CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
 
 FOR 
 
 THREE PRESIDENTS INSTEAD OF ONE. 
 
 THE EXPOSITION 
 
 OF 
 
 THE PROPOSED PLURAL EXECUTIVE 
 
 SUBMITTED 
 
 TO THE COMMITTEE IN CONGRESS MAY 27. 1878, 
 
 By t: - w. bartley. 
 
 WM. H. MOORE, PRINTER, WASHINGTON. 
 
AN EXPOSITION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 %§toym& § Jural §xmtm of tto j^iste 
 
 To the Honorable, The Members of the Commit- 
 tee of the House of Representatives, on 
 the Revision of the Laws relating 
 to the Election of 
 
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 The undersigned begs leave to submit most respectfully 
 the following views in support of the proposed amendment 
 of the Constitution, pending before the Committee, in re- 
 lation to a plural Executive. 
 
 Preliminary Remarks. 
 
 It is well said, in the preamble to the Resolutions, that 
 the framers of the constitution did not pretend, that the in- 
 strument by them ^formed was perfect; on the contrary, 
 they expressly provided a convenient mode for amending 
 the same, as experience and the growth of the country 
 should show to be expedieut and proper. 
 
 And it is further said in the preamble, that the vast ex- 
 tension of the territory and increase of the population of 
 the United States, (not anticipated when the present con- 
 stitution was adopted,) have so much augmented the pow- 
 ers and extended and complicated the duties and responsi- 
 
bilities of the Chief Executive Office, that the administra- 
 tion of the same, with a full comprehension of the great 
 questions of public policy involving the interests of the 
 country, most manifestly requires additional force to give 
 full efficiency to the Executive authority of the United 
 States. 
 
 It is, therefore, proposed so to amend the constitution as 
 to provide for the election of three Presidents, to consti- 
 tute a Supreme Executive Council, to be elected by the 
 qualified electors of all the States, and each of the three 
 to be taken from one of the three distinctive sections of 
 the United States, known, one as the Western States, one 
 as the Eastern and Middle States, and the other as the 
 Southern States, and no two of the presidents to be citi- 
 zens of the same section. 
 
 This is not a proposition to revolutionize the govern- 
 ment, but simply to amend the constitution in accordance 
 with its own terms, and in furtherance of its own true objects 
 and intent. And it is a change which is essential to per- 
 fect our political system as a representative republic, and 
 perpetuate popular government in this country. 
 
 Popular Representation the Basis of Republican Government. 
 
 As the government of the United States was intended 
 by the American people to be a representative republic it 
 is essentially important, that representation, the fundamen- 
 tal pillar in that form of government, should be as perfect 
 and complete as practicable in all its departments. And 
 inasmuch as the country has grown and been enlarged 
 from the original thirteen States with a population of some 
 three millions, to thirty-eight States with a population of 
 forty millions, extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
 ocean, and from the great Lakes of the north to the Rio 
 Grande river on the Gulf of Mexico, there is a propriety 
 as well as a necessity, that popular representation should 
 be enlarged as far as practicable, so that the people of each 
 distinctive section of the country should be fairly represen- 
 
3 
 
 ted in the Executive as well as in the other two departments 
 of the government. 
 
 The people of the great West extending to the Pacific 
 coast, engaged in agricultural, grazing, and mining pur- 
 suits, have their peculiar interests, customs, and views, not 
 to be overlooked in the conduct of the public affairs. The 
 people of the Eastern and Middle States, engaged in man- 
 ufacturing and commerial pursuits as well as agricultural, 
 have their distinct interests, pursuits and civilization de- 
 manding the attention and care of the government. And 
 the people of the Southern States, engaged in the produc- 
 tion of the great staples of cotton, sugar, rice and tobacco, 
 have also their distinctive interests, habits and conditions 
 of life requiring attentiou and consideration at the hands 
 of the government. No one man as the Executive, what- 
 ever may be his capacity, can fully comprehend, and give 
 proper attention to the vast and diversified interests of thi3 
 immense scope of country. The cabinet officers, who are 
 subordinates and the president's little coterie of personal 
 and political friends, are never selected as representatives 
 of the distinct sections and interests of this vast country, 
 and when any one of them amounts to anything more than 
 the political leader, or mere figure-head of his department, 
 the routine department business is sufficient to occupy his 
 entire attention. And for the last eighteen years neither 
 the far west nor the south have been actually in the true 
 spirit of the country represented even in the cabinet. Men 
 come to Washington from distances exceeding two thou- 
 sand miles, and from foreign countries, charged with very 
 important matters to be laid before the Chief Executive, 
 and after having to remain here for weeks and months, of- 
 ten have to go away without a full and satisfactory inter- 
 view with the president. Besides hearing aud considering 
 the innumerable applications for appointments to, aud re- 
 movals from office, consulting with politicians about polit- 
 ical and party management and movements, and attendiug 
 to the routine business of cabinet meetings, and the calls 
 
4 
 
 of Members of Congress, and other public officers and pri- 
 vate citizens, the president has no time left to devote to 
 the great matters of internal and external policy touching 
 the peculiar interests of the several distinctive sections of 
 the country. It is, therefore, undeniably essential to a just 
 and perfect representation of the people, and a complete 
 and efficient administration of the Executive authority, 
 that there should be several Chief Executive Magistrates 
 to increase the Executive force, as well as to represent the 
 various distinctive sections of the country. 
 
 There can certainly be no valid objection to the pro- 
 posed amendment, unless there be something in the nature 
 of the Chief Executive office essentially requiring a single 
 and forbidding a plural Executive. How is this ? Is there 
 anything in the nature of the Chief Executive authority 
 essentially repuguant to a plural Executive ? If the people 
 desire and require a monarchy, either absolute or limited, 
 hereditary or elective, there must be a unity in the Execu- 
 tive, and a plural Executive would be inconsistent with 
 the nature of that form of government. For monarchy in 
 its essential nature is " the form of government ivherein the 
 supreme power is vested in a single person." If absolute, the 
 whole supreme power ; if limited, only a part of the supreme 
 power is vested in the one person. The office may be her- 
 editary, or the monarch may be elected directly or indirectly 
 by the people. But & plural Executive is not, and cannot 
 be repugnant to the nature of a republican form of gov- 
 ernment, for the fundamental principle of that is popular 
 representation. 
 
 The republics which have lasted the longest, displayed 
 the greatest energy and efficiency, and afforded the beet 
 protection to the rights of person and property, have had 
 a plural Executive. 
 
 The ancient republic of Carthage was maintained over 
 five hundred years, and became a great commercial coun- 
 try, which disputed the empire of the world with Rome, 
 under a plural executive, composed of two Chief Executive 
 
5 
 
 magistrates, called Suffetes. It had also a Senate and a 
 Council of the people. Aristotle compared it with the 
 constitutions of Sparta and Crete, and honored it with 
 commendation, upon the ground that it had maintained 
 the liberties of a numerous people for many centuries, and 
 " had never suffered from any serious sedition, nor endured 
 the yoke of a tyrant." 
 
 The Roman republic which flourished and became the 
 most powerful government of ancient times, lasted over 
 four hundred and sixty years, under the guidance of a plu- 
 ral Executive. No other government, ancient or modern, 
 displayed greater energy and efficiency in the exercise of 
 its Executive powers than that of the Roman republic, 
 which was signalized in the fact, that the title of "Roman 
 citizen" became not only a mark of honor, but a shield of 
 protection in all parts of the world. 
 
 In the Grecian republics such a thing as a single Exec- 
 utive was unknown. When the people of Athens abol- 
 ished their monarchy, they declared that Jupiter alone was 
 king of Athens, and the republic of Athens was maintained 
 over nine hundred years under a plural Executive. Their 
 chief Executive authority was administered by nine mag- 
 istrates, called Archons. The Senate or Court of Areopa- 
 gus in some respects exercised a restraining power over 
 the Archons. The republic attained great power, and ex- 
 hibited wonderful energy and efficiency in war as well as 
 in peace. Of all the Grecian States Athens was the most 
 eminent in civilization and freedom, and indeed, became 
 the intellectual centre not only of Greece, but of ancient 
 Europe, and her history presents an example of the fullest 
 development of a democratic republic. 
 
 The Executive power in Sparta was vested in two mag- 
 tstrates of equal authority called kings, who were subject 
 to the superintending and controlling authority of a coun- 
 cil of five, called the Uphori. There was also a Senate and 
 a popular Assembly. This republic displayed great energy 
 and power of action, and lasted over seven hundred years. 
 
6 
 
 The republics of the other Grecian States, which main- 
 tained their liberties through many centuries, were illus- 
 trative of the same result as to a plural Executive. 
 
 The Achaean League was a federal union of Grecian re- 
 publics, in which the people as well as the States were re- 
 presented, and was maintained one hundred and forty 
 years, until the subjugation of Greece by the Romans. 
 This confederacy had an executive council of ten chief 
 magistrates, a general assembly in which the sovereignty 
 was vested, and a general in chief of the armies, who exer- 
 cised some civil as well as military power. 
 
 The Republic of Switzerland, formerly known as the 
 Helvetian republic, situated in the centre of Europe, has 
 maintained the liberties of the people against the powerful 
 monarchies around it for five hundred and sixty-seven 
 years, under a plural executive. And it is to this day exist- 
 ing in the height of its prosperity and power as a Federal 
 Union of cantons or States, with the chief executive power 
 vested in a federal council of seven members elected every 
 three years by " the Federal Assembly." The supreme au- 
 thority of the republic is vested in a parliament of two 
 chambers, one of which called "the State Council" is com- 
 posed of 44 members, elected by the twenty-two cantons 
 of the confederation, two by each canton; and the other 
 of which chambers, called " the National Council," is com- 
 posed of 135 representatives of the Swiss people, chosen in 
 a direct election, at the rate of one representative for every 
 20,000 of the people. The joint meeting of these two 
 bodies called "the Federal Assembly" elects the chief 
 executive council of seven, and also the president of the 
 council from the seven members composing the council. 
 But the president of the council has no prerogative or ex- 
 ecutive power beyond that of any other member of the 
 council. 
 
 It is an incontestible fact, that every prominent republic 
 of past times, which exhibited great energy, vigor and 
 
7 
 
 efficiency, and was able to maintain itself for any great 
 length of time, had a plural executive. 
 
 A Plural Executive the only Republican Form. 
 
 There cannot be any thing, therefore, in the nature of 
 the Executive authority of a republican form of govern- 
 ment essentially repugnant to a plural Executive. In a 
 monarchy, which is a government of one man, there can- 
 not be a plural Executive in the nature of things, for the 
 unity in the head or single Executive is the monarch him- 
 self. But in a republic, which is a government of the peo- 
 ple by means of representation, there is no such repugnan- 
 cy ; on the contrary the more perfect the popular represen- 
 tation the more perfect is the government, so far as repre- 
 sentation is practiable and consistent with the public in- 
 terests. The legislative or law making branch admits of 
 a larger and more numerous representation, as deliberation 
 and mature consideration are essentially important in the 
 enactment of laws. And as to the legislature it has been 
 said, that promptitute of actiou is oftener an evil than a 
 benefit. Hence in the best regulated governments the 
 legislature consists of two Houses, so that one may be a 
 check on the other to prevent hasty legislation. But in 
 the executive and judicial branches, dispatch and prompt- 
 itude of decision and action, so far as may be consistent 
 with a clear and comprehensive understanding of the sub- 
 ject matter, are important. Hence in the executive as well 
 as in the judicial branch, the number of the incumbents 
 should not be inconveniently large so as to occasion un- 
 necessary delay or tardy action. The number of three, or 
 five, or seven, or even nine, have been found prompt, and 
 to act with great energy aud efficiency, both in the exe- 
 cutive as well as the judiciary. The nine archons of 
 Athens, and the executive couucil of seven in Switzerland, 
 were for many centuries unequalled in energy and effici- 
 ency by the monarchies around them. But for greater 
 
8 
 
 certainty in avoiding tardy action by the members of the 
 Executive, the proposed amendment provides for only 
 three, a number of persons who, acting by a decision of 
 the majority, can certainly act with as much energy and 
 dispatch, and better comprehension of the subject-matter, 
 than a single person could possibly do. 
 
 The Influence of the American Example of a Single Ex- 
 ecutive. 
 
 Prior to the adoption of the constitution of the United 
 States, such a thing as a republic with the supreme Exec- 
 utive power vested in the hands of a single person was at 
 least rare, and no such government had ever acquired any 
 great distinction for stability and permanency. Subse- 
 quently, however, the example of the United States in this 
 regard was followed by the people of Mexico, and also of 
 some of the South American States, as well as by the peo- 
 ple of France, in numerous attempts to maintain republi- 
 can government with a single Executive. But it must be 
 conceded, that these various experiments, as to stabil- 
 ity and permanency at least, have not been successful, but 
 to a great extent, failures. With a plural Executive these 
 countries might have had, and probably would have had, 
 different results. In the United States the republican ex- 
 periment has been more successful hitherto, but mainly on 
 account of the counteracting influence of the State dynas- 
 ties in preventing centralization of power and checking 
 the inevitable tendencies to absolute monarchy. But the 
 country is not now free from impending dangers, which 
 the proposed amendment, if adopted, would certainly re- 
 move. 
 
 The tendency and natural result, however, of a single 
 Executive in a republic, unrestrained by local State dynas- 
 ties, have been exemplified in a signal example of recent 
 times, which cannot have faded from the recollections of 
 the present generation. The people of France, one of the 
 
9 
 
 most enlightened and highly civilized nations of the world, 
 have frequently shown a desire for a republican form of 
 government since the expulsion of the Bourbons. In May, 
 1848, the people of that country established a republic, 
 and in December of that year Louis Napoleon, under pro- 
 fessions of extraordinary attachment and devotion to re- 
 publicanism, was elected President of the French republic 
 under a constitution modeled after the plan of that of the 
 United States. And in less than four years, in defiance of 
 the staunch republicans of the National Assembly, headed 
 by VictorHugo, aud others like him, he did, by consummate 
 chicanery and subtle artifice, through his powers as Presi- 
 dent in the command of the army and navy aud the exercise 
 of official patronage, convert the republic into an imperial 
 monarchy. Here in our own times, before the eyes of the 
 world, is a demonstration of the danger of a single Execu- 
 tive to the liberties of a free people. If there had been a 
 plural Executive of three or five persons, selected from 
 different parts of the country, in the republic of France at 
 that time, it is undeniable that no such clandestine usur- 
 pation could have robbed the people of their liberties. 
 
 What was said on this subject in the Convention in Forming 
 the Constitution. 
 
 In the convention which formed the Constitution of the 
 United States, it was not even claimed by Alexander Ham- 
 ilton, who was the most strenuous advocate for a single 
 Executive, that it was republican in form. On this subject 
 he said, " As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted, 
 that no good one could be established on republican prin- 
 ciples." (The Madison Papers, Vol. 2, p. 887.) He fur- 
 ther said, (see same page,) "The English model was the 
 only good one on this subject. The hereditary interest of 
 the King was so interwoven with that of the nation, and 
 his personal emolument so great, that he was placed above 
 the danger of being corrupted from abroad," &c. And 
 
10 
 
 again, on p. 888 ibid, be said, "Let one branch of the 
 Legislature hold their places for life, or at least during 
 good behavior. Let the Executive also be for life," &c. 
 
 The members of the convention, raised and educated un- 
 der a monarchy, and in the literature, and a part of them 
 in the Colleges, of Great Britain, had been taught from 
 early youth to look upon the British government as a 
 model of perfection. And hence they readily adopted the 
 idea of a single Executive. 
 
 For the organization of the Executive, however, three 
 several plans were submitted to the convention. One was 
 for an Executive of three members, to be taken from the 
 different parts of the country ; another was a single Execu- 
 tive in connection with an executive council of five, on the 
 plan of the Grecian Ephori ; and the third was a single 
 Executive un restricted. 
 
 On pages 763-64, Madison Papers, Vol. 2, the following 
 appears: "Mr. Randolph streuuonsly opposed an unity in 
 the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus of 
 monarchy. We had, he said, no motive to be governed 
 by the British government as our prototype." ..." The 
 fixed genius of the people of America required a different 
 form of government. He could not see why the great re- 
 quisites for the executive department, vigor, dispatch and 
 responsibility, could not be found in three men as well as in 
 one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It 
 ought, therefore, iu order to support its independence, to 
 consist of more thau one." 
 
 Doctor Franklin proposed as a substitute for the provis- 
 ion as to the compensation for the services of the Execu- 
 tive, that his necessary expenses should be defrayed, but 
 that he should receive no salary, stipend, fee, or reward 
 whatsoever for his services. This was Washington's plan, 
 which he inculcated by his own example. For eight years 
 he executed most efficiently the most trying position of 
 General of the Armies on the simple payment of his neces- 
 sary expenses, and without any salary whatever. And the 
 
11 
 
 same rule he rigidly observed during the eight years of his 
 presidency, (see Washington's Inaugural Address of April 
 30th, 1789.) In supporting his proposition Doctor Frank- 
 lin argued, that ambition and cupidity, — " the love of 
 power, and the love of money," — were the rocks upon which 
 free government had been uniformly wrecked. These two 
 objects when united "have in many minds the most vio- 
 lent effects." "Place before the eyes of such men," said 
 he, "a post of honor, that shall be at the same time a place 
 of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it." 
 He further said, "That he had a better opinion of the 
 country than to think, that it would ever be without a suf- 
 ficent number of wise and good men to undertake, and exe- 
 cute well and faithfully the office in question, on simply 
 the payment of their expenses." And touching the ques- 
 tion of a single executive, and compensation for services 
 to be fixed by Congress, he said, that " there is a natural 
 inclination in mankind to kingly government." . . . "I 
 am apprehensive, therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that 
 the government of these States may in future times end in 
 a monarchy." ... . "It will only nourish the foetus of a 
 king, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly 
 expressed it, and a king will the sooner be set over us;" 
 (pages 771 and 773, Vol. 2, Madison Papers.) 
 
 And after the vote had been taken deciding in favor of 
 a single executive, Col. Mason, said, " We are going very 
 far in this business. We are not indeed constituting a Brit- 
 ish government, but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective 
 one," &c, (ibid, p. 788.) 
 
 And Mr. Williamson, (on p. 1189, ibid,) said, "He did 
 not like the unity in the Executive. He had wished the 
 Executive power to be lodged in three men, taken from 
 three districts into which the States should be divided." 
 
 "Another objection against a single magistrate is, 
 
 that he will be an elective king, and will feel the spirit of 
 one," &c. 
 
 It is very manifest from the debates of the convention 
 
12 
 
 in framing the constitution, that, if the vast enlargement 
 of the country, and the exaltation of the Executive powers, 
 which have taken place, could have been then fully antici- 
 pated and appreciated, the Executive power unrestricted 
 as it is would never have been vested in a single person. 
 
 The enlargement of the executive powers by construc- 
 tion given to the constitution and the statutes has not been 
 behind that growing out of the territorial extension of the 
 country. Alexander Hamilton, who favored the largest 
 grant of executive power to the president in framing the 
 constitution, said, in advocating its adoption, in his 77th 
 number of the Federalist, (edition of '73, p. 568 :) 
 
 "It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be 
 expected from the co-operation of the Senate, in the busi- 
 ness of appointments, that it would contribute to the sta- 
 bility of the administration. The consent of that body would 
 be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change of 
 the chief magistrate, therefore, would not occasiou so vio- 
 lent or so general a revolution in the officers of the gov- 
 ernment as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer 
 of offices. Where a man, in any station, had given satis- 
 factory evidence of his fitness for it, a new president would 
 be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a per- 
 son more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that the 
 discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, 
 and bring some degree of discredit upon himself," &c. 
 
 Yet no sooner di 1 the country become the plunder 
 ground between two great contending political parties, 
 than this clearly accurate construction of the constitution 
 was repudiated by Congress; and it is now settled in prac- 
 tice, that the power of removing officers, for whose ap- 
 pointment a confirmation by the Senate was necessary, 
 belonged exclusively to the president without the appro- 
 val or conseut of the Senate. 
 
 Argument for a Single Executive untenable. 
 
 The chief ground of objection to a plural executive, ur- 
 ged by Mr. Hamilton in the convention, and also in his 
 
13 
 
 70th number of the Federalist, consists in alleged want of 
 vigor or energy, and want of dispatch, and responsibility. 
 
 But this argument of Mr. Hamilton, although ingenious 
 and plausible, will not bear the test of scrutiny, and is 
 overthrown utterly by the practical experience in repub- 
 lics with plural executives. Indeed, when closely tested, 
 Mr. Hamilton's arguments will be fouud to rest on bold 
 assumptions and unwarranted conclusions. 
 
 The assumption that a council of three cannot act with 
 as much dispatch and energy as one mau is preposterous. 
 Three can confer together, and decide by a vote of a ma- 
 jority, as readily as a single executive could deliberate, and 
 decide satisfactorily of himself. The latter would usual- 
 ly advise with his subordinates, or his coterie of friends 
 around him, who being irresponsible and unknown to the 
 public would be likely under sinister influences to mis- 
 lead him. An irresponsible "power behind the throne 
 greater than the throue itself," or to use an Americanism, 
 " a kitchen cabinet" is an unavoidable accompaniment of 
 a siugle executive. Far better have three to act, each of 
 whom would not only be known, but also responsible to 
 the country, because selected and elected by the people 
 for the purpose. And the assumption, that a plural num- 
 ber of the executive would dispute, wrangle or altercate 
 with each other, and be unable to decide, is inconsistent 
 with the nature of the position, and the responsibilities 
 imposed by it. When three or more public men, taken 
 from different parts of the country, have heretofore become 
 associated with each other upon a high commission, or 
 upon the Bench of the Supreme Court, their bearing and 
 conduct have ever been courteous and dignified, and they 
 have faithfully devoted themselves to the proper dischaige 
 of their duties. In the case of a plural executive, the eyes of 
 the people of the whole country would be upon them, and 
 each one of them would have a common interest in giv- 
 ing character to their administration of the public affairs for 
 eflicieucy and success. Wrangling and discord in the coun- 
 
14 
 
 cil, before the eyes of the nation, would disgrace the ad- 
 ministration, and each member of the executive body ; and 
 the supposition of such a thing is inconsistent with the na- 
 ture of human conduct under such high responsibilties. 
 To act with becoming dispatch and energy would be en- 
 joined upon each, so that each one would be naturally in- 
 clined to prompt and aid the others to decisive action. 
 Hesitation, doubt, and procrastination have sometimes 
 characterized the action of a single executive to the detri- 
 ment and annoyance of the country, when if there had 
 been a plural executive such difficulty would have been 
 avoided. When an executive act is made the high duty 
 of three public functionaries, prompt and efficient action 
 is more certain to take place than where enjoined on a sin- 
 gle person. The assumption that three executives would 
 vie with each other, each have a separate opinion, and be 
 unable to decide, even by a majority, where action is en- 
 joined upon them as a duty, is absurd and irrational. 
 With greater reason could the objection be urged against 
 a single executive, that unaided by co-ordinates, he would 
 doubt, hesitate, and be often unable to act at all. Either 
 hypothesis is alike inconsistent with the uniform conduct 
 of public functionaries. Oar own country has actual ex- 
 perience in the judiciary, of courts of single, and of plural 
 members upon the bench. And it is undeniable, that 
 three or five judges on the bench are found to act with less 
 hesitation, and with more dispatch and vigor than a sin- 
 gle judge. Three heads are better than one. And the 
 proverb, that in the multitude of councellors there is safety, 
 has not been exploded. 
 
 In the case of three Executives taken from the different 
 sections of the country, each would bring all his intelli- 
 gence and mental power into their consultations, and the 
 suggestions and views of one would be aids to the others. 
 And it would be neither fair nor rational to deny, that 
 there would be more mental vigor and wisdom in their 
 conclusions, and more energy and efficiency in the action 
 
15 
 
 of the three, than there could possibly be in that of a sin- 
 gle Executive. 
 
 And as to responsibility, on the plan proposed by the 
 amendment, each of the three Executives would be per- 
 sonally responsible to the whole people of the United 
 States, so that the country would have the benefit of the 
 individual as well as the joint responsibility of the three 
 instead of that of a single person. There could be no possi- 
 bility, on this plan, of one of them shielding himself behind 
 the action of the others, for each would be responsible 
 and have to stand before the country ou his own vote and 
 conduct. And the actual responsibility to the country 
 would be three-fold as great as in case of a single Execu- 
 tive. The argument of Mr. Hamilton on this point is 
 wholly inapplicable to a plural Executive as here proposed, 
 and is directed mainly to the case of a single Executive 
 under the check of a supervising council. 
 
 But history, which "is philosophy teaching by exam- 
 ple," has demonstrated the utter fallacy of Mr. Hamilton's 
 argument against a plural Executive. The republics of 
 other countries and ages, noticed above, one of which is 
 still existing in the height of its power, and all of which 
 maintained the liberties of the people through a series of 
 centuries against the neighboring monarchies, have showu 
 by illustrious examples, that a plural Executive is not 
 wanting in either energy, dispatch or responsibility, and 
 not liable to the objections asserted by Mr. Hamilton, who 
 was confessedly an advocate of a qualified monarchy. 
 
 Indeed, the government of Great Britain itself furnishes 
 a striking illustration of the fallacy of Mr. Hamilton's ar- 
 gument. The Executive power of the United Kingdom, 
 although vested nominally in the Crown, is practically 
 vested in the Cabinet Ministry, composed of twelve minis- 
 ters, a body which has absorbed the functions of " the 
 King in Council," and has for the last century and more 
 exercised the executive power of the British government 
 with consummate ability. And no such defects as those 
 
I 
 
 16 
 
 ascribed by Mr. Hamilton to a plural Executive have ever 
 been witnessed in the administration of the British govern- 
 ment. On the contrary, the ministry have wielded the 
 executive power with a vigor and dispatch unsurpassed; 
 and as to responsibility, the British Ministry have shown 
 an obedience and responsibility to public opinion une- 
 qualled in any other country. 
 
 The Condition of Affairs at the Fall of the Roman and 
 French Republics present no Analogy. 
 
 No inferences are justifiable against a plural Executive 
 here from the circumstances attending the subversion of 
 either the Roman republic by Caesar, or the republic of 
 France by Napoleon Bonaparte, — on the contrary, those 
 historical events furnish signal illustrations of the dangers 
 attending the concentration of the executive power in the 
 hands of a single person. 
 
 In the degenerate clays of Rome, when the people were 
 corrupted by the distribution of subsidies and emoluments 
 derived from conquered provinces, Caesar, Pompey and 
 Crassus formed the coalition known as the first triumvir- 
 ate, an illegal combination, which virtually usurped the 
 functions of the consuls. But they never acted together 
 as a council or board of chief magistrates. On the con- 
 trary, separate and distinct duties were assigned them in 
 different and distinct parts of the country. Caesar had 
 command of the army, and the exclusive charge of the 
 government of the extensive territories on both sides 
 of the Alps designated as Gallia Cisalpina and Transal- 
 pina. Pompey had the charge of the army and govern- 
 ment in Spain, and Crassus of the army, &c, in Syria, 
 Greece and Egypt. The last named leader, having en- 
 gaged in an inconsiderate expedition against the Parthians, 
 was defeated and slain in battle. Caesar, who had capti- 
 vated the Roman people by his military exploits, and the 
 booty he had sent to Rome and distributed among the peo- 
 ple, crossed the Rubicon at the head of his army, and 
 
17 
 
 marched upon Rome, when his political adherents declared 
 him dictator with the title of imperator. On the approach 
 of Caesar, Pompey being then in Rome departed and en- 
 gaged in raising an army to check the dangerous move- 
 ments of Caesar, and he was then declared sole consul by 
 the Roman Senate. And Csesar, after taking forcibly from 
 the public treasury what money he wanted, followed Pom- 
 pey with his military forces. And after numerous military 
 movements and several engagements, the two Roman ar- 
 mies met and fought the noted battle of Pharsalia, where 
 Pompey was defeated, and immediately afterwards fled 
 from the country. After this Csesar controlled the destiny 
 of the Roman government until the tragedy of his death 
 in the Senate Chamber. The two consuls, the chief exec- 
 utive magistrates, still existed, but the civil authority be- 
 ing wholly paralyzed by the supremacy or usurpation of 
 the military chieftains, the republic was in a state of abso- 
 lute disorganization. 
 
 The state and condition of affairs here presented bears 
 no parallel or analogy whatsoever to a well regulated civil 
 organization of a republic where the military is made sub- 
 ordinate to the civil power. It simply shows a total loss 
 of the essential requisites for free government. 
 
 And the overthrow of the French republic by Napoleon, 
 in 1799, occurred also under a 6tate and conditiou of 
 things even more at variance, if possible, with the in- 
 stitutions and circumstances of an established republic. 
 France had just emerged from the bloodj 7 and horrid 
 scenes of the Revolution, and abandoned the impracticable 
 and inefficient measures of the Directory, by instituting 
 the Provisional Consulate, which was composed of three 
 Consuls, Bonaparte, Sieyes and Roger-Ducos. Nothing 
 was settled, but everything in commotion at the time. 
 This triumvirate never acted as a Board or Council at all, 
 except at the beginning to make a division of their labors 
 and responsibilities. Bonaparte was made First Consul, 
 and the command of the army and eutire direction of the 
 
18 
 
 government was committed to him. Sieves was allotted 
 the duty of preparing the constitution for the government. 
 Aud Roger-Ducos being " a man of limited and easy char- 
 acter," left everything to his colleagues. Under these cir- 
 cumstances Bonaparte had everything in his own hands as 
 much as if he had been the sole or single Executive, and 
 with the eclat of his military exploits he had no difficulty 
 in converting the republic into an empire in a short time. 
 
 The subversion of republican government, in both these 
 instances, occurred at a time of great popular commotion 
 and excitement, and under gross defects, if not the abso- 
 lute want of organization and system, in the Executive 
 department. The Consuls were not selected as representa- 
 tives of the people from different sections of the country. 
 And they did not confer and deliberate together as an 
 Executive Council, and maintain the supremacy of the ex- 
 ecutive as a distinct branch of government. Ou the con- 
 trary, they abandoned the civil authority of the executive, 
 and were overwhelmed by the usurpations of the military. 
 
 The amendment proposed requires the action of the 
 three presidents in joint council, and forbids either of them 
 the taking command of an army in the field. And the 
 selection of these high public functionaries from the dif- 
 ferent sections of the country, would give each of them a 
 distinctive character as a representative of the people in 
 the Executive councils, and make them aids to, and checks 
 upon, each other. And the people of each presidential 
 district would have an interest as well as a pride in being 
 represented by a man of known ability, efficiency and in- 
 tegrity. So that the degrading and dangerous practice of 
 taking inefficient men for the presidency on account of 
 mere availability would be at once abandoned. 
 
 Expenses Reduced, not Increased. 
 
 This proposed change in the Presidency will not increase 
 the public expenses. The President of the United States 
 at present receives an annual salary of $50,000, and the 
 
19 
 
 perquisites of the expenses of " the White House " as a res- 
 idence, includiug its repairs, servants, and other expenses, 
 amounting to at least $75,000 a year. So that his salary 
 and perquisites at this time amount to at least $125,000 a 
 year. This enormous salary, with such emoluments and 
 perquisites, was manifestly given to the President for pur- 
 poses of aggrandisement, and with a view to his regal char- 
 acter. The change proposed lays aside monarchy and 
 substitutes a republican executive of three Presidents, with 
 an annual salary of $30,000 for each, without any perqui- 
 sites or emoluments whatsoever. This would make a re- 
 duction in the expenses of the Presidency of §35,000 a 
 year, and substitute the services of three first-class men for 
 the services of one. 
 
 Indeed, discarding the extravagance and voluptuousness 
 of the monarchical feature in our government, a salary of 
 $20,000 a year, without any perquisites or emoluments, 
 things expressly forbidden in the constitution, would be 
 an ample and full compensation for a President, and more 
 consistent with the simplicity of republican institutions. 
 This would save to the people $65,000 a year, and yet 
 give far greater efficiency and safety to the executive. 
 
 A Check upon the Demoralization of Presidential Elections. 
 
 The change in the Presidential term from four to six 
 years, with ineligibility after a full term of six years, has 
 the sanction of some of the profoundest statesmen of the 
 country in past times; and the election of a President from 
 one of the three districts every two years would simply make 
 the changes in the Presidency gradual, and to correspond 
 with the regular changes in the United States Senate — one- 
 third of the Senators coming in every two years and meet- 
 ing Senators already posted and experienced in the busi- 
 ness of the Government, half of whom had already served 
 four years, and the other half two years. The Presiden- 
 tial term might be made twelve years, and one of the three 
 
20 
 
 be elected every four years. But the shorter period, cor- 
 responding with the Senatorial term, would probably cre- 
 ate the best responsibility to the people. The election of 
 a President from one of the three districts every two years, 
 could bear no similarity whatever to the present election 
 of a single President every four years, who alone wields 
 the whole patronage of the government, and therefore dis- 
 tributes it as rewards for political services. In the plan 
 proposed, the president elected every two years would him- 
 self have no patronage at his own disposal ; and therefore 
 such au election could produce no such popular commotion 
 as we now have every four years. 
 
 The Enlarged Powers of the Presidency. 
 
 The presidency of the United States has, by the enlarge- 
 ment of the country, and the exaltation of its powers, be- 
 come in reality and in fact a fully developed elective mon- 
 archy, by whatever other name it may be called. Invested 
 with the Supreme Executive power over the whole country, 
 the president collects and disburses an annual revenue ex- 
 ceeding $300,000,000, and exercises the power of appoint- 
 ment and removal over at least two hundred thousand offi- 
 cers and agents of the United States, together with an 
 influence over more thau twice that number of applicants 
 and expectants of the offices, honors and emoluments of the 
 government. With the qualified but primary power of 
 makiug treaties with foreign nations, the president has the 
 sole 'power of executing the treaties, and is the sole repre- 
 sentative of the United States in their intercourse with for- 
 eign nations. By his financial policy and executive meas- 
 ures, the president exercises a daily influence on the money 
 market and exchanges of the country, domestic and for- 
 eign, and consequently more or less, upon the prices of 
 commodities and wages of labor. Clothed with all these 
 high powers, and made " the commander-in-chief of the 
 Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of 
 
21 
 
 the several States when called into the actual service of 
 the United States," who can deny that the president has 
 become a monarch, wielding more power than any one of 
 four-fifths of the monarchs of Europe ? 
 
 These Monarchical Powers made Absolute by the Ascendency 
 of the President's Political Party. 
 
 Wielding the powers above mentioned, a president 
 elected as a political partisan is placed at the head of his 
 party, which, if in the majority in both branches of Con- 
 gress, and on the bench of the Supreme Court, gives him a 
 controlling influence with both the legislative and the judi- 
 cial branches of the government. The whole country has 
 recently seen how completely the political majorities in 
 both branches of Congress, and on the bench of the Su- 
 preme Court, are under the control of the political party 
 in power. So that the president as the head of the politi- 
 cal party in power, wielding his va3t powers aud extensive 
 patronage, would exercise a controlling influence over the 
 legislative and judicial, as well as the Executive depart- 
 ments, and therefore, would exercise the powers of an ab- 
 solute monarch. And the history of the world has shown 
 that the most corrupt and debasing of all monarchies is the 
 elective monarchy. It debases and corrupts the very foun- 
 dations of society, and places the control of the country in 
 the hands of men governed by ambition, cupidity and 
 self-aggrandisement, crushing out all elevated patriotism 
 and magnanimous regard for advancement and improve- 
 ment in man's condition. Far better for the country to 
 have a hereditary and absolute monarchy at once. 
 
 The political sentiment most deeply rooted in the minds 
 of the Americau people is to be found in their attachment 
 to a republican form of guvernment, believing it to be the 
 sheet anchor of their liberties, and the palladium of the 
 Union of the States, And that lofty and patriotic senti- 
 ment is taught iu the schools, and inculcated in the litcra- 
 
22 
 
 tn re of the country; and with the spirit of republican lib- 
 erty which animates the people throughout this vast coun- 
 try, long and devastating wars must inevitably precede the 
 destruction of the freedom of the States and of the people. 
 It is, therefore, a matter of the highest moment to the coun- 
 try, that the constitution should be so amended as to perfect 
 and preserve a representative republic, and guard against 
 the evils which now threaten and endanger the perma- 
 nency of our institutions. 
 
 "The natural inclination of mankind to kingly govern- 
 ment," mentioned by Dr. Franklin, is founded on that 
 instinct of human nature which leads to hero worship or 
 doing homage to some human idol, and frequently to his 
 apotheosis after death, as shown in various phases of socie- 
 ty in the course of the history of the world. It is said, that 
 the Hebrew when fed by the bread of heaven murmured 
 at his God, and looked back and pined for the luxurious 
 slavery of Egypt. Afterwards, under the dispensation of 
 Judges guided by divine wisdom, the Hebrews committed 
 the enormous sin of petitioning for and having a king an- 
 nointed to rule over them. One of the sages of old illus- 
 trated the folly of this act by the fable of the frogs petition- 
 ing Jupiter for a king, and he finally gave them a stork, 
 that fed upon and devoured them. 
 
 Whether monarchy be substituted for free government 
 by a sudden and violeut usurpation, or by gradual and in- 
 sidious approaches under the semblance of republican 
 institutions, it matters not, for the basis of it sooner or 
 later is inevitably laid in the division of the people into 
 two classes, the nobility and the commonalty. And for 
 the purposes of subordination, sooner or later the doctrine 
 of the divine right of kings, and that the king can do 
 no wrong, with all the other degrading superstitions of 
 king-craft, will be inculcated among the masses of the peo- 
 ple. How soon the spirit of liberty among the American 
 people can be subdued, and their necks be prepared for the 
 yoke, is veiled iu the mysteries of the future. But certain 
 
23 
 
 it is, that there will be stirring times, terrific]" struggles, 
 and havoc and slaughter, such as the world never hereto- 
 fore witnessed, before that dire and dread event can be 
 reached. The literature of the country has taught the 
 present generation of our public men, and is teaching the 
 coming one, that death is preferable to a loss of their liber- 
 ties. And there are champions and leaders among the peo- 
 ple yet unknown, who will be brought out to astonish the 
 world by their prowess, before a usurper and a tyrant can 
 trample down the constitutional liberties of this country. 
 But it is the part of statesmanship and wisdom to provide 
 safeguards against threatened dangers. 
 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 T. W. BARTLEY. 
 
 May 25th, 1878. 
 
 The following is a copy of the Resolutions : 
 
 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
 States of America in Congress assembled, (two-thirds of each House 
 concurring therein,) That the following article be proposed to the 
 legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the Consti- 
 tution of the United States, and substitute for the first, second, 
 third and fourth clauses of section one of the second article of said 
 Constitution ; which, when ratified by three-fourths of said legis- 
 latures, shall be valid as a part of the Constitution, namely : 
 
 Article XVI. 
 
 Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in, and shall 
 be hereafter administered by, three Presidents, constituting a Su- 
 preme Executive Council of three, to be elected by the qualified 
 electors of each and all of the States, and each to be taken from 
 one of the three several prominent sections of the United States, 
 known, one as the Western States, one as the Eastern and Middle 
 States, and the other as the Southern States, and no two of whom 
 should be citizens of the same section or district of the country. 
 And the boundaries of each of the said three Presidential districts 
 shall be defined specifically, and established by law. 
 
 Sec. 2. The stated Presidential term of office shall be six years, 
 and no President having served a full term shall be eligible for a 
 second term. And at the first election under this article, the Pres- 
 
ident from the Western district shall be elected for a fractional 
 
 term of two years, and the President from the Southern district 
 for a fractional term of four years, and the President from the 
 Eastern aud Middle district for a full term of six years ; and after 
 the first election, one President shall be elected from one of the 
 three several districts every two years.. 
 
 Sec. 3. The time and place of holdiug the elections for Presi- 
 dent in the several States, and the rules and regulations for con- 
 ducting the same, and the time and mode of making the returns 
 of such elections, and of counting the votes and declaring the re- 
 sults, shall be prescribed by Congress. 
 
 Sec. 4. Each one of the three composing the Presidential Coun- 
 cil shall have all the qualifications to make him eligible to the 
 office heretofore required of the President of the United States ; 
 and each, before enteriug upon the discharge of his duties, shall 
 take the oath of office now required of the President of the United 
 States ; and each of the three shall be subject to the liability of 
 removal from office on impeachment to which the President is now 
 subjected. 
 
 Sec. 5. In electing the members of the Supreme Executive 
 Council, the qualified voters of each State shall vote directly for 
 the candidates for such office; and the three caudidates having 
 the highest number of votes in any State shall be entitled to the 
 vote of such State in such election ; aud the vote of each State 
 thus ascertained shall entitle the candidates having such highest 
 number of the votes to a vote for the Presidential office equal to 
 the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which such 
 State may be entitled in the Congress of the United States ; and 
 the three candidates having the highest number of votes of all the 
 States thus counted shall be declared elected to the Presidential 
 Council; and in the case of a tie in the popular vote of any State, 
 or in the count of the votes in the several States, every such tie 
 vote shall be determined as Congress shall provide by law. 
 
 Sec. 6. The said Presidential Council shall have full power to 
 perform all the duties aud execute all the authority now conferred 
 and enjoined upon the President of the United States; and, in so 
 doing, all questions arising in the administration of the executive 
 authority, upon which a difference of opinion may exist, shall be 
 decided promptly by a majority vote. Aud in the case of the re- 
 moval of any member of the Presidential Council from office, or 
 of the death, resignation or inability of either to discharge the 
 powers and duties of the said office, such vacancy shall be filled 
 by such other officer of the United States or in such manner as 
 may be provided by law. And it is made the duty of the Con- 
 gress of the United* States to prescribe by law the mode and au- 
 thority for filling all vacancies occurring iu the Presidential Coun- 
 cil until an election can be duly held according to law. 
 
 Sec. 7. A majority of the Presidential Council shall always be 
 competent for the transaction of the business of the Council ; and 
 
25 
 
 in case of the temporary vacancy in the places of two members 
 of the Council at any one time, the remaining member shall, for 
 the time being, perform the duties of the Council until the vacan- 
 cies can be filled. 
 
 Sec. 8. Each member of the Presidential Council shall be en- 
 titled to full information from the heads of each of the executive 
 departments, and also to the opinions and suggestions, in writing, 
 of any such officer on any subject connected with the business of 
 his department, whenever he may require the same. And the mil- 
 itary and naval forces of the United States shall be subject to the 
 authority and control of the Presidential Council ; but no member 
 of the Council shall take personal command of the Army of the 
 United States in actual sendee in the field. 
 
 Sec. 9. The Supreme Executive Council shall have a journal, 
 regularly kept, of their proceedings, in which the votes of the sev- 
 eral members shall be entered and recorded upon every important 
 subject upon which a division of opinion may arise ; and each mem- 
 ber shall, when he desires it, have a note made on the journal of 
 his reasons for any such vote by him given. And a duplicate of 
 such journal shall be sent to the Congress of the United States at 
 the beginning of every regular session. 
 
 Sec. 10. Instead of the Vice-President now provided for, the 
 Senate of the United States shall, every four years, elect a Presi- 
 dent of the Senate, who is not a member of that body, and who, as 
 the presiding officer of the Senate, shall have and exercise all the 
 authority heretofore conferred on the Vice-President. 
 
 Sec. 11. Each of the Presidents shall, at stated times, receive 
 for his services a compensation not exceeding thirty thousand dol- 
 lars a year, and which shall neither be increased nor diminished 
 during the period for which he shall have been elected ; and nei- 
 ther of the Presidents shall receive within that period any other 
 emolument or perquisite from the United States, or any of them, 
 either in the way of furnishing him with his dwelling-house, or 
 paying the expenses thereof, or otherwise ; and all subsidies, pres- 
 ents, or donations to either of the Presidents from any foreign gov- 
 ernment, prince, potentate, or subject, or from any resident of the 
 United States, shall inure to the benefit of the United States, and 
 be at once delivered over to the Treasurer for that purpose.