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LETTERS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 SILVER QUESTION 
 
 (AS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE “EVENING POST") 
 
 BT 
 
 J. S. MOORE, 
 
 author OF THE “PARSEE letters..” 
 
 gXnv Dork: 
 
 RUSSELL BROTHERS, PRINTERS, 
 17, 19, 21, 23 ROSE STREET. 
 
 187 7. 
 
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 Mi84 
 
To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the 44 th 
 Congress. 
 
 In dedicating the following letters on the silver question to 
 your honorable body, I certainly do not desire to come in antag¬ 
 onism with the full and able report which the Commission on the 
 Currency Question will shortly lay before you. 
 
 The silver question, like a huge planet, may even receive light 
 and warmth from a mere satellite. If ten years’ application to 
 the statistical and economical questions of this country can author¬ 
 ize an opinion, I most respectfully point out to Congress that tho 
 demonetization of silver in 1873 is not one of the causes of tho 
 present depression of trade and commerce, nor will the rernona- 
 tising of silver effectually remove the evil. 
 
 The real causes of the present depression of trade and finance 
 are indicated in the following letters, although necessarily treated 
 with brevity. Suffice it to say that while the volume of currency 
 for the last ten years, and at this present moment, in the United 
 States, is perfectly ample to transact twice the amount of the an¬ 
 nual busiftess of the country, confidence, on the other hand, lias 
 indeed been unnaturally contracted, and timidity and suspicion 
 are the ruling characteristics of the capitalists. 
 
 To remove the latter evil, Congress at this juncture holds the 
 key of the situation. A speedy and satisfactory settlement of 
 the all-absorbing political question will, as if by magic, restore a 
 commercial and financial confidence to the cruntry unknown 
 since the war; and if, in addition to this happy consummation, 
 a more liberal impulse were given to the commerce and industry 
 of the United States, by reforming the present unjust and 
 oppressive tariff laws, there is no reason to doubt that pros¬ 
 perity and happiness would once more dawn upon forty-five 
 millions of the most enlightened and industrious people of 
 the world, inhabiting a continent unparalleled, which at no 
 remote period is destined to sustain and give abundance to two 
 hundred millions of the human race. 
 
 Most respectfully, 
 
 J. S. MOORE. 
 
 Hew York. December, 1876 . 
 

 
THE SILVER QUESTION. 
 
 LETTER 1. 
 
 SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF SILVER-GOLD THE MORE 
 STABLE MEASURE FOR COMMODITIES. 
 
 To the Editors of the Evening Post. 
 
 My attention has been called to a set of inquiries by the Sil¬ 
 ver Commission which appeared in the Evening Post of October 
 13, and is prefaced as follows: 
 
 “ The Silver Commission, of which Senator Jones is chairman, 
 have sent to prominent bankers and business men a circular, set¬ 
 ting forth the authorization of the commission, and concluding 
 with the following request: 
 
 “ Your attention is respectfully invited to the fact that, under 
 the first clause of the resolution, it becomes the duty of the 
 commission to inquire into the changes in the relative value of 
 gold and silver, and the effects thereof upon trade, commerce, 
 finance and the productive interests of the country. 
 
 “ In pursuance of this requirement they desire to submit to 
 you, as a merchant, banker, broker, manufacturer, producer or 
 carrier the following interrogatories, with the request that you 
 will answer them, in writing, and return such answers to the 
 commission, at your earliest convenience.” 
 
 As I have the misfortune not to be (at present at least) a ban¬ 
 ker, merchant, broker, manufacturer, producer, or u even" a car¬ 
 rier, I could not of course expect to be called upon by the com¬ 
 mission for aid in their inquiries; but, as these inquiries ap¬ 
 peared in a public journal, I assume that they are now public 
 property, and in answering them I sincerely hope that I will 
 not detract from the dignity of the honorable commission by giv¬ 
 ing the public in general, and the commission in particular, my 
 views on the subject* 
 
 * It is but fair to state that, since the date of this letter, I have been called 
 before the Commission and fully examined on the silver question.—J. S. M. 
 
6 
 
 Question 1.—To what causes do you attribute the recent 
 changes in the relative value of silver and gold ? 
 
 Answer.—To the simple cause of supply and demand. India, 
 China and Germany until recently have been the chief pur¬ 
 chasers of silver. India has incurred a debt for building rail¬ 
 ways and irrigating lands which may safely be set down at two 
 hundred million pounds sterling, or one thousand millions of 
 dollars. This debt has been contracted in England, and the 
 interest is guaranteed by the Indian Council in London, and is 
 payable in sterling or gold. The average interest is 5 per 
 centum, and it requires therefore $50,000,000 annually to be 
 found by India to pay Englishmen their interest. ISIow the way 
 this interest is paid is very simple. The Indian Council in Lon¬ 
 don draw twice a month from thirty to forty lacs of rupees (for 
 the benefit of the Silver Commission I may say that a lac is one 
 hundred thousand rupees), divided among the great cities of 
 Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. In other words, if a merchant 
 or banker in London wants to send a credit to Bombay for a 
 thousand candies of cotton (a candy, by-the-by, is 777 lbs.), and 
 a candy of cotton sells for 150 rupees, he needs of course 150,000 
 rupees in Bombay. The merchant and banker therefore can go 
 and buy this credit of the India Council in London, which is 
 paid at ten days’ or at sight in Bombay in silver rupees. '1 he 
 sovereigns or bank notes received by the Council are applied 
 to pay the interest on the bonds. Now, this drawing by the 
 India Council in London on the revenue in India naturally 
 shuts up an avenue of silver export from the west, to at least 
 100,000,000 rupees, or $50,000,000 annually. Again, for three 
 years the price of India and China produce has at least been on 
 the average 20 per cent, less in value than formerly; and 
 although there is an immense increase in the quantities of cotton, 
 linseed, saltpetre, jute, hemp, and many other articles exported 
 from India, and even of teas and silks from China, yet it does 
 not take as many silver rupees and silver dollars to purchase 
 these products as formerly. 
 
 By-the-by, raw silk has gone up in price, and silver dollars 
 were quoted higher in China than the same weight of silver was 
 quoted in India, thus showing that the demand will cause a rise 
 in silver as well as in potatoes. 
 
7 
 
 Again, another great avenue for the silver demand has not 
 only been shut up for the last two years, but, what is worse, 
 Germany, the country formerly a great customer for silver, has 
 been demonetizing silver, and is selling it freely. £9,000,000 
 worth of double thalers are in the market now, and some 300,- 
 000,000 thalers are to follow. 
 
 In addition to this temporary unexpected supply of silver, a 
 decided increased supply from all the mines of the world has set 
 in, as compared with ten years ago, and the demand being crip¬ 
 pled and the supply increasing, as stated above, the price of sil¬ 
 ver has fallen. This fully accounts for the cause of the recent 
 ■changes in the relative value of silver to gold. 
 
 Question 2.—What percentage or portion of such change do 
 you attribute to a fall in silver, and what portion to a rise in 
 gold? 
 
 Answer.—Now, this question is the great hobby of my good 
 friend, Senator Jones; but, really, there is no bonanza in it at 
 all. The plain answer is, Gold is the standard, and is by mu¬ 
 tual consent fixed; it has risen in relation to silver simply be¬ 
 cause silver has fallen. But I will be more explicit in respect 
 to this question by answering the next, which is : 
 
 Question 3.—By what process of reasoning or deduction do 
 you arrive at the conclusion given ? 
 
 Answer.—My process is very simple. Gold is the yard meas¬ 
 ure, while commodities are the stuffs to be measured. Now, if 
 I measure to-day a piece of cloth and find that it contains fifty 
 yards, and remeasure it to-morrow and find that it only contains 
 forty-nine and one-half yards, and both days’ measurements are 
 right, surely it is the cloth that has shrunk one-half yard, and 
 not the yard measure that has increased in length 1 per centum. 
 
 But let me come to actual facts. Let me take middling cotton 
 as an example. For the last three to four months the price has 
 not fluctuated more than one-sixteenth of a penny in Liverpool. 
 It may reasonably be taken at a standard price of sixpence per 
 pound. Now, suppose I had one thousand ounces of silver four 
 months ago, and wanted to convert it into cotton in Liverpool, 
 I would have sold my silver at the then price of 54 pence per 
 ounce, and got exactly £225 for it in gold. I could, at sixpence 
 a pound, have bought nine thousand pounds of cotton. Two 
 months later cotton was still sixpence a pound. I had again one 
 
8 
 
 thousand ounces of silver with which to buy cotton. I would 
 have had to sell it for 50 pence an ounce, and would have got 
 £208 6s. 8 d. for it, and I could only have bought 8,333 2-6 
 pounds of cotton for my one thousand ounces of silver, or 666 
 pounds less than two months before. 
 
 To-day silver sells at 52 pence an ounce, and my 1,000 ounces 
 of silver will bring me 333 pounds more of cotton than it would 
 two months ago, and 333 pounds less than four months ago. 
 Thus there are three distinct fluctations, whereas if I had 100 
 ounces of standard gold (22 carats) I would have got four 
 months ago, two months ago and to-day, the same price for it, 
 namely, £3 175. 9 d. an ounce ; and, what is still more, I would 
 all the time have bought the same quantity of cotton for it, pro¬ 
 vided the cotton did not, as in the example given above, fluctu¬ 
 ate in price.* 
 
 Now, this holds good with every article. If, for instance, 
 cotton had fluctuated in price, that price, being measured by the 
 yard measure or yardstick called gold, would always have given 
 me the fair measure; whereas, if I dealt with the commodity in 
 silver only, it would have fluctuated doubly, namely, the silver 
 and the cotton. 
 
 I shall answer the other inquiries in my next letter.* 
 
 J. S. MOORE. 
 
 New York , October 16, 1876. 
 
 * As a curious fact, cotton has advanced since the 16th of October to the pres¬ 
 ent day, December 28th, £ of a penny or 12£ per cent. Silver advanced from 52 
 pence to 58^, also about 12^ per cent., but during the last twelve; days it has 
 fallen to 56 pence. Now, if cotton had been paid for in silver twelve days ago, 
 and resold now for silver, notwithstanding that there was actually a rise of 2| per 
 cent in cotton, the speculator would lose 2i per cent, on the transaction. 
 
9 
 
 LETTER 2. 
 
 CONDITION OF TRADE AND COMMERCE IN THE UNITED 
 STATES-CAUSE FOR THE DEPRESSION-FATAL 
 FINANCIAL POLICY OF MR. BOUTWELL, WHO 
 MIGHT EASILY HA \IE RESTORED SPECIE PA YMENT. 
 -PERNICIOUS EFFECT OF THE TARIFF. 
 
 To the Editors of the Evening Post. 
 
 The fourth question the Silver Commission are anxious to 
 have answered is: 
 
 Question 4.—What is the present general condition through¬ 
 out the country of the trade, commercial or financial calling, or 
 productive industry, in which you are engaged ? 
 
 Answer.—Although not engaged in any trade, it has been my 
 vocation to collect statistics and facts on commerce and trade. 
 From these I gather that the general condition of trade, com¬ 
 mercial and financial, throughout the country, is very unsatis¬ 
 factory. It is, however, noticeable that a somewhat better feel¬ 
 ing has set in since the early part of September, and in a short 
 sentence it may be said that a revival of trade has been, since 
 the 1st of September, on trial. But no verdict can be given for 
 two or three months, at least. 
 
 Question 5.—If possible, give some statistics showing the con¬ 
 dition of such industry compared with its condition at other 
 
 periods ? 
 
 Answer.—I am sorry to give the honorable Commission the 
 most startling of all statistics bearing on the subject, namely: 
 The number of business failures for the third quarter of 1876 
 was 2,450, with liabilities reaching $47,857,871, against 1,794 
 for the second quarter, with liabilities footing up $43,771,273. 
 That is, the number of failures was 656 more in the third than 
 in the second quarter, and the liabilities were more than four 
 millions greater. These unfortunate figures speak more forci¬ 
 bly than any comparative statement possibly can, as it must be 
 obvious that a country must have suffered deeply which wipes 
 
10 
 
 out of existence some 10,000 traders annually, with liabilities 
 from $190,000,000 to $200,000,000. 
 
 Question 6.—If a depression exists, to what cause or causes 
 do you attribute it ? 
 
 Answer.—I attribute the depression of commerce, finance and 
 trade in the United States to the following causes : 
 
 First, To recklessness in trade, extravagance in the habit of 
 expenditures, in every walk of life. 
 
 Second, To an irredeemable, fluctuating currency. 
 
 Third, To the impolitic tariff and unnecessarily high taxation 
 and to stagnation of trade all over the world. 
 
 I will treat these three causes categorically : 
 
 First—reckless trade and extravagance. When the war 
 ceased in 1865-66 one portion of the Union—the South— 
 undoubtedly was substantially ruined, while the North and 
 Northwest were inflatingly rich. A sudden wealth of $2,500- 
 000,000 was conjured up by the war, called the public debt, 
 and irredeemable currency. Unwholesome as this mountain of 
 debt was and is, it is, nevertheless, wealth, and he who held 
 bonds and greenbacks was rich. Now, there is no denying the 
 fact that the high prices that prevailed during the war and up to 
 1873, the immense profits made by all classes engaged in indus¬ 
 try, and the very nature of the currency in which the people 
 dealt inflated the price of real estate as well as of broomsticks. 
 It inflated the price of luxuries as well as of necessaries. The 
 general household expenditure of the mechanic rose from $300 
 a year to $500 or $600. That of people in a higher position of 
 life from $1,000 or $2,000 a year to $5,000 and $10,000. The 
 whole country lived in a state of saturnalia. Every house that 
 was built from 1868 to 1873, every manufactory erected and 
 found in machinery, every steamboat and every mile of railroad 
 was built by inflated prices, and cost 50 per centum on the 
 average more than in sober times it would have cost When 
 you build a house which costs $50,000 and have to pay 7 per 
 centum for a mortgage, you cannot afford to let it for less than 
 $5,000. But inasmuch as that $50,000 house was at least $20,- 
 000 or $25,000 inflated in price, and is in reality only worth 
 $25,000, it is literally impossible to get $5,000 rent for it, 
 as there are other houses alongside of it which have been 
 
11 
 
 bought for or cost only $25,000, and are let for $2,000 a 
 
 year. 
 
 Now the man who during the national saturnalia built his 
 house for $50,000 and got a mortgage on it for $30,000 finds 
 two things: first, that the mortgagee wants his money or more 
 margin, or forecloses ; and secondly, that the rent of the house 
 does not pay the interest and taxes. Thus the price collapses 
 and the wealthy real estate owner becomes bankrupt 
 
 Again, let us take the great railway interest since the war. 
 Up to 1873 there were a leagued brotherhood of benevolent 
 railroad projectors. Of course, it was all in the interest of de¬ 
 veloping the country. But facts are facts. All that was neces¬ 
 sary was a paternal land grant from Congress ; the rest speedily 
 followed. Financial agents blew the soap bubble not only in 
 Europe but at home. Bonds in the most charming colors (by- 
 the-by, they all have, however, a green foundation color) were 
 printed and sold, and the general division of these schemes was: 
 For manipulating, blowing bubbles, etc., 40 per centum; for 
 sundry divisions in bonds and shares where they did the most 
 good, 20 per centum; for labor, 20 per centum; and for ma¬ 
 terial, 20 per centum. Now in such a state of things surely 
 nothing but speedy disaster could follow. 
 
 In 1873 there must have been two hundred thousand laborers 
 employed in the United States in building these bogus railroads. 
 Their pay and engagement depended entirely on the sale of 
 green colored bonds in Europe and at home. Suddenly £he 
 bond buyers ref used to have anything more green thrust in their 
 eyes, and the collapse came, involving in ruin and distress not 
 only the very numerous class of investors in the United States 
 and Europe, but throwing an immense number of people out of 
 employ, and them and their families into suffering. 
 
 Well then, ever since the panic of September, 1873, the 
 country has been in a state of transition ; it has been struggling 
 bard to become sober again, to find that high wages, if every¬ 
 thing else is high, are much worse than low wages when every¬ 
 thing else is cheap. The moneyed classes are. in my opinion, 
 needlessly blamed for not having confidence. The fact is, there 
 is not a moneyed centre or moneyed man that has not still 
 a skeleton in the cupboard grinning at him eyer since 
 
12 
 
 September, 1873. This is one reason or cause for the depres¬ 
 sion. 
 
 Second—The irredeemable and fluctuating currency. The 
 visible cost of the luxury of having an irredeemable currency 
 is about 70 to 80 millions of dollars annually. That is to say, 
 our imports and duties being paid in gold, and our earnings paid 
 in paper, we have to raise from 70 to 80 millions of dollars an¬ 
 nually in excess in paper to pay for our imports. But that is 
 only the visible part of it The invisible part is that these 80 
 millions of dollars premium on gold at least double or perhaps 
 treble themselves before they reach the consumer. Thus the 
 people have one of the two silent diseases gnawing in their bones, 
 which compels them to raise $200,000,000 annually for the lux¬ 
 ury of an irredeemable currency. This silent disease, £his na¬ 
 tional curse, might easily have been now, at least for three years, 
 a thing of the past, had not the unfortunate financial policy of 
 Mr. Boutwell prevailed, who reversed the order of the universe 
 (if I may use the simile) by trying to move the sun round the 
 world instead of the world round the sun. Mr. Boutwell’s four 
 years as Secretary of the Treasury were the most successful 
 financial years this country ever saw. He collected during the 
 four fiscal years, 1870 to 1873 inclusive, $1,457,262,839 net 
 ordinary revenue exclusive of $45,000,000 of premium on gold. 
 When he entered office in 1869 the expenditure for the fiscal 
 year, extravagant as it was under Mr. Johnson’s administration, 
 was as follows: 
 
 Net ordinary expenditure.$190,496,354 
 
 Interest on the debt. 130,694,242 
 
 Total.$321,190,596 
 
 The following year, namely, 1870, Mr. Boutwell found the 
 expenditures reduced very greatly to 
 
 Net ordinary expenditures.$164,421,507 
 
 Interest on the debt. 129,235,498 
 
 Total...$293,657,005 
 
 a saving of $27,500,000. 
 
 Of this amount about 1£ millions was the saving on interest 
 
13 
 
 Now, this clearly shows that President Grant’s administration 
 could rule the country, leaving the saving of interest out, for 
 about 294 millions of dollars annually, which, in four years, 
 amounts to 1,176 millions of dollars. The receipts for the four 
 years having been 1,457 millions there was a surplus of 281 mil¬ 
 lions of dollars, beside some 80 millions of dollars surplus in the 
 treasury when Mr. Boutwell entered office. 
 
 Now, can the crudest financial tyro or the shrewdest financial 
 genius doubt that with such a surplus it would have been in the 
 least difficult to bring the country to specie payments, when the 
 whole irredeemable currency outstanding was only $356,000,000 ? 
 But Mr. Boutwell, in the most orthodox fashion, tried to move 
 that immense financial sum of bonded indebtedness—amounting 
 to more than $2,000,000,000—around the insignificant planet of 
 $356,000,000 in greenbacks, arguing that by paying off your 
 debt you will be able not only to fund the bonds cheaper, but 
 to bring about specie payments. Events, strangely enough, 
 prove that when Mr. Boutwell was paying off the debt at the 
 rate of $100,000,000 a year, he had difficulty in funding at 5 per 
 centum, whereas, when the payment of the debt has not only 
 ceased, but there is a strong aversion to it, the present secretary 
 is overwhelmed with offers to fund at per centum. But the 
 opportunity was lost, and the honorable Senator alone is respon¬ 
 sible for the present existence of an irredeemable currency, as 
 well as for the additional burden of at least $200,000,000 annu¬ 
 ally to be raised by the people on account of an unredeemable 
 currency, which is another cause of the present depression in trade. 
 
 Third—The impolitic tariff and unnecessarily high taxation 
 and stagnation of trade everywhere. The present tariff is such 
 an expensive luxury that the burden of an irredeemable cur¬ 
 rency is only a fleabite to it. If the production of manufactures 
 of this country is estimated at only $4,000,000,000 annually, 
 the tariff, on the average, enhances the cost of that production at 
 least 15 per centum, or $600,000,000, the treasury barely receiv¬ 
 ing $150,000,000 revenue from the tariff. But enormous as this 
 burden is, there is another phase to the silent disease called pro¬ 
 tection ; it prevents the industry of the country from having cus¬ 
 tomers abroad. That is to say, in the four thousand millions of 
 dollars’ worth of products neither cotton, breadstuffs, nor gold 
 
14 
 
 and silver are included. It consists of manufactured articles. 
 Of these the country does not export more than §80,000,000 to 
 $85,000,000 annually, or about two per centum of its produc¬ 
 tion ; and, as there is naturally at least 10 per centum more 
 manufactured in a country than is there needed or used, it 
 follows that there is a surplus of §320,000,000 accumulating 
 annually in the manufactories, which, in the course of four or 
 five years, is alone a sufficient cause for bankrupting half the 
 industries of the land—a result which as surely and naturally 
 has now followed this selfish policy as the law of gravitation. 
 
 It must, however, in all justice be added that, with the single 
 exception of France, the commercial world in general has been 
 suffering more or less from an utter prostration of trade; and 
 this subject I shall treat more fully in my next letter, when I 
 answer the three last inquiries of the Commission. 
 
 J. S. MOORE. 
 
 New York , October 17, 1876. 
 
 LETTER 3 . 
 
 DEPRESSION OF TRADE IN THE U. S. IN SPITE OF 
 INCREASED EXPORT TRADE—CAUSE OF DEPRES¬ 
 SION IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY-WHY FRANCE 
 IS THE ONLY EXCEPTION. 
 
 To the Editors af the Evening Post. 
 
 Resuming my answers to the inquiries made by the Silver 
 Commission, I now come to 
 
 Question 7.—Is such depression due in part to a similar de¬ 
 pression in some other country or countries, or to a general 
 depression throughout the commercial world ? In other words, 
 is it local or general ? 
 
 Answer.—The depression of trade since 1873 in the United 
 States is undoubtedly in sympathy with the general depression 
 (except in France) abroad. Yet statistical facts strangely tend to 
 show that if the prosperity of the United States depends upon 
 exports only we really ought not to have suffered. 
 
15 
 
 Our total exports during the last three years since the panic 
 were: 
 
 1874, value of exports. $693,148,054 
 
 1875, “ “ 643,094,767 
 
 1876, ! ‘ “ 644,956,406 
 
 Total in three years.$1,981,199,227 
 
 As compared with the exports of the three years of 1871-3 
 inclusive: 
 
 1871, value of exports 
 
 1872, “ “ 
 
 1873, “ 
 
 *$1,760,870,932 
 
 $562,518,651 
 
 549.219,718 
 
 649,132,563 
 
 Thus it will be seen that during the last three years since the 
 panic we have exported in value actually $220,000,000 more 
 than during the three years of great prosperity from 1871-3 
 inclusive. And yet the country has undoubtedly suffered very 
 severely. The sympathy, however, that this country feels in the 
 general depression in Europe must be ascribed to the want of 
 confidence, or inability of the European money centres to fur¬ 
 nish money for the immense enterprises and undertakings which 
 were so vigorously pushed in the United States from the cessa’ 
 tion of the war until the fall of 1873. It was a collapse, as far 
 as this country is concerned, which began with the failure of the 
 Northern Pacific Railroad and its hundreds of kindred enter¬ 
 prises, thus suddenly depriving a multitude of people of employ¬ 
 ment who drew their supplies chiefly from our local industries. 
 This, of course, threw an immense amount of not only surplus 
 labor on the market, which did not need it, but it also accumu¬ 
 lated unsaleable surplus stocks of manufactures, which caused 
 hundreds of thousands to go idle and reduced the wages of those 
 employed. 
 
 As a statistical fact I will show the reduction of wages from 
 1870 in New York City alone: 
 
 * Our chief exports are of coarse cotton, breadstuffs, petroleum, tobacco and 
 precious metals. 
 
16 
 
 Wages, Wages, 
 
 1870, 1876, 
 
 Per Wee«c. Per Week. 
 
 Bricklayers.$27 to $30 $21 to £24 
 
 Brickmakers. 21 to 24 18 to 21 
 
 Shoemakers. 9 to 12 8 to 10 
 
 Carpenters. 21 to 27 18 to 21 
 
 Cabinetmakers. 18 to 20 15 to 18 
 
 Dry goods clerks. 15 to 18 10 to 15 
 
 Cigar makers.. 15 to 20 12 to 15 
 
 Engineers.. 18 to 30 15 to 24 
 
 Plumbers. 18 to 21 15 to 18 
 
 Piano finishers. 20 to 30 15 to 20 
 
 Longshoremen. 15 to 21 12 to 18 
 
 And there is the same ratio of reduced wages in every branch 
 of trade. Now, the whole wages paid in 1870 in manufacturing 
 industries alone were $775,584,343. These wages have shrunk 
 in 1876 at least twenty per centum, or one fifth. It naturally 
 follows that the mechanics had about $155,000,000 less money 
 to spend for necessaries or luxuries of life, as the case may be, 
 in 1876 than in 1870. But, if we add to this calamity that at 
 least twenty per centum of the working classes were entirely 
 unemployed in 1876, we find that the trade of the country has 
 been crippled at least $300,000,000 from the reduction of wages 
 and unemployed labor. This alone would be a sufficient cause 
 for the local distress; and, if you add to this that, with lower 
 wages and an unemployed multitude, all commodities naturally 
 came down in price, the immense stocks of goods of all kinds on 
 hand shrunk in value to a degree that crippled their holders or 
 owners, we can fully account for the vast amount of distressing 
 failures all over the land. 
 
 Question 8.—If the latter, to what causes of world-wide 
 or international application do you attribute such depres¬ 
 sion? 
 
 Answer.—This question, more lucidly translated, means: “ To 
 what cause is the general depression of trade all over the world 
 attributable?” The distress in England is owing to a great fall¬ 
 ing off of exports. The great demand in Bussia, India, the 
 United States, Peru and other countries for railway material 
 alone has fallen off immensely since 1873, and these great 
 enterprises of building railways having partially ceased, there is 
 
17 
 
 also a less demand for fabrics and other articles which a pros¬ 
 perous, employed people will use. 
 
 Let us look, for example, at the export of railway iron and 
 steel from England to the United States in 1873 and 1876 re¬ 
 
 spectively : 
 
 1873—Railroad iron shipped to the United States. .$10,541,036 
 1873—Railroad steel. 9,199,666 
 
 Total in 1873.$19,740,702 
 
 Now turn to 1876 : 
 
 1876—Railroad iron shipped to the United States.. $6,738 
 
 1876—Railroad steel. 2,863,027 
 
 Total in 1876. $2,869,765 
 
 Here is a falling off of nearly $17,000,000. 
 
 But still more astounding is the falling off of the English ex¬ 
 ports to the United States alone in 1875 as compared with 1872. 
 
 In 1872 the exports from England and Wales alone to the 
 United States were $234,496,955. In 1875 the exports from 
 England and Wales to the United States were $144,195,531, a 
 falling off of more than $90,000,000. Now, Russia has ceased 
 to buy railroad materials, and England, having first furnished 
 money to Peru, and to some of the other South American repub¬ 
 lics, and then for a year or two having furnished them with 
 goods, has all at once lost her money and her trade. Again, 
 India, that great customer of England, has had for the last two 
 years to pause in her onward course of improvement of all kinds, 
 and the distress is naturally felt in England. It should not be 
 forgotten that England, being and having been for half a century 
 the workshop of the world, naturally finds a stoppage of orders 
 for goods immediately distressing. Nor should it be lightly 
 considered that in one year the English investors (and, unfor¬ 
 tunately, they are a numerous class) in Turkish, Egyptian, Peru¬ 
 vian, and other South American state securities, have lost in the 
 shrinkage of the stocks and bonds not less than the French paid 
 to the Germans in indemnity, or at least $1,000,000,000. A 
 loss of that kind will and must make itself felt 
 
 The depression in Germany is now owing entirely to the sat- 
 
18 
 
 urnalia of prosperity that followed the Franco-German war. 
 Extravagantly as prices were inflated in the United States after 
 the war, or wild as bubble speculations have been, they compare 
 favorably with the wilder speculative mania in Germany after 
 the cessation of the French war. Real estate in Berlin rose two 
 and three hundred per centum. There was not a town or village 
 of two thousand inhabitants that did not have a project for a 
 factory, railroad, discount bank, or a dozen other wild projects. 
 From 1871 to about April, 1873, the whole of Germany seems 
 to have gone wild. It was the old story of the railway mania 
 in England in 1845-6 over again. The titled magnate in 
 Germany in 1872 leagued together with the upstart “ Gran¬ 
 der,” or projector, to establish a strumpfenband, or garter factory, 
 in Posemunkel, capital five hundred thousand thalers; or a rail¬ 
 road of one hundred miles from points where there is no traffic, 
 capital ten million thalers; or a bathing establishment, capital 
 two hundred thousand thalers. As for companies and private 
 parties to build houses in large and small cities, their projected 
 capital might have been counted by hundreds of millions. 
 
 All this wild delirium went on swimmingly until one fine 
 morning a sickly, black-eyed little man, with an immense head 
 on his shoulders and a lion’s courage in his heart, got up in the 
 Prussian Chambers and denounced the whole schemes as swin¬ 
 dles and corruption, and demanded an investigating committee. 
 This was the famous Herr Lasker. The committee had to be 
 granted, and it was scarcely two weeks in session when the whole 
 mighty schemes collapsed like a pricked balloon. Then came 
 all sorts of woe. Men who had bought houses and lands on 
 margins were ruined; hundreds of millions’ worth of projects 
 which had been undertaken—some useful and others useless— 
 were alike swept away, and ruin was everywhere, because in 
 their delirium people had lived for two years beyond their 
 means, and especially as rents, clothing, necessaries and luxu¬ 
 ries were inflated to the highest degree. 
 
 To show to what an extent the speculative mania in Germany 
 raged I append the following statistics, just published : 
 
19 
 
 [From Purdy’s City Life, London, 1876.] 
 
 JOINT STOCK COMPANIES IN GERMANY. 
 
 Companies created in 1872. 
 
 Value 1872. 
 
 Mines, iron and salt works.£36,890,000 
 
 Stone and mineral industries. 1,095,000 
 
 Metal works. 788,000 
 
 Machinery and apparatus. 6,834,000 
 
 Chemical works. 1,180,000 
 
 Light and heating. 279,000 
 
 Textile industries. 2,495,000 
 
 Paper and leather. 731,000 
 
 Wood and carving. 251,000 
 
 Food and refreshments. 3,098,000 
 
 Clothing. 63,000 
 
 Building. 8,514,000 
 
 General trade. 789,000 
 
 Art dealing. 71,000 
 
 Commercial. 1,316,000 
 
 Various. 723,000 
 
 Bank credit. 65,313,000 
 
 Pailway ordinary shares. 87,909,000 
 
 Eailway preference. 13,771,000 
 
 Value 1876. 
 
 £12,296,000 
 
 240,000 
 
 216,000 
 
 2.733,000 
 
 250,000 
 
 147,000 
 
 1,071,000 
 
 277,000 
 
 82,000 
 
 1,674,000 
 
 11,000 
 
 2,147,000 
 
 461,000 
 
 3,000 
 
 797,000 
 
 120,000 
 
 36,071,000 
 
 57,975,000 
 
 8,230,000 
 
 £231,670,000 £124,801,000 
 
 A loss or shrinkage of over £106,000,000, or more than half 
 the indemnity. 
 
 France escaped the calamity of a depression, because after 
 the disastrous war she set to work to recuperate and save. No 
 wild schemes, no overstocking of goods or manufactures was 
 allowed to lure a people sobered by misfortune. France, too, is 
 the most thrifty nation in the world. The idea of Micawber, 
 that earning £20 a year, and spending £19 19s. is happiness, 
 prosperity and bliss, while earning £20 and spending £21 is 
 misery, ruin and distress, is a truly French proverb so well told 
 by Mr. Dickens. Frenchmen save. The Anglo-Saxon race, as 
 a rule, spend more than they earn. France, therefore, is now 
 enjoying prosperty earned by her prudence, economy and inde¬ 
 fatigable industry. Long may she enjoy it, as she is well de¬ 
 serving of it And every political economist must yield in 
 admiration to her as the brightest example in trade and commerce 
 in this century. 
 
 2 
 
20 
 
 The ninth request by the commission which is: 
 
 “ 9. Please furnish the Commission with any other information 
 bearing on the above subjects which you possess and desire to 
 communicate ?” 
 
 I shall, with much pleasure, treat in some subsequent articles. 
 
 And now may I be allowed to ask the honorable Commission 
 one question ? It is this : What in the name of Bramah, Vishnu 
 and Siva, have the questions of the Commission numbered 4, 5, 
 (>, 7 and 8 to do with the silver question? This side of the 
 Rocky Mountains upon the forty millions of people who have 
 dealt for the last fifteen years in rag money, and who still deal 
 in it—to whom a silver coin until lately was the greatest novelty 
 —the fall of the rupee in Bombay from 2s. to Is. 8c?., the dollar 
 in Hong Kong from 4s. 3d. to 3s. 4c?., and the tael in Shanghai 
 from 6s. 3c?. to 5s., has had as much influence as the small pox 
 in Kamschatka has had upon the diphtheria in New York. 
 
 I was and am naturally glad to answer such questions, because 
 they are in the line of political economy. But it is scarcely fair 
 to try to connect the present depressed state of this country with 
 the fall in silver, when in fact, always excepting the western 
 slopes of the Rocky Mountains, this country has not dealt in it 
 or come in contact with it commercially or industriall}’’ as a 
 medium of money for now more than fifteen years. If the Com¬ 
 mission want to have the opinion of those capable of forming ft 
 on the subject, whether silver should be monetized, or whether 
 there should be a single or double standard, or whether such a 
 change would benefit the country, why not ask it in a bold way ? 
 
 The silver question must be met boldly and squarety. The 
 good Senator Bogy, for instance, should remember that he can¬ 
 not treat the question as Don Quixote did his second pasteboard 
 helmet, that is, not strike it too hard with his lance for fear of 
 breaking it again ; but as the ninth request of the Commission 
 is a carte blanche to ventilate one’s ideas for their benefit, I shall 
 certainly give my views on the silver and gold question, I hope 
 lucidly, certainly; fearlessly. j & MOORE. 
 
 New York , October 17, 1876. 
 
21 
 
 LETTER 4. 
 
 IMPRACTICABILITY TO ESTABLISH THE RELATIVE 
 VALUE OF SILVER AND GOLD BY AN ACT OF CON¬ 
 GRESS.-THE SINGLE GOLD STANDARD IN ENG¬ 
 LAND-OBJECTIONS TO A SINGLE GOLD STAND¬ 
 ARD IN THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 To the Editors of the Evening Post. 
 
 The ninth request of the Silver Commission reads: 
 
 “ Please furnish the Commission with any other information 
 bearing on the above subjects which you possess and desire to 
 communicate.” 
 
 In order to comply with this request in something like 
 regular order, it is first of all necessary to look into the Act 
 of Congress of the 15th of August, 1876, which creates the 
 Commission and charged it to inquire into sundry specific 
 questions. Now the second resolution in the act reads: 
 
 “ [Inquire] into the policy of the restoration of the double 
 standard in this country; and, if restored, what the legal rela¬ 
 tion between the two coins (metals), silver and gold, should 
 be.” 
 
 To establish a legal relative value between the two coins, 
 silver and gold, either by a commission or by an Act of Con¬ 
 gress, must, indeed, prove a hopeless task. How can such a 
 relative value be established when all the world have agreed 
 upon the actual value of an ounce or pound of gold, and 
 when the other metal—silver—is almost daily, certainly weekly 
 (of late), fluctuating in price ? Suppose an Act of Congress 
 solemnly declares that the relative value of silver to gold is 
 sixteen ounces silver to one ounce of gold, who ever would 
 heed such an act? If I could get eighteen ounces of silver 
 for my one ounce of gold in England, would not there be 
 thousands of brokers who would gladly give seventeen and a 
 half ounces of silver in New Yk>rk for my ounce of gold, 
 and get rich by a multitude of such operations? 
 
22 
 
 Such an act would be as much of a fiction as was the act 
 that established the legal value of an American paper dollar 
 bill to be the same as that of an American hard metallic dollar. 
 Who cared for the act? Has the country been able, during 
 fifteen years, to exchange these solemn American legal paper 
 dollars for silver or gold, when silver was equal to 15£ to 
 one in gold? 
 
 Gold and silver money is, after all, only gold and silver 
 metal. If we reduce the present half eagle in weight it will 
 be worth less than a sovereign. N ow it is worth about fifteen 
 cents more than a sovereign. While our silver dollar, weigh¬ 
 ing 412£ grains fine silver, will be worth 46—78 pence, provided 
 silver sells at 54 pence an ounce, and only 43—4 pence if silver 
 sells at 50 pence an ounce. Hence a gold metal dollar can only 
 vary here or in Europe when either its weight or fineness is 
 reduced, while the silver dollar, with its standard fineness and 
 standard weight, is subject to the vicissitudes of supply and 
 demand in the great marts of the world. 
 
 It is, therefore, obvious that such a task—namely, for Congress 
 to enact a law to establish the relative value between the two 
 coins or metals—is hopeless. Far different, however, is the pro¬ 
 posed inquiry into the policy of restoring the double standard 
 in this country. Such an inquiry demands the most serious 
 consideration. 
 
 In the first place, it should seriously be considered whether 
 there is really a metallic standard of money in the United States 
 at present. If a gold eagle is a standard ten dollar piece, why 
 did I pay for it $10.90 in greenbacks on the 12th of September, 
 $11.20 on the 18th of September and $11.10 greenbacks for it 
 on the 19th of September? Is gold coin, therefore, at present 
 in the United States not as much a merchandise as cotton and 
 wheat, and are greenbacks, after all, not the standard money of 
 the law ? 
 
 In California gold is the standard, and see how the dealing is 
 reversed. A trade dollar was worth ninety cents in July last; 
 it is worth ninety-four cents, I believe, to-day. A greenback 
 was worth ninety-one cents on the 12tli of September, and 
 eighty-eight and one half cents on the 19th of September. Wher¬ 
 ever gold is the standard in this country, all other money is a 
 
23 
 
 merchandise, and is measured by that standard- We must, 
 therefore, conclude that east of the Rocky Mountains the only 
 standard for money is the paper dollar; and, as that unfortunate 
 standard is erratic, the wisest conclusion is so reduce it to some¬ 
 thing that is everywhere non-fluctuating, or get rid of it entirely, 
 and establish, if possible, something in its stead, as a sound non¬ 
 fluctuating currency. But the very fact of not having a dt facto 
 metallic standard east of the Rocky Mountains is certainly in 'our 
 favor of choosing a true and sound one. 
 
 In considering the question of a precious metal by single stand¬ 
 ard or double standard for the United States, all considerations 
 of convenience or inconvenience to foreign countries ought to be 
 set aside. The main object in hand is what will best suit the 
 trade, commerce and industry of this country ; and I think it by 
 far a wiser policy to induce foreign nations to accommodate 
 themselves to our convenience than for us to be compelled to 
 accommodate ourselves to their convenience, and the influence 
 of the single gold standard in England and Germany, or the 
 dubious double standard of the Latin races in Europe, should 
 have no serious weight in our choice. 
 
 Let us now consider the single gold standard. 
 
 England has now had this single gold standard for half a cen¬ 
 tury. Notwithstanding all that has been said against it, it has 
 proved a success, because it has established a fixed, unalterable 
 measure for all other merchandise. It is owing to this great 
 fact that the Russian merchant in New York who has to remit 
 fifty thousand rubles to St Petersburgh buys sterling exchange 
 in New York on London; or the Spanish merchant in New 
 York remits sterling exchange to Cadiz. Now, with both these 
 transactions—I mean in shipping the cargo from Cronstadt or 
 Cadiz or selling it in New York—England had nothing to do, 
 and yet we find that the final settlement is made in sterling 
 money, and the operation is mathematically correct. Sterling 
 •exchange means gold, and as gold is the most unchangeable 
 money metal in the world, the countries which have a silver 
 standard, or even a double standard, will get most truly and 
 surely the full value by its use. As an evidence of this fact, I 
 may mention that I have been credibly informed that before 
 Germany had a gold standard most of the remittances from New 
 
24 
 
 York to Germany were made in sterling, and that since the gold 
 standard was established in Germany an immense increase in 
 direct remittances to Germany in Reichsmarks has taken place. 
 
 Again, it should be remembered that the great multitude of 
 people in Great Britain are proverbiaily poor in respect to carry¬ 
 ing or holding money. If a national loan of so great a magni¬ 
 tude as £100,000,000 were to depend for success in England on 
 being placed among the multitude in small sums of £5 or £10, 
 it would prove a miserable failure ; while in France it has proved 
 a perfect success, simply because the people there are not only 
 thrifty, but also singularly addicted to having metallic wealth 
 in money in their possession. This great fact that the people in 
 England do not hold much money, even in small sums, is, of 
 course, greatly in favor of a smaller circulation. Hence we see 
 the strangest of all anomalies, that Great Britain is able to do a 
 foreign trade of exports and imports amounting to some $2,200,- 
 000,000 and all her own internal trading, besides being the 
 bankers of the whole world, with the most insignificant volume 
 of money, which at the highest does not amount to more than 
 $600,000,000. 
 
 It has been urged that the several panics in England were, if 
 not brought about, at least sharpened by the fact that she uses 
 the single gold standard, and as a proof it was shown that in 
 1857 and 1866, when a large amount of gold was withdrawn 
 from the Bank of England, the panic came, and that it was 
 stopped simply by the several acts promptly made in council to 
 allow’the Bank to manufacture paper money without the equiva¬ 
 lent gold in its vaults. 
 
 Well, then, suppose that there had been a double standard in 
 England at such a period: would not the silver as well as the 
 gold have flown out? If the merchants of London in 1866 had 
 had silver, they could easily have got gold for it from the Conti¬ 
 nent Or, on the other hand, if silver had been money in Eng¬ 
 land, and there had been a demand for it on the Continent, as in 
 those days there always was, how long would silver have re¬ 
 mained in England ? The gold went away from England in 
 1866 because other nations called for it, and lawfully were en¬ 
 titled to it. Surely they would have taken silver as well, and in 
 1857 and 1866 they would have taken it in preference. 
 
25 
 
 The fact is, these panics were the result of want of confidence 
 in everything and everybody, and the act allowing the banks to 
 manufacture currency without an equivalent in coin was an en¬ 
 dorsement by Parliament or the government which resulted in 
 renewed confidence; and it is a singular fact that in 1866 not a 
 single £5 note created by virtue of the act of Parliament was 
 used. As soon as the moneyed people saw or believed that the 
 government was going to see the crisis through, they concluded 
 to see it through themselves. I therefore maintain that it would 
 be a delusion to charge the panics in England to the single gold 
 standard. 
 
 There is not the least danger of England changing her present 
 gold standard, because a trial of fifty years has proven that it 
 suits her immense trade, above all her gigantic financial and ex¬ 
 change operations, and is by no means an inconvenience to her 
 population, ninety per centum of whom scarcely have, on the 
 average, five shillings per capita in their pockets in coin. 
 
 But how would a single gold standard work with us? In the 
 first place, we ought to make up our minds what the necessary 
 volume of our circulation should be. If, for instance, we agree 
 that the present volume is not too large—namely, say, $750,- 
 000,000 in paper and $50,000,000 in silver of subsidiary coin—it 
 would require at least sixty per centum of gold to maintain such 
 a volume—I mean sixty per centum on the $750,000,000 of re¬ 
 deemable paper money, which is $450,000,000 gold. 
 
 In the second place, we have to consider how to get this 
 amount of gold; and in the third place, if we do have it will we 
 be able to retain it ? Suppose that the $750,000,000 of circula¬ 
 ting paper money rests on $450,000,000 gold, a withdrawal or 
 rather an export of fifty million dollars in gold eagles would 
 immediately necessitate a withdrawal of $83,000,000 in the 
 redeemable paper circulation. 
 
 Of course the movements of gold will be subject, as they 
 always are, to the laws of trade. And I am by no means pre¬ 
 pared to say whether or not a withdrawal of gold would be a 
 misfortune or would lead to embarrassments; all that I desire 
 to point out and discuss are probable results from which conclu¬ 
 sions may be drawn. 
 
 Again, the American people, unlike those in England, have 
 
26 
 
 the habit not only of carrying but of putting daily more money 
 in circulation than any other forty-five millions of people in the 
 world. They are the greatest inland travelling people on the 
 earth; and, as distances are naturally greater here than in any 
 other civilized country, it naturally follows that more money for 
 circulation is needed here than elsewhere. And I candidly 
 think that the same volume of money per capita which is found 
 sufficient in England would not be sufficient in the United 
 States. And I further unhesitatingly come to the conclusion 
 that a single gold standard necessarily limits the circulating vol¬ 
 ume of money. 
 
 I simply point out these facts. If the objectionable points I 
 have made can be reasonably overcome, there can be no doubt 
 but that a single gold standard with a subsidiary silver coinage 
 as an auxiliary is the best, the truest, and in the end, the cheap¬ 
 est circulating medium a country can have. But I am unwil¬ 
 ing and, indeed, unable satisfactorily to maintain that a single 
 gold standard is the most suitable circulating medium for the 
 commerce, trade and industry of the United States. 
 
 I shall consider not only the double standard, but also the 
 single silver standard in my future articles. j g t\j OOBE 
 
 New York , October 13, 1876. 
 
 LETTER 5. 
 
 A DOUBLE STANDARD IN THE U. S. CONSIDERED. 
 
 To the Editors of the Evening Post. 
 
 I may safely conclude from what has been already said in my 
 former letters, and from the far more able and interesting 
 researches and deductions made by eminent men here as well as 
 abroad, that to establish by law a relative fixed value between 
 the metals (silver and gold) is perfectly hopeless. I shall, there¬ 
 fore, take the liberty of considering the double standard. 
 
 A double standard means, and must mean, two distinct values 
 of the two metals. It is often argued that France and the Latin 
 Convention having adopted a double standard and made silver a 
 
27 
 
 legal tender the arrangement works satisfactorily in those coun¬ 
 tries. 
 
 But what are the actual facts ? Let the following statistics, 
 taken from a paper read at the American Association in Detroit, 
 in 1875, by my friend E. B. Elliott, of Washington, explain the 
 situation in those countries where silver is a legal tender. Mr. 
 Elliott said: 
 
 “ France, jointly with Switzerland, Italy and Belgium, adopted 
 in part the subsidiary principle at their Quadripartite Convention, 
 held in 1865, silver coins of lower denomination than five francs 
 being reduced in fineness, the weight remaining unchanged, and 
 limited as legal tender to sums not exceeding fifty francs. But 
 the silver five-franc piece, like the United States silver dollar, 
 was still permitted to remain a legal tender for all amounts. 
 Unlike the United States, however, these countries did suffer 
 inconvenience from the change, the mint ratio assumed being 
 fifteen and one half to one, while the market ratio fluctuated 
 above and below that point. From the year 1852 to about the 
 year 1870 the fluctuating market ratio averaged fifteen and three 
 eighths to one, and gold circulated to the exclusion of the legal 
 tender silver. Since then the market ratio has risen to a point 
 above the mint standard, and given a tendency to silver to circu¬ 
 late to the exclusion of gold, which latter has now become rela¬ 
 tively the dearer. This tendenev the government, represented 
 in the Quadripartite Convention, have partly counteracted by re¬ 
 tiring the legal tender silver and diminishing the amount of its 
 coinage.” 
 
 The reason why the lower price of silver at present does not 
 embarrass the countries mentioned above is owing, therefore, to 
 the fact that the mints take care not to inundate the country with 
 five franc pieces, as the Quadripartite were only allowed to coin 
 silver, legal tenders for the years 1874 and 1875 respectively, in 
 the following proportions : 
 
 France. 60,000,000 francs. 
 
 Belgium. 12,000,000 “ 
 
 Italy. 60,000,000 “ 
 
 Switzerland. 8,000,000 “ 
 
 Total.140,000,000 
 
 or about $28,000,000. 
 
 Suppose we had a strictly gold standard at this present date; 
 
28 
 
 and only $40,000,000 of subsidiary silver coinage in circulation, 
 Congress could with all safety make the subsidiary silver coin a 
 legal tender for all sums, as it would soon be found that subsidi¬ 
 ary coin if used as a legal tender would become so scarce that it 
 would be equal to or even command a premium on gold. And 
 that is precisely the relation of the French silver five-franc piece 
 to gold. The coinage of five-franc pieces, says my friend 
 Elliott, has been diminished, and we see the Quadripartite Con¬ 
 vention has taken good care not to cause confusion to trade and 
 exchanges by coining an unlimited amount of silver. 
 
 If, therefore, a double standard in this country should have 
 the same meaning as it has in France, all we have to do is to 
 limit the silver coinage to an insignificant amount But that is 
 exactly what the advocates of a double standard wish to guard 
 against. Plenty of money is the cry, an unlimited supply of 
 silver coin is demanded, and in order to do that there must be 
 two distinct separate standards , one of gold, which will be station¬ 
 ary in value here as well as in London, St. Petersburg or Austra¬ 
 lia, and the other is silver, which must take its chance of fluctu¬ 
 ation as compared with gold; perhaps in a lesser degree, but 
 certainly a fluctuation the same as our present irredeemable 
 paper money does. 
 
 Now comes the question, How would such a double standard 
 suit our commerce and industry ? 
 
 If at the present time the United States were entirely free 
 from public debt, I honestly and sincerely believe that a single 
 silver standard of a dollar, weighing 412 \ grains, would be our 
 best and wisest policy. Our very great demand for silver would 
 give this metal a substantial value and not make it liable to 
 violent fluctuations. We should, beside, be less liable to mone¬ 
 tary drains when England or Europe is in financial difficulty. 
 Nor do I see how a purely silver currency could much derange 
 our exchanges, inasmuch as statistics show that the balance of 
 trade of late years has been in our favor. But a single silver 
 standard is at present out of the question, because our solemn 
 obligations require us to provide about $100,000,000 in gold for 
 interest on the public debt, beside an enormous amount of gold 
 for State, municipal and corporation bonds, the interest of which, 
 in many cases, is made payable in gold. The political econo- 
 
29 
 
 mist has no choice. Science teaches that it is not only wise to 
 pay obligations but to pay them in that coin which is acknowl¬ 
 edged as the best standard of the world. And of this fact the 
 present funding of the public debt gives the best proof. If any 
 doubt of the payment of interest in gold should exist, Europe 
 would certainly not take our 4£ per centum bonds at par, and 
 beside this saving of actual interest the great moral effect is of 
 more value to the United States than the whole debt itself, 
 interest included. That we must have a gold standard, what¬ 
 ever other standard we may choose beside, is in my humble 
 opinion at present a moral necessity. 
 
 And now let us consider what would follow, if in addition to 
 this gold standard of money we should add a silver currency. 
 
 A silver currency to be legal tender for all amounts simply 
 means the replacement of the present paper money by silver. 
 (I shall reserve the question of redeeming greenbacks in silver 
 for another occasion.) What I mean is this : the present paper 
 money having ceased to exist, we would have to found a paper 
 currency on a pure and simple silver basis to take its place. Sup¬ 
 pose we agree that 412£ grains fine silver shall be the current 
 dollar for all our internal trade and traffic, the same as our 
 greenback dollar is the current dollar for all our home traffic. 
 In order to do this we would require, first, at least $500,000,000 
 of silver, on which to found a $750,000,000 or $800,000,000 
 paper circulation. Second, it would be necessary to have a rea¬ 
 sonable assurance that we could retain the silver in the 
 country. 
 
 I don’t know whether my opinion will be sustained, but I do 
 believe that, first, it would be easier to get $500,000,000, or even 
 $600,000,000, into the country in silver than $350,000,000, or 
 even $250,000,000, in gold; and second, we would most de¬ 
 cidedly be able to hold and retain silver longer than we could 
 gold. As for the inconvenience due to the bulky nature of the 
 metal, it should be borne in mind that the metal itself would not 
 circulate, but the convenient redeemable paper which represents 
 the metal. 
 
 But there is another, and in all respects the most serious ques¬ 
 tion to be considered, namely, Will this silver currency fluctuate ? 
 Will we by such a currency, which is to regulate our irredeem- 
 
30 
 
 able paper money, better our financial condition by making it 
 - more stable ? 
 
 I think we would better it to a great degree, although we 
 could not prevent a fluctuation. Yet it needs no prophet to 
 foretell that the fluctuation would on the average be for the bet¬ 
 ter. What I mean is that the 412^-grain dollar would not fall 
 below its intrinsic value computed in gold from the day that it 
 was issued, but would appreciate and in a short time rise to the 
 actual value of the gold dollar; and thus trade, or the law of 
 supply and demand, would solve the difficult question of the 
 relative value of silver to gold which no Act of Congress could 
 accomplish. It must also be obvious that if silver money 
 reaches a par with gold, and thus the two metals become de facto 
 of unchangeable relative value, there will be needed less gold or 
 less silver, or indeed less of both, inasmuch as each metal will do 
 the service that is required of both when the relative value fluc¬ 
 tuates. 
 
 Then follows another question: How will the trade of the 
 country be affected with these two distinct standards, one in 
 silver and another in gold ? 
 
 It may be safely assumed that, by establishing the two distinct 
 standards of gold and silver, trade, industry and exchanges 
 would be less violently agitated than if a single standard only, 
 either of gold or silver, were adopted. At this present moment 
 we deal daily in two distinct standards of money. The whole 
 immense internal trade and traffic is transacted in the irre¬ 
 deemable paper money, while a vast amount of merchandise is 
 bought and sold in gold, only with this difference, that the trans¬ 
 actions in gold are entirely of a wholesale nature, while those in 
 irredeemable paper are both of a wholesale and retail character. 
 For instance, there are cargoes of sugar, coffee, hides, tea, lead, 
 tin and hundreds of other articles imported and sold in gold by 
 importers to wholesale dealers and jobbers for which not only 
 gold payments pass, but notes payable in gold are made out 
 The foreign freight that is brought to the United States is made 
 payable in gold, or in general in sterling money, which means 
 gold, of course. But as soon as the goods pass out of the hands 
 of the importer, who sells them in gold into the hands of the 
 jobber, the gold price is converted into irredeemable paper value, 
 
31 
 
 and they are resold to dealers and consumers for paper. And 
 this is one of the melancholy features of an irredeemable 
 currency, inasmuch as the dealer or jobber who has paid for his 
 goods in gold, and has to sell them for paper, naturally becomes 
 a gambler in gold, and will always allow himself a larger margin 
 for premium than the actual average market price for gold war¬ 
 rants ; and this in the aggregate amounts to many millions of dol¬ 
 lars additional burden on the consumer. But the fact remains the 
 same. We certainly deal now in two distinct kinds of money, 
 one called gold and another greenbacks. If, therefore, the silver 
 currency is to take the place of the present paper currency, it 
 would then simply become a question of premium on gold pay¬ 
 able in silver. And as I before said, if the silver dollar was, for 
 instance, to weigh 412£ grain fine silver, the fluctuation would 
 certainly be less, and decidedly of a more favorable nature than 
 the present fluctuation in irredeemable paper. And the trade 
 and commerce of the country would be less violently shaken 
 than if a single standard only should at once take its place—that 
 is to say, the transition would be less severely felt. 
 
 The next thing to consider is, What reasonable danger does 
 exist in the fluctuation of silver if adopted as a second standard 
 for money? This question I shall have much pleasure in dis¬ 
 cussing in my next article. j g jy[00RE 
 
 New York, October 23, 1876. 
 
 LETTER 6. 
 
 CAUSES OF THE FLUCTUATION IN SILVER-SILVER A 
 FIT METAL FOR MONEY-THE GREAT DEMAND 
 FOR THIS METAL IN INDIA.-REASONS FOR THE 
 DEMAND, AND WHY LITTLE IS EXPORTED FROM 
 INDIA . _ 
 
 To the Editors of the Evening Post. 
 
 I have promised to consider the fluctuations in the price of 
 
 silver. 
 
 This metal exercises a strange charm over the human race. 
 
32 
 
 The countries that have demonetized silver still look with favor on 
 it. Those that use it for a medium of trade lovingly foster it, 
 and those, like ourselves, who deal in paper money are not only 
 not adverse to it, but the majority long for it 
 
 A western Solon very pathetically said to me in Washington 
 last June: “ I cannot go back to my people and make them be¬ 
 lieve that a hard silver dollar is not good money.” 
 
 This observation struck me as very forcible indeed, and I am 
 sure there is but a small minority in the world who maintain 
 that silver is unlit for money purposes. It may not suit or be 
 of advantage to single countries, like England, for instance, to 
 use it as a legal tender, but to discard the precious metal silver 
 entirely as a medium called money is perfectly absurd. But the 
 first question which arises is, Will this metal, or can this metal, 
 not be supplied in such large quantities as will reduce its value 
 to the standard of baser metals ? 
 
 Now, enormous as the supply, especially during the last ten 
 years, has been, it is certain that the yield all over the world has 
 not exceeded $76,300,000 in a single year, while the experience 
 of three or four thousand years has proven that in no instance 
 has either silver or gold been found in such large quantities in a 
 mine as copper or tin. I leave lead and iron out of the ques¬ 
 tion. Nor does the most extravagant expectation warrant such 
 a proposition. Gold and silver therefore are found always in 
 limited quantity. I do not propose to go into the cost of mining 
 the metal, I only wish to treat of the quantity. It certainly is 
 perfectly fair to call into consideration one undeniable fact, which 
 is that the yield of gold and silver, as well as other original 
 metals and coals, is only a question of time. It has, for instance, 
 been calculated that the coal in Great Britain will be entirely 
 consumed in some say five hundred years, others say more and 
 others less. But one thing is certain, that the entire disappear¬ 
 ance of coal from Great Britain is only a question of time, and 
 no earthly power can ever replace it. Now, every ounce of 
 silver that is mined can never be replaced or grown. There will 
 be more on the surface, but always less in the bowels of the 
 earth; and daily there is a loss in silver used in the arts and 
 manufactures, as well as by aberration in coin. It is true there 
 may be prolific silver mines in Patagonia or in Alaska, but they 
 
33 
 
 are unknown at present, and we can only speculate on the yield 
 from those mines that are already known. Well then, until 
 within the year 1876, the silver yield was certainly not found to 
 be too enormous, as we have it as a statistical fact that from 
 1848 to 1872 the fluctuation was from 59£ pence per ounce 
 in 1848 to 60 T V in 1872. In the single year 1859 it reached 
 the high price of 62-^ pence. From 1872 to within the be¬ 
 ginning of 1876 silver fell from 60| to about 57 pence, a depre¬ 
 ciation of about £>£ per centum from the high price of 601- 
 pence. During the present year the fluctuations have certainly 
 been very violent, especially during the last six months ; at one 
 time silver was quoted as low as 47 pence. But it has since 
 fluctuated between 50 and 53 pence. 
 
 Some reasons for the fall of silver have already been given in 
 these letters, but the chief reason for its late violent fluctuation 
 is decidedly found in the fact of a less demand for silver for the 
 present in India, and that avenue of demand being partially 
 stopped by the drawings of the India Council as well as in the 
 fall of exchange, which gave more rupees to sterling gold money, 
 as also to the sudden supply of the silver to Germany. 
 
 It may be interesting to notice how the drawings of the India 
 Council during the last six years were distributed in amount. I 
 quote from the table of Mr. Purdy’s “ City Life,” London, 1875 : 
 
 DRAWINGS DY THE INDIA COUNCIL. 
 
 1870 .£8,918,500 
 
 1871 . 9,800,000 
 
 1872 . 13,952,500 
 
 1873 . £14,835,100 
 
 1874 . 11,050,000 
 
 1875 . 16,300,000 
 
 Now comes the most interesting of all deductions. From 
 1870 to 1872, inclusive, the value of silver only fluctuated one 
 fourth of one penny, and the rupee exchange on India was about 
 1 shilling 11 pence. During those three years one million 
 pounds sterling purchased from the India Council 10,434,782 
 rupees. In 1873 silver fell to 59£ pence, and the exchange in 
 average was 1 shilling 10 pence per rupee. One million pounds, 
 therefore, purchased from the India Council 10,909,090 rupees. 
 In 1875 silver fell to 56$ pence, and exchange per rupee on 
 India fell to an average of 1 shilling 9 pence. One million 
 
34 
 
 pounds sterling, therefore, purchased of the India Council that 
 year 11,428,571 rupees. While during the present year the 
 rupee exchange fell during some months as low as 1 shilling 7£ 
 pence, one million pounds will purchase 12,307,680 rupees. 
 Thus it will be seen that one million sterling did purchase dur¬ 
 ing some months in 1876 1,872,898 rupees more than in 1870-72, 
 and it naturally follows that a drawing of £12,000,000 in 1876 
 would, on account of the fall of exchange, place in India at least 
 some 18,000,000 more rupees than otherwise would have had to 
 be sent there in silver. But, on the other hand, a rise of only 
 ten per centum in value of Indian products, which are at present, 
 without exception, at their lowest ebb as compared during fifteen 
 years, would in a great degree counteract the adverse influence 
 that the drawing of the India Council in London on India has. 
 
 It is a patent fact that the Council has been drawing these 
 large amounts on India for years past; yet we find its influence 
 only felt since 1873, and culminating in 1876, the very four years 
 when India produce has fallen lower and lower in price. The 
 rise in the value of only £5,000,000 in India produce, which is 
 less than ten per centum on the exports, would at once create a 
 demand of $25,000,000 more silver for that market; and as the 
 export of raw material from India, such as cotton, hemp, indigo, 
 jute, dyestuffs and drugs, breadstuffs, as well as hundreds of 
 other articles, is steadily increasing in quantity, it is only a ques¬ 
 tion of higher prices, which would at once create a demand for 
 silver. The immense increase in imports to England of India 
 produce, independent of cotton, may be seen from the following 
 
 tables: 
 
 Imports from India. 
 
 Nine Months ended September 30. 
 Chief Articles. 1874. 1875. 1876. 
 
 Wheat, cwt. 1,009,000 460,000 2,100,000 
 
 Hides. 268,000 280,000 242,000 
 
 Flax and linseed, qrs. 284,000 459,000 917,000 
 
 Tea, lb. 12,420,000 17,711,000 18,521.000 
 
 Wool, lb. 15,267,000 17,239,000 19,415,000 
 
 In the violent agitations of late on the silver question, the most 
 extravagant idea has been advanced, viz: for India to demonetize 
 silver and take to the gold standard. I really think it would be 
 easier to make Christians of all the Hindoos than to deprive them 
 
35 
 
 of the most sacred of all idols, a silver rupee. The idea is so 
 absurd that it is not worth while to waste an argument of the 
 why and wherefore on it. But what is more to the point is, Will 
 India be as eager for silver in future as she has been in the past? 
 And also What 1ms become of that incalculable amount of silver 
 that has poured in for thousands of years and hardly ever gone 
 out? 
 
 The three hundred millions of natives in the whole of India 
 may, for their thriftiness and saving habits, be termed the semi- 
 civilized French of Asia. The love of saving nnd hoarding 
 money, and that in silver, is the greatest passion of the Indian 
 people. The difference between the French and Hindoos is 
 that the Frenchman will put his gold, silver or bank notes in 
 stockings, and lock it up in a trunk, while the Hindoo will 
 either hoard his rupees in the ground or turn them into silver 
 bangles and other ornaments and hoard them. It is a common 
 saying in India that there is more silver in rupees and orna¬ 
 ments hid in the ground than there is visible on the top of the 
 ground ; and this will no doubt in a great measure explain why 
 India has not been overflooded with silver long ago. Western 
 India, now for a hundred years under British rule, might rea¬ 
 sonably be supposed to feel that life and property are safe. 
 But stern facts prove that, if we except the great cities on the 
 coast, such Kurachee, Bombay, Madras aud Calcutta, in all the 
 rest of India the natives hoard silver in the ground. Nor do I 
 think that this vice or passion for hoarding will be eradicated as 
 long as the Hindoo race remain heathens, naturally timid and ad¬ 
 dicted most stubbornly to castes. The Hindoo cannot be made 
 to understand that all governments do not mean oppression, and 
 that squeezing is not the ultimate aim of ruling. Unfortunate 
 as such a state of things may be, it is, however, an established 
 fact, and there is hardly any reasonable doubt that of the enor¬ 
 mous amount of silver that has gone to India, half of it is 
 hoarded under ground. 
 
 This ostrich silver policy of India is nevertheless a very im¬ 
 portant part in the absorbing power of silver, and India will for 
 many years be as steady and faithful a customer for silver as 
 England is for American cotton. To this fact must be added 
 another very important feature, viz: The railroads and irriga- 
 3 
 
36 
 
 tions in India thus far have proven upon the whole a very safe 
 and fair investment But the works already finished are sim¬ 
 ply a nucleus to what is to follow. True, during the last few 
 years a halt in the works has taken place, as always happens 
 when a country makes projects too gigantic. But during the 
 next generation public works, such as thousands of miles of 
 branch railroads to feed the great trunk lines, and, above all, 
 irrigation works amounting to thousands of millions of dollars, 
 will be carried on. This capital must chiefly come from Europe, 
 and, as the balance of trade is already immensely in favor of 
 India, a hard silver stream must follow from Europe to accom¬ 
 plish these great undertaking. Such an event would speedily 
 counteract the drawings of the India Council and make the 
 price of silver stable, simply on account of the immense demand. 
 As to China, that great absorber of silver, with its 400,000,000 
 of population, if to her present enormous exports, which it 
 requires silver to purchase, railway works are to be added (and 
 they will be, to a certainty, sooner or later), will not the demand 
 for silver increase ? Neither China nor India can have a gold 
 currency, becanse the people are naturally adverse to it Thus, 
 then, with these two customers for silver alone—to say nothing 
 of the demand for silver in the Straits, Singapore, Manilla and 
 Java—I cannot conceive that the world need be much alarmed 
 about the depreciation in silver. It should also not be forgotten 
 that the Quadripartite Convention of the Latin races in Europe 
 have at present limited the silver legal tender coinage because 
 silver has fallen, and has no longer the comparative value of 15£ 
 to one. But whenever silver reaches sixty pence per ounce, the 
 demand for silver will set in to supply France, Belgium, Switzer¬ 
 land and Italy, and add another great and important customer 
 for it The absorption of $500,000,000 or $600,000,000 in the 
 United States, should we adopt silver as a second standard, 
 would in itself have the tendency of relieving Europe, or rather 
 Germany, of her surplus silver, by transferring it to a permanent 
 home in the United States, and then the supply of the mines 
 would have to deal with the legitimate demand, and not be 
 hampered by the unforeseen enormous temporary supply caused 
 by the demonetizing of silver in Germany and Scandinavia. 
 
 For these reasons I respectfully conclude that there need be 
 
37 
 
 no fear that in the event of our making silver a second standard 
 of money such money is liable to depreciate to any violent de¬ 
 gree. On the contrary, it can be reasonably assumed that the 
 value of silver would appreciate, and that our currency would 
 be steadily improving. But as it may disarrange trade and val¬ 
 ues if the appreciation of silver should, as in 1859 and in other 
 years, overstep the relative value of gold—that is to say, if the 
 412^- grain dollar should be worth, for instance, $1.03 in gold— 
 our silver dollars no doubt would, by the law of trade, be replaced 
 by gold dollars intrinsically worth only 100 cents ; and as gold 
 will be made to have the option to be always a legal tender, 
 however high silver may rise, it would follow that during such 
 periods gold would be the predominant currency of the country. 
 
 New York , October 24, 1876. 
 
 J. S. MOORE. 
 
 LETTER 7 . 
 
 OBJECTIONS TO MAKE SILVER A LEGAL TENDER AS 
 LONG AS PAPER MONEY IS LEGAL TENDER. 
 
 To the Editors of the Eveniny Post. 
 
 The third resolution of the Act of the 15th of August, 1876 
 which created the Silver Commission, reads as follows: 
 
 “ [Inquire] into the policy of continuing legal tender notes 
 concurrently with the metallic standards, and the effects thereof 
 upon the labor, industries and wealth of the country.” 
 
 I suppose that there can be no doubt that the question means, 
 What effect would three distinct standards of value have on the 
 labor, industry and wealth of the country ? The resolution says 
 “ metallic standards,” which naturally means the two metals, 
 gold and silver, while the legal tender notes are to continue as 
 an irredeemable money. No other explanation can possibly be 
 given of this resolution, because, if legal tender notes are made 
 convertible into gold or silver they represent the metallic stand¬ 
 ards, and virtually become gold and silver. Hence, the Commis- 
 
38 
 
 sion is directed to report what would happen if we had a gold 
 and a silver standard, and, in addition thereto, the legal tender 
 notes, which would remain irredeemable. 
 
 In order to place ourselves in such a situation all we would 
 have to do w T ould be to make a silver dollar either of 4121 grains 
 or less weight a legal tender, and give the borrower the option 
 to pay debts either in silver dollars or in irredeemable legal 
 tender notes. 
 
 The confusion that would follow such a monetary system is 
 beyond calculation. Suppose such a law was in force at the 
 present moment, what would be the value of a dollar in gold, in 
 silver and in legal tender notes ? 
 
 First— The gold dollar would be de faclo and de jure the real 
 standard dollar, and, of course, would be worth a dollar. 
 
 Second—The premium on gold to-day being 110, a greenback 
 dollar would be worth 90@91 cents in gold. 
 
 Third—The silver dollar of 412| grains would have to be 
 measured by the price of silver, and as silver is worth 53 
 pence in London, the silver dollar weighing 412 \ grains would 
 be worth 93 \ in gold, and consequently as gold is at 110 premium, 
 102-43 cents in greenbacks. The consequence would be that 
 abor, as well as debts, would this day be paid in the cheapest, 
 currency, that is, greenbacks, and not in silver or gold. 
 
 But if silver should fall next week to 50 pence an ounce, and 
 the premiums on gold still remain at 110, a silver dollar would 
 be worth, as near as possible, 88 cents in gold, and only 96-80 
 cents in greenbacks, and debts and labor would then be paid in 
 silver. Again, if silver remains at 53 pence per ounce, and the 
 gold premium goes down 3 per centum, to 107, a silver dollar 
 would be worth 99-63 cents in greenbacks, and silver and green¬ 
 backs would be about even. But the confusion would always 
 be greater between the irredeemable currency called legal tender 
 notes and the silver currency, as gold goes up or down; and 
 labor, above all things, not having the choice, would invariably 
 be paid in that currency which was the cheapest, and, as a mat¬ 
 ter of course, would command the lesser purchasing power for 
 commodities. If an irredeemable dollar, either a government 
 promise or one made of a cowry shell, had the same purchasing 
 power as a gold dollar, no one in his senses would clamor for gold. 
 
39 
 
 But is it not a perfectly patent fact that $100 in gold, or ten 
 gold eagles, will purchase every conceivable article, will pay for 
 every conceivable kind of labor, and pay every conceivable debt 
 for which eleven ten dollar legal tender notes, or $110 in paper, 
 are now required? 
 
 The great object of currency, therefore, must be that the value 
 indicated on its face, or the represented value, should have the 
 same purchasing power; that tbe money it calls for is supposed 
 to be the best standard. If the object of continuing the legal 
 tender notes concurrently with the metallic standards is more 
 money, regardless of its current value, measured, as it always 
 must be, by the great standard of gold, then the very best money 
 to have is an unlimited irredeemable paper currency. But if the 
 desire of this great nation is for a better currency—a currency 
 which will fluctuate less and come nearer to the purchasing power 
 -of gold, a silver currency, or rather a paper currency, redeemable 
 at all times in silver, circulating concurrently with the other me¬ 
 tallic standard, gold, would certainly not only be in accordance 
 with the wisest policy, but also the most beneficial to industry 
 and labor, as naturally it would have a higher purchasing power 
 than irredeemable legal tender notes. 
 
 If silver is to be monetized, or rather if notes redeemable in 
 silver are once more to circulate in the United States, legal tender 
 notes must cease to exist. No country, especially a great com¬ 
 mercial country, could prosper under four different standards of 
 money, namely, gold, silver, irredeemable paper and subsidiary 
 ooin. 
 
 Such a monetary policy would bring this country on a level 
 with China, where the money consists of Sycee silver, of Mexican 
 dollars, of chop dollars and of copper cash. Now, the China 
 merchant knows well enough that Sycee silver has a fractional 
 advantage in its purchasing power over dollars. Clean or new 
 dollars have a greater purchasing power than chop dollars, and 
 all three currencies have an immensely greater purchasing power 
 than the debased currency of the country known as “cash.” 
 
 By this time it is pretty well understood all over the country 
 that not the quantity of our money requires increasing, but that 
 the quality needs bettering and stability. Eleven years of pro¬ 
 found peace have, unfortunately, failed to solve the problem, but 
 
40 
 
 they have at least had the effect of pointing out the dangers 
 which a nation should avoid. 
 
 J. S. MOOEE. 
 
 New York , October 25, 1876. 
 
 LETTER 8. 
 
 WHY A SILVER DOLLAR SHOULD NOT BE THE RE¬ 
 DEEMER OF THE PAPER CURRENCY, OR BE USED 
 IN THE PAYMENT OF THE INTEREST ON BONDS — 
 THE THEORY TO RELIEVE THE DEBTOR CLASSES 
 EXPLODED. _ 
 
 To the Editors of the Evening Post. 
 
 The fourth and last resolution of the Act of Congress which 
 created the Silver Commission reads : 
 
 “ [Inquire] into the best means for providing for facilitating 
 the resumption of specie payments.” 
 
 I suppose it is well understood that one of the objects of the 
 friends of a silver currency is the payment of the greenbacks in 
 silver dollars—of either 412£ grains fine silver, which was the 
 legal silver dollar up to the date of demonetizing silver, or in a 
 408 grain fine silver dollar, as advocated by Senator Jones in his 
 celebrated speech in the Senate. Either of these propositions 
 would place this great commercial country in a false position, 
 and injure the good name and credit of the country. 
 
 The present position of our monetary system is so simple that 
 a short statement of facts will throw full light on it 
 
 The United States bonds are an interest-paying debt; the 
 greenbacks are a non-interest paying debt. Both solemnly 
 promise to pay the face value, as well as the interest of the 
 bonds, in dollars. Some of the late bonds expressly state in 
 coin; but all of the indebtedness promises dollars. A green¬ 
 back reads on its face : The United States will pay the bearer 
 one, five, ten, or one hundred dollars. When these greenbacks 
 were created a dollar meant either one dollar in gold, or a dollar 
 in silver—412£ grains fine. No other dollar could possibly be 
 
41 
 
 meant. Until 1878, before silver was demonetized, it would 
 have been as just, as it would have been equitable, to redeem in 
 412^ grains of silver a greenback dollar. But Congress saw fit 
 to demonetize these silver dollars in 1878. At the time when 
 the silver dollar was demonetized silver sold at 59£ pence per 
 ounce, and a 412^ grain silver dollar was worth a premium in 
 gold. Hence, if the treasury had been able to redeem green¬ 
 backs in specie in 1873, it would have done so in gold dollars 
 worth just 100 cents, and not in 4121 grains fine silver, which 
 was worth more than $1. It is therefore perfectly obvious that 
 the Act of Congress to demonetize silver dollars was in its favor 
 —that is to say, it got rid of a legal silver dollar, which was 
 actually selling from 1 to 2 per centum more than a gold dol¬ 
 lar, and the redemption of legal tender notes in dollars could 
 from that date only mean gold dollars. 
 
 Now, suppose that silver had remained at 59£ pence per ounce, 
 or even that it had gone higher, no one, I suppose, would have 
 asked the United States government to enact a law to redeem 
 greenbacks in 4124- grain silver, and thus pay virtually more 
 than the face value of a note called for. But, on the other hand, 
 silver having fallen to 53 pence (and it has been much lower), a 
 4124- grain fine silver dollar being worth 914c. in gold, Congress 
 is asked to monetize silver for the sole purpose of paying 914c. 
 in gold value for 100c. promise it made to pay on the paper 
 dollar. 
 
 Put it in any way, in any shape you may, such an act only 
 means paying old debts in less amounts than agreed upon. 
 
 It may perhaps with much justice be said that if America re¬ 
 quires, buys and holds $400,000,000 or $500,000,000 of silver, 
 a 4124- grain fine silver dollar may be fully worth 100 cents gold 
 again, nay, it may even go to 1024 - cents again; but that would 
 not alter the equity and strict justice of the question. From the 
 day that the act was passed to demonetize silver (it may have 
 been a very impolitic act), from that day, if the United States 
 government intends to keep its high reputation for financial 
 honor, it cannot possibly employ any other money in the pay¬ 
 ment of its bonds, interest and the redemption of the greenbacks 
 than that sole metal standard left in this country and called 
 money—gold. 
 
42 
 
 As for reducing the old silver dollar from 412| grains to 408, 
 that only means in a still further degree paying less for the 
 greenbacks in gold. 
 
 As a plausible reason for paying greenbacks off in cheaper 
 currency than they call for, or, in other words, for depreciating 
 their value, there is the old cry of the debtor classes. 
 
 It is urged that inasmuch as all commodities, real estate, etc., 
 for which debts have been incurred, have depreciated perhaps 
 20 per centum on the average during ,the last three years, it is 
 but just that the money of the country should be depreciated 
 equally in order to balance the depreciation of the commodities 
 for which notes of indebtedness are held. In other words it 
 means this: If a greenback is depreciated it takes more green¬ 
 backs to buy commodities, and- therefore inflates prices; while, 
 on the other hand, it only takes exactly the number of green¬ 
 backs an indebtedness calls for to pay it, whether a greenback is 
 worth one hundred cents gold or only seventy cents gold. 
 Therefore it is maintained that in this way the distress of the 
 country would be relieved, and prices for all commodities and 
 real estate would advance. 
 
 Well, then, if this theory is correct—and it may be so for 
 the time being—one thing would certainly follow, that all in¬ 
 debtedness incurred from and after such a happy event would 
 be on the elated prices again, because the greenback representing 
 $1, when its actual value is only seventy or eighty cents, would 
 naturally have to inflate prices twenty or thirty cents. 
 
 Would not, therefore, the same thing happen again in four or 
 five years ? Would not the debtor classes again have the same 
 reason, and say we went into debt when prices were high ? Now 
 everything is low. Give us another dose of relief.' 
 
 But this much sympathy with the debtor classes is, after all, 
 a mere philanthropic chimera. The debtor classes at present—I 
 allude to that vast number who held real estate, manufactories, 
 etc., and who have been in debt since the clqse of the war—are 
 pretty well an extinct race, and those that remain are an insig¬ 
 nificant number. Since the September panic of 1878 no less 
 than one thousand millions of dollars of indebtedness in one 
 shape or other has gone into liquidation, and since that period 
 the indebtedness has been small and of a more substantial na- 
 
43 
 
 ture. As well might we try to make corpses drunk as to try to 
 stimulate the old debtor classes. They are long since beyond 
 the power of stimulating. 
 
 The attempt to redeem the greenback in a currency that repre¬ 
 sents less than the value of its denomination means a debasement 
 of the currency. It is an old remedy often enough resorted to 
 by absolute potentates when they needed money to go to war 
 with, and is as old as the early Crusades. But history records 
 that it has always left a full crop of misery and wretchedness 
 behind it. 
 
 There are but two ways of redeeming the greenbacks— 
 either in gold dollars, or by funding them into United States 
 interest-paying bonds. 
 
 Now, I respectfully disagree with those who think it very easy 
 to get a sufficient amount of gold in the treasury or redeem with 
 safety the greenbacks. The effort will be found to be full of 
 complications and danger. But I do believe if the government 
 was to allow greenbacks to be funded in a four and a half per 
 centum bond, and to provide that such greenbacks, once funded, 
 should be forever destroyed, that, first of all, an immense amount 
 of greenbacks would be funded, and, in the next place, that 
 those remaining would nearly, if not fully, appreciate to the gold 
 value; and as that process might be carried on gradually, it 
 would follow that even the great spectre of contraction need not 
 be so much feared, as in case an agreement is made to have a 
 412£ grain silver dollar circulate, the new silver currency would, 
 in a great measure, relieve the inconvenience of contraction. 
 
 But it would be as unwise as it would be politically dishonest 
 to create by an Act of Congress a special currency, and that cur¬ 
 rency a depreciated one, to pay the solemn obligation of a great 
 
 nation - J. S. MOORE. 
 
 New York , November 6, 1876. 
 
44 
 
 LETTER 9. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS ON THE BLAND SILVER BILL WHICH 
 PASSED THE HOUSE-THE FLUCTUATION IN SIL¬ 
 VER DEMONSTRATED. 
 
 To the Editors of the Evening Post. 
 
 There is not the slightest reason for alarm that the passage of 
 the Bland Silver Bill through the House of Representatives can 
 become the law of the land in the shape it is now. In order to 
 understand his bill properly the wording must be analyzed 
 The bill reads: 
 
 “ authorizing the coining of a standard silver dollar, and 
 
 restoring its legal tender character. 
 
 “ That there shall be, from time to time, coined at the mints 
 of the United States silver dollars of the weight of 412£ grains 
 of standard silver to the dollar, as provided for in the Act 
 of January 18, 1887; and that said dollar shall be a legal tender 
 for all debts, public and private, except where the payment of 
 gold coin is required by law.” 
 
 Thus a 412£ grain silver dollar would have to be taken in un¬ 
 limited amounts in the Custom House because duties are payable 
 in coin. The interest on nearly all the bonds up to 1873, and 
 the bonds themselves, are payable in coin, or, as this bill has it, 
 silver dollars. Now, the Senate can never agree to a policy 
 which would prove a financial equivocation. 
 
 For instance, the present price of silver is already equal to 
 sixteen to one, and perhaps before the week is ended a 412-£ 
 grain silver dollar will be fully at par with gold. Could this 
 standard remain fixed, no actual financial harm would be done. 
 But the trouble is that silver will vary, and no doubt will go 
 higher, and a 412£ grain silver dollar will be worth a premium 
 of from 1 to 2 per centum as compared with gold. In that case 
 the Bland bill, if enacted, will be a perfect dead .letter, as no 
 one will pay duties in a coin that is 2 per centum premium, nor 
 will government pay interest in silver coin. 
 
 On the other hand, a metal like silver, which has fluctuated 
 
45 
 
 within less than two months something like eleven per centum, 
 may naturally fluctuate to same degree in the future ; and if the 
 price of silver should be, for instance, fifty-seven pence an ounce, 
 our new silver dollar will of course be some four per centum 
 below the par value of a gold dollar, and the duties would be 
 paid in the silver coin of less value, while the interest on the 
 bonds would also be paid in a depreciated currency. 
 
 Now, a great commercial nation, whose financial system rests 
 upon the rock of faith and honor, can no more afford to adopt 
 such an equivocal financial policy than an archbishop could 
 afford to enrich himself by taking tithes out of the funds of the 
 charity boxes ; as it must be evident to every thinking person 
 that, while advantage could and would be taken of people to 
 whom interest money was due, they would be deprived of the 
 advantage of getting their pay in silver dollars when that coin 
 was at a premium. 
 
 The report of the Silver Commission will no doubt show that, 
 while a considerable number of witnesses examined were in 
 favor of a bi-metallic standard, they were opposed to the pay¬ 
 ment of the interest in silver coin, and also to the reception of 
 silver for customs duties. 
 
 A silver dollar currency is by no means so very objectionable 
 for the internal commerce and traffic of this country; but it is 
 decidedly objectionable in two instances: First, in the payment 
 of interest and duties; and, second, in the redemption of the 
 greenback. The paper money of this country should be re¬ 
 deemed either in gold coin, or, as that, in my opinion, is extremely 
 improbable, it ought to be funded in an interest-paying bond, 
 while a new silver ’currency of a 412|- grain dollar could 
 very well succeed the once and forever funded green¬ 
 backs. 
 
 That silver has gone up in price cannot be much wondered at. 
 The causes have been foreseen, and it was not very difficult to 
 foresee them. During the last two months the causes that made 
 silver rise in value were as follows: 
 
 First—The German Empire refused to sell silver at the panic 
 price prevailing. 
 
 Second—The India Council in London somewhat curtailed 
 their drawings on India. 
 
46 
 
 Third—Some of the East India produce, particularly saltpetre 
 and cotton, have advanced in price in London. 
 
 Fourth—It has been discovered that the production of silver 
 in Nevada was grossly overrated. It seems that the good people 
 of California, in order to give their mines an exaggerated value, 
 made the world believe that certain mines had an inexhaustible 
 amount of silver in them. The Goschen Committee fell into a 
 perfect trap, and, in order to show the trap they fell into, I here 
 quote from a San Francisco letter published in the London Times 
 of November 24th, which said: 
 
 “ There is no doubt that the report of Mr. Goschen’s Committee 
 has been of very great service in bringing together an immense 
 mass of facts regarding silver, gold and the foreign exchanges, 
 and the information presented will be of the utmost benefit all 
 over the world. Yet on the main cause of the depreciation as 
 described in the report — 1 the discovery of new silver mines of 
 great richness in the State of Nevada ’—th6 estimate for the year 
 1876 is exceedingly wide of the mark. Nothing could show 
 more conclusively now untrustworthy the statistics of govern¬ 
 ment officials frequently are, and how mischievous their miscal¬ 
 culations may be, than the present case. The estimated pro¬ 
 duction of silver in the United States for 1876 was $50,000,000; 
 whereas the best authorities here, with the figures to the end of 
 September before them, estimate the amount for the year at 
 $28,000,000. In my letter in the Times , of .August 29, I stated 
 that the year’s production would be between $25,000,000 and 
 $30,000,000. The total yield will be about 24,000,000 ounces 
 of fine silver, this being the most accurate form of estimating, 
 as the price during the year has been subject to considerable 
 fluctuations.” 
 
 This statement, no doubt a correct one, opened the eyes of the 
 silver alarmists. 
 
 I further suspect that Russia has of late been a customer for 
 silver. 
 
 Thus, then, the supply of silver having visibly fallen off, and 
 the demand having somewhat increased, the price of silver has 
 gone up, nor is there any immediate danger of silver going down 
 to panic prices. 
 
 The most amusing part of the Silver Bill is that when it was 
 first conceived, silver was very low, and a 412£-grain dollar was 
 only worth some 85 to 88 cents, while on the very day of the 
 
 \ 
 
47 
 
 passage of the bill through the House of Representatives, a 412^- 
 grain dollar was worth nearly par in gold. 
 
 I suppose it is hopeless to point out to the lawmakers that 
 there is a higher law than even Congress can enact—the law of 
 supply and demand. That great law laughs at all arbitrary rules 
 or regulations. 
 
 J. S. MOORE. 
 
 New York , December 14, 1876. 
 
 LETTER 10. 
 
 FLUOTUA TION OF S/L VER-FURTHER DEMONSTA TION. 
 
 To the Editors of the Evening Post. 
 
 It has often happened, when this country’s attention was 
 absorbed by one great political question, that the most unfortu¬ 
 nate acts have been passed by Congress. Such were, for in¬ 
 stance, the many oppressive tariff acts during the war. I, there¬ 
 fore, do not wonder that the silver bill was passed pell mell 
 through the House of Representatives in order to make more 
 room for the one great question at issue. But if the Senate or 
 the people in general can find time to give attention to the 
 Bland-Kelley bill, they ought to see that there is extreme dan¬ 
 ger in it Now I again repeat, and as my testimony before the 
 Silver Commission will prove, that I consider a silver dollar cur¬ 
 rency beneficial for this country, provided the greenbacks were 
 funded, and, above all, that silver money is not to be used for 
 the payment of interest on the public debt, and, consequently, 
 taken for duties. Let me prove to the community in the short¬ 
 est possible way why silver money is unfit for this purpose. 
 
 On the 13th instant, when the Silver Bill passed the House, 
 silver was selling in London for 57f pence. On the 14th, when 
 I wrote my latest letter on the subject, it sold for 58£ pence. 
 To-day, the 18th, the price of silver in London is 57 pence. It 
 therefore fell in four days 2^ per centum. Now, I ask any rea¬ 
 sonable man whether a money that can fluctuate 2£ per centum 
 in four days is the best money in which a great financial nation 
 
48 
 
 should have the option—or perhaps have no other option—to 
 pay the interest on its bonded debt? Is it possible that this 
 great commercial country can afford to be placed in such a false 
 position ? 
 
 I have not the slightest doubt that silver will go to 58 or even 
 to 60 pence again ; but I have, on the other hand, no reasonable 
 assurance that it will not fall to 54 or 58 pence. I can perfectly 
 well understand the cause of the present fall of silver during the 
 last four days, and it will in time be found to be true, namely: 
 Germany had ceased to sell silver at panic prices. I have even 
 seen a cable telegram saying that Germany would not sell silver 
 under 55 pence. There came lately a heavy demand for silver 
 from India. Let the following statement from the London 
 limes, of December 1, testify : 
 
 “ The Peninsular and Oriental steamer Bokhara, sailing for 
 the East this afternoon, takes £826,720. The chief part of this 
 (£618,000) is in silver for Bombay and Calcutta, and £160,000 
 in dollars for China and the Straits.” 
 
 Thus it seems that £778,000, or nearly $4,000,000 in silver, 
 left England in one day on the 1st of December. Exchange for 
 rupees was quoted at Is. 9 7-17 d. in Bombay, and the dollais in 
 Hong Kong were 4s. 2%d. per dollar. No wonder, then, that 
 silver went up to 58£ pence per ounce, as at that price even it 
 would pay to ship silver to Bombay and get bills back at Is. 
 9 \d. per rupee ; but, in the meantime, I dare say that Germany 
 was not asleep. That empire has £69,000,000 of silver to dis¬ 
 pose of, and it must have poured into London a goodly supply to 
 secure the higher price; but no sooner was this supply felt, 
 which undoubtedly overtopped the demand, when, as we see, the 
 price fell from 58^ to 57 pence in four days; and I do not 
 doubt that the onward higher price for silver will be tempora¬ 
 rily checked. 
 
 I can only once more repeat that, however advantageous it 
 may be to have silver dollars for our internal trade, it is abso¬ 
 lutely dangerous to the commercial and financial interests of this 
 country to make it an agent to pay the interest on the debt, 
 owing solely to its fluctuating propensities. That interest ought 
 to be paid in a money that, like Caesar’s wife, is above suspicion. 
 
 New York , December 18, 1876. S * M00E - E *