Congressional Uecord 
 
 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 87 CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION 
 
 ) — 
 
 a inn 
 
 ,ao 5 
 
 Laos and the Southeast Asia 
 Crisis 
 
 Speech of 
 
 Hon. Thomas J. Dodd 
 
 of Connecticut 
 in the 
 
 Senate of the United States 
 
 Monday, May 21, 1962 
 
 Not printed 
 at Government 
 expense 
 
 United Stales Goveiiiment Printing Office, Washington: 1962 
 
 641203—84362 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2017 with funding from 
 Columbia University Libraries 
 
 https://archive.org/details/laossoutheastasiOOdodd 
 
I-CLO^ 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. THOMAS J. DODD 
 
 OF CONNECTICUT 
 
 IN THE SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES 
 Monday, May 21, 1962 
 
 Mr. DODD. Mr. President, we are all, 
 I know, deeply distressed over the trend 
 of events in Laos. No one could help but 
 be impressed by the President’s message, 
 and by his warning concerning the grav- 
 ity of the situation in southeast Asia. 
 
 President Kennedy will, I am certain, 
 have the support of all of us in his de- 
 cision to dispatch American troops to 
 defensive positions on the Laotian fron- 
 tier, and for any further measures he 
 may find it necessary to take to prevent 
 the subjugation of southeast Asia by in- 
 ternational commimism. 
 
 In his prompt and solitary decision to 
 send American forces into Thailand, 
 President Kennedy has provided the kind 
 of leadership which galvanized the free 
 world at the time of the Korean in- 
 vasion, the kind of leadership which our 
 Allies expect of us. By his actions 
 President Kennedy has greatly bolstered 
 the entire position of the free world in 
 the southeast Asia crisis. But these en- 
 ergetic measures, I fear, wall be seriously 
 undermined and conceivably negated 
 unless we also take measures to reap- 
 praise and revise certain aspects of our 
 policy in Laos. 
 
 Both Republican and Democratic ad- 
 ministrations have committed them- 
 selves to defend the freedom of Laos 
 against the threat of Communist ag- 
 gression. When SEATO was established 
 after the fall of North Vietnam, Laos 
 was specifically brought imder the 
 SEATO umbrella and the Asian Com- 
 munists were warned that an attack 
 against it would result in a collective re- 
 sponse by the SEATO powers. 
 
 But today, despite our one-time assur- 
 ances to Laos and despite the assurances 
 we have now given to Vietnam and to 
 Thailand, the fact remains that Laos 
 stands in serious danger of a Communist 
 take-over. 
 
 The present crisis makes it imperative 
 that we reappraise our recent policy in 
 Laos, to see where we have erred and 
 what might be done, even at this late 
 date, to salvage something from the sit- 
 uation. 
 
 In Laos, Communist tactics have ad- 
 mittedly been complex, but they have 
 in no way been novel. On the one hand, 
 they have exercised military pressure 
 through native guerrillas and North Viet- 
 namese troops. On the other hand, they 
 have inactivated us through protracted 
 negotiations and bewitched us with the 
 prospect of a neutralist Laos, governed 
 by a Communist-neutralist-conservative 
 coalition. 
 
 In Laos, indeed, our entire policy has 
 been predicated on the assumption that 
 Soviet desires did not go beyond the 
 establishment of a truly neutral govern- 
 ment, open to the influence of Moscow 
 and Washington alike. It is in line with 
 this belief that we have urged our 
 Laotian friends to enter into a coalition 
 government with the Communist and 
 neutralist forces. But the prospects of 
 peaceful coexistence in Laos have been 
 shattered by the events of the past week. 
 
 That the United States has been played 
 for a fool — 
 
 Said the distinguished columnist. Mar- 
 guerite Higgins, in the New York Herald 
 Tribune, Monday, May 14 — 
 
 was evident in Washington, firstly, from 
 events in Laos, where Red troops led by 
 Hanoi and Red-Chinese trained officers were 
 ferociously giving the lie to the Harriman 
 doctrine « • *. it was evident from the 
 small, smug smiles of the Communist states- 
 men and Journalists in Washington, who 
 were patronizingly telling the subdued and 
 silent non-Communist set that — in the 
 
 641203—84362 
 
 3 
 
4 
 
 words of one Soviet bloc official — "the New 
 Frontier never really set much store by Laos 
 anyway, so how could you consider it a 
 setback?” It was evident from the cold in- 
 difference with which Moscow heard out 
 Washington’s pleas to live up to pledges to 
 support the cease-fire. 
 
 The crisis of Laos represents a crisis 
 of the first magnitude for the whole of 
 southeast Asia. Indeed, it is no exag- 
 geration to say that it represents a crisis 
 of the first magnitude for the whole free 
 world. 
 
 The countries of southeast Asia are 
 rich in natural resources. But it is their 
 strategic importance, rather than their 
 economic importance, that makes them 
 primary targets of Communist aggres- 
 sion. 
 
 If the Communists ever succeeded in 
 establishing their dominion over the 
 whole of southeast Asia, they will, in 
 effect, have cut the world in half. The 
 western Pacific land mass will be theirs 
 from the Bering Straits to Singapore, 
 while the control of the southern island 
 chain, from Sumatra to New Guinea, 
 would give them command of the en- 
 trances from the Pacific Ocean to the 
 Indian Ocean. 
 
 The Communists conquest of south- 
 east Asia would produce so serious a 
 shift in the world balance of power that 
 cur very ability to survive would be called 
 into question. 
 
 Prom our recent policy in Vietnam and 
 from the commitment we have now made 
 to Thailand, it would appear that we 
 have accepted the harsh reality that our 
 own security and the security of south- 
 east Asia are inseparably intertwined. 
 The most dramatic evidence of this is the 
 fact that 5,000 American soldiers are 
 today serving in South Vietnam as in- 
 structors in guerrilla warfare, as trans- 
 port pilots, and as advisers in combat 
 areas, while another several thousand 
 have now been dispatched to the fron- 
 tier of Thailand. 
 
 The administration has made it clear 
 by these commitments that South Viet- 
 
 641203—84362 
 
 nam and Thailand will not be permitted 
 to fall to communism. But we have 
 been warned, and rightly, that it may 
 take many years before this battle is 
 won, and that it will almost certainly 
 take a much heavier commitment in 
 American manpower and, conceivably, in 
 American blood. 
 
 The Communist assault on the coun- 
 tries of southeast Asia has been incredi- 
 bly persistent, incredibly cunning, and 
 remarkably successful. 
 
 Their primai'y weapon in this area 
 has been guerrilla movements, organized 
 and trained in and supported from ter- 
 ritoiT already under their control. With 
 this weapon they almost succeeded in 
 taking over Malaya, they succeeded in 
 conquering the larger part of Vietnam, 
 and they have now taken control of the 
 larger part of Laos. 
 
 In Malaya, the num^ber of Communist 
 guerrillas never exceeded 10,000. But it 
 required the expenditure of billions of 
 dollars and the efforts of a highly trained 
 British Commonwealth force of several 
 hundred thousand men over a period of 
 5 years before the Malayan guerrillas 
 were brought under control. As a re- 
 sult of the British experience in Malaya, 
 it is now accepted as a fact that, even 
 employing troops of the highest quality, 
 a successful antiguerrilla operation re- 
 quires antiguerrilla forces 10 to 15 times 
 as numerous as the guerrilla forces 
 which oppose them. 
 
 In Vietnam, when I was there less 
 than a year ago, the number of Com- 
 munist guerrillas was estimated at ap- 
 proximately 10,000 men. Opposmg 
 them was a Vietnamese army some 120,- 
 000 strong, backed up by another 30 or 
 40 thousand home guards. But even 
 with these numerical odds, the Govern- 
 ment was able to make no serious head- 
 way against the guerrillas. More than 
 1,000 Government representatives and 
 village administrators were being as- 
 sassinated every m.onth. Every day 
 brought new reports of attacks on 
 
5 
 
 bridges and powerhouses and other in- 
 stallations. The hard-pressed Govern- 
 ment army, which had done without 
 leave for many months, was strained to 
 the breaking point. The administra- 
 tion of the country was slowly deteri- 
 orating as a result of the terrible 
 casualties inflicted on administrators 
 and technicians at all levels of govern- 
 ment. The morale of the people was 
 sagging. 
 
 I wholeheartedly applaud the admin- 
 istration’s commitment to save South 
 Vietnam from the growing menace of 
 Communist subversion. But, on the 
 basis of what I saw and learned in the 
 course of an extensive tour of south- 
 east Asia last year, I am afraid that 
 there has been a tendency to focus too 
 narrowly on South Vietnam. 
 
 As matters stand today, I believe that 
 our policy in South Vietnam is in con- 
 flict with our policy in Laos, that our 
 policy in Laos, as a matter of fact, is 
 undermining the affirmative and cou- 
 rageous policy w'e are endeavoring to 
 follow in Vietnam. 
 
 I think we would all have less diffi- 
 culty in understanding the world situa- 
 tion if we studied our maps more 
 frequently. In the case of Laos, its 
 strategic importance should be instant- 
 ly apparent from a look at the map. 
 
 If there is any one country that may 
 be described as the geographic heart of 
 southeast Asia, it is Laos. For Laos has 
 common frontiers with virtually every 
 country in the area— with Communist 
 China and North Vietnam, with the 
 neutralist nations of Cambodia and 
 Burma, and with the two committed 
 nations of the southeast Asia mainland. 
 South Vietnam and Thailand. 
 
 Toward the end of 1960, Soviet planes 
 began airlifting supplies to the Lao 
 Communist, or Pathet Lao, forces. At 
 this point, the Soviets were still very 
 uncertain of our reaction. The first 
 Soviet planes that flew in carried ben- 
 zene. These Soviet planes discharged 
 641203—84362 
 
 their cargoes unmolested; we did noth- 
 ing. Perhaps President Eisenhower did 
 not want to commit the American Gov- 
 ernment to a potentially hazardous 
 course of action in the last days of his 
 regime. 
 
 In any event, the next group of So- 
 viet planes that arrived carried small 
 arms ammunition. Still, we did noth- 
 ing. 
 
 Then Soviet planes began to arrive 
 bearing jeeps and howitzers and other 
 heavy equipment. Still, we did nothing. 
 
 Finally, when it was apparent that 
 they could intervene with impunity, and 
 that there would be no American re- 
 action, the Communists began flying in 
 technicians and military personnel. 
 
 There still w'as the possibility that 
 SEATO w'ould honor its obligations to 
 defend Laos against the threat of Com- 
 munist aggression. But when the 
 SEATO Council met in April of 1961, it 
 took no action. The SEATO nations in 
 the immediate area — the Philippines, 
 Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and 
 Pakistan — all favored common military 
 action in defense of Laos. Britain and 
 Prance objected. The United States sat 
 on the fence. And since all SEATO de- 
 cisions must be unanimous, SEATO did 
 nothing. 
 
 I want to emphasize that at the time 
 this SEATO meeting took place, our 
 Asian allies were prepared to provide all 
 or most of the necessary ground troops. 
 They took the stand that it was much 
 better for Asians to fight in Asia and 
 that, if SEATO did intervene, American 
 participation should consist primarily 
 of air and logistical support. Had W'e 
 provided the necessary leadership at this 
 historic session of SEATO, Laos would 
 not be on the verge of falling to eom- 
 miunism today. But instead of provid- 
 ing such leadership, our own primacy 
 in SEATO was used as a brake to pre- 
 vent the Asian member nations from 
 taking the measures of collective self- 
 defense which they considered essential. 
 
6 
 
 Our Asian allies were bitterly disap- 
 pointed. 
 
 We are prepared to fight and die with you 
 if necessary — 
 
 Philippine Foreign Minister Serano 
 said to me just a year ago this month — 
 
 but we cannot fight without American 
 leadership. 
 
 For this delinquency we shall, I am 
 afraid, have to pay a heavy price both 
 in American and Asian blood. 
 
 One of the excuses that has been 
 offered for our own inaction in Laos is 
 that the Lao people and the Lao Army 
 have shown no will or ability to resist 
 the Communists. This is coupled with 
 the assertion that the Communists ap- 
 parently have far more popular backing 
 than does the Royal Lao Government. 
 
 Even if these assertions were com- 
 pletely true — which they are not — it 
 would, in my opinion, still be necessary 
 to defend Laos; even if we were not in- 
 terested in the fate of the Lao people, 
 the defense of Laos would still be a 
 strategic necessity because, ultimately, 
 the fate of all southeast Asia and our 
 own security may hinge on it. 
 
 But I do not accept the thesis that the 
 Lao people are indifferent to communism 
 and that the Royalist forces are incapa- 
 ble of fighting. 
 
 I remind the Senators that it was a 
 year ago last December that the Royalist 
 army, under General Phoumi, drove the 
 highly touted Kong Le rebels out of 
 Vientiane. 
 
 I remind the Senators, too, that certain 
 units of the Lao Army, in particular the 
 10,000 Meo tribesmen who are serving 
 with it, have put up truly heroic re- 
 sistance in situation after situation. 
 
 I call to their attention the fact that 
 there are now more than 40,000 refugees 
 from Communist terror in the Vientiane 
 area, and that hundreds more are arriv- 
 ing every day. 
 
 I call to their attention the reports of 
 the dedicated American missionary. 
 
 Father Matthew Monger, v/hom I met in 
 Laos, and whom I recently had the 
 pleasure of seeing again in this countiw. 
 Father Monger is one of the very fe\v 
 Americans who speak Laotian fluently. 
 He has traveled extensively on foot 
 throughout the country. He has, even in 
 recent months, visited many villages in 
 territory that is supposed to be under 
 firm Communist control. Father Monger 
 has reported that the Communists con- 
 trol the strategic centers; but even in the 
 northern province of Samneua, which 
 was the first to fall to the Communists, 
 the capital city of Samneua is com- 
 pletely surrounded by anti-Communist 
 villages. 
 
 As of 2 years ago, it was probably true 
 that few Laotians knew the meaning of 
 communism or felt very strongly about 
 it. But, as of today, the evidence is that 
 the Laotian people have learned the 
 meaning of communism the hard way, 
 from their actual experiences under 
 Communist rule in those portions of the 
 country that have been overrun by the 
 Laotian and Vietnamese Red forces. 
 
 True, the Laotians, by and large, are 
 not a martial people. There may be a 
 number of reasons for this. Certainly 
 one of them is the orthodox Buddhist re- 
 ligion which prevails in Laos and which 
 frowns upon the killing of any living 
 thing, even so useless a thing as a mos- 
 quito. But American military men with 
 whom I discussed the situation told me 
 that, with adequate training and proper 
 leadership, the Lao can be a very good 
 fighting man. They said that certain of 
 the best trained units in the Royalist 
 army had conducted themselves in a 
 highly creditable manner in engage- 
 ments with the Communists. Against 
 the Laotian Communists, I was told, the 
 Royal army was generally able to hold 
 its own and better. But they were simply 
 no match for the hardened professionals 
 of the North Vietnamese Communist 
 army which has been participating in 
 
 641203—84362 
 
7 
 
 the Laotian civil war through independ- 
 ent units and thi’ough units of specialists 
 attached to the Laotian Communist 
 forces. 
 
 There is another reason, in my opin- 
 ion, why the Royal Laotian army units 
 have frequently failed to stand up against 
 the Communist enemy. All the world 
 has confidence in a winner; and in Asia, 
 far more than in Western countries, hu- 
 man behavior is determined by a belief 
 in an irresistible wave of the future or 
 by an equally fatalistic acceptance of 
 certain downfall and defeat. 
 
 With their aggression, their determi- 
 nation, their persistence, their arrogant 
 self-confidence, and the unstinting back- 
 ing they have received from the Soviet 
 Union and Red China, the Lao Com- 
 munists have succeeded in creating the 
 impression that they are part of the ir- 
 resistible wave of the future. By our 
 own inaction and by our repeated fail- 
 ures to live up to our assurances, we have 
 fostered the corollary impression that 
 our side is doomed. 
 
 Under these circumstances, who can 
 blame the Lao army if its morale 
 has frequently been uncertain? Even 
 Americans serving as instructors and ad- 
 visers in Laos have been demoralized by 
 the ambivalence of American policy. 
 For example, last Sunday over one radio 
 news program, an American instructor 
 in Laos was quoted as saying ; 
 
 Why am I here trying to teach these peo- 
 ple to fight, if it’s already been decided that 
 the country is to be turned over to the 
 Communists? 
 
 Parenthetically, at this point, I would 
 like to say a few words about the un- 
 fortunate habit of designating Prince 
 Bonn Oum and Gen. Phoumi Nouvasan 
 as rightwing leaders. The manner in 
 which this description has been used by 
 the press and, regrettably, by some State 
 Department spokesmen, somehow sug- 
 gests that Prince Boun Oum and General 
 Phoumi are exploiters or big landowners 
 or political reactionaries. Actually, Laos 
 641203—84362 
 
 is a very primitive country without any 
 landowning or capitalist class, and from 
 a purely economic standpoint, it makes 
 little sense to talk of rightwing or left- 
 wing. I believe it would be far more 
 correct and far more meaningful, and 
 certainly, it would feed far less grist to 
 the Communist propaganda mill, if our 
 press could learn to refer to the Commu- 
 nists as “Communists” and to people like 
 Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi 
 as Loyalist or anti-Communist leaders 
 rather than rightwing leaders. 
 
 I consider this matter of nomenclature 
 of the greatest importance, because it is 
 with insidious little words like these that 
 public opinion is poisoned against our 
 friends in other countries. 
 
 Against the background of SEATO’s 
 failure, the Lao Government in May of 
 last year agreed to negotiations with the 
 Communists. 
 
 Speaking in Manila a year ago, and 
 speaking on the floor of the Senate on 
 my return from the Far East, I said that 
 the Communists would not be satisfied 
 with the partial conquest of Laos, and 
 that they would violate the cease-fire at 
 every opportunity. For the accuracy of 
 this prediction, I take no particular 
 credit. I believe that this prediction 
 could have been made by anyone familiar 
 with Communist tactics. 
 
 Since the cease-fire was signed, the 
 Communists have occupied point after 
 point, until today they hold more than 
 half of Laos. North Vietnamese inter- 
 vention, previously limited and carefully 
 veiled, is now unconcealed and massive. 
 At the present time, there are reported 
 to be in excess of 7,000 battle-hardened 
 soldiers of the North Vietnamese armies 
 fighting alongside the Lao Communist 
 forces. 
 
 Communist supplies are moving into 
 Laos at a constantly accelerated rate, by 
 land and by air, supporting the greatly 
 increased Communist military activities, 
 both in Laos and in Vietnam. As a mat- 
 ter of fact, it is thanks primarily to their 
 
8 
 
 control of this area adjoining South 
 Vietnam that the Vietnamese Commu- 
 nists have been able to double the size 
 of their guerrilla forces in South Viet- 
 nam over the past year. 
 
 And while all this has been going on, 
 we have continued to negotiate with un- 
 deterred good faith, in the hope that a 
 truly neutral government can be con- 
 structed around the personality of Sou- 
 vanna Phouma. 
 
 Prince Souvanna Phouma, we are told, 
 is not a Communist. But I also recall 
 that we w'ere told that Castro was not a 
 Communist. For my own part, I believe 
 that w'e are building our foreign policy 
 on forlorn and impossible hopes when 
 we assume that Prince Souyanna 
 Phouma, who has visited the Communist 
 capitals but has refused an invitation to 
 the United States, and who openly shares 
 offices and living quarters with his half- 
 brother Prince Souphanouvong, the ac- 
 knowledged head of the Lao Communist 
 movement, will save Laos from commu- 
 ^n.ism. 
 
 When I was in Laos last May, I was 
 assured categorically that we would never 
 consent to giving the Communists the 
 key positions of the Ministry of the In- 
 terior and Ministry of Defense in any 
 coalition government. But today, it is 
 reported that our representatives have 
 agreed to assign both the Ministry of 
 Defense and the Ministry of the Interior 
 to the designees of the so-called neutral- 
 ist leader. Prince Souvanna Phouma, on 
 the specious theory that a Souvanna 
 Phouma government is the only thing 
 that can save Laos from a complete take- 
 over by the Communists. Not merely 
 have we accepted this position, but for 
 several months now we have been pres- 
 suring our Lao friends to enter into such 
 a coalition government against their own 
 better judgment. 
 
 Prime Minister Prince Bonn Oum and 
 his Defense Minister, General Phoumi, 
 have, to their credit, resisted our pres- 
 sures. And, to our shame, we have now 
 
 641203—84362 
 
 cut off our monthly assistance to the 
 government of Laos in an effort to force 
 them into a coalition with the Commu- 
 nists. 
 
 THE QUESTION OF COALITION GOVERNMENTS 
 
 I do not know whether to be surprised 
 or awed over the fact that, after so many 
 sorry experiences, we have again fallen 
 for that most shopworn of all the Com- 
 munists shell games: the coalition gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 The free world first fell for the coali- 
 tion government trick dm'ing World War 
 II. In November 1944, having abandoned 
 General Mihailovitch in Yugoslavia, 
 Britain and the United States attempted 
 the impossible task of preventing a Com- 
 munist take-over by forcing Prime Min- 
 ister Subasic into a coalition government 
 with Marshal Tito. Needless to say, 
 there were all kinds of assurances from 
 Marshal Tito that he did not intend to 
 communize Yugoslavia, and that there 
 w'ould be free elections at an early date. 
 
 In February 1945 at the Yalta Confer- 
 ence, the Tito-Subasic formula was to 
 become the model for a whole series of 
 coalition governments in central Eu- 
 rope — coalition governments which in- 
 variably and, in my opinion, inevitably 
 paved the way for a complete Communist 
 take-over. The central formula of the 
 Yalta Declaration promised the liberated 
 countries of Europe, “governmental au- 
 thorities broadly representative of all 
 democratic elements of the population.” 
 This, of course, was a euphemism for 
 coalition governments. 
 
 Hardly had the Tito-Subasic agree- 
 ment been signed, than Tito began to dis- 
 honor its terms. He made it clear that 
 by free elections he meant elections with 
 a single slate of Communist-approved 
 candidates. The few’^ non-Communist 
 political leaders in the cabinet were re- 
 moved, and placed in prison or total 
 obscurity. 
 
 With minor differences in timing and 
 technique, the coalition governments 
 established in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hun- 
 
9 
 
 gary. Poland and Czechslovakia de- 
 veloped along similar patterns. 
 
 The proven Communist techniques for 
 subverting representative government via 
 interparty coalitions has been described 
 with amazing frankness by the Czech- 
 slovak Communist, Jan Kozak, in a book 
 intended as a guide for fellow-Commu- 
 nists. In this booklet, Mr. Kozak spoke 
 of “the possibility of forming a govern- 
 ment of broad democratic forces grouped 
 around the working class, relying on the 
 revolutionary activity of the masses. 
 Such a government can be set up without 
 armed battle by peaceful means. Its 
 installation would be practically tanta- 
 mount to the establishment of the demo- 
 cratic revolutionary power of the peo- 
 ple.” Specific lessons were drawn from 
 the Red take-over in Czechoslavakia. 
 
 Mr. Kozak’s formula calls for a com- 
 bination of “pressure from above” and 
 “pressure from below” to convert the 
 coalition government into a “socialist” 
 one. He said: 
 
 Gradually, as the natiorial and democratic 
 revolution changed into a socialist one, the 
 pressure “from above” was applied in an 
 ever-increasing measure for the direct sup- 
 pression and destruction of the counter- 
 revolutionary machinations of the bour- 
 geoisie. Let us recall the signal role played 
 in the development and extension of that 
 pressure by the Ministry of the Interior, for 
 instance, which was led by the Communists, 
 and the units of State Security directed by 
 them. 
 
 I challenge anyone to read Mr. Kozak’s 
 brochure outlining the Communist theory 
 and practice of coalition governments, 
 and come away from this reading still 
 convinced that Communists can enter 
 into coalitions in good faith. 
 
 I find it all the more difficult to under- 
 stand our present policy in Laos because 
 Ambassador Harriman has, himself, had 
 a very personal and exceedingly bitter 
 experience with coalition governments in 
 the immediate postwar period. 
 
 The governments set up in the central 
 Eui’opean countries after their “libera- 
 tion” by the Red Army did not corre- 
 641203—84362 
 
 spond in any way to the democratic gov- 
 ernments that had been forecast by the 
 Yalta Declaration. 
 
 Speaking in the House of Commons 
 on August 20, 1945, the British Foreign 
 Secretary said: 
 
 The governments which have been set up 
 in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary do not, 
 in the view of the British Government, rep- 
 resent a majority of the people. The im- 
 pression I got from recent developments was 
 that one kind of totalitarianism was being 
 replaced by another. * • • The form of 
 government being set up does not impress me 
 as being sufficiently representative to meet 
 the requirements of diplomatic relations. 
 
 It was against this background that 
 the foreign ministers of the allied pow- 
 ers met in Moscow in December 1945. 
 Despite the wholesale violation of the 
 Yalta agreement, the British and Ameri- 
 can Governments joined the Soviet Gov- 
 ernment in calling for the establishment 
 of a new coalition in Rumania. This 
 coalition was to include representatives 
 of the two national parties, the National 
 Peasant and the National Liberal Party, 
 and it was to be followed by free and 
 unfettered elections. To carry out this 
 agreement, a supervisory commission 
 consisting of Foreign Minister Vishin- 
 sky. Ambassador Harriman, and British 
 Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, 
 was sent to Bucharest. 
 
 Jules Maniu, the revered leader of the 
 Peasant Party, and the other democratic 
 leaders warned the Western Ambassa- 
 dors that the Com.munists had absolutely 
 no scruples and that their assurance of 
 free elections meant nothing. But Sir 
 Clark-Kerr and Mr. Harriman argued 
 against these misgivings and urged the 
 democratic Rumanian leaders to enter 
 into the coalition. 
 
 What happened subsequently is a 
 matter of recent history; but our memo- 
 ries, unfortunately, seem even too short 
 for this small span. The opposition 
 press was completely suppressed. Op- 
 position parties were first intimidated, 
 then terrorized, then illegalized. The 
 opposition leaders, Jules Maniu of the 
 
10 
 
 Peasant Party, Bratianu of the National 
 Liberal Party, and Petrescu of the Social 
 Democratic Party, were all imprisoned: 
 and in July 1951 it was reported that 
 Maniu died in prison, a martyr to his 
 country’s freedom. 
 
 Today in Laos, it seems to me that the 
 tragedy of Rumania is being repeated 
 almost step for step. Even some of the 
 cast is the same. Thus, we find Mr. Har- 
 riman urging the Lao anti-Communist 
 leaders, against their own better judg- 
 ment, to enter into a coalition govern- 
 ment with the Communists: and I take 
 it for granted that Mr. Harriman must 
 be repeating some of the well intentioned 
 assurances that he gave to the demo- 
 cratic political leaders in Rumania in 
 1946. 
 
 The assurances in Laos, I am afraid, 
 have not always been the most friendly. 
 I should like to draw the attention of 
 my colleagues to the following account by 
 the distinguished American correspond- 
 ent, Joseph Alsop, which appeared in the 
 New York Herald Tribune for April 23. 
 1962: 
 
 Governor Harriman looked at the Lao 
 leaders one by one; pointed a stern forefinger 
 at each of them in turn; and told them that 
 he wished them to know they would be ‘‘re- 
 sponsible for the destruction of their coun- 
 try” if they refused to do his bidding. There 
 was a brief silence, and General Phoumi then 
 replied; ‘‘You know. Governor Harriman, we 
 in Laos have many years’ experience of co- 
 lonial rule. But we were never spoken to In 
 quite that fashion In the colonial times.” 
 
 The coalition government gambit has 
 had results just as disastrous in Asia as 
 in Europe. In fact, our commitment to 
 a coalition govemment in China In the 
 postwar period was perhaps more re- 
 sponsible than any other single factor 
 for the loss of mainland China to the 
 Communists. 
 
 The commitment to a coalition govern- 
 ment or a “government of national 
 unity” was formalized in the so-called 
 Marshall directive of December 1945. 
 This directive, which was drafted by 
 John Carter "Vincent, the head of the 
 
 Far Eastern Desk in the Department of 
 State, reflected the philosophy of the 
 Institute of Pacific Relations, which for 
 many years had enjoyed a near monop- 
 oly on Far Eastern expertise. 
 
 At the time when the Marshall di- 
 rective was issued, the Nationalist forces 
 occupied the bulk of China, had over- 
 whelming military superiority, and were 
 pressing offensives against the Commu- 
 nists at a number of points. In a mis- 
 guided effort to force President Chiang 
 into a coalition government with the 
 Communists, Secretary of State Mar- 
 shall, in the summer of 1946, placed an 
 embargo on arms and ammunition to the 
 Nationalist forces. Repeatedly, the Na- 
 tionalists were told that unless and until 
 they came to terms with the Communists, 
 they could expect no active assistance 
 fi’om the United States. Finally, in the 
 fall of that year, with the aid of the 
 embargo and a variety of other pres- 
 sures, the Department of State succeeded 
 in forcing President Chiang to agree to 
 an armistice, and to conversations with 
 the Communists with a view to forming 
 a coalition government. 
 
 Tlrese conversations dragged on for 
 months and months, punctuated by re- 
 peated violations of the cease-fire by 
 the Communists. The Chinese Reds, 
 for their part, maintained the pretense 
 of favoring a coalition government until 
 the Nationalist position had so weakened 
 that the Communists were no longer 
 interested in compromise. 
 
 Our folly in China persisted to the 
 bitter end. As late as March 1948, the 
 administration reiterated its adherence 
 to the principles enunciated in the Mar- 
 shall directive. 
 
 Commenting on the similarity between 
 our ill-fated China policy and our pres- 
 ent policy in Laos, the New York Times 
 said editorially on May 12, 1962; 
 
 The American policy is based on Washing- 
 von’s belief that the Lao are uninter- 
 ested in political or ideological conflicts and, 
 in contrast to the Vietnamese, will not fight. 
 
 641203—84362 
 
11 
 
 But to back up that policy and force 
 the pro-Western leaders Into the coalition 
 with the Communists, even to surrender the 
 army and police, which they refuse, Ameri- 
 can authorities have tended to undercut the 
 pro-Western Government, even to accuse 
 It of provocation, until this policy begins 
 to resemble that which lost China. 
 
 In justification of the coalition policy 
 in Laos, it has been argued that not 
 every government which included Com- 
 munist ministers has wound up by suc- 
 cumbing to communism. It has been 
 pointed out that such coalitions did, in 
 fact, exist in France, in Italy, and in 
 Finland, and one or two other countries 
 in the postwar period. 
 
 This comparison completely skirts the 
 issue. France and Italy emerged un- 
 scathed from the postwar experiments 
 in coalition because there was no Com- 
 munist military presence in these coun- 
 tries, because their security forces and 
 the armed forces remained under anti- 
 communist control, and because the 
 democratic parties in these countries dis- 
 posed of very considerable resources in 
 men, money, and experience. 
 
 Finland survived her postwar coali- 
 tion because the Finns are one of the 
 toughest people in Europe and perhaps 
 the most sophisticated about the ways 
 of their Soviet neighbors. 
 
 But Laos is not France or Italy; and 
 the Laotian people, in terms of sophisti- 
 cation, cannot be likened to the French, 
 Italians, or the Finns. Given the mas- 
 sive presence of the Red Chinese and 
 North Vietnamese army on its frontiers, 
 given the existence in Laos of substantial 
 units of Red Chinese and Vietnamese 
 forces, given the lack of national unity, 
 the lack of sophistication, the dearth of 
 political leadership, not even a miracle 
 could save Laos if it were ever saddled 
 with a coalition government such as is 
 now proposed. 
 
 I cannot understand the persistence 
 in believing, despite all the available evi- 
 dence, that Souvanna Phouma is truly 
 a neutralist, that he is not under Com- 
 munist domination, and that he can be 
 641203—84362 
 
 trusted to designate non-Communists for 
 the positions of Minister of Defense and 
 Minister of the Interior. 
 
 In an interview with Ronald Stead of 
 the Christian Science Monitor, which 
 appeared in the March 21, 1962, issue of 
 that paper. Prince Souphanouvong, the 
 Laotian Communist leader, on the one 
 hand denied that his half-brother Prince 
 Souvanna Phouma “is a prisoner of the 
 Pathet Lao.” Mr. Stead wrote: 
 
 He described this as “an odious calumny 
 against the rightful Prime Minister of Laos 
 (Souvanna Phouma) and a maneuver to 
 cause a spiit between my half-brother’s gov- 
 ernment and the Pathet Lao.” 
 
 On the other hand. Prince Soupha- 
 nouvong said to Mr. Stead : 
 
 Nobody can destroy the firm solidarity 
 forged in the fire of battle. For this reason 
 American efforts to separate us must be in 
 vain. 
 
 Mr. Stead, incidentally, was to my 
 knowledge the only American corre- 
 spondent to point out that — 
 
 Souvanna Phouma now has headquarters 
 and joint residence with his half-brother. 
 Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the pro- 
 Communist Pathet Lao armed forces and 
 their political counterpart, the Neo Lao 
 Haksat. 
 
 In the light of all this, it is inconceiv- 
 able to me that the kind of coalition gov- 
 ernment now proposed can terminate in 
 anything but a Communist Laos. True, 
 there are a few instances of coalition 
 governments — France, Italy, and Fin- 
 land — which did not terminate in dis- 
 aster. But this was only so because the 
 democratic elements in these countries 
 succeeded in extricating themselves 
 from the coalitions with the Commu- 
 nists at their earliest opportunity. 
 
 It can be stated categorically that 
 there has never been an instance of a 
 stable, neutral coalition government, 
 embracing Communists and non-Com- 
 munists. 
 
 It can be stated categorically that 
 there has never been an instance of a 
 coalition government that has served 
 the interests of the free world. 
 
12 
 
 It can be stated categorically that 
 there has never been a coalition govern- 
 ment in which the Communists held the 
 twin positions of the Ministry of the In- 
 terior and Ministry of Defense, which 
 did not culminate in a complete Com- 
 munist take-over. 
 
 It is in the light of this historic ex- 
 perience, that we must take a fresh look 
 at the situation in Laos. 
 
 To let Laos fall to communism while 
 we attempt to defend South Vietnam 
 v/ould be like trying to catch the flood 
 w'aters in buckets, while doing nothing 
 to strengthen or maintain the river 
 levees. I have discussed the situation 
 in Southeast Asia with a number of mili- 
 tary men with experience in the area, 
 and I have yet to meet one who does not 
 agree with this estimate. But apparently 
 in this situation, as in other situations, 
 we have paid scant attention to the 
 opinions of our military men. 
 
 We have also paid scant attention to 
 American missionaries serving in the 
 field. Why we consult them so little, I 
 shall never be able to understand, be- 
 cause they are a remarkably dedicated 
 and intelligent group of men, who have 
 no political ax to grind, who invariably 
 speak the language of the country, who 
 have lived with the people, and who have 
 traveled widely, frequently on foot. 
 They are in a far better position than 
 most people to know what is going on 
 in a country such as Laos or the Congo. 
 
 In this connection, I would point out 
 that our policy in China went off the 
 tracks when om’ State Department fell 
 for the proposition that the Chinese Reds 
 were really agrarian reformers. Ameri- 
 can missionaries in China v/arned 
 against this policy, but no one listened 
 to them. By the time we got the “agra- 
 rian reformer’’ sand out of our eyes, 
 China had gone Communist. 
 
 Speaking from a more recent and 
 more personal experience, I believe that 
 many of the mistakes we have made in 
 our Congo policy could have been 
 
 avoided if we had troubled to obtain the 
 opinions of the scores of American mis- 
 sionaries who are today serving there, 
 and who know the country far more in- 
 timately than most foreigners there. 
 But so far as I know, the many dedi- 
 cated American missionaries in the Con- 
 go were never asked for their opinion; 
 and the few that offered their opinions 
 were ignored. 
 
 During the past week, the Lao Com- 
 munist forces, supported by the Chinese 
 Communists and North Vietnamese, 
 have seized Nam Tha and other towns 
 in northern Laos, in a drive that has car- 
 ried them all the way to the border of 
 Thailand. At this very moment. Com- 
 munist forces are threatening the cap- 
 ture of the Royal capital of Luang Pra- 
 bang and the administrative capital of 
 Vientiane. 
 
 There are reports that, as a result of 
 the massive and flagrant violations of 
 the armistice by the Communists, the 
 administration is now reconsidering its 
 position on Laos. I earnestly hope that 
 this is so. I earnestly hope that the 
 measures already announced in Vietnam 
 and in Thailand will be followed by still 
 further measures already specifically 
 geared to the situation in Laos. I ear- 
 nestly hope that we will not accept this 
 new act of aggression in Laos as a fait 
 accompli and force our friends in Laos 
 into a coalition government against this 
 background. 
 
 I am in wholehearted agreement with 
 the distinguished Senator from Wash- 
 ington [Mr. Jackson], who said several 
 days ago that he would prefer a parti- 
 tioned Laos to a united Laos governed 
 by a coalition government. 
 
 We already have two Korea's, two 
 Germany’s, two Vietnam’s. And no one 
 could possibly be happy at the prospect 
 of seeing another comrtry partitioned. 
 But we are in the unpleasant position 
 where we are compelled to choose the 
 lesser of two evils. And, recognizing this, 
 there is no doubt in my own mind that 
 
 641203—84362 
 
13 
 
 partition would be an infinitely less dan- 
 gerous evil than a coalition government 
 that is bound to terminate with the 
 Communists in complete control of the 
 country. 
 
 I do not think I am revealing any 
 military secret when I say this attitude 
 is shared by many of our own military 
 men, by many of our friends in south- 
 east Asia, and by some of our much- 
 abused friends in Laos. The reason for 
 their preference is obvious. If an anti- 
 communist government can be main- 
 tained in the southern portion of Laos, 
 including the critical Lao panhandle 
 and the Mekong River Valley as far v/est 
 as Vientiane, and as far north as Luang 
 Prabang, this would protect Cambodia, 
 it would greatly facilitate the struggle 
 against the Vietnamese guerrillas, and 
 it would afford a large measure of pro- 
 tection to Thailand. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, will 
 the Senator yield? 
 
 The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. 
 Smith of Massachusetts in the chair) . 
 Does the Senator yield? 
 
 Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to the 
 Senator from New York. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. I am sorry to inter- 
 rupt the Senator, but I have an engage- 
 ment which is going to take me from 
 the Chamber, and I did not want to leave 
 without commending the Senator from 
 Connecticut for the extremely informa- 
 tive analysis which he has made of the 
 situation in Laos and southeast Asia. 
 He has recently traveled there exten- 
 sively. 
 
 As I understand the Senator — and he 
 may correct me if I am wrong — his feel- 
 ing is that Laos and southeast Vietnam 
 Province are indivisible and are not com- 
 pletely separate in character. 
 
 Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct. 
 The Senator understands very clearly 
 what I have said. That is my view. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. I remember the Sen- 
 ator’s warning which he sounded some 
 641203—84362 
 
 time ago, perhaps as much as a year 
 ago. 
 
 Mr. DODD. I believe the Senator re- 
 fers to the speech I made in the Senate 
 just about 1 year ago on the same 
 subject. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. And at that time he 
 made it very clear, as I remember, that 
 it was, in the opinion of many Senators, 
 and in the opinion of many military 
 men, capable of being relieved and de- 
 fended from Communist onslaught. 
 
 Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct in 
 his recollection. In addition, I tried to 
 point out that our SEATO friends in that 
 part of the world were anxious and will- 
 ing to assume that responsibility. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. That judgment of 
 the Senator coincided with the one I 
 formed at that time. We have now 
 drawn a line. It is sometimes stated 
 in the press reports as being a line in 
 Laos. The Mekong River is virtually 
 the line between Laos and Thailand, and 
 such a line w'ould involve only a tiny 
 peninsula in Laos on our side of the 
 Mekong River. 
 
 Mr. DODD. The Senator is right. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. To draw a line there 
 is virtually to abandon Laos, at least 
 militarily. Does not the Senator agree 
 with that conclusion? 
 
 Mr. DODD. Yes; I do agree, com- 
 pletely. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. It seems to me our 
 policies leave a god deal to be desired in 
 that regard. One thing that has dis- 
 turbed me — and the Senator from Con- 
 necticut has been giving eloquent voice 
 to a lot of thoughts that have been going 
 through my mind — is the press reports 
 of the situation in Laos. We hear it all 
 the time, and it seems to me they must 
 be stimulated by some elements in the 
 Department of State. They speak of the 
 official government of Laos as rightwdng 
 elements, as if they were extremists, and 
 the moderates as consisting of so-called 
 
14 
 
 neutralists, which consist of neutralists 
 plus the Communists. 
 
 Mr. DODD. The Senator Is quite 
 right. That fact has been disturbing 
 me. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. Instead of saying 
 that the Government of Laos Is being 
 overrun, they say the rightwing ele- 
 ments have been overrun. 
 
 Mr. DODD. I have been noticing it 
 for some time. It is very unfair and 
 very untruthful. It would be far more 
 accurate if Boun Oum and General 
 Phoumi were referred to as government 
 officials. If we are going to call them 
 anything at all, we should call them the 
 anti-Communist forces. That is what 
 they are. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. That is correct. 
 Souvanna Phouraa, certainly, according 
 to the past record, has shown much more 
 friendliness to the Communist cause 
 than he has toward the western cause. 
 
 Mr. DODD. That is correct. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. He is a neutral like 
 some of the neutrals to whom we have 
 been giving aid — a neutral in favor of 
 the Soviet Union and a neutral against 
 the United States. 
 
 Mr. DODD. That is correct. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. I express the hope 
 that every Member of the Senate will 
 read the entire speech of the Senator 
 from Connecticut, as I shall certainly 
 do. It seems to me he is making a very 
 significant speech. I stand 100 percent 
 behind the President, as the Senator has 
 said he stands 
 
 Mr. DODD. Indeed, I do. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. In taking a position 
 on the Mekong River; but that is not 
 the whole situation, and the Senator has 
 brought that out most forcefully in his 
 remarks today. 
 
 Mr. DODD. I am encouraged by the 
 Senator’s remarks. I am well aware that 
 this is a subject which many persons do 
 not like to discuss. However, it is a 
 critical question, and the fate of the free 
 world could very well be decided in the 
 641203—84362 
 
 struggle in Southeast Asia, and our se- 
 curity could be seriously affected. It is 
 why I have spoken out today. 
 
 Mr. KEATING. This is the most im- 
 portant problem which we face today in 
 this country. The speech the Senator 
 is giving is one of the most significant 
 I have heard. 
 
 Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator for 
 the compliments he has accorded me. 
 
 President Diem has, from the begin- 
 ning, taken the stand that if we are not 
 prepared to make the effort to save the 
 whole of Laos, we should, out of respect 
 for the security of southeast Asia, at 
 least make the more limited military ef- 
 fort that would be necessary to secure 
 the southern portion of Laos. I discussed 
 this matter with President Diem in the 
 course of a 2-hour conference in Saigon, 
 just over 1 year ago — to be precise on 
 Wednesday, May 3. I still have the map 
 which he used to illustrate his 
 presentation. 
 
 President Diem proposed that SEATO 
 paratroops be used to secure the town 
 of Tchepone, in the Lao panhandle, and 
 several other key centers in the area 
 that w’ere still in the hands of the Lao 
 Government forces. He warned that 
 control of the panhandle would give the 
 Communists a vastly greater common 
 frontier with Vietnam and that this 
 would enable them to step up their guer- 
 rilla activities proportionately. 
 
 Three days later, on Saturday, May 6, 
 I learned in Bangkok that Tchepone had 
 fallen to the Communists the previous 
 day. 
 
 Less than a month later a series of 
 items which appeared in the press indi- 
 cated that Tchepone had already been 
 converted into a major base for Com- 
 munist guerrilla operations against 
 South Vietnam. Today, Tchepone has 
 become the southern terminal of the so- 
 called Ho Chi Minh trail, the land route 
 over which the North Vietnamese Com- 
 munists send most of then equipment 
 and guerrillas into South Vietnam. It 
 
15 
 
 has also become one of the chief receiv- 
 ing points for the Ilyushin transports 
 which daily deliver tons of military sup- 
 plies to the Vietnamese and Lao Com- 
 munist forces. 
 
 A year ago there were 10,000 Commu- 
 nist guerrillas ir. South Vietnam. Today 
 there are estimated to be in excess of 
 25,000. To offset this formidable increase 
 in strength, we have had to pay for a 
 substantial increase in the Vietnamese 
 armed forces, we have had to send in 
 more than 5,000 American boys as in- 
 structors and pilots, we have now com- 
 mitted another 5,000 troops to Thailand, 
 and we are warned that we may have to 
 play an even larger and more active role 
 in the antiguerrilla war if South Vietnam 
 is to remain free. 
 
 This is the price we have to pay and 
 will be called upon to pay for our failure 
 to keep Tchepone and southern Laos out 
 of Communist hands. But, since I do 
 not accept the thesis that every Com- 
 munist victory must be regarded as 
 sacrosanct, I believe that measures still 
 can and should be taken to force the 
 Communists out of Tchepone and out of 
 the panhandle, and to establish a de- 
 fense perimeter along the mountain 
 ranges to the north. No measure open 
 to us would do more to relieve the situa- 
 tion in South Vietnam and restore our 
 prestige in southeast Asia. No measure 
 open to us would do more to fortify our 
 position in the negotiations with the 
 Communists and to create the possibility 
 of an acceptable compromise in Laos. 
 
 I do not underestimate the risks or the 
 potential costs of attempting to repair 
 the situation in Laos by making parti- 
 tion rather than a coalition government 
 the chief objective of our diplomacy. 
 But I think it would be far more dan- 
 gerous to underestimate the cost of fail- 
 ing to undertake this repair. Every 
 time we postpone dealing with a situa- 
 tion, every time we yield new ground 
 to the Communists in the name of avoid- 
 ing escalation, we make it that much 
 641203—84362 
 
 more difficult to stand fast next time, we 
 further encourage the arrogance of the 
 Communists, and we increase the danger 
 of the global war we wish to avoid. 
 
 Miss Marguerite Higgins, in the article 
 to which I have already referred, quoted 
 an Asian diplomat as saying: 
 
 If the United States dares not act at a 
 time v/hen Red China is in turmoil and 
 starving, when America has the atomic 
 bomb and Red China has not, what will 
 America do when China Is recovered and 
 Is an atomic power? If you dare not stand 
 up to the Communists in Asia today, what 
 will happen tomorrow? 
 
 Mr. President, I have made this state- 
 ment with some reluctance, because in a 
 time of crisis, even the most sincere and 
 constructive criticism may be misunder- 
 stood. Indeed, there have been many 
 times in recent months v/hen I have felt 
 constrained to speak out about the sit- 
 uation in Laos: but until today I have 
 yielded to another feeling which urged 
 me to defer m.y statement. 
 
 If I have spoken today, it is because 
 time is running out in Laos; because I 
 am convinced that the coalition govern- 
 ment formula in Laos can only lead to 
 disaster; and because I feel conscience 
 bound to speak out while the situation 
 can still be remedied. 
 
 I have been encouraged to speak out 
 by the knowledge that the wisdom of 
 our policy in Laos has in recent months 
 been questioned by some of om’ ablest 
 political commentators, and by some of 
 our most distinguished editorial col- 
 umns, among them the columns of the 
 New York Times. 
 
 But I have been encouraged to speak 
 out, above all, because the administra- 
 tion, in its recent actions and commit- 
 ments, has displayed flexibility and 
 courage and a willingness to meet chang- 
 ing situations with changes in policy. 
 
 My complaint is not one of harsh 
 criticism. It is, rather, uttered almost 
 in the sense of a prayer that there will 
 be a reconsideration of our policy in this 
 fateful part of the world, with respect to 
 the troubles which beset it. 
 
16 
 
 There is no reason to despair about the 
 situation in southeast Asia. There is 
 every reason to be hopeful. The Chinese 
 Communists do not have the total free- 
 dom of action they pretend to have. 
 Their regime has never been weaker eco- 
 nomically or more plagued by political 
 disaffection. On the other hand, the 
 presence of American troops in both 
 Vietnam and Thailand gives us a polit- 
 ical and diplomatic leverage which we 
 have not heretofore possessed. And our 
 entire position in the area has been fur- 
 ther bolstered by the commitment of the 
 other SEATO nations to dispatch con- 
 tingents of troops which will take their 
 places alongside the American troops al- 
 ready in Thailand. 
 
 But, having thus bolstered our posi- 
 tion, having thus increased our diplo- 
 matic leverage in the negotiations to 
 which we are committed, I hope that we 
 will not passively accept the flagrant 
 Communist violation of the cease-fire at 
 Nam Tha, as we have passively accepted 
 such violations in the past. Every time 
 we fail to react to Communist violations 
 of existing agreements or limit our re- 
 actions to paper protests, we encourage 
 the Communists to believe that they can 
 violate any agreement with the free world 
 with total impunity, we make more pos- 
 sible the kind of miscalculation that may 
 someday result in war. I believe, there- 
 fore, that before we return to the con- 
 ference table, we should insist that the 
 Communists return to the positions they 
 occupied before the most recent violation 
 of the cease-fire. 
 
 In the Laos situation, as it has un- 
 folded to date, one can And all the es- 
 sential facts about communism, and all 
 the follies and weaknesses of Western 
 policy, both writ large. 
 
 Here one can see the incredible per- 
 sistence of the Communists at work; one 
 tan see their ruthless apphcation of 
 guerrilla tactics, their ability to infiltrate 
 non- Communist groupings like the Bud- 
 641203—84362 
 
 dhist clergy, their cunning use of neu- 
 tralist or ostensibly non-Communist 
 fronts, their use of diplomacy as a screen 
 for further aggression, their ability to 
 paralyze the West by threatening escala- 
 tion. Here one can see the total perfidy 
 and total amorality which they so awe- 
 somely combine with their total dedica- 
 tion to the goal of world communism. 
 
 On the Western side, the events in 
 Laos provide us with still another dra- 
 matic illustration of our amateurishness 
 in the field of total warfare; of our 
 perennial desire, despite all disappoint- 
 ments, to believe that some kind of ac- 
 commodation with the Communists is 
 possible ; of our willingness, despite their 
 repeated betrayals, to trust their diplo- 
 matic promises; of our readiness, despite 
 numerous historic lessons, to foster coali- 
 tion governments; of the bewitchment 
 which has led us to accept the one- 
 sided rule that the cold war must be 
 waged always on the territory of the free 
 world, and never on the territory of the 
 Communist world, no m.atter how re- 
 cently this territoi-y may have been an- 
 nexed. 
 
 If we persist in this sentimentality and 
 these ambiguities that have up xmtil now 
 characterized our policy in Laos, then 
 the positions remaining to the free world 
 will be overrun or eroded, one by one, 
 under the unrelenting attacks of world 
 communism. 
 
 But if we now learn the lessons of 
 Laos and apply them to the world situa- 
 tion, it will, I am confident — at least, 
 it can, I am confident — mark a turning 
 point in the cold war. Once we have 
 digested these lessons, Laos can be saved 
 and southeast Asia can be saved. But 
 far more important, we will never again 
 make the mistake of retreating before a 
 Communist challenge, in the hope that 
 this will somehow ease tensions and re- 
 duce the danger of v/ar. Because it does 
 just the opposite. 
 
 We will, on the contrary, move to the 
 total mobilization of resources and ener- 
 
17 
 
 gies and spirit that alone can assure the 
 triumph of our free society in the life 
 and death struggle with the godless 
 forces of communism. 
 
 Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- 
 sent to have printed in the Record at 
 this place a number of articles from 
 American newspapers and magazines, 
 which will serve to indicate hov/ wide- 
 spread are the misgivings about the 
 policy we are at present pursuing in 
 Laos. 
 
 There being no objection, the articles 
 were ordered to be printed in the Rec- 
 ord, as follows: 
 
 [From the New York Times, Muy 12, 1962 1 
 New Look at Laos 
 
 The spreading military crisis in Lacs com- 
 pels the American Government to take a 
 new look at this tiny but strategically im- 
 portant kingdom and to review its whole 
 policy with a view toward more forceful ac- 
 tion to keep it out of Communist hands. 
 
 The crisis has been simmering ever since 
 the Geneva conference of 1954 which was 
 supposed to settle everything but merely led 
 to continued Intermittent fighting in Laos 
 and one military coup after another. It 
 reached its present stage when the com- 
 bined neutralist and Communist forces, 
 aided by Soviet Russia, Communist China 
 and Communist North Vietnam, broke the 
 latest year-old cease-fire agreement and 
 launched a new offensive that has overrun 
 several strongholds of the pro-Western Gov- 
 ernment and placed all northwest Laos un- 
 der Communist control. 
 
 This development has put pro-Commun- 
 1st forces on the Mekong River, where they 
 can menance Thailand, and is opening a new 
 route for Communist invasion of embattled 
 South Vietnam. 
 
 President Kennedy declared three months 
 ago that if the cease-fire were broken we 
 would be faced with “most serious deci- 
 sions.” But the Government clings to its 
 present policy, agreed upon between Presi- 
 dent Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev at 
 Vienna, which calls for a neutral and inde- 
 pendent Laos under a coalition regime 
 formed of pro-Western, neutralist and Com- 
 munist factions. It has joined Britain in 
 calling on Soviet Russia to stop the Com- 
 munist offensive and has induced Prince 
 Souvanna Phouma, whom it backs as a 
 neutralist Premier, to call for a Communist 
 withdrawal. 
 
 It has little hope that the Communists 
 will really surrender what they hold. It 
 does hope for restoration of the cease-fire 
 and resumption of the dragging coalition 
 negotiations between the three princes head- 
 ing the three rival factions who view it all 
 
 as a family affair to be settled in Lao 
 fashion. The American policy is based on 
 Washington's belief that the Lao are un- 
 interested in political or ideological con- 
 flicts and, in contrast to the Vietnamese, will 
 not fight. But to back up that policy and 
 force the pro-Western leaders into the coali- 
 tion with the Communists, even to sur- 
 render the army and police, which they re- 
 fuse, American authorities have tended to 
 under-cut the pro-Western Government, 
 even to accuse it of provocation, until this 
 policy begins to resemble that which lost 
 China. 
 
 On the other hand, the only grim alterna- 
 tive is massive military aid from the outside, 
 which might trigger a larger conflict. Presi- 
 dent Kennedy is rightly loath to embark on 
 such a policy, but SEATO and ANZUS, which 
 are pledged to joint protection of the area, 
 should also have their say. 
 
 [From the New York Times, May 14, 1962] 
 Acres Laos le Deluge 
 (By Marguerite Higgins) 
 
 Washington. — Laos is far away, but the 
 world is small and never in this writer’s 
 20 years as a journalist has the Depart- 
 ment of State put on a more stalwart exhi- 
 bition of sticking its head firmly in the 
 sand than was the case last week with regard 
 to the crisis in southeast Asia. 
 
 A govermnent, of course, has a far more 
 em’oarra-s.sing time than an individual in 
 admitting that it has been played for a fool. 
 That the United States has been played for a 
 fool was evident in Washington firstly from 
 events in Laos, where Red troops led by 
 Hanoi and Red-Chinese trained officers were 
 ferociously giving the lie to the Harriman 
 doctrine that Moscow really didn’t want a 
 Communist takeover in Laos and would re- 
 strain their Russian-supplied allies. It was 
 evident from the small, smug smiles of the 
 Communist statesmen and journalists in 
 Washington who were patronizingly telling 
 the subdued and silent non -Communist set 
 that— in the words of one Soviet bloc offi- 
 cial — “the New Frontier never really set 
 much store by Laos anyway, so how could 
 you consider it a setback?” It was evident 
 from the cold indifference with which Mos- 
 cow heard out Washington's pleas to live 
 up to pledges to support the cease-fire. 
 
 But it was not evident to the State De- 
 partment Up to and through Friday evening, 
 at least in the official line being given out 
 to the world press. 
 
 Up to and through Friday evening, the offi- 
 cial doctrine was still that a peaceful solu- 
 tion was possible because the Russians really 
 wanted a neutral and independent Laos to 
 limit Peiping’s influence there. 
 
 In its remarkable display of refusing to 
 face unpleasant facts, the State Department 
 clung to its Moscow-is-sincere line in the 
 face of the following: 
 
 1. An agreement between the Red Chinese 
 and the Pathet Lao puppet Red government 
 
 641203—84362 
 
18 
 
 that Peiping would build a road from 
 China to Red "governmental” headquarters 
 in Laos, This was announced more than 
 3 months ago. It logically raised the 
 question of how Moscow, sincere or not, could 
 be counted on to keep Peiping out of Laos 
 since the agreement brought the roadbuild- 
 ers very much in. The State Department 
 answer was that the Chinese were not con- 
 clusively in Laos despite the agreement. 
 
 2. Clear evidence that the Viet Minh 
 cadres leading the Pathet Lao have been 
 trained and supplied by Peiping as well as by 
 Russia. 
 
 3. Reports from American military advis- 
 ers that Red Chinese troops were seen par- 
 ticipating in the attack on Muong Sing (the 
 jungle headquarters or Dr. Tom Dooley). 
 This brought the comment from the State 
 Department that many tribesmen in the area 
 spoke Chinese, overlooking the fact that even 
 Chinese-speaking Lao are not ordinarily in 
 Red army uniform. 
 
 4. The fact that Souvanna Phouma, the 
 neutralist prince who was America’s choice 
 as the strong man of the coalition govern- 
 ment, called on his ally, the Red prince, to 
 halt his attacks and evacuate Nam Tlia and 
 was in turn made a fool of when the Com- 
 munists thrust instead 100 miles to the Thai- 
 land border. 
 
 Only one thing has stood between Laos and 
 Communist seizure in this and previous ad- 
 ministrations, and that has never been the 
 Lao army. If anything, the free Lao army 
 was far weaker in the days of the Eisenhower 
 administration than now. The only thing 
 that has saved Laos has been Red fear of the 
 consequences, meaning possible American or 
 other intervention. 
 
 The Kennedy administration’s distaste for 
 the Lao situation has been shown in ways 
 too myriad to detail here, but certainly Mos- 
 cow is not without reasons for gambling that 
 a Red takeover of Laos would be without 
 painful consequences. Indeed, as late as 
 Friday, the State Department was saying 
 that the alerting of the 7th Fleet was “just 
 for show.” Only Saturday did someone re- 
 alize that labeling this alert in such a man- 
 ner was most unlikely to impress the Com- 
 munists as anything other than a green light 
 to agress with safety. 
 
 Is it too late to save anything in Laos? 
 Already the entire Lao-Chlnese frontier is 
 under Red domination, meaning that Peiping 
 troops can go and come at will without the 
 West being the wiser, as was the case in 
 North Korea along the Yalu. 
 
 Already — and for the first time — Red 
 troops are on Thailand’s border. 
 
 Said an Asian diplomat: "If the United 
 States dares not act at a time when Red 
 China is in turmoil and starving, when 
 America has the atomic bomb and Red China 
 has not, what will America do when China 
 is recovered and is an atomic power? If 
 you dare not stand up to the Communists in 
 Asia today, what will happen tomorrow?” 
 
 [From the New York Herald Tribune, Apr. 23, 
 1962] 
 
 Mad Hatter’s Tea Party 
 (By Joseph Alsop) 
 
 Vientiane, Laos. — The best way to under- 
 stand the present stage of American policy 
 in this distracted little country is to re- 
 member the worst moment of the Mad Hat- 
 ter’s tea party in “Alice.” This, beyond 
 doubt, was the moment when the Mad Hatter 
 rather crossly tried to stuff the dormouse 
 into the teapot. 
 
 The role of the Mad Hatter is being played, 
 with considerable panache, by the Assistant 
 Secretary of State for the East, Gov. Averell 
 Harrimon. The dormouse in this peculiar 
 charade is the Lao anti-Communist leader, 
 Gen. Phoumi Nosavan. And as in “Alice,” 
 the dormouse has refused to be stuffed — at 
 least as yet. 
 
 It is not all so comic, however. Consider, 
 for example. Governor Harriman’s last de- 
 scent on Laos, which was intended to stuff 
 the dormouse into the teapot by main force. 
 
 At a meeting with all the leaders of the 
 present anti-Communist government. Gov- 
 ernor Harriman explained the salubrious 
 character of the teapot in question. This is 
 a neutral coalition government which the 
 Governor desires to form, with the neutral- 
 ist, Prince Souvanna Phouma, at its head, 
 with Lao Communists Included in the 
 Cabinet and with the anti-Communlsts also 
 included — but only and above all after the 
 antl-Communlsts have surrendered their 
 vital control of both the army and the police. 
 
 After expatiating on the teapot. Governor 
 Harriman gave a preliminary shove. The 
 economic subsidy of $3 million a month, 
 which the United States has long paid to 
 Laos, was suspended some time ago as a 
 pressure move. This has already caused 
 Inflation here. But other pressure moves 
 were easily possible, the Governor re- 
 minded the Lao Cabinet, thus hinting at 
 future suspension of military aid as well. 
 
 Governor Harriman looked at the Lao 
 leaders one by one; pointed a stern fore- 
 finger at each of them in turn; and told 
 them that he wished them to know they 
 would be “responsible for the destruction of 
 their country” if they refused to do his 
 bidding. There was a brief silence, and 
 General Phoumi then replied: 
 
 “You know. Governor Harriman, we in 
 Laos have many years’ experience of colonial 
 rule. But we were never spoken to in quite 
 that fashion in the colonial times.” 
 
 It can be seen, then, that rather passion- 
 ate feelings have by now been generated on 
 both sides. Yet the American policy here 
 most urgently needs cool, dispassionate re- 
 examination. 
 
 The existing policy was somewhat hastily 
 adopted at the low ebb of the Kennedy ad- 
 ministration, just after the Cuban debacle. 
 The aim was to secure a strictly neutral 
 Laos, with no North Vietnamese Communist 
 troops on Lao soil, and with the North 
 
 641203—84362 
 
19 
 
 Vietnamese blocked from using Laos as a 
 transit route lor their attack on South Viet- 
 nam. 
 
 At Geneva last spring, with his customary 
 Industry and ability. Governor Harrlman 
 negotiated an agreement with the Soviets 
 which on paper, at least, promised the de- 
 sired neutral Laos. All the requirements for 
 strict Lao neutrality were to be met, as 
 soon as a coalition, all-party government 
 could be installed with Prince Souvanna 
 Phouma at its head. The Chinese and North 
 Vietnamese delegates at Geneva gave their 
 assent: and the Soviet delegate made im- 
 portant personal commitments to Governor 
 Harrlman. 
 
 At this stage, last summer, the agreement 
 that Governor Harrlman had negotiated 
 looked like the best American bet In Laos, 
 even though it w’as obviously a longshot bet. 
 Any contraption basically depending on 
 Communist good faith must always be a 
 long-shot bet. But its real flaw was Its de- 
 pendence on stuffing the dormouse into the 
 teapot. 
 
 Prince Bonn Oum, the Prime Minister, and 
 General Phoumi, the real leader of the anti- 
 communist government, never felt enthusi- 
 asm for the coalition teapot. But they 
 would have entered, nonetheless, if the price 
 of the coalition had not been their surren- 
 dering control of the police and the army. 
 Such a surrender, they understandably con- 
 sidered, was tantamount to cutting their 
 own throats with a blunt knife. 
 
 For just this reason, despite month after 
 month of maneuvering and mounting pres- 
 sure, the dormouse has obstinately refused 
 to be stuffed. Meanwhile, the passage of 
 time and changing circumstances have 
 transformed what used to be a reasonable 
 long-shot bet into a totally indefensible 
 gamble. 
 
 A Chinese Communist general, thinly dis- 
 guised as a consul general, has turned up 
 in the northern province of Phong Saly, at 
 the head of a division of Chinese troops 
 rather better disguised as roadbuilders. The 
 Communist North Vietnamese have been 
 pushing in troops, until they now have be- 
 tween 12,000 and 14,000 soldiers in Laos, of 
 which half are in regular army battalions. 
 The transit routes to South Vietnam, which 
 were supposed to be abandoned, have been 
 persistently used and improved. 
 
 For these and many other reasons, if the 
 Lao anti-Communists are nov/ driven, by 
 main force, into the coalition that has been 
 so eagerly promoted, it will be equivalent 
 to handing Laos to the North Vietnamese 
 with a red ribbon prettily tied around it. No 
 doubt this can be done, by withdrawing U.S. 
 military aid, for instance, ■which Governor 
 Harrlman apparently told the British Am- 
 bassador here that he Intended to recom- 
 mend. But it is certainly time to stop and 
 think again. 
 
 [From U.S. News & World Report] 
 
 United States “Giving Away’’ Laos to 
 Communists? 
 
 Vientiane, Laos. — At a time when U.S. 
 troops are at the brink of war against Com- 
 munists in South Vietnam, U.S. officials are 
 cracking down on the rulers of neighboring 
 Laos to force them into partnership with 
 their Communist enemies. 
 
 U.S. policy — agreed to with Russia — is to 
 try to bring peace to Laos by setting up a 
 coalition Government of “neutrals,” anti- 
 Communists and Communists. 
 
 To try to force the coalition, the United 
 States cut off a $3 million monthly subsidy 
 that met the Lao Army’s payroll and paid 
 a third of the costs of the police and civil 
 government. Then the United States began 
 preparations to cut off shipments of arms, 
 ammunition and gasoline, to be followed by 
 withdrawal of military advisers and an end 
 to the airlift on which most of the Laotian 
 Aimy depends for food and ammunition. 
 
 The Laotian Government — headed by 
 Prince Boun Oum and Gen. Phoumi Nosa- 
 van — is trying to hold out against American 
 pressure. General Phoumi, at the start of 
 May, was appealing to anti-Communist 
 countries in Asia — Thailand, South Vietnam, 
 the Philippines, Nationalist China, South 
 Korea and Malaya — to come to his aid in his 
 battle aginst the Reds. 
 
 VICTORY FOR REDS? 
 
 But the odds now are that Laos will either 
 be controlled completely by the Communists 
 or be split across the middle into a Commu- 
 nist North and an anti-Communist South. 
 
 General Phoumi is a tough leader who does 
 not want to turn his country over to the 
 Communists. But the only alternative, as 
 he now sees it, is a divided Laos. He knows 
 he has no chance of reconquering the Com- 
 munist-held areas in the North without U.S. 
 intervention. Phoumi believes, however, 
 that he can hold the vital Mekong River val- 
 ley and Southern Laos, if the United States 
 ■will reverse its present policies and help him. 
 
 Actually, the anti-Communists in Laos are 
 not as weak as they once seemed to be. Tire 
 Royal Lao forces now number 70,000 men. 
 During the past year, the United States has 
 given basic American-style training to most 
 of the troops, and has sent 4,000 officers and 
 technicians through special schools. 
 
 In addition, about 11,000 Meo hill tribes- 
 men living in enclaves deep behind the Com- 
 munist “lines” have been armed and trained 
 by the U.S. Army's Special Forces. Officers 
 say the Meos are suberb guerrillas. 
 
 Americans who have served at the front 
 with Lao troops say flatly that their combat 
 capability has improved tremendously, that 
 morale is higher than it was a year ago, and 
 that — at the present time — the Royal Lao 
 Army could hold its own against the enemy 
 forces inside Laos. 
 
 641203—84362 
 
20 
 
 The neutralist-Communist forces, com- 
 bined, have 36,000 to 38,000 troops in the 
 field. But they are by no means unified in 
 their objectives, nor are they subject to a 
 Eingie command. 
 
 IN 1361 ; A DECISION 
 
 Judging from the information avaiiable in 
 Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam the 
 United States has not reassessed the situa- 
 tion in Laos since the spring of 1961, when 
 the Kennedy administration apparently de- 
 cided the best way out was to neutralize the 
 Red-menaced country. 
 
 So far as anyone here knows, Washington 
 has not tried to find out if conditions have 
 changed since then. No top-level mission 
 from Washington has taken a look at the 
 situation. Meanwhile, officers on the ground 
 say that several important assumptions on 
 which U.S. policy was based have turned out 
 wrong. 
 
 For example, it was assumed that the Com- 
 munists and neutrals would overrun Laos in 
 a matter of days unless a coalition govern- 
 ment that included them was set up. In 
 fact, the reverse has happened. In order to 
 maintain Red power. Communist North 
 Vietnam has had to send in new battalions 
 of its most experienced troops. 
 
 Another assumption was that Laos could 
 be effectively policed to see that it was not 
 used as a base for aggression against any 
 other country in southeast Asia. But no 
 one, so far, has been able to enforce a cease- 
 fire in Laos. Communist North Vietnam has 
 put 10 identified battalions into the lighting 
 area. 
 
 The Communists now have a stranglehold 
 on the supply corridor through Laos that 
 connects North and South Vietnam. The 
 Russians airlift supplies to Tchepone, close 
 to the South Vietnam border, and have one 
 other major airdrop zone. Even the most 
 optimistic Westerners in Vientiane now 
 acknowledge that, under a coalition govern- 
 ment, there v.'ould be no possible way of 
 policing this corridor and preventing supplies 
 from reaching the Communists in South 
 Vietnam. 
 
 Still another assumption was that the 
 Royal Lao Government was ineffective. In 
 fact, many Americans on the scene say 
 the Phoumi government is the best that 
 Laos has ever had. U.S. aid was being used 
 effectively right up to the moment that eco- 
 nomic sanctions were applied by Washington. 
 A program of technical aid and refugee assist- 
 ance costing the United States $6 million a 
 year is still in operation and is having con- 
 siderable Impact in the villages. 
 
 FOR UNITED STATES: FEW FRIENDS 
 
 As a result of the pressure from Washing- 
 ton, the United States is in a position right 
 now of having very few friends and admirers 
 in Laos. The Communists and their fol- 
 lowers regard America as the “imperialist, 
 capitalist enemy." The neutrals distrust the 
 
 United States. And the antl-Communists 
 consider the attempt to squeeze them into 
 partnership with the Reds as a “betrayal.” 
 
 Commanders in Asia say a factor that ap- 
 parently has been ignored by the Kennedy 
 administration is this: How determined are 
 the Communists to take Laos, and what are 
 their military capabilities for doing so? 
 
 There is no question about their long- 
 range intention. Even the Soviet Union, 
 which has supported the principle of a uni- 
 fied, neutral Laos, wants Laos to be a Com- 
 munist satellite, in the end. And Laos Is 
 even more important to Ho Chi Minh, the 
 Communist ruler of North Vietnam. His 
 dream of controlling the entire Indochina 
 peninsula rests on first getting control of 
 Laos. 
 
 PROBLEMS FOR COMMUNISTS 
 
 Communist capability is another thing. 
 Right now, the entire Communist-neutralist 
 force is dependent on a Soviet airlift and 
 several weekly truck convoys from North 
 Vietnam. 
 
 Red China has an estimated 40,000 troops 
 close to the Laos border. North Vietnam has 
 a combat-experienced army of 350,000. But 
 officers with long experience in Asia doubt 
 that the two countries together could main- 
 tain more than 100,000 fighting troops In 
 Laos. 
 
 Neither China nor North Vietnam has re- 
 serves of food. Chinese highways and rail- 
 ways to the Laos-North Vietnam border are 
 relatively primitive. And the industrial 
 bases to produce the necessities of war are 
 thousands of miles away, in North China and 
 Manchuria. 
 
 Field commanders say neither China nor 
 North Vietnam could fight a Korea-style war 
 in Laos. The United States and its allies 
 would also have a difficult problem of supply. 
 But the Mekong River valley and southern 
 Laos would be relatively easy to defend, using 
 a combination of Laotian, Thai and U.S. 
 troops. 
 
 “a headache, but — ” 
 
 So why is the United States threatening to 
 pull out its military support and force Laos 
 into a coalition government that could 
 either split the country or put it into the 
 hands of the Reds? Says one Western official 
 with years of experience in southeast Asia: 
 
 “The United States appears to have drawn 
 a firm line against the Reds in South Viet- 
 nam. Washington’s guarantees to Thailand 
 against outside aggression and internal sub- 
 version support the view that the United 
 States is not preparing to pull out of south- 
 east Asia. 
 
 “But if U.S. policy is to keep South Viet- 
 nam and Thailand free, abandoning Laos and 
 selling Phoumi 'down the river’ makes no 
 sense. Laos, underpopulated and shy of re- 
 sources, is a headache to any country that 
 gets Involved in it. But it is still the key to 
 defense of Thailand and South Vietnam.” 
 
 641203—84362 
 
21 
 
 [From the Baltimore Sun, Jan. 9, 1962] 
 Western Concessions to Leftists Feared 
 (By Philip Potter) 
 
 Bangkok, Thailand, January 8. — The 
 United States failure to back Prince Boun 
 Oum of Laos in his efforts to have a say in 
 the choice of Defense and Interior Ministers 
 for a new coalition government there is like- 
 ly to further erode Thailand’s confidence in 
 America. 
 
 Thai officials claim to share the West’s 
 desire for a strong, peaceful, and neutral 
 Laos, but fear that the West, in its impa- 
 tience to see an agreement between the three 
 Lao princes to this end, is Inclined to make 
 too many concessions to leftwing factions. 
 
 BOHN OUM backed 
 
 Boun Oum, they contend, is right In want- 
 ing more positive indication that Prince Sou- 
 vanna Phouma, neutralist ticketed for the 
 premiership, will maintain a strict neutral- 
 ity between East and West. 
 
 Thai have no faith at all in the neutrality 
 of the third prince in the Lao equation. 
 Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the pro- 
 Communist Neo Lao Hak Xat Party. 
 
 They are inclined to risk the formation of 
 a coalition government headed by Prince 
 Souvanna Phouma, but consider the compo- 
 sition of the cabinet the real test of his abil- 
 ity to create a balanced neutralism in the 
 country. 
 
 CAUTION urged 
 
 The West should be chary, in the eyes of 
 these officials, about criticizing pro-Western 
 Prince Boun Oum, present Pi’emier of the 
 Royal Lao Government, as he bargains with 
 Souvanna Phouma over the two important 
 Ministries of Defense and Interior. 
 
 “Western impatience for an agreement is a 
 sign of weakness,” said one official. 
 
 “The ’Vientiane Government of Prince 
 Boun Oum has said it needs a short interim 
 to make sure that Souvanna Phouna can be 
 a strong neutral personality, able to cope 
 with his friends on the left.” 
 
 This source said Thailand wanted to see a 
 quick settlement among the three princes, 
 but it must be a just and equitable agree- 
 ment, not dictated from the outside. 
 
 “If one side is not happy, and particularly 
 the one the West supports, no agreement can 
 be properly implemented,” this official said. 
 
 “We feel the West is prone to put pres- 
 sures on its friends, but not on the other 
 side. You pressure the wrong people at the 
 wrong time. The West kicked little a few 
 months back when Prince Souphanouvong 
 refused to come and see King Savang 
 Vathana, but there is much tendency to 
 blame Boun Oum for demanding a voice in 
 naming the defense and interior ministers.” 
 
 There also is resentment here over alleged 
 misrepresentation of Thailand’s position by 
 the Western press. 
 
 Officials said there had been many reports 
 that Thailand advocated strong military ac- 
 tion by the western powers in Laos. 
 
 641203—84362 
 
 This, It was said, is far from the truth. 
 
 Thailand, one top official said, has always 
 had a peace policy “however much sympathy 
 it has lor Laos, because of geographical prox- 
 imity and our common cultural heritage.” 
 
 Thailand’s hope, he said, was for a strong, 
 neutral Laotian Government supported by 
 the people and by King Savang Vathana. 
 
 VIEW'S accepted 
 
 He said the view was accepted that it 
 would have to be composed of all factions, 
 but the West must insist that it be one 
 which will malntain^ — wdth emphasis on 
 “maintain” — strict neutrality. 
 
 “What we do not want is a government 
 purported to be neutral, but with no ability 
 nor willingness to remain neutral. 
 
 “We do not want one predominantly Com- 
 munist or leftist. We fear If the balance is 
 not right it will not be a good beginning 
 and it may lead to eventual domination by 
 undesirable elements.” 
 
 To assure this, he said, the West must 
 achieve unity and be resolute In standing 
 more firmly for "what you say you believe 
 in. Our fear is that the West, in its strong 
 deshe for agreement, might be willing to 
 grant too many concessions. This is a bar- 
 gaining game. If you say what you are 
 willing to give you have no resources to fall 
 back on.” 
 
 There Is clearly a belief in Thailand that 
 partition of Laos along the lines of present 
 military control would be more advantageous 
 to this countiY than the formation there of 
 a government that would come under Com- 
 munist control and expose Thailand’s 625- 
 mile border with Laos to penetration by 
 Communist agents armed and trained by 
 Communist North Vietnam and Red China. 
 
 Officials here point out that in recent 
 months there has been widespread trouble 
 in Thailand’s northeast province bordering 
 Laos and say “there is every indication it Is 
 inspired by elements outside the kingdom.” 
 
 While it is nothing like the Communist 
 Viet Cong threat in South Vietnam, it was 
 said, subversion probably would mount if 
 Laos were to become a subsatellite of the 
 Communist bloc. 
 
 RED FORCE MENTIONED 
 
 There still reside in northeast Thailand 
 about 30,000 North Vietnamese who came 
 over and made it a base for operation against 
 the French during the early years of the 
 Indochina war. 
 
 They still owe allegiance to Ho Chlh Minh, 
 Communist leader of North Vietnam, and 
 only await the elimination of Laos as a 
 buffer state to become a large fifth column 
 In this country. 
 
 There were at one time 60,000 men, women, 
 and children, but for the past 2 years there 
 have been evacuations through the instru- 
 mentality of the International Red Cross 
 and the number here now is believed to be 
 between 30,000 and 40,000. 
 
 American sources say those evacuated have 
 been mostly old women and children, leaving 
 
22 
 
 In Thailand a hard core as potential sub- 
 versives of the Viet Cong type now operating 
 in South Vietnam. 
 
 SYMPATHY NOTED 
 
 U.S. officials here are sympathetic about 
 Thailand’s fears. 
 
 Americans, one said, "may view Laos like 
 a revolving door, in which one goes in and 
 out, but it is deeply involved in the emo- 
 tions, heart, and thinking of the Thai. 
 There is an umbilical connection between 
 the Thai and the Lao.” 
 
 Thus, he said, there is much questioning 
 here about the determination of the West to 
 protect Laos and South Vietnam against 
 Communist subversion and aggression. 
 
 "They are heartsick over the fact that the 
 Communists have been allowed to take over 
 half of Laos. They simply cannot under- 
 stand why the West is letting this happen,” 
 he said, "They say it will be Laos first. South 
 Vietnam second, and Thailand third and 
 does the V/est care anymore?” 
 
 [From the Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 
 
 24, 1962] 
 
 North Vietnamese — Laos Sees Red Units 
 (By Takashi Oka) 
 
 Vientiane, L.aos. — While political leaders 
 representing the three contending factions 
 in Laos discuss how to achieve a national 
 coalition government, military observers 
 here are increasingly concerned over evi- 
 dence of North Viet Namese regular bat- 
 talions in areas controlled by the pro-Com- 
 munist Pathet Lao and by forces of neutral- 
 ist Prince Souvanna Phouma. 
 
 Information collated by IVestern sources 
 here indicates that at least 10 North Viet- 
 namese battalions totaling 5,000 men are 
 on Lao soil. An additional 5,000 North Viet- 
 namese are believed to be serving in com- 
 munications, artillery, and antiaircraft units 
 and to form cadres and advisers in existing 
 Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma units. 
 
 Positive identification of North Vietna- 
 mese units has always been difficult but 
 military observers are fairly certain that two 
 North Vietnamese battalions are in the 
 Plain of Jars region, two in the Nam Tha 
 region, one in the Vang Vieng region, two 
 in the Nhommarat-Mahaxay region, and one 
 in the Tchepone region. 
 
 reports checked 
 
 The current dry season makes both aerial 
 and ground observation easier than during 
 the dank spring and summer monsoon, and 
 military sources say they have carefully 
 checked testimony of defectors with observa- 
 tion by guerrillas from among the Meo 
 tribesmen and reconnaissance from the air. 
 
 Tyto areas where pro-Communlst forces 
 appear to be much stronger than a year ago 
 are Nam Tha in the north, and the north- 
 south route from Nhommarat through Ma- 
 haxay to Tchepone. The former is just south 
 of the Chinese Communist border while the 
 641203-— 84362 
 
 latter composes the famous Ho Chi Minh 
 route from North to South Vietnam. 
 
 The Pathet Lao advance in the Nam Tha 
 area not only threatens the provincial capi- 
 tal of Nam Tha but brings almost all of the 
 243-miIe roadless border between Laos and 
 Communist China into pro-Communist 
 hands. The Chinese 13th Army with 25,000 
 men is believed to be Just across the border 
 in the so-called Shishong Banna Thai au- 
 tonomous area, and could move into Laos 
 undetected by outsiders once the Pathet Lao 
 had secured most of the border area, an 
 exercise in which they may be more in- 
 terested than the capture of Nam Tha town 
 itself. 
 
 SUPPLY ROUTE 
 
 The Mahaxay-Tchepone route is believed 
 to be serving as a supply road down which 
 men and material move from North Vietnam 
 to participate in the guerrilla war in South 
 Vietnam. The Pathet Lao have improved the 
 trail from Mahaxay to Tchepone and trucks 
 have been observed driving down to a point 
 halfway between the two towns. This means 
 that supplies moving south need to be por- 
 tered only from this halfway point to 
 Tchepone and thence to the Lao-Vietnamsse 
 border. 
 
 In addition, the Tchepone airfield has been 
 improved and now can take Soviet Ilyushin- 
 14’s. Almost one ton of supplies daily or 
 20 tons per month are being airlifted by So- 
 viet transport planes to Tchepone and the 
 airfield there is ringed with radar-equipped 
 antiaircraft guns which are accurate enough 
 to hit high-flying observation planes. 
 
 There is no solid evidence that North Viet- 
 namese troops in Tchepone, Mahaxay, and 
 Nam Tha have been used in actual combat. 
 Military observers believe they are being held 
 in reserve and that their mere presence 
 causes such panic among Lao units oppos- 
 ing them that the latter often turn and 
 flee without giving battle. 
 
 TROOPS RETREATED 
 
 Last month Vientiane troops loyal to the 
 Defense Minister, Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, 
 moved against the Pathet Lao both in the 
 Mahaxay area and in Muong Sai area south 
 of Nam Tha. In both areas Vientiane troops 
 beat a hasty retreat the minute they real- 
 ized that North Vietnamese battalions were 
 in the vicinity. 
 
 Trucking and equipment of Vientiane for- 
 ces have improved since the disastrous days 
 preceding the cease-fire last spring. But 
 they still have a tendency to avoid close 
 combat and their capacity to wage a co- 
 ordinated operation leaves something to be 
 desired, according to observers who have ac- 
 companied troops in some of the recent 
 fighting. 
 
 [Prom the Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 
 
 9, 1962] 
 
 Lao Factions Vie for Grip 
 (By Takashi Oka) 
 
 Vientiane, Laos. — It takes only 45 minutes 
 by twin-engine Beechcraft to go from this 
 
23 
 
 dusty administrative capital of Laos to the 
 rolling Plain of Jars where Prince Souvanna 
 Phouma’s neutralist government has its 
 headquarters at the former French Foreign 
 Legion outpost of Khang Khay. 
 
 But Vientiane and Khang Khay are worlds 
 apart. Compared with Bangkok or Saigon, 
 Vientiane is a sleepy little upcountry town; 
 compared with desolate Khang Khay, it is a 
 veritable metropolis, 
 
 American military and economic aid, which 
 so far has not stopped — despite the withhold- 
 ing of the February and March monthly aid 
 checks — supporting the Laos civil and mili- 
 tary budget, is enlarging the runway at Wat- 
 tay Airport and building a modern highway 
 to Thadua, transshipment point across the 
 Mekong River for goods coming in from 
 Thailand. 
 
 SHARP CONTRAST 
 
 Inside the city, the rightwing government 
 headed by Prince Bouii Oum and Defense 
 Minister Phoumi Nosavan — temporarily con- 
 valescing in Thailand — is widening roads, re- 
 constructing the royal palace, and building a 
 monument in front of the Government 
 buildings. Shops still are filled with Im- 
 ported goods, and one indication of the moral 
 standard is that alcoholic beverages are 
 cheaper than in Bangkok or Saigon. 
 
 Khang Khay, by contrast, has the spartan 
 atmosphere of an army boot camp. Civil 
 servants have their offices in central rooms of 
 barrack-long buildings and sleep dormitory 
 style in cots placed in the end of the rooms. 
 They bathe in discarded oil drums, bark or- 
 ders into field telephones, and ride from out- 
 post to outpost in trucks or army command 
 cars. 
 
 They use some jeeps of American manu- 
 facture, but most of their vehicles bear the 
 export label “Fait en Urss’” (made in 
 U.S.S.R.) or its Russian equivalent. 
 
 Prince Souvanna Phouma's government 
 does not conceal the fact that its materiel 
 support comes exclusively from the Commu- 
 nist bloc, particularly from the Soviet Union 
 and North Vietnam. 
 
 ARMED BY REDS 
 
 During a recent visit, this correspondent 
 hitchhiked on a Soviet plane from the Plain 
 of Jars Airfield to Pongsavan and from there 
 on a Soviet-made command car to Khang 
 Khay, where North Vietnamese carpenters 
 and other laborers are building a meeting 
 hall and a hotel. Soviet and Ctjech mili- 
 tary equipment is in evidence at military 
 installations, while the Chinese Commu- 
 nists are building a road from their border 
 to the northern town of Phongsaly. 
 
 But politically the Souvanna Phouma 
 government insists it is neutralist — that it 
 looks neither to the United States nor to 
 the Soviet Union for support but hopes to 
 bring about a Laos whose neutrality will be 
 guaranteed by all major powers. Thus it 
 draws distinction between Itself and the 
 American-supported Vletlane government — 
 
 641203—84362 
 
 as well as the Communist-supported Pathet 
 Lao under Prince Souvanna Photrma’s half- 
 brother, Prince Souphanouvong, who has his 
 headquarters in Samneua but who spends 
 much of his time in Khang Khav. 
 
 Internationally, Prince Souvanna Phouma 
 has won United States, British, French, and 
 Soviet backing for an attempt to evolve an 
 all-Lao neutralist coalition that will bring 
 together both Pathet Lao and Vietiane 
 forces under himself as Premier, with 10 
 Cabinet seats going to his own group and 
 four each to Vietiane and the Pathet Lao. 
 
 Under this formula. Prince Souvanna 
 Phoruna’s adherents will take the key posts 
 of Defense and Interior in addition to the 
 Premier post and Foreign Affairs. 
 
 But the prerequisite for such an evolution 
 is, of course, the genuineness of Prince 
 Souvanna Phouma’s neutrality. As weeks 
 turn into months and months to years since 
 coaUtion efforts began, the middle position 
 which Prince Souvanna Phouma seeks to 
 hold between Vientiane on the right and the 
 Pathet Lao on left becomes increasingly 
 difficult to maintain. Neither does the 
 Pathet Lao make things easier for the 
 Prince. 
 
 NEUTRALITY VOICED 
 
 “We are not Communists, Prince Sou- 
 phanouvong told this correspondent during 
 a recent visit to Kliang Khav. “We are a 
 party that enjoys the support of Commu- 
 nists. We stand for a peaceful, neutral, and 
 united Laos.” 
 
 Such language effectively blurs the dis- 
 tinction between the Pathet Lao and Prince 
 Souvanna Phouma and Infringes upon the 
 middle ground which is the basis of the 
 Khang Khay government’s appeal to Lao 
 opinion and to the world. 
 
 Prince Souvanna Phouma’s recent bi- 
 lateral negotiations in Luang Prabang and 
 Vietiane with General Phoumi — to be re- 
 sumed in a few days — may show that the 
 Khang Khay leader wishes to establish a 
 public image of himself as Independent of 
 his half brother, who told me; “I recognize 
 only agreements reached in mjr presence. 
 I recognize no agreements a deux.” 
 
 Meanwhile, it isn’t clear yet what effect 
 General Phoumi's illness will have on talks 
 between Vietiane and Khang Khay. 
 
 So far, Vietiane has not conceded the De- 
 fense and Interior portfolios to Prince Sou- 
 vanna Phouma. It remains to be seen 
 whether U.S. pressure, begun with the stop- 
 ping of the monthly aid check and perhaps 
 to continue to the cutting off of all military 
 and economic aid, will force this concession. 
 
 [From the Christian Science Monitor, Mar, 
 21, 1962] 
 
 Red Lao Leader Airs Views to West 
 (By Ronald Stead) 
 
 Khang Khay, Laos. — During an interview 
 here in this dusty little capital of “Souvanna 
 Phouma country” this correspondent asked 
 
24 
 
 pro-Communist Prince Souphanouvong 
 about those troops from neighboring North 
 Vietnam which number some 10,000 men— 
 about half of them are in regular combat 
 formations on the pro-Communist side in the 
 Lao civil war. 
 
 Prince Souphanouvong shares this rebel 
 capital with his half-brother, neutralist 
 Prince Souvanna Phouma. Ke is the presi- 
 dent of the central committee of the Neo 
 Lao Haksat Party, which gives political ex- 
 pression to the pro-Communist Pathet Lao 
 armed forces. 
 
 The Prince laughed as he replied, “This 
 is nonsense. You must remember we get 
 uniforms from North Vietnam along with 
 other supplies and our soldiers wearing them 
 obviously look like Vietminh troops since 
 the clothes in question are drawn from stock 
 not specially designed for us.” 
 
 NO COMMENT 
 
 When told the Royal Lao Army’s assess- 
 ment, accepted by the U.S. military group 
 advising it, is based on much more than an 
 observation of uniforms, he made no com- 
 ment. 
 
 The accumulated evidence furnished by 
 prisoners, deserters, refugees, and others, 
 as well as reports on large truck convoys 
 and other indications of reinforcement had 
 further backed the claims. 
 
 Improved antiaircraft artillery fire shows 
 the up-to-date range-finding devices now in 
 use by the rebels. 
 
 TECHNICAL AID ADMITTED 
 
 “We have North Vietnamese, Russian, and 
 Chinese technicians helping in various 
 ways,” Prince Souphanouvong declared, “the 
 same way as the Illegal government now in 
 power in Vietniane (the royalist capital of 
 Laos) has Americans aiding it on the field 
 of combat and elsewhere.” 
 
 Armed American specialist soldiers do go 
 into action with formations of the Royal 
 Lao Army. But their orders are only to de- 
 fend themselves if necessary and to give 
 advice, not orders. Sometimes the com- 
 mand officers to whom they give it take no 
 notice. And on occasion American advisers 
 have found themselves in positions from 
 which the Lao troops they were previously 
 with had unexpectedly retired. 
 
 “Tell the American people,” said Prince 
 Souphanouvong when the conversation 
 turned to political matters, “the restoration 
 of peace in Laos is now up to the U.S. 
 Government. If Prince Boun Oum (present 
 counterrevolutionary Premier of Vientiane) 
 and Gen. Phoumi Nosavan (strong man in 
 his regime) continue to refuse to agree that 
 the two key portfolios — for Defense and 
 Home Affairs — shall be in neutralist hands 
 in any coalition administration that may be 
 formed, Americans must deny them the help 
 that alone enables them to persist in office. 
 
 ALL AID ATTACKED 
 
 “Not just by withholding the monthly 
 check of $3 million that subsidizes them but 
 by withdrawing aircraft and other aid of 
 military significance which makes possible 
 their continuance on a compaign they can- 
 not possibly win. 
 
 “If the Americans do not do this they will 
 be responsible for preventing the settlement 
 of problems in Laos by the people of the 
 country themselves. I reminded the Prince 
 of the fears of the non-Communist v/orld 
 that a coalition administration in Laos, if 
 formed, would in due course become domi- 
 nated by representatives of the pro-Com- 
 munist Pathet Lao. 
 
 “That is for the people of Laos to decide 
 when we have elections again,” the Prince 
 said. Then he departed from the French in 
 which the interview was conducted to say 
 slowly in English, “next time the integra- 
 tion must be real. 
 
 EXPERIENCE RECALLED 
 
 “The last time there was discrimination 
 and vengeance and I, for one, was put in 
 prison for trying to give effect to my politi- 
 cal beliefs. Any future fusion has to be the 
 real thing — and I am going to make sure 
 it will be before we try to get together again 
 with our present enemies,” he said. 
 
 The Pathet Lao chief frowned when told 
 of the impression created at the press con- 
 ference held by the Minister of Information 
 in Vientiane that neutralist leader Prince 
 Souvanna Phouma is a “prisoner of the 
 Pathet Lao.” 
 
 He described this as “an odious calumny 
 against the rightful Prime Minister of Laos 
 (Souvanna Phouma) and a maneuver to 
 cause a split between my half-brother’s gov- 
 ernment and the Pathet Lao. It Is futile,” 
 he added, “because nobody can destroy the 
 firm solidarily forged in the fire of battle.” 
 
 PEACE TALKED UP 
 
 “For this reason American efforts to sep- 
 arate us must be in vain. The Neo Lao 
 Haksat has never deviated from its course of 
 seeking a peaceful solution to the Laos prob- 
 lem” he claimed, “for only in this way can 
 our country be led to peace, neutrality, sov- 
 ereignty, unity, democracy, and prosperity as 
 envisaged at the 14-ntalon conference at 
 Geneva which will supervise the withdrawal 
 of all foreign military personnel from Laos 
 when we can send a delegation from a coali- 
 tion government to sign the accords already 
 reached internationally.” 
 
 “The world should remember,” said Prince 
 Souphanouvong, “that Prince Boun Oum, 
 Prince Souvanna Phouma and myself agreed 
 on a basis for establishing a coalition gov- 
 ernment during our meetings in Zurich and 
 Geneva. But Prince Boun Oum has done 
 nothing but try to evade those terms and 
 prevent their implementation. 
 
 641203—84362 
 
25 
 
 "The latest rightwing proposal for the six 
 administrative commissions Instead of a 
 coalition government — under the presidency 
 of the King — is Just an attempt to keep power 
 in reactionary hands and use the dignity and 
 prestige of the throne for political ends. We 
 did not countenance it for a second.” 
 
 [From the Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 
 
 23, 1962] 
 
 Kong Le; Anger in Laos 
 (By Ronald Stead) 
 
 Khang Khay, Laos. — ^“1 did what I did to 
 open the eyes of the people of Laos and set 
 their feet on the right road," said Capt. 
 Kong Le, catalyst In the creation of the Lao 
 crisis now presenting the world one of its 
 greatest problems. 
 
 We talked in his little bedroom at the 
 former French Foreign Legion post here 
 where he commands the neutralist forces in 
 the Lao civil war. They are linked with the 
 pro-Communist Pathet Lao against the 
 country’s present rightwing counterrevolu- 
 tionary government. At this same headquar- 
 ters, the neutralist leader. Prince Souvanna 
 Phouma, has a Joint residence with his half- 
 brother, Prince Souphanouvong, head the 
 Lao pro-Communists. 
 
 Capt. Kong Le's reference was to a coup 
 during the night of August 8, 1960, when 
 he led the Second Paratroop Battalion of 
 the Royal Lao Army to take over the Gov- 
 ernment and military installations at the 
 city of Vientiane. As chairman of the revo- 
 lutionary committee he accused the adminis- 
 tration it ousted of waging fratricidal war 
 against the Pathet Lao and of allowing 
 American domination and infiltration. 
 
 He called upon army commanders to cease 
 operations against the Pathet Lao, declared 
 that the men he put into power would pur- 
 sue a genuinely neutral policy, stamp out 
 administrative corruption, and requested all 
 foreign troops to leave Laos. At the same 
 time he declared the revolutionary commit- 
 tee loyal to the monarchy of King Savang 
 Vathana, the Constitution, and denied that 
 the pro-Communists’ chief. Prince Souphan- 
 ouvong, was behind the coup. 
 
 The National Assembly unanimously 
 passed a vote of no confidence in the de- 
 posed Government under the premiership of 
 the pro-American rightwinger Prince Som- 
 sanith. TTie King accepted his resignation 
 and asked Prince Souvanna Phouma^ — 
 Premier from 1951 to 1954 and again in 
 1956 — to form a new administration. 
 
 The same day Capt. Kong Le announced 
 the handing over to Souvanna Phouma of 
 the powers he had assumed. But on Septem- 
 ber 10 tough rightwing Gen. Phouml Nosa- 
 van and Prince Boun Oum set up In the 
 southern city of Savannakhet a counter- 
 revolutionary committee which proclaimed 
 the Constitution suspended and formed an- 
 other government with Boun Oum Premier 
 and General Phouml Minister of Defense. 
 
 In due course the King approved this 
 General Phouml’s troops marched on Vien- 
 tiane, Capt. Kong Le withdrew his men after 
 fighting there between December 13 and 16, 
 1960, and Souvanna Phouma left the country, 
 later to return and install himself at Khang 
 Khay. 
 
 The forces of Capt. Kong Le Joined those of 
 the Pathet Lao, though retaining separate 
 identities, and when hostilities were sus- 
 pended by a ceasefire last May 3 the two con- 
 trolled more than half of Laos. 
 
 This brief recapitulation of events In Laos 
 in their purely internal aspect is essential for 
 putting into perspective Capt. Kong Le as an 
 important and symbolic national figure in 
 the picture showing that the Lao Govern- 
 ment is aided militarily and otherwise by the 
 United States while the 15,000 men he com- 
 mands and the 60,000 forming the Pathet 
 Lao forces are backed similarly by the Soviet 
 Union, Communist China, Communist North 
 Vietnam. 
 
 The captain is amiable, youthful, and very 
 small in stature. He came back from a liai- 
 son meeting with Pathet Lao oflacers to find 
 this correspondent in his simply furnished 
 bedroom enjoying refreshment provided 
 gracefully by the captain’s pretty and petite 
 wife. Ornaments on the desk at the foot of 
 his hardlooking bed indicate perhaps the road 
 he considers it right for the people of Laos 
 to tread now that he has opened their eyes. 
 
 Dominating the treasure was a large colored 
 photograph of General Giap, commander in 
 chief of the North Vietnamese Army cur- 
 rently accused by the Lao Government of 
 sending 10,000 men into Laos on the Pathet 
 Lao side In the civil war. 
 
 “The general sent me that himself,” said 
 the captain proudly. 
 
 Beside it was a bas-relief of Ho Chi Minh, 
 President of Communist North Vietnam. 
 And alongside this a statuette of a very fierce 
 looking lion carved out of coal from a North 
 Vietnamese mine. Another relief was of MaJ. 
 Yuri A. Gagarin, first man into outerspace — 
 next to a group picture of Cuba’s Fidel Cas- 
 tro and supporters. 
 
 Nearby stood an Impressionistic model of 
 a Soviet sputnik given the captain by the 
 Soviet Ambassador to Laos. 
 
 Among Capt. Kong Le’s books was one on 
 Major Gagarin in which one of the authors, 
 Wilfred Burchett (Australian Journalist now 
 residing in Moscow and long operating 
 assiduously in the Communist camp) had 
 written, “To Gen. Kong Le whose name is 
 known throughout the world as a great 
 patriot and who fights for the independence, 
 peace, and neutrality of Laos. With sincere 
 wishes for your further success.’’ 
 
 The captain pointed to the second word 
 of this inscription and said, “Mr. Burchett 
 calls me general but I don’t call myself that. 
 I’m Just Capt. Kong Le.” 
 
 There was no mistaking the pride with 
 which he enunciated the last three words. 
 At the time he was wearing no insignia on 
 
 641203—84362 
 
26 
 
 his uniform except a parachutist’s large 
 brass emblem on his right breast. 
 
 I am told he generally is described as basi- 
 cally and mostly "an angry young man” with- 
 out political aspirations. 
 
 "That’s right," he commented, "and some- 
 times I am very angry indeed.” 
 
 He continued, "Americans must cease sup- 
 porting the rightwingers in our civil war and 
 by denying them military help force them to 
 give up a fight they cannot possibly win if 
 left to themselves.” 
 
 Forsaking French briefly for English he 
 added "They’ve had it — and they must get 
 together with us to restore national unity.” 
 
 Before kindly sending me back in a Soviet- 
 supplied jeep to the nearby village of Phang 
 Savang where I was staying, the captain 
 made this observation in parting: 
 
 "Laos must not be a bridgehead for con- 
 flicting forces of the world. It must be a 
 bridge between them.” 
 
 [From the Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 
 
 24. 1962] 
 
 Royal Negotiations Hang on in Laos 
 (By Ronald Stead) 
 
 Khang Khay, Laos. — Prince Souvanna 
 Phouma, Premier-designate of the provi- 
 sional national coalition government, which 
 It so far has been impossible to form de- 
 spite nearly 6 months’ efforts, accorded an 
 interview to this correspondent at the head- 
 quarters and residence which he shares here 
 with the leader of the country's pro-Com- 
 munists, his half-brother. Prince Souphan- 
 ouvong. 
 
 It is a former regional command center of 
 the Franch Foreign Legion, and today’s 
 princely occupants have left undisturbed 
 some piquant murals executed by the sol- 
 dier artists of the former imperial era. In- 
 deed, they added to the murals in the main 
 hall a caricature of paratrooper Capt. Kong 
 Le kicking a soccer football vigorously onto 
 the nose of Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, strong 
 man in the counterrevolutionary admin- 
 istration currently in power at the adminis- 
 trative capital of Prince Boun Ourn, Vietiane. 
 
 PREMIER THREE TIMES 
 
 Prince Souvanna Phouma, and Prince 
 Souphanouvong have had many political 
 dealings with each other since the former 
 first became Premier of Laos in 1951. He 
 held that position until 1954, acquired it 
 again 2 years later, and was given it yet again 
 in 1960 after Capt. Kong Le’s revolutionary 
 coup ousted Prince Somsanith’s rightwing 
 pro-American administration. 
 
 Prince Souvanna Phouma left the country 
 before Gen. Phoumi Nosavan’s troops cap- 
 tured Vientiane in December 1960. How- 
 ever, he was still Premier, and he still con- 
 siders himself the rightful holder of the 
 premiership. He also considers himself the 
 rightful Minister of Foreign Affairs, which 
 
 641203—84362 
 
 is why his headquarters here has the title 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs affixed to the 
 main doorway. 
 
 DUST IS THICK 
 
 At this time of year the dominating fea- 
 ture of the surrounding landscape on the 
 highly strategic Plain of Jars (so named be- 
 cause some very large ancient Inexplicable 
 stone Jars stand at assorted angles in one 
 part of the plain) is dust, v/hich follows any 
 fast-moving vehicle like a heavy brown 
 smokescreen from an exhaust pipe. 
 
 Although now under constant Communist 
 pressure and feeling increasingly obliged to 
 accept Communist arms. Prince Souvanna 
 Phouma is not Communist, and experienced 
 observers believe him when he says he stands 
 for a policy of real neutrality. 
 
 "There has to be an accommodation with 
 Communists, internal and external,” said 
 this outstanding Lao statesman, almost the 
 only one with an understanding of the com- 
 plex international factors governing his 
 country's future. 
 
 PRESSURE ON RIGHT WING 
 
 Today he and the Lao pro-Communists are 
 entirely agreed on one thing — that the Unit- 
 ed States, having shifted the weight of its 
 support from the rightwingers to the neu- 
 tralists in the center, should put more pres- 
 sure on the rightwingers to do the same and 
 agree to place the two key portfolios in the 
 proposed coalition in the hands of the neu- 
 tralists. These are the Ministries of Defense 
 and Home Affairs, which control the army 
 and police, respectively. 
 
 The rest of the nominated ministers and 
 permanent secretaries are being juggled in 
 the hope (rather forlorn to date) of provid- 
 ing the right, left, and center with a for- 
 mula that can be accepted by all three. But 
 on defense and home affairs Princes Sou- 
 vanna Phouma and Souphanouvong will 
 never give way, the former said. 
 
 FEBRUARY COMPROMISE 
 
 The attempted compromise that Prince 
 Souvanna Phouma brought back from his 
 last visit to Vientiane February 21 to 26 was 
 one that would give the Ministries of De- 
 fense and Home Affairs to him, carrying with 
 them veterans’ affairs. He would also allot 
 the Ministry of Social Advancement. The 
 proposal was that as Minister of Defense the 
 Premier would have under him three perma- 
 nent secretaries: one from the right, one 
 from the left, and one from the center. 
 
 Prince Souvanna Phouma indicated that 
 Prince Souphanouvong would be content 
 with the triple portfolio of the Ministries 
 of Information, Sports, and Youth. 
 
 Rightwingers, however, would be far from 
 content if the pro-Communist prince had 
 them, and neutralists would prefer that he 
 be Minister of Economy and Planning in- 
 stead. The suggestion is that he have a 
 rightwing permanent secretary anyway. 
 
27 
 
 OTHER MINISTRIES 
 
 The Ministries of Public Works and Trans- 
 port ai’e envisaged as being under the Min- 
 ister from Pathet Lao. The Premier’s office 
 would be run by neutralists, who would have 
 portfolios for foreign affairs, welfare and 
 labor, health, communications, justice, fi- 
 nance, and religious affairs. Education and 
 fine arts would go to the rightwing, and 
 General Phoumi Nosavan is cmrently en- 
 visaged as Minister of Defense. He could 
 be Deputy Premier if willing to be Minister 
 of Economy and Planning. But he is a very 
 strong person, one interested in power, not 
 in the appearance of it, and he has been 
 stoutly resisting American pressures to make 
 him toe the line. 
 
 No ministry has been accorded at present 
 to Prince Bonn Oum, Premier in the 
 Vientiane Government, because in the Lao 
 scale of aristocratic precedence, he is second 
 only to the King and must be Premier or 
 nothing. 
 
 Another formula of which Prince Sou- 
 vanna Phouma talked would give 10 posts 
 to neutralists. 4 to rightwingers, 4 to left- 
 wingers, with himself as Premier in a cab- 
 inet of 19. 
 
 [From the Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 2, 
 1962] 
 
 Neutral and Red Laos Meet 
 (By Ronald Stead) 
 
 Phang Savan, Laos. — This dusty village on 
 the French-named Plaine de Janes in Laos 
 is news. And news that must be understood 
 in order to appreciate what is going on po- 
 litically in the little civil war-torn southeast 
 Asian kingdom. 
 
 A short way down the unpaved main street 
 from this correspondent’s lodgings here are 
 the headquarters of Communist China’s Eco- 
 nomic and Cultural Mission to Laos. Further 
 along is Czechoslovakia’s Economic and Cul- 
 tural Mission to Laos. And nearby is North 
 Vietnam's Economic and Cultural Mission to 
 Laos. 
 
 The Laos referred to is not that of the 
 rightwing government in Vientiane. It is the 
 Laos controlled by that country’s neutralists 
 and It is set in the midst of a wider area 
 around here controlled by the country’s 
 Communists. 
 
 The Communist diplomatic friends of these 
 two Laoses are accredited to Prince Souvanna 
 Phouma. Prime Minister-elect of the new 
 provisional coalition government that rival 
 factions of right, left, and center have been 
 unable to form in 5 months of disagreement. 
 
 Souvanna Phouma now has headquarters 
 and joint residence with his half brother. 
 Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the pro- 
 Communist Pathet Lao armed forces and 
 their political counterpart, the Neo Lao 
 Haksat. 
 
 The joint residence of the half brothers is 
 only a short ride by automobile from here. 
 
 641203—84362 
 
 But it is an uncomfortable trip owing to the 
 condition of the roads in this region. It was 
 particularly so for me when visiting the 
 princes at Khang Khay, because the auto- 
 mobile used was a large truck containing 
 only three passengers and two sacks of rice. 
 The second time I came off the seat I landed 
 on one of the sacks and decided to stay there 
 on the floor. 
 
 The French Influence persists in some ways 
 in Laos, and the rule of the road is to drive 
 on the right. In this part of the country, 
 however, people drive on the left because it 
 is less worn, though the difference is getting 
 harder and harder to detect. The truck 
 driver, a young neutralist soldier, was greatly 
 entertained at journey’s end when this cor- 
 respondent leaped adventurously to the 
 ground and sat down heavily as his travel- 
 shaken knees gave way. 
 
 The unexpected arrival was dusted off 
 amid solicitous, if incomprehensible In- 
 quiries and he offers this vignette to illus- 
 trate not only the kindness and courtesy of 
 the local residents, but also the simple con- 
 ditions in which they reside. There are no 
 taxicabs nor scheduled buses, and unless 
 private transport is at your disposal the only 
 way to travel is by thumb lift, procedure not 
 recommended after dark. 
 
 The first bedroom placed at my disposal 
 was a wooden cubicle obviously built around 
 the bed, leaving a minimum of space for 
 getting into same but a maximum for build- 
 ing another cubicle alongside. But through 
 a chance encounter with Wilfred Burchett — 
 a onetime journalist acquaintance visiting 
 here from Moscow where he lives — I found 
 an apartment that contained not only a bed 
 but also a chair and table, the latter orna- 
 mented by a tiny mug turned upside down 
 for a candlestick. 
 
 The minor comfort was Impaired by the 
 proximity of a public loudspeaker which in 
 true Communist fashion, blared out music, 
 news, exhortation and comment in masculine 
 and feminine voices from early morning on- 
 ward. This is a most alien addition to the 
 gentle unheeding of the Laos way of life. 
 
 The busiest place in Phang Savan, except 
 for headquarters of Lau Pencan [Neutral 
 Laos] party, founded by Souvanna Phouma 
 some 8 months ago, is the restaurant of 
 Ruam Mitr, hotel operated by Monsieur 
 Theo. He is a Belgian formerly in what he 
 describes as a prosperous business in Hanoi, 
 now the capital of Communist-ruled North 
 Vietnam. He takes a somewhat lugubrious 
 view of the present life and times here, and 
 dilated upon the shortage of consumer goods 
 that keeps local shops virtually empty. 
 
 Earlier he had stressed the indispensability 
 of an electric torch here if one wishes to 
 make even the shortest expedition after dark 
 in this village without street lighting. 
 
 M. Theo happened to have a spare pocket 
 flashlight. And by selling it to me he was 
 able to Illustrate quite convincingly how the 
 
28 
 
 cost of living has gone up in this neutralist 
 Laos which is so heavily dependent on Com- 
 munist protectors. 
 
 [From the Evening Star. Apr. 18, 1962] 
 Missionary Sees Need for U.S. Sacrifice To 
 Save Laos 
 
 A tall stranger, his khakis sweat-stained, 
 his bare feet covered with mud, entered a 
 Lao village, greeted the inhabitants in their 
 own tongue and sat down to share their 
 simple menu. 
 
 This stranger from another world was the 
 first white man ever seen by the Inhabitants 
 of the village and of some 40 other Lao 
 villages. 
 
 The stranger, the Reverend Mathias Men- 
 ger, a 30-year-old native of San Antonio, Tex., 
 told here today how. In his first 3 years in 
 Laos, he had walked 5,000 miles to get to 
 know the people he will serve for the rest of 
 his life. 
 
 Father Menger, an Oblate missionary, went 
 to Laos, with headquarters in Vientiane, 6 
 years ago. In January, he returned to the 
 United States for an 8-month visit and will 
 return to Laos in September. 
 
 conquered native food 
 
 In an experience remarkably similar to that 
 of the fictltlons “Father Finnian” in “The 
 Ugly American,” the controversial book about 
 American policy in southeast Asia, Father 
 Menger learned to eat Lao food by suffering 
 through attacks of dysentery until his sys- 
 tem had built up its defenses. 
 
 “In a few weeks,” he said, “I lost 35 
 pounds.” 
 
 If Laos Is not to become a Communist 
 nation, he said, more Americans will have to 
 make the same kind of sacrifices. 
 
 “I understand very well why our people 
 are not going out there to live,” he said. “If 
 I were married, I wouldn’t go out and live in 
 a Jungle. 
 
 “We need dedicated people,” he added. 
 “No purely human motive is sufficient for a 
 person to live in Laos. If I didn’t have a 
 spiritual motive, I wouldn’t live there for all 
 the money in the world.” 
 
 And yet there are people who are willing 
 to live among the people of Laos. 
 
 “One of the finest persons I have ever 
 met was a Russian Communist in Laos,” 
 Father Menger said. “I asked him how long 
 he was going to stay, assuming that, like 
 our own people, he had a short, definite 
 tour of duty. 
 
 “He didn’t seem to know what I meant. 
 ‘I have come here to make Laos a Communist 
 country,’ he told me. 'I will stay until the 
 job is done.’ ” 
 
 Since his return to the United States. 
 Father Menger has delivered 231 lectures, 
 appeared on 30 television programs and been 
 interviewed on nearly that many radio 
 stations. 
 
 One of the purposes of the lecture series 
 Is to ask for contributions to a $100,000 
 
 fund to build an orphanage — the first in 
 Laos — and a girls’ vocational school. 
 
 In every one of his lectures, he said, sev- 
 eral v/omen have been unable to listen to his 
 descriptions of some of the things he has 
 seen in Laos. 
 
 FAMILY TORTURED 
 
 A family in Father Menger’s pastorate was 
 captured by Communists, who demanded 
 they make a choice between communism and 
 Christianity. When they chose Christianity, 
 a 4-year-old daughter was brutally beaten 
 and thrown in the mud. 
 
 When they still refused to renounce Cliris- 
 tlanlty, they were buried in the village square 
 with only their heads protruding. A plow 
 was hitched to a water buffalo and the c5om- 
 munists circled the burled family. When 
 they still refused to become Communists, the 
 plow was run over the members of the family, 
 one by one. 
 
 Although he seldom goes out on military 
 patrols. Father Menger frequently works 
 close to the vagus front line of the strange 
 Laotian war. 
 
 SPIKES kill 
 
 “The Communists bury barbed spikes in 
 the ground,” he said, “and then lure their 
 enemies across the mined area. 
 
 “One day we were walking in a column 
 and the boy in front of me stepped on one 
 of the spikes. He let out a yell and fell to 
 the ground — on a bed of spikes. It was like 
 falling on a bed of icepicks. He was dead 
 in 2 minutes.” 
 
 Father Menger clearly feels that Laos is 
 the key to Southeast Asia — and that what is 
 being done now to have it is not enough. 
 
 Asked what he thought the odds are that 
 the United States will take effective steps 
 soon enough to save the country, he shook 
 his head and said : 
 
 “I know there is no reason why we should 
 lose Laos. But I Just don’t know whether 
 we will do what needs to be done to avoid it.” 
 
 [From the Nev/ York Herald Tribune, 
 Apr. 30, 1962] 
 
 Thai To Send Lao Rice To Ease “Brut.al 
 Suspension” of U.S. Aid 
 
 ■Vientiane, Laos. — Royal Government lead- 
 ers returned from ’Thailand yesterday with 
 pledges of help to ease the economic impact 
 of what a Lao official called the brutal 
 suspension of U.S. aid. 
 
 At the same time, the official. Acting For- 
 eign Minister Slsouk Na Champassak, ex- 
 pressed hope Washington v/ill understand 
 the royal Government’s position and reverse 
 U.S. policy. 
 
 The United States suspended its $3 million 
 monthly economic aid to Laos in February, 
 when Premier Prince Boun Gum refused to 
 enter into a coalition regime with neutralist 
 Prince Souvanna Phouma as Premier. 
 
 The United States insisted this was the 
 the only hope for ending the rebellion of 
 the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao guer- 
 
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29 
 
 rillas. The royal Government feared the 
 Communists eventually would take over from 
 Prince Souvanna. 
 
 Mr. Sissouk told reporters the Thai Gov- 
 ernment, as a first step, has given Laos a 
 grant of 1,000 tons of rice — about enough 
 to supply this administrative capital for 10 
 days — and will provide other products such 
 as cement. 
 
 Mr. Sisouk declined to give details but 
 said, “We have drawn a plan of our needs, 
 and Thai officials promised to consider them 
 within the limits of Thailand's capabilities.” 
 
 Asked if the U.S. policy of suspending eco- 
 nomic assistance was raised during discus- 
 sions with That officials in Bangkok, Mr. 
 Sisouk replied: “The Thai Government 
 doesn’t understand this brutal suspension.” 
 
 HARRIMAN SAW NO AID 
 
 A reporter said W. Averell Harriman, U.S. 
 Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Af- 
 fairs, had declared after his visit to Laos 
 In March that no southeast Asian govern- 
 ment would consider helping Boun Gum’s 
 government. 
 
 Mr. Sisouk said Mr. Harriman made the 
 statement “after failure of his mission 
 here.” Mr. Harriman had come here to try 
 to get the rival factions to negotiate again 
 on a neutral coalition regime. 
 
 “The seciuity of Thailand,” Mr. Sisouk 
 said, “depends on the security of Laos. 
 Therefore, Thai officials have manifested a 
 lot of sympathy in giving us what we need.” 
 
 The Government visit to Thailand was 
 the first of several to be made to Asian 
 neighbors seeking support in the dispute 
 with Washington. A delegation will leave 
 Tuesday for South Korea. 
 
 [Prom the New York Times, May 13, 1962] 
 New Crises Loom for United States in 
 
 Southeast Asia — Perils for the West 
 
 Pointed Up by Communist Gain in Laos — 
 
 Saigon Foes Still Hold Initiative 
 (By Robert Trumbull) 
 
 Taipei, Taiwan, May 12. — New successes 
 by the pro-Communist rebels in Laos have 
 again underscored the perilous position of 
 the free world in the turbulent and vital 
 southeast Asian region stretching from Sai- 
 gon on the west to Rangoon on the east and 
 reaching southward to the Indonesian archi- 
 pelago and New Guinea. 
 
 After weighing all the developments, it is 
 hard to find any place in the area where the 
 outlook for the West has brightened in recent 
 days. Disquieting signs are many. 
 
 With pro-Communlst forces advancing in 
 Laos, our friends in that country and neigh- 
 boring Thailand are becoming estranged and 
 embittered. 
 
 Despite increasingly massive U.S. support 
 to President Ngo Dinh Diems’ regime, the 
 Communist guerrillas called the Vietcong 
 still hold the initiative in South Vietnam. 
 
 Many observers expect the Communists to 
 inspire serious trouble in Singapore over 
 Malaya’s plan to absorb that strategic island 
 and neighboring British territories in Bor- 
 neo into an expanded pro-Western state to 
 be called Malaysia. 
 
 Hoping to remain aloof and continue with 
 their own development, nonallned Burma 
 and Cambodia burrow into their neutralist 
 cocoons. 
 
 soviet arms 
 
 Neutralist Indonesia, preparing to attack 
 Netherlands New Guinea in what President 
 Sukarno regards as an “anticolonial” libera- 
 tion movement, is committing more and 
 more of her resources to the Soviet Union in 
 return for arms. 
 
 The United States has attacked the prob- 
 lems in southeast Asia in various ways. 
 
 In Laos, Washington is pressing the loyal 
 pro-Western Government of Prince Boun 
 Gum to join in a coalition regime to be 
 headed by neutralist Prince Souvanna Phou- 
 ma. The coalition would include leftist sup- 
 porters of pro-Communist Prince Soupha- 
 nouvong. 
 
 The U.S. efforts to get Indonesia and the 
 Netherlands to negotiate the New Guinea 
 question have so far yielded little success. 
 
 With the new military regime just begin- 
 ning to find its feet in Burma, an effective 
 U.S. policy at this point seems debatable. 
 
 Washington’s program in Cambodia is 
 committed to supporting efforts by Prince 
 Norodom Sihanouk’s government to raise liv- 
 ing standards in this surprisingly progressive 
 Southeast Asian kingdom. American eco- 
 nomic aid far outstrips the contributions of 
 the Communist powers to Sihanouk’s devel- 
 opment plans. Sihanouk maintains his in- 
 dependence of both power blocs. 
 
 economic aid 
 
 The task of American diplomats In Malaya 
 and Singapore is complicated by Washing- 
 ton’s programs to release stockpiled tin and 
 rubber, which hit Malaya’s principal sources 
 of revenue. But Malaya’s political problems 
 are more immediately a concern of Britain, 
 which still has suzerainty in varying degrees 
 over Singapore, and the territories of North 
 Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. 
 
 Because the Communist threat is most 
 acute in South Vietnam and Laos, these are 
 the crisis points in the area from the U.S.’ 
 point of view. Because of its proximity, 
 Thailand cannot be separated from the prob- 
 lem in this sector. 
 
 “It’s too bad,” an American diplomat In 
 another Southeast Asian state said recently, 
 “that Washington can’t seem to act strongly 
 in a country until there’s a crisis.” 
 
 The Kennedy administration’s policy of 
 seeking a coalition regime in Laos is con- 
 troversial to say the least among our friends 
 in Vientiane and Bangkok. And it has 
 raised eyebrows from Australia to Pakistan. 
 
 641203—84362 
 
30 
 
 Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, the strongman 
 In Prince Bonn Gum's government, Is con- 
 vinced of the danger that the pro-Commu- 
 nlsts will eventually prevail in a coalition. 
 To prevent this, he had insisted that the 
 pro-Western side keep control of the army 
 and police. The United States and Soviet 
 Union, acting in rare agreement, want these 
 key portfolios handed over to neutralist 
 Prince Souvanna Phouma. 
 
 Those who agree with General Phoumi in- 
 clude Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the anti- 
 communist Premier of Thailand. Sarit is 
 giving Vientiane economic aid in an effort 
 to offset the punitive suspension of the U.S. 
 dole of $3 million monthly to the Bonn Gum 
 regime. 
 
 But the unchecked Communist advance 
 in northwest Laos this week has strength- 
 ened the U.S. feeling that the Royal Lao 
 Army is ineffective and that a coalition gov- 
 ernment is the only answer. 
 
 The U.S. position in Laos obviously rests 
 upon confidence in the good faith of neu- 
 tralist Souvanna Phouma and the Commu- 
 nists. This is plainly a gamble. If our bet 
 turns out to be wrong, it will be rather late 
 to prevent the other side from pulling in 
 the pot. 
 
 U.S. ADVICE 
 
 American military men in South Vietnam 
 are advised on arrival that they are “there 
 to advise, not to command.” In this frame- 
 work our efforts to aid the Vietnamese are 
 severely limited by the shortcomings of the 
 Saigon regime. 
 
 American officers are not free to overrule 
 the deployment of Ngo Dinh Diemn's 200,- 
 000-man army plus auxiliary paramilitary 
 forces in accordance with the political pur- 
 poses of the President and his powerful 
 brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. 
 
 As a result the greatly outnumbered Vlet- 
 cong continues to score in surprise forays 
 against undermanned outposts. And the 
 extraordinarily inept administration of the- 
 oretically sound programs to break the Viet- 
 cong’s hold on the loyalties of the peasant 
 
 population continues to play into the hands 
 of the enemy. 
 
 An example Is the heavy-handed Imple- 
 mentation of “Gperatlon Sunrise,” the proj- 
 ect for relocating villagers in protected stra- 
 tegic hamlets. Eyewitnesses have noted that 
 youths of military age have been conspicu- 
 ously lacking among transplanted groups. 
 The presumption has been that many if not 
 all of these have defected to the Vietcong. 
 
 These accounts tend to belle official state- 
 ments implying that the Vietcong recruits 
 mainly by abductions and other terror tac- 
 tics. In any case, the main problem in 
 Vietnam is still to get the peasants to help 
 the Government rather than the enemy. 
 
 Gperation Sunrise, combined with direct 
 military action mixing use of modern weap- 
 ons with less familiar antiguerrilla tactics, 
 may still work in South Vietnam as eventu- 
 ally happened in Malaya. The complicating 
 factor in Gperatlon Sunrise, however, is the 
 attachment of the Vietnamese to their 
 ancestral soil, an attachment the Malayans 
 generally lack. 
 
 CIVIL STRIFE 
 
 Gne of the imponderables in Vietnam Is 
 the widely discussed possibility that the 
 Ngo Dinh Diem government may be over- 
 turned by a more skillful application of 
 coup d’etat tactics than the abortive attempt 
 by disaffected army officers in November 
 1960. Americans hesitate to contemplate the 
 prospects for widespread civil disruption to 
 the benefit of the Communists should the 
 regime be upset. 
 
 Thailand has recently sought to bolster 
 her defensive position by obtaining a guar- 
 antee of military protection from the United 
 States. Should Laos fall and the Commu- 
 nists move southward, Bangkok may call for 
 help under this agreement. 
 
 With Laos still unsettled and a long war 
 ahead in South Vietnam and other areas 
 still uncertain, it is too early to try to pre- 
 dict whether events will turn out to the 
 benefit of the West in southeast Asia on 
 any front. But the prospects are for deep 
 involvement of the United States in this 
 area for a long time. 
 
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