F. P. A. Pamphlet No. 27 Series of 1923-24 X-nfernaV. Icl. The Turco-American Treaty of AMITY AND Commerce SIGNED AT LAUSANNE AUGUST 6, 1923 Report of the F. P. A. COMMITTEE ON THE LAUSANNE TREATY Presented May, ig 24 to the EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE of the Foreign Policy Association NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS NINE EAST FORTY-FIFTH STREET NEW YORK Foreign Policy Association For a Liberal and Constructive American Foreign Policy NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 9 East Forty-fifth Street, New York City EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE BRUCE BLIVEN HUGHELL FOSBROKE ROBERT H. GARDINER CARLTON J. H. HATES CHARLES P. HOWLAND PAUL U. KELLOGG GEORGE M. LA MONTE JAMES G. McDonald, chairman MRS. HENRY GODDARD LEACH MISS RUTH MORGAN RALPH S. ROUNDS MRS. V. G. SIMKHOVITCH MRS. WILLARD D. STRAIGHT MRS. CHARLES L. TIFFANY MISS LILLIAN D. WALD CHRISTINA MERRIMAN, Secretary GEORGE M. LA MONTE, Treasurer ESTHER G. OGDEN, Membership Secretary Annual Membership |5 a year. Weekly News Bulletin, 50c. a year. MEMBERS OF THE F. P. A. COMMITTEE ON THE LAUSANNE TREATY PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN : Professor of International Law at Princeton University. Former Charge d’Affaires of American Embassy, Constantinople. Author of For- eigners in Turkey. (Princeton, 1914.) SAMUEL McCREA CAVERT: General Secretary of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, who has recently returned from the Near East. EDWARD MEAD EARLE, Chairman: Professor of His- tory at Columbia University; author of Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway. (New York, 1923.) JACKSON FLEMING: A much-traveled student of world politics, with a special interest in the Near East. BARNETTE MILLER; Associate Professor of History at Wellesley College. Formerly Professor of History at Con- stantinople Woman’s College, 1909-1913; 1916-1919. LAURENCE MOORE: Acting Secretary of American Col- leges in Turkey. E. E. PRATT : Formerly Chief of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, U. S. Dept, of Commerce. W. L. WESTERMANN : Professor of History at Columbia University. Formerly Chief of the Near Eastern Divi- sion of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Paris, 1919. The Report expresses the personal conclusions of the signers and is not to be regarded as necessarily representing the organisations or in- stitutions with which they are connected. The Turco - American Treaty OF Amity and Commerce Report of the F. P. A. COMMITTEE ON THE LAUSANNE TREATY TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE F. P. A.: T he special Committee appointed by the Foreign Policy Associa- tion to report upon the Turco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce, signed at Lausanne, August 6, 1923, herewith sub- mits the result of its investigations : In spite of differences of opinion upon matters of detail, the members of the Committee are unanimously of the opinion that the prompt rati- fication by the Senate of the Turco-American Treaty would be in the best interests of the United States and of the peoples of the Near East. Our discussions have demonstrated clearly that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate a peace with Turkey which would satisfy all varieties of American opinion. The Turco-American Treaty must be considered an integral part of the Peace of Lausanne which permits the resumption of the affairs of normal life in the Near East. The Great Need in the Nesir East is Peace Even an imperfect settlement in the Near East is preferable to none. This unhappy region of the world has been cursed with an almost un- interrupted series of civil and international wars for the past fifteen years — wars which have been fought not only with the usual weapons of “civilized warfare,” but with the other deadly weapons of expropri- ation, vandalism, deportation, massacre, religious persecution, and almost every other form of outrage against life, liberty, and property. To indulge in recriminations, to vent one’s spleen with bitter diatribes against one Near Eastern people or another, is to confuse the issues. What is worse, it is to heighten racial and religious animosities and to create a vitiating atmosphere in which peace — however technically ad- mirable from the diplomatic point of view — can not survive. Vindictive- ness will contribute nothing to a solution of the Near Eastern problem. No one people has been responsible for, and no one people has been 3 exempt from, the sufferings which have accompanied the Young Turk Revolutions of 1908-1909, the Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the Great War of 1914-1918, and the Graeco-Turkish War of 1919-1922. No right-minded American will condone the massacre, literally by the hundreds of thousands, of Christian minorities by the Turks. No. intellectually honest American, however, will close his mind to the fact that the Turks themselves have suffered cruel hardships as a result of war, famine, and disease. These sufferings have been none the less severe because the less well- known in the United States. It has been estimated by competent au- thorities that at least 400,000 Turks were driven from their homes in Macedonia and Thrace during the Balkan Wars, and that the Russian invasions of Turkish Armenia from 1915 to 1917 led to the expulsion of about 800,000 Moslem refugees.^ According to the Harbord Report, not more than twenty per cent of all Turkish peasants who went to the Great War have returned to their homes, at least 600,000 having succumbed to typhus alone. “In the region which witnessed the ebb and flow of the Russian and Turkish armies the physical condition of the country is deplorable and where Armenians advanced and retired with the Russians their retaliatory cruelties unquestionably rivaled the Turks in their inhumanity.’” The devastation wrought by the Greek armies in their advance from Smyrna and Brusa is too well- known to require further comment. None of these facts is cited for the purpose of denying the charges brought against the Turkish Government for mistreatment of its sub- ject peoples. It may truthfully be asserted, however, that the excesses of the Turks have been exaggerated, and that similar excesses of Chris- tian peoples of the Near East and of Christian Powers of the West have been underestimated or passed over in silence. “If our aim is not simply to condemn, but to cure, we can only modify the conduct of the Turks by altering their frame of mind, and our only means of doing that is to change our own attitude towards them. So long as we mete out one measure to them, another to the Greeks (and Armenians), and yet a third to ourselves, we shall have no moral influence over them.”'* Atrocities are the most extreme form of a bitter racial, religious and nationalistic struggle between the Near Eastern peoples. The most ef- fective way to terminate this struggle is to eliminate foreign intrigue, to effect normal peace-time relationships, and to take up the heroic task of economic reconstruction. To treat the Turks as pariahs is to invite them to conduct themselves as such. To reject the settlement which has been 1. Cf. A. J. Toynbee, The 'Western Question in Greece and Turfeej/. (1922), especially pp. 138, 191, 342. Also Report of the Intematio^ial Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (1914). 2. Major General James G. Harbord, Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia (October, 1919). Senate Document No. 266, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session. 3. A. J. Toynbee, op. cit.j p. 354. 4 proposed is to perpetuate the psychology of war, if not an actual state of war. The way to terminate war is to make peace. A Dictated Peace Neither Possible Nor Desirable A few elementary facts must be understood if one is to pass judg- ment upon the Peace of Lausanne as a whole or upon the Turco- Amer- ican Treaty as one of its parts : 1. The Allies and the United States were not in a position to dictate to Turkey the terms of a settlement. The Turkish delegation at Lau- sanne had to be listened to, if for no other reason than that it repre- sented a nation victorious in arms whose major claims had been recog- nized by the Mudania Armistice of October, 1922. Whether the West- ern nations could have defeated the Turks is not the question. To retrieve lost military fortunes in the Near East would have required expenditures of money and of lives which no government was in a position to undertake. Certainly the Government of the United States, which had never been at war with Turkey and which was in the control of a political party pledged to an isolationist policy, could not have undertaken to reverse the military situation. Failure on the part of the American representatives at Lausanne to recognize the facts as they were, rather than as some Americans thought they ought to be, would have made any negotiations with the Turks out of the question. 2. There is no reason for believing that a peace dictated to the Turks by the Western Powers would have been a good peace. On the con- trary, there are excellent reasons for believing that such a peace would have been neither just nor lasting. A great power’s terms imposed upon the small are almost certain to be arbitrary and ungenerous. Such a peace, if accepted at all, is accepted “in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and leaves a sting, a resentment, and a bitter memory” which are the very negation of peace.'^ Such a settlement was the Treaty of Sevres, signed under compulsion by a puppet Turkish Government in August, 1920. By the terms of this treaty and of the secret interallied agreement which formed part of the settlement, the former territories of the Ottoman Empire were divided with primary consideration for the imperialistic interests of the Great Powers and with only secondary concern for the wishes and the welfare of the Near Eastern peoples. In spite of the promise of “a secure sovereignty” to the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire,^ the Turkey that re- mained to the Turks was partitioned into spheres of interest and was tied hand and foot by interallied control in military, financial, com- mercial, judicial, and administrative matters. Allied administration of Constantinople and Greek occupation of Smyrna deprived the peas- antry of Anatolia of their only satisfactory ports of export and import. 1. See President Wilson’s address to the Senate, January 22, 1917. 2. The Fourteen points of President Wilson, point XII. 5 It is not recorded that the persons now denouncing the Peace of Lau- sanne raised a voice of protest against the injustices of the Treaty of Sevres. It is essential, if we are to have peace in the world, that “impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just.’” 3. The Turks no more dictated the terms of the Peace of Lau- sanne, than did the Allies. The Turkish delegation were obdurate re- garding concessions, capitulations, and financial control of the Allies, but were surprisingly conciliatory regarding other matters. They ac- cepted without objection a regime for the Straits which is the most liberal in modern times and which, incidentally, places the city of Constantinople practically at the mercy of any first-class naval power. They recog- nized all of their debts and agreed to examine in most friendly spirit the pecuniary claims of American and Allied nationals. The property rights of foreigners in Turkey — with the exception of certain conces- sions of doubtful validity — have been scrupulously observed. No com- pensation, it is true, was provided for Greek refugees from Smyrna and Thrace whose property _was expropriated, but, on the other hand, all claims were renounced for reparation of damage wrought by the Greek Expeditionary Forces in Anatolia from May, 1919, to October, 1922. In territorial questions, full agreement was reached early in the conference; the question of Mosul was to be settled by independent negotiations between Turkey and Great Britain or by the arbitration of the League of Nations ; in other respects Turkey renounced all territory which was not predominantly Turkish in nationality. Minori- ties were placed under the definite protection of the League of Nations. Although there is no denying the fact that the Turks won national sovereignty from the Western Powers at Lausanne, that fact, however distasteful to some Americans, should not stand in the way of an honest examination of the treaties. The settlement should stand or fall upon its merits. 4. Although it is not maintained that the Peace of Lausanne is a perfect peace, it is in many respects the best Near Eastern settle- ment which has been reached for a century and a half. Since the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, in 1774, every treaty be- tween Turkey and the European Powers has been based upon the principle of the right of arbitrary interference by any of the Powers, upon one pretext or another, in the affairs of the Near East. This right of intervention, made possible by the weakness of the former Ottoman Empire, has been utilized by Western Powers to play off one Near Eastern people against another, with results disastrous to Gill 1. President Wilson’s speech at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York City, Sep- tember 27, 1918. 6 all. It is an indisputable historical fact that previous to the nineteenth century the Turks practiced a degree of religious toleration large com- pared with that practiced contemporaneously in Western Europe. As in Western Europe unorthodox religious beliefs cost the Protestant or the Dissenter or the Catholic his civil and political privileges, so in Turkey Christians were at a disadvantage compared with Moslems. It was not until the nineteenth century, however, that persecution by the Turks occurred in more than isolated and sporadic instances. Mas- sacres and deportations became endemic only when the doctrine of nationalism spread to the Near East, and they increased in geometric ratio of foreign interference and foreign intrigue. The intervention of the Great Powers in the Balkans and in Turkey has frequently been a curse to the Near Eastern peoples and to the European peoples alike. The Lausanne treaties have established a Turkish national state, free from the Damoclean sword of Western imperialism. Holding a key position in the political geography of the world, the new Turkish state will have rendered a real service to peace if it can maintain a stable government and successfully resist traditional West- ern diplomacy. To this purpose it would be wise for Americans to support the Angora Government. As long as the governments in the Balkan and Anatolian peninsulas are weak and ineffective and con- stantly flying at each other’s throats with the support of the Great Powers, no satisfactory relations — diplomatic, missionary, educational, archaeological, philanthropic, or commercial, — can be maintained be- tween America and the Near East. Political stabilization in Greece and Turkey will be one of the most effective ways of preventing con- flicts between the Near Eastern peoples, as well as conflicts between the European Powers which have been engaged in keen competition for economic, political, and strategic advantages in the Levant. In this connection it is of significance to point out that whereas France and Great Britain were at swords’ points on Near Eastern questions almost continuously from October, 1914, to July, 1923, their relationships have been materially improved since the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, The Scope and Purpose of the Turco- American Treaty It was not and could not have been the purpose of the American representatives at Lausanne to unmake the sordid history of the Near East from 1914 to 1923 — the deportations and massacres of Armenians, wholesale extermination of populations by war and disease, predatory imperialism violating legitimate national aspirations, the ill-advised Greek invasion of Anatolia followed by another cruel war of devas- tation, the totally unacceptable peace at Sevres, the charred ruins of Smyrna and Afiun Karahissar and Eskishehr. These damages were 7 irreparable. Our inability or unwillingness to participate fully in the discussion of peace terms for Turkey because we had never been technically at war with the Ottoman Empire ; our consent to the Greek occupation of Smyrna; our refusal — right or wrong — to accept a mandate for Armenia; all these reasons made it impossible for us to retrace the various steps in American policy in the Near East since 1917. Even the advocates of cooperation in Europe, it may safely be said, would hesitate to embroil the United States in the present Near Eastern situation. The only course the American delegation at Lausanne could pur- sue was the course it chose. Faced with a treaty between Turkey and the Allies which abandoned the Capitulations and other exterritorial rights and which recognized the National Government of Angora, it would have been futile to do otherwise than to secure most-favored- nation treatment for American interests. Aware of the temper of American public opinion, it would have been out of the question for the American delegation, apart from the European Powers, to assume re- sponsibility for the purely political questions of boundaries, the status of Constantinople and the Straits, or the establishment of an Ar- menian Republic. What Mr. Grew^ signed at Lausanne was a Treaty of Amity and Commerce designed to secure to Americans the same rights as were secured by the Allied Treaty to Britons, Frenchmen, Italians, and the others. It is difficult to ascertain upon what basis we could justly claim more or by what methods we could enforce any such additional claim. In general, the attacks upon the Treaty are launched with two alleged justifications: first, that we have abandoned our rights; sec- ond, that we have ignored our responsibilities. It is sometimes inti- mated, also, that no diplomatic relationships with Turkey — except, presumably, such as are based upon force or the threat of force — are desirable. As regards American rights in Turkey, they may be classified under the following heads : regime of the Capitulations ; economic ; mis- sionary, educational, and philanthropic; archaeological. American responsibilities, we take it, are concerned with the protection of minorities and with the status of Armenia. Abolition of the Capitulations The Turco- American Treaty of August 6, 1923, surrenders the exterritorial rights which American citizens, in common with other foreigners, possessed in Turkey before October 1, 1914, on the basis of most-favored-nation treatment. Under the Capitulations, Ameri- 1. Mr. Joseph Grew, Minister to Switzerland, was the American observer at the second Lausanne Conference. 8 cans formerly enjoyed immunities from the jurisdiction of Turkish financial officials, the Turkish police, and the Turkish courts. Under the proposed treaty, Americans in Turkey will enjoy no such im- munities. This is admittedly the surrender of an important American privilege, but it is not the first instance in which such privileges have been surrendered.^ It is not certain, however, that the former regime of the Capitula- tions was justified on the grounds of either expediency or right. The exemption of foreigners from taxation and the veto of foreign gov- ernments over increases in the Ottoman customs duties assisted in the perpetual pauperization of the Turkish Treasury and placed the Sublime Porte at the mercy of European diplomatists and European financiers. As a result of the privileged juridical status of foreigners the grossest abuses arose. Foreign consuls were exalted officials who usurped the place, in large measure, of the Turkish authorities. For- eigners were so completely exempt from the jurisdiction of the Turk- ish police that they came, in effect, to be regarded as subject to no law. Consciously or unconsciously, they not infrequently indicated an utter disregard and contempt for many of the police regulations. The Turkish authorities often found themselves quite helpless under the most trying and exasperating circumstances. The most notorious instance of this helplessness was the impotence of the police in dealing with the hotels, cafes, gambling houses, saloons, dance-halls, and other pleasure resorts which flourished in defiance of Moslem sensibilities. Even before the Great War, the European Powers recognized that a system which permitted of such abuses must come to an end. They bargained with the Turks in Oriental fashion for valuable conces- sions and other special privileges as the price of their abrogation. The discredited regime was doomed, and it was no surprise to any- one when, upon entering the Great War, the Ottoman Government declared the Capitulations at an end. The Treaty of Sevres of August 20, 1920, sought to reimpose the system of the Capitulations, but by Article VI of the National Pact the Nationalist Government 0 \f Turkey had previously made it plain that this was one point upon which Mustapha Kemal and his followers would not compromise. The first Lausanne Conference broke up largely because of the de- termination of the Turks to fight rather than to surrender upon what they considered a vital issue. The Allies were not disposed to resume hostilities, with the result that the second Conference terminated in the abrogation of the Capitulations in every respect. 1. Exterritorial rights in Japan have long since been surrendered by the United States. A treaty was signed on December 16, 1920, between the United States and Siam providing for the aboiition (as regards the United States) of exterritorial privileges in Siam. See 42 — 17. S. Statutes at Large. 9 The United States could not contend single-handed for what the Eu- ropean Powers had renounced. We can not now properly claim priv- ileges greater than those enjoyed by nationals of the Allied Powers. The Turks, with the best of good will toward us, can not be expected to concede to Americans a special status which they have refused to grant Europeans. Such being the situation, inexorable logic de- manded that the United States should define its relations with Turkey in treaty form in order not to be placed at a serious disadvantage. The Treaty of August 6, 1923, together with the accompanying uni- lateral declarations of the Turkish delegates at Lausanne, grants to nationals of the United States most-favored-nation treatment Avith nationals of the Great Powers as defined by the Treaty of July 24, 1923. The juridical status of Americans, therefore, is as follows: 1. Although Consular Courts are abolished, Article VIII of the Turco- American Treaty provides that Consuls retain their special rights “in mat- ters of civil status according to international law or special agreements.” This provision is general enough to permit of liberal interpretation and elaboration under tactful diplomacy and cautious experiment. 2. All questions of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, dowry, paternity, adoption, guardianship, inheritance, etc., are left to the juris- diction of American tribunals or other competent American authorities outside of Turkey. 3. According to a special declaration of July 24, 1923, issued by the Turkish delegation at Lausanne in connection with the new system of judicial administration : “In civil or commercial matters, all references to arbitration and clauses in agreements providing therefor are allowed, and the arbitral decisions rendered in pursuance thereof shall be executed on being signed by the President of the Court of First Instance, who shall not refuse his signature unless the decision shall be contrary to public order.” Experience alone will demonstrate the value of this provision, but it would seem to offer great possibilities for the settlement of litigation by foreigners outside the Turkish courts. 4. Paragraph three of the same declaration provides that: “In cases of minor offenses, release on bail shall always be ordered, unless this entails danger to public safety or unless such provisional release is likely to im- pede the investigation of the case.” 5. The Turkish Government obligates itself to employ a number of legal advisers selected from a list prepared by the Permanent Court of Interna- tional Justice. These advisers shall observe the administration of justice, receive complaints, make suggestions to the Ministry of Justice, and assist in the drafting of legislation. Domiciliary visits on foreigners by the police are to be reported to these advisers. 6. Foreigners are guaranteed equality of treatment with Turkish na- tionals — that is, they shall not be discriminated against in the administra- tion of justice. It is dear that these judicial guarantees are not comparable to to those enjoyed by Americans before the Great War. Moreover, they are to continue for only seven years unless permitted to remain 10 in force by the Turkish authorities subject to abrogation after six months’ notice. It is also apparent that after the long period of wars and administrative demoralization in Turkey, it will require a long time to train competent executive and judicial officials. The admin- istrative inexperience of most of the Nationalists and the scarcity of trained functionaries of intelligence and probity will place a heavy responsibility upon Turkey. It is the opinion of the majority of this Committee that it would have been highly desirable in every way, for the Turks no less than foreigners, if some transitional system had been established during which the Angora Government might have prepared itself for the full assumption of police and judicial powers. Turkish suspicion of European intentions is so deep-rooted, how- ever, that no such compromise at Lausanne was possible. Whatever one may think of the regime of the Capitulations per se, one must admit that it can be re-established in Turkey only by force. No other nations are prepared to go to war with Turkey for the purpose and it is unthinkable that the United States should assume this Quixotic role unassisted. To insist that Americans still enjoy ex- territorial privileges under the Treaty of 1830 is to close our eyes to the facts. Such a stand would be ignored by Turkey and would be resented by the European Powers. There remains only the alterna- tive of a graceful acceptance and the securing, by wise diplomacy, of a maximum of legitimate advantages for American interests in Turkey. American Economic Rights Under the Treaty Sweeping assertions have been made that the Treaty with Turkey is “humiliating and purposeless” and “surrenders every American right in Turkey.” Nothing could be further from the truth. The abolition of the Capitulations, to be sure, will remove the exemptions from taxation which American business formerly enjoyed in the Otto- man Empire. Inasmuch, however, as no foreigners are hereafter to enjoy such exemptions, American interests are placed at no disad- vantage as regards other interests. Americans are to enjoy most- favored-nation treatment as regards import and export duties, patents and trade marks, the transportation of goods and the free entry of merchant vessels, etc., in accordance with the traditional policy of the open door. A convention has been negotiated which satisfies, it is understood, all legitimate pecuniary claims of American citizens for damages resulting from operations of war and other causes for which the Turkish Government may be considered responsible. Further- more the Treaty confers upon American commercial corporations the right to hold property in their own names, a departure from Ottoman custom which will materially expedite the transaction of business. It is the general opinion of American business men in Turkey that the 11 Nationalist Government should be given an opportunity to establish a stable administration without the interference of foreign powers. Commercial interests desire nothing more than an end of war in the Near East and the re-establishment of normal economic relationships. The Committee has received an illuminating letter from a promi- nent American merchant in Constantinople, a quotation from which will indicate the point of view of those who are now doing business with the Turks: “Naturally, there are many whose interests would be served by the non-ratiftcation of the Treaty, chiefly our European competitors for trade here. Of late, we have equalled or exceeded British imports; and if the new British Parliament ratifies and we do not — and all of the Allies will ratify sooner or later — we shall be placed at a great disadvantage nationally, and individually we shall have a hard time to get along.” It has been stated by opponents of the Treaty that American trade with Turkey is insignificant in volume, that it holds out no hope for the future and that, consequently, it may be ignored as a factor in the situation. This opinion does not con- form with the facts. In 1900, American exports to Turkey amounted to only $50,000; in 1913, they had risen to $3,500,000 and in 1920 to $42,200,000. Imports into the United States from Turkey, includ- ing certain important raw materials, increased from $22,100,000 in 1913 to $39,600,000 in 1920. From 1919 to 1922 American trade with Constantinople alone averaged over $30,000,000 annually.* While one cannot definitely predict that there will be a continued increase in Turco-American trade, one can predict with certainty that the de- nunciation of the Treaty will do nothing to promote such an increase. According to Article X of the Treaty “merchant and war vessels and aircraft of the United States enjoy complete liberty of naviga- tion and passage in the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bos- phorus on a basis of equality with similar craft of the most-favored- nation, subject to the rules relating to such navigation and passage in the Straits Convention of Lausanne of July 24, 1923.” An exami- nation of the Straits Convention discloses that American merchant vessels, yachts, fishing vessels and non-military aircraft enjoy unre- stricted freedom of navigation of the Straits, without any formalities except international sanitary regulations and without any tax or other charge except such as may be freely paid for towage, pilotage, and other similar services. These privileges are guaranteed American ves- sels in time of war, as in time of peace, with the single exception of a 1. Great Britain, France and Italy have already ratified the Treaty of Lausanne and with the formal approval of Japan which is expected in a few days, the Treaty will come into force. New York Times, May 16, 1924. 2. There has been a falling off in Turco-American trade during 1923, because of the interallied military evacuation and post-war economic depression throughout the Near Fast. 12 war between the United States and Turkey, in which case, of course, American vessels would be subject to seizure if not adequately pro- tected. In spite of these indisputable facts, a recent memorandum ad- vocating rejection of the Treaty unblushingly states that the Darda- nelles “may be closed at the will of the Turks, as was done in 1914 and on many other occasions.” The most charitable thing which may be said of this statement is that it is ambiguous. If the implication is that the Turks may legally close the Straits, it is inaccurate. If the implication is that they may arbitrarily close the Straits by military force, it overlooks completely the elaborate regulations of the Straits Convention for the complete demilitarization of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, and of the islands which control those waterways. It ignores, also, the fact that the administration of these regulations is to be in the hands of an international Commis- sion of the Straits upon which the United States, if it so chooses, may be represented. At the instance of Mr. Richard Washburn Child, the American observer at the first Lausanne Conference, the Straits Convention likewise permitted free passage through the Dardanelles and the Bos- phorus of American war vessels to a tonnage equal to that of the most powerful single fleet of the Black Sea countries. It was the contention of Mr. Child that this privilege was desired by the United States in order “to police the free seas, to protect its citizens and ships wherever they might be, to suppress piracy and other menaces, and to act at times for the public good and to give relief to suffering, just as ships of war have recently acted in the Near East.” ^ Insofar as American commercial interests and philanthropic enterprises are centered in Samsun and other Black Sea ports of Turkey, they will be under the protection of American destroyers should the Government elect to despatch them. It may safely be said that the Straits Con- vention of Lausanne is the most liberal international agreement which has yet regulated navigation in those waters. It is desirable to make clear at this point that there are several members of this Committee who are fearful of the existing tendency of Governments to promote actively by diplomatic and military means the so-called “economic interests” of the nation in foreign territory. Were there any evidence in this Treaty that the Department of State had permitted its Near Eastern policy to be determined by an economic quid pro quo, several members of this Committee would be inclined to advo- cate the reopening of negotiations with Turkey on a different basis. There is no such evidence, however, and the Secretary of State has 1. Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-lSZS. Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace. (London, 1923) p. 146. 13 recently denied that the negotiation of the Turco-American Treaty was conducted in a spirit of economic imperialism. In his speech be- fore the Council of Foreign Relations, at New York, January 23, 1924, Mr. Hughes said: “At no stage in the negotiations was the American position determined by the so-called Chester concession. This had been granted before negotiations of our treaty with Turkey had been begun. This Government took no part in securing it; this Government made no barter of any of its rights for this or any other concession. Our position is a simple one. We maintain the policy of the open door, or equality of commercial opportunity; we demand a square deal for our nationals. We objected to the alleged concession to the Turkish Petroleum Gompany, owned by foreign interests, be- cause it had never been validly granted, and in so doing we stood for American rights generally and not for any particular interest.” The Treaty cund Archaeological Reseaurch With respect to American rights in archaeological research in Turkey, the Treaty provides that American archaeologists, in common with other Americans, shall enjoy most-favored-nation treatment. Under the terms of Article III,^ they would be permitted, subject to Turkish regulations, to conduct researches unless such researches should be forbidden to all foreigners. This means that the Turkish law upon antiquities shall apply to discoveries made by Americans who have obtained permission from the Turkish Government to ex- cavate — namely, that the antiquities discovered shall be the property of the Turkish Government, subject to such arrangements for division of the discoveries as may be made by mutual agreement of the exca- vators and the Turkish authorities.^ It is true, of course, that as with all undeveloped peoples, vandalism and lack of appreciation of materials of scientific value are more prev- alent in Turkey than in more developed countries. There is also constant danger that valuable historical materials may be lost. But it is not true that “there are no Turkish archaeologists.” The splen- did museum built up at Constantinople in the past generation by the well-known archaeologist, Osman Hamdi Bey, who died a few years ago, is sufficient refutation of this misrepresentation. The work of Hamdi Bey, an archaeologist of high international repute, is now being carried on by his brother, Halil Edheim Bey. 1. Although Article III does not specifically refer to archaeological research, it pro- vides that: ‘‘They (nationals of the High Contracting Parties) may, under the local laws and regulations in force, engage in every kind of profession, commerce, etc., not forbidden by law to all foreigners.” The American delegation at Lausanne understood that this provision included the right of Americans to engage in archaeological research under the existing Turkish law governing excavations. 2. Under the Italian and Greek laws concerning excavations, the same conditions obtain. 14 At present, two large and important enterprises of American arch- aeological research in Turkey are being refused permission to work in Anatolia. This is due to the fact that materials excavated at Sardis under a firman of the old Turkish Government were taken away during the Greek occupation of 1919-1922. The bulk of these ma- terials is Lydian-Anatolian and not Greek, and its removal by the Greek authorities is hardly to be commended. About a month before the Greek evacuation of Smyrna the materials in question were shipped to the United States, the prompt action of American archaeologists interested in the enterprise, having thus saved it from destruction in the Smyrna fire. It is the contention of the Angora Government that these materials should now be returned to the museum at Gonstantinople. If the Sardis materials are not returned Americans may be seriously handi- capped in conducting excavations in Anatolia. Religious, Philanthropic and Educational Institutions No American interest in Turkey, it may safely be said, makes a wider appeal than our schools, colleges and orphanages and religious or philanthropic institutions. The role which they have played in healing the wounds of feuds and wars, on the one hand, and in lay- ing the foundations of racial and international conciliation, on the other, is one of which every American may be justly proud. Sir William Ramsay, a distinguished British Orientalist, has stated that American institutions have done more to bring about a just settle- ment of the troublesome Eastern question than all the statesmen of Europe combined. Professor George Young, former secretary of the British Embassy at Constantinople, and Professor Arnold J. Toynbee, a reputable British historian of the Near East, have testified, as have many other students of the Near Eastern question, regarding the great work which the American schools and colleges have done in breaking down racial and religious prejudices among the younger gen- erations. American schools in Turkey have been appropriately called “oases of peace in a desert of discord.” It is the unanimous opinion of this Committee that the cessation of these educational and philan- thropic activities would be the betrayal of a great trust and the aban- donment of America’s greatest opportunity for humanitarian work in the Near East. There never was a period, in fact, when their presence was more needed than during the coming critical years of economic reconstruction and political readjustment. The officials of American schools, missions, and hospitals in Turkey are aware that no detailed regulations, national or international in character, will be as effective in the prosecution of their work as the 15 good will of the Turks. Personal relationships, much more than judicial capitulations, or treaty provisions, are of importance in main- taining harmony with the Turkish Government. As has been stated by the Turks themselves, “American missionaries and teachers should not object to the abolition of the Capitulations because they have not needed recourse to the courts.” No amount of diplomatic or military force would be of avail if the Turks lost confidence in the good in- tentions of the American institutions themselves. The Turks have indicated their desire that the American schools and colleges should continue their work. As Ismet Pasha, now Prime Minister of the Angora Government, said at Lausanne, they “want these institutions to stay and have no intention of adopting laws that will embarrass the continuation of the admirable American philan- thropic work among their people.” (One of Ismet Pasha’s brothers is at present a student in Robert College in Constantinople.) More recently at Angora, in an interview with an official representative of the American colleges, Ismet Pasha reiterated his Lausanne declara- tion, and other cabinet ministers confirmed this profession of good faith. Americans in Turkey know, and the Turks themselves must con- fess, that the resources of the peoples, both Moslem and Christian, are too meagre to provide institutions adequate for the educational train- ing and the moral advancement of the people in whose hands will lie the future of the Near East. The Turks know, also, that our schools, missions, and hospitals in the Near East — unlike those of some other foreign countries — are without government subsidies and have never been used as agencies of political and economic penetration. They have held our teachers, physicians and missionaries in high esteem as men and women of generous sympathies, good sense and tact. Left to themselves, these Americans have been able in the past, through per- sonal negotiations, to compose official or private differences with the Turkish Government. It is on the basis of their good record, and on the basis of their great promise for future service, that the American institutions in Turkey rely for favorable treatment by the new Turkish Administration. The United States Government has maintained its defense of Ameri- can schools and philanthropic institutions in Turkey upon the general ground of most-favored-nation treatment, but there has never been any specific treaty between these two countries that provided for the estab- lishment of such institutions. This has always been by act of courtesy of the Ottoman Government on behalf of a friendly people. The Sultans, of their own free will, usually granted the institutions certain immunities from jurisdiction as well as authority to carry on their work and the United States Government has always permitted the application of Otto- 16 man municipal law in the regulation of the status and work of these in- stitutions insofar as this has not interfered with the personal rights of Americans claimed under most-favored-nation agreement. Irades, or decrees of the Sultan, conferring specific rights of immunity to certain American schools in Turkey have also been the freewill grants of the Ottoman Government without treaty coercion. It was in accordance with precedent, therefore, that the Turkish delegation at Lausanne re- fused to incorporate in the treaties with the Allies and the United States specific provisions designed to establish in international, rather than merely Turkish law, the special position of foreign institutions. Their refusal in this respect was based also upon fear — justified by many a bitter experience in the past — that like guarantees, under inter- national agreement, to certain European Powers would be utilized as a pretext for intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey. What they were unwilling to grant to the Allies, the Turks hardly could grant to us. Nevertheless, on August 4, 1923, Ismet Pasha addressed to Mr. Grew a letter promising to American institutions in Turkey liberal treatment under Turkish law. The letter in question, which is identi- cal with a letter addressed to each of the Allied Powers at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, is as follows: Excellency : With reference to the Convention regarding the conditions of residence and business signed at Lausanne to-day, and following on the decision taken by the First Committee at its meeting of the 19th May, 1923, regarding the substitution of the declaration, which was to have been annexed to the said Convention, by an exchange of letters, I have the honor to declare, in the name of my Government, that the latter will recognize the existence of American religious, scholastic and medical establishments, as well as of charitable institutions recognized as existing in Turkey before the 30th Octo- ber, 1914, and that it will favorably examine the case of other similar American institutions actually existing in Turkey at the date of the Treaty of Peace signed toda}", with a view to regularize their position. The establishments and institutions mentioned above will, as regards fiscal charges of every kind, be treated on a footing of equality with similar Turkish establishments and institutions, and will be subject to the ad- ministrative arrangements of a public character, as well as to the laws and regulations governing the latter. It is, however, understood that the Turkish Government will take into account the conditions under which these establishments carry on their work, and, insofar as schools are con- cerned, the practical organization of their teaching arrangements. I avail, etc., [Signed] M. ISMET. There is one respect in which the Committee would desire to see this declaration, or a clause in the Treaty itself, made more exact. Commercial corporations are guaranteed certain specific rights under 17 the Treaty, including the right to hold property in their corporate capacity. Similar rights are not guaranteed corporations organized for religious and charitable purposes. The property owned by Robert College at Constantinople, for example, must continue to be held in the name of an individual rather than in the name of its Trustees. We believe, however, that this distinction may be removed by sup- plementary negotiations between Washington and Angora, without requiring an actual amendment to the pending Treaty. As Dr. Gates has stated in a recent communication, the American institutions have received assurances from the Turkish Government that American property rights will be satisfactorily regularized immediately after the resumption of normal diplomatic relations. The officials of the American educational institutions are ready to accept the conditions and carry on their work in Turkey. Dr. Mary Mills Patrick, who has been engaged for more than half a century in missionary work in Turkey, and who for almost thirty-five years has been President of Constantinople Woman’s College, joins with Dr. Caleb Gates, President of Robert College, in declaring in favor of ratification of the Turco-American Treaty. Dr. Gates, for ex- ample, has said, “As to the Treaty itself, what does it give us? It gives us the good will of the Turks instead of their ill will. That is certainly worth something to all who live and work in Turkey. To them the Treaty affords an opportunity to work out the problems which their life in Turkey presents and to exercise what influence they possess in favor of the right. It still leaves an opportunity for missionaries and educators to try to make the principles of righteous- ness known and practiced in Turkey.” Furthermore, the American schools and colleges actually are carrying on their work under the new regime. Mr. Albert W. Staub, American Director of the Near East Colleges, wrote last autumn from Constantinople: “On account of the changes that have taken place here, it was generally predicted that the enrollment of our colleges would fall off considerably. But with the return of peace has come a new confidence in the future, as the increased enrollment above that of last year would indicate.” Robert College began its sixty-first year last September with four hundred and fifty students of nineteen different nationalities — Greeks, Turks, Armenians and Bulgarians leading in numbers. Constanti- nople Woman’s College has a registration of three hundred and fifty, comprising Moslem and Christian students of fifteen different races or nationalities. The Turks declare that they are done with the Sultanate and the Caliphate. They have ahead of them tremendous tasks of economic reconstruction, political reorganization, and social readjustment. To insure their success, they need the sympathy and 18 cooperation of those Western States who boast of greater enlighten- ment. The Turks want our schools; our schools want to stay in Turkey. In this connection, Dr. James L. Barton, Secretary of the Ameri- can Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, wrote the De- partment of State on November 24, 1923 : While the Treaty does not contain all that we would like, yet I am sure I express the judgment of the officers of the American Board and, so far as I know, the missionaries both on the field and here at home when I say that it is our earnest hope that the Treaty will be ratified by the Senate and that without acrimonious debate. We are convinced that this is the best Treaty which could be secured under the circumstances, and that it will furnish a basis for negotiations and for securing privileges not covered in the Treaty. If the Treaty should be rejected, I am convinced that the continuance of American institutions in Turkey would be jeopardized. Under the Treaty there are grounds for believing that they will be permitted to continue. . . . There are indications that the Government will look with increasing favor upon the continuation of these institutions and grant them enlarging privileges. This has already taken place in Smyrna, Tar- sus and at some other points. The Problem of Minorities No pledges of the American people regarding the Armenians or other subjects of the former Ottoman Empire have ever been in- corporated in treaties between the United States and Turkey. The United States was not a signatory of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 or the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which contained elaborate provisions for the protection of minorities in Turkey. On the other hand, at various times the Government of the United States has definitely taken the position that it could not assume responsibility for the main- tenance of internal peace in the Ottoman Empire beyond safeguard- ing the property and lives of American citizens. Our policy of polit- ical isolation was departed from under President Wilson, although even under his administration there was no declaration of war against Turkey — ^in spite of keen sympathy for the Armenians — and no American participation in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Sevres. Those who advocate rejection of this Treaty on the ground that it does not provide for an Armenian Republic or for the adequate protection of minorities in Turkey, overlook the obvious fact that a treaty which obligated the United States to any such policy would meet still greater opposition from the advocates of political isola- tion. The Allied Treaty with Turkey contains adequate provisions for the preservation of the liberties of minorities, under the super- 19 vision of the League of Nations. If the isolationist sentiment can be overcome, the best manner of American intervention on behalf of the Christian subjects of Turkey is through participation in the League. If isolationist sentiment cannot be overcome, it is futile to talk of defending the rights of minorities. It is incumbent upon opponents of the Treaty to indicate in what respect its rejection would provide for the establishment of an Armenian Republic or would safeguard the lives, liberties and property of the minorities in Thrace and Ana- tolia. It would be nothing short of criminal to incite the Armenians to resist, directly or indirectly, the settlement reached at Lausanne un- less we are prepared, with military force if necessary, to support such resistance. It is the opinion of this Committee that there is no immediate prospect of an American offensive, military or political, to settle the minorities problem. In 1920, we flatly refused an Armenian man- date, at a time when we were asked only to assume guardianship for territory under the military subjection of the Allies. Short of a successful armed invasion of the Anatolian peninsula, there is now no way we can achieve what we then refused to consider. Ratifi- cation of the Treaty with Turkey, however, would enable our ac- credited representatives at Angora to exercise their influence on be- half of moderation and justice. Furthermore, we should remember that ratification of the Turco-American Treaty would assist in making the Peace of Lausanne part of the public law of the Near East, and the Peace of Lausanne is more specific on the question of minorities than any other previous settlement in modern history. It provides for cooperative action on behalf of subject peoples without permitting the arbitrary intervention of any single power. The United States retains its moral right, however, to interest itself in behalf of op- pressed peoples. By the terms of the Allied Treaty with the Turks of July 24, 1923, the new Turkish Republic extends certain guarantees to all nationals of Turkey “without distinction of birth, nationality, lan- guage, race or religion”; equality before the law and full protection of life, liberty and property; equal civil and political rights; permis- sion to establish, maintain and control religious, philanthropic, and social institutions; freedom of religion and unrestricted use of the vernacular; freedom of social customs, including family law and per- sonal status. It will be freely charged, of course, that these promises are not worth the paper they are written on — other such promises, albeit not so far-reaching, have been made before. In this connection it is well to quote Article XLIV of the Allied-Turkish Treaty: 20 ARTICLE XLIV Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding articles of this sec- tion affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions con- stitute obligations of internationdi concern and shall he placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not he modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. Turkey agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article XIV of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party there- to demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article XIII of the Covenant. As between Greece and Turkey, a solution of the minorities prob- lem was attempted by a compulsory interchange of populations. This plan was the intellectual child of M. Venizelos, born in 1913, and adopted by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen at Lausanne in 1923. The first pro- posal for an interchange of populations between Greece and Turkey came in a letter of June 24, 1914, from M. Venizelos to the Sublime Porte, which subsequently led to an agreement of July 8, 1914. This agreement became inoperative because of the outbreak of the Great War less than a month later. At the Paris Conference of 1919, M. Venizelos again evidenced his enthusiasm for the idea of inter-migra- tion of dissatisfied peoples across national frontiers by negotiating a treaty providing for an interchange of populations as between Greece and Bulgaria. This latter interchange was carried out by a mixed commission on which Dr. Nansen represented the League of Nations. Even as late as 1921, the Turks did not contemplate such a move and only on the strenuous advocacy of Dr. Nansen was this consum- 21 mated.^ He became so convinced of the wisdom of the plan under certain conditions that he requested permission to appear before the Territorial and Military Commission of the Lausanne Conference. At the meeting of this Commission on December 1, 1922, Dr. Nansen made an impassioned appeal for a compulsory exchange of popula- tions between Greece and Turkey under the auspices of a mixed commission, similar to that which had supervised the Graeco-Bul- garian exchange. His proposals were well received and subsequently incorporated in a convention of January 30, 1924, between Ismet Pasha and M. Venizelos.’ It will be objected by American opponents of the Treaty that paper guarantees and interchanges of population, however satisfactory in themselves do not solve the minorities problem. In their opinion no settlement should be ratified which does not provide a national home for the Armenian people. Upon the wisdom of establishing an Ar- menian Republic on territory ceded by Turkey, there is some differ- ence of opinion in this Committee. Upon the practicability of estab- lishing such a Republic at the present time there is unanimity of opinion. We believe that we can not render a service to the Armenian people by agitating for their national independence at this time. “If we wish an in- dependent Armenia, we must go in and fight for it ; the Armenians are too few to win it for themselves. If we do not wish to fight for it, we must be willing to see the Turk remain master in his own house, (subject to such reasonable restrictions as are laid down for him in the afore- mentioned Article XLIV of the Treaty of Lausanne.) It is the most criminal and cowardly form of betrayal to lead the Armenians to believe that we stand ready to support them in their claim for inde- pendence when we know, as we do know, that we shall not send troops to fight for it. For if we lead the Armenians so to believe, they will attempt to rise again encouraged by the belief. If they do and are massacred again, the guilt will be not theirs, not Turkey’s, but ours. The sincerest friendship we can show the Armenians now is to encourage the movement for rapprochement (with the Turks).* 1. Precedents for interchange of populations; (a) Graeco-Turkish Agreement of 1914. The idea was originally that of M. Venizelos. Details of Greek Government’s 'note of June 24 , 1914 , and Turkish reply of July 8, 1914, are given in Toynbee, op. cit., p. 141.