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A UTHOR : 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 GREAT PROBLEM OF 
 SUBSTANCE AND ITS 
 
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 1895 
 
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THE GREAT PROBLEM 
 
 OF 
 
 SUBSTANCE AND ITS ATTRIBUTES. 
 
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 lUBSTANCE AND ITS ATTRIBUTES. 
 
 INVOLVING THE RELATIONSHIP AND LAWS 
 
 OF MATTER AND OF MIND 
 
 AS THE PHENOMENA OF THE WORLD, 
 
 DERIVED FROM 
 
 THE ABSOLUTE. 
 
 ** This unifying conception of Nature,*^ 
 
 Ernst Haeckel. 
 
 LONDON 
 KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRIjbNER & CO, Ltd. 
 
 PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD 
 
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 PREFACE 
 
 It is allowed on all hands that fresh discoveries have 
 to be made in the great field of Science : it is con- 
 fessed indeed, that, notwithstanding the advances 
 already made, much that is mysterious, and not a 
 little that is contradictory, confront the puzzled in- 
 quirer. Discoveries, however, will be made— not 
 probably tferough the medium of brighter intellects 
 than those which have already been engaged in the 
 pursuit, but mainly no doubt through the accumu- 
 lated acquisitions, of which we in these latter days 
 are the inheritors ; for hereby enlarged scope will be 
 afforded for philosophizing by means of the additional 
 facts supplied. Yet the very plea that an Author 
 comes forward pretending to disclose new truths is not 
 unlikely to be received with some scepticism, if it 
 does not create prejudice against his claims. 
 
 If I ask the reader to follow me in a track 
 which can hardly be called " a beaten path," at least 
 as regards method, I trust I shall not lead him 
 through a murky avenue, where twilight has scarcely 
 dawned. The task, however, which I have under- 
 taken, is not in itself an easy one, if it involves the 
 
 2 
 
 252579 
 
VI 
 
 Preface. 
 
 pretence of safely pioneering a route through a terra 
 incognita^ in which others of far greater capacity 
 have lost themselves. 
 
 I have to acknowledge many deficiencies in the 
 production now issued, partly owing to the new 
 ground which has been broken for the first time, 
 partly to its brevity as a statement of principles, 
 and partly to the fact that a remedy which might to 
 some extent be applied, by re-writing the whole, 
 short as the whole is, is beyond my physical achieve- 
 ment. But under any circumstances, I could not 
 pretend to construct a pathway strewed with flowers, 
 or indeed to make what might be termed " a royal 
 road " into metaphysical arcana, which have been 
 regarded by not a few as a hopeless attainment. 
 
 While, therefore, I invite a candid examination 
 of the principles which I have propounded, I bespeak 
 a charitable and forbearing consideration in respect 
 of the defective execution of my work. 
 
 ** Errors like straws upon the surface flow ; 
 
 He who would seek for pearls must dive below." 
 
 The unexplored vista, which I here attempt to open 
 up to my reader, is so unspeakably important, and on 
 that ground ought to be so peculiarly interesting, that 
 I trust my awkward use of the machinery employed 
 to lift up the deep dark veil which shrouds the great 
 
 Preface. 
 
 VII 
 
 Unseen, will not be made matter of reproach, if even 
 but a faint light is thrown on the spirit-region with 
 which our worid, and we who live therein, stand so 
 intimately connected. 
 
 If I may be permitted to call attention to some 
 of the specialties which characterise this publication 
 I would mention the following .--The inherent attri- 
 butes of primitive and essential substance have been 
 eviscerated ; for substance without attributes \^ a 
 contradiction in terms. The expressions, Spirit and 
 Matter, have been respectively defined, while their 
 consanguinuity and connexion have been traced to 
 what is obvibusly their natural source. The great 
 bugbear of the age, that of materialism as itself the 
 direct foundation of mind, has been relegated to its 
 proper province. The precise source and foundation 
 of physical Forces, and the laws whereby they have 
 their play in the economy of nature, have been 
 pointed to, as determined in circumstances consistent 
 with universal experience. The basis of Life, that 
 is of Natural Law in the vegetable and animal 
 spheres, as well as in the mineral kingdom, has 
 been duly manifested ; and the great law of Causality, 
 as an all-pervading principle in the wonderful chain 
 of existing conditions, has been fairiy analyzed and 
 formally promulged. 
 
 Nor is this all. A scientific basis (as I must 
 
vni 
 
 Preface. 
 
 regard it) has been found for a harmonious scheme 
 of Mental Philosophy ; a definite foundation has been 
 discovered for the Ego or Soul of man, as essentially 
 a spirit-entity ; and not of man only, but of every 
 animal creature — all in perfect analogy ; the range as 
 well as the complexion of mental states being in all 
 cases limited by the character of the cerebral organi- 
 zation, with which each is equipped ; and this, with- 
 out the risk of sinking into the quagmire of materialism. 
 The great doctrine of Realism has been established, 
 according to the inevitable conviction of the common 
 mind, in that a significant and unmistakable nexus 
 has been ascertained as a go-between, to connect 
 the material object externally, with the subjective 
 mind internally. Moreover, the initiation of Will 
 and its operations in all its phases, have been decy- 
 phered, and its freedom, as a movement of the Ego 
 under the exercise of Judgment, has been, as 1 think, 
 satisfactorily vindicated. The foundation of Morals 
 also, as the magnificent prerogative of the rational mind, 
 has been accounted for on grounds which will bear 
 examination, and which show, what is a fact, that the 
 law of Morals must as a necessity be always dependent 
 for its soundness, on the extent and accuracy of the 
 intelligence through which it is manifested. 
 
 I would farther call attention to the fresh repre- 
 sentation of the Absolute, as the all-comprehending 
 and fundamental Totality, which appears to me to be 
 
 Preface, 
 
 ix 
 
 logically reached, on the one hand as the final Ground 
 or Quarry of existing beinghood ; and on the other 
 hand, and in immediate connection therewith, as the 
 intelligent Source from which all particulars have 
 emanated. The Scheme of Psychology, moreover, 
 which r have propounded, should, from its simplicity 
 and harmony with facts, recommend it for acceptance, 
 \i it is free, as I think, from the contradictions and 
 incongruities of prevailing systems, and will satisfy 
 fair questioning as to the processes whereby accepted 
 conclusions are fulfilled. 
 
 If I shall have contributed in some degree 
 to throw down and to destroy what I must re- 
 gard as one of the most complicated, and at the 
 same time most mischievous structures ever built up 
 by the perverted ingenuity of man— I mean the a 
 priori schemes of Kantian and Hegelian transcenden- 
 talism, I shall rejoice ; for thereby philosophy will be 
 freed from one terrible incubus, by which it has been 
 too long enthralled. 
 
 Let me say, in conclusion, that one enormous 
 advantage of obtaining a sound knowledge of our 
 human mechanism, and of the relationship in which 
 our souls stand to the external world, on the one hand, 
 and its influences ; and to the Absolute on the other 
 hand, as ministered through a Mediator, for the higher 
 elevation of our souls, will more and more be appre- 
 
X Preface. 
 
 hended, in that hereby we shall ascertain what consti- 
 tutes the basis of sin, and the true idea of atonement, 
 as the removal of sin. There are other theological 
 questions such as the Divine decrees, and the grounds 
 of human immortality, which will be found briefly 
 referred to, as perfectly manageable topics on prin- 
 ciples with which we are more or less familiar. 
 
 Perhaps I should have hesitated making such a 
 recital as is contained in the foregoing statement, 
 leaving the book simply to the judgment of critics. 
 That under any circumstances must be the case ; and 
 I commit my thoughts to them for frank and fair con- 
 sideration, as the thoughts of one who is not tied to 
 the leading strings of any master, and who cares 
 only for the achievement of truth. 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Section I. 
 
 An Inquiry into the Findings of preceding Investigations. 
 
 Section II. 
 
 A programme of principles, which go to satisfy, and in their 
 application to solve, important Physical and Metaphysical 
 Problems. 
 
 (1) Absolute Substance : (2) Absolute Impersonality : 
 (3) Absolute Personality : (4) Applications of Absolute Sub- 
 stance; : (6) Origin and Operation of Affinity through Absolute 
 Substance : (6) Causality through Absolute Substance : (7) 
 Other Capacities of Absolute Substance : (8) Mental States : 
 (9) Organization of Mental States : (10) Source of Emotions : 
 (11) Source of Morals: (12) Modifications of Will: (13) 
 Principles of Will- Determination : (14) Freedom of Will : (15) 
 Mr. Drummond on Evolution. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE. 
 
 Section I. 
 
 (^aracteristics of Matter and of Ether, and of the Cosmical 
 ^orcta. 
 
1^ 
 
 xii Contents. 
 
 Section II. 
 
 The Cosmical Forces dependent for their characteristics on 
 the Affinity of the conditions brought into operative Relation- 
 ship. 
 
 Section III. 
 
 The Origin of Affinities. 
 
 Section IV. 
 
 The Cosmical Forces dependent on Energy for their 
 Dynamic Origin. 
 
 Section V. 
 
 The last and higest Attribute of Ether. 
 
 Section VI. 
 
 The Liiw by which Proi)agatioii is effected as compared 
 with Creative effort. 
 
 Section VII. 
 The circumstances under which Mind is developed. 
 
 Section VIII. 
 
 What constitutes Intelligence. 
 
 Section IX. 
 
 Mind in its highest as well as lowest expression, operates 
 in conjunction with Matter. 
 
 1 
 
 ''SI 
 
 Contents. 
 Section X. 
 
 xiu 
 
 The Foundation of Morals. 
 
 Section XI. 
 
 Mental States are reflective of Material Conditions. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Foundation of Soul Economy and the grounds of varie 
 Mental Operation. 
 
 THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 
 
 Section I. 
 
 Dilemmas of Philosophers, 
 
 Section II. 
 
 There is a nexus between Matter and Mind. 
 
 Section III. 
 
 How the Mental Ego is constituted. 
 
 Section IV. 
 
 The Faculty of Perception. 
 
 Section V. 
 
 The Faculties generally. 
 
I 
 
 f] 
 
 XIV 
 
 Contents. 
 
 (1) Memory: (2) Imagination : (3) Conception : (4) Reason- 
 Faculties : (a) Judgment: (6) Reasoning: (5) Brief 
 Recapitulation. 
 
 ing 
 
 THE EMOTIONAL POWERS. 
 
 Section I. 
 
 Motives. 
 
 Section II. 
 
 Appetites and Desires 
 
 Section III 
 
 The Construction of Motives. 
 
 Section IV. 
 The Foundation of Morals and the Law of Morals 
 
 Section V. 
 
 The Moral Idea the Root of Moral Law. 
 
 Section VI. 
 
 Human Responsibility. 
 
 Section VII. 
 
 A Higher Law than that of mere Morals creates Religioiu 
 
 Freedom of the Will under imperative Laws. 
 
 I 
 
 Contents. 
 
 Section IX. 
 
 The circumstances under which Freedom prevails. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 APPENDIX I 
 
 Professor Stokes, and Rev. Mr. Birks on Ether. 
 
 APPENDIX II 
 
 On Causality and the Being of a Personal God. 
 
 XV 
 
Ii 
 
 19 t • * • 
 
 INTRODUCTION; 
 
 • c » • •» * 
 
 ' », 
 
 •t- 
 
 « 3 * * • > 
 
 * } I '< 
 
 4 > <» 
 
 SECT/ ON I. 
 
 AN INQUIRY INTO THE FINDINGS OF PRECEDING 
 
 INVESTIGATORS. 
 
 ^Tp'HERE do not seem to have been many earnest 
 A or hopeful inquirers into the profound question 
 of Ontology. The difficulty of obtaining an adequate 
 idea of substance as such, seems to have repelled all 
 procedure in this investigation. The reason of this is 
 obvious. If we lay for ourselves a foundation which 
 has no validity, the superstructure cannot stand ; and 
 the consequence is that we get confounded in mystery, 
 and feel our incompetence. Sir William Hamilton 
 complicates the subject by telling us that "whatever 
 is thought, is thought under the attribute of existence;"* 
 but then, in the very next breath, he gives forth the 
 dictum that "existence is an a priori notion, native to 
 the mind." He denies that the idea is elicited through 
 experience ;" and, on the plea (as he says) "that what 
 suggests the notion of existence, is itself an object of 
 
 *• 1 wouM ask wliat kind of an attribute is that of " exist- 
 ence " ? Wliatever exists must have some attribute whereby it 
 can be known. If by existence he means " reality," I agree 
 with him. Even a phantom, as such, though in the mind, must 
 liave existence, otherwise it no longer is. But can we call the 
 mere fact of beinghoo<l an attribute ? What is an attribute ? 
 It is an endowment belonging to something having existence. 
 Existence, therefore, is not an attribute, because mere existence 
 predicates nothing respecting the thing existing. 
 
ii 
 
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 It I 
 
 « »• 
 
 « 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 * 
 
 POftSCloustlds^'t*; " Where," he asks, " is the object of 
 ■c<)nsGJo«siidsfi 'not already thought under the very 
 ; at.tribM.tc ; which this doctrine would maintain it 
 ! orrgiii^lly- tpi suggest?" Heie lies the fundamental 
 misconception of Hamilton, and the host of others 
 who hold that there must be a pre-existent condition 
 of mind, involving in itself a consciousness of existence, 
 antecedent to the suggestion of any object ab extra. 
 Accordingly he holds that " ens is to be viewed as a 
 primuin cognitumr And he goes on to assert that 
 " we are conscious of the conditioned itself, only as 
 not unconditionally conditioned ; for, of the uncon- 
 ditioned, of the absolute or the infinite," he says, " we 
 have no cognition, no conception, in a word, no 
 consciousness." He says " this principle is valuable, 
 as affording a genesis a) some of the most momentous, 
 and, at the same time, most contested phenomena of 
 mind." And he goes on to say that " in the principle 
 of the conditioned, two great principles, the law of 
 substance and accident, and the law of cause and 
 effect, find their origin and explanation. They are no 
 longer to be regarded as ultimate data of intelligence : 
 they appear now as merely particular cases, merely 
 special applications of this higher principle. Take the 
 former (he says) the law of substance. I am aware 
 of a phenomenon, a phenomenon be it of mind or of 
 matter: that is, I am aware of a certain relative, 
 
 ♦ Can there be consciousness apart from an object of con- 
 sciousness, and can there be an object of consciousness which 
 is not elicite<l through experience ? What he calls a primum 
 cognitum is an ultimum cognitum derived from, and the necessary 
 consequence of, our experience of the outward realities made 
 known to us. (See following note.) 
 
 Hamilton on Substance. 3 
 
 consequently a conditioned existence. This existence 
 is only known and only knowable as in relation. 
 Mind and matter exist for us only as they are known 
 by us ; and they arc so known, only as they have 
 certain qualities relative to certain faculties of know- 
 ledge in us ; and we certain faculties of knowledge 
 relative to certain qualities in them." * He asks " why 
 am I constrained to suppose that this relativity is the 
 known phenomenon of an unknown substance? 
 Philosophers say it is an ultimate law of mind. I 
 answer and say (he continues) it is a particular case 
 of the general law, which bears that not only the 
 unconditioned simply, but even the unconditioned of 
 the conditioned is unthinkable.! Take an object (he 
 says) strip it by abstraction of all its qualities, of all 
 its phenomena, of all its relativities, reduce it to a 
 mere unconditioned, irrelative, absolute entity, a mere 
 substance, and now try to think this substance. You 
 cannot. It cannot be thought except as a negation 
 
 * This is true so far as it goes. ' We have knowledge of 
 certain qualities, as these are conveyed to our understandings 
 by means of the faculties or instrumentality given to us for that 
 purpose. But this is not pHmum cognitum or first consciousness. 
 T\\Q first consciousness is that of self as the object, or self-con- 
 sciousness. The secundum cognitum, in the order of conscious- 
 ness, is that of the external world. The third in the order of 
 consciousness, comes through the internal senses. The last of 
 all is the consciousness of ens as a noumenon or thing in itself, 
 obtained through the relativity of a constant which is found to 
 come into play in the production of all phenomena. 
 
 t Why is Sir William Hamilton's unconditioned "unthink- 
 able?" The reason is because he strips it of all qualities ; and 
 it is impossible to think of a thing which has nothing whereby 
 it can l)e characterized. 
 
Introduction. 
 
 of the thinkable."* "Take now (he says) a 
 quality or phenomenon. A phenomenon is a relative, 
 ergo a conditioned, ergo a thinkable. But try to 
 think this relative as absolutely relative, this con- 
 ditioned as unconditionally conditioned — as a phe- 
 nomenon and nothing more. You cannot ; for either 
 you do not realize it in thought at all, or you suppose 
 it to be the phenomenon of something that does not 
 appear. You give it a basis out of itself; you 
 conceive it as the accident of a subject or substance." — 
 Hamilton s Edition of Reids Works, p. 9:^5. 
 
 Such reasoning on the part of this gigantic meta- 
 physician has frightened many investigators from 
 tackling a subject so ticklish, or even questioning 
 conclusions so decisively maintained ; and, indeed, if 
 we grant the premises on which he grounds his 
 assertions, it is not easy to see how they can be 
 controverted. But we do not grant his premises ; on 
 the contrary, we affirm that his premises have no 
 foundation in fact. First of all, where have we any 
 proof, or even the shadow of proof, that there is such 
 a thing as a transcendental consciousness, that is an a 
 priori consciousness prior to experience? In this 
 assertion we have a begging of the whole question, 
 
 ♦ Of course, if we take away all that belongs to an object, 
 there is nothing left. We cannot strip away qualities and have 
 substance left. There is no such thing as substance without 
 quality. We may remove or take away the conditions of which 
 quality is susceptible ; but quality itself must remain as the 
 very foundation of substance. Quality is the inseparable 
 attribute of substance. This attribute as regards primitive 
 substance may not be patent to our senses. Hence the 
 phenomena which are cognizable by us are but the secondary or 
 derivative qualities of which primordial quality is susceptible. 
 
 Hamilton's Basis Questioned, 
 
 and a begging of it without the slightest real grounds 
 in support of it. There is no such phenomenon as 
 consciousness apart from the object of which there is 
 the consciousness. There is the spirit-entity of 
 course — the raw material, which has the capacity of 
 consciousness ; but, if there is no object submitted to 
 it through agency, it has the consciousness of 
 nothing, that is, it is without consciousness. True it 
 is that apart from impressions communicated through 
 the senses, there is fundamentally what is properly 
 self-consciousness. But what is this primitive self- 
 consciousness ? It is neither more nor less than the 
 consciousness of the bodily self, as will afterwards be 
 shewn. Secondly, it is a grievous mistake, and a 
 gratuitous assumption, to suppose that in this spirit- 
 entity, which constitutes the foundation of our souls, 
 there are any antecedent forms or conditions of 
 thought ; that is, so many special pigeon holes, as 
 crannies or crevices wherein necessary truths are 
 boxed up, and which, upon being stimulated, give 
 forth ideas of time and space, ideas of causality, and 
 other ideas of what is called '' pure reason." The 
 whole is a gigantic supposition which has deranged 
 the investigations of mind, because it can be shewn 
 that all necessary truths are but deductions from the 
 current eventualities of our experience. The Ego (so 
 called), as intrinsically conditioned with the primary 
 attribute of a conscious capacity, is said, when 
 conditioned forms are brought to it, to be conscious 
 of these ; and this, exactly according as they are 
 received by the Ego. The forms and conditions are 
 not antecedently in the Ego ; but the Ego appropriates 
 and lays up the forms and conditions of things as they 
 
6 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 Quality an essential of Substance. 
 
 I 
 
 \ 
 
 » 
 
 are imparted to it. There is, therefore, in the human 
 mind, no antecedent knowledge of existence, apart 
 from the facts of existence which are imparted to us 
 in the course of our experience. Hamilton may tell 
 us that we can only ascertain " the conditions of 
 consciousness by its application ; " but, we reply that 
 the conditions of consciousness are neither more nor 
 less than the consciousness we have of the conditions 
 of things. 
 
 And now, with respect to the distinction which he 
 introduces betwixt " substance and accident," he for- 
 gets to consider, or seems to overlook, what consti- 
 tutes the absolute and inseparable attributes of sub- 
 stance, in that he supposes the possibility of substance 
 without attributes, and then calls this " the uncondi- 
 tioned !" Substance without attributes (of which 
 nothing can be predicated) is no longer substance. It 
 is obvious that substance as such must be characterised 
 by its own fundamental characteristics, — its intrinsic 
 or essential attributes : otherwise how can there be 
 such a thing as substance ? He speaks of stripping 
 an object by abstraction of all its qualities ; but the 
 idea is absurd. The moment we take away all its 
 qualities we annihilate it. But absolute annihilation 
 is impossible. There must be a foundation which 
 cannot be destroyed. That foundation is substance 
 in its absolute or primordial state ; and the forms and 
 conditions which are superinduced thereon are simply 
 to be regarded as the accidents thereof. It is obvious 
 these accidents cannot subsist by themselves ; for 
 they are the contingencies of which substance is sus- 
 ceptible. Substance as such fundamentally has its 
 own generic attributes, which are inseparable from 
 
 substance as such, and it is the particulars of these 
 generic attributes, which we find developed in the 
 matter of the world of which we have experience, and 
 of the relativity of which in connexion with primary 
 substance we have constant and never ceasing ex- 
 perience. The idea of a naked .mbstratum^ apart from 
 an absolutely qualitative basis, has nothing whatever to 
 support it, but everything in reason to deny the 
 possibility of this. With such a naked substratum, we 
 are grounded at once in an Serbonian bog from which 
 there is no escape. There can be no substance but 
 as grounded in quality, and representing the 
 potentiality of its respective conditions.* 
 
 And assuming (as we feel bound to do) that the 
 ideas of things which we receive by means of our ex- 
 ternal senses are representations which convey to us 
 a sense of their reality, our knowledge of external 
 objects therefore constitutes of necessity a conscious- 
 ness of their reality, as they outwardly exist, — a con- 
 sciousness therefore of the existence of a material 
 world. Here the question has arisen, — What is 
 matter ? and whence have we matter ? We usually 
 define matter to be — that condition of substance 
 which is cognizable by means of the external senses, 
 or still more profoundly, that condition of substance 
 which admits of limitation. But this definition is not 
 perfect in as far as we have good reason to suppose 
 that what we call spirit-substance has its forms, and 
 accordingly has its limitations. There are what we 
 call matter-forms, and also what we regard as spirit- 
 
 * Of that substance we shall have occasion to treat 
 hereafter, and in the Appendix I. 
 
 A 
 
i; 
 
 8 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 \ 
 
 % 
 
 forms, and the distinction betwixt them must be re- 
 garded as that which pertains to the external modifi- 
 cation of the conditions — that which marks the crass 
 and tangible, as compared with that which is very 
 refined, and beyond the range of sense. We discard 
 then the doctrine of dualism, — the doctrine which 
 implies the existence and subsistence of a twofold 
 substance of independent character essentially and 
 eternally. There is no such thing as two substances 
 absolutely independent of one another : there is no 
 experience whatever of such a phenomenon, and we 
 shall come to shew that such a supposition is incon- 
 sistent with the close and intimate relation in which 
 all the various characteristics of substance stand inti- 
 mately associated and connected. 
 
 Since the days of Descartes, philosophers have 
 been occupied with the idea of two independent sub- 
 stances, matter and mind, with a veering tendency 
 towards materialism. The Positivist school have no 
 doubt made psychology subsidiary to physiology, 
 without, however, understanding in what way physi- 
 ology paves the way for the territory of mind. 
 This school repudiates all inquiry into causes. Stuart 
 Mill, while holding to the doctrine of sensationalism, 
 seeks to explain away the principle of causation into 
 a combination of sensations. Herbert Spencer 
 supplements Stuart Mill by his theory of evolution, 
 yet without giving the slightest insight into the theory 
 of causation. The new German psychology makes 
 consciousness the result of the mechanical unification 
 of sensations. Lange in his history of materialism 
 seems at first sight an apologist of the materialistic 
 philosophy ; but it is not that materialism is to be 
 
 The Vieivs of Philosophers. 
 
 9 
 
 regarded as a philosophical explanation of things, but 
 from the fact that the mind is thereby directed to the 
 study of reality. Materialism in this view, he rightly 
 says, has done eminent service. Matter itself he holds 
 is in its essence emphatically the inexplicable. It has 
 never arrived at the reality itself, but only at that 
 relative reality which bears the impress of subjectivity. 
 Henoe, according to Lange, the necessity of being 
 lifted to the ideal, to something siii generis, that does 
 not belong to the phenomenal. " We are brought 
 face to face with the a priori, not in the realm of 
 intellect alone, but of religion also." 
 
 After the School which proscribes all inquiry into 
 causes, and that which explains away the principle of 
 causation, there is the critical School which dis- 
 tinguishes reason from the world of phenomena. The 
 Kantian School has given most emphatic recognition 
 to the element of a priori, which it has boldly placed 
 above and beyond the world of phenomena. This 
 latter is sacrificed to the pretensions of mind. This 
 view seems to follow from Descartes' famous deduc- 
 tion, that the soul has essentially thought in opposition 
 to matter ; and in this he imagined lay the principle of 
 causation. The ego not being regarded as the product 
 of sensation is made itself to establish the reality of 
 corporal existence; hence the untenable dualism 
 between thought and matter. Descartes' famous 
 maxim cogito, ergo sunt, is thoroughly logical. But in 
 connexion with the cogito, there has to be an analysis 
 of the consciousness, and that analysis is made by 
 inquiring, of what does the consciousness consist? Is 
 there such a phenomenon as consciousness without an 
 object ? We answer assuredly not. To be conscious 
 
10 
 
 Inttoduction. 
 
 The solution of the Problem. 
 
 11 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 of nothing is to be without consciousness. Hence 
 consciousness implies the subject in which this feeling 
 prevails, and the object given to it is that which 
 occasions the feeling. Descartes made the object, 
 synonymous with matter, and without considering how 
 matter became an object of thought, he concluded that 
 the soul was a thinking subject of itself, and quite 
 different from matter as involving space. 
 
 Kant took up the question of soul as an independ- 
 ent thinking subject from Descartes, and proclaimed 
 that thinking things could never occur among 
 outward phenomena ; yet that something underlies 
 phenomena which so affects our sense as to furnish it 
 with notions of space, matter, form, &c., which 
 something he regarded as a noumenon or thing in 
 itself. Kant said that we can never know things 
 in themselves, because (as he mistakingly held) the 
 mind comes between us and them. He held that 
 substance and cause, like time and space, are purely 
 subjective. He sets aside the Cartesian proofs 
 of the existence of God, whether cosmological 
 or optological. The world does not enable us to 
 arrive at any conclusions about its Author : and, as 
 phenomena it is made the product of our own facul- 
 ties. Instead of regarding the existence of nature as 
 involving space and time, with him the science of 
 nature was simply the application of outward things 
 to the thought of space and time. Fichte refused to 
 see anything but the Ego in the world, and projected 
 all beinghood therefrom. Schelling upheld the idea 
 of an objective, but was unable to distinguish between 
 knowing and being, and somehow made the Ego the 
 hidden forces from which everything emanated. He- 
 
 gel showed the Absolute as revealing itself in the 
 reason, and worked up a logical concatenation of 
 being accordingly. These various forms of substance 
 have proceeded more or less from Kant, whose funda- 
 mental axiom was the subjectivity of pure reason. I 
 ought to have taken into account the views of Spinosa, 
 who like Kant may be said to be the offspring of 
 Descartes, but in wholly different attitude. Spinosa 
 entered into the question of substance more fully, and 
 with greater originality than any philosopher before 
 him. He defined substance as that which exists in 
 itself, and is conceived by itself He very properly 
 regarded substance without attributes as a misnomer. 
 If a thing is, he held that it must have some attri- 
 bute whereby it can be known, and quite repudiated 
 the term " unknowable existence " as a contradiction 
 in terms. He had no proper idea of cause, but spoke 
 of causa sui^ which to us is self-contradictory. He 
 defined God as a being absolutely infinite — that is 
 substance consisting of infinite attributes ; but he was 
 unable to separate God from his works. 
 
 We ask now, what is the true solution of the great 
 problem before us ? Let us proceed upon acknow- 
 ledged grounds. First, nobody doubts that he has 
 received the impression (and hence the idea) of an 
 external world oi matter. Man has the consciousness 
 of it. " There is no scepticism possible," as Hamilton 
 says, " respecting the facts of consciousness." I hold 
 an orange in my hand ; its colour, figure, taste, smell, 
 etc., are before the mind ; still all lies in the act of 
 consciousness ; how am I to know that such impres- 
 ssion and ideas aie anything more than affections of 
 the mind ? I may appeal to what Dr. Reid termed 
 
'M^ 
 
 ti 
 
 I 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 " rational principles of action," which may be regarded 
 as intelligence in general, or what may be termed the 
 harmony of thought, and the rediictio ad absurdmn in 
 the conduct of life, if the reality of external objects is 
 questioned ; and hence the dismay, confusion, and 
 distress that would ensue, and the violence done to 
 moral principles. If Hume comes forward and still 
 insists that this supposed reality of external objects is 
 after all but a phantasm of the mind, and that we 
 know not how such ideas may be generated in the 
 mind, I ask farther, that the facts of consciousness 
 may be fairly looked at. As we cannot deny the facts 
 of consciousness without self-contradiction, so neither 
 can we deny the characteristics belonging to these facts. 
 Among these characteristics there is thisone universally 
 allowed, that the orange we hold in the hand stands 
 external to us. This assurance of externality is a part 
 of the fact, as determinate as the fact itself We are 
 fairly entitled then to take up the hypothesis of external 
 matter when so assurcilly suggested and presented to 
 us, and we ask — can this hypothesis be sustained by 
 circumstantial evidence ? Supposing the orange to be 
 a reality, having figure, colour, sapidity attached to it, 
 can I find out any nexus, or chain of connection, 
 between this supposed outward object and my mind 
 sufficient to convey the idea of it thereto, as a reality 
 of my consciousness ? I reply that I do find this in 
 the great fact, that, everywhere, and universally with- 
 out exception, the luminiferous Ether radiates or 
 carries forth the forms and conditions of external 
 objects from the objects to the external organ of 
 perception, or shall we say that the material object, 
 whatever it is, expresses itself in the immaterial and 
 
 The Result of our Findings. 
 
 13 
 
 all pervading Ether, both in quality and in form, and 
 therefore indicates the characteristics of the objects ; 
 in other words, intimates what they are ; and that this 
 very service, coming through the appointed nerve 
 channel of the outward sense, operates as a message 
 conveyed to the territory of cognition. The ascertain- 
 ment of this fact satisfactorily answers every demand. 
 We have but to find out how the whole man is 
 structured, and how it comes to pass that mind is 
 engendered, and how to account for the operation of 
 mind in all its various departments of intellection and 
 of volition in connection with, and in dependence on, 
 material instrumentality ; and how a spirit-homestead 
 is hereby constructed, fitted for translation to a more 
 refined sphere hereafter.* 
 
 If this claim which we make shall be found to be 
 solidly and soundly substantiated — if the view we 
 have sought to introduce respecting the etherial 
 medium shall be found on further investigation to 
 bear out the prerogatives of primitive substance, and 
 the attributes which we have assigned to it — if 
 the structure of animal nature, and more especially of 
 human nature, bodily and mentally, as hereafter set 
 forth, be correctly described — if there be known no such 
 economy as mind, apart from the body with which it 
 stands connected, if the supposition of a pure reason 
 in itself and by itself, apart from conditioned form, be 
 one of the most groundless imaginings which ever 
 took possession of human thought, if it constitutes a 
 
 * Tlie fact of a proof being established for a connection 
 betwixt the external object and the subjective intellect will 
 form a foundation for our process of inquiry. 
 
 )l 
 
14 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 The Absolute. 
 
 15 
 
 I 
 
 1 ■ 
 
 gratuitous foundation of mystery, which is not only 
 unsupported by any evidence, but which leads to 
 confusion and contradiction throughout in our inquiries 
 into mental constitution, then it behoves that there 
 must be an entire revisal in the method of our 
 psychological pursuit. I have ventured into a groove 
 of thought, which, as it appears to me, leads to a clear 
 and harmonious interpretation of the phenomena of 
 the world, and through these phenomena to the funda- 
 mental entia from which they are derived. As regards 
 the execution of this task, I have but one desire, and 
 that is to have the ability to re-write the whole from 
 the beginning ; but there are physical weaknesses 
 which prevent this being done ; and I commend my 
 work, with all its defects, to the candid judgment of 
 the intelligent. But I have yet, as introductory 
 matter, to lay down the great principles on which my 
 scheme is founded. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 A PROGRAMME OF PRINCIPLES, WHICH GO TO 
 SATISFY, AND IN THEIR APPLICATION TO 
 SOLVE, IMPORTANT PHYSICAL AND META- 
 PHYSICAL PROBLEMS. 
 
 1. — Absolute Substance. 
 
 np\H AT there is fundamentally a Universal Substance 
 A which exists as an ens by itself, which is the 
 absolute basis of all beinghood, which is uncreated, 
 infinite, eternal, without parts, all pervading, unseeni 
 that cannot be displaced, and withal impersonal J 
 generic, moreover, as to Quality, and therefore having 
 no particular condition in itself; yet having all 
 possible qualities under one homogeneous unity, and, 
 therefore, having the capacity of yielding up or 
 supplying all possible definite oc distinctive qualities, 
 each of which may be drawn forth, when sample 
 examples are prescribed for that purpose; and, 
 further, also generic as to Energy, and therefore having 
 no particular Force in itself, but having what con- 
 stitutes the foundation of all possible forces under one 
 homogeneous potentiality, and consequently the ca- 
 pacity of yielding or expressing all possible definite 
 or determinate forces, according as these are generated 
 under the agency of specific qualities in their respective 
 conditions, that is, when the qualities are particularly 
 conditioned and adjusted to one another, so as to 
 introduce the operation of their affinity. We shall 
 hereafter discover the fact of this universal and 
 
 w. 
 
16 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 Absolute Personality. 
 
 17 
 
 ij 
 
 I 
 
 immaterial substance in the Ethcrial medium by 
 which we are environed, and with which we are 
 coming to be more and more conversant ; and we 
 shall find it as the universally operative agency, 
 explanatory of the phenomena of the world, in all the 
 departments of nature. 
 
 2. — A bsolute Impersonality, 
 
 That Absolute Impersonality is to be understood 
 by the description of Absolute Substance, which we 
 commonly designate Ether or the Etherial Medium, 
 and which we must regard as being of the nature of 
 Spirit, or what we may designate as Pneum or Spirit- 
 substance, having the wonderful property of receiving 
 and involving within itself any number of impressions 
 which may in growth be developed into separate 
 conditions ; that said universal substance is properly 
 to be regarded as Absolute Impersonality, and, 
 therefore, an objective platform, constituting the 
 foundation of all particular substances, as well as the 
 primary substance out of which all particular sub- 
 stances are evolved ; and looking to the fact that in 
 its essential being as an absolute Unity, all particulars, 
 as finite and specific qualities derived therefrom, must 
 have a necessary affinity among one another, differing 
 according to their conditions, and according to the 
 laws of their combination — an affinity in virtue of 
 which they are attracted to one another, or repelled 
 from one another, according to the character of the 
 existing conditions, and the relation in which they are 
 made to stand to one another, we hence find that 
 Energy being hereby particularized, we have the source 
 
 ' 
 
 and spring of cosmical Forces, while we gather also that 
 the forms and conditions that belong to a pure etherial 
 or spirit-nature, may, by the application of an occult 
 influence which we term temperature, be developed 
 from the etherial into the material sphere, as an 
 inspissation, or thickening of conditions ; and, of 
 course, as something cognate to our external senses, 
 and through these made perceptible to our intellects ; 
 and further, we find as a fact in our experience, that 
 all the existing qualities of matter in all their possible 
 modifications or conditions are in universal sympathy 
 with the primary mother-substance which constitutes 
 the foundation of the Universe. 
 
 3. — A bsolute Pe> sonality. 
 
 That there is an Absolute Personality as well as an 
 Absolute Impersonality, and that the one is the 
 complement of the other — the one being the primary 
 Subjective with a manifestation of intrinsic conditions 
 in distinctive action ; the other' being the primary 
 Objective in their comprehensive oneness, the sub- 
 jectiv:: and the objective being in eternal unison : the 
 former being the Absolute Unity of all fundamental 
 particulars in one Personality, the latter being the 
 Absolute Unity of the same in their non-development, 
 both being intrinsically one and the same substance, 
 with this distinction, that the Personality is the sum 
 of fundamental Qualities separately developed in the 
 eternal activity of their full expression, while the 
 Impersonality, in like manner, is the sum of funda- 
 mental Qualities in the fulness of their non-expression, 
 or what may be called the capacity of their expression : 
 
18 
 
 Introduction, 
 
 The Applications of Substance, 
 
 19 
 
 
 that while the former must be regarded as properly 
 Deity, in being the absolute thinking and designing 
 Source of all movement, and of all adjustment of 
 relationships, the latter must be regarded as the 
 necessary circumstantials of Deity, without which 
 there could be no creation, and, indeed, no perfection 
 either in Deity or in nature : that, therefore, it behoved 
 that there must be in God as a Personality, those 
 essential limitations of qualitative characteristics out 
 of which all causality springs, and which are essential 
 in order to the production of those limitations which 
 are extracted from the Impersonal, and which 
 constitute the works of Creation : that, as we shall 
 hereafter find, there is in primitive substance, not only 
 the qualitative attribute that admits particulars in 
 the objective developments of substance, but that 
 it is likewise lighted up as intelligence under 
 consciousness, being the highest prerogative of which 
 substance is susceptible, and which is developed only 
 where personalities are constructed out of the funda- 
 mental Impersonality ; that the primitive Personality, 
 therefore, as having the highest form of manifestation, 
 must be regarded as the Supreme Intelligence ; and 
 in his own Personality standing apart from all his 
 works, and not to be confounded with his works further 
 than as a manifestation of his skill and wisdom, his 
 righteousness and goodness, his omniscience and 
 omnipotence. 
 
 4. — The Appiicatiofts of Absolute Substance. 
 
 That the essential nature of the Etherial medium 
 properly regarded as absolute substance, and there- 
 
 fore existing in itself, is to he considered as peculiarly 
 of the nature of spirit, by which we understand not 
 only a tenuity that is all-pervading, and all-penetrat- 
 ing through the category of matter, but which, as we 
 practically find, assumes to itself as spirit-substance, 
 the forms and qualities which are derived from mate- 
 rial conditions : that it is manifested in the depart- 
 ments of Pllectricity, Magnetism, Gravitation, Chemi- 
 cal and other afifinities, and the Cosmical Forces gene- 
 rally: — that it has the capacity of taking on and setting 
 forth in its own bosom what we may designate spirit 
 copies of all material objects, and that by an endless 
 elasticity peculiar to itself, it has the power of freely 
 admitting any number of copies according to the 
 number of material objects that happen to be present; 
 and this separately, distinctively, and simultaneously 
 in the same area, without collision and without con- 
 fusion : that this power of representation is illustrated 
 in the processes of growth, by reason of the forms and 
 qualities that are found in and belong to the germs of 
 plants, and which through the action of the etherial 
 medium are made to bear upon the nutritive plasma, 
 and so to introduce new forms, as the development of 
 the plant brings these into manifestation ; and thus 
 not only growth, but variety of growth-forms is pro- 
 moted, and in all cases in accordance with the germ 
 that is present as a pattern. Farther, that the Ether, 
 which we are inclined to designate as Pneum in order 
 to intimate its spirit-nature and immediate applica~ 
 bility to a multitude of purposes, is the medium 
 whereby Causality is made to operate, and its effects 
 are made to appear as the manifestations of natural 
 law, not only in cases where the causal elements arc 
 
 iv , 
 
20 
 
 Iniroduction. 
 
 The Source of Affinity. 
 
 21 
 
 in conjunction but where they arc separated by long 
 distances : that said medium is the causal nexus 
 whereby external objects are conveyed to the eyes of 
 the beholder, and thence by the optic nerve to the 
 brain : that this medium acts as a solid in binding to- 
 gether distant orbs, as well as atoms of matter in 
 dense masses, according to the strength of their 
 affinity, while at the same time it is a fluid in which 
 all objects live and move ; that still further, it is with- 
 out doubt the medium out of which all animal intelli- 
 gence is derived, in that it is found to operate subjec- 
 tively also in developing the highest attribute of its 
 capacity, viz., Consciousness, according to the organi- 
 zation presented by the animal economy for the mani- 
 festation of this noble prerogative. 
 
 5. — The Origin and Operation of Affinity through 
 
 Absolute Substance, 
 
 That we must regard the first and primary creations 
 of the Divine Personality, as preliminary and prepa- 
 ratory particulars, in order to the building up of the 
 universe, — that these primary creations are the prim- 
 ordial elements or specific qualities for forming the 
 alphabet of an objective economy, that is, the a, b, c, 
 out of which the book of the world is composed, and 
 that these elements have, as already noticed, a neces- 
 sary affinity to one another, being of necessity related 
 to one another as members of a united family, and 
 the offspring of the same mother-substance : that it 
 behoved therefore that there should be a varied readi- 
 ness of combination in these primary elements in 
 accordance with their atomic values ; and so combin- 
 
 ing, that they would be the molecules of composite 
 substance, even as the junction of the alphabetical 
 letters constitute syllables and words ; and again, as 
 words have to be joined to form sentences, and sen- 
 tences to form the symbol of complex thought, so 
 composite matter had to be combined, first in simply 
 inorganic forms, preparatory to a more structural for- 
 mation, known as cellular or organic, adapted in its 
 combinations for vegetable and animal life : — that the 
 idea of life, which has been regarded as in itself pecu- 
 liarly mysterious, (for to life, which is an effect, has 
 been mistakenly ascribed a formative and causative 
 power in the mechanism and growth of plants, 
 each after its kind) is neither more nor less than 
 the normal activities of organic matter in following 
 out the causality of those relations which are combined 
 to constitute a definite individuality ; and that growth 
 is simply the conformation of the germ, operative 
 through the all-pervading Ether on the plasma which 
 supplies the required nutriment '^ — that the animal 
 system is supplied with an economy of nerves of which 
 vegetation is destitute, and that the nerve-economy 
 serves to display the operation of bodily sensation as 
 intimating the affecting of a different part, by the 
 influence exerted on another, while its formation as a 
 central organization of cerebral functions, arouses the 
 highest prerogative of the Etherial self-hood, by 
 developing consciousness, and through consciousness, 
 the intelligence of our surroundings. 
 
 6. — Causcdity through Absolute Substance, 
 That the great question of Causality finds its 
 
 i 
 
I 
 
 I 'I 
 
 22 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 application and exposition throughout all the depart- 
 ments of nature as well as in the more mysterious 
 categories of existence, by means of the self-existent 
 Ether, as being the all connecting link whereby one 
 material object is joined in sympathy with another, 
 according to the several relationships in which they 
 are made to stand to one another. What then are 
 the principles of Causality as these are variously 
 discovered in the relationship of cosmical objects ? I 
 answer they are found first and fundamentally in the 
 respective conditions of the causal elements : Second, 
 in the relation in which these are made to stand to 
 one another as to the order of their combination. 
 Upon these two considerations depends the Affinity 
 that comes to be displayed, which is always sub- 
 servient to the Relationship in which the conditioned 
 objects happen to stand to one another. We have an 
 illustration of Causality in the junction of the letters 
 of the alphabet, each of these being regarded as 
 conditioned objects. A certain junction of certain 
 letters forms a word, as for example the word note : 
 change the relationship of the letters, and we get the 
 word tone : add an ingredient, for example the letter 
 s, and we get stone, seton, notes, tones. Take again the 
 words as conditioned objects and join them in varied 
 relationship and we obtain sentences which have their 
 respective and definite meaning as the effect. This 
 holds good with respect to the material elements with 
 which chemistry makes us familiar ; and it will be 
 found that the effect is found to depend first on the 
 particular conditions assembled : second, on the 
 relation in which they are made to stand to one 
 another. Then we have the precise affinity displayed 
 
 Causality and other Capacities. 
 
 23 
 
 in exact subserviency to this relation ; and out of this 
 affinit}- arises the resultant operation or the Force, 
 along with the qualitative change produced. I would 
 sav the Affinity furnishes the Force, and the Relation 
 prescribes and defines the law of the Force. Upon 
 these principles we have the expression of all material 
 law in the universe. But let it always be noted, that 
 were it not for the fact that the conditions in their 
 prescribed relationship are linked together by the all 
 pervading nexus of the Etherial medium, there could 
 be no natural function of matter with matter. And 
 as Ether is essentially of the nature of spirit, it 
 explains, also, as will be noticed, the connexion and 
 causality cf matter operating with mind. 
 
 7. — Other Capacities of Absolute Substance, 
 
 We have seen what absolute substance is in itself, 
 as an homogeneous whole — as an objective Imperson- 
 ality — as a generic in quality, having fundamental 
 qualities, but without any expression of them by itself; 
 we have seen also that there exists therein an expres- 
 sion of fundamental qualities, united in a primary 
 Personality, being a vivid manifestation of all condi- 
 tions that are contained in gremio of the other ; we 
 have seen that it behoves the principles of causality 
 therefore to reside in this primary Personality, in as 
 far as it is by the junction of one quality with another 
 that there can be the production of a tertium quid; we 
 have seen that it behoves that Supreme Intelligence 
 must exist therein for the devising of new conditions in 
 the processes of production ; and that, when specific 
 and specially conditioned objects arc produced, there 
 
 m 
 
24 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 Spirit-Forms and Matter- Forms. 
 
 25 
 
 I 
 
 % 
 
 w 
 
 I 
 
 is in absolute substance a response thereto ; and that 
 absolute substance, in its generic character, is the com- 
 mon and exhaustless ground on which the first great 
 Cause doth operate. What we are first and presently 
 familiar with is the category of matter ; and matter is 
 known to us under what are called non-metallic and 
 metallic qualities, and found in these states as solid, 
 liquid, and gaseous ; and farther, by the application 
 of heat,* the solid may be reduced to a liquid, and the 
 liquid to a gas, and the gas dispersed in atoms. 
 Hence, much speculation on the theory of atoms, 
 sometimes termed monads, some of which have been 
 supposed to have subjective characteristics, and some 
 to have objective characteristics, and by a process of 
 natural selection thereby to begin a scheme of evolu- 
 tion of which no account has been given, or can be 
 given, as a scheme of causality guided by Nature. We 
 have seen that the process of first introducing certain 
 particular substances must, according to the laws 
 of causality, have had its source in a Supreme 
 
 * What heat is it is «lifficult to describe. It has been termed 
 by Tyndall '* a mode of motion ;" but motion in any mode what- 
 ever is not heat, but only a result of heat. We speak of tem- 
 perature as marking the gradations of heat ; and we find that 
 the conditions of matter are modified by the application of heat. 
 As regards the sensation of it in the animal system, it may be 
 pleasjint to us or painful, according to the intensity with which 
 it is applied : this arising no doubt from its action on the par- 
 ticles of the body. Heat differs from colil as only a gradation 
 of temperature. Whatever we may describe heat or cold to be, 
 we may say it is that peculiar influence whereby the conditions 
 of the qualities of matter are altered ; and for aught we know 
 it is that influence whereby the conditioneil in spirit-substance 
 is converted into matter-substance. 
 
 All-Conditioned One, to whom the foundation of 
 particulars is to be traced ; and, that in their 
 origination, the first formation of particular sub- 
 stance must be in spirit-substance only, and not 
 as matter ; and hence the original conditioning 
 of the qualities must have been in spirit-substance 
 only. What we say then, in order to the pro- 
 duction of material objects is this,— that spirit- 
 forms are susceptible of being thickened ; in other 
 words, that etherial conditions are capable of being 
 incrassated. We find, as a fact, that there is a close 
 sympathy betwixt the two.* We have seen that 
 material conditions are everywhere invariably attended 
 by corresponding spirit-forms and qualities in the 
 etherial medium, extending according to a determinate 
 law, under which the representation diminishes as the 
 square of the distance from the object increases, and 
 that the delineation of form and quality is carried 
 throughout every part of this area, and therein also 
 afifinities operate. We find, moreover, that the forms 
 and conditions of external things thus extended are 
 conveyed to our external senses, and (as has been 
 already noticed) by the nerves connected with these to 
 the brain, where there is the sensorium or centre of 
 nerve-transmission, at which the Etherial Me or Ego is 
 posited. It is obvious that the foundation of this Ego, 
 or what we may call the raw material of the Ego, is 
 neither more nor less than the etherial representation 
 of the bodily economy set up in the receptacle natural 
 to it, and adjusted to be the recipient of impressions 
 
 ♦ We have the spirit-forms rendered material forms; and 
 again material forms changed into spirit-forms in Scripture. — 
 (>ice Luke xx.iv. 31 ; John xx. \\)). 
 
 s, 
 
26 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 The Source of Mental States. 
 
 27 
 
 I*' 
 
 il 
 
 coming in the character of ideas of external things as 
 objects of consciousness ; and that under the peculiar 
 circumstances in which it is operated upon, as bearing 
 a reaction upon itself, as it were between body and body 
 by means of afferent and efferent nerves, this Eero. 
 already h'ghted up with a consciousness of self, be- 
 comes by further impressions through the senses 
 lighted up with intelligence of the objects around us in 
 the world. 
 
 8. — Mental States. 
 
 That the mental Ego is established as the etherial 
 representative of the animal body is demonstrated by 
 a variety of evidence, the most important being the 
 fact that the fundamental self-consciousness of the in- 
 dividual is a consciousness of its own bodily states 
 and of these only, and that its tastes and tendencies 
 are those of the body ; and also that there is a direct 
 connection between the etherial images objectively, 
 and the same received subjectively as ideas ; that as 
 images are formed in the spirit-substance in confor- 
 mity to present material forms, so it behoves that 
 a conscious state in the animal economy is not only 
 excited, but must vary, according to the kind of 
 organization whereby impressions are conveyed to the 
 platform of spirit-substance, and hence the different 
 mental constitutions attached to each separate animal 
 economy, one rising in intelligence above another, 
 according to the number and character of the inlets 
 or organs for the introduction of ideas ; that man has 
 a cerebral organization in analogy with that assigned 
 to the lower animals, some of which in point of com- 
 
 plexity approach to the intricacies found in the human 
 brain ; but it is obvious that there is in the organiza- 
 tion of the human brain a special quality such as 
 gives to man a range of intelligence to which there is 
 no limit as compared with the lower animals, in that 
 it enables him to embrace in his vision the relations of 
 the not-self, as well as the relations of self. Ani- 
 mals see what relates to self but man in cognizing 
 the relations of not-self is able to penetrate into the 
 future and to prepare for the future ; and not only 
 this, but to weigh character, to draw inferences, to 
 fulfil purposes, and all this in subordination to the 
 intuitions of duty and moral obligation. 
 
 9. — Organization for Mental States. 
 
 That the external senses are the instrumentality by 
 which the mind is enabled to exercise the faculty of 
 Perception, and that by Perception we have a 
 cognition of the external world -and its objects, and 
 that these in their respective conditions are conveyed 
 by the Ether to the eyes, and other senses, according 
 as the qualities conveyed are adapted to them 
 respectively ; and from the senses through the 
 attached nerve to the brain : that the impressions 
 received through the senses in the exercise of 
 Perception, constitute the pabulum from which the 
 internal senses derive their inner impressions, as these 
 are registered in the cortical and cellular substance, 
 and through which, as material to work upon, we 
 have the facts of Memory, the pictures of Imagination, 
 the creations of Conception, the conclusions of 
 Reasoning, etc., all of which make up the sum of our 
 
 >4I> 
 
f 
 
 '.I 
 
 Jl 
 
 28 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 »♦!( 
 
 m 
 
 knowledge as the ideas come to and are appropriated 
 by Intellect as its property : that the internal senses 
 operate by means of a leading impression, drawing to 
 it the required image by means of Affinity through 
 Association ; and whatever be the nature of the im- 
 pression, it is ever to be understood that the self-same 
 quality with all its characteristics passes as ideas into 
 the ethcrial or spirit-ground of the Ego ; that the 
 Ego as being fundamentally the ethcrial or spirit 
 representation of the bodily conditions, is in reality 
 the Intellect or Soul, which admits any number or 
 amount of involutions of separate data given to it, and 
 preserves them intact as the furniture which it acquires, 
 save when under the discipline of life, it has to yield 
 up what it has been brought to repudiate as no longer 
 its inherent property. 
 
 10. — The Source of Emotions, 
 
 That the inbringing of impressions (and these in 
 the spirit-substance constitute ideas), creates emotions 
 so soon as the ideas reach the Me ; and the emotions 
 vary in character and kind according to the condition 
 of the ideas on the one hand, and the condition for 
 the time being of the Me on the other hand : that 
 emotions are sensations which equally affect the body 
 and the mind, but the mind through the impress on 
 the body ; and this because the idea is but a spirit 
 representation of the impression which is founded in 
 the material organ ; and the emotion is felt to be 
 mild or vivid, weak or strong, according to the qualities 
 that are hereby brought into combination. Tell a 
 man that some one, of whom he kuows nothing, has 
 
 The Sources of Emotion and of Morals. 29 
 
 been drowned, he is but little affected ; but let him 
 know that the drowned man is his father, and you 
 immediately create a strong emotion by the very 
 change of the idea as one affecting himself. That the 
 PLmotion according to its character may be attended 
 by the immediate exercise of Will is obvious in very 
 many cases. If meat is set before a hungry man, the 
 Emotion at once carries with it the Will to partake of 
 it. A counteractive emotion may however be aroused 
 in the very act of partaking, i.e. if the idea should be 
 introduced into the mind, that there is poison or some 
 deleterious mixture in the food. A similar counter- 
 action might also be manifested by the introduction 
 of a moral idea, as when the military officer on 
 putting a glass of water to his parched lips, on seeing 
 a wounded soldier looking wistfully at him with 
 craving eye, withdrew it and gave it to the man, say- 
 ing " thy need is greater than mine." It is obvious 
 then that the ought not introduced by the moral idea, 
 may be sufficient to restrain the operation of the 
 sensuous Will. 
 
 11.-77/^ Source of Morals. 
 
 That moral ideas create moral emotions, and are 
 those which interfere with or affect the rights of the 
 sentient creature ; and that these ideas are found to 
 arise at the very back of the sensuous Will ; and that 
 they exercise a controlling influence in either arrest- 
 ing or permitting the operation of the sensuous Will, 
 as when the idea intervenes that the accomplishment 
 of the sensuous Will, may be an injury or not to 
 another: that moral ideas are also presented when 
 
30 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 Will- Determination and Freedom, 
 
 31 
 
 ! 
 
 '\ ;i 
 
 1' I 
 
 » 
 
 i 
 
 i I 
 
 we see a creature in pain from which he can be 
 relieved, or in any need whereby he can be properly 
 benefited, in which case an emotion is aroused which 
 constitutes a Will to supply the want. This emotion 
 as a rule will be greatly modified, i.e. heightened or 
 lessened accordingly to the relation in which the 
 party in want may happen to stand to the Me as 
 feeling the emotion. 
 
 \1.— The Modifications of Will, 
 
 While moral ideas influence the Me, by introducing 
 the ought or the ought not, as the case may be, anent 
 the exercise of the sensuous Will, there are ideas or 
 sentiments which come to us as having a peculiarly 
 authoritative aspect, ideas for example, which are 
 believed to come from Deity, or which, according to 
 the education we have received, stand in our minds as 
 sentiments which are not to be controverted. Such 
 ideas will be found to influence and engender Will, 
 even when moral law, if left to itself, would otherwise 
 prevail. We can hereby explain such cases as the 
 sacrificing of children to Moloch by their parents. It 
 is thus made obvious that the law of morals can be 
 and is modified in character and action according to 
 the views of authority under which the mind is placed. 
 
 13.-77/^ Principles of Will-Determination. 
 
 That, in the exercise of Will, there is very often an 
 alternative placed before the Me (the mind), as when 
 two or three separate ideas seem to contend for 
 appropriation in the fulfilment of a purpose, and one 
 
 of them only can be adopted : it may be illustrated 
 by the fact of several candidates coming forward to 
 fill an appointment, and one only can be chosen : it 
 has been asked what moves the Will in these 
 circumstances? I answer — In these circumstances 
 the Will must aivait upon ftidgment. Judgment pre- 
 scribes ivhich of the ideas are on the ivhole the fittest or 
 most desirable to the Me. The Me becomes then 
 changed in its relation to the claimants generally, and 
 through the exercise of Judgment it is drawn to its 
 choice by the J udgment. This sets forth clearly enough 
 what is called the determination of the Will. It is the 
 determination which constitutes the Will ; and the 
 determination is simply the preferential attraction 
 which the Me has for one of the pleas rather than the 
 other, after fudgment has decided on their merits, 
 
 14. — Freedom of Will, 
 
 That in all cases where there is the freedom of 
 choice, there may very likely be a bias or predis- 
 position leaning in some particular direction ; but 
 this fact does not touch the question of one's indi- 
 vidual liberty. P'or what is really meant by the 
 power of choice ? Is it not the power of following 
 one's own inclination, or at all events of serving some 
 purpose? If I have a proclivity or bias in any 
 particular direction, or if I have an end to accomplish, 
 surely my liberty consists in adopting that direction 
 in preference to any other ; and when I have in 
 Judgment weighed all the consequences of so doing, 
 and decided upon the course I have resolved to follow, 
 I am responsible accordingly. 
 
 k 
 
32 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 Mr. Druvimofid's Evolution. 
 
 33 
 
 I 
 
 li 
 
 N.B. — In close connexion with the universal 
 principle of Causality, there stands forth the all-im- 
 portant question of Evolution. Since the fore^^oing 
 principles were penned, I have read the latest 
 publication on this subject, viz. : — Drummond's 
 " Ascent of Man." It does not fall to me to express 
 an opinion on the merits of this work ; but I take the 
 freedom of saying, that his plea of " altruism," as a 
 struggle for others in the field of nature, is not well 
 founded. True it is that, in the animal economy, we 
 see this instinct well established, particularly in 
 mothers, in behalf of their young, while the young are 
 dependent on their help ; but so soon as the young 
 are able to provide for themselves, all care and con- 
 cern for their offspring cease. We say, therefore, the 
 instinct is a wise provision for the preservation of 
 life while in a state of helplessness ; but this case 
 of parents nursing their young cannot properly be 
 regarded as at all a question of Evolution, but is an 
 implanted instinct. We aver that until moral law comes 
 into play, as in the case of man, we see very little of 
 altruistic struggles for others in the world. And 
 even then the selfish element has for the most part 
 reigned paramount, as seen in the destructive wars 
 which have ever prevailed. Until Christianity came, 
 altruism has been at a discount ; and even yet we see 
 what a vigorous battle it has to fight before the 
 struggle in behalf of others comes to prevail. 
 
 True it is that we see the great principle of self- 
 sacrifice in nature ; and Mr. Drummond makes much 
 of this in corroboration of his altruistic claims. But 
 though one department of nature is found to be made 
 available by sacrifice for the maintenance of another 
 
 and a higher department, what lesson does it teach ; 
 certainly not the fact of Evolution. It teaches the wise 
 provision of an omniscient mind in ordaining that the 
 lower stages of being should give way for the support of 
 the higher. But until we have seen this law of altruism 
 enforced in the person of Jesus Christ, viz., love to 
 our neighbour, as the great principle of Christianity, 
 we can hardly call the self-sacrifice of nature by the 
 name of altruism. 
 
 Mr. D. rightly regards Love as the perfection of 
 altruism ; but he has a curious notion of the origin 
 and characteristics of love. " Love is love (he says) 
 and has always been love, and has never been any- 
 thing lower. Whence (he asks) came it ? W^ho be- 
 stowed it ? a little child. Till this appeared, Mary's 
 affection was non-existent ; woman's was frozen." 
 Surely everybody knows that love, like every other 
 affection of the mind, is produced by the presentation 
 of something which is agreeable to the mind and heart. 
 As a general rule love is an attachment to what is 
 gratifying to us. This attachment of course varies 
 according to the category of the object which excites 
 it. There is the love of money, the love of children, 
 the love of truth, and the love of God, as the highest 
 of all. 
 
 The principles of Evolution contended for by Mr. 
 Drummond cannot I think be upheld. They wildly con- 
 tradict all the laws of causality, in that they leap from 
 species to species, without any real foundation for the 
 results attained. We have been accustomed to believe 
 that whatever is contained in the effect is to be found 
 in the cause ; but Mr. Drummond's effects under 
 evolution contain much for which there is no cause 
 
. 
 
 84 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 TJie true nature of Evolution. 
 
 :^5 
 
 M 
 
 M 
 
 Ji: 
 
 whatever. I need but mention the conversion of the 
 gills of the fish, which have no connexion whatever 
 with hearing, and no adaptation for the sense of 
 hearing, into ears, with their varied nerve organization 
 for hearing, when the fish become a land animal ! 
 The whole is a burlesque on natural law. That there 
 is such a principle as evolution cannot for a moment 
 be questioned ; but evolution has not only its limits 
 but its laws ; and for every expression of it there 
 must be a satisfactory reason found ; and in every 
 expression of it also, there must be a preservation of 
 what may be termed \.\\q ground-forjn of the structure; 
 that form which may be regarded as the basis of 
 
 species. 
 
 In behalf of an absolute evolution, it has been 
 maintained that a single cell might be made to 
 involve a very large number of separate characteristics. 
 This is true, as we find in the case of the human germ 
 and of others. But granting this, we are bound to 
 assume the special interposition of a Creator of the 
 germ in each distinctive stage of species ; for before 
 man came, it behoved that there should be complete 
 development in each separate case of the respective 
 seeds of animal creaturehood.* And then, if there is 
 
 * It is ?iffirine(l that the human cell, in its development, 
 troea throuf,'h tlie mnge of animal production, in its ascent, till 
 its final stage of ascent in man. The fact of a single cell em- 
 bodying stich an enormous amount of separate fundamentals for 
 the development of the extraordinary multi|)licity that is ktiown 
 to exist in the organization of man, is one of the wonders that 
 confronts us ; and it opens up to us this consideration, that as 
 the etherial arena or spirit-substance is known to embrace in 
 its bosom any nund)er of separate impressions without in any 
 way confounding them, so it would seem that a va.st number of 
 
 a gradual ascent till we come to man, as must be 
 allowed, how are we to account for the expressive 
 variety of collateral types, each having its own 
 evolutionary changes? Nature in her ever-varying 
 moods, according to the influences that happen to 
 prevail through climate, food, training, etc., can after 
 all introduce nothing that is absolutely new. We may 
 have members strengthened by exercise, or members 
 weakened by want of this, or even lost by the want of 
 it ; and we may have many changes by evolution in 
 what constitutes the conditions of things ; but that 
 natural law should of itself invent de novo, or create a 
 fresh organization, either by natural selection or by 
 any other process, without the interposition of a con- 
 structive hand, is not only contrary to all analogy, 
 but is inconceivable on the known principles of 
 Causality. 
 
 these may l)e infolded in the smallest sjmce, and presented under 
 a material form. In the.se circumstauces," it is most natural to 
 tlunk that, in creating the germs for future development, the 
 Creator began with the simplest, and in each succeeding case 
 imparted what constitutes the basis of additional structures, 
 without increasing tlie size of the cell, when made capable of 
 further (hn-elopment.- 
 
 i|kf| 
 
Matter and Spirit. 
 
 37 
 
 \i 
 
 I 
 
 l( >.l 
 
 I 
 
 * \\ 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE. 
 
 Sectiofi 1 . — 
 
 Characteristics of Matter and of Kther 
 and the Cosmical Forces. 
 
 THE problem of Existence, or the great question 
 - of Ontology, involves the philosophy of sub- 
 stance. Great minds have addressed themselves to the 
 solution of this problem, and have given it up in de- 
 spair. Will any succeeding inquirers be more fortunate? 
 It is not likely that better brains intrinsically can or 
 will be applied to the investigation ; and yet in the 
 advance of scientific attainment, an inferior mind, 
 placed on a higher pedestal, may be able to grasp a 
 fresh peg whereby he can lift himself to still further 
 views, and thereby be led to make additional headway 
 into the inner secrets of essential beinghood. 
 
 We are familiar with the outside world of matter ; 
 and we have pursued endless speculations on the 
 inside world of mind ; but how to connect these two 
 great categories, has baffled our philosophers. That 
 there is a connection betwixt them, and this of the 
 most intimate nature, is an assured fact to every man ; 
 yet the modus operandi of body upon mind, and of 
 mind upon body, remains to this day a mystery. We 
 are accustomed, and I think rightly, to regard the 
 
 essential basis of mind to be what we call Spirit- 
 substance,* and for the very good reason that while 
 matter is finite and limited in its qualities, and quickly 
 loses its identity by the changes which are wrought 
 upon it : mind has the capacity of receiving endless 
 accessions, and with them all can, through memory, 
 point to its identity, by bringing up past experiences 
 in their separate occurrences. I may be assured that 
 the tree in my garden is the growth of the very plant 
 which I inserted in the ground twenty years ago ; but 
 there is no outward sameness now betwixt the original 
 plant and the tree as it presently stands ; but that I 
 am 7101V the individual I was then, is, notwithstanding 
 all the changes I have undergone, an assurance of 
 which I have no doubt whatever, because I can re- 
 cal the facts and the very state of mind which existed 
 at the date in question. 
 
 The fact then that I can trace backward a long 
 .series of identities that have been mine, and still are 
 mine, constitutes a feature in the' category of mind, 
 which assuredly does not belong to matter as we 
 ordinarily perceive it. The fact, moreover, that mind 
 can hold in its grasp a multitude of items called ideas, 
 without confusion, without collision, and without 
 
 * Tht're are some who think tliat the term "substance" 
 cannot be employed or embraced in the term "spirit," which is 
 usually understood as an abstract characteristic, such as cour- 
 age, vigour, &c., in the matter of disposition or temper. But 
 wliat is tiiis but tlie pith or marrow of the substance, and the 
 term spirit may be used not only as denoting tlie cliaracter of the 
 substance, but as meaning the substance itself, as something 
 particularly refined and subtle, with energy and resilience for 
 its attributes. 
 
 7 
 
 i 
 
88 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 Philosophers on the nature of Ether, 
 
 39 
 
 f*' 
 
 i 
 
 amalgamation, constitute qualities which cannot be 
 predicated of matter; while the attribute of conscious- 
 ness has no manifestation whatever in the arena of 
 matter as such. We have good grounds then for 
 concluding, that the basis of mind must be regarded 
 as spirit-substance. 
 
 Here inquirers have been led to .stop .short ; and 
 they have hence concluded that spirit-substance must 
 be regarded as exclusively '' mind-stuff," and therefore 
 not to be .sought for in the category of mere physics. 
 Physical philosophers in this respect have sadly over- 
 looked the great fact, that spirit-substance may be 
 found operating (and in contrary directions at the 
 same time) * in the field of pure-matter. We are 
 acquainted with the great forces which constantly 
 play their parts in fulfilling the phenomena of the 
 world, and with the ultimate common ground in which 
 they all rest. VV^e are indebted to Sir George Grove 
 for the assurance that Electricity and Magnetism. 
 Chemical and Electric Affinity and Gravitation are 
 not only convertible into one another ; but thit for 
 this very rea.son, these forces are but different 
 affections of one and the same invisible medium. 
 Physical philosophers indeed are fully cogni.sant of 
 this medium which is known by the name of Ether ; 
 but though they speak of it as "a highly elastic 
 
 * Hence the (IcKtrine which has |>revaile«l aiuoijcr philoso- 
 phers, ami is still believed in by many, of two tiui.js (positive 
 and ne^rative) ; but two fluids in point of fact would not suffice; 
 for it can be proved that a score of different lines of action niav 
 be found operatin«; in the .same plane, that is in the same local 
 compartment, and in all possible directions without interruption. 
 
 medium," they have been unwilling to regard it as in 
 itself other than matter ; and even to speak of its 
 atomic character, though they nevertheless find 
 that "nature abhors a vacuum."* If it were a 
 
 * Sir William Thomson asks the question " What is Ether ^" 
 and answers, " It is matter prodigiously less dense than air- 
 millions and millions and millions of times less dense than air. 
 We can form some sort of idea of its limitations. We believe it 
 is a real thing, with great rigidity in comparison with its 
 density ; it mav be made to vibrate 400 million million times 
 per second, and* yet be of such density as not to produce the 
 sli<dite.st rtisistance toany body going through it."— (Constitution 
 of Matter, p. 347.) Tyndall says "Space is occupied by a sub- 
 stance almost inHnitely elastic, through which the pulses of 
 light make their way." And he goes on to say " it is just as 
 e^sy to c(.nceive of a vibrating atom, as to conceive of a vibrat- 
 incr cannon ball ; and there is no more difficulty of conceiving 
 this Ether, as it is called, which Hlls space, than in imagining all 
 space to be filled with jelly. You can imagine the atoms vibrat- 
 in<r, and their vibrations communicated to Ether in which they 
 swimr, to be propagated through it in wa>^s. These waves enter 
 the pupil, cross the ball of the eye, and break upon the retina 
 at the back of the eye. Their motions are communicated to the 
 retina, transmitted thence along the optic nerve to the brain, 
 and then announce themselves to consciousness as sight." (Lec- 
 tures on Heat, p. 250.) Sir J. Herschel on the undulating theory, 
 says "an excessively rare, subtle, and elastic medium, or Ether, 
 fills all space, and pervades all material bodies, occupying the 
 intervals between their molecules; and that the molecules 
 of Ether are susceptible of being set in motion by the agitation 
 of the particles of ponderable matter." Faraday says-" I sup- 
 pose we mav compare the matter of Ether and ordinary matter, 
 and conside'r them in. their essential constitution, either or both 
 comi)osed of little nuclei considere^l in the abstract as matter, 
 and as force or power, associated with these nuclei ; or else as 
 both consisting of mere centres of force, according to Bosco- 
 viU'h's theory." It is very obvious that the view of Ether given 
 
 II 
 
40 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 The Prerogatives of Ether 
 
 41 
 
 it 
 
 medium composed of atoms, then assuredly the 
 atoms, as finite particles, could be displaced ; but 
 there is no such thing as displacement for a moment, 
 or by the thousandth part of a hair's breadth of the 
 Etherial medium : it must be regarded, as we shall 
 see, as an endless continuity, or absolute uniformity, 
 without the possibility of a break therein. I lence it has 
 been compared to a compact jelly, or being one 
 continued persistent unity. And moreover its 
 elasticity is such that however occupied in connexion 
 with any representation, or set of representations, it 
 has always a fresh side for the representation of 
 additional objects that may be brought into the arena 
 of manifestation. 
 
 by tliese distinguished Hutiiors be«(s a i-oiuliticiu of this primitive 
 substance very ilitferent from that set forth in the text, and 
 very unphilosophical, because it is fouml to be in many respects 
 unlike to matter, and because it fails to account for tlie |»resent 
 con<lition of thini,'s on any feasible principles. The autln.rs of 
 ''The Unseen Universe" (p. 148) s;4y-*'the principal properties 
 of Ether are at first sinrht at least of an inconirruous character ; 
 for from one point of view, it appears as a tiuid, from another a.s 
 an elastic solid. There is no appieciable resistance offered bv 
 Ether to planetary motions even wiien the veh)citv, as in the 
 case of the earth is 10(),rX)0 feet per .second. On the otiier hand, 
 light transmitted with a veU»city 188,000 n.iles per second, de- 
 pends upon transverse disturlmnces of some kind, while several 
 optical phenomena indicate a velocity almost infinitely great, in 
 compari.son with this enormous velocity. Regard the Ether as 
 we please, tliere can be no doubt that its properties are of a 
 mui;h higher onler in the arcana of nature than those of tan- 
 gible matter ; for we know from what it (h)es that it is capable 
 of vastly more than any one has yet ventured to guess." See 
 this subject (Ether) further disrussed in Appendix I. 
 
 And here it is needful to point to the first and most 
 important ofifice accomplished by Ether. Obviously 
 it is not intercepted by matter-substance. This is 
 made known to us by the fact that in day-light it 
 readily passes through transparent matter such as 
 glass ; and not only so, but by the fact that it carries 
 with it the forms of which it happens to be the bearer. 
 And this opens up one of the most important 
 features of this remarkable medium, which is this : — 
 that the matter of outward objects is not only 
 penetrable by, and pervious to the Ether, but that 
 from the material object there is projected a corres- 
 ponding etherial representation or form, etherially 
 bearing the qualitative properties of the object ; and 
 extending by a certain definite and determinate law, 
 according to its mass, while decreasing inversely as 
 the .square of the distance increases. This great law — 
 the Etherial projection of the material object — has not 
 been taken into account by our physical philosophers, 
 as it ought to have been. But it is in the first place 
 proved to be a fact ; and in the second place it is 
 found to explain the whole phenomena of nature, 
 which stand before us as facts which are otherwise 
 utterly mysterious — facts which are patent to us, but 
 of which we can ordinarily give no explanation. 
 
 As to the fact that the representation of the 
 material object is projected or radiated over the 
 plane of the object : this is made known to us by 
 holding up a mirror before the object. Hereby it is 
 shewn as decreasing in size inversely as is the square 
 of the distance of the mirror from the object ; and 
 here also, is a remarkable fact that the whole 
 surrounding medium in every part takes on the 
 

 42 
 
 The Problem of Existence, 
 
 Matter-Fonns and Spirit-Forms. 
 
 48 
 
 image — not by threads, but by continuity. And 
 accordingly, we find that in day-light the objects of 
 the outer world are depicted on our eyes, as so many 
 mirrors receiving the images of them. And in their 
 case the image is carried by the optic nerve to the 
 brain, where, as we shall afterwards see, there is a 
 reception of them, and consequently a cognition and 
 consciousness of them, by the mind. 
 
 But we have reason to know that it is not merely 
 in the luminifcrous condition of the Kther that there 
 is a radiation of the material object, but at all times, 
 in the darkness as well as in the light. It is thereby 
 that heat is radiated ; and it is thereby that the 
 formless protoplast takes on the characteristics of the 
 existing germ-forms, whereby growth is promoted. 
 In the merely physical economy we can produce the 
 representation of an object, as by electrical agency, in 
 a plasma adapted for receiving it. And it seems 
 natural enough to suppose that, if the etherial me- 
 dium, as the most fundamental and the most all- 
 penetrating medium in existence, takes on the speci- 
 alty of the form and character of an object, the plastic 
 medium, which is provided as a material basis, through 
 the action of the etherial medium, takes on the same 
 form and characteristics as that belonging to the 
 germ.* 
 
 This leads us to speak of the Forces of nature gene- 
 rally. \\'e have become familiar enough with the 
 phenomena of Electricity, and more particularly with 
 its use in telegraphy. We ask — what is telegraphy ? 
 The answer is — it is the transmission of material con- 
 ditions, or .shall we not rather say, of ///^ representation 
 of material conditions, through a medium found adapted 
 for this end. What arc material conditions ? I ans- 
 wer, such as are manifest to our senses — they are 
 forms which can be seen by the eyes, or heard by the 
 ears, or felt by the hands ; or they are savours ascer- 
 tained by the taste, or odours made known by means 
 of the nostrils ; there are al.so physiological conditions 
 which are determined only by their chemical consti- 
 tution. What is here affirmed is, that all those con- 
 ditions of matter seem to plant their essential quali- 
 ties in the surrounding etherial medium, and therefore 
 they exert their affinities in the etherial medium as 
 effectually as when we see these affinities fulfilled 
 before our eyes in the sphere of matter. 
 
 In this view we come to have a fresh aspect as to 
 the foundations of matter. The difference betwixt 
 spirit-formations and matter-formations appears to be 
 this, that by some process (we may call ic attempering) 
 a change of thickening takes place, whereby the spirit- 
 form^ which of course is finite, comes to be represented 
 
 * It may be regarde<l as still a myatery in the process of 
 "growth, how to account for the new developments of blossom and 
 of fruit, witli all the many s|)ecialities of form nnd quality dis- 
 played! in the world of vegetation ; and for the variety of organs 
 and filaments that are manifested in the animal btnly as it 
 comes to maturity, none of which can be detected in the germ 
 or seed fn»m which all is developeil. Here we are iuitiate<l into 
 
 the wonderful capacities of substance, which is not only able to 
 bear within the bosom of the germ the initiatory form of body 
 in its more immediate developnient, but those posterior 
 itnpre.ssions which shew themselves at the back of certain 
 expansions. It would s^^em that the enornious number of 
 involvements which spirit-substance may embrace in the 
 smallest conjpass may be folded up in matter. 
 
 'I 
 
44 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 The Source of Cosmical Forces. 
 
 45 
 
 as a matter-form. In both cases there is the finite 
 constitution made up of its respective quahties, the 
 material representation being simply a grosser mani- 
 festation of the more refined deh'neation in Ether that 
 is unseen * Of these refined delineations in the spirit 
 world, we must distinguish those which arc fixed and 
 determinate, as having their natural sphere therein, 
 from those which are temporary, as being the evanes- 
 cent shadows of material objects reflected therein, and 
 dependent on the presence of the material objects. 
 
 We see, however, the value and importance of these 
 shadows, in as far as the forces of nature are carried 
 on thereby. For example, the etherial representation 
 of the sun meets the etherial representation of the 
 earth, and that of the other planets of our solar sys- 
 tem, and thereby maintaining the centripetal relation 
 of each to the sun, while their movement given to 
 each centrifugally balances this relation into a definite 
 circumambience ; and again, the great mass of our 
 earth attracts to its surface the material objects which 
 are separated from its own compact body, thereby 
 constituting what is called gravitation. In other 
 words, the maxim holds good universally that what- 
 ever happens to be the affinity of the substances which 
 constitutes the globes of space, that same affinity is 
 
 ♦ What are we to un<lerstaii<l as to those jipjjearauces of 
 anj/els, as beings beloiiginif to the spirit-world, wlioin the 
 Scriptures represent as at times appearing in material forms \ 
 Wiiat but to suppose the |K)ssibility of their s))irit-forms being 
 manifeste«l in tlie garb of matter. Wliat also, about tiie spirit- 
 form of the Lord Jesus Christ after his resiUTection, wlueli was 
 yet made to j)ut on the material form and handled as sucli by 
 hiH disciples { 
 
 expressed by the interplanetary ether, and through 
 this reacts on the material objects themselves.* 
 
 Section 2. — The Cosmical Forces dependent for their 
 characteristics on the Affinity of the Conditions 
 brought into operative relationship. 
 
 I have said that the Ether penetrates material sub- 
 stances, and in so doing according tc its universal law, 
 it partakes of the quality and therefore the affinity 
 which the particles of matter have for one another ; 
 and it confirms that affinity, according as it is strong 
 or weak. Hence the tenacity with which the particles 
 of the diamond cleave to one another, while that of 
 ice, water, and steam are quite different. This con- 
 stitution of matter moreover explains what may be 
 called the transmissibility of force through any mate- 
 rial medium. The particles may be so loosely joined 
 that the body of matter is thereby less fitly adapted 
 for an electric current ; or they may'be so compactly 
 joined as to be little susceptible of motion ; or they 
 may be constitutionally unfitted for receiving impres- 
 sions, and therefore to be regarded as bad conductors 
 so called. We find the required quality and consis- 
 tency in the particles of a copper wire which carry out 
 the impressions imported. And as confirmatory of 
 the doctrine that the junction of distinctive qualities 
 lies at the foundation of force, and that forms which 
 
 ♦ Here it is obvious that the Ether manifests itself as at 
 once a soli<l and a flui«l. It behaves in the character of a solid 
 wlien it grips the heavenly bodies together, as if in one mass, 
 and at the same time as a fluid, when it permits their respective 
 movements within its bosom. 
 
 I 
 
40 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 Matter-Forces manifested in Ether, 
 
 47 
 
 i 
 
 may be conjoined with the force, when not violent, are 
 conveyed through a. suitable medium, we find not only 
 certain configurations, but the very sound, as the 
 quality whereby these configurations are accompanied, 
 can be conveyed, and may be detailed, if there be but 
 a proper receptacle for the reception of the same at 
 the opposite terminal. 
 
 The force here spoken of is commonly called by the 
 name of Electricity. But Electricity opens up to us 
 another force which is created thereby, viz., the force 
 of Magnetism. Electricity during the process of its 
 operation creates what has been called a transverse 
 position of the particles of matter to one another ; and 
 this it is found changes their affinity in a transverse 
 direction. This transverse direction of the particles 
 creates what is called the magnetic force, of which 
 the etherial medium is partaker ; and when this trans- 
 verse attitude of the particles becomes static, we have 
 what is called a magnet. The power of a magnet is 
 seen in the particular polaric attraction which is here- 
 by constituted. It is particularly illustrated by plac- 
 ing a magnet into a bag of nails, when as exemplify- 
 ing the magnet influencing the ether, and the ether the 
 nails, the nails with their polarity hereby changed, are 
 found not only to cleave to the magnet but to one 
 another. And what is the explanation of all this ? 
 It is simply this, that the etherial condition created in 
 the ether by the vicinity of the magnet, communicates 
 itself to the particles of the nails according to the law 
 of inverse distances. And here we could have no 
 better example of matter having its condition repre- 
 sented, first in the spirit-substance, which everywhere 
 envelopes matter, and by means of the spirit-substance 
 
 «»U 
 
 again carrying this condition into other matter, so as 
 to condition it accordingly. 
 
 The force known as Elective Affinity, and indeed 
 all other affinities, are explained upon the self same 
 principles. Each substance has, of course, its own 
 special qualities, and whatever these may be, they are 
 projected in the universal medium of ether as spirit- 
 substance, according to the law of inverse proportions, 
 and therefore when two substances, having an attrac- 
 tion for one another come within the sphere of their 
 mutual range, they are drawn towards one another by 
 means of the interposing conditioned ether. This may 
 be seen by placing two corks floating in a basin of water. 
 Placed at a certain contiguity, they will be gradually 
 drawn to each other, and as they approach nearer 
 they will rapidly run together, thereby showing that 
 the spirit-medium is the operative agent as having its 
 initiative from the material substances themselves. 
 
 We come then to understand that, in the first place 
 there is a universal spirit-medium, Which we call by 
 the name of Ether — that all matter of necessity sub- 
 sists therein, and gives forth its qualities thereto, 
 thereby constituting a spirit-form, as the efflux of the 
 material form ; and that in virtue of the kind of con- 
 ditions imparted, and the circumstances attending it, 
 so will be the forms attending the operation of these 
 forces. In this way we come to explain, as already 
 noticed, what has been regarded as a profound mys- 
 tery, the operation of growth, where there is the forma- 
 tion of special lineaments in the prepared protoplasm, 
 according to the fashion of the germ, as the type in 
 question of which grow^th is constituted.* 
 
 * Tyndall sliowa clearly that crystals are built by the ftlay 
 of polar force ( see liis Lectures on Sight, pp. 101, 259, &c.) In 
 
If 
 
 I 
 
 II 
 
 » 
 
 I ^ 
 
 II 
 
 48 
 
 T/ie Problem of Existence. 
 Section X — The Origin of Affinities. 
 
 Having then so far ascertained under what 
 circumstances the forces of nature in the physical 
 economy have their operation, and each with its own 
 pecuhar characteristics— having ascertained moreover 
 that the laws of Affinity in material objects arc 
 imparted to the spirit-form in the medium surround- 
 ing these objects, and that corresponding operations 
 ensue, we come to the consideration of the still 
 deeper questions, whence come the Affinities which in 
 the states of attraction or repulsion, characterize the 
 different kinds of matter ; and whence comes the 
 Energy which gives rise to various kinds of Forces 
 with which we are cognisant?* It is a remarkable 
 
 his Fiagiiients of Science, p. 8G, he asks " Wliat is the ve«,'etable 
 world itself Imt the result of the complex play of these molecular 
 forces i Here, as elsewhere throu^jhout nature, if matter moves, 
 it u force that moves it, ami if a certain structure (ve«,'etable or 
 mineral) is pnxluced, it is throu<rh the oj)eration of "the forces 
 exerted between the atoms and the molecules. In ve«;etable as 
 well as mineral forms are the final expression of this com j)licated 
 molecular action." Tyn<iall siiw the great fact of their 
 operation in the question of growth ; but he has failed to point 
 out what constitutes the guiding rule in each separate case. 
 
 * In one of the very latest publicatir.ns whicli has to deal 
 with the Forces of Nature, we have the following:— "In reality 
 neither here nor anywhere else, have we any knowledge what- 
 ever of what is actually meant by attraction : nor in°the one 
 sphere nor in the other, have we seen the means of api)roxi- 
 mating to such knowledge. To Newton himself, the verv 
 conception of one atom or one mass attracting through emi>ty 
 space another atom, or another mass, ])ut his mental jmwers to 
 
 Two Departments of the Absolute, 
 
 49 
 
 fact that, whatever happens to be the kind of matter 
 in the universe, the etherial medium sympathizes 
 therewith : there is no exception to this law ; and 
 here we fairly infer that there is, and must be, an 
 intrinsic connexion betwixt the matter of the universe 
 in all its states, and the etherial medium, as the 
 universal substance throughout all space. We inquire 
 what is the source and nature of that connexion ; in 
 other words, whence come the affinities that exist in 
 the varied matter of the universe ? This is a question 
 that can be answered in such a way as first to account 
 for the facts of affinity, and second to explain the 
 facts as they present themselves. 
 
 I have laid it down that first and fundamentally, 
 there is but one absolute substance — that said 
 absolute substance exists under two distinct categories, 
 depicted as positive and negative — that the positive 
 department sets forth the absolute expression of funda- 
 mental Form, or what we may term plenary and 
 primary Individuality, as the source out of which all 
 secondary or derived individuality can proceed, and 
 that the negative department sets forth the platform 
 whereon all derived individuality can alone have its 
 
 confusion. And as to the term Affinity, the most recent 
 chemistry finding it utterly unfathomable in itself, confines its re- 
 searches at present to the investigation of its mode of action. 
 Science does not know indeed what forces are : it only classifies 
 them here as in every deep recess of physical nature, we are in 
 the presencti of that which is not physical. That whicli bars the 
 way iniperiously at every turn to a materialistic interpretation 
 of the world." — (Drmnmonds Ascent of Man, p. 433^. The 
 author of the present little treatise humbly hopes that the 
 door may be by and by opened which shall conduct to a fresh 
 illumination of the dark passages which conceal nature's secrets. 
 
 WW 
 
'\ 
 
 « . 
 
 II 
 
 f 
 
 50 
 
 T/ie Problem of Existence. 
 
 validity established, the difference between the two 
 being that the one is the self-existing Source of all 
 positive conditions having causality in Himself; and 
 that the other is the self-existing Ground in which 
 fresh conditions are impressed: the former being the 
 primordial Conditioned in its essential manifestation 
 and unity, with its endless scope for manipulation : 
 the latter being the primordial Unconditioned, with 
 endless capacity for receiving and displaying con- 
 ditions, the former being Personality in its necessary 
 existence, and the latter being Impersonality in its 
 necessary existence. It is obvious that without both 
 there could be no such thing as the origination and the 
 propagation of positive beinghood. I shall have 
 something further to say about the primitive /^rj^/z^/ 
 substance ; but in the meantime, I call attention to 
 the primitive impersonal substance. 
 
 Primitive or primordial substance in its im- 
 personality is regarded as one and infinite throughout, 
 without parts, without atoms, a continued uniformity, 
 embracing in its bosom the capacity of allness of 
 qualities with its conditions, in some such fashion 
 as day-light embraces all the colours, though it has 
 none of its own, and with the capacity of manifesting 
 all positive conditions when a pattern is exhibited. It 
 may therefore be asked how the primitive forms of 
 matter are deduced from homogenious substance? 
 The only answer which can be given comes to be this, 
 viz., the introduction of primitive and specially 
 qualitative substances as originals : in which case 
 they could be propagated to any extent. Hence, then, 
 we readily can conceive under the production of finite 
 qualities, not only the affinity of qualities as being all 
 
 The Origin of Affinity. 
 
 51 
 
 derived from one and the same mother-substance, but 
 likewise the multiplication of atoms, as the measure 
 of their respective combination to form compressed 
 qualities in the great spirit-medium. But how, it may 
 be asked, do these become the foundations of matter? 
 I have only one answer, and that is by the process of 
 thickening. What is the key to this process we know 
 not ; but there can be given no other answer so far as 
 appears. How the spirit-form is converted into a 
 material form we have no means of showing further 
 than this, that there is a process of incrassation, 
 probably by a depression of what we call temperature 
 — we think this can hardly admit of doubt — a process 
 whereby spirit-forms can be shown as material bodies. 
 But now, what we say is this, that the fact of all 
 the varied qualities of substance being ultimately 
 drawn from one and the self same general mother- 
 S2ibstance^ it behoves that there must be an affinity of 
 qualities among them, that is a near relationship of 
 filiation, as being the offspring of one and the same 
 parent. It is of enormous moment therefore, that, 
 while we can point to the great facts of Affinity, we 
 can also set forth the rationale of these facts. In 
 other words, we can say why it is that certain 
 ingredients exhibit an intense sympathy for alliance 
 with one another, and why it is on a reversion of 
 circumstances that certain others have an antipathy 
 to one another. We can also show a reason why we 
 
 ♦ I find that Brewster, in endeavouring to explain "the 
 persistent acjtivity " of light, remarks that "Ether itself may be 
 a compound body, consisting of, or containing, all the elements 
 of matter," 
 
52 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 must regard the various qualities of derived sub- 
 stance as atomic in their constitution * while pure 
 Ether, as such, in its own essential and primordial 
 condition is destitute of any such characteristic. 
 
 Section 4. — The Cosmical Forces dependant on Energy 
 
 for their dynamic origin. 
 
 There is, also, another attribute of primitive Ether. 
 There is not only the Qualitative attribute just referred 
 to, out of which all special qualities of substance are 
 drawn, but there is also, the Dynamic attribute 
 known as Energy, out of which come all the particular 
 Forces which are to be found in our experience. It is 
 of great importance that we should understand under 
 what circumstances the various Forces which exist in 
 the world as forces have their outcome. Energy is 
 
 * The very fact of separation into determinate qualities im- 
 plies the great fact of limitation. It is obvious therefore that 
 Quantity is a dependent on Quality. And as rej^ards the 
 question of Quantity it is perhaps not easy to say where limi- 
 tation ends. Sir Wm. Thomson (Lord Kelvin) says *' it used to 
 be a favourite subject for metaphysical argument amongst the 
 scholars, whether matter is infinitely divisible, or whether space 
 is infinitely divisible, which some maintained ; while others 
 maintaine<l that matter only is not infinitely divisible, and 
 demonstrated that there is nothing inconceivable in the infinite 
 sub-division of space." An»l he goes on to say that it is simply 
 an incmiceivable absurdity to suppose a limit to smallness 
 whether of time or space ; and here we find him lecturing on 
 the millionth of a millimetre of Oxygen. (Lectures on the 
 Construction of Matter, p. 151). Practically there is no such 
 division ; but it is demonstrated that Ether c;in hold no end of 
 separate elements in the same area. 
 
 Energy the Basis of Force. 
 
 53 
 
 the foundation of them all.* The particular affinity 
 manifested by the quality or qualities of substances in- 
 each special case exemplifies its own corresponding 
 force. We have the force of Electricity dependent on 
 the readiness with which a certain condition imposed on 
 matter affects the matter adjacent to it ; or rather the 
 readiness wherewith the particles of matter (say in a 
 copper wire) are affected by the key-note imparted at 
 the terminus, and prescribed to and adopted by the 
 Etherial medium. We have the force of Gunpowder 
 
 * It is obvious that Energy, being a fundamentiil attribute 
 of primitive substance, is so to speak measured by the quali- 
 tative character given to created substance, when converted 
 into Force. We speak of a conservation of energy and a 
 dissipation (►f energy ; and most unphilusophically, as if energy 
 couhl either be increased or diminished. If we could rightly 
 consider the matter, we wouUl recognize tliat energy could not 
 anteceilently be measured, because its measurement is squared 
 simply by the qualities of things existing and the relation in 
 which these are made to stand to one another. 
 
 On this subject of Energy it is proper to take notice of "the 
 kinetic theory of matter" as hitherto prevailing. It is painful 
 to read the elaborate ingenuity of Sir Wm. Thomson and others 
 in accounting for the operations of matter. He says, "if we 
 could be perfectly satisfied with the kinetic theory of gases 
 founded on the collisions of elastic solid molecules, there would 
 still be beyond it a grander theory, which lieed not be considered 
 a chimerical object of scientific ambition to explain the 
 electricity (»f solids." He is in ditticulty as to an explanation of 
 "the properties of matter," and says "though this consum- 
 mation may never be reached by man, the progress of science may 
 l)e— I believe, step by step, will be— towards it, on many different 
 roads, con>'erging towards it on all sides." I have n(» hesitation 
 in saying that the proi)erties of matter are the specific qualities 
 which are orginated by Deity from the etherial substance, each 
 of these qualities l)eing modifie<l by conditions which are the sub- 
 
54 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 indicating the suddenness of the repulsion which takes 
 place in its particles, by the change of condition which 
 is effected by the application of fire. And so with 
 respect to all other forces which arise naturally, accord- 
 ing as one condition of matter is affected by another : 
 the law being, that according to the prevailing affinity 
 in the particles of matter, so is Energy displayed in 
 the character of the Force attending these actions. 
 
 We shall have more to say respecting the attributes 
 of Ether. Here it is necessary simply to call to mind 
 the great fact that Energy is one of the inherent and 
 inalienable attributes, and hence that wherever there 
 is substance, there also there must be energy. In pri- 
 mitive or pure ether there can by itself be no force of 
 any kind indicated, for the reason that the ether is ab- 
 solutely generic, and perfectly balanced, having no 
 particular bias in any one direction more than in an- 
 other ; and this from the fact that it has no express 
 particular or particulars in regard to a qualitative cha- 
 
 qualities or accidents .to which the category of any quality may 
 be subjected ; and while the more generic qualities have their 
 necessary affinity, the conditions of these qualities which 
 constitute particular modifications of these must of course alter 
 the affinities accordingly. It is obvious that in these circum- 
 stances the affinities of gases, and the affinities of solid matter, 
 must all be referred to the same general law of o|)eration. But 
 we do not believe in " elastic solid molecules," and Sir William 
 (I mean Lord Kelvin) allows that the kinetic theory of gases is 
 an unsolved problem (see his Constitution of Matter— Lecture — 
 Steps towards a Kinetic Constitution of Matter). The whole 
 prc^blem of kinetics must be held to lie in the relationship 
 in which the properties stand to one another, and out of that 
 ^ relationship therefore the exposition of kinetics is not to 1^ 
 found. 
 
 Force Graduated by Condition. 
 
 55 
 
 racter, the energy which is inherent has therefore no 
 impulse to express itself one way or another. But 
 the moment a special quality is introduced, the energy 
 must give expression to the characteristic of that 
 quality ; and the atoms, of which the quality is com- 
 posed, arc held together by said energy ; that is to say, 
 the energjy gives expression to the affinity whereby 
 they are held together. And here, again, wc find ope- 
 ration or force as the result of the inherent energy, 
 when two substances (that is two distinctive qualities) 
 arc brought within the sphere of each others influence, 
 then the affinity is found which gives specialty to the 
 force, an affinity carried by ether from the material 
 objects, which hereby affect each other by way of 
 attraction. And what is the operation but a force, 
 varying according to the mutual affection which be- 
 longs to the separate ingredients. And this display 
 of force is illustrated in gravitation, in chemical affi- 
 nity, in elective affinity, in electricity, in magnetism, 
 in the growth of plants, and the like. Without energy 
 there could be no force, and without quality there 
 could be no particuiar force. 
 
 Section b.— The last and highest attribute of Ether. 
 
 There is still another attribute of the Etherial sub- 
 stance to be considered, which has not heretofore 
 been observed ; but it is one of enormous moment, in 
 as far as it not only explains what has hitherto been 
 a very great mystery, and utterly baffling human 
 sagacit)', but one which applies throughout to the 
 exposition of Mind in all its stages, in the animal 
 vvoVld as well as in man. We have found Ether to be 
 
56 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 Consciousness Developed by Ether. 
 
 57 
 
 first of all a non-material substance, yet in such a 
 world as ours constantly engaged with material sub- 
 stance, supplying representatives of the conditions of 
 material substance in all its qualities, save in the 
 grossness or crassness which characterizes matter. 
 We have moreover found Ether to be the generic sub- 
 stance which is at the foundation of all substances, and 
 which comprehends within itself all the derived 
 qualities of material substance, which we must regard 
 as specialties which characterize material qualities, 
 and that all of them are primarily derived from the 
 primitive Ether, and this explains to us two important 
 facts : first, the fact that Ether sympathizes with all 
 matter of whatever sort, and secondly, the fact that 
 there is an Affinity betwixt the various qualities of 
 matter as linked together by Ether. And we have 
 also found that besides a fundamentally Qualitative 
 character out of which we have positive substance, 
 Ether has also an essentially Dynamic character to 
 which we give the name of Energy, out of which we 
 have positive Force. Hence Forces cannot be illus- 
 trated but by the combined employment of both 
 these ; for whatever happens to be the quah'tative 
 characteristics of various kinds of matter, it is the 
 same which manifests the kind of Affinity in matter, 
 and which gives significance to Energy, and hence a 
 special kind of force is expressed. Such are the attri- 
 butes of Ether as displayed in i\\Q physical world. 
 
 I have just said we have still another attribute of 
 Ether— an attribute which can have no manifestation in 
 the merely physical world, but which shows itself 
 abundantly in the animal world, where there is the 
 establishment of a nervous system, and a centre of 
 
 brain-work for its operation. First of all, inquirers 
 have been puzzled beyond measure and perplexed as 
 to the source cf mental states. They have obtained 
 some knowledge of all objective substances, but they 
 have not seen, nor otherwise knowrt, any such pheno- 
 menon as Ether emitting consciousness : whence 
 consciousness comes has been an utter mystery to 
 man. It displays itself in one set of circumstances 
 only, viz., in the animal frame, wherein, there is the 
 establishment of a nervous system. There is much, 
 very very much, to lead us to believe that the 
 operation of mind is neither more nor less than our 
 old friend in a new position — the Ether, found as 
 the spirit-medium in physics, and always working in 
 and along with matter. In the first place we have 
 the knowledge of this medium being constantly 
 illustrated, and inexhaustively as spirit-substance 
 in the world of matter ; and what other medium can 
 we conceive as spirit-substance operating with matter 
 in the territory of the brain ? In the second place, it is 
 most natural to suppose that, as an offshoot from the 
 nervous system, there must be an etherial representa- 
 tion and concentration of the bodily frame inwardly ; 
 that is, it is in correspondence with all analogy that a 
 radiated or projected representation of bodily states 
 posited in Ether, at what we must call the central 
 station, which spiritously denotes the me. Thirdly, 
 we say — here is developed the new attribute of con- 
 sciousness ; and it is easy to understand how in these 
 circumstances such an attribute should be brought 
 into manifestation, which is impossible in the merely 
 physical economy, on the ground of there being in 
 that economy no subjective reaction. In subjective 
 
 / 
 
5S 
 
 Thp. Problem of Existence. 
 
 reaction there arises the display of a conscious self- 
 hood, which ensues from the fact that the etherial de- 
 velopment of the bodily me is not lost in vacancy as 
 in physics, but is reflected so to speak as its own self- 
 hood, and hence the expression of its self-hood men- 
 tally is manifested therein. We are hereby enabled 
 to say what are the very foundations of mind in the 
 animal economy. The expansion of mind and its 
 various faculties arc of course necessarily dependent 
 on the varied instrumentality by which mental states 
 are revealed. But all this will be more particularly 
 dwelt upon hereafter. 
 
 Section 6. — The Laiv by ivhich Propagation is effected 
 as compared ivith Creative effort. 
 
 In treating of the phenomena of substance, it has 
 been noted that Quality and Form lie in two distinct 
 categories. Quality we have .seen is an indispensable 
 essential of substance. If it were not so, if there 
 were primarily a substratum without quality, or apart 
 from quality, whence, we might fairly ask, is quality to 
 be obtained ? Could quality have any being apart 
 from the substance in which it inheres? Substance 
 then, as developed in some particular quality, is the 
 basis on which Form hath its foundation. As quality 
 may be indefinitely modified and varied in its 
 conditions, so form may be endlessly changed in its 
 configurations. Now, reverting to the fact, that the 
 Conditions and Forms which constitute the character- 
 istics of any material object, are radiated or projected 
 therefrom in the etherial medium, according to a 
 definite and intelligible law, we are in a position to 
 
 I 
 
 The Propagation of the Seed-form. 
 
 59 
 
 consider the all important problem which deals with 
 the forms and conditions of objects, their propagation, 
 their multiplication, and their diversification. We 
 cannot look outward without seeing some illustration 
 of the great facts which nature shews. The outward 
 scene, as depicted on the eye proves it : the forms 
 pictured on the mirror prove it: the photographic 
 picture proves it : the forms that are constituted by 
 the law of growth prove it : the messages through the 
 telegraphic wire prove it: the changes created by 
 magnetic influence prove it. Hence it is made 
 apparent to us, that growth as a law of nature where- 
 by plants are raised from seed is a very different thing 
 from the primary initiation or introduction of new 
 forms by the creating hand of a purposing Intelligence. 
 The work of creation is the special conception of a 
 rational mind, which devises an object with its 
 separate characteristics in harmonious adaptation to 
 one another, and all as a compact individuality to 
 serve some purpose connected vvith its environment : 
 the process of propagation is the slow formation of an 
 individual from a pattern already constituted, all that 
 is wanted being the lodgment of the pattern or seed- 
 form in soil congenial to the expression and expansion 
 of it in a sympathetic protoplasm. 
 
 Under the operations of nature, there may be 
 changes from the pattern form ; for where 
 intermediate influences interpone, there must be 
 correspondent changes in the product. These changes 
 constitute what we called Evolution, and there may 
 be an endless variety of these changes, which are 
 modifications of conditions and of forms ; yet it 
 would seem confined within the circle of the general 
 
60 
 
 The Problem of Existence, 
 
 basis, which we may term the type of species. It is 
 within the range of experience indeed to understand, 
 that very considerable changes must of necessity take 
 place by means of speciality in training, in feeding, in 
 breeding and in climatic influences (and these 
 agencies only confirm the accuracy of the great law 
 of causality) while the species as a rule is preserved 
 with tolerable distinctness. There may be cases 
 where uncertainty prevails as to whether there is a 
 line of clear demarcation, especially in tribes which 
 have gone wild as compared with those which have 
 had a long history of domestic treatment. But one 
 thing we may rest tolerably sure of is that, under the 
 processes of pure propagation, there cannot be the 
 introduction de novo of forms and conditions which 
 have not entered into the causal circle of elements. 
 There is much said about *' natural selection ; " and 
 to it is given a wide range of association. We hardly 
 see how this should prevail to a great extent, seeing 
 artificial processes can do so little. But granting all 
 that can be demanded in this category, we ask, in the 
 name of wonder, how can a complex adaptation of 
 parts appear by nature, which ingenuity can ex- 
 plain not otherwise than as the construction of 
 a creating and purposing intelligence? There is no 
 analogy in nature for the first introduction of such a 
 phenomenon. Time, however prolonged, cannot help 
 in a question of this sort ; what we call the operations 
 of nature must be regarded as the results of a created 
 original, with its concatenation of appointments, 
 shedding the seed of its own conformation as a 
 pattern for its propagation in an amalgam adapted 
 for its nourishment. And as we have already 
 
 I) 
 
 The Circumstances of Mind-development. 61 
 
 noted, the sympathetic Ether operates in extending 
 the causal germs. 
 
 We should naturally come now to inquire under 
 what circumstances we may readily grasp the idea of 
 a Creator.* It is obvious, however, that the notion we 
 have acquired of a primordial Ether, as the absolute 
 infinity of primitive and essential substance, should be 
 preliminarily grasped ; for it by itself cannot corres- 
 pond to our idea of a formal and personal Intelligence. 
 There is not only no personality in any of the 
 attributes wc have discovered in Ether — not only no 
 source whereby the origination of new conditions and 
 new forms of things might be introduced, but nothing 
 on which to ground or to express the limitations of a 
 conceiving mind. It is necessary, therefore, that we 
 should first have exhausted our inquiry into all the 
 attributes of Ether, as essential and underived 
 substance, before seeking those which constitute 
 the positive and particular expression of them 
 in the concrete form, of a personal and perfect 
 Intelligence. That inquiry, like others, must pro- 
 ceed on observing the lines of phenomena brought 
 before us in connexion with our present ex- 
 periences. And one of these experiences is the gradual 
 and almost imperceptible indications of mind as we 
 advance into the more complex productions in the world 
 of matter. We trace no appearance of mind in in- 
 organic nature ; moreover, we trace none in the vege- 
 table economy : it is only when we enter into the field 
 of the animal world that we discover not only sensa- 
 tion, but obviously what gives the subjective assurance 
 of sensation, the consciousness of it ; and this only by 
 very gradual stages — each stage increasing in intel- 
 
 * See Appendix II, 
 
 ? 
 
 If 
 
 'I 
 
()2 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 ) 
 
 lectual power till we reach its highest manifestation in 
 man. The question therefore arises— If Ether is the 
 absolute substance which has essential and eternal exis- 
 tence, and therefore the substance out of which all 
 f)henomenal existences are derived, whence have we 
 mind ? Whence have we consciousness ? Whence 
 have we intelligence ? These three terms all lie within 
 the same category, and consciousness is the basis of 
 the others ; without consciousness we could have no 
 intelligence, for intelligence marks a connected or 
 combined consciousness as applicable to a general 
 knowledge of a subject ; and mind is a still more ge- 
 neral term as applicable to the exercise of cognition 
 as a whole. Whence then have we consciousness? 
 Consciousness does not appear in the clods of the 
 earth, in the stones of the ground, in the trees of the 
 forest, or in any plants of the garden, but it is observ- 
 able when and only when we come to the animal 
 economy ; and it is seen in its highest manifestations 
 in man. Whence comes consciousness ? We have 
 seen that the attributes of external things are those of 
 visible quality and form, that the world of matter is 
 objective condition and form — what we call inanimate 
 things— things primarily derived from ether, and in all 
 their changes sympathised with by ether, and having 
 their functions carried on through ether. We have 
 found no other substance in absolute existence, but 
 this ether : whence then comes consciousness ? What 
 alternative have we left but to have recourse to ether? 
 And we shall have occasion to see that there is in the 
 animal economy, especially as it advances in the pos- 
 session of many inlets, a representation of the bodily 
 constitution in ether, and that from the very fact of its 
 
 The Subjectivity of Animal Selfhood. 
 
 63 
 
 being peculiarly acted upon and reacted upon itself, 
 it gives forth a subjective realization of the impres- 
 sions conveyed to it. There is a reason why there is 
 no subjectivity in the material objects of the world. 
 We have seen, indeed, that they are attended by an 
 ectype of themselves in the etherial medium ; but 
 that expression cither falls on vacancy or on other 
 objects, so as to affect them in some more outward 
 relation ; but in the case of the animal subject this 
 etherial representation is not spent on a vacant field, 
 nor on something external to itself, but is confined to 
 the operations of its own bodily self-hood, which it re- 
 presents and is accordingly lighted up in these circum- 
 stances with the consciousness first of all of its own 
 self-hood. And when the basis of this is sufficiently 
 laid, it is from its spirit-nature equipped to express 
 the consciousness of all the communications which 
 come through the various inlets which are opened up 
 with the external world. And not only this, but to 
 express all the modifications of 'consciousness which 
 arise by means of the varied organization with which 
 the brain happens to be supplied. 
 
 But the question may be asked — Can we be thus 
 dependant on material things for consciousness with- 
 out falling into materialism ? Those who ask such a 
 question do not understand the economy of things, 
 and it is for want of this understanding that material- 
 ism is misapprehended and has become a great bugbear 
 to many. It ought to be known at once, that it is not 
 matter that gives forth consciousness, but the etherial, 
 or spirit representative, when formed into an Ego. 
 It alone gives forth consciousness, and it gives forth 
 the consciousness of the material object. It cannot 
 
 ' ii 
 
64 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 be disputed (it stands as a fact), that the material 
 object is accompanied with its spiritual representation ; 
 and if we are able to show how this spiritual 
 representation of the external object is carried to the 
 Ego, we show not only the sources of consciousness, 
 but the connexion betwixt matter and mind. 
 
 Section 7. — The circumstances under which Mind is 
 
 developed. 
 
 We see, then, what are the circumstances under 
 which mind is developed. A stone for example can- 
 not develop consciousness ; and the reason is because 
 there is nothing in such an object, i.e. no means of 
 concentrating its self-hood on itself, so that this self- 
 hood might re-act in any one part of its body. Its 
 self-hood is its own objective corpus or mass : it has 
 no other : it has no subjectivity in itself : it can have 
 none, because the very conditions which create sub- 
 jectivity are wanting. But these conditions are found 
 in the presence of an apparatus whereby the etherial 
 representation is played upon within itself; and not 
 only this, but whereby also there is the capacity s^{ 
 response for re-action being made within itself, 
 according to the kind of intimations made. A stone 
 has no means of self-representation within itself, and 
 no power of self-movement within itself, and therefore, 
 of course, can have no consciousness of self. Nor can 
 a plant develop consciousness for the same reason. 
 True it is that a plant has several characteristics 
 which are utterly wanting in a stone. It is organized 
 by a cellular structure : it is characterized by variety 
 of condition in the separate parts of its structure, such 
 
 The Nature of Life. 
 
 65 
 
 as woody fibre, bark, leaves, blossom, and fruit. It 
 draws the sap of its life from the substance of the soil, 
 and passes it on converted by assimilation into its 
 own nutrient qualities between the bark and the 
 wood to supply subsistence to the leaves, and fresh 
 nourishment for the development of the fruit, and as 
 it passes, it undergoes a formative process in accord- 
 ance with the cellular character of the plant. There 
 may be also the manifestation, as perceived by us 
 outwardly, of sensation in the plant, that is of dis- 
 turbance of parts by the action of an adjacent object. 
 For what is sensation, fundamentally ? It is 
 stimulation ab extra ; and stimulation may be created 
 on one part of an object by external influence on 
 another part ; but in the plant there can be no 
 consciousness of sensation. And for the reason that, 
 while there is what is called life* in the plant, by 
 reason of the ministering of nutrition to all its parts, 
 and by the chemical conversion of that nutrition into 
 the separate conditions, and fOrms belonging to 
 its different parts ; yet there is nothing in the plant 
 to set forth, and to concentrate an etherial self- 
 hood of its own, that is a spirit- representation 
 of the plants' bodily economy within itself to 
 
 * Much mystery has been ascribed to the term life, as if it 
 iiidicateil some invisible causative |X)wer whereby each creature 
 in the ^'egetable antl animal world grows and propagates its 
 kind. Tliere never was a greater mistake. There is no invisible 
 cau.sative power so endowed. Life is but the activity of a 
 causal arrangement in organic structures. And we say this 
 from tht; fact that the process whereby tlie creatures live and 
 move and propagate their kind, can readily be accounted for 
 and expounded iu the process of natural law. 
 
 F 
 
66 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 re-act upon itself as the attitude under which alone a 
 subjective consciousness of its beinghood could be 
 manifested. The tree, of course, like everything else 
 material in the world, hath its own external re- 
 presentation in the etherial spirit-substance ; but all 
 this is mere objectivity ; and an objectivity too, 
 which as I have noted serves a very important end ; 
 for were not the projection outwardly expressed, we 
 should not be able to see the object, nor any objects ; 
 nor would the affinities, which are constantly playing 
 throughout all nature, have their validity asserted as 
 phenomena everywhere prevailing. What is demand- 
 ed then in order to the subjective development of 
 consciousness is the etherial representation of the 
 bodily self within itself, and concentrated at a pole or 
 centre of action in order to the development of the 
 intellectual attribute. 
 
 The apparatus whereby alone this wonderful phe- 
 nomenon can be brought about, exists in the animal 
 economy only. This apparatus is found in the ner- 
 vous system of the creature. And when we pass into 
 the category of the animal world, we find a very gra- 
 dual and almost insensible approach to the acquisi- 
 tion of a nervous system, such, that the line of demar- 
 cation betwixt the vegetable and the animal depart- 
 ments can scarcely be drawn. While, therefore, sen- 
 sation becomes more marked in the animal than in the 
 vegetable, by reason of the connexion in which one 
 part with another is established through the agency of 
 nerves, as connected with muscles, yet there can 
 scarcely be the shadow of a doubt that, in the case of 
 many creatures, such as e.g. the worm and a host of 
 others, it is in their case a process of reflex action, or 
 
 The Initiation of Consciousness. 
 
 67 
 
 what we may call sensation without the consciousness 
 of sensation.* Under what circumstances, we may 
 ask, is it possible to have the consciousness of sensa- 
 tion developed ? We may answer, by the organiza- 
 tion of a brain ; and this development is manifested 
 in proportion as that organization has its validity built 
 up from the smallest possible beginnings to the high- 
 est possible complexity as in man. 
 
 It may be generally stated then that the foundation 
 of self-consciousness lies in this, that there must be a 
 nerve-system from the body carried to a centre, as 
 the nucleus of a brain. There the glimmer ot con- 
 sciousness may be developed, but so feeble as to 
 demand little or no response beyond what is required 
 in vegetable life. We find that such a state of things 
 prevails in point of fact. True it is that it might be 
 regarded as a diflficult question for solution, whether 
 certain movements, in the initiatory stages of the ani- 
 mal world are not the tokens of reflexive sensational 
 disturbances rather than of conscious operations ; but 
 one can have no hesitation in concluding for the exis- 
 tence of consciousness in cases when to the creature 
 is given an additional sense, such as eyes, in virtue of 
 which it is able to turn aside from obstacles which 
 are observed to stand in its way. The fact stands 
 (which nobody doubts) that the more the animal is 
 endowed with external senses, beyond that of touch, 
 as the first natural sense of the creature, the more it 
 
 * The facts of reflex action, or the manifestation of 
 sensation without the consciousness of sensation, lias been well 
 illustrated by the decapitation of a frocr. Stimulation of a limb, 
 by pinching or by a drop of acid, is followed by the withdrawal 
 of the limb. 
 
68 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 
 has its consciousness enlarged. And still further, 
 when we take into account the gradual increase of 
 brain formation, whereby new ideas are manufactured 
 out of those that have been registered, as first brought 
 to the mind by the external senses — ideas such as the 
 relation of one thing to another ; or the consciousness 
 of the me itself, as distinct from that of the object en- 
 visaged ; or the discovery of inferences drawn from the 
 comparison of objects which have some relation to one 
 another ; or the power of recalling ideas which had 
 formerly a place in the mind ; or the power of evolving 
 new pictures out of those we have once apprehended ; 
 or the power of imparting or implanting new ideas in 
 addition to an assemblage of present ones as when 
 we have before us a purpose to fulfil, and have diffi- 
 culty in knowing how to accomplish the purpose : I 
 say, when we take into account the increased com- 
 plexity of the brain apparatus whereby our faculties 
 of thinking are augmented and varied, we see at once 
 the close connexion which is made to subsist betwixt 
 the material instrumentality of thought which initiates 
 the movement, and the etherial representation wherein 
 is the actual consciousness of self, and which must be 
 regarded as the receptacle of ideas and therefore 
 constituting the general ground of the intelligence of 
 the Me. 
 
 So dependant are we as living creatures on the 
 prepared and specific instrumentality of thought for 
 our particular thinking, that many have felt themselves 
 forced to conclude that consciousness must somehow 
 be regarded as itself an attribute of a certain kind of 
 matter; but without doubt this conclusion is a grievous 
 mistake ; and the sound analysis of physical phenomena 
 
 Organs generate Thought. 
 
 69 
 
 proves it to be a mistake. We have in the physical 
 world, as has been noticed, the operation constantly of 
 pure spirit-substance in connexion and along with 
 material objects. We have seen that in the physical 
 world, there is not one object but has its spirit 
 representation in the universal Ether, as spirit-sub- 
 stance essentially ; and the proof of this among other 
 things is the wonderful privilege that pertains to said 
 spirit-substance in that it can never be so crowded 
 with representations of things, but that by reason of 
 its elasticity, and consequent expansion for a fresh 
 surface, it has always still an open receptivity for 
 admitting additional representations ; and this with- 
 out the confounding of one thing with another; shew- 
 ing therefore a capacity wholly beyond the prero- 
 gative of matter as such. What then ? Why we are 
 constrained to see that the particular organs which in 
 the brain stand as initiating new spiritual forms, do, 
 through these, initiate fresh forms of thought— organs 
 which, as creating new spirit-forms, constitute therefore 
 special facilities for the generation of the definite 
 classes of ideas, carried into the mental field, and 
 which therein co-exist in mutual relation to one an- 
 other, and have each its own etherial characteristic. 
 There is the impression laid up in the cellular condi- 
 tions of the cortical substance of the brain, and there 
 is the ideal counterpart which is carried to the etherial 
 platform which constitutes the Ego. The former 
 serves for the purposes, first of all, of memory, in 
 which case the Ego has not what is simply called cog- 
 nition, but r^-cognition of that of which it is already 
 in possession, while the vast multitude of stored up 
 impressions, as gathered not only by observation of 
 
 I 
 
70 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 external thinrrs, but gathered in the course of reading 
 and study, constitute a field for the exercise of Imagi- 
 nation, Conception, and other processes in the analysis 
 and synthesis of thought. We thus apprehend, then, 
 a constant and close connexion betwixt mind and 
 matter, which is perfectly analagous to the connection 
 betwixt spirit and matter in the objective sphere. 
 This fact cannot be too minutely considered. While 
 the initiation of each separate mental movement 
 takes place through the association by separate 
 members of the cerebral organization carrying 
 their respective impressions, it always, and in- 
 variably in each case, is accompanied by its own 
 etherial response, which in that case is an idea which 
 enters the territory of the Ego ; and herein we have 
 what IS called Mind. That the brain is the instru- 
 mentality of mind cannot be questioned, on the sure 
 ground that not only does disease of the brain pro- 
 duce disease of the mind, and softening of the brain 
 produces want of the memory, and brings on mental 
 imbecility, or amentia, but that aught which produces 
 inactivity or immobility of brain induces coma, or a 
 state of unconsciousness. Had we ere now understood 
 the precise circumstantials which attend all physical 
 phenomena, we should have been able to master the 
 great secret which explains the fact of matter being 
 caught by, and received into, the intelligential sphere 
 as acquired knowledge. 
 
 I have observed that, in the world of objective 
 matter, we are everywhere surrounded by spirit and 
 that to spirit we are indebted for the phenomena pre- 
 sented by matter. We see this illustrated in the tele 
 graphic wire. There we find that the conditions and 
 
 The Mind Passive in Cognition. 
 
 71 
 
 forms attending the vibration introduced at one termi- 
 nal of the wire where initiation takes place, are carried 
 to the other terminal, and are there revealed in all their 
 accuracy, not only in the fact that the sound as a 
 quality in that vibration, is maintained, but in the 
 convection of the very words as uttered. 1 ask, what 
 are the nerves in the animal body but telegraphic 
 wires which reveal the conditions of the body as the 
 basis of the me to a local terminus within ? And what 
 are the external senses but termini with attached nerves 
 of various qualities, fitted for the reception and trans- 
 mission of separately conditioned ingredients, such as 
 savours for taste, odours for smell, sounds for hearing, 
 colours for sight, as well as modifications of touch, of 
 which in each separate cisc a consciousness is excited. 
 Nor is it the mere vibration that is transmitted, but in 
 each case the vibration is so to speak loaded with a 
 quality emphatically its own, and the quality accord- 
 ingly is transmitted along with the vibration. There 
 are mental philosophers who will-tell us that the vibra- 
 tion which is communicated to our ears when a piano 
 is being played, has supplied to it by the mind the 
 various qualities of sound : but this is a doctrine which 
 cannot be maintained. The mind supplies nothing 
 whatever from itself, but is emphatically and purely 
 receptive of all that is communicated to it, and has 
 the consciousness of it accordingly. The mental part 
 is simply receptive (so far as regards cognition) of the 
 ideas carried to it ; and these ideas are either the 
 forms as they exist in the external world, or as they 
 are manipulated by the analytic and synthetic proces- 
 ses of what we must call the internal senses. 
 
 I 
 
72 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 Section 8. — What constitutes Intelligence. 
 
 Here let me notice how the Etherial spirit, which 
 we call the Soul, has not only the experience of single 
 acts of consciousness as ideas are carried thereto, but 
 has, as it may be called, a conjunct expression of this 
 final and lofty attribute of what may be called a com- 
 bined consciousness which we denominate Intelligence. 
 I ask, what is Intelligence? and I answer it is a mul- 
 tiplied Consciousness, or an intuition of what stands as 
 a series of conscious acts in one general focus. An 
 insulated act of Consciousness cannot be called Intel- 
 ligence. At all events, before we can be said to have 
 Intelligence, we must have the exercise of Judgment 
 therewith. An insulated Consciousness cannot dis- 
 cern truth from error. It is constrained to receive 
 things as represented, however false or absurd they 
 may be. This is illustrated in dreams and mesmeric 
 states ; and it is only when we come to be fully awake, 
 and when we are able to apply Judgment to these 
 states, that we can see the absurdity of them. What 
 we say is, that in the me there is a collected assem- 
 blage of individual cases of Consciousness ; and this 
 we call Intelligence ; but as noticed, the foundation of 
 correct intelligence lies in the exercise of Judgment, 
 which attends all acts of normal cognition. The 
 intelligence of man begins with representations from 
 the external world, and is added to by the inner 
 workings, which give what may be called Imaginings, 
 Memories, Inferences, and other sentimentality which 
 are thought out, and become the experiences of the 
 me. Out of all these separate cases of consciousness 
 combined, we have that which constitutes the human 
 
 Intelligence developed in Ether, 
 
 73 
 
 intelligence ; and that this intelligence is not the de- 
 velopment of mere matter is obvious enough, from the 
 fact that on the central platform of thought is lodged 
 an endless number of distinct ideas, each and all held 
 in its individuality, so to speak, in the self-same locale, 
 without collision and without confusion. This is one 
 of the remarkable prerogatives of spirit-substance. 
 
 And that spirit-substance should in these circum- 
 stances manifest this subjective prerogative is most 
 natural : — first, because we know of no other primi- 
 tive substance that is assuredly made known to us, as 
 the fundamental entity of existence : second, because 
 universal substance having an objective outlet in 
 respect of its physical qualities, may well be regarded 
 as having also a subjective outlet, when circumstances 
 are favourable for its manifestation : third, because we 
 have no right to assume another and unconnected 
 substance, insulated, and separated intrinsically there- 
 from : fourth, because it is demonstrable that the 
 phenomena of consciousness a're closely connected 
 with, and inherently an offshoot from, the self same 
 substance, with which matter itself stands connected : 
 fifth, because the fact of one and the same primary 
 substance being in all circumstances represented by 
 the material instrumentality (each organ yielding its 
 own spiritous images), offer a satisfactory explanation 
 that intelligence emanates from the etherial spirit, and 
 this is the only satisfactory explanation of the vast 
 variety of intelligences which are marked out and 
 defined by the respective cerebral organs which 
 prescribe their particular ideas. 
 
74 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 Section 9. — Mind i^i its highest expression operates in 
 
 conjunction zvith Matter. 
 
 There has been brought into view, as already 
 noticed, the high prerogative of the all-pervading 
 spirit-substance as made to play in physical conditions, 
 a prerogative which as we have seen comes into mani- 
 festation under particular circumstances, an attribute 
 which, as we have seen, lays in the whole animal 
 kingdom the foundation of a mind, differing in each 
 case according to the diversity of organization. I have 
 endeavoured to point out under what circnmstanccs 
 matter is produced from said primary substance, and 
 what therefore, gives rise to the laws of affinity which 
 prevail among the constituents of matter, and the cir- 
 cumstances under which matter functions in the 
 play of cosmical forces ; it now falls to be considered, 
 not simply under what circumstances mind is 
 devcloi.ed from the self same source, but how mind 
 operates in connection with matter, and is dependent 
 on the organization of the cerebral system, and is 
 expanded according to copious variety in that system, 
 for the different faculties or powers by which any and 
 all gradations of mind happen to be characterized. 
 It may be repeated, in addition to what has been 
 stated, that the all pervading etherial spirit-substance, 
 which we have found to be constantly operative in 
 the great physical arena, is operative also, in the 
 development of mind : — first, we know of no more 
 fundamental substance, as an actually all-pervading 
 element, than Ether ; and as we have found that 
 Ether is essentially of a spirit-nature, in that, unlike 
 to matter, it is receptive of any amount of epigraphs at 
 
 The basis of Mind. 
 
 75 
 
 the same time and on the same area ; and there is no 
 antecedent reason why said substance should not give 
 forth the characteristic of consciousness when circum- 
 stances favour that an object should attain to a 
 sensible subjectivity of its own. Second, we know 
 this, that in the arena of mind, as a foundation of 
 mind, there is and must be a basis of what has been 
 called "mind-stuff," out of which consciousness arises; 
 and if it be a question whether we shall start the 
 hypothesis of an alien essence — of which we practically 
 know nothing — nothing abstractly of its relation to, or 
 connexion with, other matter or other substance of 
 any sort, and therefore of being of necessity in a maze 
 of mystery respecting it; or whether we adopt that sub- 
 stance which is of necessity always in connexion with 
 matter and representative of the conditions of matter, 
 and which is perfectly analogous in its capacities of 
 holding and of setting forth within one area, a vast 
 combination of forms, there can surely be no doubt 
 for a moment as to which alternative one must choose. 
 I have already set forth the grounds on which this 
 spirit-substance must be regarded as representing 
 fundamentally at the basis of the brain, the spirit- 
 personality of the bodily system, and how and why 
 this spirit-personality should be endowed with 
 consciousness. 
 
 But there is another — an abundant and abiding 
 reason why we must regard the spirit-substance in 
 question as inherently endowed with the attribute of 
 consciousness. We have spoken of the etherial 
 medium, as that generic medium which contains in 
 gremio, and therefore negatively, all the qualities which 
 are manifested positively in the all-conditioned 
 
7f) 
 
 The Problem of Existence 
 
 Personality. Wc have, I think, the complctest 
 evidence of an absolute Personality, based on the 
 platform of an infinite Impersonality — a personality 
 which, as I have said, is the positive and inherent 
 manifestation of all that is hidden in the Imperson- 
 ality : the one the supplement of the other, in as far 
 as the Impersonal without the Personal would be the 
 susceptibility of endless conditions and forms, with- 
 out the possibility of initiating any, and the Personal 
 without the Impersonal would be the positive in 
 thought without the positive in action, or the capacity 
 of action : it wc uld be a Framer without the material 
 and the platform to work upon, and therefore without 
 the means of exercising it. Both, therefore, are 
 essential in order to the production of the objects of 
 creation. What I say then is this, that if the absolute 
 Personality is endowed with the foundations of 
 positive being-hood, of which intelligence is the con- 
 summation, the infinite Impersonality must have the 
 susceptibility of shewing these foundations developed 
 into reality, and therefore of manifesting intelligence 
 as its consummation, when animal creatures arc made 
 capable of displaying this attribute. We may thus in 
 some measure approach to the characteristics o{ the 
 Personal through a knowledge of those belonging to 
 the Impersonal.* 
 
 Having then good reason for concluding that the 
 etherial medium, as essentially a spirit-entity, 
 carries within itself the capacity of developing con- 
 sciousness, and of being manifested as intelligence, it 
 should now be our business to show under what cir- 
 
 * JSee A|j|>einli\ 11. 
 
 TJic Expansion of Intelligence. 
 
 77 
 
 cumstances mind is manifested in the animal frame 
 and how mind is expanded according to the number 
 and variety of the organs with which the animal crea- 
 ture happens to be endowed. If I were asked to say 
 what are the conditions of intelligence, I would answer 
 an accumulation of separate and varied acts of con- 
 sciousness. Intelligence barely begins with simple 
 naked consciousness ; and in many of the humblest of 
 the animal race it can amount to nothing more than 
 mere insulated consciousness, that is, it can be re- 
 garded as little more than the expression of animal 
 sensation. If a creature has simply and .solely but 
 one sense or inlet as the channel of its consciousness, 
 as for example that of touch, it has of necessity not 
 even the incipience of mind, and its instinct is to be 
 guided by that of sensation alone ; and in a sense we 
 see this exemplified as a stage but a little beyond that 
 of the vegetable economy. Give to the creature the 
 sensation of smell in addition to that of touch, and 
 you light up this twofold sensation to become a mi- 
 nim of consciousness. Let it have a mouth with the 
 capacity of distinguishing one quality of food from 
 another, and you raise it to a still higher platform in 
 the range of animal life. In order to receive this 
 threefold order of impressions there must be the 
 nucleus within, of an organ of receptivity for this more 
 expanded experience. Let it still further have the 
 organ of hearing, and its con.sciousness will become 
 developed into something like incipient mind, in as 
 far as it has thus a series of spheres in which it can 
 play its part. Endow it now with the sense of sight, 
 in addition to those already named, and you very con- 
 siderably expand the domain of its range ; and such 
 
78 
 
 The Problem of Existence, 
 
 an equipment of necessity characterises a large num- 
 ber of creatures on land and in water as well as among 
 the feathered tribes that lodge in the branches of trees, 
 and so disport themselves in their respective spheres.' 
 But these inlets are after all but the foundation of 
 mind. Besides the avenues of the external senses, 
 each supplying its own department of consciousness] 
 there is in some of the lower animals not only an 
 organ for the exercise of memory but an approach to 
 some of the higher attributes of thought. But it is 
 emphatically in man that the internal instrumentality 
 is developed, and varied to the highest possible extent. 
 For example, there is in man not only a repository 
 wherein impressions are registered, and an instrumen- 
 tality whereby these can be recalled in the exercise of 
 memory ; but there is further an agency for bringing 
 up not simply insulated facts as matter of menujry, 
 but a number of associated impressions which are 
 curiously collected and united in one pictorial repre- 
 sentation ; and this process is called Imagination. 
 It is to be noted, then, that the facts of remembering 
 and of imagining are each separate acts of conscious- 
 ness, and of course add to one's intelligence. And it 
 is remarkable how Intelligence comes to be enlarged 
 in the case of man. There is the great faculty of Con- 
 ception with which he is endowed— the faculty where- 
 by genius is displayed— the faculty which gives to man 
 a creative power of thought— the faculty which is ex- 
 ercised when a difficulty presents itself, and which has 
 to overcome some difficulty when a purpose has to 
 be fulfilled, which demands the employment of re- 
 condite resources for its accomplishment. This process, 
 like all other processes of thought, is dependant on a 
 
 Expanded Human Consciousness. 
 
 79 
 
 special organ adapted for such uses ; and by a refined 
 exercise of association, it carries its representative 
 spirit-ideal to the central area of the personal con- 
 sciousness. Here, also, of course, an important acces- 
 sion is made to Intelligence by such conscious concep- 
 tion. Besides, throughout man's waking thoughts 
 there is the constant exercise of the faculty of 
 Judgment — that faculty whereby he is enabled to see 
 truth as distinguished from error, and whereby he is 
 preserved from falling under delusions as in dreaming, 
 when the Judgment is shutout from exercise. 
 
 In this way, man's area of a multiple consciousness 
 as constituting the great field of his Intelligence is 
 much enlarged beyond what it can be in mere animal 
 nature, in as far as many of these separate states of 
 consciousness are wanting in them ; and as has been 
 noted, they are all brought to have their proper rest- 
 ing place in the central platform of the conscious Me. 
 
 But this is not all : it is far from being all in the 
 long list of departments in whicK the consciousness of 
 man revels. Man has also, by means of other special 
 qualities given to his cerebral apparatus the great 
 prerogative of seeing the relations of the not-me in 
 virtue of which there is a capacity of an endless ex- 
 tension of his knowledge. The creature that is 
 confined to a cognition of the relations of self merely, 
 has in him the little narrow world of his own self-hood 
 only, and his own wants. He may see the varied 
 world outside of him, but the relations of each and all 
 are shut out from his consideration. It is different 
 with man — different as regards the wider arena of 
 knowledge — different in the fact that there is a 
 cognition of the relationships which belong to ex- 
 
80 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 
 ternal objects generally, as compared with those which 
 can see the relations only which pertain to self ; and 
 is different as regards his concern for the wants and 
 requirements of others. And here particularly it is, 
 that the whole field of morals is opened up to him — a 
 field which, lying in the fundamental idea that every 
 creature, endowed with the capacity of pleasure and 
 of pain, has its God-given rights as its own native pro- 
 perty shews that any infringement of these constitutes 
 an offence against the law of morals — a law by the 
 way which is graduated in force according to the 
 elevation of the creature to which the rights belong. 
 
 Section 10. — The Foundation of Morals. 
 
 The question as to the foundation of morals and of 
 the law of morals is a very important one. It is ac- 
 knowledged to be so ; and many a struggle has there 
 been for its reconciliation with this, that, and the other 
 theory, which has been propounded as adequate foun- 
 dations. Satisfaction has not been found with any of 
 the pleas which have been advanced ;* but that there 
 is a basis which stands in consistency with the de- 
 velopment of this great principle, as seen in the various 
 
 * It would be out of place here to fjive an account of the 
 various theories which have been advanced as foundations for 
 the ethical principle of morals. Some have pronounced it to be 
 God-given in the sense of being an impress from GckI, and 
 therefore that morals is an argument or proof of the being of (iml : 
 some ascribe it to a certain fitness or suitability of actions: some 
 hold that morals is a new instinct in the human mind . some 
 hold that its foundation lies in self-interest, others in utility or 
 happiness. But while all of these are objectionable, there is one 
 
 The Source of the Moral Idea. 
 
 81 
 
 conditions of social life, can hardly be doubted : and 
 I offer that just propounded as the true ground which 
 operates variously in this great department according 
 to the enlightenment which the mind has received. 
 
 I believe that moral states are as thoroughly depen- 
 dent on cerebral action as any other manifestation of 
 mind, not (be it carefully noted) that any cerebral or 
 material operations, which are adapted simply to carry 
 or convey a particular class of impressions, can for a 
 moment be regarded (being physical states in them- 
 selves) as concerned with moral ideas any more than 
 with the ideas of physical things ; for moral ideas (as 
 we shall more fully notice hereafter) arise from a cog- 
 nition of a particular class of creature-objects which 
 come before the mind. If the object of our thought 
 be purely a thing without life and unassociated with a 
 personal creature having conscious sensation, there 
 can be no moral characteristic therein. There must 
 alwa)'s be, either directly or indirectly, a sentient per- 
 sonality, not only having life, but also susceptible of 
 pleasure and of pain, before the element of morals can 
 intervene. That creature may be one's own self, or 
 any other person, or it may be any of the lower ani- 
 mals : hence, I define a moral idea to be that which 
 represents the affecting of a creature sjisceptible of 
 pleasure or of pain. It is obvious, then, that such an 
 idea is ascribed not to any subjective virtue vested in 
 the human intelligence as such ; but that it arises 
 
 important preliminary which all of them have left unconsidered, 
 and that is the moral Idea out of which the principle of right 
 and wrong flows. This subject will be more fully considered 
 when I come to the questicm of Will. 
 
82 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 from the kind of object that is apprehended, and is 
 attributable therefore to the apprehension of injury 
 or of benefit done to an animal creature. Brute 
 creatures can see the injury done to another, and they 
 can see the help rendered to other creatures in their 
 need ; but as a rule, they (io not apprehend the relation 
 which one creature bears to another. It is therefore 
 the peculiar capacity which man has in cognising the 
 relations of not-self— the relations of things to one 
 another, that gives to him the great prerogative of 
 moral discernment. This may be called intellectual 
 altruism. And in what does this prerogative consist ? 
 I answer, it consists in his ability to see the fitness of 
 things. In other words it lies in his ability to see the 
 relations of the not-me, and the harmony or want of 
 harmony existing in these relations. It is for want 
 of seeing the relations of the not-me, that the lower 
 animals, as they are called, arc incapable of such ideas 
 as are common to man — are incapable of looking into 
 the future, and are so narrow and contracted in 
 their sphere of existence compared with man. 
 
 The lower animals, indeed, can apprehend the 
 relation of things, so far as things affect themselves. 
 They know what food is adapted for them, and they 
 repair thereto to obtain it. They know what things 
 will injure themselves, and these they avoid ; but their 
 apprehension does not extend to the cognition of 
 what have been called altruistic relations — the re- 
 lations of the not-me or the connexion in which one 
 thing stands abstractly to another. Hence, unless it 
 be in the case of that instinct, which is given to a 
 creature when rearing and nourishing and protecting 
 its young, the lower animals want moral intuitions. 
 
 The Basis of Human Reason. 
 
 83 
 
 Hence, also, the tremendous extension of mental 
 vision to man, or his altruistic ability to cognize the 
 relation of one thing to another in the vast outer 
 world. 
 
 This prerogative of apprehending the relations of 
 the not-me is properly the foundation of human 
 Reason.'^ The question then for us to solve is this : — 
 What gives to man this expansive power of discern- 
 ment ? What gives to man the prerogative of seeing 
 more than is patent strictly to the outward vision ? 
 If I see a boy in some one's garden robbing apples, 
 what gives to me the idea that he is stealing? It can- 
 not be the bare fact of his plucking apples from a tree, 
 but it is the apprehension of the non-relationship of 
 the boy to the owner of the garden, and hence the 
 inference that this fact is an injury done to the pro- 
 prietor of the garden. 
 
 Section 10. — Mental states are^ reflective of Material 
 
 conditions. 
 
 There can be no question as to the distinctive quali- 
 ties of separate nerves as adapted for the reception, 
 the association, and the conveyance of special charac- 
 teristics of impressions. Among the outward senses 
 we find that the nerve in the nostrils will take on the 
 
 * Reason is a term indicating a cognition of harmony or 
 fitness in the relation of things. The lower animals have this 
 in what pertains to their own personal condition. But this is so 
 very small a portion of the cognition which pertains to the re- 
 lationship of things generally in the world, that we apply the 
 tern» Reason to man only as observant of the fitness of things 
 as connected with one another in the world. 
 
84 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 quality of flavour, and hence we have the sensation of 
 smell ; another will take on the quality of savour, and 
 hence we have the sensation of taste ; another will 
 admit only the impressions contained in the light, and 
 hence we have the sensation of sight ; another set of 
 nerves again are affected by bodily contact, hence we 
 have the sensation of touch ; and still another is 
 affected by the vibration of the air, carrying certain 
 characteristics of sound, whence we have the sense of 
 hearing. Each of these sensations may carry ideas in 
 them. With the sense of smell we may have the idea 
 of a certain plant or flower ; with the sense of taste 
 a certain kind of food ; with the sense of sight the 
 idea of an object seen, and so with the other senses. 
 
 There is obviously a still more remarkable refine- 
 ment in the distinct individualities of nerve which 
 pertain to the various instrumentality which con- 
 stitutes the complex organization of the brain. There 
 we have not only the reservoir of vesicles of gray 
 matter which form the repertory of Memory ; but we 
 have those nerves of white matter which associate 
 thence impressions of all kinds that are laid up therein, 
 and which convey them to the central Ego, wherein 
 they are lighted up as ideas of the mind— the centre 
 where, as I have noticed, the bodily representation is 
 fundamentally converted into the conscious Mc, and 
 where all ideas brought thereto become the cognitions 
 of the Me. And this apparatus, which serves the pro- 
 cesses of memory, serves also those of Imagination, 
 in which an impression draws to itself by association 
 a number of other impressions, which are constructed 
 into what is called an ideal picture — a picture not of 
 one idea only, as is an act of memory, but of other 
 
 Brain essential for Mental Faculties, 
 
 85 
 
 
 associated ideas, or properties of ideas, which when 
 joined, constitute a picture of Imagination, all the 
 parts of which are drawn from the same reservoir of 
 impressions. From the same reservoir are drawn also 
 by association another set of impressions under what 
 we call Conception ; and this takes place when we have 
 before the mind what has been called a schema of 
 thought to be completed, a schema void oi some ele- 
 ment sought for, which requires some accessions in 
 order to its empty part being filled up ; that is a pur- 
 pose demanding fulfilment. The process of nerve ope- 
 ration here is remarkable, in that the quality and form 
 of the element wanted is, so to speak, searched for ; 
 and if it is to be found in the area of laid up impres- 
 sions, it will be seized and appropriated to fill, up the 
 blank. And here it is that genius is illustrated and 
 manifested ; under Conception we have creations 
 which display forms and their relations which arc 
 new and fresh presentations before the mind. 
 
 I might go on, and point to 'that peculiar building 
 up of nerves whereby we are enabled to draw infer- 
 ences, first, as to the character of things ; second, as to 
 the uses and applications of things ; and third, as to 
 the causes of things. It has to be noted that all in- 
 ferences are to be obtained by means of comparing one 
 thing witli another, that is, of comparing the subject 
 for which an inference is desired, with a cognate sub- 
 ject in the mind to zuhich the inference desired is 
 already attained and attached. When we judge as to 
 character, it behoves us to have already before us a 
 standard (the major term in logic) to which the object 
 to be judged (the minor term) is carried, and that 
 standard the best of kind in our estimation ; and thus 
 
86 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 by means of the comparison, the discernment of cha- 
 racter is ascertained. In plain terms, the nearer the 
 object comes to the standard, the higher in character 
 is the judgment pronounced on the object. Again : 
 when we judge as to the consequences of an action, we 
 require to have already before the mind an analagous 
 or cognate case as a standard in our experience, in 
 which a corresponding action with its consequence is 
 before the mind, and by means of the comparison, 
 we can lay hold of and apply the corresponding con- 
 sequence. And, in like manner, when we inquire into 
 the catise of any denoument or upshot, we require to 
 have before us a correlative case, to which the cause is 
 attached, with which to compare it, when we are able 
 to lay hold of the cause as matter of our experience 
 in an analogous case ; and thus we apply this cause, as 
 the cause which we seek for in order to account for 
 the consequence in question. This latter is called 
 Induction, as the other is called Deduction, but the 
 mental process in both is the same. And in this light 
 how simple does the doctrine of Reasoning appear, 
 whether in the exercise of Judgment, or in that of 
 Induction and Deduction on which so much has been 
 written in the field of Logic. What the precise 
 organs in the Brain are by which these important 
 results are accomplished has not yet been discovered; 
 but that the functions now referred to are accom- 
 plished by cerebral instrumentality there can be no 
 doubt. 
 
 We find then that every process of operation in the 
 human mind is carried on by means of brain instru- 
 mentality, and in every case it is accounted for by 
 means of the refined and delicate qualities ascribable 
 
 Brain essential for Will, 
 
 87 
 
 
 to the brain organization, that is to the peculiar 
 qualities of the nerve apparatus in its several parts, 
 and to the structure of this apparatus in its confor- 
 mation of parts. And what fundamentally lays the 
 province of Reason in man is the capacity of 
 associating the relations of the not-me. Without this 
 capacity there could be no process of adapting one 
 thing to another in the economy of human action. 
 
 The same thing has to be said in regard to the 
 more active properties of human thought in the 
 exercise of Will. This is the more evident because 
 in this department of thought, as we shall see, Will is 
 always stimulated by motive, and motive is neither 
 more nor less than the emotion created by the 
 contact of an idea introduced upon the me ;* that is 
 fundamentally, the contact of a particularly condition- 
 ed impression upon another condition in the repertory 
 or storehouse of impressions which constitute the fur- 
 nishings on the material side, creates an emotion in 
 the material which in spirit is conveyed to the Me. 
 There can be no doubt that in direct connexion with 
 the bodily economy there is a cerebral centre of resort, 
 to which all nerve operation conducts, and whereon 
 the ideal forms which come to the Me are founded ; 
 and as the common depository of impressions from 
 which the accumulation of ideas in the creature's ex- 
 perience is conducted. Whether this repertorium of 
 ideas called the Me or Ego be at the medulla 
 
 * All idea implies preliminarily an impression. The impres- 
 sion has respect to the material side in virtue of which we have 
 bodily sensation : the idea is the counterpart of the impression, 
 but on the spirit side. The sensation under emotion constitutes 
 what we call Feeling. 
 
88 
 
 The Problem of Existence. 
 
 M 
 
 oblongata * as I am much disposed to believe, I will 
 not pretend to say ; but I unquestionably conclude 
 for such a foundation of the intellectual me in this 
 material economy to which we belong. 
 
 What would at first startle some in coming to such 
 conclusion would be, that we seem to make too much 
 of gross materialism. It is quite otherwise. We 
 work through and by means of material organs, but 
 the production of ideas and of thought is exclusively 
 in the spirit-substance: without a foundation of 
 materiilism it would be impossible to get at the spirit- 
 nature of soul, which in this constitution of ours is by 
 means of the material organization. No scheme could 
 be more spiritualistic than that which I seek to pro- 
 claim; for I strive to shew how it comes to pass that 
 in strict connexion with a material instrumentality in 
 every department of mind, the great fact of mind 
 itself, as a grand combination of separate con.scious 
 states, is unequivocally and purely the phenomenon of 
 an essentially immaterial or spirit-substance, and this 
 phenomenon of consciousness I wish to shew is 
 not only the effulgence of spirit-substance, but the 
 final and ultimate attribute of said substance as 
 brought into practical manifestation in the peculiar 
 circumstances under which brain organization gives 
 scope for its expression. 
 
 * " This bulb is a crowded collection of active nerve centres, 
 —a thoroughfare, ever crowde<I with nerve injjHilses from and' 
 to the higher centres "-(Dr. McKenzie, in Kiin on the Senses) 
 When we consider what a multitude of future developments 
 are bound up in a single cell (the human germ cell for example) 
 we need not wonder at the endless multitude of impressions 
 that may be lodged in the material side of tlve Me. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE FOUNDATION OF SOUL-ECONOMY, 
 AND THE GROUNDS OF VARIED 
 MENTAL OPERATION. 
 
 -s^. 
 
 Section 1. — Dilemmas of Philosophers. 
 
 npHE all-absorbing question of mind has been end- 
 * lessly debated, may we not say in all manner 
 of ways distorted, by two different schools of philo- 
 sophy ; yet neither of these schools have been able to 
 indicate any possible or natural scheme to account for 
 the origin of souls, nor even to vindicate all that has 
 been allowed as to the operation of souls. We have 
 what is known as the a priori school presented under 
 various hues, which on the whole founds upon an inde- 
 pendent mental equipment, mysteriously operating 
 apart from the body, and cognizing some sort of 
 objectivity which is not regarded as reality, and this on 
 rules not easily understood, and less easily analyzed, 
 and certainly not consistent with the common convic- 
 tions of mankind ; and again, we have what is known 
 as the a posteriori school, which does not question the 
 fact of a subjective consciousness : which accounts 
 in some way not only for a material objectivity, 
 
90 
 
 Soul Mechanistn. 
 
 but which directly craves it, by making consciousness 
 a characteristic of matter, or leaving it otherwise as a 
 blank mystery, not admitting of solution This scheme 
 is equally unable to indicate, and certainly fails to 
 explain, in what way we obtain cognition : it fails to 
 show in what the philosophy of consciousness consists, 
 or how it comes to be displayed. 
 
 There is an obvious reason for this dilemma. It 
 arises from the fact that little or no serious attempt 
 has been made to discuss and make manifest what is 
 properly the philosophy of substance. We have no 
 doubt heard much of the question of Ontology ; but 
 it would seem as if there was a tie plus ultra in that 
 direction— a beyond into which it is not permitted for 
 philosophers to venture to find their way as being ab- 
 solutely a terra incognita. We have no end of sur- 
 mises, and some of these not very definite or consis- 
 tent, as to the ultimate atoms of matter, what they are 
 and of vvhat they consist, and an equally indefinite 
 supposition as to the source and ground of intelli- 
 gence.* I have endeavoured to grapple with this 
 profound subject, and (as I believe) upon the prin- 
 
 ♦ Philosophers in seeking for the ultimate constitution of 
 matter have generally taken for gi-anted that the principle of 
 Atomism is an established fact ; l.ut no sooner have they so 
 concluded than their difficulty began. Were there originally 
 many ultimate kinds of them, or only one i Were they all 
 material atoms to be regarded as centres of Force and Motion I 
 or were there also centres of consciousness which have been 
 termed monads ? Were the material atoms vortex rings of 
 Ether, as Lord Kelvin has suggested ? and iuilestructible and 
 indivisible as Helmholtz has averred i Were thev originallv 
 simple or complex bwlies ? And if thev were atoms of Ether 
 how came they to be matter with force and motion in a con' 
 
 A general want of Insight. 
 
 91 
 
 
 ciples of a sound induction. The value of any dis- 
 covery depends upon its practical utility ; and the 
 soundness of any discovery depends on its consistency 
 in all its applications. The value, indeed, of any 
 fundamental principle may be said to lie in its gene- 
 ral applicability to the natural and needful exposition 
 of the phenomena of the world. We are conscious 
 of the great fact of a material world, and we are con- 
 scious also of the equally great fact of affinities, as 
 pertaining to the separate qualities of matter; but where 
 have we an ascertainment of the ground which gives 
 birth to this consciousness ? We see the operation of 
 ca?^se constantly at work in every department of the 
 great arena of nature ; but have we as yet obtain- 
 ed a definite idea of what strictly constitutes Cause ? 
 We see the operation of an endless multitude of forces 
 in the economy of the world ; but have we ascertained 
 the source of them, and can we give a clear and dis- 
 tinct rationale of their respective functions, whether 
 on the arena of matter or on that of mind ? Many of 
 us believe in the existence of spirit-substance, as dis- 
 tinct from matter-substance ; but who has expounded 
 the precise connexion and communion of the one with 
 the other ? or who, indeed, has appropriately defined 
 the one and the other ? We speak very naturally of 
 
 scions world ? How do we get a universe of thinking beings 
 from the theory of atoms ? What is the starting point under 
 the original distribution of atoms ? How are these enormous 
 problems to be satisfied by the theory of a primary atomism ? 
 Talk of Evolution I What in this light is Evolution ? It is a 
 name : what else ? The marvel is that man will avoid a con- 
 clusion which meets him at all points, and plunge into an area 
 of darkness and of difficulty from which there is no escape. 
 
 \\ 
 
02 
 
 Soui Mechanism. 
 
 the me, with its self-consciousness and its supposed 
 independent power of self-determination ; but who 
 hath set forth a plausible account of the origin of the 
 me\ or have we even yet any satisfactory exposition 
 of its self-movement, if it be self-movement, or of its 
 position and relation to our material constitutional 
 framework ? Again : we are all agreed that there is 
 the attribute of Morals pertaining to the rational un- 
 derstanding, but we are still waiting for the discovery 
 not only of what constitutes the source of moral sanc- 
 tions, but for a valid foundation to all varieties of 
 matter and of mind which will bear the test of univer- 
 sal application. It is allowed that in the animal world 
 up to man, there is a gradation of mental states from 
 a narrow consciousness to a wide intelligence ; and, 
 moreover, it is supposed that these mental states arc 
 graduated or defined by varied cerebral conditions ; 
 but hitherto we know little of the modus opcramii, and 
 still less of the modus efficiendi, in accomplishing the 
 separate results. We have in man the highest condi- 
 tions of mind known in the world ; but we are still in 
 the dark as to the sources of our varied reasoning 
 powers, either as to the fountain and foundation of 
 morals, or as to the laws of human freedom in the 
 exercise of Will. 
 
 A deeper insight into these and similar questions is 
 surely very desirable, if it were only to set at rest the 
 heaving strivings of the many in their constant and 
 tantalizing attempts to solve the enigmas of existence; 
 but it is specially desirable, if it would serve to explain 
 many of the secrets of life, and serve also to harmo- 
 nize the great scientific problems which lie for classi- 
 fication in one great unity, and thereby open up to 
 
 A deeper InsigJit desirable. 
 
 98 
 
 view not only the endless capacities of the grand field 
 of nature, but to connaturalize the whole economy of 
 the world, and thus exhibit more truly what the 
 genuine aspects of religion are ; and, farther, show 
 what are the well grounded hopes we may entertain 
 with respect to the future, and how mankind may 
 ultimately be solidified in our common mind and 
 judgment. 
 
 We find distinguished philosophers not only still 
 debating whether there be such a thing as natural 
 realism, but giving forth the dictum that, apart from 
 the thinking mind, we can have no assurance of an ob- 
 jective world.* It is granted, of course, that apart 
 
 * " Natural realism (says Professor Pfleiderer in his GifFord 
 Lectures, p. 83) is the popular opiniou that our knowledge of 
 things is given to us simply through the perception of the senses. 
 In this view the soul is represented as like an unwritten sheet 
 of ])aper or as a photographic plate, on which things make copies 
 of themselves, so that they come kito our consciousness exactly 
 as they are in themselves. But Physics, Physiology, and Psy- 
 chology have irrefutably shewn how erroneous this popular 
 realism is. Sounds do not lie in the vibrating bodies or in the 
 waves of air which proceed from them, but they arise, first, in 
 our hearing ear : colours do not lie in vibrations of the Ether, 
 but arise only in our seeing eye ; and the same holds true of the 
 sensations <»f smell, taste, and touch. But even extension and 
 motion depeinl for our consciousness on the perception of space, 
 by which it is easy to perceive that they cannot be given to us 
 from without. Just as little as the nerves of the eye, can those 
 of the sense of touch convey into our consciousness spacial copies 
 of bo<lie8 : on the contrary the spacial image or perception can 
 only be sketched by the self-activity of the soul, and on the 
 ground it is true of certain signs given in sensation. But if 
 s]3acial extension and form are just as subjective as colour, 
 sound, and sm«rll, what remains of the material world of bodies ? 
 
94 
 
 Soiti Mechanism, 
 
 from our own personal thinking, we can have no assu- 
 rance of anything whatever ; but to entertain the 
 thought that the realities of objective existence are de- 
 
 And what right have we then still to hold our perceptions to be 
 simple copies of things themselves ? Nay more, what guarantee 
 have we for holding that there are any things outside of us 
 which correspond to them ? What ground have we for deter- 
 mining whether our representations are not merely subjective .' 
 And whether our assumption of an existence of external things 
 IS not a pure prejudice sprung from the conceptions of substanti- 
 ality and of causality which have been arbitrarily fashioned by 
 us? With this conclusion (which was drawn in Hume's 
 Scepticism), the world of the senses which empirical realism had 
 held to be the comjilete or even the only reality, became an un- 
 substantial appearance or phantasm, a chaos of impressions and 
 representations of our consciousness, to which we are not entitled 
 to ascribe either reality or substantiality, or causality, or 
 regulated order according to law, and which therefore hardly 
 signify more than do the illusion of a confused dream. This 
 was the natural and inevitable en<l of the empirical realism 
 which made the knowing mind the passive receiver of a truth 
 given from without." 
 
 It is to us matter of wonder how this author, like others 
 before him, advocating views so doubly contrary to the spon- 
 taneous sentiment and feeling of mankind in every age, couhl 
 reconcile to himself the fact so remarkable that amid all the 
 accidents and changes of life, all parties should have the self- 
 same forms of histijrial representation in their subjective con- 
 sciousness, if there were no outward forms as the one foundation 
 of them. If thinking of outward objects were like a ** confused 
 dream," it must be the marvel of marvels how it comes to pass 
 that, when reference is made to objective things, all men should 
 dream the sanie things. Our author allows that this form of 
 idealism had its rise from objections urged by Hume ; but we 
 are in a position fairly to meet, and fully to answer, and obviate 
 the difficulty urged by Hume, who challenged a connecting link 
 betwixt the external object and the subjective mind. It is 
 remarkable that the example of the photographic plate hat» 
 
 Popular Convictions the Sound Ones. 
 
 95 
 
 pendent on our thinking, or that our thinking is not 
 dependent on the world to which we are introduced, 
 seems to us at once irrational and absurd. To be sure, 
 when the plea of all popular conviction is set forth as 
 a truism, which has secured, and secures, the common 
 consent of mankind, viz., that we see a tree in one's 
 garden because it is there, Hume met the question 
 
 not shewn such philosophers that, as there is a connexion 
 formed between the object and the photographic plate, so there 
 must correspondingly be a connexion formed betwixt the object 
 and the eye of the observer. One cannot help asking Professor 
 PHeiderer, what the use can be of the nerve attached to each of 
 our sense-organs, as so many electric wires, if not to carry 
 messages of things as they are from the external world ? He 
 regards s[)ace as a purely subjective form of thought. I hold 
 that we couM have no idea of space, but as gathered from the 
 objects of the world. Surely it is a matter of common experi- 
 ence that a material object occupies so much room. What is 
 this room or space but the extension that is measured by certain 
 boundary lines. The same reasoning applies to the conception 
 of time. As space has regard to extension, so time has refernce to 
 duration. If space be a boundary line to extension, so time is a 
 boundary line to duration ; and for this latter therefore we 
 must have experience of movement. Both space and time there- 
 fore are forms of thought gathered exclusively from the data 
 carried to us froiu the external world. It is equally absurd to 
 suppose that sounds are not in the vibration of material things, 
 but in the hearing of the ear, or that colours are not in 
 object* of the world but in visions of the eye. How can the ear 
 hear apart from the sounds that are uttered ? And how can the 
 eye see colours apart from the presentation of them ? And if 
 til ere be no external presentation of them, how can two or three 
 separate minds agree as to the facts simultaneously set before 
 them ? Physics and Physiology and Psychology cry out against 
 the doctrines propounded by this philosopher and the school of 
 thought to which he belongs 1 
 
96 
 
 Sou/ Mechanism. 
 
 Tlie necessity of a Causal Nexus 
 
 97 
 
 not only with a caveat, by pointing out that the per- 
 cept (the tree) was after all a subjective or mental 
 phenomenon in our consciousness ; and by question- 
 ing (if the idea were originated by the external object), 
 where is the nexus or chain which links on to the mind 
 the object seen as external, so as to make it the sub- 
 ject of thought in the mind, he started a puzzler. 
 This enquiry involves an exposition of the origin of 
 Ideas. Let us give attention to this question. 
 
 Section 2. — There is a nexus betzcixt ^ fatter and Mind. 
 
 It will be allowed on all hands that the first set of ideas 
 which enter into the mind from the days of infancy. 
 are the ideas of external things ; it will be allowed 
 also, that the ideas of external things are momentarily 
 present to our waking minds, in as far as the external 
 senses are present to our minds as the channels 
 through which they come : farther, it will be allowed 
 as a universal sentiment, that in cognizing such ideas, 
 we do so, as consciously receiving them, ab externo, and 
 though we do not .see the link of connexion whereby 
 mind and matter are conjoined, yet we have the com- 
 mon assurance that the real objects exist as repre- 
 sented by our ideas.* On this question there is abso- 
 lute harmony of thought — a harmony which, amid all 
 the changes of human .sentiment, stands forth as the 
 universal corroboration of this one conviction, as to 
 the source of what are known as our percepts. Persons 
 
 * The author feels that he is liere occupvin*? <Troun(! whirli 
 has been already traverse<l ; but there is an expHn.sioij of view 
 now given which ha.s not been previously detSiiled. 
 
 will differ in describing the particulars of an object, 
 which has been submitted to their observation ; (and 
 we can account for this through the differences in the 
 observation), but however they may differ as to an 
 observation of details, and therefore as to a descrip- 
 tion of details, there is under no circumstances, any 
 difference as to the fact, that the ideas which we have 
 of external things come into the mind ab externo ; and 
 further, that the object is in reality what it is repre- 
 sented in the mind to be, a substantial outside object, 
 distinguished and known by certain specific qualities. 
 Now, on the plea that after all, the cognition of the 
 object is a universal subjectivity, we are apt to forget 
 the conscious fact, that this subjectivity, as a universal 
 conviction, has its .source outside of us, i.e.y comes into 
 the mind from a realism external to us. Apart then 
 from the discovery of the " causal nexus " whereby 
 this conviction is constituted and established in our 
 minds, we are entitled to say that whether we see it or 
 not, there is and must be a causal nexus, in as far as 
 we see and act upon this conviction as founded in 
 truth ; and this, on the ground that if this conviction 
 were fal.se, then all our convictions must be false ; and 
 because the whole structure of human thought is 
 built, as we shall see, upon the foundation of our per- 
 cepts. In these circumstances, were it otherwise, it 
 would follow that our whole life must be a lie — a con- 
 clusion which bears absurdity in its very complexion. 
 We are warranted, therefore, in supposing, nay we 
 are bound to believe, that there must be a chain of 
 connexion betwixt the external object and the mind, 
 as conscious of the object ; and the question is. What 
 can that chain be ? and then, In what way are its ope- 
 
 H 
 
98 
 
 Soul Mechanism, 
 
 rations carried on as a go-bettveen, in conveying the 
 facts of matter into the territory of mind ? Here, 
 then, we have recourse to a great fact — a fact which 
 heretofore has not been sufficiently regarded — which 
 has indeed been quite overlooked, viz. this, that proof 
 exists, not only that there is everywhere an all-per- 
 vading medium invisible to our eyes, and indeed 
 directly insensible to our senses generally, but yet from 
 its effects unmistakably existent and prevalent, in as far 
 as we have warrant that said medium bears on its bosom 
 a representation of the external object — an ectype of 
 the object, delineated from the object, and presenting 
 the characteristics of the object, according to a deter- 
 minate law, whereby the representation of the object 
 is proportionally diminished as the square of the dis- 
 tance from the object increases. And what we say is 
 that this etherial medium must be regarded as essen- 
 tially spirit-substance, for reasons already described, as 
 being the endless and simultaneous servitor of all con- 
 ditions — the servitor not only of those conditions 
 whereby one body of matter is represented in loco, and 
 whereby another body and another is also represented 
 in codem loco, but also whereby one body is connected 
 with another, and consequently also whereby all varie- 
 ties of matter are connected with mind. 
 
 We proclaim, then, what constitutes the connecting 
 link whereby the facts of the external world are 
 apprehended by our mind : yet this will not easily 
 satisfy all that constitutes for us what Hume called 
 a causal nexus between the material object and the 
 thinking mind, unless we are able also to show that 
 there is a naturalness and harmony of junction 
 betwixt this connecting ectype, as I have called it, 
 
 r- 
 
 J 
 
 f 
 
 The Origin of the Ego, 
 
 99 
 
 which represents the material object, and the mental 
 substance which in us is conscious of apprehending it. 
 In fact, there are two important essentials wanted to 
 be made obvious, in order to set this hitherto knotty 
 question at rest. One is that we shall be able to 
 establish a sameness in character, betwixt the repre- 
 sentation of the external object, as projected from it 
 in nature, and the receptive subject as acquiring 
 possession of it, and therefore as having a cognisance 
 of it ; and the other is that we shall be able to trace 
 the channel throughout whereby this representation 
 is conveyed from the real object to the conscious mind. 
 
 Section 8. — Hoiv the Mental Ego is Constituted. 
 
 There arises here a three-fold consideration, first, 
 the fact of there being a representation of the material 
 object, in the etherial medium carried to the mind : 
 and second, what is it that constitutes the mental Ego 
 and its relation to said representation : and third, by 
 what circumstances are the two connected ? The first 
 consideration then is, what is it that constitutes the 
 niental Ego, and under what circumstances is its 
 foundation laid ? Then, it will be our business to see 
 how it operates, and this in its active as well as 
 passive states. 
 
 In discovering the origin of the Ego, I have once 
 more to call attention to what I hold is a universal 
 laiv attending all material existences.* It is this, that 
 
 •'• I feel, in prosecuting the exposition of this chapter, par- 
 ticularly as regards the intellectual side of the mind, the neces- 
 sity so far of treading on ground already gone over ; but it is 
 hoped the investigation will be made more complete. 
 
f 
 
 100 
 
 Sou/ Mechanism. 
 
 wheresoever there is a material object, thete is a counter- 
 part or similitude of that object adumbrated therefrom 
 by a regular law in the Etherial medium, and con- 
 sequently a similitude of corresponding qualities, 
 spiritous in their consistency and nature. There is, of 
 course, the outward form radiated from the mass or 
 body, but over and above, it is to be noted that there 
 is spiritously the essential quality ; and it is to be 
 noted also that one purpose of a nervous system 
 throughout the animal economy is hereby to arouse a 
 consciousness of the essential conditions of the body, 
 as a constitutional personality, in a concentrated form 
 at a pole of centralisation ; and we know that at the 
 base of the skull in man the nervous centres of the 
 bodily system have generally their termini. For 
 example, the spinal cord and axis, the sympathetic 
 nerves, as well as the nerves of the five senses, and 
 many others, meet in or near the medulla oblongata* 
 
 * Dr. Foster, in his text-lnwk on Physiology, says, " the 
 medulla oblongata is the link between the brain and the spinal 
 cord, and the majority of the centres for various organic 
 functions are situated in it. Of the whole brain (he says) certain 
 parts respond easily to stimuli such as the corpora qxtadrigeviinay 
 the crura cerebri, the pons Varollii" Carpenter (Mental Physi- 
 ology, p. 119, 4th edu.,) says, "the sensory ganglia comprehend 
 that assemblage of ganglionic masses at the base of the skull in 
 man, and partly included in the medulla oblongata in which the 
 nerves of the special senses (taste, hearing, sight, smell) have 
 their central terminations. With these may be associated the 
 two pairs of ganglionic bodies known as the Corpora Striata and 
 the Thalami Optici into which may be traced the greater pro- 
 portion of the fibres that constitute the various strands of the 
 medulla, and which seem to stand in the same kind of relation to 
 the nerves of Touch or common sensation that the Olefactory, 
 Optic, Auditory, and Gustative ganglia bear to their several 
 
 i 
 
 The Sensorium. 
 
 101 
 
 and the sensorial ganglia attached thereto have 
 their termini there — what, then, we say is this, 
 that here, at what is generally called the sensorium, 
 
 nerve trunks." Dr. Ferrier (Functions of the Brain) says, "with 
 tlie e.xception of the paths of volitional motor impulse, compa- 
 r.Ltively little is as yet definitely known regarding the functional 
 si<'nificance of the numerous afferent and efferent tracts which 
 connect the medulla with the cerebellum and cerebral ganglia, or 
 of the specific functions of the various grey centres of the medulla 
 itself. Direct experiment on the medulla is full of difficulties, 
 and the results full of complications. We know much more of 
 the medulla oblongata as an independent centre. Should all the 
 encephalic centres above the medulla be removed, the mutilated 
 organism will continue to live and breathe. The functions 
 depending on the spinal centres will go on automatically, and 
 reflex actions will be called forth in regions inervated by the 
 medulla itself. The eyelids will close if the conjunctiva be 
 touched : the tongue, oral and facial muscles, will contract, and 
 the ear twitch in irritation of the sensory nerves, in reflex re- 
 lation with the movements in question. Occasionally, human 
 infants are born entirely without any cerebral centres above the 
 medulla. Yet such ancephalous infants suck and swallow as 
 well as the perfectly developed child when put to the mother's 
 breast. The medulla is thus a co-ordinating centre of reflex 
 actions essential to the maintenance of life. The destruction of 
 the medidla causes their instant and permanent annihilation." 
 
 It cannot be urged that physiology gives us very definite 
 instruction as to the formation of the intellectual Me. Yet we 
 find some interesting facts. There is the fact that a basis of 
 niin«l exists even if the whole eucephalon should be destroyed, 
 provided the medulla oblongata be left entire ; and there is the 
 fact that the links of union between the outer senses an<l 
 intellect are those which terminate in the medulla. Those 
 which refer to Touch are at the base of the brain, but lie within 
 the ranjre of what is called the commune sensorium, which is 
 supposed to cover the corpora striata and the thalami optici as 
 well as part of the medulla oblongata. 
 
102 
 
 Soul Mechanisvi. 
 
 there is a transcript or efflux of bodily states funda- 
 mentally reflected in spirit-substance, on spirit-sub- 
 stance as now constituted to the soul ; and this forms 
 the etherial or spiritous representative of the bodily 
 constitution, with of course the bias or proclivity 
 which characterizes the material nature; which nature 
 gives birth to what we call disposition in the animal 
 economy. Here, I say, is laid the very foundation of 
 soul, as founded on, derived from, and specially con- 
 formed to its own animal character ; and hereby is 
 formed the basis of a mental self-hood, capable of 
 being enlarged according to the number and variety 
 of inlets with which it happens to be organically 
 supplied by means of the senses and other springs for 
 lodging impressions. 
 
 But the question is naturally asked : How comes 
 this subjective Ego, thus derived, to be furnished with 
 the attribute of consciousness — the consciousness of a 
 multiplicity and variety of forms in the one Ego, and 
 developed into Intelligence? If the foundation of this 
 Ego is neither more nor less than a spirit-conformation 
 of bodily states in the Etherial medium, according to 
 the analogy of which we have experience in the 
 objective material sphere, how comes it to pass, that, 
 in this case, we find it displaying an attribute so very 
 remarkable as that of consciousness, of which we have 
 no intimation in the merely physical world ? The 
 brief answer to this question is, that in the arrange- 
 ments of the outer or mere physical world, there is no 
 scope and no possible outlet for the display of subjec- 
 tivity. In the outer world we have in ether simply 
 the ectype of the material object as a phenomenon, 
 and it either alights or terminates on nothing, or it 
 
 Development of ConscioHsness. 
 
 103 
 
 comes in contact with the representation of some 
 adjacent object ; and thereby manifests its affinity 
 therewith, or it carries the form of the object into 
 some plasma that is receptive of the form, and so ful- 
 fils an important purpose, as in the processes of 
 growth ; but its end is there fulfilled— fulfilled, in that 
 its capacities are only called to the extent of engender- 
 ing fresh forms or of carrying its conditions to other 
 conditions. It is different under the cerebral pro- 
 cesses, in which it is made to re-act in itself^ as a 
 constituted self. Here, for the first time in the econ- 
 omy of its various sympathetic action, it has the 
 prerogative for itself, of receiving and delivering 
 impressions; AND UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
 there is developed the ultimate and the highest 
 attribute of its nature. This phenomenon of conscious- 
 ness is universal in the animal economy,* and it opens 
 
 * We should have scarcely anticipated that what takes 
 ])lace ill the constitution of the niental })art of man by natural 
 law, would by f)hilost>phers be generally disallowed as corres- 
 pondingly taking place among the lower animals, in constituting 
 their mental part, the distinction being that the consciousness 
 created in man is an extended consciousness in response to the 
 many inlets supplied by the superior organization of his brain, 
 while the consciousness created in the inferior animal is pro- 
 portionally narrowed because of its inferior organization. But 
 what do we find I In the '"Relations of Mind and Brain," by 
 Professor Calderwood, we have statements to the contrary 
 passifn. In page 268, he says, " Consciousness is illustrated in 
 the kn(»wledge of a sensation, as a present experience in our own 
 life ; it involves knowledge of our own existence, and of the 
 state of that existence at the moment. Further, consciousness 
 belon<Ts so much to the verv nature of intelligence, as to imply 
 knowledge that the present experience is not the result of our 
 own effort. It thus supplies the test on which we seek for an 
 
i 
 
 !1 
 
 104 
 
 Soul MecJianisni. 
 
 up to us a new philosophy— a philosophy of substance 
 hitherto hidden from us ; a new psychology therefore 
 which expounds for us not only the facts of the 
 physical world, but their connection with the facts of 
 the mental world as developed from its indistinct 
 beginnings up to the highest capacities displayed (as 
 we should see) in the intelligence of man : all this 
 
 external explanation of present experience. This explanation 
 we find in external excitation, which physiolocry represents as 
 the conditions of sensori-raotor action.* Apart from the dis- 
 tinction in consciousness between self and not self, an explanation 
 of sensori-niotor activity could not be attempted. The power of 
 comparing? things is essential for the interpretation of sensori- 
 motor action, and tliis power of comparing is the distinguishing 
 characteristic of mind. We may therefore say that conscious- 
 ness IS a function essential to mind. If therefore it is doubtful 
 whether animals possess consciousness, it is doubtful whether 
 they possess mind." Professor Calderwood wants to distinguish 
 betwixt what he calls « the action of mind'' and " the action of 
 mechanism." Why ! what is consciousness ? Is it not the fact 
 of being aware] And does not this fact apply to animals? 
 How could there be fear, courage, joy, sorrow, or any feeling 
 without consciousness ? Wherever there is sensation, animals 
 have the consciousness of their sensation. There is, of course, 
 such a thing as reflex action in which we may have no conscious- 
 ness, because that action is not carried through the brain. We 
 have no consciousness of the flowing of the blood nor ordinarily 
 of the beating of the heart. These come not within our 
 observation. But how there could be sensori-motor action 
 without the consciousness of it is unaccountable, or how the 
 sensori-motor action can be expressed as absent from conscious- 
 ness we know not. We might quote many passages to the same 
 effect from the volume referred to. 
 
 I give but one more, as follows, from page 307, "on the evi- 
 dence now adduced, we reach the conclusion that the intelligence 
 of man, as known in personal consciousness, is of a nature 
 entirely distinct from the seusor.v api^ratus, its functions bein.^ 
 
 f» 
 
 The Faculty of Perception. 
 
 105 
 
 however, depending on the wonderfully structured 
 conditions and forms of the varied brain -work with 
 which man is endowed — a brain-work, the organization 
 of which in all its parts shows a remarkable adap- 
 tation for the fulfilment of its very refined functions. 
 
 We shall now come to perceive that there is but 
 one true method of philosophizing, and that is to base 
 our procedure on facts, by a strict process of induction ; 
 and if we find a natural and feasible explanation of 
 phenomena hereby, we may rest tolerably certain that 
 we have found the key to open the gates of psychology. 
 
 Section 4. — The Faculty of Perception. 
 
 It will have been seen ere now, how we come to 
 
 iiuaipable of explanation in accordance with the laws of sensory 
 activity. Mind is not a product of cerebral evolution, and could 
 not be so, inasnmch as even in its lowest function it is incapable 
 of being performed by sensory apparatus." If the author means 
 that the material organs of Brain cannot, as from themselves, 
 give forth consciousness, we quite agree with him ; but if he 
 means that there is any outcome in the animal economy between 
 sensation and consciousness, we tell him he mistakes. We have 
 define<l sensation to be an affection of the bodily system ; and 
 whatever results might appear as the effects of reflex action, yet 
 the animal creature would be insensible of it without the con- 
 sciousness of the sensation : he would be anaesthetic, and in that 
 case we could not speak of the creature as an object of pleasure 
 or of pain. Moreover, the idea of mind operating in man apart 
 from the exercise of Brain is introducing needlessly a difficulty 
 from which there is no outlet, and contrary to the facts of ex- 
 p(;rience. We have seen that the analogy betwixt man and the 
 lower animals is complete, and that consciousness is the pheno- 
 menon of the spirit with which the creature comes to be 
 endowed, and according as it is endowed, in virtue of its brain 
 instrumentality. 
 
I! 
 
 > 
 
 106 
 
 Sou/ MechanisJH. 
 
 have a full and (as I thinkj a satisfactory solution of 
 the great problem of Perception: First of all, we have 
 to remember that there is fundamentally formed in or 
 near the medulla the conscious Me, by the birth of a 
 living animal body, and that said conscious Me is but 
 fundamentally the etherial, and therefore spiritous, 
 reflex of the characteristics of the living body. In the 
 second place, we have to remember that the several 
 
 ■■' As Perception is tlie ci>^iution of outwArcl objects by 
 means of the external senses, it must be easier umler its exercise 
 to find out the locale of intellect than in the deeper departments 
 of mind, where the internal senses are employed, and con- 
 sequently in which the organization of the cerebrum is engaged. 
 What takes place in visual impressions, for exam})le, is carried 
 direct to intellect by means of the optic nerve which terminates 
 in the medulla. The medulla liowever is so closely connected with 
 the optic thalami and corpora striata that these may be regarded 
 as the sensorium. Now the sensorial ganglia are the seat of all 
 consciousness (see Carpenter's Unman Physiology, pp. 786, 799, 
 etc., 4th edition). "The sensory ganglia, he says, collectively 
 constitute the sensorium, and may be regarded as the most 
 essential part of the encephalon. They directly receive tlie 
 nerves proceeding from the organs of special sense, each pair of 
 which has its own distinct ganglionic centre. The sensory 
 irauirlia form the organ through whose instrumentalitv the mind 
 is rendered conscious of impressions made on the organs of sense. 
 There is no reason to think that the sensorium has in itself any 
 higher function than that of impressing the consciousness of the 
 individual, and constituting i<lealism." Again, lie says (p. 727) 
 " We may fairly regard the Thalami optici as the chief focus of 
 the sensory nerves, and more especially as the ganglionic centre 
 of the nerves of common sensation, which ascend to it from the 
 medulla oblongata. On the other hand, the corpora striata, which 
 are closely connected with the Thalami optici by comisussural 
 fibres are implanted in the motor tract of tlie crura cerebri" 
 whereby impressions fmni the rurt'hrtrin are delivered to intellect. 
 
 
 T/ie Operation of Perception. 
 
 107 
 
 senses of the living body, eyes, ears, palate, nostrils, 
 and bodily surface, have separate nerve conduits 
 attached to them, all of which are carried to the self- 
 same spiritous receptaculum corporis. Hence (to take 
 the sense of sight as an example), when the impres- 
 sion of a dog, a tree, a house, &c. is carried from the 
 object to the eye, and from the eye to the brain, and 
 as an etherial impression, enters the etherial Me as an 
 idea, we have the cognition of it. Similarly, if it be a 
 sound passing through the ear, we have a cognition of 
 it ;* and so also of impressions in taste, smell, and 
 
 * It is said that " the tremor which accompanies sound is a 
 sensible impression, and the difficulty is to understand how the 
 feeling or consciousness called sound is connected with the 
 sensible impression perceived as a tremor of the auditory nerve." 
 The interpretation of this difficulty seems to me to be this: 
 The tremor conveys sound as an impression on the auditory 
 nerve, precisely according to the quality of the organ or 
 instrument in which the tremor is originated ; and the 
 sound, whatever may be its kind, falling on the ear, is 
 Ciirried silently as a quality along the nerve attached to 
 tiie ear, and as a quality is thereby presentei^l to the etherial 
 personality, where the consciousness of the presentation is 
 evoked. Certainly the sound is not given by the mind to itself. 
 We have the analogous case of the telephone. One may speak 
 to another, who is miles <listant, by means of this agency, and 
 while the quality of sound is carried silently along the wire, it 
 is developed at the other terminal in all its accuracy. What is 
 the lesson here I It is this ; that the qualities that are devel- 
 o|)ed in matter may yet be, and are, mysteriously hidden in 
 Ether, It is out of all reason to suppose that while the auditory 
 nerve feels the vibration, the music is supplied by the mind. 
 The same sort of argument has been used for vision, and assertion 
 is made that the impression of the object on the eye is one thing, 
 but that the nerve cannot convey colour, and hence that colour 
 must be the contribution of the mind. This doctrine is full of 
 
Ill 
 
 lOS 
 
 Soul Mechanisui. 
 
 touch. Whatever happens to be the characteristic of 
 the impression externally, that self same characteristic 
 is carried by the nerve to the brain, and as an idea, it 
 is accordingly received by the conscious Me. That is 
 whatever happens to be the condition or conditions 
 belonging to the external object, as for example, 
 mineral or metal, solid or liquid, in regard to touch ; 
 black, or white, round or square, in regard to sight ; — 
 tuneful or harsh, harmonious or discordant in regard 
 to hearing ; — fragrant or fetid in regard to smell ; — 
 these and other conditions applicable to matter are 
 equally conveyed in spirit-form by the appointed 
 nerve channels, adapted for their respective functions, 
 and are each and all carried to the same central Ego 
 of the living frame ; and there is consequently in this 
 conscious self-hood, a specific consciousness of the ex- 
 ternal world in those details of which each person has 
 had the experience.* 
 
 Having ascertained the foundation of mind and the 
 service and process of the great fundamental Faculty 
 of Perception, whereby we are cognisant of the exter- 
 nal world, we shall come to see how and in what way 
 the other Faculties of the Mind are framed ; and if 
 these are found to be framed on the same satisfactory 
 principles, it becomes tolerably certain that the a priori 
 philosophy, as a system of transcendentalism, has no 
 
 inconsistencies. We lay down the doctrine that there i» not a 
 phenomenon indicatetl by matter, but fintls its quality hidden in, 
 and developed again by Ether in the cliannel adapted for its 
 transmission. 
 
 * It will l>e noticed that what are called ** the forms of 
 thought" l>y transcendental philosophers, ar« simply the forms of 
 thinf^B in their reality, as transniitteil from the external world. 
 
 
 Faculties of the Internal Organs. 
 
 109 
 
 ground whatever to rest upon. If any feature of all 
 the separate mental states can be accounted for on 
 a posteriori principles — principles which a sound in- 
 duction alone can favour, then there ought to arise a 
 new era in our philosophical speculations — an era in 
 which we are no longer shrouded in the mist of cloudy 
 obscurity, or left in the bewilderment of labyrinthine 
 perplexity ;* and thus made to stand in a position 
 such, that we know not whence we have come, or 
 whether we are going — a position wherein we are lost 
 in contradiction and mystery. 
 
 Section 5. — The Faculties generally. 
 
 We come now to the other faculties of mind. Here 
 we have but to consider that, as the various depart- 
 ments of Perception are dependent on the various 
 external organs, which are adapted for transmitting the 
 separate conditions of matter, so we must infer that 
 the various phases of Memory, Imagination, Con- 
 ception, Judgment, Reasoning, &c., are similarly de- 
 
 ♦ We get bewildered, for example, in endeavouring to 
 master Kant's critical idealism with his " pure /," and his 
 changeable / — his transcendental self consciousness, and hi.s 
 empirical consciousness— the /of pure psychology, and the / as 
 to form or representation ; and more confounded still, when told 
 that things in themselves cannot be known— that time and space 
 are mere conditions of thought, that the unconditioned can have 
 no objective reality, that the categories of the understanding 
 are simply forms whereby an object can be known, while his 
 id(;as of pure reason are a priori principles beyond the possi- 
 bilit}i^ of ex[)erience. Well might Hamilton describe them as 
 " the production of perverted ingenuity," though he himself got 
 involved in not a few of them. 
 
Saul Mechanism. 
 
 pendent on a separate framework of internal organs as 
 equally adapted to fulfil the results which these 
 separate faculties accomplish. The internal cerebral 
 organization must in the first place contain a general 
 ground or basis for the reception and retention of im- 
 pressions ;* and in the second place must possess a 
 special apparatus of neural framework for the abstrac- 
 tion and reinstatement of these impressions under new 
 
 * ''The elements of the cerebral s-ibstance, the iincouscioiw 
 atjents of the inaiiifestiition of our paycho-intellectiial life, work in 
 silence at the operations which they accomplish in common. 
 They associate together with their manifoM properties in one har- 
 monious effort, corresponding with one another by the mysterious 
 channels of their anastomosis ; and without our knowledge 
 preserve in their minute organism |K)sthumous prolongations 
 of past impressions. They act simultaneously to pro<luce 
 the phenomena of memory, and separately give off reminiscences, 
 as illuminated bodies give off their luminous waves store<l up in 
 their substance." (Luys on the Brain, p. 141). "The organic 
 memory of sensory impressions is the fundament-al basis of 
 knowledge. If the sense impressions were evanescent or 
 endowed only so long as the object was present, the range of 
 conscious intelligent action would be limited to the present, and 
 we ahouUl have no real knowledge. We can only be said to 
 know where we recognize identity or difference between |iast 
 and present conscious mo< I iti cations. If we had no organic 
 memory of the past capable of re-excitation, to serve as a basis 
 of comparison, we should be unable to recognize either agree- 
 ment or difference." (Ferrier on the Brain, p. 428). " It is now 
 very generally accepteil by psychologists that any idea which 
 has once passed through the mind may be repro<iuced at how- 
 ever long an interval through the instrumentality of suggestive 
 action." '* It is obviously on this recording of impressions, so that 
 they are reproduced as ideas when the appropriate siiggesting 
 strings are pulled, that all our accumulated knowle<lgedepen<ls." 
 (Mental Physiology, Carpenter, p. A'l^ and 434). 
 
 The Uses of Brain Organs not all knoivn. Ill 
 
 relations, when the affinities by which association 
 works draw them forth. 
 
 Physiologists with all their pondering, allow that 
 they are as yet but very imperfectly acquainted with 
 the separate functions performed by the varied organs 
 of the brain. They have done all that has been 
 hitherto possible in probing into the anatomy of this 
 wonderful structure ; but we are yet in ignorance save 
 as to a few of its departments, in regard to which they 
 have attained to some general notions as to the pre- 
 cise functions accomplished by specific parts. We 
 may know that the cerebrum has to do with intel- 
 lectual operations, that the sensorium is the seat 
 when intelligence is developed, and that the cerebel- 
 lum in all probability has to do with the regulation of 
 physical movements ;* we may know that the fibres 
 are for the transmission of impressions, (delicate for 
 their delicate work) and that the cells in the cortical 
 substance, are for lodging injpressions ; but to say to 
 v\hat purpose the corpus callosnm, the pons Varolii, 
 the corpora quadrigemina and others are devoted, can- 
 not be surely understood.! Nor is this to be wondered 
 
 ♦ '* The cerebellum would seem to be a complex arrangement 
 of individually differentiated centres, which, in associated action, 
 regulate the various muscular adjustments necessary to main- 
 tain the equilibrium ami steadiness of the body : each tendency 
 to the displacement of the equilibrium round a horizontal, 
 vertical or intermediate axis, acting as a stimulus to the special 
 centre which calls into play the antagonistic or compensatory 
 action." (Ferrier, p. 199). 
 
 t The cerebral hemispheres are connected together by a 
 great system of commissural fibre, the corpus callosum which 
 forms the floor of the longitudinal fissure, and roof of the cerebral 
 
112 
 
 Soul MechanisiH. 
 
 at. The whole machinery is conducted so thoroughly 
 in the dark, that a complete insight into the offices 
 performed by the respective organs has not yet been 
 obtained. We are therefore dependent to a large ex- 
 tent on analogy to explain the reflex phenomena of 
 mind, in connexion with the complex organization of 
 cerebral matter with which it stands connected. 
 
 (I.) — Memory, 
 
 The first Faculty of Mind after that of Perception 
 that comes under our review, is undoubtedly that of 
 Memory. Perception is the cognition of ideas ingatliered 
 from the external world ; and the first reflex operation 
 of the infant mind is the recallment of the ideas of 
 Perception, and the r^-cognition of the ideas as the 
 counterparts of the impressions already known and 
 recalled from the storehouse of memory. For what is 
 memory fundamentally but the storage of impressions; 
 and what are impressions but the imprints on the 
 cellular organs, which imprints are the source of the 
 etherial forms called ideas, which become the property 
 of the intellectual me when carried thither. There is 
 thus a two-fold copy of what constitutes the pabulum 
 of human knowledge— the impressionism lodged in 
 the cortical substance of the brain, and the idealism 
 which constitutes the foundation of the Ego or Mc. 
 The Me is properly the soul of the man ; and the 
 ideas which it receives constitute the knowledge with 
 
 ventricles." (Ferrier, p. 45). The relations of tlie Pons are verv 
 imperfectly determined. The corpora quadrigeniina have *a 
 relation to the visual centres of the cerebral hemispheres. 
 
 Memory. 
 
 118 
 
 which it is equipped. Hence, in the matter of Memory 
 it behoves that in our present constitution there is a 
 basis of matter {ox holding impressions, as well as rt: 
 basis of mind for holding ideas, and when old impres- 
 sions are returned to the Me it has a r^-cognition as 
 something already acquired. 
 
 In the present constitution of our minds, with a 
 constitution which operates throughout by means of 
 cerebral instrumentality, we are and must be de- 
 pendent on brain for the efficient working of mind ;* 
 because the Me as an hitelligence is purely receptive, 
 and is cognisant of ideas, only when ideas are trans- 
 mitted to it. And this explains what has long been 
 the crux philosophorum, viz. : — the power of self- 
 insight, as if the eye which sees other things could by 
 any possibility see itself, apart from a mirror reflect- 
 ing it.t The me sees and knows itself, not by what 
 has improperly been called introspection, for that is a 
 
 * "That the bi-ain is the organ of the mind is a universally 
 admitted axiom. We have no proof of subjectivity or modifi- 
 cation of consciousness apart from the action of the cerebral 
 hemispheres. Why couvsciousness should arise only in co-relation 
 with the activity of the cerebral hemispheres is a question which 
 has not yet received any satisfactory answer." (Ferrier, p. 324). 
 *' Nothing can be more certjiin than that sensational conscious- 
 ness is excited through physiological instrumentality" (Carpen- 
 ter's Mental Physiology, j). 12). 
 
 f Professor Calderwood, p. 6, mistakes the meaning of 
 introspection when he gives as example of it, the consciousness 
 of our thoughts and feelings. He says the physician does not 
 hfsitate to ask his patient how he feels, and he calls his experi- 
 ence introspection. Why I all such experiences are not intro- 
 spection, but the cognition of affections wrought upon us ah 
 extra. 
 
114 
 
 Soul Mechanism. 
 
 contradiction in terms, in as far as the observer can- 
 not be the object observed, otherwise we confound 
 subject and object. There cannot therefore be an 
 intuition such as that of self looking upon self unless 
 self is somehow mirrored as an object. If, however, 
 we find self cognizing new ideas, and /-^-organizing 
 old ideas: if we find self cognizing ideas of Perception, 
 and ideas of Imagination, and ideas of Conception, 
 and ideas which are the conclusions of Judgment, and 
 ideas which are the inferences of ordinary reasoning : 
 if, moreover, we find that the me is conscious of the 
 knowledge which it possesses in the furniture of its 
 ideas, we are hereby able to say what the me is, as a 
 spirit-formation, having the capacity of understanding 
 what sort of ideas are introduced to it, and of laying 
 up these ideas in itself, as the separate departments of 
 its knowledge.* Hence the soul is a structure entirely 
 built up in this world in connexion with the body. 
 
 (2.) — Imagination. 
 
 The next Faculty which naturally comes before us, 
 is that of Imagination. Imagination differs from 
 Perception, in that Perception is dependent on the 
 
 * Hence, observe how we are able to mark the i<lentity of 
 self, whatever accessions it niav receive. The identitv of a 
 material object is interfered with by the accessions which it 
 receives, because it thereby loses its primitive form and 
 character ; but tlie distinction f»s applicable to the mental self is 
 this, that each separate set of experiences is preserved therein 
 distinct and inviolate ; and we can point to any one set of prior 
 experiences, and fix them as the realities applicable to our 
 inilividual case. 
 
 Imagination. 
 
 115 
 
 external world for its ideas, and lays a foundation for 
 the exercise of Imagination. Perception, y?r.f/ of all, 
 fills the mind with fundamental ideas ; and when we 
 think of the whole process of our education in the 
 world, not only by observation, but by reading in all 
 departments of literature, we might say, that, in Per- 
 ception we lay up a store of these impressions in the 
 cortical substance of the brain, with their counterpart 
 ideal forms in the spirit-substance of the me ; and 
 Imagination as well as Memory operates on this foun- 
 dation ;* and in their exercise these lay a farther 
 extension of forms on this foundation. It is out of 
 this foundation that both Memory and Imagination 
 find the supply of their respective materials. But 
 there is this difference betwixt Memory and Imagi- 
 nation, that the former deals with the recurrence of 
 ideas in their integrity : the latter partakes of the re- 
 currence of ideas or of parts of ideas which are first 
 broken up by analysis and jDuilt up anew by synthesis 
 into new forms. For example, we may have first of all 
 by Perception received the idea of an orange: the parts 
 of that idea are colour, shape, ruggedness, sapidity, etc. 
 What does Imagination do? It takes any one or 
 more of these parts, and dresses an object of its own 
 of different material, and consistency, and applies its 
 colour to it, and its shape to it, and perhaps the 
 characteristics of something else to it. In this way a 
 
 ♦ If Perception does not lay a foundation of pabulum for 
 all the other faculties of the mind, tlien we must be constrained 
 to suppose that after all, there is a transcendentalism applicable 
 to the human mind, which contributes by itself to human 
 thought ; but this is contrary to the whole structure of mind as 
 we have represented it. 
 
IIG 
 
 Spul Mechanism. 
 
 fresh picture of things is set up — set up as made of 
 elements all culled out of ingredients which have been 
 primarily obtained from various objects received in 
 the exercise of Perception. 
 
 What may be the precise instrumentality of the 
 Brain for the borrowing of certain attributes of con- 
 crete ideas, and of building them up into a new 
 picture, as presented in the exercise of Imagination, it 
 is not easy to say ; but this much is obvious, that, 
 while Remembrance is the calling up of ideas in their 
 totality, Imagination is the calling up of ideas and 
 such attributes of ideas, as are sought for to constitute 
 some analogy or resemblance.* Attention should be 
 had to the source of this power, in calling up what is 
 wanted from the territory of the stored up material. 
 
 It may be asked, by what power are we enabled to 
 summon up old impressions, or parts thereof, to the 
 central formation that is immediately before the mind? 
 The answer no doubt is by Association! But what is 
 Association ? It is neither more nor less than the 
 operation of Affinity between an impression before 
 the mind in a state of want ^ and an impression in the 
 store-house which supplies that 7i'ant.f Such is the 
 exceedingly delicate refinement of operations in the 
 cerebral system, that the intercourse betwixt a subje»:t 
 
 * "The faculty of Ima^inatioij works witlnii the same limits 
 as Recollection." See illustrations in Carjienter's Mentiil Physi- 
 ology, chapter xii. 
 
 t Every separate impression has m^ own distinctive quality ; 
 and it is in virtue of the special conditi jn attached to each, that 
 the law of attinity is found to operate with such unfailin]Lr 
 accuracy, thereby enal)Hn«r association to fulfil the most import- 
 ant functions in the exercise of mind. 
 
 Conception. 
 
 117 
 
 before the mind and the objects laid up in the frame- 
 work of impressions, that the felt necessities of the 
 subject or impression as the idea before the mind, are 
 responded to as by attraction, to complete some 
 analogy or picture sought to be drawn into the com- 
 bination. Hence, it happens that, when one has had 
 considerable experience of the practical affairs of life, 
 he may by help of these varied impressions revel in 
 manipulating fresh pictures for himself, by making up 
 analogous scenes. This is the work of Imagination ; 
 and it is carried on by means of the material organiza- 
 tion of the brain, adapted to fulfil such a purpose. 
 
 (3.) — Conception. 
 
 But we have another great Faculty of the Mind 
 known as Conception. Conception is that Faculty 
 which betokens genius : it is the faculty which is em- 
 ployed when we are met by- difficulties, and which aids 
 us in overcoming difficulties. It is this faculty 
 which indicates resources — the power of origi- 
 nality in fulfilling some purpose of the mind — the 
 faculty therefore which is brought into play in the 
 exercise of invention. In employing conception there 
 must always be a purpose before the mind. A pur- 
 pose is what Kant calls a schema — a form of thought, 
 expressing something that has to be adopted, but 
 wanting in some element which must be supplied to 
 it, before it can be carried out — before the end can be 
 realized. The instrumentality of brain equipped for this 
 service must be such as to carry with it the impress 
 of a certain condition in zvant, and therefore having a 
 craving for a particular supply adapted to it ; and 
 
118 
 
 Soul Mechanism. 
 
 not only this, but it must have scope afforded to it of 
 feeling its way among the stored up impressions for 
 the article wanted ; and if there is failure in finding 
 this, the mind is said to be baffled in overcoming the 
 difficulty before it, that is in accomplishing the pur- 
 pose sought to be realised. It is obvious that success 
 in the exercise of Conception, as well as of Imagina- 
 tion, must chiefly depend on two things, first, on the 
 varied store of laid-up impressions ; and second, on 
 the refinement of the nerve-fibre in laying hold of the 
 desiderated form, which answers to its want. While 
 r rccption, Memory, and Imagination also so far 
 belong to the lower animals, it does not appear that 
 they are gifted with the faculty of Conception, in so 
 far as no such thing as a schema to be filled up 
 comes before their mind, unless it be in such isolated 
 cases as the bird in building its nest, or the bee in fur- 
 nishing its hive, or the mother in providing for her 
 young ; and these cases are properly denominated 
 Instinct.* Instinct may be called an exercise of 
 
 * The reason wliy the lower animals want the faculty of 
 Conception save in such isolated cases as have been referre<l to, 
 lies in this, that they have not the power of apprehending the 
 relations of the not-me. Hence, their attitude to these relations 
 is that of blindness : hence, therefore, the narrow sphere to 
 wliich they are confined — the sphere which alone concerns self. 
 And hence, their movements are influenced so far onlv a s 
 outward circumstances pertain to self. As not-%elf opens up 
 indefinitely the objects of the world, and their relations 
 to one another, and as man has a sight of these relations 
 especially as these are conjoined for the fulfilment of a 
 purpose, it is obvious that the Reason of man is hereby 
 indefinitely expanded in the adaptation of things to one another. 
 It haa moreover to b»^ noted that this pre-eminent power of man. 
 
 Judgment. 
 
 119 
 
 
 \ 
 
 Reason confined to one particular department. Reason 
 is the power of adapting one thing to another gene- 
 rally in the accomplishment of a purpose. Hence, 
 Conception may properly enough be regarded as the 
 fundamental faculty, in which Reason or the power of 
 adaptation operates as the agent in the exercise of 
 human purposes. 
 
 (4.)_7y/^ Reasoning Faculties— (a) Judgment, 
 
 But there are other aspects of Reason constantly 
 predominating in the human mind, that is in drawing 
 Inferences or in forming conclusions. And without 
 doubt there must be an apparatus in the Brain ad- 
 apted for the accomplishment of all this. All infer- 
 ences are obtained by compat ing one thing zuith another) 
 one of these is called the major premiss, and the other 
 is called the minor premiss— the former must have 
 been acquired in the course of experience, the latter 
 is the object whose character has to be ascertained, 
 and before a comparison can be made betwixt the one 
 and the other, the two must be cognate, that is analo- 
 gous objects, with this difference, that the former 
 which is embraced in our experience stands as the best 
 of its kind ; and the character of the object comes out 
 according as it comes near to it as the standard of ex- 
 cellence. That is, the major premiss stands before 
 the mind, as a standard of excellence or criterion 
 whereby we form our Judgment ; and the correctness 
 of the Judgment must always depend on the accuracy 
 
 in apprehending the relations of the n(>t-me, nnist be ascribed 
 to a peculiar quality of brain with which he is gifted. 
 
120 
 
 Soul McclianisDL 
 
 or sufficiency of what may be called our standard of 
 measurement. What the precise form of organ is in 
 which our standard ideals are registered, we cannot 
 say ; and what the precise form of organ whereby a 
 fresh cognate idea is applied, we cannot say, farther 
 than that there is in connection with Brain-organiza- 
 tion a grand Register-Department of our experiences; 
 and in order to obtain the judgment required with 
 reference to some object brought before the mind, 
 there is the summoning, by association, of the correla- 
 tive subject which contains the required inference to 
 be appended * 
 
 (b.) — Reasoning . 
 
 Such is the process in the exercise of Judgment 
 whereby we are ad/e to indicate character as applicable 
 to objects. Somewhat analogous is the process which 
 has to be gone through in what is commonly called 
 Reasoning. Reasoning is spoken of as having two 
 great branches, that of Induction and that of Deduc- 
 tion ; but the process in cither case is strictly the 
 
 * We search in vain throujjjli treatises on Phvsiolojrv to find 
 any clue to the jnocess of brain operation in niakinj; the eoni- 
 (mrison of an object which has just entered into the mind, with 
 an object already laid up in the nnnd. In the exercise of judijj- 
 ment the process is onlinarily automatic, and the pronouncement 
 of the character of that which is presented to us seems in certjiin 
 Ciises to be immediate. It appears as if in cognate matters the 
 topography of analogous cases were determine<I, and that when 
 a representation enters the optic thalamus^ it is at once con- 
 fnujted bv another con-similar, in virttie of which we have an 
 immediate intuition of *litierence, antl thereby an exercise of 
 judgment. 
 
 Reasoning. 
 
 121 
 
 same, the distinction being that in Induction we have 
 in po.ssession the major premiss containing what we 
 call a Cause, and, therefore, we seek and obtain, 
 throu^^h this an inference which constitutes the Cause as 
 adequate to account for the conclusion in the minor 
 premiss ; while in Deduction we require to have the 
 major premiss as containing the conclusion we seek for ; 
 and therefore we seek through this an inference which 
 constitutes the Conclusion, adequate to satisfy the 
 Cause in the minor premiss. Here, as in the 
 exercise of Judgment, there is a comparison betwixt 
 two cognate objects, one of them being the minor pre- 
 miss, or that to which we wish to attach an inference, 
 the other being the major premiss as something laid 
 up in the storehouse of impressions, and brought for- 
 ward by association as containing the inference re- 
 quired, whether by Induction in searching for a Cause, 
 or by Deduction in order to find a Conclusion.-*^ 
 
 * The exercise of Reasoning is one of the most perplexing 
 to the student of mind. It is made obvious that it takes place 
 by (iomparing oiie representation with another. How that can 
 be effected by any s])ecifie organ defeats us to understand : yet 
 upon the plea that like is drawn to like, the process becomes 
 understandable enough. We have in our experience that 
 represenUtion which we have gathered as the best of its kind, 
 and when a cognate image is i)resentetl, and confronted there- 
 with we are able at once to pronounce on said injage according 
 as it comes near to the model with which it is compared. This is 
 the exercise of judgment. Again, we have in our experience a 
 subject to which the cause and consequence are attached : when, 
 theiefore, a cognate subject comes to the optic thalanuis with 
 the sjime conse(pience, we find it c«)nfronte(l with the subject of 
 our experience to which the cause is attached, and we draw 
 tiience the cause which we seek for. This we call Induction. 
 
 c^ 
 
122 
 
 Soul Mechanisjn. 
 
 (5.) — Brief Recapitulation. 
 
 Such is a resume of the Intellectual Faculties of 
 the human mind : so-called, not because any use of 
 them can be exercised apart from the cerebral instru- 
 mentality through which the mind operates, but 
 because said Faculties stand preliminary to, and are 
 essential to, the operation of these motor Faculties 
 which have their outlet under the title of Appetites 
 and Desires, and what is called Will-power which 
 is carried into execution by our volitions. The in- 
 tellectual Faculties present different phases of under- 
 standing. For example. Perception is the ideation of 
 external things, which come to us in seeing, hearing, 
 touching, etc. : Memory is the recallinent to conscious- 
 ness of ideas formerly entertained : Imagination is the 
 groping together by generalization of ideas and parts 0/ 
 ideas through preliminary abstraction, and hence 
 pictures which gratify the fancy, or illustrate some 
 principle for w hich we contend : Conception is an ex- 
 tension of Iinagiyiation into the deep recesses of brain, 
 in order to find means to ends, by the inventive or 
 creative processes of the mind, when projecting or 
 purposing new schemes of action. The Faculties of 
 Judgment and of Reasoning are analogous in that they 
 depend on the comparison of a presented idea ivith a 
 cognate idea already laid up, the difference in the case 
 of Judgment being that we have to pronounce on the 
 
 The process is precisely tlie same in Deduction. When we 
 have a subject with its cause given in the presentation, 
 and liave it confronted with a cognate subjec^t and cause, alrea<ly 
 laid up with the conclusiou attachetl, we are able to read off this 
 conclusion accordingly, as tliat w we seek for. 
 
 Intelligence preliminary to Will. 
 
 123 
 
 character of the presented idea ; and in the case of 
 Reasoning that we have to find out a cause or a con- 
 sequence to the presented idea, according as one or 
 other is required. And further, in the case of Judg- 
 ment, the standard laid up is to be regarded as \hQ best 
 of its kind ; and in the case of Reasoning the similitude 
 must contain the inference sought for. 
 
 Such are the extremely simple methods whereby we 
 are enabled to expound the most difficult processes 
 of human thought. It indicates an extraordinary 
 delicacy and refinement of the wonderful operation of 
 Association in the field of relationships, and of the 
 Affinities which subsist under these relationships. 
 Under whatever mode of exposition we adopt, these 
 delicate affinities shew themselves, and introduce fresh 
 movements accordingly. And we can have no doubt 
 that in the world of Spirits so-called, it is in virtue of 
 the affinities pertaining to spirit-forms, that their 
 relation (the relation of separate conditions) to one 
 another is disclosed, and their correspondent action 
 accounted for. We have but one source of movement 
 made known to us, and that one source is the opera- 
 tion of affinity under conjoint relationships. It is 
 under these relationships that we account for the 
 exercise of Will-power, to which we shall now give our 
 attention. The material instrumentality by means of 
 which our minds presently operate, can be regarded as 
 simply a crass, or if we like better a gross expression 
 of what is more refinedly manifested in the spirit 
 world. What we say is, that it is through such agency 
 (the agency of conditioned forms), that we have the 
 basis laid of the Ego itself, and through such agency 
 that we account for all the operations of mind. 
 
 >\ 
 
124 
 
 Soul Mcclianism. 
 
 Having dealt with the INTELLECTUAL Powers, I 
 now proceed to consider 
 
 IL— THE EMOTIONAL POWERS. 
 
 (\?)— Motives. 
 
 In prosccutii'g this theme we shall have to deal 
 with the great questions of Will and of the Freedom 
 of Will, each of them a crux, in the philosophic 
 systems hitherto in vogue. It is unquestionably the 
 Ego (the Me, the conscious-self) that wills The first 
 question naturally is, under what circumstances is the 
 Will originated, and how comes it to be exercised ? 
 There must be a cause. We cannot imagine an 
 absolute self commencement as the cause of Will, for 
 that would be a cause without a cause ;* nor can we 
 suppose a movement having a certain direction, to 
 deviate into a contrary direction without an iinpelling 
 
 ♦ Ami yet there must be a Cause wliicli is itself without a 
 cause. And here is the distinction wliicli we have to make. 
 The absolute Cause is the self-contained e.ipressiun «>f e.s.sential 
 causality in eternal existence — that existence which cannot but 
 V>e — that existence which is not only the source of all derive«l 
 beinf'. but which is the funtlaniental expression of combined 
 conditions as the necessary source of all derived phenomena. 
 That existence, if we consider it arij^ht has in itself the con- 
 ditions out of which all movement comes ; and if we would 
 regard it aright, must have intellectually an«l morally the best 
 conditions that instigate movement, with entire control over 
 that movement. It is different with respect to derive<l con- 
 ditions. For example, if there is aught that stan<ls by itself 
 essentially passive without connexion with other c(Hiditions, 
 then it is utterly impossible to conceive that passivity of itself 
 becoming essentially active. 
 
 Motives. 
 
 125 
 
 cause. If the Me then is in itself intrinsically passive, 
 as being simply receptive, and therefore conscious of 
 impressions received ; and if the Will, as the active 
 impulsion of the Me, is to be regarded, and must be 
 regarded, as an effect ; we ask naturally what is the 
 operating cause by which this effect is produced, or out 
 of which it arises ? I answer at once : — Will is created 
 by the introduction of ideas into the Me. How so ? 
 Let it be noted that the Me, while it is etherially 
 a representation of the body, is additionally a structure 
 of ideas through the senses : we have therefore 
 only to remember that the condition of the 
 Me, on the one hand, as for the time cogniti- 
 oned, and the condition and character of the 
 ideas which are carried to it, on the other hand, create 
 an emotion or motive poiver, in precise correspondence 
 with the kind of affection hereby produced upon the 
 Me. Or, shall I say, it is by the junction of the idea 
 with the Me, that a characteristic emotion is excited ? 
 There is without doubt such a phenomenon as an 
 operative chemistry in the spirit-sphere, as unquestion- 
 ably there is an operative chemistry in the matter- 
 sphere ; and when we come to know more of the 
 relations of spirit-conditions to one another, and the 
 refined and delicate affinities of these to one another, 
 this conclusij>n will be simple enough, and be seen to 
 be amply illustrated and confirmed in mental exercises. 
 As emotion, then, is the motive power whereby Will 
 is engendered, it is of enormous moment to understand 
 under what circumstances motive power for this end 
 is created in the human mind. I have said that 
 emotions may be indefinitely varied ; and they are so 
 varied according to the specific qualities of the ideas 
 
 iifi 
 
 Mil 
 
Soul Mechanism. 
 
 that arc brought to bear upon the Me ; and not only 
 so, but varied also according to the temperament in 
 which the Me happens to be situated at the time. 
 The process has its direct analogy in the world of 
 matter, as when an alkali and an acid are conjoined. 
 It may be that an idea, when conveyed to the mind 
 (that is to the conscious Me), creates simply an 
 emotion which is properly denominated a sensation, 
 which may be strong or weak, as when we see a man 
 walking on a rope raised aloft, or when he hears of 
 .some accident in a distant land, which little affects 
 him, or when a piece of ordinary intelligence is com- 
 municated to him. But if the idea introduced to the 
 mind be an intimation of the death of one's dear friend, 
 a man is affected according to the quality of the 
 relationship. And here comes in the operation of 
 Will under Emotion. If the emotion be that arising 
 from the death of a father or near relation, there will 
 be the accession of an idea craving for the supply of a 
 want to be fulfilled. In short, when the idea intro- 
 duced involves a condition of need in the object, or in 
 the circumstantials of the object, then that very con- 
 dition engenders the operation of Will, that is a 
 tendency in the Me to relieve the need. If a man is 
 seen to fall from a height, or if there is the know- 
 ledge of an object in danger or in distress, or in any 
 special need which our aid can supply, an emotion of 
 desire to rescue or relieve him is at once in.stigated by 
 the very communication of the idea ; and this accord- 
 ing to the nature of the want which the idea involves. 
 
 (2.) — Appetites and Desires, 
 
 It is to be observed that the law which generates 
 
 Appetites and Desires. 
 
 127 
 
 Will, applies to Appetites and Desires. Appetites 
 have their origin in purely bodily states ; these states 
 are well known. Hunger and thirst are bodily 
 cravings, and they are stimulated by the sight of that 
 which responds to their cravings ; or they may be 
 stimulated by the presence of that which peculiarly 
 gratifies or brings pleasure in the u.se of them. The 
 sexual appetite in like manner is aroused by the 
 presence or even the imagination of that which grati- 
 fies it. And what is it all, but that impulse of the Me^ 
 which in itself is strong Will for indulgence. The 
 circumstances under which the Will of Appetite is 
 frustrated, are readily apprehended, as when inappro- 
 priateness or when moral sentiment interposes. These 
 will be noticed by and bye. 
 
 Desires have by many philosophers been described 
 as something definite and determinate in their 
 number and character ; but this is a mistaken view. 
 There is nothing more indefinite than our desires, be- 
 cause these arise out of the jdiosyncracy or disposition 
 of the individual, according to his means and oppor- 
 tunities. Desires, then, are endless in their nature, as 
 circumstances happen to generate particular wishes. 
 The sight of an object, or even the apprehension of it 
 in imagination, may excite an emotion for the gratifica- 
 tion, especially if there be any natural proclivity to- 
 wards it. For example, let a man who is fond of golf, 
 chess, cards, &c. have a proposal made to him to play 
 thereat, the emotion which constitutes the will thereto 
 is at once aroused, if circumstances are otherwise 
 favourable for the exercise ; and vice versa, there will 
 be a repudiation of the proposal, if there be no taste 
 tendency or inclination for joining in the game. 
 
 1 
 
 l; 
 
12S 
 
 Soui MecJuxyusDi. 
 
 We see, then, what is the source and foundation of 
 Will, in what may be regarded as mere animalde- 
 sires ; that is of Will in regard to which there is the 
 natural excitement of the moment, that is of Will, 
 which as a matter of course would have its impulse 
 gratified, were there no mechanical or other obstacle 
 as a necessary interposition standing in the way. It 
 is obvious, that in this case, sensuous Will is that 
 spontaneous operation of the Me which is created by 
 the entrance of the causal idea as carnal, which 
 prompts it in the mind. It is the mere phenomenon 
 of law, as displayed by the automatic impulse arising 
 from the combination of two distinctive qualities ; 
 and it arises in the Me as particularly conditioned on 
 the one hand by its special consciousness at the time ; 
 and as it is affected on the other hand by the particular 
 idea thrust upon it. 
 
 (3.) — The Counteraction of Motives. 
 
 So far as we have proceeded, we have seen that 
 Will is not only an effect, but in what manner it is an 
 effect. Like all other effects, /'/ is the result of at least 
 two combining properties creating an emotion, or what 
 we ordinarily call a motive ; and we shall farther see 
 that there is no such thing as Will zvithout a motive. 
 But now we come to see how one emotion may 
 counteract another ; or, shall I say, how one Will goes 
 to restrain another, in what we regard as the mere 
 animal intelligence. If we set food before a hungry 
 dog, the impulse seizes him to lay hold of it, that he 
 may have his appetite satisfied ; but if at the same 
 moment we hold a cudgel over his head, threatening 
 
 The Restraining oj Emotions. 
 
 129 
 
 to apply it, if he do but touch the food, he will be re- 
 strained. The emotion, created by the sight of the 
 stick, obstructs and overcomes the emotion created by 
 the sight of the food. The same kind of motive power 
 may be seen in man, as when a thief is restrained 
 from stealing, when the eye of a detective is upon him, 
 through whom he would be visited with punishment. 
 
 But man, by means of the wider range of his appre- 
 hension, has the prerogative of ultroneously curbing 
 his sensuous Will, as when their happens to intervene 
 the presence of a restraining idea : — a restraining idea 
 (be it observed) arising out of the very presence and 
 operation of the sensuous Will in question. It may be 
 asked, How does this come about ? The answer is by 
 observing the effect likely to be produced, if the sen- 
 suous Will be gratified. For example, there may be 
 set before a man food very savoury, and for which he 
 has a natural craving, as being very gratifying to the 
 taste, and therefore creating a desire to partake of it 
 when presented ; but in th^ very circumstances there 
 arises a sentiment that said food is injurious to his 
 constitution ; and this idea (that of the injury to self) 
 operates restraint upon the sensuous emotions, just as 
 the threatened blow on the dog's head operates to re- 
 strain him from the dish. 
 
 (4.) — The Foundation of Morals and the Law 
 
 of Morals. 
 
 There is a general source, whence a restraining idea 
 proceeds in order to counteract the sensuous Will. 
 We know that the law of Morals is constantly at 
 work in this sphere of action, and its operation is seen 
 
Soul Mechanism. 
 
 in the application of incidents to others as well as to 
 self. It is, therefore, of essential moment that this 
 knotty question of morals should be fairly analyzed, 
 and that the source of its operation should be clearly 
 and satisfactorily traced and determined. Whence 
 then comes, and how comes, the restraining idea in 
 morals ? The answer is — from a Moral Idea. But 
 what is a Moral Idea ? I answer a moral idea is one 
 which affects the well-being of a sentient creature^ 
 that is a creature susceptible of pleasure or of pain. 
 Every animal having the attribute of consciousness is 
 capable of pleasure and of pain ; and moreover every 
 animal, as naturally endowed with its own inherent 
 constitution, has what may be called its God-given 
 rights, as the attributes essentially belonging to its 
 tribe. 
 
 Now, the fundamental rule of moral laiv is to respect 
 those rights — the rights that are the essential prero- 
 gatives of the creature's very existence ; and these 
 rights are to be regarded as sacred in proportion to the 
 scale of elevation in which the creature happens to be 
 placed. Hence, there exists of necessity a line of 
 moral gradations. We should say the rights of no 
 creature are to be unnecessarily disturbed, i.e., if there 
 be no good motive or inducement thereto. But when 
 the requirements of the higher nature demand that 
 those of the inferior creature shall be sacrificed, if the 
 latter stand in the way of the former, it is expedient 
 therefore that the inferior creature must give place for 
 the sake of the superior. In the same sense, what 
 would be regarded as maining and cutting of the 
 animal frame, a thing immoral in itself, must yet 
 in the circumstances be regarded as highly moral, if it 
 
 The Foundation of Morals. 
 
 131 
 
 subserves the end of removing worse ailments. Ab- 
 stractly an inaniiuate object has in itself no rights. 
 Whatever may happen to be its characteristics, these 
 exist as mere property for the use of the animal crea- 
 ture endowed with consciousness, and more especially 
 for man, the highest specimen of beinghood upon the 
 earth. Hence, one may mow down grass, pluck 
 flowers, cut down trees, or hew rocks, to serve his 
 purpose, so far as he happens to be proprietor of 
 these. There is no infringement of moral law so 
 far as the things themselves are concerned. But if 
 the things interfered with belong to another person we 
 cannot appropriate them without affecting him, and 
 we may not invade his rights. The superior rights of 
 the general community may, however, in certain cir- 
 cumstances demand this infringement, in as far as a 
 community are of more importance than the indi- 
 vidual, and then legislative authority may intervene 
 for this end. 
 
 (5.) — The Moral Idea the root of Moral Law, 
 
 It is observable, then, that the foundation of moral 
 law lies in the maxim, suum cuique tribuito : allow to 
 every sentient creature its own inherent rights ; and 
 this implies that we should do injury to none beyond 
 what a higher moral law demands. We are in a 
 situation now to see how and under what circum- 
 stances a moral idea comes in with a restraining 
 emotion to check or to suppress a sensuous emotion 
 which otherwise would become Will. 
 
 We have seen that the introduction of an idea to 
 the Me raises an emotion in the Me precisely corres- 
 
 II 
 
132 
 
 Soui Mechanism. 
 
 ponding to the relation of that idea to the Me, and 
 thereby constituting what is the foundation of specific 
 Will. It happens in these circumstances, that when a 
 sensuous emotion for Will is apprehended or regarded 
 as a Volition, which must affect either self or any 
 other sentient creature, then this t^ery apprehension is 
 the introduction of a moral idea; and there immediately 
 arises a moral emotion, an emotion of approval or dis- 
 approval as regards the volition in question — an 
 emotion which restrains the sensuous Will, if the 
 sensuous Will is regarded as a wrong done ; but of 
 justification, if the deed is regarded as appropriate or 
 helpful to the creature. 
 
 (6.) — Human Responsibility. 
 
 We see, then, what is the foundation of the ought 
 and of the ought not. If a wrong is done to the rights 
 of another, or if it is seen being done to the rights 
 of another, by fulfilling a certain action, a restraining 
 emotion of ought not comes into play, unless the de- 
 mands of a higher moral law come in to over-ride the 
 same. The sight of a beautiful flower might induce 
 me to pluck it and appropriate it ; and if in no man's 
 land, this might be done without offence to any ; but 
 if said flower happened to be in the garden of another 
 man, the very fact of his ownership must restrain me 
 from taking it, unless I have his consent or authority 
 to do so. The amputation of a limb would, in need- 
 less circumstances, be a wrong on the sentient creature; 
 but if the limb were diseased, and threatened the ruin 
 of its possessor, the act would be regarded as a boon 
 conferred upon him and therefore highly moral. What 
 
 An Abnormal State. 
 
 133 
 
 then, we say is this, that man, being endowed with 
 the prerogative of seeing the right, or (as the case may 
 be) the wrong, of an action, before the action is 
 fulfilled, hath every where in his vocabulary the 
 ought or the ought not brought before him as the 
 expression of the emotion aroused. And what I now 
 call special attention to, is this, that said emotion 
 becomes properly the judgment of his Reason^ and he 
 feels himself responsible as to the action which he 
 pursues. 
 
 No doubt the confession of the ancient poet has often 
 to be made video meliora proboque deterioi^a sequor. 
 But this fact (the fact of an evil tendency in one's 
 heart) cannot alter the responsibility. It must be 
 sufficient that a man has before him two ways, and 
 the power and freedom of taking the one or the other, 
 after he has seen the consequences in either case ; for 
 then his choice is that he embraces the consequences 
 of the alternative which he adopts. It may be said 
 that for the moment he is blind to consequences, and 
 is influenced by an over-ruling passion. All that can 
 be said in these circumstances is that he is in an 
 abnormal state. An abnormal state is out of the 
 category of reason. It is a state of passion. Passion 
 will prevail for a time and will blind a man, who has 
 not learned to regulate his emotions in conformity 
 with moral law.* David, under the spell of Bath- 
 
 -•' It has been sjiid " A man with a criminal nature and edu- 
 cation under given circumstances of temptation, can no more 
 help committing crime, than he could help having a headache 
 under certain conditions of brain and stomach. Botli the crime 
 and tl»e headaclie result from a series of antecedent causes, 
 culminating in their eti'ects. The man inherits his brain as 
 
134 
 
 Soul Mechanism. 
 
 sheba, became blind to the rights of Uriah. But there 
 comes a time when passion being ended or arrested, 
 there arises a sight and a sense of the wrong done, 
 and the moral judgment pronounces the deed as evil, 
 and the man says, " I have sinned against the Lord." 
 Then it is that under an apprehension of the evil, a 
 discipline may be applied for restoration to greater 
 moral strength for resistance in time to come, when a 
 fresh paroxysm of craving returns. 
 
 (7.) — A higher Law than that of mere morals 
 
 creates Religion. 
 
 We ought not to forget that under the Christian 
 economy there comes into the Me for operation a still 
 higher presentation than that of any merely moral 
 idea, in that it is received as coming from God, an 
 authoritative presentation which occasions the strong- 
 est and most powerful emotion possible in inducing 
 the exercise of the Will, that is beyond any and all 
 other ideas, and which is therefore properly the highest 
 law of mind in the circumstances. If we believe that 
 certain maxims or principles come from God. and if 
 we regard God as the highest and most authoritative 
 of all beings, and if we believe our accountability to 
 
 much as he inherits his estate." (Cotter Morison, p. 289). This 
 is granted ; but the two cases of headache and crime are 
 certainly not analagous. The heada«!he will arise from physical 
 conditions, and will not he motlified by the presence of others : 
 the crime can be and is controlled and restrained in the presence 
 of others, shewing that there is a power of restraining the Will 
 in the matte) of crime. We cannot suspend a headache, but 
 villains can and do suspend a crime. 
 
 The Source of Religion in the SouL 135 
 
 God. it is obvious that in this we have the very 
 foundation of what is strictly known as Religion, 
 There has been much discussion among philosophers 
 as to the real source of the religious principle in the 
 human mind. We have no hesitation in saying that 
 it lies in a belief in God,— in the belief of a certain 
 invisible Power to whom we are amenable. If we 
 could get rid of all faith in such a Being, this very fact 
 would do away with the religious feeling. Religious 
 feeling is neither more nor less than the feeling of being 
 bound in responsibility to the demands of some sup- 
 posed Supreme Authority, under hope of reward for 
 obedience, or under pain of punishment inflicted by 
 him for disobedience. Whatever, therefore, happens 
 to be the faith which we entertain respecting the God 
 whom we own and acknowledge, in precise conformity 
 thereto will be the religion which we cherish. With- 
 out God, the reign of moral law would alone be that 
 which would characterize us, and this under circum- 
 stances in which it would be terribly contravened by 
 carnal proclivities. In a savage state it is the most 
 natural thing for man to entertain the notion of an 
 unseen authoritative Being. They see around them 
 what they cannot but regard as effects, and they 
 ascribe the effects to some great Cause. The sun and 
 the moon send forth light and heat : they rise and set : 
 again, the winds and waves, the clouds and showers, 
 and a hundred things besides, are regarded as effects, 
 and must have causes ; and hence the natural con- 
 clusion, that there must be a Supreme unseen Power 
 over the operations of nature : whatever demands 
 therefore are ascribed as the requirement of this 
 Superior Power, have naturally the strongest efficacy 
 
II 
 
 i! 
 
 136 
 
 Soul Mechanism. 
 
 in creating an emotion influential above all others. 
 Hence, ideas which are believed to be from God, are 
 held to over-rule every other consideration. Moral 
 law would tell us that it is cruel to slaughter need- 
 lessly a living creature ; but if the idea prevails that 
 this is demanded as a sacrifice to please God, moral 
 law is made to yield to the Divine Law; and this 
 because of the tremendous sanctions by which the 
 Divine behests are attended. 
 
 It may be said that practically under Christianity, 
 in which the element of Divine teaching is peculiarly 
 and strictly enforced, the lower and sensuous Will is 
 notwithstanding frequently the prevaih'ng one. This 
 must be admitted : it must be admitted that there is 
 constant transgression of laws which are believed to 
 be expressly from God. How is this to be explained ? 
 No doubt chiefly on the ground of the immediate im- 
 perativeness of the carnal law ; but there is more, it is 
 to be explained partly on the ground of the weakness 
 of our faith, and partly on the ground of our belief in 
 an escape from punishment. If, for example, the 
 doctrine is implicitly entertained that Jesus Christ has 
 been substituted for us, and hath suffered the punish- 
 ment due for our sins, we are fain to cling to the prin- 
 ciple that a righteous Being will not inflict punishment 
 twice, that is upon us, as well as upon our Substitute. 
 Moreover, there is also the less impulse to put a check 
 upon our passions, if it is taught that our so doing is 
 not to be reckoned an ingredient of our acceptance 
 with God. It is a matter of profound regret that such 
 teaching should prevail in the church of Christ — a 
 teaching whose tendency is to lead to such laxity in 
 the discipline of our passions. 
 
 How can the Will be Free? 
 
 137 
 
 (8.) The Freedom of the Will under imperative Laws. 
 
 But here comes in one of the most puzzling problems 
 which any philosopher has had to encounter, and 
 which amid all the varied resources of human investi- 
 gation has never yet been fairly grappled with, much 
 less solved, viz., the freedom of human willing, in con- 
 sistency with the undoubted fact that human willing 
 is itself a result of antecedent causation. It is allowed 
 that there is not a single example of the exercise of 
 Will, but we can trace the same to the play of prelimin- 
 ary elements upon the mind, and that therefore we can 
 always trace the same as arising out of this combina- 
 tion of ideas operating on the Me. How then, it is 
 asked, can the Will be regarded as free?* This has 
 
 * It would be an almost endless task to quote the many 
 authors who have insisted in the doctrine of necessity in regard 
 to the Will. I quote two specimens of the argumentation em- 
 ployed. " It is strange to see Wow some who confidently come 
 to base their argument for the existence of a God on the ground 
 that everything in nature must have a cause, are content in 
 their zeal for Free Will to speak of the Will as if it were self- 
 determined and had no cause. As thus vulgarly used, the term 
 Will has no definite meaning, and certainly is not applicable to 
 any concrete reality in nature, when in the matter of Will, as in 
 everv other matter, we perceive effect witnessing to cause, and 
 varying according as the cause varies." In this statement, Dr. 
 Mau<le8ley is right. But he goes on to say, ** It would be vain 
 to pretend to throw any sure light upon a subject which has 
 been discussed over and over again, and the opponents on each 
 side convinced that they have gained the day. The question is 
 one which will not be settled by controversy, but by the pro- 
 gress of hun»an knowledge, the time being probably not far 
 distant when men will wonder that so much subtle ingenuity 
 
 V:| 
 
138 
 
 Soul Mcchanisw. 
 
 This has been, and still is the chief stumblins: block— 
 the crux philosophorum. It is allowed, moreover, that 
 we have the consciousness of freedom ; but when this 
 consciousness comes to be analyzed, wc are told it 
 must after all be regarded as a delusion. If a delusion, 
 it is a most inexplicable delusion ; for in the first place, 
 every rational man, without exception, has this con- 
 sciousness ; and because he has this consciousness, he 
 feels his responsibility ; and explain it how we may, 
 he feels that he is not a mere automaton, that is, a 
 thing moved only when a power external to itself 
 pushes it on. A man feels that he can determine as 
 he pleases, that he can make choice as he pleases, and 
 that he is responsible for the choice he makes ; and 
 yet his philosophic friend tells him that when he 
 makes his choice, and determines in one way rather 
 than another, he is prompted thereto by some impulse 
 which influences the Will to determine in one direction 
 rather than in another. Is it come to this, then, after 
 
 and zealous labour should have been bestowed upon it." (Physi- 
 ology of Mind, p. 409). 
 
 "Man is a protluct of nature in body and mind. Hence, 
 not merely what he is, but also what he does, wills, feels, and 
 thinks, depends u})on the same natural necessity ;is the whole 
 structure of the worhl. Only a superficial observation of human 
 existence could lead to the conclusion, that the actions of nations 
 ami individuals were the result of a perfectly Free Will. Human 
 liberty of which all bojist (says Spinosa) consists solely in this, 
 that a man is conscious of his Will, and unconscious (.f the causes 
 by which it is determined." (Blichner's Force and Matter, p. 239). 
 It is one of the most curious exemplifications of non-observation 
 that it shoidd have escaped philosophers that what has been 
 called the self-determination of Will is only a question of Jud^^- 
 ment. 
 
 How Freedom is Manifested. 
 
 139 
 
 all, that reason and logic must disallow the truth of 
 this feeling — the feeling of a conscious freedom? It 
 may be thought that after so much vain warfare, there 
 is now no way out of the dilemma, and that the prob- 
 lem is insoluble. 
 
 Let us yet more closely examine this vexata questio 
 of Freedom. It is allowed — it must be allowed — 
 that Will as such, in all cases is an effect, and that we 
 can point to the cause, in that it is brought about by 
 the contact of an idea with the Me ; out of which con- 
 tact arises an emotion or motive which is the source 
 of Will. There is no such thing as Will without a 
 motive, and in all cases a motive is the impulse or 
 craving which arises from the circumstances in which 
 we may happen to be placed. It may be thought by 
 this admission that we necessarily give up the whole 
 question, because it is nothing less than a contradic- 
 tion in terms to say that the Will cannot be free, and 
 at the same time i\\Q puppet of extraneous movements. 
 The matter requires yet cXosqy consideration in coming 
 to our conclusion. 
 
 Taking such an example as the very common one 
 of an impulse on the carnal side, and a restraining 
 impulse on the moral side, or on the Christian side, 
 how does the Me stand with respect to both ? Does 
 it not properly become a matter of Judg^nent, as to 
 which of the two is best for the Me? In all normal 
 action this is the case ; and I hold that it is this very 
 consideration that creates the responsibility. There 
 may be a strong iinpulse on the carnal side, to give 
 way to the craving ; but that the Me is not a mere 
 puppet under the craving is manifested by the fact 
 that, when persons are present, before whom it would 
 
 A 
 
140 
 
 Soul Mechanistn. 
 
 be unbecoming or improper to give way to it, it can 
 be resisted ; and that the real situation of the Me be- 
 fore two or more competing claims is first to JUDGE 
 which of the two is most suitable and most profitable, 
 that is most desirable on the whole, to be adopted. 
 It is not the Will therefore which choses, 
 when there is an alternative before the Me, BUT THE 
 Me itself in the exercise of Judgment, which 
 pronounces, and through this shows a preferential 
 attribute for the one impulse rather than the other. I 
 do not say that the Judgment, in weighing probabili- 
 ties, will always come to a wise conclusion. The wis- 
 dom or non-wisdom in willing does not enter into the 
 consideration. What enters into the consideration 
 is, that when there is a competition of claims before 
 the mind, it is the Me itself that pronounces on the 
 character of the conclusion, and hence the responsibi- 
 lity of the Me in favouring the conclusion, which the 
 Me prefers ; and hence the Will follows. Let it be 
 seen then, that in all cases of self-determination, the 
 Will operates through the exercise of Judgment. If we 
 prosecute the inquiry respecting any case, in which 
 there is an alternative course of action, and if we de- 
 mand why the determination of the Me, has a 
 preference of the one over the other, I have to say 
 that in all normal cases, this arises in the exerci.se of 
 Judgment, which pronounces on what it likes as most 
 desirable ; and this Judgment constitutes the free atti- 
 tude of the Me, as to the character of these contend- 
 ing claims, and consequently this free preference forms 
 the source of the movement of the Will in favour of 
 that claim for which the decision is given. It will be 
 seen therefore, in cases of what is called self-determi- 
 
 The Laiv of Human Freedoom. 
 
 141 
 
 nation that fudgment is the servitor of the Will It is 
 that attitude of the Ego which pronounces on charac- 
 ter, and which therefore induces a choice betwixt two 
 or more objects. Hence, it is the arbitrament or de- 
 termination for which the Ego is responsible. It will 
 be observed, then, that while Will in all ordinary cases 
 is the effect arising from the emotion created under the 
 prevailing idea which enters the Me, in all cases where 
 there has been what is improperly termed the deter- 
 mination of the Will, as between two contending 
 claims, the element of freedom comes in, when, under 
 the exercise of Judgment, the Me gives a preference 
 for one such rather than another. In these circum- 
 stances the exercise of Will is the free volition of the 
 Me as giving preference to one impulse rather than 
 another. This Will is the decision of Judgment, and 
 Judgment is an exercise of the Reason, — that exercise 
 which, in a matter of this sort, accords best with the 
 condition of the Me, as most satisfactory to it. 
 
 ^9.) — The Circumstances under which Freedom Prevails, 
 
 Have we then untied this gordian knot of Free- 
 Will ? Of course, if there be no alternative before the 
 mind, there can properly be no exercise of Judgment, 
 and therefore we cannot speak of freedom, becau.se in 
 the circumstances there is no choice ; but when there 
 is an alternative. Judgment rightly or wrongly pro- 
 nounces in behalf of one in preference to the other. 
 Here, then, I detect, and here I proclaim, the law of 
 human freedom 1 Liberty is simply the power of the 
 Me when confronted with two or more ideas for adop- 
 tion, to judge which is the preferable, and to pro- 
 
142 
 
 Soui Mechanism. 
 
 nounce in favour of one or other of them, in order to 
 the exercise of Will. The claim has been misappre- 
 hended as that of the Will, but i/ie icill cannot choose : 
 Will is the result of choice in this case ; and here it is 
 that the endless confusion, distraction, misunderstand- 
 ing, and misrepresentation have arisen. The free in- 
 tellectual pronouncement of the Me in the exercise of 
 Judgment, I repeat, simply defines the attitude of the 
 Me to the proffered objects, and this very attribute 
 connects the Me by association with that which is 
 [)ronounced to be best, and hence the operation of Will 
 is but the self-movement of the Me to that object 
 which Judgment presents to it. 
 
 It will be seen, then, that, in all cases where there 
 is presented two or more ideas before the mind, 
 whether in the sensuous department, or in the moral 
 department, or what may be called the spiritual de- 
 partment, there is a sense of responsibility because 
 there is a feeling of freedom. The feeling of freedom 
 may be very different in different circumstances. We 
 are all familiar with the case when there may be no 
 bias in the mind in favour of one item more than 
 another, and when the Judgment is undecided in its 
 conclusions. There may be a number of candidates 
 for an appointment : in that case the Me has to be 
 informed as to the fitness of each ; and then a pro- 
 nouncement of superior fitness being made by 
 the Judgment in favour of one, the Me is drawn 
 to that one ; and it wt7/s accordingly. Or there 
 may be a variety of patterns of paper set before 
 the Me for choice to cover the walls of a room : 
 Judgment in like manner brings these to the standard 
 of taste which happens to exist in the mind ; and, 
 
 Freedom in its Diverse Operations. 14-*J 
 
 accordingly, that which comes nearest to this standard 
 is fixed upon : and the Will operates accordingly. In 
 morals the self same process exists. An honest man 
 will not rob his master, though he may have the op- 
 portunity, because of the injury which the robbery 
 might inflict not only on his master but on his own 
 self-respect. He may be in want of the money ; but 
 as one paying more respect to the law of morals than 
 to the sensuous craving, he pronounces for the oiight- 
 not, and therefore the Me wills for restraint. Another 
 not so refined in moral honesty, may be induced to take 
 the opportunity of appropriating to himself what is 
 not his own ; but here, as in the former case, it is still 
 a matter of judgment, in as far as the man shuts out 
 the moral impulse as weak, and is the slave of what 
 would satisfy the covetous nature. Take a case in 
 which a man is supposed to be taught his duty by 
 God. Joseph in the hour of temptation judged it to 
 be wrong to yield to it, because in direct contraven- 
 tion of the command of God ; David, on the contrary, 
 gave way to it. How is this explained ? It may be 
 explained that in the latter case there was very little 
 room permitted for the exercise of Judgment ; the 
 overweaning power of the passion blameably repelling 
 the employment of calm Judgment, the strength and 
 imperativeness of the passion for the moment shutting 
 out all other considerations. But then, David could 
 scarcely be said to have lost his freedom, in as far as 
 there were many conceivable circumstances in which 
 he would have restrained himself. In fact, whatever 
 his bias or passion was, his freedom lay in pleasing 
 himself See how Annanias was found fault with 
 in the conduct which he practiced in the selling 
 
i 
 
 144 
 
 Sou/ Mechanism. 
 
 of his land. His desire was great to stand well with 
 the church, as one giving up all, and thus to gain 
 credit for his sell-devotion in giving up his all for the 
 common good ; at the same time he had personally 
 and privately another and equally strong desire, viz., 
 to be the possessor of means apart from his share in 
 the common stock. How was he to gratify both pro- 
 pensities ? It could only be by preferring to utter false- 
 hood. We have heard of a banker who gave largely of 
 his means to christian charities, and to the schemes of 
 the church, for the piopagation of the gospel, and who 
 at the same time was guilty of forgery and doing other 
 deeds of villany. His freedom of Will lay in the fact 
 that this species of character pleased him — that it 
 pleased him to gratify two inconsistent propensities 
 which could only be done by playing false to the one 
 or to the other. Hence, where the impression of the 
 moral law or of the Divine requirement is weak, and 
 the sensuous desire is strong, judgment is perverted, 
 and the man being carried away by the imperative 
 character of the desire, the Will in these circumstances 
 acts freely accordingly. It cannot be said that a man 
 hath in such a case lost his freedom, because it is cer- 
 tain that had the facts been known to his fellow-crea- 
 tures, he would in that case have restrained himself 
 from practising deceit, because of the disgrace thereby 
 accruing to himself A man may choose to be false in 
 order to commend himself to another. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 1'T has occurred to me while presently residing at a 
 -^ rural resort for the sake of bracing the bodily 
 constitution somewhat, that some general observations 
 — not for anticipating any difficulties which may be 
 entertained, or for obviating objections which may 
 likely be expressed on some of the intricate questions 
 which have been more or less brought under review in 
 the preceding pages, but at all events for concentrating 
 the scheme of thought which has been propounded, 
 and for bringing into clearer relief their harmony and 
 scientific character. As to objections that may pre- 
 sent themselves to my readers, it is perhaps impos- 
 sible here to forestall them, and I can only promise 
 that, if this volume is honoured to be promoted to a 
 second edition, I shall do my best to obviate such 
 difficulties as may be fairly propounded, and in the 
 spirit of one who seeks for truth, and cares only for 
 the attainment of truth. 
 
 I may state that where I am now placed, I stand 
 under one great disadvantage, that of being without 
 books, and at a distance specially from such books as 
 would be servicable to me ; and hence I cannot quote 
 the words of authors, nor pretend to give their argu- 
 ments. I have, however, some knowledge of the 
 current of thought which has prevailed in discussing 
 
146 
 
 Concludins: Obsen^ations, 
 
 the problem in question, and if I refer to any, these 
 can be authenticated. 
 
 Let me here say that, while I regard the externals 
 of the world with which are surrounded, as </>aivo/x€va, 
 I regard them also as owia, as therefore realities of 
 which we have to give an account, of which it behoves 
 us to say how they have come to pass. Every phe- 
 nomenon is to be looked upon as an effect ; and hence 
 I say that all phenomena lie in the category of Caus- 
 ality. Then, on coming to the category of Causality, 
 we have to ascertain in what it consists. And to this 
 we answer — in these two. Condition and Relativity. But 
 what is Condition and what is Relativity? I answer Con- 
 dition is the particular modification ivhich may be imposed 
 upon Quality or of ivhich Quality is susceptible \?iX\d Rela- 
 tivity has respect to the particular relation in ivhich a 
 combination of conditions may be made to stand to one 
 another. It is to be noted that the association of con- 
 ditioned objects must be in such conjunction or con- 
 tiguity, as to be brought within the sphere of each 
 other's influence. Then, and only then, it is that 
 Causality operates — operates in virtue of the Affinity 
 that exists among the conditions concerned. Affinity, 
 therefore, is shewn and expressed, when separate con- 
 ditions are brought within the range of each other's 
 influence. It is to be noted that each variety of con- 
 dition changes the character of the affinity which an 
 object would otherwise present to the adjacent objects, 
 and it will affect also the affinity whereby the mole- 
 cules of any one object cleave to one another, making 
 it what we call a solid, or a liquid, or a gas. It is 
 found as a rule, that the application of heat relaxes the 
 attraction which the atoms have to cohere; and in 
 
 The Characteristics of Substance, 
 
 147 
 
 some cases it creates a very strong repulsion, which 
 becomes sudden and violent, as when a lighted match 
 is applied to gunpowder. 
 
 We come, then, in the process of our inquiry, to ask 
 what is Quality as involved in the very nature of sub- 
 stance, and our reply is — Quality is that characteristic 
 of substance which constitutes the very basis of sub- 
 stance, which is inseparable from substance, and with- 
 out which there cannot be substance; and it exists 
 essentially and primordially in substance in conglom- 
 erate union as one comprehensive and absolute totality, 
 out of which all particulars of Quality are derived. 
 Substance is known as such, by reason of the inherent 
 attribute of Quality ; and we say that specific sub- 
 stances are different from one another according as 
 their Qualities are particularized. We are acquainted 
 with a good many different Qualities of substance — 
 Qualities which are essentially different from one 
 another ; and yet these Qualities have not only an 
 affinity for one another, in that they enter into re- 
 lationship with one another, according to certain 
 definite and fixed laws, but exchange conditions with 
 one another as we see in the conversion of the sap of 
 the soil into the protoplasm of the plant, whatever 
 may happen to be the characteristics of the plant. 
 Hence, we are compelled to infer that there is and 
 must be a unity, under which they all stand connected 
 as one. As condition is lost in quality, as being the 
 accident of quality, so we say — all qualities are lost in 
 one generic quality which comprehends them all as 
 the colours of the rainbow are lost in generic light. 
 
 There is, then, a primordial substance from which 
 all others are derived. Of this substance we have 
 
f ! 
 
 148 
 
 Concluding Ohsennitions. 
 
 come to have practical experience in the Ether, of 
 whose presence and services we are made cognisant 
 from a variety of considerations, but especially from 
 an inquiry into the phenomena of light. On this 
 point I must refer to the valuable observations of Pro- 
 fessor Stokes, given in Appendix I. I have noticed 
 also that it has an inherent Dynamic as well as Qualita- 
 tive attribute, and that as particulars of Condition are 
 changed, so correspondingly particulars of Energy are 
 changed. Energy when particularized becomes Force. 
 We therefore come to know what is the very founda- 
 tion of Force. As I have said that every change of 
 Condition creates a change of Affinity, and every 
 change of Affinity is Force ; and Forces are of all 
 kinds from the extremes of attraction to the extremes 
 of repulsion. We find that there is a law of contiguity 
 among separate objects, so that these affect one 
 another in consequence, and that the connecting link 
 between them is Ether, which hereby joins the affini- 
 ties and brings out their operation. And however 
 many and however diverse be the conditions involved 
 (and they must in numberless instances be operating 
 in all possible directions) Ether as the inexhaustible 
 spirit-servitor fulfils all requirements, without collision 
 and without confusion. 
 
 liut while Quality and Energy are the inherent and 
 inseparable attributes of substance, in its primordial 
 and essential being, as natively existing in a generic 
 state, and therefore without the demonstration of any 
 particulars, and in this state it behoves that all particu- 
 lars being held in perfect balance in pure Ether, there 
 should not be in these circumstances aught that should 
 disturb the energy— aught that should carry it to display 
 
 M odifications of Affinity. 
 
 149 
 
 force one way or another. We have come to be practic- 
 ally acquainted with such a substance, and this in its 
 primitive and self-existing nature, in that all things arc 
 found to live and move and have their functions there- 
 in — in that it has a sympathy with every particular of 
 existing matter, and gives efficacy, i.e., force there- 
 unto. 
 
 We conclude, then, that what are called the primary 
 elements of matter have their origin in primitive sub- 
 stance, and therefore that they have a natural affinity 
 for one another, as being every one of them the off- 
 spring of the same mother-substance ; and hence 
 that they have a definite and fixed relationship, in 
 which they come to be chemically combined, when 
 placed in a natural attitude to one another, while, of 
 course, there will be more or less a repulsion from one 
 another, in circumstances under which they cannot 
 combine ; and further, that in circumstances where 
 the particles of matter are combined into one solid 
 consistency, and then have their condition altered, 
 there are cases in which their affinity is so changed 
 hereby, that they suddenly fly asunder with an explo- 
 sion. As regards the material state of quantities 
 primarily etherial, we may say that atoms arise from 
 the fact that qualities created in the etherial medium 
 have by the application of some mysterious influence 
 which we may call temperature, have become thick- 
 ened into grossness, and hence are divisible into the 
 minutest parts. It is to be understood that the sensible 
 qualities of matter, which show themselves more im- 
 mediately to the external senses, such as hardness, 
 colour, odour, savour, and sound, though not directly 
 manifested to us in the spirit-world, yet may in some 
 
150 
 
 Concluding Observations. 
 
 i 
 
 sense exist therein. That there are forms in the spirit- 
 world, and variously endowed with different qualities, 
 is not to be questioned ; and that living beings in the 
 spirit-world are able to communicate with one another 
 under circumstances, if not wholly analogous to those 
 which are familiar to ourselves, yet certainly by the 
 aid of the universal ether, as in our own case, is not to 
 be doubted ; but only in a manner much more refined 
 than pertains to the material world. 
 
 What, then, is the nature of the spirit-world, which 
 we hold lies at the foundation of the material world ? 
 Therein, we say. Forms which are made determinate 
 bodies (if we may here use that term) live and move 
 and have their being in the fathomless ocean of spirit- 
 substance which abounds everlastingly and end- 
 lessly, as the link of conditions which are the 
 mainspring of individual activity. Hence we 
 say, all matter has its foundation in the economy 
 of spirit ; and matter itself is to be regarded as 
 an economy of grosser forms adapted for the pro- 
 pagation of a race having grosser forms ; but in the 
 case of man, who is so united with the spirit-form called 
 soul, which is itself generated in ether by means of 
 the pre-existing bodily form, the bodily form being 
 accompanied by its attendant spirit form, shews 
 the fact of a harmonious intercourse between them, 
 and explains what has hitherto been regarded as 
 the mystery of mysteries, the mutual interchange of 
 influences, and the mutual action of the one upon the 
 other. We know, indeed, that this action is constantly 
 interchanged in the purely objective economy, and 
 is illustrated in all the forces of nature, such as Gravi- 
 tation, Light, Heat, Electricity, and Magnetism ; and 
 
 M 
 
 The Formation of an Intelligent Me, 151 
 
 in the mind of the animal-creature it is made to play a 
 new and remarkable office. 
 
 It is here that this same medium, when made repre- 
 sentative of the bodily Me, is enabled to give forth its 
 highest and noblest prerogative, viz., consciousness, 
 and hence the foundation-consciousness of every animal- 
 creature in all cases is the consciousness of its body, 
 that is the consciousness of self, that is self-conscious- 
 ness ; and to this comes to be added other forms of 
 consciousness, according to the number of inlets which 
 are supplied for this purpose— inlets not only from the 
 external world whereby information of external objects 
 is communicated, but inlets also from the storehouse 
 of impressions that are lodged in the cortical substance 
 of the brain, and which are separated by a process 
 of analysis into parts, when there is abstraction of 
 parts, with synthesis into new forms ; while also the 
 operations of Reason and of Reasoning are variously 
 performed. And hereby a spirit-ego or personality is 
 formed varying according -to the furniture with which 
 it is equipped in the exercise of experience. 
 
 In this process of furnishing an intelligent Me, we 
 are made acquainted with the various methods of ful- 
 filling the higher ends of being. We see under what 
 circumstances the various faculties of the mind come 
 to be exercised, and how we are enabled to employ 
 them. There has been much said and written on the 
 inherent powers of mind in engaging by itself the great 
 powers of Reason, and of the self-possession by itself 
 of the ideas of Time and Space, of Moral Feelings, of 
 Causality, and such like. If our exposition of the Ego 
 and of its origin is sound, this cannot be ; but as cer- 
 tain portions of our mental states arc unmistakeably 
 
M' 
 
 ill 
 
 III 
 
 162 
 
 Concluding Observations. 
 
 traceable to the instrumentality which is furnished by 
 the material apparatus, so we are prepared to show 
 that all, even the most complex of the loftier powers 
 of mind, are due to this source, whether it be Me- 
 mory or Imagination, Conception in framing means 
 for the fulfilment of a purpose, or Reasoning in draw- 
 ing conclusions from premisses ; or whether it be the 
 Intuition of moral obligation or the Apprehension of 
 the relations which indicate Time and Space, we can 
 clearly show the entire dependence of the mind 
 throughout on the wonderful organization that is pro- 
 vided for these ends. And if this should happen to be 
 questioned, we are prepared to point out under what 
 processes the operations are accomplished. 
 
 Nor is it in the field of mere Intelligence only, 
 that the organization with which we are supplied by 
 our cerebral apparatus fulfils the accomplishing of the 
 great offices of the mind, but in the exercise of Will, 
 whether in the origination of Will, in the suspension 
 of Will, or in any modifications of Will ; in short, in 
 the entire management of Will, organization fulfils its 
 indispensable part ; and without this, we can honestly 
 feel and bodily avow that we are endowed with the 
 great prerogative of exercising full freedom as to the 
 forth-putting or the non-forth-putting of Will in any 
 set of circumstances ; the fact being that, while Will 
 in all cases must be regarded as an effect, the Ego in 
 the exercise of its Judgment as to the propriety or 
 utility, or advantage of its immediate volition, finds 
 itself drawn for the exercise or non-exercise of its 
 function : the idea that is interposed at the last, con- 
 stituting the final arbiter in the emotion which has to 
 be fulfilled. 
 
 \4i 
 
 Cause and Effect matter of Experience. 153 
 
 It is obvious that, constituted as man is in relation 
 to the world outside of him, he is enabled to exercise 
 all the powers of Mind and of Will, which we have 
 ascribed to him ; and among the special ideas which 
 arise in his mind is that of a great First Cause. He 
 cannot get rid of this conclusion under the principles 
 we have adopted. It arises from the very circumstance 
 that when he sees an effect, it forcibly occurs to him 
 that there must be a Cause. His whole experience 
 connects the two. Yes ! in all the departments of life, 
 and from his early days in which cause and effect are 
 constantly illustrated before his eyes. When, therefore, 
 he looks on the phenomena of the world, and sees them 
 as effects, he is bound to infer that they have a Cause. 
 He may not be able to point out the immediate as 
 apart from the remote cause. But it comes to this, 
 that there must be a primary Cause in the first intro- 
 duction of the foundations of the world. What then 
 can we say as to the first and independent Cause, the 
 Framer of all things, the Source of all limited being- 
 hood as found in our world ? 
 
 This question has been a perfect puzzle to inquirers. 
 Inquirers have reached what they have called the 
 " Unconditioned," and there they have been launched in 
 a mare infinitum, without a margin or shore whereat 
 to touch ; in plain terms there is no peg to hang any- 
 thing upon, and indeed without a single relic to set up.* 
 
 * Sir Wm. Hamilton tells us that "the unconditioned is 
 incognizable and unconceivable, its notion being only negative 
 of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or 
 conceived." (Discussions, p. 12). His unconditioned was tanta- 
 mount to annihilation, in as far his unconditioned was the abro- 
 gation of all quality. 
 
 'vy 
 
154 
 
 Concluding Obsen'aiions. 
 
 u ■ 
 
 ^1 
 
 Others have taken refuge in the eternity of matter, and 
 have supposed a universe of atoms or monads, as the 
 centres of power, and have awkwardly enough sup- 
 posed a structured universe spontaneously coming out 
 of these * Forgetful of the great doctrine of Causality, 
 
 ♦ Priestly, Hartley, and Hobbes contended for an absolute 
 materialism with more or less modifications. Blichner «<ay8 — 
 " The immortality of matter is now a fact scientifically estab- 
 lished and can no longer be denied." (Force and Matter, p. 13). 
 Dr. Maudrtley says — " We find it a hard matter to declar*? at 
 what |>oint tlie brain loses all its inherent properties as livinj^' 
 structure, an«l becomes the passive instrument of an immaterial 
 entity. Those who repudiate such materialism niuy comfort 
 theniselves by conceiving a fine matter of extreme subtlety an<l 
 tenuity — a sort of immaterial matter — whether they spiritualize 
 matter in this way, or materialize mind, is a (piestion of words, 
 not of facts." (Physiology of Mind, p. 128). This gentleman 
 ouMit to have recognized that matter is not simply a question of 
 tenuity, seeing one characteristic of spirit-substance is its in- 
 definite capacity of involution. Mr. Picton says—" If by sub- 
 stance we mean that which is, and must be, then we know that 
 life is ; but we do not know anything else. And the phenom- 
 ena of the physical world are at least conceivably explicable on the 
 hypothesis of ultimate centres of energy, which centres may, for 
 au^dit we know, be to our consciousness the elementary phen- 
 omenal definition of a Universal Spiritual Power. Life we know ; 
 Force we feel ; nothing more." (The Mystery of Matter, p. 54). 
 Mr. Barrat says — "The difficulty which at present is felt, is 
 how consistently with reason ami fact, to conceive the ultimate 
 relation of these few existences, Matter, Force, Energy, and 
 Motion. Some conclusions in respect of them are pretty clear. 
 For instance. Matter is a system of centres of force — force is 
 known oidy as a function of Motion. Energy is measured by 
 the motions or the condition of the motions of masses; and mass 
 depenils only on the number of gravitating atoms or ftnce 
 centres; and finally, motion is of atoms and the aggregates of 
 atoms, that is again of centres of forCe." (Physical Metempiric, 
 
 K4 
 
 
 Mystery in Present-Day Science. 155 
 
 as invariably and irresistibly fulfilling an effect pre- 
 cisely in accordance with the Causal ingredients and 
 relationship into which they have entered into com- 
 bination in producing an effect ; forgetful also of the 
 equally imperative doctrine that in initio before Caus- 
 ality can fulfil its end in symmetrical order and 
 harmony, there must needs be a designing and order- 
 ing mind, not only in devising and preparing con- 
 ditions, but in adjusting one condition to another in 
 the fulfilment of an end, they have begged the doctrine 
 of an absolute Evolution as the law of mere existence, 
 in accounting not only for the progress of phenomena 
 but for the primary initiation of bcinghood as we 
 now have it. What we say is, that it becomes men 
 endowed with lofty reason — reason based on great ex- 
 periences, not to build up theories which have in them 
 no naturalness — theories which are unsupported by any 
 analogies — theories which are not only adverse to all 
 experience, but to all that we can imagine as proba- 
 bilities — theories which subvert our common under- 
 standings as to what is probable or possible. If there 
 were nothing in eternity but atoms — a universe of 
 atoms, call them monads or any other name, the 
 query is, How came they to be constituted into 
 structures? No man can tell. All inquirers with such 
 data only, are left in the depths of utter mystery. 
 And if they establish a foundation of structure whether 
 a jelly fish or anything else simpler, and say that there 
 has been descent therefrom by a process of evolution, 
 the mystery is not in the least degree removed, but if 
 
 p. C!)). I trust there has been already shewn herein a more 
 excellent way. 
 
 \ i 
 
 hi 
 
 W 
 
i" 
 
 150 
 
 Concluding Observations. 
 
 possible, deepened, in as far as no answer can be given 
 to the question — Whence came the jelly fish, or the 
 amoeba, or whatever the given foundation is ; or whence 
 arose the multiplication of new forms and new qualities 
 in such exceeding great complexity, and yet no less in 
 beautiful arrangement and harmony of parts. Talk of 
 natural selection ! This only confounds the problem. 
 Whence came the material to be selected ; and, grant- 
 ing that there were sets of independent materials, 
 whence came the very wonderful concatenation of 
 elements. To us it seems not only a miracle of opera- 
 tion, for which natural law has no answer, to assemble 
 a series of separate and independent ingredients to 
 compose beautiful and refined structures without an 
 adjusting hand, guided by a purposing Intelligence a 
 conclusion of which nature (if we examine it fairly) gives 
 no experience. It is said that millions upon millions of 
 years were required for this. We only darken counsel 
 by taking refuge in the category of Time. It is de- 
 monstrable in the doctrine of chances, that a universal 
 harmony could never have been achieved under such 
 circumstances. As well might we believe that any 
 number of letters, if allowed to float in the great void, 
 would in time adjust themselves into a beautiful poem 
 We believe in the doct . 'ne of evolution ; but not in an 
 evolution which is inconsistent with the law of natural 
 generation, and involves in it nothing less than an in- 
 telligent creating hand ; for assuredly if there is found 
 one distinct and definite species, and another separate 
 and definite species which contains properties and 
 forms for which there was no natural pathway by 
 natural propagation, which no natural causality could 
 have introduced, and which, therefore, could have 
 
 An Intelligent First Cause. 
 
 157 
 
 made its appearance only through the interposition of 
 an intelligent arm, we are constrained in these circum- 
 stances to have resource to an all-intelligent Author. 
 Every thing betokens this, if we would be fair to our 
 reason, to our own experience, and to the conclusions 
 which we are accustomed to draw in analagous exem- 
 plification. 
 
 We are constrained, then, to infer the operation of 
 an Intelligent Reason, in tracing the beginnings of 
 things to a Universal First Cause, while in the con- 
 tinuity of things created, we are equally constrained 
 to see that there is a law of propagation — of like pro- 
 ducing like, with varieties according to the external 
 influences that happen to have been introduced into 
 the Causal operation. And if we could but discern 
 what these influences precisely are, we should then be 
 in a position to foreshow and to detail the evolutionary 
 changes occasioned thereby. We should, in these cir- 
 cumstances, be qualified to observe not only the wide 
 distinction betwixt creation and propagation, but to 
 find that it is only in the latter category that there can 
 be evolution ; and further, that there can be no evolu- 
 tion till creation has laid the basis of develop- 
 ments in the processes of propagation. Assuredly 
 there is no consistent ground for the primary initiation 
 of evolution apart from creation. 
 
 Here we have to tackle a very difficult problem. 
 We have already had before us the universal ground 
 of Existence in what I have styled the absolute Im- 
 personality, out of which all particular substances 
 have been derived, and I have also, in connection 
 therewith, spoken of the absolute Personality as the 
 intelligent Deviser and wise Architect by whom they 
 
 
158 
 
 Concluding Obsen'ations. 
 
 have been conceived and framed ; and here the ques- 
 tion is raised — What do we say about the personality 
 of Deity ? We hear of " the form of God." And the 
 very name and nature of " form " involves limitation ; 
 nay more, the very conditions of thought itself involves 
 limitation, in as far as there is the distinction of one 
 thought from another, and the thought of any definite 
 object is limitation ; and in the Divine Personality 
 there must be what we call a definite constitution. 
 How otherwise could definite objects be inaugurated ? 
 We must, therefore, imagine to ourselves a definite 
 Personality as characteristic of Deity. 
 
 Now, if we apprehend in God a definite Personality, 
 as we are bound to do, how are we to suppose this 
 Personality as equally absolute with the infinite Im- 
 personality ? We are assisted somewhat in this in- 
 quiry by asking — how is it that inferior personality is 
 displayed in the great spirit-medium by which all 
 worlds and all objects are enveloped, or in which they 
 are contained ? We find that Form is equally dis- 
 played over the whole arena or range in which the 
 radiation of the object extends. It is ascertained, as 
 has been frequently noticed, that individual forms 
 while extending according to their mass, show 
 diminished form according to the inverse square 
 of the distance. What then ? Why, here is this 
 very remarkable fact, that every portion of the sphere 
 to which the radiation extends, is filled with that 
 form. This is proved by a simple experiment. Set 
 up a mirror, say three feet, as a radius from the object; 
 the object is depicted thereon all throughout in every 
 direction in a circle. Carry back the mirror three feet 
 or six feet, or any number of feet, and the radiation of 
 
 On the Form of God. 
 
 159 
 
 IM 
 
 the form is still in every part complete all round, but 
 proportionally reduced. What lesson does this teach 
 us in regard to the Divine form as displayed in the 
 etherial medium — a medium which I have ventured to 
 name Pneum, in order to point to it as indicative of a 
 peculiar spirit-nature. Form, as manifested in the 
 material world is a distinct and definitely localized 
 filament or configuration ; but so far as it is manifested 
 in the spirit-medium, it is not so treated and localized, 
 but pervades the area to which it belongs ; and this 
 at every point. It has margin throughout. It is diffi- 
 cult for us to realise how this should be ; and it helps 
 to open our understandings as to the extraordinary 
 nature of spirit-substance in its exhaustless power of 
 representation. What can we say then as to the re- 
 presentation of the Form of God ? We must of 
 necessity believe tha there is some Form attached to 
 the Personality of God ; but we can predicate nothing 
 whatever respecting the character of that form, nor 
 can we with any propriety ^ssign absolute boundaries 
 to that form ; or rather, if we cannot think of form 
 without boundaries, it is not easy to say where or how 
 the boundary begins or ends. W^e are taught by the 
 limitless extension of creation, that the expansion of 
 the Divine Works do not admit of contraction, as if 
 saying — " Thus far and no farther shall creation be 
 displayed." Whatever then we may think about the 
 Form of God, it is obvious that there is no extension 
 reached by the arm of the Most High, but it may be 
 advanced still farther, and that there is no part of the 
 vast compass of nature but He can interpose therein. 
 
 And here we have one or two questions which have 
 been regarded as puzzling enigmas which it behoves 
 

 A 
 
 160 
 
 Concluding Observations. 
 
 us to take into consideration. One is the grounds of 
 causality and of varied productiveness in Deity in the 
 creation of the world ; and another is to show that 
 such manifestations as Space and Time have of ne- 
 cessity had their validity as integrants in the personal 
 Absolute ; and, still further, we may enter into the 
 consideration of a difficult doctrinal problem touching 
 what is known as the Predestination of God, that is 
 the decisions of the Divine Will in connexion with the 
 knowledge or foreknowledge of the Divine Intelli- 
 gence. 
 
 We may begin with the simplest of these questions, 
 the origin of Space and of Time. Now what we say 
 is that Space is a certain limitation in Infinity, and 
 Time is a certain limitation in Duration. Space has 
 reference to extension : Time has reference to transi- 
 tion. Space marks the negation which lies between 
 certain boundary lines ; Time marks the negation which 
 lies between the passage of an object from any one 
 point to any other point. Space is marked out by 
 each one of the globes which fill the heavens, and the 
 interjacence or chasm between them ; and Time is 
 marked out by the movements of these globes, and is the 
 intermittence of duration which marks a constant trans- 
 ition ; or, shall we say, it is the interval of duration which 
 elapses betwixt a movement from any one point to 
 any other ? For example, we say, the sun rises and 
 the sun sets, and the interval between the two we call 
 Time ; and Time, like Space, can be diminished inde- 
 finitely. By means of clock movements we can divide 
 the day into hours, and the hours into minutes, and 
 the minutes into seconds, and, if we chose, the seconds 
 into still smaller minicles of time. There is no limit 
 
 Ideas Embraced in Infinity and Eternity. 161 
 
 to the subdivision of time. Suppose an object moving 
 with the rapidity of light : and suppose it to move 
 along a line divided into yards feet and inches, what 
 would be the period of time in which the object would 
 take in moving from the one line of division to the 
 other ? It might be calculated in figures, but could 
 not be realized as an interval in our experience. 
 
 What do we say then as to an absolute infinity and 
 an absolute Eternity? Infinity, we say, is extension 
 without any boundary lines whatever ; and Eternity, we 
 say, is duration without any beginning or ending. What 
 then ? The very fact of envisaging personality or what 
 we may call individualism, of necessity implies the idea 
 of space. In the Personality of God, therefore, we 
 cannot get rid of the idea of space ; and yet it is that 
 space to which we can assign no limit. The operations 
 of God may not be confined to any particular space : 
 but the very thought of a personality of necessity im- 
 plies space, but obviously it is that space which does 
 not admit of restriction. Again, we cannot suppose 
 Deity to be a dead and immovable thing ; on the con- 
 trary, his being implies a living and constantly mov- 
 ing being — a being having thought, and therefore the 
 transition of thought. What then ? Why, it follows 
 that as Infinity carries space in its bosom, so Eternity 
 bears time in its bosom. We have our philosophers 
 telling us that they " cannot conceive an absolute 
 commencement," and when all is reduced to what has 
 been called the Unconditioned, they cannot con- 
 ceive an initiation of space that is a limitation in 
 extension. But if it be considered that space is an 
 inherent prerogative in Infinity, and that time is 
 an inherent prerogative in Eternity, we are no longer 
 
162 
 
 Concluding Observations. 
 
 B^. ! 
 
 i ;■ 
 
 troubled about an absolute commencement, knowing 
 that there is no such phenomenon in the Absolute. 
 
 And nowwe come to the great question of Creation. 
 Creation, of course, has had its beginning, as we are 
 able in our present circumstances to apprehend it ; 
 but its beginning only, as a continuation of that ever- 
 living action which belongs to, and is inherent in God. 
 The thought has occurred to man, How could crea- 
 tion arise, and whence could creation be produced, if 
 before what is technically called " the Beginning," 
 Deity was alone, sublime in the ever constant activity 
 of his own thoughts. The mystery behoved to be in- 
 surmountable, if we were unable to entertain the idea 
 of an Impersonal Infinity of fundamental substance as 
 well as a Personal Absolute, from whose devising all 
 things have sprung. The mystery would also be still 
 further insurmountable, if we were unable to see what 
 constitutes the nature and foundation of Causality ; 
 and, further, if we were unable to discern that this 
 foundation essentially resides in God. Need .we re- 
 peat in what this foundation consists ? We speak of 
 the All-conditioned in contrast to the Unconditioned. 
 It is a mistake to think otherwise of the Personal 
 Jehovah. Grant that in him resides, and to him 
 essentially belongs, what forms the fundamental quali- 
 ties which constitute the very nature of his beinghood, 
 and we have the case of the Creator before us. 
 
 What constitutes Causality ? We answer, the junc- 
 tion of one quality brought into combination with an- 
 other, so conditioned as to produce the effect desired 
 by the operation of their affinity. We have only to 
 understand that God .sees by his intelligence what 
 quality would require to be joined with another in 
 
 Existing Laws Traced to God. 
 
 163 
 
 order to produce the tertium quid. Recognizing this 
 much, we cognize under what circumstances this, that, 
 and the other device, that has come forth from the 
 mind of God, hath had its origination.* And as regards 
 the materials from which he hath obtained his objects, 
 we have already indicated the inexhaustible quarry of 
 the ctherial medium, through which an endless supply 
 could be obtained. In truth, we see that there behoved 
 to be ever before the mind of God an objective arena 
 for the foundation of worlds, and for the enlargement 
 of worlds upon worlds, and for the furnishing of them 
 with suitable objects adapted to the wants of the 
 creatures which he has made. In our experience we 
 discover and discern, that all material objects, under 
 the light of day, have their phenomena radiated in the 
 etherial medium or pneum, according to the law of 
 inverse squares ; and that the representation hereby 
 projected does not only pervade the whole area which 
 it involves, but that it carries out in spirit-condition 
 the precise quality and form of the original which it 
 delineates. If, then, the All-conditioned, operating as 
 Cause, and having the Impersonal to operate upon, 
 
 * It may appear i)resiimptuous to some, to argue about the 
 mode of Divine (»])er;iti(ni in Himself as a Personality — but 
 what is it which every rational man pursues in his reasonings, 
 and is obliged to pursue / Is it not the application of ascertained 
 principles i If we have got a principle which satisfies and ex- 
 plains the great problem of Causality, are we not entitled to 
 maintain that the principle holds good throughout ? We are not 
 called upon to suppose that in this matter, there are more prin- 
 ciples of a<jtion in fulfilling a function, than one. There may be 
 mt)re methods than one ; but the principle in each must be the 
 same. It is here the maxim is particularly applicable, ** entia 
 nou sunt multiplicauda praeter uecessitatem," 
 
4 ! 
 
 II 
 
 HI 
 
 11 
 
 iHf 
 
 164 
 
 Concludiusr Observations. 
 
 constitutes from his own inherent conditions, any 
 special object, and sets it forth, what follows ? Why, 
 upon the principles which we find realized among 
 ourselves, this very creation, by an inherent law, begets 
 consimilar representations in the endless ocean of Ether. 
 No doubt as we experience these, they are but 
 transitory representations, existing or subsisting, 
 so long as the original remains, even as our 
 image exists, while it continues before the mirror. 
 Yet as we ourselves can fix that image when it alights 
 and takes effect upon an impressible plasma, it is not 
 difficult to imagine how the Omnipotent might mul- 
 tiply forms and qualities that shall be permanent to 
 any extent. We are not to suppose that one can 
 fathom and compass the many ways in which the Om- 
 niscent One might construct creation ; but it is a per- 
 fectly legitimate process for us to argue from what 
 takes place in our experience, to what in analogous 
 circumstances might take place in the hands of our 
 Maker. 
 
 We can imagine, then, how Nature (as we term it) 
 came into being, and how natural law came to have 
 its province as a valid operation in the world. It be- 
 hoved God first to create the rudimentary elements, as 
 the basis out of which he would construct the more 
 complex phenomena of the universe. We have the 
 letters as the foundation of our syllables ; and syl- 
 lables as the foundation of our words ; and words as 
 the foundation of our senteces ;n and our sentences as 
 the foundation of our literature, and they have to be 
 curiously built together and interlaced to answer the 
 ends of a living language, and so become the source of 
 living communication between man and man. Wc 
 
 The Kingdom of Nature. 
 
 165 
 
 find, in like manner, that it behoved the Creator to 
 institute an alphabet of creation, and accordingly we 
 have what are called the primary elements, all of which 
 could separately be obtained from the generic ground of 
 all substance. These elements would each have its 
 own distinctive quality ; and being one and all de- 
 rived from a source where they had originally their 
 entire union and amalgamation, it behoved that they 
 should have affinity with one another, and accordingly 
 that they should of necessity be qualified to enter into 
 varied union, according to the relation in which they 
 miglit happen to be associated. It is easy to suppose 
 that the All-wise Intelligence would build them up in 
 such forms and conditions as would answer the pur- 
 poses which he desired that they should serve. As a 
 fact, we find the worlds and the furniture with which 
 they are equipped so constructed. And this we call 
 the great kingdom of nature. 
 
 We find that the Kingdom of Nature hath its own 
 operations. What are these, and how do we account 
 for them ? They are the Forces which are variously 
 found in constant operation — forces whereby the 
 operations of nature are carried on — forces whereby 
 worlds are not only sustained in being, but whereby the 
 creatureship of the world is propagated and maintained 
 for the continuance of life, while the preservation and 
 development of being are displayed in freshly improved 
 condition. There are what we call the laws of nature; 
 and they are dependent not only on Energy, which is 
 the inherent attribute of substance dynamically, but 
 upon the Quality or Qualities of the Substance present, 
 which give law to the force or forces which energy de- 
 scribes. Hence, not only is Force the product of 
 
 \ 
 

 .( 
 
 M 
 
 i. 
 
 166 
 
 Concluding Observations. 
 
 Energy according to the conditions which happen to 
 be allied in its production, but whatever be the forms 
 under which force operates, these very forms it carries 
 with it in the minutest features into the all-pervading 
 Ether ; and if there is the medium of an organizable 
 plasma, this plasma is correspondingly affected ; and 
 hence, we account for growth. And agreeably to this 
 law, we find each tree producing after its kind, and 
 each animal producing after its kind, and all because 
 the laws of causality are of the most precise and 
 determinate character. 
 
 And on this very principle also, viz., the fixed and 
 unvarying laws of Causality, we can account for all 
 the changes which take place in the processes of Evolu- 
 tion. There is nothing surer in nature than that " like 
 produces like " : this is an iron law which admits of no 
 deviation whatever ; and it is because of the inexorable 
 fixedness of this law, that any extraneous influence 
 entering into the category of operation, of necessity 
 shews itself. A single letter of the alphabet entering 
 in among the letters of an existing word will entirely 
 change that word, and the nature of the change, more- 
 over, will very much depend on the place which is 
 assigned to it in the association. It is the same in the 
 kingdom of nature. The same ingredients as have 
 been noticed when differently associated, will produce 
 different results, and if additional ingredients are add- 
 ed, these will show a corresponding modification in 
 the effects. The office of nature is production accord- 
 ing to the ingredients which are associated in the Causal 
 nexus. Hence, we ask, if there is no extraneous hand 
 to introduce new forms and new conditions which 
 constitute an entirely new type of creature, whence 
 could such new devices have come ? 
 
 Earthly Things a Basis fo*- Spiritual. 167 
 
 We come, now, to ascertain what is the nature of 
 the providence of God in connexion with the great 
 ends which He has to serve by Creation? We may 
 well believe that such an elaborate mechanism of 
 things has not been introduced, simply that they may 
 by and by be dismantled and discharged and annihi- 
 lated ; and all for the mere purpose of beholding their 
 temporary beinghood. It might suit the mere creature 
 to be amused with childish toys, and by and by to 
 wish them destroyed ; but we have to regard the pur- 
 poses of an Almighty and All-Wise Creator ; and we 
 say it is alone worthy of Him to have had an all- 
 important and permanent end before Him, to be ful- 
 filled by this grand work of Creation. We have seen 
 upon what grounds the animal creature is made to live, 
 and upon what still higher grounds man stands as a 
 mere creature of earth. We see that as such, his 
 knowledge is of the earth earthy, and that as sure as his 
 body dies, so his mind as a mere intellection of earthly 
 elements must die also. The things of this world can- 
 not give immortality to the soul ; there is, and can be, 
 no immortality in mere material things ; and they 
 cannot give that which they do not possess in them- 
 selves. Material things, of necessity, serve but a tem- 
 porary purpose ; however long their preservation may 
 be protracted, they arc constantly changing, and con- 
 stantly wasting, and in the nature of things, go in the 
 long run to destruction. But they may be the instru- 
 mentality for supplying a basis on which to engraft 
 spiritual things— things which are essentially eternal. 
 Accordingly, it has pleased God to reveal Himself 
 specially to man, and through this, to implant the 
 seeds of the Divine nature in his soul. The nature of 
 
168 
 
 Concluding Observations. 
 
 Ill 
 
 this revelation is such, that when duly embraced, it 
 takes the soul out of the perishing elements in which it 
 lies naturally immersed in this life, and gives it an ad- 
 hesion to the things of a more refined and permanent 
 life. The very fact of man having a revelation of God 
 — of the sublimity of His nature — of the purity of His 
 character — of the equity of His righteousness — of the 
 glory of His truth — of the sacred ness of His faith- 
 fulness and perfect integrity, without malice, guile, 
 or hypocrisy, is of unspeakable moment to man ; in 
 that there is hereby an engrafting upon His soul of 
 principles that can never perish, when they become 
 the principles of action by which the soul is character- 
 ized. These principles are inconsistent with a mere 
 subjection to carnal and worldly likings. Hence, the 
 necessity, in order to immortality, of a weaning from 
 an attachment to, and a dependence on, mere material 
 things, as if these constituted all our care and concern, 
 and of a holding to things which are revealed to us as 
 characteristics of God. We believe that such a spiritual 
 state has been manifested to men by Jesus Christ. 
 Hence, the life and the principles of Jesus Christ con- 
 stitute for us the ladder whereby we are to climb to 
 immortality. 
 
 This immortality comes to be nothing less than 
 salvation, that is an escape from a death, which is, strict- 
 ly speaking, an extinction of our earthly being, and a 
 preservation in life, that savours of permanency, as 
 being a sharing of what belongs to God. The renewal 
 of the soul, therefore, in the Divine life, ought to be 
 the chief end of man in the discipline that is appointed 
 for him in the life that now is. It is a strange and 
 remarkable fact, that there should be so much diversity 
 
 llie Foundations of Human Sin. 
 
 169 
 
 of thought in respect of the pursuit of immortality. 
 No doubt the difificulty which has prevailed, and which 
 still prevails, is to be traced to the ideas of sin, and of 
 the removal of sin from the human constitution — ideas 
 which have unfortunately been ingrained in the church 
 through the interpretations which have come down to 
 us, and have had place and position in the church, be- 
 cause of the ignorance of the human constitution and 
 the consequent misinterpretation of Scripture. As 
 churches, we have greatly failed to realise the true 
 attitude in which Jesus Christ, who is set forth as our 
 great Exemplar, stands to sin, and consequently the 
 true attitude which He sustains towards the great 
 question of taking away sin. 
 
 Let it ever be remembered that human sin funda- 
 mentally springs from the flesh, as being antagonistic 
 to spiritual life ; and necessarily so, because spiritual 
 life goes to restrain carnal life. Hence, St. Paul's 
 saying, " They that are in the flesh cannot please God." 
 The reason why they caonot please God lies in this, 
 that they cannot, as carnal persons, practise spiritual 
 life, and therefore cannot prepare for immortality. 
 Now that God hath revealed Himself, and thereby 
 given to man the principles of a new and spiritual life, 
 the pursuit of carnal and worldly things, as ending in 
 death, cannot satisfy God, who desires that man may 
 have immortal life. Hence, under the new regime 
 which God hath ordained in the New Testament, the 
 carnal mind is regarded as " enmity with God " ; in 
 other words, adherence simply to the calls of the flesh 
 as our all in life, is regarded as sin, in as far as it is 
 antagonistic to divine principles. Christ Jesus, we are 
 told, " came to put away sin," and he did so by '* the 
 
 I 
 
 1 1 
 t 
 
II 
 
 i I. 
 
 M 
 
 Concluding Obseri uttious 
 
 sacrifice of Himself." How so? We are told He took 
 to Himself the body of our flesh, and through this, 
 " He was in all respects tempted like as we are ; " but 
 He overcame all the allurements and temptations 
 wherewith He was beset, and lived wholly in accord- 
 ance with Divine principles. All the influences of the 
 flesh, and of the world, and of the devil, had been ap- 
 plied to Him, but in vain ; for He could say to His 
 Father, " I have finished the work which Thou gavest 
 Me to do," viz., that of sacrificing the flesh. Hence, 
 Christ is said to have *'laid that foundation, other than 
 which none can be laid," for securing eternal life. This 
 accomplishment involves what is called Atonement, in 
 as far as it was the removal of the carnal life, as at 
 best no preparation for God, and the substitution of 
 the spiritual as the requirement of God. 
 
 Now, this life of Jesus Christ is revealed to us, and 
 is recommended to us for our instruction and imitation ; 
 and when we adopt His principles and imitate His ex- 
 ample, we are said to have faith in Jesus Christ, and 
 hereby to have the application of His atonement to us. 
 Hence, faith in Jesus Christ means, not the substitution 
 of CJirist for us, but the application of Christ to us ; for 
 hereby it is that we are made one with Him, and be- 
 come partakers with Him. What we say, then, is this, 
 that Christ is shewn to be the grand standard, and the 
 indispensable foundation of Divine life for humanity, in 
 the plan of God for accomplishing the sacrifice of 
 bodily lusts, and of bringing about the immortalization 
 of men. 
 
 The church has puzzled and perplexed herself about 
 the introduction of sin into the world, and the preval- 
 ence of sin in the world. There are two kinds of sin 
 
 TJie Alternative to the Entrance of Sin. 171 
 
 in the world, the sin of living simply to the flesh when a 
 contrary call is made on us ; and the sin of knowingly 
 perverting the truth, despising the Divine command, 
 and defying the express threatening of God. To be a 
 mere creature of the flesh was obviously man's 
 created state ; and as such, he could hardly be said to 
 have sin while knowing nothing better : but, as a 
 creature of the flesh he could have no eternal life, 
 in as far as he could be made to have eternal life 
 only by the communication of God's word ; and this 
 was what God intended and desired him to have. 
 Hence, God revealed His own mind to him. He 
 took him into Eden for that purpose. This of 
 necessity involved opposition to the laws of the flesh; 
 and hence, " the flesh lusted against the spirit and 
 the spirit against the flesh ;" and hence, in that case, 
 the flesh became sin. There was no alternative to this, 
 
 for i:iTHER MAN MUST PERISH AND BE NO MORE, OR 
 SIN MUST HAVE AN ENTRANCE INTO THE WORLD. 
 It was for the glory of God that sin should be en- 
 countered, that it might be overcome, rather than that 
 man should perish with the beasts, and have no im- 
 mortality secured for him, and the great end of creation 
 therefore be frustrated.* 
 
 The great struggle has been going on for ages past, 
 and in the course of events, man is becoming increas- 
 
 * Here, then, is a very simple explanation of the fall, or in 
 other words of the intro<luction of sin. How came sin ? The 
 answer is and must be, through the ministration of the Divine 
 Spiritvto man. Apart from this, man had not known sin. He 
 could not, if he had received no revealment of the Divine law; 
 for sin is the transgression of this law. Sin, then, began in man 
 when lie, following the impulses of the tiesh, rebelled against the 
 
 ! I 
 
 : J 
 
 )■ 
 
172 
 
 Concluding Obseri nUions. 
 
 ingly prepared for more fully realizing the boon which 
 is ordained for him. He will be matured for this in the 
 course of Divine procedure. But the question arises — 
 How comes it to pass that the desire of God is so long 
 in being accomplished ? Does not sovereignty belong 
 to God? Is not God at the helm of affairs? and what 
 obstacle is there which God cannot overcome? The 
 answer is, that it is for the glory of God that man 
 should be left to the freedom of his own will and by 
 his own ivill be brought to salvation. This explains 
 the long delay which takes place, ere the world of man- 
 kind are turned in obedience unto God. God is thus 
 constrained to wait upon man's blindness and obstinacy 
 as refusing the rulership of God. 
 
 But this view of the case seems only to deepen the 
 mystery ; for it is asked, How, in these circumstances 
 can God be said to be the Author of man's salvation ? 
 And if a man turns to the Lord, how can the 
 honour and glory thereof be assigned unto God ? 
 It is said — If man be left to himself, and if 
 God has to wait for a change of will on the part of 
 man, then, it follows that surely man must have power 
 in himself and by himself to become Godlike in his 
 nature ! Or again, taking the other alternative, it is 
 
 Divine law. Under this law, man was between two cjreat in- 
 fluences, the law of authority grafted on him from without, and 
 the law of the flesh which was natural to him. He yielded to 
 the latter, and ran counter to the former. Hence, he has for- 
 feited the promise of life, and the struggle has gone on, till it 
 has been found that the second Adam has displayed a victory 
 over sin, and has displayed a new manhood absolutely, under the 
 control of the Divine Spirit. 
 
 Go(fs Working and Human Freedom. \T-\ 
 
 said, if man has no power by himself of fulfilling the 
 Divine will, then must man be regarded as altogether 
 the puppet of God ; and he cannot be said to have 
 entire freedom of will in the circumstances. Hence, 
 the perplexity by which theology is puzzled. It is 
 most true that man left to himself has no power to 
 turn unto God ; and most true, that if a man turns 
 unto God, the glory thereof belongs unto God ; and 
 with all this, it is most true that man is left to the 
 freedom of his own will. How is all this explained ? 
 The answer is that God supplies the motives to man's 
 conversion. Without the motives, man would have no 
 inducement, no will, no ability to change his mind ; 
 without divine motives there could be no divine will, 
 and no sanctification of soul. But what are motives ? 
 They are teachings, encouragements, and inducements 
 to follow a certain course ; but they are not compul- 
 sions and they do not at all interfere with man's free 
 will ; for man is left hereby to weigh consequences, 
 and to determine as seemeth good to himself, and this 
 explains the whole matter of human freedom under 
 the discipline which God has ordained. 
 
 But why, it is asked, Has God ordained that some 
 should be predestined to everlasting life ; and by conse- 
 quence that others, to say the least, should be passed by ; 
 and this, through a decree pronounced from the begin- 
 ning? We are persuaded that much misconception 
 also prevails in connection with this great doctrine. Of 
 course it behoved that God in creating the world should 
 have a great and final purpose before him. We have 
 seen that the purpose was not (could not be) fulfilled by 
 the introduction of mere earthly things, because 
 earthly things perish ; we have seen that God's pur- 
 
 \ ■*! 
 
 I ■' 
 
(I 
 
 •I 
 
 i 
 
 174 
 
 Concluding Observations. 
 
 pose lay through this in promoting and preparing a 
 people for eternal life ; and God saw clearly at the 
 same time that in securing this purpose, there would 
 be large numbers among the generations of men, who 
 would fail to come under the category of immortality; 
 and no doubt also some who would abuse the great 
 privileges of grace offered to them, by turning a deaf 
 ear to his call, and even by profaning the name and 
 the laws of God. What then ? Was God hereby to 
 be prevented from introducing his great scheme of 
 immortality ? Here lies the terrible alternative. 
 Were he to do so, then the world and the things of the 
 world would have to be blotted out; and man too, like 
 the beasts and all perishable things, would become as 
 if they had never been, and the elaborate work of God 
 in the creation of the world would have been vain and 
 rcsultless. But that would have been wholly un- 
 worthy of God. Hence, it came to this, that the fore- 
 sight and the fore-knowledge of the waywardness of 
 some must not prevent the bestowment of eternal 
 privileges on those who would be induced to listen to 
 his voice and to obey ; and so secure for them a 
 glorious immortality. 
 
 Let it not be thought that God was hereby a Res- 
 pecter of persons. Who they might be abstractly that 
 should fulfil his will, and who they might be that 
 should reject his counsel, was nothing to him. The 
 failure of some to come under his covenant, and the 
 blameworthiness of others who might rebel, did not 
 concern the righteousness of the great object which he 
 had at heart; for he would offer the word of life — not 
 to individuals as separate from the mass, but to all 
 who lay within the sphere of its deliverance ; and his 
 
 Predestination not Founded in Sovereignty. 175 
 
 proclamation was this, that to those who should obey 
 the general call upon all to repent and forsake their 
 sins, there should be a special call given to become 
 inheritors of eternal life. Could anything be more 
 natural, or more equable, seeing that such parties only as 
 break loose from the trammels of the flesh are adapted 
 to exercise faith, and to receive the grace of life, and 
 be made heirs of salvation ? 
 
 The church hitherto, when speaking of the lost, has 
 been able simply to ascribe all to the mere sovereignty 
 of God ; and in blank helplessness to expound the ways 
 of God, it could only say " Even so Lord, for so it 
 seemed good in Thy sight." It no doubt becometh us 
 to bow in meek humility under the mighty hand of 
 God, in cases where we do not understand, whatever 
 be the trying experiences to which we may be sub- 
 jected, resting assured that what we know not now, we 
 shall know hereafter ; but as regards the great plans 
 and purposes of God, we know and are assured that 
 things are not left to the operation of mere sovereignty, 
 and that what may appear questionable to our limited 
 understandings is not the outcome of irresponsible 
 power, but oi power directed by what is right. Whatever 
 were the Divine purposes before the foundation of the 
 world, we are certain that these purposes were not aban- 
 doned to the exercise of mere sovereign authority, but 
 to authority guided by the highest wisdom and inspired 
 by unbounded love. It is therefore demonstrably im- 
 possible, looking to His very nature and attributes, 
 that God could have a priori fore-ordained any to 
 eternal pains and penalties. The Apostle Peter lays 
 down the principle of fore-ordination very clearly and 
 succinctly. He tells us that election is " according to 
 
 \ \ 
 
 i 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
I M 
 
 176 
 
 Concluding Obsenuiiions. 
 
 fore-knowledge " ; it must be so ; it cannot be other- 
 wise. In other words, it intimates that Intelligence in 
 the very nature of things must be antecedent to Will 
 We find this realized in our own case, and were it 
 otherwise, the Will would be neither more nor less than 
 blind impulse. To suppose this of the All-wise and 
 omniscient Being, would not only be derogatory, but 
 extremely absurd ; and yet, we have those who 
 tell us that God forsees things only from the fact 
 that he has fore-ordained them. Such persons 
 know not what they say. Before creation, God knew 
 all possibilities ; and seeing these, he determined on 
 what it was best to adopt — best in order to fulfil the 
 great purposes which were before His mind. 
 
 One other point — one that is not a matter of natural 
 science but of revelation in scripture, I touch upon ; 
 first, because I have implicit confidence in scripture- 
 statement; and second, because the knowledge of 
 nature, as it increases, is sure to bring clearer light 
 to bear on scripture truth. The point I refer to is 
 that of a second Personality in God-head. That 
 God should have an alter ego, brought out through 
 Himself from the Impersonal All, seems to me the 
 most natural and likely. There is nothing incon- 
 sistent in the statement that an image of himself 
 should exist before the world was. We are no more 
 hedged up from believing in this great revelation, 
 than we are prevented from tracing the things 
 that are, to a primary root and source. If we were 
 better acquainted than we are with the capacities 
 of substance, and its susceptibility of bringing out into 
 manifestation another self — a beinghood after the 
 manner of that which has been as a self-existence ab 
 
 The Fatherhood of God. 
 
 177 
 
 eterno ; and if we knew that the begetting of this Per- 
 sonality was essential to the production of inferior 
 orders of creation, we should then know that it con- 
 sists with the facts of Divine Personality, that there 
 must be a Divine Fatherhood in connection with 
 the everlasting Impersonality which accompanies His 
 Beinghood; and that through this Impersonality there 
 must be a representation of Himself This com- 
 mends itself to our thinking, though probably if left to 
 ourselves, we should scarcely have discovered this as a 
 necessary fact in the great field of nature. That the 
 eternal offspring of God should himself be made the 
 Builder and Framer of the world, as himself derived 
 from the same inexhaustible Fountain of beinghood 
 is, we think, at once rational and credible. And that 
 the Ivithcr, in the prosecution of Intellection should 
 devise and communicate his devices to the Son ; and 
 that the Son, as himself made of that which consti- 
 tutes creation, should be so to speak Operator accord- 
 ing to the will of the Father, is not only a revelation 
 which we are asked to receive, but it is one in perfect 
 consistency with reason as well as with revelation. 
 
 It does not concern me here to point out how the 
 eternal Son must be regarded as the Holy Ghost of 
 Scri[)ture ; and that He should communicate himself 
 to, and manifest himself in, the person of Jesus Christ 
 of Nazareth ; but assuredly, when rightly interpreted 
 and duly considered, there is nothing in the statements 
 revealed that need be regarded as unnatural much less 
 improbable. The fact of God being in Christ Jesus, is 
 simply initiatory of the fact of God communicating 
 himself to man as the foundation of a new nature ; 
 and the case of Christ seems to differ from the case of 
 
 11 
 
 i 
 
 N 
 
i 
 
 178 
 
 Concluding Ohsennitions. 
 
 true Christians, in that the fulness of the Divine mind 
 was conveyed to Christ, and that he walked in entire 
 obedience to Divine principles, and perfectly overcame 
 the antagonistic influences that were inherent in the 
 flesh, and that assailed him throu^^h this world and 
 the devil. In this way Christ introduced and con- 
 solidated a new manhood, as the pattern after which 
 we are to be formed. 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 ON ETHER. 
 
 — ^ — 
 
 PRorKSSOR Stokes says : " Tlie fundamental hypothesis of 
 the existence of a medium to which we give the name of Ether, 
 I have already noticed. We might not have been disposed on 
 tlie fii-st instance to believe that such a solid material as glass 
 reall}' had Ether pervading it. But we must beware of applying 
 to the mysterious Ether the gross notions which we get from 
 the study of ponderable matter. The Ether is a substance, if 
 substance it may be called, respecting the very existence of 
 which our senses gives us no direct information : it is only 
 through the intellect, by studying the jjlienomena which nature 
 presents to us, and finding with what admirable simplicity those 
 of light are explained by the supposition of the existence of an 
 Ether, that we become convinced that there is such a thing. 
 We know that a magnet attracts iron through a piece of glass ; 
 and yet the magnetic influence is one which we can neither see 
 nor feel. Why then should not Ether exist within the glass 
 and be capable of vibrating within it ? 
 
 " It may be readily supposed, as more probable than the 
 contrary, that the presence of the ponderable molecules inter- 
 spersed through the Etl'er, within the region of space, which is 
 enclosed by the surface of the glass, may have the effect of 
 altering the velocity of propagation of the Etherial vibrations 
 within it, and very probably diminish it. But what may be 
 the precise mechanism by which this result is brought about we 
 do not know. It is easy to frame plausible hypotheses, which 
 would account for the result ; but it is quite another matter to 
 establish a theory which will admit of, and which will sustain, 
 cross questioning, in such a variety of ways, that we become 
 convinced of its truth. 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
I 
 
 i 
 J 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 180 
 
 Appendix I. 
 
 " Here it may be well to ])ause, an.l contemplate for a little 
 the wonder with which our study of the phencunena up to the 
 present point has shown that we are surrounded. 
 
 " First, we learn to rej^anl the interplanet;\ry and interstellar 
 spaces as no mere v()i<l, or empty spaces |)assed throui;h by swift 
 messengers, in the shape of particles of li<;ht (^onveyin.i,' infor- 
 mationlfrom «listant worlds, but as tilled with an ever-present, 
 all pervading; suKstance, in which the ultimate particles <.f 
 ponderable matter, includini,' those of our own bodies, ari' 
 continually, as it were, bathed, and yet of which our senses 
 give us no correct cognizance. 
 
 " Secondly, that whatever other inj|)ortant offices this Ether 
 may fulfil, this one at any rate belongs to it, that it forms the 
 me«'iium of visual communication between (.urselves and our 
 fellow creatures, between ourselves and the various objects 
 around us, l)etween ourselves and tlistant worlds. 
 
 "Thirdly, that this communication iscarric.l on by tremors 
 of some kind propagated through the Ether, with a velocity s«> 
 enormous, that for all practical purposes it may be deemed 
 instantaneous. In fact, light wouhl tmvel about seven and a 
 half times round the whole earth in one second. But so rapid 
 are these tremors that many hundreds of millions of millions 
 take place in one second. Notwithstanding, therefore, the 
 enonnous rate of propagation, the lengths of the waves are ex- 
 cessively small, ranging about one fifty thons;indth of an inch. 
 Were the length of waves of light comparable with the length 
 of the waves of sound, we shoidd, as regards the use of our eyes, 
 be merely in the condition of a man who was all but blind, whi> 
 couM just distinguish light from darkness, or a gleam of red 
 from a gleam of green, and no more. 
 
 *' Fourthlv, we learn that notwithstan«ling the almost in- 
 conceivable shortness of the tin»e of viltration, a variation in this 
 peri<Mlic time is nevertheless rec(»gnisable by our sen.ses, and 
 that it is to this cause it is due, that the face of nature does not 
 present to us light ami shade like a photoi^raph, but that we 
 have that endless variety of colour that we enjoy. 
 
 " Fifthly, in the plan of an elastic medium, conveying sn:all 
 vibrations, we have a mechanism of the simplest j)ossibh' Wind 
 
 Appendix I. 
 
 181 
 
 having for the result, that rays of light from objects all around, 
 cross each other's j>aths, in all sorts of ways, without any mutual 
 <listurbance. 
 
 "When we survey a varieil landscape, each visible point in it, 
 however mimite, may be regarded as an indepejulent source of 
 light, from which the light j)roceeds in all directions. True, the 
 objects are not in general self-luminous ; they are seen by the 
 light of the sun, or of the clouds, which the^' irregularly reflect ; 
 but as regards the behaviour of the pencils which proceed from 
 theni, they are as good as self-luminous.* Well then : from 
 each visible point however minute, there enters the eye every 
 second a length of light of about 18(),000 miles, that in light 
 which would have travelled that distance had not the eye been 
 tlien* to catch it, this immense length being filled with modu- 
 lations of lengths ranging about 50,000 to an inch. And if the 
 landscape be contemplated by a multitude of persons, from each 
 visible point in that vast length of light, consisting of modu- 
 lations of such excessive minuteness, enters the eye of each 
 spectator every second of time ; and all these various streams 
 of light proceeding in all sorts of directions, cross each other's 
 paths in all sorts of ways without the slightest mutual 
 ilisturbance.t 
 
 '* rrofessor Stokes speaks of " the pencils which proceed " from 
 the objects around, saying that '* ihey are as good as self-luminous." 
 If they were self-luminous, we should fail to see them as we now do. 
 It is l>ecause ihey are not selfduminous, that the objects lying in this ocean 
 of luminiferous Ether, are pencilled forth in all their minuteness by a 
 univc rsal law, and are reflected on our eyes as in a mirror, and are con- 
 veyed in all their qualitative character along the optic nerve, and re- 
 vealed as they are thus conveyed to the intellect. 
 
 li 
 
 t Professor Stokes states what is realized as an amazing fact ; but 
 he fails to philosophize upon the fact ; when he might have abundantly 
 shewn that Ether had and has characteristics which cannot be predi- 
 cated of matter— characteristics which carrying forms in all directions, 
 crossing and recrossing each other without collision and without con- 
 fusion, indicate a power of endless service to which common matter can 
 lay no claim. 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 'i 
 
 182 
 
 Appendix L 
 
 "To one previously unacq\iainted with the subject, these 
 statements seem like the tlreams of an enthusiast, or at best 
 the speculations of some wild theorist ; and yet there is nothing 
 in what I have stated, beyond the sober conclusions uf scientific 
 investigations — conclusions sujiported by an amount of evidence 
 altogether overwhelming. In saying this, it is to be remembered 
 that the precise work of the Ether has been left an open 
 question." (Nature of Light, ]). 85, etc.) 
 
 The Rev. Mr. Birks, Rector of Kelshall, Herts, as far back 
 as 1862, tells us that for 28 ye^irs he had been engag«*d in prose- 
 cuting inquiries into the laws of Matter and of Etlier. He says, 
 (1) "The simplest view of matter, derived at once from the law 
 of gravitation, is that it consists of monads or moveable centres 
 of force, unextended but definite in position, which attract each 
 other with a force varying inversely as the square of the <lis- 
 tance between the centres. (2) The law of Gravitation in 
 Matter so constituted will not alone account for the cohesion 
 and solid structure of b«Mlies. Either the law of gravitation 
 must be modified for small distances, or there must be some 
 other substance distinct from common matter on which the 
 phenomena of cohesion depend. (3) A self-repulsive Ether, 
 wholly distinct from common matter, also exists, and is diffused 
 widely throughout all known space.* (4) No second fluid, of 
 
 * Mr. Birks quotes the closing words of the Principia of Newton, 
 which are like a prophecy, as follows :~" I might add something about 
 a certain very subtle spirit, which pervades dense bodies and lies hid in 
 them, by the power of which, bodies at very small distances attract each 
 other, and when brought close together cohere ; and electrical bodies 
 act at greater distances, attracting and repelling neighbouring bodies ; 
 and light is emitted, refracted and reflected, and warms bodies ; and 
 sensation is excited, and the limbs of animals are moved at will, through 
 vibrations of this spirit, propagated through the nerves to the brain, and 
 from the brain to the muscles. But these things cannot be expounded 
 in a few words ; nor is there extant a sufficient abundance of experiments 
 by which the laws of the activity of this spirit could be accurately de- 
 termined." Mr. Birks also quotes from Sir Isaac Newton's Optics, the 
 same thought in the modest form of queries, as follows : — ** Is not heat 
 conveyed through a vacuum by the vibrations of a much more subtle 
 medium than air ? Is not this medium the source by which light is re- 
 
 Appendix /. 
 
 183 
 
 caloric, of electricity, or of magnetism, ought to be recognized, 
 until it can be proved that the action and reaction of common 
 matter, and a luminous Ether are incapable of supplying the 
 require<l explanation. (5) The existence of Matter and of Ether 
 requires the admission of three and only three laws of force for 
 their mutual action— First, matter acting on matter— sec(md, 
 matter acting on Ether, and Ether on matter— third. Ether 
 acting on Ether: these two unknown laws cannot be the 
 same with gravitation, or vary only as the inverse square. (6) 
 The Ether of the Universe greatly excee<ls in quantity or in the 
 number of its atoms the amount of ponderable matter. (7) The 
 mean distjuice of the particles of free Ether must be less and is 
 probably far le>,s than one ten millionth of an inch. (8) The 
 pressure of the Ether on any surface must be immensely great. 
 (D) The action of matter on Ether must vary as the inverse 
 cube or some higiier law, and the repulsion of Ether on Ether 
 as the inverse fourth or some higher integer power. (10) The 
 three laws of force imply two independent constants, and two 
 other results from the acUial constitution of Ether in space and 
 of material bodies." 
 
 We cannot regard Mr. Birks' view of matter or of Ether as 
 sound, for reasons which will afterwards appear ; but as he 
 farther in his chapter on the nature and properties of light has 
 more to say on Ether, it is well to take an account of his addi- 
 tional statements as taken from the theory stated by Sir John 
 Herschel in the Enc. Metr., as follows. "(1) An excessively rare 
 and elastic Ether pervades all space. (2) It pervades all 
 material bodies, and occupies the interval between their mole- 
 
 fracted and reflected, and communicates heat to bodies, and is put into 
 fits of easy reflexion and transmission ? Do not hot bodies communi- 
 cate their heat to cold ones by the vibrations of this medium ? And is 
 it not exceedingly more rare and subtle than air, and exceedingly more 
 elastic and active? And does it not readily pervade all bodies? And 
 is it not by its elastic force expanded through all the heavens?" The 
 sagacity of Newton properly divined not only the existence but m some 
 respects the characteristics of Ether ; but Mr. Birks mistakes these, 
 when he speaks of Ether as self-repulsive ; for Ether absolutely per se 
 can have no preferences and therefore no action, but is the servitor of 
 the aftinities communicated by material objects. 
 
li 
 
 F 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 184 
 
 Appendix I. 
 
 cules. (3) Ether by passing between them or by its extreme 
 rarity, offers no resistance to the motion of the earth, jilanets, 
 and comets, appreciable by the most delicate observations. (4) 
 The molecules are capable of bein«,' set in motion by the pai tides 
 of matter, and of comniunicatin*; motion to the jiarticles wliich 
 are adjacent. (5) It is less elastic in refractory bodies. ((3) The 
 frequency of the pulses or number of impulses made on our 
 nerves in a given time, <leter4nines the colour of the light, and 
 the amplitude of the excursions, its brightness or intensity." 
 
 Thereafter, Mr. Birks sets forth a nund>er of grounds where- 
 by Ether explains the lleflection and Kefraction of light, and 
 accounts for the dispersion of light, the polarizjition of light, 
 circular polarization, and the probable relation between ra«liant 
 heat and light, as well as the relations between light ami sound 
 with respect to the variety of musical tones and of coloure.l 
 rays. 
 
 I have oidy now to make a few remarks on the character- 
 istics assigned to Ether by our author. In common with almost 
 all writers, he terms Ether "an excessively rare and elastic 
 medium perva<ling all space." This, as a generally su|)erticial 
 definition, may be regarded as good, if we understand the use 
 here made of the term " elastic." Elastic must mean not only 
 the property of springing back to its original form after tension, 
 but mainly and peculiarly the ;x>wer of being indefinitely ex- 
 tended, so that when preoccupied at one j>oint, it may always 
 have a fresh surface for any new form that may be presentetl, 
 and this in eodem loco. 
 
 It is said to pervade all material bodies, but only to occupy 
 the intervals between their molecules. This statement, I regard 
 as a misapprehension. It implies thf.t the particles of matter 
 are impenetrable by Ether, whereas the law seems to be that 
 Ether enters into the very bosom of matter, and without affect- 
 ing the conditions of matter, itself takes on these conditions, and 
 shares them, with this distinction betwixt itself and matter, that 
 the latter are expressed in a gross or thickened aspect, while the 
 fonner expresses the same quality and form in an esentially 
 spirit state. 
 
 Again, it is said, Ether offers no resistance to the motions of 
 the heavenly bodies. This fact ought to go to prove that Ether 
 
 Appendix I. 
 
 185 
 
 is of a spirit-nature ; for if it were anything like ponderable 
 matter, it behoves that there should be resistance. But in re- 
 spect of motion, as well as every other condition of material 
 objticts, there is no doubt that the Ether symi)athises with these 
 niovements, and. finds corresponding expression in itself. Our 
 autiior, somewhat out of consistency with the non-resistance of 
 Ether, says, — " the pressure of Ether on any surface must be 
 immensely great." He compares the velocity of sotmd with that 
 of light, and observing that the velocity of a vibration varies as 
 the square root of the pressure of Ether must be i:H billions of 
 j)ounds on the square inch, whereas that of air is only about 15 
 pounds to tile square inch. But if he had duly a|)prehended 
 the character of Ether, he would have found that it exerts no 
 pressure whatever, but is entirely negative in that respect, ami 
 is leceptive, as noti«;ed, of the characteristics of quality and con- 
 <lition and form as pertaining to matter, save the fact of its 
 crassness. 
 
 Our author has regarded Ether as self-repulsive. He draws 
 thi* inference from the fact that light travels throufdi Ether 
 with such enormous rapidity ; for, he says — " if its particles 
 were mutually attractive, they would evidently condense around 
 centres, when there was anv excess of densitvat first: and linht 
 could not pass from one of these condensing systems to another." 
 Hence, he infers that mutual repulsions must be one of its fun- 
 damental laws. Surely the inference must be the extraordinary 
 attraction of Ether for the condition of light. What is lifdit ? 
 It is one of the con<litions of matter, and so great is the affinity 
 of Ether for that condition that it takes it on with amazing 
 readiness, and spreads it with inconceivable rapidity. He sj)eaks 
 of the particles of Ether as if they were atomic and se[)arable 
 like matter, indicating that in his day, however strange and 
 puissant Ether had been suspected to be, Mr. Birks and others 
 had failed to guess its real character. 
 
 Again, it is noticed that " the existence of matter and 
 Ether requires the admission of three and only three laws of 
 force ; first, matter acting on matter ; second, matter acting on 
 Ether, and Ether on matter ; and third, Ether acting on Ether." 
 It is verv doubtful whether matter acts directlv on matter, that 
 is apart from the connecting link of Ether, save mechanically 
 
 -' 
 
 
Ml! 
 
 186 
 
 Appendix I. 
 
 when one body comes into collision with another. We believe 
 that the cohesion of the |)articlesof matter is |)r(Kluceil by means 
 of the all pervading Etlier, which, taking <)n the affinities of the 
 particles, binds them together accortling to the law of attraction 
 which inherently pertains to them. There is, therefore, the 
 operation of two great laws only, viz., that of matter npon 
 Ether, and that of Ether upon matter. "First of all, by the crea- 
 tion of matter with its qualities anil conditions, we have Ether 
 assuming the same qualities and conditions, while yet retaining 
 its c(insistency as spirit-substance, an<l projecting those diminish- 
 ing inversely as the square of the distance increases. When two 
 material bo«lies therefore meet at a distance from one another, 
 yet within the range of their respective affinities, they affect one 
 another precisely as if the etherial representation were one solid 
 mass with the bodies themselves, and thus we account for tlie 
 great doctrine of gravitation. 
 
 The author speaks of the particles of Ether, and says, " the 
 mean distance of the particles of free Ether niust be less, and 
 probably far less than one ten millionth of an inch." Like 
 others who have treated of the great question of Ether, he speaks 
 of the })articles or atoms of which it is composed. One would 
 think that it should have occurred to these great men to see from 
 the fact of its extraordinary elasticity, to which all of them refer, 
 that it must be of an absolutely contiiuious nature. We have 
 not only referred to the absolute impossibility of finding, or of 
 procuring a vacuum, in which Ether is not persistently present, 
 but the very fact also of that endless elasticity, whereby it is 
 so expanded as to present a fresh and free front to every add- 
 itional object that has to be represented therein, and fulfils that 
 representation notwithstanding any pre-occupation, ought to con- 
 vince us that there is nothing of a finite character pertaining to 
 it. Matter is seen an<l known to us to be of a finite character, 
 and whatever may be the nature of the atoms into which it is 
 divisible, there can be no doubt that it is separable into atoms. 
 
 It may be allowed that there is Ether in one set of circum- 
 stances more rare, and in another set of circumstances more 
 dense, according as it is absolutely free from all or any influence 
 spent upon it from any body of matter, or when the space is 
 occupied by a series of representations such as the earth and the 
 
 Appendix I. 
 
 187 
 
 various conditions of the earth, and in addition to the conditions 
 pertaining to electricity and magjietism, and varied individual 
 delineations. Hence, it may be that there is a condensed Ether, 
 as well as an Ether of still higher tenuity. Of course, the Ether 
 would in these circnmstamtes be most condensed in solid bodies, 
 and hence, while the free passage of forms in light miirht be 
 ofxin for many repetitions in the free atmosphere, it is quite 
 conceivable that a limit must be had to the transmission and re- 
 transmission of messages through the telegraphic wire. It is 
 also quite conceivable that the velocity of a wave or pulse of 
 Ether in travelling through a liquid or transparent solid must 
 be affected by the affinity of the solid or fluid atoms. Refraction 
 seems to depend on density. Light must have an equal move- 
 ment so long as the wave travels in undisturbed Ether ; but 
 when it is permanently condensed, as in certain transparent 
 solids, the path of the wave takes a lateral direction. 
 
 It has been thought difficult to explain what has been 
 called circular polarization as compared with common light. We 
 have but one explanation that is satisfactory, and it is this, that 
 in the projection of an object and its circumstantials in the 
 medium of Ether, the precise lines which characterize the object, 
 are represented as they are contained in the original. 
 
 There is a relation betwixt the vibrations of light and those 
 of Hountl ; but the one is a tremor of pure Ether and the other 
 has its initial utterance in air ; and hence the slowness of the 
 latter passage compared with the former. 
 
 We have much to add to the characteristics of Ether, which 
 will be found in the effort made by this publication to make 
 known its properties generally. 
 
APPENDIX 11. 
 
 ON CAUSALITY, AND TIIK liKIXC <>F TIIK 
 
 PERSONAL (ioI>. 
 
 TiiKiiK are Lwu aAi..hi> wl.ich arise as simple ;nnl necessary iiifr- 
 reiices in connection with human experience, ami which all n »- 
 aonahle beinj^s have to a<,'iee to, who are ahle to enter on tiic 
 question : these are, first, "that every . fleet must have a cause;" 
 and, second, that "the effect cannot contain mow in it than 
 bel(>n<rw to the cause." It may be asked—what is a cause, an«l 
 what is an etiect, and how »lo they stand related to one another? 
 These are proper en(mjL,di cpiestions. We must have an under- 
 stamlir.i,' as to what a thini,' is before we can truly pronounce 
 upon its characteristics. We define a cause, then, to be t/idt <i8- 
 semblaye of inyredients irUich u'hen combined proiluces a definite 
 result* It is obvious, then, that cause and effect are correlative 
 
 * Many have wondered why it hapi)ens in the case of every 
 rational being, that there is this belief, that every cause must have its 
 effect, and that every effect must have its cause ; but practically this is 
 what a child is leorning every moment of its developing existence. 
 Every mechanical movcnieni is an illustration of cause and effect. One 
 cannot shut the door, cannot take food, cannot stir the fire, but there is 
 hereby the operation of cause and effect. A child cannot see a new 
 toy brought inti> his nursery. <«r an old toy removed from it, but he 
 observes cause and effect conjoined. A child from experience knows 
 that there would be a serious effect if his toy w ere put into the fire, or if 
 a pail of nippers were to lie applied to one of his fingers. In con- 
 struction also, the child learns the connexion l)ctwixt cause and effect. 
 He sees a doll dresseil, or he sees a house made of wooden blocks, or 
 he may come to assist in piecing the cuttings which go to make a map 
 or picture : when therefore the effect is shewn he can state the cause. 
 In this way the relation of cause and effect becomes unconsciously 
 familiar to him. 
 
 I' 
 
 Appendix II. 
 
 180 
 
 teinia for one and the same thing, the difference beinfj the cause 
 is the ingredients in conti;j:uity in onler to their conibinati(m ; 
 and effect is the aceompUshment of the combination. Cause 
 and effect imply one and the same array of factors ; but the 
 relationship is differejit. In the cause we have respect to the 
 particular and sj)ecific elements which enter into the combina- 
 tion ; in the effect we have respect to their congUmieration into 
 on(» wh(de. When, however, a combination of elements has 
 bet!n once effected, there may be introduced an additional ingre- 
 dient, which ingre«lient, of course, produces a change in the 
 result. We sj)eak of that ingredient, therefore, as the cause of 
 this change ; but in respect of the whole question, that ingre- 
 dient is but an individual factor whereby the result as a whole 
 is constituted. 
 
 Having pren)ise<l this much resjiecting the intimate relation 
 which subsists between cause and effect, we come now to the 
 alisidute and uncaused (iround which lies obviously before us, 
 viz., that of an infinite Ether, which as a medium we have seen 
 is one continueil and unbroken unity and unif(jrmity through- 
 out, in itself undisturbeil, save in so far only as it is affected by 
 the individual objects with which space is fiUeil. These objects 
 without exception bear on them the marks of constmction^ in as 
 far as they shew the adaptatiwi of things in themselves indepen- 
 dent of one another, and which have in themselves no natural 
 connexion, brought together and conjoined obviously in the ful- 
 filment of a j)urj)ose. Supposing these constructed objects to be 
 out of the way, and removed entirely, what have we to all ap- 
 pearance left ? We have simply the universal Ether — an Ether 
 to which we can ascribe no limit, and, therefore we naturally or 
 necessarily predicate respecting it, that such has the characteristic 
 of infinite substance. That is, we have hereby a 8[)irit-substance, 
 as the absolute basis of beinghood, in one continuous and bound- 
 less existence. In these circumstances, it is utterly inqjossible 
 to conceive the beginning of a disturbance. As existing in equi- 
 librio by itself, there is nothing to derange that equilibrium, 
 nndei' the sup])osition of an absolute substance without parts. 
 I; there comes to be an agitation of this univeral substance, it 
 behoves that there must have been a cause ; and that cause 
 must have been an ingredient in some sense out of itself. We 
 
 J 1 
 
190 
 
 Appendix II. 
 
 can have no conception of cause^ apart from a plurality of con- 
 ditions. 
 
 Looking, then, to the facts of the world as they 8taii<l before 
 us, we are necessarily shut up to the conclusion, that there be- 
 hoved to be in a sense outside the universal substance, a positive 
 entity, having the power of creating a change of condition. 
 What this power might be has been the theme of many a pen. 
 Happily, there is no antagonism among parties as to the great fact 
 of there being a ro(»t, a positive root^ from which all derivetl exis- 
 tences are supposed to have sprung. The sole question has been, 
 as to the nature of this initiatory beginning of individualism. 
 Some will have it that it was inherent in the primal substance, 
 and that it has spontaneously developed in the course of many 
 ages into the diversity which we presently see in the world. =- 
 
 Such a conclusion is a contradiction of all our experiences 
 touching the great question of cause and effect. How spon- 
 taneity in mere substance shouhl, in the negation of movement, 
 begin to move — how it should come to operate by itself, in add- 
 ing structure to structure, without an antecedent active power 
 to introiliice at least the nucleus of that structure, utterly battles 
 us to comprehend, or even how there should be a developement 
 in nature to the attainment through a long series of varied 
 creatures, to an individual such as man, with reasoning powers 
 and a designing mind, apart from, and independent of, a great 
 Original, as the comprehension in himself of existing organization 
 anfl of existing capacities, is what I cannot imagine. Such a 
 
 * The standpoint in the philosophy of Hegel is to our view utterly 
 inadmissible. No doubt that standpoint, asw as that of Schellint;, was 
 primarily an absolute identity, in which thought and being were one ; but 
 how this absolute One or All should have had a beginning of movement 
 is the difficulty. To talk of a " becoming," or an evolution of the con- 
 crete, indicates a state of unrest, and destroys the absoluteness of the 
 oneness. No doubt we may speak of a germ-cell as one ; and in virtue 
 of the modifications within it these develop into the many. So they 
 do ; but this only in virtue of the cell being implanted in a suitable 
 medium ; but where is the absolute oneness in this case ? The cjuestion 
 is, How is that which is absolutely one and undivided, to begin move- 
 ment, if there was no movement before ? There can be no self-deter- 
 mination in absolute and uniform, or rather formless, oneness. 
 
 Appendix II. 
 
 191 
 
 conclusion is a drawing on the credulity of rational beings in a 
 mo$t unnatural fashion. It is not reason that we should guess 
 at, atul adopt as possibilities, what lies beyond and out of the 
 liiHi of our experiences. We ought to be true to ourselves, and 
 follow the leadings of onlv rational argument. 
 
 There are no such experiences as are here postulated. True, 
 we have the experiences of natural laws, as they are presently 
 conducted in the world. But what are these ? Unquestionably, 
 they are comprehended in this formula, that each creature pro- 
 duces after its kind, with such deviations within the circle of 
 the species, as the accidents of interposing influences may en- 
 gender. To such deviations we give the name of evolution. 
 Every fresh inquiry confirms this conclusion. We have learned 
 to know, therefore, what is the law of propagation. It is a law 
 entirely congruous to, and confirmatary of, cause and effect. And 
 whatever changes may be effected in the processes of propagation, 
 there is nothing in the effect, but that which is contained in the 
 cause, in as far as the influences which have been operatiu"- in 
 the combination, were they known, would be sufficient to account 
 for all results. 
 
 We are shut up to this conclusion that propagation 
 is a totally different thing from construction ah initio ; and still 
 further to the conclusion, that as propagation cannot introduce 
 creations de novOy so we must have resource to a designing and 
 constructive Mind at the foundation, and before all existin<y 
 things, a» the jjrimary Source from which they are as creatures 
 derived. 
 
 What, therefore, can we say generally of the Personal 
 Fountain of all being, but that He must be regarded as funda- 
 mentally the Absolute comprehension as a Cause of all possible 
 conditions, in positive primitive expression ; even as the Im- 
 personal ground must be regarded as fundamentally in like 
 manner the absolute comprehension, as a basis of all possible 
 conditions in latent inexpression. The one is to be considered as 
 the exact counterpart of the other ; and the two departments go 
 to make up one entire and perfect whole, through which there 
 is a possible generation of the heavens and of the earth, and all the 
 objects that are therein. Beyond this, it does not seem possible 
 for us to go ; but thus far we are clearly led. And we can only 
 
102 
 
 Appendix II. 
 
 wonder that intellij^'ent men cm be foiiiul wlio can think that 
 Agnosticism, or the unknowableness of an ahsohite first Cause, 
 1i<as a foot to stand iipon. 
 
 As to what constitutes the oneness of tlie prinjoidial per- 
 sonal Cause, it is not easy to speak. The (h»ctrine of Causality, 
 as indicatinj' movement in virtue of the communism of at least 
 a diversity of qualities co-existin«( in the same orj;anic unity, 
 constrains us to come to the conclusion that to the personal 
 Deity this diversity must be heM as applicable. Kow or in 
 what way this variety in unity subsists in (iod is not for us to 
 say. lint that variety of condition must needs primarily be 
 in some forni or another, and existinjf too, under limitations, 
 whereby alone limitations can be [innluced, is not to be doubted 
 for a momt?nt, while, at the same time this variety as conjoined 
 in the unity of a j)erfect combination, must also be received. 
 And this, ii» like manner, must be envisaj^ed in the thoui^ht of a 
 personal (iod, that, while he has the platform of infinity before 
 liini, as attonlint,' endless scope for the production of works (or 
 shall I say worlds /) without limit, the conditions tjf his being 
 nnist Ihj regarded as fundamentally such, that out of those con- 
 ditions he is able to minister the ty}u's^ of thing's in the universe, 
 and by means of these types to draw forth from the exhaustless 
 source of the impersonal and unconditioned, the stores where- 
 with the universe is filled. 
 
 Thus ^^L■ ,ite brou^lit face to face with what we ref,'ard as a 
 great fact, that, while we first (»f all reach a universal spirit-sub- 
 stance tjeneric in respect of Quality and of Energy, we are also 
 of necessit V brouj^ht into immediate cognisance of an absolute 
 spirit-substance having partirnhtrs in respect of Quality and 
 Energy : — that the former must Ih? regarded as in itself abso- 
 lute Impersonality/, and by itself utterly incapabh' of originating 
 any definite or express condititui or conditions as particidars, or 
 indeed of l>egii:ning any movement whatever : while the latter, 
 being a formal nrinifestation of fundamental Qualities and 
 Powers, as the primal constituti<»n of his beinghood, ami 
 omni]»ntence must be regarded as absolute PersonnUt)/ : — 
 that the former, as containing in its bosom the exhaustless 
 substance, which is thequarrv of tlie |)articulars of the universe, 
 is also the basis on which all beinghoml rests, wldle the latter is 
 
 Appendix II. 
 
 193 
 
 the Source or Original by which all creaturehood is fundament- 
 ally constructed ; and that the two are practically one entire 
 Absolute, as the only perfect complement, which accounts for 
 the introduction of the worhls and their contents. The latter is 
 the positive aspect of primitive being— the underived substantial 
 Individuality, antl must be regarded as the Absolute Form 
 (whatever that may tuean) in the self-subsisting unity of its 
 Qualities— as the full Expression positively of the inner possibili- 
 ties which lie negatively in the Unconditioned, but not Unquali- 
 fie<l Imj)ersonality ;* and therefore the Personal is the Source and 
 Spring of movement, and the Originator of all derived conditions 
 w ith their respective adjustments and laws of operation. We have 
 c<3mpletest evidence for the existence of an absolute Personality, 
 as co-existing, on the platform of an absolute Impersonality — a 
 Personality which is the exact con naturalness of all that is con- 
 tained in the Impersonality, with this distinction, that the one 
 contains in HiiUvSelf in positive manifestation, what lies hidden 
 an<l concealed in the other. Without the positive Existence, 
 embracing in its bosom the fundamental qualities, out of which 
 all action proceeds, there could be no mind, an«i no movement 
 in accoidance with mind ; and therefore no manifestation of 
 being ; and without the pregnant soil of the Unconditioned, as 
 at once the ground to work upon, and the mine to respond to 
 every call made upon it, there could have been no production of 
 beinghood and no inbringing of the world in any form. The 
 Personal without the Impeisonal would have been power with- 
 out the possibility of putting it into practical action. The Im- 
 personal without the Personal, would have been material with- 
 out the power of being modified into condition and form. 
 
 What follows from the great fact of their co-existence is the 
 process of creation of which we can grasp some idea. First (as 
 we conceive), there had to be set forth the primary elements as 
 the alphabet of creation — of the varied substance of the world. 
 What these elements were, it is unnecessary here to inquire, 
 
 * The Uncondilioned of Hamilton was made to be also the Un- 
 qualified. We have before noticed that there is no such entity as 
 substance without a basis of Quality. But there may be Quality with- 
 out Conditions. Conditions are the mere accidents under which 
 Quality is manifested. 
 
194 
 
 Appendix II. 
 
 Appendix II. 
 
 195 
 
 '!» 
 
 but, coming from the aelf-same fountain, they would natui-ally 
 have the affinity of attraction for one another when placed in a 
 certain relationship to one another, and the terms of their union, 
 we can understand couM be determined, while, if the relation- 
 ship were changed it would follow that the attraction would l»e 
 changed ; and it might be ii»to repulsion. Second, we can under- 
 stand that there had to be such a variety of these as would be 
 adapted for the matter of the universe. The letters of the 
 alphabet, as illustrating the primary elements, by their union 
 first into words, and then words into sentences, will point out 
 the mode of compound union in regard to the composition of 
 matter. In the construction of matter as inorganic, we find 
 attention given to the arrangements adapted for crystalliaition. 
 And finally, as a preparation for the organic dej)artment, we find 
 the introduction of a structural cell with this proviso, that be- 
 ginning with the siuiplest of all, item after item seems to be en- 
 folded therein, and made to develop each its separate inclusion in 
 growth ; and another and still higher organization seems to be 
 imparted to the cell as the type of a higher stage, and ho on until 
 the case of man was reached, when, of course, the cell could de- 
 velop no more thar. what had primarily been bound up in 
 its prerogatives. The difficulty of believing in the fact of a vast 
 number of separate branches of bcxlily structure, and as in the case 
 of man, being all involved within a very very small compass such 
 as a single cell, is not greater than the fact which we know to be 
 illustrated in the case of Ether, holding in separate distinctness 
 a vast multitude of separate forms ; or in the case of a human 
 soul being filled with thousands u|K)n thousands of se))arate ideas 
 constituting one's knowledge, as we know to be a fact patent to 
 all. 
 
 One of the great difficulties in the conception of Deity, has 
 been the assignment of limitation to Him, and consequently, in 
 looking simply to the infinite to show how the finite couhl emanate 
 from Him ; but to Him belongs limitation and non-limitation — 
 limitation in respect to form for the construction of forms, but 
 non-limitation in respect to the extent and variety of the forms 
 that might be brought upon the stage of the universe. Without 
 both, perfection would be wanting. 
 
 There is another representation of Deity made known par- 
 
 ticularly in the New Testament, which is presented to us as the 
 counterpart of that which stands in its intrinsic originality. We 
 should naturally have no knowledge of this representation, were 
 it not a revelation specially made to us, and that in a book that 
 comes to us with an overwhelming evidence of its authenticity 
 and genuineness. How this Image of the Original Personality 
 came to be introduced, we do not know ; but this we must 
 know, that, while the Personality which is original and 
 underived, must remain it its intrinsic and essential Form 
 of Beinghood, that which is begotten must be regarded as a 
 derived Form of the same, but generated through the uncondi- 
 tioned Impersonality.* Whether mirrored therein, and made a 
 fixture therefrom, as is not impossible or unlikely, it is not for 
 us to pronounce ; but if so, it could only be the beginning of 
 that great analogy, according to which we liave presumed that 
 all that is in the world is formed. 
 
 Though it does not fall to us to consider theology so far as 
 it is revealed to us in the Scriptures, this question of what is 
 therein called " the only begotten Son of God " is of such enor- 
 mous moment to those receiving the Scriptnres as genuine, that 
 a few words on the subject may not be regarded as altogether 
 irrelevant ; and we may readily take up the language of the 
 Nicene creed and regard thisjsounterpart of the Form of God as 
 " becrotten of the Father before all worlds." We may say this, 
 that v^'hile without the Divine record it would in all probability 
 never have occurred to us, that such a production as an entire 
 Image of God, in proper Personality, should have engaged our 
 thoughts as a sober reality apart from the revelation of the fact, 
 yet the fact, when fairly considere<l, is far from being beyond 
 the range of our ordinary thinking. All we can say is, that it 
 is the Personal reflected through the Impersonal. And if we 
 
 * Let it be noted, that while we speak of the unconditioned Im- 
 personality, we do not imply an unqualified Impersonality. We have 
 asserted that Quality lies at the foundation of all substance, and con- 
 stitutes the foundation of primal substance ; but then, primal substance 
 in its absolute state is without conditions. Conditions are the modi- 
 fications which are contingent on particular substances ; and contingen- 
 cies do not exist in the Absolute, 
 
 I 
 
 
lOG 
 
 ^ 
 
 \ppendix II. 
 
 consider the ijreat purpose which "the only begotten Son" was 
 employed to fulfil, viz., to operate as the Supreme Agent by 
 whom creation should be practically intnxluced, while the 
 Father devised and originated the scheme of things which had 
 to b« intnnluced, it follows that He nnist be one with the Father, 
 as receiving the purposes and plans, for the accomplishment of 
 which He was delegated bv the Father to fulfil. 
 
 While totiching u|)on this theme of a plurality of Personali- 
 ties it may be aske«l where is the Trinity of the orthodox 
 churches ; for we here present but a simple Duality ? Before 
 coming to the question of Trinity, it may be mentioned that, in 
 the Eternal Son we have all that is demanded by Old Testa- 
 ment teaching under the name of the Holy Ghost. It was He 
 by whom prophets spake. What then? It humbly appears to 
 the writer, that the pleromn or fulness of the Divine Son, as 
 the Eternal Spirit, was reflected in the aoid of Jesus Christ, and 
 that this constituted the personality of Christ to be in oneness 
 with the Eternal Son. Assuredly this view answers all the in- 
 timations of Holy Writ, in as far as it sets forth Christ as made 
 after the manner of men, and yet in respect of his acquisition of 
 the Eternal Sonship " without measure" or stint, it makes him 
 to be classified as in point of fact He who made the worlds. It 
 does occur to me that the view here stated, which makes Christ 
 one with the Eternal Spirit, and as one w}K)se name is made a 
 convertible term with the Eternal Spirit — (see Rom. VIII. 9, 10) 
 — fulfils the intimation of sacred Scripture, wliile yet the invented 
 term of " Trinity" is hardly appropriate — a term nowhere found 
 in the Holy Word of G(k1. While this view ascribes the Divine 
 nature emphatically to Jesus Christ, it does away with that 
 tremendous mystery which attaches to a personal change taking 
 place in the Eternal Son, as actually divesting himself of his 
 position as such : the whole truth being, that he imparts or ap- 
 plies the fulness of his own mental sphere to Jesus Christ. This 
 view, moreover, sets forth the grand analogy of the diffusion of 
 this same Holy Ghost, being given through Christ to the church 
 for all believers, who are declared by Peter and Paul to be par- 
 takers of the Divine nature. This view, moreover, confirms all 
 New Testament doctrine in respect of the precious bloo<l ul 
 Christ. What is the sprinkling of the blood of Christ " but the 
 
 Appendix 11. 
 
 197 
 
 bestownu nt of that whi«'h constitutes the life of Christ, which 
 is **the blood of the New Testament "—the grace of God which 
 bringeth salvation ? There is no other blood which reaches unto 
 us : there is no other blood that can reach unto us, for the blood 
 of the bcxly was sacrified and therefore put out of the way ; but 
 the blood of God (so Ciilled) which constitutes the life of God in 
 the soul of man, is vouchsafed for all who are open to receive it. 
 
INDEX, 
 
 A. 
 
 Absolute, 
 
 Affinity, 
 
 Ananias— bis free«loni, 
 
 Annibilation— absolute, impossible, 
 
 Ap]>etites. 
 
 A ])Osteriori School, 
 
 A priori School, ... 
 
 Ascent of Man, ... 
 
 Association, 
 
 Atoms, 
 
 Attraction and Repulsion, 
 
 Attributes, 
 
 B. 
 
 Brain— the orjjan of miml, ' 
 Brain -the cortical substance, 
 
 PAGE. 
 
 16, 17,49, 162 
 20, 56, 146 
 144 
 6 
 127 
 89 
 89 
 32 
 116 
 24,90, 149, 155 
 149 
 1 
 
 68, 70, 113 
 115 
 
 C. 
 
 Call, general and special, ... 
 Calder wood, Professor, 
 
 Causality, 
 Causal nexus. 
 Cause and Effect, 
 
 Cause, ... 
 
 Cause-Stuart Mill and Spencer on, 
 
 Cell-development, 
 Cerebellum, 
 Cerebral substance. 
 Cerebral centre, ... 
 
 175 
 
 
 
 103, 
 
 113 
 
 22, 
 
 147, 
 
 155, 
 
 162 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 20 
 
 86, 
 
 App 
 
 endi> 
 
 :II 
 
 
 
 121, 
 
 124 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 33 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 111 
 
 
 • • 
 
 
 110 
 
 
 • • 
 
 
 87 
 
11 
 
 Index. 
 
 Index. 
 
 Ill 
 
 HI 
 
 
 
 
 
 PAt.E 
 
 Chemical combination, 
 
 ... 
 
 
 149 
 
 Colour, sound, etc., — how cog 
 
 nized. 
 
 
 • • • • • • 
 
 95 
 
 Condition, 
 
 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 147 
 
 Condition and Form, 
 
 
 
 • • • • • • 
 
 58 
 
 Conditions — their mutual action. 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 150 
 
 Conditioned and Unconditioned, 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 Conception, 
 
 
 
 .. 75, 78, 
 
 117, 122 
 
 Connecting link,... 
 
 
 
 • • • « • 
 
 49 
 
 Consciousness, 
 
 2, 10, 57, 6 
 
 2, G4, 67. 72 
 
 , 75, 151 
 
 Consciousness — must have an 
 
 object. 
 
 * • * • • • 
 
 5 
 
 Consciousness— the highest, 
 
 • • • 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 18 
 
 Conscious Me, 
 
 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 2«, 106 
 
 Cogito, ergo sum. 
 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 9 
 
 Conservation of Energy, ... 
 
 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 53 
 
 Contiguity, 
 
 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 148 
 
 Cosmical Forces, ... 
 
 
 
 
 45 
 
 Creation, 
 
 
 
 ■ • • • • 
 
 69, 162 
 
 Creation — Divine object in. 
 
 
 
 • • • • • 
 
 167 
 
 Criminal nature,... 
 
 
 
 * * • • • 
 
 133 
 
 Crux philosophorum. 
 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 183 
 
 
 D. 
 
 
 
 Divid's sin. 
 
 
 
 133, 143 
 
 Des Cartes on Substance, ... 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 Des Cartes on the Ego, 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 Deduction, 
 
 
 
 
 120 
 
 Development — subjective, . . . 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 Desire.s,... 
 
 
 
 
 127 
 
 Determination of Will, 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 Dilemma of Philosophers,... 
 
 
 
 
 89 
 
 Divine teaching — when resisted. 
 
 
 
 136 
 
 Dynamic attribute of Ether, 
 
 « 
 
 
 
 148 
 
 Eotype of external object, 
 EiFect — how found. 
 Ego— how originated, 
 
 • • • Ho 
 
 121 
 5, 25, 92, 99 
 
 Elective Affinity, 
 
 Electricity, 
 
 Elements— primary source, 
 
 Emotions, 
 
 Energy — generic, 
 
 Eternity, 161 ; of matter impossible. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 47 
 
 . 33, 46 
 
 . 149, 165 
 
 . 28, 124 
 
 15, 52, 54 
 
 54 
 
 Ether, ... 
 Evolution, 
 Existence, 
 Kxternalitv, 
 
 12, 16, 38, 40, 45, 52, 54. 61, 74, 76, 103, 148, 151 
 32,59,155,157,166 
 
 ... ... ... ... i) *^'*) ^^ 
 
 1 1 Q7 
 
 ... ••• ••• ••• ••• J.i| %J I 
 
 Externality — Dr. Reid and Hume,... 
 
 F. 
 
 Faculties — internal. 
 
 Faith determines one's religion. 
 
 Fall of man, how introduced, 
 
 Faraday on Ether, 
 
 Ferrier on the Medulla, ... 
 
 Fichte on the Ego, 
 
 First Cause — a necessity, ... 
 
 " Form of God," how expressed, 
 
 Forms in matter and in spirit, 
 
 Forms of thought, whence. 
 
 Force lies in Causality, 
 
 Forces, their source, 
 
 Freedom, 
 
 Free Will, the Gordian knot untied, 
 
 G. 
 
 G(k1 not a respecter of persons, 
 
 God's working and man's freedom. 
 
 Godhead, a second Personality, 
 
 Gunpowder, 
 
 Gravitation, 
 
 Grey matter of Brain, 
 
 Growth, 
 
 12 
 
 17, 19, 38, 48, 63, 
 31, 137, 139, 
 
 109 
 
 138, 169 
 
 171 
 
 39 
 
 101 
 
 10 
 
 153 
 
 159 
 
 8, 25 
 
 108 
 
 23,54 
 
 148, 165 
 
 141, 143 
 
 141 
 
 174 
 
 172 
 
 176 
 
 ... ... 'Jo 
 
 44 
 
 84 
 
 21, 42, 48, 59, 65, 166 
 
li 
 
 IV 
 
 Hamilton on the Genesis of Mind, .. 
 Hamilton on the Unconditioned, 
 Heat, 24 ; changCvS affinity, 
 Hegel on the Absolute, 
 Herschel on Ether, 
 Hume, ... 
 
 Idea, correlative of Impression, 
 
 Idea, representative of a thing. 
 
 Idea, the loftiest to be had. 
 
 Ideas, found in spirit-substance 
 
 Ideas create emotions. 
 
 Ideas — repro<luction of, 
 
 Ideas — innate do not exist. 
 
 Identity of self, ... 
 
 Imagination, 
 
 Immortality, its ground, . 
 
 Impersonality, 
 
 Impressions, 
 
 Induction, 
 
 Inferences, 
 
 Infinity, 
 
 Insight of self, ... 
 
 Intelligence, 
 
 Intelligence — supreme. 
 
 Instinct, 
 
 Judgment, 
 
 Kant on the Ego, 
 Kantian School, ... 
 Kant's Psychology, 
 
 31,72,79, 119, 122, 140 
 
 10 
 9 
 
 109 
 
 J 
 
 Index. 
 
 Kelvin- -Lord, on Ether, ... 
 Kinetic theory, ... 
 
 PAGE 
 
 39 
 52 
 
 Lansre on Materialism, 
 
 Law, its source, ... 
 
 Law of human freedom, ... 
 
 Laws by analogy traced to be in Deity, 
 
 Life, wliat. 
 
 Limitations, 52 ; in Deity, 
 
 Lower animals without morals. 
 
 M. 
 
 Magnetism, 
 
 Man's superiority. 
 
 Matter, 
 
 Matter and Mind, nexus, ... 
 
 Matter-formation, 
 
 Materialism, 
 
 Material object— the law of, 
 
 Medulla oblongata, 
 
 Mind, ... ... 
 
 "Mind-stuff," ... 
 
 Mind graded by organs, ... 
 
 Mind dependent on body,... 
 
 Memory, 
 
 Mental states. 
 
 Mental substance receives ectype. 
 
 Method in philosophizing. 
 
 Morals,... ... 
 
 Moral Idea, 
 Moral Law, 
 Moral Emotion, ... 
 Motives, how produced, ... 
 Motives, counteraction of, 
 
 8 
 33 
 
 141 
 
 163 
 
 21, 65 
 
 18 
 
 82 
 
 46 
 
 ... ... /y 
 
 ... 7,24,37,51,150 
 
 96 
 
 43,150 
 
 63 
 
 100 
 
 88, 100 
 
 55, 61, 64, 70, 123, 154 
 
 38, 74 
 
 ... ... t ^, 1 1 
 
 ... ... lo, lio 
 
 84, 112, 122 
 ... ... 9^, lol 
 
 ... ... yy 
 
 105 
 29,80,92,129 
 
 81,132 
 
 130 
 
 13u 
 
 87, 125, 173 
 
 125 
 
¥ 
 
 VI 
 
 
 Index. 
 
 N. 
 
 \ 
 
 Nature,... 
 Natural Law, 
 Natural selection, 
 Necessitv — the doctrine of, 
 Nerves,... 
 Nervous system, ... 
 Nervous centres, ... 
 Not-nie, relations of, 
 Nouraena — Kant's idea of, 
 
 Ontology, Hamilton on. 
 Organization for mind. 
 Organs of thought, 
 
 P. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 59, 100, UiT) 
 33 
 60, 150 
 139 
 83, 95 
 66 
 100 
 79 
 10 
 
 Pal mlum of knowledge, ... 
 
 Particular as opposed to general, ... 
 
 Passion, an abnormal state, 
 
 Passivity cannot change itself. 
 
 Perception, 
 
 Pei'sonality, 
 
 Perplexities of philosophers, 
 
 Pfleiderer on Realism, 
 
 Phenomena, 
 
 Physiologists know little of organ-functions, 
 
 Predestination, ... 
 
 Priestlv and others on Matter, 
 
 Primum cognitum, 
 
 Positivist School, defect, ... 
 
 Pole of centralization 
 
 Propagation, 
 
 Purpose or decree, its basis, 
 
 1, JH) 
 
 27 
 
 69, 78, 108 
 
 ... 112, 115 
 
 148 
 
 133 
 
 124 
 
 96, 106, 115, 122 
 
 50, 75, 158, 161 
 
 37, 57 
 
 93 
 
 9, 91, 146 
 
 111 
 
 .. 173, 176 
 
 154 
 
 3 
 
 8 
 
 100 
 
 59 
 
 175 
 
 Q 
 
 Quality.. 
 
 15, 50, 5», 147 
 
 Index. 
 
 Quantity, 
 
 R. 
 
 Radiation of material objects in Ether, 
 
 Reason, its basis,... 
 
 Reasoning, its process. 
 
 Realism natural,... 
 
 Reflex action. 
 
 Religious feeling, its source. 
 
 Relativity, 
 
 Repository of Impressions, 
 
 Responsibility, ... 
 
 Ri'dits, the foundation of morals, ... 
 
 Ri'dits do not belong to inanimate objects. 
 
 Schelling on the Ego, 
 
 Selfhood, 
 
 Self consciousness, 
 
 Sensation, ... --.^ 
 
 Senses, 
 
 Sensorium, 
 
 Sensuous emotion, 
 
 Schemes of mind, 
 
 Sin, its foundation and removal, ... 
 
 Sin, the alternative if it did not exist. 
 
 Sin, why continued. 
 
 Space and Time, ... 
 
 Spencer on Substance, 
 
 Spirit-substance,... 
 
 Spirit and Matter, 
 
 Spirit-Formations, 
 
 Spirit, the basis of Matter, 
 
 Spirit Ego, how formed, ... 
 
 Soul, origin of, ... 
 
 Stuart Mill ignores Causality, 
 
 Vll 
 PAGE 
 
 66 
 83 
 
 120, 123 
 93 
 
 67 
 135 
 146 
 
 78 
 133 
 129 
 131 
 
 • • • 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 63 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 5 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 66 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 107 
 
 25, 
 
 101, 
 
 106 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 131 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 88 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 1C8 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 171 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 172 
 
 • • • 
 
 95, 
 
 160 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 11 
 
 19, 37, 68, 7: 
 
 3,98 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 44 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 43 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 150 
 
 • • • 
 
 
 151 
 
 • • • 
 
 102, 
 
 114 
 
 8 
 
'H 
 
 Vlll 
 
 Index. 
 
 Stnicture requires a guiding hand, 
 Stokes, Professor, on Ether, 
 Substance absolute, 
 Substance, not more than one. 
 Substance and Accident, 
 Substance niust have attributes, 
 Substance, fundamental, ... 
 Sul>stratum, what. 
 
 
 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 
 » • • 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 156 
 
 • • • • 
 
 
 148, 
 
 Appendix I. 
 
 
 
 
 15, 
 
 19, 58 
 
 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 8 
 
 • • • 4 
 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 4, 147 
 
 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 5, 147 
 
 
 
 
 • • • 
 
 C 
 
 Tait on Ether, 
 
 
 
 40 
 
 Telegraphy, 
 
 
 
 45, 70 
 
 Time, ... 
 
 
 
 68, 156 
 
 Thinking, on what it depends. 
 
 
 
 75 
 
 Tyndall on Ether, 
 
 
 
 39 
 
 Tyndall on Forces, 
 
 
 
 48 
 
 AVI it?j ••* ••• ••• ••• 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 u. 
 
 Unity developed,... 
 Unconditioned, ... 
 
 W. 
 
 27 
 153 
 
 TvIXl| ••* ■•• ••' 
 
 Will, sensuous, ... 
 Will, curbing of, ... 
 Will, does not choose, 
 White matter of the brain, 
 
 30, 87, 124, 128, 139, 152 
 
 128 
 
 129 
 
 142 
 
 84 
 
 ABERDEE.V : 
 
 PRINTED BY GEORC. E LESLIE, 
 
 3 ADELPHI. 
 
 
 IJ 
 

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