cannot possibly know itself even rudimentarily as one except as identical with, yet different from, its otheVf and as knowing itself and its other as alike. Its awareness of itself as one is its awareness of itself and its mother as two — its generic unity of apperception as prius of its synthetic unity of appercep- tion, and vice versa. The babe cannot, of course, grow into a vivid and distinct consciousness of likeness betiveen itself and its mother^ as two of a kind, except after innumerable repetitions of slight and vague impressions, both prior and subsequent to birth; yet this developed consciousness of likeness, which is the only possible root of the conscious- ness of personal unity as " One of the We," must precede all consciousness of its mere negation as unlikeness, and must, therefore, lie at the bottom of the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego as unlike.^ Again, therefore, it appears that 1 ** Our knowledge commences with the confused and complex, which, as regarded in one point of view or another, may easily be mistaken for the individual or for the general. The discussion of this problem belongs, however, to Psychology, not to Logic. It is sufficient to say TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 135 self-consciousness cannot possibly originate in that antithesis as such; for that antithesis itself originates in the earlier and germinal antithesis of My-Consciousness and Another- Consciousness, as tivo that are alike, yet not one and the same, in which the real unity of self-consciousness as " One of the We " must be primarily evolved. This fundamental opposition of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness, transmitted potentially or implic- itly by heredity and developed actually or explicitly by personal growth, is itself, likewise, the emergence of race- consciousness, or consciousness of the unity of the We as One Kind (" things which are A "). As implicit or poten- tial, race-consciousness goes down from generation to gen- eration, is the same in all generations and all individuals, and constitutes the unbroken continuity of all human life'. As explicit or actual, it rises simultaneously with its co-factor, self-consciousness, into personal consciousness, which is never duplicated, but constitutes the real individtL ality of each human life. As the hundred-eyed Argus who watched lo in her wanderings closed only two of his eyes in sleeping, while all the rest of them remained awake, so the imperishable race-consciousness of mankind sleeps for a while in the birth of the babe, but wakes during the life-time of all adults. Kay, the rhythmical periodicity of personal consciousness itself, which sinks into unconscious- ness at night and renews itself in the morning, is but the repetition in miniature of the larger periodicity of race- consciousness, which goes to sleep in the origination of a in general that all objects are presented to us in complexity ; that we are at first more struck with the points of resemblance than with the points of contrast ; that the earliest notions, and consequently the earliest terms, are those that correspond to this synthesis, while the notions and the terms arising from an analysis of this synthesis into its parts, are of a subsequent formation." (Sir William Hamilton, Logic, 156, 157.) This goes to corroborate the position taken in the text above, that the resemblance between the mother and the babe, as like in kind, must be apprehended sooner than the contrast between the babe and (say) its rattle, as imlike in kind. 136 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY new human being and reawakens in his gradual evolution. There are defects in the analogy, but they are immaterial. Personal consciousness — the unique, original, and incom- municable individuality of a real I — is that identity in difference of hereditary race-consciousness and spontaneous self-consciousness by which, when rationally comprehended, a real I knows the We to be immanent in all of its own units as a whole, and both immanent and transcendent in each of its units as a part ; it is essentially the I's knowl- edge of itself as a unit in its own universal plus its knowledge of itself as a universal in all its own units (§ 63), that is, as / in the We. For " I and Another " are «We,'' no less than "I and a thousand million Others;" and the discovery that "I and Another" are alike, that is, two of a kind, is itself the discovery of / in the TFe — the emergence of personal consciousness out of unconsciousness. This principle that both the essential factors of personal consciousness originate, not in the later antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego, but in the earlier and germinal antithesis of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness, is a rational or necessary result of the scientific theory of universals, of which our entire doctrine of the real I is simply an illus- tration and direct practical application. But it stands, likewise, in complete accordance with the facts of experi- ence. On the one hand, the psychical dualism of My- Consciousness and Another-Consciousness, as the origin of all personal consciousness in the knowing and knowable I, repeats and illumines the physical dualism of germ-cell and sperm-cell, as the origin of the knowable I itself. That is, just as life itself originates in the dynamical correlation of two sexes, so all personal consciousness of that life originates in the dynamical correlation of two consciousnesses. True, in the origination of life as such, the two (the parents) originate a third distinct from both (the child), while, in the origination of personal conscious- ness, the two (mother and child) originate simply a higher TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 137 form of life in one of that two (the child), since personal consciousness is a more highly evolved form of life than organic unconsciousness. This difference, indeed, in the two cases, brings out the fact (in itself a profounder enigma than the riddle of the Sphinx) that in all personal consciousness the subject must become an object to itself. But this very fact shows the emergent personal conscious- ness as itself a third, a resultant of the two; that is, the simple co-ordination of My-Consciousness and Another- Consciousness results in My-Personal-Consciousness as / in the We. Hence the difference in no degree impairs the analogy, or weakens its corroborative force as a verification of reason by experience. On the other hand, just as per- sonal consciousness originates in the germinal antithesis of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness as mother and child, so it culminates in the crowning antithesis of My-Consciousness and Another-Consciousness as husband and wife. Lifelong love between two I's is the supreme personal relation in the We; true marriage is the condition of the highest possible development of human individuality. This is not the place to dwell on these truths; but it is necessary to point out in this connection that the funda- mental dualism which marks both the origination and the culmination of personal human life, as such, marks no less the origination of all personal consciousness of that life. The human I begins in the We as two (fatlier and mother) learns to know itself in the We as two (mother and child)' and achieves its own highest individuality in the We as two (husband and wife); and these facts of experience powerfully confirm the truth of reason that the human I can neither be born, nor come to personal consciousness, nor realize its destiny, except as / in the We, § 69. Further, solely out of the I's knowledge of itself as I in the We can spring its knowledge of itself as I in the World, Both My-Self and Another-Self, considered merely as units of existence, are things ; My-Self is one thing, and 138 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY Another-Self is another thing. This opposition of Mj-Self and Another-Self, in which the generic unity of apper- ception must originally manifest itself as that confluence of heredity and spontaneity which is the genesis of per- sonal consciousness, constitutes necessarily the germ of all real self-knowledge as / in the We, For every nascent or potential I that learns by experience to distinguish itself from another I becomes in that very distinction, and only in that distinction, an actual / in the We, a con- scious thing in its kind. A conscious thing, as one of a kind, is possible only through another of that kind; there must be two of them, at the very least, or there cannot be one of them; and two conscious things which are conscious of each other already constitute, so far, a kind of conscious things. But, similarly, a kind is possible only through another kind; there must be two kinds, at least, or there cannot be one kind. A kind of conscious things, however, can have no other kind than a kind of unconscious things; for, from the nature of the opposition of A and Not-A, these two kinds of things together constitute all things as a whole, that is, as the World. In other words, out of the primary consciousness of other things of the same kind as myself there springs necessarily the secondary consciousness of another kind of things than my kind, and hence that of the difference or unlikeness between conscious- ness and unconsciousness y as marks of the two great kinds which divide the universe. However difficult it may be to observe the actual beginnings of personal consciousness in others or to remember them in ourselves, it is obvious that, whatever may be the psychological evolution, the logical and philosophical order requires that, before I can distin- guish "things which are A*' (conscious things) from "things which are not A" (unconscious things) as unlike classes, I must have already learned to class together " things which are A " (My-Self and Another-Self) as like units. The necessity of this logical order is our only guide in the investigation of facts so obscure as these. TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 139 Thus the opposition of My-Self and Another-Self be- comes the germ of the opposition of the I and the Not-I. But, it is evident, in this Not-I must be included (1) All Other I's, and (2) All Other Things than I's. So understood, the opposition of I and Not-I constitutes the Empirical Antithesis, in which the individual human I, as a mere unit of existence or thing, opposes itself to all other things, whether these in themselves are I's or Not-I's. It is a real antithesis, indeed, yet one which, being founded solely on the experience and recognition of individual con- scious existence as a unit or thing, and on complete neglect of the rational universality of that existence as one of a kind, is neither critical nor scientific. That is, although it is entirely accurate, and constitutes to that extent the only scientific form of the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego, it possesses no particular scientific utility, because it disre- gards the natural and logical laws of scientific classification. It divides the universe, to be sure, yet on no rational prin- ciple, since it opposes one unit of a kind to all other units of that kind, indiscriminately mixed and grouped together with all units of the only alternative kind. The confusion and unscientific character of this purely naive opposition are obvious; and it has begotten innumerable confusions in philosophy. The necessity of getting rid of this confusion leads to the correction of the Empirical Antithesis by re-grouping the units of existence, or things in general, according to their natural kind-relations. In this way, the Empirical Anti- thesis of I and Not-I is inevitably evolved, in the philo- sophic mind, into the Rational Antithesis of We and Not- We, in which the We, as a real universal or kind of conscious things, opposes itself to the only alternative kind of uncon- scious things, as the Not- We. This is the natural and rational opposition to All I's and All Not-I's which opposes all units of one kind to all units of the only alternative kind, and now becomes the scientific antithesis of the sphere of consciousness and the sphere of unconsciousness. This 140 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY opposition of the We and the Not- we, the Conscious and the Unconscious, framed in strict accordance with the scientific theory of universals and its fundamental principle of the identity in difference of experience and reason in all human knowledge, divides the universe into two real kinds of things, which together equal all units of existence as Things in the World, Thus out of the I's knowledge of itself as I in the We springs its knowledge of We in the World^ and, therefore, of itself as 1 in the World, § 70. In consideration of the interests of exact thinking, it is to be regretted that two real oppositions so obvious in themselves — namely, the empirical antithesis of I and Not-I and the rational antithesis of We and Not- We — should have been so long disregarded or confused. But it is by no means to be wondered at. The long struggle in philosophy since Bacon and Descartes between empiricism and rationalism, growing out of the uncritically assumed and strangely uncontested possibility of separating, instead of merely distinguishing, the two inseparable elements of experience and reason in human knowledge, led inevitably to two other oppositions, in themselves thoroughly one- sided and unscientific. Empiricism, denying with Hume all knowledge not de- rived from sensuous experience, and therefore all knowledge of necessity and strict universality, starts with the Ego as the purely empirical I or mere " succession of perceptions," which it conceives to be all that is real in it. Yet to this non-universalized content of the purely individual conscious- ness it opposes, naively and inconsistently, the Non-Ego as the universalized world of unconsciousness, without consid- ering that (unless it should seek refuge in solipsism, which it never does) the opposition thus set up leaves no place in either term for the " succession of perceptions " in any other Empirical /, and altogether fails, therefore, to divide the universe. Clearly, the origin of self-consciousness can never be logically derived from the antithesis of Ego and I TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 141 Non-Ego, when conceived so loosely and illogically as that of the empirical I and the Not- We.* Rationalism, on the other hand, denying with Kant that knowledge can be derived at all from sensuous experience or perception as such,* starts with the Ego as the purely rational I or mere « synthetical unity of api)erception *' — the real fountain of " pure knowledge a priori," not as the empty form of objectless or merely possible concepts, but as the filled form of actualized concepts in mathematics and physics — the pure "understanding itself," which creates all concepts out of the pure or impure intuitions of the sensibility as its proper « object " — the original and spon- taneous universalizing act of transcendental synthesis, or a priori conjunction of the manifold — the universal rational consciousness itself, abstracted from the empirical con- sciousness and absolutely pure from all empirical elements. This Pure I (reines Ich) is that common element of spon- taneous transcendental self-activity, that essential com- munity of nature, which is inherent in every Empirical I [der mit Vemunft hegabte Sinnenmensch), and which, ac- 1 " Die Gegenseitigkeit von Ich und Nicht-Ich, von Gefiihl und Empfindung, von Triebund Widerstand, Action und Reaction, diese Gegen- seitigkeit ist das ursprunglich Gegebene : das Bemtsstscin existirt, cogita- tioest. Die aussere Erfahrung steht an Unmittulbarkeit, Gewissheit und Wirklichkeit der inncm nicht nach. Das Dasein von etwas Acusserem, von niir Verschiedenem ist so wenig aus dem Dasein meiner selbst gefol- gert, dass ich von mir selbst nichts wissen konnte, wenn niclit etwas Aeusseres da ware, wovon ich raich unterscheide." (A. Riehl, Der pliilo- sophische Kriticismus, II. ii. 147.) Professor Riehl, whose " critical real- ism" is somewhat paradoxically founded upon Kant's "critical idealism," cannot justly be classed with pure empiricists; but this passage, never- theless, exhibits the full-fledged empiricist antithesis, and derives from it the origin of self.consciousness. His Ich is manifestly conceived as the empirical I, while his Nwhi-Ich is no less cleariy conceived as the Not- We; for *' something external and different from me" cannot include something external and like me, i, e. another I, but must be sometliing external and different from all I's, i. e. the Not- We. * ** In den Sinnen ist gar kein Uri;heil, weder ein wahres noch fal- sches." (Kant, Kritik der reinen Vemunft, Werke, III. 245.) 142 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY cording to rationalism, must be completely abstracted from the sensibility in order to be thought; it is the universal which inheres in the individual as such, and is one and the same in all individuals (in allem Bewusstsein ein uml dasselhe ist), in a word, it is the pure "consciousness-in- general " {Beivusstsem iiberhaupt). To this pure conscious- ness-in-general, as Ego, rationalism opposes the Non-Ego, not, however, as the negation of consciousness-in-general (which would be required by logical consistency), but rather as the negation of all consciousness, general or particular. Naively enough, both empiricism and rationalism conceive the Non-Ego irregularly as the universalized world of unconsciousness, and do not determine it as Not-A must be determined by A ; that is, they posit the Ego in one sense, and then negate it in another. Consequently, just as in the case of empiricism, there results for rationalism a false antithesis, which leaves no place whatever in either term for consciousness-in- particular. Yet consciousness-in- particular is just as real as consciousness-in-general, and must be equally included in the universe, no matter whether this is conceived as real or ideal, noumenal or phaenomenal or both. Hence the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego, conceived by rationalism as that of the Pure I and the Not- We, is just as loose, defective, and illogical as that of empiricism ; it wholly fails to divide the universe, and cannot possibly serve to explain the origin of self-consciousness. § 71. The positive and critical results of the last four sections are so important that they require to be set forth synoptically in the form of tables, which will enable the careful reader to seize and to fix the distinctions now drawn in the clearest manner possible. TABLE ra L Empirical Antithesis op I and Not-I A. The I = Real Unit in its Real Universal — My Self in each and all of My Conscious States as One of the We = My Inner World (real). TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 143 B. The Notrl = All that is not My Self = All Other Selves than My Self -h All Other Things than Selves = My Outer World (real). C. My Inner World -f My Outer World = the Universe. This is the only scientific antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego, though it possesses no scientific utiUty. II. Rational Antithesis of We and Not-We A. The We = Real Universal in All its Real Units = All I's = All Things which are Selves = All that is Our Consciousnesses = Our Inner World (real). B. The Not-We = All Not-I's = All Things which are not Selves = All that is not Our Consciousnesses = Our Outer World (real). C. Our Inner World -I- Our Outer World = the Universe. This is the only scientific antithesis of the Conscious and the Unconscious. III. Irrational Antithesis op I and Not-We i. Empiricist Form: Ego = Empirical /, Non-Ego = Not-We A. The Empirical I = Pseudo-Units Out of their Universal = " My Succession of Perceptions " without " Synthetical Unity of Apperception " = My Inner World (abstract). B. The Not-We = Our Outer World (real or ideal). C. But My Inner World + Our Outer World do not = the Uni- verse. For Your Inner World, which is no part of mine, is left out of the account. The antithesis is a false one. ii. Rationalist Form : Ego = Pure /, Non-Ego = Not- We A. The Pure I = Pseudo-Universal Out of its Units = " Synthet- ical Unity of Apperception" without "My Succession of Perceptions " = Pure Consciousness-in-general (abstract). B. The Not-We = Our Outer World (real or ideal, noumenal or phaenomenal). C. But Pure Consciousness-in-general + Our Outer World do not = the Universe. For every Empirical Consciousness-in- particular, which is no part of Pure Consciousness-in- general, is left out of the account. The antithesis is a false one. M I 144 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY § 72. From these tables and the tables of § 60 are dedu- cible certain necessary conclusions which go far to dissipate the fog that hangs over unmodernized philosophy and hides from it very obvious distinctions. 1. The antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego cannot he scientifi- cally used as equivalent to that of the Conscious and the Unconscious. Nothing but confusion of the Empirical An- tithesis with the Rational Antithesis can possibly account for the existence and wide prevalence of the Irrational Antithesis, which posits the Ego in one sense, and negates it in another. The irrationality here consists (1) in posit- ing the Ego as either purely empirical or purely rational, that is, as only a fragment of the real I ; (2) in positing the Non-Ego, not as negation of the Ego already posited, but as the Not- We; (3) in opposing the Ego and the Non- Ego, thus misunderstood, as the Conscious and the Uncon- scious; and (4) in imagining that this false and illogical antithesis of T and Not-We, this mere philosophical blunder, is a philosophical explanation of the origin of self-conscious- ness. One might as well hope (with Plato) to explain the origin of Existence out of the sterile antithesis of Being and Non-Being, as hope (with Fichte) to explain the origin of self-consciousness out of the equally sterile antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego. 2. The true origin of self-consciousness and of race-con- sciousness, the two co-factors of personal consciousness, is immediately given neither in the empirical antithesis of I and Not-I nor in the rational antithesis of We and Not-We, but must be sought in that earlier, primordial, and germinal antithesis of Mg- Consciousness and Another- Consciousness which is the purely positive and simplest possible con- sciousness of I in the We. Both the I and the We must be posited before either of them can possibly be negated, because they cannot be posited except in conjunction. The I in the We is, as it were, the ultimate molecule of personal consciousness, to which self -consciousness and race-con- sciousness stand related somewhat as the ultimate constitu- TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 145 ent atoms, to abstract either of which is to break up the whole essence of the molecule itself. The generic unity of apperception, that identity in difference of heredity and spontaneity by which the I and the We must be given to- gether before they can be negated separately, is the only principle which can explain the origin of self-consciousness as a fact of evolution. 3. Both the empirical and the rational antitheses illus- trate the scientific theory of universals, by which the real individual inheres wholly in its real universal, while the real universal inheres wholly in all its real individuals and partly in each of them. They illustrate it, not as a " meta- physical" or merely abstract theory, but as a practical working method adequate to all problems, which is at bottom the method of all scientific investigation, and will be recognized as such by all scientific men, when they rise above their own specialties and come to sec that all special matters are only so many special applications of the one universal method of universal science as such — that is, of philosophy itself. 4. The empiricist form of the irrational antithesis illus- trates the futility of the attempt to get along with no theory of universals — that is, to suppress the real univer- sal altogether and get along with the real units alone. The rationalist form of it illustrates the futility of the Aristo- telian theory of universals, by which the universal, as ab- stract common element or necessary essence, inheres wholly in each of its units, as the "form" in the "compound of form and matter ; " while the individual exemplifies the uni- versal, but does not inhere in it, since the "compound of matter and form " cannot be in the " form " alone. That is, the pure consciousness-in-general (Bewusstsein uberhauj^t)^ as " form" inheres in every empirical Ego (der mit Vemujift hegabte Sinnenmensch)^ as "compound of form and matter," — is identically the same in all empirical Egos {in alleni Bewusstsein ein und dasselbe ist), — and is both expressible and abstractive as that universal "I think" (ich denke) VOL. r.— 10 } h 144 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY § 72. From these tables and the tables of § 60 are dedu- cible certain necessary conclusions which go far to dissipate the fog that hangs over unmodernized philosophy and hides from it very obvious distinctions. 1. The antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego cannot he scientifi- cally used as equivalent to that of the Conscious and the Unconscious. Nothing but confusion of the Empirical An- tithesis with the Rational Antithesis can possibly account for the existence and wide prevalence of the Irrational Antithesis, which posits the Ego in one sense, and negates it in another. The irrationality here consists (1) in posit- ing the Ego as either purely empirical or purely rational, that is, as only a fragment of the real I ; (2) in positing the Non-Ego, not as negation of the Ego already posited, but as the Not- We ; (3) in opposing the Ego and the Non- Ego, thus misunderstood, as the Conscious and the Uncon- scious; and (4) in imagining that this false and illogical antithesis of T and Not-We, this mere philosophical blunder, is a philosophical explanation of the origin of self-conscious- ness. One might as well hope (with Plato) to explain the origin of Existence out of the sterile antithesis of Being and Non-Being, as hope (with Fichte) to explain the origin of self-consciousness out of the equally sterile antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego. 2. The true origin of self-consciousness and of race-con- sciousness, the two co-factors of personal consciousness, is immediately given neither in the empirical antithesis of I and Not-I nor in the rational antithesis of We and Not-We, but must be sought in that earlier, primordial, and germinal antithesis of My- Consciousness and Another- Consciousness which is the purely positive and simplest possible con- sciousness of / in the We, Both the I and the We must be posited before either of them can possibly be negated, because they cannot be posited except in conjunction. The / in the We is, as it were, the ultimate molecule of personal consciousness, to which self -consciousness and race-con- sciousness stand related somewhat as the ultimate constitu- V TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 145 ent atoms, to abstract either of which is to break up the whole essence of the molecule itself. The generic unity of apperception, that identity in difference of heredity and spontaneity by which the I and the We must be given to- gether before they can be negated separately, is the only principle which can explain the origin of self-consciousness as a fact of evolution. 3. Both the empirical and the rational antitheses illus- trate the scientific theory of universals, by which the real individual inheres wholly in its real universal, while the real universal inheres wholly in all its real individuals and partly in each of them. They illustrate it, not as a " meta- physical" or merely abstract theory, but as a practical working method adequate to all problems, which is at bottom the method of all scientific investigation, and will be recognized as such by all scientific men, when they rise above their own specialties and come to see that all special matters are only so many special applications of the one universal method of universal science as such — that is, of philosophy itself. 4. The empiricist form of the irrational antithesis illus- trates the futility of the attempt to get along with no theory of universals — that is, to suppress the real univer- sal altogether and get along with the real units alone. The rationalist form of it illustrates the futility of the Aristo- telian theory of universals, by which the universal, as ab- stract common element or necessary essence, inheres wholly in each of its units, as the " form " in the " compound of form and matter ; " while the individual exemplifies the uni- versal, but does not inhere in it, since the "compound of matter and form " cannot be in the " form " alone. That is, the pure consciousness-in-general (Bewusstsein uberhaupt), as " form" inheres in every empirical Ego (der 7nit Vemunft hegabte Sinnenmensch)^ as "compound of form and matter," — is identically the same in all empirical Egos (m allem Bewusstsein ein und dasselbe ist), — and is both expressible and abstractible as that universal "I think" (ich deuke) VOL. I. — 10 146 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHT ; which must "accompany" {begleiten) every one of my con- 8C10US states in order to make it mine; while, on the con- trary, the empirical Ego, or concrete individual, cannot possibly inhere in the pure consciousness-in-general, or ab- stract universal, but can only be subsumed under it, as an example of it and empirical consciousness in one. The fail- ure of this rationalist form of the irrational antithesis to agree with the facts, already proved by the exposure of the fourfold irrationality of it (§ 72, 1), is simply a practical Illustration of the scientific inadequacy of the Aristotelian theory of universals itself, and the practical necessity of superseding it with a better theory. 6. The three antitheses, taken together as a whole, ex- pose the dreary emptiness of the problem on which the philosophical world has for two or three centuries so pa- thetically wasted so much genius of the very highest order • namely, the "problem of the reality of the external world." All personal consciousness is primarily or genetically rooted in the gradual divergence and ultimate distinction otthe I and the Other-I, of My-Consciousness as the babe and Another-Consciousness as the mother, which must con- dition and antedate the distinction of the I and the Not-I as A and Not-A (§ 68). Yet My-Consciousness is my in- ternal world, and Another-Consciousness is already another world, internal to itself, but external to me. Since the orig- inal germ of all my self-cognition, and the prime condition of all my other cognitions, consists in knowing myself aa I in the We, I cannot possibly have any personal consciousness whatever, —I cannot possibly become "a sense-man en- dowed with reason," an empirical-rational I, a subject of actual knowledge, -unless I know, in one original and in- divisible act, an internal world in myself as a unit and an external world in my race as its universal. But, just aa I cannot know myself except as / in the We, so I cannot know my race except as We in the World: that is, I cannot know myself at all except as / in the We in the World (§ 69). The "We, and the We alone, mediates between knowl- ! TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 147 edge of ray internal world (I) and knowledge of my exter- nal world (Not-I) ; for the We is both in one, as identity in difference of I and Not-I, Nowhere, with my utmost inge- nuity, can I so run aline of logical demarcation between the I and the Not-I, as to make my doubt of an external world anything better than a fooPs doubt. For I cannot know the I as a unit without knowing the We as its universal ; yet, on whichever side of my line I place the Other-Ps that with myself make up the We, they constitute in themselves a knoivn external world. If I place them with the Not-T, I get the Empirical Antithesis ; if I place them with the I, I get the Rational Antithesis ; if I evade the difficulty and ignore them altogether, I can get only the Irrational Anti- thesis, in one or the other form. Hence I conclude that to doubt an external world, at least from the vantage-ground of the scientific theory of universals, is simply to fall into an abyss of folly. For I cannot at the same time donht my external world as the We, yet know my internal world as the I: to know or doubt either, I must know or doubt both. I conclude, therefore, that the absolutely indivisible and necessary cognition of myself as I in the We in the World is itself the absolutely certain cognition of an external world. In short, this so-called " problem " is no problem at all, except to the empiricism which vainly tries to eliminate the universal, or the rationalism which vainly tries to eliminate the particular, or the eclecticism which vainly tries to rec- oncile these two contradictory attempts. But it is no " problem " to a scientific philosophy. It is a problem gen- erated solely by an unscientific theory of universals ; for the scientific theory of universals, applied to it in the principle of the generic unity of apperception, is the scientific solu- tion of it. This is easily apparent. It is a bald self-con- tradiction to say, " We doubt, or do not know, an external world; " for the "We " thus posited or affirmed is itself, to every I, a world partly internal and partly external, and ex- plicitly affirms what the judgment denies. Nay, it would ress itst^lf in either one or the other of them, the doubter, whether I or We, is powerless to say or even to think his doubt without contradicting himself in the very saying or thinking of it. If this is not a scientific solution of the "problem," it would be difficult to state what is, or could be. 1 TRADITIONAL ORIGIN OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 149 and the We of the rational antithesis; if it is not, then it belongs in the Not-I of the former and the Not- We of the latter. In either case, however, these two antitheses are completely and equally true to experience and to reason. They perfectly agree with the facts, and they are logically valid because, as A and Not- A, they divide the universe • and they perfectly subserve the uses which have been already made of them. But it is not their purpose or their function to answer the question above propounded. They simply determine the relation of I and Not-I, We and Not- We, in real oppositions which divide the universe, and leave these, as indisputable facts, for further investigation. That the I is a real unit and the We its real universal, — that the Not-I and the Not-We cannot be confounded to- gether as " Non-Ego," except in ruinous disregard of expe- rience and reason alike, — so much is certain, whether the body is or is not a part of the I. It cannot but be that rigorous regard for the distinctions established in these antitheses will conduce greatly to a scientific treatment of the latter question. So far as these antitheses alone are concerned, however, this question is left open for strictly scientific investigation ; the result of which, if philosophy is possible in the form of historico-literary expression, is already indicated above at the close of § 25. n ORIGIN OF THE TRADITION 151 CHAPTER VI ORIGIN OF THE TRADITION: THE ARISTOTELIAN PARADOX § 74. In this connection it only remains to show, al- though necessarily at considerable length, the source of that traditional account of the origin of self-consciousness in the antithesis of Ego and Non-Ego which we have been examining in the last seven sections. This could not be shown until the scientific theory of the I, as derived from the scientific theory of universals, had first been positively developed, in order to possess a scientific basis of historical criticism in the philosophy of philosophy. The historical root of the antithesis, as this has been explained and criticised above, is the Aristotelian theory of universals. Zeller, than whom there is no higher au- thority on the history of Greek philosophy, maintains that a fundamental and irreconcilable contradiction permeates the whole system of Aristotle, and infects it throughout with incoherence and want of precision. This contradic- tion, if it be one, lies in Aristotle's two attempts to deter- mine scientifically the object of knowledge, now as the unit of conception, or intelligible universal essence of the individual (to ri r/v cTi/at, 17 Kara tov Xoyov owrta, owria as pure Form), and now as the unit of existence, or real individual substance of the universal (toSc ti, ovo-ta as union of Form and Matter).^ Whether tliere exists an actual contradic- tion between these two notions of the object of knowledge, it is not at present necessary to decide, as the question will 1 Ariat. Metaph. VI. 11, 1037 a. 29, ed. Rerol. : tj oMa ydp iffri rb ttSot rb iv6v^ i^ o5 Kal rrjs OXrji ij ff^voSoi X&yerai ovaia. Prantl (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, I. 238, Anm. 461) and Edwin Wallace (Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle, p. 68, n. 4) adopt the reading aOvoXot. ^L come up again in a later chapter. Our present concern with the Aristotelian theory of universals is simply with reference to its effect upon the concept of the individual as such, and therefore upon that of the real I as the human individual. § 75. " With the inquiry into universal concepts," says Zeller,^ "philosophy had taken in Sokrates that new turn which not only Plato, but also Aristotle essentially followed. From this fact it results that he universally presupposes the Sokratic-Platonic view of the nature of concepts and the problem of conceptual thought. But, just as we shall hear him, in his metaphysics, contradict the Platonic doctrine of the independent reality of the universal which is thought in the concept, so in logic, likewise, he finds in that connection certain stricter determinations necessary for the treat- ment of concepts. Although Plato himself had demanded that the essential, and not the accidental, properties of things should be included in their definitions, yet he had at the same time hypos- tasized all universal representations as [substantial or self-subsist- ent] Ideas, without carefully discriminating between concepts of property and concepts of substance. This discrimination Aristotle makes, since he allows nothing but the individual to be substance. He distinguishes, not only the accidental from the essential, but also, within the sphere of the essential itself, the universal [prop- erty] from the genus, and both from the concept or the conceptual essence of things. " A Universal is everything which belongs in common to several things, not merely by accident, but in consequence of their nature {KaB£Kov di Xc'yo) o av Kara irairros re VTrdpxrf Koi Ka6^ avrit Kai § avro — Xeyo) d€ KoBoKov to narm fj firjSevi vndpxfiv). If this common element is a determination involved in the essence [i. e. as only a necessary part of it], then the universal is a property-concept — it denotes an essential property ; but, if it is itself the [whole] essence of the things concerned, the universal becomes the Genus. If to the common marks comprised in the concept of the genus there are added, for a part of its extent, still further essential marks by which this part is distinguished from the other parts of the same genus, then there arises the Species, which, accordingly, is com- posed of the genus and the specific differences. If, finally, in this way an object is so determined by means of all its distinctive marks that this determination as a whole is applicable to no other 1 Die Philosophic der Griechen, II. ii. 203-214, 3te Auflage. 152 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY ORIGIN OF THE TRADITION 153 object [i. e. to an object of no other species], then we obtain its Concept. The object of the concept, consequently, is the substance, and indeed, more precisely, the determined substence or peculiar essence of the things; and the concept itself is nothing else than the thought of this essence [der Gedanke dieses Wesens — dpiafios eWt Xoyoff 6 TO rt ?!/ (ivai (TTjfiaivav]. This thought of the essence comes to pass through determining the generic universal more definitely by all the distinctive marks of the species. According to Aristotle, however, the essence of things lies in their form alone, and with this alone, therefore, the concept is concerned ; no concept can be framed of sensuous things as such. Even if the peculiar essence of an object, and therefore its concept, also, in- cludes a determinate relation of the form to the matter, yet there can be no definition of this sensuous object itself, but only of this determinate mode of sensuous existence — only of the universal form of the object If from this it immediately follows that the concept does not relate to sensuous individuals as such, then the A)llowing statements must hold good of the individual in general : namely, knowledge goes invariably to a universal — even the words of which a definition is composed are universal designations — every concept embraces, or at least may embrace, several individ- uals—and, although we descend to the lowest species, we yet obtain always universal determinations alone, within which indi- viduals are no longer distinguished specifically, but only by acci- dental marks. Between accidental maiks and specific differences lie those properties which belong exclusively to things of a certain species, yet without being contained immediately in their concept. These Aristotle calls peculiarities (i8ta); in a wider sense, how- ever, he includes both specific differences and accidental properties under this name. What falls under one concept is, so far as this is the case, identical; what does not fall under one concept is different. But perfect identity, of course, also includes unity of matter; individuals among which no difference of species exists are yet different with respect to number, because in these the same concept presents itself in different matter." § 76. With regard to Aristotle's conception of the indi- vidual as such, Zeller further brings out certain involved and important consequences with great distinctness, as follows : — ^ 1 Die Philosophic die Griechen, II. ii. 339-344 ; cf. also 802. "Finally, in the matter alone shall we be able to discover the ground of individual existence, at least in all the things which are composed of matter and form. Aristotle, it is true, did not express himself concerning the principle of individuation with the univer- sality and definiteness which might have been desirable, and he thus bequeathed to his followers in the middle ages a rich oppor- tunity for scientific contention. Besides beings possessing bodies, he is acquainted, as we shall learn, in the case of the Deity, the sphere-spirits, and the rational part of human souls, with beings possessing no bodies and tainted with no matter ; and these, like- wise, we must consider as individuals. But, where the form attains existence in a matter, it is this matter alone to which we can refer the fact that the form exhibits itself in it not otherwise than under certain limitations and with certain more intimate determinations which are not contained in the form as such, the pure concept of the thing. The form or the concept is always a universal ; it de- notes not a ThiSf but a Such ; it may indeed be thought for itself, but it cannot exist for itself in separation from things ; no distinc- tion of species or form can be drawn among the individual beings into which the lowest species split up ; individuals, therefore, can- not be distinguished one from another except through their matter alone. Though Aristotle himself cannot maintain this position without some wavering, yet his system leaves no room for indi- vidual forms of sensuous things. [In a footnote, Zeller adds con- clusively on this last point: ** No place at all can be found in Aristotle for such individual forms. For since, according to his well-known principle, the form neither originates nor perishes, and since this must hold good of that form, also, which as rofic ti exists in an individual being, it follows that there would necessarily belong to the individual forms of sensuous things, if there were any such, an existence separable from the things whose form they are. But this is absolutely unthinkable from the Aristotelian point of view."] Every individual being, therefore, has matter in itself, and every thing possessing body is an individual being : Aristotle uses * sensuous things* and * single things' as synony- mous. If the matter accomplishes all this, then it cannot, one would think, be distinguished from the form by mere privation or potentiality [Nochnichtsein]^ but it must contribute to the form something positive or peculiar of its own." ^ * In two long footnotes, Zeller elaborately and effectively defends his position that, according to Aristotle, ''only the matter is the ground of i 154 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY § 77. Lastly, in Aristotle^s conception of the I as the real human individual, Zeller recognizes the incoherency of a fundamental dualism : - Discerning in the living being as a whole a gradual develop, ment to ever higher life, Aristotle considers the psychical life of man, likewise, from the same point of view. The individual man mdeed, unites in himself all kinds of animation. To the nutritive soul there is added in him the sensitive and motile soul, and to these two the rational soul. His representative faculty advances from sensation to imagination and memory, then to reflection, and. m the highest grade, to pure rational intuition, while his active faculty advances from sensuous desire to rational will; he is capa- ble not merely of perception and experience, but also of art and science ; he raises himself in his ethical activity above desire, as in this he raises himself above the plant-like functions of nutrition and propagation. Thus, then, even Aristotle himself condenses his entire doctrine of the soul into a single proposition : namely, the soul IS in a certain sense all existing things, so far as it unites the sensuous and the intellectual and bears in itself the form of the one as well as of the other. Naturally, this must hold good of the human soul first of all. But, as we observed in the case of Plato the defect that he did not know how to combine his three parts of the soul in an inner unity, - nay, that it scarcely admits of a doubt that he altogether failed to propose this problem to himself with scientific clearness, -so in the case of Aristotle, likewise, the same fact 18 to be regretted. The relation of the sensitive and the nutri- individuality;" that "the form is a r6Se, so far as it exhibits a deter- mmate kind of being, but first becomes the form of a determinate ^ngle thing through combination with a determinate matter, irrespective of which combination it is a universal ; " and that, contrary to Hertling's erroneous conclusion, " the constitutive principle of individual being lies in the mat- ter by which the form is first individualised." (Anm. 6, 340-342 • Anm 1 342-343.) Of. IL ii. 212-213, Anm. 5, where he says: "Defiidtion can be continued until all specific differences are exhausted, and the reXevrala Sca^popd IS reached ; but under this there still always remain the individu- als, which are no longer distinguishable in species and are so far 8fu>.a Yet these always constitute a plurality, indeed an indeterminate plurality' and precisely for this reason can be no object of science and of the concept »* Thus It results that, for Aristotle, not only matter as such, but also the individual as such, is unknowable in itself. ORIGIN OF THE TRADITION 155 tive soul might of itself be enough to raise the question whether the one is developed out of the other, or whether they both origi- nate simultaneously and subsist separately side by side ; and where, in the latter case, the connection between them, the unity of the ani- mal life, is to be sought. Yet this doubt becomes far more pressing with respect to the reason and its relation to the lower powers of the soul. If we consider the beginning or the course or the end of this combination, there is everywhere revealed an unresolved dualism, and nowhere do we obtain a satisfactory answer to the question where the unity-point of the personal life, the power which holds together and controls all parts of the soul, is properly to be sought." ^ "For Aristotle, the human being [considered ethically] falls asunder in two parts, between which no living bond can be dis- covered. Similar difficulties would present themselves with relation to self-consciousness, if Aristotle had expressed himself on that subject with greater detail. But the very fact that he did not do this, — that he nowhere raises the question how we come to cling to the I as a permanency in the changing states and activities of life, — shows best of all how imperfectly conscious he is of the problem to explain the unity of the personal life.'* In a footnote: "He did not investigate how the identity of self-consciousness is to be explained in the different activities which, indeed, he assigns to different parts of the soul.'* ^ " As little as his metaphysics gave us a clear and non-contradic- tory explanation of individuality, just as little does his psychology give us such an explanation of personality. As there it remained undecided whether the ground of individuality lies in the form or the matter, so here it remains in the dark whether personality lies in the higher or in the lower powers of the soul, in the immortal or the mortal part of our nature. The correct conclusion is simply that, on either of the two assumptions, difficulties lie in the way which the philosopher did nothing to remove, and which, therefore, he undoubtedly overlooked. Reason as such, the pure spirit, it appears, cannot be the seat of personality, for it is the eternal, universal, and unchangeable in man ; it is untouched by the vicis- situdes of the life in time, by birth and death ; it lives unalterably in itself, without receiving external impressions or transcending itself in its activity. On the contrary, all manifoldness, and all * Die Philosophic der Griechen, H. ii. 592, 593. 2 Ihid. H. ii. 600-602. 156 TUE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY motion, all interaction between the world and man, all change and development, in one word, all the vitality and deterniinateness of personal existence, fall to the side of the sensibility. And yet the personality of a rational being and its free self-determination cannot lie in its sensuous nature. Where it lies, however, we ask in vain. As reason enters the sensuous soul from without and again separates itself from it in death, inner unity is wanting to the two even during life ; and what the philosopher says about the passive reason and the will is, in his uncertain treatment, unsuited to effect a scientific accommodation among the heterogeneous ele- ments of the human being.** ^ ** Nothing in the Platonic system offends him so much as that dualism of the Idea and the Phaenomenon which took so crude a form in the doctrine of the self-existence of the Ideas and in the reduction of Matter to the concept of Not-Being. His complete transformation of the Platonic metaphysics and the peculiar ground-concepts of his own sprang out of opposition to this dualism. But the more earnestly and profoundly he struggles to overcome it, the less does he in truth succeed. He denies that the generic universal is, as Plato had taught, a substantial ex- istence ; yet he maintains, in agreement with him, thrj, cTSos, ovaiv€Tai ydp t6 ffvp.^^yjKb^ iyyOs n toO firj 6yTos. , , . 6 ydp Av tJ /iijr dtl fii^d* uis iirl t6 iroXi/, tovt6 afi€v AWui rov avpL^e^y^KbTOt , , , Uri S* ivi- ar-iiixtf oifK Han rov avfji^c^TfK&TO^ av€pbv. iTriar-jfifirf fxh ydp irdffa ij rov del 1j Tov a»$ iirl rb toXjJ. \ 2 Metaph. V. 2, 1027 a, 13 : dxTre ^ CXi; ^(Ttcu atria , , . rod avfipcpri- K&roi. ORIGIN OF THE TRADITION I59 justly and indeed necessarily concludes, the matter alone can be recognized as the ground of the thing's individu- ality _ the ground, that is, of its individual difference from all other individuals of its own species. Apart, then, from its immanent universal form, by which alone it can be understood or known or thought, the Aris- totehan ro'Sc t., or real individual thing in itself, fades out into a colorless unreality, a mere arithmetical unit devoid of all individual content (ri ip^d^ui cV), a mere specimen of a species, differing from other specimens of the same species in nothing but matter or number, in the sense that the par- ticular matter in it is not, numerically considered, one and the same matter as that in any other specimen. In fact, the Aristotelian conception of species has no conceivable ground whatever of any plurality of specimens ; the ad- mission of plurality into it has no basis but mere percep- ana me apiff^ ev is a mere reluctant concession to common- sense Since, moreover, matter in itself is unknowable,' the individuality or individual difference which is grounded on matter alone cannot but be equally unknowable. The reason, therefore, why Aristotle was compelled to ignore It as an element of intelligible reality, becomes perfectly obvious. In this suppression of the individual difference, however part and parcel though it is of the real essence of the indi' vidual thing in itself, lies the failure of all ancient philos- ophy as Begriffsphilosophie from Aristotle to Hegel inclusive And m the discovery of it, as the « advantageous variation,'' lies the unconscious philosophical revolution which was the beginning of a really modern philosophy in the Darwin- Wallace principle of natural selection (§ 86). II. From this suppression of the individual difference, It was simply a necessary consequence that there could be no individual form of the individual thing {haecceitas, So- A on^'**J?' ^'- ^^' ^°^^*' ® •" "' ^' ^'^ ^^''^^''^^ '^««' ^^^-' Phys. III. 6, 207 a, 26 : eWos ydp oCk fx^i ij CXrj, 160 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY cratitas). The rational necessity of this consequence, as Zeller points out, is fully recognized in the Aristotelian system, which has "no room for individual forms of sen- suous things," "no place at all for such individual forms." The ToSc Tt is a mere receptacle or bearer of the specific form, which is a pure universal ; it is a mere arithmetical unit of matter ; it has no knowable individual nature ; it is a continent of the universal with no content of its own. III. From the fact that the individual thing in itself has neither individual difference nor individual essence or form, it follows of necessity that there can be no individual con- cept of it, that is, no thought of it as an individual essence (oiKctos Xoyo5, notlo individualis). Every concept of a thing must be that of the universal essence or form of the species to which the thing belongs ; it must be applicable to all specimens of that species indifferently ; it cannot be appli- cable to one specimen alone, as different from the rest. This consequence, likewise, Zeller has explicitly recognized as necessary, when he says above that, according to Aris- totle, "no concept can be framed of sensuous things as such." IV. Further, from the facts that the individual thing in itself has no intelligible individual difference, and therefore no individual form, and therefore no individual concept, it follows, of course, that there can be no definition of it; for the definition is simply expression of the concept.^ This consequence, also, is explicitly drawn by Zeller, when he says that " there can be no definition of this sensuous object itself, but only of its determinate mode of existence — only of the universal form of the object." V. How, then, is Aristotle's toSc rt, the individual thing in itself, to be known at all ? The only possible answer to this query is that, according to Aristotle himself, the individual thing, (pm individual, is completely unknowable.* 1 Metaph. VI. 15, 1039 b, 28 : tw*/ ovaiuv tQu aladrrruv rvv Ka0' ^Kaara oifd' optfffxbi ovT* cLTdSei^lt icmv. 2 M«'tai)li. II. 4, 999 a, 26 : efre yhp fi^ iffn rt Tcapii rd Kaff Uoffra, tA ^ ORIGIN OF THE TRADITION 161 Im^I ^'"'~^' .^^" ^"^^^^ P--i-^; and per- ception (a..V^.) .s not scientific, that is, conceptual knowl- edge {^-^^Trr^MV All actual perception is of particulars but an knowledge is of universals j ^ and the two I ^ wj mentally unlike in kind, because, as we have seen paSu lars are grounded in the matter alone, while u^i^^^^^^^^^^^ alone. True, Aristotle holds that knowledge cannot be evolved except out of perception, which, moreover, Ipos sessed in some degree by every living being- out of perception arises memory, out of many' memories arises unitary experience, and out of experience arises the knowl edge of universals.^ But the original perception of plr ticulars and the evolved knowledge o? unfversals ha" nothing m common; they remain at last disparate, hetero geneous separated by the whole difference of maUer Ind form Perception altogether ceases to be perception, when It becomes knowledge, because there can be noth n. in common between the ^cnknowaMe matter, which is the ground of all perception of particulars, and the knou^ahl! fTm, 2 De Anima, II. 5, 417 b, 22 : atnop 5' Sn rCv Kad* Uaamu 4, *j, X' . -'I'll*, li. j.», If jf D, 6b'. fyet yko [irdura rn ^A«l * IhU. 100 a, 3: ^k ^Uv o^ alaO^aeo^s yl.erac f^^^rj, When Aristotle says, De Anima, III. 8, 432 a, 5: ip ro?s eldeffi rots ahSyfTOiSTd. porjrd itrri, it is evident that lie uses the word eZSos here, not m Its philosophical, but merely in its popular meaning as the form which is physically visible and perceived in the object of sense. For, having just said that "perception is the form of things perceived " (77 aUd-qat^ eWos alfferrrGiv), it naturally follows that the "form of things perceived" is ''perceived forms " — that is, elSos in its popular meaning. It would be nonsense for Aristotle to say, iv rotj vottto'i^ roh alaerjroh to. vo-qTo. eart. / 164 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPUY ORIGIN OF THE TRADITION 1G5 unity or personal identity at all, whether human or divine. All that is clear is that the empirical I and the rational I, the 6 Tis avOpomoi: and the voOs, are left divided by the chasm of an " unresolved dualism," grounded in that of matter and form ; and that, until this dualism is resolved, no scien- tific theory of the real I is at all possible. The absence of such a theory in Aristotle's system, therefore, is the nec- essary consequence of the Aristotelian Paradox. § 79. This " unresolved dualism " in Aristotle, however, was itself a necessary consequence, a legitimate inheritance of the past. It was simply the best answer he could give to the problem with which Greek philosophy wrestled from its birth : namely, the problem how to discover the One in the Many, the eternal unity in the eternal diversity of the world. Crude attempts to find the principle of the One in the Many — as water (Thales), as undifferentiated and in- definite matter (Anaximander), as air (Anaximenes), as number or harmony (the Pythagoreans), as fire or eternal flux of all things (Herakleitos), as love and hate among the four elements of earth, water, air, and fire (Empedokles), as mind unmixed with matter (Anaxagoras) — led naturally, on the one hand, to denial of the Many by the Eleatics (Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno), and, on the other hand, to denial of the One by the Atomists (Leukippos, Demok- ritos), or else to despair of all objective knowledge of either the One or the Many in the Sophists (Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodikos). Out of this despair Sokrates found an escape, through the dialectical and inductive formation of concepts' in the acquisition of knowledge of objectively valid uni- versals — in the conceptual grasp and definition of univer- sals as objective realities in the world.* But in this way 1 Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. i. 107: *' Diese Nothigung aber lag fiir Sokrates in dem Grundsatz, welchen die zuverlassigsten Benchte mit grosser Einstimmigkeit als die Seele seines Philosophirens hervorheben, dass jedes wahre Wissen von richtigen Begriffen auszugehen habe, dass nichts erkannt werden konne, wenn es nicht auf seinen allge- memen Begriff zuruckgefuhrt und aus ihm heraus beurtheilt werde." — the original dualism of the One and the Many was simply transferred from the sphere of being to the sphere of thought, and soon developed into the correlative dualism of sense and intellect, as conversant respectively with a world of sensibles (koV/xos aWBriroi) and a world of intelli- gibles (kcmt/xos vorp-os). Sense alone perceives the individuals, or the Many ; intellect alone knows the universal, or the One; each acts in complete independence of the other. This epistemological dualism of the Sokratic concept-phi- losophy is the absolute separation of experience and reason ; and in it, as a germinal principle, lies implicitly the whole history of philosophy down to the very end of the nine- teenth century. Out of it sprang immediately the polar opposition of Sokrates's two pupils, Antisthenes and Plato.* Antisthenes, on the one hand, though accepting the posi- tion of Sokrates that the conceptual essence of things must be determined and defined before anything can be predi- cated of them, yet nullified it in the main by denying un- qualifiedly all knowledge of objective universals, and by maintaining that no subject can have a predicate which adds another concept to the concept of that subject, — that the individual can be defined by itself alone, — that the only possible definition of a thing is its simple name or the simple enumeration of its elements. This, of course, is the putting of mere description in the place of definition, the suppression of all scientific investigation, the impossi- bility of all scientific knowledge. Antisthenes contended against Plato that nothing is real but the individual as snch, and that universal concepts express, not the essence of iMd. 114: "So wird sich der Streit iiber Subjektivitat oder Objektivitat der sokratischen Lehre dahin entscheiden lassen, dass dieselbe zwar im Vergleich mit der fiiiheren Philosophie eine entschiedene Vertiefung des Subjekts in sich zeigt, dass sie aber nichtsdestoweniger keinen rein subjektiven Charakter hat," u. s. f. 1 Wahrend daher ein Plato aus der sokratischen Forderung des begrif- flichen Wissens ein System des entschiedensten Realismus ableitete, leitet Antisthenes einen ebenso entschiedenen Nominalismus daraus ab. " (Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, II. i. 295.) \ 166 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY \ ORIGIN OF THE TRADITION 167 things as they are, but only men's thoughts about them : in other words, that the Many can be perceived, but the One cannot be known. This was at once a reaffirmation of the Sokratic dualism and a reaction against its pure universal in behalf of the pure individual.* * But Plato, on the other hand, accepting equally without reservation Sokrates^s epistemological dualism (knowledge of the universal by concepts alone and perception of the individual by the senses alone), proceeded to develop it into the metaphysical or ontological dualism of substance and semblance, noumenon and phaenomenon, archetype and ectype, the One and the Many once more, — that is, the Idea, or universal kind, and the Appearance, or individual thing.'^ This development was simply a logical necessity inherent in the premises. For, if knowledge by concepts and perception by the senses have nothing in common, then the universal objects of knowledge and the individual ob- jects of perception can have nothing in common ; the only possible ground of knowing the difference between knowl- edge and perception, as acts or processes, lies in knowing 1 Artist. Metaph. IV. 29, 1024 b, 32: 'AvTKrBivrjs i^ro evridufs fXTfO^M d^iuv \t)f€y *' (5 HXdrwv *' ir} " twirov p.^u opQ, ivird' rrrra 8^ oix opQ." koI 3s elirfi; " #x«s M^" opa, TO dpiOfiio €v), Thus the Aristotelian individual "thing in itself," the toSc ti, notwithstanding the Aristo- telian principle (derived from Antisthenes) that the to8c tl is the only real substance, was a mere arithmetical unit, a mere continent of the universal with no content of its own ; the alleged conjunction in it of matter and form gave it no 172 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 173 more and no other reality than that of the form alone, and no addition to its reality could possibly proceed from the matter as such. For, precisely so far as Aristotle adhered to his own explicit determination of matter as pure "po- tentiality," matter itself was necessarily unreal; and so, one would think, must be the individual difference, the "accidents" of which it was composed, and the individual thing itself, when its individuality had no ground except in matter alone. This was coming dangerously near to that Platonic doctrine of matter as not-being (to firj ov), and of sensuous perception of material things as in effect illusion, which Aristotle tried to oppose. Against this determination of the individual, however, may be urged the gravest objections, which point to quite another principle than the Aristotelian Paradox. § 81. The "accidents" are thrown out of philosophy by Aristotle, as perceptible but scientifically unknowable, be- cause he identifies them with the non-universal and the non-essential. He finds them neither in every specimen of the species (Kara iravro^) nor in the species which is imma- nent in every specimen (^a^ airo), and therefore not at all in the universal (to KaOoXov), which to him is the only object of scientific, conceptual, or necessary knowledge.* But this is a very narrow, fragmentary, and one-sided view of the subject. The "accidents" stand necessarily in a twofold relation, (1) to the specimen as an individual, and (2) to the species as its universal. This Aristotle overlooked. To the specimen itself, on the one hand, the " accidents " are by no means unessential. On the contrary, they are absolutely essential to it; for, if the specimen has any reality at all (and Aristotle everywhere insists, with Antis- thenes, that the individual is the only real substance), then this reality must be its total essence or true being, not only 1 " In der Vereinigung aber des icard travrSi und des KaS' axnb beraht es, dass das KaSbXov das Nothwendige ist." (Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, I. 122.) I I' I in Space, but also in Time.* This total reality must in- clude, not only the permanent common essence which each specimen shares with all the other specimens, but also the " accidents," the transient and successive changes which it undergoes in relation to other things in general. The permanence of the one and the transience of the other are conditioned, of course, by the objective reality of Time, without which nothing could be knowable. In the order, succession, and connection of these changes, in the perpet- ual action and reaction of the individual as a complex of energies, or thing among things, lies its whole realization in Time as an evolution-series. Nothing short of this evo- lution-series as a whole, as a unitary system of changes in Time as well as in Space, can constitute or exhibit the com- plete reality of the thing. Aristotle himself presupposes all this in his own principle of the "entelechy" as the self-evolution of the real in the potential, the form in the matter, the species in the specimen ; for all the successive G volution-phases in the self-realization of the universal ^KaOoXov) in the individual (toSc ti), since they successively appear and disappear, are in truth mere "accidents" in the universal itself, conceived as an evolving individual specimen. Hence Aristotle can defend his thesis of the intelligibility of the universal itself, as a self-evolving reality, in no way whatever except by the principle that the scientific knowledge of evolution of the universal in the individual involves scientific knowledge of its evolu- tion-phases as " accidents," and that these " accidents " are essential to whatsoever evolves. But it follows necessarily from this Aristotelian principle that the ''accidents'' are absolutely essential to the specimen. If Aristotle had only * It is needless to say that the Kantian theory of the pure subjectivity or ideality of Space and Time was as foreign to Aristotle as it is to modern science, and that it is here ignored as contrary to reason and experience alike. For some of the reasons of this rejection, it may be permissible to refer to the author's article on " The Philosophy of Space and Time," in the North American Review for July, 1864. Other reasons will be presented hereafter. 174 \ THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 175 completed his half-protest against Plato, he would have been the first to recognize this necessary truth, and to ad- mit that there can be nothing really unessential, nothing really " accidental " or fortuitous, in a universe of law. He almost seems to recognize it when he says that the acci- dents exist "of necessity" (cf. above, § 78, 1). By his failure to recognize it, however, he lost control of his own movement to reform the Platonic philosophy, as Phaethon lost control of the reins by which he was guiding the horses of Helios, and the result was an irremediable defeat of philosophy. Hegel, who might perhaps be considered the last great Aristotelian, made no advance on his master in this respect, and continued to defend the " absolutely acci- dental side " of the object of experience as such.* It was not until the coming of Darwin that the "accident," as " advantageous variation," was found to be essential both to specimen and to species. On the other hand, the " accidents " will be considered as essential or non-essential to* the species, precisely in accord- ance with the manner in which the species itself is con- ceived. If the species is taken abstractly as merely the common real essence of all the specimens, then the innu- merable " accidents " of the innumerable specimens will be indeed, just as Aristotle held, non-universal and non-essen- tial to the species ; and the species itself will remain per- manent and immutable, unaffected by all the " accidents " of all its specimens. But, if the species is taken concretely as the totality of all the real specimens in all their real interactions and interconnections, as related to things in general, then the essence of the species will include every- thing that is included in the essences of all the specimens ; the " accidents " essential to the specimens as units will be ipso facto just as essential to the species as their universal; and the way will then lie open to explain the facts of phy- * " Der Gegenstand hat nunmehr die Bcstiramnng, (1) eine schlechthin acciden telle Seite, aber (2) auch eine Wesentlichkeit und ein Bleibendes zuhaben." (Werke, XVIII. 83.) logeny as well as of ontogeny, the evolution of the ever- changing species as well as that of the ever-changing specimens. Precisely here lies the difference of the old science of mere registration and classification and the new science of genesis and of origins. The Darwinian revolution in sci- ence was an unconscious revolution in philosophy, a purely practical abandonment of the Aristotelian Paradox, with its abstract and immutable species, for the scientific theory of universals, with its concrete and mutable species. The passage from one to the other was effected by recognizing the truth which Aristotle failed to discover : namely, that the hidividnal difference is esseiitial to the ivhole individual, and the whole individual is essential to the whole species. The individual difference thus becomes the master-key to the evolution of living forms, when it is once grasped as the " advantageous variation " of the individual specimen or specimens. For the specimen stands to its own " acci- dents " as tlieir knowable universal or real whole, failin^^ which condition, it could not stand as a knowable unit to its own species ; yet solely out of the " advantageous varia- tion" of its individual specimens can the variation and evolution of the species be explained by the law of " natural selection." Nothing but this double-constitution as a unit- universal makes the individual as such an object of knowl- edge, and its knowableness depends just as much on that of its individualizing difference as on that of its universalizing common essence. For solely as a unit can it be perceived ; solely as a universal can it be conceived ; and solely as a unit-universal, as an object at once to sensibility and to understanding, can it be even incompletely known. Thus the identity in difference of experience and reason in all human knowledge is made luminously manifest in the nec- essary constitution of its ultimate molecule, the percept- concept: namely, knowledge of the individual as such througli knowledge at once of its universal specific essence and its individual reific difference. For it is these two 176 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 177 interpenetrating elements of one reality which alone make the individual a particular thing of a particular kmd, and thereby an object of possible knowledge as " something J^ § 82. The individual difference, then, is real, because it is absolutely essential to the reality, the existence, the actual evolution of the individual as such in Space and Time. Moreover, it is not only real, but also necessarily knowable, because the universal itself would be unknow- able, if we could not know the individuals of which it must be either (1) the immanent and abstractible common essence (Aristotelian Paradox) or else (2) the concrete whole sub- stance (scientific theory of universals) ; while the unknow- ableness both of universals and of individuals would be the non-existence, nay, the utter impossibility, of all human knowledge. We shall see later, however, that the Axiom of Philosophy, " human knowledge exists," is both an actual and a necessary truth, both a fact of experience and a prin- ciple of reason. From these premises it follows, that the particular and perceptible " accidents," of which the indi- vidual difference is simply the totality, must be at least partly knowable, because they stand to the known individ- ual difference in the knowable relation of parts to their whole. But how can they be knowable in themselves? To answer this question, we must recall Aristotle's at- tempt to explain how knowledge is evolved out of percep- tion, as stated by Zeller above (§ 78, IV). It becomes necessary to controvert the proposition that "what the senses perceive is not the individual substance as such, but always only certain properties of it," or, in Aristotle's tech- nical expression, that " perception is of the Such, and not of the This." ^ On the contrary, perception is always of the This, and never of the Such — always of the unit, and never of the universal; the unit must be perceived, and 1 Anal. Post. I. 31, 87 b. 28 : el y^p Kal ianv ij atae-qai^ tov roioOSe Kal fiTj Tovbi Ttvos, dW aiffOdveffOal ye avayKoiov t65€ ri koI irov Kal vvv. Ibid. II. 19, 100 a, 17 : koI yap aiaQdviToi pjtv rb kuO' Uaarov^ i) 5' atadrfins roO Ka06\ov iffriv. 1:11 the universal must be conceived, while at the same time the unit cannot be perceived unless the universal is con- ceived, nor the universal conceived unless the unit is per- ceived; both perception and conception enter inseparably into every cognition or act of knowledge. This is only to say that there can be no knowledge unless " something " is known: that is, some particular thing of some particular kind, or some particular kind of particular things. It is only to say that the two acts of perception and of concep- tion — perception of the This and conception of the Such — condition each other absolutely in every possible cog- nition.^ It is only to say that an absolutely unrelated term cannot be perceived, that an absolutely undetermined rela- tion cannot be understood, and that terms and their relations must be known together or not at all. It is only to say that sense and intellect, sensibility and understanding, ex- I)erience and reason, are ultimate categories in the theory of knowledge, for the reason that things and relations, or units and universals, are ultimate categories in the theory of being. 1 Fichte follows Kant in acknowledging this truth: "Eine blosse Anschauung giebt kein Bewusstseyn ; man weiss nur von demjeuigen, was man begreift und denkt." (Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschafts- lehre, Werke, I. 491.) But the converse is just as true, that a mere con- cept gives no consciousness; it is only the indissoluble union of concept and percept that constitutes a cognition as such. But this principle is refutation of the assumed possibility of ''pure thought." This, too, Fichte sees : " Wir ktiunen niis nichts absolut erdenken, oder durch Denken erschaffen ; nur das unmittelbar Angeschaute konnen wir denken ; ein Denken, dem keine Anschauung zu Grunde liegt, das kein in dem- selben ungetheilten Momente vorhandenes Anschauen befasst, ist ein leeres Denken; hochstens mag es das Denken eines blossen Zeiehens des Begriffs und, wenn dieses Zeichen, wie zu erwarten, ein Wort ist, ein gedankenloses Aussprechen dieses Worts seyn. Ich bestimme mir durch das Denken eines Entgegengesetzten meine Anschauung ; dies und nichts Anderes bedcutet der Ausdruck: ich begreife die Anschauung." {Ibid, 492. ) Fichte, however, refers both percept and concept to the pure pro- ductivity or spontaneity of the I itself, that is, to the pure activity of the I, as subject, with no object except of its own making. This is his tran- scendental idealism. But his theory of cognition, nevertheless, agrees with the above, making allowance for this difference. VOL. I — 12 178 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 179 For example, if I perceive a straight stick, Aristotle would hold that I perceive straightness in the stick as in itself only a Such, that is, only as a universal property com- mon to many things, present or absent ; but that I perceive the stick as in itself a This, that is, as an individual thing or single substance here and now. On tlie contrary, what I perceive in fact is not straightness in general, but this straightness in particular — not a universal property as such, but only this particular case of a universal property in a particular thing; while at the same time I cannot per- ceive this particular straightness at all, unless I compre- hend the Such of which it, too, is a This. Every case of straightness in particular is related to straightness in general (as a " universal of property ") precisely as a single stick is related to stick in general (as a " universal of genus "). Each is a unit within its own universal, no matter whether the universal be a kind of things or a kind of property in things ; the universal property is the self-related totality of all its units or cases, just as the universal genus is the self- related totality of all its units or things. What experience perceives is the unit as unit ; what reason comprehends is the universal as universal ; and the truth is, not that reason or comprehension is " developed " out of experience or percep- tion, but that experience and reason, perception and compre- hension, are the two inseparable factors of all knowledge as such. In other words, both experience and reason are just as necessary to the act of knowing as the two blades of a pair of scissors are necessary to the act of cutting. The straight- ness of the stick, then, is simply a unitary instance of a universal property, just as the stick itself is a unitary instance of a universal genus ; in either case, perception is of the unit, comprehension is of the universal, and knowl- edge, or identity in difference of experience and reason, is of the unit-universal, the doubly-constituted object of knowledge, the identity in difference of the This and the Such. Hence the straightness of the stick, as one of its "accidents," is just as real and just as knowable as the stick itself ; and so is the totality of all its " accidents," the individual difference as such. For every "accident," however exceptional or transient, is a single case of some universal property, quality, activity, relation, state, or change, and, when both perceived and comprehended, is thereby known. ^ But where, then, lies that absolute unif/U(mess of the individual without which it fails to be completely individualized ? § 83. If Aristotle had only carried out and completed his half-protest against Plato (see §§ 79, 98), — if he had overcome the Platonic " separation " of Idea and Appear- ance, Noumenon and Phaenomenon, in the only possible way, namely, by boldly identifying the whole reality of the universal with the whole reality of all its individ- uals, one in many and many in one, as is done by the Darwinians, — he would have found no more difficulty in conceiving a unique individual than he found in conceiv- ing a unique species. For it cannot be too clearly under- stood, or too emphatically said, or too often reiterated, that to Aristotle himself, everi/ species as suck is absolutely unique. He assumes without question, as a mere matter of course, that every species is completely individualized as a species: that is, absolutely distinguished from each and every other species by developing out of the common generic essence, as its matter, its own specific difference, as its form. He thus conceives each specific form as an abso- lutely unique combination of genus and specific difference ; * Aristotle's own example of the "accident" is the "sitting" which may or may not inhere in one and the same person : oXov ri> Kadijadai ecies means no longer the abstract universal which inheres in each individual, but the con- crete universal in which each individual inheres. It no longer means the abstract common essence, fixed and immutable, of many individuals, but the mutable concrete totality of all the individuals as a higher individual. The essence of the species itself is evolved, that is, gradually changed by incorporating in itself new sjiecific characters which originate in the non- inherited advantageous variations of one or a few specimens, and spread by heredity through the whole species. In the seventh chapter of his *' Dar- winian Theory," Romanes well states this as follows: ** If in any genera- tion some new and beneficial qualities happen to arise as slight variations from the ancestral type, they will (other things permitting) be seized ujion by natural selection, and, being transmitted by heredity to subsequent generations, will be added to the previously existing typo." Manifestly, such "slight variations" could not be taken account of, if. they were unknowable "accidents." Recognition of the individual difference as not only knowable, but also indispensable to the science of philogeny, is the great theoretical advance which was made, however unconsciously, by Darwin beyond Aristotle ; for it is the necessary presupposition of natural selection as a scientific theory. In Huxley's Collected Essays (Darwin- iana, pp. 26-28, 33, 49-50, 74, etc.), the same conception of species as a " group " of real individuals, and not as an inherent universal, is expressed with perfect clearness. suspected. This deeper conflict has been between the Graeco- German concept-philosophy, founded on the Aristotelian Paradox, and modern science itself, founded on the scien- tific theory of universals which lay gorminant in Lamarck- ism and Darwinism : the former denies, the latter affirms, knowledge of the indhudual difference. As so often happens,' the new truth worked itself into practice long before it came to consciousness in theory. Revolting instinctively against the Aristotelianism of the old science, as exhibited in Cuvier's tenet of the immutability of species, Darwin completely metamorphosed the concept of species from that of the abstract specific nature, immanent and unchangeable in every specimen, into that of the concrete totality of all the specimens themselves as one constantly changing and evolving organic whole. But this was to discover the im- measurable scientific value of the individual difference and the individual form, not at all as a " merely subjective con- cept" (conceptualistic nominalism), but as an objective reality in Nature and the fountain-head of her inexliaustible variety (scientific realism). This is a philosophical as well as a scientific revolution. For it establishes the momentous truth that the domain of the existent and the domain of the knowable are co-terminous; whence it follows as a necessary corollary, not only that reason cannot transcend experience, but also (what is just as true) that experience cannot tran- scend reason. In other words, all human knowledge is con- ditioned on the identity in difference of experience and reason : knowledge of units and knowledge of universals are unconditionally and inseparably one knowledge of the unit- universal, the individual form, the immanent relational con- stitution of the " thing in itself." § 87. The two alternative foundations have now been clearly indicated. Two irreconcilable doctrines of the con- cept result from the Aristotelian Paradox and the scientific theory of universals. § ^S. From a forced and artificial combination of two inherited principles, (1) the Platonic principle that the ( 192 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY pure universal (cTSo?, JSea) is the only real substance and the only object of real or scientific knowledge, and (2) the Antisthenian principle that the pure individual is the only real substance and the only object of such knowledge as is possible (in Aristotelian phrase, such alaOrjaL^ as is not hrLaTrifxrjy but yv^t? rt?), Aristotle derived his own compro- mise-principle that the pure universal (to ti tjv ctmt, to cTSo? TO €v6v) is immanent in the mixed individual, or compound of reality and potentiality as form and matter (toSc ti, to cV rovrmv)y and that this pure universal is both the only real substance and the only object of real or scientific knowl- edge in the individual itself. This compromise determined his concept of the concept: namely, the concept is the thinking which signifies the pure, matterless, or universal essence of the individual (6 \6yos 6 to rlyjv cimt o^/xati/wv). To Aristotle, the pure universal of thought is adequate scientific knowledge of the pure universal of being ; it is pure and perfect knowledge of the whole reality of the individual; there is no individual form in being and no individual concept in thought. That is, the concept of the pure universal is itself the pure and perfect concept. This doctrine of **pure thinking'* as the pure and perfect concept, or pure reason absolutely independent of all ex- perience, is the prime tenet of the concept-philosophy in all ages, from Aristotle's realism to HegePs idealism (the Begriff des Begriffes as absolutes Wissen)-, and it is the necessary consequence of the attempt to effect the episte- mological separation of reason and experience. Neverthe- less, the pure concept as knowledge of the pure universal is logically impossible, because knowledge of the universal without knowledge of the units of which it is the universal is itself a mere contradiction in terms. There cannot pos- sibly be any such thing as "pure knowledge a priorV* 1 '*Der Gcgcnstand des Begriffs ist mithin die Substanz, und zwar genauer die bestimmte Substanz oder das eigenthiimliche Wesen der Dinge, und der Begriff selbst ist nichts anderes, als dor Gedanke dieses We^ns." (Zeller, Die Philosophic der Griechen, II. 2, 207-209.) THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 193 Hence the concept-philosophy has always been driven to introduce into its professedly pure concepts, albeit surrep- titiously and by minute degrees, as in HegePs dialectic development of the categories, that very empirical element which it pretends to exclude in the gross. This incon- sistency, of course, was unavoidable, since without it the concept-philosophy would present nothing whatever to con- ceive. But complete logical failure of the concept-philos- ophy might have been predicted at the start from Aristotle's fundamental error: namely, repudiation of the individual difference, the individual form, the individual concept, and the individual definition. § 89. From the ground-principle of the scientific theory of universal, that the whole individual inheres in the whole universal, but that the whole universal does not inhere in the whole individual, — in other words, that the individual difference is essential to the whole reality of the individual, and that the whole reality of all its individuals is essential to the whole reality of the universal, — it fol- lows that the individual form is the inseparable co-existence of generic essence, specific essence, and reific essence in one real, knowable, and unique unit-universal in Space and Time (§ 86) ; and that the individual concept is the thought which thinks this immanent relational constitution of the "thing in itself." The necessity of individual concepts, that is, percept-concepts as the sole form of actual cogni- tion, is involved in the very nature of existence and of knowledge. "To exist" means "to be something " — that is, to be a thing of some kind, a particular single thing of some universal kind. It means to stand out (exsistere) as the actual concrete union of genus + specific difference -f- indi- vidual difference, in distinction (1) from nothingness, that is, from no-thing-ness, and (2) from other-thing-ness, that is, from all other things, whether of its own or of any other kind. This constitution as a real and unique unit-universal or "thing in itself" is the essential form of all actual VOL. I. — 1.{ 194 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY being, the one absolute, necessary, and universal condition of existence itself. Moreover, this absolute condition or prius of all existence or actuality, this Apriori of Being as distinguished from the Apriori of Thought (§ 99), is no less the one absolute, necessary, and universal condition of all knowledge. For real knowledge must be knowledge of something by some- thing, that is, knowledge of the object by the subject ; and existence of the object and the subject, as terms, conditions the existence of knowledge itself, as a real relation between those terms. To deny or doubt the necessity of this Apri- ori of Being, as itself the condition of the Apriori of Thought, would be simply to beg the question ; for denial or doubt is necessarily denial or doubt of something by something, that is, denial or doubt of the object by the subject, and existence of the object and the subject, as terms, conditions the existence of the denial or doubt itself, as a real relation between those terms. There is no way to evade the necessity of this Apriori of Being as condition of the Apriori of Thought. It is the absolute law that whatever "exists" must "be something;" it underlies all existence and all knowledge, and simply constitutes their possibility. § 90. Further, the ontological necessity of the constitu- tion of the "thing in itself" as a real and unique unit- universal of generic -f specific -f reific essence conditions all possibility of the concept itself as actual knowledge. Even if we grant the most extravagant claim of idealism, that the subject absolutely "produces" (erzeugt) the object, it remains true, nevertheless, that both the subject and the object themselves must conform to the ontological prius of all existence, and be each constituted as a unit- universal, a "something," a "thing in itself," or else be non-existent. This ontological prius conditions whatever productivity the subject may be claimed to possess; the producing subject must "be something," and the object produced must "be something," or else there THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 195 can be no production whatsoever. In short, whatever "exists," either subjectively or objectively, must "be something," and "to be something" is to be only one speci- men of only one species of only one yenus^si unit-universal of generic -f specific -f reific essence — a " thing in itself." Whatever exists, therefore, must exist at once in its genus, in its species, and in itself But this its necessary mode of existence cannot but determine a priori any and every possible mode of knowing it, since, of course, nothing can be known to be what it is not. In other words, the indi- vidual form of the "something," or object of knowledge in general (including the subject which knows itself), neces- sarily determines aprio^-i the individual concept of it, just so far as this concept is knowledge of existence or cogni- tion of the real : the constitution of the individual form as a unit-universal necessarily determines the constitution of the individual concept of it to be, likewise, that of a unit- universal. This agreement of the two, this actual deter- mination of the concept by the form of the object, is the truth of the concept — its validity as knowledge. If such determination were impossible or unreal, the concept would not be knowledge of the object, but ignorance of it — pure error. That is, knowledge could not in that case exist at all. But, as proved in Chapter I, the existence of human knowledge is the one Axiom of Philosophy, of which denial and doubt are alike impossible. It follows that the individual concept, in accordance with the necessary con- ditions of its existence as knowledge, must be determined by the individual form of the " thing in itself." § 91. It would avail nothing against this conclusion to plead that we do not know hoiv the "thing in itself" can determine the concept of it. The plea miglit be admitted without shaking the conclusion itself in the least degree. That "how" may or may not remain to be discovered. But, if knowledge exists at all, the constitution of the concept must be determined by the constitution of the object, the conditions of knowledge by the conditions of 196 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY existence, the Apriori of Thought by the Apriori of Being. Otherwise, the knowing subject could " know what is not so" — which is the very acme of absurdity. It is as certain as anything can be that existence of the individual concept as real knowledge of the " something " is absolutely conditioned, not only on the real existence in that " some- thing" of an immanent relational constitution or indi- vidual form, but also on the real determination of the concept by that form. To deny this would be to deny the possibility of knowledge altogether as true thinking of being ^ and resolve it into a meaningless play of irrationality ; while to affirm it is simply to affirm that perception, as distinct from mere sensation, lies at the bottom of all intellectuality or rationality, in the necessary and universal nature of all actual cognition as percept- concept, § 92. For perception and conception enter inseparably into every actual cognition of a " something " — that is, of whatever exists as an object of real knowledge. If, as seems incontrovertible, every " something " is necessarily a " thing in itself," in the sense that it must be internally constituted as a unit-universal or individual form of generic -f specific -f- reific essence, that is, as only one speci- men of only one species of only one genus (and this definition of " something " is purely analytical, transcend- ing in no degree the actual content of the only possible concept of " something " as " a thing of some kind "), then it is manifest that, in order to be known at all, the "some- thing " must be both perceived as a unit and understood as a universal in one indivisible percept-concept. As simply a unique combination, complex, or focus of universal modes of energy (for every individual " accident," no less than every generic and specific character, is in itself universal or common to many), the immanent relational constitution or individual form of the "something" is neither a pure unit nor a pure universal, but necessarily a unit-universal — at once a perceptible unit in its own THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVEUSALS 197 species and an intelligible universal in its own "accidents" or evolution-series. Consequently, the concept of any real or particular " something " is at the same time both individual and universal; it includes both an individual difference and a universal essence; it is not a "pure" concept at all, either of the individual or of the univer- sal, but a concretion or concrete knowledge of both, a reciprocally conditioning union of perception and concep- tion — a percept on the side of the unit, a concept on the side of the universal, a single, unique, and indivisible percept-concept of the iinit-universaL In other words, a concept of the " pure individual " and a concept of the " pure universal " are alike impossible ; the percept-concept of the unit-universal is alone possible, even in the de- siccated form of the abstraction, in which the attention, indeed, is withdrawn to a greater or less extent from the perceptive element, but in which, nevertheless, the percep- tive element still abides as the disregarded foundation of the conceptive element itself. § 93. It must not, however, be imagined for a moment, least of all assumed to be a part of the concept-doctrine which is derivable from the scientific theory of universals, that the individual concept of the individual form — in more scientific phrase, the percept-concept of the unit-uni- versal — is to be considered as perfect knowledge of its object. Quite the contrary is the case, as already shown in § Q6. The percept-concept is no more " perfect " than it is " pure." In no human cognition (and it is only human cognition which is here considered) can perception actually extend to all the units of the species to which a particular "something" belongs. It must extend to several, that is, to an indeterminate number, in order to discern the indi- vidual difference of the particular "something" from other specimens of its species ; but the quantitative limitation of perceptive power in a given human subject forbids its extension to all the specimens of any species. Since, therefore, the whole reality of a species is the whole reality 198 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY of all its specimens, and our perception can never actually extend to them all, it is plain that the percept-concept, founded as it must be on perception, is necessarily pre- vented by this quantitative limitation of perceptive power from ever becoming perfect knowledge of that whole reality. Moreover, this very limitation of perceptive power in- volves a corresponding limitation of conceptive power. While perception grasps the unit in its universal (the specimen as one of its species), conception grasps the universal in all its units (the specimen as the whole of its own " accidents ") ; but the same limitation of percep- tion which prevents its extension to all the specimens of the single species prevents equally its extension to all the " accidents " of the single specimen. Consequently, the scope of the percept-concept is limited in both directions alike ; it fails to perceive all the units of the universal, and for that very reason fails to conceive perfectly the universal in all the units. The whole reality, therefore, of any and every unit-universal, " something," or " thing in itself," extends far beyond the grasp of the human percept-concept, con- tains always more than has yet been discovered, and per- petually challenges further investigation. Herein lie at once the explanation of the shortcomings of science and the possibility of its limitless advance, the ground of human fallibility and the hope of greater human wisdom. The perfect percept-concept is simply the unrealized ideal of science ; as, for instance, the " theory of limits " in mathematics. Nothing, therefore, could be farther from the truth than to suppose that the percept-concept, as the sole and necessary form of human knowledge, can be ac- tually either " pure " or " perfect." Such a claim as this may be freely abandoned to the concept-philosophy which exhibits its pure " concept of the concept " as the realiza- tion and perfection of "absolute knowledge,"* and which 1 "Das absolute Wissen ist der BegriflF, der sich aelbst zum Gegen- Btand und Inhalt hat, somit seine eigene Realitat ist." (Hegel, Werke, THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 199 thus, in the eyes of the more modest philosophy of science, surrenders itself a voluntary victim to the ** conceit of knowledge without the reality." § 94. Lastly, just as the individual difference conditions the individual form and the individual form conditions the individual concept, so the individual concept conditions the individual definition, by which human knowledge is stamped as current coin in the commerce of intellect. Remembering that every single " accident " which goes to make up the individual difference is in itself (1) a universal mode of existence in countless specimens of countless species, yet (2) a unitary case of this universal mode of existence in a particular specimen at a particular place and time, disap- pearing in another unitary case of the same or of some other universal mode of existence which immediately succeeds it, we can easily understand that not only the complex of " accidents " at any one moment, but also the entire suc- cession of such complexes throughout the whole existence of the individual, must enter into the individual difference as a whole ; and that this individual difference as a whole, therefore, is neither more nor less than the total evolution- series of the specimen in its species. Clearly, then, the scientific definition of the individual as such, so far as human knowledge of it extends (and this limitation of the definition results from the quantitative limitation of per- ceptive and conceptive power in every actual human sub- ject), will be neither more nor less than the record of this total evolution-series. In other words, the scientific defini- tion of the individual as such would be the whole story of its existence in Space and Time — its individual biography. Of course, such a scientific definition as this can never be completely realized; it remains a scientific ideal which can only be approximated in and by the growth of human knowledge. But nothing short of a complete realization of it would be " absolute knowledge " of the " something." It Xyill. 144.) This BegHff, as reines Denktn, contains no Anschauimg; it is pure concept, not percept-concept. 200 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY goes without saying, then, that the concept-philosophy, repudiating the individual difference and recognizing only the universal essence, is a mere travesty of absolutes Wissen. For example, taking an illustration from the individual as such in its highest potency, that of the real person op empirical-rational I, it is manifest enough that the life of George Washington was an absolutely unique combination of elements which were yet in themselves universal, as thoughts, feelings, impulses, principles, words, deeds, and so forth. As a human being, his generic essence was " being," and his specific essence " human ; " but his reifio essence was the absolutely unique evolution-series or life, the absolutely unduplicated character and career, which distinguished George Washington from every other human being that ever existed or ever can exist.^ This was his individual difference, and every other man has his own. Kepudiated by the concept-philosophy of "pure thought," which professes to reject every empirical element from its pure, perfect, and universal concept, but recognized by scientific philosophy as essential to the individual form, individual concept, and individual definition, this personal difference of George Washington is necessarily included in the imperfect concrete concept of him which is expressed in 1 " Every great man is a unique. The Scipionism of Scipio is pre- cisely that part he could not borrow. . . . Not possibly will the soul, all rich, all eloquent, with thousand-cloven tongue, deign to repeat itself." So says Ralph Waldo Emerson, in the classic essay on " Self- Reliance." What he says is true, and more than he says is true. Every great man is a great unique, and every little man is a little unique ; nay, every unit of existence is a unique, and absolutely so. It is interesting to note how Emerson, just like Darwin, is here quite unconsciously repudiating the Aristotelian Paradox, and sturdily championing the individvxil difference^ though in another field. The truth is that the advance from the Aristote- lian Paradox to the scientific theory of universals has been a vaguely but increasingly felt necessity of the nineteenth century, and asserts itself not only in science and philosophy, but in literature as such, notably in the new emphasis on fiction and biography in general. What we are here do- ing is but to interpret this demand of the time to itself in a clear intel- lectual consciousness. THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 201 his scientific definition : namely, his personal biography. If his biography is at its best but very imperfect knowledge of him, this fact is exactly what the scientific theory of univer- sals requires that it should be ; for this imperfection is only the necessary consequence of the quantitative limitation of perceptive and conceptive power in his biographers as men (§93). But his biography remains knowledge of him, however imperfect and partial it may be, and knowledge which is both empirical and rational, too. All history, including the history of philosophy itself, must be subject to precisely the same imperfection, and exhibit precisely the same twofold character. For biography and history are but the scientific definition, at once imperfect and con- crete, of the unit-universals with which they deal, and with which they can deal only under the fixed conditions of human knowledge, as determined by the fixed conditions of actual existence. Or, taking an illustration from the opposite pole of individuality, that of the ultimate atom of the material universe, it is plain that, so far as human perception ex- tends, atoms of one and the same chemical element are to-day indistinguishable from each other. Our knowledge of them is at present confined to their universal characters, as mere arithmetical units of one and the same chemical species; as specimens, they are no more to us than Aris- totle's o/xota, d8ta<^opa, to dpcOfx^ ev. That is, the individ- ual difference of a single atom is as yet utterly beyond the range of our perceptive and conceptive power. Neverthe- less, if we could perceive and conceive the interminable suc- cession of states, changes, affections, combinations, actions, and reactions, of whatever sort, through which a single atom must have passed in the evolution of a universe, this unique complex of " accidents " would distinguish it from every other atom, constitute its individual difference, and supply the indispensable basis for a scientific definition of it as the biography of its unduplicated career, its existence- story in Space and Time. The absolute condition of all 202 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 203 actual or possible existence, that whatever ** exists ^^ must " he something " — that is, must be a unit-universal of generic 4- specific -h reific essence — is itself the possibil- ity of a scientific definition of that " something," whenever our combined perceptive and conceptive power, our capacity of combined experience and reason, shall have become suf- ficiently evolved to learn, at least in part, its individual difference. And who is qualified to say that, even in the case of the atom, such an evolution is forever impossible to the human mind ? § 95. Such, then, are the two doctrines of the concept founded on the Aristotelian Paradox and the scientific theory of universals. Aristotle's neglect of the individual difference, individual form, individual concept, and individ- ual definition, logically necessitated his doctrine of the pure concept — that is, perfect and exclusively rational knowledge of real existence as the pure universal in the individual^ ro €t8os to ivov. Correction of Aristotle's funda- mental error by full recognition of the neglected elements logically necessitates the doctrine of the percept-concept — that is, imperfect and concrete (empirical-rational) knowl- edge of real existence as the unit-universal. The former is the doctrine that the pure universal (cTSos) is the sole object of knowledge (cVtcmJ/Ai;), and that "this something" (toSc Tt = ctSos -h v\7J)y so far as it includes more than the pure universal (this more being the various ovfifitprfK^a grounded in vAt/), is unknowable : the latter is the doctrine that the pure universal is itself unknowable, because as such it is non-existent, and that only the concrete or exist- ent "something," the unit-universal which is identity in difference of generic -f specific -|- reific essence, is know- able at all, because whatever " exists " must " be something/* and whatever " is something " must be in itself " an object of possible knowledge" — more tersely still, because exist- ence and knowableness are one and the same immanent relational constitution, non-existence and unknowableness one and the same lack of it. The former doctrine is the self-defeating attempt to separate experience and reason — to eliminate all perception from knowledge, and to produce knowledge, independently of all perception or experience, out of pure conception or reason alone ; while the latter is simply the unavoidable acknowledgment of perception and conception as equally necessary and reciprocally con- ditioning factors of every actual cognition. This result was already involved in the universal principle established in Chapter I ; namely, the identity in difference of expe- rience and reason in all human knowledge, as itself grounded on the identity in difference of existence and knowledge in all personal consciousness of the real I as A Man in Mankind. § 96. But now arises a new and profound question. Why must the origins of human knowledge (so far as mere modes of acquisition can be considered origins) be limited to two, experience and reason, sensibility and understand- ing? Tliorough-going empiricism and thorough-going ra- tionalism have alike sought for centuries to reduce these two origins to one, the former to sensibility alone, the latter to reason alone ; yet neither has succeeded, and the strife still goes on. Nay, all attempts of mere eclecticism to recognize both origins as equally necessary, and to reconcile them in one self-harmonious theory of knowl- edge, have failed no less signally. Why this long record of failure in philosophy as knowledge of knowledge ? For philosophy as knowledge of thought emancipated from all dependence on real being is not philosophy at all, hut a bald begging of the question (§ 86). The explanation of this failure is not far to seek. It lies in a series of historical facts not difficult to understand, if the results arrived at hitherto are correct: (1) Greek philosophy failed to solve scientifically its one great prob- lem of the Many and the One, the Universal and the Unit, but bequeathed to later ages an unscientific solution of it in the Aristotelian Paradox ; (2) mediaeval philosophy failed to solve scientifically the same great problem, as revived 204 THE SYLLOGISTIC rniLOSOPHY and left unsettled in its own long controversy respecting the theory of universals, and simply handed down the same unscientific solution of it, transformed from realism to conceptualism, but essentially unchanged; (3) modern ra- tionalism, as continuator of the Greek concept-philosophy, and modern empiricism, as continuator of the Greek per- cept-philosophy, have equally failed to solve the ancient and mediaeval problem of universals scientifically, because they have both still clung to the Aristotelian Paradox, and uncritically converted into a mere dogma Aristotle^s disre- gard of the individual difference and the individual form of the ToSc Tt or " thing in itself ; " (4) Darwin, solving scientifically the problem of the origin of species, discov- ered in this particular instance the scientific value of the individual difference as the "advantageous variation," thereby unconsciously overthrowing the Aristotelian Para- dox itself, and revolutionizing by necessary implication the whole theory of human knowledge ; while (5) modern philosophy has not yet discovered Darwin's discovery, or made a single serious attempt to understand the profound epistemological significance of tlie Darwinian revolution (§ 8G). These facts, if thoughtfully pondered and di- gested, clearly enough account for the inability of mod- ern philosophy, unliesitatingly avowed by its greatest master, Kant, to explain why the knowing-faculty in gen- eral must exercise itself in two, and only two, fundamental functions : to wit, sensibility and understanding. The dif- ficulty itself is simply a necessary consequence of the Aristotelian Paradox. § 97. But no more convincing proof or verification of the truth of the scientific theory of universals could be desired, perhaps, than is found in the incidental explanation it affords of this supposed mystery. To Kant, sensibility and understanding were two ulti- mate, co-ordinate, heterogeneous, and independent functions of the knowing-faculty in general {Erkenntnissverm6gen\ between which there existed no " known " community of THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 205 origin, no "known" reciprocity of influence, no "known" necessity of co-existence.^ They were two as an inexpli- cable fact — no reason of the twoness was assignable beyond a bare and blind conjecture that the two might " possibly " spring from some "common, but to us unknown, root."^ Here, then, is that unreasoned but unequivocal separation of sensibility and understanding, perception and conception, experience and reason, which the great German inherited from the great Greek in the Aristotelian Paradox, and which he made the bottom principle of the German con- ^ " Mit der erkannten und festgestellten Unterscheidung jener beiden Vermogen beginnt die kritische Philosphie. . . . Demnach theilt sich die Erforschuiig der menschlicben Vernuuft in die Untcrsuchung dor Sinn- lichkeit und die des Verstandes." (K. Fischer, Geschichte der neucrn Philosophic, III. 290.) — "In dieser Forme! erwarte das Problem seine Losung, aber nicht von der kritlschen Philosophic, die unter ihrem Gcsichts- punkte die gemeinschaftliche Wurzel von Verstand und Sinnlichkeit nicht iinden kann, und es iiberhaupt fiir unmoglich erklaren muss, dass die menschliche Vernunft je dieselbo finde." {Ibid. III. 458.) * " Nur so viel scheint zur Einleitung oder Vorerinnerung nothig zu sein, dass es zwei Stamme der menschlicben Erkenntniss gebe, die viel- leicht aus einer gemeinschaftlichen, aber uns unbekannten Wurzel ent- springen, n'amlich Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, durch deren ersteren uns Gegenstande gegebcn, durch den zweiten aber gcdacht werden." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 52, ed. Hart.) — "Unsere Erkenntniss entspringt aus zwei Grundquellen des Gemiiths, deren die erste ist, die Vorstellungen zu empfangen (die Receptivitat der Eindriickc), die zweite das Vermogen, durch jene Vorstellungen einen Gegenstand zu erkennen (Spontaneitat der Begriffe) ; durch die erstere wird uns ein Gegenstand gegeben, durch die zweite wird dieser im Verhaltniss auf dieso Vorstel- lung (als blose Bestimmung des Gemiiths) gcdacht." (Ibid. III. 81.) — *• Wir begniigen uns hier rait der VoUendung unseres Geschiiftes, namlich Icdiglich die ArchUcktonik aller Erkenntniss aus reiner Vernunft zu ent- werfon, und fangen nur von dem Punkte an, wo sich die allgemeinc Wurzel unserer Erkenntnisskraft theilt und zwei Stamme auswirft, deren einer Vcmuvft ist. Ich verstehe hier aber unter Vernunft das gauze obere Erkenntnissvemuigen, und seize also das Rationale dem Empirischen entgegen." (Ibid. III. 550.) The antithesis of sensibility and under- standing is thus expressly identified by Kant with that of experience and reason, which remains an ungrounded separation ; while the whole sifdcm (or form) of human knowledge is spun a priori out of pure reason alone. 206 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 207 cept-philosophy as " pure knowledge a priori " and " pure thought." Yet this underlying and all -supporting and all- comprehending principle of German idealism is not only confessedly groundless in reason, but also demonstrably false in fact. For Kant's "common, but to us unknown, root," from which sensibility and understanding diverge as the two con- stitutive functions of all human knowledge, is discovered through the scientific theory of universals to be those aborigi- nal particular conditions of the " existence of human knowl- edge" (Axiom of Philosophy) which are ultimately determined, in the now familiar phrase of modern science, by the "conditions of existence" in general. That is, if knowledge exists, it must exist as the percept-concept alone. In more technical language, Kant's " common but unknown root " is that Apriori of Being which necessarily deter- mines the Apriori of Thought, because the form of exist- ence necessarily determines the form of all knowledge of existence; more precisely still, it is that ultimate and necessary constitution of the object of knowledge as the "something," the unit-universal, the identity in difference of generic -|- specific + reific essence, the One in Many and Many in One, beyond which lies only the absolute '•' nothing" of non-existence and non-intelligibility. Knowledge of existence is the only possible knowledge ; knowledge of non-existence or absolute nothingness is impossible, be- cause knowledge of "nothing" = no knowledge at all. Since, therefore, existence is possible only as the " some- thing" or unit-universal, knowledge is possible only as per" ception of the unit and conception of the universal in one indivisible percept-concept of the unit-universal. The ultimate necessity of the twofold branching of the know- ing-faculty, therefore, is ontological, not ultimately episte- mological or psychological; it must be "rooted" in the nature of the object, no less than in the nature of the sub- ject; the percept-concept is the only actual or possible form of knowledge, (1) because the unit-universal is the only actual form of existence, and (2) because the unit-universal must be known as it is, or not at all. In other words, the only possible modes, functions, or faculties of knowl- edge are, from the sheer necessity of the case, in the un- created " nature of things," those two forms of activity of the one knowing-faculty which, on the side of the unit, we call sensibility or perception or experience, and, on the side of the universal, understanding or conception or reason. Further, but still in accordance with the fundamental principle of all scientific epistemology, namely, that exist- ence determines knowledge, this necessary two-sidedness of the knowing-process in Man must originate ultimately in a corresponding two-sidedness of the evolution-process in Nature. For we have seen already, in § 84, that the neces- sary interaction of two complementary principles alone accounts for the origin and evolution of the "something" as " a thing of some kind " or unit-universal : heredity^ or continuous specific activity, as the origin of its common element or community, and adaptation^ or original indi- vidual variation in reaction to the environment, as the origin of its peculiar element, individual difference, or in- dividuality. Hence it is plain that, if knowledge is to be possible at all, perception^ as knowledge of units, is made necessary by adaptation^ as the origin of individuality or individual unity in the " something ; " and that conception, as knowledge of universals, is made necessary by heredity, as the origin of its community or universality. In other words, the double-constitution of the knowing-process as perception and conception, or sensibility and understand- ing, results necessarily from the double-constitution of the evolution-process as adaptation and heredity ; and this is itself the necessary result of the fact that, by the Apriori of Being, the " something " can neither exist nor be evolved except in the form of a unit-universal. In still other words, every " something," as product, comes into existence through evolution, as process, and this process is the identity in dif- ference of heredity and adaptation ; hence cognition of the 208 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY "something," as product, equally comes into existence through evolution, as process, and this process is identity in difference of perception and conception. The process of evolution, by which the " something " comes into existence, and the process of learning, by which it comes into knowl- edge, are at bottom one and the same, because the former process necessarily determines the latter, as the condition of its reality. That is, learning is the evolution of all our knowledge : through conception and words we inherit the universality of the "something," and through perception we adapt ourselves to its unity. Further enlargement on these pregnant principles would be here out of place ; but the sagacious reader will divine the depth of their signifi- cance, and guess what light may yet be thrown on the origin of the human mind, if the double nature of intel- ligence as both sensibility and understanding can be thus traced to the double nature of all evolution as both heredity and adaptation. § 98. These fundamental analyses or definitions of ex- istence and knowledge may be condensed into the form of continued equations. I. To " exist " = to "be something " = to be a thing of some kind = to be only one specimen of only one species of only one genus = to be a unit-universal of generic + specific -h reific essence = to be an immanently self-related object of possible knowledge = to be a knowable " thing in itself." So far, then, from its being true that the "thing in itself " is unknowable, the truth is that nothing but the "thing in itself " is knowable at all. Kant to the contrary notwithstanding, the phaenomenon can exist solely on con- dition of being, also, a noumenon ; the Gegenstand der Erfahrtmg can exist solely on condition of being, also, a Ding an sich. II. To " know " = to "know something " = to know some unit-universal = to perceive the unit and to conceive the universal in one indivisible percept-concept of the unit- universal. Tersely, the knowing-faculty in general could THE TWO THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS 209 not "exist," except as identity in difference of two, and only two, fundamental functions: perception and conception, sensibility and understanding, experience and reason. In the last analysis, therefore, Kant's " common but unknown root" becomes known as the Apriori of Being — as the absolute law that whatever " exists" must " be something," and that whatever "is known" must "be something," too (§ 84). It is that unconditioned necessity in rerum natura which itself conditions and determines the imma- nent relational constitution of the res per se. It is those ultimate, underived, and absolute " conditions of existence " which determine a priori, in an ontological sense, (1) the form of every objective or subjective reality to be that of the unit-universal, "something," or "thing in itself," and (2) the form of every particular cognition to be that of the percept-concept, and (3) the form of the universal knowing- faculty to be that of the identity in difference of perception and conception, or sensibility and understanding, or ex- perience and reason, as reciprocally conditioning factors of all human knowledge. This scientific epistemology, grounded practically in the Darwinian revolution of modern science, and grounded theoretically in substitution of the reformed theory of uni- versals for the Aristotelian Paradox, is the needed logical completion of Aristotle's half -protest against Plato (§ 79) ; and its truth is logical disproof, not only of Plato's x^pto-/!©?, but also of Kant's Trennung, and of Hegel's reiner Begriff as absolutes Wissen (§ 93). For, if Absolute Being is neither pure unity nor pure universality, but the Absolute Unit- Universal or Real Universe, then "absolute knowledge" can be neither " pure experience " nor " pure thought," but only the absolute percept-concept of the absolute unit- universal in the self-knowledge of the Absolute I. VOL. I — 14 CHAPTER VIII TRANSITION FROM THE I TO THE WE § 99. Our investigations have thus led us by the path of rigorous necessity to three fundamentally related princi- ples, three ultimate laws, each of which in its own right permeates each of the three spheres of Being, Thought, and Knowledge, and all of which together constitute what may be now with strict propriety called the Law of Unit- Universals, as demonstrated identity in difference of those three coincident or interpenetrating and interper- meating spheres of Reality. An " Unknowable Reality " would be simply a non-existent or pure nothing: the All- Being thinks and knows, the All-Thinking is and knows, the All-Knowing is and thinks, — that is, the All-Reality is, thinks, and knows itself as the infinite unit-universal of Energy in the form of a Real, Active, and Knowing I. By rectifying and completing the half-protest of Aristotle against Plato, and thereby rendering obsolete the Aristo- telian Paradox, the Law of Unit-Universals becomes in truth an absolute necessity of the philosophical reason in all its valid forms and processes, and may now be formu- lated or stated somewhat as follows : — I. The Apriori of Being is that ultimate and underived condition of existence by which whatever really exists must exist and be constituted in itself as A Something or Thing of Some Kind : that is, as the identity in difference of generic plus specific jo/ws reific essence in a real unit- universal of energy, or thing in itself, — as the immanent relational constitution of a noumenon-phaenomenon, the only object of actual or possible knowledge. This is the "principle of individuation," the law of thinghood, the TRANSITION FROM THE I TO THE WE 211 foundation of scientific ontology, or Science of Being as Universe of Units, One in Many and Many in One. II. The Apriori of Thought is that derivative condition of existence by which every real cognition of what really exists must itself exist and be constituted as A Fercejtt- Concept of A Something or Thing of Some Kind: that is, must be itself constituted as a unit-universal in Thought, and be itself determined as such, however incompletely or approximately, by its correlative unit-universal in Being. The essence of the percept-concept is to perceive a unit in its universal (a thing in its kind) and to conceive a universal in all its units (a kind in all its things). The essence of the syllogism itself, the norm and form of all scientific or empirical-rational thinking, is to be nothing but a percept-concept: (1) the major conceives all the specimens of a given species to belong to a certain genus — " All equilateral triangles are equiangular figures ; " (2) the minor perceives some particular being or beings to belong to that species — "This triangle is equilateral;" (3) the conclusion infers that specimen to belong to that genus — " Therefore, this triangle is an equiangular figure ;" (4) the whole force of the " therefore " which unites con- clusion to premises lies in the necessity of the inherence of the specimen in the species and of the species in the genus, that is, of the individual in the universal. This is reversal of the Aristotelian Paradox. Every syllogism is a highly complex percept-concept; every percept-concept is a virtual syllogism, mediating implicitly between the specimen and the genus by the species. The Apriori of Thought, being derived from and determined by the Apriori of Being, is the constitutive principle of reason- ing and the foundation of logic or the Science of Thought. III. The Apriori of Knowledge is that derivative con- dition of existence by which every percept-concept of a unit-universal of Being must itself exist in Thought as the cognitive act, however incomplete or inaccurate or partially erroneous, of the Knowing I in the Knowing We : that is, 212 THE SYLLOGISTIC PniLOSOPHY as the act of a unit-universal of energy which is an active Mmd, capable of functioning simultaneously as perception and conception, sensibility and understanding, experience and reason, — the act of a Mind which is real, because it mdivisibly energizes (1) empirically in the perception of units, and (2) rationally in the conception of universal, evolves thereby (3) an increasingly true percept-concept of a unit-universal of Being, and thereby more or less (4) really knows. The Apriori of Knowledge, being derived from that of Being and of Thought together, is the foun- dation of scientific epistemology in its three stadia of Knowledge of Knowledge, Science of Science, and Philos- ophy of Philosophy (§ § 1-3, 58). § 100. This apriorism of the philosophy of philosophy is opposed to the apriorism of Kant and his continuators by the whole diameter of speculation. The two are oppo- site poles. The essence of Kant's apriorism lies in this short sentence as in a nutshell: "We must of necessity attribute to things a priori all the properties which consti- tute the conditions without which we cannot think them."* Here the conditions of existence are resolved into mere conditions of thought, and all these conditions of thought are resolved into the necessary "attributing," the necessary a priori activity, of the human understanding. In other words, the conditions of human thought determine abso- lutely apriori whatever knowable conditions of existence there inay be, and, beyond our human experience as tlius determined solely by our human understanding a priori, there are no knowable conditions of existence at all: all knowable conditions of existence are the pure a j^riori work or product of the human mind. This is the Kantian apriorism. Of course it follows that the existence of the hnman mind itself is determined by no knowable conditions 1 ''Die Ursache aber hievon liegt darin, dass wir den Dingen a priori alle die Eigenschafteii nothwendig beilegen mussen, die makes these "mine," cannot, of course, be attached to the states of any empirical consciousness which is not mine : its sole function is to make my own conscious states mine, and cannot without absurdity be " transferred " to any pos- sible empirical consciousness which is not mine. No one has admitted this more clearly or more emphatically than Kant himself: "Every manifold of intuition refers of necessity to the ' I think, ' in the same subject in which this manifold is found,'' ^ (The italics are ours.) Whatever "universality" or "objective validity," therefore, I may attribute to my own "judgments of experience," must be logically limited to such universality and objective validity as may obtain in me; it cannot logically be attributed to any judgment in you. From all attribution to his own judgments of any " objective validity " for any other con- sciousness, Kant is absolutely precluded by his own most essential principles ; if he attributes to them any validity beyond his own personal "I think," he does it in glaring contradiction of himself. His own "judgments of experi- ence " may perhaps hold good universally throughout his own empirical consciousness, and be, therefore, objectively valid /or himself But, if he tries for that reason to make them necessary, universal, and objectively valid for you, he turns into nonsense his great doctrine of the " synthetic unity of apperception," by making his own "I think" overleap the chasm between him and you^ by confounding his "I think" with your "I think," and Ms "I" with your "I, "and by setting up this "merely logical subject" of his own consciousness 2LS a, second and usurping subject in yours. This is wilfulness incarnate. The supposition of any Other-I whatsoever, except as a mere phaenomenon in his own empirical consciousness, and as dependent for its very existence, therefore, on his own "I think," is throwiug all logical consistency to the dogs. And this is precisely what he does, in shrinking from the solipsism which lies implicit in all his premises. 1 Kr. d. r. Vernunft, Werke, III. 116. 222 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TRANSITION IN KANT 223 § 104. Turning to Kant's own language on this topic, nevertheless, it is interesting to note how freely and naively he uses the expressions "we," "us," "our," "our- selves," "every one else," "everybody," and so forth, as if there were no necessity of justifying them rationally by a logical transition from the I to the We ; and how he thus begs the whole question of the Kritikismus by taking for granted, as a mere empirical datum of "common sense," that very plurality of subjects which he is bound to account for rationally, but does not and cannot account for at all. For the main thesis of the Kritikismus is to prove the reality of "pure knowledge^a j!>Wori," as the condition of all necessity and universality, that is, of all objective validity, in human experience as such ; in other words, to explain the possibility of "synthetic judgments a jn-iorV^ by proving the existence of a universal "pure reason" which shall legislate a priori for all possible experience, not only in himself, but also in all mankind. Yet he seeks to prove this universal "pure reason" from premises or principles which forbid the recognition of any save a strictly individual "pure reason" of his own. All such expressions as the above, therefore, being unjustified by any rational transition from the I to the We, do but betray a purely arbitrary and naive admission of a fact too stubborn to be denied or doubted, yet impossible to be established by the "synthetic unity of apperception," if unsupplemented by the generic unity of apperception: namely, the fact of a human race. These are the passages to be considered : — "All our judgments are at first mere judgments of perception; they are valid merely for ourselves, that is, for our subject ; and only afterwards do we give them a new reference, namely, to an object, and insist [wolleriy — so translated forcibly and correctly by Bax] they shall be valid for ourselves at all times, and, likewise, for everybody." * " * Objective validity ' means precisely the same thing as ' validity 1 Prolegomena, § 18, Werke, IV. 47. * which is necessary and universal for. everybody.' . . . We will ex- plain this. That the room is warm, the sugar sweet, the worm- wood bitter, are merely subjectively valid judgments. I do not in the least expect [verlange] that I at all times shall, or that every one else will, make these judgments as I make them now. They express only a reference of two sensations to the same subject, namely, myself, and that, too, only in my present state of percep- tion ; and for that reason they cannot be supposed to declare the nature of the object. Such judgments I call judgments of percei> tion. The case is quite different with the judgment of experience What experience teaches me under stated circumstances, it must teach me at all times, and likewise eveiybody, and its validity is not limited to the subject or to its present state. Therefore I characterize all such judgments as objectively valid. For example, if I say, ' the air is elastic,' this judgment is at first only a judg- ment of perception ; I only relate two sensations in my senses to one another. If I insist [will icK] that it shall be called a judgment of experience, I require [verlange] this [subjective] correlation to stand under an [objective] condition which makes it universally valid. Therefore, I insist [ich will] that I at all times, and, like- wise, everybody, must necessarily combine the same perceptions [that is, make the same correlation of subject and predicate, the same judgment] under the same cncumstances."! § 105. In these significant passages of his two greatest works, what reason does Kant assign for believing in the existence of any I but his own? None whatever. Despite the earlier hypothesis of a "transference of this my con- sciousness " to "other things," he afterwards simply pos- tulates the existence of other I's, without offering any genuine reason for it in either case. He cannot help believing it, but he does not know why he believes it. Instead of a reason, he assigns only an act of will in his thrice-repeated "I insist" — in his "I expect," "I re- quire," "I transfer my own consciousness to other things, which only by that means are represented as thinking beings." But why need they be represented or at all con- ceived as thinking beings, when such conception vitiates 1 Prolegomena, § 19, Werke, IV. 47, 48. 224 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY and nullifies all his reasoning ? No reason, no necessity, no justification is shown or can be shown for arbitrarily injecting consciousness into "other things," and thereby converting them, in violation of every principle of Kritikis- TnuSf into known things in themselves. The real reason for this necessary and universal belief in the existence of Other I's is hidden from him by his own theory of the Pure I. This left him satisfied with an unsubstantial or Unreal I, a "merely logical subject." If he had only discerned that it is impossible to arrive at the consciousness of " my self " (which must be a deter- minate unit or Real I) except through consciousness of "other selves" (which must be a determinate universal or Real We), and vice versa, — that is, if he had only supple- mented the synthetic with the generic unity of appercep- tion as two reciprocal conditions, just as necessary to each other in the real unity of personal consciousness as subject and predicate are necessary to each other in the real unity of the judgment, — he could readily have found a rational transition from the I to the We. But he found none such, and relied at last, as the above passages show, on a mere volition, "I insist," as the ground of his belief in "other thinking beings." One can almost see the ironical smile with which the great reasoner must have written down the words; for no one could understand better than he the utter arbitrariness of his own procedure, in a case where nothing but arbitrariness, it iB^twie, was possible for him. The fact remains that the whole Kritikismus collapses in this failure to effect a rational transition from the I to the We ; for it leaves " synthetic judgments a priori " necessary and universal, or objectively valid, for me and for nobody else, and therefore makes his "judgments of experience" impossible in the sense propounded and demanded: namely, that of "objective validity for me at all times, and, likewise, for everybody." \ CHAPTER X THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE § 106. It was the baffling, almost mocking evasiveness of Kant*s Pure I, a "merely logical subject" which is con- scious of itself as nothing but a faculty^ of conjoining single elements into one intuition and many intuitions or states into one consciousness, and of which not even sub- stance can be predicated, that drove the powerful and ear- nest mind of Fichte into rebellion against his master. His intensely ethical nature and consciousness revolted at the Kantian evaporation of personality into an Unreal I — a spontaneous, empty, unsubstantial " act of synthesis." Un- fortunately he, too, inherited the Aristotelian Paradox, and did not dream of questioning the Kantian separation of reason and experience.^ Hence he struggled in vain in his own philosophy to overcome the logical necessity of an Unreal I which lay implicit in those premises. He ex- 1 " Ich exiatire als Intelligenz, die sich lediglich ihres Verbindungsver- mogens bewusst ist," u. s. w. (Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, IlL 131.) * "Nun hat die Philosophie den Grund aller Erfahrung anzugeben ; ihr Object liegt sonach nothwendig aiLsser aller Erfahrung.'' (Erste Ein- leitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 425.)— "Wir konnen dieses Bewusstseyn [des Besonderen] Wahmehmung nennen, oder Erfahrung. Es hat sich gefunden, dass im Wissen von der blossen Wahmehmung abgesehen werden muss." (Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, II. 7.) — "Zu diesem Denken des Wissens nun, ak des Einen und sich selbst gleichen in allem besonderen Wissen, und wodurch dieses letztere nicht dieses, sondern eben iiberhaupt Wissen ist, ist der Leser hier einge- laden, wo vom absoluten Wissen gesprochen wird." {Ibid. II. 14.) The italics are all Fichte's. He, like Aristotle, cancelled the individual differ- ence as unknowable : nothing was knowable but rb cWos t6 iv6v. VOL. I. — 15 \ I \ 226 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY hausted a fine philosophical genius in the effort to evolve Kant's disembodied ghost of an I into the truth of life. He did indeed clothe it with some of the attributes of vitality, yet he left it at last a phantom still. Although beginning his career with a firm persuasion that he was only interpreting Kant's system to the world in a more intelligible and explicit fashion than that of its f ramer, Fichte soon discovered, especially after Kant had dis- owned the interpretations of his self-appointed expounder, that the work of exposition involved, not merely far- reaching developments, but also fundamental corrections of Kant's own conception of the Pure I as " nothing more than a transcendental subject of thoughts = ic, which is known solely b}^ the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these thoughts, we can never have the the least conception " — "a simple, contentless, utterly empty representation, /, of which we cannot say that it is a concept at all, but a mere conciousness which accompanies all concepts " — " the concept of a subject taken here in a merely logical sense." ^ Such an I as this, Fichte clearly perceived, would be phantasmal, unreal, incapable even of the one essential function assigned to it in the synthetic unity of apperception, as the condition of all experience. Even Kant himself confesses that " the absolute unity of apperception, the simple I, in the representation [ich derike] to which all the conjunction or disjunction that constitutes thought is related, becomes important for itself, although I have found out nothing about the subject's constitution or subsistence : apperception is something real, and its unity lies already in its possibility." ^ Surely, reasoned Fichte, that which in all thinking whatsoever really joins or dis- joins, that is, actively relates, must be itself a real activity — something vastly more than a mere subject {blouses Sub- ject), a mere logical abstraction, a mere negation of all real activity. Without an I both real and active, all synthetical 1 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, III. 276, 285. 2 Ihid. III. 285. THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 227 unity of apperception necessarily vanishes, and with it all real thinking. But a real and active I must be a real unit —-object as well as subject— 'Oh]ect to itself and thereby conscious of itself as subject-object. His argument, which marked a new epoch in speculation, is perhaps best pre- sented in his Attempt at a New Exposition of the Doctrine of Science, translated here with his own italics : § 107. " Let us advance to a higher speculative standpoint. " 1. Think yourself, and observe how you do it : that was my first demand. Observe you must, in order to understand me (for I spoke of something which could be only in yourself), and in order to find what I said to you true in your own experience. This attention to ourselves in that act was the subjective element common to us both. Your procedure in the thinking of yourself, which in me, too, was the same procedure, was that to which you attended; it was the object of our investigation, the objective ele- ment common to us both. ** But now I say to you : observe your observation of your own act of self-position ; observe what you did in the just made inves- tigation itself, and how you did it, in order to observe yourself. What was before the subjective element, make that itself the ob- ject of a new investigation which we are now instituting. " 2. The point which I have here in mind is not so easily hit ; but, if it is missed, everything is missed, for on it rests my whole doctrine. Let the reader permit me, then, to conduct him through a passage-way and place him as closely as possible before that which he has to consider. " When you are conscious of any object, — yonder wall, perhaps, — you are properly conscious, as you have conceded, of your think- ing of the wall, and only so far as you are conscious of that is a consciousness of the wall possible. But, in order to be conscious of your thinking, you must be conscious of yourself. " You are conscious of yourself, you say ; you must distinguish, therefore, your thinking I from the T thought in the thinking of it. But, in order that you may be able to do this, again must that which thinks in that thinking be object of a higher thinking, to become a possible object of consciousness ; and you at once obtain a new subject, which is conscious now of that which was previously the self-consciousness. Here, again, I argue as before; and, after \'l 228 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 220 we have once began to reason according to this law, you can no- where show me a place where we can stop; we shall need forever, consequently, for every consciousness a new consciousness whose object is the first, and shall never arrive, therefore, at the possi- bility of assuming a real consciousness. You are conscious of yourself as object [des Beumssten] merely in so far as you are con- scious of yourself as subject [des Bewusstseyenden] ; but then the subject is again the object, and you must again become conscious of the subject of this object, and so on ad infinitum; and so you may see how you reach a first consciousness. ** Shortly : in this way consciousness cannot possibly be ex- plained. *' Once more: what was the essence of the argument just gone through, and the true reason why consciousness was inconceivable in that way ? This : every object comes into consciousness merely on condition that I be conscious also of myself, the conscious sub- ject. This proposition is undeniable. But in this self-conscious- ness of myself, it was further contended, I am to myself an object, and what held true of the previous subject holds true again of the subject to this object; it becomes object, and needs a new subject, and so on ad infinitum. In every consciousness, therefore, subject and object were divided from each other, and each was treated as a separate thing : that was the reason why consciousness fell out for us to be inconceivable. "But, notwithstanding, consciousness exists; that contention, therefore, must be false. * It is false* means * its opposite is true.' Consequently, the following proposition is true : there is a consciousness in which the subjective and objective elements cannot be divided, but are absolutely one and the same. Accordingly, such a consciousness would be what we needed in order to explain consciousness in general. Without dwelling further on the point, we now return unembarrassed to our investigation. " 3. Since, as we requested you, you thought now objects ex- ternal to you, now yourself, you undoubtedly knew that, and what, and how you thought ; for we were able to converse on the subject with each other, as we have done in the foregoing. " Now how did you come to this consciousness of your think- ing? You will answer me: *I knew it immediately; the con- sciousness of my thinking is not something contingent, subsequent, additional, annexed to my thinking itself, but it is inseparable from it.' So you will answer and must answer; for you cannot at all think your thinking without a consciousness of it. " At the very outset, then, we might liave found such a con- sciousness as we were in search of — a consciousness in which the subjective and objective elements were immediately united. The consciousness of our own thinking is this consciousness. Well, then, you are immediately conscious of your thinking : how do you conceive this ? Manifestly, no otherwise than thus : your inner activity, which goes to something out of it, to the object of thought, goes at the same time to itself and into itself. But, according to what precedes, through activity returning into itself there origmates for us the I. Accordingly, in the thinking of yourself, you were conscious of yourself, and just this self-con- sciousness was that immediate consciousness of your thinking, whether you thought an object or merely yourself. Therefore, self -consciousness is immediate ; in it the subjective and objective elements are inseparably united and absolutely one. ** Such an immediate consciousness is scientifically expressed as an Intuition^ and we, too, will call it so. The intuition here con- sidered is a positing of self as positing something objective, which may be myself as mere object. But it cannot in any way be a mere positing ; for by that we should be involved in the already indicated impossibility of explaining consciousness. Everything depends for me on being understood and found convincing on this point, which constitutes the foundation of my whole system. " All possible consciousness as objective to a subject presupposes an immediate consciousness in which the subjective and objective elements are absolutely one; without this, consciousness is posi- tively inconceivable. We shall always seek in vain for a bond between subject and object, unless we have originally apprehended them both in their union. All philosophy, therefore, which fails to start from the point in which they are united, is necessarily shallow and incomplete, and is, therefore, no philosophy. "This immediate consciousness is the intnition of the I, just described; in it, the I necessarily posits itself, and is for that reason the subjective and objective elements in one. Every other consciousness is attached to this and mediated by it, — becomes a consciousness merely through combination with it; this alone is mediated or conditioned by nothing; it is absolutely possible and simply necessary, if any other consciousness is to take place. The I is not to be considered as bare subject, which it has been 230 THE SYLLOGISTIC rillLOSOPHY considered almost universally down to the present time, ^ but as subject-object in the sense explained. " Now here there is question of no other * being * of the I than that in the self-intuition described, — or, more strictly expressed, than the * being' of this intuition itself. I am this intuition, and absolutely nothing more; and this intuition itself is I. By this self-positing there is not produced an existence of the I as a thing- in-itself which subsists independently of consciousness, — a conten- tion which would be, without doubt, the gieatest of absurdities. Just as little does this intuition presuppose an existence, independ- ent of consciousness, of the I as (intuiting) thing : which in my judgment is no less an absurdity, although, of course, one must not say this, since the most celebrated world-sages of our philo- sophical century have adhered to this opinion. Such an existence is not to be presupposed, I say ; for, if you can speak of nothing of which you are not conscious, but everything of which you are con- scious 15 conditioned by the self-consciousness pointed out, you cannot, on the contrary, make a determined something of which you are conscious, that existence of the I which is said to be independent of all in- tuiting and thinking, condition that self consciousness. Either you would have to confess that you speak of something without know- ing about it, which you will hardly do, or you would have to deny that the self -consciousness pointed out conditions every other con- sciousness, which will be absolutely impossible for you, if you have only understood me. From what lias been said, it is evident, moreover, that, in virtue of our first proposition, not only for the case instanced but for all possible cases, we are inevitably com- mitted to the standpoint of transcendental idealism; and that it is one and the same thing to understand that proposition and to be convinced of this standpoint. ** Consequently, the intelligence intuites itself simply as intelli- gence, or as pure intelligence, and precisely in this self-intuition its essence consists. Hence this intuition, in case there should possibly be still another mode of intuition, is called intellectual in- tuition in distinction from the latter. Instead of the word * intel- ligence,' I prefer the designation * I-hood * [Ichheit], because this most directly expresses, for every one who is capable of the least attention, the return of activity into itself.*** 1 Fichte has in mind here Kant's description of the I as " nichts weiter, als ein transscendentales Subject der Gedanken = a?." (Werke, III. 276.) 2 Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, Werke, I. 525-530. THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 231 § 108. Considered simply as a criticism of Kant, Fichte's reasoning admits of no reply. Kant's " division " or " sep- aration " of the I-object from the I-subject in self-conscious- ness, to which Fichte is evidently alluding, involves, as the latter clearly proves, the impossibility of thinking any self-conscious subject whatever. That is, if in a given self- consciousness or " real unity of apperception " the object can be indeed "divided " or "separated " from the subject, the "division" instantly abolishes the self-consciousness; the object (0) immediately absorbs the subject (S), and be- comes a new object (0 -f S) which of course demands a new subject (S') ; this new subject is immediately absorbed by the new object (0 -f S) to constitute still another object (0 -f S -f S'), which in turn demands still another subject (S") ; and this process must repeat itself endlessly, without the possibility of ever arriving at any real self-conscious subject at all. Shortly : — Immediate consciousness = O -f- S. First self-consciousness = (O -I- S) + S' = O' -f S'. Second self-consciousness = (O' + S') + S" = O" -j- S". Third self -consciousness = (O" -f S") -f- S'" = O'" + S'" etc. This Kantian method of separating the object and the subject in self-consciousness, therefore, as Fichte above makes clear, annihilates the possibility of self-conscious- ness itself by annihilating its necessary condition, namely, a self-conscious subject. The "separated" or pure subject (reines Ich) vanishes in the unattainable limit of an infinite series ; and Kant's pure consciousness-in-general (Bewusst- sein iiberhaupt), which absolutely requires a pure subject, vanishes with it. But this, both to Kant and to Fichte, would be the end of all philosophy. The " division " or " sep- aration," then, as Fichte unanswerably urged, must be itself impossible; in all self-consciousness subject and object must be, not separated, but distinguished; self -conscious- ness as such must be a consciousness in which subject and object are one and indivisible, that is, identical in difference r 232 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 233 as Subject' Object. It is Fichte's supreme merit to have seen and demonstrated this commanding truth ; for Kant himself failed to see that it was the necessary logical implication of his own confession that " the absolute unity of appercep- tion, the simple I, in the representation [i. e. < I think '] to which all the combination or separation that constitutes thinking is related, is important for itself, too, although I have discovered nothing as to the subject's constitution or substantiality," — that "apperception is something real, and its unity lies already in its possibility." * Fichte has proved that Kant's " division " or " separation " of I-subject and I-object in self-consciousness would annihilate all possi- bility of this " real unity of apperception," and thus render impossible " the highest principle in all human knowledge ; " and it is Fichte's greatest achievement in philosophy to have established, in opposition to Kant's notion of the I as " mere logical subject," his own notion of it as indissoluble "subject-object." * § 109. But how did he proceed to develop this notion ? Only two lines of development lay logically open before him. One is determined by the Aristotelian Paradox (§ 78, VI), which excludes the individual difference of each I, isolates the common essence of all I's as bare "subject- object," and leads to the abstract universal as the Ichheity the "I-hood" or Pure I (§ 71, Table III, Rationalist Form of the Irrational Antithesis). The other is determined by the Law of Unit-Universals (§ 99), which includes the indi- vidual difference with the common essence in each Real I, and leads to the concrete universal as the Real We (§ 71, Table III, Rational Antithesis). Fichte followed the for- mer line, as his whole doctrine shows. For instance : 1 Kr. d. r. Vern., Werke, III. 285. 2 " Das Ich ist nicht zu betrachten, als blosses Subject, wie man es bis jetzt beinahe durchgangig betrachtet hat, sondem als Subject-Object in dem augegebenen Sinne. " (Werke, I. 529. ) — ;♦ ' Die in sich zunickgehende Thatigkeit als feststehend und beharrlich aufgefasst, wodurch sonach beides, Ich, als Thatiges, und Ich, als Object meiner Thatigkeit, zusammen- fallen, ist der Begriff des Ich." (Ibid, I. 533.) 'il m Kant had said : " This representation [namely, the uni- versal a think'] is an act of spontaneity; that is, it cannot be considered as belonging to the sensibility. I call it the pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical ; or, also, the original apperception, because it is that self-consciousness which, in producing the representa- tion *I think' that must be capable of accompanying all other representations and is in every consciousness one and the same, can be accompanied by no representation beyond itself." * Now Fichte quoted this passage approvingly, because he interpreted it as expressing his own concept of the Pure I. He particularly emphasized by italics the words — " *s in every consciousness one and the same^^ and added : " Here the nature of the pure self-consciousness is clearly de- scribed. It is in every consciousness the same — unde- terminable, therefore, by any accident of the consciousness : the I in it is determined solely by itself, and is absolutely determined." ^ What does this mean ? Those words itali- cized by Fichte are the hall-mark of the Aristotelian Para- dox. They do but translate, as applied to this instance, Aristotle's to ctSo? to cVoV — the pure " form " in the " com- pound of form and matter," the universal which inheres in the individual and thereby gives to the latter all its reality and all its intelligibility. Fichte's " I in it," das Ich in ihm, is simply the ttSos to lv6v of consciousness, the Pure I im- manent as universal self-consciousness in every conscious state of every empirical individual, absolutely identical and unchangeable in all individuals as pure " subject-object." In no possible way could Fichte have disclosed his adhesion to the Aristotelian Paradox with greater clearness than in this emphatic approval of Kant's adhesion to it, or indi- cated more unmistakably what theory of the general rela- tion of the universal to the individual determined and went to the making of his whole theory of the I. 1 Kant, Werke, III. 116. 2 Fichte, Werke, I. 476. 234 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY Rationally to conceive, in its entirety, necessity, and uni- versality, " the absolutely unconditioned and characteristic element of self-consciousness," to the complete exclusion of every empirical element, and thereby to know the absolute essence of the I as "subject-object," was Fichte's aim. This knowledge was the Wissenschaftslehre^ the all-exhaustive science of the Ichheit, beyond which nothing exists.^ Yet, in order by the method thus adopted to win knowledge of the I as "subject-object," Fichte fell into the very error which he exposed in Kant. Precisely as Kant, according to Fichte, destroyed self-consciousness by " separating " the I-object and the I-subject, Fichte himself destroyed knowl- edge by "separating" reason and experience.* In both cases, "separation" or "division" renders insoluble a prob- 1 " AUes was ist, ist uur insofern, ala es im Ich gesetzt ist, und ausser dem Ich ist uichts." (Werke, I. 99.) — "Ich bediene uiich statt des Wortea Intelligenz lieber der Benennung : Ichheit ; well diese das Zuriickgehen der Thatigkeit in sich selbst fiir jedeu, der nur der geringsten Aufinerk- samkeit fahig ist, am unmittu Ibarsten bezeichnet." {Ibid. I. 630.) — *♦ Die Ichheit ist es [d. h. das absolut Unbedingte und Characteristische des Selbstbewusstseins], die Subject- Objectivi tat, und sonst durchaus nichts ; das Setzen des Subjectiven und seines Objectiven, des Bewusstseins und seines Bewussten, als Eins ; und schlechthin nichts weiter, ausser dieser Identitat." {Ibid. IL 362.) — "Die Wissenschaftslehre soil aber nicht nur sich selbst, sondem auch alien imglichen iibrigen Wissenschaften ihre Form geben, und die Giiltigkeit dieser Form fiir alle sicher stellen." {Ibid. I. 51.) * "Nun hat die Philosophie denGrund aller Erfahrung anzngeben ; ihr Object liegt sonach nothwendigaitsser aller Erfahrung. Dieser Satz gilt fiir alle Philosophie, und hat auch, bis auf die Epoche der Kantianer und ihrer Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns, und also der inneren Erfahrung, wirklich allgemein gegolten." {Ibid. I. 425.) — "Der Grund liegt alleraal ausser- halb des begriindeten, d. i. er ist demselben entegegengesetzt." {Ibid. I. 456.) Compare Kant's own words: "Der Verstand vermag nichts an- zuschauen und die Sinne nichts zu denken. Nur daraus, dass sie sich vereinigen, kann Erkenntniss entspringen. Deswegen darf man aber doch nicht ihreu Antheil vermischen, sondem man hat grosse Ursache, jedes von dem andern sorgfaltig abzusondem und zu unterscheiden." (Kr. d. r. Vem. Werke, III. 82.) To separate and distinguish — not to dis- tinguish without separating : that is the concept-philosophy's principle. THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 236 lem which can be solved only hy distinction tvithin the inseparable or indivisible, — by the equal recognition of difference and identity in one and the same reality. But it is necessary to take note of Fichte*s resultant concept of the Ichheit, and to inquire whether by means of it a rational transition can be effected from the I to the We. § 110. The Pure I, as "subject-object," is variously, but in the main self-consistently, characterized by Fichte. It is a free self-activity {Selhstthatigkeit) which returns into itself.^ It is a self-realizing energy, a union of power and product, a "deed-act" which appears in no empirical con- sciousness, but underlies and conditions every empirical consciousness, and which absolutely posits, originates, and constructs its own being.^ It is an unconditioned free- 1 " Er [d. h. jeder] wird hoffentlich einsehon . . . dass, sago ich, der Gedanke seiner selbst nichts anderes sey, als der Gedanke dieser Hand- lung, und das Wort Ich nichts anderes, als die Bezeichnung desselben ; dass Ich und in sich zuruckkehrcndcs Haiideln voUig indeutische BegrifFe siud." (Werke, I. 462.) — "Nun aber ist das Ich laut obigem nichts anderes, als ein in sich selbst zuriickgehendes Handcln ; und ein in sich selbst zuriickgehendes Handeln ist das Ich." {Ibid. I. 532.) 2 "Er [d. h. der absolut-erste, schlechthin unbedingte Grundsatz alles menschlicheii Wissens] soil diejenige That/tandlung ausdrucken, welcho unter den empirischeu Bestinnnungeu unseres Bewusstseyns nicht vor- kommt, noch vorkonimen kann, sondem vielmehr allem Bewusstseyn zum Grunde liegt, und allein cs mbglich niacht." {Ibid. I. 91.) — "Also das Setzen des Ich durch sich selbst ist die reine Thatigkeit desselben. — Das Ich setzt sich selbst, und es ist, vermoge dieses blossen Setzens durch sich selbst ; und umgekehrt : das Ich ist, und es setzt sein Seyn, vermoge seines blossen Seyns. Es ist zugleich das Handelnde, und das Product der Hand- lung ; das Thatige, und das, was durch die Thatigkeit hervorgebracht wird ; Handlung und That sind Eins und dasselbe ; und daher ist das : Ich bin, Ausdruck einer Thathandlung ; aber auch der einzig-moglichen." {Ibid. I. 96.) — ''Das Ich ist urspriinglich nur ein Thun ; denkt man es auch nur als Thatiges, so hat man schon einen empirischen, und also erst abzuleitenden Begriff desselben." {Ibid. I. 495.) — ''Sich selbst setzen und Seyn sind, vom Ich gebraucht, voUig gleich. . . . Denkt man sich die Erzahlungvon dieser Thathandlung an die Spitze einer Wissenschaftslehre, so miisste sie etwa folgendermassen ausgedriickt werden ; Bos Ich setzt urspriinglich schlechthin sein eigenes Seyn." {Ibid. I. 98.) — ** Erst durch 236 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPIiY agency, which is the I's substance and innermost essence.^ It is a shut but self-seeing eye, which produces itself out of nothing. 2 It is an intellectual intuition, without which the concept and the sensuous intuition together would not be enough to constitute a mental representation or definite state of consciousness (^Vorstellung)} It is an absolute, diesen Act, und lediglich durch ihn, durch ein Handeln auf ein Haudeln selbst, welchem bestimmten Handeln kein Handeln iiberhaupt vorhergeht, wird das Ich urspriinglich fiir sich selbst." (Ibid. I. 459.) This denies heredity — denies that act of the We which, as generation, conditions every act of the I, even the Thathandlung. 1 '*Die letztere [d. h. die absolute Kraft des Ich] ist Substanz des Ich, sein eigenstes innerstes Wesen, in welchem das Wissen ewig ruht : die Aeusserung [d. h. das Gefiihl] ist Accidens, aber nur formaliter ; seyn konnend iiberhaupt, oder auch nicht ; wenn sie aber ist, durchaus nothwen- dig diejenige seyend, welcho sie ist, denn sie ist bestinimt durch dus uu- veranderliche Verhaltniss zum Universum." {Ibid. II. 124.) 5* *• Das Wissen ist nun gefunden und steht vor uus, als ein auf sich selbst ruhendes und geschlossenes Auge. Es sicht nichts ausser sich, aber es sieht sich selbst. Diese Selbstanschauung dcsselben haben wir zu erschopfen, und mit ihr ist das System alles moglicheu Wisseus ei-schiipft, und die Wissenschaftslehre realisirt und geschlossen. . . . Die iutellec- tuelle Anschauung ist fiir sich ein absolutes Selbsterzeugen, durchaus aus Nichts. . . . Alle Anschauung aber ist Freiheit, isi daher schlechthiu, weil sie ist : absolutes Selbsterzeugen aus Nichts." {Ibid. II. 38, 39.) • "Die Wissenschaftslehre geht, wie wir soeben gesehcn haben, aus von einer intellectuellen Anschauung, der absoluten Selbstthatigkcit des Ich." {Ibid. I. 471.) — " Ich bin diese Anschauung und schlechthin nichts weiter, und diese Anschauung selbst ist Ich." {Ibid, I. 629.) — " Diese intellectuelle Anschauung ist der einzigo feste Standpunct fur alle Philoso- phic." {Ibid. I. 466.)— " Nach Kant, nach Schulz, nach mir, gehort zu einer voUstandigen Vorstellung dreierlei : das, wodurch die Vorstellung sich auf ein Object bezieht, und die Vorstellung von Etwas wird, und welches wir einstimmig die sinnliche Anschauung nennen (auch wenn ich selbst das Object der Vorstellung bin, ist es so ; ich werde mir selbst ein Beharrliches in der Zeit) ; das, wodurch sie sich auf das Subject bezieht, und meine Vorstellung wird, und welches bei Kant und Schulz nicht An- schauung heissen soil, von mir aber, weil es zur voUstandigen Vorstellung in deniselben Verhaltnisse steht, als die sinnliche Anschauung, so genannt wird ; und endlich das, wodurch beides vereinigt, und nur in dieser Ver- einigung Vorstellung wird, welches wir abermals einstimmig den Begriff nennen.'* {Ibid. I. 474.) — "Nun aber kommt diese Anschauung nie THE TRANSITION IN FICIITE 237 illimitable subject, which originates or produces uncon- sciously within itself both terms of the conscious antithe- sis of (empirical) I and (empirical) Not-I — both terms being mere " accidents " in the unconscious I as " divisible substance."^ It is an absolute I-in-itself, which never- theless is not a thing-in-itself, because it is not an ob- ject of experience, but is above all experience in virtue of its own free self-determination.^ This I-in-itself is for allein, als ein vollstandiger Act des Bewusstseyns, vor; wie denn auch die sinnliche Anschauung nicht allein vorkommt, noch das Bewusstseyn vol- Icndet, sondem beide miissen begriffen werden. Nicht aber allein dies, sondcrn die intellectuelle Anschauung ist auch stets mit einer sinnlichen verkniipft." {Ibid. I. 463-464. So, also, II. 41.) 1" Das Ich sowohl, als dasNicht-Ich sind beides Producte ursprtinglicher Handlungen des Ich, und das Bewusstseyn selbst ist ein solches Product der ersten urspriinglichen Handlung des Ich, des Setzens des Ich durch sich selbst." {Ibid. I. 107). — *' Die Masse dessen, was unbedingt und schlechthin gewiss ist, ist nunmehr crschopft ; und ich wiirde sie etwa in folgender Formel ausdriicken : Ich seize im Ich dcm tlieilharen Ich ein tlicil- bares Nlcht-Ich cntgegen. Ueber diese Erkenntniss hinaus geht keine Philosophic ; aber bis zu ihr zuriickgehen soil jede griindliche Philosophic ; und so wie sie es thut, wird sie Wissenschaftslehre. Alles was von nun an im Systeme des menschlichen Geistes vorkommen soil, muss sich aus dem Aufgestellten ableiten lassen." {Ibid. I. 110.) — "Ich und Nicht-Ich, sowie sie durch den Begriff der gegenseitigen Einschrankbarkeit gleich- und entgegengesetzt werden, sind selbst beide etwas (Accidenzen) im Ich, als thcilbarer Substanz ; gesetzt durch das Ich, als absolutes unbeschrankbares Subject, dem nichts gleich ist, und nichts entgegengesetzt ist." {Ibid. I. 119.) — *\Femer ist klar, dass das Ich seiner Thatigkeit in dieser Produc- tion des angeschauten, als eines solchen, sich nicht bewusst seyn kcinnc, darum, weil sie nicht rellectirt, dem Ich nicht zugcschriel>en wird. (Nur in der philosophischen Reflexion, die wir jetzt anstellen, und die wir immer soi^faltig von der gemeinen nothwendigen zu unterscheiden haben, wird sie dem Ich beigemessen.) " {Ibid. I. 230.) But — ** Das Ich ist nur inso- fem, inwiefem es sich seiner bewusst ist." {Ibid. I. 97.) How reconcile these two positions ? * ** Nun ist gerade dieses Ich an sich das Object des Idealismus. Das Object dieses Systems kommt noch als etwas reales wirklich im Bewusstseyn vor, nicht als ein Ding an sich, wodurch der Idealismus aufhoren wiirde zu seyn, was er ist, und in Dogmatismus sich verwandeln wiirde, aber als Ich an sich, nicht als Gegenstand der Erfahrung (denn es ist nicht bestimmt. 238 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY itself alone,^ an Anundfarsichsej/n, a universal self-conscious- ness which, excluding every element of human experience and every ground of human individuality, includes nothing but the colorless and characterless self-identity of a merely potential Subject-Object, a Pure Universal I which holds in itself, as such, no possibility of Empirical Individual Fs, If these are known to exist, the ground of the knowledge of their existence must lie, not in reason, but in experi- ence ; and knowledge of it must have the form, not of a pure concept, but of the percept-concept. § 111. For, precisely as Aristotle's " first philosophy " was found, in §§ 76-78, to contain no principle of indi- viduation in general and his psychology no principle of personal identity, so Fichte's philosophy of the I, his Wis- senschafislehre, which from beginning to end is completely dominated by the Aristotelian Paradox, is found to contain no principle of individuality. Constructed in accordance with that theory of universals, which suppresses the indi- vidual difference as unknowable, how could his philosophy find room anywhere for the real individual as such ? The only I which it recognizes must be, of course, divested of individuality ; and so we find it. Just as Aristotle opposed the pure, impersonal, and imperishable intelligence, or vov^, to the perishing empirical individual, or 6 rU avOpumcx:^ — just as Kant opposed them as das Bewusstsein uherhaupt and der mit Vemunft hegahte Sinnenmenschy — so Fichte opposed them as Ichheit and Individualitdty das Ich and das sondern es wird lediglich durch mich bestimmt, und ist ohne diese Be- stimmung nichts, und ist iiberhaupt ohne sie nicht), sondern als etwas uber alle Erfahrung erhabeues. Das Object des Dogmatismus im Gegentheil gehort zu den Objecten derersten Klasse, die lediglich durch freies Denken hervorgebracht werden ; das Ding an sich ist eine blosse Erdichtung, und hat gar keine Realitat." (lUd. L 427-428.) Of course, this distinction is futile. The "thing" is simply a *' something," a unit of existence, an Etwas as opposed to Nichts ; and, if the Ich is Etwas^ and not Nichts, the Ich an sich is of necessity a Ding an sich. See above, §§ 67, 68, 98. * "Ich Kn nur filr Mich: aber fur Mich bin ich Twthtoendig," {Ibid, I. 98.) THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 239 Individuum, In each case the reason was one and the same, namely, the Aristotelian Paradox. How could it be otherwise with a theory which shuts its eyes to the end- lessly rich and scientifically knowable variety exhibited by the individual specimens of a given species, treats them all as mere o/xoia or d8ta<^opa, and in the species itself can dis- cern no other intelligible reality than the immutable com- mon essence, which, if divorced from all the individual differences of all the specimens, has no possible existence save as an empty abstraction, a definition that defines noth- ing real, a mere ens rationis? But Fichte's adoption or unconscious inheritance of this theory, with its consequent complete exclusion of individuality from his notion of the I, does not admit of doubt. At the close of his philosophical lectures, in 1794, Fichte thus concluded a farewell address to his students (the italics are his own) : — " Earth, and heaven, and time, and space, vanish for me in this thought ; and should not the individual vanish for me ? I lead you not back to that I All individuals are included in the one great unity of the pure spirit. Let that be the last word which I commend to your remembrance, and with which I take my leave." ^ Again, speaking confidentially to his reader, he says: ** Perhaps thou mightest have introduced into the concept of the I sundry things which I had not introduced into it ; for example, the concept of thy own individuality, because this, too, is denoted by that verbal symbol. All this now is dropped; only that which comes to pass by the mere return of thy thinking upon thyself is the I of which I here speak." 2 § 112. Still more significant are the passages in which he puts his exclusion of individuality from the notion of the Pure I into scientific form. For instance : ** The sum of that which is unconditionally and absolutely cer- tain is now exhausted, and I would express it in the following 1 Werke, I. 416. 2 Werke, I. 523. 240 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY formula : Within the /, / oppose to the divisible la divisible not-I. No philosophy travels beyond this truth ; but every well-grounded philosophy must recur to it, and, in proportion as it does this, becomes Wissenschqfislehre. Whatever truth is hereafter to appear in the system of the human spirit must be deducible from that formula. " ^ But thus — " the I itself is degraded to a lower concept, that of divisibility, in order that it may be equated with the Not-I, to which, in the same concept, it is likewise opposed. Here, therefore, there is no ascent^ as in every other synthesis, but a descent. Both the I and the Not- I, as they are thus equated and opposed through the concept of reciprocal limitability, are themselves something (accidents) in the I as divisible substance — posited by the I as absolute and illimit- able subject, to which nothing is equal and nothing opposed. All judgments, therefore, whose logical subject is the limitable or deter- minable I, or anything which determines the I, must be limited or determined by something higher. All judgments, however, whose logical subject is the absolutely undeterminable I can be determined by nothing higher, because the absolute I is determined by nothing higher ; but they are unconditionally grounded and determined by themselves."^ The meaning and intent of this somewhat bunglingly expressed distinction are on the whole sufficiently plain. Fichte is laboring to define to 'himself in scientific clearness the relation of the reines Ich to das Individuuiriy in such a way as shall meet the requirements of the Aristotelian logic, whose well-known rule of definition by genus and specific difference he has just been expounding with ap- proval. This individual I: how close the truth lay to Fichte's hand, could he but have grasped it ! But he missed it. His unconscious fidelity to the Aristotelian Paradox made him as unable to grasp it as Aristotle was before him. Out of " This Individual I " he was bound to reject " This Individual," and to keep the pure " I " as its sole reality. To Fichte, the rei7ies Ich is rational, uni- 1 Werke, I. 110. a Werke, I. 119. THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 241 versal, necessary, absolute, undeterminable, impersonal, imperishable, — in effect, vov^ ; while das Individuum is empirical, individual, accidental, relative, determinable, personal, perishable, —in effect, 6 tU avOpioiroq, Within itself as " divisible substance," the Pure I, being the sum- mum genus as the Ich an sich or original " self-returning activity," posits the antithesis of I and Not-I, — that is, the " divisible I," as empirical individuals, and the " divisible Not-I," as the world of phaenomenal existence. But, for Fichte, these two cannot be subordinate species of a generic Pure I, since that relationship would give them equal validity as "things in themselves," and thereby involve surrender to that " dogmatic philosophy," which to Fichte, as follower of the "critical philosophy," was altogether intolerable. Hence, this empirical I and this equally em- pirical Not-I, he concludes, must both stand to the Pure I in the relation of mere " accidents " (Fichte's Accidenzen is the translation of Aristotle's ra crvfi/Si/SrjKOTa) — mere eva- nescent phaenomena, non-essential to the Pure I, unreal, perishable. The individual as such, truly, must "vanish for him ; " yet not without great violence to logic. § 113. For, if we inquire by what logical right he admits the "concept of divisibility," not to mention that of " divisible substance," into his concept of the Pure I as nothing whatever but " self-returning activity," we inquire in vain. "The concept of a thinking that returns into itself, and the concept of the I, mutually exhaust each other. The I is that which posits itself, and nothing more; that which posits itself is the I, and nothing more."* Surely, this pure notion of outgoing and self- returning activity admits of no conceivable division except into the outgo and the self-return; but, if these are divided into two independent acts, the unity of the Thathandlung, and with it the unity of the Ichheit, are totally abolished. Such a division should be for Fichte unthinkable ; it would » Werke, I. 523. VOL. I — 16 242 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY be even more niinous than that conversion of the outgo into the self-return for which Fichte's mysterious Anstoss is no explanation. The "self-returning activity," as a pure universal concept, must surely be one and indivisible, or the unity of the Ichheit is destroyed and the JVissenschaftslehre self-exploded. By what logical warrant, then, does he divide the Pure I into a "divisible I "and a "divisible Not-I " ? That these cannot be species within the Pure I, he clearly sees; for, since the genus enters with the specific difference into the definition of every species, the empirical individual or " divisible I " would then be a Pure I, and the empirical world of phaenomena or " divisible Not-I " would be a Pure I, too, — precisely as the tiger and the lion are each a cat. Such a result would be pure nonsense, of course. But Fichte does not help matters, when he calls his " divisible I " and " divisible Not-I," not species, but accidents: *^ etwas (Accidenzen) im Ich,*' For the accident (to avfiP^Pr^Ko^) never belongs to the genus, to the species, to any universal, but solely to the individual; and to call the Empirical I an "accident" of the Pure I is not to account for it in the least, or find a logical place for it in the Wissenschaftslehre, but simply to degrade the Pure I itself to the rank of a mere individual, that is, to the rank of the only concept that can possibly support "accidents." Extremes meet! This is " descent " with a vengeance {gar kein Heraufsteigen, sondern ein Heralstei- gen). The truth is that the whole philosophy of "pure thought," which begins with a rigorous exclusion of " experience " from " knowledge " and seeks the latter in " pure reason " alone, fails utterly in the endeavor to think any Real I whatsoever. How could it be otherwise with the Aristotelian Paradox for foundation? Fichte's failure is only the failure of his school, while his successes are his own. But let us persevere in the examination of his theory as it stands. We have already seen that it excludes all in- dividuality from the I-liood, and reduces the individual to THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 243 a mere vanishing " accident " of the Pure I. We have yet to see how he relates the I, both as empirical and as pure, to the We, and how far he effects a rational transition from' one to the other, over and above that mere common-sense assumption of human plurality which he and all other idealists, with innocent and amusing gayety, evervwhere make. § 114. Our attention is now challenged by the following long but important passage : — « * We can form no other notion of our person, under the con- cept of the I, than that of our own person in contrast with other persons,' confess other opponents of the Wissenschaftslehre. * / signifies my own determinate person, just as I am now named, Caius or Sempronius, in contrast with all others who are not so named. If I now eliminate by abstraction this individual person- ality, as the Wissenschaftslehre requires, tliere remains behind to me nothing which could be characterized as /; I might just as well name the remainder It.^ " Wliat is it that this objection, advanced with so much bold- ness, really means to say? Does it speak of the original real synthesis of the concept of the individual (their own person and other persons), and do they intend therefore, to say : nothing is synthesized in this concept except the concept of an object in general, that is, of the It, and the distinction from others of its own sort, which, consequently, are likewise an It and nothing more? Or does it rely upon verbal usage, and do they mean to say : in language nothing is denoted by the expression / except individuality? ** As to the first objection : every one who is still master of his faculties must surely comprehend that, by the distinction of an object from its like, and therefore from other objects, nothing results except a determined object, but not at all a determined person. With regard to the synthesis of the concept of the person, the relation is quite otherwise. The I-hood (self-returning activity, subject-objectivity, or what you please) is originally opposed to the It, to mere objectivity ; and the positing of these concepts is abso- lute, conditioned by no other positing, — thetic, not synthetic. To something which has been posited in this first positing as an //, as mere object, as something external to us, the concept of I-hood 244 THE SYLLOGISTIC PIIILOSOPnY which has been developed in ourselves is transferred,^ and synthet- ically united with it ; and first through this conditioned synthesis there arises for us a Thou, The concept of the Thou originates out of the union of the It and the I. The concept of the I in this opposition, therefore, as the concept of the individual, is the syn- thesis of the I with itself. In the act described, I am that which posits itself — not posits in general, but posits as I; and, in the same act, thou art that which is posited hy vie, and not that which is posited hy itself, as I. This product of a synthesis which has to be explained can doubtless be eliminated by abstraction ; for what one has himself synthesized, one should certainly be able to analyze again. That which remains behind after the abstraction is the I in general, that is, the Not-Object. Taken in this sense, this objection would be very absurd. "Or do these opponents rely on verbal usage? If they were right in the assertion that the word I has hitherto signified in language the individual alone, would it follow, from the fact that a distinction which needs to be pointed out in the original synthesis has hitherto not been noticed and expressed in speech, that it must never be noticed and never expressed ? But are they right in that assertion ? Of what verbal usage may they speak ? " Of the philosophical ? That Kant takes the concept of the Pure I in the same sense in which the Wissenschajlslehre takes it, I have already shown above. When it is said, * I am that which thinks in this thought,' do I then oppose myself merely to other persons outside of me, or do I not rather oppose myself to every 1 Fichte's word for "transferred" is iibertragen, which betrays a con- scious reference to and acceptance of Kant's theory of "transference" {Uebertroffung), already stated and sufficiently criticised above in § 102. To the criticisms there urged, Fichte here makes no anticipatory sem- blance of a reply. He does not show how a mere It, posited absolutely by the /, can become a Thou outside of the I that posits it, without becoming at the same time a Ding an sich as well as an Ich an nch — for him an insufferable result: the Thou, compound of It and /, an It which becomes an /, is an It in itself and an / hy 'Hransferencc " alone. Nor does he in the least explain the miraculous process by which the "concept of the I " can bo "transferred " into a mere It, so as to metamorphose it into a Thou; nor throw any light on the question whether it is the pure or the empirical consciousness which is "transferred." Yet (Werke, I. 490) he tenders to us this same blind explanation of " tiansf erence " as accounting for the " Kantian empirical realism." THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 245 particular thought? *The principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself identical, consequently an analytical propo- sition,' says Kant. That means the same thing which I likewise said: the I originates through no synthesis, whose manifold one might further analyze, but through an absolute thesis. This I, however, is the I-hood in general; for the concept of individuality originates evidently through synthesis, as I have just proved, and the principle of it is a synthetical proposition. Reinhold, in his law of consciousness, speaks of the subject, in German, vom Ich; to be sure, merely as of the presenter or representer [vom Vorstel- Icnden], but here that is nothing to the point. In distinguishing niyself as representer from the represented [vom Vorgestellten], do I distinguish myself merely from other persons, or do I distinguish myself from everything represented, as such ? Even in the case of the above lauded philosophers, who do not, like Kant and the Wissenschaflslehre, make the I the presupposition of the manifold of representation, but constitute it out of that, is their one thinking principle in the manifold thought the individual only, or is it not rather the intelligence in general [vovi rather than 6 rh ai/^/jowroy] ? In one word : is there indeed any philosopher of repute who, before them, has made the discovery that / signifies the individual only, and that, if individuality is abstracted, there remains nothing behind but an object in general? " Or do they speak of the common verbal usage ? To point out this, I am obliged to introduce examples from common life. If you call to someone in the darkness, * Who is there? ' and he gives you for answer, ' It is I,' on the supposition that his voice is known to you, it is clear that he speaks of himself as this determined person, and is to be understood as saying, ' It is I who am called so and so, and no one of all the rest who are not so called ; ' and this because you, in consequence of your question, * Who is there?' already presuppose that it is some reasonable being, and now only wish to know what particular one among the possible reasonable beings it is. But if you, perhaps, — pardon me this example, which I find especially convenient, — are sewing or cutting some garment on the body of a person, and you unawares wound him, he would possibly cry out, * Hark! that is /, you are hitting me.* What would he mean by that? Not that he is this determinate person and no other, for that you know very well ; but that what you are hitting is not his dead and feelingless garment, but his living and feeling self— which you did not know. By this *I' 246 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY he does not distinguish himself from other persons, but from things. This distinction is ever-present in Ufe, and without it we cannot take a step on the ground or move a hand in the air. " In short, I-hood and individuality are very different concepts and the composite character of the latter can be very distinctly observed. By the former we oppose ourselves to everything which IS outside of us, not simply to persons outside of us, and we com- prehend under it not only our determined personaHty, but our intellectual nature in general; and so the word is used in philo- sophical and in ordinary language. The objection under consider- ation reveals, accordingly, not only an unusual want of thought but also a great ignorance and unfamiliarity with the commonest philosophical literature. But they persist in their incapacity of thinking the concept explained to them, and we must believe their word. Not that they must needs lack the general concept of the Pure I, in the sense of mere rationality and intellectuality ; for then they would cease, as much as a block of wood, to make objections to us. But it is the concept of this concept {der BegriJ dieses Begriffs) which fails them, and to which they are unable to elevate themselves. Of course they have it in* themselves; they simply do not know that they have it. The ground of this inca- pacity of theirs does not lie in any particular weakness of their thinking powers, but in a weakness of their whole character. Their I, in the sense in which they take the word, that is, their individual person, is the ultimate aim of their conduct, and conse- quently the limit of their distinct thought. It is for them the only true substance, and reason is only an accident of it. Their i>er8on does not exist as a particular expression of reason, but reason exists in order to help their person through the world ; if their person could only be just as well off without reason, we could dis- pense with reason, and then there would be no reason at all. This mode of thinking betrays itself throughout the whole system of their ideas, in all their assertions, and many among them are honest enough to make no concealment of it These are quite right in their confession of incapacity, so far as they themselves are concerned ; only they must not give out for objective truth what has merely subjective validity. In the Wissenschajlslehre the rela- tion is precisely the reverse : there reason is the only thing in itself [;. e. the Ich an «cA], and individuality is only accidental [accidenteU]', reason is the end, and personality the means; per- sonality is only a particular mode of expressing reason which 'must THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 247 evermore lose itself in the universal form of reason itself. For the Wissenschaftslehrej only reason is eternal ; individuality must everlastingly perish. He who shall not first of all conform his will to this order of things will also never attain to a true understand- ing of the Wissenschaftslehre.^^ ^ § 115. We have let Fichte state his own case fully and at length in his own way. It remains to examine his statement. The objection of certain unnamed opponents whom Fichte undertook to refute, although not put by him in such terms as are adapted to bring out its full force, simply because he could not escape from the Aristotelian Paradox, goes deeper than he perceived ; undoubtedly deeper than his opponents themselves perceived. It raises the question of the real unity of the I in the real universality of the We, and demands such a notion of the real person as shall recognize the independent equality of many real persons in real human society. It means that we must have, not the "original real synthesis of the concept of the individual (their own person and other persons)," but the original synthesis of the generic unity of apperception as I and Other-I^s, or I in the Wey by which the 1 is given not as a mere " object in general" or empty "It," but as a real specimen in a real species. It means that, "in language," the expression I denotes, not mere "individuality," but the identity in difference of individuality and universality, each element conditioning and conditioned by the other in the real unit- universal. It maintains that the word I, whatever else it may signify besides, must and does signify this real unity of the individual and the real independent equality of many individuals as coexistences in the We, each as aii I in its oivn right ; and that, if individual personality and independ- ent equality are to be eliminated from the notion of the I, the I is evaporated into an unreality which is neither speci- men nor species, a mere impersonal thing without either empirical or rational self-consciousness, a mere abstraction ^ Zweite Eiuleitung, u. 8. w. Werke, I. 501-605. 248 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 249 without other reality than that of an unconscious entity as a mere object of thought, —not an /, or the /, or I at all, but merely It, This was the deeper meaning of the objection raised by Fichte's opponents, easily discernible even in his statement of it. But he failed to penetrate to the heart of their diffi- culty, much more to solve it. "The I must be a real person, at once individual and universal, in order to explain the We as many persons ; if you strike out its real person- ality, you strike out its real I-hood and degrade it to an It." This was the pith of the objection, however stammer- ingly articulated. What was the pith of his reply ? « The I cannot be a real person, because it must be a pure uni- versal, and not an individual at all ; the universal I [to ctSos TO cVoV] which is immanent or inherent in the individual I is alone real ; the individual I [cZSos -f- {^A^ = 5 tis iv^puwros] is a mere vanishing accident [frviiP^PrjKo^] of the universal I; the person as such perishes, but leaves behind the uni- versal, impersonal, and imperishable Pure I [vov^\ of which it is only a transitory and brief expression. The concept of the individual is that of the empirical I, as opposed to the empirical Thou. But the Thou is a mere compound of the I and the It ; for, to some It in the phaenomenal world of Its, the empirical I transfers its own concept of I-hood, and thus clothes it as an empirical Thou, an It which appears as another I. But the I which posits this com- pound of It and I as Thou, and the I which is thus posited, are one and the same I; it is merely a synthesis of the I with itself." Is this an answer to the real difficulty propounded ? " If you strike individuality out of the individual I," say the objectors, in the true meaning of their objection, "you strike out its real I-hood, and have nothing left but an It." " On the contrary," replies Fichte, " I do strike individual- ity out of the individual I, and I have left the Pure I ; and the Pure I is not an It." Clearly, the difficulty is not met, unless the real I-hood and the Pure I ai-e one and the same — which IS not the case, unless the Pure I is self^sonscious What distinguishes the I from the It is the presence or absence of self-consciotisness : whatever has self-conscious- ness is an I, whatever lacks self-consciousness is an It. No other distinction between the two has ever been suggested so far as we know; and Fichte himself unqualifiedly ap^ proves it, when he says that " the I exists so far only as it IS conscious to itself of itself." ^ But, if the distinction holds, Fichte's objectors are in the right, and his answer to their objection ha^ said nothing whatever to put them in the wrong. He does not at all answer them until he proves that the Pure I is conscious as such ; but this he does not even try to prove. So far from this, they can prove to him out of his own mouth that, when he strikes individuality out of the individual I, the residuum which he so jealously guards as a Pure I is, by his own principles, unconscious, and therefore nothing but a Pure It. To show this, we must quote another passage. § 116. "The first question would be, ' How is the I for itself?' and the first postulate, * Think thyself, construct the concept of thyself, and notice how thou doest it.* " Every one who only does this, maintains the philosopher will find that, m the thinking of that concept, his activity as intelli- gence goes back into itself, makes itself its own object. ** In the first place, what in the act described belongs to the phUosopher as such, and what to the I which is to be observed by him V To the I, nothing more than the turning-back into itself ; all else belongs to the relation between it and the philosopher, for whom already exists, as mere fact, that system of completed ex- penence which is to be brought under his gaze by the I, in order that he may learn to know the manner of its origination. " The I goes back into itself, — that is maintained. Does it not then, already exist for itself before this going back, and independ- ently of It? Must it not already exist for itself, in order to be able to make itself the goal of an action ? If this is so, does not your philosophy take for granted what it ought to explain ? 1 "Das Ich ist nur insofem, inwiefern es sich seiner bewusst ist." (Werke, I. 97.) 250 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY " I answer : not at all. First by this act, and by it alone, by an action on an action, which particular action no action in general precedes, does the I originate for itself. Only for the philosopher does it pre-exist as a fact, because he has already passed through the whole experience. He must express himself as he does, simply in order to be understood ; and he can express himself so, because he has already long ago formed all the requisite concepts. ** What, then, considering first of all the observed I, is this its going back into itself ? Under what class of the modifications of consciousness should it be put ? It is not conception [kein Begreifen] ; this originates through the opposition of a Not-I, and through the determination of the I in that opposition. Consequently, it is a mere intuition [eine hlosse Anschauung]. For these reasons, also, it is not consciousness, certainly not self-consciousness [kein Beumsst- sein, nicht einmal Selbstbewusstsein]. Solely because no conscious- ness comes to pass through this simple act [of going back or self-return], another act is inferred by which a Not-I arises for us ; solely by that other act does a progress of philosophical reasoning and the required deduction of the system of experience become possible. By the act described, the I is advanced merely to the possibility of self-consciousness, and with it of all other conscious- ness, but there arises yet no real consciousness [kein wirkliches Beiousstsein]. The act in question is simply a part of that whole procedure of the intelligence by which it brings about its con- sciousness — a part to be isolated by the philosopher alone, but originally not isolated. "On the other hand, how is it with the philosopher? That self-constructing I is no other than his own [Jenes sich selbst con- struirende Ich ist kein andereSj als sein eigenes]. Only in himself can he intuite the act of the I in question, and, in order to be able to intuite it, he must perform it. He produces it in himself volun- tarily and with freedom/' ^ § 117. Here, pointed out and elaborated by Fichte him- self with singular precision, we learn the essential distinc- tion he draws between das Ich and das Individuumy the Pure I and the Eeal I. Nothing whatever belongs to the Pure I, he says, beyond " the return into itself "of an ac- tivity which is absolutely spontaneous and underived, and 1 Werke, I. 458-460. THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 251 whose alleged origin is a mere recoil on itself as "an ac- tion on an action" — a "determinate action" which is ab- solutely unconditioned by any " action in general " prior to itself — an action, therefore, which is confessedly unparall- eled elsewhere, a unit of no universal, a thing of no kind, and for that reason a pure impossibility in being as well as in thought. It could not even appear in Fichte's system as a metaphysical entity, unless, unrecognized by him, his own mind had necessarily supplied motion as the universal conditioning activity of which both the outgo and the self- return of das Ich must be thought as two particular and differently determined units ; for only as such can the "self-returning activity" itself be thought at all. But (waiving this point) the "self-returning activity" is de- termined further in itself as a " mere intuition : " not a " concept," and therefore not a cognition,^ not a " self-con- sciousness," not a " real consciousness " at all. That is to say, the l*ure I, if once divorced from the individuality or personality which is only its non-essentiiil iind perishing "accident," is not in itself even a ''subjt^ct-object," does not know itself, is not conscious of itself, is in itself uncon- scious^ and therefore, by Fichte's own declaration that " the I exists in so far only as it is conscious to itself of itself," * not an existent / at all, but only an existent It, When, therefore, he strikes out of das Ich the individuality or per- sonality which, by his own showing, is the ground of its only possible self-consciousness, he himself reduces das Ich to das Es, and establishes the truth of the very objection which he has vainly tried to refute. But this is not all. Not only does Fichte prove, however much against his will and intent, that the Pure I divested of individuality is nothing whatever but a Pure It, but he also proves that the individual as such is the only Real I — that ^ *' Eine blosse Anschauung giebt kein Bewusstseyn ; man weiss nur von deiujenigeu, was man begreift und denkt." (Werke, I. 491.) ' "Das Ich ist uur iusoferu, inwieferu es sich seiner bewusst ist." iJtM, I. 97.) 252 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY the Pure I becomes a Real I only by becoming individual- ized. His " philosopher as such " is only das Individuum, only an individual who has fitted himself to philosophize; and Fichte, as we have seen, teaches that, in the philoso- pher, " the I which constructs itself is no other than his own.'' In other words, the I becomes real solely by becom- ing an individual ; the " mere intuition " of " self-returning activity " which constitutes the whole being of the Pure I as such, and without which the Pure I itself would vanish, is conditioned on the philosopher's own hidividual or per^ sonal irituition, an intuitive act which the philosopher as an individual or person must perform, and does perform "voluntarily and with freedom," that is, with free self- conscious volition. It is strange that Fichte should not have perceived the real bearing and import of these deter- minations. They do not show, nor tend to show, that das Indioiduum is a mere "accident" of das Ich, and that the Ichheit is absolutely independent of and separable from the Individualltat : on the contrary, they show that das Ich is nothing but an inalienable intuition, a " voluntary and free " act, of das Individuum, and that the Ichheit and the Individualltat inseparably depend on each other. If the individual must vanish, the I-hood which is nothing but his own intuition of " self -returning activity " in himself must vanish with him, and nothing of the I would remain in being, not even an It. If, in order to attain reality, the I must construct itself in the philosopher, not as such, but as an individual merely, then the individual is just as necessary to the I as the I is to the individual ; the univer- sal and the individual must reciprocally condition each other in the unit-universal, as Real I ; and das Ich can never survive das Individuum. These conclusions lie in Fichte's own premises, which he has failed to handle logic- ally. The logical result of his own determinations would simply confirm the results above arrived at in § 59 : namely, that the only Real I, real in any other sense than that of a barren abstraction in speculative metaphysics, is the real THE TRANSITION IN FICHTE 253 individual, the real person as such, and that the scientific- philosophic concept of the real person as such can be noth- ing whatever but the percept-concept : " I know myself in each and all of my conscious states as One of the We." When Fichte, therefore, strikes Individualitdt out of his Ichheit, and das Individuum out of his das Ich, instead of retaining das Ich as a reality, he annihilates the reality of both, and retains das Ich solely as a barren abstraction, a mere object of thought, a mere " entity of reason," das Es, — which is precisely what his opponents charged him with doing, in the objection which he failed to refute. " I think myself," Fichte says, "and that pure self -re turning activity is the real whole of my Pure I." " Not so," might his oppo- nents reply ; " you do not and cannot think yourself at all, unless you think yourself (1) as in each and all of your conscious states, and (2) as One of the We. The first gives you your internal empirical multiplicity or universality; the second gives you your external individuality and ra- tional unity ; both together give you your whole reality as a unit-universal, or possible object of knowledge. And you cannot be an object of knowledge, even to yourself, until you think and know yourself as you are in yourself — a unit-universal. Your Pure I or das Ich is a blank potentiality of self-consciousness, at the most a blank con- dition of it, a mere abstract and unreal It, unless it is com- plemented with your Empirical I or da^ Individuum, It is the inseparable and conditioning union of the two concepts that must constitute your concept of yourself as a Real I, empirical and rational at once, and solely as such, by your own confession, self-conscious or capable of self-conscious- ness." What effective rejoinder could Fichte make to this reply ? § 118. By Fichte's own principles of reasoning, it thus becomes clear that the Pure I retains and can retain no reality whatever, that is, no real self-consciousness, when individuality has " vanished." The I can be real only as the identity in difference of individuality and universality. 254 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY When Fichte made his epochal protest against Kant's I* separation " of subject and object in self-consciousness, he in effect proclaimed the doctrine of their identity in differ- ence as Subject-Object ; by parity of reasoning, he ought to have protested against his " own separation "of the Pure I and the Empirical I, and proclaimed the doctrine of their identity in difference as the Real I. But he did not. The consequence of this inconsequence shows itself in his amaz- ing theory of the origin of das Ich. For he makes this origin an absolute miracle, the absolute self-creation of something out of nothing. This theory lies in a nutshell. It is all condensed into the sentence already quoted: "First by this act, and by it alone, by an action on an action, which particular action no action in general precedes, does the I orlyinate for itself." * No Being {Seyn) other than that of the self-returning activ- ity itself, as " mere intuition," conditions this self-originative act ; no universal activity conditions it as a particular act ; no prior act whatever conditions it ; it is absolutely uncon- ditioned, absolutely spontaneous, absolutely first and sole of its kind; it is something self-born out of nothing. Such a definition defines no concept. It is simply unthinkable. " De nihilo nihil, in nihilum ?iil j)osse reverti,*^ Yet there is in it an element of necessary truth. In any thinking of that which evolves, room must be found for the concept of spontaneity, self-adaptation, or self-determina- tion. In the succession of stages or phases which together constitute the universal evolution-series, each is an individ- ual unit and as such necessarily unique (see § § 81-83) ; and spontaneity is simply the origination of this uniqueness, the becoming of the individual difference, the emergence of the unique unit out of the self -particularizing universal. The universal is itself conditioned by this necessity of self- 1 " Erst durch diesen Act, und ledil THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY § 130. « The I iiituites itself as self-consciousness, and the ex- pression of it in its purity is I r= I, or, I am I.i "This proposition of self-consciousness is pmpty of content. The impulse of the self-consciousness consists in realizing its own concept and giving to itself the consciousness of itself in every- thing. It is active, therefore, (1) in cancelling the otherness of objects of experience [das Anderssein der Gegenstdnde] and positing them as equal to itself, and (2) in alienating itself from itself and in that way giving itself objectivity and existence.* Both are one and the same activity. The becoming-determined [Bestimmtwerden] of the self -consciousness is at the same time its self-determining [Selbstbestimmen], and conversely. It produces itself as object of experience. "In its formation or movement the self-consciousness has the three stages : (1) of desire, in so far as it is directed to other things ; (2) of the relation of mastership and servantship, in so far as it is directed to another self-consciousness which is unequal to it; (3) of the universal self-consciousness which knows itself in other self-consciousnesses, equal to them as they are equal to it. "Both sides of the self-consciousness, the positing and the cancelling, are therefore immediately united with each other. The self -consciousness posits itself through negation of the otherness, and is practical consciousness. When, therefore, in the consciousness proper, which is also called the theoretical, the determinations of it and of the object change in themselves, this happens now through the activity of the consciousness itself, and for it. It is conscious to itself that this cancelling activity belongs to it. In the con- cept of self-consciousness lies the determination of the not yet realized [purely arithmetical] difference. In so far as this difference becomes distinct in it, it has the feeling of an other-being or other- ness in itself, of a negation of itself, or the feeling of a want, a need. " This feeling of its otherness contradicts its equality with itself. The/€// necessity of cancelling this opposition is the impulse. The negation or the otliemess presents itself to it as a thing which 1 Compare Fichte's — *' Ich bin diese Anschauung und snhlechthin nichts weiter, und diese Anschauung selbst ist Ich " (Werko, I. 629), and — "das schlechthin gesetzte X lasst sich auch so ausdriicken : /cA = Ich; Ich bin Ich "(L 94). a Compare Fichte's— *' Ich setze im Ich dem theilbaren Icli ein theil. bares Nicht-Ich entgegen.'* (Werke, I. 110.) THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL 277 is external and different from it, but which is determined by the self-consciousness (1) as a something consonant to the impulse, and (2) as a something negative in itself whose existence is to be cancelled by the self and posited in equality with it. " The activity of desire, therefore, cancels the otherness of the object, 'its existence in general, and unites it with the subject, whereby the desire is gratified. This is accordingly conditioned (1) through an external object which subsists as its equivalent, or through the consciousness ; (2) its activity produces the gratifica- tion only through cancellation of the object. The self-conscious- ness derives thence its self feeling alone. " In desire the self-consciousness is related to itself as individual. It refers to a selfless [selbstlosen] object, which in and for itself is another than the self-consciousness. The latter attains, therefore, to its self-equality with regard to the object solely through can- cellation of it. Desire is in general (1) destructive; (2) in the satisfaction of it, therefore, the result is only the self-feeling of the subject's existence for itself as individual, the undetermined con- cept of the subject combined with objectivity. *' The concept of the self -consciousness, as a subject which is at the same time objective, gives the relation that for the self- consciousness another self -consciousness exists. " A self-consciousness which is for another is not as mere object for it, but as its other self. * I ' is no abstract universality in which, as such, there is no difference or determination. When ' I,' therefore, is object to the I, it is to it, on this side, as the same which it is. It intuites itself in the other. " This self-intuition of the one in the other is (1) the abstract moment of sameness. (2) But each has also the determination that it appears for the other as an external object, and in so far immediate, sensuous, and concrete existence. (3) Each is abso- lutely for itself and individual towards the other, and demands also to be as such for the other, and to be taken at its worth accordingly —to intuite its own freedom as a subject which is for itself in the other, or to be acknowledged by it. " In order to establish its own worth and be acknowledged as free, the self-consciousness must exhibit itself for another as free from the natural existence. This moment is as necessary as the freedom of the self-consciousness in itself. The absolute equality of the I with itself is not essentially an immediate equality, but such as accomplishes itself through annulment of the sensuous 278 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL 279 immediacy, and thereby establishes itself for another, also, as free and independent from the sensuous. Thus it shows itself to be in agreement with its concept, and must be acknowledged because it gives to the I reality." [Here we omit some sections which relate to the doctrine of mastership and servantship, but not to the matter in hand.] " The universal self-consciousness is the intuition of itself, not as a self which is particular and different from others, but as the self which exists in itself and is universal. Thus it recognizes in itself both itself and the other self-consciousnesses, and is recog- nized by them. " According to this its essential universality, the self-conscious- ness is real only in so far as it knows its reflection in others (I know that others know me as themselves), and as pure spiritual universality belonging to the family, the fatherland, and so forth, knows itself as essential self. (This self-consciousness is the foun- dation of all virtues, of love, honor, friendship, valor, all sacrifice, all fame, and so forth.)" § 131. However different may be the form of expression, Hegel's theory of the I and the We is in ail essential deter- minations identical with Fichte's, as plainly appears in the foregoing statements. His "universal self-consciousness," or Pure I, is the self-returning and self-determining activity of pure " self -intuition," empty of all content, of all partic- ularity or manifoldness, of all difference from others, the " universal self " which exists in and for itself as " essen- tial self " (to ctSos TO €v6v in 6 tU avOporTro^, the vovs) ; it con- tains no principle of plurality or individuation other than that of mere number or pure arithmetical unity (to apiOfnZ cv), and even for this there is no more rational ground than is to be found in Aristotle. Nay, the " universal self-con- sciousness " does not become " real " at aU, even as a bare arithmetical unit, until it " knows its reflection in another ; " that is, until it has become an empirical consciousness in " the family, the fatherland, and so forth." In other words, just as Aristotle denied reality to Plato's ideas when separated from their appearances in single things, yet con- ceded reality to single things themselves solely in virtue of the idea or essential universal inherent in them as individ- uals, — just as Fichte denied reality or self-consciousness to the Pure I, until it had " constructed itself " in the " philosopher as such " or the empirical individual in gen- eral, yet conceded reality to the individual himself solely in virtue of the abiding Ich-helt immanent in his vanishing IndividuaHtdf, — precisely so does Hegel deny reality to the "self-consciousness according to this its essential univer- sality " until it "appears for the other as an external object, and in so far immediate, sensuous, and concrete existence," yet concede reality to this " self-consciousness for the other " only in so far as, while still immanent in this ex- ternal object, it " exhibits itself for an other as free from the natural existence " — as " free and independent of the sensuous." Thus for Hegel, no less than for Fichte, the Pure I in its purity is not a real self-consciousness at all, — is in itself and for itself alone unreal and unconscious, — is in truth not a Pure I, but a Pure It (§ 117) ; a Pure It, moreover, which can become a E-eal I solely as an Em- pirical I (§ 118), and which loses all its reality and relapses once more into a Pure It, when reines Denken separates reason and experience, suppresses the empirical individual difference, cancels the individual as such, and again resolves the " universal self-consciousness " into a real unconscious- ness, § 132. In the first three paragraphs translated above in § 130, a keen eye will easily detect the essential features of Ficlite's theory of the " transference " of self-consciousness, as developed out of Kant's original hint and as criticised in the last chapter. Hegel holds that the self-consciousness is impelled to realize its own conceptual essence in the form of externality, and to renew or duplicate itself in every such external form, whether in that of " the other " as " object " (Fichte*s das Es as das Object uberhatipt) or in 280 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY that of " the other " as " self -consciousness " (Fichte's das Ich iiberhaupt, d. h. das Nicht- Object). In either case, the subject "produces" its "other" out of itself, and neces- sarily encounters the impossibility of "transferring" its own self-consciousness, as already explained (§§ 102, 120).^ To the It, or mere object, the subject attributes its own " thought, reflection, or form," as the object's only true essence or "inwardness;" it thus alienates itself from it- self, cancels the object's otherness or " other-being," equates it with itself, and makes itself thereby an objective reality, either as a thoughUhing or as another self, the Thou. To this Thou, Other-I, or conscious object, the subject attrib- utes a real relationship to itself, whether as unequal (master or servant) or as equal (pure unit of universal self- consciousness). But the whole of this activity, whether positing or cancelling, is only an elaborate and complicated " transferring ; " it happens within the pure subject itself, 1 "Das Inruire der Dinge ist der Gedanke oder Begriff derselben. Indem das Bewusstsein das Innere zum Gegenstando hat, hat es deii Gedanken odev eben so sehr seine eigeue Reflexion oder Form, somit iiberhaupt sich zum Gegenstande. ... Der Trieb des Selbstbewusstseins besteht darin, seinen Begriff" zu reaUsiren und in AUera sich das Bewusst- sein seiner zu geben. . . . Es bringt sich selbst als Gegenstand hervor " (Werke, XVIIL 84.) These last words of Hegel are a manifest equivalent m idea to Fichte's : " Auf etwas, das in diesem ersten Setzen als ein Es, als blosses Object, als etwas ausser uns gesetzt worden, wird der in uns selbst gewordene Begriff der Ichheit ubertragen, nnd damit synthetisch veremigt ; und durch diese bedingte Synthesis erst entsteht uns ein Du Der Begiiff des Du entsteht aus der Vereinigung des Es und des Ich." (Werke, I. 502.) For the subject can ^^ give itself consciousness of itself in everything " solely by some mode of - transference " of that conscious- ness. In the Phanomenologie, Werke, II. 131-140, Hegel explains dia- lectically the mode of this " transference " in a way i>eculiarly his own, but not in a way to remove the impossibility of it. If the subject "pro- duces itself as object," it matters not whether that object is an It or an I • for self-consciousness is absolutely and forever non-transferable, and can only be evolved in a new unit of existence through the generic unity of apperception. The I producing and the I produced can only be one and the same I, as Fichte saw and admitted. A new I can originate in the We alone. THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL 281 and for itself; it cannot transcend the subject; it is nothing but the motion of the Ber/riffas pure self-determi- nation in the sphere of pure thought, and is no warrant what- ever for considering this strictly subjective dialectical process as capable of establishing valid distinctions of any sort in the carefully excluded sphere of empirical reality. The triadic dialectic movement is all within the universal self-consciousness as such, and has nothing to do with a plurality of empirical units, whether unconsciousnesses or other self-consciousnesses. When it comes to that, Hegel is as impotent as Fichte. If he is bent on recognizing the empirical plurality of I*s as the We, he can only murmur something about the pure subject's " realizing its own coni cept and giving itself consciousness of itself in everything." But that is a mere euphuism for the fantastic doctrine of " transference," which needs no further discussion. HegePg Thou, like Fichte's, is neither more nor less than a marion- ette, and his We remains still undifferentiated from his I : "JcA, das Wir^ und Wir das Ich 1st.*' § 133. It is all in vain that, out of an evident discon- tent with this Kantian-Fichtian theory of " transference," Hegel seeks to find some ground of real plurality of self- consciousnesses in the pure concept of self -consciousness as such. He has expressed this concept in the first sentence of the passage quoted: "The I intuites itself as self- consciousness, and the expression of it in its purity is, 1 = 1, or, I am I." Later, he says : " In the concept of self- consciousness lies the determination of the not yet realized difference. In so far as this difference becomes distinct in it, it has the feeling of an other-being or otherness in itself, of a negation of itself, or the feeling of a want, a 7ieedJ^ Is this true ? Does Hegel derive these elements of " feel- ing "(Gefilhl), " want " (Mangel), " need " (Bedurfniss), and, as he goes on to say, " desire " (Ber/ierde) and its " gratifi- cation " {Befriedigung), from the pure concept in its purity ^s lam I? Or rather must he derive them from that mere empirical individuality, that impure element of mere indi- 282 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY vidual experience as such, which the pure concept rigor- ously excludes^ Hegel finds himself helpless in carrying out his dialectical development of the pure self-conscious- ness without introducing into it these elements of the empirical consciousness — "feeling," "want," "need," "desire," "gratification," and so on; and it is futile to claim that these empirical elements lie already in the pure concept as the " not yet realized difference." If the differ- ence involves these empirical elements, it cannot be itself involved in the pure concept. One cannot have his cake, and eat it too, — not even in reines Denken, " Desire " and its " gratification " are no grounds of pure thought, no grounds on which to rest the deduction of a plurality of self-consciousnesses in a system which professes to unfold the purely dialectical self-evolution of the pure concept. The bare " I am I " cannot contain or involve the Other-I, the Thou, the We, even as a " not yet realized difference." Nor is Hegel's other attempt more successful. " The concept of the self-consciousness," he says, " as a subject which is at the same time objective, gives the relation that for the self-consciousness another self-consciousness exists." This assertion is quite too bold. As Fichte proved (§ 108), Kant's separation of the subject and object in self-con- sciousness is unthinkable ; they are inseparable as subject- object. The very essence of self-consciousness is the identity in difference of subject and object ; it is subject-object, or nothing at all. But the reality of one subject-object does not give the independent reality of another subject-object, except in and through the We as their common universal (generic unity of apperception). HegePs statement is sur- prisingly sophistical. The " concept of self-consciousness " is that of " a subject which is at the same time objective " — objective to itself alone ; it is not, as Hegel here employs it, that of " a subject which is at the same time objective " — objective to another. Neither does it nor can it " give the relation that for the self-conciousness another self-con- sciousness exists," unless it is logical to argue that, because THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL 283 " A exists," therefore " B exists " — which is the impossible inference from particular to particular. How Hegel could have fallen into such an error as to find a plurality of sub- jects involved in " a subject which is objective " to itself alone, is not to be explained, in view of Kant's explicit warning against it on merely logical grounds : " That the I of apperception (for that reason in every act of thought) is a singular^ which cannot be resolved into a plurality of sub- jects, and therefore denotes a logically simple subject, lies already in the concept of thinking [/. e. * ich dcnke '], and is, therefore, an analytical proposition." ^ It is an error which is not in the least explained, but only deepened, by HegePs fuller exposition of his doctrine in the Phdnomenologie, as follows (we preserve his own italics) : — § 134. " In life, which is the object of the desire, the negation is either in an other^ namely, in the desire, or as determinateneas in comparison with another equivalent form, or as its inorganic uni- versal nature. This universal independent nature, in wliich the nej;ation is as absolute, is the speoies (Gattung) as such, or as self- conseiousness. The self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self consciousness. "The conce|3t of self-consciousness is first perfected in these three moments: (a) pure indifferentiated I is its first immediate object. (6) This immediacy, however, is itself absolute media- tion; it is only a6 annulment of the independent object, or it is desire. The satisfaction of the desire is, indeed, the reflection of the self-consciousness into itself, or the self-certainty developed (gewordejie) into truth, (c) But the truth of the same is rather the doubled reflection, the reduplication of the self-consciousness. It is for the consciousness an object which posits in itself its other- being or the difference as an invalid one, and in this [procedure] is independent. In the process of life itself, indeed, the differen- tiated merely lirimj form animls its own independence, too, but ceases with its difference to be what it is.; the object of the self- consciousness, however, is equally independent in this nej^ativity of itself, and by that it is for itself species, universal fluidity in the particularity of its separation — it is living self-consciousness. » Kr. d. r. Vem., Werke, III. 278. 284 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHr THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL 285 " A self-consciousness is for a self -consciousness. First by this [relation] does it in fact exist; for first in this there becomes for it the unity of itself in its other-being j /, which is the object of its concept, is in fact not object ; the object of desiie, however, is only independent, for it is the universal indestructible substance, the fluid self-equal essence. Since a self-consciousness is the object, it is just as much I as object. With this, the concept of the spirit is already present for us. What further becomes for the conscious- ness is the experience what the spirit is, this absolute substance which, in the perfect freedom and independence of its antithesis, namely, of diverse self-consciousnesses existing for themselves, is their unity : the / is the We, and the We is the /. First in the self-consciousness, as the concept of the spirit, has the conscious- ness its turning-point, at which, out of the colored show of the sensuous Here and out of the empty night of tlie supersensuous Beyond, it advances into the spiritual day of the present." ^ § 135. In this passage lies Hegel's attempt at a rational transition from the I to the We, through the dialectical self-evolution of the "concept of self-consciousness," the BegHffoi the reines Ich. He here states its three essential "moments," that is, the essential movements, stages, or steps, in the " motion " {Bewegung) of its self-evolution as pure self-determination. (a) In its pure self-position and self-intuition as I = I, the subject has, for its immediate object, itself as "pure undifferentiated I." That is, the object is empty of all difference, determination, or content ; it is " the fluid self- equal essence," "the universal indestructible substance," of the I as such, — not an absolute vacuum, but the pure universal which implicitly contains everything in itself, or in which everything lies concealed.^ 1 Phanomenologie des Geistes, Werke, IL 138-140. ^ **So ist denn Ich das Allgemeine, in welchem von allem Besonderen abstrahirt ist, in welchem aber zugleich AUes verhiillet liegt. Es ist des- halb nicht die bios abstrakte Allgemeinheit, sondem die Allgemeinheit, welche Alles in sich enthalt." (Encyklopadie, Werke, VI. 48) — " Das erste dieser Momente ist das der mit sich identischen Allgemeinheit, gleichsam das neutrale erste Wasser, worin Alles enthalten, aber noch nichts geschieden ist. Der zweite ist dann die Besonderung dieses Allgemeinen, \> (b) "Desire" of "life," discontent with the emptiness of its immediate object, impels the subject (Trieb des Selbstbewusstseins) to negate the object as "pure undif- ferentiated I." ^ But the negation of pure undifferentiation is the position of difference, and the " desire " can be " satis- fied " only by positing such a difference in the I-object as shall make it reflect the I-subject. But the I-object by reflecting the I-subject becomes itself I-subject as well as I-object; it becomes another subject-object, another self- consciousness. The I has duplicated itself. (c) The self-consciousness now negates its own negation ; it negates the difference it has just posited, and again posits its own original self-certainty or unity with itself in a higher unity; it posits the truth of its own self- certainty as the doubled reflection of each in the other, the reduplication of self-consciousness. The other self- consciousness which it has posited in the object is just as independent as itself, and now posits itself, not as other- being for the first, but as being for itself ; it is no longer only object, but also subject {ebenso wohl Ich, wle Gegen- stand). The two self-consciousnesses, then, are numeri- cally, but not conceptually, two ; they are empirically or phaenomenally two units, but conceptually one universal; there is no conceptual difference between them ; each unit [to dpt^/x<3 tv\ is pure subject-object, no more and no less, that and that only. In this higher unity with itself {die Einheit seiner selbst in seinem Anderssein), the Pure I wodurch dasselbe einen bestimmten Inhalt bekommt. Indem dann dieser bestimmte Inhalt durch die Bethatigung des Allgemeinen gesetzt ist, so kehrt dieses durch denselben zu sich selbst zuriick, und schliesst sich mit sich selbst zusammen." {Ibid. VI. 380.) 1 Hegers doctrine of Negation has been explained and criticised above, in the footnote to § 67. The " negation " of the dialectic movement does not give the vacuum {die Leerlieit) or the pure nothing {cin leeres NicMs, das reine Nichts), but the nothing which is a determinate and has a con- tent {ist ein Bcstimmtes und liat einen Inhalt). Here not the I itself is negated, but only its undifferentiation, and the nothing of that is, of course, the difference. 286 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL becomes the unity of all the plural independent self-con- sciousnesses (die Einheit verschiedener fiXr sich seyondcr Selhsthetvusstsein) ; it is universal fluidity, with no solution of continuity in the particularity of its separateness ; it is living self-consciousness, a self-consciousness for another self-consciousness. The I is the We, and the We is the I ; the two are conceptually one and the same; the I = the We = the Species (Ga^ww*/) =the Reason (Vtmunft) = the Spirit {Geisty 1 Kuno Fischer, restating Hegel, enumerates the stages of the whole phaenomenological development substantially as follows : I. Conscimisnesg as (1) the sensuous certainty, (2) the perceiving consciousness, (3) the understanding, and (4) the single Self; IL Self-Cansciousncss as (1) the desiring self-consciousness, (2) the recognizing self -consciousness, (3) the universal self-consciousness or the Reason, and (4) the consciousness of reason, the truth knowing itself, or the Spirit. (Geschichte der ncucm Philosophic, Jubilaumsausgabe, VIII. 666-671. This volume appeared after the present chapter was written.) As to the transition from the I to the We, he says: *• Among the living objects which, in fullilment of its desire, the single self-consciousness destroys, devours, and makes away with, are also self-conscious beings ; for the living thing which has the impulse to raise itself above its own existence is self-conscious. The single self- consciousness is now encountered by anoUier single self-conscionsness, the I by another I ; their demeanor to each other in mutual strife and the re- lation of irmstership and scrvantship leads to mutual rccofpiitimi. This whole process in all its moments and stages is nametl by Hegel the rcaxj- nizing self-conscioiisncss. . . . Out of the relation of mastership and servantship develops itself the rccogT^king sd/-conscioiisness, the conscious- ness of the equality of essence between I and I. This essence, however, in which the differing Is are equal and identical, hence one and only one, is the Rcasmi. Consequently, the recognizing self-consciousness has for its object and theme, no longer the single, atomic, mutually exclusive in- dividuals, but their identity, — no longer the single I, but Uie We; it is no longer the individual self-consciousness, but the iinivirml self-con- scioiimess, or the Reason." (Tlie italics are Fischer's.) In other words, Hegel, like Fichte, excludes all Individual itiit from the Ichhcit ; the We IS not the correlated total reality of many I's, but merely their common identical essence, which is neither individual nor personal, the Aristot«»- lian cWoy r6 ^i'6i' ; and the "universal self-consciousness" is nothinff but Aristotle's impersonal vov%. Hegel's actual transition from one I to an- other I is wholly empirical, arbitrary, assertive, naive, — mere echo of 287 This abortive attempt to effect a rational transitiofi from the I to the We and from the We to the Absolute Spirit, is the dialectical evolution of the Hegelian Paradox. Hegel began with Fichte and now ends with Fiehte : " All indi- viduals are included in the one great Unity of the Pure Spirit." ^ Both, with Aristotle, acknowledge reality and intelligibility in the immanent universal alone (to cTSo? to cVoV), as the conceptual essence of the individual ; and both, discarding the individual difference as accidental and unintelligible, concede to the individual no individuality or personality which is other than merely numerical, empiri- cal, phaenomenal, and therefore evanescent. The pure unity of the Ichheit " includes," indeed, the arithmetical plurality of Individualitat, but only to dissolve it again in itself; and the Pure I, like the vov?, is a "universal self- consciousness" which, containing no principle of concep- tual difference or individuation, leaves the empirical individual utterly unexplained and phantasmal, and, as with Aristotle, reduces itself to a real unconsciousness, an impersonal reason, a Pure It. The dialectical evolution of the Pure I becomes thus its dialectical dissolution. § 136. But let us more narrowly examine the process as Hegel presents it, and inquire into its validity as a process of "pure thought." 1. In the formula of the pure self-consciousness as common sense ; while his transition from the I to the We is simply tran- sition from the I's empirical individuality to its own rational and imma- nent universality — from the I as rbde ri to the I itself as elSoj rh ivl^. For him, the We does not exist at all except phaenonienally ; from the Real I to the Real We he makes actually no rational transition wlwatever ; and the Hegelian Paradox shows itself as merely the Aristotelian Paradox applied. Fischer throws absolutely no light on the difficulties of either, and remains unconscious of them ; hence he anticipates none of the criti- cisms of our present chapter. * ** Alle Individuen sind in der Einen grosscn Einheit dcs reinen Gcistes eingeschlossen : dies sey das letzte Wort, wodurch ich mich Ihrem Andenken empfehle ; und das Andenken, zu dem ich mich Ihnen cmpfehle." (Fichte, Werkc, I. 416.) II 288 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL 289 subject-object, 1 = 1, the immediate I-object is "pure undifferentiated I." The truth of the equation itseli requires, then, that the I-subject shall be likewise « pure undifferentiated I." Each is absolutely and equally empty of all difference or distinguishable content; neither contains anything but pure conceptual emptiness ; neither possesses even numerical unity in itself to reflect into the other, for, if either were a numerical unit in itself, the equation would then necessarily present two self-consciousyiesses at the start, the one subject-object would be already doubled, and the first moment of the triad would be a bald begging of the question. It would be absurd to represent the explicit "reduplication of the seJf-consciousness " in the third moment as an evolution from the first, if the first already contains and exhibits that explicit reduplication. Keitlier I-object nor I-subject, therefore, in the formula, I = I, is a numerical unit in itself ; and neither can reflect into the other a numerical unity or numerical " otherness " which it does not possess. Hence the equation, I = I, as the " expression of self-consciousness in its purity, '^ is of necessity the expression of " subject-object " as ojie unit, and not as tivo units. This was the capital truth which Fichte vindicated against Kant. But that which is so empty of all difference or content as to be in itself not even a numerical unit, not even "a something," cannot be dis- tinguished from " nothing " {die Leerheit, das reine Nichts). Hence the formula of pure self-consciousness, 1 = 1, is precisely equivalent to = 0, and what cannot be evolVed out of the latter cannot be evolved out of the former. From that equation, = 0, not even Hegel would pretend to evolve a " reduplication of self-consciousness." The = 0, however, really expresses the truth that there is no such thing as "pure self-consciousness;" for all self- consciousness that is real is both rational and empirical at once, never "pure," and its true formula is "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states " ( § 59). The first moment of Hegel's triad lies, therefore, between . \ lii Scylla and Charybdis : the equation 1 = 1, either postulates two self-consciousnesses at the start as coequal units, as 1 = 1, and thereby begs the question of the " reduplication of self-consciousness," or else it is equivalent to = 0, and goes no farther. 2. Hegel makes his election in the former alternative; he is, of course, unconscious of begging the question, but he begs it, nevertheless. He illicitly introduces numerous empirical elements into his pure concept. That is, in the formula, I = I, he takes the I-subject virtually as a full- fledged empirical self-consciousness, endowed with " desire " and the power of " gratifying " it, determined in itself as a numerical unit and " certain " of itself as such, and enabled to " reflect " this its own individual unity into the I-object ; further, he takes the I-object, ostensibly defined as " pure undifferentiated I," as in fact an empirical "other," another empirical self-consciousness, stout enough to resist and defeat the sublating or annulling attack of the I-sub- ject, to maintain its own "independence," and to establish its own independent " being-for-self " by "reflecting" back into the I-subject as defiant a self-assertion as its own. Frankenstein has created his "monster." But "desire," "gratification," "reflection," "certainty," numerical unity, Trieh, — all these, without which the triad of moments would lack all mediation, are empirical determinations which cannot possibly exist, either in the I-object or in the I-subject, as " pure undifferentiated I." Yet Hegel is obliged to assume their presence in both, if the motion of the Begriff is to move at all. The result, however, is to beg the question by assuming these differences, these em- pirical determinations, in the "pure undifferentiated I" with which he starts. 3. On these easy terms, he arrives in the third moment at the Verdopphmg des SelhsthewusstseinSy the plurality of independent self-consciousnesses, as if the result were a pure self-determining motion of the Begriff in the "ele- ment of pure thought." In truth, the process is nothing YOL. I. 19 iopa). " Pure individuality," however, has been proved to be neither more nor less than the empty arithmetical unity of to apLOfi(^ ev; and this arithmetical unity, be it never so empty, has been proved to be neither more nor less than empirical individuality. (§ 140.) Of two things, therefore, one is necessarily true : (1) if the "1 = 1" is really pure from aU individuality, as it must be if it is " pure," it becomes " = " ; the I itself disap- pears in identity without difference, the universal without 1 Encyklopiidie, Werke, VI. 315: * ' Der Begritf ist das Freie . . . uml iat Totalitat . . ." 310 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL 311 any units, which is unreal, unthinkable, and for that reason unspeakable ; and, when I say " I," I say nothing at all ; or, (2) if the "1 = 1" contains any individuality whatever, even in the form of the empty arithmetical unity, then, when I say " I," I say the individual as well a« the uni- versal. In either case, Hegel's view is utterly untenable. If it is true that "/is only a universal," the word means nothing and says nothing ; but, if / is a unit-universal, then the word says what it means and means what it says. It avails nothing to urge the shallow truism that / is a word of universal application, — that "everybody is that which I say : /, this individual I" Words are universal rep- resentatives, but what they represent in any given instance is the meaning intended or the meaning understood (speaker and hearer are the factors in all speech). They can repre- sent nothing else. Every word is a unit-universal, a uni- versal symbol applied to a particulai- case, a saying of "something," which is itself of necessity a unit-universal; every word, therefore, both means and utters the particu- larity as well as the universality. It must say "some- thing" or "nothing." Otherwise speech would cease to be speech, and all communication of meanings would become impossible. Hegel's reasoning here is sophistical to the last degree. What / says is determined, not alone by the universality of its application as a mere word, but equally by the individuality of the speaker who applies it to himself and himself alone; it must and does mean and say /u'm, and no other. This necessity of determining it by individuality of application as well as by universal- ity of applicability constitutes the very possibility of lan- guage as such; without it, nothing whatever is said or could be said. It is absolutely untrue, then, that " /is only a universal," and the untruth is apparent in a test case. If the state- ment were true, it would follow that, since " the I is the We and the We is the I," all I's are one and the same, in- distinguishable as one and the same pure universal; all difference between one I and another I, even empty numer- ical difference, vanishes absolutely in this universality, if it is indeed pure. Consequently, the relation between speaker and hearer, if thought, must be that of absolute identity, and, if said, will become the judgment, "I am You." But nothing could be clearer to either of them than that this is a false judgment, and that the only true judg- ment is, " I am 7iot You." That not is the absolute dis- proof that "/ is only a universal" — absolute proof that " I " and " You " are not only each a unit-universal in itself, but also, taken together, two unit-universals which cannot be identified as indistinguishably one. That is what the true judgment means, and that is what it says. Hegel's assertion, therefore, that I may mean the individual, but must say the universal only, falls to the ground — goes to wreck in that not. I can say neither the pure universal nor the pure individual : I can only mean, and I can only say, the unit-universal. § 146. When, in the second passage translated above, Hegel says that, "when I say /, I mean myself as this individual and completely determined person," the state- ment is unexceptionably true. But, when he adds, "yet in fact I express nothing particular about myself," the addi- tion is wholly untrue; for what I express is my own particularity, as an absolutely unique person, and nothing could be more particular than that. If HegePs notion of personality as the pure " I = I," the pure self-consciousness stripped of all empirical conscious states, were true to the fact, his addition would be true, too. But, if the notion of personality as "I know myself in each and all of my conscious states as One of the We," is true to the fact (§ 59), his addition is completely untrue ; for each of my conscious states is particular and unique in my whole consciousness, and T myself am particular and unique as one, and no other one, in tlie We. To "pure thought" as the Hegolian concept^]ihi]oso|)liy, "/ is the pure being- 312 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL for-self in which every particular is negated and cancelled — that ultimate, simple, and pure element of conscious- ness ; " which is nothing but a Pure It. But to scientific thought as knowledge of the real world in history, and so in the history of philosophy, / is the unduplicated self- conscious being of my real person, not for myself alone (im- manent end), but just as much for the common being of all in the organism of persons as the human race (exient end) ; which is a Real I in a Real We. It is enough to contrast the two notions in outline, and leave them so for the present. § 147. In the third and fourth extracts above, Hegel indicates with precision his conception of personality, freely and more fully restated as follows : — 1. Individuality as such is simple singleness, the empty arithmetical unity with no empirical determinations, the numerically one continent of the universal essence as species with no content of individual difference as specimen (toSc Tt as only to dpLOfiw cv), pure specific essence with no reific essence, the pure one which is also pure universal. 2. Individuality as / is the single personality, not as the empirical I with its merely perceptive content, the " suc- cession of perceptions " which is its " particular " or " abso- lutely accidental side," but rather as the pure I with its conceptual content of " I = I," the specific essence as indifferently I or We, the pure arithmetical unit of self- consciousness as such. Personality is single but pure the pure one which is in itself pure universal. 3. Such a pure personality is that of God, the Abso- lute One which is the Absolute Universal, the "1 = 1" as " Universality = Individuality,'^ the "absolute Spirit" which is the " relation " of mutual recognition, mutual opposition, and mutual reconciliation of these two I*s in the "reconciling Fes." But it is real only as an idea (Gedanke), and has no existence except in thought. 4. The principle of personality is universality that is, universality which admits no other individuality than 313 empty arithmetical unity, the pure one which is in itself the pure universal (1) as pure individuals in "absolute discontinuity " of the universal essence, and (2) as unity of all the pure individuals in "unbroken continuity" of the universal essence. (How the many pure individuals of the " absolute discontinuity " can become the one pure universal of the " unbroken continuity " without sacrificing their empty arithmetical unity remains unexplained.) This is HegePs best endeavor to conceive " pure person- ality "— personality which shall be "perfectly universal," "the universal in which there is abstraction from every particular, but in which at the same time all lies con- cealed," " the pure being-for-self in which every particular is negated and annulled — that ultimate, simple, and pure element of consciousness." But this best endeavor was from the first a foreordained failure, not from any lack of subtilty or speculative genius in Hegel, but from the intrinsic impossibility of thinking the absolutely self- contradictory and conceiving the inconceivable. He wants to conceive a universal in which there shall be no particu- lars, yet in which there shall be pure numerical units as pure particularitf/ ; whereas all units qua units are impure (empirical) and themselves 'particulars, and particularity as such is synonymous with impurity. He wants to conceive a universal in which " unbroken continuity," as pure uni- versality, shall be equated with " absolute discontinuity," as pure individuality; that is, in which no-particulars shall be equated with all-particulars, no-individuals with all- individuals. He wants, in short, to conceive a pure uni- versal which yet shall not be a pure universal, and the result is, not a pure concept, but no concept at all. For his "1 = 1" is construed as " pure universality = pure individuality," i. e, "pure identity = pure difference," or « identity without difference = difference without iden- tity," which is an irremediable self-contradiction and a speculative absurdity. If it had been construed as "uni- versality in individuality = individuality in universality," • ) /I 31^ THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL 315 i, e, "identity in difference = difference in identity," it would have expressed at least the possibility of considering the real unit-universal in its twofold aspect, (1) in the aspect of its universality as a rational whole of seriated and empirically known self-conscious states, and (2) in the aspect of its individuality or unity as one of the We ; but this would have been the expression, not at all of the impossible Pure /, but of the Real or Rational- Empirical I (§§ 60-71) — recognition, therefore, of the necessary truth that the empirical consciousness and the rational self- consciousness reciprocally condition each other, and that neither one nor the other can either be or be thought alone. But this recognition would have been recognition of the absolute impossibility of "absolute idealism" as reines Denken, It is no escape from this self-contradiction in HegePs outcome, as the equation of universality with individuality in the pure universal as Absolute Spirit, to plead that, in the " pure individuality," all the individuals or particulars as such are annulled (aufgehohen), and that the " pure in- dividuality " is retained solely as an absorbed result. For individuality or particularity, however pure, is nothing but the specific common essence of individuals or particulars as such^ inseparable from them as they are inseparable from it; whence it follows that, if the individuals or particu- lars are annulled, the individuality or the particularity must be annulled with them — cannot be retained with- out them, just as the idea of motion cannot be retained without the idea of that which moves. But to annul the individuality would destroy one member of the "1 = 1" and so break up the whole Begriff in "pure thought" itself. In order to avoid this, Hegel has no option but to retain the "pure individuality" as a member of his equation, and therewith the individuals or particulars, as at least pure arithmetical units. But he takes his revenge upon them for this obstinate intrusion by identifying them as a mass with "the Evil," while the "pure universality" he identifies with " Duty " or the Good. There is immense significance in this. For he thus buries ethical dualism in the very heart of his " pure personality," irreconcilable discord in the " personality of God," even if this has no existence, as he says, except in thought ; and his Geister, his beide Ich, whose two concurrent Yeses, as a mere treaty, constitute the '* reconciling Fes" which, even in thought, is the only existence of the Two I's as One I {Daseyn des zur Zweiheit ausgedehnten Ichs\ would be most fittingly named as Ormuzd and Ahriman, if not as Jehovah and Satan.* § 148. This ethical dualism in the " personality of God," however, would possess more significance than it does, if it were not so evidently formal rather than ethical, mathemati- cal rather than spiritual. For it reduces Good and Evil themselves to mere relations of pure number, — to empty arithmetical unity ("unbroken continuity") as related to empty arithmetical multiplicity ("absolute discontinuity") in an impersonal It, as their mere " relation " of equality, recognition, opposition, and reconciliation. HegePs " pure personality " thus reduces itself to absolute impersonality. It consists in excluding from real personality as it is ex- l^rienced (" I know myself in each and all of my conscious states as One of the We ") every element which is derived from experience, — every element, therefore, which in- volves conduct or the laws of conduct, the essence of all real ethics. It is nothing but abstraction carried to the last limit of attenuation, to the very verge of absolute nothingness, since its only content is the absolutely barren tautology, "1 = 1." If Good and Evil, moreover, when 1 It is, of course, not difficult to discern in Hegel's notion of "pure personality " as One I in Two I's an obscure allusion to the doctrine of the Trinity— "universality " as the Father, "individuality" as the Son, and the " reconciling Yes " as the Holy Spirit. But the identification of "individuality" with "the Evil" reduces the whole notion to utter con- fusion and chaos. " Nur die Dreieinigkeit ist also die Bestimmung Gottes als Geist, Geist ist ohne diese Bestimmung ein leeres Wort." (Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XL 22.) r ^ 316 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY II identified respectively with "pure universality " and "pure individuality," had any positive ethical significance what- ever, such an identification would give them nothing but a false significance ; for ethical good and evil concern the Real I alone, into which, as unit-universal, both uni- versality and individuality enter as constitutive factors, and by which, as real person in the organism of persons, good and evil must be found in practical truth or untruth to the organic-personal constitution of the We. So far as HegePs " pure personality " is concerned, then, its " pure universality *' and " pure individuality," by his own account, possess only mathematical significance, and his "Good" and "Evil" are (in this connection) words without ethical or spiritual meaning of any sort. But in another aspect they possess a profound philosophical sig- nificance quite unintended by Hegel himself. His effort to eliminate all empirical elements from the I as " pure person- ality," and his supposition that he has done this by reduc- ing empirical individuality to the empty arithmetical unity of "pure individuality" as one of the three essential moments of the Pure Notion of the Absolute Spirit, when in truth this "pure individuality" is itself unsuspected empirical individuality to the very last, reveal the utter impossibility of "pure thought" as such. The Hegelian Paradox is founded on the Aristotelian Paradox, and this is founded on the assumed impossibility of knowing the individual difference — on the principle, therefore, of the absolute conceptual indifference of species and specimen. HegePs application of this principle to the Absolute Spirit as the absolute conceptual indifference of the I and the We, or their absolute indistinguishableness, renders impossible any rational transition from the one to the other, any rational comprehension of either, any true idea of Man, of Nature, of God. This total defeat of philosophy as Begriffs- philo Sophie or rdnes Dmken lay in the essential nature of its aim, not in any defect of genius in its great advocates and formulators; it lay in the very attempt to separate THE TRANSITION IN HEGEL 317 reason and experience, instead of recognizing their neces- sary identity in difference ; and its remedy lies in the law of unit-universals as rational reform of the Aristotelian and Hegelian Paradoxes. The advent of Darwinism was the passing of the Greek-German concept-philosophy and the Hegelianism which was its splendid culmination. END OF VOL. L / \ u » < u> o^ X iff?£K»-ii^',»^-, ^m ."■■ \^ .If- ^4- 'A' v^^ ■rf Si, J^ii fe-r.%'.- »s ^H- '*•; ^fl^ X'-t ,^£"5 r^:*- ' 4S^? .■X ■J|f '^-^ ■^^A , 1 • I \3\AU W 11 in titi? ®itu of ll^tv ^arh GIVEN BY •3?^i This book is dae two weeks from the last date stamped below, and if not returned or renewed at or before that time a fine of five cents a day will be incurred. ^uii ft ii*> 22lllay43 %\ U'AI i'!i*!BPt.»«n?"^aB^< ' •«»>•» r-;-OF-r jrA^*~(»'^iifi THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY OB PROLEGOMENA TO SCIENCE THE r I SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY OB PROLEGOMENA TO SCIENCE BT FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT, Ph.D. Knowing Is the measure of the man. By how mach we know, so much we are. Ralph Waldo Emkbson. The man who knows not that he knows not aught— He is a fool ; no light shall ever reach liim. Who knows he knows not and would fain be taught — He 18 but simple ; take thou him and teach him. But whoso, knowing, knows not that he knows — He is asleep ; go thou to him and wake him. The truW wise both knows and knows he knows — Cleave thou to him and never more forsake him. Arabian Proverb, IN TWO V0LUME3 Vol. II BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY 1906 Copyrifjhtf 1906, By K. Stanley Abbot. All rights reserved Piil.lished October, 1906 I CONTENTS VOLUME TWO Chapter ^^^^ XII. The Syllogistic Must 1 Xin. The Syllogism in General: Nine Canons of Syllogistic ^^ XIV. The Syllogism of Being 59 XV. The Syllogism of Knowledge 92 XVI. The Syllogism of Philosophy 132 XVII. Philosophical Method as Dialectic .... 175 XVlll. Philosophical Method and System as Syllo- GISTIC *** THE UNPrERSTTT PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, U. 8. A. TABLES Table IV. Critical Idealism : Object of Knowledge V. Critical Realism: Object of Knowledge VI. Synopsis of Syllogistic Philosophy . . . VII. Ontology as Ground of Epistemology . VIII. Epistemology as Grounded in Ontology . IX. Ethics as Grounded in Epistemology . . X. Philosophy as Grounded in Absolute Syllo- gistic ^^^ XI. Philosophy as Ground of Absolute Religion 308 138 144 297 800 302 304 4UU413 T VI CONTENTS \l it • I APPENDIX Paok Fundamental Philosophemes : Original Plan of Five Books Book I. Scientific Realism ^11 Book II. Constructive Realism *12 Book III. Critical Realism »1* Book IV. Ethical Realism •!• Book V. Religious Realism ^25 TABLES The Categories of Organic Philosophy Categories of Being ^29 Categories of Mind '^^ Categories of Evolution 8^2 Categories of Constitution 333 Fundamental Analyses I. Mechanical Constitution 835 II. Organic Constitution 836 III. Personal Constitution 337 IV. Cosmical Constitution 338 Universal Schema of Organic Philosophy I. Organism of Human Knowledge 339 n. Organism of Human Life 340 III. Organism of Divine Life 342 INDEX 347 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY CHAPTER XII THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST § 149. The philosophy of pure experience, as represented by its greatest expositor, David Hume, ingenuously con- fesses its inability to think the I as person or to form a clear concept of personal identity. The philosophy of pure reason or pure thought, as represented by its greatest expositors, Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, has proved its inability to think the I as person, because it surrenders the individual difference in general and the personal differ- ence in particular as unknowable, confounds the specimen with the species, and degrades the personal I to the im- personal It. With Aristotle himself, the Aristotelian Paradox culminates in the imperishable but impersonal vovs, — with Kant, in the unknown x, a merely logical subject which may or may not be substance, — with Fichte, in a mere self -returning activity, a self-determining but in itself unconscious subject-object, of which personal self- consciousness or self-conscious individuality appears as a non-essential and fleeting accident, — with Hegel, in a self- determining notion of the notion, in which the I and the We are absolutely indistinguishable and both vanish as a mere "relation" (Verhdltniss) of two contradictory terms. Hume gives us perceptions without perception, units with- out their necessary universal, and illustrates the Irrational Antithesis of I and Not-We in its Empiricist Form ; Kant, Fichte, and Hegel give us pure self-consciousness without empirical conscious states, the universal without its neces- sary units, and illustrate the Irrational Antithesis of I and VOi. II. — I i i r \ 2 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY Not- We in its Rationalist Form. (§ 71.) Hume represents the Antisthenian half, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel the Platonic half, of the Aristotelian Paradox (§ 79), around which philosophy helplessly revolved until the rise of Darwinism in natural science. In this complete failure of empiricism and rationalism to think the I except as the It, and in their consequent failure to effect a rational transition from the I to the We, the philosophy which recognizes the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason must not decline this supreme task of all philosophy: namely, the task of thinking the I as person in accordance with the law of unit-universal s. § 150. Evolution is but one aspect or factor in the life- process of the universe, the absolute unit-universal in Space and Time. The other factor is involution. Nothing can evolve which does not live : nothing can live which does not evolve; evolution and life are so far equivalent terms. This truth is now too generally understood to require elaboration, much less defence, in this place. The world as a whole is no longer conceived as a mere mechan- ism, but as an organism, that is, a machine which lives and evolves. Spencerism, with its vain attempt to con- ceive and formulate universal evolution in purely mechan- ical terms, and therefore to ignore the immanent, universal, and necessary teleology on which all evolution itself depends, is already out of date at the beginning of the twentieth century. (§§ 178-183.) Evolution itself, however, must be contemplated under two aspects, as the progress to actual consequences (history), and as the regress to necessary conditions (philosophy). Being in Space and Time moves everlastingly out of the past into the future through the present. From the stand- point of the present, a Delos-isle of Time between two pseudo-infinitudes which in truth are but the one infinite of Eternity, Thought may move in two directions, forward into the eternal differentiation of consequences as the Many, backward into the eternal integration of conditions ' THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 3 as the One. In Being, the One and the Many are distin- guishable, but not separable ; eternal evolution of the Many in the One, eternal involution of the One in the Many, — that is the entire self-perpetuating double-process of the universe, so far as known, of which the current evolution- ism recognizes only the half. But in Thought two lines are possible. From some point of Time, arbitrarily chosen in the past, the line of evolution may be followed down empirically from some proximate origin as the One (the homogeneous) to the present stage of development as the Many (the heterogeneous): this is the progress to actual consequences, as in astronomy, geology, biology, psychol- ogy, so far as these are historical. Or, from the present point of Time, the line of involution may be followed back rationally from the existing stage of development to the necessary ultimate origin, the absolute unity of the universe as'the Absolute I ; this is the regress to necessary conditions, as in the scientific philosophy which grounds epistemology on ontology. (Chapters XV and XVI.) Is such a regress made possible, nay, necessitated, by the foregoing reformation of the Aristotelian Paradox as the law of unit-universals ? That is the question we are now to answer. § 151. The method of the rational regress to conditions is determined necessarily by the Apriori of Being as the principle of individuation. (§ 99.) That is, every speci- men, as a unit-universal, originates, inheres, and is differ- entiated, in a higher unit-universal as its own species ; every species similarly originates, inheres, and is differen- tiated, in its own genus ; and so on to the siimmum genus. If this is a law of scientific logic (for instance, omne vivum ex vivo), it is only because the Apriori of Thought is itself absolutely determined by the Apriori of Being ; the neces- sities of logic are conditions of existence, and the only scientific classification is that which results from real gen- esis. The principle of the regress to conditions is that the specimen is conditioned by its species, the thing by its 4 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY kind, the individual by its universal, as its eondicto sine qua non. That is, the species evolves the specimen and the specimen involves the species; the genus evolves the species and the species involves the genus ; the progress to consequences in Being is the course of evolution through involution, and the regress to conditions in Thought, fol- lowing this same course in the reverse order, is the course of involution through evolution. The regress itself is dis- covery, in that which has been evolved, of what was in- volved in that very evolution. For involution and evolution are in themselves only two coefficients or co-factors in one and the same life-process, complementary and essential to each other, neither possible without the other ; but, while evolution gives the actual fact presented to- observation, involution gives the neoessary reason presented to reflec- tion. Hence the evolutionary progress to consequences is learned empirically in history, while the involutionary re- gress to conditions must be learned rationally in philosophy. The sole known method of Being is this one double-method of involution in evolution and evolution in involution ; the sole scientific method of Thought as Philosophy, that is, as rational regress to necessary conditions or principles, is the double-method of explaining evolution by involution and involution by evolution. In other words, because the Apriori of Thought is determined by the Apriori of Being, and because the method of Thought and the method of Being are thus essentially one. Thought (1) as History, and (2) as Philosophy, is the Knowledge of Being, to ovTa>9 6v ; and the unit of knowledge, the particular cogni- tion as such, is the percept-concept, the syllogism. § 152. Every valid syllogism, which is the characteris- tic act of all reason in experience, expresses at once the progress to consequences in the fact and the regress to conditions in the reason : it is the identity in difference of the reason and the fact. The major premise posits the condition or reason as a universal rule ; and this is an act of rational conception. The minor premise posits the con- THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 6 ditioned as a particular case of that rule ; and this is an act of empirical perception. The conclusion posits the unconditioned dependence of the conditioned on the condi- tion, the necessary inherence of the unit of the minor in the universal of the major, as an absolute necessity in- volved in their coexistence ; the major -h the minor = the conclusion, as inevitably as 3 -{- 5 = 8, which means is and mmt be equal. The whole syllogism, isolating it from all others as prosyllogisms and assuming the truth of the premises, is this one act of equation, this one judgment combining within itself the three elements of the condi- tioned (minor term), the mediating or conditioned condition (middle term), and the unconditioned condition (major term) ; it is this one act of equating the reciprocal relation- ship of the three terms, as implicit in the premises, with itself, as explicit in the conclusion; it is the absolutely necessary equation of essential self-identity of the two members ; and it is an act of cognition as such — the mole- cule of cognition, as it were, in which the necessary rela- tions of the atoms as parts are the molecular constitution of the whole. Every judgment is an implicit syllogism, and every syllogism is (as above) an equation or explicit judgment ; both depend on the actual or assumed existence of the three terms, major, minor, and middle, whose inter- relation under that assumption, however, is unconditionally determined by the Apriori of Being, the unconditioned con- ditions of existence, the law of unit-universals. In this mu^t of the conclusion, in this unconditioned necessity that, if both the premises are valid, the conclu- sion must be valid (and this mv^t is always there, expressed and felt in the therefore) lies the essence of reason as dis- tinguished from experience, and therefore the essence of the syllogism as its constitutive act. Experience, or the perception of units (things of some kind), is the learning of what is : reason, or the conception of universals (kinds of things), is the learning of what must be ; knowledge, or the identity in difference of experience and reason, unites 6 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY the two elements under the relation of conditioned and condition ; and their union in the percept-concept of the unit-universal is the only actual or possible cognition of an actual or possible object (something, as thing in its kind, or kind in its things, or kind as thing in a higher kind). It follows, therefore, that every actual or possible cognition has of necessity the latent or patent form of the syllogism . as a unit-universal, which is determined to be the necessary form of knowledge because it is the necessary form of ex- istence ; the necessity is epistemological simply and solely because it is ontological. Consequently, the absolute must which conjoins the two premises, as " antecedent," to the conclusion, as "consequent," is not at bottom a necessity of Thought, but a necessity of Being, conditioning both Thought and Being alike as the absolute prius of their only actual or possible form : namely, the form of the unit- universal. In other words, the syllogistic must is the com- plex of those necessary organic relations, or " bonds," so to speak, by which the premises and conclusion, as atoms, are . united and relationally constituted as a molecule, the three judgments as one syllogism or unit of cognition. As Sir William Hamilton has well expressed it : — " In regard to the act of Reasoning, nothing can be more erroneous than the ordinary distinction of this process, as the operation of a faculty different in kind from those of Judgment and Conception. Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning are in reality only various applications of the same simple faculty, that of Comparison or Judgment. I have endeavored to show that concepts are merely the results, rendered permanent by language, of a previous process of comparison ; that judgment is nothing but comparison, or the results of comparison, in its immediate or simpler form ; and, finally, that reasoning is nothing but compari- son in its mediate or more complex application. It is, therefore, altogether erroneous to maintain, as is commonly done, that a reasoning or syllogism is a mere decompound whole, made up of judgments, as a judgment is a compound whole, made up of concepts. This is a mere mechanical mode of cleaving the mental phaenomena into parts, and holds the same relation to a genuine THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 7 analysis of mind which the act of the butcher does to that of the anatomist. It is true, indeed, that a syllogism can be separated into three parts or propositions, and that these propositions have a certain meaning, when considered apart and out of relation to each other. But, when thus considered, they lose the whole significance which they had when united in a reasoning ; for their whole significance consisted in their reciprocal relation, — in the light which they mutually reflected on each other. We can cer- tainly hew down an animal body into parts, and consider its members apart ; but these, though not absolutely void of all meaning, when viewed singly and out of relation to their whole, have lost the principal and peculiar significance which they pos- sessed as the coefficients of a one organic and indivisible whole. It is the same with a syllogism. The parts which in their organic union possessed life and importance, when separated from each other remain only enunciations of vague generalities or of futile identities. Though, when expressed in language, it be necessary to analyze a reasoning into parts and to state these parts one after another, it is not to be supposed that in thought one notion, one proposition, is known before or after another ; for in consciousness the three notions and their reciprocal relations constitute only one identical and simultaneous cognition." ^ § 153. Now the peculiar problem of the syllogism is the problem of the mmt which is its essence or soul. What is this necessity in thought ? Is it ultimate, or is it grounded in a deeper necessity of being? In other words, is the Apriori of Thought derived from the Apriori of Being? Pure Empiricism denies any knowable necessity what- ever, and resolves its appearance in thought into mere custom, mere association of ideas, as a/ac^ tvithout a reason. Pure Rationalism denies any knowable necessity beyond thought as such, and resolves its appearance in thought into the result of a certain actual constitution of the reasoning faculty, as an ultimate fact; that is, this merely actual con- stitution of pure reason, by which the necessity or apodeic- ticity of a given judgment or a "pure a prioH concept" is * Lectures on Logic, 1860, p. 194. 8 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY supposed to be explained, offers us, again, a fact mthout a reason. But scientific philosophy finds knowable necessity in the syllogism per se, and traces it back through a series of necessary prosyllogisms as the regress to conditions or grounds, until it arrives at the unconditioned, immanent alike in every single syllogism and in the nexus of prosyl- logisms, as already involved and given in each link and in the chain of links. This immanent and unconditioned necessity is the Apriori of Being, the law of unit-univer- sals, and constitutes the immanent reason of reason itself the absolute ground of the possibility of intelligence as such in the reasoning process ; for the ontological relation of condition and conditioned, as itself the absolutely uncon- ditioned, is a fact of being on which the very existence of reason as a process of thinking unconditionally depends. Keason does not make this relation, and cannot unmake it ; on the contrary, reason presupposes and depends on it. The Knowing I does not and cannot establish this relation, for it is only in accordance with this very relation that the Knowing I can be itself established as that which perceives, thinks, reasons, knows — it is only in accordance with the Apriori of Being that reason itself can be. Thus scientific philosophy, as epistemology grounded in ontology, arrives, not at a fact without a reason, but at a fact which is itself a reason : namely, at the Being of Reason itself — at the Absolute Unit-Universal as the Absolute I — at the identity in difference of reason and experience in every actual or possible cognition as essentially a syllogism. For reason gives the condition in the major premise, expe- rience gives the conditioned in the minor premise, and, these once given, knowledge gives the necessary or absolutely unconditioned conclusion : that is, every valid syllogism is an existent cognition as a given fact in consciousness, and its own content as unconditioned dependeiice of the condi- tioned on its condition is at once a. fact of existence and the ultimate, absolute, unconditioned reason of that fact. This 'I t THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 9 constitution of the syllogism, as a knowledge of being which is itself being, is what it is simply because it cannot be otherwise; and its existence as the absolutely uncon- ditioned form of every actual cognition is itself the existence of human knowledge. § 154. Empiricism, as we have said, denies any know- able necessity whatever in human knowledge. Hume has been already quoted above (§ 54) as holding that "the understanding never observes any real connection among objects," and that "even the union of cause and effect, when closely examined, resolves itself into a customary association of ideas." It is strangely obtuse in so acute a thinker not to perceive that the " customary association of ideas " itself presupposes unity, universality, and persistent identity in that which associates the ideas and acquires a permanent custom of associating them. This is a necessary condition immanent in the very act of "association" as such, beyond which mere act, however, Hume does not look at all, and into which he does not look deeply enough to see what it does and must contain. " Association " can unite separate states solely through unity in that which associates ; " custom," as a habit of associating, is a repeti- tion of acts which must be referred to one and the same agent ; and the " understanding," if it is to be more than an intuitive but unretentive and non-associative mirror, does and must " observe " this unconditioned dependence of the conditioned on the condition as a " real connection among objects," in order to render comprehensible even the "association of ideas." In the final edition of his "First Principles," in the " Postscript to Part I " (dated March, 1899), Mr. Herbert Spencer holds that " knowledge involves the three elements. Relation, Difference, Likeness,^^ and that <^ unconditioned existence, of which no one of these can be affirmed without contradiction, consequently does not present a subject- matter for knowledge." That is, we cannot know the existence of anything unconditioned. Yet, in this very 10 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY postscript, Spencer himself refers to a previous section which says : " Before it can constitute a piece of knowledge or even become an idea, a mental state must be known not only as separate in kind or quality from certain foregoing states to which it is known as related by succession, but it must also be known as of the same kind or quality with certain other foregoing states." That is, we cannot know even the existence of a "piece of knowledge," an "idea," or a " mental state," unless we know the existence of its unconditioned similarity to foregoing states. In short, combining these positions, we cannoty and yet we do and musty know the existence of this similarity as uncon- ditioned. Similar contradictions lie in every other denial of the possibility of knowing the existence of the unconditioned or absolute element in human knowledge. For this very denial of possibility is in itself an affirmation of uncondi- tioned necessity. That is, if S cannot be R, it mu^t be Not-R. Impossibility and necessity are the only two forms of the unconditioned as such; if we know either in any case whatever, we "know the existence of the uncondi- tioned." In these self-contradictions of Hume and Spen- cer, which can be matched in every empiricist writer, empiricism refutes and annihilates itself as rational thinking. § 155. Rationalism, in its turn, denies any knowable necessity beyond the actual constitution of the reasoning faculty, as in itself the ultimate and absolute ground of all necessity we can know. According to its way of thinking, the relation of condition and conditioned is itself merely a thought-relation, determined solely by the nature of the human intelligence as such ; it is a purely subjective form, imposed on the otherwise formless but equally subjective matter of experience by a cognitive faculty whose exist- ence is an absolutely inexplicable fact ; it is the essential relation which determines the reasoning process, but has no origin extraneous to the spontaneity of the reasoning THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 11 faculty itself. In other words, there is an Apriori of Thought, which consists in forms that are the necessary conditions of experience^ but there is no Apriori of Being as necessary conditions of reason : things in themselves are un- knowable, and can have therefore, no knowable conditions. In other words still, the only necessity which is knowable by man is always subjective and never objective, — always grounded in the merely actual constitution of the subject as its ultimate origin, never grounded in a necessary consti- tution of the object per se as co-determinant factor in all cognition of the object by the subject. Consequently, while rationalism posits in reason alone all the necessary conditions of thought as cognition or experience (Apriori of Thought), it posits in reason itself merely an actual con- stitution, and denies that any explanation of this actual constitution can be discovered in any necessary conditions of its existence (Apriori of Being). It thus conceives hu- man reason as a complete organism in itself, absolutely cut off from all being but its own, touching nowhere an exist- ence which does not depend upon itself, and finding know- able independent existence beyond itself neither as units (things in themselves) nor as universals (conditions of ex- istence in general) ; it absorbs into this exclusive subjec- tivity all things as mere phaenomena, and all conditions of things, even Space and Time themselves, as mere forms of these phaenomena. It follows, of course, that consist- ent rationalism is absolute subjectivism, and that consistent subjectivism is absolute solipsism; but this consequence must not delay us here. With great clearness and precision, Kant has expressed this principle of the exclusive subjectivity of all knowable necessity as follows : — ** In our reason, considered subjectively as a human faculty of knowledge, there lie ground-rules and maxims of its employment which have altogether the aspect of objective principles. Hence it happens that the subjective necessity of a certain combination of our concepts in the service of the understanding is taken for an 12 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This is an illusion^ but it cannot be avoided." ^ ** Pure reason is a spliere so isolated, so thoroughly interrelated in itself, that we cannot touch one part without involving all the rest, and cannot effect anything without having determined before- hand for each part its position and its influence on the others. For, since there is nothing outside of this sphere which can correct our judgment within it, the validity and use of every part depends on the relation in which it stands to the others in reason itself; and, as in the structure of an organized body, the function of each organ can be deduced only from the complete concept of the whole. It may be said of a universal critique of reason, therefore, that it is never trustworthy unless it is wholly completed, even to the least elements of pure reason; and that we must determine and make out either everything or nothing in the sphere of this faculty. . . . [Synthesis was the original method of exposition] in order that the science might exhibit all its articulations in their natural 1 Kritik der reinen Vemunft, Werke, III. 246. This passage seems, but only seems, to be contradicted in the Kritik der pniktischen Vemunft, Werke, V. 12, where Kant says : ** Subjective Nothwendigkeit, d. i. Gewohnheit, statt der objectiven, die nur in Urtheilen a jrriori stattfindet, unterschieben, heisst der Vemunft das Vermtigen absprechen, iiber den Gegeustand zu urtheilen, d. i. ihn and wa* hm zukomme, zu erkennen," u. s. w. For by "objective necessity," in the passage translated in the text, Kant means a necessity inherent in ** things in themselves," of which he denies all knowledge ; whereas, in this passage, he means by the same phrase a necessity inherent in ** judgments a priori" respecting the "object of experience " (Oegenstand = Erscheinu7ig\ not the *' thing in itself." Of course, all "judgments" must inhere in the subject^ not in the ohjed as thing-iu-itself ; hence their necessity must be subjective^ and not objective^ and both passages referred to perfectly agree in doctrine. This confusion in terms is inimical to the interests of clear thinking, how- ever, and is greatly to be regretted. In my own usage, "object" always means the "thing in itself," determined by the Apriori of Being to be in itself a unit-universal, and deteraiinant of the percept-concept as the necessary identity in difference of Jnschaiiung and Begtnff, and therefore as an implicit syllogism (§ 157). Hence, as will appear below, I regard the syllogism, even when it exists only in an individual consciousness as an "object" of that consciousness, as none the less a "thing in itself," because the necessity of its conclusion results from its own constitution as determined by the Apriori of Being behind the Apriori of Thought. THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 13 I I connection, as the organization of an entire special faculty of knowledge." ^ § 156. It thus appears that empiricism is the philosophy of simple actuality, the quality of that which is, yet may be otherwise ; that rationalism is the philosophy of subjective necessity, the quality of that which is and cannot be thought otherwise ; and that critical realism is the philosophy of objective necessity, the quality of that which is and cannot be otherwise. It is evident, however, that objective neces- sity includes subjective necessity, since " to be " conditions and includes " to be thought," which is only a particular mode of being, not exclusive of other possible modes ; that is, the Apriori of Being includes the Apriori of Thought as the greater includes the less. For instance. Space must be, whether it can or can not be thought ; its being thought is the condition of its being asserted, but neither its being thought nor its being asserted is the condition of its being, which has no condition at all ; on the contrary, its being is the absolute condition of its being thought or being asserted. Hence Space is the unconditioned condition of extended- ness or extension, since whatever is extended must have room (Space) to be extended in.^ Conditions of being, therefore, cannot be resolved into nor explained by con- ditions of thought : these must be explained by those. The relations of condition, conditioned, and unconditioned are involved of necessity in all thought, because they are in- volved of necessity in whatever can be thought about; and this objective necessity, now everywhere recognized by modern science as the " conditions of existence," is in itself identical with the simple Possibility of Being, without which there could be no possibility of thinking as a mode of be- ing, and behind which no thought can go without a self- contradiction. * Prolegomena, u. s. w., Vorrede, Werke, IV. 11. a North American Review, July, 1864, article on *'Tlie Philosophy of Space and Time." I \ 14 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOrHY THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 15 i § 157. Now these primordial and constitutive relations of Being — condition, conditioned, and unconditioned, which cannot be conceptually united except as unconditioned con- dition of the conditioned^ and which in this union, therefore, must constitute the goal of all philosophic inquiry into Being — are the essential relations or ground-form of Thought as a mode of Being, that is, as an act of the I. The rationalists are not wrong in seizing self-activity or self-determination as the essence of the Thinking I, nor are they wrong in seizing the syllogism as its essential act ; their cardinal error lies in not seizing the Apriori of Being, the law of unit-universals or principle of individuation (every " thing " is an existent unit-universal of generic, specific, and reific essence, and cannot be otherwise), as the unconditioned condition of the syllogism itself, because it is the unconditioned condition of the particular unit- universal of which any given syllogism is the percept- concept. In all its self-activity, the Thinking I must be, in order to think, and must, therefore, be substance; it must act or think, in order to be, and must, therefore, be energy ; its substance is its energy, and its form is thinking energy or the syllogism itself, which, if valid, is Knowledge of Being, but which, if invalid, is Error or Ignorance of Being. That is, the Thinking I is the Knowing I, when it thinks in accordance with the Apriori of Being; for the syllogism (expressed or implied) is the only possible form of real cognitions in concreto. If, for instance, I say, " That tree is an oak," my judg- ment, which seems to be grounded on nothing but appercej)- tion, is in truth a condensed syllogism, " All trees with certain marks are oaks ; that tree has those marks ; there- fore, it is an oak," — a syllogism in which perception as experience gives a unit in the minor, conception as reason gives its universal in the major, and knowledge of the object, as a unit-universal, follows in the conclusion, as a percept-concept of that unit-universal. Every answer to the questions, " What is that ? And why ? " similarly throws itself, when analyzed, into the syllogistic form. In other words, to think is to syllogize, and to know is to syllo- gize in accordance with the Apriori of Being. It follows that, inasmuch as Kant's "pure knowledge a priori" is knowledge which is pure from all experience, and inasmuch as experience has been shown to be a necessary factor of the syllogism as the necessary form of all knowledge, there is and can be no such thing as " pure knowledge a priori,'^ ^ For it would be total suppression of the minor premise in every syllogism. § 158. It was said in § 153 that the problem of the syl- logism is the problem of the 7nust ; and it now is evident that the tnust is at bottom ontological — epistemological only because it is ontological. Given a conditioning uni- versal as a kind, and given, also, a conditioned unit as a thing of that kind, that unit jnust inhere in that universal ; it cannot he otherwise, and for that reason alone cannot with- out error he thought otherwise. This unconditional objective necessity in rerum natura that whatever exists must exist in and of the kind it belongs to, and cannot exist in and of a kind it does not belong to, is the ontological ground of the law of contradiction as a law of logic. Self-contradiction in Being is impossible, and for that reason is impossible in Thought, except as Error. Whatever is, is as it is, and * '* Wiis Schlimmeres konnte aber diesen Beiniihiiugen wohl iiicht begegiien, als wcnn Jemand die unerwartete Entdeckung machte, dass es iibemll gar kein Erkenntniss a priori gebe, noch geben konne. AUein es Lat hiemit keine Noth. Es ware ebeii so viel, als ob Jemand durch Ver- imnft beweisen woUte, dass es keine Vernunft gebe. Denn wir sagen nur, dass wir etwas durch Vernunft erkennen, wenn wir uns bewusst sind, dass wir es auch batten wissen konnen, wenn es uns auch nicht so in der Erfahrung vorgekommen ware ; mithin ist Vernunfterkenntniss und Er- kenntniss a priori einerlei." (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Werke, V. 12.) To affirm that there is jw reason separated from experience is not to affirm that there is no reason. That separation is the fatal mistake, not of Kant alone, but of the whole school of the Beg riff sphilosophie. To suppress experience in the syllogism is to suppress the minor altogether, and that is to suppress the syllogism as such. To separate reason and experience is to deny both. . 1 7l 16 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY h cannot he as it is not ; that is the bottom reason why it can- not he known as it is not — that is, cannot be without error referred to any kind it does not belong to. If S is R, it cannot be Not-R, too; it may cease to be R and become Not-R, but it cannot be and not-be R at once. Thus the law of contradiction in logic is conditioned by the law of unit-universals as unconditioned ohjective necessity — a ne- cessity of Being in the existence of the unit-universal as the necessary form of any possible object of knowledge, and a necessity both of Being and of Thought in the existence of the percept-concept, the syllogism itself, as a unit-universal which is the ultimate molecule of knowledge as such. In this correspondence or agreement of the forms (immanent relational constitutions) of the object of knowledge and the syllogism, the thing in itself and the thought of it, as both unit-universals (cv tovtois 17 to-on;? kvonj^), lies the reality of the cognition, that is, its truth. And thus the Apriori of Being, the Apriori of Thought, and the Apriori of Knowledge, as shown in Chapter VIII, are all three united in the Law of Unit-Universals : which, it may now be added, having the Apriori of Being for its major pre- mise, the Apriori of Thought for its minor premise, and the Apriori of Knowledge for its conclusion, now appears as the aboriginal and eternal Syllogism of Being, the iden- tity in difference of Being and Thought as Subject-Object, the Self-Knowledge of the Absolute I. § 159. In this must, then, contained in the " therefore " which declares the unconditionally necessary equation of the two premises as the twofold '^antecedent" with the conclusion as the single " consequent," lies the soul of the syllogism, its energy as affirmation or judgment, its essence as the characteristic act of reason. With the penetration of a genius never surpassed, Kant identified this "act of synthesis " with " the understanding " itself ; although he considered it as only an "act of spontaneity," traced it back no farther than to the actual constitution of the under- standing itself, and failed to see that the " synthetical unity THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 17 of the manifold in intuition " cannot be thought except in the form of the syllogism, more or less disguised in count- less ways outwardly, but always essentially the same. The synthetic act of reason in the syllogism is certainly spon- taneous, as every act must be, in the sense that the act may or may not be performed; but, if performed, its form is determined by the nature of that with which it deals, as the course of a river is determined by the nature of the country through which it flows, and the spontaneity of reason or the synthetic understanding in no way creates the absolute must of the syllogism, the unchangeable form and intrinsic self-relatedness of the understood. In other words, neces- sary relations, which are what they are simply because they cannot be otherwise, and which, therefore, constitute an absolutely unconditioned element in all intellection, enter into every syllogism, not ultimately because the sub- ject cannot think otherwise, but ultimately because the object cannot be otherwise, and because the subject cannot think the object as it is, or know it, without thinking its own subjective necessities as at bottom objective necessities, too. The entire aim of Kant^s famous deduction of the cate- gories, however, is to explain away all objective necessities in the thing-in-itself as merely subjective necessities in the thinking subject — to disprove the objectivity of relations in Being by proving the exclusive subjectivity of relations in Thought. The method of procedure, in a nutshell, is (1) to conceive the object in general, not as the objectively determined Di^ig an sich, but as the merely subjectively determined Erscheinung or Gegenstand der Erfahrung ; and (2) to conceive all relation as such, not as the immanent re- lational constitution of the object in itself, but merely as the relating activity of the subject — that and nothing more. This is in truth the complete disappearance of the object of cognition, as distinct or distinguishable in the last analy- sis from the individual subject ; but the two misconceptions VOL. u. — 2 4 iiii 18 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY l| just stated are the sum and substance of Kant's so-called "theory of knowledge" — which would be better described as his theory of our necessary ignorance of things as they are in themselves. But, waiving this consequence, the ground of Kant's position is the assumption that relation as such is nothing whatever but the subject's act of combination. Sensuous intuition, mere sensitiveness to impressions which in some inexplicable way come from without the subject, gives the Many, the manifold content of our representa- tions ; and the form of sensuous intuition (Space and Time), which exists a priori in our representative faculty as the condition of our sensibility itself, is nothing but the mode in which the subject is affected. But it is the spontaneous act of combination which alone gives the One in this Many, the unity in this manifold content of intuition; and this act of combination, which cannot be given by sensuous intu- ition as such, and cannot even be contained in the a priori form of it, can proceed only from a faculty which is itself active, not passive or receptive like the representative faculty. As distinguished, then, from the merely passive sensibility and its a priori forms of Space and Time, the actively combining faculty must be the understanding. Consequently, all combination ( Verbindung, conjunction si/tv- thesis), that is, all relating or relationing, must be in all cases a mere act of the understanding, determined by nothing beyond itself, and therefore purely spontaneous. " We cannot represent anything to ourselves as combined in the object [that is, as related or interrelated within it] without having ourselves combined it previously. Of all representations, combination is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but must be performed by the subject itself, because it is an act of its self-activity." Com- bination, then, is the spontaneous act by which the under- standing relates, and thereby unifies, the manifold content of a phaenomenal object. It originates, in so doing, the category of unity of a pure concept a priori; but this unifying act of combination presupposes a higher unity THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 19 I I III I*; still, not the unity of the manifold in the phaenomenon, but the unity of the combining faculty of that which unifies. This higher unity is that of the subject itself, the originally synthetical unity of apperception, without which there could be no combination as a spontaneous act of the understand- ing, and no combination of its combinations in a single consciousness.* This is tlie entire content of the famous chapter on the " deduction of the categories," put into a nutshell as the principle of the exclusive subjectivity of re- lations — that is, the principle of the Apriori of Thought as the ultimate and exclusive source of all knowable necessity or universality in whatever is known. (See § 172.) § 160. Here, in the most unequivocal manner, is taught the principle of the exclusively subjective origin of all relations as such; for positive and negative combination includes both conjunction and disjunction, both synthesis and analysis, with all that these imply. All cor>biuation, then, all relating or relationing, is reduced to the mere energizing of the understanding, as the active faculty in all cognition ; and the form of its activity, the combining judg- ment, is a fact without assignable reason. All known things are the product of "sensibility," and all known combina- tions or relations of things are the product of " understand- ing," as the receptive and active faculties of the subject : in Kant's own words, " the understanding does not derive its apriori laws from Nature, but prescribes them to it." ^ In other words. Nature as we know it is nothing whatever but the work of the human mind. This is the necessary and logical outcome of the principle of the exclusive sub- jectivity of relations, the denial of their independent objec- tivity, the reduction of all relation in the object to the mere combining or relating activity of the subject. It is the simple, merely actual nature of the understanding to com- bine, to predicate, to judge ; but why it combines or predi- cates or judges as it does, and not otherwise, why it runs 1 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Werke, IIL 114. « Prolegomena, u. s. w., Werke, IV. 68. m f* I V H 20 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY all the fluid matter of experience in the form-giving mould of its own a priori categories, why these categories are at all necessary in themselves, — these are questions unan- swered and unanswerable by the Kantian theory of knowl- edge. For, as we have seen in § 155, Kant denies explicitly that subjective necessities in knowing are determined ulti- mately by objective necessities in being ; he fails to see that what is necessarily combined or related in the object must be so, and not otherwise, combined or related by the subject in its thought of the object, or else its thought of the object will be, not knowledge, but ignorance. For ob- jective relations are the absolute condition of the possibility of knowledge ; all combinations by the understanding must be governed by prior combinations in the object, or else the understanding forfeits its own being and vanishes in misunderstanding. § 161. The bearing of these considerations on our pres- ent subject, the syllogistic must, lies in the fact that Kant^s theory of the exclusive subjectivity of relations, as acts of combination by the understanding which are purely spon- taneous, that is, wholly independent of and uninfluenced by any possible but unknown combinations in the object per se, converts that must into a " spontaneous act " of un- explained assertion, and evacuates the syllogism itself of all logical necessity. Let us examine an instance: — (1) All stars shine by their own light Procyon is a star. Therefore, Procyon shines by its own light. (2) All stars shine by their own light. Procyon is a star. Therefore, Procyon does not shine by its own light. Here we have two final judgments, "Procyon shines by its own light" and "Procyon does not shine by its own light," which, considered merely as isolated judgments un- combined with other judgments, are equally possible in themselves. Why is not one as valid as the other ? Why THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 21 may I not make the affirmation or the negation with equal ease? There is nothing in either judgment, as a mere single judgment, to prevent the understanding from com- bining its subject and its predicate just as the understanding itself arbitrarily elects; irrespective of other judgments, there is manifestly no necessity which requires the under- standing to combine that subject and that predicate either with or without the "not," and its act of combination, therefore, is indeed so far " spontaneous," or undetermined by anything beyond itself. But the case is totally changed as soon as we consider the two judgments not as isolated, but as conclusions from premises in a syllogism. The first immediately becomes a necessary inference, the second an impossible inference. The understanding's act of combination is no longer "spontaneous," in the sense of being undeter- mined by anything beyond itself; on the contrary, it is now determined by the premises, that is, by the inherent necessity of other judgments per se, which necessitates the understanding in this case to combine the subject and predicate of the conclusion affirmatively, not negatively. The nature of the syllogism per se is as absolute as that of the triangle, and depends no more than the latter on any imagined spontaneity of the understanding. It is impos- sible for the understanding to think the triangle at all except in accordance with the immanent laws of the tri- angle, or to infer at all except in accordance with the equally immanent laws of the syllogism. We may or may not conceive or construct a plane triangle; but we can neither construct it nor conceive it except under the condi- tions that, if constructed or conceived at all, the greatest side shall stand opposite to the greatest angle, and the sum of the three angles shall equal two right angles, and not more than one of the three shall be as large as ninety de- grees. Omnipotence itself could not construct, omniscience itself could not conceive, a plane triangle, except under these conditions, the unconditioned necessity of which is a I n 22 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY part of the Apriori of Being ; no power, no will, no sponta- neity of the understanding, nothing whatever could in the least degree modify the conditions named, which simply cannot be otherwise. The same is true of the syllogism. I may not infer at all, or I may draw false inferences, which are no inferences ; I cannot infer except in accord- ance with the nature of the syllogism, which is determined by the Apriori of Thought, which is itself determined by the Apriori of Being. Because the law of unit-universals is the condition of whatever exists, it is the condition of all knowledge of whatever exists ; and for this reason the form of all knowledge is the syllogism, the enthymeme, or the percept-concept in general. § 162. Now these forms of the triangle and the syllo- gism, once put forth by one understanding and brought within the scope of another understanding as actual prod- ucts, cease to be purely subjective, and become as un- deniably objective per se as a house or a mountain. A communicated syllogism is a known Dirig an sich. The two syllogisms presented above, which, while I am writing, stand as my own individual thinking only, cease to be my thinking altogether when thought by the reader. To me, the conclusion of the first syllogism is a necessary infer- ence, and that of the second an impossible inference ; what- ever spontaneity I may attribute to my own understanding, I rmist combine that subject and that predicate in the first way, and I cannot combine them in the second way. More- over, I believe that you, the reader, are equally necessitated to draw the same inference. If so, what is the ground of this identical necessity in two independent minds ? If two, twenty, a million minds cannot but infer as I do from those particular premises, is it not evident that they are all con- strained so to think by the determinative nature of this syllogism in itself, as an object per se of independent intel- ligences, an object which determines the combining facul- ties of various cognizing minds to combine that subject and that predicate, not according to any supposed spontaneity THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 23 in themselves, but according to immanent and absolutely fixed relations in the object itself? Even Kant could not otherwise account for the necessary agreements of independent minds. In a remarkable pas- sage which unconsciously surrenders his own dogma of the unknowableness of the Ding an slchj he says : — ♦* When we find reason to hold a judgment as necessarily and universally valid (in which case it never rests on perception, but on the pure concept of the understanding under which the perception is subsumed), we must hold it as also objective. That is, we must hold that it expresses, not merely a reference of perception to a subject, but a constitution of the object [Gegenstand — which is here treated as a Ding an sich]. For there would be no reason why other people's judgments must of necessity agree with mine, if there were no unity of the object to which they all refer, with which they must all agree and therefore must all coincide one with another.** 1 Yet, after thus attributing to the object ^er se a determi- native influence on the judgments of different individual subjects, so irresistible as to explain by the immanent re- lations of that object per se the necessary coincidence of all those judgments respecting it, and after thus claiming a knowledge of its inner ''constitution'' ( Beschaffenheit), Kant goes on in the very next sentence to repeat the dogma he has just unwittingly discredited : namely, that "we do not know the object in itself {das Object an sich).'' This is trying to have one's cake and eat it, too. If I re- tain those two syllogisms, one with a necessary and the other with an impossible inference, strictly within the sphere of my own consciousness, I may perhaps succeed in convincing myself that the necessity of my combining judgment lies solely in the subjective "act of sponta- 1 Prolegomena, u. s. w., Werke, IV. 47. The same idea is expressed in the Kritik der praktischen Vemunft, Werke. V. 12, 13 : '' Ich erwahne hier nicht einmal," u. s. w. But it is distinctly denied in the Kritik der reinen Vemunft, Werke, IIL 117: " Verbindung aber liegt nicht in den Gegenstanden," u. s. w. 24 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY neity " of my own understanding. But, if I communicate them to others, that explanation breaks down. For I find that all other minds judge precisely as I do ; that, if all the necessity in the syllogism communicated is derived from my particular understanding a priori^ nothing but this necessity of my particular understanding can possibly be found there by others ; that any necessary agreement of all other minds with mine must be explained either (1) as the effect of my mind necessitating all other minds to agree with me, or (2) as the effect of an absolute relation in the syllogism itself, independent of me and necessitating all minds to agree with it. For I cannot arrive at any neces- sity immanent in all mind as mind, that is, at any Bo" wusstsein iiberhaupt or " universal consciousness," until I arrive there by the path of the / in the We in the Absolute I — until I find the unit-mind explained by the universal mind, and this I cannot do until I effect a rational transi- tion from the I to the We, which, as we have seen, is not to be found in Kant, in Fichte, in Hegel. Kant, therefore, explains his " subjective necessity " in the syllogism, not as a necessity in it, as a part of the con- ditions of existence or the Apriori of Being, but only as a necessity in him, resting at last on an "act of sponta- neity " of an individual subject. So, at least, he leaves the case logically. His Bewusstsein iiberhaupt is only his own individual consciousness writ large, and he deceives him- self in imagining that any " pure concepts a priori " of his particular understanding must needs be absolute categories for any other understanding, unless he can prove that ab- solute categories for all understandings are determined to be such by a known immanent constitution in the object joer se, the IHnff an sich. But this is precisely what he most persistently denies. He unconsciously evacuates the syl- logism of its intrinsic must, therefore, just because he cannot see that this must is at bottom an "objective necessity," a condition of existence : namely, necessary total inherence of the unit in the universal, and necessary partial THE SYLLOGISTIC MUST 25 inherence of the universal in the unit. In other words, he leaves the syllogism itself a mere arbitrary assertion, a mere " act of spontaneity " without a reason — an act un- grounded in the necessary nature of Thought, because he fails to ground the necessary nature of Thought in the necessary nature of Being. CHAPTER XIII THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL: NINE CANONS OF SYLLOGISTIC § 1G3. It is now time to enter into a more searching examination of the nature of the syllogism itself, and to inquire how any judgment whatever can be at once st/n- thetic and necessary. This latter question was the original problem which confronted Kant, and he thought he had solved it by explaining all synthetic judgments as merely of a priori origin — that is, as due merely to an a priori constitution of reason, antecedent to all experience, and to the a priori combinations of this pure reason as " acts of spontaneity." But this notion of "spontaneity" is fatal to his explanation. As the conclusion of our given syllo- gism, the synthetic judgment that "Procyon shines by its own light" is necessary; but mere "spontaneity," whether in the sensibility a posteriori or in the understanding a priori, can never explain necessity — not even the "sub- jective necessity " which Kant intends. The real question is : why rmist the understanding combine that subject and that predicate affirmatively, and why cannot it combine them negatively? To say that it does combine them so " a prioriy" or independently of all experience, would not say in the least that it must combine them so; while to say that it combines them so " spontaneously " would say that it combines them so without any assignable necessity anywhere. In either case, the synthetic judgment is not shown to be necessary at all, much less explained as such, and the original problem is evaded. To ground " subjec- tive necessity " on mere " acts of spontaneity," even if not an absolute contradiction (for spontaneity, it might be f THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 27 claimed, is itself disguised and unexplained necessity), is at least a curious instance of stopping short of an explanation. But the problem itself cannot thus be abandoned. Any particular syllogism may be properly enough referred to an "act of spontaneity," so far as the understanding either may or may not frame it. But, if the understanding does frame it, it must be framed in accordance with the imma- nent and necessary laws of the syllogism per se, over and above any possible freedom of " spontaneity " in the under- standing itself ; otherwise, it is not a hit, but a miss, — not a syllogism at all, but a fallacy. In other words, the syl- logism, like the triangle, has an absolutely limited relational constitution as a Ding an sich, an unconditionally necessary frame of its own, which determines every combining act of the understanding, however spontaneous it may appear or pretend to be ; and this " subjective necessity " of the syl- logism, as a mode of thinking, must rest, Kant to the con- trary notwithstanding, on an " objective necessity " in the syllogism itself, as an object of thought, that is, on the con- ditions of its existence as a syllogism and not a fallacy, on the Apriori of Being as the law of unit-universals. § 164. These ontologically apriori conditions of existence determine the truth of the syllogism as a piece of knowl- edge, and the untruth of the fallacy as a piece of igno- rance ; and exact compliance with them in all its operations or thought-combinations is the condition of the understand- ing itself as the knowledge-faculty, Kant's " faculty of cognitions." They in no degree limit or interfere with the understanding's legitimate freedom or spontaneity ; on the contrary, they are the very ground of possibility of the understanding itself, which, if the immanent laws or rela- tions of the syllogism were not unconditionally fixed, would have no fixed form of activity, instrument of action, or field of exercise. Relations in the object which were deter- mined solely by the understanding's " acts of spontaneity," as Kant holds they all are, would give nothing to know H 28 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 29 \ except these acts themselves ; which acts of " combination," moreover, being " spontaneous " or destitute of assignable grounds of reasons, would be non-rational or purely empiri- cal, — destitute, that is, even of '* subjective necessity" in "pure reason" itself. In this manner, by this principle of the exclusive subjectivity of relations, Kant annihilates all principles of rational necessity, all possibility of reason itself as the source of synthetic judgments which are really necessary and universal, and gives a firm foothold in his system to the alogism of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann — none to the panlogism of Hegel. It is the objectivity of relations, as this is grounded in the law of unit-universals, and both illustrated and demonstrated by the absolutely necessary nature of the syllogism per se, which alone throws light on the nature of Being as itself essential Reason — as in itself, not alogistic, nor purely panlogistic, but neces- sarily, universally, and eternally syllogistic. For the objective ground of subjective necessity in the syllogism, as the norm of all human knowing, is the objective neces- sity of the unit-universal itself, as the norm of all possible being. That is, the eternal self-ordering of Energy in Space and Time according to absolute objective relations of genus, species, and specimen, which are what they are because they cannot be otherwise, and because no possible universe could be other than the One in the Many and the Many in the One, is itself the Syllogism of Being. (§ 158.) Absolute objective relations of genus, species, and speci- men, then, determine the constitution of every subjective syllogism, thought or communicated, as a known thing in itself ; not at all because the understanding has so related or " combined " it a priori by " acts of spontaneity," but because the conditions of its possibility are fixed immutably by the law of unit-universals or Apriori of Being, — that is, because the conditions of human knowledge are identical with the conditions of existence itself. "Subjective ne- cessity " must be itself explained ; but it cannot be explained by Kant's " spontaneity " — it can be explained only by J. " objective necessity," which is as far as explanation can go. Let us, then, study the syllogism further. § 165. Every valid syllogism may be considered in the quantity of intension or in the quantity of extension. Viewed in the quantity of intension or comprehension, our given syllogism — All stars shine by their own light ; Procyon is a star ; Therefore, Procyon shines by its own light — means that Procyon contains all the common specific attri- butes of stars, that all stars contain th© common generic attribute of self-luminosity, and that Procyon, therefore, must contain this generic and specific attribute. Viewed in the quantity of extension, the syllogism means that Procyon is contained as a specimen in all stars as a species, that all stars as a species are contained in self- luminous bodies as a genus, and that Procyon, therefore, must be contained in the genus of self-luminous bodies. In either case, we have the same three elements, genus, species, specimen ; and the whole rational, logical, or sub- jective necessity of the inference, the must of the syllog- ism as a whole, depends on the ontological or objective necessity of those relations among genus, species, and specimen which cannot but be what they are, and which, therefore, necessitate the inference itself, irrespective of any supposed "spontaneity" in the understanding or its " combinations." That is, if the understanding should combine the major, middle, and minor terms in a syllogism contrary to the objective relations of whole and part which exist among genus, species, and specimen in nature, the syllogism would be distorted into a fallacy, and the under- standing would extinguish itself as sheer misunderstanding. For those objective relations of genus, species, and speci- men which constitute the law of unit-universals are con- ditions of existence of the syllogism itself, and knowledge ft ■ 30 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY i > k> i Hi 1 consists in conforming the subjective relations of thought to those objective and immutable relations of being. In the quantity of extension, the major term of the syllo- gism is the genus, as containing most units, and the minor term is the specimen or a class of specimens, as containing fewest units. In the quantity of intension, the major term is the specimen, as containing most attributes, and the minor term is the genus, as containing fewest attributes. But the middle term in both quantities is the species, mediating between the genus and the specimen or specimens, and link- ing the three elements in thought as they are necessarily linked in existence. The intensive syllogism is founded upon the necessary constitution of the speeirnen, as compris- ing generic essence, specific essence, and reific essence in indissoluble unity — the immanent relational constitution of the " something," the " object in general," the " thing in itself," the unit-universal. (§ 98.) The extensive syllogism is founded upon the necessary constitution of the genusy as comprising all its whole species, and that of the species^ as comprising all its whole specimens. In other words, the validity of the syllogism as a cognition, whether considered intensively or extensively, depends unconditionally upon the law of unit-universals as the Apriori of Being. (§ 99.) § 166. The three terms of the syllogism can be com- bined in three, and only three, pairs. Inclusion of the species in the genus gives the major premise, which is the assumption of one rational concept under another ; inclusion of the specimen or class of specimens in the species gives the minor premise, which is the subsumption of an experi- ential percept under the smaller rational concept; and inclusion of the specimen or class of specimens in the genus gives the conclusion, which is the subsumption of the experiential percept under the larger rational concept. Here we have, apparently, merely three acts of inclusion, three " acts of spontaneity " by the understanding, three judgments of precisely similar nature ; yet there is a pro- found difference between the last and the first two. THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 31 In any isolated syllogism, the premises are non-necessary judgments, mere judgments of actuality which may even be mistakes, and which, considered logically, stand only as assumption and subsumption in an argument; yet, if the subjective relations of genus, species, and specimen, as determined in the two premises taken together, accord with the objective relations of genus, species, and specimen, as determined by the Apriori of Being, the conclusion drawn from those premises is an absolutely necessary judgment. The necessity of the inference, as inference merely, has nothing to do with the truth of the premises as state- ments of fact, and nothing to do with the " spontaneity " of the understanding in "combining" them; the under- standing may or may not "combine" them, but it cannot combine them as the conclusion of a syllogism except in accordance with the objective laws of the syllogism per se, as determined by the conditions of its existence in the law of unit-universals. For instance : — All books are birds ; The Parthenon is a book ; Therefore, the Parthenon is a bird. These absurd premises are simple assertory judgments ; yet the conclusion, being the only possible inference from those premises as assumed, is an apodeictic or necessary conclusion. That is, if all books are birds, and if the Parthenon is a book, — if books are a species of the genus bird, and if the Parthenon is a specimen of that species, — it follows of necessity that the Parthenon cannot but be a bird. How happens it that the combination of two merely assertory judgments, when related as sumption and sub- sumption, can yield an apodeictic judgment? Major -f minor = conclusion : how can the second member of an equation contain more than the first member? Neither premise contains necessity, yet the conclusion contains it. Manifestly, the necessity of the conclusion is derived, not from either premise alone, nor even from the mere sum of 32 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 33 the two premises uncombined, but solely from their objective interrelation or natural " combination " — that is, not from any " spontaneity '' in the subject, but from the intrinsic character of their objective relations as " objective necessiti/,^^ The above syllogism is merely one case, all the more easily perceptible and intelligible because destitute of material truth, of the law which determines a priori the universal and necessary reciprocal relations of genus, species, and specimen, that is, the conditions of their co- existence as wholes and parts ; and this a priori necessity of their objective interrelation as the ground of their possibility is itself the Apriori of Being. Genus, species, and specimen cannot exist at all as logical wholes and parts, unless they are as absolutely interrelated as the angles and sides of a triangle ; and all syllogisms whatever are merely cases of this unconditional interrelation of genus, species, and specimen as logical wholes and parts. The apodeicticity of the syllogism, its absolute vnisty has nothing to do with the *' spontaneity " of the understand- ing; for the constitution of the syllogism per se is a necessary cosmic law as the form of all actual or possible reasoning. If the understanding fails to conform its operations to that cosmic must^ it becomes mere misunder- standing, mere mindlessness, and swamps the syllogism in the fallacy. The Apriori of Thought can never explain this syllogistic must, this derivation of an apodeictic con- clusion from merely assertory premises, except as the Apriori of Thought is itself explained by the Apriori of Being, the laws of which are the deep and ill-discerned, yet none the less absolute, determinant condition of all reasoning whatever. § 167. The " objective necessity " which Kant pro- nounced an "illusion which cannot be avoided" (§ 155) proves, therefore, to be no illusion at all. So far from this, it is the only possible explanation of an indubitable logical fact : namely, that the premises of an isolated syllo- gism are never anything in themselves but merely assertory judgments, while yet their combination in the conclusion is an apodeictic or unconditionally necessary judgment This supreme characteristic of the syllogism, of which Kant takes no notice, and of which his " spontaneity " of the understanding is certainly no explanation (necessity out of spontaneity is ex pumice aqua), can be explained solely by the fact that, while the premises singly are mere assertions, they already contain the whole rational neces- sity of the conclusion in their own organic combination, connection, or interrelation in the syllogism per se. That is, the " objective necessity " of the correlational nexus of the two assertory judgments as premises = the " subjective necessity" of the apodeictic judgment as conclusion. Nothing but this equation of involved objective necessity in the premises and evolved subjective necessity in the conclusion constitutes the necessary truth that sumption -f subsumption = conclusion — that is, the truth and apodeic- ticity of the syllogism itself. § 168. The peculiar nature of the syllogism as itself an absolutely fixed form and "object of knowledge," with a necessary constitution of its own which is dependent on nothing but the Apriori of Being, will be made clearer by a conspectus of its most important characteristics, which may be called the Nine Canons of Syllogistic. Canon 1. In the syllogism as a constitutive act of the logical understanding, the major and middle terms are con- cepts, the work of reason ; the minor term is a percept, the work of experience; and the conclusion, subsuming the percept under the major concept in a single indivisible judgment, is a percept-concept — a particular cognition grounded on identity in difference of experience and reason as the essential elements of all human knowledge. Canon 2. The major term denotes the concept of a genus; the middle term denotes the concept of a species of that genus; and the minor term denotes the percept of a specimen or specimens of that species. The copula must be "is'' or " is not," and always denotes inherence, signify- VOL. II. — 3 34 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 85 ing " contains " or " is contained in.'' Every syllogism may be read both ways, as intensive or extensive; but, if read intensively, the major term becomes the percept, as con- taining the most attributes, and the minor term the genus, as containing the fewest. Canon 3. The major premise subsumes the species under the genus; the minor premise subsumes the specimen or specimens under the species ; and the conclusion subsumes the minor premise under the major premise in a single judgment, that is, subsumes the specimen or specimens through the species under the genus. Canon 4. The logical " antecedent" consists of the two premises taken together — two merely assertory judgments which are linked, welded, or mediated by the identity or self-equality of their common middle term. The logical " consequent '' is the conclusion alone — a single apodeictic judgment whose apodeicticity or " subjective necessity " is derived from the intrinsic inevitableness or "objective necessity" of that mediation through self-equality of the middle term, as unconditioned condition of the possibility of a syllogism. That is, there can be no syllogism without self-mediation — no logical "consequent" without self- mediation in the logical " antecedent." The self-mediation itself consists in an objective subordination of tlie specimen or specimens under the species, and of the species under the genus; and the necessity of it in the syllogism is the necessity of that subordination in Being, if there is to be a syllogism in Thought at all. Failure of that objectively necessary self-mediation, as in case of "undistributed middle," is failure of the sequence, and destruction of the syllogism's "subjective necessity" as apodeicticity or demonstrative force. Canon 5. The logical necessity of self-mediation as the principle of demonstration in Thought, that is, the logical necessity of the syllogism as the mode and form of all proof, is conditioned by and depends upon the ontological necessity of universal self-mediation in Being: that is, i: \ objective self-mediation hy the species between the genus and specimen^ through necessary inherence of every specimeii in its species and of every species in its genus (§ 127). This necessary inherence is necessary origination of every unit in its own universal. If such inherence is not universally and unconditionally necessary, the syllogism, which pre- supposes it, ceases altogether to be a proof ; but, if it is, the syllogism as a proof is ultimately grounded in the law of unit-universals as the Apriori of Being. The necessity of inherence cannot be derived from *Hhe understanding as a faculty of spontaneity," ^ because real spontaneity con- tradicts all necessity, whether objective or subjective, and because no "faculty of spontaneity" will account for a single necessary judgment. The principle of necessary in- herence is itself the principle of all inference and all proof. It does not depend upon reasoning, but all reasoning abso- lutely depends upon it. It is the condicio sine qua non of the syllogism itself, for the relations of major, middle, and minor terms in particular are nothing but relations of genus, species, and specimen in general. Inference is simply a connecting or relating comprehension of necessary 1 " Dieses ist der logische Unterschied zwischen Verstand und Sinnlich- keit, nach welchen diese nichts, als Anschauungen, jener hingegen nichts, als Begriflfe liefert. Beide Grundvermogen lasseii sicli freilich auch noch von einer andern Seite betrachten und auf eine andere Art definiren ; namlich, die Sinnlichkeit als ein Vermogen der Receptivitdt, der Verstand als ein Vermogen der SporUaneitdi. AUein diese Erklarungsart ist nicht logisch, sondern metaphysisch." (Kant, Logik, Werke, VIIL 36.) If the spontaneous operations of the understanding are governed only by its own spontaneous action, determined by no assignable necessity, it is im- possible to explain the difference between the valid syllogism and the fallacy. One is as valid as the other, if they are equally products of mere spontaneity. The power to enact is the power to repeal, and the under- standing cannot bind itself to infer with even " subjective necessity," unless there is a higher " objective necessity " which it can neither enact nor repeal. Hence the "pure concepts a priori" cannot be absolute categories in experience, if their source is mere "spontaneity." Only that which cannot be otherwise (Apriori of Being) will explain that which cannot be thought otherwise (Apriori of Thought.) m THE SYLLOGISTIC PUILOSOrHY inherences as objective relations. The syllogism proves because Being syllogizes. Canon 6. The Syllogism of Being is the real identity in difference of genus, species, and specimen, as the unit- universal in general — the One in the Many and the Many in the One, the Absolute Unit-Universal, the Universe, the necessary constitution of the Absolute I as identity in dif- ference of Knower and Known. It is the Unconditioned Form of Existence. Canon 7. Tlie Syllogism of Thought is the ideal identity in difference of genus, species, and specimen, as the percept- concept of the unit-universal in general and in particular, the necessary constitution of every particular cognition. It is the Conditioned Form of Knowledge of Existence. ('anon 8. The formal truth of the syllogism is equality of the consequent with the antecedent in part, that is, in respect to inherence or self-mediation as form alone. In every isolated syllogism, the two premises which consti- tute the antecedent are always two interdependent assump- tions, a self-mediated pair of hypotheses, which must be "granted" before the conclusion is "proved."^ If their self-mediation is determined by the self-mediation of Being in accordance with the principle of inherence, — that is, if the minor term inheres in the middle and the middle in the major, — then the consequent, inferring explicitly through the middle that the minor inheres in the major, is precisely equal to the antecedent as implicitly self- mcdiBted; the inherence which is implicit in the ante- cedent simply becomes explicit in the consequent. Thus the syllogism, instead of being a mere "begging of the question," is that march of thought by which the implicit is converted into the explicit; and its formal truth is simply exact equality of the self-mediation of the conse- 1 " Logic is only concerned with the formal truth, the technical validity, of its syllogisms, and anything beyond the legitimacy of the consequence it draws from certain hypothetical antecedents it does not profess to vindicate." (Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, 322.) THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 37 quent, as evolved, with the self -mediation of the antecedent, as already involved. In other words, logical sequence, as "subjective necessity," is Thought becoming aware of the universal self-equality of the involved with the evolved in all evolution of Being, the eternal identity of Being with itself, as " objective necessity." Whenever this equality obtains in a syllogism, the syllogism itself, irrespective of the material significance of its three judgments, is formally true, — that is, is valid as the empty form of every partwular cognition. Canon 9. The material truth of the syllogism is equality of the consequent with the antecedent as wholes, that is, not only with respect to inherence or self-mediation as form alone, but also with respect to material or substantial significance. The material truth of the minor term as a percept, that is, the agreement of the percept with the object perceived, can never be proved by reasoning ; but by continued obser- vation and experiment, by comparison of repeated observa- tions, by use of instruments which augment the observing powers, by co-operation of many observers, and so forth, the percept may be purified, deepened, enlarged, corrected, verified, yet never brought to absolute adequacy with an inexhaustible object. The material truth of the middle and major terms as concepts, likewise, so far as concepts are founded in percepts, is subject to the same experiential limitation; but, so far as they are abstractions from per- cepts, that is, so far as they are conceptual comprehen- sions of specific and generic essence, their material truth is determinable by reason. The minor premise, therefore, remains always the sub- sumption of a percept under a concept ; it brings of neces- sity an empirical yet essential element into every possible syllogism, and renders chimerical that dream of separating reason and experience which is the inveterate illusion of the Begriffsphilosophie ; ^ and its material truth must be 1 "... an dessen Statt ich es lediglich mit der Vernunft selbst und ihrem reinen Denken zu thun habe, nach deren ausfiihrlicher Kenntniss 38 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY determined by experience. The major premise, however, remains always the subsumption of one concept under another concept ; and its material truth as a valid universal principle must be determined by reason. This rational validification of the major premise happens with perfect cogency only when the principle itself stands as the con- clusion of a prosy 11 ogism in the regress to conditions ; that is, when it can be traced back through a series or chain of prosyllogisms to a larger principle which is conditioned by nothing but the Apriori of Being itself. Such a series of prosyllogisms, including and completing the given syllo- gism, constitutes the grounded and filled form of a particular cognition. § 169. Thus it is only as the syllogism, only as the experientially filled and rationally grounded form of the percept-concept, only as that immanent relational consti- tution of every actual or possible cognition which, as itself an object of knowledge, is determined, not by the Apriori of Thought as Kant's mere "spontaneity of the under- standing," but by the Apriori of Being as absolute condition of the understanding itself, that knowledge can be said to have real existence. The individual subject may be as completely unconscious of the epistemological laws it obeys ich nicht welt am mich suchen darf, well ich sie in mir selbst antrefTe und wovon mir auch schon die gemeine Logik ein Beispiel gibt, dass sicb alle ihre einfachen Handlungen vollig und systematisch aufzahlen lassen ; nur dass hier die Frage aufgeworfen wird, wie viel ich mit derselben, wenn mir aller Stoff und Beistand der £rfahrung genommen wird, etwa aus- zurichten hoffen diirfe." (Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Vorrede zur ersten Ausgabe, Werke, III. 8.) The conception of logic as a purely formal or exclusively rational science disappears, of course, just as soon as it is perceived that experience enters of necessity into the syllogism to- gether with the minor premise, not to mention the experience which lurks in the background of every concept, however abstract. The empirical- rational constitution of the syllogism itself, determined as such by the Apriori of Being because it "cannot be otherwise," puts an end to the "hope" of accomplishing anything without the " material and a8sist:»nce of experience" — an end, therefore, to the dream of "pure apriori knowledge." THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 39 in all its knowing, as the bee is unconscious of the geo- metrical laws it obeys in all its honeycomb-building ; but the laws are there, and they must be obeyed. Knowledge consists in conscious subsumption of the singular and the particular under the universal — in conscious solution, as it were, of the empirical in the rational, and precipitation of their crystalline union in the form of the percept-concept or syllogism, no matter how disguised the crystals may be by their own conglomerations, transformations, or recom- binations in the metamorphic bedrock of human knowledge. Or — changing the comparison — the doctrine of syllogistic which results from the law of unit-universals as the Syllo- gism of Being, namely, that the Syllogism of Thought is the typical form of every actual or possible cognition through the necessary identity in difference of experience and reason in the Syllogism of Knowledge, becomes the cell-theory of all living intelligence, (1) as the organized . world-knowledge of the Human We, and (2) as the organ- ized self-knowledge of the Absolute I. § 170. But we must push further our inquiry whether the logical necessity of the syllogism, in which consists all the finality or conclusiveness of demonstration itself, is at bottom a merely rational necessity (Apriori of Thought) or an absolute necessity (Apriori of Being) — whether apodeic- ticity itself lies in a proximate " it cannot he thought other- wise" or in an ultimate "it cannot he otherwise." The decision must lie in the essential relations of thought and existence. To exist is to be something ; for the only possible alter- natives are to be something or to be nothing, and to be nothing is not to exist. But to be something is to be a thing of some kind; for to be a thing of no kind is to be no kind of thing, that is, to be nothing, which is, again, not to exist. It follows that thing and kind reciprocally condi- tion each other, and are inseparably related in existence. There can be no separation of thing and kind, or of indi- viduality and universality, but the distinction between them 40 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 41 W is involved in the very nature and possibility of existence as a world of things, a universe of units, identity in differ- ence of the Many and the One. Now this necessity is unconditional, absolute, ontological as well as logical. It lies in the very nature of existence as such, and can be in no way deduced or derived from the nature of thought as thought. Existence is the absolute priiLs of thought, not the reverse : both the subject and the object of thought must exists or else thought is impossible. If thought itself exists, it can exist only as subject to and conditioned by this absolute ontological necessity. Thought as existent can exist only under the unconditional condition of all existence: to wit, that it shall be a something, a thing of some kind, a thinking of the thinking-kind, an in- dividualized thought (Begriff) in thought as a universal (begreifen). For, if thought is not a thinking it is no thinking, and does not exist as thinking or thought at all ; it cannot exist as mere abstract or formless Being (Sein\ but only as concrete or formed Existence (Dasein) in a de- terminate thing of a determinate kind {Etwds determined as this particular and no other Begriff), More specifically, the constitutive existential determinations or objective re- lations of genus, species, and specimen, which inhere in the form of immanent relational constitution of every possible sense-object, inhere no less in the form or immanent rela- tional constitution of every possible thought-object, the Begriff des Begriffes or vorja-iq voijo-cto? itself not excepted. For these relations are the aboriginal groundform, the pos- sibility itself, of Existence as a universe of Existents, iden- tity in difference of the One and the Many. They are the condition of all thoughts of all beings because they are the condition of all beings themselves; they are the Apriori of Being itself, and for that reason the Apriori of Thought and the Apriori of Knowledge, too. They are not the causes of any existence, neither are they the limits of any knowledge; they are simply the absolute condition of all existence and all knowledge, without which neither could be — that absolute form of both without which nothing could either be or be thought. In other words, the unit- universal, as identity in difference of generic plus specific pltis reific essence, as only one specimen of only oue species of only one genus, is the most general formula of the thing in itself, as the only possible object of knowledge; and the law of unit-universals formulates that " objective necessity " which to Kant was only an " illusion," yet without which the ♦'subjective necessity" of his "pure judgments apriori'' ceases to be necessity altogether, and becomes the merely actual and empirical working of an " organization " of " pure reason " which he does not pretend to account for, but as- sumes to exist as a mere matter of fact, inexplicable by us. § 171. This point is of paramount importance to philos- ophy. Are the necessities of thought, above all the apo- deicticity or logical necessity of the syllogism, without any deeper root than a certain actual constitution of "pure reason," for which no reason can be rendered ? Or are all necessities of thought ultimately determined by deeper ne- cessities of being, and is the actual constitution of reason itself at bottom necessary — in other words, what it is because it cannot be otherwise? According to Kant, tha human intellect cannot penetrate deeper than to mere "subjective necessity," and is powerless to reach an ob- jective or absolute necessity in the nature of "things in themselves," — a notion which he pronounces to be an « unavoidable illusion." (See above, § 155, and note,) But, according to what has been here argued, the law of unit- universals is of subjective necessity in Thought because it is of absolute necessity in the Being which determines and conditions all Thought. The arguments already adduced appear to be conclusive, and to need no further enforce- ment; but these additional considerations are entitled to no small weight. § 172. Kant teaches (1) that necessity and universality are the essential characteristics and indispensable criteria of synthetic judgments a priori; (2) that all judgments u 42 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY a priori are derived from pure reason alone ; and (3) that pure reason itself, as pure "spontaneity of knowledge,"* is derived from nothing, but founds a science of itself as the "organization of an entire special faculty of knowl- edge.'' ^ Thus both the essential constitution and the whole operation of pure reason stand in the Kantian system as a mere matter of fact, the ultimate fact which explains all other facts, but is itself unrationalized, unexplained, unde- rived, unrelated even to a knowable I; and its "subjective necessity," the only necessity that is real and not an "illusion," springs solely out of its own "spontaneity." What is the logical implication of these positions ? Cer- tain very important consequences, as follows ; — I. That Kant's " subjective necessity/ " loses itself in mere actuality. For, if the human understanding is nothing but the " spontaneity of knowledge," and if spontaneity is noth- ing but non-necessity, and if no stream can ever rise higher than its source, the "subjective necessity" which flows merely from spontaneity can never rise above the level of the non-necessary, the merely actual. In truth, Kant's critical idealism or rationalistic subjec- tivism shows in this consequence its vulnerable Achilles- heel. It would explain the "necessity and universality" of "synthetic judgments a priori" by that of pure reason itself, as their exclusive source; but pure reason turns out to be pure "spontaneity" — not necessity at all, but non-necessity. Surely, there can be no necessity in any 1 "Wollen wir die Receptxmt&b unseres Gemiiths, Vorstellungen zu cmpfangen, so fern es anf irgend eine Weise afficirt wird, Sinnlichkeii nennen, so ist dagegen das Vermogen, Vorstellungen selbst hervorzu- bringen, oder die Sfwntancitdt des Erkenntnisses, der Verstand." (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Einleitung, Werke, IIL 82 : cf. 114, 115.) 2 "Hier ist nun ein solcher Plan, nach vollendetem Werke, der nun- mehr nach analytisoher Methode angelegt sein darf, da das Werk selbst durchaus nach synthetischer Lehrart abgefasst sein musste, damit die Wissenschaft alle ihre Articulationen, ala den Gliederbau eines ganzen besonderen Erkenntnissvermogens, in seiner natiirlichen Verbindung vor Augen stelle." (Prolegomena, u. s. w., Vorrede, Werke, IV. 11.) THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 43 judgment whatever which proceeds exclusively from non- necessity in the judging subject; a judgment is necessary only when it cannot be otherwise, and, if it cannot be otherwise, the subject is necessitated to make either that judgment or none. But this is necessity, not spontaneity, in the judging subject itself. What determines it ? The nature of the object judged. There is no other possible determinant of a particular necessary judgment, whether analytic or synthetic; its necessity must be immanent in itself. Knowledge is judging an object as it is, ignorance is not judging it as it is, error is judging it as it is not, and that, too, absolutely irrespective of any spontaneity in the judging subject, which must be limited to the option of judging or not judging. According to Kant himself, the "faculty of judgment" is identical with the "faculty of thought." ^ Now there is unquestionably a real spontaneity of thought, because thought, when it considers an object, may be either knowledge or error ; and, further, it may or may not consider it. But there is no such thing as a " spontaneity of knowledge," since, in order to be knowl- edge, thought must judge the object as it is. Yet a real " spontaneity of knowledge," as the real existence of pure reason or the understanding, is the fundamental assump- tion of the Kantian subjectivism, which makes knowledge itself depend wholly on the subject and not at all on the object, inasmuch as it makes the subject "spontaneously" create the object as concept, and with it all knowledge of it. In this way we can easily comprehend how Kant came to conceive the understanding as a real "spontaneity of knowledge," although we cannot easily comprehend how so keen a mind came to suppose that "' spontaneity " generates " subjective necessity," that being clearly impossible. But he found necessity among his twelve categories or pure concepts a priori, and he found the understanding, whence he derived them, to be nothing but a "spontaneity of 1 •* . . . Vermogen zu urtheilen, welches eben so viel ist, als das Vermogen zu denken." (Werke, III. 101.) 44 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY knowledge ; " hence he had no option but to derive neces- sity from spontaneity. In this, the rationalistic subjectiv- ism of Kant blindly imitated the empiricistic subjectivism of Hume : if the former found necessity in the spontaneity of pure reason, the latter found it in the spontaneity of pure experience.^ They agreed in finding no necessity save in the subject. " Necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects," said Hume. " The subjective neces- sity of a certain combination of our concepts in the service of the understanding is taken for an objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This is an illu- siorif but it cannot be avoided," said Kant. Both agreed in denying objective necessity, in affirming subjective neces- sity, and in deriving subjective necessity from mere spon- taneity. But out of mere spontaneit}', or non-necessity, no necessity of any kind can proceed in fact or be derived in thought. It is subjective necessity ungrounded in objective 1 '*The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression conveyed by our senses which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be derived from some internal impression, or impression of reflection. There is no internal impression which has any relation to the present business but that propensity which custom proe of cosmic organisms — is accepted by the dominant thought of our time as having the liighest warrant of scientific probability. . . . In this extended view, nebulae and luminous stars are but the infantile and adolescent stages of the life history of the cosmic individual ; the dark star, its adult stage or time of true virility. Or we may think of the shrunken dark star as the germ-cell, the pollen-grain, of the cosmic organ- ism. Reduced in size, as becomes a germ-cell, to a mere fraction of the nebular body from which it sprang, it yet retains within its seemingly non-vital body all the potentialities of the original organism, and requires only to blend [through collision] with a fellow-cell to bring a new genera- tion into being. Thus may the cosmic race, whose aggregate census makes up the stellar universe, be perpetuated — individual solar systems, such as ours, being born and growing old and dying to live again in their descend- ants, while the universe as a whole maintains its unified integrity throughout all these internal mutations — passing on, it may be, by in- finitesimal stages, to a culmination hopelessly beyond human comprehen- sion." ( Henry Smith Williams, The Story of Nineteenth Century Science) 1901, pp. 84-87.) 54 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 55 111! The organic constitution of the universe as it is in itself, with its immanent objective relations of genus, species, and specimen, is the absolute condition of the possibility of the syllogism; the constitution of the syllogism as such is determined by that of the objective universe, not vice versa. The a priori law of the syllogism is that of genus, species, and specimen; and it is derived from no "synthesis a priori " in the " understanding " as " spontaneity of knowl- edge," but solely from the Apriori of Being, as that abso- lute necessity which determines the understanding to be first of all perceptivity, and the syllogism or percept- concept to be the sole form of its knowledge in concreto. If any athletic Kantian aspires to defend Kant's splendidly audacious thesis that "the understanding does not derive its a priori laws from Nature, but dictates them to her," the scientific objectivist stands ready to strike his flag and surrender at discretion, provided his valiant but perhaps indiscreet opponent can succeed in " spontaneously " con- structing a valid syllogism on any other principle than that of genus, species, and specimen, derived as the Apriori of Being from Nature alone. This principle does not in the least depend upon the understanding. Quite the reverse ; for it determines the understanding. Nothing but absolute or natural necessity determines the nature of the under- standing itself to be primarily perceptive of genus, species, and specimen, and that of the syllogism to be the necessary form of all reasoning in dependence upon their necessary relations.^ 1 "To conclude: this whole mystery of genera and species, which make such a noise in the schools and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas, more or less comprehen- sive, with names annexed to them." (Locke, Essay of Human Under- standing, Bk. in. Ch. in. § 9.) This dictum, though still echoed virtually in many quarters to-day, is amusingly pre-Darwinian. If genera and species are ** nothing else but abstract ideas," and not most significant facts of Nature, what becomes of the great historical battle over the "origin of species"? What of modem biology ? What of the whole phi- losophy of evolution ? But the most amusing aspect of the case is the fact The two premises, therefore, are expressions or enuncia- tions, in terms of Thought, of objective organic relations in Being, which determine objectively a prloriy that is, by objective necessity, the essential form of every judgment as subject and predicate, and of every syllogism as antecedent and consequent. The species can exist only in its genus, and the specimen can exist only in its species : these are universal and necessary conditions of existence which "cannot be otherwise," and which therefore determine a priori the essential constitution of every possible judgment and every possible syllogism as existent forms of knowledge. But, besides these two expressed relations in the premises, that the process of forming *' abstract ideas," as told by Locke himself, in- volves ** genera and species," not as abstractions, but as realities. He says, in the same chapter : " Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas ; and ideas become general by separating from them the cir- cumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made caj^able of representing more individuals than one ; each of which, hav- ing in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as as we call it) of that sort. . . , And thus they [children] come to have a general name and a general idea ; wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all." What, then, is this ** way of abstraction " ? Peter and James, Mary and Jane, it appears, possess each numerous characteristics — a real genus ; of these character- istics, some are "peculiar to each" — a real species ; and others are "com- mon to all " —another real species. The '* way of abstraction," therefore, whatever is understood by "ideas," presupposes (1) a real genus of char- acteristics, (2) a real species of those "peculiar to each," and (3) another real species of those "common to all;" and the "abstract idea" it- self is formed by dividing the genus, including all of one species, and excluding all of the other species. What stronger proof could be de- sired than that which Locke himself supplies of the fact that, instead of disproving the reality of "genera and species," the process of abstraction would be itself impossible without them ? The same fact is patent in every other process, physical and psychical alike. Genus, species, and specimen, with their immanent real relations, must remain the absolute condition a priori of every process, whether in Being or in Thought ; and every attempt to disprove this truth is necessarily a bald begging of the question, since all reasoning whatsoevir presupposes it. (I,. 56 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL 57 I III ■M I 'I there is another relation not expressed, equally necessary, but only implied. This unexpressed but implied relation is that of the specimen to its genus — the relation necessarily contained and involved in the co-existence of the two pre- mises as one antecedent, and equally necessary per se whether that co-existence is perceived or not. It cannot hut he that, if the species is in the genus, and if the speci- men is in the species, the specimen is in the genus, too. This necessity is all one necessity ; it is unconditional, ob- jective, absolute ; it is the ground and form of the reasoning process as such, determines the syllogism, and constitutes its apodeicticity, because it determines the reciprocal re- lation of all thoughts no less than the reciprocal relation of all beings. Now the antecedent expresses this one objective necessity in part, and in part leaves it unexpressed ; it expresses the relation of species and genus in the major, and the relation of specimen and species in the minor, but it does not ex- press the relation of specimen and genus at all. Yet this last relation is already contained and exists objectively in the objective co-existence of tlie three terms, genus, species, and specimen ; for where the terms are, there is every pos- sible relation of the terms, whether expressed, or unex- pressed, perceived or unperceived. Consequently, in the antecedent, the inherence of the specimen in the genus ("Procyon is a self-luminous body ") is already an objective necessity, but only as unexpressed, latent, implied, involved. In the consequent or conclusion, however, the previously involved objective necessity becomes expressed as an evolved subjective necessity, too ; and in this union of objective ne- cessity with subjective necessity, as absolute necessity, lies the apodeicticity of the syllogism as a proved or completed real cognition. For thus the Syllogism of Being reproduces itself in the Syllogism of Thought as the Syllogism of Knowledge. § 175. In every valid syllogism, therefore, — that is, in every Syllogism of Knowledge, — there is exhibited in con- sciousness the identity in difference of objective necessity and subjective necessity as absolute necessity : the Apriori of Being and the Apriori of Thought unite in the Apriori of Knowledge, and the syllogism in its entirety is the form of their actual union. But the syllogism is neither a dead form nor an unconscious mechanism ; on the contrary, it is the formed act of the Knowing I, the definite product of a process which is identity in difference of experience and reason in a living intelligence as I in the We. The ante- cedent and the consequent of a syllogism are not simul- taneous. As the names indicate, the antecedent precedes and the consequent follows ; the syllogism is a march of thought, a movement of mind from the involved objective necessity to the evolved subjective necessity; this move- ment, this process, is conscious formation of a conception of the identity in difference of the involved and the evolved; and the law of the process is self-mediation grounded on the necessary inherence of every individual, of whatever order, in its own universal, — that is, grounded on the law of unit-universals, the widest generalization of which human intelligence is capable. The conceptive or discursive under- standing infers inherence of the specimen in the genus from the two inherences of species in genus and of specimen in species, because species, as the middle or mediating term, must be always identical with itself; and this self-media- tion, which lies in the very nature of inference because infer- ence itself is mediation through this identity, is the active movement of mind as such from the involved to the evolved. That is, the existent but as yet unperceived objective neces- sity, involved in the premises, comes into clear conscious- ness as the existent and perceived subjective necessity which is evolved in the conclusion; both are at bottom one and the same absolute necessity of Being. The convincingness of the syllogism is the conscious development of this per- ception from nascency to clearness in the discursive or syllogizing understanding, as it moves from the antecedent to the consequent, from the involved to the evolved. It is th 58 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY II! :i u perfectly true that the conclusion contains nothing which is not involved in the premises, but, so far from being a " begging of the question," this is the very essence of all proof. For proof never originates anything new ; it only creates a certitude out of the uncertain — makes a judg- ment subjectively necessary as the "conclusion" which before was subjectively doubtful as the "problem;" and this it does by developing an evolved or felt necessity in the conclusion out of the involved or unfelt necessity in the premises. An understanding which was indeed " spontane- ous " could prove nothing, because it could not generate in the subject even a " subjective necessity " which it did not itself contain. Kant*s "subjective necessity" could not possibly emanate in any manner from a real " spontaneity." It can emanate solely from an understanding which (1) per- ceives or intuites the particular objective relation of a single species to its own single genus, and the particular objective relation of a single specimen, or a single class of specimens, to that single species ; (2) conceives or infers the necessary relation which is already involved objectively in the objective co-existence of those two particular rela- tions through the objective identity of the mediating term ; and (3) syllogizes, or creates a single syllogism in a single percept-concept of three uuit-universals, namely, a genus, a species, and a specimen or class of specimens, by devel- oping the involved objective necessity of this self-media- tion into the evolved subjective necessity of the syllogism itself as a whole, organic, particular cognition. This is the scientific analysis of the syllogistic process as proof, demonstration, or apodeictic certitude (dTrtJSctfts), because it rests upon absolute necessity as the Apriori of Being — upon the law of genus, species, and specimen, as the absolute a priori condition of the possibility of the reasoning process itself as an actual syllogism. CHAPTER XIV THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING § 176. Reason, therefore, or the syllogizing understand- ing, is not at all the "spontaneity of knowledge," but acquisition of knowledge in accordance with law. It is orderly movement of mind from the involved necessities of Being to the evolved necessities of Thought, and the law of this orderly movement, as discovery of truth or learning-process, is the scientific method of observation (perception), hypothesis (conception as rational imagina- tion), and verification (subjection of rational imagination to the test of renewed perception). This orderly movement from the involved to the evolved is the necessary method of Thought because it is the necessary method of Being : it is the way of the mind simply and solely because it is the way of the world. There is and can be no subjective or rational necessity in the syllogism, the existing norm of all knowing, which is not grounded in objective or absolute necessity in the unit-universal, the norm of all existing. The absolute relations of genus, species, and specimen cannot be deduced from any concept whatsoever, a priori or a posteriorly because they are the antecedent conditions of all intuitions, all concepts, all judgments, all syllogisms, all exercise of the sensibility and the under- standing and the reason, — of the reasoning process, — of the mind per se, whether finite or infinite, — of conscious- ness as such ; for the forms of consciousness, be they what they may, are determined a priori by these very relations, and can exist under no other condition. The syllogism formulates but does not originate them. Here we abut on absolute necessity, on that which "cannot be otherwise," Ki 60 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY on the Objectivity of Relations, on the Apriori of Being. Thought itself, though sublimated to HegePs Begriff des Begriffs or absolutes Wissen, depends on these supporting relations of thing and kind, unit and universal, or genus, species, and specimen, just as absolutely as the flight of birds depends on a supporting atmosphere. And the ground of the absolute necessity of these supporting rela- tions, whatever it may be, or whether it may be at all, can never be explained} for all explanation presupposes both them and it. § 177. In the very constitution of the syllogism, there- fore, as the norm of all thought that knows, we behold that necessary movement of mind from the involved to the evolved which is the essence of the knowing process. The antecedent involves the consequent, the consequent evolves the antecedent; the entire syllogism, as percept subsumed under concept in the percept-concept of the unit-universal, exhibits the genesis of knowledge as such. In truth, the syllogism is itself knowledge in the making, the one and only way of the mind as the Knowing I. As we have already said, it is the way of the mind simply and solely because it is the way of the world ; and the reason is that the world itself is at bottom mind — not, as critical ideal- ism would have it, the human mind dictating its a priori laws to a merely phaenomenal Nature, but, as critical realism has it, the Absolute I syllogizing eternally in noumenal Nature as identity in difference of Existence, Thought, and Knowledge, yet in absolute conformity with that Apriori of Being which is the necessity of its own existence as identity in difference of the Energy and the Reason of the Universe, identity in difference of the causal series and the rational series in that " course of Nature " which is the autobiography of the Absolute I itself. § 178. Nothing, then, could be more unphilosophical than the mechanical evolutionism of the Spencerian school, unless it be the inconsequent subjectivism of the idealistic school — the only consequent subjectivism being solipsism. THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 61 Herbert Spencer (whom no one should mention except honoris causa, in view of his splendid devotion for more than half a century to the advancement of truth as he understood it) labors to conceive evolution without involu- tion. So far as the method of thought alone is concerned, he comprehends both factors in the syllogism of knowledge, and well states the case : — " The consciousness of logical necessity is the consciousness that a certain conclusion is implicitly contained [i. e. involved] in certain premises explicitly stated. If, contrasting a young child and an adult, we see that this consciousness of logical necessity, absent from the one, is present in the other, we are taught that there is a growing up to the recognition of certain necessary truths, merely by the unfolding of the inherited intellectual forms and faculties."* That is true vision. But, so far as the method of being is concerned, he altogether loses this insight into evolution and involution as complementary factors of one indivisible world-process. Here the civil engineer or the pure phy- sicist, not the philosopher, defines his fundamental con- ceptions of both terms : — ** Evolution under its most general aspect is the integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion ; while Dissolution is the absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter. The last of these titles answers its purpose tolerably well, but the first is open to grave objections. Evolution has other meanings, some of which are incongruous with, and even some directly opposed to, the meaning here given to it. The evolution of a gas is literally an absorption of motion and disintegration of matter, which is exactly the reverse of that which we here call Evolution. As ordinarily understood, to evolve is to unfold, to open and expand, to throw out ; whereas, as understood here, the process of evolving, though it implies increase of a concrete aggre- gate, and in so far an expansion of it, implies that its component matter has passed from a more diffused to a more concentrated state — has contracted. The antithetical word Involution would 1 First Principles, 6th eJ., p. 155. 62 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY more tiiily express the natare of the change ; and would, indeed, describe better those secondary characters of it which we shall have to deal with presently. We are obliged, however, notwith- standing the liabilities to confusion resulting from these unlike and even contradictory meanings, to use Evolution [rather than Invo- lution] as antithetical to Dissolution. The word is now so widely recognized as signifying, not, indeed, the general process above described, but sundry of its most conspicuous varieties, and certain of its seeondary but most remarkable accompaniments, that we cannot now substitute another word. While, then, we shall by Dissolution everywhere mean the process tacitly implied by its ordinary meaning — the absorption of motion and disintegration of matter — we shall everywhere mean by Evolution the process which is always an integration of matter and dissipation of motion, but which, as we shall now see, is in most cases much more than this."i In no other passage in "First Principles" is the word •* Involution " so much as mentioned ; and it is mentioned here solely as a possible but undesirable equivalent, alter- native, or "substitute," for the word "Evolution" in an- tithesis to "Dissolution." So trivial a fact is significant merely as showing how destitute of philosophical insight is Spencer's notion of evolution itself. ^ No man has done 1 First Principles, p. 261. The "much more than this" proves to contain no new concepts but those of homogeneity and heterogeneity, with reference to the redistribution both of matter and of motion. 2 The only jMissage in all his works, we bt^lieve, in whicli Huxley men- tions the word Involution, is this sentence in his Collected Essays, Vol. I. p. 94 : — *' The phaenomenal world, so far as it is material, expresses the evolution and involution of energy, its passage from the kinetic to the potential condition and back again." This is the syllogism of energy, recognized below in § 179, 9 ; but it does not add to tlie mechanical con- cept of evolution. Huxley remains as blind as Si)encer to all involution of reason in energy as teleological end ; his conception of evolution remains as exclusively mechanical as that of Spencer. Haeckel expresses the com- mon principle of all the advocates of mechanical evolutionism better than any other of them in this luminous statement of it : — *' The great abstract law of mechanical causality, of which our cosmological law — the law of substance — is but another and a concrete expression, now rules the entire universe, as it does the mind of man ; it is the steady, immovable pole- i THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 63 more than he during the last four decades to give currency to the word, and no man has done so much as he to belittle its meaning. For he derives his notion of it from the mechanism alone, and not from the organism, the only possible source of an adequate notion of it. § 179. Let us look at the law of the organism in a con- crete case of its operation. 1. Acorn evolves oak, then oak evolves acorn; again, acorn evolves oak, and oak evolves acorn; and so on. This is the visible or evolutional side of the organic process. 2. But, at the same time, acorn involves oak, that is, holds within itself the inherited oak-idea as the condition and origin of the new oak-form, — also, oak involves acorn, that is, holds the inherited acorn-idea as the condition and origin of the new acorn- form; again, acorn involves oak, and oak involves acorn; and so on. This is the invisible or involutional side of the organic process. 3. Thus it is the essential nature of the organic process, considered both evolutionally and involutionally, to revert to its own initial stage and renew itself in a connected series of similar generations. This rhythmical succession of generations involves in itself one continuous and uni- versal life of the species, as itself a higher organism of organisms. In each generation the oak-species alternately contracts into its acorns and expands into its oaks, yet with minute changes under modification by the environ- ment which in time may amount to a gradual change or star, whose clear light falls on our path through the dark labyrinth of the countless separate phaenomena." (The Riddle of the Universe, translated by McCabe, 1901, p. 366.) Under this conception, however, the "course of Nature " is cvolutUm of nothing — not rational and purposive formation, but senseless, purposeless, irrational transformation — in Spencer's own phnist% ** different aspects of one transformation, determined by an ulti- mate necessity." (First Pnnciples, p. .'JO.^.) If he had entitled his philosophy, not that of "Evolution," but that of "Purposeless Trans- fonnation," how much yjopularity would it have got ? One need not be a Diogenes to see that mankind is fooled by words. 64 TUE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY evolution of species itself, already involved in the evolving genus and the evolving world. This alternate contraction and expansion constitute, as it were, the regular beat, the systole and diastole, of a single heart. The contraction is involution, and the expansion is evolution ; each conditions the other ; it requires both to constitute the self-perpetuat- ing organic process, and what happens in the species hap- pens equally, on a smaller scale, in the specimen. The life of the oak in the genesis of its own organs is the life of the oak-species on a smaller scale, and no less is it, on the grandest scale, the indwelling and inworking life of the world, as the identity in difference of the Many and the One. 4. This conception of life is the exact reverse of Spen- cer's as the passively mechanical "continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations; " for it conceives life as the actively organic adjustment of external relations to internal relations. Instead of being in the last analysis a merely mechanical result of "incident forces," life is the victorious subjugation of "incident forces" by imiuanent forces, as is proved by the constant absorption, assimila- tion, and incorporation of food^ with selective excretion of whatever successfully resists this digestion. Instead of being a merely mechanical product of the "environment," life dominates the environment, and harnesses it to its own chariot; it originates from itself alone (pmne vioain, ex vivo), reproduces itself alone, and exhibits itself from first to last as mastery of the mechanism by the organism. What constitutes the organism, as distinguished from the mere mechanism (the mere mechanism can only be manu- factured from without, but the finite organism is itself a mechanism which, seizing its own material from without, makes and works itself from within), is above all else the immanent inherited and constructive idea of the species, Claude Bernard's Videe creatrice ; which, so long as the specimen lives, dominates the environment, yokes to its own ends all "incident forces," shows itself visibly as a THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 65 I'' 1 1 new unit of the universal life at work in the involution of form as idea and evolution of form as fact, and ceases to work only when the specimen dies. For the cessation of this organic and organific process in the specimen is its death or dissolution. 5. Involution of form as plan or idea and evolution of form as fact: that is the double life-process itself. Slowly evolving the oak, the acorn evolves trunk, roots, boughs, twigs, leaves, new acorns, as an actual constitution of constituent natural organs ; slowly involving in each new acorn the specific plan of this constitution as the bequeathed idea of the species, the oak involves it as an inherited law of future development, proposed or purposed in advance of the fact. This inherited organic idea which dominates the young specimen, and which, if the specimen lives, dominates its environment, too, is all in all, because it gives definite and unchanging direction to all the speci- men's inherited energy; it is the predetermined goal and the determinant of that goal, — the bequeathed, inherited, and involved idea of a future fact which is the cause of the development of the present fact into that future fact, and so a final cause, — the end or aim of the life-process, — the proposituniy the result proposed or posited in advance, the purpose of it as a process. This involution of idea in all evolution of form, which is the very essence of the organic process as life, is that immanent and universal teleology of Nature which only blindness can deny. For, of course, in all growth of the oak from the acorn and the acorn from the oak, the idea in the oak is not an idea of the oak ; the seat of the idea as consciousness is the self -involving and self-evolving universe itself, the identity in difference of World-Energy and World-Reason as the Absolute I. This inherent, omnipresent, and ineradicable purposiveness of the organic constitution as such is that teleology of Nature which, because it is a fact of obvious experience, admits of no rational denial. But, deny it who may, the organic process is everywhere and always both a mechanical and a VOL. II. — 6 66 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOrHr teleological one, and its two inseparable factors are invo- lution and evolution — involution as the inflow of the idea into the form, and evolution as the outflow of the form from the idea. Thus all life is movement from the involved to the evolved in form, and movement of the involved into the evolved in idea; and the living being is this living identity in difference of idea and form in fact. 6. The involutional side of the organic process, there- fore, is its invisible teleological side; while the evolutional side of it is its visible mechanical side. The necessary identity in difference of involution and evolution in the organic process, outside of which neither element alone is in the least intelligible, is the necessary identity in difference of the mechanical and the teleological — the impossibility, therefore, of separating them or conceiving either with- out the other, the impossibility of conceiving evolution without involution or the mechanical without the teleologi- cal. The thing cannot be done, and the attempt to do it simply defeats itself by a manifest misconception of the mechanism; for the mechanism just as much involves teleology as the organism involves causation. What sort of a concept of the empirical machine is it which leaves out the purpose of the machine as a whole, or the purpose of its parts in their reciprocal relations? Can it be any- thing better than an unreal abstraction? Yet, if the real machine of experience cannot be itself explained without teleology, how can it explain a "world-machine " in which all teleology is denied? These questions answer them- selves. Hence the mechanical theory of evolution, which aspires to explain Nature without teleology as a mere machine, necessarily begins by misunderstanding the machine as mechanical only, and ends by misunderstand- ing Nature even in its strictly mechanical aspect. It is a blind leader of the blind. Nothing but the organism can explain a world which evolves. 7. The organic process, then, as the life-process, that is, as the perpetual involution of idea and perpetual evo- \ .1 .'I * ■■. 1 i' THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 67 lution of form, is itself the cosmical process, the " Course of Nature." Either this is true, or there is no cosmical process at all, no cosmical procession of existence from form to form in accordance with any genetic or intelligible law, no orderly evolution of energy as form and orderly involution of reason as idea in a formed cosmos. Nothing can be said to ** proceed " at all, in the sense of moving by rational law or intelligible rule, except as genesis, that is, formation through ideation — purposive formation, not pur- poseless transformation. The exact opposite of orderly process is formless and aimless motion — disorderly motion which has no form for aim ; while all orderly process, that is, motion which has form for aim, is essentially organic, both mechanical and teleological at once, — mechanical as cause and effect, teleological as end and means, and organic as identity in difference of the mechanical and the teleo- logical, or evolution and involution, in every organism as such, and therefore in the world-organism as a whole. This is the only thinkable cosmical process; for the only alternative is an absolutely irrational time-series, an unin- telligible succession of events as empty of evolution as of involution, because having no more rational or genetic connection than the mechanically related but teleologically unrelated succession of figures in the kaleidoscope (as a machine, even the kaleidoscope contains a teleological ele- ment, but not in the immediate relation of figure to figure). The "Course of Nature," on the contrary, is a self- sustained rational and genetic movement from the involved to the evolved, from the idea to the form, from the universe as invisible but abiding unity to the universe as visible but vanishing multiplicity; and the rationality of it lies in the eternal genesis of form out of form (the specimen as fact out of other specimens as facts) through the eternal media- tion of idea (the specific form as purpose) — a genetical syllogistic process which is mechanical so far as it contains causality and teleological so far as it contains finality, and which is organic because it contains both laws at once in 68 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY working harmony. The abiding unity of the universe is the eternity of this cosmical process as life-process: the universe is alive. This is the Syllogism of Being, in which the antecedent, as involved cosmical idea, or Spirit, is eternally equal to the consequent, as evolved cosmical form, or Nature. That is, the organic life of the cosmos as a whole, differenced as infinite from all the finite organ- isms within it because, unlike these, it is self -originated and self-sustained, self-perpetuating and self-suflScing, is the eternal self -equation of activity in the transient and repose in the permanent — of mechanical energy and teleo- logical reason — of evolution and involution, in the infinite personality as Eternal Subject-Object or Absolute I. 8. For, in the last analysis, the organic or life-process of the world, the cosmical process itself, is the personal or ethical process, of which aetiology or mechanics is the outermost, biology or organ ics the inner, and teleology or ethics the innermost principle: causality, finality, and ethicality are all one in personality, and this one is the identity in difference of Nature and Spirit as God. Cause and effect, end and means, actual and ideal, — these are the three ultimate principles of all real being as known, whatever more may lie hidden in the unknown; and the rash objection that these principles are inconsistent, and must needs clash in operation on a cosmical scale, is at once silenced by the obvious fact that they exist simulta- neously and operate without clashing in the actual consti- tution and operation of every human being. If they can thus CO- work in harmony in man, it would be frivolous to argue that they cannot co-work in harmony in the cosmos as a whole. Cause is universally involved in effect, end in means, ideal in actual — effect is evolved out of cause, end out of means, actual out of ideal : the cosmos is not a dead static fact, but perpetual movement from the involved to the evolved, and this movement in its unity and univer- sality is identity in difference of cause, end, and ideal, or energy, purpose, and reason— -the Syllogism of Being — THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 69 the rational self-activity of that infinite All-Person in whom the mechanical process, as evolution of the actual out of the ideal, and the ethical process, as involution of the ideal into the actual, are one and the same as Life, and in whom all evolved finite persons live and move and have their being. Nothing less than this can be the con- tent of a " philosophy of evolution " which is to be con- ceptually adequate to all the known facts it would explain, as cognition of the identity in difference of Nature and Spirit in God. 9. In fine, so conceived, the total world-process presents itself, not to blind human faith, but to seeing human in- telligence, as possessing inherently a threefold aspect: mechanical or kinetic, teleological or vital, and ethical or spiritual. In the mechanical aspect, the universal or cosmical energy particularizes itself in the single cause or group of causes as the involved antecedent, and remains equal to itself in the single fact, effect, or event, as the evolved consequent (syllogism of energy as potential and kinetic). In the teleological aspect, the universal or cosmical purpose particularizes itself in the single precon- ceived end as the involved antecedent, and remains equal to itself in the means or in the realized end as the evolved consequent (syllogism of reason as idea and form). In the ethical aspect, the universal or cosmical ideal particularizes itself in the single ideal aim as the involved antecedent, and remains equal to itself in the deed or act as the evolved consequent (syllogism of conduct as ideal and real). But these three aspects are ail one in the Syllogism of Being, conditioned and determined as the necessary syllogistic form of existence by the law of unit-universals or the Apriori of Being — that ultimate and absolute necessity which, being the condition of all explanation through rea- son, is not to be itself explained by reason. These, then, are the essential elements of the concept of the cosmos as Reality : — (1) One sole substance as Energy. 70 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY (2) One sole essence as Reason. (3) One sole constitution as identity in difference of substance and essence, or Energy and Reason, in the cosmos as All-Person or Absolute I (§ 185). (4) One sole process as the identity in difference of involution and evolution: involution of essence in sub- stance as ideal form, or end intended, and evolution of essence in substance as real form, or end achieved. (5) One sole law of the process as the Syllogism of Being: eternal self-mediating procession of the involved antecedent idea into the evolved consequent form. (6) One sole aim of the process as the Good of the Universe: eternal involution of the changeless ideal as absolute virtue and absolute beatitude, and eternal evolu- tion of the changing actual as finite virtue and finite beatitude — eternal pursuit of the ideal. (7) One sole ground of the process as the Love of the Universe: eternal identity in difference of Being with Itself as the One and the Many — eternal self-devotion of the One to the Many as the Life of God in Infinite Love. One thing more by way of application. When a human life is lived consciously and voluntarily in accordance with Nature {secundum Naturam), that is, when it freely sub- sumes itself under the strictly natural law of spiritual movement from the involved ideal of Good to the evolved actual of Character, the cosmical-ethical process in Man and the cosmical-ethical process in Nature are so far one and the same in essence, differing only in scale as a unit in its universal.^ This is identity in difference of the finite life of Man and the infinite life of God — which is Religion. § 180. Comparing this ethical theory of evolution through involution with Spencer's mechanical theory of 1 This is a sufficient answer to the Romanes lecture of the noble but confaseil Huxley, setting up a factitious antagonism between the ethical process in Man and the cosmical process in Nature. Such antagonism is consistent with the mechanical theory of evolution, but not with facts. THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 71 evolution without involution, we find the latter's essential elements determined in the following passages : — ** We come down, then, finally to Force, as the ultimate of ulti- mates. Though Space, Time, Matter, and Motion, are apparently all necessary data of intelligence, yet a psychological analysis (here indicated only in rude outline) shows us that these are either built up of, or abstracted from, experiences of force. Matter and Motion as we know them are concretes built up from the contents of various mental relations ; while Space and Time are abstracts of the/orww of these various relations. Deeper down than these, however, are the primordial experiences of Force. . . . Force, as we know it, can be regarded only as a conditioned effect of the Unconditioned Cause — as the relative reality indicating to us an Absolute Reality by which it is immediately produced." * "A finished conception of Evolution thus includes the redis- tribution of the retained motion, as well as that of the component matter. . . . The formula finally stands thus : — Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion ; during which the matter passes from a relatively indefinite, in- coherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent hetero- geneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."* " In other words, the phaenomena of Evolution have to be deduced from the Persistence of Force. As before said — * to this an ultimate analysis brings us down, and on this a rational syn- thesis must build up.' This, being the ultimate truth which transcends experience by underlying it, furnishes a common basis on which the widest generalizations stand; and hence these widest generalizations are to be unified by referring them to this common basis." • " From this conception of Evolution and Dissolution as together making up the entire process through which all things pass, and from this conception of Evolution as divided into simple and com- pound, we went on to consider the law of Evolution as exhibited among all orders of existences in geueral and detail. . . . Further, 1 First Principles, pp. 151, 152. 2 Ihid. pp. 366, 367. In obedience to the ''Note" on the latter page, the word "relatively " is inserted above in its proper place. « Ibid. p. 369. 72 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 73 it was pointed out that in all evolutions, inorganic, organic, and super-organic, this change in the arrangement of Matter is accom- panied by a parallel change in the arrangement of contained Motion. . . . While we think of Evolution as divided into astro- nomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, sociologic, etc., it may seem to some extent a coincidence that the same law of metamorphosis holds throughout all its divisions. But when we recognize these divisions as mere conventional groupings, made to facilitate the arrangement and acquisition of knowledge — when we remember that the different existences with which they severally deal are component parts of one Cosmos — we see at once that there are not several kinds of Evolution having certain traits in common, but one Evolution going on everywhere after the same manner. . . . It must be remembered that, while the connection between the phaenomenal order and the ontological order is forever inscrutable, so is the connection between the conditioned forms of being and the unconditioned form of being forever inscrutable. The inter- pretation of all phaenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, is nothing more than the reduction of our complex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols ; and, when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms, the symbols remain symbols still. . . . Though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter, the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both." * § 181. These citations suflSciently indicate Spencer's conception of Evolution as the universal or cosmical pro- cess. It is essentially and solely mechanical. It com- pletely suppresses both the teleological and the ethical elements of the cosmical process, because it completely neglects and leaves out Involution, the necessary correla- tive and complement of Evolution. We will tersely restate his essential positions in our own words, and criticise them as tersely as may be. 1. Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force, are the only elements of reality, so far as man relatively knows it. But Space, Time, Matter, and Motion are mere derivatives 1 First Principles, pp. 499-610. of Force, which is the sole ultimate relative reality. Force itself, however, is a mere derivative of the Unconditioned Cause or Absolute Reality. The Unconditioned Cause, we infer, is meant to be in itself something other than Force. But what can this other be ? To call it cause is to call it that which produces its effect, and Spencer himself says that Force is a " con- ditioned effect," a " relative reality " which is " immediately produced" by the Unconditioned Cause as "an Absolute Reality." He thus forgets the sagacious warning of Hume: "I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connection, and pro- ductive quality, are all nearly synonymous; and therefore it is an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest."^ When he attributes immediate productivity to his Unconditioned Cause, he identifies the latter with the Force which he ostensibly distinguishes and derives from it. The " productive quality '* of Cause is one with the " pro- ductive quality" of Force, and Spencer thus locates his ultimate " Absolute Reality " in nothing but Force itself. Since, therefore, he carefully excludes all teleological and ethical elements from Evolution as such, he reduces the whole reality of the evolutional process to nothing but Mechanical Force, and erases all his intended distinction between this and the Unconditioned Cause. When he thus refers all reality, whether "relative" or "absolute," to pure Mechanical Force as its ultimate origin, and charac- terizes this pure Mechanical Force as the "ultimate of * Treatise of Human Nature, Philosophical "Works, I. 201. It should be observed that "necessity" does not belong in the above list, unless limited as ** physical necessity." For the necessity which makes the greatest side and the greatest angle opposite in the triangle involves nothing that can be resisted, nothing of agency, power, force, etc. That which, in Kant's phrase, simply "cannot be otherwise" involves nothing but the conditions of existence or Apriori of Being ; and this is not causa- tion as energy or force. So "connection" belongs in the list only as limited to "causal connection" — which Hume, however, would not admit. 1 74 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 75 ultimates," — when he sums up all in the declaration that " it is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist as The Un- knowable," * — he virtually confesses that Mechanical Force itself is unknowable per se, takes refuge in blind "feeling" or ^^ indefinite consciousness of it" as "the Absolute, " ^ concedes unconsciously that evolution without involution, as we have shown, is itself unintelligible, and reduces the Synthetic Philosophy to an island of Mechan- ism in an ocean of Mysticism.' 2. The definitive " formula " in which Spencer embodies his "finished conception of Evolution " omits all Involution — includes only the mechanical, and omits the teleologi- cal and the ethical which are inseparable from the mechan- ical in the cosmical process. He includes only (1) Matter, (2) Motion, (3) Processes of integration and dissipation in Matter and Motion, and (4) States of homogeneity and heterogeneity in Matter and Motion. Such a " finished conception of Evolution " as his " for- mula " defines, however, omits not only the involution of idea, but also the evolution of form. It explains neither the genesis nor the form of anything whatever. Yet the whole meaning of evolution is concentrated in the Be- coming of Existence — that is, in the gradual genesis of its particular specific forms, as opposed to their sudden creation without genesis. Its capital questions are — What evolves? From what does it evolve? Into what does it evolve? The one answer is — Particular specific form evolves from its own specific form as idea into its own specific form as fact. Correctly understood, this answer covers machine, organism, and person, whether as finite or as infinite. Question and answer alike depend on the genesis of form as the essence of all evolution. Yet Spencer's formula has nothing to say either of form 1 First Principles, p. 97. « Ibid. pp. 75, 109. « IMd. p. 96. or of its genesis. His half-conception of evolution is fatal misconception of it. Even his maimed and fragmentary abstraction, however, although omitting the most essential elements of what it purports to define, contains nevertheless a presupposition which, if he had understood its importance, would have shown him that his "finished conception of Evolution," so far from being "finished," was scarcely begun. For "homogeneity" and "heterogeneity" self-evidently pre- suppose the whole law of unit-universals. Homogeneity is nothing but likeness among things of the same kind, and heterogeneity nothing but unlikeness among things of different kinds. They presuppose, therefore, knowable objective relations of things and kinds, all the necessary relations of genus, species, and specimen, the whole law of unit-universals, — in a word, the Syllogism of Being, with its immanent necessity of involution and evolution as one inseparable process. Strike out either necessary ele- ment of this necessary process, and there remains neither homogeneity nor heterogeneity — neither integration nor dissipation — neither Matter nor Motion — neither " fin- ished conception" nor defining "formula" of Evolution, even as Spencer vainly tries to conceive it. For the Invo- lution he leaves out lurks unsuspected in the very Evolu- tion he retains : the inseparability of the factors he tries to separate is the self-destruction of the "finished conception " he tries to construct out of one factor alone. 3. All the phaenomena of Evolution must be deduced from the Persistence of Force. But there are and can be no phaenomena at all without homogeneity and heterogeneity among the elements of the phaenomena — without likeness and unlikeness of things and kinds — without necessary and knowable objective relations of genus, species, and specimen — without the Syllogism of Being — without identity in difference of involution and evolution, as one inseparable process. Consequently, there are and can be no phaenomena of 76 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY evolution which are not at the same time phaenomena of involution — that is, phaenomena of the one inseparable process. But these, the only real phaenomena because they are also noumena per se, cannot be deduced at all from the persistence of mere Force or Energy alone, that is. Cause and Effect as mere Mechanical Force ; they can be deduced (so far as they are deducible) solely from the persistence of the cosmical process as at once mechanical, teleological, and ethical, that is, from the identity in difference of Energy and Reason in the cosmos itself as Absolute I. 4. The one Evolution going on everywhere, the entire process through which all things pass, is Mechanical Evolu- tion and Mechanical Dissolution, deducible exclusively from pure Mechanical Force. But such evolution as this, evolution without involution, goes on nowhere; and the "finished conception " of it is an impossible pseudo-concept, proved to be such by Spencer's unconscious presupposition, as proved above, of the very involution which he aims to exclude, when he defines mechanical evolution in terms of homogeneity and hetero- geneity. 5. The connection between the phaenomenal order and the ontological order is inscrutable, as is also that between the conditioned forms and the unconditioned form of Being. In other words, things in themselves are unknowable: human knowledge is nothing but unverifiable and ground- less human supposition. It is unnecessary to examine Spencer's very crude form of subjectivism, after what has gone before in criticism of profounder forms of it. 6. The interpretation of all phaenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, is merely reduction of complex concepts to simple concepts; but all concepts, including those of Matter and Spirit, are mere symbols or signs of a Reality which remains Unknown. The attempt to interpret all phaenomena in mechanical terms is the attempt to exclude all but mechanical concepts THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 77 from human knowledge — in other words, to think the world as machine, and nothing but machine. Such an attempt is logically congruous with the ancient dualism which Spencer especially abjures — the theory of an ex- ternal Artificer making the world as a mechanical product, and operating it from without after the analogy of all arti- ficial machines. But it is not logically congruous with monism in any form. A world which makes and works itself, without any external Artificer, can be a machine solely in the sense of the organism, the natural machine which makes and works itself from within, that is, the machine which is not artificially constructed but naturally evolves. The mere machine manifests only the law of cause and effect in the motion of its parts and its own motion as a whole. But the organism, the natural machine, manifests in its motions both the law of cause and effect and the law of end and means at one and the same time. It manifests in actual working harmony the identity in difference of the teleological and the mechanical, of cau- sality and finality, of involution and evolution; and only from the organism, not from the mere machine, can be derived the true theory of evolution, as applied to a world which is not made from without, but makes itself from within. It is amazing that Herbert Spencer should not understand the necessity of this. The philosophy of evo- lution must be monism, not dualism; and the philosophy of monistic evolution must be derived from the law of the organism, not that of the mere machine. Yet Spencer defeats the essential aim of such a philosophy by his self- contradictory attempt to interpret all phaenomena in mechanical terms. Only purely mechanical phaenomena can be so interpreted; all others remain overlooked and uninterpreted. If Spencer's Unconditioned Cause, or the Absolute, re- solves itself into pure Mechanical Force, as we have seen it does, and this into an Unknown Reality, all the *^ rela- tive reality " with which so-called human knowledge deals 78 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY becomes a merely euphemistic synonym for unreality. The distinction between " relative reality " (phaenomena) and " absolute reality " (noumena), just like that between the "relatively true, the true yj>r W5, " and the "absolutely true, the true in itself, ^^ must rank no higher than a controversial shift, an adroit sleight-of-hand, a political compromise, a device by which a bewildered philosophy which is afraid of logic seeks to escape from decision between the only logical alternatives : namely, the true and the untrue, the real and the unreal. From pure Mechanical Force as an Unknown Reality, no real knowledge can be derived. Pure Mechanical Force, divorced from all teleology and all ethics, and reduced to a law of mere Mechanical Mo- tion of Matter without assignable purpose, idea, or ideal, becomes an absolute surd; and all the knowledge of "phaenomena alone" which is derivable from it becomes knowledge which is not knowledge, but illusion, — knowl- edge which is as unreal as the "relative reality," and so, in a very literal sense, absurd.^ At bottom, the question is one of the reality or unreality of knowledge, of know- able truth itself; and it is no cause for surprise tliat tlie philosophy of mechanical evolution, driven to pure me- chanical force without teleology or ethical aim as the ulti- mate principle of all explanation of the cosmos, should name itself Agnosticism — the philosophy, not of Science, but of Necessary Nescience. § 182. The word Agnosticism, originally adopted by Huxley as the name of the obfuscation which he had avowedly derived from Mansel, Hamilton, and their teacher Kant, and virtually sanctioned by Spencer, not only in deriving his own obfuscation from the same au- thorities in "First Trinciples," but also in declaring that ** our own and all other existence is a mystery absolutely *'"W]jcn Phaononienalism loses its hoad, ami, becoming blatant, stops forwar«l as a theory of first principles, then it is really not respectable. The best that can l)e said of its pretensions is that they are ritliculous." (F. H. Hmdley, Appearance and Reality, 1S93, p. 120.) THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 79 beyond our comprehension,"^ has acquired two distinct meanings in current use, one loose and popular, the other strict and philosophical. The former might be formu- lated as, " I don't know anything about God, Freedom, or Immortality;" the other as, "I know phaenomena, but I can't know and you can't know anything about noumena." ^lany of the noblest and bravest men of our time are Ag- nostics in the former sense, and simi)ly reflect a confusion of thought quite intelligible in the present confused state of philosophy and of the popular teachings founded on it. The other formula expresses a definite and dogmatic epis- temological doctrine, the absolute unknowableness of noumena or things as they are in themselves, which re- ceived its scientific form from Kant, so far as that can be called scientific which abolishes science as science of the real and reduces all knowledge to illusion agreed on. For, if things as they are cannot be known, much less can things as they are not; and the agreement to accept knowledge of phaenomena, or things as they are not in themselves, as a substitute for the knowledge of noumena, or things as they are in themselves, can be dignified with no other or higher name than illusion agreed on. The intellectual self-sophistication of such an agreement to accept false- hood for truth amounts to a moral degradation of philos- ophy in its present state, and more or less justifies the widespread contempt for it as "mischievous metaphysics." Philosophy can recover its legitimate influence by nothing short of stern and virile loyalty to logic — by ceasing to pretend that knowledge of phaenomena alone, or things as they are not in themselves, is "science," or that a " relative truth for us " which is confessedly not " absolute truth in itself" can be anything else than absolute falsehood for ns. It is this not logical and not valiant and not sin- cere pretence which is the vice of philosophical agnosti- cism, and which is not in the least expunged or atoned for 1 First Principles, p. 96. 80 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY ^ by the splendid personal virtues, and shining achievements in the particular sciences, of the great men wlio, unable to detect its sophistries, have made agnosticism fashion- able in our day. The chief evil of agnosticism, apart from the intrinsic falsity and deceptiveness of its epistemologi- cal dogma, lies in the fact that it paralyzes human reason by driving it to despair, stops investigation in the highest themes by making it seem futile, and quenches the love of truth by making truth itself seem a riddle without an answer — in other words, demoralizes the human intellect itself. It is no accident that the rise and spread of agnos- ticism, as a popular belief among the reading classes, has been followed at the opening of the twentieth century by a world-wide recrudescence of barbarism, militarism, and commercialism, a world-wide decay of the democratic ideal, a world-wide revival of that imperialist spirit of conquest and greed and contempt for human rights which was sup- posed to be passing away forever. What else could be expected when the majority of thinking men, misled by false lights, have learned to look on the world as nothing but a machine — to see in it nothing but "an infinite and eternal Energy from which all things proceed," that is, nothing but Mechanical Force — to discern in Nature no moral law at all, and to discern in Man no moral law that has a deeper root in his own nature than habit, custom, statutes, social conventions, business policy, self-interest in citizens and. in nations alike? No stream rises higher than its source, and no man's life rises higher than his idea of the universe and his own place in it, save by that "divine inconsistency " for which he can never rationally account, and which in fact is the unacknowledged but overpowering influence of a universe vaster and truer than his idea of it. This influence of a universe truer than his idea of it makes Herbert Spencer's life, which has been devoted to a very noble ideal, not to be at all " interpreted in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force," immeasurably more instructive than his system. Nevertheless, before THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 81 leaving the latter, it is necessary to note the utmost height to which he has carried his idea of the universe itself. This high-water mark of his philosophy is shown, we think, in a well-known passage: — § 183. ** This, which to most will seem an essentially irreligious position, is an essentially religious one — nay, is the religious one, to which, as already shown, all others are but approximations. lu the estimate it implies of the Ultimate Cause, it does not fall short of the alternative position, but exceeds it. Those who espouse this alternative position assume that the choice is between personahty and something lower than personality; whereas the choice is rather between personality and something that may be higher. Is it not possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending Intelligence and Will as these transcend mechanical motion? Doubtless we are totally unable to imagine any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence ; it is rather the reverse. Have we not seen how utterly unable our minds are to form even an approach to a conception of that which underlies all phaenomena? Is it not pioved that we fail because of the incompetency of the Conditioned to grasp the Unconditioned ? Does it not follow that the Ultimate Cause can not in any respect be conceived because it is in every respect greater than can be conceived ? And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not elevations, but degradations? Indeed, it seems strange that men should suppose the highest worship to lie in assimilating the object of their worship to themselves. Not in asserting a transcendent difference, but in asserting a certain like- ness, consists the element of their creed which they think essential. ... To think of the Creative Power as in all respects anthropo- morphous is now considered impious by men who yet hold them- selves bound to think of the Creative Power as in some respects anthropomorphous, and who do not see that the one proceeding is but an evanescent form of the other. . . . After it has been shown why, by the very constitution of our minds, we are de- barred from thinking of the Absolute, it is still asserted that we ought to think of the Absolute thus and thus. In all ways we find thrust on us the truth that we are not permitted to know, nay, are not even permitted to conceive, that Reality which is behind the VOL. II. — 6 I 82 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY veil of Appearance ; and yet it is said to be our duty to believe (and in so far to conceive) that this Reality exists in a certain defined manner. Shall we call this reverence ? or shall we call it the reverse ? Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious.**! ^ In this passage Spencer shows an evident desire to set before mankind a formless form as a possible object of rational worship. We say intentionally, a formless form : if that is a contradiction, it is Spencer's own. On the one hand, this object is absolutely inconceivable because it is too great to be conceived in any respect; there can be absolutely no conception of it, not even an approach to a conception of it. That is to say in effect that, since all form, being a congeries of relations, is for that reason essentially and necessarily conceivable, the only possible object of rational worship must be in itself relationless or absolute. 2 It must be devoid of all relations, external or internal ; it must possess no attributes, since all attributes involve relations; it must be the Absolute itself as Absolute Ifhi'vilessness. On the other hand, this object of rational worship must be conceived, that is, relationally formed in thought, as having at least nine attributes. It must be conceived, according to this very passage itself: — 1. As Unconditioned : related to the conditioned as its negation and condition. 2. As Noumenal: related to phaenomena as "underly- ing " them, or as " that Reality which is behind the veil of Appearance." 3. As Causal: related to phaenomena as its own effects. 1 First Principles, pp. 92-94. Compare with the closing part of the above : "It is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist as the Unknowable " (p. 97 — italics ours). 2 *• It is hnpossible to put the Absolute in the same category with any- thing relative, so long as the Absolute is defined as that of which no neces- sary relation can be predicated." {Ihid. pp. 67, 68.) THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 83 4. As Ultimate: related to proximate causes as their opposite. 5. As Transcendeiit : related to the immanent in general as its opposite, and here to "Intelligence and Will" in particular, as that which stands below it and in which it is not immanent. 6. As Different: related to what is like as the unlike, and here to human nature as that to which it is unlike. 7. As Great: related to possible objects of conception as having in itself a magnitude which renders it "too great to be conceived." t. 8. M Inconceivable : related to man's conceiving power as beyond its possible field of exercise. 9. As Impersonal: related to the personal, not as that which is below it, but as that which is above it. That is Impersonality transcends Fersonality, It is evident, therefore, that the Absolute must be in itself unconditioned, noumenal, causal, ultimate, tran- scendent, different, great, inconceivable, impersonal. This complexus of strictly conceptual and conceivable relations constitutes, if not a coherent conception, at least "an approach to a conception." It certainly is Spencer's own conception of the inconceivable, and, how- ever ineffectively, conceives the Absolute as "the uncon- ditioned form of being" which underlies "the conditioned forms of being: " in other words, as Absolute Form, Consequently, in accordance with his combined teachings on the subject, the only possible object of rational worship, as we have just said, must be the Absolute as Formless Form, This result, meaningless because contradictory, would doubtless be explained by Spencer himself as merely illus- trating his own thesis that we "are not even permitted to conceive that Keality which is behind the veil of Appear- ance." We admit this. But it would be a cogent reason for his repudiating the whole Part First of his own "First Principles," as a vain effort to conceive that "Reality," a I 84 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY fl' self -stultifying attempt to know "The Unknowable," and therefore a mischievous source of confusion in multitudi- nous minds of his own generation. Nevertheless, this Part First is the most important, because the most influential, portion of his whole Synthetic Philosophy, and demands further consideration on that account. Giving in advance the final outcome of his " finished conception of Evolution " as applied to religious ideas, and conceiving the Absolute Keality as, on the whole and in the last analysis, nothing but Impei-sonal Mechanical Force, it illustrates the logical impossibility of the effort to think the world as nothing but a machine — that is, the logical impossibility of think- ing evolution without involution and the mechanism with- out the organism. So much as this, we believe, has been made plain enough in what has gone before. But, whether the Absolute Keality is Impersonal Mechanical Force or Absolute Person itself, is a question on which more must be said. § 184. "Is it not possible," Spencer asks, "that there is a mode of being as much transcending Intelligence and Will as these transcend mechanical motion? Doubtless we are totally unable to imagine any such higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather the reverse." Most certainly so. Nothing could be more admirably spoken, and the mani- fest truth of the words has gone very far to persuade the unwary thinker of the truth of the utterly sophistical differences he draws from them. Spencer infers that the mode of being which transcends intelligence and will must be itself devoid of intelligence and will; that to attribute these or any other human attributes to the Ultimate Cause must be, just because they are human, a degradation, and not an elevation ; that it is wisdom to assert a " transcendent difference " between that Cause and all things human, but folly, irreverence, and impiety to assert between them any " likeness " in any degree ; that to do the latter is to fall into bottomless gulfs THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 85 of " anthropomorphism ; " that the choice lies, not between personality and subterpersonality, but between personality and superpersonality — in other words, that the superper- sonal cannot be also personal, but must be absolutely im- personal. In all this, how much logical force and material truth can be found? In the first place, intelligence and will, as Spencer him- self admits, certainly transcend mechanical motion. But, as we know intelligence and will in our own experience, they transcend mechanical motion by including, not ex- cluding it. Person includes, not excludes, the machine; the living man is a machine as well as a person, moves as a machine under all the laws of mechanical motion, and dies when his machinery ceases to work under those laws. Whether the person-machine or the mere machine, such as a steam-engine, transcends the other in dignity and intrin- sic worth, need not be here debated; we will accept the common opinion as well grounded, namely, that intelli- gence transcends unintelligence, and that will, or conscious force directed to rational ends, transcends unconscious force — in a word, that the man transcends the machine. But, if so, the man transcends the machine by including, not excluding it; the personal machine transcends the impersonal machine, and not vice versa. That is, revers- ing Spencer's principle of estimation of worth, personality transcends impersonality. If the choice lies, as Spencer says it does, between personality and something higher, not something lower, then the higher must be, not imper- sonal, but personal and something more, unimagined though it be. In order to be higher than mere personality, then, the Ultimate Cause must be personal and something more; it must transcend personality by including, not excluding it; it must transcend intelligence and conscious will, not by dropping dowji to unintelligence and unconscious force, but by rising up to higher intelligence and vaster con- sciousness, perhaps to modes of spiritual existence as much above human personality as the human person is 86 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY >i: 1l( above the mere machine. What more than person the Ultimate Cause may be we know not, for we cannot rise even in thought above ourselves ; for us, at least, the dic- tum of Protagoras holds true — ** Man is the measure of all things." But high, infinitely high if you will, as the Ultimate Cause must be above the human, it cannot tran- scend personality without including it and being personal, too. That is the law of Nature as we know it: the organ- ism transcends the machine by including it; the i)erson transcends the organism and the machine by including both; and the Ultimate Cause can transcend the person, the organism, and the machine solely by including all three. This law of ethical worth (for ethical it is and must be), namely, that the higher must include the lower, is our only possible criterion of transcendence; and the application of it here is the conclusion that, whatever more than personal the Ultimate Cause may be, it must be personal first of all, intelligent and not unintelligent, or, instead of being higher than personality, it is necessarily lower. If Spencer reasoned logically from facts as they are, he could reason in no otlier way. His Ultimate Cause, his apotheosis of blind, unconscious, unintelligent, impersonal. Mechanical Force, for all its absoluteness and infinitude, is as much below the *' Apologia " of a Socrates as is the unconscious roaring of a f umace-blast ; and his sophistical pretence that the Ultimate Cause is "elevated" rather than "degraded" in rational estimation by being characterized as impersonal can impose only upon the shal- lowest and least thoughtful of minds. In the next place, the superficial considerations quoted above about "anthropomorphism" are such as to delight the "groundlings" in philosophy, but to "make the judi- cious grieve." They make Spencer himself illustrate his own statement in the fine opening sentence of First Prin- ciples: "We too often forget that not only is there a * soul of goodness in things evil,' but very generally, also, a soul of truth in things erroneous." He certainly forgets THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 87 to apply this principle to anthropomorphism, which he takes to be error with no soul of truth. Yet, justly and rationally interpreted, the essential principle of anthropo- morphism, however hidden by gross and uncomely super- stitions, is a shining and much-needed truth: namely, that, in all that concerns moral dignity or ethical worth, personality transcends impersonality. This principle, if Spencer had only understood it, would have rescued him from falling a victim to undiscriminating anti-anthropo- morphism in the apotheosis of Force, as the sole principle of his "finished conception of Evolution;" for it is this latter principle of mere mechanism that makes all the real degradation of anthropomorphism itself, when it substi- tutes Force for Good, Power for Love, in men's notions of the Divine. But the lurking truth in anthropomorphism, that personality transcends impersonality, lies at the very foundation of ethics; for ethical categories of "good" and "bad," and ethical obligation to realize the ideal of the "good" in all self-conscious acts, apply to persons and persons only. Spencer very clearly recognizes that real being without form is impossible, when he makes his ulti- mate contrast lie between its " conditioned forms " and its "unconditioned form;" if, then, among the forms we know as conditioned, the form of personality is the highest, to think of the unconditioned Ultimate Cause as personal is a higher conception, however " symbolical " it may be, than to think of it as impersonal. To put it plainly, the an- thropomorphism which, however crude or raw its concept of the person may be, conceives the Ultimate Cause under the highest form it knows, that of personality, is a less degrading superstition than the anti-anthropomorphism which, violating the ethical scale of worth, conceives the Ultimate Cause under the longest form it knoivs, that of impersonality. In the dry light of reason and logic, the mechanical theory of evolution without involution, refer- ring all things at last to Impersonal Force, is more super- stitious tlian the lowest fetich-worship which conceives its ;()' i! i *f! 88 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY fetich as, in whatever grotesque or incomprehensible or mysterious manner, Person. If that judgment is itself anthropomorphism, so be it : it is none the less sane and scientific philosophy, for it finds the essence of personality itself in the principle of ethicality. Lastly, although the closing pages of Spencer's Part First on "The Unknowable" express much that is ethically very noble and does him the highest honor, he yet makes use earlier of a humorous satirical illustration which has had great popular influence, yet is a masterpiece of sophis- try. It is this : " If for a moment we made the grotesque supposition that the tickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of consciousness, and that a watch possessed of such a consciousness insisted on regard- ing the watchmaker's actions as determined like its own by springs and escapements, we should simply complete a parallel of which religious teachers think much. And were we to suppose that a watch not only formulated the cause of its existence in these mechanical terms, but held that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate this cause, and even vituperated, as atheistic watches, any that did not venture so to formulate it, we should merely illustrate the presumption of theologians by carrying their own argument a step further."* Soberly and not sophistically handled, what does this illustration really illustrate? The exact opposite of what Spencer very honestly but very curiously intends. In "formulating the cause of its existence in mechanical termsy^^ and "holding that watches were bound out of reverence so to formulate them," such a watch would only do what Spencer himself does, and ought to be lauded by him as a faithful and intelligent disciple of his own phi- losophy of mechanical evolution. He satirizes himself alone. This hypothetical watch endowed with consciousness becomes by the hypothesis itself a conscious machine, a * First Principles, pp. 91, 95. THE SYLLOGISM OP BEING 89 being which is consciousness and machine in one, and just so far a person. The watchmaker, likewise, is conscious- ness and machine in one, a person. When the supposed watch, therefore, forgetting the consciousness and remem- bering only the mechanism in itself, ignores the conscious- ness and recognizes only the "springs and escapements" or other mechanism in the watchmaker, as the cause of its own existence, the watch argues precisely as Spencer argues, makes the very same argument, and merits his applause rather than his satire ; for both formulate the phaenomena in merely mechanical terms, both formulate the Cause of the phaenomena in merely mechanical terms, and both, suppressing consciousness, exalt mechanical force as all in all. But if, on the contrary, the watch as con- scious machine, or person, should formulate the watch- maker, the cause of its own existence, as likewise conscious machine, or person, it would show itself a reprehensibly anthropomorphic watch, to be sure, but, mirablle dlctUy would exactly hit the truth! For the true cause of the watch was indeed the personal watchmaker. The moral of Spencer's little apologue, quite contrary to his intention, would seem to be that anthropomorphism in its rudest form is a truer philosophy than his own incoherent compound of mechanism and mysticism. " Theologians " may not be very wise (we fear they sel- dom are), but very few of them are such poor reasoners as Spencer here shows himself to be. The failure of the Synthetic Philosophy was foreordained in its "finished conception of Evolution " as evolution without involution — in its conception of the World as only Machine, Force without End or Aim. § 185. For the world is not a mere machine, involving nothing but the mechanical law of cause and effect in Mo- tion; nor yet a mere organism, involving nothing but the mechanical law of cause and effect, and the organic law of end and means, combined in Life; but Person itself, in- volving both these laws and the ethical law of actual and 90 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY li 'II 2'" ideal in Conduct. All forms of being and all modes of action which are known by man, whether in common experience or science or philosophy, are easily resolvable into these ultimate elements, which meet in practical union and working harmony in the constitution of man as finite person ; consequently, there can be no a priori reason why they should not meet in equal union and harmony in the constitution of the world as infinite All-Person. That this identity in difference of man and the world is essen- tially, in point of principle, no philosophical innovation, but a truth in some sort familiar to the ancients, is evi- dent in the old crude doctrines of ho7no mensura and of macrocosm and microcosm. But its conclusive grounds are not fully brought to view except by the philosophy of the identity in difference of evolution and involution, as founded on the reformed epistemology which this philos- ophy necessitates and supplies through the reformation of the Aristotelian Paradox as tlie law of unit-universals, the Apriori of Being. The Idea of the Universe which results from the philos- ophy of evolution without involution, as exemplified by Herbert Spencer and all other agnostics who philosophi- cally comprehend their own principle of the " relativity of knowledge" as essentially the Kantian epistemology, is that of an " Ultimate Unknown Keality " as the " Uncon- ditioned Cause," which manifests itself solely as the "per- sistence of Force " — mechanical, impersonal, alogical Force — an infinite and eternal but Irrational Energy from which all things proceed; for, if it were Rational Energy, it would be personal, which all agnosticism most strenu- ously denies. Realities, noumena, or things as they are in themselves, are unknowable ; appearances, phaenomena, or things as they are not in themselves, are "relatively known" as a "relative reality." But knowledge of a " relative reality " which ex hypothesi is unreal, that is, knowledge of things which are not so, is nothing but ignorance, error, illusion agreed on. In other words. THE SYLLOGISM OF BEING 91 agnosticism is the philosophy of intellectual self-despair, man's abdication of his own nature as "rational animal," in strictest truth the philosophy of Absolute Nescience: in Spencer's self-humiliating expression — " Our own and all other existence is a mystery absolutely beyond our com- prehension." * The Idea of the Universe, on the contrary, which results from the philosophy of the identity in difference of evolu- tion and involution in the Syllogisms of Being, Thought, and Knowledge, may be stated thus : — Mechanical causality or the law of cause and effect in Nature, organic finality or the law of end and means in Life, and personal ethicality or the law of ideal and real in Spirit, — the three eternal and all-pervasive real prin- ciples by which the whole known world exists, — are at bottom one in the real principle of omnipresent Reason- Energy^ Self- Consciousness, or Absolute Personality^ and constitute the unity of the universe in the essential being and life of God, as at once Nature, Life, and Spirit, or infinite machine, infinite organism, and infinite person — the All as Absolute I, known by the finite I in its own self- knowledge as / in the We in the Absolute L So far as the truth of philosophies is to be estimated by the truth of their rational outcomes, the two philosophies of evolution, the one without and the other with involu- tion, may be judged from comparison of these two Ideas of the Universe as a Unit. The one ends in Nescience, as experience without reason. The other ends in Science, as identity in difference of experience and reason in the Syl- logism of Knowledge. And it is the latter, not the former, which is philosophy true to itself, the self-certitude of man as a reasonable being, a Knowing and Self-Knowing I. 1 First Principles, p. 96. kl liii li CHAPTER XV THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE § 186. Comprehension of identity in difference — not separation in the distinguishable, but distinction in the inseparable — is the key to comprehension of the world. This has been hitherto assumed, and now it must be ex- plained. Organization is the type of identity in difference. In Being it is the organic constitution ; in Thought it is the organic idea. The organic constitution is the idea as real- ized or evolved in Being; the organic idea is the constitu- tion as idealized or involved in Thought; the organism, therefore, is the identity in difference of involution and evolution, idea and constitution, reason and energy. Thought and Being. As such, and only as such, can the organism appear, whether as Kant's " mere phaenomenon " or as Hegers "phaenomenon in itself." But since, in order to appear, the phaenomenal organism must exist, and since, in order to exist, it must be the identity in difference of organic constitution and organic idea, it follows that the organism cannot be a phaenomenon with- out being a noumenon too. That is, it cannot be percep- tible without being ipso facto intelligible, — perceptible as many related organs and intelligible as one self-related organism, and so an object of both experience and reason, that is, of knowledge. It other words, the organism cannot possibly be known at all except as the identity in difference of the One and the Many as organism and organs, a phaenomenon-noumenon, a " thing in itself " and " object of knowledge." THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 93 For instance, the finger is an organ of the hand, the hand an organ of the arm, the arm an organ of the body; the body is the living whole of all its own organs, from the constituent cell to the nervous system. If the finger is cut from the hand or the hand from the arm or the arm from the body, the organ is destroyed and the organism is mutilated ; the destruction of all the organs is the de- struction of the organism itself. It is Nature, not human reason, which constitutes the reality as Jinf/er in haiid in arm in body — that is, all the parts in correlation and graduated reciprocal interdependence as one organism of many organs, identity in difference of the one and the many — many unit-universals in one larger unit-universal; for the possibility of human reason is itself conditioned on the prior reality of the human organism, and it is absurd to dream that the conditioned can " prescribe to Nature " its own conditions of being. If in my thought of the organism I undertake to separate the one and the many, I establish difference without identity, and thereby destroy; if I confound the two elements, I establish identity with- out difference, and again destroy; if I would understand, I must neither separate nor confound, but distinguish. This immanent relational constitution of the organism in itself as one in many and many in one, this necessary reciprocity between the organic whole and the organic parts, is in no sense the productive work of the human mind. It is neither my concept, nor yours, nor ours, but (since Kant himself confesses, in the Introduction to the Prolegomena, that human reason is itself an organism) it is the prior condition of you and me and all our concepts. It is absolute refutation of the theory of the exclusive sub- jectivity of relations, whether as "pure thought," "pure reason," "pure synthesis a jt>nort," or what not. It is that absolute necessity in objective relations which conditions and predetermines all necessity in subjective relations, and necessitates recognition of the Apriori of Being as the origin of the Apriori of Thought. 94 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 95 Man is organic, therefore, because the world is organic, not vice versa. Identity in difference of the One and the Many as the Absolute — not the Absolute One here and the lielative Many there, but the Absolute in the Relative and the Relative in the Absolute everywhere and always — is the essential and eternal a priori condition of the Absolute itself, the necessary constitution of the universe as the All-Organism; and organism in the highest form comprehensible by man as finite person (not necessarily the highest form in Being beyond the reach of his present comprehension) is the infinite All-Person — identity in difference of infinite reason and infinite energy as the Absolute I. The way of separation or abstraction as reines Denken is the farilis descensus Averni of philosophy. Whether it be abstraction of experience from reason as in Hume's aposteriorism, or of reason from experience as in Kant's apriorism, — abstraction of energy from reason as in Spencer's pandynamism, or of reason from energy as in Hegel's panlogism, — any attempted separation of the inseparable defeats itself, and renders every problem in philosophy insoluble. The only possible solution of philo- sophical problems is the way of identity in difference. For necessary total inherence of every unit in its own universal and necessary partial inherence of every universal in each of its own units, — that is, identity in difference of the unit and the universal, — constitute together the unconditioned condition of the reciprocal relations of genus, species, and specimen, whether in Being or in Thought; and, since these conditions and relations are what they are simply because they "cannot be otherwise," the law of unit-universals is the Apriori alike of Being, of Thought, and of Knowledge. Turn in whatever direction we may, illustrations of identity in difference meet us on every hand. Every object of vision presents it as inseparable form and color; wherever the form is, there is the color, and wherever the color is, there is the form; extinction of one would be ex- tinction of the other as a visual object. Every object of touch presents it as inseparable form and resistance ; and every object of hearing, as a sound, a word, a tune, pre- sents it as inseparable pitch, intensity, and timbre. Iden- tity in difference is less than absolute sameness ; but it is more than indissoluble union, which may be mere external juxtaposition, while identity in difference is the absolute internal co-extension and interpenetration of essences as reciprocal conditions each of the other. When, for in- stance, Kant teaches that "intuitions without concepts are blind, and concepts without intuitions are empty," he seems to declare their interpenetration as matter and form, and doubtless means that; yet he really declares only their indissoluble union in " experience " alone, for he actually separates them as "pure concepts" and "pure intuitions" in "pure knowledge a priori. ^^ He derives intuitions from the sensibility alone and concepts from the understanding alone, two faculties which "have, perhaps, a common though unknown root," but which act in reciprocal inde- pendence of each other; their products, therefore, cannot be more closely united than the processes themselves, which are separated in all "pure knowledge a priori." But identity in difference of substance, as energy, and essence, as reason, in the constitution of the cosmos, as All-Person, — identity in difference of involution of essence in substance, as ideal form or reason, and evolution of essence in substance, as real form or fact, in the cosmical process as Syllogism of Being, — identity in difference of experience and reason in all process of human intelligence as Syllogism of Thought, — identity in difference of sensi- bility and understanding in the one knowing-faculty and the one knowing-process, or of perception and conception in the percept-concept of the unit-universal as real product of that process in the Syllogism of Knowledge, — such identity in difference as this is immeasurably more than mere juxtaposition, or even indissoluble union, for it is interpenetration so profound that suppression of one ele- ment is eo ipso absolute suppression of the other, too. 96 TUE SYLLOGISTIC PUILOSOPIIY Comprehension of such identity in difference as this, not separation in the distinguishable, but distinction in the inseparable, is, we repeat, the key to comprehension of the world ; for it is the key to the solution of the problem of Greek philosophy, nay, the problem of all philosophy, in the reconciliation of the One and the Many as at once infinite Machine, infinite Organism, and infinite Person, in the Absolute 1. In the last analysis, all identity in differ- ence is that of essence and substance. What are these? § 187. Descartes answered this question by affirming that substance is Independent Being — that which so exists as to need nothing else for its existence (res quae ita existit ut nulla alia re Ind'ujeat ad existendum). Tliere are three substances : one absolutely independent substance which is infinite and uncreated but creative, perfect per- sonal spirit as causa sui, that is, God; and two finite and created substances which are absolutely dependent on God, but relatively independent of each other, namely, body and soul. The nature or essence of independent substance is to be conceivable through itself alone, that is, through its own independent quality as two ultimate attributes, (I) of extension and (2) of thought. The nature or essence of the dependent substances is to be conceivable through others alone, that is, through their own dependent quality as modes, accidents, or particular forn;^ of extension or of thought (inodi extensionis or modi cogitationis)^ which have nothing in common; thinking substance and extended sub- stance {res cogitans and res extensa) are both conceptually distinct and ontologically separable. This is the dualism of mind and matter, which, however, proves to be an awk- ward compromise between trinism and monism; for it gives a primary dualism of God and the World, and a secondary dualism in the World itself as Body and Soul. These two dualisms, as really a trinism if taken together, hopelessly confuse the relations of God, Body, and Soul, as soon became manifest in the universal occasionalism of Geulincx and the universal pre-established harmony of THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 97 Leibnitz. That is, Descartes separated God, as immaterial spirit, from the World, as mere material mechanism; be- tween which two disparate substances the possibility of interaction was just as incomprehensible as between body and soul in the World itself. The primary dualism ought to exclude all Soul from the World; within an exclusively mechanical World, however, in which there can be no logi- cal place for soul at all, he conceded the actual interaction of body and soul in human beings, as a fact not to be denied, but also not to be explained. The conception of substance which involved such perplexities as these evidently needed to be recast. § 188. Spinoza greatly modified the answer of Descartes. Substance remained Independent Being — that which ex- ists in itself and is conceived through itself (id quod in 86 est et per se concipitur). But there were not with Spinoza, as with Descartes, three substances, God, body, and soul, but only one substance, God alone (Deus sive sub- stantia). Descartes's two finite and dependent substances became Spinoza's two infinite and independent attributes of the one independent substance as extension and thought, each conceived without the other, each independent of the other, and each both distinct and separate from the other in its own kind; particular bodies and souls were no longer substances at all, but merely modes of these two attributes of the one substance. The whole problem of interaction between two disparate substances thus disappeared, of course, but at no small cost of philosophical comprehen- siveness. For, while Descartes completely separated God as personal spirit from the world as mere machine, Spinoza overcame the separation and reunited the two by sacrificing the spirit to the machine. He discarded the spirituality and the personality altogether and virtually identified God with simple mechanical causation, operating with equal universality and rigor in the two spheres of extension and thought, and without the least tincture of teleology in either. This violated the essential difference of extension VOL. II. — 7 98 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 99 and thought, which were thus merged in one class as effects, God became simply the identity in difference of natura naturans, as the one immanent and absolute Free Cause, and natura naturata, including both extension and thought as two parallel but independent Causal Series (ordo et con- nexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio reriim)» In both, God was one and the same Free Necessity (libera necessitas)f because all things in each series follow in pure logical sequence and absolute purposelessness from the inner mechanical necessity of the divine nature alone. In exact phrase, the one divine substance is Independent Being, and the one divine essence is Purposeless Power or Mechanical Force (Dei potentia est ipsa ipsiits essentia). No better formula could be devised for Evolution with- out Involution. Spinoza's Causa Sui is Spencer's Uncon- ditioned Cause; Spinoza knows only natura naturans as Cause, and natura naturata as Effect — Spencer knows the Absolute only as the "Unconditioned Cause," and the Persistence of Force as "conditioned Effect." To both thinkers there is a reserved field for mysticism — to Spinoza, the innumerable " infinite attributes " other than " extension and thought," — to Spencer, the "idefinite con- sciousness of the Absolute " as the Impersonal Reality which is "higher than personality;" but, to both, this mystical field is the Unknowable, while the whole field of the Knowable is that of all-inclusive mechanism without teleology. It may be imagined that Spinoza, at least, recognizes more than the purely mechanical, when he makes thought one of the two known attributes of the one infinite sub- stance; and this supposed recognition of the hyperme- chanical has deceived many as to the strictly mechanical character of his system. For in this system the purely mechanical law of cause and effect is conceived to govern absolutely the Divine Thought, no less than the Divine Extension; whence it follows that thought itself ceases to be thought and becomes, at the very utmost, merely self- i conscious mechanism. But self-conscious mechanism is a self-contradiction, as evident as Spencer's confessedly " grotesque supposition " that *' the tickings and other movements of a watch constituted a kind of conscious- ness." The reason is that the necessary condition of all real thought is free purpose, (1) the purpose to know from the desire to know (8ta yap to Bav^aiuv ol avOpoiiroL KoX vvv Kttt TO TrputTov i^p$avTo <^tA.oo-o<^€ti/), or (2) the purpose to know from the desire or need to act: thought without this free purposive self-activity, thought directed to no end and for no end, is itself impossible, because the possibility of thought is destroyed in destroying freedom as its condition. Spinoza's recognition of thought, therefore, as an attri- bute of his one substance, is merely nominal (God he con- ceives to be devoid both of "will and understanding," as mere " modes of thought ") ; while his recognition of effi- cient causality (Dei jmtentia) as its sole essence (ij)sa Ijtskis essentia) is real. Thus the attribute of extension neces- sarily swallows up the attribute of thought, extinguishes it, and reduces God in reality to the one essential and sole attribute of efficient without final causality. This is a one- sided Mechanical Monism, that is, a monism of mechanism without teleology, evolution without involution, efficient causal series without purposive rational series, identity in difference of substance as God and essence as Mechanical Force alone. Even this one-sided monism does not escape an internal dualism, since the two attributes, the nominal and the real, are conceived as not only distinguished but also separated in the one substance, incapable of affecting one the other. Such a distorted and imperfect monism of substance in ostensible but illusory dualism of essence fails to justify the common conception of Spinozism as a thoroughly monistic system. Pure monism, indeed, would be un philosophic, since philosophy can think the One and the Many in organic harmony only as identity in difference of monism and pluralism. But in a higher sense this total organic constitution, too, must be thought as absolutely 100 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY one in the absolute unit-universal of Existence, the one and only universe of Real Being, the identity in difference of unity and universality in the Absolute I. Spinoza fails to conceive the self-supporting and all-comprehensive totality of a oneness which fulfils itself through its own internal self-correlation in an infinite manifold ness, just because he divides his one substance into two essences, that is, two essential attributes, which are supposed to have nothing in common, and which stand over against each other within the Divine nature itself in stark and unreconciled opposition. For his Extension is the Mere Machine, and his non-purposive or merely mechanical Thought is Thoughtlessness : Extension devours Thought. Substance and essence cannot be thus violently separated ; they are identical in difference, distinguishable but indivi- sible ; and the only monism of substance which can sustain itself is that which involves monism of essence — one eternal substance and one eternal essence in one eternal process. Only as Absolute I can this condition be fulfilled in Ileal Being, and Spinoza excluded the conception of the I from liis conception of God by his exclusion of teleology, will, and understanding, thereby reducing his conception of the one substance to that of the mere machine. § 189. Leibnitz conceived substance neither under the form of Descartes's attempted dualism nor under that of Spinoza's attempted monism, but under the form of plural- ism or monadology. Substance remained Independent Being, but only as Independent Active Being. Substance is not the all-producing unit-universal, but a mere infinite multitude of disconnected monads or units, each existing by acting independently of all the rest. " Whatever acts is a singular substance; whatever does not act does not exist; substance is a being capable of action." Substance, then, is independent individual being, and its essence is independent individual activity; and, except in their inex- plicable likeness in substance and essence, no two monads are alike at all. More than this does not concern us here, THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 101 since the doctrine of monads bristles with difficulties, to consider which would take us too far afield. However, the common essence is further defined. The monad, as an independent unit of substance (there is no universal of substance other than the arithmetical sum of the units as an infinite multitude), is not a material, solid, inactive unit, an atom moved only from without, but an immaterial unit of self-active force {vis activa), moved only from within and incapable of influence by its fellows; it is incorporeal, indivisible, immortal, punctual or nouspatial, capable only of self-development from within, representa- tive of the universe it mirrors by reproducing it internally, and so forth. Its substance is its being as uniqueness or absolute individuality, and its essence is its form as abso- lute self-activity; while yet, as dependent on God, it is also passive — a relation which, as in the case of Descartes, throws the whole doctrine into confusion again. For God is only the supreme monad, the motias monadiim^ between whom and the other monads there ought, by the theory, to be no interaction whatever. This is the internal contra- diction of the monadology which seems least of all to admit of reconciliation, for it seems to negative the very essence of substance as independent self-activity of the individual monad. The conception of substance as a plu- ralism of monads appears thus to destroy itself: substance as independent individual being, and its essence as action which is at once dependent and independent, are certainly irreconcilable with each other. § 190. The dualism of Descartes, the monism of Spinoza, and the pluralism of Leibnitz were all held as ontological theories of things as they are in themselves. With all three, substance was Independent Being, to ov rj 6v. But Descartes's principle of individual self-certainty as the primal and fundamental fact of philosophy contained in itself the seeds of modern subjectivism in forms of ex- haustless variety and of all degrees of inconsistency; for the only form of subjectivism which is logically consistent 102 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOrHY THE SYLLOGISM OP KNOWLEDGE 103 with itself is pure solipsism, and this does not occur. Descartes, who thought he had avoided solipsism through the idea of God as innate in the Ego, merely gave a scien- tific formula to the spirit of subjectivism in his famous eogitoy ergo sum; he thereby doubtless strengthened that spirit, but he did not originate it. Objectivism in science, as purely physical investigation of Nature, had maintained itself by the verifiable character of its results j but these results were too closely confined to physics to permit any larger generalization than the conclusion of Descartes him- self as a physicist, not as a philosopher, that the world is a machine : a generalization which is an indubitable truth, yet which is turned into an untruth when it is made to mean that the world is nothing but a machine. For, in- stead of being a final result, an end of all investigation and all thinking, it is merely the definite first step or beginning of larger investigation and higher thought: the question remains, ichat is a machine ? Put that question precisely and press thought to an answer — analyze the machine of experience, and discover that it is and can be nothing but an artificial, separable, and temporary organ of the organism — demand further to know how such a concept of human experience can be applied at all to the world as a whole, and discover the necessary identity in difference of the infinite machine and the infinite organism as one infinite universe — insist on knowing how the uni- verse as an infinite organism could possibly be an infinite system of immanent ends and means without being at the same time an infinite person : press objectivism in science, we say, to these higher and necessary generalizations, and the spirit of subjectivism in philosophy would vanish like the fog before the coming day. (See Appendix, Funda- mental Analyses.) But the day had not come, and the fog of subjectivism spread everywhere, until Kant arrived at last to give to it, in his Erkenntnisstheorie^ the formidable and gigantic shape of a Spectre of the Blocksberg. Intimidated by this phan- II torn, the type of speculative thought which sincerely be- lieves itself to be "modern philosophy," but which in truth is waiting to be modernized by scientific objectivism, just as chemistry has been modernized by the atomic theory and biology by the derivation theory within the last half- century, has not even yet proved able to resist the phan- tom's paralyzing influence. For under the much-abused name of the " relativity of knowledge " it still upholds the Kantian Erkenntnisstheorie^ which we have shown above (§§ 172, 173) to rest ultimately on the proposition that necessity = non-necessity. Such a theory of knowledge, teaching the absolute subjectivity of all relations as such, and denying the objectivity of any relations in real exist- ence because all relation as such is nothing but "synthesis a priori " by the Subject, reduces existence itself to a surd, and permits no higher concept of substance than that of Relative or Dependent Being: that is, Being which has no reality whatever except as the pure product, idea, or con- ceptual work of the human Subject, and which, therefore, absolutely depends on that Subject. When, in perfect good faith, Kant caricatured as " dogmatism " the claim to know substance as Independent Being, or things as tliey are in themselves (Dinge an skh)^ he forgot that he exposed himself thereby to the crushing but inevitable retort that the claim to know substance as Dependent Being, or things as they are not in themselves {Gegenstande, nur Erschel- nungen)y is on the very face of it self-convicted "humbug" as nescience. For who is so blind as not to see that pretended knowledge of "what is not so" is nothing but ignorance? So long as noumena remain, by Kant's own definition, things as they are in themselves, and phaenom- ena things as tliey are not in themselves, the pretence that ive k7iow " phaenomena alone " must remain, no matter how sincerely and innocently the pretence is made, what Sokrates satirically characterized as "the conceit of knowl- edge without the reality." If we cannot know substance as Independent Being, as Reality, we can at least reconcile 104 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY ourselves to necessary nescience with stoical fortitude ; but it concerns the dignity of philosophy and the ethics of the intellect not to accept as " knowledge " at all that pseudo- science of substance as Dependent Being, or mere Rela- tivity, which passes current now with so many as " modern philosophy." The very first step towards a truly modern philosophy must be the clear recognition, in no spirit of opposition, but in that of unflinching scientific accuracy, that phaenomenism in all its forms is essential agnoiology, and noumenism the only scientific epistemology. § 191. If the concept of substance as Independent Being, then, fails to sustain itself with Descartes as dualism, with Spinoza as monism, with Leibnitz as pluralism, — if the concept of substance as Dependent Being fails to sustain itself with the Kantian subjectivism as "phaenomena alone," mere appearances without intrinsic reality, — what conceivable form remains for it to take? Briefly, this: identity in difference of Independent Being and Dependent Being — not an abstract Absolute without a Relative ("out of relation," as it is put), nor yet an abstract Relative without an Absolute ("pure relativity"), but, on the con- trary, concrete identity in difference of the Absolute, or Independent Being as One (which is the absolute monism), and the Relative, or Dependent Being as Many (which is the absolute pluralism), in the real form of the world as one infinite and eternal sole universe. More particularly : the real form of the world as the infinite One is by no means an abstract Eleatic unity op sterile simplicity, but rather an immanent relational constitution (the objectivity of relations being inseparable from the objectivity of things as their real terms) which is an infinite and eternal productivity of real forms as the finite Many, and which is both organic in itself and organific in these its concrete products. This immanent relational constitution of the universe, as one infinite real form in itself and infinitely many real forms in its immanent concrete products, is clearly and distinctly conceivable as identity in difference THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 105 of substance, essence, and process, in one knowable Reality, as follows : — I. The substance of the world is one infinite and eternal Energy, or Action in Thought, as the mechanical side of the organic process, that is, as Evolution. II. The essence of the world is one infinite and eternal Reason, or Thought in Action, as the teleological side of the organic process, that is, as Involution. III. The process of the world is the identity in difference of Energy and Reason, Action in Thought and Thought in Action, or Evolution and Involution, as the one organic process of Life, the eternal Syllogism of Being. IV. The Being or Reality of the world is the identity in difference of this substance, this essence, and this process, as One All-Person, the Absolute I. (§ 179, adfinem.) V. Whatever may lie in the reality of the world as not yet known may add to, but not subtract from, the reality of what is known already. For, just so far as it goes, Knowledge is as real as Being, because it is Being itself as conscious Subject-Object. The concept of substance as identity in difference of Independent Being and Dependent Being, therefore, is involved in that of the world as identity in difference of substance, essence, and process. This is Reality itself — Energy informed by Reason in the course of the actual universe. Human experience gives us knowledge of De- pendent Being as the Many Units, and human reason gives us knowledge of Independent Being as the One Universal, — two distinguishable but inseparable elements of knowl- edge as science of the Unit-Universal of Real Existence. This conception of Reality may be simply set down in this little diagram of the "course of Nature" from the One to the Many : — World / B"*>«**n<^ = Enerpry = Action in Thought = Mechanical Evolution \ World *19T \ Process = Identity in Difference of Evolution and Involution = Life -A ^''Real Real Form \ Essence = Ileason = Thought in Action = Teleological Involution / Real Forms. »') 106 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY § 192. Reason is here intended to connote all other essential elements of personality, of which it is the domi- nant principle; and process implies its own law, aim, and ground, as indicated in § 179. Reason means to think, and it can exist as ideality only in real ideation — that is, only as Thought in Action. Equally, Energy means to act, and it can exist as actuality only in real actiou — that is, only as Action in Thought. Separate and isolate Reason from Energy, as is done by rationalism, — or separate and isolate Energy from Reason, as is done by empiricism, — and both vanish from reality into mere abstraction. It is only as identity in difference of Reason and Energy in Life that either element can he real. That is why their separation yields only a concept of the Unreal I, while their identity in difference yields the only concept of the Real I, as explained in § 60 by Tables I and II; also, why both empiricism and rationalism reach only the Irrational Antithesis of 1 and Not- We, as explained in § 71 by Table III; also, why all systems of materialism, or Energy with- out Reason, and all systems of idealism, or Reason without Energy, are equally and absolutely failures — equally and absolutely incompetent to meet the just demands of science and scientific realism. Kant's "pure reason" and HegePs "pure thought," that is. Reason or Thought pure from all experience or empirical elements, and therefore pure from all admixture of Energy as affecting the understanding through sensuous or intellective perception, ultimate in nothing but unreal abstractions from real knowledge ; and the root of the failure lies in their subjectivist concepts of substance. Kant fatally separated Reason, or essence, from Energy, or substance, by his fundamental doctrine of "synthesis a priori," or "spontaneity of knowledge" in the pure understanding, as the exclusively subjective origin of all relations as such. The consequence was that "things as they are in themselves," being divested of all originally immanent relations, became necessarily unintelligible as THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 107 substance without essence, and nothing was left to be known but "phaenomena alone," or things as they are not in themselves; that is, essence without substance, mere relations created by and inherent in the subject, abstrac- tions, absolute unrealities, nothing but pure entia rationis. Hegel fared no better, but just as fatally separated Rea- son from Energy, though he transformed Kant's "subjec- tive idealism " into " absolute idealism." He says: " According to the Kantian philosophy, the things of which we know are only phaenomena /or us, and their Ansich \i. e. their im- manent relational constitutions, the relational essence which makes the substance intelligible] remains for us an unattainable Beyond, The common-sense consciousness has justly taken umbrage at this subjective idealism, according to which that which forms the con- tent of our consciousness is something that is only ours, something which is posited by us. In fact, the true relation is this : the things of which we immediately know are not only mere phae- nomena for MS, but also mere phaenomena in themselves, and the peculiar determination of finite things is to have the ground of their being, not in themselves, but in the Divine Idea. This con- ception of things, then, is to be designated in any case as idealism, yet, in distinction from that subjective idealism of the critical phi- losophy, as Absolute Idealism ; which absolute idealism, although transcending the common realistic consciousness, is nevertheless so little to be considered as a peculiarity of philosophy that it rather forms the foundation of all religious consciousness, namely, in so far as this, too, considers the total content of all that exists, in general the actual world, as created and ruled by God." ^ 1 Encyklopadie, Werke, VI. 97, 98. Of course, *' phaenomena in them- selves" which have the "ground of their heing in the Divine Idea," yet are also ''phaenomena for us," can have no possible self-subsistence or independent being in themselves, but must exist only as effects wrought in the human subject by the Divine Subject. This conception of Hegel seems scarcely, if at all, distinguishable from that of Berkeley — objects whose only esse is percipi, to be explained only by the direct action of the Divine on human consciousness. From this point of view, the distinction between " objective idealism " in Hegel and "subjective idealism " in Kant or Berkeley wholly disap]>ears. Kant himself opposed Berkeley and ** sub- jective idealism," as '* mystical and visionary," as mere "cobwebs of the brain." (Prolegomena, Werke, IV. 41, 42.) 108 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY This "objective" or "absolute idealism "is frequently considered as conceding the "real existence of a material world," even if not quite in the way that "common sense" wants it ; and too many Hegelians, who would not accept this view if they discriminated the really significant state- ments of Hegel from the relatively insignificant ones, so take it. The most important of the significant statements are those which define or indicate HegePs concept of sub- stance, and are mainly these (the italics are everywhere his own) : — " The need of philosophy may be more precisely determined by the consideration that, since Spirit as emotive and intuitive has for its object the sensuous, — as imagination, images, — as will, aims, — and so forth, it thus, in the bare opposition or distinction of these farms of its existence and its objects, at the same time satisfies its own supreme subjectivity. Thought, and arrives at Thought as its object. In this way it comes to itself in the deepest sense of the word, for its principle, its unalloyed selfhood, is Thought." ^ " As for the beginning which philosophy has to make, it seems, even in its universaHty, to begin with a subjective presupposition, just like the other sciences : that is to say, just as they make Space, Number, etc., their particular object, so philosophy seems to be under the necessity of making Thought itself, as a given single fact, the particular object of Thought. But this is the free act of Thought, to put itself in the position where it exists for itself, and thereby /)ro(/ticcs and gives to itself its own object.**^ " Thought, as it constitutes the substance of external things, is also the universal substance of the spiritual," • ** In truth, however, as we have just seen. Thought is that which determines itself to be Will (das sich selbst zum Willen Bestimmende), and the former remains the substance of the latter." * 1 Encyklopadie, Werke, VI. 17. 2 Ibid. VI. 25. » IMd. VI. 46. * Ibid. VII. ii. 358. (Cf. VIII. 35: "Der Wille ist eine besondere Weise des Denkens.") Hegel here contradicts himself, for self-determina- tum ** to be will" presupprjses the will to determine. Kuno Fischer very justly remarks : *' lu this transition from the theoretical to the practical THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 109 "Thought abides with itself, relates itself to itself, and has itself for object." * ♦* The Idea shows itself as the Thought which is absolutely identical with itself, and no less as the Activity [/. e. AVill] which places itself over against itself in order to be for itself, and in this Other merely abides with itself." * •* The objective meaning of the figures of the syllogism is in general this, that everything rational (alles Vernunftige) shows itself as a threefold syllogism, and indeed in such a manner that each of its members just as well assumes the position of an ex- treme as it does that of the mediating middle term. This is particularly the case with the three members of the philosophical science, that is, the Logical Idea, Nature, and Spirit. Here, in the first place. Nature is the middle or connecting member. Nature, this immediate totality, unfolds itself in the two extremes of the Logical Idea and Spirit. Spirit, however, is only Spirit while it is mediated by Nature. Then, in the second place, the Spirit which we know as the Individual and the Active is just as much the middle, and Nature and the Logical Idea are the ex- tremes. It is Spirit which knows the Logical Idea in Nature, and spirit there lies a certain ambiguity. Is it the result of the whole previous development that the Intelligence knows itself as Will, or that it makes itself Will and becomes Will ? If we look back to the l)c- ginning, we must answer this question affirmatively in its first alternative. ... At the beginning of the development of the theoretical spirit, the Will appears as the moving principle — at the close, as the emergent result ; there it is primary, here secondary. As to the relation between Will and Intellect, therefore, there exists just as unmistakable an agreement between Hegel and Schopenhauer there, as here the unmistakable opposition and conflict. Here, therefore, a contradiction makes itself observable which affects the Hegelian doctrine itself." (Geschiehte der neuern Philosophic, VII. ii. 683.) Again: "The Hegelian psychology has proved that there is no Will without Thought, but also no Thought without Will, since the whole development of the theoretical Intelligence starts from intuition, which itself presupposes attention and the act of the IVill necessary to it." {Ibid. 692.) Then the Hegelian psychology itself disproves the Hegelian metaphysic which makes Thought the one sole substance. The identity in difference of Thought and Will can be only that of Reason and Energy as Person — Energy as substance and Reason as essence, which is our con- tention against Hegel. * Encyklopadie, Werke, VI. 63. » Ibid. VI. 26. no THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY so elevates it to its essence. In the third place, the Logical Idea itself is just as much the middle ; it is the ahsolute substance of Spirit as well as of Nature, —the Universal, the All-Pervading. These are the members of the absolute syllogism." * **The definition of the Absolute, that it is the Idea, is itself absolute. All previous definitions return to this. . . . The Idea itself is not to be taken as an Idea of Something [von irgend Ettoas^y just as little as the Notion is to be taken as determined Notion. The Absolute is the One Idea, which, as judging, particularizes itself in the system of determined ideas, which, however, exist as determined ideas only to return to the One Idea, to its truth. It is first of all from this act of judgment that the Idea is the one universal substance, but its developed genuine reality is that it exists as Subject, and so as Spirit." * Briefly : Thought is the only Substance — that is, noth- ing exists but ideas, as fleeting forms in the eternal dia- lectic of self-contradiction and self-reconciliation as the One Idea. This is the fundamental and distinctive stand- point of Absolute Idealism. § 193. These few passages are enough to determine with great precision the fundamental position of Hegel as to the concept of substance, on which everything else in philosophy depends. What he found in previous modern 1 Encyklopadie, Werke, VI. 353, 354. If any one should assert that Hegel's objective or absolute syllogism resembles or is identical with our Syllogism of Being, he would only convict himself of the grossest incapacity for fundamental distinctions. For Hegel recognizes no "substance" in Nature or in Spirit but the Logical Idea itself, nothing but Thought or Reason — Reason without Energy ; while we consider Reason without Energy, just as much as Energj' without Reason, to be absolute nothingness or non-existence. Hegel never blunders on this prime principle of Thought the only Substance — there is no place in his system for Energy, as an element just as substantial as Thought, Reason, Logical Idea. To con- found this philosophy with Hegel's, or to imagine it derived from Hegel's, when its source has been simply the logical implications of the anti- Hegelian principle of the objectivity of relations, — and this has been done, — ought to be impossible for any critic who is both educated and honest. For Hegel himself, if he were alive, would be the first to disown it — with emphasis. 2 Ibid. VI. 385, 386. THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 111 thinkers as materials from which to construct it, on the general basis of the Aristotelian Paradox (§§ 122-129), may be shortly summed up, taking account of great dis- tinct standpoints alone, as follows : — Spinoza represented the standpoint of ontological monism, the doctrine of the absolute reality as One Independent Being. The one sole substance was God, the Absolute Unit as the necessary juxtaposition or indissoluble union, not the identity in difference, of Extension and Thought — real Extension and nominal Thought as real Thong htless- iiess ; its essence was purposeless necessity, that is, purely mechanical force ; and its process was the eternal concate- nation of mechanical causes in a twofold chain, in the connected but alien attributes of Extension and Thought. This was the conception of the world as nothing but Energy in a machine, notwithstanding its apparent but deceptive recognition of Thought as a purposeless intellect — which is no intellect. Leibnitz represented the standpoint of ontological plural- ism, the doctrine of the absolute reality as Many Independ- ent Beings. The innumerable substances were monads, unextended but thinking individuals, Absolute Units of Thought; their common essence was individual self- developing activity; and their common process was the mirroring or representation, with varying degrees of clearness and distinctness, of the universe of monads by each monad in isolated subjective thinking. This was the conception of the world as nothing but Thought in a mul- titude of ontologically independent centres or subjects — Thought as the" Many. Kant represented the standpoint of individual subject- ivism or phaenomenism, the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge in each individual subject as the true reality of Subjective Dependent Being : a doctrine which is, in truth, the absorption and disappearance of individual subject and individual object in the relation of which they are the terms, and on which, as the sole true reality, they both 112 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOrilY depend (Pure Formalism, Pure Relation ism). The only real substance was this relativity of knowledge itself, as the formal relation of the unformed to the unformed, that is, of an unknown logical subject (the I = a:) to an un- known real object (noumena = unknowable things as they are in themselves, phaenomena = knowable things as they are not in themselves: with either as real object, the "re- lativity of knowledge" = error or absolute ignorance). The essence of this substance was the exclusive subject- ivity of relations. The process was "pure synthesis a prioriy" or free subjective creation of all relations by the individual understanding as "spontaneity of knowledge." This cannot be called a conception of the world at all, for it gives us a mere Je ne sais quoL Out of these heterogeneous elements, Hegel, with mar- vellous ingenuity, wove the web of his absolute idealism. From Spinoza he took the principle of the absolute mon- ism of substance, but rejected the principle of mechanism. Handicapped by his own juxtaposition of Extension and Tkought as incompatible attributes of the one substance, Spinoza had been logically compelled, in order to preserve the unity of process in both attributes, to drop Thought by construing it as a purposeless and mechanically moved intellect, devoid both of will and understanding; whereby his one substance, as compound of real Extension with real Thoughtlessness, could be moved only by mechanical causa- tion as its one process. But Hegel took the other horn of the dilemma. Equally unable to reconcile Extension with Thought, he dropped the former entirely, expunged the whole mechanical process to universalize the logical, and kept Thought alone as the one sole substance, as declared so explicitly in the foregoing extracts — Thought purified from all Experience of Extension as Matter, Mechanism, or Mechanical Energy (reines Benken), From Leibnitz Hegel took the principle of free self- development as the aJ)solute process in substance^ but rejected that of pluralism of substances, or Thought as the Many. THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 113 'I His monistic process is the Infinite Logic, Thought as the One, self-activity as free self-determination in the dialec- tical unfolding of the notion in the one eternal self- thinking {Begriff des Begriffes, reine Idee), His idea is not the "Idea of Something," but has its infinite Being as the One Absolute Idea of itself, in itself, and for itself. From Kant Hegel took the principle of subjectivism, but freed it from the narrowness of Kant's individualistic standpoint by universalizing the individual subject as the knowable (not unknowable) Absolute Subject, and making this, as Absolute Spirit, the absolute essence in substance. He thus brought substance, essence, and process, the three great elements of Reality, into the unity of a true synthe- sis as identity in difference — one absolute substance as Thought, one absolute essence as Subject or Spirit, and one absolute process as self-development, free self-deter- mination, or dialectical Self- Activity. So constituted as a pure Monism of Thought, it is not to be wondered at that HegePs absolute idealism won and so long held an immense influence in the philosophical world ; for no pre- vious system ever exhibited on the whole so high or so superb a degree of self-harmony. § 194. Nevertheless, the imposing structure rests on a false foundation in its concept of substance, and this falsity has wrought the ruin of its influence by alienating the scientific mind. The real substance of the world, the one sole and universal substance, is not Thought, but Energy, without which Thought itself could not exist as Self- Activity. HegePs admission of Self-Activity into his panlogism is his unwilling, if not unconscious, confession that his panlogism itself is fundamentally false — that Thought, after all, is not the one sole substance. Energy, on the contrary, is the substance, and Thought or Reason (in fuller truth. Personality) is the essence, of the real universe : abolition of either element would be the renas- cence of chaos. When, ignoring Energy altogether as mechanical causation because recognition of it would have VOL. II. — 8 114 THE SYLLOGISTIC PHILOSOPHY THE SYLLOGISM OF KNOWLEDGE 115 I'l t ^^1 involved that empirical element from which all idealistic thought must be "pure," yet compelled to recognize it as spiritual self-activity because without this even idealistic thought itself could not think at all, Hegel put pure Thought in the position of the one sole substance, he not only fatally separated the real substance and the real es- sence of the world, but no less fatally confounded the real distinction between substance and essence as such by put- ting " form " in the place of " matter." In justice to him, however, it must be admitted that here he wavered just as his master Aristotle had wavered before him. Conceiving v\ri as pure potentiality, that is, unreality now and reality by and by, Aristotle had conceived substance first as cTSos -f v\r}j TO