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The Balance 
 
 Military Power in Europe, 
 
 AN EXAMINATION OF 
 
 THE WAR RESOURCES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND 
 THE CONTINENTAL STATES, 
 
 COLONEL MAURICE, 
 
 ROTAL ABTILLERY, 
 
 PK0FE8S0B OF MILITARY ART AND HISTORY AT THE 
 
 ROYAL STAFF COLLEGE. 
 
 George A. Spooner, 
 
 IvEAVECNV/ORTH, KANSAS. 
 I 891 . 
 
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 f¥o. 
 
 7 50 5D 
 
 C. J. SMITH & CO., PRINTERS, 
 LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS. 
 
GONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
 Introduction, ....... 5 
 
 The Balance of Military Power in Europe. - -' 27 
 
 I. Russia and England, - - . . . 47 
 
 II. Germany, France, and Belgium, . - . 73 
 
 III. Germany, Russia, and Austria, - - - 119 
 
 IV. Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances, - - 161 
 
 Index. ........ 199 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The circumstances which led to the writing of the arti- 
 cles forming the substance of this book were as follows: 
 About four years ago I was asked to contribute to the " Citi- 
 zen Series " — now being published by Messrs. Macmillan & 
 Co. — a volume on "National Defences." I objected at first, 
 that as the national defences of England depend on the 
 navy, it was rather a subject for a sailor than a soldier. On 
 the whole, however, I was persuaded that though it was 
 necessary for me to consult some able sailor, the whole 
 statement might be more conveniently furnished by me. 
 From that time the question has been continually before 
 my mind; but the more I have thought of it, the more im- 
 possible it has seemed to me to deal satisfactorily with it 
 until there was, in some shape or other, before the public a 
 statement, to which I could appeal, as to the warlike condi- 
 tion of other Powers. What is necessary for the defence of 
 the English Empire depends on what attack is likely to be 
 made upon it. 
 
 Furthermore, as it has happened to me to know intimate- 
 ly almost all those who for many years past have been practi- 
 cally considering the question, I was aware that for many 
 reasons the time was hardly ripe for bringing the subject in 
 a satisfactory shape before the public. The result has been 
 that, greatly I fear to the disgust of my excellent friend 
 and editor, Mr. Craik, I have been continually postponing 
 
6 Introduction. 
 
 the publication of the volume. In the course of last year 
 circumstances changed. 
 
 The advent of Mr. Smith to the War Office, and of Gen- 
 eral Brackenbury to the head of the Intelligence Depart- 
 ment, led to the serious and earnest taking up of practical 
 work of a kind that many of us had been praying for for 
 years, and had begun to think past praying for. Notably 
 the defence of our coaling stations — which my friend the 
 late Colonel Home had throughout his active life, in season 
 and out of season, pressed upon the attention of successive 
 governments and on the country — began to be seriously 
 taken up as a matter of practical politics. The subject had 
 been referred to a Royal Commission as long ago as May, 
 1879, when Lord Beaconsfield's government was in office. 
 But there did not seem to be any prospect of the stations 
 being properly garrisoned, as well as fortified and armed, 
 till Mr. Smith took office, and both in his first tenure, his 
 short period of opposition, and his return to office, pressed 
 for the taking of practical steps to maintain at all times in 
 our distant possessions such garrisons as would enable us to 
 resist a coup de main. Moreover, fortunately, information as 
 to the steps being taken both in this respect and in others 
 to make our defences practical, and not visionary merely, 
 was laid in such shape before the public, that it was possible 
 to quote it without divulging any information which was 
 not designed for the public ear. 
 
 It had been my duty also, for the purposes of my cur- 
 rent work, to study with especial care during two years, the 
 present condition of the armed powers of Europe, and their 
 military frontiers. Naturally, for a duty of importance to 
 the future staff officers of our army, I had facilities for ob- 
 taining knowledge which were not easily accessible to others. 
 
 Just at the moment when I was beginning to feel my- 
 self competent to speak with some authority on the subject, 
 the following circumstances occurred. 
 
Introduction. 7 
 
 First, Lord Wolseley very kindly allowed me to study 
 in proof the exhaustive essay, which has since been publish- 
 ed in Mr. Ward's Jubilee volume, on the Past and Present 
 of the English Army. That essay led to the conclusion that 
 it is necessary for some authoritative non-party tribunal to 
 determine the purposes for which we maintain our army and 
 navy, to consider how far our present forces fulfill the neces- 
 sary conditions, and to decide what forces we do or do not 
 require to maintain. 
 
 Almost at the same time Sir James Fitz-James Steph- 
 en's Commission, among many other most valuable sugges- 
 tions, made the same point. 
 
 In the course of conversation with me. Lord Wolseley 
 had expressed the view that in the present condition of af- 
 fairs we have the strongest interest in joining those powers 
 who desire to preserve peace, and in resisting those who 
 threaten disturbance. 
 
 All the circumstances of the time seem to make it so 
 probable that war may suddenly break out in more than one 
 quarter of Europe, that I thought it probable that many 
 readers would be interested in having such guidance as a 
 careful preliminary study of the facts might enable me to 
 supply as to the probable conditions under which war would 
 take place, either between France and Germany or between 
 Russia and Austria, with Germany on the side of Austria. I 
 thought, also, that I saw my way to that statement in rela- 
 tion to the European forces which seemed to me essential 
 as a preliminary to any discussion of "our national de- 
 fences; " and therefore, for the purposes of the proposed 
 volume, I was glad to seize it. Just at the present moment 
 an acquaintance of Sir Charles Dilke's put into my hand a 
 proof of his last article of the series on "The Position of 
 European Politics" — that on the "United Kingdom." He 
 asked me to notice certain expressions which Sir Charles 
 Dilke had used about a recent speech of Lord Wolseley's, 
 
S hitroduction. 
 
 and to comment on them for Sir Charles Dilke's informa- 
 tion. I had not seen Lord Wolseley since he had delivered 
 the speech referred to; but as I was convinced that Sir 
 Charles Dilke had misunderstood him I wrote a series of 
 comments which may now be read in Sir Charles Dilke's 
 volume. For, to my no small surprise, I shortly afterwards 
 found that my comments had been embodied in Sir Charles 
 Dilke's article with the statement that they represented 
 Lord Wolseley's own explanation of his speech. As they 
 did nothing of the kind, and, from the nature of the case, 
 could not do so, I strongly conveyed that fact to Sir Charles 
 Dilke, through our common acquaintance, before the article 
 was sent to press; nevertheless he retained the words as he 
 had originally written them. Naturally I was not disposed 
 for any further communications of that character. I had, 
 however, been reading the " Fortnightly" articles with con- 
 siderable interest,, and as they had touched on the very sub- 
 ject I was anxious, for quite other reasons, to bring before 
 the world, this incident led to my writing to Mr. Blackwood 
 proposing to deal in his magazine with the question as a 
 whole. I never have been, and, unless it be so to be a sup- 
 porter of the Union, I am not now, a party man. I prefer- 
 red, nevertheless, to ask Mr. Blackwood to take the papers 
 rather than any one else; because, looking at the matter 
 solely as a question of justice, it seemed to me that Sir 
 Charles Dilke had been curiously ill-qualified, and had in 
 his article shown himself so, to address " those who desire 
 to put aside personal and party prejudice." He had fasten- 
 ed in his attack upon a minor incident of the broad scheme 
 of reform, which owed its practical possibility to Mr. Smith, 
 He had given it a false interpretation. It seems to me that 
 if we are ever to get things put on a proper footing, it is the 
 bounden duty of all those who do not care for party to rally 
 to the support of the first statesman, whoever he may be, 
 who will seriously take up practical business. If that is par- 
 tisanship, I am a partisan. I am certain — and it is the opin- 
 
Introduction. 9 
 
 ion of all those who have had the whole of the facts before 
 them— that Sir Charles Dilke's words on that subject did 
 nothing but mischief. He has since tried to avoid the issue* 
 by saying that it is an irrelevant question whether Mr. Smith 
 was a good man of business or not. Certainly it is. I never 
 raised it. It is not an irrelevant issue whether the effect of 
 Sir Charles' articles is or is not to move a vote of no confi- 
 dence in a particular statesman, precisely because he at- 
 tempted to provide us with effective garrisons for our coal- 
 ing stations and harbors, and to enable our corps d" armie to 
 act in the field. If to say that you will only believe these 
 things when you see them.f as Sir Charles Dilke specifically 
 did, be not to declare "no confidence," and if that be not 
 the ordinary English mode of expressing a wish to displace 
 a statesman, I do not understand what words mean. 
 
 I am anxious, however, to avoid making this introduc- 
 tion or these articles into a mere controversy with Sir 
 Charles Dilke. Considering the amount of attention which 
 his articles had attracted, it was almost impossible to avoid 
 noticing those points on which I agreed or differed from 
 him. But my purpose has been to deal with questions only 
 incidentally alluded to by Sir Charles Dilke, 
 
 In the article under the general heading of the "Bal- 
 ance of Power in Europe," my object has been to show his- 
 torically, that in the cases in modern times in which we 
 have had any interest in intervening on the continent, we 
 could have, in fact, intervened with decisive effect. I 
 have, in order to show this, dealt with the cases in Denmark 
 in 1864, and of Constantinople in 1878. My complaints as 
 to Sir Charles Dilke's statements on these subjects were, in 
 fact, little better than pegs on which to hang certain histori- 
 
 *See the whole passage, "Fortnightly Review," January 1887, p. 5. 
 
 f "Present Position of European Politics," p. 316. 
 
1 hitrodtiction. 
 
 cal statements, on which, for the purposes of my general 
 contention, I am most anxious to insist. The appearance of 
 Mr. Kinglake's new volumes has enabled me to reinforce 
 these statements by appealing to his account of the Kertch 
 Expedition, and to his admirable comments on that incident 
 as well as to the legitimate deductions from what he has 
 now proved to have been the true story of the siege of Se- 
 bastopol itself. 
 
 The deduction which it is my object to draw from these 
 records of the past is that, to quote Mr. Kinglake again, the 
 places "where land and sea much intertwine" are those 
 where the power of England can best be exerted. Further, 
 that the power which we can there exert does not depend 
 on our navy alone, but upon the marvelous force we possess 
 in our unrivaled mercantile marine. That there is quite a pe- 
 culiar and enormously potent military influence which may 
 be exerted by a small army which can be landed at pleasure 
 at unknown points by a nation which possesses the command 
 of the sea. That, in order to make that force available, it is 
 indispensable that it should be warlike — not merely mili- 
 tary — in its composition; in other words, that it is useless 
 to ship in this way mere regiments, batteries and squadrons, 
 but that the force must consist of perfect little armies, such 
 as are formed by the corps d' arm^e of the continent. That, 
 from the nature of the conditions under which we must al- 
 ways enter upon war, it is more — not less — necessary for us 
 than for Continental powers to have the force with which 
 we are to act ready for instant action, not on a parade or at 
 an Aldershot review, but on a field of battle and throughout 
 a campaign. That, nevertheless, our whole military power 
 disappears unless our navy is so overwhelmingly powerful 
 that it will be able to spare force for striking blows away 
 from home, and will not be absorbed in mere defence of 
 our shores and of our vast commerce. That to that end it 
 is necessary that our coaling stations and harbors shall be 
 adequately armed and garrisoned, and that the garrisons of 
 
Introduction. 1 1 
 
 our distant stations beyond sea shall be permanently main- 
 tained there; because war breaks out always with such start- 
 ling rapidity that garrisons not on the spot are useless, while 
 our Foreign Office will, beyond all doubt, resist, as a matter 
 of diplomatic prudence, reinforcement on the eve of war. 
 even if war ever had a really long "eve." The only time 
 when we can garrison Hong-Kong, Singapore and the like, 
 is during profound peace. 
 
 In the first article of the consecutive series, called "Rus- 
 sia and England," I have maintained — having here very 
 powerful support from Sir Charles Dilk's arguments — that 
 two facts have changed altogether for us the circumstances 
 with which other generations of Englishmen had to deal. 
 The first of these is this, that the frontiers of Russia and 
 England now virtually march side by side in Asia. The 
 second is, that the armed forces of Continental powers have 
 been developed to an extent of which most Englishmen 
 have never formed to themselves any conception at all. I 
 have appealed to evidence, which I believe to be unanswer- 
 able, to prove that we can never make terms with Russia to 
 which Russia will adhere longer than it suits her. 
 
 Just at this moment, when Russia has objects and pur- 
 poses which clash with the wishes and interests of Continen- 
 tal powers, she will be sure to be most willing to arrange 
 terms which will for the time keep us quiet. She is not 
 actually ready to attack us in India. We know that she in- 
 tends to do so. Of course, if she can divide us from others 
 whom she wishes to crush also, she will do it. ''Divide et 
 Impera" is not a maxim which is brand-new in 1888. 
 
 My contention in this article is that, if we can act in 
 such a way that we can lend effective service to other pow- 
 ers who have an interest in opposing the designs of Russia 
 in Europe, and if we can make that service so valuable that 
 it would be worth their while to make with us a treaty which 
 
1 2 Introduction. 
 
 would equally prohibit Russian attack on India, it is our 
 true policy to do so. 
 
 Furthermore, I have shown that the territorial condi- 
 tions of our Indian frontier greatly increase the importance 
 of this question. It is vitally important to stop Russia from 
 possessing herself of Heri Rud. For reasons I have given, 
 we cannot safely attempt this from India. It is not there 
 that "land and sea much intertwine." 
 
 The remaining articles all deal with the question thus 
 raised. 
 
 In the second — that headed "Germany, France, and 
 Belgium" — I have endeavored to show, by comparing the 
 conditions of foreign powers on the Continent and our own, 
 that those statesmen are leading us on to a false scent who, 
 acknowledging the necessity which the present time pre- 
 sents for a more effective condition of our armaments, be- 
 lieve that they may at the same time reduce our expendi- 
 ture, because, as they say, foreign powers do so much more 
 with a given sum of money than we do. 
 
 It is difficult to keep the bearing of an argument, car- 
 ried on in consecutive months, before readers who do not 
 necessarily read each article. I was therefore not surprised 
 that a few critics, who admitted the truth of what I said, 
 made also some complaint that I should connect this sub- 
 ject of relative expense with that of the "Balance of Power 
 in Europe." Now it will be observed that the problem I 
 set myself was to discuss the question raised by Lord 
 Wolseley and Sir Fitz-James Stephen's Commission, the im- 
 portance of which had been admitted by Sir Charles Dilke — 
 " What we want, what we want it for, and whether we can 
 afford to pay for it." My dealing with the " Balance of 
 Power in Europe" is an all important incident of the reply 
 to that question, because I contend that the present condi- 
 tion of the balance of power in Europe determines how we 
 
Introduction. 1 3 
 
 can most economically and effectively develop and employ 
 our power for the defence of the Empire. But it is obvious 
 also, that the question whether we can for the same money 
 obtain the results secured by foreign powers is also an essen- 
 tial element of my answer. I believe that I have shown 
 reason for my contention that our own army is incompara- 
 bly the cheapest army in the world, in the sense that, for 
 the work it does, it puts less strain upon the country, and 
 takes less money out of it, than the army of any Continen- 
 tal State. I am far from contending that no reforms are 
 needed. I believe they are. But I believe that they must 
 be reforms which assume the conditions of English life, and 
 do not ignore them. So far from wishing to modify any- 
 thing I have said in this part of the article, I desire to rein- 
 force it by two remarke I have not there made. 
 
 First, there is only one country in the world which fair 
 ly compares with our own in expenditure. The United 
 States alone of all countries has, like our own, the commer- 
 cial wisdom to pay directly for what it wants. 
 
 Now the great anomaly on which would-be economical 
 reformers fasten, as the extravagant fact connected with our 
 army, is, that with a force of 208,357 regulars we have a non- 
 effective return of nearly three million pounds sterlitig. 
 
 Now the United States army consists of 25,000 men, all 
 told. Its non-effective return reaches seventeen million pounds 
 sterling. 
 
 As I am anxious to emphasize this fact, and do not wish 
 to be supposed to have made some mistake as to currency, 
 I will put it also that it costs eighty million of dollars. 
 
 Of course that is largely a result of the great Civil war; 
 but that does not affect the point for which I mention it — 
 namely, that it may happen that a non-effective return rep- 
 resents some of the best money that is paid by a country. I 
 have shown in the text what the services are which our non- 
 
1 4 Introduction. 
 
 effective return renders us in one respect; but as, since my 
 articles were written, a great point has been made about the 
 extravagance of our medical non-effective return, and as the 
 facts on that subject supply some instructive information, I 
 shall touch on it here. 
 
 The reason why our medical pension list is so high is 
 this. A few years ago the government and the medical 
 schools were at war. The schools beat the government hip 
 and thigh, from Dan to Beersheba. In utter despair of get- 
 ting any medical men for the army, the government surren- 
 dered at discretion. It appeared possible to take advant- 
 age of the conditions of medical civil life in England in this 
 way. Young doctors usually spend the first seven years or 
 so of their medical life in getting old enough to be suppos- 
 ed fit to take up a practice, spending that time on merchant 
 ships, in attending hospitals, or in various ways which for 
 the most part are somewhat disjointed from their after ca- 
 reer. It was thought, and it has proved true, that by offer- 
 ing a lump sum at stated periods early in their career, or 
 small pensions a little later, the ablest young doctors might 
 be tempted to enter the army for a time, without sacrificing 
 the more lucrative prospects of civil practice. Now it is to 
 be observed that if this scheme succeeded, its inevitable ef- 
 fect would be to increase the medical "non-effective return" 
 out of proportion to the "effective return." The pensions 
 were, in fact, the very means by which the government paid 
 for the services of the men actually in the army. As they 
 induced abler men to join the service than could be obtain- 
 ed in any other way because of the conditions of civil prac- 
 tice, and as they induced them to accept relatively low rates 
 of pay, there is nothing in the mere fact of the large "non- 
 effective medical return," which of itself proves that we are 
 not obtaining our doctors by the cheapest scheme on which 
 we can get them. Whether it may or may not be better to 
 pay in some other way, I am not concerned to discuss. But 
 I am certain that the outcry against the mere circumstance 
 
Introduction. 1 5 
 
 of the high relation between the medical "non-effective" 
 and the "effective" return — that is, between the proportions 
 paid for pensions and for pay to doctors in the army — is 
 merely and only the result of ignorance of the facts, or of 
 short memories. It is startling to find that, of all the states- 
 men who were members of the House of Commons when 
 these arrangements were made, no one remembers them 
 sufficiently well to be able conclusively to answer a purely 
 ficticious though most plausible cry. All is not gold that 
 glitters; but we are always being run away with by glitter, 
 because no one scratches below the surface. The chances at 
 present are that, yielding to an outcry, the weakness of 
 which they do not take the trouble to examine, our states- 
 men may be forced into a fresh trial of strenght with the med- 
 ical schools. They will infallibly be beaten, and will have 
 to make probably yet more ignominious terms with their 
 triumphant conquerors. "Their triumphant conquerors," 
 think of it. Imagine these words applied to the govern- 
 ments of Germany, Austria, and Russia, and then gravely 
 discuss the question of the money you vote for your army, 
 and the money they vote. In Germany the medical man is 
 under the compulsion which the general conditions of uni- 
 versal service put upon him. He is glad enough to be em- 
 ployed on his proper work, to go through a government 
 school which offers him educational facilities, binding him- 
 self to serve afterwards as a medical man on cheap terms. 
 But blink the matter as they may, that compulsion is itself 
 an enormous money tax inflicted on the profession as a 
 whole. It appears in no budget. Yet the general effect 
 is to extract from the country, though it comes from only 
 one section of it, an enormously larger sum than we pay for 
 our medical service. 
 
 It is strangely difficult to get people to look at a ques- 
 tion from a point of view to which they are not accustomed. 
 Because I was contending in this article that, great as in 
 many respects were the services which universal military 
 
1 6 Introduction. 
 
 training renders to the health and order of a country, it is 
 very dear as a mere question of money, I was in one quar- 
 ter answered, " No one thinks of introducing universal ser- 
 vice. You waste your breath in arguing against it." I am 
 not arguing against it at all. I am simply accepting our con- 
 ditions as they stand, and I say that our budget, ugly as it 
 looks, is in fact so small a one as compared with the con- 
 cealed money waste of universal service, that our people are 
 deceived by its appearance. Everybody says that, if only 
 the country were convinced that it is getting its money's 
 worth for its money, it would gladly do what is necessary 
 for national security. I maintain, and no one has yet faced 
 my argument, that we get our army more cheaply than any 
 other Power; that here and there economies may be effect- 
 ed, but that the broad fact remains that the thirty-eight mil- 
 lions will barely maintain our home and Indian army in cur- 
 rent efficiency, and that the additional sums we require for 
 horses, stores, effective armaments, garrisons for coaling 
 stations and harbors, and for an efficient navy, cannot be 
 obtained without exceptional expenditure, such as all Con- 
 tinental powers have incurred for them. Direct money pay- 
 ment for each thing you want is, as every one who has ever 
 catered for bar or army mess, or for a party of any other 
 body of men, knows by experience, the most thrifty mode 
 of payment. But thrift may become ruinous if the large 
 figures staring you in the face frighten you from paying 
 what is necessary for efficiency, because others who pay 
 through the nose without realizing itj don't face figures as 
 large. 
 
 The medical case is a capital illustration, because it is 
 the one instance in which the government comes fairly face 
 to face with the professional conditions of a wealthy coun- 
 try. These conditions tell, nevertheless, in directions where 
 they are not known to tell. All through my service I have 
 hardly known any very able men in the army who, unless 
 very wealthy, were not continually being forced to consider 
 
Introduction. 17 
 
 whether they could afford to remain in it. Of course in many 
 instances they yield to necessity, and a disastrous process of 
 weeding goes on. This process, which drives able men out 
 of the army, is continually working. The temptations which 
 are held out to them in England are enormous. I could 
 give case after case of the most startling kind. It applies 
 to all ranks. In some instances I conld clearly show the 
 direct pecuniary loss which has resulted to the country 
 from the fact of the tremendous competitions offered by 
 civil life. When large English companies find it commer- 
 cially advantageous to pay their chairman ^^7,500 per annum 
 as is the case with one large railway company, ^8,000 per 
 annum, as is the case with others, it is absurd to say, as the 
 cry now is, that the pay of our highest civil and military ser- 
 vants is to be compared with those of Germany. I am cer- 
 tain that the direction in which economy is being looked 
 for is a false one. Not one question is asked by any Parlia- 
 mentary or other committee with the view to ascertain these 
 facts. Nay, when any evidence is tendered which may pos- 
 sibly show that economy lies in a different direction from 
 that which is assumed, it is usually ignored and neglected. 
 Now you cannot really secure economy except by facing 
 facts. Inquiry, the object of which is not to ascertain truth 
 but to confirm an established popular prejudice, will cer- 
 tainly lead to conclusions which end in disaster. 
 
 Therefore I am certain that the discussion in the pages 
 of this volume, 78-96, on " German and English Econ- 
 omy," is a necessary and a most important part of the in- 
 quiry with which I am here concerned. I am happy to find 
 from the notices, more especially in the leading provincial 
 papers, that hardly any has excited more interest, or has 
 been more generally confirmed from local experience, some 
 papers having supplied fresh facts of the greatest value 
 bearing on the matter. I have reason to know that Lord 
 Randolph Churchill has had some unpleasant experiences in 
 
1 8 Introduction. 
 
 trying to press his views on men of large commercial 
 knowledge. 
 
 The next subject— that of the military frontiers of 
 France and Germany — is intended, first, to serve the pur- 
 pose of assisting readers to understand the general situation 
 between those powers, so as to follow with an intelligent 
 interest discussions which are daily appearing in the news- 
 papers, and to understand events if war should unhappily 
 break out. Secondly it is necessary as part of the account 
 of the general situation of Europe, in order to show how our 
 power can be most economically exerted for our own de- 
 fence. The questions about Belgium, and our relations to 
 that country, so obviously concern ourselves, that I do not 
 think they need be further touched on here. 
 
 In the article on " Germany, Russia, and Austria," the 
 same double purpose is followed. The final article deals 
 with the whole situation as it concerns ourselves. Its purpose 
 is to show that the rise of the Italian power has offered us 
 the opportunity of affording that assistance to the Con- 
 tinental powers.which will enable us, on the do ut dcs princi- 
 ple, to secure that alliance the advantage of which it was 
 the object of the first article to insist upon. 
 
 The anonymous veil that was originally thrown over the 
 authorship of these articles was always very thin. I never 
 concealed my identity from any one who cared to know it. 
 Sir Charles Dilke was informed of my purpose before I pub- 
 lished an article, because I was naturally unwilling to attack 
 him without letting him know who his assailant was. Never- 
 theless it has had one useful effect. Despite the extreme 
 kindness which I have met with from most of my critics, a 
 few have illustrated rather amusingly their ideas and expe- 
 riences as to the anonymous in writing. As they are most 
 of them anonymous writers, the facts are suggestive. 
 
 I had warmly defended the proper use of cavalry, quo- 
 ting the names of the greatest authorities in Europe as 
 
Introduction. 19 
 
 guarantees for the truth of what I had said. Therefore one 
 critic announced, without hesitation, that I was a cavalry 
 officer. I had spoken of General Brackenbury as "one of 
 the most distinguished of living artillery officers," therefore 
 another critic announced in three successive paragraphs, as 
 a fact within his own knowledge, that I was General Brack- 
 enbury. It is needless to say that, having this exact knowl- 
 edge of my identity, he displayed his literary critical capa- 
 city by detecting in parts of these articles a style identical 
 with certain other articles which, as he alleged, General 
 Brackenbury had written. 
 
 I presume that it was in vengeance for his error that he, 
 the week after he discovered it, proceeded to attack " mili- 
 tary professors" — it being obvious that two years special 
 study at the Staff College in an official appointment, which 
 I received on the understanding that it would in no way in- 
 terfere with my employment on active service, had changed 
 my nature as a soldier after four campaigns and twenty-four 
 years previous service in the army. 
 
 The same critic assumed that it was because of some 
 salaries in which I was specially interested, that I pointed 
 out that, for instance, the Portsmouth command, the pay of 
 which is unusually large, is only an expense to its holder, 
 and does not in the proper sense yield pay at all. 
 
 The one thing which these gentlemen seem unable to 
 conceive is, that there are some of us, whose business it has 
 been to watch events closely for some years past, not from 
 a party point of view, but in the interest of national safety, 
 who really and earnestly believe that there are facts which 
 it is vital that the country should face. I myself know from 
 many conversations that even the most intelligent classes in 
 this country are not in the least aware of the actual condi- 
 tion of the armed powers of the Continent. Sir Wilfrid 
 Lawson is able to say to an average audience without being 
 hissed: "Why should not we invade France instead of 
 
20 Introduction. 
 
 France invading us, if we have a Channel Tunnel?" And 
 the depth of the folly which that sentence expresses is not 
 understood by one Englishman in ten among business men 
 or professional men. 
 
 Now we soldiers may be all wrong in what we say. 
 Those who are not soldiers or sailors may be the only people 
 who can think without bias — who can judge what ought to 
 be done. But no men of any kind can be right who form 
 their conclusions from false assumptions as to facts. What 
 I find everywhere is that the facts which may be gathered* 
 from any authoritative source altogether independent of 
 soldiers are not known, and, as Mr, Gladstone once put it, 
 in an analagous matter, " If they are read, they are not 
 marked, learned, and inwardly digested." 
 
 I do not know how the facts are to be brought home if 
 it is assumed at once and without examination of what he 
 says, that whoever has been obliged to look into these facts 
 must necessarily have some secret base motive for asking 
 his countrymen to examine them. Surely the question is 
 suflficiently serious — I do not mean by that panic-suggest- 
 ing, but merely not fitting for a society journal joke — to 
 make it right that some men who cannot have any base 
 motive, such as these writers instantly attribute to a soldier 
 or sailor, should look for themselves into the question and 
 see whether these things are so or not. 
 
 Perhaps I may now claim that, by the very assumptions 
 which these writers have made as to my probable identity, I 
 come forward under circumstances which do not suggest the 
 presumption of prejudice. A soldier, I am pleading before 
 
 * Alack ! I had in my haste written, "say from the 'Statesman's 
 Year Book,'" but reference at once showed that that work was decep- 
 tive, and deceptive only and completely, as to the strength of armies. 
 English statesmen "care for none of these things," and those who cater 
 for them know it. 
 
Introduction. 21 
 
 all things for the navy. I am pleading on grounds of the 
 military study of the Continent, which it has belonged to 
 my office to undertake, and which I think I have made in- 
 telligible to the mind of all Englishmen, so that they who 
 are not soldiers or sailors may judge for themselves. 
 
 Trained and militarily bred as a field-artillery-man, and 
 having had the honor of wearing the horse-artillery jacket, 
 I am, from sheer conviction, pleading that, for the sake of 
 the country, we field-gunners must bear to see our own arm 
 reduced, rather than that the army as a whole, including the 
 artillery, should not be able to act with the promptitude 
 which is necessary for the service of the country. 
 
 I am pleading thus, though I know that our volunteers 
 and militia stand sorely in need of the support of field-guns, 
 and that they are not an army without them. 
 
 I am pleading thus against a most brilliant writer, who 
 has given more study to foreign armies than any other of 
 our statesmen, and who girds at me because I do not believe 
 it possible on our present estimates to make an increase of 
 390, or, as he at first not unfairly urged as the proper com- 
 plement, 900 field-guns. 
 
 Perhaps the generous critics to whom I have alluded 
 may discover for me the hidden baseness which may lead 
 me to suggest that the money required for this object ought 
 first to be spent in ensuring the safety of our harbors and 
 coaling stations — in none of which I hope ever to be em- 
 ployed — and in ensuring the supremacy of our navy, in 
 which I have no other concern than that of a tax-payer and 
 a subject of the English crown. 
 
 The increase of the field artillery would, in fact, have 
 for me the most direct and immediate professional advan- 
 tage. It would give to me under almost any possible organ- 
 ization such professional advancement as would be of more 
 value to me than any other merely personal advantage that 
 
22 Introduction. 
 
 an expenditure of money can bring. I do not think, there- 
 fore, that the pleas I put forward ought, from the mere 
 source from which they spring, to be met with suspicion. 
 
 The audience to which I am anxious to appeal are the 
 lawyers, the business men, the doctors, the numbers of intel- 
 ligent working men whom I know to be interested in the 
 concerns of their country. Of course I am glad to have the 
 support of soldiers as to the military soundness of what I 
 have urged. I can hardly receive kinder, warmer, or more 
 authoritative testimony on that point than I have received. 
 But unless Englishmen generally will judge for themselves 
 of the policy I here advocate, my words are wasted. States- 
 men cannot, for the reasons I have assigned, make for us 
 that federal treaty which, as I believe, will ensure peace in 
 our generation, will protect India and secure our commerce; 
 still less can they ensure the efificiency of our small army 
 and the necessary supremacy of our navy without your sup- 
 port, sir, or madam, who chance to be reading this. It is in 
 proportion as the nation refuses by practical voting to allow 
 the question of our foreign policy to be made the shuttle- 
 cock of party, that foreign statesmen are ready to give as 
 we give. I am speaking on some of the very best authority 
 in all Europe when I so speak. You can play your part in 
 making the question intelligible to others. In its broad 
 outline it is a very simple one, and easily explained. The 
 Secretary of the Treasury is your representative. It is to 
 save your pocket that he turns out Lord Charles Beresford. 
 He does so merely because we, none of us, like to pay what 
 is needed to make the navy efificient. I have as little liking 
 for the taxgatherer's little chit as you have. I have no 
 more personal interest in the navy than you. But I have had 
 to study matters which, if you will follow these pages, you 
 may understand as well as I do. If you do understand 
 them, you will see that every shilling we now save in taxes 
 from Treasury decisions, which help to make the navy inef- 
 ficient, is ruinous extravagance. We shall have to live a 
 
Introduction. 23 
 
 very few years in order to pay for them in many pounds for 
 each shilling, and we shall then have suffered in a thousand 
 other ways which no pounds will redeem. 
 
 It was^as Mr. Kinglake has shown without a possible 
 logical flaw, on the evidence of exhaustive parliamentary 
 inquiries — the direct act of a Secretary of the Treasury, Sir 
 Charles Trevelyan, which absolutely caused all the misery, 
 the extravagance, and the loss of life of the Crimean Winter. 
 There is no man living who, for the reasons I have named, 
 is so directly your representative and mine as taxpayers as 
 the Permanent Secretary of the treasury. It is as you feel 
 that he will act. If you choose to have such a navy and an 
 army so mobile that you can by their aid ensure the support 
 of the Central powers in keeping Russia quiet. Sir Reginald 
 Welby will not be a second Sir Charles Trevelyan.* You 
 will have no war with Russia for India at all, in all human 
 probability. At the worst, if you do, it will be a short one, 
 for you will have some of the greatest powers in the world 
 on your side. There are few facts more certain in the world 
 than that within the next ten years the fruits of your decis- 
 ion will have been gathered. The one thing on which you 
 must not reckon is, that any one in the position of the Sec- 
 retary of the Treasury will take them into account. They 
 never have done so in all their history, and they never will. 
 The question that concerns them is the preparation of the 
 budget of the year. The budgets of the next ten years are 
 beyond their purview. 
 
 I have had occasion to refer several times to the scheme 
 for the British army, apparently suggested by Sir Charles 
 Dilke. My reference has been always to these words: " I 
 am convinced that by an expenditure of far less than the 36 
 to 38 millions sterling which we spend already upon our 
 army, we could create a force which would make our ene- 
 
 * The offices are not identical, though both are correctly described as 
 Secretaries of the Treasury. The distinction is irrelevant to my purpose. 
 
24 Introduction. 
 
 mies pause before they ventured to attack us. This is not the 
 time to work out, as I intended to do, the possible relations 
 in the new infantry system between what might be called 
 the guards, the militia, and the volunteers. Some of the 
 Australian colonies, in their new military systems, have 
 recognized the distinction which should exist, in order to 
 call out the full local military strength, between various 
 classes of what they style volunteers. Some of them have 
 a force in the nature of a volunteer militia which is paid, 
 . . . and it will be interesting at a future time to consider 
 whether the various Australian military systems do not 
 point out to us the way in which we should walk in future."* 
 
 I think I was justified in concluding from these words, 
 accompanied by a fierce attack upon all the steps actually 
 being taken to give us two effective army corps and a cav- 
 alry division, that Sir Charles Dilke did not realize the im- 
 portance of "our amphibious strength." The desire to 
 bring home to all men the importance to England of pos- 
 sessing a highly mobile force, helped to make me wish to 
 lay before them the facts which are here recorded. 
 
 Sir Charles Dilke, in his more recent articles, has de- 
 clared his wish to provide us with the two army corps and 
 a cavalry division, and has cited the case of Switzerland to 
 show that we ought to be able also to possess several hun- 
 dred field guns. As he has withdrawn from the proposal to 
 reduce our expenditure, and now, on the contrary, thinks 
 that we must increase it, I naturally can only await with 
 unalloyed interest the explanation of his present proposals. 
 I have no reason to suppose that they will clash with any- 
 thing that I have here said. They certainly will not tend. 
 
 * " Present Position of European Politics," pp. 333, 334. 
 
Introduction. 25 
 
 if they carry out the indications he has now given, to dimin- 
 ish the importance of what I have urged. 
 
 The system of a developed militia, which the original 
 proposal appeared to suggest, met its coup de grace at 
 Olmiitz in 1849. So long as we get the power which will, on 
 the do ut des principle, enable us to play our part in keeping 
 the peace of Europe, and in keeping Russia out of India, I 
 am content. 
 
- -THE -- 
 
 BALANCE or MILITARY P0VER 
 IN EyRQPC. 
 
NOTE. 
 
 I HAVE on the whole preferred to retain the articles in their original 
 form, only putting in such matters as would bring them up to date. To 
 distinguish between the new notes added to the volume and the original 
 text and notes, I have retained the "we" of the originals, but have writ- 
 ten "I" in the notes added afterwards 
 
THE BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER IN 
 EUROPE. 
 
 It is a curious fact that the most unmistakable mark of 
 himself which it appears likely that Mr. Bright will leave 
 behind him on our statute book is to be found in the Army 
 Act. Up to the year 1867 the preamble of the Mutiny Act 
 had always declared that the purpose for which the army 
 was maintained was " the safety of the United Kingdom, the 
 defence of the possessions of her Majesty's crown, and the 
 preservation of the balance of power in Europe." 
 
 But when Mr. Bright became a cabinet minister in Mr. 
 Gladstone's administration, the words referring to the "bal- 
 ance of power in Europe " were, at his instance, dropped 
 out; and as the preamble to the annual act now stands, our 
 army exists only for " the safety of the United Kingdom 
 and the defence of the possessions of her Majesty's crown." 
 
 As a rule, abstract questions, such for instance as the 
 purposes for which we maintain armed forces at all, are not 
 in England thrashed out. A writer here or there propounds 
 a theory which obtains a certain amount of acceptance; and 
 a few years later one finds it taken for granted by the care- 
 less and the thoughtless that certain assumptions, on which 
 no adequate Areopagus has ever decided, are to be accepted 
 for the future as the primary data of all discussion. Then 
 some fine morning a cabinet minister gives practical effect 
 to the abstract discussion, and we discover that the reason- 
 ings which appeared to be too little serious to need the 
 attention of men absorbed by everyday work, have had the 
 
30 The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 
 
 most momentous effect on practical politics at least, if not 
 on business and life. 
 
 Mr. Bright, then, has duly dismissed to the shades the 
 wicked dream of our great statesmen of the past, that it was 
 not for the well-being of England that any one power on the 
 Continent should assume a position so preponderating that 
 it could dictate tyrannically to all its neighbors. History 
 would appear to confirm the view that for any state to 
 acquire, as Spain did under Charles and Philip, or France 
 did under Louis XIV. and Napoleon, or as Russia did under 
 Nicholas, a position of overweening power, is a matter dan- 
 gerously affecting the liberties of nations. In former days 
 our statesmen thought that, for the safety of England her- 
 self, she ought to be ready to join hands with other nations 
 in defending the liberties of Europe. They believed that 
 nations, like individuals, have their duties as well as their 
 rights, and that the neglect of one, or carelessness in regard 
 to the other, is sure, sooner or later, to meet with punish- 
 ment. They embodied these ideas in the phrase, "the bal- 
 ance of power in Europe." It may or may not have been a 
 happy one. We have no anxiety to see it restored to the 
 preamble of the Army Act. Still it had its advantages. It 
 avoided all terms of pharisaical assumption, yet it declared 
 to other nations our readiness to play some other than a 
 purely selfish part. It naturally made them ready to meet 
 us on the do iit des principle — the principle, that is, of mutual 
 co-operation for national independence. But what we can- 
 not help noting with some amusement is the quaint humor 
 with which, in these matters, time brings his revenges. 
 Here, in the month of June, 1887, we have a writer of the 
 extremest radical school concluding a series of articles — on 
 what? Well, he says they are on "The Position of Euro- 
 pean Politics." But, we call Mr. Bright himself to witness 
 that we are setting down naught in malice, — "the trail of 
 the serpent is over them all." "The balance of power in 
 Europe" is the subject with which this very able writer 
 
The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 3 1 
 
 finds himself at every turn compelled to deal. Dismissed 
 from the preamble of the Mutiny Act, it forces itself into 
 practical politics from the moment politics cease to be insu 
 lar — that is, from the moment that, in guiding the helm of 
 the state, the pilot does not sleep, and, sleeping, dream that 
 he can escape all storms because he sees none that are 
 rising. 
 
 We have recently had from three distinct quarters an 
 earnest demand that the country shall really make up its 
 mind for what purposes it maintains its military forces, and 
 what those forces are expected to do. Differing on nearly 
 every other subject, the Fortnightly Reviewer and the Adju- 
 tant-General of the army* are agreed in this, that it is utterly 
 impossible that we can have our armed forces on a satisfac- 
 tory footing until some authoritative body determines what 
 we ought to expect from them. In so far as Sir James Fitz- 
 James Stephen's Commission has had opportunity, it has 
 earnestly pressed upon us the same sound principle. 
 
 It has been noticed already by some of those who have 
 criticised the work of the Fortnightly Reviewer, that he 
 has strangely ignored the conditions under which modern 
 armies engage; and that, whether his statistical calculations 
 of numerical force be accurate or not, his balance is not a 
 true balance, because he treats the value of a soldier as a 
 quantity absolutely independent of all his fighting qualities 
 and national characteristics. Yet Napoleon was in the habit 
 of reckoning the elements of the forces with which he dealt, 
 for practical purposes and as a matter of business, on the 
 principle that a man of one nationality might be taken as 
 the equivalent of so many more of another. Whatever was 
 the case in his day, it is perfectly certain that in ours a mass 
 of men incapable of acting so as effectively to use modern 
 arms becomes simply a broader target for shot as its num- 
 
 * The reference is to the article contributed by Lord Wolseley to the 
 Jubilee Volume edited by Mr. Ward. 
 
32 The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 
 
 bers increase. Moreover, the writer throughout treats 
 force, latent somewhere or other in a country, as though 
 that could be reckoned as the actually available fighting 
 power on the battlefield. He laughs, not without some jus- 
 tice, in his final article — that on England— at Mr. Howard 
 Vincent for speaking of the ultimate forces of the British 
 empire as 2,250,000 men, " without telling us anything of the 
 time that it would take to place even a tenth of this force 
 in line near London." Yet in the article on Russia, he him- 
 self does precisely the same thing as regards the Russian 
 forces. He treats the vast numbers of armed Russians 
 available somewhere or other among the great deserts and 
 mountains and roadless morasses of Russia, as though they 
 had all to be reckoned with on the frontiers of Germany and 
 Austria whenever it pleased the Tzar to issue his fiat that 
 they should move thither. He complains that those who 
 dispute the accuracy of the picture he has drawn of the 
 colossus of the north do not appreciate the improvement 
 that has taken place in the Russian army since the Turkish 
 war of 1877-78, yet he utterly fails to show how the weak- 
 nesses which then existed have been remedied. He gives no 
 hint that he is aware how amazing was the weakness which 
 Russia actually displayed in the Turkish campaign; and in- 
 deed in some parts of his latest article, when he is having 
 his wicked will of the " Jingoes," — a safe pastime always 
 for a Radical politician in distress, — he demonstrates abso- 
 lutely that he either does not know it, or finds it convenient 
 for the purposes of his argument to suppress the fact. 
 
 Holding, therefore, with the Fortnightly Reviewer, Sir 
 James Fitz-James Stephen's Commission, and the Adjutant- 
 General, that it is of vital consequence for us to determine 
 in military matters " what we want," what we want it for, 
 and whether we can afford to pay for it, we propose, in the 
 following pages, to discuss the military relations of the 
 great powers of the Continent at the present moment, and 
 to consider how far those relations affect our own military 
 
The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 33 
 
 power. We propose to take up those precise aspects of the 
 question which have been altogether ignored by the Re- 
 viewer. We purpose not only to study the armed forces of 
 the Continent, as they exist on paper, as well as our own, but 
 we intend further to take account of the medium in which 
 those forces have necessarily to interact. That is to say, 
 we mean to allow for the influence of those conditions of 
 modern warfare, conformity to the laws of which determines 
 what the effective fighting power of nations really is, almost 
 as much as any numerical estimate of their fighting men 
 can possibly determine it. We are convinced that the whole 
 tendency of the articles which have dealt with the " Posi- 
 tion of Modern '.Politics " has been to put these matters in 
 a false light. We are sure that their writer would have us 
 believe that England is weak where she is strong, and strong 
 where she is weak, and that he has misjudged the other 
 forces among which her power has to act. In particular, as 
 regards Russia, he has, as we believe, put her strength for 
 weakness, and her weakness for strength. He has not 
 taken account of the effect upon the position of England in 
 Europe of the rise of the new power — Italy, whose army and 
 politics he has in many respects most admirably described. 
 He has in many most important respects misjudged the 
 strength of Austria, of Germany, and of France. In almost 
 every instance, not from an inaccurate statement of bare 
 facts, so far as he has given them, but from assumptions 
 radically false, he has tended to lead our statesmen astray. 
 We therefore look upon it as a duty, for the sake of our 
 national future, to endeavor, whilst there is yet time, to 
 remove the false impressions which have been produced on 
 the minds of men by these attractive papers. 
 
 For the most part, we shall state our own convictions, 
 and the grounds on which they are based. We shall not 
 weary our readers with lengthy controversy. Indeed we 
 shall have little need to do so. The writer, as a rule, deals 
 only in dogmatic assertion on military matters, He is sure, 
 
34 The Balance of Military Poiver in Europe. 
 
 for instance, that the French frontier and the Russian fron- 
 tier against Germany are much stronger than the German 
 against either. He gives no grounds for his assertion, and 
 he does not describe the character of the frontiers. We 
 hope to be able to make clear to all our readers our reasons 
 for believing the precise contrary.* He is sure that on mil- 
 itary grounds the Germans will march through Belgium; he 
 is sure that England will not resist them if they do. We 
 deny the soundness of his military assumption, and we pro- 
 pose to expose the weakness of the grounds of his political 
 one. We intend, in either case, to state fully the reasons for 
 our belief.f 
 
 This part of the subject — that of relative military power, 
 and of the courses of action which are, as a consequence of 
 it, open to us — is of such paramount importance, and needs 
 such full statement, that we cannot follow him into those 
 deeply interesting, but — may we say it without offence? — 
 slightly gossipy records of past politics which have enliv- 
 ened his pages. 
 
 We must, however, once and for all, enter our protest 
 against the claim of the writer to appeal to those who desire 
 to put aside " personal and party prejudice." Whether or 
 not he "who drives fat oxen should himself be fat," this 
 much at least is certain, that the appeal to men to judge, 
 on higher than party grounds, questions in which party pas- 
 sions have been largely involved, can only justly be made 
 by a man who first takes the beam out of his own eye. In 
 our life, among all the passionate perversions of facts, of 
 which we have had enough and more than enough of late 
 years, we have never read assumptions as to the past more 
 
 * See II., "Germany, France, and Belgium;" and III., "Germany, 
 Russia, and Austria." 
 
 f See II., "Germany, France, and Belgium." 
 
The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 35 
 
 grotesquely unfair than those which are thus paraded under 
 the banner of inpartial history. For a man with the past 
 political record of Sir Charles Dilke, who has now avowed 
 the authorship of these papers, to attempt, when writing 
 anonymously, and at a time when his identity was really 
 concealed, to pass for an impartial historian, weighing with 
 the fair balance and even weight of one looking only to his 
 country's good, the foreign policy of the past, seems to us, 
 to put it mildlyj to be a not very ingenious proceeding. 
 But in every historical statement, still more in every care- 
 fully considered omission, the cloven foot of the bitter par- 
 tisan peeps out. It is made worse, not better, by the well 
 calculated compliment to Lord Salisbury's recent policy, so 
 worded as to make it appear as though Lord Salisbury had 
 done little more than adopt Lord Rosebery's line of action 
 in foreign affairs, so that it matters now little which party 
 is in office, so far as foreign politics are concerned. There 
 is something strangely cynical in this boundless faith in the 
 short memory of the English public. 
 
 It happens that, in one particular instance, we are anx- 
 ious to recall a passage of past history which it has suited 
 Sir Charles Dilke's purpose to forget. Our purpose in re- 
 calling it is, however, to illustrate the form in which the 
 power of England can now be most effectively employed. 
 We only incidentally touch on the historical error. 
 
 It has pleased Sir Charles Dilke to fix the date when 
 that reign of force began in Europe, which, as he truly says, 
 now so determines facts, that every politician of the present 
 day who desires to be more than a vestryman, must under- 
 stand the conditions under which armies are marshalled for 
 the field. We allege distinctly that he has fixed that date 
 solely, we will not say for the purposes of party, but blind- 
 ed to the plainest historical facts by that spirit of partisan- 
 ship which, after years of party life, has become to him a 
 second nature, from whence he can no more emancipate 
 
36 The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 
 
 himself than he can leap from his own shadow. He says 
 that England, at the Berlin Congress, contributed to set up 
 that reign of force because we "virtually annexed an island 
 which had not been conquered," and that from that mo- 
 ment the reign of force began. We say that England did 
 contribute her share to the setting up the reign of force 
 in Europe, but that it was not in the year 1878, when, with 
 the full assent of the Sultan of Turkey, we occupied Cyprus. 
 The reign of blood and iron was not established by paying 
 good gold that might have enabled reforms to be carried 
 out, and by actually improving the administration of a Turk- 
 ish island. No! It was in the month of February 1864 that 
 England, after — through the mouth of Lord Kimberley, 
 then Lord Wodehouse — she had persuaded the Danes to sur- 
 render to Prussian aggression the first line of their defences 
 and the fortress of Rendsburg, expressly on the ground that, 
 till that was done, she could afford no material assistance, 
 drew back and left the Danish monarchy to be dismember- 
 ed avowedly by sheer force.* 
 
 Nothing in all diplomacy is recorded with more precis- 
 ion than the fact that then force was set up as the rule of 
 right. The Berlin lawyers expressly recorded their opinion 
 after the war that Prussia and Austria were the sole lawful 
 possessors of the Duchies, because the only original right to 
 them was that of the reigning King of Denmark, who, as a 
 
 *No doubt at all times force has been the only means by which law 
 could be enforced. It is almost tautology to say so. What I contend is 
 that, from the fall of Napoleon onwards up to 1864, there had been an 
 acknowledged principle that the " European concert " should resist the 
 exercise of mere force. Rightly or wrongly, our statesmen in 1864 be- 
 lieved that force was being wrongfully exercised, and yielded to it. I 
 have myself always had great sympathy with the German determination 
 not to allow Germans to be bullied. Our action was based on no such 
 feeling, but on sheer fear of redeeming our pledged word. Either it was 
 wrong to pledge our word, or it was wrong not to redeem it. What I 
 desire to show is that we could have redeemed it. 
 
The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 37 
 
 consequence of the conquest, had transferred by treaty all 
 his rights in them to the conquering States.* 
 
 Of the part which England played in those transactions 
 the father of the present ambassador in Berlin, Sir A. Malet, 
 has, in his "Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation," re- 
 corded his views in terms of such vigor as a diplomatist 
 rarely permits himself. He has shown conclusively that 
 England did lead the Danes to suppose that armed assis- 
 tance would be offered by her, even if she stood alone. It 
 was, in fact, certain that she would not stand alone. Aus- 
 tria knew well that Prussia was then preparing her over- 
 throw, and she was therefore only waiting for a signal from 
 us to abandon the artificial alliance into which she had been 
 forced. The French Emperor was only sulking because we 
 had refused to join him in his proposed European Congress. 
 The feeling in France in behalf of the Danes would have 
 been too strong to be long resisted. Sweden with her gal- 
 lant little army was ready to join us at once. All that was 
 needed was the facing of a momentary danger of enormous 
 apparent magnitude. 
 
 We have always believed that, in a military sense, the 
 danger was apparent only. We speak on the evidence of 
 some of the best trained English soldiers who were actually 
 present at the struggle, when we say that we believe that, 
 had even such a force as we could then have sent to Den- 
 mark been joined to the Danish and Swedish armies, posi- 
 tions could in that most peculiar country have been taken 
 up where, protected by the guns of our fleets, the united 
 army, all of excellent quality, could have defied the utmost 
 efforts of the Austro-Prussian forces to break down their 
 resistance. It needed only a few weeks of boldly facing the 
 
 * See a very clear summary of this remarkable State paper in the 
 Annual Register for 1865. Foreign History p. 245. 
 
38 The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 
 
 risk then, to have broken down the first avowed effort at set- 
 ting up the law of force in Europe. 
 
 We are far from saying that we now wish all the history 
 of the past undone. We are by no means sure that the for- 
 mation of a United Germany in the center of Europe, by 
 whatever means it has been brought about, has not been the 
 event of our time which in the long run will most tend to 
 the happiness of the human race. But that England then, 
 for the first time, shrank back from redeeming her virtually 
 pledged word in the presence of mere force, and that she 
 did so under a mistaken estimate of her danger, we are firm- 
 ly convinced. We believe that then Prussia, despite her 
 breech-loaders, which she had not tried in war, and with an 
 army organization which, inaugurated only four years be- 
 fore, was not as yet complete, would have evaded the strug- 
 gle, knowing well the dangers to which in a short time she 
 would have been exposed. 
 
 What Sir Alexander Malet does not record, but what is 
 nevertheless a matter of history, is that the great question 
 on which the whole future of European history, "of the po- 
 sition of European politics," for at least a century, of the 
 "balance of European power" was to depend, was settled 
 at a certain cabinet council in London. Then for the first — 
 not for the last — time the Sibyl presented herself to the re- 
 sponsible statesmen of England, offering for a price, not, as 
 she did to Tarquin, merely the books which should foretell 
 the future, but ready at their bidding to change the very 
 course of history. Before that cabinet council. Lord Palm- 
 erson and Lord Russel had been conscious of the absolute 
 obligation which lay upon England to redeem words which, 
 taken in their natural meaning by those to whom they were 
 addressed, were now pleaded by Denmark as binding us to 
 support her. They had actually ordered Sir Alfred Hors- 
 ford to prepare the scheme for an English army to be land- 
 ed on the shores of Denmark, though for the moment we 
 
The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 39 
 
 should have had alone to face two of the great powers of the 
 Continent. But when the cabinet council broke up, Sir Al- 
 fred Horsford heard no more of any war like proposals. 
 
 Who had carried the decision of the council in the teeth 
 of two such statesmen? Who had succeeded in persuading 
 an English cabinet to make itself responsible for the true 
 inauguration of the reign of blood and iron ? Who had 
 triumphed so far over all the past traditions of English pol- 
 icy? Who had set the ball a rolling which, with rapid rush, 
 was to lead on to the "overthrow of the Germanic Confed- 
 eration," to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, to the crea- 
 tion of that life of war in peace time which now lies like a 
 blight on all the nations of the Continent? 
 
 It has not needed that the Queen's secrets should be 
 betrayed in order that it should be matter of notoriety that 
 in that cabinet meeting, though other influences affected the 
 question, and though other members of the cabinet were 
 strongly in favor of a peace policy, that which decided it 
 was the overmastering eloquence of Mr. Gladstone. 
 
 It is not therefore surprising that a Radical statesman 
 who up to the last associated himself with the very latest 
 phases of what Mr. Bright has lately called " Mr. Glad- 
 stone's many turnings of his coat," should desire to forget 
 that very noteworthy date of February, 1864, and should de- 
 sire to transfer to the Congress of Berlin the responsibility for 
 that change in English politics and in the international law 
 of Europe which was then inaugurated. It is not unnatural 
 we say, that he should "desire" to make this change. But, see- 
 ing that all that we have here written is known to Sir Charles 
 Dilke as well as it is to us, with what face, when he thus 
 changes some of the best known pages of history in accord- 
 ance with partisan desires, can he address himself "to those 
 if there be such in these days, who are free from party pre- 
 judice, from prejudice personal and national — to those, in 
 short, who try to see things as they really are" ? That is 
 
40 The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 
 
 certainly what we wish to do, as far as we can; but we are 
 warned by the example of the Reviewer against protesting 
 too much. 
 
 It is by no means only with a view to the question of the 
 correct date of the origin of the modern reign of force that 
 we have referred to the story of the Danish war. The chief 
 purpose for which we recall it to mind will appear fully 
 after we have dealt with a very curious confession, accom- 
 panied, as we do not think but absolutely know, by an 
 enormous historical error of fact, of the gravest possible 
 consequence. 
 
 " If," says Sir Charles Dilke, " I have sometimes fallen 
 foul of those whom I look upon as belonging to the Jingo 
 school of 1878, it is because I doubt their wisdom. Of their 
 patriotism I have a profound conviction; and it is only of 
 their methods that I complain, believing as I do that the 
 inflated language of 1878 was a mere insult to our intelli- 
 gence, and that the occupation of Cyprus was a blunder cal- 
 culated to divert the country from the penitential consider- 
 ation of its own real military weakness, and of the true ways 
 in which that weakness should be remedied Never- 
 theless I hate to contend with them, because I feel all the 
 time that upon the essential points we are in real agreement 
 — namely, that we are living in a fool's paradise; that we 
 are not in a military position, in spite of the enormous sums 
 that we have been spending, to defend the empire against 
 attack."* 
 
 Now there is a good deal here which suggests food for 
 reflection. To begin with, the word "Jingo "f is one of 
 extremely doubtful acceptation. It was originally invented 
 by Mr. Bradlaugh, and made its first appearance, under his 
 
 * Present Position of European Politics, pp. 330, 331. 
 
 f We speak, of course, of the political nickname, and not of the 
 ancient oath. 
 
The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 4 1 
 
 auspices, in a letter which appeared in the "Daily News," in 
 which he said that a certain race of people had recently 
 come to be known "whom / call Jingoes." The word was 
 eagerly caught at, at the time, by Mr. Gladstone's followers, 
 because there existed, independently of party, a widespread 
 feeling of patriotic appreciation of the position which, under 
 Lord Beaconsfield's guidance, England had assumed in Eu- 
 rope, and it was necessary, for party purposes, to pour con- 
 tempt upon that feeling. 
 
 In all such popular movements there are necessarily ele- 
 ments of vulgarity mixed, and the music hall song which 
 was popular at the time expressed undoubtedly the vulgar 
 side of the feeling in the words — 
 
 "For we don't want to fight, 
 
 But, hy Jingo, if we do, 
 
 We've got the ships, we've got the men, 
 
 We've got the money too." 
 
 Shortly afterwards Sir William Vernon Harcourt, at 
 Oxford, fully explained what he and his friends meant by 
 flinging the expression " Jingoes " at those who differed 
 from them in opinion. He began by saying, "Do you want 
 to know who the Jingoes are ? I will tell you who they 
 are." And then, using that ample vituperative vocabulary 
 with which he is supplied, he proceeded to represent a char- 
 acter in which everything that was contemptible in point of 
 brains, loathsome in point of vice, repulsive in manners, 
 was mingled in a well chosen mass of offensiveness. 
 
 From this time onwards, therefore, the word served two 
 purposes, different in degree but similar in kind, and both 
 of them invaluable. In the first place, the name was of a 
 meaning sufficiently uncertain to prevent it, in its apparent 
 use, from being too manifestly abusive for the purposes of 
 ordinary conversation. "Oh, you are a Jingo! " was in 1880 
 the ready reply to any one who thought that Mr. Gladstone 
 was a man capable of human error, or that Lord Beacons- 
 field might occasionally slide, by accident, into conduct 
 
42 The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 
 
 which was neither that of a fool nor a knave. To all who so 
 far in either respect transgressed the party creed of the 
 passing hour, the expression was so used, no matter what 
 their antecedents might have been. It was intended to hint, 
 without asserting that it would necessarily follow, that the 
 person so addressed was probably an habitual frequenter of 
 the lowest music halls in London, and that it was quite an 
 open point whether, properly speaking, all that Sir William 
 Vernon Harcourt had said of him was not true. 
 
 Thus the word was delightful alike in the universal 
 sweep with which it could be flung, in its deliberate and es- 
 sential insolence of purpose, and in its vagueness. When, 
 therefore, now Sir Charles Dilke, who was immediately 
 afterwards a member of the same government as Sir Wil- 
 liam Harcourt, rakes up these expiring embers of partisan 
 warfare, and flings about these brands after he has set them 
 a burning, at the very moment that he is appealing to those 
 who love country rather than party, we must, before at- 
 tempting to grapple with his words, have some little defini- 
 tion of their meaning. Of course, if he means to assert 
 that any one who has the misfortune not to agree in every 
 syllable he writes is guilty of all those wickednesses which 
 Sir William Harcourt declared to be the peculiar attributes 
 of the Jingo, discussion with him is closed. We naturally 
 have no special affection, on the one hand, for the character 
 described by Sir William Harcourt. On the other, if we 
 have to choose between the part of pouring such language 
 upon the heads of those who differ from us in opinion and 
 of receiving it, we unhesitatingly prefer to be called Jingoes 
 rather than to violate all the decencies which make fair ar- 
 gument possible. But apparently Sir Charles Dilke, whilst 
 smacking his lips on almost every alternate page over the 
 insolence which he is able subtly to convey in the use of the 
 term "Jingo," reserving its more offensive meanings to be 
 only understood as latent in it, usually means by it only the 
 equivalent of chauvinism or gasconade. He expressly says 
 
The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 43 
 
 so in one place; but he uses the term in so many different 
 senses, that it is hard to know what the policy he really re- 
 fers to is. 
 
 How it can be that he is "attacked by the true Jingoes 
 for saying that we are still able to defend ourselves," we are 
 absolutely at a loss to understand. We thought that it was 
 the Jingoes who used to boast our ships, our men, and the 
 like. Nay, in the very passage we quoted just now, Sir 
 Charles Dilke spoke of the "inflated language of 1878." 
 
 It is necessary for us, therefore, to define our own posi- 
 tion, and to explain the historical fact which, as we allege, 
 Sir Charles Dilke has mistaken, regardless of the various 
 meanings with which he finds it convenient to play in using 
 this term. 
 
 Certainly, then, we at all events are not among those 
 who think that our army or our fleet is at this moment so 
 complete in its organization that we either now have, or can 
 be said to have had in 1878, the men and the ships that are 
 needed for the defence of our commerce and the empire. In 
 the main we heartily agree with very much that Sir Charles 
 Dilke has said in these matters, though we think we shall 
 be able to show that he has not taken the best course to rem- 
 edy them. 
 
 But when Sir Charles speaks of the "inflated language 
 of 1878," it is tolerably evident that he refers to an altogeth- 
 er different matter from the silly music hall ditty which pro- 
 duced the name "Jingo." He manifestly refers to the tone 
 adopted in dealing with Russia by Lord Beaconsfield and 
 Lord Salisbury in the early months of that year. Now we 
 assert positively what is a matter easily susceptible of his- 
 torical proof, that the haughty tone then taken by our 
 statesmen was simply founded upon absolute knowledge of 
 the complete collapse which had attended the Russian at- 
 tempt to march upon Constantinople, We do not for a mo- 
 ment doubt that the confession which Sir Charles Dilke now 
 
44 The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 
 
 makes that his opposition to the policy of that time was not 
 founded upon any doubt of the patriotism or the import- 
 ance of the object of keeping Russia out of Constantinople, 
 but upon a belief that we were pretending to be able to keep 
 her out when we could not have done so, is representative 
 not only of the opinion under which he himself acted, but 
 that of thousands of others throughout the country at that 
 time. Lord Randolph Churchill's Wolverhampton speech 
 is virtually a confession that that was his view. The real 
 facts were not known out of the government offices. We 
 have always held that, as a piece of party statesmanship, it 
 was a very great mistake that steps were not taken to make 
 them known. We can well recall how, after the meeting of 
 Parliament, country members came up to town saying, 
 "Well, we have got peace certainly; but what an amount of 
 swagger and bunkum there has been beforehand about it." 
 There was no swagger and no bunkum, if by that is 
 meant any threatening to do that which at the time we were 
 unable to carry out. The Turkish resistance had no doubt 
 completely collapsed. Without our action, the advance 
 force of the Russian army could certainly have made its way 
 into Constantinople. As certainly the force which, with the 
 assistance of the Indian troops brought to Malta, we could 
 have landed at Gallipoli, was enough and more than enough 
 to have utterly defeated the feeble remnant of Russians who 
 had passed Adrianople. It does not take a large force of 
 well mounted and well trained cavalry to defeat mounted 
 men whose horses have utterly broken down under them, 
 and that was actually the condition of every Russian dra- 
 goon who passed the Balkans. Numerically the Russian 
 force beyond Adrianople never exceeded 30,000 men. They 
 were disappearing day by day, from exhaustion and illness 
 more rapidly than they could be replaced. Of those that 
 did reach Adrianople, large numbers arrived by way of Var- 
 na. That supply would have been cut off the moment our 
 fleet entered the Black Sea. If there be a fact more certain 
 than another in history, it is that at that particular moment 
 
The Balance of Military Power in Europe. 45 
 
 our position was such that, at all events till the summer, we 
 were able by mere military and naval force alone to pro- 
 hibit the advance of Russia upon Constantinople. In the 
 then condition of the Russian army, even a Tzar could not 
 venture to keep it till the summer, with its sea-borne supplies 
 cut off by our fleet, and those terrible snow covered roads, 
 blocked with broken wagons, with dying and dead horses 
 and men, as its sole means of being fed. Upon a knowledge 
 of these facts alike the Tzar and the English government 
 acted. 
 
 But they were not understood throughout the country 
 in England. To those who were living not immediately be- 
 hind the scenes (and we ought to say, what we believe Lord 
 Salisbury would now declare, that no government was ever 
 better served with information than our own was in those 
 days), it appeared incredible that we, with all our unreadi- 
 ness — with our little army and our slight preparation — could 
 really face the power of the Tzar, whose forces even then 
 were reputed to be counted by the million. 
 
 Englishmen revolted against what seemed to them a 
 sham and a false pretence. They punished, as they always 
 have punished, by their votes, a government which acted 
 honestly in their behalf, but acted upon information which 
 they did not possess. There is a naiveU about Sir Charles 
 Dilke's admission that he at least to this day does not know 
 the truth, and that, had he known it, he would have been 
 bound to appear on the opposite side to that which he took 
 in 1880. We can afford to allow him to employ what is vir- 
 tually an algebraical formula — an unknown variable — some- 
 times equated with Sir William Harconrt's vituperation, 
 sometimes chauvinism, sometimes panic-mongering to his 
 heart's content, in return for an acknowledgement at once 
 so important and so instructive.* 
 
 * I shall have occasion in the final article to challenge the reply 
 which Sir Charles Dilke has made to this passage, both as regards Con- 
 stantinople and as regards a point not alluded to above— our power to for- 
 bid Russia to advance in Asia Minor. 
 
I, 
 
 RaSSlA ANB ENGLAND. 
 
RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 
 
 Let us now, in regard to Russia and to England, and to 
 the question generally of English power, draw together the 
 points on which we desire to insist in these corrections of 
 historical inaccuracies. 
 
 We believe, then, that twice since the establishment of 
 the rule of force in Europe — once at the time of its incep- 
 tion, and once since then — it has been either the duty or the 
 interest of England to be ready to intervene on the conti- 
 nent of Europe. We believe that, in either case, from the 
 most peculiar circumstances of the time, it would have been 
 possible for us, even as our armed forces then were, to have 
 intervened with decisive effect; but most assuredly not in 
 either case without a loss proportionate in men and money 
 to the want of actual readiness for war, from which we then 
 and now suffer. To what, then, do these experiences point? 
 Let us consider what were in either case our points of van- 
 tage and of weakness. Beyond all doubt, our point of van- 
 tage in either case consisted in the facilities of sea trans- 
 port, and in the fact that the points in which alone we were 
 interested were easily accessible from the sea. In the case 
 of Denmark, we believe that the fighting power of our fleet 
 could have been directly made to tell in aid of our land 
 forces. In the case of the Russo-Turkish war, the enormous 
 facilities supplied by our fleet, mercantile as well as warlike, 
 for the transport, almost to the field of battle itself, of our 
 
50 Russia and England. 
 
 whole available force, would have told with incalculable 
 effect. 
 
 We speak grave fact, and speak in no chauvinist vein, 
 for which, indeed, no one who really knows our actual defi- 
 ciencies at this moment has any heart, when we say that no 
 other power in Europe could have so quickly subdued the 
 Egyptian revolt as we did in 1882. The reason is simple. 
 The force that was actually landed in Egypt, about 30,000 
 men, was just sufficient, not more than sufficient, for the 
 task assigned it; and we possessed the means — thanks to 
 our vast mercantile marine and the efficiency of the person- 
 nel of our navy in such matters — of transporting at short no- 
 tice that number of men, and the stores required for them 
 on a desert march, more easily than any other European 
 power. 
 
 We would earnestly urge any of our readers, v/ho sup- 
 pose that these cases are altogether exceptional, to study 
 the masterly account of the Kertch expedition, which is to 
 be found in Mr. Kinglake's eighth volume, chapter four. 
 Every word of Mr. Kinglake's wise and sound comment on 
 the general deductions to be drawn from that experience is 
 as worthy of examination as the striking story itself. 
 
 Compare now the case of Russia. To any point at 
 which she desires to strike, she must, by an inexorable nec- 
 essity, when we are opposed to her, convey her troops over 
 enormous distances by land. By no manner of means, 
 though Sir Charles Dilke and Lord Randolph Churchill ex- 
 ercise all the genius of man, and show a knowledge of the 
 real conditions of warfare which, as we shall have presently 
 occasion to show, is singularly wanting in these papers, can 
 either of them, with the rival schemes for our military 
 forces which they are advertising as concealed in their re- 
 spective breast pockets, enable us to compete, in point of 
 numbers, with the paper millions of the Russian empire. 
 
 But the one advantage we do possess, that of transport- 
 ing, to the very point where we want to strike, the force we 
 
Russia and England. ^i 
 
 can embark in England, is a power the nature of which 
 those know best who best understand the real conditions of 
 war. To Sir Charles Dilke it seems enough to show what 
 forces Russia can collect at her depots. He does not un- 
 derstand how those terrible miles of road, over which the 
 loyal Russian soldiery, whose heroic readiness to die, and 
 whose patriotic and religious enthusiasm he has so truly 
 and so well described, will stretch their limbs, present them- 
 selves to the minds of any soldier who does not understand 
 what war is. Verestchagin has, perhaps, with his terribly 
 veracious realism, in part brought home to Londoners at 
 least the awful truth which Sir Charles ignores. He does 
 not see that an army wanting altogether alike in an officer 
 and in a non-commissioned officer class, with habits of pec- 
 ulation engrained in those who cater for it, and suffering al- 
 ways from that disease of "Too much Archduke" which 
 proved so fatal to it in 1877, enters upon any distant cam- 
 paign under disadvantages which no numbers at the depots 
 can compensate. 
 
 We cordially and heartily agree with Sir Charles Dilke 
 that it is needful for us, for the defence of the empire, to be 
 able to strike blows far from the shores of England. It is 
 only an application to our time of that which, in the grand- 
 est of the Duke of Wellington's despatches, was for ever in- 
 sisted on, that the true principle for an English patriot is, 
 not to make preparation for fighting an enemy at home — 
 though in its measure that too is needful — but to strike 
 blows abroad which shall keep the shores of England sa- 
 cred from invasion. In all reason, then, where is the 
 weakness of our enemy at which we ought to strike ? 
 Where is the special strength which we ought to develop? 
 
 We have given illustrations which supply the answer. 
 We were not ready, as we ought to have been, to land at 
 once, and in effective fighting trim, upon the shores of Den- 
 mark, the force which, properly equipped and ready for war, 
 
52 Russia and England. 
 
 would have pricked the bladder of the apparent strength 
 which in February 1864 inaugurated the reign of force in 
 Europe. We were much more ready in 1877, ^^'^ ^^'^ were 
 not as ready as we ought to have been. 
 
 In each of those cases, and in 1882, exceptional oppor 
 tunities — in the latter case, brilliantly seized and taken ad- 
 vantage of — would have enabled or did enable us to use our 
 real power. But we cannot hope to have such opportuni- 
 ties in such form so presented to us as that, no matter how 
 careless we are, we can act against armed nations, whilst we 
 secure in our island home, trust to the free service of our — 
 we thank Sir Charles Dilke for so boldly asserting it — really 
 warlike people. Not all the militia, not all the guns, not 
 all the officers, with which he would supply us, will serve 
 our need for the precise purpose which he has well shown 
 that we need. Of the ultimate and essential power of En- 
 gland, if only time be granted her to develop it, no one, as 
 Sir Charles Dilke himself asserts, has any doubt. What is 
 doubtful is what she can do in the first few weeks and 
 months of a modern war, and, as he has well shown, that is 
 the time on which now the fatal issues hang. But no mer- 
 cantile marine, not even our own, can in the first few weeks 
 of war transport to a hostile shore an army reckoned by the 
 hundred thousand, even if we possessed such a force. Per- 
 haps in a month or two the transport of 200,000 armed men, 
 if all our vast mercantile resources were strained to the ut- 
 most, and everything sacrificed to it, might be possible. 
 But 200,000 men are not an army. If we have afoot a force 
 of something like 70,000 men, complete in all its arms, and 
 actually ready to take the field, that represents pretty near- 
 ly the limit of the power with which we could, under any 
 circumstances, strike our blow. Not if we were to submit 
 to all the strain of universal service under which the conti- 
 nent is groaning ; not though we spent upon our army all 
 the millions which Germany wrung from France, which she 
 employed for military service, forgotten as they have been 
 
Russia and Englatid. 53 
 
 alike by Sir Charles Dilke and Lord Randolph Churchill; 
 not though we spent those yet vaster sums of the extraordi- 
 nary budgets of France which, while they have heaped debt 
 upon her, have created and armed her fortifications, and are 
 quietly left out of the account of these most accurate finan- 
 ciers and would-be economical army reformers, — not so, or 
 by any other means that they can devise, will England be 
 made so ready to meet the special needs of her position, as 
 by four simple means. First, by having her fleet actually 
 able to perform the duties of guarding by effective offensive 
 strokes the vast commerce — 7nore than double as it is of the 
 whole carrying trade of the zvorld outside of Great Britain — the 
 guardianship of which entails upon that fleet such duties as 
 falls to the lot of no other navies, not of all the combined 
 navies of the world besides. Secondly, by completing the 
 armament and garrisoning of her home fortresses and for- 
 eign coaling stations, so that, possessed as we are of the 
 most important points of vantage for a steam navy through- 
 out the world, we may be able to utilize them to give power 
 to our own fleet, instead of finding them turned to the de- 
 struction of our commerce. Thirdly, by completing, in ab- 
 solute security under our own control, our telegraphic com- 
 munication with our distant dependencies and outlying 
 forts. Lastly, by having at home an effective army actu- 
 ally ready at any moment to be made complete; of such 
 strength as a mercantile marine like ours can suddenly and 
 rapidly ship, with all its stores, with all its needed land 
 transport, and can deliver i^i an imknown direction — support- 
 ed at home by such a force of volunteers and militia as will, 
 when actual invasion threatens, in the sense in which it did 
 in 1805, enable the whole body together to take the field, 
 and, when it does not, will enable the active army to be em- 
 ployed for the defence of the empire and the fulfillment of 
 national obligation. 
 
 Of the two rival politicians who are anxious to return 
 to political power, by announcing that they have each dis- 
 
54 Russia and England. 
 
 covered the philosopher's stone —Parr's Life Pills for our 
 army and the Elixir of Life for the nation — but that the pa- 
 tient must be submitted to their hands before they will an- 
 nounce their discoveries,* neither of them inspires us with 
 confidence from the circumstances under which their an- 
 nouncements are made. In the first place, what is it that 
 they both declare ? There is one nation in the world, and 
 one only, which, in consequence of its political system, has 
 hitherto submitted the management of its military and 
 naval affairs to such as they are — to politicians bidding for 
 place. In every other nation of the world the administra- 
 tion of naval and military affairs has been left to experts. 
 The motive assigned has been a simple one. No one sup- 
 posed that soldiers or sailors could not, better than politi- 
 cians, determine what would be most effective for war by 
 land or sea. But — so we have always been taught — the 
 control of the House of Commons over the money was neces- 
 sary, to insure that it was not misapplied or wasted. Here 
 suddenly from the ranks of the bidders for place step out two 
 men, who declare that the whole system has, as a matter of 
 mere economy, utterly broken down. They both declare 
 that those reckless countries— Germany and France — which 
 have left the disbursement of the money and almost the de- 
 termination of its amount to soldiers, and to soldiers only, 
 have been served by them so economically that, for less 
 money than we spend, they have secured results with which 
 ours cannot for one moment be compared. We shall exam- 
 ine this question more thoroughly in our next article; but 
 
 * This is no longer fair as regards Sir Charles Dilke. He promises 
 us at some time or other a statement of his great plan, but as yet he acts 
 like Penelope. He will tell us his choice when he has finished spinning 
 his large web. He is always, however, ripping what he had spun. To 
 ray thinking, no more clear and admirable account of the German army 
 than that contained in the January 1888 " Fortnightly" has hitherto ap- 
 peared in England. It is the most complete reversal of the account given 
 in the " Present Position of European Politics " that the most severe as- 
 sailant of that volume could have published. 
 
Russia and England. 55 
 
 we have here to remark that, apart altogether from the pal- 
 pable absurdity of comparing two countries which take 
 their men by compulsion, with a country which pays in the 
 dearest market in the world at the market rate, these gen- 
 tlemen have, as we hinted above, directly miscalculated the 
 expenditure of France and Germany by millions. Lord 
 Randolph Churchill has certainly done it more recklessly 
 and openly than Sir Charles Dilke. There is just the differ- 
 ence between them of a suggestio falsi as against a suppressio 
 veri, Lord Randolph, though in another part of his speech 
 shows that he knows what huge sums France has bor- 
 rowed of late years, yet tells the men of Wolverhampton 
 that, in comparing the ordinary expenditure of France and 
 England, the complete armament of the German and French 
 fortresses is to be compared with the deficiencies of ours.* 
 Does he or does he not know how much of that huge debt, 
 which has rolled up since the war of 1870, has been expend- 
 ed on placing the fortifications and armament of France on 
 a proper footing ? Furthermore, we charge both of them 
 with having absolutely ignored the extent and nature of 
 the work which our fleet has to do; and we refuse to place 
 confidence in financiers who begin by showing that they 
 cannot make estimates of expenditure without errors in the 
 millions, while they at the same time show that they do 
 not understand in the least what the nature of the task they 
 have to undertake is. 
 
 There are grave deficiencies in the condition of our de- 
 fences both at home and in our distant fortresses. We cer- 
 tainly have no wish to underrate them, or to deny that many 
 of those defects which Lord Randolph has described really 
 exist. But why is it that both these gentlemen select the 
 present moment to bring before the public these defects of 
 our condition? From whom was it that Lord Randolph 
 Churchill learnt all those weaknesses of our condition which 
 
 * "Times" report, June 4, 1887, of speech at Wolverhampton. 
 
56 Russia and England. 
 
 need to be remedied? The answer is simple enough. It is 
 because for the first time a cabinet has courageously faced 
 them. Because his colleagues laid before him these neces- 
 sities of our condition, and propose to remedey them. 
 Above all, because one quiet, business like, silent man, the 
 present leader of the House of Commons, has insisted in 
 office and out of office upon the all importance of actually 
 and effectively placing our coaling stations in a condition 
 which will enable our fleet to rely upon them, instead of 
 having to defend them. As General Brackenbury explain- 
 ed, in behalf of the Secretary of State, to the United Service 
 Institution, more effective steps have been taken within the 
 time of Mr. Smith's tenure of the War Office than during 
 any preceding period, to arrange as far as can be done on 
 our present expenditure, for carrying out those reforms 
 which we have laid down as essential for developing to the 
 full our real power. They are steps only; but steps have 
 been taken towards providing that we shall have garrisons 
 available for home fortresses, and for our coaling stations, 
 and above all, for making it possible for us to strike for the 
 defence of the empire, by having ready as an army two 
 corps and an effective cavalry division available to go any- 
 where and do anything.* That scheme has not been fully 
 carried out, and cannot be fully carried out till all parties in 
 the state are agreed as to what is necessary. Why has it 
 not gone further as yet? Sir Charles Dilke has supplied the 
 answer — "The recent fit of economy promoted by Lord 
 Randolph Churchill." That has not, indeed, acted in the 
 way he has assumed. It has not induced the cabinet to 
 make reductions on their estimates. We must confess that a 
 cabinet placed in so critical a positions as the present one 
 was at the moment of Lord Randolph's escapade, seems to 
 us to have displayed a patriotic courage rare in our times, 
 
 * See General Brackenbury' s speech at the United Service Institu- 
 tion, separately issued. 
 
Russia and England. 57 
 
 and to deserve from a Radical who is especially anxious to 
 appeal to those who cast aside personal and partisan feeling 
 somewhat better treatment than Sir Charles Dilke gives 
 them in his mode of dealing with Lord Randolph's boasted 
 economy. Otherwise we have nothing to object to in the 
 following argument: "With a still weaker government, a 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer of equal boldness might on 
 this principle claim credit for saving the whole amount of 
 the army and navy expenditure of the country. He would 
 indeed possibly be borne in triumph for it, although also 
 possibly afterwards hanged when the country found that he 
 had been wrong in his calculations" (p. 295). Neither have 
 we any objection to the statement, that some of the revela- 
 tions recently made would "justify the hanging of a few ex- 
 Secretaries of State for war" (p. 314). 
 
 But, in fact, the unfortunate effect of Lord Randolph's 
 action has been this: Instead of boldly asking for all that 
 was required to make' our two corps and our cavalry divis- 
 ion actually available for fighting in England, or for trans- 
 fer abroad, and for furnishing the garrison artillerymen, who 
 are sorely needed to make our fortresses of any use, the or- 
 der has gone forth that at present, at all events, only so 
 much should be done as could be managed by robbing Peter 
 to pay Paul. The absolute necessity, if our troops are to be 
 able to fight at all, of having ammunition columns for such 
 artillery and infantry as we do send into the field, has, un- 
 fortunately, owing to the fact that the estimates could 
 not be increased, led to a reduction in the artillery. The 
 particular necessities which it is now proposed to provide 
 are precisely those, many of them named by Sir Charles 
 Dilke, which are required to enable us to take advantage of 
 our volunteers and militia in making secure our fortresses, 
 in providing generally for their co-operation with an effect- 
 ive army in the field, and for enabling such an army as we 
 
58 Russia and England. 
 
 could at once transport from England to act immediately 
 on being landed. 
 
 Much undoubtedly remains to be done, but, for our own part 
 we heartily echo the words in which the Earl of Wemyss, 
 for years the most energetic protestant against the neg- 
 lect of those very measures which are at least now officially 
 proposed, declared General Brackenbury's speech to be the 
 most important, and, on the whole, f^;«/t'r//;/^ statement that 
 has been made in our time. Money has undoubtedly been 
 wasted in the past. Sir James Fitz James Stephen's Com- 
 mission has shown how and why it has been wasted. Un- 
 fortunately, a perusal of that report does not tend to con- 
 firm Lord Randolph's allegation that the condition of the 
 House of Commons, the strife of parties, and the suprem- 
 acy of talkers, or of men who are political partisans first 
 and administrators afterwards, has not been the chief cause 
 of the evil. 
 
 But the moment when, in a quiet business like way and 
 for the first time, the real difficulties have at least been fair- 
 ly acknowledged, is not the one for throwing in the face of 
 the present men the crimes of their predecessors. We heart- 
 ily wish to see the whole question referred to that authori- 
 tative body, independent of party, for which Sir Charles 
 Dilke and Lord Wolseley alike ask. Such a body must first 
 determine the true meaning of the preamble of the Army 
 Act— that is, how "the possessions of her Majesty's crown" 
 are to be defended. We believe that they would find that 
 the very small reduction in the total force of our field guns, 
 horse artillery together, is not, as Sir Charles Dilke has 
 averred, dangerous as a symptom, but that it is a part, how- 
 ever unfortunate a part, of a response to the earnest in- 
 stances of those who have been for years pressing for gen- 
 uine efficiency. But we are bound to admit that when we 
 
Russia and England. 59 
 
 talk of genuine efficiency, we cannot accept Sir Charles 
 Dilke's mode of determining what efficiency is. 
 
 It happens that the particular occasion on which Gen- 
 eral Brackenbury's speech was delivered will enable us to 
 show one instance — we shall take another as conclusive be- 
 fore we have done — of the degree to which Sir Charles 
 Dilke is to be depended on as a military authority, or rather 
 as capable by his ipse dixit of erecting into decisive military 
 authorities certain people carefully kept behind the veil, to 
 whom he constantly refers as the exponents of true military 
 wisdom. 
 
 "The volunteers," says Sir Charles, "however useful 
 they may be as garrison artillery, will never be able in large 
 numbers to manage field artillery" (p. 315). And again: "Sir 
 Edward Hamley, indeed, has suggested that it is a positive 
 advantage to this country, that while the force which will 
 attack us will, by the nature of things, be provided only 
 with field artillery, our defending force will be supplied with 
 guns of position — that is, with guns of heavier weight; as 
 though a small trained army, making a dash on London, 
 would be likely to advance directly upon intrenched posi- 
 tions, armed with heavy guns, when it could so easily march 
 into London by twenty other different routes" (p. 315). 
 
 We should have thought that a soldier who has devot- 
 ed his life to the subject of strategy, the author of the great- 
 est book on that matter in the English language, speaking 
 about his own arm of the service, might have been treated 
 with a little more respect than this. Sir Charles Dilke evi- 
 dently does not know his man. He is himself a clever wri- 
 ter and a clever politician. But cleverer writers, some of the 
 greatest whom our times have seen, have before now cower- 
 ed before the lash he has provoked. Abler politicians than 
 he have winced when Sir Edward's pen has been employed 
 to expose sentences not quite so silly as this. 
 
 Sir Charles talks about Jomini, but he evidently has 
 never heard that, though big guns are ugly customers, there 
 
6o Russia and England. 
 
 are such things as what are known to soldiers as "attractive 
 positions," in which big guns call a hostile army towards 
 them with more subtly winning voice than any siren singing 
 from her rocks. The Russian army found that out when, 
 willy-nilly, Plevna had to be tackled. 
 
 Most assuredly, "guns of position" will not supply the 
 place of highly mobile field artillery, but yet there are few 
 armies that would not rejoice in their aid if they could pro- 
 cure them in such numbers as we can obtain for English 
 service by the aid of the volunteers. Not rarely their effect 
 would be decisive. 
 
 As we have hinted, the discussion at the United Service 
 Institution, at which General Brackenbury was authorized 
 to explain the scheme which Mr. W. H. Smith had approv- 
 ed and Mr. Stanhope had accepted from him, was devoted 
 to the discussion of this very subject of volunteer field ar- 
 tillery. 
 
 General Brackenbury, himself one of the most distin- 
 guished of living English artillery officers, pointed out the 
 absence of any artillery to support our militia and volunteer 
 infantry. Sir Charles Dilke has mentioned it in these words: 
 "This country, in the event of invasion, would put some 
 300,000 militia and volunteer infantry in line; and in order 
 to feel secure with such a force, we ought, according to the 
 ordinary rules of war, to have 900 properly worked guns at 
 home."* 
 
 Genenal Brackenbury, it is true, did not talk about "the 
 ordinary rules of war." It is an expression which trained 
 soldiers are rather apt to avoid, because war knows few 
 "rules," though many principles; and further, both alike are 
 apt to vary in their application, according to circumstances 
 and the nature of the country in which war is carried on. 
 Again few soldiers who have ever carefully and practically 
 
 * Present Position of European Politics, p. 314. 
 
Russia and Eitgland. 6i 
 
 considered the question of the defence of England can fail 
 to be aware that the nature of the country restricts and 
 modifies the ordinary use of artillery in a very marked de- 
 gree. F"urther, as large numbers of volunteers would be re- 
 quired for garrison work, he puts our active field army for 
 home defence at 130,000 infantry, besides the two corps and 
 cavalry division, so that the deficiency in field guns would be 
 390— not goo. But he asked whether any possible agumen- 
 tation of so expensive an arm as the royal artillery or royal 
 horse-artillery, that the country could be expected to grant, 
 would supply this deficiency. We confess to some curiosity 
 for a sight of that most economical budget of Sir Charles 
 Dilke's, which, in addition to supplying all that we at pres- 
 ent have and an army of Continental size ready to be trans- 
 ported by sea at a moment's notice, is to furnish us with an 
 augmentation of goo royal artillery field guns. These will, 
 of course, consist chiefly of horse-artillery on Sir Charles's 
 principles.* 
 
 But meantime, till we are furnished either by Sir 
 Charles Dilke or Lord Randolph with the rival philosophers' 
 stones which are thus to coin gold for us, we are content to 
 accept authority of Sir E. Hamley and General Brackenbury. 
 At this meeting other very able artillery officers confessed 
 that, having had to overcome great prejudices in that mat- 
 ter, they had, from actual trial and experience of the work- 
 ing of volunteer field artillery, come to the conviction that 
 
 * Sir Charles has complained that I have here too closely tied him to 
 the figure of "900." I have simply followed the only clue he had given 
 to the numbers he proposed to supply. I certainly shall be delighted to 
 get the additional security provided by 390 royal artillery guns, if the 
 country will pay for them HI But before the end of this volume I think I 
 shall be able to show that the expenditure ought not to be incurred till we 
 are sure that our fleet is all that it ought to be, and till our harbors and 
 coaling stations are secure, hardly even till our world telegraph system is 
 complete. Certainly the thing cannot be done on the principle assumed 
 by Sir Charles Dilke, when he wrote "The Present Position of European 
 Politics," "that it is not in expenditure that we fall short" (p. 287). 
 
62 Russia and England. 
 
 it could be made most efficient. We believe, then, that the 
 decision of the government is a sound one, that they will 
 reverse the policy of their predecessors and do their utmost 
 to encourage the development of volunteer heavy field ar- 
 tillery. We should have thought that a man so anxious as 
 Sir Charles Dilke to appeal to those who cast aside "per- 
 sonal" — we presume, therefore, professional— prejudice, 
 might have guessed who are likely to be giving at this mo- 
 ment the best advice,— three such artillery officers as Sir Ed- 
 ward Hamley, General Brackenbury, and Colonel Shakes- 
 peare; or those who think that there is nothing like leather, 
 and that volunteers must be warned off the sacred field of the 
 royal artillery. 
 
 Before leaving this question of the artillery, we may as 
 well note the recklessness with which, so far as English offi- 
 cers are concerned. Sir Charles Dilke goes out of his way to 
 enlist against, him those whom most Englishmen look upon 
 as of some weight, as English soldiers go, in matters of prac- 
 tical war. Again and again he alleges that Lord Wolseley 
 was positively in favor of the reduction of the horse artillery 
 per se, speaking of it as the "theatrical" element in war. 
 Now, a reference to Lord Wolseley's speech shows that in 
 it the horse artillery was not mentioned. It was a purely 
 gratuitous assumption that in speaking of the "theatrical" 
 element he referred to the recent reduction of that arm. 
 We have reason to know that, in Sir Charles Dilke's behalf. 
 Lord Wolseley's attention was called to Sir Charles's state- 
 ment, and that he replied, not only that he had not said 
 anything whatever of the kind, but that he was thinking of 
 altogether other matters; and that he added,— "No one re- 
 grets more than I do the reduction of the horse artillery; 
 but as we had to choose between keeping guns we could not 
 use, and supplying, by their disestablishment, what was in- 
 
Russia and England. 63 
 
 dispensable to make the army we can use as a whole effect- 
 ive, we had very reluctantly to dispense with them." 
 
 Sir Charles's attention was drawn to the substance of 
 these statements prior to the publication of the recent arti- 
 cle; yet he retained the words in inverted commas, as though 
 Lord Wolsely had actually spoken of the "theatrical horse 
 artillery." * 
 
 Sir Charles has endeavored to pour cold water on the 
 efforts at present being made to produce an effective force 
 of two army corps and a cavalry division, by referring con- 
 stantly to what, quoting Mr. Stanhope, he calls the "abor- 
 tive scheme of eight army corps." We confess that we re- 
 gret the phrase. The author of that scheme, now dead 
 many years, was a soldier of first rate ability, who did very 
 great service to the English army, and we have a dislike to 
 the process of kicking dead lions. But the scheme, such as 
 it was, was never intended to do more than expose the 
 weaknesses of our condition. When Sir Charles says that 
 "the defence made for the reduction of the horse artillery 
 has revealed that, for all practical purposes, we may be said 
 to have no artillery for the volunteer and militia infantry," 
 it is clear that he has never looked at that scheme. Each 
 "army corps" was shown as it would be for peace service, 
 with blanks at every point where deficiencies existed. If 
 members of Parliament like Sir Charles Dilke neglected 
 to look at it, and therefore did not take the hint or ask any 
 questions about it, what becomes of Lord Randolph's conten- 
 tion, that the House of Commons is nowise to blame for our 
 present condition? 
 
 The work, of which Mr. Hardy spoke, on railways and 
 the like, was actually done; and though changes in the units 
 
 * As Sir Charles Dilke has in his recent articles quoted words which 
 show that Lord Wolseley in the abstract wishes for an increase, not a re- 
 duction, of the artillery, I have here suppressed a long extract from a 
 speech which was given to prove that point. 
 
'immt 
 
 64 Russia and England. 
 
 of the army involve some corrections in it now, the sub- 
 stance of it remains available, and is habitually used by all 
 staff officers, trained during the last ten years, in the consid- 
 eration of railway schemes and such matters. What is now 
 being done is of an altogether different kind, and no one 
 would have more rejoiced to see it worked out than the au- 
 thor of that old scheme, though he would be perhaps amus- 
 ed to find that shafts aimed at his "abortive" effort have 
 tended to rebound against the very different and most im- 
 portant scheme of to-day, to which he would have looked 
 forward as to a promised land he was not permitted to see. 
 
 So far, then, as our own immediate offensive strength 
 against Russia is concerned, we hold that it depends first on 
 our navy; and secondly, upon our being able to prepare for 
 instant action as large a force as we can promptly ship from 
 our ports. We ought at least, in the first instance, to work 
 up to the standard at which the government is now aiming; 
 that of putting two army corps and a cavalry division into a 
 condition for effective action abroad, the only true and 
 proper defence of our empire. We believe firmly that no 
 German military authority would look upon the power we 
 should so possess as the equivalent only of the force of Rou- 
 mania. The Roumanian army in the field may be consider- 
 ably larger than two corps d' arnUe and a cavalry division. It 
 is one thing to have such a force on land; it is another thing 
 to be able to deliver with it a blow in any direction we 
 choose, while we also possess the command of the sea. It 
 is almost certain that we shall never have to enter into any 
 quarrel in which we cannot on the do ut des principle obtain 
 allies. In any alliance, the command of the sea, such a 
 force so capable of movement, and the financial support of 
 England, will be of priceless value. If Germany, as Sir 
 Charles Dilke alleges, in the beginning of 1887 advised Aus- 
 tria to reject our alliance, we think we can tell him the rea- 
 son. In 1882 Germany took the greatest pains to ascertain 
 
Russia and Englattd. 65 
 
 precisely what power we had shown in Egypt. A very short 
 inquiry enabled Major von Hagenau, the commissioner with 
 our army, to ascertain that the force which captured Cairo 
 was not, in the European sense, a mobile army at all, and 
 that, but for the seizure of the railway and canal, transport 
 would for it have been an insuperable difificulty. If Major 
 von Hagenau had been able to record the fact that, apart 
 from the force which we brought from India, which was in 
 all respects fit to take the field, we had had a really mobile 
 army of two corps d' armec and a cavalry division capable of 
 being transported at a moment's notice anywhere, his view 
 of the question would have been a very different one. 
 
 But in order that such a force, able to serve as a nucleus 
 for auxiliaries, may also be able to strike effectively, it is es- 
 sential to us that entry should be possible for us into the 
 Black Sea, as well as into the Baltic. We shall endeavor in 
 our final article* to show that the nature of the alliances 
 which it is to our advantage to form is of such a kind that 
 if we do not restrict ourselves to the defence of India, but 
 meet Russian agression where other powers have an interest 
 in resisting it, we place ourselves on a footing of vantage 
 which we almost absolutely lose if we restrict ourselves to 
 the defence of India. In India itself our whole advantage 
 lies in forcing Russia to act as far from her base as possible, 
 and in striking her line of communications through Persia, 
 as has been admirably pointed out by Colonel Malleson.f 
 To announce beforehand that we restrict aggression to an 
 attack upon Vladivostock, is to abandon the most effective 
 part of our special strength — the uncertainty of the direct- 
 ion of our blow. 
 
 It is rather remarkable that in speaking of Vladivostock 
 Sir Charles Dilke has not drawn attention to the essentially 
 
 * See IV.. "Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances." 
 
 t See Colonel Malleson's article, •'Blackwood's Magazine,"' April 
 1887, "The Fortnightly Reviewer and Russia," 
 
66 Russia and Englajid. 
 
 offensive purpose with which Russia is strengthening her 
 fleet at that point. Yet it is no secret that had war with 
 Russia broken out a few years ago, it was her purpose to 
 have struck thence directly upon our Australian colonies, 
 and that the knowledge of that fact has been the great mo- 
 tive which has led our colonists to set seriously to work to 
 arm and prepare themselves. It may, no doubt, on that ac- 
 count be necessary that one of our earliest blows should be 
 struck at Vladivostock. 
 
 We by no means desire to underrate the danger of Rus- 
 sian power, and of the steady purpose with which she pur- 
 sues her aims against us. The danger with which Russia 
 menaces us is her steady progress toward our Indian fron- 
 tier, extending her dominion over tribes at such a distance 
 from us that we cannot with advantage to ourselves reach 
 her during her progress; while yet she is continually more 
 and more able to employ those tribes in harassing us. She 
 can so, almost without effort, entail costly expenditure 
 upon us. Therefore it appears to be our true policy to for- 
 bid her advance, and to enforce that prohibition by attack- 
 ing her where we can get at her We can only do this by 
 European action, to which we contribute our legitimate 
 share. Hence it becomes of the greatest importance to 
 judge what the real character of the Russian army is, and 
 whether it is, as Sir Charles Dilke has alleged, so over- 
 whelmingly powerful in Europe that, even with such allies 
 as will be glad to join us in the task of opposing it, we have 
 reason to fear the issue. 
 
 The Russian infantry undoubtedly has those character- 
 istics of which Sir Charles Dilke has spoken. The men are 
 ready to die silently and without troublesome inquiries as to 
 what they are ordered to do. As long as it was possible to 
 form masses of them into great columns, and to push them 
 forward, regardless of loss of life, into the field of battle, the 
 power of their obstinate heroism and of their numbers was 
 
Russia and England. 6y 
 
 enormous. But the effects of the breech-loader on the cha- 
 racter of modern fighting had been felt by all Europe eleven 
 years before the Turkish war. Russian officers had realized 
 them as fully as others; and it was only the impossibility of 
 handling the men under the fixed conditions of modern war, 
 that obliged them to sacrifice life with such melancholy re- 
 sults as attended the attempt of 1877-78 upon Constantino- 
 ple. The national characteristics of the Russian peasantry 
 have not changed. The conditions of Russian life, and the 
 absence of the men who could intelligently lead them in the 
 subordinate ranks, is a fact as marked as ever. All military 
 observers who look below the surface note it now as much 
 as then. These factors in the estimate are ignored by Sir 
 Charles Dilke.* 
 
 Strangely enough, he seems, in relation to the cavalry, 
 to have awakened to the fact that we are in a period of war 
 when the breech-loader counts for something. He is so af- 
 fected by it, that he propounds a theory that cavalry can 
 now only act in war, without being destroyed, by adopting 
 the method which the Tzar has chosen for his Cossacks. 
 The Russian cavalry of all classes have recently been con- 
 verted into a sort of imitation of the mounted rifles who 
 constituted the cavalry of the American war. The Cossacks 
 are not trained infantry soldiers, in any sense of the term. 
 They are not men accustomed from childhood to the use of 
 rifles, as were the American marksmen. They are as unlike 
 
 * Sir Charles Dilke, who treats Inkermann as ancient history, has in 
 his January 1888 article appealed to the fact that "against Russian troops 
 the veterans of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon struggled in vain." 
 The French, it is needless to say, cherish a curious delusion about the "sun 
 of Austerlitz" and a few other matters, such as the causes which led to the 
 capture of Moscow and the retreat from it. But apart from that, I would 
 earnestly press that Mr. Kinglake's account of Inkermann should be act- 
 ually studied. It will there be seen that the Russians then attempted to 
 employ modern Prussian tactics and failed because of national character- 
 istics just as they did in 1877. 
 
68 Russia and England. 
 
 highly effective mounted infantry as it is possible for men 
 to be. Yet Sir Charles would impress on his readers the 
 belief that there is no kind of doubt as to their superiority 
 to all cavalry which trusts chiefly to the proper weapon of 
 the true cavalry soldier — the arme blanclic. There is no 
 country in Europe from which decisive authority may not 
 be quoted against him on the other side. 
 
 In the year 1882, Von Moltke's opinion, and that of the 
 German military leaders generally, was decisively expressed 
 on the subject, in consequence of the publication of a book 
 declaring that the day of cavalry was over, and that the 
 sooner armies got rid of "this lumber " the better. Von 
 Moltke in that year, in a letter which may be read in the 
 "Revue Militaire de I'Etranger," pronounced a strong opinion 
 that only the want of more perfect handling prevented the 
 German cavalry, during the 1870 campaign, from producing 
 even greater results on the field of battle than they actually 
 did, great as those results were. The Germans continually, 
 at their manoeuvres, practice their cavalry in surprise 
 charges with the arme bla?iche. 
 
 As to Austrian opinion, no military reader in any nation 
 of Europe shares that profound contempt for the Archduke 
 Albrecht which is expressed by Sir Charles Dilke, when he 
 says that the Austrians have now no great leaders. Most 
 soldiers look upon Albrecht as a very skillful leader indeed, 
 and would trust his opinion on a point of this kind rather 
 than that of almost any man in Europe. Now it happens 
 that quite recently the Archduke has expressed his convic- 
 tion that the change which has been made in the Russian 
 cavalry has ruined its efficiency. The Austrian cavalry lead- 
 ers — and they are among the best in Europe— all take that 
 view, and would like few things so well as to lead their men 
 against those motley riding footmen, who are neither, in any 
 shape, fish, flesh, nor good red herring. 
 
 French opinion, whether as expressed in the masterly 
 papers which appeared in their "conferences," in the "Revue 
 
Russia and England. 69 
 
 Militaire," and in the "Journal des Sciences Militaires," or 
 as shown by their actual cavalry training, is on the same 
 side. 
 
 But the most effective exposure of all the weaknesses 
 of the present Russian cavalry has come from a Russian 
 pen. Few sounder or more able papers on the modern ser- 
 vice of cavalry have ever been written than that by Colonel 
 Baikov, which has been rendered available for general read- 
 ing by an excellent translation in a recent number of the 
 'Revue Militaire de I'Etranger."* 
 
 Colonel Baikov shows that not only is the present sys- 
 tem contrary to all sound principle, but that it is hopelessly 
 unsuited to the habits and traditions of the Russian cavalry 
 itself. Further he takes the history of the use of the Rus- 
 sian cavalry during the 1877-78 campaign, and declares 
 that they were then employed chiefly in service on foot; so 
 used, he declares, that they were not able even to stop convoys. 
 He declares that they expended, without producing an ef- 
 fect, a million and a quarter of cartridges. 
 
 On one notable occasion a picked body of them, select- 
 ed expressly because of their supposed shooting quality, 
 were dispatched with orders to stop a particular convoy in 
 the neighborhood of Plevna. Having reached a point as 
 near as it was thought desirable for them to move as a 
 mounted corps, they left their horses behind them and ad- 
 vanced to attack, only to be driven off by a small party of 
 Turkish soldiery, without doing the latter any damage what- 
 ever. Colonel Baikov shows further that all the recent 
 changes have tended to aggravate these defects. 
 
 Yet this is the cavalry of which Sir Charles Dilke tells 
 us that it is the only mounted force in Europe adapted to 
 the modern conditions of war! 
 
 * Revue Militaire de rEtranger. vol. xxx. pp. 139-149 (issue of ISth 
 Aug. 1886). 
 
70 Russia and England. 
 
 It is on data like these that he determines the power in 
 Europe of the Russian army and its relative condition as 
 compared with the armies of Austria and Germany.* 
 
 So sure is he of his facts, that he is convinced that this 
 cavalry force alone will sweep away the feeble resistance of 
 the Austrians, and render their mobilization impossible. So 
 overwhelming is the force of Russia, that it is useless for us 
 to attempt to rely upon such feeble reeds as any of the 
 other Continental armies; and therefore, such is the logical 
 conclusion, we had better fight this gigantic power alone on 
 our own resources, and having warned her where we intend 
 to attack her, prepare at home our future expedition against 
 Vladivostock by a system almost entirely dependent on a 
 developed militia.f 
 
 We certainly do not deny the numerical force of the 
 Russian artillery. But artillery is an arm exceptionally 
 difificult to send in vast masses, great distances from home, 
 over difficult country; and it is still more difficult under 
 such conditions to keep it supplied with the forage and the 
 ammunition it needs. If our points of attack are well chosen, 
 however great may be the numbers of the Russian artillery 
 at home, we ought not on the field of battle to meet with 
 
 * In his last article Sir Charles Dilke throws out a remark which 
 touches me nearly. He says, "It ill becomes the advocates of mounted 
 infantry to speak lightly of the new Russian cavalry." Now I have been 
 for at least sixteen years the enthusiastic advocate of the use of " mount- 
 ed infantry." Having during that time seen again and again the services 
 which our own mounted infantry has rendered us in our own expeditions, 
 I have no kind of doubt of the services they would render us in Euro- 
 pean warfare. It is because I do not think that the Russian dismounted 
 Cossacks fulfill the conditions required of good mounted infantry that I 
 disbelieve in them. Cavalry and mounted infantry are each invaluable 
 arms, but you cannot mash them together without destroying them for 
 their proper work. 
 
 f This, the scheme apparently suggested in the "Position of Euro- 
 pean Politics," has been abandoned in the more recent articles. 
 
Russia and Englatid. 71 
 
 them in overwhelming force. They certainly in 1877 ^i"^ 
 not do much to prepare the way for the assaults of their in- 
 fantry. 
 
 We do not propose to follow Sir Charles Dilke into a 
 numerical comparison between the depot forces of Russia 
 and our own. For the reasons we have alleged, the com- 
 parison appears to us to be absolutely futile. It is, as Bis- 
 marck long since said, a question, when the comparison is 
 so made, of a contest between an elephant and a whale. 
 There is, however, one element in our strength which neith- 
 er we nor Russia can safely ignore. Sir Lepel Griffin has 
 lately spoken, with an authority almost beyond dispute, of 
 the zeal with which the feudatory princes of India would 
 aid us to resist a transfer of authority in the East from us to 
 Russia. That is a point on which we cannot now dwell at 
 length, but it is an element in the question not to be 
 ignored. 
 
 To sum up, then, the conclusions towards which we de- 
 sire to lead. We shall find, when we come to examine the 
 conditions under which foreign nations maintain their huge 
 armies, that, though our own army in proportion to num- 
 bers costs sums which appear to be fabulously large in pro- 
 portion to theirs, yet that in mere monetary resources the 
 drain of their system is incalculably greater than ours. Our 
 own army is, as we believe, the cheapest in the world for 
 the work it has to do. Though much money has been wast- 
 ed in the past, and though many reforms are needed, we are 
 now, in the main, upon the right track, provided the public 
 will so far interest itself in the matter as to see that abuses, 
 which have crept in, mainly because of that very parliamen- 
 tary system which Lord Randolph acquits, are remedied. 
 The navy is now in hands which earnestly intend to sift its 
 weaknesses and redress what is wrong;* but it has a gigan- 
 tic task in defending a commerce, the extent and weakness 
 of which, before attack, is never realized by Englishmen. 
 
 * Written whilst Lord Charles Beresf ord was at the Admiralty. 
 
72 Russia and England. 
 
 On the other hand, that commerce supplies to us a special 
 power for striking effective blows at a distance from home, 
 which of its kind is unrivaled. 
 
 We are beyond question in the main, as both Sir Charles 
 Dilke and Colonel Malleson are agreed, within India itself 
 restricted to an essentially defensive position. Any contest 
 with Russia in which Russia should be able to strike, and 
 we only to defend, would be a disastrous one. There- 
 fore we need to develop our power for striking rapidly as far 
 as we reasonably may. The inexorable conditions of sea 
 transport impose a limit which cannot be passed to the force 
 that can so be used for striking rapidly. 
 
 If we believed— which we do not — that Vladivostock 
 was the one vulnerable point in the Russian dominions at 
 which we could strike, we should hold Sir Charles Dilke to 
 be a traitor for disclosing our purpose of going there, seeing 
 that all effective strokes depend on their being delivered 
 after the fashion of our movement in 1882 from Alexandria 
 to Ismailia, of which Arabi never heard till he was a prison- 
 er in Ceylon.* Therefore we do not propose to discuss the 
 exact direction in which our blow should be delivered, but 
 in our final article we shall show cause why the power of en- 
 tering the Black Sea is vitally important to us. 
 
 The efforts which are being made at the present mo- 
 ment by the government to put matters on a right footing, 
 and to face facts, deserve the support of every patriotic 
 Englishman. They only need to be supported against the 
 purveyors of nostrums on the right hand and on the left, and 
 to be encouraged to ask for what they ought to have, con- 
 cealing nothing. 
 
 Lastly, we propose to show that the present condition 
 of the Continent offers us the opportunity, on the do ut des 
 principle, of alliance, which is vital to us if we are to de- 
 fend our empire without ruinous strain on our people. 
 
 * Here, as in several instances where the case of the Egyptian cam- 
 paign of 1882 is mentioned, I may now refer to the official history of that 
 war, which has been published since the articles were written. 
 
II, 
 GERMANY, TRANGC, ANB BEbGiyn, 
 
GERMANY, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM. 
 
 We propose now to take in order the following ques- 
 tions, which were raised in our last article under the general 
 heading: 
 
 I. We intend, by comparing the methods which are em- 
 ployed by Germany for raising her forces with our own 
 methods, to maintain our thesis — that our own army is the 
 cheapest in the world, in proportion to the work it has to 
 do. It will be seen that our contention is that our army 
 payments represent a money sacrifice to the country so in- 
 comparably less than the monetary sacrifice which her meth- 
 ods oblige Germany to make, that no subsequent care and 
 economy on the part of German officials in the expenditure 
 of cash, when it has once been obtained, can prevent ours 
 from being, as a question of money, the more economical 
 method of the two. We wish clearly at the outset to separate 
 this question that of the expenditure of the money, in which 
 we have everything to learn from Germany, and Germany 
 has little or nothing to learn from us. We shall therefore, 
 in the first instance, deal with Lord Randolph's notions of 
 economy, and show that neither English nor German expe- 
 rience supports them. We shall then endeavor to make 
 good our case as to the enormous sacrifices which Germany 
 is making as compared with ourselves. We shall be content 
 to establish this in the case of Germany alone, because the 
 whole administration of Germany is in its expenditure so 
 notoriously wise and economical, that, if Germany cannot 
 make a compulsory service and a state manipulation of huge 
 
76 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 funds of money economical, it is certain that no other pow- 
 er can do so. 
 
 II. We propose next to discuss the relative strength of the 
 present French and German military frontiers - as to which 
 we directly challenge Sir Charles Dilke's statement that the 
 French frontier is now the stronger of the two. It will be 
 seen, when we come to describe the two frontiers, that there 
 are most plausible grounds for Sir Charles Dilke's belief; that 
 it is well that the question should have been raised; that 
 the views and principles which induce the German strate- 
 gists to prefer a method of defence altogether different from 
 that of France, do not lie on the surface. Nevertheless we 
 believe that we shall be able to show that they are sound 
 and true. In any case, the views of the two great military 
 powers are so startlingly different, that we think a state- 
 ment of them, intelligible to non-military readers, cannot 
 fail to be of interest. It will prepare such readers, at least, 
 to study the events which will occur on the outbreak of war 
 whenever it takes place. 
 
 III, The third point in relation to France and Germany, 
 on which we challenged Sir Charles's statements, is this. 
 He assumes that, as a necessary consequence of the enor- 
 mous strength of the new French frontier, Germany will cer- 
 tainly be disposed to march through Belgium. We pro- 
 pose to show that there are strong military reasons, involved 
 in the nature of the case, which tend to turn the balance the 
 other way. At the same time, we must at once admit that, 
 though we differ from Sir Charles as to the extent to which 
 the military balance tends to sway in this direction, we do 
 not differ from him in thinking that if Belgium would in- 
 sure her liberties she must effectually arm. 
 
 IV. Connected with this is the next question, which 
 immediately concerns ourselves, whether we have abandon- 
 ed all purpose of fulfilling the international obligations we 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. TJ 
 
 have undertaken, provided that Belgium performs her part. 
 On this matter we protested that Sir Charles Dilke had no 
 adequate grounds for the conclusion he had arrived at. We 
 intend therefore to show, in the first place, to what extent it 
 is probable that we should be able to make good our sup- 
 port of Belgian neutrality in the event of a war between 
 France and Germany. In the second, we shall quote the 
 words of our statesmen, at the time when the question last 
 arose, to show how clear and certain our responsibility is. 
 We shall declare our disbelief that Englishmen intend to 
 abandon an acknowledged duty. 
 
 V. We shall next discuss in general terms the present 
 efficiency of the two opposing armies. It seems to us es- 
 sential to enter, so far as we may, into these matters, if the 
 mere numerical figures which Sir Charles Dilke has supplied 
 are to have any practical value. 
 
 This will occupy all the space we can afford for the 
 present. In our third article we shall first discuss, in a sim- 
 ilar manner, the frontiers opposed to one another of Russia 
 and Germany, and the relative advantages for offence and 
 defence presented by them to each power; secondly, the po- 
 sition of Germany, in alliance with Austria, in a war against 
 Russia and France, and the general character of Austria as 
 a military power; thirdly, we shall have to reply to the state- 
 ments made in Sir Charles Dilke's now published volume 
 on that matter, which is for us always the central "couple," 
 as the mathematicians would call it, of the European bal- 
 ance — Russia and England — in relation to European war. 
 In every instance this is the point towards which we desire 
 to lead up; but we shall not be able to complete our state- 
 ment in regart to it until our final article, after we have 
 completed our survey of the other powers involved in the 
 present condition of most unstable equilibrium. 
 
78 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 I. German atid English Economy. — Economy, says Lord 
 Randolph Churchill, and efficiency go hand in hand. We 
 agree with him. We believe that efficiency is always eco- 
 nomical, provided you can afford to pay for it. That is the 
 secret of the U:\xq German economy. Lord Randolph has 
 well illustrated the meaning which he attaches to the phrase 
 by the questions which he put to witnesses in the Parlia- 
 mentary Committee of which he is chairman. He did not 
 leave much doubt of his meaning in his Wolverhampton 
 speech. Let us illustrate Lord Randolph's philosophy, and 
 show its universal soundness and applicability to the current 
 experience of English life: "Pay for shoddy, and you are 
 sure to get good English broadcloth. Pay for butterine, and 
 you are sure to get the best Dorsetshire butter. Pay for 
 cheap clothes, and you are sure not to get nasty. Mark 
 your lawyer's brief with the lowest of known fees; you are sure 
 to secure the services of the most leading counsel and their 
 constant attendance on your suit. Seek out where you can 
 consult a physician for a ten-shilling fee, and you are sure 
 to get the advice of the best specialists in London." Such 
 is Lord Randolph's knowledge of the world. Is it really 
 possible that, apart from all German experience, of which 
 he manifestly knows nothing, Lord Randolph never read 
 the masterly essay on Lord Clive, which describes how that 
 Indian administration was created, the efficiency of which 
 has been the standing admiration of all foreign critics? 
 Lord Randolph should, at least, know something of India. 
 
 " Clive saw clearly that it was absurd to give men pow- 
 er and require them to live in penury. He justly concluded 
 that no reform could be effectual which should not be coup- 
 led with a plan for liberally remunerating the civil servants 
 of the Company." That is Lord Macaulay's account of econ- 
 omical administration. Again, if Lord Randolph chooses 
 to call before his committee those who know the present ad- 
 ministration of the War Office, we venture to predict this: 
 that he will find there is one conviction shared by them all. 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 79 
 
 be they who they may — soldier, clerk, those who wish to see 
 a stronger military element infused into the department, 
 those who wish for some other reforms, and those who wish 
 to keep things as they are, — all, we say, have alike one con- 
 viction on one subject connected with that office. It is this: 
 that the cheapest service for which the country has at this 
 moment to pay, done by any of the civil staff, is that of the 
 most highly paid permanent civil servant within it. Many 
 private jealousies and personal piques are engendered by se- 
 dentary work; yet within the walls of the War Office, and 
 among those who have business relations with it, all will 
 agree that every pound of money that is paid for Sir Ralph 
 Thomson's salary is more economically expended than most 
 other two pounds that go out of her Majesty's Exchequer. 
 
 We say, then, that on English evidence alone Lord 
 Randolph's notions of economy by cheeseparing cutting 
 down of salaries is a false one. We say further, that if ig- 
 noring our own experience, the experience of America, and 
 the experience of Germany, with which we are now about to 
 deal, he appeals simply to the prejudices which induce 
 working men to believe that any one who gets higher pay 
 than they do must be overpaid, he will be the deadliest 
 enemy that his country has had to encounter for years. He 
 will bring about a costly collapse of our administration as 
 well as of our army, such as it would not be possible for any 
 one who has not an influence over the democracy so power- 
 ful for good and evil as his own, to cause. 
 
 As a question of the factors that must go to determine 
 the propriety of the salaries paid in Germany and England, 
 we ask our readers to consider this report of an actual con- 
 versation which took place a year or two ago in German so- 
 ciety, not certainly in Berlin, but as it happens in Dresden. 
 We change only the names. 
 
8o Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 "What extraordinarily lucky people those Von Cobos 
 are! " 
 
 "Why, what has happened? " 
 
 " Haven't you heard?" 
 
 " No; tell me." 
 
 "Why, Fraulein von Cobo is engaged to be married to 
 a man with ;6300 a year!" 
 
 Literally that took place, and represented the general 
 feeling of society; ^300 a year — all told — was looked upon 
 as an independent fortune on which a "Von" was to be con- 
 gratulated as a quite exceptional piece of luck. 
 
 How can you compare, by merely citing figures, salar- 
 ies under such circumstances in London and in Dresden or 
 in most parts of Germany? It does not matter a bit whether 
 the difference results from a more economical style of liv- 
 ing or from money actually purchasing more. The man in 
 office has to live in England as it is. 
 
 Let us take another illustration to make this point clear. 
 A few years ago it was necessary to send a distinguished 
 English officer to command the native Egyptian army. He 
 found that, tempting to an able soldier as that position was, 
 he would "have been obliged to refuse it unless there had 
 been attached to it an income of several thousands a year. 
 For, living in the society of the Pashas of Cairo, a grandee 
 among them, he must either have beggared his own family 
 or put himself in a false position if he had not received an 
 adequate salary. 
 
 Lord Randolph says that the point of a Secretary of 
 State in England receiving about double the pay of a simi- 
 lar official in Berlin is irrelevant. It may be convenient 
 to him for his own purposes to allege that that is so, 
 but he either ignores or forgets an important historical dis- 
 cussion. When last the salaries of our great State officials 
 were publicly attacked, the strongest and most convincing 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 8i 
 
 argument by which they were defended was this from the 
 then Lord John Russell: "I have been a poor man all my 
 life, but I never knew what it was to be in debt till I became 
 a Secretary of State." 
 
 Thus it is especially on poor men that the strain falls 
 of positions of power to which no adequate salary is attach- 
 ed; the State instantly suffers, since the choice necessarily 
 falls on men of inferior capacity and character, who are rich 
 enough to take the office. That is the most foolish of all 
 unwise economies. 
 
 In Prussia there is not a rich class, independent of its 
 pay, from which fairly efficient officers might be drawn. So 
 thoroughly is the necessity of paying for efficient services, 
 if you desire economy, understood in Germany, that a few 
 years ago a somewhat startling surprise disturbed an ar- 
 rangement of Mr. Gladstone's. Thinking that the econom- 
 ical conditions of Prussia must involve lower rates of pay 
 for her officers, which would enable him to propose curtail- 
 ment of expense in the pay of the English army, he called 
 for a return of the pay of all ranks of officers of the German 
 army. The return brought out facts so little to Mr. Glad- 
 stone's taste, that the document was never presented to the 
 House of Commons, for whom it was originally intended. 
 
 General Brackenbury, in his evidence before Lord Ran- 
 dolph's Committee, has given such full particulars on this 
 subject that we need not enlarge on them here. He has 
 shown that, while the junior officers of the German army 
 receive, in comparison with the conditions of civil life and 
 with civil salaries, very much higher pay than our own, 
 some of our higher grades receive much larger pay than the 
 German. But we could easily prove that Lord Russell's 
 speech applies strictly to these cases. As an instance, the 
 expenses of the Portsmouth command are so great that it is 
 impossible to appoint any officer to it who has not a private 
 income of several thousands a year. A distinguished cav- 
 
82 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 airy officer, who has no children, and is certainly not a poor 
 man, told the present writer that, much as he should like to 
 accept the command of the cavalry at Aldershot, he feared 
 he could not afford to do so. The nominal pay of a full 
 "general" in England only obtains for a man in actual com- 
 mand in the field. In that position he is a much poorer 
 man than the German "general" with half his salary. The 
 English general has necessarily to incur the expenses of the 
 political hospitalities of England. He has to entertain 
 princes. All such expenses fall on the German Emperor. 
 High as is the nominal pay of an English Commander-in 
 Chief in the field, the command in most of our recent expe- 
 ditions has been in each instance almost pecuniarily ruinous 
 to the actual leader. We challenge Lord Randolph to in- 
 vestigate the exact accuracy of every one of these state- 
 ments. If he really desires the good of his country, he can 
 hardly refuse to test them when thus laid before him. If 
 not, perhaps some other member of the Committee will 
 keep the matter in mind. 
 
 We may take as an illustration of the German views of 
 wise expenditure, the fact that when, during the Revolution- 
 ary period of 1848, the Prussian Reds broke into the gov- 
 ernment arsenal, they found there a complete store of rifled 
 small arms, ready for issue to the whole army, at a time 
 when none of the wealthy powers of Europe, not even Eng- 
 land had ventured to incur the outlay of purchasing rifles 
 for the rank and file. Again, in 1864, Prussia had complete- 
 ly re-armed her soldiers with breech-loaders before any of 
 the wealthier powers had done so. For the third time now 
 she has just completed, or is just completing, the issue to 
 all her troops of magazine rifled small arms. For the third 
 time, in this expenditure on what she has decided to be the 
 best weapon, she anticipates England and France. 
 
 In other words, her economical principle is the exact 
 reverse of Lord Randolph's. She does not believe in the 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 83 
 
 theory that he practically laid down at Wolverhampton: 
 "Advertise for the cheapest article; you are sure to get the 
 best." 
 
 When, however, the question arises how the money or 
 money's worth is originally procured from the country, we 
 must declare that ours is by far the most economical sys- 
 tem. 
 
 Let us take first our enormous non-effective charge, the 
 one that has excited most the wrath of Lord Randolph and 
 of other critics. What that charge does for us is this: it 
 keeps all the ranks of our army from dropping into the con- 
 dition of senility which attended the Royal Artillery and 
 Royal Engineers — the only two pure seniority corps we 
 then had— shortly before the Crimean war. How hopeless the 
 inefficiency produced by that senility was, may be judged by 
 any one who looks at the pathetic pictures of what a Wool- 
 wich parade was in those days. From all we have seen of the 
 German army of late years, we much doubt whether their 
 equivalent of our system has done as much for them. We 
 have seen pictures of the senior officers of German messes 
 that might have passed for sketches taken of our officers at 
 the worst period of our post 1815 peace time. 
 
 But what is the German equivalent of our non-effective 
 return? In many respects, like all other parts of the Ger- 
 man system, it is excellent, and utilizes in a very effective 
 way the services of officers and non-commissioned officers. 
 The State is the proprietor of all the Prussian railways, of 
 all the Elsass-Lothringen railways, and of many more 
 throughout the empire. Officers and non-commissioned offi- 
 cers, after they have retired from the army, are provided, in 
 connection with these and other State properties, with ap- 
 pointments which serve as excellent substitutes for heavy 
 pensions. 
 
 But how came the government to be proprietor of so 
 many railways, most of them originally started as private 
 
84 Germany, France, a^td Belgium. 
 
 companies? The answer is easy, and happily illustrates the 
 nature, on this expensive side, of Prussian economy. The 
 command of capital due to the French indemnity greatly 
 facilitated the process. That vast sum was well turned over 
 at interest, while it was accumulating for military purposes. 
 The process consisted in purchasing at first a moderate 
 number of railways that could, with the advantage of State 
 support, be worked so sharply in competition with others 
 that the latter no longer paid. Their proprietors were there- 
 fore glad to dispose of them at a moderate rate to the gov- 
 ernment. The new purchase was soon turned to good ac- 
 count, both as a profitable investment and as a means of 
 extending the system by competition with other railways. 
 
 In this way, no doubt, as a holder of funds, the State 
 had arranged for their disposal at great advantage. But 
 what about the relative cost to individuals of their system 
 and of ours? Which would be cheaper in the long run for 
 English tax payers; to pay the 2d. on the income-tax which 
 about represents the equivalent of the cost of the non-ef- 
 fective return — or to have the whole railway property of the 
 country run down by government competition and bought 
 up below par? 
 
 It must be remembered in comparing the Budget of 
 Germany with our own, that all the pensions that are paid 
 are entirely struck off the Army Budget. So that to insti- 
 tute any comparison, the three millions which our non-ef- 
 fective vote costs must be deducted from army expendi- 
 ture. The railways are only an example of the method pur- 
 sued. All the offices of the State are filled with retired offi- 
 cers and non-commissioned officers, whose pensions are thus 
 saved. Yet the actual monetary cost of the non-effective 
 service of Germany is, according to General Brackenbury's 
 evidence, ^2,250,000 sterling, in addition to these salaries. 
 
 Let us take another illustration of the point we are anx- 
 ious to drive home. During one of the cavalry attacks at 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 85 
 
 Mars la Tour, two sons of Prince Bismarck were riding as 
 privates in the ranks of the 2d Dragoons of the Guards. 
 They played their part as troopers gallantly. One was se- 
 verely wounded, one carried a comrade out of fatal danger. 
 Heaven forbid that we should disparage the moral and na- 
 tional advantage of such association of the highest with the 
 lowest in the performance of simple patriotic duty! But as 
 a question of monetary resources expended on war what 
 does it represent ? Doubtless, as far as these two young 
 men are concerned personally, very little. It was no mone- 
 tary loss to the country that they should be doing humble 
 duty well, at a time when they were not ready for such work 
 as has since been given them. But as regards the number of 
 classes between them and that which fills our ranks, what 
 does that simple statement imply? The agents of great mer- 
 cantile houses, the eye doctor on the Rhine with a practice of 
 many thousands a year, all those on whose skill and knowl- 
 edge the accumulation of wealth throughout the country de- 
 pended — these men were everywhere present in the ranks. 
 Hardly any rate of taxation could extract from the country 
 such sums of money as this complete dislocation of trade and 
 professional work involved. Again we say, we by no means 
 deny the gain which balanced the loss; but it was not a 
 money gain. 
 
 We are not now dealing with that particular aspect of 
 the case, of which Sir A. Malet, in the book we quoted in 
 our last article, speaks, when he says that the German system 
 involves the sacrifice for almost every healthy man through- 
 out the country of twenty years of personal independence. 
 What we urge is, that when politicians go down among our 
 working men, who trust them, and tell them that we are 
 spending too much of our money, because foreign govern- 
 ments do not show in their budgets sums much larger than 
 our own, it is not enough to reply, "You forget how cheaply 
 foreign governments fill their ranks." It is not true that 
 they fill them as cheaply as we do; though the cost to them 
 
86 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 appears in no budget. In no country in the world would 
 the mere monetary loss of substituting a universal for a vol- 
 untary and highly paid service be so great as in our own. 
 
 To tell a nation that it is making prodigious monetary 
 sacrifices at a time when it is in fact saving its wealth by 
 paying those to serve whom it can best afford to employ, is 
 to deceive it. Foreign nations sacrifice to the protection 
 and security of national interests much more than money. 
 They sacrifice personal ease, social privilege, individual in- 
 dependence. But in addition to that, they sacrifice for the 
 whole country a power of accumulating wealth by devoting 
 their young men to that purpose, which represents an addi- 
 tional monetary loss of a magnitude so enormous that the 
 money that would be taken out of England, if we adopted 
 their methods, would stand to that which we now spend in a 
 proportion that no man can measure, but that would at least 
 be represented by a high midtiple of our present figure. This 
 is the only fair method of comparison as to the money rate 
 they are paying and the money rate we are paying for na- 
 tional defence. 
 
 We have spoken of the conditions of English social life, 
 as elements that must be taken into account when we try to 
 estimate the kind of rate that must be paid if we would have 
 economical service from those classes of which we have 
 taken the present permanent Under Secretary of State for 
 War as an example. Does the same thing apply or does it 
 not apply to our working classes? 
 
 Listen to this: Doubtless many of our readers are ac- 
 customed to read, or at least to take in, some of the agricul- 
 tural journals of the country. If they do, they will bear us 
 out when we say that a phenomenon has lately been noticed 
 by careful observers which, like many other humble mat- 
 ters, has a deep significance. The markets of the country 
 have changed in a very curious way. A few years ago, fat 
 pigs, fat bacon, even fat mutton and fat beef, were in great 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 87 
 
 demand. But farmers find that the production of fat no 
 longer pays as it did. Why so? The answer which those 
 give who best understand such matters is this: The vast 
 mass of the population of these islands has acquired tastes, 
 engendered by increasing prosperity, which make them pre- 
 fer more costly ways of obtaining that necessary part of 
 human food, of which fat is the cheapest form. Butter, but 
 ferine, and the like, are now eaten by them instead of the 
 fat of bacon. Their very habits of cooking have changed. 
 Moreover, though the production of fat no longer pays as it 
 did, the consumption of bacon has increased more largely 
 than that of any other article of commerce, because of the 
 increased purchasing power of those who make it their chief 
 form of meat food. 
 
 You are thus competing for your soldiers in a market 
 yearly offering more and more opportunities to the class 
 from which they come of acquiring wealth, and the habits 
 which wealth engenders. Whether, from all points of view, 
 it is purely national gain that the population should crowd 
 in to the work of highly paid factories, is a question beside 
 our present purpose. What we earnestly urge upon the con- 
 sideration of such politicians as Lord Randolph Churchill 
 and Sir Charles Dilke is this: You are actually getting your 
 army on a system which subtracts from the general wealth 
 of the country sums so immeasurably less than the Conti- 
 nental system would subtract from it, that all monetary 
 comparisons between their budgets and ours tend to deceive 
 us as to the sacrifices we are making. 
 
 You cannot both have your pie and eat it too. You can- 
 not save the national purse by adopting methods which, in 
 their direct payment for what we want, are, commercially 
 speaking, immeasurably sounder than the Continental sys- 
 tem of taking wealth by other means than by direct pay- 
 ment, and yet have an adequate defence for your vast em- 
 pire by paying what they pay in hard cash. 
 
88 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 The constant cries that ours is a most costly system are 
 most dangerous and deceptive. Our whole national econ- 
 omy is based upon commercial wisdom; and, as a mere mat- 
 ter of such calculation, we have been far wiser in our gener- 
 ation than our neighbors. But we are living in a fool's para- 
 dise. "Cut it down! cut it down!" were the cries which 
 greeted Lord Randolph's absolutely deceptive comparison 
 of our Army Budget and that of Germany. If you do cut 
 it down, you can by no manner of means supply those ter- 
 rible deficiencies in our needed preparation for possible war 
 which Lord Randolph himself pointed out. Those deficien- 
 cies exist because our statesmen have been attempting an 
 impossible problem. They have tried to adopt principles 
 for saving the wealth of the country which do save that 
 wealth, and yet, in comparing their doings with those of 
 Continental statesmen, they have given themselves no credit 
 for the saving, but have gone on to act as if they ought to 
 get what they do not pay for. 
 
 To turn to the other side of the comparison. What has 
 Germany to do with the army and navy which she employs? 
 What have we with ours? The German empire lies within 
 a ring fence. Her system of localization and all the cheap 
 service which it represents is easy, because her army has, 
 during peace time, never to stir from home. We have an 
 empire which occupies in mere extent one-fifth of the habit- 
 able globe, a population which is reckoned by the lOO mil- 
 lion. But that is not all or nearly all. It is scarcely too 
 much to say that every square mile of water which connects 
 the outlying portions of our dominions is for us a territory 
 needing defence as much as does Elsass-Lothringen or Po- 
 merania. It is a defence which to be adequate needs the 
 work alike of army and of navy; of navy first — of army, that 
 the navy may be free to do its proper work. Everywhere 
 over it we have harbors and fortresses, which must be held 
 by our army unless our vast resources, dispersed over that 
 watery dominion, are to be open to far more easy attack 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 89 
 
 than any of those German villages which now sleep so se- 
 curely behind the men who guard the Rhine. 
 
 Lord Randolph makes a great point of the fact that In- 
 dia pays for the army which we keep there, and that this is 
 an additional proof of our extravagance. Perhaps an Amer- 
 ican gerenal, a military Lycurgus in his own country, may 
 be allowed the weight of an unprejudiced onlooker, so far 
 as our Indian system is concerned. General Upton* has un- 
 hesitatingly declared that nowhere in all history have such 
 results been obtained as we have secured from our native 
 army in India. He has given all the figures of our high pay- 
 ments for local service, and, like Macaulay, he has declared 
 that, judged by its results, it has been the most economical 
 system known on earth. Those of us who know its present 
 weaknesses know also that they all lie on the side exactly 
 opposite to that on which Lord Randolph tries to lay his 
 finger. If he is going to apply to India the manifold mean- 
 ness suggested by his questions as chairman of his Commit- 
 tee, the day of the collapse of our Indian empire will date 
 from that on which he gains power to carry out his will. 
 
 But, though our native army in India has been a mar- 
 vellous and most economical accession to our imperial 
 strength in India, and though for the actual service of our 
 European army in India that empire pays, that does not 
 close the question as a comparison between our army and 
 the German. 
 
 Mr. Knox has, perhaps by this time, brought home to 
 Lord Randolph the fact that at present the whole conditions 
 of our service at home are determined by the necessities of 
 Indian and colonial empire. Even in the scheme which is 
 now proposed for carrying out, as perfectly as may be, that 
 sudden mobilization, the success of which in 1870 brought 
 France down on her knees before Germany at the very 
 
 * See "The Armies of Asia and Europe," p. 75. 
 
90 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 opening of the campaign, the fact that our army has prima- 
 rily to hold a world-wide empire must be taken into account. 
 
 We cannot have the same simple system of mobiliza- 
 tion as a country which keeps all its army in the neighbor- 
 hood of their homes. The continual transfer of regiments 
 from England to India and the colonies involves, in a vast 
 variety of ways, costs which Germany never incurs. The 
 necessities of a voluntary service in themselves prevent its 
 being possible to keep regiments from year to year in an 
 unpopular station. An army which can only have to be 
 moved by rail or road, on the outbreak of war, is on a very 
 different footing. 
 
 We can arrange, and we are arranging, if Lord Ran- 
 dolph and Sir Charles Dilke will allow us to do so, to have 
 the ports of embarkation told off for our troops, and all those 
 conditions provided beforehand which facilitate sea trans- 
 port. The actual numbers of troops, the particular regi- 
 ments, the weight of their stores, will all be fixed, so that 
 the Admiralty can at any moment know what ships will be 
 required and what accommodation must be prepared. The 
 stores to go on board those ships will be ready at the ports. 
 Every reserve man will know, long beforehand, where he is 
 to join his old regiment, and will find his clothing and equip- 
 ment waiting for him on the spot. The quartering of regi- 
 ments will, for the first time in our history, be arranged with 
 a view to making easy a mobilization either for home ser- 
 vice or embarkation. Every item of the departments which 
 enable an army to march and fight, which we do possess, 
 will be turned to account. But it must be realized by En- 
 glishmen that hitherto in the hopeless attempt we have de- 
 scribed to buy with hard cash what foreigners take by 
 a more costly method, and yet to pay as little as they do, 
 the English army has been hitherto always stinted of those 
 very things on which the power of the German army de- 
 pends. It was because the German army consisted, not of 
 a number of regiments, but of corps d' armee, complete in all 
 
Germany, Fra?ice, and Belgium. 91 
 
 their parts, that Germany in 1870 struck down Imperial 
 France within a month. 
 
 For though we get our money on the cheapest system 
 we can, the Germans understand, and we do not, how to 
 spend it when they get it. Lord Randolph and Sir Charles 
 Dilke are agreed that they and their class have made the 
 most hopeless mess of the process that was humanly possi- 
 ble. We are of the same mind. In Germany, among all 
 the fierce attacks that have been made against Prince Bis- 
 marck and the other members of the Prussian government, 
 no hint has ever been dropped of a doubt that the money, 
 once voted, has been expended in the most economical man- 
 ner possible. Any one who will be at the trouble to read 
 the questions that some of the members of the House of 
 Commons on Lord Randolph's Committee have been asking 
 will have no difficulty in seeing the reason why we have 
 been in so different a condition. We have been told that 
 the selection of the Committee has excited general dissatis- 
 faction in the House itself. For the credit of the House of 
 Commons, we hope that that is true. There are of course 
 some members who always ask most business like and ex- 
 cellent questions ; but really others appal one. One does 
 not expect a member of the House necessarily to know very 
 much, but he ought at least to know where to get informa- 
 tion. He ought to be a man of the world enough not to 
 ask a soap muanufacturer details as to the manufacture of 
 cheese, when he is appointed to arrive at truth. Yet that is 
 the principle on which the inquiry is being conducted. 
 
 We heartily thank Lord Randolph for having insisted 
 upon making public these questions as they proceed. They 
 will supply admirable material for heckling. We commend 
 them to the attention of constituents who have reasons of 
 their own for wishing to make their members ridiculous 
 when they next have to face them. Let us take an instance. 
 Mr. Knox is a most able accountant, and a most hard work- 
 ing man. We suspect even Lord Randolph, if he knew 
 
92 Germany, France, and Bel^mm. 
 
 nothing of him before, is a little sorry that he committed 
 himself to the statement at Wolverhampton that the copy- 
 ists did all the work at the War Ofifice, Mr. Knox and his 
 fellows doing nothing. But Mr. Knox is necessarily like 
 other men who achieve much in their own line, obliged to 
 stick to his last- He does not travel far beyond the walls 
 of the dingy, inconvenient, and poisonous office in Pall 
 Mall, to which Lord Randolph boasts that he has confined 
 the men on whose health and clear headedness the effi- 
 ciency of our army depends. Just imagine, then, the select- 
 ing of Mr. Knox for examination on the details of the edu- 
 cutional arrangements of the Civil Service Commissioners; 
 on the wisdom of the arrangements of the foreign armies; 
 on the reasons why a regiment which moves from MuUingar 
 to Stirling, then to an out station of Plymouth, miles from 
 any board school, and thence to Pembroke docks, should 
 not have its unfortunate children shunted from one board 
 school to another, from one absolutely different system of 
 education to another, every time that it moves. Again, it 
 is a tolerably familiar fact, to most men who have even a 
 little studied modern war, that the general education of the 
 German army has been one of its greatest powers. Our own 
 conviction of the relative weakness of the Russian army is 
 based on the stolid ignorance of the Russian peasantry. 
 Nothing has so much tended of late years to increase the 
 practical power of our own army as its enforced education. 
 No one who knows what a young soldier is when he first 
 joins would dream of submitting to him the question 
 whether he would like to learn. A greater cruelty could not 
 be done him. Every temptation is thrown in his way not 
 to learn. If the option is nominally left to him, it will be 
 no option at all. All weak young fellows will yield to the 
 pressure of their comrades, and will avoid learning. In 
 most the regiments the question — the vital question — of 
 whether they can or can not get good non-commissioned 
 officers is almost absolutely a question of whether their 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 93 
 
 commanding officers have or have not taken pains to encour- 
 age the general education of their recruits. 
 
 Yet these gentlemen select Mr. Knox, who can by no 
 accident have had either the experience or the special 
 knowledge of the conditions of modern war, required to an- 
 swer such a question, as the man whose opinion they take on 
 the point whether money may not be saved by making op- 
 tional the regimental schools for the privates, as well as do- 
 ing away with the other educational establishments of the 
 army. There are numbers of English soldiers whose spec- 
 ial business it has been to make themselves acquainted with 
 the conditions of foreign armies. If their own evidence is 
 to be distrusted because they are soldiers, they at least 
 know to what unanswerable and authoritative documents the 
 Committee ought to be referred. But if the soldiers are to 
 be examined on the technical details of army accounts as 
 carried on in the War office, and the accountants on ques- 
 tions of pure military experience, what result but miserable 
 failure can come of this wretched system of inquiry? 
 
 This is the sort of economy which in the past has been 
 so costly. " Happy thought," says some one who knows 
 nothing about it. "Let us do away with the expense of the 
 education of the army. Soldiers want to fight, not to learn. 
 They would like it ever so much better themselves." Slap 
 goes the vote. Two years after appear some powerful let- 
 ters from a newspaper correspondent, pointing out how all 
 important in modern war the education of some foreign 
 army has. proved in a decisive campaign, in which public in- 
 terest at the time is absorbed. Everything must then be 
 sacrificed to the one object of educating the soldier. Money 
 is voted to re-purchase land and buildings, and to re-estab- 
 lish a machinery which cannot be made as efficient as the 
 old one that was destroyed. Everything is at high pressure 
 and double cost. 
 
 We take this as an illustration. Hitherto, we must ad- 
 mit, education has not been assailed. But Lord Randolph 
 
94 Germany, France, atid Belgium. 
 
 will, no doubt; easily persuade the men of Wolverhampton 
 that no one ought to know anything that they do not; so that 
 now the special turn of education has come. In other mat- 
 ters — in those in which the military power, the sudden strik- 
 ing power more especially of Germany and now of France 
 too depend -we have been doomed to impotence by the 
 hopelessness of attempting to make the House of Commons 
 interested in army efificiency. Whatever attracted atten- 
 tion — the talk of ladies looking on from the House of Com- 
 mons' stand at a great review — has had its due favor. Those 
 things, the value of which the experience of war alone can 
 teach, have been left to take their chance. 
 
 Hence it happens that while we have for our army the 
 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, for those two corps of which 
 we have spoken we are without any adequate supply of the 
 needed transport, of the needed medical staff, of the needed 
 engineers for bridging, for telegraph work, and for other en- 
 gineer duties. We have no supply ready of the field baker- 
 ies, of "artillery ammunition columns," or "infantry ammu- 
 nition columns," or "provision columns." 
 
 Now, in the German army all these bodies in their due 
 proportion are embodied in, and form part of, the mobiliza- 
 tion of each corps d' armee. 
 
 This is the great contrast which must strike any one 
 who will be at the trouble of turning to the Appendix of 
 the Prussian official history of the war of 1870 and compar- 
 ing the tabular statement of the German army with our own 
 army estimates, or with any other complete record of our 
 army as it exists. If the various portions of the force which 
 are there given had ever existed in our army, they would 
 long since have been abolished, because some one would 
 have asked Mr. Knox why such unwarlike agents should be 
 kept up in peace time? It is not Mr. Knox's business to 
 know the answer ; but Mr. Knox's authority would have 
 been sufficient for their abolition. 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 95 
 
 Now, from the German point of view, economy consists 
 in providing those things which make an army efificient. 
 Our own army is not efficient for war, and cannot be ready 
 to take the field with that rapidity which is of the essence 
 of the question, until we can, on the word "mobilize" being 
 issued from headquarters, instantly prepare whatever force 
 we have complete in all these respects. 
 
 To send an army into the field unprovided with those 
 auxiliary aids, without which an army cannot move, without 
 which it cannot fight, is as reasonable as to send a regiment 
 into the field without its arms. If the question were whether 
 we should send to war one regiment armed with the best 
 breech-loaders or two unarmed at all, no one would hesitate 
 as to the answer. Yet to any one who has studied modern 
 war it is just as wise, it amounts to the same thing, to send 
 an army into the field without its proper auxiliary services, 
 thinking that you add more to its force by increasing its cav- 
 alry, infantry, and artillery without supplying what you have 
 with what is required to enable them to fight, as to keep on 
 adding to an army men whom you cannot arm. 
 
 The central cause of this enormous difference between 
 the wisdom with which the German money once obtained 
 for war is administered, and the folly with which we expend 
 ours, lies in the existence in Berlin of that "great staff," of 
 which Von Moltke is the head. Until quite lately we have 
 had no body whatever in London which supplied the place 
 of the "great staff." The "Horse Guards" and 'War Office" 
 are employed on matters of daily routine and petty detail — 
 very largely, indeed, in preparing answers for questions put 
 forward in the House of Commons to embarass a govern- 
 ment for party purposes. Von Moltke's staff does not con- 
 cern itself at all with the innumerable matters of minor reg- 
 imental discipline, the solution of which is the chief duty of 
 the Adjutant-General's Department of our army. It is ab- 
 sorbed entirely in the consideration of those matters on 
 which the effective fighting power of the army depends. Of 
 
96 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 late these have, with us, been undertaken by the Intelligence 
 Department. That department is a kind of parasite. Its 
 absolute necessity and its value have made itself so felt by 
 all other departments, not only of the War Office but of the 
 government, that it has gradually been absorbing duties al- 
 most analogous to those of the "great staff"; but it is in its 
 wrong place. It ought to be the thinking head of the army 
 — that which deals under the immediate responsibility of 
 the chief of the army with all the questions of the mode in 
 which the money voted by Parliament can be most economi- 
 cally and efficiently used — the question of organization, the 
 questions of preparedness for war. The mighty questions 
 whether a private in an infantry regiment ought or ought not 
 to have been punished for going to sleep in church, whether 
 a corporal's guard should or should not have been relieved 
 at two o'clock, and the like, with which actually now the 
 time of a man like Lord Wolseley is not unfrequently occu- 
 pied, ought to be dealt with, on their own responsibility and 
 finally, long before the Horse Guards is reached. 
 
 Our present system of centralization does not confer 
 power on the headquarters of the army. It deprives them 
 of all real power by burying them under detail. We have a 
 congress of departments at headquarter^ ; we have a con- 
 gress of regiments and of local staffs about the country. 
 Wc have no "great general staff; " we have no corps d' armh. 
 
 II. TJic New Military Frontiers of Germany and of France. 
 We turn now to the second question with which we propose 
 to deal: The relative military power of Germany and of 
 France, and more especially the respective strength of their 
 two frontiers. Simultaneously with our last article, while 
 we were expressing our conviction that Sir Charles Dilke 
 was in error in maintaining the superior strength for practi- 
 cal purposes of the French and Russian frontiers over the 
 German, an article appeared in the "Contemporary Review," 
 written by a German officer, which, so far as the actual for- 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. gy 
 
 tifications of France against Germany and of Germany 
 against France are concerned, leaves nothing to be desired. 
 We are better pleased that that should be so, because we 
 are anxious to avoid a vast body of detailed geographical de- 
 scription, and a catalogue of names, which, for all but a lim- 
 ited class of readers, would possess neither meaning nor in- 
 terest. For all details, therefore, of the most elaborate sys- 
 tem of French defence, we may refer our readers to that 
 article. 
 
 What we desire to do is to explain the broad principles 
 on which the two most opposite systems of defence, carried 
 out by the two nations, have been designed, and to give our 
 reasons for preferring to believe in the German. After the 
 war of 1870, the French engineers found that, with the ex- 
 ception of a very small strip of the frontier, the Germans 
 had possessed themselves of the old natural mountain bar- 
 rier on which France had for generations relied for her de- 
 fence. They had to deal with a country not in itself strong- 
 ly defensible. They had virtually a tabula rasa on which to 
 exercise their skill. They have worked with the greatest 
 ability, backed by an unstinted supply of money. Incredi- 
 ble as the sum appears, France is reputed to have expended 
 since 1870 on her re-armament and fortification 135 million 
 pounds sterling. Such a sum skillfully expended could not 
 fail to produce a formidable result. They have piled forti 
 fication upon fortification all along the frontier. Certainly 
 he would be a rash man who would venture to speak confi- 
 dently as to the result, should the German armies have to 
 attack this continuous belt of fortification, adequately gar- 
 risoned by formidable troops. 
 
 Belfort itself has been girdled with forts. Epinal has 
 been similarly strengthened, so has Toul, so has Verdun. A 
 great defensive position has been prepared on the " Plateau 
 de Haye," between Frouard and Pont St. Vincent. Then 
 curtains of forts d' arret close all the chief roads between 
 these great places of defence, An elaborate series of de- 
 
gS Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 fences cover the Cotes de Meuse between Toul and Verdun. 
 In second line Langres, Besancon, and Dijon have been con- 
 verted into vast intrenched camps. In fact, as Major Wachs 
 says, Epinal, Belfort, Besancon, Dijon, and Langres form a 
 large strategic pentagon, in which every angle is filled with 
 a fortified place of the first rank. Reims, La-Fere, and Laon 
 have all been converted into entrenched camps. So num- 
 erous are the forts which connect these various greater 
 places that only two gaps of any extent remain, one between 
 Verdun and the Belgian frontier, one between Toul and 
 Epinal. These have been deliberately left in order to 
 tempt an invader to advance by lines which would be disad- 
 vantageous to him. Nor is this all; the network of railways 
 in rear of these fortresses, and connecting them, is most 
 elaborate and complete. 
 
 The enormous size of the works may be judged by the 
 fact that Verdun will require a garrison of 25,000 men to 
 hold it; it has for its external forts a perimeter of 28^^ miles. 
 Epinal has similarly a perimeter of 28 miles, Belfort of 30 
 miles — and so on. 
 
 Before discussing what appears to us to be the weak 
 point in this magnificent scheme, let us consider what Ger- 
 many has done on the other side. First, she has demolished 
 nearly all the smaller forts and fortresses in Elsass-Lothrin- 
 gen. Secondly, she has everywhere elaborated her facilities 
 for detraining and entraining troops. She has perfected 
 her railway communication between all parts of Germany 
 where corps assemble, and Strasbourg and Metz. She has 
 also perfected the railway system north and south, as well 
 as east and west, within the newly conquered territory. 
 Thirdly, she has made of Strasbourg with Kehl an intrench- 
 ed camp so vast, that Major Wachs declares — and we be- 
 lieve that it is true though others scarcely put the figures so 
 high — that it would cover and supply an army of 280,000 
 men. It can be protected by a belt of water from the III, 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 99 
 
 the Rhone Canal, and the Rhine. Three of the forts are 
 similarly protected by wet ditches. The forts communicate 
 by subterranean telegraph wires, and a railway circuit con- 
 nects them with the great system which converges on Stras- 
 bourg. We rather doubt Major Wachs' statement that this 
 circular railway is now in order, but the roadway is there, 
 and the rails could easily be laid down. Germany has enor- 
 mously improved and strengthened the forts round Metz. 
 She has treated with a sort of careless indifference three 
 other fortresses which she has not actually dismantled, 
 Thionville, Bitsch, and Saarlouis. 
 
 By the treaty after the war, she obtained possession also 
 of Neu Breisach, and this she has retained in its old form, 
 as it covers an important bridge over the Rhine. Here, as 
 eslewhere, she has greatly improved the facilities for de- 
 training troops. Breisach will serve to bring into the South- 
 ern Vosges the Bavarian corps. But, with the exceptions 
 we have named, no other fortresses have been left standing 
 on the French side beyond the line of the Rhine, Germany 
 has, however, still her old line of great intrenched camps, 
 giving her command of rivers — Ulm, Rastatt, Mayence, Cob- 
 lentz, Cologne, and Wesel. 
 
 She has over the Rhine itself no fewer than sixteen rail- 
 way bridges, besides four steam ferries, capable of carrying 
 entire trains, and also twenty bridges of boats for wheeled 
 carriages. Most of these passages are fortified. All can be 
 rapidly destroyed. Double lines of railway run along either 
 bank of the Rhine throughout its entire length. 
 
 Now what does this mean? It means that Germany re- 
 lies for the defence of her territory against France upon 
 facilitating in every way the gathering of her forces upon 
 the French frontier, and upon striking in the field rapid 
 blows against any French force that shall attempt to pass 
 the Rhine to invade her. It means that every topographi- 
 cal condition which will hamper the movement of an army 
 
100 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 attempting rapid offence against her has been studied; that 
 she will have the most telling bases and pivots of manoeu- 
 vre for supplying her forces. The Germans will be able to 
 manoeuvre in concentrated masses against an enemy who 
 must expose himself to blows in such fashion that the Ger- 
 man army can strike on flanks or rear. The blow may be 
 delivered when the French army is divided by the necessi- 
 ties of movement in difficult country or across a great river, 
 of which the Germans hold all the bridges, so that they can 
 forbid its passage to the French and pass it themselves when 
 and where they please. That is the nature of the defence 
 manifestly designed. 
 
 It is as auxiliary to this purpose that the great camps 
 exist. Her army is not swallowed up by many fortresses. 
 The great mass of the fortresses which we have named, 
 which hold the rivers, are far to the rear, so that, while the 
 active army moves forward to the frontier, there can gather 
 securely behind them the great territorial army, which will 
 fill these camps, and be daily gaining cohesion and disci- 
 pline. 
 
 And now as to what she will do for offence. That 
 clearly depends on the weak spot she has the opportunity 
 to assail. In all that vast and wonderful mass of fortifica- 
 tion which confronts her, is there one? Not in the fortress- 
 es, perhaps, as yet; but, unless all that we have gathered 
 from the discussions which have of late been sufficiently 
 ample in France, and from some other sources, be deceptive, 
 there will be one most serious weakness involved in the 
 French system of defence. 
 
 Among the literature which poured from the French 
 press after the war of 1870-71, there was one pathetic little 
 pamphlet, written by the Emperor of the French himself, 
 describing the causes of the French disasters. He emphati- 
 cally declared that the great cause of all his trouble was 
 that neither he nor any one else understood that the move- 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. loi 
 
 ment of troops by railway for a great campaign was an art 
 in itself, till the bitter experience of war taught him how 
 little he knew about it. The statement was certainly an ex- 
 aggerated one. The causes of the woes of France lay much 
 deeper than that. But this much is certain, that everything 
 for France in the next war with Germany will at first depend 
 on the question whether her soldiers have or have not prac- 
 tically mastered the difficulty which the methodic move- 
 ment to the frontier of both her active and territorial army 
 will entail upon her. 
 
 For the defect of that vast agglomeration of works 
 which she has piled together is, that it will take an army to 
 defend it. Germany, with her one strong place of Metz, 
 fronts ten first-class fortresses alone, independent of all the 
 minor forts which jostle one another along that mighty line. 
 If the French proposed to employ their regular army in 
 these works, well might Major Wachs exclaim, as he does: 
 "Now, this riveting of an army to a fixed immovable spot is 
 difficult to combine with the offensive, and the year 1870 
 showed that a French army could be brought rapidly behind 
 walls, but not easily before them; so that we may be permit- 
 ted to ask the question, whether the nation which leads so ex- 
 cited a life to the west of the Vosges is still the same that in 
 former times used to be so eager to advance and attack the 
 enemy, and which, indeed, always showed a rapture for open 
 battle and swift decision, and the profoundest aversion to 
 merely standing and exchanging fire, or to remaining long 
 behind wall and trench?. . . .Dead walls are the grave stones 
 of the military self confidence of the French, and the ' not- 
 withstanding their presence,' may very soon be converted 
 into ' because of their presence.' France prefers to put her 
 trust in the shield rather than in the hand that wields the 
 spear." 
 
 But Major Wachs, carefully as he has studied the 
 French frontier, evidently does not know the French views 
 as to the mode in which these fortresses are to be held. 
 
102 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 The idea is that, while the active army takes the field, these 
 fortresses are to be occupied by the territorial army. There 
 seems to us to lie the weakness of the whole scheme. It 
 appears to have escaped notice in England that France has 
 never ventured to adopt the system of localization and ter- 
 ritorial mobilization of the Germans. When the word "mo- 
 bilize" goes forth from the French headquarters, the reserves 
 which will join the nearest troops will not be men who have 
 been trained with the regiments they join. It is extremely 
 difificult to believe that such an operation can be conducted 
 with the rapidity, ease, and certainty with which a German 
 village, in which all the men belong to one company, falls 
 in and joins the men of the next village or two in making up 
 the total 'reserves of the battalion whose headquarters lie 
 close to them. It is very difficult not to believe that the 
 French will suffer as we have done ourselves from the want 
 of cohesion, due to vast numbers of men being placed with 
 officers they have not known before. Then the whole mass 
 of men, both of the active and territorial army, will have to 
 move eastwards. The army will have to take up its posi- 
 tion; the territorial force to occupy the forts. It is the most 
 enormous problem of military railway transport under the 
 most difficult conditions that has ever been attempted. It 
 may succeed, of course; but during all the earlier years which 
 followed 1870, if not since then, there was an irregularity 
 and uncertainty about the way in which men were passed 
 into the reserves and about the way in which the training was 
 given, which makes us gravely doubt whether the mobiliza- 
 tion will not be much more like that which Prussia attempt- 
 ed in 1849 and in 1859, which collapsed, rather than like that 
 of 1866 or 1870. Practice makes perfect rather in such mat- 
 ters as these than in most others. It was no bellicose wish 
 which induced General Boulanger to desire the experimen- 
 tal mobilization of two corps. At all events, whatever may 
 have been his private views, there was grave reason why 
 France should make the experiment. We have solid grounds 
 for believing that, shortly prior to his proposal for the mobi- 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 103 
 
 lization of the corps, General Boulanger had specifically as- 
 certained that all arrangements for the movements by rail- 
 way of the F"rench army on a large scale were in a condition 
 as chaotic as they had been prior to the war of 1870. If that 
 is true, we would give very little for the value to France of 
 the 135 millions spent on the fortifications.* 
 
 For what, meantime, has Germany been doing as regards 
 her own mobilization? The one arm of the service which in 
 1870 was relatively slow in being ready was the one whose 
 services were needed first— -the cavalry. If we are rightly 
 informed, such vigorous steps have been taken to remedy 
 that inconvenience, that, thirty-six hours after the magic 
 word "mobilize" has arrived, each cavalry regiment will be 
 ready to take the field. Everything is done in Germany 
 with a silence which contrasts notably with the chatter and 
 the fussy efforts at secrecy which were characteristic of 
 General Boulanger's administration. It is therefore not easy 
 to be certain to what point the time required for mobiliza- 
 tion has been actually reduced. It is put sometimes 
 now as low as four days. The maximum time is, we 
 believe, at all events, six days. After that it will be simply 
 a question of extremely rapid railway transport upon forti- 
 fied places for large portions, at least of the army. With- 
 out knowing the total number of entraining and detraining 
 stations available for each corps, it would be impossible to 
 estimate the time within which the German army may be 
 reckoned upon to arrive within striking distance of the 
 French line. It is upon such points as these, the amount of 
 rolling stock and the multiplication of railway lines, and 
 not upon mere distance, that the rate of transfer of large 
 bodies of troops depends. Seeing that the German govern- 
 
 * I do not think that the mobilization actually dispelled these causes 
 for suspicion. It was known too long beforehand which corps was to be 
 mobilized, and the difficulties described above could not in the experi- 
 ment have occurred. 
 
104 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 ment has been bending all its energies to facilitate move- 
 ment by these means ever since the war, we confess that we 
 anticipate a rapidity of concentration on the fronteir or on 
 the Rhine that will startle the world almost as much as the 
 earlier successes of 1870 surprised it. If that confusion 
 reigns over the French mobilization which we anticipate, so 
 that, at the moment when the German forces are ready on 
 their frontier, the occupation of the French frontier forts is 
 in progress, or if the forts are occupied by inferior troops 
 hurriedly brought together, that will be the moment of the 
 German stroke. The two forts which must be taken in 
 order to enable a German army to advance will be suddenly 
 attacked and overwhelmed with fire. That their capture 
 will cost the Germans severe loss in men cannot be doubted. 
 But it must be remembered that under all conditions of war- 
 fare that we have ever known, the weakness of a practically 
 continuous and greatly extended system of fortification lies 
 in this, that broken in one point it is broken in all. 
 Mutatis mutandis, the example of Marlborough's success 
 against the very same system when adopted by the 
 French of his day will apply now. The danger to the 
 French lies in the temptation which Mr. Hooper, in his 
 lately published history of the Sedan campaign, very ably 
 discusses as that which will be held out to weak commanders 
 of an exaggerated reliance on great entrenched camps. We 
 agree with his critic in the "Spectator" that the case of 
 Metz and Bazaine is not fairly in point; because Metz, as it 
 existed in 1870, did not fulfill any of the conditions which 
 obtain in either the French or German camps of to-day. 
 But, nevertheless, the danger is a real one. No one who 
 has followed our statement will fail to see how anxiously 
 the Germans have endeavored to avoid it. There is no mis- 
 taking the significance of their careful demolition of Schlett- 
 stadt, Marsal, Phalsbourg, La Petite Pierre, Lichtenberg and 
 Landau. 
 
 As Major Wachs has put it in the passage we have quot- 
 ed, the danger is lest an army "brought rapidly behind 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 105 
 
 walls" will not be brought "easily before them." For our 
 part, we have the most profound belief in the strength of a 
 defensive position under the modern conditions of war; pro- 
 vided always that an army knows how, when needed, to use 
 it, and when to dispense with it. But that local power of 
 the defensive is one which a skillful assailant may turn to 
 his own profit, as the Germans showed alike before Metz, 
 Sedan, and Paris. The French method is, as Major Wachs 
 has well said, a recurrence to the "cordon system of the last 
 century." Beyond doubt the completeness in itself of each 
 separate fortification is a matter of the greatest importance; 
 but we confess to thinking that there is risk lest these forti- 
 fications should be only too comfortable for the generals of 
 the French army. Victory will now, as ever, be ultimately de- 
 cided in the open field. Fortifications are of importance in so 
 far as they assist an army in its operations in the field. They 
 become dangerous when, instead of being used as pivots of 
 manoeuvre, they are erected, like the stone wall of China, 
 themselves to bar the progress of the invader. 
 
 We think that, in what we have said, we have supplied 
 an explanation, and to some extent even a justification, of 
 Sir Charles Dilke's statement, though we have given our 
 reasons for differing from him. To any one looking merely 
 at the elaboration, the cost, the completeness of the French 
 defence, it must seem that the Germans have on their side 
 done nothing comparable to it. The German behaves like 
 the master of fence who apparently drops his point, and lays 
 his breast open to be stabbed. Woe betide the unskillful 
 fencer who thinks that he has also dropped his eye! 
 
 III. Will the Germans violate Belgian territory? It will, 
 perhaps, now be apparent why we do not ourselves believe 
 that Germany will make her great attempt upon France by 
 violating Belgian territory. We have no wish to speak dog- 
 matically on the subject. We are quite aware that others, 
 whose judgment is entitled to the greatest weight, think dif- 
 
io6 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 ferently. For our own part we believe distinctly that Sir 
 Charles Dilke has done the greatest service to Belgium in 
 drawing her attention to the necessity that, 
 
 "Would she be free, herself should strike the blow." 
 
 But, as it seems to us, the balance of advantage to Germany 
 in moving by that line is so nice a one, that a conviction that 
 Belgium and England would act together to resist any such 
 attempt would be amply sufficient to t^^rn the scale. If Bel- 
 gium refuses to play her part in maintaining her neutrality, 
 the case falls of course. We are under no obligation to as- 
 sist her if she will spend nothing on the armaments and the 
 men that are needed to fulfill her international contract. We 
 certainly should be most unwilling to say anything that may 
 tend to prevent Belgium from setting her house in order. 
 But if we are right as to the weak point in the French de- 
 fence at which it is the policy of Germany to strike, it is 
 obvious that the blow must be struck rapidly and in an un- 
 known direction. Time is the essence of the question. 
 Now for Germany to choose the road by Belgium is to 
 abandon all the advantages of time. 
 
 It is as well to remember that during the war of 1870 
 and in the advance on Sedan, subsequent that is to the ne- 
 gotiation of our common treaty with Germany and France 
 for the protection of Belgium during August of that year, 
 orders were given to the German army that "should the 
 enemy enter Belgium territory and not be disarmed at once, 
 he is to be followed thither without delay." * Obviously 
 we should in that case have had even under that treaty no 
 casus belli against Germany. The case is analogous to that 
 of a blockade, which to be respected, must be effective. In 
 speaking, therefore, of German violation of Belgian terri- 
 tory, we speak of direct invasion intended to attack the 
 northern frontier of France, so as to avoid the necessity of 
 
 *Prussian Official History, Vol. II. p. 291. 
 
Germany, France, and Belgmm. 107 
 
 dealing with the great fortress barrier between Verdun and 
 Belfort. We do not speak of such chance viohition of terri- 
 tory as may occur in any marches made to the north of Ver- 
 dun in the course of a westerly movement. If that frontier 
 of Belgium be not properly guarded, it will no doubt be 
 casually or deliberately violated by parties on both sides. 
 We doubt, in that case, if anything but diplomatic apologies, 
 more or less sincere, could be expected to follow. 
 
 When we speak of the element of time being against a 
 German invasion of France by way of Belgium, we speak of 
 an advance from Cologne across Belgian territory, directed 
 upon Mezieres and Maubeuge, either to turn the line of the 
 fortresses or to carry the army immediately upon Paris. At 
 Metz, and in the general concentration in Elsass-Lothringen 
 the German armies can, within their own territory, concen- 
 trate by railway without its being possible for any but the 
 vaguest reports to reach the French as to the direction of the 
 impending blow. They arrive at once without difificulty 
 within striking distance, and with all the facilities so neces- 
 sary to a railway concentration afforded by terminal stations 
 elaborately prepared for the purpose. The nearest point at 
 which concentration can take place on similar terms on the 
 Belgian frontier is at Aix-la-Chapelie. From Aix only a sin- 
 gle railway runs across the frontier of Belgium. Obviously, 
 if force were attempted on this side, it would be the duty of 
 the Belgian government to destroy this line. As the crow 
 flies, the distance from Aix to Mezieres is ninety miles; and 
 as the railway runs through Liege, and makes a considera- 
 ble detour, it would be impossible for any Prussian force to 
 secure it throughout its length without deliberate conni- 
 vance or scandalous neglect on the part of the Belgians. 
 Even were the line in the hands of the Germans it would 
 furnish a most insecure dependence for supply. At best the 
 army must march by road through Belgium, so that at least 
 six or seven days must elapse between the departure from 
 Aix and the arrival within striking distance of the French 
 
io8 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 frontier. Six or seven days of clear warning would thus be 
 given to the French before their first line of defence could 
 be reached. 
 
 Though the defences of the northern frontier of France 
 are not like those of the eastern, they are not to be despis- 
 ed. Here the character of the French defence much more 
 nearly approaches to that of the German, as we have al- 
 ready discussed it. The railways would facilitate the rapid 
 gathering of the armies from all parts of France. Their 
 movement thither would not interfere with the concentra- 
 tion eastwards of the territorial army into the great fortress 
 belt. The main line of supply for the German armies would 
 still be intercepted by the Verdun-Belfort forest of for- 
 tresses. It seems to us inconceivable that, if this Belgian 
 line alone were taken, the French armies should not be able 
 to meet the German in superior numbers, in more perfect 
 concentration, and with every advantage of posititon in 
 their favor. 
 
 Of course the case would present fresh complications if 
 the neutrality of Luxembourg were violated as well as that 
 of Belgium. Again here we must say that the question 
 mainly turns upon the sincere desire of the King of Holland 
 to fulfill international obligation. By an agreement with 
 the King of Holland, no doubt the railway from Treves by 
 Luxembourg and Arlon could be made to assist; but to any 
 one who realizes what the nature of a great railway move- 
 ment of thousands of men and their stores is, it will, we 
 think, be evident that the mere fact of this violation of ter- 
 ritory would at once and necessarily substitute marching by 
 road for railway shipment, at least for the first advance of 
 the troops. Probably, in any case, in order to relieve the 
 railways, parts of the German army from the nearer distance 
 will march. But the developed facilities for railway trans- 
 port since the war are now so great that it does not look as 
 if, for the first line of their main army, that were the Ger- 
 man purpose. 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. log 
 
 By no manner of means that we can see would it be 
 possible for a German army to maintain itself in France and 
 to carry out successfully an offensive campaign, unless some 
 part of the great fortress barrier is by one means or another 
 broken down. Certainly it would be impossible without a 
 preliminary complete and absolute conquest of Belgium and 
 possession of Luxembourg, unless the barrier be broken. 
 Therefore, as it seems to us that the easiest time for break- 
 ing that barrier will be the earliest possible moment at 
 which it can be attempted, and as it cannot be done so 
 quickly by moving on the northern frontier as by striking 
 boldly at the eastern, we do not believe that the tendency 
 of the military situation lies in the direction of invasion of 
 France by Germany through Belgium. Either the condi- 
 tion of a preliminary attempt of France to adopt that line, 
 or absolute quiescence and indifference to her liberties on 
 the part of Belgium, would no doubt materially alter the 
 whole aspect of the case. 
 
 As long ago as in 1868-69, Von Moltke pronounced de- 
 cisively as to the advantages to the French of not violating 
 Swiss or Belgian territory. To any one who reads his words 
 now, it will, we think, be tolerably evident that with very 
 little modification the same argument applies both to French 
 and German action under present conditions. 
 
 "The neutrality of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland 
 limits the theatre of war to the area between Luxembourg 
 and Basle. Should France disregard the neutrality of one 
 of these States — say Belgium — her army must weaken itself 
 considerably in Brussels and before Antwerp. Her further 
 advance over the Meuse can be more effectivel}^ met from 
 the Moselle than from Cologne, as we should compel the 
 enemy to form front to the south, and while threatening his 
 communications, give him decisive battle. As the distance 
 from Brussels to Cologne is greater than from either Maintz, 
 Kaiserslautern, or Trier, we should, in such an eventuality, 
 
1 10 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 still be in time to take up a position on our lower Rhine 
 front. 
 
 "No less difficulties would ensue were France to violate 
 the neutrality of Switzerland, in which countr}^ she would 
 have to encounter a strong and well organized militia. 
 
 "Now, the concentration of considerable forces on the 
 Moselle would so immediately threaten France and her 
 capital, that she could hardly embark in such very remote 
 enterprises." * 
 
 Of all possible violations of territory, that which appears 
 to us to be by far the most probable, if any is attempted, is 
 that of Switzerland by France in the event of a war in which 
 from the fact of Germany being engaged against another 
 powerful enemy, France became the invader. Von Moltke 
 has given the reasons which make even that improbable; 
 but certainly our experience during the last fifty years does 
 not tend to show that Swiss neutrality has been much re- 
 spected. Nevertheless, though the southern frontier of 
 Germany lies almost absolutely unguarded, though few 
 troops are quartered there, and the railway system is most 
 incomplete, Gemany looks upon the danger to France of 
 throwing into the scale against herself the hostility of Switz- 
 erland, as a point sufficiently important to enable Germany 
 to disregard the menace of the many fortresses and the ac- 
 cumulation of men ready for action which, on the French 
 side, front Switzerland. We say this only to point out how, 
 when forces are so nicely balanced as they are at present on 
 the Continent, politics must determine the course of war 
 rather than the necessities of war determine the course of 
 politics. The Germans boast that with them it is for the 
 soldiers to tackle the problem, subject to the necessary po- 
 litical conditions. They will not draw into the scale against 
 Germany one little State, whose hostility might be incon- 
 
 * Prussian Official History, Part I, Vol. 1, p. 51. 
 
Germany, Frcwce, and Bclghan. ill 
 
 venient, in order to ease the military problem, or to seem to 
 ease it. 
 
 Therefore we say boldly, that if the question remains 
 doubtful whether Belgium, doing her duty to Europe, shall 
 be abandoned to the strong arm of violence, it is within the 
 power of England, if she possesses the strength, without 
 which she cannot guard her own empire, to decide the issue. 
 The Netherlands, Belgium and England together, would 
 certainly not be '' tnic qnantitc negligible'' * for either France 
 or Germany. Neither power would attempt, during a war 
 with the other, to place on their direct line of communica- 
 tion such forces as could thus be thrown against them. The 
 risk, in a militar}^ sense, would be far too serious. If Bel- 
 gium arms, and England forbids violation of her territory, 
 the territory of Belgium will not be violated. 
 
 IV. Has England abandoned Belgium ? Therefore it is 
 important to examine the grounds on which Sir Charles 
 Dilke expresses his conviction that all England has changed 
 its mind since 1870. 
 
 There was a letter of "Diplomaticus" in the "Standard," 
 there was an article in the " Standard," and we know not 
 what other anonj^mous paper or two, written by some, we do 
 not use the word in any offensive sense, literary hack or 
 other performing his morning's task. This is Sir Charles 
 Dilke's view of public opinion. There are two authorities 
 to whom we at present and in the first instance propose to 
 appeal against him. The first is that masterly statement in 
 the first volume of Kinglake's "Crimea," of the way in which 
 action and reaction set in, in public opinion in England. 
 Such nothings as those of which Sir Charles speaks almost 
 always catch some back current of the uninformed public 
 
 * This phrase, it will be remembered, was used by French statesmen in 
 reference to the power of China, before Tonquiu taught a different 
 lesson. 
 
1 1 2 Germany, France, and Belgitivi. 
 
 mind. We cannot believe that the influence of a man, no 
 matter how able he may be, writing anonymously, as Sir 
 Charles Dilke did, in a magazine, is so great that he has 
 power to evoke immediately an informed and final express- 
 ion of the purpose and will of England. England is a great 
 country, and before its mind is definitely declared, some 
 precedent thrashing out of a question is needed. The ma- 
 terials for forming its judgment must be laid before it. We 
 feel very little doubt that Sir Charles Dilke did good ser- 
 vice in raising the question. We disbelieve that he has re- 
 ceived the final answer, which will be given when all the 
 data have been laid before those from whom England learns 
 to judge of war and politics. We prefer to believe with 
 Lord Salisbury that the determination of what England will 
 do in the future is to be judged rather by the whole course 
 of past English history and politics than by chance opinions 
 of a particular politician. 
 
 Let us then hear how English feeling was actually ex- 
 pressed when the question last came before it. Lord Gran- 
 ville was at the time our foreign minister. It happened, 
 therefore, that the following scene took place in the House 
 of Lords. It would not have mattered at the time in what 
 assembly of Englishmen the question had been raised, the 
 result would have been the same 
 
 Lord Russell had just declared in relation to the defence 
 of Belgium, "that it was impossible to conceive a more spe- 
 cific and defined obligation than ours. We are bound to 
 defend Belgium." Other speakers on both sides of the 
 House had spoken in the same tone. In reply: "With the 
 general and enthusiastic cheers of the House, Lord Gran- 
 ville made the required declaration. ' I venture,' he said, 
 * to state most positively, that her Majesty's government is 
 not unaware of the duty which this country owes to the in- 
 dependence and neutralit}' of Belgium; ' and, ' I trust that, 
 whatever may be the opinion of individual members of this 
 House, your lordships will not believe that when once we 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 113 
 
 have made a clear intimation of our intentions in any respect 
 anything will prevent us from adhering scrupulously to the 
 position we have taken,'" 
 
 We confess that the wording of Lord Granville's speech 
 seems to us to put the matter on grounds which would make 
 us very unwilling to believe that England would easily 
 abandon a duty of such distinct obligation as this. Observe 
 the indignant repudiation of the idea that an English govern- 
 ment could be supposed to be guilty of such treachery ; the 
 implied sense not only of the whole House, but of the en- 
 tire country, that, however unpleasant the duty, it was one 
 that we could not shirk.* We can only suppose that the 
 sense of helplessness in presence of the great forces of the 
 Continent has in the minds of some writers engendered the 
 idea that we cannot attempt to fulfill a plain international 
 duty. For our own part we believe that the Sibyl will be 
 inexorable, and will demand a higher price, and offer less 
 for it, every time that we refuse to pay what she asks as the 
 condition of empire. Both France and Germany are only 
 too anxious that they should have data on which they can 
 depend, and would welcome our boldly insisting on the sa- 
 credness of the soil of Belgium. Indeed, according to the 
 "conclusion" of Sir Charles Dilke's now published volume, 
 he has been severely handled in France, because of the curi- 
 ously false reading of his articles that he himself advocated 
 the abandonment of Belgium. Certainly a previous an- 
 
 * As a study of controversial method, it is worth noticing that Sir 
 Charles Dilke's reference to this passage is to say that I "quoted Lord 
 Russell against him." It will be seen that the reference to Lord Russell 
 is most casual, merely in order to lead up to Lord Granville's speech in 
 behalf of Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet, given "with the general and enthusias- 
 tic cheers of the House," and expressly cited as an illustration of the uni- 
 versal feeling of the country. Sir Charles Dilke, however, could, under 
 present circumstances, afford to sneer at Lord Russell, not at Lord Gran- 
 ville, hence this method of citation. 
 
1 1 4 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 nouncement of our intention to play so paltry a part would 
 help to bring about the evil. 
 
 V. The French and German Armies of to-day. When, 
 apart from the mere question of frontier, we balance or at- 
 tempt to balance the present forces of Germany and France 
 the problem is a far more difficult and more complex one. 
 On the one hand, seventeen years is a long period in the 
 history of armies. It is the period between the Napoleon 
 of 1798 and the Napoleon of Waterloo. It is the period be- 
 tween the Prussia of the " Political Capitulation of Olmiitz" 
 and Prussia of Sadowa. It is ten years more than the period 
 between the collapse of the Prussian mobilization of 1859 and 
 the mobilization which overthrew the German Confedera- 
 tion. As far, therefore, as time is concerned, there is no 
 reason whatever why the weights should not have changed 
 in the scales. The power of armies is a thing which cannot 
 be gauged by any sight. Moreover, the seventeen years that 
 have passed have strangely enough just added those years 
 to the age of the elderly men who commanded the German 
 armies in 1870, and have left them still in authority. Unless 
 we are much misinformed, a tendency of this kind towards 
 a too great senility has to some extent tended to invade all 
 ranks of officers. Few things are more ruinous to the effi- 
 ciency of an army. Indeed, if the German army had been 
 like the Prussia of Frederick the Great, or the France of 
 Napoleon, or even the English army of Wellington, resting 
 on the traditions of a great name, we should, from analogy, 
 incline to suspect that the chances of its having suffered 
 very seriously in efficiency from the lapse of time were very 
 strong indeed. But the peculiarity of the campaign of 1870 
 was that, able leader as Von Moltke showed himself, it was 
 not he who won most of the battles. It was the German 
 army. Mr. Hooper, to whose work we have already refer- 
 red, has admirably pointed out both the dangers and the 
 power which attended the mode in which the Germans 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. 115 
 
 fought their battles. The risks which would have been run by 
 them if the numbers and other conditions had been anything 
 like equal, are beyond dispute. But for all that, the trained 
 habit of war, the knowledge how to act together in emergen- 
 cies, the mutual confidence, represented a force of its kind 
 unique and new. Some approach to it existed formerly in 
 our own army in the Peninsula. But the conditions of 1870 
 demanded a far freer exercise of individual initiative than 
 was ever possible before. Hence one may almost say that 
 it was the engrained habits or custom of the German 
 army which won the war, or at least gave to the Germans the 
 marvelous power they developed. Now there are few things 
 in the world more permanent than custom. We incline, 
 therefore, to believe that the ef^ciency of the German army 
 is likely to be maintained for a longer time than has usually 
 happened where armies formed under the ideas of a great 
 leader have rusted during a long peace, and have gradually 
 mistaken forms for the spirit which once animated them. 
 That certainly is a danger for the German army, but we do 
 not think that it has yet affected it. The conviction which 
 we feel in looking at a set of German soldiers at work is still 
 always that whatever has to be done is done with absolute 
 thoroughness and efificiency. 
 
 On the other side, we-cannot persuade ourselves that 
 all the gaseous froth which has attended the career of Gen- 
 eral Boulanger was precisely the thing that was wanted to 
 give efficiency to the French army. To take a small point. 
 There was a great flourish of trumpets a little time ago as 
 to the supply to the French army of magazine rifles. So far 
 as we can ascertain, few divisions have actually received 
 them. Meantime, beyond all doubt and question, the Ger- 
 man government, which has talked as little as possible about 
 the matter, has been steadily proceeding with the actual 
 armament. In the same way, everywhere one gets a sense 
 that the French will have talked of a good deal more than 
 they have done, and that the Germans will have done a 
 
Ii6 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 good deal more than they have talked about. That affects 
 largely the question even of the armed forces that will re- 
 spectively be put into the field. 
 
 The grand French total shows, on paper, a force of 
 646,000 odd more than the German, — the German total being 
 2,075,000, the French 2,721,000.* If a great leader, capable 
 of awakening the enthusiasm of the French, should arise, 
 there is of course, no calculating what influence that fact 
 might have on the future war ; but that at present the gen- 
 eral temper of the French army, and more especially of the 
 territorial army, represents the same high condition as the 
 German, we cannot persuade ourselves. Probably the ter- 
 ritorial army is now better in hand than were those Gardes 
 Mobiles who surprised MacMahon by demanding to be sent 
 back to Paris instead of towards Berlin; but with such an 
 enormous operation to be' carried out, as is represented by 
 the mobilization, the very numbers that will come to hand 
 must depend on the discipline of men scattered all over the 
 country. We cannot satisfy ourselves that the indications 
 are that the discipline of the French army is in a satisfac- 
 tory condition. That, with such elaborate preparations as 
 the French have made, the war would be a very different 
 one from that of 1870, we have no doubt; but that at pres- 
 ent the German army would still be able to give a good ac- 
 count of the French we feel tolerably certain. The element 
 of self confidence, so necessary to the French, which made 
 the French Guards, always accustomed to victory, go for- 
 ward with such power during the 1870 campaign^ has dis- 
 appeared. The French are always talking to persuade them- 
 selves that they are as good or better than the Germans. 
 The talk sounds hollow. It has not in it that kind of a ring 
 which presages victory. The Germans have acquired a calm 
 
 * This is balanced by ihe new German bill. 
 
Germany, France, and Belgium. I17 
 
 confidence which they did not possess at the beginning of 
 1870. 
 
 We must leave for our two next articles an examination 
 of the bearing of these remarks upon the general question 
 of the balance of power as it affects ourselves. It will be 
 necessary to consider, first, the Russo-German frontiers and 
 their effect on possible war. 
 
 Note. — A courteous and friendly critic of our last article 
 in the "St. James Gazette," suggests a doubt whether it was 
 not Sir Arthur Otway, and not Mr. Bright, who caused the re- 
 moval of the term the "balance of power in Europe" from 
 the Mutiny Act. We are grateful to him for giving us an 
 excuse for citing a rather curious and interesting piece of 
 historical evidence from a friend who, on the appearance of 
 the last article, wrote to us, — "It may interest you to know 
 that I happened to be in the speakers gallery of the House 
 of Commons when Mr. Bright came to speak to a friend of 
 his who was sitting near me, and said to him, 'Do you know, 
 I have just found out the oddest thing in the world? Would 
 you believe that they have retained to this year the state- 
 ment that our army is maintained "for the preservation of 
 the balance of power in Europe ? " ' They both laughed, 
 and next year the words disappeared from the Army List." 
 
 Our own statement was founded upon a letter from Mr. 
 Bright to a friend which we well remember to have seen pub- 
 lished at the time. We do not remember the exact part which 
 Sir Arthur Otway may have played in the matter, but that the 
 Cabinet Minister whose action determined the ch^ange was 
 Mr. Bright, we believe to be beyond dispute. 
 
 We do not know whether it is necessary to point out to 
 more than one reader of our last article, that we certainly 
 did not say that Mr. Bradlaugh was the author of the very 
 ancient form of adjuration "By Jingo;" but that we did say 
 that he invented the political nickname " A Jingo," " The 
 
ii8 Germany, France, and Belgium. 
 
 Jingoes," founding it upon the then popular song in which 
 the ancient adjuration appeared. As a correspondent of the 
 "Glasgow Herald" thinks that he has disposed of our state- 
 ment by quoting from "Bombostes Furioso" the oath, we 
 may say, first, that he might have seen from our own article 
 that the use of the oath in the popular song preceded Mr. 
 Bradlaugh's use of the political nickname; and, secondly, 
 that the antiquity of the oath runs many centuries back be- 
 fore "Bombastes Furioso." Our assertion as to the author- 
 ship of the nickname has not been challenged, because it 
 could not be. 
 
Ill, 
 GERMANY, RBSSIA, ANB AUSTRIA, 
 
GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND AUSTRIA. 
 
 It happened to the present writer to be in Paris almost 
 immediately after the fall of the Commune in 1871. Both 
 then and at a rather later period, while M. Thiers was still 
 the ruling power of France, he was staying with French 
 friends who had means of knowing what the private views 
 and private conversation of that veteran statesman were. 
 Again and again he was assured that M. Thiers was bent 
 upon preparing France to be ready for two events— the 
 death of the present Emperor of Germany, and the death of 
 the then Tzar. There is surely something pathetic in the 
 case. The one factor of which elderly men seem never to 
 take account is the uncertainty of the space within which 
 they can expect to exercise a determining influence on events. 
 M. Thiers, in the course of nature, has gone to his rest; 
 Alexander the emancipator has been removed by a violent 
 death; but the great German ruler still survives, seventeen 
 years from the time when M. Thiers was counting upon his 
 great age as an element of hope for France. Nevertheless 
 the soundness of M.Thiers' analysis of the European situa- 
 tion is vindicated by the relation to one another in which 
 the Powers stand to-day. It is on the life of the present 
 Emperor of Germany that the peace of Europe hangs. 
 
 It remains to be seen how far M. Thiers' calculation 
 will prove itself true, that the personal antagonism between 
 the present Tzar and the Crown Prince of Germany may be 
 securely relied upon to bring about a Russo-German war. 
 It looks at the present moment as if peace were almost as 
 
122 Ger^nany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 much imperilled by the uncertainty of his life as by the un- 
 certainty of that of the Emperor. The present Tzar has at 
 least shown clearly enough, in his dealings with Prince 
 Alexander of Battenberg, that such personal considerations 
 profoundly affect his policy. Again, it is at least certain 
 that.anxious as the German statesmen are for permanent 
 peace, if that be possible, it is to the securing of peace dur- 
 ing the lifetime of the present Emperor that all their present 
 efforts are directed. A truce dependent on the life of a man 
 of the Emperor's age can scarcely be one of great length, as 
 time is reckoned in the history of nations. It can hardly, 
 therefore, be without interest, even as a question of the im- 
 mediate future of European policy, to consider the condi- 
 tions under which the two great empires must engage if 
 they should ever meet in arms. For reasons on the face of 
 facts, on which we shall have occasion to enlarge presently, 
 the matter is one of vital importance to ourselves. We 
 have spoken of the characteristics of both armies already. 
 We propose therefore, now to consider the nature of the 
 operations which the frontiers of the two Powers will impose 
 upon either army in defence or offence. 
 
 I. The German and Russian Frontiers. The superiority 
 of the German military frontier on the Russian side is much 
 more obvious than it is on the French. It has been elabor- 
 ately discussed ; and we do not know, at all events, any 
 opinions which have been given, unless it be in some chauv- 
 inist Russian newspaper, in favor of the superior advantages 
 of the Russian frontier over the German, so long, that is, as 
 Austria and Germany are in alliance. The importance how- 
 ever, of the Austro-German frontier to Germany, in the 
 event of a war with Russia, is so great that, if it were on 
 that account alone, it would seem to be a certainty that 
 Germany must fight to save Austria from destruction.* 
 
 * The recent publication of the treaty of 1879 does not leave much 
 doubt on this point now. It was hotly contested by Sir C. Dilke. 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 123 
 
 During the last seven years, Russia has certainly done 
 rather more than Germany to improve her position on her 
 eastern frontier. She has made Warsaw into a great in- 
 trenched camp. She has greatly increased the defences 
 of Ivangorod (or Demblin), of Modlin (or Novo-Georgie- 
 visk), of Goniondz (Sperfort), of Kovno, and of Lutzk. She 
 has increased the number of her railways running into Po- 
 land, and has made lines running towards Kholm and Rovno, 
 which would facilitate the supply of an army on the Aus- 
 trian frontier. Meantime Germany, beyond completing 
 what she had been engaged upon since 1870, and in addi- 
 tion, what may be looked upon as ordinary fortress repairs, 
 has only perfected her railway system along the Polish fron- 
 tier, where it was defective before. But nothing has been 
 done on either side substantially to alter the balance of ad- 
 vantage as to the frontiers which existed in 1879. At the 
 end of that year, two papers, giving each an elaborate study 
 of the military frontiers of the two countries, were publish- 
 ed, one by a German ofificer, under the title of " Die Befes- 
 tigung und Vertheidigung der Deutsch-Russischen Grenze 
 der Deutschen Armee dargestellt von einem Deutschen Offi- 
 zier"* (The Fortification and Defence of the Russo-German 
 
 * Of which a new editiou has been published this year. We refer in 
 the text to these only, because they are probably the most accessible and 
 most complete statements of the facts. The number of articles that 
 have appeared on the subject is legion. A very elaborate and careful 
 study of the Polish theatre of war, ' 'Skizzen aus dem europaischen Russ- 
 land," has been published by Captain Janki, professor at the Metz War 
 School. It is, however, too full of detail for general readers. Among 
 periodical papers, two interesting articles appeared in the "Augsburg 
 Gazette," 21st and 22nd March 1882, and another in the "Golos," 8th No- 
 vember. 1880. A scheme of invasion of Russia by "Sarmaticus," and a 
 review of this in the ' 'Novoe Vremia" of April 1886, are among the most 
 recent. We have been indebted to Captain A'Court of the Rifle Brigade, 
 who has been for a long time a careful student of the Russian army, for 
 drawing our attention to these. The most valuable study of the Austro- 
 Russian frontier was that of the late General Haymerl^. Marga's study, 
 to which Sir C. Dilke refers, seems to have been based on Haymerl^'s 
 lectures. 
 
124 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 Frontier, reviewed for the benefit of the German army, by a 
 German officer) — and another by an Austrian officer, Cap- 
 tain Kirchhammer, "Deutschlands Nordost-Grenze" (The 
 North-Eastern Frontier of Germany). The substance of 
 both of them was translated in 1880 by Sir Lumley Graham, 
 and appears in the Journal of the United Service Institution 
 Vol. xxiv. Any one who desires to make a fuller study of 
 the subject, and to understand in detail the grounds we have 
 for the opinions we have expressed in our first article as to 
 the superior strength of the German frontier, cannot do bet- 
 ter than refer to that paper. The substantial facts of the 
 case have not been changed in any material degree, except 
 as to the section on Russian fortifications, which requires 
 the modifications we have given, and except, further, that a 
 certain number of the Russian lines which were then single 
 have been doubled. The discussion is so sound and able 
 that it would not be easy to improve upon it. Naturally 
 the Austrian officer is rather more anxious than the German 
 to insist on the importance to Germany of the alliance of 
 Austria; but the German admits this also, and there can be 
 very little question that substantially Captain Kirchham- 
 mer's views are correct. 
 
 We should observe, to begin with, that the Russian rail- 
 ways which have been added since 1880, as well as the old 
 ones, are very different from the German lines. If as many 
 as four trains travel over the most important lines in the 
 day, it represents their full number. Bradshaw does not 
 acknowledge some of the smaller lines, and gives only two 
 trains a day for others. Curiously enough, for a country 
 like Russia, few of the railways belong to the government. 
 Altogether, the staff that is kept up on them is in no way 
 adapted to undertake the charge of great movements of 
 troops by rail, and their entraining and detraining arrange- 
 ments are naturally on a scale proportioned to their normal 
 wants. Railways under these circumstances are amazingly 
 slow in the dispatch of great numbers of men. On the 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 125 
 
 other hand, it must be recognized that Russia maintains 
 permanently during peace an enormous body of troops in 
 Poland at all times. Her doing so, however, seems to sug- 
 gest that she has some fear lest, if she did not sit pretty 
 heavily on the supposed corpse of poor Poland, it might 
 give signs of having been prematurely buried. For our 
 own part, we are disposed to believe, with Sir Charles Dilke, 
 that no great Polish forces will ever again fight in arms 
 against Russia. Nevertheless, those who most nearly watch 
 the ancient kingdom are convinced that a hostile army 
 would find within it a population by no means so patrioti- 
 cally disposed to resist attack upon Russia, as, let us say, 
 the inhabitants of Moscow. If Warsaw is ever set on fire to 
 expel an army engaged in the invasion of Russia, the fire 
 will not have been ignited by the citizens. 
 
 A very interesting paper, by Karl Blind, which appear- 
 ed in the "Fortnightly Review" for August, offers striking 
 evidence against the current theory to which Sir Charles 
 Dilke has given his support, that the anti-Russian element 
 in Poland is purely that of a small aristocratic class. It 
 would be scarcely possible to have evidence which throws 
 more light from within the revolutionary circles on a very 
 obscure part of history. Karl Blind distinctly alleges that 
 the last Polish revolt was essentially a popular one. He 
 further shows that the agrarian arrangements, which are as- 
 sumed by Sir Charles Dilke to have made revolt against 
 Russia for the future impossible, were, in fact, initiated by 
 the National Junto, were at first opposed by Russia, and 
 were only accepted by her as ultimately inevitable. If the 
 popular memory of these facts is as vivid as popular tradi- 
 tion is apt to be, they are an element that must not be ig- 
 nored in the political balance of Eastern Europe. Further- 
 more, Karl Blind offers some evidence to show that even in 
 1864 the Poles themselves recognized that Prussian Poland 
 had become essentially German. Prussia has no longer any 
 interest in checking Polish discontent against Russia. 
 
126 Germany^ Russia, ctHd Austria. 
 
 These considerations are of importance, because, 
 throughout almost its entire length, the frontier of Russia, 
 which marches with that of Germany, is the frontier of Po- 
 land. In all discussions on the invasion of Russia by Ger- 
 many, it is assumed that Poland will be the object of Ger- 
 man attack. In the discussion of Russian invasion of Ger- 
 many, in addition to that of advance from Poland, there is 
 another possible line, the existence of which is of great im- 
 portance to England, because it shows how, in the event of 
 actual war between the two great empires, England might 
 afford the most material assistance to Germany. We do 
 not think that our military judgment is affected by this fact; 
 but it has always seemed to us that the line of invasion 
 which would be most advantageous for Russia would be 
 that across the Niemen, and by the line of the Baltic. For, 
 as the "German officer" says, "the Russian fleet would com- 
 pletely command the sea, and would have access to numer- 
 ous good harbors." 
 
 The powerful defences which have been erected bj'^ 
 Prussia in the extreme north angle of the kingdom along 
 the Baltic, would be very difficult to take by a Russian army 
 which was not supported by a fleet having complete com- 
 mand of the sea. For the works of Memel, Pillau, and 
 Konigsberg, together with the two arms of the sea known as 
 "Haffs," and the rivers which run into them, form together 
 one vast fortress of which Konigsberg is the key. Konigs- 
 berg cannot be invested till the invader has forced the en- 
 trance of the " Frisches Plaff," which enables Konigsberg to 
 maintain communication with Danzig. Supported by a 
 powerful fleet, the advance could ultimately be made. So 
 advancing, a Russian army would be striking straight for 
 the line of communications of any German army that should 
 attempt to invade Poland. It would be directly covering 
 its own communications, and could fall back at once if men- 
 aced by superior force. Nevertheless, even by this line the 
 difficulties that it would have to encounter in the fortresses 
 
Gertnany, Russia, and Austria. 127 
 
 we have named, and in Danzig, Graudenz, and Thorn, on the 
 line of the Vistula, are sufficiently serious. 
 
 We have spoken first of this line because it is to some 
 extent external to the question of attack against or from 
 Poland, which would, we believe we may say with certainty, 
 be the direction taken by any German invasion of Russia. 
 
 The general form of the frontier of Poland "at first sight 
 would appear to give Russia great offensive power." We 
 purposely quote these words from Sir Lumley Graham, be- 
 cause we cannot help believing that they exactly represent 
 the semblance of advantage which has, in our judgment, de- 
 ceived Sir Charles Dilke as to the relative power for offence 
 and defence represented by the two frontiers. We can hard- 
 ly put the matter better than Sir Lumley has done in these 
 words: " No one can look at the map of Europe without 
 being struck by the extraordinary configuration of the Rus- 
 so-German frontier, which is identical with that established 
 in 1815 between Prussia and Russia, and the outline of which 
 was determined by historical rather than by geographical 
 considerations. The old kingdom of Poland, which has since 
 181 5 formed part of the dominions of the Czar, is driven 
 like a huge wedge (200 miles in thickness) into the body of 
 Germany within 200 miles of its heart (Berlin); while the 
 advanced provinces of Germany enfold Russian Poland like 
 two mighty arms; the left and longer one (East Prussia) 
 extending some 200 miles; the right one (Silesia) some 70 
 miles behind its foremost point, the latter arm being pro- 
 longed for a further distance of nearly 200 miles by the Aus- 
 trian province of Galicia. The extremity of Germany's 
 longer arm is, however, not less than 500 or 600 miles from 
 the heart of Russia, whether you consider that heart to be 
 St. Petersburg or Moscow." 
 
 But long before "Prussia" had become "Germany," her 
 statesmen had fully realized the danger which thus existed 
 for them. Humble as Prussia was to Russia, her deliverer, 
 
128 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 for many years subsequent to 1815, she steadily pursued the 
 course of securing her frontier by every means which art 
 could devise. Of late years her plans have been carried out 
 so systematically that it is not surprising that since 1880 she 
 has rested content with things as they were, only complet- 
 ing characteristically enough her railway system. 
 
 For essentially, as on her western so on her eastern 
 frontier, it is on the threefold power of rapid mobilization, 
 of rapid and perfect railway transport, and of fortresses 
 which would enable her active army in the field to manoeu- 
 vre in every direction with advantage, that she depends. As 
 against France so against Russia, she possesses the advan- 
 tages of a natural frontier so fortified by art that her army 
 can at pleasure rapidly develop its force for striking into the 
 heart of the enemy's country, or can fall back upon a power- 
 ful river of which she commands all the passages, with the 
 option of holding or destroying those she pleases. As 
 against France so against Russia, her striking offensive point 
 is pushed far out beyond the great defensive fortress river- 
 line. 
 
 To make clear the nature of these positions, let us now 
 go rather more into detail. The province of East Prussia, 
 which is wedged in between Poland and the Baltic, is cover- 
 ed all along its southern frontier, which faces Poland, by a 
 series of lakes and marshes. Movement is here, as in Po- 
 land, much restricted by the nature of the country, which 
 makes transport very difficult, except by the best roads. 
 The two great highways are held by Germany at Lotzen and 
 Osterode ; though acting on the same principle as she has 
 adopted on her French frontier, she no longer maintains 
 Osterode as a fortress. Thorn on the Vistula, just inside 
 the Prussian frontier, was, by works completed in 1880, 
 made into a great intrenched camp, with five great forts on 
 the right bank and three on the left. Thorn commands not 
 only the Vistula, but its tributary the Drewenz, which runs 
 from the lakes to fall into the Vistula just south of Thorn. 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 129 
 
 The Drewenz forms for a considerable distance the frontire 
 line. Behind all this frontier, Prussia has now a complete 
 railway line covered by the Drewenz, the fortresses, and the 
 lakes. Four great railways converge on Thorn, giving com- 
 munication with the interior of Germany, forward along the 
 frontier into East Prussia, south-westward around the west- 
 ern frontier of Poland, and northward behind the Vistula. 
 Thorn also covers one of the only four Russian railways 
 which meet the German lines. Only one Russian railway 
 crosses the Vistula at Warsaw ; one branch along the right 
 bank crosses the German frontier near Mlava, one, after the 
 crossing, towards Thorn, while the third runs completely 
 south towards Myslovitz, at the extreme south point of the 
 common Polish and German frontier. The fourth line over 
 the frontier is that from Goniondz to Lotzen. On the other 
 hand, Germany has complete communication from the in- 
 terior to that part of the Vistula which forms the border 
 line of the province of East Prussia, and her railways pass 
 thence into the province from Graudenz and Marienburg, 
 two fortified bridge-heads, while Thorn and Danzig are the 
 great fortress barriers which secure it on right and left. 
 
 Looking now along the frontier south-westwards from 
 Thorn. Posen on the Wartha has been converted since 1870 
 into a great intrenched camp of the first class, with eleven 
 detached forts. It is about forty miles from the point of 
 the Russian frontier which juts farthest into Germany. Six 
 lines of railway unite here. Next to Posen lies Glogau, a 
 strong bridge-head on the Oder. These form the advanced 
 German fortresses towards Russia. Behind them lies Kiis- 
 trin, commanding the junction of the Oder and the Netze, 
 the favorite type of a site for a great German fortress, be- 
 cause an enemy cannot invest such a one without dividing 
 his army into three sections, each liable to separate attack. 
 
 The whole of the country to the south of Thorn, Posen, 
 and Kiistrin is interlaced with very numerous railways, 
 which would permit the transfer of Prussian forces in any 
 
130 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 direction along the frontier ; but as a direct advance east- 
 wards upon Poland would never, for reasons we shall pres- 
 ently note, be the most favorable direction for German at- 
 tack, hardly any of these railways have been led up to the 
 frontier line. 
 
 Let us now look across the border at the condition of 
 Poland itself. The peculiarity of the ground lies in this, 
 that it is a vast plain, cut off from the great mass of Russia 
 by the enormous Pinsk Marshes. Of the defence of the 
 kingdom, and of its general military power, Warsaw is the 
 center. Unquestionably, the recent adaptation to modern 
 war of the Warsaw works, and the fortifications of Novo- 
 Georgievisk, have added greatly to the merely defensive 
 strength of this base. The position at Ivangorod makes the 
 whole of this line of the Russian Vistula strong, so far as the 
 completeness of the fortresses is concerned; but the defect 
 of the base as such is well expressed by the " German offi- 
 cer" when, after speaking of a number of Russian railway 
 projects, which, though their proposal was already of old 
 standing seven years ago, have not been carried out, he 
 adds: "All these additions, however, will be of little effect 
 from a military point of view upon the utility of the railways 
 west of the Vistula, as long as the passage of this river, and 
 consequently the connection of the railways on its left bank 
 with those from the interior of Russia, is only to be effected 
 by the one bridge at Warsaw. It will be absolutely neces- 
 sary to build several railway bridges over the river before 
 you can calculate upon concentrating a Russian army on the 
 central and southern portions of the German frontier with 
 the speed demanded by the present style of making war." * 
 
 Now, no fresh bridges have been constructed over the 
 Russian part of the Vistula, and the want of manoeuvring fa- 
 cility which this implies, marks the typical difference be- 
 tween the Russian power and the German. Furthermore, a 
 
 * Journal of the United Service Institution, Vol. xxiv, p. 137. 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 131 
 
 direct advance upon Germany westwards would be neces- 
 sary to take advantage of the position which, from the point 
 of view of what Sir Charles Dilke rather happily calls "map- 
 makers' war," looks so valuable for Russia. Of course, if 
 mere distance on a map determined military movements, 
 the thrusting forward of Poland into the heart of Germany 
 ought to give Russia a great opportunity for attack. Direct 
 advance from Warsaw westward is, however, prohibited by 
 the fact that there are no railways in that part of Poland to 
 facilitate supply. Furthermore, the country is so difficult 
 to traverse, that the army that began the march would have 
 dwindled into very different numbers before it had accom- 
 plished it. Finally, from East Prusssia, Germany could, 
 from an amply supplied base, aided by every kind of rail- 
 way facility, strike across the communications of the in- 
 vader. 
 
 It is rather significant that even the "German officer," 
 though he naturally does not enlarge on the subject, assumes 
 as a sine qua non the friendship of Austria, which he regards as 
 an absolute datum. That granted, any attack from the Russian 
 base on the Vistula, passing to the south of Silesia, which 
 must in any case be very eccentric, would be impossible till 
 Austria was conquered. Undoubtedly, on the other hand, 
 with Austria at the feet of Russia, invasion of the southern 
 portion of Silesia would be relatively easy; simply because 
 Prussia, knowing the practical impossibility of direct inva- 
 sion westwards from Poland, has no fortified place in this 
 district south of Glogau, itself little more than a strong 
 bridge-head. Neisse and Glatz, her two southward fortress- 
 es, would be completely out of the line of advance. 
 
 Hence Russian attack from Poland is virtually limited 
 either to a movement upon East Prussia directly northward, 
 which would encounter all the difficulties of the line of the 
 lakes, and be met by a far more rapid German concentra- 
 tion; or along the line of the Vistula, which would have the 
 advantage of that stream for a highway, and be to a large 
 
132 Germany, Russia, and Aiistria. 
 
 extent assisted by two of the lines of railway which run to- 
 wards the frontier. 
 
 But it is against this movement along the Vistula that 
 the German defences are the strongest. The advance along 
 the right bank would meet the defences of the Prussian Vis- 
 tula. Against the movement by the left bank, between 
 Thorn and Posen, a distance of 80 miles, there spread at in- 
 tervals great swampy forests, which would impede move- 
 ment and restrict the invader very closely to the neighbor- 
 hood of the fortresses themselves; while the facilities in 
 rear for Prussian concentration and action are ample — and 
 here, as always, the counterstroke from East Prussia would 
 be an element of danger. The "German officer," rather cy- 
 nically we think, suggests for Russia a double movement — 
 part along the Vistula from Poland, on either the right or 
 left bank, and part by the line we have already referred to 
 as what seems to us the best, that altogether independent 
 of Poland, moving upon Konigsbergand the north from the 
 great Russian depot of Diinaburg and from Vilna. Such an 
 attempt to move in two separate columns, unless each col- 
 umn was in overwhelming force, which, from the nature of 
 the country, would not be easy, must give opportunities to 
 a German general for dealing blows right and left against 
 either army while separated by the lake region of East 
 Prussia. Thus an attack by Russia upon Germany appears 
 to be one which offers every kind of advantage to the Ger 
 mans, either for a prolonged resistance with inferior forces, 
 or if in approximately equal numbers, for striking deadly 
 blows against the invader. 
 
 Unquestionably the character of the Polish region and 
 the neighboring provinces is of a kind that offers also many 
 facilities for pure defensive action to Russia. But it pre- 
 sents none of those combinations which give to the defender 
 the opportunity for counterstrokes against an invader 
 which the German frontier supplies. The province is de- 
 pendent upon its artificial communications by railway with 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 133 
 
 Russia for any rapid reinforcement, because of the difficult 
 country which separates it from the interior. As Captain 
 Kirchhammer says: "The value of these communications 
 as a whole is much weakened by the fact that the two north- 
 ernmost lines are much exposed in consequence of their 
 situation in close vicinity to the German frontier. The Rus- 
 sian base is certainly not well adapted to military require- 
 ments. First of all, it is too narrow in proportion to the ex- 
 tent of the German theatre of war; moreover, it is outflank- 
 ed from the very first; in a word, it is weak." 
 
 In rear of the main defensive line of the Russian Vis- 
 tula stands the very important fortress of Brest Litewsk, 
 which protects the connection of a vast number of railways, 
 and is on the Bug, about no miles east of Warsaw. It is 
 intended to cover the concentration of the Russian forces 
 coming from the various quarters of the empire, whose 
 movements are separated by the great Pinsk Marshes. It 
 seems, however, to us that it would be almost as difficult a 
 task for the Russians to protect from Prussian cavalry the 
 lines of railway which connect Brest Litewsk with Warsaw, 
 as it would be difficult for the Russian cavalry to disturb any 
 of the railway lines which are needed for the German con- 
 centration. This is the more remarkable, because the Prus- 
 sian railways run much more conviently near to the frontier 
 than the Russian. 
 
 So far as the immediate attack of Germany upon Rus- 
 sia is concerned there are no other fortresses that need be 
 taken into account. For of all countries in the world Rus- 
 sia is the last which can safely be attacked by plunging into 
 the depths of "her large and almost impenetrable stretches 
 of marsh and of forest imperfectly supplied with roads." 
 
 "Germany must," as the German officer puts it, "while 
 standing on the defensive, on the eastern frontier of East 
 Prussia, at once take possession of such a large portion of 
 Poland as to cripple the action of Russia on that side." 
 
134 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 "The kingdom of Poland is the most densely populated 
 portion of the Russian empire, and is well adapted, from 
 the nature of the country, for operations on a large scale.* 
 The task, therefore, which would devolve upon a German 
 commander would not be impossible ; and its successful 
 completion, entailing as it would a prolonged occupation of 
 the conquered country, might well lead to the attainment of 
 the object of the war. Otherwise it would remain for the 
 German leader to proceed with his further operations ac- 
 cording to circumstances, his chances of success being much 
 increased in every way by the preliminary occupation of 
 Poland." t 
 
 For this purpose, in a war in which Germany could af- 
 ford to employ her troops in an attack upon Russia, without 
 troubling herself about another enemy, it seems to us that, 
 from the nature of the Russian communications with Po- 
 land, Germany ought almost with certainty to be able, for 
 a time, to isolate the force in Poland before it could receive 
 material reinforcements. That force is undoubtedly large, 
 probably more than twice as large as the army which Ger- 
 many has in the neighboring provinces ready to bring 
 against it. But the conditions of the frontier would make it 
 impossible for it to act against Germany before her mobili- 
 zation was complete. Any premature advance westward or 
 northward would only tend to separate it more from the 
 main Russian army, and to expose its communications more 
 completely to the enemy. Moreover, Russia has taken a 
 precaution which, while it certainly indicates that she is 
 more afraid of attack herself than hopeful of a rapid success 
 from sudden invasion of her neighbors, would seriously inter- 
 
 * An expression which, we must admit, seems to us not to take ade- 
 quate account of Napoleon's great enemy, the Polish mud. Still he cer- 
 tainly did conduct there operations on a large scale. 
 
 t Journal of the United Service Institution, Vol. xxiv. p. 145. 
 
Germany, Rtissia, and Austria. 135 
 
 fere with her throwing her Polish army so quickly across the 
 frontier as to interfere with mobilization. She has taken as 
 the gauge of her railways 5 feet instead of 4 feet 8^ inches, 
 which is the common gauge of Germany, Austria, and the 
 Continent generally. Both she and her neighbors have shift- 
 ing axles provided to overcome the difficulty, but the ex- 
 tent to which they would practically facilitate transport is 
 very uncertain, and they are likely to be better managed by 
 German than by Russian railway engineers. Therefore, 
 under such conditions, the contest would not and could not 
 be between the army of occupation of Poland and the Ger- 
 man peace army. It would be the mobilized German army 
 which would be able to throw itself upon the army in Po- 
 land. If that takes place, we are of the opinion of Captain 
 Kirchhammer, that "the overlapping form of the German 
 base will make any line of operations, having for its object- 
 ive Russian Poland, strategically safe, and will give the 
 commander-in-chief considerable facilities, should he wish 
 to change that line 
 
 "The want of cohesion between Poland and the remain- 
 der of the Russian empire will naturally suggest to the Ger- 
 man general the idea of slipping in between the two, of 
 completely isolating the regions of the Vistula, of over- 
 whelming its garrison, and of preventing the arrival of rein- 
 forcements from the interior. 
 
 " Whether the main German operation should be direct- 
 ed from Posen-Thorn against the triangle Warsaw, Novo- 
 Georgievisk, Serotsk, or from Konigsberg-Lotzen against 
 Brest-Litewsk — whether to play a safe or a bold game — 
 whether to aim at the Russian army or at its communica- 
 tions, — he who has to decide this question must go beyond 
 mere geographical considerations; he must take account of 
 a great mass of circumstances, and above all he must reckon 
 up the armed force which Germany can hurl on Russia. Our 
 rapid survey satisfies us that the northeastern frontier of 
 
136 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 Germany forms an excellent base both for offence and de- 
 fence. 
 
 "The strategist will find in it almost an ideal theatre of 
 war, a field for numerous and varied combinations." * 
 
 An almost similar result would occur if Poland had been 
 so far denuded of troops by the consequences of war else- 
 where as to leave to a portion of the German army the oppor- 
 tunity of striking against it, though the main body of the 
 German forces were otherwise engaged. 
 
 We mention these several cases because it is highly im- 
 probable, in the present condition of European politics, that 
 a war will ever take place in which Germany and Russia will 
 be engaged against one another without allies on either hand. 
 Not only the Prussian frontier but the heart of the Ger- 
 man empire would be open to an attack directed from Rus- 
 sia in possession of a secured hold upon Galicia. This fact, 
 and the isolation in which Germany would be left if Austria 
 was crushed, make it scarcely possible to conceive that Aus- 
 tria will be allowed to be seriously defeated before Germany 
 takes the field. We cannot believe, as Sir Charles Dilke 
 thinks, that Russia would be allowed to wrench Galicia from 
 Austria. Similarly, the very existence of Austria depends 
 on the support of Germany. For though we do not believe 
 that Austrian force is une quantity negligible, we certainly do 
 not think that, taken alone, she is equal in power to Russia; 
 and she knows well that, in the long run, no terms that she can 
 make will prevent Russia from feeling her to be an obstacle 
 in her path, while one most powerful section of her people 
 will resent all terms made with Russia. On the other hand, 
 it needs no prophet to predict that " the Chassepots," or 
 rather now the Lebels, "will go off of themselves," if ever 
 Germany is at war with Russia. 
 
 II. Aiistria. Here, therefore, it becomes important to 
 consider what contribution Austria can at present offer to 
 
 * Journal of the United Service Institution, Vol. xxiv. p. 148. 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 137 
 
 the resistance to Russian aggression. The sketch which Sir 
 Charles Dilke has given of the present weakness of Austria 
 appears to us to be defective in this, that while most that he 
 has said is true as a bare statement of fact, it ignores all the 
 elements which compensate this weakness, and it does not 
 take account of the special character which Austrian resis- 
 tance to Russia would assume. There is no story in the his- 
 tory of the world more remarkable than that of Austria. It 
 is the history of the triumph of diplomacy over war, and 
 yet of a diplomacy dependent always for its power on a cer- 
 tain kind of military strength. To us it seems that though 
 undoubtedly the heterogeneous character of the monarchy, 
 which has always weakened its armies, is more apparent on 
 the surface than ever, yet that, in a contest with Russia 
 which should take place a year or two hence, Austria would 
 be practically stronger than she has been at any time in her 
 history. The Austrian armies have probably sustained more 
 defeats than any other troops in Europe, yet over and over 
 again she, has become the decisive power, whose influence, 
 thrown into the scale, has determined the issue of victorious 
 war. It was her union with the allies that proved fatal to 
 Napoleon in 181 3. Her union with us during the campaigns 
 of Marlborough is connected with some of the most glori- 
 ous periods of our own military history. The power of re- 
 cuperation which she has again and again shown after de- 
 feat has been marvellous. It is no doubt due to the fact 
 that her population, almost entirely agricultural, has always 
 furnished a vast supply of hardy, healthy soldiers; while the 
 masses of her rural folk have, despite the socialism of the 
 towns, been less disposed towards revolutionary changes 
 than any others in Europe.* Patriotism, except in Hun- 
 gary, is no doubt difficult for the inhabitants of the agglom- 
 
 * The tremendous shock which she sustained in 1848 was far more 
 due to a conflict of races than to any insurrectionary tendencies among 
 the masses of the people. 
 
138 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 erate empire. It is hard to know towards what nation their 
 patriotism should be felt. Nevertheless the loyalty of many 
 races — the Tyrolese, for instance — and generally a certain 
 attachment to the Royal house, if it does not supply all the 
 motive power which armies need, saves Austria from many of 
 the risks which some of her neighbors run. It is of no small 
 consequence that all the heterogeneous population feels the 
 Emperor's authority to be essential to them. Certainly 
 those who have most recently been studying the people of 
 Austria are not disposed to think that Russian propagand- 
 ism has made any way even in Bohemia or among the Slave 
 populations. No doubt it is true, as Sir Charles Dilke says, 
 that the difficulties of such an empire are aggravated by the 
 adoption of popular forms of government which tend to give 
 play to jealousies within the empire. But on the other hand, 
 it is well to remember that as long ago at least as the cam- 
 paign of Blenheim, the weakness of Austria against which 
 her enemies directed their efforts, was the hostility of the 
 most warlike section of her people to the Imperial govern- 
 ment. It was precisely in order to give scope to the possi- 
 ble effects of Hungarian insurrection that Louis XIV. plan- 
 ned the scheme of war which was defeated by Marlbor- 
 ough's famous march, of which the great purpose was to 
 save the empire from destruction. Prussia hoped to secure 
 the same advantage in 1866. To-day, amid all the efforts 
 which have been put forth by Austria to prepare for the 
 coming fray, those who have most enthusiastically respond- 
 ed to the call have been the Hungarian subjects of the Kai- 
 ser. The enthusiasm which in Hungary has greeted new ar- 
 rangements of the Landsturm, which have vastly added to 
 the numerical forces at the disposal of the Austrian gener- 
 als, led to officers and men of the army, and to members of 
 the Hungarian Parliament, patiently submitting last year to 
 the drudgery of special military courses, designed for devel- 
 oping the warlike power of a race apt beyond most others 
 in the art. The change which is thus represented, cannot 
 
Germany, Russia, attd Austria. 139 
 
 fail to show itself in fighting efficiency. Never before has 
 Austria entered upon war, with Hungarians passionately en- 
 listed on her side, without Italian regiments ready to lay 
 down the arms of a hated service the moment an oportunity 
 presented itself. Tyrolese and German loyalty is not less 
 than of old. '^ 
 
 Of the fourteen chief races which are included in the 
 Austrian monarchy, it appears to us that a war against Rus- 
 sia will unite at least twelve in more enthusiasm for the 
 cause than has ever been felt in an Austrian struggle before. 
 Only two, the Serbs and the Ruthenians, are both Slaves 
 and of the Greek Church. It is tolerably certain that the 
 bitter persecution of alien religions in Russia will have es- 
 tranged, among several of the other Slave races, such as the 
 Czechs and Croats, any sympathies which race affinities or 
 Slave propagandism may have produced ; while, on all ac- 
 counts, German, Jew, Magyar, Saxon, and Italian have their 
 own special and bitter feud with the Tzar. Therefore, so 
 far as it is possible to judge of such matters by any other 
 test than that of trial, the inner moral weakness which has 
 always hitherto made the magnificent presentments on pa- 
 rade of the Austrian armies a deceptive indication of their 
 strength, seems at least likely to have disappeared. No 
 doubt the discrepancies of language will remain a difficulty; 
 but that is, as compared with the other, a secondary mat- 
 ter.* It is not a little remarkable that one of the earliest 
 protests against the Metternich system in 1848, came from 
 the army, in the form of a pamphlet by an officer, Karl 
 Moring, entitled " Die Sibyllinischen Biicher," in which de- 
 claring that "the Austrian has no fatherland," he pointed 
 out the increased power which would be given to Austria if 
 a more liberal system were introduced. For a very inter- 
 esting account of this incident and its effect, as well as of 
 
 * Only, however, " as compared with the other," I am far from un- 
 derrating its vast importance. 
 
140 Gennany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 the several races of the Austrian empire, in tabular form 
 with their religions, and for another matter which we shall 
 next mention, we may refer our readers to a volume just 
 published on "The Revolutionary Movement of 1848 49 in 
 Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany."* The same author 
 brings out a fact which is of no little importance to our present 
 purpose. It appears that the Bohemian historian Palacky 
 was asked to join the Revolutionary Assembly at Frankfort 
 as representative of Bohemia. He, speaking in the name of 
 his countrymen, protested against their being called upon to 
 send such representatives at all, on two grounds: one, the 
 necessity of an independent Austria as a barrier against 
 Russia; the other, the fact that "Austria, which must neces- 
 sarily remain an empire, could not consent to a close union 
 with " a republican " Germany without breaking to pieces." 
 We venture to commend this statement from a brother his- 
 torian, who may be supposed to know something of the sev- 
 eral races of the empire in which he lived, to Mr. Freeman, 
 apropos of his letters to the "Times" of September 17th and 
 October 15th, 1887. 
 
 It has not been from lack of producing great generals, 
 skilled officers, a perfect discipline, or hardy soldiers, that 
 Austria has so often failed. Wallenstein, Prince Eugene, 
 the Archdukes Charles and Albert, have been leaders of the 
 highest class. But again and again in the past, Court intri- 
 gue has kept the genius from command, and left to the 
 pedant or the beau sabrcur the opportunity to destroy armies 
 that in better hands might have given a different account of 
 their enemies. Both Court intrigue and the exclusiveness 
 of aristocratic privilege are likely to play a much less dan- 
 gerous part in the future than they have done in the past of 
 
 * By C. Edmund Maurice, London; George Bell «feSons, York Street, 
 Covent Garden, 1887. Marga gives a more complete account of the races, 
 but it is not so easily seen at a glance. Oddly enough, the Jews, who 
 number, according to Marga, 1.400,000, are omitted from the book we 
 have referred to it in the text. 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 141 
 
 Austrian history. No doubt it is true, as Mr. Freeman says 
 in the letters to which we have referred, that the Croatians 
 and others of the various peoples ruled over by the Haps- 
 burgs are conscious of claims which have been by no means 
 dealt with in the Austro-Hungarian compact. But, so far 
 as we have been able to ascertain from those who have most 
 recently studied the feeling of these nationalities, they are 
 conscious of the danger of allowing the empire to become 
 a loose bundle of sticks such as Mr. Freeman would desire 
 it to be. They cherish, no doubt, certain sentimental griev- 
 ances; but these are by no means at present likely seri- 
 ously to affect the zeal of men in the ranks. 
 
 Meantime the efforts that have been recently made to- 
 wards developing the numbers and improving the fighting 
 efficiency of the army have been vigorous. It is not easy to 
 ascertain how far the fortresses have been completed. Aus- 
 tria is always in financial difficulties, and fortresses of the 
 modern type are costly luxuries. Cracow (or Krakem) and 
 Przemysl, Olmutz, Komorn, and Pola* in Dalmatia, have all 
 lately been receiving attention, as well as, for southern war, 
 Mostar * in the Herzegovina. It is impossible to say how 
 much may be done, before a war, to render them fit for use 
 under modern conditions, as the works, so far as Austria is 
 able to afford the expense, are now in progress. It is cer- 
 tainly not a little remarkable that Austria, which secured her 
 hold in Italy by one of the most powerful combinations of 
 fortresses ever devised, has never succeeded in completing 
 her defence system as worked out by her own engineers. 
 There is no story to tell of carefully planned artificial im- 
 provements of the natural frontier such as we have given 
 for Prussia. On the other hand, few countries have a more 
 commanding situation naturally than Austria possesses to- 
 wards Russia. The great range of the Carpathians forms 
 for her a kind of natural citadel of which Galicia is the 
 
 * Both Mostar and Pola are beyond the limits of our frontier map. 
 
142 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 glacis. From them she can strike northward into Poland 
 even more easily than Germany can strike south; while her 
 position as against any Russian movement to the south of 
 her empire is so commanding that Russia has never yet ven- 
 tured to attack Turkey without coming to an understanding 
 with her. As against attack, she has the enormous advan- 
 tage that the Russian troops, which are now said to be col- 
 lecting in Poland and the south, could not attack her from 
 these quarters without giving her the opportunity of deal- 
 ing with each of them separately. Any movement of the 
 Russians from Poland, as long as Austria and Germany are 
 in alliance, is seriously affected by the difficulties of passage 
 across the directly western frontier of Poland, which we 
 have described. She must, to attack either Power, move 
 north or south, and therefore expose herself to the risk of 
 attack from the one which is not immediately assailed. 
 
 According to a French officer, who has, in the columns 
 of the "Revue Militaire de I'litranger," been devoting near- 
 ly a year to a statement of the present organization of the 
 Austrian army, the results of which were summed up in the 
 issue for August 30th last, the total infantry of the Imperial 
 Hapsburg army, including standing army, Landwehr and 
 Landstrum, but excluding depots of recruits and untrained 
 men, is now 32,600 officers and 1,380,000 men, the cavalry 
 3,358 officers and 88,263 men. They have also been increas- 
 ing the personnel of their artillery by some 28,000 men. Pro- 
 bably, therefore, including artillery, the numbers may be 
 reckoned at something considerably exceeding a million 
 and a half. For a population of 39 millions odd that is cer- 
 tainly not as formidable a result as either France or Ger- 
 many has produced; but thanks to the recent political act- 
 ion of Russia, very considerable armies may now be reck- 
 oned as added to those which Austria would employ, if the 
 quarrel arose about Russian interference with Bulgaria. It 
 is hardly too much to say that Bulgaria, Roumania, and Ser- 
 via might all in that case be reckoned on to give any sup-' 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 143 
 
 port they could to Austria. The Roumanians showed their 
 efficiency in 1876 by saving the Russians from ignomini- 
 ous disaster, and were rewarded with a treachery which 
 they have not forgotten. The Bulgarians have also shown 
 that they could fight, and the support of a large disciplined 
 army would probably make valuable troops of them all. 
 Together it is believed at present that they could put eight 
 army corps, or say 240,000 men, into the field, without count- 
 ing their troops of second line, the organization of which is 
 by no means complete. 
 
 The Austrian army, as organized for war, would be pro- 
 bably raised to forty-nine divisions of 18,000 each, by help 
 of the new organization. The discrepancy between these 
 figures and those which are represented by the million and 
 a half of trained men whom we have mentioned above, ex- 
 ists in all the armies, whether of Russsia, Germany, or 
 France, in greater or less degree. Thus, out of the German 
 total of two millions, 1,265,746 constitute the field army ; 
 and of the 2,721,000 of the French, 1,211,000 constitute the 
 field army.* An addition to the 882,000, composing the 
 forty-nine Austrian divisions, of the 240,000 men of the 
 three minor states, would raise the Austrian field-army, 
 which compares with these, to about 1,120,000 men. 
 
 It is impossible to estimate what proportion of the Rus- 
 sian nominal grand total of seven millions could actually be 
 moved to attack Austria; but considering the enormous ex- 
 tent of her almost roadless territory, and the proportion 
 
 * The whole character of the French organization has, however, been 
 recently changed. By a law introduced on June 25, 1887, by General 
 Ferron, forty-five battalions have been added to the forces actually with 
 the colors. This has been gained by a sacrifice of all available cadres to 
 such an extent that Frencii critics themselves believe that the mobiliza- 
 tion of all but the first line will be reduced to hopeless confusion. The 
 law took effect from October 1, 1887. It is hardly possible as yet to esti- 
 mate what the result may be. 
 
144 Germany, Russia, and Austna. 
 
 which has always hitherto existed between the paper num- 
 bers of the Russian army and the force it was possible to 
 place in the field, there does not seem to us any reason to 
 believe that the forces which she would actually deliver in 
 the area of war would be practically greater than those which 
 Austria and the minor states would be able to maintain in 
 action. On one side and on the other it will become a 
 question of the numbers that can be fed and supplied with 
 ammunition. That, though it is in part a question of money 
 is by no means altogether so. The numbers that could be 
 supplied from Germany and fed in France afford no means 
 of judging what would be possible for armies dependent 
 upon such railways as Russia possesses. Moreover, the rail- 
 way connection across the border between Russia and Aus- 
 tria is even more slender than it is between Russia and Ger- 
 many. Already there are clear indications that the Rus- 
 sians are finding it impossible to provide for their nominal 
 army sufficient numbers of non-commissioned or commis- 
 sioned officers of even such quality as have hitherto sup- 
 plied her forces. At this moment the Russian infantry has 
 probably the best breech-loader possessed by any army; 
 but by the end of 1888, the Austrian infantry is to be armed 
 throughout with magazine rifles. It may or may not be 
 the case that in all respects magazine rifles are a great im- 
 provement on effective breech-loaders for fighting purposes. 
 What is certain is that the army which does not possess 
 them, and finds itself in the presence of those that do, will 
 be at a great disadvantage as to the morale of the troops. 
 
 We have already in a former article given so fully our 
 easons for distrusting the effect upon the efficiency of the 
 Russian cavalry of the changes which the present Tzar has 
 introduced, that the value of our estimate of the Austrian 
 cavalry must depend on the soundness of that statement, 
 based as it was on authorities taken from every country in 
 Europe. If that contention be right, then we have no hesi- 
 tation in saying that the Austrian cavalry is second to none 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 145 
 
 in Europe. The Austrian artillery has unfortunately been 
 the subject of so many experiments and failures that we 
 confess we are entirely unable to judge of the power it 
 would actually show in war. So far as peace manoeuvres 
 furnish means of judging, it is in a high state of efficiency. 
 
 In discussing the position in which Austria stands to 
 Russia, Sir Charles Dilke has evidently misunderstood Cap- 
 tain Marga. He says: "As a great foreign military writer, 
 Marga, has consolingly observed of Austria-Hungary, in that 
 which is the first of all the military works of the day, 'After 
 several defeats she can retire into the wooded Carpathians;' 
 but he adds, ' The road to Vienna is thus uncovered.'"* 
 But Marga, p. 142, Vol. ii, says this, not in the least in order 
 to show that the Austrian army is likely to be defeated, but 
 in order to defend a proposition that Austria has a much 
 more effective defence against one particular line of Russian 
 attack than that of retiring by the line of the Carpathians. 
 "C'est en s'appuyant sur les principaux cours d'eau, ainsi 
 que sur les places de Cracovie et de Przemysl, que I'Aut- 
 riche chercherait a couvrir la Galicie," is the previous sen- 
 tence. Then he shows that for an Austrian army to fall 
 back on the Carpathians in case of defeat would have the 
 disadvantage of uncovering Vienna, and probably of allow- 
 ing the Russians to break her army in two. This, however, is 
 only to lead up to the argument that, by falling back instead 
 on the San, the Wysloka, and the Donejec, while guarding the 
 carriage roads across the mountains by field fortifications, 
 the Austrian army would completely cover both Vienna and 
 Pesth, and oblige the Russian army to follow its excentric 
 movement. He had already shown that Russian attack by 
 the left of the Vistula, and so on Cracow, would expose the 
 Russian army to the danger of being cut off from Russia by 
 an Austrian army acting along the right bank. The discus- 
 sion throughout tends to give the advantage to Austria be- 
 
 * The Present Position of European Politics, p. 189. 
 
146 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 cause of the formidable Pinsk Marshes, which tell more in 
 favor of Austrian than even of German action. But there is a 
 yet more telling sentence of Marga's, saying that, in order to 
 carry out a march on Vienna, Russia "must be very sure of 
 the neutrality of Germany." Sir Charles thinks he has dis- 
 posed of this awkward phrase, which he does not quote, by 
 adding, " Neither can Germany be trusted to defend Vienna 
 by menacing the long line of the Russian advance; because 
 when Germany ceases to be neutral, the neutrality of France 
 in turn will cease^ and Germany will have enough to do to 
 defend the Rhine." * Is that so? That is just what we pro- 
 pose to consider next We may, however, observe in pass- 
 ing, that the number of troops is not very great that are re- 
 quired to cause the collapse of an army which has commit- 
 ted itself to a long line of advance, open to attatk through- 
 out its length by fresh forces acting at right angles to it. 
 Russia learnt that both in Asia and in Europe in 1878. It 
 seems hardly conceivable that Sir Charles Dilke will lull 
 her into repeating, by a march on Vienna exposed to the 
 possible attacks of a hostile Germany, even though engaged 
 against France, the mistakes of the march on the Balkans 
 and the march on Erzeroum. We may safely assume that 
 Bayazid and Plevna are names too deeply burnt into Rus- 
 sian souls for that. If that is so. Sir Charles Dilke's whole 
 theory of the political balance, with Austria forced to rest 
 on Italy, tumbles like a house of cards touched at its base. 
 
 III. The position of Germany in a war with both Riissia 
 and France combined. We now propose to consider the cir- 
 cumstances of vantage and of disadvantage which tiie two 
 frontiers of Germany and of her neighbors, and the nature of 
 her whole defensive and offensive strength, present to an 
 alliance against her of France and of Russia. That she 
 would stand alone, we disbelieve ; that it is in our interest, 
 
 * The Present Position of European Politics, p. 189. 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. I4,y 
 
 or in that of Europe, that she and Austria should together 
 stand alone against Russia and France, it will be one of the 
 special purposes of our next article to deny. But it is im- 
 portant to realize what the forces will be that will be brought 
 into the issue by the Power against whom the Franco-Rus- 
 sian alliance, if it ever becomes a fact, will be in the first in- 
 stance directed. 
 
 Undoubtedly an examination of the German methods of 
 national defence must, we think, leave one impression at 
 least upon any of our readers who have realized them as we 
 have laid them before them. They are pre-eminently bold. 
 On both frontiers alike her most effective defence depends 
 on her power of being able to strike offensive blows at the 
 outset of a campaign. Has she the strength, and dare she 
 attempt, to strike offensive blows on both sides of her great 
 empire, at once against two such adversaries as Russia and 
 France ? We answer that it is morally certain that her 
 rulers will be much too wise to carry on two long offensive 
 campaigns at both ends of her empire at the same time. But 
 there are offensive strokes like that which Napoleon attempt- 
 ed against the Anglo-allied and Prussian armies during the 
 Waterloo campaign, which are only intended to knock out 
 of time one assailant before another can come on. It ap- 
 pears to us that the central position of the German empire, 
 guarded on either frontier by the fortified rivers of the 
 Rhine on one side, and of the Vistula and Oder on the 
 other, with the advanced post of Metz thrust out beyond the 
 mountain barrier of the Vosges on one side, and the arm of 
 East Prussia stretched out along the kingdom of Poland on 
 the other, offers opportunities to a great strategist that are 
 even more "ideal" than those which Captain Kirchhammer 
 has so described. War nowadays has indeed come to be 
 waged on a colossal scale; but there are possibilities in- 
 volved in the possession by Germany of a middle position 
 covered with a most perfect and carefully devised railway 
 system, and a telegraph network as complete, which stagger 
 
148 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 one as to the terrible grandeur of the drama which may be 
 enacted by their means almost under our eyes. In a time 
 far shorter than it took Napoleon to transfer his force from 
 Boulogne to Ulm and Austerlitz, far shorter than it took 
 Marlborough to carry out that magnificent campaign from 
 which Napoleon, in all probability, took the idea which roll- 
 ed up the map of Europe for ten years, a German army 
 might be nowadays transferred from the Rhine to the Vis- 
 tula, or from Konigsberg to Metz. Under given conditions, 
 such a transfer of men from one side of Europe to the other 
 might be made without any knowledge of the movement 
 reaching either of the hostile armies, until one that had been 
 advancing triumphantly was crushed by the new and over- 
 whelming power suddenly thrown into the field, and till the 
 other had lost the opportunity afforded by the diminution 
 of force. For, though the two frontiers of Germany are 
 specially fitted for offensive action, both are adapted also to 
 afford means to a comparatively inferior force for imposing 
 delay on one very superior. The difficult country of West- 
 ern Poland, the lakes and the shallow /la^s of East Prussia, 
 the swampy forests between the Wartha and the upper Vis- 
 tula, the marshy region of the Obra in the province of Posen, 
 the Polish mud which bothered Napoleon, the strong de- 
 fences of Thorn and of Posen, the broad Vistula directly in- 
 tercepting a Russian march through Prussia, as it does not 
 intercept a Prussian stroke against the Russian communica- 
 tions with Poland, will be inconvenient obstacles for those 
 Russian generals, " who," as the "German officer" has it, 
 "after sharing many a disillusion during the late Russo-Turk- 
 ish war, may wish to satisfy their ardent thirst for glory at 
 the expense of Germany, but who might possibly find out 
 by experience that it is more difificult to gain their object in 
 a war against that power than even in one against Turkey." 
 The difficulties of the Vosges, the passage of the Rhine, the 
 siege of Metz or Strasbourg, may delay the picking up of 
 the field-marshal's baton by a French general, even when 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 149 
 
 the flash of guns in Poland had set the Chassepots or the 
 Lebels going off of themselves. 
 
 It would, of course, be vain to speculate on which side 
 the blow of the central force would, in such a case, be first 
 struck. If, in order to give Austria breathing time after- 
 wards, it were thought better to join her in overwhelming 
 the force in Poland, then the French might be allowed to 
 advance into positions in the Vosges, where a stroke deliv- 
 ered from the north at their communications would be easier 
 work than a dash at the fortress-forest of the frontier; or 
 the French might be tempted to raise up foes in their rear 
 by a violation of Swiss or Belgian neutrality. Or to take 
 the other side of the theatre of war, — if the decision were to 
 anticipate the French mobilization, to strike a blow that 
 might induce the French for sometime afterwards to hug 
 their fortresses, Austria might then be left for a time to 
 hold her own as best she might, and the stroke at Poland 
 might be subsequently delivered while the Russian forces 
 were employed in the Carpathians, or the advance on Vienna 
 might be made disastrous by an even easier movement upon 
 Galicia. Such speculations are only of value in so far as 
 they suggest the possibilities which are offered by her posi- 
 tion to Germany. The decision will of course depend on 
 the circumstances of the hour, largely upon the belief in 
 Berlin as to the efficiency of the French mobilization and 
 the condition of the Russian forces in Poland, the state of 
 the Austrian army, of other political alliances, the time of 
 year, and the probable nature of the weather. We have, 
 however, we think, said enough to explain why, neither as to 
 her frontiers nor as to her military situation, do we believe 
 that as a power in Europe, Germany, though she has before 
 her a tremendous task, has ceased to be the mightiest empire 
 on the Continent. That she is now an essentially conservative 
 and peaceful nation we firmly believe. That most assuredly 
 she has no temptation to go to war, and that if her most skil- 
 full statesmen can save her from that dire calamity they will 
 
150 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 do so, we are well convinced. Unfortunately no one who stud- 
 ies the present situation believes any more than Sir Charles 
 Dilke that their success can be more than temporary. 
 
 At the present moment there are in the world two "fret- 
 ful realms; " and it is of vital consequence to us to estimate 
 accurately the forces that exist for keeping them in awe. 
 Of those forces we are convinced that Germany must always 
 be the mighty nucleus. We disbelieve that she is in a posi- 
 tion scornfully to reject any alliance for the purpose on 
 whose loyalty she can depend. We are certain that it is 
 contrary to the whole policy of her statesmen to do so. For 
 us the great necessity is to realize that Sir Charles Dilke 
 has earnestly pressed upon us, that, now that our frontier 
 virtually marches with that of Russia in Asia, and that we 
 certainly know that her progress towards India is no acci- 
 dent brought on by over-zealous servants, but part of a de- 
 liberately designed plan, all the particulars of which are 
 known, we must face the facts like men, and prepare for the 
 inevitable attack. We differ from him as to the means by 
 which we ought to meet it. But we are sure that we cannot 
 do wrong in pressing home this, that no reply has been 
 made to the challenge given in the " Quarterly Review" of 
 January 1887, to those who know, to deny that they have 
 had indisputable evidence before them that Russian action 
 on India is and has been for years deliberate, designed, care- 
 fully planned, and that it is hourly approaching the period 
 of overt action.* We cannot think that enough has been 
 
 * The wording of the passage we refer to deserves to be given: "To 
 those who would fain believe that this rapid advance is the result of acci- 
 dental circumstances, we would, icith full knowledge of the subject, reply 
 by challenging any high official, either Liberal or Conservative in either 
 India or England, to say that he had not had absolute proof s before Mm that 
 the Russian advance is the result of a icell matured design to dispute our 
 empire in the East."— Article "Constantinople, Russia, and India," 
 Quarterly Review, January, 1887. For our own part, we cannot doubt 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 151 
 
 done to bring this fact home to our people. With our great 
 enemy the case is different. The whole resources of the 
 State are at the disposal of the Tzar, before whom silently 
 the facts which serve as motives for action can be laid. 
 Year after year a policy can be steadily pursued, the results 
 of which are only obvious to us when they are about to be 
 secured. Sir Charles Dilke has himself admirably exposed 
 the reckless indifference to solemn pledges, the ingenious 
 subterfuges, the false analogies which have been used as 
 cloaks to cover from English eyes the steady purpose with 
 which her march proceeds. 
 
 Now it is not possible that we should meet that delib- 
 erate scheme as long as our people are halting between two 
 opinions as to whether Madame Novikoff and her faithful 
 henchman are not honest friends of England, instead of be- 
 ing, as in fact they are — one consciously, the other blinded 
 by flattery, by gratitude for favors received, and by personal 
 vanity — the agents for throwing dust in the eyes of English- 
 men. We are sure that Sir Charles Dilke has done good 
 service in endeavoring to persuade our statesmen that great 
 as were the diplomatic facilities of the days of Castlereagh, 
 those days are in fact for England no more. Our people 
 must know things which in those days were wisely for the 
 national good kept from them. Secrecy has, in war, still 
 overwhelming advantage. We believe, as we have already 
 urged, that it is a very great mistake to discuss in public 
 the precise point at which our blow at Russia should be 
 aimed. Such a public discussion as led to the movement 
 on Sebastopol in 1854, would, in these days of completed 
 railways and telegraphs, bring disaster upon the expedition 
 which attempted the advertised attack. But there are many 
 
 that this was an authorized attempt to draw public attention to this vital 
 truth. Sir Charles Dilke obviously is not among the officials referred to; 
 the information was probably obtained subsequently to his leaving office. 
 In any case, he knows nothing of the matter. 
 
152 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 questions of politics as to which we attempt to carry on the 
 old system of playing their own game against nations which 
 can secretely exert all their power when we cannot develop 
 ours, or maintain a constant policy unless the country at large 
 understands the true facts. We entirely agree with Sir 
 Charles Dilke that " if it were possible to conduct the for- 
 eign relations of a democratic country, such as England has 
 now become, with secrecy as well as with firm devotion to 
 a fixed line of conduct, no doubt it would be better to leave 
 the consideration of many questions untill they actually 
 arise; but at the present moment we suffer from the disad- 
 vantages of both systems. We do not fully discuss foreign 
 relations in advance, and make up our minds as to our best 
 course; we do not even take steps to inform ourselves thor- 
 oughly as to the facts; but at the same time we encourage 
 our public men to make rash and hasty statements founded 
 upon imperfect knowledge, and we ' go wild ' from time to 
 to time in various directions." * 
 
 It would be very easy for us to show that Sir Charles 
 Dilke has offended against his own canons; that he has mis- 
 interpreted the meaning of the surrender to China of the 
 station at Port Hamilton; that he has similarly misinterpre- 
 ted the meaning of the present government scheme for add- 
 ing power to our army. It has been precisely because he 
 has not been behind the scenes in these matters that he is 
 not aware that they have been attempts to secure many of 
 the very objects which he himself most earnestly desires. 
 He has struck wild blows, hitting those who have been 
 steadily working to secure real efKciency. Nevertheless, in 
 so far as he has brought before the country the necessity for 
 not shutting our eyes to undoubted facts, and before our 
 statesmen the necesity for keeping the nation informed of 
 the dangers to be faced, he has rendered a great service. 
 
 * The Present Position of European Politics, p. 285. 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 153 
 
 There are not a few of these dangers which he has ig- 
 nored. He has, for instance, touched far too lightly on the 
 risk to our trade round the Cape of the French occupation 
 of Diego Suarez, the magnificent harbor to the north of 
 Madagascar, and of the Comoro Islands,* which together 
 command the Mozambique Channel. The case is the more 
 curious because he has rightly judged that the Cape route, 
 and not the Suez Canal, must necessarily be that on which 
 we chiefly depend during war time. 
 
 We must confess that we have found it extremely diffi- 
 cult to be sure of the exact impression which he has wished 
 to leave by his statements on many of the subjects he has 
 handled. He certainly appeared to us, as he did to many 
 others of his critics, to wish us to believe that Russia was a 
 Power fully a match by herself for Germany and Austria 
 combined. We by no means have committed ourselves to 
 disputing his assertion that, on the whole, Austria is not so 
 strong a power, if she stands alone, as Russia. Yet, in the 
 " Conclusion " to his now published volume, he appears al- 
 most to limit himself to that assertion. We are not aware 
 that that position has been anywhere assailed. He has, how- 
 ever, in no wise modified his views as to the value, under 
 present conditions of war, of the Russian infantry or of the 
 Russian cavalry as newly organized. In our first article we 
 cited from almost every country in Europe high authorities 
 against his opinion. We do not, indeed, know where those 
 authorities are to be found to whom he constantly appeals as 
 decisive. The opinions of those whose names ordinarily 
 carry weight are everywhere against him. It seems to us 
 that, in order to support his statement on this subject, he 
 must have inquired either among those who have not been 
 tried, or among those who have been tried and failed. On 
 other questions, as, for instance, when he appeals against Co- 
 lonel Malleson to high Indian authorities '* whom Colonel 
 
 * Not mentioned at all. 
 
154 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 Malleson would be the first to respect," there is this difficul- 
 ty, from his habit of citing without naming men,* that he evi- 
 dently is not aware what a conflict of opinion exists as to 
 the question of the proper defence of India among the high- 
 est Indian authorities, nor does he quite realize how very in- 
 telligible that conflict is. So far as we have been able to 
 ascertain, among those who, without any circumstances 
 which tend to obscure their vision, base their opinion upon 
 pure military grounds, and upon the advantage to England 
 of the course to be pursued, there is no dispute as to the 
 facts which we pressed home in our former article. On the 
 one hand, so far as the fighting on the actual Indian fron- 
 tier is concerned, the farther we can fight Russia away from 
 her base, and therefore the nearer to our Indian frontier, 
 unless we can strike through Persia from an altogether inde- 
 pendent base, the stronger we are. On the other hand, 
 though we cannot safely advance upon Herat from India, it 
 is vitally necessary to us to forbid Russia to possess herself 
 of Herat and the Heri Rud. Therefore it is also vitally nec- 
 essary for us to put pressure upon Russia elsewhere than at 
 Herat in order to protect Herat. 
 
 Undoubtedly, if the Afghans were a united people, who 
 could be trusted to adhere religiously to contracts made by 
 a central power, advance upon Herat would be a question of 
 their friendship or hostility ; but that is just the element on 
 which we cannot count. The Afghans are, in fact, a con- 
 geries of fierce tribes, who, no matter what bargains we had 
 made with them beforehand, would be apt to break out in 
 our rear after the first check we received in our front. 
 Therefore, advance far beyond the Indian frontier becomes 
 for us most dangerous. Our position there is strongest 
 when it is strictly defensive. 
 
 * A good deal of this difficulty has been removed in his more recent 
 articles. It will be seen that the mentioning of the names in no way 
 weakens the force of anything I have said here. 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 155 
 
 But all the world over human nature is human nature, 
 and the clearest military vision may be obscured by the 
 temptations of a brilliant campaign. The matter may be 
 plausibly put: "We are all agreed that Russia must be stop- 
 ped from advancing upon Herat, — why should not the cam- 
 paign to achieve that end be carried out from India her- 
 self ? " It is not therefore difficult to guess why some of 
 the highest authorities — whose names Sir Charles has not 
 produced, but of whom we will give Sir Charles the benefit 
 of declaring that, as we know their views, we know also that 
 their names would add much weight to his words— should 
 be tempted, against their better judgment, to persuade 
 themselves of the wisdom of a course which would for Eng- 
 land be very dangerous. If the question as to the proper 
 course to be pursued by another country and another army 
 under analogous conditions could be submitted to their un- 
 biassed judgment, we have no doubt at all as to the value of 
 their military opinions. The analogies of military history 
 are now sufficiently numerous, and we say unhesitatingly 
 that they all preach — "Strike by all means. Do not wait to 
 be struck, when you know that your enemy is only waiting 
 for the moment which will be best for him to strike you; 
 but do not strike him at the point where he is strongest and 
 you will be weakest." 
 
 Sir Charles Dilke, who has not had the means of know- 
 ing what, in England at all events, have been the proposals 
 of " the highest authorities " for some time past, puts for- 
 ward a series of statements, dogmatically given without sup- 
 port of any kind, to the effect that we cannot attack Russia 
 in Europe. He treats the question as though we had noth- 
 ing to offer in exchange for those facilities for "getting at 
 her in Europe" for which we unquestionably require the aid 
 of other Powers. What he has not told us is, that the great 
 power which Russia has shown in her Asiatic conquests, is 
 that of gaining strength as she goes forward — of assimila- 
 ting the tribes she has conquered there, as he shows that she 
 
1 56 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 has now assimilated the tribes of the Caucasus. The omis- 
 sion in his calculations which Colonel Malleson pointed out, 
 is the central point of the whole question: 
 
 "What, then, I may ask, has become of the survivors of 
 the defeat of Geok Tepe in January 1881? Of the many 
 thousand Turkmans who fought, some thousands at least 
 submitted. What, too, has become of the Turkmans of 
 Merv? The whole of these yielded without striking a blow, 
 and we may be sure that Russia did not slaughter them in 
 cold blood. It cannot be that they have no trained horses. 
 The testimony of many travelers, from 'Burnes down to 
 Vambery, proves that there has ever been an abundance of 
 horses among the Turkman tribes — horses ready to do the 
 work of the desert, hardy, stout-hearted, full of endurance. 
 No; in those nomadic countries it is safe to assert that his- 
 tory repeats itself. From the earliest days, from Mahmoud 
 of Ghanzi down to Nadir Shah, the Turkman cavalry have 
 invariably taken service with the conqueror of their desert 
 homes, more especially when they have realized the fact 
 that that conqueror designs to lead them to pastures rich in 
 booty. As light cavalry they can scarcely be surpassed; 
 they are accustomed to Eastern warfare; they make war 
 support war. With such men Russia could ill dispense, and 
 we may be sure that she has not dispensed with them. 
 There are, at this moment, not hundreds, but thousands of 
 them at the beck and call of Russia." * 
 
 He has taken no notice of this,f except by a casual ad- 
 mission that it is the manifest interest of Russia to absorb 
 Northern Persia, "as Russia alone of European Powers can 
 absorb an Eastern country." He quietly proposes to hand 
 
 * " The Fortnightly Reviewer and Russia" — Blackwood's Magazine, 
 April 1887, p. 576. 
 
 f See the answer to Colonel Malleson, pp, 339,330, "The Present Po- 
 sition of European Politics," (Chapman & Hall). 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 157 
 
 over Herat to Russia, because in the "race for Herat, Russia 
 has undoubtedly beaten us," ignoring what Colonel Malle- 
 son has unanswerably urged as to the vital importance of 
 our preventing Russia from securing all the advantages "of 
 the marvellous fertility of the Heri Rud," as a base for act- 
 ing against India. 
 
 We are to yield every sort of advantage to Russia for 
 the attack on India, because "the highest authorities" have 
 decided that we cannot attack Russia in Europe. We assert 
 emphatically, that just as the "highest authorities" in rela- 
 tion to cavalry action mean, for Sir Charles Dilke, as we 
 showed in our first article, "those who agree with me," and 
 do not mean the men of European reputation, or the men 
 whose arguments have been laid before the military opinion 
 of Europe, and have been universally accepted as sound by 
 those whose judgments decide it, so in relation to this far 
 greater question, the "highest authorities" do not mean the 
 men who have been tried and have proved their value, but 
 do mean either those who have not been tried, those who 
 have failed, or those who have had no opportunities for 
 knowing the evidence on this question. It is naturally not 
 the business of Indian authorities, however high, to obtain 
 information as to the best points for attacking Russia in 
 Europe. 
 
 It is because the power of attacking Russia in Europe 
 is vital to us that the question of the "balance of military 
 power in Europe" is a matter that concerns us so nearly. 
 
 So far as we have gone at present in discussing that 
 question, our purpose has been to show: 
 
 1. That the reform of our military forces which is at 
 present in progress, is of the kind which will enable us 
 most economically to utilize the strength we possess and to 
 defend our empire. 
 
 2. That we cannot keep India in economical and tran- 
 quil security, even if we can defend it at all, without the 
 
158 Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 power of striking effective blows against Russia elsewhere 
 than from India. 
 
 3. That we at present do not spend upon our forces 
 sums incomparably greater than foreign pov/ers do, but that 
 on the contrary our monetary sacrifices are much less than 
 those of foreign powers, although we have a far more vul- 
 nerable and a vastly more extended empire than any other 
 power whatever, and though we do not make any of those 
 personal sacrifices which are involved in compulsory ser- 
 vice. 
 
 4. That unless this be recognized, it is hopeless to at- 
 tempt to provide an army relatively economical and effi- 
 cient, because our actual deficiencies, as to which all men 
 are agreed, are so very serious that only by increased ex- 
 penditure can they be remedied. 
 
 5. That our present system of expenditure has not 
 been an economical one, because it has been headless, un- 
 reasoned, inorganic, haphazard — designed to furnish War 
 Ministers with effective speeches for the House of Com- 
 mons, and not designed by any men who could really and 
 effectively combine power and responsibility ; because 
 power and knowledge have been hopelessly divorced, be- 
 cause every department has catered for itself, and no one 
 for all. 
 
 6. That in the present condition of the Continent, the 
 great central and conservative Power of Germany is un- 
 doubtedly still, by frontiers, by position, by organization, 
 by military training and force, the strongest in Europe. 
 That to her Austria is a necessity; and that, though Austria 
 is not as strong as Russia, her forces would have probably 
 many elements of strength in such a contest which she has 
 often lacked in former wars. That France is undoubtedly 
 immeasurably stronger than she was in 1870, but that there 
 are elements of uncertainty in her military organization 
 such as there are not in Germany. We may add now that 
 
Germany, Russia, and Austria. 159 
 
 those uncertainties have not been removed by her recent 
 very limited and long prepared mobilization, and that the 
 new military law has at least introduced a new element of 
 uncertainty as to her strength. That Russia, from the enor- 
 mous numbers of her population, and from the extent to 
 which she devotes all her resources to preparations for war, 
 must always be a great military Power; but that she has not 
 gained, but lost heavily indeed, by the changed conditions 
 of modern warfare. That, till she has again had to fight 
 with a European Power, it will be impossible absolutely to 
 estimate her military strength ; but that, though she has 
 been actively engaged since 1877 in perfecting her military 
 organization, yet the weaknesses which she showed in the 
 Turkish war were due not merely to temporary defects, but 
 to conditions inherent in the nature of her people and her 
 government. That, nevertheless, her special aptitude for 
 assimilating an Eastern people, and so rolling up her 
 strength as she advances towards India, is a real power, and 
 to us a real danger. That that advance is no result of acci- 
 dent, or of such causes as those which have, in the teeth of 
 every sort of effort of the Home government to restrain the 
 tendency, led to the extension of our Indian empire. That 
 the notion that that is so is simply the result of ignorant, 
 cosmopolitan, easy going pseudo-liberality of mind in Eng- 
 land. That the advance has been designed from St. Peters- 
 burg, and has been concealed by every artifice. 
 
 7. That under those circumstances our interest lies, 
 not in insular exclusiveness, but in joining hands with those 
 who have as much interest as we have in opposing the de- 
 signs of Russia. That for us, therefore, the central point of 
 the balance of power in Europe lies in the relations of other 
 Powers to Russia. 
 
 8. In our last article we examined the counterweights, 
 Germany and France. Incidentally we there showed why 
 we do not believe that there is any reason for fear lest 
 either of them will be greatly tempted to violate the neutral- 
 
i6o Germany, Russia, and Austria. 
 
 ity of Belgium, provided Belgium performs her duty; that 
 we shall earn no gratitude either from Germany or France 
 by not fulfilling international obligations to Belgium to 
 which we stand distinctly pledged; and that certainly no 
 one has had authority to declare that we intend to break 
 our word. 
 
 In our next and final article, we propose to examine cer- 
 tain questions as to our own possible alliances, and more 
 especially to consider the effect upon the European balance 
 of the rise of the young and vigorous Power of Italy, and the 
 condition of Turkey, and to say a few words about China. 
 We shall then be able to lead up to our general conclusion 
 as to our future policy based upon the considerations we 
 have urged. 
 
iTAliY, TdRKEY, AND ENGLISH 
 AI2LIANGES. 
 
ITALY, TURKEY, AND ENGLISH ALLIANCES. 
 
 We have now to deal with what seems to us to be for 
 Englishmen the most important factor in the whole Euro- 
 pean problem. Writing, as we have been throughout, purely 
 from a national and in no wise from a party point of view, it 
 would be both ungracious and unfair not to acknowledge 
 that, in our judgment, we very largely owe the national ad- 
 vantage to us of the rise of the Italian power to one man — 
 Mr. Gladstone. Probably no man ever more completely ex- 
 pressed the feeling of sympathy of one great nation for an- 
 other than did Mr. Gladstone, when he declared in i860 that 
 there was a subject on which all Englishmen everywhere 
 were agreed —"that Italy ought to be one; that Italy ought 
 to be free." It was many years after that before Italians as 
 a nation fully realized the extent and depth of the sympa- 
 thy which had been felt for them in England. They have 
 very fully realized it now. Such matters are of the gravest 
 possible importance. It seems to us that no word should 
 be said in England which can in any way tend to modify 
 that friendly feeling.* 
 
 Yet there is, apart altogether from historical sympathy, 
 a service which England can now render to Italy such as it 
 has never before been possible for England to render to any 
 
 * We regret that in Sir Charles Dilke's article in the November 1887 
 number of the "Fortnightly," he should have thought it necessary to dis- 
 cuss the possible injury which English hostility might inflict on Italy. Is 
 it vsrise for a politician to discuss such a subject at all in regard to a 
 friendly and most sensitive country? 
 
164 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 Power possessed of a great national army. England can at 
 one and the same time secure Italy from attack, and can 
 enable her to become an offensive Power. That is a consid- 
 eration for statesmen rather than for peoples, but it is essen- 
 tial for us that our people should understand it. What is 
 perhaps of even more importance to us is, that this fact is 
 thoroughly realized by Italian statesmen of all parties, and 
 by the more influential and intelligent classes throughout 
 the country. We almost fear lest, in the space of an article 
 in which we have much else to discuss, we shall not be able 
 to bring fully home to our English readers in detail the 
 causes which make this a military and political certainty. 
 Briefly stated, it is clear enough that a country with an enor- 
 mous sea-board, a country of length without breadth, de- 
 pendent for a large portion of its forces on two islands, and 
 divided throughout the length of its mainland by a great 
 mountain-chain, is liable to invasion from France by sea to 
 an extent to which she is not liable to invasion across a 
 mountain range the defence of which has been elaborately 
 prepared. The consequence of these facts is, that the de- 
 bates in the Italian Parliament, the pamphlets which have 
 teemed from the Italian press, and the innumerable discus- 
 sions which have testified to the intense patriotic interest 
 which all Italians have taken in the question of national wel- 
 fare, all turn upon this point. As we shall probably more 
 easily convince our readers by a few extracts of the inten- 
 sity of this feeling, than we shall drive home a proof of some 
 military intricacy as to facts about a foreign country, we ven- 
 ture to give the following: 
 
 Here is the first, from "Nuova Antologia" of October, 
 1884: "With our present resources we can defend ourselves, 
 but we cannot conquer. . . . We must be prepared to see, at 
 the beginning of hostilities, our coasts and seas infested by 
 war-ships, which will capture ships, destroy railways, and at- 
 tempt surprises and attacks of all sorts. If we are not pre- 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 165 
 
 pared to do the same, we shall be surprised, crushed, and 
 exposed to incalculable disasters." 
 
 Here is a soldier's view. Lieut. -General Ricci, late 
 Chief of the Staff of the Italian army, on returning from a 
 tour of inspection at Massouah, said to his constituents at 
 Belluno: "Our continental frontier is one of the strongest 
 in the world, because the Alps, fortified as they are, and de- 
 fended by 250,000 or 300,000 Italians present an impassable 
 barrier. I even dare say that we are too strong on the side 
 of the Alps, and I wish again to ask the Chamber to econ- 
 omize here as much as possible in order to increase the 
 naval budget, so that we may have enough ships to prevent 
 attack on our coasts, the weak point — very weak point — of Italy 
 Each time that I, General of the Army, and Alpine de- 
 puty, appear in Parliament, I shall say, 'AH for the navy,'" 
 
 These extracts, which might be multiplied indefinitely, 
 are only representative of what is the universal Italian feel- 
 ing. The difficulty is to convey to English readers the im- 
 pression which is left upon those who have most closely 
 been watching what has been going on in the peninsula of 
 the "zeal and untiring energy with which Italy has pressed 
 forward her land and sea defences; it is necessary to take 
 stock of the multitudinous improvements in every service, 
 and to study the frequent and instructive debates, to acquire 
 a true idea of the immense interest taken in this question by 
 all classes." We quote from a private letter from Captain 
 A'Court, the author of " Military Italy," who has devoted 
 years to the patient study of this question. His book is 
 now, by far, the most complete account we have of the act- 
 ual condition of the military forces of the kingdom. 
 
 For our purposes it will be sufficient to say that by the 
 laws of 1882 the Italian army having been increased by 
 150,000 men, and the army corps increased from ten to 
 twelve, she has now 430,000 men actually available in the 
 army, with 200,000 "mobile militia" in second line ready to 
 
l66 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 reinforce them. Allowing for the complete defence of the 
 Alpine region, according to a scheme elaborated by General 
 Ricci, she has available 330,000 men for active operations in 
 the fieid, either against Russia or in support of Austria or 
 against France in support of Germany, — provided, and pro- 
 vided o?dy, that an alliance with a great naval Power secures the 
 Italian coasts. 
 
 With all the efforts that Italy has made to strengthen 
 her navy, she does not at all disguise from herself that the 
 French navy is incomparably stronger. Nor is it only the 
 French navy that she has to fear by sea. When we have 
 spoken of two army corps and a cavalry division as re- 
 presenting the force which at least we ought to have ready 
 to ship, and have declared that at least until that force has 
 been provided complete in all respects and ready to act, no 
 other additions to our army would serve our turn, we take 
 account Of the immense distance to which it would be nec- 
 esssary for us to transport troops. The vast increase in the 
 supplies of all kinds which are involved in long sea-transits 
 multiplies, to an extent that would hardly be believed, the 
 amount of mercantile tonnage that is required. The few 
 hours steaming which intervene between France and Italy 
 impose altogether other conditions of sea-transport. Paper 
 transport by sea for those who have not actually taken up 
 the tenders, is apt to seem a much simpler thing than it 
 does to those who have to provide, even for a few days, for 
 all that troops require on landing. It will, however, at least 
 give some indication of what Italians fear, if we say that 
 Colonel Perrucretti, in "La Difesa dello stato," one of the 
 most popular of Italian works, calculates that France has the 
 means of forming and rapidly transporting by sea four army 
 corps. It is not too mmch to say that if that is true, or any- 
 thing like true, the mere danger of such a descent on some 
 unknown point of the Italian coast together with the com- 
 mand of the sea by the French fleet, would be sufificient to 
 paralyze the entire Italian army that could be spared from 
 
Italy, Turkey, mid English Alliances. 167 
 
 the local defence of the Alps. Thus a French force num- 
 erically most inferior to the Italian army would be sufficient 
 to prevent Italy either from assisting Austria or troubling 
 France. 
 
 To sum up— the Italians have, with one exception which 
 we shall presently note,* no fear of not being able to hold 
 their own perfectly as long as the contest is confined to 
 movement across the respective land-frontiers. Without an 
 English alliance the entire Italian army would be paralyzed 
 for offensive action by the French fleet and a comparatively 
 small portion of the French army. With an English alliance 
 the combined Italian and Mediterranean fleets would cer- 
 tainly command the sea, paralyze any possible attempt at 
 French invasion by sea, protect the much exposed Italian 
 ports, many of which, like Naples, are not only unprotected, 
 but from local causes cannot be adequately protected, and 
 finally would set free the Italian army for action beyond the 
 frontiers. We say, therefore, that the rise of the Italian 
 Power has completely changed the relation of a great naval 
 Power like England to the military forces of the Continent. 
 Without putting a soldier on shore abroad, and without 
 moving a soldier from England, we can by our naval action 
 alone, and that without any special strain on our naval 
 forces, set free at least 300,000 men for effective action 
 against the aggressive Powers of the Continent. 
 
 It seems to us that under these circumstances the prin- 
 ciple of all our policy ought to be, before all things, an act- 
 ive alliance with Italy. No one who has studied the views 
 of Italian statesmen can fail to see that that is their opinion 
 also. An alliance of Italy with Germany, or even of Italy 
 with Germany and Austria, without an English alliance 
 againsi Russia and France, is of the nature of the alliance 
 of Thumblin with the giant, in which Thumblin gets all the 
 
 Fide, p. 264. 
 
1 68 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 knocks. Not that we do not think Italy a great Power. 
 Italy and England allied together become two very great 
 Powers indeed, from the moment that England has pro- 
 vided the force which is indispensable for the security 
 of her own existence. But no alliance that Germany 
 or Germany and Austria can offer to Italy, will save 
 her from what Italians know to be their real danger. 
 Germany and Austria, having to deal with the Russian 
 navy, cannot absorb a sufficient portion of the activity of 
 the French fleet to make Italy safe. 
 
 There is no alliance which would so securely unite all 
 parties in this country. If it be true, as Sir Charles Dilke 
 alleges in his article in the "Fortnightly" of November 1887, 
 that Prince Bismarck has recently proposed to England to 
 join the three Powers, the cause is clear. Either Signor 
 Crispi's interview or the views of Italian statesmen, express- 
 ed through other means, have made him attach a different 
 value to the "sick old woman" from that which it suited his 
 policy to profess in former times. It is clear that England 
 and Italy together can offer to the central Powers an acces- 
 sion of strength which Bismarck could not and does not des- 
 pise. It is equally clear that he cannot get Italy to join 
 him on the same terms without our alliance. This fact 
 changes the nature of our power in relation to every state 
 on the Continent. We do not believe, as we have already 
 shown, that Italy is, as Sir Charles Dilke alleged, so neces- 
 sary to the existence of Austria that Austria must cringe to 
 her to any extent to secure her alliance; but this much is 
 certain, that Italy cannot move a man to the support of 
 Austria without our alliance. The position of France in any 
 contest between Russia and Austria is so menacing for Italy 
 that neutrality is enforced on Italy, at least until Germany 
 and France are at war. Even then we think we have given 
 reasons for believing that while the French fleet holds the 
 seas, Italy will be scarcely able to move. Therefore to Aus- 
 tria our adhesion to the alliance is vital in proportion as the 
 
Italy, Turkey, and Englisli Alliances. 169 
 
 alliance of Italy is or is not important to her. As Sir 
 Charles Dilke has at least given its full weight to the value 
 of that alliance, the importance of which for Austria we by 
 no means ignore, we claim his evidence as representing on 
 that side the value we can offer to Austria on the do ut des 
 principle. We have much else also to offer her, of which it 
 will be more convenient to speak later. 
 
 Having this view of the importance and effect of Italian 
 alliance before us, we wrote in our first article: "It is almost 
 certain that we shall never have to enter into any quarrel in 
 which we cannot obtain allies, to whom the command of the 
 sea, such a force * so capable of movement, and the finan- 
 cial support of England, would be of priceless value." f 
 We do not think that these words, used after we had refer- 
 red to the importance of Italy, and had repeatedly spoken 
 of acting on the do ut des principle, conveyed to any one else 
 the impression which they did to Sir Charles Dilke. "He is 
 positive, however," he says of the present writer — "and I 
 envy him his firm belief — that ivlien war comes upon us we 
 shall have allies." If they had done so, they would have 
 been ill-chosen words. A forced construction placed on an 
 isolated clause in a long argument is apt to mislead; but as 
 it is vital to us not to be misunderstood in this matter, we 
 are much more anxious to make our meaning clear than to 
 split hairs as to the correct turn of a phrase. The pur- 
 pose, then, with which we undertook these articles may now 
 be fully stated, and the argument as a whole worked out. 
 We do not believe, and never have believed, that if we wait 
 till war comes upon us in behalf of our own interests, we can 
 
 *Two army corps and a cavalry division complete in all respects, and 
 ready to embark on the word being given. 
 
 f Vide p. 89. I retain here the wording of the original article as it 
 has been challenged by SirC. Dilke. I have for the sake of greater clear- 
 ness slightly altered it at p. 89, 
 
1 70 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. , 
 
 secure allies who will fight for us when we have refused to 
 fight for them. We believe, as Sir Charles Dilke believes, 
 that a great change has come over the political relation of 
 England to the Continent since we have in Asia come to 
 have frontiers which virtually march with those of a great 
 European power. We believe that the phase of public opin- 
 ion which looked upon it as the duty of English statesmen 
 to keep clear of Continental alliances, and to devote our 
 strength to the peaceful extension of our colonial empire, 
 was a very natural and legitimate view of the existing con- 
 dition of things for many years of the present century. We 
 believe also with Sir Charles Dilke that in our days it is im- 
 possible for English statesmen, however clearly they may 
 see that the circumstances which tended to form a certain 
 popular sentiment have radically changed, to commit the 
 country to action for which it is not prepared. We do not 
 see how, as an upright statesman who desired to pledge 
 himself to brother statesmen on the Continent to that only 
 which he could fulfill to the letter, it would have been pos- 
 sible for Lord Salisbury to completely commit this country 
 to a formal union with the great peace-league of the three 
 Powers. Therefore we firmly believe that, in order that such 
 alliance, which is now vital to our interests, should be form- 
 ed, the nation generally must have laid before them the mo- 
 tives which ought to determine our action. It is well that our 
 foreign policy should be consistent, continuous, and based on 
 a knowledge of the existing state of things, which prevents 
 violent changes when one party succeeds another in power. 
 Circumstances, however, alter cases. The policy which 
 was wise, or appeared wise, to the majority of Englishmen 
 under one condition of things, may, if they see clearly that 
 those conditions have altogether changed, appear in a very 
 different light to them. There is no reason why English 
 opinion should not be roused to the same interest in the 
 question which exists at this moment everywhere through- 
 out Italy. Therefore we held it to be our duty, having facts 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 171 
 
 before us which, as we have heard from all sides, have not 
 hitherto been understood by most Englishmen, to lay them 
 before them. 
 
 We think we do Sir Charles Dilke no injustice when 
 we say that the whole purport of his articles was to leave 
 the impression that war with Russia being sooner or later 
 inevitable for us, and war with Russia and France together 
 a by no means impossible contingency, we must prepare our- 
 selves to fight them without allies. He based that opinion 
 on the belief that our alliance was not worth having, and 
 that the rejection of it by Austria at Prince Bismarck's in- 
 stigation, which he alleged had at the beginning of the year 
 recently occurred, was representative of what we had to ex- 
 pect for the future.* We said, therefore, when we first chal- 
 lenged his statements, and we say now, that both in the 
 case of England and Russia he put strength for weakness 
 and weakness for strength. We entirely agree with those 
 military critics who have assured him that he has under- 
 rated the power of Russia, and exaggerated the power of 
 England, in maintaining that by some tinkering with our 
 military finances, by some catching at popular military pre- 
 judices, by some substituting of a plausible statesman who 
 is " out" for one who is in, we can more easily arrange to 
 meet Russia in the field, in India, or at Vladivostock, with- 
 out allies, than we can arrange to meet her elsewhere with 
 them.f We say that he exaggerated the power of Russia 
 when he tried to persuade us to leave the nations of the 
 Continent to be trodden under the feet of the colossus be- 
 cause Russia, or, at all events, Russia and France together, 
 represented a force so great that other nations could not re- 
 
 * Compare ''The Present Position of European Politics," pp. 16. 21, 
 160, 185, 186 et seq., with p. 277 and pp. 339-343. 
 
 f Sir C. Dilke has challenged the fairness of this statement. My 
 answer lies in the references given in the preceding note. 
 
172 Italy, Turkey, and hjiglish Alliances. 
 
 sist them. We say that he misjudged the statesmanship of 
 Italian statesmen when he believed that their whole policy 
 was one of ponrboires. 
 
 We believed then, and believe now, that the position in 
 which we stand is very much like that in which Prussia 
 stood in the years prior to 1806, while Napoleon was over- 
 throwing Austria and the other states of the Continent. We 
 can fan ourselves with the belief that it is a matter of no 
 moment to us whether Russia and France do or do not deal 
 first with the Continental Powers, and then with ourselves. 
 In that case we shall surely be left, as Prussia was in 1806, 
 without allies when the fast approaching hour arrives when 
 Russia is able to deal with us in India, secure at least in a 
 neutrality of France benevolent towards her, and ready to 
 take every advantage of her many causes of quarrel with us. 
 On the other hand, if only our fleet be in the condition in 
 which all Englishmen desire to see it, we can offer such ad- 
 ditional strength to the alliance of Germany, Austria and 
 Italy, that we ought to be able to make such terms as will 
 keep Russia and France quiet and at peace both with our- 
 selves and the other Powers for our generation and perhaps 
 the next. We neither deny nor affirm that our fleet is now 
 in that condition. That is a question for sailors. It hap- 
 pens now, as it often happens, that the questions of the 
 nature of the great services which a fleet can render us are 
 mainly dependent on points of military study on land. It 
 is because of the nature of the military frontiers of Ger- 
 many and Russia, and of the military forces and lines of 
 communication of the two great empires, that we are able 
 to affirm that, by prohibiting a Russian naval expedition 
 against Konigsberg, Memel, and Danzig, the Whale can 
 offer a direct service to the Prussian Eagle against the Ele- 
 phant that may be worth the Eagle's purchasing at a price.* 
 It is because of the necessary military distribution of 
 
 * See III., "Germany, Russia, and Austria." 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 173 
 
 the Italian depots, fortresses, and frontiers that we are 
 able to affirm that our navy can offer a service to Italy 
 which will affect Germany and Austria alike, and be worth 
 at least 300,000 men to the alliance. Whether our navy can 
 at this moment crush or confine the now nearly ready Rus- 
 sian fleet in the Black Sea. and at the same time, with the 
 assistance of the Italian fleet, dominate the Mediterranean 
 and the Baltic, while it secures our commerce, our shores, 
 and our colonies from attack, we do not know. From a mil- 
 itary point of view, those are the services it ought to render 
 us. Till it can accomplish them with certainty, we cry with 
 General Ricci, "All for the navy and nothing for the army." 
 To that, however, there is one saving clause on which we 
 need not dwell, as on that point we are in entire agreement 
 with Sir Charles Dilke. The army knows perfectly what 
 the navy requires from it in order to accomplish its proper 
 work at sea — secure ports, and secure coaling stations. 
 Their security is imperative if we are to be able to feed our 
 population in time of war. 
 
 We shall, however, continue to accuse Sir Charles Dilke 
 in season and out of season, of party spirit, until he acknow- 
 ledges one fact on that matter, which is true whether he 
 acknowledges it or not. The one statesman who has 
 really and heartily thrown himself into the cause of practi- 
 cally securing for us coaling stations and harbors effectively 
 garrisoned, and has gone as far in it as was possible for a 
 man to do, has not been Sir Charles Dilke, has not been Mr. 
 Stanhope, or any other statesman, Conservative or Liberal, 
 but Mr. Smith. Sir Charles Dilke either knows that or is 
 wilfully ignorant of it. For our part, in so far as any feel- 
 ing of the kind affected our determination to offer these 
 articles to our readers, it was the sense of the mischief to 
 the country that was done when a statesman not much given 
 to talk, but steadily and honestly setting himself to work at 
 reforms not showy but vital to efficiency, was assailed by a 
 clever talker, appealing to every catch-penny prejudice that 
 
174 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 could be raked together. Those reforms have been now 
 fully explained in public by General Brackenbury; and we 
 are at a loss to understand how Sir Charles Dilke can say, 
 after expressing the fullest approval of them, that he does 
 not know what was meant when, speaking of this work, 
 which had then, at Mr. Smith's instance, and with his full 
 approval, been just accomplished. Lord Wolseley declared 
 that more effective, non-theatrical work had been done in 
 them than he had known done for years. Sir Charles Dilke 
 wishes those who desire genuine army reform not to hit at 
 one another. We heartily sympathize with the wish; but 
 the speech from him seems to us like the historical one of 
 the robber to the policeman, to which we can only give the 
 policeman's answer. The present writer never once spoke 
 to Mr. Smith. Not a word of what has been here written in 
 Mr. Smith's praise would have been altered had he been a 
 Radical statesman, if that statesman had shown the desire 
 Mr. Smith has shown to accomplish genuine work for the 
 country. We have had enough and to spare of brilliant 
 speeches made by Secretaries of State for War, for which 
 they receive the compliments of every one in the House. A 
 little steady, unstagey, untheatrical work, that does not show 
 in a speech, is a novelty; and, while Sir Charles Dilke shows 
 his patriotism and independence of party spirit by vitupera- 
 ting or undervaluing all work, no matter how valuable it has 
 been, done while Conservatives happened to be in power, 
 we shall show ours by throwing all the enthusiasm we can 
 into the support of any statesman, no matter of what party, 
 who will strive after genuine efficiency. 
 
 Since we began our series there has appeared an arti- 
 cle* from the pen of Herr von Bunsen, declaring not as an 
 expression of his own opinion but as a study of the growth 
 of public opinion in Germany, that the Germans generally 
 
 * "Nineteenth Century," Sept. 1887— "A German View of Mr. Glad- 
 stone." 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 175 
 
 have come to look upon this question as we do. He says 
 that the whole feeling of Germany towards England has un- 
 dergone a change, precisely because they consider that the 
 great danger of the present situation lies in the high proba- 
 bility that, whether from deliberate design or as a conse- 
 quence of the course of events, Russia and France together 
 may attack England by herself first without allies, or else 
 may attack Germany and Austria by themselves. We have 
 in the present article shown why it is the case that these 
 great military Powers may well desire the alliance of Eng- 
 land, even though she should not be able to land a single 
 corps (Tarm^e anywhere. Herr von Bunsen belongs to a 
 family of statesmen, and is not likely to write without know- 
 ing what the views of German statesmen are. This article, 
 the speeches which have been made in the Foreign Commit- 
 tee of the Hungarian Delegations, notably on November 5, 
 together with Signor Crispi's declarations, have been suffi- 
 cient to refute Sir Charles Dilke's statement that "we are so 
 little prepared for war that no Power thinks our alliance tvorth 
 having for a short war, and it is the first days of a war 
 that count at the present time." * But if these be not suffi- 
 cient, Sir Charles's present assertion that Prince Bismarck 
 has recently pressed upon us an alliance with the three Pow- 
 ers, is its complete and final refutation.f 
 
 We entirely agree with Sir Charles that the first days of 
 a war are now of vital importance. We entirely agree with 
 him that our army is not now ready for the first few days or 
 weeks, hardly for the first few months, of a Continental war. 
 It has been with a view to make it so, that all the reforms 
 which Sir Charles Dilke has so fiercely attacked were being 
 
 * The Present Position of European Politics, p. 160. 
 
 f Fortnightly Review, November 1887. 
 
176 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 attempted.* If he can use his influence with Radical mem- 
 bers to give courage to the government to ask for the im- 
 mediate expenditure which he now at last admits to be nec- 
 essary in order to carry them out, he will confer the great- 
 est service on his country which lies in his power. 
 
 Nevertheless with our army as it is, though we cannot 
 do all that we ought to be able to do for the defence of the 
 country, we can act potently on the first few days of a Con- 
 tinental war, as we cannot act on the first few days of a war 
 between ourselves and Russia, A telegraphic order to our 
 Mediterranean fleet to join the Italian navy will then and 
 there set free at least 300,000 soldiers in Italy from the mo- 
 ment they are mobilized, and will begin to operate with 
 enormous force in favor of the great alliance during the 
 course of the very few days of mobilization. A telegraphic 
 assurance to Germany that another English fleet will co-op- 
 erate with the German from the moment that the state of 
 the Baltic permits the Russian fleet to approach Memel, K6- 
 nigsberg, or Danzig, will enable the German leaders com- 
 pletely to modify all their plans for dealing with Russia. It 
 will secure the communications of a German army engaged 
 in the invasion of Poland. It will protect Germany on the 
 only side on which Russian attack could be seriously dan- 
 gerous.f Before we conclude our article, we shall show that 
 yet another telegraphic order will be worth a further 200,000 
 men to Germany. There is no Power in Europe whose in- 
 fluence can be so rapidly exercised. 
 
 Therefore, pace Sir Charles Dilke, we say that, with 
 these weapons in our hands, it will be not in war-power but 
 
 * I do not myself profess to reconcile the apparent approval of Gen 
 eral Brackenbuiy's speech, alluded to on p. 244, and the attack on the 
 very same reforms which was the basis of Sir Charles Dilke's article on 
 '•The United Kingdom." 
 
 f For the complete justification for these statements, see III., "Ger- 
 many, Russia, and Austria." 
 
Italy, Turkey y atid English Alliances. 1 77 
 
 in statesmanship and diplomacy that England will fail, if we 
 are not able to make such terms with other states as will 
 oblige Russia to leave Herat alone. We feel certain that if 
 only our statesmen will take to heart that principle which 
 Sir Charles Dilke has so soundly and wisely pressed on 
 them, that at present they must understand the conditions 
 of war on the Continent if they would attempt to safeguard 
 England, there are yet other terms that we can make. We 
 believe that Russia could be held to adhere, in relation to all 
 the points of interest to us as well as to Europe, to the bar- 
 gain she has made. We believe that we could obtain security 
 that her pledges so habitually broken, and her solemn words 
 so habitually repudiated, shall not again be ignored. Only 
 by the union of the four Powers, all interested in peace, can 
 such a result be secured. 
 
 We believe, also, that we could obtain a very similar se- 
 curity as against France. We wish that Sir Charles Dilke 
 had brought out more fully than he has done many of those 
 causes of quarrel with France to which he has only allud- 
 ed. We fear that our diplomacy will only be too willing to 
 continue the evil courses in which it has been for more than 
 a generation engaged, trusting to the ignorance of the na- 
 tion as to the feeble concessions about which Sir Charles 
 has only given hints. 
 
 We wish that he had drawn attention to the almost ap- 
 palling frankness with which law officers of the Crown have 
 declared that on the coast of Newfoundland, thanks to the 
 carelessness and neglect of our statesmen, we have allowed 
 French "rights of user" to be converted into "rights of wont," 
 and "rights of wont" to be converted into tolerated claims 
 to exclusive possession, till now, in a territory where the 
 French have not by treaty, a yard of soil, the Frerich news- 
 papers talk of "the French coast," almost as if they had ter- 
 ritorial jurisdiction over it and we had not. How long it 
 will be before French diplomatists adopt the same tone it 
 
178 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 would be dangerous to predict. An alliance for the main- 
 tenance of treaty rights, by which the rights of all the four 
 Powers concerned were mutually guaranteed, and the viola- 
 tions of treaty were regarded as a matter of common interest, 
 would give a firmness to our diplomacy and a security to 
 peace such as there has not been in the world, at least since 
 what Sir Charles Dilke now says that he agrees with us in 
 thinking our great blunder in 1864, though he considers us 
 most partisan writers for having called it so. 
 
 For it must not be disguised that the situation, as it 
 now stands, though it is most satisfactory for the central 
 Powers, is most dangerous for us. It is true that the Hun- 
 garian representatives have shown that they appreciate the 
 nature of the action of English statesmen in a way that, un- 
 fortunately, it would be thought derogatory to the dignity 
 of an English Opposition on either side to admit that they 
 appreciated it. "We expect," said Csernatony, " no formal 
 alliance on the part of England, as it is her habit not to 
 bind herself before she finds it necessary to go to war; but 
 it is highly satisfactory to learn that England is not against 
 us, and will never side with our enemies; and that her good 
 will towards us, from which we may derive great advantages, 
 is assured." 
 
 Unfortunately the "semi-alliance" which may confer 
 these great advantages on the central Powers offers us no 
 guarantee of their help in an event which that semi-alliance 
 itself is especially likely to bring about. 
 
 Sir Charles Dilke thinks that nihilism would disappear 
 if Russia went to war. We gladly accept his authority on a 
 subject of which he knows much more than we do. It is at 
 least certain that the probability that war would kill nihilism 
 is sufficiently strong to make war present continual tempta- 
 tions to the Tzar. Is it not likely, then, that the very 
 strength of the alliance of the three Powers, with England 
 in the background, may induce the Tzar now to turn his at- 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 179 
 
 tention towards India, instead of towards Europe? Unless 
 we have not made a " half alliance " but a whole alliance 
 with the other Powers, so that they are as much pledged to 
 us as we to them, he will there find England in the fore- 
 ground with no other Powers behind her. Nor, unless the 
 declarations which Lord Hartington used formerly to make 
 are wholly unsound, would the result be very different if the 
 Tzar were to turn his attention to Asia Minor instead of to 
 India. "In Asia Minor," as Lord Hartington used to say, "lies 
 the great danger for England." In either case, as Sir Charles 
 Dilke himself admits, it would be at least highly probable 
 that we should have France on our back at the same time. 
 Why should we run this tremendous risk merely for the 
 sake of preserving a pedantic tradition of English states- 
 manship, suited to conditions which are not those of to- day? 
 Why should we be compelled to put our armed forces on an 
 enormously expensive establishment? For the discovery 
 that Sir Charles Dilke has now made, that we must at least 
 begin with an expenditure of several millions, shows only 
 that he now knows of a flea bite on what it will actually 
 cost us to be ready, out of our own resources alone, to face 
 Russia and France together, as he admits that with the 
 policy which he advocates we must be ready to do. 
 
 Towards the end of the Franco-German war, when M. 
 Thiers — the old war historian of France, the great exponent 
 of the Napoleonic tradition as to war, the author of the for- 
 tifications of Paris — was endeavoring to persuade his coun- 
 trymen for the moment to make peace, he used an argument 
 which seems to us worth considering in our present situa- 
 tion. "If," he said, "four men better armed than I am come 
 to me and demand my pursd, I do not choose the moment 
 when they are superior to me to settle the question finally. 
 I make such terms with them as I can make for the moment 
 and then I go to six other men as much interested as I am 
 in stopping robbery, and arrange with them to master the 
 robbers and receive my purse." We are in a somewhat hap- 
 
i8o Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 pier position. Two are threatening a general disturbance. 
 If they can only catch one alone, they are quite ready to 
 tackle him for their common advantage. Three of those 
 exposed to this risk are agreed in lending one another mu- 
 tual support. We, the fourth, stand apart, wishing well to 
 the three, and very likely to be obliged to join them if the 
 three are attacked. The three are most anxious that we 
 should join them, and are quite ready to give as we give. 
 But we have, and can have, no counter-promise from them, 
 because, though our feelings are sufificiently well known to 
 the other two to irritate them greatly, we prefer sitting half 
 on one side and half on the other of the fence, and will not 
 make up our mind to a definite decision. Is that for us a 
 satisfactory condition of things? Can it foreshadow any 
 good for us? 
 
 Nor is even that a full statement of the case. As we 
 have shown in our detailed examination of the facts, we can, 
 for the purposes of the general alliance, use our own special 
 strength to the full. If we allow ourselves to be isolated 
 and then attacked, instead of being able to lend offensive 
 power to the general service, we shall be thrown upon a 
 miserable defensive. With Russia we shall find, as we did 
 in the days of the Crimea, that we cannot exert our naval 
 power to its full extent, and must trust to the service in 
 which we shall be always weakest. When Sir Charles Dilke 
 has done his utmost to expand our forces to the dimensions 
 of the great Continental armies,* we fear much that the 
 faithful son must say to his country what the little frog of 
 .(Esop's fable said to his mother, attempting to blow herself 
 out to the size of an ox — " You will burst before you suc- 
 ceed." We can be, relatively to other countries, as great a 
 
 * I, in common with others have so understood him. But, as the 
 burial service puts it, "he continueth not in any one stay," so that it is 
 difficult to be sure what his actual meaning is. He now says that this 
 does not represent his view. 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. i8i 
 
 naval power as we choose to be. We shall be delighted if from 
 Sir Charles, or any one else, we can hear of any means that 
 will economically increase the size of our army. We are 
 bound, however, to say that, if what he has in his articles 
 foreshadowed be the solution he is about to propose to us, 
 then there is much danger lest he should increase numbers 
 without increasing force. He speaks of an English system 
 not based upon foreign schemes. We are delighted with all 
 genuine thought and genuine originality. We fear, however, 
 that he has already given us hints enough to show that the 
 scheme he is to propose is one that has been already 
 tried and discarded because of its failure by a great Conti- 
 nental Power. However, we shall be anxious to hear with- 
 out prejudice what his proposals are. In the meantime, we 
 do not think it will be easy to persuade Englishmen that a 
 contest in which their naval power cannot be freely exert- 
 ed can never be so satisfactory a one for them as one in 
 which naval power tells from the first outbreak of war. 
 
 There is, however, one argument which has been re- 
 cently very ably put in the "Spectator" against the possi- 
 bility of our forming an alliance such as we have described. 
 The writer urges that we cannot adhere as patiently and 
 consistently to a formed purpose as is the case with Powers 
 ruled by a despot. Is that historically true? We do not 
 think so. Of all the Powers opposed to Napoleon, which 
 maintained the struggle with most patience and consis- 
 tency? 
 
 Nor can we persuade ourselves that the more aristocratic 
 nature of our constitution in those days materially affected 
 the question. The feelings of all classes were as heartily 
 enlisted in that struggle as were those of the ruling men — 
 nay, it was the popular feeling which originally forced Pitt's 
 unwilling hand. But if that be not a sufificient indication of 
 the extent to which a country with a very popular constitu- 
 tion may adhere firmly to a policy once thoroughly under- 
 
1 82 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 stood by the mass of the nation, what case can be more 
 forcible than that of the United States of America during 
 the war with the South? What comparisons are naturally 
 suggested by the setting of that case side by side with the 
 action of the Russian armies in the days of Frederick the 
 Great ! Then the successive deaths of Russian rulers con- 
 verted on the spot enemies into friends, friends into ene- 
 mies. What reversals of policy that, at the worst, England 
 has ever known, approach in their suddenness the changes 
 which are suggested by the mere names, Elizabeth, Paul, 
 Catherine? It appears to us that the whole history of the 
 English race, both in America and England, promises, de- 
 spite some lapses due to the violence of party spirit,* a se- 
 curity of allies not to be found elsewhere. It is of equal im- 
 portance to us that the belief that that is so is strong on the 
 Continent. Even now, in the Foreign Committee of the 
 Hungarian Delegations, the independent members con- 
 trast the "sympathetic attitude of England" with " the fre- 
 quently vacillating conduct of Germany." Few things can 
 be more significant than Count Apponyi's speech on that 
 matter on November 5th. 
 
 We turn, however, now to a question on which, as it seems 
 to us, the Italian alliance offers us a solution of a difficulty 
 which more than any other threatens to make it hard for us 
 in England to maintain a continuous and persistent policy 
 in foreign affairs. We hardly think that any one in Eng- 
 land now doubts that pacha government in Asia Minor is 
 intolerably bad. We hardly think that any one is ready to 
 commit England to the defence of intolerably bad govern- 
 ment. On the other hand, no Conservative statesmen has ever 
 
 * We are disposed to agree with Mr. Green that the worst case of 
 whicli we have ever been guilty, the desertion of Fredericli, was due 
 chiefly to the personal willfulness of the young king. George III., on his 
 accession. Chatham surely then represented the popular feeling in favor 
 of persistency. 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 183 
 
 been more strongly opposed to allowing Russian govern- 
 ment to be substituted for Turkish, than were Mazzini and the 
 most Liberal or Radical Italian statesmen. Karl Blind's ar- 
 ticle, to which we have referred already,* supplies, to those 
 who are not cognizant of these facts, unanswerable evidence 
 on that subject. Notoriously Signor Crispi is the heir of 
 these traditions, and not of any mere historical or selfish 
 policy for the maintainance of the integrity of the Turkish 
 empire. Bad as pacha government may be, it is at least 
 subject to a pressure from without which tends to check its 
 worst excesses. We would ask any one who thinks that 
 there may not be something worse than this to study Prince 
 Kropotkine's new work.f We cannot believe that English- 
 men, who appreciate the check to tyranny which is supplied 
 by ample daylight, can doubt that a government which can 
 work out in absolute darkness such deviltry as Prince Kro- 
 potkine proves to be common, would be a blessing even to 
 Asia Minor. No statesmen are more heartily friendly than 
 the Italian to the emancipated Balkan States. No one now 
 doubts that friendliness towards them is the true policy of 
 English statesmen, and that in the persons of Lord Salis- 
 bury and Lord Rosebery both parties are committed to that 
 view. The policy of Russia towards Turkey is simple 
 enough. It consists in pandering to the vices of the ruling 
 pachas in order to make the government of Turkey as bad 
 as possible, so that it may disgust Europe and become in- 
 tolerable to the subjects of Turkey. J It seems to us that all 
 
 * P. 175, ante. 
 
 f In Russian and French Prisons. By Prince Kropotkine, Lon- 
 don: Ward & Downey. 1887. 
 
 X Ignatieff, no doubt, in 1877, carried out that policy with a perfec- 
 tion that it never attained before or since. To have induced the repudia- 
 tion of the debt, and by a subtle complication of ingenious intrigue to 
 have almost compelled the Turkish government to employ in the supprea- 
 
1^4 Italy, Turkey y and E?iglish Alliances. 
 
 English parties may agree in resisting to the utmost that 
 policy. Surely also we may join Signor Crispi in refusing 
 to allow Russia to be the heir of Turkey, 
 
 We have dealt first with what we believe to be by far 
 the more difficult problem involved in this question — the 
 problem, that is, of adopting such a policy towards Turkey 
 as may enable us to utilize her brave soldiers in the common 
 resistance to Russian aggression, with the consent of Eng- 
 lishmen, who loathe as much as we do the wretched rule of 
 the pachas in the outlying provinces of the Turkish empire. 
 We do not in the least believe that it is necessary to com- 
 mit ourselves to vague promises as to maintaining against 
 her subject races the integrity of the empire in order to 
 gain her assistance in keeping the Russians out of Asia Minor, 
 or in inflicting such blows upon Russia, if she recommences 
 the repudiation of treaties and the aggressive policy of the 
 past, as will keep her quiet for many a long day. It is 
 notorious that Turkey is now anxiously seeking admission 
 into the Central Alliance. It will almost certainly not be 
 granted to her — and we do not think that it ought to be 
 granted to her on the terms on which other Powers enter 
 into that alliance. Nevertheless it may be possible to agree 
 with Turkey to assist her in preventing Russia from carry- 
 ing out further aggression in Asia Minor, on condition of 
 
 sion of the insiirrection he had fomented the local militia instead of the 
 Turkish regulars, were masterpieces of their kind. The knowledge he 
 thus showed of the possible deviltries which the sectarian zeal of Bulga- 
 rian Verts might be trusted to work on men of their own race, with whom 
 they had carried on a feud for centuries, was marvellous. His cynical 
 appreciation of the effect of his action upon the conscience of Europe was 
 only equalled by the cynicism with which he subsequently worked for 
 political purposes the deviltries of the Jew-baiting. In his person Russia 
 decorated the supreme leader in both crimes. We have never been able 
 to understand why the volume known as "Les Responsabilites," in which 
 the whole story of Ignatieff's action at Constantinople was set forth, was 
 never published or in any way made known in England. 
 
Italy, Turkey, and EnglisJi Alliances. 185 
 
 her assisting us in attacking the Russian lines of communi- 
 cation should Russia move on India. 
 
 On the one side of Europe, Russia can now only ap- 
 proach Constantinople over the free Balkan States, or by 
 sea. We think Sir Charles Dilke will admit that towards a 
 European prohibition of Constantinople to Russia on that 
 side, we can lend, if not the most powerful assistance that 
 any State can contribute, at least an aid which is second to 
 none. That the English, Italian, and Turkish navies can, 
 even when the very formidable fleet which Russia is provid- 
 ing in the Black Sea is complete, prohibit approach to 
 Varna or Constantinople, ought not to be open to question. 
 Whether that is an assistance which Roumania can offer in 
 such an event to Austria, we shall not insult our readers by 
 discussing. 
 
 We are not impressed by the knowledge as to the mili- 
 tary facts of the 1877-78 campaign which has been shown by 
 Sir Charles Dilke, whoever may have been his military ad- 
 visers. He, in the form of a question, wishes to destroy the 
 basis of an argument of ours, of some importance to the 
 general position we have taken up. For the purpose of dis- 
 closing the weakness of his thesis, it will be convenient to 
 extract from the question the logical position it involves. 
 
 Major premise — Some generals, who knew nothing of 
 the condition of the Austrian and Prussian armies in 1866, 
 felt sure that Austria must beat Prussia. 
 
 Minor premise— Yet Prussia beat Austria. 
 
 Therefore it is clear that no knowledge, however com- 
 plete, and however fully confirmed at present by historical 
 documents, of the condition of the Russian army in Turkey 
 in 1878, and of the strength of the English forces that could 
 have been landed in the neighborhood of Constantinople, 
 can now enable any soldiers to say that in 1878 England was 
 in a position to have prohibited Russian approach to Con- 
 
1 86 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 stantinople. Deduction, — Such fools are all soldiers! We 
 shall not reply; but leave Lord Macaulay's school boy to 
 do so. 
 
 The question, however, next arises, whether Italy and 
 England can lend to Turkey a support in the Black Sea. 
 and in Asia Minor, which will enable us to forbid Russian 
 approach on the Asiatic side towards Constantinople, and to 
 utilize the Turkish troops. 
 
 We should attach more importance to Sir Charles Dilke's 
 very confident assertions of our impotence, if he had shown 
 that he knew even a little of the present condition of the 
 Turkish army. To judge of the prospects of a race or a 
 battle from a knowledge of the efforts at training of only 
 one of the competitors, is after all, not to bet on a certainty. 
 Sir Charles, from similar one-sided knowledge, evidently 
 thinks that he is in that happy position. Now we have 
 strong reason to believe that Turkey can even now put 
 something like 300,000 effective soldiers, complete in all 
 arms, into the field in Europe alone, without calling upon 
 her Asiatic subjects. If that is so, considering that the far 
 greater proportion of her fighting population resides in Asia 
 Minor, it is not hard to believe, as we also have reason to 
 think, that she is steadily working up to a standard, which 
 will enable her to put an effective army, in all, more than 
 700,000 strong in the field. 
 
 We entirely agree with Sir Charles Dilke that if the 
 numbers of the Turkish soldiery that can be provided out of 
 this force to contend with Russia in Asia Minor are not ade- 
 quate, we can add to them nothing in point of numbers that 
 will justify us in speaking of protecting the Asiatic domin- 
 ions of Turkey. But on the other hand, both Russia and 
 Turkey know well that we more easily than any other Power 
 can lend such aid in such a contest as will simply turn the 
 scale of victory and defeat. We can enable Turkey to main- 
 tain her armies in the field in a country where efificiency of 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 187 
 
 condition and facility of supply are more important than 
 numbers, and where numbers that cannot be supplied and 
 fed are utterly useless. We can supply officers that can be 
 trusted, many of whom can speak Turkish. The two corps 
 and the cavalry division of which we have spoken, serv- 
 ing as the nucleus of a force of Turks as large as the 
 complete command of the sea would enable us to furnish 
 and supply, would, in despite of Sir Charles Dilke's confi- 
 dent assertions, be able to act in those regions with decisive 
 effect upon Russian action in India. 
 
 We know what we are talking about.* For the reasons 
 we have already given, we utterly refuse to enter into fur- 
 ther details for the benefit of our enemies. Here, as in the 
 case of the European alliance, we say it is far better for us 
 to develop and use such strength and force as may undoubt- 
 edly be ours, than to strain at the development of a force 
 which will be delusive, and will involve us in confusion 
 worse confounded. There is one principle which we venture 
 to think we may at least learn from the Germans, if the 
 common sense of our own people does not furnish us with 
 sufficient arguments for it — and that is, not to be perpetu- 
 ally reversing the methods on which we work with our army. 
 One, if not the greatest misfortune which has hitherto at- 
 tended the effort to bring our army up to the conditions of 
 modern warfare, has been the necessity for providing suc- 
 cessive Secretaries of State with the material for oratorical 
 effects. The principles needed for the mobilization of an 
 army are now as well understood as the laws of the game of 
 chess. What we want is to have them applied with business 
 like precision to our actual condition, as Mr. Smith was 
 
 * I retain this phrase, because I do not think it will be misunderstood 
 by any one but Sir Charles Dilke. I mean simply that I deliberately ab- 
 stain from entering into details because I do not think it would be right 
 to enter into them, and not because I have not carefully considered 
 the question, or have not had the means of knowing what those think 
 who have had even better means of judging of it. 
 
1 88 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 striving to do during his unfortunately short tenure of the 
 War Office. When we know what we want, the thing is act- 
 ually to get it. We have endeavored to show in what direc- 
 tion our efforts can be most economically and effectively 
 employed. We feel a little disposed to borrow from a 
 speech delivered some years ago by Mr. Grant Duff, when 
 member from the Elgin burghs. What we want from those 
 who mean to have the army put on a sound basis is that 
 they should "vote straight," and work to get others to "vote 
 straight," not for a party but for the nation. 
 
 Before, however, we draw together the points which we 
 are most anxious to enforce, we must recur to a matter to 
 which we alluded when speaking of the defence of Italy on 
 the land frontier. There is a service to the cause of Italian 
 defence which it ought not to be beyond the power of uni- 
 ted European diplomacy to render her. Among the few 
 remnants of the Treaty of Vienna, we thihk that most Eng- 
 lishmen assume that the neutrality of Switzerland has at 
 least remained a part of the public law of Europe. Now, by 
 one of the protocols of the Vienna Congress, "toutes les fois 
 que les puissances voisines de la Suisse seront en hostilite 
 ouverte ou imminente," Switzerland was authorized, for the 
 purpose of neutralization, to occupy the districts of Cha- 
 blais, Faucigny, and other named parts of Savoy. Nothing 
 in the transfer of Savoy and Nice to France in i860 altered 
 this condition of European law. Switzerland has recently 
 claimed the right to execute this protocol in the event of 
 imminent war. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the im- 
 portance to Italy of having this question at least settled on 
 a clear basis. Upper Savoy in the possession of France, and 
 with the free right to use it, allows a French army to men- 
 ace Italian concentration in Piedmont by the Simplon, and 
 to turn the Swiss defences by taking them in rear by Fri- 
 burg and Berne, so as to fall upon the left flank of a Ger- 
 man army between Basle and Schaffhausen. Clearly, both 
 Italy and Germany have a right to understand whether this 
 
Italy, Tnrkey, and English Alliances. 189 
 
 neutralized ground remains sacred from war or not. Left 
 in the condition in which the question at present stands, 
 with French troops trained to use this very ground in the 
 teeth of treaties,* this nominal neutralization itself prevents 
 either State from taking effective measures to protect them- 
 selves against the risk. It appears to us that we at least 
 ought not to object to have any refusal to allow Switzerland 
 to occupy this ground under the conditions of the protocol, 
 considered as one of the casus belli which would be regarded 
 as of common interest by all the members of the great al- 
 liance whose effective creation on fixed terms we desire. 
 
 As to China, we have little to add to what Sir Charles 
 Dilke has said, except to express our strong agreement with 
 him as to the importance to us of securing, as against Rus- 
 sia, that alliance in its most effective form. Nevertheless, 
 we venture to think that here, as elsewhere, we must give if 
 we wish to take. If it had been possible, with the full con- 
 sent of China, to retain Port Hamilton — still more if it had 
 been possible, with due regard to the vast number of our dis- 
 
 * I do not, of course, mean that it is expressly contrary to treaty for 
 Frencli troops to be drilled on this ground, but that their local training to 
 an employment of ground which would be valueless except by a violation 
 of treaty is too significant not to suggest the purpose for which it is de- 
 signed. It is a training to a use of this ground, which, if ever put into 
 warlike practice, would be contrary to treaty. Sir Charles Dilke, in with- 
 drawing a charge he had made of incorrectness against my statement, has 
 declared that he looks upon the training of French troops in the military 
 use of neutralized ground as equivalent to "the training of Prussian 
 guards at Potsdam." The difference between the two kinds of military 
 training is clearly a question for soldiers. I directly deny the soundness 
 of Sir Charles Dilke"s position, and I unhesitatingly submit the question 
 to the military opinion of Europe. Drilling upon a parade ground is one 
 thing; local practice in the military knowledge of mountain passes and a 
 mountain district is another — one which can be only acquired in that dis- 
 trict itself. The very acquisition of that special knowledge by troops be- 
 comes suspicious when it would be \iseless unless treaties were violated, 
 and when a violation of treaty would give immense military advantage to 
 the troops so trained. That is now the case in neutralized Savoy. 
 
r90 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 persed fortresses in distant seas and to their efficient de- 
 fence, to make Port Hamilton into a strong fortress — we 
 should have quite agreed with him as to the importance of 
 gaining that foothold for enabling our fleet to cross any 
 Russian movement from Vladivostock upon Australia. But 
 we cannot believe that what Mr. Carlyle used to call " pre- 
 ternatural suspicion" is the wise attitude for those who are 
 not engaged in carrying on difficult negotiations as against 
 those who are, so long as the critics are flying the banner 
 of patriotism against party, and are appealing to their coun- 
 trymen on those terms. Preternatural suspicion is, of 
 course, the established function of " her Majesty's Opposi- 
 tion." So long as Sir Charles Dilke professes to write on 
 party principles, these and many other strokes are intelligi- 
 ble enough. They are a part of a game that we know. A 
 government has plenty of provision against such. What we 
 object to is the sheep's-clothing of appeal to those who, 
 like ourselves, do not accept those principles in a matter of 
 national concern. Our own belief is, that which ever party 
 had been in. Port Hamilton would have been surrendered 
 when it was found that our occupation offended the Chinese. 
 
 Sir Charles Dilke thinks that, in maintaining that it is 
 to the interest of England not to abandon Belgium if Bel 
 gium does not abandon herself, we have added further proof 
 of the necessity for revolutionary change in our military 
 system.* We believe on the contrary, that the broad prin- 
 ciple which underlies our contention — the great alliance for 
 the maintainance of treaty rights — is the only one which 
 will enable us to maintain our empire without changes which 
 would affect to a revolutionary extent our domestic as much 
 as our military condition. England, known as the support 
 of the minor seaboard States, possesses a power which she 
 loses from the moment that she abandons that position. 
 
 * "Fortnightly," November 1887, p. 610. 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. igi 
 
 We have said our say as to Belgium, and shall not return to 
 the subject ; but there is another question closely allied to 
 it. If Denmark has to choose between an alliance with 
 France or with Germany, the temptation to her to join 
 France, if only she thinks France strong enough to win, 
 must necessarily be very great. If Denmark has to choose 
 between an alliance with England and Germany on one side 
 and France on the other, it is tolerably certain that she will 
 be wise enough to prefer the Anglo-German alliance. Nor 
 does it, in that case, seriously matter to any nation except 
 herself what decision she may arrive at in the matter. Her 
 neutrality, at least, would be enforced. Now, as may be 
 seen by any one who will refer to the official history of the 
 war of 1870, during the earlier part of the war — that is up to 
 the end of July — Germany, fully expecting that France 
 would attempt an incursion by sea, retained the whole mo- 
 bilized force of 1st, 2d, 4th, and 5th corps — that is, at least 
 120,000 men — ready to meet such an invasion. Denmark is 
 able to put about 60,000 men behind very effective fortifica- 
 tions in a country hard to invade. Now, suppose France 
 and Russia — having full command of the sea — ship, as they 
 well may, to a friendly country 50,000 men each to reinforce 
 the Danish 60,000, we have an army of 160,000 men, with 
 indefinite possibilities of reinforcement, concentrated in a 
 position whence they could strike straight for Berlin and 
 the heart of the German empire. 
 
 It must be remembered that in all that we have said as 
 to our disbelief as to the overwhelming forces which Russia 
 could employ against Germany or Austria, the single rea- 
 son we have alleged has been the difficulty of movement 
 and supply. There is no question as to the vast number of 
 troops which Russia has available. Therefore we think 
 we shall be understoood when we say that the troops which 
 Russia could thus ship to Denmark, however numerous 
 they ultimately became, would substract nothing from 
 the numbers she could pour directly over the German 
 
192 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 frontier. Yet for Germany the whole of this danger van- 
 ishes when she has secured the English alliance. We are 
 convinced that we understate the fact when we say that, in 
 any war against Russia and France, Germany must, for the 
 defence of her coasts and to fend herself from the risks of 
 such an attack as we have described, subtract 200,000 men 
 from the armies of the East and West. Therefore here is a 
 figure of at least 200,000 men whom we can add to the mili- 
 tant forces available for the central alliance. Moreover, here 
 as elsewhere we can act quicker than any other Power. From 
 the moment that our alliance is known to be secured, all 
 danger of this Russo-Franco-Danish action based on Den- 
 mark vanishes. German generals can work out their cam- 
 paign at once with the full addition of the 200,000 men 
 whom otherwise they must subtract from offensive war. 
 
 We have now stated our case. We have shown: 
 
 1. That, by the assistance we can afford to Italy, by 
 protecting the German coasts, and by forbidding Denmark 
 to lend herself as a base to Russia and France, we can give 
 to the central alliance a support which is worth more to it 
 than half a million of men. More than that number, because 
 the question of Memel, Konigsberg, and Danzig is not in- 
 cluded in that estimate. 
 
 2. That we can also contribute more than our share 
 towards protecting Constantinople and Varna from attack 
 on the European side, because the easiest approach to both 
 of them is by sea. We have left it to our readers to judge 
 for themselves whether the complete possession of the 
 Black Sea, as against the complete loss of it, would not be 
 worth to Austria something of importance in addition to 
 this assistance. 
 
 3. Whether, when we have these advantages to offer 
 her, Germany is likely to care to violate Belgian territory if 
 we object to her doing so, we leave it to our readers to de- 
 
Italy, Turkey, and Ejiglish Alliances. 193 
 
 termine. As a question of the principle of maintaining 
 treaty rights, which is the single principle on which a secure 
 alliance can be based, we think that if Belgium fulfills her 
 part, we ought not to abandon her, and that our abandon- 
 ment of her would greatly weaken us. 
 
 4. In all that we have spoken of above, we have almost 
 exclusively insisted upon what our navy can do if it is as 
 strong as it ought to be. If, in addition to the above, we 
 can place a small but highly organized force of two corps 
 (Tarmee and a cavalry division where we please, on the out- 
 break of war, and can supply what is needed to render the 
 Turkish forces effective to resist Russia, we believe we shall 
 be in a condition to make such terms with other Powers as 
 will prevent either Russia or France from attacking us 
 either at Herat or elsewhere. 
 
 That is the position on the one side. It is virtually a 
 permanent security for peace on condition of our making up 
 our minds, now that the circumstances under which we 
 adopted the principle of insular exclusiveness have changed, 
 to change that principle of our policy. 
 
 On the other hand, if we will not do so, we run at least 
 the almost infinite risk of having, by ourselves and with 
 our own strength alone, to resist Russia, and very probably 
 Russia and France, under circumstances most disadvantage- 
 ous to ourselves. We shall not, as against Russia, be able 
 to put forth anything like the same strength that we can put 
 forth in support of other Powers, who can deliver against 
 her far more effective blows than we can. 
 
 Meantime, while neither Austria nor Italy in the small- 
 est degree disguise their wish that we should join their al- 
 liance, Germany, while she has, with perhaps the exception 
 of Italy, more to gain by it than any other Power, shows 
 clearly that she is anxious for it, while, as it has been well 
 
194 Italy, Turkey, and Ejiglish Alliances. 
 
 put to us, " she scoffs at it like a skillful purchaser in an 
 Eastern bazaar." 
 
 The reason is clear. She knows that she has to deal 
 with English statesmen who, whichever party may be in 
 office, do not understand, or attempt to understand, the mil- 
 itary bearings of the question. All her statesmen, under- 
 standing these perfectly, feel that they are in the position 
 of a horse dealer wanting to buy a horse from a man who 
 knows nothing about the points of his own animal. We can 
 if we understand the advantages we have to offer, make 
 what terms we please. 
 
 When we first saw the announcement of the anonymous 
 articles which were appearing in the "Fortnightly," we hail- 
 ed them with eager pleasure. They seemed to promise that 
 at last some man well acquainted with many of the inner work- 
 ings of foreign politics, and with the interior of our own For- 
 eign Office, was attempting to master also the military prob- 
 lems involved in our foreign relations. Having for years at- 
 tempted to urge that study upon such politicians as fate has 
 thrown in his way, the present writer, as a soldier, certainly 
 did not ask for the apology which Sir Charles Dilke has offer- 
 ed for making the attempt, nor does he know one soldierwho 
 has not welcomed the effort. When, however, he found 
 that, under guise of patriotism, party spirit was rampant; 
 when under the name of facts, fictions were put forward; 
 when no one of the points so all important to England as 
 to the part she can now play in ensuring peace were noticed, 
 — it seemed to him to be the time to put forth a warning 
 voice. If the Italian statesmen are wrong in thinking that 
 a great naval alliance is what will best serve their turn; if 
 Germany will not require to be protected at sea, for the rea- 
 sons we have assigned; if the frontiers of Germany, of 
 Russia, and of France are not such as we have shown them 
 to be, — our errors can be easily exposed. If, on the other 
 hand, what we have said is true, we think that a patriotic 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 195 
 
 statesman should admit the truth of those points which have 
 been omitted from his calculations. Our anxiety through- 
 out has been to give such of our readers as have not seen 
 Sir Charles Dilke's pages a fair account of what he has put 
 forward, in order to show how far we agreed with him, and 
 where we differed. In hardly any instances as yet has his 
 method of reply to us consisted in anything else than in al- 
 leging that we had said that which we had not anywhere 
 said, and in arguing against that which we do not believe.* 
 
 * The most audacious statement of this kind is the averment that the 
 articles were written "in the name of the Adjutant-General of the Army" 
 ("Fortnightly," November 1887, p. 611). Our readers will have seen that 
 there was not even a pretext for this assertion. A direct misquotation 
 from a public speech of Lord Wolseley's had been made in inverted com 
 mas by Sir Charles Dilke. We challenged Sir Charles Dilke to show that 
 the words he bad quoted were to be found in any short hand writers re- 
 port of the speech. He was utterly unable to show that Lord Wolseley 
 had ever used the words which he had repeatedly quoted. Under these 
 circumstances we submit that, for a man who considers himself bound by 
 ordinary laws of civilized society in England, there is only one course 
 open — viz., to withdraw and apologize for what, under the circumstances, 
 was a very grave slander. In order, however, that by no subterfuge we 
 might take advantage of Sir Charles Dilke' shaving made a rather careless 
 quotation, which he could not substantiate, we, for that express purpose, 
 inquired personally of Lord Wolseley, to what matters he was referring 
 when he spoke of our recent reforms as having been business like and di- 
 rected towards getting rid of the "theatrical" element. For that purpose, 
 and that purpose only, throughout the entire series of articles, we quoted 
 a private statement of Lord Wolseley's. The complete report of the na- 
 ture of the reforms had not been made public, and we were therefore, for 
 the purposes of this personal explanation, for which, under the circum- 
 stances, it was natural for any one to ask, obliged to say that Lord Wolse- 
 ley referred to quite other matters. What those were is now evident to 
 every one who has read General Brackenbury's evidence. 
 
 The most comic case in which Sir Charles has thus dealt with our state- 
 ments is one in which he has charged us with a ludicrous blunder which 
 we did not commit, but which he did. He says, p. 620, November 1887 
 "Fortnightly," that we had made a statement to the effect that we might 
 rely upon the native States of India in the event of war with Russia, and 
 make use of them against that Power. — an opinion in direct conflict with 
 
196 Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 That, no doubt, will be very convincing to those readers of 
 the " Fortnightly" who have not looked at our articles. It 
 will, we fancy, produce a different effect upon those who 
 read both. 
 
 In conclusion, we have this to say: Whether it be a 
 partisan opinion or not, there are numbers of us, who never 
 cared a rush for party before, who are looking to the pres- 
 ent government in the hope that, taking all its elements into 
 consideration, it is going to be thoroughly national in its 
 policy. Nothing could have tended to inspire us with more 
 hope in that respect than the business like way in which 
 
 that of the Indian Commission "who pointed out in their report that the 
 friendship of an Indian prince is no defence against the hostility of his 
 people." Sir Charles never gives references, so that none of his charges 
 can be compared by an ordinary reader with the original. If we have 
 been in any case unfair to him, the correction is easy, for we give the re- 
 ferences. Now what we did in this matter — ante, p. 98 — was to quote Sir 
 Lepel Griffin on a point on which we venture to think his authority higher 
 than that of most Indian soldiers. He had said that we might, in the 
 event of war with Russia, rely upon the loyalty of the feudatory princes 
 of India. We said nothing about the extent to which they could carry 
 their people with them, or about the military value of their assistance ; 
 but we said that the fact of their loyalty was an element of our strength 
 "not to be ignored." We expressly reserved discussion, because we ex- 
 pect to have an opportunity of saying something about it elsewhere. 
 
 Now on pp. 171,172 of "The Present Position of European Politics," 
 there is an elaborate discussion of the effect of the native army and the 
 " sympathies of t?ie oriental populations " upon the chances of a contest be- 
 tween us and Russia. After setting forth the views of foreign writers as 
 to the chance of these both being easily won by Russia, Sir Charles, as his 
 leading argument against that opinion, says, " I believe in the superior 
 popularity of England among the native princes to any which may be 
 thought to be enjoyed by Russia." 
 
 We certainly should not have ventured to use that argument in the 
 way Sir Charles Dilke has done, because we have been long aware of 
 the facts which he appears to have discovered between the publication of 
 "The Present Position of European Politics" and that of the article in 
 the November number of the "Fortnightly." Nevertheless we continue 
 to think, with Sir Lepel Griffin, that the loyalty of the native princes is 
 
Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 197 
 
 Mr. Smith was setting himself to work to secure untheatri- 
 cal reality in matters of vital importance to the country. 
 Nothing will more utterly shake our faith than any looking 
 back by those who have set their hands to the plow. The 
 government have been going bravely forward in Ireland, and 
 have gained strength in proportion to their courage, in the 
 face of such encouragement to lawlessness as we have never 
 seen before. They have inspired confidence by their firm- 
 ness in London. But it is idle to deny that many of those 
 who wish them best are afraid that both at the Admiralty 
 and the War OfTfice Lord Randolph's escapade has had too 
 much influence. The government perfectly well know how 
 very much truth there is in the charges against our condition 
 of preparedness which both Lord Randolph Churchill and 
 Sir Charles Dilke have made. In a very short time indeed, 
 if they do not carry out into practice the reforms which 
 
 an element " not to be ignored," though we neither allege that it carries 
 with it the affection of the populations, nor a very great access of military 
 power as the defence of India is at present constituted. 
 
 We cannot weary our readers with more specimens; but after these, and 
 those to which the course of our argument has led us in the body of the 
 text, we think that we may fairly ask that no statement of our words shall 
 be accepted, without reference, on Sir Charles Dilke' s authority. The curi- 
 ous in specimens of unfair quotation may compare Sir Charles' statement, 
 November "Fortnightly," p. 612, as to our expressions about Lord Salis- 
 bury's and Lord Rosebery's policy, with ante, p. 48. It is needless to say 
 that we in no wise denied the continuity of the two policies, but objected 
 that a man who claimed independence of ^party should ignore the history 
 of the previous years of foreign policy to which we alluded. Or they 
 may compare his reference to the question of the 900 field-guns, p. 613, 
 with our words, ante, pp. 79-86. 
 
 It would not, however, be fair to complain too much. Sir Charles 
 has been trained by the habit of speaking in the heated meetings of parti- 
 sans who, provided their opponents are roundly abused, are not nicely 
 particular as to facts. The training of the present writer for such dis- 
 cussion has consisted chiefly in having to supply facts as accurate as pos- 
 sible, because on their accuracy the lives of men might depend. It is nat- 
 ural that we should approach controversy from different points. 
 
igS Italy, Turkey, and English Alliances. 
 
 have been worked out on paper under Mr. Smith's impulse, 
 they will be responsible when the hour of reckoning comes, 
 which is now fast approaching. We have cautiously 
 throughout spoken, not of what our navy is, but of what it 
 ought to be. We have as cautiously spoken of the two corps 
 (Varniie and the cavalry division towards which we were work- 
 ing. The reduction of the Horse Artillery will have been 
 an inexcusable blunder if, in return for that great sacrifice, 
 we are not to find, when the next Army Estimates are pre- 
 sented, that actual progress has been made towards a real 
 and effective provision tor the mobilization of those forces. 
 It is idle to deny that numbers of our best naval officers 
 are alarmed by the announcement that no more ironclads 
 are to be built. We have not written these articles for the 
 sake of crying "Peace, peace," where there is no peace. We 
 have endeavored to show in what way most economically 
 the terrible dangers which we must face can be met and 
 dealt with. We do not believe in the policy of taking more 
 upon our shoulders than we need take. Nevertheless this 
 much is certain, that if we do not help ourselves no other 
 Power will help us. If we cannot and will not give help, we 
 cannot get help. It is a question simply of securing for a 
 moderate price the incalculable blessings of peace, or of be- 
 ing involved in certainly the most costly, and probably the 
 most fatal, war in which we have ever been engaged. 
 
NBEX 
 
 A' Court, Captain, on the military 
 resources of Italy, 165. 
 
 Adriauople, the Russian force be- 
 yond, 44. 
 
 Alsace-Lorraine, annexation of, 39. 
 
 "Amphibious strength, our," 24 
 
 Apponyi, Count, on the attitude of 
 England, 182. 
 
 Armed- force, the work of oiir, 31. 
 
 Armies, the field, of Europe, 148 
 — Russian numbers v. Austrian, 
 143. 
 
 Armies, transport of, by sea, 52. 
 
 Army Act, alteration of the, 29. 
 
 Army-corps scheme, the eight, 63. 
 
 Artillery, field, and its use, 21. 
 
 Artillery, volunteer. 59 — Sir Ed- 
 ward Hamley on, 59 — the field, 60 
 — Russian do., 70 — reduction of 
 English horse, would be a blun- 
 der, 198. 
 
 Asia Minor, the danger of, 179 — can 
 Britain protect? 186. 
 
 Australian colonies, 24. 
 
 Australian colonies, Russian designs 
 on our, 66. 
 
 Austria in historic wars, 137 — the 
 races of, 140 — her great soldiers, 
 140 — her commanding position, 
 141. 
 
 Austrian defence, 145. 
 
 Austrian strength, 137— effect of 
 recent changes on Austrian power, 
 138 — recent, fortification, 141 — 
 forces, 142 — inferiority of Aus 
 trian rifles to those of Russia, 144, 
 
 Austro-German frontier, the, 122. 
 
 Baikov, Colonel, on the Russian 
 cavalry, 69. 
 
 "Balance of power," meaning of, 
 as formerly used, 29 — a fictitious, 
 31 — when our pledge was broken, 
 36 et seq. 
 
 Balance of military power in Europe 
 the, 29 et seq. 
 
 Balkan States, the, 183. 
 
 Baltic fortresses, German, 126. 
 
 Beaconsfield's, Lord, Government, 
 and the defence of coaling sta- 
 tions, 6. 
 
 Belgian neutrality, 106 — Von Molt- 
 ke's view of, in 1870, 109. 
 
 Belgium and England, 106 — time 
 '0. violation of Belgium, 106 — rail- 
 way difficulty of violation, 108 — 
 our relation to Belgium, 111 — Mr. 
 Kinglake and Lord Salisbury on, 
 111 — the latest pledge to, 112 — 
 duty of England towards, 190. 
 
 Beresford, Lord Charles, 22. 
 
200 
 
 Index. 
 
 Berlin Congress, the, 36. 
 
 Bismarck's, Prince, sons, 85 — his 
 advocacy of an Italian alliance, 
 168 — Sir Charles Dilke's errone- 
 ous views regarding the opinions 
 of, 175. 
 
 Blind, Karl, on Poland, 125. 
 
 Boulanger, General, and mobiliza- 
 tion, 103 — his gaseous froth, 115. 
 
 Brackenbury, General, on the 
 scheme of defence, 56 et seq. 
 
 Budget, an economical, 61. 
 
 Bridge, the Russian, on the Vistula, 
 130. 
 
 Bright, Mr., and the "balance of 
 Power," 117, 
 
 British army the cheapest in the 
 world, 12. 
 
 British war power, 51 — how to de- 
 velop it, 52. 
 
 Bunsen, Herr von, on Mr. Glad- 
 stone, 174. 
 
 Campaign of 1877-78, the military 
 facts of, 185. 
 
 Camps, intrenched, 100. 
 
 Carpathians, the, a natural citadel 
 to Austria, 141. 
 
 Cavalry, Russian, 69 — Austrian do., 
 144. 
 
 Cavalry, the proper use of, 18. 
 
 Channel Tunnel, the, 19. 
 
 China, conditions of an alliance 
 with, 189. 
 
 Chinese Wall, the, 105. 
 
 Churchill, Lord Randolph, his Wol- 
 verhampton speech, 44 et seq. — 
 on the state of our defences, 55 — 
 his deceptive comparison of the 
 army budgets of Britian and Ger- 
 many, 88. 
 
 Clive's economy, 78. 
 Coaling stations, 173 — and partis- 
 anship, 174. 
 
 Coaling Stations, foreign, 53. 
 
 Commerce, our strength and weak- 
 ness, 71. 
 
 Comora Lslands, the French occu- 
 pation of the, 153. 
 
 Comparisons, true and false, 86. 
 
 Confidence, French and German, 
 116. 
 
 Constantinople, the Russian ap- 
 proach to, 185 — British protec- 
 tion of, and Varna, 192. 
 
 Continental armies, the dimensions 
 of the, 180. 
 
 Continental war, importance of, the 
 first days of a, 1 75. 
 
 Controversy, the necessities of, 194. 
 
 Cyprus, the occupation of, 36, 40. 
 
 Danish army, strength of the, 49. 
 
 Danish war, the story of the, 40. 
 
 Defence, the rival schemes of, 56. 
 
 Defences, grave deficiencies in the 
 condition of our, 55. 
 
 Denmark, the attitude of, 191. 
 
 Diego Suarez, the French occupa- 
 tion of, 153. 
 
 Dilke, Sir Charles, on "the position 
 of European politics," 7, 30 et 
 seq. — his blunders, 194e^s<'5'. — his 
 misrepresentation of Lord Wolse- 
 ley, 195 note. 
 
 Dragoons, the new Russian, 67 — 
 opinions on, 68. 
 
 Economy and efficiencj^ 78 — cost- 
 ly economy, 93. 
 
Index. 
 
 201 
 
 Education, questionable economy 
 in, 93 — recruits, non-commis- 
 sioned officers, and, 93. 
 
 Efficiency, army, English and Ger- 
 man, 94. 
 
 Egypt, the English force landed iu, 
 in 1883, 50. 
 
 Egyptian revolt, the, 50. 
 
 Elsass-Lothringen railways, 83. 
 
 Empire and commerce, 89. 
 
 England, the new power of, 164. 
 
 English power ' 'cometh but by sea, " 
 49, 180. 
 
 Europe, the war-map of, 34 — the 
 field-armies of, 143. 
 
 "Facing-both-ways, ' ' Mr. , 180. 
 
 Fighting, means of, 95. 
 
 Fleet, a strong English, a necessity, 
 172. 
 
 Force, the work of our armed, 31 
 — the reign of, in Europe, 35 — 
 British force depends on amphib- 
 ious strength, 64. 
 
 Fortresses, home, 53 — the forest of, 
 97— German and Baltic do., 126 
 — Russian do., 133. 
 
 French army of to-day, 114 — its 
 strength, 116. 
 
 French defence scheme, the, 97 — 
 its weak point, 100. 
 
 Frontiers, French and German, 96 
 — German and Russian do. , 122. 
 
 Geok Tepe, the defeat of, 156. 
 
 German and Baltic fortresses, 126. 
 
 German and English economy, 76. 
 
 German and Russian frontiers, the, 
 122 — recent changes, 122 — ad- 
 vantage of German frontier, 135. 
 
 German army of to-day, 114 — do., 
 of 1870 and 1888, 1 15— its strength, 
 116. 
 
 German defence scheme, the, 98 
 — do. silent work, 103 — the, op- 
 portunity, 104. 
 
 German empire, ring-fenced, 88. 
 
 German pension-list, 83. 
 
 "Germanic Confederation, over- 
 throw of the," Sir A. Malet's, 39. 
 
 Germany, why, needs Austria, 136 
 — position of, in a war with Rus- 
 sia and France combined, 146 — 
 her power of transfer of force 
 and of gaining time, 148 — her 
 power of keeping two "fretful 
 realms" in awe, 150 — the great 
 and conservative power of, 158. 
 
 Germany, France and Belgium, 75. 
 
 Germany, Russia and Austria, 121. 
 
 Gladstone, Mr. , his attitude on the 
 Danish question, 39 — Mr. Bright 
 on Mr. Gladstone's many turnings 
 of his coat, 39 — his influence on 
 Italy, 163. 
 
 Graham, Sir Lumley, 124. 
 
 Granville, Lord, on the Belgian 
 question, 112. 
 
 Griffin, Sir Lepel, on the feudatory 
 princes of India, 71. 
 
 Guns, big, and loose critics, 59. 
 
 Hagenau on the British strength in 
 
 Egypt, 65. 
 Hamilton, Port, the surrender of, 
 
 152 — its importance, 189. 
 Hamley, Sir Edward, on volunteer 
 
 artillery, 59. 
 Harcourt, Sir William Vernon, on 
 
 the "Jingoes," 41. 
 Hardy, Mr., on defence work, 63. 
 
202 
 
 Index. 
 
 Hartington, Lord, on the danger in 
 Asia Minor, 179. 
 
 Herat, how to protect, 154. 
 
 Heri Rud, the, 12. 154. 
 
 Hong-Kong, 11. 
 
 Hooper's, Mr., history of the Sedan 
 campaign referred to, 104. 
 
 Horsford's, Sir Alfred, scheme for 
 landing English troops in Den- 
 mark, 38. 
 
 Hungarian approval of English 
 policy, 178. 
 
 Hungary, patriotism in, 137. 
 
 IgnatiefE's action towards Turkey, 
 
 183 note. 
 India, British disadvantage in, 65 
 
 — our native army in, 89. 
 "Indian authorities," 153— do. on 
 
 Europe, 157. 
 Indian frontier, Russian menaces 
 
 on the, 65. 
 Infantry, the Russian, 66 — Russian 
 
 mounted do., 69. 
 Intrenched camps, true use of. 100. 
 Italian alliance, effect of an, on 
 
 British foreign policy, 183. 
 
 Italian power, use of the, 167. 
 
 Italian statesmen and Turkey, 182. 
 
 Italy, its enormous seaboard, 165 — 
 its war resources, 165 — alliance 
 of, Germany, Austria and Eng- 
 land, 168 — the probability of war 
 with Russia and France as allies, 
 171 — the naval service England 
 could offer to, 172 — German view 
 of Italian politics, 174. 
 
 Italy, Turkey and English alliances, 
 168. 
 
 Jena, Prussia before, 171. 
 
 "Jingo," the, 40 — use of the word. 
 41 — hopeless confusion of the 
 term, 42 — the author of, 117. 
 
 Kertch expedition, the, 50. 
 Kimberley, Lord, and the Danes, 36. 
 Kinglake, Mr., the lessons of the 
 
 Kertch expedition, 50 — on the 
 
 Belgian question, 112. 
 Kirchhammer, Captain, on the 
 
 Russo-German frontier, 124. 
 Knox's, Mr., knowledge of army 
 
 schemes, 89. 
 Kropotkine, Prince. 183. 
 
 Luxembourg, the neutrality of, 108. 
 
 Malleson, Colonel, on Russian ag- 
 gression in Asia, 65. 
 
 Malta; the Indian troops at, 44. 
 
 Marga, Captain, on Austrian de- 
 fence, 145. 
 
 Maurice's, C. Edmund, revolution- 
 ary movement of 1848-49 in Italy, 
 Austria, Hungary and Germany, 
 referred to, 140. 
 
 Medical men, the payment of, in 
 the army, 17. 
 
 Medical pension-list, 13. 
 
 Military power in Europe, balance 
 of, 29 et seq. 
 
 ' 'Military professors, ' ' press attacks 
 on, 19. 
 
 Mobilization, difficulties of English, 
 89 — the present scheme, 90 — 
 German do. in 1888, 103. 
 
 Moltke on the Russian dragoons, 
 68 — his position as head of the 
 "great staff," 95. 
 
•-r-^^f 
 
 Index. 
 
 203 
 
 Napoleon, Louis, on the causes of 
 the French disasters, 100. 
 
 Newfoundland coast question, 177. 
 
 Nihilism in Russia, 178. 
 
 Novikoff, Madame, and her faith- 
 ful henchman, 151. 
 
 Otway, Sir Arthur, and the balance 
 of power controversy, 117. 
 
 Pay in Germany, officers', 80 — do. 
 in England, 81. 
 
 Peace or war, 198. 
 
 Pension-list, the German, 83. 
 
 Perrucretti, Colonel, on French 
 power of transport of troops by 
 sea, 166. 
 
 Poland, Karl Blind on, 125— Rus- 
 sian fortresses in, 130 — Poland as 
 a theatre of war, 134 — the armies 
 that would engage, 135. 
 
 Polish mud Napoleon's great enemy 
 134, note. 
 
 Polish region, importance of, 126. 
 
 Position, author's own, 43. 
 
 Powers, strength of, 34 — English 
 power, 52 — how to develop it, 53 
 — navy, wires, harbours, mobil- 
 ity, 54 
 
 "Quarterly Review" on Russia, 
 150 et seq. 
 
 Railways, Russian, 124. 
 
 Recruits, non-commissioned officers 
 
 and education, 93. 
 Reserve forces, the, 60. 
 Rhine, the command of the, 99. 
 Ricci, Lieutenant-General, on the 
 
 natural strength of Italy, 165 — on 
 
 the Italian army, 165. 
 
 Roumanian army, the, 64. 
 
 Russell, Lord, on the defence of 
 Belgium, 112. 
 
 Russia, the broken pledges of, 177. 
 
 Russia and England, 49. 
 
 Russia's wedge, 127 — how met by 
 Germany, 127 — method for de- 
 fence and offence, 129 — when 
 should we strike her real power, 
 155 — her power of absorbing East- 
 ern countries, 156. 
 
 Russian base, weakness of, 132. 
 
 Russian forces in 1878, 43 — our 
 power to stop them, 44 — condi- 
 tion of the Russian army, 66 — dis- 
 belief as to the overwhelmimg 
 forces which Russia is said to be 
 able to employ against Germany 
 and Austria, 191. 
 
 Russian frontier, the, 122. 
 
 Salaries, civil, 80. 
 
 Salisbury, Lord, on the foreign pol- 
 icy of Britain, 112. 
 
 Savoy, neutral, 188. 
 
 Schemes, the rival, and their auth- 
 ors, 53, 
 
 Seaboard States, the minor, 191. 
 
 Secrecy in State and camp, 151. 
 
 Sedan campaign, the, 104. 
 
 Services, cheap and dear, 78 — 
 money cost of universal, 85 . 
 
 Shakespeare, General, 62. 
 
 Silesia, importance of, 131. 
 
 Singapore, 10. 
 
 Situation, danger of present, 178. 
 
 Smith's, Mr. W. H., work as a mili 
 tary reformer, 56, 174. 
 
 Soldiers from a dear market, 87. 
 
 "Staff, the great general," 95. 
 
204 
 
 Index. 
 
 Stanhope's, Mr., defence scheme, 
 63. 
 
 Stephen's, Sir James Fitz-James. 
 commission, 31 et fteq. 
 
 Strength and weakness, our, 33. 
 
 Switzerland, and the Vienna Con- 
 gress, 188. 
 
 Switzerland, is, safe"? 110. 
 
 Taxation, methods of, 84. 
 
 Telegraphic orders for the move- 
 ment of troops, 176. 
 
 Thiers, M., bis power in France 
 after the fall of the Commune, 
 121— on the law of right, 179. 
 
 Thompson's, Sir Ralph, salary and 
 services, 79. 
 
 Transport of armies by sea, 52. 
 
 Trevelyan, Sir Charles, his respons- 
 ibility for the misery, the ex- 
 travagance, and loss of life in the 
 Crimean winter, 23. 
 
 Turkey and the Central Alliance, 
 184. 
 
 Turkish army, the condition of the, 
 186— its strength, 187. 
 
 Turkish Empire, the maintenance 
 of the, 184. 
 
 Turkish war of 1877-78, the, 31. 
 
 United States expenditure. 13. 
 Universal service, money cost of, 
 85. 
 
 Upton, General (U. S.), on our 
 native army in India, 89. 
 
 Vantage, our, in Europe, 65. 
 
 Verestcbagin and Russia, 51. 
 
 Vienna, the treaty of, 188 et seq. 
 
 Vienna Congress, the, 188. 
 
 Vincent. Mr. Howard, on the ulti- 
 mate forces of the British Em- 
 pire, 31. 
 
 Vistula, Russian bridges over the, 
 130 — Russian advance by, 131. 
 
 Vladivostock. the importance of, 
 65, 70, 71. 
 
 Vosges, the difficulties of the, 149. 
 
 Wachs, Major, on the French fron- 
 tier fortresses, 98. 
 War map of Europe, the, 33. 
 War Office, practical work at the, 6 
 Warsaw camp, the, 123. 
 Waste, causes of, 91. 
 Welby, Sir Reginald, 23. 
 
 Wellington, Duke of, on prepara- 
 tion for war, 52. 
 
 Wolseley, Lord, his essay on the 
 past and present of the English 
 army, 7 — and the use of artillery, 
 62 — his opinion of Mr. Smith's 
 army reforms, 174 — Sir Charles 
 Dilke's misrepresentation of, 195 
 note. 
 
-M^i^^-;jm.jms^i^^^^\^^mi^\s^. 
 
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w«„^ 
 
 DUi DATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Printed 
 in USA 
 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES 
 
 0040292576 
 FEB 2 2 1954 
 
 940.9 
 
 1/14461 
 
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