///(^ / SYNOPSIS of the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes What It Is What It Means to World Peace What It Means to America Published by The League of Nations Non-Partisan Association 6 East 39th Street, New York, N. Y. 1 The text of the Geneva Protocol as re- printed herewith was approved by the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations and opened for Signature at Geneva on October 2, 1924. The synopsis of the Protocol was prepared by Dr. Manley O. Hudson, Bemis Pro- fessor of International Law, Harvard University. INTRODUCTION T he Protocol of Geneva is a treaty to outlaw war. That phrase now gains new significance. It is no longer merely a matter of public discussion, but has become a practical procedure for making war an international crime. The Protocol fills in gaps in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Its framers desire that all war in the future should be outside the pale of law, just as, during the past few centuries, fighting between individuals has been put outside the pale of law. If their methods should prove successful, fighting could lawfully be undertaken in the future only to defend the com- mon interests of all nations against attack. It may not be necessary for all nations to follow exactly the same course. What proves satisfactory for one continent may not prove satisfactory for another. In North America, we have long had an agreement with Canada for border disarmament. Per- haps the same kind of an agreement would not work in another part of the world, where conditions are different. In the Western hemisphere, we have long had the Pan-American Union. Perhaps this same method of international organization would not be sat- isfactory in another continent. But it is a significant fact that forty-eight nations have joined in framing the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and that eleven European nations have already signed it in an attempt as among themselves to establish a procedure which will meet their own ideas of security. Other nations will undoubtedly take part. The nations of North America can hardly fail to welcome an event so important, so fraught with possibil- ities for the peace of the future. There is no question today of the United States signing the Protocol. But there is a question of how we are to greet a serious effort made by other nations to meet in their own way the problem of establishing a secure peace. If they succeed in doing this, how- ever, there will also be the question of American participation in a World Conference on Disarmament. We should see to it that our country does not fail to participate in this ; for this is some- thing which does not involve us in any of the commitments which members of the League take upon themselves. In such a confer- ence we should be quite free to decide for ourselves how far we may go in this direction. 3 TEXT OF THE PROTOCOL* PREAMBLE Animated by the firm desire to ensure the maintenance of general peace and the security of nations whose existence, inde- pendence or territories may be threatened ; Recognizing the solidarity of the members of the interna- tional community ; Asserting that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and an international crime ; Desirous of facilitating the complete application of the sys- tem provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations for the pacific settlement of disputes between States and of ensuring the repression of international crimes; and For the purpose of realizing, as contemplated by Article 8 of the Covenant, the reduction of national armaments to the low- est point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations ; * Reprinted from the ofticial Document. The French and English texts are both authentic. 4 Comment on Preamble, par. 3. This declaration that aggressive war is an international crime is made for the first time in history. It is a realization of the American movement to outlaw war, in which Senator Borah, Professor John Dewey, of Columbia University and Mr. Salmon O. Levinson, a Chicago lawyer, have been active. Senator Borah introduced a resolution in the Senate on February 13, 1923, that war should be made a “public crime under the law of nations.” This has now been done by the Protocol. Comment on Preamble, par. 4. The Protocol is a separate treaty. It does not supersede or amend the Covenant. Rather, it supplements the covenant just as the Protocol establishing the World Court supplements it, and provides for actually doing what members of the League had already agreed to do. Comment on Preamble, par. 5. The League has had a special committee, called the Tem- porary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, at work for four years. Its efforts have shown that dis- armament depends on security, and that security depends on arbitration. Hence the Protocol links the three things — arbitration, security, disarmament. 5 The Undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, agree as follows : Article 1. The signatory States undertake to make every effort in their power to secure the introduction into the Covenant of amend- ments on the lines of the provisions contained in the following articles. They agree that, as between themselves, these provisions shall be binding as from the coming into force of the present Protocol and that, so far as they are concerned, the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations shall thenceforth have power to exercise all the rights and perform all the duties conferred upon them by the Protocol. « Article 2. The signatory States agree in no case to resort to war either with one another or against a State which, if the occasion arises, accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations in accord- ance with the provisions of the Covenant and of the present Protocol. Article 3. The signatory States undertake to recognize as compulsory, ipso facto and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the cases covered by paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, but with- out prejudice to the right of any State, when acceding to the special protocol provided for in the said Article and opened for signature on December 16th, 1920, to make reservations com- patible with the said clause. Accession to this special protocol, opened for signature on December 16th, 1920, must be given within the month following the coming into force of the present Protocol. States which accede to the present Protocol, after its coming 6 'Comment on Article 3. This binds the signatories to accept, within one month after the Protocol conies into force, the compulsory jurisdic- tion over legal disputes of the Permanent Court of Inter- national Justice. Such jurisdiction applies in the following cases (Art. 36 of the Court Statute) : 1) Interpretation of a treaty. 2) Any question of international law. 3) Determination of breach of any international obligation. 4) Reparation for such a breach. 7 into force, must carry out the above obligation -within the month following their accession. Article 4 . With a view to render more complete the provisions of para- graphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article 15 of the Covenant, the signatory States agree to comply with the following procedure: 1. If the dispute submitted to the Council is not settled by it as provided in paragraph 3 of the said Article 15, the Council shall endeavor to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or arbitration. 2. (a) If the parties cannot agree to do so, there shall, at the request of at least one of the parties, be constituted a Committee of Arbitrators. The Committee shall so far as possible be constituted by agreement between the parties. (&) If within the period fixed by the Council the parties have failed to agree, in whole or in part, upon the number, the names and the powers of the arbitrators and 8 Twenty-one states have already accepted this jurisdic- tion. These include: Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Esthonia, Finland, Haiti, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Salvador, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay. France has now accepted it also, for M. Briand signed the so-called “optional clause” of the Court Statute the day he signed the Protocol. A state may make reservations in accepting the optional clause. Thus, Mr. Arthur Henderson announced that Great Britain had in mind a reservation that the clause would not apply to any question arising out of the use of the British fleet in defense of the Covenant with the approval of the League. Comment on Article 4, unnumbered par. 1. This is an attempt to fill out the gap in Article 15 of the Covenant and to make its application more simple. Under Articles 12 and 13 of the Covenant a state may submit a dispute either to arbitration or inquiry by the Coun- cil. If it chooses the latter course, then the Protocol here outlines what the Council will do. It will : Comment on Article 4, par. 1. 1) Try to settle the dispute. 2) Failing (1), try to persuade the disputants to arbitrate. Comment on Article 4, par. 2 (a). 3) Failing (1) and (2), if one disputant requests, set up an Arbitration Committee. Comment on par. 2 (b). Special provision is made for selecting the members of this arbitration committee. 9 upon the procedure, the Council shall settle the points remaining in suspense. It shall with the utmost possible despatch select in consultation with the parties the arbi- trators and their President from among persons who by their nationality, their personal character and their experi- ence, appear to it to furnish the highest guarantees of competence and impartiality. (c) After the claims of the parties have been formulated, the Committee of Arbitrators, on the request of any party, shall through the medium of the Council request advisory opinion upon any points of law in dis- pute from the Permanent Court of International Justice, which in such case shall meet with the utmost possible despatch. 3. If none of the parties asks for arbitration, the Council shall again take the dispute under consideration. If the Council reaches a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of any of the parties to the dispute, the signatory States agree to comply with the recommendations therein. 4. If the Council fails to reach a report which is concurred in by all its members, other than the representatives of any of the parties to the dispute, it shall submit the dis- pute to arbitration. It shall itself determine the composi- tion, the powers and the procedure of the Committee of Arbitrators and, in the choice of the arbitrators, shall bear in mind the guarantees of competence and impartiality referred to in paragraph 2 (b) above. 5. In no case may a solution, upon which there has already been a unanimous recommendation of the Council ac- cepted by one of the parties concerned, be again called in question. 10 Comment on par. 2 (c). The arbitration committee may also seek through the Council the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice on legal points. Comment on par. 3. 4) Failing (1), (2) and (3), if an arbitration is not requested the Council will endeavor to reach a unani- mous agreement on a report, and if such agreement is reached it will be binding. Comment on par. 4. 5) Failing (1), (2), (3) and (4), the Council itself will submit the dispute to arbitration and determine the conditions of the arbitration, 11 6. The signatory States undertake that they will carry out in full good faith any judicial sentence or arbitral award that may be rendered and that they will comply, as pro- vided in paragraph 3 above, with the solutions recom- mended by the Council. In the event of a State failing to carry out the above undertakings, the Council shall exert all its influence to secure compliance therewith. If it fails therein, it shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto, in accordance with the provisions contained at the end of Article 13 of the Covenant. Should a State in disregard of the above undertakings resort to war, the sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant, in- terpreted in the manner indicated in the present Protocol, shall immediately become applicable to it. 7. The provisions of the present article do not apply to the 'settlement of disputes which arise as the result of meas- ures of war taken by one or more signatory States in agreement with the Council or the Assembly. Article 5. The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article 15 of the Cove- nant shall continue to apply in proceedings before the Council. If in the course of an arbitration, such as is contemplated in Article 4 above, one of the parties claims that the dispute, or part thereof, arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the arbitrators shall on this point take the advice of the Permanent Court of Interna- 12 Comment on par. 6. At any of these stages a judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice or an award of the arbitrators, or a unanimous recommendation of the Council must be followed by the disputants, and if a state refuses to follow, the Council will exert its influence to induce the state to accept. If in disregard of this undertaking, a state goes to war, it will become an aggressor. Comment on Article 5, par. 1. The Covenant provides in Article 15, par. 8, as follows: “If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Coun- cil shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.” This paragraph continues to have force. Comment on Article 5, par. 2. This only applies to a contention that a dispute relates to a domestic matter arising in the course of an arbitration. If the Court upholds such a contention, the arbitration must cease. 13 tional Justice through the medium of the Council. The opinion of the Court shall be binding upon the arbitrators, who, if the opinion is affirmative, shall confine themselves to so declaring in their award. If the question is held by the Court or by the Council to be a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, this decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the Council or by the Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant. Article 6. If in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Cove- nant a dispute is referred to the Assembly, that body shall have for the settlement of the dispute all the powers conferred upon 14 Comment on Article 5, par. 3. This is the so-called Japanese amendment. When a dispute is found to relate to a domestic matter, neither the arbitrators nor the Council can thereafter recommend a binding solution, but as a condition precedent to a state’s being called an aggressor, the Council may “consider the situation.’’ This means that the Council may discuss the international sit- uation created by the dispute in the hope of averting hostilities and persuading the parties to avoid going to war. This power had already been conferred on the Council by Article 11 of the Covenant, which reads as follows: “Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole Leagpae, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the Secretary- General shall, on the request of any Member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to dis- turb international peace or the good understanding be- tween nations upon which peace depends.’’ Comment on Article 6, of The Covenant provides in Article 15, par. 9, that: “The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be IS the Council as to endeavoring to reconcile the parties in the man- ner laid down in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 15 of the Cove- nant and in paragraph 1 of Article 4 above. Should the Assembly fail to achieve an amicable settlement; If one of the parties asks for arbitration, the Council shall proceed to constitute the Committee of Arbitrators in the manner provided in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of Article 4 above. If no party asks for arbitration, the Assembly shall again take the dispute under consideration and shall have in this con- nection the same powers as the Council. Recommendations em- bodied in a report of the Assembly, provided that it secures the measure of support stipulated at the end of paragraph 10 of Ar- ticle 15 of the Covenant, shall have the same value and effect, as regards all matters dealt with in the present Protocol, as recom- mendations embodied in a report of the Council adopted as pro- vided in paragraph 3 of Article 4 above. If the necessary majority cannot be obtained, the dispute shall be submitted to arbitration and the Council shall determine the composition, the powers and the procedure of the Committee of A.rbitrators as laid down in paragraph 4 of Article 4. Article 7. In the event of a dispute arising between two or more sig- natory States, these States agree that they will not, either before the dispute is submitted to proceedings for pacific settlement or during such proceedings, make any increase of their armaments or effectives which might modify the position established by the Con- ference for the Reduction of Armaments provided for by Article 17 of the present Protocol, nor will they take any measure of mil- itary, naval, air, industrial or economic mobilization, nor, in gen- eral, any action of a nature likely to extend the dispute or render it more acute. It shall be the duty of the Council, in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of the Covenant, to take under consider- 16 so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within 14 days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.” Article 6 of the Protocol simply applies to this event the procedure already provided for, if the dispute had remained before the Council. Comment on Article 7, par. 1. This is an undertaking on the part of states not to pre- cipitate hostilities in the event of a dispute. Comment on Article 7, par. 2. The Council is given power to consider any complaint 17 ation any complaint as to infraction of the above undertakings which is made to it by one or more of the States parties to the dispute. Should the Council be of opinion that the complaint re- quires investigation, it shall, if it deems it expedient, arrange for enquiries and investigations in one or more of the countries con- cerned. Such enquiries and investigations shall be carried out with the utmost possible despatch and the signatory States under- take to aflford every facility for carrying them out. The sole object of measures taken by the Council as above provided is to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes and they shall in no way prejudge the actual settlement. If the result of such enquiries and investigations is to estab- lish an infraction of the provisions of the first paragraph of the present Article, it shall be the duty of the Council to summon the State or States guilty of the infraction to put an end thereto. Should the State or States in question fail to comply with such summons, the Council shall declare them to be guilty of a viola- tion of the Covenant or of the present Protocol, and shall decide upon the measures to be taken with a view to end as soon as possi- ble a situation of a nature to threaten the peace of the world. For the purposes of the present Article decisions of the Council may be taken by a two-thirds majority. Article 8. The signatory States undertake to abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression against another State. If one of the signatory States is of opinion that another State is making preparations for war, it shall have the right to bring the matter to the notice of the Council. The Council, if it ascertains that the facts are as alleged, shall proceed as provided in paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 of Article 7. 18 that a state is about to precipitate hostilities in the event of a dispute. In dealing with this complaint the Council may arrange to conduct an investigation, such investigation to be limited to the question of compdiance with the procedure for peaceful settlement. Comment on Article 7, par. 4. If the Council should find that a state has taken precipi- tate action, it will call upon the state to put an end thereto, and if that state refuses, the Council will declare it a law- breaker. Comment on Article 7, par. 5. In all of this the Council will act by 2/3 majority. Comment on Article 8. The signatory states agree to refrain from threats of aggression and from preparations for war. The Council will consider any complaint on this basis and conduct an in- vestigation. 19 Article 9. The existence of demilitarized zones being calculated to pre- vent aggression and to facilitate a definite finding of the nature provided for in Article 10 below, the establishment of such zones between States mutually consenting thereto is recommended as a means of avoiding violations of the present Protocol. The demilitarized zones already existing under the terms of certain treaties or conventions, or which may be established in future between States mutually consenting thereto, may at the request and at the expense of one or more of the conterminous States, be placed under a temporary or permanent system of su- pervision to be organized by the Council. Article 10. Every State which resorts to war in violation of the under- takings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor. Violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarized zone shall be held equivalent to resort to war. In the event of hostilities having broken out, any State shall ’ be presumed to be an aggressor, unless a decision of the Council, which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare : 1. If it has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure of pacific settlement provided by Articles 13 and 15 of the Covenant as amplified by the present Protocol, or to comply with a judicial sentence or arbitral award or with a unanimous recommendation of the Council, or has dis- regarded a unanimous report of the Council, a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognizing that the dispute between it and the other belligerent State arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the latter State; nevertheless, in the last case the State shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question 20 Comment on Article 9. This is a recommendation that demilitarized zones be established by states desiring to establish them. Where such zones exist, they may be placed under a system of supervi- sion to be organized by the Council. Norway and Sweden established such zones by treaty in 1905, and Russia and Finland have recently taken similar action. Comment on Article 10, unnumbered par. 1. This is the definition of “aggressor.” It follows the prin- cipal idea of the Bliss-Miller-Shotwell (the so-called Amer- ican) plan. Comment on Article 10, unnumbered par. 2. If a war breaks out, a state will be presumed to be an aggressor, unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise in the enumerated cases. Comment on Article 10, numbered par. 1. The refusal to submit to the procedure outlined or to comply with a judgment of the International Court or an arbitral award or a unanimous recommendation of the Council is an aggression. If, however, a matter has been judged to be domestic, a state is an aggressor in undertaking hostilities only when the matter has not been previously submitted to the Council or Assembly for “consideration of the situation.” 21 to the Council or the Assembly, in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant. 2. If it has violated provisional measures enjoined by the Council for the period while the proceedings are in prog- ress as contemplated by Article 7 of the present Protocol. Apart from the cases dealt with in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present Article, if the Council does not at once succeed in deter- mining the aggressor, it shall be bound to enjoin upon the bel- ligerents an armistice, and shall fix the terms, acting, if need be, by a two-thirds majority and shall supervise its execution. Any belligerent which has refused to accept the armistice or has violated its terms shall be deemed an aggressor. The Council shall call upon the signatory States to apply forthwith against the aggressor the sanctions provided by Article 11 of the present Protocol, and any signatory State thus called upon shall thereupon be entitled to exercise the rights of a belligerent. Article 11. As soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 of the present Protocol, the obligations of the said States, in re- gard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant, will immediately become opera- tive in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor. Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory States to cooperate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow. 22 Comment on Article 10, numbered par. 2. Refusal to comply with the Council’s suggestions for preventing precipitate hostilities will constitute a state an aggressor. Comment on Article 10, unnumbered par. 3. If the Council cannot say who is aggressor, it will order an armistice fixing the terms and supervising the execution. Comment on Article 10, unnumbered par. 4. If a state refuses to accept this armistice, it will be an aggressor. Comment on Article 10, unnumbered par. 5. Once a state is found to be an aggressor, the Council will call upon all signatory states to exercise sanctions against it. Any state thus called upon will be entitled to become a belligerent, but will not be bound to become a belligerent. Comment on Article 11. This article provides for the application of all the sanc- tions already stipulated in Article 16 of the Covenant. These sanctions provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant are of various kinds ; economic, financial, military. In the case of the military forces to be contributed, the Council may only recommend, it cannot decide, the contribution of each state. The states are bound to afford passage to the troops engaged in protecting the covenants of the League. Comment on Article 11, par. 2. The precise nature of the cooperation is not prescribed. Here is special recognition of differences in geographical position. 23 In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Cove- nant the signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the assistance of the State attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and recipro- cal exchanges as regards the provision of raw materials and sup- plies of every kind, openings of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and by sea of the attacked or threatened State. If both parties to the dispute are aggressors within the mean- ing of Article 10, the economic and financial sanctions shall be applied to both of them. Article 12. In view of the complexity of the conditions in which the Council may be called upon to exercise the functions mentioned in Article 11 of the present Protocol concerning economic and financial sanctions, and in order to determine more exactly the guarantees afforded by the present Protocol to the signatory States, the Council shall forthwith invite the economic and finan- cial organizations of the League of Nations to consider and report as to the nature of the steps to be taken to give effect to the finan- cial and economic sanctions and measures of cooperation contem- plated in Article 16 of the Covenant and in Article 11 of this Protocol. When in possession of this information, the Council shall draw up through its competent organs : 1. Plans of action for the application of the economic and financial sanctions against an aggressor State; 2. Plans of economic and financial cooperation between a State attacked and the different States assisting it; and shall communicate these plans to the Members of the League and to the other signatory States. 24 Comment on Article 11, par. 3. Each signatory agrees to come to the assistance of a victim of aggression. But except for the precision of this article, each state will determine for itself the nature of the assistance it will render. Likewise, each state will determine for itself the measures in its power to be taken to keep com- munications open. Comment on Article 11, par. 4. Two states engaged in a war may both be aggressors — they would then be engaged in an illegal international brawl. Comment on Article 12. Provision is made for defining and specifying the measures to be taken in order to give effect to the economic and financial sanctions laid down in Article 16 of the Cove-“ nant. Definite plans are to be drawn up by the Council on the basis of information supplied by the economic and financial organizations of the League. When these plans have been communicated to the signatories, it will then be for each signatory to say for itself whether and how it will execute these plans. 25 Article 13. In view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant and by Article 11 of the present Protocol, the Council shall be entitled to receive under- takings from States determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action im- mediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the Covenant and the present Protocol. Furthermore, as soon as the Council has called upon the sig- natory States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 above, the said States may, in accordance with any agreements which they may previously have concluded, bring to the assistance of a particular State, which is the victim of aggression, their military, naval and air forces. The agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be registered and published by the Secretariat of the League of Nations. They shall remain open to all States Members of the League which may desire to accede thereto. 26 Comment on Article 13, par. 1. The provision in Article 16 about use of military forces is here recognized to be “contingent.” That is, the Council can only recommend use of such forces to protect the League covenants. Each state decides for itself whether and to what extent its forces will be used. No state is willing to give up its control of its own army and navy. Under this article of the Protocol, states may give to the Council, and the Council may receive, undertakings from various states to use their forces in aid of the obligations of the Covenant and the Protocol. No state is bound to gpve such an undertaking. The English text is made clearer by the Erench text which literally translated says that the Council shall have capacity to receive — “aura qualite p>our recevoir”- — such undertakings. These undertakings are to be preferred to particular treaties, for they seem less like alliances. Comment on Article 13, par. 2. This is a recognition that states may enter into special treaties to protect one another. Comment on Article 13, par. 3. But such treaties must be registered under Article 18 of the Covenant. This may prevent another such discus- sion as that of 1920 about the registration of the Eranco- Belgian military convention. Moreover, every such treaty must be open in the sense that other members of the League may accede to it. Thus if Erance and England agree to protect each other in case of attack, Belgium will be entitled to make it a three-cornered arrangement if she desires. Ger- many would have the same privilege if she should join the League. This is a very big innovation. 27 Article 14 , The Council shall alone be competent to declare that the ap- plication of sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be re- established. Article 15 . In conformity with the spirit of the present Protocol, the signatory States agree that the whole cost of any military, naval or air operations undertaken for the repression of an aggression under the terms of the Protocol, and reparation for all losses suf- fered by individuals, whether civilians or combatants, and for all material damage caused by the operations of both sides, shall be borne by the aggressor State up to the extreme limit of its ca- pacity. Nevertheless, in view of Article 10 of the Covenant, neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of the ag- gressor State shall in any case be affected as the result of the application of the sanctions mentioned in the present Protocol. Article 16 . The signatory States agree that in the event of a dispute be- tween one or more of them and one or more States which have not signed the present Protocol and are not Members of the League of Nations, such non-Member States shall be invited, on the conditions contemplated in Article 17 of the Covenant, to sub- mit, for the purpose of a pacific settlement, to the obligations ac- cepted by the States signatories of the present Protocol. If the State so invited, having refused to accept the said con- ditions and obligations, resorts to war against a signatory State, the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant, as defined by the present Protocol, shall be applicable against it. 28 Comment on Article 14. As it is the Council which calls upon the sig'natories to apply the sanction, (Art. 10), so it is also the Council which decides when the application of the sanctions is to cease. Comment on Article 15. The idea that the aggressor must pay the cost was in- cluded in the Shotwell draft. This is a severe penalty. It may have a dissuasive effect. The penalty can never be exacted to the point of depriving a state of independence or territory. Comment on Article 16. Under this article, states not signatory to the Protocol and not members of the League are invited to accept the obligation of the Protocol in case of a dispute with a signa- tory and member. This is co-extensive with Article 17 of the Covenant, and hence involves no new idea. 29 Article 17. The signatory States undertake to participate in an Interna- tional Conference for the Reduction of Armaments which shall be convened by the Council and shall meet at Geneva on Monday, June 15th, 1925. All other States, whether Members of the League or not, shall be invited to this Conference. In preparation for the convening of the Conference, the Council shall draw up with due regard to the undertakings con- tained in Articles 11 and 13 of the present Protocol a general programme for the reduction and limitation of armaments, which shall be laid before the Conference and which shall be communi- cated to the Governments at the earliest possible date, and at the latest three months before the Conference meets. If by May 1st, 1925, ratifications have not been deposited by at least a majority of the permanent Members of the Council and ten other Members of the League, the Secretary-General of the League shall immediately consult the Council as to whether he shall cancel the invitation or merely adjourn the Conference to a subsequent date to be fixed by the Council so as to permit the necessary number of ratifications to be obtained. Article 18. Wherever mention is made in Article 10, or in any other provision of the present Protocol, of a decision of the Council, this shall be understood in the sense of Article 15 of the Cove- nant, namely that the votes of the representatives of the parties to the dispute shall not be counted when reckoning unanimity or'*' the necessary majority. 30 Gomment on Article 17. The conference for the reduction of armaments here provided for depends on the Protocol, as the Protocol de- pends on the conference. (Art. 21). Unless three of the four permanent members of the Council — France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan — and ten other members of the League have ratified the Protocol by May 1, 1925, the conference may either be postponed or canceled altogether. All states, members and non-members of the League, are to be invited to the conference, including Germany, Russia and the United States. They will consider a definite program for reduction and limitation of armaments drawn up by the Council. In this work the Council will have the assistance of (1) the recently reorganized Temporary Com- mission on Reduction of Armaments, now called to meet on November 17, 1924; (2) the Permanent Advisory Com- mission on Military, Naval and Air Questions; and (3) the Disarmament Section of the League Secretariat, which in- cludes many experts. Preparatory work has already begun. On the day after the Protocol was approved, the Council met and took preliminary decisions. Geneva was the natural choice for the meeting place. It is ridiculous to suppose that there was any hostility to Washington or to the United States in selecting it. Geneva is the only city in the world where the necessary machinery now exists to prepare and to conduct the Conference. Forty- eight states, in the habit of meeting there every year, natu- rally preferred it. Gomment on Article 18. This article merely extends the provision of the Cove- nant that in case of a dispute, the decision of the Council is regarded as unanimous if it includes all the votes except those of the parties to the dispute. The parties to a dispute, even though not members of the Council, become members of the Council ad hoc when the dispute is submitted to the Council. 31 Article 19 . Except as expressly provided by its terms, the present Pro- tocol shall not affect in any way the rights and obligations of Members of the League as determined by the Covenant. Article 20 , Any dispute as to the interpretation of the present Protocol shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Article 21. The present Protocol, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. The deposit of ratifications shall be made at the Secretariat of the League of Nations as soon as possible. States of which the seat of government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Secretariat of the League of Na- tions that their ratification has been given; in that case, they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible. So soon as the majority of the permanent Members of the Council and ten other Members of the League have deposited or have effected their ratifications, a proch-verbal to that effect shall be drawn up by the Secretariat. After the said proces-verbal has been drawn up, the Protocol shall come into force as soon as the plan for the reduction of armaments has been adopted by the Conference provided for in Article 17. 32 In this way they are sure of participating on a basis of equal- ity in the proceedings ; but if the votes of the disputants were counted in the decisions, this would make them judges in their own case. Comment on Article 19. The Protocol does not supersede the Covenant, nor re- lease the members of the League from any of its obligations. Comment on Article 20. This article, which gives to the Permanent Court of International Justice compulsory jurisdiction over all dis- putes as to interpretation of the Protocol, corresponds to similar provisions in numerous treaties and protocols drawn up since the Court came into existence. Comment on Article 21. In addition to the usual provisions for ratification, this article contains the provision making the coming into force of the Protocol dependent on the adoption of the plan for the reduction of armaments by the conference (Art. 17), and on the carrying out of this plan. In this way the inter- dependence of disarmament, security and arbitration is again emphasized. 33 If within such period after the adoption of the plan for the reduction of armaments as shall be fixed by the said Conference, the plan has not been carried out, the Council shall make a declara- tion to that effect ; this declaration shall render the present Proto- col null and void. The grounds on which the Council may declare that the plan drawn up by the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments has not been carried out, and that in consequence the present Protocol has been rendered null and void, shall be laid down by the Conference itself. A signatory State which, after the expiration of the period fixed by the Conference, fails to comply with the plan adopted by the Conference, shall not be admitted to benefit by the provisions of the present Protocol. In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized for this purpose, have signed the present Protocol. Done at Geneva, on the day of October, nineteen hundred and twenty-four, in a single copy, which will be kept in the archives of the Secretariat of the League and registered by it on the date of its coming into force. 34 The Protocol has now been signed by eleven states as follows: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Esthonia, France, Greece, Latvia. Poland, Portugal, Serb- Croat-SIovene State. It is open to signature by forty-four more members of the League. The United States is not invited to sign. After signature, a state must ratify. When three of the four Powers — British Empire, France, Italy and Japan — and ten other members of the League have deposited their ratifications with the Secretariat at Geneva, a proces- verbal will be drawn up. But the Protocol will not come into force finally until the plan for the reduction of armaments has been adopted by the conference (Art. 17). If the Coun- cil finds, in accordance with criteria laid down by the con- ference, that the plan for the reduction of armaments has not been carried out, a declaration to that effect renders the Protocol null and void. Even though the plan and conse- quently the Protocol are both operative, no single state failing to comply with the plan can benefit by the provisions of the Protocol. ^ 35