MASTER 
 NEGATIVE 
 
 NO. 91-80338 
 
MICROFILMED 1991 
 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK 
 
 as part of the 
 "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project 
 
 Funded by the 
 NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES 
 
 Reproductions may not be made without permission from 
 
 Columbia University Library 
 
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT 
 
 The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United 
 States Code - concerns the making of photocopies or other 
 reproductions of copyrighted material... 
 
 Columbia University Library reserves the right to refuse to 
 accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order 
 would involve violation of the copyright law. 
 
AUTHOR: 
 
 COLVIN, STEPHEN 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 SCHOPENHAUER'S 
 DOCTRINE... 
 
 PLACE: 
 
 PROVIDENCE, R. I. 
 
 DA TE : 
 
 1897 
 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSriT LIBRARIES 
 ['RESERVATION DEPARTMENT 
 
 Master Negative # 
 
 Bn?LT;G.v\PHIC MICROFORM TARGET 
 
 Restrictions on Use: 
 
 Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record 
 
 
 SBSchbColvm^ wtephevi ^Dnsido-n^ 1669- lH--~- w 
 T^^ ' bchope-nh^w^eVs aoc+Tine o+ the 
 
 thing- in- ii"sel+ and his ^Hernpt tQ Tei^^-fe 
 fo +ne woyIq ot pnsnonnen?^. 
 Providence i6^7. ' Q ^^a 
 
 \f 
 
 t StT^SSDw4T(^ 
 
 un 
 
 y- 
 
 i. 
 
 TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA 
 
 FILM SIZE: ^^2\X^ REDUCTION RATIO 
 
 IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA (I^A ID IIB 
 
 DATE FILMED: M^^jLiS INITI ALS_.rLL0LlU1lLl'_v 
 
 HLMEDBY: RESEARCFi PUBLICATIONS. INC WOODnijTPGE, CT 
 
 (I 
 
^ )^> vb. 
 
 
 r 
 
 Ulllfl 
 
 A— o c latlott fof Inforifiatl o n * * ? ■> a l mB^e Manacie m e n 1 
 
 1100 Wayfit; Avenue, ouite iiuu 
 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 
 
 301/587-8202 
 
 \ 
 
 Centimeter 
 
 2 
 I 
 
 Inches 
 
 3 
 I 
 
 4 
 
 i 
 2 
 
 ! • ! 
 
 1.0 
 
 I.I 
 
 1.25 
 
 8 
 
 10 
 
 I 
 
 11 
 
 ! 
 
 I 
 
 12 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 mAmmmmmmimm 
 
 m0i^^it^^m>i^mm»mmiiMim^ui>*^mmfM 
 
 I I I I II I i 
 
 |50 
 
 2.5 
 
 — '- 
 
 i^r^ 
 
 2.2 
 
 |63 
 
 
 "** 140 
 u 
 
 Kiku 
 
 2.0 
 
 
 1.8 
 
 1.4 
 
 1.6 
 
 13 14 15 mm 
 
 ' ' Sllllllllllll 
 
 111 I I I II I 
 
 I 
 
 MfiNUFflCTURED TO PIIM STfiNDRRDS 
 
 BY nPPLIED IMRGE. INC. 
 
T 
 
 o 
 
 Ci 
 
 'P. j^: 
 
 • ••. 
 
 if; 
 
 
 < <A 
 
 t /\fj^^ 
 
 <..- 
 
 *,• - 
 
 <^:- 
 
 
 X^'^Jr r^-r ■^■ 
 
 *-^<- 
 
 
 .- yf> 
 
 N 
 
 o 
 
 
 o 
 J I 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 
 / 
 
 L#-k 
 
 ti, 
 
 
 5 r' V 
 
 
 ■fi»^ 
 
 # ■*<« 
 
 \s 
 
 •^ 
 
 fc-fc^^** 
 
 4 #^ 
 
 lb 
 
 
 jM^oi 
 

 
 
 
 
 'If 
 
 
 ; id 
 
 ' * • ' *' 'l I. • 
 
 
 • * 
 
 ♦ • 
 
 SCHOPEXH\rHR'S DOCTRINE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 
 
 
 / 
 
 TH!NG-iN-!TSELF 
 
 AND HIS ATTEMPT TO RELATE IT TO THK 
 
 : tS,,? , 
 
 Mi- 
 
 T 
 
 J 
 m 
 
 ?f. 
 
 II- 
 P' ■" 
 
 
 li 
 
 935cK6> 
 
 TCI 
 
 ®oUtmI)la mnlxicvsity 
 in titc (Citij of |Xciu \HovU 
 
 iLibvary 
 
 GIVEN BY 
 
 SWf^ssbwrq U-niversi^y^ 
 
 I* i 
 
 ''■i 
 
 I 
 
 WORLD OF FIIEXOMEXA 
 
 INAUGURAL DISSERTATION FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE DOCTOR'S DEGKEK 1 RuM 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL FACULTY OF THE KAISKR-WILHELMS-UNIV- 
 
 ERSITY OF STRASSBURG IN ALSACE. 
 
 PRESENTED BY 
 
 STiiPHEN SHELDON COLVIN. 
 
 PKi.'\-IDENCE, K. r. 
 
 •j i i F. 1 ' R A N K L I K F K i : J^ S . 
 
 pi • 
 
 
 &>?' 
 
 
 
 
 ^-' ' " 
 
 
 Ff^--^ ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^fea' '*' 
 
 
 m-^' 
 
 
 
 
 |^^^~ 
 
 (k^ , 
 
 
 fer. 
 
 
 • " il I tfilili liil'ii iiiifflliiBlililill ii . ' m; -i 
 
 
 •'-5*1 
 
 
 / 
 
• • •* .• • 
 
 1 * « 
 
 • • - * 
 
 » • » t « 
 
 • • 
 
 • • » t ^ 
 • • , , r . 
 
 » •« • • 
 
 , ■ » • • • • 
 
 * • • « • . 
 
 f 
 
 TO 
 
 Accepted by the Philosophical Faculty, May 15, 1897. 
 
 
 PROK. W. G. KVERETT T, 
 
 WITH 
 
 KSTB^eM A^ND QRATITUDK. 
 
 i 
 
 ) 
 
 ,1 
 
 
/ 
 
 / 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 THE WORLDS OF BEING AND OF BECOMING. 
 
 § 1. Schopenhauer recognizes the necessity of their 
 union, a union which is made difficult by his ei)istenK)k)gy. 
 
 § 2. Possil)le modes of rehition as set forth in Scho})en- 
 hauer's doctor's dissertation. — The causal and the teleok)gi- 
 cal notions. 
 
 § 3. The nature of the thing-in-itself and of phenomena 
 as expounded by Scho[)enhauer. 
 
 CHAPTER n. 
 
 ATTEMPT TO JOIN PHENOMENA WITH NOUMENA, PROCEEDING 
 
 FROM THE FORMER. 
 
 § 4. Schopenhauer's epistemology in relation to Kant's 
 
 ^'mven. 
 
 M 
 
 § 5. Method of reaching and determining the nature of 
 
 the will. 
 
 CHAPTER HI 
 
 ATTEMPT TO JOIN NOUMENA WITH PHENOMENA BY FINDINCr IN 
 THE FORMER A POSITIVE PRINCIPLE FOR THEIR CONNECTION. 
 
 § 6. The doctrine of parallelism. — Spinoza's philosophy. 
 
 § 7. The doctrine of the empirical and the intelligible 
 character. — Kant' s philosophy. 
 
 § 8. The doctrine of the idea and its copy. — Plato's 
 philosophy. 
 
 § 9. The doctrine of immanence. — Aristotle's phil- 
 osophy. 
 
 \ 
 
 / 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE TELEOLOGICAL PHASE OF SCHOPENHAUEr's DOCTRINE. 
 
 § 10. Its connection with the transcendental side of 
 Aristotle's system. 
 
 ft. 
 
 § 11. Its relation to Fichte's philosophy and Neo-Pla- 
 tonic mysticism. 
 
 ^12. Schopenhauer's system yiewed as an ethical and 
 religious philosophy. 
 
 i) 
 

 • • • 
 
 
 • • 
 
 • • • 
 
 • t • 
 
 • • • 
 
 • • • < 
 
 . • • • 
 
 . ••• • • 
 
 • i » t • ' 
 , . . , . » 
 
 • • • 
 
 « ■ 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 • 
 
 • • * 
 
 » » 
 « 
 
 
 • • 
 
 « ■ 
 
 / 
 
 I 
 
 \ 
 
 , 
 
 I 
 
 "™%V 
 
 y 
 
 I 
 
 . CHAPTER !. 
 
 THE WORLDS OF BEING AND BECOMING. 
 
 WHEN Greek philosophy with the intuitive insight 
 of fresh awaking genius first developed the 
 antithesis of the worlds of Being and Becoming 
 it raised a })robleni whose solution was to busy the speculative 
 thinking of the ages to come. The relation between these two 
 worlds, the bond of union which joins the ceaseless flux of 
 j)henomenal existence to the eternal changeless essence — this 
 has furnished material for an inquiry of the greatest profund- 
 ity, an inquiry which the schools and systems of Antiquity, 
 the disputations of the Middle Ages and the metaphysics of 
 Modern Times have continually sought to answer. True, 
 some sceptical of human attainment have been content to 
 limit knowledge to the workl of experience, while others 
 with dogmatic assurance have in their eager search after 
 ultimate reality left far behind the realm of phenomena, thus 
 forgetting the source and aim of their inquiries; but neither 
 sceptic nor dogmatist can be said to have achieved results of 
 a permanent character. The human mind can never content 
 itself with a phenomenal world which contains in itself no 
 abiding reality. Equally unsatisfactory is the realm of 
 transcendent shadows where abstract concepts without flesh 
 and blood elude the grasp of the seeker after truth. The 
 worlds of Being and of Becoming both have their worth and 
 'their justification but neither alone can be said to have true 
 meaning or existence. No philosopher has recognized more 
 clearly than Schopenhauer the necessity of an intimate rela- 
 tion between these two worlds. His entire system, from one 
 point of view at least, may properly be considered as an 
 explanation of the physical universe through super physical 
 concepts. For him metaphysics is the interpretation of 
 experience, and a transcendental hypothesis is valid only in 
 
 1 
 
I 1 
 
 ( 
 
 
 • • 
 
 :.•/ 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 • • • • , 
 
 
 I 
 
 / 
 
 ^ 
 
 if 
 
 
 / 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE WORLDS OF BEING AND BECOMING. 
 
 I. 
 
 W 
 
 HEN Greek philosophy with the intuitive insight 
 of fresh awaking genius first developed the 
 antithesis of the workls of Being: and Becoming 
 it raised a problem whose sohition was to busy the speculative 
 thinking of the ages to come. The relation between these two 
 worlds, the bond of union which joins the ceaseless flux of 
 phenomenal existence to the eternal changeless essence — this 
 has furnished material for an inquiry of the greatest profund- 
 ity, an inquiry which the schools and systems of Antiquity, 
 the disputations of the Middle Ages and the metaphysics of 
 Modern Times have continually sought to answer. True, 
 some sceptical of human attainment have been content to 
 limit knowledge to the worki of experience, w^hile others 
 with dogmatic assurance have in their eager search after 
 ultimate reality left far behind the realm of phenomena, thus 
 forgetting the source and aim of their inquiries; but neither 
 sceptic nor dogmatist can be said to have achieved results of 
 a permanent character. The human mind can never content 
 itself with a phenomenal world which contains in itself no 
 abiding reality. Equally unsatisfactory is the rtalm of 
 transcendent shadows where abstract concepts without flesh 
 and blood elude the grasp of the seeker after truth. The 
 worlds of Being and of Becoming both have their worth and 
 their justification but neither alone can be said to have true 
 meaning or existence. No philosopher has recognized more 
 clearly than Schopenhauer the necessity of an intimate rela- 
 tion between these two worlds. His entire system, from one 
 point of view at least, may properly be considered as an 
 explanation of the physical universe through superphysical 
 concepts. For him metaphysics is the interpretation of 
 experience, and a transcendental hypothesis is valid only in 
 
 m A m t i f We ,'* J8 B>^- 
 

 • c • 
 
 • • • •»• «, . 
 
 • * * » • • « 
 
 • • • • 
 
 .. • • • 
 
 • • . • . , 
 
 
 > * ( 
 
 8 
 
 so far as it is adapted to phenomena. He has styled philoso 
 phy world wisdom whose business it is to solve the riddle of 
 the universe. ''The problem of meta})hysics," he writes 
 (11-201) '^ "is in truth not the observation of particular 
 experiences, but the proper interpretation of the totality of 
 experience. Its foundation nnist, therefore, by all means 
 be of an empirical nature, ' ' and again, metaphysics ' ' never 
 separates itself completely from experience, but is simply 
 the explanation and exposition of the same, since it never 
 speaks of the thing-in-itself otherwise than in its relation to 
 phenomena." (11-208). 
 
 Under such assumptions no metaphysical system can lay 
 claim to recognition which does not attempt, at least, to show 
 its connection with physics, but this connection Schopen- 
 hauer, on account of his epistemological presuppositions, was 
 perhaps, of all metaphysical in(iuirers, least able to establish. 
 This epistemology, inherited from Kant, is in certain 
 important respects an emendation of the teachings of its 
 author, but the emendation, especially the discarding of the 
 distinction between the understanding and the reason (the 
 most favorable point of departure for a metaphysics on the 
 Kantian basis), can hardly be said to have been suited to ai<l 
 Schopenhauer in the fornuilation of his system. Tlie doc- 
 trine of the complete subjectivity of the forms of space, time 
 and causality, together with the categories of formal lognc, 
 precludes the hope not only of reaching an ultimate reality, 
 but also of relating such to experience could it by any })os- 
 sibility be discovered. Kant himself was in the main am- 
 sistent in the carrying oui of his fundamental princij^le. In 
 the Prolegomena he raises the question as to " whether such 
 
 ) 
 
 f 
 
 f 
 
 9 
 
 a thing as metaphysics be even possible at all '' and his con- 
 clusion, though not so formulated, must be taken in the 
 negative. Kant allows metay)hysics to exist, hvit in name 
 only, while epistemology, as expounded in the Criticnie (tf 
 Pure Reason, is the beirinnino^, end and sole content of tlie 
 once proud science. '' The dogmatist,* ' says Kant i preface 
 to the iirst edition of the Critiijuei, ''})r()mises to extend 
 human knowledge beyond the limits of i)ossible experience, 
 while I hum])lv confess this to be entirely l>ev{md my 
 j)ower. In the place of such an attempt I limit myself to 
 the examination of reason and its ])ure thought solely." To 
 those, who find in Kant's aim ^^of al)oIishing knowledge to 
 make room for l)elief '* a satisfactory foundation for trans- 
 cendental knowledge, the following passage from the Criti(]ue 
 of I^u-e Reason is noteworthy. Here he asserts: ''The 
 conviction (in regard to the existence of a Godi is not a 
 logical but a moral certainty, and since it rests on subjective 
 grounds (of the moral sentiment) 1 must not for a moment 
 say : /t As- morally certain that there is a God, etc., but / 
 ((//f morallv certain, etc., that is, the belief in God and 
 in another world is so interwoven with my moral sen- 
 timent that 1 am under as little ap})rehension of losing 
 the former as of having the latter torn from me."-'' 
 Such belief may ])e all suHicient from a i)rju:tical stand})oint, 
 but it can hardly be called, as Caird-1- would maintain, more 
 than knowledofe; in reality it is soniethino' far less. Further, 
 whatever sliixht advantao^e Schopenhauer miiiiit have obtained 
 from the practical and religious side of the Kantian })hilos- 
 o])hv, he himself discards, declarimr the second edition of the 
 Criticpie a ''bad improvement " of the tir.^t. in which Kant 
 
 • The Roman numerals I and II refer to the first and second volumes 
 respectively of Schopenhauer's " Die Welt als Wille ujid Vorstelluug," 
 Brockh'aus edition, Leipzig, 1891. 
 
 * Vol. II., p. 638; Rrserikranz, Leipzig;, 1838 
 
 t Edward Caird, '^The Critical Philosophy of Kaiit/' New York, 
 1889. 
 
 '^ / 
 
) 
 
 
 V 
 
 lo 
 
 through the weakness of old age withdrew the vigor of his 
 attacks upon ''the sacred doctrines of dogmatic philosophy. " 
 Schopenhauer in accepting Kant's doctrine and in insist- 
 ing upon its most literal interpretation failed, a})parently, 
 to recognize that the Critical Philosophy was in no sense a 
 metaphysics, and when held strictly to its presup})ositions 
 mast lead to the overthrow of all attempts to discover an 
 ultimate reality. The doctrine of the thing-in-itself, the 
 most vulnerable part of the teaching of Kant, is misinter- 
 preted by Schopenhauer into a positive i)rinciple and made 
 the basis of an attempt to reach the transcendent. That 
 such an attempt v/as essentially self contradictory and implic- 
 itly contained the germs of its own destruction was disregarded, 
 , while Schopenhauer, reaching the thing-in-itself by a method 
 in sharpest contradiction to a theory of knowledge which 
 declared all relation between phenomena and noumena 
 impossible, f-eeks to tit out this absolute (which, however, is 
 never really the thing-in-itself) into a principle for the ex- 
 planation of experience. Yet when the world of sense and 
 the thing-in-itself are once completely sundered, no brid-j^e 
 can span the gulf between them. Schopenhauer, however, 
 does not shrink from the task. Indeed, why should he, as 
 for him paradoxes are evidences of profundity and contra- 
 dictions are the most certain of truths "i But it is to be 
 noted that as long as Schopenhauer holds strictly to the 
 Kantian epistemology his success is never real, and oiily 
 temporarily apparent. The thing-in-itself either remains an 
 empty form, or becomes a tangible thing of flesh and blood 
 by suffering reduction to the rank of simple phenomena, 
 while it bears a name to which it is no longer entitled. The 
 /true thing-in-itself, as far as it is reached at all by Schopen- 
 \ hauer, is arrived at by emi)loyingan epistemological ground- 
 
 ) 
 
 > 
 
 r 
 
 M 
 
 t 
 
 11 
 
 work not recognized by the Critical Philosophy. What this 
 epistemology is will later appear, but for the present atten- 
 tion will be directed to Schopenhauer's failure to pass be- 
 yond phenomena according to his own doctrine most clearly 
 expressed in his doctor's dissertation ''On the Fourfold 
 Root of the Prmciple of Sufficient Reason.'' 
 
 2. ] This dissertation, though the earliest of Schopenhauer's 
 works, is bv no means his least able, and bv far the most 
 consistent. Yet even here mav l^e seen the necessarv char- 
 acter of the contradictions which a})pear in his su])se(iuent 
 metaphysical writings, since in this treatise Schopenhauer 
 deliberately cuts oft' all paths which might lead to noumena 
 by limiting all relations to the world of phenomena. The 
 four possible modes of relation set forth are: (1) the logi- 
 cal; (2) the spacial and temporal; (3) the causal: (4) the tel- 
 eological. Yet, as has l)een previously pointed out, Scho- 
 penhauer's express aim is to explain the world of sense in 
 its relation to the thing-in-itself and not to discover a trans- 
 cendent reality which has no connection with phenomena. 
 Relations must be assumed and it therefore becomes nec- 
 essarv to examine more closely these four forms as treated 
 by the philosopher in order to discover if any secret door re- 
 main by which he may surreptitiously pass from phenomena 
 to noumena. The iirst two modes of relation are clearly 
 in themselves insufficient for Schopenhauer's purpose. The 
 attempt to construct a universe out of mere logical rela- 
 tions finds its exemplication and inadequacy in the Abso- 
 lute Thought of the Hegelian school. Materialism, like- 
 wise, fails to explain reality by positing atoms which have 
 their sole bond of connection in space and time. Indeed, 
 such a method of building up a world is definitely repudi- 
 ated by Schopenhauer. The meagreness of these concepts in 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 w ■ 
 
 S 
 
 I i 
 
 
 L^ 
 
> 
 
 tV*s"-i 
 
 12 
 
 themselves, however, does not exclude the i)ossibility of 
 their obtaining importance in connection with the second 
 two modes of relation, the causal and the teleological which 
 are evidently nuich weightier. 
 
 Upon examination the causal law is found to have a most 
 intimate connection with the temporal and s{)acial notions, 
 so intimate in fact that at tirst sii^ht it mav seem that this 
 law can have no real njeaning when se[)arated from action in 
 space and occurrence in time. A closer investigation reveals 
 the fact that the causal notion is of a dual nature ; a fact 
 which if not cirefully held in mind may lead to serious 
 anomalies and contradictions. These dithculties arise in 
 viewing the causal law purely siih specie teinpnri^^ as 
 expressed in the fornuda : Every change has its cause. 
 This temporal notion of causality requires that between every 
 cause and its effect a certain interval of time shall have 
 elapsed ; otherwise we have an eii'ect contemporaneous with 
 the cause amino chan^^e has resulted. Yet here a diflicultv 
 for thought arises, for a cause which is separated from it> 
 effect for the smallest conceivable time is not })roperly tiie 
 cause of the given effect. If between the cause A and the 
 effect B a time interval exists, reason will attempt to till up 
 the gap, as for example .1, a, h, B; in which series a is 
 the eff'ect of A and the cause of h, which in turn becomes 
 the cause of B. But again the same difficulty repeats itself, 
 for between each member of the time series in the second 
 formula a certain time is likewise supposed to have ela})sed. 
 Other members must be introduced and the process nuist be 
 carried on ad injinltny,. Thus reason at this point finds 
 the temporal notion of rausality inadequate. I)e riatura 
 rat Ion !h est ren sah quadant (eternUatiH specie percipere 
 (Spinoza, Ethics). From another standpoint the causal law 
 
 s 
 
 ) 
 
 \ 
 
 $> ^ 
 
 h , 
 
 13 
 
 presents a similar difliculty. A as the cause of B, contains 
 in itself no sufficient ground for the effect which proceeds 
 from it, since A likewise must be regarded as an effect of a 
 preceding cause. In seeking to ffnd a cause for B which in 
 itself shall not ))e contingent (does not owe its existence to a 
 |)receding cause), thought fails to find satisfaction, being 
 confronted ])y an eternal regress. Again reason finds itself 
 in a helpless tangle. T)e luiturd cinm raii-rui..'^. c-i rc>^ id nec- 
 essarais et non id c(>)ili ngtntes corde)nplarl (S\n\\o7.Q.^ Ethics.) 
 Kant's treatment of the causal law both in the Critique 
 and in the Prolegomena, is especially pertinent in considera- 
 tion of this latter anomalv. In the solution of the third 
 antinomv two notions of causality are presented, one of 
 which the philosopher terms the causality of nature, the 
 other that of freedom. The causalitv of nature is limited to 
 phenomena as necessarilvoccurin^ in time. Of the causality 
 of freedom Kant says (Prolegomena, § 53): ''If, on the 
 other hand, freedom be the characteristic of certain causes 
 of phenomena, it must as regards the latter as events ])e a 
 faculty of beginning them from itself [sponte)^ i. e. without 
 the causalitv of the cause itself havinix Ijegun, and hence 
 another f^round would be necessarv to determine the begin- 
 ning. In this case, however, the cause as to its causality, 
 must not he s\d)jected to time deterinlnations of its state, that 
 is, it must not be phenomena, but must l)e regarded as a 
 thin<r-in-itself and its eff'ects onlv as phenomena.''^- Th-.s 
 for Kant the causalitv of nature is entirely immanent. Its 
 application is to the phenomenal world with its spacial and 
 temporal relativity, where it finds itself operative in an end- 
 less circle and can never separate itself from the ceaseless 
 flux of events. The cause of freedom, on the other hand, 
 ambitiously rising above the world, seeks the changeless and 
 
 * Bax's translation, London, 1891. 
 
 \ 
 
 / 
 
 \ 
 
 { 
 
14 
 
 timeless existence of nounienal reality. It is to be observed 
 that many of the difficulties involved in the causal notion 
 vanish when it is separated into natural and metaphysical 
 causality. Natural causality may be termed occasional cau- 
 sality. It does not contain in itself the causality of its 
 cause ; hence nowhere in the phenomenal series can the mind 
 find this element which belongs to metaphysical causality 
 alone. Further, it is to be seen that natural causality is 
 totally unable to annul the interval between itself and its 
 effect. In metaphysical causality alone can the effect be con- 
 temporaneo'js with its cause, since here no temporal deter- 
 minations exist. Metaphysical causality must be considered 
 as the basis of phenomena, natuvd naturan^^ npc^rov uiv- 
 ovv. Natural causality, however, is simply the occasion 
 for the individual manifestations of metai)hysical causality, 
 naturanaturata, vXtj. It is this material mechanical cau- 
 sation which the empirical sciences recognize. 
 
 A careful distinction of the two ideas implicit in causality 
 is most important for a clear understanding of the system of 
 Schopenhauer, not only as considered from the standpoint of 
 the pure causal notion, but also when treated in connection 
 with the teleological notion which Schc^penhauer sets forth 
 as a special instance of the causal law. The teleological rela 
 tion is an essential modification of the causal idea, in- 
 asmuch as the end of an action exists as tue cause of the 
 events which precede and lead up to it. The ordinary causal 
 formula becomes reversed, the series c, h, a, taking place 
 of a, b, c,. The possibility of such a readjustment of the 
 causal series is, as commonly interpreted, dependent on con- 
 sciousness and the priority of e to a and /> demands the notion 
 of time. Here the idea of the end arises in time and the 
 entire series is determined by the relation of the members in 
 
 ) 
 
 s 
 
 (^ 
 
 • 
 
 J 
 
 / 
 
 15 
 
 time. Such a teleology involves the positing of a material in 
 which the idea finds but a partial realization and is exemplifi- 
 ed in the plan of the builder as seen in the product of his 
 skill. Against this conception Kant's polemic is directed in 
 his discussion of the physico -theological proof for the exist- 
 ence of God. The teleological idea when freed from the 
 l)onds of time rises to the dignity of a metaphysical cause 
 and becomes of a different character than the temporal 
 notion of causality. Here the priority of the end is not 
 temporal but logical; further the end is not realized in a 
 material foreign to itself, the effect appearing with its cause. 
 An attempt has been made to conceive such teleology as 
 independent of consciousness. The conception, however, if 
 it is considered objectively demands a cause working along 
 the lines of thought. Whether this is possible without 
 thought is an important ([uestion, but cannot materially 
 change the notion of the teleological law itself. If this 
 teleological cause is treated purely subjectively it becomes, 
 as with Kant, simply a heuristic principle for the interpreta- 
 tion of phenomena and its application to a world-ground in 
 itself is unjustifiable. In the subsequent discussion it will be 
 seen what an important })art the causal law plays in Schop- 
 enhauer's attempts to connect phenomena and noumena. It 
 will then be shown that the philosopher avails himself of the 
 metaphysical character of the causal notion, though never 
 admittino: its existence. The teleoloofical determination of 
 this notion will likewise be found to have a most intimate 
 and vital connection with the system under consideration, 
 transforming it in the end to such an extent that the original 
 doctrine is to a great measure done away with. Before, 
 however, tracing the various steps of this transition and 
 before outlining Schopenhauer's procedure in his attempt to 
 
I 
 
 f I 
 
 16 
 
 construct a iiielupliysico and relate it to the world of ex- 
 perience, it will be advantageous to point out more clearly 
 the general point of view from which the system as a whole 
 proceeds. 
 
 3.] When w^e seek to discover Schopenhauer's teachings 
 concerning the nature of the two worlds of phenomena and 
 y \ nouraena we do not lind his statements in relation to them at all 
 times consistent and satisfactory. As has been said, however, 
 the doctrine set forth is plainly a development in the first 
 instance of the Kantian philosophy from the standpoint of 
 the thing-in-itsrflf. The thing-in- itself, as with Kant, is 
 removed entirely from the world of relation, for a thing in 
 relation can no longer be a thing-in-itself. Despite this the 
 thing-in-itself is considered by Scho|)enhauer in accordance 
 with Kant as the ground of phenomena; but from this point 
 onward Schopenhauer advances beyond the point of view^ of 
 the Critical Philosophy, and seeks to give a positive deter- 
 mination to this transcendent and purely limitative concep- 
 tion. We are told by Schopenhauer that the thing-in-itself 
 is the hv Hoi nav^ the one and the all. That in this concep- 
 tion there is not added an imj)()rtant or productive princij)Ie 
 for the development of the barren ide.t of the thing-in-itself, 
 but rather another purely negative motion, Schopenhauer 
 clearly shows in his statement concerninir the nature of the 
 unity involved in the idea. '^ It (the will) is one, vet not as 
 an object is one, whose unity is recognized only in opposition 
 to a possible multiplicity, nor again as a concept is one which 
 arises only by abstraction from multiplicity; but it is one as 
 that which lies beyond time and space, the prlnclpunn 
 individuation Is ^ that is the possi})ility of multiplicity." (I- 
 134). It is here evident that Schopenhauer reaches the ^'y 
 Hal nav purely as the opposing pole of phenomena, thus 
 
 > \( 
 
 V 
 
 ' 
 
 
 ) 
 
 ( 
 
 / 
 
 17 
 
 remaining in the fullest accord with the Critique of the Pure 
 Reason by holding to the absolute ideality of space and time 
 together with the pure phenomenal application of the causal 
 law. The fact that he does not accept the remaining Kantian 
 Categories of the understanding as constructive principles, 
 while making the category of causality a function of simple 
 intuition is an interesting detail in his theory of knawledge, 
 but is not significant in considering his doctrine as to the 
 nature of phenomena. 
 
 Schopenhauer's doctrine in its most radical form may, 
 perhaps, be considered as a legitimate development of the 
 Kantian epistemology, but is certainly not in accord w ith 
 the evident meaning of the Critical Philosophy. Expressed 
 in a word, it is the complete relativity of all things. The 
 world is relative first of all in its particular determinations, 
 l)ecause each individual thing exists only in relation to 
 another in the ceaseless flow of time, in the boundless 
 extent of space and in the eternal regression of the causal 
 nexus. Nothing is permanent, all flows. In this Heracli- 
 tean w^orld of kaleidoscopic change exist only forms and 
 shapes which know no abiding. The w^orld which we appre- 
 hend wdth our senses ' ' is purely appearance and knowledge 
 ^f 7>r/(^>7'^ has validity simply in relation to this." Further, 
 the world considered as a totality is as relative as the parts 
 which compose it, since the world exists for us an object ; 
 but as an object requires a subject and has no permanence of 
 its own, so the world vanishes when the subject disappears, 
 ''The entire world is only an object in relation to a subject, 
 the intuiting of intuitions, in a word idea. All which 
 belongs, or even can belong, to the w^orld is inevitably con- 
 ditioned in this determination through the subject and is 
 there only for the subject." (1-4). Berkeley is praised 
 
 \ 
 
 
 V 
 
 \ 
 
 / 
 
 
c 
 
 \ 
 
 I * 
 
 18 
 
 by Schopenhauer for giving a definite expression to the 
 principle which finds e.^-^e alone in i^ercipi and allows the 
 world to exist only as a dream. The world which presents 
 itself to our senses has ''purely a seeming existence." It is 
 the veil of Maja and something so completely unreal that we 
 can deny its being with as much pro[)riety as we can affirm 
 it. So the external world becomes reduced to a mere sub- 
 jective feeling. Yet this idealistic position allows the sul)- 
 ject to remain a permanent reality amid all relativity, but 
 Schopenhauer with one bold sweep removes this last solid 
 foothold. He cannot, it is true, refute the teaching of com- 
 plete subjective idealism, though he pronounces those who 
 seriously maintain it fit subjects for the madhouse. He 
 places subject and object on equal terms, yet he does not 
 permit the objt:ct to exist by raising it to the permanence of 
 the subject ; he takes the converse method and gives the 
 subject an existence no more real than that of the object. 
 The subject, we are told, is only the subject of knowledge, 
 which must have for its correlate an object. Here we find 
 ourselves confronted by a relativity from which there seems 
 no possibility of escape. The world considered as a sum of 
 particular things has no stability, since each individual is 
 conditioned throuo:h another : neither has the world as a 
 totality any greater permanency, since it is conditioned 
 thi ough a subject, and lastly, this subject exists not in itself 
 but only in relation to an object. 
 
 Schopenhauer attempts to reinforce this theoretical position 
 by an argument based on empirical observation, thus falling 
 into the most gross and self-evident of contradictions. ''The 
 subjective and the objective," writes the philosopher (11-12), 
 constitute no e^>7?^//M/?/7/r, that which is immediately known 
 is limited by the skin, or rather by the external end of the 
 
 y 
 
 \ 
 
 \ 
 
 19 
 
 nerves which lead out from the cerebral system. Without 
 lies a world of which we have no other knowledge than 
 through pictures in our head." Here the subjectivity of 
 the impressions of sense is attempted to be proved by a - 
 process of reasoning based on the physical construction of 
 our bodies, but unfortunately for Schopenhauer's contention, 
 our bodies (at least as extended in space and active in time) 
 are impressions from the idealist's standpoint as purely sul)- 
 jective as the forest, the field or the sky. It is evident 
 that such an argument could have weight only when we 
 assume that we possess a knowledge of the construction of 
 our bodies not derived through empirical means. Schopen- 
 hauer has credited man with a knowledge of certain things 
 belonging to the external world (here the brain and the 
 nerve organs) in order to prove that the external world is 
 removed entirely from our knowledge. In fact, he does not 
 shrink from giving definite expression to this most palpable 
 of errors, by asserting that in his explanation the existence 
 of the body presupposed the world as idea in as much as 
 the body exists as body, or real object, alone in the world 
 as idea; and on the other hand the idea itself presupposes 
 the body, since the idea arises alone through the function 
 of an organ of the same. Thus Schopenhauer, following 
 the most"" radical of the French materialists, reduces the 
 intellect to a simple function of the brain, while at the 
 same time asserting that the whole world hangs on a single 
 thread, consciousness. " The intellect, as of a secondary 
 nature' is dependent throughout on a particular organ, the 
 brain, whose function it is, just as grasping is the function 
 of the hand,'' (11-278.) Such a doctrine can hope for no 
 rational justification, and its only defence is to be found in 
 the words of Tertullian; " Credihile est quia hieptum est, 
 
 \ 
 
 / 
 
< 
 
 I 
 
 \ I 
 
 i i 
 
 i 
 
 !■ I 
 
 20 
 
 cerium est quia impossiUe est^ credo quia alsurdum.^'' At 
 this point we find Schopenhauer's theory of cognition devel- 
 oped to its most absurd consequences. His position in 
 reo-ard to the nature of consciousness leads to the absolute 
 relativity of the world from the empirical side as does his 
 epistemology from the theoretical side. 
 
 Under such conditions it is easy to see why Schopenhauer 
 at the outset is compelled to seek his only reality in a thing- 
 in-itself, which when closely examined is nothing more or 
 less than bare Eliatic Being, whose conception is condi- 
 tioned on the abstraction from it of all characteristics of 
 the world of phenomena. Yet such a pure essence is to- 
 tally incapable of furnishing a ground for the world. A 
 positive quality is therefore sought from which the world 
 may be developed. This positive quality Schopenhauer 
 finds in his conception of the will, but here again the phil- 
 osopher is obliged to deny to it all phenomenal qualities. 
 This will lacks at the outset what is ordinarily regarded 
 as the sijie qua nm of its existence, i. e. self -conscious- 
 ness. It becomes a perfectly blind and aimless principle 
 removed from all change. It retains the name of will, but 
 the substance of this name has vanished. Schopenhauer by 
 playing fast and loose with this conception is able at one 
 time to make the will assume the functions of the thingr-in- 
 itself, at another time to give it all the definite determina- 
 tions of its phenomenal manifestations. In other words the 
 will has two distinct sides, one phenomenal and the other 
 noumenal, so that by the double use of language Schopen- 
 hauer is able to present a plausible argument for his meta- 
 physical theory. The phenomenal world, too, is made to 
 appear in a dual character. Schopenhauer interprets his 
 proposition: ''The world is my idea " at one time as if it 
 
 21 
 
 should read, The world is my idea, and nothing more; at 
 another time, The world is my idea, but only in part. 
 The system which is thus constructed has at the best an in- 
 secure foundation, and must develop w^ithin itself many 
 contradictions, until it at length breaks out into open contra- 
 dictions with its epistemological ground work. Finally we 
 find a return to the Kantian 'standpoint, and in his ethical 
 and religious philosophy, Schopenhauer once more exalts 
 the thing-in-itself (no longer the will) to a point beyond 
 human view where it becomes the goal of religious mysti- 
 cism. 
 
 y 
 
 I 
 
\ 
 
 ( 
 
 22 
 
 's *■ 
 
 I; 
 
 i 
 % ■ 
 
 CHAPTER 11. 
 
 ATTEMPT TO JOIN PHENOMENA WITH NOUMENA. 
 
 j f-y CHOPENHAUER compares metaphysics and 
 
 4J >w physics with two parties of miners ^'who far 
 O removed from each other tunnel in the bosom 
 of the earth and must meet if they work properly/' 
 This simile as applied to Schopenhauer's system may 
 be taken as illustrative of the mode of procedure which 
 it exemplifies. The philosopher seeks to unite phenom- 
 ena and noumena, ^a) by iinding in the world traces of 
 the thing-in-itself and (b) by introducing into the thmg- 
 in-itself phenomenal elements. The attempt to connect nou- 
 mena with phenomena by proceeding from the latter may 
 be set forth under two principal points of view as illustra- 
 ted, first in Schopenhauer's epistemology, and secondly in 
 his method of reaching the thing-in-itself and determining 
 its nature. His attempt to make noumena a principle for 
 explaining phenomena divides itself into four main topics 
 according to his various ways of looking at the thing-in- 
 itself. They may be tabulated as follows: 
 {a) Theory of Parallelism; the philosophy of Spinoza: 
 Q)) Theory of the Empirical and Intelligible Character; the 
 
 philosophy of Kant: 
 (6^ Theory of the Idea and its copy; the philosoi)hy of 
 
 Plato: 
 (d) Theory of Immanence; the philosophy of Aristotle. 
 
 Finally Schopenhauer's metaphysics may be considered 
 from their purely negative side as set forth in his ethical and 
 religious teachings. Here we find ourselves not far removed 
 from Fichte's philosophy and Neo-Platonism. 
 
 23 
 
 Schopenhauer's theory of cognition, limiting the intellect, 
 as has been seen, to the empirical world and thought through 
 the relativity of subject and object and through the four 
 forms of the Law of Reason (^Satz vom Grunde)^ never 
 reaches beyond the circle prescribed by itself to anything 
 which can claim an independent existence. This epistemology, 
 instead of assuming that the real nature of an object becomes 
 the more definite the more it relates itself to the subject of 
 knowledt>-e, and further that the categories of intuition and 
 thourtht brino- to lidit the true essence of their contents, 
 maintains with strange perversity that under such conditions 
 the obj'ct's characteristics arc rendered more and more 
 uncertain. In fact this epistemology, if held strictly to 
 account, is forced to admit that it is totally unwarranted in 
 assuming the existence of anything beyond the limits of 
 individual consciousness. Thus knowledge, which Schopen- 
 hauer defines as ''an idea resulting from a physiological 
 })rocess in the brain of an animal," is no longer worthy of 
 its name. Kant sought to save his olyject from absolute 
 subiectivitv }>v recoonizin<T in it an clement foreign to the 
 pure a priori categories of intuition and understanding,— a 
 " friven" not to be explained ])y thought; a something which 
 nuist be referred tc an outer cause, i. e. the thing-in-itself. 
 Schopenhauer's attack on Kant's position at this point as 
 inconsequential is doubtless justifiable. He asserts that the 
 thinor-in-itself deo^enerates under Kant's hands, to an object 
 in itself, which is "an imaginary nothing whose assumption 
 is a will-o'-the-wisp in philosophy." "The only truly 
 empirically 'given' in perception is the entrance of the 
 sensation into the organs of sense: the presupposition that 
 this must have a cause in general rests on a law having its 
 root in the form of our knowledge, that is, in the functions 
 
 / 
 
 / 
 
 ! t 
 
\ 
 
 ( 
 
 1 
 
 ! ' \ 
 
 • I 
 
 24 
 
 of our brain, whose origin therefore is even as subjective as 
 the impression of sense itself," (IM3). - We find accord- 
 ingly that the collective elements of empirical perception lie 
 in ourselves and that they do not contain that which might 
 yield a sure application to anything totally ditierent from us, 
 a thing-in-itself."-^ Hence we know of no world beyond 
 that of our sensations, a world of appearance which leads us 
 into manifold errors and is the source of all (lelusion. 
 The intellect ^^comprehends simply relations of things and 
 does not penetrate into their inner nature, into their proper 
 being. It is accordingly a simple surface power, attaches 
 itself to the outer side of things, and grasps simply ispvchs 
 transltivas, not the true being of the same." (11-325). 
 
 It is not surprising that Schopenhauer does not long hold 
 to this extreme position, since to have persisted in it would 
 have necessitated the abandoning of all metaphysical in- 
 quiry. We soon find him assuming the same standpoint as 
 that which called forth h s criticism of Kant by discarding 
 his lirst thesis: The world is my idea, and nothing more; 
 and i^norinjj his chanore of view, holding to his second in- 
 terpretation of his idealistic proposition, i. e. The world is 
 my idea, but only in part. Here Schopenhauer like Kant 
 discovers a ''given" in our knowledge, a lawless element 
 not amenable to a prior l rules. ' ' First where all assertions 
 a priori cease, consequently in the completely empirical part 
 of our knowledge of the body, therefore in the form, quality 
 and definite manner of working of the same, that will reveals 
 itself which we have already recognized and established as 
 the being of the thing-in-itself" (11-348.) Pure mathemat- 
 ics and pure natural science together with logic are consti- 
 tuted entirely out of the a priori elements of our knowl- 
 edge and contain nothing foreign to these forms. ''These 
 
 •Satz vom zureich. Gunde, § 21, p. 82, Brockhaus edition. 
 
 c 
 
 «* « 
 
 \ I 
 
 \ 
 
 f 
 
 1 » 
 
 25 
 
 sciences show us nothing more than simple relations, the 
 connections of one idea with another, form without con- 
 tent. All content which they obtain, every phenomenon 
 which fills these forms, possesses soinetliing no longer com- 
 pletely hnowaUe according to its entire being, no longer to 
 be explained completely through something else, therefore 
 something without ground on account of which knowledge 
 loses directly in evidence and forfeits an adequate penetra- 
 tion. This element which does not permit of foundation is, 
 however, indeed the thing-in-itself, is that which is essen- 
 tially not idea nor object of knowledge, but first becomes 
 known by entering into this form " (1-144.) Here is clearly 
 presented and described that which Kant sets forth as the 
 irreducible surd in knowledge. It is nonsense to say that 
 the mind does not know this element, since to know of its 
 existence is to know it, not completely and adequately, per- 
 haps, yet in a degree sufficient to allow a departure from 
 the world of phenomena to that of noumena. 
 
 By what means does Schopenhauer accomplish this trans- 
 ition ? Kant is condemned for employing the causal law, 
 but his critic's procedure is identical with that of Kant, as a 
 closer investigation into the nature of that which Schoi^en- 
 hauer regards as the "given" in cognition will show. 
 This "given" appears perhaps most clearly in the 
 treatment of the great elemental powers of nature {Natur- 
 krafte.) These Naturhrafte determine the definite man- 
 ner in which objects act, they are "the quality, the 
 character of every phenomenon, the ungrounded, that 
 which does not depend on the form of the phenomenon, 
 the Law of Reason. They are that to which the form in 
 itself is foreign; they arc that which, however, enters into 
 this form according to whose law alone they make their 
 
 y 
 
\ 
 
 \ 
 
 ( 
 
 : I 
 
 r I 
 
 i - 
 
 I i 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
 !ti 
 
 24 
 
 of our brain, whose origin therefore is even as subjective as 
 the impression of sense itself," (IM3). - We tind accord- 
 ingly that the collective elements of empirical perception he 
 in ourselves and that they do not contain that which might 
 yield a sure application to anything totally ditierent from us, 
 a thing-initself."'^ Hence we know of no world beyond 
 that of'our sensations, a world of appearance which leads us 
 into manifold errors and is the source of all delusion. 
 The intellect '' comprehends simply relations of things and 
 does not penetrate into their inner nature, into their proper 
 being. It is accordingly a simple surface power, attaches 
 itself to the outer side of things, and grasps simply i^pvcles 
 transitivas, not the true being of the same." (11-325). 
 
 It is not surprising that Schopenhauer does not long hold 
 to this extreme position, since to have persisted in it would 
 have necessitated the abandoning of all metaphysical in- 
 quiry. We soon find him assuming the same standpoint as 
 that which called forth h s criticism of Kant by discarding 
 his first thesis: The world is my idea, and nothing more; 
 and ignoring his change of view, holding to his second in- 
 terpretation of his idealistic proposition, i. e. The world is 
 my idea, but only in part. Here Schopenhauer like Kant 
 discovers a ''given" in our knowledge, a lawless element 
 not amenable to a priori rules. ' ' First where all assertions 
 a priori cease, consequently in the completely empirical part 
 of our knowledge of the body, therefore in the form, quality 
 and definite manner of working of the same, that will reveals 
 itself which we have already recognized and established as 
 the being of the thing-in-itself" (11-348.) Pure mathemat- 
 ics and pure natural science together with logic are consti- 
 tuted entirely out of the a priori elements of our knowl- 
 edge and contain nothing foreign to these forms. ''These 
 
 ♦Satz vom zureich. Gunde, § 21, p. 82, Brockhaus edition. 
 
 C 
 
 V • 
 
 i. 
 
 \ i 
 
 \ 
 
 t 
 
 •% V 
 
 25 
 
 sciences show us nothing more than simple relations, the 
 connections of one idea with another, form without con- 
 tent. All content which they obtain, every phenomenon 
 which fills these forms, possesses sovietking no longer cam- 
 jyletely ImowaUe according to its entire being, no longer to 
 be explained completely through something else, therefore 
 something without ground on account of which knowledge 
 loses directly in evidence and forfeits an adequate penetra- 
 tion. This element which does not permit of foundation is, 
 however, indeed the thing-in-itself, is that which is essen- 
 tially not idea nor object of knowledge, but first becomes 
 known by entering into this form " (1-144.) Here is clearly 
 presented and described that which Kant sets forth as the 
 irreducible surd in knowledge. It is nonsense to say that 
 the mind does not know this element, since to know of its 
 existence is to know it, not completely and adequately, per- 
 haps, yet in a degree suflacient to allow a departure from 
 the world of phenomena to that of noumena. 
 
 By what means does Schopenhauer accomplish this trans- 
 ition ? Kant is condemned for employing the causal law, 
 but his critic's procedure is identical with that of Kant, as a 
 closer investigation into the nature of that which Schopen- 
 hauer regards as the "given" in cognition will show. 
 This "given" appears perhaps most clearly in the 
 treatment of the great elemental powers of nature {Natur- 
 krafte,) These Naturkrafte determine the definite man- 
 ner in which objects act, they are "the quality, the 
 character of every phenomenon, the ungrounded, that 
 which does not depend on the form of the phenomenon, 
 the Law of Reason. They are that to which the form in 
 itself is foreign; they arc that which, however, enters into 
 this form according to whose law alone they make their 
 
 / 
 
) 
 
 i 
 
 26 
 
 appearance; which law, however, determines the appear- 
 ance alone, not that which appears, only the how, 
 not the what of the phenomenon, only the form, not 
 the content." (1-145.) ''That which indeed always 
 lends to a cause, though it may appear innumerable 
 times, its ability to work is a power of nature, is as such 
 groundless, that is, lies completely outside of the chain of 
 caut^ation and in general of the i)rovince of the Law of Rea- 
 son and is philosophically recognized as the immediate ob- 
 jectivity of the will, which is the kernel {(ui-sich) of nature 
 in its entirety" (1-155.) The forces of nature are the 
 dynamic element in the universe, that which acts in it- 
 self and exists independent of space and time and the eter- 
 nal succession of phenomena. What Scho[)cnhauer really 
 describes here is not far to seek. It is the causal law in 
 its non-temporal character ; that which Kant calls the cause 
 of freedom, and that which the mind intuitively seeks in 
 order to escape from the relativity of the world of sense. 
 It was this notion of causality w^hich enabled Kant to con- 
 clude from his " given " to a something lying beyond, and 
 it is this very same notion that Schopenhauer instinctively 
 employs though he refuses to allow to it the name of caus- 
 ality. He was enabled to do this by interpreting the caus- 
 al law as applying alone to phenomenal succession. The 
 causal law, we are told, is expressed as follows: " Every 
 chansre has its cause in another which immediatelv precedes 
 it. If something hai)})ens ''^ '•• " ^' '" it is necessary 
 that something else unmediately preceding should have un- 
 dergone a change; before this again something else, and so 
 on into infinity; for a first cause is as impossible to think as 
 a beiTinnino: to time or a limit to space" (11-4:9.) "Every 
 change in the material world can take place only in so far 
 
 1 
 
 f 
 
 27 
 
 as another immediately precedes it; this is the true and com- 
 plete content of the causal law" (11-46.) Further, Scho- 
 penhauer maintains that the meaning of the causal law is 
 limited to occasional causation and does not recognize as 
 causality that element which lends to the cause its causality. 
 ''Every natural cause is only occasional cause, offers 
 only the occasion, the opportunity for the appearance 
 of the one and individual will." (1-164.) The nature 
 of the causal notion as interpreted by Schopenhauer is 
 further illustrated by his treatment of the concep- 
 tion of matter, a second element which is descriljed as ex- 
 istino- free from the endless succession of phenomena. The 
 essence of matter is expressed in the causal idea. We are 
 told that it is the causal law thought in general; or in other 
 words that it is the vehicle for the manifestation of the 
 thing-in-itself. It may further be descri])ed as the condi- 
 tion or occasion by means of which the noumenal world 
 finds expression in the world of sense. Matter itself can- 
 not have a cause, since it must be considered as the a])strac- 
 tion of the causal law. "Matter is simply a})ility to work 
 in general, pure working as such, causality itself thought 
 objectively"* This identification of the causal la^v with 
 matter is clearly but another way of stating Schopen- 
 hauer's previous doctrine, i. e. causality is simple occa- 
 sionalism. Thus we find in Schopenhauer's world a certain, 
 perhaps unavoidable, dualism. On the one side is metaphy- 
 sical causation, on the other the cause of nature; on the 
 one side pure creative energy, on the other the matter in 
 which it imperfectly realizes itself. These two notions ap- 
 pear from time to time in Schopenhauer's metaphysics, but 
 here it is necessary to observe only that the former notion 
 is as essential to his epistemology as the latter, though as 
 • Satz vom zureich. Grunde, p. 82, Brockhaus edition. 
 
\ 
 
 i 
 
 28 
 
 has been pointed out the philosopher does not openly recog 
 
 nize the fact. 
 
 5.] The transcendental employment of the causal law, dis- 
 tinctly apparent even in the epistemological groundwork of 
 Schopenhauer- s system, shows itself yet more definitely when 
 his method of reaching and determining the nature of the 
 thing-in-itself is studied. In discussing the relativity of the 
 phenomenal world, its illusion and instability, Schopenhauer 
 promises to provide a more secure position whence the 
 observer can look upon the flux of events and yet not be 
 caught in their current. This elevation above the world of 
 sense cannot be reached, we are informed, by any process of 
 reasoning. We are socking for ultimate reality and here 
 logic is of no avail. ^' Every truth is the relation of a judg- 
 ment to something outside itself and an inner truth is a con- 
 tradiction "* The cognition of the ultimate must be a direct 
 and immediate intuition, not a truth in the ordinarily 
 accepted sense of the term, but something rising higher 
 than the relativity on which such truth is conditioned, — 
 this is the doctrine of Schopenhauer. Where then 
 is to be found this intuition of the essence of the 
 world ? The answer is, in self-consciousness, the only 
 immediately given. At this point is to be noticed 
 a direct break with the Kantian theory of cognition 
 as set forth in the Critical Philosophy, though it approxi- 
 mates to the theory expounded in Inaugural Dissertation of 
 1770. In treating of the source of Metaphysics (Prolego- 
 mena, §1). Kant writes, * 'Neither external experience, the 
 source of physical science proper, nor internal experience, 
 the groundwork of empirical psychology will suffice for its 
 foundation." Again he says : ''lam just as conscious of 
 the reality of bodies as external phenomena in space, as 1 am 
 
 ♦ Satz vom zureich. Grunde, § 30, p 107, Brockliaus edition. 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 y; 
 
 / 
 
 f 
 
 29 
 
 of the existence of my soul in time by means of the internal 
 experience, which I also cognize only through phenomena, 
 as an object of the internal sense (that is, as) constituting an 
 internal condition of which the essence in itself, lying at the 
 foundation of these phenomena is unknown to me." (Prol. 
 §4:9.)* This, indeed, was the only consistent position that 
 Kant could have maintained, since all our internal states are 
 conditioned through their succession in time, and hence 
 must be purely phenomenal. Schopenhauer likewise recog- 
 nizes this temporal element in our internal consciousness, 
 and hence the thing-in-itself (the will) appears not as the 
 unitary one, but as a multiplicity. " I know my will," he 
 says (I. 121), "not in its totality, not as a unit, not com- 
 pletely according to its being, but I know it alone in its 
 particular acts, therefore in time, which is the form of the 
 phenomena of my body, as of every object : therefore tlic 
 body is the condition of the knowledge of my will." Scho- 
 penhauer, then, clearly admits that he does not know the 
 thing-in-itself directly, but only its phenomena, but he hopes 
 at least to escape in part from the world as idea by declar- 
 ing that we have a more immediate knowledge of the essence 
 of our own being than we have of that of the external world. 
 This statement can mean only that we have a practical knowl- 
 edge of our own existence, a knowledge which we can never 
 doubt. We can never mistake the phenomena of the inner 
 sense for a pure dream, or conceive ourselves as ultimately 
 unreal. Considered from this standpoint Schopenhauer's 
 view must be pronounced correct. Metaphysics, however, 
 aims to find out the meaning behind phenomena and unless 
 there is a special faculty in man for the cognition of nou- 
 mena, can arrive at its ultimate only by reasoning from 
 phenomena as effect. Schopenhauer urges that because the 
 
 * Bax's translation. 
 
 / 
 
i 
 
 30 
 
 internal sense is not subjected to all the a priori determina- 
 tions of the external world, that it must be nearer the 
 thing-in-itself ; yet we find him admitting that it never ap- 
 pears free from time. This admission becomes most sig- 
 nificant when we inquire more closely into this position and 
 discover that the real cause of the delusion of the world, the 
 veil of Maja, is this very category of time. "Ihe 8u})strat 
 or filling, TtXi'fpoD^cx, or the matter of the present, is through- 
 out all time one and the same. The impossibility of recog- 
 nizing this identity is indeed time, a form and limit of 
 our intellect.'' (11-5-1:9.) The deceptive nature of time is 
 most strongly emphasized in Schopenhauer's treatment of 
 history. History is no science, since it limits itself to the 
 recounting of events. It has to do only with the transit- 
 ory, with that which now is and then passes away. ^' What 
 history narrates is in fact only the long, heavy, disturbed 
 dream of humanity.'' (11-505) When, then, we are informed 
 that the will as thingr-in-itself is a timeless unit, this fact is 
 certainly not revealed by the internal sense whose most ev- 
 ident characteristic is succession in time. 
 
 What, then, is for Schopenhauer the nature of the 
 intuition of the so-called thing-in-itself. He tells us that 
 everyoae knows immodiately in concreto that the ))eing in 
 itself of his own phenomenal life is his will "which con- 
 stitutes the most immediate element of his consciousness. As 
 such, however, it has not completely passed into the form of 
 idea in which object and subject stand over against one 
 another, but it makes itself known in an immediate manner, 
 in which subject and object are not with complete clearness 
 differentiated." (1-130). When we consider what this inner 
 state is which has not become an object for thought we find 
 that Schopenhauer is not here describing some mysterious 
 
 \ 
 
 \ 
 
 I 
 
 - 31 
 
 revelation from another world That internal state in which 
 the will is revealed as the kernel of personality is nothing 
 more or less than what is psychologically known as feeling 
 (Gefil/d)^-. In the first book of the World as Will and 
 Idea (page 320) Schopenhauer says, "Philosophy can never 
 do anything more than explain and make clear what is given, 
 l)ring to distinct, abstract knowledge the being of the v/orld, 
 which i7i concreto, that is as feel in ij, expresses itself clearly 
 to everyone.'"' In placing the inmost essence of the person- 
 ality in feeling Schopenhauer nuist be credited with having 
 given expression to a Aveiglity psychological truth, •!• but to 
 have raised such an empirical fact to the rank of the thing- 
 in-itself is a fallacy too evident to need criticism. Schopen- 
 hauer here finds himself placed on the horns of a dilemma. 
 Either the l)eing of the world becomes reduced to feeling, 
 or rather wdll (a term which for the philosopher takes into 
 account feeling in its ordinary sense), and is therefore of a 
 phenomenal nature; or the thing-in-itself is not directly and 
 
 ♦ This term may be taken to signify for Schopenhauer an inner state 
 which includes both feeling (simplyj and will. 
 
 t Interesting in this connection are the words of Lotze (Mikrokos- 
 nius, Erster Band, Zweite Auflage, Seite 281.) 
 
 *'Der getretene Wurm, der sich im Schmerze kriimmt, unterscheid- 
 et sein eigenes Leiden gewiss von der iibrigen Welt, obgleich er weder 
 sein Ich noch die Natur der Aussenwelt begreifen mag. Aber die 
 vollendete Intelligenz eines Engels, fehlte ihr jenes Gefiihl, wiirde 
 wohl scharfe Anschauungen des verborgensten Wesens der Seele und 
 der Dinge entwickeln und in lichter klarheit die Erscheinuug ihrcr 
 eigenen inneren Selbstspiegelung beobachten, aber sie wiirde nie 
 erfahren, warum sie auf ihren Unterschied von der iibrigen Weltjemals 
 einen grosseren Werth leglen sollte, als auf die zahlreichen Verschied- 
 enheiten der Dinge iiberhaupt die sich ihrer Erkeuntnitss ebenso 
 darbeiten." 
 
 < A i 
 
1 
 
 II I. 
 
 32 
 
 immediately given in feeling and must l)e reached through a 
 process of mediation. Both of these alternatives are made 
 use of. Schopenhauer admits his failure to reach the thing- 
 in-itself as follows: '' Indeed, we have never maintained an 
 absolute and creative knowledge of the thing-in-itself, but 
 on the other hand have recognized very well that it is im- 
 possible to know anything as it is absolutely and for itself. 
 For as soon as I know I have an idea; this, however, cannot 
 be identical with the known because it is my idea. ^" '^ * ^ 
 ■^ * Therefore, strictly speaking we never know our will 
 other than as phenomena, ' ' (II 566. ) Again : ' ' A knowledge 
 of things-in themselves in the strictest sense of the word 
 would accordingly be im];)ossil)le, because the point at which 
 the being-in-itself of the thing commences, knowledge 
 ceases," (11-311.) This limiting of knowledge to phenom- 
 ena, though directly in accord with Kant's teaching, can- 
 not of course be Schopenhauer's permanent position, if he 
 would persist in his attempt to explain the world from a 
 transcendent point of view. In so far as phenomena are to 
 be given a permanent ])asis the t)hilosopher must pass beyond 
 the realm of sense; but how is this transition to be made, 
 how is the noumenal world to be reached I Evidentlv the 
 path is one of mediation, that is, one of relation, and of the cat- 
 egories of relation recognized by Schopenhauer ])ut one can 
 serve the purpose. Logical relations are too intimately con- 
 nected with the philosophy of the "charlatan'' Hegel to be 
 even spoken of without anger ; space and time, the j>ri7U'fj)iuni 
 individuation is J are the source of delusion and error; it 
 remains for causality to reach the unconditioned from the con- 
 ditioned. It is evident that Schopenhauer finds the starting 
 point for his theory of the will in a psychological fact, and it is 
 equally apparent that he attempts to find an adequate cause 
 
 f 
 
 / 
 
 33 
 
 to explain the phenomena included under this fact. His con- 
 clusion is, that the will as thing-in-itself is the author of the 
 individual, phenomenal wills. We are told that the ])ody is 
 the irorl^ of the will, that in the will alone lies the eternol 
 pou^pr which gives rise to individual forms. The will is 
 the most real of all things, but '-that which docs not ad 
 is likewise nothing ' ' (11-3^2. ) But the concepts of ^rorl^i?^(7, 
 of jHNrrr, of action are the very essence of the causal idca."^' 
 Schopenhauer's procedure in atte!iii)ting to estal)lish the con- 
 tention that the will is the l)asis of the |)henomcna of nature 
 as well as of those of the individual Ego shows beyond a doubt 
 that he conceived a causal relation to exist between pheno- 
 mena and the thing-in-itself. He saysJI-SOl^): - Along the 
 subjective road the inner nature is at every moment acces- 
 sible to us: there we find it immediately as the will in our- 
 selves, and we must ihvough the jrri7ieij)Ie of analog!/ to om' 
 own ])eing be able to solve the riddle of the being of others." 
 In other words, Schopenhauer finds a similarity existing 
 between oiu- bodies and oV)jects in the external world, tliere- 
 forc he concludes that the crfNsc which produced one must l)e 
 the same as, or similar to that whicli produced the other. 
 Thus the thing-in-itself in Nature is reached l)y an undis- 
 irnised use of the causal law, for the entire validity of the 
 nr-ument from analogy rests on the assumption that like 
 causes produce like effects, t 
 
 * cf. Sigwart's Logic, Band II, 2 Auflage, § 73. 
 
 t The following use of tliis argument to establish a common cause 
 for all phenomena in the external world is noteworthy: 
 
 "^ehe ich nun auf diese Weise Eines sich meinem Bhcke entziehen, 
 ohne dass ich je erfahre wohin es gehe ; und ein Anderes hcrvortreten 
 ohnedass ich je erfahre, woher es komme ; haben dazu noch Beu.e 
 dieselbeGestalt, dasselbe Wesen, den selben Charakter, nur allem 
 
 i 
 
 <f 
 
 / 
 
^ 
 
 r 
 
 34 
 
 nicht die selbe Materie, welche jedoch sic audi walirciid ihres Dascins 
 fortwahrend abwerfen und erneuern ; — so liegt docli wahrlicli die 
 Annahnie, dass Das, was verschwindet, und Das, was an seine Stelle 
 tritt, Eines und dasselbe Wesen sei." (II-544.) 
 
 > 
 
 / 
 
 6 
 
 I 
 
 36 
 
 CHAPTER 111. 
 
 ATTEMPT TO JOIN NOUMENA WITH THENX^MENA. 
 
 T is now evident tiiat Schopenliaiier in his atteni})! to 
 estal)lish a connection between the world and the thina- 
 in-itself, in so far as he sets out from the former, is suc- 
 cessful only through employing the causal law as the 1)ond of 
 this connection; for, as has been seen, his epistemology hid- 
 denly recocrnizes the validity of this law in its transcendental 
 ap})lication, while his method of reaching the will is confront- 
 ed with the necessity of employing it. The question now 
 arises, Can the philosopher succeed better in connecting 
 phenomena with noumena, proceeding from the latter ? Can 
 there be introduced into the idea of the thing-in -itself any 
 positive (quality by which it will be possil)le to pass from 
 the Avorld of Beinof to that of Becomini]^ in any other man- 
 ner than by the establishing of a causal connection l^etween 
 the individual thing and its innermost essence ? The con- 
 sideration of the problem from this point of view, as has 
 already been said, involves a comparison of Schopenhauer's 
 doctrine with the systems of Spinoza, Kant, Plato and Aris- 
 totle. 
 
 ' ' Betw^een the act of the will and the action of the body 
 there is absolutely no causal connection," writes Schopen- 
 hauer,* 'i but both are immediately one and the same per- 
 ceived in a double manner, once in self consciousness, or 
 the inoer sense, as an act of the will, and at the same time 
 in the outer, spacial phenomena of the brain as an act of the 
 body." Ao-ain : " In reflection alone is wall and act dif- 
 ferent, in reality they are one. Each true, genuine, imme- 
 
 * Satz vorn zureich. Grunde, § 21, p. 79. Brockhau's edition. 
 
 V 
 
 / 
 

 diate act of tho will is directly and inime liately also a visi- 
 ble act of the body, and corresponding to this on the otlier side 
 every affection of the body is also at once and iuiincdiatoly 
 an affection of the wiir^ (1-120.) The doctrine expressed 
 here is that of an exact parallelism between the inner and 
 the outer series of phenomena. The entire body presents 
 in its particular changes the outer side of an inner nature 
 corresponding exactly to it. Yet again, - as the human 
 body in general corresponds to the liumjui will in general, 
 so the individual bodily structure, which consecinently com- 
 pletely and in all parts is characteristic and exi)ressive, cor- 
 responds to the individually moditied wills, to the character 
 of particular individuals/' (1-121).) Further, Schopenhauer 
 teaches that the inner world in certain M()n-temi)oral and 
 eternal determinations linds its counterpart in a corresjiond- 
 incr series of changeless characteristics in the world of space. 
 *' The parts of the body must exactly correspond to the 
 principal cravings through which the wdll manifests itself, 
 must be the visible expression of the same: teeth, throat 
 and alimentary canal are objectitied hunger; the genitals ob- 
 jectified sexual desire; the grasping hand, the luirrying foot 
 correspond to the more mediate strivings of the will, which 
 they express" (T-129) Thus three grades of paral- 
 lelism are distinctly outlined. First, there is a corres[)ond- 
 ence between the individual acts of the })ersonal will 
 and the individual actions of the body, secondly, l)ctwecn 
 the individual will as an expression of an individual char- 
 acter m toto and the body there is a like parallel; and 
 thirdly, between the wdll in its various changeless attributes 
 and the world of sense as viewed in race {Gatttfjuj) char- 
 acteristics there is also a parallel. 
 
 The doctrine here expressed is not original with Scho- 
 penhauer, but finds its systematic exposition in the philoso- 
 
 ^ 
 
 i 
 
 > 
 
 \ 
 
 P 
 
 m 
 
 phy of Spinoza. For Spinoza there exists as the ground of 
 the universe the Absolute Substance wdiich is as with Scho- 
 penhauer the fV xal ndv. Per substaatlain intdJigo Id 
 quod in se est et ^^^r se conclpHuv; hoc cd id, cuin.s con- 
 ct'ptuH 7ion indUjct coiiceptu altcrius vti^ a (jao forinan de- 
 hrat'' (Ethics 1. def. 3) 
 
 Here is the thing-in-itself, the suljstance which exists in 
 itself, and which to l)e known must be conceived as indepen- 
 dent of relations. Of this Absolute Spinoza maintains that 
 w^e know l)ut two determinations, i. e. that of the inner and 
 that of the outer world, cogltatlo and extensio. Schopen- 
 hauer likewise teaches that the world as known by us has 
 two sides; the outer world of space and the inner world 
 which is primarily will. At this point we see a difference 
 between the two thinkers, for while Spinoza considers the 
 all important factor of the inner life to l)e the intellect, 
 Schopenhauer asserts the primacy of the will. Schopen- 
 hauer may seem to differ from Spinoza in another important 
 particular; for while the latter declares that God has 
 innumerable attributes, tlms no one being applica])le to his 
 existence, the former would assert that the thing-in-itself 
 is capalde of a definite determination, i. e. it is will. Here, 
 however, the difference is not so great as might appear at 
 first glance. We have already seen that Schopenhauer, 
 according to one point of view at least, admits that we do 
 not know the thing-in-itself as it really is. '^The in-itself 
 of the world, which w^e think according to the clearest of its 
 expressions under the concept of will,'' is yet as a finality 
 removed from all determinations whatsoever. Spinoza, 
 likewise, while seeming to teach the unknowableness 
 of God as an absolute l)eing, plainly gives to his ultimate 
 a character borrow^ed from the inner life, in as much as the 
 
 / 
 
^ 
 
 38 
 
 world-ground is related to individual existences not causally 
 but logically. For Schopenhauer the world is a process of 
 will, for Spinoza a process of thought, a mathematical rather 
 than a dynamical necessity. It follows from the eternal neces- 
 sity of God's nature as the angles of a triangle result from 
 the nature of triangle itself. ''E,r mcc^sltair dicniae ndtarae 
 hijhilta ijijinlt^'s modis [hoc f.s7, omnia qnnc suh Inttllectirm 
 Injin'dain eadere p(>><^unt) xkjuI dihcDt/' (Ethics, I, prop. 
 16). From this point on the resemblance between the 
 thought of the two philosophers is most marked. ^\q iind 
 Spinoza setting forth an exact parallel between the attril)utes 
 of thouirht and extension. For everv mode in the inner 
 world there is a corres})onding mode in the world of si)ace. 
 '' Ordo d connexlo Ideanun idvin cd^ ac ordo tt convcvui 
 rerumy (^Ethics II; pr()[) 7. ) Further, Spinoza like Schopen- 
 hauer conceives the determinations of these two attril)utes 
 iyModi) under three phases. For every act of the body there 
 is a corres[)()ndence in the inner series; again the body as a 
 whole has a corresponding idea connected with it, and lastly 
 there are certain modes which" do not belonix to the individual 
 as such, but to the individual onlv in so far as he is universal. 
 Spinoza w-ould teach, that the universal nature of the 
 individual is his only true and ade([uate nature, just as 
 Schopenhauer holds that it is only the Platonic ideas which 
 may really be said to exist. Thus we tind botli Spinoza and 
 Schopenhauer denying ])ersonal immortality.'' ''It is the 
 race,'' says the latter, "which lives at all times.'' The 
 former teaches that between the human Ixxlv and its idea 
 there is a complete correspondence; and hence with the death 
 of the body the idea of the same })asses away. Correspond- 
 ing to these three distinct grades of the determination of the 
 Spinozistic attril)utes are three grades of knowledge. First, 
 
 * Here they are in close agreement with Arietotle. 
 
 I 
 
 ; 
 
 ♦ 
 
 ^ 
 
 » f • 
 
 39 
 
 that knowledo^e which arises from the bodily affectations; sec- 
 ond, the knowledge of reason, and third, intuitive knowledge. 
 Schopenhauer here fully agrees wdtli his predecessor. 
 Knowledge first arises as a slave to the will, reflective know- 
 ledo^e is freed momentarily from its thraldom, w^hile intuitive 
 insight leaves behind the entire world of sense and finds com- 
 plete freedom in the contemplation of the Platonic idea. 
 We cannot fail to notice that the theory of coofnition here 
 involved differs essentially from the epistemology expounded 
 in the Critique of Pure Reason. This difference will asrain 
 be pointed out Avhere its importance and bearing in Schopen- 
 hauer's philosophy will be more apparent. 
 
 When it is asked what is for Spinoza the ground of the 
 parallelism between the attribute of extension and the at- 
 tribute of thouijht the answer is not difficult. God is the 
 bond of the union, and in him all differences find a recon- 
 ciliation. He is the one and the all, and all modes, finite 
 or infinite, owe their existence to him. He is caum adoc- 
 (juatir of the Avorld. Likewise Schopenhauer declares that 
 the harmony and connection which all parts of the universe 
 manifest should not excite w^onder for "it is, indeed, one 
 and the same will w^hich objectifies itself throughout the 
 entire world." But here it is to be remem1)ered that the 
 w^ill which Schopenhauer is speaking of is the thing-in-itself , 
 the ultimate, which like Spinoza he is obliged to regard as 
 the source of individual appearance. When, however, he 
 is discussing the parallelism which exists between the will 
 and the world he is employing the term in its secondary 
 sense. This will is not unitary ])ut appears in manifold in- 
 dividual manifestations, in the Platonic ideas, the individ- 
 ual characteristics of human beings, and in the particular 
 
 * It is to be remarked that this notion of causality is rather logi- 
 cal than dynamic. 
 
 V 
 
 i 
 
I i 
 
 40 
 
 41 
 
 phenomena of the world of space. The parallelism which 
 exists between the outer and inner sides of these various 
 manifestations disp3as3s for tho moment with the causal 
 idea. The doctrins of parallelism, however, docs not tind 
 itself able to entirely remove this notion. It places its 
 sphere of action one step farther back, but finds itself com- 
 pelled to assume its ultimate validity. 
 
 The crucial point in Spinoza\s philosophy appears when 
 the question is asked: How is it that the absolute sub- 
 stance beyond all determination and free from all change 
 and divisibility in itself bacomes pheuomenized and limi- 
 ted? An attempt to picture this process involves a dualis- 
 tic conception of the universe. The world falls apart into 
 natura naturam and natuni naturata^ notwithstanding the 
 philosopher's express denial of such a division. This es- 
 sential dualism shows itself with great clearness in Spino- 
 za's Ethics. Here we lind man the partaker of the ntiture 
 of both these realms; in essence free, yet under the s\v;iy 
 of affections and passions. Not only is the world of freedom 
 a cause, but the realm of nature likewise exercises a causal 
 influence. It is the principle of darkness in the universe, 
 the source of evil and illusion. Schopenhauer, proceeding 
 from conceptions similar to those of Spinoza, is met at this 
 point by a similar difficulty. The problem is for liini to 
 explain how the will as thing- in-itself becomes a diversity 
 in the world of space and time. To solve this problem Scho- 
 penhauer employs the conception of " Objectivation," ^^ 1 
 understand," he writes (11-277) ''by objectivation self-ex- 
 hibition (das SichdarsteUen) in the actual material world.'' 
 Objectivation of the will is to be viewed as the manifesta- 
 tion to consciousness of the inner being of the world. The 
 objectified will is the same as the phenomenized will. ''The 
 
 •♦' 
 
 A 
 
 ■s % 
 
 ^ i 
 
 t 
 
 K • 
 
 entire body is nothing else than the objectified will, that is, 
 will become idea." So we tind Schopenhauer speaking of 
 the will as entering into time, as manifesting itself in space 
 and as appearing under the conduct of the causal law. 
 Here then is set over against the will as thing-in -itself a 
 secondary reality, namely the a priori forms of thought. 
 These forms are however, dependent on the intellect, and 
 thus the world would seem at this point to divide itself into 
 will and intellect. Schopenhauer would attempt to ex- 
 plain away this dualism l)y his doctrine of the primacy of 
 the will. The intellect we are told, is created 1)y the will 
 for its individual purposes, since the will is confronted by 
 hostile conditions, and in order to pursue its way in secur- 
 ity, is coin})elle(l to prepare a light to illuminate its path. 
 Such a c()ncei)tion, lunvever, in attem})ting to do away with 
 dualism, substitutes pluralism. In the place of one will 
 there are innunicrable, hostile forces tiahtin<r with each other 
 for supremacy. The contradictions involved in this view 
 mav be sunuuarized as follows: The will, which is in 
 essence one, appears as a manifold, when the intellect ap- 
 prehends it under the a priori forms of space, time and 
 causality: but the intellect is already a product of the will 
 (which has previously become individual, since the intellect 
 exists in order that the special aims of the individual will 
 may be realized in opposition to the aims of other contend- 
 ing wills. ) Further, Schopenhauer asserts that these wills 
 tind tlieir sole realization in a world which is hostile to them, 
 in as nuich as the realization is always partial and imperfect. 
 It is in this world that the will tinds itself compelled to 
 create an intellect in order to better obtain its aims. So 
 tinally we discover that it is not the intellect but the world, 
 as the necessarv nriu^ of the intellect, which is set over 
 
 1 ; 
 
 \ i 
 
^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 42 
 
 43 
 
 / 
 
 acyamst the will. ^'The world has created itself without the 
 help of the intellect which is linnted through Nature, lies 
 in it, belongs to it, and therefore cannot place itself over 
 against Nature as something totally foreign' ' (11-320)'^ Hence 
 as with Spinoza the universe falls into two })arts, natura 
 naturans (will) and naturanaturata (Nature.) Once more is 
 presented the notion of the two forms of causalitv, the 
 transcendent, timeless; and the temporal, the realm of Nature 
 as grasped under the concept of matter, "the visability '' 
 (SicAthai'Ji'rit) of the will. 
 
 7.] It 's at this point that Schopenhauer's thought most 
 evidentlv and naturallv joins with the Kantian doctrine of 
 the empirical and the intelligil)le character. Scliopenhauer 
 attributes the highest importance to this part of the Critical 
 Philosophy and styles it "tlie greatest of all achievements 
 of human thought [Tief>iJiin.)\ " We have here '' says 
 Lehmann,:}: " without doubt the very ],)oint before us, at 
 which the system of Scliopenliauer joins itself actually with 
 the Kantian phil()so})hv, but what Kant with foresight })()s- 
 tulated that Schoi)enhauer dogmatically asserted." This ob- 
 servation must be taken as su})stantially correct; especially 
 important is the latter part of the statement. Ktmt's doc- 
 trine is for him only a postulate, an assum})ti()n which helps 
 to explain certain diiiiculties, but hardly a fundamental 
 principle of the Critical Philosophy. Scliopenhauer, liow- 
 ever, in appropriating it, develops and enlarges the con- 
 ception, at the same time employing it as one of the most 
 essential elements of his metipliysics. This a brief exp;)si- 
 
 * Here again is to he notced the materialistic side of vSehopenhaaer's 
 doctrine. The intellect is not only secondary to the will, but is 
 further simply a development of matter. 
 
 t Grand Prob. der Ethik, p. 176, Brockhaus edition. 
 
 X Rudolf Lehmanu. "vScbopenhauer, eiu Beitra;^ zur Psychologie 
 der Metaphysik" 
 
 \ 
 
 i 
 
 \ 
 
 i 
 
 tion of the doctrine, as treated by Kant and by Schopen- 
 hauer, will show. 
 
 Kant, like Spinoza, conceives man as belonging to two 
 worlds, the world of necessity and the world of freedom. In 
 the former he is a self-determining being, in the latter com- 
 pletely subjected to the laws of mechanical necessity. In 
 discussing: the possibilitv of such freedom in harmonv with 
 the universal laws of natural necessity, Kant says: ^ "I term 
 that element in a sensuous object, which is not itself pheno- 
 mena, intelligible. If, accordingly, an object which must 
 be regarvled in the world of sense as phenomenon possesses 
 a faculty which is not an object of sensuous intuition, but by 
 means of which it is capable of being the cause of phenomena, 
 the causality of an object or existence of this kind mav be 
 treatoi from two ditferent points of view, namely, as intellig^i- 
 ble according to its action as thing -in-itself; and sensuous 
 as regards its effects, as a phenomenon })elonging to the sen- 
 suous world.'' In other words Kant sees in everv ssnsuous 
 object, as before pointed out, an evidence of the thinir-in- 
 itself. He recognizes here an element which cannot be 
 attributed to the world of phenomena, since it is utterly 
 inex})licable from a priori rules. To this thing-in-itself may 
 be attrii)uted, '' besides to the property of self-phenomeniz- 
 ation, a ciiusality whose effects are to be met with in the 
 phenomenal world, although it is not itself a phenomenon.'' 
 Beside beinsf a manifestation of this transcendental cause the 
 object of the senses is construable under certain a priori 
 forms, and as such possesstf^ an empirical character which 
 guarantees "that its actions as phenomena stand throughout 
 in connection, accordino^ to unvarvin<]: natural laws, with all 
 other phenomena. " "'" '"' "^^ '' According to its empirical 
 character, this subject as })henomenon would be subordinate 
 
 * Critique of Pure Reason, p. 423, Rosenkranz Edition. 
 
^ 
 
 44 
 
 to all empirical laws of causality, and would be so far noth- 
 ing- more than a phenomenon and member of the sensuous 
 world, whose effects like all other phenomena continually 
 arises' from natural causes. -^ ^ * According to its 
 intelligible character, on the other hand, '• '" " the subject 
 must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences and 
 from all phenomenal determinations. '''• There can be no 
 doubt that Kant is here dealing with the two separate notioji^ 
 of causality which have been previously discussed, and that 
 his distinction between empirical and intelligible character is 
 exactly the same as that between temporal and n()n-temi)oral 
 causality. The purpose of this distinction is for Kant 
 primarily to point out a possible way in which the third 
 antinomy with its demand for both a tinal and a temporal 
 cause may be satisfied, and not to maintain absolutely that 
 such a transcendent cause exists, though his ethical theory linds 
 its chief support from this sup})osition. We must assume 
 that man U free, says Kant, in order to obtain a meaning 
 f)!- the cate^rorical imperative; but this freedom is reached 
 by the practical rather than by the theoretical reason. Thus 
 Kant would escape, when strictly interpreted, from assert- 
 incr, at least doi^maticallv, the existence of transcendental 
 freedom, and thus he would seek to save himself from falling 
 into complete contradiction with his epistemology. 
 
 Schopenhauer, however, makes no such reservation. lie 
 not only accepts Kant's doctrine as a working hypothesis, 
 but raises it to an absolute metaphysical principle by the 
 aid of which he seeks to set forth the connection between 
 the thing-in-itself and phenomena. His method of proced 
 ure is most clearly illustrated in his discussion concernin 
 the will of man. The individual will as seen in its phenom- 
 enal manifestations is capable of analysis into two ele- 
 
 ♦ Ibid, p. 423, 244. 
 
 (Y 
 
 to 
 
 I 
 
 ♦ 
 
 > 
 
 I 
 
 45 
 
 ments. One of these Schopenhauer styles with Kant the 
 intelligible and the other the empirical character. The in- 
 telligible character finds its expression in a permanent di- 
 rection of the will, while the empirical character mani- 
 fests itself under the conduct of motives (a special form of 
 the law of occasionalism. ) The intelligible character is to 
 be treated as a non- temporal, therefore as ^'a non-divisible, 
 unchangeable act of the will, whose phenomenon sundered 
 and displayed in time and space and in all the forms of the 
 law of sufficient reason is the empirical character '' (1-341. ) 
 ''These acts of the will have always, hovrever, a ground 
 outside of themselves in the motives. Yet these (motives ) 
 never determine anythino: more than that which I will at this 
 time, in this place and under these conditions; not, how- 
 ever, that I will in general, nor what I will in general, i. e. 
 the maxims which characterize my will as a totality ; hence 
 mv will is not accordino^ to its entire nature to be explaiiied 
 from motives ; but these determine simply its expression at 
 a given point of time; the}^ are simply the occasion through 
 which mv will manifests itself : this (will) itself, on the 
 other hand, lies outside the province of motivation : its 
 appearance alone is determined at every point of time neces- 
 sarily through this (law of motivation) " [1-127] Thus tlie 
 motive cannot be said to determine the act in itself, but only 
 its direction. It changes the manner of the wilFs manifesta- 
 tion, but never the will itself. Therefore virtue cannot be 
 taught, and therefore the special manifestations of the will 
 are of no significance. It is of like importance whether one 
 plays for nuts or a crown, but that be plays— this is the 
 noteworthy fact. 
 
 The doctrine of the intelligible and the empirical character 
 Schopenhauer applies not alone to the will of man, but he finds 
 
^ i 
 
 46 
 
 it to be the fundamental characteristic of the thing-in- itself 
 in all grades of its manifestation. Examples are to be found 
 in all parts of nature. '^ When the clouds move across the 
 sky the figures which they build are not essential to them, are 
 for them of equal importance ; but that they as elastic vapour 
 arc pressed together, driven about, extended and torn apart 
 by the impact of the wind, this is their nature, (this) is the 
 essence of the force which o])jectities itself in them, (this) is 
 the idea : they are for the individual ol)server alone actual 
 figures. For the brook which rolls onward over its })el)bles, 
 the eddies, waves, the fragments of foam which are seen (on 
 its surface) are of e(pial importance and unessential : that it 
 obeys the law of gravity, preserves its nature as a non -elas- 
 tic, mobile, formeless, transparent fiuid ; this is its essence." 
 (1-214). Thus Schopenhauer developos and adds to the con- 
 caption of the intelligible and empirical character as set forth 
 by Kant. Depending as this notion does at its very incep- 
 tion upon the fundamental distinction between temporal and 
 non-temporal causality, it in no way avoids this distinction 
 under Schopenhauer's treatment. Indeed, the exposition 
 rather emphasizes than weakens it. The will always is rep- 
 resented as the real cause of its phenomenal manifestations ; 
 the 'motive, the excitation, the Dure mechanical action, as 
 the necessitv of Nature, as the occasion of individual occur- 
 rence. Most sie^nificant in this connection is the followinir : 
 ^^It (the will) holds individuals fast fixed to this scene (of 
 action) and it is \h^ jrrliniiiu mohlle of their activity, while 
 the outer conditions, the motives, determine simply the 
 direction of the same in particulars." (11-401)). Schopen- 
 hauer doubtless saw the real nature of the assumption here 
 involved, but attempts to save himself from inconsistency 
 by limiting the application of the causal law to phenomena, 
 
 » 
 
 s 
 
 f 
 
 
 If 
 
 > 
 
 47 
 
 as already pointed out, and thus by no means excluding the 
 activity of transcendental causality. 
 
 From another point of view it will be seen that Schopen- 
 hauer's conception of the relation between the intelli^nble 
 and empirical character involves the notion of temporal, occa- 
 sional causality as well as that of transcendental causalitv. 
 Scho])enhauer teaches that the intelligible character is iden- 
 tical with the original act of the will which reveals itself in 
 the empirical character. What, then, is the nature of this 
 iict of the will ? In the inorganic world it api)ears as a 
 l)ower of nature and this suggests the identification of the 
 intelligible character with the conception of force in general. 
 Schopenhauer, however, hastens to declare that such a notion 
 is inadeipiate, since force is but a special form of the will 
 and is (jualitas occulta. We find that the will, which as has 
 already been shown, is at the outset as thing-in-itself purely 
 a negative principle, obtains a positive determination by its 
 identification with impulse [Trleh)^ desire {Drang)^ lontrino- 
 {Sehnmcht).- The will manifests itself "as a tireless 
 mechanism (Truilnt'erk)^ an unconscious impulse " (11-409). 
 The notion of the will as universal desire is not in itself suf- 
 ficient, however, to definitely characterize the thing-in-itself. 
 Desire must be desire for something, otherwise the universe 
 would remain in a purely static condition. In vain Schopen- 
 hauer protests that the will in general has no aim. '^In 
 fact there is an absence of everv aim, of all limits in the 
 being of the will in itself, which is an endless striving " (I- 
 195). Notwithstanding this express statement to the con- 
 trary, the will has the most distinct of aims, for it is the 
 will to live.f Yet there is not one will to live but manv, 
 
 *cf. I-140 
 
 t The importance of this principle will be more fully discussed when 
 Schopenhauer's relation to Aristotle is considered. 
 
 
i 
 
 48 
 
 49 
 
 and hence arise the distinctions in the intelligible character 
 of men and of the lower objectitications of the will. All 
 seek for self-realization ; hence the strife and misery of the 
 world , hence the ethical need of self-reniinciati<m. Here 
 we find Schopenhauer characterizing the thing in-itself })y a 
 principle taken without reservation from the phenomenal 
 world ; for life is the characteristic of temporal existence, 
 beyond which and its illusion there is alone rest, since there 
 alone life ceases. Farther, there are countless conilicting 
 ^yills— demonic forces which seek to rend each other in order 
 that they may subsist but the spice of a day^s dream. Once 
 again in the notion of the will has thething-in-itself vanished. 
 The ev nai Ttdv is after all only itav. The will thus 
 degraded involves essentially the conception of time, first 
 because it is conceived as mere longing or desire after that 
 which it does not possess and which it strives to obtain. 
 "The basis of all willing is need, want'' (I-;3t;T). Like- 
 wise, the notion of many wills seeking with varying fortunes 
 to realize themselves, and ever striving to mount higher in 
 the scale of being can alone ])e pictured s*ih sj}rr/\> ti'iiijyyris. 
 Thus it is clear that the intelligible character as cause of the 
 individual acts of the empirical character is at this point 
 conceived as temporally determined. It must likewise be 
 observed that the causal notion here involved contains in it 
 a teleological element, since the will, though unconsciously 
 according to Schopenhauer, moves toward an end. Hence 
 bis treatment of the relation between the intelligil)le and 
 empirical character must be viewed under two heads, first 
 that of transcendent causality (already implicit in Kant's 
 conception) and second that of immanent teleology which 
 does not rise above the world of phenomena. The teleologi- 
 cal notion, however, relates itself closely to the doctrine of 
 
 ^ 
 
 i 
 
 I 
 
 ^ 
 
 t 
 
 the Platonic iaea which forms a most essential part of Scho- 
 penhauer's system. 
 
 8.] Although Schopenhauer's doctrine of the idea may be 
 regarded as an attempt to furnish a mediating principle 
 between the worlds of Being and of Becoming, it must be 
 remembered that for Plato it was rather an epistemoiogical 
 than a metaphysical need which prompted him to philosophize. 
 Likewise Schopenhauer may be understood at this stage of 
 his thouirht as seekinoj in the first instance for a knowledtre 
 of reality rather than as attempting to construct a sure 
 bridge between the world of ovala and the world of yeveo'i?. 
 Both Plato and Schopenhauer are convinced of the unreality 
 of the present life. Here all is relativity and true knowl- 
 edf^e can never be attained; yet neither philosopher can be 
 content with such a world. True knowledge must be sought 
 in order that the practical demands may be satisfied. ' 'If the 
 world was not something that, practically expressed, ought 
 not to be, it would not be a theoretical problem," (11-664). 
 Plato strives for a solid foundation for ethics, while Schopen- 
 hauer recognizes the necessity of knowing reality in order to 
 satisfy the religious aspirations. "Temples and churches, 
 pagodas and mosques, in all lands, at all times, in splendor and 
 grandeur, testify to the metaphysical need of humanity, " (H- 
 177). In attributing an eternal truth to the Platonic ideas, 
 and in ascribing to man under the most favorable circum- 
 stances an ability to apprehend this truth, Schopenhauer 
 clearly abandons his contention that truth is such only in 
 relation and asserts that the human mind can grasp the trans- 
 cendent apart from its phenomenal character. We have 
 already pointed out this change in Schopenhauer's theory of 
 knowledge when discussing his relation to Spinoza; and here 
 the full importance of the doctrine can be estimated, since 
 
 \ 
 
 < 
 
50 
 
 without this revised epistemology Schopenhauer would have 
 been unable to maintain his connection with Plato. To this 
 intuitive knowledge of the non-sensuous the Scholastics and 
 Mystics would have subscribed, and for this the much 
 despised Hegel would have contended, ' ' The only content 
 which can be held to be the truth," writes Hegel (Logic, 
 §74), *^is one not mediated with something else, not limited 
 by other things; or otherwise expressed it is one mediated 
 by itself, where mediate and immediate reference to self 
 coincide. ' ' ^ This absolute knowledge is what Plato evidently 
 seeks in his attempt to ground ethics, and this is the knowl- 
 edge which Schopenhauer must extol in so far as he follows 
 the teachings of Plato. True, this intuitive knowledge has 
 for Schopenhauer a certain relativity, since to know is to 
 have an object of knowledge which requires as its antithesis 
 a subject. Hence it is that he declares that the Platonic 
 ideas do not reveal the thing-in -itself but only its ade(piate 
 objection. Yet we are led to suppose that the Platonic 
 ideas reveal the true nature of the phenomenal world, t and 
 the distinction cannot be held to be of great importance. 
 Over aorainst the knowledo^e of the eternal ideas is set that 
 of the senses, which becomes confused and muddy througli 
 entrance into a material medium. It is difficult here to 
 believe that we are considering the doctrine of an avowed 
 follower of Kant. This is rather the epistemology of Leib- 
 niz than that of the author of the Critical Philosophy. 
 
 The strong emphasis which Plato gives to the phenome- 
 nal character of the world of sense, and the ecpially strong 
 affirmation of this doctrine by Schopenhauer cause both 
 
 * Translation by Wallace, Oxforo 1892. 
 
 t This such passages as the following show: 
 
 " Nicht die mir vorschwebende raumliche Gestalt, sondern der Aus- 
 druck, die reine Bedeutung derselben, t'Ar innerstes Wesen, das sich 
 mir aufschliesst, und mich anspricht ist eigentlich die Idee," (I-247). 
 
 \ i ^ 
 
 k 
 
 A 
 
 \ 
 
 ^ 
 
 / 
 
 * • 51 
 
 philosophers to place a seemingly light value upon this 
 realm; and thus their teaching is confronted with the dan- 
 ger of a reduction to pure Eliatism ; yet while the world 
 is declared to be an illusion and to have only a relative ex- 
 istence, it must be remembered that this illusion and this 
 relativity are such for thought. In no sense can an illusion 
 be said to be non-existent, and the consistent philosopher, 
 far from io-norinor it, is forced to recognize its presence and 
 to attempt to relate it to the clearer but no more existent 
 realm of truth. The importance of this fact should have 
 especially appealed to Schopenhauer, who as a disciple of 
 Kant rejoiced in the death blow given to the old time ontol- 
 ogy'^ There are no grades of being, for " being is evi- 
 dently not a real predicate, "f Phenomena cannot then be 
 explained away but must be connected with noumena. But, 
 as has already been said, Plato was not in the first instance 
 concerned with this connection, while Schopenhauer's posi- 
 tion in so far as he agrees with Plato, may be treated as 
 epistemological rather than metaphysical. Yet out of Pla- 
 to's epistemology a metaphysics arose, the outlines of which 
 he himself indicated, and which was developed to a greater 
 richness and fullness by Aristotle. Schopenhauer, too, 
 finds a metaphysical side for the doctrine of the idea and 
 enlarges it beyond the bounds of Plato's teaching. Hence 
 it becomes necessary to consider more closely the Philoso- 
 phy of Idealism as expounded by its founder and as inter- 
 preted by Schopenhauer. . 
 
 That Plato intended to give to his ideas something more than 
 
 "VDaherTsTder Begriff der ''Vollkommenheit," wenn schlechthiu 
 und in abstracto gebraucht, ein gedankenleeres Wort, und ebecso das 
 Gerede vom ''Allervollkommensten Wesen" u. dgl. m. Das Alles 1st 
 blosser Wortkram. [Kritik der Kantischen Philosophic; (1-503)-] 
 
 t Compare Kant's discussion of the Ontological Argument, Critique 
 of Pure Rea^>on, Trans. Dialectic, Book ii., Chapt in , § 4- 
 
 i 
 
r 'i 
 
 — .« 
 
 52 
 
 1^ 
 
 a purely logical existence there can be no doubt. The idea 
 must be understood as a reality whose being is in no way 
 dependent on individual thought, though it is cast in thought 
 forms in so far as these forms are universal. The idea is an 
 abiding essence beyond space and time, on the one hand 
 pointing to an al)solute above it, and on the other shadowing 
 forth its being in the world of phenomena. In this respect 
 Schopenhauer's doctrine is entirely in accord with that of 
 Plato. The wall as adeipiately objectiticd knows no growth 
 and no decay. Ideas are ^'the permanent, changeless forms 
 independent of the temporal existence of individuals, sjjccies 
 rerum, which properly constitute the purely objective in phe- 
 nomena " (11-416). As has been pointed out, however, Scho- 
 penhauer does not find in these ideas the thing-in-itself. They 
 ' are the forms in which the final essence is revealed to knowl- 
 edore ; yet they are of a permanent and abiding worth in them- 
 selves. Plato's doctrine, at least in its final stage of develop- 
 ment, must be interpreted as in agreement with that of 
 Schopenhauer. The ideas, though eternal, are not a})solute; 
 behind them is the deity with whom these ideas nuist enter 
 into union. But how is such a union possi!)le; liow^ can God, 
 whom Plato conceives as absolute reason, combine in himself 
 ideas seemingly of the most heterogeneous and conflicting 
 nature ? Plato's answer to this question, if definitely 
 expressed, would be that the ideas are not ecpial in rank ; 
 [ some are subordinated to others, and between the lowest and 
 , the highest there is a series ever mounting toward the idea 
 ' of the Good. Thus the connection and arrangement of the 
 ideas involves unmistakably the notion of an end. The 
 world of Being exhibits an eternal arrangement of ideas 
 unified through a teleological ordering of the whole. Thus 
 Plato would explain the relation of his ideal world to the 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 ^ 
 
 \ 
 
 ! 
 
 ^ 
 
 i 
 
 53 
 
 Absolute, the World Reason. The problem still remains to 
 connect this world with phenomena. This relation is far 
 from clear, and only the general direction of the philosopher's 
 thinkinor can be indicated. It is evident that since the ideas 
 themselves are subjected to no change, they cannot be con- 
 sidered as the cause of the world of sense in so far as it is 
 conceived as pure becoming. A secondary principle must 
 be introduced, and this we find in Plato's conception of 
 em})ty space (yu// ov^). This is a sul)sidiary cause and may 
 be viewed as matter which a world-forming God moulds 
 according to the ideas. Here all ends in allegory and 
 mysticism; no scientific conception is offered as to the rela- 
 tion between phenomena and the Avorld of essences : yet the 
 unmistakable character of this union so faintly shadowed 
 forth is teleological. 
 
 At first glance Schopenhauer w^ould seem to be debarred 
 from placing a teleological principle in his universe, since 
 he most explicitly declares that the intellect is secondary to 
 tlie will and purely a product of the phenomenal world. 
 The discussion of this question belongs more properly to 
 the consideration of Schoi)enhauer's system in so far as it 
 accords with Aristotle's philosophy: here it is sufficient to 
 point out that Schopenhauer pictured the ideas as arranged 
 according- to a hierarchy: and that since he declares that be- 
 tween them there exists no temporal relation, the determin- 
 ing factor in this arrangement must be sought as a logical and 
 teleological one in which exists a gradation according to 
 some end. " Every general, original power of nature," 
 says Schopenhauer, ' ' is in its innermost being nothing else 
 than the o])jectivation of the will at a low grade; we call 
 such a irrade an eternal idea in Plato's sense." (1-159.) '^At 
 the higher grades of the objcctivation of the will we see 
 
( 
 
 54 
 
 individuality significantly make its appearance." (1-155) 
 What Schopenhauer considers as the determining factor in 
 the arrangement of the ideas will later be more fully dis- 
 cussed. For the moment it suffices to remark that a distinct 
 teleological notion is involved in the connection of these 
 ideas with the absolute princii)le under which they fall. 
 Concerning the nature of the relation between the ideas and 
 the phenomenal world Schopenhauer is much more explicit 
 than Plato. In so far as the ideas are identified with the 
 intelligible character the relation has already been consid- 
 ered. Schopenhauer, like Plato, is obliged to conceive the 
 subsidiary, yet independent existence of a secondary cause, 
 which serves as the medium for the partial reabzation of 
 the ideas as well as furnishing the reason of their inade- 
 quate expression in the world of sense. Schopenhauer also 
 asserts with Plato that the world is a faint copy of the ideas. 
 ^ a understand," he says (1-151:) ''by idea every definite 
 and changeless grade of the objectivation of the will, in so 
 far as it is thing-in-itself, and hence removed from nudti- 
 plicity; these grades relate themselves to the individual 
 things altogether as their eternal forms or patterns (Muster- 
 bilder)" This is, however, simply the statement of the 
 problem, not its answ^er. The (juestion is, what is the 
 irround of the resemblance between the ideas and the changing 
 forms of the phenomenal world? Plato, we have seen, of- 
 fers no real solution. It remained for his follower, Aris- 
 totle, to carry on and com})lete the work begun; hence ])e- 
 fore considering Schopenhauer's attempt at solving the prob- 
 lem, it becomes necessary to review in outline the system of 
 the great Stagirite which although it posesses no historical 
 connection with Schopenhauer's philosoi)hy, yet exhi])its an 
 important pragmatic relation to it. 
 
 f 
 
 i 
 
 P 
 
 55 
 
 9. ] The solution which Aristotle gives to the problein raised 
 by Plato's philosophy (i. e., the relation between the ideas 
 and the phenomenal world) may be stated as follows: He 
 removes from the idea its quality of transcendence and sets 
 forth a metaphysics of immanence. The ideas exist, but 
 not apart from this world; they are the essences which re- 
 alize themselves in matter. But this realization is in time, 
 since its form is that of development. Hence the ideas lose 
 much of their noumenal reality and take upon themselves 
 the qualities of the world of sense. As the organ develops 
 to its perfection, so the kernel in the unformed matter seeks 
 more and more to realize itself. Not only does a unitary 
 plan manifest its workinirs in the (jrow^th of individual 
 things, but also Nature as a whole must be viewed as a 
 realm of connected and ordered parts whose forms rise even 
 higher and higher toward the deity, the transcendent prm- 
 cij^le in Aristotle's universe. The deity itself is the pure 
 form which does not enter into matter, while all other 
 forms find their ex})ression alone in the physical w^orld. 
 Hence there are two w^orld principles for Aristotle: one 
 that of the inunanent forms w^hich continually seek to come 
 to expression, the other that of the transcendent cause, actus 
 puru^, the immoved mover who draws all to himself. 
 Thus the universe must be viewed as the result of two 
 causes, that of tenq^oral and of transcendental teleology. 
 Later the transcendental notion of teleolof^v will be found 
 to assume the greater importance for us, where it forms the 
 basis for the most consistent ex))ression of Schopenhauer's 
 doctrine, namely in his philosophy of ethics and religion. 
 
 Turninof our attention for the moment to the immanent 
 side of Aristotle's system, we find that apparently it con- 
 flicts with the most fundamental principles of Schopenhauer's 
 
 I 
 
^ I 
 
 56 
 
 V '4 
 67 
 
 teachings. Nowhere are we brought more clearly to recog- 
 nize the insuperable obstacles which Schopenhauer attempts 
 to overcome than at this stage of his thought; hence we shall 
 not be surprised to find that the fourtli book of the '' Workl 
 as Will and Idea" in a measure frees itself from the presup- 
 positions of its earlier cha})ters, while pointing to the only 
 conclusion in regard to the solution of the relation between 
 the world and its absolute principle which it was {)()ssible 
 from the outset to reach, — namely that a detinite knowledge 
 of such a relation is impossible, since the thing-in-itself is 
 purely a negative and limitative concept. The ))()ints at 
 which Schopenhauer's philosophy seems most evidently to 
 conflict with Aristotle's system may be thus summarized : 
 
 I. Schopenhauer ascribes to the ideas an existence above 
 the world of sense, while Aristotle denies their reality apart 
 from phenomena. 
 
 II. Schopenhauer declares that the ideas require a 
 special faculty for their apprehension, while Aristotle sees 
 the only sphere of their exhibition in the visible and tangi- 
 ble universe. 
 
 III. Schopenhauer regards the process of history as 
 unmeaning, while for Aristotle time in essential, since the 
 pure forms reach adequate expression by development. 
 
 IV. Schopenhauer asserts that the intellect is only of a 
 secondary and relative importance, while the logical and 
 teleological elements in Aristotle's philosophy are primary. 
 
 Schopenhauer, however, by no means holds to these prin- 
 ciples, and in his development of the doctrine of the ideas he 
 assumes a position intimately related to the Philosophy of 
 Immanence. ''I say, therefore,'' writes Schopenhauer 
 (Kritik der Kantischen Philosophic, 1-507) ''that the solu- 
 tion of the riddle of the world must proceed from an under- 
 
 ^ 
 
 / ^ 
 
 < I 
 
 % J 
 
 S I 
 
 > 4 
 
 standing of the world itself; that therefore the problem of 
 metaphysics is not to soar above experience in which the 
 world stands forth, but to understand it completely, shiee 
 experience, outer and inner, i^certahdy tlte principal source 
 of all knowJcdgey Likewise (11-203): "It (metaphysics) 
 remains immanent and does not become transcendent." 
 Again (11-730): " my philosophy ''■ - - - does not attempt 
 '•• " '" to explain the being of the world according to its final 
 principle; it rather stops at the facts of outer and inner 
 experience, as they are accessable to every one, and shows 
 the true and deep connection of the same, yet without indeed 
 going out to any supermundane objects and their relation to 
 the world. It affords no conclusion, therefore, to that 
 existing beyond all i)ossible experience, but offers simply 
 the exposition of the given in the outer world and in self- 
 consciousness, contents itself, therefore, with grasping the 
 being of the world according to the inner connection with 
 itself. It is consequently immanent in the Kantian sense of 
 the word." Thus Schopenhauer's philosophy fails to reach 
 the transcendent. At this point it may further be observed 
 that the will (the so-called thing-in-itself) has only a phe- 
 nomenal existence. This a ])rief consideration of Schopen- 
 hauer's own statements will show. The will, as has been 
 seen, is the will-to-live. "So it is the same thing and only 
 a })leonism, if instead of saying simply » the will ' we say 
 ' the will-to-live' " (1-424) In other words wall and life 
 are so intimatelv bound too:ether that where there is no life 
 there is iikew^ise no will. On the other hand, this phe- 
 nomenal existence "as inseparably accompanies the will 
 as the shadow accompanies its body, and if there is 
 will there wdll also be life, (there will also ])e) the 
 world" (1-324.) Further, it appears in Schopenhauer's 
 
 5 
 i 
 
 i \ 
 

 >< 
 
 58 
 
 59 
 
 ethical and religious doctrines, that with the denial 
 of the will-to-live not only life ceases but also the will 
 itself, for the two must stand and fall together, '^ No will : 
 no idea, no world." Thus the will and its adeciuate object- 
 tivation, the Platonic ideas, can no longer be regarded as 
 transcendent, but bound to space and time and cxistentent 
 alone in the phenomenal world. This clearly is the Aristotelian 
 development of the philosoi)hy of idealism. Since the will 
 and the ideas are no longer to be regarded as siii)ernum(hine 
 entities it naturally follows that they ex[)ress themselves in 
 the world and do not require a special faculty of intuition 
 for their apprehensicvn. Scliopcnhauer can no longer con- 
 tend that ''the will is toUxjinevr different from idea'' (phe- 
 nomenal world.) Rather the entire world of sense is '- only 
 the objectivation, the mirror oi the will(^l-315), and ''to the 
 nature of the will its phenomena nuist exactly correspond'' 
 (11-679.) Hence the study of i)hen()mena nuist reveal the 
 true nature of their essence. For example: ^'In order com- 
 pletely to grasp the ideas which manifest themselves in wa- 
 ter, it is not sufficient to see it in the still pool, or the even 
 flowinty stream; but those ideas comi)letelv reveal them- 
 selves first, when the water appears under all i)ossible con- 
 ditions and obstructions, which acting upon it cause it to 
 fully express all its characteristics" (1-29 T). Since the 
 ideas are bound up so closely with phenomena the time fac- 
 tor can not be regarded as unimportant, and the entire 
 world process must be taken into consideration. "The 
 idea of mankind, if it was to appear in its ai)propriate sig- 
 nificance, might not present itself alone and unconnected, 
 but had to be attended downwards stej) by stej) through all 
 the forms of the animal world, through the kingdom of 
 plants to that of inorganic life; they all act supplementary 
 
 4 
 
 S 
 
 i 
 
 S 
 
 I 
 
 to each other for the complete objectivaiion of the will: 
 the idea of humanity as necessarily presupposes them, as 
 the blossoms of the tree presuppose the leaves, the branch, 
 the trunk and the root: they form a pyramid whose summit 
 is man." (1-182). This intimate connection between all parts 
 of the world makes history of the highest importance. It 
 is no lono:er a mere dream and delusion. " What reason is 
 to the individual that is historvto the human race '* (11-508. ) 
 Yet more important is the consideration that the whole 
 world, l)ound inseparably as it is with the temporal notion, 
 is the scene of the denial of the w-ill, an historical event of 
 transcendent significance. Thus the will appears as limited 
 in time and its extinction becomes the goal of practical en- 
 deavor. 
 
 Schopenhauer, thus completely in accord with Aristotle 
 in placing the Platonic ideas under temporal conditions, like- 
 wise agrees with him in his conception of the teleological 
 character of the relation between phenomena and the ideas 
 which manifest themselves therein, although such an agree- 
 ment may seem to come into the sharpest conflict witli 
 Schopenhauer's contention that we are prohibited from ap- 
 plying the notion of an end to nature as a whole which is 
 the jjri us of all intellectuality. " We are in no way justi- 
 fied to apply our limitations to Nature which is itself a ^^/vVx 
 of all intellect, and whose workings are from ours "" '' 
 totally different. She brings into existence the api)arently 
 purposive and planned without thought and without the no- 
 tion of an end, because without an idea the origin of which 
 is completely secondary" (11-373) In vain w^ould Schopen- 
 hauer contend that the teleological notion is purely heuristic 
 in its character; that it is an idea which the intellect reads 
 into the world. " The purposiveness of the organism exist 
 
\ 
 
 I 
 
 60 
 
 simply for the reason which recognizes it." (TI-373) Not- 
 withstanding this explicit denial of a more than su))ject- 
 ive validity to the teleological notion, Schopenhauer 
 clearly pictures the world objectively considered under 
 thought determinations, since he, as already said, arranges 
 the Platonic ideas, the adequate objectivation of the thing- 
 in-itself, according to a teleological principle. Further, the 
 will shows a tendency to realize itself in a workl of j)henom- 
 ena and creates the individual intellect that it may Ik iter 
 succeed^ although we are told that it is a com[)letely blind 
 principle without aim. By this we are doubtless to under- 
 stand that the will has no rational end; one that could be 
 justified by the highest wisdom and widest exj)ericncc. It 
 certainly has the most definite of aims, that of living and of 
 living, too, in a certain definite and determined manner. 
 Schopenhauer must be understood as admitting the validity 
 of the teleological notion in the realm of nature. Lucretius, 
 Bacon and Spinoza have denied it, but wrongly and l)ecause 
 they considered it inseparable from speculative theology. 
 '* Spinoza did not know how to help himself in any other 
 manner, than through the desperate expedient of denying 
 teleology itself, therefore purposiveness in the works of na- 
 ture, a contention whose monstrosity is apparent to every- 
 one who has obtained an exact knowled^^e of orii:anic nature. 
 * * ^ In comparison with these philosoi)hers of 
 Modern Times Aristotle appears to a great advantage 
 who just at this point shows himself in a most favorable 
 light." (11-388). Thus Schopenhauer agrees with Aris- 
 totle's principle of immanent teleology, finding indis- 
 putable evidence of its domain just where the great teacher 
 of Antiquity discovered it, namely in the organic world. 
 Schopenhauer pictures the whole physical universe under 
 
 
 i 
 
 ♦ 
 
 ♦ 
 
 s 
 
 \ 
 
 > 
 
 61 
 
 the symbol of organic life. It is the unfolding of the will- 
 to-live and agrees in its various parts. Yet the teleology 
 which ^t bears evidence of is conceived as possible without 
 intelligence. Though "in fact we cannot clearly think of a 
 final cause [Endursachc) otherwise than as an end corteni- 
 plated, that is as a motive;" yet 'nf vvc closely ol)serve the 
 final causes in nature, we must, in order to express their 
 transcendent beinir, not fear a contradiction, and 1x)ldlv 
 state: fnal caune is a utotlve trlilcli v:ovhs upon a h'-iVKi^ hnt 
 Is not recognized Ijy //." (11-378) The will is related to 
 the world through the principle of unconscious theolog}'. 
 This principle, moreover, as with Aristotle, centres in tlie 
 ideas which seek self-realization {.^uu/n esse conservarc). 
 "The idea, or the species is that wherein the will to live as 
 a matter of fact roots itself and manifests itself" ^11-552 i. 
 Thus the will-to-live becomes the end as it is the cause and 
 essential exj)ression {i.iopcpij) of l)eing. But how far this 
 will is removed from the thino^-in-itself which knows no re- 
 lation and is completely sundered from the phenomenal 
 world! As already pointed out, this will of vrhich Scho- 
 penhauer is here speaking realizes itself alone in the world 
 of sense and must rise and decay with phenomena. 
 
 A comparison of the manner in which Aristotle and Scho- 
 penhauer developed the notion of temporal teleology in the 
 physical universe is not without interest. Schopenhauer 
 finds three principal grades of the ol^jectivation of the will, 
 ramely in the inorganic realm of mechanical necessity: 
 in the realm of vegetable life, where mechanical neces- 
 sity is replaced by the law of irritability in the growth 
 and development of the plant, and finally in the realm 
 of sentient life, where the will appears under the 
 guidance of motives. Similarly Aristotle distinguishes 
 
 ♦ 
 
s 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 62 
 
 I » 
 
 i 
 
 63 
 
 between the mechanical causation of inorganic nature 
 and the causation which first displays itself in organic 
 life, namely in the plant world, in the animal king- 
 dom, and finally in the life of human beings. The lower 
 forms with him as with Schopenhauer are necessary for the 
 existence and activities of the higher. This interesting gra- 
 dation of inorganic and living matter according to the ideas 
 which seek to express themselves finds also its parallel in 
 the natural philosophy of Schelling. 
 
 ^ i 
 
 '/ 
 
 s 
 
 I 
 
 ♦ 
 
 » 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE TKI.EOI.OCICAL PHASE OF SCHOFEMIAUER S DOCTRINE. 
 
 10. 
 
 T 
 
 HE relation of teleoloaieal imiiianenee niav 
 be considered as the final form iiiuler v liich 
 8chc)i)enhaiier attempts to conceive tlie con- 
 nection l)etween the will and the world. We have 
 seen that his previous notions of this connection ha^'e 
 not led to a satisfactory solution of the problem which 
 he essays to solve. Schopenhauer, in so far as he succeeds 
 in joining noumena with phenomena, proceeding from his 
 conception of parallelism between the inner and the outer 
 series, makes use of the causal law, which he likewise em- 
 ploys in his doctrine of empirical and intelligible character. 
 Yet in these tAvo instances we have found him dealing with 
 a i)henomenal rather than a noumenal will. The same is 
 also true, when by the aid of the teleological concept, he 
 becomes the expounder of the philosophy of immanence. 
 In fact Schopenhauer, following Kant, has in no way suc- 
 ceeded in reaching a transcendent principle, a positive 
 thing-in-itself. The will under all points of view appears 
 w^hen carefully examined as a multiplicity, subjected to 
 space, time and causality. When it is spoken of as the 
 final reality of the universe it is another principle and not 
 the wdi which is leally referred to. This other principle 
 raises itself above the will and opposes itself to it. ' ' In 
 truth what gives to our life its strange and ambiguous char- 
 acter is the fact that in it kvo diametrically opposed aims 
 continually conflict with each other, that of the individual 
 will directed toward chimerical fortune in an ephemeral, 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
64 
 
 65 
 
 dreamlike, deceptive being, where in reference to what has 
 past fortune and miKsfortune are of equal importance, where 
 the present, however, at every moment l)ecomes the past; 
 and that of Fate^ evidently directed toward the destroying 
 of our fortune and therebv toward the mortification of our 
 will and the removal of the delusion which holds us chained 
 in the bonds of this world." (11-735.) The })rescnce of 
 this second and tinal princii)le is likewise recognized by 
 Schopenhauer in the fact that the identity of all liuman l)e- 
 ings is conceived as depending on the denial of the will and 
 not on its afhrmation. It is only when the will is destroyed 
 that the cause of diversity in the world disa})pears. ''This 
 identity is, however, present only in the condition of the 
 devial of the will (Nirvana) since its atlirmation (Sansara) 
 has for its form the phenomena of the same in their mul- 
 tiplicity" (11-700.) 
 
 It is this second principle whicli determines the arrange- 
 ment of Schopenhauer's world of ideas and which becomes 
 their aim and goal. Under this higher reality the world is 
 conceived as^ progressing toward man and intellectual exis- 
 tence, just as with Aristotle. The ideas which find their 
 expression in the world are not nmtually independent but 
 arranged according to a system of transcendental valuation 
 whose goal is not in this world. The will on the other hand 
 is reduced to the position of demiurge, the creator of the 
 present world. It, therefore, becomes the source of illusion 
 and not the intellect, which intuitivelv recoirnizes the error 
 of earthly existence and destroys the will wh.ch gave it 
 birth. The purely secondary character of the will can no 
 longer be doubted. '' Behind our being ^h^^:Q \^ soinetldng 
 {Etwas) different," so different indeed that it is possible that 
 our nature from its very foundation may become something 
 
 t 
 
 I I I 
 
 else and a '^ transcendental change " take plact^. This tran- 
 scendental chancre is the end of existence and toward this all 
 nature moves through its countless gradations, from the 
 senseless forms of matter to the religious genius who reads 
 the meaning of life and comprehends its delusion. It now 
 becomes plain why it is that Schopenhauer pictures the ideas 
 as arranged in an ascending scale whose end is knowledge ; 
 for the will ''can be removed through nothing else, than 
 through knowledge. Therefore the only way to salvation is 
 this, that the will should appear unopposed, in order that in 
 this appearance it may recognize its own being. Only in 
 consequence of this knowledge can the will remove itself, 
 and therewith likewise end the suffering which is inseparable 
 from its appearance : this is not, however, possible through 
 (the use of) physical force, as through destruction of the 
 germ, or the killing of the new-born, or suicide. Nature 
 leads the will to the light, because it can find its deliverance 
 alone in the light " (1-474). Thus the relation of the world 
 to this superior principle becomes beyond a doubt a pur- 
 posive one, but what this ultimate is Schopenhauer does not 
 attempt te definitely set forth. "What remains after the 
 complete removal of the will is for those who are yet full of 
 will, indeed, nothing. However, on the other hand, for 
 those in whom the will has transformed and denied itself is 
 this our so real world with all its suns and milky ways — 
 nothing " (1-487). As long as we are the will to live, that 
 which is beyond the will is for us nothing and from this it 
 follows, since knowledge arises alone with the will, that the 
 ultimate principle of the universe is unknowable. Here 
 Schopenhauer is once more true to his Kantian epistem- 
 ology. After finding the will to be a purely immanent 
 principle in his doctrine of the ideas as revealing and express^ 
 
 ? 
 
 s 
 
 ^ 
 
( 
 
 66 
 
 incy themselves in the world of sense, Schopenhauer discovers 
 that it is impossible longer to consider such a phenomenized 
 and relative principle as the true thing-in-ilself. The real 
 behind all change and beyond the possibility of phenomeni- 
 zation is the purely limitative and negative concei)t under 
 which Kant conceives the thing-in-itself. Yet for the mind 
 to set up limits means that in a certain sense these limits 
 must be transcended, and so in Scho})enhauer's treatment of 
 the phenomenal world in relation to this newly promulgated 
 thing-in-itself, an idea of this absolute must be shadowed 
 forth, even though most vaguely. This turn in Schopen- 
 hauer's thought leads us directly to his religious mysticism 
 and his connection with the philosophy of Fichte. 
 
 11.] Schopenhauer's avowed contemi)t for the idealism of 
 successors of Kant did not entirely free him from the spirit 
 of his times, and we find here and there i)assages by no 
 means repugnant to the doctrine of Hegel; while in his 
 teaching concernino- the irrational element at the l)asis of the 
 world and in his treatment of natural philosophy there is 
 much which reminds one of the poetic and extravagant ex- 
 position of Schelling; but of the three great apostles of the 
 Idealistic School, his relation to its founder is the most im- 
 portant for the pur[)oses of this discussion. Clearly the 
 point at which Schopenhauer enters into the closest connec- 
 tion with Fichte is in his construction of metaphysics from 
 an ethical and religious basis with the necessary theological 
 presuppositions as to the relation of the world to its ultimate 
 principle. This i)rinciple is for Fichte the Universal Ego, 
 for Schopenhauer at tirst the will, l)ut later an unknown 
 and unknowable " Etivas.'' Fichte conceives philosophy as 
 founded on morals, and the order of the universe is an ethi- 
 cal order continually expressing itself with greater perfec- 
 
 ♦ 
 
 \ 
 
 I 
 
 67 
 
 tion. Thus far Fichte's philosophy is purely immanent and 
 unreservedly optimistic in marked contrast to Schopenhauer's 
 system which finds the world the worst possible, so full of 
 pain and evil that were it but a little worse it could not 
 exist. Yet even for Schopenhauer the world offers an oppor- 
 tunity for the exercise of morality, since all beings are 
 called upon to minimize the suffering around them by the 
 limitation of their own personal wills, the source of all evil. 
 When Fichte \s philosophy bee )mes transcendant and assumes 
 a distinctively religious character it enters into a much closer 
 accord with Schopenhauer's system. Here there is no great 
 difference between the ''Incomprehensible One " of Fichte 
 and the Etwm of Schopenhauer. They approach very near 
 to the Kantian thing-in-itself and are negative concepts. 
 The absolute Ego is inexplicable and incomprehensible to 
 finite minds. In itself it is neither subject nor object ; it 
 tirst l)ecomes known ])y its separation into these antithetical 
 elements. In essence it is the pure, white light which is 
 never known in its purity. Schopenhauer at this point must 
 he interpreted as in intimate agreement with Fichte. The 
 will like the Ei^o is in the first instance a psvcholooficallv 
 known fact. It is employed to denominate the thing-in- 
 itself, yet the a!)solute as such reseml)les in name alone its 
 alleged counterpart. The will like the Ego belongs entirely 
 to the phenomenal world ; as without the NonEjro the E^o 
 cannot be conceived, so without the world the will falls 
 away. The ultimate behind the manifold is an enigma, since 
 it is irrational in so far as with the renunciation of the will, 
 the intellect, which has fulfilled the j)urpose for which it was 
 created, is removed. Subject and object fade away in the 
 eternal nio^ht which broods over all. 
 
 For Fichte, however, the absolute Ego cannot be regarded 
 
 t 
 
i 
 
 (T8 
 
 without certain determinations, in as much as its relation to 
 the world must be conceived as the foundation of moralit}'. 
 It cannot be explained, perhaps, why the eternal being 
 divides itself into subject and object since its freedom is be- 
 yond comprehension, yet it must stand in a teleological re- 
 lation to its phenomena and cannot be regarded in itself as 
 irrational. Further, it becomes the end of religious striv- 
 ing, and though it approximates to a nothing for knowledge, 
 for faith it may become everything, as the history of nega- 
 tive theology from Philo to the present day shows. "Man," 
 Fichte tells us, "must do away with himself as the great 
 negation and then he passes into God. ' ' This is the goal of 
 life and this is the final mystitication of Fichte' s system. 
 How near this teaching is to the ultimate philosophy of 
 Schopenhauer, as expressed in the closing chapters of the 
 World as Will and Idea, a rapid survey will show. Scho- 
 penhauer's negative must not be conceived as a nothing. 
 " If something is nothing among all that which we know, 
 so is it, indeed, for us completely nothing. Yet it does not 
 follow from this that it is absolutely nothino', that it also 
 viewed from every possible standpoint and in every possible 
 sense must b e nothing, but only that we are limited to a 
 purely negative knowledge of the same, which very well 
 can arise from the limitations of our standpoint" (11-703.) 
 This relative nothing has a decided moral relation to the 
 world. Life is a punishment and an atonement for the origi- 
 nal sin implicit in all living. " Man's greatest crime is that 
 he was born." This existence then is not simply a mistake, 
 not simply something that brings more sorrow than hapi)i- 
 ness, not simply the epitome of pain ; it is morally wrong, 
 and therefore must be conceived in opposition to a higher 
 principle which rules the universe, demanding a strict account 
 
 
 I 
 
 t m 
 
 ■> r 
 
 69 
 
 for the sin of humanitv. " The world is exactlv what it is, 
 because the will, whose appearance it is, is such, because it 
 so wills. The justification for the suffering is that the 
 will affirms itself in this appearance and this affirmation is 
 justified and atoned for through the fact that it bears the 
 sufiering. Here is revealed to us a glimpse of eternal jus- 
 tice.^'' (1-390.) This higher principle is not conceived 
 alone under moral attributes. The world while ethically 
 wrong, is yet the scene for the working out of salvation. 
 Man is the crown of creation because in him is the possibil- 
 ity of escaping from temporal existence. Here is the dis- 
 tinctive religious side to Schopenhauer's doctrine and here 
 he is in accord with Fichte and Neo-Platonic mvsticisni. 
 " Should yet a positive knowledge be insisted upon concern- 
 ing that which philosophy can exy^ress only negatively as 
 denial of the will, then there is nothing left but to point out 
 that condition which those have reached who have experi- 
 enced a complete denial of the will, and which is indicated 
 by the name ecstacy, rapture [Entruckung^) illumination, 
 union with God, etc. ; which condition, however, is not 
 really to Ije called knowledge, because it has no longer the 
 form of subject and object, and because further it is accessi- 
 ble only to individual experience and cannot be communi- 
 cated to others." (1-485.) "Life presents itself as a pro- 
 cess of purification whose cleansing lye is pain. If the 
 process is completed, it leaves its previous immorality and 
 wickedness as a shell behind and then comes that condition 
 of which the Veda says : findltur nodus cordis, dissfdvim- 
 tur omnesdidjitationes, ejusque opera evaneseunt.'^ (II 735. ) 
 Thus Schopenhauer's philosophy passes over into religious 
 mysticism. The final principle of the universe is no longer 
 a matter of knowledge. Its essence and its relation to the 
 
 * - " l— W ^^B*- 
 
70 
 
 world are discernable to the eye of faith alone. Yet this 
 much is certaiiL The aim of all things animate and inani- 
 mate is reabsorjion into the infinite from which it has pro- 
 ceeded. Schopenhauer agrees most fully with Meister 
 Eckhard and the mystics of the Christian faith, hut especially 
 he is in accord with the religious teachings of the Orient, 
 whose theme is the nothingness of life, whose goal is Nir- 
 vana. 
 
 " The dew is on tho lotus : rise Great Sun ! 
 
 *' And lift my leaf and mix me with the wave, 
 
 '' Om mani padmc hum, the sunrise comes! 
 
 ^' The dewdrop slips into the shining sea.''* 
 12.] In order to understand the worth and si<rni(icancc of 
 Schopenhauer's i)hilos()[)hy itis most imi)()rtant from the out- 
 set to determine the point of view from which it is to he 
 considered, and in this connection it is necessary first of all 
 clearly to grasp the fact that the system which is presented 
 to us is by no means a unity wlicn treated as a metaphysical 
 doctrine. Here it 1)reaks down completely and here is seen 
 the impossibility of grounding a transcendental }>lnl()S()pliy 
 on the Kantian epistemology. The negative importance of 
 this part of Sch()i)enliauer\s philosophy is notewortliy in con- 
 nection with Kant's teaching, since the founder of the ( j-itical 
 Philosophy did not journey beyond the island of experience. 
 Schopenhauer, however, ventures out on the ^'wi<lc and 
 stormy ocean, the region of illusion, where many a fogbank, 
 many an iceberg, seems to themariiur on his \()\ao:c('f <lis- 
 covery a new country/' 4- ()n this ocean Schopenhauer's 
 adventurous bark wanders iip and down, but e\er an<l ancui 
 returns to the kM faniibar co:ist, having found no continent 
 beyond. 
 
 * The Light of Asia ; Sir I'Mwin An-oli. lA'tul.n iH^^k 
 t Criticjuc of Pure ReastHi , Transcendental Doctnne of Uic I'aenltv 
 Judgriieut, Chapter 111. 
 
 « 
 
 71 
 
 The Kantian doctrine, however, is but one side of Schopen- 
 hauer's philosophy. The doctrine of the id. as must not be 
 forgotten although the system under consideration is thus 
 divided into two opposing lines of thought which are never 
 reconciled. The world drama has no unity of plot, but 
 moves forward under the influence of two diametricadly 
 oi)posed forces and the denouement must be found on a stage 
 not presented to human view. It is a transcendental climax 
 which we must seek if we wish to find even a modicum of 
 consistency in the system of Schopenhauer. Otherwise all 
 remains frao^mentarv and unsatisfactory. Lehmann has 
 hinted at the point of view which must be assumed if these 
 heterofreneous fragments are to ])e brought together. 
 '' What holds these elements together," he writes, "])rea+Jies 
 life into them, binds them into an organic whole, is a unity 
 at the basis of which lies a inoral ordering of things. 
 This conception of a moral world orders merges, however, 
 into a relio-ious determination of the universe which must be 
 considered as the final standpoint from which Schopenhauer's 
 philosophy is to be treated. Meta})hysics nmst yield jibtce 
 to a })hiloso})hy of ethics and religion, if meaning is to l>e 
 extracted from a doctrine which is otherwise not even ci n- 
 sistentlv inconsistent Such an interpretation of tlie ]ibil- 
 o-ophv l)ef()re us is })y no means forced or far fetclied. hut 
 is in the closest accord with the evident meaning of Scho})en- 
 hauer himself. As Kuno Fischer has clearly ])ointed (uit. it 
 was no mere whim which induced the })hiloso])her to in-tall 
 the statue of Buddha in the |)lace of honor in his household, 
 and wdiich |n'oni])ted him to salute the iMdefaligahlo Fraueii- 
 stadt as - l^r::- Ernnq.lint^^ and his con verts as '• Apostles. 
 Schopenhauer was deeply in earnest. lie repirde^d liiniself 
 as the prtanulgator of a new inoralh}- mij»! a> tiie heralder ot 
 a new sahation. 
 
 f 
 
< •■■» 
 
 Scti()[)enhau('r must be credited with a keen insight into 
 the essence of ethics and religion. Two of his <loctrines are 
 especially noteworthy, the one that of the unethical nature 
 of the i)urelv individual will and the necc.-^sity of its denial 
 for the sake of true morals nn<\ religion : the otlier that of 
 the mystical nature of the tinal ])rinci|)le of religious viaiera- 
 tion. Here we are no longer to consider the will as thing- 
 in-itself !)ut as the source of sorrow and misery in the world. 
 The i)ersonal will directed toward the attainment of its own 
 desires must l)e reirarded hv reliirion and ethics alike as 
 iniw^orthy ; and since Schopenhauer's coiirc|)tion of the will 
 is contined |)urely to its ind.\ idtial mnnifestnt ions and recog- 
 nizes no universal tendencies in its natui'c it folhc^v-s that 
 this will nnist he denied and crucjlicd. Here Scliopen- 
 hauer gives emplia>i> to a most ini|)oida!!t trutii, a truth 
 wliich the optimism of \n^ time \va< in 'lann-i^r of tnrircUing. 
 Salvation comes alone with the di\atli of ths' evil will, \vlio'<(^ 
 destruction all religicsn mu^t seek. Only in the liiial illu- 
 mination of the traji-cendenl worM is re.-l reaelied. and tlu.' 
 door of eternal peace ()|>en(Ml. Urns Schopenhauer is in 
 svmpatliy with the tea'/liiiii'- of the irreat AuLi-u-line, who 
 likewise stronirlv assert.- the -pririiarv i'.f tlie will at the out- 
 set, l)ut wdio ends in pla<'inii- tlie \-i-inn of (ind a^ \\ir tlnal 
 aim of all stri\'inir. d'h*'re is ca.lin aftor the str.rni. So 
 Augustine, like Schopc'ihaner, iind> the end of all (aaleavnr 
 in Neo-Fla,tonic mysticism vdiose S|iifi! llimuLiii reiituiao of 
 formalism and spii'itual decay ke|)t adive The t!aio religaai in 
 the Church. Tims, \'it,'\vir!L!' ^eh,(!pia!h;uie!-'> ph'i!o-.(>|!.hy frren 
 the standpoint of ethics and i-eligion it ohtaiie- a worth 
 which it cannot claim as a pure metaj-'h} <ie>. Here tin.' 
 tangled threads of Schopenhauer'.s liieaighl iiecume separated, 
 
 • I 
 
 r 
 
 « 
 
 / 
 
 liere the heterogenous elements find a union and a meaning, 
 when the world is viewed as |)rogressing toward a goal 
 wdiich, though no human eye can see and no finite mind can 
 know, the heart can feel and compreliend. 
 
 I 
 
Natus sum dlv'iv. knl. Apri, MIX \X;i.X I X, I'hcnirc in 
 Khodiciisis Insulae ro-})uhlic;!. St('|'hanus (\.lvii> opcrari- 
 onim fahricae dux patiu" nicu^ e^l. lldei addielus sum 
 
 evaiiir^dicae. 
 
 Septem arinos in ludis privatis v{ dciiidi' annos ti'cs in 
 
 Academia Worccstd" studii.-^ iucuiiui. 
 
 Anno MDCCCLXA'Il apud riiiversitatnn lii-uncn-cMu 
 matric'ulatus : (inattuor annis in studiis artium hoiu'>tarum 
 consumptis ad i^-radiun liacralaurt'i pliilo.-^upliiat' t'M'etus sum. 
 Trinus postea aiuiis in ctidcin uiiivcrsitati^ iiradjim artium 
 nirunstri onera historiai' litti'raruiii .VuLiiiraiMun vX liuLniae 
 })raeci[)iu' data, nu'ritus sum. l*rai'tt're:i uuuni aruiuiu m 
 universitate i>runen^i moratus Jacoitum Sclli |>lnlr»-,op|tiao 
 |)r()fess(»rem \irum humanis>!niuiii audrvi. 
 
 Amu) MDCCX'XlA' l)(u-(»iimun iiu' ■•ontuli uhi jU'()i\'.-ori - 
 })us chirissimis I'aul.-t'n v\ PlIridci-riM't dn.-tnrc Siinmrl maL'"- 
 isti'is studiis philosc.phiao ojserain da!'<Mn. Ab die l^aN^•}lali 
 MDCCCXCVI Ari^i'iitorati fui cl proU'-sore^ Knapj), 
 Koeppcd, Windelhand el Ziculei' viio-. ofiiatissimos audivi. 
 
 His omnibus mairislri- uTatias a^-o tiiiafii inaxinia--^. 
 
 } 
 
 W 
 
 
 
 
 hf V 
 
 ;'•'/ 
 
 A^**'' 
 
 
 
 
 (fy-f ■*■ 
 
 
 p^ ' 
 
 jf- 
 
 W 
 
 2; 
 
 s. 
 
 
 ** if 
 
 
 
 
 
 « 
 
 *.*i 
 
 
 
 *. 
 
 ,iiiiiiiiMiiJiiiiiMiiiii|ii«.i»i<i ~ 
 
 to 
 
 *. 
 
 7C2 
 
 
 \ Ai 
 
 
 fV4-4 
 
 
 
 
 -'■' .*■ L 
 
 
 -.-.;-^l 
 
 X t- \y! 
 
 
 t .»• 
 
 
 
 
 /> 
 
 -^s: 
 
 '■*:?» 
 
 
 
 
m 
 
 •v. v^ 
 
 . > n 
 
 V':^.:./^<:;<^ 
 
 
 ;^ 
 
 kl<