CUKRENCY AND RAILWAYS. The subject of the great Moveiient in Raiwats, whicli absorbs the public attention, to the exclusion of almost all other topics, is so closely connected wth the question of the “ Currency,” that it may be useful at the present time to those engaged in their promotion and to the public in general, to show the pernicious effect of the present system of Restricted Currency in respect to the progress and ex¬ ecution of these most desirable national undertakings. It is to be presumed that no one tvill now dispute the utility of railways, or the vast superiority, in aU respects, of this new mode of conveyance, over the old, and especially in respect to the saving of time and money. This is no longer, as it was some years ago, a problem to be solved, but it is an axiom established. And more than this — it is a truth forced on the conviction of the country by experience, that the general establishment of railways, wherever traffic has caused the promotion of a highway, is now become a necessity. And it has become a necessity for this reason; that those ^stricts whose farming, manufacturing, and commercial in¬ terests are devoid of the facilities and economies which conveyance by railway affords, find that they are not in a condition to compete with other parts, where those facilities are in action ; and that it has come to pass, that either they must contrive to procure the like ad¬ vantage of this modern invention for themselves, or that they must be content to remain in a position of comparative social stagnation, with their property deteriorated, and their profits and incomes lessened. The strong conviction of this truth in the public mind has occasioned therefore a general desire, and a consequent movement in aU parts of the country, to establish' in their own localities the same system of railway conveyance which has been proved to be 2 CUKKENCY AJJD EAILWATS. usefnl and profitable in others, and which has now become a necessity in all; and this attempt may be viewed as a grand national struggle to develope the resources of the country, and to call forth the powers of.industi-y of the population, to the end of increasing individual wealth and national prosperity. Jfow all persons must allow, that to increase individual wealth and national prosperity is a consummation most devoutly to be wished: and when it is considered that such desirable results are proposed to be accomplished by the most commendable means — not by the agency of war, but by the arts of peace—by the application of the unemployed powers of labour to the creation of the things desired; it would seem that there could be no objection to allowing full scope to the industry of the nation. And it is to be borne in mind also, that the great tUtficulty of the present day is to find employment for that which is called — but which, in our opinion, is erroneously called — a “redundant” population. Kow here is, on one side, a want which is universally felt—the want of railways generally throughout the country; and on the other side, there are ready thousands of brawny arms and willing minds ready and eager to make them; — the demand for railways occasions a demand for labourers; and without labourers the railways cannot be made; while labourers are standing idle, or starving on insufficient wages, because of their want of that employment which the formation of railways might afford; — what, then, is the obstacle which prevents railways from being made, the population from being employed, and the wealth, which railways would produce, from being created? The answer is, “The want of money.” But why is there a want of money ? Is not money a mere symbol or sign of value to be passed' from hand to hand in some convenient shape, for the purpose of facilitating the exchange of one commodity for an¬ other ; inasmuch as to exchange a haystack in one part of the country for a house in another part, by the bodily removal of each, would be a very inconvenient mode of proceeding; and as it is in the power of the com¬ munity to have as many of these symbols as their industrial necessities require, why should “ a want of money,” or, in other words, a want of symbols, prevent useful objects from being effected, and the wealth of the nation increased in accordance 'with its powers of industry? The answer to this is, that, by the present system of currency, it is determined that the amount of the money of the country—that is to say, of the symbols which are necessary for carrying on the indus¬ trial operations of the country—shall be arbitrarily restricted to the CtlBRENCT AND RAILWAYS. amount of gold and silver bullion which can be easily procured in exchange for those symbols! Thus, if by any accident, whether of foreign wars requiring the gold bullion which at present remains in this country, or of the same gold being wanted by other nations in payment for the corn wanted by Great Britain, or for any other reason, this precious metal, as it is called, should be withdrawn from the cellars of the Bank of England, where it is at present deposited, the country is, therefoke, to sus¬ pend the industrial operations which it was in the act of carrying on, or which it had planned to carry on, in order that the amount of national industry developed might not exceed the proportion of gold bullion on wliich the “money” of the country is made arbitrarily to depend! Li other words, the present system of currency restricts the quan¬ tity of industrial operations which shall be carried on to the amount of a certain scarce metal which can be procured to form the “ money” by which those operations are effected! And although there are a great many notes of the Bank of Eng¬ land and of other banks in circulation, and performing the office of money,—practically proving that it is not necessary that money should be a valuable commodity in itself, but that the symbol of a piece of paper serves the purpose quite as well as a lump of gold,—the quan¬ tity of these notes is restricted by law, from the fear, as the law says, or implies, that there may be more notes in circulation than there might be “ gold money” to exchange for them on demand. So that, this being the law, the nation is not allowed to have the convenience of a money which might represent the value of all sorts of commodities; but their money is arbitrarily made the represent¬ ative of one particular commodity, namely, gold ; and as this com¬ modity is scarce, it necessarily follows that the money of a country representing it must be scarce also. And such is the fact; and such is the evil under which this country at present labours; and the present want of money for developing the industry of the country by means of the formation of Railways is a practical illustration of the pernicious effect of the present system of “ The Currency.” Now let us see the amount of money wanted for the formation of the railways at present in progress; we mean those for which acts have been obtained. This amount is about thirty-eight millions; to which is to be added about eight millions for foreign railways, which are supported by speculators in this country: but we shall put those A 2 CUKRENCT KAILWATS. eight millions aside for the present, for the sake of simplifying the argument, and speak only of the thirty-eight millions required for our internal projects. The companies who will have to raise these tliirty- eight millions have the power to raise on loan the further sum of fourteen millions, making in all a sum to be procured of fifty-two minions. But besides the railway companies already incorporated by act of parliament, there are many other railways projected, and which re¬ quire a vast amoimt of money for their execution. It cannot be taken for granted that everyone of these pi-ojected railways is a sound and judicious enterprise; but we mil take the extreme, and set down all these proposed undertakings as good, and we shall then find that we have about 600 approvable lines projected, requiring four hundred minions of money to complete them. It is this thirty-eight miUions of money positively wanted to com¬ plete the lines already in progress, and still more the prospect of the four hundred millions of money for the railways projected, which occasions the present alarm, and the embarrassing question of “ where is the money to come from ? ” And in truth, under the present system of currency, it may wen be asked “ where is the money to come fromfor the law restricts and forbids the creation of money beyond a certain amount, so that it is impossible for the amount of money wanted to be forthcoming. As wen might a thirsty population cry out for water in a counfry where their rulers had ordained that no water should be brought from the weU except in golden pitchers: there might be water enough in the well, if those who had the power-of deafing it out would allow it to he carried away in common vessels; but no; nothing but pitchers of gold! the quantity of water to be distributed among the people must be confined to the quantity of golden pitchers which the people could procure to hold it! What would be the condition of that people? With plenty of water at their command, they would die of tliirst! — As water is to the people supposed, so is money to the population of this country; our golden money is their golden pitcher. But, it may be said, seeing the vast amount of money wanted for the completion of all these railways,—this fifty-two millions positively and immediately, and this four hundred millions prospectively, — is it possible, by any means, to raise in time such enormous sums of money for this or any other purpose ? Let us see whether such an operation is possible; perhaps, if we can show that such operations-have been effected before, it may be allowed that they may be done again ; and more especially if we can CHERENCr a: RAILWAYS. show that sums equally large have been raised to be thrown into the sea,—or that which is equivalent, in respect to our argument, to being thrown into the sea,—it may be granted, that for purposes individually profitable, and nationally advantageous, the like sums of money may be raised again;—but certainly not under the present system of currency. Let us take a glance at what was done during the period between the years 1797 and 1815, both inclusive, wliich for the most part was a time of war; what was the amount of money wanted then? and how was it provided? We find by the parliamentai-y tables, which all may consult, that the amount of money raised in those eighteen years was nearly fifteen hundred millions! Nearly fifteen hundred millions! These are startling figures; but they are quite correct. The total revenue raised in these years was more than 981 millions, and the total of the money borrowed was more than 470 millions, making in all 1451 millions. There was really more than 758 millions of money borrowed; but as more than 287 millions of debt was paid off during that time, it reduces the amount to the sum which we have stated, namely 470 millions. And it is worth while to note that in one of these years, namely, in 1813, the sum of more than 150 millions was raised in revenue and loan, of which nearly 82 millions was loan for the national use ; and this in a single year! Now, if 82 millions of money could be raised in one year for the purpose of carrying on a war, sm'ely 52 millions may be raised in a year for carrying on railways. For the money so raised for carrying on a war was actually sunk, wasted, lost, as if it had been thrown into the sea. It saved the country from foreign domination, but that is another question; we are talking of the power of this nation to raise money for the purpose of being expended; and we are showing that the nation could and did raise in one year, besides its more than 68 millions of revenue, a further sum of more than 82 millions as loan. And in respect to the objects for which the sum of 470 millions of money was raised, and the way in which it was expended, we contend that, as a mere money question, it might be more easily raised for making railways than for making war, and that in the former way it would be much more profitably employed. Because, as we have said before, the 470 millions which were raised lor carrying on the war was actually sunk and lost. There remained. 6 CDBEESCV AKD KAILAVAYS. indeed, the glory of our wai'like exploits, and our deliverance from foreign domination; hut the money was sunk and gone. But in ex¬ pending money on railways it is not sunk and gone; its visible and substantial value remains in the shape of bricks and mortar, and stones fashioned for their uses, and viaducts, and bridges, and in aU the conveniences which attach to railways: it is not like gunpowder, which has gone off in a roar or a puff; but it endm-es as solid stuff. And more than this, such works do not stand, Hke the pyramids, as monuments of useless labour; but they remain as creations of utility and value, and jdelding an interest, or fruit for the money expended, to the private individuals who expended it; and are a source of conveni¬ ence, of economy, and of wealth to the nation which possesses them. So that, seeing that it is a fact that the people of this country were enabled in 1813 to raise and expend, in addition to the 68 mil¬ lions of revenue, a further sum of 82 millions for the purpose of being expended, and which was expended, in making war, it follows that the same people, by the same means, might in 1845, in a time of peace, raise a like sum for the purpose of executing useful undertakings within their own control, and for their own profit, and which would yield a large interest for the money so expended ; that is to say, pro¬ vided the means remained the same, and that the country had not become poorer in the interim. Now with respect to the question of whether this country is richer or poorer than it was in the years to which tve refer, we consult the parliamentaiy papers which have been made public on that point, and we find the following information : In 1815, which was the last year of that war tax called the pro¬ perty tax, the income from real property chargeable with that tax was about fifty millions;—in 1843 it exceeded eighty millions. The increase of this income, from fifty to eighty millions, shows that the property from which that income was derived, was about 600 millions. Added to the above, the increase of the legacy duty on personal property, shows that the personal property of the people of this country had increased between the years 1834 and 1843 to the amount of 450 millions. More figures to the like effect might be produced; but this statement of the increase of the property of the country proves that the country is not poorer than it was in the years when it was able to raise the sum of 150 millions of money in a single year, more than 82 millions of which it could afford to expend on a foreign war. So far therefore as the question depends on the capability of raising the money required for railways, it is clearly proved that the CUKB15NCY KAILWAYS. country is in a much better condition in respect to its wealth for the raising of the money than it was thirty years ago. But in respect to the means of raising it, that is, its financial ma¬ chinery, that is another affair. It is here that our ^faculty appears. Fifty years ago, and onwards for nearly twenty years, that is, from 1797 to 1815, the country was enabled to raise, and to expend and sink, without showing any signs of impoverishment, but, on the con¬ trary, the most manifest signs of prosperity, a sum of more than 470 millions; and now, at the end of thirty years from 1815, and after a period of thirty year’s of peace, it is found that the country cannot raise a similar sum for the formation of railways ; — nay, more than this, there are the strongest fears that the attempt to raise even the sum of fifty-two millions for the purposes of the profitable employment of the population rviU cause the most fatal disasters to the community ! The question then arises — why is this ? The answer can he only, that seeing there is more property on -which to base the money ■rv.anted, if the money wanted cannot he raised as it was raised when there was less property, there must be some change in the financial machinery of the country—some defect in the means of raising or creating that symbolic representative of value called “money;”—and a little inquiry shows that such is the fact. Now the change consists in tliis: During the period between 1797 and 1815, money was rightly used as a mere symbol of value, and not as value in itself; hut now money is made by law a commodity of value, namely, gold. The consequence of this is, that as gold is a scarce metal, only a certain limited quantity of it is to he procured at any time; and as it is a very valuable metal, the quantity procured must he deai’ly paid for. And .one of the effects of limiting the quantity of money for the uses of the community to the quantity of gold wliich can he procured to represent it, is this; that when other countries want the gold which this country may have got, and di-aw a certain amount more or less from it, the community of this country is deprived of so much of its circulating medium as that quantity of gold represents; and no matter, according to the present law, whether the subtraction of that amount of its circulating medium is inconvenient or not, or to what extent it is mischievous, the community must do without it. It is true that all the hank notes which are in circulatioii, and which form so large a portion of the currency, are not representatives of so much gold; because, of the twenty millions of Bank of England KAIWAYS. notes now in circulation, not more than fom-teen millions conld be exchanged for gold, that being the present amount in, the Bank cellars. But all these twenty millions of hank notes, besides the eighteen mil¬ lions, or thereabouts, of the notes of private hankers, are based, as it is termed, on gold; that is to say, that the issuers of these thirty-eight millions of notes are liable to he called on to give gold for them in exchange; not silver, nor iron, nor copper, nor any other metals or commodities, but only gold; and as gold, therefore, forms the base of the circulation, and as the quantity of gold, and the value of it, are continually fluctuating and shifting, it follows that the superstructure of the currency must also be continually fluctuating and shifting, which the mercantile community feel, to then- cost. It appears, therefore, that under the existing law, which limits the quantity of the money in the country to the amount of gold which can be retained in the country to exchange for it, that the unlimited quantity of money which was raised during the years between 1797 and 1815, cannot be raised now. And it is clear also, that under such a law the industrial powers of the country, whether in respect to rail¬ ways or other useful and profitable undertakings, cannot be fairly developed; because, as more money is wanted to carry them on than exists, and as more cannot be created, inasmuch as nature has limited the quantity of gold on which the law forces it to be based, although she has not limited either the resources of the country or the in¬ dustrial capabilities of its inhabitants—the national creation of wealth is thereby restricted to the amount of the particular sort of money by which alone the legislature has decreed that its wealth shall be measured. But in order to render this point more popularly in¬ telligible, it is necessary to go into some few particulars, showing the difference in the state of the currency in the years to which we have referred, and, at intervals, to the year 1825, and the state of the cur¬ rency as it is by law arbitrarily restricted now. In 1797, it was enacted by Mr. Pitt, that it was not necessary that the notes of the Bank of England should be payable in gold on demand; and he took measures for their being issued on the national credit by such means causing them to assume the quality of a sym¬ bolic money. It was not a perfect symbolic money; nor are we ad¬ vocates for the formation of such a money by such means; but it approached the perfection of a symbolic money, and it proved the advantages of such a currency over metallic money: and it proved it in this way; it showed that such money—that is, paper or symbolic money—was capable of expansion according to the necessities of the community, which metallic money, is not; and it proved that the cnjuiENcy KAILWAYS. nation could carry on its business, and support a war besides, by means of a paper currency alone. The effect of Mr.'Pitt’s measure was instantaneous and striking. The country instantly recovered, as if by magic, from the difficulties under which it was labouring, and which, threatened to weigh it down; and for eighteen years, while Mr. Pitt’s system was in force, the nation advanced in a wonderful degree in riches and prosperity, and laid the foundations of that increased wealth-creating power which all the financial blunders since have been unable entfrely to neutralise. It may be useful in this place to take a brief retrospect of the finan¬ cial state of the country, then and since. In 1797, Mr. Pitt passed the celebrated Bank Restriction Act, which increased the means of circulating the wealth of the country, and of creating more, to an extraordinary extent: and the great embarrass¬ ment and distress of that year were succeeded by a series of years of the most brilliant prosperity, notwithstanding the enormous expenses of war, which consumed during that period more than 470 millions of money, and notwithstanding the severe taxation of the country to the amount of more than 981 millions; sums which may be stated in figures, but which almost surpass the powers of the imagination. This state of prosperity continued till the year 1815. Inl816,itwasprospectivelydeterminedbyParliamenttodepartfrom Mr. Pitt’s system, and to return to a system of metallic money; and the Bank of England, in consequence of the anticipated measures of Parliament, began prospectively to reduce its issues; that is to say, to lessen the amount of the circulating medium. In 1816, general and severe distress prevailed throughout the country. This, at the time, was attributed, by some, to the change from a state of war to a state of peace; an opinion the most absurd, as it attributed the distress of the country to the fact, of about 26 millions a year—which was the average cost of the late war, in loans, and which was so much of the labour and produce of the country actually sunk and lost—being now saved to the country 1 The distress of 1816 is now seen to have been caused by the diminution of the currency, which restricted the industry of the country, and threw vast masses of peo¬ ple out of employment. This effect of the threatened return to what was called “ cash pay¬ ments ” Was so far foreseen, however, and its effects were so far feared, that even the government intimated its intention of effecting the change by very gradual means; and the consequence was, that the 10 CUERENCr KAILWATS. Bank, reassured by this intimation, increased its circulation, and in 1817 and 1818 the distress generally ceased. In 1819, however, the government proceeded to carry its measures into execution by the celebrated Currency Bill of that year; and by which bill it was enacted that cash payments should be resumed in 1823. It became necessary for the Bank therefore again to diminish its issues, in preparation for its bullion payments, and which diminution it continued till 1822 ; and correspondingly with the reduction of the circulation, the distress of the country returned in 1819, and became extreme in the years 1820, 1821, and 1822. In 1822, the government, appalled by the increasing distress, and by the complaints and insurrectionary spirit of the people, suspended the operation of the Currency Bill for three years. Immediately'afterwards, that is, in the next year, 1823, the distress of the country abated, and was rapidly changed to a state of pros¬ perity, which continued as long as the increased issues of the Bank con¬ tinued, namely, until 1825, which was the famous year of prosperity so much vaunted by the ministers of the day. But the year 1825 was the year fixed on for the return to a metallic currency; and the Bank, being obliged to take its measures in time, and to reduce its circulation, so as to correspond ivith the quantity of gold bullion which it could conveniently procm'e, and which was thenceforth to serve as the base of the currency, the grand crash came; and that memorable epoch of ruin and convulsion occurred which must still be in the memory of our readers. And since that time, that is, since the Curreney Bill of 1819 has been in operation, there has occurred a series of alternations of commer¬ cial prosperity and adversity, according as the currency has’been en¬ larged or restricted by the influx or efflux of gold to or from this country. Among the mo.st memorable and most disastrous are those of 1834 and 1839 ; and the question now is, not whether this or that commereial enterprise might be beneficial to the nation, nor whether the industrious capabilities of the country and of the increased popu¬ lation might not be further developed, to the increase of individual happiness, and to the augmentation of the national wealth; but whether “ money” can be obtained to effect such desirable improvements;—or, in other words, the country possesses, in its population, its powers of machinery, and its application of industry, the means of creating al¬ most unbounded wealth for all its inhabitants, but it arbitrarily refuses to take advantage of its resources, because it is insisted that it shall not produce more cirenlating wealth than can be represented by, gold! For such is really the case. If it is necessary for the increased em- CUIUSENCY KAiEWAYS. ployments of industry that there should he more of that indispensa¬ ble article money to carry on its operations, and the law says that there shall he no more money than there can he in-ocured of the metal gold to exchange for it, it necessarily follows that the operations of indus¬ try must he restricted and kept down to the amount whieh can be procured of that particular commodity — gold. So that, to apply the operation of this principle to the subject of the railways;—although all the materials of which the railways are to be made, with very trifling exceptions, exist in this country, ready to our hand— although there are thousands of labourers wanting employ¬ ment, and able to make the railways — although railways are most desirable things to be executed, and would amply repay, by their profits, all the money laid out in their formation; —and although the whole of the population of this country, it may be said, are at this moment enthusiastically eager to aid in the accomplishment of an im¬ provement, the advantages of which, in a national point of view, mo¬ rally, commercially, and poUticaliy, would be of incalculable benefit to the empire, — all these great advantages are to be abandoned, or the enjoyment of them indefinitely suspended, because an arbitrary law restricts the quantity of currency which is necessary for. their exe¬ cution to the amount of gold which can be retained in the country! Wliat is the use of this metal gold in forming railways ? No part of a railway is made of gold. It is labour that makes railways, out of materials of which gold forms no part. If it was necessary for the rails of a railway to be made of gold, that would be another thing ; but the rails are not made of gold, but of iron, a metal far more valuable than gold, for the inhabitants of the earth could do without gold—so far as their experience goes, at least—^but they could not do without u-on. But it may be said, that railways cannot be made without money, and that the only money which the present system of currency recognises is gold money. But what law of natm-e is there to force us to have no other money than gold money? What is money wanted for ? It is a thing neither to be eaten nor drunk, nor to build houses with, nor to plough nor to dig with. It is used only to represent value, in order to facilitate the exchanges of commodities. Why would not some other metal, or some other substance, do as well as gold ? And why is it necessary that money, which is only required as a token or symbol of commodities wanted to be exchanged, should be a thing of value in itself? How does that facilitate exchanges ? the facility being the thing aimed at—Does it not, on the contrary, cause the exchanges of commodities — exchanges being the life and soul.of industry — to be limited to its own small amount? And is not this 12 CUKKENCr UAILWAYS. limitatioii misdueTons ?—and does it not have a most pernicious' and paralysing efiect on the development of the industrial resources of the country? Does not experience prove that the present system of curreney works badly; and that in proportion as the community de¬ parts from the use of a purely symbolic money, its commercial pursuits are exposed to adverse fluctuations, and all its operations of industry are cramped and confined ? Now, if the nation had the advantage of a money that was merely symbolic; that is to say, merely a representative of the value of something else, of which value it was the token or representative, the facility woidd exist of extending the amount of such money to the wants of the community, whether for the purposes of peace or war. It has been proved that it could effect the object desired in a time of war; and, a fortiori, it can effect the same object in a time of peace. The advocates for the adoption of some such system — not that system — but some such system of symbolic money as the country flourished under from 1797 to 1815, consider that a symbolic paper money can efficiently serve all the purposes of metallic money; because, from 1797 to 1815, and at intervals until 1825, it did effect that object. And with respect to the objection to a sort of money which is illimitable, and in the operation of which the example of the French assignats and mandats is adduced to show its dangerous character — it may be said, that; the example of the French assignats and mandats is admirably adapted to show the difference of a paper money not founded on real transferable property, nor created by the legitimate wants of trade, but issued capriciously by an irresponsi¬ ble government and a national paper currency issued by a respon¬ sible government, similar to that which existed in England during the eighteen years of its paper-currency prosperity, from 1797 to 1815. The advocates for the adoption of a symbolic currency maintain that the holding forth to the world the convertibility into gold at pleasure of the quantity of paper money necessary for the vast trans¬ actions of this great commercial country, is a delusion; that, on the contrary, the fact is established, that when the proof of the con¬ vertibility of the paper money of the country has been brought to the test; it has totally failed; as witness the failures in 1816, in 1819, in 1822, in 1825, in 1834, and in 1839; and that, in fact, the monthly publication of the quantity of gold bullion held by the Bank, exhibits in the plainest manner, that the supposed convertibility of its notes into gold, on demand, is a continual delusion. The advocates for a repeal of the Currency Bill of 1819, and its CDKRENCY 13 complemental bill of 1844, contend, that the present depressed and discontented state of the population of this country, which has been increasing for the last thirty years, and which has necessitated the increased coercion of the labouring classes iii special prisons erected for them under the name of Union Workhouses,—to say nothing of the refinements of painful punishment which have been invented for their correction in the penal jails of the kingdom,—has been caused by the restrictive action on industry wliich the present system of currency has exercised; and that the main evil of that system is the attempt to cany on a paper currency adequate to the wants of the country, and at the same time convertible by law into gold on demand at a fixed price. This attempt, they say, is pernicious to the country, by permanently contracting the circulating medium to the amount, not of the wants of the country, but of the quantity of gold procurable; thereby occasioning continual fluctuations in the amount of the circulating medium,—not according to the greater or less re¬ quirements of the community, but according to the greater or less demand for gold as a marketable commodity, abroad or at home. We shall say nothing here of the inadequacy of a commodity which is thus continually changing in value, to serve as the representative of the value of other commodities; because we are endeavouring to show its deficiency in respect to amount, rather than its faultiness as a representative of value; and its faultiness, as a representative of value, is notlung, compared with its inefficiency as “currency,” wliich, from the limited production of it by natui-e, or the limited power of its being digged from the earth by art, must for ever render it unfit to serve the purposes of the cuiTeney of such a nation as Great Britain. It is from this consideration, that it is the object of the advocates of a paper currency not depending for its amount on gold, first, to enable the country to regulate the amount of its money according to the amount of its commercial and other transactions of exchange, and not according to the quantity of gold procurable to represent them; and secondly, to secure the community from the various fluctuations in the amount of the national money, and from the sudden rises and falls in prices consequent on such fluctuations; so that the industry of the country may have full play, and the national resources be made avail¬ able to their utmost extent, for the comfort and happiness of aU. That such a state of the currency is not vague theory, or rash experiment, is proved by what was effected by the paper currency, imperfect as it was, which existed from 1797 to 1815, and at intervals to 1825. The only money then circulating, apart from the small quantity of 14 CURRENCY RAILWAYS. silver money in use for fractional parts of exchanges, was paper,— approaching, as we have said, to the perfect state of a symbolic money. But, by the agency of that paper currency,'which was neither of intrinsic value in itself nor represented intrinsic value, and which re¬ presented credit alone, the nation was enabled to carry on successfully a most extensive foreign war, and to increase at the same time most prodigiously in internal wealth. There was then general profitable employment, general prosperity, and general content. No one felt any necessiQ^ for the establishment of union workhouses, or for grind¬ ing down the poor to a minimum quantity of food. No one ventured to complain of over-population. According to certain political econo¬ mists, all that was very wrong; they said that the nation ought not to have prospered imder such a wicked system as a paper currency. But the nation did prosper nevertheless, although some bullionists grew alarmingly indignant at the continuance of a prosperity which was so repugnant to their doctrine. The people indeed were content to profit by the advantages wliich they possessed, without inquiring imder what system of currency they enjoyed them: the labourer ate his meat, and drank his beer — instead of, as now-a-days, washing down his cold potatoes with water— in blissful ignorance that his state of prosperity was contrai-y to the theoretical doctrines of the bullionists. So long as he could exchange his commodity, ivhich was labour, for the beef and beer wliich other people had to sell, it did not matter to him whether he effected the exchange by the means of a bit of paper or a lump of gold ; it was neither the paper nor the gold that he wanted to eat, but the food and the drink, which the convenience of the paper money enabled him to exchange his labour for, and to purchase. But it appeared that the country was in too thriving a condition : it was like the ox that had got fat on a wrong system; and, although fat he was, some bullionists insisted that it was better that he should be lean, and starve, and die, on their system, than get fat on any other. The country had arrived at a plethora of prosperity, which required the interference of the pseudo-political economists: an ingenious phrase was invented, and the currency was pronounced to be in an “ unwholesome state; ” the Currency Bill of 1819 was concocted: then came on convulsion and distress, which ended in the grand crash of 1825, and which partially reappeared in 1836 and 1839: and these facts—these warnings, cannot be too often repeated; for the country is in the same condition now as it was in 1834 and 1839; that is to say, resting on a false security; trusting to the present comparative abundance of the currency, and supposing that it is to continue; while CmilENCT AND RAKLAVATS. 15 at tlie same time it is subject at any moment, either by the withdrawal of the gold in payment for foreign corn, or the apprehension of a foreign war, or by a panic which would cause gold to be hoarded and withdrawn from circulation, and from a thousand other causes, to be arbitrarily and suddenly contracted; and then down go prices, away go loans and discounts; money, by wliich the present inestimably valuable railway projects are supported, vanishes; and general con¬ fusion, distress, and rum ensue! And all because it is insisted that railway and other undertakings and operations of industry shall be carried on only by one sort of money — gold, or by a paper cur¬ rency based upon and depending upon gold; instead of having a money purely symbolic, representing value, but entirely independent of the amount of gold in the country, and entirely free- from the fluctuations in amount by wliich the present currency unhappily is characterised, and which sets at defiance aU calculation as to how much or how little there may be of it at any given time, and which exposes to failure the best planned schemes, and prevents the ex¬ ecution of national works which would immeasurably enrich the nation. A consideration of the facts and arguments above stated will pre¬ pare the way for the following suggestion of a scheme by which railway companies %n esse and in posse might be enabled to carry on their oivn schemes of improvement with facility, by a system of co¬ operation, which, while it wmuld benefit themselves, would be at the same time infinitely beneficial to the community. As the feasibility of transacting commercial and other industrial operations by the means of a currency composed entirely of a symbolic paper money, may now be considered as proved, because it was done for a series of years, from 1797 to 1816, and, at intervals, to 1825, the ground is cleared for shotving that Kailway Companies, and other such associations, may carry their intentions into effect in a like manner, by a general system of agreement and combination. But it wiU be useful, in the development of the subject, to bear in mind, that the plan ivhich we are about to suggest is in, fact in operation in this country, in a manner which fuUy and completely de¬ monstrates the facility of its application in the way to which we refer. We allude to the system of Exchequer Bills Issued by the Govern- . ment. About thirty millions of these bills are issued by the govern¬ ment every year; and it may be set down that about this amount is constantly in a certain state of circulation. 16 CTORENCT AND RAItWATS. Now these Exchequer Bills, as every body knows, perfornj, though inadequately, the functions of money. The “ Grovemment,” in its corporate character, issues these bills for the purpose of enabling it to pay salaries and the general expenses of the government, and they purport, by the writing impressed on them, that the government will pay them off at a certain specified time. It is not said that the government will pay them off in money; but that they are to be paid off in “money” is, of course, understood: but what sort of money ? certainly not in gold money; there is not a word said about that; but they are to be paid in some sort of money not expressed, and which, in fact, is meant to be, and actually is, symbolic paper money; for it is very clear that if the holders had the right to demand gold money, and that the government were bound to furnish it, that the government would be reduced to a state of bankruptcy, inasmuch as the quantity of gold sufficient to discharge the obligation does not exist in the country, or does not exist avail¬ ably for such a purpose. But, in point of fact, no one who takes an Exchequer Bill, either in discharge of a debt, or in payment of the purchase of an estate, ever thinks of its representing gold; — he receives it as a symbolic repre¬ sentative of value, which he knows he can pay away in discharge of his own debts, or in the purchase of another estate for himself, and, as it is compeBably receivable by the government in payment of taxes, it always maintains its symbolic value; and sometimes something more; for as it is a sort of money that bears interest, it increases in value every day in the holder’s hands, because it is compeUably receivable again by the government for the amount which it bears pins the accumulation of the interest which has accrued. Now the distinctive character of these Exchequer Bills, it will be observed, is this — that it is a sort of money in the shape of a receipt for value received, which the issuer binds himself to receive again ; and is based, not on gold, nor on any metal, but on credit. It is based on the credit of the government to raise money by taxes; the pieces of paper which form it, are of no more value than any other pieces of spoiled paper of the same size; it is based not on gold, as we have said, nor on any other metaL But more than this, it is not based on any species of property whatsoever; except the abstraction of the realisation of part of the national property in the shape of taxes; it is based solely on credit. And with respect to this credit, it must not be forgotten, that of all credits, that which is called national credit is the least to be depended on, as witness the sums of money which have been lent to the various CDBMNCr AND BAIWATS. 17 South American States, and, notably, to the United States of America, hy ■which States the debts so contracted have been either declared too large for their governments to discharge, or have been altogether re¬ pudiated. To pursue this part of the subject a little further: — If the sums lent to the Am erican States had been lent on the security of land, or of houses, or of property of any sorb the lenders might have been able to obtain from their borrowers, if not the whole, at least some part of their claim; but their money having been ad¬ vanced on the “abstraction” of national credit, when they fall hack on that national credit they iind only an abstraction — a nonentity, a delusion, a thing aerial and imsubstantial. But the national credit of Great Britain is of the same sort as all other national credit; that is to say; it is an abstraction, and it is on the faith of this abstraction alone that the Exchequer Bills issued by the government are received and pass current as representatives of a certain ideal value. These Exchequer Bills then may be considered as examples of symbolic money. It win doubtless occur to the reader, that this especial sort of money—the Exchequer Bill—is not fitted to perform the offices of money as common and popular currency, for it is issued only in large amounts, and the wants of the people require a more convenient sort -of money, consisting of pounds, shillings, and pence;—and such is the fact. These Exchequer.Bills are not fitted for the office of the money required in the ordinary transactions of buying and selling, and they, do not perform that office. But they perform the same sort of office in transactions requiring the payment of thousands or hundreds of pounds, which pounds, shil¬ lings, and pence do in the facilitating of small exchanges. And it is not^ so much on their character as circulating money that we are at present desirous of fixing attention, as on their symbolic character as paper for large amoimts, which are created by the government out of nothing, and are issued and received in a continual circle without the intervention of any metal whatsoever. _ We have said that these Exchequer Bills, which the government passes away as money or as money’s worth, are created out of nothing ; and we think, from the description which we have given of them, that it is plain that they are so created, for national credit, it must be granted, is not property. Now the plan which we suggest for the carrying out of the railways projected, is by the creation of a certain, sort of Exchequer Bills which shall be based on something; not on credit, national or individual, but on bona fide property, substantial 18 ■ CUKEEKCr' AND HAILWATS. bricks and mortar, land, houses, and other things intrinsically va- It has been shown already, that a government, to wit our own, can issue its Exchequer Bills based on nothing but credit, receiving them back in payment of the calls levied on the nation under the name of “ taxes.” What is there to prevent an association of indi¬ viduals from issuing their Exchequer Bids, receiving them back in payment of the contributions which they have to levy on their proprietors under the name of “ calls ?” The government pays its current expenses, or part of its current expenses, which is enough for our argumentj by means of its Ex¬ chequer Bills, which are receivable again in payment of taxes: the railway governments in the same way, may issue their Exchequer, Bills in payment of their expenses, which are receivable again in payment of “ calls.” Where is the difficulty in the one case more than in the other.!' In what consists the essence of the value of the government Exchequer BiQ? In its being receivable by its issuers for the money which its holder has to pay. In like manner, the Railway Exchequer Bill would have its value fixed, by being receivable by the railway government as money to be paid for calls or other debts. But the Railway Exchequer Bill would, in truth, he a bill of much greater value than any mere government hiU could possibly he; for the Railway Bill would represent property; hut the government bin represents, and can represent, only credit. If the lenders of the money to the American States had advanced it in return for receipts representing so many divisional parts or shares in an American railway, they would now be able to realise from such property the money which they had lent; and such receipts of Ame¬ rican railways, so representing honafide property, would have passed fromhandto hand as representatives of actual value. And the argument holds good with the national credit of one country as well as of another. For although the faith and honour of this country stand unimpeachable for the fidelity with which it has fulfilled its engage¬ ments of money borrowed, yet the highest degi’ee of such faith and honour in no way afiects the argument of the superiority of the security of substantial property over the “fiction” credit. The Railway. Exchequer Bills, therefore, to which we refer, would be better money than the exchequer bills of a government, because they would represent value which government bills do not. And in the same way that the inferior government bill circulates CUKKENCT 19 AND RAILWAYS. from the government to' the people, and from the people to the government, so would the Railway' Bill circulate from their govern¬ ments to the people and from the people to their governments; for no one would refuse to take, as money, the paper which he knew was based on and reajly represented, actual property, into which it could he easily converted. It is to he home in mind that the Railway Exchequer Bills here contemplated, are not paid away for foreign produce, hut for pro¬ perties existing within the coimtry, and, more than for anything else, for labour; and even if it should he considered necessary to. have in use some of the common money of the country, it does not damage our argument in favour of the Railway Exchequer Bill, because it is not necessary that aU the pecuniary transactions of 'the railway com¬ panies should he conducted in this new sort of money. If the plan here suggested should serve only in aid of the Railway enterprises^ it would he a vast assistance to them; and it is no valid objection to the plan to say that it cannot he adapted in toto, to the superseding of aU of the present sort of money; if it cannot he adopted in toto it can in partibus ; and that would he sufficient to enable a great many railways to he formed, which without this expedient, could not he formed for a great many years. It is to he observed also, that such Railway Exchequer Bills would he representatives not merely of a determinate value or share in the property of lands, houses, &c., but that they would he the representa¬ tive of a continually increasing value from the profits of the railway, resembling in this the attractive character of the Government Ex¬ chequer Bill wliich bears interest. The Railway Exchequer Bill may he made, in the same way, to have the. property of a like cumulative And with respect to the mode of carrying out this plan, although it is not necessary to go into aU the details of a system the working of which wiU he obvious to those accustomed to consider such matters, it may briefly he suggested, that a railway company has it in its power to divide the amount of its shares into as many receipts as it may consider serviceable for its views;—that is to say, a share of one hundred pounds may be divided into a hrmdred receipts, or into a larger number, which possibly might be desirable. These receipts by a system of mutual agreement between all the projected railway companies, to which, those finished might, advantageously to them¬ selves, be added, would be receivable—those of each company by all the rest — to an amount to be fixed by common consent^ and ex¬ changeable at a central Bank in London or elsewhere, which would . B 2 20 CUBEENCT AND KAIEWAYS. exercise functions analogous to those in operation at the Bankers’ clearing-house in Lombard Street. Thus the railway companies would establish a currency for them¬ selves, with which they could pay aU that they had to pay, and which they would receive in payment of debts due to themselves, similar, though far superior to the system of Exchequer Bills. Their receipts might in truth be- emphatically called “Exchequer BiUsforthe mil¬ lion;” and possess i n g this prodigious advantage over government Exchequer Bills, that they would be based on real and substantial property; whereas the government bills are based on a system of credit, which a foreign war, or internal commotion, and a thousand other acmdents, might either totally destroy or seriously damage the value of. TVe will stop here for a moment to consider an objection which, as it has been made before, may be made again, with respect to the right of individuals to create money in the way which is suggested; or, supposing that they have the right, to the expediency of permitting The consideration of this point in all its bearings would lead to a longer discussion than the limits of such a pamphlet as the present would allow ; but there is a brief argument which may be urged in reply, and which by most persons may be considered satisfactory. "What inherent right has a government, it may be said, to interfere with the mode in which a nation may think fit to conduct its mer¬ cantile and industrial pecuniary transactions ? Admitting, of course, the ftdl right of the community to provide against fraud, and against individual occupations being pursued to the public detriment, by what right inherent or politic does a government claim the privilege of preventing the community from fashioning for themselves a circu¬ lating medium for the facilitating of their mutual exchanges ? Why should the community submit to the arbitrary enactment of a govern¬ ment which says that a railway proprietor shall not employ the labourer who with his shovel over his shoulder is solicitous for em¬ ployment, unl'jss the railway employer can procure gold or silver money wherewith to pay the labourer his hire ? What is money wanted for ? To represent a value interchanged. The labourer changes his labour for part of the railway proprietor’s property, the value of which is represented by the railway receipt. Suppose his wage was paid by a bit of gold, what could the gold do -more than buy a piece of beef, or any other thing that he wanted ? 'The gold is only wanted as a medium of exchange; if a piece of paper will do as well, why stop industrial operations because gold can- eUERENCY AM) RAttWAYS. 21 not be obtained in a sufficient quantity for the carrying on of these in addition to other industrial operations already in progress? And in speaking of a piece of paper, it may be -well that the argu¬ ment against paper should be, in limine, forestalled, in respect to a piece of paper being “worthless:” so it is worthless, piece of paper; but it is not worthless as the acknowledgement and representa¬ tive of a value known, positive and substantial. A government piece of paper is truly a worthless piece of paper as it does not represent any sort of property; and yet such a piece of paper can serve the purposes of money, although based on nothing — for credit, qua credit, is nothing. But if such credit-paper may be made to serve the purposes of money, a fortiori property-paper may be made to serve the same pur¬ pose ; for the proper object of money, as cirrrency, is to represent the value of something else, of which it is the sign or the symbol; and if that sign or symbol can be offered in the shape of a railway receipt representing real property, it cannot be a worse “money” than a sign or symbol representing credit only:—on the contrary, it would be a much better sort of money; more intelligible; and, as such, would readily pass from hand to hand, and would form a sound, safe, most effective, and, pro tanto, national currency. And with respect to its character, as compared with the paper mo¬ ney of the Bank of England, this may be said of it; that it is a bet¬ ter, more secure, and superior paper currency, as far as it goes, than the paper of the Bank of England; and for this reason, that it would be based really and truly on property, which the paper of the Bank of England is not, or at least only in part: for of the paper of the Bank of England, only a portion of it represents property; the rest represents nothing — except credit. It maybe allowed that the n,otes issued for the gold bullion which it holds in its cellars is repre,- sentative of property;' for gold, as a commodity, is property; and it may be conceded, that the notes which it issues in the discotmting of bills for merchants and traders are also based on property, as it may be presumed that the parties whose bills the Bank discounts, are worffi property available for the payment of so much money as their bills are drawn for. But what can be said of the eleven millions of debt, in representation of which the Bank is allowed by law to issue an equal quantity of notes? "What can these notes be said to be based on ? A debt 1 An odd sort of property on which to base paper mo¬ ney 1 "What can such notes be said to represent ? A debt: this is a droll sort of value to be represented, and especially such a sort of debt. ^ COKraajCr AMP K^WATSi The goremment owes eleven millions of money to the Bank; — what is that body or thing called a government ? It cannot be said to consist of particular individuals, because the individuals composing the government change every day; it must mean the governing power, ■ sometimes represented by these men, sometimes by those. And what does the governing power mean ? It can mean nothing but the dele¬ gated sovereignty of the nation. But what is the meaning of all this as security for money lent? It is an abstraction; and every body knows that if the Bank had to enforce payment of the debt due to it firom the “ Government,” it would have to depend on an abstraction, or nothing; for where is the “ property ” which is to be made avail¬ able for the payment of the- debt ? It exists, to be sure, in the pockets of the nation; but how is it to be got at — except by the ma¬ chinery of taxation. But property so to be got at, is a very different thing from the land, and bridges, &c., which form railway property. In the latter case there is something visible, substantial, something to be got at; but in the other case, it is a something which may or may not be got at, according to circumstances. So far, therefore, and in this particular instance at least, the railway security for eleven mil¬ lions of notes would be much better than the security of a debt — which is no more than an abstraction. Now eleven milli ons of money is a large proportion of the twenty milli ons of the circulation of the Bank of England; and yet the public is content to receive these notes, based on nothing, as the re¬ presentative of positive value: much more -willingly, therefore, would the public receive eleven millions of notes based on the solid security of railway property. But again, it may be said, why not let the Bank supply the addi¬ tional quantity of money — or of symbols — wanted for the additional operations of industry now in course of development, or ready to be developed ? The reply to this is, that the Bank of England is restricted in its issues; and in this way:—By the Currency Bill of 1819, comple¬ mented in 1844, the Bank is bound by law to pay its notes in gold at acertain price; that is to say, at the price of SI. 17s. IQid. per ounce ; and although gold, as a commodity, may be worth more than 31. 17s. 10^ per ounce, the Bank is obliged to pay its notes at that rate. But the evil of arbitrary rule of price, though most pernicious in its operation, does not enter into our present plan of argument. The Bank of England then, being so restricted, cannot issue more than a certain quantity of notes, even if the law allowed it, because it is obliged to adapt its issues to the amount of gold which it can CUBBENCT AND BAILWAYS. 23 readily obtain. So that, although the country may require more mo¬ ney to carry on its industrial operations than is extant, as in the pre^ sent flagrant case of railways, it cannot have it; because, as the Bank of England alone, with the now unimportant exceptions of the country banks, is allowed to supply the currency, the currency, or current money of the country, can be no more than the quantity of gold procurable can allow the Bank to base it on. So that, although railways are admirable undertakings to en¬ gage in, alike profitable to individuals and beneficial to the com¬ munity at large, these industrial operations evolving value from otherwise valueless labour, are obliged to be abandoned or indefinitely postponed, because there is “no money” to carry them on! —“No money” meaning, when interpreted, no gold to form .the “money” which is wanted for facilitating the necessary exchanges during the operation. Arid let it be observed, that the money wanted, is not wanted to pay to foreign nations for their foreign productions; it is not wanted for effecting exchanges betiveen nation and nation, but for performing that office between individual and individual within the same kingdom: but, by a strange law, it is enacted, that nothing but gold shall be the medium of such exchanges I at least so far as the great money-mint, the Bank of England, is concerned; and that by a gold money alone shall railways, and aU other public or private un¬ dertakings, be effected! But as there is not, - and never can be, enough of gold money to servo for the currency of this country, — seeing that the quantify of the metal gold is restricted, and the powers of the production of the country are unrestricted, —the only remedy is for the people to con¬ trive a sort of money for themselves. Now the proposed system of a railway currency, which would quickly become a national currency, is suggested to meet the difficulty stated. The government will not interfere to contrive money for the people to make their railways -with; let the people make the money for themselves. Nor let it be said that those persons especially interested in the formation of national railways are a small or insignificant part of the community: they are, on the contraryj a most numerous and most influential part of the community, confining ourselves to those only who are interested in railways as proprietors: but taking into account the landowners, the manufacturers, the merchants and shopkeepers, and the labouring classes, who are indirectly concerned in the ad¬ vantages which carriage by railways affords, the whole nation becomes comprehended among its promoters; and it is not on in- 24 CURRENCY RAILWAYS. dividiials. but on the entire population of the country, that railway enterprises rest for their support. Such a comprehensive plan, therefore, as is here suggested, would en¬ gage the hearty co-operation of all classes in Great Britain; who would he eager to assist in its development, and interested in its success. With respect to the machinery of its working, that could he easily organised, as the materials for its supervisors and agents already exist in companies projected, like a net-work, over the whole face of the three kingdoms,—extending even to the colonies and dependencies of Great Britain, whose affiliation and co-operation in the scheme would he facile in execution, and might he made available in a most important manner to the general establishment and success of the- system;—hut the consideration of that branch of the subject is pur¬ posely avoided, in order that the simplicity of the “working” may not he encumbered by an extension which is not necessary for the development of the primitive plan. To conclude, the plan of a combined railway system of mutual cm'rency by means of receipts, is based on the following consi¬ derations :— 1st. On the wants of the community, which requii’es additional currency of some sort to carry on its additional industrial operations. 2nd. On the benefits to be derived, individually and nationally, from Eailways. 3rd. On the positive and real security of such receipts. 4th. On the feasibility of a currency of railway receipts, re¬ ceivable for calls and other payments, as Government Exchequer Bills are receivable for .taxes and other debts; the Eailway Ex¬ chequer Bills being based on property, which is a valid security: whereas the Government Bills are based on credit, which is a non¬ entity and a fiction. And, lastly, if such Government Bills are good, such Eailway Bills would be better. London: Printed by A. Sfottiswoode, New-Street-Square.