MASTER NEGA TIVE NO. 91-80008 MICROFILMED 1991 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code - concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material... Columbia University Library reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR: URBAN, WILBUR TITLE: HISTORY OF THE PRINCIPLE ... PLACE: PRINCETON DA TE : 1898 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT RTRT TOCRAFHir MTCROFORM TARGET Master Negative # Original Material as FUmed - Existing Bibliographic Record flPfr- v.l IGO Url ■^■■^Mp|VMPB«V~''||pV*'**^P>"Pf^l ■*r ■«i>«— ^•■■■M«Mra«anp^Mi|B9i«TT«'«0^ .,„iilPHPijm..,„.m Urban, Wilbur Marshall, 1873- ... The history of the principle of sufficient reason: its meta[)hysical and logical formulations. By Wilbur Ur- ban ... * Princeton, N. J., The University press [1898] cover-title, 88 p. 26"". (Princeton contributions to philosophy; ed. by A. T. Ormond. vol. 1. no. 1) Contents on end cover. First issued as the author's inaug.-diss. — Leipzig, 1897. ;>:>#:»i> Library of Congress O 7-41104 Restrictions on Use: TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA : //X IB IIB FILM SIZE: If^TC::^^ IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA d^ DATE FILMED: *jUuAi INITIALS HLMEDBY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS. INC WOODBRIDGE. CT REDUCTION RATIO: *%. v^, o. r Association for Information and image Management 1 1 00 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1 1 00 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 12 3 4 iiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiilii TTT lllllllll 5 6 7 8 9 10 ilmiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiilni liiiiliillll m T^ 1 1 1 11 12 n'n ii'^i rf'i'i Ti'TvTf t'iT'i't' ''I't'i 13 lllllllll 14 iilii 15 mm Inches 1.0 I.I 1.25 LS|||2£ l» |a2 |6J I 71 IB Itt 3.6 4.0 1.4 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 MRNUFPCTURED TO nilM STRNDflRDS BY RPPLIED IMRGE- INC. l5*»-. « .-i ©otttmlJlii '^Iniuctrsltvj in tlic ®ita of |lcw ^ov\\ I r" 1 J GIVEN BY Leipz.10 univ^ ii 'P i [p t I ' 1 > 1 v' A HISTORY OF THF. • • • • • • • • • • ■ • • •• • • ••• • • • • • •• • • • II I II ] • • • • , • • •• • • • 1 » • • Principle of Its Metaphysical and Logical Formulations P.EINC; A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG TO SECURE THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IJY S^ WILBUR MARSHALL URBAN 1 1 1 1 897 • • • ... ... .: : : : -. .-. CONTENTS. • •• •1,» • • ! • • • • • • . • • • ! ••• ••• • • • ...-..•:••:•. ;:: .• •- :•. .-::.•:: : chapter i. h^TRin'vcTOB^'i^JiiE Prohlem ; Thk Dkvi.i.oi'MENT of the L^'cnCA?; ?;&i»*4'l>i;sNKss IN Connection with the Prin- Ctptl^ OF SUFFICIENT REASON, I'ai.ks. 1-9 CHAPTER II. Pre-Leibnitzian Thinking, . . . . . 9-20 CHAPTER 111. Origin of the Problem: The Eeii-nitziaxs; Metaphysical AND Logical Motivf:s, 20-31 CHAPTER IV. Sufficient Reason as the Basal Principle of Meta- physics: The Kantians, 3^-5^ CHAPTER V. The Struggle between Metaphysical and Motives: Herbart and Trendelenburg, . CHAPTER VI. Logical . . . 52-67 Sufficient Reason as the Basal Law of Logic: Sigwart, Erdmann and Wundt 68-84 CONCLUSION. General Results, 85-88 X U: 4 t_ , ^> 5-i THE HISTORY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON: ITS METAPHYSICAL AND LOGICAL FORMULATIONS. WILBUR URBAN, Ph.D., Reader in Philosophy, Princeton University. CHAPTER I. Introductory.— The Problem. The following essay may be looked upon as an attempt to show, by means of a historical study of the development of the principle of Sufficient Reason, the standpoint occupied by the modern German logicians, as contrasted with the Epistemologists of the metaphysical schools. As the title indicates, the nature of the principle has completely changed in the development of post-Leibnitzian thought. In its origin, conceived of as extra-logical, as metaphysical and as identified with the causal axiom, it has finally been accorded the place of basal law of the logical consciousness and only secondarily connected with the real relations of causality. The extension of the bounds of the logical consciousness, involved in this transformation, the critical determination of the relation of metaphysical to logical principles resulting from such a development are both phenomena characteristic of the modern ^* Erkentniss-theoretische " logic. It is the writer's notion that the achievement of these characteristic standpoints is in great part the result of reflec- tion upon the nature of this Law of Ground, variously form- ulated as metaphysical and logical, and that a conscientious study of the history of the principle would throw much light upon the growth of our broader view of logic. 2? 262826 • -• • • • 1 . • • I • • • • * • «^ • • \ / T ^Au- fofKnr. the writer was much charmed with the ele^"entf ■ ?; -S^I ^^ which Schopenhauer, despite Ms Tany metaphysical ^^"- ^ T'^V^^'Z^cy^ thinking by following the gukl.ng thread of the spe he ) far-reaching problem of Sufficient Reason. Ana ^^ true o Schopenhauer in so great a degree, -ay be ad with more or'less truth of all the great P'^'l^P'^-y;,;'^.^^ Leibnitz. How should we have so clear a -^-""^ ^^^J .^ chanter upon the" Grundsiitze der reuuu \ erstandcs bti,rine f he had'not gathered them all under the o-e pr.nc.ple o eround? Wifhout Herbarfs " Methodologie. ^1"=^ Jias fhe problem of ground and consequence as t - -^^obj-t Of his dialectical interest, the rest of the "Mctaphjsik were scarcely understandable. „..,„Uv«;rs c the connexio uUarnvt the last question of logic m '^s broadest 1 • , , ,.-o,. Invp the mutual re ations ot the two sense, and in nonav have int muiu. „f tuu h^^^l been so subtly elucidated as in the critical study of this basal principle of Sufficient Reason. , i :f Starting then with these two ideas, on the one hand, f possible, of showing the fundamental place of the principle under consideration, in the philosophical systems of the more important Post-Leibnitzians, and secondly of discovering in the development of the law likewise the development of the modern concept of logic and its problems, my study has produced the following essay. A short preliminary chapter upon the Pre-Leibnitzians, attempts, to show the conditions out oi which Leibnitz s quite original formulation of this entirely new princple arose Leibnitz is treated with considerable detail with the desire of showing that his formulation discloses the presence of two motives, one which tended to formulate the law as a logical principle, the other, the one which finally predomin- ated being metaphysical, reduced the problems of the grounds of knowledge to a metaphysical determinism. The succeeding history of the principle is then conceived to exhibit three main stages : > I ' •••^ V\s 1. The metaphysical formulation of Sufficient Reason, from Leibnitz through Kant and Schopenhauer. 2. A struggle between metaphysical and logical atti- tudes iu Herbart and Trendelenburg. 3. The logical formulation in the modern logicians, Sig- wart, Wundt, &c. Two questions which may arise, why, on the one hand, the study is limited to German thinkers, and secondly, why Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are omitted, are answered simply : By the consideration of the fact that the problem, as limit- ed by our study, is exclusively German, the only extra Ger- man thinker who has handled the technical problem of Suf- ficient Reason being the Kantian, Sir Wm. Hamilton; and secondly, the immediate Post-Kantians, especially Hegel, represent no new phase of the problem, but rather a return to the conditions against which Leibnitz's formulation arose as a protest, the pre-critical, pan-logism ol the Spinozistic type. The following study is then concerned with the interplay of these two distinct motives, the logical and the metaphys- ical, or rather perhaps with the two ways of defining the principle of Sufficient Reason. This is the basal law of all knowledge, this Law of Ground, and according as it is conceived as extra-logical and metaphysical, or on the other hand as the most general law of logic, is our whole theory of knowledge affected. The argument of the succeeding historical study is briefly that the origination and first formulation of the principle in Leibnitz's thinking, represents a stage of inconsistency in which both motives, both attitudes stand in more or less contradiction, and that the succeeding movement at first manifests a decided trend toward the metaphysical side, to be replaced in more modern thought by the reformation of the logical point of view, broadened and changed. L Leibnitz's origination of the principle of Sufficient Reason is found to have arisen out of a protest against the genera, trend of previous thinUing towar « .e u n of Lpirica. causa, re.tions - ^<^^f^^;^2^_ {^^ , ,,„. ''' 'Tt'Z^ e ^Pir cal and extra-.ogical. Since its ceived as pu.eU emj iopment being th.rou P^^^^^ ^^.^^^ ing, Sufficient Reason .denuhe ^ ^^^^.^^^ ^_.^^^_ thus ---:f .^^'^^.^f :;,f„"^ the direction of a metaphysi- ment, but setting the current loo-ical consequence ealformulation of the new pnnciple. Th^gl^g'^^^^^ s\ ^e of this identification of causation ..th S. f-''^^[ .^^j • J .c -, nrinciole of determination, just as tne lo^ii- ':;mT'Leibn tJ d d no admit, but insisted that this law was norms, Leibnitz a determining ground.* only one of .«#«^«/ rea »n "Ste ^^^ substituting At this point Crusms takes up t'^^P ^istin-uishing - determinateness tor sunicicnc> besides .he ide,! grounds, »»/'»- ,';';f;,„"i .tcTuts ri .tri'S' spS .H"S ..rces^he metaphysical side o. .he problem into the foreground.' Th. advent of the critical philosophy of Kant, repre The advent o t f ^.^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^j^^^ sents «^-"f ^^^'^.f^rphj-sical treatment of S. R. He tSnTthr^:' ofTruL\ that the law of ground ^ a orTndpTe of determination and not of '.sufficiency, and accepts the ..determination" element in the Judgment of 'round an^i consequence as a necessity to be metaphysically Irounded.^ For the knowledge of this determniing ground Ltside of logic a transc.n,.n^al P^-^P^^/J .^^^ng tfe Other than logical is then necessary.' Though denying tne possibility of an ontology of the real, he proceeds to ontolo- 'cf. I 19- •5 22, ♦cf. ? 22. »cf. S 27. •cf. I 32- ^cf. I 34. 1 5 gize this most fundamental of knowledge principles. It is conceived of as «-/r«-logical and /r««-scendental.' Finally Schopenhauer defines it as .«.M-logical and as the transcen- dental knot of the Subject-Object relation, which hkew.se marks its most complete divorce from a logical point of view, since an Intellectual Intuition of metaphysical relations is substituted for the logical thinking of ground and conse- nuance." . , . , II What we have been led to call the /ogual motive for Leibnitz's formulation of the new law of knowledge, is ex- pressed in this great thinker's attempt to formulate its place in relation to logical laws. As we have seen, it was defined as extra-logical, in view of the formal and yet metaphysical theory of logical necessity against which the new law arose as a protest.' And vet this very protest indicated a desire to extend the narrow bounds of the logical consciousness beyond its formal limits, so as to include all knowledge pro- cesses Leibnitz's most general definition of S. R. is at the same time the most general definition of the logical con- sciousness as conceived to-day.* And besides logical neces- sity amon- ideas clear and distinct was conceived to be the teleological goal of the confused ideas of which S. R. was developed as the empirical law. This inherent possibility m the Leibnitzian thinking of extending the concepts of logic in such a manner as to include Sufficient Reason as a basal principle we shall call the logical motive. In the Leibnitzian school itself Wolff showed a tendency, in contrast to that of Crusius, to include Sufficient Reason as a distinct logical principle, side by side with Identity and Contradiction. But his attempt to deduce S R. from the other two laws led back to the formalism and ontolog- ical way of looking at things against which Leibnitz had protested.' The critical philosophy of Kant, notwithstand- ing the fact that on one side it is but a continuation of the metaphysical tradition, nevertheless represents a stage in ' cf. \ \o. 'cf. \ 51. 'cf. II 20, 21. *cf. \ 21. ^cf. \ 26. the development of the modern logical consciousness, and the corresponding treatment of S. P. as the basal law of that consciousness.^ Although S. R. is still identihed with the causal axiom, it is with the causal axiom as a knowledge principle, rather than an ontological princii)le that Kant is concerned. In fact the Law of Ground is found only by a deduction from the logical categories^ (causation being derived from the hypothetical judgment.^ It is because of this critical balance of Kant, which sees that S. R. ^^ ^ssen- tially a relation of lo-ical ground and consequence, although it is transcendental ; in other words, because Kant remains within his transcendental logic, that Schopenhauer hnds fault, and it is for this that he substitutes the doctrine ot Intellectual Intuition.^ From Herbart on, the logical motive makes itself strongly felt. The idea of Sufficient Reason as having for its goal a contradictionless whole of experience and thought,^ gives it the place of a universal logical principle to which the formal laws of Identity and Contradiction are subordinated, although Herbart is not able to formulate the law without a meta- physical basis. But already in his concept of the -widen- ed ground," which should include the whole nexus out of which the consequence springs lies the germ of a broader view of logic. "^ Sufficient Reason, the most general term for all necessary relations in knowledge, has as its mam problem the extent of its application to the real, therefore its relation to causality, but it is not identihed with causa- tion.^ Through the intermediate stages of Trendelenburg and Drobisch, to the former of whom, the concept of logic included the entire phenomenology of the judgment, formal and material -J while the latter, though retaining the concept of a purely formal logic, formulates Sufficient Reason as the basal law' of logic,^ the modern logic, as represented by \ y *cf. 'i 41. '— 'i 53- *H65, 69. •^ 71. •I 79. • I * Wundt, with its recognition of S. R. as basal ^^'^ finally reached. Sufficient Reason is here the general law oHh ilrdependence of all acts of thought, to which the no ma ive laws of Identity and Contradiction are subordina- ted" And t" question o'f its relation to causality is now a critical one_that of the relation of the -usal axiom o the Ineral logical postulate of Grounding. Sigwart, Lotze and fvund ho V the impossibility of the identification of causa- In and Sufficient Reason, distinguishing between the deter- liLig ground as logical and the empirical complex or cause r.n the Other hand as only sufficient.^ The se of this broader view of logic on account of which SufJcient Reason was again conceived of as purely a princi- nle of knowledge-and not a metaphysical law of the real to ^identified wfth causality was much f ed '.y ^ew mot>v which entered into German thought with the adxent 01 The Kan an - Kritik." This may be characterized as an auempt to get at the phenomenology of the grounding pro- cess Th"^ - addition to the -Objective Deduction of Te concepts of the Understanding, ^^^^^^^^^^^ -^dtiicS^ ri ht: f:o-rrre Jtfz^ , rn.mes for the given results in judgment. He immanental logical causaiiiy r .; ''■'"ZTVLZl'SoLL. This genetic point ol ;: : L irelr tuggested ,y the ^='^f ™-f :Scl' m 80, 83. 88. ^U 41. 42. ♦ § 41 and 42. II 8 eternal ideas, but could not come to complete expression, owing to the metaphysical interpretations put upon it by the Monadologie. Merbart, who represents a stag-e of con- flict between the metaphysical and lo<^ical formulations of S. R., in his conception of the logical ground so widened as to include elements not in the conception as amenable to formal logic, conceives this widening as brought about by chance suggestions, by " Zuflilligen Ansichten," thus admitting a psychological element into the process of grounding.^ Al- though the logical causality thus suggested is reduced in his system to metaphysical terms, yet it is important to recog- nize that Sufhcicnt Reason as a principle of knowledge is conceived to be an immanental necessity broader than the necessity of formal loiric. Trendelenburg's tiicory tliat logic should be extended to include the material, psychological as well as the formal ele- ments in the judgment, brings the problem of phenomenol- ogy to the front. The modal categories of thought, possi- bility, reality, and necessity are, after the manner of Kant's "subjective deduction," conceived as phenonienological mo- ments in the grounding process, in which the formal and material elements are united.- It is especially Trendelen- burg, who, against the i)sychological doctrine of '' Zufall " in the grounding processes develops his doctrine of the teleological nature of all grounding processes.' They are a ** wahres Geschehen " under the law of teleological causality, the goal of which causality is Knowledge, includino- Thoug-ht and Being. The postulate of an immanental logic, function- ing in all judgment processes, becomes a permanent element in modern Logic, in Sigwart and Erdman.-' In Wundt, finally, the concept of a Logical Causality as the Law of Ground in its primary form, governing the higher appercep- tive processes, is set over against the empirical applications of this law, the Causal Axiom, in its two expressions physi- cal and psychological causality. The teleological necessity \. y • « • • r < ^168. ' S 77. •^78. of our thought processes is the Law of Ground seen in- wardly.^ In conclusion, we may make our object and method clearer by comparing in a general way the present problem with that which Konig sets himself to solve in his extensive history of the "Causal Problem. "^ Here, by an exhaustive study, covering two volumes, and comprising a detailed exposition and criticism, the author seeks to secure valid results for the causal concept of to-day. This involves not only the complete metaphysics, but explains the psychologi- cal and natural science standpoints of the authors under con- sideration. The present essay, on the contrary, aims only to show that there has been a continuity in reflection upon this more general and more formal principle of Suflhcient Reason ; that, in the changes of attitude toward it, now constructing it logically and again metaphysically, and secondly in the way in which natural and psychological causality have been conceived to be related to it, an instruc- tive insight, not blurred by too much data, may be afforded into that somewhat difficult province, the border-land between Metaphysics and Logic. In view of this limitation of the problem, the writer may then hope to be pardoned for what may appear from another standpoint an insufficient treatment of very deep and thorough thinkers. CHAPTER II. Pre-Lp:ibnitzian Thought. § I. In order to understand the origin of Sufficient Reason as a general unifying term, under which the more particular problems of the Science of Knowledge might be put for- ward, as well as to secure an insight into the reasons for its dominance of German thought from Leibnitz to the present day, it is necessary to sketch the general tendencies of pre- Leibnitzian thought. ^U 91. 92. * Konig, Edward, '' Die Entwickelung des Catisal-Problems''' Leipzig, 1888. 10 There are discoverable tendencies toward a unification of the problems of knowledge, which, though general, are yet so evident as to excuse the anachronism, of referring for the sake of conciseness, to expressions of Sufficient Reason before its actual formulation in Leibnitz. Provisionally, then, it may be said that Greek thinking tended to formulate Sufficient Reason in terms of a naive real logic of experience. Christian thought, as typified in Augustine, sought it in an introspective determination of the conditions of Belief. The Reason of the former was the certainty of the external Intuition, corrected by a dialectical removal of contradictions; that of the latter the satisfac- tion and certainty of the subjective intuition of the self. These general norms being once attained, the tendency was to give them universal validity. Thus, Aristotle is found studying the movements of knowledge and of psychological processes in general under the same categories as external happening. Augustine, on the contrary, can understand his- torical happening only as the expression of the Divine Will, constructed on the analogy of the experiences of his own subjective willing self and its necessities. § 2. The Greek formulation of Sufficient Reason reached its fullest expression in Aristotle, — his doctrine of causation, Lotze calls the first formulation of the Law of Ground. But from this doctrine of causation should not be separated Aristotle's applied logic and the realistic doctrine of concepts which it involves. The two are closely bound together and their unity alone affords the basis for a unitary formulation. The distinction between formal and applied logic, in the modern sense, according to which, as shall appear later, Sufficient Reason is defined as logical, its appli- cations being material, was not yet made. The real con- cept, as participating in the idea, lends itself equally well to logical forms and causal constructions — on its ideal side to logical formal relations, on its real side to causal construc- tion. To formulate a general law, therefore, the whole sphere of mediate knowledge, lying between the intuition ot "V y ^ fc II perception, ''which is for us first" and the intuition of the ideas, "which is in itself first" to use Aristotle's terms, all lying between these two extremes of the immediately certain, requires sufficient grounds for its certainty.^ These grounds may be determined either by the laws of logic, as developed by Aristotle, or by his fourfold doctrine of causation. The important point is that in either case the concepts dealt with are real, as well as rational, and the conclusions either of the principles of logic or of the laws of causation are un- questioned constructions of the real. No deep-rooted dis- tinction is made between the logical and the causal side of thought, because the deeper distinctions of the subjective and objective had not arisen. The lack of this distinction between formal logical thought and concrete real thought is characteristic of a unitary metaphysical point of view. It is the naive rationalism which, though it may distinguish between ideal and real grounds, makes no essential break between them. g 3. From the very beginning of Greek thought this naively rationalistic attitude toward reality was marked. All attempts to solve the problems of Being and, especially, of Becoming, which arose to challenge this attitude, were charac- terized by the use of concepts which contained already the presupposition of their reality. The voik of Anaxagoras, the logical principles of Zeno, Identity and Contradiction, the number system of the Pythagoreans were not handled as principles of knowledge but as directly analysed out of reality. And when Plato became convinced of the dualism between the material and ideal world, the essential rationalism of Greek thought prevented him from taking the step which would to modern thought necessarily follow, of distinguish- ing between real cause and ideal ground. The ideas are made the causes of material things and are called causes,' and even force is ascribed to them by means of which they are able to work upon us and make themselves known. ^ ^Aua/vf. Post. 7, P- 100. b. 13. ' ^^^^"^ 95, E. » In the Phaedrus, where Plato's doctrine of Ideas first appears, it is confined to moral ideas. 12 This brings with it a complete confusion of ideal and real grounds.' The ideas are both causes and grounds for the knowledge of the real of perception, of which, without the mediation of the ideas, there is no knowledge but only belief.'^ For the knowledge of this world of appearance the ideas must be taken into service. But they in turn can only be known in an intuition out of time. ^4. In Aristotle there is no material change in the general conception of the essential sameness of logical ground and real cause. As we have seen, the validity of the causal and logical laws alike rests upon the reality of the general con- cept. Thus Schopenhauer has gathered together in his his- torical sketch numerous (piotations in which a logical pre- mise is called cause, ahtov being used for every sort uf ground.^ Logical thoughts as well as psychoh)gical phe- nomenaare looked upon as a real happening subject to the same construction as other external movements. One dif- ference may be distinguished however. The ideas as pure form, in Plato's sense, are no longer looked upon as causes either of perception or of natural phenomena, but Aristotle has reached a critical standpoint from which he is able to see that only the general concept, as containing ideal and real elements in union, may be conceived of causally.* Thus instead of Plato's simple ideal causation arises Aristotle's more complex doctrine of a fourfold causation, of which moving and end causes are the more important. The idea is cause only in so far as it is natural force and teleological end. But although both moving and end cause, are con- sidered principles of Sufficient Reason of Becoming, the stress is put upon the teleological side. The cause is poten- » This confusion is characteristic of a stage where the postulate of ground is not yet recognized, formulated as a basal principle of thought, but only acts unconscious of itself. So all the formulations of Plato appear to us, as Schopenhauer says—" wie der Stand der Unschuld gegen den der Erkentniss des Guten und Bosen." Viivfache Wurzel. — p. 19— cf. also Philebus p. 240. "^X^^Xwxzs—Psyiholo^iedcsErkeunens, Leipzig, 1893. An hang. Par. 7. • " Vierfache IVurztl dts Zurcichendcn Grundes." ^ 56. * Sigwart, Logik I, page 394. \. / 13 tentiality of the effect, because the idea of the effect is con- sidered to be already in the cause. In order, therefore, that a present real might be seen to be the outcome of pre- ceding real conditions, into these conditions was read an idea which rationally could be seen to be the dunamis of the present state. ^ §5. If for the sake of clearness we follow the use of a biological analogy, we may call attention to the extremely undifferentiated state of this life-principle of thought— this fundamental motive of Sufficient Reason. In the absence of a sense of the difference even between the necessities of thought and reality, it is still less to be expected that we shall find a strong sense of the difference between the necessities in different spheres of reality— or between sub- jective sufficiency and objective necessity. In fact, these differentiations, in thought as in material development, appear only as the result of tedious processes. To the first of these differentiations, the source of the distinction between subjective and objective necessity, our attention must now be turned. § 6. In addition to the naive rationalism of Greek thinking, a second ingredient found its way into modern philosophy, a force which, though less obtrusive, is perhaps equally to be reckoned with — namely, the subjective psychological doc- trine of belief of Mediaeval thought, as formulated in Augustine. This, as has already been suggested, sought the grounds of real judgments in an introspective determi- nation of the subjective conditions of belief. And the norm, according to which external realities are judged, is the certainty of the subjective intuition of the self. Belief, which according to Plato and Aristotle lay outside the sphere of knowledge, ^ becomes the very presupposition of knowledge. Credo ut intelligam is by no means merely a theological axiom, but locates the problem of the grounds of * Ueberweg und Hdinze, Geschichte der Philosophic, 7th Edition, Vol. I. page 203. Aristotle Anal. Post, 87, b, 31. «Cf. I 3. knowledge in the subjective assent which accompanies all* judgment.* §7. This subjective assent or belief, which is evidently in the first place psychological, is, however, conceived by Augustine to be grounded. It is with the nature of this grounded sufficiency that we arc alone concerned. That something appears in consciousness is certain. Our doubt can only extend to the nature of that something.^ Now, that Avhich is given to us most certainly and really is the consciousness of self, not as a nutaplivsical substance, but as a willing, believing, doubting self — even the last cle- ment of doubt making the certainty of the self ])resence more absolute, as Descartes likewise argued. Tlic self is the source of all assent — and the certainty of the self the norm of the certainty in our assent to other realities.'* Thus he argues; reality must be discovered within us to be after- ward extended to the external world — for that to which we give our subjective assent of the will is, as Augustine with insight expresses it, "our life." ''That which later ripens into knowledge must first be grasped by faith; who disdains faith will never be able to raise himself to knowledge."* Self-certainty is then the norm according to which assent is given to the reality of the elements that enter consciousness. §8. But the important question arises how may this sub- jective certainty, arising out of the assent of the will, which Augustine believes to be prior to our extension of knowl- edge to the external world, be conceived to be valid also for external reality. At this point the Will Metaphysics of Augustine enters, together with his Theism. The Will of God, as ground of the world, made after the pattern of the Eternal Ideas (a neoplatonic element in his system), is the source of our will, as part of the world, and therefore works ^*^ De Fraedestinatione" — sec. C, 2 — " Ipsum credere nihil aliud ist quam cum assensione cogitare. Non enim omnis qui cogitat, credit, cum ideo cogitent plerique ; ne credant ; sed cogitat omnis, qui credit et credendo, cogitat et cogitando credit." ^''Contra Academ,'' III, c, il. *''De beata Vita;' 7, 11. *•• Tract.;' 36 in Ev. Joh. n, 7. \ y 15 upon the finite will, determining our subjective assent or disbelief. Thus is our belief in the truths of the external world a direct function of our subjective assent. And for Augustine there is really no causality except that deducible,. theologically, from the nature of the Will of God, and no knowledge except that vouchsafed to our subjective belief. § 9. The reason for our treatment of the Augustinian doc- trine of assent, is that it is a typical expression ot an important element of subjective grounding, taken up into later philoso- phy, especially the Cartesian. It expresses, too, the exactly opposite standpoint from the Aristotelian, in that while the reality of the general concept is in the former taken for granted, here concrete subjective reality is the starting point. They are alike in this, however, that as in the former the grounds of logical knowledge and causes in reality are not distinguished, because the reality of the general con- cepts is the basis of both, so also in Augustine the grounds of truth as discovered in assent, just as the grounds of ex- ternal reality, are in both cases ultimately to be found in the will of God. Thus reconstructing Augustine's theory of Sufficient Reason in modern terms, it might be said that to him, what- ever satisfies the demands of the Will for the real, and is taken up by the transcendental belief, without which the inner life is impossible, is true. Whatsoever can be shown to be grounded in the Will of God is real. In both cases the grounds are ultimately the same. § 10. This Formulation of Ratio Sufficiens is, at bottom, the expression of the whole mediaeval intuition of the world. As Dilthey expresses it ''Weiter als Augustinus hat kein mittelalterlicher Mensch gesehen." What followed was but an impossible attempt to graft the Aristotelian rational- ism of concepts upon this Will metaphysic— but it remained ahvays ** fremdes Gut." The Realists sought to find concepts which by their very definition would include their reality, concepts which thus by the mere application of the Aristotelian syllogism, i6 would build a whole system of objective truth ; but these very concepts of the relig^ious consciousness were in reality but products of the relii^ious belief that Augustine had grounded, and were capable of no more scientific proof. This tendency reached its culmination in the famous Ansel- mian proof of the existence of God. Against this movement appeared, from time to time, the Nominalists, who by means of the weapons of scepticism, sought to retain the doc- trines of belief grounded on the old Augustinian Will meta- physic. The final conflict was fought out between Duns Scotus and St. Thomas, — of whom the former was Augus- tinian and the latter Aristotelian. But already in the 13th century men had begun to speak of a " Two Fold Truth," for which there should be two entirely different instruments of investigation, one for theology and another for secular sciences. Thus began to arise among the scientists a mechan- ical doctrine of causation, which later in modern philosophy should supply the Ratio Sufficieiis of Becoming, of existendi, which, as we have already seen, failed entirely in the thinking of Augustine. § II. Descartes' theory of grounding represents, as has already been suggested, a union of the Aristotelian and Augustinian standpoints, a union which from the point of view of clear critical thought, it must be admitted, brought only confusion. Although to modern critical insight, they both, Aristotle and Augustine, represent extremes of objective and subjective treatment of the problems of knowledge, yet each is thoroughly consistent. With the former logical forms and causal relations are equally of the warp and woof of objective reality, a premise is the cause of a conclusion and from a given result the necessary cause is thought, not discovered. Augustine, on the contrary, with a subjectivity as naive as Aristotle's objectivity, reduces knowledge to belief or assent which is a function of the ethical will, but not content with finding the grounds of knowledge in the subjective will, finds it impossible to construe objective cau- sation otherwise than as a function of the divine will, Conse- \ J 17 quently all causes with Augustine are at bottom moral causes, as witness his doctrine of history. §12. The union of these two standpoints in the Car- tesian thinking may be expressed as follows; 1. Objective Causation is reducible to logical gromiding — for causation is the term for the interaction of substances and their attributes, and the relation of substance and attribute is logical. This depends upon the Aristotelian and Scholas- tic theory of the real nature of the general concepts called metaphysical substances. 2. But the reality of these general concepts, upon which logical grounding and, consequently, objective causation rests, is in turn subject to a psychological grounding, after the Augustinian fashion. For Descartes starts his reflection from the very same point of certainty of the self-intuition, as the outcome of doubt, which characterized x\ugustine's thought. From the absolute doubt, with which the ''Meditations" begin, Descartes is led back to certainty of the self — but not by a reference to higher logical criteria as in the process of knowledge. ''Cogito ergo sum,'' if of the nature of a logical syllogism is ?ipetitio principii of a logical law not yet grounded, but if of the nature of an intuition (which is undoubtedly the right interpretation) has simply the character of subjective belief. Descartes now makes use of the self-intuition in a way entirely unwarranted, for this subjective belief is made the criterion of logical clearness and distinctness. Every- thing that comes to consciousness, si clairissemejit et si distincte- ment, as the self-intuition is valid, says Descartes, ignoring the difference between the clearness and distinctness of the self-intuition and of logical and real relations, and failing to see that the criteria of the latter can only be logical and real relations themselves. This mode of procedure, when put in practice by Des- cartes, discloses a series of real ideas, which become the last grounds of knowledge and of the real. In addition to the idea of the self or res cogitans as the ground of all phe- i8 nomena of consciousness, we intuit the idea of a res extensa,. or objective substance with equal necessity, and as equally real, and as the ground of both the 'Mnost real" idea of God. Thus is developed Descartes' doctrine of a hierarchy of real concepts, as far as a theory of objective orrounding is con- cerned, Aristotelian, but itself ultimately grounded in the subjective belief of Augustine. §13. The consequence of this for his doctrine of Causa- tion is important. " The most perfect knowledge," says Descartes, *'is the knowledge ot results out of their causes. The highest point of philosophy is therefore to explain things on the ground of the knowledge of God as their creator.'* This last sentence is the logical consequence of a position which he himself carefully defines in his argument against Gassendi.' In the cause all the reality of the result either formally or immanently (/. r., either the same realities or others that are more perfect) must be contained, for there can be in the result no more reality than in the cause." All causal relations, then, are reducible to logical relations among the viodi of these most real substances. For because of the substantiality of these most real ideas, their logical relations must equal real relations. Thus both the Aristotelian and Aug-ustinian elements in Descartes lend themselves to a theory which excludes empirical causality as such, and the concept of causation is reduced to that of logical grounding. §14. And since in the actual application of this logical causal principle the last criterion must be the clearness and distinctness of subjective certainty, the Sufficient Reason of Knowledge is in the last analysis subjective. And now enters the peculiar element of the system. As the meta- physical ground of this subjective certainty, God the abso- lutely real and veracious, is conceived to be the final war- rant and Sufficient Reason of its truth. The concept of God, however, was itself only discovered as most real through this subjective certainty and belief. The ontologi- cal proof of the divine existence is but the clothing of ' ^^ Meditation es in Prima Philosophia" III. V y SJJ 19 a religious postulate in false logical forms. Between the objective logical and causal world, the world of mediate grounding, and the world of subjective assent or belief, exists a chasm in the Cartesian thought which has not been bridged, and which constitutes what has already been described as an unassimilated union of the objectivity of Aristotle with the subjectivity of Augustine. Not only is real causal happening reduced to logical grounding, but the latter in turn to subjective sufficiency. ^15. This break, then, in the very middle of the Car- tesian Theory of Knowledge, shows the problem before modern philosophy, to be that of the relation of the sub- jective and objective sides of Sufficient Reason, of knowl- edge and real ground. As we shall see, it had its first definite answer in Kant, though by no means a final one. We may, in the second place, see in this contradiction between psychology and logic, the germs of the two dis- tinctly opposite movements that followed : The rationalis- tic doctrine of mediated erround is carried out into a com- plete identification of eausa and ratio by Spinoza, with an absolute neglect of the subjective side. § 16. On the other hand, the intermediate sphere of logical causation appears to Malebranche an unassimilated term, and the subjective satisfaction is brought into immediate rela- tion with the objective Will of God, to the exclusion of the intermediate sphere of phenomenal ground and consequence. The phenomena are simply occasional causes by means of which God satisfies the desires of the subject. Thus, he says poetically, *' Every idea of the human consciousness is a prayer of the will which God satisfies with its consequence." On the other hand, every idea in my consciousness is the immediate product of the Will of God. W^e need only remark that this, in its essence, is but the '^ Willens i\nsch- auung" of the Middle Ages, and that the possibility of such a return (logically) from Descartes shows how imperfect was his break from a purely religious intuition of the World. 20 gi;. The sccoiul inovemcnt of Spino/a is, however, an absolute break, in that it is built upon the rationalistic oerm in Descartes, which was the Classical element in Christian thinking, the one unassimilated element in its World-intu- ition. With him the confusion of cdz/sa and ^uin'o was com- plete. Because the form of the oiitoloo;ical proof is logical and, thus, of the nature of the principle of mediate grounding as developed by Descartes, he extends the form of vSutbcient Reason between j.henomena and the objective thing in it- self without any question whatever, neglecting the sub- jective postulate element in the Ontological Proof. Thus Spinoza's Pantheism and determinism become, properly, only the realization of Descartes' Ontological Pn^of, and that which Descartes took, ideal and subjective as the ground of knoivledgc for the existence of God, (reciuiring a correspond- ing- real cause) wa<, for S])iii()/a, real. The concept of God not only must have its real counterpart, but it is God him- self. The whole of philoso|)hy is thus a logical relation of concepts — and j^either the problem of a real object to which they correspond or a subject to whom they are sufficient truth, is at all in question. Schopenhauer's study and criticism of Spinoza is a com- plete exposition of this confusion, and in default of space for further study, we must refer to him.' For us only the main outlines are of importance. CHAl^TER HI. Origin of the Prixc itlh — The Li:ii:m izians. gi8. The outcome of the entire preceding trend of thought was, as we have seen, to reduce the problem of causation to one of logical grounding. That grounding, being metaphysi- cally conceived, involved an identification of the ideal ground of knowledge with the material relations of cause and effect. This essential lack of distinction between logical and real grounds, arose from the Aristotelian doctrine that real con- "^''Vierfache Wurzel,'' Par. 8. \ y 21 cepts are alike the data of logic and causal judgments; it was strengthened by Augustine's theory of a hierarchy of subjective certainties or reals, in which real and ideal terms are contained without distinction and reached its fullest ex- pression in Descartes and wSpinoza in an absolute confusion of the nature of logical and real relations. J^ 19. Leibnitz's thinking, then, in so far as the postulate of Sufjfjcii'ht Reason and its origin, are concerned, arose as a protest against this reduction of causalty to logical ground- ing. But it is against logical grounding hypostatized to onto- loirical validitv, rather than au^ainst the essentially logical nature of the grounding process that he protests. As has been pointed out in the introduction, there is still consider- able discussion concerning the interpretation to be given to this original i)rinciple of Leibnitz. He himself defined it as applying distinctly to empirical truth, to vdrites de fait, in contrast to the vhith eternith, concerning which he believed logical deduction gave complete and absolute truth. To appreciate the place of Sufficient Reason in his theory of knowledge, it is important to understand the full force of this distinction. Without going fully into the metaphysics of the Monad, it will suffice for our understanding of his theory of knowdedsre to call attention to his doctrine of the Monad as a self-determining developing real, in which the present state is always the presupposition and ground of each suc- ceeding state so that one knowing the entire present of the Monad could tell its past and future. Since, however, the inner happenings in the Monad form the basis of all external empirical happenings whatsoever it follows that a dynamic law of monadic development, must in some sense or under some different aspect, become a law of empirical happening. The determination of the first sphere must be ground of the determination in the second. Now^ the self conscious Monad is the one in wdiich the principle of Sufficient Reason manifests itself as a law of knowledge, and, as a matter of fact in the form of a postulate or demand growing out of the very nature of this determination. This demand, as expressed in !>'? V the '^ Principia Philosophiar that all acts of knowledii^e shall have sufficient j^rounds, that is, in terms of the ♦* Monado- logie," that every state of the self conscious Monad must be determined, is further expanded to read, *' no fact can be considered true, no judi^ment held as true, if a satis- factory ground can not be found, on account ot which it is thus and not otherwise, althou,i;h these uTounds are often unknown to us." (Also Fifth Letter to Clarke 1^125.)* Jf20. Thus worded, the j)rincijile is undoubtedly loi^ical, that is loo^ical m the broad sense that it is a universal postu- late or principle of all knowledixe. As such it must be con- ceived equally as the i^eneral law <^n)vernini^ judgments concerning the vcritcs ctcrnitcs and judgments regarding the vc'ritcs dc fait. And this seems to be the onlv j)ossible con- clusion in regard to a principle stated so broadly and gen- erally as the Leibnitzian Law. If Sufficient Reason de- mands simply that every judgment should have a reason sufficient to explain why it is so and not otherwise, this should also include t!ie judgments of formal U)gic, as well as mere judgments of empirical fact. It was a logical motive in the truest sense which led to the formulation of such a general law of all knowledge. Why then did Leibnitz place it side by side with the logical j)rinciples of Identity and Contradiction — as tar as validity is concerned, but conhne it as a material principle to matters ot fact, to vcn'tcs de fait .' ^21. The answer to this (piestion is sim[)le. Side by side M'ith the logical motive which led to the tormulation of such a general |)rinciple of knowledge, psychological and meta- physical motives equally strong arose which prevented a complete and consistent exi)ression of the logical principle. L The distinction between the eternal and empirical truths, inherited frcun Descartes, rests upcMi a psychological distinction between clear and confused ideas, which Leib- nitz connects very closely with his doctrine of the Monad. Now it is just with the sphere of the ** confused ideas," in- * " Ce principe est celui du besoin d'unc raisr)n suHisante, pour qu'une chose existe, qu'un cvcment arrive qu'une vcriiti ait lieu." J 23 .eluding the cases (mentioned by Leibnitz in the formulation already given) where the grounds are not known at all, that the new law of Sufficient Reason is to be concerned. Here the formal logical laws do not hold, because a ground cannot be such logically if it is not known, or even not clear. Leibnitz had in mind, then, a principle which shall supplant the laws of Identity and Contradiction in a psychological sphere where these do not hold. It is clear, then, why Leibnitz places the law of Sufficient Reason side by side with those of formal logic, without giving the former the place of a logical principle. It is in his system of knowledge prin- ciples, extra-logical, but merely because the concept of logic is narrowed to its formal side. It is to include just those unclear confused elements of our knowledge which are not amenable to formal logical principles, but which are not- withstanding, subject to law. A new light is thrown upon the problem when we consider that the dynamic of the Monad consists in the raising into clear apperceptive con- sciousness of relation just th^ petites perceptions, the confused ideas for which Sufficient Reason is the law. And the goal of this development is logical clearness and distinctness, so that a continuous movement from the psychological to the logical consciousness is the ideal of knowledge. There is no do\d)t that Leibnitz himself grasped the profound import of this idea of a teleology in the very heart of knowledge pro- cesses, but he failed to draw the necessary conclusion that the whole process must be conceived as logical, and the concept of logic extended to include it all. He came near to the idea of Ideological movement in the apperceptive processes, which might be seen to be the very heart of Sufficient Reason— and ,thus to the idea of a logical causality in apperception, later developed by Wundt, but he remained bound to narrow views of the logical consciousness, which excluded this profound insight. §22. II. Failing, thus, because of a metaphysical psy- chology to extend Sufficient Reason to the whole knowledge process, formal logical and sub-logical, and thus to achieve 24 an early definition of the loirical consciousness, which has in later times become so important, he falls back upon his meta- physics of the Monad, and formuhites Sufficient Reason as a metaphysical extra-logical principle. It is identified with causality. This metaphysical identification of Sufficient Reason with the causal axiom marks an important point in the deyelopmcnt of thoui^ht. On the one hand, in that the ne\y law, and therefore the causal axiom, are conceived as extra-logical, a bar is set to that logical ontologism of Spinoza which reduced causal necessity to logical grounding. On the other hand, this same interpretation of the law as extra- logical demands a new metaphysical grounding of the causal axiom, which should show^ Sufficient Reason to be a prin- ciple of determination of the real, as formal logic is of mere concepts. This demand Leibnitz did not fully recognize, but conceiyed his princi|)le as one of "sufficiency" rather than "determination." With the criticism of Crusius and Kant upon the term "sufficient reason," and their substi- tution therefore of the idea of "determining ground," the metaphysical motiye in force in Leibnitz's thought found its logical conclusion. i$2 3. But we haye yet to consider the nature and extent of the latter's metaphysical grounding of his new principle. The secret of that lies in the doctrine of the Monad. For the sphere of the confused and unclear ideas is not only psy- ' chological but also metaphysical in its import; the movement from the confused to the logically clear ideas, the basis of his theory of knowledge, is only conceivable as necessary, on the basis of the metaphysical necessity of the determination of the Monad. And since the internal happening of the Monad is the metaphysical ground (jf extenal phenomenal relations, the identification of the basal law of that haj)pen- ing, causation, with the basal law of the inner movement of the Monad, Sufficient Reason, is logically necessary. §24. While at bottom a metaphysical principle, it is easily conceivable from the foregoing how S. R. in Leib- nitz may appear now" as the outcome of a logical motive, and / • • « « 4 % 25 again as the result of psychological considerations. It was- natural that the first formulation of a principle so general, and yet so capable of exposing the last roots and problems of knowledge, should be uncertain in its distinctions. But the state in which the problem was left \yas perhaps one most calculated to attract to it the attention of future thought. If Sufficient Reason is a new principle of knowledge, of validity for a sphere of ideas not amenable to the norms of formal logic, what is the relation of formal logic to knowl- edge in general? Must not the bounds of the logical con- sciousness — that is the consciousness concerned Avith neces- sary relations among ideas — be extended beyond the sphere of formal logic? This was the problem which lay inevitably in the origin of Leibnitz's principle. §25. But again the impetus to new^ metaphysical formula- tions offered by Leibnitz's origination of his new^ law was immense, and sufficient to obscure the preceding problem of the possible extension of the concept of the logical conscious- ness. For consider that in the place of the belief in the ontoloo-ical validity of the results of purely formal logic, which had begun to wane, there was now offered the prob- lem (and the apparent means of solving it) of a metaphysical determinism other than logical. Thus was inaugurated the great problem of the transcendental grounding of experience and of its great postulate, the law^ of Sufficient Reason. This involved the Idealistic position of the identification, not of the loo-ical g-round with the real ground, but of the trans- cendental knowledge grounds with real grounds, the identi- fication of phenomenal reality with the knowledge of that re- ality. This logical consequence, though not carried out to the completeness attained by Kant and Schopenhauer, is yet clearly enough implied in Leibnitz's thinking. Thus (in the Letters to Clarke, ^125) the metaphysical universality of the law^ is clearly taught It is the principle alike of external happening and of the inner life of the Monad, and again the highest concept of the source of the principle is that of the Creator, "in welchem die Macht die die wirkinden Ursachea 26 schafft und die Weisheit welche die Zweck-tluitigen ordnet, sich vereinigt finden." The difference between Leibnitz and his rationalistic pre- decessors is this: He, too, postulates an intellectual world ground, with the Christian colorinij;^ — believing that it must be found eventually in the Will of God. He, too, believes that the ideal of knowledge is logical necessity expressed in the two positive norms, Identity and Contradiction. But the problem of Knowledge he finds not so sinii)le, and in order to encompass all possible emj)irical knowledge a third principle is necessary, which he formulates in the general and negative way that we have seen. It is general in that it is a postulate, that ^///things must have a reason and a cause. It is negative in that in its emi)irical ap|)licati{)n the postulate demands, not tliat our knowledge proceed by identities and lack of contradictions in concepts, but by admitting to the body of our ktiowledge only such facts and judgments of facts that have a sufficient reason.* The validity of that sufficiency he further proceeds to gound metaphysically, as we have already seen. That he should have confined the postulate of Sufficient Reason to empirical truth is not surprising, nor that he should have failed to distinguish the logical from the metaphysical aspect; that he had insight enough into its logical nature to make it coordinate with the lon^r estab- lished norms is what stamps him as the originator of a new era in philosophical thinking. §26. Wolff follows Leibnitz with the attempt at a com- plete logical expression of Sufficient Reason although it still lies in the sphere of "Ontologie" or metaphysics. In the ''Vernunftigc Gcdankcn von Gott, dcr Welt und dcr Scele,'"^ we are told that while equally with the principles of Identity and Contradiction, that of Sufficient Reason lies in the nature of men, yet '* Leibnitz war der erste seine Wichtiirkeit zu erkennen, dass nehmlich alle veritates contimrentes oder alle zufiillige Wahrheiten aus diesem Satz als ihren ersten Quellen fliessen, ja vermoge desselben, die contingentia ihre *cf. also a similar negative formulation by Kant, H 36, 39. '§30. V / 27 ' veritatem determinatem ' haben, vermoge dessen sie ein unendlicher Verstand vorher wissen konnte." But to the rationalistic mind of Wolff it appeared that if "'ein unendlicher Verstand" knew these verities beforehand, they must be of the nature of logical relations. So that the attempt is made to secure the place of Sufficient Reason as a logical law, and this, by means of deduction from the law of Contradiction. This occurs in ''Ontologia'' (§§66-70.) A thing has either a Sufficient Reason or it has not. In the last case it must be granted that there is something which has nothing for its ground. But out of nothing can something never be known. Baumgarten repeats the same proof in Metaphysics % 20. The pctitio principii, as well as the confu- sion of real and knowledge ground, is evident, and it is upon the failure of this proof that Crusius(as we shall see) takes his stand for his ow^n point of view. The meaning of this attempt to prove logically what Leibnitz had considered in the light of a postulate is evidently nothing else than a falling back into the rationalism against which the new law had risen as a protest. What had been with Leibnitz a postulate of the necessary Zusanunenhang of the world in the broadest sense, and of our ability to understand the same, becomes with Wolff a claim for the logical determinism of the things which make up the world of contingency. To be sure Wolff had distinguished between four prin- ciples of Sufficient Reason* — cognoscendi, the logical deduc- tion of conclusions from premises; fiendi, from which grounds we discover the reality of a thing ; essendiy from which the possibility of a thing is seen (relation in space and time); agcndi, in the ground of which we see the necessity of an act. But with all his important distinctions which later figure so materially in the history of the principle, he never left the rationalism which belonged to his intuition of the world, for in the last analysis the grounds are always determined logically,^ and grow^ out of the Scholastic definition of the " thing, "as made up of logical characteristics. ^ Ontologia, ^ 866. ' Ontologia, § 951. \ 28 §27- The study of Sufficient Reason in the '^ Entwurf dcr noizvendigen Vcrnunft-Walirlicitcn;' 1753, by Crusius is of the nature of a weak protest against the Wolffian point of view.* Wolff had defined philosophy as the science of the possible, thus making its criteria purely logical, all that could be thought without contradiction being of course possible. This covered his whole view of Sufficient Reason. Crusius protested against this by defining I'hilosophy as the Science of the Real. A ground to be Sufficient Reason shall not suffice merely if it involves no contradiction, but it must so show the rela- tion as to make it evident that with the ground the conse- quence is necessarily givai. How docs it affect reality, if the opposite can be thought? The existence of the opposite cannot be thouirht of, if the existence is once known to be a real fact.2 Thus the distinction made by Wolff between the abso- lute necessity of thought and hypothetical necessity which is found in the law of ground in contingent reals is false, and arises out of the subjective relation thereto.'^ All necessity is absolute, but not all logical and ca})able of being expressed in terms of knowledge. This point is weighty, for his two great contributions to the problem are: a. His clear distinction between the different spheres of the functionin^r of Sufficient Reason, especiallv between the real and ideal grounds, and : b. His especial study of the problem of the ground in the sphere of the Will. In regard to the first, he complains of the changeable meaning applied to the term ground, and especially the fail- ure to keep separate the ideal ground of kntjwledge and the real ground, a distinction only suggested by Wolff and not carefully adhered to. '^Hierdurch (Vermischung) wird nicht nur die Aufmerksamkeit auf das wahre Wesen dersel- ben verhindert, sondern auch zu der Ubereilung Gelegen- * Reimarius— " Die Vernimftlehre ^I20— also stands for a separation of the meta- physical application from its application as a lojjical principle. ' Dissertatio Philosophii de Usit et Limitibus Principii Rationis Dderminaniis vulge Sujfficientis. Lips. 1743, §6. ^Entwurj der Not, Wahr.— WW. Cf. also Kant ^.39. \ / 29 heit gegeben, vermoge welcher man annimt dass alle wahr- haft zureichende Realgriinde auch zugleich zureichende Erkentniss-griinde apriori, sein mlissten." ^ This simply means that as far as the Principle of Sufficient Reason is to be ap- plied to the real, one can only say a necessary ^'Zusainmen- hang'' exists, according to laws, but in no way does the rationalist's postulate follow that their relations may be known as logically expressed. It is not a problem of the knowledge-ground of the rational possibility of a thing, but a postulate of real and necessary relations among things. §28. Having thus separated the knowledge or logical problem from that of real grounds, he next divides the sphere of the latter into two great main divisions, the moral and physical real. This, it must be remembered, rose out of his moral and religious problem of the freedom of the will. In the physical sphere we have two, aspects of the real ground ; first, the real ground as cause, to explain the prob- lem of becoming; and secondly, the real ground as possi- bility, in which, like Wolff, he brings to light the space and time conditions of empirical judgments, as the conditions of the possibility of the real or the ''law of ground" of being. This was later developed into the Kantian modal category of the Possible, the criteria of which are formal. His schemat- ism is, so to speak, the setting of the great problem of Sufficient Reason which later occupied the minds of Kant and Schopenhauer. It may be expressed somewhat as fol- lows (De usu, etc., §§35, 36): Ground. Moral. Real. Physical. Knowledge. Being-Cause. Possibility. Apriori. Aposteriori. Space and Time. Being. Experience. 1 " Entwurf der Not, Wahr:' Chap. 3, § 38. 30 §29- The problem of Sufficient Reason in the s|)here of Morals or of the Will, is his chief (juestion, and is kept care- fully distinct from the physical si)here. But here ai^ain must be distinguished carefully between the ideal and real ground, for we are tempted to consider the idea which we call motive, (the idea which is the ground of our being con- scious of a «'/// act,) the real cause or ground of that act. This is false, for it is foolish to ask for grounds of an act of will, for it is simply the nature of will to act as it wills. Thus he champions the doctrine of Augustine and Scotus that the Will is independent of the " \^)rstellungen," not, however, indeterminism, for the law of ground lies in the Will itself. To ask for its ground in an idea is to confuse knowledge and real grounds, for will is real and force. The proof of this position we need not give, for it rests upon cer- tain errors concerning the definition and relation ot the ideas of substance and force, and an application of the same to a metaphysic of the will in an unjustifiable manner. Sufficient for our historical study is it to notice that for the Will, as well as for simple Being, is postulated a peculiar law of ground which dare not be identified either with causality or Ideal ground.* §30. In summing up the Leibnitz-Wolffian movement, we may describe it as having three moments: (a.) Leibnitz propounds the Principle of Sufficient Reason as a postulate of empirical knowledge, extends it in some of his formulations to a general logical principle — thus extend- ing potentially the sphere of logic beyond the bounds of the formal. Not being able to achieve the full formulation of his logical motive, he finally secures universality for his new principle by yielding to the metaphysical demand which identified it with the universal causal determination, devel- oped in his system, grounding it on his Monadologie. (b.) Wolff attempts to restore the principle to the place of a logical law, but through his limited notion of logic and the attempt to deduce Sufficient Reason from the principles of *cf. Konig — '' Die Entwicke lung des Causal Problems,"' Chap, on Crusius. \. / 31 Identity and Contradiction, he falls back into Pre-Leibnitz- ian Rationalism, (c.) Crusius, in protest against Wolff's. Rationalism, excludes the law entirely from logic, and de- velops the metaphysical motive of Leibnitz still further. The Kantians. CHAPTER IV. Sufficient Reason as the Basal Law OF Metaphysics. §31. As has been already suggested in the introductory chapter, the metaphysical motive in Leibnitz's formulation of Sufficient Reason which sought to ground the validity of the principle in extra-logical considerations and which was car- ried out in Crusius' construction of the law as a principle of metaphysical determination rather than of ** sufficiency " for knowledge, finds its continuation in Kant and Schopenhauer. The characteristic of this entire metaphysical movement was already prominent in Crusius. Besides the distinction between ideal and real grounds, there is a further differentia- tion of different classes of real grounds, namely, a) those of the Sufficient Reason of Being as afforded by the relations of space and time, b) of Sufficient Reason of Becoming, in the relations of Causality, c) the grounds of Will acts. This meta- physical differentiation of real grounds into three distinct classes, becomes prominent, because the essentially unitary and logical nature of the law sinks out of sight. This unitary nature of the Law as a knowledge postu- late both Kant and Schopenhauer seek to" restore, the former by what, following Schopenhauer, we may call Transcen- dental Logic, the latter by his doctrine of the Intellectual Intuition, both of which are in their essence metaphysical principles. § 32. Kant. Kant may be said to have had as the problem of his entire thinking, the nature of philosophical grounds. For his starting point was given him by the Leibnitzian- school, and in the particular problems of Crusius. In the 32 ''Nova Diliicidatio'' (or fully "^iven, '' Principium primoruni cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatid'^ 1755 (Kant's Habil- . itation's Schrift), beside the laws of Identity and Contradic- tion is considered the " Satz voin Grunde.*' With Crusius Kant acrrees that the term sufficient ground (*' zureichender ") is weak and chooses ''determin- ing " (" bestimmender") instead. Moreover, he is unsatisfied with the definition of Wolff, that the ground is that '' durch das voraus mehr sei als nicht sei." It explains nothing for **T'^r^//^;" means simply " aus welchem grund."^ Thus if the only determining ground is that its opposite can not be thought, this is only ideal or *' nacJiJur bcstimmenden GriituV and not ''vorher bestivnnenden,'' It answers the question of the ''quod'' and not of the "wariuny On the basis of this distinction between "vorhcr"' or " antcccdcntcr'' ground and "nachker^^ or " cojiscquentcr,^' he insists upon an absolute determinism for the iormer or real ground and justifies this thorough-going determinism against the attacks of Crusius, who complained that it made impossible the freedom of the will. Upon the basis of distinction of real and ideal ground, Crusius had maintained that to consider an idea, cause or ground of an act of will is to confuse real and ideal grounds. This " idea" (Vorstellung) is the Sufficient Reason, as far as the knowledge of the act is concerned, but it cannot be said that it is determining for the individual Will itself. Will contains a law of ground, but a law of its own, for *' durch das blosse Setzen der Willcns Thlitigheit alle entgegen- gesetzten Bestimmungen ausgeschlossen werden ; folglich ist ein vorher bcstimmenden Grund nicht erforderlich. "■ Kant answers with a keen psychological analysis of the Will and its functions, showing that there is a distinction between the impulse or desire which is the determining ground of the will act and our idea of the same which we use as an ideal term of the knowledge of will acts. Thus partic- ular impulses and desires are the motives or grounds of the decisions of the Will, although they are to be included in the ^§190. *§§ 199-203. \ y 33 Will itself, and so the postulate of the Law of Ground is ful- filled, which demands that every event shall have its Suffi- cient Reason or determining ground. ^33. Kant's next step is in the direction of a closer study of the Law of Ground in things — the principle of causation. In 1763 appeared the paper entitled "Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grossefi in die Welt-Weisheit hinein zu fiigen,'* in which is to be seen the working of the second force brought to bear upon Kant, namely, the Humian criticism. Wolff had taken the empirical postulate of Leibnitz and jgiven it such a logical turn that all its applications were made through the logical principles of Identity and Contra- diction, to the latter of which he had tried to make it subordinate. Kant sees that in the sphere of the real these principles are not applicable. For in actual nature a nega- tive force in relation to a positive (and in fact, positive and negative functions in general) do not constitute a contradic- tion. Though both positive in their nature, they do not annul each other as in logic. Thus Wolff in the ** Vernunf- tige Gedanken' had taken the figure of Archimedes' Scales as an intuitive proof of contradiction and Sufficient Reason in relation to each other. An exact balance is an intuitive contradiction of positive and negative. Now, if one side sinks, the contradiction is destroyed and there must be a ground why that side has sunk rather than not. Taking this same figure of the scales, Kant shows that no logical analogy exists, and that one cannot speak of the two sides being in contradiction, but rather are both to be considered causes in producing an entirely different condition, namely, the new state of the balance of the scales. Thus, likewise in the sphere of morals, plus-crime and minus-crime do not equal zero, nor do pain plus pleasure equal zero, but pro- duce an entirely new mental state. He concludes, there- fore, that the problem of causation or of real ground lies entirely outside the sphere of formal logic. §34. It is, however, in the ''Grundsatze des reinen Verstandes," that most clearly written chapter of the entire 34 Kritik. that we have at the same time the full expression^ of Kant's doctrine of Sufficient Reason and the source of Schopenhauer's formulation, with which we shall later be con- cerned. After considering the law of Contradiction as the supreme principle of analytical judgments, Kant asks the question: What is the supreme principle of synthetic judg- ments? To this the answer is: the Law of Ground.* That Kant thus identifies the Law of Ground, the principle of empirical judgments, with a synthetic function of mind rather than with the analytic procedure of logic, is in har- mony with the metaphysical motive of Leibnitz, which sought an extra-logical validity for the principle of Sufficient Reason. In further asking the question, how synthetic judgments a priori, without logical grounds, are possible Kant is obeying the logic of the motive and seeking a meta- physical source for the validity of the extra-logical law. The ontologizing of this fundamental law is the Transcen- dental Logic of the Kantian Kritik. §35. 'WiQ general Law of Ground Kant formulates as fol- lows:^ *" Vier/ach€ Wurzel" §52. *•• Vier f ache Wurzel^ §§ I. 2. •Cf. paragraphs 35. 36. 43 ciple of ground assumes in its empirical use ; and before him Crusius had likewise, besides the fundamental distinction between real and knowledge grounds, distinguished among real grounds those of being, spatially and temporally deter- mined, of becomifig, causally determined, of will^ or motive grounds. But it cannot be denied that what, with Crusius and Kant, especially the latter, was more a matter of schematism and definition, Schopenhauer, in somewhat scholastic fashion, makes fundamental and metaphysical. § 46. The development of this theory of the specific neces- sities of different kinds of relations of ideas, leads to the dif- ferentiation ot four distinct classes: I. The relations of space and time, transcendental and a priori^ are so given in the intuition, that certain relations of points, given in space or time, determine the place of others in the intuitional complex. This is the Law of Ground of Being, and upon it is based the whole of mathematics, geometry upon the spacial and arith- metic upon the temporal necessity. Out of this position the theory naturally follows, and it is one which Schopenhauer maintains with especial interest, that geometrical reasoning is not a logical process, but that its necessity is a matter of intuition.^ The relation of this theory of the Law of Ground of space and time relations, to Kant's '* Axiome der Anschau- ung " is evident.* 2. Causality, or the Law of Ground of Becoming, is that /? /r/^r? relation among ideas, by means of which **ein un- mittelbares, intuitives Auffassen der ursachlichen Verbind- ung " is possible. Something more than the temporal relations of succession is expressed in the causal judgment. It is the specific necessity of the causal relation, but it is not a conceptual logical postulate reflectively applied to the phenomenal subjective succession, thus giving it empirical > Schopenhauer himself admits, " Welt als Wille, &c.," page 150, that only the recognition, the " cognitio" of geometrical necessity, is intuitive. The proof or '' con- victio " is logical. This theory of mathematics is of course now discredited. The best Vier f ache IVurzel, %% 46 ; T43. And again § 52, he calls it : " Der immanente Keim aller Dependenz, Relativitat, Instabilitat und Endlichkeit in unserem subject- object befangenen Bewustsein .... welche das Christentum mit richtigem Sinn die Zeitlichkeit nennt." 48 before us. On the one hand, the empirical manifold of the Law of Ground, in so far as it is entirely empirical is reduci- ble to the one common term of temporal succession. This common element, empirically considered, contains no princi- pie of determination, however, other than psychological necessity. The peculiar necessities of the three different spheres of Causality, Space and Time and logical relations, are only explainable as expressions of one metalogical or ontological principle of determination, which is the Subject- Object relation itself. This identification of the metalogical Sufficient Reason with temporal succession is only explaina- ble in the light of the general metaphysical system of which Schopenhauer's peculiar doctrine of S. R. is an element. The phenomenal objectif\cation of the Ontological Will, which is at the same time the origin of the world and of the knowledge of the world, is in its first stage temporal succes- sion, and this temporal succession is the logical prius of the particular necessities of the different spheres of the mani- festation of this primal law. The phenomenal objectifica- tion is Sufficient Reason as a metalogical principle. This much of Schopenhauer's Ontology is sufficient to make clear the relative place of the logical Law of Ground and of the causal axiom in his theory. In that Sufficient Reason is at the same time the principle of the phenomenal objectification and of the knowledge of that objectified phenomena; knowledge and reality are the same process. '' Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung," " Object fur das Subject sein und unsere Vorstellungen sein ist das- selbe." Causality is an a priori, not simply regulative, but •constitutive Sufficient Reason of the existence of objective reality. ** Materie ist durch und durch Causalit'at." §53. Now Kant had likewise found in the causal axiom, the Sufficient Reason of phenomenal reality— the law of the binding together of phenomena, but as an axiom of knowl- edge the causal principle was conceived to be partly a logi- cal postulate. The logical deduction of the categories aims to show that though transcendental, they are yet logical in / .« 49 their essence. This reflective theory of the movement of Sufficient Reason in the temporal flow of phenomena, de- scribed by Kant in the ''Deduction," was constructed, Schopenhauer maintains, '' um innerhalb der Transcendental Logik zu bleiben."^ This logical standpoint Schopenhauer abandons. 2 Since objective reality and the knowledge of that reality are the same, a unitary movement of Sufficient Reason in the causal principle, the reflective logical element in the principle of ground is discarded as superfluous, and in its place is substituted a unitary non-reflective function called the *' In- tellectuelle Anschauung." This Intellectual Intuition then, as an inuncdiate perception of the relation of ground and consequence in reality, independent of reflection and logical thought, is a necessar}^ mysticism growing out of the identi- fication of the reality of objective existence and its relations with the necessity of the knowledge of that reality. As a consequence, the whole Kantian attempt to show (in the psychological Subjective Deduction) how the postulate of logical thought necessity may combine with sensational reality in a transcendental material judgment is vain. In the Intuition we have reality and intellectual necessity at the same moment.^ § 54. This identification of the modal categories of reality and necessity which Kant had distinguished so carefully, is typical for the whole standpoint, and follows logically from 'Appendix, " Welt als Willc, &c." Haendel, p. 36. '^ Konig-, {Entwichelung dcs Causal-Problems,'^ Vol. II, page 32), makes the criticism that the general principle of Ground is developed merely as a formula for the whole spliere of ideas. Since a Deduction of the law fails both for the general law itself and for the particular cases of the law, it can be looked upon only as an empty formula for a number of incommensurable relations. This must necessarily follow if the essence of the principle, its logical element, is discarded. ' ''Die Welt als Wille, &c." Haendel, p, 17. " Daher auch erregt die anschau- liche Welt, so lange mann bei ihr bleiben steht, im Betrachter weder Skrupel noch Zweifel ; es geibt hier weder Irrthum noch Wahrheit ; Diese sind ins Gebiet des Abstracten, der Reflexion gebannt. Hier aber liegt fUr Sinne und Verstand die Welt offen dar, giebt sich mit naiver Wahrheit fur das was sie ist, fiir anschauliche Vor- stellung, welche gesetzmassig am Bande der Causalitat sich entwickelt." 50 his metaphysics.' It is the complete ne-ation of the criti- cal standpoint, which has as its chief problem the deter- mination of the relation of the logical to the material elements in the Law of Ground. The critical balance of Kant, is overthrown in favor of a metaphysical dogmatism. §55. Schopenhauer's doctrine of Sufficient Reason was intended to make clear in a technical and scientific wav, what his entire philosophical attitude conlinually implied, namely the insignificance of logical refiection in our knowledge pro- cesses. Theoretical logical necessity, he is continually announcing, is but the appearance, the shine of knowledge. The direct intuition in which no contradictions appear is the only real source of truth. Aside from the general weakness of a position such as this, which invalidates the entire logical concatenation of his own system, we are interested chiefiy in understanding what, from the standpoint of development, results for our special problem of the Law of Ground, by such a negation of the logical consciousness. §56. If we keep in mind the general trend of our study — that Post Leibnitzian thinking disi)lays an interaction and often struggle between the logical and metai)hysical motives, both prominent in Leibnitz's formulation of Sufficient Reason, and secondly that the Crusius-Kantian movement represents a development of the metai)hysical motive, it will be clear that Schopenhauer's modification of the Kantian philosophy is the extremest possible putting of the anti-logical tendency. The logical consciousness is reduced to a minimum of range and value. Logic is only formal and, in that it deals only with nominalistic concepts, mere shadows of the real, it has only symbolic value. Not only is the essential logical nature of the Law of Ground denied — but logic ceases to be even an essential side of the Law. ^ Thus in his " K'ritik der Kantischen Philosop/iie,'' " Alle diese Umstande (die Begnffe Moglichkeit, Ummoglichkeit) daher stammen keineswegs aus einer Geistes Kraft des Verstandes, sondern entstehen durch den Conflict des Abstracten Erkennens mitdem Intuitiven wie man gleich sehen wird " — and again on p. 161, " Demgemass ist alles Wirklich zugleich ein Notwendiges und in der Realitat zwischen Wirklichkeit und Notwendigkeit ist kein Unterschied und eben so keiner zwischen Wirklichkeit und Moglichkeit." V / 51 § 57. This very radicalism of Schopenhauer's doctrine makes it of particular value in the present study — as a crucial and turning point — so to speak, in the development of the principle under consideration. For what is the Law of Ground, if not a knowledge principle — and what is a knowl- edge principle if not in some wa}^ connected with the logical consciousness, and its reflective processes. Again the notion of Sufficient Reason is in contradiction with the idea of knowledge in a unitary Intuition. The relation of ground and consequence, implies the analytical severance of two distinct elements, the ground and the consequence. This analytical abstraction must necessarily result in thinking the ground and consequence conceptuall3^ As Kant says, ''Die einfachen Elemente der Anschauung liegen vollig ausserhalb der Sinnlichkeit und sind conceptual."^ The concept of Intellectual Intuition and the relation of ground and con- sequence are therefore absolutely contradictory ideas, for the latter relation is analytical as succeeding thinking fully demonstrated, while intuition describes a movement of con- sciousness unitar}' and synthetic, in which no differentiation of parts arise. Kant then did well in remaining ''innerhalb der Transcendental Logic"- — that is in extending his concept of the logical consciousness to include Sufficient Reason — and it cannot be a matter of wonder that he was almost scornful in his condemnation of Eberhardt's doctrine of ''In- tellectuelle Anschauung" as destructive of all critical think- ing. Schopenhauer's negation of the logical consciousness, and formulation of Sufficient Reason as a process of metalog- ical Intuition is a mysticism which may be very properly called the reciiictio ad absiirduvi of the anti-logical, metaphy- sical tendency in the history of the Principle. ^ Cf. Note, page 41. 'Appendix " Welt ah Wille 6^ Vorstellung,'" p. 36. 52 CHAPTER V. The Conflict Between the METAi'Hv>ic al and Logi- cal Doctrines of Suifk ifm- Reason. ^58. Scht^pcnhauer's formulation of Sufficient Reason received the preccelin- full treatment in view of ttie tact that in several important respects it stands as typical for the whole movement from Leibnitz on, and secondly because it contains the best expressicjn of the contradiction out of which the modern logical theory arose as necessary conse- quence. §59. Looking: backward, it may not be too much to say that this classical formulation stands as a rcdiictio ad absur- dum of the principle which characterized the preceding movement. For Schopenhauer's doctrine is the most con- sistent answer to the Leibnitzian demand that a Principle of Sufficient Reason be found for empirical reality that should lie outside the sphere of logic. Leibnitz had in mind a Law of reality itself — and identified Sufficient Reason with causation, but there was also implicit in the idea of Sufficient Reason, a notion of a new principle of knoiclcdgc of empirical reality other than the logic of concepts. But if we assume a causal law in reality independent of our knowledge, — our knowledge of that causal relation can come about alone in one of two ways, either through logical thought, or through immediate intuition of these causal relations. This contra- diction made itself felt immediately in the successors of Leibnitz. Already Wolff champions the logical formulation of the law, while Crusius leans toward a view, according to which our knowledge of causal and will relations is of an unlogical nature, although he does not come to a clear form- ulation of the nature of that knowledge. Kant again made a synthesis of the two sides, in that instead of the simple ** sufficiency " of Leibnitz he demanded a determinism for ■^ V / 53 our knowledge of empirical reality, but not the determinism of formal logic. In its place enters a doctrine of a Transcen- dental Logic in which the intuitional and conceptual elements are critically balanced. This temporary balance was neces- sarily disturbed by the succeeding movements, the Hegelian movement falling back upon the formal side of Kant's Tran- scendental Logic, Schopenhauer taking the intuitional side to the exclusion of the logical conceptual element. In that the Sufficient Reason of empirical reality is given directly and immediately in the sense intuition, is the Leibnitzian demand first consistently answered— the demand that the principle of empirical knowledge lie outside the conceptual, logical sphere. ^60. But in that this stage is reached, is the impossibility of such an answer evident. For the doctrine of an imme- diate intuition of the empirical Sufficient Reason, once clearly formulated, proves itself to be in direct contradiction to the idea of the relation of ground and consequence— as Kant already protested against Eberhardt, and as fully pointed out in the case of Schopenhauer. This contradictio in adjecto in the conception of the intellectual intuition of the ground and consequence is the reduetio ad absurdiim, which shows us the impossibility of a relation of ground and consequence other than logical. ^61. After Schopenhauer a marked change is evident in tlie attitude of thought to our principle, a change which appears as a historically and logically necessary consequence of the failure of the first movement. This change is in the direction of a logical formulation of Sufficient Reason, not logical in the sense that it is subordinated to the Principles of'^Identity and Contradiction, as with Wolf, but rather in that it becomes the basal principle of logic to which the laws of Identity and Contradiction are subordinated. In this movement two stages may be distinguished: i. The struggle between metaphysics and logic, as represented in Herbart and Trendelenburg, and 2) the completed formulation of the law as basal principle of logic in Sigwart and Wundt. The \ 54 most obvious motive to such a return to a logical view of Sufficient Reason, is the recognition of the impossibility of any other than a logical conception of the relation of ground and consequence. An unusually strong motive is the appear- ance of a distinct trend toward scientihc method in Philoso- phy. The logical possibility of the relation of cause and effect, and the possibility of a unity of the " thing " among its manv attributes, — these are the metaphvsical problems which most concern science. HERB ART. ^62. It becomes then the |)r()blcm of a theory of knowl- edge, in touch with the new scientific consciousness, to subject the fundamental concepts of science to critical analy- sis. We are led herewith to a new attitude and a new 'method in philoso|>hy — w hicli makes itself immediately felt in the new turn given to the formulation of Sufficient Reason in Herbart's thinking. This may be described briefly as a conflict between a logical and metaphvsical form- ulation, in so far as the Law of Ground is concerned. Protesting against a certain formalism and abstraction in the Kantians, according to which general a priori laws of empirical thought, a sort of mechanism, are set over against the concrete activity of mind upon concrete problems of scientihc thought, Herbart sets himself immediatelv to the solution of the problem of the relation of ground and conse- quence as such. The MctJiodologic or the first part of his Metaphysik\ is concerned entirely with the Principle of *' Sufficient Reason," the third chapter of which he beo-ins with this sentence: '' Die erste aller Fragen fiir den welcher durch Speculation sein Wissen erweitern woUte war unstrei- tig die; wie folgt Eins aus dcm Anderen ? Was ist ein Grund? Was heisst eine Folire? " §63. He finds, in answering these questions, that formal logic has failed entirely to show how the relation of ground and consequence is thinkable, since it contains the contra- diction of assuming that its concepts are definitely determined N 55 quantities, and yet demands in the Law of Ground that the consequence be something new, else it does not consti- tute a widening of knowledge. But if the consequence is new it was not contained in the definitely known concept, called the ground. Thus the principle of ground must as a method of widening our knowledge lie outside the formal lo-ic of definite concepts.' This, however, is nothing more thtn the Kantians had discovered, but their substitutions in place of the failure of formal logic are equally unsatisfactory to Herbart. First of all, the Law of Ground was sup- posed to be explained when a certain number of a priori subjective forms were shown to be the logical pre-supposi- tions of all experience, but this is a subjectif^cation of the problem which Herbart will not allow, and likewise an un- warranted generalization, for the problem of ground and consequence is always the question of definite empirical rela- tions of the possibility of one element being thought the ground of the other, and any attempt to deduce these formal relations in experience from a priori knowledge forms leads to blindness in regard to the problems of each particular relation = The problem of knowledge is not how according to the nature of our knowledge functions, it is possible for us iiberhaupt to know, but rather is the world of experience given us in its complex of form and content, and this we must so reconstruct as to make it rational.' „ , , §64 Equally true is it that the " Intellectuelle Anschau- un-" fails to answer the problem. Immediate intuition cannot give the evidence which belongs to relations of crround and consequence. To be sure it gives us ideas and relations, which we must hold fast to although logic threatens to abandon them, but we cannot fall back upon the sloth of "diesen Schwarmern" who will not think the prob- lem through but claim that the relation of ground and consequence is given in the "Anschauung.- The contra- 'Herbarfs CompleU Works, edited by Kehrbach. Vol. VIII, ?l66, p. 15. ' Complete Works, Vol. VIII, p. 32. , , „ o . Comflete Works. Vol. VIII. p. 18. ' Complete Works, Vol. VIII. ?l85. p. 38. L^ 56 dictions which arise in the immediate intuition must be put aside by logical thought.^ Historically, Herbart had in mind in these introductory criticisms, besides Kant himself, the logical rationalism of Hegel and the Intuition theory of Schelling's Natural Philosophy, but if Schopenhauer had been a ruling thinker of the time, his intuitional view of the relation of ground and consequence would not have escaped. §65. The failure of all these thinkers, he continues, has been that they have invariably assumed the possibility of the relation of ground and consequence; and this has been the root of so many profitless generalizations.- An analytical study of the logical possibility of the relation itself is the first step, and from this the conclusion is reached that the principle of Sufficient Reason is first of all a subjective postulate arising out of a contradiction between the intuition and our concepts already developed— a postulate which de- mands the removal oi these contradictions and may be expressed as a demand for a contradictionless whole of expe- .rience.2 The possibility of the satisfaction of this impulse, of the solution of these contradictions, lies in the possibility of so extending the meaning of the general concept as to make a new ground, a new complex of ideas in which the contradictory element of experience may be seen to be con- tained. This concept of the solution of the contradiction between ground and consequence, by widening the ground, is further developed in his so-called *' Methode der Bezieh- ungen" of which it is necessary for us to get some notion. §66. While Herbart, recognizing the contradiction in- volved in the subsumption of the Law of Ground under the norms of formal logic, denies the sufficiency of the latter, he yet recognizes in the demand of Sufficient Reason for a contradictionless whole of experience, an essentially ^Complete Works ^ ^192, p. 46. ^Complete Works, Vol. VIII. p. 414.-" Meine Untersuchung," he savs in his reply to the criticism of Prof. Brandis. " stellt aber die ganze Moglichkeit dass es tiberhaupt Cirunde geben konne, von vorn herein in Zweiiel ; und hier wenn irgendwo, ist, meines Erachtens, Zweifel der Weisheit Anfang,'' ^Complete Works, Vol. VIII, p. 23. ^ / # • • • "V » f': » • 1 • < I 57 logical nature. The problem of his analysis is so to investi- gate the possibilities of logical relations, so to widen the notion of logical ground, one might say, as to make the relation of ground and consequence a logical possibility. Since the contradiction arises out of the relation of the con- crete particular to the abstract concept, the first problem is that of the relation of the two. This is, according to his theory, purely nominalistic. General concepts are but short-hand registers for the real, by means of which the *' manifold " of the given may be grasped in a unity. ^ Formal logic can, therefore, of necessity give only schematic rela- tions, in which the manifold of the real cannot be contained without contradictions. But in that these concepts are only symbols they may be changed to suit the requirements of the particulars with which they are in contradiction. The laws of formal logic remain their only governing principles, under the more primal postulate which includes all of expe- rience, for the material side has as its problem the continu- ous widening of the general concepts to meet the require- ments of particular experiences, in order that a logic of concepts may be a logic of reality. §67. Instead of the principle of Subalternation w^hich determines this relation in formal logic, in the broader view of logical necessity which this doctrine of Sufficient Reason compels, a new principle must be sought. This, the ''Meth- ode der Beziehungen," consists in so widening the concept by adding elements, that the consequence may be seen to be necessarily contained in it.^ This proceeds by chance sug- gestions, ''Zufallige Ansichten," that is of new possibilities which lie hidden in space and number relations which serve * Complete Works, Vol. VIII, p. 15. ' Complete Works, Vol. VIII, §§ 174, 175. Especially the example of the solu- tion of the Pythagorean problem of the right-angled triangle (by dropping a perpendic- ular upon the hypotheneuse. by means of which the concept of the right-angled triangle together with the added concepts developed by the dropping of the perpendic- ular, form the whole ground of the consequence that all the angles equal two right angles) shows the nature of the process, and is in itself proof against the Schopen- hauerean theory that ground and consequence are here found by means of Anschauung^ 58 as a means of helpincr on the deduction. ** Diese Kunst- griffe enweitern den Grund aiis welchem die Folge hervor- gehen soll.^ The conclusion, which is the matter of great importance for an historical study, is simply this: that the ground is never one definite concept but a changing com- plex of concepts, a system, the dependence of one' concept from another being the necessity out of which the norms of formal logic get their material. The Law of Ground is there- fore an immanental law of all conceptual interdependence, and as such the presupposition of the analytical laws of Iden- tity and Contradiction. § 68. Wlien this theory of Sufficient Reason is con- trasted with the Kantian point of view the most striking dif- ference is found to lie in the fact that while the latter, to escape the contradictions and insufficiencies of formal logic, is driven to a metaphysical formulation, in which the logical nature of the law is recognized only as a transcendental ele- ment, with Herbart these same difficulties of formal logic are overcome without deserting for a moment the logical point of view, but merely by broadening the notion of logical dependence and by the introduction of the concept of a " widened frround."^ This difference is likewise reflected in Herbart's energetic protest against the point of view which assigns to the judgment of ground and consequence a syn- thetic rather than analytic nature. The analytic of formal logic is continued in the analytic by means of which the immanental relations in the larger ground are discovered, and by means of which the contradiction is solved, for this analytical process must occur as often as our attempt to fasten a relation in thought develops contradictions. In his second letter in reply to Brandis' criticisms"* he points out that it is not the judgment of relations of ground and .con- sequence that is synthetic, but only the immanental depen- dence or Zusammenhang which underlies this judgment. The judgment of ground and consequence is itself analytical. > Complete Works, Vol. VI 11, p. 25. * Complete Works, Vol. VIII, p. 36. • Complete Works, Vol. VII, Appendix ; also p. 45, §IQI. \ / 59 § 69. The second division of our exposition is the applica- tion of this theory of Sufficient Reason to reality itself, or a consideration of the third '' Forderung einer Methodologie," that it shall be able to return from its reflexions again to the Given. ^ That is, the '' Methode der Beziehungen " must be applied in general to a consideration of those chief forms in which phenomena manifest their ** togetherness," to the typical complexes of the " Schein," to see by the abolishing of contradictions "vie viel Hindeutung auf Sein " there is.^ Now the source of these particular contradictions, according to the basal metaphysical principle of Herbart's system, is the necessary contradiction between the unity and indepen- dence of real being, and the relativity of empirical phe- nomena. The fundamental concepts of this latter phenomenal sphere are necessarily full of intuitional sense elements, or better expressed, psychological in their immediate origin. It is the working over of these concepts, in order to free them from the contradictions that arise out of these con- ditions of their origin, that constitutes the main problem of philosophy. It is therefore not in immediate real relations but in \\\^ possible to thought that final reality is to be found. §70. We are not so much interested in the '^ working over" of the particular concepts of Causality, Substance, and Inherence, as in the role which the Law of Ground plays in this connection. The characteristic feature of Herbart's concept of logical thinking, and of the function of Sufficient Reason is that these are not confined to particular logical schemata such as the syllogism or the hypothetical form, but the consequence is conceived as springing rather from an indefinite and complex system of concepts, the "widened ground." This complex and phenomenalistic relation of ground and consequence, corresponds then to the complex relativity of empirical phenomena, as we have it expressed in the empirical concepts of Causation, Inhere;ice, &c. The .analytical working over of these latter concepts, until they ^Complete Works, Vol. VIII, p. 14. ^ Complete Works, Hartenstein, Vol. Ill, p. 44. 6o express the lo<^ical relation of ground and consequence with- out contradictions, is therefore the goal of Sufificient Rea- son. The relation of ground and consequence shall like- wise make the relations in the real understandable that all real connections may be seen to depend upon the logical relations of ground and consequence. * g 71. In the working out of this new and modified ration- alism it is seen that the concepts of Inherence and Causation inevitably carry thought from the appearance to the meta- physical ground of the appearance.' Especially the causal concept, as the result of this analytical determination by the "Methode der Beziehungen," loses the empirical signifi- cance which distinguishes it from the logical law of gnnind. Causation as a phenomenon of succession belongs entirely to the sphere of appearance. Real happening and the neces- sity involved in it are conceivable only as metaphysically de- termined. ^ The application of the logical law of ground and consequence to experience led Herbart to the belief that all thinking concerning phenomenal relations, according to its principle, must consist in metaphysical constructions. The- ** Sufificient" Reason of the real is again identified witb causality. The idea that the empirical as well as the meta- physical concept of causality might be an expression of the law of ground did not find a place in his thinking. The ideal of a contradictionless whole of thought as his ideal ol Suf- ficient Reason led him into ontology. %'J2. Professor Brandis in his critique properly asks, can we consider that, after this method of Relations has done away with all contradictions, we have actually come '*Uber die ratio cognoscendi hinaus?" Can it be said that by reliev- ing the concept of causality of its contradictions we have gotten to the real inner nature of a particular causal relation? Is it not rather a *' Machtspruch des Denkens" that changes. the logical result into a knowledge of the real as it is? As a matter of fact, Herbart anticipates this criticism when he ^Complete Works, Vol. VIII, p. 243. *Cf. Kfinig, Ent7viikelung des Causal Problems^ Vol. II, p. 1 18. \ y 61 says *'unsere ganze Abweichung von der Erfahrung besteht in notivendigen Erganzungen dessen was sie uns nicht voU- standiof zeig-t."^ And indeed it does seem that if a contra- dictionless whole of experience be the ideal of Sufificient Rea- son — that if the nature of the principle is that of a logical postulate, then starting with experience as a basis, whatever the exigencies of the logical working over of the contradic- tions involved in that experience develops, must represent the real. But this involves a tremendous assumption which no theory of knowledge has a right to make, viz. : that the logical consciousness can penetrate to the essence of reality. Although Herbart had clearly before him the two distinct problems of the logical nature of the postulate of ground and consequence on the one hand, and on the other the ques- tion of the application of that logical postulate to reality as given in experience, yet he did not rise to the point of dis- tinguishing between an empirical and a metaphysical appli- cation of the Law of Ground, nor did he appreciate fully the critical nature of the problem of the limits of these two extensions. This remained for a later and more developed stage of logical reflection — as represented by the logicians Sigwart and Wundt. §73. It is at this point that the struggle between a logi- cal and a metaphysical view of the Law of Ground, which characterizes the Herbartian thinking, becomes prominent, namely, in the two problems, on the one hand of the nature of the law and secondly the extent of its application to re- ality. Arisen as a problem of methodology, defined as a sub- jective postulate demanding a contradictionless whole of ex- perience, it is further developed into a complete logical and analytic method which, without deserting the logical stand- point, extends in a critical fashion the concepts cf logic to meet the demands of the material elements, for which formal logic is not sufificient. In the application of this principle to the problems of reality Herbart fell back into the ration- alistic and ontological point of view, to which his theory was » Cotiiplete Works, Vol. VIII, p. 399. 62 near akin. For in following out this postulate of a con- tradictionless whole of thou^^ht, he was led in the way of WolfT, that is into the world of the -possible" and not of the real, for the former alone can be disclosed by the pruiciple of Contradiction unaided by the limitation of the dchnite laws of experience. It remained for a follower ol IIerl)art, Drobisch, to develop more dehnitely tlie h)-ical nature of the Law of Ground, and for later tliinkers, also mtlu- enced by him, Sigwart and Wundt, to determine more critically the application of the law to reality. It should not be overlooked, however, that llerbart -rasped the one historically important idea, namely, that the Law of Ground is'essentially a logical principle, with applications to the real, and not a metaphysical law of real relations. Per- fectly consistently then he distinguishes in the last chapter of his Encvcloplidia, an indehnite number of grounds, in sig- nificant contrast to the fourfold division of whicli Schopen- hauer made so much. §74. With the Herbartian School properly closes the history of Ratio Sufficiens as a metaphysical i)rinciple in the strict sense of the term. Now begins a process of disinte- gration which makes it somewhat difficult to follow the fate of our principle. It would be almost impossible, in the midst of this eclecticism that follows, to give a satisfactory account of it were it not for a phenomenon which is char- acteristic of this eclecticism, but of immense importance to the progress of modern thought — namely, the rise of the modern ''Erkentniss-thcorctischc Logik:^ In this movement Logic comes to a consciousness of itself and its problems — of its close relations to psychology, on the one side, and to metaphysics on the other. And what is still more important to us, this change arises in close connecticm with the prin- ciple of Ground. The Law of Ground as a metaphysical principle in the hands of Leibnitz, resisted the logical form- ulations attempted by Wolfl and his school, which made it subordinate to the principle of Contradiction, and passed over into the metaphysical formulations of Kant and the \ / 63 post-Kantians. But it will be remembered that in the formu- lations of both Schopenhauer and Herbart there was a psychological element as well. In Schopenhauer's ideal- ism this was the principle of dependence among ideas in the purely temporal association flow of ideas. Herbart's realism, on the other hand, has its psychological side in the struggle among ideas to preserve their individuality in their mutual interference or ''Heinmuugr The psychological repro- duction in these ideas is simply a picture in consciousness of a like condition among metaphysical reals. But the ques- tion, how logic shall be related to this principle, has re- mained in the back-ground. Wolff had looked upon Suf- ficient Reason as equally ontological and logical, but its subordination to the Law of Contradiction hid the problem contained in it. Besides, according to his thinking, the foundations of logic lie in Ontology as well as Psychology.^- With the absolute distinction between form and content in Kant's critical philosophy, logic became a purely formal discipline; consequently Sufficient Reason as the supreme law of synthetical material judgments found no place in hi^ formal logic. So also Schopenhauer recognizes logic as only formal, and only as one of the four forms of grounding which involves him, as we have already seen, in a puzzling contradiction. Krug and Kiesewetter continue the formal tradition of Kant, and, influenced by them, Sir William Hamilton developed a formal logic upon the same lines. Under the special influence of Krug, the Law of Ground and Causation are both subordinated to the more general terms of ''Conditioning" and " Conditioned." ^ In his "Discussions," however, a later work, the Law of Ground is treated merely as a corollary of the three-fold normative law of logic, Identity, Contradiction, Excluded Middle. ^ And again (page 603 of the same work) he demands that: "The Principle of Sufficient Reason should be excluded from logic. For, inasmuch as the principle is not material, it is ' ''Loo-ica Discursus Praeliminaris,'' §88. "^Lo^ic, p. 62, 63. ^Discussions, pp. 160-603. 64 only a derivative of the three formal laws, and inasmuch as it is material, it coincides with the principle of causation and is extra logical." In its essence it is not normative but ma- terial. Likew^ise Herbart' and his school aim at a complete diremption of formal logic from metaphysics and psy- chology, especially Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch.- §75. Against this formal tendency in Logic, as well as against the subordination of logic to metaphysics arises the *'Erkentniss-theoretische Logik" with the problem of following logical forms into their psychological and meta- physical sources. As especial originator of this movement we may consider Trendelenburg, whose '' Logischc Uutcr- stichuyigen^' appeared in the first edition in 1840. But although this work arose as a distinct protest against the formal logic, (whose neglect of the problems of ''content," he claims would only be be allowable " wenn die Formen des menschlichen Denkens Uber die Wechsel — Beziehung in der sonst alle Dinge gefangen sind, erhoben waren"^); yet it is equally in opposition to the existent forms of the metaphysics of the day as represented in Hegel, Herbart and Schopen- hauer/ As might be expected from the nature of its ante- cedents, this w^ork does actually have as its main problem a satisfactory formulation of Sufficient Reason. For it is in this principle that the boundary line between logic, psy- chology and metaphysics lies. Formal logic cannot deal with it alone, because of its material element. If, on the other hand, the material element be taken cognisance of, it leads us directly into psychology and metaphysics. §76. It is at this point that Trendelenburg's critique of preceding systems aims to show wherein these metaphysi- cal formulations of Sufficient Reason are untenable. His own formulations will include, then, only such material ele- nients — metaphysics and psychology — as the proper under- * Einleitung in die P kilos. , § 34. ' Introduction to Third Edition of his Logik. ^ Logische Untersuchun^en, 3d Edition (1870), p. 17. * Introduction to Second Edition, 61, 4. / 65 Standing of the process of knowledge itself demands. Whether his metaphysical doctrine of ground be tenable is another question. The problem itself is a new one, and an important step in modern thinking: Sufficient Reason is the basal problem of knowledge — therefore of logic; it cannot be treated alone formally, for it contains material elements; just these material elements, therefore, must be included in our logic. %'j6. The problem of the relation of ground and conse- quence becomes the central point in the Logische Untersuch- iingcn. Critically antagonistic to Hegel's identification of logic with ontology which, though at first sight it seems to offer what formal logic fails to give, really implies that thinking is without real presuppositions and of its own necessity develops,* he is equally critical toward Herbart's nominalism, seeing no means by which the *' Method of Re- lations" can be more than a formal principle, since there is no reason \vdiy on the basis of this theory the number of ele- ments in the 'Mvidened" ground should correspond to the plurality of metaphysical reals, how the solution of a logical contradiction can be the solution of a real discrepancy.' Likewise, in opposition to Schopenhauer, he attempts to find a fundamental place for the teleological element in Sufficient Reason, as a constitutive element in each of its mechanical categories, space, time and causation.^ %77. Although Trendelenburg's entire work is in a sense an exposition of the Law of Ground, the requirements of our historical study, as well as the limitations of space, allow of but merely a passing glance. His view of logic as a material as well as formal science leads to a doctrine of Sufficient Reason w^hich assigns to it likewise a material character. The real necessity of the ratio essendi and the merely formal necessity of logical ground and consequence have been either absolutely separated or fully identified. Neither of these "^Logische Untersuckungen, Vol. I., p. 38. * Logische Uniersuchungen, Vol. II., p. 397, 399. ^Logische Untersuckungen^ Introduction to II, and III. Editions, 66 extremes ot Schopenhauer or Hegel is necessary. As knowledge includes both thought and being, so this basal principle of knowledge is equally a real and a thought principle. The solution of this contradiction between the Law of Ground as a logical principle, and as real necessity, is accomplished by a reduction of both to a common lower metaphysical term which is yet higher than either.^ This third metaphysical term rejuvenates the Aristotelean theory of one primal activity or movement, of which thought and being are elements. Applied to the concept of ground, the theory seeks to show that in the complete ground elements of thought and reality unite to produce the consequence. §78. While such a metaphysical hypothesis of a " Grund- thatigkeit,*" including both thought and being, is an impos- sible solution from a logical standpoint, we must carefully distinguish this hypothesis from the historical motive which brought it into being, and from the logical working over of the formal categories which followed as its proof. ^ First of all the motive which led to this metaphysical theory was that of finding a basis for a theory of logic which would include material elements. It was essentially a protest against a narrow formal view of logical categories, and claiming material necessity for the Law of Ground, it sought a widening of the concept of logic. It is not to be wondered at that a metaphysical theory was close at hand. And, secondly, the working out oi the logical categories, especially those of modality, developed a phenomenology of the logical consciousness^ which enriched and deepened our logical insight, a debt which Sigwart fully recognizes. In the development of this phenomenology two striking charac- teristics of the logical consciousness and of its fundamental principle. Sufficient Reason, are brought to light. First, in that the processes of judgment, of knowledge, are con- ceived as a wahres Geschehen,^ 3, happening in which real and ^ Logische Untersuchungen, \o\. I., p. 135. ^ Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II., p. 140. * Logische Untersiichungen, Vol. II., p. 178 and p. 312. N . . 67 knowledge elements are united, the causal interdependence of these processes becomes a fundamental concept. The concept of an immanental logical causality of our knowledge processes, as the last term of S. R., becomes prominent. And, secondly, this wahres Geschehen, this immanental logic, is conceived to be teleological in its nature. This is particu- larly marked in Trendelenburg's theory of geometrical reasoning.^ The necessity which emerges then from this teleological movement of the Immanental Logic — is itself not a category of merely formal logic — not merely thought necessity in the one-sided use of that term, but a necessity both formal and material, 2 as the later logicians formulate it, both logical and psychological. ^ Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II,, p. 190, 191. * Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II., p. 183. 68 \ CH AIRIER \ 1. SuFFiciKNT Reason a> niv: Ba^al Principle of MoDKKN Lot;ic. §79. Before passir.,L: t(^ 8i,ia:\vart we must notice the con- tributions of several otiier men, to the modern lo.^fical move- ment, but onlv in so far as they hav^ ritributed elements, afterward taken up into the modern doctrines of - Sutlficient Reason," for we have to do with tlie historv of modern logic onlv in so far as it affects the fate of our problem. I. First of all — Drobisch '—between whom imkI Tren- delenburi;, in the dilf-jreat editi >ns of their works, a battle raged concerning' the |)rovince of loi;ic, tlie former always maintainini^Mhe formal side, according: to Ikrbartian prin- ciples. Though logic is formal in its nature, Drobisch also maintains that the Law of Ground is the basal princii>le of all logical relations, in striking contrast to the preceding formal logic which excluded it as a material principle. Her- bart, he savs, was the first to recoirnize the true nature of logical ground and conse(]uence, for he showed that ground could never be unitary and simple and thus the full nature of the relation of ground and consequence exhausted in the syllogism. Formal logic is as little satisfied with the syl- logism as an expression of grounding as is material thinking.^ For the relation between ground and consequence in logic is not that which the syllogism at first sight shows: that from a simple, already distinct unitary concept a new con- cept is deduced. That involves a contradiction, as Herbart showed. The ground is equally in formal logic t/ie entire inttrdepiiidencc of all the concepts expressed in tJic syllogism upon each other. Thus the relation of ground and con- sequence is synthetical and analytical at the same time, analvtical in so far as subject to the norms of Identity and Contradiction. But being simply the law of thr dependence ^ Logik — jrd Edition. Introduction, ^ Logik. — jrd Edition. §39. 69 of all concepts upon each other, it excludes the metaphysical axiom of causation from consideration as an expression of the Law of Ground in the logical sense. ^ The Law of Ground is then the fundamental principle of logic to which the prin- ciples of Identity and Contradiction are subordinate. It ex- presses itself in all relations among ideas, either immediately in the logical relations of concepts, or mediately in the formal relation of ground and consequence in the syllogism, especially in the hypothetical judgment. Implied or expressed Sufficient Reason is the basal law of all logical relations.^ 2. Thus is rinally reached a clear statement of what Her- bart had implied and what Trendelenburg had meant by the idea of the co-existence of the concei)tual and material ele- ments in the ground. That is the concept of an immanental loo-ic as over against the clearly expressed formal relations of identity, is fully attained. A wider extension of the prin- later in Wundt. g8o. Another i)rinciple of importance, not fully attained ciple, as well as a more definite formulation is to be found in Herbart and Trendelenburg, is finally clearly determined by Lotze. The problem of the nature of the causal concept as an aspect of the general Law of Ground was throughout the history of the principle the most important and yet the most difficult to determine. All those who answered it in the meta- physical spirit looked upon the causal judgment as synthetic and material, without reference to the logical relation of ground and consequence. Herbart and Trendelenburg, in bringing the whole principle of ground again into the logical sphere, are yet not able to determine the proper relation of the logical element of ground in the causal concept. A distinction between the logical postulate, and the empirical elements, both equally present in the causal judg- ment in germ, exists, however, as a necessary consequence of the consideration of the causal relation as an application of the logical postulate of Sufficient Reason. This distinc- "^ Logik.— 3rd Edition. §39- P- 44- "" Logik.—jrd Edition. %^-}. 70 tion is first clearly set forth by Lotze, who goes out from the difficulties in the Ilcrbartian doctrine of this relation; for he considered that between reals with no quality other than that of simple - position," no relation of cause and effect can be thought. With Herbart and Trendelenburg he is in accord, in the view that the Ratio Sufficicns consists in the whole complex of data, and their relations from which the character of the supervening effect is deducible and in this sense he defines the Aristotelian doctrine of Sum/At? and ivepyela as the first expression of Sufficient Reason. But he maintains further, that in the Postulate of Sufficient Reason with which we come to phenomena we must distinguish between the general logical postulate of a mressary relation of ground and consequence in the causal concept, and the empirical suffi- ciencyoi a given cause, in bringing about a given effect. This distinction, one of the most weighty points of his thinking, is treated fully in his metaphysics and logic, but for a concise expression, the following quotation from the '- Grundzugc der MetapJiysik'' will suffice: — *'An die Stelle des falschen Be- Sfriffs der schaffenden muss der der wirkenden Ursache gesetzt werden. Und dieser richtige Begriff des Causal — Nexus enthlilt zwei verschmolzene Principien, das der Ratio Sufficiens und das der Causa Efficiens."' The latter expresses the logical postulate of necessity, the former the empirical sufficiencv included in the causal concept. Here at last is reached a clear doctrine of the relation of Sufficient Reason to causation, from the lack of which the wh(jle history of the problem since Leibnitz had suffered. A more complete development of the distinction is to be found in Wundt's doctrine which follows in a later chapter. SIGWART. §8 1. With Sigivart is the place of our Pt^inciple in Modern Logic definitely sectired. Following upon the earlier work of Trendelenburg and Uberweg, as he himself remarks in the * Lotze, " GrundzUge der Metaphysik" p. 39. \ / 7» introduction to his Logik,^ he is enabled to .^o^"!^*^ S/^" cient Reason critically, to show its place in logic and its relations on the one hand to psychology and on the other to n^etaphysik. i. As a positive result of Trendelenburg s work Sufficient Reason receives an important place in his logic together with all its unlogical implications, and as a negative refult of the same work, the line between the psychological Ind metaphysical is closely drawn. As the basal law of log c its formulation is as follows: "Jedes Urtheil behauptet dnen logischen Grund .u haben, der es fUr ^en Denkenden J. „^i,t Mit dem Grunde ist die folge notvvendig macht. . . • ^^''^ u^'" ^ , , „j gesetzt mit der Folge ist der Grund aufgehoben. This however is a law which, though universal in logic, is comparatively limited in its application, for it can apply only toVdgments whose .rounds are kno.n, ^hat is concept ually determined :-" denn streng genommen ein log.scher "nind den wir nicht kennen ist ein Widerspruch denn er wird erst ein logischer Grund dadurch dass wir ihn erkennen 1 T>ns primal logical lau, extends then in mo d^recUons in o sphe'res where the grounds are not all logically, conceptual y determined-in the form of two postulates, closely connected but "t at bottom different, a. The first is the psycholog- ical postulate : that no judgment is given without psycl^olog^cal Troundfor its certainty^not necessity), b. The second is the ^ir^ axiom: that nothing happens in the objective world v'hout a sufficient cause. It is important to determine the relation of logical Sufficient Reason to these two postulates and of each to the other. . ^8 a. Evidently the psychological postulate is much n.o;e general than the logical for it applies eq-ll);^ ^^'fe ments whose grounds are not known, and to those whose g;u:ds are known; while the logical, strctly g>eaking governs only the lattter. Subjective ^-^^^M^^^ lewustsein," is the most general term for Sufficient Reason, ^Cf. Logik, 1873. Introduction. "^Logik, 1873- §32. *Cf. also Leibnitz, §21. in that all logical necessity is also subjectively certain, but there is much more subjectively certain that is not logically necessary. (Thus the confusion of *' Sufificient Reason'* with psychological necessity as we have seen it exemplified in Augustine, Hume, and to an extent in vSchopenhaucr.) But to the j)henomenology of this psychological '* Geltung's Bewustsein " Sigwart denies meta|)hysical W(jrth — its phen- omena must be studied as throwing light upon the logical consciousness, by developing the psvchological laws with which logical judgments arc related. In this phenomenology of grounding the marks of Trendelenburg are plainly to be seen — especially in the chapter on the Modal Categories that follows. But into the detail of this movement of grounding we cannot enter. While the phcnomenologv of Grounding cannot be taken as of mctai)hvsical value, in Trcndelenbunr's sense, it allows us to postulate back of logical relations of ground and conse(|uencc, as brought to consciousness in the formal judgment, an immanental logic of ideas which encom- passes the whole psychological complex which lies back of the judgment. So that Sufficient Reason is extended beyond formal logic to the place of a general principle of thinking. This is well expressed by Beno Erdmann, who, in general, repeats the same view as Sigwart, when he says: '*Sofern das Geltung's Bewustsein aus der Gewissheit und Denknot- wendigkeit besteht ist es durch beide bedingt, durch beide zureichend begriindet."* §83. b. The second problem is thai of the extension of Suffi- cient Reason outwardly, as a principle of causal judgments. This is expressed in the statement that causation is not a peculiar form of Sufficient Reason, but only ^ postulate oi the validity of the Principle in an external metaphysical sphere. Only in so far, ti.erefore, as a relation of cause and effect allows itself to be expressed in the form of a hypothetical judgment, can it be said to stand under the logical Law of Ground. (Here also Erdmann takes practically the same ^Erdmann, Logii, ^46. \ / • • • I » 4 « * « 73 position,*) Causation is not an independent manifestation of Sufficient Reason for the sphere of objective truth, in the Schopenhauerian sense, for that includes in it the pre- supposition that causation is the Sufficient Reason of exist- e?tce of that objective Reality, which leads to a further meta- physical construction of Sufficient Reason in an idealistic direction, as the principle which necessitates the objectifica- tion ot subjective ideas. ^ It is psychologically certain that an individual is necessitated to assign his sense affections to an outer cause, but it does not follow, that this cause actually exists either in space or in thought. Besides, that I am not conscious of producing these causal relations does not pre- clude the possibility of their being of purely subjective origin, therefore does not prove that causation is an objective form of "Sufficient Reason." The consequence is that we can not consider causality an axiom of reality but only a postulate of knowledge. As such a postulate, its relation to logical ground and consequence is that of any other a priori axiom, in the sense that the existence of this principle or of some particular fact based upon it is used as a ground for some logical expression of thought. Thus the necessity ex- pressed by the hypothetical judgment, which is really the onlv formal expression of the Law of Ground in logic, is based upon this axiom which is in every hypothetical judg- ment either expressed or implied.^ In so far as the relation of cause and effect is expressed in the hypothetical form of judgment, it is taken up into the sphere of the necessity of formal logic. § 84. We are now in a position to distinguish between the three kinds of grounds developed b}^ Sigwart. There is first, — the logical ground in the strict sense of the word in the hypothetical relation of two concepts which says that if one is true, the other is; if the consequence is proven to be false, the ground is false also. Only in this sense is the law of * Erdmann, Logik. ^409. « Vol. I, ^48. p. 367. 'Sigwart, Logik. Vol. I. p. 211. 74 ground an independent law of pure logic, and as such it is more of the nature ot a postulate than of a normative law In the second place, that is gound of a judgment which psychologically brings it about ; therefore the entire complex of consciousness out of which a judgment grows This includes partly, merely psychological association of ideas partly conscious comparison according to the logical laws of Identity and Contradiction; partly the « prion postulates especially causation, which is both logical and psychological in its necessity. The third source of ground is that to which reality is attached and which, according to the principle of Sufficient Reason, is considered the condition of the existence of another element of external reality, called the effect. A considera- tion of the mutual relations ol these three grounds to each other would show that the only direct logical expression of Sufficient Reason is the hypothetical form of judgment, in that it stands under the law of ground analytically— the consequence is expressly contained in the ground.' All other forms of judgment are under the law of ground in logical immamnce. That is, the predicate is contained in the sub- ject This immanence of the predicate in the subject leads back, however, to a sphere where the logical necessity is not clearly expressed, where the full ground is not known, and the grounds thus become partly psychological. Here the Law of Ground can only be expressed as a postulate of the universality of this logical immanence among our ideas. On the other hand, pushing out from the formal relation of ground and consequence into external reality we postulate the existence of what we merely logically express as ground and consequence. In so doing we have fallen back upon the causal axiom.' Thus equally in both the inner and outer direction in consciousness and in what is out of conscious- ness, is extended, through postulates, the force of the Law of Ground. •Sigwart, •' Biitrage zur Uhrt vom hypothetische UrtheiU. (Tlibingen, 1871). ' Erdmann, Logit, pp. 3°' and 4I9- . * ^^ 75 WUNDT. § 85. By far the most important modern statement of Suf- ficient Reason is to be found in Professor Wundt's Logik, from the second edition of which (1893), the following resum6 is taken. This is true not only because of the extraordinary fulness with which the problem is treated, but equally because •of the definiteness of the place assigned it in logic, and the critical acuteness with which the relations of the logical to its psychological and metaphysical applications are deter- mined. It was the failure of Leibnitz, according to Professor AVundt, that in his conception of the principle, it was con- fined to empirical truth, to the psychological sphere of con- fused ideas, thus obscuring at the very beginning of the ■history the essentially logical nature of the term ground— and thus making it identical with the causal axiom, with which it has only a distant relation.^ Kant, despite his severing of the Law of Ground from formal logic, fell into a certain rationalism, in that identifying the principle with causation, he deduces both from the hypothetical judgment.^ Schop- enhauer makes the mistake of putting the weight upon the empirical application of the law not upon its original logical nature. His method is of the same order as that which would seek to make Identity in the intuition and Identity in concepts two distinct roots.^ His four fold principle with its ''Intellectuelle Anschauung" must be looked upon as a metaphysical rationalism ; nothing more than a remainder of the Wolffian logic of reality. Finally any attempt, such as that of Hamilton, and later of Riehl,* to bring Sufficient Reason into logic by subordinating it to the law of Identity must fail, for Sufficient Reason expresses just those relations in thought which do not come under the rubric of Identity, relations of dependence, equivalence, by reason of which the 1 Wundt, Logik, 2nd Edition, i6g^. Vol. /, /. 569. « Wundt, Logik, 2nd Edition, iSgj, Vol. I, p. 5Cf. Lotze's distinction, | 80 (above). « Vol. I, p. 574. »Cf. Lotze, I 80 (above.) ^ 4 81 approach to an expression of this logical element in causation. On the other hand the study of phenomena shows us that invariably the cause and effect appear only as successive. Thus in an early edition of his Logik* we find the antinomy formulated as follow^s: Thesis : (Rational) Ursache und Wirkung sind Antithesis: (Empirical) Die Ursache geht der Wirk- zugleich. ung voran. equally Mit dem x\ufhoren der Ur- sache erlischt die Wirkung. also Nach dem Aufhoren der Ur- sache verharrt die Wirkung. This antinomy shows how far the Law of Ground pene- trates reality as the causal axiom. In its pure logical form it cannot enter but is met by a refusal on the part of phenomena to conform to its demands. In the modified form of a partly empirical law it can attain '< sufficiency " — that is sufficient causes may be found, but the absolute determin- ation of the logical postulate, reality resists. Such a deter- mination is only possible on the basis of a metaphysical theory of the phenomenal causal relations being transparent con- cepts for the application of the logical Principle of Ground — the postulate of a logic of the Universe. So long as we abstain from a metaphysic, these antinomies do not trouble us. §91. But still more complicated becomes the antinomy when the Law of Ground is applied to the sphere of psycho- logical phenomena. Here it is the antithesis between caus- ality **als Erzeugniss unseres Denkens und unser Denken als Erzeugniss der natur." Here we have turned the Law of Ground upon the phenomena of consciousness, and as upon any other phenomena, here also it makes the demand that the relation of the phenomena of consciousness, of the ideas which make it up be logically necessary. Now if we look at the ideal content of consciousness, from one side, it will be ^Logik, i88o-'83, p. 536. 82 seen that from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge these ideas in their relations, concept to concept, stand under this general logical law of Sufficient Reason or of the dependence of concepts upon each other, for it was in this sphere that we saw the law in its original form expressed. Here it will be seen, we have gone out from the results of the activity of consciousness. But if on the contrary we look upon psychological life, in its entirety aside from its value for knowledge, the application of the Law of Ground must be two-fold, of the nature of an antinomy as in the case of the application to external reality. For on the one hand the mere association of ideas, by reason of its connection with the external world, is subject to mechanical causation; to will acts however must be assigned an inner causality, for they are governed by the teleological principles of purpose and worth. How then does the general logical principle of Sufficient Reason relate to these two different sides of the content of consciousness? Of course, in so far as the assoc- iation of ideas is governed by mechanical laws, the Law of Ground is applied according to the principle expressed in the preceding paragraph, but on the other hand the relation between the logical Law of Ground and the inner teleolog- ical causality is of another sort. For this problem Wundt has a simple, and yet far reaching answer. The primal Law of Ground and the inner causality are identified. In other words the inner causality as represented in the higher apperceptive processes of judgment and will is an immediate manifestation of the primal Law of Ground. " FUr die Wirkung innerer Kraft giebt nicht eine gewaltige Umform- ung der natur-causalitiit, wie in Psycho-physik, sondern hier graft die logische Cansalitdt in Hirer ursprungliehen Gestalt Flats, der Satz vom Griinde selhst'''^ With this striking cutting of the Gordian-Knot, two of the most difficult problems of the whole history of the Prin- ciple of Sufficient Reason seem to be solved, a. The first problem of the relation of the logical Law of Ground to the ^ Logik, Vol. I, p. 627. *»» 83 causality of the will, which was variously solved, either by making the latter independent of the logical laws as in Crusius, or identifying it with mechanical causation as in Schopenhauer, is now solved by so extending the logical Law of Ground as to include the logical causality of con- sciousness which worksunder the laws of *' ends and worths.*** b. The second, more especially epistemological, problem concerns the relation of this primal logical law and its neces- sity to the *' sufficiency " of the psychological processes w^hich produce the logical results. Here again the concept of logi- cal causality is extended to include all these psychological processes out of which the logical ''resultants" arise. Here again "der Satz vom Grunde greift in ihrer urspriinglichen Gestalt Platz." Logical necessity lies alone in the ''Resul- tanten " of these apperceptive processes,^ but in that these results act as the immanental ends of the processes that precede them, is the whole movement under logical causal- ity, or in other words the whole apperceptive side of con- sciousness is under the Law of Ground. The relations of cause and effect between ''resultant" and the process which has brought it about, are decided not by equivalence of forces as in mechanical causation, but by equivalence of values' between the process which is considered ground and the judgment which results. §92. This doctrine of Logical Causality as governing the whole apperceptive side of consciousness, brings the element of teleology in the Law of Ground, again strikingly to the front. The Law of Ground as applied to consciousness and its cofttent (except in so far as that content is under association laws) must be applied as a teleological principle, for the Sufficient Reason that in applying the Law of Ground to conscious content we go backward from the "resultants" to the sources, and these "resultants" are judged alone by »'*Zweckeuncl Werthe." ^Logik, Vol. I, p. 81. Cf. also the Psychological Law of " Resultanten"— *' Grimdriss der Psychologic'' (1896), § 23. ^ Logik, Vol. I, p. 612. Note. 84 their purpose or value for consciousness, exactly the opposite of the application to mechanical causation. **Zweck und Causalitiit sprincren aus verschiedencn Betrachtuno^sweisen derselben Voro;Uni;-e " — und " seit die Causalitiit von dem Grunde zu Folate fortschreitet, der zweck aber von der Folge zum Grunde zuriick, so sind beide die einzeln mogliche Gestaltungen des Satzes vom Grunde."' The important point however is, that, although not shut out from the sphere of causal observation of nature, teleology vet finds the chief application as a princii>le of grounding in the sj)here of con- scious processes, either judgments or will acts. One need only compare this treatment of the teleological element with that of Leibnitz to see the full meaning of the development. With Leibnitz teleology is identified with causation, as the Law of Ground ruling outside of logic; here it is the Law of Ground ruling as logical causality in our conscious apper- ceptive processes. §93. To the final metaphysical (piestion whether there is anv common term for the solution of this antinomy between the two sides of the Law of Ground, the mechanical causa- tion and logical causality as they stand over against each other in the sphere of conscious processes, Wundt answers with the hypothesis of a transcendental thinking Will, mani- fested in this logical causality or apperception," but as far as the empirical problem is concerned there remains a perma- nent antinomy of attitude, for to give one or the other a ruling place, is to attempt the solution of a metaphysical problem with empirical means. ^ ^ Logik, Vol. I, p. 612. Note. ^Logik, \'ol. I. p. 630. ^Logik, Vol. I, p. 628. 85 i * « # r CONCLUSION. §99. This resume of Wundt's doctrine of Sufficient Reason shows the main weight to lie upon its definition as the basal principle of logic; and then, secondly, in the critical determination of the extent and nature of its applica- cation to phenomena — i) to external phenomena in the causal axiom, and 2) to the actuality of the processes of conscious- ness ; in other words, to the metaphysical and psychological problems. Here then is a concise and critical determination of the mutual relation of the three elements most prominent in the history of the law\ These critical results must be compared with the points of view attained at the different stages of the development of the principle, if the importance of its outcome for modern thought is to be appreciated. Such a comparison, in brief, the introductory chapter aimed to facilitate. And the succeeding detailed treatment of the struggle between the metaphysical and logical motives, out of which the first formulation of Sufficient Reason arose, and of the final victory of the logical standpoint has, it is to be hoped, only served to impress upon the reader the inherent necessitv of the movement. The concomitant development of what has been called the modern logical consciousness and the corresponding dis- integration, or at least loss of importance of the metaphysi- cal motive, it has been constantly maintained, lies deeply rooted in the necessity of this movement. Only, in such light, is it possible to understand the meaning of the develop- ment of this fundamental postulate from an extra-logical to a fundamentally logical formulation, according to which it is first of all a logical postulate, with only secondary applica- tions to the metaphysical real. This logical consciousness knows no higher law than the postulate that empirical knowledge is alone possible by means of conceptual logical relations, although the bonds of the logical consciousness have been extended. » * 86 The satisfaction of the desire for unification can g^^ no further than the postulate that all phenomena which come to our knowledge must be under the universal principles of logic in order to be known. Whether these principles ex- haust the nature of the reality of these phenomena is another question. Thus Dilthey, in closing the first volume of the Einleitung in die Geistes Wisscnschaften, which is concerned with the history of the disintegration of metaphysics and the rise of the modern mental sciences, calls attention to the fact that, by looking backward, we may see that the attempt at a unitary metaphysical formulation of Sufficient Reason has been the problem of the whole modern metaphysical move- ment. The failure to accomplish it has been the failure of metaphysics in general.^ This, then, is the meaning of the giving up of a metaphysical for a merely logical theory of Sufficient Reason. Only so far as the ground is logically conceived is it necessary. As material principle it can only be ''sufficient" not metaphysically determining, as Crusius and Kant would have. The only possible way of grasping reality, then, is by seeking relations of logical thought neces- sity in the relativity of experience. Into this relativity Science, whose ideal is a contradictionless whole of experi- ence, brings logical method, constitutes an objective sphere of space, time and causality. The mathematics of space and time; the various sciences, mental and physical, with their various causalities, reducible, however, to physical and psychical, constitute the limits of the function of the postulate of Sufficient Reason as applied to phenomenal real- ity. But the element of necessity, common to all these forms, is just the logical postulate which forms the skeleton of thought. Those elements, which are peculiar to the par- ticular applications of the postulate to definite particular material, are only of the nature of subjective sufficiency, and not determining necessity. This is evidently the opposite, in every particular, of Schopenhauer's position, which * Dilthey, ''Einleitung in die Geistes Wissensc ha/ten,^' p. 407-519. x'^ !• V 87 ascribes to them, not to the logical kernel, the source of necessity. With the limits of the validity of this logical postulate in trans-phenomenal usage, this paper has, of course, nothing to do. There may be a logic of reality, which is independent of the laws of empirical knowledge, but in so far as the Law oi Ground is concerned with phenomena, we are constrained to say, from the results of the foregoing study, that the ex- tension of the postulate is limited, by the very nature of the material to which it is applied, to the surface of things. The postulate of a contradictionless whole of experience, which since Herbart has been a characteristic definition of Suf- ficient Reason, cannot be pressed so far as to lead us to seek the real beyond experience, but can only be extended as far as the logical element in the experiential laws demands. The impulse to metaphysical unification, often falsely identified with the technical Law of Ground, though it demands rightly a fundamental place in thought must in so far be subordinated to the critically determined limits of the material applications of Sufficient Reason, that in the interests of unity, distinctions so vital, as for instance that between physical and psychical causality, are not obscured. This critical standpoint reflection has attained by a long process of struggle, which it has been the aim of the preced- ing pages to portray ; and such a standpoint is not likely to be lost. It has been a struggle simply because, in attaining a standpoint from which the bold logical nature of this pos- tulate is clearly seen, of necessity, the more subjective postu- lates, ethical and religious, as well as the metaphysical demand for unitv, have been forced one b^^ one to fall away. Historically, even until Leibnitz's time, through the Greeks, Augustine, Descartes and Spinoza, Sufficient Reason had religious or ethical coloring, as well as metaphysical. The Leibnitzians, the Kantians, and even the Herbartians, failed to separate it entirely from metaphysical demands, and to give it a purely logical self-sufficiency. This the modern logical consciousness, which is only another aspect of what is called 88 the modern scientific consciousness, has partially attained. A certain formalism and abstraction cannot be denied to the process, and the religious, ontological postulates remain just as strong though separated by the development of our thought from the logical Law of Ground. Perhaps all these worth categories might be found to have a '^sufficiency" of their own, and the abstraction by means of which vye come to a critical understanding of the logical Law of Ground, may only serve to bring the antithesis more plainly to our consciousness. At all events the critical results cannot be undone. i THE END. fr '«" \? J/.J. 7 -if-t >%T|i'?^^. r*r W- VITA. The writer of this dissertation, Wilbur Marshall Urban, was born March 27, 1873, in the city of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, the first son of the Reverend Abram Urban, a clergyman in the Protestant Episcopal Church, and was baptized and confirmed in the same confession. Ilavinir received the elements of education in the public schools of his native city, and being prepared for the univer- sity in the William Penn Charter School of Philadelphia, he was admitted to Princeton University in the fall of 1891. After two years of study of the Humanities, and two years entirely devoted to Philosophy, he was graduated in 1895 with the Baccalaureate degree and was appointed James McCosh Fellow in Mental Science. Immediately upon grad- uation, the author visited Germany, spending the first two semesters in Jena, where he availed himself of the opportu- nity to hear the lectures of Professors Euchen, Liebmann, Ziehen and Dr. Erhardt. The winter semester of 1897 was spent in Leipzig under the teaching of Professors Ileinze, Wundt, Volkelt and Schmarsow, after which the examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was successfully passed. The author desires to exj)ress to his honored teach- ers his deep appreciation of their helpful interest. 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