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NOTES ON THE NEW EDITION OE GOODWIN’S 
 GREEK MOODS AND TENSES. 
 
 CASKIE HARRISON. 
 
 I. 
 
 These notes will be devoted to strictures. Dispraise is not the 
 guerdon of the work; but strictures form an integral part of criti- 
 cism, important in proportion to the importance of their subject. This 
 edition greatly enhances the reputation of its precursors, and its 
 merits are sure of the amplest commendation; still, it has not even 
 yet outgrown a certain fundamental narrowness and irrational 
 reserve, with certain errors and inconsistencies of application. 
 
 This is not an age of syntax; the history and comparison of forms 
 and sounds are the gods of our scholars; meaning and interpretation 
 beyond what may be incidently assumed from rudimentary reminis- 
 cence, have few worshippers. The- expressed opinions, the actual 
 instruction, the published work of our professors and teachers; the 
 programmes of electives and graduate-courses in our leading col- 
 leges; the lists of papers read before The American Philological 
 Association — about one in seven being syntactical; the conceptions 
 and valuations of the several aspects of classical study acquired 
 •even by honor-men in our universities — hardly one in a hundred of 
 whom appears to have heard whether there be any syntax beyond the 
 school-manuals; the blunders from which “ comparative grammar” 
 has not saved some of our very few aspirants in syntax; the ease with 
 which crudity and superfluity find a place in our journals — all these go 
 to show that “fondness for syntax”is not a characteristic of American 
 scholarship. If “fondness for syntax” were, as it ought to be, a charac- 
 teristic of American scholarship, we should not have a maker of 
 books teaching contradictory doctrine in companion-volumes, elabo- 
 rated prolixity of detail in demonstration of ancient doctrine; if 
 “ linguistic science” found amongst us its true complement in “fond- 
 ness for syntax,” we should not have absurdities removed and re- 
 tained at the same time by a simple change from text to foot-note; 
 we should not have waited so long for this new edition, and Gilder- 
 sleeve would long ago have had his deserved preeminence. 
 
2 Notes on the New EditioJi of Goodwin s Greek Moods and Tenses 
 
 As it is, since the facts of syntax cannot be understood or imparted 
 without some theory of syntax, the helpless teacher or writer is forced 
 to ignoble confession or to brazen artifice, while the shower of ap- 
 plause that greets the rare author’s last revision is the very same that 
 exhausted its vocabulary of panegyric over the views he has since 
 abandoned as false. If Allen and Greenough’s Latin Grammar had 
 not suffered from overpraise and mispraise at the hands of those who 
 of themselves ought to have seen, and who by position ought to 
 have exhibited, its obvious and self-perpetuating weaknesses, not even 
 its publishers could have made its success so great; and the fact that 
 the book, in the hands of a safe teacher, is really so available is only 
 a stronger reason why it should be relieved of peril to the unsafe 
 and inexperienced. At an interval, very much the same may be 
 said of Goodwin’s Syntax. 
 
 II. 
 
 This revision is notable, chiefly because of its author’s conversion; 
 like Saul, he has seen a great light, and he preaches it. Till now 
 severely practical, he has grown through practice to theory, and he 
 joins the band of these prophets. True, he is not a full-fledged philos- 
 opher; that he will never be; his philosophy is not a natural, but an 
 acquired, taste; but the changed mind and heart atone for all neg- 
 ligences and ignorances. That Professor Goodwin, whose fame is 
 indissolubly connected with the conditional sentence, should, for so 
 many years, have considered his indebtedness to Gildersleeve ade- 
 quately settled by the forgotten foot-note in The Transactions, is 
 now less a marvel than that he should ever have allowed himself to 
 be and to remain in such sympathy with, and under such obligations 
 to, a man of such different mould. Amidst the labored indifference, 
 not to say the studied disapprobation, with which New England and 
 the East have viewed Gilderseeve’s work, this declaration of 
 Professor Goodwin’s is like the eruption of an unsuspected volcano. 
 Those who fully estimate what his acknowledgment implies may 
 pay Gildersleeve the tribute of quoting his imperfect as the “ tense of 
 disappointment,” and say ‘■Nic aderas !" 
 
 III. 
 
 Professor Goodwin is the highest type of New England scholar, 
 and the general justice of his domestic and foreign reputation is 
 cheerfully conceded everywhere. But the chief merit of the mind 
 
Notes on the New Editio7i of Goodwin s Greek Moods a7id Tenses 3 
 
 he typifies is simplicity, its chief result is availability, qualities no 
 way incompatible with lack of depth in interpretative insight. Com- 
 plete classification is not a characteristic of the mind he represents; 
 the leading characteristic of that mind is pursuit of the practical, 
 which often mistakes clearness for truth; and the practical man too 
 often proves himself inferior to the theorist by having his work to 
 do over. To such a mind, given a genus naturally falling into five 
 species, the New England grammarian will probably see and note 
 only three; and, in his examples, he will give two instances of each 
 of two species, and omit illustration of the third; or he will word 
 his principle so that no one of his examples necessarily applies. 
 
 Professor Goodwin’s books have been justly praised in England; 
 but it must be remembered that the English are particularly deficient 
 in grammatical sense; and the tribute of one of their great weekly 
 reviews to the second edition of The Moods Tenses as virtually a 
 “ treatise on logic and the science of language ” must have seemed 
 premature even to the flattered author. Simplification no more implies 
 profundity than common-sense implies learning or the power to 
 teach; in fact, simplification is obstructed by the very fulness of 
 knowledge and by the breadth of a total view, and it can often be ob- 
 tained only by the discounting or even the subversion of the truth. 
 This is why the greatest scholars cannot make the most available 
 books; their presentation, in satisfying themselves, becomes inac- 
 cessible to those for whom it is intended, and is overlooked by those 
 who would profit by it. In point is Gildersleeve’s Latin Grammar — 
 the best, and almost the only original, work on Latin Syntax in Eng- 
 lish, but the most impracticable for the age usually concerned with 
 grammar. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Professor Gildersleeve, the high water-mark of American scholar- 
 ship, is the very opposite of Professor Goodwin. To learning as 
 great, he adds a magic versatility of cognizance and apprehension 
 and sympathy almost unparallelled; the acutest feeling for gram- 
 matical subtleties, the most infallible power of interpretation, and 
 the most felicitous gift of expression; a vital touch with all phases 
 of modern life, and a delicate or a playful familiarity with ancient 
 men and times; which combine to render him a unique figure in con- 
 temporary scholarship. And yet he has not enjoyed the recognition 
 and the homage due to such a position. How far this aloofness is 
 due to his personal and professional attitudes may be a question; 
 
4 Notes on the New Edition of Goodwin s Greek Moods and Tenses 
 
 but, a certain succls d' estime left out, the fact remains that, in the 
 country at large, he has been for the most part ignored and mis- 
 trusted. To a just mind,'this is marvellous, but not more marvellous 
 than that none of Gildersleeve’s favored and favorite pupils seem to 
 have caught his spirit and been called to missionary service in the 
 cause of his ideals; not more marvellous than that the very journal 
 to which Goodwin is so profusely indebted should, for ten years, 
 have found it hard to live for the men who will now, of course, admire 
 his revised views. When Professor Goodwin transcends the circle 
 that has sometimes to some of us seemed a mutual admiration society, 
 if not an organized propaganda, to glory in studying pages that so 
 many boast of leaving uncut, in learning from a man whom his neigh- 
 bors under their breath call fantastic, while they fear him so whole- 
 somely, I deem it a worthy date for the new hegira from the buga- 
 boos of the practical and the scientific; and his willingness to con- 
 fess so much in behalf of his only possible rival— a rival, too, likely 
 to be advanced greatly in general repute by his endorsement — is a 
 fitting text for the new dispensation. 
 
 V. 
 
 To discuss in detail all the exceptions that may fairly be taken to 
 this revision would far exceed any space and time at my command. 
 I purpose to consider at relative length the general criticisms I 
 make, and then indicate briefly such individual cases as they include. 
 
 Professor Goodwin discloses his unsymmetrical way of looking at 
 things in the very beginning: he does not define verb, and proceed 
 to explain how interrogative and imperative forms really assert; and 
 he does define mood, resting satisfied in traditional vagueness; and, 
 coming to tense, he defines that idea with no new felicity. The 
 individual moods he does not define; on the contrary he merely cata- 
 logues a number of unequally significant uses, wherein no histori- 
 cal claims can atone for the logical obscuration. Though it does 
 not appear from the new preface, he is evidently still under the dom- 
 ination of the scientific scare, whose demands for accuracy he rec- 
 ognizes to an extent beyond his power to meet. But it is not lack 
 of accuracy, lack of comprehensiveness, lack of brevity, that he 
 seems to have in mind; the only warning that can fairly be drawn 
 from the “ numerous unsuccessful attempts ’’ is the difficulty of mak- 
 ing definition self-explanatory, which, however, is no absolute condition 
 of definition; if it were, science could not live or move; and Semper’s 
 
Notes on the New Edition of Goodwin s Greek Moods and Tenses 5 
 
 colossal definition of the “ conditions of existence ” ought to be con- 
 solation enough for any definer who is not reconciled to his lot by the 
 summary disposal of heat as “ a mode of motion.” If physical 
 science, with its advantages of concreteness, objectivity, mechanism, 
 and symbols, has even occasionally to rest in such definitions, I think 
 students of disembodied function need not fear her criticisms on 
 their formulae. Till science establishes all her claims and claims 
 only what she has established — till she becomes logical enough to 
 remember that her special processes were logic’s before they were 
 appropriated by science, and to make her votaries conform to logic, 
 whether they become ficientific or not, fear of her demurrers is 
 altogether gratuitous It is entirely possible to characterize moods ac- 
 cording to all the conditions of definition, if types are viewed out of 
 the confusions of secondary association, as it is to differentiate rain- 
 bow-colors out of their blending. The pure indicative is the actual; 
 the pure second mood (subjunctive, optative, conditional, potential, 
 etc.) is the potential; but the actual is itself potential of that which, 
 under the law of universal dualism, it is always becoming, and the 
 potential is actual so far as it is an existent and operating principle; 
 and so we find the two forms secondarily changing places, especially 
 under the tendency to view indirectly (i. e. potentially) what is really 
 an assertion of the actual. This explains the modal use of the in- 
 dicative, both in the continuative and in the indefinite tenses, involv- 
 ing the transition of tense to mood, so extensively illustrated in 
 Hebrew. And the logical classification of uses not only does not con- 
 tradict the historical, but is the only one that stimulates rationally 
 the processes of mind, whde the latter may assert nothing beyond 
 mechanical occurrence. This classification does not imply that 
 “ moods were deliberately invented to express certain definite classes 
 of ideas to the exclusion of all others, and then always held rigidly 
 to these predetermined uses; on the contrary, their various uses 
 grew up gradually, as language was developed and found new ideas 
 to express”; but, while the developed series of functions in a mood 
 is not necessarily deduced, each term from one immediately preced- 
 ing in time, no mood, however its various meanings seem to cross 
 each other’s tracks in chronological advance and retreat, ever ac- 
 quires any use irreconcilable with its origin. Thus the indicative is 
 the generic mood, retaining and sometimes asserting those potential 
 uses of which the other moods are merely specialized functions, 
 more or less capable of reverting to the original value. Finally, as 
 long as our minds work by logical association and not by temporal 
 
6 Notes on the New Edition of Goodwin's Greek Moods and Tenses 
 
 connections, the correlation of uses will prove more available than 
 their chronological tabulation; and so long as science fails to free 
 herself from the other limits of her jurisdiction, the moods of man 
 may fairly claim to be outside of her power to symbolize mathemati- 
 cally and to define mechanically. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Especially interesting is the substitute for the long since super- 
 annuated appendix on the subjunctive and optative; the present view 
 is the one that I have held for some fifteen years; the one that I 
 urged on Professor Goodwin in the revision of his grammar. There 
 is certainly no way to determine that the subjunctive originally ex- 
 presses only futurity, since futurity and contingency are inseparable 
 reciprocals; but all the infallibility of all the Germans is not 
 sufficient to deduce the uses of subjunctive and optative from such 
 secondary ideas as will, wish. The neutral value is unquestionably 
 original, and adapts itself to either mental attitude, the cognitive 
 (declarative) or the volitive (imperative). “ Potential” is better used 
 as a differential of form than of mental attitute, so that the subjunc- 
 tive and optative are potential declaratives or potential imperatives; 
 and the infinitive as a predicate may be regarded as an actual or a 
 potential assertion or “imperation.” Again, the particle av, which has 
 assumed and retained certain conventional positions, is never pri- 
 mary or necessary, but always only a secondary explication of im- 
 plicit meaning — a view which clears up many difficulties as to its 
 presence or absence in unexpected placed. (See §§ 162, 3, 4, 329, 
 506, 681,489,592; ci. possum expressed or omited after vbs. trial 
 — si.') 
 
 VII. 
 
 There is the old sophistication as to the change from indicative 
 to optative in oratio obliqua. The optative to the indicative is a 
 difference in kind, which is overcome by the conditional (potential) 
 element of oratio obliqua; but the optative to subjunctive is only a 
 difference in degree of the same (potential) kind. The optative to 
 the imperative is a difference in kind, being parallelled by an indica- 
 tive assertion of the actual to an optative with av assertion of a po- 
 tential, which may differ only as direct and indirect views of the 
 same phenomena. 
 
Notes on the New Edition of Goodwin's Greek Moods and Tenses 7 
 
 VIII. 
 
 The ordinary aorist now begins to get its dues, but the new learn- 
 ing has not clarified the definition of the gnomic aorist, which the 
 author still ascribes to “ animated language,” as if the proverb and 
 the oracle were not “sententious” or anything except “animated.” 
 And, in explaining, he forgets his definition of aorist and uses the 
 very details he has excluded. The gnomic aorist has nothing to do 
 with “one distinct case or with several distinct cases;” it simply 
 gives the yea or nay of the record, one case being as good as, and 
 no better than, a thousand. “ Care killed a cat” has no suggestion 
 of distinct cases; it is only the voice of the record as to the actuality 
 of occurrence. But, when it accepts the fact as sufficiently established 
 by one case, it is far from denying that many have happened; else 
 the iterative aorist with would be impossible. 
 
 It is especially important in Greek to antithesize the aorist and 
 the perfect, and I do not think Professor Goodwin has satisfactorily 
 done so. The phenomena referred to by both are the same, neces- 
 sarily past; the aorist simply so refers to them, the perfect asserts 
 their present value in the form of permanent result or established 
 reputation or abiding experience, without implying substantial or 
 mechanical or concrete result. “I have built a house” does 
 not necessarily imply present possession of the house; nor 
 does “ he has killed his man” imply present possession of 
 the cadaver; but each assert the possession of the reputation 
 established and the experience acquired. But, as the aorist does not 
 express, so it does not deny, the resulting condition; any more than 
 the aorist denies the continuative or repeated character of the act 
 which it, instead of the imperfect, represents; and thus the exigen- 
 cies of metre, or even mere variety, may veer between aorists and 
 imperfects or aorists and perfects in reversible combinations. 
 
 IX. 
 
 The chapter on the uses of the moods, in spite of some shifting, 
 retains its old haphazard arrangement. If there is method in lan- 
 guage, there ought to be some method in its presentation. Here 
 Professor Goodwin has not learned from Gildersleeve, or he would 
 never have tumbled simple and complex, direct and indirect,, 
 sentences into one chapter, putting asunder sentences that the logic 
 of mind has joined together, and confounding all grades of hypo- 
 
8 Notes on the New Edition of Goodwins Greek Moods and Tenses 
 
 tactic integration. Conditional sentences the extremes of reciprocal 
 subordination, are thrown in midway, with no connection 
 before or after, absolutely cut off from the potential expressions 
 from which they are developed; and the same may be said of rela- 
 tive sentences, except in their relation to the conditional. Oratio 'ji 
 
 obliqua, which is not part of any coordinated sentence— classifica- 
 tion, is plunged into the midst of unh'.kes; and causals and wishes |! 
 
 come in as an anti-climax. 
 
 X. 
 
 I pass now to some details. In § 259, “the distinction of tense 
 has no reference to the moods” is at least misleading in 
 view of the cogerit discrimination of M. W. Humphreys in Trans. 
 
 Am. Phil. Ass’n for 1876, which I take to be conclusive. 
 
 After the analysis of § § 261 sqq., which is a memorable substitute 
 for the old desideration of purpose as an element in fearing-clauses 
 (cf. old ed. § 43 C.) — being an attempt to fit a genus into one of its 
 species— the reversal in the order of topics in § 303 is surprising. 
 
 (cf. XII below, on § 926.) ^ 
 
 In § 306, the explanation of /i?/ pr] for jxrj ov as due to 
 
 the desire to avoid repetition, is hardly adequate in a language that 
 repeats negatives so freely as the Greek. More likely, ov is the 
 negative of idea (notion), fxrj of form ; at long interval, the dues of 
 the form unconsciously assert themselves ; and no doubt pr} ov is 
 always to be expected. 
 
 In §§ 312, 313, difficulties are removed by bearing in mind that, 
 whatever the conjunctional form of introduction, even when there is 
 none, every subjunctive or optative is genetically conditional (poten- 
 tial); hence av is conditional as well as final, and the clauses -y 1 
 
 after verbs of trial (§ § 4^^; 4^7) final as well as conditional. 
 
 Both sets are causal, purpose being final cause and condition the theory 
 of cause ; and both are relative, as being the dependent m^embers of 
 correlated combinations. Again they are both indirect questions, 
 purpose being action taken to answer the question whether there is 
 power to actualize a potential. The presence or absence of av is 
 explained by its merely explicative character, just as the expression 
 of a verb of fearing with a clause is a mere explication. There 
 is in fact no such thing as a final particle ; the finality grows out of 
 the relation, as all the values afterwards expressed by special con- 
 junctions originate without conjunctions; and the same particle 
 
 ■<1 
 
Notes on the New Edition of Goodwin s Greek Moods and Tenses g 
 
 ■explicates various relations, as the same relation may explicate itself 
 hy many lines of conjunctional development (cf. expecto si, ut, 
 dum. See further below.) 
 
 From what has been said, it does not seem that the Greeks were 
 ■ really aware of so many distinctions of contingency as are noted in 
 §§ 235, 399 — the forms with ocv being mere explications of the 
 •others, as is the possible intent of the somewhat inconsistent foot- 
 note (i), page 144. 
 
 In conditions, the ultimate difference between indicative and sub- 
 junctive-optative is this : the indicative, not being itself conditional, 
 acquires its conditional value only by relation ; while in subjunc- 
 tive-optative, which are per se conditional, this value is inherent and 
 independent of the conjunction which explicates the relation. In 
 other words, every general principle being conditional of its special 
 applications, an indicative condition is to a subjunctive-optative 
 ■condition as “a drowning man catches at straws ” = “ if a man 
 drowns, he catches at straws,” is to “a drowning man would catch at 
 straws if a man should drown, he would catch at straws;” or 
 as volo to velim. That is, the indicative may express the theory of 
 condition by forms based upon and limited to a special time ; the 
 subjunctive-optative, by using future time, implies besides futurity 
 the abstract relation outside of actual time ; and it is emphasizing 
 this merely relational and theoretic character of the combination 
 that suggests remoteness of prospective realization for the optative 
 and reflects upon the subjunctive the secondary idea of nearness or 
 vividness ; just as the indicative becomes the mood of fact in mere 
 offset to the subjunctive-optative as the moods of conception. Per- 
 haps it is this affinity of the future and the conditional notion that 
 vindicates the use of subjunctive-optative in protases of general 
 •conditions, which are doubly conditional through the expressed 
 relation and the general principle, and hence prefer to explicate 
 modally. 
 
 In §§ 486, 487, the explanation is a crude substitute, not clearly 
 grasped and not consistently followed, for a rough-and-ready pred- 
 ecessor ; consequently, it is not conclusive. The apodosis after verbs 
 •of trial is expressed ; it is the principal verb ; and there is no ellipsis. 
 There is no such thing anywhere as the kind of ellipsis Professor 
 Goodwin imagined in the earlier editions, the attempt to supply 
 which is simply to chase an infinite series of final causes. Nor is 
 there any complexity of protasis and apodosis, except as every sub- 
 
> 
 
 lo Notes on the New Edition of Good^vin's Greek Moods and Tenses 
 
 junctive-optative is an apodosis and implies a protasis ; and the- 
 examples here are not like those protases that become indirect 
 questions only by becoming object-clauses to a verb requiring such 
 complement, as ibo visam si domist. Roby (§ 1754) states the miscon- 
 ception at length ; and even Gildersleeve nods,* though of course his 
 filling of the ellipsis would be far different from Goodwin’s. There .4 
 
 is no ellipsis in these examples, because there is no way to attach the 
 assumed apodosis ; etymologically and logically, the clause need not. 
 be or be considered a technical condition, as the same conjunction 
 explicates different relations and the same relation is explicated by 
 different conjunctions, and relation depends ultimately for interpre- 
 tation not on vague pronominal conjunctions or even on mood but on* 
 the circumstances of the case ; and finally the conditional conjunction' 
 is at any rate only secondarily conditional, while these clauses are as- 
 old as the language. But, if we must consider the protasis as tech- 
 nically conditional, it is only as every subjunctive-optative is essen- 
 tially conditional, as is the final clause, in whose case the conditional 
 value has already been exhibited, and in temporal clauses and else- 
 where. Condition is the theory of cause; purpose is final cause,, 
 that is the theory tested ; the test (apodosis) is actual, the theory 
 (protasis) conditional and potential ; in other words, purpose is au' 
 action undertaken under the hypothesis that by it a certain result is- 
 possible (cf. § 612.) Venio si videam, venio tit videani, differ, if at all,, 
 only in the roads appropriated by later specialization, and not in the 
 ultimate relation, which in the mood remains the same ; the former 
 explicates the essential hypothesis in si, implying “in the hope that ” 
 as a justification for the action taken, and suggesting that action as 
 the effort to solve a problem of possibility; the latter, keeping the 
 hypothesis, may be held to regard it as an apodosis expressing the 
 possible manner of the main verb, to which si veniatn might be 
 appended as a protasis. In fact, it is possible to consider venio si 
 videam as a double condition, equal to venio si videam si veniam ; 
 
 (cf. § 510) ; and, if there must be ellipsis, this is the only rational 
 form of it. Professor Goodwin altogether misses the point of con- « 
 ditions like (^tireipov ei aXcoGoivro (§ 495), in which akc^Goivto 
 does not mean '•'■were to be captured” (§ 697); wmEipov involves 
 (Gil. L. G., § 603) eXsyov ointepeiv (cf. Madv. L. G., § 369). 
 
 Mood and tense alike show that these are not causal in the sense 
 that Bavpafco ei is causal. The principle is § 490, where however 
 
 *And yet, is it the nod of Zeus? (II. A, 526, 527.) 
 
Notes on the New Edition of GoodwitH s Greek Moods and Tenses 1 1 
 
 the two indicative protases need at least a reference — though they do 
 not seem to be covered by any single section. The element of wish 
 ascribed to some of the protases here included may be either for 
 or against, (Cf. Gil. L. G., § 598, and Wordsworth’s “O mercy! 
 If Lucy should be dead!”, and Hebrew condition = prohibition, 
 Students’ Heb. Gr., p. 330. Goodwin continues to ignore wish 
 against.) In point is § 612, though there Goodwin makes the con- 
 ditional value secondary, losing the ultimate signification of the 
 relations. 
 
 From what has been said, the exclusion of Iol v from interrogatives 
 is invalid and impracticable. Such protases as occur in § 491, like 
 all others under similar circumstances, become indirect questions 
 according to their relation to the leading verb ; if that verb implies 
 question or answer, oral, mental, actional, and there is no other 
 object for its complement, the originally antecedent protasis fur- 
 nishes to the transitive verb the expected object or subject, as being 
 the most or only available supply of that demand of mind ; just as, 
 the predicate being given — as in an impersonal verb — the next 
 element afforded is regarded as the subject under the requirements 
 of mental procedure. Ei may introduce subjunctive-questions, as it 
 may introduce subjunctive-conditions (§ 454); the sav questions 
 with subjunctive are chiefly the purpose-conditions already ex- 
 plained ; the difference between the conjunctions and the relations 
 they imply is not important enough to be distinguished with the 
 optative or in Latin. Similarly, § 304 is over-discriminating. 
 
 XI. 
 
 § § 61 1 sqq. — 621 sqq. The treatment of particles signifying until 
 and before is, on the whole, greatly improved, though § 553 ought to 
 be included ; and references to dum redeo (Verg. Ec. IX. 2f)— while 
 I am returning = //// I return ; to Abbott (§ 184) for to— till, till= 
 to, prep, or conj.; to Earle, Phil. Eng. Tongue, for modern 
 provincial while=till, are in point. As the author does not make 
 conditionality a fundamental differential, it is not easy to see his 
 object in relating these temporals to conditional sentences instead of 
 to finals — especially as his explanation of “protases after verbs of 
 trial” cannot be accepted. Nor is the difference in mood with 
 sNOX^%=.until after past and future forms respectively clearly ex- 
 plained by showing how what was an aim has become an inde- 
 
12 Notes on the New Edition of Goodwin s Greek Moods and Tenses 
 
 pendent fact ; and there is no reason why § 614 should be degraded 
 to finer print. 
 
 § § 621 sqq. The theory of these constructions could have been 
 clarified by a correlation of (i) negation of priority,- (2) priority of 
 negation, (3) continuance of negation, (4) negation of continuance ; 
 (i) (2) are interchangeable, but not so (3) (4); (i) (2) must be ov 
 Ttpiv j (3) may be ov Ttpiv, ovx £go<= j (4) must be ovx’soo';; Ttpiv 
 odoa— until after affirmatives only when the affirmative is continu- 
 ative. Verbs of ceasing — or (4). More stress needs to be laid on 
 divergence of Latin or Greek for priority=^prevention of action 
 merely conceived, hindered (§ 626 ; cf. Madv. Gk. Synt. § 167). 
 
 XII. 
 
 § 662. We have the same definition of oratio obliqua — one which 
 is either circular or meaningless. “Conform to the construction of 
 the sentence in which they are quoted ” is either untrue or truistic ; 
 it either means that an indirect quotation is one that takes the con- 
 struction proper to indirect quotation — which may be true and must 
 be useless ; or it implies a kind and a degree of conformity which 
 do not exist. Indirect discourse has for its only distinctive feature 
 the readjustment and reduction of an old assertion to new relations, 
 primarily, pronominal, secondarily, modal or temporal ; but this 
 readjustment and this reduction have not, even in one language, a 
 single invariable form, they have no form that is not a part of other 
 constructions. No change of form is essential, no subordination by 
 conjunction or mood is indispensable ; in fact, a subordinating con- 
 junction may even accompany the direct quotation {§ 711.) The 
 -definition is a part of “general grammar and here, as well as in 
 the case of mood, as the mind must classify, the teacher or writer 
 must exempt the immature pupil from a necessity he cannot ignore. 
 Gildersleeve (§651), in avoiding mechanical reduction, becomes too 
 vague. § 684 is not satisfactory. (Cf. § 136 and Am. J. Ph. IV., 
 428.) The difference between “comp, inf.’’ and “ acc. with inf.” is 
 simply in degree of integration, whereby one act becomes a mere 
 preliminary part of another. The infinitive (as a verb) must always 
 have a subject in thought (§ 744); but, when the actions are inte- 
 grated, the identical subject of both verbs acts at once for both. 
 (A. & G. have confused the matter, § 271.) It is not “the meaning 
 of the leading verb,” but closeness and continuity of thought, that 
 
Notes on the New Edition of Goodwills Greek Moods and Tenses 13. 
 
 debars a subject expressed from the dependent verb ; an expressed 
 subject would be gratuitous and intrusive. 
 
 My chief comment on the Infinitive and Participles concerns the 
 sections on their theory, where I find a lack of clear and profound 
 thinking and several Bunsbian opinions, in spite of considerable 
 improvement of a practical character. To discuss the various words 
 and phrases that illustrate this general comment would require more 
 time and space than I can afford ; but I suggest, as a sign, a com- 
 parison with Gildersleeve’s way of interpreting the article in the 
 articular infinitive (cf. his Just. Mart. A, 3, 9 : 10, 16). § 786 ought 
 
 to refer to § § 438, 736 ; and § 803 to § 623. In § 850, the Latin 
 example is not in point, as se absente belongs to tentari, and the 
 expression “ difference in meaning ” seems to have no meaning at 
 all (cf, Madv. 428, i). In § 867, we have a telling contrast to § 109,. 
 N. 9 of the old edition and to § 277 N. 3 of revised Grammar of 
 1879 (cf. Gil. Just. Mart. A, 4, 19). In § 926, the statement seems 
 to imply surprise 'that does not take a dative agent — a misplaced 
 and misleading implication. (Cf. X above, on old ed. § 43, C.) 
 
 XIII. 
 
 Omitting some fundamentals from lack of space, I close with a 
 brief gleaning on sundry heads. 
 
 § 22. In some uses, English shows relative tenses more freely than 
 Greek, as in all future conditionals or quasi-conditionals. 
 
 § 25. The modal value of present and impf. (as Th. 1, 28, 4, 5,. 
 anayoDGx.; 53, 3, ; Verg. Ec. 4, 3 canimus) is not ade- 
 
 quately brought out. Cf. § 49°- 
 
 §§ 27, 49. Pres, and pf. are reciprocals; the completion of one 
 act = the continuance of a state or of another act ; hence the power 
 of reduction is noway “ peculiar” (cf. § § 32, 51.) After what was- 
 said above on the relations of pf. and aor., there is nothing surpris- 
 ing about § 61. § 60 is parallelled by colloquial “ did you know ? ” 
 
 = “DO you know?” and by the mother’s ^Nid it want a lump of 
 sugar, then?” 
 
 § 75 is another example of explication. I have not seen attention 
 called to the future participle used as coincident with its leading 
 verb; cf. Isoc. Paneg. § 185, EGEG^ai ^EXrjGorXra? j also Eng. 
 “ I should have liked to have seen,” “ He is a man who I should not 
 think would do such a thing,” “ He wants that I should go.” (Cf. § § 
 4L 211, 428, b.) 
 
14 Notes on the New Edition of Goodwin's Greek Moods and Tenses 
 
 § 76. The persistence of this verb in indie., where subj.-opt. 
 would be expected, ought to be noted (cf. § 553, where add to exam- 
 ples, Xen. Hell. II., 2, 16 ; II., 3, 4, 7 ; also §§ 591, 592.) 
 
 § 127. The future element is involved in the leading verb : cf. 
 Eng., “He said to learn the next page”=:“He told us to learn.” 
 Goodwin’s use of such expression as ^'■offending aorists ” (§ 127), 
 '•'■fluid language” (§ 239), "venerable Canon Davesianus ” (§ 364), 
 "borderland between past and future” (§ 448), are very significant 
 of his growth. 
 
 §§ 144, 146 end, leave us in doubt how this participle combines 
 with the perfect. I am inclined to believe that, when the matter is 
 fully worked out, it will be found that the identical time-reference in 
 the participle here is no more and no less than the coincidence of 
 § 150. For § 150, a reference to some papers in Trans. Am. Phil. 
 Ass’n is in point. (Cf. above on § 75.) 
 
 § § 165 sqq. and 322. These state the groove or rut in which the 
 Greek language ordinarily moves ; but, abstractly, there is no more 
 objection to the optative here than to its use in a condition based on 
 and dated from the present, as is its normal use (cf. Hayman, Od., 
 App. I., 15 ; also M. T. § 252 R. 2, § 409.) 
 
 § 172 points the Latin contrast (cf. Gil. L. G. § 517 R. 2 ; § 598, 
 R. I, 2.) 
 
 In § § 176, 558 sqq., assimilation is considered merely formal, as in 
 § 239 ; it is really the recognition that the dependency of a poten- 
 tial is a fortiori potential (cf. also § 334.) 
 
 § 220 is an extension of 219 ; av is attracted to the verbs of mod- 
 ified assertion. 
 
 In § 244 end, the example Od. IV., 544 again suggests the unreal 
 fut. perf., above referred to ; cf. Verg. Aen. VI., 879, and Liv. XXII., 
 60, 15 (peregissem.) 
 
 § 249, in the last member of the first sentence, lays a burden on 
 somebody who ought to believe the rest of us. 
 
 § 254 needs more distinct reference to impv. as a virtual protasis 
 of condition. 
 
 § 369. The confusion is explained in the same general manner 
 as ez, iav interrogative above: 7^77 = interrogative only for the fear 
 which involves the wish to remove it by settling negatively the ques- 
 tion whose uncertainty produces it. The rendering of the first 
 example in point is cumbrous for “ we shall not doubt through fear ” 
 
Notes on the New Edition of Goodwin s Greek Moods and Tenses 1 5 
 
 {=we shall know.) So § 37i=to think with fear ; § 373=to refuse 
 through fear; § 376 = to doubt through fear. 
 
 § 368. I confess myself unable to see the practical importance, 
 either of the suspense or of the discovery. The conditional relation 
 is inherent in the reciprocal attitude of the elements involved, and 
 is not a secondary result of some other relation distinctly expressed 
 by a specialized conjunction ; all subordinate conjunctions are rela- 
 tives, or deputy-relatives (as TC-pir, effrs); but, as such, they are inde- 
 terminate to vagueness, and offer no specific suggestion of direction 
 in development : this must still be sought for in the original relation 
 of the elements (cf. uses of ca?, tit, and the clause after expecto.') 
 
 § 410. It ought to be noted that unreal apodoses, while in the 
 same general present or past time as, their protases, may be relatively 
 future to them. In “ If I had the money, I would pay you,” the 
 protasis belongs to the specific moment of speaking ; the apodosis 
 does not. 
 
 § 412. I may be permitted to refer to a forthcoming paper of Mr. 
 M. A. Bayfield’s and my answer thereto in the Classical Review. 
 
 § 467, like § 155, § 534, is certainly a misconception. The gener- 
 ality is directly expressed in the indicative tense ; else § 24 errs. 
 
 §511. I do not remember seeing attention directed to the illus- 
 tration of the same general principle in the negation of two propo- 
 sitions in relation, either of which may be true alone ; cf. Dem. de 
 
 Cor., § 179 (the famous climax), Cic. Mil. XXXI., neque rnotu. 
 
 Similarly, as an affirmative combination of the same nature. Psalms 
 XV., 4, “ He that sweareth to his own heart, and changeth not.” 
 
 § 513 is an unworthy thirty- year survivor. -‘Now” and “then,” in 
 the logical sense, are conjunctions; adverbs become conjunctions 
 by acquiring a sentence-relation. “Now Barabbas was a robber” 
 illustrates the conjunction now ; in conditions, then, always implied as 
 the apodotic introductory, is the conjunctional sign of reciprocal 
 subordination. Professor Goodwin will find in Webster and in 
 Maetzner then as a conjunction ; it goes back to Anglo-Saxon. 
 
 In §§ 565 sqq., 575 sqq., there is still some confusion due to the 
 relations of purpose and result, which are not adequately treated. 
 
 § 736. At last we have, though only as an alternative, , the true 
 explanation of yu?/ by analogy; the wonder is we have had to wait so 
 long for so little. 
 
 P. S. — Since these notes were written, I have read the only professed review that 
 I have seen — the Nation s. It is a pity all reviews are not signed, that we might 
 
1 6 Notes on the New Edition of Goodwin's Greek Moods and Tenses 
 
 estimate the views by the writer or the writer by his views. No doubt there is a 
 certain strength added to a writer by his absorption into the impersonality of a 
 reputable journal ; no doubt there is a certain repute added to a journal by its 
 absorption of the personality of a strong writer. However these things be, it is 
 worth the while of anybody to acquire a masterly conception of one writer and 
 his works just as a touchstone for the critics and criticisms of those he has to read 
 by report. Nobody who tries the experiment can fail to conclude that, little as is 
 the wisdom with which the world is governed, it is the very quintessence of sagacity 
 as compared with that which is most often manifested by the reviewer. The Nation's 
 review is a fair type of the foreordained favorable, constrained by traditional pro- 
 priety to work off a few commonplaces by way of reservation. It is conventional 
 in the beginning, random in the end, inadequate everywhere. It notes the changes 
 from the first edition without any misgiving that at least some of these, depending 
 not on new discoveries but on old reflection, ought to have been made years ago, — in 
 fact should never have been needed. The reviewer credits his author with powers he 
 has never shown, and he quotes from the preface without comprehending its most 
 significant acknowledgments. He desiderates certain doctrines, without seeing that 
 the details he mistrusts grow out of just the principles and the general point of view 
 he commends ; and he never suspects the delicate irony of complimenting a writer 
 for a certain point of view when that writer confesses his deepest indebtedness, and 
 illustrates it even more emphatically than he records it, to the very apostle of the 
 opposite point of view. His exercise of the reviewer’s inalienable right is very 
 tame and somewhat forced; he does seem to have the current confidence in justifica- 
 tion by faith in statistics, not remembering what the eunuch said to Philip ; but he 
 has not found all the misprints.