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This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order If, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR HOFFDING. HARALD TITLE: BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY PLACE: NEW YORK DATE: [1912] COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROFORM TARHFT Master Negative # Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record 109 H675 H^ffding, Harald, 184^-1931. A brief history of modern philosopliy, by Dr. Harold HofTtling ... Authorized translation by Charles Finley Sanders ... New York, The Macmillan company /1912] X p., 1 1.. 324 p. lOicm. Includes a section on Spinoza (p. 67-78) Restrictions on Use: 1. Philosophy— Hist Library of Congress I. Sanders, Charles Finley, 1869- tr. (Continued on next card) 12—22145 B798.D3H68 -^ i48ol| FILM SIZE: ^j3^^yyt^ IMAGE PLACEMENT: Ia" DATE FILMED:„_5'Z^^ TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA IB IIB REDUCTION RATIO: //X INITIALS^^^fl__ FILMED BY: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS. INC WOODBRIDGE. CT BIBLIOGRAPHIC IRREGULARITIES MAIN ENTRY: A. ^ri^ ^ a&i^ /^i/o&^Y Biblioeraphic IrregulariH es in thp Original DnrtimPT^f List volumes and pages affected; include name of institution if filming borrowed text. — L_Page(s) missing/ not available: i?-7jp / ^n^? *,^- »:^ ^ .i»^' ^ \ ^ LIBRARY 'i \ ) ill -t| A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY il ^' ■'% BRIEF HISTORY OF llODERN PHILOSOPHY BY y^^y^^^ THE MACMILLAN COMPANY MKW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO DALLAS • SAN FRANCISCO MACMILLAN & CO., Limited LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA MKLBOURNB THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. TORONTO DR. HAROLD . HOFFDING PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION BY CHARLES FINLEY SANDERS PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE, GETTYSBURG, PA. AUTHOR OF THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF JERUSALEM'S INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY j ^to gorit THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 4 I i » » » r < I . • .• • • • t « ( « « » • » •• • ' « * • > • • • • • • » • * * » J • * • < • • • • » . . . « • < . < • ♦ • S ( * • I , ( COPTBIGHT, 1912, By the M ACM ill an COMPANY. Set up and electrotyped. Published September, 1912. PREFACE Professor Harold Hoffding is already well known to the English-speaking world through the translations of his Psychology, Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Problems of Philosophy and his History of Modem Philosophy (2 vols.), all published by the Macmillan Company. The fact that his works are rapidly finding their way into English and other languages is the best evidence of the esteem in which his work is held and of his importance as a thinker. Bom in 1 843 , professor of philosophy in Copen- hagen since 1883, Doctor Hoffding has worked over the whole field of philosophy with great thoroughness. The original (German) edition from which this translation is made appeared in 1905/ It is therefore the fmit of his ripest scholarship. The book is clear, compact and com- prehensive. The various schools are analyzed and criti- cized, and the thread of continuous development is con- stantly kept clearly in view. These features constitute the exceptional merit of the book as a text. The student is constantly aware that a familiar spirit is safely guiding him through the bewildering maze of philosophic problems and tentative solutions. As a psychologist Doctor Hoffding is an empirical intro- spectionist. He is thoroughly modem in his antipathy towards metaphysical speculation. He discovers a native tendency in man, manifesting itself in the impulse towards well-being, the source or further meaning of which is beyond our knowledge, which furnishes the basis of ethics. I *i^ .':« VI PREFACE Religion is the reaction of the human mind to the sense of value and represents the highest fimction of the human mind. As a critical empiricist he possesses a peculiar advantage in the interpretation of the trend of philosophic thought. We offer this book to the English student because of its merit, as an efficient guide to the tmder- standing of modem philosophy. C. F. Sanders. Gettysburg, Pa. I July 20, 1 91 2. V TABLE OF CONTENTS. Introduction ""^^J FIRST BOOK THR PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE A. The Discovery of ^jw-Watural Man a 1. Pomponazzi, I ^achiav^ , Montaigne \ * 2. Vives, Melanchilion, ^thusius, Grotius ...'.'! 8 3. Bodin, Cherbury, Bohme ,' ] g 4. Ramus, Sanchez, Bacon j- B. The New Conception of the "World 21 1. Nicholas of Cusa ! ] ! 22 2. Telesius ^ 3. Copernicus , ^6 4. Bruno * 28 C. The New Science ^- 1. Leonardo .^ 2. Keple r * vj 3CGiE% \ \ \ \ \ W \ 39X SECOND BOOK the great systems y. 1. Descartes aTx 2. Hobbes .'.'.'.*** 'c^> y^ 3- fpj^^^ .'.'.*!.'!!! r^ 4. Leibnitz , . THIRD BOOK ENGLISH empirical PHILOSOPHY .' i \ I. Locke 2. Newton . . . , . ' ,v< 90 P' ii /' '^ "•■'?l vm CONTENTS PAGE i (> 3. Berkeley 98 4. Shaftesbury 102 5. Hume 106 6. Smith 113 FOURTH BOOK \ t PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN FRANCE AND GERMAN!^ A. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment in France and Rousseau 118 1. Voltaire and the Encyclopedists ......... 118 ■ 2. Rousseau 123 < 1*.:.. - / B. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment in Germany and Lessing 132 1. The German Enlightenment 132 2. Lessing 135 FIFTH BOOK IMMANUEL KANT AND THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY A. Theoretical Problems 140 1. The Development of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge 140 a. First Period. 1 755-1 769 140 b. Second Period. 1769-1761 140 2. Critique of Pure Reason 144 a. Subjective Deduction 144 b. Objective Deduction . . . 146 3. Phenomena and Thing-in-itself 148 4. Criticism of Speculative Philosophy 150 B. The Ethico-religious Problem 153 1. The Historical Development of the Kantian Ethics . 154 2. The Specifically Kantian Ethics 155 3. The Religious Problem 156 4. Speculative Ideas on the Basis of Biology and "^ -^thetics 159 C. Opponents and First Disciples 162 1. Hamann, Herder, Jacobi 163 2. Reinhold, Maimon, Schiller 165 / 1 CONTENTS ix SIXTH BOOK THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM PAGB A. The Speculative Systems 171 1. Fichte 171 2. Schelling lyy 3- Hegel 182 B. The Critical Romanticists 189 1. Schleiermacher 189 2. Schopenhauer , iqj. 3. Kierkegaard 201 C. The Under-current of Criticism in the Romantic Period 205 1. Fries 205 2. Herbart 207 3. Beneke 211 D. The Transition from Romanticism to Positivism . .213 1. The Dissolution of the Hegelian School 213 2. Feuerbach 214 SEVENTH BOOK positivism A. French Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century before COMTE 210 (The Authority, the Psychological and the Social Schools.) B. Augusts Comte 224 C. English Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century beforb John Stuart Mill 231 D. John Stuart Mill 237 E. The Philosophy of Evolution i . . 246 1. Charles Darwin 247 2. Herbert Spencer 250 \^\ X CONTENTS PAGB F. Positivism in Germany and Italy 260 1. Duhring 261 2. Ardig6 264, EIGHTH BOOK NRW THEORIES OF THE PROBLEM OF BEING UPON A REALISTIC BASIS Introduction. (Modern Materialism) 268 A. Modern Idealism in Germany 271 1. Lotze ••• 271 2. Hartmann 275 3. Fechner 278 4. Wundt 280 B. Modern Idealism in England and France .... 284 1. Bradley 284 2. Fouill^e 287 NINTH BOOK new theories of the problems of knowledge and of value A. The Problem of Knowledge 289 1. German Neokantianism 290 2. French Criticism and the Philosophy of Discontinuity 292 3. The Economico-biological Theory of Knowledge . . 296 1. Maxwell, Mach 298 2. Avenarius 299 3. William James 301 r B. The Problem of Value 303 j I. Guyau .••.... 304 2. Nietzsche 306 3. Eucken 310 4. William James 312 Chronology of the most Important Works 315 Index 321 A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY s !1 BRIEF HISTOEY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY ■^ INTRODUCTION The subject matter of the history of philosophy consists of the efforts which individual thinkers have made to explain or perchance to solve the ultimate problems of knowledge and of being. Modem philosophy— i. e. the philosophy of the last three centuries — ^has been specially concerned with four great problems. These problems, moreover — ^as I have shown in my Philosophic Problems (Eng. Tr. 1905) — are intimately related to each other, and there likewise exists a most significant analogy between them, in that the antithesis of continuity and discontinuity is of fundamental importance in each of them, except that it manifests itself under different forms. I. The psychological problem originates from the inquiry concerning the essential attributes of psychic life. Is the soul a distinct substance, or does its essential nature consist of a peculiar activity? Is the soul com- posed of a variety of independent elements, or is it characterized by imity and totality? The discussion of these questions can be of value only as it is based upon a detailed investigation of psychical phenomena and functions. It will likewise appear that the solution of these questions has a very important bearing on the treatment and the solution of the remaining philosophic problems. Whilst psychological investigation finds its subject matter in the bare facts of psychic life, there are two r » INTRODUCTION lgaie and are led to organize societies under the influence of a native social impulse (appctitus societatis); but tbe constitution of society presupposes certain principle; of government- above all the inviolability of every proanwc— and the pcH)plo therefore pledge themselves to the observance of these rules either by expressed or tacit contract. The obligation to keep promises, according to Grotius, i^ts upon a primitive promise. In direct opjxxsition to Althaus, Groiius holds that the people— i. c. after Uwiy have constituted society on the basis of the immitive contract — am renounce its sovereignty absolutely because it confers it on a prince or corporation. His tlieory of the relation of the state to religion, on the other hand^ b more liberal than that of the strictly confessional AUhatis: The only requirement wliich the state can make i X2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE BOHME n of its subjects is the acceptance of general religious ideas (the unity of Deity, predestination). 3. The general religious ideas which Grotius has in mind, and which even Melanchthon accepted, were elabo- rated by a series of thinkers in more or less direct op- position to the confessional conception. Similar ideas had ah-eady been expressed during the period of the older Itahan Renaissance (especially in the Platonic Academy at Florence). Jean Bodin (a Frenchman learned in law, d. 1596), previously mentioned, in his remarkable work called the Dialogue of Seven Men (Colloquium Heptaplomeres) describes a conversation between men whose reHgious viewpoints were widely at variance. Two of the men, defending natural religion— one of them dogmatically, the other more critically— engage in con- troversy with a CathoHc, a Lutheran, a Calvinist, a Jew, and a Mohammedan. According to Bodin, true religion consists in the ptmfied soul turning to God, the infinite essence. This reHgion can be exercised within any of the various religions, and the seven men therefore separate in charity and peace. Bodin's book was in circulation for a long time in nothing but manuscript copies. In 1624, however, the English diplomat, Herbert of Ckerbury, pubHshed his book De veritate, which remained the text book of natural religion for a long mmiber of years. Cherhury takes issue with those on the one hand who regard confessional faith as superior to rational knowledge, and seek to incul- cate such faith by threats of future punishment, and those on the other hand who pretend to depend wholly on the rational understanding, together with those who would derive everything from sense experience, conceiving the soul as a blank tablet (tabula Rasa). He holds that there 13 ! is an immediate, instinctive sense which guides all men to the acceptance of certain truths (notitiae communes). This sense is the natural product of the instinct of self- preservation, which is another instance of the operation of divine predestination. The following propositions are instinctive truths of this order: Two contradictory propositions cannot both he true; There is a first cause of all things; No one should do anything towards another which he would he unwilling to suffer in return. According to Cherhury, even natiu-al religion rests on an instinctive foundation, an inner revelation experienced by every human soul. The evidences of this revelation consist of the fact that we have capacities and impulses which finite objects fail to satisfy. The following five prop- ositions contain the essence of all religion: There is a Supreme Being; This Being must he worshipped; The truest worship consists of virtuous living and a pious disposition; Atonement for sin must he made hy penitence; There are rewards and punishments after the present life. Questions which go beyond these five propositions need give us no concern. Jacob Bbhme (1575-1624), the Gorlitz cobbler, and the profoimdest religious thinker of this period,' does not intend to oppose positive religion, as is the case with Bodin and Cherhury, He means to be a good Lutheran. He simply wishes to furnish a philosophy which will har- monize with Protestantism. Although a mere artisan, the influence of mysticism and natural science gave rise to grave doubts in Bbhme^s mind. He accepted the Copemican astronomy. He could no longer regard the earth as the center of the universe. But must it not follow therefore that man is but a negligible quantity in the universe, and is it not true that the great world proc- 14 14 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE RAMUS esses must take their course regardless of the fate of man? Notwithstanding all this, if we should still pre- sume to maintain our faith in God as the author of the universe, what shall we say in explanation of the evil, strife and suffering which everywhere abounds? After profound spiritual struggles Bbhme discovered answers to these questions which he pubHshed in his Morgenrote im A ufgang ( 1 6 1 2) . His thought moves in majestic symbols drawn from the Bible and the chemistry or alchemy of his time. He is however fully aware that these symbols can express the piure thought relations but very imper- fectly. He was also well aware of the fact that his ideas went beyond the theology of the church. But he stoutly denied the charge that his ideas were heathen. "/ write like a philosopher, not like a heathenr He meets the first doubt with the idea of the presence of God's power and nature in everything—in the human body as well as in the stellar spheres, and the latter must therefore be possessed of a kind of life— in human souls and throughout infinite space. As a matter of fact our bodies reveal the same elements as are found in the other objects of nature. In objective nature the divine activity is veiled; but in the mind of man it is clearly conscious. It follows there- fore that we possess what is highest within ourselves* and there is no need that we should seek it beyond the stars. He solves the second doubt with the idea that man must assume an original multiplicity within the divine unity, on the ground that multiplicity cannot be derived from unity, and moreover because opposition and difference are necessary conditions of consciousness: "A being incapable of experiencing contrasts could never become conscious of its own existence." But multi- pHcity and contrast furnish the possibility of disharmony, 15 of strife and evil. The origin of evil is explained by the fact that a single element of Deity strives to become the whole Deity. This accotmts for the profound conflict and the intense suffering in the world through which man and nature are to fight their way through to peace. In this conflict God is not far off: it is indeed his own inner conflict. ''Everyone whose heart is filled with love and who leads a compassionate and sweet tempered life, fighting against evil and pressing through the wrath of God into the light y lives with God and is of one mind with God, God requires no other service,'' 4. The effort to attain a natural, purely himiamstic conception likewise affected the logic of the Renaissance, as well as the psychology, ethics and philosophy of relig- ion. The scholastic logic, by which is meant the logic of the middle ages, was primarily the servant of theology and of jurisprudence; it was adapted to the single purpose of drawing valid conclusions from the presuppositions established by authority. But an effort was now being made to discover the relation which exists between logical rules and natural, spontaneous, informal thought. It was with this end in view that Pierre de la Ramee (Petrus Ramus) attacked the Aristotelian logic {Institutiones Logicim, 1554, French Ed. 1555). He was the son of a charcoal burner (bom in northern France 151 5), and it was by sheer dint of his thirst for knowledge and his in- defatigable energy that he forged to the front and enjoyed a most successful career as a teacher in the College of France. Being a Protestant, he fell a victim to the mas- sacre of St. Bartholomew's night (1572). Ramus called attention to the fact that the earliest philosophers had no formal logic, and that the spontaneous functions of thought are not confined to these men, but that they i!' iH' i6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE can be studied in the mathematicians, the statesmen, the orators, and the poets as well. These observations however still failed to lead Ramus to the founding of a psychology of thought. As a Humanist, he rejoices in the fact that the classical authors could be of service to logic. His own treatment however does not get much beyond the theory of inference, in which he differs but little from Aristotle. A controversy between the Ramists and the Scholastics arose at this time— enlisting France, England, Germany and the North— which contributed greatly to the development of freedom of thought. Franz Sanchez (1562-1632), a Spaniard, professor of medicine and philosophy at Montpelier and Toulouse, felt the need of substituting a new method for the scholas- tic logic. He expresses his dissatisfaction with the existing state of knowledge in his book Quod nihil scitur (1581). The further he presses his investigations the greater are the number of difficulties which he finds. Owing to the mutual interdependence of all things, and the infinitude of the universe, he has but little hope of attaining certainty in knowledge. He insists on obser- vation and experiment however, and takes as his motto; Go to the facts themselves. But the ultimate ground of certainty is nevertheless within the human mind itself: no external knowledge can equal the certainty which I have of my own states and actions. On the other hand however this immediate certainty of inner experience is far in- ferior to the knowledge of external objects in point of clearness and precision. Bacon's enthusiastic optimism concerning the future prospects of science presents a sharp contrast to the pessimism of Sanchez, He hoped for great things and devised magnificent plans. He anticipated great ad- BACON 17 «l vancement in culture which was to be brought about by the mastery of the forces of nature through the aid of natural science, a study which ancient and mediseval thinkers had contemned. The aim and purpose of science is the enrichment of human life by means of new dis- coveries. Bacon nevertheless bestows high praise on the ^ve of contemplation (contemplatio rerum): the vision >^ Hght is far more glorious than all the various uses of jHght. These sublime hopes furnish an insight into Bacon's personal character and his method of doing things. He justified the use of every available means in acquiring the conditions without which he thought his scientific plans impossible, on the plea of their necessity to the realization of his great purposes. Francis Bacon of Verulam was bom of an excellent family in 156 1. In order to acquire the influence and the wealth which he regarded as necessary to his purposes, he threw himself into politics and gradually rose to promi- nent positions; finally attaining to the office of Lord Chancellor. But he gained this promotion by dishonor- able compromises with the despotic caprice of EHzabeth and James the First. Under the charge of bribery and the violation of the law, parliament deposed him in 1621. His last years were spent in retirement engaged in scien- tific pursuits. He died in 1626. His political activities had not prevented him from continuing his studies and the production of important works. The tragedy of his Hf e consisted in the fact that ulterior demands claimed his attention to so great an extent that not only his real purpose but even his personal character had to suffer imder it. Bacon describes himself as a herald (buccinator) who announces the approach of the new era without par- y I ii N If i8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE tidpating in it himself. He insists on quitting fruitless speculation and introducing the method of experience, induction, in every department of knowledge, — in the mental sciences as well as in the natural sciences. In the Novum Organon (1620) he examines the reasons why the sciences are inadequate and describes the in^ ductive method. In the De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623) he presents a sketch of the actual state of the sciences and proceeds to show, frequently in a most brilliant manner, the gaps which still remain to be filled. If a man would understand nature correctly, he must first of all reduce himself to a blank tablet. No one can enter the kingdom of nature except as a little child. But we are all hindered to a greater or less degree by various y illusions, both native and acquired (Idola mentis). These may be divided into four classes. The first class, having its origin in human nature, is common to all mankind K (Idola tribus). This is why we are constantly disposed to regard things from the viewpoint of their relation and their similarity to ourselves, rather than from the view- point of their true place in the general order of the tmi- verse — ex analogia hominis instead of ex analogia universi. We assimie a greater degree of order and simplicity in things than the facts justify. We discover teleologic causes in nature because our own actions reveal such causes. The second class rests on individual peculiarity V^ (Idola specus; every one interprets nature from the view- point of his own cave) . This accounts for the fact that some minds are more impressed by the differences of things, whilst others are disposed to emphasize their resem- blances. Some are constantly striving to analyze and reduce things to their elements; others are engrossed with I BACON 19 totalities. The third class is due to the influence of language upon thought (Idola fori). The formulation^' of words is governed by the needs of practical Hfe, but exact thought frequently requires distinctions and com- binations whicb differ widely from those of common speech. In certain cases there is a superabimdance of words, in others there are too few. The fourth class (Idola theatri) is ascribed to .the influence of traditional^ theories. We must get rid of all these illusions. Bacon makes no attempt to show how this may be accomplished. The conception of the idola tribus contains a profound prob- lem which Bacon failed to see, a problem however which acquired vast importance at a later period; we are obliged in every case to interpret reality from the human stand- point (ex analogia hominis) ; but in that case the question arises as to how our knowledge of the world can possess objective validity. -Bacaw takes exception to the prevalent method of induc- tion on the groimd of its being limited to positive cases (as an induction per enumerationem simpHcem). He insists that we must likewise take note of results in cases> where the phenomenon under consideration is absent. He demands fiuthermore that we investigate the modifica- tions of phenomena under varying conditions. After sufficient material has been gathered by these methods — and in order to avoid being overwhelmed by the confused mass of facts (for, citius emergit Veritas ex errore quam ex confusione) — ^it is necessary to formulate a tentative hypothesis and examine the cases which seem to establish or refute the hypothesis. Bacon's method is therefore not a pure induction. He has a presentiment of the profound mutual dependence of induction and deduction. I 20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE His depreciation of the quantitative method however prevents him from attaining the true method of natural science as we find it in his contemporaries, Kepler and Galileo. According to Bacon, the method of induction gives us an insight into the "Forms" of things. The Baconian " Forms," from one point of view, bear a close resemblance > to the Platonic ideas, and from another they are analogous to the laws of natural science. The latter conception he frequently emphasizes very strongly. He says, e. g. "If the Forms are not regarded as principles of activity, they are nothing more than fictions of the human mind." Generally speaking. Bacon occupies a unique position in the transition from the ancient and scholastic worid view to that of the modem period. This is clearly mani- fest in his effort to acquire a mechanical theory of nature. We never understand an object until we are in position to explain its origin, and the genetic processes of nature are brought about by means of minute variations (per minima) which elude our senses. But science uncovers the secret process (latens processus) and thus reveals the inherent relation and continuity of events. We do not* discover, e. g. that the "Form" of heat is motion through! sense perception; nor do the senses reveal the fact that the sum total of matter remains constant throughout all the changes of nature. Bacon makes a sharp distinction between science and ^religion. The former rests upon sense perception, the latter upon supernatural inspiration. In philosophy the first principles must be submitted to the test of in- duction; in religion, on the other hand, the first principles are established by authority. Reverence towards God increases in direct proportion to the absurdity and in- BACON 31 credibility of the divine mysteries accepted. Bacon how- ever believes in the possibility of a purely natural theology. The very imiformity of nattiral causation reveals the existence of deity. In ethics Bacon makes a distinction between the theory of the moral idea (de exemplari) and the theory of the development of the will (de cultura anima). The former he finds thoroughly elaborated by the ancients; but the latter has received but very Httle attention hitherto. B. The New Conception of the World The middle ages developed its theory of nature as well as that of the spiritual life on the foundation of Greek antiquity-^xcept where its ideas were derived from the Bible and Christian tradition.— They received their theory of medicine from Galen, their astronomy from Ptolemy, their philosophy from Aristotle, Their world view was a combination of the theories of Aris-^ totle and Ptolemy with the Biblical doctrines: the earth is stationary and forms the center of the tmi verse; the sun, moon, planets and the fixed stars, attached to firm but transparent spheres, revolve aroimd it. The sub-limar world, i. e. the earth and the space intervening between the earth and the moon, is the realm of change and death. Here the four elements (Earth, Water, Air, Fire) are in a state of constant motion. Each seeks its "natural place." Weight consists of the natural tendency to descend, lightness consists of the tendency to ascend. Beyond this moon-sphere is the reabn of ether, consisting of matter which has no "natural place," which is therefore capable of continuing its motion eternally with absolute regularity. The motions of the heavenly bodies — due to this absolute regularity— are a direct copy of the nature I 23 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE I of Deity. They move in circles because the circle is tb« \ most perfect figure; it invariably retiuns into itself I The universe is botmded by the sphere of the fixed stars which is moved by the Deity himself, whilst the lower spheres are moved by variotis ethereal spirits. This world theory seemed to be in harmony with the authorities of the age, AristoUe and the Bible, and at the same time to be in accord with the direct evidence of ' sense perception. This is why it required such a severe struggle to supplant it. It not only required the re- /pudiation of venerable authorities, but even the most familiar sensory impressions. It was this profoimd revolution that constituted the stupendous task of the great Copernicus. The epistemological foundations of the ancient world view were imsettled by two men who had no acquaintance with its doctrine. I. Nicholas Cusanus (1401-1464), a profoimd thinker with Neoplatonic and mystical tendencies, had even in the fifteenth century gone beyond the traditional view of a limited and stationary imiverse. Bom in Cues (near Trier), he was educated by the "Brothers of the Common Life." He afterwards continued his studies in Italy. He attained to high ecclesiastical positions and his phi- losophy has its starting point in theological speculations. In his doctrine of the Trinity he. regards the Spirit as the uniting principle which combines the oppositions implied in the characters of Father and Son; spiritus sanctus est nexus infinitus. He afterwards discovers analogous principles in hmnan knowledge and in nature generally.— Falckenberg^s Grungzuge der Philosophie des Nicholas Cusanus (Breslau, 1880) and M. Jacobi's Das WeltC" gebdude des Kardinals Nicholas von Cues (1904) are splendid memoirs of this remarkable man. f . ( I CUSANUS 23 All knowledge consists of a process of combination and assimilation. Even sense perception combines vari- ous impressions into unitary wholes and these are in tiuTi reduced to ideas and the ideas finally to concepts. In this way the intellect (intelligentia) is forever striving for imity— but it invariably requires an antithesis, some- thing "other than" (alteritas) itself to effect its develop- ment. Finally, in order to 'transcend the antitheses, thought tmdertakes to conceive them as the extremes of a continuous series. In this way maximum and minimum are united by a continuous series of magnitudes. But we are tmable to reconcile all antitheses: thought cul- minates in antitheses, i. e. there always remains an un- assimilated increment beyond itself. It is as impossible •for our thought to comprehend the Absolute as it is to describe a circle of pure polygons, even though we may constantly approach it more closely. Although we are incapable of conceiving the Absolute, Deity, we never- theless understand (such is the nature of the intellect) our incapacity, and the ignorance in which our thought cuhninates, as a matter of fact, is a scientific ignorance^ (docta ignorantia). (One of the most interesting of the works of Cusanus is entitled De docta ignorantia,) This fimdamental peculiarity of our knowledge is like- wise of importance in the study of nature. We are con- stantly striving to form continuous series from given points, but without being able to arrive anywhere. Thus, e. g. we can divide our idea of matter to infinity, in ex- perience we must always be satisfied with a finite division, and the atom concept therefore always remains relative. It is the same with the idea of motion: an everlasting, perpetual motion were only possible in case there were no resistance. Here Cusanus anticipates the principle of I ;| m I I i 24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE TELESIUS inertia. And the same thing applies even to the deter- minations of locality: we always regard the objects of the universe from a given place which is, for the time being, the center of the universe for us; the universe as such, however, can have neither center nor circumference, and all motion is relative. The theory that the earth is at thecenter of the universe is therefore false. However if it is not at the center of the imiverse, it cannot be at rest; it must be in motion even though we do not perceive it. There is no grsiimd therefore for the assimiption that the processes of ori^ and decay should be confined to the sublunar sphere; we must rather assume that all world bodies are subject to similar conditions to those of the earth. According to Cusanus, therefore, the same principle which precludes our knowledge of Deity like- wise demonstrates that the world can neither be limited nor stationary as was hitherto believed. 2. It was characteristic of the ancient, aesthetic con- ception of natiu-e to emphasize the opposition of Form and Matter. The "Forms'' of natural phenomena like- wise contained their explanation. Bernardino Telesius (i 508-1 588) introduces the concept of Force (principium agens) instead of Form (in his work De rerum natura, 1565-1587), as the opposite of Matter. He believes that this conforms more closely with the facts of experience. The "Forms" were mere qualities, which explain nothing. He rejected the traditional theory of the "natural places" and the qualitative distinction of the elements. There are as a matter of fact but two fundamental forces; the one expands (heat), the other contracts (cold), and the various "Forms'' which Matter, in itself unchanging and quantitatively constant, asstmies must find their explanation by reference to the interaction of these two 25 forces. There are no "natural places, " for space is every- where the same. Different places in space do not of themselves mvolve any qualitative differences Telesius was bom at Cosenza in the vicinity of Naples His circumstances were sufficiently comfortable to provide him the opportunity to devote himself to science He taught in the University of Naples and founded an Academy m his native city. He had planned to sub- stitute a new theory, based on experience, for Aristotelian Scholasticism. But his critical equipment was inadequate to the accomplishment of this ideal. His general princi- pies however mark an important advance. The details of his natural philosophy are no longer of interest. But his ideas on the psychology of knowledge still continue to be of considerable importance. He tries to bring thought and sensation into the closest possible relation - bhould an object which has once been perceived in the totahty of its parts and attributes recur at some later time with certain of its parts and attributes lacking we can supply the parts which are lacking and imagine the object as a totality notwithstanding the fact that we perceive it but in part. We can imagine fire, e. g. with all Its attnbutes, even though we only see its hght, without perceiving its heat and its consuming energy. Intellection ^ (intellegere) is the process of construing our fragmentary expenence into such a totality. Even the highest and most perfect knowledge simply consists of the ability to discover the unknown attributes and conditions of phenomena by means of their similarity to other cases known as a totality. Inference simply means the rec- ogmtion of the absent attributes by this method The simplest sensory impressions are therefore related through a large number of intervening degrees to the highest rl^ 26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE COPERNICUS 27 / product of scientific thought, and there is no ground for attempting to deduce our knowledge from two different sources or faculties. The problem as to whether similarity- is a sensory quality like color and tone remains imsolved, as even Patrizzi, a contemporary of Telesius, charged against him. Telesius is inclined to ascribe sensitivity to all matter, just as, on the other hand, he regards the soul as material (with this exception, he postulated a supernatural part in the soul on theological grounds which he regarded as a forma superaddita). Every himian soul, like everything else, possesses a native impulse towards self-preservation, which constitutes the foundation of ethics. Himian virtues represent the various attributes which are favor- able to the preservation of the individual. Wisdom is an indispensable condition which must therefore co- operate with all the other virtues (as virtus universalis). The social virtues, which are comprehended under the concept humanitas, are of great importance, because intimate association with others is a necessary condition of self-preservation. The climax of all virtue however is magnanimity (sublimitas), which finds its sufficient satisfaction in its own personal integrity and diligence. Telesius conceived his ethics in the spirit of the Renais- sance, and it produced a lasting impression. His natural philosophy and his psychology were likewise very influ- ential, especially over Bacon and Bruno. 3. Nicholas Copernicus (Coppemick), the fotmder of the modem theory of the universe, was bom at Thorn (1473), studied at Cracow and at various Italian Uni- versities and was prebendary at Frauenburg, partly as Administrator, devoting part of his time to his studies. He took no part in the great controversies agitating his age. But he seems to have had a measure of sympathy with the religious movement, and he feU into discredit during his latter years on account of his liberal, humanistic tendency. He began the elaboration of his astronomical theory ah-eady in 1506, but he was hesitant about its publication, and the first printed copy of his work De^- revolutionibus orhium coslestium only appeared shortly before his death (1543). The matter which specially concems us is the epistemological presuppositions which form the basis of this work. Two of its presuppositions must claim our attention. Nature always takes the simplest course. The theory of -" the whole universe revolving around so small a body as the earth is inconsistent with this principle. And the ^ case is similar with the theory that the planetary orbits should not be simple circles but a very complicated system of epicycles. On the other hand, if we regard the sun as the center of the universe, and the earth and the planets as revolving around it, we have a very simple theory ofv the universe. The second presupposition is the principle of the rel- / ativity of motion previously suggested by Cusanus. The ^ perception of motion is not adequately explained by the mere reference to the fact that a perceived object has really changed its position in space. It may likewise' be due to the fact that the perceiving subject has moved. If we therefore assume that the earth, from which we observe the motion of the heavenly bodies, is itself in motion (around its axis and around the sun), we will be in position to explain the phenomenon quite as well (only more simply) as the traditional theory. Copernicus still adhered to the idea of a finite universe and regarded the firmament of the fbced stars, the boun- iiJI 'I'l^ pii] aS THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE BRUNO 29 1 '■ It i f ! K r « dary of the universe, as motionless. He believed the planets to be enclosed in a series of concentric permanent spheres But notwithstanding this he prepared the way for a radical change in the theory of the universe. Facts which apparently rested on the direct evidence of sense perception and were supported by the most famous authorities must now be regarded as discredited! We must awaken to the fact that the system of things which constitutes the universe admits of a different interpretation from the apparent demands of sense perception. 4. Giordano Bruno (i 548-1600) is at once the most profound and the most com-ageous thinker of the renais- sance period. Strongly influenced by the philosophy of antiquity and accepting the theories discovered by Cusanus and Telesius, he found a real foundation for his theory of the imiverse in the new astronomy, as elabo- rated by Copernicus and later by Tycho Brake. Bom at Nola in southern Italy, Bruno entered the Dominican order in his early youth. He was soon charged with heresy. His active mind and restive spirit could not endure the rigid monastic discipline. He fled the cloister, discarded the monastic garb and began a wander- ing career of study and travel, which took him to Switzer- land, France, England and Germany. He appears in the capacity of teacher in Toulouse, Paris, Oxford and Wittenburg; but nowhere did he find a permanent position. This was due in part to the opposition of the traditional schools, and in part to his restless disposition. But despite his wanderings he found time to write his in- genious works, among which the Italian dialogues, pub- lished in London 1584, deserve special mention. He never regarded reconciliation with the Catholic church as impossible, and even cherished the hope of returning to Italy and, without re-entering the cloister, continuing his Hterary activities. He felt that his career north of the Alps was a failure and Protestantism, with its many little popes, was more reprehensible to him than the ancient church with its single Pope. He finally returned therefore, but was arrested by the Inquisition at Venice (1592) and, after a long imprisonment, burnt as a heretic at Rome in 1600. He died like a hero. Bruno held Copernicus in high esteem because of his lofty mind. It was he who had lifted him above the illusory testimony of the senses to which the vast majority remained enchained. But notwithstanding his unstinted admiration for the man, he nevertheless regarded the Copemican theory as inadequate because of its conception of the universe as bounded by the sphere of the fixed stars. The basis of Bruno's opposition to this theory was two-fold, its failure to accord with his theory of knowledge together with his religio-philosophical views. a. The sensory evidence of an absolute world-center and an absolute world-boundary is merely apparent. The moment we change our viewpoint we attain a new center and a new boundary. Every point in the universe can therefore be regarded at once as both central and periph- eral. Abstract thought and sentiency agree in this; namely, that we may add number to number, idea to idea, ad infinittmi, without ever approaching an absolute boundary. The possibilities of progress in knowledge are therefore imlimited, and it is from this characteristic of knowledge (la conditione del modo nostro de intendere) that Bruno conceives the character of the universe: abso- lute boundaries are as inconceivable of the universe as of knowledge. r 1'' i It so THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE V It follows therefore that there are no absolute positions. Every position is determined by its relation to other positions. One and the same point may be either center, pole, zenith or nadir— depending entirely on the point from which it is observed (respectu diversorum). There can therefore be no absolute motion and no absolute time. The ancients based their theory of absolute time on the absolute regularity of the motions of the fixed stars; but since the motions observed from any particular star differ from that of another star there are as many times as there are stars. And, finally, the traditional theory of absolute heaviness and lightness is likewise an error; its tenability was based on the presupposition of an absolute center of the universe. Heaviness and hghtness must therefore be understood with reference to the various world-bodies. Sun particles are heavy in relation to the sim, earth particles in relation to the earth. Accord- ing to Bruno, "heaviness is the expression of a natural impulse within the parts to return to the greater whole to which they belong. The principle of relativity is closely connected with the theory that nature is everywhere essentially the same. We can infer the conditions in other parts of the universe from the conditions about us here on the earth. We observe e. g. that ships, when seen at a distance, appear to be motionless, whilst as a matter of fact they are moving very rapidly, and thus by analogy we may assume that the fixed stars appear to be motionless by reason of their great distance from us. There is no justification for maintaining the fixity of the firmament dogmatically as the ancients and even Copernicus had done. Bruno therefore challenged the dogmatic principles which Copernicus had still accepted. He saw very clearly BRUNO 31 however that the matter cannot be definitely determined by mere speculative generaHzations; genuine proof can only come from the discovery of new facts of experience And he beheves furthermore, and rightly so, that no one can mvestigate the matter without prejudice who adheres dogmatically to the traditional hypothesis.— At one important point he was able to appeal to weU-defined facts. He rejected the theory, still accepted by Coper- nicus, that the stars are enclosed in permanent spheres: // the earth can move freely in space, why should it be im- possible for the stars to do the same? And he found his conclusion verified by Tycho Brahe's investigation of comets, which as a matter of fact pass diagonally through the "Spheres'' whose crystal masses were supposed to separate the various parts of the universe! It foUows therefore that the contrast of heaven and earth, of perma- nent and changeable parts of the universe, is untenable. b. In his philosophy of religion Bruno starts with the infinitude of the Deity. But if the cause or principle of the universe is infinite it must follow that the universe Itself is Hkewise infinite! We are unable to believe that the divine fullness could find expression in a finite uni- verse; nothing short of an infinite number of creatures and worlds would be an adequate display of such full- ness. Bruno elaborated his theory of the infinity of the uni- verse in two dialogues, the Cena de la ceneri and DeV tnflnito universo e mondi (1584), and in the Latin didactic poem De tmmenso (15Q1). These works are of epochal miportance in the history of the human mind. Just as this wide expanse inspired in Bruno a feeling akin to deliverance from the confines of a narrow cell, so the human mind is now presented with a boundless f ^^\ 32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE BRUNO t^i prospect forever promising new experiences and new problems. c. Bruno elaborated his general philosophical princi- ples, which were naturally closely related to the new worid theory, in the dialogue De la causa, principio e uno (1584). Inasmuch as the new world theory annulled the op- position between heaven and earth, Bruno undertakes the task of annulling all oppositions by means of a pro- founder speculation. Sharp antitheses originate in the human mind and there is no ground for ascribing them to nature. Plato and Aristotle e. g. had no warrant in objective fact for assuming a distinction between Form and Matter. There is no absolute Matter, just as there is no absolute position and no absolute time. Absolute Matter must necessarily be absolutely passive, in which case it could acquire form and development only through some external agency. But in the natural worid Forms are not introduced into Matter from without, after the manner of a human artist; they originate from within by an evolution of nature's own inherent energy. Matter is no less divine than Form and it persists in constant change even as the ancient Atomists had observed. Na- ture reveals a constant cycle— from inorganic matter through the organic processes and back again to the inorganic. According to Bruno's own statement, he was so profoundly impressed with this idea for a while that he was inclined to regard Forms and the spiritual factor in the universe as unessential and ephemeral. Later on however he perceived that Form and Spirit, no less than Matter, must have their ground in the infinite Principle. He admitted that everything must contain a spiritual principle, at least potentially (secondo la sostanza), even 33 if not always actually (secondo Patto). The ultimate source of all things consists of a Being which transcends the antitheses of Matter and Form, potentiality and reahty, body and mind. In so far as this ultimate source is conceived as something distinct from the universe it is caUed^^' Cause,'' in so far as it is conceived as actively present in natural phenomena it is called *' Principle" The Deity is not a far distant being; it reveals its presence in the impulse towards self-preservation and it is more intimately related to us than we are to ourselves It is the soul of our soul, just as it is the soul of natui-e in general, which accounts for the all-pervasive interaction throughout universal space. The culmination of thought likewise marks its Hmit because we are incapable of thinking without antitheses' Every conceptual definition imposes certain limitations- the infinite Principle is therefore incapable of definition' Theology must forever remain a negative science i e a science which eliminates the limitations and antitheses from the concept of Deity. The only significance which positive theology can have, i. e. a theology which under- takes to express the infinite Principle by definite pred- icates, is practical, didactic and pedagogic. It must address itself to those who are incapable of rising to a theoretical contemplation of the universe. God is indeed more highly honored by silence than by speech. d. The ideas described above are characteristic of the most important period of Bruno's philosophical develop- ment. It is possible however (with Felice Tocco, in •his valuable treatise Opera latine de G. Bruno, 1889) to distinguish an earlier and a later period in his development Dunng the first period Bruno's philosophy had somewhat of a Platomc character, in that he regarded general ideas I 34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE ^ t as the highest object of knowledge and the universe as an emanation from Deity (De umbris idearum, 1582). But his ideas apparently mean something different from the universal concepts (as in Plato). He seems rather to regard them as laws which describe an actual relationship (e. g. between the different parts of the body). — The last period, as is evident from the De triplici minimo (1591), is noteworthy for its emphasis on the individual elements of being between which this actual relationship obtains. Sensory objects consist of parts notwith- standing the apparent continuity perceived through sense perception. Bruno calls the ultimate, irreducible (or first) parts atoms, minima or monads. There are various classes of monads, and he even calls the universe and God monads, when speaking of them as imits. The distinctions between Bruno^s three points of view — the theory of Ideas, the theory of Substance, and the theory of Monads — ^however are simply matters of degree. e. Bruno^s ethics conforms with his general theory of the universe. His Spaccio de la hestia trionfanta (1584) evaluates htmian virtues according to a new standard. Its dominant characteristic is the prominence given to the desire for truth and to honest toil. Every correct evalua- tion presupposes truth, and toil is the nattu-al consequence of the task imposed upon man, not merely to follow na- ture, but to bring forth a new, higher order of nature, that he may become lord of the earth. In the Degli eroici furori (1585) Bruno describes the heroic man as one who is aware that the highest good can only be realized through strife and suffering, but who never despairs, because pain and danger are evils only from the view- point of the world of sense, not from the viewpoint of eternity (ne Tocchio del etemitade). The possibilities BRUNO 35 of pain increase with the height of the aim. But the heroic man finds his joy in the fact that a noble fire has been kindled in his breast-even though the goal should be impossible of realization and his soul should be con- sumed by its profound yearning. This courageous wis- dom typifies Bruno^s character as it appears in his Hfe and m his heroic death at the stake. C. The New Science Without any disparagement of the tremendous im- portance of the free investigations in the sphere of mental science, or even the radical change in the general theory of the universe, the fact nevertheless remains that the founding of modem natural science had a far profounder influence upon human life. The contributions of an- tiquity are likewise in evidence here, particularly the study of the writings of Archimedes. The real cause however must be traced to the increasing interest in the industries mechamcs and engineering operations, especially in the Italian cities. Galileo makes mention of this fact at the opemng of his chief work. It was but natural therefore that this should give rise to a desire to understand the laws and principles by which to promote these operations. Ihen foUowed a transition from the achievements of man to the majestic products of nature, because man depends more or less consciously, on the analogy between human mechamcs and the efficiency of nature. Modem natural science created a new method. It substituted observation and experiment together with analysis and computation for speculation and dogmatic constmction on the one hand and the mere collection of facts on the other. The human mind evolved new func- tions, whose nature and value necessarily suggested new '^f\f il 36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE m problems in the philosophy of knowledge. Owing to the fact that the new method was applied almost exclusively to the reahn of matter, the concept of matter naturally came to the foreground. And as a matter of fact it was not until then that the problem of the relation of mind and matter could be sharply and definitely stated. Ethics and the philosophy of reHgion likewise received their comple- ment of new data. The self-sufficiency of man was mag- nified. New forms of social life were evolved, especially through the progressive division of labor made possible and necessary through the mechanical inventions. The growing conviction of the prevalence of fixed natural laws required a restatement and a more precise definition of the problem of reHgion. Man's general attitude to the uni- verse, both in its theoretical and its practical aspects, un- derwent a most remarkable change. We shall mention three men as the real founders of modem science. I. Leonardo da Vinci (1451 iK^ig), the famous artist, whose varied talents made him one of the most remarkable characters of the Renaissance period, is known to us through several fragments in natural science and philos- ophy which are of great importance. His manuscripts became scattered and none were published until late in the nineteenth century. {E, P. Richter has pubHshed a good collection. London, 1883. A German translation of the most important fragments was pubhshed by M, Herzfeldy Leipzig, 1904.) Experience is the common mother of all knowledge. But we cannot stop on the plane of mere observation. We must find the internal bond of nature (freno e regula interna) which explains the vital relation of things and events. And the only possible method of doing this is KEPLER 37 by the aid of mathematics. Mathematical deduction is the only method of discovering the unknown from the give^^ facts of nature. We thus find even here a clear ex- pression of all the characteristics of modem method, viz. the proper coordination of induction and deduction.-^ Certain statements of Leonardo's indicate a sturdy natu- ralism. The only thing we can know about the soul is the nature of its functions and its activity as an organic prin- aple; whoever cares to know more must inquire of the ^ Monks! Nature consists of a majestic cycle between the J morgamc and the organic, and between the animate and the mammate. Nature always takes the simplest course. There is reason therefore to hope for a great future with respect to the knowledge of nsLtnre.— Leonardo suggested a number of interesting anticipations of the principle of inertia and of energy. He stands solitary and alone in his own age. It was not until a century later that any advancements were made along the lines which he indi- cated. ^ b. ^ John Kepler (1571-1630), the famous astronomer, is an interesting example of the evolution of an exact scien- tific conception of nature from a mystic-contemplative starting-point. His first treatise (Mysterium cosmography tcum, 1597) is based on theological and Pythagorean prin- ciples. The universe is the manifestation of God. The paths and motions of the heavenly bodies must therefore reveal certain harmonious and simple geometrical rela- tions. The Holy Ghost is revealed in the harmonious ratio of magnitudes of stellar phenomena, and Kepler thinks it possible to constme this magnitudinal ratio. Later on however he simply maintained the general belief that cer- tain quantitative ratios must exist between the motions ot the planets and formulated the results deduced from :Nl i> ( I Hlii 38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE Tycho Brahe^s observations in the laws which bear his name. He afterwards demonstrated the quantitative ratios on the basis of the facts of experience. Here his method involved the combination of the experimental with the mathematical method. Just as he had at first — ^ established the principle that nature conforms to mathe- matical laws by the theological method, so he further be- lieves that the planets are guided in their course by sepa- rate planetary souls, even as the entire world-system is directed by the world-soul which dwells in the sun. His explanation of nature therefore was thoroughly animistic or mythological. Later on in life he held that science must make no asstmiptions except such as can be actually de- duced from experience. He calls such causes vera causa. He also rejected the idea of planetary souls which as a matter of fact are never actually given in experience. In his Astronomia nova s. physica cosies tis (1609) he makes the transition from theology and animism to pure natiu-al science. He defends his belief in the importance and truth of the quantitative method psychologically and em- pirically as well as theologically. Mathematical knowl- edge is the clearest and the most certain knowledge which we possess and it becomes us therefore to apply it as widely as possible. The processes of natiwe are qualitatively modified by our subjective states (pro habitudine subjecti). Perfect certainty and objectivity can only be attained by the quantitative method. And, finally, experience reveals the fact that all material phenomena have quantitative, especially geometrical, attributes; "the method of meas- urement can be applied wherever there is matter" (ubi materia, ibi geometria). As a matter of fact the universe participates in quantity (mundus participat quantitate). Kepler elaborates his general conception of scientific GALILEO 39 method in his Apologia Tychonis, All science is based on hypotheses. But hypotheses are by no means to be re- garded as arbitrary notions. They must vindicate their title by the harmony of their logical consequences with the given facts and the consistency of their implications. Science begins with the observation of facts, uses these data for the formulation of hypotheses and finally seeks to discover the causes which account for the uniformity of events. c. Galileo Galilei (i 564-1642) is the real founder of modem science, because he shows the clearest under- standing of modem methods— the method of induction and deduction as mutually complementary. If induction demanded the examination of every pos- sible case, inductive inference would be impossible. But it is possible to examine a number of characteristic cases, and formulate a hypothetical principle by an analysis of these cases, and finally prove that the consequences de- duced from this principle are in accord with experience. In order to make this deduction and show its agreement with the facts correctly we must be in position to state our facts in quantitative terms. We are therefore under necessity of measuring phenomena exactly. Galileo raised the watchword; Measure everything which is measur- . able and reduce the things which will not admit of direct meas- urement to indirect measurement, Kepler had previously shown that matter cannot of it- self pass from rest to motion. Galileo advances a step farther. According to the principle of simplicity,— which, like Copernicus, Bruno and Kepler, he regarded as a ^universal law— he maintained that a body tends to remain j its given state so long as it is unaffected by external in- lences. A body can therefore of itself neither change its w \ i ( M '«&iili.' I 40 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE motion nor pass from motion to rest. In the absence of all external influences a moving body would continue its motion indefinitely at the speed originally given. This as a matterof cotirse represents an ideal case, since absolutely empty space is unrealizable, but Galileo showed by the experiment of rolling a ball in a parchment groove that the length of time the ball continued in its course was in direct proportion to its own smoothness and the smooth- ness of the parchment. In this way he proved the prin- ciple of inertia. But Galileo likewise thought that circular motion, which he also regarded as simple and natural, as well as motion in a straight line, would be continuous if all external obstacles could be eliminated. In his investiga- tions of the motion of falling bodies he likewise starts with the principle of simpHcity, with a view to showing later that it is verified by observation and experiment. "// a stone, falling from a given position at considerable height, accelerates its speed, why should I not regard the acceleration as due to its simplest explanation? And there is no simpler explanation of acceleration than that of a continuously uniform increase.''— It follows further from the principle of inertia and the law of falling bodies that we must take account of the energy or the impetus of motion (energia, momento, impetu) present at each moment as well as the actual sensible motion. Galileo elaborated the modem theory of motion, which forms the basis of physics, in his Discorsi della nouve scienze (1638). — His Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo (1632) draws a comparison between the Ptolemaic and Copemican world-systems, without, as he thought, taking sides, but in such a way as to leave no doubt as to his real opinion. This brought on the catastrephe of his life, n;) had even previously (after the discovery of the moondiQ GALILEO 41 Jupiter and of sun-spots) expressed himself publicly as favonng the Copemican system. When the College of the Inquisition, therefore, in the year 1616, placed Coper^ mcus book on the Index, he is said to have promised Car^ dtnal Bellarmin that he would neither defend nor dissem- inate the Copemican theory. He denied that the Dialogo was a violation of this promise on the ground that he had expressed himself hypothetically. But the book was for- bidden, and the old man of seventy was required-under threat of torture~to solemnly abjure "the false doctrine " that the earth is not the center of the universe and that it T"'; t, v! ^^q^i^iti^^ held him under suspicion for the rest of his life and he was forced to have his works pub- lished m foreign countries. It has akeady been observed that the Copemican theory beautifuUy illustrates the unwisdom of accepting our Ideas as the expression of reality without further question. Gahleo emphasized this phase of the new theory very strongly; -Think of the earth as having vanished, and there will be neither sun-rise nor sun-set, no horizon even and no mertdtan, no day and no night/ » Later on he expanded this idea so as to include the whole of physical nature. In the Dialogue he takes occasion to observe that he had never been able to understand the possibility of the transubstantiation of substances. When a body reaUy acquires attributes which were previously lacking it must be explained by such a rearrangement of its parts as would neither destroy nor originate anything. This clearly asserts the principle that qualitative changes can only be understood when referred to quantitative changes. Gahleo had already stated this view even more strongly in one of his earlier works (// saggiatore, 1632). Form, mag- nitude, motion and rest constitute all that can be said of m 42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE Ji- things; they are the primary and real attributes of things (primi e reali accidenti). Our disposition to regard taste, smell, color, heat, etc., as the absolute attributes of things, on the other hand, is due to sense-prejudice. We give these names to things when they furnish the occasion of certain sensations, but these sensations take place within our bodies. They do not inhere in things. They would vanish if the corpo sensitivo were to vanish. — This doc- trine, which contains the principle of the mechanical con- ception of nature, acquired vast importance in the in- vestigations into the theory of knowledge in the following period. SECOND BOOK THE GREAT SYSTEMS The new interests, viewpoints, and discoveries of the Renaissance naturally gave rise to a desire to elaborate a new world-theory, one which would be inherently con- sistent and at the same time conform to the new thought. It was but natural that men should be anxious to follow the new ideas to their ultimate consequences. The human mind always shows a certain tendency, more or less pro- nounced, towards the systematization of knowledge into a unitary theory, and the more peaceful period which fol- lowed the turmoil and strife of the Renaissance furnished a splendid opportunity for the development of this ten- dency. ItassumedJheJa^_of^combi^^ the new world- view_and the^aew science with the'pEilosophy of mind or spirit. Here Bruno had prepared the way. He had not howevef completely grasped the new scientific method. He was unable to apply the mechanical conception— by means of which a multitude of problems can be stated with far greater precision— to the statement of his problem. Of the four fundamental problems of philosophy, the ' problem of Being now takes first rank. Compared with this, other problems, despite the fact of their frequent and perplexing obtrusiveness, fall into the background. The constructive method was courageously applied to the solu-/- tion of the profoundest problems of human thought. Descartes, the first of the group of the great systematizers, both in his preliminary essays as well as in the later more positive statement of his theory, still reveals a distinct 43 y 42 THE GREAT SYSTEMS DESCARTES 45 ^..ort to pave the way for speculative construction by means of exhaustive analysis. But with Hobbes and Spinoza the constructive element is predominant. The only way we can discover the facts and analyses by which these thinkers estabHshed their definitions and axioms is by a less direct method. In Leibnitz, the fourth and last of the group, the analytic method becomes more promi- nent again. He marks the transition to the eighteenth century, in which the problems of knowledge and of values acquire an exceptionally prominent place. The increasing favor of the constructive method of this period is closely paralleled by the dogmatic character of these intellectual efforts. The principles of the mechan- ical theory of nature were regarded as absolute, objective truths. Leibniz likewise shows some divergence from his predecessors on this point, by the fact that he subjects even these "primary and real" attributes of things, which were regarded as absolute data in the mechanical theory of natiire, to a critical analysis. a. Rene Descartes (i 596-1 650) may be called the real founder of modem philosophy. He was the first to in- qmre after the ultimate presuppositions of knowledge, and his theory was the first to take explicit account of the me- chanical explanation of nature in the statement of the problem. He applies the analytic method in searching for ultimate principles, but he quickly abandons it for the constructive method, because he believes it possible to demonstrate the necessity and rationality of the principles ipf the mechanical theory of nature. He regards the idea of God, the validity of which he demonstrates by the spec- ulative method, as an absolute terminus of reflective thought. Descartes thus presents a peculiar combination of keen analysis and dogmatic assertion. Descartes was the son of a French nobleman, and his economic independence furnished him the opportunity of devoting himself whoUy to meditation and scientific re- search. His Discours de la methode ( 1 63 7) is an interesting philosophical autobiography. He received his education at a Jesuit CoUege, but, notwithstanding the fact that he • had among his tutors the best teachers of his age, he was very much dissatisfied with his acquirements when he had finished his studies. He knew many things, but a con- sistent system and clear fundamental principles were lack- mg. He was particulariy fond of mathematics but it seemed to be nothing more than a fiction of the human brain. He finally plunged into public life, trying one thing after another, but was invariably driven back to his solitude by his insatiable thirst for knowledge. He finally resolved to make a first hand study of practical life in the army and the courts of the nobiHty. But at every venture he returned again to quiet meditation. During the winter of 161 9, while in camp with the army of the Elector of Bavaria, he experienced a scientific awakening. In a moment of intellectual enthusiasm a plain way of escape from his doubt appeared to him. If we begin with"! the simplest and clearest ideas and pass step by step to / the more complex problems, the confusing multiplicity of / our ideas will vanish. We can then arrange our thoughts j in such an orderly manner that the successive steps can I always be deduced from their antecedents. He followed J this principle both in his mathematical and in his philo- sophical investigations. After several years of study in Paris he returned to Holland, where he believed he could pursue his investigations with less danger of disturbance. There is no doubt however that the severe injunctions against antischolastic theory formed part of his motive 46 THE GREAT SYSTEMS DESCARTES for leaving France. But even in Holland he became in- volved in controversies, because both Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians regarded his philosophy with suspicion. At the invitation of Queen Christina he spent his last years in Sweden. I. Descartes y who was a great mathematician himself (foimder of Analytical Geometry), attributed the dis- tinction between geometry and philosophy to the fact that the former is based upon principles concerning which there could be no room for doubt, whilst the controversies in philosophy pertain to these very principles. The dis- f covery and establishment of first principles require the / use of the analytic method, i. e. we must proceed from the ^ given or the provisionally established to its presuppositions. Analysis finally leads to simple inttiitions, and these in turn originate directly through experience. The subjective movements of intellect are of this sort, e. g. that a triangle is boimded by three lines — that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time, — that everything has a cause, — ^that the effect cannot be greater than its cause, — that I must exist if I think {Regies pour la direction de Vesprit^ evidently written 1628-1629). He called these processes simple intuitions, and afterwards made the last one men- tioned the basis of his theory (in the Discours and in the Meditationes which appeared in 1 641). It is pos- sible to doubt every idea or object of knowledge; all our / perceptions or postulates might be illusory. But doubt I has a definite Hmit. Even the most radical doubt pre- supposes thought. Thought is a reality even though all of its conclusions should be illusory. Descartes takes the word thought in its broadest sense: thought is everything which goes on in consciousness. When, in the language of his famous proposition, he says: Je pense, done je suisl 47 (Cogito, ergo sum!) he might as well have said: Je sens je veux, doncje ^«w/--ThawQrd_l! therefore 'iOZfliti;, er^o) is inexact; iorPesmks does not reganl,the.proposition as a logical deduction, but as an immediate intuifeien, a sim- ple inteUectual step, through which w^ become conscious that we are conscious.—The clearness and distinctness of this intuition, according to Descartes, furnish the crite- rion by which to test other propositions- There are two more intuitions however which he thinks are just as clear and self-evident as this first one, namely the proposition f that everything has a^cause, and that the effegt^nnoj: be greater than the cause. "^^ ^ ; ^TTwe examine" olS-aifferent ideas, we find that some of them can be attributed to external and finite causes, and that others are produced by ourselves, but that there is one idea which presupposes an infinite cause— namely the idea of God. I^ myself (which is proved by the fact that I can doubt) a fiHite, imperfect being, and I cannot Jhere- fore have formed the idea of an infinite, perfect being. This idea must have its origin in an infinite bein^,. This IS the only possible explanation of the fact that my in- tellect, as soon as it has attained mature development forms this idea. It is "innate," not indeed as if it were consaously present at the very beginning of life, but in the. sense that there is a disposition to form it in the very nature of the inieWect,— Descartes however has another proof of the existence of God: God, the perfect Being, must exist; for existence is perfection, hence the denial of the existence of God would be self-contradictory. This is the so-caUed ontological proof, which finds the warrant for the existence of God in the concept. It is only after Descartes has established the validity of the idea of God (assuming the principle of causaHty as a N 48 THE GREAT SYSTEMS matter of course) that he has a secure foundation for the validity of knowledge in general: for a perfect being can- not deceive. Descartes bases the knowledge of reality on the idea of God, just as Kepler had explained the conformity of nature to mathematical principles on theological grounds. But, in that case, God is merely an explanation of the sublime uniformity of nattu-al phenomena, rather than a specifi- cally religious concept. Thus, e. g. in the sixth meditation, he says, ^^ By nat ure in ge neral^(natura generaliter spectata) I simply mean ^odhimsjlJi_or_t^^^ and disposition in- stituted Sco or dinatio) by: Him in created things J' Every- thing which is to be accepted as true must fit into this great system. The criterion by which we are able to distinguish between dream and wakeful consciousness consists in the fact that the various experiences of wake- ful life can be coordinated with our total experiences and recollections without a break in the system. — Descartes had not observed that this criterion was already contained in the causal principle, so that he might have spared him- self the indirect route through the idea of God. The es- Itablishment of this criterion furnished the basis of a new Conception of truth, according to which truth consists of the internal relation of perceptions and ideas, instead of their harmony with something unperceived. ■Descartes is fully aware that the idea of God, which he makes the foundation of all science, is not the popular one. He says that when God is conceived as a finite being, re- ceiving honor from men, it is not strange that His exist- ence should be denied. God is however the absolute Substance, i. e. a being, which exists through itself (per se)y requires no other being, in order to exist. It is true, Descartes likewise employs the concept of substanc DESCARTES 49 in reference to finite things (e. g. matter and the soul); he says however that the concept cannot be used univocally (univoce) of infinite and finite bei^ig, because finite beings are always dependent and the term substance is therefore applied to them inexactly. According to the broader, inexact linguistic usage, "Substance" means the same as thing or being, the subject or matter or substrate of given attributes./ 2. The idea of God not only guarantees the reality of things, but it is likewise the source of the fundamental principles of natural science. (Principia Philosophies 1644.) • ' Our sense impressions serve the purpose of guiding us in practical activities. In order to do this they need not be like the things themselves, if only they correspond to them. When we come to think of the real nature of things apart from our sensations, there are only three attributes which are incontrovertible: extension, divisibiHty and mo- biKty. We cannot even in imagination think these attri- butes away. And these three attributes furnish the basis of the simplest and clearest understanding of everything that takes place in the material universe, whilst quaHties merely furnish illusory explanations. All the attributes of nature may therefore be referred to extension, divisi- bility and motion. Qualities however are simply to be ascribed to the perceiving subject. —Descartes thus delib- ^ately systematizes the mechanical conception of nature. - He seems to have been led to this conclusion by his studies in natural science during the years 1620-1629, independent of Galileo, although perhaps influenced by Kepler. \ He derives the first principles of the mechanical con- ception of nature from the concept of God. As perfect bemg God must be immutable. The idea of anything n_ so THE GREAT SYSTEMS i\ which He has created being capable of changing its state without some external cause contradicts this immutability. Material things cannot therefore on their own account {sua sponte) without external interference (of another material thing) pass from motion to rest or vice versa. (Descartes nevertheless makes a reservation in the interest of his spirituaHstic psychology, namely that it is perhaps possible for souls or angels to act on matter.) Besides inertia, Descartes likewise deduces the constancy of mo- tion (an imperfect antecedent to the persistence of motion) from the tmchangeableness of Deity. Conservation (which, according to Descartes, consists of an incessant continuance of creative activity) implies that the sum total of motion implanted in matter at creation must re- main tmchanged. The distribution of motion among the various parts of the universe may vary, but no motion can be lost and no absolutely new motion arise. Descartes regards the teleological explanation of nature, which accounts for natural phenomena from the viewpoint of ends, as inapplicable. He bases his rejection of final causes on theological grounds. Since God is an infinite being, he must have purposes beyond our power to con- jecture, and it were therefore prestmiption on our part to suppose it possible to discover the purposes of natural phenomena. There are likewise many things in the finite universe which do not affect us in the least, — ^what sense could we therefore ascribe to their having been created on our accoimt! — ^The teleological explanation is therefore rejected, because it is too narrow. y/ Descartes undertakes a detailed explanation of nature on the basis of the principles thus established. He differs from Bacon at this point in the importance which he at- taches to deduction, and from Galileo (whose importance ; DESCARTES SI he decidedly underestimates) in his inability to combine deduction and induction in the investigation of the facts of experience. He regards experience as nothing more i than occasional, because he thinks that science can only give the possible, not the real, explanation of phenomena. He aims to restrict himself to hypotheses, and he does -■ not even attempt to verify these hypotheses. His natural i philosophy thus assumes an abstract and arbitrary char- acter. His importance rests on the ideal of natural science . which he proposed: namely, to deduce phenomena from their causes with mathematical necessity. He therefore took no account of an3rthing but the geometrical attri- butes of things, and he treated the concepts of matter and extension as identical. He substituted this ideal of knowl-^^ edge for the prevalent scholastic method of explanation,^ based on qualities and hidden causes. Descartes attempted to explain the existing state of the Universe by mechanical processes of development. He assumes a primitive condition in which the particles of matter exist in whirling eddies (vortices) with fixed cen- ters. The smaller particles, resulting from the mutual friction of the larger particles, were compelled to congre- gate around these centers, and thus formed the various world-bodies. Some of these bodies, like the earth, have lost their independence, because they are carried along by the more powerful cycles in which the great world- bodies are found. Weight consists of the pressure due to the rotary motion, which drives the smaller particles into close proximity to the larger bodies. — In suggesting this theory, imperfect as it is, Descartes anticipated Kant and LaPlace. Organisms, as well as the World-all, are to be regarded as machines. If physiology is to become a science, it must Kit 52 THE GREAT SYSTEMS DESCARTES S3 be mechanics. The organism must be subject to the '' general law of matter. Harvey^ s discovery of the circula- tion of the blood (1628) strengthened Descartes^ conviction. Descartes did much to suppress the fruitless theory of vital- ism which explained organic phenomena by the assumption of a specific vital energy. In the department of nerve physiology, like Harvey in the doctrine of the circulation of the blood, he is a pioneer because he was the first to de- scribe what is now called reflex action, i. e. muscular activ- ity resulting directly from an objective stimulus without the intervention of any attendant consciousness. Des- cartes ascribed conscljusness to man alone; he regarded • animals as mere machines. The htmian soul interacts with the brain, or, to be more exact, with a distinct part of the brain (the pineal gland, glandula pinealis), which, in Descartes^ opinion, was centrally located, and it does not consist of pairs, like the other parts of the brain. The "vital spirits" (the delicate fluid, which, according to the physiology of the age, in- herited from antiquity, pours through the nerves) strike this pineal gland and the impact translates it to the soul, *thus giving rise to sensations. If the soul on the other hand strikes the pineal gland it can produce changes in T^e tendencies of the "vital spirits" and thus give rise to muscular activity. — Here Descartes contradicts his own doctrine of the persistence of motion; for if the pineal gland strikes the soul, a loss of motion must result, and, conversely, if the soul excites motion in the pineal gland, new motion must arise. He of course limits the action of the soul to the mere matter of pro- ducing a change of tendency; but this requires him to postidate an arbitrary exception to the principle of inertia. Descartes places great stress on the distinction in definin? the soul as thinking being, and matter as extended being Their fundamental attributes are so different that they must be called two different substances, and moreover in the full sense of the word, since it must be possible for the one to exist without the other. But, in that case, their interaction becomes an impossibility; for Substance, stnctly speaking, cannot be acted on from without In his special psychology (particularly in his interesting treatise on the emotions, published ^n his TraiU des pasi swns, 1649) he endeavors-in harmony with his dualistic theory-to furmsh a separate definition for the mental phenomena which have a psycho-physical basis from those which are purely psychical. Hence he makes a distinction between sensation and judgment, sensory and mental recoUection, imagination and intellection, desire and will affections (passions) and emotions {emotions tnlereures). His precision at this point is rarely equaUed even by spiritualists. ^ Descartes' ethics bears an interesting relation to his world theory. He elaborated the details of this phase of his theory m his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth Chnsttna of Sweden, and Chanut the French ambassador to Sweden.-He emphasizes the cultivation of the sub- • jective emotions, rather than the "passions" which de- pend on external influences. But improvement in knowl- edge is likewise of great value: we discover that everything depends on a Perfect Being; we find that we are but in- fimtesimal parts of an infinite world, which cannot have been created on our account. We finally come to regard ourselves as parts of a human society (Family, State), whose mterests take precedence over our private interests. , it IS important above aU else to distinguish between what S4 THE GREAT SYSTEMS GEULINCX 55 is within our power and what is not. The highest virtues are magnanimity {generosite) and intellectual love towards God {amor intellectualis del). The latter is capable of governing our whole life, even though in the eyes of the theologians it should perhaps be regarded as insufficient for salvation. Cartesianism was the first form in which the thought of the new age became accessible to wider circles. Not- withstanding his hypotheses, which were frequently un- fortunate, his rigid insistence on a mechanical explanation of nature marks a distinct advance, and his labors inspired a vigorous movement in the department of natural science. His spiritualism and his attempt to combine theology and science developed a sympathetic attitude towards religion, notwithstanding the fact that many theologians, to whom a criticism of scholasticism was identical with a challenge of faith, were fanatically opposed to him. The clearness with which he expressed his views admitted of easy popu- larization, and, after the first opposition subsided, he ac- quired a large following in France, Holland and Germany. Descartes however bequeathed profound problems to his successors. How can the existence of an absolute |\ Substance be reconciled with the independent existence of [particular things (souls and bodies)? And how shall we conceive the interaction of spirit and matter if both are to be regarded as independent beings (Substance), and this moreover if the principle of the persistence of motion is likewise to be maintained! Occasionalism, so called, which had a tendency to refer all true causality to the absolute essence, so that the states of finite beings merely furnished the "Occasions" for God to interpose, was the logical result of these problems. This principle was at first only applied to the relation of spint and matter: what takes place in the body furnishes God the occasion to permit a change to take place in the soul and vice versa. It soon became evident however that if there is an absolute substance, it is impossible for a finite being to be a caiise at aU. How can anything produce an effect beyond its own being in some other thing? Not only the interaction between spirit and matter but aU interaction between finite beings is impossible, and divine causahty alone remains possible. In this way first the psycho-physical problem and then the problem of causahty conceived as a whole came to be regarded as insoluble and philosophy resolved itself into theology After a number of Cartesians had prepared the way for this conception, it was cleariy and definitely elaborated by Arnold Geultncx (1623-1660) and Nicholas Malebrancke (1648-1 715). Geulincx, originally a Catholic (he was bom at Louvain) but later a convert to Protestantism, experienced a vigor- ous opposition both from Protestant as well as from Cathohc scholasticism on account of his Cartesianism Dunng his latter years he occupied the chair of philosophy at the university of Leyden. His most characteristic work IS his ethics (166s, complete 1675). In order to do right man must learn to understand his position in the world- self-exammation (inspectio sui) is therefore the foundation of ethics It reveals the fact that intellect and will are all ian^r "^ ^ fft *° ""^ ^^^- ^y ^y °° ^^^ other hand IS a part of the material univei^e where I can accom- phsh nothing. For I am only responsible for the things of which I can know the origin, and this knowledge is lim- ited to my inteUect and will. My activity cannot tran- scend my essential nature (i. e. my inteUect and will) It IS utterly impossible for a thing to produce changes be- BRXn I S6 THE GREAT SYSTEMS GLANVIL 57 yond itself and its own states. If the changes of one being (e. g. the soul) correspond to the changes in another being (e. g. the body), it can only be explained by the fact that their common author forever adapts them to ^ch other— like two clocks which a clockmaker is con- stantly regulating in successive order (a figure used already by the Cartesian Cordemoy), — ^The ethical system which Geulincx elaborates on this foundation consistently assimies the character of resignation, and its chief virtue is humility. For, where I am unable to do anything, it is sheer folly that I should desire {uhi nihil vales, nihil velisl), Mdehranche, a member of the Oratory, gives the mystic phase of occasionaHsm still greater prominence. His philosophic inspiration came from one of Descartes' books, and it permeated his entire Hfe, which was spent in the cloister. The senses — ^as appears in his Recherche de la verite (i674ff) — are given us for practical purposes and they are unable to discover the real nature of things. The senses deceive us every time we are misled into ascribing sensible qualities to things themselves. Whence there- fore do we get knowledge of things? The understanding is quite as incapable as sensibility to teach us anything about things which exist independently of us. Neither we ourselves nor things can produce knowledge, for no finite being can create anything new. Causation is a divine thing, and it is pagan to ascribe causality to finite beings. Finite beings forever remain simply causes oc- casionelles. We can neither regard the motions of matter nor the thoughts of men as causes. God could not even give a finite being the power to be a cause, for God cannot create gods. Chir knowledge is entirely the work of God; we see everything in Him. It is only through his inter- position that we get ideas of material things. Each idea is reaUy a Hmitation of the idea of God Joseph Glanvil (1636-1680), of England, had even prior to this defined the problem of causality in his Scepsis SaenHfica (1665) a book which was influenced Sthe philosophy and the natural science of Descartes tZ greater the difference between cause and effect the less tZ::t:iT^^ Causa^y canno as a matter of fact be conceived at all (causality itself is tact that two things succeed each other Hul^r\T^ *''' ^'''"'^"'"^i'^^ are the antecedents of Hunte There are two additional thinkers who are strongly influenced by Descartes, who however, each in Ss own way, are radicaUy opposed to him, and L fact chS! enge every attempt to solve ultimate problems with the aid of reason. ^ maise Pascal (1623-166.) is closely related to Descartes m h,s conception of scientific method, and he likewise ac cepts his concise distinction between mind and matter He makes frequent reference to these ideas in his Pens^es. fcTj^f'^^r^- "^^ V°* ""^""y "^'^^y ^°^- His heart longed for a living God, finaUy even for a God of flesh and bbod despite the fact that faith in such a God was repnl- tw! . the^nderstanding. He required such a faith as this to subdue the fear which the thought of the eternity tTlTV'f^"'^'^ ^'^^ ""»• The ideas of Bruno and BohmetaAed to give him peace. Knowledge is un- cert^n, and the learned are at variance. Reason refutes the dogmatic philosophers, nature the sceptical philos- ophers. As a matter of fact in the last analysis the seep- tics are right; otherwise were revelation unnecessary. In reply to those who find it difficult to subordinate reason A :|, S8 THE GREAT SYSTEMS HOBBES 59 to faith, Pascal applies the Cartesian psychology and says: We are machines as well as mind; begin with the machine, accustom yourself to the ceremonies, and your mind will also finally yield. Pierre Bayle (i 647-1 706) was rather a man of letters than a philosopher. His interest consisted in explaining and interpreting literary productions and speculative opinions in their manifold variety. But his desire for clearness impelled him to distinguish sharply between the various standpoints and to emphasize the crux of the problems rather than any illusory solution. {Dictionnaire historique et critique, 1 6gs ff.) He was particularly opposed to all efforts to reconcile faith and knowledge, theology and philosophy. He regarded the problem of evil as the great rock of offense. If we resolutely follow reason, it is impossible to reconcile the reality of evil with the omnipo- tence and goodness of God, and the only consistent solu- tion that remains is the Manichaean assumption of two world principles, one evil, the other good. We are obliged to choose between reason and faith. (Dictionnaire Art, Manicheisme. — Response aux questions d^un provincial.) He nevertheless believes in a natural basis for ethics, and, furthermore, because the actions of men are determined more by their nature than by their reHgious opinions, he was in position to defend toleration and religious freedom with great zeal. {Pensees diverses a V occasion de la comkte.) 2. Thomas Ilohhes (i 588-1679) made the first indepen- dent attempt to treat the new mechanical theory of nature as the only science, to maintain its viewpoints as the only ones from which reality is to be conceived. Energetic as a thinker and controversialist, mild and timid in his mode of life, Hobbes, like Descartes, was dissatisfied with his scholastic training, and hence devoted himself to literary pursuits,— e. g. he published a translation of Thucydides The unsettled conditions in England aroused his interest iii pohtical and ethical questions, which soon led, especiaUy after he became acquainted with the new viewpoints of natural science,- to general philosophical investigations For a while he was private tutor and afterwards an inti- mate fnend of the noble family Cavendish. While travel- ling in Italy he made the acquaintance of Galileo, and in France he became a friend of Pierre Gassendi (1592-16??) hkewise an admirer of Galileo, who, having resigned his clencal position, was then living in Paris as professor of mathematics. In his philosophical thought Gassendi reveals a philosophical tendency simUar to that of Sobbes {Opera Omnia, Lugd., 1658). His revival of the Epicurean atomic theory became a matter of signal importance, for It was from the writings of Gassendi that Newton became acquamted with this doctrine, and Dalton, the chemist afterwards received it from the writings of Newton and adapted it to chemistry. Gassendi insisted that aU the changes m nature must be explained by the motions of atoms. Following Galileo, Gassendi teaches (what Des- cartes had overlooked) that energy (impetus) is not dis- sipated by actual motion. Nevertheless, Hobbes seems to have arrived at the con- elusion that aU change is motion. independently. It was during a discussion with several friends of what con- stitutes sensation that the thought occurred to him that if everything in nature were motionless or in uniform mo- tion there would be no sensation. A change of motion (dtversttas motuum) is therefore the condition of sensation i-or sensing unceasingly one and the same thing and sensing nothing at all amounts to the same thing. This • pnnaple, which Hobbes makes the basis of his psychology 6o ■1 THE GREAT SYSTEMS HOBBES 6i occurred to him early in life, and the conviction that all change consists of motion, and that sense-quaHties are purely subjective, probably occurred about the same time (ca. 1630), at any rate before his acquaintance with Galileo and Gassendi, At the outbreak of the revolution Hobbes left England and spent a number of years in France, where for a time he was tutor to the fugitive king Charles II, He retiuned imder Cromwell ^ devoting hin- -elf privately to literary purstdts, occupied with studies and polemics imtil his death at the venerable age of ninety-one years. The series of articles and the splendid volume in Fromann^s Philosopische Klassiker by Ferdinand Tonnies have con- tributed much towards a clear understanding of Hobbes^ development and his philosophical significance. Hobbes^ chief works are: Elements of Law (1640), De cive (1642), Leviathan (1651), De corpore (1655), De homine (1658). a. Hobbes^ first concern in the systematic presentation of his theory given in the De corpore is to establish the fundamental principles of investigation. He is certain that these principles must be discovered by a process of analytical regression from the given to that which ex- plains it {a sensum ad inventionem principiorum) , just as he had previously in fact arrived at the doctrine of mo- tion by a similar regression from sensation. But, on the other hand, he strongly emphasized the fact that the as- sumption of principles is pxirely an arbitrary matter, and must necessarily consist of a choice. He does not there- fore regard such an analysis as a demonstration; deduction is the only method of demonstration, and this is impossible in the case of first principles. — Hobbes described the arbi- trary act with which science begins more precisely as an apt^niaining. But this act is subject to certain condi- tions even from its very beginning; it is not permissible therefore to give two contradictory names to one and the same thing. That all change consists of motion (mutationem in motu conststereUs therefore the most general principle of science. Hobbes thinks that, if we should only rid ourselves of aU prejudices, the proof of this principle is wholly superfluous He assumes several other, purely dogmatic, principles, without inquiring more closely into their respective con- ditions; the law of causation, the principle of inertia, the pnnaple that only motion can be_the cause^f motion and that only motion can be the result, and the principle of the persistence of matter. If these principles are to explain aU existence, then/ everything must be motion. The classifications of the system are therefore based on a classification of motion l^irst m order comes the theory concerning the Corpus (body m general); here he treats of the geometrical, mechamcal and physical laws of motion. The second part contains the theory of the Homo, i. e. the motions which take place jn Man; here the physiological and psy- cholopcal motions are treated. The third part is the doctnne of the Gives, i. e. of the motions in men which con- dition their mutual relations and their association. Hobbes was unable to complete his system by purely , deductive processes. He was forced to concede the neces- sity of mtroduang new presuppositions at a number of points. Thus, e. g. when we pass from geometry to me- chamcs: Hobbes grants, that a pure geometrical explana- Y rests on an abstraction, and that we must assume the colicept of energy (conatus, impetus) at the beginning of mijchamcs. The same is true when we pass from mechan- // I > 63 THE GREAT SYSTEMS ics to physics: the sensible attributes of body (color, tone, etc.) are discovered only by means of sense perception, which involves a new inductive beginning at this point. And the last two main divisions of the system, the theories of the Homo and the Gives, we can establish by direct (psychological and historical) experience, without going through the first main division. Hobbes also wrote his psychological and political works {Elements of Law, De cive, Leviathan) before he had completed his theory of the Corpus. If everything is motion, all reality must be corporeal. An incorporeal thing is a chimera (Unding). It follows therefore that science can only investigate finite things, since only finite things can be in motion. It is impos- sible to have any knowledge of the universe as a complete whole. All questions concerning the universe as a totality lead into the inconceivable and can only be determined by faith, not by knowledge. Science can tell us nothing concerning either the origin, extent or destiny of the uni- verse. The highest science, the firstlings of wisdom (primitia sapientice), Hobbes remarks ironically, are re- served to the theologians, just as in Israel the firstlings of the harvest were sacrificed to the priests. b. Hobbes started with sensation; from it he derived the principle of change, and thence the principle of motion. If everything is motion, therefore, sensation must likewise be motion. "Sensation is nothing more than a motion among the particles of the sensing body." And this ap- plies to consciousness in general. In his criticism of Descartes* Meditations Hobbes says "Consciousness (mens) is nothing more than a motion in certain parts rof an organic body." Motion is the reality, consciousnesa is only the form tmder which it becomes apparent (appf HOBBES 55 tion). The feeling of pleasure, e. g., is really only a motion in the h^art, thought only a motion in the head. The psychology of Hobbes is therefore merely a part of his general theory of motion. His materialistic tendency which IS apparent at this point is modified by his clear in- sight into the subjective conditions of knowledge. In a remarkable passage {De cor pore, xxv, i) he says: "The very fact that anything can become a phenomenon {id ipsum) {TO (pazvefftpai) is indeed the most wonderful of all phe- nomena." The fact that motion can be conceived, sensed, known, is therefore more wonderful than that it exists. The conception, the "apparition," then cannot itself be motion, but must be an evidence that there is still some- thmg else in the universe besides motion. Sensation, memory and comparison are intimately re- lated to each other. If the sensory stimulus vanishes, instantly, there is in fact no sensation {sensio), but only a vague impression {phantasma). Real sensation presup- poses a distinction and comparison of such impressions. The sensory stimuli must therefore vary, in order to make sensation possible.— Memories follow certain laws: they reappear in the same order of sequence as the original sen- sations, unless disarranged by the feelings and impulses. All order and every definite relation governing our ideas (except our temporal order of sequence) are conditioned by the fact that we are actuated by a purpose and seek • the means for the realization of that purpose. The con- i stant fixation of our purpose {frequens adfinem respectio) brings system into our thoughts. The capriciousness of dream-ideas is explained by the absence of a constant pur- pose during sleep. He derives all individual feelings and volitional experi- ences from the impulse of self-preservation. Pleasure and ^ ^ 64 THE GREAT SYSTEMS pain arise according as our organic life is fostered or sup- pressed. Every movement and every idea which is favor- able to the persistence and advancement of life is con- served; detrimental motions and ideas are suppressed. Here again we are confronted with the idea of change as a condition of soul-Hfe. There can be no feeling and no will without distinctions in experience. An absolute goal, attainable once for all, is imthinkable. If it were at- tained, the possibility of a wish or of effort wotdd no longer exist and feeling would likewise be impossible. The greatest good can consist only in an imhindered progress towards ever higher goals. The various forms of feeling and of desire appear as expressions of a feeling of power or of weakness. That is to say whether I feel pleastire or pain depends upon whether I am conscious of having the means of continued existence, development and satisfaction, and, as a matter of fact, it is through a consciousness of this sort that the feeling of power is conditioned by its opposite, the feeling of weakness (which can also be a dependence upon re- ceiving help from friends or from God). Here the com- parison with other men plays an important part, for my self-preservation is quite frequently favored as well as hindered by others (and their impulse to self-preserva- tion). Life is a great race. Whenever we surpass others we rejoice, but we feel humbled when we fall behind; while we are making the best progress we are filled with hope, but doubt as we grow weary; we become angry when we see an unexpected obstacle, but we are proud when we have surmounted a serious difficulty; we laugh when we see another fall, but weep when we fall otu"selves; we have a sense of sympathy when some one whom we wish well falls behind, indignation when some one whom we wish ill HOBBES 5- succeeds; love when we can assist another in the race happiness when we are constantly overtaking those ahead of us, unhappmess when we are constantly falHng behind. And the race ends^only in death. c. The human impulses of self-preservation are not pnmanly m mutual harmony: this is clearly manifested m the^ expenences of the great world-struggle. Strife wm arise, and encroachments are always to be feared ' The state of nature, i. e. the state of human life as it would be without state control, is a war of aU against all (bellum ommum contra omnes). The sole governing principle at this stage IS the unrestrained impulse and power of the individual, and fear, hatred, and the restless human pas- sions are supreme. But in calmer moments {sedato animo) . men perceive that greater advantage can be attained by ■ cooperation and association than by strife. This gives nse to the moral principle: Strive for peace, but if peace is ^ impossible, warfare must be organized! This principle gives nse to the special virtues and duties; fidehty, grati- tude, complaisance, forbearance, justice and self-control are necessary if peace and society are to be possible. Hence the general rule, that one must not do to others what he^ would not suffer from them, likewise follows from this pnnciple. But Hobbes likewise suggests that to be just towards others and to be able to give them aid (animi mgm opus proprium est auxUiari) is a sign of strength and I magnanimity. But the efficient execution and maintenance of these laws and rules require a strong political organization. Ihe freedom of the state of nature must be surrendered. ' ihis IS accomplished either by an expressed or tacit con- tract, by which each individual at once renounces the nght of his unconditioned impulse to self -preservation i \ 66 THE GREAT SYSTEMS and pledges unqualified obedience to an established au- thority (a prince or a convention) .—-Whilst Althusius and Gfoiius made a distinction between the contract through which society originates and that upon which the author- ity of the state is foimded, with Hobbes both coincide. He believes that, if the war of all against all is to be brought under control, the opposition between the governing power and the individual must be absolute, and he cannot there- fore imagine that a people could exist without govern- ment. The governing power must therefore originally proceed from a decision of the people. Hobbes is the ir ^^ nattu-alistic exponent of absolute sovereignty. Every limitation (by class, parliament or church) would involve a division of power, and consequent retrogression to the State of nature. The will of the sovereign executes the will of the people and he alone (to whom indeed the natural rights of every individual are transferred in the original contract), 1^ ^ The sovereign must decide all questions touching re- Kgion and morality. He shall above all determine the manner in which God shall be worshipped: otherwise the worship of one would be blasphemy to another, resulting in a som-ce of constant strife and disintegration. For the same reason, the ultimate definitions of good and evil must be fixed by the decree of the sovereign. The first prin- ciples of ethics and politics rest upon arbitrary enactment (in this case by the authority of the state). Theoretically Hobbes anticipates the rationalistic des- potism of the eighteenth century. He opposes hierarchy and class government and bases the hope of an enlightened political authority, through which the will of the intelligent public will receive recognition, on the prospect of a pro- gressive educational development of the people (paulatim erudUur vulgisf). f. SPINOZA 67 3. Baruch Spinoza's (163 2-1 67 7) chief work {Ethica or dine geometrico demonstrata, 1677) represents the most profound effort of this period to elaborate the fvmdamental principles of the new conception of nature into a general world theory. .This work, despite its abstract form, is by no means impersonal and purely theoretical. With Spinoza, thought and life are identical. Clear thinking was for him the way to spiritual freedom, the highest form x ! of personal life. He aims to regard all the various aspects and forms of existence from the viewpoint of internal har- mony. The majesty of his thought consists, first of all, in the resolute consistency with which he elaborates the vari- ous intellectual processes, each of which, in itself, expresses an essential characteristic of reality; every essential view- point must receive due recognition, without prejudice and without compromise; and, secondly, in the proof that every system of thought which is inherently self-consistent and complete nevertheless signifies nothing more than a single aspect or form of infinite Being. In this way he seeks to maintain luiity and multiplicity, mind and matter, eternity and time, value and reality in their inner identity. Each of these fimdamental concepts is in itself an expression of the total reality and can therefore be carried out ab- solutely. In his chief work, mentioned above, he elaborates this theory deductively or synthetically. Beginning with defi- nitions and axioms we advance through a series of doc-''^"^ trinal propositions. Owing to this method of treatment ^'^ Spinoza failed to give his own ideas their true force. Their content is not adapted to this mode of treatment, and his proofs are therefore frequently untenable. Nor does the method pursued in his treatment correspond with the method by which he discovered his theory. The unfin- I; I II 68 THE CKEAT SYSTEUS ■\ 'i i tl^-jttv ished treatise De etnendatiqne inUllectus is the chief souroe of information concerning this method. Here he begins autobiographically after the manner of Descartes in his Discours. Experience has taught him that neither enjoy- 3 X ment, nor wealth, nor honor can be the highest good. He finds it, on the contrary, in the knowledge of the relation existing between our mind and nature as a whole. The pleasures of knowledge became his highest and strongest ambition, his ruling passion, and the glory conferred on existence through the possibility of participating in this joy is what made life worth living to him. It is for this very reason however that he institutes the inquiry as to the possibility of realizing this end, and he then indicates how he arrived at the definitions and axioms with which the "Ethics" begins. Spinoza, the son of a Jewish merchant of Amsterdam, began his career as a Jewish theologian, inspiring great hopes among his brethren in the faith. He however grad- ually became increasingly critical of the ancestral ideas of fx faith and was finally ceremom'ally excommunicated from the sjmagogue. Thereafter he lived in the country for a while, moving thence to Rhynsberg, in the vicinity of Leyden, and finally to The Hague, occupied with study and the writing of his books. He provided a scanty living by grinding lenses. He enjoyed the active intellectual fellowship of a circle of yotmg friends who studied his ethics, even while it only existed in manuscript. His life is a splendid example of happy resignation and inner de- votion to intellectual labor. The essay. Von Gott, Menschen und dessen Gliick, written in his youth, is Spinoza^ s first attempt to bring what he regarded as essential in religious ideas into inner harmony with the scientific conception of nature. Later on he SPINOZA 69 wrote an exposition of the Cartesian philosophy for one of his pupils; tdthough strongly influenced by the writings of Descartes (together with Jewish theology and the works of scholasticism, and perhaps also by the works of Bruno) he was never a Cartesian. He likewise studied and used the works of Bacon and Hobbes. — In his Tractatus theologico- politicus (1670) he advocates religious Hberty and makes some interesting contributions, to the historical criticism of the various books of the Bible. a. Otu* knowledge originates in incidental experience (experientia vaga). On this plane we arrange phenomena according to laws which are apparently mechanical, and we are satisfied so long as there is no exception. Science (ratio) however institutes exact comparisons of the given phenomena. It begins with experience, and then seeks to discover what belongs to nature as a whole as well as to its various parts — the universal laws, which prevail everywhere. Spinoza illustrates this by reference to the laws of motion in the realm of matter and the laws of the association of ideas in the realm of mind. It is only in these laws that our thought processes culminate, whilst the series of particular phenomena continue to infinity, because that which is cause in one relation is effect in another relation and vice versa. The only absolute which can satisfy intellect is the law which governs the causal series, not its supposed beginning or end. Spinoza calls this absolute Substance; that which exists in itself and is to be understood through itself, so that its concept presupposes no other concepts. Spinoza's Substance, the terminus oiy^^' all thought, is therefore the principle of the uniformity of Nature. Spinoza's discussion of the validity of knowledge is somewhat vacillating. At times he seems to hold the il !i ) 70 THE GREAT SYSTEMS SPINOZA 71 poptilar and scholastic definition of truth as the agreement of thought with its object. But when he examines the pre ' lem more closely he concludes that the perfection of knowledge consists of complete elaboration and internal consistency. He always regards error as negative, as due to the limitation of oiu* experience and thought. Error , is resolved by observing strict logical consistency ; we even- tually discover that we were regarding a part for the whole. Thus error finds its explanation in the truth: Veritas est ' norma sui et falsi. Hence the norm of truth lies in the very nature of our thought, not in its relation to something external. Knowledge of the laws of nature is however not the highest kind of knowledge. Spinoza places intuition above experientia vaga and reason. The former appre- hends particular events and the latter discovers general principles, but in intuitive knowledge {scientia intuitiva) the particvdar phenomenon is immediately apprehended as a characteristic member of the whole system of nature, the particular being in its relation to the whole of Sub- stance. This higher intuition is only acquired after we have passed through the stages of experience and science. Spinoza even says that he himself understood but very little in this highest manner. It appears to be more like an artificial intuition than a pure scientific conception. We regard things from the standpoint of eternity {suh specie aterni) in the second as well as in the third form of knowledge; i. e. not in their isolation and contingency, but as members of a more comprehensive system. b. Following Descartes and Hohhes, Spinoza bases his entire philosophy on the principle of causality, the validity of which, for him as for them, is self-evident. In his ex- position of the law of causation he takes special pains to emphasize that cause and effect cannot be things which differ in kind. He says, e. g., that "If two things have nothing in common, the one cannot be the cause of the other; for then there would be nothing in the effect, which had also been in the cause, and everything in the effect would then have originated from nothing." According to Spinoza the fact that two things are related as cause and effect signifies that the concept of the one admits of a purely logical derivation from that of the other. He does not distinguish between cause and ground. He iden- tifies the relation of cause and effect with the relation of premises and conclusion. The fact that cause precedes \ effect in time, as well as in thought, finds no place in his theory. "From the standpoint of eternity" time dis- appears. The cause of an event may therefore exist in the event itself or in something else. That which has its cause within itself is Substance, Substance is that which exists in itself and is understood through itself, so that its con- ' cept does not presuppose any other concept. We have . already observed that Spinoza's fundamental principle is revealed in the uniformity of nature. It is therefore the fundamental presupposition of all existence and efficiency. It foUows from his definition, that it exists necessarily! it contains its cause within itself, and hence nothing can prevent its existence! Only one Substance is possible: for, if there were several, they would limit each other, in which case neither one could be understood from itself. It is Hkewise self-evident that Substance can neither have beginning nor come to an end, neither be divided nor lim- ited. This concept, which is Spinoza's inner terminus of all thought, is at once identical with the concept of God and II 72 THE GREAT SYSTEMS the concept of Nature. These concepts must then how- ever be conceived of in a different manner than usual. Nature is the inherent energy which is active in every- thing which exists {natura naturans), not the mere simi of all existence (natura naturata), **I have an opinion about Cod and Nature" says Spinoza, ** which is different from that commonly held by modern Christians, I hold that Cod is the internal, not the external, cause of all things. That is, I hold, with St, Paul, that all things live and move in Cod," Another divergence from the ordinary concept of God is contained in the fact that Spinoza does ggt think that hu- I,.. ^man attributes, such as tmder§t^nding and wjll, can be ascribed to the Deity; for understanding presupposes given experiences which shall be understood, and will presup- poses that there are ideals which are as yet unrealized, each of which would contradict the absolute perfection of God. Spinoza calls the things which do not contain their cause 'i"i^ within themselves Modi (phenomena, individual things). The Modus is caused by something other than itself, through which alone it can be understood. The real cause of the Modi is contained in Substance, of which they are the particular manifestations. Externally they stand in a catisal relation to each other, but the total aggregate of the Modi, the total series of causes and effects given in experience (the total natura nattu-ata), is a revelation of Substance, which constitutes the vital relation of the whole series of phenomena. c. According to Spinoza real existence can only be ascribed to Substance. Phenomena are its particular Forms. Everything which exists (Substance and its Modi), therefore, comes into experience under two attri- butes (fundamental characters or fundamental forms): '^^^tibQu^.and extension (mind and matter). As an infinite SPINOZA 73 and perfect being Substance must have an infinite number of Attributes; but we know only two, because experience reveals no more to us. An attribute is what thought con- ceives of Substance as constituting its essence {essentiam substantia constituens). This definition implies that the whole natiu-e of Substance must be present in every At- tribute, in every fundamental form; each individual at- tribute must therefore, like Substance itself, be imderstood through itself, and its concept cannot be derived from any other concept. Everything which pertains to a given Attribute must be explained by means of this attribute alone, without reference to any other Attributes; thoughts must therefore be explained only by means of thoughts, ^ li material phenoniena only by means of material phenom- ena. Not only Substance as such, but each of its phe- nomena, each Modus, e. g. man, can be regarded and ex- plained completely imder each Attribute. The nature of reality is revealed in the realm of matter as well as in the realm of mind, and the one form of manifestation cannot be derived from the other. Mind and matter (sotd and body) are one and the same, only viewed from different sides.^ Spinoza holds, in opposition to Descartes, that two irredu- cible attributes do not necessarily require two different natures, but that they can very, easily pertain to one and the same nattwe. He differs from Hobbes in that he does not regard mind as a mere effect or form of matter, but sees in it an aspect of being quite as distinctive and primary as matter. — Qescartes, Hobbes and Spinoza represent the three leading hjrpotheses concerning the relation of mind and matter. Spinoza elaborates his theory of mind and matter (which in recent times has frequently been described by the unfortvmate term parallelism, or the identity hy- n ri ii 74 THE GREAT SYSTEMS SPINOZA 75 iJSthesis) according to the deductive method, because he derives it from his definitions of Substance, Attribute and Modi, jj^ have however aheady called attention to the fact th^^e discovered his definitions by means of the analysis of experience and of knowledge. The definition of Attribute presupposes the f imdamental principle of the identity of cause and effect, previously mentioned; from this presupposition the relation between the Attributes follows in the same manner as the relation between Substance and Modi. That everything which pertains to a given Attribute must be explained by reference to that attribute is really nothing more than a metaphysical paraphrase of the principle that material phenomena can only be explained by means of material phenomena. Kepler's vera causa makes the same demand. That this is really what Spinoza meant becomes quite apparent from the following expression: **If any one should say that this or that bodily activity proceeds from the soul, he knows not what he is talking about, and really grants that we do not know the cause of such activity." — He nevertheless likewise calls attention to the fact that the development of the soul advances proportionately with the development of the body, and that we have no right to set arbitrary limits to the material imiformity of nature. Spinoza does not regard the hjrpothesis of identity as a mere psychophysical theory. He likewise gives it an epistemological significance in that he speaks of an identity of thought with its object. Here he confuses the relation of subject and object with the relation of soul and body. This is the more remarkable, since he 1 1 holds that the validity of knowledge depends on its i! logical consistency rather than on the agreement with its objects. But he is also somewhat vacillating on this last point, which is an after-eflEect of the scholastic studies of his youth. Criticism of this most .rationalistic of all Systems of /'^ philosophy must first of all be directed against the central proposition of the homogeneity (or reaUy identity) of cause and effect. Should this proposition prove untenable or even be incapable of consistent elaboration, it must foUow that, in the last analysis. Being is not, as / Spinoza believed, absolutely rational. We shall find this i problem discussed by the EngHsh empiricists and by the critical philosophers. d. Spinoza teaches, in harmony with this theory of error, that every idea is regarded as true, so long as it is not supplanted by another. Our theory of reality is developed through the rivahy of ideas. The most com- prehensive and most consistent theory is the truest. Spinoza's elaboration of the psychology of the eniotions as given in his ^Ethics- is unsurpassed in its exceUence. Like Hobbes he starts from the impulse of self-preser- vation. But he bases it on the consistency of his system. The infinite Substance is actively present in every indi- vidual being (modus); the effort towards self -preser- 1 vation of each individual being is therefore a part of the divine activity. Hence whenever effort is successful, it produces pleasure, and conversely pain. But this only occurs in case of a transition to a more perfect or less per- fect state; an absolutely changeless state would neither give rise to pleasure nor pain.— The various emotional quaHties result from the association of ideas. We love ' ^at produces pleasure, and hate what produces pain. We love whatever contributes to our love, and hate what constrains it. When a being similar to ourselves ex- 76 THE GREAT SYSTEMS SPINOZA 77 periences pleasure or pain, the same emotion involun- tarily arises in us. But this moreover not only gives rise to sympathetic joy and sorrow, but it may also inspire envy and pleasure at the ntiisfortune of others, i. e. if we ourselves wish to enjoy another's pleasures, or if we are previously filled with hatred towards the tmfortunate. — Just as pleasiu-e becomes love by means of the idea of its cause, so mere appetite {appetitus, co- natus) becomes desire (cupiditas), when joined with the idea of its object. In Spinoza's description of emotional and volitional ? life we discover a degree of vacillation between a ptirely intellectuahstic and a more realistic (or voluntaristic) theory. In several passages he describes the emotions as confused and inadequate ideas {idecB confused et inadequate), which vanish as soon as the idea becomes perfectly clear. But there are other passages in which the emotions are regarded as real, positive states, which can only be displaced by other real states. The same thing occurs with the concept of the will. In several passages voHtion is treated as one with the activity of thought; will and understanding are identical. But in other passages the will is identical with the impulse of self-preservation, and all ideas of value and value- judgments are dependent on it; ''We seek, choose, desire and wish for a thing, not because we think it is good, but, inversely, we think a thing is good, because we seek, choose, desire and wish for it." In this case therefore he asserts the priority of the will. — This vac- illation is evidently (in agreement with F. Tonnies in Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophies VII) to be explained from the fact that, during the prepara- tion of the Ethics, Spinoza's older, intellectuahstic con- ception was supplanted by a more reaUstic conception under the influence of Hobbes without a thoroughgoing apphcation of the logical consequences of the new con- ception. e. Spinoza bases his etHcs on the instinct of self- preservation.-Man is conditioned by the fact of being one among many individual beings, and obstacles con- stantly thwart his instincts. As a member of the total senes of causes and effects man does not contain his cause within himself, he is not active, but passive, not free, but necessitated. The sense of dependence enables man to strive for freedom and independence. He then ^ miagines an ideal of human life {Uea hominis, tanquam natural kumante examplar), as it would be under con- ! ditions of perfect freedom and independence. This i furmshes a standard of judgment: whatever contributes ' towards the realization of that ideal is good; whatever t pra,ents tt ts evil. The predicates "good" and "m/" i which are meaningless when appUed to absolute Being bubstance, become significant from the viewpoint of temporal experience and finite development. Sub specie (Bterm there is no ethics; aU antitheses and differences ^ and moreover aJl valuation, disappear when so con-- sidered. A desire can be subdued only by another desire, and fience, if the ideal is to govern our life, it must either give • nse to or become a desire. Duty then becomes a matter :. Of making this desire as strong as possible. Social life !^ IS a means to this end. Men can make better provision tor self-preservation by uniting their energies. Spiritual goods especiaUy knowledge, which furnishes the only ' possible means to perfect freedom and activity, can only be acquired under conditions which guarantee the external 78 THE GREAT SYSTEMS means of subsistence and this is more readily obtained m organized society than otherwise. Spiritual, unlike ma- terial, goods, which only one or a few can possess, are not the occasion of strife; they are rather the common pos- session of everyone, and here the individual can assist others without sustaining any loss to himself. The cour- ' ageous instinct of self-preservation {fortitudo), which constitutes virtue, appears therefore not only in the form of vital energy (animosUas), i.e. as power to impress the influence of one's personality, but also in generosity (generositas) , i. e. power to lend spiritual and material , assistance to others.— But the acme of spiritual freedom can nevertheless only be attained through a perfect under- V standing of ourselves, in our real identity with that which is most essential and highest in Being, because we con- ceive our own energy as a part of infinite energy and we are filled with an intellectual love for Deity brought about by the joy of knowledge (amor intellectualis det). We then see ourselves sub specie (zternitatis. In his theory of the state, contained partly in the Tractaius theologico-politicus, partly in the imfinished v^ Tractatus PoliticuSy Spinoza, like Eohhes, draws a sharp distinction between the state of nature and life within the state ; but he likewise holds that it is the duty of the state to secure a greater degree of freedom and indepen- dence than wotdd be possible in a state of nature. The individual does not surrender his liberty when he becomes a member of the state. The state is not supposed to reduce men to animals or machines, but to provide the conditions for the development of man's spiritual and bodily functions. It would therefore contradict its . office if it failed to maintain liberty of thought and . speech and to guarantee complete religious liberty. LEIBNITZ 79 4. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716), like his three predecessors, Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza is convmced of the importance of the mechanical explanation of nature. His three predecessors regarded the mechanical prmaples as self-evident and as given once for aU, and assumed the task of interpreting the various elements of reality m harmony with the principle of mechanical causahty. Leibnitz however subjects the principle of causality to a profounder analysis by inquiring into its presuppositions and seeking to refer it back to something stiU more fundamental. It is only after he ha^ succeeded m this that he proceeds to the definition of the relation between matter and mind. The motive for this investi- gation was m part purely theoretical, due to the fact that Leibmtz discovered gaps and inconsistencies in his pre- decessors, in part practical, due to his desire to bring the modern explanation of nature into more perfect harmony with lus reHgious presuppositions. He attempted to accomphsh both at a single stroke, by means of a single Idea, the idea of continuity. Even as a boy, in the Hbrary of his father, who was a professor m Leipzig, Leibnitz had become familiar with the wntings of Scholasticism. When he afterwards became acquainted with the natural science and philos- ophy of his own day he felt as if "transported into another world. He saw that the new ideas could not be refuted but neither could he surrender the conviction that nature IS ultimately regulated by prescience, that is to say tnat the mechanism must be grounded in teleology. His mathematical ideas were influenced profoundly by the physicist Huygens during a visit in Paris, and he after- wards likewise drew personally close to Spinoza. From 1676 onwards he Kved at Hannover as councillor and W' 80 THE GREAT SYSTEMS LEIBNITZ 81 . Hbrarian, occupied with philosophy, mathematics, history and jiirisprudence. His broadly comprehensive mind was capable of engaging productively in a wide range of subjects to their material advancement. He was every- where affected by the controlling idea of continuity, which can only be rigorously carried through by the continual discovery of more numerous and finer distinc- tions and nuances of thought. a. Leibnitz discovered a difficulty in Descartes' and Spinoza's theory that the sum total of motion in the universe always remains constant, namely, that it fails to explain how to account for motion and rest respectively in the various parts of the universe: They exist as antithetical states! Continuity can be established only through the concept of Force (or tendency,^ conatus). If motion has ceased at a given point in the universe, the Force still remains and can be revived again. Motion and rest are only relatively opposed to each other. Instead of the persistence of motion we should speak of the persistence of Force. Force is the factqr in any given cu-cumstance which contains the possibility of future change. We first discover a tuiiform relation between two states and we afterwards call the factor in the first state which makes the second state possible Force. The concept of Force therefore rests on the concept of law, the ultimate presupposition of which is the uniforai con- sistency of changing states. Leibnitz calls this pre- supposition the principle of sufficient reason. But how shall we accoimt for the persistence of energy? According to Leibnitz this question can be answered only teleologically. If the energy of a cause were not preserved in the effect, nature would retrograde, which contradicts divine wisdom. Leibnitz thus finds a basis for his faith in prescience in the corrected basal principle of mechanical natural science. In explaining particular facts he would apply the strict mechanical method, but the principle of mechanism itself requires the principle of teleology for its explanation. ^ b. Leibnitz carries his analysis further than his pre- decessors at still another point. They had regarded extension as a fundamental attribute of Being. LeibnUz challenges this assumption. Extended things are always mamfold and complex, and the true realities are the elements which constitute things. If there were no absolute umts (which cannot be extended), there would be no real existence. It is only these ultimate units that can be regarded bs Substance (in its strict significance) Ina^uch therefore as Force persists, it follows that this persistent Substance must likewi^ be Force; it would be utterly impossible for activity to originate from Sub- stances in a state of absolute rest. LeibnUz caUs these^ substantial units, whose objective manifestation constitutes matter, Monads. Each Monad is a Httle universe; its nature is revealed in the laws which govern its inner successive changes. What then, as a matter of fact, are these Monads? Leibmtz answers: Our souls alone furnish us with an nnmediate example of a unitary being, whose inner states foUow a umform law. We must think of all Monads after this analogy, because we presuppose something in aU of them analogous to our sensations and activities. Since according to the principle of continuity, we permit no leaps m nature, we must postulate innumerable grades and degrees of soul life in the universe. And this enables us to understand the origin of human consciousness. Here the Cartesians, just as in the case of the transition from !! 82 THE GREAT SYSTEMS rest to motion, were confronted by a riddle; for con- sciousness like motion cannot come into being all at once. The relation of the unconscious to consciousness is analogous to the relation of rest and motion. In order to vindicate the continuity of soul-Hfe, Leibnitz directs attention to the fine nuances and changes of consciousness which are frequently overiooked. We are likewise obliged to postulate such minimal elements (petites per- ceptions) in the unconscious. Leibnitz first elaborated this, his so-called theory of Monads, in a short essay in 1685 {Petit discours de meta- physique) and in his correspondence with Arnaidd during the following year, but not until he had prepared the way for it by a ntimber of earHer essays. He afterwards pubHshed several expositions of the theory especially in the Syst^me nouveau (1695) and in the Monadologie (^^yi^), --Leibnitz approaches his system first by the method of analysis, and then by the method of analogy. He seeks the ultimate presuppositions of science and then explains these presuppositions by means of analogy. Here he made a very important discovery, in showing that analogy is the only method by which to construct a positive metaphysics. Every mythology, reHgion and metaphysical system had used this method; but Leibnitz is the first to understand the principle which forms its basis. His system, the first attempt at a meta- physical ideaHsm (i. e. the theory that the fundamental principle of reality is spiritual) since Plato and the pattern of all later ideaHstic attempts, has, to say nothing of its content, a permanent interest just because of this clear consciousness of its source. However if we should ask him why he uses the principle of analogy with so much assurance, he would answer: Because its help ofiEers LEIBNITZ g^ the only possibiHty of comprehending reality and because reaUty-on the basis of the principle of sufficient reason —must be comprehensible. c. It was Leibnitz' intention that his doctrine of Monads should form the complete antithesis to Spinozism Whilst Spinoza recognized only one Substance, Leibnitz postulated an infinite number, each of which forms a universe of its own, or, to invert the expression, constitutes a separate view of the universe. Each Monad develops by virtue of an inner necessity, just Hke Spinoza's Sub- stance. Leibnitz' theory thus appears to be an absolute pluralism in contrast with an equaUy absolute monism. Leibnitz* only explanation of the ultimate correspondence and harmony of the Monads however, without which they could not constitute a universe, involves the reference to their common origin in God. The Monads issue or radiate from God, in a manner similar to the way in which Substance, according to Spinoza, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, produced the Modes. But at this point— the conception of unity and multipHcity— Leibnitz encounters a difficulty which is even greater than that of Spinoza, since even God— just as every reality- must likewise be a Monad together with the other Monads, whilst Spinoza's Substance maintains vital relation with the Modes. Leibnitz also approaches very close to Spinoza in his conception of the relation of mind and matter. He insists on the continuity of all material processes and can ' therefore neither accept any transition from matter to mind nor any influence of mind upon matter. Extension is only the external sensible form of psychical states: that which takes place in the soul finds its material expression in the body and vice versa. Leibnitz therefore defends 84 THE GREAT SYSTEMS LEIBNiTZ «s l^h the hypothesis of identity just as Spinoza had done. He however gives it an idealistic cast, since he regarded the absolute reality as psychical, and denied the Spinozistic coordination of the two attributes. d. A perfect continuity pervades the separate Monads, i. e. the individual life of the soul, just as the Monads among themselves form a complete continuous series. Every conceivable degree of soul-life exists, unconscious as well as conscious. Leibnitz developed his views on psychology and the theory of knowledge, as a polemic directed against Locke, in his Nouveaux Essais (which only appeared long after his death) . He criticizes the assertion that the soul is originally a blank tablet. The obscure impulses of the soul must not be ignored. Just in pro- portion as the distinction and contrast between our sensations are small, the less a single element is distinguish- able from the remaining content of the soul, or, more briefly, the more obscure the psychical states are, so much the more readily is their existence denied. But there are no absolute divisions, but rather every possible degree of variation between obscurity and clearness. Leibnitz calls the obscure changes within ourselves, which do not really rise to consciousness, perceptions; they correspond to the phantasmata of Hobbes, The lowest forms of being, the Monads of the lowest degree, never rise above such perceptions. We approach a higher level when perceptions are combined with memory and consequently possess more than mere momentary significance; consciousness is then present (sentiment, of. Hobbes' sensio). The highest degree is characterized by attention to its own states; here Leibnitz uses the terms apperception and conscience; conscience is connaissance reflexive de I'etat interieur, i. e. self-conscious- ness, not consciousness in general. The fact that thj^ Cartesians attributed psychical life to human b^gs alone was due, according to Leibnitz, to their failure to observe the innimierable gradations of psychical life. Here, even as in material nature, the clear and sensibly apparent is a resultant, an integration of small magni- tudes. The apparent evanescence of psychical life is merely a transmutation into more obscure, more element- ary forms. The minute distinctions escape observation, and yet we are never wholly indifferent to them (just as in material nature there is no such thing as absolute rest). It is only when the distinctions become great and sharp that we are clearly aware of ourselves and feel the contrast between the self and the rest of the universe. Leibnitz applies the principle of continuity consistently throughout, both in psychology and in the philosophy of nature, on the basis of the concept of minute differentia. As a mathematician the same thought process led him \ to the discovery of the integral calculus. His "differentials" ' are infinitely small magnitudes (or changes of magnitude), but they eventually constitute a finite magnitude through summation (integration). His great mind was occupied with problems in widely different fields of knowledge, but the general type of his thought was everywhere the same. In referring all the distinctions of mental life to dis- tinctions of obscurity and clearness, he is a forerunner of the century of enlightenment. But we must not over- look the fact that the obscure states have an infinite content, for each Monad is a mirror of the whole universe, even though it is conscious of only a part of it. A finite being is therefore incapable of complete and perfect enlightenment; its sole prospect consists of continuous y ,' 86 THE GRrCAT SYSTEMS LEIBNITZ 87 effcm. Leibnitz likewise discovers a tendency (appetit- tendance) in the soul, to pass from the single ''percep- tions" to new perceptions. This is an element which presupposes other distinctions than obscurity and clear- ness. Both Spinoza and Leibnitz contain suggestions of a profoxmder theory of will, which is suppressed by their intellectuaHstic tendency. e. Although Leibnitz, in opposition to Locke, maintains the involimtary and unconscious foundation of knowl- edge, and objected to the idea of a tabula rasa, he is still in agreement with Locke's criticism of ''innate ideas" in requiring a proof for all truths, even the * ' innate," that are not identical propositions. To prove a prop- osition means to trace it hsicJL to an identical proposition. According to him logic culminates in the principle of identity whilst the Aristotelians and Scholastics base their theory on the principle of contradiction. He -had sketched an outline of logic in which each judgment is stated in the form of an identical proposition. But this sketch was tmknown tmtil 1840 (in /. E, Erdmann^s Opera phUosophica Leibnitii), and the logical investi- gations of Boole and Jevons, which reveal a similar tendency, were the first to direct attention to them. Just as the principle of identity is the criterion of truth in the realm of pure thought, so is the principle of suffi- cient reason in the reahn of experience. Leibnitz how- ever, even as Spinoza, never made a clear distinction between ground and cause (ratio and causa). He re- garded this principle not only as a principle of scientific investigation, but as a tmiversal law. — The difference between truths of experience ("contingent" truths) and truths of pure thought ("necessary'* truths) is only a matter of degree: the former can be reduced to identical propositions by a finite, the latter by an infinite analysis. The relation is similar to that wHch obS between rational and irrational numbers • *; J^^ Z^°^^ °^ ^^^ Leibnizian philosophy is character- ized by a harmonizing and conciliatory tendency. He IS especially anxious to combine mechanism with teleol- tSIi !"t^°«t """promising the integrity of either. Teleology is ^ply to be another way of construing mecha^sm He says that "ever^Wng in nature can be explamed by final causes (causa finales) quite as weU as by ; .iiaent causes (causas efficientes)." But he is not satisfied to stop with this purely philo- sophical theory, notwithstanding the fact that its em- pirical verification contained an abundance of problems He was also anxious to effect a recondUation between eccleaastical theology and philosophy. He wrote the Theoduee m refutation of Bayle, just as he had written ae Nouveaux Essais in refutation of Locke. Here he employs the distinction between "necessary" and conitngent" truths: nothing can contradict the fonn«^ but since "contingent" truths can never be reduced to a final analysis, such as the principle of suffi- cient reason requires, we are compelled to go beyond the ^nes of actual causes (extra seriem) and postulate a first cause, which is seK-caused. The universe, actuaUy created by this first cause, was not the only one possible; -according to the principle of sufficient reason-it must have been given the preference only because it was the b^^ssible Before the creation of the world the vmous Possibihti^ presented a conflict in the Divine T^ff Ji' ^°'^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^ preference because rt offered the ^eatest harmony together with the greatest multiphaty. But even such a world cannot be entirely 88 THE GEEAT SYSTEMS LEIBNITZ / free from fault. It is impossible f ^r the Ehvme Nature to reveal itself in finite nature withc-^t encountering nu- merous obstacles and limitations. Suffering ("physical evfl") and sin ("moral evil") are consequences of these obstacles ("metaphysical evil").-This reminds us of the mythology of Jacob Bohme. Leibnitz must con- cede to Bayle that the world is governed by two prm- dples, with this modification, namely, that he ascnbes the one to the divine will, which reduces evil to aminimum, the other to the divine understanding, which determmes the various possible world forms. ,..,•!.•, ■ But these are not the only arguments which Letbmtz adduces. He cites the infinitude of the universe, as admitting the possibiUty that the evil which we expen- ence in our part of the universe (which is perhaps the worst part!) may be insignificant as compared with the world as a whole. This argument is new. It had only become possible through the new world-theory of Coper- nicus and Bruno. On the other hand, Leibnitz employs an old argument when he says that evil and sm were necessary in order that the good and the beautiful might be rendered conspicuous by contrast. This view occurs already in Flotinus and Augustine. It is rather esthetic than moral. And moreover the sacrifice of single parts of the universe, i. e. single Monads, for the good of others, conflicts with Leibnitz' own theory. , , . , Leibnitz bases his ethical ideas on the longing for perfection, i. e. for a higher degree of energy and greater ^iritual harmony. The sense of pleasure is correlated with an abundance and harmony of energies. The individual is spontaneously impeUed to strive not only for Ws own happiness, but Ukewise for the happme^ of others. In the controversy between Bossuet and 89 a^^Z.^'^F T*""«.'' "'^^terested love," Leibnitz of^tve f ? ""^"^ '^' ^^i*y ^d th^ value ot such love ; he however emphasizes the fact that tZ ne regards justice, conceived as the harmonv of lov^ an^ Letbmtz hmiself referred to their similarity. I v I LOCKE 91 n 1 1 THIRD BOOK. ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY. The great system builders did indeed begin with analysis^it the foundations upon which they b,Mt were conit^ and presuppositions just the same, and these wl not carefuUy investigated. This is speciaUy tme of the principle of cau^tion and several of thepnnaples of natural science, which were regarded as self Went. The method of using presuppositions without mquinng • into their validity has, since the time of Kant b^n called dogmatism. It is the great merit of Enghsh philosophy that it instituted an investigation of the presuppositions of knowledge. It investigates the psychological processes which give rise to these presuppositions, as well as the Ltho(£of demonstrating their vaHdity. The problem of psychology and the theory of knowledge thus come into S foreground, and the problem of bemg gradually recedes into the background. The consequences of this transposition of problems were of great importance in other departments as weU as in the specific domain of philosophy. People began to demand a definite account, not only of scientific presui^ positions, but also of the principles winch were regarded ksfundamental in pohtics, religion and education Au- thorities, which had hitherto been accepted without hea- tation, must now give an account of their origin and thar trustworthiness. Stated in philosophical terms tto means that the problem of evaluation now became more prominent than formerly. This is a matter that m neither be solved by an appeal to authority nor by a mere 90 deduction from theoretical principles, but requires a oTSfcsrr^"^*^"^^^^*^^-^' ThefoSion of ethics likewise receives independent treatment mo^ frequently than Utherto. ^^em more I. John Locke (1632-1704) devotes his chief work (690), to the investigation of the nature and validiti / of human knowledge. The first draft of this T^Z work was brought about by a discussion of moST aS rehi^ous subjects When it became evident how « It IS to amve at definite conclusions, the thought oc^ to Locke that they must first of aU examine'SeTSS of knowledge, m order to see what subjects it is (JS of treatmg, and moreover what things are be^oTiS powers In the first book Locke criticizes the^Sril ' of i^ate Ideas, especiaUy in the form in which it^SSS"'" by Herbert of Cherlury; in the second boofhe S S Ideas to their simple elements; in the thini bodk he mv^tigates the influence of language on though? and ' m the fourth he examines the different Knds^f knowledge and defines its limits ' father He pays a beautiful tribute to his father in his splendid essay On Education (1692). Butl^ffo^ Z^ST'^Jtf:: -^'-''^ scLLtict;tt received at school and the university were repulsive to ton as philosophical development was Sbl^ cbefly by the study of Descartes, Gassendi an7SS Bemg unable to subscribe to the xa Art,vi»c u ^ j relinquish his original plan of b^g^itgitn h^ a^tarw^dssl^died medicine, but soon enter3r^;rv£ Of the Earl of SUftesUry, with whose family h i^SS 02 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY connected for two generations, as taitor, ^e^et^ ^d Mend At the faU of the Earl, Locke went to HoUand where he composed his most important works and likewise participated inthe preparations for thetevolutam. He returned to England with WiUiam of Orange, and helped to formulate the poUcies of the new admmistration. He spent his last years in rural soUtude. a In Locke's terminology (Mea represents evwythmg with which we are occupied WESi engaged in thought. Some have supposed that certain ideas, espeaally the idea of God and the logical and moral principles, are innate, but experience shows that children, primitive races and the illiterate possess nothing more than partkular and sen- sible ideas. There are men who have no idea of God and no real ideas of morahty. Some of our ideas are natural, i e such as have been acquired through experience by means of our native faculty, but even these ^e not iimate. Locke attributes the doctrine of immte ideas to human indolence, which shrinks from the labor mvolved in exploring the origin of ideas. , All ideas, all the elements of consciousness ongmate ' from two sources: external experience (sensation) and i internal experience (reflection). In external experience . a physical impression produces a sensation (perception) in the soul; in internal experience we observe the activity of our own mind in elaborating the sensations received from without. . . , In the acquisition of simple ideas consciousness is for ! the most part passive. Simple external ideas are of two i kinds: ideas of primary 'and of secondary qualities. The primary quaUties can be attributed to the external objects themselves ; such are soUdity, extension, figure, mobihty. Secondary quahties belong only to our ideas. LOCKE they are not attributes of the things themselves- t3 are the results of the influences of primary qSes on ^ Such secondary idea, are Hght, souS^ S If GMeo, Descartes and Hobbes. Locke adopteS^lrfrom Boyle, the noted chemist, who is the autSr o^e t^ primary and secondary qualities " Whilst we are largely passive in acquiring simple ideas we are active in forming from them,kt, Lp£ dS ^ second. Ideas of relations, third and finally abstS dS' ' Hence there are three fornis of activity: cTS^tS^"! a^ciation and abstraction. We combine Z^eX^\ mto a single Idea whenever we fonn ideas of at riiuS (mod^), such as space and time, energy and mot^ The Ideas of such attributes as sensati.^ m^o^S mSs fit W °' ''^''f "''''-' ^y "^"^^^S ideas of modes. But here a mystery confronts us. We know th^ •^ngk modes by themselves, but we are unable to tS^ ^t substance, which presumably supports the m^de " reaUy is.-We may hkewise place two ideas in iuxtaoo from God The expositions of Newton's masterpLe likewle in volve presuppositions and speculative ideas wSSTare of" phj^osophxcahmportance.-HemakesadistinctiS^^^ absolute, true, and mathematical soace" J^7 ^^' spaces. Absolute motion occmTin^r . "'''"'^ because it contains Zll^lacas QoS"" '^°"?' , places which are at once places S tS f "'"^^^' Relatione ad externum quodvitTw^S^ roSeTthln^ regard the mathematicariod ot in^^ratS;'^" b-ti:s^rd:ss,t;^ ^^ = qS ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY BERKELEY pecuUarly revealed in the simple and uniform axrangenient S the solar system. He asserts most emphatica^y that the wonderful structure (elegantissima compages) of the solar system-the orbital motions of the planets around 7he sZ, which are concentric with the orbit o the sun and he ahnost in the same plane-is inexphcable on the basis of natural law. The orbital motion can only be ex- plained by reference to supernatural energies. Left to Siemselves, the planets would faU mto the ^}-^^ remarkable structure, the organs and the instincts o animals furnish additional evidence of the ^upematui^d! (Besides the Scholium generale contained m the Pnn- cipia Newton expressed himself on these matte,^ in l£ optics, Queries 28-29, and in his lette^ to BenUey) -But Newton did not think that the mechamsm of the universe was finished once for all. God must mterpose as an active regulator from time to tnne. This problem was the occasion of a very interesting discussion between Leibnitz and Clarke, one of Newton's disaples. ,. George Berkeley (1685-17S3) occupies a place in empirical philosophy simUar to that of LetbnUz m the gSt of systematizers. He represents a reaction agains o S and N<^to» similar to that of Leibmtz against Descarus, HobUs and Spinoza, and, like J^^ibnUz,My not only represents a reaction, but an advan(^ and furthe development. " He aimed to refute the conclusions of th new sdence which were hostile to religion, and he hoped to .. accomplish this by a criticism of the ab^*'"^ J "J' and by a return to immediate expenence and intmton^ Child4e piety and acute critical an^y^^^faf ^^^S been so intimately united as in this clear """^i; J^* * University of DubUn he occupied himself with the study S S.W and N^ton, and his chief works were 99 composed while he was yet but a young man IT. afterwards entered the Anglican church'and'pSpat^ ' m the controversy against the Free-thL^s H^ missionary zeal inspired an interest in Crica a^H he conceived a plan of founding a coUege 1^ SeiS The sublime ambition to which he aLJa It " ' years of his Ufe comprehended not ontTco '"* ^ the Indian, but likewise the ^..^^l^^Z:::. and art m the western hemisDherP w^ r ^™® Amenca. He afterwards served as Bishop of Clovt,^ in ^eland, equaUy zealous as pastor, philan'th^JpgTd ^ectedparticularlya^gairilttL^^^T^^^^^^ , deas. WecanfonnanideaofpartofanobjecfSolt Its remaimng parts, but we are unable to fo,^ separate ideas which are supposed t^S^^^^ain tSTwS general, which should contain that which is common Z red^een, yellow, &c. If I wish to have i M^hich quaatatively different, I must either use a sien p phy of religion, just as he does in ethics He instituted a twofold investigation into the problS of knowledge and he likewise foUows the same pl^ tZ matter of rehgion ; i. e. he investigates both the psycho! lo^^cal ongm of religion and the vaHdi'ty of ^^s mo^vlf K fr ""f °"^''^*' ^'"""^ P"^^ly intellectual motives, but from fear and hope, and from the disposition to tbnk of all other beings after human analogy. iS hve man represents the beings to which he tXs refuge m the fearful moments of his life in very imperfect foi. fn L-^' r ^^^'^^"^ to «^Pand and ideahze is also m evidence here, and man graduaUy recognizes that his God must be an infinite being and that there can be but has the effect of elevating Deity far above anytWng tr "t P'r^.H^- -t - g^-t distance from the fimte world, there is another counter tendency which ^tlZ.^ r^'""''^* ""^'^^ ^^ '^^ ^* hand, present and intuitively perceivable, and religion reveals a constant tendency to oscillate between these two extremes. 112 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY Eume investigates the validity of religious ideas in his Dialogues, which is a very important document in the philosophy of reHgion of the modern period. He adduces several different viewpoints: that of a specu- ^' lative Supematuralist, a rationaUstic Deist and a skep- tical NaturaHst. Although the naturalist finally courte- ously withdraws, it is neverthless clear that Hume regarded his arguments as the most important and most conclusive. He denies the right to infer the existence of God from the order and teleology of the universe: Why could the teleology (so far as it really exists !) not have arisen from natural causes and gradual adaptation? We explain the particular phenomena of nature by referring them to nattiral causes, and the whole series is explained in the explanation of its several parts. At any rate it is im- possible to infer, from a world which reveals so many imperfections together with its teleology, the existence ' of an absolutely perfect being. Furthermore, if we should wish to attribute the origin of the universe to a divine idea, we must not forget that this idea is nowhere given in experience except as a phenomenon combined with other phenomena: with what right therefore can we deduce all the other parts from this single part?— If the natiu-aHst still gets no farther than to discover ' ^ difficulties in each of the various viewpoints, it is certainly not enough that we regard it merely as a matter of caution, but rather as the expression of Hume's constant effort to state the problems clearly and to keep them open. 6. Hume's clear statement of the problem of knowl- edge did not call forth any profound reply immediately. England has not even furnished such a reply. — On the contrary the English literature of the latter half of the 1 8th century consists of a series of philosophic efforts SMITH 113 which in part continue and supplement and in part oppose Eume, ^ Adam Smith (1723-1790), a professor at Glasgow and a fnend of Hume, elaborated his ethical theory more fuUy In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) he describes the moral sense m its evolution from the mere instinct of sym- pa hy. A spontaneous impulse of imitation causes us to put ourselves m the place of others, and our feehngs and judgments are therefore primarily determined by environ- ment. But on the other hand, if the feehngs and judg- ments of others are not of the same kind and intensity as those which arise in our own minds in their stead, or would naturally arise, we then experience a feeling of disapprobation. Again, we approve their feelings and their judgments (as weU as their conduct) whenever according to our own experience, they seem to stand in a fitting relation to the causes which give rise to them - and whenever our sympathy for them, for the objects their judgments and conduct, is not abnormal. To lUustrate, we cease to approve of acts of revenge whenever i'^ 'r''^? .^7^ t° be too cruel for the circumstances and the subject. A standard is thus graduaUy evolved which IS whoUy free from any reference to uti/ty And TC likewise apply this standard to ourselves. We dis- cover that we are criticized by others and not only criti- azmg others ourselves. We divide ourselves, so to speak, mto two persons, of whom the one criticizes the other in fte capaaty of an impartial witness. We unconsciously Idealize this witness; that is we ascribe to him a far more comprehensive knowledge than it is possible for ma« to I attain. It has frequently been observed that Smith's ethics radicaUy contradicts his famous work in economics, 114 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY HARTLEY "5 The Wealth of Nations (1776). But, on the other hand, the fact that both works were originally parts of one and the same course of lectures does not harmonize with this view. Moreover the fact has been overlooked, that in his political economy Smith assimies the attitude of an ^^ impartial witness^* of industrial hfe: his demand for imconditional Hberty in commerce and industry rests upon the principle that this is the only way in which capacity can be properly developed and the best methods and instruments of production and of trading be dis- covered. It frequently happens that the individual serves the community best when he is most concerned about his own interests; he, at the same time, serves a purpose which he has not proposed as if guided by an unseen hand. Sympathy with human life in every phase forms the basis of Smithes political economy; it covers the effort of laborers to sectire better wages, as well as the effort of employers to increase production. His ethics is therefore in internal harmony with his economics. It is admitted, as a matter of course, that he did not fully appreciate the social problem in its entire scope. His contention was directed against the trusteeship of the reactionary governments, and his optimism led him to expect a large measure of social harmony, even a harmony between ethics and economics, if we should only permit evolution to have free course. The association of ideas had a profound influence on Hume's theory of knowledge. The physician, DavU Hartley (i 705-1 757), supplemented his theory on this point. He endeavored to explain all the higher mental phenomena by means of the association of simple sen- sations and ideas. According to Hartley, the laws of association are the highest spiritual laws of nature {Observation on Man, 1749). The physiological correlate of association is the combination of various osciUations of particles of the brain. The significance of association manifests itself in three specific forms: it is possible for ideas to so unite intemaUy as to form a new idea with new attributes; conscious activities may, by repetition, be performed entirely automatically; the vividness of an idea may be transferred to the idea which is associated with It. Consciousness can assume an entirely different character from its original by means of these three processes. The most radical metamorphoses become possible in this way, as e. g. when an egoist lapses into complete mystical self-forgetfulness through a series of degrees.— These theories were popularized through the writings of Joseph Priestley (i 733-1804), the noted chemist. And Erasmus Darwin (i 731-1802) afterwards went a step farther, and proposed the hypothesis of the trans- missibility of such acquired characters (Zoonomia, 1794). Hume was opposed by what has been called, in the narrower sense, the Scottish School These thinkers aim to quit theorizing and return to the mere description of mental phenomena. As against the results of analyt- ical philosophy they appeal to common sense. Thomas Retd (1710-1796), Professor at Aberdeen and Glasgow, IS the most famous representative of this school. His most important work. Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), was written against Hume, whom he regarded as the destroyer of all science, religion and virtue. According to Reid, there are certain instinctive pre- suppositions at the basis of all knowledge, which are unassailable by doubt. These principles of common sense are older than philosophy and proceed from the ii6 ENGLISH EMPIRICAL PHILOSOPHY hand of God. Thus, e. g. every sensation by natural suggestion gives rise to the behef in an external object, as also in an ego as the subject of the sensation. In this way the causal instinct also leads us to the presupposition that the combinations of phenomena which we have per- ceived will likewise take place in the same way in the future. We likewise have such intuitive evidence in the sphere of morals; we judge a given act good, another evil, intuitively and spontaneously. — Reid overlooked the fact that Hume had expressly recognized common sense; but Hume discovered a profound problem in case one should wish to investigate the foundation of common sense. Kant afterwards remarked very pertinently, that instead of making use of common sense as authority, it should rather be used in refutation of objections. FOURTH BOOK THE PHILOSOPHY O. XHE EKLIOHXE.MENX IK ..ANCE AND GERMANY But about the^TIT^IXt'tht': °^ *^"^^- was made to popularize tt,P ill Tl ^''*'^ ^"^ effort mental prindple, thaTlu t3^^pS"rd\tm''' '""'" furnished the basis for criticizinrZ ?■ ^^P^"«^^' things both in Church anrsSeTt "^ "^^^ ^^ prevailed that man had attaL J J diZxTeHf " ment and that he was now in posseiionT I ^"^'S^*^" suppositions for the final solS TltJe ^'^tr" or to dismiss them definitely as Itm^ a ^ r' mat^sm arose, which wa. perhaS nef s^ iZ T destroy the old form of dogmatist T?? ^^ *° popularization of the J^ih^i^ T^ Germany the dJ^ion of al? ment^^tt^Xtr d'V"^^'. ^^ ^^- tween obscurity and cleameT^^^ Z^^Sr."^; and the inference was drawn thate^ SS f d It ' ;ng but enlightemnent, is the one ^^"e^,^ T: there were minds both in France and in k!!! . * thoughts wf>rp rv>„t^^ A *^, ^® ^™ ™ Germany whose of mCl uroTwl f °" ?' Profounder presuppositions 117 ii8 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT A. The French Philosophy of the Enlightenment AND Rousseau I. In France the agitation produced by the enlighten- ment assumed a decidedly revolutionary character. This was due more particularly to the fact that the old order of things had here reached a greater degree of definiteness and had assumed an attitude of contempt for the new thought to a greater extent than in England and Germany, and that at the same time it was more shallow and corrupt than in the other countries. France was revolutionized by Eng- lish ideas. The visit of Voltaire and Montesquieu to Eng- land at the close of the third decade of the century became a matter of epochal importance. It was not until then that the EngHsh philosophical, religious, aesthetic and poHtical ideas became known in France and on the con- tinent generally. Voltaire's Lettres sur les Anglais (1734) marks the beginning of a new period in French thought. Voltaire (1694-1778) was not an original thinker. But he possessed the happy faculty of stating scientific ideas and theories with brevity and clearness, and at the same time aggressively. He pubHshed a most excellent exposi- tion of Newton's natural philosophy, and he used Locke with splendid effect in his philosophical works. With Locke's principle, that all our ideas proceed from experi- ence, and Newton's discovery of the uniformity of nature as his basis, he criticized the theology of the Church. He does not confine himself in the controversy to logical argu- ment, but likewise employs sarcasm and ridicule and— especially when attacking spiritual and physical oppression and intolerance — profound indignation. — The following are his most important philosophical works: Dictionnaire philo- sopkique portatif (1764) and Le philosophe ignorant (1766). MONTESQUIEU «s with undemanding .„ Se^d tS'^^S "■JT' the limit of our knowledS- a^tV T"'' '^^'^^^ of CM ■ S ,^ "^ of „.te is proof of the easleS I oeme sur le desastre de Lisbonne) makoc: ,> ;„,„ •. , believe in the omnipotence of ri^ v "^^^'^^^ *« our belief in His goo^nei 1£ ^^ ^'^ '" '^'"^^ ligion, but opposer^^vlfed ri£ZT"^ "'*'"^ ^^- means (freouentlv 7^''^^'^ "^^ 'S^o'i by every available . ^irequently of course mdirectly and secretlvl Voltaire now applies the principle of simolid^v f^?^^^' planationof thesuoematiLl ,-/+i: ^'^P^'^^'ty *» the ex- ers of tt,« T? supernatural m the same way as the think- rS evemr''"\'-r"^'' '' *° *^« "^^^-^ --W He of the Jupel'Sra^, ^'S ^^rZT^l'''^ ^y means ot their superstition. Thp h^^Qf ^«r • "tf-?;;.r^-----of^Si^^^^^^^^ vocates the mutual dependence of institttTois^n^ of i" S ut- "^ ""^ "°^"' ^"'^^tions of the natbns A nSf T"*"* ^^''■^^^^^ be transferred from ont natxon to another without modification. The SnS A- 120 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT and comparative methods enabled Montesquieu to criticize the existing social conditions incisively and systematically. His over-rapid generalizations however are unhistorical. He proposes an ideal form of the EngHsh constitution, without observing that the long period of the political development of the English people by means of self- government in smaller groups was its historical presup- position. Condillac (17 15-1780) attempted a simplification of Lockers theory of knowledge in his Traite des sensations (1754), by means of referring the whole of our conscious experience to absolutely passive sensations. Attention is nothing more than an intense sensation, which precludes the possibility of another sensation arising; memory is simply a secondary effect of sensation, and comparison con- sists of nothing more than the concomitant appearance of two sensations. The comparison of pleasure and pain gives rise to desires and imptdses. — Notwithstanding his endeavor to eliminate every form of activity from psychol- ogy, Condillac still adheres to the Cartesian theory of the soul and the body as two distinct entities. Sensation cannot be identified with motion, and oiu* ability to make comparisons (i. e., to be conscious of two sensations at the same moment) definitely proves that the vehicle of sen- sations is a simple substance. Condillac, who was a Cath- olic ecclesiastic, was thus able to harmonize his psychology with his theology. But the spiritualistic element of Con- dillac^ s theory was devoid of influence. His followers in- sisted on reducing all psychical phenomena to passive sensations. La Mettrie (1702-17 51), a physician, had even before this time substituted a thorough-going materialism for the Cartesian dualism in his famous work, Uhomme machine VON HOLBACH 121 ^nttn^lTJ temperature under the influence of enthuaaan and the mental agitation produced bv fevers can only be explained on the theory tlit wha we c/uTh^ matter, just hke extension and motion. The real nat,,r« of matter however transcends the power of S Tde^ standmg.-Besides these materiahstk= theories ".£' evolution ^"f 'P"*'«"%^"d suggestions of a theory of evolution. The vanous forms of life evolve from eternal orgamc germs under the influence of environmer S and need are the forms of energy which make for prog^eT and be,ngs without needs lack the attribute of S ^tltS^f^ n^2 ''--' '' '^ — ^- - t^e P^rif '^^f'!'V'^'^~'789), a German baron living in Pans, published a purely dogmatic and systematic elb oration of materialism. In his System de la «a/«t (r to) pL'SrS th n r T"^'" ^^ *^^ ^'^^ c^nsist^nt'g planation of the facts of natural science. If motion is a pnmary property of matter (as Toland had affirmed) and If matenal phenomena are only explainable brreference to matenal causes, it foUows that it is unneceiiy to a^ sume either one or many minds distinct from mattTr Z appeal to mind is only a sign of ignorance. Thought o^ oonsaousness is simply the agitation of the partSes oi matter, a motion which is similar to fennentaSn whii' s the common basis of all nourishment and groXmo- ^ons which are indeed imperceptible, but ZcTZeS- feired from what is evident to the senses. There is but one science physics, i. e. the theory of motion. The as jmption of two kinds of nature, spiritual and mltoiS. IS not only unnecessary, but positively hannful. It is / 122 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT conducive of superstition and thereby leads back again to the authority of priestcraft. Even the so-called natu- ral religion is. dangerous; for religion, no matter what the form, must necessarily have a form of worship, and the in- stitution of forms of worship involves submission to the authority of priests. The formation of the concepts of deity is the product of a profound politics on the part of the theologians, those fabricateurs de la diviniW Hehetius' (1715-1771) theory of the original equality of all men, as respects nature and talent, is in a certain sense closely related to Condillac's doctrine of the passivity of all psychic life. All distinctions are due to external causes, to education in its widest sense, i. e. to all the in- fluences which affect us. Education is responsible for the tendency which claims our interest and"attention. No two men ever receive precisely the same kind of education. The only motive is self-interest, and whether it shall be actuated by great or small ideas depends entirely upon education {De V esprit, 1758). Helvetius' posthtimous work De Vhomme (1773) is a polemic, based on the fore- going presuppositions, against the distinction between private and public interests, a distinction which is favored by despotic forms of government, and to which he attrib- utes the misfortune of his native land. This last ob- servation is of fundamental importance for the under- standing of Hehetius, He was a tender-hearted, patriotic spirit, who devoted his vast fortune, acquired as Farmer- general, to the service of literature and philanthropy. The profoundest thinker of this whole group was Denis Diderot (1713-1784), renowned as the energetic editor of the great Encyclopedia on account of which the French philosophers of the Enlightenment were called Encyclo- pedists. Diderot covdd only express his own ideas in- ROUSSEAU ,^v 123 f 2? ^ *^'^ Encyclopedia. In the InlerpretaHon de those of La MeUr^:'V:titlnZ;Zu^7 ^, Le^bn^lz, especiaUy in the matter of his UZ^s^tZ conceptsof continuity and force. The twoZo^ s tnt ten m 1769, but not published until 18-0 Zi^^ T mgenious ideas. In direct contradiction of La Mettrie and Holbach, Djderot denies that the psycWcal pro^ti Sn be adequately explained as a mere effect of theSSLSn of matenal elements. A transposition of IITZ^^ produce consciousness. The only possibi expLation o the ongm of psychic life is on the presuppodtfon of ti ^ence of germs or dispositions in the lower orders wh^S can be developed to conscious life in the higher ordeTfbv means of a process of progressive integraLn S attributes sensibility to everything in ni^e wT ivt: ^"^ '''^^ ^*-*^'l -'i -S selS! ity (enstbtbte tnerte, sensibilite active). He likewise Irn Phasizes the difficulty of conceiving how a unfZ Z" sciousness could be constructed from a great va2tv o^ psychical elements. He does not solvfthe Toblem oftoiiJSr "f r *° ^'^"^ ^ tenaciously toTheS ekSr '^' '"' "° '"^"^ ^'' ^y "^"^y distinct associairw^^r f "'''"" (^7x2-1778) was intimately assoaated with the Encyclopedists for a while His run UtSS """^""^ '"^^'^^ ^^^^''^y contributed not a just as Hume s problem pertained to the possibihty of i!' VH; 'I 124 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT i i science, so Rousseau's problem raised the question con- cerning the value of civilization. Rousseau was bom in Geneva. His restless spirit, chaf- ing under the restraints of social custom, impelled him to a life of romantic travel and adventure, turning up in Paris in the year 1741, where he became a friend of Diderot and Holhach. The thought of the contradiction between na- ture and culture (Kultur), containing the principles of far-reaching consequences, caused him to leave Paris in order that he might Hve in the country, and the rupture with his Encyclopedist friends soon followed. His writ- ings made him a fugitive and vagabond. He was not even able to find a permanent residence in Switzerland. Dur- ing his latter years his suspicions and illusion of persecution developed a decidedly morbid character. He spent his last years in seclusion in France. a. His first essays {Discours sur les sciences et les arts, 1750, and Discours sur Vorigine et les fondements de Vin- egalite parmi les hommes, 1755) draw a sharp contrast between nature and culture. Several different classes of ideas are vaguely combined in Rousseau's earlier theories of nature, but his ideas are gradually clarified by constant reflection, so that his theory of natiu-e as it appears in his masterpiece, Emile (1762), is very clear. In the third dialogue of the remarkable essay entitled Rousseau juge de Jean Jacques he calls attention to the fact that his works form a connected series, which leads back step by step to certain fimdamental principles. Whoever would wish to read him synthetically, he says, must therefore begin with Emile. His object in the first essays was to criticize the existing state of culture and to remove the obstacles which impede natural development. The direct and positive elaboration of his principles must necessarily KOUSSEAU come later The paradoxes to which his introductory theones had led would Hkewise then be removed by tS positive presentation. ^ ^^® Three distinct classes of ideas (as may be seen from the f'T. .''''.''"""" '' ''^'^^'"^ -fl-enced rZssII fmm the first m the fonnation of his theory of nat^e a theological, a zoological and a psychological. Natoe'is a divme product, but civilization is a human produc The state of nature is therefore a state of perfection of ''heavenly and majestic simplicity.- We arrhere r^ minded of the Garden of Eden ^,,f rl ^' sc^be the state of naturet^at; of^pltLTf^^^^^^^^^ reflection and imagination are wholly undevelooed Rousseau passes from the department of theolog^ S S zoology without being aware of it. The reaffole o tt ?Swf^'^^^^^^ AsTmal past but wl 'T' '^^'"^^^ ^^^^^ ^^y ^-^ distant past, but with a matter which he was able to discover t'tde^^^^^ '^N-ture^'consistsoftheimmedTte ^resSlf '"T."""^ development, rather than SSt M 'T^^^^ ^^''^ '^'^-^^^^ so readily seTfToT. • ^^^^f ^^^^^^1 tendency to assert hinC ious ter^^^^ '"'''"'" ""^ ^"P^^^^- ^-d this sp^- s Trich t^^^^^^^^^ '" P"^^^^' ^^^ ^^dden source of life Zath^^ '''''' '^ -^--^ -ntradicts sympathy, or resignation and self-denial. The individual wWch r^i^t ^ '''"'' ^'""^ ""''^ ^^t^'^ds to all beings wmch are smiilarly constituted to the individual himself- ^ndness and love are therefore natural. Even religious emotion-ni the fonn of gratitude, adn^ation JtriZ. li 126 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT ROUSSEAU r 127 ence — ^is a natural consequence of this spontaneous ex- pansion. However when the distinction between individuals makes itself felt, due to the rise of comparative reflection self-assertion {amour de sot), in itself free and noble, be- comes egoism {amour pro pre). Dependence, discontent, vanity, envy and lust for power manifest themselves. And to this must be added the division of labor which so- cial life evolves. Factdties and accomplishments are specialized and the perfect, harmonious and all-round development of personality is suppressed. Mental life is broken to pieces and rendered artificial. With Rous- seau the demand to return to nature is therefore identical with the demand that man shall once more become a unit; Rendez Vhomme unl — This sense of completeness and imity, experienced in the freedom of nature with which he became so well acquainted during the vagabond journeys of his youth, grew upon Rousseau with an extraordinary power and freshness. He is the first to have given enthusiastic expression to the genuine joy to be found in the soHtude of nature and in the appreciation of the beauties of nature. The more profoundly he reflected upon his ideas the clearer it became to Rousseau (as had also been the case with Shaftesbury before him) that the contradiction be- tween nature and culture cotdd be only a matter of degree. When he declaims against science and art, he really means only the science and art of his own age which was so utterly devoid of originality, whilst he praised the great investi- gators of the Renaissance and the seventeenth century. Even genius is likewise a form of spontaneous develop- ment, rather than the product of imitation or discipline. Culture is a good thing and natural in itself, so long as it harmonizes with the stage of htunan development; indeed It then even becomes a means to the proper development of natural powers. A given type of culture however can never be transferred from one people to another without modification. There is no culture which is adapted to aU men, to aU ages and in aU places. Rousseau vigorously opposes the opinion that the Parisian enlightenment and culture of the middle of the eighteenth century should be regarded as typical of culture in general; and it was ex- ceedingly vexatious to him that Voltaire and tlw Encyclo- pedists were endeavoring to introduce this culture into his beloved Switzerland. (The author of this text-book has endeavored to elaborate this conception of Rousseau^s theory of nature more fully in his book entitled Rousseau una seme Fhilosophie.) b. The psychology then in vogue still retained, in ad- herence to Aristotle, the twofold division of psychical ele- ments into inteUigence and will, the theoretical and the practical faculties. The question of a different division of the mental functions was agitated to a certain extent by Sptnoza and the English psychologists of the eighteenth century {Shaftesbury and his disciples). But the real credit for securing the recognition of feeling as manifesting a distinct phase of psychic Hfe nevertheless belongs to Rousseau. As a matter of fact, feeling possesses the character of immediacy and expansion which Rousseau regards^ pecuHar to nature, whilst cognition consists of companson, voHtion of preference or choice. It is feeling turthermore, according to Rousseau, that constitutes the real value Qf human life. It is almost wholly independent ot knowledge; in its climaxes, when it rises to ecstasies, it excludes clear ideas entirely. And it changes less rapidly than knowledge. (See, besides Emile: Reveries d^un promeneur solitaire.) ^ 128 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT c. Rousseau makes a strong defense for Nature in his pedagogy. He decidedly prefers to leave education to nature, because he has implicit confidence in the growth and the natural improvement of the various organs and faculties. The fact however that children are constantly exposed to external social influence imposes the necessity of protecting them against harmful impressions, so as to give free course to nature. Education should be pre- dominantly negative, i. e. it should rather consist in the removal of obstacles than in the making of positive im- pressions. His splendid apology for Entile, — Lettre a Beaumont, archeveque de Paris, — contains a full develop- ment of this idea of a negative pedagogy. Its supreme necessity rests upon the fact that we are utterly ignorant of the nature of the child at the beginning of its career. We cannot begin positive discipline until after we have become acquainted with the disposition of the child by- means of observation. The period of infancy is quite as distinct and important a part of life as the later periods and it should be regarded as more than a mere preparation for the latter. The child should therefore be as free from restraint as possible, giving itself to the joy of life without reserve. It were decidedly the best if the child could ac- quire all of its knowledge independently, discover all the established truths for itself. The negative period of discipline is an exceedingly diffi- cult task. It requires the pedagogue to be observant, alert, inspiring and yet reserved and self-denjdng, all at the same time: tout faire, en ne faisant rient — This idea represents one of the most important modifications in the history of pedagogy. d. In his attitude towards religion Rousseau presents a very pecuHar contrast to Voltaire^ even though both ROUSSEAU 129 practically agree in their religious idea being tht^gh a A^l^fZ. 'J 130 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT ROUSSEAU And the only way of explaining the evil and the sin in the world is on the assumption of a constant resistance to the divine purposes; i. e. the eternity of matter. Rousseau objects to the positive reHgions on the ground that they set up authorities and books between man and God, and that they detract from the dignity of the divine relationship by their "clumsy worship." He regards himself a Christian, even though he cannot accept the dogmas and miracles. Rousseau elaborates his religious ideas in fullest detail in the Emile, in the famous section entitled "Profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard." He would postpone religious instruction until the adolescent period, because children should not accept ideas which are incomprehensible to them. And the aim of rehgious instruction should be above all else to satisfy the needs of the heart. "What does it matter to me whether the world is eternal or created?" In the Contrat Social he advocates natural religion as the state reHgion. Here, speaking from the viewpoint of the state, he takes strong ground against Christianity, because it regards man's highest duty and his highest aim to pertain to the next world and thus para- lyzes the energy which the state mi^t require of its citi- zens. e. Rousseau elaborated his political ideas in the Contrat Social (1762). He advocates popular sovereignty with an enthusiasm unknown since the days of AUhusius, The universal will (la volente generale, rather than la volente de tous) must be the final court of appeal. It represents the inner yearning, the governing tendency of the people which is concerned for the common interests, the welfare of the whole as well as the individual in the constantly changing generations. It finds expression in the senti- 131 ment of patnotism and is analogous to the desire for self assertion (amour de soi) in the individual. Subjection fj It does not mvolve any limitation of Hberty, because t combmes the wills of aU the individuals: each Sdu^ IS membre du souverain moiviaual Ml7:LtS7'^''''' '''"^" '^^ '^^ -' '^- state ^ts had d^e the^ovemment, just a. Bodin and Altku^ sius nad done. The former can be only one since <^^r ereignty always belongs to the people; Lt tl fo^flf' frTS: ::^r^^^^ ^'^'^ ^' -^^- and the^L! acter of the people. Rousseau had a decided preference • or smaU states, for the simple reason that in thercustom ^r^^r^n^ the spontaneous expression ST^ cons^u^^^^^^ ^" T'' "^ P^^^*^ P^^^^s without consaous mterference and without formal ledslation These offer the most favorable conditions for thl'^^t ment of sympathy and humanity Thev fnm,'! 7 degree of liberty and it is unneSssaX thJ ^ '^'' authority sho^d be so S p^^^^^ freedom I ZJ ^ ^''^^''''' ^^^ maintain its sSes "^ "^^ ' ^"^ "^ ^ ^^ber of smaller J^i^^r'rt^^^^^ "^ ^'^^^ ^' ^^'^-^-ntal to society ^Mhi ^l^^^^^f^^^^ which, for Rousseau^is iden- t cal with the social problem. He was the fir^f f ^ f c ear conception of the social probl'^'T^l^frof proaucing a state of unnatural dependence on others 'uSfX ad""''i^'^ 'r^^^ *^' <^'-- ^^^^ much farther advanced m the cities, and the country Uke- 'iiltj i 132 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT wise brings one closer to nature. He regards the country- folk as really constituting the nation and looks with grave apprehension on the strong drift from the coimtry to the city. B. The German Philosophy of the Enlightenment AND Lessing I. Christian Wolff (1679-175 4) was the first to give a detailed exposition of modem philosophy in the German language. He popularized the philosophy of Leibnitz. The wide range of his systematic writings drove scholasti- cism out of the advanced schools of Germany. However, it was not metaphysical idealism and the doctrine of monads that was prominent in his system, but the theo- logically more acceptable theory of preestablished har- mony. But even this doctrine made him a mart)^. King Frederick William I dismissed him from his professor- ship at Halle on account of his apparent fatalism, and even drove him into exile on the short notice of forty-eight hours.' He went to Marburg, but was recalled to Halle during the first year of Frederick II, — His Vernunftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, der Seek der Menschen, auch alien Dingen Uberhaupt (17 19) contains a general outline of his philosophy. His attempt to derive the principle of sufficient reason from the principle of contradiction — because he thinks that origin from nothing involves a con- tradiction — ^brings the dogmatico-rationalistic philosophy to its culmination in him. Many of his disciples never- theless tried to accord due recognition to experience. This led to a combination of the Lockian and Wolffian phi- losophies in a more or less eclectic fashion. They were especially disposed to place great emphasis on empirical psychology (in which indeed Wolff himself was a famous MENDELSSOHN of ideas is aU th^lr;,?^*^^'^^™^^^^^ obscurity however, like ^./It^f Enl? T^ '" ^^"^"^^ France. Sulzer (in thelZ ff ^""^ ^'"''""'^ « . 1755) held that the sentkn2t ^v. • ""J.^^^^anty. cesqor<= T.t. ''^^'ii'^rs are Kant s immediate prede- -any in^plications wWch^l cLSSS doT*"" But GoMold Ephraim Lessin, ul'c^^^^f T""^'- especially as the thinker of the Geman ^r tf ' °"* who proiects him^^if u^ a 1^ '-'^rman enhghtenment respects character and talent, hi^SHnlrSIr" of thought IS nevertheless analogous. As a matter of facf h. was not a productive writer himself, but he h^d a kSn Se^a? ''"'' " °"^"^'*^ '" ^^"g'^t - weU as for tSt tZii^ """I'T"^'^ ^""^ "^^^^ '^^ exhausted n the defimtely expressed forms of life. His attitude towards Oh wT- V I theological critic he appealed to primitive Chnstiamty which is older than the much discusS Ce i'if I »\'3 M'W (I iq 136 PHILOSOPHY or THE ENLIGHTENMENT (fiher den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft). He likewise places the everlasting search for truth upon a higher plane than the slothful possession of it (Duplik). The continu- ity of spiritual evolution does not consist in results and dogmas, but in the inner strivings to which the former owe their origin.— In aesthetics he is hkewise guided by the sense for the original and characteristic. In his Hamburg- ischen Dramaturgic— conirBxy to the dominant classicism ^he refers to Shakespeare as the unrivalled model of dra- matic poetry, and in his Laokoon he attempted to define the sphere of sculpture and poetry. Lessing's own rehgious attitude is best described by the statement that it is impossible to base our knowledge of the eternal uniformity of reality upon particular historical events. The various positive reHgions must be imder- stood as stages of human spiritual evolution, or, as Lessing expresses it figuratively, as disciplinary forces. Revela- tion bears a relation to the human race similar to that of education to the individual. The Old and New Testa- ments are " the primers of the human race," ' The time will come when such books will be unnecessary. For the present it is important that the pupil should regard his Primer as the highest science,— but the third kingdom, the new everlasting Gospel will come {Erziehung des Mensch- engeschlechtSy — Gesprdche iibcr die Freimaurer). From the purely philosophical point of view Lessing (according to JacohVs account in his Brief e iiber die Lehre des Spinoza) is closely related to Spinoza; if he were to name himself after anyone, he knows of no one else more suitable. He wanted a purely natural theory of the universe and of life, free from any transcen- dental leaps. (Cf . Chr. Schrempf: Lessing als Philosophy 1906.) FIFTH BOOK IMMANUEL KANT AND THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY We have found investigations into the nature of knowl- edge as early as the philosophers of the Renaissance and m the great system builders. But they were nevertheless deadedly under the speU of the constructive tendency As a result of the English empirical philosophy regarding the investigation of knowledge as the distinctive problem of philosophy, we have the extreme statement of theprob- em by Hume, It was this statement of the problem that ' furnished the occasion which led Kant to undertake a comprehensive investigation of the conditions and pre- suppositions of our knowledge and of our mental functions m general. SUch an investigation constitutes the task of lit . t "^^^"^u^" ^'^"^ PhUosophy, The critical ' philosophy has nothing to do with a theory of the evolu- tion of knowledge, in the modem sense of the word. Its. distinctive task is to discover the necessary principles . which must be presupposed-howsoever human nature ' wWT. .f r '^^^'f ^--^^ ^ ^^^^^^ f^^-^ion, no matter whether it be cogmtion, aesthetic or ethical evaluation, or religious trust, is to attain any valid results. It investi- ^^ gates the conditions of the validity^oi knowledge, not those ot Its ongm. The success of and the purely scientific element contained in this philosophy consists in its pene- tratmg beneath the finished products and results of the human mmd to their efficient causes. Just as we can only understand a man^s real nature by penetrating beneath his outward acts to his real character, so Hkewise the only way 137 If, 138 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY KAST 139 to understand the phenomena of mental life is to pene- trate to its original sources. — By founding the critical phi- losophy, in this understanding of the term, Kant defined • the problem and method of the science of mind. The entire product of the nineteenth century in the department of the mental sciences is based upon the view-points which he has marked out. < According to Kant's theory, primitive human thought is dogmatic. Man begins with an implicit confidence in his intellect and he believes himself capable of solving all problems. He wishes to comprehend and coordinate everything. It is tliis desire that leads to the dogmatic V systems, which proceed from the demand for unity so deeply imbedded in human nature. But eventually, when disillusionment supervenes, and the systems are found to contradict each other, there arises a tendency towards sceptical reflection. The third step however is the specific investigation of knowledge or the understanding, i. e. critical reflection. It is this endeavor, at once the sign of philosophic maturity and self-limitation, that Kant wishes to introduce. The life of the thinker who bequeathed this profound thought to the world was confined within narrow circles, but it is a hfe of simple majesty. Immanuel Kant was bom of poor artizan parents at Konigsberg on the 2 2d of April, 1724. His parents were moderate pietists, and the mother especially exerted a profound influence upon the son. At the University in Konigsberg he studied the Wolffian philosophy and the Newtonian physics. Through the former he became acquainted with the dogmatic method of philosophy, and in the latter he discovered a pattern of exact empirical science. After having spent several years in various families of the nobiHty in East Prussia as private tutor, he habilitated a^ Privatdozent at the University, in which capacity he labored for a long penod with pronounced success. Not until 1770 did he receive an ordinary professorship. He never left his native province of East Prussia. He devoted his whole ' life to the elaboration of his works and to his academic instruction. Notwithstanding this however he partici- . pated actively in the social life of Konigsberg and had the reputation of being a most agreeable companion. He belongs to the period of the enlightenment, but he regarded ''enlightenment'' as a process, a problem, rather than as a fimshed product. And finally, when his critical principle led him into profound depths, unknown to the ordinary enlightenment, he possessed a sense for the sublime in harmony with the conception of the aesthetic, ethical and rehgious which furnished the guiding principle of his mental life. In his old age, under the clerical reaction which followed the death of Frederick the Great, he suffered persecution. The publication of an essay on religious philosophy in 1793 brought forth a royal rescript against ' him with a threat of severer measures in case he persisted in the same tendency. Kant replied with the declaration that he would thenceforth neither speak nor write any- thing Whatsoever on religious matters. He did not renew his activities in the philosophy of religion until the begin- ning of a new administration when he published the whole of the controversial proceeding (in the preface to the Streit der Facultdten, 1 798). His last years present a case of the • gradual disintegration of a mighty spirit. He apparently . became a victim of dementia senilis. Isolated moments of mental brilliance are the only reminders of his former greatness. He died on the 12th of February, 1804. m m> w I40 1 1 V. THE CRITICAi. PHILOSOPHY A, The Theoretical Problem KANT 141 I. Kant's philosophical reflections matured very slowly. There are two distinct periods of development, in his theoretical writings, before the appearance of his masterpiece; the first extends from 1755 (the year of Kant's habilitation) to 1769, the second from 1769 to 1781 (in which latter year his masterpiece appeared). — In describing the historical development of the Kantian phi- losophy (both as respects the theoretical as well as the practical problems) the author of this text book follows his essay on Die Kontinuitdt im pkilosophischen Entwicklungs- gange Kant's (Archiv fiir Gesch. der Philos., VII, 1894). a. The dominant characteristic of KanVs first period is the firm nonviction that an all-pervasive uniformity of nature rigidly determines the phenomenal universe. His famous hypothesis of the evolution of our solar system is elaborated in his Allgemeine Naturgeschickte und Theorie des Eimmels (1755). Newton had declared that a scien- tific explanation of the origin of the solar system is im- possible. But Kant now shows that such an explanation is possible. He starts with the asstmiption of a rotating nebulous sphere, and then deduces the logical conse- quences according to the known laws of nature. He fur- thermore regards the denial of nature's capacity to evolve order and purpose from its own inherent laws as an erro- neous presupposition. He discovers the proof of deity in the very fact of the uniformity of nature itself. — Kant elaborated this theory more fully in the essay Einzig moglicher Beweisgrund einer Demonstration Gottes. Whilst he had even then already lost confidence in the validity of the traditional ''proofs" of the existence of God, he at the same time found a basis for his religious conviction in the ultinate postulate of aU real scienc^the postulate of the umfoxtrnty of nature. He stood quite close to Spinolat this respect without being aware of it. Kant's mind was likewise occupied 'with various other probkms during this period. His conclusion conce^^g the distinction between philosophy and mathematics"! noteworthy, namely, that phUosophy camiot create its concepts as mathematics does. It derives its concepts from expenence. Hence, inasmuch as experience is n^ universal, philosophy is limited to imperfect conc^pte The concg^t of^sul, for example, is an imperfect conSt substanc^. In the mgenious brochure, Traume eines Gnstersehers, erlauteri durch Traume der Metaphysik (i 766) Kant shows, partly in satire, how easy it is to cons met ' system of the super^nsible world. The only reqSement Ind final "''''"* ""^''"" "^ °"^ "^^^"^ ^ ^-^ The concept of causality is another example of an in- complete concept. How can the analysis of a given phi nomenon reved the necessity of another phenomenon? Begnff der negahven Grosse in die Weltweisheit cinzujuhren 1762) approaches the problem of causaUty in precisely the same fonn in which it had been stated by Sf hlr "^- T'^'' '"^^ '' "^ '^^-■'^ ^«-^ tha^ roused tslT' V """^^^ '''^^^^^' ^^*^ ^'' ^-'^^' reference dicate that tlus awakemng took place as eariy as 1762 Students of Kant differ widely on this point howevlr It IS mipossible to describe the years in which Kant was occupied with the study of the causal concept S i : 142 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY KANT The Dreams of a Ghost-seer, as spent in "dogmatic slumber. '' b. Kant is led to the first step from his inquiring, sceptical attitude towards criticism by the discovery that space and_time, with which the exact natural sciences ^perateV^re not real objects or attributes in the absolute sense; but schemata (schemata coordinandi) which are abstracted from the forms in which our sensations are ar- ranged. Space, which Newton regarded a divine sense, thus becomes a human sense {De mundi sensihilis atque intelligihilis forma et principiis, 1770). He makes the discovery that many propositions which we regard as ob- jective only express the conditions imder which we per- ceive or conceive the objects. For the time being he ap- plies this observation only to space and time as the forms of sense-perception. This was nevertheless the discovery of the fundamental thought of the critical philosophy. Kant had thus ah-eady discovered the theoretical method which he afterwards called the Copemican method. Just as our perception of the rotation of the firmament around the earth is due to our position in the universe, so, accord- ing to Kant J it is likewise due to our method of sense per- ception that we apprehend things under the relations of time and space. This explains therefore — and this is the essential matter so far as Kant is concerned — ^how it hap- pens that piu-e mathematics, which is after all a ptu*ely intellectual science, can be valid for every possible sense- perception. We experience everything in time and space, and everything must therefore conform to the mathemat- ical laws of time and space. Kant was still of the opinion that the understanding could grasp the absolute nature of things. But he soon saw that the Copernican principle must likewise apply to 143 the understanc^ng. His letters and notes enable us to follow the gradual development of this deeper insight We are active in the operations of our own thought i e* we act m a manner peculiar to our mind; but how can ihe products of our own mental activity retain their vaHditv when applied to the perceptions which are objectively pro- duced?~As to the nature of this mental activity, aa in- vestigation of the fundamental concepts of our under- standing, especially the causal concept, reveals the fact that the understanding is likewise a uniting, synthetizing acuity like sense-perception. The uniting principle (Hume s) which was the stumbling-block of Kant^s En^- hsh predecessor, now became Kant^s fundamental pre- supposition of knowledge. He could now say of the fundamental concepts of the understanding (categories), after the analogy of what he had previously said of the forms of intuition: Knowledge exists only when what is gtven (the matter) in the forms of our thought is united The concept^of synthesis m therefore the fundamental concept of all know edge and the profoundest thought of the Kantian philosophy. This constitutes KanVs real dis- covery, which will justify its value, even if KanVs par- ticular theories are to a considerable degree subject to criticism. We must apply his own method in the study of Kant We must penetrate the finished forms in which According to his own statement, Kant wrote out the results of his reflections covering a period of twelveyears quite hastily. His chief work, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) IS therefore a very difficult book.-In presenting Its contents we shall follow a clearer order than that given oy Kant himself. n 4ng to affect our own inner unity, in the fact that we combine together the antecedent and con- sequent in a definite manner. Thus', e. g. I know a line only when I draw it, i. e. when I combine its several parts according to a definite law. Or, e. g. I know a fact, e. g. the freezing of water, only when I am in position to com- bine the antecedent state (the water in liquid form) with its conseque.it according to a definite law. Kant believes that he has thus discovered a method which proves the necessity of a certain number of con- cepts of the understanding (categories). He savs th^ function of the understanding is judgment eve^' } ment consists of a combination of L^^.' tZ muS I Wrr tfT ^'''''''' '' ^'^^ - ^"^« oi juagments!— He thus discovers, on the basi^ nf fh^ seK), twelve categories, neither more nor less. TMsZs certainly a profound illusion. For the customan. clal? fication of judgments is logically untenable, it Tat elst s^^ttsr rcLSs^^ -- -- - -- nught be regarded as representative of these two classes M our judgments express either a relation of maSde both relations: aU ^^1^^ TntLrrfroL^ sm^^er magnitudes, and cause passes .o.,^^XZ We have thus far discovered two grouos of fnrm.. fi, onns of intuition and of the categorierBuftl^^J^S a thmi group. We are not satisfied with simply a^anSg sensations m space and time, and afterwards arranSne he intuitional fonns which have thus arisen acc^g to .ii tW \^^'-^- -d cause. The sy^thet S rit^-e Z"w "^ ''"'^*^' '' "^ '^^P'^^ ^'"bedded in our nature that we are constantly in search of higher uni J.S and totalitie^and finally demand an absolutet^I" fe anri 7'^'?,."'^° ^««°Pt« ^ conceive absolute uni- te and totahties. Kant calls the ideational faculTy ) 'II 146 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY KANT 147 reason in its narrower significance. (In its broader sig- nificance understanding and intuition likewise belong to reason.) Those synthetic impulses together with these ideational faculties give rise to the dogmatic systems which deal with the ideas of God (as the absolute being), the soul (as substance) and the world (as absolute total- ity) . Kant attempts to prove, by a very artificial method, that these three are the only ideas: they are to correspond with the three forms of inference of the traditional logic. b. Objective deduction investigates the right of apply- ing our cognitive forms to given sensations. The fact that we are able to become conscious of the content of our intuitions and concepts does not constitute the problem. Neither does the fact that we can deduce new content from experience constitute a problem. But Kant's prob- lem rather consists in this, namely, the fact that we are able to use otir intuitional forms and categories in such a way as to form, with their help, valid judgments which are not found in experience* He expresses it in his own lan- guage as follows: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? By analytical propositions we become aware of the content of our intuitions and reflections; by syn- thetical propositions a posteriori we include new content derived from experience; but synthetic propositions a priori extend our knowledge independently of our experi- ence. The following are examples of such propositions: every perception has extensive and intensive values, and every event has a cause (or better: every change takes place according to the law of the connection between cause and effect). According to Kant the validity of such judgments rests upon the fact that experience — ^in the sense of the fixed and necessary relations of phenomena — ^is possible only in case the mathematical laws and the concepts of magnitude and causality are vaHd for all perceptions. Only such ab- stract propositions as formulate the very conditions of experience are synthetic propositions a priori. Whenever we are able to discover and express the conditions of ex- perience we come upon propositions which are propositions of pure reason, because they are based on the pure forms of our knowledge, and which must nevertheless be valid for all experience. The whole content of experience is conceived in space and time. Hence since pure mathematics really does nothing more than develop the laws of space and time, it must be valid for every possible content of experience, every^ possible perception. But this demonstration like- wise involves a limitation: namely, mathematics is valid only for phenomena, i. e. only for things as we conceive them, not for things-in-themselves. We have no right to make the conditions of our conception the conditions of things-in-themselves. Time and space can be con- ceived only from the view-point of man. Experience not only impHes that we conceive something in space and time, but likewise that we are able fj comlnne what is given in space and time in a definite way, 1. e. as indicated in the concepts of magnitude and causality. This is the only means of distinguishing bet.\'cen experi- ence and mere representation or imagination. All ex- tensive and intensive changes must proceed continuously, i. e.^ through every possible degree of extension and in- tensity, otherwise we could never be certain of having any real experience. Gaps and breaks must be impossible (non datur hiatus non datur saltus). The cdgin of each particular phenomenon moreover must be conditioned by certain other phenomena, -analogous to the way in which It ill' 148 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY KANT 149 it the conclusion of a syllogism is conditioned by the prem- ises. In any purely subjective representations or in dreams, images may be combined in every variety of ways; we have experience however only when it is impossible to permit the members of a series of perceptions to exchange their places or to pass from one perception to another by means of a leap. In my mind I can at will, e. g. conceive of a house being built from the roof downward or from the foundation upward; but in the case of the actual construc- tion of a house there is but a single possible order of suc- cession. Wherever there appear to be gaps in the series of perceptions we assume that further investigation will discover the intervening members. This demonstration of the validity of the categories of magnitude and causality likewise involves a limitation: The validity of the cate- gories can only be affirmed within the range of possible expenctice; they cannot be applied to things which from their ver\' nature cannot become objects of experience. Exper'-^ce i?; the empirical synthesis which furnishes valid- ity to every other synthesis. The principles of demonstration by which we obtain our results when dealing with the forms of intuition and the categories are inapplicable to the realm of ideas. The ideas denia.id an uncoiiditionality, a totality, finality; but experience, vhlch is always limited, never furnishes any such thing. Neither God, nor the soul (as substance), nor the universe (as an absolute whole) can be given in experi- ence. There is here no posstbilHy of an objective deduc- tion. It is impossible to construct a science of ideas. When Kant bases the real ^.igniiicance of the rational sciences upc n an analysis of the conditions of experience, it must of course be remembered that h^^ uses the concept of experience in its strict sense. Experience consists of the fixed and necessary relation of perceptions. But in this sense experience is an idea (in Kant's meaning of the term) or an ideal. We can approach this ideal to infinity, but it was a piece of dogmatism when Ka7tt here failed to distinguish between the ideal and reality. Kant had not, as he believed, solved the problem propounded by Hume; for the thing concerning which Hume was skeptical was just the matter as to whether any experience in the strict sense of the term really exists. — This dogmatic tendency is peculiarly prominent in Kant's special works, especially in his Metaphysische Anfangsgrunden der Naturwissen- schaft (1786). — Kant's chief merit consists in referring all knowledge to synthesis and continuity. These funda- mental principles enable us to anticipate experience. But all anticipations are only hypotheses. 3. As we have observed, the demonstration of the real validity of abstract knowledge (of pure reason) is closely related to the limitation of this validity. Kant states this as follows: We know only experiences, but not things-in- themselves. Whenever he expresses himself concisely, he calls the concept of the thing-in-itself an ultimate concept or a negative concept. In this way he gives expression to the permanently irrational element of knowledge. Speak- ing exactly, the concept of the thing-in-itself indicates that we cannot deduce the matter of our knowledge from its form. For Kant however the concept of the thing-in-itself imperceptibly assumes a positive character. The thing-in- itself is regarded as the cause of phenomena (especially in reference to the matter, but likewise also in reference to the form). Here (as F. H. Jacohi was the first to show) Kant falls into a peculiar contradiction; he has limited the real validity of the concept of causality to the realm of experience (in which the thing-in-itself can never be pres- i ISO THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY h IfX:. ent) and then conceives the thing-in-itself as cause! — Here again we discover a remnant of dogmatism in KatU. 4. KatU proves the impossibility of constructing a .17 )^ science of ** Ideas,** both by the fact that ideas contain none of the conditions of experience (as is the case with the forms of intuition and the categories), and by means of a criticism of the attempts which have been made to estab* lish such a science. a. Criiicistn of speculative (spiritualistic) psychology. There is no justification for concluding from the imity of psychic life, which manifests itself in synthesis, the ftmda- mental form of consciousness, that the soul is a being which is distinct from the body or a substance. Synthesis is only a form, which we are not permitted to regard as a separate substance. It is impossible for psychology to be more than a science of experience. There is no ground for interpreting the distinction between psychical and ph3rsical phenomena as a distinction between two en- tities: It is possible indeed that one and the same essence should form the basis of both kinds of phenomena. b. Criticism of speculative cosmology. Every attempt at a scientific theory of the imiverse conceived as a totality is ever and anon confronted with contradictions. Our .Q y^ thought here culminates in antinomies; the imi verse must have a beginning (in space and time), else it were not a totality. But it is impossible to conceive the beginning or the end of space and of time, because every place (in space and in time) is thought in relation to other places. — Furthermore the world must consist of parts (atoms or monads) which are not further divisible, otherwise the summation of the parts could never be complete. But everything conceivable is divisible; we can think of every body as divided into smaller bodies. — ^The series of causes KANT ISI must have a first member if the universe is to be regarded as a complete system, and if a complete causal explanation of particular phenomena shall be possible. But the as- sumption of a first cause is in conflict with the law of causality, for this cause would itself have no cause, and at what moment should it begin its operation? According to Kant the only way to avoid these antin- omies is to distinguish between phenomenon and the thing-in-itself and limit the validity of our knowledge to phenomena. We meet with contradictions the moment we attempt to apply our concepts to the things which transcend our circumscribed experience. Kant therefore regards the antinomies as a demonstration of his theory of knowledge. c. Criticism of speculative theology. Reflective thought aims to find in the concept of God an absolute resting- place for all its effort. This concept is supposed to con- tain the ground of the concepts of soul and universe. In it knowledge would attain its ideal: all ideas would be re- ferred to a single idea which in tiuii contains the groimd of its existence within itself and hence implies nothing be- yond it! According to Kant the concept of God is fully justified as an ideal; but we must not confuse an ideal of^ knowledge with knowledge actually attained. The tradi- tional arguments for the existence of God however rest upon such a confusion of terms. The most popular argument rests upon the adaptation of natiu^ and thence infers the existence of an all-wise, . all-loving and all-powerful Creator (the physico-theological argument), — ^But by what right do we presuppose that the order and adaptation of nature should not be explainable as the effects of natural causes operating according to natu- ral laws? And at any rate this argument can only lead to xo IS2 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 2.-X 7-3 M- li the assumption of an architect or governor of the universe, not to that of a creator. The cosmohgical argument goes into the matter more profoundly: the tmiverse must have a cause (both as to its niatter as well as to its plan). — But the law of causality leads only from one member of the causal series to another — it only furnishes causes which are in ttim conditioned, i. e. effects, and hence never establishes the assumption of an unconditioned, necessary being. In the case of every existing thing, even the highest, it always remains not only possible but necessary to inquire: Whence doth it come? The ontological argument, if it were tenable, is the only one that would lead to the desired goal. It is also the tacit presupposition of all the other arguments. This argument proceeds as follows: to think of God as non- "^existent were a contradiction, because He is the perfect being and existence belongs to perfection! — But existence or being is a predicate which differs from all other predi- cates. The concept of a thing does not change because the particular thing does not exist. My concept of a htm- ^dred dollars is the same, no matter whether I possess them or only think of them. The problem of existence is inde- pendent of the problem of the perfection of the concept. And, as the investigation of th^ categories has shown, we have but a single criterion of existence or reality: namely, the systematic uniformity of experience. B. The Ethico-Religious Problem I. There is a sense in which KanVs ethical ideas de- velop along parallel lines with his ideas of theoretical knowledge. Rousseau's influence evidently affected him on this point at two different periods with telling effect. Kant declares, in an interesting fragment, that Rousseau KANT i' IS3 taught him reverence for mankind, to ascribe a certain dignity to all men which is not merely based on the degree of their intellectual culture. He had previously been an optimist whose basis was an intellectual and spiritual aris- tocracy. And in addition to Rousseau, Shaftesbury, Hume ^ and especially Hutcheson likewise influenced him at this'>^ period. During the sixties Kant bases his ethics on the sentiment of beauty and the dignity of human nature. (Beobachtungen uber das Gefiihl des Schonen und des Erhabenen, 1764.) Even here Kant already emphasizes the necessity of fundamental principles of morahty; they are however only the intellectual expressions of the con- tent of the sentiments: " The fundamental principles are not abstract laws, but the consciousness of an afection that dwells in every human breast , . , of the beauty and dignity of human nature,** Kant afterwards abandoned this identification of ethics with the psychology of the affections. In his Essay of 1770 he declared that it is utterly impossible to base moral principles on sentiment, i. e. empirically. It is also evi- dent, from a fragment discovered by Reicke, that at the period during which he was engaged with the Critique of Pure Reason he based the ethical impulse on the self- activity which we exercise in our striving for happiness. The matter of happiness is empirical, but its form is in- tellectual, and the only possibility of realizing our freedom and independence rests upon maintaining the constant harmony of our will with itself. Morality is liberty under ^ a universal law which expresses our self-consistency. Even here Kant's ethics attains that purely formal char- acter which is so peculiar to it. In ethics as in epistemol- ogy he regards the form as the constant factor in contrast with its ever-varying content. i< < I V 154 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY But in the fragment just cited Kant's ethics was still individualistic: The moral law demands only that the in- dividual be in harmony with himself. The specifically Kantian ethics springs from an expansion of this principle. He elaborates it in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) and the Kritik der praktischen Vernunfl (1788). Here he formulates the moral law as follows: Act according to the maxim that you could at the same time will that it might become a universal law!— The viewpoint is therefore no longer individualistic, but social. His elab- oration of the theory of knowledge evidently affected his ethics at this point. The fundamaital moral law must be quite as universal and objective as the theoretical funda- mental principles, as e. g. the principle of causality! But there are other theoretical motives likewise here in evi- dence. In the interval between the fragment just cited (1780) and the first draft of the ethics (1785) another noteworthy essay appeared, namely, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Ge- schichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht (1784), in which Kant shows that the only viewpoint from which history is com- prehensible and of any value is from that of the human race as a whole, but not from that of the individual citizen. Reason is an evolutional product of the process of history. The antagonism of interests brings the capacities of man to maturity, until he finally organizes a society in which free- dom under tmiversal laws is possible. And it is only then that genuine morality becomes possible! Kant observes that Rousseau was not wholly in error in preferring the state of nature, so long as this stage has not been reached. — It is evident that, from the viewpoint of history, the moral law which Kant formulated in 1785 contains a sub- lime anticipation. The individual citizen is expected to KANT IS5 S? n t \^^'^ ^^^ ^^^' ^'^"^'^^y ^' ^ actions shall finaUy be regulated in that ideal society. MoraHtv like history, is likewise incomprehensible from the view' point of the individuaL-iTa.^/ returns to this theory two years later (1786 in the essay on Muthmasslicher Anfanz der MenschengescUchte). Civilization and nature are con- tradictory principles (so far Rousseau was right) "until perfect art becomes nature once more, which is the final aim of the moral determination of the human race." Kant therefore arrived at this definitive ethical theory by the historical or social-psychological method, and Rousseau's conception of ^ the problem of civiHzation influenced him at this point just as it did at an earlier stage of his ethical reflection.~But m the mind of Kant that sublime antici- ' pation appears with such ideality and absoluteness that he regarded the fundamental moral laW as a manifestation from a super-empirical world and he forgot his historical and psychological basis. (Cf. the author's essay: Rous^ seaus Etnfluss auf die definitive Form der KanVschen Ethik m Kantstudien, II, 1898.) ' 2 In the first draft of his ethics (1785) Kant discovers the fundamental moral law by means of an analysis of the practical moral consciousness. That action alone is good which spnngs from pure regard for the moral law. Neither authonty nor experience can be the source of this sense. Moral pnnciples reveal the imnost, supersensible nature of our yolition, and neither psychology nor theology can here furnish the basis. The fact is the more evident in that there axe elements in human nature which impel us in directions which are contrary to the moral law. The moral law manifests itself in opposition to these empirical ' and egoistic tendencies in the foim of duty, an uncondi- tional command, a categorical imperative. The distinc- I iS6 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY KANT 157 tively moral element appears most clearly in cases wh&re duty and incHnation stand out in sharp contrast. Kant even says in a certain place that a state of mind in which I follow duty even though it is in conflict with my pur- poses is the only one which is really good in itself. The moral law must be purely formal. Every real con- tent, every purpose would degrade it to the level of the empirical and hence to the material. The moral law can do nothing more than indicate the form of the fundamental principles which our actions are intended to express,— that is to say, that these fundamental principles are capable of being based on a universal principle of legisla- tion in such manner as to enable all rational beings to obey them under similar circumstances. I must, e. g. return borrowed property even though no one knows that it does not belong to me; because the contrary course will not admit of generahzation, and in that case no one would make a loan to another. Kant however here clearly presupposes that man is a member of society. This maxim is therefore not purely a priori. He likewise realizes the need of a more realistic formulation of the maxim and the necessity of a real object of human action. The highest object can be given only through the moral law, and Kant discovers this object in the very dignity which every man possesses in the fact of being capable of becoming consaous of the moral law. From this he deduces the principle: "Act so as to treat humanity, in thyself or any other, as an end always, and never merely as a means!" The moral law is not objective, but deeply imbedded m the nature of man and identical with the essential nature of volition. Law and liberty are not separate concepts. They express only the autonomy of man viewed from op- posite sides. As an empirical being man is subject to psychological laws, but as a rational being he is elevated above all empirical conditions and capable of oriSS a senes of changes absolutely. But man possesses S capaa y only as an "intelligible character," as a "thing-S! Itself." AndsincetWngs^n^n^selvescannev^ m e^nce^is ta^SisIEI^orlntaEiibS^^ empincal nece^ity ever to conflict with each oTEir7^a«/ here mtro-aSHiTa positive use^onhe concept of the thing- R.fhZ',^^^^'^.^^'^^ 'P"'^^ P'"^^'^^ °f ethics in his RecMslehre and his Tugendlehre. Both works appeared in t?ilf '^-J-^e -press of old age.-Right,'ac "%^' ^""^^ '''' ^^^^^ '^"^y in the realization of the dignity of man, which is based on auton- qualities. To be useless and superfluous is to dishonor hmnamty m our own person. Besides personal perfect ani'^Tr" °i ''^'" f " "^""^^ °f f undamentai* p " tance. The perfection of others on the other hand can oX be realized through their own efforts; and we proi for our own happiness even through a natural instinct 158 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 3. Kant aimed to establish the pure autonomy and spontaneity of the moral sense, and especially as inde- pendent of all theological presuppositions. But he was nevertheless convinced that religion and morality are vitally related. He finds the transition from moraHty to reHgion to rest on the fact that man is destined to reahze the imconditional moral law in the empirical world, i. e. in the world of finitude, limitation and conditionality. Ideal and reaHty here appear in sharp contrast to each other, which gives rise to a demand for harmony between liberty and nature, virtue and happiness, and it is just because experience offers no guarantee, that religious pos- tulates, which contain the conditions of such a harmony, are formulated. Besides the freedom of the will pre- viously cited, there are according to Kant two additional postulates: viz. the immortaUty of the soul and the exist- ence of God. Kant is convinced that these postulates re- veal a universal htmian need. Faith is the natural con- sequence of the sentiment of morality, even though faith is not a duty. The possibility of faith rests upon the fact that knowl- edge is limited to phenomena. The native element of the dogmas of faith is the thing-in-itself . But these dogmas add nothing to our knowledge. This follows even from the fact that our intellectual and intuitional forms do not pertain to the thing-in-itself. Religious ideas are nothing more than analogies or figures of speech. Kant even goes so far as to say that if the anthropomorphisms are care- fully discarded from the psychological attributes ascribed to God, nothing remains but the empty word. This fact, which even applies to the ideas of natural reHgion, is still mere pertinent to the ideas of positive re- ligion. In his treatise on Religion inner halb der Grenzen der KANT ,59 blossen Vernunft (1793) Kant shows that important ethi- cal ideas are hidden within the Christian dogmas. In the dogma concerning sin he discovers the experience of an in- clmation, deeply imbedded in human nature, which strives agamst the moral law; which he calls " radical evil " Kant regards the Bible story of the Fall as a subjective experi- ence on the part of each individual, not as an historical event. So is the Bible story of the suffering Christ like- wise experienced by every serious human being; regard for the moral law gives rise to a new man who must endure the suffering due to the constant opposition of the old man of sensual inclination.— The significance of a purely histoncal or ^^ statutory ^^ faith is only provisional; but we respect "the form which has served the purpose of bring- ing a doctrine, the acceptance of which rests on tradition —which IS irrevocably preserved in every soul and re- qmres no miracle,— into general influence." 4. Kant maintains a sharp antithesis between the world of experience and things-in-themselves both in his theory of knowledge and in his ethics. In fact, his whole philosophy is characterized by these sharp antitheses. This was necessary to his purpose, if he would demonstrate the validity of knowledge and the unconditionality of ethical ideals. But the question must naturally arise- even in consequence of the critical philosophy— Must not even these distinctions and antitheses be ascribed to the method of our human understanding? The fact that this point also occurred to his mind with more or less definite- ness is a splendid testimony to Kant's profound critical acumen. He felt the need before concluding his reflec- tions, of investigating whether there might not be view- points which— more directly than the religious postulates —would transcend these profound antitheses. He thus i6o THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY KANT l6l il' discovers certain facts which show us how existence by virtue of its own laws and even our ethical ideals become matters of our knowledge. There are two such facts: the one is of an aesthetic nature, the other biological {Kritik der Urtheilskraftj 1790). In the phenomena which we call beautiful and sublime the object inspires in us a sense of disinterested satisfac- tion. In the case of the beautiful this rests on the fact that our intuitional faculty or our understanding is in- duced to harmonious cooperation, in that the parts of a phenomenon are readily and naturally combined into a single imit. Kant places special emphasis on the piu-e immediacy and involuntariness of the impression of ^beauty, — ^what he calls free beauty (e. g. the beauty of a flower, of an arabesque, of a musical fantasy). He does not regard the "secondary" beauty presupposed in the concept of an object (e. g. the beauty of man as such) as real beauty. — In contemplating the sublime our faculty of comprehension is overwhelmed and the sense of self subdued in the consciousness of being confronted by the immensity, the immeasurable in content and energy; but even in this very vanquishment, the consciousness of an energy superior to all sensible limitations arises in our con- sciousness: the consdousness of ideas and of the moral law as transcending all experience. The really sublime, according to Kanty is not the object, but the sentiment to which it gives rise. Just as we behold the activity of Being in harmony with our spiritual dispositions in the beautiful and the sublime, even so the genius acts his part as involuntarily as a process of nature, and nevertheless produces works which have the value of patterns or types. Genius is a talent by means of which nature furnishes rules of art, — ^it is typical originality. Organic life presents an analogy to the beautiful, the sublune, and the mgenious. Nature employs a method m the orgamc realm for which we reaUy have no concept Here we do not discover a being originated by the mecW ical articulatK,n and interaction of parts; nor have wTthe nght, saentxfically, to assume an antecedent plan Z^rl mg to which the parts are afterwards combined (as in Se case of human architecture). The organism is therefore unexplamable either teleologically or mechanically B^t perhaps the antithesis between the mechanical and the teleo ogical explanations of nature rests merely on the peculiarity of our knowledge. Our understanding pro! c^^ds discursively, i. e. it proceeds from the parts i the whole, and If the parts are to be regarded as defined from the viewpoint of the whole, we are obliged to apply th2 anthropomorphic analogy with human purposes. But in pure being the same regulation which provides for the t^S^ i tT^u °^ '''^^'^' ^°""^ ^^P^ble of adap- tation. It might be that the principles of mechanism and of teleology are after all identical in the unknown grounS The same might be true also of the antithesis of pure reason which formulates natural laws, and the practical reason which propounds ethical ideals Such being the case it would follow that it is one and the same principle which is revealed in the^Jaws of nature and in the principles of Here Kant reverts at the conclusion of Ws career to a ^7l^Un"^ '"'if ^'" considerably during his TI ^fsemetne Naturgeschichte und Theorie des mmmek. Etnztg moglicher Beweisgrund) , and which cer- l62 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY HERDER tainly had never left him. He suggests the possibility of a monistic theory, which, according to his conviction, was incapable of scientific elaboration. C. Opponents and First Disciples If Kant himself felt that the stupendous critical task made it necessary to appeal to a fundamental unity be- hind the variety of distinctions, such demand must neces- sarily become even more insistent to independent thinkers who asstmied a critical attitude to his own investigations. Independent disciples, if they had seriously studied the doctrines of the master, must likewise have felt the need of a greater imity and harmony. The difference between the opponents and the disciples consists in the fact that the former asstmied a purely polemical attitude, whilst the latter endeavored to forge ahead to new viewpoints on the basis of the critical philosophy; the former oppose the necessary totality of life and faith to philosophical analy- sis, whilst the latter seek to realize a new idea of totality by means of a thorough analysis. I. Foremost among the opponents, stands John George Eamann (i 730-1 788), ^'The Wise Man of the North,*' who was one of Kant's personal friends. After a restless youth he settled in Konigsberg in the office of Superintendent of Customs. His external circumstances were poor and he experienced profound mental struggles. He was a foe to every kind of analysis because of a morbid demand in his own nature for a complete, vital and un- divided spiritual reality. He finds the ground of religion in our total being and it is far more comprehensive than the sphere of knowledge. The life of pure thought is the most abstract form of existence. Eamann refers to Hume as not having been refuted by Kant (the Prussian Hume). 163 In harmony with Giordano Bruno he thinks existence consists of a coincidence of opposites (coincidentia opposi- torum), which are compatible with Hfe, but in reflective thought remain forever incompatible. This explains the futility of analysis. In direct antithesis to Kant he holds (m the posthumous treatise Metakritik iiber den Furismus der retnen Vernunft) that reason, apart from tradition faith and experience, is utteriy helpless. He directs Hs attack more particularly against Kant's distinction be- tween matter and form, intuition and reflection. What nature has joined together man must not put asunder' John Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) likewise emphasizes the helplessness of reason: It is a product, not an original pnnciple. He makes the racial character of poetry and religion prominent, regarding them as the immediate prod- ucts of the human mind, in contrast to clear conception and volitional conduct. He extols the ages in which the ^^9^:^^?:^mrm¥^chwetTy, philosophy and religion were one. He aimed to penetrate behind the division of la^T^rtn the realm of mind. During the sixties he was an enthusra'slTc student 6r Kant, whom he attacks rather in- directly in the Ideen zur Fhilosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-1791), which is his most important work more directly in his later, less significant treatises {Meta- kntik, 1799, Kalligone, 1800). As opposed to Kant he demes the opposition between the individual and society The individual is identified with the entire race by in- numerable unconscious influences, and his inmost being is modified by historical development. On the other hand the goal of history is not alone determined by the race as a whole but likewise by the individual. Herder was no less opposed to the distinction between mind and nature i64 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY God and the world, than to the sharp distinction between the individual and society, or between the conscious and the unconscious. God can no more exist apart from the world than the world can exist apart from God, and, Hke his friend Goethe, he was an admirer and exponent of Spinoza J to which Lesnng referred in the famous conver- sation with Jacohi. His ecclesiastical position did not pre- vent him from expressing his thoughts freely and coura- geously. {Gott, 1787.) On this point he disagreed with his friends Hamann and Jacohi, notwithstanding their common emphasis of the total and indivisible life. Friedrich Heinrich Jacohi (i 743-1819), the third mem- ber of this group, as already observed, exposed the con- tradiction resulting from the Kantian theory of the *Hhing-in-itself" {David Hume Hher den Glauhen, oder Idealismus und Realismus, 1787). Like Hamann and Herder, he likewise fails to find in the Kantian philosophy, and in all philosophy for that matter, the complete, total, undivided unity which can only be found in life and in unmediated faith. He contends that philosophy, if it is to be consistent, must annul all distinctions, combine everything into a single series of causes and effects, and thus not only the perfect and the vital, but even all orig- inality and individuality, would be annulled. He used this argument in his Brief en iiher Spinoza (1785) against the philosophy of the enlightenment. In his David Hume he used the same argument against Kant, and later he made similar objections to Fichte (Jakohi an Fichte, 1799) and Schelling {Von den gottlichen Dingen, 1811). He regards even direct perception a miracle, since it is utterly impossible to furnish any demonstrative proof of the reality of the objective world. We are bom into faith. Jacohi defends the rights of the individual REINHOLD both in the realm of morals and of relidon Tficr...^ ^1 right for a beautiful soul to be guS b" the affe w' even though it should thus contradict .d^^^^^Z^ 2. The Kantian philosophy was first introduced inl' ;t S) tT' Tr'-''^' ^^- ''' kantis^Pml Remhold had become a monk in his early yoSh but ^^^^^C:^S^ ^^ rationalistic Xotpt' and the Cathohc faith became too strong, he fled the clois ter, became acquainted with the Kani?;n philos^ i" Weimar and was shortly afterwards called to a pXsor Mhe inL^^^^^^^^ Jena now became the centi ot the philosophical movement inspired by Kant ^n ' contrast to KanVs multiplicity of dis'tinctiJs and Us Re^nhold ^ro^o^^^ the derivation of everything froTa X J X 1^ T\ :' r ""''"'^" Vorstellungsver^ ti Ihat ?; ^^/^^"^^^ "^^ P--ciple from the pos- tulate that every idea sustains a twofold relation to a subject as well as to an object. Consciousness, as a mat' K I T'. T''''' ^^ ^^"^ ^ relationship. That whfch W caUed Form is that element of an idea by mea^s of which It IS related to the subject. It is necesLrtn same a thing-in-itself, because it is imp^LSS^^^^^^^^ ect to produce the object. The fact that he conceiv^ he thmg-m-itself as something entirely distinct frorn^f tnhrf\"'^'"''' ^,,,,,,, ,, , contradiction six IS in gTT;-. ™^ --^-^-tion is clearly elab- orated m G. E. Schultze's Aenesidemus (1792) The clearest exposition of the error resulting from pos s bT/i'^ '^l^-^-^^f as a positive concept howe've. IS by Salomon Matmon (1754-1800). The thing-in-itself IS mtended to be the cause of the matter of our knowlSl i66 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY SCHILLER —but we never discover any absolute, i. e. entirely unformed matter, in our consciousness, and it would therefore be impossible even to inquire concenung the cause of the matter! The pure matter (pure sensation) is an "idea" like the pure form, the pure subject. . , Maimon, the Lithuanian Jew, foUowing the example of Reinhold in quitting the Catholic cloister, abandoned his native village with its Umitations and poverty, m order to satisfy his inteUectual hunger in Germany. Kant ad- mitted that Maimon was the man who best understood him; but the venerable master was nevertheless dissatis- fied 'with the criticisms and corrections offered by his brilliant disciple. ' ."* ' Maimon saw clearly that the mere reference to the con- ditions of experience is not the solution of Hume's prob- lem- for what Kant calls experience, the permanent, neces- sary coherence of impressions, is the very thing that Hume denies By experience Hume understands nothing more than impressions. That wMch is given in experience is never anything more than a succession of impressions, and it is useless to appeal to the categories, for they are nothing but rules or ideas used in our investigations. The concept of causality, e, g., enables us to attain the highest possible degree of continuity in the series of our impressions. It is not reason that impels us to transcend experience, but the imagination and the desire for completeness. These are the motives that give rise to the ideas (m the Kantian sense), to which we afterwards ascribe objective reaUty. It is not the objects which are believed to exist on these grounds, but rather the constant striving after totaJity-which is the source of faith-that constitutes 167 the highest reality. (Versuch einer TranscendentalphUos. ophte, 1790. Philosophisches Worterbuch, ijoi. Versuch etner neuen Logik, 1794.) There is a close analogy between Reinhold, Maimon and Fnednch Schller (1759-1805). SchUler, like the others ran away from his cramping environment (the Militar^^ school at Stuttgart). And then, after the writing of his first sentunental essays, he devoted himself more thor- ougHy to the I^ntian literature. He greatly admired Kant s indefatigable research and the exalted, ideal char- acter of his ethics. But from his point of view Kant had nevertheless over-emphasized the antitheses of human nature, and severed the moral nature too completely from the actual development and ambitions of men. Duty an- peared to be a kind of compelling force which man's higher nature exercises over his lower nature. SchUler therefore asserts that harmony is the highest criterion in life as well asm art. _ All the elements in the nature of man must cooperate m his actions. In order to be good, an act must not only bear the badge of dignity, but likewise of grace- fulness. Morality is slavish as long as it consists of self- command (Uber Anmut und Wurde, 1793). SchUler elaborates this theory more fully in his Briefen Uber aesthetische Erziehung (1795) which shows a decided agree- ment with Rousseau's problem of civilization (which like- wise exerted a profound influence on the reflections of Kant). The important thing is to surcharge the spon- tarieous fullness of the natural Ufe with the independence and freedom of human life, the devotion to ever- changing circumstances with the unity of personaUty, the matter-impulse with the form-impulse. The solution of this problem is found in play, which is the beginning and prototype of art. It is only in i68 THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY the free play of his energies that man acts as a totality. The aesthetic state is therefore the highest perfection of culture: it is at once the end and the means of development, which transcends all coarseness and all harmony. SIXTH BOOK. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM. The history of philosophy, from the Renaissance onward has revealed the fact that philosophy is not an exclusive world. It was in fact the new theory of nature and the new methods of natural science that, in all essential respects, determined the problems and the character of modem philosophy; to these must be added the new humamstic movements. And later on Kant was not only influenced by the opposition between Wolff and Hume, but likewise by the Newtonian natural science and Rousseau's problem of civilization. The develop ment which foUowed during the first decades after Kant furmshes a new type of thought,-the romantic tendency of thought at the transition to the nineteenth century exerased a profound, in part even a fatal, influence on philosophy Philosophy here reveals an undue suscepti- bility to the influences of other departments of thought Otherwise the philosophy of Romanticism would have been unable to supplant the critical philosophy Kant had indeed aroused a profound enthusiasm, and he had a large foUowing in his own age. But tHs was largely due to the seriousness and the depth of his fundamental pnnaples of ethics. The new age was consciously op- posed to the eighteenth century, the period of the EnltRht- enment to which Kant, despite his profounder conception nevertheless belonged. It now became necessary to institute a profound investigation of nature and history directly. Men were anxious to enjoy spiritual life in its unity and totahty. Science, poetry and religion were 169 lyo THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM FICHTE 171 no longer to be regarded as distinct or even hostile forces, but merely as different forms of a single life. No- valis proclaimed this gospel with fervent zeal. All antitheses must be transcended. Kanfs philosophy abotmded in antitheses; the profound antithesis between thought and being especially now became a rock of offense. Kant's suggestion of a unity at the basis of all antitheses was taken as the starting-point. According to Kant this conception represented one of the boundaries of thought; but now this was to furnish the starting- point whence all else is derived. Reinhold had aheady made the start. He proposed the ideal of knowledge assumed by Romanticism, No one inquired whether such an ideal were logically tenable: does not every inference in fact presuppose at least two premises! The intensity of their enthusiasm led men to believe that they could dispense with the traditional methods of thought and of science. As Goethe's Faust (this work appeared just at this time and the Romanticists were the first to ap- plaud it), dissatisfied with everything which previously passed for knowledge, resorted to magic, in the hope of thus attaining an explanation of *'the secret which maintains the universe in harmony," so the philosophers of Romanticism beUeved it possible to discover a new avenue to absolute truth. They resorted to intellectual magic. An attempt was made to sever the relationship which had existed between natural science and philos- ophy since the days of Bruno and Descartes, Despite the intense enthusiasm, the sublime sentiment and the profound ideas of the Romantic school, it nevertheless represents a vain attempt to discover the Philosopher's Stone. But just as the ancient Alchemists were not only energetic students, but in their effort to produce gold Mcewise acquired important idea^ and experiences, so the significance of German idealism must not be estimated alone by the results of its keen speculation. The fact is indeed patent, that profoimd ideas neither stand nor fall with the demonstration which men seek to give them The kernel may persist even though the husk decays. I he persistence of values is no more identical with the persistence of certain special f onns in the reahn of thought than m the reahn of energy. A. The Speculative Systems. I. John Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), the son of a Saxon peasant, took an enthusiastic interest, during his school period, in the spiritual struggles of Lessin, and later, after struggling with extreme poverty during his umversity life, was led to philosophy by the writings of Kant, His service at the University of Jena met with great success, not only because of his intellectual keen- ness and his eloquence, but likewise on account of the impression made by Ms moral earnestness. . Having been dismissed on account of his religious views he went to Berlin, where he afterwards received an appointment. He takes first rank among those who, m the disastrous period following the battle of Jena labored for the preservation of the sentiment of patriot' ism and of hope, especially by his Addresses to the German Nation, delivered during the winter of 1808-0 while Berlin wa^ still in the hands of the French. ^, Fichte' s philosophy is inspired by the criticism of the Kantian theory of the thing-in-itself in which Jacohi - ^chulze and Maimon were aheady engaged. The motives at the root of Fichte' s reflections however were not purely theoretical. Action constituted his profoundest motive 172 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM riCHTE 173 \\ from the very beginning, and he even regarded thought as action. It was perfectly consistent therefore for him to say, in the clearest exposition of his doctrine which he has given {Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, 1797), that a man's philosophy depends primarily on his character, Fichte contends that there are two funda- mental divisions in philosophy: Idealism, which takes the subject, the ego, as its starting-point, and Dogmatism, which takes the object, the non-ego, as its starting-point. This follows from the nature of the problem of philosophy, i. e. the explanation of experience. But experience con- sists of the knowledge of objects. And this admits of but two alternatives, either to explain objeqjts (things) from the standpoint of knowledge (the ego), or knowl- edge (the ego) from the standpoint of objects (things). Persons of an active and independent nature will be disposed to choose the former method, whilst those of a passive and dependent nature will adopt the latter method. But even then idealism, from the purely theoretical point of view, has the advantage of dogmatism (which is liable, either as MateriaHsm, Spiritualism or Spinozism, in all three cases to resolve itself into a theory of substance or things). Because it is impossible to deduce knowledge, thought, the ego, from things (i. e. regarded either as material, spiritual or neutral). But ' idealism makes knowledge, thought, the ego, its point of departure and then proceeds to show how experience, i. e. certain definite forms of knowledge, arises. The ego can contain nothing (known or thought) which is not posited by the activity of the ego. In his chief work (Grundlage der gesammten Wissen- r schaftslehre, 1794) Fichte starts with the activity of the , ego. The non-ego exists for us only by virtue of an activity of the ego; but the ego posits itself. Every idea involves this presupposition in a peculiar and special form. But the only method of discovering it is by abstract reflection, for immediate consciousness reveals nothing more than its products. We are never directly consaous of our volitions and activities; we take note of our limitations, but never of the thing which is thus limited. Free, unconstrained activity, which transcends the antitheses between subject and object, can only be conceived through a higher order of comprehension through intellectual intuition. That is to say, it tran- fr scends every concept because every concept presupposes an antithesis. But it is impossible to deduce definite, particular ob- jects from this free activity, i. e. from the pure ego. In ' ^^ addition to the presupposition of self-activity by m'eans of which the ego posits itself, we must therefore postulate a second presupposition: The ego posits a non-ego. ^^ Both propositions, notwithstanding their opposition ' must be combined, and thus by thesis and antithesis we amve at synthesis; so that our third proposition must be stated thus: The ego posits a Hmited ego in antithesis to a Hmited non-ego. This finally brings us to the ^ level of experience. The limited ego is the empuical ego, which is constantly placed in antith- ' esis to objects and must constantly overcome limita- tions. Fichte moreover seeks to deduce the universal forms ■ of expenence (the Kantian intuitional forms and cate- gones) from these fundamental principles. Thus, e. g. time is a necessary form whenever several acts of the ego are to be arranged in a definite order with reference to each other, and causality comes under the third funda- 174 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM FICHTE 175 mental principle (concerning the mutual limitation, i. e. the reciprocity between the ego and the non-ego). All r such forms are forms of the activity of the pure, tm- limited ego, which forms the basis of the empirical v.antithesis between ego and non-ego, but which can never \ manifest itself in experience.- But how is it possible to deduce this antithesis of an i empirical ego and a non-ego from the pure ego? How , does it happen that this unlimited activity is resisted and ' broken?— These questions are theoretically unanswerable according to Fichte. Whence this opposition, whence this impetus comes we do not know, but it is necessary to the explanation of actual (empirical) consciousness. And the limitation, as a matter of fact, does not even concern us theoretically, it pertains only to the practical reason! **An object possesses independent reality only in so far as it refers to the practical capacity of the ego." The ' only explanation of the existence of a world of non-egos . is that we are intended to act: activity and effort as a matter of fact presuppose opposition (resistance) and I / limitation. Our task consists in realizing our liberty and independence through the successive transcendence , of limitations. But the ultimate presupposition forever ^ ' remains that pure activity which is revealed in us under ;\ the form of an impulse to act for action's sake. This presupposition furnishes the only possible explanation of the unqualified obligation which Kant expressed m the categorical imperative. This complete subordination of the theoretical to the practical resulted in a complete refutation of fatalism. For the dependence of the whole system of our ideas Tests far more profoundly on our volition than our activity on our ideas. b. ^ The empirical ego is dependent even as limited. It experiences an impulse to transcend the objects in order to transform them into means of pleasure. Activity reveals itself at first as mere natural impulse. But the impulse to act for action's sake can never be satisfied by a finite object, and hence consciousness will forever strive to transcend what is merely given. Man gradually learns ^ to regard things merely as means towards his own self- ^ development. It follows therefore that the highest ! moral obligation is expressed in the law: realize the pure ego! And this realization comes to pass by virtue of the fact that each particular act belongs to a series which ' leads to perfect spiritual liberty. {Sittenlehre, 1798.) 1, Radical evil consists of the indolence which holds fast to existing conditions and resists progress. And more- over it leads to cowardice and treachery. The first impulse in the development towards liberty comes from men in whom natural impulse and liberty are in equi- librium, and who are consequently regarded as types. The spontaneous respect and admiration accorded to such typical characters is the primitive form of moral affection. The man who is stiU incapable of self-respect may nevertheless perhaps respect superior natures. Fichte elaborated this idea in considerable detail in his famous Reden an die deutsche Nation (1808) as the foundation of a theory of national education. The spontaneous adoption or creation of ideal types forms the middle term between passive admiration and perfect liberty. According to Fichte the religious consciousness is - really implied in the moral consciousness. For the very . fact that I strive to realize my highest ideal assumes at the same time that the realization of this ideal by my 176 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM SCHELLING 177 : own activity is possible. I must therefore presuppose a '; world-order in which conduct based on moral sentiment can be construed consistently. Religion furnishes an immediate validation of the confidence in such a world- ' order. It is not necessary that I should collect the experiences which reveal my relation to this world-order and formulate from them the concept of that unique being which I call God; and ascribing sensible attributes to this Being and making Him the object of servile and egoistic reverence, may even be positively harmful. This were indeed real and actual atheism. The fact that I conceive of God as a particular Being is a consequence of my finitude. The act of conceiving involves limitation ' and every supposed concept of a God is the concept of an idol! {Vher den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine gottliche Weltregierungy 1798. Appellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, 1799.) c. Fichte was never satisfied with the expositions which he had given of his theory. He was constantly trying to attain greater clearness both for himself and for his readers. He modified his theory unconsciously by these repeated restatements. In his later drafts he discarded the scholastic method of proof which he had employed in the first exposition of the Science of Knowl- edge, He then placed more stress on the immediate states and facts of consciousness. But the more he I delved into the inexpressible ideas of absolute reality and no longer conceived this reality as active and infinite, ' but as at rest and superior to all effort and activity, the s more his theory likewise assumed a mystical character. His religion was no longer mere practical confidence, but it now became a matter of devotion, of absolute self- ■ surrender. This idea is quite prominent in his Anweis- ung zum seligen Lehen (1806). Grundziige des ocgcn- wdrtigen Zeitalters (1800) is likewise of vast importance on account of the incisive polemics against the eighteenth century as ''the age of enlightenment and imp over ishmenr {Auf-und Auskldrung). Here we find a clear statement of the antithesis which was later (in the school of St Simon) described as the antithesis between the organic and critical age. 2. Friedrich William Schelling (1775-1854) is the typical philosopher of Romanticism. Having no critical prejudices whatever, in Jhis youthful treatises which constitute the exclusive basis of his philosophical signif- icance, he proclaims a new science which is intended to transcend all the antitheses still confronting the traditional science. He labored first at Jena, afterwards at Stuttgart Munich and Erlangen. His youth was characterized by great productiveness, which was however foUowed by a remarkable period of stagnation in his productivity After the death of Hegel, when nearly seventy, he was caUed to Berlin by Frederick William IV, for the purpose of counteracting the radical tendencies arising from the Hegelian philosophy. His lectures at Berlin, which had aroused great anticipations, were however a complete disappointment. a. Schelling began his philosophical career as a col- laborator of Fichte, His first essays constitute a further development of the Fichtean science of knowledge. But he could not accept the subordinate position ascribed •to nature in Fichte's philosophy (as mere limitation and means). He undertakes to show in his Ideen zu \etner Philosophic der Natur (1797) and in various essays m natural philosophy, that it is impossible that nature should assume such a mechanical relation to mental life 178 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM SCHELLING 179 He States his problems very clearly; the romantic character consists in the treatment and the solution. Whilst the natural scientist lives in the midst of nature as in the immediate presence of reaHty, the philosopher of nature inquires how it is possible to know nature: ^ How nature and the experience of it is possible, this is the problem with which philosophy arose." Or as it has^ also been expressed: ''The phenomenality of sensibility is the borderland of all empirical phenomena." {Erster Ent- wurf eines 'Systems der Naturphilosophie, 1799.) This setting of the problem recalls the observation of Hobbes, namely, that the most remarkablp. of all phenomena is the fact that phenomena do exist. The realist and the / romanticist agree in the statement of the problem, how- ever widely they differ in their respective solutions. -Schelling wishes to explain nature from the viewpoint of mind and thus substitute a new science instead of the natural science founded by Galileo and Newton. The natural scientist cannot explain how nature can be known. The natural philosopher explains it by con- struing nature as unconscious mind. Fichte had even distinguished a twofold tendency in consciousness: an infinite, unconditioned activity (the pure ego) and Hmitation (by the non-ego). Hence if there is to be any possible way of understanding the origin of mind from the forces of nature, it follows that these two tendencies must akeady be manifest in nature, only in lower degrees, or, as Schelling puts it, in lower potentialities. And since nature differs from mind only as a matter of degree, in which the tension of those ten- dencies, the polarity of opposites, as Schelling calls them, is manifested, it follows that the various phenomena of nature likewise show only quantitative differences. Gravity, light and the organism represent the various levels through which nature ascends to mind. The relation of contraction and expansion varies on the different levels; in the organism they coexist in inner unity, and as a matter of fact we are then likewise ah-eady at the threshold of consciousness. Whilst mechanical natural science, with its atoms and laws of motion, reveals to us only the external aspect of nature, as lifeless objectivity It IS the business of natural philosophy to explain nature as It really is in its inmost essence, whereby it at the same time appears as the preliminary step to mind. On the lower levels the objective element predominates, on the higher levels the subjective element. These three levels of nature correspond to knowledge, action and art in the realm of mind {System des transcendentalen Idealismus, 1800). Art portrays directly and concretely what phi' losophy can describe only abstractly. Here therefore the two tendencies of being manifest themselves in perfect unity. Schelling could no longer regard the Absolute as pure ego because the relation of the latter to the non- ego was wholly external. The distinction between the subjective and the objective vanishes entirely in the Absolute; it is pure identity. Antitheses exist only for finite mind. ■ Schelling^ s Philosophy of Nature is really nothing more than a symbolic interpretation of nature, not an expla- nation of nature. He is even conscious of tliis fact him- self. In one of his best essays (Methode des akademis^ Chen Studiums, 1803) he remarks: '^Empiricism con- templates being as an object apart from its meaning, because the nature of a symbol is such as to possess its own peculiar life within itself. In this isolation it can ap- pear only as a finite object, in an absolute negation of i8o THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM SCHELLING l8l the infinite." That is to say the natural scientists are not aware of the fact that nature is a symbol, hut they regard it as a thing-in-itself . The Philosopher alone understands (because he starts from within or from above) the symbolic significance. But then Schelling's phHosophy Hkewise really amounts to nothing more than a system of analogies and allegories which are very arbitrarily applied. It is not without justification that the term ''Philosophy of Nature'' has acquired a suspicious sotmd in scientific ears. Notwithstanding the fact that Schelling speaks of levels and transitions, he is nevertheless not an evolutionist in the modem significance of the term. He does not accept any real development in time, but regards nature as a magnificent system which reveals at once the profound antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity in the greatest variety of nuances and degrees, whilst none of these differences pertain to the absolute ground of his system. Time is nothing more than a finite form.— Schelling' s ideas have nevertheless contributed much towards producing the conviction of the inner identity of the forces and forms of nature. b. Schelling' s philosophy, with various modifications which we cannot here discuss, bore the character of ''Philosophy of Nature" throughout its first period (until 1803). But a problem now arises which all specu- lative philosophy must eventually take up: namely, if the Absolute is to be regarded as an absolute unity or indifference, how shall we explain the origin of differences, of levels or (as Schelling likewise remarks) of potencies? How can they have their ground in an absolute unity? He treats this problem in his essay on Philosophie und Religion (1804), which forms the transition from Schelhng s period of the philosophy of nature to that of the phi- losophy of reHgion. If experience reveals not only differences, but even antitheses which cannot be harmonized, it must mean that a faU from the eternal harmony must have taken place. Historical evolution implies the mastery of disharmonies and the restoration of harmonious unity. Just as he had made nature the preliminary of mind in the Philosophy of Nature, he now Hkewise construes history as a series of stages; not only the former but the latter is Hkewise an Odyssey of the soul, Schelling elaborated this idea more fully in the treatise Philosophische Untersuchungen uher das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhdngenden Gegenstdnde (1809). Schelling' s pHlosophy of reHgion was considerably influenced by the writings of Jacob Bohme, as this treatise in particular shows. Schelling seeks to prove that the only way God can be conceived as a personal being is to assume in Him an obscure pnnciple of nature which can be clarified and harmonized by the unfolding of the divine life. The infinite person- ality must contain the antithesis within itself, whilst the finite personalities discover their antitheses outside themselves. But without opposition and resist- ance there can be no life and no personaHty. Hence God could not be God if there were not something within him which is not yet God. Just as Schelling had read mind into nature in his PMlosophy of Nature, so he reads nature into the absolute tnind in his PhHosophy of ReHgion. But that obscure principle contains the possibiHty of evil, according to Schelling even as for Bohme. That which was merely intended to be principle and matter may separate, i. e. l82 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM isolate itself. We can thus understand egoism, the sin and evil in nature, the irrational in general, which refuses to conform with ideas. Thus Schelling passes into mythical mysticism. He elaborated his philosophy of religion in greater detail in works which appeared after his death, and which con- stituted the content of his Berlin lectures {PhUosophie der Mythologie and PhUosophie der Offenbarung), He regarded the history of religion as a great struggle with the Titanic elements which had been isolated by the Fall. This struggle takes place in the religious consciousness of mankind, which ascends through the various mythol- ogies to Christianity, and finally through the development of Christianity to the religion of pure spirit.— In addition to briUiant ideas and points of view, we find here also, just as in the Philosophy of Nature, a large measure of fantasy and arbitrariness. 3. George William Frederick Hegel (1770-1831) is the systematizer of Romanticism, just as Fichte was its moralist and Schelling its mystic. He too labored at the Univer- sity of Jena in his youth. Later on he went to Bavaria, first as an editor and afterwards as the director of a gym- nasium. He appeared again in the capacity of university professor at Heidelberg, but soon accepted a call to Ber- lin where he founded a large and influential school. a. Hegel undertook to construe the ideas which, ac- cording to his conception, express the essence of the various phases of existence in a progressive series based on logical necessity. What he called the dialectical method con- sisted in the discovery of the inherent necessity with which one concept leads on to another concept until at last all the concepts constitute one great system. Notwith- standing this however, this purely logical charagter, which HEGEL jg^ is SO prominent because of the severely systematic fonn of . Hegel s works, is not the fundamental characteristic of Hegelian thought. Hegel was naturaUy a reahst His supreme ambition consisted in penetrating into the real forces of bemg, and abstract ideas were intended to ex- ^ press only theforms of this content. He was of course con- vmced that the elements of reality in every sphere are essentially related to each other in the same way as ideas are m the mmd. In this way the twofold character of his .• philosophy as realistic penetration and logical system be- comes clear. Epistemologically tHs might be stated as Mows: namely, that he once more annuls the distinction between ground and cause {ratio and causa) which Hume and Kant had tnsisted on so strongly. To this extent he returns • to pre-cntical dogmatism. The realistic character is still quite dominant in HegePs earher works, with which we are acquainted through his manuscripts which have been used by a number of in- vestigators. During his youth he was much occupied with histoncal studies and reflections, especially those of a reHe- lous nature. He paid high tribute of praise to the periods m which men dwelt in natural fellowship, because the in- dmdual stiU constituted an actual part of the whole, and had not yet asserted itself with subjective reflection and cntiasm as is the case in modem times. Even Chris- tiamty appeared to him as a sign of disintegration because It was a matter of individual concern, whilst on the other hand he regarded classical antiquity as fortunately situ- ated because the individual Hved and wrought completely and spontaneously within the whole. Like Fichte (in the C^rundzuge des gegenwdrtigen Zeitalters) Hegel likewise experienced a profound sense of antagonism towards the enhghtenment, notwithstanding the fact that he too be- 1 84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM tt t » longed to this period. But it was not HegeVs affair to revel in ecstasies over the ideals of the past. According to him ideal and reality, reason and actuality, are not real opposites. He stood quite close to Schelling for a considerable period, during which time they pubUshed a paper in part- nership. But important differences gradually arose and Hegel assails his former colleague openly in the preface to his first important treatise, Phdnomenologie des Geistes (1807). He admits of course that Schelling understood that the problem consists in discovering the harmony be- tween the antitheses. But he operates with a mere schema (subject-object), which he applies to everything mechanically, instead of showing how the one member of the antithesis effects the transition to the other by an in- herent necessity, and how a higher unity of both is then formed. The absolute cannot be an immobile indiffer- ence; it is process, life, mind.— He showed, even in this book, how ordinary, practical consciousness rises to specu- lative consciousness through a series of steps, each of which leads to its successor by means of the contradictions discovered within itself. The reader is thus brought to the point from which he may grasp the pure system of ideas. This evolution takes place in the individual as well as in the human race as a whole; the Phenomenol- ogy is both a psychology and a history of civiHzation. The same law pertains to both reahns, the same progres- sive dialectic. b. According to Hegel dialectic is not only character- istic of thought, but it is likewise a fundamental law of being, because one form of existence always implies ' another and things are members of one grand totality. No single idea is capable of expressing the totahty of HEGEL jg^ being. Each idea leads to its own negative, because it reveals itself as limited and to that extent untrue. Nega- tion then brings a new concept into existence. But since this one is likewise determined by the first, the necessity of a higher unity is evident, a unity within which both find their explanation, because they are ''annulled'' in a two- fold significance,— namely, negated in their isolation and at the same time affirmed as moments of the higher unity. Hence, according to the dialectical method, thought pro- ceeds in triads, and the system of all these triads constitutes truth. Truth can never be particular, hut must always ber totality. The fact that dialectic constitutes the process of being is revealed by the fact that every phenomenon of nature and of history leads beyond itself and exists only as an element of a totality. It is evident that Hegel here con- strues all being after the analogy of consciousness; the things which constitute the universe are supposed to sus- tain the same relations among themselves as ideas sustain in our minds. But he likewise makes use of other anal- ogies. The effects of contrast show how the antitheses may oscillate from one to the other. And organic growth shows how it is possible for the earlier stages to determine the later and to continue their existence in them. Hegel constructs his theory of universal dialectic upon such anal- ogies without being clearly conscious of the fact himself. Everything perishes and yet there is nothing lost. The memory of the universal mind preserves everything. And it is because of 'its inherent identity with the universal mind that the human intellect is capable of evolving the pure forms of the universal dialectic. Kant's doctrine of the categories is transformed into a worid-system {Wissen- schaft der Logik, 181 2-1 8 16). i86 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM HEGEL 187 Pure logic however is only the first part of the system. This follows from the fact that the pure forms of logic constitute the antithesis to real nature. We are led from logic to the philosophy of nature (likewise the profoundest problem in HegeVs system), i. e. to the doctrine of the phenomena which occur in time and space, by a dialectical necessity. As a matter of fact we have here to deal with Schelling's ^^'YaXa,'' HegeVs exposition of the philosophy of nature is, so far as particulars are concerned, quite as . arbitrary and fantastic as that of Schelling, He likewise regards nature as a series of levels: we approach physics through mechanics, and thence to the organic sciences, but always under an ^^ inherent necessity, " Hegel has no more room for a real development in time than Schelling, — The philosophy of nature brings us to the philosophy of mind, the "higher unity" of the first two parts of the sys- tem. The struggle incident to the objective distraction of space and time matures the abstract idea and it now re- turns within itself. Dialectic likewise leads through a series of steps in this case. Subjective mind (in a series of steps known as soul, consciousness and reason), the mental life of the particular individual, leads to objective mind, which is manifested in the triad of right, individual . morality (conscience) and social morality (social and pohtical life). The higher unity of subjective and object- ive mind is absolute mind, the totality of mental life, in which the antithesis of subject and object is annulled. Absolute mind is revealed in art, religion and philosophy {Encyclopddie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 18 17). c. We shall discuss two divisions of the philosophy of . mind somewhat more in detail; the doctrine of objective * mind, which Hegel elaborated in his Philosophie des Rechts (182 1), and the Philosophy of Religion as treated in the Vorlesungen uher die Philosophie der Religion, published posthumously. Although Hegel no longer refers to the ancient charac- ter of the state with the same romantic fervor that char- acterized his early youth, his theory of the state neverthe- less assumes an antique character. Actual morality appears in the life of the family, political society and the state, and not only forms an antithesis to abstract and ob- jective right, but also to "morality," to subjective con- science in its isolation from the historical forms of society. The good exists in moral association and does not depend upon individual caprice and contingency. The moral world reveals the activity of something which is superior to the consciousness of the individual. The individual can only realize the highest type of development by a life in and for society. " The moral substance " is the mind which i governs the family, the political society, and above all the state. The state is the complete actuality of the moral idea: the fact that the state exists is the witness of God's course in the worid. The constitution of the state is a necessary consequence of its nature, and individual con- struction is here quite as much out of place as individual criticism. The modem state as a matter of fact is an organization of liberty; but this does not imply that the individual can participate in the government accord- ing to his individual caprice. The wise shall rule. Gov- ernmental authority belongs to the enlightened, the scien- tifically educated bureaucracy. The fact that the system- atic development of the Hegelian philosophy of right shows a striking correspondence with the constitution of Prussia at that time (as far as it may be called a constitu- tion) is not to be explained as a mere accommodation, but it was rather a consequence of HegeVs realism. Hegd i88 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM thinks the divine idea is not so feeble as to be unable to permeate reality — of the state as well as of nature — and it is not the business of philosophy to contrive new ideals, but to discover the ideality of the vital forms realized hitherto. The contrast between formalism and realism in the ' Hegelian philosophy appears perhaps most clearly in the sphere of religion. Here too it is HegeVs sole purpose to . penetrate the facts; even here the sole business of philos- ophy consists in understanding what is actually given. He was convinced that philosophy which is developed to perfect clearness has the same content as religion. Philos- ophy indeed seeks the unity of being through all antitheses and at every step, — and religion teaches that everything has its origin in the One God. The only difference is this: ' that what philosophy expresses in the form of the concept, religion expresses in the form of idea, of imagination. Phi- losophy states in the language of abstract eternal concepts what religion proclaims concretely and enthusiastically in sublime symbols. The relation (as Hegel remarks, bor- rowing an illustration from Hamann) is like that between the closed fist and the open palm. Religion, e. g., speaks of the creation of the world as a definite act in time, accom- plished once for all, whilst philosophy conceives the re- > lation between God and the world as eternal and timeless (like that of ground and consequence). In the religious doctrine of reconciliation God becomes incarnate, lives as a man, suffers and dies on the cross: according to philos- ophy this too is an eternal relationship : the incommensu- rability of the finite and the infinite which must constantly be annulled in consequence of its finite form, if it is to de- scribe an infinite result. — In the fervency of his zeal Hegel failed to see that this distinction of form might be of de- SCHLEIERMACHER 189 cisive importance. He describes the distinction between two world theories— the theory of monism or immanence and the theory of dualism or transcendence. Hegel re- veals his romanticism in the naive conviction that values are never destroyed by transposition into new forms. The problem which he thus neglected, as we shall presently see, was very clearly defined by his disciples. B. Critical Romanticists The critical philosophy was not wholly suppressed dur- ing the romantic period. There were certain thinkers, who, whilst profoundly affected by the romantic tendency' had nevertheless not rejected the results of the critical philosophy. Although critics in epistemology, they en- deavored at the same time by various methods to secure a theory of life which would transcend the limitations of science. Among these we mention Schleiermacher^Schopen- hauer and Kierkegaard, I. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834) completed his first courses of study at a Moravian institu- tion, and even there ah-eady laid the foundation of his dis- tinctive theory of life. The desire for a broader and more critical training took him to the imiversity at Halle, where he later, after serving a nimiber of years in a pastorate, became professor of theology. After the battle of Jena he went to Berlin, where, as professor and preacher, he labored not only on behalf of science and the church, but in the interest of public questions and the affairs of the nation. He came to the conclusion early in life that the real characteristic feature of human life, its real nature, has its seat in the affections, and that in them alone man experi- ences the totality of his personal self. In addition to this IQO THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM SCHLEIERMACHER 191 he acquired, both by independent reflection and by the study of the works of Kanty a clear insight into the Hmits of human knowledge. He did not join the circle of romanticists until later. Dilthey has described this course of the development of the critical romanticist in his Leben ScMeiermachers. Schleiermacher's position in the history of philosophy is characterized by the fact that he keeps the spirit of the critical philosophy aHve within the ranks of romanticism. His Socratic personality, in which the capac- ity of complete inner devotion was imited with a remark- able degree of calm discretion, furnished the basis for the combination of romanticism and criticism. According to his view the things which criticism destroyed and would no longer regard as objectively true did not necessarily lose their religious value if they could be supported as the symbolic expression of an affective personal experience. ScMeiermacher reveals his romanticism especially in the fact that he does not distinguish sharply between symbol and dogma. He failed to see that as a matter of fact he assigned to religion a different position in the spiritual life than that which the chxirch could accept. In his Reden uher die Religion an die Gehildeten unter ihren Verdchtern (1799) he defined immediate intuition and feeling, by which man is enabled to experience the infinite and the eternal, as the psychological basis of religion. Here every antithesis is annulled, whilst knowledge must forever move from idea to idea and volition from task to task. The only method by which intellectual, aesthetic and moral culture can attain their completion is by finally resting on subjective concentration such as is given in feeling alone. Hence S Meier macher defines religion from the standpoint of human nature, not vice versa. He seeks to show the value of religion for life. ScMeiermacher^ s philosophical labors cover the depart ments of eptstemology, ethics and the phUosophy of religion . t. ^.^/^vff gates the presuppositions of knowledge m his Dialechk (which was published only after his death) Knowledge exists only in the case where every single idea IS not only necessarily combined with all other ideas but where an actual reality likewise corresponds to the'par- ticular Ideas. The relations between ideas must corre- spend with the relations between things. Particularly does the causal relation of objective reality correspond to the combination of concepts expressed in judgments. Here Schleier macher presents a mixture of criticism and dogmatism. He forgets that the only knowledge we have of reality IS by means of our thoughts, and furthennore to reality and thought forever remain incomparable. He nevertheless assumes that the identity of thought and being IS a presupposition of knowledge, but not in itself biowledge. He thus opposes Schelling, for whom in fact that v^rj identity constituted the highest kind of knowl- edge. But, according to ScUeier macher, Schelling offers nothing more than abstract schemata.-The pathway from that presupposition, which fornis the starting-point of knowledge, to the idea of a complete totality of all exist- ence, which would be the consummation of aU knowledge- or, as It may likewise be expressed, from the idea of God to the Idea of the universe-is a long one, and it can never be compassed by human knowledge. Knowledge is only provmonal We are always somewhere between the be- ^nmng and the end of knowledge and neither the one nor the other can be transformed into actual knowledge. But beyond the confines of knowledge the unity of being can be directly experienced in the affections and expressed in symbols. Here dialectic justifies every symbol which 192 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROMANTICISM maintains the inseparability of the beginning and the end (God and the world). It is impossible to construe either of these from the standpoint of the other. But dialectic insists, in opposition to the reHgious method of represen- tation, on the symboHc character of all expressions which are supposed to describe God, the world, and their respec- tive relationship. Thus, e. g. the term ''person,'' when applied to God, is nothing more than a symbol. b. Just as knowledge presupposes the unity of thought and being, so action likewise presupposes the unity of will and being. Action would be impossible if the will were absolutely foreign and isolated in the world. The former presupposition can no more be a fact of knowledge than the latter. We are thus led from dialectics to ethics (cf. a series of essays published in Complete Works, III, 2, and Philosophische Sittenlehre, pubHshed by Schweizer, 1835). According to S Meier macher ethics is a theory of development in which reason and desire cultivate and govern nature. This development would be impossible if reason and will were not already present in nature. Nature is a kind of ethics of a lower order, a diminutive ethics. Will reveals itself by degrees— in the inorganic forms, in the life of plants and of animals, and finally in human life. There is no absolute beginning of ethical development. Here S Meier macher in direct opposition to Kant and FiMe coordinates ethics with nature and history. But it is nevertheless only within the realm of humanity that he accepts an actual, real development. Ethical capacity consists partly of organization, i. e. of constructive and formative power, partly symbolizing, i. e. expressive and descriptive power. Its organizing activity is shown in material culture and in commercial and legal business. In its symbolizing activity man ob- SCHLEIERMACHER jectifies his itmer experiences in art, science and religion -Whilst m his youth Schleiermacher {Monologe SS was impatient with the prominence ascibed to ma S culture and as a matter of fact wanted to reco^^ "ht symbolizing" activity alone as ethical, later on^e triS to^r.o^..e both foi^s of activity in th;ir distin-ctt"^ He disagreed with Kant and Fichte not only in the mat- ter of the intimate relation of ethics to nat^e, but Se- mse m Ins strong emphasis on individuality. The natoe of he mdividual is not exhausted in the u^versal and "! cal. The only way an individual can possess any moral value IS by n.eans of the fact that he expresses S is universal m human nature in an individual way hL acts must therefore necessarily contain something whkh codd not pertain to another individual. The in^^S ould not have been fully active in the case of any ret 5 h. which lacked the distinguishing marks of his ISlS- /' A ?.?' inception of religion Schleiermacher is in- clined both to mteUectualism and to moralism. He assies £rZ T rr "'"^ *^^ ^^-'^ -' the mental S! S^^t^'*.'"*^"^ '^*'"^' '^^ -h-^ t^t which is mdividual IS just m process of differentiating itself from h umvers^, .Jhout however as yet having attaTedTS antithesis of subject aniobject. This point is riven in die Rehgton) descnbed as a sense of unity later on rtn Derchristliche Glauie, x8.x) rather a^a sen^ 7i de Pendence. It is the Urth-place of pZanal^ In £l fta Je^/" '\rt P"""^ -'^ 'i^P-on'earH Comte himself added ethics as a seventh science. Accord- ing to his conception, ethics is moixj specialized tliaii 228 POSITIVISM COMTE 229 sociology, because it goes more into details, especially in the fact that it places special emphasis on the affections, which receive but little attention in sociology. c. Comte^s positivism is not empiricism. As a matter of fact the theory of stages presupposes that the facts must always be combined; the only question is, whence is the combining instrument to be derived. In the positive stage the combination can be effected in two ways. We associate phenomena which are given simultaneously according to their similarity of structiu-e and function. We nat\irally arrange phenomena which follow in succes- sion in a temporal series. The former is a static explana- tion {par similitude) ; the latter is a dynamic explanation {par filiation). We satisfy oiu* mind's native impulse for unity by both methods and thus discover the constant in the midst of change {Discours sur Vesprit positif, 1844). Of this combining function of the mind, which Comte here presupposes, he made no ftuther investigation. His works contain no epistemological nor pS3^chological analyses. His conception of knowledge is biological. Our knowledge is determined by the interaction of our organism with the objective world, of our understanding with the milieu. The elaboration of the impressions received from without follows the laws of our organiza- tion, and all knowledge is therefore determined by a relation of subject and object. Comte is of the opinion that in this biological theory of knowledge he is a fol- lower of Kant and Aristotle, — In his later years he came to emphasize the subjective character of our knowledge more and more, until he finally proposed a subjective system instead of the objective system given in the Cours de philosophie positive. d. The term sociology was formulated by Comte and, despite its philological indefiniteness, it has gradually come to mean the rights of citizenship in scientific ter- minology. In Comic's sense, the term sociology covers what has generally been called the philosophy of history, and in addition thereto, political economy, ethics and the major portion of psychology. Just as in other depart- ments of science, so likewise in sociology we must dis- tinguish between statics and dynamics. Social statics includes the doctrine of the reciprocal relation of the factors of society, e. g., ideas, customs and institutions. The business of institutions is simply to regulate whatever has been evolved in the course of unconstrained cooperation. As compared with spon- taneous development, law and the state are of subor- dinate importance, and the concept of law is subordinate to the concept of duty. The concept of duty originates from the individual's consciousness of being a member of the social whole. And this consciousness arises at the moment when the soHdarity of the himian race is first felt and recognized. Mankind spontaneously follows the social impulse, and only later discovers the advantages which thus accrue. On this point Comte regards Hume and Adam Smith as his predecessors. He discovers the first germs of solidarity in biology: in the sexual instinct and in the instinct to care for offspring. In the realm of mankind there is a constant progressive discipline towards altruism (which term was likewise formidated by Comte), The individual, considered by himself and in isolation, is a mere abstraction. The family is the social unit; here we have more than a mere association, it is a complete union. In larger societies the cooperation of individuals towards common ends and imder the inspiration of com- 230 POSITIVISM PHILOSOPHY BEFORE MILL 231 mon ideas is of pectdiar importance. The supreme idea is the idea of hiimanity, to which all individual and social development should be subservient. — Cotnte challenges the distinction between private and public functions. This distinction belongs to modem thought; it was un- known to the Greeks and to the Middle Ages. It is the duty of positive philosophy to develop a sentiment by means of which all should be enabled to regard them- selves as co-laborers of the one great body of humanity. It is especially important to incorporate the proletariat, which has arisen since the abolition of slavery, into the social system. The law of the three stages, with which we are already acquainted, belongs to social dynamics. The various stages of intellectual development correspond to definite stages of social and political development. Militarism corresponds with the theological stage. This is the period of regulative authority. The control of the jurists ("legislators") corresponds with the metaphysical stage; their specific task consists in regulating the rights of the various classes, partictdarly the rights of the middle class, of the miHtary and of the clergy. Industrialism corre- sponds with the positive stage; the distribution of power is now determined by productive capacity, and social problems take the place of the political problems. e. In a later work (Politique positive j 185 1-4) Comte imdertook to lay the fotmdation of a new religion, the Religion of Himianity. (The complete title therefore reads as follows: Politique positive j ou traite de sociologie instituant la religion de Vhumanite.) Whilst in his Cours he made the world or nature his starting-point and aimed to attain an understanding of man on the basis of the knowledge of nature, he would now replace this objective method by a subjective method. Nature as a whole must be construed from the himian standpoint and humanity described as the highest being (le grand etre). The affections and not merely the imderstanding are now to be the final arbiter, and synthesis, i. e., the con- ception of unity, is to be regarded as superior to analysis and specialization. The new religion is to be a worship of humanity, of which we are all members, — those now living as well as those who have died and those as yet unborn. Every thought and action is to be directed towards the development of this Grand etre. The constitution of the future is to be a Sociocracy, a social community without fixed institutions. The patricians direct production, whilst the proletariat represent the dynamic, the philosophers the reason, and the women the affections of the social body. Public opinion and the right of refusal to cooperate will furnish an adequate check against any misuse of power on the part of the spiritual or temporal authorities. — ^Thus the foimder of positivism ends up as a Utopian romanticist. His school divides on this point, several of them (as e. g. Littre) maintaining the theory of the Cours, whilst others (such as Lafitte and Rohinet) regarded the Politique positive as the actual culmination of the positive philosophy. C. English Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century before John Stuart Mill. Both in Germany and in France the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century was effected by a revolution — ^in Germany by the romantic revolution in the sphere of thought, in France by the political revolution. In England on the other hand there were a number of energetic philosophic thinkers who endeav- 232 POSITIVISM BENTHAM ^33 ored to make a practical application of the principles dis- covered by the eighteenth century to the problems of the nineteenth centiiry. The EngHsh philosophy of the nineteenth centxiry therefore, in its chief representatives, bears the stamp of radicalism and empiricism. Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, pronounced adherents of the radical enlightenment, produced a profotmd impression on the first decades of the centxiry. John Stuart Mill afterwards undertook on the one hand a consistent development of their principles, and on the other to adapt them to the changed setting of the problem, — namely, that brought about by the romanticism represented by Coleridge and Carlyle and the criticism represented by Hamilton and Whewell. I. Jeremy Bentham' s (i 748-1832) most important philosophical writings had appeared already in the eighteenth century (^4 Fragment on Government, 1776; Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789). But they did not make much of an impression tmtil after the dawn of the new century. Bentham, who, as a private scholar, devoted himself uninterruptedly to his efforts for social and legislative reform, assumed as his chief task the reform of English legislation. He demanded a codification of the laws (he formulated the term codifi- cation himself), a reduction in the costs of legal processes, prison reform and an extension of political franchise. Theoretically he assumed the principle of the greatest happiness to the greatest number, previously advocated by Hutcheson, as the fimdamental principle of morality. This principle, which to his mind is self-evident, is to govern our judgment of every institution, every action, every quaHty and every motive. Bentham attacks the so-called natural rights as well as the morality which is founded on authority and tradition. He examines the intensity, persistence, certainty, intimacy, purity and fruitfulness of pleasurable feelings which follow our acts and which condition the value of an act. He investi- gates the motives of action in order to discover what motives should be fostered and what others should be restrained. He regards self-interest, properly tmder- stood, as the most reliable motive, because he believed that self-interests, properly understood, are harmonious, so that the individual must necessarily be interested in the general welfare even for prudential considerations. This idea is expressed very one-sidely and harshly in a work {Deontology) that was published posthumously, and perhaps interpolated by the publisher. Bentham' s friend, James Mill (i 772-1836), was a zealous exponent of the radical application of the principle of utility. This energetic man, whose high official position in the East India Company excluded him from Parliament, acted as counsellor of the radical politicians who were working for parliamentary reform, and above all else the emancipation of the middle classes. He under- took the theoretical task of furnishing a psychological basis for Bentham' s ethical theory, the so-called utili- tarianism. He discovered such a basis in the Asso- ciational psychology founded by Hume and Hartley, which he greatly simplified by referring all combinations of ideas to association between such ideas as frequently take place together (association by contiguity) (Anal- ysis of the Human Mind, 1829). He attaches special importance to the fact that the association may be so completely subjective that an entirely new totality may arise, without containing any traces of the original elements whatever. By this method he aims to show, 234 POSITIVISM CARLYLE 235 i. e. to explain, how selfless ("disinterested'') feelings may arise. Such feelings are secondary; they arise from the fact that something which is at first capable of exciting pleasure only as a means afterwards becomes an end and then acts as a pleasurable stimulus directly. This is the psychological explanation of the immediacy of conscience. (The best exposition of this theory is given by James Mill in appendix B. of his polemical essay, Fragment on Mackintosh, 1835.) 2. Against these enthusiastic advocates of empirical and analytical psychology and ethics there arose a roman- tic tendency, under German influence, whose most noted representatives were Coleridge and Carlyle. Samuel Taylor Coleridge (i 772-1834) in his early youth was an ardent disciple of the associationist psychol- ogy. But he later became an opponent of all analysis and of every effort to explain mental life by elementary principles, and, in adherence to Schelling, he proclaimed the awe-inspiring totality of all things as intuitively appre- hended, in opposition to the empiricism wliich brwiks everything to pieces. He however attaches special im- portance to the Kantian antithesis of "undcrstandinK*^ and "reason." He charged all rehgious criticism to the account of the pure "understanding,'* and thtm refuted it by an appeal to the higher court of "re;i.wn, " the faculty of ideas and the theory of totality. He not only hurls his polemics against the free-thinkers, but likewise against the theology which has degenerated into barren dogmatic formulas. His great work which was inttiTuled to show the agreement of Christianity and philosophy was never written. We gather his ideas from his essays on Church and State (especially the appendix) and fn;m his Bio- graphia Literaria and his Table Talk. Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) did not care to attain any "higher" knowledge. He satirized Coleridge's ''tran- scendental moonshine^ He proposed a new basis of faith and for the guidance of life to which he was led by the study of Goethe and the romantic philosophy. His effort was directed towards securing independence from the never-ending investigations of science. After having extricated himself from materialistic theories in his early youth, he cherished a romantic aversion towards analysis and criticism. His polemic appHes especially to the "philosophy of cause and effect" and the utilitarian ethics. In his profoundest essay. Sartor Res artus (1833), he develops a ''philosophy of old clothes,'' based on Kant's distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself : The world is the gamicnt of Deity; natural $ckiioc€3Kimii>estlie gamient without knowinj^ its wearer. Nature is a mighty syrnlK)l, a revelation of ideas wliidx no scientific method is capable of conceiving. It i.s the duty of philosopliy evw and anon to inspire the sense of the mysterious majesty of l>dng when men have fallen xslccp through familiarity. Even our ideas of belief arc garments of I>eily; — ^but the garment of 1 )city must be woven anew from time to time. Carlyle' s practical view of life reveals two distiitct char* acteristics. — Everything great takes place quietly» in silence. Great deeds are accomplishod without any express consciousness of the fact. A full and clear oon- sciousn(\*;.s makes everytlung Kmall and mechanical. The highest truth, so far as man is cxmcemed, can only exist in the form of a symbol: the symbol ^ithhoMs and expresses, obscures and revejil.s at one and the same time. — The hi^he-st revelation consists of the ^reat men, the heroes {On Heroes and Hero-worship, 184 1). They are the guides and i)attcnis, the founders of e\'efytliing that is 236 POSITIVISM HAMILTON 237 ■ good. The hero may appear as prophet, poet or states- man; but he always represents great, concentrated energy of life, and his words and deeds reveal the hidden ideas of the movement of life. Such heroes are especially neces- sary for the solution of the social problem. Carlyle was one of the first authors, who — in opposition to the then dominant school of political economy — noted the exist- ence of this problem. He made no specific investigations. Empirical science was too distasteful to him for that. 3. In the same year (1829) that James Mill published his Analysis f the most important work of the asso- ciationist psychology, William Hamilton's profound treatise on The Philosophy of the Unconditioned likewise appeared, in which he severely criticized all philosophy that treated the unconditioned as an object of knowledge. Hamilton (i 788-1 856) spent a ntunber of years in fruitful professorial activity at the university of Edinburgh. — Whatever we apprehend and conceive — ^by the very fact of its apprehension and conception — ^is related to some- thing else, by which it is limited and conditioned. To think is to condition. We neither conceive an absolute whole, nor an absolute part; each whole is a part, and each part is a whole. We only know the conditioned finite. We define whatever we know in terms of space, time and degree (extensively, protensively and intensively) and even the law of causaHty is likewise nothing more than a special form of the law of relativity. Hamiltonregaxds the principle of causality as the expression of otir incapacity to conceive an absolute addition of reahty. On account of this incapacity we try to conceive the new (as effect) as a new form of the old (as cause). If cause and effect should fail to fully correspond to each other, we should be com- pelled to assume an absolute beginning of the new. Hence, according to Hamilton (like Cusanus), philosophy ends in a docta ignorantia. Its value consists in its constant seeking, by means of which the energies of the mind are exercised. Hamilton is nevertheless convinced that faith in the unconditioned is necessary in order to establish oiir spiritual existence. The more refined definitions of unconditioned being can only be secured by analogy with human personality. — ^This argument was applied to the defense of the orthodox faith by Hamilton's disciple, Henry Mansel {Limits of Religious Thought^ 1858). William Whewell (1795-1866), professor at Cam- bridge, demonstrated the principles of the critical philos- ophy from another point of view. He endeavored to verify Kant's fundamental principles as the necessary presuppositions of the inductive sciences {History of the Inductive Sciences , 1837; Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences J founded on their History ^ 1840). Induction signifies not only a collection of facts, but their arrange- ment according to some governing principle. The organ- ization of the facts is possible only in case the investi- gator brings such a principle with him (as e. g. Kepler brought the idea of the ellipse to his studies of the planets). We must finally go back to the fundamental concepts which express the very principles of our cognitive faculty, principles which form the basis of all sense perception and all induction. Such fundamental concepts are: time, space, cause (in mechanics), end (in biology), and duty (in ethics). These cannot be analyzed into simpler concepts. D. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). John Stuart Mill, the son of James Mill, was trained in the ideas of the radical enlightenment, as they had been developed by his father and Bentham, and he accepted 238 POSITIVISM MILL 239 them as a veritable gospel. In his very interesting auto- biography he describes how the ideas adopted during his childhood and youth came into sharp conflict with the ideas and moods of a later period which likewise agitated his very soul, and how he was then compelled to struggle through a mental crisis. This contradiction not only appears in his life but likewise in his works, and the inconsistencies which, despite his vigorous intellectual effort, his theories reveal, are partly due to this fact. There likewise exists an intimate relation between his theoretical views and his efforts for social reform. The fact that in philosophy he seeks to derive everj^hing from pure experience does not rest upon ptu-e theoretical con- viction alone, but he likewise regarded it as a weapon against the prejudices which impede progress (similar to the French philosophers of the eighteenth century).— Like his father. Mill was an officer of the India Company; after its dissolution he was a member of Parliament for a short time. a. Stuart MilVs System of Logic (1843) contains the answer of the English school to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and at the same time the most radical form of empirical epistemology. According to Kant's fimdamental principle, all real experience contains a ra- tional element, which can be discovered by analysis. Mill now undertakes to show not only that all knowledge proceeds from experience, but that experience itself involves no antecedent presuppositions. He would make experience the standard of experience. ' ' We make ex- perience its own test!''— By experience (like Hume) he means a sum of impressions, and his problem consists in showing how universal principles can be derived from such a simi. Mill bases his logical investigations partly on histor- ical and partly on psychological principles. In matters pertaining to the history of thought, as he openly acknowledged, he was greatly benefited by WhewelVs work on the History of the Inductive Sciences, John HerscheVs book On the Study of Natural Philos- ophy (1831) was likewise one of his preparatory studies. Mill's problem consisted in describing the fundamental methods of inductive thought by an analysis of the methods of the empirical sciences as these had been de- veloped during the past three centuries, and then to examine what presuppositions underlie this thought. — He discovers foiu- methods of induction. The method of agreement infers, from a series of cases, in which two circimistances (A and B) always succeed each other, whilst all other circumstances vary, a causal connection between A and B. But this inference is not certain imtil we can at the same time apply the method of difference because it shows that B does not appear whenever A is ex- cluded, and vice versa. This is the chief inductive method. To this is added the method of residues, in which every- thing previously explained is eliminated and an inference is then drawn concerning the relation of the remaining circimistances, and the method of proportional variation, in which we have two series of experiences which vary proportionally between each other and infer a causal relation between them. Mill illustrates these methods by striking examples from the history of the sciences. He attempted, by this exposition, to substitute a system- atization of inductive logic for the Aristotelian system- atization of deductive logic; his logic was a continuation of Bacon's work. He differs from Bacon not only in the wealth and quantity of the examples at his disposal 240 POSITIVISM KILL 241 but likewise by his clearer insight into the necessity of forming hypothesis and by the interchange of induction and deduction. The deductive method becomes neces- sary especially in cases where there are large numbers of contributing factors. We must then examine each factor separately by induction and then test by deduction from the residts of these separate investigations whether the interplay of all the factors is explainable. The final analysis of thought reveals the psychological basis of MiWs logic. According to Mill every deduction presupposes an induction. For — ^in his opinion — deduc- tion starts from a general proposition; but whence can this proposition be derived, if not from experience? Every general proposition implies a reference to a number of experiences. We ultimately come back to the par- tictdar impressions. The beginning of the whole knowl- edge-process consists in the fact that two phenomena take place coincidently. Once this has happened frequently, the presence of the one phenomenon will arouse an expec- tation of the other. This is the fundamental form of inference. It does not however start from a general proposition, but rather proceeds from particulars to particulars. The child withdraws its hand from the burning taper, not because of its knowledge of the general proposition, that contact with fire is painful, but because the sight of fire immediately arouses the idea of pain. It is therefore an objective association (association by contact) that forms the original basis of all inference: all logical principles are eliminated. The transition from one idea to another takes place immediately , and, according to Mill, this means, without ground. — In the theory of causality Mill would likewise eliminate all presupposi- tions. Mill concedes however that the inductive methods are demonstrable only on the presupposition of the causal principle. Notwithstanding the fact that B always follows A, and B does not appear in the absence of A, nevertheless our only groimd of inference to a causal relation between A and B is the presupposition that B must have a cause. What then is the source of the causal prindple? Mill answers: the same as all general prop- ositions, experience, i. e., induction. — ^The circumlocution which is here apparent in MilVs argument has been clearly exposed by Stanley Jevons (in a series of articles under the title, Stuart MilVs Philosophy Tested^iiSjj- 1879) — ^reprinted in Pure Logic and other Minor Works). Jevons had already demonstrated in his Principles of Science (1874) that the principle of identity is presup- posed as the basis of all inference, because of the fact that the proof of an induction always consists of a deduc- tion, which carries its inference back from a hypothetical proposition to the given impressions. MiWs attempt therefore to fiunish a system of logic which is wholly inductive did not succeed. This attempt forms the coimterpart to HegeVs attempt to invent a logic which is wholly deductive. Mill tried to spin the forms of thought from their content, Hegel the content of thought from its forms. It is in these two men that the contrast between romanticism and positivism is most sharply drawn. b. The pyschological presuppositions at the basis of MilVs logic come from James MilVs Analysis, They were the presuppositions of the ^^ Associational Psy- chology:' When, in his later years (1869), Stuart Mill pubhshed a new edition of the Analysis, in his appended notes he modified his psychological theory. Following Alexander Bain (whose chief works are The Senses and the 242 POSITIVISM MILL 243 Intellect, 1856, and The Emotions and the Will, 1859), he here shows that the objective association (association by contact) constantly presupposes a subjective correlate (association by similarity). He had even before that, in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865), indicated a still more radical change in the funda- mentals of his psychology. He then saw that such phenomena as anticipation and recollection cannot be accounted for by the theory of consciousness imderl3dng the '' Associational Psychology''— viz,, that of a mere sum of elements. The phenomena mentioned prove — so he thinks — that the bond by which the psychical elements are held together is just as real as the elements them- selves, and that it cannot be derived from these elements. And the term ''Ego'' appHes to this bond alone. Mill therefore once more revives Hume's ''uniting principle," which had been forgotten in the " Associational Psychol- ogy," and as a matter of fact even accorded it a central position. Had he then been able to revise his logic, the possibilities were present of developing the prin- ciples of knowledge as ideaHzed psychical tendencies.— The modifications and even the inconsistencies contained in Mill's theories bear witness to the indefatigability and candor of his investigations. c. In ethics even as in psychology Stuart Mill was also originally a disciple of his father; here he was Hkewise a disciple of Bentham, The objectivity and onesideness of Bentham's utiHtarianism had however been brought to his attention even in his early youth, especially through the influence of Coleridge and Carlyle, Nevertheless, he never surrendered the presupposition that the ultimate criterion for the evaluation of himian actions must be sought in their effects on human happiness. The aim is not the greatest possible happiness for the actor himself, but the greatest possible happiness for all who are affected by the results of the action. Stuart Mill bases this prin- ciple, not on the self-interest of the actor properly under- stood as Bentham had done, but on the psychological nature of the moral sentiment {Utilitarianism, 1863). In his theory of this sentiment he adopted the doctrine of the metamorphoses of sentiments' as developed by Hartley and James Mill The origin of the moral sentiment is due to the cooperation of a large number of elements: sympa- thy, fear, reverence, experiences of the effects of actions, self-esteem and the desire for the esteem of others. It is in this complex nature that the cause of the mystical character attaching to the idea of moral obHgation is to be found. The complex may however become so completely subjective and perfect that the sentiment itself will appear as unitary. Its development ordinarily takes place under the influence of social life by which individuals are accustomed to regard common interests and to enlist united efforts. In this way a sentiment of soHdarity and unity evolves which may even (as in the case of Comte's religion of humanity) assume a reHgious character. But Mill not only modified utilitarianism by the emphasis which he placed on the subjective factor, but likewise by the assumption of the qualitative differences of the sentiments. He thinks "happiness" must not be estimated according to quantity alone, but likewise according to quality. He says, like Plato (in the ninth book of the Republic), that he alone who knows the various qualities of happiness from personal experience is in position to furnish a valid estimate of their different values. A Socrates dissatisfied is better than a satisfied idiot. 244 POSITIVISM MILL 245 These modifications reveal the fact that the ethical problem is far more consequential and difficult than the older utilitarians ever dreamed. Henry Sidgwick (1838- 1900), who, in his penetrating work The Method of Ethics (1877), distinguishes definitely between two distinct kinds of utilitarianism, of which the one is based on self- interest, the other on altruism, saw this clearly. He likewise shows that the practical ethics (the morality of common sense) which prevails at the present time rests imconsciously upon a utiHtarian presupposition. d. Mill produced a number of important works in the department of social ethics, which made a profound impression upon the life of the age. Thus, e. g., in his book On Liberty (1859) he asserted the right of the indi- vidual to the free development of his native powers, and endeavored to estabHsh definite limits for the inter- position of legislation and of pubHc opinion. His funda- mental principle is that the impulse to everything noble and great proceeds from individual geniuses, who are the salt of the earth. In his Subjection of Women (1869) he makes a peculiar application of the principle of liberty to the position of woman. He likewise holds that our ideas of the *' nature*' of woman have been derived from the subordinate and retiring position which woman has hitherto occupied, and he anticipates splendid contri- butions to htmian culture after women are enabled to develop their faculties just as freely as man has ahready done for ages. In his Considerations on Representative Government (1861) he regards the poHtical issue at the present time as a conflict between democracy and bureau- cracy, which must be brought to an end by the former enlisting the services of the latter and only retaining a general control. He likewise recommends a proportionate franchise in order to guarantee the rights of the minority. Mill's future ideal however went beyond a political democracy. He is convinced that personal and political liberty cannot be secured without great social and economic changes {Principles of Political Economy^ 1849). Here he is confronted by the profotmd, according to him, diametrical antithesis of individualism and sociaHsm, and he frankly acknowledges that he is at a loss to know how to reconcile them. He holds however that neither the individualistic nor the socialistic fundamental principle has been theoretically and practically developed in its best possible form. Hence, e. g. the right of private property might readily be maintained, if the laws would take even as much pains to reduce its difficulties as they now take in order to increase them. Socialists are wrong when they make competition the ground of social evil. The cause lies in the fact that labor is subject to capital, and Mill expects great things from the trades unions and producers unions, especially because they encourage the virtues of independence — ^namely, justice and self-control. e. MilVs religious views appear only by way of suggestion in the works published by himself. He holds, in opposition to Comte (in his book on Comte, 1865), that theological and metaphysical theories are not necessarily destroyed by the attainment to the positive stage of science, but they must not contradict the results of scientific investigation. There are .some open questions! But he protested vigorously against the teaching of Hamilton and Mansel (especially the latter), that the concepts (particularly ethical concepts) must be treated as having an entirely different content when applied to deity than when applied to man. He would refuse to call any being good — even if that being were able to 246 POSITIVISM DARWIN 247 condemn him eternally for so doing — ^who is not what we mean when we call a man good. He expresses himself more fully in his posthimious Essays on Religion (1847). He denies that he can infer an omniscient, omnipotent, and absolutely good Creator from the facts of nature. He regards it possible how- ever on the other hand to believe in a personal God, who, in constant conflict with uncreated and persistently resistant matter, is seeking to bring about a beneficent order of nature. Man can therefore, by his own effort, be a co-laborer with God, and, according to Milly the real religious attitude consists in the sentiment aroused by this fellowship. He attaches great importance to the fact that such thoughts and sentiments elevate man above the limitations of experience and the prosiness of ordinary life. E. The Philosophy of Evolution. About the middle of the nineteenth century the theory of evolution came into vogue and was recognized as an essential element of human thought. The romantic philosophy had indeed likewise spoken of evolution, but they simply meant by this a ptu-ely logical or systematic relation of the forms and types of being, not a real process, taking place in time. The idea of evolution had already made itself felt however in various departments of thought. Thus, e. g., in the astronomical hypothesis of Kant and Laplace ^ in the theory of epigenesis (i. e. the theory of the gradual evolution of the embryo from a simple rudiment) as formulated by the anatomist, Caspar Wolff J in the psychology of Spinoza^ Hartley and James Milly in the eighteenth century belief in the evolution of history, in Comte's theory of the three stages. Lamarck finally announced the theory of a continuous evolution of organic species by means of a progressive transformation of the organs brought about through the constant exercise of its powers. But the evolutionary theory only received general recognition as a fundamental principle in wider circles after the announcement of Darwin's hypothesis of the origin of the organic species by the process of natural selection, Herbert Spencer at the same time undertook to determine the fundamental forms of evolution by analysis of the phenomena in the various departments of experi- ence, after having previously shown how characters which are unexplainable from the viewpoint of the experience of the individual may be explained from the viewpoint of race-experience. I. The great naturalist, Charles Darwin (i 809-1 881), deserves a place in the history of philosophy, because, like Copernicus J Galileo and Newton y he is of profound significance in the treatment of philosophical problems, not only on accotmt of his results, but likewise on account of his theory of science and its sphere. After a tour of the world covering three years, upon which he collected his large supply of specimens and observations, he lived in the solitude of the country as a quiet investigator. His effort to explain the origin of the species was in complete harmony with the spirit of positivism. He referred to a fact which was actually operative in nature: namely, the necessity for every living being to possess the attributes and equipment essential to the preservation of life, or as he expressed it figuratively, the struggle for existence. If we persist in saying that the species were created, each one independently, this, in the eyes of Darwiny is but a pious way of expressing our ignorance. The struggle for existence however is not the whole M^l 248 POSITIVISM DARWIN 249 cause. It presupposes that individual organisms reveal variations which may be either more or less favorable to their preservation or to the preservation of the species to which they belong. Those individuals which show favor- able variations would naturally survive in the struggle for existence {Origin of S pedes j 1858). Darwin foimd the proof of his theory in the ^^intelligible thread'^ by means of which a vast array of facts can be combined. He did not regard his theory as a dogma, but rather as an instrument of research. He always insisted on tracing out the significance which a given character, function or organ possessed for the struggle for exist- ence. — He regarded the problem concerning the origin of the variations by virtue of which natural selection takes place as a weakness in his hypothesis. He assumes the fact that such variations exist, and for the time being calls them ^^ chance-variations y^^ only meaning by this however that their causes are imknown. He takes a similar attitude to the problem of life in general. Darwin^s assimiption that very small variations fur- nish a real advantage in the struggle for existence was perhaps an error. Hugo de Vries has quite recently undertaken to show that very important variational ** leaps" ("mutations") may take place and that a new type may thus arise at once, which must then establish itself in the struggle for existence. It has become appar- ent, fiirthermore, that these mutational types are very tough. The contrast between the types and variations consequently becomes even sharper than Darwin^ and especially the Darwinians, who have frequently been more dogmatic than their master, ever supposed. Darwin saw no reason for regarding man an exception from the general biological laws. In his opinion the actual value and the actual dignity of man suffers no diminution by regarding him as having evolved from lower forms. For the theological and romantic concep- tion, which regarded man as a fallen angel, he substituted the realistic conception of man as an animal which has evolved a spiritual nature {The Descent of Man, 1871). Darwin elaborates his views on the problems of moral philosophy in the third chapter of his book on the origin of man. He sympathizes with the view represented by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume. He starts with the principle that a group of animals or men among which the idea of sympathy and mutual helpfulness prevails would be favorably situated in the struggle for existence. He thus discovers a biological foundation for the moral sentiment. According to Darwin this sentiment presupposes, besides sociability and sympathy, the faculty of recollection and comparison. With these conditions given we have the basis for a more or less conscious estimate and judgment of actions. After the faculty of language has been evolved mutual praise and blame can Hkewise exert its influence. Public opinion can then take form. Habit and exercise in efforts for the common welfare would also tend to give permanence and strength to the social motives and instincts. The characters thus acquired may perhaps likewise be transmitted by inheritance (as Lamarck had assumed). Touching reHgion Darwin was still a believer in revela- tion when he returned from his famous tour. His views changed gradually, without any painful rupture, and he finally (in 1876, and published in Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, 1887), adopting a form of expression introduced by Huxley, declared himself an agnostic, i. e. one who knows that the solution of the problem of being 2 so POSITIVISM SPENCER 251 is beyond our powers. That is to say, his philosophy culminates in a docta ignorantia. He regarded the idea that the world is the result of chance (brute force) quite as incredible as that it should be the product of conscious design. His statement of the problem at this point reminds us of that given by Kant in the Critique of Judg- ment. 2. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) gave up a life of prac- tical affairs in order to devote himself to philosophical investigations. In his early youth he was an engineer, but soon acquired an interest in social problems and ideas which in turn led him to the study of psychology and biology. He was a self-made man. He never attended a university and never took an examination. He was peculiarly gifted in observing facts which might serve to illuminate general principles. His philosophy sprang from the necessity of discovering a governing principle which would serve the purpose of organizing a series of studies in natural science, psychology and social science into a system. He has described the course of his develop- ment in his A utobiography ( 1 904) . He remained a private citizen all his life, occupying himself with his studies and his writings. Spencer's ideas are expressed in their purest, most original form in a series of essays, published in three volumes under the title: Essays, Scientific, Political and Speculative. From the literary point of view, the Essays form the most valuable portion of the Spencerian writings. — He had even before this, in his Social Statics (1850), appHed the idea of evolution to social life. Following Coleridge he regarded the complete unfolding of life as a divine idea which is to be realized gradually. Later on he regarded this conception as too theological. He then began to search for a concept of evolution which could be appHed to every sphere of experience. According to his conception philosophy is unitary knowledge. Its task consists in the discovery of general principles under which the particular principles postulated by the special sciences can be organized. But this unitary knowledge can neither be attained by the a priori, deductive method, followed by Hegel, nor by the simple, encyclopedic collation of facts, as Comte thought. Spencer seeks to discover what is common in the special principles and laws by means of the comparative method. During the course of thirty-six years (1860-1896) he produced a detailed exposition of his Synthetic Philos- ophy filling ten large volumes. The first volume, containing the First Principles (1861), furnishes the fundamental principles of his worid-theory and defines the concept of evolution both inductively and deductively as the fundamental concept of all science. The remaining volumes apply" the special forms of this concept to the departments of biology, psychology, sociology and ethics. —Otto Gaup has published a valuable characterization and exposition of Spencer's philosophy (Frommann's Klassiker, Herbert Spencer, 1897). a. Spencer's theory of knowledge shows the influence of both Stuart Mill and William Hamilton (and, through the latter, Kant). He challenged pure empiricism, on the ground of the fact that perceptions require elaboration before knowledge can arise and this elaboration pre- supposes both a faculty and a standard. The ultimate ba- sis of all knowledge consists of the faculty of distinguish- ing the like from the unlike; even radical skepticism must presuppose this basal principle. The ultimate standard by which truth and error are distinguished consists of the ( 252 POSITIVISM SPENCER 253 principle that a proposition which is inherently self -con- tradictory cannot be true. Truth implies a perfect agreement between our ideas (representations of things) and our impressions (presentations of things). Every inference and every postulate assimies the truth of the criterion contained in the principle of contradiction. This criterion cannot therefore be derived from mere experience: it is a priori. Every individual must possess the innate factdty of comparing impressions and drawing inferences from impressions, but this factdty cannot be derived from the impressions alone. But the a priori appertains to the individual alone. If we inquire into the origin of this faculty we must appeal to the race from which the individual has sprung. Empiricism is in error only in so far as the particular individual is concerned, not as respects the whole race. The experiences acquired by the race during the course of countless generations, the incessantly recurring influence to which it was subjected, evolve dispositions which form the basis upon which single individuals begin their course of development. That is to say, the single individual possesses in his native organization the clear profit of the experiences of untold generations. That which is a priori in the case of the individual is racially a posteriori. Even in the first edition of his psychology (1855) Spencer J who had early become an evolutionist, referred to the fact that the things which are inexplicable on the basis of individual experience might be explained by race experience. He imagined that this amounted to a final disposition of the controversy between empiricism and a prforism. He nevertheless perceives that in the final analysis he concedes the correctness of empiricism, and declares himself a disciple of Locke rather than of Kant, He extends the scope of the older empiricism by going back of the individual to the race. He failed to see however that the actual problem of epistemology is not the matter of the factual origin of knowledge, but its validity. In the construction of his own theory of the factual origin of knowledge he, as a matter of fact, simply assumes the criterion of truth! Furthermore, the dis- tinction between the race and the individual is not fundamental, because the race at any given time is represented by definite single individuals. Every gener- ation, even as every individual, must possess its own a priori faculty. Spencer had advanced the hypothesis of the natural origin of the species, which in 1885 he applied to psychol- ogy, in an essay even as early as 1852. Darwin therefore regards him as one of his precursors. At that time how- ever he stood closer to Lamarck than to Darwin, because he was not yet acquainted with the idea of the struggle for existence in its bearing on the theory of evolu- tion. It was impossible for him therefore to con- strue knowledge as an instrument in the struggle for existence. b. According to Spencer the sphere of knowledge is determined by the fundamental function of thought, which, as a matter of fact, consists in distinguishing like from unlike. We can only know such things as can be compared with other things, i. e. related to other things. Here Spencer adheres closely to William Hamilton, except that he dropped the latter's theological viewpoints.^ The things which we presume to know must necessarily be relative, i. e. they must bear definite relations and they must therefore be limited. The absolute and uncondi- 254 POSITIVISM SPENCER 255 tioned cannot be related to anything else, neither can it be defined in terms of likeness or unHkeness. The absolute, according to Spencer, is nevertheless a positive concept. We are always under the necessity of assuming something which can be defined, marked out, compared— something which is independent of the definite form ascribed to it by our thought. We represent it to ourselves, after the analogy of our own energy, as a universal energy which underhes all objective and sub- jective changes and forms the content of our knowl- edge—but which cannot itself be expressed by any concept. Spencer moreover regards this as offering a possible solution of the controversy between religion and science. It is the common aim of all religions to furnish knowledge of the universal energy. But it is still only in its most primitive stages that religion pretends to furnish com- plete knowledge of the absolute. The higher the develop- ment of religion, the more readily it concedes the exist- ence of an inexplicable mystery. When the evolution of religion has once been perfected religion and science will join hands in the common acknowledgment that the real nature of things is unknowable, and religion will cease to oppose the scientific explanation of phenomena.— 5/>ewcer is weU aware of the fact that men are loath to surrender the well-defined intuitive ideas of the various religions. He nevertheless anticipates a progressive development in this direction. He fondly hopes that the emotional side of religion, its musical temper, may be able to survive, even though its dogmas must perish. Spencer failed to overcome the discrepancy between the so-called absolute and relative. Even though, e. g., he assumes the appHcabihty of the concept of evolution to every sphere of phenomena, he nevertheless denies that this concept applies to "the Absolute" itself. c. Philosophy, as imitary knowledge, is in search of a common principle or a general type of all phenomena. Spencer discovers such a principle by the method of induction and analysis, which he afterwards seeks to deduce from a general principle. The principle which philosophy has been seeking is the principle of evolution. Every phenomenon has come into being, so far as we are concerned, by a process of evolution, and we understand a phenomenon whenever we know its evolution. But what is evolution? There are, according to Spencer, three characteristics by which it can be described. In its simplest forms evolution consists of concentration, a transition from a more attenuated to a more permanent state of coherence. The formation of a pile of sand on the ocean beach is a simple example. The evolution of the solar system (in its primitive phase, as the formation of the primeval nebula) and the earth (by its asstmiing the spherical form within the original nebtda), the growth of an organism by means of assimilating nourishment, the origin of a people from its stems and groups, etc., furnish examples on a larger scale. — Diferentiation goes hand in hand with integration, especially on the higher levels. There follows then a transition from a state of greater homo- geneity to one of greater heterogeneity. It is not the whole, as such, that differentiates itself; different parts within the whole differentiate themselves from one another and assimie definite forms. Thus the various heavenly bodies of the solar system have taken form, and each of the heav- enly bodies in turn develop differences between the respec- tive parts of their surfaces and their internal structure as well as between the parts of the surfaces themselves. '■fr 256 POSITIVISM SPENCER 257 The various organs are developed by the process of spe- cialization during the course of the evolution of the organism. Organic Hfe on the earth divides into various species. And in the sphere of social Hfe we have an example in the division of labor.— Whenever differentia- tion proceeds one-sidedly, dissolution quickly follows. A third characteristic of evolution must therefore be added, namely, that it consists of a determination which presupposes a definite harmony between integra- tion and differentiation. The concept of evolution just described appHes to every particular phenomenon, and to every phenomenal sphere (but not, as some have misunderstood Spencer, to 'Hhe universe" as a whole). It has been discovered by induction, but it must also be verified by deduction. Here Spencer falls back on a principle which he regards the foundation of all real science: the principle of the persistence of energy. With Spencer this principle (as with Hamilton and even Descartes and Spinoza) is really identical with the principle of causaHty. Every ex- periment rests upon the assumption of this principle: for if energy could originate or be lost during the course of an experiment it would be impossible to draw any inference. It follows therefore that similar elements must be similariy affected by similar energies, which estabhshes the principle of integration. It follows further that similar elements must be differently affected by different energies; which establishes the principle of differentiation. Proof of the necessity of the third characteristic determination is lacking. It is not a mere accident that Spencer was unable to estabhsh this principle. From the viewpoint of experience it is impossible to furnish any guarantee for the harmony of integration and differentiation, whilst the hypothetical conditions demand the presence of both processes. Notwithstanding his sublime optimism, Spencer was therefore unable to furnish a proof of harmonious evolution. With Hegel ''the higher unity was a logical necessity; but a final deduction is impossible in the case of Spencer's systematic positivism, even though the problem which here arises did not clearly occur to him. d. The series of works which ftimish a detailed development of the theories advanced in the First Principles contain a gap, due to the fact that Spencer failed to furnish a specific treatise on evolution in the sphere of inorganic phenomena. On the other hand he demonstrates the general forms of evolution in the realms of biology, psychology, sociology and ethics in detail. Life, according to Spencer, consists of an adjustment of internal relations to external relations. Organisms are not only directly determined by external factors, but there are indirect factors likewise developed from within by means of which they are enabled to adjust themselves more advantageously to future conditions than in the past. That is to say these influences lead to a transposition of the organic elements; the structure changes under the influence of function. This gives rise to variations which then endeavor to survive in the struggle for existence. Spen- cer attaches greater importance to the adaptation resulting from the exercise of the functions than to that resulting from the loss and death of such forms as are ill-adapted by ** natural selection" (which Spencer prefers to call ^Hhe survival of the fittest^'). Consciousness is likewise a form of adaptation. As soon as the number of objective impressions increases, the corresponding subjective states can only adjust themselves 258 POSITIVISM SPENCER 259 advantageously by arranging them in serial order, and such arrangement is the characteristic fimction of con- sciousness. Psychology is a division of biology. We must never- theless make a distinction between subjective and objec- tive psychology. Objective psychology consists of the natural science of the material processes with which the phenomena of consciousness are ordinarily associated. Subjective psychology rests upon introspection and forms the correlate of all the other sciences; with the single difference, that it treats of the knowledge process as such, whilst all others treat of the objects of knowl- edge. In the sphere of consciousness we again discover the general characteristics of evolution: concentration, dif- ferentiation and determination. We rise by gradual transitions from reflex movement through instinct and memory to reason in a constantly increasing concentra- tion, and likewise from the simplest sensory discrimina- tions to the most refined distinctions of the intellect. And we find that each stage is modified by the necessary correspondence with the conditions of life and its relations. Spencer seems to be somewhat vacillating on the prob- lem of the relation existing between consciousness and matter. He at first conceives this relation as a case of metamorphosis of natural forces according to which consciousness bears a relation to the brain process anal- ogous to that of heat to motion. Later on however he regarded mind and matter as two irreducible empirical forms of universal energy. This theory however has not been consistently carried out in his works. The task which Spencer had set for himself was to discover the fundamental principles of the evolutionary theory in every department of science, and for this purpose it was really immaterial what psychological theory was sub- sumed. He says however — ^in harmony with his attitude towards subjective psychology as compared with all other sciences — ^that if he were to choose between the two alternatives of referring psychical phenomena to material processes or vice versa, he would regard the latter solution as the most acceptable. In sociology Spencer lays the chief stress upon its direct bearing upon the actual problems of Hfe. The struggle for existence is intended to develop human character, and hence no social ordinance and no state institution dare be interposed between the individual and real life. Because of the fact that the whole matter turns on the develop- ment of character, evolution progresses slowly and Spencer is far less sanguine at this point than Comte and Mill, — His pedagogical theory is governed by the same line of argtmient . The child is to acquire independent experiences as early as possible and be under the guidance of authority and tradition as little as possible. Otherwise twofold adjust- ment would be required, namely, first to the authority and then to the actual conditions of life {Education^ 1861). Concentration prevails during the earlier stages of social evolution, i. e. the individual is subordinate to the whole. It is conditioned by the necessities of common protection. It is here that militarism enjoys its classic period. Later on — as the individual forges to the front — a differentiation takes place. Individuals are then able to realize their own ends according to their pleastu-e, and they can advance their mutual interests by the free organiza- tion of individual energies. The struggle between militarism and industriaHsm is still in full sway. But Spencer anticipates a third stage in which labor for the 26o POSITIVISM DUHRING 261 sheer necessities of life will no longer occupy the central place, but in which devotion to occupations which are valuable per se will be far more general than now. It is the duty of ethics to develop the content of the highest stages of social life. The method of ethics is essentially constructive: from the highest principles of evolutionary theory it constructs the idea of the perfect life as a harmony of concentration and differentiation, a complete determination. In the perfect organic type the development of the one suffers no limitation save the recognition of the corresponding right of the other to development, and the individual is not coerced to tmder- take occupations which offer no immediate satisfaction. Altruism on the contrary furnishes the individual oppor- tunity to develop faculties and dispositions which would otherwise remain fallow. The contrast between altruism and egoism is thus reconciled. — For the present we are still far removed from such an ideal state. For this reason we can only have a relative ethics, not an absolute system; but the absolute ethics can nevertheless be for- mulated and serve as a guide to relative ethics. Spencer regards the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill as too empirical. The highest ethical ideas can be dis- covered only by the theory of evolution. But in his ethics as in his theory of knowledge, he still differs from his pre- cursors only in the matter of having extended the horizon. P. Positivism in Germany and Italy. As we have already observed, positivism is by no means to be conceived merely as a movement which is opposed to romanticism. It is the result of well-defined intellectual motives which are peculiar to it alone. Within the posi- tive school (in its broader sense) we have seen men like Stuart Mill and Spencer , each taking their own course. We have Hkewise found investigators outside of France and England, who have become positivists independently. Among these we wish to describe Eugen Duhring of Ger- many and Roberto Ardigo, the Italian. I. Eugen Duhring (bom 1883), despite the fact that he became bhnd early in life, has shown a remarkable activity as a teacher and author. His external misfortunes were due to his severe opposition to and distrust of academic authorities, on account of which he was dismissed from his position as a Privatdocent at the University of Berlin. He has published a characteristic autobiography under the title, Sache, Leben und Feinde Als Hauptwerk und Schlussel zu seinen sammtlichen Werken (1882). His first work of any consequence was Natural Dich lectic (1865). Here he is still in close touch with the critical philosophy, and he distinguishes sharply between formal and real science. The intellect is constantly striving to discover continuous transitions and to form infinite series (i. e. capable of continuation according to the same principle). In mathematics, e. g. we have the concept of infinity and in logic the principle of suffi- cient reason. But we must not transfer this tendency to continuity to the sphere of real being. Here the prin- ciple of definite number prevails, as experience shows. Astronomy, physics and chemistry show how completely the character of natural processes and natural elements are governed by the law of definite proportions. Each separate series of causes which nature reveals consists of a finite ntmiber of members. Duhring' s theory of the vital relation between the laws of thought and being presents a singidar contrast to the above distinction. Thought is a continuation of being. 262 POSITIVISM DUHRING 263 The uniformity revealed in nature as well as in the interplay of nature's forces corresponds to the combi- nations and deductions of the intellect; the identical natxire of particular elements under varied conditions corresponds to the logical principle of identity; the real relation of cause and effect corresponds to the logical relation of premise and conclusion, etc. The fact that man is capable of knowing nature rests upon the fact that the laws of htmaan consciousness are likewise nature's laws. This latter view is decidedly in the ascendent in Duh- ring *5 later writings, where he indulges in vigorous polemic against the critical philosophy, which makes a distinction between our knowledge of things and the things-in-them- selves. Duhring here regards this distinction as an attempt to enlist the services of philosophy in the defense of transcendental fancies. His positivism vanquishes his criticism (Cursus der Philosophic, i875^rewritten under the title Wirklichkeitsphilosophie, 1895; Logik und Wissenchaftslehrey 1878). The problem of the philosophy of reality consists in formulating a * 'world-scheme," a problem which must be solved by the systematization of experience. It is evident that the forces of nature constantly act in a definite way, and in a way moreover that the results of their cooperation invariably show definite totals. This pro- vides for the origin of beings which not only exist and act, but which are likewise conscious of their existence and action and the enjoyment which it produces. The possibility of such an evolution is due to the combination of different forces. The idea of an everlasting conflict of forces would be an absurdity, and a universe wholly unconscious would represent the anomaly of a half-done performance. But nature contains a logic of its own which precludes absurdity. True, the antagonism of forces likewise plays an important part; but this antag- onism is the very condition of the potential discharges of motion and experience. The value of life and the attainment of its higher planes depend wholly upon the differences and rhythms of nature. The profoimd satis- faction which life furnishes would be impossible without the cruel, the bitter and the painful {Das Werth des Lebens, 1865). Duhring, like Comte, finds the germinal principle of the moral Hfe in the instinct of sympathy. The sufferings of others have a direct effect upon individual feelings, and its influence increases with civiHzation. Moral progress however consists both in individualization and social- ization. Crude force is still the governing principle in existing states, but in the free organizations of the future the interest of the individual will be devoted directly to his work, not merely to the products of his work. The ideal of the future does not consist in social- istic concentration, but in the growth of free industrial communities. Duhring anchors his hope to a progressive evolution by the progressive unfolding and survival of the good, and he strongly opposes Darwin's struggle for existence and Marx's catastrophe theory. — ^The contem- plation of the majestic order of the universe, which has made such an evolution possible, begets a universal affection,— the eqmvalent of the religious sentiment of the past {Ersatz der Religion durch Vollkommneres, 1883). 2. In Italy a period of depression and lassitude fol- lowed the promising mental activity of the period of the Renaissance, and the general history of philosophy has 264 POSITIVISM ARDIGO 26S but few names to record that are of any consequence in the general trend of the evolution of thought. The nineteenth century produced a new Renaissance, which at first assumed a romantic speculative form. During the first half of the century Rosmini and Gioherti developed a kind of Platonism by which they hoped to harmonize religion and science. These philosophical efforts were intimately associated with poHtical issues, because it was generally beHeved that the head of the church would lead the movement for political rehabilitation. But the hopes of Italy were to be reaHzed by an entirely different method. The harmony of reHgion and science was broken — ^in the first place because the head of the Catholic church sanctioned the scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages as the only one permissible, and, secondly, because philosophy assimied a more critical and positive character. We shall here treat of Roberto Ardigo (bom 1828), a representative of the latter tendency. Ardigo became a positivist by a process of gradual development. His studies in natural science and philos- ophy carried him step by step, without being aware of it at the time, away from the scholasticism which he had practiced as a Catholic ecclesiastic. The growth of his ideas proceeded so smoothly, that, when all of a sudden the veil was withdrawn, he thought he had always been a positivist. The evolution experienced in Ws own intellectual life became the theme of his philosophizing when he accepted the chair of philosophy at Pavia after quitting the chiu-ch. He regarded his own course of development as a type which reveals the general character- istics of all development, no matter in what department it occurs. Whilst Spencer really started from the analogy of organic evolution, Ardigo starts from the analogy of intellectual evolution,— '^//^w most remarkable of all natural formations^' He did not become acquainted with the French-EngHsh positivism until later. He calls himself a positivist, but at the same time emphasizes that the essential element of positivism consists in its empirical starting-point, rather than its systematic conclusion. He says: the positivist proceeds step by step, with a constantly widening horizon. He elaborated his theory of evolution in connection with an analysis of the Kant-Laplace theory which he regarded a typical example of the scientific method of explanation {La formazione naturale nel fatto del sistema solare, 1877). The present state of the solar system came into being by a process of separation (distinzione), in which smaller bodies (distinti) were formed within larger undifferentiated bodies (indistinto). The larger body is not destroyed by this process. It persists and forms the basis of the interaction of the smaller body. There exists therefore an inherent continuity between the larger body and the smaller bodies which constitute its parts. The possibilities potentially contained within each of these indistinto (as * 'forze latente or virtuale'') can only be developed by interaction with other objects ! Each indistinto is therefore in turn a part of a more comprehen- sive whole, so that the distinction between indistinto and distinti is merely relative. Science is here confronted by an infinite series of processes; but its only task consists in explaining the fundamental relation of indistinto and dis- tinti in each particular case, because it assumes that all differences, no matter where they occur, proceed from one whole and are forever comprehended within it. The theory of knowledge is but a special case of the general theory of evolution. Every explanation consists 266 POSITIVISM ARDIGO 267 of a differentiation, an analysis; there is nothing under- stood which is not differentiated (indistinto). The theory has a certain tendency to stop with finite elements (distinti finiti) ; but the principle that every particular is part of a whole imposes the necessity of an infinite continuimi. Hence, since even thought is simply a special case of the nattiral process, it is impossible to deduce the whole process of nature from thought. We never attain a final term.— There is a problem at this point which Ardigo failed to estimate correctly, in that knowl- edge is nevertheless the natural process through which alone we acquire our knowledge of all other processes of nature. On the other hand he (especially in La Ragione, 1894) describes the cognitive functions in detail, especially emphasizing the intimate relationship of recollection and judgment, and finding once more the relation of indistinto and distinti in the rhythm of synthesis and of analysis. He likewise extols the services of Kant to the morphol- ogy of knowledge in this work. And he afterwards emphasized Kant's theory of the sjmthetic unity of consciousness in his chief work Vunita delta coscienza (1898) in still stronger terms. Psychic life consists of a continuous synthetic process. There is a profound tendency in things to combine all elements and functions in a single stream. This confluence (confluenza mentale) is the only explanation of the association of ideas. It is impossible to explain this unity of consciousness as a product of separate elements, because the only way we can discover the elements is by an analytic process of thought which already presupposes a given whole. Ardigo' s admiration for Kant, whom he called il secondo Galilei delta filosofia nei tempi modernij does not pre- vent him from severely criticizing the theory of the thing-in-itself {V idealismo nella vecchia speculazione, 1903) • Ardigo likewise applies the theory of the indistinto and of the distinti to the problem of so\il and body. The facts given in experience consist of the psychophysical reality in its undifferentiated form. But our investigations must in this case be divided into psychology and physiol- ogy, each of which is obliged to deal with abstractions. The psychical and the physical never exist in reality apart from each other; one and the same reality {reale indistinto) underlies both {La psicologia come scienza positiva).— As a psychologist Ardigo reveals a remarkable faculty of describing both the continuity as well as the more refined nuances of psychical phenomena. Ardigo' s fundamental viewpoint likewise has a striking application to ethics. Each individual is a distinto whose real existence is in an indistinto, i. e. in a society. Each individual is evolved within a social body (family, state, etc.), and thus learns to judge human actions from the viewpoint of the whole, which provides for the evolution of an anti-egoistic tendency. It is in this that what Ardigo calls ''the social ideality" consists. This tendency assumes the form of a holy affection at its culminating points, which impels to sacrifice and begets a faith in The Eternal despite the tragedy of human life. MOLESCHOTT 269 EIGHTH BOOK. New Solutions of the Problem of Being on the Basis of Realism. The romantic philosophy believed it could reform natural science. And this notwithstanding the fact that at the very time of the origin of this philosophy, the closing decades of the eighteenth century, natural science was making astounding progress. The traditional convic- 1 1 tion of the persistence of matter, throughout all changes was experimentally demonstrated by Lavoisier, by means of the quantitative method,--by weighing,— and the fundamental laws governing the material changes in- volved in the constitution of plant and animal life were discovered by a number of investigators {Priestley, Saus- sure, etc.), and organic life was thus incorporated within the majestic cycle of material processes. Natural science received a new impetus during the forties of the nineteenth century, due especially to Robert Mayer's discovery of the principle of the conser- vation of energy (1842). Ideas which had akeady been suggested by Descartes, Huyghens and Leibnitz now received their empirical authentication, because the demonstration that there is no dissipation of force, already established in pure mechanics, could likewise be demon- strated in the interaction of the particular forces of nature, because it could be shown that a definite quanti- tative relation exists between the potential value (e. g. motion) which vanishes and the new potential value (e. g. heat) which arises. 268 In addition to this we note Darwin's hypothesis of the origin of the species announced during the fifties. Natural science thus demonstrated the existence of a profoimd vital relationship, where man had previously seen nothing more than gaps and fragments, in a brilliant manner. The only question was as to what would be the bearing of these discoveries on the treatment of philosophic problems. The appropriation of the new views came most natural to positivism, and we have akeady seen how Herbert Spencer endeavored to incorporate them in his evolutional system. The new impulse of natural science furnished the occasion for a large German literature of a materialistic trend, which had the efEect of disseminating the ideas and discoveries of natural science very widely. About the middle of the nineteenth century the German material- ists were supported in their opposition to dogmatics and spiritualistic speculation— as had been the case with their French precursors of the eighteenth century— by an idealistic movement based upon the interests of humanity and progress. It is to be observed that idealism is not incongruous with theoretical materialism: the materialist can consistently recognize the value of mental phenomena and efficiency, even though he does regard them as due to mere molecular changes. The most noted writer in this movement is the physiol- ogist, Jacob Moleschott (1822-1893), who was bom in Holland, was Docent at Heidelberg in his youth, and, after being dismissed there on account of his views, went to Zurich and later to Italy, where he enjoyed a long and successful career as professor of physiology. In his book, Kreislauf des Lebens (1852), he extols chemistry as the highest science because it shows how matter— and to- 2^o REALISM THE NEW IDEALISM IN GERMANY 271 m m gether with matter, how Hfe, and with life in turn, how thought— accomplishes its sublime cycle. He expounds the history of his ideas in his autobiography {An meine Freunde, Reminiscences, 1895) and says that as a matter of fact his only contention was against dualism, and that his theory— on account of the inherent relation of force, mind and matter-^might quite as well be called ideaHsm as materialism! The physician, Louis Buchner (1824-1899), whose Kraft und Stojff (1855) was for a long time one of the most widely read books of the age, similarly goes beyond the specific views of materialism, only less cleariy, and this is Hkewise the case with Heinrich Czolbe (1819-1873), who, Hke Buchner and Moleschott, was also a physician! Czolbe directly inverts the proposition that sensation is motion, and consequently attains an idealistic theory {Die Entstehung des Selbstbewusslseins, 1856). In his later works he undertook to estabHsh a new world theory by the use of more speculative methods. It is a matter of peculiar interest in the case of Czolbe that he is fully aware of assuming certain axiomatic principles, namely, the theoretical requirement of the perspicuous and intuitive nature of thought, and the ethical requirement of life and its relations in the present worid-ordcr, with complete exclusion of everything transcendent. A Httle later the famous zoologist, Ernst Haeckel (bom 1834), undertook to organize the latest results and hypotheses of natural science into a system of Mo- nism, The first work specifically devoted to this purpose was his Generalle Morphologie (186 2-1 866), which was followed by his more vigorous and more dogmatic WeU trdtzel (1899). He regards everything as animated; atoms and cells have souls as well as tlio bruin. These souls may interpose in material processes on the one hand just as material processes may be the causes of psychical phenomena on the other. The Monism of Eaeckel therefore combines spiritualistic and materialistic ideas in a way that is not altogether clear. But EaeckeVs significance, who in this respect shows an affinity to the thinkers of the Renaissance, does not consist in his logical consistency, but in the tremendous enthusiasm aroused by his ideas, and in the fanciful vividness of his expo- sitions. It appears therefore that dogmatic materialism, ac- cording to the testimony of the materialistic author himself, is no longer possible. The results of criticism have therefore not been in vain. Another group of thinkers who still adhered to Uie fundamental principles of romantictsm, even though they clearly saw the necessity of a reooflistruction o£ the foundation and a restatement of dE), the individual discovers contradictions, deviations and exceptions in the given; it appears strange and recognition is impossible. Every extension of the circle of experience, every enlargement of the horizon, is liable to bring with it new problems. The advance of civilization increases the problems. Conversely, if the energy is greater than the demand (so that RE. The solution involves three stages— need, effort, dis- charge—and the problem disappears. Avenarius regards these three stages of problematization and deproblemat- ization essentially as symptoms of certain physiological processes in the brain. His theory is physiological rather than psychological— even though as a matter of fact he constantly deduces the correlative physiological processes from the psychological "symptoms." The result of the process, the deproblematization, does not always constitute a real solution. A tentative or purely individual viewpoint may be attained, without excluding the possibility of a new state of tension, a new problematization. Deproblematization is definite and tuiiversal only whenever a perfect adaptation has taken place, from which all subjective and tentative elements have been eliminated. This is reaUzed whenever knowl- edge essentially consists in a quantitative description, and a description furthermore in which the consequent is always the equivalent of the antecedent. We have then reaUzed the viewpoint of pure experience, Avenarius differs from Maxwell and Mach, especially from the fact that he failed to see the relation between economy and symbolism (analogizing), as he underesti- mates the significance and the necessity of analogy in general. 3. William James (bom 1842), the Harvard professor, in an article published in 1898 {The Pragmatic Method, reprinted in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1904) laid the foundation of a theory of knowledge by which he wished at once to review and I 302 PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE JAMES 303 I I correct the classical EngHsh philosophy. He has elabo- rated his theory more fully in a series of articles which appeared in the above-mentioned periodical during the years 1904 and 1905. He had already placed great stress on the continuity of psychic life in his Principles of Psy- chology (1890), by insisting that what is actually given in psychical experience consists of an incessant *' stream of thought y'' and he has applied this conception to the special problems of psychology with telling effect. He calls this original flux of hfe ''pure experience'' (an expression which he uses more consistently than Avenarius), It is only for practical reasons that we depart from the original flux of life: distinctions, definitions, and axioms are postulated for the purpose of reahzing certain ends. This conception of knowledge is what constitutes pragmatism^ whilst rationalism, which accords the highest place to abstract thought, regards those intellectual instruments of thought as immediate revelations of the absolute. If we estabhsh the elements, which we carve out of this continuous stream for the purposes of solving our problems concep- tually, they may be interchanged, and operations with these elements enable us to attain results similar to those of actual experience. But this is not the case with all the elements however. There is more discontinuity in the tmiverse than we ordinarily suppose and we cannot always combine one part of our experience with another or substitute it for another. Just as pragmatism leads to empiricism, so, according to James, does empiricism also lead to pluralism. James has stated this clearly in his preface to the collection of essays published tmder the title The Will to Believe (1897). Pure experience really presents nothing more than factual transitions, no "intellectual" transitions. Our knowledge consists of combinations made by con- tinuous transition, we know no absolute and rational unity. In addition to combinations there are as a matter of fact disparate phenomena: new facts arise in the world and there is an absolute beginning. The vinity of nature is a matter which is only coming to pass gradually, i. e. in proportion as we verify our ideas. — It is an open question whether such a radical pliu-alism as James adopts is possible. According to James the combination is quite as much a matter of fact as the mani- fold variety of phenomena, and the unity of the universe is construed as in process of realization. In addition to this James asstmies the possibility of substitutions; but these presuppose the existence of something more than mere differences. (The author of this text -book has developed this critical suggestion more fully in an article which appeared in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods (1905) imder the title A Philo- sophical Confession.) We shall have occasion to refer to James' philosophy of religion in the following section. B. The Problem of Values. It is one of the signs of the times that the problem of values occupies such a prominent place in philosophical discussion at present, and that, as compared with other problems, it is coming forward with greater independence than formerly. There is a growing conviction that the final word on the value of existence cannot be established purely theoretically. Here however there will always remain at least a philosophical problem; the investigation of the psychological basis and the inherent consistency of efforts at evaluation. % 'i 304 PROBLEM OF VALUES GUYAU 305 This point presents three types.— (7w3'aw and Nietzsche expect new forms of life to arise, and they base their expectation upon the fact that the overflowing fullness of vital energy in our present experience and our present conditions of hfe cannot find an adequate outlet. Like Rousseau they insist on the right of spontaneous, instinc- tive life as against analytic reflection. The formula R < E finds its appHcation here.— Rudolph Eucken likewise makes the contradiction between the capacity and the actual status of men his starting-point. The Hfe of every-day experience is incoherent, without any center of gravity, and suffers from the contrast between nature and value. The only possibility of a true culture is through a new concentration which lays hold of a ''spiritual sub- stance'' beyond the confines of experience,— " a spiritual existence'' in which what has been already acquired is preserved and from which new constructions proceed.— William James treats religious problems purely psycho- logically. He seeks to examine reUgion as it manifests itself at first hand in individual men,— " personal reUgion" (as against "institutional reHgion"), which is a result of the individual's life-experiences, the experiences which determine his fundamental attitude and his method of reacting towards the fact of life. This fundamental attitude or this reaction constitutes religion whenever on account of contrasts and conflicts they acquire a tran- scendent character. I. Jean Maria Guyau (1854-1888) exemplifies a rare combination of subjective emotion with indefatigable reflection. He feels the profound difficulty of the prob- lems and the illusion of the majority of the solutions, but he holds that the illusions are valuable if only they are fruitful, i. e. if they excite the activity of the intellect and the will. (See the poem, Illusion feconde, in Vers d'un Philosophic.) — Guyau enjoyed a home-life which was peculiarly favorable to his activity as a student and author. Early in Hfe however he fell a victim to an incurable disease of the chest, but this did not suppress the energy of his intellect and his vital courage. His first Hterary attempt was a criticism of English utilitarianism and evolutionism {La morale Anglaise contemporaine, 1879). Here he takes the ground that English moral philosophy must inevitably lead to the uncertainty and illusoriness of the moral feelings them- selves due to their psychologico-genetic explanation of these feelings: i. e. if conscience is evolved from more elementary feelings it is really nothing more than a pure elementary feeling itself! There exists an immediate im- pulse however towards self-development, an impulse which may assume the character of devotion, of altruism, without the assistance of any association of ideas and evolution! — In his own theories he endeavors to avoid the difficulties which he charges against the English school (Esquisse d' une morale sans obligation ni sanction y 1885). The development of Hfe is the goal which nature has set for itself, and ethics is the theory of the ways and means by which the highest and fullest development of Hfe may be reaHzed. It is necessary to maintain and develop both the subjective and the objective phases of Hfe, and the sympathetic emotions and social life are of the highest importance for both phases, because isolation and egoism restrict the horizon and the efficiency of the individual. The highest virtue— the attribute of character which makes for the highest development of Hfe— is therefore generosity. Reflection and analysis are thus not con- strued as hostile powers (as imder the presuppositions of m \ 306 PROBLEM OF VALUES NIETZSCHE 307 ^ the English school). For the expansive energy which forms the basis of Hfe begets hope and courage and makes possible what would otherwise be impossible. The only sanction which the ethics of the future will require is that of the subjective satisfaction which cor- responds to the greatness of the risk {le plaisir de risque). Guyau Hkewise bases his philosophy of religion on the impulse of expansion {V irreligion de Vavenir, 1887). The day of religion is past. Religion consists essentially of man's feeling of fellowship with the personal director of the course of the universe. It finds its characteristic expression in the mythological explanation of nature, in a form of worship with magic rites and in a body of dogmas which are regarded as absolute truths. Religion is in process of complete dissolution in every one of these directions. What is best in religious life will be able to survive; the imptdse to transcend the bare facts of experience and to discover a higher unity will not vanish with rehgion. As a matter of fact this impulse is only now finding room for free development, since the rigid, dog- matic forms no longer impose obstacles. Everyone will express his sense of fellowship with existence— the ideal - sociology of existence— in his own way. The disharmo- nies of the universe will be felt more profoundly than before, but the fundamental note will asstmie the charac- ter of subHmity, and the world will be one of hope and of courage for Hfe and for death. 2. Friedrich Nietzsche (i 844-1 900) builds on the same fundamental principle as Guyau, only that in him the conflict between the poet and the philosopher is even more pronounced than in the case of the Frenchman. Both Guyau and Nietzsche oppose an emphatic affirmative to the negations of pessimism. But whilst Guyau guards his subjective disposition and his melancholy resignation against the change and the evanescence of values, Nietzsche assimies an attitude of disdain and contempt for both past and present, and his hope for a glorious futtire constantly assumes a more imtractable and spas- modic character. As a youth Nietzsche, along with philosophical studies, devoted himself zealously to classical philology, and became professor in this department at Basle at the age of twenty-fotir. Owing to ill-health and his comprehen- sive Hterary plans he afterwards resigned his position and thereafter Hved mostly in Engadine and Northern Italy, until insanity made it necessary for him to return to his German home and be cared for by his mother and sister. Nietzsche's chief aim is to establish a new, positive estimate of life on the basis of the historical facts of civilization. The clearest statement of his purpose is found in the essay written in his youth. The Birth of Tragedy (1872). He contrasts the tragic-poetic view of life, symbolized in Dionysius and Apollo, with that of the intellectual optimism represented by Socrates. It is Nietzsche's purpose, as he said later on, to consider science from the viewpoint of art, and art from the viewpoint of life. Dionysius is consequently— i. e. the superabundant life, life absorbing and vanquishing pain and death- superior to Apollo, and Apollo is superior to Socrates. This view leads to a severe criticism of Strauss, the optimistic free-thinker, and a glorification of Schopen- hauer and Richard Wagner, given in Unzeitgemdssen Betrachtungen (1873-1876). He soon finds however that he must go farther than both these "educators." He famiHarizes himself with the latest scientific and philo- U\ < I 3o8 PROBLEM OF VALUES NIETZSCHE 309 sophical theories, and thenceforward we find a struggle between a mqre realistic and a purely subjective ten- dency. In addition to this he was horrified at pessimism, not only as he found it in Schopenhauer, but likewise as he found it in Richard Wagner. He then assailed his own old deities. Durmg the whole of the remaining period in which he was still able to do anything he labored towards the discovery of an adequate, decisive expression of his opposition to every form of pessimism, to every form of depreciation of Hfe, to all levelling processes. He particularly challenges the theories of morality which have been prevalent hitherto and insisted on'' an inversion of all values," The most characteristic statements of this polemic are fotmd in Jenseits von Gut und Bose (1886) and in the Geneaologie der Moral (1887). Here he develops the ideas advanced in the essays of his youth more rigidly, and the fundamental theory becomes a radical aristocratism, which leads to a social duab'sm. The goal of history is not in the infinitely distant future, but it is realized in the worid's great men. The great mass of mankind is nothing more than an instrument, obstacle or copy. A higher, ruhng caste is necessary, which exists for its own sake,— which is an end in itself, not at the same time an instrument. Corruption begins just as soon as the aristocracy no longer believe in their right to Hve, to rule and to treat the great masses as their laboring cyclops. Aristocracy must show the value of life by the mere fact of their existence. It is impos- sible to develop the highest virtues among the great masses. They are only capable of religion and civic morality. But, as history proves, the great masses have repeatedly been able to claim that their morality is the highest. The true estimate of life, as the sense of energy and might {Nietzsche later calls it Der Wille zur Macht) has frequently been overthrown by the uprising of the moral slaves — ^in Buddhism, in Socrates, in Christianity, in modem humanism. Even the tendency of natural science is in this direction: it even makes a democracy of nature by its principle of general uniformity! Nietzsche frequently expresses himself as if he would abolish all morality. But he really demands nothing more than an inversion which has been necessitated by the domination of the morality of slavery. As he ob- serves in one of his essays published posthumously (Der Wille zur Macht), he wishes to introduce a moral natural- ism. He must however also have a standard for his "inversion." He discovers such a standard in the prin- ciple of the affirmation of life and of the increase of vital energy. From this point of view he wanted to elaborate a ^'number and measurement scale of energy," by which all values could be systematized scientifically. There is no kind of vital energy or vital pleasure which could here be excluded. Here Nietzsche appears as a utilitarian of the first rank. And he finally renounces his social dualism definitively, and then proposes as the end, not the happi- ness of the individual but the vigorous development of *'the total life." This change of attitude is still more prominent in the poetic elaboration of his ideas. The real tragedy and contradiction of his life consisted in his wasting so much time and energy in the effort to set forth his antipathy and contempt for things in general, whilst he failed to describe fully and clearly the tremendous positive con- ception of life which constituted his central idea. The poetic-philosophic treatise. Also sprach Zarathusthra 1883-1891), was left imfinished. Here he elaborates his i' I '"! 3IO PROBLEM OF VALUES EUCKEN ideas on the super-man: The aim of the present struggle is to evolve a new human type, related to the man of the present as man is related to the ape. This is the common aim of the whole human race. The period of duahsm and of animosity should be relegated to the past Zara- thusthra, the seer and guide, hates his own hatred. And Nietzsche paradoxically advocates the affirmation of hfe in the strongest terms, life of every form and on every plane. The idea that the cycle of the umverse must repeat itself became a controlling idea with Inm. Accord- inkto his view the universe consists of a fimte sum of elLents, and hence the number of combinations of these SS^ents must Hkewise be finite. It follows tWore that when the number of combinations has been exhaust^ the same course of evolution must begin anew This dl of repetition or recurrence at first horrified metzsche and he h^ a severe struggle before he could reconcde himself to it. Zarathusthra reveals to man the blessed gospel of the coming of the super-man-but on the con- dition that man wishes to choose and emulate life despite £ repetition. Just as all mankind yield their assent to this proposition, Zarathusthra dies for joy. In tHs way according to Nietzsche the sublime expan- sion of the vital impulse vanquishes all disharmomes and all doubt. He is therefore admitted to a place in the history of philosophy, not because of his saentific treat- ment of its problems, but because of his experience of the pmfound antitheses of life, and because of his effort to elaborate these experiences m idea^ and symbols. _ .4 ^ Rudolph Eucken (bom 1846), professor at Jena, the original seat of metaphysical idealism, following a sen^ of prehminary treatises {Die Einheit des Getsteslehens, 1888, 3" Der Kampf urn einen geistigen Lehensinhalt, 1896) has elaborated the religious problem of our age in his work on Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion (1901). The aim of this work is to show that religion harmonizes with the innermost ground of our being. If this is true, it must follow that every attack and every criticism will serve only to bring out the eternal principle of religion with increasing clearness. The civilization of the ancients over-estimated the form and culminated in the barrenness of plastic art; the civilization introduced by the renaissance over-esti- mated the energy and culminated in a restless striving without any absolute aim. The Church, as a matter of course, furnishes a total view of the useful life in its perfection, but it over-estimates the historical forms, in which the total view was once expressed, and it therefore regards all truth as imitation and repetition, whilst on the other hand it isolates the highest realities from actual, every-day life. Critical philosophy has contrasted the realm of value with the realm of reality. But there still remains the task of construing the valuable as the most truly real. A new metaphysic will avail nothing at this point. The only way to attain the goal is through living experience. Eucken applies the term Noology to the effort to affirm the absolute reality of the spiritual world, on the ground that it would otherwise be impossible to maintain the absolute obligations and the superiority of spiritual values. The noological view would direct its attention to the permanent, the free and the rational, as manifested in experience. Particularly in the case of the beginning of a new form of experience — organic, psychical and the higher spiritual life, — ^noology will discover pro- found motives. The noological view cannot justify itself 312 PROBLEM OF VALUES EUCKEN 313 It' I by proofs; its basis consists of a spiritual impulse, which is aroused by the experience of the disharmonies of Hfe, and which not only leads to indefinite reUgious ideas, to a ^^ universal religion^ but at its cuhnination can lead to a ^^characteristic religion'' with definitely formed general symbols. The great symbols formulated by the founders of the positive religions bear witness to the presence of a divine energy in spiritual evolution. Noology therefore culminates in metaphysics. , , . 1 a 1 Whilst Eucken regards a purely psychological and epistemological treatment of the problem of rehgion inadequate, this method of treatment has nevertheless been quite prominent in recent years. A number o American investigators have made valuable individual contributions {Stanley Ball, Leuha, Coe, etc.). James book on Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study oj Human Nature (1902) here takes first rank. According to James the study of religious phenomena reveals how scant a portion of our spiritual life can be clearly explained. Consciousness shades off through a large number of degrees into the unconscious or subcon- scious, and it frequently happens that the fundamental presuppositions of our conscious ideas proceed from the "subUminal" (or " submarginal ") region. Consaous arguments frequently affect only the surface of our nature, and a spontaneous and immediate conviction is the deep thing in us. James is inclined to regard the influences which issue from that deeper region a^ the means by which a higher order of things works in us Every attempt to define this order more precisely is ot course an interpretation; any single experience may be the subject of various religious interpretations. lUe majority of people are lacking in critical insight and care, not in faith; they are too prone to base a dogmatic belief on every vivid idea. Every emotion may, under given circumstances, ac- quire a religious character. This character manifests itself by the fact that man sums up his vital experiences which give rise to a total attitude, which determine his entire attitude towards life. Spiritual life thus acquires a unity and harmony which are otherwise sought for in vain. In some natures this unity of Hfe is the result of profound spiritual struggles, and can only be realized by a crisis, a ** conversion" ; in other natures however it arises by suc- cessive growth or spontaneous unfolding. This repre- sents the difference between religious leaders: the differ- ence between the healthy and the sick souls, or, better still, between the once-born and the twice-born. But in both classes the goal cannot be attained without the inflow of energy from unconscious sources. How this fact shall be interpreted is a private matter for each individual. James is himself convinced of the fact that new powers and starting-points may proceed from those dark sources, and he thinks that in academic circles we dismiss this possibility all too quickly. Religion rests upon a cosmo- logical hypothesis, which cannot however be formulated dogmatically. The religious consciousness can never accept the tragedies and shipwrecks of life as the final word concerning existence. Our judgment of the value of religion must likewise be based on experience. We judge religious phenomena by their fruits, and as a matter of fact this has always been the case. The principle of pragmatism is likewise applicable here. Reverence for deity ceases whenever it fails to affect the heart, and whenever it conflicts, in its whole character, with something the value of which we iitii IN 'M 3M PROBLEM OF VALX7ES have experienced and do not wish to deny. Mankind retains the gods which it can use, and whose command- ments substantiate the requirements which they make of themselves and of others. We constantly apply htmian standards. James assumes a sympathetic attitude towards religion. He is convinced that the best fruits of religious experience are the best things in history. The inner life here mani- fests a fervor and an energy, a subjectivity and a concen- tration which lifts us into a higher atmosphere. — James does not discuss the intimate relation which exists be- tween "personal" and "institutional" rebgion. His treatise however suggests points of view which are very fruitftd from which to consider the problem of rehgion — or, if we prefer, the problem of an equivalent of rehgion. 1440. 1513. 1516. 1538. 1540. 1543- 1554. 1565- 1577. 1580. 1581. 1582. 1584. 1584. 1584. 1585. 1591. 1591. 1597. 1603. 1609. 1612. 1620. 1623. 1623. 1624. 1625. 1632. 1637. 1638. 1640. 1641. CHRONOLOGY OP THE CHIEF WORKS IN PHILOSOPHY. Ctisanus: De docta ignorantia. Machiavelli: II prindpe. Pomponazzi: De immortalitate anims. Vives: De anima et vita. Melanchthon: De anima. Copernicus: De revolutionibus orbium coelestium. Ramus: Institutiones dialecticae. Telesio: De rerum natura. Bodin: La rdpublique. Montaigne: Essais. Sanchez: Quod nihil scitur. Bruno: De tmibris idearum. ** Cena delle ceneri. De r infinito universo et mondi. De la causa, principio, et uno. De grheroici furori. De triplici minimo. De immenso. Kepler: Mysterium cosmographicum. Althusius: Politica methodice digesta. Kepler: Astronomia nova. Bohme: Aurora. Bacon: Novum Organum. (Eng. trans.) " De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum. (Eng. trans.) Galileo: II saggiatore. Cherbury: De veritate. Grotius: De jure belli et pads. Galileo: Dialogo sopra i due massimi system! del mondo. Descartes: Discours de la m^thode. Galileo: Discorsi. Hobbes: Elements of Law. £>escartes: Meditationes. (Eng. trans.) 31S ^«<^><94^^> 3i6 1642. 1644. 165 1. 1655. 1658. 1658. 1665. 1669. 1670. 1674. 1677. 1685. 1687. 1689. 1690. 1695. 1695. 1695. 1704. 1705. 1709. 1 710. 1 710. 1711. 1714. 1720. 1725. 1726. 1734. 1739 ( 1745. 1748. 1748. 1748. 1749. 1750. 1751. 1754. i< «« it *i CHRONOLOGY Hobbes: De cive. Descartes: Prmcipia Philosophue. (Eng. trans.) Hobbes: Leviathan. De corpore. De homine. Gassendi: Opera omnia. Geulincx: De virtute. (VoUst&ndig 1675 unter dem Titel Ethica.) Pascal: Pens^es. (Eng. trans.) Spinoza: Tractatus theologico-politicus. (Eng. trans.) Malebranche: Recherche de la v6nt6, Spinoza: Ethica. (Eng. trans.) Leibnitz: Petit discours m^taphysique. (Eng. trans.) Newton: Principia. Locke: On Government. Essay on Human Understanding. Reasonableness of Christianity. Leibnitz: Syst^me nouveau de la nature et de la commiini* cation des substance. Bayle: Dictionnaire historique et critique. Toland: Letters to Serena. Mandeville: The Fable of the Bees. Berkeley: Theory of Vision. Leibnitz: Th^odic^. Berkeley: Principles of Knowledge. Shaftesbury: Characteristics (I). Leibnitz: Monadologie. (Eng. trans.) Wolff: Vemunftige Gedanken. Hutcheson: Inquiry into the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Butler: Sermons. Voltaire: Lettres sur les Anglais. -1740). Hume: Treatise on Htmian Nature. Crusius: Entwurf der notwendigen Vemunftwahrheiten. Montesquieu: Esprit des lois. (Eng. trans.) La Mettrie: Lliomme machine. Hartley: Observations on Man. Hume: Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding. Rousseau: Discours sur les sciences et les arts. Hume: Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Condillac: Traits des sensations. CHRONOLOGY 317 I 1754. 1755. 1755. 1755. 1757. 1758. 1762. 1762. 1762. 1763. 1764. 1764. 1765. 1766. 1766. 1770. 1770. 1776. 1777. 1778. 1779. 1781. 1783. 1784. 1784 (■ 1785. 1786. 1786. 1787. 1788. 1789. 1789. Diderot: Interpretation de la nature. Rousseau: Discours sur I'origine de Tin^galit^ parmi les hommes. Mendelssohn: Brief e uber die Empfindungen. Kant: Allgemeine Naturgeschichte undTheorie des Himmels. Hume: Natural History of Religion. Helvdtius: De I'esprit. Rousseau: Emile. (Eng. trans.) " Contrat social. Kant: Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grdssen in die Weltweisheit einzufuhren. Reid: Inquiry into the Human Mind. Voltaire: Dictionnaire philosophique portatif. Lambert: .Neues Organum. Leibnitz: Nouveaux essais. (Eng. trans.) Kant: Traume eines Geistersehers. (Eng. trans.) Voltaire: Le philosophe ignorant. Holbach: Syst^me de la nature. Kant: De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis. Smith: Wealth of Nations. Tetens: Versuche uber die menschliche Natur. Lessing: Duplik. Hume: Dialogues on Natural Religion. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vemunft. (Eng. trans.) Prolegomena zu jeder kunftigen Metaphysik. (Eng. trans.) Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte. -1 791). Herder: Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. Kant: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. (Eng. ^ trans.) Kant: Mutmasslicher Anfang des Menschengeschlechts. Mendelssohn: Morgenstunden. Jacobi: David Hume uber den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. Kant: Kritik der praktischen Vemunft. (Eng. trans.) Reinhold: Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsverm6gens. Bentham: Principles of Morals and Legislation. « «i 3l8 CHRONOLOGY 179a Kant: Kritik der Urtheilskraft. (Eng. trans.) 179a Maimon: Versuch uber die Transzendental philosophie. 1793. Kant: Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Ver- nunft. (Eng. trans.) 1793. Schiller: Ueber Anmuth und Wurde. 1794. Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. (Eng. trans.) 1797. Schelling: Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. (Eng. trans.) 1799. Schleiermacher: Reden uber die Religion. (Eng. trans.) 1 803. Cabanis : Des rapports du physique et du moral de rhomme. 1806. Fichte: Grundzuge des gegenwartigen Zeitalters. 1806. Fries: Neue Kritik der Vemunft. 1807. Hegel: Phanomenologie des Geistes. (Eng. trans.) 1808. Herbart: Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik. 1809. de Maistre: Soirees de St. Petersbourg. 1809. Schelling: Ueber den Menschlichen Willen. 1812. Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik. (Eng. trans.) 1813. Saint-Simon: M^oire sur la science de ITiomme. 1813. Schopenhauer: Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom Zurdch- enden Grunde. (Eng. trans.) 1817. Hegel: Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. 1819. Schopenhauer: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. (Eng. trans.) 1820. Fries: Psychische Anthropologic. 182 1. Hegel: Philosophie des Rechts. (Eng. trans, in part.) 1821. Schleiermacher: Der christliche Glaube. 1824. Herbart: Psychologic als Wissenschaft. (Eng. trans.) 1825 (-1827). Beneke: Psychologische Skizzen. 1829. W. Hamilton: Philosophy of the Unconditioned. 1829. James Mill: Analysis of the Human Mind. 1830 (-1842). A. Comte: Cours de philosophie positive. (Eng. trans.) 1833. Carlyle: Sartor Resartus. 1835. . Strauss: Leben Jesu. 1840. Trendelenburg: Logische Untersuchungen. 1841. Schopenhauer: Grundprobleme der Ethik. 1841. Feuerbach: Das Wesen des Christentums. 1842. Robert Mayer: Bemerkimgen uber die Kr&fte der unbeleb- ten Natur. CHRONOLOGY 319 1843. Feuerbach: Grundsatze der Philosophie der Zukunft. 1843. Stuart Mill: System of Logic. 1843 (-1846). Kierkegaard's Hauptschriften. 1844. Schopenhauer: Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. (Eng. trans.) 1851. Lotze: Allgemeine Physiologic. 1852. Moleschott: Der Kreislauf des Lebens. 1854 (-1864). Renouvier: Essais de critique g^n^rale. 1855. Buchner: Kraft und Stoff. (Eng. trans.) 1855. Spencer: Principles of Psychology (I). 1856. Lotze: Mikrokosmus (I). (Eng. trans.) 1858. Darwin: Origin of Species. 1859. Stuart Mill: On Liberty. i860. Fechner: Elen*ente der Psychophysik. 1 861. Spencer: First Principles. 1864. Jevons: Pure Logic, or the Logic of Quality apart from Quantity. 1865. Diihring: Naturliche Dialektik. 1865. Lange: Geschichte des Materialismus. (Eng. trans.) 1866. Wundt: Die physikalischen Axiome. i869r Hartmann: Die Philosophie des Unbewussten (Eng. trans.) 1871. Darwin: Descent of Man. 1 87 1. Cohen: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. 1872. Nietzsche: Die Geburt der Tragddie. 1874. Wundt: Grundzuge der physiologischen Psychologic. 1875. Boutroux: De la contingence des lois de la nature. 1876. Bradley: Ethical Studies. 1876. Avenarius: Philosophie als Denken der Welt. 1876. Riehl: Der philosophische Kritizismus (I). (Eng. trans.) 1877. Ardig6: La formazione naturale. 1879. Guyau: La Morale Anglaise contemporaine. 1882. Duhring: Sache, Leben und Feinde. 1883. Nietzsche: Also sprach Zarathustra (I). (Eng. trans.) 1884. Windelband: Praludien. 1885. Renouvier: Classification des syst^mes philosophiques. 1885. Guyau: Esquisse d* une morale. 1886. Mach: Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen. (Eng. trans.) 1886. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und B6se. (Eng. trans.) 320 CHRONOLOGY 1887. Wundt: System der Philosophic. 1887. Guyau: L'irreligion de I'avenir. 1888. Avenarius: Kritik der reinen Erfahrung (I). 1888. Bergson: Les donn^es imm^diates de la consdenoe. 1889. Paulsen; System der Ethik. (Eng. trans.) 1890. James: Principles of Psychology. 1892. Paulsen: Einleitung in die Philosophic. (Eng. trans.) 1893. Pouill^: La psychologic des id^es-forces. 1893. Bradley: Appearance and Reality. 1896. Rickert: Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffs- bildung. 1897. James: The WiU to Believe. 1898. Ardig6: L'unit^ della coscienza. 1898. James: The Pragmatic Method. 1901. Renouvier: Les dilemmes de la m^taphysique pure. 1901. Eucken: Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion. (Eng. trans.) 1902. James: Varieties of Religious Experience. 1904. Cohen: Die Ethik des reinen Willens. 1905. Mach: Erkenntnis und Irrtum. INDEX Abstraction, 93, 99. Agnostics, 250. Althusius, 9. Ampere, 222. Analogy, 18, 81 ff., loi, 180, 202, 237, 275. Apperception, 84, 144. Ardig6, 219, 266. Associational Psychology, 114 f., 233, 242, 284 f. Atom, 34, 272. Attribute, 72. Avenarius, 297. Bacon, 17. Bain, 242. Bayle, 58, 87 £. Being, Problem of, 2, 44, 90, 170, 246. Beneke, 211. Bentham, 232. Bergson, 294. Berkeley, 98. Bodin, 12, 13. B6hmc, 13, 181. Bostr6m, 200. Boutroux, 294. Boyle, 93. Bradley, 284. Bruno, 29. Buchner, 270. Burckhardt, 4, Butler, 104. Cabanis, 220. Caird, 284. Carlyle, 234, 236. Category, 143, 145, 147. Causality, 46, 55, 57, 71, 94, 108, 142, 144, 240, 297. Cherbury, 12. Clarke, 98. Cohen, 291. Coleridge, 234, 236. Comte, 224, 230. C^ondillac, 120. Continuity, 79, 123, 135, 145. 261. Copernicus, 27. Cosmological problem, 2, 44, 90, 170, 246. Cousin, 222. Critical Philosophy, 137 £., 189, 205, 289. Crusius, 134. Culture, Problem of, 103, 124, I54» 167, 307. Cusanus, 22. Czolbe, 270. Darwin, Charles, 247, 268. Darwin, Erasmus, 115. Deduction, 37, 39, 51, 74, 185 f., 239. Descartes, 144. Destutt de Tracy, 221. Dialectic, 185, 190 f. Diderot, 122. 321 I H*"*^*' ••T.-tflfcft. 322 INDEX INDEX 323 Docta ignorantia, 23, 36, 250, 262, 267. Dogmatism, 44, 90, 117, 121, 138, 171. Duhring, 219, 261. Eddmami, 134. Encyclopedists, 123. Energy, Concept of, 80. Energy, Constancy of, 80, 268. Energy, Principle of, 37, 50, 268. Enlightenment, 117, 140. Erdmann, J. E., 213. Evolution, 51 f., 121, 123, 140, 246. Ethical problem, 2, 90, 102 f., no, 153 flf., 215, 248, 284 f. Eucken, 304, 310. Experience, 108, 146, 147 f., 285. Fechner, 278. Feuerbach, 213, 214. Fichte, J. G., 171. Fichte, J. H., 214. Force, Concept of, 80. Fries, 205. Fouill6e, 287. Oalileo, 39. Gassendi, 59. Geijer, 200. Geulincx, 55. Gioberti, 264. Glanvil, 57. Goschel, 213. Green, 284. Grotius, II. Guyau, 303 f. Haeckel, 270. Hamann, 162. Hamilton, 236, 256, 298. Hartley, 114. Hartmann, 275. Hegel, 182. Hegelian school, 213, 284. Helvetius, 122. Herbart, 207. Herder, 163. Hobbes, 59. Hoijer, 200. Holbach, 121. Hume, 106. Hutcheson, 104. Idea, 33, 92, 144, 149, 150. Idealism, 81, 170, 171, 272, 284. Identity, Principle of, 85. Ideology, 224, 229. Idola mentis, 17. Induction, 20, 39, 237, 238 f. Inertia, Principle of, 24, 37, 39, 53. Jacobi, 149, 164 f. James, 301, 312. Jevons, 241. Kant, 132, 137. Kepler, 37. Kierkegaard, 201. ICnowledge, Problem of, 2, 90, 105 f., 138 ff., 238 f., 240 £., 289. Krause, 214. Lambert, 135. LaMettrie, 120. Lange, F. A., 289. Lasalle, 213. Lavoisier, 268. Leibnitz, 44, 83. Leonardo, 36. Lessing, 135. Locke, 91. Lotze, 272. Mach, 299. Machiavelli, 5. Maimon, 166. Maine de Biran, 221. Maistre, 220. Malebranche, 55 f. Mandeville, 105, Mansel, 237. Marx, 213. Materialism, 63, 120, 269. Matter, 37, 50, 72 f., 81, 99 f. Maxwell, 298. Mayer, Robert, 268. Mechanical conception of na- ture, 41 f., 43 f., 49, 51, 59, 83 ff., 177 f., 272 f., 289, 298. Melanchthon, 8. Mendelssohn, 133, 134. Metaphysical idealism, 82, 102, 196, 212, 272 ff. Metaphysical problem, 2, 44, 90, 170, 246. Mill, James, 232, 233. Mill, John Stuart, 224, 232, 237. Modus, 72. Monad, 3, 33, 81, 292. Monism, 32, 71 f., 83, 270, .'»75. Montaigne, 6. Montesquieu, 119. . Motion, Constancy of, 50, 80. Mutation, 248. Natura (naturans, naturata) 7, 47, 72. Natural right, 9, 66, 95. Natural religion, 12, 47, 95, 119. Nature and culture, 103, 124, 154, 167, 307. Neo-Kantianism, 289. Newton, 64, 96. Nietzsche, 304, 306. Occasionalism, 54. Ontological argument, 47, 109, 134, 153. Optimism, 87 f., 102, 113, 306 ff. Pantheism, 72, 95. Pascal, 57. Paulsen, 281, 292. Pessimism, 57, 105, 198 f., 277. Pluralism, 83, 302. Pomponazzi, 4. Positivism, 224. Pragmatism, 297, 302. Priestley, 115. Primary and secondary quali- ties, 92. Principle of sufficient reason, 81,82,87, 194 f. Problems, 1-3, 42 f. Psychological problem, i, 107 f., 114 f., 127 f., 241, 284 f. Quality and quantity, 38 f., 49 f,, 27? f., 294 f.. 298 f. Ramus, 16. Reid, 115. Relmaius, 138. ; Reinhoid, 165. » • - I „ I i f j1 'I 324 INDEX Relativity, 24, 27, 28, 62, 64, 142 f., 166, 236, 250 f., 294. Religious problem, 2, 12-14, 105, no f., 129, 158, 204, 214 f., 245, 306, 3" ff- Renouvier, 292. Richter, 213. Rickert, 292. Riehl, 292. Romanticism, 169, 219, Rosenkranz, 213. Rosmini, 264. Rousseau, 123. Royer Collard, 222. Ruge, 219. Saint Simon, 223. Sanchez, 16. Schelling, 177. Schiller, 167. Schleiermacher, 189. Schopenhauer, 194. Schultze, 165. Shaftesbury, 102. Sibbem, 200. Sidgwick, 244. Smith, 113 Sociology, 228, 258. Spencer, 250. Spinoza, 67, 80. Spiritualism, 52, 121, 274 f. Strauss, 213. Subjectivity of qualities, 42, 49 f., 60, 92. Substance, 49, 52, 53, 69, 71, 81, 93 f., 109. Sufficient reason, Principle of, 81, 82, 87, 194 f. Sulzer, 133. Synthesis, 147 f., 150, 241, 284 f. Taine, 287. Teleology, 50 f., 79 U 87, 112, 119, 140, 151 f., 161,250. Telesius, 24. Tetens, 133, 135. Theism, 219^,274. Theodicy, 87 f. Toland, 96. Trendelenberg, 214. Tycho Brahe, 31, 38. Truth, 49, 69, 74 f., 185, 296 flf. Utilitarianism, 232, 243, 259. Values, Problem of, 2, 87 f., 90, 104, 198 f., 277, 303. Vives, 7. Voltaire, 118. Voluntarism, 282. Vries, 248. Weisse, 214. Whewell, 237. Windelband, 292. Welfare, Principle of, 104, 232. Wolff, 132. Wundt, 280. npHE following pages contain advertisements of a few of the Macmillan books on kindred subjects. t I 'BF :! i«i The Persistent Problems of Philosophy BY MARY WHITON CALKINS Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in Wellesley College AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY THROUGH A STUDY OF MODERN SYSTEMS Cloth, octavo, 575 pages, $2.50 net. First Edition, igo7; Second, Revised Edition, igo8; Third, Revised Edition, 1912 "To expound the metaphysics of modern Europe is no light task, but Professor Calkms has accomplished it for the most part in a clear and scholarly manner. Beginners may read her 'Introduc- tion' with understanding; and even those who are weary with the confusion of metaphysical tongues will be interested in the freshness of her comment and criticism. The chapters on Descartes and Leibnitz are good examples of the way in which the history of philosophy should be written and the criticism of philosophy per- formed. . . . 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