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 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
THE M ACM ILL AN COMPANY 
 
 NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALI,AS 
 ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 
 
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 TORONTO 
 
THE EUROPEAN 
 ANARCHY 
 
 BY 
 
 G. LOWES DICKINSON 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 1917 
 
 All riihts reserved 
 

 COPYMGHT, 1916 
 
 By the MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 Set up and electrotyped. Published April, igi6. 
 Reprinted April, 1917. 
 
 J5& 
 
FOREWORD TO THE AMERICAN 
 EDITION 
 
 These pages were written in the hope that they 
 might be read and considered by the more reason- 
 able section of the British pubhc. But they are 
 likely at the present moment to find more re- 
 sponse in America than in England. The sym- 
 pathies of Americans appear to be, generally and 
 warmly, on the side of the allies, because they rec- 
 ognize that a German victory would imperil the 
 principles and the spirit for which America stands. 
 But Americans also recognize that no military 
 victory or defeat can of itself secure that durable 
 peace by which alone democratic Hberties can 
 be assured and developed. The whole system 
 of international relations must be transformed 
 by a deliberate act of policy if this result is to 
 be achieved. The states must combine not in 
 temporary alliances and counter-alliances, preg- 
 nant with new wars, but in a union to develop 
 
 the law of nations and to sustain it against law- 
 
 s 
 
6 FOREWORD 
 
 breakers. As I write, this country is engaged in 
 a campaign for preparedness. Preparedness for 
 what? To enter that European competition 
 in armaments, which alone is a sufficient cause 
 of war? Or to put armaments, jointly with 
 other states, behind law and against aggression, 
 from whatever Power aggression may be threat- 
 ened? To do the former would be merely to 
 add to the dangers of war a new factor. To do 
 the latter might start the nations on the road 
 to a durable peace. Anarchy and destruction, 
 or law and reconstruction, is the choice before 
 the world; and the United States during the 
 next months may largely help to determine 
 which it shall be. A practical proposal for mak- 
 ing the transition from anarchy to law is put 
 forward by the American League to Enforce 
 Peace. ^ It is to some such solution that this 
 
 I essay points. For it shows how behind this 
 war, as behind wars in the past, lay not merely 
 
 I the aggression of Germany, but the whole tradi- 
 
 ^ League to Enforce Peace, American Branch, 70 Fifth 
 Avenue, New York City. Hon. William Howard Taft, 
 President; A. Lawrence Lowell, Chairman of Executive 
 Committee; William H. Short, Secretary. 
 
FOREWORD 7 
 
 Ition and practice of European diplomacy. To 
 take the lead in introducing into international 
 relations that new policy which alone can guar- 
 antee and preserve civilization may be the spe- 
 cial mission and glory of the United States. 
 On their action at this crisis of the race the future 
 of society may depend. And if this little book 
 shall have any smallest influence in clarifying 
 and concentrating American opinion upon the 
 problem to be solved, it will have fulfilled the 
 purpose for which it was written. 
 
 G. Lowes Dickinson. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I. Introduction ..... 13 
 
 Europe since the Fifteenth Century — Machiavellian- 
 ism — Empire and the Balance of Power. 
 
 f2. Tee Triple Alliance and the Entente . 17 
 y.,,^,,.,,^ Belgian Dispatches of 1905-14. 
 
 3. Great Britain . . . . .23 
 
 The Policy of Great Britain — Essentially an Overseas 
 Power. 
 
 4. France ...... 27 
 
 The Policy of France since 1870 — Peace and Imperial- 
 ism — Conflicting Elements. 
 
 5. Russia ...... 32 
 
 The Policy of Russia— Especially towards Austria. 
 
 / 6<V^USTiaA-HUNGARY . . . -37 
 
 y4^ The Policy of Austria-Hungary — Especially towards the 
 / Balkans. 
 
 7. Germany ...... 39 
 
 The Policy of Germany — From 1866 to the Decade 
 1890-1900 — A Change. 
 
 8. Opinion in Germany . . . .46 
 
 German "Romanticism" — New Ambitions. 
 
 9. Opinion about Germany . . .57 
 
 Bourdon — Beyens — Cambon — Summary. 
 
 10. German Policy from iSgo-igcx? . • 67 
 
 Relation to Great Britain— The Navy. 
 9 
 
10 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 TT^ Vain Attempts at Harmony . 
 
 Great Britain's Efforts for Arbitration — Mutual Suspi- 
 
 11 
 
 PAGE 
 75 
 
 12. 
 
 15- 
 
 & 
 
 Europe since the Decade 1890- 1900 
 Germany and Turkey . 
 
 The Bagdad Railway. 
 
 Austria and the Balkans 
 
 Morocco .... 
 
 The Last Years . 
 Before the War— The Outbreak of War. 
 
 17. The Responsibility and the Moral 
 
 The Pursuit of Power and Wealth. 
 
 18. The Settlement 
 
 19. The Change Needed 
 
 Change of Outlook and Change of System — An Inter- 
 national League— International Law and Control. 
 
 91 
 94 
 
 lOI 
 
 108 
 116 
 
 127 
 
 133 
 141 
 
THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 I. Introduction 
 
 In the great and tragic history of Europe there 
 
 is a turning-point that marks the defeat of the 
 
 ideal of a world-order and the definite acceptance 
 
 'of international anarchy. That turning-point 
 
 »is the emergence of the sovereign State at the 
 
 end of the fifteenth century. And. it is sym- 
 
 bolical of all that was to follow that at that point 
 
 stands, looking down the vista of the centuries, 
 
 the brilliant and sinister figure of Machiavelli. 
 
 »From that date onwards international policy 
 
 I has meant MachiavelUanism. Sometimes the 
 
 masters of the craft, like Catherine de Medici 
 
 or Napoleon, have avowed it; sometimes, like 
 
 Frederick the Great, they have disclaimed it. 
 
 But always they have practised it. They could 
 
 not, indeed, practise anything else. For it is 
 
 as true of an aggregation of States as of an ag- 
 
 igregation of individuals that, whatever moral 
 
 sentiments may prevail, if there is no common 
 
 law and no common force the best intentions 
 
 will be defeated by lack of confidence and se- 
 
 icurity. Mutual fear and mutual suspicion, ag- 
 
 13 
 
14 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 gression masquerading as defence and defence 
 masquerading as aggression, will be the protag- 
 onists in the bloody drama; and there will be, 
 
 I what Hobbes truly asserted to be the essence 
 of such a situation, a chronic state of war, open 
 
 I or veiled. For peace itself will be a latent war; 
 and the more the States arm to prevent a con- 
 flict the more certainly will it be provoked, since 
 to one or another it will always seem a better 
 chance to have it now than to have it on worse 
 
 ? conditions later. Some one State at any moment 
 may be the immediate offender; but the main 
 and permanent offence is common to all States. 
 It is the anarchy which they are all responsible 
 
 I for perpetuating. 
 
 * While this anarchy continues the struggle 
 between States will tend to assume a certain 
 
 '^stereotyped form. One will endeavour to ac- 
 quire supremacy over the others for motives at 
 once of security and of domination, the others 
 will combine to defeat it, and history will turn 
 upon the two poles of empire and the balance 
 
 •»of power. So it has been in Europe, and so it 
 will continue to be, until either empire is achieved, 
 as once it was achieved by Rome, or a common 
 law and a common authority is established by 
 
 ♦agreement. In the past empire over Europe has 
 been sought by Spain, by Austria, and by France; 
 
INTRODUCTION 15 
 
 and soldiers, politicians, and professors in Ger- 
 many have sought, and seek, to secure it now 
 for Germany. On the other hand, Great Britain 
 has long stood, as she stands now, for the bal- 
 ance of power. As ambitious, as quarrelsome, 
 and as aggressive as other States, her geograph- 
 ical position has directed her aims overseas rather 
 than toward the Continent of Europe. Since 
 the fifteenth century her power has never men- 
 aced the Continent. On the contrary, her own 
 interest has dictated that she should resist there 
 the enterprise of empire, and join in the defen- 
 sive efforts of the threatened States. To any 
 State of Europe that has conceived the ambi- 
 tion to dominate the Continent this policy of 
 England has seemed as contrary to the interests 
 of civilization as the poHcy of the Papacy ap- 
 peared in Italy to an Italian patriot like Mach- 
 iavelli. He wanted Italy enslaved, in order 
 that it might be united. And so do some Ger- 
 mans now want Europe enslaved, that it may 
 have peace under Germany. They accuse Eng- 
 land of perpetuating for egotistic ends the state 
 of anarchy. But it was not thus that Germans 
 viewed British policy when the Power that 
 was to give peace to Europe was not Germany, 
 I but France. In this long and bloody game the 
 I partners are always changing, and as partners 
 
i6 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 'change so do views. One thing only does not 
 
 '•change, the fundamental anarchy. International 
 relations, it is agreed, can only turn upon force. 
 It is the disposition and grouping of the forces 
 
 •alone that can or does vary. 
 
 But Europe is not the only scene of the con- 
 flict between empire and the balance. Since 
 the sixteenth century the European States have 
 been contending for mastery, not only over one 
 
 f another, but over the world. Colonial empires 
 have risen and fallen. Portugal, Spain, Hol- 
 land, in turn have won and lost. England and 
 France have won, lost, and regained. In 
 the twentieth century Great Britain reaps the 
 reward of her European conflicts in the Empire 
 (wrongly so-called) on which the sun never sets. 
 Next to her comes France, in Africa and the 
 East; while Germany looks out with discontented 
 eyes on a world already occupied, and, cherish- 
 ing the same ambitions all great States have 
 cherished before her, finds the time too mature 
 for their accomplishment by the methods that 
 
 ^availed in the past. Thus, not only in Europe 
 but on the larger stage of the world the inter- 
 national rivalry is pursued. But it is the same 
 rivalry and it proceeds from the same cause: 
 the mutual aggression and defence of beings Kv- 
 
 »ing in a "state of nature." 
 
ALLIANCE AND ENTENTE 17 
 
 Without this historical background no spe- 
 cial study of the events that led up to the 
 present war can be either just or intelHgible. 
 The feeling of every nation about itself and 
 its neighbours is determined by the history 
 of the past and by the way in which that 
 history is regarded. The picture looks dif- 
 ferent from every point of view. Lideed, 
 a comprehension of the causes of the war could 
 only be fully attained by one who should 
 know, not only the most secret thoughts 
 of the few men who directly brought it about, 
 but also the prejudices and preconceptions 
 of the public opinion in each nation. There 
 is nobody who possesses these qualifications. 
 But in the absence of such a historian these 
 imperfect notes are set down in the hope 
 I that they may offer a counterpoise to some 
 I of the wilder passions that sweep over all 
 peoples in time of war and threaten to pre- 
 pare for Europe a future even worse than its 
 past has been. 
 
 2. The Triple Alliance and the Entente 
 
 First, let us remind ourselves in general of 
 the situation that prevailed in Europe during 
 the ten years preceding the war. It was 
 
i8 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 in that period that the Entente between France, 
 Russia, and England was formed and consoli- 
 dated, over against the existing Triple Alliance 
 
 ♦between Germany, Austria, and Italy. Neither 
 of these combinations was in its origin and pur- 
 
 'pose aggressive.^ 
 
 ^The alliance between Germany and Austria, which 
 dates from 1879, was formed to guarantee the two States 
 against an attack by Russia. Its terms are: — 
 
 "i. If, contrary to what is to be expected and con- 
 trary to the sincere desire of the two high contracting 
 parties, one of the two Empires should be attacked by 
 Russia, the two high contracting parties are bound re- 
 ciprocally to assist one another with the whole military 
 force of their Empire, and further not to make peace 
 except conjointly and by common consent. 
 
 "2. If one of the high contracting Powers should be 
 attacked by another Power, the other high contracting 
 party engages itself, by the present act, not only not 
 to support the aggressor against its ally, but at least 
 to observe a benevolent neutrality with regard to the 
 other contracting party. If, however, in the case sup- 
 posed the attacking Power should be supported by Rus- 
 sia, whether by active co-operation or by military meas- 
 ures which should menace the Power attacked, then the 
 obligation of mutual assistance with all military forces, 
 as stipulated in the preceding article, would immediately 
 come into force, and the military operations of the high 
 contracting parties would be in that case conducted 
 jointly until the conclusion of peace." 
 
 Italy acceded to the AUiance in 1882. The engage- 
 
ALLIANCE AND ENTENTE 19 
 
 And, so far as Great Britain was concerned, the 
 relations she entered into with France and with 
 Russia were directed in each case to the set- 
 tlement of long outstanding differences with- 
 out special reference to the German Powers. 
 •But it is im possible in the European an- 
 <archy that any arrangements should be made 
 
 ment is defensive. Each of the three parties is to come to 
 the assistance of the others if attacked by a third party. 
 
 The treaty of Germany with Austria was supple- 
 mented in 1884 by a treaty with Russia, known as the 
 "Reinsurance Treaty," whereby Germany bound her- 
 self not to join Austria in an attack upon Russia. This 
 treaty lapsed in the year 1890, and the lapse, it is pre- 
 sumed, prepared the way for the rapprochement between 
 Russia and France. 
 
 The text of the treaty of 1894 between France and 
 Russia has never been published. It is supposed to be 
 a treaty of mutual defence in case of an aggressive attack. 
 The Power from whom attack is expected is probably 
 named, as in the treaty between Germany and Austria. 
 It is probably for that reason that the treaty was not 
 published. The accession of Great Britain to what then 
 became known as the "Triple Entente" is determined by 
 the treaty of 1904 with France, whereby France abandoned 
 her opposition to the British occupation of Egypt in 
 return for a free hand in Morocco; and by the treaty of 
 1907 with Russia, whereby the two Powers regulated 
 their relations in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. There 
 is no mention in either case of an attack, or a defence 
 against attack, by any other Power. 
 
20 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 ' between any States; wVuVh Hn not; arrm^ sus- 
 'ipici on in oth ers. And the drawing toget her 
 of the Powers of the Entente did in fact app ear 
 '*to Germany as a men ace. She believed that 
 she was being threatened by an aggressive com- 
 bination, just as, on the other hand, she herself 
 seemed to the Powers of the Entente a danger 
 «to be guarded against. This apprehension on the 
 part of Germany is sometimes thought to have 
 been mere pretence, but there is every reason to 
 suppose it to have been genuine. The poUcy of 
 the Entente did in fact, on a number of occasions, 
 come into collision with that of Germany. The 
 arming and counter-arming was continuous. And 
 the very fact that from the side of the Entente 
 it seemed that Germany was always the aggressor, 
 should suggest to us that from the other side 
 the opposite impression would prevail. That, in 
 fact, it did prevail is clear not only from the 
 constant assertions of German statesmen and of 
 the German Press, but from contemporary ob- 
 servations made by the representatives of a State 
 not itself involved in either of the opposing com- 
 binations. The dispatches of the Belgian am- 
 bassadors at Berlin, Paris, and London during 
 the years 1905 to 1914 ^ show a constant impres- 
 
 ^ These were published by the Norddeutsche Allge- 
 meine Zeitung, and are reprinted under the title "Bel- 
 
ALLIANCE AND ENTENTE 21 
 
 sion that the Entente was a hostile combination 
 directed against Germany and engineered, in the 
 earlier years, for that purpose by King Ed- 
 ward VII. This impression of the Belgian rep- 
 resentatives is no proof, it is true, of the real 
 intentions of the Entente, but it is proof of how 
 they did in fact appear to outsiders. And it is 
 irrelevant, whether or no it be true, to urge that 
 the Belgians were indoctrinated with the Ger~ 
 man view; since precisely the fact that they 
 could be so indoctrinated would show that the 
 view was on the face of it plausible. We see, 
 iiien, in these dispatches the way in which the 
 policy of the Entente could appear to observers 
 outside it. I give illustrations from Berlin, Paris, 
 and London. 
 
 On May 30, 1908, Baron Greindl, Belgian 
 Ambassador at Berlin, writes as follows: — 
 
 Call it an alliance, entente, or what you will, the group- 
 ing of the Powers arranged by the personal intervention 
 
 gische Aktenstiicke," 1905-14 (Ernst Siegfried Mittler 
 and Sons, Berlin). Their authenticity, as far as I know, 
 has not been disputed. On the other hand, it is to be 
 assumed that they have been very carefully "edited" 
 by the German to make a particular impression. My 
 view of the policy of Germany or of the Entente is in 
 no sense based upon them, I adduce them as evidence 
 of contemporary feeHng and opinion. 
 
22 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 of the King of England exists, and if it is not a direct 
 and immediate threat of war against Germany (it would 
 be too much to say that it was that), it constitutes none 
 the less a diminution of her security. The necessary 
 pacifist declarations, which, no doubt, will be repeated 
 at Reval, signify very little, emanating as they do from 
 three Powers which, like Russia and England, have just 
 carried through successfully, without any motive except 
 the desire for aggrandizement, and without even a plau- 
 sible pretext, wars of conquest in Manchuria and the 
 Transvaal, or which, like France, is proceeding at this 
 moment to the conquest of Morocco, in contempt of 
 solemn promises, and without any title except the cession 
 of British rights, which never existed. 
 
 On May 24, 1907, the Comte de Lalaing, 
 Belgian Ambassador at London, writes: — 
 
 A certain section of the Press, called here the Yellow 
 Press, bears to a great extent the responsibility for the 
 hostile feeling between the two nations. ... It is plain 
 enough that official England is quietly pursuing a policy 
 opposed to Germany and aimed at her isolation, and 
 that King Edward has not hesitated to use his personal 
 influence in the service of this scheme. But it is cer- 
 tainly exceedingly dangerous to poison public opinion 
 in the open manner adopted by these irresponsible jour- 
 nals. 
 
 Again, on July 28, 191 1, in the midst of the 
 Morocco crisis. Baron Guillaume, Belgian Am- 
 bassador at Paris, writes : — 
 
GREAT BRITAIN 23 
 
 I have great confidence in the pacific sentiments of 
 the Emperor William, in spite of the too frequent exag- 
 geration of some of his gestures. He will not allow himself 
 to be drawn on farther than he chooses by the exuberant 
 temperament and clumsy manners of his very intelligent 
 Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kiderlen-Waechter). I feel, 
 in general, less faith in the desire of Great Britain for 
 peace. She would not be sorry to see the others eat one 
 another up. . . . As I thought from the beginning, it 
 is in London that the key to the situation lies. It is there 
 only that it can become grave. The French will yield on 
 all the points for the sake of peace. It is not the same with 
 the EngUsh, who will not compromise on certain prin- 
 ciples and certain claims. 
 
 3. Great Britain 
 
 ♦ Having established this general fact that a 
 state of mutual suspicion and fear prevailed 
 between Germany and the Powers of the Triple 
 
 » Entente, let us next consider the positions and 
 purposes of the various States involved. First, 
 let us take Great Britain, of which we ought to 
 know most. Great Britain is the head of an 
 Empire, and of one, in point of territory and 
 population, the greatest the world has ever seen. 
 This Empire has been acquired by trade and 
 settlement, backed or preceded by military 
 force. And to acquire and hold it, it has been 
 necessary to wage war after war, not only over- 
 
24 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 seas but on the continent of Europe. It is, 
 however, as we have aheady noticed, a fact, 
 and a cardinal fact, that since the fifteenth 
 century British ambitions have not been di- 
 rected to extending empire over the continent 
 of Europe. On the contrary, we have resisted 
 by arms every attempt made by other Powers 
 in that direction. That is what we have meant 
 by maintaining the "balance of power.'' We 
 have acted, no doubt, in our own interest, or 
 in what we thought to be such; but in doing 
 so we have made ourselves the champions of 
 those European nations that have been threat- 
 ened by the excessive power of their neighbours. 
 British imperialism has thus, for four centuries, 
 not endangered but guaranteed the independ- 
 ence of the European States. Further, our 
 Empire is so large that we can hardly extend it 
 without danger of being unable to administer 
 and protect it. We claim, therefore, that we 
 have neither the need nor the desire to wage 
 wars of conquest. But we ought not to be sur- 
 prised if this attitude is not accepted without 
 reserve by other nations. For during the last 
 half -century we have, in fact, waged wars to 
 annex Egypt, the Soudan, the South African 
 Republics, and Burmah, to say nothing of the 
 succession of minor wars which have given us 
 
GREAT BRITAIN 25 
 
 Zululand, Rhodesia, Nigeria, and Uganda. Odd 
 as it does, I believe, genuinely seem to most 
 Englishmen, we are regarded on the Continent 
 as the most aggressive Power in the world, al- 
 though our aggression is not upon Europe. We 
 cannot expect, therefore, that our professions 
 of peaceableness should be taken very seri- 
 ously by outsiders. Nevertheless it is, I believe, 
 true that, at any rate during the last fifteen 
 years, those professions have been genuine. 
 Our statesmen, of both parties, have honestly 
 desired and intended to keep the peace of the 
 world. And they have been assisted in this 
 by a genuine and increasing desire for peace 
 
 tin the nation. The Liberal Govermnent in 
 particular has encouraged projects of arbitra- 
 tion and of disarmament; and Sir Edward Grey 
 is probably the most pacific Minister that ever 
 
 • held ofi&ce in a great nation. But our past in- 
 evitably discredits, in this respect, our future. 
 And when we profess peace it is not unnatural 
 that other nations should suspect a snare. 
 
 Moreover, this desire for peace on our 
 part is conditional upon the maintenance of 
 the status quo and of our naval supremacy. 
 Our vast interests in every part of the world 
 make us a factor everywhere to be reckoned 
 with. East, west, north, and south, no other 
 
26 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 Power can take a step without finding us in 
 the path. Those States, therefore, which, un- 
 like ourselves, are desirous farther to ex- 
 tend their power and influence beyond the 
 seas, must always reckon with us, particu- 
 larly if, with that end in view, by increasing 
 their naval strength they seem to threaten our 
 supremacy at sea. This attitude of ours is 
 not to be blamed, but it must always make 
 difficult the maintenance of friendly relations 
 with ambitious Powers. In the past our dif- 
 ficulties have been mainly with Russia and 
 France. In recent years they have been with 
 Germany. For Germany, since 1898, for the 
 first time in her history, has been in a position, 
 and has made the choice, to become a World- 
 Power. For that reason, as well as to protect 
 her commerce, she has built a navy. And for 
 that reason we, pursuing our traditional policy 
 of opposing the strongest continental Powers 
 have drawn away from her and towards Russia 
 and France. We did not, indeed, enter upon 
 our arrangements with these latter Powers be- 
 cause of aggressive intentions towards Germany. 
 But the growth of German sea-power drove us 
 more and more to rely upon the Entente in case 
 it should be necessary for us to defend ourselves. 
 All this followed inevitably from the logic of the 
 
FRANCE 27 
 
 position, given the European anarchy. I state it 
 for the sake of exposition, not of criticism, and 
 I do not imagine any reader will quarrel with my 
 statement. 
 
 4. France 
 
 Let us turn now to France. Since 1870 we 
 find contending there, with varying fortunes 
 and strength, two opposite currents of senti- 
 ment and policy. One was that of revanche 
 against Germany, inspired by the old tradi- 
 tions of glory and hegemony, associated with 
 hopes of a monarchist or imperialistic revolu- 
 tion, and directed, in the first place, to a re- 
 covery of Alsace-Lorraine. The other policy 
 was that of peace abroad and socialistic trans- 
 formation at home, inspired by the modem ideals 
 of justice and fraternity, and supported by the 
 best of the younger generation of philosophers, 
 poets, and artists, as well as by the bulk of the 
 working class. Nowhere have these two cur- 
 rents of contemporary aspiration met and con- 
 tended as fiercely as in France. The Dreyfus 
 case was the most striking act in the great 
 drama. But it was not the concluding one. 
 French militarism, in that affair, was scotched 
 but not killed, and the contest was never fiercer 
 than in the years immediately preceding the 
 
28 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 war. The fighters for peace were the Socialists, 
 under their leader, Jaures, the one great man 
 in the public life of Europe. While recogniz- 
 ing the urgent need for adequate national de- 
 fence, Jaures laboured so to organize it that 
 it could not be mistaken for nor converted into 
 aggression. He laboured, at the same time, 
 to remove the cause of the danger. In the year 
 1 91 3, under Swiss auspices, a meeting of French 
 and German pacifists was arranged at Berne. 
 To this meeting there proceeded 167 French 
 deputies and 48 senators. The Baron d'Estour- 
 nelles de Constant was president of the French 
 bureau, and Jaures one of the vice-presidents. 
 The result was disappointing. The German 
 participation was small and less influential than 
 the French, and no agreement could be reached 
 on the burning question of Alsace-Lorraine. 
 But the French Socialists continued, up to the 
 eve of the war, to fight for peace with an en- 
 ergy, an intelligence, and a determination shown 
 in no other country. The assassination of Jaures 
 was a symbol of the assassination of peace; but 
 the assassin was a Frenchman. 
 
 For if, in France, the current for peace 
 ran strong in these latter years, so did the cur- 
 rent for war. French chauvinism had waxed 
 and waned, but it was never extinguished. 
 
FRANCE 29 
 
 After 1870 it centred not only about Alsace- 
 Lorraine, but also about the colonial ex- 
 pansion which took from that date a new 
 lease of life in France, as it had done in 
 England after the loss of the American colo- 
 nies. Directly encouraged by Bismarck, France 
 annexed Tunis in 1881. The annexation of 
 Tunis led up at last to that of Morocco. Other 
 territory had been seized in the Far East, and 
 France became, next to ourselves, the greatest 
 colonial Power. This policy could not be pur- 
 sued without friction, and the principal friction 
 at the beginning was with ourselves. Once 
 at least, in the Fashoda crisis, the two coun- 
 tries were on the verge of war, and it was not 
 till the Entente of 1904 that their relations were 
 adjusted on a basis of give-and-take. But by 
 that time Germany had come into the colonial 
 field, and the Entente with England meant 
 new friction with Germany, turning upon French 
 designs in Morocco. In this matter Great Britain 
 supported her ally, and the incident of Agadir 
 in 191 1 showed the solidity of the Entente. This 
 demonstration no doubt strengthened the hands 
 of the aggressive elements in France, and later 
 on the influence of M. Delcasse and M. Poin- 
 care was believed in certain quarters to have 
 given new energy to this direction of French 
 
30 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 policy. This tendency to chauvinism was recog- 
 nized as a menace to peace, and we find reflec- 
 tions of that feeUng in the Belgian dispatches. 
 Thus, for instance, Baron Guillaume, Belgian 
 minister at Paris, writes on February 21, 1913, 
 of M. Poincare : — 
 
 It is under his Ministry that the military, and slightly 
 chauvinistic instincts of the French people have awakened. 
 His hand can be seen in this modification; it is to be hoped 
 that his political intelligence, practical and cool, will 
 save him from all exaggeration in this course. The notable 
 increase of German armaments which supervenes at the 
 moment of M. Poincare's entrance at the Elysee will 
 increase the danger of a too nationalistic orientation of 
 the policy of France. 
 
 Again, on March 3, 1913: — 
 
 The German Ambassador said to me on Saturday: 
 "The political situation is much improved in the last 
 forty-eight hours; the tension is generally relaxed; one 
 may hope for a return to peace in the near future. But 
 what does not improve is the state of public opinion in 
 France and Germany with regard to the relations be- 
 tween the two countries. We are persuaded in Germany 
 that a spirit of chauvinism having revived, we have to 
 fear an attack by the Republic. In France they express 
 the same fear with regard to us. The consequence of 
 these misunderstandings is to ruin us both. I do not 
 know where we are going on this perilous route. Will not a 
 man appear of sufficient goodwill and prestige to recall 
 
FRANCE 31 
 
 every one to reason? All this is the more ridiculous 
 because, during the crisis we are traversing, the two 
 Governments have given proof of the most pacific senti- 
 ments, and have continually relied upon one another to 
 avoid conflicts. '* 
 
 On this Baron Guillaume comments: — 
 
 Baron Schoen is perfectly right. I am not in a position 
 to examine German opinion, but I note every day how 
 public opinion in France becomes more suspicious and 
 chauvinistic. One meets people who assure one that a 
 war with Germany in the near future is certain and in- 
 evitable. People regret it, but make up their minds 
 to it. . . . They demand, almost by acclamation, an 
 immediate vote for every means of increasing the defen- 
 sive power of France. The most reasonable men assert 
 that it is necessary to arm to the teeth to frighten the 
 enemy and prevent war. 
 
 On April i6th he reports a conversation with 
 M. Pichon, in which the latter says: — 
 
 Among us, too, there is a spirit of chauvinism which 
 is increasing, which I deplore, and against which we 
 ought to react. Half the theatres in Paris now play 
 chauvinistic and nationalistic pieces. 
 
 The note of alarm becomes more urgent as 
 the days go on. On January 16, 1914? the Baron 
 writes: — 
 
 I have already had the honour to tell you that it is 
 MM. Poincare, Delcasse, Millerand and their friends 
 
32 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 who have invented and pursued the nationalistic and 
 chauvinistic policy which menaces to-day the peace of 
 Europe, and of which we have noted the renaissance. 
 It is a danger for Europe and for Belgium. I see in it 
 the greatest peril, which menaces the peace of Europe 
 to-day; not that I have the right to suppose that the 
 Government of the Republic is disposed deliberately to 
 trouble the peace, rather I believe the contrary; but the 
 attitude that the Barthou Cabinet has taken up is, in my 
 judgment, the determining cause of an excess of mil- 
 itaristic tendencies in Germany. 
 
 It is clear from these quotations, and it is 
 for this reason alone that I give them, that France, 
 supported by the other members of the Triple 
 Entente, could appear, and did appear, as much 
 a menace to Germany as Germany appeared a 
 menace to France; that in France, as in other 
 countries, there was jingoism as well as pacifism; 
 and that the inability of French public opinion 
 to acquiesce in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was 
 an active factor in the unrest of Europe. Once 
 more I state these facts, I do not criticize them. 
 They are essential to the comprehension of the 
 international situation. 
 
 5. Russia 
 
 We have spoken so far of the West. But 
 the Entente between France and Russia, dat- 
 
RUSSIA 33 
 
 ing from 1894, brought the latter into direct 
 contact with Eastern poKcy. The motives and 
 even the terms of the Dual Alliance are imper- 
 fectly known. Considerations of high finance 
 are supposed to have been an important factor 
 in it. But the main intention, no doubt, was 
 to strengthen both Powers in the case of a pos- 
 sible conflict with Germany. The chances of 
 war between Germany and France were thus 
 definitely increased, for now there could hardly 
 be an Eastern war without a Western one. 
 Germany must therefore regard herself as com- 
 pelled to wage war, if war should come, on both 
 fronts; and in all her fears or her ambitions this 
 consideration must play a principal part. Fric- 
 tion in the East must involve friction in the 
 West, and vice versa. What were the causes 
 of friction in the West we have seen. Let us 
 now consider the cause of friction in the East. 
 The relations of Russia to Germany have 
 been and are of a confused and complicated 
 character, changing as circumstances and per- 
 sonalities change. But one permanent factor 
 has been the sympathy between the governing 
 elements in the two countries. The governing 
 class in Russia, indeed, has not only been in- 
 spired by German ideas, it has been largely 
 recruited from men of German stock; and it 
 
34 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 has manifested all the contempt and hatred 
 which is characteristic of the German bureaucracy 
 for the ideals of democracy, liberty, and free 
 thought. The two Governments have always 
 been ready to combine against popular insur- 
 rections, and in particular against every attempt 
 of the Poles to recover their liberty. They have 
 been drawn and held together by a common 
 interest in tyranny, and the renewal of that 
 co-operation is one of the dangers of the future. 
 On the other hand, apart from and in opposi- 
 tion to this common poHtical interest, there 
 exists between the two nations a strong racial 
 antagonism. The Russian temperament is rad- 
 ically opposed to the German. The one expresses 
 itself in Panslavism, the other in Pangerman- 
 ism. And this opposition of temperament is 
 likely to be deeper and more enduring than the 
 sympathy of the one autocracy with the other. 
 But apart from this racial factor, there is in 
 the south-east an opposition of political ambi- 
 tion. Primarily, the Balkan question is an Austro- 
 Russian rather than a Russo-German one. Bis- 
 marck professed himself indifferent to the fate 
 of the Balkan peoples, and even avowed a will- 
 ingness to see Russia at Constantinople. But 
 recent years have seen, in this respect, a great 
 change. The alliance between Germany and 
 
RUSSIA 35 
 
 Austria, dating from 1879, has become closer 
 and closer as the Powers of the Entente have 
 drawn together in what appeared to be a men- 
 acing combination. It has been, for some time 
 past, a cardinal principle of German policy to 
 support her ally in the Balkans, and this deter- 
 mination has been increased by German ambi- 
 tions in the East. The ancient dream of Russia 
 to possess Constantinople has been countered 
 by the new German dream of a hegemony over 
 the near East based upon the through route 
 from Berlin via Vienna and Constantinople to 
 Bagdad; and this poKtical opposition has been 
 of late years the determining factor in the re- 
 lationship of the two Powers. The danger of; 
 a Russo-German conflict has thus been very 
 great, and since the Russo-French Entente Ger- 
 many, as we have already pointed out, has seen 
 herself menaced on either front by a war which 
 would immediately endanger both. 
 
 Turning once more to the Belgian dispatches, 
 we find such hints as the following. On Octo- 
 ber 24, 191 2, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian 
 Ambassador to London, writes as follows: — 
 
 The French Ambassador, who must have special rea- 
 sons for speaking thus, has repeated to me several times 
 that the greatest danger for the maintenance of the peace 
 of Europe consists in the indiscipline and the personal 
 
36 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 policy of the Russian agents. They are almost all ardent 
 Panslavists, and it is to them that must be imputed the 
 responsibility for the events that are occurring. Beyond 
 a doubt they will make themselves the secret instigators 
 for an intervention of their country in the Balkan conflict. 
 
 On November 30, 191 2, Baron de Beyens 
 writes from Berlin: — 
 
 At the end of last week a report was spread in the 
 chancelleries of Europe that M. Sazonov had aban- 
 doned the struggle against the Court party which wishes 
 to drag Russia into war. 
 
 On June 9, 19 14, Baron Guillaume writes 
 from Paris: — 
 
 Is it true that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has im- 
 posed upon this country [France] the adoption of the law 
 of three years, and would now bring to bear the whole 
 weight of its influence to ensure its maintenance? I 
 have not been able to obtain light upon this delicate 
 point, but it would be all the more serious, inasmuch as 
 the men who direct the Empire of the Tsars cannot be 
 unaware that the effort thus demanded of the French na- 
 tion is excessive, and cannot be long sustained. Is, then, 
 the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg based upon 
 the conviction that events are so imminent that it will be 
 possible to use the tool it intends to put into the hands of 
 its ally? 
 
 What a sinister vista is opened up by this 
 passage! I have no wish to insinuate that the 
 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 37 
 
 suspicion here expressed was justified. It is 
 the suspicion itself that is the point. Dimly we 
 see, as through a mist, the figures of the ar- 
 chitects of war. We see that the forces they 
 wield are ambition and pride, jealousy and fear; 
 that these are all-pervasive; that they affect 
 all Governments and all nations, and are fostered 
 by conditions for which all alike are responsible. 
 It will be understood, of course, that in bring- 
 ing out the fact that there was national chauvin- 
 ism in Russia and that this found its excuse 
 in the unstable equilibrium of Europe, I am 
 making no attack on Russian policy. I do not 
 pretend to know whether these elements of opin- 
 ion actually influenced the policy of the Gov- 
 ernment. But they certainly influenced Ger- 
 man fears, and without a knowledge of them 
 it is impossible to understand German policy. 
 The reader must bear in mind this source of 
 friction along with the others when we come 
 to consider that policy in detail. 
 
 6. Austria-Hungary 
 
 Turning now to Austria-Hungary, we find 
 in her the Power to whom the immediate occa- 
 sion of the war was due, the Power, moreover, 
 who contributed in large measure to its remoter 
 
38 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 causes. Austria-Hungary is a State, but not a 
 nation. It has no natural bond to hold its popula- 
 tions together, and it continues its political 
 existence by force and fraud, by the connivance 
 and the self-interest of other States, rather than 
 by any inherent principle of vitality. lJL_is_in 
 relation to the Ealkan St?^tes t h?^t this in sta- 
 bility has been most marked and m^ost dan ger- 
 ous. Since the lyngdxiD^... aL..Serbia-_acc[uired its 
 independent existence itJiasJ3£jeii_ajQ§nixe draw- 
 ing to itseH.._the_.disconte]iL and JJie_„^mbitions 
 of the Slav p opulations u jideii-the Dual Mon- 
 archy, The realization of those ambitions im- 
 plies the disruption of the Austro-Hungarian 
 State. But behind the_ Souther n Slavs stands 
 Russia^ mid„aay attenipLJii-jchangeJtlie.4>olitical 
 status in the Balkans has thus meailt,_Jgr years 
 past, acute risk of waJ^ between . the- J:wo Em- 
 pires that border them. This political rivalry 
 has accentuated the racial antagonism between 
 German and Slav, and was the immediate origin 
 of the war which presents itself to Englishmen 
 as one primarily between Germany and the West- 
 ern Powers. 
 
 On the position of Italy it is not necessary 
 to dwell. It had long been suspected that she 
 was a doubtful factor in the Triple Alliance, and 
 the event has proved that this suspicion was 
 
GERMANY 1866-1870 39 
 
 correct. But though Italy has participated in 
 the war, her action had no part in producing 
 it. And we need not here indicate the course 
 and the motives of her policy. 
 
 7. Germany 
 
 Having thus indicated briefly the position, 
 the perils, and the ambitions of the other Great 
 Powers of Europe, let us turn to consider the 
 proper subject of this essay, the policy of Ger- 
 many. And first let us dwell on the all-important 
 fact that Germany, as a Great Power, is a crea- 
 tion of the last fifty years. Before 1866 there 
 was a loose confederation of German States, 
 after 1870 there was an Empire of the Germans. 
 The transformation was the work of Bismarck, 
 and it was accomphshed by "blood and iron.'' 
 Whether it could have been accomplished other- 
 wise is matter of speculation. That it was ac- 
 complished so is a fact, and a fact of tragic sig- 
 nificance. For it established among Germans 
 the prestige of force and fraud, and gave them 
 as their national hero the man whose most char- 
 acteristic act was the falsification of the Ems 
 telegram. If the unification could have been 
 achieved in 1848 instead of in 1870, if the free 
 and generous idealism of that epoch could have 
 
40 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 triumphed, as it deserved to, if Germans had 
 not bartered away their souls for the sake of 
 the kingdom of this world, we might have been 
 spared this last and most terrible act in the 
 bloody drama of European history. If even, 
 after 1866, 1870 had not been provoked, the 
 catastrophe that is destroying Europe before 
 our eyes might never have overwhelmed us. 
 In the crisis of 1870 the French minister who 
 fought so long and with such tenacity for peace 
 saw and expressed, with the lucidity of his na- 
 tion, what the real issue was for Germany and 
 for Europe : — 
 
 There exists, it is true, a barbarous Germany, greedy 
 of battles and conquest, the Germany of the country 
 squires; there exists a Germany pharisaic and iniquitous, 
 the Germany of all the imintelligible pedants whose 
 empty lucubrations and microscopic researches have 
 been so imduly vaunted. But these two Germanics are 
 not the great Germany, that of the artists, the poets, 
 the thinkers, that of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Goethe, 
 Schiller, Heine, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Liebig. This 
 latter Germany is good, generous, humane, pacific; it 
 finds expression in the touching phrase of Goethe, who 
 when asked to write against us replied that he could 
 not find it in his heart to hate the French. If we do not 
 oppose the natural movement of German unity, if we 
 allow it to complete itself quietly by successive stages, 
 it will not give supremacy to the barbarous and sophistical 
 Germany, it will assure it to the Germany of intellect 
 
GERMANY 1866-1870 41 
 
 and culture. War, on the other hand, would establish, 
 during a time impossible to calculate, the domination 
 of the Germany of the squires and the pedants.^ 
 
 The generous dream was not to be realized. 
 French chauvinism fell into the trap Bismarck 
 had prepared for it. Yet even at the last mo- 
 ment his war would have escaped him had he 
 not recaptured it by fraud. The publication 
 of the Ems telegram made the conflict inevi- 
 table, and one of the most hideous and sinister 
 scenes in all history is that in which the three 
 conspirators, Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, 
 "suddenly recovered their pleasure in eating 
 and drinking," because, by pubHshing a lie, 
 they had secured the certain death in battle of 
 hundreds and thousands of young men. The 
 spirit of Bismarck has infected the whole pubhc 
 life of Germany and of Europe. It has given 
 a new lease to the political philosophy of Mach- 
 iavelK, and made of every budding statesman 
 and historian a solemn or a cynical defender of 
 the gospel of force. But, though this be true, 
 we have no right therefore to assimae that there 
 is some pecuhar wickedness which marks off 
 German policy from that of all other nations. 
 Machiavellianism is the common heritage of 
 
 ^ Emile OUivier, ''L'Empire Liberal." 
 
42 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 Europe. It is the translation into idea of the 
 fact of international anarchy. Germans have 
 been more candid and brutal than others in their 
 expression and application of it, but statesmen, 
 politicians, publicists, and historians in every 
 nation accept it, under a thicker or thinner veil 
 of plausible sophisms. It is everywhere the iron 
 hand within the silken glove. It is the great 
 European tradition. 
 
 Although, moreover, it was by these methods 
 that Bismarck accomplished the unification of 
 Germany, his later policy was, by common con- 
 sent, a policy of peace. War had done its part, 
 and the new Germany required all its energies 
 to build up its internal prosperity and strength. 
 In 1875, it is true, Bismarck was credited with 
 the intention to fall once more upon France. 
 The fact does not seem to be clearly established. 
 At any rate, if such was his intention, it was 
 frustrated by the intervention of Russia and of 
 Great Britain. During the thirty-nine years 
 that followed Germany kept the peace. 
 
 While France, England, and Russia waged 
 wars on a great scale, and while the former Powers 
 acquired enormous extensions of territory, the 
 only military operations undertaken by Germany 
 were against African natives in her dependencies 
 and against China in 1900. The conduct of the 
 
GERMANY 1 890-1 qcdo 43 
 
 German troops appears, it is true, to have been 
 distinguished, in this latter expedition, by a bru- 
 tality which stood out in relief even in that orgy 
 of slaughter and loot. But we must remember 
 that they were specially ordered by their Imperial 
 master, in the name of Jesus Christ, to show 
 no mercy and give no quarter. Apart from this, 
 it will not be disputed, by any one who knows 
 the facts, that during the first twenty years or 
 so after 1875 Germany was the Power whose 
 diplomacy was the least disturbing to Europe. 
 The chief friction during that period was between 
 Russia and France and Great Britain, and it 
 was one or other of these Powers, according to 
 the angle of vision, which was regarded as offer- 
 ing the menace of aggression. If there has been 
 a German plot against the peace of the world, it 
 does not date from before the decade 1 890-1 900. 
 The close of that decade marks, in fact, a new 
 epoch in German policy. The years of peace 
 had been distinguished by the development of 
 industry and trade and internal organization. 
 The population increased from forty miUions in 
 1870 to over sixty-five milhons at the present 
 date. Foreign trade increased more than ten- 
 fold. National pride and ambition grew with 
 the growth of prosperity and force, and senti- 
 ment as well as need impelled German policy 
 
44 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 to claim a share of influence outside Europe in 
 that greater world for the control of which the 
 other nations were struggling. Already Bis- 
 marck, though with reluctance and scepticism, 
 had acquired for his country by negotiation large 
 areas in Africa. But that did not satisfy the 
 ambitions of the colonial party. The new Kaiser 
 put himself at the head of the new movement, 
 and announced that henceforth nothing must be 
 done in any part of the world without the cog- 
 nizance and acquiescence of Germany. 
 
 Thus there entered a new competitor upon 
 the stage of the world, and his advent of necessity 
 was disconcerting and annoying to the earlier 
 comers. But is there reason to suppose that, 
 from that moment, German policy was definitely 
 aiming at empire, and was prepared to provoke 
 war to achieve it? Strictly, no answer can be 
 given to this question. The remoter intentions 
 of statesmen are rarely avowed to others, and, 
 perhaps, rarely to themselves. Their policy is, 
 indeed, less continuous, less definite, and more 
 at the mercy of events than observers or critics 
 are apt to suppose. It is not probable that Ger- 
 many, any more than any other country in Eu- 
 rope, was pursuing during those years a definite 
 plan, thought out and predetermined in every 
 point. 
 
GERMANY 45 
 
 In Germany, as elsewhere, both in home and 
 foreign affairs, there was an intense and unceas- 
 ing conflict of competing forces and ideas. In 
 Germany, as elsewhere, poHcy must have adapted 
 itself to circumstances, different personalities 
 must have given it different directions at different 
 times. We have not the information at our dis- 
 posal which would enable us to trace in detail 
 the devious course of diplomacy in any of the 
 countries of Europe. What we know something 
 about is the general situation, and the action, 
 in fact, taken at certain moments. The rest 
 must be, for the present, mainly matter of 
 conjecture. With this word of caution, let us 
 now proceed to examine the policy of Ger- 
 many. 
 
 The general situation we have already indi- 
 cated. We have shown how the armed peace, 
 which is the chronic malady of Europe, had as- 
 sumed during the ten years from 1904 to 1914 
 that specially dangerous form which grouped 
 the Great Powers in two opposite camps — the 
 Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. We 
 have seen, in the case of Great Britain, France, 
 Russia, and Austria-Hungary, how they came 
 to take their places in that constellation. We 
 have now to put Germany in its setting in the 
 picture. 
 
46 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 Germany, then, in the first place, Hke the 
 other Powers, had occasion to anticipate 
 war. It might be made from the West, on the 
 question of Alsace-Lorraine; it might be made 
 from the East, on the question of the Bal- 
 kans. In either case, the system of alliances 
 was likely to bring into play other States 
 than those immediately involved, and the Ger- 
 man Powers might find themselves attacked on 
 all fronts, while they knew in the latter years 
 that they could not count upon the support of 
 Italy. 
 
 A reasonable prudence, if nothing else, must 
 keep Germany armed and apprehensive. But 
 besides the maintenance of what she had, Ger- 
 many was now ambitious to secure her share of 
 "world-power." Let us examine in what spirit 
 and by what acts she endeavoured to make her 
 claim good. 
 
 First, what was the tone of public opinion 
 in Germany during these critical years? 
 
 8. Opinion in Germany 
 
 Since the outbreak of the war the pamph- 
 let literature in the countries of the Entente 
 has been full of citations from German po- 
 litical writers. In England, in particular, the 
 
OPINION IN GERMANY 47 
 
 names and works of Bernhardi and of Treitschke 
 have become more familiar than they appear to 
 have been in Germany prior to the war. This 
 method of selecting for polemical purposes certain 
 tendencies of sentiment and theory, and ignoring 
 all others, is one which could be applied, with 
 damaging results, to any country in the world. 
 Mr. Angell has shown in his "Prussianism in 
 England" how it might be applied to ourselves; 
 and a German, no doubt, into whose hands that 
 book might fall would draw conclusions about 
 public opinion here similar to those which we 
 have drawn about public opinion in Germany. 
 There is jingoism in all countries, as there is 
 pacifism in all countries. Nevertheless, I think 
 it is true to say that the jingoism of Germany 
 has been peculiar both in its intensity and in 
 its character. This special quality appears to 
 be due both to the temperament and to the 
 recent history of the German nation. The 
 Germans are romantic, as the French are im- 
 pulsive, the English sentimental, and the Rus- 
 sians religious. There is some real meaning 
 in these generalisations. They are easily to 
 be felt when one comes into contact with a 
 nation, though they may be hard to establish 
 or define. When I say that the Germans are 
 romantic, I mean that they do not easily or 
 
48 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 willingly see things as they are. Their tempera- 
 ment is like a medium of coloured glass. It 
 magnifies, distorts, conceals, transmutes. And 
 this is as true when their intellectual attitude 
 is realistic as when it is idealistic. In the Ger- 
 many of the past, the Germany of small States, 
 to which all non-Germans look back with such 
 sympathy and such regret, their thinkers and 
 poets were inspired by grandiose intellectual 
 abstractions. They saw ideas, like gods, mov- 
 ing the world, and actual men and women, actual 
 events and things, were but the passing symbols 
 of these supernatural powers; 1866 and 1870 
 ended all that. The unification of Germany, 
 in the way we have discussed, diverted all their 
 interest from speculation about the universe, 
 life, and mankind, to the material interests of 
 their new country. Germany became the pre- 
 occupation of all Germans. From abstractions 
 they turned with a new intoxication to what 
 they conceived to be the concrete. Entering 
 thus late upon the stage of national politics, 
 they devoted themselves, with their accustomed 
 thoroughness, to learning and bettering what 
 they conceived to be the principles and the prac- 
 tice which had given success to other nations. 
 In this quest no scruples should deter them, no 
 sentimentality hamper, no universal ideas dis- 
 
OPINION IN GERMANTY 49 
 
 tract. Yet this, after all, was but German ro- 
 manticism assuming another form. The objects, 
 it is true, were different. "Actuality" had taken 
 the place of ideals, Germany of Humanity. But 
 by the German vision the new objects were no 
 less distorted than the old. In dealing with 
 **Real-politik" (which is the German transla- 
 tion of Machiavellianism), with "expansion," 
 with "survival of the fittest," and all the other 
 shibboleths of world-policy, their outlook re- 
 mained as absolute and abstract as before, as 
 contemptuous of temperament and measure, as 
 blind to those compromises and qualifications, 
 those decencies, so to speak, of nature, by which 
 reality is constituted. The Germans now ^aw 
 men instead of gods, but they saw them as trees 
 walking. 
 
 German imperialism, then, while it involves 
 the same intellectual presuppositions, the same 
 confusions, the same erroneous arguments, the 
 same short-sighted ambitions, as the imperial- 
 ism of other countries, exhibits them all in an 
 extreme degree. All peoples admire themselves. 
 But the self-adoration of Germans is so naive, 
 so frank, so unqualified, as to seem sheerly ridicu- 
 lous to more experienced nations.^ The English 
 
 ^ As I write I come across the following, cited from a 
 
50 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 and the French, too, beheve their civilization 
 to be the best in the world. But English common- 
 sense and French sanity would prevent them 
 from announcing to other peoples that they pro- 
 posed to conquer them, morally or materially, 
 for their good. All Jingoes admire and desire 
 war. But nowhere else in the modern world is 
 to be found such a debauch of "romantic" en- 
 thusiasm, such a wilful blindness to all the reali- 
 ties of war, as Germany has manifested both 
 before and since the outbreak of this world- 
 catastrophe. A reader of German newspapers 
 and tracts gets at last a feeling of nausea at the 
 very words Wir Deutsche, followed by the eter- 
 nal Helden, Heldenthum, Heldenthat, and is in- 
 clined to thank God if he indeed belong to a 
 nation sane enough to be composed of Handler. 
 
 The very antithesis between Helden (heroes) 
 and Handler (hucksters), with which all Ger- 
 
 book of songs composed for German combatants under 
 the title "Der deutsche Zorn:"— 
 
 Wir sind die Meister aller Welt 
 In alien ernsten Dingen, 
 
 Was Man als fremd euch hochlichst preist 
 Um eurer Einfalt Willen, 
 1st deutschen Ursprungs allermeist, 
 Und tragt nur fremde Hiillen. 
 
OPINION IN GERMANY 51 
 
 many is ringing, is an illustration of the romantic 
 quality that vitiates their intelligence. In spite ( 
 of the fact that they are one of the greatest trad- 
 ing and manufacturing nations of the world, 
 and that precisely the fear of losing their trade 
 and markets has been, as they constantly assert, 
 a chief cause that has driven them to war, they 
 speak as though Germany were a kind of knight- 
 errant, innocent of all material ambitions, wan- 
 dering through the world in the pure, disinter- 
 ested service of God and man. On the other 
 hand, because England is a great commercial 
 Power, they suppose that no Englishman lives 
 for anything but profit. Because they them- 
 selves have conscription, and have to fight or 
 be shot, they infer that every German is a noble 
 warrior. Because the English volunteer, they 
 assume that they only volunteer for their pay. 
 Germany, to them, is a hero clad in white armour, 
 magnanimous, long-suffering, and invincible. 
 Other nations are little seedy figures in black 
 coats, inspired exclusively by hatred and jeal- 
 ousy of the noble German, incapable of a gen- 
 erous emotion or an honourable act, and destined, 
 by the judgment of history, to be saved, if they 
 can be saved at all, by the great soul and domi- 
 nating intellect of the Teuton. 
 
 It is in this intoxicating atmosphere of tern- 
 
52 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 perament and mood that the ideas and ambi- 
 tions of German imperialists work and move. 
 They are essentially the same as those of im- 
 perialists in other countries. Their philosophy 
 of history assumes an endless series of wars, due 
 to the inevitable expansion of rival States. Their 
 ethics means a belief in force and a disbehef in 
 everything else. Their science is a crude mis- 
 application of Darwinism, combined with in- 
 vincible ignorance of the true bearings of science 
 upon life, and especially of those facts and de- 
 ductions about biological heredity which, once 
 they are understood, will make it plain that 
 war degrades the stock of all nations, victorious 
 and vanquished alike, and that the decHne of 
 civilizations is far more plausibly to be attrib- 
 uted to this cause than to the moral decadence 
 of which history is always ready, after the event, 
 to accuse the defeated Power. One peculiarity, 
 perhaps, there is in the outlook of German im- 
 perialism, and that is its emphasis on an un- 
 intelligible and unreal abstraction of race." 
 Germans, it is thought, are by biological quaHty 
 the salt of the earth. Every really great man in 
 Europe, since the break-up of the Roman Em- 
 pire, has been a German, even though it might 
 appear, at first sight, to an uninstructed ob- 
 server, that he was an Italian or a Frenchman 
 
OPINION IN GERMANY 53 
 
 or a Spaniard. Not all Germans, however, are, 
 they hold, as yet included in the German Em- 
 pire, or even in the German-Austrian combination. 
 The Flemish are Germans, the Dutch are Ger- 
 mans, the English even are Germans, or were 
 before the war had made them, in Germany's 
 eyes, the offscouring of mankind. Thus, a great 
 task lies before the German Empire: on the 
 one hand, to bring mthin its fold the German 
 stocks that have strayed from it in the wan- 
 derings of history; on the other, to reduce under 
 German authority those other stocks that are 
 not worthy to share directly in the citizenship 
 of the Fatherland. The dreams of conquest 
 which are the real essence of all imperiahsm 
 are thus supported in Germany by arguments 
 peculiar to Germans. But the arguments put 
 forward are not the real determinants of the 
 attitude. The attitude, in any country, what- 
 ever it may be called, rests at bottom on sheer 
 national vanity. It is the behef in the inherent 
 superiority of one's own civiHzation, and the 
 desire to extend it, by force if need be, through- 
 out the world. It matters Httle what arguments 
 in its support this passion to dominate may 
 garner from that twilight region in which the 
 advanced guard of science is labouring patiently 
 to comprehend Nature and mankind. Men 
 
54 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 take from the treasury of truth what they are 
 able to take. And what imperiahsts take is a 
 mirror to their own ambition and pride. 
 
 Now, as to the ambitions of this German 
 jingoism there is no manner of doubt. Ger- 
 mans are nothing if not frank. And this kind 
 of German does want to conquer and annex, 
 not only outside Europe but within it. We 
 must not, however, infer that the whole of Ger- 
 many has been infected with this virus. The 
 summary I have set down in the last few pages 
 represents the impression made on an unsym- 
 pathetic mind by the Hterature of Pangerman- 
 ism. Emerging from such reading — and it is 
 the principal reading of German origin which 
 has been offered to the British pubHc since the 
 war — there is a momentary illusion, "That is 
 Germany!'' Of course it is not, any more than 
 the Morning Post or the National Review is Eng- 
 land. Germans, in fact, during recent years 
 have taken a prominent place in pacifism as 
 well as in imperialism. Men like Schiicking and 
 Quidde and Fried are at least as well known as 
 men Hke Treitschke and Bernhardi. Opinion 
 in Germany, as in every other country, has 
 been various and conflicting. And the pacific 
 tendencies have been better organized, if not 
 more active, there than elsewhere, for they have 
 
OPINION IN GERMANY 55 
 
 been associated with the huge and discipHned 
 forces of the Social-Democrats. Indeed, the 
 mass of the people, left alone, is everywhere 
 pacific. I do not forget the very important 
 fact that German education, elementary and 
 higher, has been deliberately directed to incul- 
 cate patriotic feeling, that the doctrine of armed 
 force as the highest manifestation of the State 
 has been industriously propagated by the au- 
 thorities, and that the unification of Germany 
 by force has given to the cult of force a meaning 
 and a popularity probably unknown in any other 
 country. But in most men, for good or for evil, 
 the lessons of education can be quickly obhter- 
 ated by the experience of Ufe. In particular, 
 the mass of the people everywhere, face to face 
 with the necessities of existence, knowing what 
 it is to work and to struggle, to co-operate and 
 to compete, to suffer and to relieve suffering, 
 though they may be less weU-informed than 
 the instructed classes, are also less liable to 
 obsession by abstractions. They see little, but 
 they see it straight. And though, being men, 
 with the long animal inheritance of men behind 
 them, their passions may be roused by any cry 
 of battle, though they are the fore-ordained 
 dupes of those who direct the policy of nations, 
 yet it is not their initiative that originates wars. 
 
56 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 They do not desire conquest, they do not trouble 
 about "race" or chatter about the "survival 
 of the fittest." It is their own needs, which are 
 also the vital needs of society, that preoccupy 
 their thoughts; and it is real goods that direct 
 and inspire their genuine idealism. 
 
 We must, then, disabuse ourselves of the 
 notion so naturally produced by reading, and 
 especially by reading in time of war, that the 
 German Jingoes are typical of Germany. They 
 are there, they are a force, they have to be reck- 
 oned with. But exactly how great a force? 
 Exactly how influential on policy? That is a 
 question which I imagine can only be answered 
 by guesses. Would the reader, for instance, 
 undertake to estimate the influence during the 
 last fifteen years on British policy and opinion 
 of the imperialist minority in this country? 
 No two men, I think, would agree about it. 
 And few men would agree with themselves from 
 one day or one week to another. We are re- 
 duced to conjecture. But the conjectures of some 
 people are of more value than those of others, for 
 they are based on a wider converse. I think it 
 therefore not without importance to recall to the 
 reader the accounts of the state of opinion in Ger- 
 many given by well-qualified foreign observers in 
 the years immediately preceding the war. 
 
OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 57 
 
 9. Opinion about Germany 
 
 After the crisis of Agadir, M. Georges Bourdon 
 visited Germany to make an inquiry for the 
 Figaro newspaper into the state of opinion there. 
 His mission belongs to the period between Agadir 
 and the outbreak of the first Balkan war. He 
 interviewed a large number of people, states- 
 men, pubhcists, professors, poHticians. He does 
 not sum up his impressions, and such summary 
 as I can give here is no doubt affected by the 
 emphasis of my own mind. His book,^ how- 
 ever, is now translated into English, and the 
 reader has the opportunity of correcting the 
 impression I give him. 
 
 Let us begin with Pangermanism, on which 
 M. Bourdon has a very interesting chapter. 
 He feels for the propaganda of that sect the 
 repulsion that must be felt by every sane and 
 liberal-minded man: — 
 
 Wretched, choleric Pangermans, exasperated and un- 
 balanced, brothers of all the exasperated, wretched wind- 
 bags whose tirades, in all countries, answer to yours, 
 and whom you are wrong to count your enemies! Pan- 
 germans of the Spree and the Main, who, on the other 
 side of the frontier, receive the fraternal effusions of 
 Russian Pan-Slavism, Italian irredentism, English im- 
 
 ^ "L'Enigme Allemande," 1914. 
 
58 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 perialism, French nationalism! What is it that you 
 want? 
 
 They want, he replies, part of Austria, Switzer- 
 land, Flanders, Luxemburg, Denmark, Holland, 
 for all these are "Germanic" countries! They 
 want colonies. They want a bigger army and 
 a bigger navy. "An execrable race, these Pan- 
 germans!" "They have the yellow skin, the 
 dry mouth, the green complexion of the bilious. 
 They do not live under the sky, they avoid the 
 light. Hidden in their cellars, they pore over 
 treaties, cite newspaper articles, grow pale over 
 maps, measure angles, quibble over texts or 
 traces of frontiers." "The Pangerman is a prop- 
 agandist and a revivalist." "But," M. Bour- 
 don adds, "when he shouts we must not think 
 we hear in his tones the reverberations of the 
 German soul." The organs of the party seemed 
 few and unimportant. The party itself was 
 spoken of with contempt. "They talk loud," 
 M. Bourdon was told, "but have no real fol- 
 lowing; it is only in France that people attend 
 to them." Nevertheless, M. Bourdon concluded 
 they were not negligible. For, in the first place, 
 they have power to evoke the jingoism of the 
 German public — a jingoism which the violent 
 patriotism of the people, their tradition of vic- 
 torious force, their education, their dogma of 
 
OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 59 
 
 race, continually keep alive. And, secondly, 
 the Government, when it thinks it useful, turns 
 to the Pangermans for assistance, and lets loose 
 their propaganda in the press. Their influence 
 thus waxes and wanes, as it is favoured, or not, 
 by authority. "Like the giant Antaeus,'* a corre- 
 spondent wrote to M. Bourdon, "Pangermanism 
 loses its force when it quits the soil of govern- 
 ment." 
 
 It is interesting to note, however, that the 
 Pangerman propaganda purports to be based 
 upon fear. If they urge increased armaments, 
 it is with a view to defence. "I considered it 
 a patriotic duty," wrote General Keim, "in 
 my quality of president of the German League 
 for Defence, to demand an increase of effectives 
 such that France should find it out of the ques- 
 tion to dream of a victorious war against us, 
 even with the help of other nations." "To the 
 awakening of the national sentunent in France 
 there is only one reply — the increase of the 
 German forces." "I have the impression," 
 said Count Reventlow, "that a warlike spirit 
 which is new is developing in France. There 
 is the danger." Thus in Germany, as else- 
 where, even jingoism took the mask of necessary 
 precaution. And so it must be, and will be 
 everywhere, as long as the European anarchy 
 
6o THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 continues. For what nation has ever admitted 
 an intention or desire to make aggressive war? 
 
 M. Bourdon, then, takes full account of Pan- 
 germanism. Nor does he neglect the general 
 militaristic tendencies of German opinion. He 
 found pride in the army, a determination to 
 be strong, and that belief that it is in war that 
 the State expresses itself at the highest and the 
 best, which is part of the tradition of German 
 education since the days of Treitschke. Yet, 
 in spite of all this, to which M. Bourdon does 
 full justice, the general impression made by 
 the conversations he records is that the bulk 
 of opinion in Germany was strongly pacific. 
 There was apprehension indeed, apprehension 
 of France and apprehension of England. "Eng- 
 land certainly preoccupies opinion more than 
 France. People are alarmed by her movements 
 and her armaments." "The constant interven- 
 tions of England have undoubtedly irritated 
 the public.'' Germany, therefore, must arm 
 and arm again. "A great war may be delayed, 
 but not prevented, unless German armaments 
 are such as to put fear into the heart of every 
 possible adversary." 
 
 Germany feared that war might come, but 
 she did not want it — that, in sum, was M. Bour- 
 don's impression. From soldiers, statesmen, 
 
OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 6i 
 
 professors, business men, again and again, the 
 same assurance. "The sentiment you will find 
 most generally held is undoubtedly that of peace." 
 "Few think about war. We need peace too 
 much." "War! War between us! What an 
 idea! Why, it would mean a European war, 
 something monstrous, something which would 
 surpass in horror anything the world has ever 
 seen! My dear sir, only madmen could desire 
 or conceive such a calamity! It must be avoided 
 at all costs." "What counts above all here 
 is commercial interest. All who live by it are, 
 here as elsewhere, almost too pacific." "Under 
 the economic conditions prevailing in Germany, 
 the most glorious victory she can aspire to — 
 it is a soldier who says it — is peace!" 
 
 The impression thus gathered from M. Bour- 
 don's observations is confirmed at every point 
 by those of Baron Beyens, who went to BerHn 
 as Belgian minister after the crisis of Agadir.^ 
 Of the world of business he says : — 
 
 All these gentlemen appeared to be convinced parti- 
 sans of peace. . . . According to them, the tranquiUity 
 of Europe had not been for a moment seriously menaced 
 during the crisis of Agadir. . . . Industrial Germany 
 required to live on good terms with France. Peace was 
 
 ^See "LAUemagne avant la guerre," pp. 97 seq. and 
 'O seq. Bruxelles, 1915. 
 
 170 seq. Bruxelles, 1915. 
 
62 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 necessary to business, and German finance in particular 
 had every interest in the maintenance of its profitable 
 relations with French finance.^ At the end of a few 
 months I had the impression that these pacifists personified 
 then — in 191 2 — the most common, the most widely spread, 
 though the least noisy, opinion, the opinion of the ma- 
 jority, understanding by the majority, not that of the 
 governing classes but that of the nation as a whole (p. 172). 
 
 The mass of the people, Beyens held, loved 
 peace, and dreaded war. That was the case, 
 not only with all the common people, but also 
 with the managers and ovmers of busmesses 
 and the wholesale and retail merchants. Even 
 in Berlin society and among the ancient Ger- 
 man nobility there were to be found sincere 
 pacifists. On the other hand, there was cer- 
 tainly a bellicose minority. It was composed 
 largely of soldiers, both active and retired; the 
 latter especially looking with envy and disgust 
 on the increasing prosperity of the commercial 
 classes, and holding that a "blood-letting would 
 be wholesome to purge and regenerate the so- 
 
 ^ A Frenchman, M. Maurice Ajam, who made an 
 inquiry among business men in 19 13 came to the same 
 conclusion. "Peace! I write that all the Germans with- 
 out exception, when they belong to the world of business, 
 are fanatical partisans of the maintenance of European 
 peace." See Yves Guyot, "Les causes et les consequences 
 de la guerre," p. 226. 
 
OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 63 
 
 cial body" — a view not confined to Germany, 
 and one which has received classical expression 
 in Tennyson's ''Maud." To this movement 
 belonged also the high officials, the Conserva- 
 tive parties, patriots and journahsts, and of 
 course the armament firms, deUberate fomen- 
 ters of war in Germany, as everywhere else, 
 in order to put money into their pockets. To 
 these must be added the "intellectual flower 
 of the universities and the schools." "The 
 professors at the universities, taken en bloc, 
 were one of the most violent elements in the 
 nation." "Almost all the young people from 
 one end of the Empire to the other have had 
 brought before them in the course of their studies 
 the dilemma which Bemhardi summed up to 
 his readers in the three words * world-power or 
 decadence.' Yet with aU this, the resolute parti- 
 sans of war formed as I thought a very smaU 
 minority in the nation. That is the impres- 
 sion I obstinately retain of my sojourn in Ber- 
 lin and my excursions into the provinces of 
 the Empire, rich or poor. When I recall the 
 image of this peaceful population, journeying 
 to business every week-day with a movement 
 so regular, or seated at table on Sundays in 
 the cafes in the open air before a glass of beer, 
 I can find in my memories nothing but placid 
 
64 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 faces where there was no trace of violent pas- 
 sions, no thought hostile to foreigners, not even 
 that feverish concern with the struggle for exist- 
 ence which the spectacle of the human crowd has 
 sometimes shown me elsewhere." 
 
 A similar impression is given by the dispatch 
 from M. Cambon, French Ambassador to Berlin, 
 written on July 30, 1913.^ He, too, finds ele- 
 ments working for war, and analyses them much 
 as Baron Beyens does. There are first the ^^ jun- 
 kers," or country squires, naturally mihtary by 
 all their traditions, but also afraid of the death- 
 duties "which are bound to come if peace con- 
 tinues." Secondly, the "higher bourgeoisie" — 
 that is, the great manufacturers and financiers, 
 and, of course, in particular the armament firms. 
 Both these social classes are influenced, not only 
 by direct pecuniary motives but by the fear of 
 the rising democracy, which is beginning to 
 swamp their representatives in the Reichstag. 
 Thirdly, the officials, the "party of the pen- 
 sioned." Fourthly, the universities, the "his- 
 torians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and 
 other apologists of German Kultur." Fifthly, 
 rancorous diplomatists, with a sense that they 
 had been duped. On the other hand, there were, 
 as M. Cambon insists, other forces in the country 
 ^ See French Yellow Book, No. 5. 
 
OPINION ABOUT GERMANY 65 
 
 making for peace. What were these? In numbers 
 the great bulk, in Germany as in all countries. 
 *'The mass of the workmen, artisans and peas- 
 ants, who are peace-loving by instinct." Such 
 of the great nobles as were intelligent enough 
 to recognize the "disastrous political and social 
 consequences of war.'' "Numerous manufac- 
 turers, merchants, and financiers in a moderate 
 way of business." The non-German elements 
 of the Empire. Finally, the Government and 
 the governing classes in the large southern States. 
 A goodly array of peace forces! According to 
 M. Cambon, however, all these latter elements 
 "are only a sort of make- weight in political mat- 
 ters with hmited influence on public opinion, or 
 they are silent social forces, passive and defence- 
 less against the infection of a wave of warlike 
 
 * feeling." This last sentence is pregnant. It 
 describes the state of affairs existing, more or 
 less, in all countries; a few individuals, a few 
 groups or cliques, making for war more or less 
 deliberately; the mass of the people ignorant 
 and unconcerned, but also defenceless against 
 suggestion, and ready to respond to the call to 
 war, with submission or with enthusiasm, as 
 soon as the call is made by their Govem- 
 
 * ment. 
 
 On the testimony, then, of these witnesses, 
 
66 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 all shrewd and competent observers, it may be 
 permitted to sum up somewhat as follows: — 
 \r^ In the years immediately preceding the war 
 the mass of the people in Germany, rich and 
 poor, were attached to peace and dreaded war. 
 But there was there also a powerful minority 
 either desiring war or expecting it, and, in either 
 case, preparing it by their agitation. And this 
 minority could appeal to the peculiarly aggres- 
 sive form of patriotism inculcated by the public 
 schools and universities. The war party based 
 its appeal for ever fresh armaments on the hostile 
 preparations of the Powers of the Entente. Its 
 aggressive ambition masqueraded, perhaps even 
 to itself, as a patriotism apprehensively concerned 
 with defence. It was supported by powerful 
 moneyed interests; and the mass of the people, 
 passive, ill-informed, preoccupied, were defence- 
 less against its agitation. The German Govern- 
 ment found the Pangermans embarrassing or 
 convenient according as the direction of its policy 
 and the European situation changed from crisis 
 to crisis. They were thus at one moment neg- 
 ligible, at another powerful. For long they agi- 
 tated vainly, and they might long have continued 
 to do so. But if the moment should come at 
 which the Government should make the fatal 
 plunge, their efforts would have contributed to 
 
GERMANY FROM 1890-1900 67 
 
 the result, their warnings would seem to have 
 been justified, and they would triumph as the 
 party of patriots that had foretold in vain the 
 coming crash to an unbeheving nation. 
 
 10. German Policy from 1 890-1 900 
 
 Having thus examined the atmosphere of 
 opinion in which the German Government moved, 
 let us proceed to consider the actual course of 
 their policy during the critical years, fifteen or 
 so, that preceded the war. The poHcy admit- 
 tedly and openly was one of "expansion." But 
 "expansion" where? It seems to be rather 
 widely supposed that Germany was preparing 
 war in order to annex territory in Europe. 
 The contempt of German imperialists, from 
 Treitschke onward, for the rights of small States, 
 the racial theories which included in "German" 
 territory Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and 
 the Scandinavian countries, may seem to give, 
 colour to this idea. But it would be hazardous 
 to assume that German statesmen were seriously 
 influenced for years by the lucubrations of Mr. 
 Houston Stewart Chamberlain and his followers. 
 Nor can a long-prepared policy of annexation in 
 Europe be inferred from the fact that Belgium 
 and France were invaded after the war broke 
 
68 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 out, or even from the present demand among 
 German parties that the territories occupied 
 should be retained. If it could be maintained 
 that the seizure of territory during war, or even 
 its retention after it, is evidence that the territory 
 was the object of the war, it would be legitimate 
 also to infer that the British Empire has gone 
 to war to annex German colonies, a conclusion 
 which Englishmen would probably reject with 
 indignation. In truth, before the war, the view 
 that it was the object of German policy to annex 
 European territory would have found, I think, 
 few, if any, supporters among well-informed and 
 unprejudiced observers. I note, for instance, 
 that Mr. Dawson, whose opinion on such a point 
 is probably better worth having than that of 
 any other Englishman, in his book, "The Evo- 
 lution of Modern Germany,"^ when discussing 
 the aims of German policy does not even refer 
 to the idea that annexations in Europe are con- 
 templated. 
 
 So far as the evidence at present goes, I do 
 nQJL-think a case can be made out for the view 
 that German poHcy was aiming during these 
 years at securing the hegemony of Europe by 
 annexing European territory. The expansion 
 Germany was seeking was that of trade and 
 ^ Published in 1908. 
 
GERMANY FROM 1890-1900 69 
 
 markets. And her statesmen and people, like 
 those of other countries, were under the belief 
 that, to secure this, it was necessary to acquire 
 colonies. This ambition, up to a point, she was 
 able, in fact, to fulfil, not by force but by agree- 
 ment with the other Powers The Berlin Act 
 of 1885 was one of the wisest and most far-seeing 
 achievements of European policy. By it the ^ 
 partition of a great part of the. African continent i 
 between the Powers was peaceably accomplished, 
 and Germany emerged with possessions to the 
 extent of 377,000 square miles and an estimated 
 population of 1,700,000. By 1906 her colonial 
 domain had been increased to over two and a 
 half million square miles, and its population 
 to over twelve millions; and all of this had been 
 acquired without war with any civilized nation. 
 In spite of her late arrival on the scene as a co- 
 lonial Power, Germany had thus secured with- 
 out war an empire overseas, not comparable, 
 indeed, to that of Great Britain or of France, 
 but still considerable in extent and (as Germans 
 believed) in economic promise, and sufficient 
 to give them the opportunity they desired to 
 show their capacity as pioneers of civihzation. 
 How they have succeeded or failed in this we 
 need not here consider. But when Germans 
 demand a "place in the sun," the considerable 
 
70 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 place they have in fact acquired, with the ac- 
 quiescence of the other colonial Powers, should, 
 in fairness to those Powers, be remembered. 
 But, notoriously, they were not satisfied, and 
 the extent of their dissatisfaction was shown 
 by their determination to create a navy. This 
 new departure, dating from the close of the dec- 
 ade 1 890-1 900, marks the beginning of that 
 friction between Great Britain and Germany 
 which was a main cause of the war. It is there- 
 fore important to form some just idea of the 
 motives that inspired German policy to take 
 this momentous step. The reasons given by 
 Prince Biilow, the founder of the policy, and 
 often repeated by German statesmen and pub- 
 licists,^ are, first, the need of a strong navy to 
 protect German commerce; secondly, the need, 
 as well as the ambition, of Germany to play a 
 part proportional to her real strength in the 
 determination of policy beyond the seas. These 
 reasons, according to the ideas that govern Euro- 
 pean statesmanship, are valid and sufficient. 
 They are the same that have influenced all great 
 Powers; and if Germany was influenced by them 
 we need not infer any specially sinister intentions 
 on her part. The fact that during the present 
 
 ^ See, e. g., Dawson, "Evolution of Modern Germany," 
 p. 348. 
 
GERMANY FROM 1890-1900 71 
 
 war German trade has been swept from the seas, 
 and that she is in the position of a blockaded 
 Power, will certainly convince any German pa- 
 triot, not that she did not need a navy, but that 
 she needed a much stronger one; and the retort 
 that there need have been no war if Germany 
 had not provoked it by building a fleet is not 
 one that can be expected to appeal to any nation 
 so long as the European anarchy endures. For, 
 of course, every nation regards itself as menaced 
 perpetually by aggression from some other Power. 
 Defence was certainly a legitimate motive for 
 the building of the fleet, even if there had been 
 no other. There was, however, in fact, another 
 reason avowed. Germany, as we have said, de- 
 sired to have a voice in policy beyond the seas. 
 Here, too, the reason is good, as reasons go in 
 a world of competing States. A great manu- 
 facturing and trading Power cannot be indiffer- 
 ent to the parcelling out of the world among 
 its rivals. Wherever, in countries economically 
 undeveloped, there were projects of protectorates 
 or annexations, or of any kind of monopoly to 
 be established in the interest of any Power, there 
 German interests were directly affected. She 
 had to speak, and to speak with a loud voice, 
 if she was to be attended to. And a loud voice 
 meant a navy. So, at least, the matter natu- 
 
72 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 rally presented itself to German imperialists, as, 
 indeed, it would to imperialists of any other 
 country. 
 
 The reasons given by German statesmen for 
 building their fleet were in this sense valid. But 
 were they the only reasons? In the beginning 
 most probably they were. But the formation 
 and strengthening of the Entente, and Germany's 
 consequent fear that war might be made upon 
 her jointly by France and Great Britain, gave 
 a new stimulus to her naval ambition. She could 
 not now be content with a navy only as big as 
 that of France, for she might have to meet those 
 of France and England conjoined. This defen- 
 sive reason is good. But no doubt, as always, 
 there must have lurked behind it ideas of ag- 
 gression. Ambition, in the philosophy of States, 
 goes hand in hand with fear. "The war may 
 come," says one party. "Yes," says the other; 
 and secretly mutters, "May the war come!" 
 To ask whether armaments are for offence or 
 for defence must always be an idle inquiry. They 
 will be for either, or both, according to circum- 
 stances, according to the personalities that are 
 in power, according to the mood that politicians 
 and joumaKsts, and the interests that suborn 
 them, have been able to infuse into a nation. 
 But what may be said with clear conviction is. 
 
GERMANY FROM 1890-1900 73 
 
 that to attempt to account for the clash of war 
 by the ambition and armaments of a single Power 
 is to think far too simply of how these catas- 
 trophes originate. The truth, in this case, is 
 that German ambition developed in relation to "^ 
 the whole European situation, and that, just as 
 on land their policy was conditioned by their 
 relation to France and Russia, so at sea it was^ 
 conditioned by their relation to Great Britain^ 
 They knew that their determination to become 
 a great Power at sea would arouse the suspicion 
 and alarm of the English. Prince Biilow is per- 
 fectly frank about that. He says that the difficulty 
 was to get on with the shipbuilding programme 
 without giving Great Britain an opportunity 
 to intervene by force and nip the enterprise in 
 the bud. He attributes here to the British Govern- 
 ment a policy which is all in the Bismarckian 
 tradition. It was, in fact, a policy urged by 
 some voices here, voices which, as is always the 
 case, were carried to Germany and magnified 
 by the megaphone of the Press. ^ That no British 
 Government, in fact, contemplated picking a 
 quarrel with Germany in order to prevent her 
 becoming a naval Power I am myself as much 
 convinced as any other Englishman, and I count 
 
 ^Some of these are cited in Billow's "Imperial Ger- 
 many," p. 36. 
 
74 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 the fact as righteousness to our statesmen. On 
 the other hand, I think it an unfounded con- 
 jecture that Prince Biilow was dehberately build- 
 ing with a view to attacking the British Empire. 
 I see no reason to doubt his sincerity when he 
 says that he looked forward to a peaceful solu- 
 tion of the rivalry between Germany and our- 
 selves, and that France, in his view, not Great 
 Britain, was the irreconcilable enemy. ^ In build- 
 ing her navy, no doubt, Germany deliberately 
 took the risk of incurring a quarrel with England 
 in the pursuit of a policy which she regarded as 
 essential to her development. It is quite another 
 thing, and would require much evidence to prove 
 that she was working up to a war with the ob- 
 ject of destroying the British Empire. 
 
 What we have to bear in mind, in estimating 
 the meaning of the German naval policy, is a 
 complex series of motives and conditions: the 
 genuine need of a navy, and a strong one, to pro- 
 tect trade in the event of war, and to secure a 
 voice in overseas policy; the genuine fear of an 
 attack by the Powers of the Entente, an attack 
 to be provoked by British jealousy; and also 
 that indeterminate ambition of any great Power 
 which may be influencing the policy of statesmen 
 
 ^ See "Imperial Germany," pp. 48, 71, English transla- 
 tion. 
 
ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 75 
 
 even while they have not avowed it to themselves, 
 and which, expressed by men less responsible 
 and less discreet, becomes part of that "public 
 opinion" of which policy takes account. 
 
 II. Vain Attempts at Harmony 
 
 It may, however, be reasonably urged that 
 unless the Germans had had aggressive am- 
 bitions they would have agreed to some of the 
 many proposals made by Great Britain to ar- 
 rest on both sides the constantly expanding 
 programmes of naval constructions. It is true 
 that Germany has always opposed the policy 
 of limiting armaments, whether on land or sea. 
 This is consonant with that whole mihtarist 
 view of international politics which, as I have 
 already indicated, is held in a more extreme 
 and violent form in Germany than in any other 
 country, but which is the creed of jingoes and 
 imperiahsts everywhere. If the British Govern- 
 ment had succeeded in coming to an agree- 
 ment with Germany on this question they would 
 have been bitterly assailed by that party at 
 home. Still, the Government did make the 
 attempt. It was comparatively easy for them, 
 for any basis to which they could have agreed 
 must have left intact, legitimately and neces- 
 
76 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 sarily, as we all agree, the British supremacy 
 at sea. The Germans would not assent to this. 
 They did not choose to limit beforehand their 
 efforts to rival us at sea. Probably they did 
 not think it possible to equal, still less to out- 
 strip us. But they wanted to do all they could. 
 And that of course could have only one mean- 
 ing. They thought a war with England pos- 
 sible, and they wanted to be as well prepared 
 
 las they could be. It is part of the irony that 
 attaches to the whole system of the armed peace 
 )that the preparations made against war are 
 
 'jthemselves the principal cause of war. For 
 if there had been no rival shipbuilding, there 
 Ineed have been no friction between the two 
 countries. 
 
 "But why did Germany fear war? It must 
 have been because she meant to make it." So 
 the Enghsh argue. But imagine the Germans 
 saying to us, "Why do you fear war? There 
 will be no war unless you provoke it. We are 
 quite pacific. You need not be alarmed about 
 us." Would such a promise have induced us 
 to relax our preparations for a moment? No! 
 Under the armed peace there can be no con- 
 fidence. And that alone is sufficient to account 
 for the breakdown of the Anglo-German negotia- 
 tions, without supposing on either side a wish or 
 
ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 77 
 
 an intention to make war. Each suspected, and 
 was bound to suspect, the purpose of the other. 
 Let us take, for example, the negotiations of 
 191 2, and put them back in their setting. 
 
 The Triple. Allia nce was confronting the Trip le 
 Entente. On both sides were, fear and sus- 
 picion. Eg,ch believed in the possibility ot the i 
 others springi ng a war upon them . Each sus-/_ 
 pected the others of wanting to lull them into 
 a false security, and then take them unpre- 
 pared. In that atmosphere, what hope was 
 there of successful negotiations? The essen- 
 tial condition — ^mutual confidence — was lacking. 
 What, accordingly, do we find? Tbe^Germans 
 offer to reduce their naval programme, first, 
 if England will promise an unconditional neu- 
 trality ;_secondly, when that w as reje c^T if 
 England will promise neutrality in a war which 
 should be "forced upon" Germany. There- 
 upon the British Foreign Office scents a snare. 
 Germany will get Austria to provoke a war, 
 while making it appear that the war was pro- 
 voked by Russia, and she will then come in 
 under the terms of her alHance with Austria, 
 smash France, and claim that England must 
 look on passively under the neutrality agree- 
 ment! "No, thank you!'' Sir Edward Grey,^ 
 accordingly, makes a counter-proposal. Eng- \ 
 
78 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 land will neither make nor participate in an 
 "unprovoked" attack upon Germany. This 
 time it is the German Chancellor's turn to hang 
 back. "Unprovoked! Hm! What does that 
 mean? Russia, let us suppose, makes war upon 
 Austria, while making it appear that Austria 
 is the aggressor. France comes in on the side 
 of Russia. And England? Will she admit that 
 the war was 'unprovoked' and remain neutral? 
 Hardly, we think!" The Chancellor there- 
 upon proposes the addition: "England, of course, 
 will remain neutral if war is forced upon Ger- 
 many? That follows, I presume?" "No!" 
 from the British Foreign Office. Reason as 
 before. And the negotiations fall through. How 
 should they not under the conditions? There 
 could be no understanding, because there was 
 no confidence. There could be no confidence 
 because there was mutual fear. There was 
 mutual fear because the Triple Alliance stood 
 in arms against the Triple Entente. What was 
 wrong? Germany? England? No. The Eu- 
 ,ropean tradition and system. 
 
 The fact, then, that those negotiations broke 
 down is no more evidence of sinister intentions 
 on the part of Germany than it is on the part 
 of Great Britain. Baron Beyens, to my mind 
 the most competent and the most impartial, 
 
ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 79 
 
 as well as one of the best-informed, of those 
 who have written on the events leading up to 
 the war, says explicitly of the policy of the Ger- 
 man Chancellor: — 
 
 A practicable rapprochement between his country and 
 Great Britain was the dream with which M. de Bethmann- 
 Hollweg most willingly soothed himseK, without the 
 treacherous arriere-pensee which the Prince von Biilow 
 perhaps would have had of finishing later on, at an oppor- 
 tune moment, with the British Navy. Nothing authorizes 
 us to believe that there was not a basis of smcerity in the 
 language of M. de Jagow when he expressed to Sir E. 
 Goschen in the course of their last painful interview his 
 poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire pohcy and 
 that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends 
 with Great Britain, and then through Great Britain to 
 get closer to France.-^ 
 
 Meantime the considerations I have here 
 laid before the reader, in relation to this general 
 question of Anglo-German rivalry, are, I sub- 
 mit, all relevant, and must be taken into fair 
 consideration in forming a judgment. T he facts . 
 show clearly that Germany was-. xh a11engi ng 
 as well as she could the British supre macy at .. — 
 sea; tha t c^he Tyas d^ terTnined to beGx^m^e^^^i^^aval-^ — 
 as well a s a militar y Power; and that her poHc}^ 
 was, on the face of it, a menace to this country; 
 
 ^"L'AUemagne avant la guerre," p. 75, and British 
 White Paper, No. 160. 
 
8o THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 just as the creation on our part of a great con- 
 script army would have been taken by Ger- 
 many as a menace to her. The British Govern- 
 ment was bound to make counter-preparations. 
 I, for my own part, have never disputed it. I 
 have never thought, and do not now think, that 
 while the European anarchy continues, a single 
 Power can disarm in the face of the others. All 
 this is beyond dispute. What is disputable, 
 and a matter of speculative inference, is the 
 further assumption that in pursuing this policy 
 Germany was making a bid to destroy the Brit- 
 ish Empire. The facts can certainly be ac- 
 counted for without that assumption. I my- 
 self think the assumption highly improbable. 
 So much I may say, but I cannot say more. 
 Possibly some day we may be able to check 
 conjecture by facts. Until then, argument must 
 be inconclusive. 
 
 This question of the naval rivalry between 
 Germany and Great Britain is, however, part 
 of the general question of miHtarism. And it 
 may be urged that while during the last fifteen 
 years the British Government has shown itself 
 favourable to projects of arbitration and of 
 limitation of armaments, the German Govern- 
 ment has consistently opposed them. There 
 is much truth in this; and it is a good illustra- 
 
ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 8i 
 
 tion of what I hold to be indisputable, that the 
 militaristic view of international politics is much 
 more deeply rooted in Germany than in Great 
 Britain. It is worth while, however, to remind 
 ourselves a little in detail what the facts were since 
 they are often misrepresented or exaggerated. 
 
 The question of international arbitration was_ 
 brought for ward at the first Hague Conference 
 in i8QgJ„ Fro m theT)egirimiiglt was recognized 
 on all sides th at it would b e idle to propose gen- 
 eral comp ulsory arbitration for all subjects. 
 No Power would have agreed to it, not Great 
 Britain or America any more than Germany. 
 On the other hand, projects for creating an ar- 
 bitration tribunal, to which nations willing to 
 use it should have recourse, were brought for- 
 ward by both the British and the American 
 representatives. From the beginning, however, 
 it became clear that Count Miinster, the head 
 of the German delegation, was opposed to any 
 scheme for encouraging arbitration. "He did 
 not say that he would oppose a moderate plan 
 of voluntary arbitration, but he insisted that 
 arbitration must be injurious to Germany; that 
 
 ^The account that follows is taken from the "Auto- 
 biography" of Andrew D. White, the chairman of the 
 American delegation. See vol. ii., chap. xlv. and follow- 
 ing. 
 
82 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 Germany is prepared for war as no other coun- 
 try is, or can be; that she can mobilize her army 
 in ten days; and that neither France, Russia, 
 nor any other Power can do this. Arbitration, 
 he said, would simply give rival Powers time 
 to put themselves in readiness, and would, there- 
 fore, be a great disadvantage to Germany." 
 Here is what I should call the militarist view 
 in all its simpHcity and purity, the obstinate, 
 unquestioning behef that war is inevitable, and 
 the determination to be ready for it at all costs, 
 even at the cost of rejecting machinery which 
 if adopted might obviate war. The passage 
 has often been cited as evidence of the German 
 determination to have war. But I have not 
 so often seen quoted the exactly parallel declara- 
 tion made by Sir John (now Lord) Fisher. "He 
 said that the Navy of Great Britain was and 
 would remain in a state of complete preparation 
 for war; that a vast deal depended on prompt 
 action by the Navy; and that the^ truce afforded 
 by arbitration proceedings would give other 
 Powers time, which they would ilOt Oth'erw ise 
 have, to put themsdves.. into com^ete_xeadi- 
 ness.- ^ So far the "mihtarist" and the "marin- 
 
 ^ Mr. Arthur Lee, late Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 
 at Eastleigh: — 
 
 *'If war should unhappily break out under existing 
 
ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 83 
 
 ist" adopt exactly the same view. And we may 
 be sure that if proposals are made after the war 
 to strengthen the machinery for international 
 arbitration, there will be opposition in this coun- 
 try of the same kind, and based on the same 
 grounds, as the opposition in Germany. We 
 cannot on this point condemn Count Miinster/ 
 without also condemning Lord Fisher. / 
 
 Miinster's opposition, however, was only the 
 beginning. As the days went on it became clear 
 that the Kaiser himself had become actively 
 opposed to the whole idea of arbitration, and 
 was influencing Austria and Italy and Turkey 
 in that sense. The delegates of all the other 
 countries were in favour of the very mild ap- 
 plication of it which was under consideration. 
 So, however, be it noted, were all the delegates 
 from Germany, except Count Miinster. And 
 even he was, by now, so far converted that when 
 orders were received from Germany definitely to 
 refuse co-operation, he postponed the critical 
 
 conditions the British Navy would get its blow in first, 
 before the other nation had time even to read in the papers 
 that war had been declared" {The Times, February 4, 
 
 1905)- 
 
 ''The British fleet is now prepared strategically for 
 every possible emergency, for we must assume that all 
 foreign naval Powers are possible enemies" {The Times ^ 
 February 7, 1905). 
 
84 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 sitting of the committee, and dispatched Pro- 
 fessor Zorn to Berhn to lay the whole matter 
 before the Chancellor. Professor Zorn was ac- 
 companied by the American Dr. Holls, bearing 
 an urgent private letter to Prince Hohenlohe 
 from Mr. White. The result was that the Ger- 
 man attitude was changed, and the arbitration 
 tribunal was finally established with the con- 
 sent and co-operation of the German Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 I have thought it worth while to dwell thus 
 fully upon this episode because it illustrates 
 how misleading it really is to talk of "Germany'* 
 and the "German" attitude. There is every 
 kind of German attitude. The Kaiser is an un- 
 stable and changeable character. His ministers 
 do not necessarily agree with him, and he does 
 not always get his way. As a consequence of 
 discussion and persuasion the German opposi- 
 tion, on this occasion, was overcome. There 
 was nothing, in fact, fixed and final about it. 
 It was the mihtarist prejudice, and the preju- 
 dice this time yielded to humanity and reason. 
 
 The subject was taken up again in the Con- 
 ference of 1907, and once more Germany was 
 in opposition. The German delegate. Baron 
 Marschall von Bieberstein, while he was not 
 against compulsory arbitration for certain se- 
 
ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 85 
 
 lected topics, was opposed to any general treaty. 
 It seems clear that it was this attitude of Ger- 
 many that prevented any advance being made 
 beyond the Convention of 1899. Good reasons, 
 of course, could be given for this attitude; but 
 they are the kind of reasons that goodwill could 
 have surmounted. It seems clear that there 
 was goodwill in other Governments, but not 
 in that of Germany, and the latter Hes legiti- 
 mately under the prejudice resulting from the 
 position she then took. German critics have 
 recognized this as freely as critics of other coim- 
 tries. I myself feel no desire to minimize the 
 blame that attaches to Germany. But Enghsh- 
 men who criticize her poKcy must always ask 
 themselves whether they would support a Brit- 
 ish Government that should stand for a general 
 treaty of compulsory arbitration. 
 
 On the question of limitation of armaments 
 the German Government has been equally in- 
 transigeant. At the Conference of 1899, in- 
 deed, no serious effort was made by any Power 
 to achieve the avowed purpose of the meeting. 
 And, clearly, if anything was intended to be 
 done, the wrong direction was taken from the 
 beginning. When the second Conference was 
 to meet it is understood that the German Gov- 
 ernment refused participation if the question of 
 
86 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 armaments was to be discussed, and the subject 
 did not appear on the official programme. Never- 
 theless the British, French, and American dele- 
 gates took occasion to express a strong sense 
 of the burden of armaments, and the urgent 
 need of lessening it. 
 
 The records of the Hague Conferences do, 
 then, clearly show that the German Govern- 
 ment was more obstinately sceptical of any ad- 
 vance in the direction of international arbi- 
 tration or disarmament than that of any other 
 Great Power, and especially of Great Britain 
 or the United States. Whether, in fact, much 
 could or would have been done, even in the ab- 
 sence of German opposition, may be doubted. 
 There would certainly have been, in every coun- 
 try, very strong opposition to any effective meas- 
 ures, and it is only those who would be willing 
 to see their own Government make a radical 
 advance in the directions in question who can 
 honestly attack the German Government. As 
 one of those who believe that peaceable pro- 
 cedure may and can, and, if civilization is to 
 be preserved, must be substituted for war, I 
 have a right to express my own condemnation 
 of the German Government, and I unhesitat- 
 ingly do so. But I do not infer that therefore 
 Germany was all the time working up to an 
 
ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 87 
 
 aggressive war. It is interesting, in this con- 
 nection, to note the testimony given by Sir Edwin 
 Pears to the desire for good relations between 
 Great Britain and Germany felt and expressed 
 later by the same Baron Marschall von Bieber- 
 stein who was so unyielding in 1907 on the ques- 
 tion of arbitration. When he came to take up 
 the post of German Ambassador to Great Britain, 
 Sir Edwin reports him as saying: — 
 
 I have long wanted to be Ambassador to England, 
 because, as you know, for years I have considered it a 
 misfortune to the world that our two countries are not 
 really in harn^ony. I consider that I am here as a man 
 with a mission, my mission being to bring about a real 
 understanding between our two nations. 
 
 On this Sir Edwin comments (191 5): — 
 
 I unhesitatingly add that I am convinced he was sincere 
 in what he said. Of that I have no doubt. ^ 
 
 It must, in fact, be recognized that in the 
 present state of international relations, the gen- 
 eral suspicion and the imminent danger, it re- 
 quires more imagination and faith than most 
 public men possess, and more idealism than most 
 nations have shown themselves to be capable of, 
 
 ^Sir Edwin Pears, "Forty Years in Constantinople," 
 p. 330. 
 
88 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 to take any radical step towards reorganization. 
 The armed peace, as we have so often had to 
 insist, perpetuates itself by the mistrust which 
 it establishes. 
 
 Every move by one Power is taken to be a 
 menace to another, and is countered by a sim- 
 ilar move, which in turn produces a reply. And 
 it is not easy to say "Who began it?" since the 
 rivalry goes so far back into the past. What, 
 for instance, is the real truth about the German, 
 French, and Russian military laws of 1913? Were 
 any or all of them aggressive? Or were they 
 all defensive? I do not believe it is possible to 
 answer that question. Looking back from the 
 point of view of 19 14, it is natural to suppose 
 that Germany was already intending war. But 
 that did not seem evident at the time to a neutral 
 observer, nor even, it would seem, to the British 
 Foreign Ofhce. Thus the Count de Lalaing, 
 Belgian Minister in London, writes as follows 
 on February 24, 191 3: — 
 
 The English Press naturally wants to throw upon 
 Germany the responsibility for the new tension which 
 results from its proposals, and which may bring to Europe 
 fresh occasions of unrest. Many journals consider that 
 the French Government, in declaring itself ready to 
 impose three years' service, and in nominating M. Delcasse 
 to St. Petersburg, has adopted the only attitude worthy 
 
ATTEMPTS AT HARMONY 89 
 
 of the great Republic in presence of a German provoca- 
 tion. At the Foreign Office I found a more just and calm 
 appreciation of the position. They see in the reinforce- 
 ment of the German armies less a provocation than the 
 admission of a military situation weakened by events 
 and which it is necessary to strengthen. The Government 
 of Berlin sees itself obHged to recognize that it cannot 
 count, as before, on the support of all the forces of its 
 Austrian ally, since the appearance in South-east Europe 
 of a new Power, that of the Balkan allies, estabHshed on 
 the very flank of the Dual Empire. Far from being able 
 to count, in case of need, on the full support of the Gov- 
 ernment of Vienna, it is probable that Germany will have 
 to support Vienna herself. In the case of a European 
 war she would have to make head against her enemies on 
 two frontiers, the Russian and the French, and diminish 
 perhaps her own forces to aid the Austrian army. In 
 these conditions they do not find it surprising that the 
 German Empire should have felt it necessary to increase 
 the number of its Army Corps. They add at the Foreign 
 Office that the Government of Berlin had frankly ex- 
 plained to the Cabinet of Paris the precise motives of its 
 action. 
 
 Whether this is a complete account of the mo- 
 tives of the German Government in introducing 
 the law of 191 3 cannot be definitely established. 
 But the motives suggested are adequate by them- 
 selves to account for the facts. On the other 
 hand, a part of the cost of the new law ^as to 
 be defrayed by a tax on capital. And those 
 
90 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 who believe that by this year Germany was def- 
 initely waiting an occasion to make war ha^'e a 
 right to dwell upon that fact. I find, myself, 
 nothing conclusive in these speculations. But 
 what is certain, and to my mind much more 
 important, is the fact that military preparations 
 evoke counter-preparations, until at la^t the 
 strain becomes unbearable. By 1913 it was al- 
 ready terrific. The Germans knew well that by 
 January, 191 7, the French and Russian prepara- 
 tions would have reached their culminating point. 
 But those preparations were themselves almost 
 unendurable to the French. 
 
 I may recall here the passage already cited 
 from a dispatch of Baron Guillaume, Belgian 
 Ambassador at Paris, written in June, 1914 
 (p. 34). He suspected, as we saw, that the 
 hand of Russia had imposed the three years' 
 service upon France. 
 
 What Baron Guillaume thought plausible must 
 not the Germans have thought plausible? Must 
 it not have confirmed their belief in the "inevi- 
 tabihty" of a war — that belief which, by itself, 
 has been enough to produce war after war, and, 
 in particular, the war of 1870? Must there not 
 have been strengthened in their minds that par- 
 ticular current among the many that were mak- 
 ing for war? And must not similar suspicions 
 
EUROPE SINCE 1890-1900 91 
 
 have been active, with similar results, on the 
 side of France and Russia? The armaments 
 engender fear, the fear in turn engenders arma- 
 ments, and in that vicious circle turns the policy 
 of Europe, till this or that Power precipitates 
 the conflict, much as a man hanging in terror 
 over the edge of a cliff ends by losing his 
 nerve and throwing himself over. That is 
 the real lesson of the rivalry in armaments. 
 That is certain. The rest remains conjec- 
 ture. 
 
 12. Europe since the Decade 1 890-1 900 
 
 Let us now, endeavouring to bear in our minds 
 the whole situation we have been analysing, con- 
 sider a little more particularly the various epi- 
 sodes and crises of international poHcy from the 
 year 1890 onwards. I take that date, the date 
 of Bismarck's resignation, for the reason already 
 given (p. 42). It was not until then that it would 
 have occurred to any competent observer to ac- 
 cuse Germany of an aggressive poHcy calculated 
 to disturb the peace of Europe. A closer rap- 
 prochement with England was, indeed, the first 
 idea of the Kaiser when he took over the reins of 
 power in 1888. And during the ten years that 
 followed British sympathies were actually drawn 
 
 / 
 
92 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 I towards Germany and alienated from France. * 
 It is well known that Mr. Chamberlain favoured 
 
 ^ The columns of The Times for 1899 are full of attacks 
 upon France. Once more we may cite from the dispatch 
 of the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in London, 
 dated May 24, 1907, commenting on current or recalling 
 earlier events: "A certain section of the Press, known here 
 under the name of the Yellow Press, is in great part re- 
 sponsible for the hostility that exists between the two 
 nations (England and Germany). What, in fact, can one 
 expect from a journaHst like Mr. Harmsworth, now 
 Lord Northcliffe, proprietor of the Daily Mail, Daily 
 Mirror, Daily Graphic, Daily Express, Evening News, 
 and Weekly Dispatch, who in an interview given to the 
 I Matin says, ' Yes, we detest the Germans cordially. They 
 I make themselves odious to all Europe. I will never allow 
 : the least thing to be printed in my journal which might 
 wound France, but I would not let anything be printed 
 which might be agreeable to Germany.' Yet, in 1899, 
 this same man was attacking the French with the same 
 violence, wanted to boycott the Paris Exhibition, and 
 wrote: 'The French have succeeded in persuading John 
 Bull that they are his deadly enemies. England long 
 
 I hesitated between France and Germany, but she has al- 
 ways respected the German character, while she has 
 \ come to despise France. A cordial understanding cannot 
 exist between England and her nearest neighbour. We 
 have had enough of France, who has neither courage nor 
 political sense.'" Lalaing does not give his references, 
 and I cannot therefore verify his quotations. But they 
 hardly require it. The volteface of The Times is sufficiently 
 well known. And only too well known is the way in 
 
EUROPE SINCE 1890-1900 93 
 
 an alliance with Germany,^ and that when the 
 Anglo- Japanese treaty was being negotiated the 
 inclusion of Germany was seriously considered — 
 by Lord Lansdowne. The telegram of the Kaiser / 
 to Kruger in 1895 no doubt left an unpleasant 
 impression in England, and German feeling, of 
 course, at the time of the Boer War, ran strongly 
 against England, but so did feehng in France 
 and America, and, indeed, throughout the civ- 
 ilized world. It was certainly the determination 
 of Germany to build a great navy that led to 
 the tension between her and England, and fi- 
 nally to the formation of the Triple Entente, as 
 
 which the British nation allows its sentiments for other 
 nations to be dictated to it by a handful of cantankerous 
 journaUsts. 
 
 ^ "I may point out to you that, at bottom, the char- 
 acter, the main character, of the Teuton race differs 
 very sHghtly indeed frov. the character of the Anglo- 
 Saxon {cheers) J and the same sentiments which bring 
 us into a close sympathy with the United States of America 
 may be invoked to bring us into closer sympathy with 
 the Empire of Germany." He goes on to advocate "a 
 new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the 
 two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race" (see The 
 Times, December i, 1899). This was at the beginning 
 of the Boer War. Two years later, in October, 1901,, 
 Mr. Chamberlain was attacking Germany at Edinburgh. 
 This date is clearly about the turning-point in British 
 sentiment and policy towards Germany. 
 
 ^ 
 
94 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance. It is 1900, 
 not 1888, still less 1870, that marks the period 
 at which German policy began to be a disturbing 
 element in Europe. During the years that fol- 
 lowed, the principal storm-centres in international 
 policy were the Far and Near East, the Balkans, 
 and Morocco. Events in the Far East, important 
 though they were, need not detain us here, for 
 their contribution to the present war was remote 
 and indirect, except so far as concerns the par- 
 ticipation of Japan. Of the situation in the other 
 areas, the tension and its causes and effects, we 
 must try to form some clear general idea. This 
 can be done even in the absence of that detailed 
 information of what was going on behind the 
 scenes for which a historian will have to wait. 
 
 13. Germany 'i-nd Turkey 
 
 Let us begin with the Near East. The situa- 
 tion there, when Germany began her enterprise, 
 is thus summed up by a French writer^: — 
 
 Astride across Europe and Asia, the Ottoman Empire 
 represented, for all the nations of the old continent, 
 the cosmopohtan centre where each had erected, by 
 dint of patience and ingenuity, a fortress of interests, 
 influences, and special rights. Each fortress watched 
 
 ^ Pierre Albin, "D'Agadir a Serajevo," p. 81. 
 
GERMANY AND TURKEY 95 
 
 jealously to maintain its particular advantages in face 
 of the rival enemy. If one of them obtained a conces- 
 sion, or a new favour, immediately the commanders 
 of the others were seen issuing from their walls to claim 
 from the Grand Turk concessions or favours which should 
 maintain the existing balance of power or prestige. . . . 
 France acted as protector of the Christians; England, 
 the vigilant guardian of the routes to India, maintained 
 a privileged political and economic position; Austria- 
 Hungary mounted guard over the route to Salonica; 
 Russia, protecting the Armenians and Slavs of the South 
 of Europe, watched over the fate of the Orthodox. There 
 was a general understanding among them all, tacit or 
 express, that none should better its situation at the ex- 
 pense of the others. 
 
 When into this precariously balanced system 
 of conflicting interests Germany began to throw 
 her weight, the necessary result was a disturbance 
 of equilibriimi. As early as 1839 German ambi- 
 tion had been directed towards this region by 
 Von Moltke; but it was not till 1873 that the 
 process of "penetration" began. In that year 
 the enterprise of the AnatoHan railway was 
 launched by German financiers. In the succeed- 
 ing years it extended itself as far as Konia; and 
 in 1899 and 1902 concessions were obtained for 
 an extension to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. 
 It was at this point that the question became 
 one of international politics. Nothing could 
 
u> 
 
 96 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 better illustrate the lamentable character of the 
 European anarchy than the treatment of this 
 matter by the interests and the Powers affected. 
 Here had been launched on a grandiose scale 
 a great enterprise of civilization. The Mesopo- 
 tamian plain, the cradle of civilization, and for 
 centuries the granary of the world, was to be 
 redeemed by irrigation from the encroachment 
 of the desert, order and security were to be re- 
 tored, labour to be set at work, and science and 
 power to be devoted on a great scale to their 
 only proper purpose, the increase of life. Here 
 was an idea fit to inspire the most generous imagi- 
 nation. Here, for all the idealism of youth and 
 the ambition of maturity, for diplomatists, engi- 
 neers, administrators, agriculturists, educationists, 
 an opportunity for the work of a lifetime, a task 
 to appeal at once to the imagination, the intel- 
 lect, and the organizing capacity of practical 
 men, a scheme in which all nations might be 
 proud to participate, and by which Europe might 
 show to the backward populations that the power 
 she had won over Nature was to be used for 
 the benefit of man, and that the science and the 
 arms of the West were destined to recreate the 
 life of the East. What happened, in fact? No 
 \ sooner did the Germans approach the other na- 
 itions for financial and poHtical support to their 
 
GERMANY AND TURKEY 97 
 
 scheme than there was an outcry of jealousy, sus- 
 picion, and rage. All the vested interests of the 
 other States were up in arms. The proposed rail- 
 way, it was said, would compete with the Trans- 
 Siberian, with the French railways, with the ocean 
 route to India, with the steamboats on the Tigris. 
 Corn in Mesopotamia would bring down the price 
 of com in Russia. German trade would oust 
 British and French and Russian trade. Nor 
 was that all. Under cover of an economic enter- 
 ^prise, Germany was nursing political ambitions. 
 She was aiming at Egypt and the Suez Canal, 
 at the control of the Persian Gulf, at the domina- 
 tion of Persia, at the route to India. Were these 
 fears and suspicions justified? In the European 
 anarchy, who can say? Certainly the entry of 
 a new economic competitor, the exploitation of 
 new areas, the opening out of new trade routes, 
 must interfere with interests already established. 
 That must always be so in a changing world. 
 But no one would seriously maintain that that 
 is a reason for abandoning new enterprises. But, 
 it was urged, in fact Germany will take the oppor- 
 tunity to squeeze out the trade of other nations 
 and to constitute a German monopoly. Ger- 
 many, it is true, was ready to give guarantees of 
 the "open door." But then, what was the value 
 of these guarantees? She asserted that her enter- 
 
98 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 prise was economic, and had no ulterior political 
 gains. But who would believe her? Were not 
 German Jingoes already rejoicing at the near 
 approach of German armies to the Egyptian 
 frontiers? In the European anarchy all these 
 fears, suspicions, and rivalries were inevitable. 
 But the British Government at least was not 
 carried away by them. They were willing that 
 British capital should co-operate on condition 
 that the enterprise should be under international 
 control. They negotiated for terms which would 
 give equal control to Germany, England, and 
 France. They failed to get these terms, why 
 has not been made public. But Lord Cranborne, 
 then Under-Secretary of State, said in the House 
 of Commons that "the outcry which was made 
 in this matter — I think it a very ill-formed 
 outcry — ^made it exceedingly difficult for us to 
 get the terms we required."^ And Sir Clinton 
 Dawkins wrote in a letter to Herr Gwinner, the 
 chief of the Deutsche Bank: "The fact is that 
 the business has become involved in politics here, 
 and has been sacrificed to the very violent and 
 bitter feehng against Germany exhibited by the 
 majority of newspapers and shared in by a large 
 number of people." ^ British co-operation, there- 
 
 ^ Hansard, 1903, vol. 126, p. 120. 
 
 ^ Nineteenth Century ^ June, 1909, vol. 65, p. 1090. 
 
GERMANY AND TURKEY 99 
 
 fore, failed, as French and Russian had failed. 
 The Germans, however, persevered with their 
 enterprise, now a purely German one, and ul- 
 timately with success. Their differences with 
 Russia were arranged by an agreement about 
 the Turko-Persian railways signed in 191 1. An 
 agreement with France, with regard to the rail- 
 ways of Asiatic Turkey, was signed in February, 
 1 914, and one with England (securing our interests 
 on the Persian Gulf) in June of the same year. 
 Thus just before the war broke out this thorny 
 question had, in fact, been settled to the satis- 
 faction of all the Powers concerned. And on 
 this two comments may be made. First, that 
 the long friction, the press campaign, the rivalry 
 of economic and pohtical interests, had contrib- 
 uted largely to the European tension. Secondly, 
 that in spite of that, the question did get settled, 
 and by diplomatic means. On this subject, at 
 any rate, war was not "inevitable." Further, 
 it seems clear that the British Government, so 
 far from "hemming in" Germany in this matter, 
 were ready from the first to accept, if not to 
 welcome, her enterprise, subject to their quite 
 legitimate and necessary preoccupation with their 
 position on the Persian Gulf. It was the British 
 Press and what lay behind it that prevented the 
 co-operation of British capital. Meantime the 
 
loo THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 economic penetration of Asia Minor by Germany 
 had been accompanied by a political penetration 
 at Constantinople. Already, as early as 1898, 
 the Kaiser had announced at Damascus that the 
 ^' three hundred millions of Mussulmans who 
 live scattered over the globe may be assured 
 that the German Emperor will be at all times 
 their friend." 
 
 This speech, made immediately after the Ar- 
 menian massacres, has been very properly rep- 
 robated by all who are revolted at such atrocities. 
 But the indignation of Englishmen must be tem- 
 pered by shame when they remember that it 
 was their own minister, still the idol of half the 
 nation, who reinstated Turkey after the earlier 
 massacres in Bulgaria and put back the inhabi- 
 tants of Macedonia for another generation under 
 the murderous oppression of the Turks. The 
 importance of the speech in the history of Europe 
 is that it signalled the advent of German influence 
 in the Near East. That influence was strength- 
 ened on the Bosphorus after the Turkish revolu- 
 tion of 1908, in spite of the original Anglophil 
 bias of the Young Turks, and as some critics 
 maintain, in consequence of the blundering of 
 the British representatives. The mission of Von 
 f der Goltz in 1908 and that-of Liman von Sanders 
 in 1 914 put the Turkish army under German 
 
AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS loi 
 
 command, and by the outbreak of the war German / 
 influence was predominant in Constantinople. 
 This poHtical influence was, no doubt, used, and 
 intended to be used, to further German eco- 
 nomic schemes. Germany, in fact, had come in to 
 play the same game as the other Powers, and 
 had played it with more skill and determination. 
 She was, of course, here as elsewhere, a new and 
 disturbing force in a system of forces which al- 
 ready had difficulty in maintaining a precarious 
 equilibrium. But to be a new and disturbing 
 force is not to commit a crime. Once more the 
 real culprit was not Germany nor any other 
 Power. The real culprit was the European an^ 
 archy. 
 
 14. Austria and the Balkans 
 
 I turn now to the Balkan question. This is 
 too ancient and too complicated to be even sum- 
 marized here. But we must remind ourselves 
 of the main situation. Primarily, the Balkan 
 question is, or rather was, one between subject 
 Christian populations and the Turks. But it 
 has been complicated, not only by the quarrels 
 of the subject populations among themselves, 
 but by the rival ambitions and claims of Russia 
 and Austria. The intpyii^rt. of Pir.sin jn the Bal- 
 kans is partly one of racial "Sympathy, partly 
 
I02 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 one of territori al amh itinn^ for the road to C on- 
 stantin ople lie s th rough Rumania and Bulg aria. 
 It is thi s territorial ambition of Russia that has 
 given orra_sion in the past to the inter vention 
 of the Western Pow ers, for until recently it was 
 a fixed prin ciple^ both of Fr ench and British 
 policy, to keep Russia out of the Mediterranean. 
 Hence the Crimean War, and hence the disas- 
 trous intervention of Disraeli after the treaty of 
 San Stefano in 1878 — an intervention which 
 perpetuated for years the Balkan hell. ^Tjie 
 interest of Austria i n the peninsula depe nds 
 primarily on t he fact t hat the Austrian Empire 
 contains a larg e Slav population desiring its 
 independence, and that this national ambition 
 of the Austrian Slavs finds in the independent 
 kingdom of Serbia its natural centre of attrac- 
 tion. The determination of Ant;tria, t<^ retain 
 her Slavs as unwilling ci tizens of h erEmpire 
 brings her also into conflict witVi "RnQgia^ go i^^^ 
 as Russia is the protector of the ' Slav s. The 
 situation, and the danger with whith it is preg- 
 nant, may be realized by an Englishman if he 
 will suppose St. George's Channel and the At- 
 lantic to be annihilated, and Ireland to touch, 
 by a land frontier, on the one side Great Britain, 
 on the other the United States. The friction 
 and even the warfare which might have arisen 
 
AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS 103 
 
 between these two great Powers from the plots 
 of American Fenians may readily be imagined. 
 Something of that kind is the situation of Aus- 
 tria in relation to Serbia and her protector, 
 Russia. Further, Austria fears the oc -nipation 
 by any Slav State of any p ort on the coast line 
 of the Adriatic, and herself desires a port on 
 the JEgesLTi. Add to this the recent German 
 dream ot the route from Berlin to Bagdad, and 
 the European importance of what would other- 
 wise be local disputes among the Balkan States 
 becomes apparent. 
 
 During the period we are now considering 
 the Balkan factor first came into prominence 
 with the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina in 1908. Those prc jyinces. it wiU 
 be remembered, were handed ^oveL Jo _Auatliaix . 
 protection at the Congress jl^JBerli^^ 
 Austria went in and policed the country, much 
 as Engl and went in and policed Egypt., ...and, 
 from the material point of view, with similarly 
 successful results. But, Hke England in Egypt, 
 Austria was not sovereign there. Formal sov- 
 ereignty still rested with the Turk. In 1909 , 
 during the Turkish revolutian^ Austria took 
 the opportunit y to throw off that n omiria,1 >su 
 
 k 
 
 z ^rainty. Russia protested, Austria mobiHzed 
 against Serbia and Montenegro, and war seemed 
 
I04 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 imminent. But the dramatic intervention of 
 Germany "in shining armour'' on the side of 
 her ally resulted in a diplomatic victory for the 
 Central Powers. Austria gained her point, and 
 war, for the moment, was avoided. But such 
 diplomatic victories are dangerous. Russia did 
 not forget, and tbf f^v^^tp ^f ^9^9 wfff ^^ /^p^^^- 
 tive cause in tJie ra.tastrophe of^ Qi£. IXLMlmg 
 as she did in this ma tt er Austria-Hungary de- 
 fied the^publi c law of Europe, and Ger many 
 suppo rted her in doing: so. 
 
 The motives of Germany in taking this action 
 are thus described, and probably with truth, 
 by Baron Beyens: "She could not allow_ the 
 soh'Hif?^^_ nf the Triple Alliance to' be sha ken : 
 she had a de bt of gratitude to pay to her a lly, 
 who had s upported her a t_t he Con gress of-^- 
 geciraSj^ Finally, she beheved herself to be the 
 object of an a ttempt at end rrlemSifhy Ff^nffij 
 England^ a nd Russia^ and w as anxious to show 
 that the gesture of putting her hand to the sword 
 was enough to dispel, the illusions of hfJLadver- 
 saries." ^ These are the kind of reasons that 
 all Powers consider adequate where what they 
 conceive to be their interests are involved. From 
 any higher, more international point of view, 
 they are no reasons at all. But in such a matter 
 ^ "L'AUemagne avant la guerre," p. 240. 
 
AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS 105 
 
 no Power is in a position to throw the first stone. 
 The whole episode is a classical example for 
 the normal working of the European anarchy. 
 Austria-Hungary was primarily to blame, but 
 Germany, who supported her, must take her 
 share. The other Powers -of~EuriDp£..ja£^uiesced 
 for the sake of peace, and. „,they,,cpMlA^ 
 do no better. There will never be any guaran-^ 
 tee for^lhe~public law o f Europe until th ere is 
 a public tribunal and-ar-public force Jxi-^eThat 
 its decisions are carried out. 
 
 The next events of importance in this region 
 were the tw o Balk^ fi wars. We need not here 
 go into the causes and results of these, except 
 so far as to note that, once more, the rivalry 
 of Russi a and Austria played a disastrous part. 
 It was the determina tion of Austria no t to give 
 Serbia access to the Adrjatic^jhat. led Serbia 
 to retain territories assigned by treaty to Bul- 
 garia, and so precigi^ted^ the^ sec^^^ 
 war; for that war was due to th e indiffliatio n 
 cause d in Bulgari a by the breach of faith, and 
 is said to have been directly prompted by Aus- 
 tria. The bad part played by Austria through- 
 out this crisis is indisputable. But it must be. 
 observed that, by general admission, Germany \ 
 throughout worked hand in hand with Sir Ed- ) 
 
io6 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 \ ward Grey to keep the peace of Europe, which, 
 indeed, otherwise could not have been kept. 
 And nothing illustrates this better than that 
 episode of 19 13 which is sometimes taken to 
 throw discredit upon Germany. The episode 
 was thus described by the Itahan minister, Gio- 
 litti: "On the 9th of August, 1913, about a year 
 before the war broke out, I, being then absent 
 from Rome, received from my colleague, San 
 Giuliano, the following telegram: ^Austria has 
 communicated to us and to Germany her in- 
 tention to act against Serbia, and defines such 
 action as defensive, hoping to apply the casus 
 fcBderis of the Triple Alliance, which I consider 
 inapplicable. I intend to join forces with Ger- 
 many to prevent any such action by Austria, 
 but it will be necessary to say clearly that we 
 do not consider such eventual action as defen- 
 sive, and therefore do not believe that the casus 
 foederis exists. Please telegraph to Rome if you 
 approve.' 
 
 "I replied that, *if Austria intervenes against 
 Serbia, it is evident that the casus fmderis does 
 not arise. It is an action that she undertakes 
 on her own account, since there is no question 
 of defence, as no one thinks of attacking her. 
 It is necessary to make a declaration in this 
 sense to Austria in the most formal way, and 
 
AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS 107 
 
 it is to be wished that German action may dis- 
 suade Austria from her most perilous adven- 
 ture.'" 1 
 
 Now this statement shows upon the face of 
 it two things. One, that Austria was prepared, | ^ 
 by attacking Serbia, to unchain a European 1/ / 
 war; the other, that the ItaKan ministers joined 11/ 
 with Germany to dissuade her. They wereJ 
 successful. Austria abandoned her project, and 
 war was avoided. The episode is as discredit- 
 able as you Hke to Austria. But, on the face 
 of it, how does it discredit Germany? More, 
 of course, may he behind; but no evidence has 
 been produced, so far as I am aware, to show 
 that the Austrian project was approved or sup- 
 ported by her ally. 
 
 The Treaty of 'R ij j^h ^ ^^^^ , ^^ ^ ^^ <"Oti rinHeH 
 the second Balkan War, left all the parties, c on- ^^ 
 cemed dissatisfied. But, in particular, it left 
 the situation between Austria and Serbia an d 
 
 between A nutria ^r\(\ "Rngc^ia more c;trainpfj_fhan 
 
 e ver. It was this situation that was the proxi- 
 mate cause of the present war. For, as we have ' '' 
 seen, a quarrel between Austria and Russia over > ^ 
 
 ^ It is characteristic of the way history is written in .•♦* 
 time of war that M. Yves Guyot, citing GioHtti's state- -^^ 
 ment, omits the references to Germany. See "Les causes 
 et les consequences de la guerre," p. loi. 
 
io8 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 the Balkans must, given the system of alliances, 
 unchain a European war. For producing that 
 situation Austria-Hungary was mainly respon- 
 sible. The part played by Germany was sec- 
 ondary, and throughout the Balkan wars Ger- 
 man diplomacy was certainly working, with 
 England, for peace. "The diplomacy of the 
 Wilhelmstrasse," says Baron Beyens, "apphed 
 itself, above all, to calm the exasperation and 
 the desire for intervention at the Ballplatz." 
 "The Cabinet of Berlin did not follow that of 
 Vienna in its tortuous policy of intrigues at Sofia 
 and Bucharest. As M. Zimmermann said to 
 me at the time, the Imperial Government con- 
 tented itself with maintaining its neutrality 
 in relation to the Balkans, abstaining from any 
 intervention, beyond advice, in the fury of their 
 quarrels. There is no reason to doubt the sin- 
 cerity of this statement." ^ 
 
 15. Morocco 
 
 Let us turn now to the other storm-centre, 
 Morocco. The salient features here were, first, 
 the treaty^jQl, . 1880, to which all the Great Powers, 
 including, of course, Germany, were parties, 
 and which guaranteed to the signatories most- 
 
 ^ ^'L'AUemagne avant la guerre," pp. 248, 262. 
 
MOROCCO 
 
 109 
 
 favoured-nation treatment; secondly, the inter- 
 est of Great Britain to prevent a strong Power 
 from establishing itself opposite Gibraltar and 
 threatening British control over the Straits; 
 thirdly, the interest of France to annex Morocco 
 and knit it up with the North African Empire; 
 fourthly, the new colonial and trading interests 
 of Germany, which, as she had formally an- 
 nounced, could not leave her indifferent to any 
 new dispositions of influence or territory in un- 
 developed countries. For many years French 
 ambitions in Morocco had been held in check 
 by the British desire to maintain the status quo. 
 But the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 gave 
 France a free hand there in return for the aban- 
 donment of French opposition to the British 
 position in Egypt. The Anglo-French treaty 
 of 1904 affirmed, in the clauses made pubhc, 
 the independence and integrity of Morocco; but 
 there were secret clauses looking to its partition. 
 By these the British interest in the Straits was 
 guaranteed by an arrangement which gave to 
 Spain the reversion of the coast opposite Gibral- 
 tar and a strip on the north-west coast, while 
 leaving the rest of the country to fall to France. 
 Germany was not consulted while these arrange- 
 ments were being made, and the secret clauses 
 of the treaty were, of course, not communicated 
 
no THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 to her. But it seems reasonable to suppose that 
 they became known to, or at least were sus- 
 pected by, the German Government shortly 
 after they were adopted.^ And probably it was 
 this that led to the dramatic intervention of 
 the Kaiser at Tangier, ^ when he announced 
 that the independence of Morocco was under 
 German protection. The result was the Con-^ 
 ference of Algeciras, at which the independence 
 and integrity of Morocco was once more affirmed 
 
 ^ See *' Morocco in Diplomacy," Chap. XVI. A dis- 
 patch written by M. Leghait, the Belgian minister in 
 Paris, on May 7, 1905, shows that rumour was busy on 
 the subject. The secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish 
 treaty were known to him, and these provided for an 
 eventual partition of Morocco between France and Spain. 
 He doubted whether there were secret clauses in the 
 Anglo-French treaty — "but it is supposed that there is a 
 [certain tacit understanding by which England would 
 j leave France sufficient liberty of action in Morocco under 
 the reserve of the secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish 
 arrangement, clauses if not imposed yet at least strongly 
 supported by the London Cabinet." 
 
 We know, of course, now, that the arrangement for 
 the partition was actually embodied in secret clauses in 
 the Anglo-French treaty. 
 
 ^According to M. Yves Guyot, when the Kaiser was 
 actually on his way to Tangier, he telegraphed from 
 Lisbon to Prince Biilow abandoning the project. Prince 
 Biilow telegraphed back insisting, and the Kaiser yielded. 
 
MOROCCO III 
 
 (the clauses looking to its partition being still 
 kept secret by the three Powers privy to them), 
 and equal commercial facilities were guaranteed 
 to all the Powers. Germany thereby obtained 
 what she most wanted, what she had a right 
 to by the treaty of 1880, and what otherwise 
 might have been threatened by French occu- 
 pation — the maintenance of the open door. But 
 the French enterprise was not abandoned. Dis- 
 putes with the natives such as always occur, 
 or are manufactured, in these cases, led to fresh 
 military intervention. At the same time, it 
 was difficult to secure the practical application 
 of the principle of equal commercial opportu- 
 nity. An agreement of 1909 between France 
 and Germany, whereby both Powers were to 
 share equally in contracts for pubUc works, 
 was found in practice not to work. The Ger- 
 mans pressed for its application to the new rail- 
 ways projected in Morocco. The French de- 
 layed, temporized, and postponed decision.* 
 /Meantime they were strengthening their posi- 
 ftion in Morocco. The matter was brought to 
 a head by the expedition to Fez. Initiated on 
 
 * See Bourdon, "L'Enigme Allemande," Chap. II. 
 This account, by a Frenchman, will not be suspected 
 of anti-French or pro-German bias, and it is based on 
 French official records. 
 
112 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 the plea of danger to the European residents 
 at the capital (a plea which was disputed by 
 the Germans and by many Frenchmen), it clearly 
 heralded a definite final occupation of the coun- 
 try. The patience of the Germans was exhausted, 
 and the Kaiser made the coup of Agadir. There 
 followed the Mansion House speech of Mr. Lloyd 
 
 I George and the Franco- German agreement of 
 November, 191 1, whereby Germany recognized 
 
 I a French protectorate in Morocco in return 
 for concessions of territory in the French Congo. 
 These are the bare facts of the Moroccan epi- 
 sode. Much, of course, is still unrevealed, par- 
 ticularly as to the motives and intentions of 
 the Powers concerned. Did Germany, for in- 
 stance, intend to seize a share of Morocco when 
 she sent the Panther to Agadir? And was that 
 the reason of the vigour of the British interven- 
 tion? Possibly, but by no means certainly; 
 the evidence accessible is conflicting. If Ger- 
 many had that intention, she was frustrated 
 by the solidarity shown between France and 
 England, and the result was the final and definite 
 absorption of Morocco in the French Empire, 
 with the approval and active support of Great 
 Britain, Germany being compensated by the 
 cession of part of the French Congo. Once more 
 a difl&cult question had been settled by diplo- 
 
MOROCCO 113 
 
 macy, but only after it had twice brought Europe 
 to the verge of war, and in such a way as to leave 
 behind the bitterest feeHngs of anger and mis- 
 trust in all the parties concerned. 
 
 The facts thus briefly summarized here may 
 be studied more at length, with the relevant 
 Mocuments, in Mr. Morel's book "Morocco in 
 i Diplomacy." The reader will form his own 
 opinion on the part played by the various Powers. 
 But I do not believe that any instructed and im- 
 partial student will accept what appears to be 
 the current English view, that the action of 
 Germany in this episode was a piece of sheer 
 aggression without excuse, and that the other 
 Powers were acting throughout justly, hon- 
 estly, and straightforwardly. 
 
 The Morocco crisis, as we have already seen, 
 produced in Germany a painful impression, and 
 strengthened there the elements making for war. 
 Thus Baron Beyens writes : — 
 
 The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto 
 pacific regard another war as a necessary evil.^ 
 
 And again : — 
 
 The pacific settlement of the conflict of 191 1 gave 
 a violent impulse to the war party in Germany, to the 
 propaganda of the League of Defence and the Navy 
 
 ^ "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 216. 
 
114 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 League, and a greater force to their demands. To their 
 dreams of hegemony and domination the desire for revenge 
 against France now mingled its bitterness. A diplomatic 
 success secured in an underground struggle signified noth- 
 ing. War, war in the open, that alone, in the eyes of this 
 rancorous tribe, could settle definitely the Moroccan 
 question by incorporating Morocco and all French Africa 
 in the colonial empire they hoped to create on the shores 
 of the Mediterranean and in the heart of the Black Con- 
 tinent.^ 
 
 This we may take to be a correct descrip- 
 tion of the attitude of the Pangermans. But 
 there is no evidence that it was that of the na- 
 tion. We have seen also that Baron Beyens' 
 impression of the attitude of the German people, 
 even after the Moroccan affair, was of a general 
 desire for peace. ^ The crisis had been severe, 
 but it had been tided over, and the Governments 
 seem to have made renewed efforts to come 
 into friendly relations. In this connection the 
 following dispatch of Baron Beyens (June, 191 2) 
 is worth quoting: — 
 
 After the death of Edward VII, the Kaiser, as well 
 as the Crown Prince, when they returned from Eng- 
 land, where they had been courteously received, were 
 persuaded that the coldness in the relations of the pre- 
 
 ^ "L'AUemagne avant la guerre," p. 235. 
 ^ See above, p. 62. 
 
MOROCCO 115 
 
 ceding years was going to yield to a cordial intimacy 
 between the two Courts and that the causes of the mis- 
 understanding between the two peoples would vanish 
 with the past. His disillusionment, therefore, was cruel 
 when he saw the Cabinet of London range itself last 
 year on the side of France. But the Kaiser is obstinate, 
 and has not abandoned the hope of reconquering the 
 confidence of the EngHsh.^ 
 
 This dispatch is so far borne out by the facts 
 that in the year succeeding the Moroccan crisis 
 a serious attempt was made to improve Anglo- 
 German relations, and there is no reason to 
 doubt that on both sides there was a genuine 
 desire for an understanding. How that under- 
 standing failed has already been indicated. ^ 
 But even that failure did not ruin the relations 
 between the two Powers. In the Balkan crisis, 
 as we have seen and as is admitted on both sides, 
 England and Germany worked together for 
 peace. And the fact that a European conflagra- 
 tion was then avoided, in spite of the tension 
 between Russia and Austria, is a strong proof 
 that the efforts of Sir Edward Grey were sin- 
 cerely and effectively seconded by Germany. ^ 
 
 ^ This view is reafiirmed by Baron Beyens in "L'Alle- 
 magne avant la guerre," p. 29. 
 ^ See above, p. 76. 
 ^ Above, p. 105. 
 
ii6 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 1 6. The Last Years 
 
 We have reached, then, the year 191 3, and 
 the end of the Balkan wars, without discover- 
 ing in German pohcy any clear signs of a deter- 
 mination to produce a European war. We have 
 found all the Powers, Germany included, contend- 
 ing for territory and trade at the risk of the 
 peace of Europe; we have found Germany suc- 
 cessfully developing her interests in Turkey; 
 we have found England annexing the South 
 African republics, France Morocco, Italy Tri- 
 poli; we have found all the Powers stealing in 
 China, and in all these transactions we have 
 found them continually on the point of being 
 at one another's throats. Nevertheless, some 
 last instinct of self-preservation has enabled 
 them, so far, to pull up in time. The crises had 
 been overcome without a war. Yet they had, 
 of course, produced their effects. Some states- 
 men probably, like Sir Edward Grey, had had 
 their passion for peace confirmed by the dangers 
 encountered. In others, no doubt, an opposite 
 effect had been produced, and very likely by 
 1913 there were prominent men in Europe con- 
 vinced that war must come, and manoeuvring 
 only that it should come at the time and occasion 
 most favourable to their country. That, accord- 
 
THE LAST YEARS 117 
 
 ing to M. Cambon, was now the attitude of the 
 German Emperor. M. Cambon bases this view 
 on an alleged conversation between the Kaiser 
 and the King of the Belgians.^ The conversa- 
 tion has been denied by the German oflScial 
 organ, but that, of course, is no proof that it did 
 not take place, and there is nothing improbable 
 in what M. Cambon narrates. 
 
 The conversation is supposed to have occurred 
 in November, 1913, at a time when, as we have 
 seen, 2 there was a distinct outburst in France 
 of anti-German chauvinism, and when the arm- 
 ing and counter-arming of that year had exas- 
 perated opinion to an extreme degree. The 
 Kaiser is reported to have said that war between 
 Germany and France was inevitable. If he 
 did, it is clear from the context that he said it 
 in the belief that French chauvinism would 
 produce war. For the King of the Belgians, 
 in replying, is stated to have said that it was 
 "a travesty of the French Government to inter- 
 
 ^ French Yellow Book, No. 6. In "L'Allemagne avant 
 la guerre" (p. 24) Baron Beyens states that this con- 
 versation was held at Potsdam on November 5th or 6th; 
 the Kaiser said that war between Germany and France 
 was "inevitable and near." Baron Beyens, presumably, 
 is the authority from whom M. Cambon derives his in- 
 formation. 
 
 ^ Above, p. 28. 
 
ii8 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 pret it in that sense, and to let oneself be mis- 
 led as to the sentiments of the French nation 
 by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits 
 or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators." 
 It should be observed also that this supposed 
 attitude on the part of the Kaiser is noted as 
 a change, and that he is credited with having 
 previously stood for peace against the designs of 
 the German Jingoes. His personal influence, 
 says the dispatch, "had been exerted on many 
 critical occasions in support of peace." The 
 fact of a change of mind in the Kaiser is ac- 
 cepted also by Baron Beyens. 
 
 Whatever may be the truth in this matter, 
 neither the German nor the French nor our own 
 Government can then have abandoned the effort 
 at peaceable settlement. For, in fact, by the 
 simimer of 1914, agreements had been made 
 between the Great Powers which settled for 
 the time being the questions immediately out- 
 standing. It is understood that a new parti- 
 \ tion of African territory had been arranged to 
 meet the claims and interests of Germany, France, 
 and England alike. The question of the Bagdad 
 railway had been settled, and everything seemed 
 to favour the maintenance of peace, when, sud- 
 denly, the murder of the Archduke sprang upon 
 a dismayed Europe the crisis that was at last 
 
THE LAST YEARS 119 
 
 to prove fatal. The events that followed, so 
 far as they can be ascertained from published 
 documents, have been so fully discussed that it 
 would be superfluous for me to go over the ground 
 again in all its detail. But I will indicate briefly 
 what appear to me to be the main points of 
 importance in fixing the responsibility for what 
 occurred. 
 
 First, the German view, that England is re- 
 sponsible for the war because she did not pre- 
 vent Russia from entering upon it, I regard as 
 childish, if it is not simply sophistical. The 
 German Powers deliberately take an action which 
 the whole past history of Europe shows must 
 almost certainly lead to a European war, and 
 they then turn round upon Sir Edward Grey 
 and put the blame on him because he did not 
 succeed in preventing the consequences of their 
 own action. "He might have kept Russia out." 
 Who knows whether he might? What we do 
 know is that it was Austria and Germany who 
 brought her in. The German view is really 
 only intelligible upon the assumption that Ger- 
 many has a right to do what she pleases and 
 that the Powers that stand in her way are by 
 definition peacebreakers. It is this extraordi- 
 nary attitude that has been one of the factors 
 for making war in Europe. 
 
I20 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 Secondly, I am not, and have not been, one 
 of the critics of Sir Edward Grey. It is, indeed, 
 possible, as it is always possible after the event, 
 to suggest that some other course might have 
 been more successful in avoiding war. But 
 that is conjecture. I, at any rate, am convinced, 
 as I believe every one outside Germany is con- 
 vinced, that Sir Edward Grey throughout the 
 negotiations had one object only — to avoid, if 
 he could, the catastrophe of war. 
 
 Thirdly, the part of Austria-Hungary is per- 
 fectly clear. She was determined now, as in 
 1913, to have out her quarrel with Serbia, at 
 the risk of a European war. Her guilt is clear 
 and definite, and it is only the fact that we are 
 not directly fighting her with British troops that 
 has prevented British opinion from fastening 
 upon it as the main occasion of the war. 
 
 But this time, quite clearly, Austria was backed 
 by Germany. Why this change in German 
 policy? So far as the Kaiser himself is con- 
 cerned, there can be little doubt that a main 
 cause was the horror he felt at the assassina- 
 tion of the Archduke. The absurd system of 
 autocracy gives to the emotional reactions of 
 an individual a preposterous weight in deter- 
 mining world-policy; and the almost insane 
 feeling of the Kaiser about the sanctity of crowned 
 
THE LAST YEARS 121 
 
 heads was no doubt a main reason why Ger- 
 many backed Austria in sending her ultimatum 
 to Serbia. According to Baron Beyens, on hearing 
 the news of the murder of the Archduke the 
 Kaiser changed colour, and exclaimed: "All the 
 effort of my life for twenty-five years must be 
 begun over again!'' ^ A tragic cry which in- 
 dicates, what I personally believe to be the case, 
 that it has been the constant effort of the Kaiser 
 to keep the peace in Europe, and that he fore- 
 saw now that he would no longer be able to resist 
 war. 
 
 So far, however, it would only be the war 
 between Austria and Serbia that the Kaiser 
 would be prepared to sanction. He might hope 
 to avoid the European war. And, in fact, there 
 is good reason to suppose that both he and the 
 German Foreign Office did cherish that hope 
 or delusion. They had bluffed Russia off in 
 1908. They had the dangerous idea that they 
 might bluff her off again. In this connection 
 Baron Beyens records a conversation with his 
 colleague, M. BoUati, the Italian Ambassador 
 at Berlin, in which the latter took the view that 
 
 at Vienna as at Berlin they were persuaded that Russia, 
 in spite of the oflScial assurances exchanged quite re- 
 
 1 u 
 
 L'AUemagne avant la guerre," p. 273. 
 
122 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 cently between the Tsar and M. Poincare, as to the 
 complete preparations of the armies of the two aUies, 
 was not in a position to sustain a European war and 
 would not dare to plunge into so perilous an adventure. 
 
 Baron Beyens continues : — 
 
 At Berlin the opinion that Russia was unable to face 
 a European war prevailed not only in the official world 
 and in society, but among all the manufacturers who 
 specialized in the construction of armaments. M. Krupp, 
 the best qualified among them to express an opinion, 
 announced on the 28th July, at a table next mine at the 
 Hotel Bristol, that the Russian artillery was neither good 
 nor complete, while that of the German army had never 
 been of such superior quahty. It would be folly on the 
 part of Russia, the great maker of guns concluded, to 
 dare to make war on Germany and Austria in these con- 
 ditions.^ 
 
 But while the attitude of the German Foreign 
 Ofhce and (as I am inclined to suppose) of the 
 Kaiser may have been that which I have just 
 suggested, there were other and more important 
 factors to be considered. It appears ahnost 
 certain that at some point in the crisis the con- 
 trol of the situation was taken out of the hands 
 of the civilians by the military. The position 
 of the miHtary is not difficult to understand. 
 They believed, as professional soldiers usually 
 
 1 <( 
 
 L'AUemagne avant la guerre," p. 280 seq. 
 
THE LAST YEARS 123 
 
 do, in the "inevitability'' of war, and they had, 
 of course, a professional interest in making war. 
 Their attitude may be illustrated from a state- 
 ment attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince Lich- 
 nowsky in 1912:^ "The soldiers think about 
 war. It is their business and their duty. They 
 tell us that the German army is in good order, 
 that the Russian army has not completed its or- 
 ganization, that it would be a good moment . . . 
 but for twenty years they have been saying the 
 same thing." The passage is significant. It 
 shows us exactly what it is we have to dread 
 in "militarism." The danger in a military State 
 is always that when a crisis comes the soldiers 
 will get control, as they seem to have done on 
 this occasion. From their point of view there 
 was good reason. They knew that France and 
 Russia, on a common understanding, were mak- 
 ing enormous military preparations; they knew 
 that these preparations would mature by the 
 beginning of 191 7; they knew that Germany 
 would fight then at a less advantage; they be- 
 lieved she would then have to fight, and they 
 said, "Better fight now." The following dis- 
 patch of Baron Beyens, dated July 26th, may 
 probably be taken as fairly representing their 
 attitude: — 
 
 ^ See "L'Enigme Allemande," p. 96. 
 
124 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the 
 opinion which prevails in the German General Staff, 
 that war with France and Russia is unavoidable and 
 near, an opinion which the Emperor has been induced to 
 share. Such a war, ardently desired by the military and 
 Pangerman party, might be undertaken to-day, as this 
 party think, in circumstances which are extremely favour- 
 able to Germany, and which probably will not again 
 present themselves for some time. Germany has finished 
 the strengthening of her army which was decreed by the 
 law of 19 1 2, and, on the other hand, she feels that she 
 cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments with 
 Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The 
 Wehrbeitrag has been a disappointment for the Imperial 
 Government, to whom it has demonstrated the limits of 
 the national wealth. Russia has made the mistake of 
 making a display of her strength before having finished 
 her military reorganization. That strength will not be 
 formidable for several years: at the present moment 
 it lacks the railway lines necessary for its deployment. 
 As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her 
 deficiency in guns of large calibre, but apparently it is 
 this arm that will decide the fate of battles. For the 
 rest, England, which during the last two years Germany 
 has been trying, not without some success, to detach 
 from France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dis- 
 ; sensions and her Irish quarrels. •■• 
 
 It will be noticed that Baron Beyens sup- 
 poses the Kaiser to have been in the hands of 
 the soldiers as early as July 26th. On the other 
 
 ^ Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 8. 
 
THE LAST YEARS 125 
 
 hand, as late as August 5th Beyens believed 
 that the German Foreign Office had been work- 
 ing throughout for peace. Describing an inter- 
 view he had had on that day with Herr Zimmer- 
 mann, he writes: — 
 
 From this interview I brought away the impression 
 that Herr Zimmermann spoke to me with his customary 
 sincerity, and that the Department for Foreign Affairs 
 since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict had 
 been on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was 
 not due to it that its views and counsels had not pre- 
 vailed. ... A superior power intervened to precipitate 
 the march of events. It was the ultimatum from Ger- 
 many to Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very mo- 
 ment when the Vienna Cabinet was showing itself more 
 disposed to conciliation, which let loose the war.^ 
 
 Why was that ultimatum sent? According 
 to the German apologists, it was sent because 
 Russia had mobilized on the German frontier 
 at the critical moment, and so made war in- 
 evitable. There is, indeed, no doubt that the 
 tension was enormously increased throughout 
 the critical days by mobilization and rumours 
 of mobilization. The danger was clearly pointed 
 out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the 
 Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd to his Gov- 
 ernment : — 
 
 ^ Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 52. 
 
126 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 As the result of reports about measures taken for mob- 
 ilization of Russian troops, Count Pourtales [German 
 Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the Russian Minis- 
 ter's attention in the most serious manner to the fact 
 that nowadays measures of mobilization would be a 
 highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure. For in that 
 event the purely military consideration of the question 
 by the General Staffs would find expression, and if that 
 button were once touched in Germany the situation would 
 get out of control.^ 
 
 On the other hand, it must be remembered 
 that in 1909 Austria had mobilized against Serbia 
 and Montenegro,^ and in 191 2-13 Russia and 
 Austria had mobilized against one another with- 
 out war ensuing in either case. Moreover, in 
 view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, 
 it is difficult to believe that a day or two would 
 make the difference between security and ruin 
 to Germany. However, it is possible that the 
 Kaiser was so advised by his soldiers, and gen- 
 uinely believed the country to be in danger. 
 We do not definitely know. What we do know 
 is, that it was the German ultimatum that pre- 
 cipitated the war. 
 
 We are informed, however, by Baron Beyens 
 that even at the last moment the German Foreign 
 Office made one more effort for peace: — 
 
 ^ Austrian Red Book, No. 28, ^ See p. 103. 
 
THE MORAL 127 
 
 As no reply had been received from St. Petersburg 
 by noon the next day [after the dispatch of the German 
 ultimatum], MM. de Jagow and Zimmermann (I have it 
 from the latter) hurried to the Chancellor and the Kaiser 
 to prevent the issue of the order for general mobilization, 
 and to persuade his Majesty to wait till the following day. 
 It was the last effort of their dying pacifism, or the last 
 awakening of their conscience. Their efforts were broken 
 against the irreducible obstinacy of the Minister of War 
 and the army chiefs, who represented to the Kaiser the 
 disastrous consequences of a delay of twenty-four hours. ^ 
 
 17. The Responsibility and the Moral 
 
 It will be seen from this brief account that 
 so far as the pubhshed evidence goes I agree 
 with the general view outside Germany that 
 the responsibihty for the war at the last moment 
 rests with the Powers of Central Europe. The 
 Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, which there can 
 be no reasonable doubt was known to and ap- 
 proved by the German Government, was the 
 first crime. And it is hardly palliated by the 
 hope, which no well-informed men ought to 
 have entertained, that Russia could be kept 
 out and the war limited to Austria and Serbia. 
 The second crime was the German ultimatum 
 to Russia and to France. I have no desire what- 
 
 * "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 301. 
 
128 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 ever to explain away or palliate these clear facts. 
 But it was not my object in writing this pamph- 
 let to reiterate a judgment which must already 
 be that of all my readers. What I have wanted 
 to do is to set the tragic events of those few 
 days of diplomacy in their proper place in the 
 whole complex of international politics. And 
 what I do dispute with full conviction is the 
 view which seems to be almost universally held 
 in England, that Germany had been pursuing for 
 years past a policy of war, while all the other 
 Powers had been pursuing a poHcy of peace. 
 The war finally provoked by Germany was, I 
 am convinced, conceived as a "preventive war.'' 
 And that means that it was due to the behef 
 that if Germany did not fight then she would 
 be compelled to fight at a great disadvantage 
 later. I have written in vain if I have not con- 
 vinced the reader that the European anarchy 
 inevitably provokes that state of mind in the 
 Powers, and that they all live constantly under 
 the threat of war. To understand the action 
 of those who had power in Germany during the 
 critical days it is necessary to bear in mind all 
 that I have brought mto relief in the preceding 
 pages: the general situation, which grouped 
 the Powers of the Entente against those of the 
 Triple Alliance; the armaments and counter- 
 
THE MORAL 129 
 
 armaments; the colonial and economic rivalry; 
 the racial and national problems in South-East 
 Europe; and the long series of previous crises, 
 in each case tided over, but leaving behind, 
 every one of them, a legacy of fresh mistrust 
 and fear, which made every new crisis worse 
 than the one before. I do not paUiate the re- 1 
 sponsibility of Germany for the outbreak of 
 war. But that responsibility is embedded in 
 and conditioned by a responsibihty deeper and 
 more general — the responsibility of all the Powers 
 alike for the European anarchy. t 
 
 If I have convinced the reader of this he will, 
 I think, feel no difficulty in following me to a 
 further conclusion. Since the causes of thisi 
 war, and of all wars, lie so deep in the whole 
 international system, they cannot be perma- 
 nently removed by the "punishment" or the 
 "crushing" or any other drastic treatment of 
 any Power, let that Power be as guilty as you 
 please. Whatever be the issue of this war, one»» 
 thing is certain: it will bring no lasting peace 
 to Europe unless it brings a radical change both . 
 in the spirit and in the organization of inter- .) 
 national politics. /* 
 
 What that change must be may be deduced 
 from the foregoing discussion of the causes of 
 the war. The war arose from the rivalry ofi 
 
130 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 'States in the pursuit of power and wealth. This 
 is universally admitted. Whatever be the di- 
 versities of opinion that prevail in the different 
 countries concerned, nobody pretends that the 
 war arose out of any need of civilization, out 
 I of any generous impulse or noble ambition. It 
 arose, according to the popular view in Eng- 
 land, solely and exclusively out of the ambition 
 of Germany to seize territory and power. It 
 arose, according to the popular German view, 
 out of the ambition of England to attack and 
 destroy the rising power and wealth of Germany. 
 Thus to each set of belligerents the war appears 
 as one forced upon them by sheer wickedness, 
 and from neither point of view has it any kind 
 of moral justification. These views, it is true, are 
 both too simple for the facts. But the account 
 given in the preceding pages, imperfect as it 
 is, shows clearly, what further knowledge will 
 I only make more explicit, that the war proceeded 
 I out of rivalry for empire between all the Great 
 * Powers in every part of the world. The con- 
 tention between France and Germany for the 
 control of Morocco, the contention between 
 Russia and Austria for the control of the Balkans, 
 the contention between Germany and the other 
 Powers for the control of Turkey — these were 
 the causes of the war. And this contention 
 
THE MORAL 131 
 
 for control is prompted at once by the desire 
 for power and the desire for wealth. In practice 
 the two motives are found conjoined. But to 
 different minds they appeal in different pro- 
 portions. There is such a thing as the love of^* 
 power for its own sake. It is known in individ- 
 uals, and it is known in States, and it is the most 
 disastrous, if not the most evil, of the human 
 passions. The modern German philosophy of* 
 the State turns almost exclusively upon this 
 idea; and here, as elsewhere, by giving to a pas- 
 sion an intellectual form, the Germans have 
 magnified its force and enhanced its monstrosity. 
 But the passion itself is not peculiar to Germans, 
 nor is it only they to whom it is and has been 
 a motive of State. Power has been the fetish 
 of kings and emperors from the beginning of 
 political history, and it remains to be seen whether 
 it will not continue to inspire democracies. The 
 passion for empire ruined the Athenian democ- 
 racy, no less than the Spartan or the Venetian 
 oligarchy, or the Spain of Philip II, or the France 
 of the Monarchy and the Empire. But it still 
 makes its appeal to the romantic imagination. 
 Its intoxication has lain behind this war, and 
 it will prompt many others if it survives, when 
 the war is over, either in the defeated or the 
 conquering nations. It is not only the jingoism 
 
132 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 of Germany that Europe has to fear. It is the 
 jingoism that success may make supreme in 
 any country that may be victorious. 
 
 * But while power may be sought for its own 
 sake, it is commonly sought by modern States 
 
 lias a means to wealth. It is the pursuit of mar- 
 kets and concession and outlets for capital that 
 lies behind the colonial policy that leads to wars. 
 States compete for the right to exploit the weak, 
 and in this competition Governments are prompted 
 
 for controlled by financial interests. The British 
 went to Egypt for the sake of the bondholders, 
 the French to Morocco for the sake of its min- 
 
 terals and wealth. In the Near East and the Far 
 it is commerce, concessions, loans that have led 
 to the rivalry of the Powers, to war after war, 
 to "punitive expeditions" and — irony of ironies! — 
 to "indemnities'' exacted as a new and special 
 form of robbery from peoples who rose in the 
 endeavour to defend themselves against rob- 
 
 »«bery. The Powers combine for a moment to 
 suppress the common victim, the next they are 
 at one another's throats over the spoil. That 
 really is the simple fact about the quarrels of 
 
 "States over colonial and commercial policy. So 
 long as the exploitation of undeveloped coun- 
 tries is directed by companies having no object 
 
 • in view except dividends, so long as financiers 
 
THE SETTLEMENT 133 
 
 prompt the policy of Governments, so long as 1 
 military expeditions, leading up to annexations, 
 are undertaken behind the back of the public 
 for reasons that cannot be avowed, so long will 
 the nations end with war, where they have begun 
 by theft, and so long will thousands and millions 
 of innocent and generous lives, the best of Europe, 
 be thrown away to no purpose, because, in the 
 dark, sinister interests have been risking the peace 
 of the world for the sake of money in their pockets. J 
 It is these tremendous underlying facts and 
 tendencies that suggest the true moral of this 
 war. It is these that have to be altered if we 
 are to avoid future wars on a scale as great. 
 
 18. The Settlement 
 
 And now, with all this in our minds, let us 
 turn to consider the vexed question of the settle- 
 ment after the war. There lies before the Western 
 world the greatest of all choices, the choice be- 
 tween destruction and salvation. But that choice 
 does not depend merely on the issue of the war. 
 It depends upon what is done or left undone by 
 the co-operation of all when the war does at 
 last stop. Two conceptions of the future are* 
 contending in all nations. One is the old bad 
 one, that which has presided hitherto at every 1 
 
134 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 'peace and prepared every new war. It assumes 
 that the object of war is solely to win victory, 
 and the object of victory solely to acquire more 
 
 i power and territory. On this view, if the Germans 
 win, they are to annex territory east and west: 
 Belgium and half France, say the more violent; 
 the Baltic provinces of Russia, strategic points 
 of advantage, say the more moderate. On the 
 other hand, if the AUies win, the AlKes are to 
 divide the German colonies, the French are to 
 regain Alsace-Lorraine, and, as the jingoes add, 
 they are to take the whole of the German prov- 
 inces on the left bank of the Rhine, and even 
 territory beyond it. The Italians are to have 
 not only Italia Irredenta but hundreds of thou- 
 sands of reluctant Slavs in Dalmatia; the Russians 
 Constantinople, and perhaps Posen and Galicia. 
 Further, such money indemnities are to be taken 
 as it may prove possible to exact from an already 
 ruined foe; trade and commerce with the enemy 
 is to be discouraged or prohibited; and, above 
 all, a bitter and unforgiving hatred is to reign 
 for ever between the victor and the vanquished. 
 
 *This is the kind of view of the settlement of Eu- 
 rope that is constantly appearing in the articles 
 and correspondence of the Press of all countries. 
 Ministers are not as careful as they should be 
 
 I to repudiate it. The nationalist and imperialist 
 
THE SETTLEMENT 135 
 
 cliques of all nations endorse it. It is, one could * 
 almost fear, for something like this that the peo- 
 ples are being kept at war, and the very existence 
 of civilization jeopardized. t 
 
 Now, whether anything of this kind really can 
 be achieved by the war, whether there is the 
 least probability that either group of Powers can 
 win such a victory as would make the programme 
 on either side a reahty, I will not here discuss. 
 The reader will have his own opinion. What 
 I am concerned with is the effect any such solu- 
 tion would have upon the future of Europe. Those 
 who desire such a close may be divided into two 
 classes. The one frankly believes in war, in domi- 
 nation, and in power. It accepts as inevitable, 
 and welcomes as desirable, the perpetual armed 
 conflict of nations for territory and trade. It 
 does not beheve in, and it does not want, a dura- 
 ble peace. It holds that all peace is, must be, 
 and ought to be, a precarious and regrettable 
 interval between wars. I do not discuss this 
 view. Those who hold it are not accessible to 
 argument, and can only be met by action. There 
 are others, however, who do think war an evil, 
 who do want a durable peace, but who genuinely 
 believe that the way indicated is the best way to 
 achieve it. With them it is permitted to discuss, 
 and it should be possible to do so without bitter- 
 
136 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 ness or rage on either side. For as to the end, 
 there is agreement; the difference of opinion is 
 as to the means. The position taken is this: 
 The enemy dehberately made this war of aggres- 
 sion against us, without provocation, in order 
 to destroy us. If it had not been for this wicked- 
 ness there would have been no war. The enemy, 
 therefore, must be punished; and his punishment 
 must make him permanently impotent to repeat 
 the offence. That having been done, Europe will 
 have durable peace, for there will be no one left 
 able to break it who will also want to break it. 
 Now, I believe all this to be demonstrably a 
 miscalculation. It is contradicted both by our 
 knowledge of the way human nature works and 
 by the evidence of history. In the first place, 
 wars do not arise because only one nation or group 
 of nations is wicked, the others being good. For 
 the actual outbreak of this war, I beHeve, as I 
 
 » have already said, that a few powerful individuals 
 in Austria and in Germany were responsible. 
 |But the ultimate causes of war lie much deeper. 
 jIn them all States are implicated. And the punish- 
 .|ment, or even the annihilation, of any one nation 
 
 •I would leave those causes still subsisting. Wipe 
 out Germany from the map, and, if you do noth- 
 ing else, the other nations will be at one another's 
 « throats "in the old way, for the old causes. They 
 
THE SETTLEMENT 137 
 
 would be quarrelling, if about nothing else, about ' 
 the division of the spoil. While nations continue 
 to contend for power, while they refuse to sub- 
 .tjtute law for force, there will continue to be 
 wars. And while they devote the best of their* 
 brains and the chief of their resources to arma- 
 ments and miHtary and naval organization, each 
 war will become more terrible, more destructive, 
 and more ruthless than the last. This is irrefut- 
 able truth. I do not beheve there is a man or 
 woman able to understand the statement who 
 will deny it. 
 
 In the second place, the enemy nation cannot, 
 in fact, be annihilated, nor even so far weakened, 
 relatively to the rest, as to be incapable of recover- 
 ing and putting up another fight. The notions 
 of dividing up Germany among the Allies, or of 
 adding France and the British Empire to Ger- 
 many, are sheerly fantastic. There will remain, 
 when all is done, the defeated nations — if, in- 
 deed, any nation be defeated. Their territories 
 cannot be permanently occupied by enemy troops; 
 they themselves cannot be permanently prevented 
 by physical force from building up new armaments. 
 So long as they want their revenge, they will 
 be able sooner or later to take it. If evidence of 
 this were wanted, the often-quoted case of Prussia 
 after Jena will suffice. 
 
138 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 And, in the third place, the defeated nations, 
 so treated, will, in fact, want their revenge. There 
 seems to be a curious illusion abroad, among the 
 English and their allies, that not only is Germany- 
 guilty of the war, but that all Germans know it 
 in their hearts; that, being guilty, they will fully 
 accept punishment, bow patiently beneath the 
 yoke, and become in future good, harmonious 
 members of the European family. The illusion 
 is grotesque. There is hardly a German who 
 does not believe that the war was made by Russia 
 and by England; that Germany is the innocent 
 victim; that all right is on her side, and all wrong 
 on that of the AlHes. If, indeed, she were beaten, 
 and treated as her "punishers" desire, this belief 
 would be strengthened, not weakened. In every 
 German heart would abide, deep and strong, the 
 sense of an iniquitous triumph of what they be- 
 lieve to be wrong over right, and of a duty to 
 redress that iniquity. Outraged national pride 
 would be reinforced by the sense of injustice; 
 and the next war, the war of revenge, would be 
 prepared for, not only by every consideration of 
 interest and of passion, but by every cogency of 
 righteousness. The fact that the Germans are 
 mistaken in their view of the origin of the war 
 has really nothing to do with the case. It is not 
 the truth, it is j^hat men believe to hq fct^e truth^ 
 
THE SETTLEMENT 139 
 
 that influences their action. And I do not think 
 any study of dispatches is going to alter the 
 German view of the facts. 
 
 But it is sometimes urged that the war was 
 made by the German mihtarists, that it is unpop- 
 ular with the mass of the people, and that if 
 Germany is utterly defeated the people will rise 
 and depose their rulers, become a true democracy, 
 and join fraternal hands with the other nations 
 of Europe. That Germany should become a true 
 democracy might, indeed, be as great a guarantee 
 of peace as it .might be that other nations, called 
 democratic, should really become so in their for- 
 eign policy as well as in their domestic affairs. 
 But what proud nation will accept democracy 
 as a gift from insolent conquerors? One thing 
 that the war has done, and one of the worst, is 
 to make of the Kaiser, to every German, a symbol 
 of their national unity and national force. Just 
 because we abuse their militarism, they affirm 
 and acclaim it; just because we attack their gov- 
 erning class, they rally round it. Nothing could 
 be better calculated than this war to strengthen 
 the hold of militarism in Germany, unless it be 
 the attempt of her enemies to destroy her mili- 
 tarism by force. For consider! In the view we 
 are examining it is proposed, first to kill the 
 greater part of her combatants, next to invade 
 
I40 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 her territory, destroy her towns and villages, and 
 exact (for there are those who demand it) penal- 
 ties in kind, actual tit for tat, for what Germans 
 have done in Belgium. It is proposed to enter 
 the capital in triumph. It is proposed to shear 
 away huge pieces of German territory. And then, 
 when all this has been done, the conquerors are 
 to turn to the German nation and say: "Now, 
 all this we have done for your good! Depose 
 your wicked rulers! Become a democracy! Shake 
 hands and be a good fellow!'' Does it not sound 
 grotesque? But, really, that is what is proposed. 
 I have spoken about British and French pro- 
 posals for the treatment of Germany. But all 
 that I have said appHes, of course, equally to 
 German proposals of the same kind for the treat- 
 ment of the conquered Allies. That way is no 
 way towards a durable peace. If it be replied 
 that a durable peace is not intended or desired, 
 I have no more to say. If it be repHed that punish- 
 ment for its own sake is more important than 
 civihzation, and must be performed at all costs 
 —fiat justitia, mat ccelum — then, once more, I 
 have nothing to say. I speak to those, and to 
 those only, who do desire a durable peace, and 
 who have the courage and the imagination to 
 beheve it to be possible, and the determination 
 to work for it. And to them I urge that the 
 
THE CHANGE NEEDED 141 
 
 course I have been discussing cannot lead to their 
 goal. What can? 
 
 19. The Change Needed 
 
 First, a change of outlook. We must give up, 
 in all nations, this habit of dwelUng on the unique 
 and peculiar wickedness of the enemy. We must 
 recognize that behind the acts that led up to the 
 immediate outbreak of war, behind the crimes 
 and atrocities to which the war has led, as wars 
 always have led, and always will lead — ^behind 
 all that lies a great complex of feehng, prejudice, 
 tradition, false theory, in which all nations and 
 all individuals of all nations are involved. Most 
 men believe, feel, or passively accept that power 
 and wealth are the objects States ought to pursue; 
 that in pursuing these objects they are bound by 
 no code of right in their relations to one another; 
 that law between them is, and must be, as fragile 
 as a cobweb stretched before the mouth of a can- 
 non; that force is the only rule and the only de- 
 terminant of their differences, and that the only 
 real question is when and how the appeal to force 
 may most advantageously be made. This phi- 
 losophy has been expressed with peculiar frankness 
 and brutality by Germans. But most honest and 
 candid men, I believe, will agree that that is 
 
142 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 the way they, too, have been accustomed to think 
 of international affairs. And if illustration were 
 wanted, let them remember the kind of triumphant 
 satisfaction with which the failure of the Hague 
 conferences to achieve any radical results was 
 generally greeted, and the contemptuous and al- 
 most abhorring pity meted out to the people 
 called "pacifists." Well, the war has come! We 
 see now, not only guess, what it means. If that 
 experience has not made a deep impression on 
 every man and woman, if something like a con- 
 version is not being generally operated, then, in- 
 deed, nothing can save mankind from the hell of 
 their own passions and imbeciHties. 
 
 But if otherwise, if that change is going on, 
 then the way to deliverance is neither difficult 
 nor obscure. It does not lie in the direction of 
 crushing anybody. It lies in the taking of certain 
 determinations, and the embodying of them in 
 certain institutions. 
 
 First, the nations must submit to law and to 
 right in the settlement of their disputes. 
 
 Secondly, they must reserve force for the coer- 
 cion of the law-breaker; and that implies that 
 they should construct rules to determine who the 
 law-breaker is. Let him be defined as the one 
 who appeals to force, instead of appealing to law 
 and right by machinery duly provided for that 
 
THE CHANGE NEEDED 143 
 
 purpose, and the aggressor is immediately under 
 the ban of the civilized world, and met by an 
 over:whelming force to coerce him into order. In 
 constructing machinery of this kind there is no 
 intellectual difficulty greater than that which has 
 confronted every attempt everywhere to sub- 
 stitute order for force. The difficulty is moral, 
 and lies in the habits, passions, and wills of men. 
 But it should not be concluded that, if such a 
 moral change could be operated, there would be 
 no need for the machinery. It would be as reason- 
 able to say that Governments, law-courts, and 
 police were superfluous, since, if men were good, 
 they would not require them, and if they are 
 bad they will not tolerate them. Whatever new 
 need, desire, and conviction comes up in mankind, 
 needs embodiment in forms before it can become 
 operative. And, as the separate colonies of Amer- 
 ica could not effectively unite until they had 
 formed a Constitution, so will the States of Europe 
 and the world be unable to maintain the peace, 
 even though all of them should wish to maintain 
 it, unless they will construct some kind of machin- 
 ery for settling their disputes and organizing their 
 common purposes, and will back that machinery 
 by force. If they will do that they may construct 
 a real and effective counterpoise to aggression 
 from any Power in the future. If they will not 
 
144 THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY 
 
 do it, their precautions against any one Power 
 will be idle, for it will be from some other Power 
 that the danger will come. I put it to the reader 
 at the end of this study, which I have made with 
 all the candour and all the honesty at my disposal, 
 and which I believe to represent essentially the 
 truth, whether or no he agrees that the European 
 anarchy is the real cause of European wars, and 
 if he does, whether he is ready for his part to 
 support a serious effort to end it. 
 
 Printed in the United States of America. 
 
'T^HE following pages contain advertisements of a 
 few of the Macmillan books on kindred subjects. 
 
The Diplomacy of the Great War 
 
 By ARTHUR BULLARD 
 
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 A book which contributes to an understanding 
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 function of diplomacy diuring the last generation, 
 so that the reader is in full possession of the gen- 
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 added a chapter of constructive suggestions in 
 respect to the probable diplomatic settlements 
 resulting from the war, and a consideration of the 
 relations between the United States and Europe. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 
 
Roadside Glimpses of the Great War 
 
 By ARTHUR SWEETSER 
 
 n/., cloth, i2mo, $1.2$ 
 
 Mr. Sweetser^s experiences as prisoner of both 
 the Germans and the French are perhaps the 
 most exciting adventures any American has yet 
 described. His book is not a grim, depressing 
 picture of war, but a real, human account of the 
 great conflict, exhilarating in its graphic pictures 
 of the armies and full of many thrilling and hu- 
 morous episodes. 
 
 "A valuable, stirring tale of adventure." — 
 Boston Transcript, 
 
 "Few equally thrilling stories of personal ex- 
 periences have been published." — Bellman, 
 
 "A vivid picture."— iV. Y, Post, 
 
 "Will enthrall the reader from the first page to 
 the last." — Pittsburgh Dispatch, 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 
 
The Aftermath of Battle 
 
 By E. D. TOLAND 
 With a Preface by Owen Wister. With i6 full-page 
 
 PLATES 
 
 Clothy i2mo, $1.00 
 
 " Most of the pages in this book," says Owen Wister in 
 his preface, *' are like the photographs which go with 
 them, torn fresh and hot, so to speak, from the diary of a 
 young American just as he jotted them down day by day 
 in the war hospitals of France." Of the author's service 
 and of the nature of his record of it Mr. Wister continues : 
 " In those hospitals ... he served the wounded Germans 
 and allies, he carried them upstairs and down, or in from 
 the rain, he assisted at operations, he held basins, he gave 
 ether, he built the kitchen fire, he pumped the water, he 
 was chauffeur, forager, commissariat, he helped in what 
 ways he could, as he was ordered and also as his own 
 intelligence prompted in the not infrequent absence of 
 orders. He saw the wounded die, he saw them get well, 
 and he tells about them, their sufferings, their courage, 
 their patience. ... As page succeeds page, written with- 
 out art, yet with the effect of high art, with the effect, for 
 example, of DeFoe's account of the Plague, the reader 
 ceases to be looking at a picture ; he is himself zn the pic- 
 ture, its terrific realities surround him as if he were walk- 
 ing among them." 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Fublisliers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York 
 
Ordeal by Battle 
 
 By FREDERICK SCOTT OLIVER 
 
 New American Edition ^ cloth, 8vo, $i.jo 
 
 "The first great book on the war. ... It 
 deals, and deals worthily and greatly, with the 
 mightiest issues ever known to the world. . . . 
 By one of those rare men in whom hard thinking 
 and clear writing go together. . . . AHve and 
 luminous; adorned with portraits, enriched with 
 studies of character and performance." — New 
 York Tribune. 
 
 "A genuine book, a great and necessary adven- 
 ture in difficult truth- telling." — London Saturday 
 
 Review, 
 
 "A rare eloquence and a wealth of illustration 
 which recalls Burke. ... A storehouse of polit- 
 ical thought, set out with a precision and an elo- 
 quence which have been absent from the literature 
 of pontics. . . . Every page is Ht up by some 
 memorable phrase." — The London Times. 
 
 "A big book and a valuable book. A stirring 
 appeal, able, eloquent, vigorous and sincere. Here 
 at last is a man who has a definite thesis to main- 
 tain." — New Republic. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenu© New York 
 
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