MASTER NE A TIVE NO 92-80652-1 MICROFILMED 1993 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project" Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code - concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or other reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.'* If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR: PRICE, DR. TITLE: FREE DISCUSSION OF THE DOCTRINES OF... Jl M^/\ C/ Mlt • LONDON DATE: 1778 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT BIBLIOCRAPHIC MTrRQFORM TARHFT Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record -Eimaxd r? ^'""^ I Joseph,. 1733- 1804-. Tre.e. discuissfon of Ihe. . .'■^e.e. discMssion of Ihe. docl-rmes ot Weri-^Urio T,r,d philo5ophfc-nl necessify dwchori... 350047 [^ ^ idwch'ori... 350047 ^Londojn lfI78. 0. J, f 4^ + ^^9 p. Master Negative # Restrictions on Use: TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA FILM SIZE: IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA {Tl DATE FILMED: ^-* 7 REDUCTION RATIO: IB ^13_ INITIALS //x FILMED BY: RESEARCH P UBLICAfmM:^^ INC WOnnRRTnnpTT" BIBLIOGRAPHIC IRREGULARITIES 1 .1 ; .11 MAIN ENTRY; ?^>ai^ P/P. Bibliographic Irregularities in the Original Document List volumes and pages affected; include name of institution if filming borrowed text. Page(s) missing/not available: yolumes(s) missing/not available:. .Illegible and/ or damaged page(s):. Page(s) or volumes(s) misnumbered:. Bound out of sequence: Page(s) or illustration(s) filmed from copy borrowed from: Qj^Acuse. Other: : -i ! . .: '\ • : » I FILMED IN WHOLE OR PART FROM A COPY BORROWED FROM SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY c Association for Information and image Management 1100 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 12 3 4 iiiliiiiiiiiilniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii M M I M M M M 5 6 liiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiilii n I 7 8 iiiliiiiliiiiliii rrr 9 I. m 10 11 12 13 14 15 mm iiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiilini[ Hiimii|ii|ii| Inches 1.0 I.I 1.25 m 2.8 :iii 5 6 3.2 IJ. 3.6 1*° r 1.4 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 MRNUFRCTURED TO fillM STRNDRRDS BY RPPLIED IMRGE. INC. ^V T i#(. -/■ L^V * ^^M:^^y*^i^i--i ^**^;::j« , ,« _*x>,>-j^\^. 'Jl'-^f ' ft^sfii;^'"*'* i'ii ^: :->• i * • »^ . •' C ■ ;- ■,.■*•-.*■:■* ^V;' r ■*"%■*.- ;-v;^S.f o»-- ■vi,(fti;k.-^ . 1 '•...■^^-:v ^^' ^■f ^^^ ^i*^€>;^- Lis >^)- ' ^vrv*'^At*i*j5pts^«^t£titx|t^c Iri^la^'jfiitg^/i rll/iia. ^J;.i j Columbia tBnitif «itp LIBRARY • • • t • • « I > I • I .... ■ t • 1 1 ■ • • • « t • • • I t , > • • • I > I FREE DISGT7S-SIGN OF THE DOCTRINES OF MATERIALISM, AND Philosophical Necessity, In a Correspondence between Dr. PRICE AND Dr. PRIESTLEY. By TO WHICH are added, Dr. PRIESTLEY, An INTRODUCTION, Explaining the Nature of the Controversy, and LETTERS to feveral Writers who have animadverted on his Disquisitions re- lating to Matter and Spirit, or his Treatise on Necessity. Together let us beat this ample Field, . Be candid where we can. But vindicate the Ways of God to Man. POTE. LONDON: Printed for J. Johnson, No. 72, St. Paul's Church.Yard, and T. Cadell, in the Strand, M.DCCLXXVIII. • • • ■ • • • ' * • • • • < • • * I f\ 1 T THE DEDICATION. To JOHN LEE, Efq, O F LINCOLN's-INN. Dear Sir, I TAKE the liberty to prefent to you, not in the charader of an advocate, but in that of 2i friend, and ^ judge, a produdion that is in part my own, and in part that of our common and excellent friend Dr. Price. Though you are em- ployed in the practice of a particu- lar profeffion, your education, and ftudies, have by no means been con- a 2 fined ■m "f -"w V ''*'<-' "'• THE DEDICATION. fined to it, but you have extended your inquiries to all fubjeds that are interefting to men^ to citizensy and to chrijlians. My objed in the prefent publi- cation, as well as in thofe which have preceded it, is to overturn, as far as my endeavours can efted it, what I deem to be a prejudice of the greateft antiquity, and the deep- eft rooted, of any that have con- tributed to debafe chriftianity, and a corruption which, in this philo- fophical age, calls the loudeft for reformation. And though this will neceffarily deftroy fome flattering hopes refpeding our profpeds after death, they are fuch as are ill found- ed ; and it will draw our attention more ftrongly to thofe more certaitij though more difiant profpeds, that chriftianity holds out to us. Our THE DEDICATION. Our friend, however, confiders my endeavours in a light unfavour- able and hoftile to chriftianity, and overturning not fuppofed, but real foundations. As truth will finally prevail over all oppofition, time (though we may not live to fee the iffue) will difcovcr whether my zeal in attacking, or his in defending, is better founded ; and as our inten- tions, I believe, are equally upright, our difcuftion truly amicable, and confequently truth^ not viEiory^ our objedl, it will be equally (or, to make allowance for a little human frailty, it will, I hope, be as near as pofiible equally) acceptable to us both, on which fide foever it be found. You, who have an equal friend (hip for us both, will not, on this account, be biafled on one fide more than on the other ; and which- ever way any of our friends incline, as we are confident we {hall not lofe THE DEDICATION. lofe their efteem, fo, we can affure them, they will not lofe ours. Intricate as the difcuflion of fuch queftions as thefe is, there is a pe- culiar pleafure attending the fpecu- lations ; and from the relation they bear to the greateft of all objeds, they have a dignity and fublimity in them, and eminently contribute to in- fpire zfere?7ity and elevation of mind ^ which both improves and enlarges it, and thereby enables us to look down upon the trifling but torment- ing purfuits of a buflling world. I have no occafion to defcribe to you the fatisfadion that arifes from the rational ufe of the human facul- ties, a freedom Irom vulgar and de- basing prejudices, and the habitual contemplation of great and impor- tant fubjedls ; and alfo from fuch a courfe of reading, and fuch a choice of THE DEDICATION. of company, as tends to keep up that right bent^ ^wdifirmnefs of mind, which a neceffary intercourfe with the world would otherwife warp and relax. He who can have, and truly enjoy, the fociety of fuch men as Dr. Price, Mr. Lindfey, and Dr. Jebb, cannot envy the condition of princes. Such fellowfhip is the true baifam of life; its cement is in- finitely more durable than that of the friendfhips of the world, and it looks for its proper fruit, and com- plete gratification, to the life beyond the grave. I think myfelf happy in being able to call myfelf one of fuch a fraternity ; and wifliing to perpetu- ate, as far as may be in my power, the memory of fuch friendfhips, and efpecially that with yourfelf, which is now of long ftanding, and has 't THE DEDICATION. has been ftrengtliened by a variety of ties, I fubfcribe myfelf, Dear Sir, Your countryman, friend, and fellow chriftian, J. PRIESTLEY, Galne, Aug. 24, 1778. THE «MM THE INTRODUCTION. THIS work, it will be owned, exhibits an uncommon, if not a Angular fpedacle, viz. that of two perfons difcuiTing, with the moft perfca freedom and candour, quef- tions which are generally deemed of the greateft confequence in pradice, and which are certainly fo in theory. The occafion of it was as follows. When my Difquifitions, &c. was printed off, I put it, as I have ob- ferved, into the hands of feveral of my friends, both well and ill affeded ^ to 11 THE INTRODUCTION. THE INTRODUCTION, in to my general hypotheiis, that I might take the advantage of their remarks, in an additional flieet of IlluJlrationSy which is accordingly annexed to the firft volume. Among others, Dr. Price vi^as fo obliging as to enter in- to a more particular difcuffion of feveral of the fubjefts of the work ; and afterwards, imagining that I meant to write a dired anfwer to his remarks, he expreffed a wifh that I would print them at large, together with any notice that I fhould think proper to take of them. This, I told him, did not fall within my views with refped to that particular publication, but that I would take the liberty to propofe another fcheme, which I thought would correfpond with both our views, and be ufeful to others who might wi£h to fee the arguments on borii lides freely canvailed, without the the mixture of any thing perfonal, or foreign to the fubjed, which often conftitutes a great part of the bulk of controverlial writings, and tends to divert the mind from an attention to the real merits of the queftion in debate. It was, that he ihould re-write his remarks, after feeing what ufe I had already made of them in my fheet of Illujirations ; that I would then reply to them diftindlyj article by article, that he fhould remark, and I reply again, &c. till w^e fhould both be fatisfied that we had done as much juftice as we could to our feveral arguments, frankly acknowledging any miftakes we might be convinced of, and then publifli the whole jointly. To this propofal he chcarfully ac- ceded, chu/ing only that the remarks he had already fent ihould ferve as a balls, and that, to avoid repetitions, b 2 I I (,;. rv THE INTRODUCTION'. I might refer to my Illujlratiom in my fifft reply. He added, howevery certain ^eries, that by my anfwers to them he might perceive more dif- tinftly in what refpeds my ideas really differed from his. Accord- ingly I replied to his remarks, and anfwered his queries, with as much explicitnefs as I poflibly could ; and in the courfe of the correfpondence propofed others to him, with the fame view, and likewife, in order to bring into a fmall compafs, my ob- jections to the commonly received hypothecs. In this manner, at our leifure, and without communicating with any third perfon, we exchanged our rejnarh and replies^ till it ap- peared to us needlefs to advance any thing farther. In this ftate we fub- mit the refult of our difcuffion to the judgment of the public, wiftiing that they may attend to it with the lame THE INTRODUCTION. ▼ fame coolnefs and candour with which we ourfelves have written. Our readers will obferve that this difcuffion refpefts all the fubjefls of my Difquifitions^ except the dodlrine of the pre-exijlence of Chriji. But though this be the point to which all that I have written tends ; it be- ing the capital inference that I make from the do(9:rines of materialifm, pe- ^ netr ability of matter^ and necejftty (thefe being, in my idea, parts of the fame fyftem) Dr. Price thought it was a fubjed that had been fo much de- bated, that it would be needlefs to enter into it, I will here acknowledge, that in propofing this fcheme, I was not without a farther view, which was, that among fo many angry opponents as I expedled, I might fecure a friendly one, and at the fame time one who b 3 could X vi THE INTRODUCTION, could not but be acknowledged to be capable of doing ample juftice tq his argument as any writer of the age. I had pledged myfelf to go through with this bufmefs, replying to every thing that Ihould appear de- ferving of notice ; and it was much more agreeable to me to urge all that I had to fay in letters to a can- did friend, than in tart replies to an angry difputant. And I thought that, according to the law of arms, and modern honour, when I had fairly engaged with one antagonift on this fcore, 1 Ihould be more eafily excufed encountering another. The reader, however, will find that I have not entirely availed myfelf of this privilege ; for though I have not entered minutely into the argument, which would have been mere tauto- logy, I have noticed fuch other op- ponents as have appeared fince the publication of my work. And though THE INTRODUCTION. vii I think I may now be excufed from replying to any others in a feparate publication, I will promife that, in any new edition either of the £)^ qutfitmis themfelves^ or of this work, I will take more or lefs notice of every thing that fhall come out in the mean time, and that fhall ap- pear to myfelf and my friends to deferve it; and I will publifh all fuch additions feparately, To do more would, I think, be tedious with re/ped to the Public, and unneceflary in itfelf. As many perfons unverfed in con-^ troverfies on the fubjed of religion (and I wifh I could not fay the fame of fome who are verfed in them,) will be apt to entertain a confufed notion about the nature and ifftpor- tame of the queftions that are here difcufTcd, it may not be amifs to '^'- plain, with fome diftindlnefs, tlu b 4 I'LIL- viH THE INTRODUCTION- it {Lould be pretty much at large, what the nature and importance of them really are, and to give our readers a plain rule by which to form a judgment in other cafes of a limi- lai nature. I muft aflume as a maxim, that the object and end of all jpeculatmt is praEiice^ and that, in matters of religion, opinions are on no other account worth contending for than as they influence the heart and the life. If this be allowed me, I think I can eafily fatisfy my readers, that they have no reafon to be alarmed about the tendency or iflue of this debate, notwithft/nding all the da- mour it has, in difterent ages, and even at preient, excited. That the general interefts of vir- tue will be efFedlually fecured by the belief of a fuficient recompence in a THE INTRODUCTION. IX future life, for all that has been well or ill done in this, will hardlv be denied. Now this is equally taken for granted both by Dr. Price and myfelf. We even believe this day of recompence to take place at the fame period, viz. at the general re- fur reEi ion ; when " all that are in " the graves fliall hear the voice of " the fon of man, and fhall arife ; " fome to the refurredion of life, " and others to the refurredion of " condemnation." The advantage, therefore, that either of our fchemes can have over the other, muft arife principally from the truth and confiftency of fuch opinions as are ufed in fupport of the great dodlrine of future retribution ; on which account one of us may be fuppofed to give a more firm and unwavering affent to that pradical dodrine, and to be in lefs danger of X )y X THE INTRODUCTION. of abandoning it. Or one fet of opinions may be fuppofed to exhibit our maker, or ourfelves, in a light more proper to excite and keep up a juft fenfe of devotion ; confifting of the fentiments of love, reverence and truft in God, and alfo to im- prefs the mind with a ftronger feeling of benevolence towards our fellow creatures. It muft be added, alfo, that one fet of moral and metaphyfical prin- ciples, by exhibiting every thing about which we qre convcrfant, and to which our fpeculations can extend, in fuch a manner as fhall imprefs the mind with ideas o{ fnnplicityy com- frehenjivenefsy Jymmetry^ beauty-, &c. may give the mind more pleafure in the contemplation of it, and confe- quently create a ftronger attachment to it, and in forae meafure heighten the finer feeling.s of virtue. But THE INTRODUCTION. xi But thefe are matters in which the bulk of mankind have certainly very little to do; and as the effed of thefe views of things depends, in a great meafure, upon our own per- Juafton concerning them, it cannot be eafy to determine what fyftem of fpeculative opinions has the moft of thefe leiTer advantages. We all claim them, and are too apt to think the fyfteni of our adverfaries deftitute of tficm; fo much fo, that we often think it impoflible to contem- plate it with any degree of fatisfac- tion, or without fenfations of pain and difguft. Now the fa5i of this perfuafion being generally mutual is a proof that there is a great deal of imagination in it. Why then fhould we difpute about thefe matters, with any other difpofition, than that with which we ufually difcufs other fub- jedts of tafie \ and we do not quarrel with our neighbours if they happen not >l m0 THE INTRODUCTION. THE INTRODUCTION. xiu to think as favourably of our houfes, gardens, pidures, wives, or children, as we do ourfelves. All that is worth confidering, therefore, in this cafe, is whether any cf the opinions contended for by Dr. Price and myfelf will, if proved to be falfe, weaken our fiith in the great dodrine of a future ftate of retribution, or indifpofe the heart to the love of God or ot man. Having ftated thefc preliminaries, let us conlider feparately the nature and effects of the different opinions we hold with refpecl to the penetra- bility of matter^ the doElrine of the fouli and of pbilofophical necejftty. That matter has, or that it has not, the property of impenetrability has no afped whatever with rcfpcd to morals and theology ; but as mat- ter ter being fuppofed to be poffefTed of it, may be confidered as an argu- ment againft its being endued with the properties of perception and thought^ thofe different properties be- ing apprehended to be incompatible • But I think it will be generally . acknowledged, that there can be no objeaion to matter, as I defcribe ^ and conceive of it, being capable of thought, fo that one fubftance may admit of all the properties of man ; and its being favourable to this hypothecs is the circumftance that gives me a bias towards it : becaufe it is with reludance that I can admit the intimate union and mutual atlion of two fubflances, fo different from one another as matter iLndfpirity are defined to be, in the conflitution of one beings i. e. man. To fuppofe man ^ to be all matter^ or all fpirit, will, of itfelf, be allowed to be an advan- tage k; " J SIV THE INTRODUCTION. tage in point of fpeculation, pro- vided the thing itfelf be pofTible, and agreeable to appearances. The proper advantage derived froni the dodrine of a foul^ or the hy- pothecs of the perceptive and think- inof powers of man refiding in a fub- ftance diftindl from his body, is that it will not be affeded by the death of the body, but will pafs into a ftate of recompence when the body is in the grave. This doftrihe is> therefore, in fad, nothing more thari a provifion againft a failure in the arguments for the fcripture doctrine of the refurreSiion of the deady and confequently does not affed a chrif- tian, who, as fuch, firmly believes that dodrine. On the contrary, the dodrine of a foul places the evidence of a future life on a foundation quite different from III THE INTRODUCTid>?. xf from that on which revelation places it ; which always reprefents the re- furreSiion of the dead (founded on the promife of God, confirmed by the refurredion of Chrift) as the ob- jeft of all our future hopes, and never fuggefts the idea of the foul, or the percipient and adive part of man, being in one place, and the body in another. The dodlrine of a foul is, indeed, '^ generally reprefented as coming in aid of the chriftian dodrine of a fu- ture life, and that would be the cafe if it fupplied another argument for the fame thing ; but here the things themfelves are different: for the confcious ftate of t\\& feparate foul h not the refurredion of the whole man j and according to the fcripture, the rewards of virtue and the punifli- ments of vice do not commence till the day of judgment; fo that the chriflian m\ i xvi THE INTRODUCTION- chriftian believes one thingy and the mere theift another. This, however, has nothing to do with any thing in debate between Dr. Price and myfelf ; the difference between us being chiefly this. He fuppofes that the powers of percep- tion and thought refide in an im- material fubftance, but that the ex- ercife of thefe powers is made to de- pend on the organization of the body ; whereas I fuppofe thefe pow- ers to refide in the organized body itlelf, and therefore miTft be fufpend- ed till the time when the organiza- tion fliall be reftored. This 1 think can never be conceived to be a dif- ference of much importance, all the confequences being the very fame. The confideration that biafes me, as a chriftian, exclufive of philo- fophical confiderations, againft the dodrine THE INTRODUCTION, xvii dodrine of a feparate foul, is that it has been the foundation of what appears to me to be the very groffeft corruptions of chrijiianityy and even of that very antichrijiianifmy that began to work in the apoftles' times, and which extended itfelf fo ama- zingly and dreadfully afterwards j I mean the oriental philofophy of the ^ pre-exijle^tce of foulsy which drew after it the belief of the pre-exiftence ^ and divinity of Chrift, the worlhip of Chrift and of dead men, and the dodrine of purgatory, with all the popifh dodrines and pradices that are conneded with them and fup- ported by them. Among thefe I rank the dodrine ^ of atonement for the fins of men by the fufferings or death of Chrift. For I think it will be allowed, that had Chrift never been confidered as any other than a mere man (though the c moft xvm THE INTRODUCTION. K 1 moft diftinguiflied prophet, or mef- fenger from God to man) it would never have been imagined that his fufFerings could have had the efFed that has been afcribed to them, and confequently the doArine of the pro- per placability^ and free-mercy of God would not have been impeached. Alfo, what would it have fignified to contend for the tranfmutation of bread and wine into the real body and blood of Chrift, if Chrift had been a mere man, and confequently his flefli and blood nothing more than the flefh and blood of Mofes, John the Baptift, or any other man. As a Chrijliariy therefore, and a Protejiantj I am an enemy to the dodrine of a feparate foul. One who believes in a foul tnay 7wt^ but one who difbelievcs that doctrine cannot be, a papift. At the fame time I readily acknowledge that this bias may THE INTRODUCTION. xl^c may carry a man too far, even to re- jed dodrines eflential to chriftianity, though held by papifts. But this objedion has no weight here. I iliall not enlarge upon this topic ; but it would be eafy to fhow, that almoft every thing that has been re- prefented as moft abfurd and mif- chievous in the faith of chriftians, and what, of courfe, has been the caufe, or pretence, of a great part of the infidelity of the philofophical world, in the prefent age, muft be laid to the door of this one article. It is evident, therefore, that a chriftian has, at leaft, no reafon to be biaffed in favour of the dodrine of a foul, and may, without concern, leave it to philofophical difcuffion. With thofe who do not believe the dodrine of an intermediate ftate, c 2 . and I , N 1 ; n i XX THE INTRODUCTION. and myfelf, the difFerence between a foul^nA nofouly in my opinion, nearly vaniflies: for according to them, though it be a fubftance diftind from the body, it is altogether incapable of fenfation, or aftion, but in con- jundion with the body. There only remains the doctrine of necejftty^ with refped to which the difference of opinion between Dr. Price and me can be thought of much importance. But even here our difference of opinion is not fuch as to affed: our expectation of a fu- ture ftate of retribution. For what- ever we apprehend to be the founda- tmi or ground of future recom pence, we equally believe both iht faB and the propriety of it. To me it feems fufficient, that men be volimtary agentSy or that motives, luch as hopes and fears, can influence them in a ccrtuiri and mechanical manner, to make THE INTRODUCTION. xxi make it in the higheft degree rights and wife in the Divine Being to lay fuch motives before them, andconfcquent- ly to place them in a ftate of moral difcipline, or a ftate in v/hich rewards and pvfnifhments are diftributed, fo as to correfpond to certain characters, and actions. By this means, and by this means only, can his great objed, the happinefs of his intelligent off- ipring, be fecured. And one prin- cipal reafon why I rejedl the doc- trine of philofophical liberty, is that exactly in the degree in which we fuppofe the mind not to be deter- mined by motives, in that very de- gree do rewards and punifliments lofe "Jieir effed, and a man ceafes to be a proper fubjed of moral difci- pline, At the fame time that I fecure this great advantage, which is of a practical nature, I think it is a con- c 3 Uderation ' *i'ii \ * ^ :i xxu THE INTRODUCTION. fideration greatly in favour of the dodrine of neceflity, that, accord- ing to it, all effeSisy even thofe de- Dcndent on the volitions of men, ^lave an adequate caufe, in their pre- vious circumftances ; which, • being known, a being of competent under- ftanding, may certainly foiefee the effed-. On this fcheme therefore, there is a fufficient provifion for a plan of univerfal providence J compre- hending all events whatever ; every thing being what God forefaw and intended, and which muft iffue as he wifhes it to iffue, /. e. as I fup- pofe, in the greateft pollible happi- nefs of his creation. Upon this fcheme, therefore, we have, as it appears to me, every mo- tive that can poffibly influence the mind of man to exert ourfelves to the utmoft, to promote our own happinefs and the happinefs of others, at THE INTRODUCTION, xxiii at the fame time that it lays the deepeft foundation for the moft in- tire fubmiffion to the will of God, and an unbounded confidence in his affedion and providential care, with refped to all things prefent, paft, and future. It alfo, in my opinion, takes away all poffible ground for envy and hatred towards men, and thus gives the freeeft fcope to the arowth of univerfal benevolence, and of all virtue. In the eye of Dr. Price, however, this fcheme, great and glorious as it appears to me, wears a very difl:erent afped. He thinks we cannot juftly ' be accountable for our condud, and rewarded or puniflied for it, unlefs we be, in his fenfe of the word, agents J or the proper and ultimate caufes of our own adions; that, there- fore, fince we are in a ftate of dif- cinline, and a future ftate of retri- ^ c 4 bution I \\K xxiv THE INTRODUCTION. bution will take place, we muft be pofTeffed of a power of proper ■i felf-determination. not fubiect to the iontrol of any being whatever ; and that fiiice God does govern the world, and has frequently foretold events dependent upon the volitions of men, he muft have a power, incomprehen- fible as it is to us, of {oxtk.€\XiJ certainly, having much mor,e reafon for it, not exprefs lefs efteem and good-will for him than he has done for me. It is myfelf only, who avow fuch unpopular opinions, that ftand in need of fuch a teftimonial ; and, on this account, it fhews con- fiderable courage in friendJJoip to ad: as Dr. Price has done. If he will allow me to fpeak fo freely, I would fay, that I fee no reafon for fo particular an apology as he makes for a feeming w^ant of re- fped in his manner of writing; as I really think he has nothing of this kind to apologize for. I am certain I might with more reafon apologize for the manner in which I have ex- prelTed myfelf with refped to him. But, in my opinion, it is perfedly confiftent with candour, and even with friendihip, to exprefs the ftrongeft difapprobation of any opi-- nmts i XXX THE INTRODUCTION. nions whatever; and freely to fay that we think them incmfifie7it, con- tradi&ory^ or even abfurd^ or dan- gerous, if, after an attentive con- fideration, they really do appear fo to us. All that candour requires is, that we never impute to our adverfary a had intention, or a defign to mijlead, and alfo that we admit his general good underftanding, though liable to be mifled by unperceived biafes and prejudices, from the influences of which the wifeft and beft of men are not exempt. And where par- ticular fricndpip is not concerned, there certainly are occafions that will juftify even great afperity, indigna-. tion or ridicule in controverfial writ- ing. This is often the befl method of reprefling extreme conceit and ar- rogance, joined, as it often is, with as great weaknefs in fupporting a bad caufe. THE INTRODUCTION, xxxi caufe, even when there is no proper want of fincerity. A man mufl be very criminal in- deed, who can maintain what he, at the fame time, believes to be ill- founded. There are very icWy I hope, fo much abandoned. But there may be a great degree of guilt fhort of this. For the difpofition may be fo vitiated by a wrong bias, that the mofl frivolous reafons fhall appear to have the force of demon- ftration, when a favourite hypothefis is concerned, and arguments, in them- felves the moft perfedlly conclufive, fliall appear to have no weight at all when urged againft it. The truly candid will confider not the manner of writing only, but alfo the oc- cafion of it, and all the circumjlances attending it. What can exceed the indignation and zeal with which Paul often writes, the feveritv with which Ii xrMi THE INTRODUCTION. which the meek apoftle John ex- preffes himfelf, or the vehement in- veftives even of our Saviour himfelf on juft provocation. The letters which I have ad- dreffed to my other opponents are written differently, according as I felt myfelf difpofed towards them at the time of writing. I do not fufpea that any thing will be objeaed to the manner in which I have expreffed myfelf with refped to Dr. Kenrick, or Dr. Plorfeley ; and my addrefs to Mr. Whitehead is, I think, as refpedful as he dcferves. I had alfo addreffed a letter to the anonymous author of An EJJ'qy on the immatenality and immortality of the Jo'uh but as I could not help treatino; him vvith a good deal ot levity and contempt, I was advifed by my iViends n ; to infert it in the prcfent publication, as not fuiting ^ the THE INTRODUCTION, xxxiii the gravity with which the reft of the work is written. Befides, I am not without hopes that this negled may ferve to keep back other equally ignorant and felf- fufficient anfwerers, and thereby leave the field more open to the truly abh^ who are generally, at the fame time, the moft candid. And as the fubjed is of great importance, I ftill profefs myfelf ready to argue it with any perfon who fhall appear to me to have ability, and learning equal to the difcufHon ; and to fuch a one it would give me but little pain to make any conceflion, or re- tradlion, that I might be convinced was neceflary. They muft, how- ever, go on other ground than that of Dr. Price, who has certainly done all poffible juftice to his ar- gument. <1 As xxxiv THE INTRODUCTION. As the Sheet of lllufirations, fub- ioined to the Difquifttions, is fre- quently referred to in this work, and as it is fufpeded that fome of the copies may have been fold with- out it, it is here reprinted, with additions, written for the fetisfaftion of fome of my friends, who wiihed me to difcufs fome queftions that they propofed to me. It may be proper to obferve, that in this publication I confine myfelf to the confideration of particular ob- feSlions and difficulties ; and that the proper arguments in fupport of my hypothefis are to be looked for in the Dijquifitions on Matter and Spirit, and the Treatife on Necejftty. J\^ X-/ JCi A ■* L T T E R FROM Dr. PRICE, T Q Dr. PRIESTLEY. Newington-Green, May 14, 1778, DEAR SIR, I A M obliged to you for fending me your laft replies. I have read them with a defire to be as open as poflible to convidion ; and even not without wifliing for an opportunity of fhevving candour by retradling any miftakes into which I may have fallen. But more perhaps through d 2 a I I xxxvi ALETTERTO a fault in me, than in you, my views and fentiments continue the fame. I muft leave you to manage the publication as you pleafe. You muft be fenfible that my firji remarks were written without the moft dif- tant view to publication; and this, I hope, will be an excufe for the incorredneffes and want of order which will be found in them. There is alfo in fome parts of thefe firft remarks, a turn of expreflion which carries an appearance not fufficiently refpedful ; and which I fhould have avoided had I written them with a view to publication, and been more on my guard. I know your can- dour has engaged you to overlook this, but I cannot refledl upon it without fome concern. Dr. PRIESTLEY. XXXVIJ ; I fliall be very happy jfhould this publication anfwer any valuable ends; but I am afraid the difcuflion it con- tains v^ill be too dry and metaphyfi- cal to be generally acceptable. Some good ends, however, it may proba- bly anfwer. It will afford a proof that two perfons may differ totally on points the moft important and facred, with a perfed efteem for one another ; and it may likewife give a fpecimen of a proper manner of carrying on religious controverfips* There is nothing that offends me more than that acrimony of fpirit with which controverfies in general, and particularly religious ones, are commonly conducted. In religion there is nothing fo effentiai as charity, candour, and benevolence. * flow inexcufable then is that cruel d 3 :5cal ill i I xxxv'iii A LETTER TO zeal which fotne religious people in- dulge; and how melancholy is it to fee them, in the very aft of con- tending for religion, lofing what is xnoft valuable in religion ? Will you give me leave, Sir, here to add, that your opinions give a ftnking proof of a truth, which, could it be ftamped on every human mind, would exterminate all bigotry and perfecution ; I mean the truth, that worth of charader, and true in- tegrity, and confequently God's ac- ceptance, are not neceffarily con- neded with any particular fet ot opinions. Many think yours to be fome of the moft dangerous poiliblc ; and yet the perfon who holds them is known to be one of the beft men in the worM ; and I ardently wiOi my foul may be united to his at the tune when Dr. PRIESTLEY, XXXIX when all that are in their graves Jhall hear the voice of the/on of ma7t, and come forth ; they who have done good to the refurreSiion o^ life^ and they who have done evil to the re- furreSiion of damnation. Our agree- ment in expeding this awful period makes it of little confequence in what we differ. With great refped and affedion, I am, Dear Sir, ever yours, RICHARD PRICE. d 4 TABLE '*fc ■ m I TABLE O F CONTENTS t i PART I. Of the Nature of Matter. First Communication by Dr. Price, •with Dr. Prieftley's Replies page i Second Communication, containing Re- marks by Dr. Price on Dr. Prieftley's Re- plies in the firft Communication, with Dr. Prieftley's fecond Replies - - page 24 Third Communication, containing Dr. Price's Remarks on Dr. Prieftley's Replies in the fecond Communication, with Dr. Pxieftley's third U^/'^Vj- - - page 39 Fourth Communication by Dr. Price, with Dr. Prieftley's Anfwer - page 42 PART xlii TABLE OF CONTENTS. I t J. i I PART IL 0/ t/lfe Human Mind, t^e Mortality OF THE Soul, and the Essence of the Deity. First Communication by Dr. Price, with Dr. Prieflley's Anfiver - page 49 Second Communication, containing Dr. Price's Obfervations on the Replies in the lirft Communication, with Dr. Prieftley's fecond Replies - - - page 89 Third Communication, containing Ob^ fervations by Dr. Price on Dr. Prieltley's Replies in the fecond Communication^ with Dr. Prieftleys third i?^///W - page 122 PART III. Of the Doctrine of Necessity, First Communication, containing Se- ries by Dr. Price, with Dr. Prieftley's . Anfwers - ----- - p^g^ ^^7 Second TABLE OF CONTENTS, xliii Second Communication, containing Dr. Price's Obfervations on Dr. Prieftley'q Anfwers to the Slueries in the firft Commu^ nication ; and a particular Account of the DoBrine of Liberty y with Dr. Prieftley's Anfwer - - - - - page 130 Third Communication, containing ^^- ries by Dr. Prieftley on the Materiality of the Souly Permijion of Evily Influence of Motives y &c. with Dr. Price's An- fwer ----- page 156 Letter from Dr. Prieftley to Dr. Ken- RiCK ----- page i8i » ' to Mr. Whitehead p. 198 , to Dr. Horfeley p. 213 Illustrations by Dr. Prieftley offome Particulars in the Difquifitions on Matter and Spirit - - - - page 229 Additional Illustrations, by Dr. Prieftley. Sect. i. Of the Natw^e of Matter p. 243 Sect. 2. The Connexion between Senfation and Organization - - - page 256 Sect* xliv TABLE OP CONTENTS, Sect, 3. A general View of the Origin and Progrefs of Opinions relating to the EJfence of the Soul - -. - - page 260 Sect. 4. Of Confcioufnefs - - page 280 Sect. 5. An Addition on the Argument of the DoBrine of NeceJJity y from the Conjide- ration of Caufe and EffeSl - page 288 Sect. 6. Of the Nature of Remorfe of Con- fcience^ and of praying for the Pardon of Sin on the DoBrine ofNecejjity page 296 A Letter from Dr. Price to Dr. Prieft- ley . - - - page 321 Additional Observations by Dr. Price, on a Review of the whole Controverfyy and of Dr. Prieftley's Letters arid Illujlra- iions « - - - page 327 Replies to Dr. Price's Additional Obfer- vat ions - - - page 363 A Letter to Dr. Price from Dr. Prieft- ley ... - page 407 ¥iorE from Dr. Price - - page 416 Answer by Dr. Pricftley - page 417 A D V E R- ADVERTISEMENT. 'T^HE Reader has been already informed (Introdu£lion p. 36) that a great part of the following Remarks (top. 178) has been written by Dr. Price, without any view to publication. He thinks it neceffary to add here, that his Additional Observa- tions (from p. 327 to 359) are the refult of a deliberate review of the whole con- troverfy, as it 4iad been previoufly printed > and have, therefore, been compofed, with more care and attention. This controverfy having been made too prolix, he has left every perfon to judge for himfelf, of the force of Dr. Priestley's Replies to thefe Additional Obfervations, (from p. 363, to p. 405) chufing to take leave with the fliort Note at the end of this volume. X I' REM JK. j\. B Y Dr PRICE O N SEVERAL Pas SAGES IN Dr P R I E S T L E Y's Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit WITH Dr. Priestley's REPLIES. A A i\. X CURSORY REMARKS, 1 N I III \\ u., Reading Dr. Prieftley's Difquifitiom on Matter and Spirit. PART I. U. B. In reading thefe Remarks, great Allowance muft be made for a Want of Order, and many Repetitions, occafioned by the Manner in which they have been written. v>>- \\ •^^•mmmmm 3 T • ^ ' PARTI. Remarks concerning the Penetrability OF Matter. The first Communication. DR. Prieftley obferves in J^ifquijitiom^ (page 2, 3) " that it is ajerted that ^' matter is necejfarily fJid, and of itfclf defii^ ** tute of all powers whatever ^ as thofeofaf^ '^ t ration and repuljton, G?r. or that matter " /> pojfejfed of a vis inerti^s^, and indif- ** ferent to reji or motion but as it is aBed ** upon by a foreign power / do not won^* << der (adds Dr. Prieftley) that the vulgar ** Jhould have formed thefe notions^ G?c." Dr. Price's Remark. That matter is inert y or that it will con- tinue in that ftate of reft or motion which it poflefles till fome foreign caufe alters that ftate ; and that this alteration of ftate muft be in proportion to the impreftcd force, &;c* Thefe pofitions are the foundation 01 all A z that m^ • •. .• • » • • • • • •• • 4 OF JJI^.^^TURE OF MATTER, V : : ••' .*: •: •.: :':•: : •th'af i§"dertibriftrated*by natural philofophera coiic'i?rai"nj2:: -the laws of the coUifion of boJies. They are, in particular, the foundation of Sir Ifaac Newton s Philo- fophy. The three laws of motion with which he begins his Prmdpia have no meaning, or evidence, if they are only vu/gar prejudices. To me they appear to be felf-evident truth " That matter is '* of itfelf deftitute of all powers'* may be faid with much more truth of matter ac- cording to Dr. Prieftley's ideas of it, than of matter according to the common ideas. Solid matter has the power of ailing on other matter by impulfe, and the cfFeds of this aBiofij in all cafes, have been de- monftrated by mathematicians, particularly in the laws of motion, and the corollaries, at the beginning of the Principia. But unfolid matter, that is, matter which ad- mits other matter into its place without refinance, cannot aft at all by impulfe; and this is the only way in which it is capable of afting. — See the next, and fomc of the following remarks. Answer* Of THE NATURE OF MATTER. 5 Answer, by Dr. Priestley. All the laws relating to what has been Called the collifion of bodies are neceffarily the very fame, whether their feparation from each other be fuppofed to take place at the point of contadt, or at any given diftance from it, occafioned by a power of repulfion, extending fo far beyond the real furface. The laws of motion are only ge- neral rules, to which the fads relating to the approach of bodies to each other, and their receding from each other, are re- ducible, and are confiftent with any caufe of fuch approaching or receding. Unfolid matter is here faid to admit other matter into its place without re^ fifiance ; but this is direcftly contrary to the hypothefis, which makes matter to be a fubftance, which, though penetrable, is poflefled of a power of repulfion, which, if an approaching body be not able to overcome, cfFe ^^0 ^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ whole paffage with care, but find nothing in it that ap- pears to me to bear harder upon my hy- pothefis than on the common one. For it only fliows, though in a very clear and mafterly manner, that the prcfent laws of nature require an intelligence, and an energy, of which what we ufually call matter is not capable. Now I certainly admit an intelligent and adive caufe in nature, and have no objeaion to fuppofing that this in- tdlie:ent caufc has even more to do in the execution of the laws of nature than Dr. Price is willing to allow. Dr. Price. I \ BY DR. PRIESTLEY. f Dr. Price. Difquijitions, p. 14. " The particles of •* light never impinge on any folid parts in " paffing through glafs, &c." How does- this appear ? All the light never paffes through glafs. Part of it probably im- pinges, and is loft. This was Sir Ifaac Newton's opinion. Opticksy p. 241. Answer. That the particles of light never impinge on the folid part of glafs, &c. is evident from none of them being obferved to be defleaed from theiV c-urfe after they have entered it, prodded the fubftance be per- fecSly trrjiSarenc. Newton's fappofition of pariiclss of light being loft by their impinging on the folid particles of bo- dies, is neither probable in itfelf, nor. coun- tenanced by myfatl. The moft probable eftbd of fuch impinging would be a re- flexion, and not a ceflation of motion. Dr. Price- 11 g^:ft'r.„. _„ <4 m^^^mmmiam io OF THE PENETRABILITY OF MATTER; Dr. Price. Difquifitions^ p. 17. ** Matter has in ^^ fa£i no properties but tboje of attraBion ** and repulfwn.'' This is frequently alTerted iii the courfe of thefe Difquijitions ; and matter is de- clared to be nothing but powers. And yet in p. 25, the property of extenjion is ex- prefsly afcribed to matter, by which it oc^ cupies a certain portion of /pace. And in p. 19, it is faid to confift oi phyfical points only, (that is, fmall parts of extenlion) endued with powers of attraBion and re^ fulfion taking place at different dijiances This is not conlillent ; but let us examine it particularly, and conlider what matter is. Matter, if it be any thing at all, muft confift of folid particles or atoms occupy- ing a certain portion of fpace, and there- fore extended^ but at the fame tivnt fmple and uncompounded^ and incapable of htfng refolved into any other fmaller particles ; and it muft be the different form of thefe primary particles and their different com- binations BY DR. PRICE. If tinations and arrangement that conftitute the different bodies ancf kinds of matter in the univerfe This feems to have been Sir Ifaac Newton*s idea of matter. See his Opticksy p. 375, &c. Mr. Baxter s notion that thefe particles are themfclves compofed of other particles which cohere by divine agency ; and, for the fame reafon, thefe others of others ftill fmaller which cohere by the fame caufe, and fo on ; this notion appears to me abfurd. According to the account juft given, each of thefe par- ticles is a monady or -^ folid continuum^ void of pore, and, as fuiJi, endued with re- fiftance and impenetrability, and capable of receiving and communicating motion by impulfe, according to the laws of coliifion explained by Keily Newton ^ and others. If this is not a right account, then matter muft be either mere extenfion ^ or it muft be fomething more, which is entirely un- known to us. If the former is true, then matter is nothing but fpace. Inftead of having 1 /k fi OF THE PENETRABILITY OF MATTEPLi having pores, it is all pore* Like fpace, it muft be neceflary and infinite, and a vacuum muft be impoflible. This was Defcartes's notion of matter, and alio Spi- noza's, who has founded upon it a fyftem of atheifm. On the other hand, if it is aflerted that the elementary parts of matter have in them fomething more than extenfion, but that this fomething, not being folidity, is un- known to us, it will follow, 'that, being ignorant what matter is, we cannot reafon about it, or determine any more concern- ing it than that, wanting folidity, it is in- capable of ading or re-afting in any way on other matter. It muft not be faid, that the property which matter has more than extenfion, is a power of attrafting and repelling. This would be faying that void fpace attrads and repels. Befides, it has been fhewn that the particles of matter cannot, according to any conception of them, have fuch a power. When two particles not in contaft, are faid to attrad: one another, all that is meant, is, that there is fome force that drives BY DR. PRICE. ij drives them towards one another, accord- ing to a certain law. That force, it is certain, cannot be their own force, for the reafon already affigned. It muft then be the impulfe of furrounding particles, or (if that is not poffible) fome other foreign force. The power, therefore, of attradion and repulfion afcribed to matter, is demon- ftrably a foreign property, I fay demon^ fir ably ; for nothing can be demon ftrated, if a pofition can be falfe which is implied in a maxim fo clear as that, ** nothing ^* can ad where it is not," In fhort. Matter, according to the idea ^ of it into which I am enquiring, being an unknown extended fomething which makes no oppofition to any thing that would tvike its place, and not being capable of ading beyond the fpace which it occupies, can have no powers. It can be of no ufe. It is as fuperfluous in nature as Dr. Prieftley in J). 65, &c. reprefents matter to be accord- ing to Mr. Baxter's ••ccount — But more than this may be faid. From Dr. Prieftley's account of matter it may be inferred, not pnly that it is of no ufe, but that it muft be \ i «4 OF THE PENETRABILITY OF MATTER, J be a non-entity. It has, he afferts repeaU cdly, no other property than the power of attraaing and repelling ; and the argument in Difquifttions, p. 5 and 6, obliges him to affert this. But it has been proved that this is a property that cannot belong to it. It muft, therefore, be nothing. Let it, however, be allowed the pro- perty of ^x^^;/>«. If ^ot mere extenfion, it muft be fomething that has fhape and form, and is circumfcribed within a certain portion of fpace. It muft, therefore, confift of parts. Thefe parts muft be held together by fome power; and the fame muft be true of the parts of thefe parts, and fo on. But we cannot go on thus in infinitum. The exiftence of matter, there^ fore, is impoflible. Should it be faid in anfwer to this, that the primitive particles of matter may be ex- tenued and fi- ured, and yet not be divifible, or want any attrafting force to keep them from refolving themfelves into nothing. Should this be laid, I will fay the fame of a folii ' B-y PR. PRICE. || _a folid continuum, or the monads which jconftitute matter, and the argument in Dif- quifitionsy p. 5, &c. will be overthrown. But to return to the affertion that matter has no other property than the power of attraftion and repulfion. All power is the power of fomething. What is that fome- thing in the prefent cafe ?— Is it a power of attraftion and repulfion only that perceives, thinks, reafons, &c. Is it only powers that circulate in our veins, vibrate in the nerves, revolve round the fun, &c.— I will add what feems particularly worth Dr. Prieft- ley s confideration. According to his own fyftem, the attradionand repulfion of mat- ter, (performed with a fkill that gives the world its order and beauty) cannot be its own adions. They muft be the effeds of fome adion upon it. But of what adion are they effeds ? Let this be explained. If the effeds of fuch adion as that of ideas and motives on confcious and thinking beings, then fince all matter attrads and repels, all matter muft be confcious and intelligent, Answi:h» I 10 OF THE PENETRABILH T OF MATTER, Answer. It is very pollible that, in defining matter in diiFerent places in a large trea- tife, with a view to different obje<5ts, I may fometimcs have omitted fome par- ticulars, to which it was not then necef- fary to attend. The complete definition is evidently this, viz. that matter is an w- tendedfubjlancey pojfejfed of certain powers of attraBion and repuljion. That ** matter wanting folidity muft be ** incapable of a<3:ing or re-ad:ing in any " way on other matter" cannot be afiferted, without taking it for granted, that a fub- ftance defined as matter is defined above, is in itfelf impoifible. Now, it is rather extraordinary, that the only proof of im- penetrability fliould be aaual impulfe, and yet that no clear cafe of adiial impulfc can be afllgned ^ and that a definition of mat- ter framed purpofely to correfpond to fa&s only^ fhould be deemed impoffible, that is, contrary tofaSi. The reafoning in this remark goes upon the idea that matter muft be nothing at all, if it have not the property of impenetra^ bility^ III 'UN"" * \\ OF THE NATURE OP MATTER. ,7 klity^ a property which no one fad: requires, and therefore which ought not to be ad- mitted by any philofopher. It alfo feems to have arifen from a want of confidering, that the term thing, ovfui>Jiance, fignifies no- thing more than that to which properties are afcribed, and is itfelf abfolutely unknown, and incapable of fuggefting any idea what- ever. For when we exclude all properties, we, at the f^me time, exclude from our minds all idea of fubftance, and have no- thing left to contemplate. Thus, a mafs of gold is defined to be a fubftance of a certain lengthy breadth, and thicknefs, of a certain colour, weight, &c. But take away all colour, weight, length, breadth, thicknefs, with every other fenfible qua- lity, and where is the fubftance of the gold ? Impenetrability is cnly a property, or fomething that is affirmed concerning material fubftances, and therefore muft not be afSrmed without proof, any more than penetrability, or any other property. Now what I demand, is y. a proof from faB^ that any material fubftance is impenetrable to other material fubftances. Till this be B produced. 11 I to OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. k\ produced, I cannot, as a philofopher, admit that matter has fuch a property. On the contrary, analogy obliges me to fuppofe, that, fmce all the evidence of bodies being impenetrable, when rigoroufly examined, i. e. by adual experiments, (as optical, elec- trical, &c.) appear to be cafes in which bodies are prevented from coming into aftual contact by powers, ading at a diftance from their furfaces, that a// refiftance is of this kind only. If the reafoning in the laft part of this remark be juft, it will not follow that, be- caufe all the powers of matter may be ana- iized into modes of attraftion and repulfion, all particular fubftances muft have the very fame modes of attradion and repulfion, and confequently that there is no difference be- tween adds and alkalis , metals zxi^ earths, &c. The powers of perception and thought, in how great a degree foever they be unknown to us, may be the rcfult of a certain ftateof the brain, and certain motions taking place within it, though they could not refult from »9 I'l \i from matter of a different form, texture, or confiflence. Dr. Price. Difquijitions, page 8i and 104. Matter ^ has no other powers than thofe of attraSlion and repulfion. What is it that attracts and repels, and that is attradled and repelled? Till I am infornied of this, no more is told me of matter, than would be told me of the in- habitants of Jupiter, by faying that they have no other powers than thofe of mov^ ing (or rather being moved) to and from one another. And to make the idea of matter to confifl in being thus moved; Or to fay, that it has no other power or property, and at the fame time to afcribe to it the powers of thought, fenfation and reafon — This feems to me indeed extraor- dinary — How totally different are attraftion ^ and repulfion from perception, confcioufnefs and judgment? What connexion can there be between them ? B 2 Answer, iN to OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. Answer. It is impoiTible to know more of matter than can be inferred from the phenomena in which it is concerned. The relation that attradtions and repulfions bear to feveral modes of thought, may be feen in Hartley s Obfervations on Man. But though the mode of the connedion be ever fo much unknown, the reality of the connexion is evident from fad:. Perception, and all the modes of thinking, as much depend upon the brain, as the power of giving a blow to a flick. Is not the reality of the union of the foul and body, on the common hypothefis, al- ways afferted, without any perfon pretend- ing to have the leaft idea of the mode of fuch an union ? Dr. Price. Page 105. ** When we attempt to form •' an idea of the fubftance of matter ex- " chifive of the powers of attradion and •' repulfion which it has, and exclufive of *^ impenetrability i 11 OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. 'mf^^Klk *« impenetrability which it has not, ab- ** folut^ly nothing is left" — This is very true, and the juft conclufion from it is, that matter does not exift. Exclufive of attradion and repulfion, it is here faid, matter is abfolutely nothing. But it has been demonftrated that it does not attrad and repel, therefore it muft be nothing. Befides, allow it the power of attrading and repelling, yet if, as here af- ferted, it is nothing but this power, it muft be the power of nothing, and the very idea of it is a contradidion— What a ftrange thing indeed is matter according to Dr. Prieftley's ideas ? Its effence, it feems, con- fifts in impelling (without touching, or ex- erting any force that is conceivable) other matter, towards itfelf and^r^;;^ itfelf. Take this away; fet it at reft, or remove its neighbours, fo as that it may have nothing to ad upon, and it becomes nothing. The whole of it may be crouded into the very fpace that is now occupied by the fmalleft of its component parts, or into any com- pafs not fo little as a mathematical point, B 3 * and iZiB OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. «> ii and in confequence of this, having nothing to attract or repel it would be nothing. Answer. What a ftrange thing, indeed, is matter, according to Dr. Price's conftrudion of my meaning ; but fuch matter as he here de- jfcribes I never had in contemplation. The matter of which I treat is a fubftance pof- fefled of certain powers of attraction and rc- pulfion. Thefe powers may be exerted more or lefs, or not at all, according to circumftances. To matter thus defined I cannot conceive that any of thefe remarks do in the leaft apply. A Qjj E R Y BY Dr. Price. If matter is not folid extenfion, what k it more than mere extenfion ? An s we r. If, as Dr. Clarke and Dr. Price fuppofe. Sprit be extended, but not folid, what is tJbaf U tJl}af more than mere extenfion ? If Spirit can aa upon matter, as they fuppofe, it muft have the very power of attradlion and repulfion with refpe£t to matter that I afcribe to unfolid matter. If they chufe to call my matter by the name of Spirit, I have no fort of objedtion. All that I con- tend for is fuch a conjunSlion of powers in the fame things or fubftance, by whatever term it be denominated, as we find by ex- perience always go together, fo as not to multiply fubftances without neceffity. The B4 l l l l l I I I I I M ^^^^ i ii ; 24 OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. The second Communication. Of THE Nature of Matter, contain- ing Remarks by Dr. Price on Dr. Prieft- leyV Replies to the iirft Communication ; with Dr. Prieftley'j- fecond Replies. Dr. PriceV Obfervations on the Reply ^ p. 5. THE laws of the collifion of bodies, as determined by mathematicians, relate to two forts of bodies; elajlic and unelajiic. The laws which govern the collifions of the latter fuppofe no repul- lion between them ; and are founded en- tirely on the confideration of matter as JoUd extenfion, and confequently inert y and endowed with all thofe properties exprelled by Sir Ifaac Newton in his three laws of motion — The laws alfo which govern the collifions of the latter fort of bodies, fup- pofe matter to poffefs folidity, or a mo- mentum in pioving, proportioned to its quantity ^ \ '; I OF THE NATURE OF MATTER, 25 quantity and velocity, independent of its power of repulfion — For example. When an elaftic body at reft is ftruck by another equal elaftic body, the efted of the collifion will be that the latter will lofe its whole motion, and the other move forward with the very velocity which the impelling body pofl^efl^ed before collifion. But if both bodies were void of folidity, or nothing but figured and moveable extenfions repelling one another, the impelling body would move backy and the other would movt for- ward as foon as they began to repel one another. It would be impofiible for them to enter into the fphere of one another's repulfion, becaufe they wanted that folidity which gives momentum. It is not, in my opinion, confiftent with Dr. Prieftley's own fyftem to intimate (as he feems to do in the palfages in his Difquifitionsy to which I have referred in my firft remark) that " matter poflTefl^es *^ powers", and that it is a vulgar error to think it *' indifferent to reft or motion ** but as it is a£ted upon by fome fo- ^* reign caufe." If matter can move with- out a5 OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. !*,! * out being adled upon by a foreign caufe. it muft move itfelf ; but this Dr. Prieftley cannot allow. He muft, therefore, fay that it is entirely a torpid and paflive thing. This, without doubt, is the matter which is the objed: of natural philofophy : and it is this property that, in my opinion, forms one of the fundamental differences be- tween it and fpirit. When I fay that unfoHd matter will admit other matter into its place ** without re- ** fiftance," I mean, *f without any re- " fiftance given by itfelf ;" an4 I fuppofe contaBy which Dr. Prieftley muft grant to be at leaft conceivable. The refiftance arif- ing from repulfion, being always made at a diftance, is not the refiftance of the matter itfelf that is faid to repel, but of fome foreign caufe : and this I apprehend to be juft as certain as that nothing can ad on another thing without being prefent to it. When a ray of light is refleded from a bo^dy before contaft, it is certainly not that body itfelf that refleds the light: nor did Sir Ifaac Newton, who difcovered the fad, ever mean i pF THE NATURE OF MATTER. ^7 ynean to aflert this; on the contrary, he has called this an abfurdity which no one <:an receive. He profefles to have difcovered only certain fads in the conftitution of pature : the caufes he has left others to in- yeftigate. Answer. I cannot conceive any difference between the cafe of elajiic and non-elaftic bodies, with refped to the hypothefis in queftion ; fince whatever may be fuppofed concerning the parts of a folidi may be faid concerning i\i2itfphere of repulfion, which, on the new hypothefis, is to be fubftituted in the place of fuch folid parts. It is denied that foli- dity is neceflfary to give momentum, fince a fphere of refiftance may, in certain circum- ftances, be as impenetrable as any fuppofed folid fubftance. It is not folidity, but the refijiance occafioned by it that is the imme- diate caufe of momentum. I readily admit the inaccuracy that Dr. Price obferves. But I could not mean to give to a ftone the felf-determining power which ^ ■ ' J had il OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. I had denied to man. My meaning through the whole was, that matter, to be what it is, muft be poffefled of what has been de- nominated a power y viz. attraftion, efpc- cially that of cohelion. All that I mean by a repulfion at a diftance from the furface of a body, is, that which Sir Ifaac Newton proves to be the cafe with refped to light ; fo that whatever folution may be found for the difficulty in his cafe, will ferve for mine. His too is the cafe of an elaftic fubftance. Dr. Price sOifervations on tie Reply, p. 7, 8, Dr. Priejiley, in his Illujirations, (fee the Difquifitms, p. 350.) fays, that Newton confidered attradion and repulfion as '' pow- ** ers inhering in and properly belonging to <* matter." With great deference to Dr, Prieftley's fuperior knowledge on this fub- left, I would obferve, that I have never met with any affertion in Sir Ifaac Newton's works that can be fairly conftrued to imply this ; and that it is fcarcely poffible that he fliould have ufed any expreflions which will bear this interpretation, except when fpeaking OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. 29 'A fpeaking loofely, and by way of accommo- dation to vulgar conceptions. I have quoted a pafTage from the letters that pafTed be- tween him and Dr. Bentley, in which he fays the contrary very flrongly. In the fame letters he fays to Dr. Bentley, ** Pray ** don't afcribe the notion of innate gravity *' to me." And, in an advertifement pre- fixed to his 'Treatife on Optics, he informs the public, that he had, in the fecond edition of this treatife, added a queftion concerning the caufc of gravity, on purpofe to fhew that he did not take it to be an eflential property of bodies. And what he thought of the attradion or gravitation of matter he certainly thought likewife of its repulfion; and would have acknowledged concerning the repulfion of that aether which (merely in the way of conjedure and illuftration) he has fuppofed to be the caufe of gravity. Dr. Prieftley here takes notice of the dif- ficulty there is in accounting for the at- traftions and repulfions of bodies on any hypothejis. But the maxim that " nothing " can so OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. ** can ad where it is not," proves more than a difficulty in this cafe. It proves that fince thefe attradlions and repulfions are always performed at a diftance, and fometimes the greatejl diftance from the furfaces of bodies, it is impoflible they ihould be the actions of the bodies them- felves; and confequently, that they are not properties inhering in bodies,- or that belong to the nature of matter as matter; If nothing can aft where it is not, matter cannot attract or repel where it is not. It cannot, therefore, have the fo%ver of at- traction and repulfion : and it muft be an abfurdity to include fuch a power in the definition of it ; or to make it an ejfential property of matter. In fliortj this fcems to me the fame abfurdity, that it would be to afcribe to man aftions done by a higher order of beings ; and when it is afked what he is, to defcribe or define him by thefe. No light (fee p. 9.) that falls perpen- dicularly on an uniform tranfparent furfacc can be defledled in paffing through it. But how 1" OJf THE NATURE OF MATTER. ,1 how does it appear that any fubftance can be made fo tranfparent as to ftop none of the light that enters it ? Dr. Price j Obfervations on Reply, p. 16. What has been faid under the lafl head is all I would fay with refpedl to the firft part of this Reply. As to the latter part of it, I would obferve, that we afcribe im- penetrability or folidity to matter partly becaufe we find that we never can make one body occupy the place of another without removing it. The reafon of this appears indeed in fome inftances to be, that they repel one another : but in moft inftances no fuch repulfion appears : and the true reafon may be, that they are brought into contaft, and will not penetrate one another in confequencc of that effential property which we call folidity, and which we find ourfelves under a neceffity of afcribing to matter, in order to diftinguifli it from mere extenfton, or void fpace. Even in the col- lifions of elaftic bodies, the probability is, that there is contaft and impulfe; and that the reafon of their flying off from one another. I * ■■ ! i fi < I il 3* OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. another, or rebounding, is, that their parts, by impinging, are bent inwards, and after- wards unbent : agreeably to the reafonings of natural philofophers. I am, however, of opinion, that we derive our ideas of the folidity of bodies, not fo much from ex- perience, as from another more important inlet of ideas, which I have endeavoured to explain in the firft chapter of my T^reatife on Morals. But I may be very wrong : and I refer all my difquifitions on thefe and other fubjefts, to the candid attention of thofe who may think it worth their while to confider them. When I fay that " Matter wanting fo- ** lidity muft be incapable of adling, or re- ** ading on other matter," I mean, by any aftion of its own. Two equal folid bodies moving towards one another in contrary diredions, and with equal velocities, will meet and impinge and flop one another: but liiinfoUd they would not adl at all on one another, but pafs through one another, j ufl: as if there had been nothing in their way. Dr. Prieilley, in a fubfequent reply, (fee P. 22) fays. • 4 .% H s I OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. IS fays, if I underftand him, that matter fome* times neither attra but mere extenfion ? Th OF THE NATURE OF MATTER, 39 The third Communjcation. Of THE Nature of Matter, contain-: ing Remarks by Dr. Price on Dr. Prieft- ley's Replies in the Second Commu- nication, (p. 27 and 36.) with Dr. Prieftley'j third Replies. MATTER that is not folid is the fame Vf'whpore : it cannot therefore pofl"efs what natural philofophers mean by the momentum, z force of bodies, which is always in proportion to the quantity of matter in bodies, void of pore. Momentum is the caufe of refiflance, and not vice verfa. I muft here repeat (fee p. 36, 27, &c.) the following propofitions, which I think have been demonftrated ; that matter has not the power of attracting and repelling— -That this power is the power of fome foreign C 4 caufe. OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. 40 caufe, a£ling upon matter according to ftatcd laws — and that, confcqucntly, attraftion and rcpulfion, not being adions, much Icfs inherent qualities of matter, it ought not to be defined by them. Answer. I by no means allow, that though matter have not the property czWcd fo lid ity, or im- fenetrability^ it muft be all pore^ /. e. have no properties at all, or be nothing but empty fpace. If fo, it would follow that no fubjlance deftitute of folidity can be any thing at all. Even every thing that has been called J^irit would be a non- entity. If what Dr. Price calls fpirit, a fubftancq without folidity, and confcquently without momentum^ can ncverthclcfs adl upon bodies ; e.g. the brain, furely the fubftances that I term material, though tliey be not impene- trable, may have the fame power with re- ipect to each other. Article OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. 41 Article II. Every thing that cxifts mufl: be defined by its properties, or to fpcalc more exaftly, by the circumflanccs refpedl- ing it. Thus if I defcribe a magnet, I muft mention, as peculiar and belonging to it, the kinds of attra6lion and repulfion that take place when it is introduced, whether thofe attractions and repulfions, ftrictly fpeaking, neceflarily accompany it, or be caufed by the Deity, or fome intermediate unknown agent. The -J 4» OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. The fourth Communication. Of the Nature of Matter, hy Dr. Price, ivith Dr. Prieftley'j Anfwer. IT is, in my opinion, particularly In- cumbent on Dr. Prieftlcy, to give a more explicit anfwer than he has yet given to the queftion, *' What the true idea of •* matter is ?" or ** what inherent and ef- •^ fential property it pofleffes that diftin- " guifties it from mere fpacc ?" — I muft repeat here what I have faid in my firfl remarks, and infifl: upon it as of particular importance, that no anfwer is given to this queftion, by faying, that matter is some- thing which is attracted and repelled; or, in other words, that it is fomething which is continually adied upon by a foreign force -What is it that is fo aded upon ?— — Not OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. Not mere fpace. That is abfurd— 41 -Not Vifolid fubftancc. There is no fuch thing according to Dr. Prieftlcy Not the fub- jcdl of confcioufncfs and thought. That would imply there is nothing but fpirit in nature— —The attractions and repulfions which take place between different bodies are only external circumjiances which diftin- guifli one parcel of matter from another (a magnet, for inftance, from other fubftances) but they enter not into the idea of matter as matter. There are circumftances in which matter neither attracts nor repels; as, particularly in the limit between the fphere of attraction and repulfion. But this leads me to the chief obfcrvation I intended to make If I underftand Dr. Prieftlcy, all bodies at a fmall diftancc repel one another, fo as to make contact between them impracticable. Within the fphere of repulfion, the attraction of co^ hejion takes place ; and this is the power which, according to Dr. Pricftley, unites the parts of matter, and gives it exiftence. But, fince matter is penetrable, will not this 44 OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. this attraction drive all the parts of it into one another, and caufc them to coalcfcc into nothing ? This cflx:ct mufl: follow, un- lefs there exifts, beyond the fphere of at- traction and nearer to matter, a fccond fphere of repulfion, which again prevents contact. The argument which Dr, Prieft- ley draws from the effect of cold in contract- ing bodies, and of heat in fwelling them, makes it probable that this is his opinion. And, if true, the elementary parts of mat- ter poflefs juft the contrary principle to that which he afferts to be necelTary to prefervc their exiftcncc. In fliort, fmce we cannot go on afligning a fphere of repulfion beyond a fphere of at- traction, and a fphere of attraction beyond a fphere of repulfion in infinitum ; either no power at all acts on the elements of matter, or, if a power does act, it mufl be either a power of attraction, or a power of repulfion. Dr. Prieftley afferts, that if no power at all acts to keep matter together, it muft crum^ ble into jiothing. And it appears evident to me, that if a power of attrading afts, it muft coiitratl itfelf into nothing; and that OF THE NATURE OF MATTER, 4S that if a power of repulfion a£ts, it muft dijipate itfelf into nothing. What can be done in this dilemma ? The truth fcems to be, that there is an abfurdity in fuppofing the elements of matter to confirt: of parts aftually diflindt and feparable, which require a foreign agency to unite them. For the fame reafon that thefe elements muftconfiftof fuchparts> the elements of thofe elements muft confift of fuch parts, and fo on for ever. I have obferved in my firft remarks, that we muft terminate in parts, each of which is a folid continuum incapable of divifion. — Indeed, every real exiftence or fubftance muft be a monad. We are fure this is true of the beings wc are beft acquainted with; I mean, our-- felvesy and all confcious and fcntient beings. And if it be not true of matter, I know not what it is. A N s W.E R. With refpect to the definition of matter^ I really am not able to be more explicit than I have been. A definition of any par- ticular thingy fubjlanccy or being (call it what you will) cannot be any thing more than ;/ 4^ OF THE NATURE OF MATTER. than an enumeration of its known properties^ and in all cafes whatever, as with refpect to mattery fpirit, &c. &c. if wc take away all the known properties, nothing will be left, of which wc can poilibly have any idea at all ; every thing elfe being merely hypothec tical, and the terms fubjlanccy things ef- fence^ &;c. being, as I have obferved, no- thing more than a help to expreffion ; it being a convenience in fpeech to have certain words of this unlverfal application. Solid atoms, or monads of jnatter, can only be hypothetical things ; and till we can either touch them, or come at them, forne way or other,, by actual experiment, I cannot be obliged to admit their exiftence. Admitting the exiftence of thefe folid atoms, they do not help us, in the leafl:, to explain any of the known properties of matter. All the cffc^s are reducible to attractions or repiilfions. Now what connection is there between folidity, and attra^lion, or even repulfion at a diftance from the furface of a body ; and tliough refiftance at the point of contact might be explained by it, no I; OF Tim NATURE OF MATTER. ^j ho fuch thing as real contaB can be proved ; and moft of the known repulfions in nature, do certainly take place in other circumjlances, and therefore muft have fome other caufe. In reply to Dr» Price, I muft obferve, that the limit between a fphere of at- traction and another of repulfion, cannot be a place where neither of thefe powers arc exerted, but where they balance each other. It does not follow that becaufe a beam is in equilibrio, there are no weights in the fcales. That there are fpheres of attraction and repulfion within each other is evident from fact, as in electricity,' magnetifm, &c. nor can the cohefion of bodies, the parts of which (as is demonftrable from the pheno- mena of cold) do not actually touch each other, be explained without it. '^Mie parts of bodies muft therefore attract each other at one diftance, and repel at another ; and in the limit between both they muft re- main; and by this means bodies retain their form and texture. PART t hi I! M i OF THE HUMAN MIND. 49 PART IL Of the Nature of Mihd or Spirit* f The first Communication^ By Dr. Price, with Dr. Tricdlcys^nfwers. IN anfwer to the feveral arguments in the Difquifitions, Seft. III. and IV. it feems enough to fay, that a connexion and dependence by no means ^vov^ famenefs . We are confcious of the contrary in the prefent cafe. Seeing depends on our eyes, but we are not our eyes, any more than the eye it- felf is the telefcope through which it looks^ or the artift is the tool which he ufes. i Answer. This is by no means a juft ftate of the argument. I infer that the bufinefs of thinking is wholly carried on />/, and l?y D the 50 OF THE HUMAN MIND- tlie brain itfclf, bccaufc all the cfFedls from which we infer the faculty of thinking, can be traced to the brain, and no farther. I conclude that the ultimate perceptive power relating to objcds of fight is not in the eye, becaufe, though the eye be ne- ceflary to acquire ideas of fight, they remain Jomewhcre when tlic eye is dcilroycd. Bu( I have no reafon whatever to refer this perceptive power to any thing beyond the brain, becaufe when the brain is deftroyed, there is, to all appearance, an end of all fenfation and thought. To fuppofe that when the brain is dcftroyed the ideas re- main in fovic thing elfe, is a mere hypothefis unfupportcd by any fad whatever. A philofopher fuppofes no more caufes than are nccefliiry to explain effeSls. He finds the bufincfs of thinking to be de- pendent upon the brain, and therefore he concludes that the brain itfelf is competent to this bufinefs, whatever it be. To fup- pofe any thing farther is mere hypothefis, and utterly unphilofophical. What I main- tain then is, that, according to the cfta- blilhed OF THE HUMAN MIND. j, blifhed rules of philofophizing, we are not authorized to fuppofe any thing within the brain to be the feat of thought. If we do, we may juft as well fuppofe it to rcfide in fometliing within that, and in fomcthing again within that, and fo on without end ; and juft as the Indians are faid to place the earth upon an elephant, the elephant upon a tortoife, and the tortoife on they knew not what. Dr. Price. In the Difquifitionsy page 37 and 102, it is afl!erted, that ideas are certainly di- vifible. This fccms to me very abfurd. It would be as proper to aflert ideas to be hard or round. The idea of an objeft is the apprehenfion, view, or notion of it; and how can this be divifible ? Per- ception is a finglc and indivifiblc a prove, that according to the eflabliflicd rules of philofophizing, it is a property that muft infant belong to the brain, whe- ther we ever be able to conceive how it refults from the flrudure of the brain, or not. In my opinion there is juft the fame reafon to conclude that the brain thinks^ as that it is white, zndfoft. Though Mr. Locke was of opinion that our ideas of thinking fubftances are as diftindl as thofc of folid ones, he was like- wife of opinion, that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, thinking may be the mere property of a folid fubftance. Dr. Clarke fliould have fhewn not only that extenfion, but that a capacity of 7notion from place to place is not neceffarily con- nected " ^» *^ ^ * ■ ».^^-.^ 6f OF THE HUMAN MIND. neded with difcerptlbility. It appears to mc very clear, that, if fpirit be a thing that is extended and moveable, one part of it may be conceived to be moved, and the other part left behind, whether the pro- perty of confclouftiefs would be deftroyed in confequence of* it, or not. Dr. Price. In DifquifitmiSy p. 72, Dr. Prieftley fays, that *' it is demonftrable that matter is in- " finitely" divifible" — Can he fay that the being he calls btmfclfh likewife infinitely di- vifible. What would be the refult of fuch a di-vifion ? Would it not be an infinite num- ber oi other beings ? But does not this imply a contradidion ? Can there be fuch a thing as half a fclf ? — Or can the being I call my/elf ho fplit into two others ? Impoflible ! This would not be to divide, but to an^ nihilate me — And the truth is, that in this cafe divifion cannot be imagined without annihilation — In another place Dr, Prieft- ley intimates, that matter confifts of /W/- vifible points, p. 23. How then can it be infinitely divifible ? Answer. OF THE HUMAN MIND, Answer. Cj The matter of which I confift may be divifible, though the ^67//i7/ divifion of it might fo difarrangc the parts of it, that the property of thinking (which is the refult of a particular modification of them) would be deftroyed. A whole brain may think, but half a brain may be incapable of it. I fee no fort of difficulty in this cafe. Alfo, may not an extended fpirit be con- ceived to be divided without annihilation, as well as an extended folid fubftance ? To the imagination it is equally eafy. Dr. Price. Difquijiiionsy p. 92. 'The percipient power may as 'well belong to onefyftem as to one atom. — See likewife tlic anfwcr to the fourth Ob- jeftion in p. 83. I am one per/on, but it does not follow that I cannot be divided: A fphere is one things but it does not follow that it confifts of indivifible 7naterials But if matter confifts of indivifible poiiits (as is faid in p. 23.) and the foul is matter, then the foul .4 II V it I : c 1 \ ^ fc»i ' '1 llt l li 'HOli M 64 OF THE HUMAN MIND; foul confifts of indivifiblc materials. But not to infifl on this. Can any one believe of himfclf that he is one thinking being only as a great number of bodies forming a fpherc arc one fphcre ? If this is true, he muft be cither the parts themfelves that compofe the fphere ; and if fo, he is a miiltituJc of beings ; or he mufl be their fphericity y and if fo, he is nothing but an order or relation of parts, and can never re- main the fame any longer than that order IS prefcrved. As any change in the fur- face of a fphere would deftroy the fphe- ricity, and convert it into fome other figure, fo would any change in that order of parts which conftitutes myfelfy deftroy me^ and convert me into fome other perfon* Answer. If I fay that matter confifts of indivifiblc points, I ufc a common cxprefTion, though perhaps nut a corred one. But as every fcnfible part of matter confifts of an infinity of fuch points, it is plain that the fubftance can never be cxhaullcd by any divifion. To -/• 0^W I OF THE HUMAN MIND. ^ To infer from this, that the foul (confifting of matter) confifts of an indivifiblc fub- ftance, feems to mc to be a play upon words* If a thinking being be a material fub- ftance of a particular texture and form, as I define it, it cannot follow, as is here af- ferted, that it is a mere order or relation of parts. A difarrangement of this texture would deftroy all power of thought, but would not make another perfon* D R, pR ICE. Difquifitions i p. 89. '* // is impojjible to *^ foy a priori, whether afngle particle, or a ^^Jyjiem of matter, be the feat of perception^ ** hut faEi proves the latter ^ If a fyftem of matter is the feat of perception, then the fyftem is the percipient being. But the percipient being is one. A fyftem con-* fifts of many beings. It is inconceivable to me how any perfon can think that many fubftances united can be one fubftance or that all E the } ' I ■■H I II " ■ I mm'y^m'^^mr* 65 OF THE HUMAN MIND. the parts of a fyftem can perceive, and yet no iingle part be a percipient being. Answer. A fyftem, though confifting of many beings or things, is neverthelefs but one fyjiem. A brain, though confifting of many- parts, is but one brain ; and where can be the difficulty of conceiving that no fingle part of a brain fliould be a whole brain, or have the properties of a whole brain ? Dr. Pr I c E. T>ifqiiifitio7is^ Sedt. IX. It feems evident that Dr. Prieftley's principles go to prove, i that the Deity is material, as well as all inferior beings. He would otherwife have no common property with matter, by which it would be pofTible for hini to ad: upon it — But at the fame time would there not be fomething fhock- ing in faying of the Deity, that he is no- thing but a power of attraction and re- puliion ? Answer. OF THE HUMAN MIND. Answer, 6/ I By what conftruftion am I made to afTert that the divine effence is material, that is> of the fame kind of fubftance with what we generally term matter, when I fuppofe it to have quite different properties, on account of which I exprefsly fay, that it ought to have a quite dij^erent name, and not receive jts denomination from the mere negation of the properties of matter, which is, in fadt, no definition at all ? Let all beings, and all things, be defined by their known properties, and no miftake can poflibly arife; for then our knowledge and our language will always correfpond to one another. It would certainly be fomething fhocking to fay that " the Deity is nothing but a " power of attradion and repulfion," but it would be faying what is direftly con- trary to the dodlrine of my treatife, as muft, I think, be obvious to the moft fuperficial attention. Dr. Price. Difquifitions, p. 103. I am furprized Dr. Prieftley fliould here fay, that it is almoft E 2 univerfallv • ■■WNfiiiii juri^n'^ , Answer. I am furprifed at thefe conjedlures con- cerning my meaning, which is, I think, always exprefled with fufficient clearnefs, viz. that the faculty of thinking is the refult of a certain arrangement of the parts of matter ; fo that the difarrangement of them by death is neither the extinSlioriy nor the annihilation of them, and the re-arrange- ment of them after death, is (if any thing can be fo called) a proper refurre£iion. It is as muchfo, as that of . feed fown in the ground, the germ of which does not perifh, but rifes again in the form of a new plant, though the greateft part of the bulk of the feed (being merely nutritious, and extra^ neous matter) does not properly rife again, • Dr. Pr I cpt If I underftand what is faid In the begin- ning of Seft. XIII. on Perfonal Identity, the drift of it is to ihew that a being may be the fame with z former being, though ihtivfuh'- fiances^ and confequeotly all their properties, are f . OF THE HUMAN MIND. yj are different. — It is likewife implied, that the men who are to be raifed from death, will be the fame with the men who have exifted in this world, only as a river is called the fame, becaufe the water, though different, has followed other water in the fame chan- nel ; or as a forefl is called the fame, be- caufe the prefent trees, though new, have been planted and grown up on the fame fpot, in the room of other trees which had been cut down and confumed — Did I be- lieve this to be all the identity of man here- after, I could not confider myfelf as having any concern in a future flate, » The affertion that the man or the agent may be the fame, though his fubflance, or every component part of him, is different, appears to me very extraordinary indeed. I am a different perfon from my neighbour, though organized in the fame manner, be- caufe the organized matter is different — If, therefore, man after the refurreftion will be, not only a different fyftem of matter, but alfo a fyflem of matter differently or- ganized, and placed in a different world, what y^ OF THE JHUMAN MIND. what will there be to make him the fame with man in this world ? 1 think, there- fore, that Dr, Prieftley fliould, by all means, keep to what he advances towards the conclufion of this 13th Sedion. It is cffential to his fcheme to maintain the re-, furreaion of ihe/ame body, or that the very matter that compofes man at death, will be collefted at the refurredion, and com- pofe him again in another world, and for ever. But what am I faying? Man a com^ pofition of fubftances ! It is utterly impof- fible. The thinking fubftance would then be not one being, but a multitude \ nor is it poffible to evade this confequence, with- out denying that the foul is a fubftance, or any thing more than a modification of a fubftance, or an arrangement and order of the parts of fubftances. Can this be true? I the iubjed: of thought and perception \ is what every one calls himfelfi not a being, and me being ; but a mere refult from the ligure, motion, and order of a fyftem of inatcrial beings ?■ In ihort, if the foul is OF THE HUMAN MIND, yf . is material, it muft certainly be one of the primary atoms of matter. No where elfe in the corporeal world can we find any thing like that unity and fubftantiality which belong to the foul of man \ and if it is an atom, it mufl: have exifted from the firft creation of matter, unlefs there are new atoms created every time an animal is ge- nerated. 1' Answer, In Seft. XIIL I profefledly fpeculate upon principles that are not my own. It is in- tended to prove, that there may be fuch an identity offerfon^ as will be a foundation for i\x\.\xxz expectation^ obligation, &c. though every particle of the man ftiould be changed. The reafoning in this feftion I muft take the liberty to fay, I do not think to be in- validated by Dr. Price's remarks, though to him it appears fo very extraordinary. The remainder of this remark has been obviated again and again, in the courfe of my work, and alfo in the preceding parts pf this. What I call myfelfis an organized fvftem 1» OF THE HUMAN MIND. fyftem of matter. It is not, therefore, myfelf, but my power of thought^ that is properly termed the refult of figure, mo- tion, &€• Dr. Price. jyifqutfitions^ p. i6o, &c. " What is there ** in the matter that compofes my body, that ** jhould attach me to it more than to the matter ** that compofes the table on which I write ?" This is a furprizing queftion from Dr, Prieftley. If the matter which compofes my body is myfelf, I certainly have as much reafon to prefer it to the matter of a table, as I have to prefer myfelf to a table. To affert, as Dr. Prieftley does, that the matter of the body is the foul, and at the fame time to fuppofe,as he does, in this 13 th Sedion, that the foul may remain the fame, though the whole matter of the body is changed, appears to me indeed fo apparently inconfiftent, that I cannot help fufpefting I muft greatly mifunderftand him. Should he fay, that the foul is not ftridly the matter of the body, but the organization of that matter ; this, as I have already obferved more • OF THE HUMAN MIND. tr t more than once, is making the foul a mo- dification, an order and juxta-pofition and connexion of parts, and not a being, or fubjiance. But is it pofiible to conceive of any thing more fubftantial than the foul ? Can there be a being in nature, if the fen- tient principle, the fubjeft that feels plea- furc and pain, that thinks and reafons, and loves and hates, is not a being ? Suppofe it, however, if you can, to be merely the or- ganization of the body ; would not a change in the matter of the body make another body ? And would not another body make another foul, though the fame organization fhould be preferved ? If not, then may not I and Dr. Prieftley be the fame man, fince the organization of our bodies is the fame, and only the matter different ? Would not, in fhort, any number of living bodies be one foul, one fentient principle, fuppofing their organization the fame ? Answer. The beginning of this remark relates to the fpeculation abovementioned, which*goea upon other principles than my own. To the 1 ^i OF THE HUMAN MIND. the queftion at the end of the remark, vi'Zi •* Would not any number of living bodies « be one foul, one fentient principle, fup- ** pofing their organization the fame," I anfwer, that different fyftems of matter, organized exaftly alike, muft make dif- ferent beings, who would feel and think exaftly alike in the fame circumftances. Their minds, therefore, would be exaftly Jimilar, but numerically different. Dr. Price. Bifquifitions, p. 1 23. It feems to be hinted here, that the foul, after death, is as little of a fubftance (that is, as truly nothing) as matter would be without extenfion. — It is added, if together ivith the ceffation of thought they will maintain the real exijience of the foul after deaths it mujl be for the fake of hypothefs only, and for no real ufe whatever. Does Dr. Prieftley then really mean that the foul lofes its exiftence at death ? How can it be faid to be of no ufe to maintain the exiftence of the foul after death, when without this, a refurredion muft be impoiTible ? Answer. OF THE HUMAN MIND. >9 I ^0 Answer. I fay, that they who maintain the cef- fation of thought after death, cannot main- tain the feparate exiftence of the foul,, ex- cept for the fake of an hypothefis, and for no real ufe whatever, for this plain reafon j that, during this entire ceffation of thought, the foul is, in fadl, of no ufe, no pheno- mena indicating that any fuch thing exifts. Had not the perfons who maintain fuch an infenfible ftate of the foul, believed a re- furreaJ been dead, viz. the body) is manifeftly ufelefs, upon the fuppoiition of there being a foul diftina from the body; it being upon this hypothefis, the foul, and not the body, that is the feat of all perception, and the fource of all adlion. Dr. Pr I ce- Difquifitions, p. 224. It was unquejlionably the opinion of the Apojlles, that the thinking powers ceafed at death. If, indeed, the Apoftles (as is here af- fertedtoopofitively) thought that the powers of fenfation were deftroyed at death, or as Dr. Prieftley fpeaks in p. 248, that death is the utter extinftion of all our percipient and intelleftual powers; if, I fay, the Apoftles thought thus, they believed a con- tradiaion in believing a refurreftion. If thefe powers are not deftroyed, they muft remain, and it can be only the exercife of them that ceafes at death. Certainly Dr. Prieftley fliould have guarded better his language on this fubjed, which is often fuch as implies that the foul lofes its cxiftence *.i OF THE Human mind. * i exiftence at death. Indeed, I never knew before that any believer in a future ftate could aflert, not only that thought and per-- ception ceafe at death, but that there is then a total extindion of the very powers them- felves. In fhort. Dr. Prieftley fhould be explicit in faying which it is he believes, th^ Jleepy or the non-exijlence of the foul after death. There is no lefs than an in- finite difference between thefe two things. The former may be the truth, and it implies the natural immortality of the foul; but if the latter is true, there is an end of all our hopes. Talking of the reftoration of man after death, will be talking of the re- ftoration of a non-entity. Dr. Prieftley calls this, (inDifqtiifitiofiSy p. 1 2 5 . ) ^;/ extraordinary ajertion ; but it appears to me felf-evidently true. Of what ufe. Dr. Prieftley afks, is an exiftence after death, without thought and perception ? I have given a plain anfwer to this queftion. It is of infinite ufe, by making a future ftat6, or a re- ftoration of man, pofllble. Would it not be ftrange to fay of a man who is fallen F into I OF THE HUMAN MIND. into a fwoon, that fince he Is infenfible it makes no difference whether he is in a fwoon or dead ? — Would it not be proper to fay in anfwer,- that if he is only in a fwoon he may recover, but if he is dead he will never recover. — Juft fo ; if a man at death is only difabled^ he may be reftored. But if his exiftence is gone, he never can be reftored. Answer. I cannot help exprefling my furprife at this remark. As far as I fee, my language upon this fubjed is always uniform, and ftridly proper. I fuppofe that the powers of thought are not merely fufpended, but are extinSi, or ceafe to bey at death. To make my meaning, if poffible, better un- derftood, I will ufe the following com- parifon. The power o? cutting, in a razor, depends upon a certain cohefion, and ar- rangement of the parts of which it confifts. If we fuppofe this razor to be wholly dif- folved in any acid liquor, its power of cutting ■■■ OF THE HUMAN MIND. g^ cutting will certainly be loji, or ceafe to be, though no particle of the metal that con- ftituted the razor be annihilated by the procefsj and its former 7:?j^j>^, itiA power of cuttings &c. may be reftored to it after the metal has been precipitated. Thus when the body is diffolved by putrefaction, its power of thinking entirely ccafes ; but, no particle of the man being lojl, as many of them as were effential to him, will, I doubt not, be colledled, and revivified, at the refurreftion, when the power of think- ing will return of courfe. I do not, there- fore, think that any thing that I have advanced implies that the foul, that is, the man lofes his exijlence at death, in any other fenfe than that the man lofes his power of thinking. I really do not know how I can be more explicit than I have been through the whole of my treatife on this fubjed:, with refpe fute it. But if not, it muft be in vain to argue about it. Answer. If ideas be nothing diflind from the mind, or modifications of the mind, va- rying as their architypes vary, a mind with ideas, and a mind without ideas, would be the fame thing ; and if the ideas of com- pound objeds be not compounded things, and confift of as many parts as the objedls of which they are the ideas, I am unable to conceive any thing about ideas. That motions, or volitions of the mind, do de- pead upon ideas, or, in other words, that the mind is influenced, or aSied upon by them, is a certain>6?, v/hether the repre- fentation confute itfelf or not. No perfon acquainted with the principles of Hartleys theory, can be at a lofs to know what I fuppofe ideas to be, and in what manner they operate. Dr . Price. Obfervations onDr. Prieftley V Reply, p . 5 8, Gfr. I have already fiiid, that I know nothing of the extenfion of fpirit. I only wiili to diftinguifh 96 OF THE HUMAN MIND. t I diftingiiifli on this fubje£t between what 1^ certain, and what is uncertain. I think it certain, that whatever the fubjeft of con- fcioufnefs may be in other refpefts, it is incapable of being divided without being annihilated. I do not exped; that the chapter in But- lers Analogy, on a future State, which I have wifhed to recommend to Dr. Prieft- ley's attention, can appear to him as weighty as it does to me. Butler and Clarke are with me two of the firft of all writers. In p. 222 of the Difquijitions, &c. to which Dr. Prieilley refers me, the contradictory account of fpiritual beings, which makes them to exift no where, or to have no re- lation to place, is laid to be " t/?e only " conjljlent fyftem of immaterialifm, held *' by Mr. Baxter, and all the moji approved " modern writers on the fubjed:." Can it be right to fay this, when there are fuch men as Dr. Clarke and Newton who have entertained different ideas, and extended them even to the fupreme Spirit ? I do not believe ^V TflE HUMAN MIND. ^7 l^elieve that even Mr. Baxter entertaiiied any fuch notion. It is, however, the notion of Spirit which is combated through the greateft part of Dr. Prieftley^s work. Dr. Prieftley's view in writing, was, to prove that there is no diftinftion between matter and fpirit, or between the foul and body: and thus to explode what he calls the heathenifh fyftem of chriftianity, by exploding the dodrines of Chrift's priE- exigence, and an intermediate ftate. But if / in doin^ this, it comes out that his accountof matter does not anfwer to the common ideas of matter j or that it is notyS/Z^extenfion, but fomething not folid that exifts in fpace; it agrees fo far with fpirit : And if fuch matter is, as he aflerts, the only matter poffible, what he has proved will be, not that we have no fouls diftind: from our bodies, but that we have no bodies diftind:. from our fouls. Matter which poifefTes folidity, or impenetrability and inertnefs, is certainly the only matter that is the objed of natural philofophy. This, Newton has faid, in a paHage I have quoted from G * him '/3 5t OF jm HUMAN MIND. Hoi. If Aich matter is impoflible, it will follow that all in nature is Spirit. 0r. Prieftley, in this reply, p. 60, men- tions his views. They are, I doubt not, the pureft and heft pofllble^ There is no one of whofe heart I have a higher opinion* But at the fame time my fixed apprehenfion is, that he is one of thofc great and good men who have pufhed on too eagerly in the purfuit of truth,, and who, in endeavouring to ferve the beft of all caufes, have run upon bad ground, and, without knowing it, employed means of the moft dangerous tendency* Answer* To this I haveBOthing particular to fay- My quotations from various writers prove, that befides the profefled Cartefians, many other philofophers and metaphyficians have fuppofed thzt jpj'rif bears no relation to /pace. Dr. Watts, without having ever been re- futed that I know of, has fliewn that this is the only confiftent idea of an immaterial being, I have added Ibme additional ar- guments I OF THE HUMAN MIND. ^ guments to prove the fame thing, and this was my own idea while I held the dodrine of immaterialifm. This idea, therefore, I have chiefy combated ; but npt this only, but alfo every other idea of immaterialifm that I have met with, that appeared to mc to deferve particular notice* Dr. Price. Obfe^rvalions on the Replies ^ p. 65 and 66. A thinking being. Dr. Prieftley fays, is a material fubftance of a particular texture ; not a mere order or relation of parts. Does it not then follow, that the deftrudion of the order or texture of the parts ; that is, their dif-arrangement, cannot be the de* ftrudlion of the thinking being ? " A fyftem,** it is farther faid, " though •* confifting of many, beings y is but one © *^ fyjlem: and a brain, though confifting *' of many parts^ is but one brain 1 no ** fingle part of which can be the whole.** But it is felf-evident, that a fyftem, con- - lifting of many beings, though one as a G 2 fyjiem, ' \\ iOO OF THE HUMAN MIND. ■ fyjieniy in the fame fenfe that an army is one as an army^ muft be a multitude of beings ; and can no more be one being than an army can be one man. In like manner, though a brain confiding of many material fubllances, not one of which, according to Dr. Prieftley, is in contadt with another -, though I fay fuch a brain may be one as a brain, it cannot certainly be ont fiibjiance. But the foul is on^fub- fiance, one being. This Dr. Prieftley grants at the end of thefe replies, and it is impoifible he fhould deny it. He cannot, therefore, think the brain to be the foul. AH that he can believe, is, that the foul's thinking depends on the order and texture of the brain. Experience proves this ; and it is indeed, as I have before faid, all that experience teaches us. Answer. I cannot fee any thing in this remark that is not merely verbal. A man, in my idea, is one thinking being, and not two thinking beings, let this thinking being confift mm OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. ■i \ I ^ IO| confift of as many fubftances, or unthinking beings as any perfon pleafes. D R. Pr I C E, * Obfervations on the Reply, p. 67. '* By what conftrudtion am I made to " aflert, that the Divine EiTence is ma- *^ terial ; that is, of the fame kind of fub- *^ ftance with what we generally term ** matter, when I fuppofe it to have quit^ ^^ different properties, &c. ?" I have mentioned this only as an in- ference from Dr. Prieftley 's principles ; and particularly from a principle which he has argued upon as a maxim, namely, ^' that nothing can adt upon another with- ** out having common properties with it." If this is true, the Deity muft have com-- mon properties with matter; and matter being a power of attraftion and repullion united to extenfion, the Deity muft be the fame. If, in order to avoid this Confe- (juence. Dr. Prieftley ftiould acknow^ledge G 3 thi§ i If I 102 OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. this maxim not to be univerfally true, it will follow that Spirit may adt upon matter without having any other common pro- perty with it than being locally prefent to it ; and one of his chief arguments for the materiality of the foul will be given up. Indeed, I cannot imagine how it is pof- fible for him to maintain this maxim without afferting the impoffibility of the creation of the world out of nothing : For what common property can the Creator have with nothing? It would not fatisfy roe to be told here, that the Divine Nature poffeffing peculiar properties, we can draw no argument from it. The contrary is true in many cafes : Particularly .in the following. — The Deity afts on matter, without having any common property with it ; therefore fuch aftion is poffible.— The Deity is an immaterial being; therefore im- material beings are poffible : And the ne- gation of matter is not the fame with the negation of all exiftence. — In like manner, the Deity is an intelligent being; therefore intelligent beings are poffible. — He pof- f OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. 105 fcflcs the powers of felf-determination ; therefore fuch powers are poffible. — He is an agent ; therefore there may be other agents. — All tlaefe conclufions appear to meiiobejufL I have by m) mcaa« de%nci to charge Dr. Prieftky with maintaining that the Deity is nothing but a power of attraftion and repulfion, I only mean to fay, that If the Deity be a material being, and mat- ter (as Dr. Prieftley contends) is nothing but fuch a power, thea the Deity muft alfo be nothing but fiich a power. I know that Dr. Prieftley afferts the immateriality of the Deity. I only doubt about the confiftence of this with the other parts of his theory. Dr. Prieftley fays, p. 68, that he docs not chufe to call fpace an attribute 9/ the Deity \ becaufe, fuppofing there was no Deity, ** fpace would ftiil remain ; it ** being impoffible to be annihilated even ^* in ideasi" G4 According I flp ^1^^^^ OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE. i i According to Dr. Clarke, the impof. fibility of annihilating even in idea, J^aci and time, is the fame with the neceJJ'ary exijience of the Deity, whofe attributes they are. Inftead therefore of faying, *^ wa§ ** there no Deity fpace would flill remain," wc fliould fay " fpace wall ftill remain ; *' and therefore the Deity will ftill remain, ^' and his non-exiftence cannot be ima- ** gined without a contradiftion." It ap- pears to me, that whatever cannot be an- nihilated, even in idea, muft be an at- tribute of the Deity. This may be ap- plied not only to fpace and time, but to truth, pojjibles, &cc. as I have done in my 'Treatife on Morals. 'Eternity, im^ menjity, infinite truth, &c. cannot be conr ceived not to exift. All exiftence prct- fuppofes their exiftence. That is, there exifts neceflarily an eternal and omniprefent intelligence, the parent of all things.— I am afraid Dr. Frieftley will not like this ; but I am as much fatisfied with it as he is with any part of Dr. Hartley's Theory. Answer. OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE, m^ Answer, • What is attraction or repulfion but a power of moving matter in a certain di-^ redlion ? If, therefore, the Deity does thus afl: upon matter, he muft have that power, and therefore o?i€ property in common with matter, though he be poflefled of ever fo many other powers of which matter is in-? capable. Dr. Price's argument, that becaufe God is a felf' deter mined being, there may be other felf-determined beings, and becaufe God is an agent there may be other agents, &c. &c. may, I am afraid, carry us too far. For may it not be faid alio, that becaufe God is a felf-exifient being, there may be other felf-exiftent beings, and becaufe God can create out of no^ thing, &c, &c, other beings may have the fame powers ? I cannot, I own, fee any thing don- plufive in Dr. Price's argument for the ^eing of a God, a priori. I do not fee why ,o6 OP THE DIVINE ESSENCE. why it fliould be taken for granted, that *« whatever cannot be annihilated, even in #* idea, muft be an attribute of the Deity/' This appears to me to be quite an ar- bitrary fuppofition. Th2it Jpace, duration, frutb, fojjihles, ice. fhould be denominated attributes, founds very harih to me. If the infinite fpacc occupied by the Deity be an attribute of his, I ihould think that the finite fpacc, occupied by fijiite minds and things, fliould be called their attributes, and alfo the portions of duration to which they are co-exiftent, another of their at- tributes, &c. fo that the fame individual portions of fpace and time^ muft be at- tributes both of the Deity and of created beings. Alfo mere attributes of things cannot, in idej, be feparated from them ; whereas nothing is ealicr than to form the idea of mere Jpace, without any thing to occupy it. But this is not my fubjedl. Dr. Price. Obfervations on Reply, p. 69, I muft repeat here what I have already faid, that I know no more of the extenfioa OF THE MORTALITY OF THE SOUL, vty of fpirit, than that it pofTefTes local prefcnce^ and is at the fame time indifperptible. Let any one refledt on himfelf, or on the immenfity of the Divine Nature, and deny the poflibillty of this if he pan, Space has parts, but they are only af* Jignable pa'rts. A feparation of them from one another implies a contradion. An s we r. If a, finite fpirit occupy a finite portion of fpace, one part of that fpirit may be conceived to be removed from another, as well as one part of folid matter from ano- ther ', though this is not true of the Deity^ who neceflarily fills all fpace. <%•■'' ^ ... Dr. Pr ice. Ohfervations on Reply, p. 75- Dr. Prieftley here fays, that he intende4 ^n Se9 134 OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, fecondedii.) I have ftated, in the beft manner I am able, the queftion concerning Liberty and Neceflity. Dr. Prieftley, in his fecond volume (Sed. 5th and 6th) has replied to what I have faid in moft of thofe paflages, with candour and ability : But I cannot fay that I think he has done it with fuccefs. He feems to mifunderftand me, and, there- fore, I will endeavour to give a more diftinit account of my ideas on this fubjeft. If they are wrong, I fhall rejoice to fee them proved to be fo. If they are right, it will be eafy to form a judgment of all Dr. Prieftley's arguments in his fecond volume, and to determine how far we agree^ and differ* After Dr. Clarke, I define Liberty to be " a power to ad", or " a power oi felf- *^ motion^ or felf-determination." On this definition I would make the following ob- fervations. I . That liberty is common to all animals^ as well as to all reafonabk beings -y every animal, as fuch, poffeffing powers oi felf- motion^ or fpontaneity. 2. There OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 135 . 2. There are no degrees of liberty, be- caufe there is no medium between aEling^ and not a£ting -, or between poffeffing felf- motive powers, and not poffeffing them. 3. The liberty now defined is poffible. One thing cannot move another, and that another in injinitum. Some where or other there muft exift a power of beginning motion, that is, oif elf -mot ion. This is no lefs certain than that fince one thing cannot produce another, and that another in in-- Jinitum, there muft be a^r/? caufe. This argument feems to me decifive, not only for the pojjibility^ but the aBual exijience of liberty. But farther. We are confcious of it in ourfelves. I can fay nothing to convince a perfon who will de- clare that he believes his determinations do not originate with himfelfy or that he has no power of moving or determining himfelf. It is another queftion, whether he moves himfelf with or without a regard to motives. Afferting felf-determination with a regard to motives, (and no one ever yet afferted the contrary) is afferting felf- 1 4 determination^ tsS OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. determination^ and, therefore, it is the fam? with afferting.liberty. Dr. Prieftley often fays, that felf-determination implies an ef- fed without a caufe. But this cannotbe juft- ly faid. Does it follow that becaufe I am myfelf\\\z caufe, there is no caufe ? 4. This definition implies, that in our volitions, or determinations, wc are not aBed upon. Ailing^ and being aSied upon^ are incompatible with one another. In whatever inllances, therefore, it is truly faid of us that we aB^ in thofe inftances we cannot be aBed upon. A being in re- ceiving a change of its ftate, from the exertion of an adequate force, is not an agent. Man therefore would not be an agent, were all his volitions derived from any force, or the efFcds of any mechanical caufes. In this cafe it would be no more true that he ever ads, than it is true of a ball that it aBs "whtnjiruck by another ball. But the main obfervation I would make is the following. 5. ** The liberty now defined is con- ** fiftent with acting with a regard to mo- l* tives." This has been already intimated ; but 2 OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. ,37 but it is necefl^ary it fhould be particularly attended to and explained, Suppofing a power of felf-determinatioa to exift, it is by no means neceflary that it fliould be exerted without a regard to any end or rule. On the contrary, it can never be exerted without fome view or defign. Whoever adls, means to do fomewhat. This is true of the loweft reptile, as well as of the wifeft man. The power of deter- mining ourfelves, by the very nature of it^, wants an end and rule to guide it; and no probability, or certainty, of its being exerted agreeably to a rule, can have the lead tendency to infringe or diminiiji \t. All that Ihould be avoided here, is, the intolerable abfurdity of making our reafons and ends in ading the phyfical caufes or efficients of aftion. This is the fame with afcribing the adion of walking, not to the feet (or the power which moves the feet) but to the eye, which only fees the way. The perception of a reafon for adling, or the judgment of the underftanding, is no more than feeing the way. It is the eye of the mind, vriiiiHiiiil^^ 138 OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. mind, which informs and direfts ^ and what- ever certainty there may be that a particular determination will follow, fuch determina- tion will be the felf-determination of the mind ; and not any change of its ftate ftamped upon it, over which it has no power, and in receiving which, inftead of being an agents it is merely ^fqffivefubjeB of agency. In a word. There is a diftindion here of the laft importance, which muft never be overlooked. I mean the diftindion fo much infifted on by Dr. Clarke, between the operation of phyfical caufes, and the m- fuence of moral reafons. The views or ideas of beings may be the account or occa/ions of their ading ; but it is a contradiftion to make them the mechanical efficients of their aaions. And yet I fufped: that Dr. Prieft- ley will avow this to be his opinion. Ideas he makes to be divifible and extended. He afcribes an impulfive force to them : And afferts that they ad by mechanical laws on the mind, as one material fubftance ads upon another. See his Replies, p. 52, 85, 955 and the Difquijitionsy p. 38. In i OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 139 In order better to explain the diftinc- tion I have mentioned, I will beg leave to give an account of the following par- ticulars, in which it appears to me that phyfical and moral caufes differ. 1 . The one are beings \ the others are only the ijiews of beings. 2. The one always do^ and the other may produce a certainty of event. But the certainties in thefe two cafes differ eflcn- tially. It is, for inftance, certain that a man dragged along like a piece of timber, will follow the fuperior force that acfls upon him. It may be alfo certain, that a man invited by the hope of a reward, will follow a guide. But who fees not that 'thefe cer- tainties, having different foundations, are of a totally different nature ? In both cafes the man might in common fpeech be faid to follow y but his following in the one cafe, however certain in event, would be his own agency : In the other cafe, it would be the agency of another. In the one cafe, he would vfSiWy follow : But in the other cafe, being dragged, he couid not properly be faid 140 OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. faid to follow. In the one cafe, fuperloF power moves him : In the other, he moves himfelf. In fhort; to afcribe a neceflary and phyfical efficiency to motives, is (as Dr. Clarke has obferved) . the fame with faying, that an abJiraB notion can Jlrike a ball. 3, The certainty of event arifing from the operation of phyfical caufes is always equal and invariable, but the certainty of event arifing from moral caufes, that is, from the views and perceptions of beings, admits of an infinite variety of degrees; and fometimes paffes into probability and cgntingency. Suppofing contrary reafons equally ba- lanced in the mind, it may be uncertain how a being will adl. If, for inftance, a temptation to an adt of wickednefs comes in the way of a man whofe love of virtue is nearly equal to the ftrength of his paf- fions, it may be doubtful which way he will determine. If his love of virtue ex- ceeds the influence of paffion, there will be z probability of his afting virtuoufly, pro- portioned OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 141 portioned to the degree in which the love of virtue prevails within him : And it may be fo prevalent as to make it certain that he will always follow his perceptions of virtue. 4. In the operation of phyfical caufes, it is always implied that there is not in any fenfe a power to produce, or a poffibility of producing any other effed than that which is produced; but the contrary is true of effects dependent on the wills, and occafioned by the views of free agents. A benevolent man will certainly relieve mi- fcry when it falls in his way ; but he has the power of not relieving it. On the con- trary, a ftone thrown from the hand mujl move. There is no fenfe in which it can be faid, that it polTeffcs the power of not moving in the precife diredion in which it is thrown. The reafon of this is, that the benevolent man aUs : The ftone only fuffers. Were the determination to give relief in the former cafe, and the motions of the ftone in the latter, both alike fufferances^ (if I may io fpeak) or both effed:s of a force which could not be refifted, they would \ I Ht OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. would be both alike void of all merit A man at the bottom of St. Paul's w7/ not jump ujf : A man at the top wi// not jump down. Both events may be certain. But a man at the bottom cannot jump up : A man at the top can jump down. And if in common ipeech we Ihould % in the latter cafe, that a man at the top cannot jump down, we ihould fpeak figuratively and improperly; meaning only that he certainly will not. Who can deny, even with refpeft to the Supreme Deity, that, however certain it may be that he will not make his creation miferable, he has the power to do it ? It is, indeed, on this power that all our notions of moral ex- cellence in the anions of beings depend. Were the benericence of a being no more tis aftion, or felf -determination y than the falling of rain is the aftion, or felf-de- termiLation, of rain, it would not be the obj. a of moral approbation ; or the ground of eiicem and gratitude. {Stt Review of Morals, p. 410 to p. 415. fecond edit.) This leads me to obferve, laltly, 6. That OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 143 6. That the cafuality implied in the views and difpofitions of beings is entirely confident with moral obligation, and re- fponfibility: But that all effeds brought about by mechanical l^ws are inconfiftent with them. This appears fufficiently from the preceding obfervations. Upon the whole. The queftion con- cerning Liberty is not, ** Whether the *^ views or ideas of beings influence their *' adions," but " what the nature of that '* influence is." That it is not any kind of mechanical or phyflcal efficiency, appears to me palpably evident. But if I am miftaken in this opinion ; and if indeed, as .Dr. Prieftley maintains, man has no other liberty in followmg motives than water has in run- ning do\Mi hill, or than the arms of a fcale preft by weights, have in niing and falling : If, I fay, this is the truth, man never a£ts. It is folly to applaud or reproach ourfelves for our condudt ^ and there is an end of all moral obligation and accountablenefs — Dr. Prieftley does not acknowledge thefe con- fequences. I think them clear to fuch a degree m Iff OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSIT?. degree as riot to admit of proper proof. The beft that can be done in this cafe is to ftate the queftion diftindtly and intelligibly, and leave the decifion to common fenfe^ In reviewing thefe papers I have found, that my defire to explain myfelf fully has led me to a redundancy of expreflion and many repetitions. Dr. Prieftley will, I hope, excufe this. I refer myfelf to his candour, and chufe now to withdraw from this controverfy His firft volume con- cludes with fome obfervations in defence of the Socman fcheme of chriftianity. I will not enter into any debate with him on this fubjed. My opinion is, that the Socinian fcheme degrades chriftianity, and is by no means reconcileable to the Scriptures. But I know that fome of the beft men and wifeft chriftians have adopted it. Among- .here 1 reckon Dr. P.^, Mr. U^J. and Dr. Jeii ; and fliould it, contrary to my apprehenfions, be the true chriftian doftrine, I wifli them all poflible fuccefs in propagating it. Answer. OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, 145 Answer. On the fubjedt of Necejjity I have nothing material to add to what is contained in the fecond volume of my work, arid I cannot help thinking, that if what I have there advanced be attended to, it will be fuf- ficient to obviate the objeftions here urged by Dr. Price. But as he has been fo ob- liging as to give his ideas with great frank- nefs, and diftindnefs, on the fubjedt, and I conceive this to be the only difference of real confequence between us, 1 (hall fo far repeat the fubftance of what I have faid before, as may be neceffary to reply with equal explicitnefs to what he has here ob- ferved. \ifelf -motion y ov felj -determination ^ pro- perly fo called, be eflential to liberty, I muft deny that man is poffefled of it ; and if this, and nothing elfe, muft be called agency y I muft deny that, in this fenfe, man is an agent ; becaufe every human vo- lition is invariably directed by the circum- ftances in which a man is, and what we K call f * • ,46 OF THE IX>CTRINE OP NECESSITY. call motives. It appears to me that we have no more rcaibn, from fa£i and obr- fervatmij to conclude that a man can move himfelft that is, that he can will without motives, than that a ftone can move itfelf. And if the will is as invariably influenced by motives as the ftone is influenced by gravity, it may juft as well be faid that the ftone moves itlelf, though always ac- cording to the laws of gravity, as that the will, or the mind, moves itfelf, though always according to the motives ; and whe- ther thefe motives be called the moral or the phyjica! canks of our volitions, is of no fort of Signification ; becaufe they are the only and the necejary caufes, juft as much as gravity is the only and necelfary caufe of the motion of the ftone. Let the mind ad: contrary to motives, or the ftone move contrary to the laws of gravity, and I fliall then, but not before, believe that they arc not the only and necefl'ary caufes. " The perception of reafons or motives " Dr. Price calls the eye of the mind, ** which informs and direfts ;" but if the determination OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 147 determination of the mind, which follows ^pon it, be invariably according to that per- ception, I muft conclude that the nature of the mind is fuch, as that it could not adl otherwife, and therefore that it has no felf- determination properly fo called. A power nianifefted by no efte^fts, muft be con- fidered as merely imaginary, it being from effeSls alone that we arrive at the knowledge of caufes. Judging from fafts, I muft conclude that a proper Jelf-motion can no more belong tp man than felf^exijlence. Indeed, we have no mpre idea of the nature of felf-motion than we have of felf-exiftence. Motion and exiftence cannot be eternally derived, and a£lual exijience and a£iual mot ion , necef- farily lead us to iomt felf-exijling, and con- fequently felf-rmoving being. Though the idea be ever fo incomprehenfible, and con- founding to our faculties, we muft ac- qui^ice in it; for to {koip JJoort of this, or go beyond \Xy is equally impoflible. The difference that Dr. Price and others make between moral -^nd phyjical cd^uks and K 2 effecSts, J 1 I if 148 OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. efFefts, appears to me to be that which fubfifts between ^voluntary and involuntary caufes and efFefts ; and this is indeed a moll important diiference. Where involuntary motions are concerned, as in the cafe of a man dragged by force, it is abfurd to ufe any reafoning or expoftulation, or to apply rewards or punifhments, becaufe they can have no effeSt; but where voluntary mo- tions are concerned, as in the cafe of a man who is at liberty to go where he pleafes, and chufe what company he pleafes, &c. reafoning and expoftulation, rewards and punifhments, have the greateft propriety f becaufe the greateft effeSi; for they are applied to, and influence or move the will, as much as external force moves the bodv- It is on this circumftance, viz. the in- fuence of motives on the will, that the whole of moral difcipUne depends \ fo that if the will of man were fo formed, as that motives fliould have no influence upon it, he could not be the fubjed of moral government ; becaufe the hope of reward, and the fear of puniftiment, operate in no other manner than OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 149 than as motives applied to the will. And lince the whole of moral government de- pends upon the diftribution of rewards and punifhments, what has been called liberty^ or a power of afting independently of motives, is fo far from being the only foun- dation of moral government, that it is ab- folutely inconfiftent with it, as I have fhewn at large in my fecond volume. The ideas belonging to the terms ac- count ablenefs^ praife and blame^ merit and demerit^ all relate to the bufinefs of moral difcipline, and therefore neceflTarily imply that men are influenced by motives, and ad from fixed pri?2ciples, and character ; though, on account of our not compre- hending the doftrine of caufes, and ftop- ping where we ought not, we are generally under fome miftake and mifconception with refpeft to them. Therefore, to guard againft all miftake, it may be more ad- vifable that, in treating the fubjeft philo- fophically, thofe words be difufed. Every thing that really correfponds to them may \)C clearly expreffed in different language, K 3 an4, 4 I5A OF THE bbCTRINE OF NEGEfeStf V. and all the niks of difcipline^ ivery thin*f^ In praSfke^ on the part both df thfe goW^H&f' and the governed, will rtllid jiifl as befote. To make my meaning intelligible, and fhow that I do not advance this at tandoiil, I ihall httt endeavour to e^prefs in a ftHft and philofophical manner the full import of all the terms abovementioned. In common fpeech we fay that we are accountable creatures, and jujUy liable to re- noards and pimijhments for our condud. The philofopher lays, that jujiice ought to be called j!)r(9^r/>ry or ufffulnejs, o\ a rule of condlift adapted to anfvver a good purpofe, Xvhich in this cafe is the good of thbfe who are the fubjefts of government 6r dif- cipline i and therefore, inftead of faying, We ^vejiijlly liable to rewards or funijlotnents^- he fays. We are beings of fuch a con- ftitution, that to make us happy upon our abfervance of certain laws, and to make Us fuffer in confequence of our tranfgreffing thofe laws, will have a good effeft with refped: both to our own future condud and that of others; /. e. tending to our own melioration. <5F THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 151 melioration, and operating to the me- lioration of others. In common language we fay a man is ^ praife-worthyy and has merit. The phir lofopher fays, that the man has aded from, or been influenced by good principles, or fuch principles as will make a man happy In himfelf, and ufeful to others; that he 16 therefore a proper objed of complacencyt and fit to be made happy; that is, the freneral happinejs will be promoted by mak- ing him happy. So alfo when, in common language, a ^ man is faid to be blame -worthy and to have demerit, the philofopher fays, that he has adcd from, or been influenced by bad principles, or fuch as will make a man unhappy in himfelf, and hurtful to others; . that he is therefore a proper fubjed of averfion, and is fit to be made unhappy; that is, the making him unhappy will tend to promote the general happinefs. Upon the whole, therefore, though the ^ vulgar and philofophers ufe different Ian- K 4 guage, fl 11 152 OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. guage, they would fee reafon to aB in the fame manner. The governors will rule voluntary agents by means of rewards and punifhments, and the governed, being vo- luntary agents, will be influenced by the apprehenfion of them. It is confequently a matter of indiiference in whatever lan- guage we defcribe acftions and charadlers. If the common language be in feme re- fpeds inconfiftent with the doftrine of ne- ceffity, it is ftill more inconfiftent with the dodrine of liberty, or the notion of our being capable of determining without re- gard to motives. For the eff^El of the more exalted views of thephilofophicalneceflarian, (as unfpeak- ably fuperior to the more imperfedt views of the vulgar) I refer to what I have faid upon that fubjed in my fecond volume. We are not, however, to exped that necef- farians ihould univerfally, and to the eye of the world, be better than other men Even chriftianlty does not univerfally ap- pear to this advantage in the lives of its profeflbrs. But of this I aip perfuaded, that OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 153 that if any man had ftrength of mind fully to comprehend the doftrine of ne- celfity, and to keep his mind at all times under the inflqence of it, he would be much fuperior to the mere chrijiian, though not perhaps as much fo as the chriftian may be to the mere virtuous heathen^ Before I conclude this fubjed:, I cannot help noticing what appears to me to be an incpnfiftency in Dr. Price's account of his view of it. He fays, p. 137, *« The " pgwer gf felf-determinatipn can never ^* be exerted without fome view, or de- ** fign," /. e. the will cannot be deter- mined without motives, and " The power *^ of determining ourfelves, by the very na- " ture of it, wants an end, and rule, to <* guide it." From this I fhould infer, that the end and rule by which the will was guided being given, the determination would be certain and invariable ; whereas, in another place, p. 139. he fays, that ^* moral caufes only may produce a cer- " tainty^ and even that the certainty of f^ an event arifing from moral caufes, that is, " from I ( •1 154 OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. •' from the views and perceptions of things, ■** admits of an infinite variety of degrees, ** and fometimes paffcs into probability " and contingence," p. 140. Alfo that " in '' the operation of moral caufes there is a ^' polTibility of producing any other ef- " fed than that w^hich is produced." Nov^^ that the will fliould, by the very nature of it, want an end and rule to guide it, and yet be capable of determin- ing not only without^ but contrary to that rule, is, I think, inconfiftcnt; and yet upon this it is that the whole controverfy hinges. If the will be always determined according to motives (whether it be ai. Icdgcd to be by itfelf, or by the motives) the determination is certain and invariable, which is all that 1 mean by necej'ary ; whereas if it may determine contrary to motives, it is contingent, and uncertain; which I maintain to be a thing as impoffi- ble as that, in any cale whatever, an ef- fed (hould arife without a caufe; and alfo to be a thing that is, in its nature, in- capable of being the objcft o^ fore-know-- ledge. Ot THfi BOCTklNE OF NECESSITY. 155 ledge. And yet, if there be any truth in ^/ the fcriptures, the Divine Being certainly forefees every determination of the mind of man. I 4 The f 156 OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, The third Communication. Of the DoBrine of Necessity. D R, Price. ON the fubjeft of ncceflity I will only fay farther, that notwithftanding what Dr. Prieftley has faid in his laft reply, p. 145, ^ &c. I remain of opinion that '* Se/f-dettr- mination and certainty of determination are perfedly confiftent." — '' That a felf- determining power which is under no influence from motives, or which de- ftroys the ufe of difcipline and the fu- perintendency of providence, has never been contended for, or meant by any *^ advocates for liberty." — And, that I am by no means fenfible of any inconfiftency between 4C t€ i€ i€ €€ C( t( •'"j OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 157 between afTerting that every being who afts at all muft ad: for fome end, and with fome view; and afTerting, that a being may have the power of determining his choice to any one of different ends, and that when a regard to different ends is equal, contingency of event takes place. The controverfy, however, does not according to my views of it, hinge on the confide- ration lafl mentioned ; but merely on this whether man is a proper agent, or has a felf-determining power, or not. Beings may have a felf-determining power, as, ac- cording to Dr. Prieflley's conceflion, the deity has; and yet they may be always guided, as the deity certainly is, by a rule or end. — I know Dr. Prieflley will not allow me to argue thus from the deity to inferior beings. But this method of arguing appears to me fair; and, in the prefent cafe, it feems decifive. It is only the manner in which God pofTefTes his attributes that is incommuni- cable. We may juflly fay, God poffefles power. Therefore, he may give power. But we cannot, without a contradicftion, fay, God is felf-exiflent : Therefore, he may "■•mAb. I iil •'a 158 OF THE DOCTRJNE OF NECESSITY, may give felf-exiflence j for this would be to fay, that he can make a derived being, underived.^-^^Hor can we fay, God pof- leffes infinite power; therefore, he can communicate infinite power ; for this would be to fay, that he can make a being, who, as a creature, muft be finite and dependent^ infinite and independent. It might be Aewn, that creation out of nothing im- plies infinite power, and therefore cannot be communicated. Dr. Prieftley will, I hope, allow me to add the following queries. Is is not more honourable to the deity to conceive of him, as the parent, guide, governor, and judge of free beings formed after his own image, with powers of rea, fon and felf- determination, than to con- ceive of him, as the former and condu^or of a fyftem of confcious machinery, or the mover and coutrouJcr of an uoiverfe of puppets ? _ Can Dr. Prieftley believe eafijy, that m ail thofe crimes which men charge thimfelves • -•I 1 !i OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 159 f hem/elves with, and reproach themfehes for, God is the agent; and that (fpeaking phi- lofophically) they, in fuch inftances, are no more agents, than a /word is an agent when employed to commit murder ? Is it furprifing that few poffefs ftrength of mind enough to avoid ftarting at fuch conclufions ? — I am, however, ready to own the weight of fomc of the obfervations Dr. Prieftley has made to explain and foften them. And though I think, that were they commonly received, they would be dreadfully abufed; yet I doubt not, but Dr. Prieftley may be, as he fays he is, a better man for believing them. But I muft not go on. Were I to write all that offers itfelf, I ftiould fall into numberlefs tautologies ; and there would be no end of this controverfy. Answer. I know very well that Dr. Price,- and other advocates for what is called philo- fophical free-will, do not think that a felf- determining ) . 'Si i6o OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITT. determining power deftroys the ufe of dif- cipline, and but I contend that it necef- farily does fo, I alfo deny that, ftridly fpeaking, there can be any fuch thing as contingency, it always implying that there is an effeB without a caufe ; and therefore that a determination of the mind in circumftan- ces in which a regard to different objedls is equal, is an impoflibility. This muft be univerfal, and confequently refpeft the fu- preme mind as well as others. Thofc who fpeak with the greateft reverence of the Divine Being, always fuppofe that he never ads but for fome cnJ, and that the beft, /. e. he ad:s according to fome invariable ru/e. But we foon lofe ourfelves in /pecu- lation concerning the Jir/i caufe. In anfwer to the S>ueries, I reply, in ge- neral, that I cannot conceive any thing honourable to the deity, becaufe the thino- is not pojjihle in it/elf, and if poffible, not at all beneficial to man, in the fuppofition of his having endued us with what is called felf "determination. And though the dodlrine of neceffity may, like every thing the OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. ,6, the moft true and fublime, be exhibited in a ridiculous light, it is the only fyflem that is ^v^n poffible '^ and in my opinion it n in the higheft degree honourable, both to the univerfal parent, and his offspring; the jufl contemplation of it being emi- nently improving to the mind, and lead- ing to the praftice of every thing great and excellent, as I think I have fhewn in my fecond volume. It certainly founds harfli to vulgar ears, to fay that '' in all thofe crimes that men *^ charge themfelves with, and reproach '' themfelves for, God is the agent; and " that, in fuch cafes, they are in reality " no more ^^v/;/j, than a fvvord is an agent '' when employed to commit a murd'er." It does require firengtb of mind not Xo ftartle at fuch a conclufion ; but then it re- quires nothing but ftrength of mind ; /. e. fuch a view of things as fhall carry us be- yond firfi and fallacious appearances. And it requires, I think, but a fmall degree of fagacity to perceive that, whatever there \^ fhocking in thefe conclufions, it is aftually L found. i6z OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. found, and under a very flight cover, in Dr. Price's own principles; lince, I be- lieve, he admits that God forefees all the crimes that men would commit, and yet made man; that he ftill has it in his power, in various ways, to prevent the commiffion of crimes, and yet does not chufe to do it. If Dr. Price will anfwer a queftion that is frequently put by chil- dren, viz. " P^P^i Why does not God " kill the Devil ?" I will undertake to tell him why God made the Devil. Let him tell me why God permits vice, and I will tell him why he appoints it. However, the very language that Dr. Price ufes to make the dodrine of neceflity appear horrid and frightful, is the very language of the fcriptures, in which wicked men are exprefsly called God's fwordy and are faid, in a great variety of phrafes, to do all his pleafurei though, in a different fenfe, the very contrary expreiTions occur. The reply that Paul makes to what might be objefted to his faying, God has mercy on whom be will have mercy, and whom he will OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. i5j will he hardeneth, Rom. 9, &c. viz. Thou wilt fay then unto me. Why doth he yet find fault, for who has refifted his will, favours more of the ideas of a necefTarian, than I fufpeft, the abettors of the contrary dodtrine can well bear; Nay but? O man^ who art thou that repliefi againfi God? Shall the thing formed fay unto him that formed it, why haji thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay$ of the fame lump to make one vejjel unto ho^^ nour, and another unto diJJjonour ? I do not fay it is impofUble to explain this pafTage of fcripture in a manner con- firtent with Dr. Price's opinions; but I will fay that, with lefs latitude of inter- pretation, I will undertake to explain every text that can be produced in favour of the Arian hypothefis, in a manner confiflent with Socinianifm. Since, upon all fchemes, it is a faft, that vice, as well other evils, does and mufi exifl, at leafl for a time; is it not more honour- ^ able to the univerfal creator, and fupremc L 2 ruler. 1^4 OF;THE DOCTRINE OF NEGESSITV. , rpler, to fuppofe that he intended it, as an inftrument of virtue and happinefs, rather than that, though he by no means chole it (as a thing that neceffarily thwarted his views) it was not in his power to forefee or prevent it; but that he is content to make the beft he can of it when it does happen, interpofing from time to time to palliate matters, as unforefeen emergencies re- quire. This, if it be poffible in itfelf, is what we muft acquiefce in, if we rejeft the dodrine of neceflity. There is no other alternative. I think it hardly poffible that a perfoa who believes in contingencies can have a fteady faith in the dodrine of divine pre- fcience; and to divert: the Divine Being of ^his attribute, which in the fcriptures he claims as his diflinguiihing prerogative, is fuch a lejening and a degradation of Godi refpedling him too in his moft important capacity, or that in which we are moft concerned, viz. as governor of the univerje; that every thing that Dr. Price can repre- fent .- OF THP BpCTIlIT^ eai;s to me as nothiQg in com- parifon with ii. But, as Dr. Price is fully fen.fible, we fee things in very different lights ; and it is happy for us that, in general, every light in which we view our own principles is more or lefs favourable to virtue. The Papift, I doubt not, thinks his mind powerfully and advantageoufly imprefTed with the idea of the facramental elements being the real body and blood of Chrijl -, the Trinitarian ' with the notion of the fupreme God being incarnate, and the Arian with his opinion, that it was the maker and governor of the world that died upon the crofs \ and numbers will fay that chriftianity is of no value, and with Mr. Venn, that they would burn fheir bibles, if thefe ftrange dodtrines be not contained in them. Dr. Price, however, does not feel that chriftianity is degraded in his ap- prehenfion, by confidering thefe opinions ^s abfurd, or ill founded, though he L 3 does N fi 166 QJJERIES ADDRESSED does think it degraded by the Socinian hypothefis. Neither do I think chrif- tianity degraded, but, on the contrary, I think its efFeft upon the mind is much im- proved, and the wifdom and power of God more confpicuous, on the fcheme which fuppofes that our Saviour was a mere man^ in all things like unto his brethren j and that as by a mere man came deaths fo by a mere man^ alfo, comes the refurredlion of the dead. I chearfully conclude with Dr. Price in faying, in his letter fubjoined to the IntroduBiony *^ that our agreement in ** expeding this awful period, makes it •* of little confequence in what we dif- u fer." Qjj E R I E s addrejjed to Dr. Price. Of the penetrability of matter. I. Is it not a fad, that refiflance is often occafioned not by the contad: of folid mat- ter, but by a power of repulfion adling at a diftance from the fuppofed fubftance, as in dedricity, magnetifm, optics, &c. ? ?. What TO Dr. price. i6; 2. What is the efFed of fuppofed contaB^ but another refiflance ? 3. Is it not even certain, that this fup- pofed contact cannot be real contadiy fince the particles that compofe the moft com- pact bodies, being capable of being brought nearer together by cold, appear not actually to touch one another ? 4. Since, therefore, there cannot be any evidence of impenetrability, but what re- fults from the confideration of contaB, and there is no evidence of -any real contacft, does not the dodrine of impenetrability ftand altogether unfupported by any fa£l j and therefore muft it not be unphilofophi- cal to admit that it is any property of mat- ter ? Of the Sou L. I. If matter be not impenetrable. Dr. Price feems (if I may judge from what he fays in page 56,) not unwilling to ad- mit that it may be endued with the pro- perties of perception and thought. Since, therefore, the uniform compofition of the L 4 whole t6i QUERIES ADD1E6SED W^ak man will be gained by the preceding hypothefis, is it not a confideration in fa- vour of it ? It can only be a fuppofed ne^ ceffity that could lead any perfon to adopt the hypothefis oi two fubjlances in the com- pofition of one being, efpecially two fub- ftances fo exceedingly heterogeneous as matter dLuAfpirit are defined to be. 2. Admitting matter to have the pro- perty of impenetrability, is there any rea- fpn to believe that the powers of percep- tion and thought may not be fuperadded to it, but that we cannot conceive any con- nexion between the different properties of impenetrability and thought, or any rela- tion they can bear to eacli other ? 3. Have we, in reality, any idea of ^ connexion between the property of per- ception, and extended fublhnce, that is not impenetrable? 4. If not, is it not more philofophical to fuppofe that the property of perception may be imparted to fuch a fubftance as the body; it being certainly unpbilofophical to fuppofe TO Dr. price. 169 JL fuppofe that man confifts of two kinds of fubjianccy when all the known properties and powers of man may belong to onefub^ Jiance. 5. If the foul of man be an extended fubftance, it is certainly in idea, and why may it not infaSly be as difcerptible as mat- ter. If fo, are all the parts into which it may be divided, thinking and confcious beings ? If not, why may not a material being, poffeffed of thought, confifl: of ma- terial fubftances, not poffeffed of thought, as well as a fpiritual one ? 6. Whether is it more probable that God can endue organized matter with a capacity of thinking, or that an immaterial fubflance, poffeffed of that property, can be fo dependent upon the body, as not to be capable of having a perception without it, fo that even its peculiar power of felf-- motion cannot be exerted but in conjunction with the body ? 7. If there can be any fuch thing as a proper connection between material rnd imma' -"^ "^■'--'^^ ■»■ .-J^CTi- -J-«i>^iO 170 QJJEItlES ADDRESSED immaterial fubftances, muft not the for- mer neceiTarily, according to the common hypothefis, impede the motions of the latter ? * 8. Is there, therefore, any proper me- dium between the hypothefis which makes man wholly material, and that which makes the body a clog upon the foul, and confe- quently the death of the body the freedom of the foul ? 9. They who maintain the Arian hy- pothefis, believe that an immaterial fpirit, iimilar to the human foul, is capable of the grcateft exertions in a ftate independ- ent of any connexion with body, at leaft fuch bodies as ours. They alfo fuppofe that between the death and the refurredion of our Lord, he pofTefled, and exerted, his original powers. Is it not then inconfo- nant to this fyftem, to fuppofe that the human foul, which to all appearance is influenced by bodily aifecSions exadly like the embodied foul of Chrift, fhould be in- capable of all fenfation or aftion during the fleep or death of the body ? 10, Con^ * TO Dr. price. 171 10. Confequently, does not every argu- ment that proves the dependence of the foul on the body favour the Socinian hy- pothefis, by making it probable, that the foul of Chrift was equally dependent upon his body, and therefore was incapable of exertion before as well as after its union to it ? In other words, that Chrift had no proper exiftence before his birth ? Of the DoBrlne of Necessity. 1. If any mental determination, or vo- lition, be preceded by nothing, either within the mind itfelf, or external to it, but what might have exifted without being followed by that determination, in what does that determination differ from an effect without a caufe ? 2. Admitting the poffibility of fuch a determination, or a determination without any previous motive, with what propriety can it be the fubjed of praife or blame, there being no principle, or defgn (which would come under the denomination of rngtive) from which the determination pro- ceeded ? h ii r '7» OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITy, ceeded ? How then can fuch -a power of felf determination make us accountable crea^ tures, or the proper objedts of rewards and puniflimeots ? 3- If certain definite determinations of mind be always preceded by certain definite motives, or fituations of mind, and the fame definite motives be always followed by the fame determinations, may not the determi- nations be properly called necejfary, ne- ceflity fignifying nothing more than the faiife ofconjlancy f 4. If certain determinations always fol- low certain ftates of mind, will it not fol- low, whether thefe determinations be called necelTary, or not, that no determination could have been intended, or expe^ed, by the author of all things, to have been otherwile than it has been, is, or is to be ^ Since, in this cafe, they could not have been otherwife without a miracle. ^ 5- If any event be properly contingent, *. e. if the determination does not depend upon the previous ftate of mind, is it pof- fible that the moft oerfeft knowledge of that ( OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. i;! that mind, and of all the ftates of it, can enable a perfon to tell what the determina- tion will be? In other words, is a con- tingent event the objed of fore-knowledge, even to the deity himfelf ? Dr. Price* In anfwer to Dr. Prieftley's 4th query, (page 172,) and alfo to what he fays in page 161, 162, &c. I readily admit that all events are fuch as the power of God (act- ing under the direftion of infinite wifdoni and goodnefs) either caufes them to be, or permits them to be. I rejoice in this as the mofl agreeable and important ofall truths : But I by no means think witJi Dr. Prieft- ley, that there is no diiferencc between it, and God's producing all events. I fcarcely think he would conclude thus in other cafes. Are there not many inftances in which Dr. Prieftley would think it hard to be charged with doing what he only forefees, and for the heft reafons, thinks fit not to hinder ? A(ftive and felf-direcfting powers are the foundation of all morality; all dignity of nature iJ 174 OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITT. nature and charadler j and the greateft pof- fible happinefs. It was, therefore, necef- fary fuch powers fliould be communicated 5 and being communicated, it was equally lieceffary that fcope, within certain limits, fliould be allowed for the exercife of them. Is God's permitting beings, in the ufe of fuch powers, to aft wickedly, the fame with being himfelf the agent in their wick- ednefs? Or can it be reafonable to fay, that he appoints what cannot be done with- out breaking his laws, contradifting his will, and ahfing the powers he has given ? Were I to be aflced fuch a queftion as that which Dr. Prieftley (in page 162,) puts into the mouth of a child — " Why God made the Devil ?" or, '' Why God does not con- *' fine or kill the Devil?" I ihould pro- bably anfwer, that God made the Devil good, but that he made himfelf a Devil ; and that a period is neaf when the Devil and all wicked beings will be deftroyed; but that, in the mean time, the mifchief they do is not prevented by confining them, or taking away their power, for the OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 175 the fame reafon that a wife government does not prevent crimes by {hutting men up in their houfes, or that a parent does not prevent his children from doing wrong by tying up their hands and feet. I would, in fliort, lead the child to under- fland if poflible, that to prevent wicked- nefs by denying a fphere of agency to be- ings, would be to prevent one evil by pro- ducing a greater. The anfwer I would give to moft of Dr. Prieftley's other queries, may be eafily col- lected from my former replies. With refpeft to the laft of them in par- ticular, I cannot help obferving, that it implies what I can by no means admit, that free agency is inconfiftent with a depen- dence of our determinations on the ftate of our minds, and with a certainty of event. I think I have proved that our determinations may bey^^determinations, and yet this be true of them. The fore-knowledge of a contingent event carrying the appearance of a contradiftion, is f 1 o many examples in fuch writers as Vt ..Jrc and Mr. Hume. You fay, p. I, ** As to your concern for the con- ^* verfioi^ Dm. K E N R I C K. 193 \ 1 <€ li 19 J A LETTER TO You know. Sir, I prefume, that I pro- fefs to believe in a God, a providence, and a future Jiate, in the dkine mijjion of Chrtji, and the authority of the fcriptures. I have written not a little in the direft defence of thefe principles, and I hope my general charafter and condud: does not give the lie to my profeffion. Why then fhould you fuppofe me not to be fncere, and to bey*-- cretly underiniuing thele great principles of of religion ? Might not I, if I were fo difpofed, retort the fame furmifes and calumnies refpedling you? You are cer- tainly at liberty to urge me with what you apprehend to be the real confequences of my doiftrine, but this you might do without intimating, as you frequently do, that I was apprized of the immoral and dangerous confequences of my principles, and wifhed to propagate them on that ac- count. " Materialifm," you fay, p. 163, " muft " terminate in Atheifm ; " and p. 90, " The doftrine of materialifm muft be at- " tended with the moil deftrudive and " fatal I ** Mr. WHITEHEAD. 199 €€ €C 4t €( €< it It €€ €C €e fatal confequences. It fuppofes that this life is our only place of exiftence, and by this means takes away all confidence in God, all hope of future rewards, and fear of punifhment. It tears up all religion by the very roots, and renders all our moral powers and faculties wholly ufelefs, or fuppofes them to be mere creatures of education and human policy. In ihort, its language is, let us eat and drink i for to-morrow we die.'' You are pleafed to add, " I do not fay that Dr. " Prieftley will direBly defend thefe prin- ** ciples, or that he altogether believes " them to be the confequences of his doc- *^ trine." This however, is an infinuation, that, though not altogether y I do in part be- lieve them to be the confequences of my doftrine ; and other pafiages in your work fufficicntly (hew, that you think me capa- ble of advancing and fupporting thefe prin- ciples, even though I fliould be altogether perfuaded of their horrid confequences. *' It muft be owned," you fay, p. io8, <^ that our author fhews no great delicacy N 4 " refpea- ^^ tf'-iS 200 A LETTER TO €( €€ '' refpeaing the charafter of the facred '' penmen. He very freely, though in- *' direftly, befpatters them with dirt ; from *^ whence one might naturally fufpeft, that " he owes them no very good will. Pro- " felfions of this kind/' you fay, p. no, '* from one who profeffes to believe the '' gofpel, looks fo much like a feigned *^ friendjlnp^ in order to deliver it more fe- curely into the hands of the deifts, that it will not fail to recall to memory the ^* treatment of our Lord by one of his profeffed difciples, to which, with re- fpeft to the gofpel revelation, it bears a ftriking refemblance. There/' you fay, 112, '* is an end of all fcripturd au- thority at once, which perhaps would not be very difagreeable to this writer." Laftly you fcruple not to fay, page io6, " I fliould not wonder to hear this learned *^ gentleman, armed cap-a-pee, with logic •• and philofophy, reprefent his Lord and *^ Saviour as a greater deceiver than Ma- '^ hornet. To fuch miferable and profane " fhifts, may rafli reafoning bring an un- *' guarded man.'* For (C cc c< (i «c Mr. whitehead. 2Q\ For the honour of the chriftian name, and of the particular profeflion to which you belong, I hope that, on reflection, yourfelf, or at leaft your friends, will blufh for thefe things. In the preceding quo- tation, I hope. Sir, you will be thought to have given a very unfair account of my moral pr'mcipks and views-, let us now fee whether you be any better acquainted with the profejjed dejign of my work, and the na- ture of the argument. " The great objeft in view," you fay, p. 171, " it feems, in contriving and mo- " delling thefe enquiries into matter and " fpirit, was to lay a foundation for the *^ better fupport of ^/w;/^/." Now, Sir, fo much are you miftaken, that the great ob- jeft in view w^as the very reverfe of what you fuppofe, viz. the radical overturning of the fyftem of Arianifm, by proving the abfur- dity, and explaining the origin, of the dodlrines of a foid, and of pre-exijience, which arc necellarily fuppofed in the Arian fyftcm ; and a very great part of my work is, not indireftly, but openly, and both really^ and iS 1! 202 A LETTER TO ( f * fi" and by name, an attack upon Arianifm, and both what is called the high and the low Arian hypoth^Js^ which I confider fepa- rately. Let us now fee the light in which my account of the opinions of the chrijiian Fathers has happened to ftrike you; and in this you are no lefs unfortunate. " The thing " he propofes to prove/' you fay, p. 140, *^ is that the chriftian Fathers believed that " the foul can have no exiftence feparate " from the body, that thought and con- " fcioufnefs may be the refult of an orga- " nized fyftem of matter. Confequently,"' you fay, p. 149, " our author's grand boaft, *" that the apoftles and primitive fathers " thought with him, that the foul is ma- *' terial and mortal, vanilhes into air; " where, perhaps, this experimental phi- " lofopher may be able to make more of ** it than we can do in thefe lower re- ** gions." Again, p. 148, after reciting the opinion of CI. Mamertus, who fays of the fjul, that it is neither .xtended, nor in place you Mr. whitehead. 20J \ S( <€ you fay, '' Thefe feem to me moft ex- traordinary aifertions, to prove that the foul is material, and dies with the body. ** It requires more ikill in Logic than I ** am mafter of to find this conclufion in *^ either of the premifes." A very extraordinary conclufion indeed, but, if that had been my idea, it would not have been more extraordinary than your miftake of the whole drift of my argument in this bwfinefs. I had aflerted that the idc^of refined Jpiritua/ity, maintained, I find, by yourfelf, was unknown to all antiquity; and therefore I havei fliown, that though, according to the notion of the heathen philofophers, the foul was confidered as a fubftance diftind from the body, being a detached part of the great foul of the uni- verfe, it had the property of extenjiony and was, in reality, what we fhould now call a more refined kind of matter *, and that true j'piritualijm was introduced gradually; but, if any more diftind; aera can be fixed on, it was that of this very Mamertus, *«€" !i 204 A LETTER TO *n Jii I 'I I farther prove, that, according to the true fyftem of revelation, though the kn- tient and thinking principle may be fpoken of as diftinfl: from the other functions of the man, it was always fuppofed to refide in fome part of his body, and to be infepa- rable from it. For the facred writers never fpeak of the foul as in one place, and the body in another; and it was not till the in- troduftion of the heathen philofophy into chriftianity, that it was imagined that the foul retained its perceptivity and adivity while the body was in the grave. Of this 1 prefume, I have given fufficient proof. You are plcafed, indeed, to alledge, page 144, as a proof that the early chriftlans thought differently, a paffage in the epiftle of Polycarp, who lays that '* Paul, and the reft of the apollles, are in the place appointed for them, ^u^a tu kv^.c, with the *' Lord." But if you had attended to the Greek, you would have perceived that this is not the neccjjary fenfe of the pailac^e and Archbiihop Wake renders it " the place ♦• that was due to them, from the Lord." Indeed, €t 4t U%. WHITEHEAD. 205 Indeed, had you been fufficiently conver- fant with ecclejiaftical hijiory, you would have known, that it was not till many centuries after the time of Polycarp, that any chriftian thought that the feparate foul, whether fen tient or not, was in any other place than that which is diftinguifhed by the term ''hades. It was univerfally thought that ^ood men were not with God and o Chrijl till after the refurredion, which is •clearly the fcripture dodtrine. In John xvi. 3. our Lord fays, / will come again ^ and receive you unto myfelfy that where I am^ ye may be alfo. Here is a plain limitation of the time when the difciples of our Lord, and even the apoftles them- felves, were to be admitted to his prefence, and live with him, viz. at his return to raife the dead, and not before. What you fay on the fubjed of the flate of the foul between death and the re- furredion, is too trifling to deferve a par- ticular notice. As you feem not to have given fufficient attention to this fubjecft, I would take the liberty to recommend to your zoo A LETTER TO your careful perufal, what the excellent Bifliop of Carlifle has written on it. Arch- deacon Blackburne's Hijlorical View of this Controverfy; the DilTertation prefixed to Alexander's Commentary on i Cor. xv. and a fummary of the principal arguments in the third volume of my Injiitutes of Natural and Revealed Religion. It is upon this fubjedt that you note, with great triumph, that I have quoted as one, two fimilar paffages in the book of Revelation. Another perfon would havg fuppofed this to have happened through inadvertency, and not, as you will have it, ivith dejign. It muft have been infatuation to have done this in a work fo inviting of criticifm as mine is. A new edition of the work will fhqw you that my argument lofes nothing by the reaification of that miftake. I fhall mention one more miftake of my meaning, though in a thing of no great confequcnce. " It is a great miftake," you fay, p. lo, " to fuppofe with Dr. " Prieftley, and fome other philofophers,' " that Mr. whitehead. 207 *? that there is fome unknown fubftance *f in material nature, diftinft from the pro- '* perties of folidity and extenfion/' Now what I have faid, and repeated many times, is, that when all the properties of fub- ftance are taken away, the fubftance itfelf is gone; and that the terms fubftance^ ef- fcnccy &CC, &c. are merely a convenience in fpeech. You triumph exceedingly in my fpeak- ing of the fmalleji particles of matter being refolved into others ftill fmaller. For an explanation of this, I refer you to my let- ter to Dr, Kenrick. Your ftriftures on the fubjed: oi perfo7tal identity I freely leave to have their full effedl on the minds of our readers, without any apprehenfion of the confequence. Before I clofe this letter, I fhall briefly mention a few particulars, which fhow that you are not fufBciently acquainted with the Jlate of opinions for a controverfial writer on fuch fubjeds as thofe of the Difquijitions^ '' Nor iBk "«. foS A LETTER TO €( €€ " Nor do I prefume," you fay, p. 25, that any philofopher will contend for an earlier and earlier exiftence of this world, " and the creatures in it, ad infinitum.'" Now, Sir, many philofophers and divines maintain the very dotSrine that you think not to exift. It was the opinion of the Platonifts, it is aflerted by Dr. Hartley, it is what I have given in my Inftitutes, and I believe it is that of Dr. Price, who is far from thinking with mc on the fubjed; of the Difquifitions. " Our learned author," you iliy, p. 81, '* indeed, afteds to diibelicve the continual " flux of the particles of the human body; ** but this I prefume no one will ferioully *^ deny, who has a competent knovvledoe ^* of its ftructure and axonomy." Now many perfons. Sir, and even Dr. Watts, whom you quote with fo much refpeft, ferioully believed that there are parts of the body, iom^fiamina, that never phange. There tit' \ 1 / ' / Mit. WHITEHEAD. 200 There is another thing that you take for granted, in which I believe you are quite lingular, and it is, indeed, fufficiently cu- rious. You fay, p. 167, that " where body •' is, fpace is neceifarily excluded,*' and from this extraordinary fuppofitlon you draw many curious inferences, in your rea- foning about the nature of fpirit, and of the deity. Now I have heard of fpace being occupied^ but never of its being excluded before. I muft not quite conclude without ac- knowledging myfelf obliged to you for furnifhing me with a proof, which you will find, by Dr. Price's remarks, was in fome meafure wanting, of its being the real opinion of any perfon, xh'ax fpirit bears no relation to fpace. You do it in the ampleft manner, and build upon it your argument againft the materiality of the hu- man foul. According to you Dr. Clarke, Dr. Price, and others, who maintain the locality^ and confequently the extenfion of fpirit, are as much materialiils as myfelf. I leave them and you to difpute that point; O and * ) 2IO A LETTER TO Mr. whitehead. 211 'fj ill and you may imagine I fliall not feel un- pleafantly in the fituation of a fpeBator. It will give me fome refpite, and I fhall exped: to derive fome advantage from the iffue of the conteft, in vi^hofe favour foever it may be. '' No corporeal fubftance/' you fay, p. 63, whatever can poffibly be the feat of fen- fation ; for all of them have extenfion, and muft be of fome figure or form. On the fame principles," p. 128, ** we may explain the omniprefence of God not by extenfion through all bodies, as this writer feems to believe, which is an idea fo grofs that it deferves a name which, for the lake of the author, I (hall not bellow upon it." €i €€ i€ €t it €C €€ i€ €€ Now, as you have not fcrupled to make ufe of the terms materialijly and atheijl in this controverfy, I have really a good deal of curiofity to know what dread name it is, that, out of regard to mCy you fupprefs the men- tion of. If it be too dreadful for the public eary could you not favour me with the intimation of it in a private letter ? I fhall fhall communicate it to my friend Dr. Price, whom it concerns as much as it does myfelf. Dr. Clarke, you will alfo find, and in the opinion of Dr. Price, all the moft diftinguifhed immaterialifts, will fall under this ^read cenfure. But, being fo many of us, materialifts and immaterialifts, we fhall bear it the better; for bodies, and large companies of men, we know, are not cafily aflTefted either by Jhame or fear. I am. Sir, Your very humble fervant. J. PRIESTLEY. Calne, June 1778. .aEEa I To Dr. H O R S E L E ¥• Dear Sir, I THINK myfelf particularly happy that a perfon of your abilities, and mathe- matical and philofophical knowledge, has vouchfafed to allude to my work, though only in ^fermon^ as it gives me an oppor- tunity of explaining myfelf more fully with refpedl to the ftate of the queftion concern- ing liberty and necejjity^ and likewife of fhowing that xhtfeB of neceflarians, though almoft every where fpoken againji^ is more numerous and refpeftable than is generally imagined ; for that you. Sir, belong to it as much as I do ; with this only difference, that you chufe to make ufe of one fet of phrafes, and I of another, O 3 It 214 A LETTER TO Dr. H O R S E L E y. It Is impoflible for me to exprefs ia ftronger terms than you do, the abfolute y certainty of every determination of the will of man, as depending upon the cir- cumftances he is in, and the motives pre- fented to him. " A moral motive and a ** mechanical force," you fay, p. lo, ** are *^ equally certain cauies, each of its proper ** effed:. A moral motive," you fay, ** is ** what is more fignificantly called the ** final caufe, and can have no influence *' but with a being that propofes to itfelf ** an end, chufes means, and thus puts it- *' felf in aftion. It is true that while this ** is my end, and while I conceive thefe ** to be the means, a definite adion will ** as certainly follow that definite choice *' and judgement of my mind, provided I «* be free from all external reftraint and im- *' pediment, as a determinate motion will *' be excited in a body by a force applied ** in a given diredion. There is, in both ** cafes, an equal certainty of the efFed." Having granted this, it is not poffible that you and I can have any difference that is 215 i 1 ^^ IS not merely verbal. Our ideas are pre- cifely the fame ; nor have I indeed any ob- jedion to your language, in any fenfe in which it can be confiftent v/ith the above afl'ertions. You are too good a mathematician to re- quire being told, that, if every determina- tion of the mind of man certainly depends upon preceding caufes, whether the caufes be moral, or phyfical, it is not poffible that any determination, or confequently that any event, in which men are con- cerned, could have been otherwife than it has been, is, or is to be ; or that the Divine Being, who, as you juftly fay, " knows ** things by their caufes, as being himfelf <^ the firfl: caufe, the fource of power and *^ adivity to all other caufes," fhould not have intended every thing to be juft as it is. On this ground only can you affirm, as you do, that ^* to him every thing that fliall ^* ever be is at all times infinitely more <« certain, than any thing, either paft or <* prefent, can be to any man," &c. This, I fay, you need not be told. It is an im- O A mediate 2l6 A LETTER TO ii 8 P| mediate and neceffary inference from your own principle. Indeed, it is little more than repeating the fame thing in other words. You even apply thefe principles to a cafe of the greateft virtue that was ever exerted by man, viz. the voluntary fufferings and death of Chrift, and likewife to a cafe of the greateft wickednefs, viz. that of his enemies in voluntarily inflifting thofe fuf- ferings upon him. No perfon can exprefs this with more perfpicuity or energy than you have done. • ** Now therefore/* you fay, p. 3, " he be- gins to fhew them" (his difciples) " that he mujl go to Jerufalem^, and, after much malicious perfecution from the leaders of the Jewifh people, he mufi be killed. The form of expreffion here is very re- markable in the original, and it is well preferved in our Englifli tranflation. He mtijl go, he mufi fuffer, he muji be kil- led, he mufi be raifed again on the third day. All thefe things were fixed and *^ determined— rauft inevitably be — -no- ** thing (C C( %i n t€ it leaves no foundation for this fyjlem of im-- piety ; and in this refped: it has, I think, a great and defirable advantage. I own that, for my part, I feel an in- expreffible fatisfaftion in the idea of that moft intimate connexion which, on my hypothefis, myfelf, and every thing in which I am concerned, have with the deity. On his will I am entirely depend- ent for my being, and all my faculties. My fphere, and degree of influence on other beings and other things, is his in- fluence. I am but an inftrument in his hands for eflfedting a certain part of the greatefi: and moft glorious of purpofes. I am happy in feeing a little of this purpofe happier in the beliej that the operations in which I am concerned, are of infinitely greater moment than I am capable of com- prehending, and in the perfuafion that, in the continuance of my exiftence, I fhall fee more and more of this great purpofe, and of the relation that myfelf and my fphere of influence bear to it. Let the abettors of the common hvpo thefis fay more than this if -^ ' w 256 IliLUStRATlONS OF if they can, or any thing different from this, that fliall give them more fatisfaftion. II. Of the connexion between fenfation and organization. I have been aiked, whether I confider the powers of fenfation and thought as ne- cej/arily refulting from the organization of the brain, or as fomething independent of organization, hut fuperadded and communi- cated to the fyftem afterwards ; having ex- preffed myfelf doubtfully, and perhaps va- rioufly on the fubjed. * I anfwer, that my idea 720W is, that fen- fation and thought do necelTarily refult from the organization of the brain, when the powers of mere life are given to the fyftem. For I can eafily conceive a perfeft man to be formed without life, that is, without refpiration, • • In the Efay prefixed to my edition of Hartley, I ex- preffed myfelf with abfolute uncertainty in this refpea, " I " rather think that the whole man is of fome uniform com- '« pofition, and that the property of perception, as well as " the other powers that are termed mental, is the 'refult " (whether neceffary, or not) of fuch an organical ftruaurc •' as that of the brain." I i Ip ^ s 1 I THE r>li QJJ i S I T I O N S. 25}^ refpiration, or the circulation of the blood, or whatever elfe it be in which life more properly confifts, and confequently without every thing neceffarily depending upon life ; but I can- not imagine that a human body, completely organized, and having life, would want fenfation and thought. This I fuppofe to follow of courfe^ as much as the circula- tion of the blood follows refpiration ; and if there be any expreffions in my work that intimate the contrary, I fhall take care to alter them* As to the manner in which the power of perception refults from organization and life, I own I have no idea at all ; but the faB of this connexion does not appear to me to be, on that account, the lefs cer- tain. Senfation and thought do always ac- company fuch an organization ; and having never known them to be feparated, we have no reafon to fuppofe that they can be feparated. When, therefore, God had made man of the dujl of the earth ; nothing was wanting to make him all that he is, viz, a livitig fouly but fimply the breath of life. R In ^58 I L LU S T R A T f a N S OW In all other cafes we deem it fufficient to fey that certain circumftances are the caufes, and the necejfary caufes, of certain appearances, if the appearances always ac- company the circumftances. We are not> for example, in the leaft able to conceive how it is that a magnet attracts iron ; but having obferved that it never fails to do it;, we conclude that, though we do not fee the proximate eaufe, or how the attraction is efFeded, the magnet nevertheleJfe has that power, and muft ceafe to be a magnet be- fore it can lofe it ; fo that our reafoning with refped: to the refult of fenfation from organization is exadly fimilar to our rea- foning concerning the attradion of iron by magnetifm. Alfo, for the very fame reafon that it is^ faid that it is not the organized body that feels and thinks, but an irmnaterialjub^ance refiding in the body, and that will remain when the body is deftroyed, we might fay that it is not the material magnet that at- tracts, but a peculiar immaterial fubftance within THfiDlSaUIStTIONS, 25 j within it, that produces the effedl, and that will remain when the material magnet is deftroyed. And, for the fame reafon, we may imagine diJliriB immaterial fuhjlances for every operation in nature, the prox- imate caufe of which we are not able to perceive. The manner in which the aflbciation of ideas is formed, or in which motives influence the mind, was equally unknown ; but alTo* ciation of ideas was neverthelefs known to be 2.faBy and the influence of motives was not, on that account, denied* But now that Cr. Hartley has fhewn us what ideas probably are, we fee much farther into the mechanifm of the 7nind. We fee how one idea is connefted with another, and the mariner in which motives (which are only trains of ideas) produce their efFeft. Now we are not more (or not much more) ig- norant how fenfation refults from organi- zation, than we were how the motion of the hand refults from a volition, or how a volition is produced by a motive, which R % are z66 ILLUSTRATIONS OF are now no longer fuch very difficult pro- blems. It is not impoffible but that in time we may fee hw it is that fenfation re- fults from organization. III. ji general view of the origin and pro^ grefs of opinions relating to the Essence OF THE Soul, withfome conjtderations on the notion of its being an extended, though an immaterial substance. After the dedudion that I have given of the hiftory of opinions concerning the foul in the Difquifitions, it may be ufeful to give a fummary view of the whole, that the feveral fteps in the progrefs, and their na- tural connedion, may more eafily appear. Man is a being poffeiTed of various fa- culties, or powers. He cm fee, hear.fmell, feeh li'alky think, and fpeak. He is alfo a very complex being, confifting of various diftind parts, fome of which are evidently appropriated to fome of thefe powers, and others to others of them. Thus it is the eye only that fees, the ear that hears, the nofe .. THE D I S QJJ I S I T I O N S. ft£i nofe that fmells, the feet that walk, and the tongue is of principal ufe in modulating the voice. What it is in man that thinks is not fo obvious, and the opinions con- cerning it have been various. I apprehend, however, that it was always fuppofed to be fomething within a man, and not any part that was confpicuous. The writers of the Old Teftament feem to have conceived of it varioufly, fome- times referring it to the heart, perhaps as the moft central part of man, as when the Pfalmift fays. My heart is inditing a good matter, &c. but at other times to the reins, as My reins inJiruSl me in the night feafon* The pafjions are generally feat^d by them in the heart, but the fentiments of pity and commiferation are more frequently affigned to the bowels, which are faid to yearn over an objeft of diftrefs. It is remarkable that the head, or brain, never feems to have been confidered by them as having any thing to do in the bufmefs of thinking, or in any mental afFedion whatever. But the feafon of it may be that ftrong mental af- R 3 fedions 1 t 111 •IE2 ILLUSTRATIONS OF fedions were fooner obferved to afFecl die heart, reins and bowels, than the head. In antient times the fimple power of life was generally thought to be in the breathy or animal heat^ becaufe breathing and warmth are the nniveriiil concomitants of life. I do not, however, recoiled that the latter idea ever occurs in the fcriptures, but there life is fom.etimcs faid to be in the blood. When men refleded a little farther, and began to conceive that pollibly both the property of life, and alfo all the powers that we term mental, might belong to the fame thing, the breath (the fuppofed prin- ciple of life) was imagined to be compe- tent to the whole -, and then the idea of a foul was completely formed. Confequent- ly, it was firft conceived to be an acriaU or an igneous fubftance, which animates the body during life, and makes its efcapc at death .; after which it was fuppofed to be either detained near the place where the body was depofited, being held by a kind of ) t i T ii E B I S Q^U I *S *t T 1 O N 5. ^3 of at'tradion, or an affedion to its former companion, or to rife in the atmofphere to a region in which it was counterpoifed by the furrounding elements. We may fmile at the ignorance of man- kind in early ages, in fappofing that the breath of life could be any thing more than part of the common air, which was firft infpired, and then expired. But though this be a thing well known in the prefent age, I can eafily conceive that, when the nature of air and refpiration were little un- derftood, men might not immediately con- ceive that the breath, though it mixed with the air, and was invifible, was therefore the very fame thing with it. They might well enough imagine that it was fomething ,diftind from it, which was in part drawn in and oufduring the continuance of lifcf and wholly difcharged and fet loofe at death. There are other inftances of the ignorance of the antients in matters of phi- lofophy, and even in tolerably enlightened ages, almoft; if not altogether, as grofs as this, R 4 When, T f54 ILLUSTRATIONS OF When, at length, it was difcovered that the breath was nothing more than the air, ft ill the idea of an invifible principle of life and thought being once fixed, would not be immediately exploded, but would be fup- pofed to be a fubftance more attenuated, and refined I as being, for inftance, of an ethereal or fery nature, &c. ftill invifible, and more aftive. Whatever was the Invifible fubfl:ance of which the human foul confifted, the univer^ falfoul of the heathen philofophers, or the divine effence^ was fuppofed to be the very fame, and all Cher fouls were mppofedeo have been parts of it, to have been de- tached from it, and to be finally refumed into it again. In this fl:ate of opinions, therefore, the foul was fuppofed to be what we fhould now call an attenuated kind of matter, capable of divifion, as all other matter is. This was the notion adopted by the chrifl:ian Fathers from the Oriental and Platonic fyftem of philofophy, and there- fore many of thefe Fathers did not fcruple to I V I T H E D I 6 CLU I S I T I O N S. 165 to affert that the foul, though conceived to be a thing difl:ind: from the body, was properly corporeal^ and even naturally mor^ taL The opinion, however, of its being naturally immortal gained ground; and, matter, according to the philofophical fyf- tem, being confidered as a thing that was necefl^arily perijhable, as well as impure, the doftrine of the immateriality as well as of the immortality of the foul was pretty firmly efl:ablifhed ; an immaterial fubfl:ance being, however, ftill confidered as only fomething more refined than grofs matter. The idea of the foul being immaterial foon led to the idea of its not having any property in common with grofs matter, and ill time with matter ftriftly confidered • and being confounded with, and illuftrated by, the idea of the principle of life, it was aflferted to have no length, breadth, or thicknefs, which are properties peculiar to matter; to be indiviftble alfo, and finally not to exiji in fpace. This was the idea that generally prevailed after the time of Ma- inaertus, though various other refinements occur i Ill -500 ittUSTRATlO^S OF I'll t i n occtor ift the writings of the fchoolmeti aj/on the fubjed:. But the doftrine of pure fpiritualifm was not firmly eftabliflied before Defcartes^ who> confidering extenfion as the effence of matter, made the want of extenfion the diftinguilhing property of mind or fpirit. Upon this idea was built the immaterial fyftem in its ftate of greatefk refinement, when the foul was defined to be immaterial^ indivifibk^ indifcerptible, unextendedy and to liave nothing to do with locality or motion^ but to be a fubftance poflefled of the fim- pie powers of thought, and to have nothing more than an arbitrary conneftion with an organized fyflem of matter. This was the idea of mind or fpirit that was prevalent about the time of Mr. Locke, who contributed greatly to lower it, by contending that whatever exifts muft exift fomewherCi or infomeplace^ and by ftiewing that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the power of thought may be fu- peradded by the Divine Being to an orga- fiized iyftem of mere matter, though at the fame i THE D I S Q^U I S I T ! O >t S. ^7 fame tiitie declaring himfelf in favour of the notion of a feparate fouL From this lime, the doiSrine of the nature of the foul has been fluc- tuating and various 3 fome Hill maintaining that it has no property whatever in common with matter, and bears no relation to fpace, whereas others fay that it exifts in fpace^f and occupies a portion of it, fo as to be properly extended, but not to have folidity which they make to be the property that diftinguilhes it from matter. The objedl of my late work is to prove that the dodrine of a foul is altogether un- philofophical, and unfcriptural j for that, judging from the phenomena, all the powers of the fame beings viz. ma7iy ought to be referred to one fubjiance, which, therefore* muft neceflarily be the body^ and that the I'efined and proper fpiritualifm above de- fcribed is peculiarly chimerical and abfurd, Abfurd, however, as is the notion of a fub- ftance which has no property in common with matter^ which bears no relation tojpace^ and yet both adls upon body, afid Is afted upon by it, it is the dodrine that, in the courfe of ILLUSTRATIONS OP Of gradual refinement, philofophers and dl. vines were neceflarily brought to, and is the only confiilent immaterialifm. For every other opinion concerning fpirit makes it to be, in faft, the fame thing with mat- ter; at leaft every other opinion is liable to objeftions fimilar to thofe which lie againft the notion of a foul properly ma- terial. Becaufe, however, I have not been thought to have given fufficient attention to this idea of extended fpirit, I fhall here make a few animadverfions upon it. I, The chief reafon why the principle of thought has been fuppofed to be incom- patible with matter, is that there is no con^ ceivabk conneBion between thought and fo^ lidity, that the two ideas are altogether dif- ferent, and diffimilar. But is there any more conceivable connexion between thought and mere extenfion ? Are ideas, according to the opinion of the perfons who hold this dodrine, extended things ? Is t\\cjudg^ ment extended, is the will extended, or have the pajjions extenfion ? How, then, do they require an extended fubftance in which to inhere ? I THE DISCtUISITIONS. 269 inhere ? If there be fome unknown reafon why they do require an cxtcnAtiifubJiratumf may not this fubftance have folidity added to its extenfion, the idea of folidity not being more foreign to the idea of thought, than that of extenfion, nor more diflimilar ta it. 2. The eflence of the foul, it is faid, cannot be matter, becaufe it would then be divifible^ but is not every thing that is extended divifible ? It is not the folidity of bodies that makes them capable of divifion fo properly as their extenfion. It is this property that makes divifion poflible ; and then all that is neceflary to adiual divifion is difcerptibility, or the poffible feparation of one part of its fubftance from another. For wherever there is extenfion, there muft be conceivable parts, viz. a half, a third, a fourth, &c. But till the fubftance of w^hich the foul (exclufive of its power of thinking) confifts be more known to us, fo that we can fubjed: it to a rigorous exami- nation, it is impofiible to fay whether it be more or lels difcerptible than any fpecies of i?0 ILLUSTRATIONS OF ©£ matter ; for all that we know of it i§ that it is extended, and that it thinks. The* irmnefs of its texture, is a thing of which we have no knowledge at all ; and if it be any thing more than mere fpace^ it muft hawe that which may be called texture, or con/ijience, folid or fluid, elaftic or non- elaftic, &c. &c. Confequently, it may, for any thing we know, be as corruptible, and perifhable, as the body. The boafted unity of confcioufnefsy and fmplicity of perception and thought, can be no fecurity againft di- vifion and diflblution, unlefs they inhere in a fubllance naturally incapable of divifion, and confequently of diflblution. 3. As divifibility may always be predi- cated of any fubfliance that is extended, and not infinite, I wifli the advocates of this doftrine of extended fpirit would con- fider a little what would be the probable confequence of an aftual divifion of it. Suppofing the fubflance of a human foul tp be divided into two equal parts (which to divine power murt, at leafl:, be pofilble) would the power of thinking be neceflarily deftroyed. THE D I S CtU I S I T I O N S. 271 defl:royed, or would the refult be two JpiritSy of inferior powers, as of fmaller fize ? If fo, would each of them retain the confcioufnefs of the whole undivided foul, or would the fl:ock of ideas be equally di-^ vided between them ? 4. As every created being mufl: exiji be- fore it can aB, I wifh the advocates of this; doftrine would confider what idea they cam form of the extended fubflance of a fpirit before it has acquired any ideas at all, and confequently before it has begun ta think. In what will it differ from mere fpace ? Whatever this ilate be, in what does it differ from the ftate of the foul whenever it ceafes to think, as in a deep fleep, a fwoon, or the ftate between death and the refurreftion ! 5. I would alfo fubmit it to the confide- ration of the partifans of extended fpirit ua-- lijm, whatyfe^ or JJ: ape they would give to the human foul (for if it be extended, fize and fliape it muft have) and whether fome inconvenience may not arife to their iyiicm in 4 27» ILLUSTRATIONS OP in the difcuffion of the queftion. If no- thing can aft but where it is, I fhould think that the foul muft have the fize and form of the brain, if not of the whole ner- vous fyftem. For there is no region within the brain of lefs extent than the medullary part of it, that can be imagined to be the fenforium, or the immediate feat of fenfa- tion I and as the nerves confift of the fame fubftance with the medullary part of the brain, and are properly a produdion, of part of it, I do not fee why the foul ihould be confined to the fize of the brain only, exclufive of the nerves ; and then as the nerves are in every part of the body, the foul would, in faft, be of the fame form and fize with the body to which it belongs, though with more interftices. 6. It is alfo a matter of fome curiofity to the fpeculatift to confider whether the fize and form of thefe extended fouls be invariable, or lyjiether, as we fuppofe the body to undergo fome change at the refur- redion, in order to adapt it to its new mode of exigence, the foul may not undergo ^l \. THE D I S CLU I S I T I O N S. 275 a proportionable change, and be transformed together with it. 7. We are apt to impofe upon ourfelves, and to coafound our underftandings, by the ufe of general terms. To gain clear per- ceptions of things we muft infpedt them more clofely, in order to difcover what particular and more definite ideas are necef- farily comprized in the more general ones. Thus while we content ourfelves with fay- ing that man is a compound being, confift- ing of two fubftances, the one corporeal znd the oxkitx fpirituaU the one both extended and folid, and the other extended indeed^ but deftitute of folidity; and that an in- timate union fubfifts between them, fo that they always accompany and affeB one another (an impreflion upon the body cauf- ing a fenfatlon in the mind, and a volition of the mind caufing a motion of the body) we are fatisfied. The hypothefis feems to correfpond to the firfi view of the phe- nomena ; and though we cannot help being ftaggered when we confider this intimate union of two fuch heterogeneous fubftances^ S we tl lil ill m ,74 ILLUSTRATIONS OF we ftill acquiefce in it, as an union effefted by almighty power; and we are likewife repelled from a rigorous examination of it by tl:ie idea, however ill-founded, that our profpedts of a future life are materially af- fefted by it. But a future life being fecured to us by the promifes of the gofpel, upon otAer and better principles^ we need not be afraid to confider what this fuppofed union of body and foul really implies, and it appears to me to imply that the foul, having locality^ and extenfion^ muft have Jblidity alfo. That the mind fhould move the body, and at the fame time move it/elf along with the body, we may think a tolerable eafy fuppofition ; but what fliall we fay to the cafe of the body being moved during fleep, or a fwooH, to which removal the mind does not at all contribute. It will hardly be faid that, in this cafe, the foul is firft of all left behind, in the place from which the body was taken, and that it afte wards voluntarily joins its former companion. And, i' THE D I S Q^U I S I T I N S. 27J And, if not, the motion of the mind muft, in all cafes, necejfarily accompany the mo** tion of the living body, or, in other words, the mind muft be involuntarily dragged along with it. But can this motion be communicated from body to mind without real impulfe, implying a vis inertia, and folidityy without which, it fhould feem, that the one cannot lay hold of the other ? 8. It will alfo, I think, be difficult to account for the feparation of the foul from the body after death, unlefs the fpiritual fubftance be fuppofed to be a proper con- ftituent part of thtfolid mafs, which, like fixed air in bodies, is fet loofe when the reft of the mafs is diflblved by putrefaftion, or otherwife. If putrefaftion, or total dif- folution, be the phyfical caufe of this fe- paration, is there not a good foundation for the practice of the Egyptians, who pre- ferved the bodies of their friends as long as they pollibly could, probably with a view of retaining their fouls in them, or near them ? S 2 li mmmmmm^ I'M I 'H' S76 ILLUSTRATIONS OF If the foul be really infeparable from the body, which is probably the opinion of thofe who maintain that, during the death of the body, the foul is in a ftate of infen- fibility until the refurreftion, what part of the body does it accompany ? If it be in- difcerptible, it muft be wholly in fome one place; and as all the conftitutent parts of every member of the body are completely diflblved and difperfed, it muft, in fad, accompany fome one of the ultimate parti^ cles, and which of them can that be ? If the extended fpirit does not accom- pany any particle of the diflblved body, and all fouls be prefervcd, during their dor- mant ftate, in fome ^^/z^r^/r^^^/^ry (whether in the fun, the earth, or fome part of the intermediate fpace) in what manner will the re-union of the fouls and their refpedive bodies be effected at the refurredion ? Will it be by any thing like what is called eleBive attraBion between thtm, or will it be ef- feded by a new and exprcfs^at of the deity ? Thefe objedions do not much, if at all alFcd the dodrine oi fpirit bearing no relation to - THE D I S Q^U I S I T I O N S. t^j tojpa^e^ or any fpeculation concerning the divine effence, which fills all fpace. 9. Many other queries will neceflarily obtrude themfelves on any perfon who ftiall begin to fpeculate on the nature of ex- tended fpiritual fubftances, which it will be impoffible to difmifs without fome degree of attention; and it appears to mc that, let the advocates for this dodrine anfwer them in whatever manner they pleafe, they muft occafion fome degree of embarrafl"- ment, fo as to leave a fufpicion of the dodrine from which they arife, as wanting a fufficient foundation in probability and truth ; fuch as. What is the origin, or com- mencement, of the extended fpirit ? Is every foul a feparate creation, or, are fouls pro- pagated from each other like bodies ? Does it grow in fize with the growth of the body and brain ? Are thefe extended fpirit s mu- tually penetrable to each other ? There can be no doubt but that they muft occupy a portion of the fame univerfal fpace that is already occupied by the divine effence. Is the effence of thefe extended fpirits fimilar S 3 to I7f ILLUSTRATIONS OF to that of the deity, and will no impedi- ment arife from this neceflary mutual pe- netration ? Many more obfervations might be made on this notion of extended fpirit, which appears to me not to have been fufficiently confidered by thofe who hold it. They have concluded, or rather, have taken it for granted, that there is in man a foul diftind from his body, but they revolt at the idea of this foul having no extenfion, or relation to fpace, and therefore admit that it has thefe properties ; but, being driven by mere neceflity to admit thus much, they are un- willing to conlider the fubjed any farther, and fhut their eyes on all the concomi- tants and confequences of their conceffionss though, if they would attend to them, they would find them fuch as would pro- bably make them revolt at the whole fyf- tem. Their arguments for a feparate foul from the topics of thought being diffimilar to matter, from the unity of confcioufnefs, indifcerptibility, &c. properly belong to the advocates for refined fpiritualifm, and are I * t* THE D I S CLU I S I T I O N S. 279 are impertinent!)^ and ineffeftually alledged by thofe, who, admitting a real extenfion, and confequently real fize and form in the foul, in vain imagine that they are advo- cates for the dodtrine of proper immateri- ality. In fad, they are themfelves y^'w/- materialijis. ff How eafy is it to get rid of all the em- 'barraflment attending the doftrine of a foul, ill every view of it, by admitting, agree- ably to all the phenomena, that the power of thinking belongs to the brain of a man, as that of walking to his feet, or that of fpeak- ing to his tongue; that, therefore, man, who is one beings is compofed of one kind of fubjlance, made of the duji of the earth -^ that when he dies, he, of courfe, ceafes to think ; but when his Jlceping duJi fhall be reanimated at the refurreftion, his power of thinking, and his confcioufnefs, will be re.^ ftored to him ? This fyftem gives a real value to the dodrine of a refurreSlion from the dead^ which is peculiar to revelation, on which S A alone tio ILLUSTRATIONS OF alone the facred writers build all our hope of a future life, and it explains the uni- form language of the fcriptures, which fpeak of one day of judgment for all mankind, and reprefent all the rewards of virtue, and all the punifhments of vice, as taking place at that awful day, and not before. This dodlrine of a refurreftion was laughed at by the conceited Athenians, and will always be the fubjeft of ridicule to perfons of a fimilar turn of mind ; but it is abundantly confirmed to us by the well attefted refurredion of Jefus Chrift, and the promifes of the gofpel, eftablifhed on all the miraculous events by which the promulgation of chriftianity was attended, IV, Of Confchufnefs. Since, in all metaphyfical fubjeds, there is a perpetual appeal made to confcioufnefsy or internal feelingy that is, to what we cer- tainly and intuitively know by refledting on what paiTes within our own minds, and I have hitherto contented myfelf with no- ticing the particular inftances in which I apprehended I THE D I S CLU I S I T I O N S. 281 apprehended fqme miftake has been made with refped to it, a$ they occurred in the CQurfe of my argument ; I fhall here give a more general view of the fubjedt, in order to acquaint my reader what things they are that, I apprehend, we can be confcious of, and efpecially to caution him againft confounding them with thofe things of which we are not properly confcious, but which we only ijifer from them. When we (hut our eyes on the external world, and contemplate what we find with- in ourfelves, we firft perceive the images, qr the ideas of the objedls by which our fenfes have been imprefled. Of thefe we are properly confcious. They are what we immediately obferve^ and are not deduSlions from any prior obfervations. In the next place, we know by intuition, or are confcious, that thefe ideas appear, and re-appear, and that they are varioufly ponneded with each other, which is the foundation of memory or recolIeBion. We alfo fee that our ideas are varioufly combined and 1( ztz ILLUSTRATIONS OF and divided, and can perceive the other re- lations that they bear to each other, which is the foundation oi judgment, and confe- quently of reafoning. And laftly, we per- ceive that various bodily motions depend upon ideas and trains of ideas, from which arifes what is called a voluntary power over our aiftions. Thefe particulars, I apprehend, comprize all that we are properly confcious of; and with refpeft to thefe it is hardly poflible we can be miftaken. But every thing that we pretend to know that is really more than thefe, muft be by way of injerence from them ; and in drawing thefe inferences or conclufions, we are liable to miftakes, as well a,s in other inferences. In fad:, there is perhaps no fubjeft whatever with refped: to which we have more need of caution, from the danger we are in of imagining that our knowledge of things relating to ourfelves is in the frji in^ Jiance, when, in reality, it is in ihtjecond^ or perhaps the third ox fourth. U THE DISCLUISITIONS. ti^ If then, as I have obferved, all that we are really confcious of be our ideas, and the various a^eBions of our ideas, which, when reduced to general heads, we call the powers of thought, as memory, judgment^ and will, all our knowledge of the fubjeSi oj thought within us, or what we call our-^ feives^ muft be by way of inference. What we feel, and what we do we may be faid to know by intuition ; but what we are we know only by deducftion, or inference from intuitive obfervations. If, therefore, it be aflerted, that the fubjed: of thought is fomething that isfmple, indivifbk, immate^ rial, or naturally immortal, it can only be by way of conclufion from given premifes. Confequently, it is a decifion for which no man's word is to be taken. We m^^y fancy that it is fomething that we feel, or are confcious of, but, from the nature of the thing, it can only be that a man reafons himfelf into that belief, and therefore he may, without having been aware of it, have impofed upon himfelf by fome fallacy in the argument. Feeling I k 2f| ILLUSTRATIONS OF Feeling and thinking are allowed to be properties I and though all that we can know of any thing are its properties, w^ agree to fay that all properties inhere in, or belong to, (omt fubjeSl or fubjiance -, but what this fubftance is, farther than its be- ing pofTeffed of thofc very properties by which it is known to us, it is impoflible for us to fay, except we can prove that thofe known properties neceffarjly imply others. If, therefore, any perfon fay he is confcious that his mind (by which we mean the fubjed: of thought) isjmple, or indivifible^ and if he fpeak properly, he can only mean, that he is one thinking perfon, or being, gnd not feveral, which will be univerfally ap- Icnowledged, But if he means any thing more than this, as that the fubftance to which the property of thinking belongs is incapable of divifion, either having no ex- tenfion, or parts, or that thofe parts cannot be removed from each other, I do not ad- mit his afTertion without hearing what rea^ fans he has to advance for it j being fenfible that in this he goes beyond a proper con-r fcioufnefs. I may think it more probable, that THE D I S Q^U I S I T I O N Sf. a|j that every thing that exifts muft have ex* tenfion, and that (except fpace, and the divine elTence, which fills all fpace) what- ever is extended may be divided, though that divifion might be attended with the lofs pf properties peculiar to the undivided fubftance. Much farther muft a rnan go beyond the bounds of proper confcioufnefs^ into thofe of reafofiing, to fay that the fubjed: of his thinking powers is immaterial, or fome- thing different from the matter of which his body, and efpecially his brain, confifts. For admitting all that he can know by ex^ perience, or ijituition, I may tliink it more probable, that all the powers or properties of man inhere in one kind of fubftance . and fince we are agreed that man confifts, in part at leaft, of matter, I may conclude that he is wholly material, and may re- fufe to give up this opinion, till I be fliown that the properties neceffarily belonging to matter, and thofe of feeling and thinking, are incompatible. And before this can be determined, the reafons for, and agai?2jl it muft fg6 ILLUSTRATIONS Of muft be attended to. It is a queftion that cannot be decided \yj Jimple feeling. Lefs ftill can it be determined by con- fcioufnefs that the fubjeft of thought is naturally immortal^ fo that a man will con- tinue to think and aft after he has ceafed to breathe and move. We are certainly confcious of the fame things with refpeft to ourfelves, but what one man may think to be very clear on this fubjeft, another may think to be very doubtful, or exceed- ingly improbable ; drawing different con-- dufions from the fame premifes. Again, that man is an agents meaning by it that he has a power of beginning mo- tion, independently of any mechanical laws to which the author of his nature has fub- jefted him, is a thing that is fo far from being evident from confcioufnefs, that, if we attend properly to what we really do feel, we fhall, as I conceive, be fatisfied that we have no fuch power. What we really do feel, or may be fcnfible of, if we attend to our feelings, is that we never come T H E D I S Q^U I S I T I O N S. z$i come to any refolution, form any deliberate purpofe, or determine upon any thing what- ever, without fome motive, arifing from the ftate of our minds, and the ideas prefent to them^ and therefore we ought to conclude, that we have no power of refolving, or de- termining upon any thing, without fome motive. Confequently, in the proper phi- lofophical language, motives ought to be denominated the caufes of all our determi- nations, and therefore of all our anions. All that men generally mean by a con^ J fcioufnefs of freedom, is a confcioufnefs of their having a power to do what they pre- vioufly will, or pleafe. This is allowed, and that it is a thing of which we are pro- perly confcious. But to will without a motive, or contrary to the influence of all motives prefented to the mind, is a thing of which no man can be confcious. Nay every juft obfervation concerning ourfelves, or others, appears to me very clearly to lead to the oppofite conclufion, viz. that our wills, as well as our judgments, are de- termined by the appearances of things pre- fented sSS ILLUSTRAtlONS Ot i fented to us ; and therefore that the deter- minations of both are equally guided by certain invariable laws; and confequently that every determination of the w^ill or judgment is juft what the being who made us fubje£l to thofe laws, and who always had, and ftill has, the abfolute difpofal of us, muft have intended that they fhould be. If, however, this conclufion be de- nied, it muft be controverted by argument^ and the queftion muft not be decided by confcioufnefsf or any pretendedy^^////^ of the contrary* V. An addition to feSiion II. on the argu^ mentfor the DoBrine ofNeceJJity from the conjideration of cause and effect, I do not think it at all neceflary to add any thing to what I have advanced in my former treatife in illuftration of the argument from the nature of caufe and effeSi- But becaufe this is the great and moft con- clufive argument for the dodrine that I ^ontend for, proving the contrary dodrinc oi philofophical liberty, to be abfolutely im^ pojjible . k\ .i !l THE D I S Q^U I S I T I O N S. 289 po0le ; and I find that feveral perfons, of excellent judgment in other refpefts, feem not to feel the force of it, I fhall attempt a farther illuftration of it, in order to re- move, as far as I am able, the only remain- ing objedlion that I can imagine may be made to it; though I muft afic pardon of my other readers for writing what will ap- pear to them fo very obvious, and fuper- lluous. It is univerfally acknowledged, that there can be no efFedl without an adequate caufe. This is even the foundation on which the only proper argument for the being of a God refts. And the neceflarian allerts that if, in any given ftate of mind, with refpedt both to difpofition and 7notiveSy two different determinations, or volitions, be poflible, it can be fo on no other principle, than that one of them ihall come under the dc- fcription of an effcB without a caife \ juft as if the beam of a balance might incline either way, though loaded with equal weights. T It t 4* .90 I L L U S T R A T I O N S O F It IS acknowledged that the mechanifm of the balance is of one kind, and that of the mind of another, and therefore it may be convenient to denominate them by dif- ferent words ; as, for inftance, that of the balance may be termed a phyjicah and that of the mind a moral mechanifm. But ftill, if there be a real mechanifm in both cafes, fo that there can be only one refult from the fame previous circumftances, there will a real necejjity^ enforcing an abfolute cer- tainty in the event. For it muft be under- flood that all that is ever meant by necejjity in a caufe, is that which produces certainty in the effcB. If, however the term necejjity give of- fence, I, for my part, have no objedlion to the difufe of it, provided we can exprefs, in any other manner, that property in caufes, or the previous circumftances of things, that leads to abfolute certainty in the effects that refult from them ; fo that, without a miracle, or an over-ruling of the ilated laws of nature, /. e. without the intervention of a higher caufe, no de- termination iM lAi T H E D I S CLU I S I T I O N S. 291 termination of the will could have been other wife than it has been. To evade the force of this argument from the nature of caufe and effed:, it is faid that, though, in a given ftate of mind, two different determinations may take place, neither of them can be faid to be without a fufficient caufe; for that, in this cafe, the caufe is the mind it/elf, which makes the determination in a manner independent of all influence of motives. But to this I anfwer, that the mind it- felf, independent of the influence of every thing that comes under the defcription of motive, bearing an equal relation to both the determinations, cannot poflibly be con- fidered as a caufe with refpecfl to either of them, in preference to the other. Becaufe, exclufive of what may properly be called motive, there is no imaginable difference in the circumftances immediately preced- ing the determinations. Every thing tend- ing to produce the leaft degree of incli- nation to one of the determinations more T 2 than 292 ILLUSTRATIONS OF than to the other muft make a difFerence in the Jlate of mind v/ith refpeft to them, which, by the ftatingof the cafe, is exprefsly excluded. And 1 will venture to fay, that no perfon, let his bias in favour of a fyflem be ever fo great, will chufe to fay in fup- port of it, that the mind can poffibly take one of two determinations, without having for it fomething that may, at leaft, be called an inclination for it, in preference to the other; and that inclination, or whatever elfe it be called, muft have had a caufe producing it, in feme previous aiFe6lion of the mind. In fhort, let ever fo much ingenuity be fhown in ftating this cafe, it is impoffible not to come at length to this conclufion^ that, in no cafe whatever, can the mind be determined to adion, /. e. to a volition, without fomething that may as well be called a motive as be exprefled in any other manner. For the rcafon, or proper cauft', of every determination muft ncceiiarily be fomethinj^ either in the ftate of the mind itfelf, or in the ideas prefcnt to it, imme- diately I ± THE D I S QJJ I S I T I O N S. 293 diatcly before the determination; and thefe ideas, as they imprefs the mind, may, ftridly fpeaking, be comprehended in what we mean by the Jiate of mindy including whatever there is in it that can lead to any determination whatever. Or, on the other hand, the ftate of mind may be included in the meaning of the term motive, compre- hending in the fignification of it whatever it be that can move, or incline the mind to any particular determination, It appears to me that it may juft as well be laid that, in the cafe of the balance above-mentioned, the beam may be the caufe why, though equal weights be fuf- pended at the different ends of it, it may neverthelefs incline one way or the other. For, exclufive of what neceflarily comes under the defcription either of motive, or Jiate of mind, the mind itfelf can no more be the caufe of its own determination, than the beam of a balance c^n be the caufe of its own inclination. In the cafe of the beam it is immediately perceived that, bearing an equal relation to T 2 both 294 ILLUSTRATIONS OF both tlie weights, it cannot pofTibly favour one of them more than the other ; and it is fimply on account of its bearing an equal relation to them both that it cannot do this. Now, let the ftrudure of the mind be ever fo different from that of the balance, it iteceiTarily agrees with it in this, that, ex- clufive of motives, in the fenfe explained above (viz. including both the Hate of mind and the particular ideas prefcnt to it) it bears as equal a relation to any determi- nation, as the beam of a balance bears to any particular inclination; fo that as, on account of this circumftance, the balance cannot of itfelf incline one way or the other, fo neither, on account. of the fame circumftance, can the mind of itfelf incline, or determine, one way or the other. In fad, an advocate for the dodrine of philofophical liberty has the choice of no more than two fuppojitions y and neither of them can, in the leaft degree, anfwer his purpofe. For he muft either afTert that, in a given ftate of mind, the determination will certainly be a and not by or it may be either ji .- THE DISaUISITIONS. 295 either a or b. If he adopts the former, he may juft as well fay at once, that the determination will necejfarily be a, and that without a miracle it cannot be b. For any other language that he can poflibly ufe can do no more than ferve to hide what might otherwife be obnoxious in the fentiment, and will leave it ftill true, that, without a miracle, or the intervention of fome fo- reign caufe, no volition, or action of any man could have been otherwife than it ha^ been, is, or is to be, which is all that a ne- ceffarian contends for. And if, on the contrary, he chufes to afTert that, in the fame ftate of mind, the determinations a and b are equally pofTible, one of them muft be a?i effeSl without a caufe, a fuppo- fition v/hich overturns all reafoning con- cerning appearances in nature, and efpecially the foundation of the only proper argu- ment for the being of a God. For if any thing whatever, even a thought in the mind of man, could arife without an ade- quate caufe^ any thing elfe, the mind itfelf, or the whole univerfe, might likewife exift without a caufe. T 4 I 296 ILLUSTRATIONS OF I own it is irkfome to me to enter into fo minute a difcuflion of an objedion that appears to me to be fo little deferving of an anfwer; and it is only with a view to ob- viate every thing that has been^ or that I can forefce may be urged, with the leafl: plaufi- bility, that I have confidered it at all. If this do not give fatisfaftion, I own I do not think it will be in my power to give fatisfadion with refpeft to this argument, or any other. There does not appear to me to be, in the whole compafs of reafon- ing, that I am acquainted with, a more conclufive argument, than that for the dodrine of neceiTity from the confideration of the nature of caiife and effe£l. VI. Of the nature of remorse of con- science, and of PRAYING FOR THE PARDON OF SIN, OH the DoSIrine cf Nc- Several perfons firmly perfuaded of the truth of the dodrine of neccfiity, yet fay, that it is not poffible to aB upon it ; and to put what they think a peculiarly difficult cafe - t THE D I S CLU I S I T 1 O N S. 297 cafe, they aik how it is poffible for a necei^ farian to pray for the pardon of fin, I anfwer, in general, that Dr. Hartley appears to me to have advanced what is quite fufficient to obviate any difficulty that can arife from this view of the fubjed, when he admonifhes us carefully to diilin- guifli between the popular and philofophical languagey as correfponding to two very dif- ferent views of human adions: according- to one of which the bulk of mankind re- fer their adions to themfelves only, vv^ithoat having any diftind idea of the divine agency being, diredly or indiredly, X^^c caufe of them : whereas, according to the other, we look beyond all fecond caufes, and confider the agency of the fir ft and proper caufe, ex- plufive of every thing fubordinate to it. Thefe very different views of x ' muft be attended \yith very diiFe:. . rjigs ; and, when feparated fro/.i ( ^ fhey will, in feveral refpjcts, It :,,. {Qvcnt condui^y as well as req - ^flnguage. Now, fuch are the uiiiuciicts to 298 ILLUSTRATIONS OF to which all mankind, without diftindion, are expofed, that they ncceflarily refer ac- tions (I mean refer them ultimately) firft of all to themfelves and others; and it is a long time before they begin to confider themfelves and others as injiruments in the hand of a fuperior agent. Confequently, the aflbciations which refer adions to them- felves get fo confirmed, that they are never intirely obliterated ; and therefore the com- mon language, and the common feelings of mankind, will be adapted to the firft, the limited and imperfecft, or rather erroneous view of things. The Divine Being could not be unap- prized of this circumftance, or unattentive to it ; and he has wifely adapted the fyftem of religion that he has prefcribed to us, the modes of our religious vi^orfhip, and every thing belonging to it, to this imper- fed: view of things. It is a fyftem calcu- lated for the bulk of mankind^ and of philo- fophers as partaking of the feelings of the bulk of mankind; and therefore, would, we may fuppofe, have been different if the bulk ^ THE DISQ^UISITIO N,S. 299. bulk of mankind had been fpeculatively and praftically philofophers ; in fome fuch manner as the modes of worfliip varied in the Jewifh and chriftian churches. But it is of prime confequence in this bufmefs, that, in whatever fenfe^ or degree, any particular fentiment or feeling is felt as improper by a necelTarian, in the fame fenfe and degree his principles will make that fentiment or feeling to be of no ufe to him. Thus, to apply this to the cafe in hand: if the fentiments of felf-applaufe on the one hand, and of felf-reproach on the other be, in any fenfe or degree, im- poffible to be felt by a neceflarian, in the fame fenfe or degree (while he feels and ads like a neceflarian) he will have no oc- cafion for thofe fentiments; his mind being pofTefTed by a fentiment of a much higher nature, that will intirely fuperfede them, and anfwer their end in a much more ef- fedual manner. And whenever his ftrength of mind fails him, whenever he ceafes to look to the firft caufe only, and refts in fecond caufes, he will then neceffarily feel the 300 ILLUSTRATIONS OF the fentiments of fclf-applaufe and felf-re- proach, which were originally fuggefled by that imperfed: view of things into which he is relapfed. Every man's feelings will neceffarily be uniform. To be a neceffiirian mfpeculatioUy and not in praBkey is impoffible, except in that fenfe in which it is poffible for a man to be a chriftian in fpeculation and a libertine in pra£l.ice. In one fenfe a fpecu- lative chriftian, or neceflarian, may feel and ad: in a manner inconfiftent with his principles ; but if his faith be what Dr. Hartley calls a praBical one, either in the dodrine of neccflity, or the principles of chriftianity, that is, if he really feels the principles, and if his afFedions and condud be really direded by them, fo that they have their natural iniUience on ^is mind, it will be impoffible for him to be a bad man. What I mean, therefore, is that a truly praBical necejjhrian will ftand in no need of the fentiments either of felf-ap- plaufe, or felf-reproach. He will be under the influence of a much fuperior principle loving 301 THE D I S QJU I S I T I O N S. loving God and his fellow creatures (which is the fum and objed of all religion, and leading to every thing excellent in condud) from motives altogether independent of any confideration relating to himfelf. On this I need not enlarge in this place, if what I have advanced on the moral inflitence of the doBrine of necejityy in my Appendix, be confidered. It is acknowledged that a neceflarian^ ^ who, as fuch, believes that, fl:ridly fpeak- ing, nothing goes wrongs but that every thing is under the beft diredion poflible, himfelf, and his condud:, as part of an immenfe d^nd perfeB whole^ included, cannot accufe himfelf of having done wrong, in the ultimate fenfe of the words. He has^ therefore, in this fl:rid fenfe, nothing to do with repentance, confeffion, or pardon, which are all adapted to a difl^erent, imper- fed, and fallacious view of things. But then, if he be really capable of fteadily viewing the great fyflem, and his own con- dud as a part of it, in this true light, his fupreme regard to God, as the great, wife. and -^ ILLUSTRATIONS OF and benevolent author of all things, his intimate communion with him, and de- votednefs to him, will neceflarily be fuch, that he can have no will but God's. In the fublime, but accurate language of the ^ apoftle John, he will dwell in love, he will dwell in God, and God in him-, fo that, not committing any Jin, he will have nothing to repent of. He will be perfeB, as his heavenly father is perfe5l. I But as no man is capable of this degree of perfection in the prefent ftate, becaufe the influences to which we are all expofed wall prevent this conllant referring of every thing to its primary caufe, the fpeculative neceflarian, will, in a general way, refer aaions to himfelf and others ^ and confe- quently he will neceflarily, let him ufe what efforts he will, feel the fentiments of fhame, remorfe, and repentance, which arife mechanically from his referring aftions to himfelf. And, opprcflied with a itni^ of guilt, he will have recourfe to that mercy of which he will ftand in need. Thefe things mufl: neceflarily accompany one another. THE D I S CLU I S I T I O N S. 305 another, and there Is no reafon to be fo- licitous about their feparation. It is, alas ! only in occafional feafons of retirement from the world, in the happy hours of devout contemplation, that, I believe, the moft perfed: of our race can fully indulge the enlarged views, and lay himfelf open to the genuine feelings, of the neceflarian principles ; that is, that he can fee every thing in God, i. e. in its re- lation to him. Habitually, and confl:antlv to realize thefe views, would be always to live in the hotfe of God, and within the gate of heaven, feeing the plain finger of God in all events, and as if the angels of God were confl:antly defcending to earth, and afcending to heaven before our eyes. Such enlarged and exalted fentiments are fome- times apparent in the facred writers, and alfo in the hifl:ories of chriftian and protef- tant martyrs -, but the befl: of men, in the general courfe of thdr lives, fall far fliort of this fl:andard of perfedion. We i I f% -04 ILLUSTRATIONS OF We are too apt to lofe fight of God, and of his univerfal uncontrolled agency i and then, falling from a fituation in which we were equally ftrangers to wee, and fo- lickude, from a ftate truly paradifakal, in which we were incapable of knoiving or feeling any evil, as fuch, converfing daily with God, enjoying his prefence, and con- templating his works, as all infinitely good and perfea, we look no higher than our- felves, or beings on a level with ourfelves . and of courfe find ourfelves involved in a thoufand perplexities, follies and vices j and we now want, and ought to fly to, the proper remedy in our cafe, viz. felf abafe- mcnt, contrition, and fupplication. Moreover, well knowing what we ge- nerally are, how imperfea our "o'tews, and confequently how imperfed our conduB, it is our wifdom, and our intereft, freely to indulge thefe feelings, till they have pro- duced their proper effea ; till the fcnfc of guilt h:is been difcharged by the feelings of contrition, and a humble truft in the Divine mercy. Thus, gradually attaining to il /'ill \ THE D I S C^U I S I T 1 O N S. 305 to purer intentions, and a more upright condud, we fhall find lefs obftrudion in enlarging our views to comprehend the true plan of providence ; when, having lefs to refle£t upon ourfelves for, the fentiment of reproach fhall eafily and naturally vanifli; and we fhall then fully conceive, and re- joice in, the belief that in all things we are^ and have been^ fellow workers together with God'y and that he works all his works in usy by usy and for us. The improvement of our natures, and confequently the advancement of our hap- pinefs, by enlarging the comprehenfion of our minds, chiefly by means of a more dif- tind view of the hand of God in all things, and all events, is, in its own nature, a gra- dual thing, and our attempts to accelerate this natural progrefs may pofTibly be at- tended with fome inconvenience ^ though, I own, I apprehend but little danger from this quarter. What we have moft to dread, is the al- mofl irrecoverable debafement of our minds by looking off from God, living without him, U without 3o6 ILLUSTRATIONS OF without a due regard to his prefence, and providence, and idoli.ins ourjelves and the world; conlidering other things as proper agents and catifes ; whereas, ftrid:]y fpeak- ing, there is but one caiifej but one fole agent in univerfal nature. Thus (but 1 feel myfelf in danger of going beyond the bounds of the queftion I am now difcuf- fing) all vice is reducible to idolatry; and we can only be completely virtuous and happy in the worfliip of the one only living and true God ; the idea ufually annexed to the word worjhtp but faintly fliadowing out what the intelligent reader will perceive I now mean by it, In all this it muft be remembered that I am addreffing myfelf to profejfed necef- farians; and I muft inform them, that if they cannot accompany me in this fpecu- lation, or find much difficulty in doing it^ they are no more than nominal neceflarians, and have no more feeling of the real energy of their principles than the merely nominal chriftian has of thofe of chriftianity. It requires [much refleiaiwi, meditation, and ftrength \, *r H E D I S CLU I S I T I d N S. 307 ftrength of mind, to convert fpeculative principles into praBieal ones ; and till any principle be properly y^^//, it is not eafy to judge .of its real tendency and power. It isf common with unbelievers to declaim on the fub]e<3: of the mifchief that chriftianity has done in the world, as it is with the opponents of the docftrine of neceffity to dwell upon the dangerous tendency of it ; but the real necelTarian, and true chriftian, know, and feel, that their principles tend to make them better men in all refpeds ; and that it can only be fomething that is very improperly called either chrijiianity ^ oz the doBrine of necefjity^ that can tend to make tliem worfe. I think, however, that a mere fpeculatift may be fatisfied, that the feeling of re- morfe, and the prad:ice of fupplication for pardon, have ftill lefs foundation on the doftrine of philofophical liberty, than on that of neceffity, as I prefume has been de- monftrated in my treatife. Indeed, what can a man have to blame himfelf for, when he afted without motive^ and from no fixed U 2 principle^ I ■ 308 ILLUSTRATIONS OF principle^ good or bad ; and what occafion has he for pardon who never meant to give offence; and, as I have fliewn at large, unlefs the mental determinations take place without regard to motive, there is no evidence whatever of the mind being free from its necelTary influence. But it feems to be taken for granted, that whatever a neceffarian cannot feel, or do, his opponent can ; whereas, in faft, the doftrine of re- pentance, as defined by the advocates of liberty themfelves, has much lefs place on their principles than on ours. The whole dodrine oi fecond caufes being primary ones, is certainly a miftake, though a miftake that all imperfed: beings mujl be fubjed: to. Whatever, therefore, is built upon that miftake can have no place in a truly philofophical fyftem. But I will farther advance, that while men continue in this miftake, and, confequently, while their re- fledtions on their own condud:, as well as on that of others, (hall be modified by it^ they will derive considerable advantage even from an imperfed view of the true philo- fophical T H E D IS Q^U I S I T I O N S. 309 1 4 fophical dodrine, viz. that of neceffity ; whereas a man, in the fame circumftances, muft receive fome injury from the oppofite fentiment of philofophical liberty ; fo much may it be depended upon, that a knowledge of this truth can do no harm, but muft do fome good. Remorfe for paft mifcondud implies a deep fenfe of depravity of heart, or a wrong bias of mind, by which temptations to fin will have much more influence with us than they ought to have. This is the fen- timent that will be fully felt by what I now call the imperfeSi neceffarian (a cha- rader which, as I obferved before, applies to all mankind). As a neceflarian he con- fiders his bad condud: as neceffarily arifing from his bad difpofition. It is bad fruit growing from a bad tree. And, as he knows that, unlefs the tree be made good, it will be impofllble to make the fruit good ; fo he is fenfible that unlefs he can, by the ufe of proper difcipline, bring his mind into a better ftate, he can never depend upon himfelf for ading more pro- u 3 r-^-i 1' i 310 ILLUSTRATIONS OF perly on future occafioos. He, therefore, ftom that principle by which we univerfally feek our own happinefs and improvement, labours to corred: his vicious dilpofitioa; tnd, expefting no miraculous affiftance, he applies to the proper remedies indicated by the confideration of his cafe. * At the fame time, his regard to God, as the author of all good, and who has ap- pointed meditation and prayer as a means of attaining it, will make him conilantly look up to him for his favour and bleffing. And if, as he becomes more philofophical| his devotions have in them lefs of fup^ plication^ and rather take the form oi praife, tbankfgivingy and a joyful firm confidence in the divine care and providence, refpefting equally the things of time and eternity, it will not contribute the lefs to his moral improvement 'and happinefs. But the beft of men will not, in fad, get beyond that Hate of mind, in which diredl and fervent prayer^ properly fo called, will be as unavoidable as it will be tijeful to them. .What I now fay will not be well under- ftood THE D I S Q.U I S I T I O N S. 311 flood by all perfons, but I fpeak to thofe who have fome experience in matters of religion, and who are accuftomed to re- fledion on their natural feelings. Let us now confider what the dodrinc of philofophical liberty can do for a man in the circumftances abovementioned. He, like the neceffarian, finds himfelf involved in guilt, and he alfo begins to fpeculate concerning the caufes of it ; but, overlook- ing the fecret mechanifm of his mind, he afcribes the whole to the mere ohjiinacy of his willy which, of itfclfy and not neceflarily influenced by any motives, has turned a deaf ear to every thing that better principles could fuggeft. But, in what manner can fuch mens uncontrollable will be redified ? As far as we have recourfe to motives, and principles, we depend upon the doftrine of mechanifm y and without that we have. no- thing to do but fit with folded hands, wait- ing the arbitrary decifions of this fame fo- vereign will. If he fpeculates farther, and confiders how little his real temper and charaftcr are U 4 con^ I * 312 ILLUSTRATIONS OF concerned in fuch unaccountable motions of his felf-determined will, I fhould think him in fome danger of making himfelf very eafy about his vices. And this would be the cafe, if men were not neceflarily influenced by founder principles than they always diftindly perceive. Now, it appears to me, that if a man's fpeculations take this turn, it would have been much better for him never to have fpeculated at all, and that they only tend to bewilder, and hurt him. Again, fuppofing a man to have attained to fome degree of a virtuous character and condud, his farther progrefs will be acce- lerated by the belief of the dotflrine of ne- ceffity, and retarded by that of philofophical liberty. The convidion that God is the author of all good will always much more readily take firm hold of the mind than the idea of his being, likewife, the author of all m/, though all evil ultimately terminates in good ; becaufe it requires more ftrength qf piind to fee and believe this, A long time, therefore. <^ t THE DISCLUISITIONS. 31$ therefore, before we fufpedt that our evil difpofitions come from God, as well as our good ones, and that all things that exift, ultimately confidered, equally promote the divine purpofes, we fhall afcribe all evil to ourfelves, and all good to God ; and this perfuafion will be fo riveted, in a long courfe of time, that after we are convinced that God is really and truly the author of al/ things, without diftinftion, we fhall afcribe evil to him only in an unfteady and confufed manner, while the perfuafion that he is the fole author of all good will have received a great acceflion of ftrength, from our new philofophical principles coinciding with, and confirming, our former general notions. Now no fentiment whatever is fo favour- able to every thing amiable, good, and great, in the heart of man, as a fpirit of 4eep humility, grounded on difclaiming all our excellencies, and referring them to their proper fource, that feeling which Dr. Hart- ley very exprefTively calls f elf -annihilation, joined with that which naturally and ncr ppflarily accompanies it, joy and confidence in God, ■■I li r I I 1, J14 ILLUSTRATIONS OF God. as working all our good works in us and for us. This is the difpofition that in- ipires all the writers of the books of fcrip- ture, and is obfervable in all truly ferious and devout p^rfons to this day, whether their fpeculative opinions be favourable to it or not. Nay, it has given fuch a turn to the ejlablijhed language of devotion in all countries, and all c'iges, that the contrary fentiment, or that of claiming the merit of onr good works to ourfelves, would have the appearance of fomething abfolutely im- pious, and blafphemous. Now it muft be acknowledged that this difpofition of mind, viz. that of afcribing every thing that is good in us to God, is greatly favoured and promoted by the belief of the doftrine of neceffity. It may even operate this way, to the greateil: advantage, at the fame time that, through our imperfeft comprehenfion of things, we continue to afcribe evil to ourfelves, and are affefted with the deepcft fentiments of remorfe and contrition. On the contrary, as far as the doftrine* t>f philofophical liberty operates, it tends to THE D I S CLU I S I T I O N S, 315 to check humility, and rather flatters the pride of man, by leading him to confider himfelf as being, independently of his maker, the primary author of his own good difpofitions and good works. This opinon, which, without being able to per- ceive why^ every truly pious perfon dreads, and cannot bring himfelf exprefly to avow, is apprehended to be juft, *" according to the dodrine of philofophical liberty, which reprefents man as endued with the faculty of free will, afting independently of any control from without himfelf, even that of the Divine Being; and that jufl: fo far as any fuperior being, diredly or indiredly, influences * I fay apprehended to be juft, which is all that my argu- ment requires, though, ftridly fpeaking, as I have ftiewn at large, the claim of merit, or demerity is equally ill-founded on the doarine of philofophical liberty. The fentiments of merit and demerit arc certainly natural, and found in all mankind ; but they have not, therefore, any conneaion with the doarine of philofophical .liberty. On the contrary, I maintain that the common opinion is the doarine of neceffity, though not come to its proper extent. No man, for inftance, has any idea but that the ^will is alivays determined by feme mo- five, which is the great, hinge on which the doarine of ne- ceffity turns ; nor has any man in common life any idea of virtue, but as fomething belonging to charaBer and fxe4 principle, conllantly influencing the wlL p6 ILLUSTRATIONS OF influences his will, he can pretend to no fuch thing as real virtue, or goodnefs ; though the virtue that anfwers to this de- fcription is certainly not that which ani- mated the prophets of the Old Teftament, or our Saviour and the apoftles in the New, but is mere heathen S^icifm. When this temper is much indulged, it is even 'poffible, contradictory as it feems, to afcribe all moral good to a man's felf, and all moral evil to the inftigation of the Devil, or fome other wicked fpirit that has accefs to our minds : whereas, without the intervention of this docftrine of the indepen^ dency of the willy and efpecially with a little aid from the do6trine of mechanifm^ we fiioqld rather, as was fhewn before, though inconfiflently ftill, afcribe all good to God, and all evil to ourfeves, Conftantly to afcribe all to God is an at- tainment too great for humanity. To be able to do it at intervals^ in the feafons of retirement and meditation, but fo as con- fideraWy to influence our general feelings, and condud in life, is a happy and glorious advantage. THE D I S CLU I S I T I O N S. 317 advantage. Sweet, indeed, are the moments in which thefe great and jufl: views of the fyfl:em to which we belong can be fully in- dulged. But if we cannot habitually afcribe all to God, but a part only, let it be (and fo indeed it naturally will be) that which is goody and if we mufl: afcribe any thing to ourfelves, let it be that which is eviL Thus have I given a frank and ingenuous account of my own ideas and impreflions on this fubjeft. How far they will give fatisfadtion to others I cannot tell. ADDITIONAL II Miiiiiiiffli!^ 1- nmHil XintniJnm B li ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS 3 Y Dr. PRICE, O N A REVIEW of the whole CONTROVERSY, A N D O F Dr. PRIESTLEY'sLetters and Illustrations, As printed in the preceding Parts of this Work. i: « ,i |l It H Letter T O Dr. PRIESTLEY. Newington-Grien, Sept. 19, 1778. De AR Sir, THE defire you have expreffed that I would give you my fentiments of the Controverfy betvi^een us, on a view of the whole of it as now printedy has induced me once more to apply my thoughts to it. I have done this with care and attention ; but am not fure that any thing which you will judge of great importance has occur- red to me. It might, therefore, have been right to refolve to fay no more; and indeed, I am fo much afraid of perplexing by a multiplicity of words, and of giving dif- guft by too many r^^petitions, that this would have been my refolution, had I not X thought. '-^g^" -"P»^i^i"J'i'afaiilhi»ilim I t I 522 LETTER To thought, that the Additional Obfervatiofis which you will receive with this letter, contain fome new matter; and place feveral of the arguments already infifted on, in a light that may render them to fome per- fons more intelligible and ftriking. I have now faid the beft I can ; and I leave our readers to judge between us, hoping that whether they decide in your favour or mine, they will be candid, and believe that we are both of us governed alike by a fincere love of truth and virtue. I feel deeply that I am in conftant danger of being led into error by partial views, and of miftaking the fuggeftions of prejudice for the decifions of reafon j and this, while it difpofes me to be candid to others, makes me ardently vvifli that others would be candid to me. I am, in a particular manner, fenfible of my own blindnefs with refpeft to the na- ture of matter and fpirit, and the faculties of the human mind. As far as I have gone Ml this difpute 1 am pretty well fatisfied ; but I cannot go much further. You have aflced 5 r Dr. PRIESTLEY. 323 afkcd me fome qudftions (and many more may be afked me) which I am incapable of anfwering. I cannot help taking this opportunity of repeating to you, that I diflike more than I can eafily exprefs, the malevolence ex- prefTed by moft of the writers againft you. I have myfelf, as you well know, been long an objed of abufe for a publication which I reckon one of the beft anions of my life and which events have fully juftified. The confcioufnefs of not deferving abufe has made me perfeftly callous to it; and I doubt not but the fame caufe will render you fo. It is certain that, in the end, the intereft of truth will be promoted by a free and open difcuffion of fpeculative points. What- ever will not bear this muft be fuperftition and impofture. Inftead, therefore, of being inclined to cenfure thofe who, with honeft views, contribute to bring about fuch a dif- cuffion, we ought to thank and honour them, however miftaken we may think them, and however facred the points of ^ 2 difcuffion 3H LETTER TO Dr. PRIESTLEY. I difcuffion may be reckoned. I wifh I could fee more of this difpofition among the defenders of religion. I am particularly forry to find that even Mr. Whitehead does not perfectly poffefs this temper. Had he avoided all uncandid infinuations, and treated you conftantly with the fame juft refped: that he does in general, his book in my opinion would have done him much honour. Dr. Horfley is, I fancy, the only per- fon who, in oppofing your opinions, has difcovcred a juft liberality. This is wor- thy of an able Philofopher; and you have, therefore, very properly diftinguifhed him from your other antagonifts, by addreifing him, in your letter to him, with particu- lar refpeft. His method of arguing agrees very much with mine. There is, like- wife, an agreement between fome of Mr. Whitehead's arguments and thofe I have? iufed. But this agreement has been acci- dental ; for our correfpondence was begun «nd finifhed long before I knew any thing of 325 ■I of either Dr. Horfley 's or Mr. Whitehead's publications. Wifhing you every poflible bleffing, I am. With the moft afFe£tionate refpeft. Yours, RICHARD PRICE. 'iK' W W V/ "i^ /•*. X X X ^ •-.•* ••^y ""M^ "^j»* ^ «?ii ^ •> A A X y*\ -•'♦■% X3 ADDITIONAL \ ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS B V Dr. price. t Sect. I. Of the Human Soul. DR. PRIESTLEY acknowledges that the foul is difingk being or fub- ftance. But at the fame time he fpeaks of the parts of a foul ; of its being a fyjiem ; and, in p. 119, of the materials of which Chrift confifted before his birth. Has he yet proved this to be confiftent ? (*) His X 4 dodlrine (*) Page 86, *' I believe I am a being or fulftance\ '* alfo, that I am a fingle being ; and that my limbs and '^ fenfes are not my/elf:'-?. 279, - Man, who is one be- •^ ing, is compofed of one kind of fubftance, made of the " dull of the earth."— To the fame purpofe Dr. Prieftley ^avs in p. 284, " that the mind, the fubjed of thought, is |28 ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS doftrine is, that, as a number of corporeal fubftances put together in a particular man- ner, become, when put into motion, that meafurer of time which we call a clock or a watch', fo a number of corporeal fub- ftances put together in a particular manner in the brain become of courfcy when circu- lation begins, that thinking being we call ^man. And his doftrine further is, that both are alike machines, the operations of the one in meafuring time, and of the other in thinking, perceiving, willing, &c. being equally brought about by mechanical laws, and the neceflary refult of particular motions and vibrations. This, I imagine, is as concife and juft an account as can be given of his fyftem. See particularly, the fecond «' one thinking perfon, or one being;" but afterwards (in the next page) he fays, ** that the fubjea of thought, is the •* body, efpecially the brain ; and that its powers inhere in " am kindoi fubftance."— Thefc paflages compared lead me to fufpedl, that when he fays, in the firft of them, that he is one being or fubftance ; his meaning is, that he is man;^ fubftances of one kind, 1 can think of no other method of making thefe pafTages confiftent. For I fuppofe he cannot poflibly mean, that the mind, though one heing, is many>^- ftanceu This would imply, that a fubftance, numerically * '* That Dr. Clarke," whofe ideas he feems to adopt, ** was not for excluding « expanfion from the idea of immaterial •' fubftances," p. 55, and together with myfclf, and Dr. Clarke, he always fup- pofes the divine eilence to have proper ex- tenfion, filling all fpace. It certainly then behoved me to examiner this opinion of extended human fouls, and I think I have fhewn it to be no lefs abfurd than the former. Dr. Price himfelf does not chufe to defend it, but rather feems willing to adopt a new and middle opinion. fup- ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 369 fuppofing the foul to have locality, without extenfion. But this idea I have noticed^ and I think fufficiently, in my Difquijitions, referring to Dr. Watts, who confutes it more at large. I prefume, therefore, that tn no fonn whatever can the hypothefis of a foul feparate from the body be main- tained. As to what I advanced in my random fpeculation concerning the centers of at^ traStion and repulfion, of which I fuppofed that what we call matter might poffibly confift, it was a mere voluntary excurfion into the regions of hypothefis. I do not at prefent fee any thing amifs in it, but I am confident that had I been more in ear- neft, and determined to abide by that hy- pothefis, there is nothing in it of which Dr. Price could materially avail himfelf in fupport of his dodtrine of a feparate foul. The fad of the exigence of compound ideas in the mind, ilill appears to me de- cifive againfi: the opinion of fuch an abfo- \\x\.^ fimplicity and indivifiMlity of its efi^ence, A a as m 11 \H i S7d REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S as Dr. Price contends for. See Dtfquifi^ tions^ p. 37, and this Correfpondence, P- 51^ 95- Since I wrote the Additional Illujlrations^ I have had the curiofity to make fome in- quiry into the aftual ftate of opinions con- cerning the foul, and I fee reafon to think that, excepting Dr. Clarke, and perhaps a few others, the opinion that has moft ge- nerally prevailed of late, is that which I have principally combated in my Difqut- fitionsy viz. that it is a thing that has no extenfiQfiy or relation to Jpace. Dr. Watts afferts this opinion, and defends it very largely and ably againft Mr. Locke, and it is the opinion thut is advanced and proved, in all the forms of geometrical demonftration, by Dr. Doddridge in his -Lt^t^/ifr^x. Thefe Lec- tures are now read in all ourdiffenting acade- mies, where perhaps one half of the meta- phyiici'ins in the nation are formed ; for the clen^y of the eftabliihcd church do not, in g a], feem to have fo much of this turn. - I do not re- :eniber that any of my fel- I- ,. . ..Its ever entcrtaiued a dilterent idea, and % m ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. j;i and many of us were very much intent upon metaphyfical inquiries. We held very different opinions on other points, and were pretty eager difputants. I have alfo inquired of many other perfons, and hither- to they have all told me, that their idea of fpirit was that which I have confidered. It will be obferved, however, that all the ar- guments on which I lay the moft ftrefs refped: the notion of a feparate foul in general, without regard to any particular hypothefis about the nature of it. Mr. Baxter, feems to deny extenfion to fpirits, but not locality, fo that probably neither Dr. Price nor myfelf have been ex- adtly right in our idea of his opinion. It rather feems to have been that middle opinion to which Dr. Price now reverts. As to the doftrine of immaterial fpirits having real /ize, and confequently yir;^, or fjape, though I ought perhaps to have re- fpefted it more, as the opinion of fo great a man as Dr. Clarke, I really confidered it as an hypothefis univerfally abandoned, till Dr, Price's feeming avowal of it made me A a 2 give 'Bl i fe, M V I I J72 REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S give it the degree of attention which I have done, and which produced what I have advanced on the fubjed in the Additional lUuftrations to which he refers. In his Additional Ohfcrvatlons^ (p. 332) Dr. Price fuggefts an idea of a foul, and of its union to the body, that 1 own I fliould not have expefted from his general fyftemj comparing it (as ** that to which,*' he ftys, ** it is perhaps the moft fimilar") to " thofe caufes and powers in nature, ** operating according to ftated laws, which " unite themfelves to fubftances , formed •• as iron and a magnet are." Is then the foul nothing more than a power or property, neceffarily refulting from the organization of the brain? This has been my idea, and not his. I therefore fup- pofe him to mean that whenever a body is completely organized, there is a general law in nature, by which, without any particu- lar interpofition of the Deity, a foul im- mediately attaches itfelf to it. But this fuppofes what Dr. Price will excufe me for calling iV fl I ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 375 calling a magazine of fouls ready formed for that purpofe, or the pre-exiftence of all human fouls ; which, indeed, was the ori- ginal dodtrine of a foul, and what I think is neceflary to make the fyftem complete, and confiftent. Dr, Price fays, note p. 334, *^ It is cer- ** tainly very little fupport that Socinianifm <* receives from Materialifm," becaufe the refurredion being nothing more than the re-arrangement of the fame particles that compofed a man before death, the fame may have compofed a man in a ftate prior to his birth. J anfwer, that this is certainly fojfible^ and had I the fame authority for believing it, that I have to believe the refurreftion, I fhould have admitted it \ but having no evidence at all for it, it is a notion fo far within the region of mere poffibility, that it is in the higheft degree incredible. For none of the natural arguments for the fu- ture exiftence of men, which are derived from the confideration of the moral goverp- ^nent of God, can be alledged in favour of Aa 3 ^ m m \A 374 REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S a prc-exiftence of which we have no know- ledge. It is likewife poffible that, in a former re- mote period, not only myfelf, but every thing with which I am connefted, and the whole fyftem of things, may have been jufl as it now is, that Dr. Price then wrote re- marks on my Difquifitions^ &c. and that I replied to him in a joint publication, the very farne as the prefent^ that there have been infinite revolutions of the fame fyf- tem, and that there is an infinity of them ftill to come, which was the opinion of fome of the antient philofophers. But it is not the mere pojjibility of fuch a fcheme that can entitle it to any degree of credit. If, therefore, the failure in the fupport that the dodlrine of Materialifm • gives to the doftrine of Socinianifm be only in proportion to the probability of the pre- exiftence of man on the fyftem of materi- alifin (which excludes the notion of a fe- parate foul) I think it may be put down as an evanefcent ^liantity^ or nothing at all. In other AD DITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 375 Other words, the doftrine of materialifm is a fufficient, and eflfedlual fupport of the So- cinian hypothefis. So much confidence have I in the tend- ency that the doftrine of materialifm has to favour Socinianifm, that I doubt not but the moment it is believed that men in ge- neral have no fouls feparate from their bo- dies, it will be immediately and univerfally concluded, that Chrift had none. And as to the mere pofTibility of his, and our bo- dies, having had a pre-exiftence in an or- ganized and thinking ftate, I fhould enter- tain no fort of apprehenfion about it. Or, if this odd opinion fhould gain ground, it will have nothing in it contrary to the pro^ per principle of Socinianifm, which is, that Chrift was a mere maUy having no natural *^ pre-eminence over other men ; but that all his extraordinary powers were derived from divine communications after his birth, and chiefly, if not wholly, after his baptifm, and the defcent of the holy fpirit upon him. This kind of pre-exiftence can alfo afford no fupport to any other of thofe cor- A a 4 fuptions M v\ I 4 I 376 REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S ruptions of chriftianity which have been derived from the notion of a feparate foul, fuch as the dodrine of purgatory, and the worjlnp of the dead, &c. &c. Sect. IL Of the Nature of Matter. On what I advanced concerning the con- /litution of matter, as coniilling of mere centers of ottraBion and repiilfion, which I ^ave as a mere random fpeculation, and not at all neceflliry to my purpofe, but accord- ing to which it may be faid that every thing is the divine agency. Dr. Price ailcs^ (P' Zd?) " Does not the divine agency re- " quire a different objeft from itfelf to '' ad: upon," and, (p. 338) " What idea " can we form of the creation of the di- *' vine agency, or of an agency that ads " upon itfelf." I anfwer, that the diffi- culty confiils in terms only -, for that on the random hypothefis to which this argument refers, the exertion of the divine agency may properly enough be called creation, and the modification of that exertion, the action of |he Deity upon that creation, ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 377 Dr. Price fays, in the note p. 338, that ft)lid matter can do fomewhat, and be of ufe. But is it not rather unfortunate for this hypothefis, and thofe who maintain it, that they are not able to fay what it does, there being no effeB, or appearance in na- ture, to the explication of which it is neccf- fary ; all that is aBually done, where matter is concerned, being probably effedled by fome- thing to which folidity cannot be afcribed. There is certainly no conceivable connexion between folidity and attraBion. Solidity, indeed, might account for refjiance at the point of contaB, but I challenge any phi- lofopher to ftand forth, and produce but one clear inftance of adlual unquejlionable contaB, where matter is concerned. In moft cafes of repulfion it is undeniable that proper contad: is not at all concerned, and therefore there can be no reafon from analogy to lead us to conclude that it is, in any cafe, the proper caufe of repulfion; but, on the contrary, that the true caufe, as certainly in mojl cafes, fo probably in all, is fomething elfe. The cafe the mofl like 178 REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S to real contaft is that of the component parts of folid bodies, as gold, &c. but everi this caanot be any thing more than a cer- tain izmr ^/>/^r^^rj^, becaufc they are brou^^-ht nearer together by cold i and it will hardly be pretended that any body merely im- pinging againft a piece of gold comes near- er to its fubilance than the diilance at which its own component parts are placeci from each other. On this fubjeft Dr. Price refers to what be has advanced p. 31. But all that he fays there is that, in fome cafes, the rea- fon why bodies cannot be brought into contad: may be their foUdityj at the fime time allowing that, in other cafes, it is certainly a repulfive power. In the fame feftion he refers to his Treatife on Morals for another origin of the idea of folidity, But this J have fully confidered in the third of the EJfays prefixed to my edition oi Hart-, ley's T/jeory of the Human Mind. See par-s ficularly p. i^j. Ilowever, ■I* ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 379 However, the whole of what I have ad- vanced concerning the penetrability of mat- ter^ is a thing on which I lay no great ftrefs. I do not fee any reafon to be dif- fatisfied with it; but admitting matter to have all the folidity that is ufually afcribed to it, I have no doubt of its being com- patible with the powers of thought; al| the phenomena demonftrating to me that man is a being compofed of one kindoffub^ Jiafice^ and not of two, and thefe fo hete- rogeneous to each other as has been gene-? rally fuppofed. It is within the limits of this feftioa that Dr. Price puts the following queflioa to me, (p. 335.) " Since experiments do ** not furnifli us with the idea of caiifation^ " and produBive power, how came we by ** thofe ideas, and how does Dr. Prieftley *^ know they have any exiftence? HoW;^ ** in particular, does he avoid the fcep- " tical fyftem which Mr. Hume has ad- ** vanced ? " I anfwer that my idea of caufation, and of its origin in the mind, is, as far as I know^ .i.nl % \ k i 380 REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S know, the very fame with that of other perfonsi but we all diftinguifh between primary ^nAfecondary caufes, though fpeak- ing ftriaiy and philofophically, we call fe- condary caufes mere effeas, and confine the term caufe to the primary caufe. Thus we fay that the caufe of moving iron is in the magnet, though the magnet is not the pri- mary, but only the proximate, or fecon- dary caufe of that effedt; deriving its pow^ er, and all that can be faid to belong to it from a higher caufe, and ultimately from God, the original caufe of all things. So alfo I formerly confidered man as the ori- ginal caufe -of his volitions and adions, till, on farther rcfledion, I faw reafon to conclude that like the magnet, he is no more than the proximate, immediate, or fecondary caufe of them ; himfelf, his con- ftitution, and circumflances, and confe- quently his adions, having a prior caufe, viz. the fame firft caufe from which the powers of the magnet, and all the powers in nature/ are derived. 11 Sect, I S vtM ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 38^ Sect. III. Of the DoBrine of NeceJJity. On this fubjedt Dr. Price refers me, (p. 342) to the decilions of what he calls common fenfe^ or the notions of the vulgar. Thefe I have obferved, as far as they go, are uniformly in favour of the dodtrine of neceffity. For if men were properly inter- rogated, they would admit all that I require in order to a proper demonftration of the dodtrine; though, not being ufed to re- fleftion, they do not piirfue or even ap^ prebend the confequences. See my Trea-^ tife on NeceJ/ifj'y p. 103, &c. As to the confiftency of the popular lan^ guage with the doflrine of neceffity, I have again and again made obfervations upon it, which I think it unneceflary to repeat, in anfwer to the conclufion of Dr. Price's note, p. 356. Dr. Price fays, (p. 345) that he '* can- ** not conceive a more groundlefs aflertion, '^ than that the dodtrine of liberty implies " that a man can ad wickedly or virtuoufly *' without a motive." But after putting a cafe in which he fuppofes motives to be exadly 'i» ^1 If J •I I'll" ' " m 1*2 REPLIES TO Br. PRICE'S exaaiy equal, viz. the combination of fajion and interefi on one fide, and of con^ fcience and duty on the other, he makes li- berty to confift in our poifefling a power of making either of them the motive that Jhall prevail. Now it appears to me to require very little power of analization to fee that be- fore the mind can decide to which of the motives it fhall give this preference, it mull form a previous real, and mod ferious de-- termination^ and that this previous deter- mination requires a motive as much as the final determination itfelf, efpecially as Dr. Price exprefsly acknowledges, (p. 348) that " it is nonfenfe to deny the influence of motives, or that there are no fixed prin- ciples or ends by which the will is " guided." In the cafe above mentioned I have the choice of two things, viz. either to give the preponderance to the motives of interejl, or to thofe of duty, which, being by fuppofition exadly equal, are themfelves out of the queilion, and therefore cannot at all contribute to the decifion. Now this being a real determination of the mind, it muft. ^ jl 3% REPLIES TO Dk. PRICE'5 with them) the determination cannot witK propriety be denominated morale or be faid to be either virtuous or vicious. Dr. Price, on this occafion^ fuppofes that a ftrift equality of motives is a very common cafe. I anfwer that we are, in- deed, fometimes fenfible of it, but that then the determination always remains in fufpence. For it appears to me that, if we give attention to the ftate of our mindsi we fhall fee reafon enough to conclude that we never come to an adlual determi- nation without a fufiicient preponderance of motive. And if we conlider that the force of a motive depends upon the Jiate of the mind to which it is prefented, as well as upon what it is in itfelf, that the ftate of mind is in perpetual fluftuation, and that the point of light in which we view the fame thing is continually vary- ing, we fliall not be at all furprifed that, in ordinary cafes, when nothing of much confequence is depending, we determine with fuch readinefs, and from motives fo evanefcent, that we are not able to trace the progrefs of our thoughts, fo as dif- tindly t ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 3^5 tinftly to recoiled: the real caufes of our choice, after the fhorteft interval of time. If it were poffible to make a balance which fhould fupport a thoufand pounds weight, and yet turn with one thoufandth part of a grain, would it be any wonder that a perfon fhould not be able eafily to bring it to an equipoife ? But what is even this to the exquifite ftrudlure of the mind t Dr. Price acknowledges, as above, that '* it is nonfetife to deny the influence of ** motives, or to maintain that there are ** no fixed principles by which the will is '* guided;" but at the fame time he fays (p. 348) that " this nonfenfe is fcarcely " equal to that of confounding moral and *' phyjical caufes.'' Now if what I have faid on this fubjedl both in my Treatife on Necejjity^ and in my Letter to Dr. Horfe- ley be not fatisfacftory, I fhall defpair of ever being able to give fatisfadion with re- fped to any thing. I will even grant moral and phyfical caufes to be as different, in their nature and operation, as Dr. Price himfelf can poffibly fuppofe them to be; B b but 'i li' ''«! "if 11 386 REPLIES TO Dr. P R I C E's but if they be really caufesy producing cer^ tain effeiis, that is, if we be fo conflituted, as that one definite determination fhall always follow a definite ftate of mind, it muft be true that, without a miracle, no volition, or aftion, could have been other- wife than it has been, is, or is to be; and this is all that, as a neceflarian, I con- tend for. If any perfon can pleafe him- felf with calling this liberty ^ or the refult of the mind's determining it/elf, I have no fort of objedion, becaufe thefe are mere ivords and phrafcs. Dr. Price calls the dodrine of necefiity, according to which all events, moral as well as natural, are ultimately afcribed to God, a deadly potion (p. 354) and yet he hefitates not to fay (p. 358) that he believes "no event comes to pafs which ** it would have been proper to exclude, ** and that, relatively to the divine plan " and adminiflration, all is right." Now, between this dodrine, and thofe naked views of the dodrine of necelfity at which Dr. Price is fo much alarmed, I fee no real < ' in ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 387 real diiference. When a perfon can once bring himfelf to think that there is no wickednefs of man which it would have been proper to exclude, and that the divine plan requires this wickednefs, as well as every thing elfe that adually takes place (which is the purport of what Dr. Price advances, and very nearly his own words) I wonder much that he fhould hefitate to admit that the Divine Being might ex- prefsly appoint what it would have been improper to exclude, what his plan ab- folutely required, and that without which the fcheme could not have been right, but muft have been wrong. May not this view of the fubjed, as given by Dr. Price, be reprefented as an apology for vice, and a thing to be Jlmddered aty and to he fed from, which is the language that he ufes (p. 354) with refped to the dodrine of neceffity? If to make vice neceffary be deadly poifon, can that doc- trine be innocent which confiders it as a thing that is ^r^^^r, and, relatively to the divine plan and adminiftration, right? The B b 2 two k\ I '11'"' «' ■"Ml l& i: ,\> * I #<# if I f l| 11 388 REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S two opinions, if not the fame, are cer- tainly very near aim, and muft have the fame kind of operation and effect. If Dr. Price will attend to fafis, he may be fatisfied that it cannot require that great ftrength and foundnefs of conjlitution that he charitably afcribes to me, to con- vert the dodrine of neceffity, poifon as he thinks it to be, into wholefome nourifh- ment, and that he muft have fecn it in fome very unfair and -injurious light. I am far from being fingular in my belief of this doftrine. There are thoufands, I doubt not, who believe it as firmly as I dp. A great majority of the more intelli- gent, ferious, and virtuous of my acquaint- ance among men of letters, are neceflarians, (as, with refped: to feveral of them. Dr. Price himfelf very well knows) and we all think ourfelves the better for it. Can we all have this peculiar ftrength of conftitu- tion ? It cannot be furely deadly poifon which fo many perfons take, not only without injury, but with advantage, find- ing it to be, as Dr. Price acknowledges with \\ '•„■ ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 3S9 with refpedl to myfelf (p. 352) tvtn fa^ lutary. We are all, no doubt, conftituted much alike, how different foever may be the opi- nions that we entertain concerning the prin- ciples of our common nature. I, there- fore, infer that Dr. Price himfelf, if it were poflible for him to become a necefla- rian, would think it not only a very harm- lefs, but a great and glorious fcheme, wor- thy of a chriftian divine, and philofopher, and that he would fmile, as I myfelf now do, at the notions which we firft entertained of it. I '♦I ^•1 |." I €C it t€ it €€ ti Dr. Price alfo imagines (p. 355 and 356) that the belief of the dodlrine of neceffity muft operate like a dead weight upoa the creation, breaking every afpiring ef- fort, and producing univerfal abjednefs. The natural eifeft of believing that nor thing is left to depend upon ourfelves, and that we can do nothing, and are nothing, muft be concluding that we have nothing to do.'' n ? b 3 But t i t If llf I § I'l -J :fll i*|.;itl I* 1. ■ i 4. ^95 REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S But I have obferved in my Treatife oh Necejpty (p. 96, &c.) that, in the only fenfe in which the conlideration of it can operate as a motive of adion, every thing depends upon ourfehcsy much more fo than upon any other fchcme ; and therefore that the neceffarian muft feel himfelf more ftrongly impelled to an exertion of his fa- culties than any other man. By a man's making his own Jortune, I mean that his fuccefs depends upon his cBions^ as thefe depend upon his volitions, and his volitions upon the motives prefented to him. Suppofing a man, therefore, to have propenjities and objeSis of purfuit, as his own happinefs, &c. &c. of which no fyftem of faith can deprive him, he will neceflarily be roufed to exert himfelf in proportion to the ftrength of his propenfity, and his belief of the neceffiiry connection between his end and his endeavours ^ and nothing but fuch an opinion as that of philofophical liberty, which deftroys that neceffary connection, can poffibly flackcii his endeavours. With ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 391 With refpeft to this alfo, let Dr. Price confider whether his theory has any cor- refpondence with faBs. Let him confider thofe of his acquaintance who are necefla- rians. To fay nothing of myfelf, who cer- tainly, however, am not the moft torpid and lifelefs of all animals ; where will he find ereater ardour of mind, a ftronger and more unremitted exertion, or a more flre- nuous and fteady purfuit of the moft im- portant objefts, than among thofe of whom he knows to be neceffarians ? I can fay with truth (and meaning no difparage- ment to Dr. Price, and many others, who, I believe, unknown to themfelves, derive much of the excellence of their charadters from principles very near akin to thofe of the doarine of neceffity) that I generally find chrijlian neceffarians the moft diftin- guiftied for aftive and fublime virtues, and more fo in proportion to their fteady belief of the doftrine, and the attention they ha- bitually give to it. I appeal to every per- fon who has read Dr. Hartleys Oljervations an Man, whether he can avoid having the fame convidtion with refped to him. B b 4 It \ I '' t ;■: •l B »• REPLIES TO Dn. PRICE'S It is at names more than things that people in general are moil frightened. Dr. Horfeley is clearly a neceflarian, in every thing but the name. He avows his belief that every determination of the mind cer- tainly follows from previous circumftances, fo that without a miracle, no volition, or adion, could have been othervvife than it kas beeuy is, or is to be, and yet he dif- claims the doftrine of neceffity. Dr. Price does not properly maintain the dodririe, but he ftands on the very brink of that tremendous precipice; believing that the mind cannot ad without a motive, but thinking to fecure his liberty on the fup- pofition that the mind (I fuppofe, with- out any motive whatever) has the power of chufing what motive it will aft from; and believing with the neceflarian, that every thing is as it Jlmtld be, and as the di^ vine plan required it to be. Upon the whole, both he and Dr. Horfe- ley appear to me to want nothing more than what is called courage fully to adopt, and boldly defend, the dodrine of neceffity in i H ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 393 in its proper terms, and to its full extent. I well remember to have had the fame fears and apprehenfions about the doftrine of neceffity that they now exprefs ; but being compelled, by mere force of argu- 7nenty to believe it to be true, I was by degrees reconciled to it, and prefently found that there was nothing to be dreaded in it, but, on the contrary, every thing that can o-ive the ereateft fatisfadion to a well dif- pofed mind, capable of any degree of com- prehenfion, or extent of view. I think it nmch better, however, to admit the doc- trine of neceffity explicitly, and with all its confequences, than be compelled to ad- mit the fame confequences, in other words, and In conjundion with principles that are quite difcordant with it. To take off the dark cloud that Dr, Price has in thefe laft obfervations thrown over the doftrine of neceffity, I fhall nof here repeat what I have on former occa- fions advanced in its favour, but fhall leave it tQ make whatever impreffion it may on our readers. Wha^ !■ \ 4 ILi'. ffl- €t €€ 394 REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S What Dr. Price fays of tie foul (p. 355) that, '' it is poflefled of faculties which «' make it an image of the deity, and ren- ^* der it capable of ading by the fame rule with him, of participating of his hap- ^* pinefs, and of living for ever, and im- proving for ever under his eye and care," I can fay of man. But I do not think that, for this purpofe, it is at all neceffary that the mind fhould be hicorporeal^ un- compounded or felf- determining, arrogating to ourfelves the attributes of little independ^ ent gods. To whatever kind of fubftance, though it fhould be the humbleil: duji of the earth, that the truly noble prerogatives of man be imparted, it will appear to me equally refpedable. For it is not the fuh- Jiance, but the properties, or powers, that make it fo. I alfo reverence myfelf, but not in the charafter of a being felf-determined, ovjelf-^ exi/ient, but as the rational offspring of the firfl great and only proper caufe of all things. By his power I am animated, by his wifdom I am conducted, and by his bounty 4 ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 39S bounty I am made happy. It is only from the idea I have of my near relation to this areatand glorious beings and of my intimate conneftion with him, that my exultation arifes ; far from founding it upon the idea that I have a will that is not ultimately his, or a fingle thought that he cannot controul. Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things. To him^ therefore, and not to oiirfches, be glory. * Dr. Price lays great ftrefs on the con- fideration of God being a fclf-determinmg, 2SiA jeJf -moving being, as a proof that man may be fo too (p. 349 & 35°) and confidering felf-determinlng as equivalent x.o felf -moving, and this as equivalent to what we mean by a felf-exijtent, or Jirji caufe, I have not ob- jefted to applying that appellation to the Divine Being ; but I would obferve that in this I mean nothing more than to exprefs my total want of conception concerning the caufe, or reafon, of the exijience, and if I may fo fay, of the original aBion, of the Deity. For, confidering the Divine Being as aBually exifiing, I have no more idea of the f4T t I \i •'I 396 REPLIES TO Dr. PRiCE's the poflibility of his ading without a mo- tive (if there be any analogy between the divine mind and ours) than of any created being doing fo; and to afcribe this felf. determining power to the Divine Beinc meaning by it that /je aBs without a mo the, or reafon, is certainly fo far from exalting the Deity, that we cannot form any idea Qf him more degrading. It is to divert him at once of all his moral perfeftions For to ad invariably from good principles,* or motives (in whatever it be that we make goodnefs, or virtue, to confift) is ellential to moral excellence, As to the caufe, or account, as Dr. Price cxprelTes it, of the divine exiflence, I pro- fefs to have no idea at all. That there muft be a neceffarily exifting being, or a firft caufe, follows undeniably from "the ex^ iftence of other things ; but the fame diA pofition to inquire into the caufes of thin^^ would lead us on ad infinitum, were it not that we fee a manifeft abfurdity in it ; fo that, confounding as it is to the imagina- I'on, we are under an abfolute neceffity of acquis ADDITtONAL OBSERVATIONS. %<^1 acquiefcing in the idea of a felf-exijient being. Every thing that I have yet feen ad- vanced with refpe£l to' the proper caufe, or reafon of the divine exiftence appears to me either to fuggeft no ideas at all, or to give falfe ones. Dr. Clarke fays, that th: Deity exijis by an abfolute necefjity in the na^ ture of things, but this expreffion gives mc no proper idea 3 for, exclufive of that ne- ceffity by which we are compelled to admit that fuch a being exifts, which may be called neceffity a pofteriori, I am fatis- fied that no man, let his reafoning facul- ties be what they will, can have the leaft idea' of any neceffity. Of neceffity a priori it is impoffible we fliould know any thing. Let any perfon only exclude all idea of creation, which is not difficult, and con- lider whether, in thofe circumftances, he can difcover a caufe of any exiftence at all. To talk of the iiature of things^ in this cafe, is, to my underftanding mere jargon, or a cloak for abfolute ig- norance. Dr. I '^.i^f m, i9« REPLIES TO Dr. PRfCE's Dn Price himfelf does not fecm to be fatisfied with this explanation of the caufe of the divine cxiftence, and therefore fug- gtds a diiterent idea; faying (p. 351) that " the account of the divine exiftence " is the fame with the account of the ex- *' iftence of fpace, and duration, of the " equality of the three angles of a triangle '' to two right angles, or of any abftrad " truth." Now, as Dr. Clarke's language gives me no idea at all, this account ap^ pears to me to fuggeft a falfe one. The reafon, or the account, of the ex- igence of the divine being cannot be the fame with that of the exiftence oi /pace, or duration, for this plain reafon. I can, in any cafe, form an idea of the non-exift- ence both of all eJeBs, and of all caufes, and confequently both of the creation, and of the creator, and of the non-exiftence of the latter, juft as eafily as of that of the for- mer; but ftill the ideas of fpace and dura^ tion remain ia the mind, and cannot be excluded from it. To lay that fpace is an attribute of the deity, or that it necelTarily implies. :**■ I:- *l i r gpcaamaa ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 399 implies, and draws after it, the idea of his exiftence, appears to me to have no foun- dation whatever, and to have been aflumed without the leaft face of probability. For this I appeal to what paftes in any perfon's mind. Again, the reafon of the divine exiftence, and that of an abftradt truth, as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, appear to me to have no fort of analogy. They agree in nothing but that both of them are true, but with re- fpect to the reafon, or caufe of their being true, no two things, in my opinion, can be more unlike. An abftraft truth is no being, fubfance, or reality w^hatever. It implies nothing more than the agreement of two ideas, whether the archetypes of thofe ideas have any exiftence or not, and of this agreement we have the moft perfeft comprehenfion. Nothing can be more intelligible. Now, if our perfuafion of this abftradl truth was of the fame nature with our perfuafion con- cerning the exiftence of God, we fhould have I \ ¥• «i Nr i •I 4o# REPLIES TO Dr. PRRICE'i have the fame perfed: comprehenfion of the latter that we have of the former. But can any perfon ferioufly fay this, when of the former we know every thing, and of the latter abfolutely nothing? Let any perfon exclude from his mind all idea of the crea- tion, and confider whether there be any thing left that will compel him to believe the exiftence of any thing, being, or jub- fiance whatever. A creation neceffarily im- plies a creator, but if there be no creation^ the only proof of the exiftence of a creator is cut off". The caufe of the exiftence of a thing, fubfiance, or being, cannot, in the nature of things, be the fuiie with that of a mere abftraft hypothetical truth. The caufe of a being, or fubftance, muft be a bein^ or fubftance alfo, and therefore, with refped to the divine being we are obliged to fay that he has no proper caufe whatever. The agreement of two ideas is a thing fo very diiFerent in its nature from this, that the term caife is not even applicable to it; as, on the other hand, I fee no meaning what- ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 4^- whatever in the word account as applicable to the divine exiftence. In this cafe there muft either be a caufe, or no caufe. Ac^ count, here, is to me a word without meaning. If by the word account, we mean the fame with reafon, the cafes are clearly the fir theft in the world from being parallel. If I be afked the reafon why the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, I anfwer, that the quantity of the three, and that of the two, is the fame, or that the ideas, when rightly underftood^ exadly coincide. But if I be alked why the divine being exifts (I fay why he exifts, not why I believe him to cxift) can I fatisfy any body, or myfelf, by faying that the two jdeas in the propofition God exifis are the fame, or coincide ? Is the idea of God, and that of mere exiftence the fame idea? The two cafes, therefore, have nothing: in them at all parallel. Hov/ then c^n the reafon, account, or caife of an ahftraB truth, be of the fame nature with that of the rea- fon, account, or caufe of the divine ex-^ iftcnce ? C c X r ibM'iligiiu.... .' ^,a.u.,., »,»lt ? 402 REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S ill 11 I fliall now conclude the whole contro- verfy with mentioning what appear to me to be the things on which the principal ar- guments in each part of it turn, and the mifconceptions that Dr. Price feems to me to have laboured under. On the fubjea of the penetrability of matter^ he has never produced what 1 have repeatedly called for, viz. one cafe of real un^ quejlionable contaB^ without w^hich the doc- trine of proper impenetrability cannot be fupported. And till this be produced, I am obliged to conclude, from analogy, that all refiftance is owing to fuch caufes as we both agree that, in many, if not in moft €afes^ it does certainly arife from, and this is notfolidity, or impenetrability, but fome- thing very different from it. With refped to the docftrine o( a foul. Dr. Price appears to me to have been mifled principally by his notion of the ab* folute ftmplicity , or indiviftbillty of the mind, or the thinking principle in man; as if it was ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS 40^ was a thing of which we could be con^ foious ; whereas I think I have ihown fuf- iiciently that we cannot be confcious of any thing relating to the ej/ence of the mind; that we are properly confcious of nothing but what we perceive, and what we do. As to what we are, it is a thing that we muft learn by way of inference, and de-* duBion from obfervatlons, or confcioufnefs; and I think the arguments are decifively againft fuch a fimplicity and indivifibility as Dr. Price fuppofes. On the fubjed: of the dodrlne of ne^ cejjity. Dr. Price agrees with Dr. Horfeley in admitting that our volitions certainly, and invariably depend upon the preceding ftate of mind ; fo that, without a miracle, there was a real neceffity of every thing being as it has been, is, or is to be; and imagines that the controverfy depends on ' wh-2t Ithink to be themere verbal diftinclion, of motives being the moral, and not the phyfical caufes of our volitions and adions ; or, as he fometimcs expreffes himfelf, that it is not the motives that determine the C c 2 mind. »■ J Y. :-i i'f If ■ * , I! •' 4^4 REPLIES TO Dr. PRICE'S mind, but that the mind determines itfelf according to the motives ; which I maintain to be the doftrine of neceffity, only dif- guifed 'in other words. Indeed, how any man can boaft of his liberty, merely be- caufe he has a power of determining him- felf, when, at the fame time, he knows that he cannot do it in any other than in oneprecife and definite manner, jflriftly de- pending upon the circumftances in which he is placed, and when he believes that, in no one aftion of his life, he could have determined otherwife than he has done, is to me a little difficult of comprehenfion. As to real liberty^ or the power of aft- ing independently of motives, he exprefsly confines it to thofe cafes in which the mo- tives for and againft any particular choice are exaBly equal. Such cafes, I think, fel- dom.cr„ever,occur.ro,ha,a,„an;cuM have but few opportunities of Ihewing fuch a liberty as this. If they fliould occur, and any determination take place in thofe circumftances, it appears to me to be at- tended with the abfurdity (as Dr. Price himfelf ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS. 405 himfelf calls it) of determining without a motive ; and I fhould think that after fup- pofing it poffible that the mind might de- termine without a motive, it might alfo determine contrary to all motive. For the fame conftitution of mind that could enable it to do the one, would enable it to do the other. ••*•• *-M •-»-•• ''■*f \%Jt ••\ >■: .•'*'•. .•'♦*. -^ A A A :\ •^ '^ ^ y*\ >!( Cc 3 A LET- I 1,1 'TUt t .',. LETTER T O Dr. price. I w 'M Dear Sir, WITH this letter you will receive a few remarks on your Additional Ohfervations, which I have read with that attention which every thing from you de- mands. That it has not been with can^ virion, your candour, I know, will not impute to any peculiar objiinacyy but to my unavoidably feeing the fubjefts of our dif- cuflion in a light different from that ia which you fee them. We have not thQ fame idea of the nature of the human C c 4 mind^ \ I" tji V '•Al I #1 .1 'I 11 'i k ♦of A LETTER TO mind, or of the laws to which it is fub- jed, but we are both fufficiently aware of the force of prejudice, and that this may equally throw a biafs on the fide of long eJlabUJhed, or of noiiel opinions. Alfo equally refpeding the chriftian maxim of doing to others as lae vcould that others ^ould do to us, we are each of us ready to give to others that liberty which we clainT our- felves; while we equally reprobate thofe rafh fentiments which proceed from a de- cifion without a previous difcuffion of the j-eafons for and againft a queftion in de- bate. J am not a little proud of your commen- dation of me for my " faimefs in the " purfuit of truth, and following it in all " its confequences, however frightful, with " out attempting to evade or palliate " J^^";'' fP- ^S^-) It is a cpnduia that 1 hope I fhall always purfue, as the firfl of duties to that God who has given me what- ever >r«///,. I poffefs, and whatever oppar- tunttyoj inquiry I have been favoured with- and I truft I fliall continue to purfuQ this con* Dr. price, 409 conduct at all rifks. As he is properly no chriftian, who does not confejs Chriji before meriy or who is ajhamed of his religion in an unbelieving age, like the prefent ; this maxim, which the author of our religion inculcates with refped: to chriftianity in general, the reafon of the thing requires that we extend to every thing that eflentially affefts chriftianity. a So long, therefore, as I conceive the doftrine of ^feparatefoul to have been the true fource of the grofleft corruptions in the chriftian fyftem, of that very antichrif-^ tian fyjlem which fprung up in the times of the apoftles, concerning which they enter- tained the ftrongeft apprehenlions, and de- livered, and left upon record, the moft folemn warnings, I muft think myfelf a very lukewarm and difaffefted chriftian if I do not bear my feeble teftimony againft it. With refpedt to the private condudl of individuals, as afFefting our happinefs after death, I do not lay any ftrefs upon this, or It 1 *i il l>lll' I 1^ I $10 A LETTER TO or opon any opinion whatever, and therQ is no perfon of whofe chriftian temper and condud I think more highly than I do of yours, though you hold opinions the very reverfe of mine, and defend them with fo much zeal ; a zeal which, while you main- tain the opinions at all, is certainly com- mendable. But with refpe^a: to the general flan of chrijiianity, the importance of the dodrines I contend for can hardly, in my opinion, be rated too high. What I con- tend for leaves nothing for the manifold corruptions and abufes of popery to faften on. Other dodrinal reformations are par- tial things, while this goes to the very root of almoft all the mifchief we com- plain of; and, for my part, I fhall not date the proper and complete downfal of what is called antichrijl, but from the ge- neral prevalence of the dodrine of mate^ rialifm. This I cannot help faying appears to me to be that fundamental principle in true philofophy which is alone perfecftly confo- nant to the dodrine of the fcriptures; and being Dr. :p R I C E. 411 being at the fame time the only proper dedudtion from natural appearances, it muft, in the progrefs of inquiry foon ap-- fear to be Jo; and then, fliould it be found that an unqueftioriably true philofo- phy teaches one thing, and revelation another, the latter could not fland its ground, but muft inevitably be exploded, as contrary to truth and faB. I therefore deem it to be of particular confequence, that philofophical unbelievers fliould be apprized in time, that there are chriftians, who confider the doSirine of a foul as a tenet that is fo far from being ejfential to the chriftian fcheme, that it is a thing quite foreign to it, derived originally from hea- thenifm, difcordant with the genuine prin- ciples of revealed religion, and ultimately fubverfive of them. w I As to the dodlrine of necefjityj I cannot, after all our difcuflion, help confidering it as demonjirably true, and the only poffible foundation for the doftrines of a providence, and the moral government of God. Con- ■ 1 ?»|i! if I LETTER T O 4'2 A Continuing to fee things in this light, after the clofeft attention that I have been able to give to them, before, or in the courfe of our friendly debate (and you will pardon me, if I ndd, feeing this in a ftronger light than ever) you will not be difpleafed with the zeal that I have occafionally rhewn ; as I, on my part, intirely approve of yours, who confider yourfelf as defending important and long received truth, againft funda- mental and moft dangerous innovations. We are neither of us fo far blinded by prejudice as not to fee, and acknowledge, the wifdom of conftituting us in fuch a manner, as that every thing new refped- jng a fubjeft of fo much confequencc as re/igion, fliould excite a great alarm, and meet with great difficulty in eftablifliing itfelf. This furnifhes an occafion of a thorough examination, and difcuffion of all new dodrines, in confequence of which till/ are .. h^r totally exploded, or more firixily ciiaaliihed. The flow and gradual progrefs Dr. P R C £. 4iJ progrefs of chriftianity, and alfo that of the reformation, is a circumftance that bids fairer for their perpetuity, than if they had met with a much readier reception in the world. You will allow me to indulge the hope of a fimllar advantage from the oppofition that I expeft to this article of reformation in the chriftian fyflem, and that the truth I contend for will be the more valued for being dearly bought, and flowly acquired. As to the odium that I may bring upon myfelf by the malevolence of my oppofers, of which, in your letter to me, you make fuch obliging mention, I hope the fame conlcioufnefs of not having deferved it, will fupport me as it has done you, when much worfe treated than I have yet been, on an occafion on which you deferved the warmeft gratitude of your country, whofe interefts you ftudied and watched over, whofe calamities you forefaw, and faith- fully pointed out ; and which might have derived, in various refpedls, the moft folid and ft 1 1 ill' 414 LETTER T O and durable advantages from your labours. But we are no chriftians, if we have not fo far imbibed the principles and fpirit of our religion, as even to rejoice that we are counted worthy of fuffering in any good caufe. Here it is that, fuppofing me to be a defender of chrijlian truth, my objedl gives me an advantage that your excellent po^ Utical writings cannot give you. All your obfervations may be juft, and your advice inoft excellent, and yet your country, the fafcty and happinefs of which you have at heart, being in the hands of infatuated mtn, may go to ruin; whereas chriftian truth is a c^nk foimded upon a rock, and though it may be overborne for a time, we are afllired that the gates of death JJmH not prevail againft it. Having now, each of us, defended, in the beft manner that we can, what we deem to be tliis important truth, wc are, I doubt not, equally fatisfied with our- fcives, iinJ fhall chearfuJly fubmit the re- fult b*. P R I C E; 415 fult of our difcuffion to the judgment of our friends, and of the public ; and to the final and infallible determination of the God of all truth. I am, notwithftanding this, and every other poffible difference in mere opinion, with the moft perfed efteem. Dear Sir, Yours moft affeftionately. J. PRIESTLEY. Calne, Od. 2, 1778. A NOTE -•T! 4'^ #1 i3f NOTE to Dr. PRIESTLEY. Dr. Price defires Dr. Priestley's ac- ceptance of his gratitude for the expreffions of his kindnefs and regard in the preceding letter; and affures him in return of his beft wifhes and ardent efteem. The controverfy between them having grown much too te" dious, he thinks there is a neceflity of now dropping it. He cannot therefore perfuade himfelf to enter farther into it ; or to fay any more than that his fentiments are undefign- edly mifreprefented, when in page 387, Dr. Prieftley fuggefts, that he confiders wicked- nefs as a thing that is proper^ and thinks the plan of the Deity abfolutely required it. He has never meant to fay more, than that the PERMISSION of wickednefs is proper^, and that (for the reafoiis mentioned in p. 173, 174, and 358) the divine plan required the communication of powers rendering beings capable of perverfely making them/elves wick- ed, by aaing, not as the divine plan requires, (for this, he thinks, would be too good an excufe for wickednefs) but, by ading in a manner that oppofes the divine plan and will, and that would fubvert the order of nature; and to which, on this account, puniihment has been annexed. Answer ( 417 ) Answer by Dr. PRIESTLEY. Dr. Priestley will always think him- felf happy in having an opportunity of ex- preffing the very high and affedionate re- gard he entertains for Dr. Price, notwith- llanding their difference of opinion on fub^ jedls of fo much moment as thofe difcufled in the prefent Correfpondence. He is con- fident that Dr. Price needs no alTurance on the part of Dr. Prieftley, that his fen- timents have not been knowingly mifrepre^ fented; but muft take the liberty to fay, that he cannot help confidering the volun- tary permijjion of evil, or the certain caufe of it, by a being who forefees it, and has fufficient power to prevent it, as equivalent to the exprefs appointment of it, D d AN ' » jS«» w A N ALPHABETICAL INDEX t TOT H E DisQjjisiTiONs o?^ Matter and Spirit, the Treatise on Necessity, and this Corres-' PONDENCE, which is here confidered as the third volume in the Set. iV. B. Where no Roman numeral is ufed, the firft volume, or the Difyuijitions, is underltood. J GOBJRD, his account of opinions concerning the foul, 213. Abfence of mind, an argument for a feparate foul, 99. Abjiraa ideas, compatible with materialifm, 84. Accountablenejs, explained on the doarine of neceiTity, iii. 140, Agency, how underflood, ji. 50. Alexandrian School, the fource of great corruptions in chriftir anity, 292. Ammonius, his philofophy, 292. Animal Spirits, by whom brought into vogue, 217. An/elm, his opinion of the Hate of the dead, 227. Anthropomorphites, a chrilHan fe6l, 187. Aquinas, his opinion concerning the divine efTence, 190.— Of the foul, 214. Arabians, who believed that the foul died with the body, 226. Arianifm, termed the lonv, reafons againft it, 332. Arians, did not platonize, 305. Arijiotle, his opinion concerning the foul, 198. Arnobius, his opinion concerning the foul, 206. 4thanaftus, his reafons why the apollles did not preach the divinity of Chrill, 309. P d 2 Athdfm, i'l'' J I I 1 >5 ' (1 i.f 420 AN ALPHABETICAL INDEX. Jthei/m, by whom the Author has been charged with it, 166. JUraMisn and Repulfton, cfTential to matter, 5. — Whether they be powers inhering in bodies, iii. 28. Jufterities, Udily^ derived from the philolophical opinion con- cerning matter, 340. jiujtin, his opinion concerning the divine eflence, 180. — His converfion to Orthcdo.xy, 301. Macon, Lord, his opinion concerning the fouls of brutes, 235. Baxter, makes a power of refinance eflbntial to matter, 8.— Thinks that the foul itfelf is never difordered, 40. — His opinion of the ufe of the body, 44.— Of the ufe of the re- furredion, 48.— His idea of the ufe of matter to imprefj the mind, 65. — Of dreams, 67. Maudifies^ their p \ i lofophy ,255. Beaujobre, his difficulty with relpe<5l to the mutual influence of matter and fpirit, 64. ^ Bernard, his opinion concerning the place of the foul, 227. Body, difficulties attending the ufe of it, 43.— Its being a clog to the mind, iii. 53.— Whether it can ad where it is not, iii. 230. Bonnet, his doctrine concerning germs, 162. Bo/cmjtch, his dodlrine of phyfical points, 13. Breath, thought to be the fame with the foul, 171. Bruno, Jordano, confidered the powers of matter as the agency of the deity, 9. Brutes, difficulties attending the dodrine of their fouls, 42. — Hillory of opinions concerning their fouls, 233.-— The confequence of their feniient principle being annihilated at death, iii, 52. Cahhalifii, their opinion of the origin of the foul, 17CJ. Calvin, his ftrenuous defence of the immmality of the iuul, 231 CarUJle, Bijhop of, revives the opinion of the fleep of the foul, 232. Cajfiodorus, his opinion concerning the foul, 210. Caufaiion, origin of the iJea of it, iii, 334, 379. CmuJ} and Effed, proof of necefiity from it, ii. 6.— Farther illuftration of that argument, iii. 288. Celtes, whence their philofophy was borrowed, 27;. Cerinthus, a Gnoftic, 290. Qlaldeansy AN ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 421 Chaldeans, their doctrine concerning the foul, 194. Chineje, their notion of the foul, 194. Chrijt, influence of the philofophical fyilem concerning his perfon, 297. — His death foreknown and foretold, ii. 22. iii* — When good men are to be with him, iii. 285. Chrifiianhy, the importance of its confonancy with true phi- lofophy, iii. 193. Cicero, his idea of the Hate of the dead, 170 — His opinion concerning the foulj 199. Clarke, Dr. an argument of his againft the materiality of the foul, 34*— Suppofed fpirit to have expanfion, iii. 55. Clemens, Jle\* his idea of the divine effence, 186. Collificn of Bodies, an argument againll the peneU'ability of matter, iii. 24. Conjcioufnejs , an objedion to materialifm, 86. — Of liberty confidered, ii. 44. — How far it extends, iii. 85. — What queilions can be decided by it, iii. 280. Conduit, how influenced by the belief of neceffity, ii. 96. Contact, only apparent, 12. Continence, the importance of it derived from the dodrine concerning matter, 342. Crellius, his fummary \ icv/ of the opinions of the Schoolmen concerning the divine efl'ence, 190. Ckdui'crth, believed the fouls of brutes to be corporeal, 236.— His notion of the Trinity, 301. D Diimafcenus, his opinion concerning the divine eflence, 189.— Of the foul, 21 V Detid, hiftory of opiinons concerning their flate, 224. Dtath, in what ieni'c threatened to Adam, 118. — The ftate of iran in it acccrding to the fcriptures, 125. Devil, the frfl created being according to fome, 304. Dtity, whether he has properties in common with matter, 124. whetlier he he material, according to the doflrine of pe- netrability, iii. 66, 1 01, 237.— Ky whom thought to be incnpable of local prelence, I'i. 68. — The rcafon of his exiilfQCf, iii. 3'; 2, 396. Defcartes, his idea lS the mutual influence between foul and body, 62. — Hi'^ idea of tiie divine eflence, 191. — His proof of the b- ing of a God, 192. — His opinion concerning the foul, 216. Defire, the nature of it, ii. 35 Dd 3 Delermf" A ■1 ! • 1*1 P*'i !J 422 AN ALPHABETICAL INDEX. Detirminathn, whether poflible when the motive "iare cnua! 111. 344, 383, 404. ^ • P/f^tfrr^«j, believed the foul to be mortal, lor. Dig!^, Hir Kenelm, his refined fpiritualifm, 218. DivmeEfence,^n objedion to materialifm, I03.-Thercnpture n- ^-*;??!^'^'^*^M^' '34-— Hiftory of opinions concerning it, 176 Dt<'w, i»fr. his account of the religion of the Hindoos, 259. E Eaft, religious fyflem of it, 249. £d^vards, his account of God bein^ the author of fin, ii. ,22, Egypttmiu ^their funeral rites, and^ opinions concerning the £term>J, experiments in it, a proof of the fallacy of feemin^ contact, 12. ' tt Extiuaica, obfervations on the meaning of it, 164. F Eafiing, the importance of it derived from the dodrine con- cerning matter, 342. Fathers, Chrifiian, their idea of the divine e/Tence 18^ —Of the foul, 204, 207.-Their idea of the Trinity, .02. Horence Council cf, their decifion concerning the Hate of the dead, 225, 229. G Cak, believed the fouls of brutes corporeal 2;^ Gerdit, his idea of the immobility of the foul o' Cnafiia^tyiT philofophical fyilem, aec.-Their'diiFerent dif. potations, 340. GW, arguments for his being and attributes on the fyftem of Materialifm, 147— In what fenfe the author of fin ii 115. ' Gregory, the Great, his idea of. the divine e/Tence, i8o.-Of "^ [°"l' 2 1 3 —Of the ftate of the dead, 226. ^ 7 ^^^^''t'^'i ^^^ opinion concerning the foul, 208. Grace, philolophy of k whence borrowed, 269. H account of the foul, and the innocence of Materialifm, 112 Hartley, his idea of the vehicle of the foul, 79.^0f the ri lurredion, 162. ^^ vyi uic re Heat^ AN ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 423 Heat, Vital, thought to be the fame with the foul, 172. Hobbes, his definition of liberty and necelfity, ii. 2. — His ac- count of the propriety of prayer, ii. loi. Holivell, his account of the religion of the Hindoos, 256. Horfeiey, Dr. a letter to him, iii. 213. Hume, concerning praife and blame, ii. 90. I Ideas, whether divifible, iii. 51, g^.^ Compound ones, an argu- ment againfl the indivifibility of the foul, 37.— An ar- gument for the immateriality of the foul from the com- parifon of them,90— Whether they can be called agents, in confequence of motives actuating men, iii. 84. — How they differ from the mind, iii. 125. Impenetrability, not efTential to matter, 1 1 . — Whether any fafts prove it to belong to matter, iii. 334, 377. Incorporeal, what was meant by the term among the antients, 180. Indians, their notion of God, 1 78. ^Their philofophy, 254, ~ According to Moiheim, 264. J Jeivs, their opinion concerning the foul, 203. — Many of them addided to the oriental pliilofophy, 286. John, the Apofile, alarmed at the progrefs of the oriental phi- lofophy, 287 — The introdudion to his gofpel explain- ed, 291. (-P^/0 ^^'^22^. his opinion concerningthe beatific vifion,228 Jortin, Dr, his advice with refped to preaching to Jews and Mahometans, 331, Judgment, its analogy to the will, ii. 33. Julian, of Toledo, his opinion of the ftatc of the dead, 226. K Kaims, Lord, en the ufe of moral difcipline, ii. 92. Kenrick, Dr, a letter to him, iii. 182. Lateran, Council cf, their decifion concerning the ftate of the dead, 229. Leibnitz, his pre-eftabliihed harmony, 6'^, Letters on Materialifm, Author of them, his idea of the place of fpirits, 59.~Of the mutual adion of the foul and body, (i%, — Anfwer to him, ii. 169. ^ d 4 Liberty, ' i 424 AN ALPHABETICAL INDEX. Liiferiyy defined by Hobbes, ii. 2 — By Mr. Locke, ii. 5.^- By Dr. Price, iii. 134.— His obfervations relating to it, ill. 134, &c. — On what, according to him, the queftion concerning it depends, iii. 143. —Another account of the fame thing, iii. 157.— Whether it confifts in a power ©fading from either of two equal motives, iii. 347, 382. Light, whether it impinge on the folid parts of matter, iii 9. lode, Mr, his idea of the coheficn of matter, 8.— Ought to have been a Matcrialill, 32, 73. —His opinion of the place of the foul, 218 — Believes the fouls of brutes to be corporeal, 2 3 7. —His definition of liberty, ii. 5. Lmg&barM, his account of the religious opinions of the Chi- nefe, 263. loubkre, his account of the notion of a foul in the Eaft, 174. Luther^ believed the mortality of the foul, 231. M MaUhranche, his idea of the mutual influence of the foul and body, 62— Of the foul, 217— Of thofe of brutes, 235, Mamertus, CI. his doftrine concerning the foul, 208. Man a Machine, Author of it, his idea of death, 344. Martyrs, honours paid to them, derived from thole p^d to the heathen Gods, 346. Matter, attradion and repulfion effential to it, 5.— Impenetra- bility no property of it, 1 1.— Its corruptibility an argu- ment for the immateriality of the foul, loi. How it came to be confidered as the fource of evil, 172, 250, 337* Suppofed by fome to have fprung from the divine elTence] 26o.~Opinions that have been held concerning it, 326! The caufe of great corruptions in chriftianity, 338.— Whether it be any thing at all on the dodiin^- of pene- trability, iii. 10, 33, 233.— How it differs from mere Ipace on the lame hypothefis, iii. 142— Queries con- cernmg the penetrability of it propofed by Dr. Price, iii. 166. Materialifm, advantages attending the fyftem, 41.— Objediony to it, 81. -No medium between it and the moll refined fpiritualifm, 223. Manes, his philofophy from the Ball, 296. Manicheans, their ideas of the divine effence, 182.— Why not cenlured at the council of Nice, 304. MelnjilU, Mr. an optical obfervation of his, 13. Mchell, Mr, his dodrine of the penetrability of matter, 21. Mtnd, its unity, iii. 63. Momentum AN ALPHABETICAL INDEX, ^z^ Momentum of Bodies, an argument of their penetrability, iii. 39. Moral and Phsfical NcceJJity, confidered, ii. 59, 220. Mojheim, his account of the oriental philofophy, 264. Motion, Laius of it, whether inconiiilent with th« penetra- bility of matter, iii. 236. Moti'ws, their univerl^l correfpondencewith aftions, ii. 3 1 , 1 73* N Nazarenes, the only chrillians who did not philofophize, 307. NeceJJiiy, true Hate of the qaeftion, ii. i. — Its moral influence^ ii. 103, iii. 152, 352, 386, &c. — The caufe of condancy, ii. 174.— Queries relating to it by Dr. Price, iii. 129, 130, Others relating more particularly to moral government, iii. 1^8. — Others propofed to Dr. Price, iii. 171.—. Whether it be a fubtle doftrine, iii. 226, Nicolaitans, who they were, 289. O Old Tefament, the idea there given of the divine elTcnce, 1 1 2* Organization, its connexion with feniation, iii. 256. Oriental Philofophy, introduced into chrilHanit} in the apo/lks times, 277. Origen, his do<5lrine concerning the foul, 206. — A Plarcnifi:, 293. Orpheus, his philofophy, 271. Offian, the notion of a foul in his time, 174* Faul, on what he founds the belief of a future flate, 130.— His idea of the refurredion, 165; — Alarmed at the pro- grefs of the oriental philofophy, 281. Pernumia, his opinion concerning the feat of the foul, 215. Perfians, their opinion concerning the foul, 1^3, Perfonal Identity, obfervations on it, 155. — Farther confidered by Dr. Price, iii. 72, 107. PherecydiS, his dodrine concerning the foul, 195. — Whence his philofopiiy was borrowed, 277. Phoiius^ his opinion concerning the divine effence, 189. Phyfical and Moral Caufes, in what they differ according to Dr. Price, iii. 139. — According to Dr. Priefiley, iii. 147.— Argued with Dr. Horfeley, iii. 218. — Whether the quef- tion concerning liberty and necefiity depenus upon the diltindion, iii. 341. Phyfcal Points, an hypothefis concerning them, iii. 243. — Animadverted upon by Dr. Piice, iii. 336. Plato. IT \% If '1 If 42<5 An alphabetical index. F/aio, his idea of the divine cfTence, i8o Of the foul, 196- Whence he borrowed his philofophy, 274. Pomponatius, his opinion concerning the foul, 230. Fraife and Blame, the propriety of it on the doarine of nc ceflity, ii. 80. Frayir^ propriety of it on the dodrine of neceflity, 100. — — for the pardon of fin on the dodrine of neceflity, iii. 296. Predipnation, compared with the doarine of neceflity, ii. 149. Pre-exipnce, the fource of great corruptions in chrillianity, 50* Foflible on the dodrine of materialifm, 1 1 5 .—The origin of the Arian and Athanafian dodrines, 297. — — of Chrijf, general arguments againll it, 306. Pre/dence, an argument forneceflity, ii. 19, 175.— Hobbes*$ illulbation of it, 23. Price, Dr. his opinion concerning agency confidered, ii. ro. Concerning pradical virtue, ii. 56.— His letter to Dr. Prieftley, iii. 3 21. —His note to Dr. Prieflley, 416.— Letter to him, 407.— Note to him, 417. Pjtb^gcras, his opinion concerning the divine eflencc, 179.— Whence he borrowed his philofophy, 273. R ' ' Pahanus Maurus, his opinion concerning the foul, 213. Rdigicn, caufes of its depravity, 244. Remorfe, the nature of it on the dodrine of neceflity, iii. 298* Rijijiance, whether occafioned by contad, iii. 6. RefurremoH, how it embarrafles the dodrine of a foul. 47, 121.— The poflibilicy of it, 161.— A tenet in the Chal- dean philofophy, 253.~Denied by fome chriflians, 339. Re-veiation, reafons for it in the ini'ancy of the world, 24:". Its dodrine concerning man the reverfe of that of^thc heathen philofophy, 246. Rewards and Punl^ ' fi, proper on the doftrine of neceflity only, ii. 73.^ Ro/s, Jlexander, his anfwer to Sir K. Digby, 218. S Scriptures, the idea given in them of the nature of man, 1 14 How^ far favourable to the dodrine of neceflity, ii. 129. Search, Mr. on the ufe of punilhment, ii. 92.— On the nature of moral evil, ii. 122. Self 'determination, confiuered, ii. 18. — The little value of it, ii. 30.— Whether it can be inferred that becaufe it belonas to God, it alio may belong to man, iii. 104, 35c, ^94. AflTerted to be as impoflible in man as feif-eAiiience,""iii. 145.— Confidered in the letter to Dr. Ilorfcley, iii. 224. AN ALPHABETICAL INDEX* 427 Self-motion, whether it belongs to the foul, 96 Mr. Locke's difliculties with refped to it, 1 1 1. Sentient Principle , in the brain, 24, 33. Simon Magus, how reckoned the parent of herefy, 297. Sleep, a puzzling phenomenon on the dodlrine of a foul, 80. Socinianifm, Dr. Price's opinion concerning it, iii. i44.-lDr. Prieftley's, iii. 165— Whether fupported by Materialifm] 111. 334, note 373.— The fubordination of the doarinei cfthe penetrability of matter, and of materialifm to it. 111. 239. Solidity, whether to be afcribed to matter, iii. 31. Soul, in whatmanner prefent with the body, 52."^— The original philofophical dodtrine concerning it, 53.- Confidered as a mathematical point, 5 5. —Its vehicle, 74.— Its un- wearied nature, 97.— The meaning of the word in the fcnptures, 115.— What onr Saviour meant by it, 120 — The origin of the dodiine, 166— The hiflory of opinions concerning it, 192.— The confcquence of its being com- pounded, ill. 69.— In whnt fenfe it is naturally immortal, ill. 69.— Of what ufe between death and the refurredion on the fuppofition of its fleeping in that interval, iii. 76^ 80, 108.— In what feme its powers may be faid to be ex- tma at death, iii. go.— Queries relating to it by Dr. Price, iii. 87.— Others propofed to Dr. Price, iii. 167.-I A general view of the progress of opinions concernino- it, m. 260.— Arguments againfl its being extended, iii. ^68* Whether fliridlly indivifible, iii. 327, 366, 402, and Body, their mutual influences, 60. Space, whether an attribute of the Deity, iii. 68, 103. Spirit, the vulgar notion of one, 52, 173.— The' term* applied to any invifible power, 170.-^ Whether it bears anv re- lation to fpace, iii. 54, 96, 98, 106.— Whether matter might not have been fo called on the doftrine of the pe- netrability of matter, iii. 190. Stoics, their opinion concerning the divine eflence, 181.— Concerning the foul, 200. Synefius, a Platonifl, 295. Syfem, in what fenfe man may, or may not be one, iii. qg. 112, 123, 327. Tertullian, his opinion concerning the divine efl*ence, 186.— Concerning the foul, 205. Thales, his opinion concerning the foul, 195. Thinkings iflii I*' 5P 428 AN ALPHABETICAL INDEX. Thinking, in what manner it depends upon the brain, iii. 49, 89, 122, 125. —The difficulty of its arifing from matter coniidered, 82. Poland, his opinion of the origin of the do6lrine of a foul, 17;. Transfgurdticn, whether the light that furrounded Chrill in 'it was created or uncreated, a difpute among the Fathers, 185. Truths little regard paid to it by the heathen philofophel-s, 341 . T1V0 Principles, the dodrine of, 250. Vehicle of the Ssul, 74* Virtm^praiiical, what is eflential to it, ii. 56. Vis inertias, of Matter^ an objedion to its penetrability, iil. 25 , Volition, the nature of it explained, ii. 25. Voluntary, what aftions are fo termed, ii. 41. Vraie Fbilo/ophie, Author of it, his anfvver to the argument for the materiality of the foul from the confideration of com- pound ideas, 38. — His idea of the aftion of the foul upon the body, 67. W iVar Burton, grofsly miflaken with rclpeft to the origin of the Grecian philofophy, 272. Whitehead, Mr, a letter to him, iii. 197. WollajlcH, his opinion concerning the vehicle of the foal, 7^-, Of the place of unembodied fpirits, 78.— His argument for the immateriality of the loul from the influence of reafons confidered, 84. — Various other arguments of his againil the materiality of the foul, 93, &c.— His defini- tion of liberty, ii. 3. Z Zoroftftir, his principles, 267. N S. A CATALOGUE op BOOKS. WRITTEN BT Dr. price. AND SOLD BY T. C A D E L L, in the Strand, ■01 SERVATION3 on Reversionary Pat- ents; on Schemes for providing Annuities for Widows, and Perfons in Old Age; on the Method of calcu- lating the Values of AfTurances on Lives; and on the National Pebt. To which are added, Four Essays on different Subjefts in the Doftrine of Life, Annuities and Political Arithmetic. Alfo, An Appendix, containing a complete bet of Tables, (hewing the Probabilities of Life in London, Norwich, and Northampton, and the Values of two joint Lives. The Third Edition, with a Supplement, contain- ing (befides feveral new Tables) additional Obfervations on the Probabilities of Human Life in different Situations; on the London Societies for the Benefit of Widows, and of Old Age ; and on the prefent State of Population in this King- dom. Price 6s. Bound. 2. A Review of the principal Questions and Diffi- culties in Morals; particularly, thofe relating to the Original of our Ideas of Virtue, its Nature, Foundation, Re- ference to the Deity, Obligation, Subjeft, Matter, and Sane- tions. The Second Edition, Price 6s. Bound. 3. Four Dissertations, ift. On Providence. 2d. On Prayer. 3d On the Reafons for expelling that virtuous Men Ihall meet after Death in a State of Happinefs. 4th. On the Importance of Chriflianity, the Nature of hiftorical Evidence, and Miracles. The Fourth Edition, Price 6s. Bound. 4. An Appeal to the Public on the Subjed of the Na- tional Debt. Second Edition ; with an Appendix, con- taining explanatory Obfervations and Tables ; and an Ac- count of the prefent State of Population in Norfolk. Price? 2S. 5. Two Tracts on Civil Liberty, the War with America, and the Debts and Finances of the Kij^g- DOM ; with a general Introduction and Supplement. Price 5s. in Boards. I* II ill A CATALOGUE of BOOKS written by JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, L.L.D.F.R.S, AND PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON, Bookseller, at No. 72, St. Paul's Church-Yard, London. i.rj-MJE History and PsiEsEKT State of Electri, 1 CITY, with original Experiments, illuftrated with Copper-Plates, 4th Edition, correaed and enlarged, 410. il. u. Another Edition, 2 vols. 8vo. 12s. 2. A Familiar Introduction to the Study of Elec- tricity, 4th Edition, 8vo. 2s. 6d. 3. The History and Present State of Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colours, 2 vols. 410. il- luflrated with a great Number of Copper-Plates, il. ns. 6d. in Boards. 4. A Course of Licturis on Oratory and Criti- cism, 4to. 103. 6d. in Boards. 5. A Famih'ar Introduction to the Theory and Praftice of Ferspectivi, with Copper-Plates, 5s. in Boards. 6. Experiments and Obfervations on different Kinds of Air, With Copper-Plates, 3 vols. i8s. in Boards. 7. Philosophical Empiricism: Containing Remarks on a Charge of Piagiarifm refpeding Dr. H s, inter- fperfed with various Obfervations relating to different Kinds of Air, IS. 6d. ^ 8. A New Chart of History, containing a View of the pnnapal Revolutions of Empire that have taken Place in the World; with a Book defcribingit, containing an Epitome of Univerlal Hiftory, 4th Edition, los. 6d. 9. A Chart of Biography, with a Book, containing an Explanation of it, and a Catalogue of all the Names inferted in It, 6th Edition, very much improved, los. 6d. 10. Observations relative to Education : more efpe- cially as it refi ed. the Mind. To which is added, an Effay on a coiirfe of liberal Education for Civil and Adive Life with Plans of Ledures on, i. The Study of Hiftory and <^e- neral Policy. 2. The Hillory of England. 3. The Conftitutton and Laws of Engkmd, 4>. fcvved. 11. An Examination of Dr. Rfid's Inquiry into the* Human Mind on the Principles of Common Scnfe, Dr. Beat- tie^ Efiay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to Common Senfe in Behalf of Religion. zd Edition, 5s. fewcd. - 13. Hart* ,1. 'V IP Books written by Joseph Priestley, LL D 13. Disquisitions rclatino- to Mattpt, o«^ c To which is added. TheHiilory of the pSpSlDoftri:: concern,ng the Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Mal^r rD::^;i?e-."r?rfs^'-^ toU; Ife^^f Schoi:7,.td"— G— . adapted fJLln^^fTf'^u^t'^^ *^'"' Notes and Obfervations Lic.ous L.BHRTv, jd Edition. „,uch enlarg d Vs. lle^ cioN Vol. I containing the Elements of Natural Religion - to which ..prefixed. An EiTay on the beft Method of comZ' c"«ir^T'fd" iTl'M" 'l-^.^'-berfof cSaTs : Tewifh'snH A •7^°D "; ^."""'"ing 'he Evidences of the jewiih and Chriftian Revelations, 3s. fewed.—VoI III rnn taming the Doarines of Revelation, .s 6d few,-] ^^ Fourth and laft Part of this Wo k will coiltaij- arHiflTrlca! Account of the Corruptions of Chriliianity. "'"O""! in. A Harmony of the Evangelists, in Greek- To Sl^in^S; "^"'"^ BissertatIo.s, intgU^ »JI" 1^ f " r^ Address to Protestant Dissenters on Jons.t:'' °' ''' "-"^'^ '"PP"' 3d Edition, wi[hAddT t°,' Tll'/dditions to the above may he had alone, ,s. c V'» r 4?'"'^" to Protestant Dissenters on th,. Subjea of giving the Lord's Supper to Children'" ' am^g^hXn^V:-::: Le"tte?t:.Te rT Mf V^nT ^^ ftntt: ll'-^,.^---"- of "- Addrefrt; Prote'irbi^ tionf 3'j ^^"^""" f"^ Cfc/^"'. or rou«g Perfons, 3d Edi- n,?!'- ^ ^^".'""^s Catechism, confiding of a Series of {^n°^t """* '^''"'"'" ''' "^^ S'">'"'«' '"^cad of aL 25. A I', 'J, li' 11 *m Books written by Joseph Pri est li y, LL,D. 25- A Serious Address to Masters of Families, with ^?orms of Family Prayer, zd Edition. 6d. 26. A View of the Principles and Conduct of the Peotestant Dissenters, with refpe6l to the Civil and Ec- clefiailical Conftitution of England, 2d Edition, is 6d. 27. A Free Address to Protestant Dissenters, on the Subjed of Church Discipline; with a Preliminary Difcourfe concerning the Spirit of Chriflianity, and the Cor- laption of it by falfe Notjons of Religion, 2s. 6d. 28. A Sermon preached before the Congregation of Pro- testant Dissenters, at Mill Hill Chapel, in Leeds, May 16, 177-5, on Occafion of his refigning his Palloral Office ajnong them, is, 29. A Free Address to Protestant Dissenters, a$ fnch. By a Diffenter. A new Edition, enlarged and cor- rcded, IS. 6d. — An Allowance is made to thofe who buy this Pamphlet to give away. 30. Letters to the Aut'ior of Remarks on fever al late Pub- ikations rclati've to the DiJ/enters, in a Letter to Dr, Priejlley, is. 31. An Appeal to the ferious and candid Profeflbrs of Chritlianity, on the following Subjects, viz. i. The Ufe of Reafon in Matters of Religion. 2. The Power of Man to do the Will of God. 3. Original Sin. 4. EleM¥ -*:-*;*. '•V.is:-:*'».i«, ^^^^mi r:fi:^V;^•:4■l^■<^^J-^^•*K> 'MH ^.,i:.-^%i.'tt'C'' .>iAn'!A' _; ■o^'^^yi:!^^: »,.*-l/ • ' »;'<:;: *>H.-'«. * ^^r^ .--f^*: « ■■•■ '»irf - , ^■ .^SBi4$4»il5iiii^*iJiii*ii'#^ *'^-