MASTER NEGA TIVE NO. 92-80822 MICROFILMED 1992 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK 55 as part of the Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project" Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not l^e made without permission from Columbia University Library COP\T^TGHT STATEiMENT The copyright law of ihe United States - Title 17, United States Code - concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material... Columbia University Libraiy resen^es the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright lav/. AUTHOR: ALLCROFT, ARTHUR HADRIAN TITLE: SPARTA AND THEBES: A HISTORY OF GREECE,... PLACE: LONDON DA TE : [1895] Master Negative # COLUMiJIA UNIVERSiri^ LIBRARIES PRESEKYATION DliPARTMENT ^_Jfc.M^2rJ. BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROFORM TA R G ET Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record r 884 A163 Restrictions on Use: AUcroft, Arthur Hadrian, 1865-1 9 E g ... Sparta and Thebes: a history of Greece, 404-362 B. c. By A. II. Allcroft ... London, W. B. Olive [1896 3 xii, 187 p. plan. 18<^". (Half-title: The University tutorial series ...) Series title also at head of t.-p. Forms v 4 of the History of Greece. 1. Greece— Hist.— B. c. '401-359. Title from Univ. of Chicago u A 12-1312 DF231.A42 Printed by h. C. ■^» '-i* -- " TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA FILM SIZE: 11 _ REDUCTION RATIO: IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA ©L IB IIB DATE FILMED: jfil-v, INITIALS f\(ri_ HLMED BY: RESEARCH POBLICATIONS. INC WOODBRIDGE. C T " .1 ■ II II. I - IIB III .. I _ „ ■ 1,1 ,1, .,11.1 ,., Mill. I .1 . . X ■■111—^1^1^ My c Association for Information and Image Management 1100 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 1 2 3 15 mm Inches 1.0 i.i 1.25 Uk 2.8 »50 2.5 1^ 3.2 If IM 2.2 ta. it u 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.6 MflNUFfiCTURED TO fillM STfiNDflRDS BY APPLIED IMfiGE, INC. 88^ A\53 in tltc mxxj ot ^nv ViovU 1898 II. h h It k \« 11; !>' 'I 11' hi M ^be TUnivcrsiti^ tutorial Series. Classical Editok : B. J. HAYES, M.A. HISTOEY OF GREECE, 404—362 B.C. TEXT-BOOKS ON GEECIAN HISTOKY IN Zbc '^Unmvsit^ tutorial Series* A HISTORY OF GEEECE, in Six Volumes:— {Each Volitme contains an account of the Literature of the Ferial.) I. Early Grecian History. The Historic Period, down to 495 B.C. By A. H. Allcroft, M.A. Oxon., and W. F. Masom, M.A. Lond. 3s. 6d. II. From 495 to 431 B.C. [In preparation. III. The Peloponnesian War. 431—404 b.c. With Test Questions. By A. H. Allcroit, M.A. Oxon. 4s. 6d. IV. Sparta and Thebes. 404—362 b.c. With Test Ques- tions. By A. H. Allcroft, M.A. Oxon. 4s. 6d. III., IV. 431—362 B.C. In one Volume. 68. 6d. V. The Decline of Hellas. 371—323 b.c. By A. H. All- croft, M.A. Oxon. 4s. 6d. VI. History of Sicily. 490—289 b.c. By A. H. Allcroft, M.A. Oxon., and W. F. Masom, M.A. Lond. 3s. 6d. Synopsis of Grecian History. By A. H. Allcroft, M.A. Oxon. , and W. F. Masom, M.A. Lond. Part I. To 495 b.c. Interleaved. Is. 6d. II. 495—404 B.C. ,, Is. 6d. „ in. 404—323 B.c. ,, Is. 6d. J! Also :— 406—358 b.c, Is.; 382—338 b.c, Is. Synopsis of the History of Sicily, 490—289 b.c Interleaved. Is. (' ^be Tllnivcrsit^ tutorial Series. I y J > > J > 5 ) ) ' J J > ) > ) J ) ) t i ■) 1 y J 3 > I I , SPARTA AND THEBES: HISTOEY OF GEEECE, 404—362 B.C. BY A. H. ALLCROFT, M.A. Oxon., • • • AUTHOR OF "the TUTORIAL HISTORY OF ROME," "EARLY GRECIAN HISTORY," ETC. London : W. B. CLIVE, UNIVERSITY CORRESPONDENCE COLLEGE PRESS. Warehouse: 13 Booksellers Row, Strand, W.C. CHRONOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL TABLE. B.C. Chapter I. — The Year of Anarchy. PAGE CO 404 404- (i.) Introductory. . . § 1. Lack of national unity in Greece Athens tlie only centre of unity -362. § 2. Characteristics of the Period . (ii. ) The Peace of Theramenes. 404 . . § 3. Terms of the Peace , , . . § 4. Rival parties in Athens : Aristocrats, tremists, Democrats § 5. Influence of LysanJer in Sparta His character and methods Lysander restores the Extremists (iii.) The Thirty Tyrants. Ex 404 . {May) a 6. Establishment of the Thirty : Theramenes and Critias Subversal of Democratic Methods . § 7. Excesses of the Thirty . Attitude of the Upper Classes . § 8. Theramenes heads the Moderate Party The Three Thousand Policy of Critias .... § 9. Altered feeling in Greece . Dissatisfaction amongst the Allies of Sparta Party-feeling in Sparta . (iv.) The Restoration. § 10. Thrasybulus, Anytus, and Archinus ( Winter) The Exiles surprise Phyle 403 . . § 11. Death of Theramenes The Thirty seize Eleusis . § 12. The Exiles occupy Peiraeus Battle of Munychia : Death of Critias First Board of Ten .... The Thirty retire to Eleusis Pausanias v. Lysander § 13. Second Board of Ten Settlement of the Civil War . Moderation of the restored Exiles . § 14. Measures of the restored Democracy End of the Thirty .... Archonship of Eucleides . >> (Augitst) 401 . . 403-402. 259689 1 3 4 7 8 8 10 10 11 12 13 13 14 14 14 15 16 16 17 18 19 19 19 19 20 20 21 21 21 22 23 23 VI B.C. 404 407- 404 »» CHRONOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL TABLE. Chapter II.— The Ten Thousand. Accession of Arta 403 (i.) Cyrus the Younger. . . § 1. Death of Darius Notlius XvlTikCS • • • • • Claims of Cyrus .... -404. His relations with Sparta 2. Cyrus quarrels with Aitaxerxes His influence in Western Asia . Condition of the Persian Empire 3. Personal character of Cyrus 4. The time favourable for Cyrus' designs Clearchus, Menon, etc. . (ii.) The Anabasis. § § § 5. >» The march to Tarsus From Tarsus to Thapsacus >> {September) Discontent of the Greek army . § 0. Disloyalty of Persian satraps . Battle of Cunaxa : Death of Cyrus § 7. Position of the Greek army Seizure of the Greek captains . (iii.) The Catabasis. . § 8. Xenophon : his character and life ,, . . He assumes command of the Greeks 403-402. Retreat of the Ten Thousand . § 9. Remarks upon the Retreat 402-399. Further career of the Ten Thousand Moral effect of the episode > » Chapter III. — The Supremacy of Sparta. (i.) Position of Sparta. 402 . . § 1 . Declining influence of L3^sander He returns to Asia Minor Lysander v. the Ephoralty He withdraws from Sparta § 2. Internal condition of Sparta Social and political changes Sparta unfit for her position § 3. Disaffection of the Peloponnesian Alliance (ii.) The Elean War. 420-401. § 4. The quarrel with Elis . . . . 401, 400. Agis invades Elis . . . . . 399 . . Results of the War (iii. ) The Persian War. 403-401. § 5. The (luariel with Persia . . . . 400 . . § 0. Thibrou campaigns in Asia 399-307. Operations of Dercylidas . . . . PAGE 24 24 25 25 26 26 27 28 29 30 30 32 32 33 34 35 35 36 36 37 38 39 40 40 41 42 42 43 44 44 45 46 46 47 48 48 il B.C. 399 397 . . 396 . . 397 . . 396 . . 396-394. CHRONOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL TABLE. (iv.) Agesilaus. . § 7. Death of Agis • Disputed succession : Leotychides v. Agesilaus Intrigues of Lysander .... Lysander supports Agesilaus . 8. The Conspiracy of Cinadon 9. Attitude of Artaxerxes .... Agesilaus sails for Asia .... 10. Execution of Tissapherncs Conon and Pharnabazus .... 11. Humiliation of Lysander . Campaigns of Agesilaus in Asia ^ S § 395 394 395 394 ?> 393 392 391 390 392 390 >» Chapter IV.— The Liberation of Greece. Vll PAGE 49 49 49 50 51 52 53 54 54 55 55 § § (i.) The Corinthian War. 1. Mission of Timocrates to Greece Individual grievances of the Greek States 2. Spartan feeling against Thebes 3. First Year of the War : Death of Lysander a Haliartus ..... Retreat and exile of Pausanias 4. Corinth, Argos, Athens, and Thebes head an Anti-Spartan Alliance Agesilaus recalled from Asia . Second Year of the War : Battle of Nemea (ii.) The Liberation of Athens. . § 5. Conon Admiral of the Persian ISTavy Battle of Cnidus : End of the Spartan Maritime Power . . . . 6. March of Agesilaus to Boeotia . Battle of Coronea .... 7. Operations of Conon in the Aegean . ]\Iotives of Pharnabazus . Restoration of the Long Walls 8. The War on the Isthmus. Third Year Military reforms of Iphicrates § § § Chapter Y.— The Peace of Antalcidas (i. ) The Corinthian War. . § 1. Fourth Year : Party feuds at Corinth Battle of the Corinthian Walls § 2. Fifth year : Agesilaus overruns the Isthi Iphicrates desti'oys a Spartan division (ii.) The Appeal to Persia. . § 3. Jealousies of the Confederate States . First Mission of Antalcidas to Persia Agesilaus campaigns in Acarnania . . § 4. Tiribazus, Satrap of Lydia 58 59 60 60 61 62 63 63 64 64 65 65 67 67 68 68 68 70 71 71 72 72 72 73 73 VIU B.C. 390 CHRONOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL TABLE. CHRONOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL TABLE. Embassies of the Confederate States to Persia Death of Conon. 391 . . § 5. Second Campaign of Thibron in Asia 390 . . Campaign of Dephridas in Asia Teleutias' navarch .... Athens recovers control of the Hellespont Death of Thrasyhulus Iphicrates admiral in Ionia . § 6. Chabrias in Aegina . Teleutias surprises Peiraeus (iii.) The Peace of Antalcidas. Designs of Artaxerxes Antalcidas navarch : Lis Second Terms of the Persian Rescript § 7. Kemarks upon the Peace . (iv.) Evagoras of Cyprus. 411-395. § 8. Condition of Cyprus. 395 Evagoras revolts from Persia 386 . . Battle of Cyprian Salamis 389 >» 387 PAGE 74 75 75 75 75 75 76 76 76 77 Mission to Susa 77 77 78 413- 410 >> 409 >> 407 406 )) >> 403 404 403 397 CiiArxiiR VI.— Sicilian Affairs. (i.) Introductory. -409. § 1. History of Syracuse to 409 B.C. . § 2. Diodes Nomothet of Syracuse . Aggressive attitude of Carthage Egesta appeals for Carthaginian aid . § 3. Hannibal sacks Selinus and Himera Hermocrates returns to Sicily . His death .... (ii. ) The Kise of Dionysius. § 4, Dionysius .... Siege of Agrigentum Daphnaeus and Dexippus . § 5. Sack of Agrigentum . Dionysius elected a General He recalls the Democratic Exiles Dionysius declared sole General . § 6. Dionysius disarms the Syracusans and Ortygia .... Siege and Sack of Gela . § 7. Mutiny of the Syracusan horse . Dionysius makes peace with Carthage Results of the war . (iii. ) Dionysius Tyrant : First Period. . § 8. Dionysius fortifies Syracuse Abortive revolt of the Syracusans Dionysius prepares for war with Carthage . § 9. First Carthaginian War. Dionysius over Sicily . , . , • • seize runs 79 80 80 82 84 85 85 86 87 88 88 89 90 90 91 91 92 93 93 94 95 95 96 96 97 98 V ! \ B.C. 397 396 395 394-393. 392 . . 390 . . 389 . . 387 . . 384 . . 383 . . 382 . . 382-367. 368 . , 367 . 386 385 383 5) >> >> 382 381 380 379 Siege of Motye ..... § 10. Himilco recovers Motyo and sacks Messana Battle of Catana and Siege of Syracuse § 11. Dionysius allied with Sparta . Siege of Syracuse raised . § 12. Dionysius reconquers the Sicilian towns Peace with Carthage (iv. ) Dionysius Tyrant : Second Period. § 13. Condition of Magna Graecia . Dionysius allied with the Lucanians First Italian Campaign ... Second Italian Campaign. Capture of Caulonia, Hipponium, and Rhegium .... Destruction of Rhegium and capture of Croton . § 14. liysias insults the Syracusan Theory at Olympia Second Carthaginian War : Battles of Cabala and Cronium .... Dionysius tributary to Carthage § 15. Subsequent career of Dionysius Third Carthaginian War . Death of Dionysius .... Remarks upon his career . CiiArxER VII.— Sparta after the Peace. (i. ) The Oppressions of Sparta. § 1. Depravation of the Greek character . Growth of the mercenary spirit § 2. Rivalry of Agesilaus and Agesipolis . Restoration of Plataea ..... Disintegration of Mantinea . Interference of Sparta at Phlius (ii. ) The Olynthian War. § 3. Condition of the Chalcidic Greeks . Origin of the Olynthian Confederacy The Olynthians attack Acanthus . § 4. Sparta allied with the Acanthians . Explanation of the Alliance .... . § 5. Thebes declines to aid in the War . Phoebidas surprises the Cadmea . § 7. Remarks upon the event . . . Eudamidas and Teleutias in Chalcidice Second Campaign in Chalcidice Third Campaign : Death of Teleutias Fourth Campaign : Death of Agesipolis . Fifth Campaign : Dissolution of the Olynthian Confederacy IX PAGE 99 100 101 102 102 103 104 105 105 105 106 106 107 107 108 108 108 109 109 111 112 112 113 114 114 115 115 116 116 116 117 118 118 120 120 120 120 121 CHRONOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL TABLE. B.C. 379 § 2. »> • • § 3. 378 • • § 4. > > • . § 5. 51 • " § 6. ?> • • > > • • 377 • • 376 • ^ 378 376 375 (ii.) /. 376-375. 374 . j» 373 >♦ 372 >> 371 PAGE Chapter VIII.— The Progress of Thebes. (i. ) The Liberation of Thebes. . § 1. Conspiracy of the Thebaii Exiles . . . 122 The Theban Tyrants 123 Epameinondas and Pelopidas . . . .123 Recovery of the Cadmea 124 Cleombrotiis invades Boeotia . . . .126 Condition of the Boeotian towns . . .127 Measures of Epameinondas : the Sacred Band . 127 Sphodrias attempts to surprise Peivaeus . .128 Athens allied with Thebes . . . .129 Remarks upon this event . . . .129 Agesilaus campaigns in Boeotia . . .130 Death of Phoebidas 130 Second Campaign of Agesilaus . . .130 Cleombrotus fails to enter Boeotia . . .130 The Revival of Athens. Wide discontent against Sparta . . .131 Athenian leaders : Timotheus, Chabrias, Iphi- crates, Callias, Callistratus . . .131 Formation of Second Delian Confederacy . 132 Leading Articles of the New Confederacy . 132 Battle of Naxos 133 Timotheus Admiral of Athens . . . . 134 The Liberation of Boeotia. 9. Recovery of Thcsi)iac, Plataea, Chaerpnea, and Haliartus . . . . " . .135 Pelopidas attacks Phocis .... 135 Jason of Pherae 135 Jealousy between Athens and Thebes . .135 The Peace of Callias. 10. Peace between Athens and Sparta . . .135 Jason reduces Pliarsalus 136 Timotheus breaks tlie Peace . . . .136 JNInasippus besieges Corey ra . . . .137 Jphicrates Admiral in the West . . . 137 The Thebans dismantle Plataea and Thespiac . 137 Mission of Antalcidas to Susa .... 137 The Peace of Callias 138 Epameinondas claims to swear on behalf of the Boeotian Confederacy . . . .138 Thebes excluded from the Peace . . . 138 Cleombrotus invades Boeotia . . . .139 Pi eparations of Epameinondas . . . 139 Battle of Leuctra {Plan) and End of the Spartan Supremacy . . . .140 § 8. (iii.) § (iv.) § 11. § 12. § 13. CHRONOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL TABLE. XI 370 >> >» >> >> >» a »» >> 369 >» >> 368 B C, PAGE Chapter IX. — The Theban Supremacy. (i.) Thebes and Boeotia. 404-371. § 1. Prefatory : the Spartan Supremacy . . . 142 371 . . § 2. Moral results of Leuctra 142 Its effects on Greece at large .... 143 Its effects on Sparta 143 Treatment of the Survivors of Leuctra . .144 § 3. Policy of Jason of Pherae .... 145 The Theban Confederacy 145 Amphictyonic decree against Sparta . . 146 (ii.) Thebes and the Peloponnesus. § 4. Break-up of the Peloponnesian Confederacy . 146 Scytalism at Argos 147 Alliance of Athens, Elis, and Argos . . .148 § 5. Designs of Epameinondas .... 148 § 6. Agesilaus invades Arcadia .... 149 First Theban Invasion of Peloponnesus . .149 Foundation of Megalopolis and Centralization of Arcadia ...... 150 § 7. Epameinondas ravages Laconia . . .150 Foundation of Messene 151 § 8. Alliance of Athens and Sparta . . .152 Second Theban invasion of Peloponnesus . 152 Sicy on joins Thebes 153 Epameinondas excluded from the Boeotarchy . 153 369 390-370 370 . 369 . 369-365 368 . 367 . 369 . 868 . >» 867 . 366 . 368 . 367 . 366 . 365 . § 2. Pelo Chapter X. — End of the Theban Supremacy. (i.) Thebes and the North. § 1. Condition of Thessaly Jason of Pherae Assassination of Jason Pelopidas invades Thessaly Athenian activity in Macedonia Second invasion of Thessaly : Capture of pidas .... Epameinondas in Thessaly (ii.) Thebes and the Peloponnesus. § 3. Troubles in Arcadia The Tearless Battle War between Arcadia and Elis . Third Theban invasion of Peloponnesus Epameinondas again excluded from office Mission of Philiscus to Delphi Greek Embassy to Susa . . . The Greek States disown the Persian rescript Further troubles in Arcadia The Thebans occupy Oropus § 4. 5. 154 155 156 156 156 157 157 157 158 158 158 159 159 160 160 161 161 Xli B.C. 365 . 364 . 364-363 362 361 »> 360 435-355. 450-380. 470-399. 399 . . CHRONOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL TABLE. Alliance of Athens and Arcadia Death of Lycomedes § 6. Timotheus and Agesilans in Ionia Iphicrates in Chalcidice . Position of Alexander of Pherae (iii.) The Decline of Thebes. Battle of Cynoscephalae : Death of Pelopidas Thessaly subject to Thebes . § 7. Civil War in Arcadia : Tegea r. Mantiuea Last Theban invasion of Peloponnesus Epameinondas fi\ils to surprise Sparta Battle of Mantinea : Death of Epameinondas § 8, Paciticatioii of Greece .... Pamnienes the Theban in Arcadia Agesilaus in Egypt Condition of the Persian Empire The Revolt of Egypt Death of Agesilaus § 9. Failure of the aims of Epameinondas Decline of the Greek States Chapter XL—Literatuiie. § 1. Xenophon His Works . § 2. The Sophists . Meaning of their name Their teaching § 3. Socrates His death § 4. Teaching of Socrates 428-347. § 5. Plato His Works 428-378. § 6. Oratory : Lysias 437-350. Isocrates Isaeus PAGE 162 162 163 163 163 164 164 164 165 165 166 167 167 168 168 168 168 169 169 171 172 173 173 174 175 175 176 177 178 179 179 18 > » r I r SPARTA AND THEBES: A HISTORY OF GEEECE, 404—362 B.C. CHAPTER I. The Year of Anarchy. § 1. Recapitulatory.— § 2. Characteristics of the Period.— § 3. The Terms of Peace and Disarming of Athens.— § 4. Feeling amongst the citizens: Oligarchs, Aristocrats, and Democrats.— § 5. Interpretation of the Peace by Lysander : His position, aims, and methods. — § 6. The Thirty Tyrants : Theramenes and Critias : First Measures of the Thirty.— § 7. Tyranny of the Thirty.— § 8. Theramenes at variance with Critias : Further excesses.— § 9. Dissatisfaction of the Allies of Sparta : Reaction in favour of Athens : Conduct of Lysander. — § 10. Thrasybulus, Anytus, and Archinus head the Athenian Exiles : They seize Phyle and defeat the Thirty.— § 11. Alarm of the Thirty : Execution of Theramenes : Occupation of Eleusis.— § 12. The Exiles seize Peiraeus : The Thirty retire to Eleusis : First Board of Ten : They call in the aid of Sparta.— § 13. Pausanias and Lysander in Attica : Second Board of Ten : Pausanias arranges terms of Peace.— § 14. The restoration of Democracy and end of the Year of Anarchy. § 1. The fall of Athens in 404 B.C. marks an era. In one sense it is the last notable event in the history of free Greece, and from this point dates the loss of Hellenic liberty and independence. With Athens' fall ends also the Golden Age of Greece, a Golden Age of fifty years only (480—431 B.C.). There was never such a thing as an Hellenic nation, and it is the special merit of Athens, that within the brief 6'. 404-362. B < In the Gai»liest. years for which we possess any historical data, Greece appears as an aggregate of rival states, each clinging obstinately to a traditional individuality, and refusing to recognize between itself and others any such bond of union as might have resulted in the building up of an Hellenic nation. Even in the remotest times to which tradition reaches, the epoch of the glories of the Achaean chiefs of Argos and Mycenae, there is no trace of a national unity ; the mighty Agamemnon is not sovereign of a single people, but overlord of a number of petty tribes — Achaeans, Danaans, Minyans, and so on — which own no recognizable tie of fellowship. So in historic days : old names have disappeared and new ones have taken their places, but there is still the same unconquerable desire for individuality as before. Even the more comprehensive titles of Dorians and lonians betray no real growth of the idea of a national unity : they do not so much betoken the friendly coalescence of the several items in the two great groups, as the accentuated divergence of these groups from each other ; and the visible result of the acknowledgment of a common Dorism and a common lonism goes little farther than a more or less formal communion in certain unimportant forms of worship. Then came the Persian Wars. Attacked as an aggregate for the first time within their memory, the various states of Greece suddenly discovered themselves to be an aggregate, to constitute the elements requisite for the making of a nation ; and for the moment they promised to combine in something approaching to a national league. The im- mediate danger passed away, but the menace of it remained ; and it was in the fear of that menace that the states of Greece drew together in the most permanent, because most voluntary, union to which they were destined to attain. Heretofore the tendency had been solely centri- fugal, the ideal individualism; henceforward for a time there was to be a centripetal movement and an ideal of community, but dimly conceived only, and never put into perfect shape. The state which preached the new ideal and THE YEAR OF ANARCHY. stood forward as centre of the new movement was Athens, the foundress and leader of the Delian League. Yet even from the first her task was hard, for the very mention of federation again reminded the Greek states of their tradi- tional isolation, and made them suspicious of the new ideal. From the first there was dissent, and as usual the dissenting factions in the heat of their opposition adopted something of the very spirit against which they protested, and united in what was in fact a counter-federation under Sparta. But there was this essential distinction between the two Leagues, that the union inaugurated by Athens was inspired by a common wish for the welfare of its members as members of a nation, whereas the union led by Sparta was based upon no higher motives than jealousy and fear. The Delian League was a positive step towards Hellenic nationalism; the Peloponnesian Confederacy was a retro- grade step in the direction of the older and impracticable individualism. The two parties fought, and the party of retrogression prevailed. Athens fell, and with her fell the only power which was ever able to provoke a generous and voluntary effort towards union. The party of dissent was triumphant, and it seemed that, the life-work of Athens overthrown, Greece was free to revert to the traditional condition of disunion. But the crusade against Athens had been animated by no principle sufiiciently lofty, even though mistaken, to guide the policy of the victors. Its true animus had been jealousy of the power of Athens, and the victors discovered too late that in combining against one League they had subjected themselves to another and a very different one under Sparta. Sparta had nothing to offer : she inspired no enthusiasms, satisfied no desires, appealed to no sentiment. Obedience she might and did command for a moment, but nationalism she was neither desirous nor able to inspire. Yet that national union was possible, however difficult of attainment, had been proved by the history of the Athenian League now dispersed : during fifty years it had grown steadily ; within this brief period it had advanced its members to a height of prosperity and culture and good government to which they never afterwards attained ; and SPARTA AND THEBES. for nearly thirty years it withstood the incessant attacks of an enemy of at least equal powers. Nay, its members themselves confessed the possibility and the value of such a union, firstly by the stubbornness with which they resisted the attacks of the party of dissent, and secondly by the eagerness with which they sought unavailingly to renew the League only five-and-twenty years later. But there was never to be a Greek nation. Such an end was never attained more nearly than in the days when Athens and the Periclean democracy were the moving spirit of Greece. § 2. The Golden Age was ended, and Sparta was ap- parently the mistress of Greece. Apparently only ; for while there remained no single state, or federation of states, sufficiently strong to resist her will, yet the bond which held together the mass of the Greek states as allies of Sparta was neither enduring nor productive. It was based in fact upon two motives only, upon greed and upon fear. The members of the original Peloponnesian Confederacy against Athens had combined under the influence of the greed with which they looked forward to sharing in the plunder of the Athenian Empire ; and when that Empire was no more the Confederates, baulked of their hopes by the greater greed of Sparta, had no longer even this base motive for cohesion ; the late members of the Athenian League, now forced into an unwilling subjection to Sparta, remained obedient only so long as they were constrained by fear, and this restraint grew less from the very moment when Sparta's triumph revealed to her former allies the selfishness of her greed. The states of Greece were in reality less united, further removed from any recognition of a common nationality, in the moment of Sparta's victory, than even in the days when their entire number was divided into the two hostile camps of the Athenian and the Peloponnesian Confederacies. The history of the next thirty years is the history of the undoing of all that Athens had achieved. The power which did more than all others to thwart, check, and nullify the efforts of Athens was Sparta. The Spartans were by tradition a conquering people, and to the last they believed that Empire was more strongly founded, more rightly measured, in the numbers of its subjects THE YEAR OF ANARCHY. » than in their cohesion. She wished to set every state in Greece subject to herself, and every one of her subjects at variance with all the rest. She aimed at combining universal autonomy with universal subjection, and she failed because of the inherent contradiction in her aims. Holding in her grasp an Empire far wider than any of which Athens had ever dreamed, Sparta was wholly unable to retain it. From the day whereon Lysander sailed into Peiraeus the power of Sparta waned. Based upon a mis- taken and backward policy, it sought to strengthen the conquering state by weakening the rest of Greece; and unfortunately it succeeded in the latter object as signally as it failed in the former. In fact, from 404 B.C. dates the decline of Greece. It was the doing of Sparta, and a righteous Nemesis ruled that Sparta herself should be the first and most notable example. For a moment the general decay was arrested by the personality of Epameinondas the Theban, but with his death it commenced anew, and thenceforth it never ceased. With Epameinondas disappeared the final hope of a Greece united and free. Greece was never united until no longer free, and the force which then compelled her union was the Macedonian phalanx in the hands of Alexander. But side by side with the internal decay and disintegration of the Greek states proceeds the extension of their external relations. Their history is no longer their own : it is the history also of Thessaly, of Macedonia and Epeirus and Molossia, of Phoenicia and Egypt, of Persia and of the Orient at large; for these regions came successively and increasingly into contact with the Hellenic states. That final conquest by Alexander which was, in the eyes of a Demosthenes, the extinction of the Greek world, was in reality the restoration of the Greek spirit to a sphere of usefulness and power never known before, for it carried the influence of Greek life and Greek thought to the banks of the Oxus and the Indus, the Euphrates and the Nile. This is what is meant by the dictum that the history of Hellas ends where that of Hellenism begins. § 3. With the battle of Aegospotami (405 b.c.) the Pelo- SPARTA AND THEBES. ponnesian War, which had already lasted twenty-six years, virtually came to an end. Athens, it is true, did not capitulate until a few months later, but it was at once apparent that the triumph of Sparta could not be much longer delayed, and on the 16th day of Munychion, that is, in April, 404 b.c, the Athenian Ecclesia accepted the terms of peace as brought back from the Ephoralty at Sparta by its envoy Theramenes. By the terms of that peace Athens was to enjoy her original and traditional constitution ; she was stripped of all her dependencies, subjects, and allies, beyond the limits of Attica ; she surrendered the whole remnant of that magnificent fleet which had for seventy-five years carried her flag over all Grecian waters; she con- sented to the destruction of the walls and fortifications which encircled her three ports and combined the whole area from the Acropolis to Phalerum into one gigantic fortress— the shield of her power, as her fleet had been its spear; she re-admitted all those whom party feeling had driven into exile ; she laid down her claim to independence even within the bounds of Attica, and enrolled herself formally amongst the allies so-called of her conquerors, pledged in future to fight the battles of Sparta defensive or offensive. The terms were hard, yet there had been heard voices in the synod of Sparta's allies — the voices of Corinthians and Thebans— to call for nothing less than the utter destruction of the fallen city. To such extreme suggestions the Ephors had refused to listen : they spoke hypocritically of the impiety of rasing to the ground the city which had once staved off slavery from the Hellenic race. Nay, Lysander, the man to whom Athens surrendered and by whom the terms of the treaty were to be carried out, so far modified their severity as to leave a poor dozen war-ships in her harbours. Yet the terms were still hard, and nothing but famine had wrung them from the van- quished ; and harder to bear almost than the terms in themselves, was the sound of the songs and music and revelry which accompanied the overthrow of the battle- ments and towers of Peiraeus and the Long Walls. Athens herself retained her walls; but Peiraeus, with Munychia and Phalerum, became a separate and unwalled port, and THE YEAR OF ANARCHY. « only ruins and rubbish now occupied the five miles of intervening space. Freedom had dawned upon Greece, said the allies of Sparta. § 4. The future of Athens depended upon the manner in which Sparta should interpret the first article of the treaty as given above, an article which was only amplified and particularized by others which followed. What was " the original and traditional constitution " of Athens ? for hers was a polity which, founded in prehistoric days, had been already nine times revolutionized by law-givers and despots and demagogues from the legendary Theseus through Draco and Solon to Peisistratus ; thence through Cleis- thenes and the crisis of the Persian Wars towards that fully-developed democracy sketched by Aristides and com- pleted by Ephialtes and Pericles ; and through the revolu- tion of the Four Hundred to that second and less republican democracy which Athens now presented. The common voice of Greece would have said that her traditional con- stitution was democracy, certainly not oligarchy; for oligarchism at Athens had been overthrown by Solon, the brief renewal of Areopagite ascendancy after the Persian Wars had been abruptly stayed by the statesmanship of Ephialtes, and the attempt to restore it in 411 B.C. had resulted in a speedy and national revulsion. Still, there remained some who hoped to see it established now. These were the men, mostly of the wealthier classes, who had favoured the revolution of the Four Hundred, and had in many cases suffered exile for their political bias ; and they came back now as men of extreme oligarchic views, with feelings more than ever averse to the democracy which had expelled them, and with high hopes of support from Sparta. There were others amongst the exiles who owed their banishment only to the demagogism of the leaders of the extreme democrats. These represented the old moderate aristocratic party ; they had many supporters amongst the wealthy, and they could plead with some truth that the *' traditional constitution" of Athens was the limited democracy of the days when the Areopagus still controlled the machinery of the state. Lastly, there was the mass of the population which had been born under the constitution 8 SPARTA AND TJIEBES. of Pericles, and had seen in the misdeeds of the Four Hundred but a sorry specimen of oligarchic rule ; the men who for seven-and-twenty years had struggled for their country and its constitution against well-nigh all Greece, the men who had manned the fleets and filled the armies of Athens; that "sea-faring mob" in which democracy found Its strongest hold. But though superior in numbers to both of the remaining parties together, in point of wealth and birth and position they could not compare with either oligarchs or aristocrats, and they were the avowed foes of Sparta and all her works. ^ § 5. Now the Spartan government, itself the type of rigid oligarchism, was inherently strange to any democratic form of government; and this inherent diiference had developed into a positive antagonism during the course of the rivalry between Sparta and Athens and their respective allies. Nevertheless, aversion to democracy and predilec- tion for oligarchism were by no means articles of political faith at Sparta. Had the government been left free to decide the political future of Athens, it would very pro- bably have recognized the now crippled democracy as the "traditional constitution." At the worst, it would have gone no further than to restore the highly respectable ascendancy of the aristocratic Areopagites ; for that party had constantly proved itself strenuous in support of Spartan interests, and had been mainly instrumental in effecting the Peace of Nicia^. There is no reason to believe that the bpartan government as a body desired to hand over Athens to an oligarchy of the extreme kind, even though we should allow that its counsels would be little influenced by any in- convenient recollection that Sparta had achieved her triumph under the plea of asserting the freedom of all Greeks. But at this moment the Ephoralty was not by any means able to do as it pleased : the even course of its usurpations had indeed reduced the kingship and the senate to insignifi- cance, but it had allowed the rise of another power far more formidable than either. Lysander, the son of a slave mother, the ambitious neodamode, the man whose talents had won for Sparta the support of Persia and by spreading ins influence throughout the dependencies of Athens had at ' J THE YEAR OP ANARCHY. 9 length brought the Peloponnesian War to an unlooked-for completion, was now almost the embodiment of the Spartan will. Ambitious, shrewd, indefatigable, a perfect master of all diplomatic arts, as much of a knave as was consistent with Spartan ideas of virtue, and above all phenomenally successful, his example and his genius and his manners alike made him sure of admirers, even without regard to party feeling or personal interest. These latter motives, however, obtained for him supporters far more numerous : his success as admiral of Sparta had won for him extra- ordinary influence with a government which was only eager to end a burdensome war without regard to the means em- ployed, and from being the servant of his country he had risen to be something very like her master. Lowborn as he was, he yet had partisans even amongst the Spartiates, and with some of these at least the motive for their attach- ment was secret weariness of the old and narrow Spartan polity and the secret hope that Lysander might open to them a freer and less irksome life. Lysander had won his influence at home in recognition of his influence abroad : his influence abroad was founded upon his talent for political intrigue. In every Greek state there was a party more or less dissatisfied with the existing form of government : Lysander made himself the patron of such discontent, irrespective of its cause. He went further : his talent for organization enabled him to raise his clients to a degree of strength heretofore unknown. In each community the Lysandrians formed Hetaeries or clubs, of which the influence was the more formidable because of its secret character ; and whereas heretofore the malcontents had as a rule been powerless by reason of their lack of unity, Lysander's diplomacy enabled them in many cases to realize their hopes, overthrow the existing government, seize the ascendancy for themselves, and use it solely for the furtherance of their patron's aims. These were the men who at length broke down the power of Athens by stripping her of her dependencies. And Lysander was no less systematic in his treatment of such clients after their success : in each city and town which thus fell under his influence he set up Decarchies, or Councils of Ten, selected^ it i 10 SPARTA AND THEBES. THE YEAR OF ANARCHY. 11 from the most capable and reliable of his clients, strengthen- ing their position, when need was, by the support of a Spartan garrison under the control of a harmost. The presence of a harmost served at once to protect the decar- chies and to ensure their loyalty, with the further result that these new dependencies of Sparta were far less allies of herself than of Lysander in person. At Athens, as elsewhere, Lysander had been at pains to find clients and to form clubs. The fallen party of the Four Hundred offered materials in plenty ; and when he appeared in person to accept the surrender of the city, it was to be expected that he would at once establish here also a decarchy of his creatures. Contrary to expectation, he did not immediately do so. He sailed away for some weeks to superintend the reduction of Samos, the last loyal unit of the Athenian Confederacy. In the interim his partisans, sure of his support, had been active in bringing the leaders of the old democratic party into disrepute ; and when at length Lysander returned to the city and was ap- pealed to to decide upon the proper interpretation of the expression '* traditional constitution," no one was astonished that he at once set up a decarchy in Peiraeus and handed over the government of Athens to a similar Board of Thirty, charged ostensibly with the task of revising the constitution with a view to bringing it into harmony with the altered condition of the state. § 6. The Board of Thirty — the Thirty Tyrants — was thus established in May, 404 B.C., the decree for its authorization standing in the name of one Dracontides. Of the number were the proposer himself, Theramenes, and Critias. Theramenes had long been a prominent figure in Athens. Included amongst the Four Hundred of 411 B.C., he had at length gone over to the democratic side, and had assisted in expelling his colleagues in time to secure his own safety; he had been foremost in the iniquitous judicial murder of the generals of Arginusae in 406 b.c. ; and had recently served as envoy to Sparta to treat for peace, on which occasion he had used his powers as far as might be to gain friends at Sparta. His training, like that of the traitor Alcibiades, was said to be due to Socrates, his eloquence was considerable, but his lack of principle and his time-serving had earned for him the sobriquet of Cothurnus, ''Buskin*," and had made him an object of distrust to all parties alike. Critias, on the other hand, had been for some years an exile, it is not known why. He had made himself a name in Athens rather as a brilliant example of a wealthy and cultured noble — speci- mens of his poetry and orations were extant as late as the Augustan age — than as a politician ; for he was one of the comrades of Alcibiades in his youth, he was a good poet and better orator, and the heir to the wealth and name of an ancient Eupatrid family. His sister was the mother of the philosopher Plato. His years of exile he had spent as an adventurer in Thessaly, where he had adopted the usual method of the would-be despot to obtain power for himself by professing to champion the serfs or peiiestae against the oligarchs and nobles their masters. Before his plans in Thessaly could bear fruition he was recalled to Athens by the news of her fall. The Thirty showed no intention to confine themselves to the strict limits of their authority — the codification of the laws. Their first step was to sweep away the whole machinery of the late democratic government. In Peiraeus they could reckon upon the support of a decarchy of their own adherents governing that town, together with Munychia and Phalerum, as an independent community : confident therefore in their security they dismissed the existing senate and enrolled another, recruited wholly from returned exiles, men who had belonged to the Four Hundred, and others of well-tried oligarchic bias ; they treated the board of police oflicials known as the Eleven in the same way, making one Satyr us chief of their own nominees ; and to ensure their personal security they enrolled a bodyguard of three hundred men. Turning now to what was more strictly their duty, they gave out that they intended to rehabilitate the aristo- cratic government of the Areopagus as it had existed before the days of Ephialtes and Themistocles, and agreeably with this announcement they proceeded to suppress the dicasteries and such portion of the existing laws as related thereto, * That is, a shoe which will fit either foot equally well. 12 SPARTA AND THEBES. THE YEAR OF ANARCHY. 13 and to destroy the records of anti-Areopagite legislation. The suppression of the dicasteries might have been prompted by a real desire to purge the state of one of its worst- abused institutions, but in the case of the Thirty the issue showed them to be guided solely by self-seeking and fear. Equally specious was the declaration that they would put an end to sycophancy by making away with its advocates, for under cover of this plea they arrested and put to death such of the leading men of the democratic party as failed to make good their escape. The victims were dragged before the new senate, the charge was read out by one of the Thirty; and with the whole body of Thirty in the prytaneum and their three hundred guards close at hand, the senators were compelled to register their votes openly for the satisfaction of their masters. Such was the sub- stitute offered for the justice of the dicasteries. The property of the " malignants," whether they remained to be executed or went into exile, was of course confiscated to the state, that is, to the Thirty. § 7. We have few details of the proceedings of the Tyrants. We know, and indeed we should have expected, that they soon laid aside the bare pretence of legality. Their first ex- cesses were prompted by fear that a popular reaction might find leaders in the men whom they therefore hastened to put out of the way. Strombichides, a prominent democrat, was got rid of in this manner. The same motive would lead to further judicial murders as a preventive of retaliation. Then would come in the motive of cupidity, and victims would be found amongst wealthy men of no political weight. Despotism is always a costly form of power, for having none to support it on principle it needs to pay for its supporters, and apart from such bribery, the Thirty required funds for the maintenance of their bodyguard, and subsequently also for that of the garrison which they hired from Sparta. On the other hand, the Thirty took no measures to conciliate the many who viewed them with dislike ; on the contrary, they had made tacit enemies of the mass of the population by disenfranchising all. They had promised indeed shortly to publish a list of those upon whom the new and more limited franchise was to be conferred, but the promise was not yet fulfilled. The free citizens of the late democracy, without political power and in daily fear for their lives and fortunes, hurried into voluntary exile, leaving few within the walls but the partisans and hirelings of the Thirty, the wealthy men of oligarchical views, the knights, and the metics. The metics for the most part cared little for politics, so long as the government for the time being should leave them free to make what profits they might from trade. The rich Athen- ians had positive grievances : alike in times of peace and war they had been heavily taxed, whether with the burden of the state liturgies or with still more burdensome special imposts, yet it was upon them as landholders in Attica or as partners in large mercantile houses that there had fallen the brunt of the losses incurred during the late war ; and because of their fewness they had possessed but little in- fluence in the Ecclesia, while constantly exposed to the attack of demagogues and sycophants. Throughout Greece wealth and oligarchism went hand -in-hand, and at Athens the Thirty, so long as they treated their allies well, found their staunchest allies amongst the property-holding classes. § 8. Party-feeling was, however, too violent in the Greek mind to allow the Thirty to act with moderation, and more- over they, and their tools in the senate or elsewhere, were from the first fated to disagree, because constituted from the remains of two once dominant parties, that of the Aristocrats and that of the Extremists who had formed the Four Hundred. To Theramenes the error of Critias' policy was patent : if their position was to be worth keeping, the Thirty must contrive to keep Athens from depopulation ; for when the democrats had disappeared, the engines of oppression would be turned upon those who remained, and if these were estranged the Thirty must fall. Accordingly he stood forward as the advocate of less violent measures, in opposition to Critias and the extreme oligarchs. He declared that there must at once be published a list of the enfranchised, in order to stay the rapid diminution of the population, and protested strongly against the high-handed murders and robberies of his colleagues. Critias and the extreme party had reason enough to suspect the loyalty of the *' Buskin," and indeed it was manifest that the views 14 SPARTA AND THEBES. of Theramenes must find speedy echo among the mass of the populace. If he should effect a coalition with the remnant of the democracy, the position of the Thirty would be perilous. Accordingly a compromise was made for the present, and there was drawn up a list of 3000 persons to be fully enfranchised * ; but even now the concession was but half-hearted, for the list was not published, none save the Thirty knew who were included therein, and the Thirty continued to strike down one or other of the number at their will and to fill up the vacancies with other names. In fact Critias had formed a definite policy and was working, however recklessly, towards its fulfilment : he intended to stamp out democracy entirely. It was for this end that Peiraeus had been placed under a decarchy whose duty it was to discourage all commerce, and by fair means or foul to get rid of the mercantile population. To this end, no less than for private profit, the Thirty oppressed and plundered the democrats within Athens. They went further : they put a veto upon all teaching and teachers, rightly holding the sophists to be the champions of freethinking as the rhetoricians were those of free speech, two liberties which could not be tolerated in an oligarchic state ; and they made scapegoats of the metics who formed the commercial con- nexion between Athens and every other trading community in Greece. The result was that the metics fled the city and its commerce came to a standstill, while the sophists and their fellows went to join the growing numbers of the exiles, and to arouse them to reassert their rights. § 9. Before six months had passed, the feeling of Greece at large towards Athens was very markedly changed. The two chief factors in this revulsion were the conduct of Sparta and the lawlessness of the Thirty. The Pelopon- nesian War had been ostensibly a crusade against Com- pulsory Federation as exemplified in the Confederacy of Delos : its ostensible object had been to set at liberty all who were constrained to be the unwilling dependencies of Athens, and its results had been the complete dissolution The principal privilege of the Three Thousand was the right of trial by the senate, which was not worth much, while all others were liable to be disposed of without the form of trial by the vote of the Thirty. THE YEAR OF AXARCHY. 15 of the Confederacy and the overthrow of Athens. But the allies of Sparta found themselves little rewarded for the toil which they had expended at their leader's behests : the glory of victory went to Sparta alone, in the person of Lysander, and to Sparta went the spoils of the victory also —the warships of Peiraeus, the plunder of the captured towns, the large residue of the funds provided by Cyrus, amounting to no less than 470 talents, and in fact the entire outcome of the twenty-seven years of war. The allies might be content so far as glory went to enjoy the consciousness of their own merits, but they could not as easily forego their just share in the more material gains of the war ; and yet their request to be admitted to share at least in the spoils of the Decelean War and in the Persian treasure were met with rude refusal, and they learnt that they had expended money and men and toil only for the enrichment of Sparta. More than this, the much-talked-of liberation of the Greek communities was palpably a trick, for in all quarters of Greece the communities wrested from the Athenian alliance were now placed in far worse bondage to Sparta, by means of the Lysandrian decarchies and the Spartan harmosts, than any which they had ever felt at the hands of Athens ; and whereas their previous allegiance to Athens had in the greater number of cases been deter- mined by the voice of a majority of the population themselves, their subservience to Sparta was secured by the open constraint of military occupation. In fact in place of the twofold division of Greece under the headship of Athens and of Sparta, there was now one well-nigh universal subjection to the single domination of Sparta, a domination which contrasted unfavourably with that of Athens in point of liberality, freedom, and even justice. Everywhere the decarchies and harmosts committed out- rages upon life and property and national feeling not less violent that those perpetrated by the Thirty at Athens. The general disgust of Spartan coercion and arrogance found indeed only its most moving example in the pitiful condition of Athens. Not only did the Peloponnesian allies come to regret the part which they had taken in advancing the power of Sparta and in destroying the only 16 SPARTA AND THEBES. power able to countervail it, but their feelings were stirred with pity and remorse for the evil plight of the city which had been the pioneer of Greek art and civilization and culture. Disappointment, jealousy, and pity rapidly estranged from Sparta even those who had been most violent in their hatred of Athens ; and when the Lysan- drians caused to be issued an edict that all who sheltered the refugees from Athens should be regarded as enemies of Sparta, Thebes and Megara led the way in refusing to obey such an injunction. Nor were things working altogether smoothly even at Sparta, where the extraordinary ascendancy of Lysander and his consequent presumption were rapidly making him an object of distrust and dislike to the two kings, whom he was suspected of a wish to depose, to the Eph(n-alty, upon whose powers he trenched, and to the Spartiates generally, whose pride of birth he offended. His many years of successful service abroad, and his intimate relations with such men as Cyrus and Pharnabaziis, by no means tended to leave him a good citizen, but filled him with aspirations and hauteur which suited ill with the traditional humility required by the national discipline. He was disgusted to find himself less powerful in his own country than when in command of fleets and forces on foreign service, and his undisguised efforts to maintain at home what had lately been his position abroad speedily set the constitutional authorities very decidedly against him. For the first time of which we have any record Sparta began to experience the perplexities of political party-feuds. § 10. The fugitives from Athens, by this time amounting to several thousands, turned to the best advantage the feeling against Sparta and the general sympathy with their own misfortunes. In particular there assembled a great number of such refugees in Thebes and other Boeotian towns, and at Chalcis in Euboea, at which places they were within sight of their own country. Those who befriended them did not dare indeed to offer them direct aid to their restoration, but they provided them with convenient rallying-points and with funds, and encouraged them as far as they safely could. The leaders THE YEAR OF ANARCHY. 17 of the exiles were Thrasybulus, Anytus, and Archinus, all men of ardent democratic views and honest resolve. Anytus had yet to make a name, but Archinus was already a man of some prominence and considerable military experience, while Thrasybulus had earned the lasting gratitude and confidence of his party by the zeal wherewith he had resisted oligarchic intrigues at Samos and there maintained the democracy until the fall of the Four Hundred. He was well known, moreover, as a public speaker, and events proved him to be no mean strategist, and withal — a rare thing in Greece — a man in whom the promptings of partisanship did not override those of humanity. These three men resolved to attempt the restoration of the democracy at Athens. They numbered as yet but seventy followers, and their means were limited to the voluntary loans of Ismenias and other leading Thebans, but they knew that the smallest success on their part would bring to their side the hundreds of other Athenian exiles now scattered throughout Greece, and they could hope for the co-operation of those of the democratic party who still remained within the walls of Athens. Accord- ingly, late in the year 404 B.C., they left Thebes and seized the dismantled outpost of Phyle, upon the road between that city and Athens on the confines of Boeotia, and from its lofty position on Mt. Parnes commanding the whole of Attica. By this time the Thirty, yielding to the ceaseless importunities of Theramenes, had published the names of the Three Thousand selected for the franchise, doubtless including in this list only the wealthier men of oligarchic leanings. With this force, with the Knights, and with their bodyguard of three hundred, they at once attacked Thrasybulus at Phyle, favoured by unusually fine weather for the season, which was winter. Their attack was rashly made and easily repulsed ; whereupon they com- menced to blockade the fortress, but a snowstorm came on and compelled them to return to Athens, leaving their baggage in the hands of their opponents. After this a force of seven hundred men, who garrisoned the Acropolis G, 404—362. C 18 spauta and thebes. under the Spartan Callibius, together with two tribes of Knights, were commissioned to keep the exiles in check, and to prevent their obtaining supplies by foray. But Thrasybulus, whose numbers had by this time risen to seven hundred men, surprised his enemies a little before daybreak, when they were all unprepared and many of them in their beds, and completely defeated them. § 11. The Thirty became alarmed. Beyond the walls they could rely only upon Peiraeus, so long as it was occupied by the decarchy, and upon Sparta ; but the recent defeat had proved that Spartan troops were not invincible. Within the city there remained indeed few of the democratic party, but Theramenes with his moderate counsels was a standing menace to the cohesion of the oligarchs, and there- fore to their safety. Ci*itias therefore resolved to remove him, before he could enter into any dealings with the exiles. Without any warning Theramenes was suddenly denounced in the senate, and that body was called upon forthwith to condemn him to death, as a man who had in the past ruined the Four Hundred, and was in the present suspected of scheming for his own safety by the overthrow of the Thirty. When the senate demurred, partly from natural compunction and partly persuaded by the vehement rhetoric of Theramenes' reply to his accusers, and when it was objected that, as one of the Thirty, he was entitled to a formal trial, Critias replied by striking out his name from the list of the Thirty, and thereby making his immediate execution a matter for the decision of himself and his remaining colleagues. In vain Theramenes sought refuge at the altar of the Prytaneum. He was dragged away by Satyrus and the Eleven, and at once despatched by the customary draught of hemlock. Such an act was well calculated to repress the growth of defection amongst the adherents of the Thirty, but that body was now in a condition of panic terror. They com- menced a fresh series of murders and confiscations, so contriving their iniquities as to involve in them the whole body of their partisans, and thereby to make it a matter of interest with the latter to resist to the utmost any revolution which would bring them within reach of the THE TEAR OF ANARCHY. 19 vengeance of the democrats. On one occasion they sent orders to Socrates and four other prominent citizens to set out for Salamis and bring back by force a certain democrat named Leon who had gone thither for safety. Socrates bluntly refused, and defied the vengeance of the tyrants. The others were more compliant and accomplished their mission. So little, however, did the Thirty trust their position that they now cast about for some place which might serve as a refuge if things came to the worst. They selected Eleusis and Salamis, two positions admirably situated for hampering Athens and Peiraeus, and easily accessible to aid from Sparta. By a stratagem they got possession of the whole population of Eleusis, and had them to the number of three hundred put to death on the next day by vote of the Three Thousand. Whether they were equally successful in their attempt upon Salamis is not known. Lastly, they utilized the Spartan garrison in another stratagem, whereby they disarmed the whole population of Athens other than the Three Thousand, thus making impossible any attempted armed rising in favour of Thrasybulus. § 12. Meantime the exiles had found themselves strong enough to quit Phyle and march past the city to Peiraeus, which they seem to have occupied without a struggle. Thereupon the Thirty advanced along the great road from Athens, drove back the small and poorly-armed company of Thrasybulus, and at length brought him to a stand upon the slope of the hill of Munychia. Here they ventured to attack him despite the strength of his position, and suffered a complete defeat. Critias himself fell in the fight, and the whole of the Peiraeic peninsula was now in the hands of Thrasybulus. Within Athens the immediate result was the downfall of the party of extreme oligarchy. The Three Thousand formally deposed the Thirty, and elected in their place a Board of Ten, who were instructed to arrange for a com- promise with the exiles if possible. But the new board, which included at least two members of the old Thirty, were no more anxious to fulfil their purpose than then- predecessors had been : they had ardent supporters amongst 20 SPARTA AND THEBES. the Knights and the wealthy generally, all of whom dreaded punishment for the enormities in which they had been participants ; and backed up by these they made fresh appeals for Spartan aid, and for funds with which to equip a larger force. They made no attempt to negociate with the exiles in Peiraeus. Upon their deposition, the remnant of the Thirty, together with their most obstinate adherents and their bodyguard, and presumably with Callibius and his seven hundred men, had withdrawn to their lately - acquired retreat at Eleusis, whence they sent urgent messages to their patron Lysander, bidding him interfere ere it was too late to save Athens from falling into the hands of a party hostile to his own views. It would seem that Lysander found the ill-feeling which he had provoked in Sparta too strong to allow of his enlisting the government in the cause of the Thirty, or possibly it was from the wish to act with all possible despatch, that he at once left the city without an armed force and joined his proteges at Eleusis. There he commenced levying mercenaries from all quarters, him- self providing pay to the amount of a hundred talents. Three of the five Ephors had already resolved to give him no further support, and the speedy arrival of envoys from the Ten gave to Lysander's more energetic enemies an excuse for actually frustrating his designs. Headed by Pausanias, the colleague of Agis in the kingship, they obtained the despatch of a considerable force to the scene of action. The altered feelings of the Peloponnesian allies were shown in an alarming manner when the Corinthians and Boeotians flatly refused to furnish contingents to an expedition of which the ostensible purpose was the re- assertion of the position of the oligarchs at Athens : the exiles, they declared, had in no way infringed the peace, and they refused to assist Sparta in reducing so important a county as Attica to the condition of a mere outpost upon their own frontiers. § 13. Pausanias entered Attica probably about mid- summer (403 B.C.), and was at once joined by Lysander with his mercenaries. Albeit resolved to overthrow the Lysandrian ascendancy in this quarter, Pausanias was too THE YEAR OP ANARCHY. 21 shrewd to come to open quarrel with his rival. He pre- tended to be eager to restore the oligarchs, and at once bade Thrasybulus disband his forces and withdraw; but this was only a ruse, and when the exiles refused com- pliance Pausanias attacked them in a fashion intended rather to mislead the Ephors and Lysander than to dis- courage the exiles. Ultimately, after allowing himself to be once defeated in the attempt to occupy Peiraeus, and after having vindicated his own merits as a general by rather severely handling his adversaries in a second battle, he induced Thrasybulus to ask for and conclude an armistice. Meantime the Ten within the city, having failed to perform the task entrusted to them, had been very speedily deposed and their place taken by a second Board of Ten, chief of whom was Rhinon. Such an event, following close upon the overthrow of the Thirty, clearly showed the growth of the reaction against oligarchy. Rhinon and his colleagues at once set themselves to effect an accommo- dation with Thrasybulus and the exiles, and the negociations were already in a fair way to be concluded when Pausanias and Lysander again appeared before the walls. Thus Pausanias was probably from the first in communication with both parties, and having done sufficient to maintain his own credit he had no difficulty in bringing about the armistice which he desired. A few days later the exiles and the new Board of Ten came to terms, and early in August, 403 B.C., Thrasybulus entered Athens with all his followers, the democracy was formally restored, and Rhinon and his colleagues in the traditional democratic manner submitted for audit to the democratic magistrates the account of the conduct of the ofiice conferred upon them in the late crisis. By the terms of the peace, the Thirty and their instru- ments were formally deposed and all their enactments abrogated, the democracy being restored in its entirety and new magistrates at once elected. There was decreed a general amnesty : only the Thirty, the Peiraeic decarchs, the Eleven, and the Board of Ten which had succeeded the Thirty, were excepted, and even these were to be entitled 22 SPARTA AND THEBES. to the privileges of the amnesty if they would and could pass the usual audit for the offices which they had held ; while for the rest, heavy penalties were laid upon any one who should venture to bring an action for any offence com- mitted during the Year of Anarchy, as the period of revo- lution was termed. Such as feared to remain in Athens were allowed to make new homes for themselves at Eieusis, with the proviso that that town, though in political matters independent, should retain its old sacred rights, and should be accessible to all who chose to visit it for religious pur- poses. A definite space was arranged within which those who intended to migrate should do so. The peace being sworn, Pausanias withdrew the Spartan garrison and retired, leaving Athens in the hands of the democracy and the Lysandrians hopelessly defeated. § 14. The Thirty, and such others as were declared ex- cepted from the amnesty, withdrew in a body to Eieusis, where they were joined by many of the Knights and others who had shared their misdeeds; but when the number of emigrants threatened to assume serious proportions, Archinus suddenly prociu-ed the passing of a law to cancel the remaining days assigned for such emigration, and so stayed the exodus. The property of the excepted oligarchs was either confiscated to the treasury or restored, where possible, to its rightful owners ; but no proceedings were allowed againct others of their party, and Archinus did his country another service by securing the immediate execution of one who ventured to set the example of disregarding the amnesty. A proposal to limit the franchise by the exclusion of the trading classes was at once rejected, and the only limitation allowed was that which demanded pure Athenian parentage on both sides as a qualification for the citizen- ship. The funds borrowed by the oligarchs from Sparta were repaid at once by the democracy, and the leaders of the exiles were rewarded with a donation of a thousand drachms. To remove any inconsistencies between the old laws of Draco, Solon, and Cleisthenes and subsequent legisla- tion, and to codify the whole, there was appointed a board of Five Hundred Nomothetae, the results of whose labours formed the constitutional law of Athens from this time THE YEAR OF ANARCHY 23 forward. Two years later (401 B.C.), upon learning that the oligarchs at Eieusis were raising mercenaries with hostile intent, the Athenians attacked and expelled them, restoring Eieusis to its old position in relation to Athens. Never was there in Greece a revolution so important effected in so gentle a fashion, in the face of innumerable incentives to bitter vengeance and retaUation; whereof credit is due to the entire democratic population m scarcely less degree than to its leaders Thrasybulus and A Tchinus The Archon Eponymus of the Year of Restoration was Eucleides. His date is memorable for another reason: in this year the old Ionic alphabet of sixteen or eighteen letters was replaced even in legal documents by the newer alphabet of twenty-four, the Greek alphabet as we know it *. It was first employed to record the law of the new Constitution as revised by the Nomothetae. * Heretofore legal documents had been written in the Old Ionic f Pj^fJ^eJ^ oj oitrhtcen letters although the New Ionic Alphabet of twenty-four letters had ^S'fbTen''i^'uVfor general purposes. The latter .^as now ado^^^^^^^^^^ or al puiToses, i. e., the old alphabet was extended by the addition of the letters H, n, X, *, etc. THE TEN THOUSAND. 25 CHAPTER II. The Ten Thousand. § 1. Birth and position of Cyrus the Younger : His proceedings in Western Asia.— ^ 2. He quarrels with Artaxerxes and Tissaphernes : Condition of the Persian Empire.— § 3. Character and aims of Cyrus.— $ 4. He raises an army: His lieutenants, Clearchus and others.— § 5. The march to Cunaxa.— ^ 6. Measures of Artaxerxes : Battle of Cunaxa and death of Cyrus.— § 7. Treachery of Tissaphernes and massacre of the Greek generals.— § 8. Xenophon assumes the command : He conducts the army to Trapezus.— § 9. Remarks upon the March of the Ten Thousand : They proceed to Byzantium and Thrace. § 1. Darius Nothus, King of Persia, died just about the time when the Spartans, thanks mainly to his assistance, had finally humbled Athens and broken up her Confederacy. He left two sons : the elder, Artaxerxes surnamed Mnemon, was born before Darius had succeeded to the throne ; the younger, Cyrus, was born when the father was already king. About eighty years before, upon the death of Darius Hystaspes (486 b.c), the succession had been disputed by two princes born under the same conditions, and the pre- cedence had been given to Xerxes, the younger of the two, as having been born in the purple. This precedent, backed up, moreover, by every means in the power of his mother Parysatis, led Cyrus to believe himself fully as much en- titled to the throne as his elder brother ; and when interest and intrigue alike failed to prevent the accession of Artaxerxes, Cyrus came to regard himself as one that had been robbed of his birthright. It seems indeed that Darius Nothus had been unable to make any decision between the two rival brothers. Certainly he had treated Cyrus with so large a share of 24 confidence and honour as to justify the hopes of that able and ambitious prince, for he had appointed him, while yet but eighteen years of age, to the satrapy of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia, with general military surveillance of the adjoining satrapy of Lycia and Caria, and of the whole of Western Asia. The command of Western Asia had always a special value in view of the position of the Persian power in that quarter with regard to the Greeks : with the military command of this region went the task of resisting the encroachments of the Greeks of the Asiatic coast, and the duty of recovering, if possible, that ancient supremacy of Persia in Ionia which had been first attained by Harpagus, the general of Cyrus the Elder, reasserted after the Ionic revolt, and lost again during the long maritime struggle with Athens and the Delian Confederacy. When, in 412 B.C., Darius made alliance with Sparta, it was mainly with a view to the recovery of this lost ascendancy, and the terras of the alliance guaranteed to the King the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks in the event of the victory of the Spartans over Athens. Cyrus had exerted himself to the utmost to secure that victory ; Sparta's triumph was due to Lysander, and Lysander's ability owed its opportunities to the lavish generosity of Cyrus. Accordingly, by the summer of 404 B.C., the Asiatic Greeks found themselves once more at the mercy of Persia, and an acknowledged portion of the dominions of some half-dozen satraps and dependent princes. By far the larger number were included in the satrapy of Lydia and Caria under Tissaphernes, while the Aeolic Greeks to the north-west belonged to that of Cyrus, and the more straggling and remote colonies of the Cilician coast and the southern shores of the Euxme were nominally under the rule of the half-dependent prince, or Syennesis, of Cilicia and the princes of Bithynia and Pontic Armenia. § 2 Both Cyrus and Artaxerxes were present at the death-bed of Darius. Cyrus' chagrin at finding himself passed over in the matter of the succession was turned into active hatred of his brother when the latter placed him under arrest on the charge of conspiring against him. His informant was Tissaphernes, always jealous of the stripling j^ 26 SPARTA AND THEBES. I to whom Darius had made him subordinate in Western Asia. Whether the charge was true or not, we cannot say : it was as likely as not. However, the intercession of Pary satis induced Artaxerxes not merely to spare his brother's life, but to reinstate him at once in his late position. Returning to his palace at Sardis, Cyrus considered him- self ill requited for all he had done towards recovering for Persia her ascendancy over the Asiatic Greeks, for the cities and territories recovered by his aid and his funds had been made over in the main to Tissaphernes, and after the recent affair at court Cyrus cherished against his traducer an Oriental passion for revenge. He set himself industriously to seduce the Greek cities from Tissaphernes, with so much success that, with the single exception of Miletus, all Ionia and Aeolia placed themselves under his authority. At Miletus Tissaphernes forestalled such a course by the execu- tion or expulsion of the malcontents. Such as escaped made their way to Cyrus and were well received by him. He openly espoused their cause, and on this plea he pro- ceeded to levy troops of all arms, as though for service against Tissaphernes, while, to keep in with Artaxerxes, he was careful to remit with regularity to the Persian exchequer the annual tribute due from the Greek cities. The Great King cared not how his satraps quarrelled, so long as his revenues were not interfered with. Indeed the immense area included in the inheritance of Artaxerxes was far too large and unwieldy to be regulated in accordance with modern ideas of unity. The twenty or more satrapies were each a kingdom, and their satraps more like independent sovereigns than mere viceroys. It was a rare thing for them to be one and all in quietude : more usually some of the number were in open revolt, while for neighbouring satraps to levy war upon one another was a matter of too frequent occurrence to excite comment. Throughout the Empire there was no pretence of con- solidation or unification, no pains were taken to obliterate national differences of whatever sort, and the only bond of unity was in the submission of all alike to Persian satraps and taxation, which stirred up constantly the spirit of rebellion by the insolence and cruelties of the one, and by THE TEN THOUSAND. 27 the heavy burden of the other. Yet so divergent were the various peoples of the Empire, and so little inclined to any loint action, that not even the all-pervading discontent could arouse them even to a momentary unanimity, and the ill-advised rebellion of one people could always be crushed by the equally ill-advised aid of others. When Asiatics fight with Asiatics, numbers will generally decide the contest, and numbers were always at the disposal of the Great King. As for military discipline and strategy, there was none of it. Themselves brave to admiration, the native Persians wasted their valour for lack of guidance, while the millions of their subjects were for the most part only cowards. The Empire was one which held together only because no one dared to sunder it. Once attacked by a general of ability at the head of troops bred to war and discipline, it must fall if only the first attack were crowned with success. . , . ^ 3 All this Cyrus knew, and he resolved to utihze his knowledge. Unlike the mass of his countrymen, he was a general of ability. Not only did he see all the weak points in his brother's position, but he set himself carefully to destroy the few real barriers which protected it. Me possessed a fascination of manner which made for him friends upon all hands, and he practised a virtue long forgotten by the descendants of the Persians of the days ot Cyrus the Great-the virtue of truthfulness and honesty. Cyrus' word was above doubt: what he promised he performed, but not less did he exact full performance of all that he demanded. No one lived to repent havmg aided him, and no one lived to boast of having defied him. Moreover, his demands were not dictated by mere whim or appetite, as in the case of his fellow-satraps : he proved himself a worthy governor, making his province a pattern for security of life and property and for consequent well-being. Possessing none of the avarice of his compeers, his lavish generosity purchased him friends and servants wherever he sought them. When therefore he professed himself about to make war upon Tissaphernes, he tound it easy to raise forces in any number, and funds wherewith to pay them. 26 SPARTA AND THEBES. to whom Darius had made him subordinate in Western Asia. Whether the charge was true or not, we cannot say : it was as likely as not. However, the intercession of Pary satis induced Artaxerxes not merely to spare his brother's life, but to reinstate him at once in his late position. Returning to his palace at Sardis, Cyrus considered him- self ill requited for all he had done towards recovering for Persia her ascendancy over the Asiatic Greeks, for the cities and territories recovered by his aid and his funds had been made over in the main to Tissaphernes, and after the recent affair at court Cyrus cherished against his traducer an Oriental passion for revenge. He set himself industriously to seduce the Greek cities from Tissaphernes, with so much success that, with the single exception of Miletus, all Ionia and Aeolia placed themselves under his authority. At Miletus Tissaphernes forestalled such a course by the execu- tion or expulsion of the malcontents. Such as escaped made their way to Cyrus and were well received by him. He openly espoused their cause, and on this plea he pro- ceeded to levy troops of all arms, as though for service against Tissaphernes, while, to keep in with Artaxerxes, he was careful to remit with regularity to the Persian exchequer the annual tribute due from the Greek cities. The Great King cared not how his satraps quarrelled, so long as his revenues were not interfered witli. Indeed the immense area included in the inheritance of Artaxerxes was far too large and unwieldy to be regulated in accordance with modern ideas of unity. The twenty or more satrapies were each a kingdom, and their satraps more like independent sovereigns than mere viceroys. It was a rare thing for them to be one and all in quietude ; more usually some of the number were in open revolt, while for neighbouring satraps to levy war upon one another was a matter of too frequent occurrence to excite comment. Throughout the Empire there was no pretence of con- solidation or unification, no pains were taken to obliterate national differences of whatever sort, and the only bond of unity was in the submission of all alike to Persian satraps and taxation, which stirred up constantly the spirit of rebellion by the insolence and cruelties of the one, and by THE TEN THOUSAND. 27 the heavy burden of the other. Yet so divergent were the various peoples of the Empire, and so little inclined to any joint action, that not even the all-pervading discontent could arouse them even to a momentary unanimity, and the ill-advised rebellion of one people could always be crushed by the equally ill-advised aid of others. When Asiatics fight with Asiatics, numbers will generally decide the contest, and numbers were always at the disposal of the Great King. As for military discipline and strategy, there was none of it. Themselves brave to admiration, the native Persians wasted their valour for lack of guidance, while the millions of their subjects were for the most part only cowards. The Empire was one which held together only because no one dared to sunder it. Once attacked by a general of ability at the head of troops bred to war and discipline, it must fall if only the first attack were crowned with success § 3. All this Cyrus knew, and he resolved to utilize his knowledge. Unlike the mass of his countrymen, he was a general of ability. Not only did he see all the weak points in his brother's position, but he set himself carefully to destroy the few real barriers which protected it. He possessed a fascination of manner which made for him friends upon all hands, and he practised a virtue long forgotten by the descendants of the Persians of the days ot Cyrus the Great— the virtue of truthfulness and honesty. Cyrus' word was above doubt: what he promised he performed, but not less did he exact full performance of all that he demanded. No one lived to repent having aided him, and no one lived to boast of having defied him. Moreover, his demands were not dictated by mere whim or appetite, as in the case of his fellow-satraps : he proved himself a worthy governor, making his province a pattern for security of life and property and for consequent well-being. Possessing none of the avarice of his compeers, his lavish generosity purchased him friends and servants wherever he sought them. When therefore he professed himself about to make war upon Tissaphernes, he tound it easy to raise forces in any number, and funds wherewith to pay them. 28 SPARTA AND THEBES. In another point Cyrus was entirely unlike his country- men : he was able to deal with Greeks as no other Persian could, bringing them to regard him rather as one of themselves than one of the hated race which had for a hundred years been the hereditary foe of Greece. The service which he had rendered to Sparta went far to win him friends amongst many of the Greek states ; still further went his generosity, his honour, and his marked deference and predilection for anything Greek. Something of this was certainly due to genuine admiration, but more of it to a carefully-laid policy. Cyrus was bent upon no such petty scheme as the discomfiture of Tissaphernes : his aim was to drive Artaxerxes from the throne and seize it for himself, and he had not failed to see tliat his object could be accomplished only by aid of a genuine soldiery — such a soldiery as he could find only in the descendants of those whose handfuls worsted the Persian thousands at Marathon, at Salamis and Plataea and Mycale, at Eurymedon and Cyprian Salamis. § 4. Circumstances were highly favourable to Cyrus' object. The close of the Peloponnesian War had just turned adrift large numbers of men trained in the best schools of Grecian warfare, while the length of that war had produced in many the habit of regarding military life as a profession and a distaste for the monotonous drudgery of peace. On the other hand, Cyrus had already made himself a name for generosity and honourable deal- ing, and service with him seemed to open the way to the Eldorado which all Greeks saw in Persia. And while these were the feelings of the mass of the Greeks, Cyrus had many friends and abettors amongst their leading men. On the Hellespont, in Thessaly, in Boeotia, not less than in Laconia, he had agents to sound his praises and to set forth in glowing colours the advantages of service under his banner. Lastly, his court offered a harbour of refuge to all those whom the recent war in Greece had driven into exile, whether to escape from the sword of the con- querors or from the more protracted and less excusable outrages of the Lysandrian oligarchies and harmosts. In the early spring of 401 B.C., when Cyrus mustered his THE TEN THOUSAND. 29 forces at Sardis, he found himself at the head of more than 11,000 choice Greek troops, and at least 100,000 Asiatics. Cyrus in person was naturally commander-in-chief of the entire army, but the Greek force was kept entirely distinct from the Asiatic, and while Clearchus was nominally marshal of their whole number, in point of fact the various contingents owned no allegiance save to the particular leaders who brought them into Cyrus' service. Chief of these leaders were Menon the Thessalian, Proxenus the Boeotian, and Xenias the Arcadian. Others were Socrates the Achaean, Sophaenetus the Arcadian, and Pasion of Megara; while amongst the rank and file was the man who was destined to be most distinguished of all, Xenophon of Athens. Clearchus had been Spartan harmost of Byzantium towards the close of the late war, and had there conducted himself so violently as to compel the Ephoralty to dismiss him. Thereupon he attempted to retain his position by force, and being discomfited, found shelter with Cyrus, who recognized his undoubted abilities, and who moreover was particularly desirous of securing the services of Spartans in his projected undertaking. He furnished Clearchus with funds to equip and maintain a considerable force of mercenary Greeks in the Thracian Chersonese, where he had found plenty to do in protecting the Grecian settlements there from the encroachments of the neighbouring Thracian tribes. He was thus one of the first instances of a class of men which became common enough in the course of the next century, Greeks of position who abandoned their own homes to act as mercenary captains under any government which would pay for their services. Menon belonged to the Aleuadae of Thessaly, a great oligarchical family which had maintained friendly relations with Persia since the time of their expeditions to Greece. He had applied to Cyrus for aid in one of the chronic struggles which kept the Thessalian nobles at variance with the populace, and in return for Cyrus' support he now brought into the field a force of 1500 troops. He showed in a notable degree the usual traits of a Greek oligarch, and his hot blood, jealousy, 30 SPARTA AND THEBES. and treachery, earned for him a terrible requital. Proxenus, who furnished 2000 troops, had once been a pupil of the rhetorician Gorgias, and was now an intimate friend of Cyrus. He is most famous as the man who induced Xenophon to throw in his fortunes with that prince. Xenias had accompanied Cyrus to Susa on the occasion of Darius' death, and had since then been in command of the various bodies of Greek mercenaries engaged under Cyrus' orders in Ionia and about Miletus, as had also Pasion and Socrates. § 5. Cyrus was fully alive to the fact that the Greeks at large cherished a wholesome awe of the far-off power of the Persian Empire, and that it would be impossible to induce his Greek mercenaries voluntarily to undertake the march of 1500 miles through Asia to Susa. Accordingly he set himself to draw them after him by one excuse or another until it would be as dangerous for them to retreat as to advance. It was announced therefore that the army would be employed to chastise the mountaineers of Pisidia for their incessant depredations upon the lowlands of the neighbouring satrapies, and with this impression the army broke up from Sardis and moved in a south-easterly direc- tion across the Maeander (Afenderez) to Colossae and Celaenae. From this point the march lay for some distance northward to Ceramon- Agora ; thence again eastward through Caystru-Pedium and Tyriaeum to Iconium {Konieh) ; and so along the northern foot of Mt. Taurus across Lyca- onia to the formidable pass known as the Cilician Gates, through which the one practicable road from Central Anatolia crosses to Tarsus and the Gulf of Issus {Scande- roum). The pass is one which might at any time be held by a mere handful of men, and under Persian rule it was further defended by a wall and fortress at its narrowest part. It lay upon the frontiers of the dependent kingdom of Cilicia, whose prince or Syennesis was entrusted with its defence ; but that chieftain, whose queen Epyaxa had already joined Cyrus with a large and sorely-needed supply of money, was minded to keep upon good terms with both Cyrus and Artaxerxes, in order to profit by the success of either. Accordingly he allowed Menon with a troop of THE TEN THOUSAND. 31 horse to enter Cilicia by a circuitous route, and thereupon abandoned the defence of the Gates upon the plea that his flank was turned. The Cyreian army marched through without molestation, and descended to rest in comfortable quarters at Tarsus. By this time the Pisidians had been left far to the westward, and the troops saw very clearly that Cyrus had some other object than a raid upon those freebooters. The suspicion that they were being led against Artaxerxes gained ground amongst the Greeks and led to a serious mutiny, which was only quelled by the astuteness of Clearchus. Clearchus alone was in the secret of the real object of the march : backed by the assertion of Cyrus that he only wished to make a demonstration as far as the frontiers of Syria and Phoenicia, because he suspected the satrap Abrocomas of hostile designs, Clearchus in- duced the Greeks to march onward to Issus, and thence across another formidable pass known as the Syrian Gates, behind Myriandrus. Here also the natural defensibility of the pass had been further strengthened by fortifications, and here also the position was abandoned without a struggle. Cyrus had foreseen a difficulty in forcing the position, and had accordingly called upon the Spartans to requite his recent services to Lysander by providing him with a fleet which would have enabled him if necessary to land troops in the rear of the Syrian Gates and so turn the position. This fleet, commanded by the navarch Samius, had sailed as far as Issus, and had done Cyrus a collateral service in overawing the Syennesis of Cilicia. It brought 700 hoplites, under the command of the Lacedaemonian Cheirisophus. It was now no longer required, and accordingly sailed homewards, but the action of the Ephoralty in thus abetting Artaxerxes' enemy was destined to bring Sparta into more active collision with the Persians. Cyrus advanced at once as far as Thapsacus {Surijeh) on the Euphrates, the satrap Abrocomas offering no resistance whatever. At this point there was a fresh mutiny of the Greek troops, whose numbers had risen by help of various ac- cessions taken up along their route to at least 14,000 men of all arms. But they had gradually come to a tacit 32 SPARTA AND THEBES. conviction that the real goal of their march was Susa, and they were the less disconcerted by reason of the few difficulties which had thus far attended their advance. They were now within striking distance of the Persian capitals with all their fabulous w^ealth ; no enemy had . appeared to oppose them ; it seemed as if none dared offer any resistance, if the impregnable passes of Cilicia and Syria were thus left open to them. Cyrus moreover increased by one-half their pay, and promised them un- dreamt-of rewards if they would but take him to Babylon, and easy escort home thence to their own land ; while to attempt any retreat on their own account would certainly be a task of peril, and would leave them as poor as when they started. They acquiesced therefore in the task before them, crossed the Euphrates without opposition, and struck boldly across the Syrian desert along the northern bank of the river. And still they met with no enemy. At a point scarcely seventy miles from Babylon they reached a huge ditch and rampart running from the river across the plain, with but a narrow roadway of a few yards in width to permit the passage of an army. Yet even this was left undefended : the whole army passed safely through, and advanced to within fifty miles of Babylon. § 6. Meantime the Great King had had warning sufficient of the impending attack, for Tissaphernes had guessed Cyrus' object many months before and had at once informed his sovereign. Had the Syennesis or even Abrocomas been loyal, it must have been an easy matter to check Cyrus, if not to destroy his army, before it reached the Euphrates, while the fords of that broad river might have been easily defended for any length of time. But as usual the Persian monarch could rely neither upon the loyalty nor the generalship of his satraps : he could not even trust himself to bar the passage of the ditch which he had been at such pains to construct. It was only now, when his enemy was within reach of Babylon itself, that he mustered for battle with a force estimated at 900,000 men. It would have amounted to 300,000 more had not Abrocomas still played false and purposely delayed to bring up his division. THE TEN THOUSAND. 33 It was about the first week of September when the two armies at length came into collision at a point not far distant from the village of Cunaxa. Artaxerxes divided his forces into three columns of 300,000 each : commanding together with Gobryas in the centre, he entrusted his right to Arbaces, his left to Tissaphernes. His advance was from south to north, and the Euphrates covered the flank of Tissaphernes' division. Against this enormous host Cyrus could array only some 115,000 men. He would have placed the Greeks in the centre, and opened the battle by at once charging the Persian centre under Artaxerxes, but Clearchus, fearing to be hemmed in on all sides by the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, insisted that his place must be on the right wing, where the Euphrates would cover his flank. Cyrus was forced to acquiesce : he stationed his 100,000 native troops on the left under Ariaeus, and in person took his place at the head of his handful of 600 horse in the centre. So much was his force inferior in numbers that his extreme left only reached as far as the centre of Artaxerxes' line, while the Persian right under Arbaces had no enemy before it. The issue was just what might have been foreseen. The Greeks charging upon the right, cut their way with ease through the Persian left, but the smallness of their num- bers made no material change in the position of the main body of Persians under Tissaphernes. That satrap suffered them to pass by, while he himself with his division of horse advanced along the river. Simultaneously Arbaces advanced on the Persian right, and in conjunction with the centre closed in upon the Cyreian left under Ariaeus. Cyrus himself, at the very outset of the battle, charged with his six hundred horse full upon the Persian centre. In the 7nelee he caught sight of his brother's figure, and carried away by resentment, he recklessly rode at him; but his men were swallowed up in the thousands of his enemies, and were almost all cut down, while he himself died amongst the first. The troops under Ariaeus now found themselves beset on all sides and speedily gave way, while the whole Persian force at once fell to pillaging the Cyreian camps. a. 404—^02. D u SPARTA AND THEBES. Shortly afterwards the Greeks, having pushed the pur- suit of the routed left wing until they were weary, halted, re-formed their ranks, and retraced their steps towards their camp, still ignorant of how the battle had gone elsewhere. As they returned they were met by the entire force of Artaxerxes also returning. The two armies might have passed each other flank to flank, but to avoid the danger of an attack upon his right .flank Clearchus wheeled his men to face the east, while simultaneously the Persians wheeled to the west. They were now a second time face to face : again the Greeks charged without delay, and again the Persians fled before them. AVhen this second encounter was ended the Greeks bivouacked in the adjacent village, expecting every moment to hear of the safety and success of Cyrus. § 7. When, on the next morning, Ariaeus sent word of what had happened, the consternation of the Greeks was indescribable. Nevertheless they put a bold face upon matters : Clearchus invited Ariaeus to step into Cyrus' place, promising to place him upon the throne of Persia, and when Artaxerxes sent to demand the unconditional surrender of the entire force his envoys were dismissed with contempt. Ariaeus declined to take up Cyrus' designs : he was bent only on retreating in safety, and the Greeks had no choice but to follow suit. Shortly after- wards, however, came other envoys from the Great King offering to conduct the whole force safely back to the coast, if they would consent to withdraw in quietude. The offer was eagerly accepted : the whole Cyreian army was abundantly provided with supplies and comfortably quar- tered in the heart of Babylonia until Tissaphernes was ready to conduct them upon their homeward march. Under his guidance they marched eastward to Sittace, where they crossed the Tigris, and thence in a direction due north as far as the Zabatus (Greater Zab). Already there had arisen amongst the Greeks suspicions as to the good faith of Ariaeus, and they placed little more confidence in him than in Tissaphernes. Clearchus believed him to be prompting Tissaphernes to treachery, until at length, to put an end to the growing ill-feeling between all THE TEN THOUSAND. 35 parties, he took advantage of the halt on the Zab to obtain an interview with Tissaphernes. That satrap so deftly humoured the perplexed Greek, that the latter laid aside all his mistrust, and on the following day rode into the Persian camp accompanied by Proxenus, Slenon, Socrates, and Agias, with some twenty of the leading Greek captains, and a guard of only two hundred regular troops. Tissaphernes at once ordered the arrest of all the generals and the massacre of the captains and troops, and only one escaped to inform the Greeks of what had occurred. The prisoners were all sent in chains to the Great King's court, where with the exception of Menon all were executed at once. Menon, who pretended to have been the instrument of Tissaphernes' treachery, only preserved his life for a twelvemonth of tortures. Queen Pary satis did her best to save them, by reason of her affection for Cyrus, but her influence was counterbalanced by that of Artaxerxes' wife Stateira. § 8. The case of the Greeks, thus deprived of their leaders, was now far worse than before. They were further than ever from home, they had neither guides nor provisions, and while all the forces of Artaxerxes were in arms against them, Ariaeus had now openly gone over to the Great King. It was at this juncture that Xenophon came to the front. Xenophon was one of the Athenian Knights, and as such had probably taken an active share in the troubles of the Year of Anarchy, of course on the side of the Thirty Tyrants. Upon the restoration of the Democracy he doubtless found life at Athens anything but pleasant, albeit the amnesty was faithfully observed there. Accord- ingly, when his friend Proxenus sent word to him that Cyrus was in need of volunteers, Xenophon discussed the matter with the philosopher Socrates, to whom he was closely attached, and decided to take service as a private soldier in Asia. In this humble capacity he had shared in all the events of the march from Sardis to the Zabatus, and he shared also for a moment in the despair which seized upon his comrades upon the news of Tissaphernes' treachery. But it was only for a moment. In the course of the ensuing night he dreamed a dream, which seemed 36 SPARTA AND THEBES. to urge him to action with every promise of success. Always a man of almost superstitious piety, he accepted the omen as a command ; he roused his comrades, en- couraged them to hope for better things, advised them to do whatever could be done for an immediate and rapid march across the unknown heart of Armenia to the Euxine, and was rewarded by being placed at once in a position of paramount authority in the army. Perhaps on no other occasion did the value of an Athenian education show itself so decisively. Xenophon had profited to the fullest by such an education as Athens could alone give in that age : the keynote of his training had been the art of persuasion, with all the rhetorician's armoury of sound logic and specious fallacy, exhortation and denunciation, in a word the ''sophistical art" of "making the worse case appear to be the better." AVhen to influences so potent with a Greek audience there was added the bond of fellowship tlirough the past months of marching and fighting, a courage and military ability which had few rivals in the army, and an honesty of purpose which spoke the truth fearlessly and won support by its very boldness, it was not to be wondered that he obtained and kept so great an ascendancy over the hearts of his followers. It is not necessary here to detail the manifold events of the celebrated Retreat of the Ten Thousand. Steadily turning a deaf ear to all further overtures from the Great King's emissaries, the army moved across the Zabatus, along the course of the Tigris, through the hill country of the wild Carduchi ; thence across Central Armenia some- what to the west of Lake Yan, through the lands of the yet wilder Taochi and Chalybes now deep in snow and wrapt in winter ; and so again to the Euphrates near its source, and over the mountains of the Colchi, until from the summit of Mt. Thecles they once more sighted the sea so dear to all Greeks ; and descended thence, still numbering 10,000 men after so many dangers, to the hospitable shelter of Trapezus (Trebizond), a flourishing colony of Sinopian Greeks, on the shores of the Euxine. For well-nigh the whole of their march they had done ceaseless battle with the tribes that beset them ; they had THE TEN THOUSAND. 37 often despaired, often murmured even against Xenophon ; but strenuously supported by Cheirisophus and the others of his staff, Xenophon had brought them victoriously through every danger, and if they came back to Grecian civilization with empty purses, they came with such a reputation for heroism and endurance and military efli- ciency as had been claimed by no collective body of Greeks before them or of their own day. § 9. It would seem that the Great King was only anxious to get the Greeks safely out of the vicinity of Babylon, and that so long as they could be prevented from any further aggressions he was indifferent to their escape. It was to disarm their hostility that he had, for some weeks after Cunaxa, furnished them with comfortable quarters near the scene of the battle. Subsequently he became alarmed lest they should wish to establish a permanent settlement there ; for such an event would have placed at the very gates of Babylon an enemy which no Persian troops could withstand, and would have been a constant induce- ment to the over- taxed natives to revolt. To prevent this, Tissaphernes was instructed to get the Greeks out of the country by any means he could devise : hence his seemingly friendly offers of guidance. But when the Ten Thousand were once beyond the Tigris and in retreat the Persians recovered their courage, and set themselves, but in a thoroughly Oriental and half-hearted way, to annihilate the fugitives. Hence the treacherous seizure of Clearchus, and when even this failed to break the courage of the Greeks, hence the intermittent persecutions of Persian cavalry for the earlier part of their retreat. But the satraps proved themselves no more able in the pursuit than they had shown themselves in obstructing Cyrus' advance : one opportunity after another was let slip, and in the end almost the whole force made good its escape. The story of the Anabasis and Katabasis was destined to bring ruin upon that empire of whose weakness it was so signal a proof. From this day forth the Greeks learnt to despise heartily the boasted resources of the Great King's power, and when seventy years later Alexander the Great overthrew the Achaemenian Empire and made it his own, 38 SPARTA AND THEBES. that conquest was but the corollary of the march of the Cyreian Greeks. The Ten Thousand reached Trapezus early in 400 B.C., and there rested for a time. Xenophon, who was well known for his philo-Spartan views, hoped to obtain from Anaxibius, harmost of Byzantium, sufficient vessels to transport the whole force thither by sea, believing that they would find a hearty welcome and the prospect of remunerative service there. In this he was disappointed : Anaxibius had no wish to assist a force so formidable, and the jealousy with which he regarded the Ten Thousand was shared by all the Greek states of the Pontic coast. Xenophon was compelled to lead his weary followers by land to Cerasus and Cotyora, and thence by sea to Sinope and Heraclea, in the face of new perplexities arising from intrigues fostered amongst them by Anaxibius, from the jealous fear of the various states along the route, from the penury of the troops themselves, and from the disappoint- ment with which they viewed the results of their long toils. On several occasions Xenophon's own life was endangered, and more than once it was only by consummate tact that he prevented the outbreak of violence and the perpetration of some outrage, which would have aroused against his men the active hostility of all Greece. At length Anaxibius changed his tactics : he caused the whole force to be transported to Byzantium under false promises to find them profitable service elsewhere, but the discovery of his bad faith was within an ace of causing the ruin of Byzantium, which the Ten Thousand threatened to sack. For several months more the army lay in Thrace, at one time cheated into assisting Seuthes, prince of the Odrysae, only to meet with further trickery and impoverishment, more often lying idle and mutinous ; while Xenophon repeatedly endeavoured to get away and return to Athens, and was as often compelled to change his mind. At length the remnant of the army found service under Thibron the Spartan commander in Asia, and Xenophon at length resigned his command. He returned to Athens for a few months, not so very much richer than when ho left it. Within a year, however, he once more rejoined the men THE TEN THOUSAND. 39 whom he had brought through so many perils, and revenged himself richly upon Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus for the treachery of the former satrap. The Retreat of the Ten Thousand had considerable infiuence on the future history of Greece, for it showed how easily the Persian Empire might be overturned if a resolute leader would undertake the task. The idea was entertained by Agesilaus of Sparta, later by Jason the tyrant of Pherae, and still later by Philip of Macedon, but it was reserved for the latter's son Alexander to achieve the exploit of carrying the arms of the West to the capitals of the Great King. CHAPTER III. The Supremacy of Sparta. § 1. Dccliue of the influence of Lysander: Misconduct of the Lysan- drian decarchies and harmosts, and of Lysander at Sestus : He leaves Sparta. — § 2. Social and political changes in Sparta : Sparta unfitted for her new position. — § 3. Strained relations between Sparta and lier allies. — § 4. War between Sparta and Elis : Its causes, course, and results. — § 5. Sparta in collision with Persia : Position of the Greeks in Asia. — § 6. Campaigns of Thibron and Dercylidas in Asia. — § 7. Disputed succession to the Spartan kingship : Lysander supports Agesilaus : His intrigues. — § 8. The Conspiracy of Cinadon. — § 9. Agesilaus sails to Ionia : His rebuff at Aulis. — § 10. Pharnabazus overthrows Tissaphernes : His anti-Spartan policy : Conon in Cyprus. — § 11. Lysander returns to Asia : Failure of his designs : Campaigns of Agesilaus in Asia. § 1. It has been said that Lysander had lent his support to the Thirty Tyrants, had joined them when they were compelled to retire from Athens to Eleiisis, and had been prevented from restoring them only by the personal rivalry of King Pausanias. Returning to Sparta, he doubtless found himself little at ease amidst so many opponents and beneath the stern discipline of the Lycurgean rules. He applied therefore for another commission. Probably the government were very well pleased to be rid of him : he was again despatched with a Heet to the eastern shores of the Aegean, where he busied himself in revisiting the numerous decarchies and strengthening them against the violent antipathy which they had everywhere aroused. Indeed every day brought to light fresh instances of the enormities of their proceedings. While the story of the miseries of Athens was the chief example of Lysandrian misrule, numbers of smaller towns could instance cases of 40 THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA. 41 oppression not less cruel and licentious than that of the Thirty. In many cases the harmosts, the direct instruments of the Spartan government, were themselves guilty of acts of violence and outrage. In such cases the Ephoralty appear to have done little to check or punish the offenders. But the case was different with the decarchies who owed their creation and authority entirely to Lysander, and in no wise to the government. Therefore, now that Lysander was neither a useful servant nor a welcome citizen, the Ephors lent a not unwilling ear to the reports of the misdoings of his clients, encouraged by the avowed and successful anti-Lysandrism of Pausanias. Too confident of his own security and of an ascendancy unquestioned at any rate amongst the islands and coast towns of the Aegean, Lysander utilized his new commission in a manner which speedily gave excuse for interference on the part of his enemies at home. Sailing to Sestus, one of the most important strategical positions of maritime Hellas, he attempted to secure it entirely to his own interests and at the same time to furnish a notable example of his ability and willingness to reward his adherents, by expelling the entire body of its population and dividing their houses and lands amongst members of his own crews. The Ephors were not yet bold enough to act directly against Lysander, but they struck a very evident blow at his authority by ordering the immediate restoration of the expelled Sestians and by making a scapegoat of Thorax, the harmost of Sestus, who had assisted in their spoliation. Every one knew why Thorax was put to death, though the government pretended to veil its conduct by judicially convicting him under the old Lycurgean law which forbade any Spartan to possess gold or silver money. A few weeks later Lysander himself returned to Sparta, hastening his journey in order personally to combat the growing jealousy against him. It seems that in his actions in and near the Helles- pont he had shown as little regard for the rights of the Persians as for those of the Sestians, and Pharnabazus, who had for several years been an active and valuable ally of Sparta, very reasonably sent despatches to the Ephors, demanding redress for the injuries done to his Phrygian 42 SPARTA AND THEBES. satrapy by Lysander, and the prevention of such aggressions for the future. Aware of this, Lysander obtained a personal interview with the satrap, who easily flattered him into the belief that such complaints should cease at once. He further gave to Lysander a letter to be delivered to the Ephors. Armed with this document, which Pharna- bazus had led him to believe to be a complete exoneration of his conduct, Lysander presented himself confidently before the Ephors, and demanded that the letter should be forthwith read. It was read, and turned out to be yet more bitter and hostile to Lysander than were the previous complaints of the satrap, who took this means of condemn- ing Lysander as it were out of his own mouth. The latter remained but a little while in Sparta, where he was now less popular than ever : pleading the need of fulfilling a vow to Jupiter Ammon in Libya, he with some difficulty obtained leave of absence, probably in the year 402 b.c. It is not very probable that he actually visited Libya : we shall hear of him shortly in relation with the less distant oracle of Delphi. The Ephors proceeded to break down his influence by the removal of the decarchies, that is, by tacitly making it known that Sparta would raise no objection if they were suppressed like the Thirty at Athens, by the several com- munities. The harmosts however were left at their posts, each with his garrison. It was about the time of this change in the condition of the states of the Aegean that the Athenians finally expelled the Thirty from Eleusis. § 2. The jealousy which divided the Spartan state in reference to Lysander was but one of many forces now operating to her detriment. Standing now as unquestioned head of Hellas, to be competent for the duties of her new position she should have been a united state acting with one well-defined and firmly-executed policy. But she was not united. Socially, the rigours of the old Doric discipline had rapidly fallen into neglect for all practical purposes, albeit still useful at times, to assist in getting rid of a Thorax for instance ; for the long and far-reaching activity of the late war, the new and close relations into which well- nigh all able-bodied Spartans were brought with the various civilization and life of the states of Greece and Asia Minor, THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA. 43 above all, the spirit of impatience born of the long and auto- cratic authority of navarchs and harmosts, had changed the Spartan spirit. Not only had the hitherto despised culture of the more liberal Greeks made itself at home in the state of Lycurgus, but in its train had come new ideas of personal liberty and indulgence which ill bore with the stern regime of Spartan training and the meagre diet of the syssitia. With the appetite for indulgence came that for the means to satisfy it, and the old prohibition against amassing wealth, a prohibition which had always acted as an incentive to corruption, was now openly disregarded. Therewith came the heretofore unknown antagonism of rich and poor : the wealthy Spartans formed an oligarchy yet closer than that framed by Lycurgus, while the poorer sort, excluded by their more wealthy fellows from those offices which were the road to riches, grew ever poorer and more dissatisfied. They became unable even to defray the small expenses of the public mess, and sank into the condi- tion of Inferiors, that is, men whose lack of means pre- cluded them from most political advantages — a condition certain to breed discontent, and lending a new element to swell the dissatisfaction which was always fomenting amongst the helots and perioecs. Politically, things were no better. The popular assembly, the Apella, had through- out history been of but nominal authority : now the senate, the Gerusia, was reduced to a similar insignificance, and the entire control of the state had passed into the hands of the Ephors, whose annual election was of course decided by the handful of wealthy oligarchs, and whose views were not less as a matter of course adapted to those of the same oligarchs. And not only had the Ephors usurped the place of the senate : they had so far encroached upon the king- ship as to reduce that office to a merely nominal independ- ence. From the time of Agis no Spartan king took the field except accompanied by a staff of Councillors, nominees of the Ephors, who watched and controlled his every act ; while in the navarchy the Ephors had established an office which Aristotle styles "so to say, another kingship"— an office which had, in Lysander's hands, been far superior to that of the kings of his day. And lastly there was now, as 44 SPARTA AND THEBEi?. always, the inherent jealousy of one royal house towards the other — a jealousy which has been the primary means to the limitation of the powers of the royal office, and which effectually crippled any attempts of the Agiads and Eury- pontids to resist the encroachments of the Ephoralty. Thus divided socially and politically, Sparta was in no position to take up a consistent policy in relation to foreign states. Neither was it in the nature of Dorians — men trained to h've as a camp of invaders in the enemy's land, and preserv- ing still in theory the old-fashioned Constitution which had come into being hundreds of years before as expressly fitted for the needs of that remote age — to lay aside the formulae now no longer needed, and to take up broader views more in accord with their changed circumstances. Inertness was a proverbial feature of the Dorians, and a real feature so far as went any capacity for political betterment. But there is no inertia in the forces which are always active to the internal ruin of communities. Such forces thrive by neglect, and the state of which the constitution does not advance with the times is not stationary but decadent ; and the more it seems at a standstill the more rapidly is it falling to ruin. § 3. "Liberty for Hellas" had been the battle-cry of Sparta during the late war— a useful cry to inflame the perseverance of her own allies and to spread defection amidst those of Athens. But now that the war was ended such a cry was no longer needful : Sparta took all the spoils of war, the late allies of Athens became Sparta's subjects, and worn out by seven-and-twenty years of a struggle for which they had found most of the materials, Sparta's allies were in no condition to dispute her injustice. They learnt too late that they had been made the tools of her ambition, and we have seen how speedily they showed their discontent when Corinth and Thebes refused to assist Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus. All Greece saw now what was the policy of Sparta : it was no generous liberation of small and great alike, no yet more liberal, pan- Hellenic confederation upon terms of equality, but the barefaced avowal of Sparta's dominion over all alike at all costs and by all expedients, whether the aid of Persia or THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA. 45 decarchies or harmosties or mere brute force. That the decarchies disappeared with the fall of Lysander, and that Pausanias restored the democracy in Athens, was a small set-off to the heavy account against the dominant state, and probably misled no one : such acts were the outcome of a jealousy of Lysander felt not by Greece at large but by the oligarchs of Sparta, and were due to no promptings of justice or honour. Had there been no other cause of complaint it must have been intolerable to Greeks to feel themselves dependent upon any one power, most of all when that one power was the fe^v thousands of uncultured, illiberal, arrogant, and faithless Spartiates, whose only claim to supremacy was that of the strongest. The dis- satisfaction of the constituents of the new Spartan hegemony was practically universal. § 4. The Spartan government was quite aware of these facts : it was resolved to make an example of one of the most hostile states, and the victim selected was Elis, upon which war was declared in 401 B.C. Several excuses were easily found : in the year 420 B.C. the Elenns had excluded the Spartans from participation in the Olympic festival, in retaliation for the non-payment of a fine laid upon Sparta for a breach of the " Sacred Peace," and they had chastised one Lichas who had ventured to disregard that prohibition. Subsequently they had refused to allow Agis to offer sacrifice at Olympia. But it was of graver moment that the whole policy and organization of the state of Elis had in the course of the last twenty years undergone a complete change, and one very markedly hostile to Sparta : the old philo-Spartan oligarchy had been replaced by a strong and well-organized democracy ; the town of Elis had been fortified, a fleet had been built, and the neighbouring towns and villages to the east and south had been reduced to a condition of forced dependence ; and over and above such less direct defiance of Spartan wishes, the Eleans had been active in fomenting hostility to Sparta amongst the Pelop- onnesian states, and even in supporting against her the failing power of Athens. Sparta could not afford to tolerate the consolidation of a state so extensive, so wealthy, and so hostile, at her very gates, and feeling herself strong 46 SPAKTA AND THEBES. enough for action she peremptorily demanded the liberation of the dependent townships. The Elean democracy, led by one Thrasydaeus, a friend and supporter of the Athenian Thrasybulus, replied by citing the subjugation of Hellas beneath Spartan harmosties and decarchies, and made energetic efforts to secure allies in the inevitable struggle. However, though Thebes and Corinth declined, as before, to send contingents to the Spartan army, Elis was left to fight her battles alone, saving for some small help sent to her by the Aetolians. Agis crossed Achaea (401 B.C.) and invaded Elis from the north-east, but his campaign came to nothing, for the occurrence of an earthquake was taken by his troops, most of whom were but unwilling followers, as a sign of the wrath of heaven against the sacrilege of those who dared to violate the sacred territory of the Olympians. The army was withdrawn until the following spring (400 B.C.), when Agis again led it into Elis, on this occasion by way of Triphylia and the south. The Eleans were quite unable to face him in the field, and their small towns were easily captured. Within Elis itself the oligarchs, whom the recent turn of politics had placed in a position of inferiority, made a desperate attempt to cut down their opponents and deliver up the town to Agis ; but the design miscarried, and Thrasydaeus revenged it by expelling the oligarchs in a body, though he could not prevent the Spartan army, now swelled by numbers of freebooters from Arcadia and elsewhere, from making spoil of the whole country around. When Agis at last withdrew, he established the expelled oligarchs in Epitalium on the Alpheus, as a standing menace to the Eleans. So much had the latter suffered, and so well were they aware of their inability to resist Sparta, that they opened negociations for peace. The terms granted were hard : the whole of Triphylia was declared independent ; the lands bordering on Arcadia, the Acrorea, were also taken from Elis ; and in the remaining narrow territory every separate township was to be free and autonomous. Further, Elis was deprived of its walls, and the newly- founded navy was destroyed, together with its port of Cyllene. The Pisatans of course put in a claim that the THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA. 47 presidency of the Olympic Festival should be handed over to themselves, but to this request the Spartans declined to accede. The peace was probably concluded early in 399 B.C. After so notable an example of the terrors of her vengeance Sparta could feel more secure, at least as far as Peloponnesus was concerned. About the same time she expelled the remnant of the Messenian nation from the two settlements wherewith Athens had provided it in Cephallenia and Naupactus, and permanently occupied the Trachinian Heraclea by a garrison under the harmost Herippidas, whose violent energy made that position a standing peril to the doubtful loyalty of Thebes. § 5. Meantime affairs in Asiatic Greece had taken a new turn. It has been said that Sparta surrendered the Greek communities there to Darius in return for his assistiance against Athens. Artaxerxes, in the persons of his satraps, readily took up the claims of Darius, and w^hile Pharnabazus was making the most of tlie opportunity in Phrygia and along the Hellespont, Tissaphernes and Cyrus respectively struggled to get possession of the coast-towns of Ionia by force or by diplomacy. Lysander, as has been seen, came into collision with Pharnabazus with results disastrous to himself, for it would seem that he was seeking to secure certain of the Hellespontine Greeks to his own side by lending them an unauthorized support against Persian aggressions. Further to the south, many of the Greek states had voluntarily placed themselves under the rule of Cyrus, while Miletus had been forcibly retained by Tissaphernes, and probably some few communities remained still independent of either satrap. But upon the removal of Lysander Pharnabazus was left free to deal as he chose with the towns of Aeolis, and the death of Cyrus was followed by the reappearance of Tissaphernes in Caria and Lydia, with powers greater than before. Moreover, the keen and dangerous support lent to Cyrus by so many Greeks had embittered the animosity of Artaxerxes against that nation generally, no less than the support of the Lacedaemonian fleet which met Cyrus at Issus had inflamed him against the Spartans in particular. Without any formal declaration of war, Sparta had brought herself 48 SPARTA AND THEBE3. into direct collision with Persia. And indeed the Ephoralty, possibly from the first bent upon conceding to Persia no more than they were compelled to do, now saw clearly the bad policy of allowing the Asiatic Greeks to pass under Persian rule: to permit this was to undo at a blow all that had been achieved by Greeks since the day of Salamis, for it would establish the Persians in the wealthiest cities of Greece, put tljem in command of all the countless harbours of the Ionian coast, and so give them access to the whole of the Aegean, to the islands therein, and to the Hellespont ; while by allowing this to happen Sparta would but add to the many causes of complaint already to hand against her. Hence it came that in 400 B.C. the Ephors despatched an armed force to Asia in response to the appeal of the Greek communities there, and proclaimed herself set to " liberate " the same Greeks whom she had but a few years before voluntarily thrust into the hands of the Great King. ^ 6. The commander of this force was Thibron (or Thimbron). Albeit furnished with ample numbers (2000 ueadamodes or newly-enfranchised helots, 4000 Pelopon- nesian heavy armed troops, and 300 Athenian horsemen, the latter mainly adherents of the Thirty), and joined moreover upon his appearance in Asia by the 6000 survivors of the Cyreian army, he achieved little, taking only a few minor towns besides Magnesia. Much of his time was wasted in the futile siege of Larissa, and when at length he raised the siege and moved southwards towards Caria by express order of the Ephors, the commander destined to supersede him was already in Asia. This was Dercylidas, a man who had already distinguished himself as harmost of Abydus, and one whose natural ability was sharp- ened by personal antipathy to Pharnabazus, who had once been the cause of his disgrace. It was against that satrap accordingly that he turned his attention, gladly arranging a truce with Tissaphernes in order to gratify his grudge against the other by plundering a satrapy which was at once richer and less strongly guarded than that of Tissaphernes. He occupied a large number of towns in Aeolis, winning over many by his tact or cunning, and THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA. 49 \ I even wintered luxuriously in the heart of Bithynia, near the satrap's residence at Dascyleum. In the following year (398 B.C.) he crossed into the Thracian Chersonese and made good the security of that fertile Greek territory against the inroads of Thracian tribes by building a wall across the neck of the peninsula. After again wintering in Phrygia he conducted yet a third campaign with equal success and profit in both satrapies, and was only superseded at last by no less a person than Agesilaus, the new king of Sparta. § 7. Agis I., having satisfactorily concluded the Elean War and avenged himself for the insults offered to him at Olympia, sickened and died at Sparta in 399 B.C., having reigned since 427 B.C. Himself the son of King Ai^chi- damus, he left a son Leotychides, something over fifteen years of age, and a half-brother Agesilaus, born of a second and somewhat unroyal marriage of Archidamus. Rumour averred that Leotychides was no son of Agis, but the bastard offspring of his queen Timaea and the Athenian Alcibiades. Even Agis himself had expressed doubts of his lef'itimacy, but upon his deathbed he had been brought — so^'it was said— to declare Leotychides his lawful heir. As such he would probably have succeeded to the kingship without question, had it not been for the intrigues of Lysander. After quitting Sparta upon the plea of a journey to Libya, Lysander appears to have changed his mind and visited Delphi and Dodona. Disappointed and humiliated by his recent recall from the Hellespont, and knowing himself to be no favourite with the Spartiates, his ambition now led him into intrigues which fell little shoit of high treason : he resolved to win the kingship for himself, but in conformity with all precedents for revolutionary agitation in Sparta, he aspired to effect his object not by force but by fraudulently working upon the religious fears of its people. Just as the whole Lycurgean constitution was believed to be founded upon the rhetrae of Delphi, so any modifications thereof must have the same or similar authority. Accord- incrly Lysander intrigued with the priests of both Delphi and Dodona, offering large bribes if they would use the pretended voice of Apollo or Zeus to induce the Spartans G. 404-302. £ 50 SPARTA AND THEBES. to do away with hereditary monarchy and make the king- ship an elective office. For once the priests were incorrup- tible, and this design failed. A second and rather less direct intrigue, after for a moment promising complete success, broke down at the moment of trial. Thus twice foiled, but still undetected, Lysander thought it wise to desist from his original plan : if he could not be king in actuality, he would seek to be so in effect. Agis could not live long, and in the rumoured illegitimacy of Leotychides there was opportunity for fresh intrigue. I.ysander made him- self the partisan of Agesilaus, tiring the ambition of that remoter claimant, with whom he believed his influence to be so great as to ensure his own ascendancy if Agesilaus could be installed in the kingship. Accordingly, immediately upon Agis' death, the succession was made a matter of dispute. Against Leotychides was alleged his doubtful parentage ; against Agesilaus, the low station of his mother and his own physical deformity, for he was of puny stature, and withal lame in one foot. It seemed that the cause of Agesilaus, that is, of Lysander, was lost when the partisans of Leotychides produced what purported to be an ancient oracular utterance warning Sparta to *' beware of a lame reign " ; but Lysander' s wit was equal to the occasion : he explained that the accession of one who was no true son of the house of the Eurypon- tids — as was not Leotychides — was far more truly lame royalty than that of a man whose birth was indisputable even though his frame was malformed. The youth of Leo- tychides was probably greatly against him, for the position of Sparta and the attitude of other Greeks towards the dominant state rendered highly undesirable the succession of a minor of whose views and ability nothing was as yet known. There was need of a king w^ho was at once able and submissive to the control of the Ephoralty. Agesilaus was elected king, and Lysander' s designs seemed once more to prosper. § 8. The success of Agesilaus was a triumph for the liberal party in Sparta — the party which was prepared to bring tlie constitution into harmony with its altered surroundings ; it was a notable defeat of the party of rigid THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA. 51 conservatism represented by the wealthy oligarchic Spar- tiates, and for the more creditable patriotism of Pausanias. The decision was not arrived at without intense excitement, and it was scarcely made when the state was threatened with a novel and extreme peril. It has been shown how events had enriched some of the upper ranks in the state while proportionately depressing others, and how these latter were naturally unquiet under their disabilities. For the helots and perioecs to be constantly in bitterest conspiracy against the Spartiates was a legacy bequeathed from the far-distant times when the Spartiates first reduced them to slavery and inferiority — a condition of things so normal as to be accepted as part and parcel of the Spartan theory of government; but it was something new for the ruling class to be itself divided, and for the discontented amongst it to make common cause with the despised underlings. This was what happened now. Helot risings had here- tofore failed by reason of the solid front shown by the Spartiates in a body : if the latter were divided, and in part in collusion with the helots, there was hope of a different result. The Inferiors (Hypomeiones) saw this, and their insight and discontent found a leader in one Cinadon, by birth a Spartiate, but by the working of constitutional economics degraded to a condition of political incapacity. If Lysander could, by his individual influence, shake the pillars of the constitution, surely it was possible for the united efforts of the lower classes to overthrow the handful of oligarchs who were themselves at variance. Cinadon pointed to the thousands who assembled in the streets and squares of Sparta, and showed that not more than one in a hundred was contented with his lot. Could not the ninety- nine dissatisfied deal with the one exception ] The jealousy of the Ephoralty kept the helots without arms, but they had the tools of their crafts, and out of these they could forge weapons for war. The conspiracy was already widely organized, the conspirators were only waiting the signal for rising, when the whole plot was betrayed to the Ephors. The government was panic-struck, and not un- naturally, for the treason of the Spartiates threatened to 52 SPARTA AND THEBES. paralyze every effort at repression, and there were scarce iive thousand who could be counted upon to support the government. Not daring to take open measures, the Ephors met plot with plot : they caused Cinadon to be arrested while engaged in a pretended secret service mission to Anion, which they had entrusted to him. By torture they wrung from him the names of his fellow- conspirators, and arrested these also. All were loaded with manacles, publicly scourged through the streets of Sparta, and executed. The proceeding was typical of Spartan methods of government, but it was successful : the plot collapsed, the thousands of malcontents still endured their serfdom or disabilities in silence, nothing was done to obviate the occurrence of similar attempts, and the govern- ment laughed at the grim reminder that it had as many enemies as slaves. It is a matter of wonder that so wide- spread and so justifiable a conspiracy was repressed by this one act of terrorism, barbarous as it was, on the part of a handful of nobles. § 9. The anxiety consecpient upon the discovery of Cinadon's conspiracy had scarcely worn off when a Syra- cusan merchant, calling at a Laconian port on the way from Phoenicia, brought word that at every harbour of that region there was being pushed forward, by order of the Great King, the equipment of a formidable fleet of war vessels, and that the chief command was given to Conon the Athenian, who since his escape from Aegospotami had lived in Cyprus, in the service of Evagoras of Salamis. That this fleet was destined to act against Greece was patent, for Sparta had by this date been for several years at open war, in the persons of her generals Thibron and Dercylidas, with the satraps of Lower Asia. Heretofore, however, the war had been confined solely to operations by land, and when the Ephors heard of the mighty preparations going on in the Persian dockyards, they awoke to the fact that in the naval power of Athens they had destroyed their chief safe- guard against the national enemy, while they had taken no measures to replace her navy by one of their own. It seemed that Greece was threatened with another attack like that of Xerxes, nor did the new-made leaders of Greece THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA. 53 know how to prepare themselves against it. Their per- plexity was Lysander s opportunity. He had succeeded in placing upon the throne the claimant whom he regarded as his proii'ije : he now suggested that Agesilaus should be despatched at once into Asia with additional forces to take over the command from Dercylidas. In any matters con- cerning Persia and Ionian Greece, Lysander was an author- ity whose experience could not be denied. He pointed out that the appearance of a veritable King of Sparta in Asia, especially if accompanied by even a moderate fleet, must go far to overawe the Great King's new-found courage ; and this line of argument was strengthened by Agesilaus' declaration that he desired to take with him no more of the Spartiates than were considered needful as a staff, content to raise an army from helots, perioecs, and allies ; for this offered to the government a ready means of ridding themselves of the more dangerous portion of the malcon- tents of Laconia, as well as of making further use of Lysander, whose presence in Sparta was not at all to their liking. Lysander himself believed that, once out of Sparta, he would be able to do as he pleased under cover of the docility of Agesilaus, and he looked forward to renewing his old relations with the oligarchs in Ionia. It was therefore to the satisfaction of all parties that, early in 396 B.C., Agesilaus sailed for Asia with a force of 2000 neo- damodes and 6000 troops of the Peloponnesian allies. His staff consisted of thirty full Spartiates, one of whom was Lysander. To lend all pomp and circumstance to this unusual expedition, Agesilaus desired to sacrifice, as Agamemnon had done, at Boeotian Aulis before crossing the Aegean ; but he was too thorough a Spartan to think of asking permission of the Thebans, so that he had only himself to blame when the latter gave yet another proof of their attitude towards Sparta by interrupting the sacrifice and expelling the royal devotee with ignominy from their borders. Agesilaus delayed his departure no longer, but he cherished unforgiving recollections of the insult which he had thus brought upon himself, and his hatred of Thebes had an important bearing on the history of his country. 54 SPARTA AND THEBES. § 10. Successful as had been Dercylidas' conduct of the war in Asia, it was yet indirectly due to him that Arta- xerxes had formed the design of aggressive warfare upon Hellas by sea ; for the conduct of Tissaphernes in bribing Dercylidas to confine his hostilities to the satrapy of Pharnabazus, accentuating tlie long-standing enmity be- tween the two satraps, had led Pharnabazus to seek revenge by denouncing his rival as no good subject of Artaxerxes. He accused him of culpable remissness, not to say collusion with the enemy, and insisted that the way to rid Persia of Spartan interference was not by using Persian gold to buy truce after truce, and so keeping the enemy in affluence in Asia. The gold so wasted would be better employed in stirring up enemies against Sparta at home and in building a fleet to take the sea against her, for she was surrounded by malcontents in Greece, and she had no navy worthy of the name. These arguments, supported as they were by the intriguing hatred of Pary- satis, who had never forgotten or forgiven the fact that Tissaphernes had been more or less directly concerned in the overthrow of Cyrus, sufliced to persuade Artaxerxes. He caused Tissaphernes to be treacherously executed by Tithraustes, who was installed in his place as satrap of Lydia — a proceeding the more to Artaxerxes' pleasure, in that Tissaphernes had by this time shown himself quite unable to withstand the attack of Agesilaus, and had suffered a disgraceful defeat before the very walls of Sardis. Apart from jealousy of Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus had very good grounds for his action. After having loyally befriended Sparta for many critical years he found himself made the favourite victim of the inroads of her generals. The design of ridding himself of his rival was his own : the design of adopting a new policy in the conduct of the war was due to the advice of the Athenian Conon. Conon, the only one of the ten generals of Athens whom the defeat at Aegospotami had not disgraced, escaped thence to the court of Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus. There he found a cordial welcome, and surroundings coloured by the strongest of philo- Athenian views on the part of THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA. 55 Evagoras. The two set themselves doggedly to work for the restoration of Athens : the chagrin of Pharnabazus and the irritation with which Artaxerxes viewed the successes of Dercylidas in Asia furnished them with the needed opportunity. It was Conon who pointed out the weakness of Sparta by sea and her insecurity at home : he offered his own services as commander of any Persian fleet raised against her ; and it was in answer to these representations that Artaxerxes had ordered the construction of a fleet ot three hundred sail in Phoenicia. S 11. Lysander was not disappointed in the expectation that his return to Asia would place him once more in a position agreeable to his ambition : from all sides flocked to him his old partisans, the more eagerly as they saw m his presence a possible means to the recovery of that ascendancy from which the fall of the decarchies had lately ousted them, and amongst the crowds wlio paid court to him the unfamiliar and insignificant figure of Agesilaus was altogether disregarded. But once again Lysander had reckoned without his host : Agesilaus when king was a very different person from Agesilaus as a private citizen. He did not need to be aroused to a sense of his own right^ by the jealousies wherewith the remainder of his statt viewed the returning arrogance and pompous airs ot Lysander. Without breaking at all with the man who had desired to be his master, he took the course ot quietly icrnorinff every petition or suggestion made to himselt through the person of Lysander. The latter was speeddy forced to confess himself unable to fulfil all the promises and wishes which he had expressed on behalf of his clients, and was fain at last to beg for a commission elsewhere. Content to have thus humiliated him, Agesilaus com- missioned him to watch the Spartan interests on the Hellespont, where he was successful in seducing from his allegiance one Spithridates, a dependent official under Pharnabazus, and so securing for Agesilaus the aid and advice of one intimately acquainted with the condition ot Upon' the arrival of Agesilaus Tissaphernes had, as usual, arranged a truce under pretence of sending to Susa to I 56 SPARTA AND THEBES. arrange a peace, but really in order to collect additional forces. Agesilaus was too scrupulous to break the truce on his own part, and too clever to allow himself to suffer by it ; he gave out that he would, upon its expiry, at once attack Tissaphernes, thereby causing a general muster of the Persian troops in Lower Asia for the defence of Lydia and Caria ; whereupon he marched direct into the satrapy of Pharnabazus and collected spoil at his pleasure, though on one occasion his horsemen met with a reverse at Dascyleum near the Propontis. He spent the winter in Ephesus, busily engaged in training his troops and raising new levies, especially cavalry, in which he was weak ; then announcing again that he should attack Sardis, he on this occasion kept his word, which Tissaphernes so little expected to be the truth that he had again massed all his troops in Caria. Agesilaus marched almost to the walls of Sardis, defeated a large Persian force on the Hermus, and quietly sat down to pillage the country. It was in direct conse- quence of tliis last stroke that Tissaphernes was disgraced and executed. On the other hand, so well pleased were the Ephors with their king's successes, and with the manner in which he had dealt with Lysander, that they now appointed him to command by sea as well as by land. Tithraustes, the successor of Tissaphernes, in order to gain a brief respite for the arrangement of his plans, bribed Agesilaus with the sum of thirty talents to quit Lydia for Phrygia, and after some months of successful plundering there the army wintered at D.iscyleum, where Agesilaus found comfortable quarters for iiimself and his staff in Pharnabazus' palace. At the same time he easily levied new troops, especially cavalry, amongst the wealthy Ionian cities, and entrusted the equipment of the fleet to his brother-in-law Peisander. In the spring of 394 B.C. he had a conference with Pharnabazus. The satrap made not unreasonable complaints that the only return for all he had done for Sparta was thus to have his territories con- stantly ravaged. He pretended to lend a ready ear to Agesilaus' suggestion that he should revolt from Artaxerxes and join the Spartan side. Whereupon Agesilaus withdrew to the coast preparatory to a grand attack upon the Persian THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA. 57 power further to the south and east. Before he could put his army in motion he received orders from the Ephoralty to return to Greece with all possible speed. Sparta was once more engaged in a struggle which needed all her strength, and once again the Asiatic Greeks were left to their own resources. THE LIBERATION OF GREECE. 59 CHAPTER IV. The Liberation of Greece. § 1. Mission of Timocrates to the Greek states : The indictment against Sparta : Thebes lieads the disaffected states. — § 2. Thebes attacks the Phoeians : Feeling at Sparta, — § 3. Outbreak of war : Battle of Haliartus, death of Lysander, and retreat of Pausanias : Pausaiiias is exiled. — § 4. Coalition of the states : Agesilaus is recalled from Asia : Battle of Nemea. — § 5. Conon in Lycia : Revolt of Rhodes : Battle of Cnidus and defection of the maritime states. — § 6. Agesilans enters Boeotia : Battle of Coronea. — § 7. Conon returns to Athens : The Long Walls rebuilt. — § 8. Progress of the Corinthian War : Military reforms of Iphicrates. g 1. Conon's insistence that the surest way to rid Asia of the Spartans was to engage them in a war nearer home, a conviction based upon reliable knowledge of the state of feeling in Greece, lost nothing in its transmission by the mouth of Pharnabazus to the court at Susa ; and Tithraustes at once took up the line of action which Tissaphernes had been too apathetic to attempt. His emissary, a Khodian named Timocrates, crossed the Aegean in the autumn of 395 B.C., bearing with him fifty talents of gold as an earnest of the aid to be expected from Persia in case the recipients should fall in with his views, and should foment such a war in European Greece as should occupy the entire strength of Sparta. At Argos and Corinth, and especially at Thebes, Timocrates found his mission an easy one, while at Athens he needed not even to show his gold. Each and all of these states had remained quiet during the past seven years, more from weakness and from lack of any common bond, than from love of Sparta. All had the same general grievances : Sparta had made 58 herself a despot-city at their expense or by their means ; she gave them no return for their sacrifices in her behalf ; instead of liberating Hellas she had subjected to a worse tyranny than ever did Athens a far larger portion of it ; Spartan harmosties were not less instruments of oppression than Lysandrian decarchies; the recent attack upon Elis proved that the Spartan despotism was no merely transitory development, but the realization of a studied policy which was to be continued in the future ; what Elis had suffered any other free state in Greece might expect to suffer ; and so far from having any high desire to occupy that well- deserved position from which they had thrust Athens, the Spartans had voluntarily surrendered the Greeks of Asia, and practically also those of the Aegean, to Persian rule, and had utilized Persian aid in enslaving alike Athens and those whom Athens had once so heroically saved from Persian domination. Each state had also its own especial grievances : Argos still regretted her lost hegemony ; the mercantile soul of Corinth regretted the still unpaid share in the spoils of Athens ; Thebes moreover knew that for her recent treatment of Agesilaus she must expect to be called to a bitter account ; while Athens longed only to turn the tables upon her conqueror and to avenge the terrors of the Year of Anarchy. Moreover, it seemed to be an excellent opportunity for action, for it was known that Sparta was scarcely yet recovered from the shock caused by the discovery of Cinadon's treason, and that her councils were divided by the rival interests of Lysander and his opponents. The mission of Timocrates, again, was a practical test of the feeling of the leading states outside Laconia : it gave that assurance of sympathy and sup- port which was alone needful to kindle into one flame the smouldering discontent of all. Further, it brought the glad news that the hand of Persia was now turned against Sparta, and that Conon was at that very moment putting to sea with a fleet such as no efforts of Sparta could hope to raise. With these varied motives and inducements, all subordinated to the one universal hatred of Sparta, the four great states surrounding the Isthmus came to a tacit understanding, wherein the leading spirit was Thebes, 60 SPARTA AND THEBES. THE LIBERATION OF GREECE 01 > ! § 2. Thus resolved to have war, it was no hard matter for Thebes to bring it about. The Locrians of Opus "' and the Phocians were at variance about a strip of debatable border land, and the leaders of the anti-Spartan party in Thebes, if they did not actually incite the disputants to war, sided heartily with the Locrians. Whereupon the Phocians at once appealed to Sparta. Now that Elis had been chastised, Thebes was the one power in Greece of which the Spartan government most desired to make an example. It was Thebes that had set the example of insubordination in refusing to aid Pausanias in his march upon Athens ; she had taken a similarly offensive attitude in respect of both the Elean and Persian wars ; she had sheltered Thrasybulus and his fellow-exiles in defiance of the Spartan threats against all who should do so ; nay, she had offered personal insult to the Spartan king Agesilaus in his attempted sacrifice at Aulis. Her attitude was a standing menace to the security of Spartan influence beyond the Isthmus, while an attack upon her would, in the event of its success — an event which no one at Sparta doubted — secure that ascendancy in Central Greece. Moreover, her position as head of the Boeotian League was opposed to the Spartan theory of universal autonomy under the headship of Sparta alone. To all these considerations was now added the direct appeal of the Phocians for aid a<;ainst the combined forces of Thebes and Locris. The Ephoralty readily accepted this excuse for a war which they saw was necessary, if they were to maintain their hold upon the extra-Peloponnesian Greeks. § 3. The attack was to be made from two sides. Lysander, too valual)le to be neglected when there was need of energetic and capable officers, was commissioned to proceed to Heraclea in Trachis, raise an army from the Malians, Oetaeans, and Aenianes in that neighbourhood, and advance upon Boeotia from the north, so as to effect a junction on a set day with Pausanias and the main army approaching from the south. The plan miscarried. Possibly the old enmity between Pausanias and Lysander led the former to act with the less energy : at any rate he * Accordiug to Pausanias, they were the Ozoliau Locrians of Amphissa. spent some considerable time in getting together his forces, and Lysander— himself not improbably moved by jealousy and ambitious to win laurels for himself without awaiting his colleague's arrival— presented himself at the rendezvous in the neighbourhood of Haliartus before Pausanias had come up. ^Orchomenus, the town of the Boeotian Con- federacy second in importance to Thebes, had already declared for Lysander, and possibly there was in each town of the Confederacy a party favourable to similar secession. At all events Lysander, his forces swelled by the con- tingents of Phocis, deemed himself strong enough to demand the surrender of Haliartus. A company of Thebans, recently thrown into the town, prevented this. Thereupon Lysander at once proceeded to reconnoitre the walls with a view to an assault. While so engaged he was surprised by the simultaneous attack of another Tiieban division coming up to the aid of Haliartus, and of that which already garrisoned the place. Here he met his death, falling in a petty skirmish before the gates of an insignificant country town. His troops held their own with difficulty until evening, and thereupon dispersed. On the following day the arrival of Pausanias for a moment damped the exultation of the Thebans, but close in his steps followed Thrasybulus with the hoplites and cavalry of Athens in numbers sufficient to put Pausanias' force at a disadvantage. Indeed he was in a highly difficult position : his troops, composed mainly of Peloponnesian allies, were in a dangerously disloyal mood; Lysander was dead, and his army had vanished ; his death had as far emboldened the Thebans and their friends as it had discouraged his own side; and lastly his numbers, even if all were confident and loyal, were seemingly not superior to those now arrayed against them from Thebes, Locris, and Athens. If he fought he might win, but he would thereby gain nothing but the ground upon which he fought ; and on the other hand he might very possibly lose, and so make his position still worse. He decided not to risk a battle, but to ask for the customary truce for the purpose of bury- ing those who had fallen on the previous day. Such a request was the recognized acknowledgment of defeat. The 62 SPARTA AND THEBES. exultation of the Thebans was unbounded : *' It was from this moment," says Xenophon, ** that the growth of their great pride took its commencement." They showed their assurance by the unheard-of proceeding whereby they made conditional the granting of the desired truce, and the condition was nothing less than that Pausanias should forthwith quit Boeotia. The undisguised relief with which his troops heard the condition went far to justify their commander in having declined to fight. He buried the slain and withdrew with what speed he might, while the Thebans hung upon his rear and insulted his troops with impunity. Upon his return to Sparta, Pausanias was in- dicted upon the double charge of having by his negligence contributed to the death of Lysander, and of having disgracefully asked for a truce instead of risking a battle. The partisans of the dead Lysander would be loud in their denunciations, and would recall Pausanias' conduct in permitting the restoration of Thrasybulus at Athens, a matter for which the king had already been tried and acquitted. On this occasion he found it wise to forestall condemnation by flight. He took asylum at Tegea, and lived there for the remainder of his life. His career, with its vicissitudes of royalty, banishment, recall, and final exile, is a notable example of the fallen dignity of the royal office at Hparta, and of the hazard involved in un- successful generalship even in the case of an oligarch amongst oligarchs. He was succeeded by his son, Agesipolis, during whose minority Aristodemus acted as regent. § 4. Wide and notable were the results of the death of Lysander and the triumph of Thebes and Athens. The hitherto covert sympathy between the disaffected states gave place to an intimate and overt alliance of the states about the Isthmus — Corinth, Argos, Athens, and Thebes — the further populations about the head of the Maliac Gulf and Thessaly, and the Acarnanians, Ambraciots, and other peoples of Western Hellas. The Phocians were left isolated under the inadequate protection of the Spartan garrison in Heraclea; and this fortress too fell into the hands of the Thebans, thanks to the boldness and energy THE LIBERATION OF GREECE. 63 of Ismenias, within a few days. So alarmed were the Ephors that they despatched to Agesilaus in Asia that peremptory summons to return which put a stop to his schemes of anti-Persian conquest. Leaving 6000 men to garrison the Greek towns of the coast he reluctantly crossed the Hellespont, and made the best of his way homewards through Thrace and Macedonia. His brother Peisander remained with the fleet to combat the designs of Conon, whose vessels were now commissioned and active in the neighbourhood of Rhodes. The representatives of the new alliance met without delay at Corinth to discuss a plan of action against Sparta. If any further proof were needed of the extent of the alter- ation in Sparta's position, it may be found in the words of Timolaus of Corinth, who urged the allies to waste no time, but instantly to attack Laconia itself, and *' destroy the wasps in their nest." Such bold action was forestalled by the energy of the regent Aristodemus, who suddenly presented himself, with such allies as he could muster from Arcadia and Achaea, before the walls of Corinth. At Nemea the hostile armies * fought a pitched battle : the Spartan contingent defeated the Athenians with loss, while their allies were beaten all along the line by the Thebans, Argives, and Corinthians ; but Aristodemus, keeping his victorious companies well in hand, was able to neutralize the success of the various divisions of the opposite side by attacking and defeating each as it returned exhausted and disordered from the pursuit of the enemy. The allies sought shelter within the walls of Corinth, but the conduct of certain '' Laconizing " Corinthians in endeavouring to close the gates against them, and so leave them to the mercy of the Spartans, was an omen of the internal feuds soon to cripple the movements of the allies. Such as it was, the victory was with Aristodemus, yet so unreliable was the temper of his allies that he did not venture to * The forces were as follows. Aristodemus had 6000 hoplites from Sparta, 3000 from Elis, 3000 from Epidaunis, Troezen, Hermlone, and Haliae, GOO Lacedaemonian horsemen, 300 Cretan bowmen, 400 slingers. On the side of the allies were t)000 hoplites from Athens, 7000 from Argos, 5000 from Boeotia, 3000 from Corinth, 3000 from Euboea, besides 1550 horsemen from Boeotia, Athens, Eiiboea, and the Oiumtian Locrians, and also light-armed Arcadians, Locrians, and Malians. The fight is known also as the Battle of Corinth. 64 SPAllTA AND THEBES. follow up bis success, but retreated to Sparta until Agesilaus sbould return. Dercylidas, carrying to Agesilaus the news of tbe victory, found bim already upon tbe Strymon, and was by bim sent eastward to maintain tbe Spartan interests on tbe Hellespont — interests now gravely menaced by tbe approach of Conon (394 B.C.). § 5. Altbougb Artaxerxes, and more particularly Pbar- nabazus, were heartily in accord with Conon, tbe usual lethargy of Orientalism delayed bis taking tbe sea until far on in tbe year 395 B.C. At length, with only forty sail, he moved towards Lycia, where be fell in with a Spartan tleet under Pharax, three times as numerous, and was blockaded for many weeks in Caunus. Reinforced at last by a further flotilla of forty ships, be could not prevent his enemy from avoiding a battle, Pharax withdrew to llhodes, where be was expecting tbe arrival of a large fleet of transports bringing up corn from Egypt ; but the Rhodians were no fonder of Spartan rule than were their fellow-Ionians : they expelled Pharax, and welcomed Conon, and when the expected transports arrived shortly after, the whole number fell into Conon's bands. Pharax was soon afterwards superseded by Peisander. In tbe spring of 394 B.C. Conon was strengthened by tbe junction of a large Phoenician fleet under Pharnabazus, and at once moved upon the Greek ports of tbe Asiatic coast. At Cnidus be fell in with Peisander, whose design was to prevent bis communicating with the Greek com- munities. Peisander was a brave ofiicer, but no strategist : bis whole fleet was destroyed and himself slain. Almost as one man tbe Asiatic and Aegean Greeks threw open their gates with enthusiasm to tbe combined fleets of Conon and Pharnabazus. Only Abydus and Sestus on the Hellespont, through the exertions of Dercylidas, were induced to remain loyal to Sparta. This was tbe answer of tbe maritime Greeks to tbe government which had thrust upon them tbe barmosties and decarcbies, and even surrendered them to Persia. The Spartan supremacy of tbe seas fell even more quickly than it bad risen, again transferred to Athens in tbe person of Conon, eleven years after bis escape from tbe disaster at Aegospotami. THE LIBERATION OF GREECE. 65 § 6. Agesilaus was encamped at Chaeronea in Boeotia, when there reached bim tbe news of the defeat at Cnidus and the death of bis brother-in-law. He had fought bis way successfully across Thessaly, and was now hourly expecting to meet the allied army advancing from Corinth to cover Thebes. The struggle would, be well knew, try to tbe utmost his own valour and that of bis men, and be dared not damp their courage, already depressed by super- stitious fears consequent upon a solar eclipse (August 14), by divulging tbe evil news. With pitiful tact he garlanded his bead and proclaimed to tbe army that Peisander indeed was slain, but that be bad died in winning a notable victory. On tbe next morning he advanced to Coronea, and there met the enemy. After crushing all opposition in Thessaly and passing Thermopylae, Agesilaus bad moved down tbe valley of tbe Cepbissus as far as Chaeronea, a few miles west of Or- chomenus. Owing to its jealousy of Thebes, that town supported bim, as it bad lately supported Lysander, and as many as a third of bis whole number were Orchomenian and Phocian allies. Inasmuch as the Isthmus was entirely occupied by tbe forces of tbe Confederates, Agesilaus must either fight his way through their opposition or transport his army into Peloponnesus by sea fiom Creusis or some other port on the Corinthian Gulf. Which course be was to adopt must be decided by tbe result of the impending battle. He moved south from tbe Cepbissus across tbe plain of Chaeronea, marching direct for Creusis. As he approached tbe slopes of Mt. Helicon by Coronea, the Confederate army moved down to bar bis passage. Tbe whole of the Cyreian Greeks, together with a con- siderable force of allies from the Ionian cities, accompanied Agesilaus : amongst them was Xenophon, to whom we owe tbe account of the battle. Tbe Spartans, as usual, took post upon the right wing, tbe Phocian and Orchomenian auxiliaries upon tbe left, while the Asiatic and Cyreian Greeks occupied the centre. Opposed to the latter were tbe Corinthians, Athenians, and others of the lesser Con- federate contingents ; while respectively on tbe right and left tbe Thebans and Argives faced their several peculiar F G. 404—362. 66 SPARTA AND THEBES. THE LIBERATION OF GREECE. (57 i. ? 'I I'- foes, the Orchomenians and the Spartans. The engage- ment fell into a triple battle: on the right the Theban hoplites drove the Phocians and Orchomenians from the field and pursued them as far as the baggage of Agesilaus' army ; on the other hand, the Cyreians and Asiatic Greeks, captained by Herippidas the ex-harmost of Heraclea, not without difficulty drove back the Confederate centre, while the right wing of the Lacedaemonians, led by Agesilaus in person, found their Argive adversaries only anxious to escape their charge. The centre and left of the Confederates retreated to Mt. Tilphossium, one of the lower spurs of Helicon, and there formed their ranks afresh ; the victorious Lacedaemonians halting for the same purpose at the foot of the hills, wheeled about to complete their victory by the annihilation of the Thebans, now far in the rear and entirely separated from their allies. But the Thebans were equal to the emergency, and gave a foretaste of what they were later on destined to achieve at Leuctra and Mantinea. Forming in deep order, they fearlessly charged full upon the centre of the whole force of Agesilaus, bent upon cutting their way through. Xenophon, himself in the thick of the fight, has recorded the desperate bravery of either side : it was the most notable fight of his day, he said. The Thebans gained their point : not the numbers or the valour even of Agesilaus' own companies or of the redoubtable Cyreians could prevent the compact body of Thebans, less than half as numerous, from triumphantly rejoining their allies upon Tilphossium. Agesilaus himself was covered with wounds, and could not call himself a victor until, on the following day, the allies owned them- selves the weaker by asking for the customary truce of burial. Agesilaus gladly granted it, then hastened his march to Creusis, whence he took ship for the Achaean coast. After the display at Coronea he could not venture to force the Isthmus. Even as it was, the polemarch Gylis, entrusted with the command during the healing of Agesilaus' wounds and commissioned to raid Locris, was repulsed and slain. Agesilaus had gained laurels indeed, but they were barren ones. Like Aristodemus after the battle of Corinth, he was glad to retreat unmolested to Sparta, nursing a yet more bitter hatred of the Thebans who had so much jeopardized his fortune and his life. At Sparta he was welcomed with the utmost enthusiasm, a feeling which was not less lessened when it was found that he had preserved his old simplicity of manners. The results of his three years of campaigning were represented solely by the tithe of the spoils of Asia which he dedicated at Delphi — a tithe amounting to £700,000. § 7. The readiness wherewith the maritime Greeks had welcomed the advent of Conon and Pharnabazus, was justified by the moderation of those commanders. That ''liberation" which had upon the lips of Spartans been but a lie was now realized conscientiously by the Athenian and his Persian ally. With the sole exceptions of Sestus and Abydus, the two towns which still remained under Spartan influence, every Greek community of the Eastern Aegean and the coast of Ionia was left absolutely un- molested ; for Conon had thoroughly learnt the lesson of past years, and he promised to afford in Greece itself a higher gratification to Pharnabazus' thirst for vengeance than could be obtained at the cost of the Asiatic Greeks. Accordingly, in the spring of 393 B.C. the Peloponnesus witnessed a sight unknown since the day of Salamis — a Persian fleet in command of the surrounding seas, and no longer to be discomfited by the hostility of Athens but working for the benefit of that city. The Spartan army lay almost inactive at Sicyon, while Conon and the satrap cruised southwards as far as Messenia, ravaged the coast- lands of Laconia, and occupied Cythera. The whole of the eastern sea was in their power, and even in the Gulf of Corinth the Confederates were taking heart to face the Lacedaemonian cruisers. When Conon at length anchored in the Saronic Gulf there was no preventing his making what arrangements he pleased with the Confederate council. His object was simple : he would restore to Athens those walls wliich had been the basis of her late sovereignty. To do so, he assured Pharnabazus, was to inflict upon Sparta a humiliation and a lasting injury transcending any other. The satrap was delighted : he placed at Conon' s disposal the crews of his Phoenician and Cilician vessels and the funds 68 StARTA AND THEBElS. needful both to pay these and to hire from Thebes and else- where a host of masons and carpenters. Eleven years after their overthrow the Long Walls rose once more from their ruins, and the restoration effected by Thrasybulus was confirmed and completed by that of Conon, so that the latter was often styled the second founder of the Athenian sovereignty. Thus did Persia retaliate upon Sparta for promises broken, and make amends to Athens for past hostilities. But the Persian's motive was no far-seeing policy and no love for Athens herself : it was the mere thirst for revenge at any price, a thirst driven to extremes by the obstinacy with which Dercylidas maintained Sparta's one foothold upon Asia in Abydus. Had Dercylidas been less defiant and less successful, Athens might still have continued without her walls, waiting yet longer for the event which was to give to her a second lease of power previously to her own political extinction and that of Greece at large. § 8. The other chief event of this year was the construc- tion of a line of fortifications across the southern extremity of the Isthmus. So energetic were the allies, so disheartened and weak were the Spartans, that this object was accom- plished without interruption. Unable to keep the seas on either shore, and equally unable to force the land-route along the Isthmus, the Spartans could but look on sullenly at the restoration of their rival in Attica. They did indeed make a number of fruitless but harassing attacks upon the allies, but here again their energy, such as it was, worked to their disadvantage, for the immediate outcome was the organization by the Athenian Iphicrates of his famous peltasts or light infantry. The heavy-armed Greek hoplite, with his cumbersome body -armour — breastplate, greaves, and helmet — his heavy oblong shield, short sword, and stout pike, formidable enough in hand-to-hand conflict or when charging with all the weight of the phalanx, was quite use- less for the more active duties of skirmishing and scouting : the weight of his armour, the want of missile weapons, and the peculiar tactics in which he was drilled, making him in- competent to do the duty of, or to cope with, assailants formidable only from their agility and from the skill where- with they could use missile weapons at a distance beyond the THE LIBERATION OF GREECE. 69 reach of the hoplite's sword or pike. Iphicrates recognized this fact, and set himself to meet the redoubtable heavy regulars of the Peloponnesus with flying companies of yiierril- leros. He chose for this service mercenaries of every nationality, whose bodily vigour commended them for the purpose : in place of the heavy shield of metal he furnished them with the light round pelta of wood, lengthened the sword and pike, did away with the greaves and helmet, and substituted for the cuirass only a quilted corselet of linen. Fighting always in open order, and avoiding anything in the way of hand-to-hand fighting, these troops could outweary any hoplites, and while themselves keeping beyond range of the hoplites' weapons, could keep their enemy well within range of their own arms. Iphicrates with his peltasts be- came the terror of the Peloponnesian allies, though he did not yet venture to pit them against the Spartans themselves. I THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS. 71 CHAPTER V. The Peace of Antalcidas. § 1. Party feuds in Coiintli : Battle of the Long Walls.— § 2. Agcs- ilaus at the Isthmus : Iphicrates annihilates a Spartan division. — § 3. Dissensions amongst the allies : The Spartans make overtures to Persia : Agesilaus in Aearnania. — § 4. Tiribazus in "Western Asia : He supports Antalcidas. — § 5. Defeat and death of Thibron, and of Thrasybulus : War in the Hellespont. — § 6. Teleutias at Peiraeus : The Athenians wish for peace : Artaxerxes dictates terms to the Greeks. — § 7. The terms of the Peace of Antalcidas. —§ 8. Evagoras of Cyprus. § 1. The aspect of affairs had not changed when the year 392 B.C. saw the Spartans again encamped before the Isthmus, and again ravaging the lands of the wealthy Corinthians. This was the third year that the Corinthians had thus suffered, and while the fact had no effect upon the purses or politics of the poorer class, who represented the anti-Spartan and democratic party, it was a cause of very sensible loss to the wealthy land-owners who represented the oligarchic party. Heretofore the oligarchs had them- selves belonged in the main to the anti-Spartan side, but finding that the burden of the war fell almost entirely upon themselves they became desirous of an accommodation, and passed over gradually to the views of a minority of their own number who had all along favoured the Spartan side. It was these men who had endeavoured to close the town gates upon their own countrymen after the battle of Nemea, and though foiled at the moment, their party had by this time grown so much more formidable that the governing party had recourse to open violence, and thus removed more than a hundred of the malcontent nobles. Further to secure themselves they drew yet more close the bonds of their alliance with Argos ; they caused the very boundary-marks of the two states to be removed, called in an Argive garrison, and in fact made Corinth a dependency of Argolis. The natural result was that the entire aristocracy of Corinth, that of birth as well as that of wealth, became actively hostile to the government which had thus betrayed the independence of their city, placing them beneath the control of the Argives and causing their lands to be more than ever the object of Spartan animosity. They entered into nego- ciations with Agesilaus, and contrived to admit the Spartan army by night within the two long walls connecting Corinth, on the side towards Sicyon, with her port of Lechaeum on the Corinthian Gulf. Within these walls on the next day was fought a bloody battle, in which the Spartans made good their venture against the combined efforts of Corintliians, Argives, and Athenians; but for some unknown reason they omitted to maintain their advantage, and suffered the Athenians to repair both walls, thereby again excluding them from the Isthmus. The treasonable oligarchs, with their leaders Alcimenes and Pasimelus, fled to Sparta. § 2. In the following spring (391 B.C.) Agesilaus deter- mined upon a more vigorous assault upon the Confederate position. While a fleet under his brother Teleutias moved upon Lechaeum from the seaward side, he advanced upon it by land from Sicyon. Lechaeum was captured, and the Long Walls again demolished. Through the gap thus made Agesilaus moved along the Isthmus and overran the small peninsula which juts out westward into the Corinthian Gulf behind Megaris, a secluded and comparatively secure district whereby the Corinthians and Argives kept open their communications with Thebes and Athens, and into which they had conveyed for security the major part of their stock and other valuables. The whole of this spoil now fell into Agesilaus' hands, together with Peiraeum, the fortress commanding the district, and a large number of captives of either sex. He was in the act of adjudging the latter to slavery, and rejoicing to see envoys from the hated Thebans anxiously seeking his attention to their proposals for peace— for now that Peiraeum had fallen, together with Sidus, Crommyon, and Lechaeum, Thebes was completely / 72 SPARTA AND THEBES. THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS. 73 II •I severed from her allies in Corinth and Argos — when there reached him a piece of news whicli appeared to the Greeks a judgment upon liis pride, and caused his instant and humiliated retreat. This intelligence was that the peltasts of Iphicrates had cut to pieces an entire Spartan mora of six hundred men under the very walls of Corinth. This was the first occasion upon which the peltasts had tried their strength against the Spartans in the open, and it brought a bitter retaliation upon the contempt with which the Spartans had hitherto regarded them. It was not less grievous a blow to the military prestige of Sparta than had been formerly the surrender of Sphacteria ; and over and above the dis- grace there was the loss, to Sparta with her dwindling popu- lation irreparable, of some six hundred of her best warriors. Agesilaus hurried to the scene of the fight to recover the dead by battle if possible. It was too late : they had already been buried under truce, and the defeat of the Spartans stood confessed to all Greece. Worse still, the Arcadians welcomed the news with delight. To measure the extent of the disaster one has but to be told that Agesilaus, himself a Spartan king and the successful leader of the Spartans in Asia and at Coronea, though at the head of a full army of Spartans and allies, made his way home- wards at once and, as far as might be, in secret. § 3. This was the last notable event of the so-called Corinthian War. Both sides were heartily weary of the struggle, for neither gained any definite advantage, and as usual the Confederates had long since begun to feel mutual jealousies. Corinth was divided by the feuds of democrats and oligarchs ; Corinth and Argos were envious that they should suffer all the brunt of war while their allies in Boeotia and Attica went scatheless ; and finally, Corinth and Argos and Boeotia were alike jealous of the restored position of Athens. Unable, however, to bring their own quarrels to an end, all parties turned their eyes to Persia — Sparta, because now that Pharnabazus had had his revenge and she had relinquished all her hold upon Asia, there was no further reason for the Great King's hostility ; the Con- federates, to counteract the diplomacy of Sparta. As early as 392 B.C. Antalcidas had gone up to Susa as envoy of the Ephors, and thither also in the following year went Conon from Athens, and representatives from Thebes and Corinth and Argos also. Negociations with Persia were always a matter of time, and while the various envoys were intriguing one against another at Susa, Agesilaus led an expedition into Acarnania, to punish that country for its adhesion to the Confederates : he did not venture near Corinth again, where the late victory of Iphicrates had been speedily followed by the recovery of all the places recently captured by the efforts of Agesilaus and Teleutias. The Achaeans had made good a footing in Acarnania during the disturbances of the last few years, and their conquest was now threatened by a combined attack of the Acarnanians. It was to prevent this that Agesilaus intervened, in the hope also of reviving, by a successful campaign here, the laurels which had faded so rapidly in Boeotia and at the Isthmus. He gained little however except booty, and was doubtless glad to make good his retreat from a wild and almost unknown country. The simultaneous invasion of Argolis by Agesipolis led to no better results. These expeditions occurred either in 391 or 390 B.C. In the eusuing year the Acarnanians, dreading a repetition of the attack, consented to the demands of Sparta, surrendered to the Achaeans the con- quests claimed by the latter people, and enrolled themselves amongst the allies of Sparta. § 4. The mission of Antalcidas to the Persian court coincided with the arrival of Tiribazus to replace Tithraustes as satrap of Lydia. Tiribazus, having had no personal experience of the injuries inflicted upon Persia in late years by the Spartan generals from Thibron to Agesilaus, might be expected to lend an unprejudiced ear to the diplomatic suggestions of the envoy, or if prejudiced at all, it was to be supposed that the usual jealousy of one satrap towards another would cause him to take a course opposite to that of his neighbour Pharnabazus, and side heartily with Sparta. Antalcidas was an able diplomatist, skilful at making the most of his opportunities. He persuaded Tiribazus that since the evacuation of Asia by Agesilaus, and the expulsion of the fleets from the Aegean by the Hi. \^ 74 SPARTA AND THEBES. THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS. 75 battle of Cnidus, the Great King had nothing more to fear from her : on the contrary, if he would but accept her as his ally, she would be able and willing to protect his interests against the assaults of any Greeks wliatever. She would at once and for ever surrender to Persia all the Greek com- munities of Asia, and asked in return only that Artaxerxes should guarantee, under her superintendence, the absolute autonomy of every other Greek community. To Tiribazus, who desired only to get quiet possession of the maritime towns of his satrapy, these professions and conditions were highly attractive, and he gave to Antalcidas his hearty support, despite the remonstrances of the envoys despatched from Thebes, Athens, Argos, and Corinth to counterwork the influence of the Spartan envoy. All those states refused emphatically to hear of the surrender of their Asiatic kinsmen to Persia, but they had also each their several special objections to the proposals of Antalcidas. They saw clearly that those proposals aimed at destroying, by Persian aid, the recent alliance of Corinth and Argos, not less than the ancient confederacy of Boeotian towns under the leadership of Thebes, for each could be interpreted as an infringement of the proviso as to absolute autonomy. As for Athens, she dreamed still of reviving the Confederacy of Delos, or at any rate of retaining the three islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which had for nearly a century been colonized by Athenian settlers ; and the same proviso would set aside her claims in this direction. But Tiribazus cared no more for particular grievances than for general theories as to the freedom of the Asiatic Greeks : not only did he supply Antalcidas secretly with funds until such time as the Great King should formally accept the proffered alliance of Sparta, but he undertook to present Antalcidas in person to Artaxerxes at Susa, and he so far disregarded the rights of embassy as to place Conon under arrest on the alleged charge of acting contrary to the interests of the Great King. It is uncertain what was Conon' s subsequent fate. Either he died in prison, or he contrived to escape once more to his old friend Evagoras in Cyprus : in any case he was lost to Athens and died very shortly afterwards. § 5. Tiribazus was less successful at Susa than he had r^ .i*i anticipated ; he was detained there for many months, while his place was taken at Sardis by Struthas, a man of con- siderable abilities and decidedly anti-Spartan views, and so energetic that (391 B.C.) the Ephors found it advis- able to send out Thibron a second time to protect their interests beyond the Aegean. Thibron was not more successful now than formerly ; he allowed himself to be surprised in the vicinity of Ephesus with an army of 8000 men, and perished in the rout of his troops. He was succeeded by one Diphridas, who effected little or nothing. Indeed, what energy the Ephoralty possessed was directed now to recovering some portion of their power on the seas, which seem at the time (390 b.c.) to have been deserted by the fleets of Persia and Athens. They had an opening at Rhodes, where the oligarchs were at variance with the democracy established in the island immediately before the battle of Cnidus. Teleutias, acting as navarch, effected a landing upon the island and set on foot a dilatory civil war, but his only real success was the capture of a small Athenian fleet bound for Cyprus. It was shortly before this date that Evagoras of Salamis became involved in a ten years' war with his Persian suzerain, and much as their ships and funds were needed for their own interests, the Athenians, mindful of the aid lent by Evagoras to Conon, faithfully sought to repay that debt of gratitude. How- ever, to deal with Teleutias, and to support the Rhodian democracy, they commissioned a further fleet of forty sail under Thrasybulus. That general saw fit to sail first to the Hellespont, where he made alliance with the Thracian princes in the neighbourhood of the straits and with Chalcedon, drew more closely the bonds between Athens and Byzantium by setting up a democracy there, and re-established the old impost of a tithe upon all corn-ships passing the straits. He then attacked and defeated the Spartan harmost commanding in Lesbos, and sailed in leisurely fashion southwards towards Rhodes, raising njoney at every possible point. He was so engaged at Aspendus in Pamphylia when the inhabitants, exasperated by the violence of some of his men, attacked and murdered him in his tent. So died the liberator of Athens. ■ 76 SPARTA AND THEBES. Alarmed at the re-establishment of Athenian influence on the Hellespont, especially as imperilling the position of Dercylidas who still occupied Abydus, the Ephors despatched Anaxibius to supersede that officer there. Energetic and un- scrupulous, Anaxibius soon destroyed much of Thrasybulus' work, whereupon the Athenians despatched the redoubtable Iphicrates to the scene of action with twelve hundred of his peltasts. It seems that he had been only lately recalled from Corinth, where his services were no longer needed, and where he had made himself unpopular by interference with political matters beyond his sphere. Within a few days he surprised Anaxibius when marching from Antandrus, which he had just occupied with a garrison, to Abydus, and killed him with most of his troops. § 6. With such petty warfare the struggle dragged on. Even in the waters of the Saronic Gulf the Athenians found themselves hampered and annoyed by the presence of a Spartan harmost in Aegina, who encouraged constant piracy at the expense of Athenian cruisers and merchant- men. This was checked for a moment when Chabrias, the successor of Iphicrates at Corinth, and one of the few able commanders of the period, while fitting out a fresh fleet at Peiraeus for the relief of Evagoras, suddenly landed in Aegina and slew the harmost, Gorgopas. But to Gorgopas succeeded Teleutias, who signalized his arrival by an instant descent upon Peiraeus, surprising the port in the early hours of the morning, disabling the warships there anchored, plundering or towing off the merchantmen, and even carrying away many of their crews. The dash and energy of Teleutias at their very gates, coupled with the fact that another and stronger Spartan fleet was now in the Hellespont, while their own energies were divided between the need of defending themselves and the desire to aid their ally Evagoras, made the Athenians anxious to conclude a peace. Their wishes were echoed by the Greeks at large, and found fulfilment in the following year. When Tiribazus first presented himself at Susa on behalf of Antalcidas (391 B.C.) he met with little encouragement. Artaxerxes had not yet forgiven the Spartans for the exploits of Dercylidas and Agesilaus, or for the bad faith THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS. 77 shown by them in return for Darius' aid against Athens ; and as Persia was now mistress of the seas, and had com- pelled the withdrawal of Agesilaus from Asia, there seemed no reason why he should listen to any terms suggested by Antalcidas. But when the Spartans under Thibron again appeared in Asia to resist Struthas, and when the conjoint revolt of Evagoras and Egypt was found to be supported in part by Athenian aid, the Great King's views changed. He wished to be free to deal with Cyprus and Egypt : he wished therefore to have no further trouble on land in the direction of Lower Asia, or on sea from the rivalry of Athens ; and both of these objects seemed attainable by help of Sparta. Tiribazus recovered his influence, returned to Sardis, and sent immediate word to Sparta of the change in the King's attitude. In consequence, Antalcidas re- appeared in the Aegean as navarch in 387 B.C., and made a second journey to Susa. All went well with him : to Sardis tow^ards the end of the year Tiribazus summoned the representatives of all those Greeks who cared to be included in the pacification. All came, and listened patiently to the dictates of Artaxerxes : — AUtlie towns of Asia shall belong to Persia, together with the islands of Clazoineuae and Cyprus : to Athens shall belong Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros : all other Greek towns shall be free and autonomous. Thus it seems just to the Great King, and upon such as object to these conditions he will make war in conjunction with such as accept them. § 7. After hearing the rescript, the envoys departed to report the conditions t-o their respective cities, and shortly afterwards at a congress assembled at Sparta, the states of free Greece swore adhesion to this, the infamous Peace of Antalcidas. Its conditions were of grave moment to the parties concerned. Firstly, the Greeks of Asia were abandoned to Persia, and thus by one stroke of the pen Sparta for a second time surrendered to the national enemy those kinsmen for whom the Greek nation had been doing battle ever since the burning of Sardis. Nor was there any constraint to force Sparta to make this surrender : it was her own proposal, advanced with the sole object of purchasing the 78 SPARTA AND THEBES. amity, and therefore the money, of Persia for the furtherance of her own ends. Her narrow view was not to be concerned with trans- Aegean Greeks ; still less was her conscience to be pricked by the recollection of Plataea or even of Agesilaus' bold designs : her one object was to be 6rst in continental Greece, regardless of the fate of any that lay further afield. Upon the Asiatic Greeks accordingly the hand of Persia closed at once : many of their towns were destroyed, the remainder w^ere garrisoned by Persians or merceuaries, their ports sheltered Persian and Phoenician war fleets menacing the liberties of the adjacent islands, their wealth and their sons and their daughters were drained away to gratify the pleasures of Oriental luxury. Secondly, the conditions compelled the immediate dis- armament of all Greece, under pain of the combined attack of Sparta and -Persia. It compelled the dissolution of all confederacies whatever, seeing that even voluntary alliances might, if Sparta so pleased, be interpreted as infringements of the clause as to autonomy : thus Argos was compelled to rescind her close alliance with Corinth, and the Isthmus was thereby thrown open to the Spartans ; thus too Thebes was compelled, under threat of instant attack by Agesilaus, to forego her claim to sign the peace in the conjoint name of the Boeotian Confederacy. Athens alone, with the exception of Sparta, gained anything, in that she was permitted to retain her three island- colonies : but this concession was only a bribe to purchase her assent to the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks, and to induce her to leave her faithful ally Evagoras to his fate. As for the rest, all Greece Avas left in a condition of disintegration transcending anything as yet known within her borders : state was divided against state, town against town, and if such an arrangement rendered impossible any united efforts against Persia in the future, it also left Sparta free from the fear of another Confederate war. Thirdly, the whole drift of the peace was to confirm the hegemony of Sparta in Greece, but at the same time to make Sparta but the servant of Persia in the overlord- ship of Greece. The object of Persia was to prevent the formation of dangerous confederacies in Greece ; the duty THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS. 79 of Sparta was to maintain the interests of Persia in Greece with the help of Persian threats and Persian money. The Great King did not concern himself to define too nicely what was meant by absolute autonomy : the interpretation of the phrase was left to the discretion of the Ephoralty, and we shall see how it was used to reinforce the despotic system inaugurated by Lysander at the close of the Peloponnesian War. But however powerful Sparta became, it must always be recollected that her authority was based upon her own truckling to Persia. Just as Achilles would be a king, if it was only over the dead, so Sparta would at all costs be chief in Greece, though to attain her end she sold to the barbarian the liberties of herself and of her subjects. Artaxerxes had achieved a century later what Darius and Xerxes had in vain striven to accomplish : but as it was Greek cohesion which had defeated Xerxes, so it was Greek disruption which gave the victory to Artaxerxes. § 8. The immediate result of the peace was that the Great King was left free to act with his whole resources against Evagoras. That prince, descended from Teucer of Grecian Sal amis, and heir to the principality and city by him founded in legendary times at Salamis upon the eastern coast of Cyprus, had made good his position about the year 411 B.C., deposing the usurper Abdemon, by whom he had been previously driven into exile. A man of energy, honour, and refinement, he used every means in his power to raise the tone of the Cyprian civilization by Hellenic influences in the face of the rival Oriental influences represented by the large Phoenician population ; for of the ten petty states of Cyprus, three at least were entirely Phoenician, viz. Amathus, Citium, and Paphos, while in the others there was a constant struggle of Greeks and Phoenicians for supremacy. The overlord of the whole since the suppression of the Ionic revolt in 500 B.C. was the Great King, and to him Evagoras paid all deference, while at the same time gradually consolidating a considerable power for himself. The welcome which he offered to Conon, as to other Athenian refugees, led him to take a prominent part in the movement which resulted in the battle of Cnidus and the restoration of the power of 80 SPARTA AND THEBES. Athens ; but such energy and success, while it won for him the warm gratitude of Athens, speedily aroused the jealousy of the neighbouring satraps, and especially of Tiribazus. It is impossible to say what was the direct cause of the outbreak of war between him and Persia, but in the year following the battle of Cnidus he was at open hostility with his suzerain, and so vigorous and popular was he that he speedily reduced the major part of Cyprus, including Amathus and Citium, to his rule. He found allies in Cilicia, where he had passed some time in exile, and in Egypt, now in revolt under Acoris, and proceeded to secure his insular position by attacking the hostile ports of Phoenicia. The famous fortress-harbour of Tyre he stormed and sacked, and the arrival of the Athenian Chabrias with a small squadron enabled him to gain several further victories. It was the rebellious attitude of Evagoras and Egypt which made Artaxerxes ready to come to terms with Sparta, and it was the aid contributed to Evagoras by Athens made him dictate a peace in favour of Sparta ; and it was to purchase the cessation of such aid that he caused Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros to be surrendered to Athens. Immediately after the acceptance of the peace of Antalcidas, he raised an immense fleet and army, the flower of which came from the Asiatic Greek communities now ceded to Persia. Against this force, commanded by Tiribazus and Orontes, Evagoras was almost powerless. He was severely defeated in a stubborn sea-fight off Salamis, but still maintained himself for many months within that town ; until at length the mutual jealousies of his assailants enabled him to arrange an honourable peace. He lived for some time longer as tributary prince of Salamis, and finally perished by the hand of the servant of one Nicocreon, in revenge for his success in defeating a conspiracy organized by the latter. His death surrendered Cyprus wholly to Oriental influence. Ionia was already lost : Cyprus was the next portion of Hellas to fall away, and the means to dis- Hellenize Cyprus was largely found amongst the Greeks betrayed by Sparta to Persia. Agesilaus, who had hoped to turn all Greece from internal discord to one grand crusade against the national enemy across the seas, had been com- THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS. 81 pelled to relinquish that design in order to save the very liberties— so it had seemed— of his country at home. Now he had to look on in chagrin and sorrow while Antalcidas carried out a policy in which he had no heart. He cherished to yet greater vigour his old-standing hatred of the state whose insolence had driven him from Aulis, and whose energy had caused the breakdown of his schemes of Asiatic conquest and his own personal disablement at Coronea, seeing in that state the immediate cause also of the present truckling of Sparta to Persia. The energies which he was now forbidden to employ across the Aegean he reserved for vengeful indulgence against Thebes and the Thebans. When that state had hesitated to sign the late peace only on her own behalf, claiming her right to do so on behalf also of the towns of the Boeotian Confederacy, Agesilaus had rejoiced at the seeming opportunity for vengeance, and had hurried to call out the army for instant attack upon the objects of his hate. Their timely sub- mission had compelled him for the present to forego his revenge, but this disappointment also he set down to the account for which he should one day demand a reckoning. Q. 404—302. CHAPTER VI. Sicilian Affairs. (413—367 B.C.) § 1. Enthusiasm at Syracuse after the faihire of the Athenian Expedition : Active operations against Athens : Hermocrates in the Aegean: His banishment.— § 2. Diodes: Egesta appeals to the Car- thaginians : Hannibal.— § 3. Sack of Selinns and Himera : Attempts of Hermocrates to re-enter Syracuse.— § 4. First appearance of Diony- sius : Siege of Agrigentum.— § 5. Its 'desertion and sack : Disgrace of Daphnaeus : Dionysius elected a general : His intrigues : He becomes sole general. — § 6. He obtains a bodyguard, and becomes Tyrant : Fails to relieve Gela.— § 7. Suppresses a rising in Syracuse, and makes peace with Carthage.— § 8. Fortifies Ortygia and disarms the populace : Popularity of his resolve to make war on Carthage.— § 9. The war with Carthage : Excellence of the opportunity : Siege of Motye. — § 10. Himilco relieves Egesta : Sacks :Messana : Naval victory of Mago : Siege of Syracuse.— § 11. Kelations of Dionysius with Sparta: The Plague : Flight of Himilco.— § 12. Increase of Dionysius' power : Wars in Italy.— § 13. Condition of Magna Graecia : The native tribes : Sack of Rhegium : Plunder of the Temple of Agylla : Actions of Dionysius in the Adriatic, and elsewhere.— § 14. His Theory at Olympia : Oration of Lysias: Fresh war with Carthage.— § 15. Assists the Spartans against Thebes, etc. : His Tragic victory, and death : His character. § 1. The triumph of Syracuse over the Athenians at the close of 413 B.C. left her full of hatred for the power which had brought upon her so much suffering. Few things are more surprising in ancient history than the elasticity with which a Greek state recovered from blows apparently crushing. Syracuse — and indeed Athens also — proved no exception to the rule. In spite of the waste, both of citizens and of treasure, entailed by two years of war, despite the desire for peace which that war must not un- naturally have aroused, the Syracusans, having once tasted 82 SICILIAN AFFAIRS. 83 revenge, determined to follow up their success to the end To have destroyed the flower of the Athenians' forces* together with two of their most esteemed generals, was not sufficient— the very vestiges of the empire of Athens were to be swept away. Party spirit was forgotten in the enthusiasm of the moment, or rather all parties were merged in the wave of liberal democracy which, com- mencing before the year 415 b.c, had been the chief instru- ment m the defence of the city, and now gained additional impetus from its proven stability. At the head of the aggressive movement was Hermocrates— his reputation augmented by the zeal with which he had supported Gyhppus ; while the latter doubtless lost no opportunity of urging the city which owed its safety to himself and to Sparta, in its turn to assist Sparta in her crusade against Athens. Scarcely waiting to re organize their relations with their Sicilian allies and the few still hostile towns such as Catana, the Syracusans despatched, in the sprinor of 412 B.C., a squadron of twenty triremes, under Herm(> crates, to join tlie great fleet which the Peloponnesians had in that year sent out under Astyochus. Selinus sent two other vessels, and Thurii, which had lately passed over to the anti-Athenian side, furnished a squadron of ten under Dorieus. The proceedings of Hermocrates and the Sicilian con- tingents in the Aegean have been already related. For four years the combined Peloponnesian fleets carried on a desultory maritime war about the Hellespont and the coast of Asia Minor, but the proverbial tardiness of Sparta coupled with the double-deaUng of Alcibiades and Tissa- phernes, neutralized their greatest efforts. The former had incurred the personal enmity of the Spartan king Agis and the distrust of the Peloponnesians at large, and was now (411 B.C.) a refugee with Tissaphernes ; who, while pretending to favour the Spartans, was in reality playing off the two belligerent powers each against the other for his own advantage, and paralyzing the efficacy of the Lacedaemonian fleet by bribes. Hermocrates and Dorieus, themselves incorruptible, accused their confederates of venality. Astyochus was superseded by Mindarus; but 84 SPARTA AND THEBES. the new navarch, though active, was unsuccessful. He was defeated in the three successive engagements at Cynossema (411 B.C.), Abydos (410 B.C.), and at Cyzicus (409 B.C.). The last defeat cost him his life and annihilated his whole fleet. The Sicilian contingents shared in the disaster, not a vessel escaping, while their crews were left destitute on the eastern coast of the Hellespont. At the close of 409 B.C. the Syracusans at home, already dis- appointed of their confident expectations of vengeance, heard with dismay the gist of the famous despatch in which the surviving Spartan commander described his position. In a fit of most unreasonable exasperation they decreed the banishment of Hermocrates and his fellow-officers, despatch- ing others to take under their command the survivors of the defeated squadron. § 2. Two causes combined to bring the Syracusans into this spiteful temper— the revival of party animosities at home and the renewal of hostilities witli Carthage. That unanimity of parties in Syracuse which had prevailed after the overthrow of the Athenian armament does not seem to have lasted long. Its early action was marked by the appointment of a Board of Ten, headed by Diodes, a Syracusan of wide influence throughout Sicily, to revise the laws and constitution of the state. The appointment of Nomothetae, or law-givers, is a sufficiently common occurrence in earlier Grecian history, but after the year 500 B.C. becomes anomalous, and the commission of Diodes is a proof of the lamentable condition to which years of revolution and reaction had reduced his state. Diodes seems to have justified his selection by the rigour of his legislation, particularly as regarded the administration of justice, although we have no particulars of his reforms *. Until the conquest of Sicily by the Romans the laws of Diodes remained the basis of all later Syracusan codes, and were even adopted by other states, such as Selinus ; but there seems to have been no sufficient security against unconstitutional reaction, for within five years of their * With the exception of the substitution of the lot for voting in the appoint- ment of magistrates— a peculiarly democratic innovation. Still, it seems that the lots must have been worked in the interest of the oligarchs. SICILIAN AFFAIRS. 85 promulgation they were overthrown by the tyrant Diony- sius, who posed as a demagogue. This fact points to a sudden revival of the old quarrel between the aristocracy and the masses; and the banishment of Hermocrates, himself an oligarch, could have been carried only by the popular party as a spiteful assertion of its powers for the moment. One additional proof of internal dissension may perhaps be found in the fact that Syracuse was unable during a war of three years to reduce the towns of Naxus and Catana — a fact scarcely conceivable unless her energies were crippled by faction at home. The exasperation of the rival parties arising from the ill-success of their arms alike in the Aegean and Sicily was now accentuated by the danger of attack from Carthage. Since the year 480 b.c, when Hamilcar and his entire army were destroyed at the battle of Himera, the Carthaginians had remained passive spectators of Sicilian affairs, content- ing themselves with maintaining their three trading stations on the west coast *. The original cause for this attitude — dread of Gelo of Syracuse — had given place to fear of Hiero, his successor, and that in turn to apprehension of the superb navy of Athens. They had welcomed with delight the overthrow of the bulk of that navy at Syracuse — an overthrow which seemed to have left even the con- querors in the extremity of weakness. Everything promised success when, in 410 b.c, Egesta invited the protection of Carthage against Selinus. Selinus, the westernmost and most Carthaginian of all the Hellenic cities of Sicily, had profited by the troubles of Syracuse to secure a wide influence in the island, leagued with Agrigentum and Gela. The A^aunted and futile effort of Athens to champion Egesta had on the other hand made that town the object of universal antipathy, so that when, about the year 411 b.c, a dispute arose concerning some border land, Selinus was able not only to settle the quarrel in her own way, but further to attack the recog- nized territories of Egesta. The Egestaeans, without Sicilian or Greek allies, were compelled to throw themselves on the mercy of Carthage at the moment when any inter- * Solus, Motye, and Panormus. 86 SPARTA AND THEBES. ference by that state seemed likely to be most successful. It happened, too, that the chief Carthaginian magistrate, or Suffete, at the time was Hannibal, grandson of the general who fell at Himera. Having been compelled to spend many years of his life at Selinus as an exile in ex- piation for his grandfather's ill-success, he had recently returned to Carthage, where, with unbounded influence in the state, he retained a hatred of all that was Grecian and a truly Hannibalic thirst to revenge the defeat of his ancestor. He had no difficulty in persuading Carthage to take up the cause of Egesta; and by the close of 410 b.c. it was well known that he w^ould invade Western Sicily with a Carthaginian force, typical in numbers and ferocity. Hannibal was, moreover, a diplomatist as w^ell as a soldier. He despatched envoys to Selinus to remonstrate with that state for her aggressions against Egesta, and to suggest that the quarrel should be submitted to the arbitration of Syracuse. The Selinuntines, in the flush of success, de- clined ; while the Syracusans, thus rejected as arbitrators, at once declared themselves neutral, exactly as Hannibal had wished and expected. § 3. In the summer of 409 B.C. the Carthaginian army landed at Motye, and advanced at once upon Selinus. That city was taken completely by surprise. The peace party, headed by Empedion, had been silenced, and every overture refused ; but no defensive measures seem to have been taken to support so offensive an attitude, beyond an appeal to Agrigentum and Gela for reinforce- ments. Those reinforcements never arrived, for after ten days of continuous assault, Selinus was in the hands of the Carthaginians : its walls were rased, its temples desecrated, and all its inhabitants, save some 3000 who escaped to Agrigentum, weve either slain or made prisoners. The fall of Selinus roused the Sicilians to action. Syra- cuse threw off her neutrality, and 5000 men, with con- tingents from various other towns, commanded by Diocles, were at once thrown into Himera, whither the Carthagi- nian army moved direct from Selinus. Again the storming engines of Hannibal were brought up, and a ceaseless attack was maintained. For a few days the besieged held out, and SICILIAN AFFAIRS. 87 then in a sudden sally drove back the advanced posts of the enemy with heavy loss. But the appearance of the reserves under Hannibal completely changed the face of events. He drove the Greeks once more into the town with the loss of 3000 men, while at the same time came the news that his fleet was putting out from Motye to sail round to Syracuse, now nearly stripped of its military forces. Diocles at once hurried his whole force home- wards, and ordered the Syracusan squadron which occupied the harbour of Himera to retreat likewise, carrying with it as many of the useless population as possible. On the next day Himera was carried and rased. Of the prisoners, Han- nibal selected 3000 and sacrificed them on the scene of his grandfather's defeat to the spirit of that general. He then founded a new town, Thermae, in place of Himera, disbanded his whole force, and sailed home to Carthage. At about the same time (end of 409 b.c.) Hermocrates landed at Messana. After the disastrous battle of Cyzicus, he had busied himself in providing for his destitute crews ; and his personal influence with Pharnabazus, satrap of the northern parts of Asia Minor, had enabled him to obtain a large grant of money and permission to build vessels from the forests of Mount Ida. When the new commanders arrived from Syracuse with the despatch announcing the condemnation of Hermocrates, the latter was able to hand over to them a well-equipped squadron, albeit the crews murmured loudly against the injustice shown to their late admiral. Hermocrates silenced their murmurs, ad- juring them to use nothing but peaceable means to secure his restoration, and betook himself again to Pharnabazus, who furnished him with fresh funds and ships with which he at once sailed for Sicily, resolved to effect his return by force. He found, however, that his own party was still in the minority, for the oligarchs, and particularly Diocles, were at the moment in bad odour, as having caused by their remissness the destruction of Selinus. An attempt to surprise Syracuse was frustrated, and Hermo- crates drew oft* to the ruined site of Selinus, where he established himself as the leader of refugees from that town and from Himera, and harried the Carthaginian 88 SPARTA AND THEBES. reservation with impunity, there being now no army to oppose him. Thus proclaiming himself the avenger of the destroyed Greek towns, he gathered fresh adherents, while the influence of the rival party of Diodes sank propor- tionately. Accordingly, in 408 B.C., Hermocrates was able again to move upon Syracuse. On this occasion he trusted to a stratagem to secure his entry into the town, for he carried with him the bones of those Syracusans wlio had fallen before Himera, and professed to be desirous only of placing them in the sepulchres of their fathers. Any appeal to Greek sympathy on the score of reverence to the dead was politic and powerful, and the determination of Hermocrates to make himself despot must have been notorious indeed to counteract such an appeal. Party feeling ran high between the two factions, and ended, not in the recall of Hermocrates, but in the banishment of Diodes also. The bones of the victims of Himera were buried with ceremony, but Hermocrates was forced to content himself with earning an additional reputation for piety, and retired once more to Selinus. A few months later, summoned by his partisans within Syracuse, he surprised Achradina, but was immediately slain by the forces of the opposite faction (407 B.C.)*. Most of his followers were slain, the remainder banished, and many who escaped were declared by their friends to have fallen in the battle that they might thus be spared sentence of exile. g 4. Amongst this number was Dionysius, at once one of the keenest partisans of the democratic faction, and the most assiduous in exalting the prowess of the slain Hermo- crates against Carthage at the expense of Diodes and the oligarchic party f. Of low birth, he had practised as a public scribe, and may possibly have been already of some reputation as an author, for in later life he wrote a number of odes and tragedies. Having been wounded in the final attempt of Hermocrates to enter Syracuse, he "' The dates of these various attempts of Hermocrates to effect liis return are quite conjectural. Grote gives tliose wliich are here adopted. The difticultj- of the subject is increased by there being at the time two persons named Hermo- crates in Syracuse, the second of whom was the father of Dionysius. t It would seem that the Hermocratean oligarchs, disappointed of their object, now coalesced with the democrats, hoping by these means to overthrow a rival clique of anti- Hermocratean oligarchs. SICILIAN AFFAIRS. 89 ' remained in the city in concealment, and shortly after- wards appeared publicly as the leader of the democratic party, though we are not told how he continued to avoid the punishment which fell upon most of the defeated Hermocratean s. Probably the expectation of the presence of the Carthaginians in Sicily in 406 B.C. diverted from party politics the attention of the oligarchic faction, who remained satisfied with their recent success. It seems that Hannibal, having avenged the defeat of Himera and successfully supported Egesta, was desirous of no further aggressions. But the daring of Hermocrates in raiding the lands of Motye and Panormus, coupled with the confidence inspired by the easy capture of Selinus and Himera, roused the Carthaginians to fresh efforts, and in 406 B.C. a force of 150,000 men landed at Motye under the command of Hannibal and Himilco. The former had at first declined service on the plea of age, but was finally persuaded to sail on the appointment of Himilco as his colleague. The intentions of Carthage had been no secret in Sicily. The various towns had been actively engaged in preparing for resistance, more particularly Agrigentum, which now stood as the w^estern fortress of Hellenism, and was consequently the primary object of attack. The town was built on a cluster of hills rising as high as 1100 feet from sea-level, at the southern margin of the most fertile plain of fertile Sicily. On one side alone was there an approach to the walls which encircled the town — a town which could not have numbered less than a quarter of a million of inhabitants. The slight records of its political history prove that it must have escaped in great measure from the troubles which continually exercised its rival Syracuse ; while the purposed humi- liation of the neighbouring town of Gel a by Gelo had left Agrigentum without a peer on the southern shore of Sicily. Her wealth, her temples, her fortifications*, the luxuriance of her crops of grapes and olives, w^ere famed throughout Sicily ; while her name was proclaimed repeatedly before all Greece as the home of victors at * Arduus inde Acragas ostentat maxunia longe Moenia, magnanimum quon- dam generator equorum. — Acnckl, iiL 703. Ihe Greek name Acragas expresses the position of the town on cliffs. 90 SPARTA AND THEBES. the Olympic games. Three hundred of her citizens could furnish racing cars drawn by teams of white horses to welcome home one of their number, the victor at the games of 408 B.C. The walls of Selinus had been old and weak ; but those of Agrigentum seemed impregnable when the Carthaginian army drew its lines about the city imme- diately after landing. Dexippus, a Spartan, had been summoned from Gela to conduct the defence, and the siege had already lasted for some time when the Sicilian contin- gents from Syracuse, Gela, Camarioa, and other places, arrived under the command of Daphnaeus, the successor of Diodes as head of the oligarchic party at Syracuse. Routing a body of horse which endeavoured to bar his progress, Daphnaeus entered the city in safety. But unfor- tunately for himself he had withheld his men from following up their victory, wisely foreseeing that their disorder would put them at a disadvantage when Hannibal's reserves attacked them. For the same reason Dexippus had held his garrison in check ; and now both generals were loudly accused of collusion with the enemy. They escaped for the moment, but four of their Agrigentine colleagues were at once indicted and stoned to death unheard, the sole command being vested in Daphnaeus. § 5. The Greek forces were now large enough to set at defiance any attempt to storm the town, and the Cartha- ginian generals settled down to reduce it by blockade. For many months little progress was made, while a violent sickness, breaking out in their crowded lines, carried off numbers of the besiegers, including Hannibal himself, and filled the rest with superstitious terrors. Tliey had destroyed the magnificent tombs which filled the plain on the south side of the town, using the materials in their siege works. This impiety was now recoiling on them, they thought, and as an expiation the customary human sacrifices were offered. The siege dragged on into the eighth month, and was at one time almost abandoned through the mutiny of the mercenary troops, who clamoured for pay; while the whole army suffered from the difficulty of getting provisions. A squadron of Carthaginian vessels, however, contrived to surprise a large convoy of supplies oft' Agrigentum, and so SICILIAN AFFAIRS. 91 relieved Himilco's army, while scarcity began to be felt in the town. The mercenaries of Dexippus mutinied and marched away ; the fidelity of the remaining troops w^as doubtful ; and at length the order was given to evacuate the town by night. The majority of the garrison and inhabitants thus escaped; but some who preferred to share the fate of their homes were cut down or burnt in the ruins of the town when it was occupied by Himilco in the morning. The return of Daphnaeus and his colleagues to Syracuse was the signal for an outburst of popular fury. It gave to the democratic party a new and powerful handle against the discredited oligarchs. When the generals appeared before the assembly to explain their conduct, they were met with nothing but insult and clamour, until finally Dionysius, now the recognized champion of the combined democrats and Hermocrateans, openly accused them of treachery and bade the populace stone them there and then, as the Agrigentines had done with their own treacherous citizens. Rebuked by the presiding officers, Dionysius only became more reckless and violent, and in the end the generals were dismissed in disgrace, and a new Board, including Dionysius, was elected in their place. Who were the colleagues of Dionysius we do not know, except that amongst them were Philistus, the historian, and Hipparinus, a ruined aristocrat who threw in his fortunes with those of the rising demagogue. It may be regarded as certain that all the members of the Board were chosen from the ranks of the popular party, which was at that moment synonymous with the party of Hermocrates and Dionysius. But this apparent unanimity of political views did not improve matters. Dionysius began to obstruct his colleagues in every possible way, and by incessant accusa- tions of treachery to poison against them the minds of the Syracusans. The fate of Agrigentum, and the ever-present menace of the advance of Himilco upon Syracuse, had throw^n the city into a condition of panic and alarm in which the populace was ready to suspect every one, while Hipparinus and his fellow-generals doubtless played into the hands of Dionysius. The latter now declared that, 92 SPARTA AND THEBES. within the city, there was none to be trusted, and that the only true patriots were the exiled partisans of that Hermocrates who had so well proved his loyalty by aveng- ing the ruin of Selinus. On their recall, he said, depended the safety of the state. He carried his point ; and from all parts of Sicily there flocked back to Syracuse men who owed their late exile to the oligarchy, their restoration to Dionysius — men eager to do his bidding to any extent, so that it gave them revenge upon their enemies. Meanwhile the Carthaginian general had remained en- camped at Agrigentum collecting the plunder of that city, and had held his army together during the winter instead of dismissing it in the usual way. His next object of attack was Gela ; and the Geloans, aware of their danger, urged the Syracusans to assist them in defending their city. The Lacedaemonian Dexippus had already brought into the town a detachment of his mercenaries, and the Syracusan generals now marched out to his support. At Gela had appeared the same panic and mistrust as at Syracuse, and the oligarchic party were regarded by the populace with detestation and mistrust. Again Dionysius stood forth as the champion of democracy. He provoked the Geloans to rise, massacre the oligarchs, and confiscate their belongings. The proceeds of the outrage he applied to paying his troops so lavishly as to secure their loyalty. Instead, however, of marching against Himilco, he suddenly withdrew and returned to Syracuse, taking with him also the troops of Dexippus, and so leaving Gela absolutely defenceless at the very moment when the approach of Himilco was most imminent. Arrived in Syracuse, he styled himself the ** liberator" of the Geloan democracy, and stood higher than ever in popularity. In the burst of enthusiasm which greeted him, he secured the deposition of his colleagues in a body, and his own appointment as sole general with unlimited powers. § 6. The plea for such a course was solely the need of decisive action against the Carthaginians ; and had Dionysius been the patriot he professed himself, he would at once have moved westward to prevent the investment of Gela. But patriotism did not trouble the new dictator. SICILIAN AFFAIRS. 93 He had obtained his advancement by the free and spon- taneous act of the democracy ; he determined to secure it before the inevitable reaction could occur. Tyranny had but one protection, its bodyguard ; and to obtain this also by popular vote Dionysius had resort to another piece of double-dealing. He ordered the whole force of the city to march out to Leontini, which had remained, since the Sicilian expedition, a dependency of Syracuse, occupied on sufferance by a number of exiles and refugees. There was no excuse for an armed demonstration in that quarter, least of all by a general whose appointment was intended to check a Carthaginian attack. In consequence, such of the citizens as suspected the attitude of Dionysius failed to appear in arms in obedience to his summons, and he marched out accompanied only by his own adherents. En- camping at Leontini for the night, he suddenly caused an alarm to be raised, and declaring that an attempt had been made upon his life, he induced his army to allot to him a bodyguard of 600 men*. He at once proceeded to select twice that number of the most needy and reckless desperadoes obtainable, whom, with a standing army of mercenaries collected from all quarters, he secured to his service by the gift of magnificent armour and by the promise of high pay. He then marched without molesta- tion through Syracuse to Ortygia, the citadel, where he permanently established himself, after procuring by popular vote the execution of Daphnaeus and other leading oligarchs, and the dismissal of Dexippus. At the same time (beginning of 405 B.C.) he married the daughter of Hermocrates. It now remained to secure himself from the attack of Himilco, who was already besieging Gela. Marching overland, Dionysius appeared before the Carthaginian lines with 30,000 men, while a fleet of fifty sail supported him by sea. The siege now assumed the same character as at Agrigentum, and for three weeks went on a desultory war- fare without decisive results to either side. At the end of that period Dionysius made arrangements for a general attack. His fleet, assaulting the Carthaginian lines on the * The regular word for a soldier of the bodyguard in Greek is fiopv<^6po?, a spearman, from the lance carried by the bodyguard of the Great King. 94 SPARTA AND THEBES. SICILIAN AFFAIRS. 95 seaward side, where they were least securely defended, actually carried the works ; and had the land forces come up, as arranged, to attack the position at other points, victory would probably have been with the Greeks, But there is every reason to believe that such a result was purposely avoided by Dionysius : to set the Sicilian Greeks free from Carthage would be to leave them at liberty to act with Syracuse against himself, while he had no scruples about using the aid of Carthage to confirm his own power. The land attack was made too late, while the particular regiment which formed the despot's strength was never brought into action at all, so retaining its vigour and numbers unimpaired. Himilco drove off the attack of the fleet, and the Geloans now learnt that their pretended defender had resolved to evacuate the town, albeit he had suffered little loss and the position remained as tenable as ever. Like Himera and Agrigentum, Gela was abandoned in the darkness ; and Dionysius afforded a further proof of treachery by compelling the inhabitants of Camarina to join in his flight and abandon their city, thus surrendering that position also, the last outpost of Syracuse towards the south. § 7. An act of such palpable cowardice or treason, whichever it was, aroused to revolt the Syracusan soldiery, already regretful of the part which they had played in the aggrandizement of Dionysius. The cavalry, the finest troops in Sicily, mutinied in a body; and finding the usurper's person too securely guarded to admit of their reaching him, galloped oft' to Syracuse, announced the treason and flight of Dionysius, occupied his stronghold of Ortygia, and plundered the property of the despot and his adherents. They declared the city once more free, and gave themselves up to their feelings of delight and satis- faction. But Dionysius had already divined their purpose. He pushed on towards the city at full speed, and on arriving at the gates about midnight he found them virtually unguarded. To force an entry and fight his way to Ortygia was a small task in the confusion and disorder of his enemies. Those of the horsemen who could effect their escape retreated with their partisans to Aetna. The refugees from Gela and Camarina established themselves at Leontini. Syracuse apparently lay at the mercy of Himilco when- ever he chose to attack it, but at this juncture he made peace with Dionysius. It appears that a pestilence, similar to that which had attacked his army before Agrigentum, had recurred and carried off upwards of half of his troops — a fact which sets the retreat of Dionysius from Gela in a still worse light as an act of collusion. It would, more- over, serve Himilco, on his return to Carthage, as an excuse for having stayed his hand when all Sicily seemed at his mercy; and doubtless it would appear an easier thing to leave Dionysius pledged as a vassal of Carthage to the maintenance of peace in the island, than to attempt the permanent occupation of Sicily. Accordingly, peace was signed on the following conditions : the Carthaginians retained all their earlier dependencies and possessions in the west of the island, together with Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum ; Gela and Camarina were restored to their inhabitants as tributaries of Carthage, on condition that those towns should remain unfortified ; Leontini, Messana, and the Sicel communities were to remain autonomous ; and on the other hand, the Carthaginian government recognized, and undertook to support, the despotism of Dionysius over Syracuse. Himilco thus secured a sort of over-lordship in Syracuse, while in Gela and Camarina he possessed frontier positions little less hostile to the despot than to Carthage. The independence of Leontini and of the Sicel tribes completed the chain of control to the west and north, depending as they did upon Carthaginian influence for their own autonomy. The fortress of Agrigentum, the key of the southern coast, passed, with its extensive trade, into the hands of Carthage, whose reservation was thus extended beyond the Halycus to the line connecting Agrigentum with Himera. § 8. Thus left to himself, Dionysius proceeded to render Ortygia an impregnable position. He surrounded with enormously strong walls not only the whole of the small island, but also the Lesser Harbour (Lacciics), in such 96 SPARTA AND THEBES. a way as to admit of but one vessel sailing in or out at a time, while a fleet of sixty sail could lie secure within its basin. Here he collected his bodyguard and mercenaries in specially constructed barracks. At a later date he fortified also the city proper, enclosing the larger and eastward portion, Achradina, within one continuous wall, to which the walls of Tyche, the suburb on the north-west, and of Neapolis, the similar suburb on the south-west, formed appendages or loops each complete in itself. Between Ortygia and Achradina lay a narrow strip of low ground, averaging half-a-mile in width, which remained vacant and was used as a necropolis. The descent of Epipolae was also fortified, though not all at once. For the present, Dionysius contented himself with carrying a wall along the northern and more accessible scarp from Tyche to Eiiryalus, thus barring the approach of any enemy from the side of Leontini and the Bay of Thapsus. The marshes of the Anapus and the more difficult character of the southern slope seemed, for the present, an adequate defence on that side. The enormous cost of these works was met by heavy exactions from the citizens, whose murmurs broke out into open mutiny in 403 b.c. At that time the whole citizen army was encamped before Erbessus, a Sicel town which had sided with Carthage in the recent war. They killed their deputy-commander, Doric us, and, marching upon Syracuse, occupied Epipolae, where they were joined by auxiliaries from Rhegium and Messana, and by the exiled horsemen from Aetna. They even sent envoys to Corinth to ask for assistance ; but that state, their metropolis, was in no position to spare an armed force, and could do no more than send one Nicoteles to support the insurgents by his advice. The latter were now strong enough to occupy the necropolis and lay siege to Ortygia, while a Rhegine and Messenian fleet blockaded it by sea, and cut off all supplies. Starved out, Dionysius was on the point of surrender, when the over-confidence of his foes saved him. Feeling their success assured, the besiegers relaxed their vigilance, and the despot was able to purchase the services of a body of Campanian mercenaries, whose sudden arrival SICILIAN AFFAIRS. 97 raised the siege. Dionysius used his victory with modera- tion. He allowed the remnant of the insurgents to withdraw to Aetna, and took no sanguinary measures against the citizens at large. He seized, however, an early opportunity, during the ensuing harvest-time, to search the houses of the townsmen then absent in the fields, and to appropriate all their arms. He built also additional vessels and fortifications. But his power was above all strengthened by the active countenance of Sparta. That state, fresh from her victory over Athens, was now busied in overthrowing democracy everywhere, and substituting for it oligarchies and harmosts, whose government was little else than despotism under another name. With this access of moral support in addition to his extensive material resources, Dionysius successively attacked and reduced Catana, Naxus, and Leontini ; and when the Italiot Greeks of Locri and Rhegium, aided by Messana, menaced him with attack, he avoided a conflict, and was able by skilful diplomacy to put himself on good terms with all three states. He even asked a wife from Rhegium, and though the request was refused with contumely, he was more successful in a similar application to the Locrians. He married Doris, daughter of a distinguished citizen of that place, taking at the same time a second Syracusan wife * Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus. From his marriage with Doris dates the beginning of the long alliance between Locri and the Dionysian dynasty — an alliance fatal to the welfare and liberties of much of Magna Graecia. His mild policy towards Rhegium and its allies was due to a desire to conciliate all parties, and so be free to carry out his designs against Carthage. The idea of driving the Carthaginians out of Sicily was as popular now as ever ; and when the despot declared himself about to champion the cause of Hellenism against the Bar- barians, desisting at the same time from the violence and cruelties which had marked his first tenure of power, he found ready support throughout the majority of the Greek towns in the island. For three years he busied ' His first wife, daughter of Hcrmocrutes, luid beou put to death by tho insurgent horsemen, 405 b.c. G. 404—302. H 98 SPARTA AND TllEBES. himself with ceaseless preparations for war. His arsenals were stocked with many thousand stand of arms of the finest workmanship. New siege engines, notably cata- pults, were invented, and vast trains of artillery got together. His fleet was augmented to 300 sail, and amongst them were vessels larger than any as yet seen in Grecian warfare— ships of four and even of five banks of oars *. § 9. It was in the beginning of 307 B.C. that Dionysius, now fully prepared for war, commenced his aggressions by surrendering the liv^es and properties of all Carthaginian residents in Syracuse or the dependent cities to the mercy of the Sicilians. Their mercantile proclivities prompted many Carthaginians to reside in the Sicilian coast towns, so that they offered an easy and lucrative plunder to their enemies. A herald was then despatched to Carthage, bidding that power withdraw from all the great cities of Sicily on pain of war. The moment was well chosen, for the same pestilence which had thinned the armies of Himilco before Agrigentum and Gela, eight years before, had crossed to Africa, and had for three years or more been devastating the territories of Car- thage. So paralyzed were the government that no measures seem to have been taken to counteract the declared aims of Dionysius, for he was allowed to subjugate the Sicels and the Greek towns at his pleasure, despite the special clauses in the recent treaty guaranteeing their independence, as well as to manufacture arms without hindrance. Even the garrisons of the newly-conquered towns of the south coast had not been augmented beyond their ordinary peace-footing ; so that when Dionysius appeared in succession before the gates of Camarina, Gela, Agrigentum, and Selinus, with a land force of 80,000 foot and 3000 horse, and supported by a fleet of nearly 500 sail, these towns at once welcomed him as a deliverer. Tlie Carthaginian garrisons were massacred or sold as slaves, and in the spring of the same year Dionysius laid "^ 7. e. Quadriremcti and Qxiinqucrcnics. The triremes, or ordinary vessel of three banks, carried on each side three tiers of thirty oars each, and about twenty marines or fighting seamen, a total of 200 men. SICILIAN AFFAIUS. 99 siege to the oldest and most important of the native Carthaginian settlements, the town of Motye. The intense hatred of the Hellenes for the Carthaginians is well illustrated by their thus deliberately transferring them- selves to the power of a notorious despot like Dionysius. The siege of Motye was no slight matter. The Cartha- ginian element was almost unmixed in the western corner of Sicily, and the isolated fortresses of the Ely mi — Egesta and Eryx — were more Carthaginian than Greek. Entella was occupied by a body of mercenary troops, recently in the service of Carthage, and not inclined to transfer their support to Dionysius ; while the actual coast-line was entirely commanded by the great for- tresses of Motye, Panormus, and Solus. Nevertheless, the Syracusan force was sufficiently large to lay siege to Motye while detaching various divisions for action against the other positions of the interior. Of the latter, Eryx fell into the hands of Dionysius ; but the remainder, closing their gates, de6ed him, though unable to prevent his troops from ravaging the whole country at will. The town of Motye itself was built on an islet in the small bay on the northern side of the promontory of Lily- baeum, and was connected by a bridge with the coast. On the approach of the enemy the bridge had been destroyed, so that Dionysius was compelled to construct a mole from shore to shore — a distance of 1200 yards — before he could bring his engines within reach of the walls. But the mole was at length completed and the siege commenced in earnest. The Carthaginians, alarmed, as they well might be, at the rapid progress of their enemies, were only able to despatch Himilco with a fleet to act as he best could in defence of their countrymen. That general, not venturing to face the magnificent fleet of Syracuse in the open sea, endeavoured first to raise the siege by a descent upon Syracuse itself ; but, though his squadron sailed into the harbour there and destroyed some merchant vessels, the recently-erected fortifications pre- vented its doing any further damage, and it returned without creating the intended diversion. Himilco now attempted to surprise Dionysius' fleet while it lay beached 100 SPARTA AND TUEIJES. in the Bay of Motye, and it was only rescued from destruction by the vigorous action of the despot. lie caused eighty of his vessels to be transported bodily across the promontory of Lilybaeum to the sea on the other side, and Ilimilco, thus threatened with a flank attack, was compelled to retire to Carthage. Soon afterwards the town fell by a nocturnal surprise, and Dionysius, leaving his Admiral Leptincs in command, with orders to continue the operations against EnteUa, Egesta, and other towns, retired to winter at Syracuse. g 10. In the following year (396 B.C.) Dionysius rejoined Leptines, and personally conducted the siege of Egesta, which still defied his efforts. While thus engaged ho received news that Himilco had effected a landing at Cape Pelorus with a force of 100,000 men and more than 2000 ships, including transports. The landing had been effected by night, and Himilco had taken successful pre- cautions to prevent Dionysius learning the destination of the force which he knew to be gathering. An attack by Leptines failed to prevent his advance, and moving upon Motye, the Carthaginian army re-occupied that place with- out any serious resistance. Dionysius, thus robbed in a moment of the toil of so many months, and finding him- self short of supplies, retreated to Syracuse without hazarding an engagement *. Having thus relieved the besieged towns, Himilco determined to take vengeance on the Greeks for the sack of Motye. The Hellenic towns of the south coast, so recently pillaged by his troops, offered little hope of booty, nor were there any noteworthy cities on the north coast. He resolved to transfer his forces at once to the eastern coast and to attack Messana, the key of the straits, a town whose position in the most remote corner of the island had protected it as yet from the assaults of Car- thage. Accordingly he marched along the northern coast, receiving as he went the allegiance of the Sicel tiibes, who hated Dionysius as the destroyer of that independence which Carthage had by treaty secured for them. Eeigning * Lilybaeum w;is founded now, tu take the place of Motye us chief fortress and mart of Garthuge in Sicily. SICITJAX AFFAIRS. 101 a land attack, he induced the full force of Messana to quit the town and advance to meet him ; whereupon his fleet sailed unhindered into the harbour and took the place at once. The plunder, if less rich than that of Agrigentum, was sufficient to repay the trouble of the attack ; the town was rased to the ground and left a wilderness. The whole Carthaginian force now moved southward upon Syracuse, skirting the coast, and so acting in conjunction with the fleet under Mago. It is difficult to understand what could have kept the Syracusan army inactive during this time, for some months must have now elapsed since the retreat from Egesta. That retreat had been viewed as an act of cowardice by the army, and the old murmurs were again heard accusing the despot of collusion with the enemy. Such a charge was on this occasion ridiculous; but certainly little had been effected to justify the immense preparations and the great force — the largest ever under the command of a single Greek — which had been collected in the previous year. So widely had the discontent spread that when Dionysius at length m.arched northward to meet Himilco he had with him but 30,000 men. Off Catana his fleet gave battle to the flotilla under Mago. The battle was stubbornly con- tested, but ended in the complete defeat of the Syracusans, with the loss of 100 vessels and 20,000 men. Dionysius at once retreated without venturing to engage with his land force, and shut himself up in Syracuse, sending urgent requests for assistance to Sparta and Corinth. The whole Carthaginian fleet at once sailed into the great harbour ; Himilco, with his army, fortified a camp at the Olympieum and outposts at Plemmyrium and Dascon ; and twenty years after the Athenian expedition the Syracusans saw themselves once more threatened with ruin by an enemy occupying the same ground as Nicias. § 11. This second retreat of Dionysius lent new energy to the discontent. Mutiny spread among his mercenaries, and was with difficulty checked. He now exerted himself to recover some of his lost prestige, and personally con- ducted flying sn[uadrons to protect the convoys which still reached the Syracusan harbour, despite the vigilance of 102 SPARTA AND THEBES. Mago. At the same time he declined to hazard a general engagement either by land or sea. He was absent on such an expedition, when a citizen named Theodorus gave ex- pression to the general discontent. A chance engagement in the harbour, brought on by the endeavour to seize a Carthaginian transport, had left the Syracusans triumphant. Theodorus thereupon bade them for the future cense to trust Dionysius, whose generalship brought nothing but disgrace and whose despotism was misery : let them dis- own him, and fight for themselves ; for the recent fight had shown that they were more favoured of heaven than were the arms of the murderer and temple-plunderer who was their despot. Dionysius reappeared while the assembly was still undecided, and with him en mo Pharacidas, the leader of the succours from Sparta. The question depended on his decision, for to ofFend Sparta was to provoke the greatest power in the Greek world— a power fresh from the overthrow of her enemies, and triumphant throughout Greece. But it was no part of Spartan policy to favour democracy. She was already seeking the alliance of Persia and of Lycophron, tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly. She now allied herself with an equally infamous enemy of Hellenic liberty, and through the mouth of Pharacidas declared for Dionysius and tyranny. The Syracusans, deprived of their one hope of support, were cowed into acqui- escence, and Dionysius was once more free to continue his despotism. This stroke of good fortune was followed by another which had still more important results. The plague, which had so often decimated the armaments of Carthage, again broke out in the camp of Himilco with appalling virulence. His men died by thousands, while the Syra- cusans were untouched. The marsh fevers which had wasted the troops of iNicias were as nothing to the pestilence which now converted the whole camp of the Carthaginians into a mortuary. The wall which Dionysius had constructed on the northern slope of Epipolae had nullified all attempts at blockade by leaving open the road into Syracuse on the northern side, and Himilco seems never to have attempted to carry Euryalus, the key to the SICILIAN AFFAIRS. 103 whole position. Pestilence completed what stupidity had begun. Dionysius could watch the host of his enemies melting away, and could choose his own time for strikino-. Repeating the manceuvre of Gylippus, he marched round the enemy's line and took them in the flank, while his fleet attacked and burned the whole Carthaginian flotilla and the camp at Dascon. Only dread of contagion prevented his occupying Himilco's lines at once. He drew off and awaited the approaching end. It soon arrived. Himilco endeavoured to negociate for the safe retreat of his whole force. On this being refused, he made a secret treaty by which his own escape and that of the other native Cartha- ginians in his army was assured, and putting to sea by night, sailed away to Africa. His deserted army, left without a general, fled in all directions, pursued by the Syracusans. The Hiberians alone were spared, being taken into the pay of the despot (autumn, 305 B.C.). Himilco, publicly declaring his defeat to be the just reward of his sacrilege in destroying the tombs on the Helorine Way before Syracuse, starved himself to death. But the pros- tration of Carthage was completed by the revolt of her Libyan subjects, who, to the number of 120,000 men, occupied Tunis and shut up the Carthaginians within their walls. It was only at the last extremity that the Queen of Africa was able to crush the revolt by means of an opportune quarrel amoug the insurgents. She was long incapacitated from fresh interference with the power of Dionysius, though her admiral Mago maintained a vigilant attitude at the western corner of Sicily, and there by his conciliatory conduct won over many of the neighbourin join the alliance were Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, Mitylene ; then Euhoea with the excep- tion of the town Ilistiaea ; then Sciathos and Peparcthos. Anionj,' the other names foinid in the inscription may l)e mentioned Perinthus, Manjnea, Paros, Andros, Tenos, Antissa, Eresus, Ceos, Amorgos, Selymbria, Siphnos, Zacynthos. Thebes also joined this league. THE PROGRESS OF THEBES. 133 Nausinicus (378 B.C.), and the principle was so equitable that it was subsequently extended to the trierarchy. Athens found her new position very onerous, and was very soon ea^^er to make peace ; and we may conclude therefore that her less wealthy and populous maritime allies were neither more able nor more willing to maintain the burdens of the new Confederation in a manner proportionate to its in- augural proceedings. Little is known of the working of the neAv League. There was a conference of deputies, presumably meeting at Athens, by whose voice the amount of the several ''contributions" was probably determined, but who collected it, or when, or what means were provided for enforcing payment, we are not told. We may notice also that whereas the older Confederacy had been organized to protect Greece against Persia, and had passed into Athenian control solely by reason of Sparta's lack of initiative, the later Confederacy was aimed expressly a^^ainst Sparta. The question of the relations of Greece \\ii\i Persia had been settled, it seemed, by the Peace of Antalcidas, and there was now no general Hellenic revulsion against the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to the Great King ; while Athens, not to mention that her best general, Iphierates, was even now acting by her authority in the service of Artaxerxes, was in no position to quarrel with Persia had she wished it. And she did not wish it, for it was of the highest moment to her that Persia should not lend aid to S^Dartn, but should ratlier be on good terms with Athens. § 8. It has been said that Chabrias and the land forces of the Confederacy did good service for Thebes against Agesilaus. What the fleet did in the meantime we do not know; but since, after the repulse of Cleombrotus from Cithaeron in 376 B.C., the Spartans determined to try for better issues by sea, we must suppose that the Confederate fleets were active and successful in the Aegean and upon the adjoining coasts. It was to prevent any further extension of Athenian influence that in the summer of the same year the navarch Pollis put out with sixty triremes and presented himself between Paros and Naxos, and com- menced to intercept the merchantmen and corn-ships making ' lU SrARTA AND THEBES. for the Peiraeus. Off Naxos he encountered Chabrias with eighty sail, and left forty-nine of his vessels in the hands of the victorious Athenians, who now cruised unmolested from one end of the Aegean to the other, and added seventeen new communities to their Confederacy, including Abdera in Thrace, which was protected by Chabrias against the native tribe of the Triballi. Their success in winning new allies was largely due to the address and honesty of Phocion, a man who first comes into notice now, and one destined to figure largely in the history of the next fifty years. In the next year the Athenians adopted a bolder course : they determined to attempt once more one of the objects of Pericles' statecraft, and to surround the whole of the Peloponnese with a continuous chain of allies. The Spartans were equally resolved to prevent the design, but Timotheus ravaged the coasts of Laconia, defeated the navarch Nicolochus between Alyzia and Leucas, and won over to the Confederacy the islands of Cephallenia and Corcyra, as well as the Acarnanians, the Epeirote Molossians and Chaones, and other tribes of the mainland. It was only want of money to pay his crews which prevented him from still further improving his position, but Athens was sorely pressed for funds, and the victories of her fleet in the West did not arrest the constant annoyance caused nearer home by Peloponnesian privateers from Aegina. Moreover, the Athenians began to feel resentment at the growing power of Thebes : all their efforts, it i-cemed, were destined rather to improve the position of Thebes than their own. They demanded that Thebes should contribute her share towards the expenses of the fleet, but that state had enough to do on its own account, without finding funds for Athens. § 9. The latter part of 376 B.C. and the whole of 375 B.C. were months of ceaseless activity for Thebes, albeit there was no further Spartan invasion. The method of conciliation having failed to expel the Spartan garrisons from the Boeotian towns and to unite the whole country in one state, Epameinondas and Pelopidas set themselves to secure this end by force of arms. A brilliant success gained over the Lacedaemonian garrison of Orchomenus by Pelopidas and THE PROGRESS OF THEBES. 135 ^ the Sacred Band at Tegyra, and the defeat and death of the harmost of Tanagra, went far towards breaking down the last relics of Spartan ascendancy within Boeotia. Thespiae and Plataea were recovered, as well as Chaeronea and Haliartus, and by the year 374 B.C. Boeotia was united, with the single exception of Orchomenus. That fortress lay upon the borders of Phocis, and the Phocians had long been staunch allies of Sparta from fear of Thebes. Against them accordingly Pelopidas turned his arms in 374 B.C., at a time when they were also attacked by the encroaching power of Jason, despot of Pherae in Thessaly. Taken between two fires, the Phocians appealed to Sparta, as they had done in 395 B.C.; whereupon Cleombrotus came to their aid with forces sufficient to defeat the aims of Thebes. Had Phocis been reduced, Orchomenus must have fallen, all Boeotia been united, the treasures and influence of Delphi placed at the disposal of Theban politicians, and the forces of Thebes and Pherae would have joined hands. But though on this occasion the designs of Thebes were frustrated, the mere attempt upon Phocis indicated a decrree of confidence and strength at which Athens took immediate alarm. The two states had for centuries been traditional rivals, as much as Phocis and Athens were traditionally allies. Apart from the contempt with which Athens regarded the upstart claims of Thebes, and the inherent antagonism between the Ionic blood of Attica and the Aeolic Boeotians, it was most undesirable for Athens to have her north-western borders threatened by a warlike state of first-class rank. Thebes had declined m any way to contribute to the maintenance of the war under- taken by Athens (so said the Athenians) mainly for Thebes sake. On the other hand, Sparta was sorely in need of allies and would make very considerable concessions to secure the secession of Thebes from the Theban alliance, while the Athenians as a body found the war wearisome, costly, and indecisive. § 10. The upshot was that negociations were opened and a peace patched up between Athens and Sparta (374 B.C.) on the basis of the Peace of Antalcidas. Each state was to evacuate all possessions other than those within its own 136 SPARTA AND THEBES. limits, Sparta was to be the accepted hegemon by land and Athens by sea. To these conditions all the Peloponnesian allies and the whole Delian Confederacy excepting Thebes readily swore allegiance : they were well pleased to see Sparta thus easily thrust from her position of autocracy, and to revert once more to peaceful life. Not so Thebes : the longer the war continued, the more would Sparta be embarrassed, and the more freely would the power of Thebes expand. But there was no means of withstanding the general voice of Greece, and unless she was to be isolated from all alike, Thebes must also swear to the peace. Even then however she claimed, in the person of Epamei- nondas, to do so for united Boeotia, nor was it until the last moment that she conceded this point. She could afford to wait yet a little while, for her strength was growing yearly just as certainly as that of Sparta was declining. The longer she postponed her ultimatum, the more favourably would she be able at length to make it public. It would seem that the party of Cleombrotus was now in the ascendant at Sparta; certainly the party of Agesihxus saw the need of recuperating its forces before demanding the settlement of the long outstanding account against Thebes. For the fortunes of Sparta were sunk very low, so low that she was fain to decline the duty when the im- portant town of Pharsalus, one of the keys of Thessaly and an invaluable ally in view of impending struggles with Thebes and Pherae, appealed to her for help against the aggressions of Jason (374 B.C.), who had made himself master of the latter town and much of the rest of Thessaly. It was all she could do to defend Phocis : Polydamas, the despot of Pharsalus, must fend for himself. As a result, Jason reduced the town at his leisure, and so completed his subjugation of Thessaly. It was thoroughly Greek that the peace so recently con- cluded and so much desired should be broken almost as soon as made. After swearing the oath, Athens sent orders to Timotheus to bring home the fleet which he still commanded in the Ionian Sea. As he was sailing by Zacynthos, he was invited by a party of exiles to restore them to their island, and accordingly made a landing for THE PROGRESS OP THEBES. 137 A that purpose. This was a breach of the peace which the Spartans resented even more hotly than the Athenians had resented the action of Sphodrias : they forthwith declared war anew, and despatched a fleet under Mnasippus into the Ionian Sea (373 B.C.). Mnasippus laid immediate siege to Corcyra, recently enrolled a member of the Athenian Confederacy, and of particular value to Sparta as being the most advantageous port for communications with the Syracusan Dionysius, her ally. In reply the Athenians equipped a fresh fleet and again appointed Timotheus to the command ; but when the latter spent some time in the Aegean trying to raise funds, without showing the needful expedition in the relief of Corcyra, they superseded him in favour of Iphicrates. Timotheus was put upon his trial for remissness : he came off witli unblemished character, but felt that his popularity was gone, and took service, as his father Conon had done before him, with Artaxerxes. Iphicrates, on arriving at Corcyra, found that Mnasippus had been already defeated and killed. He easily swept the Spartan fleet from the western seas, and also captured a squadron of ten vessels sent to their support by Dionysius. But such proceedings as these only revived the late desire for a general pacification, a desire accentuated by the news that Thebes had once more rased Plataea, the old ally of Athens, and dismantled the fortifications of Thespiae (372 B.C.). Those two positions lay too near her walls, and their new populations were too inlierently hostile, to make them tolerable neighbours. Both Athens and Sparta recognized more clearly tlian ever the need of husbanding their resources against the growing Theban power, and both saw in the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas a means of preventing the forcible unification of Boeotia, upon which alone depended the strength of Thebes. Accordingly Antalcidas was once more sent up to Susa — so natural had it now become for the Greeks to lay their fortunes at the feet of Persia — to request Persian aid in ending the war. g 11. Artaxerxes made no objections: each such appeal was a fresh rivet in the chain of his ascendancy. Early in 371 B.C. the deputies of the Grecian states were convened at 'ill IJ i V 4 138 SPAUTA AND TIIElJES. Sparta to hear the Great King's reply. It was in the main what it had been in 387 B.C., with this important alteration, that Athens and Sparta were now declared equal powers, and Sparta was no longer to be the sole instrument for enforcing the provisions of the peace. The Greek com- munities were to be autonomous, but Sparta was no longer to read this article of the peace in the light of her own interests. Advocated by the eloquence of the Athenian orators Callistratus and Callias, from the latter of whom it took its name, the peace was readily accepted by the Peloponnesian allies and by the Delian Confederacy, whose members swore to it, as did Athens and Sparta, severally. But Epameinondas claimed once more to swear to it in the name of all Boeotia ; to have done otherwise, to have sworn only in the name of Thebes and to have left the various other Boeotian communities to do the same each for itself, would have been to undo at a blow the entire results of the past seven years of struggling ; and this the Thebans had resolved not to do. They had fought to unify Boeotia, and they would maintain their right even in the face of all Greece ; for even if it led to war with Sparta, as they foresaw it would, the worst result could only be that which would also come from their immediate renunciation of their hegemony in Boeotia. The remaining deputies looked on in wonder and expectation ; Agesilaus, burning with his unsatiated hatred of Thebes, grew menacing. Thebes must swear for herself alone, he declared, or be excluded from the peace and be left the scapegoat of all Greece. "We will swear for ourselves alone," replied Epameinondas, *^ if you Spartans will also swear each for the five townships which make up your so-called city of Sparta ! " Agesilaus struck out the name of Thebes from the signatories. Thebes alone prevented the peaceful settlement of Hellas, and against it was directed at once the full levy of the Spartans and their allies, now encamped under Cleombrotus in Phocis. § 12. The whole Theban army, not more than 6000 hoplites in addition to cavalry, took up a position at Coronea, near the frontiers of Phocis, on the direct road by which it was expected that Cleombrotus would at once advance upon Thebes. That general, however, chose another THE PROGRESS OP THEBKS. 130 course : he moved to the south-east, so as to enter the Boeo- tian territories by way of Creusis, there picking up rein- forcements sent from the Peloponnese, and placing pickets at the various passes of Cithaeron. His army now raised to the number of about 11,000 men— nearly twice as large as that of his enemies— he moved upon Thespiae. He en- camped and entrenched himself upon the extreme north- western spur of Mount Cithaeron, immediately above Leuc- tra, a small township south-east of Thespiae and some ten miles west of Plataea. Upon the slope on the further side of the valley lay the Thebans. There was much doubting in their ranks : of the seven Boeotarchs, three were in favour of retreating at once and submitting to a siege within Thebes, but the dogged resolution of Epameinondas at last secured for him a majority of votes, and it was decided to accept battle upon the spot. As for Cleombrotus, the Spartans in his ranks— there were seven hundred of them — urged him to strike at once and for ever to crush the arrogance of Thebes. Epameinondas set in motion every means to encourage his men. Favourable presages were brought to the camp from the national oracles of Lebadea and Thebes ; and seeing close by the tomb of one Scedasus and his two maiden daughters, who had been done to death by the brutal violence of Spartans in by-gone days, Epamei- nondas welcomed it as an omen of victory, quoting an ancient oracle that the power of Sparta should fall upon the spot where fell the outraged maidens. But he had more reliable resources than those of superstition : he was now to put into practice those new tactics in which he had for so long been training his troops. Heretofore a Grecian battle had been a mere question of weight : the opposing forces joined issue simultaneously all along the line, and the heavier and more valorous at any point there carried the day. Man^uvring there was none to speak of. The reforms of Epameinondas mark a new era in the art of war : he converted his forces into a mobile and easily-handled machine, replacing mere weight by skill. § 13. The army of Cleombrotus fell in about noon, facing eastward, in the usual order : the hoplites stretched away eight deep along the slope, while the cavalry were posted in 140 SPARTA AND THEBES. front. Opposite lay the Thebans, seemingly in just such another line, likewise covered by their small squadrons of cavalry. It was impossible for Cleombrotus to know that Epameinondas had drawn away troops from his right and centre, and had massed them upon his left, to the unheard-of depth of fifty, and that behind this tremendous phalanx lay the Sacred Band, ready for use wherever required. Cleom- brotus' design was to utilize his superior numbers by surrounding the smaller Theban force : that of Epamei- nondas was to concentrate his whole force upon the enemy's right, where as usual were posted the Spartans. If those were once shattered he knew that the rest of the opposiog army would give him little trouble. The battle began with a cavalry charge by the horse of Cleombrotus ; but inefticient as they were numerous, these were driven back by the squadrons of Boeotian horse, and recoiled upon tbeir own infantry, thereby creating some confusion in the line. Before they could recover and re-form their ranks, the Peloponnesian hoplites found them- selves in action : the Theban phalanx was already at close quarters with the Spartans on the riglit, but to the bewilder- ment of the allies, they found themselves out of action. The right of the Theban army remained stationary, while the centre only advanced so far as to maintain the continuity between the right and left. While the Spartans were struggling desjierately against the full force of the Theban charge, their flanks assailed by the Sacred Band so as to render it impossilde for them to deploy to the right, the Peloponnesian allies stood idle and useless, held in check by the victorious Theban cavalry. It was not for long : Cleombrotus fell fighting, and with him Sphodrias and a dozen other captains; and the whole of the right wing broke and fled in fragments to the camp. Thither also the centre and left retreated and re-formed. This was the first battle of Thebes with her enemy, and it was brilliantly successful. On the field lay not less than 1000 Lacedaemonians, of whom full four hundred were pure Spartiates — more than one-half of the whole number engaged ', while amongst the slain there were to be found scarce any of the allies. So manifest was it that THE PROGRESS OF THEBES. 141 the quarrel of Thebes was with Sparta alone. Never very enthusiastic in support of Sparta's anti-Theban bias, the allies were now less so than ever ; and although the broken army even now outnumbered its conquerors, yet the svu-viv- Y' '>'■:-■ '^ BATTLE OF LEUCTRA. July 6, 371 v,s. A. Army of Cleombrotus : B. Theban Army before the action. a. Right wint,s Spartans. C. „ „ m action. b. Centre and left, AUies. ''. Phalanx of Epamemondas. f. Horse. <• Centre. f. Horse. \j. Sacred Band under Pelopidas. h. Right. ing Spartiates darel not risk another engagement. They confessed themselves defeated, and begged the usual truce of burial. A messenger was sent to bear the evil news to Sparta, while the victorious Thebans beset the camp on all sides and challenged their foe to further combat. It was July 6, 371 B.C. ^ CHAPTER IX. The Tiieban Supremacy. § 1. Prefatory.— § 2. Moral results of the Battle of Leuctra : Its effect upon Sparta.— § 3. Unification of Boeotia and formation of the Theban League.— § 4. Political results of Leuctra : Disruption of the Peloponnesian Confederacy : Kenewed pretensions of Atliens. — § 5. — Designs of Epanieinondas. — § 6. First invasion of Pelopon- nesus : Confederation of Arcadia. — § 7. The Thehans invade Laconia : Restoration of Messenia.— § 8. Alliance of Athens and Sparta : Second invasion of Peloponnesus. § 1. The battle of Leuctra destroyed at a blow tlic supremacy which Sparta had won by the defeat of Athens in tlie Peloponnesian War. During the throe-and-thirty years which had since elapsed, she had more than once been hard pressed by tlie allies whom her selfishness had driven to revolt. She had lost her naval supremacy in the battle of Cnidus (395 B.C.), and after that had suffered severely in the ci^dit years' desultory fi^'htiog of the Corinthian War. But the Peace of Antalcidas, forced on the Greeks mainly by Persian authority, had restored her again (387 B.C.), and she maintained her position until the unprincipled seizure of the Cadmea brought upon her that conflict with Thebes which culminated in her utter ruin at Leuctra. g 2. It is difficult to realize the feelings with which the Greek world heard of the result of this fight. The power of Sparta was broken, broken in fair field by an adversary nu- merically little more than half as strong, and broken for ever. That supremacy which had been slowly built up through the centuries since the first coming of tlie Dorians, which by long use had grown to be part and parcel of all political life ill the Peloponnese, and which had recently made itself a burdensome reality over tlie whole of central and northern 142 THE THEBAN SUPREMACY. 143 I- J and maritime Greece from Olynthus to Rhodes; tho supremacy which had not scrupled to find allies in the barbarians of Persia and the tyrants of Syracuse; was fallen so utterly that the same army which but twenty days previously had descended upon Boeotia in the confident expectation of vengeance, was now decimated, and cooped up within its camp by the heretofore contemned soldiery of Thebes. Throughout the length and breadth of Greece the message stirred up aspirations for liberty even amongst communities that had for years obeyed the behests of Sparta as some irresistible mandate of the gods. But the battle of Leuctra, if it threw down Sparta, involved all Greece in her ruin. The Spartan hegemony had been oppressive, bigoted, and utterly selfish, yet it was better than none at all. And now it fell indeed, but too late, for ere it fell it had wrought this mischief, that there was' left no single state able to take up the position which Sparta's fall left vacant. Epameinondas dreamed of uniting all Hellas under the liberal leadership of Thebes, but Hellas was now divided beyond all unification other than that brought about by compulsion, and Thebes was not strong enough to compel it either in point of military force or in moral weight. Unity was to return only in the train of an alien conqueror. Sparta had been a reckless and unskilled pilot, yet she had contrived by fair means or foul to keep the helm under her control ; after her fall the vessel of Hellenic political life drifted ever more aimlessly to ruin. , „ , ^ i- On the last day of the great festival of the Gymnopaedia the news reached Sparta : a king was slain, a whole army routed and besieged, more than a thousand Lacedaemonians lay dead side by side with four hundred of Sparta's nobility. Agesilaus might bethink him with vexation and sorrow how at length his *' lame reign " had undone his people. Never in the course of history had a king of Sparta been so powerful for good or evil; none had so blindly, yet strongly, misused his power ; and now he was left, the butt of a people's murmurings and superstition, to see proud Sparta thrown back within the borders of Laconia, more enfeebled than she had been since the semi-mythical age 144 SPARTA AND THEBES. of Lycurgus. He was to see yet worse ills than this : the *' wasps " were soon to be attacked even in their nast and forced to fight for bare existence. The Ephors suffered the festival to run its course before they proclaimed the evil news. They forbade excessive mourning for the dead ; all the living of serviceable age were at once called to arms. Not the old men or the magistrates were excepted from the army with which Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, hurried to rescue the sur- vivors of Leuctra. There joined him a sorry remnant of the Peloponnesian allies, but he dared not march by way of the Isthmus. He crossed by sea to Creusis, a Boeotian seaport on the Corinthian Gulf, and Cleomhrotus' last acquisition, whore he learnt that the defeated army was already retiring under treaty. He overtook it at Aegosthena in Megaris, and hurried back to Sparta. By Lycurgean law he who survived a defeat was a disgraced man, one whom the passer-by might strike if he but wore a smile, and for whom public life had henceforth no honours or rewards : what was to be done with the three hundred survivors of Leuctra, many of them born of the chief families of the state, and all of them of tenfold value to her after the loss of so many of her best warriors ? To visit upon them the full penalty of Lycurgus' law would be to foment yet a new trouble and to drive them over, like so many Cinadons, to the side of the perioecs and helots, to whom Leuctra came as an omen of revenge long deferred, and a summons to strike for freedom while their masters' arms were nerveless. For once the laws must be disregarded, and by special decree the fugitives from Leuctra were spared all public rocojfnition of their defeat. §"3. In the flush of their victory the Thebans thought of nothing less than destroying or taking prisoners the whole remaining Spartan force which they kept besieged in their camp beneath Cithaeron ; and to this end they sent instant summons to their ally, Jason of Pherae, to bring to their aid troops sufficient to enable them, to eflfect their purpose. In the first terror which had fallen upon all the allies of Sparta, Jason marched without hindiance across Phocis into Boeotia, and united his forces with those THE Til EC AN SUPREMACY. 145 of Epameinondas. But Jason w\as a statesman not less shrewd, if less liberal, than Epameinondas : he was rejoiced to see Sparta humbled, but he had no wish to see her place taken at once by Thebes. Thebes was to him a useful ally, but he was by no means inclined to make her too powerful to continue such. Therefore he urged that it would be better for the Thebans to dismiss their humbled foes under treaty : by so doing they would make friends amongst the Peloponnesian allies who formed the larger part of the number, would inflict upon Sparta a humiUation more lasting than any mere defeat, and would avoid heaven's wrath for an abuse of good fortune. These arguments were seconded by Epameinondas, who was too large minded a Greek to cherish the wish for petty vengeance over his fellow Greeks. Their conjoint counsels prevailed : the remnant of the Spartan army marched away by night, greatly to the satisfaction of the half-hearted allies, and the Thebans turned their wrath against those of the Boeotians who still clung to the Spartans' side. On the eve of Leuctra the Thespian contingent in the Theban ranks had taken advantage of the offer of Epameinondas to quit the field, so sure were they of Sparta's victory. Now Thespiae was rased, and its population dismissed to join the fugitive Plataeans at Athens.^ Only the earnest representations of Epameinondas prevented the same punishment overtaking Orchomenus: Thebes, he said, must use her new-born power well, and set an example of moderation which, by its contrast with that of Sparta, would win over the hearts of all Greeks. Orchomenus was spared. Thereafter the envoys of Thebes passed through all the states of Central Greece, proclaiming the overthrow of Spartan rule and ofl*ering in its place the more generous alliance of their own city. Acarnania, the Epicnemidian and Opuntian Locrians, Euboea, the town of Heraclea by the pass of Thermopylae, and even the Phocians, joined this league ; and m token ot the new era now dawning Epameinondas caused to be summoned the ancient Amphictyony of Central Greece. It met at Delphi, and its first act was to pass upon Sparta a formal condemnation for seizing the Cadmea (382 b.c ) m time of peace, and even during the celebration of a holy L G. 404—302. 146 St'ARTA AND THEBES. festival. For this she was adjudged to pay a fine of fiv« hundred talents. Of course Sparta took no notice of tins indgment, whereupon the fine was doubled, but stdl re- mained unpaid. None the less Epamcinondns had gained his object. He had proclaimed Thebes the champion ot Central Greece and of the rights of the Delphian god ; he had made the oracle, despite the bonds of blood and policy which united the Delphians to their fellow Dorians, sub- servient to his political aims, and had rid it of its old dependence upon Sparta; and he had obtained a public proclamation upon religious grounds of Sparta's wrongdoing and of the legality of Thebes' revolt against her. But this revival of the Amphictyonic assembly, and its abuse as a political agent, were destined within a generation to work havoc with the liberties of Greece, although none saw it as yet, and although Epameinondas would have scouted the charge of any such intention. § 4. The consolidation of the power of Thebes in Central Greece, the formation of her new alliances, and beyond all else the unccn-tainty of Jason's intentions, kept Epnmeinondas engaged until Lite in 370 B.C., more than a ye.ir after the battle of Leuctra. Meantime the Ptloponnese was shaken from one end to the other by the party-feuds consequent upon the overthrow of Sparta, the subversion of the oligarchical ^governments which leaned upon her for support, and the lack of any fitting and acceptable head about whom her late allies could gather. Just as the decarchies and harmosties had disappeared from the islands and further sh )res of the Aegean after the battle of Cnidus and the fall of Sparta's naval supremacy, so now after Leuctra and the overthrow of her territorial power they vanished from the communities of the Peloponnesus. Only amongst the ancient Dorian settlements along the northern frontier of Argolis and about the Isthmus— at Phlius, Sicyon, Troezen, Epidaurus, Hermione, and Corinth— did Spartan influence maintain itself. The Achaeans remained impassive, while the Eleans and Arcadians became openly hostile. Even m the Dorian towns of Phlius, Corinth, and Sicyon, the pbilo-Spartan oligarchies had to struggle desperately for their ascendency, and if in the Arcadian Orchomenus and THE THEBAN SUPREMACY. 147 Ileraea the oligarchs were successful they remained isolated exceptions amid the general revolution in Arcadian senti- ment. The leaders in the revolt against Sparta were the Mantineans, who took instant advantage of their enemies' weakness to rebuild the town which Agesipolis had des- troyed (385 B.C.). Their example infected their kinsmen far and wide. For years the Arcadians had lived in tlieir mountain country without any pretence of political unity, their petty jealousies and rooted love of independence being fostered by Spartan diplomacy as the surest guarantee of their national weakness and their subservience to her purposes. Even now Spart a's case was not wholly desperate, if but Tegea, her ancient ally in the south of Arcadm, would remain loyal. But here too the spirit of liberty asserted itself : there was a brief collision between the supporters of Sparta under Stasippus and the revolutionists, which was decided in favour of the latter by the aid of the Mantineans. Thereupon, with the exception of Orchomenus and Heraea, the whole of Arcadia, as far as the very borders of Laconia, stood united in its new-found freedom. At Argos there occurred a sedition which, with the possible exception of the " Terror " in Corcyra during the Pelopon- nesian war, surpassed any heretofore known in the annals of Grecian states. From the earliest times a swoin enemy of Sparta, the city was governed at this date by an oligarchy. Alarmed for its safety by the general spread of anti- oligarchic feeling in Greece, the government was meditating repressive measures when the democratic party became suspicious. In a popular rij^ing there were slain no less than twelve hundred of the governing class, nor did the ferocity of the revolution spend itself until it had also made victims of the very leaders who had excited it. This sedition was spoken of as' the " Scytalism," from the club used as a weapon by the rioters ; and it affords a notable illustration of the growing savagery of political feeling and the deteriora- tion of Greek vwrale. At Athens the episode created so intense a disgust that the assembly, on hearing of the news, was at once ordered to be purified. Sparta lay helpless and passive ; the Thebans were still busied in Central Greece ; and in the confusion which over- US SPARTA AND THEBES. whelmed smaller states Athens once more asserted herself. Already jealous of the growth of the power of Thebes Lofore the day of Leiictra, she was doubly so when the herald brought tlie tidings of that great triumph. She would have nothing to do with any Theban alliance, con- corning herself rather with eftbrts to countervail the rise of the new power upon her borders. To very few of the Creeks could the supremacy of Thebes be welcome, and Sparta was now too weak to hold her own : Athens had a splendid opportunity to win the headship over the Pflopon- nese, and her envoys were forthwith despatched to offer her alliance to such of the southern states as felt the need of union and the lack of a guiding power. Thus was formed early in 370 B.C. an alliance af Athens, Elis, and Argos. § 5. Scarcely had this alliance been concluded when Epameinondas found himself free at last to turn his attention to the Peloponnese. With his large and liberal views, he saw that he must seek to replace by another that unity which he had shattered ; but whereas the union under Spartan rule had been constrained and abused, the union under Thebes was to be generous and voluntary. And to secure it, Epameinondas had to follow up the work only half completed on the field of Leuctra : he must show himself able to deal with Sparta in her own stronghold, must champion the cause of her revolted subjects even at her very gates, and must so organise the Peloponnese that she should never again be able to pose as a mistress there. He it was, doubtless, who by his assurances of support had encouraged the Arcadians to their revolt : now he set him- self to unify Arcadia, and place it as one nation in the path of any further Spartan aggressions. This was one of his purposes in his southward march. Another was to penetrate even into the heart of Laconia, to Sparta the inviolate itself, and to hold up to the gaze of all her emancipated subjects the utter impotence of the state to which they had bowed down. And he had yet a third design— a design more noble, more statesmanlike, and more far-reaching than either of the others: he purposed to restore the Messeni&ns to their homes and to their place amongst the peoples of Greece, and in so doing to rob Sparta beyond THE THEBAN SUrREMACY. 1!0 recovery of the best portion of her soil, planting upon it men who cherished against her the hatred accumulated in two centuries of exile and servitude. & 6 It was time that he should show himselt in the Peloponnese, for the Spartans had at length ventured to lift their heads anew. Agesilaus had taken the field against the Arcadians, more especially against the Mantineans. Too weak to prevent by force the reconstruction ot the town of Mantinea, the Ephoralty had in vain endeavoured to get it viewed as a voluntary concession on the part ot Sparta: but when they saw the Mantineans straining every nerve to unite Arcadia in arms, when they saw then- last and most loyal ally Tegea torn from them by Mantinean help, it seemed imperative to make some prohibitive de- monstration. Accordingly, before the Theban army could appear, Agesilaus led his weak column into the territories of Mantinea, and for three days ravaged the country. Ihe new town was built in such fashion that it was no longer possible to take it speedily, as Agesipolis had done by damming up a stream, and, in any case, Agesilaus had not the time for any attempt upon it. At the first news of the advance of Epameinondas he withdrew to Sparta, bo tar had the glories of his people fallen that he found material for self-praise in thus having for three days wrought his will upon the crops and orchards of the handtul of men ot Mantinea. . , i j • j. When, a few days later, Epameinondas marched into Arcadia at the head of a picked army from Thebes and her new allies of Central and Northern Greece— Thessalians, Euboeans, Acarnanians, Locrians, and others-the entire levy of Arcadia, now busied with attacks upon the recalci- trant towns of Heraea and Orchomenus, flocked to his standard, and raised his whole force to a total of more than 40 000 men. The new aspirations of the Arcadians, in- flamed and directed by Lycomedes of Mantinea, a wealthy and capable man, but lacking in the selflessness of a true leader, had already taken shape in the foundation of a city which was to be the capital of united Arcadia. ^ Under the name of Megalopolis this newest of Greek cities occupied the largest plain of the central Peloponnesus, the valley 150 SPARTA AND TOEBES. watered by the Ilelisson, a tributary of the Alpheiis ; and, lying twenty miles westward of Tegea, it blocked the outlet from Laconia by way of the Eurotas valley, as Tegea blocked that along the western slopes of Mount Parmon. To this day its ruins attest the excellence of its architects and the magnificent scale upon which it was planned. Here was the Parliament House of the new state, where was to meet the representative assembly, known as the Ten Thousand. No fewer than forty Arcadian communities sent settlers and representatives to the new city ; but tho unwieldy size of the assembly, while intended to emphasise the republican equality of \all, soon proved fatal to any conjoint action. We cannot say how far Epameinondas was directly responsible for the creation of Megalopolis and the organisation of Arcadia : certainly tho position of the city shows tho judgment of a thorougli statesman. § 7. The arrival of the army of Tliebes served to stamp with the approval of that power the revolt of Arcadia. But Epameinondas had seen in the recent march of Agesilaus upon Mantinea a sign of that renewal of Spartan aggressions which it was his first object to render impossible. Seconded by the eager enthusiasm of his Arcadian allies, he now threw down the gauntlet as no leader had ever thrown it before : he crossed the northern frontier of Laconia by four different passes, and concentrated his army at Sellasia, near the eastern bank of the Eurotas, eight miles north of Sparta. Having burnt that town he moved southwards, and crossed the bridge which formed the means of com- munication between the eastern bank and Sparta. The Spartans were now at bay indeed. Never before had an invader violated their homeland ; never had tho women of Sparta seen the camp-fires of an enemy ; never had tho perioecs and helots received so secure a summons to one unanimous rising against their oppressors ; never had the Spartiates— the carnage of Leuctia had reduced them to less than two thousand men— been so feeble and so few. But at this crisis Agesilaus stood up to redeem the ruin which his policy had brought upon his country. His un- tiring energy was a match for treasons within and general- ship ^vithout. The promise of manumission brought into THE TIIEFAN SU PRIM ACT. 151 his ranks six thousand perioecs and helots, and despite the numerous desertions to Epameinondas he was able to hold every approach to the unwalled city. Perhaps the Theban general had no great desire to blot out the name of Sparta for ever: he felt that he had now degraded her beyond hope of immediate recovery, and he knew that to rase her would be to bring upon himself the speedy loathing of all Greece. Nevertheless, he had made her humiliation complete, when, after crosMiig o the western bank of the river at Amyclae, he sudden y turned about, not without seeing his cavalry severely handled by an ambuscade of the desperate " wasps, and marched clown the whole length of the Eurotas valley, ravaging and destroying on every side Gythium, the arsenal and port of Laconia, he took and occupied with a Theban garrison. Thence he passed westward into Messenia to carry out the third and greatest of his designs. Already he had summoned to his standard all the dispersed remnant of the Messenian nation. From Rhegium and Messene, from Hesperidcs in Libya, they came back burning with loni£i'a;i', iroXXwu ^c ^tvyovTtav. (p) H[ ^ '■« elpriyrjv jjiev ex^iy ojg irpog dXXt'iXovg, aTTuvai Be tnl ra eavTwy iKciaTovg TrXrjy rwy rpuiKovra kol rujy eyhKci Koi ru)y ey Ueipaiei ap^dynoy diKa. 99. Translate and explain, adding dates : — (a) AepKvXi^ag — dvrjp BoKUjy cimi jidXa fir}\ayiK6g^ koi iKaXelTO ^c ^i/ dhaKpvg fjdxv- (d) ETrei yc fiijv EKE'iycg ETTEfTEy, ol Xonrol ovdk Tf] y'lKrj opdwg ETL E^vydadrjfTay x/^^/fl^ao■0at, dXXd ^ MATBICULATION, JANUARY 1S95— (continued), Vergil. — Aeneid, Book V. [Uniform with Aeneid III. (see p. 1) in price and arrangement of Parts.] " Of the notes, tlie index of proper names, and the appendix, we cannot speak too highly." — School Board Chronicle. 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