Columbia (HmUers'itp 
 
 inthelEupofjfotogiirk 
 
 THE LIBRARIES 
 
THE 
 
 TRADE TO CHINA, 
 
 INDIAN ARCHIPELAGO; 
 
 OBSERVATIONS 
 
 INSECURITY OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS IN 
 THAT QUARTER. 
 
 BY CHARLES ASSEY, ESQ. 
 
 LATE SECHETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAVA. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR RODWELL AND MARTIN, 
 
 BOND-STRIST. 
 
 1819 . 
 
TRADE TO CHINA. 
 
 It is proposed, in the following observations, 
 to take a general view of the commerce of the 
 Indian Archipelago, more especially among the 
 native states who are not under the control 
 of a foreign power; to consider in how far that 
 commerce may be advantageous to this country, 
 both in extending the consumption of our 
 staple manufactures, and in the demand for the 
 produce of those states in the China market; 
 and at the same time to point out the insecurity 
 of the present trade from Great Britain and 
 British India to China, if timely measures of 
 precaution be not taken to meet the progress 
 of the Americans in China, and to guard against 
 
the system of exclusive authority which the 
 Netherlands government are endeavouring to 
 establish throughout the Eastern seas. It is 
 not that I expect to offer many new facts re¬ 
 lative to the commerce of these countries; but 
 probably a concise explanation of the circum¬ 
 stances already known, may place the subject 
 in a more striking point of view than what it 
 has been supposed to possess; and as questions 
 of the greatest national interest are often under¬ 
 rated or overlooked, merely because the scene 
 of action is distant and not familiar, it becomes 
 the duty of those who from local situation have 
 been more accustomed to give their attention 
 to such matters, to communicate frankly the 
 result of their personal experience. With tills 
 view of the subject, I am anxiojus to point out 
 the probable consequences of leaving a foreign 
 nation to obtain the sole command of the 
 Eastern seas, and to control the trade and 
 industry of the native population of those 
 islands. 
 
And this question is of no trivial import¬ 
 ance : there is at the present moment an ac¬ 
 knowledged want of field for the employment 
 of the capital of our merchants. Commerce 
 has been carried to an extent which cannot be 
 continued, now that the European nations are 
 at liberty to encourage them domestic manu¬ 
 factures •, it has become therefore more ne¬ 
 cessary than ever to seek for distant markets; 
 and there is a field still open in China and in 
 the Eastern seas, which I think may be obtained 
 without any considerable expense, and without 
 at all interfering with the legitimate rights of 
 other nations. 
 
 But the more clearly to explain this question, 
 it is necessary to offer some remarks on the 
 course and nature of the trade in the Indian 
 Archipelago, and on the consumption of the 
 products of these islands in China. 
 
 From the earliest times of which there is any 
 
record, the foreign trade in the Indian islands 
 was carried on at certain ports or emporia, to 
 which the native traders resorted with the pro¬ 
 duce of their respective countries, and bartered 
 it for the commodities of Europe and of 
 China.—Acheen, Malacca, and Bantam, were 
 chief places of this description, until the Dutch 
 established a paramount authority, and by ob¬ 
 taining an exclusive control in the minor ports, 
 were enabled to force the native trade to Bata¬ 
 via. They wished to render this place the em¬ 
 porium of their Eastern possessions, and when 
 they had subdued any of the neighbouring 
 native states, they uniformly exacted the exe¬ 
 cution of a treaty which stipulated that the 
 produce and trade of the country should be 
 placed at their disposal, and the local port re¬ 
 gulations be made subject to their immediate 
 direction; the consequence of which necessarily 
 was, that they became enabled to change the 
 course of the native trade, (so far as it was not 
 comprehended in their own monopoly), to such 
 
ports as best suited their policy and conve¬ 
 nience. 
 
 But the native traders have at all times been 
 unwilling to proceed to Batavia 5 the regulation 
 was contrary to established usage, and to the 
 ordinary and convenient course of their voy¬ 
 age ; it was both arbitrary and oppressive; and 
 whenever the Dutch government were too weak 
 to.enforce submission, itwas evaded. Thus itwill 
 be found that Rhio was a place of great resort, 
 although the Dutch would rather have directed 
 the native trade to Malacca; and as soon as the 
 Eastern seas became more free, Penang rose to 
 commercial importance; and a direct inter¬ 
 course was established between the East' India 
 Company’s possessions and the Indian Archi¬ 
 pelago ; and hence it has followed that the 
 British nation has acquired an interest in the 
 commerce of these islands which was not for¬ 
 merly possessed. The mutual relations thus 
 established, have led to an increased consump¬ 
 tion of European manufactures among the 
 
6 
 
 Malay tribes, and have tended to improve their 
 habits and condition, by presenting to them a 
 ready and unrestricted sale of the produce of 
 their industry; and the Netherlands govern¬ 
 ment cannot prohibit the continuance of these 
 relations without committing a positive injury 
 on the legitimate rights of Great Britain. 
 
 It may also be presumed, that if a conve¬ 
 niently situated port were established under the 
 British flag, that port would be resorted to by 
 the Malay and Chinese traders, in preference 
 to proceeding to Batavia; because such a course 
 would be conformable to former usage and 
 convenience; and. further, because the natives 
 of the Eastern islands have, on more than one 
 occasion, during and since the restitution of 
 Java, evinced a decided preference towards the 
 British nation. 
 
 The trade between China and the islands in 
 the Indian Archipelago is of ancient date, and 
 
7 
 
 of considerable extent •, the Chinese junks pro¬ 
 ceed annually to Java, to the Celebes and Suluh 
 Islands, and to the principal ports on the island 
 of Borneo: they also go annually to Palembang 
 on the coast of Sumatra, and to the islands of 
 Bintang and Lingin: their export cargo from 
 China consistiiig principally of coarse earthen¬ 
 ware and silks, together with various articles of 
 domestic consumption among the Chinese set¬ 
 tlers residing on the different islands: gongs 
 also are a great article of export from China to 
 Borneo. In return the junks receive sugar 
 from Java; tin from Banca* j and from almost 
 all the islands, edible birds’-nests t, tripang 
 
 * The Chinese prefer the Banca tin to any other, and will 
 pay about ftli more for it than for the Cornish tin. The 
 greater part of the tin procured in Banca is sent to the China 
 market; and the quantity obtained from the Banca mines 
 has been as follows: 
 
 In the year 1814-19,149 peculs, of 133lbs. per pecul. 
 
 1815 -25,190 
 
 1816 - 26,077 
 
 •|- The birds’-ncsts are distinguished by the Chinese by the 
 names of Pasliat and Chikot, and each kind is divided into 
 three classes of best, middle, and inferior quality; the sale is 
 
8 
 
 (otherwise called sea-slug) a kind of holithurea, 
 and some other articles which are among the 
 luxuries of a Chinese epicure ; besides rattans, 
 wax, woods employed in dying, and other such 
 products of woody uncultivated countries. 
 
 There is moreover a considerable native trade 
 among the islands themselves: Java supplies 
 most of them with salt and with cotton cloths: 
 gambier is a very principal article of export 
 from Bintang: iron is found in Borneo, and 
 exported from Banjannassin to Pontiana, where 
 it sells at a higher rate than the European iron: 
 these, with rattans, mats, dammar, agar-agar, 
 
 so certain that birds’-nests are considered equivalent to 
 specie, and the average selling price of the two kinds has 
 been estimated to be, the Pashat at 3,200 Spanish dollars, 
 the Chikot at 2,200 Spanish dollars per pecul. It is esti¬ 
 mated that more than 200 peculs of birds’-nests are annually 
 imported at Canton, and that the supply might be extended 
 to 500 peculs, without much risk of lowering the sale price. 
 
 Sea-slug is of several kinds, and varies in estimation ac¬ 
 cordingly—the average sale price of the whole may be calcu¬ 
 lated at about 65 Spanish dollars per pecul, and the annual 
 demand is not less than. 400 peculs. 
 
9 
 
 (a species of sea-weed which is used for food), 
 and other minor articles in common use, furnish 
 cargoes to the numerous vessels that trade 
 along the coasts in the Eastern seas, and shew 
 the extent of the trade that might he looked 
 for if the native population were allowed the 
 fair progress, which in the ordinary course of 
 the human mind they would attain to, if they 
 were not restrained by the shackles which Eu¬ 
 ropean policy imposes on them. 
 
 But I proceed to a more particular notice of 
 the ground that had not been occupied, by any 
 European power, at the date of the latest ad¬ 
 vices from Batavia. 
 
 The convention concluded between Great 
 Britain and the Netherlands in the year 1814, 
 has restored to the latter government the fac¬ 
 tories and establishments which the Dutch held 
 in the year 1803. This restitution has compre. 
 hended Java, the Moluccas, and Celebes, with 
 their respective dependencies; but it does not 
 
10 
 
 express that the Netherlands government shall, 
 under this convention, have a right to resume 
 factories or establishments which were not in 
 the year 1803 actually held or administered by 
 the Dutch ; and it may reasonably be doubted, 
 whether it was intended to convey the restitm 
 tion of those establishments which the Dutch 
 had abandoned between the year 1803, and the 
 date of the signature of the convention. 
 
 On the decision that may be taken on these 
 different views of the subject, the present field 
 in the Indian seas becomes more or less nar r 
 rowed. If it be admitted that such positions as 
 were not held by the Dutch in the year 1803, 
 have not been given up to them by this country, 
 all the establishments which have been resumed 
 for the Netherlands government on the Western 
 coast of Borneo, since the restitution of Java 
 was carried into effect, become open to further 
 consideration and discussion; and if a formal 
 abandonment of factories held in the year 1803, 
 has excluded such factories from the terms of 
 
11 
 
 the convention above alluded to, Banjarmassin, 
 on the South-east coast of Borneo, does not be¬ 
 long to the Netherlands government by virtue 
 of that convention. 
 
 It is indeed stated in the latest accounts from 
 India, that the present authorities at Batavia 
 have not only re-occupied all the possessions 
 which the Dutch at any time held in Borneo, 
 but have also declared the Netherlands govern¬ 
 ment to be the sovereign of that island, and 
 have it in contemplation to place the whole Ar¬ 
 chipelago under one general system which shall 
 secure the monopoly of its commerce in then’ 
 own hands, and exclude other nations from any 
 direct participation or access; but it can hardly 
 be argued that these more recent arrangements, 
 which would materially affect the rights and in¬ 
 terests of this country, and were not included, 
 nor perhaps imagined, when the convention of 
 1814 was framed, can be considered conclusive 
 until they are found to be consistent with the 
 system of political relations in Europe. 
 
12 
 
 On the present occasion then it may be 
 assumed, that those islands or countries which 
 are not comprehended in the cluster of the 
 Moluccas or Celebes, and have not been ac¬ 
 tually restored under the convention which 
 was concluded with the Netherlands govern¬ 
 ment in the year 1814, constitute a field that 
 is still open in the Eastern seas: Java, of 
 course, does not come within the scope of the 
 argument; and Bali, though not actually occu¬ 
 pied by the Dutch, is too near to their esta¬ 
 blishments to be, alone, Avorthy of consider¬ 
 ation. I proceed therefore to notice the com¬ 
 mercial facilities Avithin the space that remains 
 open; tracing the different positions round the 
 Eastern and Northern coast of Borneo, to the 
 Straits of Sincapore. 
 
 The Suluh islands, and that part of Borneo 
 which is dependent or tributary to them, come 
 first in this track, and may be considered to 
 include Magindano and the other islands, 
 
13 
 
 which do not acknowledge the authority of the 
 European government at Macassar. 
 
 A mission was sent to them from Batavia, in 
 the year 1814, for the purpose of renewing the 
 treaty which had been concluded in 1774, when 
 the island of Balambangan was taken possession 
 of, and the authority of the Suluh government 
 in Borneo was transferred to the East India 
 Company. It appears from the information then 
 obtained, that the government of the Suluhs is 
 nominally administered by a despotic sovereign, 
 but is in fact controlled by a few powerful 
 chiefs, who are the proprietors of the greater 
 part of the armed vessels, which, under the ge¬ 
 neral name of Ladrones, scour the adjacent 
 seas, and plunder indiscriminately whatever falls 
 in their way. The native chiefs in Magindano, 
 and of the extensive settlement in Celebes called 
 Tantoli, are also connected with them, and it 
 is estimated that the collective strength of these 
 piratical establishments will amount to about 
 200 armed prows, of different strength and di- 
 
14 . 
 
 mensions, and from six to seven thousand fight¬ 
 ing men. They make descents on the neigh¬ 
 bouring islands, and generally lay waste the 
 country where they land, and carry off the in¬ 
 habitants, whom they afterwards sell or employ 
 as slaves*. On their return the booty is di¬ 
 vided, and one-fourth of it falls to the share of 
 the Sultan and his principal chiefs. 
 
 The great Suluh island is the principal mar¬ 
 ket for the sale of their plunder; and the Ma- 
 gindano pirates resort thither for the same pur¬ 
 pose ; but besides this traffic, there is a regular 
 trade, principally with the annual junks from 
 China, and, by tacit agreement, no violence or 
 interruption is offered to it. The junks bring 
 
 * The following has been stated to have been the amount 
 of plunder in the year 1SI3-14. 
 
 A Spanish brig from Manilla. 
 
 Twenty small craft captured among the Philippines. 
 
 About 1000 slaves, Christian inhabitants of the Philip¬ 
 pines. - 
 
 A large coasting vessel from Macassar, the commander 
 of which was ransomed for 120 Spanish dollars. 
 
 And some small craft in the Moluccas. 
 
15 
 
 European manufactures, and coarse China 
 goods; and they convey back camphor, birds’- 
 nests, betle-nut, rattans, &c. including about 
 220 tons of mother of pearl shell, and a small 
 quantity of pearls. 
 
 Of the island of Borneo, and especially the 
 Bay of Malludu and the division termed Borneo 
 Proper on the north and north-west coast, the 
 following account has been given by the late 
 Dr. Leyden. “Borneo Proper is one of the 
 states which grows rice enough for its own con¬ 
 sumption; its camphor is the best in the world, 
 but does not exceed the annual quantity of 35 
 peculs of 133 pounds per pecul. When the ori¬ 
 ginal settlement was formed in Balambangan 
 in 1771) Mr. Jesse found that not more than 
 4000 peculs were produced; and I understand 
 the country still produces pepper equal at least 
 to that quantity. The trade between Borneo 
 and the Chinese port Ammoy is very consider¬ 
 able; according to Foster there were seven 
 junks at Borneo in 1775, and the return car- 
 
goes procured by the Chinese are chiefly cam¬ 
 phor, sea-slug, tortoise-shell, birds’-nests, dam- 
 mer, sandal-wood, rattans, and various articles 
 used in dying. 
 
 “ The commodities produced at Malludu are 
 nearly the same as at Borneo Proper; it abounds 
 particularly in rattans and clove bark, and is 
 reckoned well-peopled in the interior. It has a 
 deep bay, on the east side of which are pearl 
 banks. Magindano, the most easterly district 
 of Borneo, and dependent on the Suluhs, pro¬ 
 duces gold, birds’-nests, the species of red wood 
 called lakka,' and some camphor. Considerable 
 quantities of sea-slug and tortoise-shell may 
 also be procured from the numerous shoals and 
 islets along the coast.” 
 
 These extracts serve to confirm the observa¬ 
 tions already made on the subject of the ge¬ 
 neral produce of the Eastern islands ; and it 
 may be assumed from them, that although the 
 
 commodities thus to be immediately obtained 
 
17 
 
 would not of themselves furnish a return-cargo 
 of sufficient value to repay a direct commercial 
 intercourse with the north and north-east coast 
 of Borneo, there is abundant ground for con- 
 • sidering it an auxiliary in a general- plan, the 
 object ■ of which would be, to encourage and 
 protect a coasting trade, in order to collect ar¬ 
 ticles for the China market in exchange .for the 
 manufactures of Europe. 
 
 But it is not in this temporary point of view 
 only that the subject ought to be contemplated: 
 enough is known of the island of Borneo, to 
 justify a conclusion that it promises to prove 
 in time abundantly profitable. The range of 
 mountains in which the gold-mines of Mam- 
 pawa are situated extend also to the north¬ 
 ward ; gold and diamonds have been found in 
 other parts of Borneo, and to all appearance are 
 abundant a frequency of. commercial inter¬ 
 course with the people, and the increase of 
 wants that would arise from it, would no doubt 
 lead to the usual course of civilization, con- 
 C 
 
18 
 
 sumption, and demand. We know of nothing 
 that should interrupt this ordinary progress; 
 and even if it be not thought expedient to incur 
 the immediate expense of forming an establish¬ 
 ment, it must be prudent to interfere, lest other 
 nations establish themselves to our exclusion. 
 Let this be effected, and let the natives be en¬ 
 couraged by a free trade to their ports, it may 
 be expected that the full advantage will result 
 in due time. 
 
 The Eastern islands undoubtedly contain a 
 very considerable mart for the sale of British 
 manufactures. Broad cloths are highly prized 
 by the natives, and the demand for them would 
 augment in proportion to the means of purchas¬ 
 ing. Some kinds of hardware manufactures 
 would find a ready sale; iron is in demand, 
 particularly the Swedish; and the experience 
 of late years has shewn that cotton cloths, ma¬ 
 nufactured in this country in imitation of Malay 
 
 patterns, can be exported and sold below the 
 
 local sale price of the native manufacture.— 
 
This single fact is decisive of the importance 
 and extent to which the Eastern trade might 
 be carried. That' it is a fact may be proved on 
 reference to the results of the last year, when 
 these cotton cloths have found a ready and ad¬ 
 vantageous sale,.while the colonial markets have 
 been otherwise so overstocked with European 
 goods, that they scarcely have repaid the prime 
 cost. In short, the practicability of extending 
 the demand for this species of manufacture * 
 is bounded only, by the means of access to the 
 native population; and, as a general remark, 
 applicable to almost every branch of European 
 export, it may be observed, that as the inhabit¬ 
 ants of the Indian islands are acknowledged to 
 be free from those peculiar habits and prejudices 
 which restrict the use of European luxuries 
 among the Hindoo tribes, there is no reason 
 
 • It is somewhat curious to’trace the course of this trade. 
 Raw cotton imported from Bengal and Bombay (where it is 
 grown) is manufactured in Great Britain, and re-exported 
 in its manufactured state to a sure market. It would be 
 difficult to conceive a trade more beneficial to the mother 
 country throughout its progress. 
 
20 
 
 why au increase of civilization and wealth 
 among them should not lead to an increased 
 •demand for the luxuries of civilized society. 
 
 • Thus far the subject has been considered 
 principally with reference to the extension of a 
 direct trade from Europe; but there is still an¬ 
 other branchof it that ought not to be over¬ 
 looked, which is the commercial intercourse 
 that has of late years been carried on between 
 these islands and the possessions of the East 
 India Company. By a report framed at Pe¬ 
 nang, it appears that 2100 chests of opium were 
 exported from that settlement in the year 1813- 
 14 to different Eastern markets exclusive of 
 China ; and I have been informed that about 
 45 peculs of gold dust were received at Sambas 
 and Pontiana, during the same year, on account 
 of cargoes sold at those places. Notwithstanding, 
 therefore, that the market will have become 
 greatly contracted in consequence of the pro¬ 
 duce of the island of Java being no longer 
 available as a return for the cargoes exported 
 
21 
 
 from British India to the Eastern islands, there 
 might still be a valuable trade carried on -with 
 the independent native states; more especially 
 when it is considered that this trade would lie 
 near the ordinary track of ships proceeding 
 from British India to Canton; and consequently 
 the mercantile interests in India would be ma¬ 
 terially injured by any measure which tended 
 to establish a monopoly of the trade. of those 
 islands. 
 
 The same course of argument is equally ap¬ 
 plicable with reference to the existing British 
 trade at Canton. Edible birds’-nests, sea slug, 
 and the various articles of lesser value which 
 are also. among the luxuries of. the Chinese 
 table, are. the produce of the Indian.islands, 
 and find a ready.sale in China; on the;other 
 hand, our . woollen manufactures are-in use 
 throughout the Chinese empire, and are ex¬ 
 ported from thence to japan} and I understand 
 •that the demand for-our cotton goods has very 
 rapidly and materially increased in China within 
 
22 
 
 these last few years, and promises to become 
 even more productive*. This fact leads to a 
 conclusion, that by combining both sources of 
 supply, by exporting British' manufactures to 
 the Indian market and there collecting the lo¬ 
 cal products which are sure of a ready sale in 
 China, our domestic manufactures would find 
 additional vend, and our trade to China would 
 acquire importance in the estimation of the 
 Chinese themselves, a point of no small conse¬ 
 quence at any time, and especially now, when 
 the Americans are making rapid strides, and 
 threaten to acquire a superiority in the China 
 trade. 
 
 It would hardly, perhaps, be believed that 
 their progress was so considerable; but it is 
 a serious fact, that in the last year 1817-18, 
 the trade from America to China employed 
 7,000,000 dollars, and 16,000 tons of ship- 
 
 * This furnishes another proof of the importance of pro¬ 
 tecting and encouraging the course of the cotton manufac¬ 
 ture, which has already been alluded to. 
 
23 
 
 ping, while, during the same period of time, 
 the. British trade to China occupied 6,500,000 
 dollars, and 20,000 tons of shipping•, and con¬ 
 sequently, allowing that the American mer¬ 
 chant receives his return in the course of one 
 year while the British requires nearly tv. 
 years, the American trade to China is already 
 more extensive than our own. Yet still, though 
 the encroachments of the Americans are matter 
 of daily complaint, though their means of future 
 aggression go on increasing, and their present 
 attitude denotes an indifference, if not some¬ 
 thing more than indifference, towards the opi¬ 
 nion of this country, no means are taken to 
 meet their progress, or to occupy those com¬ 
 mercial resources which might enable us the 
 better to compete with them. 
 
 Among the Indian islands, the native trade 
 along the northern coast of Sumatra is exclu¬ 
 sively in the hands of the Americans: the com¬ 
 parative cheapness with which the American 
 merchants navigate their vessels, and the quick- 
 
ness with which they obtain their return cargo 
 (for the plain and obvious reason that they are 
 not delayed by official forms, but each indi¬ 
 vidual sells his goods as he can), enables them 
 to give a higher price for colonial produce than 
 the British merchant can afford to give.. They 
 usually purchase with specie, a circumstance 
 which gives them a decided preference at Ba¬ 
 tavia or any other of the Dutch settlements to 
 which they are allowed to resort, because the 
 payment in specie is of considerable moment in 
 the financial arrangements of the Java govern¬ 
 ment. They also trade in small vessels, cal¬ 
 culated to run with facility from port to port 
 along the coasts of the independent native states; 
 and from these collective causes they obtain an 
 advantage which can only be met by affording 
 corresponding facilities to the British merchant, 
 in securing for him also a market among the 
 Eastern islands, and permitting him to resort 
 to that market freely and without reserve. In 
 short, if the commercial resources of these 
 islands be at all admitted to be an auxiliary in 
 
25 
 
 the supply of the China market, every, argu¬ 
 ment, whether drawn from domestic interest or 
 foreign policy, seems to point out the advan¬ 
 tage, not to say the necessity, of fostering the 
 native industry of these islands, and obtaining 
 a permanent connexion among them. 
 
 In the progress of this course of things also, a 
 direct intercourse may possibly be established 
 with Cochin China. The greatest obstacle to the 
 success of former attempts has been found to 
 arise from the influence which the French mis¬ 
 sionaries had obtained at the court; and, as 
 many years have now elapsed since that period, 
 probably a new succession of rulers will have 
 produced new interests and views. The possibi¬ 
 lity may at any rate be adduced as a collateral 
 argument in favour of' an establishment near 
 the China Sea; because the vicinity of such an 
 establishment, and the connexions dependent 
 on it, would necessarily facilitate communica¬ 
 tion with Cochin China;. and the known pro¬ 
 ducts of that country, as well.as the particular 
 advantages of its locality with reference to 
 
26 
 
 China, Borneo, and the Philippines, would gua¬ 
 rantee an ample repayment of expense if the 
 attempt proved successful. 
 
 The same observation, though in a lesser de¬ 
 gree, may be applied to Japan; and it may not 
 be uninteresting to give a concise history of the 
 circumstances which have transpired from the 
 commercial adventures sent to that country, in 
 the years 1814 and 1815, from Batavia. 
 
 In the years 1813 and 1814 the local govern¬ 
 ment of Java resolved to send a mission to 
 Nangazacky, for the purpose of taking posses¬ 
 sion of the Dutch factory there, under the ca¬ 
 pitulation which stipulated for the surrender of 
 the several dependencies on Java, and, at the 
 same time, to take a proper opportunity of com¬ 
 municating to the Japanese government the 
 annihilation of Holland as a separate and inde¬ 
 pendent nation, the conquest of Java, and the 
 willingness of the existing government to con¬ 
 tinue the commercial relations which had here- 
 
27 
 
 tofore subsisted, and been annually carried on 
 from Batavia. This, however, was required to 
 be done with peculiar caution and delicacy, 
 because it was known that an edict had been is¬ 
 sued by the Japanese government some few years 
 before, directing acts of reprisal against British 
 ships, in consequence of their having taken of¬ 
 fence at supplies having been obtained in a 
 compulsatory manner by the commander of a 
 ship cruising in that neighbourhood. There 
 was nothing therefore in the appearance of the 
 present adventure that should disclose at once 
 its nature and object, the cargo was assorted 
 agreeably to former usage, and the ships were 
 to enter the harbour of Nangazacky according 
 to. ancient forms, and under Dutch colours. 
 
 Upon the arrival of the commissioners the 
 
 Dutch chief of the factory refused to consider 
 himself bound by the capitulation of Java; and, 
 by representing the danger that would result if 
 he were to, make known to the Japanese go¬ 
 vernor the real character of the expedition, in- 
 
duced the commissioners to agree that the com¬ 
 mercial adventure should be carried through 
 according to former usage, and without any 
 political proceedings whatever. The commis¬ 
 sion therefore returned without having effected 
 the main object of the voyage. 
 
 But the government at Batavia were by no 
 means satisfied with this procedure; they con¬ 
 sidered the failure to have been mainly owing 
 to the intrigue of the officers of the factory; 
 and they were strengthened in this opinion .by 
 the following circumstance. It is customary that 
 on the departure of the ships from Nangazacky 
 for Batavia at the close of the annual consign¬ 
 ment, a private signal is given to ensure the 
 admission and friendly reception of the follow¬ 
 ing year; and when, on the present occasion, 
 this custom was renewed, the Japanese inter¬ 
 preters (who are the channel of communication 
 between the factory and the governor of Nan¬ 
 gazacky) secretly gave the commissioners a 
 duplicate of the next year’s signal, in order 
 
29 
 
 that no intrigue of the Dutch chief 'of the fac¬ 
 tory might prevent their return to Japan; in¬ 
 timating to them, at the same time, that the real 
 character of the expedition was no secret. 
 
 It was therefore determined to repeat the at¬ 
 tempt in the year following;—but during the 
 interval the situation of affairs had become 
 changed by the arrival of intelligence of the 
 results of the battle of Waterloo; and the fur¬ 
 ther prosecution of the plan was abandoned, 
 except that one ship was sent to Japan in the 
 years 1814 and 1815, with a cargo which had 
 been already prepared. 
 
 I shall conclude this part of the subject with 
 some information, obtained from the persons 
 employed on this occasion, and annex in an 
 appendix* an abstract of the results of con¬ 
 signments to Japan, in further illustration of it. 
 
 The Dutch trade from Batavia to Japan is 
 
 • Vide appendix. 
 
30 
 
 regulated by specific agreement as to its extent 
 and description. The export cargo from Ba¬ 
 tavia consists of sugar, -woollens, piece goods, 
 and small quantities of glass ware, spices, and 
 ornamental fancy articles; in return for which, 
 copper, camphor, silks, and lacquered ware, are 
 received from the Japanese. The price of the 
 merchandize is settled before the annual adven¬ 
 ture commences; only a small sum of money 
 is allowed to be brought to Japan, and no part 
 of the cargo is paid for in specie, the Japanese 
 laws prohibiting the exportation of the precious 
 metals under any form; the whole trade there¬ 
 fore consists in barter, and the profit depends 
 
 cargo. At the close of one year’s consignment 
 the quantity and assortment of the following 
 year’s cargo is determined, and a list is sent 
 to Batavia for the guidance of the authorities 
 accordingly. 
 
 It has been the opinion of many of the best 
 informed persons, however, that these restric- 
 
31 
 
 tions on the quantity of cargo are very much 
 owing to the mismanagement or intrigues of the 
 officers of the factory, whose interest it is that 
 the trade should not be so extensive as to , 
 interfere with their own privilege, or require 
 more than one chief officer to conduct it; and 
 the commissioner who went to Nangazacky in 
 the year 1814 expressly declares, that, in his 
 opinion, the present state of the trade is no cri¬ 
 terion for judging of the extent to which it 
 might be carried;—he says, “ The climate, the 
 habits of the people, and their freedom from 
 any prejudices that would obstruct the opera¬ 
 tion of these natural causes, would open a vent 
 
 for numerous articles of European comfort and 
 
 luxury. The consumption of woollens and 
 hard ware might be rendered almost unli¬ 
 mited ;—they are fond of the finer specimens 
 of the glass manufacture, and the returns from 
 Japan, which have hitherto been limited to 
 their copper and camphor, some lacquered 
 ware, a small quantity of silks, and a few other 
 things of trifling importance, may be extended 
 
to a long list. Specimens of teas, pitch, borax, 
 iron, cinnabar, linseed oil, whale oil, and other 
 articles which may be obtained, have been 
 brought to Java by this opportunity.” 
 
 The same gentleman has also observed, that 
 so far as his local knowledge enabled him to 
 form a judgment, the real difficulties of in¬ 
 troducing the British flag in Japan, inasmuch as 
 they depend on the character and political in¬ 
 stitutions of the Japanese, are much less than 
 they have been represented to be. He was 
 of opinion, that the ill success of the attempts 
 hitherto made has been chiefly owing to the 
 misrepresentations which it has been the policy 
 of the Dutch government to keep up, in order 
 to secure their own commercial monopoly; and 
 that the failure of the Russian embassy in 1804, 
 as well as the offence taken at the entrance of. 
 the British frigate into the harbour'of Nanga- 
 ;zacky in the year 1808, may be in a great mea¬ 
 sure attributed to the effects of this policy. In 
 short, from the various opinions expressed by 
 
33 
 
 persons who were at Nangazacky with the com¬ 
 mercial adventure in 1813 and 1814, it seems 
 reasonable to conclude that, although the re¬ 
 cent re-establishment of the Dutch factory 
 under its ancient forms will have re-opened the 
 usual supply of European goods, and will con¬ 
 sequently have taken away the particular ad¬ 
 vantages that were to be contemplated while the 
 British authority ruled in Java, there is still suf¬ 
 ficient prospect of success to justify an attempt 
 being-made, if the objects to be acquired be 
 considered worth the expense of a trial. And 
 this conclusion is confirmed by the following 
 circumstance:—When at the close of the com- 
 merclal consignment sent in the ; 1 .yearS' 1814 
 and 1815, the chief of the 1 factory, calculating 
 on the change which had taken place in Eu¬ 
 rope, renewed his' declaration that he would 
 not receive another consignment except on his 
 own terms, he requested the Japanese inter- 
 nreters to transmit a declaration, on their part, 
 that. they could not answer for the conse¬ 
 quences of any departure from the plan which 
 
34 
 
 he proposed. The interpreters did so; but 
 they concluded by saying—“ It is, however, of 
 no importance who is sent as chief of the fac¬ 
 tory, provided a lasting peace has been esta¬ 
 blished at Batavia.” This expression could only 
 imply, that if the government had become 
 settled, whether English or Dutch, the trade 
 might be continued; because it is very evi¬ 
 dent that the Japanese knew the real character 
 of the expeditions sent from Batavia by the 
 British authorities, and were aware of the con¬ 
 quest of Java; and as no doubt was ever en¬ 
 tertained of the Dutch being received at Nan- 
 gazacky, the remark was useless if applied to 
 the Netherlands government only. 
 
 Upon the whole, then, I think it may be as¬ 
 sumed, that, in a commercial point of view, 
 there is a considerable opening among the In¬ 
 dian islands, which it would be desirable to 
 occupy, before the further advances of other 
 nations shall have excluded us altogether. It 
 remains to shew, that the longer this question 
 
35 
 
 is postponed, the greater will be the difficulty 
 as well as necessity of acting with effect; and 
 that it is politically expedient to obtain a naval 
 
 station in the Eastern seas, while it can be done 
 
 without injury to the just rights of others. 
 
 The only power with whom there would at 
 present be any actual contact is the govern¬ 
 ment of the Netherlands; it is necessary, there¬ 
 fore, to consider, what are the rights which that 
 government has acquired by the convention 
 concluded in the year 1814. This convention 
 has restored the factories and establishments 
 which the Dutch possessed in the Eastern seas 
 in the commencement of 1803, viz. Java and its 
 dependencies, Celebes, and the smaller islands 
 situated in the straits of Macassar, the Moluc¬ 
 cas, Malacca on the Malay peninsula, and sun¬ 
 dry establishments on the island of Sumatra: 
 it has also ceded to them the island of Banca; 
 but'as it contains no explanatory article what¬ 
 ever, there is still this question, as before ob¬ 
 served, whether a formal abandonment by the 
 
Dutch government, subsequently to January, 
 1803 , of establishments which had been held 
 by them previously to that date, constitutes an 
 exclusion of such establishments from the pro¬ 
 visions of the convention of 1814 ? And on the 
 decision upon this point would depend the pre¬ 
 sent right of the Netherlands government to 
 consider their former factories on the island of 
 Borneo as a part of the recent restitution. 
 
 It is evident, from what has already been 
 stated, that the commercial relations between 
 Great Britain and Holland, in the Eastern seas, 
 are not the same now as they were when the 
 Dutch were in the plenitude of their commer¬ 
 cial monopoly in that quarter of the world. Of 
 late years, the British have acquired a direct 
 and frequent intercourse with the native states 
 in the Indian Archipelago, and, from that in¬ 
 tercourse, have established new relations which 
 have assisted in augmenting the amount of 
 capital employed in the British trade to China. 
 The Dutch, therefore, can no longer exercise 
 
37 
 
 the same restrictive policy and nominal con¬ 
 trol among the Eastern states, without com¬ 
 mitting a positive injury on the trade which has 
 been legitimately acquired by Great Britain; 
 nor can they extend their control over Borneo 
 and the Straits of Malacca, without encroach¬ 
 ing beyond the bounds which the convention 
 of 1814 has restored to them; consequently, 
 much depends on the system of policy pursued 
 by the present government of Java. 
 
 Now the whole course of proceedings adopted 
 by that government tends to revive the former 
 system of monopoly and exclusion. They com¬ 
 menced, at the time of the restitution of Java, 
 by refusing to admit the slightest interference, 
 or any community of interests, on the part of 
 the British government in the possessions ceded 
 or restored to them: it was their earnest en¬ 
 deavour to induce the natives to conclude that 
 Great Britain had no longer any regard or in¬ 
 fluence in their behalf. They have since an- 
 
38 
 
 nulled the very treaty by which the power of 
 ceding the island of Eanca to them was ob¬ 
 tained, and have sent the sultan of Palembang 
 a prisoner to Batavia, as a punishment for his 
 having solicited that protection which he was 
 justly entitled to expect from the British na¬ 
 tion ; and it appears, by recent accounts, that 
 they have assumed a paramount authority at 
 Banjarmassin, at Sambas, and at Pontiana, and 
 declare the Netherlands government to be the 
 sovereign of Borneo. But one step more is 
 wanting; if, with the same system and views, 
 they establish themselves also on the western 
 side of the China sea; if they obtain the islands 
 of Bintang and Lingin, and of the south-east 
 coast of the Malay peninsula, (positions which 
 they are known to have in Anew) the British 
 merchant will become wholly excluded from 
 direct trade to the Indian islands, and will not 
 have one port between Penang and China to 
 which he can resort, except under the control 
 and direction of a foreign power. The Nether- 
 
lands government have Batavia on one side, and 
 seek to obtain Rbio* on the other; by the for- 
 mer they already command the Straits of Sunda, 
 by the latter they would acquire a naval station 
 at the entrance from the Straits of Malacca to 
 the China sea; while the possession of Malacca 
 and Johore, on the southern Malay coast, would 
 complete their command of these straits; and 
 thus the direct route of the British trade to 
 China would have to pass along a line of foreign 
 settlements, while Great Britain would possess 
 no naval station nearer than Ceylon and Pe¬ 
 nang. The vexatious difficulties to which this 
 state of things would lead, and the eventual in¬ 
 security of the British trade, under such cir¬ 
 cumstances, must be too obvious to require 
 .comment. 
 
 .. The local enactments of the Java government 
 lead also to the same system of exclusion. By 
 ■regulations passed last year, foreign vessels are 
 
 * The chief port and harbour in the island of Bintang. 
 
40 
 
 not permitted to touch at the minor ports in 
 Java; all the cargo must be taken in at the port 
 from which the vessel is cleared out, an import 
 and export duty of twelve per cent, is imposed, 
 while six per cent, is paid on the cargoes of 
 Netherlands ships; and it is also understood that 
 the old system has been revived of requiring 
 all native traders at the ports under the con¬ 
 trol of the Netherlands government, to take 
 
 passes from the resident European authority; 
 a practice which necessarily tends to force the 
 native trade to such ports as the Java govern¬ 
 ment may prefer, and restricts other nations 
 from a direct participation therein. 
 
 In whatever point of view, therefore, the 
 question is considered, it seems essential to in¬ 
 terpose for the purpose of preventing the re¬ 
 vival of this injurious and pernicious system; 
 injurious as it regards the legitimate pretensions 
 of other nations, and pernicious as it presents 
 a barrier against that improvement of the native 
 population, which, in the present enlightened 
 
41 
 
 state of Europe, ought to be a subject of ge¬ 
 neral anxiety. It might not, indeed, he so im¬ 
 mediately destructive to the commercial in¬ 
 terests of Great Britain, if the government of 
 the Netherlands were satisfied with what the 
 convention of 1814 has restored, and would not 
 seek to establish their control over countries 
 which were not in contemplation when that 
 
 convention was concluded; but every act of 
 
 that government is of a different tendency; and 
 the very great exertions which have been made, 
 and are still making, shew the importance at¬ 
 tached to the object. The latest advices men¬ 
 tion, that the Netherlands government have a 
 squadron of ships of war at Batavia considerably 
 larger than that which Great Britain retains in 
 the Indian seas, and have about 10,000 Eu¬ 
 ropean troops in their Eastern settlements, in¬ 
 dependently of their colonial corps. With what 
 view can this expense be incurred, unless to 
 establish a supreme authority in that quarter of 
 the world ? . 
 
42 
 
 Surely, then, it would be injudicious to delay 
 until these plans have become matured, and 
 have acquired that plea which a continued pos¬ 
 session and a lapse of time would give to them. 
 The acts of the local government of Java, whe¬ 
 ther in taking possession of factories and esta¬ 
 blishments which were not held by the Dutch 
 government in the year 1803, such as Sambas 
 and Pontiana, or in restricting the independent 
 native trade, as in assuming a supremacy over 
 the island of Borneo, cannot of themselves he 
 considered sufficient to constitute a right of 
 possession; and it will still remain open to 
 other nations, particularly to Great Britain, un¬ 
 der the relations in which she stands with the 
 government of the Netherlands, to interpose 
 and remove the seeds of future dispute, by a li¬ 
 beral and friendly adjustment of the fair pre¬ 
 tensions of both parties. Moreover, the results 
 of the late restitution of Java and its depend¬ 
 encies afford a means of mutual concession and 
 sacrifice, if such be required. There is a balance 
 
43 
 
 of about 500,000/. sterling, which is admitted 
 to be due to the British government, in the 
 transfer of Java to the government of the Ne¬ 
 therlands ; and there is a further sum of about 
 250,000/., disputed indeed, but which is claimed 
 for the British government on just and equita¬ 
 ble grounds. Why may not the settlement of 
 these demands be united with an adjustment 
 of the future commerce of the Indian Archi¬ 
 pelago, on that system of liberal and generous 
 policy which is consistent with the acknow¬ 
 ledged views of the ruling powers in Europe, 
 and with the amicable relations now subsisting 
 between Great Britain and the Netherlands ? 
 
 An adjustment of this nature may be con¬ 
 sidered in two points of view; separately, as in-. 
 eluding only those countries where the Nether¬ 
 lands government had not, at the date of the 
 latest advices from that quarter, actually formed 
 any establishment; or, more collectively, as in¬ 
 cluding those positions which have been occu¬ 
 pied since the restitution of Java, but which 
 
were not actually transferred with Java at the 
 time of that restitution. 
 
 The Netherlands government have no pos¬ 
 sessions to the westward of the island of Banca, 
 excepting Malacca, which factory, if not com¬ 
 prehended in one general system of possessing 
 every thing to the eastward of Penang, would 
 be of no great value to them. It may also, 
 I presume, be granted, that the government 
 of the Netherlands has no right, under the 
 terms of the convention of 1814, to claim a 
 supremacy over minor ports, which were some 
 forty years ago subject to the control of the 
 Dutch, but had been formally abandoned by 
 them previously to the year 1803; and, under 
 this point of view, the native state of Johore, 
 situated on the south-east point of the Malay 
 peninsula, is free to form engagements with 
 other European powers, while no claim can 
 exist on the states of Rhio and Lingin, be¬ 
 cause the supremacy of the Dutch has never 
 been established in those islands. 
 
45 
 
 The island of Bintang, in which is situated 
 the port and harbour of Rhio, is about thirty 
 miles in length, and ten miles in breadth, and 
 contains about 7000 inhabitants; and Rhio, as has 
 been already noticed in a former part of these 
 observations, having long been the resort of 
 
 the Malay and Chinese traders, is peculiarly 
 well situated for a commercial station: the har¬ 
 bour will contain from twenty to thirty large 
 ships, in safe and excellent anchorage, but is 
 liable to objection, in consequence of the ap¬ 
 proach to it through the straits of Rhio being 
 somewhat intricate, and impeded by a shoal, 
 which renders the channel narrow for ships of 
 burden; I am, however, informed, that the sea 
 is almost constantly calm and quiet, and that 
 the difficulty of entrance is not so great as to 
 be attended with danger. Bintang furnishes 
 fresh provisions, and good water in abundance, 
 and the neighbouring island of Lingen is rich 
 in the ordinary produce of the Indian islands, 
 particularly in gambier, which is an article in 
 constant use among the Javanese and Malays. 
 
46 
 
 Rhio, therefore, would become a valuable mart 
 or emporium, where the merchandise exported 
 from Great Britain, or British India, might be 
 collected and exchanged for the products of 
 the Indian islands calculated for the China 
 market} it would also be a central station, 
 whence a further connexion with the inde¬ 
 pendent native states might be formed, and an 
 adequate squadron be placed, when necessary, 
 in the ordinary track of the British trade to 
 China. 
 
 I have before remarked that the Dutch had 
 not any possession or control in the islands of 
 Bintang and Lingin in the year 180 3 , and no 
 trace is to be discovered among the collection 
 of treaties and contracts with native states, 
 which were found among the records at Ba¬ 
 tavia, of their ever having exercised, in these 
 i sl a n ds, the supremacy which they had else¬ 
 where established in the Indian Archipelago. 
 The circumstance also of a mission having 
 some months ago been sent to Rhio by the 
 
47 
 
 governor general in council at Fort William, 
 for the purpose of forming an establishment 
 there, provided the Netherlands government 
 had not already preceded us, confirms tills opi¬ 
 nion, because it may be presumed that the act 
 of having sent this mission proves that no 
 known obstacle existed on the ground of any 
 right possessed by another nation. The na¬ 
 tive chiefs of Bintang and Rhio may conse¬ 
 quently be considered independent of the con¬ 
 trol of any European power, and free to select 
 that connexion which is most agreeable to 
 themselves; and they have more than once ex¬ 
 pressed a desire to receive a British establish¬ 
 ment, and their willingness to conclude a treaty 
 for that purpose. 
 
 If this mission has been successful, the posses¬ 
 sion of Rhio will of course become the nucleus 
 whence the farther connection with the native 
 states will proceed; and if not successful, it be¬ 
 comes the more necessary to interpose and to fix 
 the commercial relations in the Eastern seas on 
 
a secure and decided footing, before the local 
 clashing of interests has led to injury and 
 dispute. 
 
 If then it be asked what position of circum¬ 
 stances would be most likely to remove the local 
 causes of difference between Great Britain and 
 the Netherlands, the question may be readily 
 answered by suggesting that the eastern side of 
 the Straits of Sunda and the western side of the 
 China sea should become the boundary of the 
 respective establishments of the two nations j 
 thus leaving Sumatra and Banca, together with 
 the Straits of Malacca and the adjacent islands, 
 to be occupied by the British, while the Dutch 
 retained Borneo, Java, and the different islands 
 to the eastward of the Straits of Sunda. 
 
 But if such an arrangement were found to in¬ 
 volve too many of the positions which have un¬ 
 fortunately been conceded and overlooked when 
 the convention of 1814 was concluded, the Bri¬ 
 tish trade ought at any rate to have free access 
 
to all the ports where the local administration 
 and government of the country is not exercised 
 by the European power who controls its trade, 
 and appropriates its produce. The custom of 
 the Dutch government has been to establish a 
 single public agent as director of the local trade 
 of a port, and obtain a treaty or contract with 
 the native chief to the exclusion of other na¬ 
 tions; but it can hardly be sufficient in the 
 present state of the Indian commerce, that the 
 residence of a harbour-master and a few indivi¬ 
 dual merchants should constitute an exclusive 
 right of possession: nor. can it be admitted that 
 a treaty concluded with a native prince or chief, 
 in which the sovereignty of his country is ceded 
 to the Netherlands government, should convey 
 to that government a dominion over territories 
 not actually held or administered by the prince 
 who thus cedes them. Yet it is in history that 
 the power of the Dutch government in the 
 Indian Archipelago was raised by their treaties 
 with the native states having been made to 
 comprehend the cession of all islands which 
 
50 
 
 have at any former period acknowledged the 
 supremacy of that state, but were not actually 
 in subjection or tributary to it at the time of 
 the treaty being concluded; and it is only in 
 this way' that the Netherlands government can 
 now pretend to a sovereignty over the island 
 of Borneo. 
 
 Thos epositions, therefore, which are not al¬ 
 ready occupied should be obtained without fur¬ 
 ther delay; the recent proceedings of the go¬ 
 vernment-general in India should be supported 
 and maintained; and it then remains to con¬ 
 clude such further arrangements for the more 
 clear and better understanding of the com¬ 
 merce of the Eastern seas, and for that ame¬ 
 lioration and freedom of intercourse which 
 the numerous population in these countries 
 have a just right to expect. 
 
 It may be urged perhaps that the natives in 
 the Indian Archipelago are in a state of anarchy 
 and uncivilization, which unfits them for en- 
 
gaging in peaceable intercourse, and renders it 
 improbable that the trade with them would be¬ 
 come of sufficient value to repay the expense, 
 much less justify'any sacrifice to obtain it. But 
 although I am free to admit that the intro¬ 
 duction of regular commercial habits, and the 
 abolition of their present custom of having their 
 vessels equally prepared for plunder or for trade, 
 cannot be the work of a moment, I believe that 
 the barbarism of these tribes has been very 
 greatly exaggerated, and I am satisfied that 
 their piratical habits are very much owing to 
 the state of degradation in which they have 
 been held. Remove the cause, and the effect 
 would cease; permit them to enjoy quietly and 
 without restraint the fruits of industry, and 
 there is no peculiar difficulty that should pre¬ 
 vent the usual progress of freedom and of ci¬ 
 vilization among them. The same report was 
 given of the inhabitants of Java, and was cre¬ 
 dited until the experience of the British ad¬ 
 ministration in that island had shewn that there 
 exists not a people more mild in character and 
 
more accessible to kindness than the Javanese 
 are; and although the present habits of the 
 Malay tribes are less refined and civilized, there 
 is no reason to suppose that they are more in¬ 
 accessible than their neighbours. I will not 
 pretend to say that the first British vessels trad¬ 
 ing to their ports would in every instance meet 
 with the reception or the profit that could be 
 wished,' more especially in the first opening of 
 the communication; but what I am anxious to 
 establish is, that the means may be found, within 
 the circle above described, of ameliorating the 
 condition of some millions of our fellow-crea¬ 
 tures, and of obtaining, with that amelioration, 
 a permanent and material advancement of our 
 own national prosperity. 
 
 A conquest of the countries, or even a re¬ 
 sident control over the government of them, 
 would not be either necessary or politic; it is 
 sufficient to form such connexions with them as 
 would prevent any other nation assuming that 
 control to our exclusion, and establishing a mo-- 
 
53 
 
 nopoly destructive to the local industry of the 
 population. This might, I conceive, he effected 
 by the possession of an establishment in their 
 neighbourhood, which, at the same tune that 
 it offered to them a market for the purchase 
 of their commodities and the supply of their 
 wants, should contain a sufficient naval force 
 to command respect and ensure protection; 
 and, as our commercial relations extended, a 
 second such establishment might be added, and 
 communications be occasionally held with the 
 neighbouring states, or in particular instances, 
 an officer of inferior rank be sent to reside 
 as an agent. A more extended plan than this 
 would not, I presume, be required; for it would 
 be an essential part of the system to leave the 
 native trader perfectly free from restraint; and 
 if the commercial objects in contemplation are 
 to be effectually sought for, the British mer¬ 
 chant should be at liberty to trade freely to the 
 different ports, and to make his. engagements 
 as best suited his own convenience; with no 
 
54 
 
 greater restrictions than what may be found 
 absolutely necessary to secure to the East In¬ 
 dia Company the exclusive commercial privi¬ 
 leges which they already possess in China. 
 
 An establishment at the port of Rhio, and 
 either the North-west part of Borneo, or near 
 the Suluh islands, would embrace the extremes 
 of a first undertaking, and would not trespass 
 on the known rights or possessions of any 
 other power. There is a harbour on the coast 
 of Borneo Proper; and in the Suluh islands, 
 although Suluh itself is not a convenient port, 
 an excellent harbour is formed with the main 
 island by Pulo Talain, which contains a safe 
 and extensive anchorage, and is in the vicinity 
 of a well cultivated country, abounding with 
 good water and supplies. 
 
 Or, if the establishments which have been 
 recently formed on the Western coast of Bor¬ 
 neo can be matter of negotiation, and the trade 
 
55 
 
 to that coast can be recovered, Pontiana will 
 naturally become a principal place of resort. 
 The trade of this port is considerable *; there 
 is a population of between 40 and 50,000 Chi¬ 
 nese residing near the gold-mines, who have a 
 domestic government among themselves, but 
 pay tribute to the Malay sultan' of Pontiana; 
 and the revenues of this chief are estimated to 
 average 180,000 dollars per annum, including a 
 capitation tax on the Chinese, at the rate of one 
 Spanish dollar per head; and the value of 50 
 bankals of gold, which is the amount of the 
 
 * The annual demand for the Pontiana market is estimated 
 to require 
 
 8 to 10,000 bales of piece goods, 
 
 250 to 300 chests of opium, 
 
 1000 peculs of Swedish iron, 
 
 300 peculs of steel, and, 
 
 400 coyangs of salt; 
 
 besides cotton cloths of Malay patterns, a few bales of broad¬ 
 cloths, some chintzes, hardware, &c. And this independ¬ 
 ently of the Malay and China trade to the port. 
 
 In return, Pontiana furnishes about 20 peculs of gold; 
 some diamonds, birds’-nests, camphor, betle-nut, and other 
 articles which have already been enumerated, as being com¬ 
 mon to the islands in this Archipelago. 
 
o6 
 
 revenue paid on the produce of the mines *. 
 The trade to this port had, previously to the 
 
 restitution of Java to his Netherlands majesty’s 
 government, been for several years in the hands 
 of the free merchants resident in the East In¬ 
 dia Company’s possessions; and it is a tribute 
 justly due to the judgment and foresight of 
 Sir Stamford Raffles to add, that if his views 
 and wishes had been carried into execution, 
 a chain of establishments, wholly unconnected 
 with the conquest of Java and independent of 
 the provisional possession of that island, would 
 have been formed along the track of the China 
 sea, and would have obtained without difficulty 
 every one of those national objects of which it 
 may with truth be said, that the longer they 
 are delayed, the greater will be found to be 
 the necessity of looking after them. 
 
 At the same time I think it may be asserted, 
 
 * It is calculated, but the information is not so complete 
 as to mate the calculation at all certain, that about 50 parets 
 of gold are annually obtained from the mines in Succadana. 
 
57 
 
 that the plan which it is the object of these 
 remarks to recommend to public notice would 
 not only require no considerable expense in the 
 first instance, but may even be considered 
 economical, if it be admitted that the security 
 of the commercial interests of this country 
 renders it advisable to have a naval station 
 more near to the China sea than at present. 
 
 After the first cost of placing the new esta¬ 
 blishment in a posture of security against fo¬ 
 reign aggression, and of constructing those 
 works of defence which every distant position 
 must require, no large expense would be ne¬ 
 cessary to conduct the details of an admini¬ 
 stration which is intended principally for com¬ 
 mercial purposes without monopoly, and does 
 not contemplate any acquisition of territory, 
 nor any direction of the internal government of 
 other countries. In time of peace, therefore, it 
 would require no larger defensive means than 
 those which are thought necessary in the 
 neighbouring British settlements, and when- 
 
5S 
 
 ever war takes place it immediately acquires an 
 
 increase of value and importance, which would, 
 even with the most scrupulous person, justify a 
 larger expenditure on account of it. 
 
 Should a war occur in Europe, which though 
 sincerely to be deprecated cannot he consi¬ 
 dered to he an impossibility, our China trade 
 would have to pass along a line of foreign 
 ports;-should war at any time occur -with the Ne¬ 
 therlands government, that line of ports would 
 become actively hostile; and even in the event 
 of a war with the United States of America, 
 it is of importance to possess a harbour near 
 the China seas, because experience has shewn 
 that the Americans make the entrance of the 
 Straits of Sunda a principal station for then- 
 cruisers, and resort to the neighbouring bays 
 for water during their cruise. In any case of 
 war therefore the facilities which the new 
 estab lishm ent would then possess in affording 
 a naval station for the protection of the China 
 trade would soon repay the expense, if it were 
 
59 
 
 only in the single circumstance of lessening 
 the distance of convoys. 
 
 Moreover, if the British flag were established 
 at Rhio, other establishments might be consi¬ 
 derably reduced; there could then be no ques¬ 
 tion as to the practicability of dispensing with 
 a separate government and council, at Prince 
 of Wales island; and the savings effected in 
 the one instance may very fairly be set off 
 against the expense incurred ni the other. Pe¬ 
 nang, since it has been pronounced by pro¬ 
 fessional authority to be inconvenient as a 
 naval station, derives its value from the pro¬ 
 portion of native trade resorting to it, or as it 
 it may be considered an emporium to the Bri¬ 
 tish merchant trading to the Eastern islands or 
 China. It was this commerce which contributed 
 so much to raise its prosperity after the con¬ 
 quest of Malacca, and when Java was held in a 
 state of blockade; but the same causes have 
 ceased to exist; for, whether Rhio become a 
 
60 
 
 British possession or not, the settlement in Prince 
 of Wales’s Island cannot expect to recover what 
 it has lost; because if a new establishment be 
 formed at Rhio, the native traders will un¬ 
 doubtedly rather go to that port than to Pe¬ 
 nang; and if the policy of the Netherlands 
 government be successful, the native trade 
 will not be suffered to find its way direct 
 into any British port whatever. In either case, 
 therefore, the expense of government at Prince 
 of Wales’s Island is susceptible of reduction; 
 and any amount so gained may be considered 
 to come in aid of an establishment which has 
 in view the very same objects that were 
 contemplated in securing the possession of 
 Penang. 
 
 - With this remark I shall conclude the pre¬ 
 sent observations; and they lead to a fur¬ 
 ther investigation of the subject of them, by 
 any person better informed than myself with 
 regard to’ it, or induce a more general at- 
 
61 
 
 tention to the propriety of obtaining a posi¬ 
 tion in the Indian Archipelago, while yet it 
 can be done without aggression on the legi¬ 
 timate rights of other nations, my object in 
 offering them to public notice will have been 
 accomplished. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
A 
 
 Abstract Account of the Annual Commercial Adventure, from Batavia to Japan, in the Year 1806 . 
 
 To invoice price of the outward bound cargo 
 Charges at Batavia . . . 5,692 < 
 
 Freight of two ships, at 100 dollars 
 
 Charges at Japan. 
 
 Presents to the Emperor . . 10,800 0 
 
 Ditto to inferior officers at the court 5,516 0 
 Ditto to the Japanese guard 
 
 *-1 ~t— -<■ ^ ie Q om j. 
 
 Annual salary of t the Company's of¬ 
 ficers . . . 1,345 0 
 
 Ditto table allowance ditto . 3,750 O 
 
 Commission, 5 per cent, on the cargo 7,143 0 
 
 Annual rent to the Japanese . 3,462 O 
 
 Charges in landing and storing cargo 3,036 0 
 
 Short deliveries and petty charges . 2,193 30 
 
 Purchase of Homeward-bound Cargo. 
 8,520 pcculs of copper, of 1203 lbs. 
 d the pecul . . . 73,485 40 
 
 640 ditto of camphor, ditto . 7.360 0 
 
 Bales . . 413 8 
 
 4,500 chests for packing copper . 791 Ifi 
 
 2/200 planks for dunnage . . 247 32 
 
 By sale proceeds, at Japan, of the outward cargo 100,557 3o 
 Presents from the Emperor . . . 2.812 32 
 
 By amount sales of 8,238 peculs of copper, a 
 Spanish dollars per pecul 
 Ditto camphor, at 40 stuivers per lb. 
 
 Amount debits 
 
 Balance, being tbe profit on tills concern 
 
 (A true copy) 
 
 Batavia, tlic stb of December, 18|4. 
 
 J, G, BAUER, 
 
B 
 
 Account of the Commercial Adventure sent to Japan in the Year J813—14. 
 
 To invoice coat of outward-bound cargo . • 1 
 
 Allowance to the chief of tho Factory for 1400 pc- 
 culs of copper 
 . Freight of two ships 
 Presents to the Emperor 
 
 oiTiccrs employed or 
 Sundry,charges, ua per statement 
 Balance due to, the Treasury at Nanguzacky, and 
 
 , venture ..... 
 
 Amount credit side . A 
 Balance in favour of the voyage 
 To which is to be added 
 
 The debt of the former Dutch government to the 
 Emperor of Japan, which has been paid out of 
 the proceeds of this cargo, viz. 
 
 Cr. 
 
 By Cargo brought from Japan. 
 902,452 lbs. of copper, at 61 T fc Spanish dollars 
 per pecul (this price being estimated instead of 
 50 Spanish dollars} because u considerable part 
 of it is used in the coinage of colonial copper 
 duitsinJuva, and this coinage gives more than 
 84 dollars per pecul of copper) . . A 
 
 GO,437'lbs. of cumplior, which has been sold by 
 
 Add 
 
 Damaged goods brought back and sold . 
 Advances left at Nungazacky for the ex¬ 
 penses of the journey of tlic resident 
 
 
c 
 
 Account of the Adventure sent from Batavia to Japan in the Year 1814—15. 
 
 Dr. 
 
 Invoice cost of the outward cargo 
 Freight of tlic ship- 
 
 Allowance to the chief of the factory for 700 pe 
 culs of copper 
 Presents to the Emperor 
 Interest ...» 
 
 Insurance . . • 
 
 Petty charges 
 
 Salaries to the officers employed from Batavia 
 
 Balance due to the Emperor of Japan, lent for the 
 purpose of completing the expenses in the be¬ 
 ginning of the year 1815 
 
 Total 
 
 Balance in favour of this voyage 
 Spanish dollars 
 
 Camphor, Dutch weight 290 40, 
 Copper . . 6,470 112f, 
 
 Pitch . ! ’24 0, 
 
 sold for ... 
 
 50 Japan gowns, sold for . 
 
 By II, Bocjf. 
 
 Amount of cash left with him for de¬ 
 fraying the charges attendant on 
 the customary journey to Jedo, 
 
 in the year 1815 . 
 
 Amount of woollens for the same 
 purpose ... 
 
 Batavia, the 21th of October, 1815 . 
 
 eivedfrom Japan , 
 
 190,558 10 
 
 
D 
 
 Particulars of the Cargo exported from Batavia to Japan, in 
 the Year 1806, on account of the Government. 
 
 1,269,679 lbs. of Sugar 
 25,000 — Tin 
 102,000 — Sappan wood 
 17,087 — Cloves 
 10,000 — Pepper 
 100 — Nutmegs 
 6,000 — Cotton thread 
 6,082 ells of Woollens 
 2,842 — Kerseymeres 
 778 — Plush 
 59 ps. of Fustians 
 40 — Roselets 
 20 — Carpets, English 
 1,873 — Kerseys 
 4,900 — Chintzes, Bengal 
 590 — Ditto, Guzerat 
 190 — Cabayahs, Malabar 
 240 — Palempores, 
 
 And sundry small quantities of 
 Fish skins. Elephants teeth, and 
 other articles. 
 
 3,500 Ducatoons 
 
Articles shipped from Batasiia for Japan in the Year 1813—14. 
 
 1,836,270 
 
 lbs. oi 
 
 ' Sugar 
 
 18,750 
 
 — 
 
 Black pepper 
 
 34,349 
 
 — 
 
 Pig lead 
 
 26,461 
 
 — 
 
 Rolls ditto 
 
 164,000 
 
 — 
 
 Sappan wood 
 
 50 
 
 — 
 
 Mummy 
 
 87,511 
 
 — 
 
 Tin 
 
 15,000 
 
 — 
 
 Cloves 
 
 12,500 
 
 — 
 
 Nutmegs 
 
 15,013-J 
 
 ■ — 
 
 Cotton thread 
 
 5,119 pieces of Patna chintz 
 
 60 
 
 — 
 
 Coast ditto 
 
 166 
 
 — 
 
 Printed cottons 
 
 2,610 
 
 — 
 
 Surat palempores 
 
 623 
 
 — 
 
 Silks, in sorts 
 
 225 
 
 — 
 
 Woollens, in sorts' 
 
 298 
 
 — 
 
 Long ells, in sorts 
 
 231 
 
 — 
 
 Perpetrians 
 
 54 
 
 — 
 
 Camblets 
 
 3,500 Ducatoons 
 
70 
 
 F 
 
 List of Articles which the Japanese requested should be 
 the Annual Consignment 0/1814—15. 
 
 200 pieces of .Woollens, of different colours 
 
 120 
 
 — 
 
 Coarse cottons 
 
 1,200 
 
 _ 
 
 Taffechelahs 
 
 3,600 
 
 _ 
 
 Chintzes 
 
 400 
 
 _ 
 
 Silk stuffs 
 
 400 
 
 — 
 
 Taffetys 
 
 20 
 
 — 
 
 Silk, with gold embroidery 
 
 20 
 
 — 
 
 Ditto, with silver ditto 
 
 10,000 lbs. of Cotton thread 
 
 5,250 
 
 — 
 
 Cloves 
 
 4,000 
 
 — 
 
 Pepper 
 
 5,000 
 
 — 
 
 Pcetjock 
 
 9,000 
 
 — 
 
 Surat katjoe 
 
 1,250 
 
 — 
 
 Elephants teeth 
 
 50 
 
 — 
 
 Mummy 
 
 23,000 
 
 — 
 
 Lead 
 
 25,000 
 
 _ 
 
 Tin 
 
 250 
 
 — 
 
 Quicksilver 
 
 100,000 
 
 — 
 
 Sappan wood 
 
 1,250,000 
 
 — 
 
 Sugar 
 
 3,500 Dncatoons 
 
 This list is exclusive of sundry articles which are 
 
71 
 
 tioned as being required for the Emperor and for the principal 
 officers at Naugazacky—and which consist of cloths, chintzes, 
 glass ware, hooks, birds, and curiosities. Some of the latter 
 are of a ludicrous description, and show that the lists have 
 been prepared by the Japanese themselves. 
 
LONDON: 
 
 r