C h i'ti 3 
 
 Foi‘. Ties 
 
 CHINA’S CLAIMS 
 
 at the 
 
 PEACE TABLE 
 
CHINA’S CLAIMS 
 
 at the 
 
 PEACE TABLE 
 
 Published by 
 
 CHINESE PATRIOTIC COMMITTEE 
 New York City 
 
 March. 1Q19 
 
'' \ ' A •• 
 
 
 / 
 
 
 i 
 
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 / 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 A. China and the I.eague of Nations 5 
 
 B. China’s Peace Claims ii 
 
 I. The Unconditional Return of Kiao- 
 
 Chou II 
 
 If. The Nullification of Chino-Japanese 
 Treaties of 1915 and Secret Agree- 
 ments of 1918 18 
 
 III. The Cancellation of Boxer Indemnity. 27 
 
 IV. The Restoration of TarifI Autonomy 31 
 
 V. The Relinquishment of Extra-Terri- 
 torial Jurisdiction 36 
 
 VI. The Retrocession of Leased Terri- 
 tories 44 
 
 VII. The Abolition of Financial Imperialism 48 
 
 Summary 
 
 59 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2017 with funding from 
 Columbia University Libraries 
 
 https://archive.org/details/chinasclaimsatpeOOchin_0 
 
CHINA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 
 Among all the powers of the world, great and small, 
 now gathering at the Paris Conference, China en- 
 dorses the plan of the League of Nations most unhesi- 
 tatingly and wholeheartedly. Immediately after the 
 announcement of the proposed League Constitution, 
 China, throughout the length and breadth of the Re- 
 public, entertains hut one sentiment, that, hereafter a 
 new order of nationalism and internationalism based 
 on right and justice is to reign in the world, and by 
 this new order, China hopes to get an honorable place 
 among the family of nations, which she is legally and 
 morally entitled to, and by which she will be able not 
 only to realize her material development without moles- 
 tation from outside, but also to render greater and bet- 
 ter services to mankind at large. This universal senti- 
 ment of China has been voiced by both her government 
 and people. From Peking and from elsewhere, cables 
 of congratulation have been forwarded to President 
 Wilson, the founder of the League, with messages of 
 appreciation and pledges of support for the newly 
 organized international federation. Dr. V. K. Well- 
 ington Koo, one of China’s delegates at Paris, and one 
 of the members on the committee of the drafting of 
 the League Constitution, has repeatedly declared 
 China’s strong and firm stand for the League, in the 
 council meetings as well as in the plenary sessions. 
 Why does China have such an undivided and over- 
 whelming enthusiasm and faith in the League ? 
 
 China endorses the League of Nations, because she 
 agrees with the ideals and principles involved, in her 
 heart, not merely in words. She believes in intema- 
 
 5 
 
tional amity and good will in the strictest sense of the 
 term. She aspires to nothing but peace and-friendship 
 with other powers. Militarism and imperialism China 
 dislikes most, for they are alien and unknown to the 
 democratic mind of the Chinese people. The ethical 
 code for international relations that China has learned 
 from her long-continuous history and age-honored 
 civilization is one of mutual respect and unselfish 
 cooperation among the parties concerned. Friendly 
 relations should always be maintained one nation with 
 another; and international disputes or quarrels if any, 
 should always be settled through amicable means. Small 
 and weak nations should be left unfettered and un- 
 molested; and a common enemy menacing the world 
 peace should be crushed by all members of the society 
 of nations, through diplomatic channels, if possible, and 
 through armed demonstration if necessary. Interna- 
 tional rivalries and intrigues, as such, have never been 
 taught by China’s old teachers ; and war is always 
 against the moral conception of Chinese philosophy. 
 In these ideals and principles China, as a nation, be- 
 lieves from time immemorial; and in these ideals and 
 principles the League of Nations promises a permanent 
 peace of the world for the ages to come. This coinci- 
 dence of fundamentals makes China’s membership in 
 the League one of instinctive affiliation rather than 
 one of artificial inclination. 
 
 China, as a member of the League, has a supreme 
 duty to perform, a duty of helping the realization of 
 ideals and principles, for which both she herself and 
 the League stand. First and foremost, China chooses 
 to appeal to the liberal world for a complete readjust- 
 ment of the Far Eastern status. In appealing for this 
 
 6 
 
readjustment, China is working for the interests of the 
 world peace, not for the interest of herself alone, be- 
 cause the Far Eastern problem, if not solved now once 
 and for all, would cause another world catastrophe as 
 disastrous as the one just ended. Ever since the con- 
 tact of the Orient with the Occident, the Far East has 
 been a field of intrigues and rivalries among the Euro- 
 pean and the Europeanized states ; and China has been 
 the target of all the evil forces of the bye-gone genera- 
 tion. Non -militaristic and peace-loving as China is, she 
 has 'been mercilessly treated as an inexhausti- 
 ble prey of “Secret Treaties,” “Spheres of Influence,” 
 and “Balance of Powers.” The history of the Far 
 Eastern diplomacy played by different powers con- 
 tains dark records shameful both to humanity and 
 civilization, incompatible either with Kultur, or with 
 culture, or with Bushido. Not for one day during 
 the last few decades, China has ceased to be the victim 
 of the ever condemnable aspiration known as imperial- 
 ism, be it political, economic, religious, or otherwise, 
 aspired to by one nation or another, particularly by her 
 Germanized neighbor in late years. The Far 'East has 
 thus become a centre of complicated troubles. In 
 China there are still growing conflicts of interests and 
 policies of different nations ; these conflicts alone, re- 
 gardless of the natural opposition on the part of the 
 Chinese, would be enough to lead into another world- 
 wide bloody struggle. This, however, the Peace 
 delegates at Paris are seeking to avoid, and the spirit 
 of the League does not allow. 
 
 That China has ample justification in her claim of 
 readjusting her relations with foreign powers, no one 
 will deny. But will the European and the European 
 
 7 
 
states consent to such a readjustment unconditionally? 
 Surely they will, if not for the sake of China, then 
 for the sake of the newly founded League. The 
 League of Nations will be absurd and meaningless 
 if it will tolerate further continuance of old immoral 
 as well as impolitic policies practiced by the powers in 
 the Orient. With the birth of the League, a new era 
 has been inaugurated. The age of imperialisim, im- 
 perialism of any description, is gone forever. China 
 is just as tired of her humiliations as the world is 
 tired of wars. The world democracy cries for the 
 elimination of future wars; and the new regime of 
 liberalism calls for an immediate renunciation of 
 China’s humiliations. All the wrongs that China has 
 suffered from other powers during the last century, 
 and for which she herself has never been responsible, 
 must be one and all righted. Before the League of 
 Nations can be secure and before China can become 
 an effective and efficient member of the League her 
 complete sovereignty and independence must be re- 
 stored. Before the world is safe for democracy, the 
 Pacific must be preserved pacific. In this appeal 
 China is aiming, neither at revenge nor at her own 
 nationalistic interest, but at the perfection of the 
 League ideals and principles in deeds as well as in 
 letter. She is sure that the other members of the 
 League will share her aim, which is common to all 
 and antagonistic to none. 
 
 China is a nation with an enormous population and 
 unlimited resources, backed up by a splendid history 
 and advanced civilization. She has never upheld the 
 selfish ambition of taking alone, but not giving. As 
 one of the members of the League, she is willing to- 
 
 8 
 
serve the world any way possible, either toward ma- 
 terial progress or toward spiritual advancement. 
 Materially her inexhaustible resources and labor will 
 increase the comfort and luxury of every nation ; and 
 spiritually, her ancient history and civilization will 
 contribute intellectual delightfulness and ethical 
 wholesomeness to mankind. She has been expect- 
 ing to render these services to her sister nations in 
 return for her debt to the mo'dern scientific learning 
 of the West, but she has never been given a chance, 
 for every step she moves she is hampered by treaties 
 or concessions with one polwer or another. Unless 
 China is left free to manage her own affairs, the ideal 
 civilization for the new era as sought by the League 
 of Nations will remain only as a dream. If the 
 League of Nations is to mean future happiness for 
 mankind, China’s international standing must be re- 
 vised, so that she can play her important role of the 
 League programme well. 
 
 Unfortunately or fortunately, China’s case should 
 assume such an importance and magnitude at Paris 
 Conference. Her claims at the Peace Table as out- 
 lined in the following pages should not be overlooked. 
 They are in fact the crucial tests of the ideals and 
 principles of the League of Nations. The success or 
 failure of the League depends upon the solution of 
 the Far Eastern question. If the spirit of the League 
 is to be applicable to China, then the prospect of the 
 new regime is bright and safe. If China, after such 
 a display of enthusiasm and faith over the League 
 plan, is to be disappointed by the verdict of the Con- 
 ference, then the future of the League will be 
 very much in doubt. The problem of the Far East is 
 
 9 
 
indeed momentous. Four hundred millions of peo- 
 ple are facing a life and death sentence at Paris ; and 
 upon this sentence the fate of the permanent peace of 
 the world is going to depend. China pleads for noth- 
 ing but fair play and sound judgment. For the interest 
 of the world peace and for the interest of four hun- 
 dred millions of people a death sentence should not be 
 tolerated by the enlightened powers, particularly the 
 United States of America, in whom China has deepest 
 confidence and by whom the upright plan of the 
 League of Nations is originated. 
 
 10 
 
CHINA’S PEACE CLAIMS 
 
 I. The Unconditional Return of Kiao-Chou 
 
 Kiao-Chou, including the commercial port of Tsing- 
 tao, is an integral part of Chinese territory. It is 
 situated on the southern coast of Shantung Province. 
 The Bay of Kiao-Chou, together with the port of 
 Tsingtao, forms one of the finest commercial centres of 
 the world'. Kiao-tChou, owing to its promontories 
 overlooking the Gulf of Chih-Li, has great military 
 and naval value, both for offensive and defensive pur- 
 poses; and from Tsing-tao, the Kiao-Chou-Tsinan 
 Railroad controls the mainland of Shantung, leading to 
 Chih-Li Province in which is located the capital of 
 China, Peking. 
 
 Since 1898, Kiao-Chou has been leased to the for- 
 mer German Government for 99 years, because of a 
 trivial murder of two Catholic missionaries by native 
 Chinese. Following this precedent, one nation after 
 another came to China'for territory ; the lease of Kiao- 
 Chou thus marked the beginning of dark history of Far 
 Eastern diplomacy. When the war broke out in Europe 
 in 1914, China, seeing the opportunity to destroy the 
 miniature of German Kultur in the Orient, established 
 in Kiao-Chou, offered to declare war on Germany ; but 
 this offer was refused by Japan, and by Japan alone, 
 obviously for her selfish motives. Instead, the Island 
 Empire demanded Germany to withdraw her occupa- 
 tion from Kiao-Chou; and upon failure of the latter’s 
 answer, she, with the help of British military and 
 naval forces, crossed neutral territory of China and 
 captured her objective, Kiao-Chou, including Tsing- 
 tao, on November 7, 1914. Since the capture, Japan 
 
has been Japanizing the territory all the time. She 
 collected the customs duty from the port, which for 
 the four years has run up to tens of millions of dollars. 
 She replaced German administration, with methods 
 and systems peculiarly Japanese. She maintained a 
 large army and a strong fleet in Kiao-Chou, which was 
 called for by no occasion. She has sent to the terri- 
 tory thousands of Japanese subjects, representing all 
 kinds of petty professions, including prostitution. 
 Worse than that, she has even established civil ad- 
 ministration and military stations along the Kiao- 
 Chou-Tsinan Railroad, outside the territory of Kiao- 
 Chou, which the Germans never dared to do. In spite 
 of numerous protests from Chinese Government and 
 people, Japan showed little willingness to modify her 
 policy until very recently. 
 
 On the day when Japan sent her ultimatum to Ger- 
 many in August, 1914, Count Okuma, then the Japa- 
 nese Premier, telegraphed to the press in America, 
 saying: “Japan’s proximity \ to China breeds many 
 absurd rumors, but I declare that Japan acts with a 
 clear conscience in conformity with justice, and in 
 perfect accord with her ally. Japan has no territorial 
 ambitions and hopes to stand as the protector of the 
 peace in the Orient.’’ On another occasion he reiter- 
 ated his statement as follows : “As Premier of Japan, 
 I have stated and I now again state to the people of 
 America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior 
 motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought 
 of depriving China or other people of anything that 
 they now possess. My Government and my people 
 have given their pledge which will be as honorably 
 kept as Japan always keeps promises.’’ Public state- 
 
 12 
 
ments to the similar effect have been once and again 
 issued by Japanese governmental officials. Even as 
 late as January 21, 1919, Viscount Uchida, the Japa- 
 nese Foreign Minister, told the world through his 
 speech in Japanese Parliament, “It goes without say- 
 ing that Japan has no territorial ambition in China or 
 elsewhere, neither does she contemplate any action 
 which might militate against that development of the 
 legitimate intent and welfare of the Chinese nation. 
 We have solemnly pledged ourselves to respect the 
 territorial integrity of China and to abide faithfully 
 by the principle of equal opportunity and the open 
 door for commerce and industry.” But all these state- 
 ments became meaningless, when Premier Kara 
 answered the interpellation in the Japanese Diet on 
 February 21, 1919, that he did not see any reason for 
 China to claim the restoration of Tsing-tao. 
 
 While the Japanese Premier and other Japanese 
 expansionists fail to see the ground of China’s claim, 
 we Chinese fail to see the reasoning of Japanese logic 
 tinged with Teutonic philosophy. The only argu- 
 ment that the Japanese may base their contentions 
 that they have the right to keep Kiao-Chou and Tsing- 
 tao as their own is deducted from the following treaty 
 and note between China and Japan. 
 
 a. Treaty of May 25, 1915, respecting the Prov- 
 ince of Shantung: Article 1 . The Chinese Gov- 
 ernment agrees to give full assent to all matters 
 upon which the Japanese Government may here- 
 after agree with the German Government relating 
 to the disposition of all rights, interests, and con- 
 cessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or 
 
 13 
 
otherwise, possess in relation to the Province 
 of Shantung. 
 
 b. Exchange 6f Notes on May 25, 1915, respect- 
 ing the restoration of the leased territory of Kiao- 
 Chou Bay: When, after the termination of the 
 present war, the Leased Territory of Kiao^Chou 
 is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, 
 the Japanese Government will restore the said 
 leased territory to China under the following con- 
 ditions : 
 
 1. The whole of Kiao-Chou Bay to be opened as 
 a commercial port. 
 
 2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction 
 of Japan to be established at a place designated 
 by the Japanese Government. 
 
 3. If the powers desire it, an international con- 
 cession may be established. 
 
 4. As regard the disposal to be made of the build- 
 ings and properties of Germany and the condi- 
 tions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese 
 Government and the Chinese Government shall 
 arrange the matter by mutual agreement before 
 the restoration. 
 
 This treaty and note were signed and exchanged 
 under pressure of force. Plainly speaking, they 
 amount to the old philosophy — might is right. By 
 this philosophy Japan maintains that by virtue of her 
 conquest over the Germans she subsequently succeeds 
 the enjoyment of all German rights and privileges in 
 Kiao-Chou conceded by China to the former German 
 
 14 
 
Government through treaty or otherwise. She fur- 
 ther maintains that if Kiao-Chou is to be returned to 
 China, the above quoted four specified conditions must 
 be fulfilled by China. 
 
 Against these contentions China maintains the fol- 
 lowing : 
 
 A. Legally Japan has no justification to keep Kiao- 
 Chou. China’s declaration of war on Teutonic 
 Powers in August, 1917, abrogated all treaties and 
 agreements existing between China and the former 
 German Government, and automatically terminated 
 at the same time the Chino-Japanese Treaty of May 
 25, 1915, respecting the Province of Shantung. Upon 
 this abrogation and termination of treaties and agree- 
 ments, including the lease of Kiao-Chou, China is the 
 only one who has the right to claim back all interests 
 and privileges conceded to the former German Gov- 
 ernment. The mere fact that Japan captured Kiao- 
 Chou from 'the Germans does not give Japan any right 
 of succession over the interests and privileges en- 
 joyed by the Germans since 1898, because China 
 signed the lease with Germany alone, and with nobody 
 else. Japan’s occupation in Kiao-Chou has no other 
 legal status than a military occupation ; and as such she 
 has no right to retain the said territory, when the mili- 
 tary necessity ceases. As “a sincere friend of China,” 
 as “a protector of the peace in the Far East,” and as 
 “an upholder of international law,” as Japan is used to 
 style herself, she should have handed over to China 
 unconditionally all her occupation in Shantung, par- 
 ticularly in Kiao-Chou, before China claims for the 
 same. For compensation of the campaign of Tsing- 
 tao, if any and if justifiable, Japan should ask for that 
 
 15 
 
from the Germans. China has nothing to do with the 
 campaign, and thus she sustains no obligation to Japan 
 whatsoever. Japan therefore has no legal justification 
 in retaining Kiao-Chou and Tsing-tao, and China’s 
 claim for the restoration of the same is therefore in 
 accordance with the international law. 
 
 B. Morally Japan has no right to keep Kiao-Chou. 
 One of the established principles of international law 
 regarding the termination of treaties and agreements 
 is that when a treaty or agreement is concluded upon 
 threat of force, that treaty or agreement is voidable. 
 The note between China and Japan of May 25, 1915, 
 was exchanged after the same threat that made China 
 yield to Japan’s Twenty-One Demands. China con- 
 sented the conditions for the restoration of Kiao-Chou 
 as Japan specified them in the above quoted note, only 
 because of the pressure of that threat. If these speci- 
 fied conditions are to be carried out, the restoration of 
 Kiao-Chou would not mean anything in actual fact. 
 This is particularly true in the case of the second 
 condition, which says, “a concession under the exclu- 
 sive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place 
 designated hy the Japanese Government.” What does 
 this mean ? The “place” Japan has in mind is the 
 port of Tsingtao, the best of all naval bases on Chinese 
 coast. In other words, under this condition, Japan 
 would try to deceive the world as well as to deceive 
 China, hy restoring Kiao-Chou, but keeping the best 
 part of the territory for herself, namely, Tsing-tao. 
 The fulfilment of this condition, China will never con- 
 sent, and the world should never permit, for Japanese 
 occupation of Tsing-tao will not only impare China’s 
 territorial integrity, but also shut off equal opportunity 
 
 16 
 
of commerce and industry that other nations have 
 the right to share in the Province of Shantung. Thus 
 the restoration of Kiao-Chou would not be complete 
 until every part of the territory of Kiao-Chou, Tsing- 
 tao not excepted, is turned over to China. The master 
 stroke of deceipt of Japan exemplihed in the specified 
 conditions should be condemned, and Japan must be 
 made to live up to her own words, “Japan has no terri- 
 torial ambition in China or elsewhere.” In the spirit 
 of the ideals and principles that the League of Nations 
 stands for, we Chinese therefore claim that the note 
 exchanged on May 25, 1915, should be made null and 
 void, and the entire territory of Kiao-Chou should 
 be restored to China without any conditions attached 
 whatsoever. 
 
 Incidental to the claim for the restoration of Kiao- 
 Chou, we further appeal to the enlightened Powers 
 sitting at Paris for fair judgment on the problems set 
 forth below. In carrying out the campaign of Tsing- 
 tao, Japan violated the neutrality of China. She was 
 attacking her enemy in a third neutral country. The 
 initemational law has never allowed such a violation 
 of neutrality. No provision in the law will justify 
 Japan’s action, and Japan must be duly punished for 
 this violation. The campaign of Tsing-tao lasted for 
 about three months, during which China suffered 
 losses of life and property in the territory where the 
 battle was fought. Justice should provide compen- 
 sation for China. Since the German withdrawal from 
 Kiao-Chou, Japan has exacted from the customs duty 
 an amount far exceeding the actual expenses of the 
 campaign. If the international law is to be upheld, 
 
 17 
 
China Is entitled for a favorable adjustment of this 
 customs receipt with Japan. 
 
 China therefore has ample justification, both le- 
 gally and morally, to claim for the restoration of 
 Kiao-Chou, and for the adjustment of the incidental 
 problems. To this justifiable claim of China, the 
 Peace Conference should not deny. If Japan is to 
 get what she wants, then the war would be fought in 
 vain, and the League of Nations would be nothing but 
 words. 
 
 II. The Nullification of the Chino-Japanese 
 Treaties of 1915 and the Secret 
 Agreements of 1918 
 
 o. The Treaties of 1915. 
 
 We demand the nullification of the Chino-Japanese 
 treaties of 1915 on three grounds. First, because 
 they were made imder duress and ^threat. Second, 
 because they impair China’s independence. Third, 
 because they are a menace to the future peace of the 
 world. 
 
 As to the first, little need be said than stating 
 briefly how these treaties came about. As the world 
 knows, the Chino-Japanese treaties of 1915 are re- 
 sults of the notorious Twenty-One Demands presented 
 to China by Japan on January 18, 1915, for the pur- 
 pose, as the opening sentence of the Japanese demands 
 declared, “of maintaining the general peace in 
 Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friend- 
 ly relations and good neighborhood existing between 
 the two nations.” Of course we need not wonder 
 whether the general peace in Eastern Asia was in any 
 
 18 
 
way endangered or whether the friendly relations be- 
 tween the two nations needed such an extra strength- 
 ening. In plain words, Japan simply coveted the 
 things embodied in her 21 demands. The European 
 powers were breathlessly engaged in fighting German 
 militarism,- America also focussed her attention on 
 the battlefield of the Western Hemisphere. Every- 
 body was busy save Japan. It was a God-sent chance 
 for Great Nippon. The “ten thousand years” had 
 come and must not let pass. Accordingly, Japan pre- 
 sented her 21 demands to China. She presented them 
 with a warning that the matter must be kept secret 
 and that if it should be known to the world China 
 must suffer the consequences for it. China, bullied 
 and helpless, obeyed the order of her neighbor, who 
 sought to strengthen “the friendly relations” with her. 
 Therefore the matter was not known to the outside 
 world until many weeks after, when finally the news 
 through some way leaked out. Then the nation was 
 alarmed and the world bewildered. But Japan stood 
 firm and pressed her demands ever resolutely. The 
 Chinese government, seeing it impossible to escape 
 the designed blow, agreed to 15 of the 21 demands, 
 pleading that the other 6 being of a nature violating 
 her sovereign rights she “felt difficult to accept.” In 
 order to show her determination, Japan changed on 
 April 26 the original 21 demands into 24. China was 
 sitill unyielding and the negotiations lasted another 
 three weeks. Then, on May 7, under a clear sky, the 
 Japanese- Minister at Peking handed to the Chinese 
 President an ultimatum, which stated thalt with the 
 exception of Group V Japan expected China to ac- 
 
 19 
 
cept unconditionally all the demands within 48 hours. 
 The last sentences of the ultimatum read : 
 
 “The Imperial Government hereby offer their 
 advice and hope thait the Chinese Govern- 
 ment, upon this advice, will give satisfactory 
 reply by 6 o’clock p.m. on the 9th day of 
 May. It is hereby declared that if no satis- 
 factory reply is received before or at the 
 specified time the Imperial Government will 
 take such steps as they may deem necessary.” 
 
 Meanwhile, the Japanese warships had already been 
 dispatched to Chinese waters and Japanese troops 
 were under orders for action. Japan thus decided 
 to teach China her national religion that might is 
 right. China, being a peaceful nation and in no con- 
 dition to test the prowess of the Sunrise Kingdom, 
 bowed, as the events proved, to the inevitable and 
 yielded unconditionally to the Asiatic Prussia. Then 
 followed the exchanges of notes making the interpre- 
 tation of the terms still unbearable to a nation already 
 humiliated; the treaties were concluded on May 25, 
 
 1915- 
 
 This is the origin of the Chino- Japanese treaties of 
 1915. They were forced upon China. They have 
 no validity in a time when we say “might does not 
 make right.” The treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Buda- 
 pest have been annulled because they were made 
 under duress. Yet Russia and Rumania had been at 
 war with Germany and the tre-aties were natural con- 
 sequences of a lost war. But China was innocent and 
 gave Japan no provocation. Compare the two sets of 
 unprovoking to Japan. Compare the two sets of 
 
 ?Q 
 
treaties, one will be convinced that Germany, ruthless 
 as she was, still showed more leniency toward Russia 
 and Rumania than Japan toward China. Can there be 
 any slightest reason that Nippon should not follow 
 the example of Deutchland? 
 
 In the second place, Japan should not be allowed 
 to retain her booty of 1915 because the treaties con- 
 cluded seriously impair China’s existence as an in- 
 dependent nation. To be true to fact, let us examine 
 some of the most important terms of the treaties. 
 
 Article I of the Treaty respecting Shantung de- 
 clares : “The Chinese Government agrees to give full 
 assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Gov- 
 ernment may hereafter agree with the German Gov- 
 ernment relating to the disposition of all rights, in- 
 terests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of 
 treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Prov- 
 ince of Shantung.” This eliminates China’s sovereign 
 rights from that province and makes it a pawn be- 
 tween Japan and Germany. If Germany had no right 
 in the home land of Confucius, then what right has 
 Japan? Furthermore, the same treaty stipulates that 
 when China wants to build a certain railroad in the 
 Province of Shantung, she shall approach the Japanese 
 capitalists first to negotiate for a loan. This is not 
 different from saying that the railroad must be built by 
 Japan. 
 
 Article i of the Treaty repecting South Man- 
 churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia declares that the 
 terms of lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the 
 terms of the South Manchurian Railway and the An- 
 tung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to 99 years. 
 The term “99 years” is simply a pleasant substitute 
 
 21 
 
for perpetual ownership. Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the 
 same treaty provide that Japanese subjects in South 
 Manchuria shall have the right to reside, travel, and 
 “engage in business and manufacture of any kind 
 whatsoever” freely and that in civil and criminal cases 
 in which the defendants are Japanese, they shall be 
 tried and adjudicated, not by Chinese court, but by 
 Japanese consul. It can be easily inferred from these 
 provisions that Japan can manufacture munitions and 
 implements of war against China even within the very 
 borders of China herself and yet with perfect im- 
 munity. 
 
 In the subsequent exchanges of notes, China is 
 obliged to negotiate loans with Japanese capitalists 
 first when she wants to build railways with foreign 
 capital in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon- 
 golia or when she wants to make loans on the security 
 of the taxes in the above-mentioned places. Moreover, 
 if foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial, 
 military, or police matters are to be employed, Japanese 
 have the right of preference. Inasmuch as China 
 needs the assistance of foreign capital in building rail- 
 ways and inasmuch as China often employs foreign 
 advisers for purposes of internal reform, these pro- 
 visions practically give Japan complete control over 
 these provinces and reduce China’s sovereignty to a 
 mere fiction. 
 
 What is more astonishing is the stipulation re- 
 specting the Hanyehping Iron and Coal Company, 
 China’s largest iron works. The clause regarding this 
 reads : 
 
 “If in future the Hanyehping Company and 
 
 the Japanese capitalists agree upon co-opera- 
 
tiorij the Chinese Government, in view of the 
 intimate relations subsisting between the Jap- 
 anese capitalists and the said Company, will 
 forthwith give its permission. The Chinese 
 Government further agrees not to confiscate 
 the said Company, nor without the consent of 
 the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a 
 state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and 
 use foreign capital other than Japanese.” 
 
 The Hanyehping Company is China’s only iron work 
 worth mentioning and had been hitherto under the 
 control of the Chinese. By this agreement, the con- 
 trol, needless to say, has been transferred from Peking 
 to Tokyo. 
 
 So far we have just reviewed the circumstances 
 under which these treaties were made and the nature 
 of the treaties, which is absolutely incompatible with 
 China’s sovereign rights. Now let us turn to the third 
 phase of the question, namely, the treaties as a menace 
 to the future peace of the world. 
 
 These treaties are a menace to the future peace of 
 the world in two ways. Firsit, the recognition of these 
 treaties is a direct sanction of imperialism and will 
 invite further conflicts among those nations which 
 have interest in the Far East. Balance of power will 
 again come into play. Spheres of influence will be 
 resuscitated with additional vigor. The natural re- 
 siult will be inevitably a clash of arms and the world 
 will be set on fire again. Secondly, the Chinese 
 people will not stand these iniquities. They 
 have awakened to the new meaning of life; they 
 want to manage their national affairs by them- 
 selves, as they have done so for thousands of 
 
 23 
 
years. An imposed master, from whatever source and 
 for whatever purpose, not only will be refused but 
 will soon meet his fate. We are tired of abject sub- 
 mission and will tolerate no more wrongs. The es- 
 tablishment of the Republic was the first sign of 
 China’s decision to become a modern power. The 
 record of the last seven years is a strong proof of the 
 nation’s determination to march on the road of prog- 
 ress with other nations and nothing can stand iii its 
 way. Yuan Shih-kai’s imperial dream proved a fiasco 
 and Chang Hsun’s attempt to restore the boy emperor 
 resulted in a farce. The Civil War of last year was a 
 more vigorous manifestation of the nation’s sense of 
 justice and right. In short, the age of toleration of 
 injustice has gone and the Chinese people know this. 
 When the rest of the world is fighting for justice, China 
 can not allow herself to be a criminal by tolerating 
 injustice. Intrigue and design, as such, we will re- 
 sist at any cost. 
 
 From what has been said, it is obvious to every 
 fair-minded person that for the promotion of justice, 
 for China’s national existence, and for the future peace 
 of the world, the Chino- Japanese Treaties of 1915 
 should be condemned and nullified. We are Siure the 
 enlightened people of the world will echo our appeal 
 with sympathy and support. 
 
 b. The Secret Agreements of 1918 
 
 There are about eighty secret agreements between 
 China and Japan; many of them are known only 
 to the men who negotiated them. But those we 
 know may be divided into two classes. One is 
 
 24 
 
the Agreements relating to the Chino- Japanese Mili- 
 tary Convention of May, 1918, and the other the three 
 sets of notes exchanged on September 24, 1918. The 
 latter have been recently published by the Chinese 
 delegates to the Peace Conference, but the former 
 still waits to be disclosed. When, a month ago it 
 was first reported that the Chinese delegates to 
 the Peace Conference would disclose the secret 
 treaties imposed upon China by Japan, the Japanese 
 Minister at Peking warned the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment that should the Chinese delegates choose to 
 do so, Japan would exert her financial pressure on 
 China. The Minister from the Island Empire also 
 informed the Chinese Government that “no help from 
 outside could be expected because while Great Britain 
 was engrossed in her internal disturbances, Japan had 
 an unemployed army and navy.” Despite the audacity 
 of the Chinese delegates in revealing some of the secret 
 agreements, obviously the threat of the “unemployed 
 army and navy” served its purpose. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Agreements of May, 1918, 
 though unpublished, are not altogether unknown to 
 the public. The Chinese newspapers some time ago 
 gave out the general nature of them and a recent 
 despatch from London, published in a New York 
 newspaper [on February 13, confirmed the report of 
 the Chinese press. Briefly stated, the most important 
 terms of the Agreements relating to the Chino- 
 Japanese Military Convention of May, 1918, are as 
 follows ; 
 
 I. China to recognize Japan’s preponderating 
 influence in the Orient and call Japan’s police 
 power to suppress the disorder in the Southern 
 Chinese provinces. 
 
 25 
 
2. China to employ Japanese arsenal direc- 
 tors and purchase all arsenal appliances from 
 Japan. 
 
 3. China to make no further foreign loans 
 without consulting Japan. 
 
 4. China to grant no further railway conces- 
 sions to foreigners without consultation with and 
 permission of Japan. 
 
 What do these terms amount to? Are they anything 
 less than financial and military control of China by 
 Japan? If so, is China still an independent nation of 
 a Japanese colony? Or, better, is there any China left 
 at all? 
 
 Drastic as the provisions of the Military Con- 
 vention are, the notes exchanged on September 24, 
 1918, are not next to them in their insidious design. 
 The first set of tliese notes gives the Japanese capi- 
 talists the privilege of financing the railways to be 
 built first, between Kaiyuan, Hailung, and Kirin; sec- 
 ond, between Changchun and Taonan ; and third, from 
 a point between Taonan and Jehol to some seaport. 
 The total distance of these railways is over 600 miles. 
 The plan is, of course, to consolidate and strengthen 
 Japan’s position in Manchuria and Mongolia, both 
 politically and militarily. 
 
 The second set of these notes deals with the ad- 
 ministration of Shantung, over which Japan poses as 
 an over-lord. According to the disclosed documents, 
 Japan is to concentrate her troops at Tsing-tao, with 
 a contingent stationed at Tsinan, the capital of Shan- 
 tung, and Japanese are “to be employed at the head- 
 quarters of 'tlie police force, the principal railway sta- 
 tions, and the training stations of the police force.” 
 The concentration of Japanese troops at Tsing-tao, to- 
 
 26 
 
gether with the employment of Japanese police force 
 in Shantung, is for a military purpose, not in Shan- 
 tung, but beyond it. Shantung, Japan thinks, is al- 
 ready her own; she now looks farther. This project 
 will be seen in a clear light when we examine the 
 third set of these secret notes. 
 
 The third set of these notes is a more thorough 
 and audacious project of Japan’s attempt to conquer 
 China. It gives Japan the right to build railways; 
 first, from Kaomi, twenty miles west of Tsing-tao, 
 running southwest to Suchow, about 250 miles, con- 
 necting with the railway from Lanchow, in Kansu 
 Province, to the sea; and second, from Tsinan, in 
 Shantung Province directly west to Shunteh, a dis- 
 tance of about 150 miles. This would connect with 
 the railway operating from Peking to Hankow, on the 
 Yang-tze River, and connect Tsing-tao with all the 
 important railways in North China. With militar}.’ 
 headquarters established at Tsing-tao and with all the 
 strategic railways in control, Japan is ready to over- 
 run all China, north and south. What a masterful 
 scheme ! 
 
 China will surely become a Japanese province if 
 these secret agreementts are not made null and void. 
 Besides, secret agreements are in direct contradiction 
 with the principle of “open covenants.” If the League 
 of Nations is not to be built on sand, all secret agree- 
 ments of whatever kind must meet their proper fate. 
 
 * III. The Cancellation of the Boxer Indemnity 
 
 It was in the year 1898 — 20 years from today — on 
 account of the murder of two Roman Catholic priests, 
 Germany seized Kiao-Chou. In the same year Russia 
 
 27 
 
pounced upon Port Arthur and Talien-Wan — all these 
 the strategic bases of China. Following suit, Great 
 Britain took the lease of Wei-haFwai. 
 
 This rapid spoliation of the Chinese territory 
 aroused the patriotism of the Boxers. Ignorant and 
 yet daring, they started the anti-foreign movement. 
 The Manchu Empress Dowager, who, chafing under 
 the iron heels of the powers, was only too glad to find 
 an ally for her bigoted vindication of the Chinese 
 sovereignty. 
 
 The sad events that occurred in 1900 need no com- 
 ment here. Suffice it to say that throughout the tragic 
 episode, the uprising was confined to the districts 
 around Peking, and that the great majority of the 
 Chinese had no part whatever in the fanatic project. 
 The most enlightened viceroys, like Yuan Shi Kai and 
 L'u Kwan I, refused to obey the secret orders of the 
 Empress Dowager to kill all the foreigners, but on the 
 contrary gave protection to them. The outbreak itself 
 never spread beyond the south of the Yellow River. 
 
 Not only the great majority of the Chinese did 
 not have any share in the uprising, but on the con- 
 trary they stoutly opposed such suicidal project. 
 When the outbreak was in its full swing, they were un- 
 able to exert their will, for then the Manchu regime 
 was a pure autocracy, over which the Chinese had no 
 control. But after the outbreak, especially when they 
 had learned the bitter lessons of humiliation, they 
 gradually began to realize that the bigoted Manchu 
 regime which had instigated the uprising must not 
 be allowed any longer to pilot the ship of state, and 
 they expressed their conviction in the Revolution ^of 
 1911, which resulted in the downfall of the Manchu 
 
 28 
 
Dynasity. In its place they inaugurated the new re- 
 gime of the Chinese Republic, which portended a new 
 foreign policy — “peace on earth and good will toward 
 all.” 
 
 Such is the background of the case. From this, we 
 can see that the Boxer Uprising was not a concerted 
 action of the Chinese, but rather the fanatic project of 
 the autocratic Manchu rulers and ignorant officials. 
 The majority of the Chinese people did not take part 
 in the movement. They were its opponents. And yet 
 when the trouble was over, the whole country was 
 made to pay to the powers an indemnity of $350,000,- 
 000 with compound interest to be paid in annual instal- 
 ments from 1901 to 1940. The following is the table 
 showing the manner in which the indemnity was 
 divided to different powers : 
 
 Power 
 
 Proportion 
 
 Haiknan 
 
 
 Foreign 
 
 
 (per cent) 
 
 Taels 
 
 
 Currency 
 
 Germany . . . 
 
 .20.015 
 
 67 
 
 90,070,515 
 
 Mks. 
 
 278,166,423.93 
 
 Austria-Hung. 
 
 .889 
 
 76 
 
 4,003,920 
 
 Kr. 
 
 10,394,092.40 
 
 Belgium 
 
 . 1, 88s 
 
 41 
 
 8,484,345 
 
 Fr. 
 
 31,816,293.75 
 
 Spain 
 
 . .030 
 
 07 
 
 135,315 
 
 Ps. 
 
 507,431.25 
 
 United States. 7.319 
 
 79 
 
 32,939,055 
 
 Dol. 
 
 24,440,778.81 
 
 France 
 
 .15750 
 
 72 
 
 70,878,240 
 
 Fr. 
 
 265,793,400.00 
 
 Great Britain 
 
 .11,249 
 
 01 
 
 50,620,545 
 
 £ 
 
 7,593,080.19 
 
 Portugal 
 
 . .020 
 
 50 
 
 92,250 
 
 £ 
 
 13.837.17 
 
 Italy 
 
 • 5.914 
 
 89 
 
 26,617,005 
 
 lire 
 
 99,803,768.75 
 
 Japan 
 
 • 7731 
 
 80 
 
 34,793,100 
 
 Yen 
 
 48,950,891.70 
 
 Holland 
 
 . .173 
 
 80 
 
 782,100 
 
 Fi. 
 
 1,404,651.60 
 
 Russia 
 
 , .28.971 
 
 36 
 
 130,371,120 
 
 Rou. 
 
 180,084,021.44 
 
 Norway &. Sw. .013 
 
 96 
 
 62,820 
 
 £ 
 
 9,423.00 
 
 Sundry 
 
 . 033 
 
 26 
 
 149,870 
 
 £ 
 
 22,450.10 
 
 This big sum of indemnity has been a tremendous 
 burden on the Chinese people. It destroys the eco- 
 nomic strength of China. It has been imposed on 
 China far beyond the actual damages done to the 
 powers, and costs of the expedition. And yet in spite 
 
 29 
 
of financial stringencies and political disturbances 
 existed in China during the last fifteen years, China 
 has always met her obligations faithfully. The instal- 
 ments were regularly paid whenever they were due. 
 
 That justice should demand the remission of the 
 excessive amount of the indemnity none will deny. 
 The remission of $10,785,286.12 to China in 1908 by 
 the United States is an upright example, and has since 
 created an unspeakable good will in China. This good 
 will, however, should not be enjoyed by the United 
 States alone. 
 
 As soon as China declared war on the Central 
 Powers in August, 1917, the unpaid portions of the 
 indemnity due to Germany and Austria-Himgary were 
 automatically cancelled. But the outstanding sum due 
 to the other powers is still enormous, about $560,- 
 000,000 in total. Although the payment has been post- 
 poned for five years since China’s participation in the 
 war, yet mere postponement does not mean that the 
 powers have done full justice to China. China wants 
 a total cancellation of the outstanding sum, which 
 would help her greatly in her internal development. 
 
 China will not feel grateful to the powers, how- 
 ever, if they would remit the remaining sum to her 
 conditionally, as Japan has tried. Last September, 
 Japan proposed to return the indemnity. But her pro- 
 posal was strongly refused by China, because of the 
 onerous terms attached. These terms were, (i) A 
 Japanese adviser should be allowed to be present at 
 conferences of Chinese cabinet for considering pro- 
 posals to be submitted by the Chinese government at 
 the Peace Conference. (2) Prior to the end of the 
 
 30 
 
European War, China shall not borrow money from 
 any other country to return loans contracted from 
 Japan and cancel the loan agreements. (3) Japan’s 
 direction of the use of the indemnity fund and her sub- 
 sequent control of the exports of China’s iron, cotton, 
 and wool products. Any terms like these, backed up 
 by sinister motives, China will never welcome. 
 
 Therefore it is the unconditional cancellation that 
 China is appealing for. The money belongs to China ; 
 she wants free right to dispose the same for whatever 
 purpose she likes to. Conditions of any sort would 
 impair her sovereign rights. It has been decided, 
 however, by the Chinese Government that the indem- 
 nity fund, when returned, will be used for her internal 
 development, especially along education lines. With 
 this decision, the powers are assured that the cancella- 
 tion of the indemnity will do greatest good to China. 
 Why do not the powers follow the glorious example 
 of the United States and remit the unpaid part of the 
 indemnity to China? This generosity on the part of 
 the powers will surely create good will among the 
 Chinese who opposed the Boxer Uprising but have 
 been compelled to bear the responsibilitity for the 
 penalty therefor. 
 
 IV. The Restoration of Tariff Autonomy 
 
 The existing conventional tariff in China is also 
 one of the most serious of the grievances that China 
 appeals the Peace Conference for rectification. Broad- 
 ly speaking, there are two kinds of tariff — the statutory 
 tariff and the conventional tariff. Statutory tariff is 
 regulated by the legislation of a state without outside 
 
 31 
 
interference and is based on the right of taxation en- 
 joyed by all sovereign states. Such a tariff is elastic 
 and may be utilized for revenue, for the protection of 
 infant industries, or for furthering the political and 
 economic interests of a state through reciprocal or 
 preferential arrangements. A convential tariff, on the 
 other hand, is established by treaties with other coun- 
 tries. It is inelastic and carried with it none of the 
 advantages of the other system. It is this conven- 
 tional tariff system which is in force in China at the 
 present time. 
 
 The history of China’s tariff may be briefly stated. 
 It was in the year 1842 when China sustained a crush- 
 ing defeat at the hands of the British because of trade 
 disputes that China was forced to agree not to levy 
 a tariff exceeding five per cent ad valorem on imported 
 and exported goods. It is further stipulated in the 
 Nanking Treaty of 1842 that the tariff rate is to be 
 uniform and not to be changed without the previous 
 consent of the High Contracting Parties. Through 
 the operation of the so-called “most-favored-nation” 
 clause whereby a privilege granted to one nation is 
 automatically extended to other nations, this conven- 
 tional tariff has come to be applied to goods imported 
 from all foreign countries that have treaty relations 
 with China. 
 
 The Nanking Treaty of 1842 which compelled 
 China to adopt a conventional tariff was somewhat 
 modified by the Mackay Treaty concluded between 
 Great Britain and China in 1902. In that treaty Great 
 Britain agrees that China should have the right to levy 
 a surtax of per cent on imported goods 
 
 upon the fulfillment of the following conditions ; 
 
 32 
 
(i) if the likin is to be abolished, (2) if all “most- 
 favored-nations” should join in the understanding, and 
 (3) if their assent were not to depend on “any politi- 
 cal concession or any exclusive commercial conces- 
 sion.” This Mackay Treaty farther provides for a 
 complete revision of the tariff at the end of ten years. 
 In 1912 the question of revision was brought up but 
 nothing was accomplished. In August, 1917; after 
 China had declared war on Germany, the Allied pow- 
 ers were pursuaded to agree to the raising of the 
 tariff to an effective 5 per cent. This was absolutely 
 necessary in view of the fact that the tariff *then 
 existing was fixed in 1902, and that since 1902 the 
 price of commodities has been considerably increased. 
 
 Such is a brief history of the conventional tariff 
 in China. Our next step is to inquire into the main 
 features of the system. In the first place the con- 
 ventional tariff" provides for a uniform rate of five 
 per cent on imported and exported goods. It does 
 not distinguish raw materials from manufactured 
 goods nor luxuries from necessities. Consequently 
 it fails to do justice to the poor people who have to 
 depend for their existence upon the necessities and 
 it affords no protection for infant industries which 
 are just developing in the country. This arrange- 
 ment is very unfortunate, for an import duty is but 
 a tax on consumption and as such should be justly 
 distributed. To levy an uniform tax on both neces- 
 sities and luxuries is to impose an undue burden on 
 the laboring class. Hence, it violates the first prin- 
 ciple of taxation and is working directly against the 
 well-established practice of the modern advanced 
 countries. Experience in other countries has also 
 
 33 
 
demonstrated that infant industries such as those de- 
 veloping in China must need protection in order to 
 secure for them a normal growth and development. 
 This is not necessarily a selfish policy, as to foster 
 home industries is but one of the most effective means 
 of increasing the per capita wealth of the country 
 and consequently the purchasing power of the nation 
 for foreign goods and commodities. Therefore, even 
 from the point of view of their own commercial in- 
 terest, the treaty powers should agree to the complete 
 removal of the tariff restrictions on China. 
 
 The second great defect of the conventional tariff 
 in China is that it provides for only a five per cent 
 tariff, which is entirely too low for revenue purposes. 
 This is self-evident when we compare the custom 
 receipts of the various countries. In the United States 
 the revenue of the Federal government before the 
 Civil War consisted chiefly of custom receipts. Even 
 in the fiscal year 1913-1914 just before the outbreak 
 of the world war the custom receipts yielded some 
 39 per cent of the total Federal income. In Ger- 
 many customs and excises also contributed in 1913 
 about 45 per cent of the total ordinary revenue. In 
 France in 1914 customs yielded some 20 per cent of 
 the total revenue including both direct taxes and direct 
 contributions. Even Great Britain, a free-trade coun- 
 try, depends upon its tariff for revenue. The duties 
 on imports alone amounted in 1914 to over 22 per cent 
 of the total revenue. On the other hand, China 
 realized in 1914 only about 9 per cent of her total 
 revenue from customs. It is true that in that year 
 the total revenue of the state was $351,064,812, while 
 the custom revenue amounted to HK Tls 18, 202,741 
 
 34 
 
were derived from import duties. In China, unlike in 
 other countries, the maritime customs include not 
 only import duties but also export duties, coast trade 
 duties, tonnage dues, transit dues and opium likin. 
 This in part explains why China has to borrow, even 
 under onerous terms, for reorganization and other 
 purposes. This in part is also responsible for the 
 political intrigue carried on in the various foreign 
 loans that threaten to destroy the fiscal independence 
 of the Republic of China. It is clear therefore that 
 if justice is not to be denied to China and if China 
 is to be given a fair chance to work out her own 
 salvation, she must have her tariff autonomy restored. 
 This is beneficial not only to the Chinese nation as a 
 whole but also to all the treaty powers concerned, as 
 a stable government based on sound finance will enable 
 the Chinese people to improve their communication 
 facilities, to develop their natural resources and there- 
 by to increase the volume of international trade and 
 commerce. The fact that likin has been a great 
 obstacle to both internal and external trade and that 
 its abolition must necessarily be accompanied by in- 
 creasing the tariff rate as a compensation, makes it 
 even more necessary that these crippling tariff 
 restrictions on China should be abolished. 
 
 The history of the conventional tariff having been 
 briefly stated and its main features discussed, it re- 
 mains for us to emphasize once more the grave 
 injustice done to China by the treaty powers. It 
 can not be too often nor too strongly stated that if this 
 tariff remains in force, China will he permanently 
 crippled both in respect to her internal development 
 and her foreign trade. Growing industries must be 
 
 35 
 
impeded. Revenues will be insufficient. Foreign 
 loans must be contracted. The people who are obliged 
 to pay high duties on necessities will have their already 
 heavy burdens unduely increased. And the foreign 
 trade can not be sufficiently developed either to bal- 
 ance or to counteract these evils. 
 
 Not alone is this conventional tariff detrimental 
 to the best interest of the Chinese Republic but it is 
 also harmful to the various powers concerned. It 
 must be clear to every thoughtful person that a China, 
 unabled to develop her resources and consequently 
 having next to no foreign trade, can contribute very 
 little to the development of the world, and that thus 
 the treaty powers, by persisting in their atti- 
 tude, are indirectly injuring themselves. Therefore, 
 not only justice but also the self-interest of the treaty 
 powers demands that China should have restored to 
 her the tariff autonomy to which every free nation is 
 justly entitled. 
 
 V. The Relinquishment of Extraterritorial 
 Jurisdiction 
 
 The origin of extraterritoriality in China can be 
 traced as far back as the seventeenth and eighteenth 
 centuries when a want of regard for Chinese laws 
 characterized the foreigners who went to China for 
 the sole purpose of replenishing their purses. Great 
 Britain, especially, resisted the exercise of China’s 
 jurisdiction over her subjects in criminal cases. Finally 
 a bill passed the House of Commons in 1833 which 
 provided for the establishment of a British court in 
 China and this was duly executed later in the year. 
 The Treaty of Nanking between China and Great 
 
 36 
 
Britain in 1842 did not expressly provide for the en- 
 joyment of a privilege of extraterritoriality by British 
 subjects; but at the same time there were substantial 
 grounds for believing that such a concession was 
 granted by the Chinese authority as part of the price 
 paid for the restoration of peace and friendship. The 
 grounds for so believing are that the General Regula- 
 tions signed between China and Great Britain referred 
 to a certain correspondence exchanged at Nanking in 
 1842 which conceded to Britain the principles of 
 extraterritoriality, that such a concession by China was 
 expressly stated by the Marquis of Lansdowne in the 
 House of Lords some three months after the treaty 
 of Nanking arrived at London, and that the General 
 Regulations were considered and imderstood at the 
 time as forming a part of the treaty of peace. China’s 
 formal recognition of alien extraterritoriality was 
 embodied in the Treaty of Peking, signed in 1860, 
 after the war between China and the allied forces of 
 Great Britain and France. Since that year, subse- 
 quent treaties with America, Sweden, Denmark, and 
 almost all the other countries with whom China had 
 conventions gave this extraterritorial jurisdiction to 
 foreigners residing in China. In 1876 the treaty of 
 Chefoo was entered between China and Great Britain 
 as the result of the murder of an Englishman in 
 Yim-Nan, a southern province, by the uncivilized 
 mountain tribes there. One of the important features 
 of this treaty is the recognition by China of the alien 
 extraterritorial jurisdiction in her territory. Foreign 
 and mixed courts are now established in the alien set- 
 tlements and leased territories to try cases in which 
 aliens are involved. 
 
 37 
 
To understand this problem we shall first examine 
 the rules governing- the exercise of such rights of 
 extraterritoriality. If a case concerns the aliens of one 
 and the same nationality, then all questions in re- 
 gard to rights, whether of property or of person, shall 
 be subject to the jurisdiction of their own authorities. 
 But if the dispute affects the subjects of different 
 nationalities, then it shall be regulated by the treaties 
 existing between the various states, “without inter- 
 ference on the part of China.” In respect to mixed 
 suits or actions between Chinese and foreigners, the 
 treaties provide that in civil suits Chinese and -aliens 
 shall state their grievances at the alien consulate and 
 in case the consul cannot settle them amicably, then 
 he shall request the assistance of the Chinese authori- 
 ties ; and, in criminal cases, Chinese crimlinals shall be 
 tried and punished by Chinese authorities, according 
 to Chinese law, while alien criminals shall be tried by 
 their consuls and punished according to their own 
 national law. There is another novel system existing 
 in Shanghai both in the International and French Set- 
 tlements. It is the so-called Mixed Court. A mixed 
 court is a Chinese tribunal which decides all suits and 
 actions between Chinese who are resident within the 
 settlements, as well as between Chinese and foreign 
 residents in cases where Chinese are defendants. 
 
 The extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction in China 
 covered all questions in regard to rights of property 
 and of person. In practice, the jurisdiction over the 
 person of aliens in China is very far-reaching and un- 
 limited. For instance, wherever a subject of a for- 
 eign power may go wiithin the Chinese dominions he 
 brings with him his right of exemption from the ter- 
 
 38 
 
ritorial jurisdiotion and when he commits an ofifence 
 he shall be handed over to the nearest consul of his 
 nation for punishment. By right of extraterritoriality, 
 a foreigner in China is immune from search by 
 Chinese authorities in his house or vessel within the 
 treaty ports. Under the aegis of extraterritoriality 
 there has grown up in some twenty-five open ports a 
 practice for some of the grantees to establish their 
 own post olifices therein. After the Boxer troubles of 
 IQOO, to prevent a recrudescence of the anti-foreign 
 outrages, international garrisons are stationed between 
 Tientsin and Peking and the Legation Quarter in 
 Peking maintains its own legation guards. All these 
 practices impair China’s territorial integrity and na- 
 tional independence and were imposed upon China 
 against her will. 
 
 Deficiencies of the extraterritorial jurisdiction are 
 numerous and they constitute strong reasons for its 
 relinquishment. A Chinese may enter a suit against a 
 foreigner in the latter’s national court, or vice versa, 
 but the latter is entitled to no relief if he counter- 
 claims against the plaintiff. This disability may entail 
 hardships and inconveniences, but it is a necessary 
 result of the immunity from process in the local courts. 
 It is the price for which they must pay for this im- 
 munity. Therefore extraterritoriality is not at all 
 absolutely advantageous to the aliens who enjoy it. 
 
 Uncertainty of punishment in the system causes 
 much complaint among the Chinese against this sys- 
 tem. Difficulties in the way of languages, differences 
 in court procedure, the disparity of punishments in 
 the two systems and the complexities of Western law 
 prevent a Chinese from having his redress against an 
 
 39 
 
alien in the latter’s consular court. Then there is the 
 practice in most consular courts for the prisoners 
 charged with grave offences' to be sent home for final 
 trial and punishment. In such cases the sequel is 
 generally unknown to the Chinese directly interested 
 and the belief becomes inevitable that such criminals 
 have escaped unpunished. This practice, therefore, 
 both damages the good name of the foreign country 
 and robs the Chinese of the satisfaction of knowing 
 that due punishment has been inflicted on the guilty. 
 Moreover, alien offenders of law are more leniently 
 treated by his consular court than a Chinese by his 
 own national court. But Chinese involved in law 
 suits in the mixed court are treated very harshly. 
 For instance, an accidental homicide is excusable in 
 Western law, but in Chinese law the accused is never- 
 theless made to compensate the family of the deceased. 
 Over this point cases of disputes between China and 
 the Western powers are repeatedly found in the his- 
 tory of Chinese diplomacy. On the other hand, crimi- 
 nal carelessness may not be punishable unless it 
 results in an injur)-^ to the person of another, as an in- 
 jury invol-ving damage to property is civilly action- 
 able; but in the Shanghai foreign settlements, Chinese 
 are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the 
 mixed courts for carelessness resulting in damage to 
 the property of aliens. 
 
 Besides these legal objections to the extraterritorial 
 jurisdiction in China, the system is very obstructive 
 to foreign trade in China. Owing to the almost un- 
 limited rights of extraterritoriality, China cannot 
 throw her d'oors wide open to all aliens to trade in 
 all parts of China. Owing to the demarcated areas 
 
 40 
 
within the open ports and the separate iminiicipal ad- 
 ministrations in those areas, Chinese look upon aliens 
 with suspicion and unfriendly feelings. If lintema- 
 tional trade in China is to thrive and not to be hinder- 
 ed by artificial barriers, early relinquishment of all the 
 extraterritorial rights by all treaty states with China 
 must be promised. When China is open to the resi- 
 dence of all aliens and all restrictions as to passports, 
 demarcated areas, etc., are disposed with, a new era of 
 prosperity of Far Eastern Trade will inaugurate. 
 
 In present day China, any fear of possible renewal 
 of anti-foreign movement has no more ground for 
 existence because the conservative Manchu dynasty 
 has been replaced since 1911 by the progressive re- 
 publican government. Moreover, China has long 
 awakened to her international obligations. Her inter- 
 national status has been definitely settled. She has 
 participated in the Hague, Geneva, and other universal 
 conventions. She has also taken part in such minor 
 international gatherings as legislated for the white 
 slave traffic, protection of birds, bills of exchange, 
 prison reform, hygiene and sanitation, and the like. 
 She was formally recognized as a member of the 
 family of nations soon after her revolution eight years 
 ago. And, lastly, but most significantly, China dili- 
 gently engaged herself in the recent world struggle 
 against German autocracy, in checking the eastward 
 advance of the Bolsheviki movement in Siberia, in 
 forming the peace treaty of 1919 at Paris, and in 
 drafting the Constitution of the League of Nations. 
 Therefore she is universally recognized to-day an 
 independent sovereignty, and as such she must be 
 treated accordingly. Nothing in international law 
 
 41 
 
hinders a nation from existing as an independent state 
 more than the practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
 and therefore its abolition must be immediately ac- 
 ceded. 
 
 It is indeed true that China has defects in her 
 judicial system. But she has shown great progress 
 toward the legal reform during the last few years. In 
 1904 a code of commercial law, following the prin- 
 ciples of that of England, was adopted. A Bureau of 
 Law Reform was established in Peking in 1908 to take 
 up the work of recodification of Qiinese Laws. This 
 was succeeded by Law Codification Commission, ap- 
 pointed in 1914. This commission, with a group of 
 foreign advisers, has been studying all law systems of 
 the world. Efforts have been made to codify Chinese 
 laws in accordance with the spirit of European and 
 American laws. Already a draft of new criminal 
 code was published in Chinese last September, which 
 was subsequently translated with English and Erench. 
 A new Civil Code is in the process of revising now. 
 It has been the hope of the commission that within 
 five years the revision of Chinese Laws will be com- 
 pleted and promulgated. Thus China’s claim of relin- 
 quishment by extraterritoriality, gradually if not im- 
 mediately, is not altogether unjustifiable. 
 
 As to the stationing of international garrison and 
 legation guards in China, no more necessity is found 
 today. Anyone who is in any way familiar with re- 
 cent affairs in China can recall that every time there 
 is any disturbance in any part of China, the Chinese 
 authorities, whether north or south, immediately pro- 
 ceed to protect the aliens’ person and property. In 
 no case has this duty been neglected. China has been 
 
 42 
 
known as one of the most trustworthy nations in ad- 
 hering to her treaty obligations. She should be given 
 a free hand to guard foreign legations in Peking and 
 the international guards should be called back at once, 
 because her troops and police are capable enough now 
 to look after the safety of foreigners in China. 
 
 Regarding foreign postal system in China, there 
 is no more need of its further existence either. Since 
 March i, 1914, China is admitted as a member of the 
 International Postal Union. The act of admitting a 
 new member presupposes a recognition of the effi- 
 ciency of its system on the part of the co-signatories 
 of the union. Therefore there is no valid reason for 
 the continuous existence of these twenty-five foreign 
 post offices in different parts of China. 
 
 From the above facts, it is clear to the world that 
 the relinquishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
 China is not a problem of non-importance. Already, 
 in 1902, the Chino-British Commercial Treaty of 
 Shanghai expressed Britain’s willingness to relinquish 
 her extraterritoriality in China in these words : “China 
 having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial 
 .system and to bring it into accord with that of Western 
 Nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance 
 to such reform, and she will also be prepared to re- 
 linquish her extraterritorial rights when she is satis- 
 fied that the state of Chinese laws, the arrangement 
 for their administration, and other considerations war- 
 rant her in so doing.” The United States and Japan 
 followed the example of Great Britain in 1903 and 
 Sweden in 1908 in promising to relinquish their extra- 
 territorial rights when they shall find China’s laws 
 satisfactory to them. This consent might have been 
 
 43 
 
perfect if it had been coupled with either a probation- 
 aiy time-limit clause or an honor clause, or both. To 
 say that within a definite period of, say, five years 
 if China shall satisfactorily reform her judiciary in 
 harmony with the Western systems, all extraterritorial 
 rights therein will be withdrawn or surrendered, would 
 povide a strong incentive to a people who are doing 
 their utmost to put their house in order. China thus 
 waits for a fair and just decision from the Conference. 
 
 VI. The Retrocession of Leased Territories 
 
 To treat in great detail the causes and events of the 
 Opium War of 1842 and the Arrow War of i860 will 
 be too long a story. Suffice it to say that these wars 
 were the first ones that led China to open her ports 
 to foreign trade, and they marked a new era in the 
 history' of Chinese diplomacy. Before the former 
 date, it is true, there were foreigners in China. But 
 their status was of an undefined nature. In 1842 the 
 Treaty of Nanking was entered between China and 
 Britain and five ports were thrown open to inter- 
 national trade, namely. Canton, Foochow, Amoy, 
 Ningpo and Shanghai. Besides, China for the first 
 time in her recent history ceded to Great Britain by this 
 treaty the island of Hong-Kong. The treaty of Pe- 
 king of i860 which concluded the Arrow War between 
 China on the one hand and the allied forces of Great 
 Britain and France on the other, ceded to Great 
 Britain a portion of the township of Kowloon, which 
 is a peninsula standing in a strategic position over- 
 looking Hong-Kong. For a long time Great Britain 
 coveted this territory and before the signing of the 
 Treaty of Peking she had already secured a lease of 
 
 44 
 
the same in peq)etuity. Eleven more ports were opened 
 in i86i. They were: Newchwang, Tenchow, Taiwang, 
 Tsaochow, Hainan, Tansui, Nanking, Chenkiang, 
 Kiukiang Hankow and Tientsin. Fifteen years later, 
 in the treaty of Chefoo, entered into between China 
 and Great Britain, five more ports — Yeechang, Wuhu. 
 Wen-Chow, Peihai of Kwangtung Province and 
 Tsung-Chin of Szechuan Province — were opened to 
 foreign trade. 
 
 The “scramble” for territorial leases and rail- 
 way and mining concessions of 1898 marked the 
 climax of foreign aggression in China. For a petty 
 grievance of the murder of two German mission- 
 aries in Shangtung province, China was made to 
 lease to Germany under duress Kiao-Chou for a 
 period of ninety-nine years. Germany also forced 
 China to cede to her railway and mining rights in 
 the province of Shantung. Although the leased 
 territory was meant to be enjoyed by the lessee 
 for peaceful engagements, Germany made use of it 
 as a naval station. Russia, one of the two imperialistic 
 countries in the Far East, forced China to lease to 
 her Liaotung Peninsula for a period of twenty-five 
 years. In 1905, this lease was transferred to Japan 
 by Russia as one of the terms of the Treaty of 
 Portsmouth which concluded the Russo-Japanese 
 War, in spite of the fact that such leases were 
 explicitly made non-transferable. The Treaty of 
 May 25, 1915, between China and Japan extended 
 the lease to ninety-nine years. In the same year, 
 1898, France obtained a lease from China of Kwang 
 Chow- Wan for ninety-nine years and -Great Britain 
 obtained from China a lease of Weihaiwei “for so 
 
 45 
 
long a period as Port Arthur (the lease of 
 Liaotung Peninsula, including the famous port, Port 
 Arthur) shall remain in the occupation of Russia.” 
 In their essential features, these leases resemble one 
 another; and for the duration of the tenancy the 
 territorial sovereign’s administrative rights are 
 suspended, unless expressly reserved, and in their 
 place those of the lessee states substituted. 
 
 The places agreed upon for international trade 
 and residence are of four different liinds: (i) A 
 concession, or piece of territory conveyed by deed 
 of grant in perpetuity to a lessee state for the 
 residence of its nationals, the same to be admin- 
 istered by it, “saving the sovereign rights of the 
 Emperor of China.” (2) A settlement, or site 
 selected for the residence of all foreigners, within 
 which they may organize themselves into munic- 
 ipality for certain purposes and be governed by 
 their elected representatives. (3) A voluntary set- 
 tlement, or one in a port spontaneously opened by 
 China itself for the residence of aliens, of which 
 the control of municipal administration and police 
 remain vested in the local authorities. (4) A set- 
 tlement by sufferance, or one within which the resi- 
 dents have acquired, without any formal agreement 
 on the part of the territorial sovereign, the tacit 
 right to govern themselves as a municipality. 
 
 It is clear that all these leased territories and settle- 
 ments were wrung from China unwillingly. More- 
 over, the object of the powers in occupying these 
 strategic ports was for purposes of keeping “balance 
 of power” one with another. This phrase, however, 
 has only a historical value to-day and is no longer 
 
 46 
 
applicable to the Far Eastern situation. The lease of 
 Kiao-Chou like that of Port Arthur, was illegally trans- 
 ferred to Japan in 1915. Such transference may be 
 diplomatic, but they are illegal insofar as China is 
 concerned with the lessee and cannot let any other 
 power to take over the leased rights. The prin- 
 ciple of the League of Nations as proposed by 
 President Wilson is to do away with the balance of 
 power among the strong nations in the weaker and 
 less developed countries. The allied powers can 
 do no better good to China than to return these 
 leased territories to China so as to do full justice 
 to the League of Nations. All jealousy and 
 suspicion among the Western nations and Japan in 
 their interests in China will be done away with if 
 the first principle of open diplomacy is to be en- 
 forced. Besides, China is never going to alienate any 
 part of her territory to any foreign power here- 
 after, as her Peace Delegates openly proclaimed in 
 Paris recently, and China will be thrown wide open 
 to all foreign trade and residence without any fur- 
 ther need of the sphere of influence of any power 
 in any part of China. In the treaties of these leases, 
 almost invariably there were the so-called non- 
 alienation clause regarding to railway and mining 
 rights China ceded to the lessees. 
 
 Today, the sole power that is dominating the Far 
 Eastern Affairs is Japan, who holds both the leases of 
 Port Arthur and of Kiao-Chou, which formerly be- 
 longed to Russia and Germany respectively. China 
 will neither stand for a further extention of balance of 
 power, which will be contradictory both to the 
 principles of the Open Door policy as proclaimed 
 
 47 
 
by Secretary John Hay of the United States in 1898 
 right after the “scramble” for concessions, and 
 to the principles of the League of Nations; 
 nor will Qiina stand for the most unwel- 
 comed Japanese domination in China. The political 
 philosophy of an international democracy is a 
 product of the twentieth century and the allied 
 powers are its creators. If such a democratic 
 political philosophy is to prevail and to lead to per- 
 petual peace among nations, neither balance of 
 power nor Japanese domination in China should be 
 tolerated by all the nations in the world. Circum- 
 stances which had called the leased territories into 
 existence have now all fundamentally altered. New 
 circumstances have now come into existence which 
 call very urgently for the restoration of the leased 
 territories to China. The United States, being 
 China’s special friend and the originator of the Open 
 Door policy in China, ought to finish the game by abso- 
 lutely mowing out seeds of imperialism and autocracy 
 in the Far East as well as in Europe, and advocate the 
 restoration of all the leased territories and settlements 
 in China. 
 
 VII. The Abolition of Financial Imperialism 
 
 Financial Imperialism is the financial control of 
 one nation over another through politics. It is firstly 
 to control a nation financially, then to strangle it and 
 finally to place it under alien receivership. As applied 
 to China the control is deliberately planned. It has 
 a malicious purpose. Every nation has her own in- 
 
 48 
 
terest to serve. Hence there was “battle of conces- 
 sions” and there was general scramble at the expense 
 of China. 
 
 The most objectionable fact is the system which 
 sanctions what is known as the right of preference. 
 It consists of two main species. The first is the 
 polito-commercial zone system styled “Spheres of 
 Influence” signifying that a particular piece of terri- 
 tory shall not be alienated to any third state with- 
 out the consent of the other contracting party. The 
 second provides that one contracting state shall 
 have the right to be offered the first option to accept 
 or refuse a certain contemplated transaction. Let 
 us consider the first. Elaborate historical treatment 
 is unnecessary. Suffice it to say that a little after 
 the Chino-Japanese war the battle of concessions 
 was started. In 1897 France wanted China to de- 
 clare for herself that she would never alienate or 
 cede the Island of Hainan to any foreign power 
 “either as a final or temporary cession or as a naval 
 station or a coaling depot.” In 1898 Great Britain 
 suggested and China agreed that she shall never 
 alienate the provinces adjourning Yangtze River 
 either as lease mortgage or any other designation. 
 In order to make her position doubly secure Great 
 Britain had tipped off the once terrible Polar Bear 
 by the understanding reached between the two 
 powers declaring that “first Great Britain engages 
 not to seek for her own account or on behalf of Brit- 
 ish subjects or others any railroad concessions to 
 the north of the Great Wall of China and not to ob- 
 struct directly or indirectly applications for railroad 
 concessions in that region supported by Russian 
 
 49 
 
g’overnment, and secondly Russia on her part en- 
 gages not to seek for her own account or on behalf 
 of Russian subjects or others any railroad conces- 
 sions in the basin of the Yangtze and not to obstruct 
 directly or indirectly applications for railroad con- 
 cessions in that region supported by the British 
 government.” In 1898, due to the demand of Japan, 
 China declared non-alienation of the province of 
 Fukien “with all the territory in the interior and 
 along the sea coast within its limits.” In 1915 
 China declared to the same power that within the 
 province of Shantung or along its coast no terri- 
 tory or island shall be leased or ceded to any for- 
 eign power under any pretext. In the same year 
 she further assured the same power that she has 
 given no permission to foreign nations to construct 
 on the coast of Fukien province dockyards, coaling 
 stations for military purposes, naval bases, or to set 
 up other military establishments. 
 
 The legal phase of the sphere of influence need 
 not be discussed, for, aside from the formal con- 
 ventions which might seemingly give it legal sanc- 
 tity, international law does not justify its exist- 
 ence. The law of nations allows the excluding of 
 other powers in a given territory by a given power 
 only when that territory is contiguous to her do- 
 minions or protectorates or strategic locations that 
 may be used to the disadvantage to the said power 
 by an enem3^ China is neither a dominion of nor 
 a protectorate under any power, hence no spheres 
 of influence can be recognized. 
 
 It is, however, the economic side that endangers 
 China most. These so-called “spheres” are really 
 politico-commercial zone systems. They influence 
 
 50 
 
the exchange of commodities as well as the import 
 of capital. The power that has the predominating 
 influence can always create artificial conditions in 
 favor of her own commodities. These artificial con- 
 ditions may take the form of reduced taxes, rebates 
 in transportation or in half a dozen other ways. As 
 far as commodities are concerned, however, there 
 may not be sufficient ground for over apprehension, 
 for after all competition may not be entirely done 
 away with. We can manage to adapt ourselves to 
 new conditions and struggle for the markets. But 
 when we consider the import of capital we face a 
 different problem. As is deducible from the 
 Anglo-Russian agreement, the necessary result 
 from this zone system will be as is intended to be 
 the exodus of available capital from other sources. 
 No nation will take the chance of stepping into 
 somebody’s threshold if she is not ready to go to 
 the limit, which in the last analysis may mean war. 
 Economically speaking then, the sphere of influ- 
 ence is really no less than a political guarantee of 
 a monopoly for economic exploitation by the coun- 
 try that has the predominating influence. The ex- 
 clusive character can not be over-emphasized, for 
 it is the one factor that gives to those spheres their 
 unique distinction as well as notoriety. Such is 
 financial imperialism pure and simple. It is the 
 alliance of power with wealth, the combination of 
 flag and capital that has played such havoc with 
 the peaceful Republic. 
 
 The second of the system of rights of prefer- 
 ence is the right of the first option to accept or 
 refuse a certain contemplated transaction. It ap- 
 plies to loans as well as railroad and other con- 
 
 51 
 
cessions. Art. XVII of the Reorganization Loan 
 of iqi3 for 25,000,000 pounds sterling, for example, 
 reads as follows: “In the event of the Chinese 
 Government desiring to issue further loans secured 
 upon the revenues of the salt administration, or 
 to issue supplementary loans for the purposes of 
 the nature of those specified in Art. II of this agree- 
 ment, the Chinese Government will give to the 
 banks the option of taking such loans . . . The 
 
 Chinese Government undertakes further that for 
 a period of six months after the complete issue of 
 this present loan and the payment of the, last in- 
 stalment thereof in terms of the prospectus, it will 
 not proceed to the issue of any other government 
 loan or loan having a government guarantee con- 
 cluded later than April loth, 1913, without previous 
 agreement of the banks.” The right of first op- 
 tion is even more clearly brought out in the loan 
 of 1911 for industrial development and currency re- 
 form. Art. XVI of the agreement reads “If the 
 Imperial Chinese Government should desire to 
 obtain, from other than Chinese sources, funds in ^ 
 addition to the proceeds derived from the loan to 
 continue or complete the operations contemplated 
 under this agreement the Imperial Chinese Gov- 
 ernment shall first invite the banks to undertake a 
 loan to provide the funds required; but should the 
 Imperial Chinese Government fail to agree with 
 the banks as to the terms of such supplementary 
 loan, then other financial groups may be invited to 
 undertake the same and should the Imperial Chinese 
 Government decide to invite foreign capitalists to 
 participate with Chinese interests in Manchurian 
 
 52 
 
business contemplated under this loan, or to be 
 undertaken in connection therewith the banks shall 
 first be invited to participate.” 
 
 The same can be said of railroad loans except 
 the stipulation goes even further. In essence it 
 provides that the creditor having advanced the 
 money for the construction of a railroad in a given 
 piece of territory, all funds for the construction 
 of subsequent lines within the territory will like- 
 wise be provided by the same creditor unless he 
 should decline the option. It. is only plain that 
 these terms are onerous to a degree that is unbear- 
 able and give a political hue to purely financial 
 transactions. It is financial imperialism, it is again 
 political maneuvering for economic exploitation. 
 The debtor nation may want to borrow else- 
 where or may even likely secure better terms, 
 but under the agreement she must approach the 
 same creditor nation again for accommodations un- 
 less the latter chooses to decline. This creates a 
 virtual monopoly in favor of generally foreign 
 capitalist and particularly capitalists of the con- 
 tracting party. With the politico-commercial zone 
 systems installed here and there and almost every- 
 where, the question is whether China is allowed to 
 stand on her own feet. Is she to be helped by the 
 family of nations or is it their deliberate attempt 
 to prove that the history of Egypt can, and, with de- 
 termination will be made to repeat itself in China 
 irrespective of consequences? 
 
 The scramble for the privileges for railroad 
 construction is described by Lord Salisbury as the 
 “battle of concessions.” As in everything else, it 
 is essentially politico-commercial. The very nature 
 
 53 
 
of it can be easily imagined by the claim of a cer- 
 tain well known minister at Peking, who said, “I 
 repeat what I said to you when here, not a bona 
 fide or approximately practical scheme which has 
 been brought to this legation has failed to be put 
 through.” One can readily see what kind of terms 
 are generally imposed upon China when the diplo- 
 mats flock into Peking with a group of shrewd con- 
 cessionaires. There are two kinds of railroad con- 
 cessions: (i) Concessions to foreign governments, 
 and (2) concessions to individuals or to companies 
 backed up by their respective governments. The 
 first group of concessions to foreign governments 
 was demanded for political purposes. France has 
 extended the Tonking line into Yunnanfu. Russia 
 has extended her Trans-Siberian into Manchuria. 
 Great Britain has resorted to similar measures. But 
 the policy of Japan in South Manchuria affords 
 an illuminating example of the working of the 
 “Spheres of Influence,” of the doctrine of the first 
 option and of “Spheres of Interests,” especially in 
 connection with railroads. After the Russo-Jap- 
 anese War, Japan gained the vantage ground of 
 Liao-tung Peninsula and the control of the South 
 Manchuria railroad through the instrumentality of 
 which she virtually dominates Manchuria. In the 
 Portsmouth treaty and in her subsequent treaties 
 with China, Japan has pledged to observe the 
 “Open Door” policy and to preserve the integrity 
 of China. But no sooner than the war had been 
 concluded before Japan started to carry out her 
 imperialistic program. At the point of bayonet 
 she forced China to allow her to build the new 
 
 54 
 
Antung-Mukden railroad. She furnished half of 
 the capital for the construction of the Hsinmingtun 
 Mukden and Kirin Changchun lines. In obtaining 
 these concessions she took care to make it under- 
 stood that, if the lines were to be extended, appli- 
 cation for assistance should be first made to her. 
 This stipulation did not seem to be as formidable 
 as it really was, it was nothing short of a monopoly. 
 
 For instance, in 1907 China made a contract 
 with a British firm to build the railroad from 
 Hsinmingtun to Fakumen in Manchuria. Objec- 
 tion was made b)'^ Japan on the ground that this 
 line would parallel part of the Japanese South Man- 
 churian railroad and she produced in support of 
 her position a secret clause of the Yuan-Komura 
 agreement in 1905 made between China and Japan 
 concerning Manchuria. China denied that she had 
 accepted that agreement; but Japan induced England 
 to refuse support to the British firm, and China was 
 compelled to aibandon the project. 
 
 Again, in 1909,. a project was developed by 
 American, British and Chinese interests for the 
 construction of a Chinese government line from 
 Chinchow to Aigun. The plan was approved by 
 the Chinese government and had the support of the 
 American government. It is generally understood 
 that the British government at first favored the 
 project until Japan and Russia finally signified 
 their disapproval. They absolutely vetoed the 
 scheme on the ground that it would be a menace 
 to their economic interests in Manchuria. The 
 rights and interests of China received no consider- 
 
 55 
 
ation ; and the Chinese government and American 
 capital were forbidden to construct a railroad on the 
 Chinese soil. 
 
 While the negotiations for the building of the 
 Chinchow-Aigun railroad were in progress, Mr. 
 Knox, then Secretary of State of the United States, 
 advanced a proposal, saying “the most effective 
 way to preserve the undisturbed enjoyment by 
 China of all political rights in Manchuria and to 
 promote the development of the open door and 
 equal opportunity would be to bring the Man- 
 churian highways, the railroads, under an economic, 
 scientific, and impartial administration by some 
 plan vesting in China the ownership of the railroads 
 through funds furnished for that purpose by the 
 interested powers willing to participate.” The' Brit- 
 ish and the German governments were in sympa- 
 thy with the general principles of the scheme ; but 
 the Japanese government promptly announced her 
 disapproval. As a result the whole project was set 
 to nought. Whatever the merits of Mr. Knox’s 
 proposal, it clearly brought out the fact that Japan 
 was determined to keep other nations out of Man- 
 churia and that China’s autonomy was seriously 
 compromised. 
 
 Turning now to loans we will find the same in- 
 tention to control China financially through diplomacy. 
 The various loans are too numerous to enumerate. 
 They represent also an enormous sum. The an- 
 nual interest charges are already a financial strain 
 to a nation that is yet young in industrial develop- 
 ment. The Boxer Indemnities add to the drain on her 
 economic sources. The effect of both these charges 
 is to so reduce the revenue of the government that 
 
 56 
 
most of the reform measures can not be carried into 
 conclusion. It is bad enough to be a debtor nation, 
 worse yet is it to be one that has to accept whatever 
 usurious and onerous terms the creditor nations may 
 seek to impose. 
 
 Of loans there are two kinds. One is the public 
 loan and the other is the loan for specific purposes, 
 as for instance the construction of railroads. The 
 latter have been sufficiently treated under railroad con- 
 cessions, hence they need not be repeated any further. 
 The Public loans are loans directly to the govern- 
 ment for general purposes, for instance, the re- 
 organization in 1913 after the Revolution. Loans 
 require securities of one sort or another, and in 
 China various sources of revenue where the gov- 
 ernment derives its chief support are pledged as 
 securities. In the course of the last score of years, 
 many taxes, as the custom duties, the likin charges, 
 as well as other taxes, were already pledged as 
 securities. Should there ever occur a default of 
 payment the taxes are to be transferred and admin- 
 istered by the custom authorities. Accordingly, 
 China appears to be an enormous piece of mortgage. 
 Other provisions are equally exacting and are of 
 a monopolistic nature. The points discussed under 
 previous topics apply here as well. In 1913, for 
 example, failing to agree with the banking syndi- 
 cate at Peking, China succeeded in securing credits 
 in the London market. But the attempt was dis- 
 credited by the syndicate. It merely strengthened 
 the latter’s cohesive power. The Six power group 
 subsequently formed with the backing of their re- 
 spective governments worked for the monopoly of 
 
 57 
 
loaning money to China. The ulterior motives of 
 some powers became evident during the process of 
 negotiations. The American group withdrew after 
 President Wilson’s declaration that the United 
 States would not be a party to any attempt to ham- 
 per the young Republic financially or politically. 
 
 There is no need for describing any further. 
 The “Spheres of Influence,” the right of first option, 
 railroad concessions and loans point unmistakably 
 to the existence of financial imperialism or of a policy 
 of fin.ancial control through diplomacy. That jus- 
 tice demands the discontinuance of financial imperi- 
 alism under all circumstances none will deny. That 
 even expediency demands the inauguration of a 
 new era can be easily explained. The world has 
 reached a state of cosmopolitan consciousness, and 
 its chief concern in future, as is at present, will be 
 the maintenance of peace. Financial imperialism 
 as practised in China is exclusive of each other’s 
 interests. It is competitive and conflicting. And 
 where there is conflicting interest there is germ for 
 rupture which may eventually lead to war. The 
 Avorld is tired of war. Will it tolerate factors that 
 cai’se war? 
 
 58 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 The above peace claims of China do not suggest 
 any unreasonable outburst of patriotic passion, but 
 rather indicate briefly the wrongs that China has 
 suffered in the past. Since China began her rela- 
 tions with foreign nations, nearly a century ago, 
 she has been outraged one way or another by dif- 
 ferent powers at different times. Her international 
 prestige and national honor have been broken down 
 to pieces. Her territorial integrity has been no 
 more true in actual conditions, though still in diplo- 
 matic phraseology. Her political independence has 
 been reduced to nothing but a mere fiction. In the 
 late years, Japan even tries to get control of her 
 finance and army. Thus China has nearly lost her 
 right of existence as a sovereign and independent 
 nation. Yet China has always showed good will 
 toward all, and given no provocation to any. Is 
 it just to strangle a nation of such a brilliant past 
 and of such a promising future? Is it right to en- 
 danger the destiny of 400,000,000 industrious and 
 peace-loving people? 
 
 Surely the Peace Conference will answer these 
 questions negatively. The spirit of the glorious 
 victory of the war indicates the birth of a universal 
 feeling that imperialism of any description must be 
 totally condemned and cast away as a dead theory 
 of the by-gone generation ; the goal of the proposed 
 League of Nations, embodied in President Wilson’s 
 lofty ideals and enlightened principles, promises 
 to mankind an upright hew regime of nationalism 
 and internationalism, based on right and justice. 
 With this spirit and toward that goal, not only 
 China has the ample justification to claim for an 
 
 59 
 
international adjustment that would give her an 
 honorable place among the family of nations, but 
 also the Paris Conference has an important duty to 
 work out such a readjustment so as to make China 
 an efficient and effective member of the League, and 
 unroot all the causes of the future wars now fer- 
 menting in the Far East. Such a readjustment will 
 not only mean the safety of China’s place under the 
 sun, but ultimately also the permanent peace of the 
 world. 
 
 China is a sovereign and independent nation. 
 She wants to exist as such. Her territorial integ- 
 rity must be maintained. Kiao-Chou, including the 
 port of Tsing-tao, must be unconditionally returned. 
 Japanese domination in China in general and in 
 Shantung and Manchuria in particular must be ter- 
 minated. China must have complete sovereignty 
 over her territory. “Spheres of Influence” must be 
 abolished. All the territories that have been leased 
 to different powers against China’s will, like Port 
 Arthur, Talien-Wan, Kwang-Chou-Wan and Wei- 
 Hai-VVei, should be one and all restored to China. 
 No more “Balance of Powers” should be tolerated. 
 Mongolia, Manchuria and Tibet are integral parts 
 of China’s territory. No attempt at either luring 
 them away from China or exercising special influ- 
 ence over them should be permitted. 
 
 China wants her political independence respect- 
 fully observed. The notorious Twenty-One De- 
 mands and the malicious treaties that Japan forced 
 China to accept must be made null and void. The 
 entity of China’s jurisdiction must be restored. Ex- 
 traterritoriality now existing in China should be 
 relinquished gradually, if not immediately. For- 
 
 6o 
 
eign garrisons stationed at various places of China 
 should be recalled. Foreign post offices in China 
 should be closed. China must have absolute free- 
 dom in her financial affairs. The conventional tariff 
 now in force in China should be removed. Politi- 
 cal stipulations should not be allowed in contract- 
 ing any loan between China and other powers, for 
 whatever purposes. Boxer Indemnity which was 
 exacted from China far beyond the actual injuries 
 done to foreign powers should be cancelled. China’s 
 army and navy represent China’s sovereignty. No 
 nation should be allowed to get control of them. 
 
 These major claims of China aim at nothing but 
 the restoration of her complete sovereignty and 
 independence which she is morally and legally 
 entitled to. Unless the Far Eastern status is radi- 
 cally revised by the enlightened powers now gather- 
 ing at Paris, the League of Nations will be only a 
 dream. Unless “Spheres of Influence” and “Bal- 
 ance of Powers” are done away with, the permanent 
 peace of the world will not be in sight. Unless all 
 the wrongs done to China in the past are one and 
 all righted, the happiness of mankind would never 
 be realized. 
 
 In reply tq the question asked by the Peking 
 correspondent of The New York Times, Why did 
 China endorse the League? Premier Chien Neng- 
 Hsun said, “There are two considerations. First 
 China believes in the establishment of justice and 
 right throughout the world, and, second, China her- 
 self feels that she may expect the world to apply 
 these principles to her own problems.” In an inter- 
 view with the some correspondent, Pi;esident Hsu 
 Shih-Chang said, “If unfortunately the League of 
 
 6i 
 
Nations fails to become a fact, the result will not 
 only be that the world’s aspiration will remain 
 unrealized, but that the Far East may become the 
 first region dangerously affected.” These words of 
 Premier Chien and President Hsu voice the senti- 
 ment of all China. China endorses the League with 
 full expectation and faith, will the other members 
 of the League do full justice to her? 
 
 62 
 
Address all communications to 
 
 Mr. K. P. Wang 
 
 (Secretary of the Committee) 
 
 5 TO West 113th St. 
 New York City 
 
 63 
 

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