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A UTHOR : 
 
 FRENCH, J.W. 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS 
 
 PLACE: 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
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 1868 
 
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 Practical ethics, by Rev. J. W. French 
 ed. New York, Van Nostrand, 1868. 
 
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PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 BT 
 
 EEV. J. W. FEEKCH, D. D., 
 
 PE0FK8S0R OF ETHICS, tJ. 8, MILITAEY ACADKMT. 
 
 FOURTH EDITION. 
 
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 TO THE MEMORY 
 
 0» 
 
 LIEUT. J. T. GREELE, 
 
 WUO FELL AT TUl 
 
 BATTLE OF BIG BETHEL, 
 June IOtu, 1861, 
 
 IWD WHO, WIIKN LIVtNG, WAS MOST DEEPLY TN'TEKESTED IX THIS WOEK, WlllCn AIMS TO GTinB 
 
 MEN TO LOVE TIIEIU GOD, AND THEIR COUNTRY. WOKE THAN SKl.F, 
 
 AND OTHER MEN AS THEMSELVES, 
 
 THESE PAGES 
 
 ARE DEDICiVTJi:r)» 
 
 WITH ADMIRATION FOR HIS NOBLE CHARACTER, 
 
 AMD 30KR0W FOR UI6 EARLY L0B8. 
 
if 
 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 i 
 
 CHAPTER I. rA« 
 
 Inieodhctort. — Definition ; Friociples ; Divisions 1 
 
 PABT I. 
 
 (a) DUTIES ABOVE US. 
 
 CHAPTER IL 
 l>utie3 and Virtues required by Authority Divine and Human 13 
 
 (I 
 
 \h) DUTIES WITHIN US. 
 
 CHAPTER ni. 
 
 Duties to Self: General, to the whole Life and Nature; Special, to the 
 Conscience 40 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Duties to the Intellect: Correspondent Virtues, Intellioexce, Prudence 60 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Duties for Lower Impulses: Correspondent Virtue and Principle, Tem- 
 perance ^0 
 
 CHAPTER VL 
 
 Duties demanded by things inyesting us: Correspondent Virtues, FoRTi- 
 TDDK, Moderation, Industry, Economy 107 
 
VI 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 (c) DUTIES AROUND us. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. PACB 
 
 Duties to Others : Correspondent Virtues, Benevolence, Justice. Relations 
 
 m which Charity predominates 118 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Relations in which Justice predominates *35 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Same Snhject continued. Domestic and Social Relations 154 
 
 PART II. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 The Passions : Definition ; Divisions ; Treatment 113 
 
 PART III. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Leading and Destructive Vices: Corporeal; Semi-Mental; Mental. Con- 
 clusion ■^^^ 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 1. Ethics may be defined from the word, or from the thing. 
 (Course on Language ; Grammar, 644, &c. ; Logic.) 
 
 2. As defined from the word, it is the science Definitioii. 
 of good habits. 
 
 This definition is drawn from the word Ethics, because that 
 is derived from a term (Greek, Tjdog) which signifies Habit, oi 
 Custom. The word Morals leads to the same view. It is de- 
 rived from a term (Latin, mos, moris) which has a similar sig- 
 nification, Custom. The word thus indicates Ilabi^, as the 
 Subject regarded by Ethics, or Morals. 
 
 3. Habits, in their qualities are good and right, or bad and 
 wrong. They are good and right when they conform to a 
 standard of right ; bad and wrong when they deviate from that 
 standard. 
 
 Good and right Habits are called Virtues : bad and wron^. 
 
 Vices, 
 
 4. The standard is some rule by which we distinguish Virtues 
 from Vices, Eight from Wrong, Duties from Transgressions. 
 The rule is that of Eeason, or Authority ; the Authority is 
 divine or human ; the human, collective or individual. 
 
 5. Such are good habits. They are the subject of Ethics, and 
 thus the brief definition from the word is explained. 
 
 6. A definition from the thing is more full and precise, and 
 belongs to another part of the course ; to the second pai-t of 
 Ethics. 
 
2 
 
 Division. 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 7. The subject of Etliics is divided into two 
 parts. They are the Practical, and the Theoreti- 
 cal. 
 
 Distinction be- The distinction between them is, tnat the first 
 
 Practical and ^^ practical part, relies on Authority, and merely 
 Theoretical. states w/iat actions and habits, and movements of 
 
 feeling, are right, and what wrong. The second, or theoreti- 
 cal part, relies on Eeason, and shows whj/ some of these are 
 right, and w/i2/ some of them are wrono- 
 ■Why the name, ^- The first is named Practical, because it enu- 
 
 Practicai. merates simply wliat sliould or should not be 
 
 ^I^ir^l practised. It may be named actual, because it 
 «t«aiorPo«Uye. states, without theor}^ what actually is right or 
 wrong ; or positive, because it declares j>ositwely an existin<r 
 fact, without giving reasons. " 
 
 TS^etoai"""*' ^^^ **'''**'"' '* "''"^''^' Theoretical, because it 
 
 gives some theory in morals. It is sometimes 
 named Moral Philosophy, because it gives reasons, and prin- 
 ciples in morals. 
 
 Proent subject. 9- Practical Ethics is the subject now under 
 
 consideration. 
 
 Habits, the Sab- ^"^ ^^^^^stand its nature, and divisions, we 
 ject-Matter. must refer Habits, as its Subject-Matter, to their 
 
 ends and their sources, 
 
 10. Good habits, or virtues, have a good end. 
 
 It is the well-being of a man, and of other men, 
 through him. Bad habits, or vices, have a bad end. They 
 bring evH on a man, and on other men through him. 
 
 Sources of Habits. ^^' ^^ *^ *^^^^^ sources, habits in general come 
 
 from repeated actions, and actions from will 
 The source of Virtues is in the conscience, as regulated by 
 reason, and itself regulating the will. The fact that all these 
 require a higher and divine regulation does not belong to this 
 course, but to Theology. ^ 
 
 ^ Jie source of Yices is principally in unregulated passions, 
 assions. 12. The Passions are such movements of feel- 
 
 Ends of Habits. 
 
 defixition: use: essential points. 3 
 
 ing as Hope and Fear ; Love and Hate ; Joy and Sorrow ; 
 Desire and Aversion ; Anger, Envy, Emulation. Tliey may 
 be described as movements of feeling, caused by vivid im- 
 pressions on the imagination of apparent good or evil, which 
 impel a man strongly to the actions which give those pas- 
 sions gratification. 
 
 13. Practical Ethics may be described accord- weg-i«-- j%e^xA 
 ingly, as that branch of Morals which teaches ^^n. 
 
 what Virtues are to be practised ; what vices are to be avoided, 
 and how passions are to be regulated so as to promote a man's 
 well-being, and that of other men through him. 
 
 14. The subject is one of great importance for .^j^ important 
 every man. The reasons are evident. The wel- *°' ^^ "^^"^ 
 fare of individuals, and through them the welfare of society, 
 must be ever dependent on their virtues, and must be injured 
 by their vices, and by their uncontrolled passions. Tlie virtues 
 cannot be attained, nor the vices avoided, without intention. 
 There cannot be this intention without the virtues and the vices 
 have been brought under the attention. Hence this subject is 
 important. That is to say, welfare is dependent on the vir- 
 tues ; the virtues on intention ; intention on attention ; atten- 
 tion on the subject being brought before the mind by the enu- 
 aierations presented by this subject. 
 
 A theory of Morals is not needed by all men. But an enu- 
 meration, at least, of the actions and habits which are riffht 
 and which are wrong, must be brought, in some way, under the 
 attention of every human being. If not secured for, or by a 
 man, in one time or place, it must be in some other. 
 
 15. The present course is limited, and hence «„. ^ ^ , 
 
 ^ ^ ' What taken and 
 
 every point will not be considered^ There are ^^** omittea. 
 
 portions of Practical Ethics which pertain to Theology strictly. 
 
 These will not be taken. 
 
 Those portions will be regarded which are essential for the 
 
 persons for whom this course is prepared. 
 
 [16. What is essential, is determined by the ,^ ^ ^ , 
 ■- . . , ' ^ Why what is 
 
 '•onsiderations which follow. They will also taken is essential 
 
* PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 S^^LJ^for^'tiTe" ^^^^ *^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^ necessity for tliis branch of 
 xoiiitary man. Ethics, in this stage of the learner's course. 
 
 1. There are principles required for the fulfilment of the 
 oath taken on becoming a member of the Academy. 2. There 
 are habits demanded of attention to regulations and habits in 
 study, both of which are under the control of the will. 3. The 
 Articles of War require in ofiicers, on pain of dismission, con- 
 duct becoming the officer and the gentleman. Those who are 
 in training to be officers, need the principles, tastes and habits 
 which lead to such conduct. 4. The Articles of War provide 
 an oath for every officer who sits on a court-martial, which 
 demands moral considerations by his conscience, when leo-al 
 considerations fail. The Conscience must be trained to regard 
 those moral considerations, without which military justice 
 cannot be administered. 5. The officer must preserve a propei 
 moral influence over his soldiers, and often exercise the samt 
 kind of influence over disafiected or hostile populations. To 
 do this, he must both know and feel those moral principles 
 which sway powerfully the minds of men. 6. Ehetoric teaches 
 to write and speak persuasively and properly. Persuasion 
 cannot be understood without a previous knowledge of the 
 virtues, vices, and passions. Also, proi)riety and decorum in 
 official communications and transactions, can only be secured 
 by moral cultivation. 7. If fundamental moral rules are not 
 .learned early, they are not learned well. 
 
 So much needs to be embraced in the present part of the 
 course as is demanded by these considerations.] 
 What and where ^'^' The standard for Practical Ethics, as we 
 the standards. j^^^g g^^yj^ jg authority, divine or human, and, ii 
 human, collective or individual (4). Divine Authority is found 
 in the Scriptures. CollectiVe human authority exists in the 
 writings of moralists, before and after Christianity; in the decis- 
 ions of Courts of Justice, both civil and military ; and in the 
 common consent of mankind, as declared in public sentiment. 
 Individual human authority is in a man's natural and instinc- 
 tive sense of right and wrong, as declared by his conscience. 
 
 AUTHORITIES TO BE IN COMBINATION. 5 
 
 18. These authorities are to be used in Ethics , ^^ .^ , ^ 
 
 Autnonties to be 
 
 — ^not separately, but in combination. They oombuied. 
 illustrate and support each other. A man is to be guided in 
 right and from wrong by the ray which unites the light of 
 divine authority, of collective human wisdom and of his own 
 conscience. If he begin to learn what is right or wrong from 
 any one of these, he needs the assistance of the others to com- 
 plete that knowledge. Thus, if he begin with Scripture, he 
 learns more particulars of the duty commanded, or the sin 
 forbidden, from the natural law of conscience ; and yet more 
 from moralists, public sentiment and the laws of the land. If 
 he begin with moralists, the laws, or the general sentiment of 
 men, he arrives at a yet deeper sense of what is right or wrono-, 
 by Scripture, and by the inward law which every man finds 
 written on his own heart. If he begin with the latter— with 
 his own natural sense of right— he wants the additional light 
 of Divine wisdom and of collective human wisdom. We thus 
 need in duty the united authority of God, of men, and of the 
 man. 
 
 (a.) In some cases, these authorities may, when What if the com- 
 combined, appear to be in conflict, so that one SSfliitT^''*^''*'* 
 shall contradict what the other asserts. The rule in such 
 Eases is a plain one. It is, that the w/erior must yield to the 
 superior. 
 
 The superior authority is divine— as much above all that is 
 human as God is above man. If divine and human authority 
 be in conflict, the human must yield, whether it be collective or 
 individual, or both. If the conflict be with God and conscience 
 on one side, and collective human authority on the other, the 
 latter must yield. If Scripture be silent, and the conflict be 
 between an individual's private sentiment and the collective 
 judgment of mankind— not in one age, but in successive gen- 
 erations—the collective authority is to prevail. The Deity has 
 not spoken, and it is more probable that millions and ages 
 should be right, than one man. Discriminations and farther 
 discussion belong to the other branch of Ethics. 
 
e 
 
 PEACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 Their separation (^0 Those systems of morals wliicli regard 
 dangeroufl. ^^^ ^£ ^j^^^^ authorities only for every point in 
 
 Ethics, and reject the others wholly, have been found, by 
 experience, defective, and even dangerous. They give par- 
 tial views of right and wrong, and these are always danger- 
 ous. This result is w^hat might have been expected. The 
 same divine mind established them all, to be used each in 
 its proportion and place, but to be used together. In morals 
 they are not to be separated, miless where the lower appears to 
 contradict the higher. 
 
 The oombination (^0 In the present course, they will not be ap- 
 
 JSl^M^ k?tki8 P^^^^ *^ ^^'^^J subject. That method would 
 •onrse. make the course too extensive. They will be re- 
 
 ferred to miscellaneously, as subjects may appear to demand 
 them. But it is supposed that every reader or learner wdll ap- 
 ply them unitedly to any important or difficult question of right 
 or wrong which may arise in his own mind. 
 Authoritiee show 1^- These authorities, w^hen applied to actions, 
 * ^^' habits, and moral principles, form a standard 
 
 for judgment. Actions, habits, and principles, tested by that 
 standard, are found to possess qualities. The quality which 
 they possess is, of course, moral. Quality is in our estimation 
 of things. By their having moral quality is therefore merely 
 meant, that they are estimated h/ us sls good or bad ; right or 
 wrong ; useful or injurious. Some actions have no moral qual- 
 ity ; as, crooking the finger. I^ot being good or bad, they are 
 called indifierent. 
 
 S^i^TD^^les, ^^' ^^^ Qualities have degrees and opposites. 
 Extremw. (Course on Language ; Grammar, 273, 300, 706 ; 
 
 Logic.) It is so with moral qualities. They— or more strictly, 
 the actions (or habits or principles) which have such qualities 
 — present degrees and extremes. They have degrees. Thus 
 of good actions or habits, some may be better than others. Of 
 bad actions or habits, some may be worse than others. They 
 are good or bad in different degrees. 
 They have also extremes. The extremes are the limits of 
 
 extremes: rule of PROPOE'noN. 7 
 
 the dejrrees. The extremes are those of excess or defect. Ex- 
 tremes are faults or vices. The Yirtue is the medium between 
 them. Thus, Economy is a virtue, or good habit. The two 
 vicious extremes between which it stands are vices or bad 
 habits. They are, on one side, Stinginess ; and on the other, 
 Prodigality. The former is the extreme by excess ; the latter, 
 by defect. So, also. Courage is a virtue. The extremes on 
 each side of it are faults or vices. They are Fool-hardiness and 
 Cowardice. The former is the extreme by excess, and the lat- 
 ter by defect. Courtesy is a virtue. The extremes between 
 which it stands are vices. They are Fawning, and Rudeness. 
 The former is the extreme by excess, and the latter by defect. 
 Thus, every virtue has its contrary, which is a vice. 
 
 Between these extremes are degrees. Thus, a man may be- 
 come more and more economical, till he is a niggard, and a 
 miser. He may become less and less economical, till he is a 
 spendthrift. He may carry his courage gradually beyond the 
 bounds of duty and reason, till he is hare-brained. He may be 
 more and more cautious in avoiding danger, till he is a pol- 
 troon. 
 
 Whether the extreme be that of excess or defect Extremes show 
 may be always known by considering the will. Excess or Defect. 
 Where the extreme is produced by excess of w^ill, the extreme 
 is that of excess ; where, by defect of will, it is that of defect. 
 Thus, a man becomes a miser by constantly willing to lay up 
 money. He becomes wasteful by merely being careless, and by 
 having no will to resist either temptations for spending or calls 
 for money. Hence, the first is the positive extreme, or that by 
 excess ; the latter the negative, or that by defect. 
 
 21. This being the nature of all moral conduct, R^ie of proportion, 
 it is evident that Yirtues can only be practised by 
 observing the rule of degree and proportion in actions. The 
 actions of a man's will must be proportioned to the objects on 
 which it acts. And this proportion must be observed, not in 
 regard to one class of obligations only, but in regard to all, so 
 that all shall be obB Ci P^ d with proporti^ifc. Thus, between 
 
8 
 
 PEACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 the Vices just named, stands virtuous and honorable Economy. 
 It demands that the will shall be regulated by proportion, iu 
 expenditure. There should be no stronger will, however, than 
 the object deserves. 
 
 Also, other obligations beyond that which is personal in 
 economy, are to be regarded in their proportions : as the claims 
 of friendship ; of charity ; the just expectations of others for 
 hberahty; the necessity for self-respect, and the respect of men, 
 both which are lost by any meanness. All these obligations, 
 and others like them, receive their just proportion of considera- 
 tion. The result is, that the will for saving is regulated and 
 tempered. The virtue is practised, but without violating duties 
 to others, or to self. 
 
 This virtue has been taken as an example, because it is so 
 tanuhar. By the example, the principle can be understood. 
 I hat prmciple is to be applied to all the Virtues. 
 
 Bfisnitiiig maxims. ^2. "VVe thus arrive at the following maxims in 
 
 Ethics : 
 
 1. Ax ESSENTI.iL RtlLE FOB THE VlRTUES IS PKOPOETIOJf. 
 I. ViKTUES HAVE DeCKEES in THEIE QuALmES. 
 
 3. A Virtue is usually a Medium between extremes 
 
 WHICH EXTREMES ARE ViCES. ' 
 
 Jo'S^emeX! ^^^ ^ ^^'^'''^ ^^<^^Y>i^on to this last maxim 
 ««.^but only of exists in the case of those Virtues which have an 
 • infinite or vast object. Such are those to God, 
 
 and to one s country ; which will be the first examined. The 
 Deity IS infinite. The nation exceeds the individual, as mill- 
 ions exceed one. According to the first ma.xim. Virtues require 
 proportion to their objects. These objects are so great, that ' 
 while there IS an Extreme of Defect, there is none of Excess 
 A man need never fear that he will be too devoted to God or 
 his country. 
 
 of Motr '^'' ^'^^"^^'^ ^^"^ "^"^ through the whole Subject 
 
 ferandi'^Jot , ^^' ^^' '^^^^ ^' ^'^ ^'^ ^0 the proper meth^ 
 
 for treating the Subject. 
 
 divisions: phraseology. 9 
 
 As each Virtue has correspondent Vices, the latter should be 
 treated in connection with it. Hence, one head of the Subject 
 will be the Virtues ; but these will include their Contraries. 
 
 As the Passions, when regulated, support the Virtues, and 
 when unregulated form Vices, they will furnish a second, and 
 separate head. 
 
 But as some Vices are greater, and more dangerous than 
 others, it will be convenient to consider them specially, apart 
 from tlieir opposed Virtues, and apart from the stronger Passions 
 producing them. The more deadly Vices will form another 
 head. 
 
 Accordingly, the divisions of the subject will order, 
 
 be these, in the following order: 
 
 1. The Virtues, with their Contrasts: 
 
 2. The Passions: 
 
 3. The leading Vices. 
 
 Phraseology. 
 
 UseofsomeTonns. 
 
 25. A strict phraseology will not be used in the 
 present part of the course. It is not needed. Too 
 close an attention to precise shades of meaning, useful in the 
 exact sciences, would here be out of place. It would embarrass 
 the learner, when the sole object is to point out his duties, in 
 the plainest manner. For example, the word 
 Virtue means, strictly, a Habit; the word 
 Duty^ an Action due. But in the present part of the course, 
 where nice discriminations are not needed, the distinction 
 of Virtues from Duties will not be closely observed. The 
 general idea of both, which is obligation, whether in habit or 
 act, whether in being or doing, is that which will be kept 
 prominent. The word Vice is used in this subject as meaning 
 any deficiency in the required moral quality of a habit or ac- 
 tion. The noun is better, for the habit ; the adjective, vicious, 
 for the action. It has thus a more general meaning in the sci- 
 ence than in its popular use. It is not used as always synony- 
 mous with great transgressions. The word prindple means, 
 strictly, an inward rule for conduct ; precejpty an outward rule 
 
10 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 of conduct ; rule includes both. But the general idea of direc- 
 tion will be sometimes expressed by one word and sometimes 
 by the other. The subject of Ethics has been injured by an at- 
 tempt to mould it after the mathematical and physical sci- 
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 PAKT I. 
 
 VIRTUES AND THEIE CONTRASTS. 
 
 CHAPTEK II. 
 VIRTUES WHICH REGARD GOD AND OBJECTS GREATER THAN SELF. 
 
 DUTIES ABOVE A MAN. 
 
 26. The Virtues whicli are first in order are Obligations above 
 
 •^ ^ and before the in- 
 
 those which regard the Deity and objects, such dividual. 
 
 as Government and Law, which are greater than self. 
 
 When these are not made prominent, the re- Evils from put- 
 ting the individa- 
 suit is the absence of Obedience to God, of Patri- ai above them. 
 
 otism, of Reverence for Law, of Submission to rightful au- 
 thority. Selfishness will prevail in each man's character, and 
 through Society, when individualism is taught in morals. 
 
 [Hence, the Articles of War, with great propri- This class of obli- 
 ety, place first the duties which belong to these §fe^^ticies of 
 virtues.] ^^' 
 
 1. The Deity. 
 
 Duties to God. 
 
 27. The virtues which regard the Deity are 
 Theological. Their details are accordingly left 
 to Theology. 
 
 A summary view only will be taken. 
 
 The Deity is a perfect mind : He is, as such, to be revered 
 for what He is. He does good : He is accordingly to be loved 
 for what he does. He teaches man : He is, then, to be believed 
 in what He has taught. 
 
 The primary duties toward Him are thus seen to be Revbb 
 ENCE, Love, Belief. 
 
14 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 DUTIES TO THE NATION: TRANSGRESSIONS. 
 
 15 
 
 ( 
 
 II 
 
 r 
 
 I 
 
 The vice opposed to Keverence is Profanity ; to Love, in its 
 outward acts, tlie Neglect of Prh'Ate and Public "Worship ; 
 to Belief, Infidelity. 
 
 [The Articles of War condemn profane swearing. They en- 
 join attendance on public worship. They demand in public 
 worship reverence and propriety of deportment.] 
 
 Infidelity is the absence of belief in divine testimony. 
 
 2. The Nation. 
 
 IliiidB*. vbu. 
 
 28. The Dcitj ha^ transferred % portion of Ills 
 authority to men OTgiuiiz<?(l cx»llc<'livcly. Men 
 are so organized in nations. 
 
 0tUt»tii»tii r«- ^. The Nation is the Kuprcmt* itiitltority in 
 r'rxxJm fMt of ^^""g^ which are human. The cori^poiidcnt 
 Iwttivrity; oUigatioD, iinpo&ed by thii fSicI, \% that of 
 
 Allboiaxck. 
 
 2. Tttm lit fiut 80. Tlie Nation has an Oiininic Law, called 
 Uw; tl>c ConMitution. Being the supremo law, it 
 
 deinandi special reverence and obedience from all the rm;m* 
 bers of a nation. The ocirrrspondent virtue thuB required is 
 culled Loyalty. 
 
 8 rr«tt um tux ^^' ^^°*^*^ ^*^ waprcmc law, arc subordinate 
 c^iAvt«ziitiii^: laws and re^giifaUion» in liannony with it. ThesHi 
 all require, as the correi^jMJudent obligations, Scs^riXTF >x>r Law 
 aad OsKmx^'CK to Law. 
 
 4. Ttfm um &«€ ^^ GoTemment i&d Lairs are administered 
 imi J aVt S^ ^^^ l>erMinK clothed with authoritv fur the pur- 
 ity is by finiat; poee. The corredpondent obligation is that of 
 IwMior to tlwm in thcrir ofiice. The virtue which ol)derveft the 
 dutv of manifesting thk honor is calkMl OiutiRRVASCBL 
 
 [In the niilitarj ttcrricp of the nation^ Orediexcb to Sopid* 
 SMXBB 18 joined with Ob^rvance.] 
 
 6. Fi«a tb* ihA ^^- '^^^ Nation, organized bv its Constitution 
 ^Ato^Me^ an*! Law«, promotes publie and private good. 
 F""«"*i 1. It sostaiuB the present welfare of millions. 
 
 2. The nation aLo exi.^U through centurieej for the welfure of 
 
 its members, through successive generations. 3. As one of 
 the family of nations, it exists for the welfare of the world. 
 The good which the nation thus promotes is called the public 
 good. Private good is found in this public good. The cor- 
 respondent obligation resting on every member of a nation i», 
 to love that public good more than any private good for him- 
 self or others. The virtue which obj*crv(;s this obligation in 
 called Pateiotism, or thk love of country. It requires that 
 every member of a nation shall be rcjuly to sncrlfu'c his life, 
 property, liberty luid iiiclliialiuu, when required for the public 
 defence and welfare. 
 
 34. For a nation to fulfil its great office, har- ewTnsitbf f^et 
 mony and ti^anquillity, amongst it« great con- {^,Sl^t^ 
 etitnent purts, are indispeudahle. Heoce reenlts d^?«tt^fei«. 
 
 the'oBUOATION OF OUARDINO TIIK rCBMC rH.VCK. 
 
 35. Tlic obligatioiM. which reguixl the nation ofbUgttSiQi, col. 
 are thus seen to be Allegiance, Loyalty^ Re^'cr- *^^^ 
 
 cnce and ObiHlienoo for Law, Obeervanoe, Patriotism^ Self- 
 Saeriiiee, and Care tor tlie public tranquillity. 
 
 30. Tlw? fault* oppooed to theee are Trba&on^ opoani ikiiu «r 
 DiBLOTALTT, RebkllioNj Coxjfrru.xrv, Skihtiox, '^^ 
 
 I>l)<KK»r>X.T TO SonanOBd^ SELFIBIl^EeS OB IxnirrKKKNCE TO TIIK 
 PUBLIC mSLFABB, RkFU^AL TO ACT OR fiCFPER FOB TUB PUBLIC 
 
 ooon, Aorr.inox by the Demaooqubl 
 
 37. Some of tbc«c have ^^ulxlivisioriH. Tlma Mbdiriiicat. 
 I>ii;loyalty may lie negative itfid appear a8 FoREiONifx, in % 
 preference of other forms of govemineut t<i tlu; institutions of 
 oue^t$ native country ; or, in the United States, may appear hh 
 Statist, which le, elevating tlie authority of a eingle State 
 alK»ve that of tlie nation. 
 
 Disloyalty may be poojitive in t0O^ or d^ed*. It is positive 
 in wordd, when there fe a constant reviling of the fundamental 
 institutions of the oouutrv-. Thid forms Pcblic Libku Public 
 libel ifl earried to the extreme degree of haHeneaft and wieked- 
 nme, when it ii« perpetrated under foreign influence or for 
 foreign gold Disloyalty x*^ jKi^tive in deeds that are short of 
 
! 
 
 (I 
 
 ' f 
 
 ill 
 
 |i 
 
 I 
 
 16 
 
 PKACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 treason, when there is an attempt by public commotion at JS'ulli- 
 FiCATioN, or at Illegal Inxovation, or at Obstructioxs to Exe- 
 cution, applied to some part or the whole of the Organic law. 
 
 38. Thns also selfishness or indifference to the public good 
 may appear as Faction. Fanaticism, Sectionalism, Provincial- 
 ism. In all these there is a common taint. There is a want 
 of devotion to the public good ; there is a willingness to sacri- 
 fice the common welfare to some other object, pursued by one 
 man or a body of men. When that object is the acquisition of 
 power or plunder, or both, and this is preferred to the general 
 good, there is Faction. When that object is the prevalence of 
 one opinion or dogma, and this is preferred to public welfare 
 and tranquillity, there is Fanaticism. When that object is to pro- 
 mote the interest or passions of one part of a nation to the det- 
 riment of the whole, there is Sectionalism. When the same in- 
 tention is carried on in a small locality, there is Provincialism. 
 
 Such are the duties from the individual to the nation, and 
 
 Buch are the contrasted transgressions. 
 
 Obligations from 39, The nation has reciprocal obligations to its 
 
 the nation recip- . , ^ 
 
 rocal. members. Those obligations result not from any 
 
 human contract, but from the fact of organization and exist- 
 ence. As the reciprocal duties between parents and children 
 arise from the relations existing in the family, and the family 
 exists by an ordinance of the Author of Nature, so do the re- 
 ciprocal duties between a nation and its members arise from its 
 existence, and its existence from a like ordinance. The full 
 consideration of these duties from the nation does not belonor 
 to this, but to the other part of Ethics. 
 
 (a.) One of those obligations, however, has interest for those 
 for whom this course is prepared. A sacred duty for the nation 
 is, to have a public force, and to use it for the public defence, 
 and for support and execution of law. Every member of that 
 public force is to regard himself as an instrument for these 
 high purposes. 
 
 Violation on one (J.) Any violation of these reciprocal obliga- 
 ■ide does not re- ,. 1 j. j . -i ^ ^ .^ 
 
 lease on the other, ^^^^s by one party does not absolve the other 
 
 DTTriES TO THE NATION: PERMANENCE I RANK. 
 
 17 
 
 party from his obligations. Tlie duties to the nation from every 
 member of it, and the duties jfrom it, remain. They are 
 formed not by a temporary bargain, but by relatione which the 
 Creator has established. 
 
 (c.) The permanence of the relation and duties ^^^ ^^^ release 
 resulting from it is not changed by the fact that tract attends, 
 there may have been a contract in regard to certain particulars. 
 Thus, the marriage relation is permanent, and the relation de- 
 mands duties. A contract, however, in certain particulars, has 
 been made before it. Contracts may precede, accompany, or 
 follow relations, yet not affect their permanence. The same is 
 tnie w^here permanent political relations are established, and 
 there has been a contract in regard to particular things. It is 
 enough, in the present part, to make the statement, and guard 
 the mind against error. The discussion of the principle belongs 
 to the other part of Ethics. 
 
 [40. The duties to the nation are enforced by Articles of War 
 the Articles of War. They properly demand re- ^^ ^^^ Duties, 
 spect for superiors, and punish disrespectful words against the 
 head of the nation and those in authority. They also require 
 an oath of allegiance and obedience, the aim of which is to se- 
 cure the fulfilment of these duties.] 
 
 41. As to the degree in which these virtues orade of these 
 stand which regard God and the public good, ^^*^®^- 
 
 they are in the highest rank. Obligations to God excel all 
 others, as the Creator exceeds a man. Obligations to the coun- 
 try excel those which are personal and private, as millions ex- 
 ceed one, and as the centuries of a nation's existence transcend 
 the years of one human life. 
 
 42. It belongs to Theology to consider the Possible Duties to 
 rank to be assigned to the virtues which look to t^« "World: 
 
 the welfare of the world, or of the whole Clii-istian body. But, 
 leaving the question to that science wholly, and allowing for its 
 decisions, it may be said, that tlie love of country is next to the 
 love of God^ and duties to the nation are next to those to 
 Him, 
 
18 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 I 
 
 WASHINGTON, ON DUTIES TO THE NATION. 
 
 19 
 
 i 
 
 jCay never con- 43. It is* evident, however, independently of 
 
 flict with duties rr\ ^ 1 . . . 
 
 to the country. Iheolo^v, that it a man pursue universal philan- 
 thropy — whether for what he deems the temporal, or for the 
 spiritual welfare of men — to the violation of duties to his coun- * 
 try^ he is morally wrong. The Deity has determined that the 
 general good of mankind shall he promoted through the na- 
 tionalities of the world. 
 
 Grade of the o ^^' ^^ *^ *^^^ grade of wickedness in the con- 
 posed transgres- trasted vices and trans^icressions, it is evident that, 
 
 sions. 11 
 
 as these are themselves correspondent, so the 
 grade is correspondent (35). Ofiences against God, and the 
 nation, have, therefore, the highest degree of guilt among trans- 
 gressions (40). Separating those against the nation, it may he 
 said of them, tliat the guilt of such offences is to he estimated 
 by the magnitude and duration of the public evils which they 
 produce; by the character of the motives which cause them; 
 and by the grandeur of tlie obh'gations which they violate. 
 Tliey are, therefore, among tlie highest of those which are 
 merely human. It is unnecessary to enumerate them again, 
 BO as to apply this principle to each particular, since the reader 
 can do this for himself, (35, 36, 37). 
 
 45. We have now seen what, and of what moral degree, are 
 the obligations and transgressions which relate to the Deity, 
 and the public good. 
 
 Testimony of ^^^ testimony and counsels of Washington have 
 
 Washington. i^een given in his " Farewell Address," on most of 
 the subjects contained under the present head. 
 
 His counsels, as there given on these subjects, should be 
 observed by every member of the nation, and be diligently 
 learned by those for whom this course is specially prepared. 
 
 He speaks of the connection of duties to the country with 
 those to God (26) ; of the United States, as organized into a 
 nation (28) ; of Allegiance (29) ; Loyalty (30) ; Keverence for 
 Law (31) ; Patriotism (33) ; and Care for the Public Tranquillity 
 (34). He warns against Foreignism, and attempts to change 
 rashly, and illegally, the institutions of the country (37); 
 
 against Faction and Sectionalism (38) ; He also refers to the 
 reciprpcal duties of the nation to its members (39). 
 
 Washington speaks, in his " Farewell Address," 
 
 (a.) Of the connection of duties to God, with those to the 
 country : 
 
 He says: 
 
 " Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to public pros- 
 perity, Eeligion and MoRALriY are indispensable supports. 
 
 " In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, 
 who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human hap- 
 piness, these firmest props of the duties of men, and citizens. 
 The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to re- 
 spect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their 
 connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be 
 asked, where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, 
 if the sense of religious obligation d€se7't the oaths which are 
 the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice ? And let 
 us, with caution, indulge the supposition, that morality can be 
 maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to 
 the influence of refined education, on minds of peculiar structure, 
 reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national 
 ■morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle." 
 
 (J).) Of the United States, as forming not a league of nations, 
 but one nation, organized by one people : 
 
 His words are : 
 
 "The Unity of Government which constitutes you one 
 ^eopleP He says: 
 
 " The name of American, which belongs to you in your na- 
 tional capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism 
 more than any appellation derived from local discriminations. 
 
 " You have improved on your first essay [the confederation], 
 by the adoption of a Constitution of Government, better calcu- 
 lated than your former,* for an intimate Union, and for the 
 efiicacious management of your common concerns." - 
 
 * The Confederation was a temporary government formed by "a league of friend- 
 6h»p" between the different States. It gave place to the present CJonstit-ution m 1 T89. 
 2 
 
i^ 
 
 20 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 WASHINGTON, ON DUTIES TO THE NATION. 
 
 21 
 
 
 (c) Of allegiance to the Xation, as formed hy one people in d 
 Union : 
 
 He says : 
 
 " It is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate 
 the immense value of your National Union, to your collective 
 and individual happiness ; that you should cherish a cordial, 
 habitual, and immovable attachment to it, accustoming your- 
 selves to think and speak of it, as of the palladium of your po- 
 litical safety and prosperity ; watching for its preservation with 
 jealous anxiety ; discountenancing whatever may suggest even 
 a suspicion that it can, in any event, be abandoned ; and indig- 
 nantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to 
 . alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble 
 the sacred ties which now link together the various parts. 
 
 " For this you have every inducement of sympathy and in 
 terest. • 
 
 (d.) Of Loyalty to the Supreme and Organic Law, the Con- 
 Btitution : 
 
 He says : 
 
 " This government — the offspring of our own choice, unin- 
 fluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation and ma- 
 ture deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the dis- 
 tribution of its powers, and uniting security w^th energy, and 
 containing within itself a provision for its own amendment — 
 has a just claim to your confidence and you?' support. Respect 
 for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its 
 measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of 
 true liberty. 
 
 " The basis of our political systems is the right of the people 
 to make and to alter their Constitutions of Government. But 
 the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an 
 explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obli- 
 gatory upon all." 
 
 (e.) Of Obedience to the Laws : he says : 
 
 The Articles of Confederation were framed in 1777, but not accepted till 1781. Th« 
 Constitution is "ordained and established" bj the whole people. 
 
 " The very idea of the power and the right of the people to 
 establish government, presupposes the duty of every indi- 
 vidual to obey the established government. All obstructions to 
 the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, 
 under whatever plausible character, with the real design to di- 
 rect, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and 
 action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fun- 
 damental principle, and of fatal tendency." 
 
 (y*.) Patriotism is rather implied in every sentence, than sep- 
 arately inculcated. 
 
 The aims of Patriotism are given, in speaking of his own 
 wishes for the country : 
 
 He says, he desires • 
 
 " That Heaven may continue to you the choicest tokens of its 
 beneficence ; that your union and brotherly affection may be 
 perpetual; that the free Constitution, which is the work of 
 your hands, may be sacredly maintained ; that its administra- 
 tion, in every department, may be stamped with wisdom and 
 virtue ; that, in fine, the happiness of the people of these states, 
 under the auspices of liberty, may be made complete." 
 
 He thus refers to that mass of public good (23) which makes 
 patriotism obligatory. He says: 
 
 " The unity of Government, which constitutes you one peo- 
 ple, is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main 
 pillar in the edifice of your real independence ; the support of 
 your tranquillity at home ; your peace abroad ; of your pros- 
 perity ; of that very liberty which you so highly prize. 
 
 " While every part of our country feels an immediate inter- 
 est in Union, all the parts combined cannot fail to find, in the 
 united 7nass of means and efforts^ greater strength^ greater re- 
 source^ proportionably greater security from external danger, a 
 less frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations." 
 
 He states the duty of placing the affections on the country : 
 
 " The country has a right to concentrate your affections^ 
 
 ig.) He thus refers to care for the public tranquillity : . 
 
 "What is of inestimable value, they [the people] must 
 
22 
 
 PILiCTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 "WASHINGTON AGAINST FACTION: INNOVATIONS. 
 
 23 
 
 Mi 
 
 
 ix 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 V 
 
 derive from Union an exemption from those broils and wars be- 
 tween themselves, which so frequently afflict neighboring coun- 
 tries, not tied together by tlie same government, wliich their 
 own rivalships alone would be sufficient to produce, but which 
 opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues would 
 stimulate and embitter." 
 
 He speaks again of the need of care for the public tranquillity, 
 when warning against the evils of Faction. (38, and {k) in ex- 
 tracts from the Address.) 
 
 " The alternate domination of one faction over another, 
 sharpened hi/the sjdiit of revenge natural to party discussion^ 
 w^hich, in different ages and countries, has perpetrated the 
 most fiorrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this 
 leads, at length, to a more formal and permanent despotism. 
 The disorders and misei'ies which result gradually incline the 
 minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power 
 of an individual." 
 
 (A.) He warns against the combined vices and their efforts, 
 which war against a true nationality (36) and devotion to Union : 
 
 " From different causes, and from different quarters, much 
 pains will be taken, many artifices employed, to weaken in your 
 minds the conviction of this truth. This [Union] is the point 
 in your political fortress against which the batteries of internal 
 and external enemies will be most constantly and actively, 
 though often covertly and insidiously, directed." 
 
 («.) Against foreign influence, and citizens led by it to be dis- 
 loyal : 
 
 "Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, I conjure 
 you to believe me, fellow-citizens, the jealousy of a free people 
 ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience 
 prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of 
 republican government, 
 
 " Will they [the people of one section] not be deaf to those 
 advisers who would sever them from their brethren, and connect 
 them with aliens f 
 
 "A passionate attachment for another nation produces a va- 
 
 riety of evils." " It gives to ambitious, corrupteJ, or deluded 
 citizens facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own. 
 country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity — ^gild- 
 ing with the appearance of a virtuous sense of obligation, of a 
 commendable deference for public opinion, or of a laudable 
 zeal for the public good, the base or foolish compliances of am 
 hition, corruption, or infatuation^ 
 
 (k.) Against the common arts and associations of the agita- 
 tor, the seditious fanatic, the demagogue, and the libeller of 
 the institutions of the country : 
 
 " All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combina 
 tions and associations, under whatever plausible character, with 
 the real design to direct, control, counteract, or overawe the 
 regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, 
 are of fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give 
 it an artificial and extraordinary force ; to put in the place of 
 the delegated will of the nation, the will of a party — often a 
 small but artful and enterprising minority of the community ; 
 and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to 
 make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted 
 and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of 
 consistent and wholesome plans, digested by common counsels, 
 and modified by mutual interests. However combinations or 
 associations of the above description may now and then answer 
 public ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, 
 to become potent engines by which cunning, ambitious, and un- 
 principled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the 
 people, and to usurp for themselves the reins of government ; 
 destroying afterward the very engines which have lifted them to 
 unjust dominion." 
 
 (Z.) Against innovations (37) : 
 
 " Toward the preservation of your Government, and the per- 
 manen^y of your present happy state, it is requisite, not only 
 that you steadily discountenance irregular opposition to its 
 acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the 
 spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the 
 
U;^ 
 
 ■."'•'( 
 
 if II \ 
 
 
 I 
 
 24 
 
 PKACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 pretexts. One method of assault may be, to eifect in the form 
 of the Constitution alterations which will impair the energy 
 of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly 
 overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, 
 remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix 
 the true character of governments, as of other human institu- 
 tions ; that experience is the surest standard by which to test 
 the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country ; that 
 facility in changes upon the credit of mere hypothesis and 
 opinion exposes to perpetual change, from the endless variety 
 of hypothesis and opinion." 
 (m.) Agamst Faction (38) : 
 
 " Let me warn you, in the most solemn manner, against the 
 effects of the spirit of party. 
 
 " This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, 
 having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. 
 
 "It exists, under different shapes, under all governments, 
 more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed. But in those of 
 the jpopular form it is seen in its greatest ranhness^ and is truly 
 their worst enemy. 
 
 " The common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party 
 are sufficient to make it the intei-est of a wise people to dis- 
 coura^ire and restrain it. 
 
 "It serves always to distract the public councils, and en- 
 feeble the public administration. It agitates the community 
 with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms ; kindles the ani- 
 mosity of one part against another ; foments occasionally riot 
 and insurrection. 
 
 " It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which 
 find a facilitated access to the government itself through the 
 channels of party passions. Thus, the policy and will of one 
 country are subjected to the policy and will of another." 
 
 He shows that parties, whether inflamed by lust for power 
 and plunder, or by religious or moral fanaticism, or, which 
 is frequently the case, by both motives combined, are less 
 dangerous in other forms of government than in those of 
 
 WASHINGTON: DUTIES OF AUTHORmES. 
 
 25 
 
 the popular character, and on this fact, founds the most wise 
 adsTice. 
 
 " There is an opinion that parties, in free countries, are useful 
 checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to 
 keep alive the spirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is 
 probably true ; and in countries of a monarchical cast Patriot- 
 ism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the 
 spirit of party. 
 
 " But in those of the popular character, in governments purely 
 elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. 
 
 " From their natural tendency, it is ceitain there will always 
 be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. 
 
 " There being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, 
 by force of public opinion to mitigate and assuage it. Afire not to 
 he quenched^ it demands a uniform vigilance^ to prevent its hurst- 
 mg into afiame, lest, instead of warming, it shoidd consmneP 
 
 {n.) Against Sectionalism, and consequently Statism. 
 
 " In contemplating the causes which may disturb our Union, 
 it occurs, as a matter of serious concern, that any ground should 
 have been furnished for characterizing parties by geographical 
 discriminations, Northern and Southern, Atlantic and Western, 
 ;vhence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that 
 there is a real difference of local interests and views. 
 
 " One of the expedients of party to acquire influence within 
 particular districts is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of 
 other districts. You cannot shield yourselves too much against 
 the jealousies and heart-burnings which spring from these mis- 
 representations. They tend to render alien to each other, those 
 who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection." 
 
 (o.) He also states the reciprocal obligations of the Nation to 
 its members. 
 
 " It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking, in a 
 free country, should inspire caution in those intrusted with its 
 administration, to confine themselves within their respective 
 constitutional spheres; avoiding in the exercise of the powers 
 of one department, to encroach upon another. 
 
26 
 
 PEACTICAL ETUICS. 
 
 OATHS : PARTIES : EFFECT. 
 
 27 
 
 I 
 
 " Tlie spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers 
 of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the 
 form of government, a real despotism. 
 
 "A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to 
 abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient 
 to satisfy us of the truth of this position. 
 
 " The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of politi- 
 cal power, by dividing and distributing it into diiferent deposi- 
 tories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal 
 against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experi- 
 ments, ancient and modem — some of them in our country, and 
 under our eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as 
 to institute them. 
 
 " If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution and modi- 
 fication of the powers be in any particular wrong, let it be cor 
 rected in the way the Constitution designates. 
 
 " But let there be no change by usurpation ; for though tliis^ 
 in one instance, may be the insti^ument of good, it is the cus- 
 tomary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. 
 
 " The precedent must always overbalance in permanent evil 
 any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time 
 yield." 
 
 The duty of using Force for the support of Law, and against 
 the words and deeds of Faction (39. a), is also mentioned by him 
 
 He says : 
 
 " Government, indeed, is little else than a name^ where it is 
 too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction^ to confine 
 each member of the society within the limits prescribed by the 
 laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment 
 of the rights of person and property." 
 
 On these important principles, such is the instruction of 
 
 Washington. 
 
 These subjects 
 give a standard 
 for moral pro- 
 gress. 
 
 progress. 
 
 46. In looking back over these subjects and 
 their principles, the reader will see that they give 
 him a standard for estimating his own moral 
 
 He is morally higher and nobler, in proportion as he can for- 
 get himself, and live for objects greater than self. The more 
 selfish he is, the meaner is he, morally. 
 
 47. He has also a standard by which he can A standard, al^, 
 determine what kind of moral principles he ^^^^'"-^^^^ 
 should welcome to his mind, and what he should earnestly re- 
 pel. He should welcome those which teach him that the indi- 
 vidual man lives for the common good. He should repel those 
 which lift the individual above society; the single state, or the 
 section, above the nation. 
 
 ^ After advancing in the course of which the present instruc 
 tion IS a part, he will see that theories which elevate the claims 
 of the individual above those of society, have been difi'used in 
 ancient and in modern times. They have uniformly produced 
 public disasters. In Cxreece, in the time of Socrates, the sophists 
 taught them ; and Athens was so demoralized by them, as to be 
 brought to the verge of ruin. In France they were taught, and 
 produced the excesses of the great Eevolution. Other countries 
 could be named. In Eome, on the other hand, the uniform 
 teaching in her advancing period was, that the individual waa 
 to regard himself but as an instrument for the public welfare. 
 The result stands forth in the glories and successes of that- 
 period. 
 
 4a We now pass to a solemn transaction, in which God and 
 the Fubhc Authority are united with the Individual. 
 
 3. The Deptt and the Public in the Oath. 
 
 49. A combination of divine and human au- oatt* ' 
 thority appears in the oath. 
 
 In an oath are three parties. One is the Deity, Thepartie.. 
 present, beholding, attesting, receiving. The other is the Pub- 
 be Authority, to which He ha^ transferred a portion of His 
 Bovereiglity. The third is the person taking the oath. In an 
 oath of promise, the two latter are the parties contracting. The 
 former is the guardian of the contract. 
 
f?N 
 
 28 
 
 PEACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 oaths: rightfulness: obligation. 
 
 4017 
 
 Beal effect. 50. An oatli does not necessarily create a new 
 obligation, but it does create a higher degree of obligation. Not 
 only is the degree higher, but the highest. It is the highest, 
 because there is no other obligation \vhich can rise above it. 
 
 Thus, a man has a moral obligation to tell the truth, before 
 he takes, in a Court of Justice, an oath that he will do so. A 
 citizen is under the moral obligation of allegiance to the nation, 
 before taking an oath of allegiance. He is bound to support 
 the Constitution, before he vows to do so, when entering on 
 some public office. He is bound to execute the duties of an 
 office or a trust faithfully, before he takes an oath that he will 
 so execute them. He is bound to do justice, before he takes 
 an oath to that effect, as member of a court-martial. 
 
 But, after the oath is taken, the will is bound. There is no 
 place left for hesitation. There is no motive known to man, 
 of hope or fear, which may hinder the fulfilment of that which 
 has been vowed. There is no other human obligation which 
 can annul this obligation after it has been assumed. 
 
 It is therefore erroneous and criminal for a 
 man to stifle his natural sense of the saci'edness 
 and awful ness of an oath, by saying that the moral obligation 
 existed before, and that hence he is no more bound than be- 
 fore. He is bound as he was not before. There are bonds 
 within his conscience — attached on the one side to the public, 
 and on the other to God — which fix his will to one course of 
 conduct, and one only. 
 
 Such is the natural and intended effect within the mind. 
 
 51. T\\Q purpose of the oath is to produce that 
 very effect. Oaths have been established to 
 secnre a fixed will and intention in the person taking them 
 to do certain things which are essential for human welfare. 
 They also aim to give to the minds of other men repose and 
 security in the confidence that these essential things will be 
 done. This security for the individual's intention and for the 
 public confidence, is sought by appealing to the highest motives 
 of which man is conscious. 
 
 Misconception 
 opposed. 
 
 Purpose intended. 
 
 Source. 
 
 52. Tlie source of the oath is in the public 
 authority. That, as the guardian of human 
 rights and interests, looks to the purpose stated, and imposes 
 it, when necessary, for that purpose. 
 
 53. The rightfulness of oaths may be based on 
 
 several reasons by Theology. Leaving, wholly, ^^^"'^°®''- 
 what is peculiar to that science, a sufficient proof is in the 
 common consent and practice of mankind. Oaths have been 
 instituted among all nations, because needed by all. This 
 authority, the collective wisdom of men, is a safer guide than 
 the abstract speculations of some solitary theorist. " Where is 
 the security for property, for reputation, for life," if they desert 
 ns, and if "the sense of religious obligation" desert them! 
 This fact, that men have seen and provided for this necessity, 
 sufficiently vindicates their rightfulness. 
 
 54. Such being the nature, purpose, and au- state of mind, and 
 thority for oaths, the state of mind and the con- iTlft^. ^^'^^^' 
 duct which they demand are evident. He who has taken an 
 oath to do certain things, should preserve in his mind anxiety 
 and care, the most scrupulous and incessant, that no part of 
 his promise be neglected. The state of his mind should be 
 that of fixed, unswerving, and single intention. The outward 
 conduct is then to be made correspondent to this intention. 
 
 55. As to the time during which this obliga- 
 tion remains, that depends on the nature and ligStioJIndS-S" 
 circumstances of the oath when taken. Some oaths, from their 
 nature, impose this highest degree of obligation only for a time. 
 For example, when a man is called to testify in a particular 
 trial in court, that particular obligation imposed on him when 
 he takes the oath, ceases when the trial is concluded. 
 
 But others impose such obligation permanently. They do 
 so when the previous moral obligation was of a permanent 
 character, and when no limiting words have been placed in the 
 oath. 
 
 ^ ^ In such a case, the obligation remains upon a man in all 
 times and places, indissoluble but by death. 
 
> 
 
 do 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 MILITAItY oath: EFFECT: CONDUCT. 
 
 31 
 
 
 Moral grade of ^^- The Violation of an oatli is attended with 
 the violation. ^i,^ j^j^i^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ j^ -^ perjurv. 
 
 "Where the obligation lias been made permanent, this grade 
 of guilt attaches to a man unceasingly, so long as it is neglected 
 The consideration of the punishments which attend it does not 
 belong to the present course. 
 
 The Military [^7. The nature and effect of the oath of alle- 
 
 ^^ giance and obedience, taken on becoming a mem- 
 
 ber of the army and of the Military Academy, may now be 
 seen from the principles which have been stated. 
 
 Same principles (^0 "^^^^ obligations thus assumed are of the 
 appUed. jnost sacred character (50). 
 
 (b.) Care and will should be constantly applied for its fulfil- 
 ment (54). 
 
 (<?.) The highest degree of guilt is incurred by its viola- 
 tion (56). 
 
 {d,) Any neglect of it, indifference or violation, on the plea 
 that the obligation existed previously, is guilt without justifica- 
 tion. That kind and degree of obligation did not exist previ- 
 ously. If oaths but left a man in his obligations as before, 
 society would not impose them (53). 
 
 whaT^i^t,prr^ (^-^ ^^ determining the permanence of effect 
 
 manent. from the oatli, its parts must be separated. 
 
 The obligations imposed by the oath are military and non- 
 military. The non-military are political and moral. 
 
 AU these, separately and collectively, are permanently bind- 
 ing, so long as a man remains in the army. 
 
 If an officer resign, and his resignation be accepted, then the 
 military vow of obedience to orders is suspended by separation 
 from the military body. His political and moral obligations 
 remain. He must still bear true faith and allegi.ince. 
 OiiNi aad Ond- The politic4iJ and mond obligatioitt impo«od 
 ■••^ by tlie oatli, with its attendant cireTiin«tam)cs, 
 
 pecnlfarly on the Cadets and Gniduatc* of the Military A<»d- 
 enij, are permanent. TIkj relation eataMUhod between tJicm 
 and the nation U ineffaceable for thcmj except bj dcatb* 
 
 This is shown by the int<}ntion of the Government. And 
 that intention fixes the interpretation of the oath, since the 
 settled rule is, that the meaning of a promise shall be deter- 
 mined by the ii^ntion of the party impomig it 
 
 The intention of the Government in educatin^r ^ , ,. 
 
 . , o Intention of the 
 
 young men tor its service, is to secure not only Pfrty imposing. 
 
 military skill, but a body of men separated from other ties, to 
 belong in a peculiar manner to the nation, for its service and 
 interests so long as they live. 
 
 That this is the intention is not only known from history, 
 but is evident from the consideration that other motives for 
 the care and expenditure do not exist. Military skill could be 
 acquired in military schools established by individuals or by 
 States. Persons coming from such schools could pass exami- 
 nations and obtain commissions. The common bond of Allegi- 
 ance belongs to all citizens. It could not have been the objec^t 
 to secure what was already secured. But in a bod y of educated 
 and well-tried men, ftill of intelligent, and devoted loy.ilty and 
 patriotism, ready to serve the country zealously in war or 
 peace, in the anny or in civil life, there is an objc^-t worthy of 
 the meanK, and not to b(^ s( cured so well by other ways. 
 
 Suc^h nppears to ])o the intt^ition of the party impoBing the 
 oath, and this lixcs its construction. 
 
 The persons named may accordingly be considered as be- 
 longing to the nation in a peculiar nianiKT, as a child adopted 
 belongs to the person or family adopting. Ev^ry bond hostile 
 to the obligation must \m considered as permanently severed. 
 
 (/) The conduot demanded by the obhV.ution .«v 
 
 • _.!.. •' n " BnoMqnont Goa- 
 
 ls eviucnt. A certain amount of military wtTvice *^<^^ domandoa, 
 
 is imposed by promise an<l due by justice. li.>.Klgrmtion 
 
 Bhould not be offered without th« most ^veigllt7 eonsideratioiis 
 
 8ucli as it U kuowii wiU be witirfactorj to the public autliority, 
 
 nor slionld the nwignation be reganJcxl as more than proposed 
 
 till It has been officially acceptwi. ileix:ly to scDd a raigoa 
 
 tion, und act at once as if wparatlon trcre oonsammafwl, \^ not 
 
 only a grave mih'tan- oflTence, but a moral one. 
 
32 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 In war; 
 
 In peace. 
 
 "No power can release a man but the Government itself. 
 When the resignation is accepted, the moral effect on a 
 graduate is to suspend the exercise of certain military func- 
 tions, but not to sever the indissoluble bond which has been 
 formed. 
 
 So soon as he is needed again for the public 
 defence, he is bound to re-enter the service. 
 
 While out of it, he is never to forget the claims 
 of the nation oij his affections, and, when needed, 
 on his influence and his efforts for averting public dangers or 
 promoting public welfare. He has been severed from other 
 ties that tliis may be single and supreme. 
 
 Any want of proper zeal for the national welfare or honor, 
 when occasions demand it in word or deed, is culpable. Any 
 direct action against the nation, has not only the guilt which 
 attaches to such conduct in any citizen — which may be that of 
 sedition, conspiracy, rebellion, or treason, according to circum- 
 stances — but that deeper turj)itude which comes from an oath 
 violated, and from those moral claims of the adopting country, 
 which have been disregarded.*] 
 
 Here terminates the subject of duties pertaining to that 
 organized body called the nation. 
 
 4. The Family. 
 Parental AuTnoKmr, and that resembling the Parental. 
 
 The Family : An- 
 thority in it. 
 
 Duties to that 
 authority. 
 
 (a.) Parental AuTHORnr. 
 
 58. The next organization established by the 
 Creator among men is that of the family. The 
 authority existing there is parental. 
 
 59. Duties to that authority, demanded from 
 children to their parents are those of Honor, 
 
 ♦ " It is their country's voice whose claim should meet 
 An echo in the soul's most deep retreat, 
 Along the heaft's responding chords should run, 
 Mr let a tone there vibrate but the one." — Moobb. 
 
 duties to and from parents. 
 
 33 
 
 . Obedience, DociLrrr. The opposed faults are those of Dis ^ 
 respect, Disobedience, Wilfulness. 
 
 Honor is obligatory during life. " Honor thy father and thy 
 mother." Obedience, with the accompanying disposition of do 
 cility, is demanded till the child is of age, and released from pa- 
 rental authority. 
 
 In regard to the extent of obedience, it is unnecessary to 
 suppose extreme cases which can seldom occur. The divine 
 rule is, "Children, obey your parents in all things; for this is 
 well pleasing unto the LordP 
 
 Individualism gives the contrasted rule. " If a child think 
 the parent's commands not right, he is bound to disobey." The 
 mere statement of the latter rule is sufficient to show its enor- 
 mity. 
 
 While these duties belong to both parents, there is a special 
 tenderness which is due, according to the common sentiment of 
 mankind, from the son to the mother. " The Lord hath con- 
 firmed the authority of the mother over the sons" by a peculiar 
 instinct, which every man must feel, unless he is brutalized. 
 
 The child is also bound to support the parent when nec- 
 essary. 
 
 60. Duties from that authority, demanded 
 
 from parents to children, are those of Mainte- ^^"^^^ .?^°^ *^^* 
 
 -_ Authority. 
 
 NANCE, J^ducation; care for their happiness. 
 
 61. The neglect of duties on the one side does 
 
 Eot absolve from obligations on the other. Nei- Violation by one 
 ther Society nor the family are made by a con- fe'^e^toti'e^.''' 
 tract, but by the ordaining of the Deity. In 
 both, " The powers that he are ordained of GodP 
 
 62. The children and parents of one family are 
 
 bound to co-operate together for common family ^°°^'° *^' 
 good. Self is to be subordinated in the family, as it is in the 
 nation, to the weal of the whole. LTnder good are included 
 beta daily enjoyment and permanent welfare. 
 
 63. The magnitude of these obligations is 
 
 great. If duties in the family are well done ^^^^ ®^ *^®s® 
 ^1 .11 n . ' duties, 
 
 cniidren well tramed, parents duly honored, 
 
mm 
 
 S4 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 obeyed and loved, the good effects are found in every depart- 
 ment of Society. If those duties are neglected, vast evils per- 
 vade the whole community, such as may bring it to ruin. 
 
 From the importance of these duties, the divine command- 
 ment enjoining them is named " the first commandment with 
 promise." The promise is that of permanence of welfare 
 when the command is kept. 
 
 Other particulars on this subject, and on the similar domestic 
 relations of servant and master, are left to theology. 
 Ancestors. ^"^^ ^^^ obligation similar in kind, but not in 
 
 degree, extends to ancestors. They are to be 
 honored and remembered in the line of the family, without re- 
 ference to their social rank and position. The effect from the 
 fulfilment of tliis duty is most salutary. Few men can hope to 
 live in the memory of the public. But by the observance of 
 this, a man may look to live in the memory of his line. This ex- 
 pectation will be a spur to a good life, and a check in tempta- 
 tion. 
 
 „ .. , . ^ ^'5. Taking now in one view, duties to the na- 
 Umted view of . ^ ' 
 
 duties to the tion and to the family, the proper estimate of 
 family.' ^ ^ them both is determined by one simple fact: 
 
 I^ach individual was lorn under them, lie did 
 not make them by any act or word of his own, but he found 
 them. This fact settles these principles : 
 
 1. Theauthorittjof Goveymmentandthatinthe 
 setS^^ ^ fa^nily are ordained of God. If no individu- 
 al man made them, and each man found them 
 made for him, they come from the Author of Nature. What 
 kind of parents, and what kind of government each shall 
 be born under, may depend partly on human will. But that he 
 shall belong to some family, under some government, is the will 
 of the Creator. Hence, to resist such authority is to resist the 
 ordinance of God. 
 
 2. Human rights and duties Monging to the individual are 
 subordinate to these. These existed hefore the individual was 
 conscious of them. lie found them above him. Hence they 
 
 DUTIES TO EDUCATIONAL AUTHORITY. 
 
 35 
 
 Error removed. 
 
 are lefore and above individual obligations, which are merely 
 human. 
 
 The same fact removes a common error. It is 
 that which exaggerates the importance of the in- 
 dividual to the prejudice of the rights of the parent, as well 
 as of Society. 
 
 J (b.) Educational Authoefty. 
 
 ^Q, For purposes of Education, parental au- Authority trans- 
 thority is transferred to other persons, for certain tioT"^ ^'' ^^^'*" 
 times, and within certain localities. As the Deity transfers a 
 portion of his authority to the nation, and to the head of the 
 family, so may those who receive it transfer it, for good pur- 
 poses, to others. One form of authority thus established is edu- 
 cational. It may exist in a man, or in a body of men. 
 
 67. The person or authorities educatini?, thus r* , 
 
 , „ , "^ place and 
 
 Stand tor the time in the place of the parent, "&^ts. 
 
 and with reference to the purposes of education, represent him. 
 The relation to the pupil, is that of the superior to the inferior. 
 
 68. The general duties to educational author- ^ ,. , , , 
 
 ., Duties and faults 
 
 ity are, consequently, similar to those due to regarding it. 
 
 parents. They are those of Honor, Obedience, Docility. The 
 opposed faults are those of Disrespect, Disobedience, Wilful- 
 ness. 
 
 ^These duties belong to the authority and the office, indepen- 
 dently of personal feelings. 
 
 69. There are special obligations resulting ^ . , 
 /. , -^ o to Special 
 
 irom the pmposes and means for education. The obligation. 
 purpose is the improvement of the pupil, by acquisitions in 
 learning, through which his welfare will be promoted, the 
 offices of life will be performed, and the demands of society for 
 capacity and acquirements in its members, may be met. Hence, 
 a special duty for the pupil is, to have a good will for Leaen- 
 ING, and, also, Diligence. The opposed faults are Indiffer- 
 ence and Idleness. 
 
 He is to desire earnestly his own improvement, the dieci- 
 
36* 
 
 PRACTICAL ETUICS. 
 
 DUTIES TO AND FKOM VOCATIONAL AUTHORITY. 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 Duties from it. 
 
 pline of liis faculties, and the possession of the various branches 
 of learning included in his education. He is to look constantly 
 to the future^ with the sentiment that every neglect and omis- 
 sion in the spring-time of his life will leave deficiencies which 
 must be felt afterward. 
 
 He must avoid all waste of time. 
 
 Among means for education are a fixed order and certain 
 rules. These form the Constitution and Laws for that smaller 
 community, the School. The duty demanded by them is that 
 of willing Obedience. The opposed fault is Insubordination. 
 Also, several learners are together for a common purpose. The 
 obligation imposed by this fact is that of Co-operation. The 
 contrasted fiiult is that of Ilindrance, whether of the studies 
 of all, or of any one. 
 
 70. The duties from that authority are those 
 of Zeal, Diligence, and Justice. 
 
 Violation on one '^^' Violation of duties on the one side does 
 
 side does not re- not release from obligation on the other. AVhile 
 lease on the other. , . , . , , . , 
 
 the relation continues, the duties demanded by it 
 
 are to be performed. The pupil is never to forget the obliga- 
 tions due to the office, even when he suffers in his feelings 
 under injustice, whether real or supposed. 
 
 (<?.) Authority, Educational and Vocational. 
 
 Anthority that . ^^' ^^'^"^ ^^® purpose is not general educa- 
 trains for a vo- tion, but training for the avocation which is to 
 
 be followed through life, the authority then ex- 
 isting is vocational. Apprentices, clerks, students of the learned 
 professions, under their respective masters, or collections of 
 young men in institutions for any kind of professional training, 
 are examples of subjection to vocational authority. 
 Eeiation and '^^^' "^^^ relation is similar to the last. The 
 
 fh'ile'of 'Si^Edu^ general duties and the faults on both sides are 
 caUon. also similar. A young man is guilty of most 
 
 Dnty to make culpable neglect who does not use all possible 
 
 professional ac- -,.,. . • i • ix. • .i i . 
 
 ^uirements. diligence m preparing himself m the best man- 
 
 ner for his future vocation. If he enter on his life's employ- 
 ment unprepared for its duties, what is before him but failure 
 for himself, or suffering for others, through his unskilfulness ? 
 Those who have young men in training are sacredly bound 
 to see that the latter do not begin their vocations without 
 being fitted to perform well the duties to which they will be 
 called. 
 
 74. [There are special duties under this head Military charac- 
 for those in training for the military profession, attentfon't^o' 
 
 in an institution of learning. They are bound regulations, 
 to the most strict attention to regulations. They are not 
 only bound to this, as all others under such regulations would 
 be, but peculiarly, since that strictness of attention is essential 
 for forming the military character.] 
 
 75. The importance of these duties belonging j^ponanceof 
 to both educational and vocational authority educational and 
 
 1 1. J • • 1 vocational 
 
 can be seen by estimating the consequences if preparation, 
 they are neglected. Society will be filled with men untaught 
 in what they ought to know. Life will be lost through an 
 ignorant physician : property and reputation by an unskilled 
 lawyer. Defeat, disaster, and waste of life among valuable 
 ofticers and men will result from the mistakes and ignorance 
 of some one unfit for military command. The importance is 
 thus evident of the duties that have been named, and the 
 criminality of neglect, in the time of education and training. 
 " The multitude of the wise is the welfare of the world." 
 
 5. The Yocation Itself. 
 
 76. After the vocation has been entered, it Virtues in the 
 demands duties in and to it. ^^^^xi^n ; 
 
 The virtue it requires is Assiduity. A man must be sedu- 
 lous, both to execute with faithfulness^ the separate duties of 
 his profession as they arise, and also to secure constant profes- 
 sional improvement. The opposed faults consist in being pro- 
 fessionally negligent, or unprogressive. 
 
 [".ISTeglect of professional duty," is a grave military offence.] 
 
^' 
 
 38 
 
 X 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 6. The Past. 
 
 EESPECT FOE THE PAST. 
 
 39 
 
 and in it to tli« 
 past. 
 
 r 
 
 '7. The knowledge requisite for every profes. 
 sion has come from the past. It is by an or- 
 der fixed in nature, that tlie generations wliich precede, in- 
 struct those that follow. There is hence a respect for the 
 collective wisdom of past generations, incumbent on every 
 man in his profession and place, as well as in all his opinions. 
 Conservatism. The virtue thus demanded is Conservatism. 
 ^ It is also according to the same natural order, that each 
 living generation shall, during its existence, add its own dis- 
 coveries and improvements for the advancements which knowl- 
 ^'^»^«"- edge merely human, must require. Tlie action 
 
 thus demanded is that of Prookess. Conservatism and Pro- 
 gress, should be united, and temper each the other. Progress 
 should ever be conservative, and conservatism temperately 
 progressive. There is a combined duty in the present, to the 
 past and the future. 
 Opposed Against these wedded vu-tues, stands, as one 
 
 Extremes. . t i -i. 
 
 extreme, Immobility, from an excessive regard to 
 antiquity ; and, as the other, Rash Innovation, from an ex- 
 travagant desire for novelty. 
 
 78. Such are duties connected with a man's vocation, and 
 with the past. 
 
 ^UVell^ ^^^^'^ '^''^^ ^^^^"S to the same head with 
 vidnai. those to God, the public, and the family. They 
 
 are before and above the individual. 
 
 s^'oS^Jranr^^^^^^ The duties to a man's vocation are duties to 
 is above him; Society, and, througli that, to God. They pro- 
 mote the welfare of the world. Thus, they are duties to 
 society. Tlio Deity h tlie guardian of the norld'd welfare. 
 Tims they are retiiotcly, duties to iiiiiK 
 
 ^^^^^X 'V*^ ^^'' *^' ^^ ^^"^"^ ^ ^^^ "»«»«t the col 
 
 ftbOT« 
 
 leciWe wisdom of past ag^ is an unthority ^bore 
 that of the opinions of an individual. A? God, the nation, and 
 
 the family existed before him, so did the past. The nation and 
 the family are autliorities organized. The past is authority, 
 not organized. But both, by the order of nature, are authority! 
 They are guides and guardians for the individual. 
 
 79. It is an incumbent duty therefore on all Resaitin^ duty 
 persons, but especially on young men, to check ^""^ ^""^^ "'"''* 
 . the natural tendency for attacking and opposing whatever is 
 found to be existing and sanctioned by time. Fault-finding is 
 among the easiest of human employments. For some, it is one 
 of tlie most agreeable. It can never be just, however, till he 
 who indulges in it can show that he has both the wisdom for 
 devising, and the skill for establishing something, which, in its 
 continmd j^ractical worhmg, would be found better. 
 
 ^ 80. Here terminates the subject of duties above the indi- 
 vidual. We proceed to those witliin him. 
 
 A view of both, and in their due proportions, is Transition by the 
 given by Lord Bacon. The extract from him will Bacot'""^ '^ 
 furnish a fitting transition from the one subject to the other. 
 
 " There is formed in every thing a double nature of good, the 
 one as every thing is a total or substantive in itself, the other 
 as it is a part or w^emher of a greater hochj ; whereof the latter 
 is the greater and the worthier, because it tendeth to the con- 
 servation of what is more general. Therefore we see the iron 
 in particular sympathy moveth to the lodestone, but yet if it 
 exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the aifection to the lode- 
 stone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the 
 region and country of massy bodies. This douUe nature of 
 good, . . . . i^ much more engraven upon man, if he 
 degenerate not, unto whom the conservation of duty to the 
 
 PUBLIC OUGHT TO BE MUCH MORE PRECIOUS THAN THE CONSERV- 
 ATION OF LITE AND BKING."* 
 
 • fi»«a AdrasKMoent oT L«kn»r.jf. 
 
40 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Duties to self. 
 
 Why placed 
 here. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 VIRTUES WHICH REGARD SELF. 
 DUTIES WITHIN US. 
 
 1. The Virtues wliich are second in order are 
 those whieli pertain to one's self. 
 ^ They occupy this position because tliej result 
 from those virtues which have preceded them, 
 and direct those which are to follow them. 
 
 Each human being is, first of all, to love God and the pub- 
 lie good more than self. He is, then, subordinatelj to love 
 himself, as an instrument for virtues and for deeds that are 
 good, and that do good. He is then to love individual per- 
 sons as himself, extending to them the same chastened and 
 ennobled affection which he has learned to apply to his indi- 
 vidual being. The first of these duties is a foundation for the 
 second, and the second for the third. 
 
 Hence, Duties and Virtues belonging to ourselves form the 
 subject next in order. 
 
 Fundamental 2. These duties and virtues have a fundamen- 
 
 ^^"- tal rule. 
 
 We are to love and revere ourselves, as existing for 
 
 ENDS greater THAN OURSELVES, WHICH ENDS ARE TO BE AT- 
 TAINED THROUGH VIRTUES POSSESSED, AND THROUGH GOOD DEEDS 
 PERFORMED. 
 
 Duties to self may be thus divided : 1. They 
 belong, to the whole person ; or 2. To t/dngs 
 (as distinguished from persons) con7iected with him. 
 
 ^ Those to the whole person belong to the whole 
 life^ or the whole nature. 
 
 Division. 
 
 Subdivision. 
 
 QQ 
 
 S3 
 
 o 
 
 a 
 t^ 
 
 03 
 
 (—1 
 
 w 
 
 I— I 
 
m 
 
 m 
 
 42 
 
 H 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Duty to the 
 whole life. 
 
 1. Duty Eegaeding the Whole Life. 
 
 3. The obligation belonging to the whole life 
 applies—l. To the purpose of life ; 2. To the 
 virtues required for tliat purpose. 
 
 Enle for the end. ^^'^ ^^"^ *^'^ P'^frpose of life, the dutj may be 
 
 expressed in this rule : ITave one good and great 
 aim : Devote life to attaining it. 
 
 ctble^'lXntt ^- .^-^^'^ ^""^ V^o^o^^^ should bo nothing im- 
 geous', satisfac- practicable or chimerical, but one which can be 
 ^°^- gained by the person proposing it. It should 
 
 also bestow benefit, and at all times give the mind satisfaction. 
 The qualities required for the supreme end are thus manifest. 
 It should be practicable, advantageous, satisfactory. 
 Highest, left to ^- Eternal life, the highest end, is considered 
 Theology. ^^ Eeligion, and is left to that divine science, 
 
 within whose province it belono-s 
 
 Common end. ^' Accordingly, each human being should %x 
 
 his will through life on what he wishes to be, 
 rather than on what he wishes to do or to ^have. His aim 
 should be to become continually letter and wiser. 
 Why good. . (*^*) '^^^^ '"^^ practicalle for every person, {h.) It 
 
 is advantageous; since success in life depends 
 on the possession of the qualities for success. All which one 
 can have, and all which he is fitted to do, must come from 
 what he is. {c.) It is satisfying. The satisfaction from doinc. 
 right, all men know. That from learning, is among the mos^t 
 refining of human pleasures. 
 
 [A taste for science, literature, and art is important in the 
 military profession. The duties of that profession at times 
 concentrate, but usually have unoccupied intervals. Without 
 eome refining taste, those intervals may be given to vices that 
 degrade the man, and injure the service. But where there is 
 a fondness for intellectual pursuits, there is a pleasant employ- 
 ment, not only gratifying the person more than any dissipa- 
 
 FOR whole life: a great aim permanent. 
 
 43 
 
 Can be Heroic. 
 
 tions could do, but fitting him to bestow benefits on his pro- 
 fession or his country. A love of learning for its own sake, 
 should therefore be cultivated. The words, "Literature, 
 Science, and Art," in the diploma, may be considered a moni-' 
 tion to those who receive it, that they should continue the cul- 
 tivation which has been commenced.] 
 
 T. But while the aim should be thus practical, 
 and not unsuitable, there is nothing to hinder it 
 from being grand and heroic. In w^der to live with great aspira- 
 tions, one may rightly conceive the most noble actions in war, 
 in public services, in domestic life, in the offices of charity or 
 friendship, with a wish and willingness to perform them him- 
 self, if circumstances demanding them from him should arise. 
 These aspirations are a part of moral cultivation. We are 
 always better for them. The forming of them in youth seems 
 intended as part of the order of nature. 
 
 When any one keeps before his mind the image of what he 
 wishes to he, that image forms a beautiful ideal to which he 
 desires to give reality. He covets this more than any interest 
 for him. Such a state of mind makes life a constant aspira- 
 tion. It tends to form heroes and heroic men, and is the 
 foundation for heroic virtues. 
 
 The testimony of Lord Bacon on this subject Authority of 
 is valuable. • ^'^ ^^"°^- 
 
 " Of all other means the most compendious and summary ; 
 and again the most noble and effectual for the reducing of the 
 mind unto virtue and good estate is this ; the electing and pro- 
 pounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his 
 life, such as may he in a reasonable sort within his compass to 
 attain. For if these two things be supposed, that a man set 
 before him honest and good ends, and again that he be reso- 
 lute, constant, and true unto them, it will follow that he shall 
 mould himself into all virtue at once." 
 
 Such is the duty relative to the purpose of life. 
 8. (2) The Virtues required for that purpose are common 
 or heroic. 
 
44 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 lilii 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^^;:5' 
 
 Tn^o'lJfp^: '^^ ^^^^^^ Virtues are those which com- 
 potie. monly keep the reason and the will fixed on the 
 
 purpose of life. They are two : Practical Wisdom and Eeso- 
 lution. 
 
 Wisdom. ' . '^^^ ^^^*"® ^^^^^^^ fix^s the reason on the end, 
 
 is called in Scripture, Wisdom, and the opposed 
 vice, Folly. Practical wisdom is accordingly the constant 
 appreciation by the mind of the supreme end. Folly (as the 
 term is used in morals) is the reverse. It is forgetting the 
 end of life, in life's daily circumstances. Accordingly^ the 
 divine rule is, " Get wisdom." 
 
 Ecsointion. . ^'^ "^''^"^ ^^^^^ ^^^ps the will on that end 
 
 is Ptesolution. The will for good ends must be 
 constant. Fluctuation and inconstancy form the opposed 
 lault— irresolution for what is good and great. 
 
 Resolution being a constant virtue, will not only set the 
 will on the great end of life, but on the separate actions of 
 each day. These are ordered with relation to the chosen pur- 
 pose. The will should be fixed to make every action perfect 
 as possible, and suitable to the end intended. "Whatsoever 
 thou takest in hand, remember the end, and thou shalt never 
 do amiss."* 
 
 9 Heroic virtues are those which fix the reason and will 
 with nneommon intensity on the noblest purposes of existence. 
 
 iiistinotion of TT/^« • • ^ i./v. 
 
 Heroic from Com- ^^^^^^ Virtues differ from those which are 
 mon Virtues. common rather in degree than in kind. They 
 are the common virtues carried to the highest grades. Exam- 
 pes of them are in men of extraordinary virtue, and capacity, 
 situated in great circumstances, such as the martyrs, saints 
 warriors, statesmen, legislators, who have the brightest names 
 in history as public benefactors. To understand these virtues 
 we should consider what circumstances carry the common 
 virtues to the highest grade, and what names are given to the 
 virtues when these circumstances unite. 
 
 HEROIC virtues: duty to the whole nature. 
 The circumstances are the followinor : 
 
 45 
 
 Virtues belonging to the whole life have a ^en common 
 higher degree of nobleness when they act for no virtues axe high- 
 eartbly reward ; and one still higher when their ^ ^'^ ** 
 exercise demands great personal sacrifice and suff*ering, or the 
 serene daily endurance of petty annoyances and iiTitations. 
 They are also greater and nobler in proportion as they act 
 with undiminished energy through a longer time. When all 
 these circumstances unite, there is the highest moral grade. 
 All were united in the career of Washington. 
 He had a great aim. He sought no reward. ^^*°^Pi®- 
 He endured with patience. He pursued his purpose with 
 perseverance.* 
 
 Heroic virtues thus formed receive the names ^liree heroic 
 of Magnanbiity, Equanimity, Longanimity. ^dT '"^ ^^'' 
 Magnanimity implies that the soul is habitually set on what 
 is morally great; Equanimity, that it pursues that object 
 equally through trials of the feelings ; Longanimity, that it so 
 acts through a long period. There is a disregard by magna- 
 nimity of objects unimportant ; by equanimity, of agitations of 
 feeling ; by longanimity, of the weakening influences of time. 
 Tlie three are essential for a true hero. For example, they are 
 needed in long sieges, and retreats. 
 
 Such are the moral principles belonging to the Transition, 
 whole life. Those are next in order which pertain to the 
 whole nature. 
 
 2. Duty to the Whole ISTature. ^l^\^^ *? *^® 
 
 whole nature. 
 1. General, 
 
 10. Duties to the whole nature are general or Division. 
 special. 
 
 The general duty to the whole nature is to General: Order 
 give to it Order and Culture. *°d Culture. 
 
 ♦ Ecdus. Til, 36. 
 
 ♦ See Marshall's "Life of Washington"— a work which every American 
 should read. 
 
46 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 DUTY TO WHOLE NATUKE I OKDEB. 
 
 47 
 
 !il 
 
 Bubjects for it. '^^^ Subjects for this order and culture are the 
 
 parts and powers of our nature. 
 
 By the parts are meant the two natural por- 
 
 Jrarts and powers + • v • i . ■• . -^ 
 
 ofiumannature. "°"* '^'^^<^^ »'"<' umted in life and separated by 
 
 death. Tliese are the soul and the body. Of 
 these, the soul is the superior and director. By the powers 
 (the faculties) are meant capacities active and passive in both 
 mind and body. They fit human nature for acting and being 
 acted on. Such are Conscience, Keason, Will, and other faeuf- 
 ties in the mind.* Such are the senses, the appetites, the pas- 
 sions, belonging to the body, and through the body affecting 
 the mind. Each of these powers has its proper object. For 
 example, Sound and Silence are tlie objects of the sense of 
 hearing ; Eight and Wrong are the objects of conscience ; 
 Iruth and Error are the objects of reason; Good and Evil are 
 the objects of will. Each of these powers exists in two condi- 
 tions. It is active or passive in regard to its object. Thus the 
 sense of sight may be active in looking, or passive in simply 
 receiving impressions from light and color. Conscience is 
 active in directing conduct, passive in receiving impressions of 
 right and wrong. The same fact is seen in all the faculties of 
 body and mind. 
 
 Order and Culture are to be applied to all these parts and 
 powers, both in their active and passive conditions, 
 f^^/*'*'^*^ ^^- ^'■'^®'" demands for the aotive conditions 
 
 lor Order: +1 f +i • 
 
 1. In active con- ^"'^^ "^^ superior parts and powers shall rule 
 ditions. and the inferior be ruled. ' 
 
 The body is to be ruled by the mind as its director; the 
 mind, by conscience as its director; conscience, by the law of 
 duty, and by the Divine Law-giver as its directors. 
 
 * The learner must not faU into the common mistake of mapping out the mind 
 acxK>rding to its faculties. The f-.culties are merely modes of action in which t^e 
 
 Z^U T. '• Z' ^''"'' °^^ ^'^"' ^^ ^^^^^"^ '^^ ^-d -to the twtting 
 the pulhng the pushm., the grasping faculty. The one hand has the power of 
 
 performing these functions. So the one mind of man ha^ power to will to rlion 
 
 U> judge of nght and wrong. We speak of these as Will, Reason, CoLc rn": 
 
 But ^v e ever mean one nature capable of certain actions. 
 
 An illustration for this duty within and to Illustration, 
 ourselves, may be found in the first class of duties whose 
 sphere is above ourselves. A well-ordered nation is a model 
 for a well-ordered nature. In the nation are, first, its organic 
 law with a body of municipal and subordinate laws ; next, the 
 authority which administers them ; and next, grades of au- 
 thority and subjection reaching to all members of the body 
 politic. So in our nature are to be, first, the supreme law of 
 duty with its divisions; next, the administering power of con- 
 science ; and next, the powers of mind and body, all in their 
 proper grades, and all of them under due direction. 
 
 12. Order demands for the passive conditions 2. in passive 
 that no impressions, however strong, on the conditions, 
 lower powers shall prevail over the influence of the higher. 
 
 For example, there may be the strong impressions of anger, 
 hunger, thirst, lust, fear, pain. If these be allowed to prevail 
 over reason and conscience, the duty of self-command has been 
 violated, and anarchy and rebellion have been introduced into 
 the inward realm. Let, then, every person determine on this 
 rule of conduct : " In every action, in will, word, and deed, I 
 will be directed by conscience and by reason, but not by feel- 
 ing, unless that feeling shall have been first approved by these 
 higher powers." Let him estimate action past by this princi- 
 ple : " Whenever I have not acted from judgment, principle, 
 conviction, but only from unregulated feeling, I have been 
 morally deficient." 
 
 [This duty of self-command is of immense importance for the 
 ofiicer, both that he may discharge well the duties of his pro- 
 fession, and may have influence over subordinates and enemies. 
 To govern others, we must, first of all, govern ourselves.] 
 
 Order, as a principle, is thus seen to be a con- j^^^^^ ^^ ^j^^ 
 Btant and perpetual will to give every thing its principle of or- 
 due position. Applied within, it produces in- ^'^' '^' '^'^^* 
 ward regulation. Extended without, it fortifies the duties of 
 the first class, whose sphere is above us, by demanding subjec- 
 tion to law and authority. 
 
48 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 $ 
 
 1.' i^it 
 
 Virtue needed 
 for its exercise. 
 
 DUTY TO WHOLE NATUEE I CULTURE. 
 
 49 
 
 Opposed fault. 
 
 What for Cful- 
 
 ture. 
 
 13. The virtue essential for giving order to 
 our nature, is that of self-government. 
 
 The opposed fault is Disorder,— disorder 
 shown in an unregulated and undisciplined 
 nature. It consists in yielding to inclination, to feeling, to 
 imagination, to passion, or to the senses,— supi em acy°over 
 conscience. It is a moral feebleness, which grants to the in- 
 ferior powers what is not due to them, and which does not 
 give to the superior that which is due. 
 
 We have tlius seen one general duty to the whole nature— 
 that of order. 
 
 14. The next general duty to the whole nature 
 is that of Culture. 
 1. In active con- Culture demands for the parts and powers of 
 |^"°'- our nature, in their active condition, tliat all of 
 
 them, and especially the higher, be unfolded by discipline into 
 the highest and noblest excellence which is attainable by man. 
 All must be made strong. 
 
 Thus the conscience is to liave the highest energy for right; 
 the reason is to be trained in all the habits requisite for a per' 
 feet action in sciences, arts, and the affairs of life : the will, 
 subjected first to reason and conscience, is to be taught firm- 
 ness for following principle and good ends. Each power is to 
 be trained, by applying it to its proper object ; the conscience 
 by the pursuit of duty; the intellect, by that of truth; the 
 will, by that of good, and, in like manner, all the others. ' 
 2. In passive oon- 1^- Culture demands for these parts and 
 ditions. powers, in their passive condition, that the sen- 
 
 sibilities of all, and especially of the highest, to impressions 
 from their proper objects, be preserved and increased. All 
 must be made susceptible. 
 
 For example, the taste is to be cultivated so as to be alive to 
 the impressions of the beautiful in nature, in art, in conduct 
 and character. Poetry, literature, music, and all the fine arti 
 are to receive attention, since it is the law of nature and ex- 
 perience that, without the perception of what is beautiful, no 
 
 man's nature can be refined and purified. So the conscience is 
 
 to be made more susceptible to impressions of duty, the reason 
 
 to those of truth, the will to those from real great and distant 
 
 benefit. God has set forth the right, the true, the good, the 
 
 beautiful in nature, and, through Eevelation in Himself, for 
 
 developing the mind of man. They are all united. To gain 
 
 one fully, we need the others. We are bound, therefore, to 
 
 increase our sensibility to impressions from these magnificent 
 
 objects, and thus to give culture to our nature. 
 
 16. This duty of cultivation for both conditions x.,,v ^ 
 , 1 ,, T , , Xiacn man most 
 
 must be performed by the individual for himself, perform it. 
 
 Education promotes it, though by imperfect methods, in the 
 life that now is. Eeligion seeks to attain it both for the life 
 temporal and for that eternal. But neither Education nor 
 Eeligion can secure it without the individual's own will and 
 co-operation. This he is bound to render at all times, but 
 especially in youth, when the whole character is in formation, 
 and the whole nature pliable. 
 
 The first step for this duty is to form and pre- 
 serve the conviction that the work of self-im- 
 provement is one placed by the Creator within 
 our own power. For that, therefore, we are re- 
 sponsible. The succession of outward events no man may 
 control, but every man has a control over the world within 
 him. 
 
 ^ '' I did ever hold it" (says Lord Bacon) " for an Testimony of 
 insolent and unlucky saying, ' Faber quisque for- Bacon, 
 tunae suae;'* except it be uttered only as an hortative or spur 
 to correct sloth. . . . But if the sentence were turned 
 to this, ' Faber quisque ingenii sui,'t it were somewhat more 
 true, and much more profitable; because it would teach 
 men to bend themselves to reform those imperfections in 
 themselves which now they seek but to cover, and to attain 
 those virtues and good parts which now they seek to have 
 
 * Every man the architect of liis own fortune. 
 t Every man the architect of his own mind. 
 
 First step for 
 Culture : Con- 
 viction of our 
 power and re- 
 sponsibility. 
 
I 
 
 50 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 only in show and demonstration. Yet notwithstanding every 
 man attempteth to be of the first trade of carpenters, and 
 few bind themselves to tlie second; whereas, nevertheless, 
 the rising in fortune seldom amendeth the mind ; but on the 
 other side, the removing of the stonds^ and impediments of tlie 
 mind doth often clear the passage and current to a man's for- 
 tune. But certain it is, whether it be believed or no, that as 
 the most excellent of metals, gold, is of all others the most 
 pliant and most enduring to be wrought ; so, of all living and 
 breathing substances, the perfectest man is the most sus^epti- 
 ble of help, improvement, impression, and alteration ; and not 
 only in his body, but in his mind and spirit; and there again 
 not only in his appetite and affection, but in his power of^^t 
 and reason. ■'•)• 
 
 So does this great thinker insist on the necessity and the 
 benefit of self-culture. 
 
 makf cSt^e*"" ^^'^ ^^^^"^ ^^^p is to make the culture uni- 
 uni venial. versal. 
 
 The body is to be included as well as the mind. In the 
 mind, the culture is to be both moral and intellectual. The 
 intellectual is to be both scientific and artistic (that is, esthe- 
 tic). The common fault is to select some one favorite part of 
 this field, and to neglect the rest. The gymnastics of the mind 
 are regarded by some without those of the body. Intellectual 
 cultivation is carried on, while the moral part is neglected, or, 
 reversely, there is a moral training, witiiout that which is in- 
 Testimony of tellectual. Of the latter fault. Lord Bacon says, 
 ^^*^^- in language still applicable : *^ Coming back from' 
 
 your invitation at Eton " (the letter is addressed to Sir Henry 
 Savilie), '^1 fell into a consideration of that part of policy 
 whereof philosophy speaketh too much and laws too little; 
 
 ioZ ^''T '' ^ T^ T '^'°^'*'' ^^'''^ "^'^^^ ^^^^ ^ ^e^t^^^d as an ethical 
 term It means here the .iopping.places of the mind. A man was advancing 
 n^orally and mtellectually He i.- stationary. The cause of his stopping is fZ 
 Welf or rom sornetlnng without. If it be from hhnself, it is a '' stond." If 
 from external hmdrances, it is an "impediment." 
 t Bacon. Letters, No. 109. 
 
 MEANS FOR CULTURE. 
 
 51 
 
 and that is, of education of youth. "Whereupon, fixing my 
 mind awhile, I found straightway, and noted even in the dis- 
 courses of philosophers, which are so large in this argument, a 
 strange silence concerning one part of this subject. For as 
 touching the framing and seasoning of youth to moral virtues 
 as tolerance of labors, continency from pleasures, obedience, 
 honor, and the like, they handle it ; but touching the improve- 
 ment and helping of the intellectual powers, as of conceit, 
 memory, and judgment, they say nothing.''-^^^ 
 
 The third step is to use all the means known rm,- ^ ♦ 
 , . inira step : use 
 
 by experience to be most effective for this uni- all means, 
 versal development of nature. 
 
 These are— 1st, Keligion ; 2d, Opinion ; 3d, Example ; 4th, 
 Correcting one affection by another ; 5th, Fixed habits. 
 
 " The most sovereign of all is religion, which Testimony of 
 is able to change and transform it " (the will of Bacon, 
 man) " in the deepest and most inward inclinations and mo- 
 tions." "Next to that is opinion and apprehension, whether 
 it be infused by tradition and institution, or wrought in, by 
 disputation and persuasion." "And the third is example, 
 which transformeth the will of man into the similitude" of that 
 which is studied as a model. " The fourth is when one affec- 
 tion is healed and corrected by another, as when cowardice is 
 remedied by shame and dishonor, or sluggishness and back- 
 wardness by indignation and emulation." "Lastly, when all 
 these means, or any of them, have new-framed and formed 
 human will, then doth custom and habit corroborate and con- 
 form all the rest."t 
 
 17 The habitual virtue for this duty is Zeal virtue required 
 FOR Improvement. for this duty. 
 
 This virtue should live in young persons as an unceasing 
 fire, urging them ever to a constant aspiration for advance- 
 ment. The divine rule is, " Covet earnestly the best gifts." 
 
 Such are the general duties to our nature— Order and . 
 Culture. 
 
 ♦ Bacoa Letters, No. 109. 
 
 t lb. 
 
53 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Transition to The sjpecial duties follow. Tlicj are tlie appli- 
 
 speciai duties, cations of Order and Culture to specific portions 
 of our nature. 
 
 The portions of our nature receiving this specific application 
 are the ruling and the ruled.* The ruling powers are princi- 
 pally the Conscience and the Intellect. Those to be ruled are 
 the lower impulses coming from or iufiuenced bj the body. 
 
 Duty to the Whole JS^atuee. 
 2. Special, 
 
 DUTIES TO THE COXSCIENCE. 
 
 18. The first of the ruling powers demanding special Order 
 and Culture is the Conscience. 
 
 Conscience. ^^ Conscience is meant the principal directing 
 
 faculty which declares in human actions what 
 ought or ought not to be done. Our wills may be compared 
 to the propelling power in a vessel, and Conscience to the 
 helm. The machinery in a steamer gives power to move in 
 any direction, but the rudder, power to move in the one direc- 
 tion wherein it ought to go. So the Will may move us alon<. 
 any course, good or evil, but Conscience is to direct us alon^ 
 the one course, which is good. ^ 
 
 m^ual virtue The virtue demanded is Co^sciENrrorsNEss. ' 
 Three duties. ^ ^^- Conscientiousness acts in three duties. 
 
 These ai'e-lst, The Instruction of the Con- 
 science in right rules; 2d, The Application of the Conscience 
 to particular actions-past, present, and intended ; 3d The 
 Execution of those decisions of Conscience which result' from 
 comparing single actions with the rule. 
 
 Kroin three act6 These three duties correspond to the three acts 
 Of conscience. ,, conscience. Those three form what is called 
 a syllogism. ^ By the first, we consider a general proposition 
 that a certain class of actions is right or wroncr By the 
 second, we place some particular action within the^'class. By 
 
 * lu Scripture, tho spirit and the flesh. 
 
 DUTY TO conscience: its instruction. 
 
 53 
 
 the third, we conclude that the particular action being in the 
 class, is right or wrong. If it be future, we determine to do it 
 if right, and to abstain from it if wrong. If it be past, we con- 
 demn ourselves for it if wrong, and approve it if it were right. 
 For example, there may be some deed of injustice to which 
 we are tempted, and on which we are deliberating. The full 
 acts of conscience would be these : 
 
 1. Injustice is wrong. 
 
 2. This action (of which I am thinking) would be injustice. 
 
 3. Therefore it would be wrong (and I must not do it). 
 
 Or the injustice may have been committed, and we may be 
 reviewing it, at the close of the day, in the tribunal of con- 
 science. The successive decisions would be : 
 
 1. Injustice is wrong. 
 
 2. Tiiis action (which was perpetrated this day) was one ot 
 injustice. 
 
 3. Therefore it was wrong (and I condemn myself for it). 
 The process will be similar where the action is right 
 
 whether it be future or past. 
 
 Such are the three actions in every full process of conscience. 
 They may be executed in the mind so rapidly as to escape 
 analysis at tlie moment, but they are performed completely. 
 
 Tlie first act consists, therefore, in forming some general 
 moral rule which can cover classes of actions; the second, in 
 letting single actions into one of these classes, and thus under 
 the rule ; the third, in deducing a determination from the com- 
 parison of the particular action with the rule. 
 
 20. The first duty to the Conscience corre- ^^^ ^^^ duties 
 sponds to the first action. It is the duty of In- aSs.*" ^^^ 
 struction. 
 
 Instruction of the Conscience is the furnishino* l- Instruction, 
 ot It with sound moral rules for determining what actions are 
 right, and what wrong. 
 
 We are to obtain these rules from the authorities in morals 
 (r. 17) ; from Scripture, from moralists, from laws, from public 
 sentiments, and, by earnest and honest reflections, from those 
 
54 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 L 
 
 inward convictions which are the law of nature written on tlio 
 heart. 
 
 In forming these rules, the principles already given must be 
 applied (i. 18). The authorities mast be combined. The in- 
 ferior must yield to the superior. Extremes must be avoided 
 (i. 20). The rule of proportion must be carefully observed 
 (i. 22). The three great maxims of morals must be never for- 
 gotten (i. 22). Partial and extravagant views in morals are 
 dangerous. They have brought, and will ever bring, evils 
 among men. We must never regard that as right or indiffer- 
 ent which the standards of ethics show to be wrong. But we 
 must be equally careful not to condemn that which they do 
 not condemn. Under every law of duty are matters of liberty. 
 2. Application. 21. The second duty to the Conscience corre- 
 sponds to its second action. It is the duty of Application. 
 
 Application of the conscience is the placing of particular 
 actions, before or after the doing of them, in the class required 
 by the rule. 
 
 Before any action, we are to compare it with the rule of 
 duty, till we are satisfied as to its moral quality, whether it be 
 right or wrong. 
 
 ^ We are to give all possible distinctness to our conceptions of 
 right actions. These conceptions are to be ideals of excellence, 
 to which we are to give reality. The more glorious and beau- 
 tiful they are, the more do they animate the mind in the pur- 
 suit of virtue. 
 
 After any action, we should make a severe and impartial 
 comparison with the rule, giving approval if it agree with the 
 standard, condemnation if, by disagreeing, it was wrong. 
 
 The natural day furnishes a natural division of time'^fur the 
 execution of this duty in both its parts. The actions of each 
 new day should be planned at its commencement, under the 
 approved rules of duty. The actions of each day past should 
 be closely scrutinized, by comparing them with the proper 
 standard. Pythagoras made it the order for all his disciples 
 that the actions of the day Should be re vie .red thrice. 
 
 DUTY TO conscience: execution. 
 
 00 
 
 Future: right. 
 
 22. The third duty to the Conscience resulting 3. Execution, 
 from the third step is that of Execution. 
 
 Execution is the full consent of the will, with entire repres- 
 sion of all adverse inclinations, to perform in particular actions 
 whatever is demanded by the rule when applied to them. 
 
 Let the action be future : 
 
 1. If it have moral quality, it will be wrong Different cases : 
 or right. As one case, let it be wrong. Sup- Future, wrong, 
 pose it to be a falsehood by which we avoid some harm, or 
 gain some advantage; or an act of dishonesty, by which there 
 is profit; or of sinful self-indulgence, promising pleasure. 
 When compared with the rule of duty, it is seen to be wrong. 
 It must, then, be wholly avoided, however strong may be the 
 inclination for it. The decision of Conscience must thus be 
 executed. 
 
 2. As another case, let the contemplated future 
 action be rigU, It may be an act of justice to 
 another, or of kindness ; it may be an act of piety, or one re- 
 quii-ed by the obligations of our condition in life. Whatever 
 it be, it is yet seen to be demanded by the rules of duty. Yet 
 it is a very common occurrence that inclinations will stand 
 strongly opposed. In such a case, opposed feelings must be 
 repressed by strong moral energy, and the decision of Con- 
 science be thoroughly executed. 
 
 These are the requirements of morals as a human science. 
 Religion adds a demand for a consciousness of the presence, 
 the observation, and the assistance of the Supreme Beino- 
 before entering on any action. He aids man in right, and 
 against what is wrong."^ 
 
 These are the two cases of the action contemplated in the 
 future. Let the action now he past. The same two cases will 
 exist. If it have any moral quality, it will be wrong or right. 
 
 3. If the action committed shall have been 
 wrong, there must be self-condemnation. If, as ^^'* ' '^''^' 
 
 * This aid, however afforded, is called in Theology, arace: Gratia = auxUmm 
 Dti. 
 
56 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 !•! 
 
 II 
 
 t le consequence, other persons l.ave been deceived or wron-^ed 
 there must be rectification or restitution. The wrong done to' 
 another n.ust be undone, unless some impossibility intervene. 
 Kehgion adds the duty of confession to the Deity, and of ob- 
 taming, througli its required conditions, forgiveness. Thu« 
 also, must the decisions of Conscience be executed. "' 
 
 Past: right. *• "^^ remaining case is one which cannot 
 
 Tr,V.1 , M f^'f ^ "'""■ ^"'°"° i^"P°'-f«'^t l»«man beings. 
 
 . Tned by the h.ghest divine rules, no moral action of n.an is 
 
 wholly r,ght, since imperfection must adhere to it. But there 
 
 are many actions which are good by the connnon standard of 
 
 thTbcV^r ,T"'"" " "'"'' ''" '^~ '-^^-- <^-e 
 the be t wh,ch h,s crcumstances and abilities permitted. 
 
 In Ins new calling a past action right, the full satisfaction 
 of the .nnd should rest upon the consciousness of duty con. 
 eaentu^usly do.., and not on the hnman conse.uLs. D^ty 
 hould ever stand higher in the estimate of the mind than Z 
 consequences, whether good or evil. [The military man es 
 pecally must fallow this principle. lu disaster^. Ids 
 pecu harly tins consciousness: "I did my whole duty."] 
 
 Eel.g,on adds thankfulness to the Almighty, and the ac- 
 knowledgment of Ilim as the source of all go^d done 
 
 Thus^ also, are the decisions of Conscience to be executed. 
 
 ^o. Of the three dufcs to Conscience, Execution is the mo.t 
 important, because it is that without whir.), H.. . ., 
 
 fni;Mnc= T? • ""°'"^^ "'<='' the two others are 
 
 fruules Few men .nstruct conscience; fewer apply it • b„t 
 fewer stdl execute thoroughly its decisions. ' 
 
 sentin.l be TT T""" ''"'' P''^^^'^'"^ ^" ^^t^-'^' one 
 sentnnent be faxed „, the convictions of the mind, ft is that 
 
 Dutyualove all other oljects of human pursuit : TrllZ 
 ^on, the oixe evd to he feared and avoided* '•'^'^'Sres- 
 
 It also den.ands that in each action of life there shall be a 
 Bustamed moral energy, issuing both in watchfulness ov^r seh; 
 
 * To iiSvov i>opeedi; ifiayTia—Ckrymtom. 
 
 CULTrTATION or THE AFFECTIONS. 
 
 57 
 
 Affections. 
 
 and also in a sustained good will, impelling ever to tlie rio-ht 
 and restraining from the wrong. 
 
 There are requirements considered by Eeligion which are 
 left to thait divine guide. It is true that the full cure of men's 
 natures belongs to Eeligion. Yet moral science may be re- 
 garded as a handmaid, to whose discretion much has been left 
 bj the divine mistress.* 
 
 Such are duties to the Conscience by which we give to its 
 actions Order, and to itself Culture. 
 
 The Virtue, as we have seen, which is exercised in these 
 duties is Conscientiousness. The opposed fault is Deadness 
 of Conscience. It exists when conscience is not taught, not 
 applied, not obeyed. 
 
 25. For moral order and culture, the affec- 
 tions must also be cultivated. By them we be- 
 come disinterested. Without them, a man's nature cannot be 
 unfolded and ennobled. To cultivate the affections, we must 
 direct them on their proper objects. 
 
 These objects are found in the first class of duties— duties 
 whose sphere is above us, and in the third, or duties to other 
 individuals. The objects of affection in the first class are 
 God, our fellow-beings, our country with its institutions and 
 laws, oar parents. These are to elicit divine, human, patriotic, 
 and filial love. The objects of affection in the third class de- 
 mand fraternal, conjugal, parental, and friendly love. Under 
 the present head of duty to ourselves, it is sufiicient to express 
 the fact that moral cultivation of our nature is incomplete if it 
 do not include the affections as well as the conscience. 
 
 For if Conscience be exercised without the affections, we 
 may become too cold and selfish. History shows malignity 
 and cruelty in persecutors whose lives were yet devoted to 
 questions of conscience. If the affections be cultivated with- 
 out conscience, conduct may have too little regulation. Both 
 
 * The purpose of the present work requires that whUe the connection of Mor- 
 ality with Religion shall be never forgotten, and often suggested, yet Morality 
 shall be studied by itself. ' x 
 
 h I 
 
58 
 
 m 
 
 11 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 are Eecessary for the full development of the moral virtues. 
 Tlie aifections must be as life to impel ; the conscience, a^ li-ht 
 to direct. ^ 
 
 Kesalts. . ^^' ^^^^^ ^"^ instructs his conscience, applies 
 
 it, executes its decisions, and, in doing this, exer- 
 cises the most disinterested affections perpetually, his nature is 
 kept in the noblest exercise, and he is preserving a foundation 
 on Avhich all moral virtues may with divine help be erected. 
 
 Transition. ^^^ ^^^ ^^^ P^^^ *^ ^"^ics to the Intellect, 
 
 and thus to the intellectual virtues. In the 
 transition we should observe the influence of tlie moral virtues 
 on the intellectual. 
 
 Moral training through conscience and the affections forms a 
 good preparation for intellectual discipline. This fact should 
 be carefully noted by young persons engaged in study. 
 
 Experience shows this. It is the testimony of all men, that 
 they never studied, learned, or thought so well as when' they 
 were most conscientious. This is finely expressed by an old 
 writer. "The very true beginning of wisdom is the desire of 
 discipline." He adds : " And the desire of discipline is love ;" 
 that is, love for the studies and exercises which lead to mental 
 discipline. 
 
 The reason is evident. Tlie habits of mind which are 
 formed by discipline of the conscience, by reflection, attention, 
 the control of every faculty,— these are demanded for successful 
 study. Likewise the state of the will which is produced in a 
 conscientious man,--that of earnestness and singleness of pur- 
 pose,— is a source of mental vigor, since a strong will to learn 
 adds to the power of the mind in learning. Also, the affec- 
 tions developed under moral training, include attachment to 
 one's duties. Learning,— one of the duties of life,— is loved 
 This love of learning fosters the glowing action of the mental 
 powers : " The desire of discipline is love." 
 ^ We cannot, then, unfold the moral virtues without promo- 
 ting the intellectual ; but we may so cultivate the intellectual 
 as to neglect or deaden all moral virtue. 
 
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60 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 DUTIES TO THE INTELLECT. CORRESPONDEXT VIRTUES: 
 
 IXTELLIGENCE, PRUDENCE. 
 
 Intellectual 
 Virtues. 
 
 1. The general duty to tlie whole nature is 
 to be applied to the intellectual powers. It is 
 applied bj giving culture to those powers, and order to their 
 action. A class of "good habits" is thus formed. These 
 habits are Intellectual Virtues. Every person should hold the 
 conviction, that the cultivation and the discipline of his mind 
 cannot be neglected without the violation of duty. 
 
 2. Intellectual virtues are divided into those 
 ioY "knowledge and those for action. The first 
 belong more especially to life contemplative, and the second 
 to hfe active. The first are prominent in the preparatory 
 penod of life, when the young are under education and train- 
 ing for some vocation. The second are prominent in the 
 active period of life, after the vocation has been entered. Yet 
 the exercise of both is perpetually needed in both periods. 
 They are to be united, with one predominating. 
 
 Divibion. 
 
 Intellectual 
 Virtues for 
 Knowledge. 
 
 Summed in one. 
 
 1. Intellectcal Yirtues for Knowledge. 
 
 3. Intellectual virtues for knowledge are the 
 
 good habits necessary for acquiring both the 
 
 principles (with their conclusions) and the facts 
 
 which constitute human knowledge. 
 
 They may be expressed in one word : Intelli- 
 gence. 
 
 They are general or particular. 
 The general habits for knowledge are for the 
 general actions of the understanding. 
 
 The principal actions are two : reasoning and 
 rememlermg. Between these is a third, that of 
 
 Division. 
 
 Subdivision. 
 
 CULTURE OF THE INTELLECT: REASONING. 
 
 61 
 
 Beasoning. 
 
 conceiving. The two which are principal demand chief at- 
 tention. 
 
 4. Reasoninoj and rememberino: are easilv dis- ^ . , , . 
 
 ^ , o « Special distinc- 
 
 tinguished. Heasoning supposes at least two tion of reason 
 
 facts or propositions."^' One is seen, known, or °i°^emory. 
 admitted. The second is inferred from the first. Memory 
 does not necessarily suppose two facts or propositions. It is 
 the recollection of one. 
 
 5. By reasoning is meant inferring one fact or 
 one proposition from another. For example, the 
 first fact may be, " The enemy has taken up a certain position 
 in the night." The second fact inferred may be, " It is his 
 intention to attack me on the flank." So in propositions the 
 
 first may be — Each of these two lines (suppose A and 
 
 B ) is equal to a third line (C ^). The conclusion in- 
 ferred is, that the two first (A and B) are equal the one to the 
 other. This act of the mind, which, from some one tiling 
 known and admitted, draws a second by inference, is an act of 
 reasoning. 
 
 6. This act of reasoning requires two habits : ^p|.g impUed in 
 Comprehension for principles, and Sagacity for reasoning, 
 deductions. 
 
 The cause is apparent. When from one fact or proposition 
 we infer a second, we do so by means of some general j[>rhwi' 
 pie. Thus in the first example, the principle guiding to the 
 conclusion is — Every movement of .my enemy is with a delib- 
 erate purpose to help himself or harm me. Under that prin- 
 ciple, I put the fact^ that he took a position in the night from 
 which he could attack the flank of my army. Seeing that by 
 such attack he could most help himself and harm me, I infer 
 that this is his intention.f 
 
 Again, in the second example, the principle guiding to the 
 
 * The objects of intelligence are Things, Thoughts, Signs. They are received 
 by us as facts existing, or as propositions stated in language. 
 
 f You may then apply the Intellectual Yirtues for Action, and consider 
 whether vou cannot break his centre. 
 
62 
 
 PRACTICAL Ernies. 
 
 X Th T ; '""" '^'"' '' '""^ ^^-"^ -^ '^q-l to each 
 
 8.t.on Each of the two things, A and B, are equal io t^ 
 same third thinff C TlnVrll,- T ^- ^i , 
 
 and P «r« . , ; •^' '''^^'^ '^'^ conclusion that A 
 
 and a are equal, each to the otlier.* 
 
 These being the acts of mind required in reasoning, the two 
 hab.tual energies needed are: 1. That which compTelends a 
 prmcple; 2. H.at which draws a deduction. We thus r- 
 qn,re Comprehension for principles, and Sagacit, for deduT 
 
 Two kinds of <• There are two Irinrla ,-.<■ »«„„ • i 
 
 reasoning. ^ ^. , '""® "^* reasoning, demon- 
 
 strative and probable. In the first, there is but 
 one side to ever^ question; in the second, there a two id 
 
 ^.s Examples of the second are in all subjects not mathe- 
 rnatica ; m jurisprudence, ethics, statesmanship, war, in ev y 
 
 ^Cd Sie'^Tfr' ^•"''"'"" '"'-' p-^^-^'^ties-airtrz 
 
 balanced. The dehberations of a council of war are the can 
 
 vassing of probabilities. In demonstrative reasJng tl re' 
 
 a e no degrees between certainty and uncertainty. In^'p "Ta 
 
 ble reasoning, for example in a court of justice hearinre, 
 
 dence in a trial for murder, there are various degreXm 
 
 possibility through probabib'ty to certainty. The fi" t 1 
 
 ^.ders what must be; as, that the three angles ol" a t Inl' 
 
 must be equal to two nVlit in<r]o< Ti ° "' » mangle 
 
 w, u " ^"g'es. IJie second regards what 
 
 may be or may not be- ic, thnt fi,.. • '=o<"U'' wiiat 
 
 not be ..uiltv T !, ; P"'""^"" "^^y ^"^ «»• may 
 
 not be gui ty. In the mathematics, the contrary to each pro 
 
 position IS impossible in thought as well as fact. In proWbTe 
 
 • Here again is the SyUogism: 
 
 mZ' r^f „"""" '° "^« ■"""'« "^^ equal to each other. 
 M1.V0R. A and B are each equal to the same thing, C 
 r^NCL.s,o.v. Therefore, A and B are equal to eacL other. 
 
 .ot':::- ~ ^ert o^rrtr:;::' r ^-'^ =^- 
 
 reasoning: two kinds. 
 
 63 
 
 reasoning. the contrary is possible. A prisoner, for example, 
 
 is supposed innocent till proved guilty. 
 
 In both kinds of reasonino^ there must be ,^ 
 
 ^' ^ Why one should 
 
 comprehension for principles, and sagacity for not be cultivated 
 conclusions. But the modes of applying them "^^ ^' 
 are different. In demonstration the mind must consider but 
 one side, and in that follow a chain of deductions. In 
 other reasoning, tlie mind nmst consider arguments on two 
 sides, weigh them, estimate degree, and determine on which 
 side is the preponderance. The mind, by the first, increases 
 its capacity for inference ; by the second, its capacity for sound 
 judgment. The intellect should be trained in both. Both are 
 necessary for the full development of the mind. Both should 
 enter all courses of study. But skill in demonstration alone 
 does not imply sound judgment. Demonstration, cultivated 
 exclusively, may mar the capacity for judgment, since demon- 
 stration is the consideration of one side, and judgment of two. 
 Hence, no complete course of study, prescribed in an institu- 
 tion, or planned by a solitary student, should include demon- 
 strative science alone, especially if preparation be intended for 
 any of the practical professions, since they all require the bal- 
 ancing of opposed considerations. Attention to the demon- 
 strative mode alone, with an entire neglect of the other, will 
 weaken even the capacity for accurate judgment derived from 
 nature. Bequiring one-sided mental action, it will form the 
 one-sided man. Hence, a course of study must embrace also 
 the subjects which call for probable conclusions, and those 
 rules for them which are taught by logic. In demonstrative 
 science, we learn one kind of reasoning, but not the laws of 
 reasoninor itself. 
 
 8. By remembering, is meant the recollection 
 of any detached fact or proposition formerly 
 known ; for example, the name of a town in Geography, the 
 name of a character in History ; the proposition, this town was 
 formerly fortified, this character performed certain memorable 
 actions. 
 
 Eemembering. 
 
64 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 In reasoning, one of two things is given to onr knowledge 
 and admitted hy us ; the second is made into knowled-.e by 
 us, because we see it to be implied in tlie first. B^ut in 
 remembering, one tliing is given to onr knowledge, admitted 
 and preserved. Reasoning is then a power additional to 
 memory. It implies capacity to perceive relations and con- 
 nections among things. Hence, we are to expect diversities 
 among men m their capacity for reasoning. 
 
 form d *"" ^'*** ^"*^'*' ^'""■®^°'"^' (demanded for remember- 
 
 «■»« ■ ing is Recollection. The word carries the rule 
 
 for cultivating the memory. To recollect, is to re-coUect. 
 We are to colleei again all the parts of that which is to be re- 
 membered, wliether those parts be facts or words. AVhen we 
 do this perseveringly for a length of time, the repeated acts 
 f.>rni a habit. This habit is good. Being good, it is a virtue 
 ot the mind. It increases the natural power of memory, since 
 habit IS second nature. If a person's natural capacity for re- 
 membering be small, such discipline will supply the deficiency 
 eft by nature Recollection is, accordingly, a good mental 
 labit, an intellectual virtue, which collects and preserves de- 
 tailed facts and propositions. 
 
 [The military man needs it. He should make his memory 
 strong and accurate. To take one of numerous examples illus- 
 trating its necessity, what would be the efiect in a battle if the 
 aides did not transmit orders accurately!] 
 
 Such are the two general habits, 'reasoning and remem- 
 bering. 
 
 imaginauon. ^- ^^^t^een them is a mental habit which may 
 
 _ incline more or less to the one or the other. It 
 
 is that of Imagination. 
 
 Acting rightly; . ^"''''K''"^t'on ''^ a mental power for reprodu- 
 
 ciiig sensible objects in the form of distinct im- 
 ages. It is exercised as Conception or Creation. 
 Conception, J^^^ reproduction may be with the same com. 
 
 binations which exist and have been seen in 
 nature. This is Conception. Conception is simply vivid 
 
 V 
 
 IMAGINATION : CONCEPTIVE, CBEATIVB 
 
 65 
 
 Creation. 
 
 memory. An example is a recollection of a landscape, a face, 
 a transaction, made so distinct that we might paint from the 
 conception alone. Conception of places is mental topography. 
 
 The reproduction may be with combinations 
 different from those existing and formerly seen. 
 This is Creation. An example is the creation of an epic poem. 
 Every good poet possesses this faculty. A poet is " of imagi- 
 nation all compact." He is therefore called, Poet, which 
 means, maker, creator. 
 
 For the perfection of the mind both powers must be pos- 
 sessed, that of conception and that of creation. 
 
 Imagination is thus seen to be a middle power between 
 Memory and Eeason. Conception is intense memory. Crea- 
 tive imagination, as seen in the Iliad, the ^neid. Paradise 
 Lost, is akin to reason, its combinations being guided by some 
 law. Great scientific discoveries like those of Kepler ever 
 demand creative imagination, that new combinations may be 
 formed. 
 
 [The military man needs especially the power of vivid con- 
 ception. The creative power is needed when new and start- 
 ling combinations are to be formed in a battle or campaign. 
 But if he have naturally a creative imagination, let him beware 
 of its illusions and delusions, lest he mistake bis fancies for 
 facts. Napoleon possessed both powers. 
 
 Those in training for the military profession should educate 
 the mind to conceive of countries and places given in Geo- 
 graphy, as if they were travelling over them, and of battles 
 described in History, as if they saw them from the beginning 
 to the end. 
 
 Also, when any one military combination is given to them, 
 they should reduce it to its elements, and create in thought 
 new combinations from those elements. Thus a conceptive 
 and creative military imagination may be formed.] 
 
 These are two good habits of the imagination : Conception, 
 guided by memory; Creation, guided by reason and sound 
 judgment. 
 
66 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Acting 10. The opposed evil habits are formed by re- 
 
 imagmation. Kemovii.g the first, we have illusion : and re- 
 moving the second, delusion. Tlie person under illusions mis- 
 takes his fancies for facts. For example, he is an unreliable 
 witness in a court of justice. The person under delusion has 
 formed new combinations in which he mistakes the satisfaction 
 m viewing his own creations, for the satisfaction resulting 
 from the approval of reason and judgment. Such minds form 
 speculative nien, and appear among speculative races, like the 
 (Grecian. They are good in their place and sphere. But they 
 are unreliable for organizing government, framing laws, plan- 
 ning campaigns or battles. Tlieir systems of government are 
 Utopias ; their laws, ftinaticism ;* their plans of battles and 
 campaigns, theories on paper, without attention to the details 
 which must influence the result. Such a mind is under this 
 perpetual delusion : " My theory is perfect. Facts and results 
 onght to conform to it. Therefore they do." Genius, and 
 specially when moved by strong passions, is liable to such 
 delusion. Napoleon never made mistake in his military ar- 
 rangements. However new and daring Jiis combinations, they 
 --^ -"„d But in his political plans for Europe and the 
 world, fascinated by his dream of universal empfre, he was 
 extravagantly deluded. He not only weakened himself in 
 Spain, and lost a great anny in Russia, but afterward rejected 
 just and liberal arrangements for peace.f 
 
 Duties : ^ 1- There are important duties connected with 
 
 these habits of mind. 
 
 memo.;'*"""""' . ^^-^ ^''^'''^ ^""^ *^"''*^« fonnded on the prevalence 
 
 remem'berin. " "" ^ "''"" ^' ^'^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^ ~-g - 
 
 Tlie minds of men may, i„ this view, form three classes. 
 
 By conjecture, and speaking without attempt at precision, we 
 
 t See Tliiers^s "Consulate and Empire." 
 
 DUTIES, AS ENDOWilENTS DIFFER. 
 
 67 
 
 may say that out of every one hundred persons, about three- 
 fifths will have capacity for both reasoning and remembering 
 well, if that capacity be developed by education and self-cul- 
 ture. These may form one class. But about one-fifth will be 
 found so feeble in the reasoning power, that no educational 
 training can form comprehension for 'principles or sagacity for 
 deductions. These are a second class. About one-fifth will 
 have strong reasoning powers with little aptitude for clear and 
 lasting memory. These form a third class. 
 
 The duty for one of the first class who possesses both powers 
 is to cultivate both. 
 
 But as few in this class will possess those powers in an 
 equal degree, it is a duty to cultivate specially the power 
 which is weakest. Thus he who is fond of reasoning, but dis- 
 likes the tasks of memorizing, should exercise his memory 
 enough to remove the incapacity or disinclination. He who 
 shrinks from reasoning, because for him it is more onerous 
 than committing things to his memory, should set himself 
 tasks of deduction, till he has unfolded the latter power. The 
 deficiencies from nature should thus be removed by Culture. 
 
 The duty for the second class, whose power of reasoning is 
 deficient, is to cultivate those branches of knowledge which do 
 not require reasoning. When an inherent defect from nature 
 •s found to exist, by the absence of all deductive power, time 
 should not be wasted in attempting to get those acquisitions 
 which imply strict reasoning. 
 
 [Tlie duty of one who has entered the Military Academy, 
 and who has then found himself deficient in the reasoning 
 power, is to resign. The sciences cultivated there, demand 
 mathematical reasoning. War requires that a commander 
 shall be able to draw conclusions wisely from facts. The 
 absence of such a power thus unfits alike for the Academy and 
 for higher grades in the Army. But in so resigning, no one 
 should feel disgraced or discouraged. He may have taste and 
 talent for other studies, or for another profession. He is sim- 
 ply not adapted to specific studies for a particular profession.] 
 
68 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 The duty for the third class is similar. It is to follow 
 nature, by preferriug those studies and choosing those voca- 
 tions which require reasoning, rather than those which require 
 accuracy, completeness, and durability in the memory. 
 As to imagina- _ (2-) There are duties founded on the prevalence 
 
 in one's nature of the power of imagination. 
 The duties are, on the one hand, to give culture and order 
 to the imagination ; on the other, to restrain its excesses We 
 give culture to it by reading and imitating works of the imagi- 
 nation. We give order by restraint from memory in all staL 
 ments of fact ; by restraints from reason and judgment in esti- 
 mating the practical value of our own inventions. 
 
 We restrain its excesses by checking conscientiously the 
 tendency to overstate or understate when the illusions of fancy 
 are awakened by feeling. We restrain ourselves from delu- 
 sions by submitting our inventions to the judgments of other 
 men, or by laying them aside till the glow of creative action 
 has subsided, and then applying our own cool and severe 
 judgment. 
 
 Such are the general habits for knowledge. 
 
 Transition. ^^' ^^ ^^^ next to consider those which are 
 
 particular. 
 
 Tlie particular are those required for a good student. 
 13. Before the habits of studv, we need to determine the re^ 
 quirementa for study. 
 
 Kequirements The requirements for study may be summpd 
 
 for study: ;„ 7.7 / 7 7 J J uc suiiimea 
 
 m^tiberal and adequate arrangements, 
 
 1. In Subjects; ^^'^ ^'^^^ ^^'^^^^^ ^e liberal arrangements as 
 
 regards suhjects. 
 
 If any thing be fixed by the universal experience of man- 
 kind, It IS, that general education must precede professional 
 The experiment has been tried repeatedly in all countries, to 
 have the second without the first, to give special trainin<. for 
 one profession without general culture before it. Uniformly 
 the experiment has produced evil consequences for the indi- 
 viduals, the professions, and the public. The individuals are 
 
 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EDUCATION. 
 
 69 
 
 special and mechanical in their professional views. The pro- 
 fessions — Law^, Medicine, Theology, War, Statesmanship — 
 sink to routine. The public sufiers by not having men in the 
 different posts of society adequate to the demands made upon 
 them. In England, at one time, the idea was entertained, that 
 the way to make a good lawyer was to cut off the university- 
 course, and to put the youth as apprentice to a lawyer. The 
 miserable results were sufficient to indicate the greatness of 
 the mistake. 
 
 Accordingly, in all civilized countries, some course of liberal 
 and general culture is provided before the study of the great 
 professions. In ancient Greece a general course on the sci- 
 ences and arts, called a course of philosophy, was given by 
 lecture. The same general plan is adopted on the continent 
 of Europe, and most systematically in Germany. There the 
 university follows the gymnasium, and precedes professional 
 study. In England is the university course, with ample ar- 
 rangements for reading ; and in the United States, the colle- 
 giate. Such arrangements declare the common conviction 
 and the uniform experience of human generations. Whoever 
 attempts to disregard this experience will find that he has 
 made a fatal mistake. He will discover that professional 
 knowledge without general culture is a sword-blade without a 
 handle. It is general education which furnishes the handle for 
 the weapon. 
 
 (2.) There should be liberal arrangements as 
 regards time. Learning should begin early and 
 continue long. Then, habits of study begin with the first 
 periods of life, and a taste for learning is formed. The late 
 learner is liable to the contrasted obstacles. For all the great 
 professions the training should continue long. Wherever 
 there is a choice to be made between a longer and a shorter 
 time, the longer should be always preferred when practicable. 
 The reason is evident. Society demands good attainments in 
 all professions. The primary duty in planning a course ot 
 study is to look to this public interest. There is no danger on 
 
 2. In time. 
 
70 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 the side of length, since men cannot be too well prepared. 
 There is danger on the side of abbreviation, since men unpre- 
 pared at starting have seldom the ability or will to supply 
 deficiencies afterwards. In elder countries the age for com- 
 pleting preparation for the higher professions, is about twenty- 
 eight. A man who fulfilled every requirement for the most 
 responsible positions in the French service, would have at- 
 tained nearly to that age. In the United States, the age has 
 been about twenty-one, but, taught by sad experience, the 
 country is approaching twenty -five. 
 
 14. The duties corresponding to these facts are on the part 
 of the student: to welcome general attainments, and never 
 voluntarily to deprive himself of the time necessary for a per- 
 fect traininor. 
 
 Haying seen the requirements, we now come to the habits* 
 in which these duties will be incorporated. 
 Habits for the ^^' The habits required for the student are: 
 student : Strong Purpose, Attention, Reflection, Meth- 
 
 od, Industry, Constancy. 
 
 1. strong (1.) There must be Strong Purpose, because 
 
 purpose; j^^ ^^,^^ i^^^.^^ ^^jj without a good will to learn. 
 
 («.) He who studies, must kindle his will by making the future 
 present. This rousing of the will should take place, not only 
 at the beginning of terms, or after glances at the world, or 
 after letters from home— times when most students make re- 
 solutions-but daily, (b.) This good will is to be applied not 
 only to those studies for which he has an inclination, but to 
 those which he likes less. Unless he have a want of capacity 
 from nature, he should bend his faculties to those subjects for 
 which he ha^ less affinity, that he may work out (accordinc. to 
 Lord Bacon), " the knots of the mind." (c.) He should value 
 alike the general studies, and those strictly professional, since 
 the latter without the former are, as before stated, like a 
 
 A I'^r^jf !n!'^ r^r^ ^^^° ^^'^'^^ mentioned as duties under Educational 
 Authonty (68, 69). They are now to be regarded as belonging to Self-improve- 
 
 HABirS FOR A GOOD STUDENT. 
 
 71 
 
 Contrasts, t 
 
 2. Attention; j 
 
 sword-blade without a handle, (d.) The will should be sus- 
 tained through the whole course appointed. The curtail- 
 ment of that, by one's own act, for some temporary purpose, 
 without compulsion, is a wrong to himself. It is sacrificing the 
 future to the present. It is a wrong also to the profession, and 
 to society. 
 
 The contrasted faults are Aversion to study; 
 Indifference; Self -indulgence^ yA\\{^ makes ap- 
 plication only to favorite subjects ; Carping, the depreciation 
 of all or a part of the subjects embraced in education ; Im;pa- 
 tience, which, for a temporary purpose, cuts off a part of the 
 essential course of preparation. 
 
 (2.) There must be Attention, the concentra- 
 tion of thought and will, without distraction, on 
 the subject under examination. JSTo man can learn without 
 attending to that which he is to learn. He learns best who 
 gives most of that attention. 
 
 The contrasted fault is Inattention. Its 
 causes indicate the remedies: {a.) This maj 
 come from want of will. The remedy is then from the last 
 duty. A strong purpose must be formed by bringing up the 
 proper motives, ip.) Inattention may come from past habits, 
 unfavorable to the concentration of thought. The remedy is 
 then the same, but with the addition of writing an outline ot 
 the lesson studied, {c.) Inattention may come from distract- 
 ing objects that have engrossed the mind. Will to banish 
 them, and writing an outline of the lesson, will give relief to 
 every zealous student. 
 
 (3.) There must be Eeflection, because no 
 man learns well, who does not turn the subject in 
 his own thoughts. Mental food must be digested and made 
 part of one's self. After a lesson has been read, it must be re- 
 viewed, and gone over in the thoughts. 
 
 The opposed fault is unwillingness to tJdnJc, 
 This fault comes from mental indolence. Amono^ 
 its fruits, it produces skimming. Skimming is adopting some 
 
 Contrast. 
 
 3. Beflection; 
 
 Contrast. 
 
72 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 4. Method ; ^^•) ^I'ere must be Method, and that the best 
 
 Ace di::,^:;""" "-^' - -^ "'>--K that whi.h\s .od! 
 general and thl ! 1 ^'^ '"'"' ^""^ P'^"^ *'«•• «t"dy in 
 
 ^ uj reaaing , it is active bj writing 
 Accordingly, there should be a blmV h.A t 
 
 of stnd,, in .hich the lean.o r^il tl ^.t?"' "'^■"* 
 cises, or questional nr t.,1 * • analysis, or exer- 
 
 fami liar e "ami L " 7'^""''^' "'^"^ ^'^'^'^ l^^^"- A 
 
 Geograph , T „ hat ol" ^?'^^. ^^ f "^'-^'ic, or in that of 
 that°its'p;obL:s t^tL^:^:^^°7^ ,^- requires 
 drawn: the other tl.of ' ^'""■' *'"^* ^'^Ps be 
 
 The sums, th tl ^ ^e^^^^^^ " *""'^''°"^ ^^ -'«-• 
 hand, whi h make L ."■''' "'' ^'"'"'^'^ '^''"^ V the 
 
 -Wthesuy::tu :;Ltr^^ -^^ ^^^?^™-^ - 
 
 be extended to all sul.ip.f ^ T, , ^'''''^' '' '""P'^ to 
 
 active as well as ^C ' ''^ ™'"' ^"' ^^ -'^-™'3^ 
 
 desT/tlr^^' '^"' ' '^"°" ^""^^*''°^^^^' -<^ 
 
 «.inda8try; (^O There must be Indcstet. Without in 
 
 c.a»t ''''« "I'l"""' f»«lt. .r, indolence «nd wast, of 
 
 .r.e subjec. • """ ""'"'^ '='»"» •» "•«>'"■ b~oh rf 
 
 INTELLECTirAL VIRTUES FOE ACTION. 
 
 73 
 
 Contrast. 
 
 Contrast. 
 
 (6.) There must be Constancy. A temporary 
 application of the mind, under some momentary ' ^^^ *^*^* 
 impulse, is not sufficient for sound learning. Steady persev^e- 
 rauce is demanded. Continuity is requisite for acquisition. 
 In some studies, continuity from day to day is tlie important 
 element. This is the case in languages. Ten minutes a day, 
 with unbroken continuity, given to one language, will secure 
 its preservation, and even admit advancement in it. This has 
 been proved by experiment. It is the plan of nature for the 
 child in learning to speak. Those who leave intervals may 
 give much more time and effort, but as there is a w'ant of con- 
 tinuity, the most valuable element for acquisition is absent, 
 and their efforts are like the steps of one who is climbing up a 
 hill of sand. Continuity, the indispensable ingredient for lan- 
 guage, is required, but in differing proportions by all subjects. 
 
 The opposed faults are fitfulness and dram- 
 ming. The one is study by fits, when the humor 
 seizes the mind ; the other is crowded acquisition under some 
 spur, such as that of an approaching examination. Cramming 
 burdens the mind without feeding it. 
 
 These are the special habits required for a 
 good student. With them terminates the sub- 
 ject of Intellectual Virtues for Knowledge. 
 
 The next subject is that of the Intellectual Virtues for 
 Action. 
 
 2. Intellectual Virtues for Action. 
 
 16. Intellectual Virtues for Action are the intellectual Vir- 
 good habits necessary for attaining proposed ^^^^ for Action, 
 ends by the wise observation and use of means. 
 
 They are included in the Virtue of Prudence. Summed in one. 
 
 Prudence (according to Varro) is from porro Definition from 
 and vid^ns^ and means literally seeing afar. Ac- '^^^^^ 
 cording to the word, its office is to look afar into the future, 
 and to estimate the consequences of actions. 
 
 Transition. 
 
't 
 
 74 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 INTELLECTUAL VrRTCES FOE ACTION. 
 
 75 
 
 Division 
 
 1. Parts. 
 
 Definition from Prudence (trora the thing) is a virtue intel- 
 tiie category. ^^^.^^^ ^^^ jpracticol, giving counsel in single 
 actions; directing in t/ieni what should he done, or left undone, 
 to attain good and avoid evil consequences. 
 
 17. The divisions are: ihQjparts of Prudence, 
 and the suljjects of Prudence. 
 
 The parts are the particular virtues into wliich 
 prudence can be divided. An example is Cau- 
 tion. It is a special virtue under the head of Prudence. 
 
 The subjects are the persons whom pnidence 
 direct*. Tho^ ixir^oos are imlividual <»r colleo- 
 tl ve. An example of t!ic <iret is a pmdcnt nuui ; of the second, 
 A congrw, a pariiamcnt, deUbcrating on a law, and niakiii^ if 
 wiVljr, ^ 
 
 IS. The partk-tihir virtue* under prudence refer «i>ociaJly U 
 tJie rtsMlts of an action ; tlio cireutn^ianees or the meang. 
 
 fiftieour vir. ^"^ *® ^"^^^^ ^'»^ «^'"^ ^ Vommn ; for 
 totti^undir ftu- the circiir.^tanceB, CracrM.-<r>xTiox ; fur the 
 
 meiui*, SoiJcm:i«. Foreright, eirtMiDwpectiou, 
 folicitude arc, aoeordinglv, tliivc partkuliir virtue* under 
 prudence. 
 
 [TIk'j are of pecuhar and immense value in the niilitar? 
 profcwion.] 
 
 W9tmiighL ^*' '^^^ ^'''^"^ Monging to tlie result or 
 
 end of an a«:l3on ig FoEKwoirr. It U the habU 
 of viewhff future coimyuenets as if present, 
 
 Tliis habit is ei^ntial fur wi«c action, J^cci^^ a^J^ ^^ {^ 
 act4<m tciat jnuncijpUi art in Inotd^Ifff. Thev are the general* 
 from which parthiulnrB result From principles, dearly iiccn, 
 we infer oondusions. &>, from ends clearly foreseen, wo infeJ 
 meana. In leaaoaiog, Uie prineiplee wlwn diatinetly c^>iiccived 
 suggest their proper eonclu^on*. Corre.sjxmdentlv in action, 
 the reenlts (neoejaary, pn,biible, ami poeaiblo), bkng clearly 
 conceived, will «iggeat tlte proper mean* for the result. Tlio 
 •ct of mind by which we conceive of futnro coQBequenoea at 
 
 O^otTvrt. 
 
 clearly as if they were existing facts is an act of Foresight. 
 The act repeated forms the habit. 
 
 In recent times, Napoleon I. presents a strik- 
 ing example of Foresight. His mind conceived 
 the results of proposed battles and campaigns as strongly as if 
 they were present or past. Keeping those results steadily 
 before liim, as a reasoner keeps his principles, the great man 
 went from them link by link to the means adequate for those 
 proposed ends. 
 
 The oixiinary acting of hicu'k intniU U tber»> 
 vcTK>, The futnie re^tdts they conoeive India* 
 tinetly. Tlie pnhient filln and ovcri>owcr8 them. But the 
 niiiid can and should be trained in youth to thL* action. 
 
 SO. CiBCOMBfiarrioM U the hnbit of attending 
 to all the circum^^tancos, which can have any 
 bearing on the action and the result. In the circunutanoesare 
 the materials from which meana are to be ftdocted. 
 
 Ctreumapcction ii^clndcs OBSEBvjinox of what 
 k pre^it ; Mumoky, for what is p^kst ; Teacua- 
 BLfc2iE38, for tlie retulta of observations by others; and Cac- 
 Tiox again«^t dangers. 
 
 Obeurvation ik to Ik? applied to prrnon^ and 
 (hinfjs. We mnst know peraon&, hecaujte Uicy 
 can ]>runiotc or hinder our deaigna. TbiB knowledge of men i.i 
 obtained in general by an under.staudiug of human nature at 
 large, and a special study of the pereons who will co-operate in 
 tlic action piopeeed, or oppoie it Wo minit ondcaror to know 
 people not as they seem to be, but as they really are. With* 
 out this insight of men, tlicre can bo no consnmmate prudence. 
 
 Tliis knowledge of men* may be obtained in 
 particular casca, by our own observation, or ^^'^2to*^ ^' 
 throogb otiier personsw It may be obtained br 
 
 ^ The mbttenco of tlit r«miHc« co U» kao«lk|g:c of mie U ia Bacon Tbo 
 (^asriBtloo of sua U oftt n z«eded in o coart'BiMtiil, whca tng^ii^ rrtdsoco. 
 
 Ito Slvlitd&t. 
 
 Otaflmtlea. 
 
76 
 
 PRACnCAI, ETHICS. 
 
 i 
 
 the personal observation of them : first as thev 
 1. In particular . . , . .^^^ "^ 
 
 cases. appear at any single time. We should then 
 
 trust countenances and deeds rather than words 
 and in words trust more to sudden passages and surprised ex- 
 pressions unintentionally produced by strong passions and 
 affections, than to words set and premeditated. 
 
 Secondly, this knowledge of men from personal observation, 
 may be drawn, not from a single interview, but from their 
 natures and their fixed objects of pursuit. "The weakest sort 
 of men are best interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by 
 their ends."* 
 
 Again, this knowledge of men may be derived, not by per- 
 sonal observation, but at second hand from other persons. 
 " Men's weakness and faults are best known from their enemies, 
 their virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and 
 times from their servants, their conceits and opinions from their 
 familiar friends with whom they converse most.^f 
 
 But beside this knowledge in particular cases, 
 one may need a general system for the observa- 
 tion and study of men. [Such a system is often needed by an 
 ofiicer in command, and specially in time of war, and most of all 
 when he must direct at once military operations and diplomatic 
 negotiations ; because for success he must understand his subordi- 
 nates and his enemies.] For this system, three means are use- 
 ful. The first is to use those who study and understand human 
 nature most. Unworthy agents are often employed. Among 
 the agents may be included calm men, of patient observation"^ 
 versed in the business of this or that vocation. And it should 
 not be forgotten that a man of the highest personal honor and 
 principle is often the best for penetrating men, through his own 
 delicate moral instincts. But the special need is to have some 
 
 ♦ Bacon. Advancement of Learning. 
 
 f Bacon. Advancement of Learning. But, on moral grounds, this spying out 
 of men can only be justified where an accurate knowledge is necessary for impor- 
 tant human interests. 
 
 INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES FOE ACTION. 
 
 77 
 
 2. By a system. 
 
 one sincere friend, well versed in the several kinds of men, 
 who will never betray a secret, with whom one may have con- 
 sultation and free discussion. 
 
 The second is to observe, in one's own deportment, a happy 
 medium between too much openness, and too much secrecy. 
 Openness and secrecy can be thus used at discretion only in 
 matters which the other party can know or penetrate at the 
 moment, or soon after. Frankness then produces liberty of 
 ' speech on the other side, and thus much is learned. Napo- 
 leon, in his diplomatic negotiations, often used this means 
 with success.* But it is also observed that secrecy kept 
 by us in matters which the other party has penetrated, 
 will invite his confidence in communicatino: to us other 
 matters.f He sees closeness. He gives reliance. 
 
 The third is to resolve that in every conference and transac- 
 tion we will observe as well as act ; that beyond effecting some- 
 thing, we will learn something. For executing this purpose a 
 man must subdue himself to a watchful and serene habit of 
 mind which he will carry into all transactions. Metternich 
 was an example. 
 
 Such are some of the modes for acquiring a knowledge of 
 persons, 
 
 With the knowledge of persons must be joined that of 
 things. 
 
 For the knowledge of things it is indispensa- 
 ble that there be observation of all things that 
 will have influence on the proposed action. 
 This observation must be complete as to its quantity, and accu^ 
 rate as to its quality. 
 
 * See Thiers's " Consulate and Empire," passim. 
 
 f These rules in " the affairs of this life," are drawn in their substance from 
 Lord Bacon, and given because the need of some counsels of the kind is so appa- 
 rent, specially in the military profession. They are rules of prudence. They can 
 be turned into rules of cunning, if a man do not " keep the paths of uprightness." 
 The writer protests against such abuse of them. 
 
 .-o cxxc«u Observation of 
 ^ things. 
 
78 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 [A military man, for example, must carefully studv the 
 ground It he study it from an accurate map, he should con- 
 ceive of It as f he saw it. If he study it by observation, on 
 the ground itself, he should fix the image of it in histhou4ts 
 
 ory alone. This was the habit of mind in the first Napoleon.] 
 Memcay. (^'^ Memoet is to be applied to all past events 
 
 which furnish causes to promote the efi-uct pro- 
 posed, or precedents to guide the course of action. Thus a 
 commander directing an attack on a harbor, should see if th;re 
 be not some old survey proving the existence of a ne<.lected 
 
 should thmk over all the military precedents in which the dr- 
 cumstances ..ere similar. For a lawyer or physician the course 
 IS the same. So ,t is in all transactions of business. 
 Teadubienea^ ^^'^ Teachableness (but without credulity) 
 
 IS to be applied to information derived from 
 other persons, whether by verbal communications, by corre- 
 spondence orm books. ByTeachablcnessisheremeant, aptness 
 
 fu e to hear and examine the reports of those who bring him 
 valuable information, or who would not believe well grounded 
 statements, simply because they contradicted his preconceived 
 opinions, would commit a great folly. He would be foolish 
 through obstinacy. Tl.is good habit of prudent docility stands 
 between the extremes of obstinacy and credulity. 
 Caution. (*•) Caution is to be applied to dangers, alike 
 
 those actual and visible, and those conceivable- 
 It was the rule of great Captains like Cresar to "leave nothin. 
 to fortune" (nothing which could be controlled through ca„° 
 tion). It was the habit of Napoleon I. to estimate all the 
 contingencies and chances of a battle, favorable and unfa- . 
 Torable, and to be secure in each single one over which he had 
 control He would number them ; speaking of them for 
 example, as thirty on one side, and seventy on the other 
 
 rNTKLLECTUAL VIBTITES FOR ACTION. 
 
 79 
 
 Solicitude. 
 
 These are the habits of mind required for the circumstances 
 of actions ; habits in which all persons, and specially the young, 
 should train their minds. Though military illustrations are 
 used, the idea should not be formed that these and others 
 which follow are only requisite for one profession. They are 
 general. They are needed in all employments and transactions. 
 21. The end thus being seen by Foresight, and circumstances 
 by circumspection, the ri/jht use of means is to follow. This 
 right use of means demands Solicitude, third of the great di- 
 yisions of Prudence. 
 
 SoLicrruDE is the habit of mind requisite for a 
 sustained and earnest use of means, till the end 
 is secured. 
 
 For the use of means, there are two evident requirements. 
 First, they must be carefully selected. Secondly, they must be 
 earnestly applied. 
 
 Solicitude includes two habits for the selection of means; 
 they are iNVEjaTVENESs and Judgment : two for their applica 
 tion ; they are Energy and Yigilance. 
 
 (1.) Inventiveness, in practical matters, is the 
 hah it of seeing readily in every thing hiown, its 
 capacity to produce results. It is sometimes called presence of 
 mind, sometimes shrewdness, sometimes fertility of resource, 
 sometimes practical sagacity.* The French call it in military 
 affairs, coup d'mil^ the eye-glance of a commander, by w^hich 
 he sees at once a condition of things, and all its capabilities. 
 In very recent times, it was shown by Todleben, in the defence 
 of Sebastopol. But of all military men that ever have lived, 
 Hannibal possessed it in the highest degree. He saw capabili- 
 ties in things which to the eyes of other men presented noth- 
 ing available. Driven to the country of Antiochus, and having 
 a sea-fight impending, he bethought him of the serpents which 
 filled the region, and had them enclosed in earthen jars, to be 
 
 * In virtues for knowledge, sagacity is applied to deductions ; in those for action, 
 to means. 
 
 Inventiveness. 
 
80 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 flung from the masts on the deck of the enemy, to embarrass 
 hem at he moment of the hand-to-hand attack. He secured 
 the wonderful victory of Cann^, by using dexterously the pe- 
 cuhar d,spos.t,on of one of the Roman consuls; by selecting, 
 near the sea, a field of battle, which should seem a place of l^l 
 refuge for desperate men, and yet be, for the Roman army an 
 enclosed trap from which they could not withdraw; by sour- 
 ing a time when the wind from Africa blew the sea-sand strong 
 over the heads of his men into the faces of his foes ; and°by 
 postmg Ins men so that they could not be broken, and yet could 
 act more and more on the flanks of his enemy 
 
 This quickness of Invention, though a gift of nature, can be 
 developed to a certain extent, by training. Let a man con- 
 ceave m sohtude of the circumstances, with all their eombina- 
 t.ons m winch he will be called to act, and then think what 
 could and should be done. The mihtary man should study the 
 exploits of Hannibal, imagine himself in his position, and 
 try to conc-e.ve, step by step, the workings of that creative 
 gemus, till his own thoi.ghts begin to act in a similar inventive 
 manner. He may then do tl»e same with other great captains. 
 Rut when becomes to his profession, let him follow precedents 
 ne^er wuh servile imitation, but rather with emulation, as if 
 tlnnkmg what would these great men do if they were in my 
 place ? For this there must be Judgment, the next habit. 
 Jadpnent. ^^"^ Judgment, in practical matters, is tke 
 
 power of estimating and graduating means ao- 
 cordtng to thetr value for the proposed end. Judgment deter- 
 mines the relative importance of all instrumentalities. In acts 
 ot sound judgment, the essentials for the end are to be put 
 first, and kept first ; to be secured, and to be defended against 
 all contmgenoes. The attendant and subordinate means are 
 then to be provided for in their proper degrees.* 
 
 * The analogy with the process learned in Grammar of analyzing a sentence by 
 usefuUy. In action and m speech, we need like habits of mind. 
 
 INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES FOE ACTION. 
 
 81 
 
 [Wellington and "Washington are examples in recent times of 
 commanders in whom judgment predominated. The crowning 
 habit of Wellington's military genius, was judgment in seeing 
 and securing the essential things. This was seen both in his 
 position at Torres Vedras, and at Waterloo. 
 
 In military matters the judgment of Napoleon I. was equal 
 to his wonderful inventiveness. It was in political affairs, or in 
 those where military measures were subordinate to political de- 
 signs, that he showed the absence of wise discretion. There his 
 great political conceptions, creations of his inventive faculty, 
 dazzled and overpowered his judgment.] 
 
 This habit of judgment can also be developed to some extent 
 by self-culture. In any proposed course of action, let a man 
 conceive of all the unfavorable circumstances which could 
 arise, and then consider what means will be certain to defend 
 him. Let him ask himself, what is that one thing, with which 
 there can be no failure, and without which success is uncertain. 
 Let every one remember that his resources are not so much to 
 be numbered as weighed. 
 
 Invention and judgment have a mutual influence. They 
 often tend to counteract each other. The inventive man, led 
 away by his own creations, is liable to be wanting in a sound 
 cool judgment. The man of discretion and judgment is liable 
 to depreciate the real value of new resources which inventive 
 men may suggest to him. Care must be used to prevent this 
 counteraction. Every person should endeavor to cultivate both 
 powers, and so to possess one, as not to obstruct the perfected 
 action of the other. 
 
 Such are tlie habits for selecting means: Invention, that 
 none may be overlooked ; Judgment, that the best may be best 
 secured. 
 
 After means have been selected out of the mass of circum- 
 stances, they are to be applied by execution of plans. The 
 plans will be of two kinds : those already fixed, and those 
 required by new occasions. The first demand Energy ; the 
 6 
 
\ 
 
 I 
 
 82 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 second, ViGiLAi.cE. Both extend to the most minute details of 
 execution. 
 
 Energy. (^•) Eneegt in general, is force in action. It 
 
 is thorough working power. In a less general 
 sense, it is activity in the details of execution. As here distin 
 gnished from Vigilance, it is activity in the execution of each 
 detail of the plans foreordained by Invention and Judgment 
 
 For example, a pontoon bridge is to be thrown over\ river 
 at a certain hour. Assiduity will extend to preparation, in the 
 supply and transportation of tlie materials and men within the 
 required time ; and then to every particular in the performance 
 01 tile measure. 
 
 Viguance. ^^'^ Vigilance is energy in unexpected occa- 
 
 sions, using those which are favorable, and 
 thwarting the effect of those which are unfavorable 
 
 As an example of the favorable, tlie enemy have mistaken 
 the pomt of passage of the river, and assembled at another 
 place. Every advantage to be drawn from this unexpected 
 Circumstance must instantly be secured. 
 
 As an example of tlie unfavorable, there has come a sudden 
 change of weather, and cakes of ice will be drifting rapidly 
 down tlie stream before and at the time of crossing. Means 
 must be at once devised to prevent disaster. 
 
 Vigilance must include Secrecy. Every avenue of informa- 
 tion for those who would oppose must be carefully closed. 
 
 Such are the habits of mind requisite for successful Action: 
 Foresight for ends; Circumspection for circumstances; Solicitude 
 for means and for the execution of measures. These are the 
 parts of Prudence-tlie special virtues into which it may be 
 divided. Kext are the subjects of Prudence. 
 Subjecu of pm. 22. Tlie subjects of Prudence are the persons 
 
 directed by it (ch. iv., 17), and these are indi^ 
 vtauals, or men collectively. 
 
 indmdual Pru- (L) The individual may use the habits already 
 
 enumerated, for his own direction, and to attain 
 
 prudence; personal. 
 
 83 
 
 his personal purpose. Such use forms Personal Prudence.* 
 An example is the course of life laid out for himself by a man 
 in any profession to insure success. 
 
 (a) For this Personal Prudence which aims Its requirements : 
 at success in life, the first and essential require- ^® ^^^' 
 ment is, the perpetual amendment of one's own mind. Ee- 
 moval '' of the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the 
 passages of fortune, than the obtaining fortune will remove the 
 impediments of the mind."t Wealth and means, reputation, 
 [rank and] honors, may be rightly sought, and used as instru- 
 ments for still farther success. But the most common fault of 
 men is to fly to their ends, when they should have care for the 
 beginnings. They put their thoughts on these objects, instead 
 of first heeding their own personal qualities, and improving 
 them. Prudence and heroic principle (ch. iii., 6) thus lead to 
 the same rule. The will should be fixed for life, on what we 
 wish to be rather than on what we wish to do or to have. 
 
 (^.) The next requirement is that a man esti- 
 mate justly, both his own powers within him, 
 and his circumstances around him. As to his powers, let him 
 attempt nothing to which he is by nature wholly unequal. A 
 man of bungling hand should not be a surgeon. A lawyer 
 ■jrith no gifts of speech, should rather devote himself to con- 
 reyancing than pleading. 
 
 (c.) As to circumstances, one should frame the 
 mind, where principle is not involved, '' to be 
 pliant and obedient to occasion." In war, the plans must vary 
 with the circumstances. The policy of Fabius was good, as 
 against Hannibal, at the time. Afterward it was out of place. 
 As any profession advances, and the public mind changes, the 
 elements for success in that vocation are modified. It is needful 
 that the " inner wheels of the mind" move, in matters of prin- 
 
 * Named " Henarchy" by old writers, meaning the government of one {tv aoyri) • 
 but the term is not strictly classical. ^^m 
 
 t Bacon. 
 
 The Second ; 
 
 The Third. 
 
u 
 
 PKACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 cple, harmoniously with the will of the Author of the universe 
 (as an astronomical clock with the apparent motion of the stars) 
 and m matters of mere expediency harmoniously with the 
 wheels of circumstances.* 
 
 The Fourth. ^^■\ '^'*® "^^* requirement is to know the evil 
 
 arts of one's own profession ; not to use them, but 
 to overcome them. Every honorable mind will despise the foul 
 ways, the "short cuts" to success, which are known in familiar 
 language as "tricks." Eventually every one will find, that 
 the longer way around is the shorter home, and that honesty is 
 
 surely"' ^'''°^' ""' *''" ^^^^''^ ''P"^''*'^' ""^^^^'^ 
 
 Dnty, above all J" ^" *^'' ™''' ""^ P™'^^"''^ '" temporal 
 
 other objecto. attairs. It should never be forgotten that success 
 
 ,,.,,, '" ^'^^ '^ °o' the great end of life. It is better 
 to tail nobly than to succeed dishonorably. 
 
 Collective Pru- ^^"^ ^''" """^ organized collectively, in Govern- 
 
 deuce. ments, in Armies, in Famil ies, and in various sub- 
 
 ordinate, less lasting associations, such as Socie- 
 t.es and Corporations. The virtues already named are here to be 
 applied for the direction, not of one, but of many. Exercised, 
 they form Collective Prudence.f Special names are given, ac- 
 cording to the association directed. 
 
 Practical wisdom in directing a government in political 
 measures, ,s called Political Prudence ; and in framing laws for 
 and under the government, Jurisprndence. The one belon<.s to 
 the Statesman, the other to the Lawyer. The art of government 
 >s the greatest of all. Such wisdom in directing armies and mil- 
 itary organizations of all grades and kinds, on land or sea, is 
 Military Prudence. This belongs to the Soldier.^ Such wisdom 
 
 muZrcl'mTs -"" '° ' "^'^^P'"-'- '"« -^3 " Tempera mutantur. et no3 
 
 ^^-^::^t^::zi:^i^--^^^ . .e 
 
 _^Us.g the word Soldier in its most general sense, so as to include the naval 
 
 EULES FOE GENEEAL PEUDENCE. 
 
 85 
 
 in directing families is Domestic Prudence. This belongs to the 
 Father and Mother, and as between the two, specially to the 
 Husband and Father. Such wisdom in directing associations, 
 is Administrative Prudence. This belongs to the officers of all 
 Societies and Corporations. 
 
 23. There are certain general halits needed 
 both for Individual, and for Collective Prudenno *"^'" ^" *«* ""i- 
 
 m -11 . , «cuvc. leetiveandlndi- 
 
 1 hey are miscellaneous in their character, and "^"»i Prudence : 
 partake more of the nature of rules than habits. Hence they 
 are placed here, rather than under the systematic divisions of 
 Prndence. 
 
 (1). The first rule is appropriate Secrecy. 
 This is wanted both for individual and for col- "^^ 
 
 leetive prudence. In his personal affairs, one must learn to 
 keep much in his own mind. If he be too communicative, he 
 Will be thwarted by other men ; competitors, enemies, busy- 
 bodies, or lovers of mischief. This rule, so valuable for indi- 
 vidual success and tranquillity, becomes more important, as 
 part of collective prndence, where a mass of great interests is 
 afi-ected. Tims in political prudence, specially in the adminis- 
 trative part, as in negotiation with other powers, any viola- 
 tion of secrecy may cause failure. But in military prudence 
 ^ecrecy is essential perpetually. An officer, therefore, must be 
 habitually reserved in regard to all official matters. And when 
 he 18 with those to whom he can properly speak of such as 
 have a confidential character, let him habitually consider what 
 other ears can by possibility hear him. Battles have been lost 
 and votes in courts-martial known and avenged, by indiscretion 
 in not looking first outside of the tent, or around the place of 
 conversation. 
 
 (2). Another rule is to provide for some advan- 
 tage under all contingencies. We are " to imi- *°'"^' 
 tate a nature which does nothing in vain." Let the plans be 
 so arranged that if one advantage cannot be gained, a subor- 
 dinate one may be ; and that if there be an entire failure ia 
 
86 
 
 PEACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 "r a^d that Y'";r *' '"P"^"""^ '"^^ ^^^<^' --^thing 
 else and that ,t nothing can be gained in the present yet a 
 
 seed may be put for something future; and that if subs'tantial 
 benefits cannot be secured, yet good will and good opinion may 
 be obtained to bnng forth their fruits. Thusfin political pru 
 denee R„ss,a has made great sacrifices in one reign, from 
 which she has reaped benefit only after two or three, Z several 
 reigns following; according to the maxim, "Influence first 
 and territory afterward." We may take, as an illustration in' 
 imlitary prudence, any successful retreat after defeat, or the 
 efforts of Ney on the retreat from Moscow; and in profession- 
 al prudence the example of a lawyer defending a criminal, or 
 of a surgeon with a wounded man, determining the extent o< 
 amputations. In all such cases we learn what we must sacH 
 Jice, and consider what we can save. 
 
 Important Supposing our means to be arranged as re- 
 
 Method. quired by sound judgment, the essentials bein« 
 
 first, and the subordinates in different degrees'" 
 then the operations of our thouglits under this rule, follow an 
 order directly the reverse of that described under judgment. 
 For in the use of judgment, looking to success, we provide for 
 essentials first and most ; and then subordinately, for tlie less im- 
 portant means. On the other hand, in this case, and under 
 this rule, we suppose not success, but failure in our main desi<r„ 
 Conceiving our essentials lost, we consider successively, in our 
 subordinate means, what can be saved, down to the last and 
 least. Tlie rule should be carefully observed by the statesman 
 in negotiations, and in lines of policy. 
 
 Third; (^)- -Another rule is to provide for Safety 
 
 under all contingencies. It is similar to the last. 
 A man should not commit himself to any thing, though it 
 « seem perfectly safe, without having an opening through 
 which he can fly, or a pathway along which he may retire. He 
 should not put forth his hand so far that he cannot draw it 
 back. Lord Bacon iUustrates this by the fable of the two 
 
 EULES. FOE GENEEAL PEUDENCE. 
 
 87 
 
 frogs, whose pool was dry. They consulted about the place 
 whither they should go. One said, " Let us go down into a pit, 
 for it is not probable that tlie water in it will dry up." The 
 other answered, " True, but if it should, how shall we get out 
 again ?" Andrew Jackson, seventh President of the United 
 States, seemed to common beholders so bold that he was rash. 
 But those who knew him best, observed that in all his plans, 
 military, political, or personal, however daring they might 
 ai)pear, he always held some reserved measure for essential 
 safety. This rule, applied in military affairs, requires that the 
 line of retreat be secured. 
 
 (4.) Another rule for both private and pub- 
 lic prudence is moderation in the words and ^''°^' 
 deeds, both of friendships and enmities. This is embod- 
 ied in the saying of an ancient philosopher : « Love, as if you 
 might afterwards hate ; hate, as if you might one day love." 
 This maxim, however, must be accepted for caution and mod- 
 eration in private and public friendships and enmities, not 
 lor cunning and treachery in either private or public relations. 
 For example, an individual whose former friend had become 
 alienated, would regret the indiscreet confidences made during 
 the previous friendship. Or, needing the good-will of one who 
 had previously been hostile, he would have good reason to 
 deplore the infliction of injuries that could never be forgotten. 
 So a nation, coming into hostile relations with a power to 
 which imprudent concessions had been made under a previous 
 intimate alliance, would be compelled to see arrayed against it, 
 the resources which it had itself bestowed. In like manner a 
 nation which had given no bounds to its vengeance against a 
 particular enemy, will cause a resentment ineffaceable for gen- 
 erations, and will find in its own need or weakness that it can- 
 not obtain the friendship, or even neutraUty of the other power 
 Thus important in both individual and collective prudence, is 
 the rule for moderation and caution both towards friends and 
 enemies. 
 
88 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 g,„,„^ Such are the Intellectual Virtues for Action in 
 
 their parts (as belonging to the end tlm -,; ' 
 stances, and the means), and in Lw suZZtJ^ /T' 
 n.en collectively), all reducible to Prudence ^ ^" ^^ ' " 
 
 Contrasts. Oj. tu 
 
 negative extreme Iv '"'' "Z"'"^ '" ^""^*^°^« ^'•'^' ^^ the 
 from dctccfrf !i,! T" "' ^^«"«---- They come 
 Thoseon heposSj': ""-^ T""^"" '"^^ "'^'ff^- 
 The, aris f r ; o7" -r ,"""'' ''""^' ^"^ ^«-- 
 of means. (• ,7a) '"■"'"""= ''^^ unscrupulous use 
 
 Special Ex- f^" ^" individual prudence is a positive 
 
 ueme. extreme, which is Fvn,=.cc, c- P"''iii^e 
 
 _ ,^ WHICH JS iiXCESS OF SoLicrruDE.* It 
 consists m immoderatp anri *„ i • 
 •personal interests or f..r ^ ^^^ ^"'^ torturing care for 
 
 families Tliista f Z ^ '"^P"'' *^*" "'^'•^^'^•^ «- 0"r 
 
 stro, sewLiU ;iv: i-rd' ^r"-^"^^ ^^ ^^ ^^- 
 
 It comes from dispropor . ned ^H 17 , 'Z'' ''" '"^^'• 
 reliance on Providen!r P f °"'*^ ''^ '''''"'"^'^-ted ^^^ 
 
 exist incollec hxt". T"'' °' ^"''^'''^^^ '^^ ^^^4 
 
 is in pern is ;„ 'm ^ . "'"" "'"^ *^^ "^^ '' others 
 P«ni, It IS an obligation to spare no efforts and «^ c • 
 
 fice, even to that of life itself. ®^*'"" 
 
 ter .„ the active duties of life. eaucation, the lat- 
 
 We now pass from duties which regard the mind f .1 
 whose obiect is f,.„„,i : .i , , ° '"'"'*' *<> those 
 
 upon Him, for He careth for you TrZtin f^VT"^' ^"'""^ "" ^'^ ''^^^ 
 war unto the Lord. I„ every ttin.h "^ '"'* "" ^^-^^ Commit thy 
 
 %, let your request, be tnad kno;n I^G J""' "^P'"""°» '""' ""-"^S-- 
 
 Duties to the Lower Nature. 
 
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90 
 
 PEACnCAL ETHICS, 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 VIRTUE AND PRINCIPLE, TEMPERANCE 
 
 ^tinction Of The body will mean, then, the animal vitality 
 Irrational from and the material Arfr<.,„v„f j. yi , ^' 
 
 Bationai Part. • , . "f <'"*^ Organization of flesh and blood 
 
 m which the mind is placed TTn^^, •♦ a- . 
 
 on the mind are included all .1. • , . ^' ^^^^*' 
 
 ,r.;.,^ • included all the impulses which affect thp 
 
 rnrud in consequence of its union with the body ^ im 
 
 acts of the ttior: iiTd b! Zd •' ""''^^^^f^^^ ^-" 
 rational tlnVl- ™"''- "^^ "^^nd is meant the spiritual, 
 
 and mil t"^" '"'''"'' ^^''"'''^ '^ P'^'^^d ^'tl"» this bod^ 
 and made subject to its impulses. The distinction then is 
 that the higher is directed by reason. The body ai^d its im 
 
 Win,!?:: S2 natrTu^" r^°' ^'^-"-^ ^"^ 
 
 nature belonged ^ Z:Ztu^::'Z:t'lT' 
 nature are the present euhject. ^ ^'^''' 
 
 Parts of \ Rational ; \ Spiritual ) 
 
 human nature; 1 , /r^'^" [ * ^P'"*' 
 
 ' I Irrational: j Animal ] Active, Soul 
 
 In the first we resemble Pod • ,• h ' ^ ^^'''''^' ^^^^• 
 
 exampleofthelastZli:^'^^^^^^^^^ in the third, plants. An 
 
 second, from the ether- of the hTrd frf 7 "' " '"" "^^ ^^'*^' ^^*^« 
 
 from the popular divi.on ^ ^ L^^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^ ^epa.ed 
 
 text. I have therefore used there ^Z^TT "^"'"^ e-Planation in the 
 
 part. eusedthere bodj for the irrational; "mind," for the rational 
 
 DUTIES TO LOWER NATUEE I IMPULSES. 
 
 91 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Duty to the whole nature must include the lower as well as 
 the higher. 
 
 2. Duty to the lower nature requires that we 
 give to it^ as to our whole being, cultii/re and 
 order. 
 
 Duties relative to the lower nature are, then, naturally divided 
 according to their objects ; which are, 1, tiie lody, \ 
 with its immediate surroundings ; and, 2, the im-- ^^"^^^ 
 pulses arising from it. 
 
 1. Duties which refer to the Body and ns Circumstances. 
 
 3. The requirements for the body and its imme- Body: require, 
 diate surroundings are regimen 2^n& propriety. n^e^ts. 
 
 By regimen there must be care that the body be, 1, kept in 
 health; 2, made vigorous by exercises; 3, made pliant and 
 graceful by accomplishments. By propriety, there must be 
 care, 1, for bodily cleanliness ; 2, for appropriateness in dress, 
 and (except under the necessities of labor) for neatness ; 3, for 
 order in the things around.* It should be observed that 
 aiDpropriateness in dress extends to labor as well as rest (since 
 in labor, the working-dress is appropriate), and also to station 
 and profession, since the dress should correspond. 
 
 [These requirements show in the correspondent military reg- 
 ulations and customs their excellence and their utility. Those 
 for personal neatness, for the uniform, for order in the room, 
 tent, and camp ; for constant military exercises, requiring both 
 strength and activity, are not only demanded by military, but 
 by moral and sesthetical principles.] 
 
 2. Duties which refer to Lower Impulses. 
 
 4. The requirements for the Impulses are, For impulses: 
 Restraint, and Direction. The lower nature, in Di?ecti?n: 
 all its improper working, must be restrained by the higher; and 
 in all its proper working, must be directed by the higher 
 
 ♦ Order is here mentioned only as a part of propriety in appearance. 
 
02 
 
 PRACrnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 Batnre For this restraint and direction, there must be a habit 
 whaeh te,nj>ers, both all in^pulses within us, and also their ex 
 temal manifestations; givin<r inwarHlv Ja . '"" "'^'"^ ^x- 
 and deeoru.. Such 'a tbit i:"Cre (LT o^ald 
 enlarged sense of that word), signifying' that which Z^ Z, 
 Hence, Temper, gives proportion. That is to say, the impulses de- 
 and th!. f tempering through restraint and direction, 
 
 and this tempering requires Temperance. 
 
 X-errc."' J- '^''T'^^^'"' ^'^^^ t'-^^ed to its origin has 
 
 two meanings, one restricted, the other enlarged. 
 
 TEMPEEANCE AS A TIKTIJE. 
 
 A. Virtue. . ^- temperance, in its restricted sense is a 
 
 ing their ..W^.''^'^'^^'^"'''^^^^''"^^-'-^-^^^^^^ 
 These impulses are of two kinds; 1. those implanted by 
 "r^S; "'^^^f^r ^^^ P>-eservation of the individual {L 
 «jd u^o,.io by food), or of the race by new generations : 2 
 
 or of the race. S:i :trr': T'' "''''' '''''''^ 
 and the second, the lll^T^.l^ '''^' '''''''' '' ^^^^^^^ 
 
 H.W tiey act. J\^^ ''''° <='^*«es of impulses act with violent 
 words and d^ds ' tl" ^'^ ^^^^^^ts, and subsequently in 
 pulses, and toThe effcSr^"^"^ '' '" '' ''''^' *" ^^« - 
 
 f.S'ai. ^Pf ^-/^^--e, demands Abs^ekoe, S^bek- 
 D.™™, and W '^' " "^^^^''^ ^^ ^^-^-^. 
 
 Sin^r^rcarSi:: ^— t r -unts^r ' 
 r-t:;.^t^t^ettt^r.-^^^^^^^^^ 
 
 videdbvPn^ o r *''.^""»*"^'.'"""age is the limitation pro- 
 viaea by (rod and society, and haa in Ua ^« • • 
 limitations. ' permissions proper 
 
 TEMPERANCE AS A VIRTUE: CAUSES SELF-RESTRAINT. 93 
 
 The last two vices, drunkenness and lust, ,,. - , 
 
 ' ' Desire, in whom 
 
 peculiarly beset and endanger young men. strongest. 
 
 8. Temperance applied to the second class of impulses, the 
 irascible passions, demands, when we are excited, 
 the repression of excessive Anger, of Cruelty, ^^^ the second, 
 and of Eevenge, by Mildness, Clemency, and Placability. 
 
 It also requires the subjugation of hatred and malice. But 
 those subjects will be considered under duties to others. 
 
 Violent anger is one of the common faults of the young, 
 though by no means limited to them. Cruelty, 
 when found in boys and young men, seems to wvfnge?Tn"^' 
 result from their want of reflection, and the con- '^^'*'^' 
 sequent lack of sympathy with suffering, and not from an in- 
 herent deficiency in kindness of heart ; since they are naturally 
 warm-hearted. Eevenge in its first violent impulses is found 
 in the young, but in its deadly perseverance in the old, or the 
 middle-aged. All these impulses are to be constantly and 
 vigorously restrained. 
 
 9. Temperance, applied to both classes of impulses, demands 
 that the restraining power be specially applied 
 
 to the Jlrst causes and beginnings of those im- be restSned in 
 pulses. ' ®**^^' 
 
 As an example, one passion of each class will be taken ; from 
 the first. Lust, and from the second, Anirer. 
 
 10. The first causes of lust are, for the bodv, t- ♦ 
 
 n ' ^ . . 'J^ ' First oanses m 
 
 superfluity of nourishment or stimulant,^ and for ^^^y and mind. 
 
 the mind, imaginations, either self-acting, or excited by 
 •reading, by pictures, or by living objects. 
 
 He who governs his senses uses safeguards against both. 
 
 (1.) Safeguards for the body have for their Safegnards fcr 
 purpose the prevention of those secretions by the body: 
 which the blood affects the animal life, and that, the rational 
 mind. They are sought in regulations tor food, for sleep, 
 and for exercise. 
 
 'For food (including fluids), moral regulation requires that in 
 
 * Sine Baccho etCerere friget Venus 
 
94 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 In sleep ; 
 
 flM; "" ?»«"tilj Uiore be no ™« (7), ,ud In the 
 
 .re known bv ", '^'- ""^ '°'"'"°"' '" ""^ "Wol 
 
 ...e/;:ri.:cr.i^ S '"-"»- '^»^' 
 
 2""0». A.«e,io, ,»n.cienti„n, b„, iLnfo Jed „! Z '5 
 PV«e.. and n,.„, Zfl t».: ^SJC '"^Lr 
 
 ;Td'o 'zr;:r . i; r "^ "-r"-- »- 
 
 ri;ff«ro„^ f *"® ^*™<' substances vary in 
 
 diflerent temperaments and ages. ^ 
 
 For *^..^ tJie time of rest should be the short- 
 and never 1 T f "^^'^ '"'" ""^^' '^^ covering hght 
 
 :=s:rr;:t:::^^^^^^ 
 
 For e^ercue, there should be within each twenty-four hours 
 
 In exercise. "J^'f ; ^'^'^ t^at which calls for strength, anj 
 
 that which calls for activitv A^fl,,. *• 
 qniek walking, running and all wJ I "*'°°'' ^* 
 
 tion of thP h^l / "' ^"'^ ''^"'^ * '«P'd circula- 
 
 come unt; le.'; '""'^ '^^"'''' ^^ ^'-" ''^^ - sickness 
 
 % such abstinence in food in rlrmt ^ • i 
 such hardness and activity t; the Todv !o " '' "' '^ 
 
 =:rnd-^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
 
 [Tliese moral safec^uard*? rliVfof^^ u 
 
 ♦ Th. F . ' ^ ^^ ""^^'^^ ^^^ experience, 
 
 * The Emperor Justinian often slent h„f «..!,. 
 
 years old. '^^ ^"* ^^^ ^°"^. ^^ lived to be eighty-tiiree 
 
 f Ecclus. ixii. 22. 
 
 SAFEGUAKDS AGAINST IMPULSES. 
 
 95 
 
 illustrate the excellence of the routine of a military school, a 
 routine not belonging singly to one country, but found in the 
 military schools of all countries. Those of Egypt under Sesos- 
 tris, those of Sparta, of Crete in its period of glory, of Eome in 
 the camp, and those of chivalry, present the same great outlines 
 with those of modern times. The soldier must rise early, sleep 
 on what is hard, have plain food, and give a part of every day to 
 bodily exercises which demand strength as well as activity.* 
 He must " endure hardness, as a good soldier." This " hard- 
 ness" promotes at once professional training, purity of feeling, 
 and soundness of constitution. A young person should 
 welcome with exhilaration the discipline which averts from 
 him that effeminacy which undermines the health and weakens 
 the mind.] 
 
 Such are safeguards for the body. 
 
 (2). Safeguards for the 7ni7id have for their 
 purpose the prevention of impure imaginations. thfS? ^°' 
 For this, there should be constant and earnest ^°^*^' 
 employments. Idleness is the parent of vices. Also he whose 
 imagination is haunted by impurities must avoid solitude. 
 The evil influences from books, pictures, and living objects 
 should be avoided by following the rule in the Bible. " I 
 made a covenant wath mine eyes."t 
 
 Such are the moral restraints in the body and the mind 
 against this passion. 
 
 (3.) Those influences which are spiritual are left 
 to Theology. It teaches that without a divine Spiritual, 
 influence passions cannot be uprooted. 
 
 11. The causes of Anger are ^redUj>osing or immediate. 
 The predisposing are mostly internal from the ^,^,. ^. 
 
 . _ xirst cSiTues or 
 
 l^odyor the mind. The immediate are mostly ^^ger. 
 external from persons and circumstances. An example of an 
 internal cause from the body is in a state of irritability from 
 
 * Under Sesostris, a good run was required before the morning meal. See Sir 
 Oardiner Wilkinson's works on Egypt. 
 t Job ixxi. 1. 
 
96 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 stimulants on the one side ; or on the other, from pain, hunger 
 and s,ckness. [Those who govern n.en L mihtary or d ,' 
 r:r:;; ''^^\--^-'- ^^- -tatin^ are privaL: z 
 
 stat i •'; 1^7 ' '' '" "*""*' ^^"- fro- tie mindl a 
 
 PC t. „r T ' ".•'' '^'"^" ''^"^ ^-« ^- - ^-p 
 
 ternal ca„; f " ^ ^''°" '" '"^"- ^" ™P'« "^ - ex- 
 lord oTaTt r"? " *'" "^'^•""-" P~t'- from the 
 ^ ord. or acfons of another. An example of an external cause 
 
 rom ccu^stances is the arising of disasters. These areTm 
 mediate and emergent occasions for anger. 
 
 Eemedie., J^'^ .^^ eo"'>teract the predisposing canses an 
 
 of irritation toff T "'^''"^ '" ''•^"'^ '^^ ""'"^ fr^n^ ^ ^'^te 
 ot irntafon to a kind, cahn, and cheerful temper. 
 
 (^.) To resist the immediate canses there must be an en- 
 Korai, °f *^<f to «"'^d"e tlie first motions of anger, when 
 
 wh n. tl • 1 ^^^ ^^'"' """^ ^'^ ''^'^^''' fro'n speech or gesture 
 ^Inle the violent action endures. There should also be prl 
 -ousl^the foresight of occasions, and the guardin. ofTe 
 mind against their influence. A man shoull expect and b 
 prepa ed for untoward circumstances in every thin, which he 
 
 them « th a serene disposition. An earnest and impulsive man 
 
 in nations. A man energetic and methodical, using eve.v 
 a^ailable means for good results, but preparin.. for dislppoh t 
 -ents, is prepared to be patient when'evHs ari^e '' '' 
 
 all relations, alike those toward inferiors and superiors it is 
 
 norha^' T" ^^^'"'' '"^ """^ ■'•"^^""g obstacles, could 
 not have won his victories without an unalterable sweetness of 
 
 ^arituai. . ^^'^ ^^t the influence of religion is alone sufii- 
 
 cient for complete control of this, as of other 
 passions. 
 
 TEMPERANCE AS A PKINCIPLE : GIVES PEOPOETION. 97 
 
 In the same manner are all the other bodily 
 receive restraint in the first impulses of 
 tlumght. 
 
 12. The same restraint, from Temperance as a 
 to be applied to all the words and to all the actions, 
 which result from any violent bodily impulses. 
 Particulars will appear under the next head. 
 Temperance as a principle. 
 
 appetites to 
 
 Same rales for 
 other impulses. 
 
 principle, is 
 
 Bestraint to 
 extend to word*, 
 as well as 
 thoughts. 
 
 TEMPERANCE AS A PRINCIPLE. 
 
 13. Temperance, in the enlarged sense of the word, is a 
 principle, belonging to ali the virtues and their Temperance as 
 actions, and giving to aU these, proportion. perf^gSl.'""' 
 (Chap, i., 22.) 
 
 Tliis sense is seen in the kindred words, derived from the 
 same source. For example, the Latin word, temperies, means 
 « a tempering or mixing of diflbrent things in due proportions." 
 In English, we speak of tempering a sword-blade, and giving 
 tools a jnst temper; of the prevailing temperature of the air, 
 and of the Uynpcramsnts of men. In all these is the same 
 fundamental idea, that of division* into right proportions. 
 Temperance is, therefore, as a principle, that which gives moder- 
 
 * The original root, Dm, means to divide. This sense is preserved in Gr., 
 Tspvw, to cut, and L., fempas, time, both from the idea of dividing. 
 
 From this general sense, spring two classes of secondary meanings. The first is 
 that of giving wMsun and proportion, as the effect of division. This is seen in the 
 Gothic family: as English, deem, doom; Sax., dom, judgment; Dan, doan, etc • in 
 the Slavonic famUy, as Russ, dumayu, to think, and duma, or dumya, a thought- 
 m the Classic family, in the words quoted above, to which we may add L damn^ 
 condemno, and Greek, ri^r), honor. See Wel^ster on the words deem, and dooh' 
 AU good judgment and estimation imply proportion. William the Conqueror's 
 "<to»^sday.book, was weU named as apportioniw, lands. This idea, proportion, 
 from division, passes into the general meaning of temperance. 
 
 The second derived meaning is that of restraint, as the result of division This 
 .8 seen in the English word tan>e; in Gr., Sa^xd,^, to tame; in L., dorno, dominu.,, 
 domtna, domitio; in Goth, tamia, and G. zlihme. In all these is the same sense 
 that of taming by breaking. Thus we say to tame a horse is to b,-eak him' 
 Breakmg means at first to divide. This sense of restraining belongs to Temper^ 
 •nee as a virtue; the other, that of proportion, to Temperance as b. principle 
 
98 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 ation and proportion. As a virtue it restrains, as a principle 
 It directs. ^ ' 
 
 Observes pro- I*- Temperance, as a pnncijile, directs to the 
 
 v^o^- obser^-ance oi proportion in the mind, the manr 
 
 ners, the ac!:/o«», tlie words. It tempers all. 
 (1.) The effect in the mind is what is commonly called « a 
 
 S^dal-^Sa ;:'"-^"'^"'=^'^ '"•"'J-" Tlie particular disposi- 
 • tions or virtues which it includes, are the follow- 
 ing. 
 
 («.) The first is Decornm. By this is meant a constant 
 
 1. Decorum : f "^ °^ ^*"^'' """^ '''^'''- ^'^^ *>PP»«<^d negative 
 
 I'iolt IS indifference to Propriety. The fault con- 
 sists m insensibility to the proprieties demanded for persons 
 times, places, circumstances, relations. The positive extreme' 
 IS the exaggeration of trifles. ' 
 
 (b.) The second is a higli and delicate regard to personal 
 
 Hoar""'' ,""*"■* ^'"'°PP'''^'<^"^i?*t'^e fault is meanness, 
 
 .1 / 1 • . , ^""'"gness from hope or fear to submit to 
 that which demeans us. TJ.e positive excess is Inordinate 
 be IfEs eem. In consequence of this weakness, young and 
 
 untaught persons often imagine humiliations when none reaUy 
 exist. "^ 
 
 (c.) The third is Modesty. This is a modification of the 
 8. Modesty: ^!;'*- ^"'^^stj '^ self-respect modified. It is 
 
 the habitual dread of consenting to any thin<r to 
 any thought, word, or deed unworthy of ourselves or of'ur 
 rdations to others. This is the enlarged and old sense of the 
 word ; deference to mode, to customary moral sentiments. The 
 taidtm excess is Modishness, that from defect is Immodesty. 
 
 The derived and modern senses of the word are principally 
 two, the one as opposed to impurity, the other as opposed to 
 
 "In aU things wUIing to live .o.e.Uy." ZliU TZ^T T I, 
 
 thincy«"nrf>,« 7. J ., **«wm to ave with a sense, "in all 
 
 ^,lSe^"^ ''^ -d due fro. other, t..ughu. U>^^^^ 
 
 EFFECTS FROM TEMPERAN^CE AS A PRINCIPLE. 
 
 99 
 
 presumption. Thus, according to the first we speak of a mod- 
 est woman, and according to the second of a modest young 
 man. The suggestions of impurity are dreaded by the one as 
 unworthy. The suggestions of presumption are dreaded by the 
 other as unworthy. The derived and common meanings thus 
 unite in that which is primitive. 
 
 (d.) The fourth is the will for Moderation in all things. 
 Moderation as here used is rather a principle ex- 
 tending to all virtues than a special virtue. *• ^<^«atwa- 
 Moderation is a principle restraining excess in all things. To 
 this is opposed Immoderateness in any feeling, any desire, any 
 pursuit. 
 
 (e.) The fifth is Tranquillity with Contentment preserved 
 under external annoyances. To these are op- 
 posed Querulousness, and Peevishness under 5- ^^a^l^iiiity. 
 personal discomforts. 
 
 [The latter faults must be carefully shunned by an officer. 
 From the necessities of his profession he must endure much, 
 and often endure long. He should accordingly repress the 
 expressions of discontent, and thus govern himself, avoid 
 breaches of discipline, and set an example to those under his 
 command.] 
 
 The effects of this principle extend from the mind to manners. 
 (2.) Manners will spontaneously receive certain qualities 
 
 from these dispositions in the mind. They should ^4^ ^ 
 , •/ JLizect on man- 
 
 nave propriety, dignity, refinement, gentleness, ^«"' 
 
 pleasantness ; as the results of the mental dispositions enumer- 
 ated. The correspondent faults to be avoided are carelessness 
 in deportment, unseemliness, vulgarity, boisterousness, mo- 
 roseness. Shakspeare includes all in the comprehensive rule, 
 " Give no disproportioned thought his act."* The farther con- 
 sideration of manners belongs to duties to others. 
 
 (3.) Actions are to receive the impressions of 
 these mental dispositions. ^^®^* ^^ actioM. 
 
 Actions of solitude are to be directed as if the world were 
 
 * Tragedy of Hamlet. 
 
100 
 
 5*EACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 looking on ;* actions of business with system, deliberation 
 and energy ; habitual actions by a settled order. In solitude' 
 avoid improprieties and secret sins. In affairs, do not mar 
 them by confusion, precipitation, or inefficiency. Let your 
 system of lite be regulated, and let that regulation extend to 
 all the things around you, and to all employments.! ' 
 (4.) The effects in speech are restramt and direction 
 
 arect on words. ,'"'^/ 'P"''^° ^'^ ^""'^n ^^^ to be restrained 
 
 and directed. The subject requires a more full 
 consideration. 
 
 TeMPEEANCB Ef LanGITAGE, or SELF-RE^Amr A^D DiEEC- 
 
 TioN IN Speech. 
 15. This subject is of peculiar importance. The reason is 
 
 uSe^ "' •^'''' '* ''^^''*' ^^^'^ 'P^^''^ <^*" <^"t7. and all our 
 ,„! ■ , '"'''■'*''• ^' ^ff'^*^*^ <i"t'^ above us, because in 
 our words we may transgress against God and human author- 
 "j; duties withm us, because he who can govern himself in 
 -ords IS prepared for self-government in all things ;| duti " 
 around us because in the great mass of wrongs to ofh rs, there 
 are more by words than deeds. It affects ouf interests n t 
 world and ,n another. It does so in this world, since the 
 
 fruits of imprudence in language. It does so in another 
 
 be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned." For 
 these reasons it requires special attention 
 
 form t wT '''" ? '" ' ^^"'^' '""P^'^-- ^-- of men 
 
 that I sin not with my tongue." Psalm x.,iT '''"' '^ "' ^"'^ 
 
 TEMPEEAN-CE IN LANGUAGE: IN QUALrTT ; QtJANTITT. 101 
 
 16. The primary rule for temperance in speech is, Let your 
 words (like your thoughts, like your actions), 
 reflect the higher jprinciples of action, never the *"^'- 
 low and unworthy impulses of your nature. 
 
 Three streams are to be made mirrors of what is noblest in 
 principle ; the stream of a man's thoughts, the stream of his 
 actions, and the stream of his words. You would not approve 
 an unworthy thought or action. Then do not permit an un- 
 worthy word. 
 
 This rule requires restraint and direction, 1. Generally in 
 all speech; 2. Specially in its quantity and „ ^ . , 
 
 quality, and direction. 
 
 (1.) Tliere must be general restraint and direction. This 
 requires Eeflection before speaking. We must 
 consider carefully what we speak, for what, to ^®''®''*^- 
 whom, of whom, how, in what relations (whether personal, 
 social, or official), the place, the time, and the possible conse- 
 quences. The opposed fault is Eashness in speech. 
 
 (2.) There must be special restraint in the quantity of speech. 
 The virtue required is that of Proper Taciturnity. g ^^.^^ .^ 
 Divine and human testimony commend this re- quantity, 
 serve in speech. The divine testimony is, " In the multitude 
 of words there wanteth not sin." Human testimony is in the 
 recorded experience of mankind, which declares that the power 
 of keeping silence promotes tranquillity, and both mental and 
 moral improvement. For this reason, Pythagoras prescribed 
 a silence of ^yq years on his pupils, and many religious orders 
 impose habitual silence by vow on their votaries. In the con- 
 templative life, whether given to study or devotion, this may 
 be fully observed. But in active life, intercourse with others 
 requires that this reserve be tempered by Sociability. Yet the 
 power of keeping silence in particular matters must still be 
 carefully cultivated and preserved. In common life, therefore, 
 the negative extreme is Unsocial Eeserve, and the positive, 
 loquacity. Between these stands the virtue of Proper Taci- 
 turnity. 
 
102 
 
 J'EACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 (3.) There must be direction in the ^ualUy of speech. The 
 special in qnai. ^*"''^ *<> ^e banished from it are Falsehood Im 
 i^'«,S. *• P""'^' ^^"ffoonery, Slander, Tale-bearing, fi'ltter- 
 tl,.c A ^^'!' "^^^ ^'^^"■^"^g'-esses in all spheres of duty 
 tifthT. /°? ''"■' •'" *^"''- to ourselves; the fourth and' 
 hfth in duties o ourselves, and to others absent; the sixth in 
 duties to ourselves and to others present 
 
 (a.) Falsehood is the violation of truth. Theopposed virtue 
 Falsehc»d: '' Truthfulness. Falsehood is an offence as re- 
 
 gards obligations above us, within us, and 
 around us. Above us, it is against the demands of God a, d 
 -ciety, smce both require truth in our words. Within us ^ 
 IS agamst self-respect, since every one feels degraded b^ Tl'l 
 and IS also against self-culture, since Insincerity poisons the 
 whole character. Around us, it is against the ri^ts of each 
 iellow-man, since we wrong him by deception. Th^ most strict 
 observance of Truthfulness is hence incumbent on ar;;;:; 
 It must extend to promises as well as statements. ^ 
 
 [Truthfulness is part of the honor of a soldier. Strata-rems 
 
 other i,t, ,^^ ^,^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^ ^ j^^^. ^^^ 
 
 Also the whole system of military discipline is deran J f 
 ^here cannot be perfect reliance on personal and offieiafsUtl 
 
 Hot imn "" ""' '"''' '° '"""''■^ ^^^^ ^ ^'^ P'-o^'-^^'on. who 
 IS not unfaltering in veracity.] 
 
 ness, and by heir sensitiveness to the reproach of having inten- 
 tiona ly spoken falsehood. The most brave and free are 
 usually most truthful. Among those who speak the Engl sh 
 WiSTt ;;r ""'* *'^ '^"^ "^ ^^^ "^ -'ther, « you lie." 
 
 10 be truthful, we must avoid exaggeration. 
 
 INTEMPERANCE IN SPEECH : SINS OF THE TONGUE. 103 
 
 (h.) Impurity is the introduction in speech of ideas gratifying 
 pruriency. It has been named under Temperance 
 as a virtue. It is an offence against others, as l^^P^ty: 
 suggesting evil thoughts, and against ourselves, as giving ex- 
 pression to, lower impulses. This offence receives gigantic 
 proportion in writings, when an author composes works on 
 purpose to address the evil passion just named. The rule is, 
 "Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth." 
 A writer should leave "no line which, dying, he would wish 
 to blot." , 
 
 (<?.) Buffoonery is mirthfulness in excess, that excess being 
 in matter or manner. It is an offence against 
 decorum, a violation of self-respect, or of respect ^^^^^ry: 
 to others. It stands opposed to Asperity as the opposite ex- 
 treme. Between these extremes is the social virtue of Cheer- 
 fulness. 
 
 (d,) Slander is depriving another of his proper reputation 
 and honor among men by statements injurious to 
 him. Viewed as an injury to a man's neighbor, Slander: 
 this fault pertains to the next division of duty, that to others. 
 But when the passions are considered which find gratification 
 in slander, its place is in this division. The malevolent pas- 
 sions of Envy, Hatred, Anger, and Malie have expression in 
 Slander. As speech should reflect only the higher principles 
 of our nature, and slander is the expression of lower and un- 
 worthy impulses, it is an offence not only against others, but 
 ourselves. The rule of the Bible is, " Speak evil of no man." 
 Let the reader remember this, when he speaks of rivals and 
 competitors. The restraints on Slander are Justice and 
 Charity. These belong to the next division of duties. 
 
 (e.) Tale-bearing is a violation of the tacit or expressed con- 
 fidence of another person, by improperly report- 
 ing what we have heard or seen when with him. ^^^^-^eariagr, 
 It is forbidden by divine authority, and execrated by the gen- 
 oral sentiment of mankind. " Thou shalt not go up and down 
 as a tale-bearer among thy people" (Lev. xix. 16). " A tale- 
 
104 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 clTIT '"""''' '■ ^"' ^' *'^^' '^ «f * f-"'f«I spirit eon- 
 
 cealeth the matter" (Pro., xi. 13). "The word* o^ a tX 
 
 theTthT """".'^'" ^^"^- -^^"'- «)• " ^^- - wood t 
 there the fire goeth out ; so where there is no tale-bearer the 
 
 8 nfeceaseth" (Prov.xxvi.20). I„ the first of thes. palis 
 forb.dden ; ,n the second, its nature is said to be the rL a, 
 
 ng of secrets; in the third, the disgust of n^ankind is stated • 
 an the las,, the efi-ect of it is declared to be strife. The tl' 
 fidenee placed in us ,na, be tacit. This is the fact in convel 
 sa^o-. and m whatever is heard or seen in another's dwellini 
 place To report on trifling matters n.a, be a trifling fauU 
 Bu to report, w.thout .noral necessity, what will injL him 
 or a„se pa,n or enn^ities for others, is shameful and culpabC 
 
 imposed, and pro.n.se given. The ofi-ence is then aggravated 
 
 If thou hast heard a word, let it die with thee ; and be bold 
 n w.11 not bu.t thee." " A fool travaileth with a word, as a 
 woman m labor of a child" (Ecclus. xix. 10 11) . 
 
 As this fault is very common, the maxims of prudence require 
 us to guard ourselves against it. "Consult not with a Ll • 
 for he cannot keep counsel. Do no secret thing before a 
 stranger, for thou knowest not what he may bring forth. Open 
 not tlnne heart to every man, lest he requite thee with a 
 shrewd turn" (Ecclus. viii. 17, 18, 19). 
 
 Akin to tale-bearing is griping.' Tliis fault consists in 
 0^,j,^ improperly and constantly making other persons 
 
 *"^ *'>«!'• affairs the topics of conversation. It is 
 the pecuhar fault of villages and of small communities \o 
 one can comnut ,t, without feeling that he is violating at once 
 his own self-respect, and the rights of his neighbor. Employ! 
 ments hterature, and religion should so filMhe mind a fo 
 furn.sh other topics. If they do not, silence is better han a 
 /ault so contemptible. 
 
 • Slander and tale-bearing must be eschewed in military life 
 camps, garrisons, and stations. ^ ' 
 
 INTEMPERANCE IN SPEECH : SINS OF THE TONGUE. 105 
 
 Eitterness. 
 
 (/.) Bitterness is cruelty to another in the matter or manner 
 of the language addressed to him. It is a fault 
 mostly committed towards inferiors, and those 
 from whom nothing is to be feared. " Let all bitterness be 
 put away from you, with all malice, and be ye kind one to 
 another" (Eph. iv. 31). The most common instances of this 
 fault among all mankind regard the poor, and the wife. In 
 Scripture these are specially mentioned. " Whoso mocketh the 
 poor, reproacheth his Maker" (Prov. xvii. 5). " Condescend to 
 men of low estate" (Rom. xii. 16). "Husband, slove your 
 wives, and be not bitter against them" (Col. iii. 19). 
 
 These are the duties and offences connected with speech. 
 
 With them terminates the subject of duty to the whole 
 nature. 
 
 Next to duties which relate to the whole man, are thefts 
 which regard things immediately investing him. 
 
Duties relatiye to Things inseparable from Self: regard 
 
 OHAPTER VI. 
 
 DUTIES DEMANDED BY THINGS TO BE BORNE, PURSUED, AND 
 USED. CORRESPONDENT VIRTUES; FORTITUDE, MODERATION 
 INDUSTRY, ECONOMY. ' 
 
 1. Among duties pertaining to self must be included those 
 which regard the things that permanently invest Duties re ardin 
 every man. For example, no man can exist with- things that per 
 out time. In the use of time he may fulfil or *^^ *° ""' 
 violate an obligation. 
 
 Duties to self were divided into those belonging to the whole 
 man, and to things investing him. The previous chapters 
 have embraced the first division. The second remains for the 
 present chapter. 
 
 2. Things which immediately invest us may form three 
 classes: things to he home ; to he jpursxied ; to he 
 
 used. Division of them. 
 
 3. Things to be borne, are the external evils 
 
 of life. The firstdivision. 
 
 4. The virtue required by external evils, is Fortitude. It 
 should be observed, however, that the word is virtue demand- 
 here used not in its loose popular acceptation, ed : Fortitude, 
 but in its old signification, as employed in Ethics. 
 
 5. Fortitude may be defined from the w(yrd, by referring to 
 
 the near and the remote primitives from which ^ « ;, ^ 
 . . J . ^ iiennedDroni 
 
 It IS derived. Its nearest primitive is the Latin, word. 
 fortis, strong. Its remote primitive is the radical syllable from 
 ^^Anhfortis itself is derived. That root means to bear (Sansc, 
 VAE or bhak; Gr., <;&£pw; \.2X,,fero; English, hear, etc., etc) 
 Combining the sense of both, we have an accurate and satis- 
 factory etymological definition. Fortitude is strength to hear^ 
 
108 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 In its etymologJcal sense it is rather a principle than a virtue 
 As a pr^ncple, it is firmness and constancy of mind ^^ 
 actions, applied to all virtues. 
 
 6. As defined from the thing, Fortitude is amoral virtue so 
 
 De^^ from the elevatinff reason and conscience aiove the feelings 
 
 created by external ecUs, as to give " strength to 
 hear" them. "^ 
 
 7. Reason and conscience are to be so sustained by the hi-^hest 
 
 ^S^ rT^:" 'f ""'''''' ™""^^^- ^ '™« soldier 
 
 his countrv" , . f '' ^'""'^ ^^""'<^ ^"'''^ *« ^^e cause of 
 
 Ins country which he sustains, and to the principles of public 
 
 justice and order which he defends 
 
 8. Fortitude is easily distinguished from the other virtues 
 mstuiction. "J considering its object— External Evils Tpm ' 
 ^mother moral perance deals with what attracts natural desires' 
 
 en • A- . . """^"^ "^ ""^^ apparent good which is so near 
 so immediate, that it disturbs the proper action of reason Ind 
 conscience, and does so through desire for instant graZtio^ 
 Temperance counteracts that disturbance. Prudence is oZ- 
 P.ed with good, which is real, but which is so distant in tTm^ 
 .s o removed by intervening media, that reason and conscienl 
 nnless directed, will not sufficiently appreciate and Z le t 
 
 I urn sen interest, that reason and conscience un- 
 
 io^n ;:: : r'^^^^^^-^ *"^"- J-^-efu^ishes such dir . 
 tion. Fortitude, ,n contrast, is occupied with evils present and 
 immediate, tending to disturb the proper acting of reZ and 
 conscience through suffering and fear. Fortitude counteracts 
 ^.disturbance. It thus stands distinguished from the otht 
 Tirtues by having a special object 
 
 As a moral virtue it is distinguished from the intellectual 
 Fromthe intel- Virtues for knowledge, since they cultivate the in- 
 tellect directly, while this prevents the disturbance 
 
 FORTITUDE I ITS CHARACTER : DIVISIONS. 
 
 109 
 
 When Divine, 
 
 Subdivisions. 
 
 of reason, as the director, under conscience, of the will. These 
 are its distinctions. 
 
 It agrees with all the virtues in being an energy in the soul, 
 habituallj exercised. Fortitude carried to the how it agrees 
 highest action becomes heroic virtue. When the ^^^^ *^® others, 
 moral principles sustaining fortitude centre in God, it becomes 
 the manifestation of the divine virtues of faith, 
 hope, and charity ; a moral virtue emanating from 
 the spiritual and divine energies of the soul. It 
 is manifested by Christian heroes, dying for coun- ^^^^^ l^eroic, 
 try in battle, or for faith in martyrdom. 
 
 9. Fortitude is active in Courage, passive in Patience, active 
 and passive through a length of time, in Perse- 
 verance. Its subordinate virtues are thus seen to 
 be Courage, Patience, Perseverance. In all these is found the 
 original sense of the word. Something is to be I}or7ie, By 
 these virtues the mind is strong in bearing. 
 
 (1.) Courage is active fortitude in opposing dangers, espe- 
 cially those which are immediate, and which threat- 
 en, as in battle, instant death. It is sustained by ^°^*&®J 
 conscience through a sense of duty, and directed by reason 
 through a perception of results. It represses all those emotions 
 awakened by danger, which prevent the energetic action of 
 tliose higher faculties, reason and conscience. Prim aril 3^, it 
 represses the sense of fear and suffering ; secondarily, the 
 animal impulses, or the blind desire for distinction, which seek 
 danger without a reasonable object. Its action is so full of the 
 highest energies, as to give an elevating pleasure to the mind, 
 even when anger, anxiety, and pain are felt in the conflict.* 
 
 As a virtue. Courage stands between two extremes. The 
 extreme by excess is Rashness ; the extreme by 
 defect is Cowardice. Both are faults from the 
 same cause; permitting mastery to the feelings. Eashness 
 yields unreasonably to impulses impelling towards danger. 
 
 Its contrasts. 
 
 ♦ "The joy which warriora feel," etc. 
 
110 
 
 PEACrrCAL ETHICS. 
 
 Cowardice ^elds unreasonabl, to impulses repelling fro. 
 
 be energed ir 1 V^-^ '"^ '^"^"■' '"^" »' ^^-'' '« to 
 
 defence of f^KK '*' ^'■'"*"'" ^P^^-^^^ ^^e seen in the 
 
 de ence of faith bj martyrs, and of country by warriors 
 
 (2.) Paxx^o. is passive fortitude in tl e'durance' of „„. 
 Pauence. and ^^"'^"^'^ «^i'«. ^^'h a mind elevated above un- 
 
 reasonable dejection or irritation. 
 [In mihtary life its exercise is constantly demanded.] 
 
 Contrwu. ;'^ ^f '•erne by excess is Impatience, and by 
 
 defect, LvsENsiBiLnr •'^ 
 
 require. » " "^ ^^wweaJ, with the virtues which they 
 
 10. Things to be^.w are the common objects of human 
 ^^^U^. pur^iit; Such are Mn^, pJr, WealtCZ 
 
 ^^e. ., -^ . ,^ ^^"^ ^^ ^* causes the vices exhib- 
 
 Xzr ' '"' '^""'' ''--' -^'»^' -^ 
 
 (1.) The first rule for this moderation is to make these objects ' 
 rer.r !:;t'"f *« «- -P-me end of life. £ 
 long to the whole liS. '"'' """'^^^^ "^"^^^ ^"*- -^^<^^ be- 
 Second rule. ^^-^ ^l'^ °ext rule for moderation is to look 
 
 moderation: jts objects. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Third rule. 
 
 quantity than such as is consistent with our primary duties to 
 God and society, to ourselves, and to others. 
 
 (3.) The next rule for this moderation is to limit our expec- 
 tations by the natural limitations of our position. 
 These limitations, fixed by nature, are of two 
 kinds, outward and inward. The outward limitations are in 
 the order fixed by God and Society. According to that order, 
 all men cannot have all things. Tliese objects must be pos- 
 sessed by different men in different degrees. The inward 
 Hmitations fixed by nature are in the diversities of capacity 
 among men. According to these diversities all men are not 
 fitted for all things. 
 
 By such rules, moderation can be applied in human pursuits. 
 
 The faults and vices produced by the want of that modera- 
 tion will appear under these objects separately. 
 
 12. Honor is favorable regard from others to 
 some real or supposed worthiness in ourselves. ^°^®^' 
 
 The vice produced by an excessive sense of our worthiness, 
 is Pkide. The opposed extreme is Pusillanimity, 
 
 ^1068 &iid virtufis 
 
 the absence of a proper self-respect. Between relative to 
 these extremes is Virtuous Aspiration, a desire ^®^°^* 
 not so much to be honored as to become more and more 
 worthy of that honor. On the one side of this virtue is Self- 
 Kespect, a just estimate of ourselves; and on the other, 
 Humility, a just estimate of our deficiencies. 
 
 Pride is thus inordinate self-esteem, and Pusillanimity, in- 
 ordinate humility. Degeneracy is the absence of proper as- 
 piration to be more and moreVorthy. 
 
 This honor from men is given by them in thoughts, in words, 
 or in things : in thoughts, by Esteem ; in words, by Praise ; 
 in things, by Distinctions. 
 
 (1.) Esteem: Desire for the esteem of men is commendable 
 when a person seeks that esteem as the outward principles in re- 
 echo to the inward testimony of a good conscience. &*^^ ^ Honor. 
 Such a desire is praised in Scripture. " A good name is rather to 
 be chosen th^.n great riches, and loving favor rather than silver 
 
112 
 
 PBACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 and gold" (Prov. xxii. 1). It is culpable when we seek tl>«f 
 e2.at:on as a guidance in the place of conscience L' 
 ample, when we pursue the estimation of bad men b; cl 1: 
 hat correspond with their opinions. It is plainly inte' d d y 
 the Creator that .nan shall be guided hy his own conscSice 
 and by the public conscience united ; prifnaril, and un S 
 by h.s own, secondarily, by that of the public. The two ml 
 
 tion 18.) ' '"""' ""' '"°^ '" ^'""^'^'- (See Introduc 
 The desire of great men for the esteem of posterity, for a 
 "memory m after ages," through good work^ or wo d is 
 audable. [The wish of the soldier for that memoryTvh-ch 1 
 a Is glory, .s just and right. It is a desire for the esteem d 
 to him for duty bravely done.] 
 
 (2.) Phaise: n,e fault produced by inordinate sensibility to 
 Praise. ^".^''^ ^""^ "ot^ee, is that of Vanity, with the 
 
 kmdred fault of Affectation 
 (3.) DxsTiNCTioKs: The vice produced by the immoderate 
 
 Dfatmction,. ,^ ^"^ distinctions, is that of Inordinate 
 
 Ambition. 
 
 Distinctions of Honor are to be first deserved- 
 then, rather received than sought. Seek not 
 them, but let them seek you. A regulated esti- 
 mafon of them is Propek Ambition. 
 [The rule of Scripture is the best for the soldier. " Let each 
 esteem ot .r, better than themselves. Look not every man ol 
 
 Le ti , ' ^- , "^"^^ ^' **"'^' ^^'^''f""^ -°d zealously. 
 
 Let there be with it or from it, no inordinato selt^esteem. Let 
 lienors and rank then be received as assigned by PuW c 
 
 on:' 0^'- ;' "'"' ^ "° ^"'"P'^'"''"^"' - ?--aUons S 
 one » 0.V n great personal merit is overlooked. The Spartan is the 
 
 nnhtary sentiment, "Sparta has many a worthier son than L" 
 
 A proper ambition being the virtue, and inordinate ambition 
 
 the vice on the positive extreme, the opposed 
 
 vice on the negative extreme is Recklessness. 
 
 puEsurr OF power, wealth, pleasure. 
 
 113 
 
 Principle. 
 
 Virtue. 
 
 Contrasts. 
 
 [This fault of Recklessness is often seen in young men of ' 
 ability and promise. They are irritated by what they deem 
 injustice, or made despondent by their own neglects and the 
 consequences. They then rush on in desperation, seeking the 
 worst.] 
 Such are some of the moral views belonging to Honor. 
 13. Power, as here regarded, is influence | 
 
 among men. An example of one possessing it is ^^^^^' 
 the statesman. The same moral principles apply as to Honors. 
 There is here also a proper ambition, the virtue of y^^^ and the 
 Public Spirit, when a man is conscious of great contrasted Vices. 
 abilities for great trusts, of powers for power, and when he wishes 
 to use power for public benefits. There is a culpable ambition 
 for rising unworthily by improper means, for getting power 
 without fitness to use it, and for abusing it to personal or 
 factious ends, or to tlie injury of the public. On the other hand, 
 there is here also a Pusillanimity shown, when a man having 
 fitness, and called to power, refuses. 
 
 14. Wealth is a proper object of human pursuit when 
 sought under the requisite moral restraints. 
 These are, that it be acquired in the legitimate '^®*"^' 
 operations of a lawful calling, and that in every transaction 
 there be spotless integrity. 
 
 Wealth is never to be loved for its own sake. It is a mere 
 instrument for necessities, duties, and benefits, principles re- 
 This love of money irrespective of its proper uses, warding it. 
 is Covetousness. It is this love of money, and not money 
 itself, which Scripture declares to be " the root of all evil." 
 The ouposed fault is Improvidence. Between these is care 
 for the future; our own future and that of our families and 
 friends. 
 
 [The love of money must be banished from the mind of every 
 man who enters the military profession.] 
 
 15. Enjoyment, as the term is used in Ethics, is also a 
 proper object of human pursuit when it is sought 
 under the requisite moral restraints. Eiyoyment. 
 
 8 
 
lU 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 
 Bj Enjoyment, or Pleasure, is here meant gratification which 
 ,^^^^ refreshes the mind and body, and fits both for 
 
 meeting the recurrent duties and cares of life. 
 
 The restraints are, that the pleasures be innocent and pure, 
 Principles re- and that they be enjoyed with moderation. Such 
 ^ding It. pleasures are found in proper amusements, in the 
 beauties of nature and art, in bodily exercise, in travelling, in 
 the manifestation and reception of affections domestic, sodal 
 and divine, llie highest pleasures are in the exercise of divine 
 affections. 
 
 This unbending of the mind is necessary and reasonable. 
 
 It is necessary according to experience. 
 
 It is said that St. John the Evangelist was visited in his old 
 
 Why necessary, "f f ^J ^ ^'^^''"^^"' ^'^"^ ^^^^'^"^ ^^gJ«"«> ^^O came 
 
 hlled with veneration and high expectations. 
 I he traveller, to his surprise, found tlie venerable apostle play- 
 mg with children, and manifested his feeling in his counte- 
 nance. When his sports were ended, St. John took an unstrun- 
 bow from the hand of his visitor, and asked him if it should be 
 kept always strung. The traveller said "No; it is nseless if 
 not sometimes unbent." " And so," said the Apostle, " is man, 
 a bow that must be unbent to bo able to roach itB aim." 
 It is reasonaUe, according to tho end of our creation. 
 Man is made for happiness as he is for goodness, and Wm 
 end of his being ia to be regarded in each minute 
 portion of life. 
 
 [Those in c6mmand on land or sea have found licalth and 
 discipline promoted among their men by the permission of 
 regulated amusement.] 
 
 The virtue thus cultivated is ChccrfulneR^. Tlje ntf^vc 
 nj^ei extreme id Moru*cnc8b; tbcoUier, IinmodemteneflS 
 
 nxM diTiridB. ^^' ^^ ^^^"^ ^ ^ ^*^^^ ^^^ examples are Time 
 
 luid Incoene, 
 
 17. Tiino, ID the view of Etlii«, is a universaLl 
 poeseaflioii for univmal ude. For \U u*t^.M men 
 
 industet: economy. 
 
 115 
 
 Why reasonable. 
 
 are accountable, whether above them to God and the public, 
 or within them to conscience, or around them to principle for its 
 other individuals. xwe. 
 
 Tlie right use of time demands a special virtue, 
 that of Industry. ^he virtue : 
 
 Industry is the earnest and sustained applica- 
 tion of our faculties to our works. • induBtry. 
 
 Its negative extreme is the common one ; it is Indolence. 
 The positive extreme is not so common where 
 individuals have conen>l of their time. It is e.\- *'**^'**^ 
 cess of toil. It coDBiflts in do working a^ to injure the healtli, 
 shorten the life, nnd bj the wa»te of the vital powcnc, to en- 
 danger reason, or to unfit a jaded nutunj for 8elf-<jontrol. 
 Earnest men in all pureuite commit tliis fault. But it is pain* 
 fully common among tlio«j who work from nccecsity under the 
 employment ami direction of othcre, and who tluw have not 
 control of their time. He or tliej, who bj insufficieDt wages 
 or by direct command, will imi>o«ie guch labor, excq)t for some 
 imminent public neceit^ty, mu&t be recounted culpable 
 
 18. Income h property && liable to expenditnnx It may bo 
 in the form of wage^ of salary, of w^-cnne from 
 (•state, of protJtjj, of fpfts, or in any other funn, 
 Buch that it can be ]>ropcTlj expended vrithin a certain time. 
 
 The virtue which regulate* expenditure by moral principlct, 
 ift Economy. The word orii'inallv mc^ins honse- ^.^ ^ 
 law. It 16 law in the tt^ulation of a houaehold, s««o««v. 
 and thus of it« cxpcnditupe. From families, u^ago has trans* 
 femjd it to individnala. 
 
 The virtue of Economy appears a» one of two virtuea ae- 
 cviding to the amonnt of income when compared 
 uith want.s. If that amount be a«lativcly wnall, ^'^"^ 
 Kconomy must incline to Fbcoaixty; if that be relatively 
 lar)*e, to Lchkralitt ; and \f verj' lai^^ to MAoviPfcsNOK. 
 
 Tlic extremes opjxwKjd to true Economy arc on the side of 
 Frugalily, Niooardlixes*, and on that of Liberality, Prooi- 
 OALiTT. Avarice and Prodigality both imply exceef^ one in 
 
116 
 
 i 
 
 rlBHB 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 the desire for saving and acquiring ; the other in the desire 
 for spending. 
 
 [In the military profession, the rule given for the soldier of 
 the cross is best for the soldier of the country, " Owe no man 
 any thing." 
 
 But while keeping from debt, a true soldier must avoid the 
 love of money. If the root of all evil among mankind gener- 
 ally, it is utterly opposed to the military virtues. He must 
 be honorable, just, liberal, incapable of being corrupted, and 
 with public treasures passing through his hands be above temp- 
 tation, and never liable to suspicion.] 
 
 These are duties relative to things investing us ; which are 
 to be borne, pursued, or used. 
 
 After duties within us, the next in order are those around 
 
 DuTiBS TO Others: Classified by 
 
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118 
 
 PKACTICAL ETHIC5S. 
 
 chakity: subject: object: source. 
 
 119 
 
 
 chapter VII. 
 
 DUTIES AROUND US. 
 
 DUTIES TO OTHERS : CORRESPONDENT VIRTUES : BENEVOLENCE, 
 
 JUSTICE. 
 
 1. The third sphere of duty is around us. It indudes obli- 
 Third sphere of gations to other individuals—" duty to our neigh- 
 Duty, bor." Duties to men organized collectively in 
 society belong to the sphere above us, and have been ex- 
 amined. 
 
 It is third in order, because the two others form for it a 
 
 necessary preparation. Duties above us and 
 
 Why third. within us prepare for " duty to our neighbor," 
 
 by the principles which they inculcate, the virtues which they 
 
 cherish, the faults which they repress. 
 
 2. Our duties to others may be classified by 
 
 Principle of Clas- , . , . , ^ • x • 
 
 siflcation: by the Virtues which are most prominent in our re- 
 Virtues. i^^.^^g ^^ ^Yiem, 
 
 3. The two virtues which enter into all these relations, are 
 Charity and Justice. Charity is expressed in tlie 
 divine rule, " Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
 
 thyself;" and Justice, in the rule, " "Whatsoever ye would that 
 men should do to you, do ye even so to them." There are no 
 relations to others in which both these virtues do not apply. 
 
 They need, however, a few explanations, though the eluci- 
 dation of their primary principles belongs to the other branch 
 of Ethics. 
 
 CHARrrr. 
 
 4. Charity from the word {carit<iSy cams*) means, etymolo- 
 
 ♦ This word, charity^ belongs to a large group of stems in the different families of 
 the Indo-European languages, all belonging to the common root, Gr, whose primary 
 physical idea is that of revolving spirally around a centre. This is applied men- 
 taUy in cura, care, and in cams, dear. 
 
 Two virtnes. 
 
 gically, the affection which makes another d^ar charity from the 
 to us. He is dear to us from something in him, ^o^^* 
 from our feelings to him, or from both. The result of Ins being 
 dear to us is a good-will to him. 
 
 Charity (as the term is used, not in Theology, but in this 
 branch of Ethics) may be defined from the thing-, j)efined from the 
 as universal good-will to men, arising from a per- *'^^^* 
 ccption of obligations above us and within us, which good- will 
 is manifested in benefits conferred. 
 
 (1.) Taking this definition by its parts, the seat of charity 
 in our nature is in the will, the will acting to 
 confer benefit. The will is directly moved to ^-^^^^J^^ 
 do good by the affections. The affections and will are directed 
 by reason and conscience. Thus the will is rendered good^ 
 and charity becomes, as in the definition, " a good will." 
 
 (2.) The ^5/V<?^^ of Charity (as the term is used in this branch 
 of Ethics), are men ; meti capable of receiving 2. its object, 
 lenefiL 
 
 (3.) The source is in the sphere of duty above 
 
 us and within us. It comes from a perception 
 
 of obligations above us, through a sense of commonness be 
 
 tween us and other men. Lookin^j above us to ^ 
 
 " From the sphere 
 
 God, we see that we and they are cliildren of one above us, a sensa 
 
 T, ,1 1 .1 • n '\ T> • • .1 • of commonness, 
 
 rather, brethren in onelamily. rerceiving this 
 commonness we are bound to have cjood-will to them as fellow- 
 creatures. Looking above us to the nation, the family, and the 
 various aggregations of society, we may see them to be fellow- 
 countrymen, or of the same kindred or association. "When we 
 perceive such common tie, there is a natural sentiment of kind- 
 ness and good-will. 
 
 It comes from obligations within us through a sense of fit- 
 ness. As we have affections, it is befitting to use ^ ^^ ^ 
 
 ' ^ ° From the sphere 
 
 them, and men are the proper objects. Also within, a sense of 
 whatever improves our nature is befiittng for it. 
 Disinterested good- will unfolds and ennobles one's being, while 
 selfishness contracts and degrades. Thus universal good-will 
 
 3. Its source. 
 
 ;. 
 
120 
 
 PRACTICAL ETDICS. 
 
 4. Its Effect. 
 
 comes from obligations above and witliin us ; from the one by 
 a sense of commonness, and from the other by a sense of fitness. 
 (4.) The effect is in actual benefits conferred. Charity is 
 imperfect if there be only intention without 
 action. " If a brother or sister be naked, and be 
 destitute of daily food ; and one of you say unto them, Depart 
 in peace, be ye warmed and filled ; notwithstanding, ye give 
 them not those things which are needful for the body ; what 
 doth it profit V 
 
 5. The term Charity, so defined, is to be distinguished, how- 
 Listinction of ^^^^ ivom its theological and common accepta- 
 E^ae'^mthe *^''"'- ^^ Tlieology, it means much more, being 
 theological and there the perfected love of God, with all its causes 
 
 which are far higher than human power, and all 
 its consequences which are far beyond life mortal. In its 
 common and popular use, it means much less, being restricted 
 to some of the outward effects of good-will ; such, for example, 
 as the giving of alms. 
 
 6. The negative contrast to Charity is Selfishness ; an in- 
 diff*erence to the welfare and happiness of others. 
 The active contrasts are Malice and Hatred: 
 
 Malice, the desire to inflict evil ; Hatred, dislike to individuals. 
 ^^,. ,. The obligation which is imposed by this virtue, 
 
 IS that ot preservmg a constant and effectual 
 desire to do good to men. 
 
 It is evident that this virtue of Charity or Benevolence must 
 Why in all hu- enter into all relations and all actions belonging 
 man relations, to other men, while in those not fixed by strict 
 Justice it must predominate. Literally there must be " in all 
 things charity,"* because everywhere will be found this com- 
 xiionness and this fitness. 
 
 Its Contrasts. 
 
 iostice. 
 
 Justice. 
 
 7. Justice requires the explanation of the words, 
 jiist^ oUigation^ and right 
 
 ♦ " In omnibus caritas."— 5^. Aug, 
 
 just: obligation: eight: justice. 
 
 121 
 
 Just, in its primary sense, is relative equality. A ''just 
 weio-ht" is equal to the standard for weights, what we mean 
 They're is equality between the thing, and the ^yj^*- 
 standard ordained for it. 
 
 An obligation relative is a duty to another enjoined by some 
 rule. A right is the reciprocal claim. in the what, by obUga- 
 other party. A. owes money to B. The obli- tion and right, 
 gation of A. is to pay ; the right of B. is to be paid. 
 
 Obligations and rights are thus seen to be relative and re- 
 ciprocal terms. Obligations are duties to another, enjoined by 
 some divine or human rule, imposed on one party, and cor- 
 respondent to rights in a second. Rights are the resulting and 
 just claims in a second party, correspondent to rights in the 
 first. The mutual correspondence forms the relative equality. 
 contemplated in the term. Justice. 
 
 Justice is a moral virtue which inclines the Definition of 
 will to execute uniformly and perpetually all the J^^^^^^- 
 obligations demanded, under a common standard, by the righU 
 
 of another. 
 
 Let us take the parts of this definition. Justice Explanation of 
 is a " virtue'' because a good habit ; and a " moraV t^^^ definition, 
 virtue, as requiring the application by conscience of moral 
 principle. It '' inclims the will,'' since he is not j ust who knows 
 but does not execute justice. The will must be " uniform and 
 perpetual," since in every hour wherein we consent, even in 
 thought, to injustice we are unj ust. It " executes the obligations'^ 
 which correspond to the " rights of others," and thus produces 
 equality. It determines those rights and obligations by " a 
 standard." The standards are the " common" rules of action 
 established among men for collective and individual welfare. 
 
 The material for Justice, therefore, is in the relation of two 
 parties, the one having a right and the other a correspondent 
 obligation. Its due form is given by the forming of equality 
 between the right on one side, and the action or thing rendered 
 by obligation on the other, as in the payment of a debt. The 
 seat (subject) of Justice is in the will, which must be constant 
 
122 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 justice: divisions: contrasts. 
 
 123 
 
 and perpetual in desiring that equality. The end of Justice is 
 the common good ; of universal Justice, the good of the universe ; 
 of human Justice, the good of society, and of the individuals 
 composing it. 
 
 A more brief definition of Justice may be frequently em- 
 ployed. " Justice is a Virtue which renders to all their dues." 
 
 If, however, we analyze this definition, we shall be led over 
 the same ground. What is " due'' implies an obligation in one, 
 and a right in another. These must be Just, by being equal 
 to each other, and by being equal to the standard. The stand- 
 ard must be established and commanded* by some authority. 
 Division of Jus- ^- Justice is divided, according to the parties 
 ^^' exercising it, into public and private ; according 
 
 to the principles of it, into commutative and distributive. 
 
 In Public Justice, public authority is the a^ent 
 Public; • . . A , . , 
 
 or recipient. An example is the trial or con- 
 demnation of a culprit in court. 
 
 In Private Justice, private individuals are the 
 parties. An example is the payment of a sum 
 due, or the fulfilment of a promise made by one to another. 
 
 The distinction of Commutative and Distributive Justice re- 
 sults from the two modes of making that equality which, as 
 we have seen, is the foundation of Justice. Equality is simple 
 or relative. It is simple between one thing and another. 
 For example, twelve inches are equal to one foot. It is relative 
 in proportions. For example, the number two is to six, as 
 three to nine. Simple equality forms the one division of 
 justice, and relative, the other. 
 
 Commutative (reciprocal) Justice is simple 
 Commutative; Vi. • xi i. i • i ^ , 
 
 equality m that which one renders to one ; equal- 
 ity between thing and thing. An example is a sum paid ex- 
 actly equal to the value of a thing bought. 
 
 Distributive Justice is equality in that which 
 Diatributive. j ^ it.,. 
 
 one renders to several. It is relative equality ; 
 
 * If we trace the word, jus, no higher than the Latin, we have the idea of com- 
 mauiing; if above the Latin, to the root, that of establishing. 
 
 Contrast. 
 
 that between portion and portion. An example is the distri- 
 bution of an estate among creditors. If the estate be equal to 
 one-half of the sum of the claims, distributive justice requires 
 that each creditor shall receive half of his claim. Other ex- 
 amples of relations requiring distributive justice, are those of 
 parents to their families ; magistrates to applicants for Justice ; 
 officers to subordinates under their command ; administrative 
 authority of all kinds, to those under it. 
 
 Four combinations result from the union of Commutative and 
 Distributive, first with Public, and then with Private Justice.* 
 
 We have thus seen its nature and its divisions. 
 
 9. The vice opposed to Justice is Injustice. 
 The fault opposed to Distributive Justice is 
 Partiality, " the Acceptance of Persons." 
 
 10. The general active obligation imposed by 
 
 ^ ^ „ , Obligation. 
 
 Justice, is the fulfilment of all contracts express 
 
 or implied. If it be express, keep your promise perfectly. If 
 
 it be implied, meet the just expectations of the other party as if 
 
 they were your own. 
 
 Such are the two virtues entering all human relations. 
 
 11. In those relations, however, they apply one or other pie- 
 not equally, but unequally. In some relations dominates, 
 one predominates, and in some the other. The j^.^.^.^^^ 
 natural division, therefore, of these relations 
 
 and the correspondent duties is into 1. T/wse in which Charity 
 is jpredominant.attendedhy Justice; 2. Those in which Justice 
 is predominant, attended hy Charity. 
 
 Tlie reader fixes this in his mind by conceiving two insepa- 
 rable forms as appearing in all the scenes of human intercourse, 
 but in contrasted positions : in the one position. Charity pre- 
 cedes Justice ; and in the other. Justice precedes Charity. 
 
 I. Eelations in which Charity predominates. 
 12. The relations in which Charity predominates are divided 
 according to its objects. 
 
 ♦ 1. Com. Pub.: 2. Dist. Pub.: 3. Com. Priv : 4 Dist. Priv. 
 
124 
 
 PEACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 Division of those 
 relations, 
 
 1. All men. 2. 
 Suffering and 
 needy. 
 
 Philanthropy. 
 
 Men as the objects of Charity (or Benevo- 
 lence), have two divisions : 1. Men considered 
 universally; 2. The mffering and needy. 
 
 1. MEN UNIVEfiSALLY. 
 
 Men in capacities, l^- Taking men universally we mav reo-ard 
 
 characters, actions. 4-1^ „^ * t.\ ' ... ,. J g ^ 
 
 them, m their capacities, their characters, their 
 actions. In all these views they demand or may demand Be- 
 nevolence. 
 
 In capacities to be W "Viewing them morally in their capacities 
 
 happier or better. ^^^ • j t , , ' 
 
 we consider what they may be. They may be 
 made happier or better ; and this collectively or individually. 
 
 14. A constant good-will to make them col- 
 lectively happier and better, forms the virtue of 
 Philanthropy. 
 
 Kindness. . ^^' ^ Constant good-will to make them in- 
 
 dividually happier or better, is Kindness. Phi- 
 lanthropy and Kindness are thus divisions of Charity, appH- 
 cable to men universally. 
 
 Bnt wedded to ^^- But the attendant and primary virtne of 
 
 Justice. T.,«4.' 1 r J ^ yjL 
 
 J ustice may never be separated from their per- 
 fected action. Philanthropy and Kindness must be accom- 
 panied by Justice, public and private. 
 
 17. Public Justice is separated from Charity when in exer- 
 cising philanthropy and kindness, we disregard national or 
 municipal obligations. 
 
 There may be philanthropy, to any extent, for the spiritual 
 or temporal welfare of men, but it must not violate national 
 obligations in other nations or in one's own. This would 
 be separating public justice from Charity. (Ch. ii., 43.) 
 
 There may be kindness to individuals, as, for example, to 
 prisoners of war, or to enemies, in all tender charity, but not in 
 any particular contrary to laws, or orders, or custom of war. 
 This, again, would be separating public justice from Charity. ' 
 
 An example of the separation of private justice from philan- 
 
 CHAEITT : PHILANTHROPY I KINDNESS. 
 
 125 
 
 thropic or kind actions, would be leaving stolen property in the 
 hand of another, when we had it in our power to restore tho 
 property to its owner. 
 
 In all these relations Charity but predominates. Justice can 
 never be absent. "When the latter has departed, the form 
 which remains is not a virtue, but a semblance of it, wrapped 
 in its mantle and assuming its name. 
 
 18. Philanthropy and Kindness have two „^ ^ ,^., 
 
 ^•' ^ Effects of Philan- 
 
 special eflfects. One of these is external to thropy and Kind- 
 
 ness * 
 
 ourselves. It is the prevention of discord, and 
 the promoting of peace. Our Saviour com- 1. Peace, 
 mends it. "Blessed are the peace-makers." 
 The opposed transgression is said in Scripture to be a thing 
 which " the Lord hates," and the offender is " an abomination 
 unto Him ;" even " he that soweth discord among brethren." 
 In all communities of men, inward peace is necessary for order, 
 and order for welfare. Accordingly in civil life, the disturber 
 is put under bonds " to keep the peace." [In the military 
 body its peace is considered so important, that the ordinary 
 rules of command are suspended for its restoration. The 27th 
 Article of "War says, " All officers, of what condition soever, 
 have power to part and quell all quarrels, frays, and disorders, 
 though the persons concerned should helong to another regi- 
 ment, troop, or company," &c.] 
 
 It is interesting to see Theology, Civil Law, and Military 
 Law, uniting with Ethics in the enforcement of the same prin- 
 ciple : " Follow peace with all men." 
 
 19. The other effect is upon ourselves, in our 
 manners. Philanthropy and Kindness form 
 Courtesy^ and thus the true gentleman. 
 
 Courtesy is the application of Benevolence and source and quail- 
 Justice to the forms of social intercourse, so as to ^'^ °^ Courtesy, 
 produce politeness with kindness. It is the effect, on manner, 
 of the two cardinal rules : " Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
 thyself," and " "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to 
 you, do ye even so to them." 
 
 2. Courtesy. 
 
126 
 
 PRACTICAL Ernies. 
 
 He who IS courteous never gives pain to another unnecessa- 
 ril7,and then only in the matters and forms demanded by 
 Jiistice, as, for example, in correcting some fault in a friend 
 He never forgets Observance, that is, a regard to what is due 
 to others in tlieir several stations. Courtesy banishes from the 
 deportment incivility, bluntness, rudeness, and violence • and 
 from the words, carelessness and malice. It produces for all 
 persons, consideration ; and for those with whom it is not un 
 suitable, cordiality. It forms the quality indicated by the 
 word, -gentleman," that o^gentl^ne^. Gentloocse results from 
 the c^mbitiiMl oonscion.oftis of what \s becoming for self and 
 cJne to oth^rB. (Cli. v., U, (2).) Coartesy induces care for 
 pt^i^ual iipi>caran<H>. Thi« has been mentioned under Duties 
 to SeJr. (Ch. V.) It ri^ult.. uUo fn>m duties to otli<.r6, since 
 nothing disagreeable should be presented to Ibcm. True 
 emirt^y b mMMj conventi'oTial. A right exists in every 
 c^immunity to e^itublisii the appr,>vcd forms of politeness. As 
 we take frum society the fomis of language, fixed bv n^^ ^ 
 we leeetvc from the same anthority, thoe^c of nnmner. Every 
 tnio geatleman, tlieixrfore, eonfonii* in his manner to the 
 conventional rKiuirements of tluit ^ocfety in whirh he lirea. 
 
 But here, m ever, the ftui<himental cthieul rule of i>»x.portion 
 (ch. J.) sIm>uI<1 not be ncgrect<Ml. If manner be wholly con- 
 veiition^l, it degenerates into formality and insinccrirV. If 
 not properly eonrentional it prwcnts Kingularitv or rmlenesa. 
 To be complete it must liavc both matter and form. By tlie 
 one, courtesy Hill be sincere, and by the other, cnstomar^-. 
 
 Thus, raiding men as universally capable of being made 
 happier or btfttcr, ire have phiUnthropy and kindnes^ which 
 produce thdr appn>j)riate effects, 
 
 jjjihttidr ^ SO. (b,) Viewing men morally in their qu<du 
 
 ties of chaindm, we consider what they are. 
 Ihey arc, uiuvcnwdly, imjierfect beings. 
 
 A» impeifKt. ./" ^"^^"^ ""^ ^^"'^ ^^*^> Scripture, Olwenation, 
 
 3l<mihfts, Satirists, Dramatists, all nnitc. Tlie 
 divine mind, and the human mind both concur in their tcsti- 
 
 rORBKAJJAKCE, LIKE TUE DIVINE. 
 
 127 
 
 mony. If any man be compared with a proper moral Ktiuulard, 
 he is found to full short of it. 
 
 21. On tluK faet, which is universal, arises an 
 obligation which is universal. It is Forhearance ^ **' ^**^ ** 
 like that whwh in divine* This it$ demanded by Justice and 
 Cliarity. This is due to men in their relations to us, since they 
 and we share a comujon nature, and arc uliki! iinptM-liMft. It is 
 just to give to all, the tenderness which we ^\:from all. It is 
 also demanded by Charity as IxM'ng due to men in their and 
 our ccminum relattons to God, since lie is kind and forbearing 
 to IB and to them. 
 
 *^ Tic tnalceth His sun to rise on the evil and on tlie g^xxl, 
 and sendeth rain on the just and on tlie tinjiu^t He is kind 
 unto the nnthmnkful and to tlie evil. Be ye, theretbre, merci- 
 ful as yomr Father aUo is mercifur* (St Matt r. 45 ; St Luke 
 vi.% 35> 36). 
 
 The iirst effect of Forbearance is in the mind. £5e:t9 ta yw- 
 The perception of imj)crfc>etion, nnvrorthincass, and ^*«»«««« 
 wit:ke<lue.<:S <^n)<^i)g \\\<ir\^ should not deelToy good-will to them. 
 We are to accept impertei'tion in our^lvcas and others, as the 
 common and inevitable <H>nd it ion to which wo and all are born^ 
 and in which we and all cxi«t 
 
 The next ctTcct of Forlicaranoe Is In tlie words. We are to 
 ** speak evil of no man.^' Faults and imjx?rrc<.ttions «xjn in 
 aiH>ther arc t^i be piUMtt! over in silifuee, unless some claim of 
 public or private ju^tioe sliall require speaking of them. 
 
 Tl)e next effect of Forbearance i* in actions. The iH!rcH!ption 
 of unwurthEneas and wiekednees is not to prevent actions of 
 kindnese. Tlie unworthy and wicked arc to receive kindness 
 and relief, though they may rec^ve thon in a less degree than 
 othei^of a different duuracter : ** Never turn tlij faee from any 
 poor man." 
 
 Tlic contract to Forbearance is seen in the eflbets from its 
 abaenoQ. * 
 
 23, Tlie aWnce of Forbearance from the mind producee 
 some common faults. 
 
 11 
 
123 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Faults to be 
 Shonned. 
 
 :ii 
 
 One is Moral Scepticism ; distrust in Morality 
 and Keligion. An imperfection is attributed to 
 these, wliich belongs only to the person and to the human nature 
 guided by them. 
 
 Another is Misanthropy ; the hatred of men because they do 
 not correspond to our standard for them. 
 
 Another is Cen seriousness ; the habitual employment of con- 
 versation for slander, for satires and sarcasms, and for exaggera- 
 tions of the faults of men. 
 
 ^ 23. These faults are partially corrected by the proper sen- 
 timent of Forbearance, and may be fully corrected by Religion. 
 Knowing all men imperfect, we expect them still to be so, in Tome 
 degree, under the remedies of morality and Religion. Expect- 
 ing always to find them below their and our moral standard 
 for them, we do not hate them for being imperfect, unworthy 
 and wicked. This effect of Forbearance extends to language,' 
 and restrains censorious words against them. 
 Men in their 24. (c.) Viewing men in their actions we con- 
 
 sider what they have done, by inflicting wrongs 
 upon us. 
 
 Every person may receive, or suppose himself 
 to have received injuries from other persons. 
 Tlie wrongs may be real or imaginary, and in all grades from 
 the little to the great. 
 
 Duty resulting. , f.^* ^'^"^ ^^'' ^^^^ ^^^^" """"''^^S arises an 
 
 obligation : Forgiveness like the divine, 
 
 Tliis does not, however, forbid resistance to wrong. For- 
 giveness to the wrong-doer is what is required. 
 How learned : 2^- A partial disposition to Forgiveness mav 
 
 1. Partially. ^^ produced by the principles of morality as 
 derived from reason. Tliis is shown by facts. Examples of 
 clemency and of generosity towards enemies, have been ex- 
 hibited in the histories of all civilized nations.' Reason, apart 
 from Revelation, may teach us that in forgiving, we are ful- 
 filling a duty to God who forgives us, to society whose peace 
 18 promoted, to mankind by the example of remitted vengeance, 
 
 actions. 
 
 May have 
 wronged. 
 
 FORGIVENESS, LIKE THE DIVINE. 
 
 129 
 
 and to ourselves by conquest over resentment. A man reflect- 
 ing on these principles may thus see forgiveness to be right, 
 noble, and useful. 
 
 But a complete spirit of Forgiveness is to be 
 learned from Religion. Tlie inculcation of this ^' ^^^^P^^t^^y- 
 duty is one of the peculiar glories of Christianity. " Forgive, 
 if ye have aught against any, that your Father w^hich is in 
 heaven may forgive your trespasses" (St. Mark xi., 26). " If 
 ye forgive not men tlieir trespasses, neither will your Father 
 forgive you your trespasses" (St. Matt, vi., 15). " Forgiving one 
 another, even as God for Christ's sake hath forgiven you" 
 (Eplies. iv., 32). " Love your enemies, bless them that curse 
 jou, do good to them tliat hate you, and pray for them which 
 despitefully use you and persecute you, that ye may be the 
 children of your Father which is in Heaven." Not only does 
 Christianity teach it, but by its Spirit forms it. 
 
 27. The transgression opposed to Forgiveness, contrast, 
 is Retaliation by Revenge. 
 
 Reveno-e is ao-ainst oblisjations above us, both those to the 
 Deity and to Human Society. It is against Him, because He 
 has said ''Yenojeancebelono^etli unto me." It is aorainst Human 
 Society, because the punishment of WTongs is delegated to 
 Societv, and is taken from individuals. Yensjeance is aojainst 
 obligations within us, because it is giving sway, as w^e have 
 seen, to passions wliich duty to ourselves requires us to 
 restrain. It is against obligations around us, since it inflicts 
 sufterings on others ; and retaliation carried from party to party 
 will of itself break up families, societies, armies, and the whole 
 order fixed by human law\ 
 
 [Hence, tlie Articles of War with great propriety forbid 
 duelling : Articles 25th and 26th. 
 
 Duelling, in the ordinary military view, is an act of ven- 
 geance for insulted honor. It ^r'l&es partly from not observing 
 proportion (ch. i., 21, 22) and rule in the military virtues. A 
 soldier is to resrard dutv and true honor above life. From this 
 truth is drawn the sophistry, " I must risk life to avenge per- 
 9 
 
130 
 
 PEICTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 
 I', 
 
 sonal l.onor." It is a sophistry, because tLe very obligations on 
 which honor is founded belong, primarily, above the individual- 
 to God, and his country. No duty to himself or others can ri.e 
 above them. His life is not his own, nor is that of his adver- 
 sary. Tlie risk of life in personal combat is against these obU- 
 gations. 
 
 Duelling arises principally from the natural desire for 
 vengeance, seeking justification in the sophistry to which 
 reference has been made. 
 
 Duelling in another part of the moral view is, as we shall 
 see, mnrder in intention or act. 
 
 It is an obligation on all Governments to forbid it in their 
 Mil.tary and Xaval codes, both on grounds of principle, and 
 of expediency. Duelling is a crime, and is against the interests 
 01 the service.] 
 
 TransiUon. ^"'''' "'"•' «^'''R<''tion8 to men as they exist uni- 
 
 versally ; in view of what they may lecome, of 
 what they are, and of what they may iMve done. Duties to 
 the sufi-enng, and to those who are in need, next follow 
 
 MERCY, PITT, STMPATHT. 
 
 131 
 
 Duties to the 
 afflicted and 
 destitute. 
 
 Ground. 
 
 2. THE SUFFERING AND NEEDY. 
 
 28. The next relations in;wrliich Charity pre- 
 dominates, are those which belong to the suffer- 
 ing and needy. 
 
 The ground of these relations is in the common 
 evils of life. Those evils belong in common to 
 onrselves and to others. The duties to ourselves required by 
 them, have been considered. The duties to others, imposed by 
 them, form the present subject. 
 
 Nature oitha These common evils are positive, by the inflic- 
 
 tion of pain, and negative, by the absence of some 
 necessary good. By - the suffering" those are meant who endure 
 pain of mind or body. An example of pain of mind is in 
 affliction for the loss of friends, and for that of body, in the 
 endurance of wounds or sickness. 
 
 By " the needy" those are meant whose necessary wants for 
 food, shelter, and clothing are not supplied. An example is a 
 very poor man. 
 
 On this fact, obligations are founded. 
 
 29. These evils demand for those subject to what t>^ey de- 
 them, the exercise of Mercy, Pity, and Sympathy. °^ad. 
 
 Mercy, Pity, and Sympathy are obligatory. 
 They are natural. To withhold them is to thwart ^* 
 human nature, and to degrade it towards the brute. They ^re 
 right. All the authorities in morals command and commend 
 them. The principles of Morals require them. They are the 
 spontaneous effects of Charity. They are demanded by Justice, 
 since it is but just to render to others what we ourselves may 
 need at^ny moment to receive from them. They are reason- 
 able. Death and pain result from nature : destitution, from 
 the organization of society. " The poor ye have aZwaijs with 
 you." It is then unreasonable, uniformlv to reocard misfortunes 
 as faults, to reproach the unfortunate, and to withhold kindness 
 from them. It is reasonable, to conform habitual sentiment 
 to that fixed order of nature and society under which there must 
 be suffering. 
 
 Mercy, Pity, Sympathy are, therefore, to exist in the mind. 
 
 30. They are to be manifested to " the suffering" in kindly 
 and sympathetic deeds and words. 
 
 Among the sick, the wounded, the dying, the sorrowing, 
 Mercy, Pity, and Sympathy should be cordially and carefully 
 exercised. 
 
 [In the soldier's profession, the customary attentions to the 
 sick and wounded, respectful care for remains, military honors 
 for the dead, care for their personal effects, the transmission of 
 tidings and messages to relatives, should be never shunned. 
 They should be accepted with personal gratification, and should 
 not be hindered in subordinates except under the extreme ex- 
 igencies of service. Neglect of these duties is against moral 
 principle, custom of war, the feelings of friends, and the common 
 senliment of mankind. Such duties are not trifles. He who 
 
132 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 » 
 
 by extreme devotion toliis profession maj havcrisen above human 
 sympathies, should remember that all these proprieties afFect 
 the best interests of the service; internally, by the feelin<^ of 
 soldiers and men, externally, by tiie public sentiment tow^ards 
 the military body. The sentiments of every people in every 
 nation to its armies, should be those of afiection, admiration 
 and respect. ' 
 
 In a military funeral every prescribed point of respect for 
 the dead should not only be observed, but should receive such 
 attention by preparation made before, that decorum, solemnity 
 and order may not be marred.] 
 
 31. These sentiments are to be manifested to « the needy » 
 by doing them good. 
 
 This is the duty to which the Founder of Christianity was 
 devoted. "He went about doing good." 
 
 32. To the destitute classes, and individuals in them this 
 duty of doing good is to be applied, externally and mUm'ally 
 
 It is to be applied externally, by Relief. This is to extend 
 to the body by relief for their immediate wants, and to the 
 conditzm, by relief (as through settled employment) for those 
 wants which Are prospective. 
 
 It is to be applied to the destitute internally, in the feelings 
 the intellect, the character, the whole soul. ' 
 
 It is to be applied in « the feelings," by giving no unnecessary 
 pain to poor men. They are to be spared reproachful and 
 outrageous words. « Honor all men ;" « condescend to men of 
 low estate." 
 
 It is to be applied in « the intellect," by educating the poor, 
 never above their station, but to and for it. This includes 
 teaching them some honest trade by which they can support 
 themselves. 
 
 It is to be applied in "the character," bj restraining vices, 
 
 nd fostering virtues. For this result, the causes of vice should 
 
 be removed or abated. Among the causes of vice in the laboring 
 
 classes is the desire, coming on after toil, and after the mental 
 
 tnals of their condition, for some relief, or solace, or enjoyment. 
 
 CAEES FOE THE NEEDY I TEANSITION. 
 
 133 
 
 They should have innocent gratifications and amusements which 
 may cheer them. When they find in what is simple and in- 
 nocent, the refreshment which they sought in vices, the first 
 cause of craving will be removed. 
 
 It is to be applied to the " whole soul" by the instructions 
 and influences of Religion. 
 
 Such arc some of the duties to the suffering and needy. 
 
 The relations in which Charity predominates have been con- 
 sidered. 
 
 Those follow, in which Justice preponderates. 
 
J 
 1 
 
 IL Relations in which Justice predominates, 
 attended bj Charity: 
 
 RELATIONS WITH JUSTICE IN PREDOMINANCE. 
 
 135 
 
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 CHAPTER VIII. 
 RELATIONS IN WHICH JUSTICE PREDOMINATES. 
 
 1. The relations in which Justice predominates 
 
 may be classified as 1. Eelations for Distributive ^®^*^^'"^^^®^' 
 Justice; 2. Eelations for Keciprocal* Justice; 3. Eelations 
 Domestic and Social. 
 
 2. Eelations for distributive Justice are the Distributive 
 public and i\iQ private, divided. 
 
 3. In distributive public Justice, the most im- 
 
 , , , . ^ /» . . . ., Distributive 
 
 portant example is a court of justice, civil or pubUcinaCoirt 
 
 military. «^ J^^ice. 
 
 {a.) The duty of one acting as a judge is 
 impartially without fear, favor, or affection, to ^^^y of a Judge; 
 declare the law whicli belongs to the case. His very name 
 expresses this obligation. The word judge is from judex^ and 
 this from jus dico, I speak the law. The judge is to declare 
 the law, not make it ; to state what it is, not what he thinks it 
 should be. 
 
 (5.) The duty of one acting on a jury is im- 
 partially to determine whether a fact be or be ®^*J^™'»' 
 not proved by the evidence presented. He is not to determine 
 by his private opinion or knowledge, but by the proofs sub- 
 mitted. 
 
 [Members of a Court-Martial act both as judges and as jury- 
 men. Both these duties, those to the law and the fact, belong 
 to them.] 
 
 (c.) The duty of a prosecutor is to omit no 
 point of law, of evidence, or formality belonging O'^^osecutor; 
 to the side of the prosecution. 
 
 {d.) The duty of an advocate is the same on 
 the side of tlie defence. He is to enter into the Of*^^^^<>cate; 
 
 * "Reciprocal" and "commutative" are two terms used for the same division of 
 Justice. 
 
136 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 interests of his client as if thej were his own. He is never to 
 betray the coniiJential communications made to him 
 _ Both prosecutors and advocates are instruments for present- 
 ing fully the law and evidence on both sides. Both, therefore 
 may act in that capacity without being deterred by a contrary 
 persona opinion concerning the case. An advocate defending, 
 the guilty, is not promoting injustice, but assisting public 
 justice to a complete e.^amiuation of the question of <.uilt or 
 innocence. The scruples of casuists on this question Imve not 
 been sustained by the conviction of mankind. In Europe 
 those scruples have caused the punishmentof many innocent per! 
 sons, by deterring advocates from undertaking their defence 
 An advocate should feel it to be one of his duties to "see that 
 sucli as are m need and necessity have right." 
 
 [In a Court-Martial one functionary" performs the three 
 oaces of a judge, a prosecutor, and an advocate. That is the 
 Judge-Advocate. He is a judge declarative of the law to the 
 court. He ,s a prosecutor on the part of public authority. He 
 IS at the same time an advocate for the prisoner. There is no 
 human office in which it is more necessary that the virtue of 
 JustKte should be completely enshrined and embodied. He is 
 to regard himself as a mere mirror to reflect law and evidence 
 Ue IS to declare, direct, and correct, because he is the mere 
 nmnster of law. But the court de<-ides and executes. He is 
 therefore not to invade their functions, but to fulfil completely 
 his own.] ■^ ■' 
 
 OfaWitnes,- ^'''^ '^^ *'"'>' **^ » y^'^tmss is to declare the 
 
 ' truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 
 J^o personal feelings or interests are to prevent. Duties to the 
 public soar above all that are private. Human laws usually 
 except, however, confidential communications made to an ad- 
 vocate, or to a minister of religion in his official capacity. It 
 IS thought better that son.e portion of evidence be wanting in 
 individual cases, than that one accused shall be deprived oFthe 
 light of human justice, or of the directions and consolations of 
 religion. It is here that Charity tempers Justice. For like 
 
 RELATIONS FOIi Dt;^TUIUtlIVE AND COMMUTATIVE. 
 
 137 
 
 Of one accused. 
 
 reason the laws do not require Ironi a witness, testimony crimi- 
 nating or degrading himself. 
 
 (/.) The duty of one accused is (at least under 
 all laws administered in this language), to plead 
 guilty or not guilty. He is not to stand mute. His plea is 
 not a statement of fact in one way or another. It is merely 
 withholding or giving consent to the process of being tried by 
 God and his country. The refinements of solitary casuists are 
 again to be regretted. They require that every one accused 
 shall, if he think himself guilty, confess before the judge or be 
 mute. But standing mute obstructs at once the wliole ma- 
 chinery of justice, and was formerly punished by the courts 
 with great severity. 
 
 4. In these duties connected with public justice, j^^j.^^ ^^ ^^j^ 
 Charity is to enter. All proper courtesies and J^tice. 
 kindnoss, not inconsistent with the ends of justice, should be 
 exercised. Abusive lans^uasre to the accused or the witnesses 
 is a moral and a judicial offence. A court of justice should be 
 as a tcmj)le. Such are rules for j9t^^/?*<? justice. 
 
 5. Distributi vejpriva^ Justice is between Supe- Distributive 
 riors and Inferiors. private. 
 
 Superiors in age and station are to be treated with honor, 
 and inferiors with kindness. Tliese principles are to be mani- 
 fested in the appropriate manners and language. 
 
 Distributive private Justice is very strikingly violated in the 
 distribution of estates by offended and vindictive parents when 
 making their wills. If a child, or a relative justly entitled to 
 a portion of the distributed property shall have offended, it is 
 not right to carry resentment beyond the grave. Charity 
 must here also temper Justice. One about to pass into eternity 
 must forgive as he hopes to be forgiven. 
 
 [An officer must have a constant and perpetual will for dis- 
 tributive Justice among all under his command. He is to " do 
 nothing by partiality." Official Acts belong to public, and 
 personal action, to private distributive Justice.] 
 
 6. Relations for comrnutative Justice include the rights and 
 
138 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 SSf *^''*' obligations beloiicring to property, reputation 
 
 person, virtue. These are objects of Rights and 
 Obhgations. 
 
 To these objects every man has right, though in some of 
 tliem, mdividual rights are modified by the superior claims of 
 
 oocietj. 
 
 The protectors of these rights are nations and their mnni- 
 cipal authorities. Where they cannot act, the Deity is the 
 guardian. "^ 
 
 Objects of rights ^e take these objects of rights and obligations 
 andobngat.ons. ^^ the order which proceeds from the more ex- 
 ternal to the more internal, and hence, 1. Property ; 2 Rep- 
 utaton; 3. Person; 4. Virtue. In each we consider, 1. 
 the right with its immediate obligation. 2. The offence^ 
 against the right. 3. The duties which fulfil the obligation^ 
 and avoid the oflences. ' 
 
 eight to property. 
 
 Sight to prop- 
 erty. 
 
 Source and 
 nature. 
 
 7. Right to property, primarily in God, and by 
 transfer from Ilim in Society, exists in individuals 
 through common consent, and natural necessity. 
 That outward thing, a right to which the law 
 vests in any man, is his property. 
 
 Therightdivided. .^^""^ ^'^ therefore over property, 1. The divine 
 
 rights; 2. The public rights; 3. Private rights. 
 Divine right over 8. The divine right applies to that portion of 
 property. property which is needed for the support of re- 
 
 ligion, and the relief of poverty. Religion is evidently a divine 
 interest. Poverty is under divine protection, by the declara- 
 tion of divine mercy. The poor are so regarded both in the 
 Old and mw Testaments. Also the same appomtment results 
 Irom Justice. Society is ordained of God. The necessary 
 eltect of the organization of society is to produce a class in 
 poverty. " The poor ye have always with you." He who has 
 ordained the system which produces superfluity in the rich and 
 
 obligations and rights regulating property. 
 
 139 
 
 destitution in the poor, has also ordained by His Justice that 
 the superfluity shall yield enough to relieve the necessity. 
 The same duties thus result from Justice which were before 
 deduced from Charity (ch. vii., 28 to 32). 
 
 9. The public right applies to taxes, to cus- 
 toms, and to the alienations of property by judi- ° "^ * 
 cial decisions whether these be civil or criminal. Society has 
 also an indirect right to the benefits in public prosperity re- 
 sulting from private wealth. 
 
 10. Private right applies to all property which 
 
 a man lawfully possesses. The forms of prop- *^ "^ 
 erty are two : the movable, for example, money ; and the im- 
 movable, as land. The modes of obtaining property are two : 
 from ourselves, or from others. If from ourselves, it is by 
 personal but lawful acquisition. If from others, it is by gift 
 or by inheritance ; and if by inheritance, it is through a law- 
 ful will, or without a will, by law regulating the division of an 
 estate. 
 Such are the rights. The obligations corre- obUgations 
 
 spond. correspondent. 
 
 11. The obligation correspondent to the divine ^^ ^^^ divine 
 right is to give a portion of income annually for ^i&^t • 
 religion and poverty. The general consent of mankind has 
 appropriated one-tenth of income for God's service and for 
 charities. But for this rule to be followed there must be no 
 debt. The rule of morals, of law, and of reason is expressed in 
 the common saying, "We must be just before we are generous." 
 The door by which Charity goes forth to give, must be opened 
 by Justice. 
 
 12. The obligation correspondent to the public 
 
 right, is to render the public dues without deten- ^ ®^^ °* 
 tion and without fraud. Every man should willingly contri- 
 bute to the support of Government. "Render to all their 
 dues, tribute to whom tribute is due." 
 
 13. The obligation answering to private Y\^t to the private 
 is, for i\iQ public, protection. The obligation ou "5^** 
 
140 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 FJBAUDS IN BUYING AND SELLING. 
 
 141 
 
 Offences. 
 
 individuals is to abstain from taking or using tlie property of 
 another witliout tlie owner's free consent. Justice demands 
 negatively, forbearance from all wrong. Charity requires ad- 
 ditionally a positive will to make the pecuniary interests of our 
 neighbor like our own. 
 
 We have seen the rights and obligations. Offences follow: 
 
 14. The common offences against rights of 
 property are Robbery, Theft, Fraud. 
 
 They all agree in this, that they are the unjust taking of 
 property. Also every offence against even private property 
 How they agree: involves a wrong to the public. Their differences 
 How differ. ^re in the manner of taking. Unjust takin*^ may 
 be with force. This forms Robbery. It may be without force 
 and without the owner's consent. This is Theft. It may be 
 without force and with the owner's consent unjustly obtained. 
 This makes Fraud. 
 
 Bobbery. ^^' ^^^^^^ ^^J ^^ ^itli nolence to the per- 
 
 son, the dwelling, or both. Examples are High- 
 way Robbery and Housebreaking. The crime of Robbery is 
 of an aggravated character, since it includes complicated 
 wrongs. There is a wrong against property through the thing 
 taken, and against the person, and against public security! 
 'It is, therefore, severely punished in all countries. 
 .^^ 1^- Theft is distinguished from Robbery, by 
 
 the absence of violence to persons; and from 
 Frauds by the absence of consent from the owner. It is the 
 act of stealing. An example is the picking of a pocket, or 
 carrying away any piece of property in the absence of the 
 owner. It is punished in some countries by death, as a crime 
 against the public. 
 
 There are some persons who by education or by nature have 
 a strong propensity to this disgraceful crime of stealing. The 
 annals of schools, of families, and of communities show a certain 
 proportion of individuals with a settled disposition to commit 
 theft. Such persons should banish themselves voluntarily from 
 all places and all associations which furnish temptations and 
 
 Frauds. 
 
 facilities for the crime. When they will not do so, they should 
 be expelled and made known. 
 
 [If among those who wish to enter the military profession 
 are any who have this tendency, they should know that it alone 
 is sufficient disqualification. An officer must not only be free 
 from what is so disgraceful, but untainted by suspicion.] 
 
 17. Fraud is distinguished from Robbery by 
 the absence of violence ; and from Theft, by the 
 consent of the owner or of his representatives being given. 
 It is an unjust taking, because an equivalent for the property 
 or for its use is not returned. It is unjust because it is with- 
 holding from another his right. 
 
 18. Examples of Fraud are 1. In buying and Distinct ex- 
 selling, 2. In miscellaneous acquisitions, and 3. ^jnples. 
 
 lu the abuse of Trusts. All these offences are aggravated wJien 
 they include the violation of a confidence reposed hy the person 
 wronged in the wrong-doer, 
 
 19. Frauds in buying and selling are perpe- i. in buying and 
 trated when the seller gets more, and the buyer s^iii^g* 
 
 gives less than a just price. 
 
 By the just price is meant that which is equal -wTiat the just 
 to the value of the thing sold. That alone is a P"^®* 
 just price, since Justice requires equality (ch. vii., 7.) This 
 price which is equivalent is fixed by law, or by general custom. 
 The one, the other, or both form the standard price, or, as it is 
 frequently called, the market price. The equivalent is deter- 
 mined by the common judgment of men (which is one of the 
 authorities in morals), and not by individual caprice or cupid- 
 ity. (Pretia rerum^ non ex affectUy 7iec utilitate singulorum^ 
 sed cominuniterfunguntur^* The common saying, " The price 
 of a thing is what it will bring," is morally atrocious. 
 
 20. There may, however, be transactions in AUowancefor 
 which peculiar circumstances will require, in circumstances, 
 order to preserve the equality required by Justice, a deviation 
 
 ♦ Prices of things are made not by the feelings or interests of individuals, but 
 by. tlie community. 
 
 t 
 
 %\ 
 
142 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 m 
 
 from the standard price. For example a horse is to be sold to 
 oblige a neighbor. The seller we suppose suffers injury in 
 parting with the thing sold, and the buyer gains much ad- 
 vantage. In this case it is jnst that the buyer should offer and 
 the seller accept, in addition to the standard price an equiva- 
 lent for the injury. This is just. But to impose on the buyer 
 an exorbitant price in consequence of his necessity would be 
 unjust. 
 
 2. In misceiiane- 21. Frauds in miscellaneous acquisitions are 
 ou. acuons. committed by obtaining money or gains of any 
 kmd under false pretences. The modes of doing so are called 
 in common language professional tricks. In every avocation 
 of society these are found. The more gross and dangerous are 
 punished by law. Others are checked by public sentiment as 
 dishonorable. But there still remain many not banished by 
 law or opinion which morality condemns, and to which no 
 conscientious man should descend. They are advocated in the 
 different trades and professions as necessities for a livelihood 
 But there is no such necessity. Honesty is eventually the 
 best policy. If there were such necessity, it would be better 
 to suffer in temporal interests than to do wrong. 
 
 8. In tnirts. ^^' ■^"■^"^^ '° ^'■"**^ ™^y ^^ considered under 
 
 Debts and Uses. 
 
 OM«nw of • Trust, as the name implies, is an intrusting. 
 
 It is an intrusting, a confiding of property to* 
 another on certain conditions. The condition may be repay- 
 ment within a certain time. The acceptance of the property 
 under that condition forms the obligation called Debt. The 
 correspondent right in the party lending is that of being paid 
 according to the conditions. Or the condition may be use in 
 some specified way, for example, to use money for a child's 
 education. The acceptance of the money or other property 
 imposes the obligation of Use, commonly called the obligation 
 of Trusteeship. The correspondent right in the party intrust- 
 ing IS to have satisfactory evidence that the money or other 
 property has been used in the way prescribed. If any thing 
 
 FRAUDS IN USES. 
 
 143 
 
 Debts. 
 
 remain after tlie use, it forms a debt wliich the person in- 
 trusted is under obligation to pay, and which the person trust- 
 m<^ has the right to demand. These principles apply equally 
 to small and large amounts, to petty transactions and to those 
 cuarded by strict legal formalities, to the debts and trusts ol 
 individuals, corporations, or nations. Such is the Ethical view. 
 Debts and uses may in the legal view be regarded as con- 
 tracts between two parties, of which in most cases, public 
 authority, acting through law, is the immediate guardian. 
 Where the law cannot or will not act, this guardianship is in 
 the Deity. 
 
 23. Debt, therefore, is an obligation to repay 
 to another intrusted property or its equivalent at 
 or within a certain time. And a fraud in regard to debt is a 
 voluntary withholding of such payment. A refusal to pay a 
 debt is an unjust retaining of the property of another person. 
 There is the absence of the constant and perpetual will to 
 render to every one his right. 
 
 [It is part of an officer's military honor to pay his debts. 
 Failure to do so is conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle- 
 man. As such it is punished.] 
 
 24. A use (now commonly named a trust) is 
 an obligation to apply for another his intrusted 
 property to certain uses. An example is an officer having 
 public money in his hands for a particular purpose, such as the 
 payment of troops. Another and common example is a trustee 
 holdinor in trust for children an estate w^hich he is to use for 
 their support until they are of age. 
 
 25. There is fraud in regard to a Use or Trust, when fraud in a 
 1st. When the Trustee, the party intrusted, uses ^^' 
 
 the property for ^ny other purposes than those prescribed by 
 the party intrusting ; 2d. When he appropriates to himself the 
 property or any part of it ; 3. When he does not render to the 
 party intrusting satisfactory evidence by accounts showing that 
 the trust has been faithfully performed. 
 
 26. Tlie following rules accordingly should be observed by 
 
 Uses. 
 
 
144 
 
 PEACTICAL ETniCS. 
 
 M' 
 
 M. 
 
 
 Bules ^^^ pei-sons to wliom property is intrusted for use. 
 
 They are necessary to guard against fraud, and 
 against temptations, mistakes, and suspicions. 1. Learn with 
 exactness the conditions specified, whether they come from a 
 law, from a will, from an order written or spoken. If the 
 order be spoken, have it committed to writing, or secure, il 
 possible, some capable witness. If discretion be left to yon, 
 liave that distinctly specified under the same safeguards! 
 Then in the use of the trust observe strictly the conditions, and 
 use no discretion which is not clearly granted. 2. Preserve 
 the intrusted property in a position which prevents it from 
 being mingled with personal affairs. If the law shall compel 
 the placing of it somewhere under your personal name, then 
 by exact accounts preserve the separation in your own esti- 
 mates. 3. Keep accounts with exactness, and vouchers, and 
 render them in the forms fixed by law and experience. 
 Some sources of 2^- The sources of frauds in trusts, where there 
 
 was no primary intention to be unjust, will be 
 found in the neglect of these rules. The person intrusted 
 either does not know the conditions fixed and the discretion 
 left to him, and he is thus unfaithful ; or the property intrusted 
 to him being mingled with his own, he uses it under some 
 temporary necessity with the expectation of returning it; or, 
 his proceedings having been upright, he does not give 'that 
 evidence by legal accounts to which the other party has a right 
 by law and justice. 
 
 [As ofiicers of the Army have public money frequently in- 
 trusted to them, they are bound to observe these rules carefully. 
 Specially they should shun no labor, no drudgery, in keeping or 
 in learning how to keep exact accounts. They should ""not 
 trust implicitly to subordinates. Their honor, their property, 
 their own happiness, and that of their families are all en' 
 dangered by any neglect.] 
 
 Precept for right -^- Such are the obligations which reo-ard 
 of property. another in his property. They are comprehended 
 in the Eighth Commandment,—" Thou shalt not steal." 
 
 DUTIES REGAKDING PROPEKTY. 
 
 145 
 
 29 After offences, we next consider some 
 
 ,^, r. Duties regarding^ 
 
 special duties required for the fumlment oi the right of 
 
 Justice and Charity, as applied to relations of P^°P®^*y- 
 property. 
 
 30. The first duty applies to our habitual 
 
 .1. A A- •;• %• • A 1. In thought; 
 
 thoughts and dispositions ot mind. 
 
 There should be " a constant and perpetual will" to hold 
 
 nothing in possession, great, or small, to which we have not a 
 
 perfect right by the laws of God and man ; to acquire nothing 
 
 throuirh life by any fraud or injustice ; to restore with full 
 
 compensation everything unjustly taken from another party 
 
 and put into our possession, whether it came by our own act, 
 
 or by other persons giving or bequeathing : in all transactions 
 
 to guard others from wrong and deception, as carefully as we 
 
 would wish ourselves to be guarded. After these restrictions 
 
 it is right for any man to accept and acquire such fortune as 
 
 is the natural result from industry in his vocation. Fortune 
 
 so acquired is a benefit not for self alone, but for families and 
 
 the community ; an instrument for the good of men, and the 
 
 service of the Maker. Public wealth is promoted by that 
 
 which is private. 
 
 31. The second duty applies to our words, 
 whether spoken or written. Ko fraud, no false- ' ' 
 hood may be spoken or written for gain. This rule is to ex- 
 tend not only to deceptions which the law punishes, but to 
 those which it cannot reach. An example is .the case where 
 our words literally taken declare the truth, but as we know 
 they will be taken by the other party convey a falsehood. 
 Whether there be always a wrong in silence concerning defects 
 in a thing sold, is a question often discussed. The law of the 
 twelve tables in Kome did not punish the seller for silence 
 about defects in the thing sold, but it did punish him for saying 
 it was what it was not. 
 
 But the civil law of Kome required that in transfer of real 
 estate, as of a farm or house, the seller should declare all the 
 faults which he knew. If this were not done, the contract was 
 10 
 
146 
 
 PBACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 
 fraudulent and void (Cic. De Off, L. iii. IC). It is evident that 
 the rule must change according to tlie tiling sold, the law, and 
 the consequent expectation of the buyer. If the buyer 'have 
 the thing submitted to his full examination, if the defects are 
 80 evident that he can perceive them, if he know from law and 
 custom that he must rely solely on his own examination, and 
 if the price demanded be only a just equivalent for the thin<. 
 with its defects, then silence is permitted because no wrong h 
 done, or if done, not intended. An example is a house with 
 broken doors, or a horse with one eye. But silence, where all 
 IS reversed, where the qualities of the thing cannot be seen or 
 not estimated by the buyer, where from the nature of the case 
 he puts contideuce in the seller, where the price is as if the 
 thing were not defective, is highly culpable. An example is a 
 house with an undermined but apparently secure foundation 
 (S. Thom. Aq., ii. 2 : Quest. 77, Art. 3). 
 
 In cases where the question is doubtful, from the apparent 
 equivalence of reasons on both sides, the decision should be in 
 favor of the stricter side of the rule. The mind should turn 
 to that course by which Justice, Charity, Honor, and a good 
 conscience will have their demands fulfilled. It is better to 
 lose some gain, than to incur the risk of staining the con- 
 science, or of doing injury to another person. Eight is above 
 profit. 
 
 Another obligation connected with words is to keep all 
 
 .. promises, verbal or written. 
 
 3. Inactions. „ _ 
 
 rfa. Ihe next duty belongs to Actions. 
 All dealings are to be true and just. They are to be so 
 directed as to guard equally rights in others and in ourselves. 
 I hey are neither to violate Justice nor Charity. 
 
 General rule ^"'" ^ ^^'''ccting actions, the general rule is 
 
 natural and simple. It is to accept the just re- 
 turns produced by one's own labor and skill, or by invested 
 property, but to receive no remuneration nor gain, without the 
 combined sanction of conscience, of law, and of the sentiments 
 ot upright and honorable men. This is, in fact, the common 
 
 * 
 
 l\ K 
 
 WHAT AEE JUST ACCUMULATIONS. 
 
 14:7 
 
 coarse pursued by conscientious persons in all the avocations 
 ol* Society. 
 
 33. By taking some examples, we can see with special appiica- 
 more particularity what is to be done, and what ^ion. 
 
 is to be avoided. With this purpose we may consider: 1. 
 What are just accumulations and returns: 2. What are 
 moral restrictions on them. 
 (1.) What are just accumulations? What, just ac- 
 
 34. Examples may be found in Labor, in Land, cumulations: by 
 in Traffic, in Capital. 
 
 By " labor" is meant work of hand, of head, j^^bor Land 
 or of both, rendered by a man in his vocation for Traffic, Capital, 
 producing something which is needed by the common wants 
 of society. An example is the work done by a day-laborer, a 
 mechanic, a physician, a lawyer. By " land," is here meant 
 real estate, including things immovable, things which are con- 
 sidered by law to be attached to land, as houses, trees, springs, 
 mines, and like objects. By '' traffic" is meant barter, including 
 both the local transfer and tlie sale of commodities needed by 
 the common wants. An example is in the transactions of a 
 merchant. By " capital" is meant accumulated wealth, whose 
 purpose is use, whether that use be for labor, or land, or 
 traffic. The term "Capital," is usually applied to money. 
 But in its enlarged sense, the word includes any accumulation 
 for use. Tlius the professional education of a lawyer or me- 
 chanic is his capital. 
 
 All these are essential to human Society. As 
 to the first, there could be no public prosperity ^^^^ * 
 without the labor of the different avocations. As to the 
 second, lands and houses must be owned and used. As to the 
 third, the operations of commerce are essential for men, for 
 nations, for the world. As to the fourth, capital, in some form, 
 is demanded by the three others. They all require some ac- 
 cumulation for use, and this accumulation forms Capital. 
 
 Whatever is essential to human Society is entitled to sup- 
 port by just remunerations. Those are just remunerations 
 
 )1 
 
 ■; 
 
148 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHIC3. 
 
 which cause no wrong to individuals, nor to society, and which 
 
 violate neither morality nor the law of the land. 
 
 Pa^e»tfor 35. Eve.y man, therefore, may justly receive 
 
 • payment both for work done in his vocation and 
 
 This right to payment for work is so sacred that Scripture 
 req„,res pay,aient to be given to the laborer when the work 
 done. "The wages of him that is hired, shall not remain ,W 
 thee all mght until the morning." "At his day thou shaU 
 gu-ehnn h:s lure, neither shall the sun go down upon it, fo 
 he .s poor, and setteth his heart unto it."* The same rule 
 extends to the wages of servants, to the fees of physicians, and 
 to all hke cases. "Woe unto him that useth his neighbor's 
 .orvice without wages, and that payeth him not for his work "f 
 
 X^V'""" . '^^'''^ """"'"^ '^""^^ ^""^ ^o"«es are entitled 
 r m \ "■'"' ^"^ *''^ "'^ ""^ t'^^'"- Those enga<.ed in 
 
 traffic have a right to a price for things sold which wllfe'll 
 
 foln'aj::*"" T °".'^ '^'"' '^^'''''' '° ^""g'"S them to a 
 • place for sale, but which will give support to 
 
 them and the.r families. Those possessing Capital in the fonn 
 Zi^ Of of money are entitled for its use to a just remu- 
 
 • neration in the form of legal interest. In such 
 
 c ses no nght, private or public, is invaded. Private and pubhc 
 prosperity are promoted. Justice and Charity are obeyed and 
 not v,o,,,,,. s„^, ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^J^^ returTswh h 
 lorm income. 
 
 S'todf'" '^ , '^^^ '^"^ ™'^' ^PP'^ *<> t'^e sale of any thing; 
 
 • the sale of what is made by labor; the sale of 
 land or house ; the sale of movable objects of traffic • the sale 
 of invested capital. The seller is to asi and the bu^L to gT 
 
 8old shall have enhanced in the hand of the seller, he (under 
 
 WHAT RESTJRICTIONS ON ACCUMULATION. 
 
 149 
 
 
 the restrictions to be immediately stated) is entitled to tlie 
 gain. If the tiling shall have depreciated, the buyer (under 
 
 like restrictions) is entitled to the advantaore. 
 
 ,^ , ,rn 1 . . "^^^t *'® the 
 
 36. (2.) W hat are moral restrictions on accu- restrictions on 
 
 1 ^ - • „ accumulation. 
 
 inulation. 
 
 Kestrictions on these returns are not only placed by morality, 
 but usually by law and by public sentiment. The restrictions 
 arc founded on this plain principle: Every one 
 may have the prices or profits produced by the ®®^^*^* 
 Order of Nature and of Society, provided, that in seeking or 
 receiving them, he inflict no injury on the public, nor on in- 
 dividuals, nor on his own honor and conscience. The principal 
 restrictions may be reduced to three. 
 
 1st. There must he 7io combination for artfjir special- 1st 
 dally affecting prices to excess^ hy raising or de- Restriction. 
 pressing them. 
 
 The following examples give illustration. A combination of 
 workmen may be formed in order to compel an excessive rate of 
 wages. Or a combination of employers may be made on the 
 other hand to depress wages below what is just and needful. A 
 combination may be established to enhance or reduce exorbi- 
 tantly the prices for real property or rents. Bread is of primary 
 necessity. A combination may be created to raise extrava- 
 gantly the price of its material, and thus to oppress the poor ; 
 or it may be made in order to depress the price inordinately, 
 and thus to oppress the farmer. A combination of capitalists 
 may be effected to elevate exorbitantly the value of money. 
 In all these cases there is an interference with the natural 
 equilibrium of prices, with the common order of Society. In 
 most of them there is a breach of law. A public necessity is 
 artificially created for private gain. By that necessity indi- 
 viduals, and these usually of limited means or in poverty, are 
 made to undergo much suffering. Such a course is wrong. It 
 is against Justice and Charity. Gains so made are iniquitous. 
 
 37. The practical check on such wrongs is by universal 
 competition. Arrangements for a fair combat with competi- 
 
150 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 or, are not condemned bj morality. But in the cases supposed 
 there .s the endeavor to extinguish all competition, and to 
 compel the public by necessity and suffering to give more than 
 - just, or to sell for less than is just. And if this lies t 
 iniquity. It is therefore right for the law to protect the 
 members o Society from such wrongs. Where the law does 
 not, mdividual conscience must furnish that protection 
 
 The 2d restriction is, there may he no wr<nu, inflicted <m 
 other men through their necessities and ignorance. 
 2d Eestriction. f^' ^^e^fdingly no undue advantage may be 
 _ taken of public necessities even when not artifi- 
 
 dS Tt ^' "".'"' ''^""'^°" '' '"^^"^ '^' ^«'"»tary ad- 
 dition of suffering. For example, a famine, a war, or a sLe 
 
 may raise to an extravagant height the necessaries of life If I 
 xnan have these necessaries in his possession, can receive for 
 hem a just price, and yet holds them back from a starving popu- 
 lation in order to enhance his profits to the highest degree, he 
 
 wifw t 'f "' ""'" ^^ -- -fi-"g. -d he chores 
 without pity to increase it for his own gain. To such cases 
 
 the words of Scripture apply. « He that withholdeth corn, the 
 
 people shal cui-se him ; but blessing shall be upon the head of 
 
 iiiin that selleth it'' CProv xl 9fi^ Ti,^ . • . i 
 
 ^ •' ^^^ ^^^ s^'»^ principle applies 
 
 to public necessity for money. A war or public disasters may 
 enhance its value inordinately. But to oppress the Govern- 
 ment, or individuals, by withholding loans at such a time is 
 liighly culpable. Morality condemns all those increased gains 
 which can only come through increased distress. They are 
 violations of both Justice and Charity. 
 
 39. For a like reason no undue advantage may be taken of 
 Whh^ zgnorance. For example, a fleet is bearing supplies to a 
 p.ace distressed by famine. Its approach is known to one, and 
 one only, who has the same commodities for sale, and who has 
 been keeping a part back for higher prices. He sells wh,t 
 remains at the famine price of the day, though he knows that 
 in twenty-four hours the value will be reduced one-half He 
 has taken iniquitous advantage of public ignorance. 
 
 NO DISHONORABLE GAINS. 
 
 151 
 
 40. Tlie case is much stronger where loth necessity and 
 ignorance are united in the persons wronged. An example is 
 familiar to all who travel, in the impositions of the drivers of 
 hackney-coaches. Travellers as a class are ignorant of local 
 rights and customs. In arriving at a place they are usually 
 under the necessity of having themselves and their luggage 
 transported. They are thus between painful alternatives. If 
 they do not pay an exorbitant demand, property or health 
 will be endangered. If tliej^ do pay an unjust demand, they 
 are robbed as much as if a club or pistol had been used. The 
 law, therefore, interposes, and protects the traveller by fixing 
 prices which may not be exceeded. 
 
 41. This example is valuable, as fixing certain principles 
 both in law and morals. It shows the perfect propriety of all 
 those laws which limit prices in the cases w^here experience has 
 shown that the necessities or ignorance of persons will expose 
 them to wrongs if the law do not protect them. Such are the 
 laws limiting the rate of interest for money loaned, which 
 among their other benefits protect widows and orphans in their 
 estates. The law may righteously interpose to restrain prices 
 in all cases where experience has shown that without law 
 Justice would be violated and wrongs inflicted. Mere finance 
 may say the law should never interfere. But Justice is a 
 greater interest, and is the foundation for financial prosperity 
 itself. 
 
 42. The principle of the law shows the rule of morals. 
 Every gain is unjust which wrongs another through his 
 necessity or ignorance. This is to be applied to all selling and 
 buying. We may not pay less than is just, nor get more than 
 is just, because our neighbor is not free or not intelligent. 
 
 43. 3dly. 1^0 man may receive any remunera- 
 tion or gain wJien the reception thereof would he 
 dishonorable. That is dishonorable which men do not honor. 
 That which they will not and do not honor may always be 
 known by settled custom. For example, among the Eomans 
 it was thought dishonorable for the lawyer to receive fees from 
 
 
152 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 a client. This is not tlie sentiment of modern times. But in 
 every hnman avocation, there are practices which by common 
 consent are deemed dishonorable. Whoever makes gain bv 
 them loses the respect of others and consequently his own 
 It IS therefore the duty of every man to conform his sentiment 
 to this prevailing usage, and to accept nothing which that 
 usage condemns. 
 
 [It is so among military men. For an officer to buy any 
 thmg at one point for the mere purpose of profit by selling 
 It at another, is considered " conduct unbecoming an officer 
 and a gentleman." Custom and sentiment authorize the sale 
 of furniture and effects, as no intention of trading entered into 
 their purchase. But the purpose and practice of trading are 
 considered inconsistent with the military character. Some- 
 times a commanding officer may secure an accumulation of 
 petty gams by courses not suitable for an officer nor for a 
 gentleman When a temptation of this kind arises, it should 
 be bamshed by the thought,-What is the gain, compared to 
 mj honor, and the honor of the service ?] 
 
 Becapituiation. ^""^'^^ ^'"^ ^^^^ restrictions both on income and 
 
 on profits. There must be no artificial disturb- 
 ance of settled prices. There must be no wrong through the 
 necessity or ignorance of another. There must be no dishonor- 
 ab e acquisition. We have thus seen the subdivisions of obli- 
 gations m thoughts, words, and actions, with reference to 
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154 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 RELATIONS IN WHICH JUSTICE PREDOMIN5.TE2^-CONTrNUED 
 
 DOMESTIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Eepntatioa: Its 1- Tlie next right is tliat to Eeptitsttioh. 
 
 "* "*• Eeputation is a good name anion <r men in life 
 
 and after death. To appreciate tlie riglit, we sho-ild estimate 
 the value of the possession. It is, as we have seen under 
 Duties to Ourselves, a proper object, under moral limitations 
 
 It, quality. f, '''""'*° P"""'"'' (^^- ''■)■ The esteem, con- 
 
 tidence, and affection of cur fellow-men are bene- 
 fits so great that many prize them more than property or life 
 and make them subordinate only to Virtue ; of which they are 
 the shadow and the sign. This sentiment is sustained by 
 Scripture in words before quoted : " A good name is rather 
 to be chosen than great riches, and loving favor rather than 
 silver and gold." 
 
 [Tlie sentiment is essential for tho spirit and efficiency of 
 the military body ; and every true soldier gives that lofty 
 place to his deserved reputation, his unstained honor.] 
 
 to?£*l'^^'"' ^' ^°"^^P°"^«°t to Reputation is the mani- 
 '*~'- festation of respect from others in personal in- 
 
 tercourse. 
 Such is the object of the right. 
 Public rights re- ^- Public right over this object is direct or in- 
 g^^ding Eeputa- direct. It is a direct right in public authority to 
 
 inflict, by process of. law, the loss of reputation 
 and respect as a punishment for crime. Punishments which 
 imply dishonor and disgrace, and which remove from personal 
 intercourse tlie common marks of respect, are an exercise of 
 this nght. The indirect right of Society is to the public bene- 
 lits and honor resulting from individual reputations. Some 
 
 EEPUTATION : OFFENCES AGAINST. 
 
 155 
 
 nations have deemed the reputation of its great and good men, 
 its warriors, statesmen, philosophers, discoverers, poets, philan- 
 thropists, as the most valuable of all their possessions, because 
 making their national glory. These live when an empire has 
 passed away. These it can present before the eyes of other 
 nations, and transmit to distant ages. The name of Alfred is 
 an imperishable possession* for England, as is that of Wash- 
 ington for the United States of America. 
 
 4. The private right to his reputation, and to 
 
 , IX' J. • J. • Private rights, 
 
 the common marks oi respect, exists m every 
 
 man till forfeited by his own misconduct. Such is the riglit. 
 
 5. The obligation in public authority is to pro- 
 
 , . . , T 1 • 1 T Correspondent 
 
 tect that private right. It executes this obliga- obligations : 
 
 tion through its courts of justice. ^ ^^' 
 
 6. The individual obligation correspondent to 
 
 the individual right, is to injure no man's repu- ^ ^^^ 
 tation, and to withhold no proper respect from any man. The 
 divine rules are : ^' Speak evil of no man." " Honor all 
 men." Justice demands this. Charity requires us to regard 
 our neighbor's reputation, and his feelings, wounded as they 
 will be by rudeness and disrespect, as if that reputation and 
 that natural sensibility belonged to ourselves. Such are the 
 obligations. ' 
 
 7. Offences against deputation are violations offences: their 
 both of the private and public right. They are division. 
 
 of two classes : those which deprive a man of general esteem : 
 those which dissever friendship. 
 
 8. Of the first class are the offences under ^ , . . 
 
 Depriving of es- 
 
 Detraction. Detraction is a wrong to another teem by Detrao- 
 by injurious words that lessen and blacken his 
 reputation. It has been . previously considered as slander 
 under sins of the tongue wdth reference to the passions vented 
 by it. It is here considered as a wrong to one's neighbor. 
 The effect of calumny is injury to reputation. This effect 
 
 * Krfjaa fg dcec, — Thucydides. 
 
156 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 THE person: eights. 
 
 157 
 
 follows, whether it be or be not intended. In some cases, this 
 is deliberately proposed. In the mass of injurious words daily 
 spoken, and in this country daily printed, there does not 
 appear so much an active intention to injure, as an entire and 
 thoughtless disregard of the sacred private and public rights 
 belonging to reputation. Detraction by calumny and slander 
 is a sin, an offence of aggravated character. Estimating the 
 offence by the value of the thing taken, its enormity is beyond 
 that of theft.-^ This is the case where the injury is to the 
 most obscure private individual. Where the person wronged 
 is a public man, the pubhc rights are invaded. In a coun'try 
 like this, where reverence for public authority is indispensable 
 for the preservation of the institutions of the United States, 
 the constant railing against public men, the unsparing 
 censures and detractions to which they are subject, are full of 
 wrongs in the present, and of dangers for the future. 
 Depriving of ^- The offence against Friendship is by whis- 
 
 endship. pering evil insinuations, whose effect, whether 
 intended or not, is to alienate those who were friends. " A 
 whisperer separateth chief friends." (Prov. xvi., 28.) The 
 enormity of the offence is to be estimated by the value of 
 friendship, one of the greatest blessings of mortal life. 
 Offences against 1^- Offences against Bespecl are Contumely, 
 Eespect. Mocking, and Cursing. All are forms of insult, 
 
 and violations of the duty of charity and of that of honor to 
 all men. They usually spring from the irascible passions. 
 Contumely is insult, under the provocation of anger, and with 
 the assumption of superiority.f Mocking is insult with ridi- 
 cule. Cursing is insult with imprecations of evils from the 
 Divine Being on the person cursed. Cursing adds an offence 
 against God by profanity, to an x)ffence against man by 
 cruelty, and to off^ence against one's own nature by permitting 
 the unrestrained flow of the malevolent passions. 
 
 * "Who steals my purse," &c.—Shakspeare. 
 
 t Tumto, to sweU: Contumelia, swelUng against or by the side of another. 
 
 11. Cursing another, under the incitement of 
 ajio-er, involves transgression in these three re- 
 lations. If it be deliberate, the sin is aggravated. If several 
 unite to glut their malevolent passions, and mutually to in- 
 crease them, by emulous imprecations on those whom they 
 hate, each off'ender is severally guilty. If such collective im- 
 precations are made in the names of religion and morality, 
 they are in the highest degree of moral turpitude. St. James 
 speaks of the terrific contrast when the same organs of speech 
 '' bless God, even the Father, and curse men who are made in 
 the similitude of God." These high grades of guilt are 
 attained when we consider in our neighbor only the fact that 
 he is a man made after the similitude of God. But ever ad- 
 vancing degrees arise as the relations violated become nearer 
 and holier, those of country, friendship, relationship. Among 
 the terrific and revolting spectacles of the w^orld are parents 
 giving and bequeathing curses to their children. 
 
 Such are some of the offences. 
 
 The duties have been stated under those to ourselves. 
 
 KlGHTS OF THE PeESON. 
 
 12. The next rights are those of the Person, f^^^^^ *^® 
 The object of this right is the body, in its life, 
 
 in its members, in our use of it. Under the ^®° * 
 person, therefore, we include life, limb, and liberty, 
 objects are of immense value individually and socially, 
 value to individuals is easily estimated by conceiving our- 
 selves to be deprived of any one of them. Their social value 
 is evident from History. There can be no civilization where 
 these objects are not respected ; and the civilization of com- 
 munities advances in proportion as these are protected. So- 
 ciety is specially organized for the protection of individual 
 rights of the person. 
 
 13. Eights of the Person are accordingly di- Resulting di- 
 vided into those of life, limb, and liberty. 
 
 Tliese 
 Their 
 
 vision. 
 
158 
 
 PRACTICAL ETmcS. 
 
 Divine right. rr,,^\^'^ ""'"'"^ "S'^* o^^r tl'ese is primary 
 ..i. .1- .-^''"^'■''^^'^'-^^I'o gave may take. He may dele^ 
 gate Ins pnmary right to men, by special command or 
 t rough the aw of nature. He Las also a right to the serv ic 
 of men and to ascriptions both for the possession of lif 
 m.b, and hberty, and for the virtues and good deeds of whi h 
 men ai-e capable, through such possession. He is tl»e Supr m 
 P otector ot hmnan rights of the person, specially in ca! s to 
 v^nch „n.an law cannot or will not reach, as n that f 
 B ngle stranger on a desert shore. He is the direct guard! 
 ot those nghts and an avenger against all who violate them! 
 PubUcj ^, 1^;^I'"1>1'« rights over these, as derived from 
 
 tlie Creator, being delegated to Organized So- 
 cety, are d,rect or indirect. Tl.e direct right ov^r tl^ hY 
 hmb and hberty of individuals exists in pubHc aut 1 ' ' 
 -h-ch may take these away through law, under the reo J ^ 
 n.ents and necessities of public justice. A nation may Tr . 
 ice us members in war, and expose them to death, mutation 
 and capfv. y, war being an occasional public la^ for the d ! 
 
 comts of just.ce, it may take life, or limb, or confine offender! 
 for crimes, administering i„ this case law permanent The 
 ..^e.... public right extends to the social public benefits d 
 ...to the security and prosperity which result from the i-es r 
 vation of these rights of the person, and which are in^Cd Ty 
 ti.e violation of those rights. Hence, every such vijati^t 
 not only a private, but a public wrong. 
 
 ftivau. .^^■'^^ private right, the right of the indi- 
 
 vidual to life, limb, and liberty, only subject to 
 
 theTigZ!"" ""^"^"""' ' "°"™^'^^ ^"^^ p-^-* T^':: a!: 
 
 "bffi^""' J^^ 7^^P"^^'■« obligation, carrespcmdent to the 
 mS'c;""- f ^^«^ ^^'^^. is to protect these with the 
 
 deepest solicitude. Nations and their municipal 
 anthorities are, under the Deity, the consecrated guardians of 
 these natural rights of men. They are, tlierefore.'not o"; l 
 
 THE person: obligations. 
 
 159 
 
 Individual : 
 
 redress and punish particular wrongs as tliey arise, but by 
 proper laws, and by their administration, to diffuse through 
 the whole mass of the community, and in every individual's 
 thought, a sense of perfect security. 
 
 18. The individual obligation, correspondent 
 to the private right in every other individual, is 
 to respect, and never to invade these rights of the person in 
 his neighbor. As you have a right to life, limb, and liberty, 
 every other man (unless as the agent of law) is under obliga- 
 tion not to take these away. If he do, the law will punish 
 him. You are under the same obligation to every other man. 
 You must be punished by the law if you forget his right, and 
 inflict on his person a wrong. 
 
 19. Lawful correction and confinement for discipline ap- 
 plied to those under authority, do not violate these obligations. 
 The parent, or the person to whom he delegates his authority, 
 as in education, is the minister. of law divine, or natural, or 
 human, by one of which, or by all combined, he is clothed 
 with that authority. Masters of vessels, and those in similar 
 relations, have so much authority over their subordinates as is 
 o-iven by law. By the Koman law the parent had the right 
 to inflict any severity on his child, or to take his life. And 
 such a riffht was extended to other relations. But in Christian 
 States, and in this country, all excess in the kind, or degree 
 of punishment, is forbidden. Cruel and unusual punishments 
 may never be inflicted by individuals or tribunals. 
 
 20. Tlie individual obligation correspondent to the direct 
 puUic right is, to acquiesce in the deprivations produced by 
 the order of public justice. He who is doomed by judicial 
 sentence to the loss of life, limb, or liberty, should show his 
 reverence for law and justice by submission. He who suifers 
 in war, should regard himself as enduring for the cause of his 
 country. 
 
 Such are the rights and correspondent obligations regarding 
 
 the Person. 
 
160 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Offences: • ^^- ^'"^ Principal offences to be here consid- 
 
 ered are forms of personal violence. 
 Mnrderj Murder is the voluntary and unlawful taking 
 
 oi hfa It is a crime against God, against So*^ 
 cietv against the individual slain, against his relations and 
 Inends. It is so high a crime, and such a perfect bar to all 
 m-ihzation, that when Noah, with his sons, went forth after 
 tl)e deluge to establish nations, it was specially forbidden 
 The rule was made for all men and codes. " Whosoever 
 {i. e indiv dually) sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his 
 blood be shed." Eeverence for life was required trom all 
 inen. In the image of God made He man." « At the hand 
 of every man's brother will I require the life of man." (Gen 
 IX., 5 and 6.) ^ 
 
 22. Under ilurder we may include here an offence directly 
 against self, but incidentally against others-that of Suicide. 
 Suicide, ^"'•''*^^ '" self-murder. It is a voluntary and 
 
 unlawful taking of one's own life. It is a crime 
 against God, because the primary right over life exists in 
 the Creator. Ue assigns the time and mode of terminating 
 existence, through the laws of nature and of society. Suicide 
 IS, therefore, a crime against Ilim. It is a crime against 
 society. Society has a right to the lives of all its members 
 which it does not ordain by law to sacrifice. It is a crime' 
 agamst one's self. It is an unmanly yielding to the pressure 
 on the feelings of present evils. It is a refusal to trust in the 
 mercy of a Divine Providence for the future. It is a crime 
 against the friends to whom one is bound by the ties of nature 
 and affection. There are yet other and far higher aggravations 
 ot the crime considered by Theology. 
 
 Duelling. ^^- ^"^"'"g is murder complicated. It is 
 
 complicated because there is the will to take 
 another s life unlawfully, and also the will to sacrifice one's 
 own life unlawfully. There is also the guilt from the indul- 
 gence of the darker passions. It includes, therefore, both the 
 guilt ot the murder of another person, and the guilt of Suicide 
 
 THE I'EESON : DUTIES. 
 
 161 
 
 Duties. 
 
 All the aggravations enumerated in the two previous heads 
 are accumulated and complicated in Duelling. 
 
 24. After the ofFenc*^R, we consider the duties by which we 
 avoid and prevent deeds of violence. 
 
 The first duty is to restrain the passions which 
 produce injuries to the person of another. Such 
 are, Revenge, Anger, Hatred, Envy, which have been consid- 
 ered under duties to ourselves. This duty lies in the thoughts. 
 *' Out of the heart proceed murders." (Matt, xv., 19.) It is 
 here that Charity is to make its influence felt, as the attendant 
 on Justice. Those passions are to be repressed by Justice, 
 since Justice leads us to wish to do that to another w^iich w^e 
 would wish another to do to ourselves. We are to repress 
 them by Charity, which leads us to love others as ourselves. 
 
 The second duty is to exercise self-restraint in the words and 
 manners which commonly lead to deeds of violence. We are 
 to " leave off contention before it be meddled with." (Prov. 
 xvii., 14.) " A fool's N^s enter into contention ; and hisr 
 mouth calleth for strokes." (Prov. xviii., 6.) Here, also, 
 duties to ourselves prepare for duties to others. Here, also, 
 Justice and Charity will prevent the words and ways that 
 kindle strife. The natural effect of Justice and Charity is to 
 produce courtesy unbroken in manner and matter, even in 
 moments of high excitement. By them there is the sense of 
 what is due to another, and there is a feeling as if he were 
 another self. Governed habitually by these principles, you 
 will not w^ound another in his self-respect, or in the point of 
 honor. You will not utter scornful or contemptuous words to 
 inflict the stings which, when felt, urge to the shedding of 
 blood. It is well said : " Cast out the scorner^ and contention 
 shall go out." (Prov. xxii., 10.) 
 
 The third obligation is to avoid all unauthorized deeds of 
 violence. Restraint on self is to be applied to the first clutch- 
 ing of the fist, the first grasping, or drawing, or lifting of the 
 weapon. No man is to suffer himself to act from blind and 
 brutal passion. Here, also, duties to self prepare for duties to 
 11 
 
162 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 others. Here Justice and Charitj, speaking tlirongh calm 
 reason, must restrain and direct. 
 Such are obligations in thought, word, and deed. 
 
 Eight of Virtue. 
 
 BiS-it 0/ Virtue. !f • '^^^ """' '■'■g'^t 's that to our Virtue. 
 
 By our Virtue is here meant the habitual pos- 
 
 «rr' T'"". T ""'''''' "^ *''^ '^^^^ '"<>'--l principles 
 
 • It "'^-'"des all the particular virtues. Some ethi" 
 
 cal wnters use for the same idea the term Character Z 
 
 fied, unfolded, and, at last, perfected. By this possession one 
 attains good and avoids evil here and ever. By I the Deity" 
 er..d an honored. By it, society and its m'embe. reSvl 
 W hat '; -T ""' "'' i-P-shable than property, 
 
 lorever. It ,s above reputation and honor, bein-. the sub 
 stance o which they are the shadow cast. t is more t lan 
 l.fe bod>Iy, being the life of the soul in its noblest form I " 
 more than our nien.bers, or physical freedom. It is the soul's 
 mtegnty .v^thout mutilation. It is man's true, perfect and 
 unalienable reedom. Such is the object of this ri^ht. ' 
 
 eiveJ; l^cT'Z "'' /'" ^'•'^"""^ ^^J"^''* -« -l"^o«t exclu- 
 Bively in God and ourselves. 
 
 Divide right. ^ '"'*' .'^'""^ rig'i' «^er Virtue is supreme. The 
 
 f. TT- .^' ""^ *''^ "«^' t° ^''•ect and to form Virtue 
 after lis per ect will. He has a right to thanks a"d prS 
 for virtues and pure characters, formed under His law and n 
 fluenc. He also is the Protector and Rewarder of goodne" 
 How often has persecuted Virtue been compelled to look"" 
 yond contemporaries to Him ! 
 
 PuWc. . f • -P"'^''« authority has no direct invasive 
 
 fl,» K fl. "f , *'''''■ ^''^"^- ^' ^^« «° indirect right to 
 he enefi s and glories resulting to society, from the Xtu 
 
 o. Its members. It has, consequently, a right to punish 
 
 BIGHT OF virtue: OFFENCES AGAINST. 
 
 163 
 
 Individual. 
 
 injuries to Tirtue. It has the obligation of protecting and 
 defending virtue, and that of rewarding it in signal instances. 
 
 28. The individual right to Virtue is full, abso- 
 lute, unlimited. Every man has a perfect right 
 to adopt and exercise the best moral principles. Tliis, his 
 rio-ht in regard to every external influence, indicates his first 
 duty in regard to himself 
 
 29. The correspondent obligation in the indi- correspondent 
 vidual is all which requires our present attention. Obligations. 
 The obligation resting on every human being is to inflict no 
 injury on another's virtue. This is demanded by Justice. 
 Charity requires more than this negative abstinence from wrong. 
 It calls us to do all we can to promote the virtue and improve 
 the cliaracter of our neighbor. This obligation is among those 
 which are enforced by all the spheres of duty. It is an obli- 
 gation in view of the relations above us, since we thereby 
 further the kingdom of God among men, and the temporal 
 welfare of society. It is an obligation to ourselves, since, in 
 efforts to make others better, we improve ourselves. It is an 
 obligation to others, since we thus respect their rights and pro- 
 mote their happiness here and hereafter. 
 
 30. The offences against the virtue of another offences : 
 are of a general character, or of special enor- c^eneral; 
 mity. 
 
 Those of a general character consist in lessening good and 
 stimulating evil principles of action. We lessen good prin- 
 ciples by destroying another's confidence in Eeligion and Mo- 
 rality. We stimulate evil principles by filling the imagination 
 with seductive pictures of vicious indulgence, by arousing the 
 evil appetites of the body and the passions of the mind, by 
 employing others as instruments and associates in iniquity, by 
 presenting evil examples. 
 
 31. OSencea of special enormity are Seduction and Adultery. 
 In Seduction (so far as the word designates a 
 
 special crime) the female is unmarried. In *^ 
 Adultery each of the parties or one is married. 
 
104: 
 
 PRACTICAL Ernies. 
 
 TLese cnmes contain all tl.e guilt before attributed to the 
 g era offences. Tl,e, add to this a specific turpitude n 
 both .a common cr.me-that of unlawful connection. I^ 
 both .s the corruption of another's virtue. In both is the in 
 fl.et,on of great and lasting evils. Eoth are crimes git' 
 God, aga,nst socet, and its laws, against the other partfrd 
 
 S:,^""''^{ 1'" ^'"'•"''^"•'' "'- «Wi»-tiou to protect the 
 rights so .nvaded, and to punish their infraction by law 
 There are special gradations of guilt attached to ^ch of 
 
 hese crnnes. These are to be added to all the otherTonsid 
 erafons, when ^e are estimating each of the crimes. 
 Seduction. ^^z/" Seduction these specially appear bv 
 
 w . ^ V ,*^°"''*^^''''"g the female. I„ her youth she is 
 tempted by her seducer through affection, flatt ry, pres nt 
 pronnses. After her fall, she is abandoned. She is cu off a^ 
 onee from reputable society. Her good name is g A„ 
 
 rlvf , , . '' '' ''^"""^^ ^''"^ *h« -fl»ences of mo- 
 
 eternal She has no hope. Her whole life, from her first 
 te.nptat,on, ,s one of shame, agony, and despaik 
 
 The man who inflicts such wrongs and sorrows on any 
 human bemg is evidently guilty of a crime of the greate I 
 magnitude. o'^^'^tesc 
 
 Adultery. /^- A<^"ltery adds to all the ascending grades 
 
 . Su>lt which have, been stated, peculiar a.^<.ra- 
 
 As one, Adultery ,s the violation of a vow, of the marria..e- 
 vow, to keep only to the other party so long'as both sha 1 S 
 Th same pnnc.ples belong to it as to the oath. (ch. ii., 49 to 57 
 It IS ineffaceable but by death, (ch. ii., 55. See Rom. i. 2, 3 ) So 
 
 ^ii"55;Thel"'^^^°""*^"'^ ^^ ^" '-- -^p'-' 
 
 (Ch. 1. 55.) The other and special aggravation of Adultery is the 
 uncertainty which it introduces into families concerning L 
 ongm of children. The effects on the justice and legSy of 
 
 DUTIES REGARDING VIRTUE IN OTHERS. 
 
 165 
 
 inheritances, and on the feelings of the husband, and of every 
 member of the family, are evident. 
 
 From offences we pass to duties. 
 
 3i. The precept forbidding these offences, and 
 inculcating the obligation to respect the virtue of ^^^' 
 another is : " Thou shalt not commit Adultery." Adultery is 
 selected to represent all the offences, as including the guilt of 
 all. 
 
 35. Duties belonging to another's virtue apply 
 to thoughts, words, and actions. ^ ^^ * 
 
 In the thoughts we are to have a constant and 
 perpetual wish for the moral purity of others. °^^ ' 
 
 This wish is to be the source of correspondent actions. Neg- 
 atively we 'are to restrain every movement of the natural dis- 
 position which accompanies transgression. This is a dispo- 
 sition to desire that others may do the same. Men look fre- 
 quently with complacency and encouragement on the sins 
 which they like. This disposition is well depicted in the 
 words : " Who not only do such things, but have pleasure in 
 them that do them." (Eom. i., 32.) By restraining this dis- 
 position, the evil is arrested at its source. 
 
 This duty to respect another's virtue is to be 
 applied to words. No word of encouragement is * 
 
 to be given to wrong-doing. It is, on the contrary, to be re- 
 buked. No language is to be uttered which fosters any evil 
 passion. They who suggest obscene images, and impure 
 thoughts in conversation, have done something to corrupt 
 another mind, and are so far guilty. Such is the negative or 
 passive part of this obligation. Its active part consists in 
 suitably encouraging all those under one's influence to preserve 
 a steadfast adherence to moral principle. 
 
 This duty to respect another's virtue is to be 
 applied to actions. No bad example is to be set 
 before another. Examples are contagious. Evil examples 
 among men are as flames among combustibles. The active 
 part of this obligation consists in efforts to promote Virtue. 
 
 In Acts. 
 
w 
 
 "^ PKACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 Domestic and Sociai, Kelations. 
 
 Sr Eeilfon.. , ^^- ^"'"^^t'" K«l-'io"s applj to the family: 
 
 bocial Relations, to the Benefactor and the Friend. 
 neir pectdiar- 37. The peculiarity of these relations, as distin- 
 guished from the others, consists in the hidi 
 degree of Charity which enters them. They belong to the 
 pr^ent head, since Jnstiee predominates in them. The duties 
 which we owe in these domestic and social relations, are obli- 
 gations in us correspondent to rights in others, and, therefore 
 they are required by Justice. But though Justice dominates,' 
 the tender dictates of Charity rule in them more largely than 
 in any other of the private relations of mankind. 
 Sni«. ,^^- ^'>« '■^'I'^er thus sees the moral principles 
 
 which he should carry into these domestic and 
 social relations. 
 
 1. JusTicK-You must have a constant and perpetual will 
 to fulfil every obligation demanded by every right in the mem- 
 bers of your family, and in yom- benefactors and friends, 
 (cn. vii.) 
 
 2. CHAKm-.-You must preserve, without selfishness, hatred 
 or mahce, a tender affection, and an active good-will towards 
 them, by a perpetual sense of the common tie which binds 
 you to them. 
 
 DOMESTIC RELATIONS. 
 
 B«m«rtie. ^^^- ^*>'ne«tic Natural Eelations include, 1. 
 
 Those between husband and wife. 2. Between 
 parents and children. 3. Between children of the same family 
 m regard to each other. Those between master and servant 
 are conventional domestic relations. 
 
 Kature of them. ^- These domestic relations are primarily be 
 Fact^in th. re- tween the superior and inferior. " The husband 
 .T, KM. ^« t\« head of the wife." The parents are above 
 the children. The elder children are the superiors of the 
 younger. The servant is subjected to the master. Such is the 
 
 DOMESTIC KELATIOXS: DUTIES. 
 
 1G7 
 
 primary and fundamental relation established by nature, by 
 divine and human laws, and accepted by universal consent. 
 
 41. But subordinately, and by the dictates of Charity, as 
 well as of Justice, these different parties are, in occasional rela- 
 tions, equal to each other. The husband and wife are equally 
 tlie parents of the children, and equally entitled to honor from 
 them and from each other. There are many cases where the 
 parents' right and that of the child are equal ; and many where 
 an elder child has no superior right to a younger. In the 
 presence and in the w^orship of God, the master and servant 
 appear as equals. Before Him, human distinctions disappear. 
 " The rich and the poor meet together ; the Lord is the maker 
 of them all." 
 
 42. Hence, both distributive and commuta- Principleg. 
 
 .. T j_' ^1 T 1 • n 1 i- 1 Both kinds of 
 
 tive J ustice must be applied in all domestic rela- justice required 
 tions. As a superior towards those beneath you, ^ ^^®°^' 
 do no injustice by partiality in distributing favors, gifts, or 
 property. Let there be no acceptance of persons. As hus- 
 band, or master, as elder brother, or sister, never abuse your 
 superiority for the infliction of pain, through word, manner, 
 or deed. Temper all by Charity. As an inferior, render, 
 without envy, or pride, or ill-will, what is due to those who 
 are, in some relations, superior. In reciprocal Justice, meet 
 the claims of wife, child, or servant, as if he or she were a 
 stranger, armed with the full authority of the law. 
 
 43. The duties of parents and children have 
 been mentioned, (ch. ii.) 
 
 44. The duties of husband and wife result from marriage. 
 Marriage may be defined a strict and intimate 
 
 union, for life, sanctioned by divine and human ^ 
 
 law, and founded on mutual esteem, of one man and one 
 woman, in one family, for the purpose of having children, edu- 
 cating them for this world and eternity, and for promoting the 
 happiness of one another.* 
 
 ♦ This definition is principally from Beattio. Moral Science, 583. 
 
 Duties. 
 
163 
 
 PKACTICAL ETUICS. 
 
 SOCIAL EKLATIONS : DUTIES. 
 
 169 
 
 JhLOes. ^^- ^'^'■'^'■^ marriage, one of the higl.est obli- 
 
 «r,<i r. .^''^'^It " ^"^ '■^'P^''' "'^ proliibitions of divine 
 
 and human law. Here, as ever, .ve need the view of J 
 
 46 The reciprocal duties, after marriage, are those of mutual 
 affect-on and iidelitv The peculiar duties of each, as sup o 
 and nf nor, are, on the husband's part, tenderness, and on the 
 ^.fe's honor "Let ever, one of you so love his ;ife ev n 
 himself, and the wife see that she reverence her husband." TlL 
 common fault on the side of the husband is bitterness. "IIu ! 
 bands love jour wives, and be not bitter against them." That 
 from the w.fe is disrespect shown in his presence, by langu to 
 and manner, and, in his absence, by speaking evil of him ° 
 Connection with *^- '^''•^''•^ '« "<> relation of life where duties to 
 d^.es pertain, otliers are more directly affected by those belon..- 
 
 fl,. A v"^ ^^ °"'^^'^'«^- The virtues inculcated under 
 
 the second sphere are again commended to his or her attention 
 
 ac inTuttt^ !r' '" '^-"'''' ''^- '''- ^^'•*- -S 
 
 lif WoVl " ' """"'■^ P'-^P^'-^^''^" for domestic 
 
 Itue r ' •"^'""P^^^"-' - unrestrained and bitter 
 
 anxiety, idleness, extravagance, will produce their daily and 
 darkening consequences. ^ 
 
 SOCIAL RELATIONS. 
 
 Social Eelation.. ^ ^\ ^°'"'^' Relations, as here regarded, include 
 
 benefactors and friends 
 Jja. W». «. To „,. rt„ I,„ 'confer . i^„^j, 
 
 Lir Thi , , '"'' '^'"'•^ "•' """"fW"''* life, to hi. 
 I^'l}- TI.U dut, re,!, ou „.,i„„a .-iU, .„ „j^j ,,^ 
 
 The opposed vice of Ingratitude is sliown both in words and 
 deeds; in words, when no verbal acknowledgments are ren 
 dered ; in deeds, when no returns are made. 
 
 50. Friendship links man to man by a most 
 
 , . m 1 1 • J i- V. To the Friend, 
 
 sacred tie. Two human bemgs are drawn to each 
 
 other by congeniality of nature. They hold a perpetual com- 
 munion of thought and feeling. There are two bodies but one 
 soul. Such a relation must involve duties. The friend is an 
 adopted brother of the soul. Hence the obligations belonging 
 to the ties of domestic life are intensified in regard to him. 
 Charity must act in a constant desire for his happiness, welfare, 
 honor, and, above all, for his moral and spiritual character. 
 Justice must act in a conscientious purpose to utter no word, 
 and to do no act regarding him which he could deem an injury. 
 To betray his confidence, to speak of that which he gave as a 
 secret, to utter what he said in the unrestrained intimacy 
 wherein friends think aloud, would be the violation of Justice, 
 as well as of Charity, a desecration of cne of the most appeal- 
 ing ties which can bind one human being to another. 
 
 51. Friendship, in its most exalted sense, as Friendship com- 
 
 ,1 . 1 . x" • J 'i-i, • J nion to life, tem- 
 
 the union and communion oi mind with mmd, p^j.^^^ and eter- 
 
 extends beyond the temporal scene to the eternal. '^*^- 
 Immortal life presents the purest friendships. But the highest 
 friendship of which man is capable rises above all created 
 beings, human or angelic. It is friendship with God. The 
 communion, as it is, of mind with mind, it may be commenced 
 on earth. Abraham " was called the friend of God." Its con- 
 summation, however, belongs to that higher life, the instruction 
 for which we leave to Theology. 
 
 Having regarded the Virtues, and thus completed the first 
 part of the work, we come, as next in order, to the Passions. 
 
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 PAET II. 
 
 THE PASSIONS. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 DEFINITION; DIVISIONS; TREATMENT. 
 
 1. In the first part we have seen the Virtues and their Con- 
 trasts, under the three natural divisions of the sphere above us, 
 
 within us, and around us. In this second part 
 
 Passions tlifi 
 we consider the Passions. With the Passions subject of the 
 
 we must inchide the disposfpions of men. By ^^"^"^^ P*^^' 
 the iatter we mean those prochvities to certain "passions which 
 accompany the different temperaments, ages, and conditions 
 among mankind. 
 
 2. The Passions are reo-arded in Ethics for ethi- ^ ^ ^ . 
 
 '-> now regarded in 
 
 cal purposes. The first ethical purpose is so to Ethics, 
 moderate them in ourselves that they shall not hinder the ful- 
 filment of duties and the attainment of virtues. The second 
 ethical purpose is, so to know the passions in others that we 
 can better promote their welfare and happiness, and our own. 
 We promote their welfare by having such power over their 
 passions that we can guide men to their best good. This is 
 needed by the true philanthropist, whether acting as a states- 
 man, a warrior, or a private person. We promote the happi- 
 ness of others in domestic, social, and official life, by such 
 appreciation of the momentary passions awakened by words, 
 manners, and actions that we conduct ourselves with benevo- 
 lent tact, and avoid the giving of unnecessary pain. This is 
 needed by the true gentleman and lady: It is indispensable 
 for uniform, perfected courtesy. We promote our own wel- 
 fare and happiness by guarding our interests. As already 
 
lU 
 
 PBACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 stated, prudence requires the knowledge of men. For tliis 
 knowledge we must understand the working of their passions, 
 o jx.*v 2- ^^* when the Passions have been thor- 
 
 fieyond Ethics, 
 
 are ezt.nsivo ap- oughly studied and understood for Ethical pur- 
 pucations ; as in 4.1, i i j r xi, • • . .. 
 
 poses, the knowledge 01 them gives instruction 
 in many of the great provinces of the Sciences and the Arts ; 
 as in Ehetoric, Esthetics, Literature, Political Science, the 
 
 Art of War. This knowledge gives instruction 
 ' in Rhetoric by aiding persuasion, since for per- 
 
 suasion the emotions must be awakened or subdued. It orives 
 
 instruction in .^thetics by aiding impressions 
 Esthetics; i .. .1. . -r-k -r-i . . 
 
 on human sensibilities. By Esthetics we simply 
 
 mean the collective principles of all the fine arts in common. 
 The fine arts all address human sensibilities, and the knowl- 
 edge of these sensibilities must guide the artist. The archi- 
 tect of a magnificent temple seeks to awaken admiration and 
 awe in every beholder ; the historical painter now addresses 
 pity, and now love. It is, therefore, subservient to Esthetics. 
 
 It aids Literature by teaching how to please and 
 ' move. Tragedy must awaken the keen interest 
 of pity and fear. Comedy must move to laughter. Romance 
 must stir the joyous, the mirthful, and the tragic feelings. 
 Lyric poetry must issue from emotions, and awaken them. 
 History must stir us with the passions and interests of an age. 
 For such ends the Passions must be known. Such are its re- 
 lations to Literature. This knowledge aids in 
 * Political Science, by teaching how to control the 
 public passions, to assuage or direct them when excited, or to 
 arouse them when the public welfare may require. The 
 passions act in the masses of men collectively, as they do in 
 each individual bosom. He who knows them, and their 
 working in one man, knows them in multitudes. By such 
 knowledge measures, laws, and declarations can be directed 
 with prudence. The passions, then, must be regarded in Po- 
 litical Science. It aids in the Art of War. To 
 hold troops in perfect discipline, and to educe 
 
 PASSIONS DEFINED. 
 
 1^0 
 
 from them the highest degrees of daring, endurance, and effort, 
 there must be in their commander both an understanding of 
 their feelings, and skill to animate, restrain, and direct. A 
 like understanding is necessary for working on the passions of 
 an enemy to induce desired manoeuvres. 
 
 Thus extensive are the applications of a knowledge of the 
 Passions. Of these the nearest in a course of study beyond 
 Ethics will lie in Rhetoric and Literature. The reader, there- 
 fore, can trace this subject, conscious of these extended applica- 
 tions, and that he is promoting not only ethical, but rhetorical, 
 literary, and general purposes. 
 
 4. The natural treatment of the Passions ap- Division of the 
 pears to be the following : 1. Tlieir definition ; Subject. 
 
 2. Their divisions ; 3. Their treatment 
 
 5. Passions, from the word, are conditions of ,. « ^^ 
 
 . Defined from the 
 
 our nature m which we are passive. We are Word. 
 
 acted on by something. A poisonous snake suddenly arisino- 
 in the path awakens the passion of fear. The object seen pro- 
 duces a certain natural effect in the feelings. In that first 
 -effect, though it may be instantly modified by another passion 
 and by reason, we are passive. 
 
 6. Passions (as defined from the thin^, and j,^n . ^ ^^ 
 
 . ^ »? ^ Defined from the 
 
 thus troin the class) are emotions from the vivid Thing. 
 
 perception of what is pleasing or painful, directly affecting 
 the body, and through it the mind, hy creating imaginations 
 and opinions, lohich impel to the actions that are congenial 
 with the passion. 
 
 We may form a good understanding of them by following 
 the parts of this definition. 
 
 (1.) They 2iXQ emotions. Emotions are the class 
 to which Passions belong. We have before seen pmbypart%f 
 that the capacities of our nature exist in two StiJn"^'' '*®^" 
 conditions : the active and the passive. In the ^^-^ ^^^ ^^^^* 
 active condition they form faculties {facio, I do), and in the 
 passive, emotions. Thus the capacity of hearing is active in 
 attending to music by listening; but it is passive in the emo- 
 
176 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 tion of pleasure from perfect harmony. They are named 
 emotions (^, and motus^ from e-moveor^ I am moved from) be- 
 cause they are motions in our nature from one condition to 
 another. The class then to which Passions belong is that of 
 Emotions. In that class they form one division. The other 
 divisions are the Affections and the Appetites. The affections 
 are emotions of the mind simply. An example is the love of 
 duty, or hatred to wrong, or the love of God. The appetites 
 are emotions of the body. Tliey are common to man with 
 the lower animals. Such appetites are hunger and thirst. In 
 
 them we feel pain, 
 subject : 
 
 The foUowinor tabular view condenses the 
 
 Human Capa- 
 cities: 
 
 Active 
 
 ] Faculties 
 
 ./• •• ^ 
 
 Passive... \ Emotions : 
 
 {Mental, as Reason, Will, Conscience. 
 Corporeal, as Sensations. 
 ^ Semi-corporeal, as Fancy. 
 
 Mental ] Affections, 
 
 Corporeal ] Appetites, 
 
 ^ Semi-corporeal. . ■] Passions. 
 
 (2.) They are caused by vivid perceptions, 
 (2.) The Subject, rpj^.^ ^^^.^ ^^ ^j^^ definition shows the condition 
 
 of their subject,"^ of the person feeling them. One in love, 
 fear, hate, or anger, has lively ideas. If we wish to awaken the 
 passions in others, this vividness of perception must be pro- 
 duced. If we seek to subdue them in ourselves it must be 
 lessened. This liveliness of thought and feeling is common, 
 however, to the passions, with the affections of the mind, and 
 the appetites of the body. It belongs to all emotions. Thus, 
 in the affections there is a vivid perception of good and evil. 
 A man who has lost his friend by death, feels keenly the evil 
 
 * By subject is meant what is subjected. The subject in dissection is the body 
 dissected ; the subject in fever is the person subjected to fever ; the subject of 
 toothache is the tooth subjected to pain ; the subject in vision is the eye, and the 
 object is light ; the subject in hearing is the ear, and its object is sound. For 
 passions the subject generally is the man ; specially, the animal spirit, as distin- 
 guished on one side from the rational soul, and on the other, from the body, as it 
 lives in slumber. 
 
 DEFINITION EXPLAINED : OBJECTS. 177 
 
 of his loss. One stung by remorse for crime, has a strong 
 sense of the evil of transgression. These are emotions of the 
 mind. So in the appetites, there is a like perception. A per- 
 son in torturing thirst may feel, almost to madness, the delio-ht 
 which he would find in water. The dripping bucket, the cool, 
 transparent fountain, tlie sparkling, dashing rill of other times! 
 may live in his imagination. In affections we may share with 
 angels. In appetites we are with brutes, as we are in the 
 animal passions. But in all these emotions, whether in the 
 higher or lower nature, there is a vivid perception of good or 
 evil. 
 
 (3.) The objects so perceived are pleasing or 
 painful. This part of the definition states the ^' ^^® ^^^^ 
 objects^ of the Passions. The objects include what is pleasing 
 or painful to the passions. These objects are personal, or not 
 personal. They form accordingly two principal classes: 
 1. Forms of jjersonal good and evil which cause the stronger 
 passions; 2. Qualities agreeaUe or disagreeable, which p'^o- 
 duce the slighter passions. The first are personal, concentra- 
 ting consciousness on self, or on those who are to us as self. 
 The second are not personal, but withdraw consciousness from 
 self to the external object. Examples of the first class are 
 Life and Death, Health and Sickness, Wealth and Poverty, 
 Honor and Disgrace, Friends and JSTeglect. Such objects 
 cannot be referred to ourselves, or to those whom we love as 
 ourselves, without creating a strong personal interest. They 
 are forms of personal good or evil. The qualities which are 
 agreeable are principally Novelty, Excellence (as Sublimity or 
 Beauty), Grotesqueness. Each has its contrast. We shall see 
 afterward the lighter passions, such as Wonder, Awe, Admira- 
 tion, and Ridicule, which correspond to these divisions. 
 
 This part of the definition is common to the Passions with 
 
 * By object is meant that to which the action of any subject is directed, or 
 from which any action is received. The object of vision is light ; of hearing, 
 sound; of smell, odors; of conscience, right; of the will, good; of reason, truth! 
 The subject is subjected to action put under; the object is objected, put a-ainat 
 
 12 
 
178 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 the Affections above them, and the Appetites below them. 
 These emotions also regard what is pleasing or painful ; the 
 affections what is so to the mind, the appetites what is so to 
 the body. 
 
 So far we have considered what is common 'to the Passions, 
 and to those other emotions, by viewing the class, the com- 
 mon condition of the subject, and the general nature of the 
 objects as pleasing or painful. The next parts of the defini- 
 tion pass from ResembUmces to Differences. The differences 
 are seen in the effects of the passions on the body, the mind, 
 the actions. 
 
 (i.) Passions directly affect the Ijodij^ and 
 ects: throufjh it the mind. Here commences the dif- 
 
 ference between the passions and the other emotions. We 
 consider their effectj*, and begin witli effects on the body. 
 
 (a) The Passions produce some bodily change, 
 n y» ^g ^^.Q g^,g when the face is pale from fear, or 
 flushed from anger. Thus they are distinguished from the 
 affections, which are simply mental, and act serenely. But 
 passions can originate in thought. We can become angry, 
 hopeful, hating, fearing, by trains of ideas in the mind. Thus 
 passions are distinguished from appetites which originate in 
 the body. The passions act upon the body in what is solid, 
 fluid, and ethereal. They act in the solid parts upon the 
 muscles. Thus, in merriment, the muscles of the mouth, 
 nose, and eye are affected in a manner well known to all. By 
 these effects on the muscles the sculptor and actor can present 
 a countenance of grief, anger, surprise, joy, reverence. They 
 act in fluids, especially upon the blood. Thus the blood is 
 thrown into the face by shame ; out of it by fear ; into it 
 by sudden and bold anger ; out of it by anger concentrated, 
 and vindictive. They act upon what is ethereal, by aftecting 
 what is known as the animal spirits, or the nervous fluid, or 
 animal life. Under these names is iniplied a subtle agent, 
 mediating between the mind and the body, and between both 
 and the universe. By this agency, whatever be the name 
 
 BODILY EFFECT OF PASSION. 
 
 179 
 
 given, the actions of the mind are impressed upon the nerves, 
 the muscles, and the blood.* This ethereal or electric fluid 
 may rise, fall, dilate, contract. Some passions carry a current 
 upward. This is the effect of all the animating passions, as 
 Joy, Boldness, Hope. Hence the eye fills with light, the blood 
 ascends, the muscles of eye and lip are lifted, and in the voice 
 the key is sharper, the volume greater. Some passions carry 
 this vital current downward. This is the effect of the depress- 
 ing passions. Sorrow, Fear, Despair. The eye loses its lustre, 
 the countenance falls, the lines of the face are all cast down, 
 the blood sinks from the face, and, if the emotion be excessive, 
 the very frame is cast into a recumbent posture. Tlie voice 
 sinks, and comes in broken, semitonic movements. Some 
 passions dilate. This is the effect from those whose objects 
 are great, as Reverence, Admiration, Wonder, awakened by 
 things or thoughts of grandeur and sublimity. The eye ex- 
 pands, the brow is open, the nostrils dilate, the voice becomes 
 low and full. Some of these dilating passions are accompa- 
 nied with a movement downward ; and hence in Reverence 
 the falling of the eyebrow, of the lower lip, and of the voice. 
 Some are accompanied with a movement upward. Such are 
 the animating passions when kindled by great objects ; for 
 example, those of a true hero in the hour of combat. Some 
 passions contract. This is the effect from those whose objects 
 are, or are viewed as small or unworthy : Contempt, Ridicule 
 by Mockery, Envy, Jealousy. The eye contracts, the brows, 
 nose, mouth, voice, seem drawn in, to embody the littleness 
 and meanness which we contemplate. These disagreeable 
 emotions are combined with movements upward. But con- 
 traction in the animal spirits may unite with downward move- 
 ments. This is the effect in emotions gentle and subduing, 
 the contracted character of the expression coming not so much 
 from the object considered as from the feeling of the person ; 
 
 ♦ Consult Des Cartes' Treatise on the Passions for a more full statement of this 
 part of the subject. 
 
\ - 
 
 180 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 for example, in Pitj, Melancliolj, gentle aspirations, desires for 
 purity and nobleness. 
 
 The four simple movements are combined with each other 
 in various ways, according to the object of the passion, or the 
 condition of the person who is the subject.^ Such is the 
 action on the body. 
 
 The bodily condition, though it have a mental origin, reacts 
 upon the mind. It is a law of Xature that mind and body 
 shall act and react on each other, reciprocally and perpetually. 
 A condition of the mind expresses itself in the body. Tlie 
 movements, and even the assumed expressions of a passion in 
 the body affect, correspondentl}^ the mind. 
 
 {h.) Passions act upon the mi/nd, by creating 
 ^ * imaginations^ opinions^ and desires. From their 
 bodily effect we thus come to the mental. The imagina- 
 tion is strongly affected. When passions are warmly excited, 
 the mind is occupied with images belonging to the passion. 
 Thus in any strong desire for an absent object, there are 
 mental pictures of it and of enjoyments attending it. A person 
 apprehending fire sees in imagination his house burning, and 
 one full of fears at sea, is haunted by visions of shipwreck, and 
 one near a precipice imagines a fall. This is the case with all 
 the passions. This fact is to be remembered when we seek to 
 allay or awaken them in others, or to control them in our- 
 selves. 
 
 The opinions are changed by the Passions. Angry, we form 
 a judgment quite different from that of our calmer moods. 
 We estimate things, actions, persons differently, as the passions 
 in our minds are different. A man on land, saddened by 
 dangers and hardships at sea, contemplates a voyage with 
 aversion. The same man, wearied with monotony, and worn 
 
 ♦ A treatise might be written on the analogies between the Passions and 
 Music. The sharps, the flats, the major and minor modes correspond to these up- 
 ward, downward, expanding, and contracting movements. Certain emotions re- 
 quire certain Icinds of music, and reversely the music awakes the correspondent 
 emotion. See Plato's Works, and Gardiner's " Music of Nature." 
 
 EFFECT OF PASSION ON ACTIONS. 
 
 181 
 
 w,A vexations on shore, considers it as full of attractions. 
 Suffering under remorse, caused by some wrong action, we 
 tlimk we can never again be guilty of it. Placed where the 
 passion belonging to it (as revenge, hate, desire) is fully 
 awakened, we view the same action as most desirable. 
 Wrong conduct in one passionately loved, seems right or 
 triflmg.^ The same, in one hated or envied, appears atrocious. 
 What is true of individuals, is so of masses. Tlie public 
 passions in a community, color all their sentiments concerning 
 men and measures. Such is the effect of passion, on opinion! 
 It IS that which is prominent in a rhetorical view of the 
 Passions. Hence Aristotle in his Rhetoric considers them aa 
 " feelings accompanied by pleasure and pain, which change the 
 opinions."* 
 
 ^ It is here that the word Emotion in its etymological sense, 
 IS singularly appropriate. We are moved from one judgment 
 to another. 
 
 _ Such are the mental effects of the Passions on the imagina- 
 tion and the opinions ; we have thus seen their internal effects 
 in the body and in the mind. Next is their external effect. 
 
 Tlie external effect is in actions. 
 
 (e.) Passions impel to the actions which are 
 congenial with them. The imaginations, opin- («•>«>» Actions, 
 ions, and desires awakened by them unite in concentrated in- 
 fluence to impel. And the effect of that impulse is some 
 action congenial with the passion. 
 
 The man overcome by fear in the face of danger finds an 
 impulse to fly, running into his feet. The action of flight 
 follows. One aroused by violent anger feels a desire to strike 
 impelling his hand, and a desire to reproach driving his tongue. 
 Deeds of violence or words of insult are the outward effects. 
 Under hope, the young and aspiring sailor battles with the 
 waves. Under jealousy, Othello murders. Under shame, the 
 supine Athenians aroused by Demosthenes cry out, " Let us 
 march against Philip ; let us conquer or die !" 
 
 *Aris.. Rliet. ii 1. 
 
182 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Such are the effects of the Passions on the hodj, and the 
 mind, and in actions.* 
 
 We have thus viewed the general nature of the Passions. 
 
 7. From the definition we can perceive that 
 
 To know tliem, ^ ^ ^ . 
 
 see Objects, and the two principal matters to be ever regarded in 
 
 ^ ^^ ** studying the Passions are their objects and their 
 
 Bnbjects. Their objects are things and persons which awaken 
 
 , .^ . « ^. . them. Their subiects are persons feeling them. 
 In their Subjects, . *' J f, 
 
 dispositions to Persons as subject to passions are classified by 
 
 their dispositions. Dispositions to the passions 
 are universal, particular, and momentary. Universal disposi- 
 tions to the passions are those which belong to all men alike. 
 Particular dispositions are those which bel'ong to one group of 
 men. They arise from natural or conventional difierences. 
 The natural differences are those of age and temperament. 
 The ages, as they relate to the passions, are youth, maturity, 
 old age. Tlie temperaments are the active and the passive : 
 the active including the choleric and sanguineous ; the passive, 
 the phlegmatic and melancholic. The conventional differ- 
 ences are those of social condition. They are prosperity, 
 mediocrity, adversity ; in wealth, station, and friends. Thus the 
 young are more disposed to hope, the old to fear, the choleric to 
 anger, the phlegmatic to vengeance, the prosperous to a want 
 of pity, the disappointed to envy, the afilicted to indignation. 
 
 The momentary dispositions to certain passions are those 
 produced by a transitory condition of body or mind. A mart 
 when under the influence of stimulants has a stronger proclivity 
 to certain passions than when he is unexcited. One in pain is 
 irritable. 
 
 To understand the Passions, therefore, we must know what 
 objects produce them both in persons and in things, and also 
 
 ♦ Whoever wishes to investigate the subject of the Passions more extensively, 
 will find them treated most fully in their Ethical relations by Thomas Aquinas, 
 (Sum. ii., 1); in their rhetorical relations by Aristotle, Rhetoric, ii., 2; in their 
 effect. on the animal spirits by Des Cartes; in their artistic relations for artist and 
 actor in the Encyclopedic Methodique, in the division " Beaux Arts." 
 
 PASSIOi^S. OBJECTS DIMDED. 
 
 183 
 
 Division. 
 
 wliat are tfie dispositions, universal, particular, and momentary 
 in their subject. Such knowledge is necessary for dealing with 
 passion in ourselves and others. Thus, to guard against 
 violent anger in ourselves we must prevent, if we can, the cir- 
 cumstances which cause it, and avoid being in the dispositions 
 of mind or body which incline to it. To awaken hope in 
 others, to allay resentment, to subdue revenge, to awaken to 
 pity, to enkindle shame, we must seek to destroy adverse dis- 
 positions in those who are to be moved, and to present both 
 the things and persons which are the natural objects of the 
 Emotion felt by us and desired in the persons addressed. 
 
 8. Having defined the Passions, we have an- 
 swered the question ; what are they ? We are 
 next to see what are their kinds. We thus proceed from defi- 
 nition to division. 
 
 9. The rule for making their simpler divi- Method for 
 sions is to follow the divisions of their objects, division. 
 
 We therefore recapitulate, and, at the same time, give more 
 fully the divisions of the oljecfs of the Passions. 
 
 10. The objects, as before shown, are pleasing Divisions of 
 and painful. Objects pleasing and painful are the Objects, 
 divided into those personal and those not personal. Those 
 w^hich are personal are forms of good and evil strongly affect- 
 ing ourselves, directly or through others. Those which are 
 not personal are qualities in things, agreeable or disagreeable, 
 acting more gently, by giving a certain degree of pleasure or 
 the reverse. 
 
 11. These qualities are Novelty, Excellence, Grotesque- 
 NESS, with their respective contrasts, Commonness, Imperfec- 
 tion, Decorousness. Excellence requires a farther division. 
 Excellence may be considered as greater than the beholder, 
 and form Sublimity, or as in proportion to him, and form 
 Beauty. Their evident contrasts are Lowness and Ugliness. 
 These are divisions of the ohjects of the Passions. 
 
 12. The divisions of the Passions correspond to SmsK tSe 
 those of the objects. Passions are personal or not P**"®^* 
 
184 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 PERSONAL PASSIONS. 
 
 185 
 
 j)er8onal. The j>€rsonal are those which have jpersonal good (/r evil 
 for their object^ and which are thus strangest in their action, 
 Passions not personal are those which do not have personal 
 good or evil for their object^ hut mdy certain qualities which 
 form emotions less violent than those from the personal pas- 
 sions. 
 
 The Hon- ^^- '^^^^ emotion correspondent to novelty is 
 
 personal. "WoxDER ; tliat to sublimity is Awe; that to 
 
 beauty is Admiration ; that to grotesqueness is a Sense of 
 THE Ludicrous. The contrast of wonder is Tedium, which is 
 weariness, from what is too conmion and familiar; that of awe 
 is Contempt, the emotion belonging to what is low or trivial; 
 that of admiration is Disgust, the feeling awakened by what 
 is ugly. The contrast to a sense of the ludicrous is the Ab- 
 *sence of Humor, an insensibility to the ordinary causes of 
 inirthfulness. 
 
 These lighter emotions require no farther consideration. 
 Ethical nde re- ^^- ^^^^ before leaving them, we should ob- 
 gardmg them, g^j.^,^ g, good Ethical rule, wliich arises from the 
 distinction of passions into the personal and non-personal. It- 
 is, that we should carr}^ into social and domestic life, the second 
 class, the non-personal, and not the first, or personal. The 
 emotions which are not personal, those in which we most forget 
 self, sweeten and brighten intercourse with others. Reversely, 
 the person who carries a strong self-concentration everywhere, 
 with every personal passion alive in him, is unsuited to enjoy 
 or be enjoyed, to appreciate propriety in others, or to observe 
 it in his own behavior. The non-personal emotions are all of 
 them sources of social pleasure. The enjoyment of novelty, 
 admiration of the beautiful, and reverence for the sublime in 
 nature, art, and character, amusement with the grotesque in 
 incidents and narratives, these joined with kindly and self-for- 
 getting affections, are found by experience to make intercourse 
 delightful. But the clouds and storms of that intercourse are 
 mostly from the obtrusion of those personal passions, to which 
 we now return. 
 
 15. Of the two classes, the Personal Passions The Personal 
 require a more full consideration, both because of i^assions: their 
 their strength and of their diffusion. Thev are ^^^'''' 
 
 60 Strong as to produce great effects in individuals and the 
 public. They are so diffused, that within us, thought, feelino-, 
 purpose, character, are affected perpetually by them, and exter- 
 nally, words, actions, manners, all feel their sway. 
 
 16. To understand all the Personal Passions, a in, - 
 tamiliar fact should be recalled to the attention, thetic action. 
 
 It is that we can regard others as if they were ourselves, and 
 consequently extend our personal passions to them. A mother, 
 by a sick child, will experience sorrow, hope, fear, as if the 
 sickness were her own. A good man will pity the suffering 
 of a worthy fellow-man, from the sense of a common tie and 
 common principles. All these personal passions then are to 
 be considered as liable to this extension, to this sympathetic 
 action. 
 
 17. The Personal Passions are divided into the Division of the 
 simple and the complex. The complex are merely ^eJ^sonai Pas- 
 those which are not simple, but made by combi- ci^lex"^^ ^' 
 nations. When we know the simple, we are prepared to under 
 stand the others. 
 
 18. The simple Personal Passions are general or special, Tlie 
 general are eight: Love and Hate; Desire and sij^p^^ ^^^ 
 Aversion ; Hope and Fear ; Jor and Sorrows e^al or special. 
 They are general because they have for their objects, not this 
 or that special good or evil thing, but any good or any evil. 
 
 19. These general simple Passions are distin- 
 guished, each from the others, by their objects, knobby S?^®' 
 Good or evil is viewed by every person, absolutely ^®*^^^' 
 
 or relatively. Eelatively and by position, it is absent from him 
 or present with him. If absent, it is viewed as without or 
 with intervening obstacles. To these divisions, correspond the 
 simple general personal passions. The passions correspondent 
 to good and evil absolute, are Love and Hate : to them absent 
 simply, Desire and Aversion: to them absent, but with 
 
186 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 PERSONAL PASSIONS SIMPLE. 
 
 187 
 
 obstacles intervening, Hope and Fear: to them present, Joy 
 and Sorrow. This is simplified by a tabular view : 
 
 Personal 
 
 Passions 
 
 simple 
 
 are 
 
 from 
 Good or 
 
 EvU. 
 
 j Love, 
 
 Absolute (i. e., the object regarded simply in itself). . -j ^^j^ 
 
 rWithout obstacles. . | ^^^oif. 
 
 [with obstacles j Fear! * 
 
 (Joy, 
 \ Sorrow. 
 
 r Absent. . 
 
 Relative; in 
 position. 
 
 I 
 
 Present. 
 
 Love. 
 
 ^. , . , 20. This view can be well established in the 
 Simple view of 
 
 them as stages reason and memory by regarding passion as a 
 
 movement to an attractive object, and noting the 
 natural stages of that movement. The tendency to move i& 
 from love: the movement begins in desire: it continuet 
 through obstacles by hope : it reaches tlie object and its fruition 
 in joy. Love and Hate are the fountains. 
 
 21. Of all these. Love demands the fullest discussion. 
 
 The term Love is used in this language both in 
 a universal and particular signification. By the 
 former it includes an affection, an appetite, and a passion. 
 Love as an affection belongs to the mind, to the higher prin- 
 ciples of our nature. Such is the love of God, or the love ot 
 country, or the highest love of friendship. Love as an appetite 
 belongs to the body. Such is the love of animals for their 
 mates and their oftspring. Love as b. passion, is partly mental 
 and partly physical. It is applied to persons and to things. 
 An example of it applied to persons is a man or woman in 
 love. An example of it applied to things is a passion for 
 money, for praise, for glory, and for like objects of human 
 pursuit. The special personal passions, to be afterwards con- 
 sidered, are examples of love for things. In love universally, 
 and including the affection, the appetite, and the passion, 
 are two common elements, the one being the passiv^e and 
 the other the active condition of the emotion. The first is 
 the appreciation of good in the object loved. The other is 
 
 the wish to bestow good on the object loved.* Thus in the 
 affection of love to the Deity there is, passively, a sense of His 
 unspeakable perfection, and there is actively a will to serve 
 and to glorify Him. In the affection of love of country, there 
 is a sensibility to the charm of the native land, and there is a 
 willingness to do, dare, and suffer for the public benefit. In the 
 affection of friendship, there is appreciation of the sweetness 
 of the tie, and there is also a constant wish to do good to the 
 friend. As it is in the affection so it is in the appetite. In 
 the love of animals for their mates and offspring, there is 
 sensibility to the attraction of the object loved, and there is a 
 readiness to gratify and to defend. These two elements enter 
 also into love as a passion, the present subject. And so we see 
 that in love universally, the object is some good, apprehended 
 to be possessed, or wished to be bestowed. All love implies 
 complacency and favor. The contrasts appear in Hate, which 
 includes repulsion and malevolence. 
 
 (1.) love as a passion, therefore, includes both elements. 
 In love, as a passion for things, the first element predominates. 
 The second appears incidentally and in a very low degree, since 
 the passion is selfish. For example, one impassioned for 
 power may wish his child to possess the same. Love as 
 applied to things, is accordingly a pleasing passion, arising 
 from sensibility to the attraction of some congenial personal 
 good, and from a vivid perception of it. The miser lifts the 
 cover of his golden hoard, and gloats over the glittering heaps, 
 because of his intense love of money. 
 
 (2.) In Love as a passion applied to persons, the second 
 element predominates, that of a wish to bestow good on the 
 loved person. There is the previous condition of mind belong- 
 ing to the passion for a thing to be possessed. But beyond 
 and above this, there is also a wish to promote the hap- 
 
 *Amor concupiscentm, amor amiciiioB; the distinction of the older writers and 
 scholastics. St. Thorn. Aq., ii, 1, Ques. 26, art. 4. I differ from them in their lim- 
 itation of this distinction to the passion. 
 
 
188 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Fear. 
 
 Hope. 
 
 piness of the object loved. When this latter element of 
 benevolence is in highest degree, love rises from the range of 
 passion towards the glory of an affection and a principle. 
 It is the willing of good for another. It is favor, good-will, 
 disinterestedness, and differs from universal Charity, only in its 
 limitations. When this disinterested element is in lower dejrree, 
 love sinks to a selfish passion. Persons receive from us the emo- 
 tions belonging to things. We love them for our pleasure. 
 
 22. Fear is a painful passion from the lively 
 perception, in the imagination, of coming evil. 
 
 Tlie evil must be of some magnitude, distinct and imminent 
 We must include in our perceptions causes real or imaginary, 
 sufficient to produce the evil feared. 
 
 23. Hope is the reverse of Fear. It is a per- 
 ception of adequate causes of coming good, mak- 
 ing the imagination to behold the good as near, and evils as 
 being destroyed or as being far away. 
 
 [The officer must deal with these passions in the force under 
 his command, and often also in the public mind.] 
 
 24. The other simple and general Passions require little more 
 Degrees in the elucidation in this limited course. It is only to be 
 simple general, remarked that all the simple passions exist in 
 various degrees. Love may grow to mad infatuation ; Hate 
 to diabolic malice; Joy to ecstasy; Sorrow to agony, and 
 Aversion to deadly antipathy. As obstacles lessen, Hope rises 
 into confidence, and Fear diminishes into diffidence. As 
 obstacles increase moderately, confidence becomes boldness, 
 and as they increase immoderately. Fear passes into despond- 
 ency. When they are insuperable, the mind moves from 
 despondency to despair. [It is well for a military man to 
 appreciate these varying degrees of hope and fear since he will 
 find them among troops.] 
 
 25. Such are the simple general Passions. Before passing 
 from them to the special and the complex, the reader should 
 observe how the former underlie all the latter. And in the 
 former, the simple and general, he should see which are the 
 
 SOURCES ARE IN LOVE AND HATE. 
 
 189 
 
 corner-stones, since he thus learns how to deal with passions ia 
 himself and others. 
 
 26. These simple general Passions enter into 
 all the special and all the complex, mixed pas- g'^^ltw 
 sions. Thus in any special passion, as Avarice, i» the special 
 there is first the love of money, then desire for it, *°^ *'^°'P^®''- 
 then hope, then joy, as in the case of the miser. In approba- 
 tiveness, the love of praise inclines to it, there is a desire for 
 praise, hope for praise, joy in praise. So it is clearly in the 
 mixed or complex passions, since they are but combinations of 
 the simple. Anger for example, as we shall see, is a combina- 
 tion of grief and desire; grief from some infliction given, 
 desire to bestow infliction in return. 
 
 27. As these simple general Passions are at 
 
 the basis of all the others, so they in turn have last to Lov^Ind 
 two which are primary and fundamental. These ^^*^' 
 are Love and Hate. Love and Hate are the origin of all the 
 rest. They are primary, being the dispositions which prepare 
 for all the rest. Without them the others could not exist. If 
 one had no love he could have no desire for any thing, nor hope 
 nor enjoyment, since he would be without the primary sensi- 
 bility on which all the others depend. 
 
 28. From this fact arises an Ethical rule. 
 
 Limit and regulate your attachments and aver- ^^^^^ "le- 
 sions. Each new sensibility which you permit, exposes you to 
 the inroads of a train of passions. The love of money, for ex- 
 ample, must bring all its attendant sensibilities and cravings. 
 Hatred to labor or learning has its train of consequences. 
 
 29. The same fact teaches where to begin in dealing with the 
 passions of others. The commencement is in the perception 
 of what they love and dislike. Thence come their suscepti- 
 bilities and iDassions. 
 
 30. Next in the personal class are the simple simple 
 special Passions. The special passions are those *P^°^*^- 
 which are directed upon some specific hind of good or evil. 
 They are as various as the things to which they apply. 
 
190 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 All are not 
 enumerated. 
 
 Prominent taken. 
 
 31. All of the miscellaneous need not be enu- 
 merated here. An example would be Avarice, 
 the love of money. 
 
 Those which are prominent and important 
 have for their objects Reputation, Superiority, 
 and Infliction of Suffering. 
 
 . 32. The passions belonging to Reputation are 
 
 A clSSlOIlS HXiacCL % r 
 
 with love of the Love ot Approbation, Shame, Impudence. 
 
 By Reputation is meant the good opinion of 
 us in other men, whether latent in thought as esteem, or 
 manifested by words in praise, or by deeds in honors. 
 Love of Approbation is sensibility to any of these: it is a 
 lively perception of good in esteem, praise, or honor, more es- 
 pecially in the two latter. Shame is sorrow from the loss of 
 this good, and from the existence, in its place, of contempt. 
 Impudence is insensibility to shame. These passions should 
 be understood by all who wish to govern passions in theip- 
 selves or others. In the military profession the soldier's sen- 
 sibility to reputation can be skilfully used Jboth for discipline 
 and victory. Napoleon appeals to it in his proclamations. In 
 governing men it is important to understand who are, and 
 who are not, sensible to shame. Homer describes Ulysses 
 stopping the army before Troy, when it started to go home, 
 by appeals to a sense of shame in those who could feel it, 
 and by sound blows on those who were shameless.* He who 
 governs others, and must punish or reward in administering 
 justice or discipline, should adapt his measures to his men. 
 "With love of ^^* The passions belonging to Superiority are 
 
 Superiority: Emulation and Jealousy. A competition exists 
 or is supposed between ouVselves and others for something 
 which we deem good. Superiority is the surpassing of com- 
 petitors in the attainment of this good. An example is victory 
 in a foot race. Emulation is hope for this superiority for our- 
 selves. Jealousy is the fear tliat others may attain it. The 
 
 * Homer's Iliad. Book 2. 
 
 SPECIAL PASSIONS : CRUELTY. 
 
 191 
 
 distinction of emulation from envy will appear subsequentlj^ 
 [Of these, Emulation can be used with much effect in military 
 administration. The commander can arouse one body of men 
 by tlie deeds of another.] 
 
 34. The passion belonging to the Infliction of ^^^ infliction 
 Suffering is Cruelty. This is distinct from Re- of Suffering, 
 venge, which implies the previous reception of some injury, 
 and which inflicts for retaliation. But cruelty is a simple spe- 
 cial passion. It is pleasure in witnessing suffering. Savages 
 encircling the victim subjected to torture at the stake and by 
 fire, love and delight in the spectacle. The slow agonies of 
 the sufferer seem to give the beholders a kind of intoxication. 
 Among refined and civilized nations persecutors have mani- 
 fested the same gratification from the same object. Cruelty 
 may appear as blood-thirstiness, or as delight in torture. Thirst 
 for blood is a desire for indiscriminate destruction of life. It 
 is awakened when unresisted slaughter has begun. It is mani- 
 fested by troops in pursuit after a defeated enemy, and also 
 in the sack of a town. It is shown by whole populations in 
 revolutions. In the massacres at Paris and at Lyons, during 
 the great Revolution of France, mere blood-thirstiness, with 
 no rational object, was exhibited as a purely blind animal 
 instinct. Delight in torture is less indiscriminate. It selects 
 individual victims, and individualizes their sufferings and the 
 grades of them, one by one, as a miser counts his gains to the 
 minutest fraction. A high dignitary of England, in times not 
 very far remote, had a lady of the court subjected to torture, 
 and, dissatisfied with the slow movements of the executioner 
 put his own hand to the instrument to wrench the limbs apart 
 more vigorously.* 
 
 Cruelty is closely allied to fear. A common device for 
 exciting whole bodies of men to deeds of cruelty is to spread 
 panics among them. It was b/this means that the population 
 of Paris was stimulated to execute the massacres of Septem- 
 ber, and to acquiesce in the daily executions by the guillotine. 
 
 ♦Hume. 
 
192 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 The most exaggerated terrors were first difiiised. Fear extin- 
 guished pity, and incited to cruelty. When destruction had 
 begun, blood-thirstiness was formed. So intimate is the con- 
 nection of fear with this passion tliat it has given rise to the 
 proverb: Cowards are always cruel. 
 
 [In military direction this passion is to be repressed among 
 troops. It is unfavorable to discipline, and to all rational 
 purposes proposed by war. Troops must do simply that which 
 is commanded, but no more.] 
 
 T nsition from ^^' ^^ 1^^^'^ seen the simple special Passions, 
 •impie to complex. Leaving both divisions of the simple, we now 
 come to the complex. The complex Passions appear in a tab- 
 uhir view wiiich follows. 
 
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194 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 COMPLEX passions: now classified. 
 
 195 
 
 Complex eirn- ^^- ^^^^ complex Passions are those whicli are 
 
 merated. j^qi simple. They are ten. Five regard evil. 
 
 They are Indignation, Anger, Pity, Revenge, Remorse. Five 
 regard good. They are Satisfaction, Gratitude, Gratulatiou, 
 Envy, Exultation. 
 
 Made complex ^^' ^^ understand and classify them, we are 
 
 by combinations^, ^q observe that, as being not simple, but complex, 
 In Object or Sub- ^^^^J ^^^ ^^^ made by some kind of combinations. 
 J®^*' Tiie combinations are principally in the objects 
 
 considered by the passions. The combinations are subordi- 
 iiately in the suhject feeling the emotions, and combining in one 
 movement some of the primary and general passions : Love or 
 Hate, Desire or Aversion, Hope or Fear, Joy or Sorrow. 
 Those of the ^8- The combinations regarding the objects are 
 
 Object. principal, and form the great distinction of this 
 
 whole group of complex from the simple passions. This dis- 
 tinction is to be carefully noted by all who wish to know, to 
 govern, and to manage the passions in themselves or in other 
 persons. 
 
 p^g J. , . ' The great distinction^ then^ of the complex Pas- 
 porunt distinc- sions IS, that they combine ethical sentiments with 
 
 the olements of passion. The ethical sentiment 
 which they specially interweave is that of Justice.* They 
 regard good and evil in self and in others, as worthily or 
 unworthily, deservedly or undeservedly received. The words 
 good and ei^il^ express the pathetical element. The words 
 deserved and undeserved^ the ethical. In the movements of 
 these passions there is a lively perception, though often erro- 
 neous, of that equality which, as has been shown, is the aim 
 of Justice. There is in them a craving for an equilibrium 
 between desert on the one side, and the good or evil on the 
 other. When the good or evil is deserved, we conceive that 
 
 * Though I am ordinarily inclined to leave to the uninvited observation of man- 
 kind and to the slow appreciation of time, such improvements as I may suggest 
 in different subjects, I cannot but invite attention to this. I deem it of great im- 
 portance. 
 
 the equilibrium is existing; and, when undeserved, that the 
 equilibrium is wanting. Thus we have Indignation when any 
 great good or evil is bestowed unworthily. In reading a tale, 
 we have satisfaction when all the characters receive according 
 to their deserts. In Envy, we deem our successful competitors 
 less worthy than ourselves, and we desire to strip them of their 
 advantages and reduce them to an equality with us. In Re- 
 venge, we deem the suffering which we inflict as an equivalent 
 to the injuries which we have received. So it is with the rest. 
 Since this ethical element of Justice enters into these com- 
 plex passions, every one who governs men in military, political, - 
 judicial, industrial, social, or other relations, should remember 
 the inevitable effect of every act of injustice in awakening 
 human passions. In this respect, as in others, the strictest 
 principle is the highest prudence. Perfect justice prevents and 
 subdues passions. It creates and lives in serenity. The worst 
 tumults, military and civil, which history records, have come 
 from real or supposed injustice. 
 
 39. For a general view of the first table, we Explanation of 
 
 observe that * the First Table. 
 
 ^ The complex Passions are classified from their objects, by 
 eimply combining the elements with the persons. The elements 
 are pathetical or ethical. The pathetical are good and evil ; 
 the ethical are the presence or absence of desert. The persons 
 are others or ourselves. By carrying out these combinations, 
 we have, not a specific but a general view of the complex pas- 
 sions. The combinations arc reduced under three heads. 1. 
 Good or evil befalling others. 2. Good bestowed on others or 
 ourselves. 3. Evil inflicted. 
 
 Indignation and Satisfaction are general sentiments. 
 
 40. For a general view of the second table we Explanation of 
 observe that the Second. 
 
 In classifying them by the condition of the subject, the per- 
 son feeling them, we consider the simple general passions 
 which enter them. All the simple general passions spring, as 
 we have seen, from Love and Hate. Love is the origin for^'cor- 
 
19^ 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 ti 
 
 
 Taken, one by 
 one. 
 
 First group. 
 
 Indignation. 
 
 respondent desires, hopes, and joys ; Hate for aversions, fears, 
 and griefs. 
 
 Five of the ten passions imply Love. They are Satisfaction, 
 Pity, Gratulation, Gratitude, Exultation. Five imply Ilate, 
 They are Indignation, Hevenge, Anger, Remorse, Envy. Again, 
 the reader sees that, in dealing with the passions in himself 
 and others, he must keep his attention ever on the primary 
 loves and hatreds. They are the fountain of the stream, the 
 germ of the plant. 
 
 41. From this general view we come to each 
 separately, following the order of position in the 
 first table. 
 
 In the first group are two : Indignation and 
 Satisfaction. 
 
 42. The sight of good or evil befalling others 
 unworthily, and wholly undeserved by them, pro- 
 duces in a beholder Indignation. In indignation there is hate 
 in some degree to the cause of the wrong, felt to persons, and 
 even to things. There is aversion to the coui-se of conduct 
 which inflicted*the wrong, and there is grief at witnessing the 
 wrong, and in the case of evil, the sufi*ering. Thus indigna- 
 tion would be aroused by the spectacles so often witnessed in 
 the history of despotic empires. An upright and able digni- 
 tary, who has committed no fault, is disgraced, reduced to pov- 
 erty, imprisoned, tortured, slain, and his innocent kindred are 
 subjected to similar and successive disasters. An unworthy 
 man is raised from obscure station, and lifted above the nobles 
 of a kingdom, in wealth, power, and the ensigns of rank. 
 The contemporary beholder or the distant reader feels indigna- 
 tion. 
 
 43. Satisfaction is simply the contrasted emo- 
 tion. It is awakened by the spectacle of men 
 
 getting precisely what we think they deserve. Imagine a his- 
 tory nearly the reverse of the previous examples. A wise, 
 patriotic, and able statesman, long neglected, is elevated to 
 power by his sovereign. A wicked, unworthy, and cruel miu- 
 
 Satisf action. 
 
 envy: pity: revenge: angeb. 
 
 197 
 
 ister is reduced and punished. There would be love to the 
 authors of the measure, admiration of the policy, desire that it 
 might be pursued, and joy in the equality between what was 
 deserved and what was received. 
 
 Indignation and Satisfaction are not only caused by inten- 
 tioiial acts from men, but also by accidental circumstances. 
 
 44. Indignation and Satisfaction enter into tlie ^ , . 
 *,^.,, • • . . , Selation of these 
 
 remammg passions m the two otlier groups. For to the others. 
 
 example, there is a certain degree of Indignation in Envy. 
 But when they become intense, they are distinct, separated 
 passions. They are named in the table as general, because iu 
 their moderated action they underlie the others. This fact is 
 of great practical value for directing the management of pas- 
 sions in one's own person, or in otlier men. If even the lighter 
 movements of Indignation and Satisfaction are awakened"", the 
 foundation is laid for the others. 
 
 45. In the second group are four : Pity, Ee- 
 venge, Anger, Eemorse. Second Group: 
 
 The sight of evil inflicted on others, when 
 mostly undeserved by them, awakens Pity. Tli^e ^*^' 
 evil must be real, more than trifling, and inflict injury and 
 pain.-^ It must be in great part, but not wholly, undeserved. 
 A great evil, wholly undeserved, would cause pure Indigna- 
 tion ; and if wholly deserved. Satisfaction. Hence, skilful 
 writers of tragedies and of tragic tales, aiming to move Pity, 
 present their heroes or heroines as suffering in part by their 
 own minor faults or mistakes. There is enough goodness in 
 the character to awaken interest, but not such an entire free- 
 dom from error as to put Indignation above Pity. Pity is 
 thus, in part, a reduced Indignation. But Indignation, as a 
 distinct, intense emotion, may overpass Pity, and take its 
 place. He who wishes to produce Indignation may begin 
 with Pity as preparatory. Mark Antony, over Csesar's body, 
 first awakens Pity, and then passes beyond it, on the thermom- 
 eter, to mere Indignation.* But he who wishes to draw the 
 
 * Aris., Rhet., b. 2. | Shakspeare's Drama of Julius Caesar. 
 
 ^ ri 
 
198 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 tears of Pitj, must not ascend so high as Indignation. Those 
 who " pile on the agony," to use the expressive language of 
 common life, may make men indignant at wrong, but not 
 soften them to Pity. Having thus distinguished Pity from 
 intense Indignation, we can regard the simple passions which 
 interweave their activity in its movements. There is love for 
 the suffering person ; there is sorrow at the sight of his suffcr- 
 in*^' ; there is desire to relieve him. Tliere is also a certain 
 fear lest the same evils might happen to ourselves, or to those 
 connected with us. The capacity for feeling Pity depends, 
 indeed, on the idea that we or ours might have a like visit- 
 ation. Desperate men are pitiless over suffering, as hoping 
 nothino:. Confident and successful men are insolent to the 
 suffering, as fearing nothing. But the fear must not be ex- 
 cessive, otherwise it extinguishes Pity. Those excessively 
 timid are as pitiless as the over-bold. Beside these combina- 
 tions, distinctive of Pity, are the subdued elements that enter 
 Indignation : the dislike, aversion, and grief produced by 
 
 wrong. 
 
 46. Evil inflicted by ns on others, and de- 
 Eevenge; served by them as retaliation for injuries done 
 by them to ourselves, is the object contemplated by Revenge. 
 It must be considered as deserved for injuries which we, or 
 ours, have received, since otherwise it is the sentiment of Satis- 
 faction. Satisfaction is felt when any man receives the evil 
 which we think he deserves for any wrong to any one. But 
 the spirit of Vengeance is met when the other party receives 
 the evil he deserves for wrongs done to us or ours. Vengeance 
 is more fully met when we ourselves inflict those evils. Ke- 
 venge is thus a species of Satisfaction. It includes hate, a 
 desire to punish, and joy in both the suffering and requital. 
 
 47. Evil inflicted on ourselves by another, in- 
 ^^®'* tentionally, and without any perception on our 
 part that we deserve it, will cause Anger. It is not necessary 
 that the evil be great. It is enough that our feelings are 
 pained, and that the person with whom we are angry has dis- 
 
 EEMORSE : ENVY. 
 
 199 
 
 regarded those feelings by negative neglect or positive oppo- 
 sition. This consciousness of the want of personal consider- 
 ation is prominent in Anger. The simple passions it includes 
 are Grief, Momentary Aversion, and Desire for Revenge— de- 
 sire to inflict suffering by word or deed in return. Anger is a 
 modified Indignation, being accompanied by a sense of evil, 
 undeserved. But Indignation as a separate passion is perma- 
 nent, while Anger is transitory, and softened by time. The 
 immediate remedy for Anger is the removal of its cause. The 
 cause being intentional disregard, Anger is pacified by show- 
 ing the absence of intention in the person supposed to offend.* 
 
 48. Evil inflicted on ourselves, and wholly 
 deserved, causes Remorse. Remorse, as an emo- ^®°^°^s®- 
 tion, is distinct from Repentance. The simple passions which 
 appear in Remorse are momentary hatred of self for wrong 
 conduct, aversion to that conduct, and grief under the evils 
 which it has wrou£:ht. 
 
 49. In the third group are four : Envy, Gratu- 
 
 lation. Gratitude, Exultation. Third Group: 
 
 Good obtained by otliers, and specially by our equals and 
 competitors, not appearing to our imaginations to be deserved 
 by them, is an object causing Envy. 
 
 Envy, therefore, is sorrow from the perception 
 of advantages possessed by equals and competi- ^^^'' 
 toi-s. It is distinct from Emulation. In Emulation we wish 
 to obtain for ourselves, but in Envy we are indignant that 
 others possess. Envy being accompanied by lower degrees of 
 Indignation has the simple passions which accompany the 
 latter. There are in Envy hatred to the person envied ; sor- 
 row, because of the good possessed ; and desire to deprive him 
 of it. Envy attends the aspiring. It is stronger and more 
 enduring in proportion, as the disposition is more mean and 
 base. Emulation belongs to nobler natures. Whoever is 
 tempted to Envy should turn it into a generous Emulation. 
 
 ♦Aristotle, Rhet., b. 2. 
 
 J 
 
200 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 50. Good bestowed on others, and appearing 
 rat on ; ^^ ^^ ^^ |^^ deserved by them, is the object of 
 
 Gratulation. By this we mean joy for the good of others. 
 It is sympathy with " those who do rejoice." It includes love 
 to the other, and pleasure in his prosperity, and desire that it 
 may continue. It is, in many particulars, opposed to Envy ; 
 the former being joy, and the latter sorrow, caused by the 
 same thing — the good of another. Gratulation is expressed 
 })y words, deeds, and manners in congratulations. 
 
 51. Good bestowed on ourselves by another, 
 ^^^®' and not deserved by us through any claim of 
 
 justice, is the object of the emotion of Gratitude. Gratitude, 
 as a principle, has been considered before. It is now spoken 
 of as a practical and instinctive emotion. It includes love to 
 the benefactor, joy in the benefit, and a desire to make return. 
 It is a contrast to Hevenge — the latter including a desire to 
 return evil for evil. Gratitude is higher in proportion, as the 
 benefit is greater, as the necessities relieved are more pressing, 
 and as the intention of the person obliging us appears more 
 disinterested, and more exclusively directed to our own happi- 
 ness. If the benefactor obliged ns for some personal advan- 
 tage, or with no special personal interest in ns, the emotion is 
 less lively. If the good received were due to us by a claim of 
 justice, there is not Gratitude, but Satisfaction. Thus we are 
 not grateful for the payment to us of a debt. We are simply 
 satisfied. 
 
 52. Good bestowed on us, and, to our imagina- 
 tion, wholly deserved, awakens Exultation. It 
 
 includes love to self, approbation of conduct past, hope for the 
 future, and joy, both from the good received, and from a sense 
 of its fitness. An example is the reception of some honor for 
 Trhicli we liave long toiled, and which we think " befitting for 
 lis," in view of actions, sufierings, and abilities. Napoleon, 
 crowned Emperor, after his magnificent public services to 
 France, and with his consciousness of power, might have felt 
 exultation. 
 
 Exultation. 
 
 MOVEMENTS OF PASSIOXS : TREATMENT. 
 
 201 
 
 53. We have thus traced the complex passions. 
 
 W, 1 , 11,. Movements in 
 
 e iiave seen, as we traced them, their inter- Mind have been 
 
 nal and mental movements— first, in the simple, '^°^'^^^^^^- 
 
 and then in the complex. 
 
 54. If we now wish to consider those effects « ^ • 
 
 JzL3veinents m 
 and expressions of them in the hody, wliich are tneBody. 
 
 regarded by the artist, the actor, and the orator, we shall find 
 ourselves led, with Des Cartes, to that ethereal fluid in man, 
 which mediates between mind and body, and between both 
 and the universe, a fluid which he names Animal Spirit. 
 
 All their effects on the countenance, frame and voice, result 
 from their primary action on these animal spirits. It is sulfi- 
 » cient, in this brief view of them, to say that those which have 
 good for their object tend to expand and elevate, and those 
 which have evil for their object tend- to depress and contract. 
 Love, Hope, Joy, Desire, are examples of the former : Hate, 
 Fear, Sorrow, Aversion, of the latter. We can trace an analy- 
 sis of Anger in the lines of the face. 
 
 We have thus defined and divided the Passions. Here, 
 therefore, terminates so much of this subject as regards their 
 nature and action. 
 
 55. After the definition and division of the Transition from 
 Passions follows their treatment. paS^t^lhek 
 
 56. The treatment of the Passions is for our- Treatment. 
 selves or others. pl^f'^^'*^" 
 
 57. Their treatment for ourselves requires, principally, their 
 goveiifiment, 
 
 58. We are to govern them through their (jove nment of 
 causes directly, or through their effects indirectly. ^^^ Passions. 
 The attainment thus produced is that of Self-control. 
 
 59. We govern them directly through their Through their 
 causes, by directing action to the suhject or olject causes. 
 
 60. We act upon the subject ourselves, lefore^ or in the 
 time of their movement. We act lefore by subduing the dis- 
 positions which incline us to them. We act, at the time^ by 
 moderating their violence, through reason and conscience. We 
 
202 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Boles. 
 
 act upon the object by neutralizing its influence upon the feel- 
 ings ; and this, by removing it or ourselves from it ; or by 
 extinguishing our perceptions of it. 
 Several rules thus result. 
 
 {a.) Itules regarding the preceding disposition 
 of tlie subject are these : 
 (1.) Limit your objects ofp^trsuit to those €0711- 
 erai state of mended hy religion and hy the highest morality. 
 This rule is for the universal disposition (ch. iii.). 
 We have seen that the springs of all the Passions are in Love 
 and Aversion. (27.) If these could be destroyed, there 
 could be no Emotion. As these are lessened, susceptibilities 
 to emotions are lessened. Each new attachment brings its own 
 train of new sensibilities, its aversions, desires, hopes, fears, 
 disappointments. Limiting the objects of desire, you reduce 
 your dispositions to be moved. "What Bcethius says of the 
 clear light of truth, may be applied to the clear light of tran- 
 quillit}^ in a steadfast mind : 
 
 Tu quoqiie si vis lumine claro 
 Cernere venim, gaudia pelle, 
 Pelle timorera : niibila mens est, 
 Vinctaque fraenis hiec ubi regnant.* 
 
 (2). Observe and subdue the peculiar tendencies 
 2d : for special ^q particular passions^ resulting from your age^ 
 
 temperament, and social condition. This rule is 
 for the particular disposition. 
 
 3d- for momen- (^0 -^^ not voluntanly permit any bodily con- 
 tary dispositions, dition which predisposes to excitement ; and, when 
 body or mind are thus predisposed^ impose a most watchful 
 restraint. This rule is for momentary dispositions. 
 
 Such are the rules for ourselves, in our habitual dispositions, 
 before the movements of passion. 
 
 (5.) The next rule regards the actual movement, the time of 
 their occurrence. 
 
 ♦ If you wish to see truth in clear light, drive out joys and fears : where these 
 Bway, the mind is clouded, &c. 
 
 RULES FOR GOVERNING PASSIONS. 
 
 203 
 
 (4.) At the tiine when you are agitated by ariy ^^y^. for the time 
 evil passion, instantly apply your reason and o^ Passion. 
 conscience to the formation of those trains of thought which 
 will subdue it. 
 
 The very name, passion, implies, as we have seen, passivity. 
 We are acted on in anger, grief, terror, and the like. All men 
 know by experience this fact, and that passions are not voli- 
 tions. With the cold remains of our dearest friend lying 
 before us, we could not, at will, bid sorrow depart. Seeing 
 our ship, now recovering, and now driving towards a lee 
 sliore, we could not avoid the vivid alternations of hope and 
 fear. In " Eobinson Crusoe" is a lively description, probably 
 drawn from some true narrative, of the emotion manifested by 
 those who had been rescued from a burning vessel. The transi- 
 tion from fear and despair to joy can be imagined. Men can- 
 not, by mere will, prevent such emotions. From this fact is 
 drawn an erroneous moral conclusion : that we have no power 
 over them, are not morally accountable for their effects. But, 
 as passions can be aroused by thoughts and images, so they cau 
 be subdued by counteracting thoughts and images, which we 
 voluntarily produce. We cannot feel gratitude by merely 
 willing, but we can reflect on the kindness of the benefactor, 
 his personal consideration, the value of the benefit, till grati- 
 tude arises. We can thus subdue or form an emotion, by the 
 direction of our thoughts. To this work we can apply the will. 
 A man in terror may reflect, and make his fear at least mod- 
 erate and reasonable. We have control, then, over the thoughts 
 which will moderate the passions, and are to this extent ac- 
 countable. Hence the rule. 
 These are rules for the subject. 
 
 (c) The next rule is for neutralizing the influence of the object. 
 (5.) Banish from your presence or perception g^j^. ^j. ^j^^ q^,. 
 the external object, whose influence you do not J®*^*. 
 wish to feel. 
 
 The external objects causing the Passions are the things and 
 persons surrounding us. These act too strongly on our feelings. 
 
204 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 KEVEKSE government: FKOM EFFECTS. 
 
 205 
 
 IP 
 
 m 
 
 f! 
 
 •K 
 
 
 If these be removed, tlie mind may be unaffected. Tims tlie 
 proverbial remedy for love to a person is absence. Those who 
 are removed from the occasions* for revenge, indignation, 
 cupidity, envy, anger, and the like are freed from the violent 
 and wrong emotions which they would otherwise experience. 
 Where we cannot remove the object from us, or ourselves from 
 it, we are then to prevent perceptions of it through the senses 
 or the mind. We have seen that passions are caused by lively 
 perceptions. To obstruct the latter is to touch the cause. Of 
 all the organs of sense, the eye is to be particularly guarded. 
 Thus a man climbing a precipice should not look to the depth 
 below him if he would avoid fear. He who is in his first 
 eno'ao'ement should not look to the dead and wounded. He 
 who would check the beginnings of loves and desires must turn 
 away his eyes. The same rule extends to the perceptions of the 
 mind. We are to divert the attention from that whose influ- 
 ence we do not wish to feel. By cutting off or lessening the 
 bodily and mental perceptions we touch the cause, since Pas- 
 sions according to the definition are "Emotions caused by 
 vivid lively perceptions." 
 These rules thus far have related to the cause. 
 {d,) That which follows belongs to the effect. 
 6th • for the (^0 -^^^^'^^ ^^ ^^ ^^^ ^f your power the effects 
 
 Effects. and expressions of the passion excited which you 
 
 wish to subdue. 
 
 As we may govern the passions directly 
 
 ^ou^their through their cause, so we may reversely through 
 Effects. ^i^gjr effects. These effects ire, as before shown, 
 
 in the body, the mind, the voluntary actions. The effects in 
 the body are on the muscles of countenance and frame, on the 
 blood, on the vital spirits, and through the latter on the eye 
 and the tones of the voice. All these bodily effects make up 
 the expressions of the passions, the signs by which men detect 
 or depict them. The effects on the mind have been considered 
 under a previous rule. The effects on the voluntary actions 
 ♦ In Shakspeare's ♦'Poems" the effect from "occasion" is finely stated. 
 
 are in words and deeds. Over many of these effects we have 
 direct control, through the exercise of a strong will. Skilful 
 diplomatists negotiating a treaty of peace never betray the 
 emotions which they feel. Kapoleon, Metternich, and Tallev- 
 rand were striking examples in modern times. ]N'apoleon, 
 wlien he desired, could be wholly impenetrable. Agitated he 
 could at will assume the stony gaze of a statue. The same 
 power over the expression is shown by professed gamblers, and 
 by men who are known as " keen at driving bargains." Such 
 examples prove that when men will, they can govern the 
 bodily effects of the passions. It is also evident that we can 
 eontiX)l our words and deeds. If we will, we can be silent, and 
 abstain from all personal movement. There is even a partial 
 power over the imagination. A man can create an image 
 adverse to that which the passion he feels is calling up. To 
 the lively pictures of enjoyment in guilty pleasures, he can 
 oppose another vision of himself disgraced, ruined, agonized. 
 We have then power over the effects. Now in the Passions, 
 causes and effects act reciprocally, as already stated, on each 
 other. By subduing the effect we may partially subdue the 
 cause. It is a law of nature that by the effects and expressions 
 of a passion we can act in ourselves on the passion itself. If 
 it be excited, and we prevent all expression of it we obtain 
 control over it. If it be excited, and we suffer its violent ex- 
 pression we increase it. An angry man rises higher and 
 higher in his rage as he storms on in words and deeds. One 
 in fear may "talk himself," as the saying is, into an agony of 
 terror. This law of nature extends so far that by assuming 
 the expression of any passion we create a tendency to feel it.* 
 We may then govern the passions through their effect, and 
 hence the rule given is practicable and useful. 
 
 Des Cartes, in his remarkable Treatise on the Passions, has 
 applied this rule especially to the effects on the animal spirits. 
 If a passion throw the spirits downward, and hence drive the 
 blood from the face and heart, then by voluntary effort impel 
 
 * Burke. 
 
V ' 
 
 206 
 
 PRACTICAL ETUICS. 
 
 blood into the face, and life into the eye. Put on the expres- 
 sion of the passion opposed to that which is getting an unwel- 
 come mastery. Tliat great philosopher has shown in a 
 delicate analysis the aid thus given to a man over himself. 
 (e.) The remaining rule ascends to the cause of causes, to 
 
 God Himself. 
 
 7tii : for aid from (7.) Unite religion^ morals^ and ^personal will 
 
 the Power of pow- .. ^ j 7^ v 7 
 
 era, for constant mj-coniroL 
 
 Christianity presents religious truth, and divine influence 
 and prayer, as aids by which man may overcome the passions 
 which are sinful. The elements are light, power, prayer. 
 Eevelation implies and presupposes those moral principles 
 which proceed from nature and reason. Keligion and morals 
 are ineffectual without the individual's co-operation. The 
 individual must work within him and above him, within by 
 subjugating himself, above by communion with the Deity. 
 The founder of Christianity says for the one " Watch," and 
 for the other 'Tray." Primarily, therefore, there must be 
 religion, subordinately morals, perpetually a good-will. 
 
 Such are considerations for the treatment of passions in owr- 
 
 selve^. 
 
 Treatment of 61. The treatment of passions in others requires 
 
 Passions ^noth- ]^nowledge of the actual passions of men, and the 
 
 edge. 2. Uses, uses of that knowledge. 
 
 Knowledge of ^2. For knowledge of the passions of men, we 
 
 Dispositions. must understand the universal, particular, and 
 
 momentary dispositions of the beings around us. This is to 
 
 be attained by Observation. To Observation must be added 
 
 Keflection. These means for knowledge are in the possession 
 
 of every one. 
 
 (1.) Observe the movements of the Passions in 
 yourself. Their general action is similar in 
 others. 
 
 (2.) Observe what objects others pursue and dislike. You 
 have thus a key to character. 
 
 We have seen that all the Passions begin in Love and Hate. 
 
 Four Sules. 
 
 HOW TO STUDY THE PASSIONS IN OTHERS. 
 
 207 
 
 All the emotions of any person come from his primary attach- 
 ments and aversions. This is found to be as universal in expe- 
 rience as it is consistent in theory. One is avaricious. He 
 has then the train of passions which accompany the love of 
 money. He can be influenced through money. One is luxu- 
 rious. He has those which attend the love of pleasure. Uni- 
 versally, the prominent peculiarities of the individual are known 
 trom his objects of pursuit. The rule given is founded on this 
 fact. 
 
 (3.) Observe the particular dispositions belonging to various 
 ages, temperaments, and conditions. A full analysis will not 
 be attempted. Some examples may show the reader how to 
 observe. 
 
 The young are disposed in the Passions not personal, to 
 admiration and to pleasantry. They are inclined in the per- 
 sonal simple Passions to love and desire, especially in the 
 pleasures of the senses ; to hope, because they see a larger 
 future than past; to confidence, from their limited experience; 
 to intensity, in grief and enjoyments. In the special Passions 
 they have little cupidity, being inclined to generosity, and 
 more easily moved by honor than self-interest. They are sen- 
 sible to approbation, and to shame. They delight in supe- 
 riority, and are thus emulous, and in a degree jealous of rivals. 
 They are often cruel, but from a want of reflection which 
 makes them unconscious of the pain inflicted. They are brave, 
 even to delight in danger. Coming to the complex Passions, 
 they are especially liable to anger, being keenly alive to the 
 shadow of an intentional insult. They are more inclined to 
 this than to revenge. Their moral sentiments being unper- 
 verted by contact with human wickedness, they believe men 
 worthier than they are, and hence are credulous, and thus 
 inclined to indignation and pity. They are liable to envy, but, 
 from generosity of feeling, easily convert it to emulation. 
 Tlieir remorse is keen when conscious of faults committed. 
 They are sympathetic and grateful. 
 Let the reader now reflect, in like manner, on the old and 
 
208 
 
 PKACTICA.L ETHICS. 
 
 the mature ; and on the peculiar dispositions of the different 
 
 sexes. 
 
 Certain temperaments have proclivities to particular passions. 
 The choleric are inclined to anger ; the sanguine to hope, admi- 
 ration, and sensuous love ; the phlegmatic to settled aversions, 
 envies, and slow revenge ; the melancholic to sadness, fear, and, 
 when fanatical, to cruelty. Let the reader classify human 
 beings by their temperaments and conceive in detail their ten- 
 dencies. 
 
 So, in conditions, he should reflect on the natural sentiments 
 of one newly rich, of one suddenly poor ; of a man in great 
 place or in great reputation ; of one ever successful or ever 
 unfortunate ; of one in unclouded prosperity or in the deep 
 Borrows of affliction. 
 
 (tt.) Observe the signs of emotions in frame, face, eye, tone 
 of voice, movement, and in men who uniformly conceal their 
 feelings, the ^notions which are evidently assumed. 
 
 Thus the present and momentary feeling may be penetrated. 
 By such observations and reflections we promote a knowledge 
 of the Passions and prepare for their uses. 
 
 63. The uses of this knowledge are social and 
 general, rhetorical, public. 
 
 (1.) The social and general use of this knowledge 
 is in the formation of social and universal tact. 
 Tact signifies, by its derivation, delicacy of touch (tango, 
 tactum, to touch). It is a nice discernment applied to the feel- 
 ings of others. Knowing their feelings, we can avoid giving 
 them pain or disgust. Thus, there will be Courtesy and Eefine- 
 ment. We also adapt words and manners to them in the 
 observance of Decorum. 
 
 Tact is necessary for social and domestic duties. It can be 
 acquired and increased by one's own care. Not restrained by 
 principle, it may degenerate into insincerity and cunning. 
 
 (2.) The rhetorical uses consist in arousing or 
 Ehetorical. allaying the Passions. We must know, 1st, how 
 
 persons become disposed to certain passions ; 2d, what things 
 
 Uses. 
 
 Social. 
 
 HOW TO USE THIS KNOWLEDGE! TKANSITION. 209 
 
 awaken those passions ; 3d, what kinds of persons are specially 
 susceptible, and in connection with what kinds of things.* At 
 the time of moving others we must feel them ourselves.t 
 The particulars belong to Ehetoric. 
 
 (3.) The public uses are military and non-mili- 
 tary. Public. 
 
 («.) In the military profession the first require- 
 ment for governing the passions of other men is ^^^**^- 
 to govern our own. 
 
 The second is to prevent them by justice, wisdom, and kind- 
 ness, in administration. 
 
 The third is to preserve ever the highest discipline and the 
 best moral condition in the force commanded. 
 
 The fourth is to apply force and punishment promptly to the 
 passions which must be repressed. 
 
 (^.) The non-military uses are in the origina- 
 ting and executing of public laws and measures, ^^'^■""^ta'y- 
 ^ We have thus seen in the Passions their defini- 
 tion, divisions, and treatment. Transition. 
 From them we now pass to the leading and destructive vices. 
 
 ♦ Aristotle, Rhetoric, b. 2. 
 
 t Si vis me flere, dolendum est tibl— JSor. 
 
9 
 
I' 
 
 
 PART III. 
 
 THE DEADLY YigES. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE VICES: CORPOREAL; SEMI-MEXTAL; MENTAL. 
 
 1. In this Third Part we consider the leading 
 
 AND DESTRUCTIVE YicEs. In the First, we be^an ^^^J®*^*- 
 with the Yirtues, and traced them in their glorious develop- 
 ments. Now, reversely, we look at the great Yices, and trace 
 the streams from those poisoned f( u i tains. In the First, we 
 learned what we should cherish most. In this subject, we see 
 what we should shun most. 
 
 2. Bj the "leading and destructive Yices," 
 
 those are meant which have been found by ex- Dw^ctive* 
 perience most pernicious among mankind. ^^^^' 
 
 3. Of these, three may be considered as cor- 
 poreal— Lust, Drunkenness, Eage ; two as semi- ^^^"®^s- 
 mental— Avarice and Envy ; two as mental— Self-Exaltation 
 and Negligence. In the first group, are lusts of the flesh ; in 
 the second, lusts of the eye ; in the third, the pride of life. 
 Six are positive and active. The seventh is negative. The 
 seven present the great moral and religious dangers for men. 
 
 Lust. 
 
 4. Lust is bodily desire unrestrained by reason 
 and by the laws of Nature, Society, and the 
 Deitv. 
 
 I 
 
 Lost: 
 
 
214 
 
 Its Species; 
 
 Its Effects. 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHIC8. 
 
 Some of its special sins are Whoredom, Adul- 
 tery, Seduction, Incest, and oflfences against 
 
 nature. 
 Abandonment to this vice produces in the 
 
 mind, the loss of mental and moral energy, in- 
 considerateness, rashness, inconstancy of purpose, irreligion, 
 seliishness, dejection, despair. It causes in the body, weakness 
 and disease ; in the reputation, disgrace ; in the fortune, waste 
 
 Drunkenness. 
 
 5. Drunkenness is a temporary privation of 
 Drunkeimasi : reason, a short madness produced by the immod- 
 erate use of some intoxicating substance. 
 
 Its eiFects are the excitement of every evil 
 Effects. passion in one's nature. It stimulates to every 
 
 sin. In the thoughts, it suggests all kinds of wickedness. In 
 the words, it induces the betrayal of secrets, and the exhibi- 
 tions of folly, obscenities, curses, scurrilities. When habitual, 
 it brings ruin, temporal, and eternal; the loss of peace, of 
 reputation, of friendships, of fortune, of health, of heaven. 
 A kindred vice is Gluttony, 
 
 Bage. 
 
 6. Kage is immoderate anger, a desire for im- 
 ***^®* mediate vengeance. 
 
 Its effects are witnessed in domestic and social 
 Effects. ij^^^ .^ ^i^g words and deeds of violence which 
 
 are followed by so much shame, and often by incurable dis- 
 asters. It produces a momentary insanity, a deadness to the 
 dictates of reason and propriety. It causes quarrels, strife, 
 clamor, blasphemy, insults, and in every beholder, contempt 
 for the person who has so little control of himself. 
 
 Drunkenness and immoderate anger are sources of the greater 
 miseries in domestic life. 
 
 ANGER, revenge, AVARICE. 215 
 
 Anger, as a momentary passion, occurring 
 Trithout the assent of the will, and brought if Anger, 
 instantly under the application of reason and ^^*^^«^°^- 
 conscience, has been before considered under the Passions. 
 The subject now regarded is dis.tinct. It is the voluntary, 
 habitual sin. The person oflfending uses neither previous pre- 
 cautions, nor immediate control, but abandons himself to im- 
 moderate anger and fits of rage. He justifies them or is morally 
 indifferent about their occurrence. The distinction between 
 the passion and the sin is, that the former exists without of 
 against will, the latter with the consent of the will. 
 
 7. A congenial sin is Eevenge. It is a con- 
 tinued desire for prospective vengeance. It ^' ^^®^ff®- 
 differs from the former transgression in the circumstance of 
 time. Both seek the same object, but Eage in the present, 
 Eevenge in the future. In Eevenge, the will is constantly 
 giving consent during the pursuit of vengeance. It is accord- 
 ingly a voluntary act, a sin. The natural impulse for retalia- 
 tion arising in the mind but ever repressed through principle, 
 presents an example of Eevenge as a passion arising in a 
 virtuous mind. 
 
 The effects of Eevenge darken the history of Effects of 
 individuals, of families, of communities, and of Bevenge. 
 nations, from the first murder by Cain to the present hour. 
 It, singly, can break up society, since retaliations form, from 
 their nature, an endless series. It, singly, can prevent tribes 
 from coalescing into nations, as we see in the Indians of North 
 America. 
 
 Avarice. 
 
 8. Avarice is immoderate desire for money ; 
 habitual love of it, for the pleasure of possessing. -^^»^"«- 
 
 Its effects are such that Inspiration has said of 
 it, the love of money is the root of all evil. It 
 produces, (a.) the Violation of Engagements ; (5.) Fraud ; (c.) 
 
 Effects. 
 
216 
 
 PEACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 enyy: its effects. 
 
 217 
 
 Deception ; ((^.) Perjury; {e.) Disquietude; (/.) Extortion; (^.) 
 Hardness of Heart. These may come from other causes. But 
 Avarice will directly produce them. 
 
 (a.) The Violation of Engagements is the betrayal of trust 
 reposed. Treason, in its old and general sense, is the proper 
 title. Such betrayal may apply to persons, to places, to things 
 movable, to secrets. Examples of it to persons are the betrayal 
 by a friend of his associate, by a citizen of his country. He is 
 guilty of it who incites to conspiracy, sedition, and rebellion, 
 in civil, or to mutiny in military relations. He is guilty of it 
 who violates, in solemn transactions, promises to an enemy. 
 Examples of it as referred to places, are yielding up fortifica- 
 tions, camps, cities, positions, provinces to the public enemy. 
 The act of Arnold in the war of the American Kevolution, 
 betraying the key of the defence for gold, is an instance. 
 Examples of it, in things movable, are disclosing the places of 
 deposit for money, jewels, valuables of varied kinds, deeds, 
 charters, titles intrusted to one's care. Examples of it as 
 regards secrets, are the utterance by public men, of the secrets 
 of the State ; by military officers, of military counsels ; by un- 
 worthy clergymen, of disclosures made to them, in their 
 spiritual capacity ; by friends, of the revelations which flowed 
 in the sweetness of intimacy. All these public and private 
 treasons may be committed for money, and usually have been 
 
 from that motive. . 
 
 {h.) Fraud is a cunning devising of means to obtain gain by 
 
 cheating. 
 
 (c.) Deception is the crafty use of false or ambiguous signs 
 in words or things, to obtain profit through a false impression. 
 
 (d.) Perjury is deception through an oath. 
 
 (e.) Disquietude is torturing anxiety for money, from an un- 
 reasonable fear of privation in the future. 
 
 (/.) Extortion is the wrenching of money' from the poor 
 and inferiors, through sufferings, threats, and privations, by 
 those in wealth and authority. 
 
 The chief minister of a prince so enlightened as Justinian, 
 
 filled the imperial coffers with an overflowing revenue, and 
 made a colossal fortune by exactions and cruelties seldom 
 equalled.* Men who have the poor for tenants, give frequent 
 examples of cruel extortions. 
 
 (ff.) Hardness of Heart is an insensibility to suffering and 
 want, with unwillingness to extend relief by gift, and is a 
 result from the tenacious love of money. 
 
 Envy. 
 
 9. Envy, as a passion, may arise, and will be Enw-Distinc- 
 repressed in the mind of a virtuous man. It tion of the Pas- 
 
 , , . T. Ml 1 sion from the Sia* 
 
 may arise because he is a man. it will be re- 
 pressed because he is a man of principle. 
 
 Envy, as a sin, is a constant will to deprive another of the 
 good which he possesses, because his happiness is regarded as 
 our own evil. 
 
 The forms of good which awaken Envy are ^i^jj^t things 
 Ptiches, Power, Authority, Offices, Marks of <»^se Envy. • 
 Honor, Celebrity, Popularity, the Favor of Superiors, the 
 Praise of Equals, the Respect of Inferiors, Outward Splendor, 
 Beauty, Learning, Eloquence, Yirtue, even Sanctity itself, 
 with all those things, whatever they may be, which, in the 
 estimate of men, confer any distinction above others. 
 
 The effects of Envy are Hatred and Malice 
 in the mind. These produce joy in the suffer- 
 ings of others, and spite against them for their prosperity. 
 These sentiments come forth in words, through calumny, in 
 their absence, by evil suggestions and perpetual detraction ; 
 and, in their presence, through taunts, reproaches, and marks 
 of contempt. They come forth in actions, though endeavors 
 to inflict injuries upon them, or to thwart insidiously their 
 designs. 
 
 It can reatiily be seen that where Envy is, as it is with 
 many an habitual sentiment, it will cover life with transgres- 
 sions and miseries. 
 
 ♦ See Gibbon. 
 
 Its Effects. 
 
 i 
 
218 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 INDIVIDUALISM : ITS CONSEQUENCES. 
 
 219 
 
 Self-Szaltation : 
 
 Self-Exaltation. 
 
 (Commonly classified as Pride.) 
 
 10. Self-Exaltation or Self-Conceit is a 
 folly and a vice, arising from an exaggerated 
 sense of personal superiority. It is known in Theology as 
 Pride. The virtues opposed to it are, on the one side, Self- 
 Keverence, and on the other (not in the popular, but in the 
 theological meaning of the term), Humility. 
 
 For a more distinct view of this folly and vice we must dis- 
 tinguish it from the opposed virtues ; and, to do this, must 
 move for a moment in the direction of Theology, and of the 
 theoretical part of Ethics. 
 
 Those habitual dispositions are virtues for men 
 
 Beasons why it i « i i 
 
 is a Folly and a which conform to the facts that surround men. 
 leading Vice. ^ ^^^ -^ ^ point in a scale of organized exist- 
 ence. Above him, in the natural order, are the Deity and 
 the created Universe, invisible and visible, in the ascending 
 degrees of being ; and also men with their varied endowments 
 from nature or condition. Above him, in the social order, is 
 the public Society, of which he is a part, with all its gradu- 
 ated diversities. Whoever looks at this order sees his natural 
 place. Whoever compares himself w^th his obligations per- 
 ceives his great imperfection, and thus sees his moral place. 
 The recognition of that true place is Humility, which, there- 
 fore, is a virtue. But also each man is morally a being of 
 great capacities, made for high destinies, and the subject of 
 wonderful provisions and promises from the Deity. Confor- 
 mity to this fact is Self-Reverence. It, too, is a virtue. A 
 man reveres himself for the honor put on his nature by its 
 Maker. But Self-Exaltation, that is, Pride, ignores the excel- 
 lence above and around the person, contemplates a fantastic 
 excellence within him, and honors him not for what he may 
 become by a Divine power, but for what he is supposed to be. 
 Thus'Pride is justly regarded as a folly and a vice, and named 
 
 by theologians, the queen of sins, and the root of vices.* It 
 is, then, opposed equally to a true Self-Reverence and a true 
 Humility. 
 
 Coming from this momentary but necessary diversion to its 
 effects : they are, Individualism, with its consequences. These 
 consequences are, {a.) Disobedience; (5.) Boasting; {c.) Hy- 
 pocrisy ; (d,) Contention ; {e.) Obstinacy ; (/.) Discord ; 
 ig.) Rage for Novelties. 
 
 Individualism is the inordinate exaltation its primary 
 of the individual in his interests, opinions, and Effect, 
 volitions, against the established order of Nature, Society, and 
 God. 
 
 An example of it in opinions is a man disregarding all the 
 established standards of truth and duty, and saying, with the 
 Grecian sophists, "What I think right is right, and what I think 
 true is true, because the individual man is the sole measure for 
 what is true and right." Another like instance is a child re- 
 fusing to obey the parent, because its sentiments differ from 
 those expressed in the command. An example of it in inter- 
 ests is a man or body of men demanding that the measures of 
 a corporation, the laws of a community, the movements of an 
 army, the policy of a country, shall be directed for his or their 
 sole benefit, and that thus the public good shall be sacrificed 
 for that of individuals. Sparta sacrificing all Greece to Persia 
 in the peace of Antalkidas;f the Grecian cities forgetting 
 Hellenic welfare for Philip's gold ; the factions of Jerusalem 
 fighting among themselves when Titus was before the walls ; 
 the Germanic Confederation opening Germany to Napoleon 
 for individual advancement ; legislators making, annulling, 
 changing, rejecting laws, not in view of the public welfare, 
 but for private purposes — these suggest themselves from among 
 throngs of examples. 
 
 * St. Greg., lib. 31 ; Moral., cap. 17, and lib. 34, cap. 18. 
 f I agree with Grote in the proper spelling and pronunciation for these Grecian 
 names. 
 
220 
 
 PRACTICAL ETHICS. 
 
 (a.) Disobedience is voluntary transgression of 
 viduaiism in the command of some superior authority. It is 
 man ormasaes. ^jj-ected both against laws and persons. Tliis 
 proceeds directly from self-exaltation, and from individualism 
 in opinion and will. 
 
 (J.) BoAs-nNG is expressed exultation, by which one claims 
 falsely what he does not deserve ; or, indecorously and immod- 
 erately, what he does deserve. It may be and is extended from 
 and by the individual to his family, occupation, city, region, 
 country, race, from a consciousness that he is thus praising him- 
 self. In all its applications it is pride. 
 
 ((?.) IIypockisy is a word transferred from the actors of Greek 
 theatres, who wore a mask. It is feigning to be what one is 
 not. Especially it is the assuming of a false appearance of 
 virtue or religion. It is the desire to exalt one's self in the 
 opinion of others, even at the sacrifice of truth. It is then 
 a combination of pride with deception ; of an inner sin with 
 
 an outward. 
 
 {d) Contention is a clamorous and rancorous opposition to 
 truth, accompanied by revilings of persons. It proceeds from 
 the same source as Obstinacy. We defend opinions, not because 
 they are right and true, but because they are our own. It is 
 Bhown in conversation, and on a more open theatre, in con- 
 troversies of all kinds, political, scientific, moral, religious. 
 Uniformly, where arguments fail, abuse supplies their place. 
 It proceeds, like the others, from pride, and is joined with the 
 sin of hate to one's neighbor. Contention, as the term is here 
 used, is mostly an offence in words. 
 
 {e) Obstinacy is unreasonable firmness in opinion Or pur- 
 pose, only because it is one's own : adherence to it, however 
 ■unsound, with persistent rejection of others' counsels, however 
 reasonable. This also proceeds from the inordinate exaltation 
 of self, and is an effect of pride. 
 
 (/.) Discord is kindred with Contention, being its fruit in 
 action. Discord is a disruption of the bonds which unite us to 
 others, through dissension and alienation, caused by some dis- 
 
 
 negligence: its divisions. 
 
 221 
 
 crepancy between us and them. In the political body it is 
 sedition ; in the ecclesiastical, schism ; in the domestic, divorce 
 or separation. Discords proceed from the same cause with the 
 sins immediately preceding. There is an obstinate adherence 
 by one or both parties to that which has been willed. There 
 is a refusal to make the sacrifices which may be clearly 
 demanded by the love of God, of man, and of peace. Dis- 
 cord proceeds from pride, and from the absence of love to God 
 and our neighbor. 
 
 {g.) Rage for Novelties is a desire to create or encourage, 
 for the increase of personal importance, and not for the general 
 good, innovations in what is established by time and consent. 
 A true discoverer or inventor is a public benefactor. He who 
 introduces a real improvement promotes and may design the 
 general welfare. Such men usually are modest. But this vice 
 looks to self alone, disregards the interests of men, and desires 
 innovations — though needless and injurious — to be made, for 
 personal notoriety and influence. 
 
 11. Negligence is habitual disregard of the 
 purposes and duties of life. KegUgence : 
 
 The Latin, or, more correctly, the Greek word, commonly 
 employed by moralists, gives the primary idea. The Latin is 
 acedia. This is from the Greek, aicridia. The latter is from 
 a, not^ and «;r)dor, care. It is carelessness : the refusal to give 
 that care which the purposes and duties of life demand. 
 
 Negligence is manifested in Recklessness, Supineness, Indo- 
 lence, Inactivity. 
 
 In some it appears as Recklessness, a temporary desperation. 
 Those who are saddened, mortified, disappointed, are often 
 tempted to throw themselves away. Wounded pride most fre- 
 quently induces this state of mind. The young and ardent 
 often become thus reckless, and neglect every duty. In others 
 this neglect appears as Supineness ; a disposition to dislike that 
 most which it is most necessary to do. In others it appears ad 
 a state of mind specially caused by licentious indulgence, as 
 Indolence and Inactivity. Neglects of preparation, before the 
 
222 
 
 PKACnCAL ETHICS. 
 
 Effects. 
 
 profession, and of opportunities, after it is entered, are great 
 causes, in temporal pursuits, of want of success. Neglect of 
 religion and its duties is a principal cause of men's failure to 
 receive its benefits. Neglect, then, is one of the leading and 
 dan onerous vices. Though negative in its character, yet, 
 whether as Kecklessness, Snpineness, Indolence, or Inactivity, 
 in temporal and eternal relations, it is the source of neglect of 
 duty ; it is a cause of ruin here and hereafter. 
 
 Its eficcts are the following : 1. Spite against 
 others. The neglectful person blames every one 
 but himself. 2. An abject temper. The neglectful man loses 
 confidence in his own powers, and by expecting failure pro- 
 duces it. 3. Torpor. He is unmoved by commands, warnings, 
 counsels, appeals. 4. The wandering of imagination on illicit 
 pleasures. This attends the reckless, the supine, and the idle. 
 
 12. As we review all these vices, it will be seen 
 Becapituiation. ^^^^ ^Yiqj are what we have named them : leading 
 and destructive. Each one of them may bring on all the sins 
 known among men. Each may cause the greatest disasters. 
 This is true of lust, of drunkenness, of the irascible passions. 
 To what crimes may not men be led by rage and revenge ! 
 Avarice is the root of all evil, as we have learned from Scrip- 
 ture. Envy can poison the whole character and induce crime. 
 Pride produces that long train of effects enumerated. Neglect, 
 the privation of all duty and all right endeavor, brings misery by 
 the rejection of all means for happiness, and invites sins to enter, 
 because the mind is unoccupied. The reader thus sees the 
 rocks of danger which through life he is most carefully to shun. 
 
 We have thus filled up the outline proposed for 
 Conclnfion. Practical Ethics. In the First Part we considered 
 
 Duties and Virtues; in the Second, Passions; in this last part, 
 the Capital Vices. May the virtues be attained, the passions 
 governed, the vices banished. Morals will assist for the par- 
 tial attainment of these purposes. But he who wishes them 
 completely must look beyond the handmaid to the mistress ; 
 from Morals to Theology. 
 
 CJONCLUSION. 
 
 223 
 
 The next subjects in this division of the course, are Ethical 
 Science, and Jurisprudence ; first, in the common elements of 
 both ; secondly, in the principles belonging to each. 
 
 These subjects, belonging to a more advanced stage of 
 instruction, will naturally take a less didactic form than that 
 which has been adopted in the present treatise, and appear in 
 the form of Lectures. 
 
n