MASTER NEGA TIVE NO. 92-80625 MICROFILMED 1992 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project" Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code -- concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted materiaL.. Columbia University Library reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR: THOMSON, GEORGE TITLE: DISCOVERY OF A NEW WORLD OF BEING PLACE: LONDON DA TE : 1871 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT RTBTIOCRAPHIC MICRQlPORM TARGET Master Negative # Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record Restrictions on Use: "fj«« .■(^ O , , , , ~ ^. - I '..M l I I ■«! 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T'^S. .\"> ■^^ ■•/■'■ Vi^ yv ^ ^v ^:rrr.\> MAI )IS.( )X ,\\ 1 :xi i: NEW YORK. i ft 1 I NEW WORLD OF BEING. l\ I.OXDOS : PBIXTED BY SPOTTISVrOODE AND CO.. SRW-STRKF.T 8QUAIIB ASD PARLtAMEXT STBKKT PI \ \ THE DISCOVEEY OF A NEW WOELD or BEING. BT GEOEGE THOMSON. * IIoAAa Ttt Seiya • Koi/Sfu avOpwvov Zeu^rtpop TriXci. Sophocles. LONDON : LONGMANS, GKEEN, AND CO. 187L \ - / /; . ' \ ■ t A < .11 I' ) I >■ t ♦ ',' • V THE DISCOVERY OP A NEW WOELD OF BEING. -•o*- \^ CjP UJ PART I. TRE PROPOSITION. In the year 1862 the author commenced to write a series of essays on the Human Mind. Being then unacquainted with the systems either of ancient or of modern philosophy, he started his career with the conviction that man consisted of two personahties— -a personahty which is animal, consisting of a body and hfe ; and a personality which is mind. By the term Personality is meant here an unquestionably living being ; a being who has unity, identity, and individuahty ; a being whose independencies are infinitely more obvious than its dependencies ; a being who, in these, or in B \ JL 1 U U ^ i ,^^^^ A;.y. A; A NEW WORLD OF BEING. any attributes, is relatively but not absolutely distinct. And, in all the attributes which con- stitute personality, mind, comparatively, is infi- nitely more personal than animal, while mind continues to be the limit of the realised known. The writer never once supposed that mind was simply the feature of an animal, as was the general belief of mankind. So distinct from animal was mind to him, that, at the very out- set, he made mind a distinct personality — a far higher personality than animal ; he had, in the strict sense of the term, personality, annulled the personality of the animal ; although he knew that it would not do, or be convenient, to say so, in our present mode of existence ; nor be altogether correct in the wider sense of the term, personahty, which means any existence, as a stone or a flower, whose independencies are obvious, and whose dependencies are latent. And philosophically, though not sensibly, speak- ing, the animal has no more right to the term personahty, than a flower ; which will appear in the course of our argument. When I began to write, then, I had eman- THE PROPOSITION. 3 cipated the conscious and knowing we not only from what is called the purely external, but also from the animal, through which the purely external is focussed, and had identified it with the mind, or, in the language of Hume and Hegel, with the idea. I began to write, though not knowing the fact at the time, where Descartes, and Hume, and Hegel ended. Yet I took up no man's proposition, nor did I assume any proposition that I did not reahse ; for the ultimate of the realised known to me then was the mind. Let it not be supposed, however, that I began to study mind, only when I began to write on mind. I had begun to study mind in early childhood, when in a beautiful starry night I used to He on my back, and gaze up into the depths of the blue sky, and on the countless stars, wondering, and trying to fathom the origin, extent, and mystery of their, and my own, existence ; yearning to speak with, and know, the All and Unknown ; with a stronof in- tuitive conviction that I can never recall, that I could never cease to be, from the fact that I B 2 t . > A NEW WORLD OF BEING. 2 any' attributes, is relatively but not absolutely 'distinct. And, in all the attributes which con- stitute personality, mind, comparatively, is infi- nitely more personal than animal, while mind continues to be the limit of the realised known. The writer never once supposed that mind was simply the feature of an animal, as was the general behef of mankind. So distinct from animal was mind to him, that, at the very out- set, he made mind a distinct personality— a far higher personality than animal ; he had, in the strict sense of the term, personality, annulled the personality of the animal ; although he knew that it would not do, or be convenient, to say so, in our present mode of existence ; nor be altogether correct in the wider sense of the term, personality, which means any existence, as a stone or a flower, whose independencies are obvious, and whose dependencies are latent. And philosophically, though not sensibly, speak- ing, the animal has no more right to the term personahty, than a flower ; which will appear in the course of our argument. When I began to write, then, I had eman- ' THE PROPOSITION. 3 cipated the conscious and knowing we not only from what is called the purely external, but also from the animal, through which the purely external is focussed, and had identified it with the mind, or, in the language of Hume and Hegel, with the idea. I began to write, though not knowing the fact at the time, where Descartes, and Hume, and Hegel ended. Yet I took up no man's proposition, nor did I assume any proposition that I did not reahse ; for the ultimate of the realised known to me then was the mind. Let it not be supposed, however, that I began to study mind, only when I began to write on mind. I had begun to study mind in early childhood, when in a beautiful starry night I used to lie on my back, and gaze up into the depths of the blue sky, and on the countless stars, wondering, and trying to fathom the origin, extent, and mystery of their, and my own, existence; yearning to speak with, and know, the All and Unknown ; with a strong in- tuitive conviction that I can never recall, that I could never cease to be, from the fact that I B 2 4 A NEW WORLD OF BEIXG. began to be. The unreachable beginning of my existence was as great a mystery as its end- less duration. Being totally unacquainted with the natural or external process of beginning and developing, I came from eternity, and would go on to eternity. And thus isolated from the Origin and End, I shuddered at the loneUness of my own existence. These are childish ideas ; but they are none the less psy- chological facts ; and they may be as near the truth as those of mature manhood. And he who smiles at their simplicity, shall find upon reflection, with all his knowledge of natural events, that he is as ignorant of the origin and end of his existence, and as much hemmed in by mysteiy, as the child who gazes up into the bosom of the stars. It would be out of place here to give any lengthened definition of the phenomena, called collectively, mind. It is sufficient here, that we have stated that w^e identified the conscious AND KNOWING WE with it. Only we may observe, that it has a universal feature of imagination, which escaped the observation of other philoso- t THE PROPOSITION. 5 phers. Mind has no existence as such without an imagination. The speciahties of this uni- versal feature constituted their Faculties of the mind. This universal feature is made into spe- cialities or faculties by its external relations. The three grand specialities, faculties, or divi- sions, of this universal feature, are perception, memory, and creation ; creation being used here instead of imagination in its usual sense, as the term imagination is used to designate the uni- versal feature of the mind. Eeasoning, ccjmpar- ing, and so on, are compounds or combinations of these larger specialities. In a word, all the faculties of the mind are only a series of flashes of imagination, made into these speciahties by ex- ternal relations. And for every specially distinct act, or classification of acts, there is a faculty ; that is, faculties are indefinite in number. After some years, when I had written about ten essays, I discovered that the mind could create. This, I thought was a great discovery ; but I found that Hume had made this discovery before me. I understood by this discovery, however, how it was possible for God to create A NEW WORLD OF BEING. 'U the worlds out of notliing, when I found that my own mind could create out of nothing : that is, if my own mind could create out of nothing, which I thoufrht at the time it could do, it w-as an easy matter to understand how that God had created the worlds and us out of nothing. I had many arguments with friends about this wonderful power of the mind. Some accused me of sophistry, some of heresy, and some of them acknowledged that I was a clever fellow% who, though ' vanquished,* had the powder of ' ar<^uincy still' The arc^ruments were not at all as to who was the creator. The argument of all Avas, that a creation was impossible; that new form could not be produced by a finite being ; that any form could not be produced which was not the image or hkeness of the external, in its whole and its parts. It w^as impossible to convince them that there was a distinction between pure form and the elements that express it ; to convince them that form, to be known and seen, must have some element of expression, or that it could not be known and seen ; to convince them, although the imma- |i THE PROPOSITION. « terial element of expression was the semblance or likeness of the material element of expres- sion, and invariably and necessarily so to our understandings, that this immaterial element of expression was as different a thing from the pure form of the whole of anything, as gold is from the form of a watch ; and to convince them that not only could pure form be copied from the external, but that purely new form could be introduced into the visible universe from our inner beings, which had not its hke- ness in the natural world. Every imagination or idea, in its elements, is the semblance or likeness of the material or natural, but in its form may be either copied or original ; may be either the likeness of a natural form, or a pure creation. To see this, however, is very difficult without demonstration ; and we cannot, in this essay, wait to demonstrate it, because it would occupy too much time, and be too great a digression from our main argument. We may mention, however, that we have devoted an essay to the sole purpose of its demonstration. After I had written about ten other essays, i 8 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. and still much wondering at this wonderful power of the mind, how it could create out of nothing, I found that the mind itself was a creation, and not a creator. I found that every manifestation of what is called mind was a creation out of nothing to us, while mind con- tinued to be the limit of the realised known, by realising for the first time, in November 1867, MY ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE, above and beyond all that is known, or can be known ; in other words, by emancipating the conscious and KNOWING WE, omsELVES, from mind. By this discovery, creating out of nothing became an utter absurdity, or, in other words, became an intelligible and natural process ; for all the mystery of the nothing, though not of the creating, vanished in the realising of the absolute existence of the conscious and knowing we. The way I discovered my absolute existence was by observing the non-conscious feature of our being, which is common to all men, whether realised or not, both while mind is the limit of the realised known, and after our absolute exist- ence is discovered. the proposition^ I Like a flash of lightning, this moment we are conscious ; the next, we are non-conscious. This moment, we are in conscious activity ; the next, in unconscious repose. This moment, we are in conscious existence ; the next, we are unconscious of any existence. This moment, we have conscious unity, identity, and indivi- duality ; the next, we are to ourselves, in ' the womb of uncreated night.' We are, to our- selves, perpetually flashing into being, and as quickly relapsing into non-existence. We are, to ourselves, nothing but a perpetual play of existence and non-existence. Literally, the play of lightning is nothing to the rapidity of the in- cessant throbbing of our spiritual being. Time has not wings to measure it. The silent prayer of unbroken attention alone can behold it. The non-comprehending of this apparently mysterious feature of our being, is the rock upon which thousands have made shipwreck ; is the narrow bridge over the gulf of darkness from which men, treading unwarily, have tum- bled headlong into the depths of error, infidelity, and despair. On the other hand, the compre- 10 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. hending of this apparently mysterious feature of our being, is the walking across the narrow bridge between two worlds; is the walking across the narrow bridge leading from a world which we know, to the portals of another which we know not ; is the walking across the narrow bridge leading from a world which we see but to which we do not belong, to another to which we belong but which we have no eyes to see; is walking across the narrow bridge leading from that world in which we, the knowers, think we are, to that world in which we, the knowers, think we are not, but in which we are : is, in a v7ord, for the first time, to recognise our own existence, or, perhaps more precisely, to realise a new existence, in absolute distinctness, as a personality, from all that is known, and who is the author and creator of the universe and all that it contains, and from whom emanate all things, and by whom all thinos were made that are in known existence, and without whom there is nothing existent that is known to us. We receive personality, and are sent out from God, and create the worlds ; THE PROPOSITION. 11 because God, personaUy, has done nothing that we know. He makes us do the whole ; we the sons, and not the Father, are the authors of all the known. Once we realise our spiritual exist- ence, or are born again, we take up all that once we attributed to God, and thus far we identify ourselves as one with Him. The Son of Man came and told us that He did so ; and to redeem the world told us that we were like Himself; that we were all Christs, if we could only realise that we were so ; and, in solitary loneliness of spirit, and in deepest agony of soul. He wept over the bhndness of men because they could not under- stand Him or comprehend what He meant them to be. He prayed with unutterable prayers that the eyes of their souls might be opened that they might realise the Christ within, and thus identify themselves with Him the Christ without. To be Christians men must not only assume the character of Christ, but they must intellectually comprehend, reahse that they are like Him in all respects— in origin of birth, in capacity, and in compass of being, as well as like Him in purity of thought, of word, and deed. 12 THE PROPOSITION. 13 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. Nay, they cannot fully comprehend the meaning of the latter until they first comprehend the meaning of the former. They cannot compre- hend the extent of love, of purity, and mercy, until they first intellectually understand and realise, by a new birth, ^ that I exist in them and they in me. And it was over this blindness of intellect, or want of spiritual vision, that Christ wept, and not altogether at men's unw^illingness to assume His character. There shall be no millennium, or the world shall not be fully Christianised, until all men shall thus wholly identify themselves with Christ ; and then His kingdom shall literally cover the earth, as the waters cover the channels of the deep. Men do not know that they exist. They take that to be themselves which is not themselves. Their existence, in its simple hving state, is be- hind and beyond all consciousness. The animal with which men are connected is not their existence. Mind is not their existence. Mind ^ That is, literally, to be born again — to be bom of spirit as they were once born of flesh. "We all realise existence in the flesh, but we can also realise existence in the spirit, which is just to be born again. is only the product of their being in activity. All that is possible for man to know of himself, as a person, is simply to know that he exists. The highest knowledge which is possible for man to know, in his present state, is simply to know that he exists. To know that we exist is not to be known without a lifetime of labour. In few words, we, the knowers, are this moment and every moment in the world of spirits ; and yet men know it not, because they have not eyes to see this world, nor eyes to see themselves. They see only what is external to themselves in the shape of sense and mind. Sensible objects, animal, and mind, inasmuch as they are all alike the products of men, may, in a certain inter- pretation, be called themselves. But these are not men's personal selves ; which personal selves are behind these produced selves, which men thoughtlessly take to be their personal selves, which are unseen, cannot, in our present state, be seen, and can only with unwearied attention be known to exist. It requires a high order of being to be conscious of any existence, that is to be conscious at all, and identify this con- 14 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. THE PROPOSITION. 15 It ' sciousness either with animal or mind as a personaHty; but to know that our personal existence is without, beyond, or behind all ordinary consciousness, to be able to emancipate consciousness from all that is known in the shape of sensible object, animal, and mind, and be able to realise absolute existence, is possible for no being lower in the scale of creation than man ; and this knowledge is possible to him only by a lifetime of labour. Man alone can know that he exists ; and I am not aware that any man has ever known that he existed save One, and that One, for asserting this simple fact, was nailed to a tree by a bhnd and ignorant world of men, who accused Him of blasphemy because they could not realise or comprehend what He meant. Almost all men believe by faith that they will exist; but no man, save this God-man, so far as I am aware, ever yet knew that he, the conscious knower, existed, during what is called his earthly lifetime, in the world of spirits. This knowledge is possible, however, with more than mathematical evidence and certainty. And the object of this essay will be to prove this ; and also that the uni- versal order or law of external nature is, that no beings belonging to it know that they exist. All knowing beings, said to be in external nature, identify themselves with an existence which is external to themselves, and never dream that their real existence is behind any- thing that they know. Man alone can surmount this ignorance by perseverance and labour, and can ascertain that he, the conscious knower, just now exists in the world of spirits, but he cannot see his existence in his present state; cannot know of his existence in relief, simply as an existent being ; has not eyes to behold his rounded and personal existence, as just now he has eyes to behold his animal existence, which he ignorantly takes for himself. Man can simply know of himself that he exists, and that he exists absolutely, and greater than and above all that is created and known, or can be brought within the hmit of the realised known. He himself is the limit of the reaUsed known ; and the utmost that he can realise of himself is simply to know that he exists, and that the 16 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. THE PROPOSITION. 17 i universe of matter and mind is his creation and product. Matter is his one-ideaed creation, world, or product, apparently unchangeable, durable, adamantine, silent, eternal, but which, when ' waxed old as doth a garment,' with the same unconscious simplicity with which he framed it on receiving the mandate — 'Let there be light,' he shall fold up as a vesture. Mind is his infinite-ideaed creation, world, or product, apparently ever changing, insubstantial, unimportant, and but of yesterday, but which, as a manifestation of worlds created by the moment, pales the lustre of the external and one-ideaed universe in mystery, in miracle, in omnipotent display and infinite variety of power, and whose foundations are immediately set in THE ABSOLUTE AND CONSCIOUS WE, who is the same and unchangeable, and whose years shall not fail. Man is so much the creature of sense that he cannot hft up his prone eyes and disen- tangle hitnself from it. He stands abashed at his own shadow, the omnipotent display of power and mystery in an external world, and would account it as blasphemous to attribute to him the more simple production of his own hands; while strangely, on the other hand, he unreflectingly, overlooks the thousand-fold more infinite display of power and mystery in that world which is more intimately related to him — the world of mind, and which he would almost account as blasphemous not to attribute to himself and as his own creation. And all this darkness of thought is the result of man's worshipping the creature more than the creator, in his looking continually without instead of within, and because he cannot lift up the eye of his soul from the world of sense with its alluring enchantments and its petrifying cares. As for me, I can only say in my heart, with the Psalmist of old, ' I will extol thee, my God, King ; and I will bless thy name for ever and ever. Every day will I bless thee ; and I will praise thy name for ever and ever. Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised ; and his great- ness is unsearchable. One generation shall praise thy works to another, and shall declare thy mighty acts. I will speak of the glorious honour of thy majesty, and of thy wondrous c T ^^v»— -*■ i,--,^,^ \ 18 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. works. And men shaU speak of the might of thy terrible acts ; and I will declare thy great- ness. They shall abundantly utter the memory of thy great goodness, and shall sing of thy righteousness. The Lord is gracious, and fall of compassion; slow to anger, and of great mercy. The Lord is good to all ; and his ten- der mercies are over all his works. All thy works shall praise thee, Lord ; and thy saints shall bless thee. They shall speak of the glory of thy kingdom, and talk of thy power, to make known to the sons of men his mighty acts, and the glorious majesty of his kingdom. Thy kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and thy dominion endureth throughout all generations. The Lord upholdeth all that fall, and raiseth up all those that be bowed down. The eyes of all wait upon thee, and thou givest them their meat in due season. Thou openest thy hand, and satisfiest the desire of every Uving thing. The Lord is righteous in all his ways, and holy in aU his works. The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon him, to all that call upon him in truth. He will fulfil the desire of them that fear him ; he also will hear their cry, and will ^i THE PROPOSITION. 19 save them. The Lord preserveth all them that love him, but the wicked will he destroy. My mouth shall speak the praise of the Lord, and let all flesh bless his holy name for ever and ever.' I quote this beautiful Psalm to show that I feel and think as other men ; and that I do not arrogate to myself any superiority over the meanest of mankind, save in intellectual and spiritual development, and the road to which is not shut, but open to every one of the race, if he will only earnestly travel upon it. And, although the law is, that the more we know the more do we identify ourselves with God and his Son, yet, on the other hand, by how much more we know, by so much more do we see that we require to live by faith and not by sight. The great philosopher has more need of faith than the simple child. It was only the Son of Man who had to retire alone to the mountains to pray. Before entering on any demonstration of our subject, I beg to disclaim all connection with so-called spiritualists — a sect of modern times, which I believe to be either dupes or knaves, c 2 18 A KEW TTORLD OF BEING. works. And men shall speak of the might of thy terrible acts ; and I will declare thy great- ness. They shall abundantly utter the memory of thy great goodness, and shall sing of thy righteousness. The Lord is gracious, and full of compassion; slow to anger, and of great mercy. The Lord is good to all ; and his ten- der mercies are over all his works. All thy works shall praise thee, Lord ; and thy saints shall bless thee. They shall speak of the glory of thy kingdom, and talk of thy power, to make known to the sons of men his mighty acts, and the glorious majesty of his kingdom. Thy kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and thy dominion endureth throughout all generations. The Lord upholdeth all that fall, and raiseth up all those that be bowed down. The eyes of all wait upon thee, and thou givest them their meat in due season. Thou openest thy hand, and satisfiest the desire of every hving thing. The Lord is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works. The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon him, to all that call upon him in truth. He will fulfil the desire of them that fear him ; he also will hear their cry, and will THE PROPOSITIOX. 19 save them. The Lord preserveth all them that love him, but the wicked will he destroy. My mouth shall speak the praise of the Lord, and let all flesh bless his holy name for ever and ever.' I quote this beautiful Psalm to show that I feel and think as other men ; and that I do not arrogate to myself any superiority over the meanest of mankind, save in intellectual and spiritual development, and the road to which is not shut, but open to every one of the race, if he will only earnestly travel upon it. And, although the law is, that the more we know the more do we identify ourselves with God and his Son, yet, on the other hand, by how much more we know, by so much more do we see that we require to hve by faith and not by sight. The great philosopher has more need of faith than the simple child. It was only the Son of Man who had to retire alone to the mountains to pray. Before entering on any demonstration of our subject, I beg to disclaim all connection with so-called spiritualists— a sect of modern times, which I believe to be either dupes or knaves, c 2 20 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. or a mixture of both. I may be wrong, but tills is my opinion ; for, if it requires a lifetime to realise consciously the simple existence of one's own spirit, it is not very probable that we can flippantly communicate with the spirits of others. Purely scientific men may take ex- ception to the phrases 'spiritual world,' and 'world of spirits'; and they have been so hackneyed and abused by charlatans, that I would willingly adopt other phrases in their stead, were it not that, by so doing, one of the chief ends of this essay would be in a manner lost. I humbly trust that this essay will serve to throw hght on theology, as well as prove to be a discovery in a scientific point of view. Let me say, however, to scientific men, that it does not matter to me what name may be given to this new world of existence, which is proposed to be brought to hght in this essay, for I never quarrel about names. Only, I say that our existence, in its simple hving state, is unknown to us, and that it exists in a world that we know not, and that the utmost that man can do is to realise that it exists. 21 PAKT II. ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. Let us, before entering directly on our subject, observe how near some others have been to making this discovery of themselves, or of the world of spirits, and how some men have even overleaped it. It is a strange fact, that the elements, as it were, of some of those discoveries of which rational beings may justly feel proud, have floated on the waves of time for many long ages, apparently of no use. But we may rest perfectly assured, that there is nothing useless in the universe, if we only knew how to bring its use to light. There are three very obvious reasons why discoveries and inventions lie sometimes so long apparently of no use. The first reason is inabihty, in different ways, on the part of the discoverer or inventor him* 1 22 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. self, to turn his discovery or invention to use. We are all discoverers. Every day of our lives we discover, both in the world of matter and of mind, either common or strange pheno- mena, which, if properly reflected on, might be turned to good account, and for the general benefit of mankind. Thousands of people dis- covered that steam could move a kettle lid, but James Watt alone could turn this discovery to use. Our belief, therefore, is, as we have already said, that there are thousands of dis- coveries every day ; and yet, in our utter thoughtlessness and impotence, we look upon aU this obvious knowledge as nothing, useless, not worth a thought, and simply because we cannot turn it to good account. How many milhons discovered that an apple, loosened from the branch of a tree, falls to the ground ? And yet Sir Isaac Newton alone could turn this discovery to good account. From these obvious phenomena of matter have arisen dis- coveries of which men are justly proud, and which have led almost to an entire revolution in the world, both in action and belief. Dis- ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 23 *> coveries in the world of mind, as well as dis- coveries in the world of matter, without being turned to good account, are the same to the world as though they were no discoveries at all, and float as useless wrecks of mind on the ocean of time, receiving only a shake of the head from the worldly-wise, and the finger of scorn from the scornful. The second obvious reason why discoveries and inventions sometimes lie long neglected, is because the world of men in general are very sceptical about anything which is out of the common run of events, and apparently contrary to their opinions and faiths. They are too much occupied with their own affairs to pay the least attention to anything so far removed from their direct interest. They listen to the discoverer or inventor with a cold and' passive ear, and, at the conclusion of his harangue, smile with complacent pity or benignant con- tempt. The truth is, unless some one judges for them, they are utterly incapable of them- selves to judge of anything that is new to them : incapable, we believe, only because they I 24 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. are unwilling to exercise their judgments. They rather take things upon trust than judge for themselves. The third obstruction to discoveries and in- ventions arises, in a good measure, out of the two preceding causes. The passiveness of discoverers and inventors from inabihty, and the passiveness of the world from indifference and increduhty, give ample room and power to the positive element of opposition to check and smother anything new that may come to hght. There is not a discovery but clashes, or appa- rently clashes, with existing faith and opinion. There is not an invention but clashes with some one's interest. This awakens the positive ele- ment of opposition to all inventions and dis- coveries ; and the world, which is sceptical about anything new, but credulous as a child in anything which has been its belief and habit from the cradle, now joins this positive element with applause, in condemning the discoverer and his discovery, and the inventor and his invention, to everlasting oblivion. The three causes, then, that retard the pro- ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 25 gress of all knowledge, are inability in various ways on the part of the discoverers and in- ventors themselves to propagate their views, the sceptical indifference of mankind in general to anything that is new and out of the beaten track, and the positive and determined opposi- tion from men who are actuated by motives of interest. These three causes have been strongly at work in retarding the discovery which it is the purport of this essay to explain and bring to light. The rays of this discovery have been on the verge of the horizon since the days of Descartes till now. He and a number of others have soared on the wings of pure intelligence into that region where less gifted men are said to soar on the wings of faith. All men, however, soar on the same wings, on the wings of imagi- nation. These men soared on the wings of the reasoning imagination : other men soar (that is, men who soar on the wings of faith) on the non-reasoning imagination. The glorious light which has thus been hanging on the verge of %\ ♦' 'I iS 'II 26 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. the horizon for so long a time has completely dazzled some. Instead of proving to be hght to them, it turned out to be the blackness of darkness for ever. Keason became extinct; but the all-sided and omnipotent imagination was not extinct. Man's reason may be ex- tinguished, but his imagination is indestructible and immortal. And these men, whose match- less reasoning brought them safely to the verge of that world which no one in this present state of existence has eyes to behold in relief, but which all hving may realise to be in ex- istence, not only with the eye of a new a priori idea of existence, such as never dawned upon us in childhood, but also with the eye of calm, beautiful, majestic reason ; these men, we repeat, instead of pausing and reflecting, rushed head- long on without eyes or reason, into the world of wildest imagination and consequent error and despair. These men, generally, were not content in that the Deity had allowed them to ascend where other feet had never trodden, so that they might behold with the eye of realised knowledge and reason that world w^hich other 1 1 ABOUT THE PROPOSITION, 27 men were allowed to look upon only with the eye of blind imagination or of faith. They were struck blind for their headlong impetuosity and impious intent of entering without eyes within the portals of that world which we dare not enter with the eye of sense, and were therefore not allowed even to realise the existence of the world they so ardently desired to enter. The star of reason which guided them in their ascent, fell, hke Lucifer, from the firmament, back to that world from which they had as- cended ; and that omnipotent power, imagina- tion, which had borne them up, instead of reflecting light on the world below, overcast the sky with thick clouds that brooded over the earth with appalling and dreadful gloom. The world of men grew sick at the sight. They could not bear the midnight darkness. The coldness of doubt made their hearts stand still. They could not dispel the darkness which over- shadowed them. And they cried out, in despair, for some one to bring back the common light of day. Champions arose by the thousand. But not one of them could ascend into the -I 28 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. ref^ion from whence some of these rarely gifted men discharged their thunderbolts. They could not therefore dispel the illusory dark- ness. Had these declamatory champions been equal to the fight, they could have easily made it to be known how far these men were guided by reason, and when the hght of that reason forsook them. Being unable, however, to ascend and far less able to dislodge these men from the citadel wherein they had fortified themselves, they resolved to do what was far more easy, and which they knew would be more acceptable to the world, namely, to re- build a new citadel on the earth on which they trod, called, ' The Philosophy of Common Sense.* The philosophy of common sense the most common hodman could easily understand, and these philosophers were resolved to pamper his taste, so that no one might be incapaci- tated in joining the hurrah of seeming victory over a few lonely adventurers who sat afar in silent contempt, smiHng at the commotion below. This is rather a fanciful description of the ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 29 world of mind during the lives of a few eminent men since the revival of modern philosophy, but I do not think that it is in the least untrue. The error of almost all of the most gifted of these men, is one and the same. Having ascended by reason on the highway of mind till they reached its very extremity, and finding there an impassable and dreadful vacuity, where there was notliing but a total blank and the blackness of darkness, they did not stop there. This has been the great error of the metaphy- sicians who have arrived at the extremity of the highway of mind, that they did not stop here. They ascended, guided by the light of reason to this extremity, then launched impiously out into the dreadful vacuity beyond, on the wings of bUnd imagination, and thus making the science of mind a compound of truth and falsehood, of beauty and deformity, of religion and infidehty. No wonder, then, that the world has turned from so hideous a picture with disgust, and has looked upon the votaries of the science as little better than dreaming madmen or worse. They promulgated scepti- 30 A NEW WOKLD OF BEING. 1 ABOUT THE PROPOSITIOX. 31 cism, and, most strange to say, they did pro- mulgate it, bearing the brightest banners of ]icTht and truth that had ever been unfurled in the dominion of science. They themselves un- furled these banners, but could not read the inscriptions written 'thereon ; nor could anyone living unravel the mysterious writing which was inscribed on the banners which one or two only of these men were able to unfurl and hoist. By far the highest and the foremost in the van of metaphysical thinkers is David Hume. Hume, by his sceptical idealism, gave that im- pulse to modern thought which has since, almost universally, established Idealism as the only true theory of being. By the acknow- ledgment of Kant, Hume gave a new direction to his mind as a philosopher. Notwithstanding his idealism, he professed to be an empiricist, and by his negation of necessary connection between cause and effect, may be said to be the founder of modern Empiricism and Posi- tivism. Modern Germany, including Hegel and all, has never reached higher than his floating ideas. None of them has risen higher than the idea. They make the idea the all, like him. They have expounded its working and development (which he never attempted), but still it is the idea. The floating idea with them, as with him, is the all in all. And yet in all this there is no labour, no burrowing, and, we are sorry to say, no system, with Hume, but, on the contrary, the most perfect ease, grace, and clearness of mental movement, so that he appears like a boy at play, throwing rockets. In his sceptical way, after denying the existence of everything external, from the idealistic system of putting things, he came to the conclusion, finally, that there was nothing existent but floating ideas ! He did not, how- ever, deny the existence of floating ideas ; but they were floating ideas, having no necessary connection — ' homeless, without author, father, or mother,' as some of his contemporaries said in derision. ' Strange proposition, this, in- deed ! ' the world then said ; and the world still reverberates the exclamation. Yet Hume was an honest and a noble man, however strange this proposition may seem to the world. He It] 32 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 33 t i^i ; ascended thus high, enunciated his proposition, and is the only man who stopped where he ought to stop, when the powers of his own nature were exhausted. His error is not that of headlong presumption, but that of simple inabihty to evoke a new and higher proposi- tion. He threw out his proposition, and left it as an enigma for the world to solve. It was not a proposition given him to demonstrate. It arose out of the profundities of his own nature, as the last proposition there, saving one, which man's nature can evoke, and which man's reason is capable of demonstrating. His being evoked this proposition, but his being could not evoke a new and higher one, which would have explained its meaning. In plain words, he knew that there was nothing really existent but floating ideas. This was all he knew. It was his conviction, and it was a noble one ; so noble, dare we say, that few, if any, of the human race, ever had the convic- tion before him, or were so near the truth, so near the discovery of nothing less than that of a world. He fearlessly promulgated his pro- U position to the world, and, in doing this, he displayed his unexampled integrity of nature, as well as his high nobility. He did not enun- ciate this proposition to puzzle and confound the race of men, as is most stupidly beheved. He did not enunciate this proposition because he did not feel and beheve it. He enunciated this proposition because it was his noble and honest conviction. Fearless, noble, and honest Hume ! There is nothing strange in thy pro- position. Let this proposition be an everlast- ing monument of thy lofty and soaring genius. Here is another of Hume's beautiful percep- tions of self. 'Is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body, by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered, by a secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbits, this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension.' Here is also another : ' But 34 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. ABOUT THE PROPOSITION, 35 do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul, and the nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other ? This is a real creation— a production of something out of nothing— which imphes a power so great, that it may seem, at first sight, beyond the re^ch of any being less than in- finite. At least, it must be owned that such a power is not felt, nor known, nor even con- ceivable by the mind. We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent to the command of the will. But the manner in which this operation is performed, the power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond our comprehension.' And again : ' Volition is surely an act of the mind with which we are sufficiently acquainted. Eeflect on it ; consider it on all sides. Do you find anjrthing hke this creative power, by which rises from nothing a new idea, and with a kind of fiat imitates the omnipotence of its Maker — if I may be allowed so to speak — who called forth into existence all the various scenes of nature ? So far from being conscious of this energy in the will, it i r requires as certain experience as that of which we are possessed to convince us that such extraordinary efiects do ever result from a simple act of volition.' The man who thus knows and feels is unconsciously treading at the gates of immortahty and life. He is so dazzled with the surrounding splendour of his situation, so utterly astonished and confounded at the unparalleled panorama of glory, so com- pletely dispossessed of self, and so completely absorbed in the magic without, that he stands like a marble statue, silent, immovable, un- conscious, dead! The glory of the without, like the wand of a magician, has so thoroughly annihilated his self-possession, that now, for the first time since his reception of conscious per- sonahty, he has lost himself. And to find him- self out, to recover personahty, is the utmost stretch of human capacity, calmly and stead- fastly gazing, in the prayer of labour, till a new world arises into being, and estabhshes itself within the dominion of the realized known, and conscious self-existence. This last Hume did not ; but, except this, he did all that d2 36 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. human intellect and power can do. Yet few of his contemporaries allowed that this man was possessed of anything more than a little ingenuity; and the ignorant and superstitious looked upon him and his works as an unholy and unclean thing, partly man and partly devil. Such self-perceptions as these, however, are the very highest pinnacles which the human mind can reach. These are the loftiest flights of which genius is capable. Self-perception is the very acme of genius. It is the key by which we unfold the universe. He who reads him- self well has not only a perfect image of all that is human, but is soon enabled to incor- porate in himself all that is supposed to be infinite and divine, and is enabled to feel and see that he is greater than the universe, which must be but a speck of existence to the real Infinite and Divine, whose existence is utterly unknown and unreachable, but in so far as it is reflected in and through the human. What knowledge, then, can be compared to this self- knowledge, for it embraces all the knowable, both what is supposed to be only human and ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 37 also that which is supposed to be Infinite and Divine ? And this genius of self-perception is just begotten like every other genius. It is the child of hard labour and industry, and un- wearied and unceasmg attention. And these self-perceptions of Hume's are no obvious truths. A hfetime of hard study only revealed them. The most ordinary mind can create on some occasions ; but to perceive that the mind^ can create (although this in reality is a fallacy) is perceived by the eye of genius only ; and this genius was the genius of Hume. We may mourn over the complexion of this genius ; but his genius was one of the highest to which Britain, or perhaps any other country, has given birth ; so much, then, for Hume. A great many other men, however, have reached the ultimate of mind as well as Hume. Unlike him, however, they did not know when to stop. Whenever his being was bounded, he stopped. They all, without exception, pre- sumptuously rushed beyond the bounds of their » It is not the mind that creates ; it is the spirit, the Con- scioxjs AND Knowing We, Ourselves, that creates. ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 39 38 A 'SEW WORLD OF BEING. being. He has given out nothing but what it is possible for the human mind to comprehend, and to be as conscious of as it is of its own belng.^ And here he made a final stand, and left his proposition as a riddle for the world to solve. They, on the other hand, arriving where he arrived, by the same height of reason and consciousness, found a solution to this most wonderful of all propositions (that ideas, from non-existence, start up into existence, and pre- sent themselves before the eye of the astonished beholder), by the presumptuous and imaginary conclusion which cannot be proved by the ve- riest shadow either of reason or consciousness, namely, that the mind has immediate connection with the Deity ! Upon their long chain of clear, subtle, and matchless reasonings and conscious convictions, they affixed this presumptuous and imaginary conclusion. The most perfect and noble unfinished structures of human know- ledge they crowned and finished with imagi- 1 We speak here of mind in ordinary language so as to be understood ; although, in reality, mind never is conscious ; it is We, spirits, that are conscious of mind. ■4 nary dreams. They built a structure of truth, and crowned it with error. They erected the grandest of the structures of human reason and conscious conviction, and put upon it the cope of Wind imagination. This was what Hume did not, and therefore he was nearer disco- vering a new world than they all. We need not mention who these men were. There are many living men who have come to the same imaginary conclusion, simply because they can- not, like these men who have preceded them, solve the problem of their own existence. We ask anyone, is he conscious of having imme- diate connection with the Deity ? Has he any- thing to support such a conclusion but the wildest imagination ? Is there any conviction, reason, or analogy, to support such an imagi- nary conclusion ? There is none. These asser- tions of Hume's are fragments of perfect know- ledge, acquired by reason and conscious conviction, as undeniable and certain as the consciousness of one's existence either as animal or mind ; but there is no reason, no conviction, to support the imaginary assumption that the 40 A XEW WORLD OF BEING. ABOUT THE PROPOSITIOX. 41 II mind has immediate connection with the Deity. Nothing but the wildest hallucination can ever substantiate such a dream. Hume's assertion is perfect knowledge ; these men's, pure imagina- tion. This is their frightful error — the most friditful of all errors— the mixing of truth and imagination ; and then calhng the incongruous composition science ! No wonder that the world has turned from such a science with disgust. But let us examine this frightful error a little farther. With whom have they immediately connected their minds ? With an assumed or imaginary Personality, to them at least ! With a Person- ality of whom they have no knowledge but by faith. They have heard it said, and have found it written, that there is such a Personality ; and they have beUeved very likely that there is such a Personahty ; and it is written, also, that ' blessed are they that have believed and have not seen ; ' nor do we find any fault with them in believing in the existence of this Personahty by faith. But this much we do say, that no one can intelligently understand, however he may believe by faith, how it is possible for such or any other spiritual Personality to exist, until he first understands his own existence. No one can understand how the Deity, or any other spirit, can exist, until he first understands how he himself is a spirit, having no immediate connection with the Deity or any other being. All men are conscious of their own being either in the activity called mind, or in the animal with which they are connected, although, by an illusion, they thus identify their being with what is not strictly themselves. On the other hand, there is no man who has ever been, or ever shall be, conscious in any degree of the existence of the Deity as a spirit, while he re- mains in ignorance of the realised existence of his own spirit. All men have proof, conviction, of their own being, either as an animal or a mind ; but they can never know but by faith how a spiritual Deity exists, until they first realise that they themselves are now spirits in the world of spirits. And this is not all the absurdity couched in the assertion of those who say that their thoughts have immediate con- nection with the Deity. The man even who ,••'» 42 A NKW WORLD OP BEING. * h 'f '• I has realised his own spiritual existence can only understand how it is possible for an omni- potent and omniscient Deity to exist ; for he can never realise the existence of such a Deity as he realises his own existence until he is omnipotent and omniscient; and the man of faith cannot even understand how the Deity exists; he can only believe that He exists. The climax of the absurdity is, however, that these men, in connecting their minds imme- diately with the Deity, discover the existence of the Deity before they discover their own existence. The science, therefore, of these men is a fabric compounded of reason and con- scious conviction, of presumptuous imagination, and of knowledge acquired by faith. They have reason, in so far as they kept to conviction and experience ; they have presumption in con- necting their minds with the Deity ; they have displayed faith in assuming the existence of a Deity at all. Now it will not do to mix these : experience, imagination, faith. If we write a book on our experiences, we must keep to ex- perience. If we write a book of imagination, ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 43 we must keep by imagination ; and if we write a book on our faiths, we must keep by faith. No scientific man will take the testimony of imagination and faith, mixed up with expe- rience, reason, and conviction; nor will the greatest enthusiast who has ever written a book of his faith, or of his imaginations, be so stupid or Wind as not to distinguish between these and facts of reason, experience, and con- viction. What a contrast, however, do these writers form to the materialistic sect of philosophers of the present day! We shall quote one or two sentences from one of them, which shall serve as a fair specimen of the type of all their minds. ' The exercise of religion consists in search after truth, regard to the relations in which we are placed to the universe, and devotion to the Great Author of all.' This is very beautiful ; but there is nothing new in it ; for this is just the doctrine which was taught by the Man Christ Jesus, more than eighteen hundred years ago ; but it is utterly inconsistent from the pen of this writer, because he says immediately *1 ?** . , 44 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 45 If. after : ' No observation from the external world — no analogy, however plausible — no analysis, however minute, can solve the pro- blem of an immaterial and immortal existence.' The best way, we think, that he could have written this, would be thus; 'No observation of mine, from the external world — no analogy of mine, however plausible — no analysis of mine, however minute, can solve the problem of an immaterial and immortal existence.' This, at least, would be candid; but to mea- sure other men's intellects by his own is, to say the very least, a piece of presumption. Besides, there is an utter inconsistency in speaking of ' devotion to the Great Author of all,' as a part of the religion of him who discards dogmas of faith, and who, in the very next breath, acknow- ledges his inability to solve the problem of an immaterial and immortal existence. Thus, ' the Great Author of all,' with this writer, is xo- THiXG ; or, He is some big material Cyclops I So, ' the Great Author of all,' is perfect incon- sistency, cant, or worse. In the name of com- mon honesty, let all men throw off this mask of hypocrisy, inconsistency, and cant, or speak with more consistency of ' the Great Author of all.' He says, farther, in common with his sect, that we know nothing of life but from its effects or results. This is a great discovery! Who ever said that we did ? But, that we do not know anything of it but from its results, does not prove that it does not exist. Life is some- thing ; and, if it is not something, let these philosophers blot its very name out of their vocabulary. That they talk about it, condemns their pliilosophy. Talking about a thing that has no existence ! This, also, is perfect incon- sistency; or entertainment, like the 'Arabian Nights ! ' Descartes, Hume, and others, were accused of scepticism ; but their scepticism was never like this one-sided, grovelhng, and slimy scepticism — matter — matter — matter ! Matter, in its own sphere, is just as sacred a thing as life ; and we, for one, revere and worship matter, inasmuch as it is one of the two grand means, the without, by which, indirectly (that is, through us) the Deity reveals Himself to us, his intelligent creatures. We cannot look upon « I : I fl .■I r yi 46 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. a flower, a blade of grass, or a grain of sand, but we behold indirectly, that is, through our- selves, the image of the Deity. Much less can we look upon and contemplate an infinitude of worlds, which baffle the loftiest imagination to comprehend, without being struck with His omnipotent power. His infinite intelligence, and His matchless wisdom in having created such beings as we are, on whom this infinitude hangs. But to hold, or say either openly or covertly, that matter alone is the Deity of the universe, or the only expression of that Deity, does not display either power, intelligence, or wisdom. Materialists have a one-sided rage for unity, which would not only destroy all the varieties in a world, but which would even destroy worlds in their search for unity ! To search for unity is just as laudable and legitimate as it is to search for variety ; but, in doing either, we must keep to experience, to facts, to reason. There is not only to us an unreachable infini- tude of unity, but there is also an infinitude of variety. Is there not as much beauty in variety as there is in unity .^ And shall one-sided ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 47 men obliterate and destroy the inexhaustible and never-faiUng fountain of beauty and delight which rests in endless variety ? God forbid I But it is not alone that there is an infinitude of unity and an infinitude of variety ; but each variety is infinite to us ; so that the poet of old might well exclaim, when lost in wonder and adoration : ' Each thought of thine is a deep ! ' There is probably nothing existent wholly distinct ; but if men will talk of anything as distinct, there is nothing which is more distinct than the worlds of spirit and of matter. A spirit and matter are not only distinct as personaUties in the external world are distinct (as a man and a flower are distinct, or as a man's animal nature is distinct from everything else), but they are distinct as belonging to entirely dif- ferent worlds of existence. Man's animal nature is one of the most independent and distinct personalities in the world of matter ; so much so that it requires great effort of reflection and observation to see how intimately he is allied to it in nature, how closely he is surrounded by it, and how he is momentarily dependent I. V 48 A XEW WORLD OF BEING. ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 49 ! .' I ( I'f upon it for his very existence. Man's spiritual existence is, in an almost inconceivable degree, more distinct from his animal existence in man- ner of existence, than his animal existence is distinct from the external world ; and man's spiritual existence is, in an inconceivable de- gree, more distinct from his animal existence, in nature of existence, than his animal existence is distinct from the external world ; because man's animal existence is not so distinct in its nature from the nature of the external world but we can perceive a thousand ties and rela- tionships — the one being only a modification of the other ; but the nature of man's spiritual existence is so distinct from the nature of his animal existence that we can perceive no ties or relationships whatsoever between them — they belong to distinct worlds in nature of ex- istence. It is this awful distinctness in nature of existence between the world of spirits and the world of matter that makes some unthinking men suppose that there is no world of spirits at all. The reason of this delusion is very obvious. Such men are more external than internal thinkers. Ji > * I V' Would they devote a little more attention to the internal, than they in their one-sidedness do, they would come to a very different con- clusion. But, over and above all this, it is a perfectly well-known fact that, in reality, we know very little of matter. Locke perceived and taught this; but materiahsts never seem to think of this. They speak as if matter were completely known, and, as if it were the only thing which man has a legitimate right to try to know! We know only a few of the attributes and rela- tions of matter ; this is all we know about it. Of its essential existence we know nothing. It is also a notorious fact that some of the most gifted of men have questioned the very exist- ence of matter, so that we need not wonder at some men who question the existence of a world of spirits. The general belief, however, of mankind, we think is, that they are now of the world of matter ; and, that by some magic they shall in a moment become of the world of spirits. They believe as firmly in the existence of a world of spirits as a materiahst beheves in E 50 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. a world of matter ; and yet they believe that they are not, but shall become, of this world of spirits. There never was a more strange delusion, however natural it may be. Materialists not only deny the existence of spirits, but they also maintain that there is no such thing as life, as a thing in itself. We think, on the other hand, that all matter, how- ever inert, has for its very existence a sustaining life, however occult it may be, by its distance from the scale of hfe in which we move. Life is the substratum and cause of matter, as spirit is the substratum and cause of mind. And, naturally, life and matter form an external world, and spirit and mind an internal world. And, naturally, man in exact proportion belongs to both worlds, by his duality of personalities. In man these two worlds meet. In man these two worlds are united but distinct, that is, in the manner in which finite understandings in- terpret distinct. Man, in his constitution, is now a representative of both worlds, although he generally supposes that he is a representative of the external world only ; which delusion it ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 51 i II will be our task in this essay to dispel, and to establish the fact that he now represents both worlds in exact proportion. This we are enabled to do by the discovery of one of the greatest laws in the universe ; which will be taken up and explained in the sequel. Let us return, however, to the subject in hand. Materialists ask — How can there be such a thing as hfe distinct from matter, seeing that it can never be proved? It is quite in- telligible how they cannot perceive that there is hfe in any matter, as a thing distinct from matter, or as anything but a modification of matter. And let it be observed when we say that life is a thing distinct from matter, that we mean to interpret distinct just in the sense in which these philosophers interpret it ; that is, if men will talk of anything as distinct from another, and which they are compelled to do, life is such a thing, distinct from matter: that is, philo- sophically, it is relatively but not absolutely distinct ; for there is nothing absolutely distinct in the external, however this may be in the in- ternal world. The materialist never finds hfe £ 2 52 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. dissociated from matter. He always finds them linked together — inseparably hnked. All men find this as well as materiahsts. And we could never prove that life is anything more than a high development of matter, however much we might be inchned to think difierently, were it not that we can prove that our spirit is distinct from mind, absolutely distinct from anything created, and upon whom the created hangs and owes its birth and continued existence. It is utterly impossible to prove that life exists with- out some expression, either active expression or simple existent organised form. We can prove however, that a spirit exists without any ex- pression, thus giving us the key-note to an un- expressed, unseen, and presently unknown world, and upon which knowledge hang a thousand glorious truths. Hence, we infer, by just analogy, that there is something called life, distinct from matter, which is the mere expres- sion of hfe. We cannot however know of the separate existence of life from matter, as we know of the separate existence of a spirit from mind : and this is what deceives men ; but if ABOUT THE PKOPOSITION. 53 they would look within in the same proportion every way as they look without, they would not assert that there is nothing but matter. In common language we find matter dissociated from hfe, but never life dissociated from matter ; and we always find mind dissociated from spirit, because spirit is not recognised at all. We cannot, however, philosophically and truly, ever find matter dissociated from life, nor life dissociated from matter : nor can we ever find mind dissociated from spirit ; but we can find spirit dissociated from mind. A spirit is the only thing in existence which we would call distinct. We do not affirm that it is absolutely distinct in reality ; but to us it is absolutely distinct ; and there is nothing created or known which to us is absolutely distinct but a spirit. After so much, then, on these one-sided philosophers, we shall, after a few preliminary remarks, enter at once on the demonstration of our proposition, all that we have said as yet being merely introductory, in order that our subject may be understood the more clearly. It is a very easy thing to dogmatise and enun- 54 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. ciate propositions, and we confess that this is all that we have done as yet ; but it is a very different thing to prove propositions. The style of most men is to enunciate propositions, and then allow the reader to demonstrate for himself. This may do on subjects of no great importance, and sometimes propositions are self- evident to all men ; but if men would enunciate less and demonstrate more, knowledge would progress much faster, and there would be fewer disputes. Poets alone, we think, should have the privilege of enunciating propositions without demonstration. At the very least, philosophers and scientific men should never attempt such a style of writing. In all cases, and on all occasions, the proposition and its demonstration should go hand in hand ; and there should be no toleration with writers who, fearlessly and in defiance of all reason, enunciate the most daring and reckless propo- sitions or hypotheses, without waiting to give the very shadow of demonstration. To prove that spirits exist without expression is no easy task. That spirits exist without ex- ABOUT THE PROPOSITION, 55 pression is no obvious truth. It is, as a propo- sition, the most occult or recondite that has ever been enunciated. All men feel this. It is a long time since it has been enun- ciated. It may be, for all that we know, coeval with the race ; for we cannot exactly account for the origin of the proposition, whether it was first enunciated naturally or supernaturally ; but in whichever of these ways it has been enun- ciated, it has been left undemonstrated inas- much as its truth has not been fully reahsed. On the other hand, notwithstanding its occult- ness as a fully reahsed truth, there is of neces- sity, from our very constitution, a strange and indescribable apparency about it. All men are compelled to feel this at times, and not only to feel, but to act in accordance with the require- ments of an unseen power, welling up within them, whether they will or not ; and the reason why this is not always the case, and why men do not always realise the existence of a world of spirits, in the same proportion and to the same amount as they realise the existence of an external world, is so simple, so natural, and so 56 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. i% obvious to any reflective mind, that it need hardly be mentioned, but, nevertheless, shall be fully explained hereafter, when we have entered on the field of demonstration. The proposition, then, that there is a world of spirits, is not like some wild hypothesis, that has emanated from one solitary being, and of which the w^orld has never dreamed or heard. Man, in all climes and in all ages, has it as an instinctive proposition. Man may not have this proposition as it is announced in the Christian system ; but, in some shape or other, he has it as a proposition, always, and wherever he is found. But notwithstanding that the pro- position is an old proposition and a universal proposition, yet we beg to crave attention to the fact that this is not our proposition. Our proposition is a diflerent and an entirely new proposition. It is not that there is a world of spirits without us, which is the old proposition (and a true one too), but which can never be proved until we first realise that we are splits ourselves. And this is our proposition. We ARE SPIRITS OURSELVES JUST NOW IN THE WORLD ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 57 ;. OF SPIRITS. But notwithstanding that we are thus constituted, the dreadful secrecy and mys- tery which, to most men, envelope the whole world of spirits, makes it almost forbidden ground to approach so near to a world of which we can, at most, know nothing, save its very existence ; and the inadequacy of any language to throw any light on the very ex- istence of this world, makes the task of demon- stration appear as a work which is equally beyond human ingenuity to accomplish, and beyond human comprehension to understand. All these things seem against us. And this is not all. To experience the truth of the pro- position, namely, the existence of a world of spirits, or that spirits exist without expression, is not to be reached unaided, without a life-time of hard study and labour ; and to tell it to a man w^ho has not experienced it, and who is not richly endowed by nature to comprehend it intellectually (not realise however) when brought under his notice, is just the same as telling him that there are fairies in the moon, or just the same as telling him that there tf^g»'*m^»0fKr^.iM^s^g-'iiga»«m^-<^Si''^«^ •■■w u i 'M-m n'm i*- ■« W» i" 58 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. t) is a God : he may believe that there is one, but he cannot understand that there is one. And to understand how God exists as a person, is all that man in this state can ever do. Man can never realise His existence as a person, until he reaUses the totality of his own existence. Man can realise his own existence as a spirit, and can thus understand how other spirits exist ; but to understand intellectually and to realise are two very different things. One man can make another man understand how a spirit exists, but one man can never make another man reahse that any spirit exists — not even this other man's own spirit. Each man must reahse within himself and by himself. This is the chraax of the difficulty, namely, that we cannot make anyone reahse or comprehend the reahty of the proposition. Therefore to de- monstrate the proposition, to make men under- stand it intellectually, is all we can do ; but in doing this we shall make men do more than they imagine, which shall be fully explained in the course of our argument. And all men who have no natural deficiency of intellect may be />J ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 59 i ^ trained to comprehend intellectually the highest proposition that has emanated from the being of man, although all men could never produce or evoke this proposition. This is all the dis- tinction between men. One man creates ; another, by training, can perceive what is created ; and hence, in so far as amount of intellectual knowledge is concerned, both men become equal. No training in the universe, however, can teach a man how to create ; although training is the means by which he is enabled to perceive what is created. Euclid's science of geometry will easily illustrate what we mean. Is it possible that the generahty of mankind could produce that science ? May we not rather ask, what mind could have pro- duced it? And although it is probable that one mind did not create the whole of what is attributed to Euclid, there is no doubt but some one mind evoked, enunciated, and de- monstrated the body of the science — that is the great majority of the propositions. But although the majority of mankind could not create the science, that man must be defective indeed who 60 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 61 I' cannot be trained to comprehend all his pro- positions. We must observe, however, that, although our proposition can be proved with the certainty of any of Euclid's, and may be comprehended with equal certainty, there is something to be comprehended above the pro- position and its proof ; there is something above the intellectual truth to be perceived : there is here, in our proposition, something to be realised. Here is the difficulty of difficulties that we have to contend with. Here is the incommunicable and indemonstrable I am that every one has to realise. Then, how are we to arrive at a real know- ledge of the existence of a world of spirits ? Just as we have said already, namely, by ex- amining ourselves, that is, our inner selves. By examining ourselves we get a finite key to un- fold the infinite universe. An imperfect know- ledge of the existence of a world of spirits may be had from an examination of the external universe; but a real knowledge of this can never be obtained from the external. Men not only sought a real knowledge of the world of spirits in the external, but they had an exter- nalised mode of demonstration. All demon- stration is external ; but as their proposition was in the external, they had, so to speak, to externalise their mode of demonstration ; and, consequently, their demonstrative knowledge of the truth could not be but partial and imper- fect. Their proposition was partial and im- perfect ; it was an assumed proposition, not a proposition that was realised ; and, of neces- sity, any demonstration would require to be partial and imperfect. Their proposition was, generally, the existence of a God. Now, as we have said already, they could not even under- stand how a God could exist until they first realised their own existence as spirits ; and even understanding that there was a God, would still leave their proposition to be far from a proposition of reahsed existence. And to say that we can prove a proposition, of which we have not realised the truth, is one of those unaccountable absurdities into which human beings are capable of running. In this ex- ternalised mode of demonstration (although V 62 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 63 though this is seldom thought upon) the greater part of the proof of the proposition was ob- tained by an unconscious reference to self in the argument, and the lesser part of the proof in the external. " There is design in the uni- verse : therefore design argues the existence of a Designer," they said. But how did they see that there was design in the universe ? They never asked themselves this question. K they had asked this question, they would have at once seen that the greater part of the proof was in themselves and not in the external. The way they knew design, either in the natural or in the artificial worlds, was because design was in themselves, and the external beins: merely the shadow, or the likeness, of this inward or self-design. Any other design than the reflection of this constitutional or self-design would be to them not design, but monstrous disorder. Their argument should have run thus : I am a designer. I see design like my own in the universe ; therefore there must be a Designer; and intelligences that design similarly must be like ; which last would have demonstrated to them (with their imper- fect knowledge of themselves, in their not having within the dominion of realised con- sciousness, the existence of themselves as spirits), the scriptural proposition that 'Man was created after the image of God.' The design in the external world, however, directly proves in reahty nothing of the sort, either the existence of a God, or the existence of any other external spirit. And no wonder that Eobertson of Brighton, with his deep, burning, and enthusiastic spiritual insight, should have exclaimed that the man who seeks God without himself, is like the man who tries to catch the rainbow ! There is an immense, appalling, and bewildering gulf between the man who has not realised his own spiritual existence and God, whom he thus seeks in the external. When such men look upon the display of power, in- telhgence, and wisdom, in the external universe, the stride between self and God is truly appall- ing. They have an instinctive certainty almost that there must be a spiritual designer; but who the real designer is is completely hid from iff III 64 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. their eyes. The most heathenish, however, of these gifted men, who thus instinctively, as it were, from the high development of their own spiritual existence, argued or saw the w^ork- manship of a designer in the external, knew well that the designer was not a material de- signer, but an unseen and spiritual designer, however they might talk to suit circumstances, in order to meet the undeveloped minds of the world of men that surrounded them. Horace, who was well acquainted with the philosophy of Greece, and with the rehgions of both Greece and Eome, said to those who wondered at him for not rendering to the gods their due rites, before his entering the gates of a certain city, that the gods were good-natured or sleepy fellows, and took everything easy and in good part, and enjoyed themselves in quiet. He knew, in fact, that the material gods were a mockery and a cheat for those who could un- derstand no better ; and yet the gods of these heathens were supernatural personifications of humanity ; idealistic incarnations of humanity, if we may use the phrase, far above the gods of I t- ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 65 the materialist of the present day. What a contrast in self-development between a Plato and a modern materialist ! Thus, then, was the external mode of seeking a real knowledge of the existence of a world of spirits ; the proposition being taken from the external, was, as it were, turned inside out; and besides that it was thus rendered defective as a proposition : it had no right to be taken from the external at all, for evisry proposition of this nature must be from the internal. Each man saw, and could see no more, in this so- called external mode of demonstration to sub- stantiate the existence of a spirit or of spirits, than he was conscious of a spiritual existence within himself. By unconscious analogy from self to the external, he saw proof in exact pro- portion without to what he was conscious of within, however unconscious he might be that he was using an analogy or drawing a com- parison between self and the external. More proof of the existence of a world of spirits from without than what is simply a reflection of the within was, and is, utterly impossible. There- iiiJ i 66 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. i ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 67 fore, in as much as any man failed to realise within himself that he was a spirit, so much did he fail to give perfect demonstrative proof from the external of the existence of a world of spirits. Now it is known that man has failed to reahse— which alone is perfect proof— the existence of a world of spirits within ; and until he does this first, it is an utter impossibihty in the nature of things to give perfect demonstrative proof of this from without, or one iota more of proof from without than what is the reflection of his spirit within. The very idea of spirit could never have been thought upon, as existing without, or as existing at all, were it not that this simple idea is the reflection of the within, or, in sim- pler words, were it not that man is possessed of a spirit himself. This is incontrovertible. Hence the necessity of seeking within, and not without, if ever real proof is to be obtained. Then, when this real proof of the existence of a spirit within is obtained, we can obtain (and not till then) for the benefit of others perfect demonstrative proof of this without, and, to ourselves, proof of the existence of other spirits I I without us, just as perfect proof as a materialist has of the existence of other material beings Hke himself, whose existence, we would fainly trust, he does not question, however sceptical he may be about the existence of a spirit or of spirits. Besides, seeking in the external for real proof of the existence of a world of spirits, has another objection attached to it, over and above the utter inadequacy of the external, of itself, to furnish perfect proof of any kind, until the truth is first reahsed from within. This objection is, that some men deny the existence of any design in the universe. It matters very little whether they deny this or not, in so far as the proving of the existence of a world of spirits is concerned, because, as we have shown, no real proof (reaUsation) of this can ever come from this source, that is, from the external uni- verse. All the proof in the external is merely reflective, or demonstrative. The real proof of the existence of a world of spirits stands on itself, absolutely and perfectly independent of the external altogether. If this real proof were dependent on the external, p 2 68 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. however, it would be a serious objection, if there was no design to be observed in the ex- ternal universe ; but happily this is not the case. The external has nothing to do with the real proof. To those, however, who sought real and demonstrative proof of the existence of a world of spirits in the external, that men could say (however ridiculous the saying might be) that there was no design expressed in the universe, was a little staggering. But granting that men could prove that there was no design in the universe (but which they can never do — nor would any but a madman ever think of proving such a thing), still it would matter nothing to us ; for in defiance of all externahty, we can obtain real proof of the existence of a world of spirits. At the same time, /, as an individual, cannot look upon the universe as a whole, or in parts, but I see design in it. And I cannot see how any man could deny the existence of design, and order, and regularity in the uni- verse, and could expect to live for a moment after. If we could suppose a being constituted diametrically opposite to what man is, we would ., \ ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 69 not in the least wonder at him announcing that there was no design, order, or regularity in this universe of ours ; but to hear a being, in that world in which he Hves, announcing that there is no design, order, or regularity, at least to him — although there should be no design, order, or regularity to any other being — ap- pears to us the most monstrous absurdity that ever was uttered. We must admit, however, in the cause of stupidity, that there is abun- dance of room for cavilling in the argument. When a fragment of rock falls from a precipice of which it formed a part for thousands of years ; why any one particular grain of sand is found among its fellows on the sea-shore ; and why one pebble on the highway is round, and another square ; in any or all of these, it will be very difficult for any one who is not omnis- cient to see much design, order, or regularity. When the finitely knowing one shall become omniscient, he will be able to comprehend these things — but not till then. These events, or facts, are too far removed from man in the scale of being to comprehend that each of them 70 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. has a design, order, and regularity, attached to itself, as much as he has to himself. Therefore, to deny the existence of any design, order, and regularity in the universe, because we cannot see all the design, order, and regularity in it, is a piece of the most daring presumption, to say the very least that can be said about it. What design can an ass see in all the actions of men? We put the question — Do men ever act with desicrn, order, and regu- larity ? But, forsooth, because the ass cannot see all this design, order, and regularity, in the intelhgent actions of men, does this argue that there has been no design employed by man in the accomphshing of his ends, or expressed in the end when accomplished ? Is not the truth rather that the ass can comprehend neither? Therefore, if any man pleases, he can honestly announce that he sees no design in the uni- verse ; and, by analogy, we have no reason to wonder at his announcement. He who affirms that there is no design without, affirms that there is no design within. The whole of the argument, however, proving / ABOUT THE PROPOSITION. 71 the existence of design in the external, and thence the existence of an infinite designer, amounts to this, and amounts to no more, that man, unconsciously, all the time, and in the whole argument, is simply proving his own existence ; and that he himself is the designer of all that he beholds, not only in the com- paratively finite matter without, but also in the comparatively infinite mind within. 72 THE DEMONSTRATION. 73 PAET III. THE DEMONSTRATION. Let us now enter on the demonstration of our proposition, namely, that there is a world of spirits ; that we, the conscious knowers, are just now in the world of spirits ; that w^e, the knowers, are rounded beings in the world of spirits as our animal beings are rounded beings in the external world; that we, the conscious knowers, can never, in our present state, see this our proper selves ; that the utmost that we, the consciou' knowers, can do, and that with the greater possible difficulty, is to know that we, the con- scious knowers, are such absolute and rounded existences ; that, in a word, the utmost th • t man can do is to know that he exists, and tl it the human race hitherto have not known t ac they existed. And let us now, then, see if ex- ternal nature can demonstrate and substantiate I rt» this wonderful truth which external nature could never teach, but which truth, when realised within, external nature may substantiate and demonstrate. The demonstration of every true proposition which our inward beings can evoke must be in the external. Any propo- sition of being which has not its demonstration in the external is false; and if men would always try their own propositions, and test the propositions of others by this invariable and unerring guide, philosophy and religion (which are one and the same thing) would progress much more rapidly, and would have more solid and unchangeable foundations. Is there, therefore, in reality, anything strange, contradictory, or impossible to com- prehend, in the fact that men do not know nything of, are not conscious of, their own simple being or existence as spirits ; that they are not conscious of any existence but in the activity called mind, and that they, on this . ccount, always identify themselves with them- \^es in extension, that is with mind, or animal, both (we do not exclude the purely external 74 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. THE DEMOXSTRATIOX. 75 from ourselves in extension, but men never identify themselves with it, as they thus far emancipate themselves at a very early stage of life) ; that they always identify themselves with the without, the visible, both common and indi- vidual, and never dream of the simple existence of the being (their own spirit) behind all this, sitting enthroned in darkness and silence, myste- rious, terrible, and inexhaustible in power and intelligence, and of whose undeveloped being the universe is but a speck or the smallest ray ? If we reflect, there is nothing impossible to comprehend, nothing contradictory, nothing even strange, in this simple fact. Does a pebble on the sea-shore know that it exists? Does it see its own existence in the universe as we see it? These questions are even too absurd to be asked. A pebble is said to be dead and not hving. Is a plant or flower a living existence, even what we call a living existence? We suppose it will be affirmed by all men that it is what we call a living existence. Does it know of its simple existence ? It may be answered that we do not know certainly ! l^ whether it does or not. This is my answer too ; but it is not probable that it does know this for the strongest reasons. It may know (if we can call such knowing) of its activity, felt in the relish it must have in drawing its sustenance from all that surrounds it. Whatever- this relish may be, we are certain that it does not amount to what we call or experience as knowing. But of its simple existence as a plant or flower in inactivity, without any activity but the simple process of hving, we are certain that it knows nothing ; and far less does it see itself or know of its existence in rehef as a flower as we see and know it. But after all, it is not proper to prove any psychological fact by the examination of a flower, nor by the examination of any other being than man himself However, we think that any reasonable being will admit that all that we have said about the flower is correct. Here, then, w^e would next take up for examination one of (what is called) the lower animals ; but as we do not know exactly how they know, or how much they know, we shall refrain from saying anji^hing about them 1 I 76 A NEW WORLD OF BEIXG. THE DEMONSTRATION 77 n .Ifi in the meantime. Let us, therefore, turn to ourselves, for here we can speak with certainty. Here is a new-born infant. It is beautifully and completely organised. It displays a high de- velopment of animal existence, that is, organ- ised matter endued with life. Does it know of its simple animal existence as an infant? We are certain from experience, or rather non-experience, as well as from observation, that it does not know of its rounded animal existence, as an infant, as we see and know it. An infant knows from the very beginning, but does not know of itself as an it^ disengaged from its surroundings. All that it knows is what we call the purely external or its sur- roundings, and any reactionary effect that this dim first stage of knowing may make upon it. To itself, it and the external are one. Conse- quently, it has no knowledge of existence as an individual ; not only not in relief, but not even as an it, in any degree or in any mode. Yet this new-born infant is a much more higlily- finished being in the scale of life, and in the direction of knowing, than a flower ; and so we conclude that the flower does not only not know of its rounded existence as a flower, but does not even know of its activities — that is, it does not know at all. But why does the infant not know of its own animal existence, seeing that it is a Mly organised being as a man is ? Is it not because that being which afterwards knows is not yet in existence, or, if it is in existence, is stiU in an embryo state, so far as knowing is concerned ? In a word, the knower of maturer years is still in an embryo state to us, whoever that knower may be. This is cer- tain. And, moreover, we do not see any reason why a fully organised infant should not know of its own animal existence as well as a fully organ- ised man, if it were not that this knowledge is the result of another being, not the animal itself, but a spirit ; if it were not that this knowledge is not solely the result of animal organisation ; and if it were not that this other being than the animal was still in an embryo state ; for the organism of the infant is as perfect in kind as the organism of the man. The organism of the infant is as complete as 78 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. THE DEMONSTRATION. 79 the organism of the man, although not so fully developed. Here, then, is strong presumptive evidence of the existence of another being in the constitution of man than animal ; in fact, one probable proof (along with hundreds of the same kind that might be given) of the existence of a spirit, a distinct being from the animal. Probable proofs of the existence of a w^orld of spirits have often been given to the world, and might still be given by the score. But be all this as it may (whether a com- pletely organised infant should know as well as a completely organised man), here is cer- tainty, and not probability, that it is possible for a being, a fully-organised being, a new- born infant, to be in existence, and not know of its existence. There is no doubt here. What we call an infant does not know of its spiritual existence, because spiritual existence it has not in proper existence ; but it does not know of the little animal existence, this being, as it were, a thing too near itself as yet to be seen. If there should be no spiritual existence in the constitution of man, but simply animal )l I existence, this would not in the least invalidate what we want to establish, that it is possible for beings to exist and not know that they exist ; for even in this narrow view of man, it is certain that the little infant animal does not know of the little animal existence. This ignorance of animal existence, in infancy, is not to be questioned, whoever it be that is igno- rant, whether an animal or a spirit. The fact that there is, in existence, in the eyes of the world, a little being, called an infant, and that it does not know that it exists as an it, and far less as it is seen in the eyes of the world, is a truth not to be questioned, whether we look upon it as a duality of personalities, or as a simple animal. This, then, is clear demonstration that a being can exist and not know of its own existence, as a rounded and outlined being, as it is a simple being in the eyes of others, on the supposition that animal is the only existence in the consti- tution of man, and that it is the knower in after years ; and farther, on this supposition, it is clear demonstration that a being can exist, a completely organised being, and not even know W 80 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. /i! Ill that it exists as an it at all. These, then, are the two statements of the case ; ours, that in the constitution of man there are two personahties (a spirit and an animal), and that the animal never knows, and the reason why the infant animal existence is not known, is because the spirit, the knower of maturer years, is still in an embryo state, so far as knowing is concerned ; the other (the general statement), that, in the constitution of man, there is but one personahty (the animal), that the animal is the knower, and that the reason why the infant animal existence is not known, is because the animal is not fully developed, though it is completely organised. Whichever of these statements is the true one, the fact that a new-born infant is in existence, untaken up by a knower that afterwards claims it as itself or its owm, remains unalterable and unquestionable. Thus, then, the highest animal organisation in the universe does not know, cannot know, that it exists, and far less can it know of its rounded existence as seen by others, throwing all argument, about who the after-knower is, to the winds. If, however, it i 11' .1 THE DEMONSTRATION. 81 can be proved that, in the constitution of man, there are two personalities (that is, two, if animal is to be reckoned as a personality at all), and that the animal never knows at all, either in its infancy or mature age ; and that the knower is entirely a different being, a spirit, then we, the knowers, need not wonder that we may pass a hfetime and not know that we, the knowers, exist, seeing that infant animal does not know of its existence, but that even man animal, or any organisation of matter and hfe, or anything that is external, did not ever, does not, nor ever shall, know that it exists, or know at all, however strange and improbable this may appear when first brought under the eye. There is one great universal law of nature : Knowing is not an attribute of the EXTERNAL ; it is Utterly denied to any mechanism of life and matter. Knowing is an attribute OF THE world OF SPIRITS, FROM ITS FEEBLEST DAWNINGS TO ITS ALMOST OMNISCIENT DEVELOP- MENTS. The generic attribute of the worlds of matter and mind is, known ; the generic attri- bute of the world of spirits is, knowing. Even G 82 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. THE DEMONSTRATION. with the half-assumed proposition, ' Cogito ergo sum' (I think therefore I am) of Descartes, who reahsed that there was an /, distinct from the animal, but who never reahsed that he existed absolutely, by emancipating the I from mind as well as from the animal, man is on the very verge of realising this great and universal law of nature ; for the /, identified with mind, and emancipated from the animal, is a thou- sand times more distinct from and independent of the animal than the animal is from all the external world — is, in other words, a thousand times more a personality than the animal. Mr. Darwin has aptly implied that man, the animal, is nothing more than a highly-de- veloped vegetable, or such Hke. We do not agree with him, however, that the man-animal arose, or worked its way up, from so low a sphere, nor from a lower nor a higher sphere than a vegetable, nor from any sphere but that sphere in which the man-animal is now found ; for we think that the creation of a vegetable, or anything else, would have required the same Omnipotent hand that was required to bring i 83 about the creation of a man, and were both brought about in a very different way from that by which Mr. Darwin supposes they were brought about. The ultimate knowledge, in the direction of cr^eation, that Mr. Darwin or any man, can ever attain, is to know that he, himself, has created both man and vegetable and everything else known to him ; but to know, with all this knowledge, his utter impo- tence to find out the mystery of the creation of himself, of whom, through whom, and in whom, are all things visible and known. It is comparatively an easy matter for man to find out the source and creation of the visible and known, but it is not an easy matter to find out the mystery of his own creation ; this alone is the mystery of the universe. Both man-animal and vegetable are, in the meantime, only propagating their kind in the man proper ; and to attri- bute to them an origin of their own apart from man spiritual, and to try to solve the mystery attached to the manner of their production, without having /r5^ solved the mystery of our own origin from which they emanate, is, in G 2 84 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. THE DEMONSTRATION. 85 reality, nothing short of blind madness. This is mistaking the effect for the cause, the creature for the creator ; this is a perversion of thought and judgment which, as a matter of course, superinduces a perversion of language. Mr. Darwnn says that all organisations have sprung from some one common primordial form of life, which, from its low origin, has ramified and developed into the endless varieties which we now behold. We believe, barring the develop- ment system, that never unconsciously was a truer statement of the origin of things, but not in the sense in which Mr. Darwin means his ' some one common primordial form of life ' to be taken. All must be from some one common primordial form of life, that is from the hidden spiritual hfe of man ; for the universe is the production of this life, and this Hfe is the produc- tion of God. A whole host of critics leap down on Mr. Darwin, however, accusing him of what he was never guilty of. They repudiate the idea that man has sprung or risen from a monkey. We are very greatly mistaken if Mr. Darwin even insinuates such an idea. We think that Mr. f 1 Darwin only supposes that the monkey and all other organisations have sprung from some one common primordial form of hfe, but that the species of this universal genus have kept dis- tinct, and that the monkey, on account of its position in the scale of hfe, is more allied to man than most other organisations. Now what is wrong in all this ? This is simply what our own Scriptures say. Did not the life of the monkey originate from the Same Life as man ? If it did not, from what life did it originate ? To say that it did not originate from the Same Life as man, is to contradict Scripture and the belief of enlightened man from time immemorial. The only thing wrong is, that Mr. Darw^in per- verts the old proposition by turning it inside out. There is nothing new in his proposition at all, but only the perverted way in which he makes us look at it, and by his tacitly telling us to shut our eyes and take the effect alone for the cause and effect. As to the other idea (that a monkey is more allied to man than a vegetable or a stone), there is nothing either new or wrong in it. It is not 86 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. only the belief of men, but all enlightened men have reduced the belief to practice, by enacting laws for the pimishment of cruelty to the lower animals. / do not in the least look down upon a monkey and a vegetable, or despise them because they are a good deal like myself I am bound by all the laws in the universe to pay more respect to a vegetable than to a piece of rock, and more to a monkey than to a vegetable. Nor do / despise Mr. Darwin for saying, directly or indirectly, that a monkey is, in the scale of life, nearer allied to me than a pebble. This all I know myself; nor am I angry with my Creator in having thus constituted me, nor in His having created (indi- rectly) the monkey so like me, which some men by their tone would seem to be. We shall not enter on a discussion of his development theory ; it would occupy too much time. We may say by the way, however, that there is a great deal of truth in his observations of facts, but nothing new ; his inferences, on the other hand, are outrageous. There are such things as a struggle for hfe, a natural selection, and a de- THE DEMONSTRATION. 87 velopment. These, however, have been observed and repeated in a thousand forms before JVIr. Darwin was born. Development, however, is always one-sided. Nature is just, evenly balanced, and limited in her expressions. Overdo her in any one direction, and for the supposed advantage, there is proportionate retribution for neglect. For every inch of development in one direction there is propor- tionate dwarfment in the other. Nature thus balances herself whether we will it or not. If there is progression there is hand-in-hand retro- gression. We dare not touch the nice balance of Nature in all her forms ; if we do, there is instant retribution. Nor must we stupidly take improvement of condition consequent on in- crease of numbers, within any hmited area, for man's development. By an inexorable necessity for his very existence he is, under these and certain other circumstances, compelled to im- prove his condition. This is not development. What story has the world a thousand times told even of this ? A thousand desirable advantages ; but luxury, delicacy, physical decay, extinction ! 88 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. THE DEMONSTRATION. 89 The balance of nature was outraged, and finally death, and not development, was the conse- quence. But now we repeat that Mr. Darwin is not wrong in saying that man-animal is only highly-developed matter and life, such as a vegetable is lowly-developed matter and hfe ; but if Mr. Darwin means that man-animal is the whole of man, there never was a more glaring error announced by any man. Animal is only the half of man, and the lower half too ; is, in fact, only a part of his product. And let it be observed that we do not by any means speak in theological phrase or technicahty when we speak about spirit. We do not mean any such thing as the ' renewed man,' or the ' Christian conscience ' by spirit. We speak philosopliically ; and we mean by spirit a distinct whole being, and not any quality or active feature of a being, as theologians always do, unless, indeed, in some cases, where they personify this quality of a being. With theologians, however, this per- sonification is no distinct being, but the same old being with a new direction given to its energies. This new quality of the creature, this being 'renewed,' is mystically styled, in theological phrase, spirit. It is of no importance to our argument whether a man has a Christian, or a Mahometan, or a Hindoo conscience; whether he sees God in the Bible, or in the Koran, in ' trees,' or ' hears Him in the mnd.' It is of no importance to the argument what quality of being a man is possessed of, whether he has the ' will ' of a devil or of a god. We mean in plain distinct language, apart from all tech- nicahty of creed, that man, wherever he is found, and in what condition soever he is found, is a duality ; not a duahty of parts or of features, but a duahty of beings or personaUties, that is, so long as man's animal shall be called a personality. By some more recent theolo- gians, man is described as tripartite or three- fold. We think that there never was a more erroneous and confounding creed announced. The proposition of the old creed was correct, that man was a duality. The only error in it was that the existence of spirit was not rea- hsed ; and, consequently, it was mystified. Very few men there are but have an indescribable 90 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. instinct of themselves as spirits ; and from their constitution it cannot be otherwise. But some of the ideas evolved out of this tripartite creed, such as ' the self-conscious animal,' ' intellectual decay as a thing identical v/ith animal decay,' ' not capable of being conscious of our own spirits, but conscious of God, which character- ises us from the lower animals,' and ' that the conscious ive are to die,' are, if properly ex- amined, ideas which outrage both common sense and Scripture. We cannot wait in the meantime to discuss them, but some of them may be touched upon by the way, in the course of our argument. We would only say, however, that either these writers, or the Founder of Christianity, must be wrong ; for the language of the Founder of it is, ' This day shalt thou .be with me in Paradise.' Now who is the thou ? It was not the animal. To say this would be mere mockery ; for every one, as well as the man who was spoken to, knew that the animal would return to the dust. The thou was the conscious knowing being who was addressed, who was to be in Paradise and not to die. To THE DEMOXSTRATIOX. 91 have meant anything but this by the language would have been mockery, and would still be mockery. But w^e have already transgressed the limits of patience in these digressions on Mr. Darwin's theory, and on theological definitions of spirit. We do not by any means, however, say all theologians hold these opinions of spirit ; for theologians generally are among the more enhghtened of mankind ; but they are sorely kept in bonds, and often, from their sense of this restraint, do show a disposition to entrammel and enslave what God created to be free. Let us now return to our argument, and carry it out to the end, namely, that no me- chanism of matter and life, however high, ever did, ever does, or ever shall, know that it exists, or know at all : that the great and universal law is, that knowing is not an attri- bute of the external. We have seen then, in the case of the pebble, the flower, the new- born infant, that they do not know that they exist, and yet exist to others. In other words, we see that it is possible for beings to be in existence to us and not be in existence to V 92 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. themselves. The infant, however, knows, but does not know of itself as an it ; but the animal- infant does not know at all ; and that the in- fant-animal does not know at all, in any degree, will be seen by the demonstration which shall be given to prove that not only does the infant- animal not know, but that even the man-animal never did, never does, nor ever shall, know at all. If this is true, that knowing is not an at- tribute belonging to any external being what- ever, then it must be the attribute of some being ; and if we can show that no organisation of matter and life, however high, ever knows, this will be negative proof of the existence of some other being of whom knowing is the attribute. Man, we have said already, is two distinct beings. In popular phrase, man has two lives, or is two hving beings. One being is the animal, made up of body and life ; and the other is a spirit — a being that simply lives without any embodiment, at least to lis, but can assume any embodiment, the most won- derful being in the universe of whom man has direct experience — a being not far from the THE DEMONSTRATION. 93 •I sphere of its Creator— a being in distinctness and independence of existence to such an ex- tent that the distinctness of no two external things in the universe can give any idea of it — a being in power and intelligence "^hich is al- most infinite and incomprehensible — a being in whose presence the might and the powers of the external universe dwindle into insignificance. It has been thought a very difficult task — ay! an impossible task — to isolate completely the animal from the spirit, or rather to show any one of them in bold relief isolated from the other ; and it has been thought equally difficult to comprehend how the spirit communicates with the animal, and the animal with the spirit. Now both these tasks are, with that amount of knowledge which is possible to man, very easy to comprehend by the most ordinary capacity of the human race ; and surely any reasonable being will be satisfied with the distinctness of these two beings in what is called man, if we can show them as distinct to him as man and wife, or any other two beings with an equal interest in each other as man and wife should 94 A IS'EW WORLD OF BEING. have; and if, thereafter, we can show them acting conjointly or in unison as much as any two beings intently engaged on the same task, each aiding the other, and without which mutual aid the task or end in hand would not or could not ever be accomplished. This has been always thought to be a task beyond human power to execute, and beyond human intelligence to comprehend; but the Creator has marked out this distinctness of spirit and animal, and has also shown how they act con- jointly, in unison, and simultaneously. All we have to do in this case is simply to observe ; and the whole is as simple a task as the opening of our eyes. Let us then look first upon the isolated, dis- tinct, and pure animal. Here is a prostrate, unconscious, and awful form to a thinkino- being. Is it living or dead? Dead! What inhahng and exhaling ! What heaving ! What beating ! What pulsating ! Do you call this dead or alive ? And yet how lonely, and help- less, and dead I ' Not dead, but asleep; you hkely say. Asleep! Most glaring contradic- THE DEMOXSTRATIOX. 95 tion and absurdity ! Life asleep ! It is utterly impossible that Hfe can sleep. A living being cannot sleep for a moment. From the first moment of its existence till the last, here is a waking that knows no sleep. Threescore and ten, or even a hundred years of perpetual ac- tivity ! No rest !— no sleep ! Can any reason- able man assert that that being is asleep, the beating of whose heart may be audibly heard, whose lungs never cease to inhale and exhale, whose blood incessantly flows, and whose trunk is heaving hke a monster machine ? Here, in- deed, is a picture of Hfe, and unrest, and sleep- less perpetuity. Here is a vegetable, indeed, IVIr. Darwin!— a frightful vegetable to think upon ! — a vegetable of such high development of organism, and of such high vitahty, that no one can behold it without astonishment and awe ! Here is animal, the pure and isolated animal — the helpless afid mortal animal not dead, nor asleep, but isolated. And this is the height of animal (when alone and isolated), not conscious, not knowing of its own existence, not knowing that it exists, not k?iowing at all. It is Wl V I 96 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. simply living, mechanically living, and could not of itself even live long, or preserve its ex- istence, on the very account of its high deve- lopment, unless it had some superior being to guide it. Much less is it capable of performing anything higher than the simple process of living without this superior guide. The highest animal is a very low and helpless creature (not- withstanding its high organisation and develop- ment) when left to itself Animal is a much lower thing than what is commonly called a lower animal. The lower animals have a supe- rior being guiding them, as well as the higher animal, man. Theologians say they have not ; but this is like many theological dogmas, narrow, invidious, and extremely ill-natured. They say they have no soul, but are purely animal. There never was a greater mistake. They have not the same amount of soul as man ; but they have a soul or spirit the same in kind, but less in degree. They may have no soul at all, if the term soul or spirit be confined to desig- nate a certain amount of being which is the same in kind as another beincr which is less THE DEMONSTRATION. 97 than it. If the terra spirit means a being of a certain amount and capacity, and not a being anything less or greater, then lower animals have no soul or spirit, in this precise and cir- cumscribed sense of the term (which interpre- tation of the term would be both narrow and inconvenient, and especially so to theologians, when they so often refer through this term to higher beings than themselves). But call that higher being which guides their pure animal by whatever name you please, they are pos- sessed of a higher being as well as man. The name to us is nothing ; but the fact is unde- niable. How would theologians, or any men, look upon beings of superior natures to them- selves, supposing those superior beings scowled and looked down upon them, and asserted that they had 7io soul or spirit, simply because it was less developed, and not so large in capacity as that of those higher beings.^ This is one of the great causes of confusion in theology and metaphysics, that soul or spirit is denied to the lower animals; and then, after this denial, making comparisons between man and them to H 98 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. illustrate ( ! ) their systems, but which, in this style, can only darken and confuse them. There are exceptions to this narrow theological teach- ing however. Butler is a noble example of these exceptions, as may be seen in his ' Analogy of Eeligion.' Now sleep does and must mean something ; and it means isolation of the animal and the spirit— an abstraction of the spirit, or, more properly, an abstraction of the influence of the spirit fi'om the animal— a leaving of the animal to itself, for the purpose of refection, after a period of tension and exertion not its own, and caused by a being not itself, and whose influence it is not able to bear without relaxation. This is sleep. But to suppose that animal sleeps, in the popular sense of the word sleep— namely, the resting of a hfe— is an utter absurdity. Life cannot rest or sleep. The animal never sleeps, but is left to itself ; and this leaving we caU sleep ; and we have no objection to the appel- lation, only we want to explain that, popularly, sleep is misunderstood and misinterpreted ; that it is no resting of animal life, nor the resting or THE DEMONSTRATION. 99 suspension of the vital powers of the being called animal, which vital powers, in and of themselves, were supposed to be more active when the animal was what is called awake. Sleep is not the partial suspension of the vital powers of the animal from a more active state into a less active. Sleep is merely a temporary cessation of communication between an animal and a spirit, two distinct beings. The animal, tlierefore, never sleeps, but is left to itself; and far less can the spirit sleep, whose life and ac- tivity are inconceivably greater. There are sim- ply a temporary separation between them ; but, in their own natures, in and of themselves, they are both sleepless. Shall anyone assert that this same animal life that we describe is the same as the spirit ? We ask him simply, Is he conscious of what is called sleeping, when said to be asleep ? or is he conscious at all of any- thing ? The answer is, No. Well, this life that we have been describing, which is some Hfe or other, call it by whatever name you please — animal or otherwise — cannot sleep. The animal here, in this state, is not asleep ; and yet it is H 2 100 A NEW WOKLD OF BEING. not conscious, because it cannot be conscious at all ; for consciousness is the feature of another being entirely. If the animal does not know that it exists, and yet it is not asleep, what can this animal do by itself in this state ? It can do nothing but what you see. It is not for us in this essay to say all that it cannot do ; but we may state that it does not see as such, does not hear, cannot walk, cannot stand, cannot even eat, or perform one intelligent act, properly called intelligent. It would simply live as long as it could do so on that food which it is con- tinually devouring, namely, the air ; because to preserve the very existence of so high organisa- tion, it requires the guidance of a higher life than the mere elements of earth are capable of furnishing or producing ; that is, the organism of the animal is a structure so high and exqui- sitely finished that no earthly element whatever has sufficient intelligence to guide it even for the preservation of its existence, and far less so for acting intelligently in the thousand ways in which the animal is obliged to act. Earthly life is not sufficient for the guidance of the THE DEMONSTRATION. 101 highest earthly organisms. This is the consti- tution of nature ; and it may be for wiser ends than we are capable of divining in our present state. This coincides also with the Mosaic account of the creation of man. Further, does it require thought to enable a man to sleep, in the popular sense of the word? Does it require consciousness? So much is this not the case, that these, the features of another being, require to be entirely removed before sleep can take place. Philosophically speaking, it requires neither thought nor con- sciousness to enable the animal to Hve by itself for this temporary period. And let it be ob- served, also, that this life, pure animal hfe, is the same, when a man is said to be asleep or awake. There is no distinction in this animal life, in either state, asleep or awake ; the heart is for ever beating, the lungs are for ever play- ing, the blood is for ever flowing, the trunk is for ever heaving, and a thousand other animal functions and activities are ceaselessly going on, of which I know but little, when asleep and awake, in both cases alike. These things may i- ' oi 'l" I III l l' ^^ ' ^ " ■ » 102 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. THE DEMONSTRATION. 103 be accelerated, when we say a man is awake ; but this is not dependent on his being simply awake; for these things may be retarded or accelerated during the time a man is aw^ake under different circumstances, and the same also in sleep. From these remarks or facts, it may be learned that the animal can live temporarily by itself, and that it never sleeps in itself, but is only left to itself for refection from exhaustion, caused by an influence ema- nating from a being not itself. If the animal sleeps, according to the popular interpretation of the term, or when said to be sleeping, there is only one other conclusion, namely, that it is sleeping also, when we say a man is awake ; for the animal is in the same condition in both states, asleep and awake; that is, its heart beats, its lungs play, its blood circulates, its pulse beats, its trunk heaves, and many other more latent manifestations of ceaseless and sleepless activity are all going on, equally the same, when a man is said to be asleep and aw^ake. And Nature after all is the best teacher herself, showing us daily our two distinct personalities h » or living beings ; showing us the mortal in bold and isolated relief, and showing us also, side by side with it, the immortal equally as distmct from it, but not so distinct in itself, the cause of which occultness will appear evident and obvious in the course of our argument. This mortal, therefore, is the animal ; this immortal is the spirit. Now if it be true that this is the pure animal that we have attempted to describe, and which even a child can comprehend, there is another truth hanging upon it, so plain, also, that a child can comprehend it. This truth is, that there must be another higher being than this animal in the unity called man. This being is a spirit : this is incontrovertible. And that man, when said to be asleep, is the pure, isolated, distinct, and mortal animal, we have not the shadow of a doubt ; nor do we think that any reflective mind can ever come to a different conclusion ; for the more it is examined, the more evident it becomes ; and this makes us hope that, how- ever this explanation may be received now, the truth of what we say shall one day be 'Jmm 104 A NEW WORLD OF BEING. established beyond a doubt, and universally received. Many other arguments might be brought up to substantiate the truth of this doc- trine ; but if we have directed attention to the truth, our end is served here. Now this hfe, that we have been describing, is some life, call it animal, or w^hatever you please. No one can or dare deny this ; and if it is not animal hfe, we shall be glad to be told what life is it. That this life, that w^e have been describing, never sleeps, whatever life it may be, is also a trutli not to be questioned, because it is patent to a child. And if this some sleepless hfe, that we have been de- scribing, is animal life, and of w^iich we have no doubt, then not only does it demonstrate the isolated animal and prove that there must be another being in the constitution of man than animal, but it demonstrates the other truth, beyond questioning, that the old man- animal, as well as the infant-animal, does not, nor cannot, know that it exists, and far less know of its existence in rounded rehef, as seen by another, or as seen by the spirit of man, THE DEMONSTRATION. 103 when man is said to be awake ; for no being ever knows that it exists, when it is said to be asleep ; and this sleeping, in the popular ac- ceptation of the term, we have shown to be an illusion, and misinterpretation, and misunder- standing : it being only a temporary separation of two distinct lives, and not either a total or partial suspension of the vital powers of the same being, from a more active to a less active state, as is popularly and almost universally beheved. So the old man-animal knows no more that it exists, as an animal, than the young infant-animal. Neither the one nor the other knows at all. It is another being, a spirit, that knows of the old man-animal, and not the man-animal itself; and it is the embryo, or undeveloped state of this other being, a spirit, in connection with the infant-animal, which is the cause that the infant does not know of its animal existence, even when we say that it is awake. In both cases, in infancy and man- hood, the animal, in and of itself, is perfectly impotent to know that it has an existence, or to know at all. And therefore the universal, and it m « » iiii<» 1